LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

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

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

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

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January-July

1905

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

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

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

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

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

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MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

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

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

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

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

VOLUME

19

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THE THREE SOURCES AND THREE COMPONENT PARTS OF MARXISM * BACKWARD EUROPE AND ADVANCED ASIA * HARRY QUELCH * MARXISM AND REFORMISM

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

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

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PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE

The first volume contains four works (*New Economic Developments in Peasant Life*, *On the So-Called Market Question*, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's *Book*) written by V. I. Lenin in 1893-1894, at the outset of his revolutionary activity, during the first years of the struggle to establish a workers' revolutionary party in Russia.

In these works, which are directed against the Narodniks and "legal Marxists," Lenin gives a Marxist analysis of Russia's social and economic system at the close of the nineteenth century, and formulates a number of programme principles and tasks for the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat.

The paper, *On the So-Called Market Question*, is included in the fourth edition of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works*: it did not appear in earlier editions. Lenin wrote the paper in the autumn of 1893. The manuscript was believed to be lost beyond recall and was discovered only in 1937, when it was published for the first time.

Lenin's work *What the "Friends of the People" Are* is published in the present edition according to a new copy of the hectographed edition of 1894 which came into the possession of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism only in 1936, and was not taken account of in previous editions of the *Works* of V. I. Lenin. The copy mentioned contains numerous editorial corrections apparently introduced by Lenin when preparing to have the book published abroad. All these corrections have been introduced into the present edition. This edition, therefore, contains the exact text of *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*.



V. I. LENIN
1890-1891

NEW ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN PEASANT LIFE

(ON V. Y. POSTNIKOV'S *Peasant Farming in South Russia*)[1]

Written in the spring of 1893
First published in 1923

Published according to the manuscript

I

V. Y. Postnikov's *Peasant Farming in South Russia* (Moscow, 1891, pp. XXXII+391), which appeared two years ago, is an extremely detailed and thorough description of peasant farming in the Taurida, Kherson and Yekaterinoslav gubernias,* but chiefly in the mainland (northern) uyezds of Taurida Gubernia. This description is based firstly—and primarily—on the Zemstvo[2] statistical investigations of the three gubernias mentioned; and, secondly, on the author's personal observations made partly in his official capacity,** and partly for the special purpose of studying peasant farming in 1887-1890.

An attempt to combine into one whole the Zemstvo statistical investigations for an entire region and to set forth the results in systematic form is in itself of tremendous interest, since the Zemstvo statistics provide a mass of detailed material on the economic conditions of the peasantry, but they do so in a form that renders these investigations practically useless to the public: the Zemstvo statistical abstracts comprise whole volumes of tables (a sep-

---

* *Administrative divisions*: the biggest territorial division in tsarist Russia was the *gubernia* (literally—governor's province); each gubernia had its capital city which was the seat of the governor. The gubernia was divided in *uyezds* (counties) each with its administrative centre and these, in turn were divided into *volosts* (rural districts) containing a number of villages.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** The author was an official in the Government Land Department of Taurida Gubernia.

arate volume is usually devoted to each uyezd), the mere summarising of which under sufficiently definite and comprehensive headings is a labour in itself. The need to summarise and analyse Zemstvo statistical data has long been felt. It is for this purpose that the publication of the *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations* was recently undertaken. The plan of this publication is as follows: a particular question related to peasant farming is taken, and a special investigation is carried out, bringing together all the data on this question contained in the Zemstvo statistics; data are brought together relating to the black-earth South of Russia and to the non-black-earth North, to the exclusively agricultural gubernias and to the gubernias where there are handicraft industries. The two published volumes of *Results* have been compiled according to this plan; the first is devoted to the "peasant community" (V. V.), the second to "peasant rentings of non-allotment land" (N. Karyshev).[3] It is quite reasonable to doubt the correctness of this method of summarising: firstly, data relating to different economic regions with different economic conditions have to be placed under one heading (the separate characterisation of each region involves tremendous difficulties due to the incompleteness of the Zemstvo investigations and the omission of many uyezds. These difficulties were already evident in the second volume of *Results*; Karyshev's attempt to assign the data contained in the Zemstvo statistics to definite regions was unsuccessful); secondly, it is quite impossible to give a separate description of one aspect of peasant farming without touching on others; the particular question has to be artificially abstracted, and the completeness of the picture is lost. Peasant rentings of non-allotment land are divorced from the renting of allotment land, from general data on the economic classification of the peasants and the size of the crop area; they are regarded only as part of peasant farming, whereas actually they are often a special method of private-landowner farming. That is why a summary of Zemstvo statistical data for a given region where the economic conditions are uniform would, I think, be preferable.

While expressing, in passing, my views on a more correct way of summarising Zemstvo statistical investigations,

views to which I am led by comparing the *Results* with Postnikov's book, I must, however, make the reservation that Postnikov did not, in fact, aim at *summarising* materials: he pushes the figures into the background and concentrates his attention on a full and clear description.

In his description, the author pays almost equal attention to questions of an economic, administrative-legal character (forms of land tenure) and of a technical character (boundaries, farming system, harvests), but with the intention of keeping questions of the first kind in the foreground.

"I must confess," says Mr. Postnikov in the Preface, "that I devote less attention to the technique of peasant farming than I might have done; but I take this course because, in my view, conditions of an economic character play a much more important part in peasant farming than technique. In our press ... the economic aspect is usually ignored.... Very little attention is paid to investigating fundamental economic problems, such as the agrarian and boundary problems are for our peasant farming. It is to the elucidation of these problems, and of the agrarian problem in particular, that this book is chiefly devoted" (Preface, p. IX).

Fully sharing the author's views on the relative importance of economic and technical questions, I intend to devote my article only to that part of Mr. Postnikov's work in which peasant farming is subjected to political-economic investigation.*

In his preface the author defines the main points of the investigation as follows:

"The considerable employment of machines that has recently become evident in peasant farming and the marked increase in the size of farms belonging to the well-to-

* It seems to me that such an exposition is worthwhile, inasmuch as Mr. Postnikov's book, one of the most outstanding in our economic literature of recent years, has passed almost unnoticed. This may partly be explained by the fact hat although the author recognises the great importance of economic problems, he treats them too fragmentarily and encumbers his exposition with details relating to other problems.

do section of the peasantry, constitute a new phase in our agrarian life, the development of which will undoubtedly receive a new stimulus from the severe economic conditions of the present year. The productivity of peasant labour and the working capacity of the family rise considerably with the increase in the size of the farm and the employment of machines, a point hitherto overlooked in defining the area that a peasant family can cultivate....

"The employment of machines in peasant farming causes substantial changes in peasant life: by reducing the demand for labour in agriculture and rendering the existing agricultural over-population still more acute for the peasants, it helps to increase the number of families which, having become superfluous in the villages, are forced to seek outside employment and virtually become landless. At the same time, the introduction of large machines in peasant farming raises the peasant's living standard, even under the prevailing methods and extensive character of agriculture, to a level hitherto undreamt-of. Therein lies the guarantee of the strength of the new economic developments in peasant life. To draw attention to and elucidate these developments among the peasantry of South Russia is the immediate purpose of this book" (Preface, p. X).

Before proceeding to outline what, in the opinion of our author, these new economic developments are, I must make two reservations.

Firstly, it has been said above that Postnikov provides data for Kherson, Yekaterinoslav and Taurida gubernias; data in sufficient detail are given only for the latter gubernia, however, and then not for the whole of it; the author gives no data for the Crimea, where the economic conditions are somewhat different, and confines himself exclusively to the three northern, mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia—Berdyansk, Melitopol and Dnieper uyezds. I shall confine myself to the data for these three uyezds.

Secondly, in addition to Russians, Taurida Gubernia is inhabited by Germans and Bulgarians, whose numbers, however, are small compared with the Russian population: in Dnieper Uyezd, there are 113 households of German colonists out of 19,586 households in the uyezd, i.e., only 0.6%; in Melitopol Uyezd, there are 2,159



Новыя хозяйственныя явленія
въ крестьянской жизни.

По поводу книги В. Е. Постникова — „Крестьянское землевладѣніе":

I

Возвращаясь къ прочтенію этой книги В. Е. Постникова „Крестьянское землевладѣніе" (Москва, 1891 г. Стр. XXXII + 391) предпошлемъ изъ числа существенныхъ недостатковъ и отличительныя черты крестьянскаго хозяйства въ изслѣдованіи Постникова, прежде. Какъ уже сказано, предпосылаемое мы въ начальномъ (отдѣльномъ) разборѣ Постниковой книги. Описаніе хозяйства, въ 1; — и анализъ отдѣльныхъ — въ дальнѣйшемъ изложеніи трехъ различныхъ хозяйствъ; въ 2; на основаніи наблюденій автора, произведенныхъ имъ отчасти въ двухъ случаяхъ, от-

1 Автор сильно настаивает на убѣжденіи крестьянина деревни в Московской губерніи.

First manuscript page of Lenin's *New Economic Developments in Peasant Life*, 1893
Reduced

(1,874+285) German and Bulgarian households out of 34,978, i.e., 6.1%. Lastly, in Berdyansk Uyezd, 7,224 households out of 28,794, i.e., 25%. Taken together, in all the three uyezds, the colonists account for 9,496 households out of 83,358, i.e., about one-ninth. Consequently, the number of colonists is, on the whole, very small, and in the Dnieper Uyezd is quite insignificant. The author describes the colonists' farming in detail, always separating it from that of the Russians. All these descriptions I omit, confining myself exclusively to the farming of the Russian peasants. True, the figures given combine the Russians and the Germans, but, owing to the small number of the latter, their addition cannot change the general picture, so that it is quite permissible, on the basis of these data, to describe Russian peasant farming. The Russian population of Taurida Gubernia, who have settled in this region during the past 30 years, differ from the peasantry of the other Russian gubernias only by their greater affluence. Community land tenure in these areas is, in the words of our author, "typical and stable."* In a word, if the colonists are omitted, peasant farming in Taurida Gubernia does not differ fundamentally from the general type of Russian peasant farming,

II

"At the present time," says Postnikov, "a South-Russian village of any size (and the same can probably be said of most localities in Russia) presents such a variegated picture as regards the economic status of the various groups of its inhabitants, that it is very difficult to speak of the living standard of separate villages as single units, or to depict this standard in average figures. Such average figures indicate certain general conditions that determine the economic life of the peasantry, but they do not give any idea of the great diversity of economic phenomena that actually exists" (p. 106).

A little further on, Postnikov expresses himself still more definitely:

* Individual land tenure prevails in only 5 villages.

"The diversity in economic level," he says, "makes it extremely difficult to settle the question of the general prosperity of the population. People who make a cursory tour through the large villages of Taurida Gubernia usually draw the conclusion that the local peasants are very prosperous. But can a village be called prosperous when half its peasants are rich, while the other half live in permanent poverty? And by what criteria is the relatively greater or lesser prosperity of a particular village to be determined? Obviously, average figures characterising the condition of the population of a whole village or district are here insufficient to draw conclusions as to the prosperity of the peasants. This latter may be judged only from the sum-total of many facts, *by dividing the population into groups*" (p. 154).

One might think that there is nothing new in this statement of the differentiation of the peasantry; it is referred to in practically every work dealing with peasant farming in general. But the point is that, as a rule, when mention is made of the fact, no significance is attached to it, it being regarded as unimportant or even incidental. It is deemed possible to speak of a type of peasant farming, the type being defined by average figures; discussion takes place about the significance of various practical measures in relation to the peasantry as a whole. In Postnikov's book we see a protest against such views. He points (and does so repeatedly) to the "tremendous diversity in the economic status of the various households within the village community" (p. 323), and takes up arms against "the tendency to regard the peasant *mir** as something integral and homogeneous, such as our urban intelligentsia still imagine it to be" (p. 351). "The Zemstvo statistical investigations of the past decade," he says, "have shown that our village community is by no means the homogeneous unit our publicists of the seventies thought it was, and that in the past few decades there has taken place within it a differentiation of the population into groups with quite different levels of economic prosperity" (p. 323).

---

* *Mir*—a peasant community. See Note 4 at the end of the book. —*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Postnikov supports his opinion with a mass of data dispersed throughout the book, and we must proceed to gather all these data systematically in order to test the truth of this opinion and to decide who is right—whether it is the "urban intelligentsia," who regard the peasantry as something homogeneous, or Postnikov, who asserts that there is tremendous heterogeneity—and then how profound is this heterogeneity, does it prevent a general description of peasant farming being given from the political-economic standpoint, on the basis of only average data, and can it alter the action and influence of practical measures in relation to the various categories of the peasantry?

Before citing figures that supply the material to settle these questions, it should be noted that Postnikov took all data of this kind from the Zemstvo statistical abstracts for Taurida Gubernia. Originally, the Zemstvo census statistics were confined to data covering whole village communities, no data being collected on individual peasant households. Soon, however, differences were noted in the property status of these households, and house-to-house censuses were undertaken; this was the first step towards a more thoroughgoing study of the economic status of the peasants. The next step was the introduction of combined tables: prompted by the conviction that the property differences among the peasants within the village community[4] are more profound than the differences between the various juridical categories of peasants, the statisticians began to classify all the indices of peasant economic status according to definite property differences; for example, they grouped the peasants according to the number of dessiatines* under crops, the number of draught animals, the amount of allotment arable per household, and so on.

The Taurida Zemstvo statistics classify the peasants according to the number of dessiatines under crops. Postnikov is of the opinion that this classification "is a happy one" (p. XII), as "under the farming conditions in the Taurida uyezds, the amount of land under crops is the most important criterion of the peasant's living standard" (p. XII). "In the South-Russian steppe territory," says Postnikov, "the

* A dessiatine = 2.7 acres.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

development among the peasants of various kinds of non-agricultural industries is as yet relatively insignificant, and the main occupation of the vast majority of the rural population today is agriculture based on the cultivation of grain." "The Zemstvo statistics show that in the northern uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, 7.6% of the native rural population engage exclusively in industries, while 16.3%, in addition to farming their own land, have some subsidiary occupation" (p. 108). As a matter of fact, classification according to area under crops is far more correct even for other parts of Russia than any other basis of classification adopted by the Zemstvo statisticians, as, for example, number of dessiatines of allotment land or allotment arable per household. For, on the one hand, the amount of allotment land is no direct indication of the household's prosperity, inasmuch as the size of the allotment is determined by the number of registered[5] or of actual males in the family, and is only indirectly dependent on the peasant's prosperity, and because, lastly, the peasant possibly does not use his allotment land and leases it to others, and when he has no implements he cannot use it. On the other hand, if the principal pursuit of the population is agriculture, the determination of the cultivated area is necessary in order to keep account of production, to determine the amount of grain consumed by the peasant, purchased by him, or placed on the market, for unless these points are ascertained, a highly important aspect of peasant economy will remain unexplained, the character of his farming, its significance relative to other earnings, etc., will not be made clear. Lastly, it is precisely the cultivated area that must be made the basis of classification, so that we can compare the economy of the household with the so-called norms of peasant land tenure and farming, with the food norm (Nahrungsfläche) and the labour norm (Arbeitsfläche).* In a word, clas-

* *Food norm* and *labour norm*—as can be seen from the text Lenin uses these expressions as translations of the German political-economic terms "Nahrungsfläche" and "Arbeitsfläche," the former being the amount of land required to feed one person (or any other unit, such as the family) and the latter the amount that can be cultivated by one person (or family).—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

sification according to area under crops not only seems to be a happy one; it is the best and is absolutely essential.

As to area under crops the Taurida statisticians divide the peasants into six groups: 1) those cultivating no land; 2) those cultivating up to 5 dessiatines; 3) from 5 to 10 dessiatines; 4) from 10 to 25 dessiatines; 5) from 25 to 50 dessiatines and 6) over 50 dessiatines per household. For the three uyezds the proportionate relation of these groups according to the number of households is as follows:

Percentages or households	Uyezds			*Average area* (dess.)
	Berdyansk %	Melitopol %	Dnieper %	under crops per household in all three uyezds
Cultivating no land	6	7.5	9	—
" up to 5 dess.	12	11.5	11	3.5
" 5 to 10 "	22	21	20	8
" 10 to 25 "	38	39	41.8	16.4
" 25 to 50 "	19	16.6	15. 1	34.5
" over 50 "	3	4.4	3.1	75

The general proportions (these percentages are given for the whole population, including Germans) undergo little change if we omit the Germans. Thus, the author reckons that of the households in the Taurida uyezds 40% cultivate small areas (up to 10 dessiatines), 40% medium (from 10 to 25 dessiatines) and 20% large areas. If the Germans are excluded, the latter figure is reduced to one-sixth (16.7%, i.e., in all 3.3% less) and correspondingly increases the number of households with a small cultivated area.

To determine the degree to which these groups differ, let us begin with land tenure and land usage.

Postnikov gives the following table (the combined totals of the three categories of land mentioned in it were not calculated by him [p. 145]):

Peasant groups	*AVERAGE ARABLE PER HOUSEHOLD (dessiatines)*											
	Berdyansk Uyezd				Melitopol Uyezd				Dnieper Uyezd			
	Allotment	Purchased	Rented	Total	Allotment	Purchased	Rented	Total	Allotment	Purchased	Rented	Total
Cultivating no land	6.8	3.1	0.09	10	8.7	0.7	–	9.4	6.4	0.9	0.1	7.4
" up to 5 dess.	6.9	0.7	0.4	8	7.1	0.2	0.4	7.7	5.5	0.04	0.6	6.1
" 5 to 10 "	9	–	1.1	10.1	9	0.2	1.4	10.6	8.7	0.05	1.6	10.3
" 10 to 25 "	14.1	0.6	4	18.7	12.8	0.3	4.5	17.6	12.5	0.6	5.8	18.9
" 25 to 50 "	27.6	2.1	9.8	39.5	23.5	1.5	13.4	38.4	16.6	2.3	17.4	36.3
" over 50 "	36.7	31.3	48.4	116.4	36.2	21.3	42.5	100	17.4	30	44	91.4
Per uyezd	14.8	1.6	5	21.4	14.1	1.4	6.7	22.2	11.2	1.7	7.0	19.9

"These figures show," says Postnikov, "that the more affluent group of peasants in the Taurida uyezds not only have large allotments, which may be due to the large size of their families, but are at the same time the largest purchasers and the largest renters of land" (p. 146).

It seems to me that in this connection we need only say that the increase in the amount of allotted land, as we proceed from the bottom group to the top, cannot be explained *entirely* by the larger size of families. Postnikov gives the following table showing the family composition by groups for the three uyezds.

	Average per family					
	Berdyansk Uyezd		Melitopol Uyezd		Dnieper Uyezd	
	persons, both sexes	working members	persons, both sexes	working members	persons, both sexes	working members
Cultivating no land	4.5	0.9	4.1	0.9	4.6	1
" up to 5 dess.	4.9	1.1	4.6	1	4.9	1.1
" 5 to 10 "	5.6	1.2	5.3	1.2	5.4	1.2
" 10 to 25 "	7.1	1.6	6.8	1.5	6.3	1.4
" 25 to 50 "	8.2	1.8	8.6	1.9	8.2	1.9
" over 50 "	10.6	2.3	10.8	2.3	10.1	2.3
Per uyezd	6.6	1.5	6.5	1.5	6.2	1.4

The table shows that the amount of allotment land per household increases from the bottom group to the top much more rapidly than the number of persons of both sexes and the number of working members. Let us illustrate this by taking 100 as the figure for the bottom group in Dnieper Uyezd:

	Allotment land	Working members	Persons of both sexes
Cultivating no land	100	100	100
" up to 5 dess.	86	110	106
" 5 to 10 "	136	120	117
" 10 to 25 "	195	140	137
" 25 to 50 "	259	190	178
" over 50 "	272	230	219

It is clear that what determines the size of the allotment, apart from the composition of the family, is the prosperity of the household.

Examining the data for the amount of purchased land in the various groups, we see that the purchasers of land are almost exclusively the top groups, with over 25 dessiatines under crops, and chiefly the very big cultivators, those with 75 dessiatines under crops per household. Hence, the data for purchased land fully corroborate Postnikov's opinion regarding the differences between the peasant groups. The type of information as that given by the author on p. 147,

for example, where he says that "the peasants of the Taurida uyezds purchased 96,146 dessiatines of land," does not in any way describe the real situation; almost all this land is in the hands of an insignificant minority, those already best provided with allotment land, the "affluent" peasants, as Postnikov calls them; and they constitute no more than one-fifth of the population.

The same must be said of rented land. The above table gives the total figure for rented land, allotment and non-allotment. It appears that the area of rented land grows quite regularly the greater the prosperity of the peasants, and that, consequently, the better supplied the peasant is with land, the more he rents, thus depriving the poorer groups of the land they need.

It should be noted that this phenomenon is common to the whole of Russia. Prof. Karyshev, summarising the facts of peasant non-allotment rentings throughout Russia, wherever Zemstvo statistical investigations are available, formulates the general law that the amount of rented land depends directly on the renter's degree of affluence.*

Postnikov, incidentally, cites even more detailed figures about the distribution of rented land (non-allotment and allotment together), which I give here:

	Berdyansk Uyezd Arable			*Melitopol Uyezd* Arable			*Dnieper Uyezd* Arable		
	% of renting households	per renting household (dess.)	Price per dess. (rubles)	% of renting households	per renting household (dess.)	Price per dess. (rubles)	% of renting households	per renting household (dess.)	Price per dess. (rubles)
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	18.7	2.1	11	14.4	3	5.50	25	2.4	15.25
" 5 to 10 "	33.6	3.2	9.20	34.8	4.1	5.52	42	3.9	12
" 10 to 25 "	57	7	7.65	59.3	7.5	5.74	69	8.5	4.75
" 25 to 50 "	60.6	16.1	6.80	80.5	16.9	6.30	88	20	3.75
" over 50 "	78.5	62	4.20	88.8	47.6	3.93	91	48.6	3.55
Per uyezd	44.8	11.1	5.80	50	12.4	4.86	56.2	12.4	4.23

* *Results of the Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data*; Vol. II, N. Karyshev, *Peasant Renting of Non-Allotment Land*, Dorpat, 1892. Pp. 122, 133 et al.

We see that here, too, average figures do not in any way describe the real situation. When we say, for example, that in Dnieper Uyezd 56% of the peasants rent land, we give a very incomplete picture of this renting, for the percentage of renters in the groups who (as will be shown later) have insufficient land of their own is much lower—only 25% in the first group, whereas the top group, those who have sufficient land of their own, almost all resort to renting (91%). The difference in the number of rented dessiatines per renting household is even more considerable: the top category rents 30, 15 and 24 times more than the bottom one. Obviously, this alters the very character of the renting, for in the top category it is already a commercial undertaking, whereas in the bottom one it may be an operation necessitated by dire need. This latter assumption is corroborated by data on rentals: they show that the bottom groups pay a higher rent for the land, sometimes four times as much as the top category (in Dnieper Uyezd). It should be recalled in this connection that the increase in rent as the amount of rented land grows smaller is not peculiar to South Russia; Karyshev's work shows the general applicability of this law.

"Land in the Taurida uyezds," says Postnikov with regard to these data, "is rented chiefly by the well-to-do peasants, who have enough allotment land and land of their own; this should be said in particular of the renting of non-allotment land, i.e., of privately-owned and government, land, situated at greater distances from the villages. Actually this is quite natural: to be able to rent distant land the peasant must have sufficient draught animals, whereas the less prosperous peasants in these areas have not enough even to cultivate their allotment land" (p. 148).

It should not be thought that this distribution of rented land is due to its being rented by individuals. There is no difference at all where the land is rented by the community, and for the simple reason that the land is distributed on the same principle, that is, "according to where the money lies."

"According to the registers of the Administration of State Property," says Postnikov, "in 1890, out of 133,852 dessiatines of government land leased on contract in the

Peasant groups	Berdyansk Uyzed			Melitopol Uyzed			Dnieper Uyzed			All three uyzeds			
	Number of renting households	Dessiatines rented	Per renting h'hold (dess.)	Number of renting households	Dessiatines rented	Per renting h'hold (dess.)	Number of renting households	Dessiatines rented	Per renting h'hold (dess.)	Number of renting households	Dessiatines rented	%	Per renting h'hold (dess.)
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	39	66	1.7	24	383	16	20	62	3.1	83	511	1	6.1
" 5 to 10 "	227	400	1.8	159	776	4.8	58	251	4.3	444	1,427	3	3.2
" 10 to 25 "	687	2,642	3.8	707	4,569	6.4	338	1,500	4.4	1,732	8,711	20	5.0
" 25 to 50 "	387	3,755	9.7	672	8,564	12.7	186	1,056	5.7	1,245	13,375	30	10.7
" over 50 "	113	3,194	28.3	440	15,365	34.9	79	1,724	21.8	632	20,283	46	32.1
Totals	1,453	10,057	7	2,002	29,657	14.8	681	4,593	6.7	4,136	44,307	100	10.7

three uyezds, 84,756 dessiatines of good land, or about 63% of the total area, were used by peasant communities. But the land rented by the peasant communities was used by a comparatively small number of householders, mostly well-to-do at that. The Zemstvo house-to-house census makes this fact quite clear" (p. 150).*

"Thus," concludes Postnikov, "in Dnieper Uyezd more than half of all the rented arable, in Berdyansk Uyezd over two-thirds, and in Melitopol Uyezd, where mostly government land is rented, even more than four-fifths of the rented land was in the hands of the group of well-to-do peasants. On the other hand, the group of poor peasants (cultivating up to 10 dessiatines of arable), held in all the uyezds a total of 1,938 dessiatines, or about 4% of the rented land" (p. 150). The author then cites many examples of the uneven distribution of community-rented land, but there is no need to quote them here.

As to Postnikov's conclusion about the amount of rented land being dependent upon the degree of prosperity of the renter, it is highly interesting to note the opposite view of the Zemstvo statisticians.

Postnikov placed an article, "On Zemstvo Statistical Work in Taurida, Kherson and Yekaterinoslav Gubernias" (pp. XI-XXXII), at the beginning of his book. Here, among other things, he examines the *Taurida Gubernia Handbook*, published by the Taurida Zemstvo in 1889, in which the entire investigation was briefly summarised. Analysing the section of the book which deals with renting, Postnikov says:

"In our land-abundant southern and eastern gubernias, the Zemstvo statistics have revealed that a fairly substantial proportion of well-to-do peasants, in addition to having considerable allotments of their own, rent fairly large amounts of land on the side. Farming is here conducted not only to satisfy the requirements of the family itself, but also to obtain some surplus, an income with which to improve buildings, acquire machines and buy additional land. This

* The last section of this table (the totals for the three uyezds) is not given by Postnikov. In a note to the table he says that "under the terms of lease the peasants may plough up only one-third of the rented land."

is quite a natural desire, and there is nothing reprehensible about it, for in itself it contains no elements of kulakism." [There are no elements of kulakism here, it is true; but there undoubtedly are elements of exploitation: by renting land far in excess of their requirements, the prosperous peasants deprive the poor of land needed for their subsistence; by enlarging their farms they need extra hands and resort to hiring labour.] "But some of the Zemstvo statisticians, evidently regarding such manifestations in peasant life as something illegitimate, try to belittle their importance and to prove that it is chiefly the need for food that drives the peasant to rent land, and that even if the well-to-do peasants do rent a great deal of land, these renters constitute a percentage that decreases steadily as the size of the allotment increases" (p. XVII)—to prove this point, Mr. Werner, the compiler of the *Handbook*, grouped together, according to the size of their allotments, the peasant families of the *entire* Taurida Gubernia who had 1 or 2 working members and 2 or 3 draught animals. It turned out that "as the size of the allotment increases, there is a regular decrease in the percentage of renting households and a less regular decrease in the amount of land rented per household" (p. XVIII). Postnikov quite rightly says that this method is not conclusive at all, since a *section* of the peasants (only those possessing 2 or 3 draught animals) has been selected arbitrarily, it being precisely the well-to-do peasants who have been omitted, and that, moreover, to lump together the mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia and the Crimea is impermissible, since the conditions of renting in the two areas are not identical: in the Crimea, one half to three-fourths of the population are landless (so-called dessiatiners),[6] whereas in the northern uyezds only 3 or 4% are landless. In the Crimea, it is almost always easy to find land for hire; in the northern uyezds it is sometimes impossible. It is interesting to note that the Zemstvo statisticians of other gubernias have been observed to make similar attempts (of course, equally unsuccessful) to tone down such "illegitimate" manifestations in peasant life as renting land to provide an income. (See Karyshev, op. cit.)

If, accordingly, the distribution of peasant non-allotment renting reveals the existence among the various peasant

farms of differences that are not only quantitative (he rents much, he rents little), but also qualitative (he rents through need of food; he rents for commercial purposes), still more has this to be said of the renting of *allotment* land.

"The total allotment arable rented by peasants from other peasants," says Postnikov, "as registered in the three Taurida uyezds by the 1884-1886 house-to-house census of the peasantry amounted to 256,716 dessiatines, which here constitutes one-fourth of the total peasant allotment arable; and this does not include land let by peasants to all sorts of people who live in the countryside, or to clerks, teachers, priests and other persons who do not belong to the peasantry and are not covered by the house-to-house census. Practically all this land is rented by peasants who belong to the well-to-do groups, as the following figures show. The amount of allotment arable rented by peasants from their neighbours, as recorded by the census, was as follows:

Cultivating up to 10 dess. per household	16,594	dess.,	i.e.,	6%
Cultivating 10 to 25 dess. per household	89,526	"	"	35%
Cultivating more than 25 dess. per household	150,596	"	"	59%
Total	256,716	dess.		100%

"The major part, however, of this leased land, like most of the lessors themselves, belongs to the group of peasants who cultivate no land, do no farming of any sort, or to those who cultivate but little land. Thus, a considerable number of the peasants of the Taurida uyezds (approximately one-third of the total population) do not exploit their whole allotment—some for lack of desire, but mostly for lack of the necessary animals and implements with which to engage in farming—but lease it to others and thereby increase the land in use by the other, better-off section of the peasants. The majority of the lessors undoubtedly belong to the category of impoverished, declining householders" (pp. 136-37).

Corroboration of this is furnished by the following table "for two uyezds of Taurida Gubernia (the Zemstvo statistics provide no information for Melitopol Uyezd), which shows the proportion of householders who lease their allotments to others, and the percentage of allotment arable leased by them" (p. 135):

	Berdyansk Uyezd		Dnieper Uyezd	
	% of h'holders leasing their allotment land	% of leased allotment land	% of h'holders leasing their allotment land	% of leased allotment land
Cultivating no land	73.0	97.0	80.0	97.1
" up to 5 dess.	65.0	54	30	38.4
" 5 to 10 "	46.0	23.6	23	17.2
" 10 to 25 "	21.5	8.3	16	8.1
" 25 to 50 "	9	2.7	7	2.9
" over 50 "	12.7	6.3	7	13.8
For uyezd . .	32.7	11.2	25.7	14.9

Let us now pass from peasant land tenure and land usage to the distribution of farm stock and implements. Postnikov gives the following data—for all three uyezds together—on the number of draught animals possessed by the groups:

	Total		Average per household			
	Horses	Oxen	Draught animals	Other Animals*	In all*	% of h'holds possessing no dr. animals
Cultivating no land	—	—	0.3	0.8	1.1	80.5
" up to 5 dess.	6,467	3,082	1.0	1.4	2.4	48.3
" 5 to 10 "	25,152	8,924	1.9	2.3	4.2	12.5
" 10 to 25 "	80,517	24,943	3.2	4.1	7.3	1.4
" 25 to 50 "	62,823	19,030	5.8	8.1	13.9	0.1
" over 50 "	21,003	11,648	10.5	19.5	30	0.03
Total . . .	195,962	67,627	3.1	4.5	7.6	—

* In terms of cattle

These figures, by themselves, do not characterise the categories—that will be done below, when we describe the technique of agriculture and classify the peasants according to economic category. Here we shall only mention that the difference between peasant groups with regard to the number of draught animals they own is so profound that we see far more animals in the top groups than can possibly be required for the needs of the family, while the bottom groups have so few (especially draught animals) that independent farming becomes impossible.

Similar in every respect are data on the distribution of farm implements. The house-to-house census, that registered the peasant-owned iron ploughs and drill ploughs, gives the following figures for the entire population of the uyezds" (p. 214):

	Percentage of households		
	with no ploughing implements	with only a drill plough	with an iron plough, etc.
Berdyansk Uyezd	33	10	57
Melitopol "	37.8	28.2	34
Dnieper "	39.3	7	53.7

This table shows how very large a group of peasants is unable to carry on *independent* farming. The situation among the top groups can be seen from the following data on the number of implements per household in the various groups, classified according to area under crops:

	Implements per household					
	Berdyansk Uyezd		Melitopol Uyezd		Dnieper Uyezd	
	Carting wagons, etc.)	(irons ploughs and drill ploughs)	Carting	Ploughing	Carting	Ploughing
Cultivating 5 to 10 dess.	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.5
" 10 to 25 "	1.2	1.3	1.2	1	1	1
" 25 to 50 "	2.1	2	2	1.6	1.7	1.5
" over 50 "	3.4	3.3	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.4

As regards the number of implements, the top group has 4 to 6 times more than the bottom one (the group with less than 5 dessiatines under crops is entirely disregarded by the author); as regards the number of working members in the

families,* however, it has $\frac{23}{12}$ times, i.e., less than twice, as many as the same group. This alone shows that the top group has to resort to the hire of labour, while in the bottom group half the households are without farm implements (N.B.—this "bottom" group is the third from below) and, consequently, are unable to carry on independent farming.

Naturally, the above-mentioned differences in the amount of land and implements held are the cause of differences in the amount of land under crops. The area under crops per household in the six groups has been given above. The total area cultivated by the peasants of Taurida Gubernia is distributed by groups as follows:

	Dessiatines under crops	%	
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	34,070	2.4	12% of crop area held by 40% of population
" 5 to 10 "	140,426	9.7	
" 10 to 25 "	540,093	37.6	38% of crop area held by 40% of population
" 25 to 50 "	230,583	34.3	50% of crop area held by 20% of population
" over 50 "	230,583	16	
Total	1,439,267	100%	

These figures speak for themselves. It should only be added that for a family to live by farming alone, Postnikov estimates (p. 272), a crop area of 16 to 18 dessialines per household is required.

III

In the previous chapter, data showing the property status of the different groups of peasants and the size of their farms were summarised. We must now sum up data indicating the character of the farming of the various groups or peasants and their methods and systems of farming.

* See above, the table showing the family composition of the various groups.

Let us first dwell on Postnikov's proposition that "the productivity of peasant labour and the working capacity of the family rise considerably with the increase in the size of the farm and the employment of machines" (p. X). The author demonstrates this proposition by calculating the number of workers and draught animals per *given* area under crops in the different economic groups. In so doing, however, it is impossible to use the data of family composition, as "the bottom economic groups release part of their working members for outside employment as farm labourers, while the top groups take labourers into employment" (p. 114). The Taurida Zemstvo statistics do not give the number of labourers hired or released for hire, and Postnikov estimates it approximately by taking the Zemstvo statistical data for the number of households which hired people and by calculating how many working people were needed for the given cultivated area. Postnikov admits that he can lay no claim to perfect accuracy for these estimates, but he believes that it is only in the two top groups that his calculations may considerably change the family composition, as the number of hired labourers in the other groups is small. By comparing the data on family composition given above with the following table the reader can test the correctness of this view:

	In the three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia				
	Working persons			Average per household	
	Hired	Released for hire	Difference	Number in family (with hired labourers)	Working persons* (with hired labourers)
Cultivating no land	239	1,077	— 838	4.3	0.9
" up to 5 dess.	247	1,484	—1,237	4.8	1.0
" 5 to 10 "	465	4,292	—3.827	5.2	1.0
" 10 to 25 "	2,846	3,389	— 543	6.8	1.6
" 25 to 50 "	6,041	—	+6,041	8.9	2.4
" over 50 "	8,241	—	+8,241	13.3	5.0
Total	18,079	10,242	+7,837	—	—

* *Working persons*—this somewhat un-English term is used for "working members, men and women of a peasant family or household" as opposed to hired labourers.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Comparing the last column with the data of family composition, we see that Postnikov has somewhat understated the number of workers in the bottom and overstated it in the top groups. As his purpose was to prove that the number of workers per given area under crops decreases as the size of the farm increases, his approximate estimates succeeded in minimising rather than exaggerating this decrease.

Having made this preliminary calculation, Postnikov gives the following table showing the relation between the crop area and the number of working persons, draught animals, and then population generally for different groups of peasants (p. 117):

		Per 100 dess. of crop area				
		Area under crops per pair of draught animals	Households	Persons (with hired labourers)	Workers (with hired labourers)	Number of draught animals
Cultivating	up to 5 dess.	7.1 dess.	28.7	136	28.5	28.2
”	5 to 10 ”	8.2 ”	12.9	67	12.6	25
”	10 to 25 ”	10.2 ”	6.1	41.2	9.3	20
”	25 to 50 ”	12.5 ”	2.9	25.5	7	16.6
”	over 50 ”	14.5 ”	1.3	18	6.8	14
	Average	10. 9 dess.	5.4	36.6	9	18.3

“Thus, with the increase in the size of the farm and in the area cultivated by the peasant, the expenditure on the maintenance of labour-power, human and animal, that prime item of expenditure in agriculture, progressively decreases, and among the groups that cultivate large areas, drops to nearly one-half per dessiatine under crops of what it is among the groups with small cultivated areas” (p. 117).

The proposition that the maintenance of working persons and draught animals is the predominant item of expenditure in agriculture is confirmed by the author later when he cites the detailed budget of a Mennonite[7] farm: of the total expenditure, 24.3% is general expenditure on the farm; 23.6% is expenditure on draught animals and 52.1% on working persons (p. 284).

Postnikov attributes great importance to his conclusion that the productivity of labour increases with the increase

in the size of the farm (as is shown from the above quotation, taken from his preface); and, indeed, one cannot but admit its importance—firstly, for a study of the economic life of our peasantry and the character of the farming of the various groups; and, secondly, in connection with the general question of the relation between small-scale and large-scale farming. This latter question has been greatly confused by many writers, the chief cause of the confusion being that comparison was made between dissimilar farms, existing in different social conditions and differing in the type of farming; for example, farms whose income was derived from the output of agricultural produce were compared with farms whose income was derived from exploiting other households' need of land (e.g., peasant and landlord farms in the period immediately following the Reform of 1861).[8] Postnikov is entirely free of this error and does not forget the first rule of all comparisons, namely, that the things compared must be of a similar order.

The author gives a more detailed proof of his proposition in respect of the Taurida uyezds, and cites data, firstly, for each uyezd separately and, secondly, for the Russian population separately, or, rather, for its most numerous group, the former state peasants (pp. 273-74).

	Dessiatines under crops per pair of draught animals					
	For the uyezds in general			In the group of former state peasants		
	Berdyansk	Melitopol	Dnieper	Berdyansk	Melitopol	Dnieper
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	8.9	8.7	4.3	—	—	—
" 5 to 10 "	8.9	8.7	6.8	8.9	9.1	6.8
" 10 to 25 "	10.2	10.6	9.7	10.3	10.9	9.6
" 25 to 50 "	11.6	12.4	12.3	12.3	12.8	11.9
" over 50 "	13.5	13.8	15.7	13.7	14.3	15
Average	10.7	11.3	10.1	—	—	—

The conclusion reached is the same, that "on the small-scale farm the relative number of draught animals per given crop area is one and a half times or double the number on the 'full' peasant farm. The same law is revealed by the

house-to-house census in the case of all the other, smaller, groups—former landlords' peasants, tenant farmers, etc.—and in all localities, even in the smallest, confined to one volost or even one village" (p. 274).

The relation between size of crop area and farm expenditure is also found to be unfavourable for the small farms in respect of another type of expenditure—the maintenance of implements and productive animals.

We have already seen how rapidly both these items increase per farm as we proceed from the bottom group to the top one. If we calculate the quantity of implements per given crop area, we find that it *decreases* from the bottom to the top group (p. 318):

	Per 100 dessiatines of crop area		
	Productive animals	Iron ploughs a drill ploughs	Waggons
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	42 head	4.7	10
" 5 to 10 "	28.8 "	5.9	9
" 10 to 25 "	24.9 "	6.5	7
" 25 to 50 "	23.7 "	4.8	5.7
" over 50 "	25.8 "	3.8	4.3
For the three uyezds	25.5 head	5.4	6.5

"This table shows that as the crop area per household increases, the biggest implements (for cultivation and cartage) progressively decrease in number per given crop area, and, consequently, on the farms of the top groups the cost of maintaining cultivation and cartage implements should be relatively less per dessiatine. The group with up to 10 dessiatines per household under crops constitutes an exception: there are comparatively fewer farm implements than in the next group, with its 16 dessiatines per household under crops, but that is only because many of the peasants do not work with their own implements, but with hired ones, which does not, however, in any way reduce the expenditure on implements" (p. 318).

"Zemstvo statistics," says Postnikov, "prove incontrovertibly that the larger the size of a peasant farm, the smaller the number of implements, workers and draught animals employed on a given cultivated area" (p. 162).

"In previous chapters," says Postnikov further on, "it has been shown that in the Taurida uyezds this phenomenon occurs in all the groups of peasants and in all localities. It can be seen in peasant farming, as the Zemstvo statistics show, in other gubernias as well, where agriculture is also the main branch of peasant economy. This phenomenon, therefore, is widespread and assumes the form of a law, economically of great importance, for it robs small crop farming, to a considerable degree, of all economic sense" (p. 313).

This last remark of Postnikov's is somewhat premature: to prove the inevitability of small farms being ousted by large ones, it is not enough to demonstrate the greater advantage of the latter (the lower price of the product); the predominance of money (more precisely, commodity) economy over natural economy must also be established; under natural economy, when the product is consumed by the producer himself and is not sent to the market, the cheap product does not encounter the more costly product on the market, and is therefore unable to oust it. But of that more anon.

To prove that the above-established law is applicable to all Russia, Postnikov takes those uyezds for which the Zemstvo statistics contain a detailed economic classification of the population, and calculates the cultivated area per pair of draught animals and per working person in the various groups. The conclusion is the same: "where the peasant farm is a small one the cultivated area has to bear a cost of maintaining labour-power one and a half times to twice as large as when the farm is of a more adequate size" (p. 316). This is true for both Perm (p. 314) and Voronezh gubernias, for both Saratov and Chernigov gubernias (p. 315), so that Postnikov has undoubtedly proved this law to be applicable to all Russia.

Let us now pass to the question of the "incomes and expenditures" (Chapter IX) of the different groups of peasant farms and of their relation to the market.

"The territory of every farm that is an independent unit," says Postnikov, "consists of the following four parts: one part produces food for the sustenance of the working family and of the labourers who live on the farm; this, in the

narrow sense, is the *food* area of the farm. Another part provides fodder for the cattle working on the farm, and may be called the *fodder* area. A third part consists of the farmyard, roads, ponds, etc., and of that part of the crop area that produces seed; it may be called the *farm-service* area, as it serves the needs of the whole farm without distinction. Lastly, the fourth part produces grain and plants destined, either raw or processed, for sale on the market; this is the *market* or *commercial* area of the farm. The division of the territory into these four parts is determined in each separate farm, not by the crops grown, but by the immediate purpose of their cultivation.

"The cash income of the farm is determined by the commercial part of its territory, and the larger the latter and the greater the relative value of the produce obtained from it, the greater the demand made by the farmers on the market and the larger the amount of labour the country can maintain outside of agriculture within the vicinity of its market; the greater, too, is the state (fiscal) and cultural importance of agriculture to the country, and the greater, too, are the net income of the cultivator himself and the resources at his disposal for farm expenses and for improvements" (p. 257).

This argument of Postnikov's would be perfectly true, if one, fairly substantial, correction were made: the author speaks of the importance of the farm's commercial area to the country in general, whereas this can obviously be said only of a country where money economy predominates, where the greater part of the produce assumes the form of *commodities*. To forget this condition, to consider it self-evident, and to omit a precise investigation of how far it is applicable to the given country, would be to fall into the error of vulgar political economy.

To single out the market area from the farm as a whole is very important. For the home *market* it is by no means the producer's income in general (by which the level of his prosperity is determined) that is significant, but exclusively his income *in cash*. The producer's possession of monetary resources is not determined by his degree of prosperity: the peasant who obtains from his plot of land sufficient produce to satisfy his own requirements fully, but who engages

in natural economy, is well-off, but he possesses no monetary resources; on the other hand, the half-ruined peasant who obtains from his plot of land only a small part of the grain he needs and who secures the rest (although in a lesser amount and of poorer quality) by casual earnings, is not well-off, but possesses monetary resources. It is clear from this that no discussion on the importance to the market of peasant farms and the incomes they yield can be of any value if not based on a calculation of the cash part of the income.

In order to determine the size of these four parts of the crop area on the farms of the different groups of peasants, Postnikov first estimates the annual consumption of grain, taking the round figure of two chetverts* of grain per head (p. 259), which means two-thirds of a dessiatine per head out of the crop area. He then estimates the fodder area at one and a half dessiatines per horse, and the seed area at 6% of the total under crops, and arrives at the following results** (p. 319):

	100 dess. under crops consist of areas				*Cash income* (rubles)	
	Farm-service	Food	Fodder	Commercial	Per dess. under crops	Per household
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	6	90.7	42.3	—39	—	—
" 5 to 10 "	6	44.7	37.5	+11.8	3.77	30
" 10 to 25 "	6	27.5	30	36.5	11.68	191
" 25 to 50 "	6	17	25	52	16.64	574
" over 50 "	6	12	21	61	19.52	1.500

"The difference indicated in the cash income of the various groups," says Postnikov, "is sufficient to illustrate the importance of the size of the farms; but, actually, this difference between the incomes of the various groups from cropping should be even greater, for it must be assumed that the top groups obtain larger harvests per dessiatine and secure better prices for the grain they sell.

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* A chetvert equals about six bushels.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

** To determine the cash income Postnikov proceeded as follows: he assumed that the entire commercial area is sown to the dearest kind of grain—wheat—and, knowing the average crop and prevailing prices, he calculated the value of the produce obtainable from this area.

"In this record of income obtained, we have included the cultivated, and not the total area of the farm, for we have no precise data on the way in which the peasant farms of the Taurida uyezds make use of other farmland for various kinds of livestock; but inasmuch as the cash income of the South-Russian peasant, whose sole pursuit is cropping, is almost entirely determined by the crop area, the above figures fairly accurately depict the difference in the cash income from farming between the various groups of peasants. These figures show how markedly this income changes with the size of the area under crops. A family with 75 dessiatines under crops obtains a cash income of as much as 1,500 rubles a year; a family with $34\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines under crops obtains 574 rubles a year, whereas one with $16\frac{1}{3}$ dessiatines under crops obtains only 191 rubles. A family which cultivates 8 dessiatines obtains only 30 rubles, a sum insufficient to cover the cash expenditure of the farm without outside earnings. Of course, the figures quoted do not show the net income of the farms; to obtain this we have to deduct the expenditure of the household on taxes, implements, buildings, the purchase of clothing, footwear, etc. But such expenditure does not increase proportionately as the size of the farm increases. Expenditure on maintaining the family increases in proportion to its size, and the latter, as the table shows, increases far more slowly than the crop area of the various groups. As to total farm expenditure (payment of land tax and rental, repair of buildings and implements), they, at any rate, do not increase more than proportionately to the size of farms, whereas the gross cash income from the farm, as the previous table shows, increases in more than direct proportion to the size of the crop area. What is more, all these expenses are very small compared with the main item of farm expenditure, the maintenance of labour-power. We are thus able to formulate the rule that, in peasant economy, the net proceeds per dessiatine from cropping grow progressively smaller as the size of the farm decreases" (p. 320).

We thus see from Postnikov's figures that peasant farming in the different groups varies substantially with respect to the market: the top groups (with more than 25 dessiatines under crops per household) conduct what is

already commercial farming; they grow grain for the income it provides. In the bottom groups, on the contrary, cropping does not cover the family's essential needs (this applies to those who cultivate up to 10 dessiatines per household); if we make an exact calculation of all farm expenditure we shall most certainly find that in these groups the farm is run at a loss.

It is also very interesting to make use of data cited by Postnikov to settle the problem of the relationship between the splitting of the peasantry into different groups and the extent of the market demand. We know that the extent of this demand depends on the size of the commercial area and that the latter becomes greater as the size of the farm increases; but parallel to this increase in the size of the farm in the top groups there is a decrease in its size in the bottom groups. As to the number of farms, the bottom groups contain twice as many as the top: the former constitute 40% in the Taurida uyezds, the latter only 20%. Do we not get the result, in general, that the above-mentioned economic split decreases the extent of the market demand? Properly speaking, we are entitled to answer this question in the negative on purely a priori grounds: the fact is that in the bottom groups, the farm is so small that the family's needs cannot be fully covered by agriculture; to avoid dying of starvation, the members of these bottom groups have to take their labour-power to the market, where its sale provides them with monetary resources and thus counterbalances (to some degree) the lesser demand due to the smaller size of the farms. But Postnikov's data enable us to give a more precise answer to the problem raised.

Let us take some crop area, say, 1,600 dessiatines, and let us imagine it divided in two ways: firstly, among an economically homogeneous peasantry, and, secondly, among peasants split up into different groups such as we find in the Taurida uyezds today. In the first case, assuming that an average peasant farm has 16 dessiatines under crops (as is actually the case in the Taurida uyezds), we get 100 farms that fully cover their needs by agriculture. The demand made on the market will equal $191 \times 100 = 19{,}100$ rubles. Second case: the 1,600 dessiatines under crops are divided among the 100 households differently, exactly as the crop area is actu-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ally divided among the peasants of the Taurida uyezds: 8 households have no crop area at all; 12 cultivate 4 dessiatines each; 20—8 dessiatines each; 40—16 dessiatines each; 17—34 dessiatines each, and 3—75 dessiatines (a total of 1,583 dessiatines, i.e., even a little less than 1,600 dessiatines). With such a distribution, a very considerable section of the peasants (40%) will not be in a position to derive a sufficient return from their land to cover all their needs. The extent of the monetary demand made on the market, counting only the farms with over 5 dessiatines under crops per household, will be as follows: $(20\times30)+(40\times191)+(17\times574)+(3\times1,500)=$ 21,350 rubles. We thus find that, despite the omission of 20 households [undoubtedly these also have a cash income, but it is not obtained from the sale of their produce], and despite the reduction of the crop area to 1,535 dessiatines, the total monetary demand on the market is higher.[9]

It has already been said that the peasants of the bottom economic groups are forced to sell their labour-power; the members of the top groups, on the contrary, have to buy it, for the workers in their own families are inadequate for the cultivation of their large crop areas. We must now dwell in greater detail on this important fact. Postnikov apparently does not class it under the "new economic developments in peasant life" (at least, he does not mention it in his preface, where he sums up the results of his work), but it is deserving of far more attention than the introduction of machines or the extension of cropping by the well-to-do peasants.

"The more affluent peasantry in the Taurida uyezds," the author says, "generally employ hired labourers to a considerable extent and farm an area that far exceeds the working capacity of the families themselves. Thus, in the three uyezds the percentage of families in all categories of peasants employing hired labourers is as follows:

Cultivating	no land	3.8%
"	up to 5 dess.	2.5
"	5 to 10 "	2.6
"	10 to 25 "	8.7
"	25 to 50 "	34.7
"	over 50 "	64.1
	Average	12.9%

"These figures show that it is mostly the well-to-do farmers with the larger cultivated areas that employ hired labourers" (p. 144).

Comparing the data already given on family composition by groups without hired labourers (for the three uyezds separately) and with hired labourers (for the three uyezds together), we find that by hiring labourers, farmers who sow from 25 to 50 dessiatines per household increase the number of hands on their farms by about one-third (from 1.8 or 1.9 working persons per family to 2.4), while farmers with over 50 dessiatines under crops per household almost double the number of their workers (from 2.3 to 5); even more than double according to the estimate of the author, who considers that they have to hire 8,241 workers (p. 115), while they have only 7,129 of their own. That the bottom groups have to release workers on the side in very large numbers is clear from the very fact that cropping cannot provide them with the amount of produce which they need for their own subsistence. Unfortunately, we have no precise data as to the number of persons released for outside work. An indirect indication of this number may be found in the number of householders who lease their allotments; above we have cited Postnikov's statement to the effect that about one-third of the inhabitants of the Taurida uyezds do not exploit their allotment land to the full.

IV

It can be seen from the data given above that Postnikov has fully proved his point on the "tremendous diversity" in the economic status of the various households. This diversity applies not only to the property status of the peasants and the size of the areas they cultivate, but even to the character of the farming in the different groups. That is still not all. It turns out that the terms "diversity" and "differentiation" are inadequate for a full description of the phenomenon. When one peasant owns one draught animal and another 10, we call that differentiation; but when one rents scores of dessiatines of land above the allotment that satisfies his needs, with the sole object of deriving profit from

its exploitation, thus depriving another peasant of the opportunity of renting land which he requires in order to feed his family, we obviously are faced with something much bigger; we have to call that sort of thing "strife" p. 323), a "struggle of economic interests" (p. XXXII). Although he employs these terms, Postnikov does not fully appreciate their importance; nor does he see that the terms themselves are inadequate. To rent allotment land from the impoverished section of the population, and to hire as a labourer the peasant who has ceased to run his own farm is something more than mere strife—it is downright exploitation.

Recognising the profound economic strife among the peasantry of today, we can no longer restrict ourselves to just dividing the peasants into several strata according to the property they possess. Such a division would suffice if the diversity mentioned above amounted to mere quantitative differences. But that is not so. If, in the case of one section of the peasants, the aim of agriculture is commercial profit and the result is a large cash income, whereas in the case of another, agriculture cannot cover even the family's essential needs; if the top peasant groups base their improved farming on the ruin of the bottom groups; if the prosperous peasantry employ hired labour on a considerable scale, while the poor are compelled to resort to the sale of their labour-power—these are undoubtedly qualitative differences, and our task must now be to classify the peasantry according to differences in the character of the farming itself (meaning by character of farming peculiarities not of a technical but of an economic order).

Postnikov has devoted too little attention to these latter differences. Therefore, while he recognises the need for a "more general division of the population into groups" (p. 110) and attempts to make such a division, this attempt, as we shall soon see, cannot be considered quite successful.

"To achieve a more general division of the population into economic groups," says Postnikov, "we shall adopt a different criterion which, although not of uniform economic significance in all localities, is more in conformity with the division into groups made by the peasants themselves and that has also been noted in all uyezds by the Zemstvo

statisticians. This division is made according to the degree of the farmers' independence in the conduct of their farms, depending on the number of draught animals owned" (p. 110).

"At the present time the peasants of the South-Russian region may be divided, according to the degree of their economic independence and at the same time their methods of farming, into the three following main groups:

"1) Peasant households owning a full team of animals, i.e., with enough animals to work a plough or some other ploughing implement and who can cultivate their land with their own animals without having to hire or to yoke[10] with other peasants. When the implement used is a plough or a drill plough the peasant has two, three or more pairs of draught animals and, correspondingly, three or at least two adult workers and a part-time worker in the household.

"2) Peasants with insufficient animals, or yokers, i.e., peasants who yoke with one another for field work because their own animals do not suffice for independent harnessing. Such peasants have one or one and a half, in some cases even two pairs of draught animals and, correspondingly, one or two adult workers. Where the soil is heavy and a plough (or a drill plough) needs three pairs of draught animals the peasants invariably yoke with each other, even if they have two pairs of draught animals of their own.

"3) 'Footers,' or householders who have no animals whatever or have one (more often than not a horse, as oxen are generally kept in pairs and harnessed only in pairs). They work by hiring animals from others, or let their land for a part of the harvest and have no cultivated land of their own.

"This classification of the peasants according to an economic criterion fundamental to peasant life, such as in the present instance the number of draught animals and the manner of harnessing them, is usually made by the peasants themselves. But there are considerable variations of it, both within the bounds of each separate group enumerated above, and in the division of the groups themselves" (p. 121).

These groups constitute the following percentages of the total number of households (p. 125):

	I	II	III	
	Working with own animals	Working on yoking basis	Working with hired animals	With no land under crops
Berdyansk Uyezd	37	44.6	11.7	6.7
Melitopol "	32.7	46.8	13	7.5
Dnieper "	43	34.8	13.2	9

Side by side with this table, the author gives a classification of households according to the number of draught animals they own, in order to show how the animals are distributed in the uyezds described:

	Percentage of total number of households			
	Draught animals (per household)			
	4 or more	2 or 3	one	none
Berdyansk Uyezd	36.2	41.6	7.2	15
Melitopol "	34.4	44.7	5.3	15.6
Dnieper "	44.3	36.6	5.1	14

Consequently, in the Taurida uyezds, a full team consists of no less than four draught animals.

This classification, as made by Postnikov, cannot be considered altogether happy, first of all because marked differences are to be observed within each of the three groups:

"In the group of householders owning a team of draught animals," the author says, "there is considerable diversity evident in South Russia: side by side with the large numbers of animals of the well-to-do peasants there are the small teams of the poorer peasants. The former, in their turn, may be subdivided into those with full working teams (6 to 8 or more animals) and those with less than a full team (4 to 6 animals).... The category of 'footer' householders also presents considerable variety in degree of affluence" (p. 124).

Another inconvenience in the division adopted by Postnikov is, as we have already indicated, that the Zemstvo statistics do not classify the population according to the number of draught animals owned, but according to cultivated area. In order, therefore, to be able to express

accurately the property status of the various groups, this classification according to cultivated area has to be used.

On this basis Postnikov also divides the population into three groups: householders who are small cultivators—with up to 10 dessiatines under crops, or none at all; middle cultivators—with 10 to 25 dessiatines; and large cultivators—with over 25 dessiatines per household under crops. The author calls the first group "poor," the second middle, and the third well-to-do.

In respect of the size of these groups, Postnikov says:

"In general, among the Taurida peasants (excluding the colonists), the large cultivators constitute about one-sixth of the total number of households; those with medium-sized crop areas about 40%, while the households with small crop areas and those with none at all constitute a little over 40%. Taking the population of the Taurida uyezds as a whole (including the colonists), the large cultivators constitute one-fifth, or about 20%, the middle 40%, and the small cultivators and those with no tillage about 40%" (p. 112).

Hence, the composition of the groups is altered very slightly by the inclusion of the German colonists, so that no error will arise from using the general data for a whole uyezd.

We now have to describe as accurately as possible the economic status of each of these groups separately, and to try to ascertain the extent and causes of the economic strife among the peasantry.

Postnikov did not set himself this task; that is why the data he quotes are markedly very scattered and his general observations on the groups are not definite enough.

Let us begin with the bottom group, the poor peasants, to which two-fifths of the population of the Taurida uyezds belong.

The number of draught animals (the chief instrument of production in agriculture) owned by this group is the best indication of how poor they really are. In the three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, out of a total of 263,589 draught animals, the bottom group possess (p. 117) 43,625, or 17% in all, which is $2\frac{1}{3}$ times less than the average. The data on the percentage of households possessing no draught animals

were given above (80%, 48% and 12% for the three subdivisions of the bottom group). On the basis of these data, Postnikov arrived at the conclusion that "the percentage of householders who possess no animals of their own is considerable only in the groups with no land under crops or with crop areas of up to 10 dessiatines per household" (p. 135). The crop area of this group corresponds to the number of animals: on their own land they cultivate 146,114 dessiatines out of the total of 962,933 dessiatines (in the three uyezds), that is, 15%. The addition of rented land raises the sown area to 174,496 dessiatines; but since the sown area of the other groups also increases and does so to a larger extent than in the bottom group, the result is that the area cultivated by the bottom group constitutes only 12% of the total; in other words, there is only one-eighth of the cultivated area to more than three-eighths of the population. If we remember that it is the medium-sized area cultivated by the Taurida peasant which the author regards as normal (i.e., covering all the family's needs) we can easily see how this group, with a sown area $3\frac{1}{3}$ times less than the average, is deprived of its just share.

It is quite natural that, under these circumstances, the farming of this group is in a very bad way. We have already seen that 33% to 39% of the population in the Taurida uyezds—consequently, the overwhelming majority of the bottom group—have no ploughing implements whatever. Lack of implements compels the peasants to give up the land, to lease their allotments: Postnikov estimates that such lessors (whose farms are undoubtedly already utterly ruined) comprise about one-third of the population, that is, again a considerable majority of the poor group. Let us note in passing that this practice of "selling" allotments (to borrow the customary expression of the peasants) has been reflected in Zemstvo statistics everywhere, and on a very large scale. The periodicals which have drawn attention to this fact have already managed to invent a remedy for it—the inalienability of allotments. Postnikov quite rightly questions the effectiveness of such measures, which reveal in their authors a purely bureaucratic faith in the power of the decrees of the authorities. There can be no

doubt," he says, "that merely to prohibit the leasing of land will not eliminate it when it is so deeply rooted in the present economic structure of peasant life. A peasant who has no implements and means with which to run his own farm is virtually unable to make use of his allotment and has to lease it to other peasants who are in a position to farm it. The direct prohibition of the leasing of land will force the peasant to do it surreptitiously, without control, and most likely on terms that are worse for the lessor than at present, since he is forced to lease his land. Furthermore, allotments will increasingly be leased through the village courts[11] in payment of taxation arrears, and such leasing is the least advantageous for the poor peasant" (p. 140).

Absolute economic decline is to be observed in the case of all the members of the poor group.

"At bottom," says Postnikov, "there is no great difference in economic status between the householders who sow nothing and those who sow little, cultivating their land with hired animals. The former lease the whole of their land to their fellow villagers, the latter only part; but both groups *either serve as labourers* for their fellow villagers, *or* engage in *outside employments*, *mostly agricultural*, while continuing to live at home. Hence, *both these categories of peasants—those who sow nothing and those who sow little—may be examined together*; both belong to the class of peasants who are losing their farms, who in most cases are ruined or on the verge of ruin, and are without the livestock and implements with which to work their farms" (p. 135).

"While the non-farming, non-cultivating households are in most cases those that are already ruined," says Postnikov a little later on, "those that cultivate little, that lease their land, are candidates for membership of that category. Every severe harvest failure, or chance calamity such as fire, loss of horses, etc., drives some of the householders out of this group into the category of non-farming peasants and farm labourers. A householder who, from one cause or another, loses his draught animals, takes the first step along the road to ruin. Cultivating the land with hired animals is too casual and unsystematic, and usually leads to a reduction of cropping. Such a muzhik is refused credit by the village loan-and-savings societies and by his fellow villag-

ers" [a footnote says: "In the Taurida uyezds there are very many loan-and-savings societies in the big villages, operating with funds borrowed from the State Bank; but it is only the rich and well-to-do householders who obtain loans from them"]; "when he does get a loan, it is usually on worse terms than those obtained by the 'thriving' peasants. 'How can you lend him anything if he has nothing to pay with?' the peasants say. Once he gets involved in debt, the first stroke of ill luck robs him of his land too, especially if he is also in arrears with his taxes" (p. 139).

The extent of the decline of farming among the peasants of the poor group can best be seen from the fact that the author does not even attempt to answer the question of exactly how they run their farms. In the case of farms that cultivate less than 10 dessiatines per household, he says, "the conditions of farming are too fortuitous for it to be described by any definite system" (p. 278).

The characteristics of peasant farming in the bottom group that have been cited are, despite their considerable number, still quite inadequate; they are exclusively negative in character, although there surely must be positive characteristics. All we have heard so far is that the peasants of this group cannot be regarded as independent agriculturists, because their farms are in absolute decline, their cultivated area is far too inadequate and because, lastly, their farms are run haphazardly. "Only the prosperous and well-to-do farmers, who are not in need of seed," remark the statisticians in describing Bakhmut Uyezd, "can observe any sort of system in sowing crops; but the poor peasants sow whatever happens to be on hand, anywhere and anyhow" (p. 278). Nevertheless, the existence of all this mass of the peasantry embraced by the bottom group (in the three Taurida uyezds, over 30,000 households and over 200,000 persons of both sexes) cannot be accidental. If they do not live on the produce of their own farms, how do they live? Chiefly by the sale of their labour-power. We have seen above that Postnikov says of this group of peasants that they live by farm-labouring and other outside earnings. In view of the almost total absence of handicraft industries in the South, such earnings are mostly agricultural which means, in fact, that the peasants are *hiring*

themselves for farm work. To prove in greater detail that the chief feature of the economy of the bottom group of peasants is the sale of their labour-power, let us proceed to examine this group according to the categories into which they are divided in the Zemstvo statistics. As to the non-farming householders, nothing need be said of them: they are farm labourers pure and simple. In the second category we have cultivators with crop areas of up to 5 dessiatines per household (the average is 3.5 dessiatines). The division of the cultivated area, given above, into farm-service, fodder, food and commercial, shows us that an area of this size is altogether inadequate. "The first group, with a cultivated area up to 5 dessiatines per household," says Postnikov, "have no market, or commercial, area at all; they can only exist with the help of outside earnings, obtained by working as farm labourers, or by other means" (p. 319). There remains the last category—the farmers with 5 to 10 dessiatines of cultivated-land per household. The question is: what, among the peasants of this group, is the relation of independent farming to the so-called "earnings"? For a precise answer to this question, we should have several *typical* peasant budgets relating to the farmers of *this group*. Postnikov fully admits the need for and importance of budget data, but points out that the "collection of such data is extremely difficult, and in many cases simply beyond the power of the statisticians" (p. 107). We find it very difficult to agree to this view: Moscow statisticians have collected several extremely interesting and detailed budgets (see *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*. Section on Economic Statistics, Vols. VI and VII); in several uyezds of Voronezh Gubernia, as the author himself indicates, budget data have even been collected on a house-to-house basis.

It is a great pity that the budget material Postnikov himself gives is very inadequate: he cites the budgets of seven German colonists and of only one Russian peasant; moreover, all are those of big cultivators (the minimum—in the case of the Russian—is $39\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines sown), that is, all belong to a group of whose economy one may obtain a clear enough idea from the facts contained in the Zemstvo statistics. Expressing his regret that he was "unable during his

tour to gather a larger number of peasant budgets," Postnikov says that "to give an exact appreciation of these budgets is, in general, no easy matter. The Tauridians are quite frank in giving economic information, but often enough they themselves do not know the exact figures of their income and expenditure. The peasants recall with greater accuracy the general amount of their expenditure, or the biggest items of income and expenditure, but small amounts almost invariably escape their memory" (p. 288). It would, however, be better to collect a few budgets, even without minor details, than, as the author has done, to collect "about 90 descriptions and an evaluation" of the economic situation, which is elucidated with sufficient clarity in the Zemstvo house-to-house censuses.

In the absence of budgets, only two kinds of data are at our disposal for determining the character of the economy of the group under review: firstly, Postnikov's estimates of the cultivated area per household necessary to feed an average family; and, secondly, data on the division of the cultivated area into four parts, and on the average cash expenditure (per family per year) of the local peasants.

On the basis of detailed estimates of the cultivated area required for a family's food, for seed and for fodder, Postnikov arrives at the following final conclusion:

"A peasant family of average size and well-being, living exclusively by farming and balancing its income and expenditure without deficit, needs, given average harvests, 4 dessiatines to feed $6\frac{1}{2}$ members of the family, $4\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines to feed 3 draught horses, $1\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines for seed supply, and 6 to 8 dessiatines for the production of grain for sale, or in all, 16 to 18 dessiatines under crops. ...The average Tauridian has about 18 dessiatines under crops per household, but 40% of the population of the three Taurida uyezds have less than 10 dessiatines per household; and if they are nevertheless able to engage in farming, it is only because part of their income is derived from outside employments and by leasing part of their land. The economic position of this section of the population is abnormal and insecure, because in the majority of cases they are unable to accumulate the reserve to tide them over a difficult period" (p. 272).

As the average cultivated area per household in the group under review is 8 dessiatines, i.e., less than half the area required (11 dessiatines), we are entitled to conclude that the peasants of this group derive the greater part of their income from "employments," i.e., from the sale of their labour.

Here is another calculation: according to Postnikov's data, quoted above, on the division of the cultivated area, out of 8 dessiatines under crops, 0.48 dessiatines will go for seed; 3 dessiatines for fodder (in this group there are 2, not 3, draught animals per household); and 3.576 dessiatines for the food of the family (its size is also below the average—about $5\frac{1}{2}$ persons, not $6\frac{1}{2}$); so that less than one dessiatine (0.944) remains for the commercial area, the income from which the author estimates at 30 rubles. But the amount of a Tauridian's essential cash expenditure is much greater. It is much easier to collect information on the amount of cash expenditure than on budgets, says the author, because the peasants themselves often make calculations of this sort, These calculations show that:

"In the case of a family of average size, i.e., consisting of the working husband, the wife and 4 young children or adolescents, if they farm their own land (roughly about 20 dessiatines) and do not resort to renting, the essential cash expenditure, as estimated by the Tauridians, amounts to between 200 and 250 rubles per annum. A cash expenditure of 150 to 180 rubles is considered to be the minimum that a small family must make, even if they stint themselves in everything. An annual income of less than this amount is considered quite inadequate, for in these parts a working man and his wife can, by farm-labouring, earn 120 rubles a year, with board and lodging, without incurring the expense of maintaining livestock, implements and so forth, and, in addition, can get 'extras' from land leased to fellow villagers" (p. 289). As the group under examination is below the average, we take the minimum, not the average, cash expenditure, and the lowest figure of this minimum at that—150 rubles—which has to be derived from "employments." According to this calculation, a peasant of the group under examination derives from his own farming a total of 117.5

rubles (30+87.5*), and from the sale of his labour-power 120 rubles. Consequently, we again find that by independent farming the peasants of this group can only cover *less than half* of their minimum expenditure.**

Thus an examination of the character of the economy in all the subdivisions of the bottom group leads us to the unquestionable conclusion that although the majority of the peasants do cultivate small plots, the sale of their labour-power is their principal source of livelihood. All the peasants of this group are hired labourers rather than independent farmers.

Postnikov did not raise this question of the character of the economy of the bottom group of peasants, and did not elucidate the relation of outside employments to the peasant's own farming—and that is a big defect in his work. As a result, he does not adequately explain the, at first glance, strange fact that although the peasants of the bottom group have too little land of their own, they abandon it, lease it; as a result the important fact, that the means of production (i.e., land and implements) possessed by the bottom group of peasants are quantitatively far below the average, is not linked up with the general character of their

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* A food area of $3\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines will yield 25 rubles in produce per dessiatine ($25 \times 3.5 = 87.5$)—Postnikov's calculation, p. 272.

** The calculations made by Mr. Yuzhakov in *Russkaya Mysl*,[12] No. 9, 1885 ("Quotas for People's Landownership") fully corroborate this conclusion. He considers that the food norm, i.e., the lowest norm in Taurida Gubernia, is an allotment of 9 dessiatines under crops per household. But Mr. Yuzhakov sees the allotment as covering *only* the *cereal* foods and taxation, and assumes that the other expenditures will be covered by outside earnings. The budgets given in the Zemstvo statistics show that the latter expenditures constitute over half the total. For example, in Voronezh Gubernia the average expenditure of a peasant family is 495.39 rubles, reckoning expenditure both in cash and kind. Of this sum, 109.10 rubles go for the maintenance of livestock [N. V. Yuzhakov sees the maintenance of livestock as coming from hay-fields and other grounds, and not from arable land], 135.80 rubles for vegetable food and taxes, and 250.49 rubles for other expenditure—clothing, implements, rent, various household requirements, etc. [24 budgets in *Statistical Returns for Ostrogozshsk Uyezd*]. In Moscow Gubernia, the average annual expenditure per family is 348.83 rubles, of which 156.03 go for cereal foods and taxes, and 192.80 for other expenditure. [Average of 8 budgets collected by Moscow statisticians—loc. cit.]

farming. Since the average quantity of means of production, as we have seen, is only just enough to satisfy the essential needs of the family, it necessarily and inevitably follows from this fact—the fact of the poor peasants being deprived of their fair share—that they must seek means of production belonging to others to which to apply their labour, i.e., they must sell themselves.

Let us now pass to the second group—the *middle* one, also embracing 40% of the population. Under this category come farmers with a cultivated area of from 10 to 25 dessiatines per household. The term "middle" is fully applicable to the members of this group, with the reservation, however, that their means of production are somewhat (slightly) below the average: the cultivated area per household is 16.4 dessiatines, as against the average of 17 dessiatines for all peasants; livestock—7.3 head per household, as against an average of 7.6 (draught animals—3.2, as against an average of 3.1); total tillage per household—17 to 18 dessiatines (allotment, purchased, and rented), as against an average of 20 to 21 dessiatines for the uyezds. A comparison of the number of dessiatines under crops per household with the norm given by Postnikov, shows that the farming of their own land by this group yields them only just enough for their subsistence.

All these facts, it would seem, should lead us to think that the farming of this group of peasants is the most stable: the peasant covers all his expenses by it; he works not for profit but only to satisfy primary needs. As a matter of fact, however, we see the very opposite: the farming of this group of peasants is distinguished by its very considerable instability.

Firstly, an average cultivated area of 16 dessiatines is shown to be adequate. Consequently, peasants with 10 to 16 dessiatines under crops do not cover all their expenses by farming and are also obliged to resort to outside employments. From Postnikov's approximate estimates quoted above, we see that this group hires 2,846 workers, whereas it releases 3,389, or 543 more. Hence, about half the farms in the group are not fully provided for.

Further, in this group the number of draught animals per household is 3.2, whereas, as we have seen, the number needed for a team is four. Consequently, a large number

of the households in this group have insufficient animals of their own with which to cultivate their land, and have to resort to yoking. The yokers in this group likewise constitute no less than one-half of the total: we may draw this conclusion from the fact that the proportion of households owning working teams is about 40%, of which 20% go to the prosperous upper group, the remaining 20% belonging to the middle group, 90 that no less than half of the middle group do not own a working team. Postnikov does not give the exact number of yokers in this group. Turning to the Zemstvo statistical abstracts we find the following data (for two uyezds):*

	Total in group cultivating 10 to 25 dess.		Distribution of the number of dessiatines cultivated							
			With own animals		By yoking		With Hired animals		By other means	
	Households	Dess.	Households	Dess.	Households	Dess.	Households	Dess.	Households	Dess.
Melitopol Uyezd	13,789	226,389.21	4,218	79,726.55	9,201	141,483.26	321	4,405.8	49	773.3
Dnieper Uyezd	8,234	137,343.75	4,029	71,125.2	3,835	51,159.05	320	4,352.5	50	707.25

Thus, in the middle group of the two uyezds, a minority of the households cultivate their land with their own animals: in Melitopol Uyezd less than one-third of the households; in Dnieper Uyezd less than one-half. Hence, the number of yokers estimated above for all the three uyezds (one-half) is, if anything, too low and certainly not exaggerated. Of course, the peasant's inability to farm with animals of his own is in itself sufficiently indicative of the instability of his farm; but, as an illustration, let us quote

* *Statistical Returns for Melitopol Uyezd* (Appendix to *Returns for Taurida Gubernia*, Vol. I), Simferopol, 1885, p. B 195. *Statistical Returns for Dnieper Uyezd* (*Returns for Taurida Gubernia*, Vol. II) Simferopol, 1886, p. B 123.

the description of the yoking system given by Postnikov, who, unfortunately, pays too little attention to this phenomenon, interesting as it is economically and from the standpoint of life and customs.

"Among the peasants who work on a yoking basis," says Postnikov, "the standard working area is lower [than among the peasants who work with their own animals] by virtue of the law of mechanics which says that three horses harnessed together do not pull three times as much as one horse. Those who arrange to yoke may live at different ends of the village (they are usually relatives); furthermore, the number of plots belonging to the two householders (sometimes three householders yoke) is twice that of one. All this increases the time spent on travelling from one section to another." [A footnote says: "When the land is divided, each household receives for its members an unbroken patch in a particular field; hence small families receive smaller patches. The conditions of yoking in Taurida Gubernia vary considerably. If one of the yokers has a drill plough, he gets an extra dessiatine ploughed—e.g., one gets 10 dessiatines, the other 11—or the one who has no drill plough of his own has to bear all the expenses of repairing it while in use. Similarly, when the number of yoked animals is unequal, one gets an extra day's ploughing done, etc. In the village of Kamenka, the owner of a drill plough receives from three to six rubles in cash for the spring. Quarrels among the yokers are generally very frequent."] "Some time is also spent in coming to terms, and it may happen that the yokers fall out before the work is finished. The yokers sometimes do not have enough horses for harrowing, in which case the drill plough horses are unharnessed: some go off for water, while the others harrow. In the village of Yuzkui, I was told that yokers often plough no more than one dessiatine a day, which is half the normal rate" (p. 233).

There is a shortage of implements in addition to the shortage of animals. From the table given above, showing the number of implements per household in the various groups, we see that in the middle group, in all the uyezds, there is not less than one ploughing implement per household. Actually, however, the distribution of implements even within the group is by no means uniform. Unfortunately, Post-

nikov does not give any data on this subject, and we have to turn to the Zemstvo statistical abstracts. In Dnieper Uyezd, 1,808 households out of 8,227 have no ploughing implements at all; in Melitopol Uyezd 2,954 out of 13,789; in the former uyezd the ill-provided households constitute 21.9% of the total; in the latter 21.4%. There can be no doubt that the householders who have no ploughing implements approximate the bottom group in economic status, while those who have more than one such implement per household approximate the top group. The number of householders who have no ploughs is even higher: 32.5% in Dnieper Uyezd and 65.5% in Melitopol. Lastly, the peasants of this group own an insignificant number of reaping machines (they are of very great importance in South-Russian peasant farming because of the shortage of workers for hand reaping and the long-tract system,[13] which drags out grain removal for months): in Dnieper Uyezd the whole group owns 20 mowing and reaping machines (one per 400 households); in Melitopol Uyezd, $178\frac{1}{2}$ (one per 700 households).

The general system of peasant farming in this group is described by Postnikov as follows:

"Householders having less than four draught animals invariably yoke together for the cultivation of their fields and for sowing. The householders of this category have either two working members or only one. The lower relative working capacity of such farmers is due to the smaller size of the farms, the yoking system, and the shortage of implements. The yokers mostly plough with small, three-share drill ploughs, which work more slowly. If such peasants harvest their grain with machines hired from neighbours, they get them only after the latter have cut their own crops. Harvesting by hand takes longer, in some cases necessitates the hiring of day labourers, and is more expensive. For single-handed peasants any urgent household matter, or the performance of public duties, interrupts the work. If the single-handed peasant goes to work in a distant field, where the peasants usually spend the whole week until the ploughing and sowing are completed, he has to return to the village more often to see how the family at home is faring" (p. 278). Such single-handed peasants (one working member in the

family) constitute the majority in the group under examination, as will be seen from the following table given by Postnikov and showing the number of working members in the families in the different crop-sowing groups in all the three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia (p. 143):

	Per 100 households			
	With no male workers	With 1 worker	With 2 workers	With 3 or more Workers
Cultivating no land	19	67	11	3
" up to 5 dess.	9	77.6	11.7	1.7
" 5 to 10 "	4.2	74.8	17.7	3.3
" 10 to 25 "	1.7	59	29	10.3
" 25 to 50 "	1.2	40	35.7	23.1
" over 50 "	0.9	25	34.3	39.8
Average	4.3	60.6	24.6	10.5

It will be seen from this table that three-fifths of the families in the middle group have one working member each or none at all.*

To illustrate the relation of the middle to the top group, and the stability of its farms in general, let us quote data from *Statistical Returns for Dnieper Uyezd* showing how all the land at the peasants' disposal, and the cultivated area** in particular, is distributed among the groups We get the following table:***

* In support of his point about the considerable advantages in farming enjoyed by the large-family householders (i.e. those with many working members) over the single-handed householders, Postnikov cites Trirogov's well-known book *The Village Community and the Peasant Tax*.

** The data relate to the entire Dnieper Uyezd, including villages not counted in the volosts. The figures in the "Total land in use" column I have calculated myself, by adding together the amounts of allotment, rented and purchased land and subtracting the amount leased. Dnieper Uyezd has been chosen because it is inhabited almost exclusively by Russians.

*** See table on p. 60.—*Ed.*

Peasant Groups	Percentage of toal households	Allotment Land		Purchased Land		Rented land		Leased Land	Total land in use by group		Sown area	
		Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%		Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%
Poor	39.9	56,444.95	25.5	2,003.35	6	7,838.75	6	21,551.25	44,735.7	12.4	38,439.25	11
Middle	41.7	221,082.9	46.5	5,376	16	48,397.75	35	8,311	148,256.45	41.2	137,343.75	43
Prosperous	18.4	221,082.9	28	26,530.75	78	81,645.95	59	3,039.25	166,981.7	46.4	150,614.45	46
Total	100	221,082.9	100	33,910	100	137,882.45	100	32,901.5	359,973.85	100	326,397.45	100

This table shows that the middle group held more allotment arable than the others: 46.5% of the total. The peasants were forced by the inadequacy of their allotments to resort to renting, as a result of which the area cultivated by them increased all in all by more than 50%. The amount of land in the hands of the middle group also increased *absolutely*, but decreased *relatively*—to 41.2% of the total area and 43% of the cultivated area; first place was occupied by the top group. Hence, not only the bottom group, but the middle one, too, feels the direct pressure of the top group, which deprives them of the land.

All that has been said entitles us to describe the economic status of the middle group as follows. It comprises peasants who live exclusively on the returns from the land they cultivate themselves; the area of the latter is almost equal to the average area cultivated by the local peasantry (or somewhat less) and barely covers the family's essential needs. But the insufficiency of animals and implements, and their uneven distribution, render the farming of this group of peasants unstable, precarious, especially in view of the menacing tendency of the top group to squeeze out the bottom and middle groups.

Let us now turn to this top group, which comprises the affluent peasantry. In the Taurida uyezds it embraces one-fifth of the population, with a cultivated area of over 25 dessiatines per household. Sufficient facts have already been cited to show the extent to which this group is really richer than the others in draught animals, implements, and allotment and other land. To show how much better off the peasants of this group are than the middle peasants, we shall cite only the following data of crop areas: in Dnieper Uyezd, the well-to-do group have 41.3 dessiatines under crops per household, whereas the average for the uyezd is 17.8 dessiatines, or less than half as much. Generally speaking, this aspect of the matter—the greater prosperity of the big cultivators—has been sufficiently brought out by Postnikov, but he pays practically no attention to another and far more important question: what part is played by this group's farming in the total agricultural production of the region, and what price is paid by the other groups for the thriving condition of the top group.

The fact of the matter is that this group is numerically very small—in the most prosperous region of the South, Taurida Gubernia, it constitutes only 20% of the population. It might therefore be thought that its relative importance to the locality's general economy is not great.* Actually, however, we find the contrary to be true: this well-to-do minority plays a predominant part in the total output of agricultural produce. In the three Taurida uyezds, out of a total of 1,439,267 dessiatines under crops 724,678 dessiatines, or more than half, are in the hands of the well-to-do peasants. These figures, of course, are a far from accurate expression of the predominance of the top group, inasmuch as the well-to-do peasants' harvests are much larger than those of the poor and the middle peasants, who, as shown in Postnikov's description quoted above, do not run their farms on proper lines.

Thus, the principal grain producers are the top group of peasants, and hence (a fact of the utmost importance, and one particularly often ignored) all the various descriptions of agriculture and talk about agricultural improvements and so on, relate primarily and mostly (sometimes even exclusively) to the prosperous minority Let us take, for example, the data relating to the distribution of improved implements.

Postnikov speaks of the Taurida peasant's implements as follows:

"With few exceptions, the implements of the peasant are the same as those of the German colonist, but less varied, sometimes of poorer quality, and therefore cheaper. An exception is the south-western, less densely populated part of Dnieper Uyezd, where the primitive Little-Russian implements, the heavy wooden plough and wooden iron-tipped drill plough, are still in vogue. In the rest of the Taurida uyezds, the ploughs used by the peasants are everywhere of an improved type, made of iron. Side by side with the iron plough the drill plough is everywhere of primary importance in the cultivation of the soil and in many cases

* This mistake, for example, is made by Mr. Slonimsky, who in an article on Postnikov's book says: "The well-to-do group of peasants is lost in the mass of the poor, and in some areas would seem to be altogether non-existent." (*Vestnik Yevropy*,[14] 1893, No. 3, p. 307.)

is the only ploughing implement used by the peasants. But most frequently the drill plough is used side by side with the iron plough.... The harrows everywhere are of wood, with iron teeth, and are of two types: two-horse harrows, with a 10-foot stretch, and one-horse harrows, with a stretch of about 7 feet.... The drill plough is an implement with 3, 4 or 5 shares.... Very often a small seed-drill is attached to the front of the drill plough and is operated by its wheel. It plants the seed while the drill plough fills in the drills. Of the other implements used by the peasants in cultivating the soil we meet, although not often, with the wooden roller, used to roll the soil after sowing. Reaping-machines have spread among the peasants particularly in the last 10 years. In the more prosperous villages, the peasants relate, almost half the households possess them.... Mowing-machines are far more rarely met with among the peasants than reapers.... Horse rakes and threshers are equally rare. The use of winnowing-machines is universal.... For carting purposes, the German farm waggon and *mazhara** are used exclusively; they are now built in many of the Russian villages. Stone toothed rollers of various sizes are universally used for threshing" (pp. 213-15).

To learn how these implements are distributed, we have to turn to the Zemstvo statistical abstracts, although their data are not complete either: the Taurida statisticians registered only ploughs and drill ploughs, reapers and mowers, and vehicles (waggons and mazharas). If we combine the data for Melitopol and Dnieper uyezds we shall find that of the total number (46,522) of ploughs and cultivators the top group owns 19,987, or 42.9%; waggons, 23,747 out of 59,478, or 39.9%; and, finally, reapers and mowers, 2,841 out of 3,061, or 92.8%.

Data have already been cited to show that labour productivity in the top groups of the peasantry is considerably higher than in the bottom and middle groups. Let us now see what peculiarities of technique determine this specific feature of the economy of the big cultivators.

"The amount of land held and used by the peasants," says Postnikov, "largely determines the system and character of farming. Unfortunately, the dependence of one on the

* *Mazhara*—a long heavy farm cart with a light framework of poles for its sides.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

other has so far been little studied by our investigators of peasant farming, who not infrequently conceive it to be of the same type among all sections of the rural population. Leaving aside the system of farming, I shall endeavour briefly to summarise the peculiarities in the farming technique of different peasant groups insofar as I have been able to ascertain them during my visits to the Taurida uyezds.

"Householders who work with their own animals and do not resort to yoking, own four, five, six or more draught animals.* Their economic status, however, varies considerably. A four-share drill plough requires a team of four animals, a five-share implement a team of five animals. Ploughing is followed by harrowing, and if the farmer has no extra horse, he cannot harrow immediately behind the plough, but only when the ploughing is finished, that is, the seed is covered when the soil is already slightly dry, a circumstance that does not favour germination. If the ploughing is done at a distance from the village, necessitating the carting of water and fodder, the absence of an extra horse also interrupts the work. In all such cases, the lack of a full complement of working animals leads to loss of time and delays the sowing. Given a larger number of draught animals and a multi-share drill plough, the peasants are able to plant their fields more quickly, to make the most of favourable weather, and to cover the seed with moister soil. Thus it is the "full" farmer, the one with six, or, better still, seven draught animals, that has the advantage in the technique of spring sowing. With seven horses, a five-share drill plough and two harrows can function simultaneously. Such a farmer, the peasants say, 'carries on without a stop.'

"Even more important is the difference in the status of the farmers in the period immediately following the reaping, when in a good harvest year the utmost exertion of labour-power is demanded on the farm. A farmer with six draught animals can thresh the grain as it is carted and does not need to stack it, thus, of course, saving time and manpower" (p. 277).

To complete the description of the big cultivator's economy, it should be mentioned that farming in the case of this group of cultivators is a "commercial" enterprise, as

* The peasants of the prosperous group own 6 to 10 draught animals per household (see sbove).

Postnikov puts it. The data given above showing the size of the commercial area fully bear out the author's description, inasmuch as the greater part of the cultivated area yields produce for the market—52% of the total area on farms with from 25 to 50 dessiatincs under crops, and 61% on farms with over 50 dessiatines under crops. Further evidence of this is the amount of the cash income: even the minimum in the case of the well-to-do group—574 rubles per household—is more than double the essential cash expenditure (200 to 250 rubles), thus forming a surplus which is accumulated and serves for the farm's expansion and improvement. "In the case of the more affluent peasants, those with over 50 dessiatines under crops per household," even "one branch of animal husbandry—the breeding of coarse-fleece sheep—assumes a market character," as Postnikov informs us (p. 188).

Let us now pass to another question, one that is also inadequately treated (in fact, left practically untouched) by Postnikov: how does the economic success of the minority of the peasants affect the majority? Undoubtedly, the effect is completely negative: the data cited above (especially those relating to the renting of land) are sufficient proof of this, so that we may here confine ourselves merely to summing up. In all three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, the peasants rent a total of 476,334 dessiatines of land (non-allotment and allotment), of which 298,727 dessiatines, or more than three-fifths (63%), are taken by the prosperous group. Only 6% falls to the share of the poor group, and 31% to that of the middle group. If we bear in mind that it is the two bottom groups that are most—if not exclusively—in need of rented land (the data given above regarding the distribution of land among the peasant groups in Dnieper Uyezd show that in the case of the top group the allotment arable alone is almost sufficient for a sown area of "normal" size), it will be obvious how severely they must suffer from lack of land due to the commercial expansion of the tillage of prosperous peasants.*

* "The German colonist presses hard upon the local peasant ... in depriving him of adjacent land, which he could otherwise rent or purchase," says Postnikov (p. 292). Obviously, in this respect the Russian well-to-do peasant stands closer to the German colonist than to his poor compatriot.

The distribution of the renting of allotment land, data for which have been given above, leads to exactly the same conclusions. To show the importance of the renting of allotment land to the different groups of peasants, let us quote the description of this type of renting given in Chapter IV of Postnikov's work.

"Allotment land," he says, "is now an object of extensive speculation among the South-Russian peasants. Land is used as security for loans on promissory notes, these latter circulating very widely here among the Taurida peasants, the proceeds from the land going to the money-lender until the debt is cleared. The land is leased or 'sold' for one or two years, and longer periods—8, 9 or 11 years. Such allotment leases are officially registered in the volost or village administration offices. On Sundays and holidays, I have seen large animated crowds in big villages standing in front of the village administration offices. In answer to my inquiry as to why the people were assembled, I was told that refreshments were being consumed and allotments 'sold,' the 'sales' being registered in the books of the village authorities.... The 'sale' of allotments is practised both in villages where the land is divided according to the number of registered persons in each family and no fundamental redistribution of the land takes place, and in villages where the land is divided according to the number of actual members in each family and is subject to periodical redistribution; only, in the latter case, the transactions are usually for shorter periods, until the next redistribution date, which in these parts has recently in most cases been determined in advance by the community's decision on land redistribution. Nowadays, these allotment-land transactions in the South-Russian villages are bound up with the most vital interests of the local prosperous peasants, who are so numerous here, especially in the Taurida uyezds. They are, incidentally, one of the principal conditions for the extensive cultivation of land practised by prosperous Taurida peasants, and of considerable economic advantage to them. That is why the prosperous peasants are so sensitive nowadays to every change in their manner of life which might deprive them of this renting of land that is mostly cheap and is, moreover, situated near by" (p. 140). He

then goes on to tell of how the Melitopol Uyezd Board of Peasants' Aflairs[15] demanded that each separate case of allotment leasing should be sanctioned by the village assembly, how the peasants were inconvenienced by this order and how "its only effect so far has been the disappearance of the land transaction records from the village courts, although they are probably still being kept unofficially" (p. 140).

Despite the large amount of land they rent, the prosperous peasants are also practically the only purchasers of land: in Dnieper Uyezd they own 78% of all the purchased land, and in Melitopol Uyezd 42,737 dessiatines out of a total of 48,099 dessiatines, or 88%.

Lastly, it is exclusively this category of peasants to whom credits are available. To supplement the author's remarks already cited on the village loan-and-savings societies in the South, we shall quote the following description of them.

"The village loan-and-savings .societies now to be found here and there in our country—they are very numerous in the Taurida villages, for example—chiefly assist prosperous peasants, and, it is to be presumed, quite substantially. I have on several occasions heard peasants in the Taurida villages where these societies function saying: 'Thank God, we've got rid of the Jews!' But it is the prosperous peasants who say this. The economically weak peasants cannot find guarantors and do not get loans" (p. 368). There is nothing surprising in this monopoly of credit: the credit transaction is nothing more than deferred-payment purchase. Quite naturally, payment can only be made by those who have the means, and among the South-Russian peasants it is only the well-to-do minority that have them.

To complete the description of the economy of this group, which surpasses all the other groups taken together in the fruits of its productive activity, we have only to recall that it resorts "to a considerable extent" to hired labour, of which members of the lower group are perforce the suppliers. It should be remarked in this regard that it is a matter of immense difficulty to calculate exactly the hired labour employed in agriculture, a difficulty which, it seems, has not yet been overcome by our Zemstvo statistics. As agriculture does not require a constant and

steady supply of labour all year round, but only an extra supply for a definite season, the registration of regular hired labourers alone will by no means indicate the degree of exploitation of hired labour, while the calculation of the number of seasonal (often casual) labourers is extremely difficult. In making a rough estimate of the number of hired labourers in each group, Postnikov sets the labour norm in the prosperous group at 15 dessiatines under crops per working member.* From Chapter VII of his book, where the author examines in detail the actual size of the area cultivated, we learn that this norm is achieved only when the crop is machine harvested. Yet the number of harvesting-machines is not very large even in the prosperous group—in Dnieper Uyezd, for example, it is about one per 10 households—so that even if we bear in mind.the author's statement that when they have completed their own harvesting, the owners of the machines hire them out, we shall nevertheless find that the majority of the peasants have to go without machines, and, consequently, have to ,hire day labourers. The employment of hired labour in the top group must therefore be on a larger scale than the author estimates, so that the big money income obtained by the peasants of this group largely (if not entirely) represents income from *capital*, in the specific meaning of that term given to it by scientific political economy.

Summing up what has been said about the third group, we arrive at the following description of it: the prosperous peasants, who possess considerably more than the average quantity of means of production, and whose labour, as a consequence, is more productive, are the principal growers of agricultural produce in the district, and predominate over the remaining groups; this group's farming is commercial in character, and is very largely based on the exploitation of hired labour.

The brief survey we have made of the political-economic differences in the economy of the three groups of the population of this area has been based on a systematisation of

* For 1.8 to 2.3 working members it is 27 to 34.5 dessiatines; but, as we know,the peasants of the prosperous group sow 34.5 to 75 dessiatines. Hecnce, the general characteristic of this group is that the size of the farm far exceeds the family labour norm.

the material contained in Postnikov's book on South-Russian peasant farming. This survey, it seems to me, proves that a study of peasant farming (from the political-economic standpoint) is quite impossible unless the peasants are divided into groups. Postnikov, as has already been indicated, recognises this, and even flings the reproach at the Zemstvo statisticians that they do not do this, that the summaries they make, despite the abundance of figures given, are "unclear," and that "they do not see the wood for the trees" (p. XII). Postnikov is hardly entitled to cast this reproach at the Zemstvo statisticians, for he himself has not made a systematic division of the peasants into "clear" groups, but the correctness of his demand is beyond question. Once it is admitted that there are not only quantitative, but also qualitative* differences between the various farms, it becomes absolutely essential to divide the peasants into groups differing, not in "affluence," but in the social and economic character of their farming. One is justified in hoping that it will not be long before this is done by the Zemstvo statisticians.

V

Not confining himself to recording the economic strife among the peasantry, Postnikov points to the intensification of this process:

"Diversity in the prosperity of the peasant groups is to be found everywhere in this country," he says, "and has existed from time immemorial. But in the last few decades this differentiation among the peasant population is becoming very marked, and is apparently steadily progressing" (p. 130). The difficult economic conditions of the year 1891[16] should, in the opinion of the author, give new impetus to this process.

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* Character of farming: self-consumer or commercial, character of exploitation of labour: sale of labour-power as the chief source of livelihood, or purchase of labour-power as the necessary consequence of the expansion of the cultivated area beyond the family's working capacity.

The question arises: what are the causes of this phenomenon which is exerting such an immense influence on the entire peasant population?

"Taurida Gubernia," says Postnikov, "is one of the most land-abundant in European Russia, and the one where the peasants' allotments are largest; communal landownership is universal there, and the land is distributed more or less evenly per head; agriculture is practically the sole pursuit of the rural population, yet the house-to-house census shows that 15% of the population have no draught animals at all, and that about one-third of the population have not enough implemeuts to cultivate their allotments" (p. 106). "On what," asks the author, "does this wide diversity of the groups depend, and, in particular, what, in a purely agricultural economy, determines the high proportion of householders with no tillage or draught animals that we now find in the region described?" (P. 130.)

Setting out in search of the causes of this phenomenon, Postnikov goes completely astray (fortunately, not for long) and starts to talk about "indolence,""drunkenness," and even about fires and horse-stealing. Nevertheless, he arrives at the conclusion that it is not in these causes that "the most essential aspect of the matter is to be found." Nor is anything explained by talking about bereavement in families, i.e., absence of adult working members: in the Taurida uyezds, of the total number of non-farming households, i.e., that have no land under crops, bereaved families constitute only 18%.

"The chief reasons why households are non-farming," the author concludes, "must be sought in other factors of the peasants' economic life" (p. 134). Specifically, Postnikov is of the opinion that "of the enumerated causes contributing to the decline of farming among certain peasants, the one which may be considered the most fundamental, and which, unfortunately, our Zemstvo statisticians have done little to elucidate as yet, is the *fragmentation of the allotments* and the restricted amount of land in use by the peasant, the diminution in the average size of the peasant farm" (p. 141). "The root cause of Russia's economic poverty," the author says, "is the small size of the peasant's

land and of his farm, which prevents him from making full use of the labour-power of his family" (p. 341).

To explain this proposition, which Postnikov expresses very inaccurately, for he himself has established that the average size of peasant farm (17 to 18 dessiatines under crops) is sufficient to maintain a family in comfort, and that a general, wholesale description of the entire peasantry in terms of the size of the farm is impossible—it should be recalled that he has already established the general law that the productivity of peasant labour grows with the increase in the size of the farm. Full utilisation of the family's labour-power (and draught animals) is achieved, according to his estimates, only in the top groups—in the Taurida uyezds, for example, only among the prosperous peasants; the vast majority of the population "pick at the land unproductively" (p. 340), uselessly wasting a vast amount of effort.

Despite the fact that the author has fully demonstrated the dependence of labour productivity on the size of the farm and the extremely low productivity in the bottom peasant groups, this law (Postnikov calls it agricultural over-population in Russia, agricultural over-saturation with labour) should not be regarded as the cause of the break-up of the peasantry—the question, after all, is why the peasantry have broken up into such different groups, whereas agricultural over-population already presupposes the existence of such a break-up; the author arrived at the very concept of over-population by comparing small and large farms and their profitability. Hence, the question—"on what does the wide diversity of the groups depend?"—cannot be answered by talking about agricultural over-population. This, apparently, Postnikov himself realised, but he did not set himself the definite aim of investigating the causes of the phenomenon, so that his observations suffer from a certain scrappiness: side by side with incomplete and inaccurate points, we find true ideas. For example, he says:

"It cannot be expected that the fierce struggle now going on in rural life over landownership will help in the future to further the principles of communality and harmony among the population. And this struggle is not a transitory one, the result of chance causes.... In our view it is not a

struggle between communal traditions and the individualism that is developing in rural life, but a pure struggle of economic interests, which is bound to end fatally for one section of the population in view of the existing land poverty" (p. XXXII).

"It is quite an obvious truth," says Postnikov elsewhere, "that with this land poverty and the small size of the farms, and the absence of sufficient industries, there can be no prosperity among the peasantry, and all that is economically weak is bound, one way or another, sooner or later, to be ousted from peasant farming" (p. 368).

These remarks contain a much truer answer to the question, and one, moreover, that fully conforms to the above-established differentiation of the population. The answer is that the appearance of a mass of non-farming households and the increase in their numbers, are determined by the struggle of economic interests among the peasantry. On what basis is this struggle being waged, and by what means? As to the means, they are not only, and not even so much, the grabbing of land (as might be concluded from Postnikov's remarks just quoted), as the lower production costs following on the increase in the size of the farms—of which enough has already been said. As for the basis on which this struggle arises, Postnikov points to it quite clearly in the following remark:

"There is a definite minimum of farm-service area below which a peasant farm must not drop, because it would then become unprofitable, or even impossible to run. A definite food area is required for the maintenance of family and livestock (?); a farm which has no outside earnings, or where they are small, must possess a certain market area, the produce of which may be sold to provide the peasant family with money for the payment of taxes, for the acquisition of clothing and footwear, for necessary expenditure on farm implements, buildings, etc. If the size of a peasant farm falls below this minimum, farming becomes impossible. In such cases, the peasant will find it more profitable to give up farming and become a labourer, whose expenditure is more limited and whose needs can be more fully satisfied even with a smaller gross income" (p. 141).

If, on the one hand, a peasant finds it profitable to ex-

pand his sown area far beyond his own grain requirements, it is because he can sell his produce. If, on the other hand, a peasant finds it profitable to give up farming and become a labourer, it is because the satisfaction of the greater part of his needs entails cash expenditure, that is, sale;* and as, in selling his farm produce, he encounters a rival on the market with whom he cannot compete, the only thing left for him is to sell his labour-power. In a word, the soil in which the above-described phenomena grow is production for sale. The fundamental cause of the struggle of economic interests arising among the peasantry is the existence of a system under which the market is the regulator of social production.

Having concluded his description of the "new economic developments in peasant life" and his attempt to explain them, Postnikov goes on to outline practical measures to solve the "agrarian problem." We shall not follow the author into this field, firstly, because it does not enter the plan of the present article, and, secondly, because this part of Postnikov's work is the weakest of all. This will be quite obvious if we recall that most of the contradictions and incomplete statements in the work were to be met with precisely when the author tried to explain economic processes; and unless these are fully and accurately explained, there can be no question of indicating any practical measures.

* Cf. the data given above regarding the food and the commercial areas under crops (the income from only these areas goes to cover the needs of the farmer, and not of the farm, that is, represents income in the real sense, and not production costs), and also the data regarding the average cash expenditure of the Taurida peasant in connection with the quantity of grain used for food (two chetverts per person of either sex).

ON THE SO-CALLED MARKET QUESTION [17]

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

По поводу так-называемаго вопроса о рынках.

I.

Можетъ-ли у насъ въ Россіи развиваться и вообще развиться капитализму, когда часть народа вымерла и обрѣчена на гибель? Вопросъ для развитія капитализма необходимыхъ внутреннихъ рынковъ, а развитіе капитализма подрываетъ этотъ рынокъ, чрезвычайно сокращаетъ его и дѣлаетъ невозможнымъ осуществленіе капиталистическихъ порядковъ. Говорятъ, будто, что превращая крестьянъ исключительно въ непосредственныхъ производителей въ товарахъ, капитализмъ тѣмъ самымъ создаетъ себѣ рынокъ, но никто не доказывалъ, чтобы на счетъ фондовъ отмѣнъ натуральнаго хозяйства у крестьянъ могъ раз-

First manuscript paage of Lenin's *On the So-Called Market Question*, 1893 (*Reduced*)

First manuscript page of Lenin's On the So-Called Market Question, 1893 (Reduced)

I

Can capitalism develop in Russia and reach full development when the masses of the people are poor and are becoming still poorer? The development of capitalism certainly needs an extensive home market; but the ruin of the peasantry undermines this market, threatens to close it altogether and make the organisation of the capitalist order impossible. True, it is said that, by transforming the natural economy of our direct producers into a commodity economy, capitalism is creating a market for itself; but is it conceivable that the miserable remnants of the natural economy of indigent peasants can form the basis for the development in our country of the mighty capitalist production that we see in the West? Is it not evident that the one fact of the masses being impoverished already makes our capitalism something impotent and without foundation, incapable of embracing the entire production of the country and of becoming the *basis* of our social economy?

Such are the questions that are constantly being advanced in our literature in opposition to the Russian Marxists; the absence of a market is one of the principal arguments invoked against the possibility of applying the theory of Marx to Russia. To refute this argument is the aim, incidentally, of the paper *The Market Question*, which we are about to discuss.

II

The main premise of the author of the paper is the assumption of the "general and exclusive domination of capitalist production." Proceeding from that premise he expounds

the contents of Chapter XXI of Volume II of *Capital* (Part III—"The Reproduction and Circulation of the Aggregate Social Capital").

Here Marx sets out to investigate how social production replaces the part of the product which serves to satisfy the personal needs of the workers and the capitalists, and that which goes to form the elements of productive capital. Hence, in Volume I, the investigation of the production and reproduction of an *individual* capital could be limited to an analysis of the component parts of capital and the product according to their value—[as is shown in Volume I of *Capital* the value of the product consists of *c* (constant capital) + *v* (variable capital) + *s* (surplus-value)]—but here the product must be divided into its material components, because that part of the product which consists of the elements of capital cannot be used for personal consumption, and vice versa. In view of that, Marx divides aggregate social production—and consequently, the aggregate social product—into two departments: I) the production of means of production, i.e., the elements of productive capital—commodities which can serve only for productive consumption, and II) the production of means of consumption, i.e., commodities that serve for the personal consumption of the working class and the capitalist class.

The investigation is based on the following scheme [Arabic numerals indicate units of value—millions of rubles, for example; Roman numerals indicate the above-mentioned departments of social production. The rate of surplus-value is taken at 100 per cent]:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}000\,\text{c} + 1{,}000\,\text{v} + 1{,}000\,\text{s} = 6{,}000 \\ \text{II} & 2{,}000\,\text{c} + 500\,\text{v} + 500\,\text{s} = 3{,}000 \end{array} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Capital} = 7{,}500 \\ \text{Product} = 9{,}000 \end{array} \right\}$$

Let us begin by supposing that we are dealing with simple reproduction, i.e., let us assume that production does not expand, but remains permanently on its former scale; this means that the capitalists consume the whole surplus-value unproductively, that they expend it for their personal needs and not for accumulation. Under those circumstances it is obvious, firstly, that II 500 v and II 500 s must be consumed by the capitalists and the workers in

the same department II, since that product exists in the form of means of consumption intended for the satisfaction of personal needs. Further, I 4,000 c in its natural form must be consumed by the capitalists in the same department I, because the condition that the scale of production remains unchanged demands the retention of the same capital for the next year's production of means of production; consequently, the replacement of this part of capital also presents no difficulty; the corresponding part of the product existing in the natural form of coal, iron, machines, etc., will be exchanged among the capitalists engaged in producing means of production and will serve them, as before, as constant capital. Thus, there remains I (v + s) and II c. I 1,000 v + I 1,000 s are products existing in the form of means of production, and II 2,000 c—in the form of means of consumption. The workers and capitalists in department I (under simple reproduction, i.e., consumption of the entire surplus-value) must consume means of consumption to the value of 2,000 [1,000 (v) + 1,000 (s)]. To be able to continue production on the previous scale, the capitalists in department II must acquire means of production to the extent of 2,000 in order to replace their constant capital (2,000 II c). It is evident from this that I v + I s must be exchanged for II c, because, if they are not, production on the previous scale will be impossible. The condition for simple reproduction is that the sum of the variable capital and surplus-value in department I must be equal to the constant capital in department II: I (v + s) = II c. In other words, that law may be formulated as follows: the sum of *all the new* values produced in the course of a year (in both departments) must be equal to the gross value of the product existing in the form of means of consumption: I (v + s) + II (v + s) = II (c + v + s).

Actually, of course, there can be no simple reproduction, both because the production of the whole of society cannot remain on the previous scale every year, and because accumulation is a law of the capitalist system. Let us, therefore, examine how social production on an expanding scale, or accumulation, takes place. Where there is accumulation, only part of the surplus-value is consumed by the capitalists for their personal needs, the other part being

consumed productively, i.e., converted into the elements of productive capital for the expansion of production. Therefore, where there is accumulation, I (v + s) and II c cannot be equal: I (v + s) must be greater than II c in order that part of the surplus-value in department I (I s) may be used for the expansion of production, and not exchanged for means of consumption. Thus we get

A. *Scheme of Simple Reproduction*:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}000\ c + 1{,}000\ v + 1{,}000\ s = 6{,}000 \\ \text{II} & 2{,}000\ c + 500\ v + 500\ s = 3{,}000 \end{array}$$

$$\text{I}\ (v + s) = \text{II}\ c.$$

B. *Initial Scheme of Accumulation:*

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}000\ c + 1{,}000\ v + 1{,}000\ s = 6{,}000 \\ \text{II} & 1{,}500\ c + 750\ v + 750\ s = 3{,}000 \end{array}$$

$$\text{I}\ (v + s) > \text{II}\ c.$$

Let us now see how social production must proceed if there is accumulation.

First year.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}000\ c + 1{,}000\ v + 1{,}000\ s = 6{,}000 \\ \text{II} & 1{,}500\ c + 750\ v + 750\ s = 3{,}000 \end{array} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Capital} = 7{,}250 \\ \text{Product} = 9{,}000 \end{array} \right\}$$

I (1,000 + 500 s) are exchanged for II 1,500 c (as in simple reproduction).

I 500 s are accumulated, i.e., go to expand production, are converted into *capital*. If we take the previous division into constant and variable capital we get

$$\text{I}\ 500\ s = 400\ c + 100\ v.$$

The additional constant capital (400 c) is contained in the product I (its natural form is means of production); but the additional variable capital (100 v) must be obtained from the capitalists of department II, who, consequently, also have to accumulate: they exchange part of their surplus-value (II 100 s) for means of production (I 100 v) and convert these means of production into additional constant capital. Consequently, their constant capital grows from 1,500 c to 1,600 c; to process it additional labour-power

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

is needed—*50 v*, which is also taken out of the surplus-value of the capitalists of department II.

By adding the additional capital from department I and department II to the original capital we get the following distribution of the product:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}400\ \text{c} + 1{,}100\ \text{v} + (500\ \text{s}) = 6{,}000 \\ \text{II} & 1{,}600\ \text{c} + 800\ \text{v} + (600\ \text{s}) = 3{,}000 \end{array}$$

The surplus-value in parentheses represents the capitalists' consumption fund, i.e., the part of surplus-value that does not go for accumulation, but for the personal needs of the capitalists.

If production proceeds on the previous scale, at the end of the year we shall get:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}400\ \text{c} + 1{,}100\ \text{v} + 1{,}100\ \text{s} = 6{,}600 \\ \text{II} & 1{,}600\ \text{c} + 800\ \text{v} + 800\ \text{s} = 3{,}200 \end{array} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Capital} = 7{,}900 \\ \text{Product} = 9{,}800 \end{array} \right\}$$

I (1,100 v + 550 s) are exchanged for II 1,650 c; the additional 50 c are taken from 800 II s [and the increase of c by 50 causes an increase of *v* by 25].

Further, 550 I s are accumulated as before:

$$\begin{array}{l} 550\ \ \text{I s} = 440\ \text{c} + 110\ \text{v} \\ \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \downarrow \\ 165\ \ \text{II s} = 110\ \text{c} + 55\ \text{v}. \end{array}$$

If to the original capital we now add the additional [to I 4,400 c—440 c; to I 1,100 v—110 v; to II 1,600 c — 50 c and 110 c; and to II 800v—25v—and 55v], we shall get;

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}840\ \text{c} + 1{,}210\ \text{v} + (550\ \text{s}) = 6{,}600 \\ \text{II} & 1{,}760\ \text{c} + 880\ \text{v} + (560\ \text{s}) = 3{,}200 \end{array}$$

With the further progress of production we get

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{I} & 4{,}840\ \text{c} + 1{,}210\ \text{v} + 1{,}210\ \text{s} = 7{,}260 \\ \text{II} & 1{,}760\ \text{c} + 880\ \text{v} + 880\ \text{s} = 3{,}520 \end{array} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Capital} = 8{,}690 \\ \text{Product} = 10{,}780 \end{array} \right\}$$

and so forth.

Such, in essence, are the results of Marx's investigations in the reproduction of the aggregate social capital. These investigations (the reservation must be made) are given here in a most concise form; very much that Marx analyses in detail has been omitted—for

example, circulation of money, replacement of fixed capital which is gradually worn out, and so forth—because all this has no direct bearing on the question under review.

III

What conclusions does the author of the paper draw from these investigations made by Marx? Unfortunately, he does not formulate his conclusions very precisely and definitely, so that we have to make our own judgement of them from certain remarks which do not fully harmonise with each other. Thus, for example, we read:

"We have seen here," says the author, "how accumulation takes place in department I, the production of means of production as means of production:... this accumulation takes place independently both of the progress of the production of articles of consumption and of the personal consumption itself, no matter whose it is" (page $^{15}/_{3}$).

Of course, it is wrong to speak of accumulation being "independent" of the production of articles of consumption, if only because the expansion of production calls for new variable capital and, consequently, articles of consumption; evidently, by using that term the author merely wanted to stress the specific feature of the scheme, namely, that the reproduction of I c—constant capital in department I—takes place without exchanges with department II, i.e., every year a certain quantity of, say, coal is produced in society for the purpose of producing coal. It goes without saying that this production (of coal for the purpose of producing coal) links up, by a series of subsequent exchanges, with the production of articles of consumption—otherwise, neither the coal-owners nor their workers could exist.

Elsewhere, the author expresses himself much more feebly: "The *principal* movement of capitalist accumulation," he says, "takes place, and has taken place (except in very early periods) independently of any direct producers, independently of the personal consumption of any stratum of the population" (p. 8). Here, reference is made only to the predominance of the production of means of production over the production of articles of consumption in

the course of the historical development of capitalism. This reference is repeated in another passage: "On the one hand, the typical feature of capitalist society is accumulation for accumulation, productive but not personal consumption; on the other hand, *typical* of it is precisely the production of means of production as means of production" (p. 21/2). If by these references the author wanted to say that capitalist society is distinguished from the other economic organisations which preceded it precisely by the development of machines and the articles necessary for them (coal, iron, and so forth), then he is quite right. In technical level capitalist society is higher than all others, and technical progress is expressed precisely in the fact that the work of machines pushes human labour more and more into the background.

Instead of engaging in criticism of the author's insufficiently clear statements it will, therefore, be better to turn straight to Marx and see whether it is possible to draw from his theory the conclusion that department I "predominates" over department II, and in what sense this predominance is to be understood.

From Marx's scheme quoted above the conclusion cannot be drawn that department I predominates over department II: both develop on parallel lines. But that scheme does not take technical progress into consideration. As Marx proved in Volume I of *Capital*, technical progress is expressed by the gradual decrease of the ratio of variable capital to constant capital $\left(\frac{v}{c}\right)$, whereas in the scheme it is taken as unchanged.

It goes without saying that if this change is made in the scheme there will be a relatively more rapid increase in means of production than in articles of consumption. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it will be worth while making that calculation, firstly, for the sake of clarity, and secondly, to avoid possible wrong conclusions from that premise.

[In the following scheme the rate of accumulation is taken as constant: half of the surplus-value is accumulated and half is consumed personally.]

[The reader may skip the following scheme and pass straight to the conclusions on the next page. The letter a stands for additional capital used for the expansion of production, i.e., the accumulated part of surplus-value.]

1st year)

I 4,000 c + 1,000 v + 1,000 s = 6,000. . . v : (c + v) = 20.0%
II 1,500 c + 750 v + 750 s = 3,000. . . " " " 33.3%

I (1,000 v + 500 s) = II 1,500 c

a. I 500 s = 450 c + 50 v. . . " " " $\frac{1}{10}$

a. II 60 s = 50 c + 10 v. . . " " " $\frac{1}{6}$

I 4,450 c + 1,050 v + (500 s) = 6,000
II 1,550 c + 760 v + (690 s) = 3,000

2nd year)

I 4,450 c + 1,050 v + 1,050 s = 6,550. . . v : (c + v) = 19.2%
II 1,550 c + 760 v + 760 s = 3,070. . . " " " 32.9%

I (1,050 v + 525 s) = II 1,575 c
II (1,550 c + 25 s)

a. II 28 s = 25 c + 3 v. . . " " " ab. $\frac{1}{9}$

a. I 525 s = 500 c + 25 v. . . " " " ab. $\frac{1}{21}$

a. II 28 s = 25 c + 3 v. . . " " " ab. $\frac{1}{9}$

I 4,950 c + 1,070 v + (525 s) = 6,550
II 1,602 c + 766 v + (702 s) = 3,070

3rd year)

I 4,950 c + 1,075 v + 1,075 s = 7,100. . . v : (c + v) = 17.8%
II 1,602 c + 766 v + 766 s = 3,134. . . " " " 32.3%

I (1,075 v + 537 $\frac{1}{2}$ s) = II 1,612 $\frac{1}{2}$ c
II (1,602 c + 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ s)

a. II 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ s = 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ c + 1 v . . . " " " ab. $\frac{1}{12}$

a. I 537 $\frac{1}{2}$ s = 517 $\frac{1}{2}$ c + 20 v. . . " " " ab. $\frac{1}{26}$

a. II 22 s = 20 c + 2 v . . . " " " ab. $\frac{1}{11}$

$$\text{I} \quad 5{,}467\tfrac{1}{2}\ c + 1{,}095\ v + (537\tfrac{1}{2}\ s) = 7{,}100$$

$$\text{II} \quad 1{,}634\tfrac{1}{2}\ c + 769\ v + (730\tfrac{1}{2}\ s) = 3{,}134$$

4th year)

$$\text{I} \quad 5{,}467\tfrac{1}{2}\ c + 1{,}095\ v + 1{,}095\ s = 7{,}657\tfrac{1}{2}\ldots \qquad v : (c + v) = 16.7\%$$

$$\text{II} \quad 1{,}634\tfrac{1}{2}\ c + 769\ v + 769\ s = 3{,}172\tfrac{1}{2}\ldots \qquad \text{"} \quad \text{"} \quad \text{"}\ 32.0\%$$

and so forth.[18]

Let us now compare the conclusions drawn from this scheme concerning the growth of the various parts of the social product:[19]

	Means of production as means of		Means of production as means of		Means of consumption product		Aggregate social	
	Production	%	Consumption	%		%		%
1st year	4,000	100	2,000	100	3,000	100	9,000	100
2nd year	4,450	111.25	2,000	105	3,070	102	9,620	100
3rd year	4,950	123.75	2,000	107.5	3,134	104	10,234	100
4th year	$5{,}467\frac{1}{2}$	136.7	2,000	109.5	3,172	106	$10{,}828\frac{1}{2}$	100

We thus see that growth in the production of means of production as means of production is the most rapid, then comes the production of means of production as means of consumption, and the slowest rata of growth is in the production of means of consumption. That conclusion could have been arrived at, without Marx's investigation in Volume II of *Capital*, on the basis of the law that constant capital tends to grow faster than variable: the proposition that means of production grow faster is merely a paraphrase of this law as applied to social production as a whole.

But perhaps we should take another step forward? Since we have accepted that the ratio v to $c+v$ diminishes constantly, why not let v decrease to zero, the same number of workers being sufficient for a larger quantity of means of

production? In that case, the accumulated part of surplus-value will be added straight to constant capital in department I, and social production will grow exclusively on account of means of production as means of production, complete stagnation reigning in department* II.**

That would, of course, be a misuse of the schemes, for such a conclusion is based on improbable assumptions and is therefore wrong. Is it conceivable that technical progress, which reduces the proportion of *v* to *c*, will find expression only in department I and leave department II in a state of complete stagnation? Is it in conformity with the laws governing capitalist society, laws which *demand* of every capitalist that he enlarge his enterprise on pain of ruin, that no accumulation at all should take place in department II?

Thus, the only correct conclusion that can be drawn from Marx's investigation, outlined above, is that *in capitalist society, the production of means of production increases faster than the production of means of consumption.* As has been stated already, this conclusion follows directly from the generally known proposition that capitalist production attains an immeasurably higher technical level than production in previous times.*** On this point specifically Marx expresses himself quite definitely only in one

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* I do not mean to say that such a thing is absolutely impossible as an individual case. Here, however, we are not discussing special cases, but the general law of development of capitalist society.

** I shall explain the point by the following scheme:

I 4,000 c + 1,000 v + 1,000 s = 6,000
II 1,500 c + 750 v + 750 s = 3,000
I (1,000 v + 500 s) = II 1,500 c
I 500 s are accumulated, added to I 4,000 c:
I 4,500 c + 1,000 v + (500 s) = 6,000
II 1,500 c + 750 v + 750 s = 3,000
I 4,500 c + 1,000 v + 1,000 s = 6,500
II 1,500 c + 750 v + 750 s = 3,000
I (1,000 v + 500 s) = II 1,500 c
I 500 s are accumulated as before, and so forth.

*** That is why the conclusion drawn can be formulated somewhat differently: in capitalist society, production (and, consequently, "the market") can grow either on account of the growth of articles of consumption, or, and mainly, of technical progress, i.e., the ousting of hand by machine labour, for the change in the proportion of *v* to *c* expresses precisely the diminution of the role of hand labour.

passage, and that passage fully confirms the correctness of the formula given:

"What distinguishes capitalist society in this case from the savage is not, as Senior thinks, the privilege and peculiarity of the savage to expend his labour at times in a way that does not procure him any products resolvable (exchangeable) into revenue, i.e., into articles of consumption. No, the distinction consists in the following:

"α) Capitalist society employs more [Nota bene] of its available annual labour in the production of means of production (ergo, of constant capital), which are not resolvable into revenue in the form of wages or surplus-value, but can function only as capital." (*Das Kapital*, Bd. II, Seite 436.)[20]

IV

The question now is, what relation has the theory that has been expounded to "the notorious market question"? The theory is based on the assumption of the "general and exclusive domination of the capitalist mode of production," whereas the "question" is one of whether the full development of capitalism is "possible" in Russia? True, the theory introduces a correction into the ordinary conception of the development of capitalism, but, evidently, the explanation of how capitalism develops *in general* does not in the least help to clear up the question of the "possibility" (and necessity) of the development of capitalism in Russia.

The author of the paper, however, does not confine himself to expounding Marx's theory of the process of aggregate social production organised on capitalist lines. He points to the necessity of distinguishing "two *essentially different* features in the accumulation of capital: 1) the development of capitalist production in breadth, when it takes hold of already existing fields of labour, ousting natural economy and expanding at the latter's expense; and 2) the development of capitalist production in depth, if one may so express it, when it expands independently of natural economy, i.e., under the general and exclusive domination of the capitalist mode of production." Without, for the time being, stopping to criticise this division, let us proceed directly to find out what the author means by the development

of capitalism in breadth: the explanation of that process, which consists in the replacement of natural economy by capitalist economy, should show us how Russian capitalism will "take hold of the whole country."

The author illustrates the development of capitalism in breadth by the following diagram:*



A—capitalists; *W*—direct producers
a, a_1, a_{11},—capitalist enterprises.
The arrows show the movement of the commodities exchanged.
c, v, m—component parts of the value of commodities.
I, II—commodities in their natural form: I—means of production; II—means of consumption.

"The essential difference between the spheres *A* and *W*," says the author, "is that in *A* the producers are capitalists who consume their surplus-value productively, whereas in *W* they are direct producers, who consume their surplus-value (here I mean the value of the product over and above the value of the means of production and necessary means of subsistence) unproductively.

"If we follow the arrows in the diagram we shall easily see how capitalist production in *A* develops at the expense of consumption in *W*, gradually absorbing it." The product of the capitalist enterprise a goes "to the direct producers" in

* m stands for "Mehrwert," i.e., surplus-value (s); "*u. m. д.*" means "and so on."—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the form of articles of consumption; in exchange for it the "direct producers" return the constant capital (c) in the form of means of production and the variable capital (v) in the form of means of consumption, and the surplus-value (s) in the form of the elements of additional productive capital: $c_1 + v_1$. That capital serves as the basis of the new capitalist enterprise a_1, which in exactly the same way sends its product in the form of articles of consumption to the "direct producers," and so on. "From the above diagram of the development of capitalism in breadth it follows that the whole of production is most closely dependent upon consumption in 'foreign' markets, upon consumption by the masses (and from the general point of view it makes absolutely no difference where those masses are—alongside the capitalists, or somewhere across the ocean). Obviously, the expansion of production in *A*, i.e., the development of capitalism in this direction, will come to a stop as soon as all the direct producers in *W* turn into commodity producers, for, as we saw above, every new enterprise (or expansion of an old one) is calculated to supply a new circle of consumers in *W*." In conclusion the author says: "The current conception of capitalist accumulation, i.e., of capitalist reproduction on an expanded scale, is limited solely to this view of things, and has no suspicion of the development of capitalist production in depth, independently of any countries with direct producers, i.e., independently of so-called foreign markets."

The only thing we can agree with in this entire exposition is that this conception of the development of capitalism in breadth, and the diagram which illustrates it, is in complete accordance with the current, Narodnik views on the subject.

It would, indeed, be difficult to depict the utter absurdity and vapidity of current views more saliently and strikingly than is done in the diagram given.

"The current conception" always regarded capitalism in our country as something isolated from the "people's system," standing apart from it, exactly as it is depicted in the diagram from which it is quite impossible to see what connection there is between the two "spheres," the capitalist sphere and the people's sphere. Why do commodities sent from *A* find a market in *W*? What causes the transformation

of natural economy in *W* into commodity economy? The current view has never answered these questions because it regards exchange as something accidental and not as a certain *system of economy*.

Further, the current view has never *explained* whence and how capitalism arose in our country any more than it is explained by the diagram: the matter is presented as though the capitalists have come from somewhere outside and not from among these very "direct producers." Where the capitalists get the "free workers" who are needed for enterprises a, a1, etc., remains a mystery. Everybody knows that in reality those workers are obtained precisely from the "direct producers," but the diagram does not show at all that when commodity production embraced "sphere" *W*, it created there a body of free workers.

In short, the diagram—exactly like the current view—explains absolutely nothing about the phenomena of the capitalist system in our country and is therefore worthless. The object for which it was drawn—to explain how capitalism develops at the expense of natural economy, and embraces the whole country—is not achieved at all, because, as the author himself sees—"if we adhere consistently to the view under examination, then we must conclude that it is not possible for the development of the capitalist mode of production to become universal."

After this, one can only express surprise at the fact that the author himself adheres, if only in part, to that view when he says that "capitalism did indeed (?), in its infancy, develop in this very easy (sic!?) way (very easy because here existing branches of labour are involved) and is partly developing in the same direction even now (??), since there are still remnants of natural economy in the world, and since the population is growing."

Actually, this is not a "very easy" way of developing capitalism, but simply a "very easy" way of understanding the process; so "very easy" that it would be more correct to call it a total lack of understanding. The Russian Narodniks of all shades make shift to this very day with these "very easy" tricks: they never dream of *explaining* how capitalism arose in our country, and how it functions, but confine themselves to comparing the "sore spot" in our system, capi-

talism, with the "healthy spot," the direct producers, the "people"; the former is put on the left, the latter on the right, and all this profound thinking is rounded off with sentimental phrases about what is "harmful" and what is "useful" for "human society."

V

To correct the diagram given above we must begin by ascertaining the content of the concepts dealt with. By commodity production is meant an organisation of social economy in which goods are produced by separate, isolated producers, each specialising in the making of some one product, so that to satisfy the needs of society it is necessary to buy and sell products (which, therefore, become commodities) in the market. By capitalism is meant that stage of the development of commodity production at which not only the products of human labour, but human labour-power itself becomes a commodity. Thus, in the historical development of capitalism two features are important: 1) the transformation of the natural economy of the direct producers into commodity economy, and 2) the transformation of commodity economy into capitalist economy. The first transformation is due to the appearance of the social division of labour—the specialisation of isolated [N.B.: this is an essential condition of commodity economy], separate producers in only one branch of industry. The second transformation is due to the fact that separate producers, each producing commodities on his own for the market, enter into competition with one another: each strives to sell at the highest price and to buy at the lowest, a necessary result of which is that the strong become stronger and the weak go under, a minority are enriched and the masses are ruined. This leads to the conversion of independent producers into wage-workers and of numerous small enterprises into a few big ones. The diagram should, therefore, be drawn up to show both these features of the development of capitalism and the changes which this development brings about in the dimensions of the market, i.e., in the quantity of products that are turned into commodities.

The following table* has been drawn up on these lines; all extraneous circumstances have been abstracted, i.e., taken as constants (for example, size of population, productivity of labour, and much else) in order to analyse the influence on the market of *only those* features of the development of capitalism that are mentioned above.

Let us now examine this table showing the consecutive changes in the system of economy of a community consisting of 6 producers. It shows 6 periods expressing stages in the transformation of natural into capitalist economy.

1st period. We have 6 producers, each of whom expends his labour in all 3 branches of industry (in *a*, in *b* and in *c*). The product obtained (9 from each producer: a+b+c=9) is spent by each producer on himself in his own household. Hence, we have natural economy in its pure form; no products whatever appear in the market.

2nd period. Producer I changes the productivity of his labour: he leaves industry *b* and spends the time formerly spent in that industry in industry *c*. As a result of this specialisation by one producer, the others cut down production *c*, because producer I has produced more than he consumes himself, and increase production *b* in order to turn out a product for producer I. The division of labour which comes into being inevitably leads to commodity production: producer I sells 1 *c* and buys 1 *b*; the other producers sell 1 *b* (each of the 5 sells $\frac{1}{5}$ b) and buy 1 *c* (each buying $\frac{1}{5}$ c); a quantity of products appears in the market to the value of *6*. The dimensions of the market correspond exactly to the degree of specialisation of social labour: specialisation has taken place in the production of one *c* (1 c=3) and of one b (1 b=3), i.e., a ninth part of total social production [18 c (=a=b)], and a ninth part of the total social product has appeared in the market.

3rd period. Division of labour proceeds further, embracing branches of industry *b* and *c* to the full: three producers engage exclusively in industry *b* and three exclusively in industry *c*. Each sells 1 c (or 1 b), i.e., 3 units of value, and also buys 3—1 *b* (or 1 c). This increased division of labour leads to an expansion of the market, in which 18 units of

* See table on pp. 96-97.—*Ed.*

value now appear. Again, the dimensions of the market correspond exactly to the degree of specialisation (= division) of social labour: specialisation has taken place in the production of 3 *b* and 3 *c*, i.e., one-third of social production, and one-third of the social product appears in the market.

The 4th period already represents capitalist production: the process of the transformation of commodity into capitalist production did not go into the table and, therefore, must be described separately.

In the preceding period each producer was already a commodity producer (in the spheres of industry *b* and *c*, the only ones we are discussing): each producer separately, on his own, independently of the others, produced for the market, whose dimensions were, of course, not known to any one of them. This relation between isolated producers working for a common market is called competition. It goes without saying that an equilibrium between production and consumption (supply and demand) is, under these circumstances, achieved only by a series of fluctuations. The more skilful, enterprising and strong producer will become still stronger as a result of these fluctuations, and the weak and unskilful one will be crushed by them. The enrichment of a few individuals and the impoverishment of the masses—such are the inevitable consequences of the law of competition. The matter ends by the ruined producers losing economic independence and engaging themselves as wage-workers in the enlarged establishment of their fortunate rival. That is the situation depicted in the table. Branches of industry *b* and *c*, which were formerly divided among all 6 producers, are now concentrated in the hands of 2 producers (I and IV). The rest of the producers are their wage-workers, who no longer receive the whole product of their labour, but the product with the surplus-value deducted, the latter being appropriated by the employer [let me remind you that, by assumption, surplus-value equals one-third of the product, so that the producer of 2 *b* (= 6) will receive from the employer two-thirds—i.e., 4]. As a result, we get an increase in division of labour—and a growth of the market, where 22 units now appear, notwithstanding the fact that the "masses" are "impoverished"; the producers who have become (partly)

EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE

I—II...—Vl are producers.

a, b, c are branches of industry (for example, agriculture, manufacturing and extractive industries).

$a = b = c = 3$. The magnitude of value of the products $a = b = c$ equals *3* (three units of value) of which *1* is surplus-value.*

The "market" column shows the magnitude of value of the *products* sold (and bought); the figures in parentheses show the magnitude of value of the labour-power (=l. p.) sold (and bought).

The arrows proceeding from one producer to another show that the first is a wage-worker for the second.

Simple reproduction is assumed: the capitalists consume the entire surplus-value unproductively.

	Production	Production				Natural consumption
		Branch of industry			Total	
		a	b	c		
1.	I	a	b	c	9	9
	II	a	b	c	9	9
	III	a	b	c	9	9
	IV	a	b	c	9	9
	V	a	b	c	9	9
	VI	a	b	c	9	9
	Total	6a	6b	6c	54	54
3.	I	a	—	2b	9	6
	II	a	2b	—	9	6
	III	a	—	2b	9	6
	IV	a	2b	—	9	6
	V	a	—	2b	9	6
	VI	a	2b	—	9	6
	Total	6a	6b	6c	54	36
5.	I	2a	—	6c	24	11
	II	$\frac{1}{2}$a	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$
	III	$\frac{1}{2}$a	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$
	IV	2a	6b	—	24	11
	V	$\frac{1}{2}$a	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$
	VI	$\frac{1}{2}$a	—	—	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$
	Total	6a	6b	6c	54	28

* The part or value which replaces constant capital is taken as unchanging and is thererore ignored.

Market		Production	Production				Natural consumption	Market		
Sells	Buys		Branch of industry			Total		Sells	Buys	
			a	b	c					
—	—	I	a	—	2c	9	6	3	3	2.
—	—	II	a	$\frac{6}{5}$b	$\frac{4}{5}$c	9	$8\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	
—	—	III	a	$\frac{6}{5}$b	$\frac{4}{5}$c	9	$8\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	
—	—	IV	a	$\frac{6}{5}$b	$\frac{4}{5}$c	9	$8\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	
—	—	V	a	$\frac{6}{5}$b	$\frac{4}{5}$c	9	$8\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	
—	—	VI	a	$\frac{6}{5}$b	$\frac{4}{5}$c	9	$8\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	
—	—	*Total*	6a	6b	6c	54	48	6	6	
3	3	I	a		6c	21	10	11	3 (+8 l.p.)	4.
3	3	II	a	—	—	3	3	(4 l.p.)	4	
3	3	III	a	—	—	3	3	(4 l.p.)	4	
3	3	IV	a	6b	—	21	10	11	3 (+8 l.p.)	
3	3	V	a	—	—	3	3	(4 l.p.)	4	
3	3	VI	a	—	—	3	3	(4 l.p.)	4	
18	18	*Total*	6a	6b	6c	54	32	22 (+16 l.p.)	22 (+16 l.p.)	
1	3 (+10 l.p.)	I	6a	—	—	18	6	12	6 (+6 l.p.)	6.
(5 l.p.)	5	II		—	—	—	—	(6 l.p.)	6	
(5 l.p.)	5	III	—	6b	—	18	6	12	6 (+6 l.p.)	
13	3 (+10 l.p.)	IV	—	—	—	—	—	(6 l.p.)	6	
(5 l.p.)	5	V	—	—	6c	18	6	12	6 (+6 l.p.)	
(5 l.p.)	5	VI	—	—	—	—	—	(6 l.p.)	6	
26 (+20 l.p.)	26 (+20 l.p.)	*Total*	6a	6b	6c	54	18	36 (+18 l.p.)	36 (+18 l.p.)	

wage-workers no longer receive the whole product of 9, but only of 7—they receive 3 from their independent activity (agricultural—industry *a*) and 4 from wage-labour (from the production of 2 *b* or 2 *c*). These producers, now more wage-workers than independent masters, have lost the opportunity of bringing any product of their labour to the market because ruin has deprived them of the means of production necessary for the making of products. They have had to resort to "outside employments," i.e., to take their labour-power to the market and with the money obtained from the sale of this new commodity to buy the product they need.

The table shows that producers II and III, V and VI each sells labour-power to the extent of 4 units of value and buys articles of consumption to the same amount. As regards the capitalist producers, I and IV, each of them produces products to the extent of 21; of this, he himself consumes 10 [3 (=a)+3 (=c or b)+4 (surplus-value from 2 *c* or 2 *b*)] and sells 11; but he buys commodities to the extent of 3 (*c* or *b*)+8 (labour-power).

In this case, it must be observed, we do not get complete correspondence between the degree of specialisation of social labour (the production of 5 *b* and 5 *c*, i.e., to the sum of 30, was specialised) and the dimensions of the market (22), but this error in the table is due to our having taken simple reproduction,* i.e., with no accumulation; that is why the surplus-value taken from the workers (four units by each capitalist) is all consumed *in kind*. Since absence of accumulation is impossible in capitalist society, the appropriate correction will be made later.

5th period. The differentiation of the commodity producers has spread to the agricultural industry (*a*): the wage-workers could not continue their farming, for they worked mainly in the industrial establishments of others, and were ruined: they retained only miserable remnants of their farming, about a half (which, we assumed, was just enough to cover the needs of their families)—exactly as the present cultivated land of the vast mass of our peasant "agriculturists" are merely miserable bits of independent farming. The concentration of industry *a* in an insignificant

* This also applies to the 5th and 6th periods.

number of big establishments has begun in an exactly similar way. Since the grain grown by the wage-workers is now not enough to cover their needs, wages, which were kept low by their independent farming, increase and provide the workers with the money to buy grain (although in a smaller quantity than they consumed when they were their own masters): now the worker produces $1\frac{1}{2}$ ($=\frac{1}{2}$ a) and buys 1, getting in all $2\frac{1}{2}$ instead of the former 3 (=a). The capitalist masters, having added expanded farming to their industrial establishments now each produce 2 *a* (=6), of which 2 goes to the workers in the form of wages and 1 ($\frac{1}{3}$ a)—surplus-value—to themselves. The development of capitalism depicted in this table is accompanied by the "impoverishment" of the "people" (the workers now consume only $6\frac{1}{2}$ each instead of 7, as in the 4th period), and by the growth of the market, in which 26 now appear. The "decline of farming," in the case of the majority of the producers, did not cause a shrinkage, but an expansion of the market for farm produce.

6th period. The specialisation of occupations, i.e., the division of social labour, is completed. All branches of industry have separated, and have become the speciality of separate producers. The wage-workers have completely lost their independent farms and subsist entirely on wage-labour. We get the same result: the development of capitalism [independent farming on one's own account has been fully eliminated], "impoverishment of the masses" [although the workers' wages have risen, their consumption has diminished from $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 6: they each produce *9* (3a, 3b, 3c) and give their masters one-third as surplus-value], and a further growth of the market, in which there now appears two-thirds of the social product (36).

VI

Let us now draw the conclusions which follow from the above table.

The first conclusion is that the concept "market" is quite inseparable from the concept of the social division

of labour—that "general basis of all commodity [and consequently, let us add, of capitalist] production" as Marx calls it. The "market" arises where, and to the extent that, social division of labour and commodity production appear. The dimensions of the market are inseparably connected with the degree of specialisation of social labour.

"...It [a commodity] cannot acquire the properties of a socially recognised universal equivalent, except by being converted into money. That money, however, is in someone else's pocket. In order to entice the money out of that pocket, our friend's commodity must, above all things, be a use-value to the owner of the money. For this, it is necessary that the labour expended upon it be of a kind that is socially useful, of a kind that constitutes *a branch of the social division of labour*. But division of labour is a system of production which has grown up spontaneously and continues to grow behind the backs of the producers. The commodity to be exchanged may possibly be the product of some new kind of labour that pretends to satisfy newly arisen requirements, or even to give rise itself to new requirements. *A particular operation, though yesterday, perhaps, forming one out of the many operations conducted by one producer in creating a given commodity, may today separate itself from this connection, may establish itself as an independent branch of labour and send its incomplete product to market as an independent commodity*" (*Das Kapital*, Bd. 1, S. 85.[21] My italics).

Thus, the limits of the development of the market, in capitalist society, are set by the limits of the specialisation of social labour. But this specialisation, by its very nature is as infinite as technical developments. To increase the productivity of human labour in, for instance, the making of some part of a whole product, the production of that part must be specialised, must become a special one concerned with mass production and, therefore, permitting (and engendering) the employment of machines, etc. That is on the one hand. On the other hand, technical progress in capitalist society consists in the socialisation of labour, and this socialisation necessarily calls for specialisation in the various functions of the production process, for their transformation from scattered, isolated functions repeated separately in

every establishment engaged in this production, into socialised functions concentrated in one, new establishment, and calculated to satisfy the requirements of the whole of society. I shall quote an example:

"Recently, in the United States, the woodworking factories are becoming more and more specialised, 'new factories are springing up exclusively for the making of, for instance, axe handles, broom handles, or extensible tables.... Machine building is making constant progress, new machines are being continuously invented to simplify and cheapen some side of production.... Every branch of furniture making, for instance, has become a trade requiring special machines and special workers.... In carriage building, wheel rims are made in special factories (Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee), wheel spokes are made in Indiana and Ohio, and hubs again are made in special factories in Kentucky and Illinois. All these separate parts are bought by factories which specialise in the making of whole wheels. Thus quite a dozen factories take part in the building of some cheap kind of vehicle'" (Mr. Tverskoi, "Ten Years in America," V*estnik Yevropy*, 1893, 1. I quote from Nik.—on,[22] p. 91, footnote 1).

This shows how wrong is the assertion that the growth of the market in capitalist society caused by the specialisation of social labour must cease as soon as all natural producers become commodity producers. Russian carriage building has long become commodity production, but wheel rims, say, are still made in every carriage builder's (or wheelwright's) shop; the technical level is low, production is split up among a mass of producers. Technical progress must entail the specialisation of different parts of production, their socialisation, and, consequently, the expansion of the market.

Here the following reservation must be made. All that has been said by no means implies the rejection of the proposition that a capitalist nation cannot exist without foreign markets. Under capitalist production, an equilibrium between production and consumption is achieved only by a series of fluctuations; the larger the scale of production, and the wider the circle of consumers it is calculated to serve, the more violent are the fluctuations. It can be under-

stood, therefore, that when bourgeois production has reached a high degree of development it can no longer keep within the limits of the national state: competition compels the capitalists to keep on expanding production and to seek foreign markets for the mass sale of their products. Obviously, the fact that a capitalist nation must have foreign markets just as little violates the law that the market is a simple expression of the social division of labour under commodity economy and, consequently, that it can grow as infinitely as the division of labour, as crises violate the law of value. Lamentations about markets appeared in Russian literature only when certain branches of our capitalist production (for example, the cotton industry) had reached full development, embraced nearly the entire home market and become concentrated in a few huge enterprises. The best proof that the material basis of the idle talk and "questions" of markets is precisely the interests of our large-scale capitalist industry, is the fact that nobody in our literature has yet prophesied the ruin of our handicraft industry because of the disappearance of "markets," although the handicraft industry produces values totalling over a thousand million rubles and supplies the very same impoverished "people." The wailing about the ruin of our industry due to the shortage of markets is nothing more than a thinly disguised manoeuvre of our capitalists, who in this way exert pressure on policy, identify (in humble avowal of their own "impotence") the interests of their pockets with the interests of the "country" and are capable of making the government pursue a policy of colonial conquest, and even of involving it in war for the sake of protecting such "state" interests. The bottomless pit of Narodnik utopianism and Narodnik simplicity is needed for the acceptance of this wailing about markets—these crocodile tears of a quite firmly established and already conceited bourgeoisie—as proof of the "impotence" of Russian capitalism!

The second conclusion is that "the impoverishment of the masses of the people" (that indispensable point in all the Narodnik arguments about the market) not only does not hinder the development of capitalism, but, on the contrary, is the expression of that development, is a condition of capitalism and strengthens it. Capitalism needs the

"free labourer," and impoverishment consists in the petty producers being converted into wage-workers. The impoverishment of the masses is accompanied by the enrichment of a few exploiters, the ruin and decline of small establishments is accompanied by the strengthening and development of bigger ones; both processes facilitate the growth of the market: the "impoverished" peasant who formerly lived by his own farming now lives by "earnings," i.e., by the sale of his labour-power; he now has to purchase essential articles of consumption (although in a smaller quantity and of inferior quality). On the other hand, the means of production from which this peasant is freed are concentrated in the hands of a minority, are converted into *capital*, and the product now appears on the market. This is the only explanation of the fact that the mass expropriation of our peasantry in the post-Reform epoch has been accompanied by an increase and not a decrease in the gross productivity of the country* and by the growth of the home market: it is a known fact that there has been an enormous increase in the output of the big factories and works and

* This may be a debatable point only in relation to the agricultural industry. "Grain production is in a state of absolute stagnation," says Mr. N.–on, for example. He bases his conclusion on the data for only eight years (1871-1878). Let us examine the data for a longer period; an eight-year period is, of course, too short. Let us compare the statistics for the 1860's [*Military Statistical Abstract*, 1871], the 1870's [N.–on's data] and the 1880's [*Returns for Russia*, 1890]. The data cover 50 gubernias of European Russia and all crops, including potatoes.

Annual average for	Sown		Harvested		Yield (times)	Population (thousands)	
	Thousands of chetverts (minus seed)						
1864-1866 (3)	71,696	100	151,840	100	3.12	61,421 (1867)	100
1871-1878 (8)	71,378	99.5	195, 024	128.4	3.73	76,594 (1876)	124.7
1883-1887 (5)	80 293	111.9	254,914	167.8	4.71	85,395 (1886)	139.0

that there has been a considerable extension of the handicraft industries—both work mainly for the home market—and there has been a similar increase in the amount of grain circulating in the home markets (the development of the grain trade within the country).

The third conclusion—about the significance of the production of means of production—calls for a correction to the table. As has already been stated, that table does not at all claim to depict the whole process of development of capitalism, but only to show how the replacement of natural by commodity economy and of the latter by capitalist economy affects the market. That is why accumulation was disregarded in the table. Actually, however, capitalist society cannot exist without accumulating, for competition compels every capitalist on pain of ruin to expand production. Such expansion of production is depicted in the table: producer 1, for example, in the interval between the 3rd and 4th periods, expanded his output of *c* threefold: from 2 *c* to 6 *c*; formerly he worked alone in his workshop—now he has two wage-workers. Obviously, that expansion of production could not have taken place without accumulation: he had to build a special workshop for several persons, to acquire implements of production on a larger scale, and to purchase larger quantities of raw materials and much else. The same applies to producer IV, who expanded the production of *b*. This expansion of individual establishments, the concentration of production, must of necessity have entailed (or increased, it makes no difference) the production of means of production for the capitalists: machines, iron, coal, etc. The concentration of production increased the productivity of labour, replaced hand by machine labour and discarded a certain number of workers. On the other hand, there was a development in the production of these machines and other means of production, converted by the capitalist into constant capital which now begins to grow more rapidly than variable capital. If, for example, we compare the 4th period with the 6th, we shall find that the production of means of production has increased 50 per cent (because in the former case there are two capitalist enterprises requiring an increase of constant capital, and in the latter, three): by comparing this increase with the

growth in the production of articles of consumption we arrive at the more rapid growth of the production of means of production mentioned above.

The whole meaning and significance of this law of the more rapid growth of means of production lies in the one fact that the replacement of hand by machine labour—in general the technical progress that accompanies machine industry—calls for the intense development of the production of coal and iron, those real "means of production as means of production." It is clearly evident from the following statement that the author failed to understand the meaning of this law, and allowed the schemes depicting the process to screen its real nature from him: "Viewed from the side this production of means of production as means of production seems absolutely absurd, but the accumulation of money for money's sake by Plyushkin[23] was also (?!!) an absolutely absurd process. Both know not what they do." That is precisely what the Narodniks try their utmost to prove—the absurdity of Russian capitalism, which, they aver, is ruining the people, but is not providing a higher organisation of production. Of course, that is a fairy-tale. There is nothing "absurd" in replacing hand by machine labour: on the contrary, the progressive work of human technique consists precisely in this. The higher the level of technical development the more is human hand labour ousted, being replaced by machines of increasing complexity: an ever larger place is taken in the country's total production by machines and the articles needed for their manufacture.*

These three conclusions must be supplemented by two further remarks.

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* Naturally, therefore, it is wrong to divide the development of capitalism into development in breadth and in depth: the entire development proceeds on account of division of labour; there is no "essential" difference between the two features. Actually, however, the difference between them boils down to different stages of technical progress. In the lower stages of the development of capitalist technique—simple co-operation and manufacture—the production of means of production as means of production does not yet exist: it emerges and attains enormous development only at the higher stage—large-scale machine industry.

Firstly, what has been said does not negate the "contradiction in the capitalist mode of production" which Marx spoke of in the following words: "The labourers as buyers of commodities are important for the market. But as sellers of their own commodity—labour-power—capitalist society tends to keep them down to the minimum price" (*Das Kapital*, Bd. II, S. 303, No. 32).[24] It has been shown above that in capitalist society that part of social production which produces articles of consumption must also grow. The development of the production of means of production merely sets the above-mentioned contradiction aside, but does not abolish it. It can only be eliminated with the elimination of the capitalist mode of production itself. It goes without saying, however, that it is utterly absurd to regard that contradiction as an obstacle to the full development of capitalism in Russia (as the Narodniks are fond of doing); incidentally, that is sufficiently explained by the table.

Secondly, when discussing the relation between the growth of capitalism and of the "market," we must not lose sight of the indubitable fact that the development of capitalism inevitably entails a rising level of requirements for the entire population, including the industrial proletariat. This rise is created in general by the increasing frequency of exchange of products, which results in more frequent contacts between the inhabitants of town and country, of different geographical localities, and so forth. It is also brought about by the crowding together, the concentration of the industrial proletariat, which enhances their class-consciousness and sense of human dignity and enables them to wage a successful struggle against the predatory tendencies of the capitalist system. This law of increasing requirements has manifested itself with full force in the history of Europe—compare, for example, the French proletariat of the end of the eighteenth and of the end of the nineteenth centuries, or the British worker of the 1840's* and of today.

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* Cf. Frederick Engels, *The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844*. That was a state of most horrible and sordid poverty (in the literal sense of the word) and of utter loss of the sense of human dignity.

This same law operates in Russia, too: the rapid development of commodity economy and capitalism in the post-Reform epoch has caused a rise in the level of requirements of the "peasantry," too: the peasants have begun to live a "cleaner" life (as regards clothing, housing, and so forth). That this undoubtedly progressive phenomenon must be placed to the credit of Russian capitalism and of nothing else is proved if only by the generally known fact (noted by all the investigators of our village handicrafts and of peasant economy in general) that the peasants of the industrial localities live a far "cleaner" life than the peasants engaged exclusively in agriculture and hardly touched by capitalism. Of course, that phenomenon is manifested primarily and most readily in the adoption of the purely outward, ostentatious aspect of "civilisation," but only arrant reactionaries like Mr. V. V. are capable of bewailing it and seeing nothing in it but "decline."

VII

To understand what, in fact, the "market question" consists of, it is best to compare the Narodnik and Marxist conceptions of the process illustrated by the *diagram* (showing exchange between the capitalists of sphere *A* and the direct producers of sphere *W*) and by the *table* (showing the conversion of the natural economy of 6 producers into capitalist economy).

If we take the diagram we get no explanation at all. Why does capitalism develop? Where does it come from? It is represented as a sort of "accident"; its emergence is attributed either to "*we* took the wrong road" ... or to "implantation" by the authorities. Why do "the masses become impoverished"? This again is not answered by the diagram, and in place of an answer the Narodniks dispose of the matter with sentimental phrases about a "time-hallowed system," deviation from the true path, and similar nonsense which the celebrated "subjective method in sociology" is so good at inventing.

The inability to explain capitalism, and preference for utopias instead of a study and elucidation of reality, lead

to a denial of the significance and strength of capitalism. It is like a hopeless invalid who has no source from which to draw strength for development. And we shall introduce into the condition of that invalid an insignificant, almost impalpable improvement if we say that he can develop by producing "means of production as means of production."* That requires the technical development of capitalism, and "we see" that precisely this development is lacking. For that capitalism must embrace the whole country, but we see that "it is not possible for the development of capitalism to become universal."

If, however, we take the table, neither the development of capitalism nor the impoverishment of the people will appear to be accidental. They are necessary concomitants of the growth of commodity production based on the division of social labour. The question of the market is entirely eliminated, because the market is nothing other than the expression of that division of labour and commodity production. The development of capitalism is now seen not only as a possibility [something the author of the paper could at best** have proved], but also as a necessity, because once social economy is based on the division of labour and the commodity form of the product, technical progress must inevitably lead to the strengthening and deepening of capitalism.

The question now arises: why should we accept the second view? By what criterion is it correct?

By the facts of contemporary Russian economic reality.

The pivot of the table is the transition from commodity to capitalist economy, the differentiation of the commodity producers into capitalists and proletarians. And if we turn to the phenomena of the contemporary social economy of Russia we shall see that the foremost of them is precisely the *differentiation* of our small producers. If we lake the peasant agriculturists, we shall find that, on

* That is, the replacement of small industrial units by big ones, the ousting of hand by machine labour.

** That is, if he correctly appraised and properly understood the significance of the production of means of production.

the one hand, masses of peasants are giving up the land, losing economic independence, turning into proletarians, and, on the other hand, peasants are continually enlarging their crop areas and adopting improved farming methods. On the one hand, peasants are losing farm property (livestock and implements) and, on the other hand, peasants are acquiring improved implements, are beginning to procure machines, and so forth. [*Cf.* V. V., *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming*.] On the one hand, peasants are giving up the land, selling or leasing their allotments, and, on the other hand, peasants are renting allotments and are greedily buying privately-owned land. All these are commonly known facts,* established long, long ago, the only *explanation* of which lies in the laws of commodity economy, which splits our "community" peasants, too, into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. If we take the village handicraftsmen we shall find that in the post-Reform epoch not only have new industries emerged and the old ones developed more rapidly [the result of the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry just mentioned, the result of the progressing social division of labour**], but, in addition, the mass of handicraftsmen have been growing poorer and poorer, sinking into dire poverty and losing economic independence, while an insignificant minority have been growing rich at the expense of that mass, accumulating vast amounts of capital, and turning into buyers-up, monopolising the market, and in the overwhelming majority of our handicraft-industries, have, in the end, organised a completely capitalist *domestic system of large-scale production*.

The existence of these two polarising trends among our petty producers clearly shows that capitalism and mass impoverishment, far from precluding, actually condition each other, and irrefutably proves that capitalism is already the main background of the economic life of Russia.

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* The peasants themselves very aptly call this process "*depeasantising*." (See *Agricultural Survey of Nizhni-Vovgorod Gubernia for 1892*, Nizhni-Novgoro, 1893, Vol. III. pp. 186-87.)

** One of Mr. Nikolai—on's biggest theoretical mistakes is that be ignores this phenomenon.

That is why it will be no paradox to say that the fact of the break-up of the peasantry provides the answer to the "question of markets."

One cannot help noting, also, that the very (current) presentation of the notorious "market question" harbours a number of absurdities. The usual formula (see § 1) is based on the most incredible assumptions—that the economic system of society can be built or destroyed at the will of some group of persons—"intellectuals" or the "government" (otherwise the question could not be raised—"can" capitalism develop?, "must" Russia pass through capitalism?, "should" the village community be preserved? and so forth)—that capitalism precludes the impoverishment of the people, that the market is something separate from and independent of capitalism, some special condition for its development.

Unless these absurdities are corrected, the question cannot be answered.

Indeed, let us imagine that in answer to the question: "Can capitalism develop in Russia, when the masses of the people are poor and are becoming still poorer?" somebody would say the following: "Yes, it can, because capitalism will develop not on account of articles of consumption, but on account of means of production." Obviously, such an answer is based on the absolutely correct idea that the total productivity of a capitalist nation increases chiefly on account of means of production (i.e., more on account of means of production than of articles of consumption); but it is still more obvious that such an answer cannot advance the solution of the question one iota, just as you cannot draw a correct conclusion from a syllogism with a correct minor premise but an absurd major premise. Such an answer (I repeat) already presupposes that capitalism is developing, is embracing the whole country, passing to a higher technical stage (large-scale machine industry), whereas the question itself is based on the denial of the possibility of capitalism developing and of small-scale production being replaced by large-scale production.

The "market question" must be removed from the sphere of fruitless speculation about "possibility" and "necessity" to the solid ground of reality, that of studying and *ex-*

plaining what shape the Russian economic order is taking, and why it is taking that shape and no other.

I shall confine myself to quoting some examples from the material in my possession in order to show concretely on what data this proposition is based.

To illustrate the differentiation of the small producers and the fact that not only a process of impoverishment, but also of the creation of large-scale (relatively) bourgeois economy is taking place among them, I shall quote data for three purely agricultural uyezds in different gubernias of European Russia: Dnieper Uyezd in Taurida Gubernia, Novouzensk Uyezd in Samara Gubernia, and Kamyshin Uyezd in Saratov Gubernia. The data are taken from Zemstvo statistical abstracts. To forestall possible statements that the uyezds chosen are not typical (in our outlying regions, which hardly experienced serfdom and largely became populated only under post-Reform, "free" conditions, differentiation has, indeed, made more rapid strides than at the centre) let me say the following:

1) Of the three mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia I have chosen Dnieper Uyezd because it is wholly Russian [0.6% are colonist farms] and is inhabited by community peasants.

2) For Novouzensk Uyezd the data concern only the Russian (community) population [see *Statistical Returns for Novouzensk Uyezd*, pp. 432-39. Column *a*], and do not include the so-called farmstead peasants, i.e., those community peasants who have left the community and have settled separately on purchased or rented land. The addition of these direct representatives of capitalist farming* would show an even greater differentiation.

3) For Kamyshin Uyezd the data concern only the Great-Russian (community) population.

The classification in the abstracts is—for Dnieper Uyezd—according to dessiatines of crop area per household; for the others—according to number of draught animals.

* Indeed, 2,294 farmstead peasants have 123,252 dessiatines under crops (i.e., an average of 53 dessiatines per farmer). They employ 2,662 male labourers (and 234 women). They have over 40,000 horses and oxen. Very many improved implements: see p. 453 of *Statistical Returns for Novouzensk Uyezd*.

Groups of peasants according to economic strength	Dnieper Uyezd					Novouzensk	
	Number of households	%	Crop area (dess.)	%	Crop area per household (dess.)	Number of households	%
Poor group	7,880	40	38,439	11	4.8 } 10.9	10 504	37
Middle group	8,234	42	137,344	43	16.6	10,757	38
Prosperous group	3,643	18	150,614	46	41.3	7,014	25
Totals	19,757	100	326,397	100	17.8	28,275	100

The *poor* group includes households—in Dnieper Uyezd—cultivating no land, or with crop areas of up to 10 dessiatines per household; in Novouzensk and Kamyshin uyezds—households having no draught animals or one. The *middle* group includes households in Dnieper Uyezd having from 10 to 25 dessiatines of crop area; in Novouzensk Uyezd—households having from 2 to 4 draught animals; in Kamyshin Uyezd—households having from 2 to 3 draught animals. The *prosperous* group includes households having over 25 dessiatines (Dnieper Uyezd), or having more than 4 draught animals (Novouzensk Uyezd) and more than 3 (Kamyshin Uyezd).

From these data it is quite evident that the process going on among our agricultural and community peasants is not one of impoverishment and ruin in general, but a process of splitting into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. A vast mass of peasants (the poor group)—about a half on the average—are losing economic independence. They

Uyezd				Kamyshin Uyezd				
Crop area (dess.)	%	Crop area per household (dess.)		Number of households	%	Crop area (dess.)	%	Crop area per household (dess.)	
36,007	8	3.4	7.75	9,313	54	29,194	20	3.1	5.7
128,986	29	12		4,980	29	52,735	35	10.6	
284,069	63	40.5		2,881	17	67,844	45	23.5	
449,062	100	15.9		17,174	100	149,703	100	8.7	

now have only an insignificant part of the total farming of the local peasanls—some 13% (on the average) of the crop area; the area under crops is 3-4 dessiatines per household. To show what such a crop area means, let me say that in Taurida Gubernia, for a peasant household to subsist exclusively by independent farming, without resorting to so-called "outside employments," it must have 17-18 dessiatines* under crops. Obviously, the members of the bottom group already subsist far less by their farming than by oulside employments, i.e., the sale of their labour-power. And if we turn to more detailed data characterising the conditions of the peasants in this group we shall see that precisely this group provides the largest contingent of those who give up their farming, lease their allotments, have

* In Samara and Saratov gubernias the amount will be about a third lower, as the local population is less prosperous.

no working implements and seek employment elsewhere. The peasants in this group represent our rural proletariat.

But, on the other hand, from among these very same community peasants quite another group, of an entirely opposite character, is emerging. The peasants in the top group have crop areas 7 to 10 times larger than those of the peasants in the bottom group. If we compare these crop areas (23-40 dessiatines per household) with the "normal" number of dessiatines under crops that a family needs in order to live comfortably by its farming alone, we shall find that they are double or treble that amount. Obviously, these peasants already engage in agriculture to obtain an income, to trade in grain. They accumulate considerable savings and use them to improve their farms and farming methods; for example, they buy agricultural machines and improved implements. In Novouzensk Uyezd as a whole, for instance, 14% of the householders have improved agricultural implements; of the peasants in the top group 42% of the householders have improved implements (so that the peasants in the top group account for 75% of the total number of households in the uyezd possessing improved agricultural implements), and concentrate in their hands 82% of the total improved implements owned by the "peasantry."* The peasants in the top group can no longer manage their crop sowing with their own labour force and therefore resort to the hiring of workers: for example, in Novouzensk Uyezd 35% of the householders in the top group employ regular wage-workers (not counting those hired, for instance, for the harvesting, etc.); it is the same in Dnieper Uyezd. In short, the peasants in the top group undoubtedly constitute a bourgeoisie. Their strength now is not based on plundering other producers (as is the strength of the usurers and "kulaks"), but on the independent organisation** of production: in the hands of this group, which constitutes only one-fifth of the peasantry, is concentrated more than one-half of the total crop area [I take the general average area for all three

* Altogether, the peasants in the uyezd have 5,724 improved implements.

** Which, of course, is also based on plunder, only not the plunder of independent producers, but of workers.

uyezds]. If we bear in mind that the productivity of labour (i.e., the harvests) of these peasants is immeasurably higher than that of the ground-scratching proletarians in the bottom group, we cannot but draw the conclusion that the chief motive force in grain production is the rural bourgeoisie.

What influence was this splitting of the peasantry into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat [the Narodniks see nothing in this process but the "impoverishment of the masses"] bound to have on the size of the "market," i.e., on the proportion of grain that is converted into a *commodity*? Obviously, that proportion was bound to grow considerably, because the mass of grain possessed by the peasants in the top group far exceeded their own needs and went to the market; on the other hand, the members of the bottom group had to buy extra grain with money earned by outside work.

To quote exact data on this point we must now turn not to Zemstvo statistical abstracts, but to V. Y. Postnikov's book: *Peasant Farming in South Russia*. Using Zemstvo statistical data, Postnikov describes peasant farming in three mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia (Berdyansk, Melitopol and Dnieper) and analyses that farming according to different groups of peasants [divided into 6 categories according to crop area: 1) cultivating no land; 2) cultivating up to 5 dessiatines; 3) from 5 to 10 dessiatines; 4) 10 to 25 dessiatines; 5) 25 to 50 dessiatines; 6) over 50 dessiatines]. Investigating the relation of the different groups to the market, the author divides the crop area of each farm into the following 4 parts: 1) the *farm-service area*—as Postnikov calls the part of the crop area which provides the seed necessary for sowing; 2) the *food area*—provides grain for the sustenance of the family and labourers; 3) the *fodder area*—provides fodder for the draught animals, and lastly, 4) the *commercial* or *market* area provides the product which is converted into a commodity and disposed of on the market. It goes without saying that only the last area provides income in *cash*, whereas the others yield it in kind, i.e., provide a product that is consumed on the farm.

Calculating the size of each of these plots in the different crop-area groups of the peasantry, Postnikov presents the following table:

	Out of 100 dess. under crops				Cash income		In the 3 uyezds of Taurida Gubernia		
	Farm-service area	Food area	Fodder area	Commercial area	Per dess. under crops (rubles)	Per household (rubles)	Total under crops (dessiatines)	Of which commercial areas (dessiatines)	Average under crops in each group
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	6	90.7	42.3	-39	—	—	34,070	—	3.5 dess.
" 5 to 10 "	6	44.7	37.5	+11.8	3.77	30	140,426	16,815	8
" 10 to 25 "	6	27.5	30	36.5	11.68	191	540,093	194,433	16.4
" 25 to 50 "	6	17.0	25	52	16.64	574	494,095	256,929	34.5
" over 50 "	6	12.0	21	61	19.52	1,500	230,583	140,656	75
Per uyzed	6			42			1,439,267	608,869	17-18

Note to table:

1) Postnikov does not give the penultimate column; I compiled it myself.

2) Postnikov calculates the cash income on the assumption that the entire commercial area is planted to wheat, and taking the average yield add the average price of grain.

We see from these data that the bigger the farm, the more it assurmes a commodity character and the larger is the proportion of grain grown for sale [12-36-52-61% according to group]. The principal grain growers, the peasants in the two top groups (they have more than half the total area under crops), sell more than half of their total agricultural product [52% and 61%].

If the peasantry were not split up into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, if, in other words, the area under crops were divided among all the "peasants" "equally," *all* of them would then belong to the middle group (those cultivating 10 to 25 dessiatines), and only 36% of the total grain, i.e., the product of 518,136 dessiatines of crop area (36% of 1,439,267 =518,136), would appear on the market. But now, as can be

seen from the table, 42% of the total grain, the product of 608,869 dessiatines, goes to the market. Thus, the "impoverishment of the masses," the complete decline of the farms of 40% of the peasants (the poor group, i.e., those cultivating up to 10 dessiatines), the formation of a rural proletariat have led to the produce of *90,000** dessiatines of land under crops being thrown on to the market.

I do not at all want to say that the growth of the "market" as a consequence of the differentiation of the peasantry was limited only to this. Far from it. We have seen, for example, that the peasants acquire improved implements? i.e., turn their savings to the "production of means of production." We have seen that, in addition to grain, another commodity, human labour-power, has come on to the market. I do not refer to all this only because I have quoted this example for a narrow and specific purpose: to show that here in Russia the impoverishment of the masses is actually leading to the strengthening of commodity and capitalist economy. I deliberately chose a product like grain, which everywhere and always is the last and the slowest to be drawn into commodity circulation. And that is why I took an exclusively agricultural locality.

I shall now take another example, relating to a purely industrial area—Moscow Gubernia. Peasant farming is described by the Zemstvo statisticians in volumes VI and VII of *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, which contain a number of excellent essays on the handicraft industries. I shall confine myself to quoting one passage from the essay on "The Lace Industry"** which explains how and why the post-Reform epoch saw a particularly rapid development of peasant handicrafts.

The lace industry arose in the twenties of the present century in two neighbouring villages of Voronovo Volost, Podolsk Uyezd. "In the 1840's it began to spread slowly to other nearby villages, although it did not yet cover a big area. But beginning with the sixties and especially during

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* 90,733 dessiatines = 6.3% of the total crop area.

** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia.* Section of Economic Statistics Vol. VI, Issue II, Handicraft Industries of Moscow Gubernia, Issue II, Moscow, 1880.

the last three or four years, it has spread rapidly to the surrounding countryside."

Of the 32 villages in which this industry is practised at the present time it began:

in	2	villages	in 1820
"	4	"	" 1840
"	5	"	" the 1860's
"	7	"	" 1870-1875
"	14	"	" 1876-1879
"	4	"	" 1840

"If we investigate the causes of this phenomenon," says the author of the essay, "i.e., the extremely rapid spread of the industry precisely in the last few years, we shall find that, on the one hand, during that period the peasants' living conditions greatly deteriorated and, on the other hand, that the requirements of the population—that part of it which is in more favourable circumstances—considerably increased."

In confirmation of this the author borrows from the Moscow Zemstvo statistics the following data, which I give in the form of a table.*

"These figures," continues the author, "are eloquent proof that the *total* number of horses, cows and small livestock in that volost increased, but this increased prosperity fell to the lot of certain individuals, namely, the category of householders owning 2-3 and more horses....

"...Consequently, we see that, side by side with an increase in the number of peasants who have neither cows nor horses, there is an increase in the number of those who stop cultivating their land: they have no animals, and, therefore, not enough manure; the land becomes exhausted, it is not worth tilling; to get food for themselves and their families, to avert starvation, it is not enough for the males alone to engage in some industry—they did that previously, when they were free from farm work—now, other members of the family must also seek outside employment....

"...The figures we gave in the tables showed us something else; in those villages there was also an *increase* in the number

* I have omitted data on the distribution of cows (the conclusion is the same) and added the percentages. [See table on p. 119.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*]

VORONOVO VOLOST, PODOLSK UYEZD:

In Voronovo Volost	Number of householders	Number of		Per 100 persons of both sexes			Number of householders owning					Number of horses owned by householders having				Number of allotment-holding householders			
		Horses	Cows	Horses	Cows	Small livestock	No horses	1 horse	2 horses	3 horses	More than 3 horses	1 horse	2 horses	3 horses	More than 3 horses	Total	Cultivating allotment: themselves	Cultivating allotment: with hired labour	Not cultivating land
In 1869 there were	1,233	1,473	1,472	22	22	30	276	567	298	70	22	567	596	210	100	1,067	900	92	75
							22%	46%	24%	6%	2%	39%	40%	14%	7%		84%	9%	7%
In 1877 there were	1,244	1,607	1,726	25	27	38	319	465	313	95	52	465	626	285	231	1,166	965	5	196
							26%	37%	25%	8%	4%	29%	39%	18%	14%		82.5%	0.5%	17%

DISTRIBUTION COMMERCIAL NOT FOR FROM MARXIST ETO MIZO

of people having 2-3 horses, or cows. Consequently, the prosperity of those peasants increased, and yet, at the same time, we said that 'all the women and children in such and such a village engage in industry.' How is this to be explained? ... To explain this phenomenon we must see what sort of life is lived in those villages, and become more closely acquainted with their domestic conditions, and then, perhaps, ascertain what accounts for this strong urge to produce goods for the market.

"We shall not, of course, stop here to investigate in detail under what fortunate circumstances there gradually emerge from the peasant population stronger individuals, stronger families, what conditions give rise to their prosperity and what social conditions enable that prosperity, once it has appeared, to grow rapidly and cause it to grow to such an extent as to considerably distinguish one section of the village inhabitants from the other. To follow this process it is sufficient to point to one of the most ordinary occurrences in a peasant village. In a village, a certain peasant is reputed among his fellow villagers to be a healthy, strong, sober working man. He has a large family, mostly sons, also distinguished for their physical strength and good traits. They all live together; there is no dividing up. They get an allotment for 4-5 persons. It does not, of course, require the labour of all the members of the family to cultivate it. And so, two or three of the sons regularly engage in some outside or local industry, and only during the haymaking season do they drop their industry for a short time and help the family with the field work. The individual members of the family do not keep their earnings, but pool them. Given other favourable circumstances, the combined income considerably exceeds the expenditure necessary to satisfy the family's requirements. Money is saved and, as a consequence, the family is able to engage in industry under better conditions: it can buy raw materials for cash at first hand, it can sell the goods produced when they fetch a good price, and can dispense with the services of all kinds of 'hirers-out of labour,' men and women dealers, and so forth.

"It becomes possible to hire a worker or two, or give out work to be done at home by poor peasants who have lost the possibility of doing any job quite independently. Due

to these and similar circumstances, the strong family we have mentioned is able to obtain profit not only from its own labour. We are not speaking here, of course, of those cases where individuals known as kulaks, sharks, emerge from those families; we are examining the most ordinary occurrences among the peasant population. The tables given in Volume II of the *Abstract* and in Part I of Volume VI clearly show that as the conditions of one section of the peasantry grow worse, in the majority of cases there is an increase in the prosperity of the other, smaller section, or of individual members.

"As industrial occupation spreads, intercourse with the outside world, with the town, in this case with Moscow, becomes more frequent, and some of the Moscow customs gradually penetrate into the village and are met with at first precisely in these more prosperous families. They buy samovars, table crockery and glass, they wear 'neater' clothes. Whereas at first this neatness of clothing takes the shape, among men, of boots in place of bast shoes, among the women leather shoes and boots are the crowning glory, so to speak, of neater clothing; they prefer bright, motley calicoes and kerchiefs, figured woollen shawls, and similar charms....

"...In the peasant family it has been the custom 'for ages' for the wife to clothe her husband, herself and the children.... As long as they grew their own flax, less money had to be spent on the purchase of cloth and other materials required for clothing, and this money was obtained from the sale of poultry, eggs, mushrooms, berries, a spare skein of yarn, or piece of linen. All the rest was made at home. It was such circumstances, i.e., the domestic production of all those articles which the peasant women were expected to make, and the fact that they spent on it all the time they had free from field work, that explain, in the present case, the extremely slow development of the lace industry in the villages in Voronovo Volost. Lace was made mainly by the young women of the more prosperous or of the larger families, where it was not necessary for all the women to spin flax or weave linen. But cheap calico gradually began to oust linen, and to this other circumstances were added: either the flax crop failed, or the wife wanted to make her husband a red calico shirt and herself a smarter dress, and so the custom

of weaving various sorts of linen and kerchiefs at home for peasants' clothing gradually died out, or became very restricted. And the clothing itself underwent a change, partly because homespun cloth was displaced by factory-made cloth....

"...That explains why the majority of the population do all they can to make articles for sale, and even put their children to this work."

This artless narrative of a careful observer clearly shows how the process of division of social labour takes place among our peasant masses, how it leads to the enhancement of commodity production [and, consequently, of the market], and how this commodity production, of itself, i.e., by virtue of the very relations in which it places the producer to the market, leads to the purchase and sale of labour-power becoming "a most ordinary occurrence."

VIII

In conclusion, it will, perhaps, be worth while to illustrate the disputed issue which, I think, is overburdened with abstractions, diagrams and formulae—by an examination of the argument advanced by one of the latest and most prominent representatives of "current views."

I am referring to Mr. Nikolai—on.*

He regards as the greatest "obstacle" to the development of capitalism in Russia the "contraction" of the home market and the "diminution" of the purchasing power of the peasants. The capitalisation of the handicraft industries, he says, ousted the domestic production of goods; the peasants had to buy their clothing. To obtain the money for this, the peasant took to the expansion of his crop area, and as the allotments were inadequate he carried this expansion far beyond the limits of rational farming; he raised the payment for rented land to scandalous heights, and in the end he was ruined. Capitalism dug its own grave, it brought "people's economy" to the frightful crisis of 1891 and ... stopped, having no ground under its feet, unable to "continue along the same path."

* It goes without saying that there can be no question here of examining his entire work, a separate book would be required for that. We can only examine *one* of his favourite arguments.

Realising that "*we* have departed from the time-hallowed people's system" Russia is now waiting ... for orders from the authorities "to infuse large-scale production into the village community."

Wherein lies the absurdity of this "ever new" (for the Russian Narodniks) theory?

Is it that its author fails to understand the significance of the "production of means of production as means of production"? Of course, not. Mr. Nik.—on knows that law very well and even mentions that it operates in our country, too (pp. 186, 203-204). True, in view of his faculty for castigating himself with contradictions, he sometimes (cf. p. 123) forgets about that law, but it is obvious that the correction of such contradictions would not in the least correct the author's main (above-quoted) argument.

The absurdity of his theory lies in his inability to explain capitalism in this country and in basing his arguments about it on pure fictions.

The "peasantry," who were ruined by the ousting of home-made products by factory-made products, are regarded by Mr. Nik.—on as something homogeneous, internally cohesive, and reacting to all the events of life as one man.

Nothing of the kind exists in reality. Commodity production could not have arisen in Russia if the productive units (the peasant households) had not existed separately, and everybody knows that actually each of our peasants conducts his farming separately and independently of his fellows; he carries on the production of products, which become his private property, at his own exclusive risk; he enters into relation with the "market" on his own.

Let us see how matters stand among the "peasantry."

"Being in need of money, the peasant enlarges his crop area excessively and is ruined."

But only the prosperous peasant can enlarge his crop area, the one who has seed for sowing, and a sufficient quantity of livestock and implements. *Such* peasants (and they, as we know, are the minority) do, indeed, extend their crop areas and expand their farming to such an extent that they cannot cope with it without the aid of hired labourers. The majority of peasants, however, are quite unable to meet their need for money by expanding their farming, for they

have no stocks, or sufficient means of production. *Such* a peasant, in order to obtain money, seeks "outside employments," i.e., takes his labour-power and not his product to the market. Naturally, work away from home entails a further decline in farming, and in the end the peasant leases his allotment to a rich fellow community member, who rounds off his farm and, of course, does not himself consume the product of the rented allotment, but sends it to the *market*. We get the "impoverishment of the people," the growth of capitalism and the expansion of the market. But that is not all. Our rich peasant, fully occupied by his extended farming, can no longer produce as hitherto for his own needs, let us say footwear: it is more advantageous for him to buy it. As to the impoverished peasant, he, too, has to buy footwear; he cannot produce it on his farm for the simple reason that he no longer has one. There arises a demand for footwear and a supply of grain, produced in abundance by the enterprising peasant, who touches the soul of Mr. V. V. with the progressive trend of his farming. The neighbouring handicraft footwear-makers find themselves in the same position as the agriculturists just described: to buy grain, of which the declining farm yields too little, production must be expanded. Again, of course, production is expanded only by the handicraftsman who has savings, i.e., the representative of the minority; he is able to hire workers, or give work out to poor peasants to be done at home. The members of the majority of handicraftsmen, however, cannot even think of enlarging their workshops: they are glad to "get work" from the moneyed buyer-up, i.e., to find a purchaser of their only commodity—their labour-power. Again we get the impoverishment of the people, the growth of capitalism and the expansion of the market; a new impetus is given to the further development and intensification of the social division of labour. Where will that movement end? Nobody can say, just as nobody can say where it began, and after all that is not important. The important thing is that we have before us a single, living, organic process, the process of the development of commodity economy and the growth of capitalism. "Depeasantising" in the countryside shows us the beginning of this process, its genesis, its early stages; large-scale capitalism in the towns shows us the end of the process, its

tendency. Try to tear these phenomena apart, try to examine them separately and independently of each other and you will not get your argument to hang together; you will be unable to explain either one phenomenon or the other, either the impoverishment of the people or the growth of capitalism.

Mostly, however, those who advance such arguments, which have neither beginning nor end, being unable to explain the process, break off the investigation with the statement that one of the two phenomena equally unintelligible to them [and, of course, precisely the one that contradicts "the morally developed sense of the critically thinking individual"] is "absurd," "accidental," "hangs in the air."

In actual fact, what is "hanging in the air" is of course only their own arguments.

ица. „Распределение“ в первой главе
нашей начало этого процесса, зарождение его,
его ранние стадии; „кризисы“ капитализма в последней
показывают наш конец этого процесса, его
завершение. Попробуйте разорвать эти явления,
попробуйте разделить их отдельно и независимо
друг от друга, — и вы не сможете в
своем рассуждении свести концы с концами,
не сможете объяснить ни того ни другого явления,
ни обнаружить нарождение капитализма.

При этом однако бывает большая осторожность,
ибо явится подобное рассуждение без начала и
без конца, не сумеет объяснить процесса,
обратится к изображению заявлений, из
одного из двух, обманов наблюдения или явлений
[и кроме того одна сторона того, которое противоречит, нарушение равномерному
чувству критическая невозможность сомнений —
случайно, случайно, вообще в воздухе].

На самом деле, разрывается, висит в воздухе
одна часть из собственного рассуждения.

Last manuscript page of Lenin's *On the So-Called Market Question*, 1893 (*Reduced*)

Last manuscript page of Lenin's On the So-Called Market Question, 1893 (Reduced)

WHAT THE "FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE" ARE AND HOW THEY FIGHT THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

(A REPLY TO ARTICLES IN *RUSSKOYE BOGATSTVO* OPPOSING THE MARXISTS[25])

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and summer of 1894
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PART I

Russkoye Bogatstvo[26] has launched a campaign against the Social-Democrats. Last year, in issue No. 10, one of the leading lights of this magazine, Mr. N. Mikhailovsky, announced a forthcoming "polemic" against "our so-called Marxists, or Social-Democrats."[27] Then followed Mr. S. Krivenko's article "Our Cultural Free Lances" (No. 12), and Mr. N. Mikhailovsky's "Literature and Life" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, Nos. 1 and 2). As to the magazine's own views on our economic realities, these have been most fully expounded by Mr. S. Yuzhakov in the article "Problems of Russia's Economic Development" (in Nos. 11 and 12). While in general claiming to present the ideas and tactics of true "friends of the people" in their magazine, these gentlemen are arch-enemies of Social-Democracy. So let us take a closer look at these "friends of the people," their criticism of Marxism, their ideas and their tactics.

Mr. N. Mikhailovsky devotes his attention chiefly to the theoretical principles of Marxism and therefore makes a special investigation of the materialist conception of history. After outlining in general the contents of the voluminous Marxist literature enunciating this doctrine, Mr. Mikhailovsky opens his criticism with the following tirade:

"First of all," he says, "the question naturally arises: in which of his works did Marx expound his materialist conception of history? In *Capital* he gave us an example of the combination of logical force with erudition, with a scrupulous investigation of all the economic literature and of

the pertinent facts. He brought to light theoreticians of economic science long forgotten or unknown to anybody today, and did not overlook the most minute details in factory inspectors' reports or experts' evidence before various special commissions; in a word, he examined this enormous mass of factual material, partly in order to provide arguments for his economic theories and partly to illustrate them. If he has created a 'completely new' conception of the historical process, if he has explained the whole past of mankind from a new viewpoint and has summarised all hitherto existing theories on the philosophy of history, then he has done so, of course, with equal zeal: he has, indeed, reviewed and subjected to critical analysis all the known theories of the historical process, and worked over a mass of facts of world history. The comparison with Darwin, so customary in Marxist literature, serves still more to confirm this idea. What does Darwin's whole work amount to? Certain closely interconnected generalising ideas crowning a veritable Mont Blanc of factual material. But where is the appropriate work by Marx? It does not exist. And not only does no such work by Marx exist, but there is none to be found in all Marxist literature, despite its voluminous and extensive character."

The whole tirade is highly characteristic and helps us to understand how little the public understand *Capital* and Marx. Overwhelmed by the tremendously convincing way he states his case, they bow and scrape before Marx, laud him, and at the same time entirely lose sight of the basic content of his doctrine and quite calmly continue to sing the old songs of "subjective sociology." In this connection one cannot help recalling the very apt epigraph Kautsky selected for his book on the economic teachings of Marx;

Wer wird nicht einen Klopstock loben?
Doch wird ihn jeder lesen? Nein.
Wir wollen weniger erhoben,
*Und fleissiger gelesen sein!**

* Who would not praise a Klopstock? But will everybody read him? No. We would like to be exalted less, but read more diligently! (Lessing).—*Ed.*

Just so! Mr. Mikhailovsky should praise Marx less and read him more diligently, or, better still, give more serious thought to what he is reading.

"In *Capital* Marx gave us an example of the combination of logical force with erudition," says Mr. Mikhailovsky. In this phrase Mr. Mikhailovsky has given us an example of a brilliant phrase combined with lack of substance—a certain Marxist observed. And the observation is a very just one. How, indeed, did this logical force of Marx's manifest itself? What were its effects? Reading the above tirade by Mr. Mikhailovsky, one might think that this force was concentrated entirely on "economic theories," in the narrowest sense of the term—and nothing more. And in order to emphasise still further the narrow limits of the field in which Marx manifested the force of his logic, Mr. Mikhailovsky lays stress on "most minute details," on "scrupulosity," on "theoreticians unknown to anybody" and so forth. It would appear that Marx contributed nothing essentially new or noteworthy to the methods of constructing these theories, that he left the bounds of economic science where the earlier economists had them, without extending them, without contributing a "completely new" conception of the science itself. Yet anybody who has read *Capital* knows that this is absolutely untrue. In this connection one cannot but recall what Mr. Mikhailovsky wrote about Marx sixteen years ago when arguing with that vulgar bourgeois, Mr. Y. Zhukovsky.[28] Perhaps the times were different, perhaps sentiments were fresher—at any rate, both the tone and the content of Mr. Mikhailovsky's article were then entirely different.

"'... It is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the law of development (in the original: das oekonomische Bewegungsgesetz—the economic law of motion) of modern society,' Karl Marx says in reference to his *Capital*, and he adheres strictly to this programme." This is what Mr. Mikhailovsky said in 1877. Let us examine this programme more closely., which—as the critic admits—has been strictly adhered to. It is "to lay bare the economic law of development of modern society."

The very formulation confronts us with several questions that require explanation. Why does Marx speak of "modern"

society, when all the economists who preceded him spoke of society in general? In what sense does he use the word "modern," by what features does he distinguish this modern society? And further, what is meant by the economic law of motion of society? We are accustomed to hear from economists—and this, by the way, is one of the favourite ideas of the publicists and economists of the milieu to which the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* belongs—that only the production of values is subject to solely economic laws, whereas distribution, they declare, depends on politics, on the nature of the influence exercised on society by the government, the intelligentsia and so forth. In what sense, then, does Marx speak of the economic law of motion of society, even referring to this law as a Naturgesetz—a law of nature? How are we to understand this, when so many of our native sociologists have covered reams of paper to show that social phenomena are particularly distinct from the phenomena of natural history, and that therefore the investigation of the former requires the employment of an absolutely distinct "subjective method in sociology."

All these perplexities arise naturally and necessarily, and, of course, only an absolute ignoramus would evade them when speaking of *Capital*. To elucidate these questions, we shall first quote one more passage from the same Preface to *Capital*—only a few lines lower down:

"[From] my standpoint," says Marx, "the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history."[29]

It will be sufficient to compare, say, the two passages just quoted from the Preface in order to see that it is here that we have the basic idea of *Capital*, pursued, as we have heard, with strict consistency and with rare logical force. First let us note two circumstances regarding all this: Marx speaks of one "economic formation of society" only, the capitalist formation, that is, he says that he investigated the law of development of this formation only and of no other. That is the first. And secondly, let us note the methods Marx used in working out his deductions. These methods consisted, as we have just heard from Mr. Mikhailovsky, in a "scrupulous investigation of the pertinent facts."

Now let us examine this basic idea of *Capital*, which our

subjective philosopher so adroitly tried to evade. In what, properly speaking, does the concept of the economic formation of society consist? and in what sense can and must the development of such a formation be regarded as a process of natural history?—such are the questions that now confront us. I have already pointed out that from the standpoint of the old (not old for Russia) economists and sociologists, the concept of the economic formation of society is entirely superfluous: they talk of society in general, they argue with the Spencers about the nature of society in general, about the aim and essence of society in general, and so forth. In their reasonings, these subjective sociologists rely on arguments such as—the aim of society is to benefit all its members, that justice, therefore, demands such and such an organisation, and that a system that is out of harmony with this ideal organisation ("Sociology must start with some utopia"—these words of Mr. Mikhailovsky's, one of the authors of the subjective method, splendidly typify the essence of their methods) is abnormal and should be set aside. "The essential task of sociology," Mr. Mikhailovsky, for instance, argues, "is to ascertain the social conditions under which any particular requirement of human nature is satisfied." As you see, what interests this sociologist is only a society that satisfies human nature, and not at all some strange formations of society, which, moreover, may be based on a phenomenon so out of harmony with "human nature" as the enslavement of the majority by the minority. You also see that from the standpoint of this sociologist there can be no question of regarding the development of society as a process of natural history. ("Having accepted something as desirable or undesirable, the sociologist must discover the conditions under which the desirable can be realised, or the undesirable eliminated"—"under which such and such ideals can be realised"—this same Mr. Mikhailovsky reasons.) What is more, there can be no talk even of development, but only of various deviations from the "desirable," of "defects" that have occurred in history as a result ... as a result of the fact that people were not clever enough, were unable properly to understand what human nature demands, were unable to discover the conditions for the realisation of such a rational system. It is obvious that Marx's basic idea

that the development of the social-economic formations is a process of natural history cuts at the very root of this childish morality which lays claim to the title of sociology. By what means did Marx arrive at this basic idea? He did so by singling out the economic sphere from the various spheres of social life, by singling out *production relations* from all social relations as being basic, primary, determining all other relations. Marx himself has described the course of his reasoning on this question as follows:

"The first work which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of right....[30] My investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum-total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of 'civil society,' that, however, the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.... The general result at which I arrived ... can be briefly formulated as follows: in the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations ... *relations of production* which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum-total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.

In considering such transformations, a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the conditions of production, which should be established in terms of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological—forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production.... In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society."[31]

This idea of materialism in sociology was in itself a stroke of genius. Naturally, *for the time being* it was only a hypothesis, but one which first created the possibility of a strictly scientific approach to historical and social problems. Hitherto, not knowing how to get down to the simplest primary relations such as those of production, the sociologists undertook the direct investigation and study of political and legal forms, stumbled on the fact that these forms emerge from certain of mankind's ideas in the period in question—and there they stopped; it appeared as if social relations are consciously established by men. But this conclusion, fully expressed in the idea of the *Contrat social*[32] (traces of which are very noticeable in all systems of utopian socialism), was in complete contradiction to all historical observations. It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man's social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course

of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science. Hitherto, sociologists had found it difficult to distinguish the important and the unimportant in the complex network of social phenomena (that is the root of subjectivism in sociology) and had been unable to discover any objective criterion for such a demarcation Materialism provided an absolutely objective criterion by singling out "production relations" as the structure of society, and by making it possible to apply to these relations that general scientific criterion of recurrence whose applicability to sociology the subjectivists denied. So long as they confined themselves to ideological social relations (i.e., such as, before taking shape, pass through man's consciousness*) they could not observe recurrence and regularity in the social phenomena of the various countries, and their science was at best only a description of these phenomena, a collection of raw material. The analysis of material social relations (i.e., of those that take shape without passing through man's consciousness: when exchanging products men enter into production relations without even realising that there is a social relation of production here)—the analysis of material social relations at once made it possible to observe recurrence and regularity and to generalise the systems of the various countries in the single fundamental concept: *social formation*. It was this generalisation alone that made it possible to proceed from the description of social phenomena (and their evaluation from the standpoint of an ideal) to their strictly scientific analysis, which isolates, let us say by way of example, that which distinguishes one capitalist country from another and investigates that which is common to all of them.

Thirdly, and finally, another reason why this hypothesis for the first time made a *scientific* sociology possible was that only the reduction of social relations to production relations and of the latter to the level of the productive forces, provided a firm basis for the conception that the development of

* We are, of course, referring all the time to the consciousness of social relations and no others.

formations of society is a process of natural history. And it goes without saying that without such a view there can be no social science. (The subjectivists, for instance, although they admitted that historical phenomena conform to law, were incapable of regarding their evolution as a process of natural history, precisely because they came to a halt before man's social ideas and aims and were unable to reduce them to material social relations.)

Then, however, Marx, who had expressed this hypothesis in the forties, set out to study the factual (nota bene) material. He took one of the social-economic formations—the system of commodity production—and on the basis of a vast mass of data (which he studied for not less than twenty-five years) gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing the functioning of this formation and its development. This analysis is confined exclusively to production relations between members of society: without ever resorting to features outside the sphere of these production relations for an explanation, Marx makes it possible to discern how the commodity organisation of social economy develops, how it becomes transformed into capitalist organisation, creating antagonistic classes (antagonistic within the bounds of production relations), the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, how it develops the productivity of social labour, and thereby introduces an element that becomes irreconcilably contradictory to the foundations of this capitalist organisation itself.

Such is the *skeleton* of *Capital*. The whole point, however, is that Marx did not content himself with this skeleton, that he did not confine himself to "economic theory" in the ordinary sense of the term, that, while *explaining* the structure and development of the given formation of society exclusively through production relations, he nevertheless everywhere and incessantly scrutinised the superstructure corresponding to these production relations and clothed the skeleton in flesh and blood. The reason *Capital* has enjoyed such tremendous success is that this book by a "German economist" showed the whole capitalist social formation to the reader as a living thing—with its everyday aspects, with the actual social manifestation of the class antagonism inherent in production relations, with the bourgeois political superstructure that protects the rule of the capitalist class, with

the bourgeois ideas of liberty, equality and so forth, with the bourgeois family relationships. It will now be clear that the comparison with Darwin is perfectly accurate: *Capital* is nothing but "certain closely interconnected generalising ideas crowning a veritable Mont Blanc of factual material." And if anybody has read *Capital* and contrived not to notice these generalising ideas, it is not the fault of Marx, who, as we have seen, pointed to those ideas even in the preface. And that is not all; such a comparison is correct not only from the external aspect (which for some unknown reason particularly interests Mr. Mikhailovsky), but also from the internal aspect. Just as Darwin put an end to the view of animal and plant species being unconnected, fortuitous, "created by God" and immutable, and was the first to put biology on an absolutely scientific basis by establishing the mutability and the succession of species, so Marx put an end to the view of society being a mechanical aggregation of individuals which allows of all sorts of modification at the will of the authorities (or, if you like, at the will of society and the government) and which emerges and changes casually, and was the first to put sociology on a scientific basis by establishing the concept of the economic formation of society as the sum-total of given production relations, by establishing the fact that the development of such formations is a process of natural history.

Now—since the appearance of *Capital*—the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society—formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc.—another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the "pertinent facts" as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation—until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not "primarily a scientific conception of history," as Mr. Mikhailovsky thinks, but the only scientific conception of it.

And now, can you imagine anything funnier than the fact that there are people who have read *Capital* without dis-

covering any materialism there! Where is it?—asks Mr. Mikhailovsky in sincere perplexity.

He has read the *Communist Manifesto* and failed to notice that the explanation it gives of modern systems—legal, political, family, religious and philosophical—is a materialist one, and that even the criticism of the socialist and communist theories seeks and finds their roots in such and such production relations.

He has read *The Poverty of Philosophy* and failed to notice that its analysis of Proudhon's sociology is made from the materialist standpoint, that the criticism of the solution propounded by Proudhon for the most diverse historical problems is based on the principles of materialism, and that the author's own indications as to where the data for the solution of these problems are to be sought all amount to references to production relations.

He has read *Capital* and failed to notice that he had before him a model of scientific, materialist analysis of one—the most complex—formation of society, a model recognised by all and surpassed by none. And here he sits and exercises his mighty brain over the profound problem: "In which of his works did Marx expound his materialist conception of history?"

Anybody acquainted with Marx would answer this question by another: in which of his works did Marx not expound his materialist conception of history? But Mr. Mikhailovsky will probably learn of Marx's materialist investigations only when they are classified and properly indexed in some sophistical work on history by some Kareyev under the heading "Economic Materialism."

But the funniest of all is that Mr. Mikhailovsky accuses Marx of not having "reviewed (sic!) all the known theories of the historical process." This is amusing indeed. Of what did nine-tenths of these theories consist? Of purely a priori, dogmatic, abstract discourses on: what is society, what is progress? and the like. (I purposely take examples which are dear to the heart and mind of Mr. Mikhailovsky.) But, then, such theories are useless because of the very fact that they exist, they are useless because of their basic methods, because of their solid unrelieved metaphysics. For, to begin by asking what is society and what is progress, is to begin

at the end. Where will you get a conception of society and progress in general if you have not studied a single social formation in particular, if you have not even been able to establish this conception, if you have not even been able to approach a serious factual investigation, an objective analysis of social relations of any kind ? This is a most obvious symptom of metaphysics, with which every science began: as long as people did not know how to set about studying the facts, they always invented a priori general theories, which were always sterile. The metaphysician-chemist, still unable to make a factual investigation of chemical processes, concocts a theory about chemical affinity as a force. The metaphysician-biologist talks about the nature of life and the vital force. The metaphysician-psychologist argues about the nature of the soul. Here it is the method itself that is absurd. You cannot argue about the soul without having explained psychical processes in particular: here progress must consist precisely in abandoning general theories and philosophical discourses about the nature of the soul, and in being able to put the study of the facts about particular psychical processes on a scientific footing. Therefore, Mr. Mikhailovsky's accusation is exactly similar to that of a metaphysician-psychologist, who has spent all his life writing "investigations" into the nature of the soul (without knowing exactly how to explain a single psychical phenomenon, even the simplest), and then starts accusing a scientific psychologist of not having reviewed all the known theories of the soul. He, the scientific psychologist, has discarded philosophical theories of the soul and set about making a direct study of the material substratum of psychical phenomena—the nervous processes—and has produced, let us say, an analysis and explanation of some one or more psychological processes. And our metaphysician-psychologist reads this work and praises it: the description of the processes and the study of the facts, he says, are good; but he is not satisfied. "Pardon me," he exclaims excitedly, hearing people around him speak of the absolutely new conception of psychology produced by this scientist, of his special method of scientific psychology. "Pardon me," the philosopher cries heatedly, "in what work is this method expounded? Why, this work contains 'nothing but facts.' There is no trace

in it of a review of 'all the known philosophical theories of the soul.' It is not the appropriate work at all!"

In the same way, of course, neither is *Capital* the appropriate work for a metaphysician-sociologist who does not realise the sterility of a priori arguments about the nature of society and does not understand that such methods, instead of contributing to a study and elucidation of the problem, only serve to insinuate into the concept "society" either the bourgeois ideas of the British shopkeeper or the petty-bourgeois socialist ideals of the Russian democrat—and nothing more. That is why all these theories of the philosophy of history arose and burst like soap-bubbles, being at best a symptom of the social ideas and relations of their time, and not advancing one hair's breadth man's *understanding* of even a few, but real, social relations (and not such as "harmonise with human nature"). The gigantic step forward taken by Marx in this respect consisted precisely in that he discarded all these arguments about society and progress in general and produced a *scientific* analysis of *one* society and of *one* progress—capitalist. And Mr. Mikhailovsky blames him for beginning at the beginning and not at the end, for having begun with an analysis of the facts and not with final conclusions, with a study of particular, historically-determined social relations and not with general theories about what these social relations consist of in general! And he asks: "Where is the appropriate work?" O, most wise subjective sociologist!!

If our subjective philosopher had confined himself to mere perplexity as to where, in which work, materialism is substantiated, it would not have been so bad. But, despite the fact that he did not find even an exposition, let alone a substantiation, of the materialist conception of history anywhere (and maybe just because he did not), he begins to ascribe to this doctrine claims which it has never made. He quotes a passage from Blos to the effect that Marx proclaimed an entirely new *conception* of history, and without further ado goes on to declare that this theory claims to have "explained to mankind its past," to have explained "the whole (sic!!?) past of mankind," and so on. But this is utterly false! The theory only claims to explain the capitalist social organisation, and no other. If the application of materialism to the analysis

and explanation of one social formation yielded such brilliant results, it is quite natural that materialism in history already ceases to be a mere hypothesis and becomes a scientifically tested theory; it is quite natural that the necessity for such a method extends to other social formations, even though they have not been subjected to special factual investigation and detailed analysis—just as the idea of transformism, which has been proved in relation to quite a large number of facts, is extended to the whole realm of biology, even though it has not yet been possible to establish with precision the fact of their transformation for certain species of animals and plants. And just as transformism does not at all claim to explain the "whole" history of the formation of species, but only to place the methods of this explanation on a scientific basis, so materialism in history has never claimed to explain everything, but merely to indicate the "only scientific," to use Marx's expression (*Capital*), method of explaining history.[33] One may therefore judge how ingenious, earnest and seemly are the methods of controversy employed by Mr. Mikhailovsky when he first misrepresents Marx by ascribing to materialism in history the absurd claims of "explaining everything," of finding "the key to all historical locks" (claims which were, of course, refuted by Marx immediately and in very biting style in his "Letter"[34] on Mikhailovsky's articles), then pulls faces at these claims of his own invention, and, finally, accurately citing Engels' ideas—accurately because in this case a quotation and not a paraphrase is given—to the effect that political economy as understood by the materialists "has still to be brought into being" and that "such economic science as we possess up to the present is limited almost exclusively to" the history of capitalist society[35]—draws the conclusion that "these words greatly narrow the field of operation of economic materialism"! What infinite naïveté, or what infinite conceit a man must have to count on such tricks passing unnoticed! First he misrepresents Marx, then pulls faces at his own pack of lies, then accurately cites precise ideas—and now has the insolence to declare that they narrow the field of operation of economic materialism!

The kind and quality of Mr. Mikhailovsky's twisting may be seen from the following example: "Marx nowhere substan-

tiates them"—i.e., the foundations of the theory of economic materialism—says Mr. Mikhailovsky. "True, Marx and Engels thought of writing a work dealing with the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history, and even did write one (in 1845-1846), but it was never published.[36] Engels says: 'The finished portion [of this work] consists of an exposition of the materialist conception of history which proves only how incomplete our knowledge of economic history still was at that time.' Thus," concludes Mr. Mikhailovsky, "the fundamental points of 'scientific socialism' and of the theory of economic materialism were discovered, and were then expounded in the *Manifesto*, at a time when, as one of the authors himself admits, they were poorly equipped with the knowledge needed for such a work."

A charming way of criticising, is it not? Engels says that their knowledge of economic "history" was poor and that for this reason they did not publish their work of a "general" character on the history of philosophy. Mr. Mikhailovsky garbles this to make it mean that their knowledge was poor "for such a work" as the elaboration of "the fundamental points of scientific socialism," that is, of a scientific criticism of the "bourgeois" system, already given in the *Manifesto*. One of two things: either Mr. Mikhailovsky cannot grasp the difference between an attempt to embrace the whole philosophy of history, and an attempt to explain the bourgeois regime scientifically, or he imagines that Marx and Engels possessed insufficient knowledge for a criticism of political economy. In that case, it is very cruel of him not to acquaint us with his views on this insufficiency, and with his amendments and additions. The decision by Marx and Engels not to publish their work on the history of philosophy and to concentrate all their efforts on a scientific analysis of one social organisation is only indicative of a very high degree of scientific conscientiousness. Mr. Mikhailovsky's decision to twist this by the little addition that Marx and Engels expounded their views while themselves confessing that their knowledge was inadequate to elaborate them, is only indicative of methods of controversy which testify neither to intellect nor to a sense of decency.

Here is another sample: "More was done by Marx's alter ego, Engels, to substantiate economic materialism as a theory

of history," says Mr. Mikhailovsky. "He wrote a special historical work, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in the Light of* (im Anschluss) *the Researches of Morgan*. This 'Anschluss' is truly noteworthy. The book of the American Morgan appeared many years after Marx and Engels had announced the principles of economic materialism and entirely independently of it." And then, says Mikhailovsky, "the economic materialists associated themselves" with this book; moreover, since there was no class struggle in prehistoric times, they introduced an "amendment" to the formula of the materialist conception of history indicating that, in addition to the production of material values, a determining factor is the production of man himself, i.e., procreation, which played a primary role in the primitive era, when the productivity of labour was still very undeveloped.

Engels says that "Morgan's great merit lies in having ... found in the groups based on ties of sex of the North American Indians the key to the most important, hitherto insoluble, riddles of the earliest Greek, Roman and German history."[37]

"And so," quoth Mr. Mikhailovsky in this connection, "at the end of the forties an absolutely new, materialist and truly scientific conception of history was discovered and proclaimed, and it did for historical science what Darwin's theory did for modern natural science." But this conception—Mr. Mikhailovsky once more repeats—was never scientifically substantiated. "Not only was it never tested in a large and varied field of factual material" (*Capital* is "not the appropriate" work: it contains only facts and painstaking investigations!), "but was not even sufficiently motivated by at least a criticism and exclusion of other systems of the philosophy of history." Engels' book—*Herrn E. Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft**—represents "only witty attempts made in passing," and Mr. Mikhailovsky therefore considers it possible to ignore completely the mass of essential questions dealt with in that work, despite the fact that these "witty attempts" very wittily show the emptiness of sociologies which "start with utopias," and despite the fact that this work contains a detailed criticism

* *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (*Anti-Dühring*).—*Ed.*

of the "force theory," which asserts that political and legal systems determine economic systems and is so zealously professed by the gentlemen who write in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. Of course, it is much easier, is it not, to utter a few meaningless phrases about a work than to make a serious examination of even one of the problems materialistically solved in it. And it is also safe, for the censor will probably never pass a translation of that book, and Mr. Mikhailovsky may, with out fear for his subjective philosophy, call it a witty book.

Even more characteristic and edifying (as an illustration to the saying that man was given a tongue to conceal his thoughts—or to lend vacuity the form of thought) are his comments on Marx's *Capital*: "There are brilliant pages of history in *Capital*, but" (that wonderful "but"! It is not so much a "but," as that famous "mais," which translated into Russian means "the ears never grow higher than the forehead") "by virtue of the very purpose of the book they are devoted to only one definite historical period, and not so much affirm the basic propositions of economic materialism as simply touch on the economic aspect of a certain group of historical phenomena." In other words, *Capital*—which is devoted solely to a study of capitalist society—gives a materialist analysis of that society and its superstructures, "but" Mr. Mikhailovsky prefers to pass over this analysis. It deals, don't you see, with only "one" period, whereas he, Mr. Mikhailovsky, wants to embrace all periods, and to embrace them in such a way as not to speak of any one of them in particular. Of course, there is only one way to achieve this aim—i.e., to embrace all periods without practically dealing with any one of them, and that is by uttering commonplaces and phrases, "brilliant" and empty. And nobody can compare with Mr. Mikhailovsky in the art of dismissing matters with phrases. It seems that it is not worth dealing (separately) with Marx's investigations because he, Marx, "not so much affirms the basic propositions of economic materialism as simply touches on the economic aspect of a certain group of historical phenomena." What profundity! "Does not affirm," but "simply touches on"! How simple it really is to obscure any issue by phrase-mongering! For instance, when Marx repeatedly shows how civil equality, free contract and similar princi-

ples of the law-governed state are based on relations among commodity producers—what is that? Does he thereby affirm materialism, or "simply" touch on it? With his characteristic modesty, our philosopher refrains from replying on the substance of the matter and directly draws conclusions from his "witty attempts" to talk brilliantly and say nothing.

"No wonder," the conclusion runs, "that forty years after the announcement of the theory which claimed to elucidate world history, ancient Greek, Roman and German history were still unsolved riddles for it; and the key to these riddles was provided, firstly, by a man who had absolutely no connection with the theory of economic materialism and knew nothing about it, and, secondly, with the help of a factor which was not economic. A rather amusing impression is produced by the term 'production of man himself,' i.e., procreation, which Engels seizes upon in order to preserve at least a verbal connection with the basic formula of economic materialism. He was, however, obliged to admit that for many ages the life of mankind did not proceed in accordance with this formula." Your method of controversy is indeed a "wonder," Mr. Mikhailovsky. The theory was that in order to "elucidate" history one must seek the foundations not in ideological, but in material social relations. Lack of factual material made it impossible to apply this method to an analysis of certain very important phenomena in ancient European history—for instance, that of gentile organisation[38]—which in consequence remained a riddle.* But then, the wealth of material collected by Morgan in America enabled him to analyse the nature of gentile organisation; and he came to the conclusion that its explanation must be sought not in ideological (e.g., legal or religious), but in material relations. Obviously, this fact is a brilliant confirmation of the materialist method, and nothing more. And when Mr. Mikhailovsky flings the *reproach* at this doctrine that, firstly, the key to very difficult

* Here, too, Mr. Mikhailovsky does not miss an opportunity of pulling faces: what, says he, do you mean—a scientific conception of history, yet ancient history remains a riddle! Mr. Mikhailovsky, take any textbook, and you will find that the problem of gentile organisation is one of the most difficult, and has evoked a host of theories in explanation of it.

historical riddles was found by a man "who had absolutely no connection" with the theory of economic materialism, one can only wonder at the degree to which people can fail to distinguish what speaks in their favour from what severely trounces them. Secondly—argues our philosopher—procreation is not an economic factor. But where have you read in the works of Marx or Engels that they necessarily spoke of economic materialism? When they described their world outlook they called it simply materialism. Their basic idea (quite definitely expressed, for instance, in the passage from Marx quoted above) was that social relations are divided into material and ideological. The latter merely constitute a superstructure on the former, which take shape independent of the will and consciousness of man as (the result) the form of man's activity to maintain his existence. The explanation of political and legal forms—Marx says in the passage quoted—must be sought in "the material conditions of life." Mr. Mikhailovsky surely does not think that procreation relations are ideological? The explanation given by Mr. Mikhailovsky in this connection is so characteristic that it deserves to be dwelt on. "However much we exercise our ingenuity on the question of 'procreation,'" says he, "and endeavour to establish at least a verbal connection between it and economic materialism, however much it may be interwoven in the complex web of phenomena of social life with other, including economic, phenomena, it has its own physiological and psychical roots." (Are you telling babes and sucklings, Mr. Mikhailovsky, that procreation has physiological roots!? Who do you think you are fooling?) "And this reminds us that the theoreticians of economic materialism failed to settle accounts not only with history, but also with psychology. There can be no doubt that gentile ties have lost their significance in the history of civilised countries, but this can hardly be said with the same assurance of directly sexual and family ties. They have, of course, undergone considerable modification under the pressure of the increasing complexity of life in general, but with a certain amount of dialectical dexterity it might be shown that not only legal, but also economic relations themselves constitute a 'superstructure' on sexual and family relations. We shall not dwell on this, but nevertheless would at least

point to the institution of inheritance."

At last our philosopher has been lucky enough to leave the sphere of empty phrase-mongering* and approach facts, definite facts, which can be verified and make it less easy to "fool" people about the essence of the matter. Let us then see how our critic of Marx shows that the institution of inheritance is a superstructure on sexual and family relations. "What is transmitted by inheritance," argues Mr. Mikhailovsky, "is the products of economic production" ("the products of economic production"!! How literate! How sonorous! What elegant language!) "and the very institution of inheritance is to a certain degree determined by the fact of economic competition. But, firstly, non-material values are also transmitted by inheritance—as expressed in the concern to bring up children in the spirit of their fathers." So the upbringing of children is part of the institution of inheritance! The Russian Civil Code, for example, contains a clause saying that "parents must endeavour by home upbringing to train their" (i.e., their children's) "morals and to further the aims of government." Is this what our philosopher calls the institution of inheritance?—"and, secondly, even confining ourselves solely to the economic sphere, if the institution of inheritance is inconceivable without the products of production, transmitted by inheritance, it is just as unthinkable without the products of 'procreation,' without them and without that complex and intense psychology which directly adheres to them." (Do pay attention to the language: a complex psychology "adheres to" the products of procreation! That is really exquisite!) And so, the institution of inheritance is a superstructure on family and sexual relations, because inheritance is inconceivable without procreation! Why, this is a veritable discovery of America! Until now everybody believed that procreation can explain the institution of inheritance just as little as the necessity for taking food can explain the institution of

* By what other name, indeed, can one call the device by which the materialists are accused of not having settled accounts with history, without, however, an attempt being made to examine *a single one* of the numerous materialist explanations of various historical problems given by the materialists?—or by which the statement is made that we could prove it but we shall not bother about it?

property. Until now everybody thought that if, for instance, in the era when the fief system[39] flourished in Russia, the land was not transmissible by inheritance (because it was regarded as conditional property only), the explanation was to be sought in the peculiarities of the social organisation of the time. Mr. Mikhailovsky presumably thinks that the explanation of the matter is simply that the psychology which adhered to the products of procreation of the fief-holder of that time was distinguished by insufficient complexity.

Scratch the "friend of the people"—we may say, paraphrasing the familiar saying—and you will find a bourgeois. Really, what other meaning can attach to Mr. Mikhailovsky's reflections on the connection between the institution of inheritance and the upbringing of children, the psychology of procreation, and so on, except that the institution of inheritance is just as eternal, essential and sacred as the upbringing of children? True, Mr. Mikhailovsky tried to leave himself a loophole by declaring that "the institution of inheritance is to a certain degree determined by the fact of economic competition," but that is nothing but an attempt to avoid giving a definite answer to the question, and a futile attempt at that. How can we give this statement our consideration when we are not told a single word as to exactly what "certain degree" inheritance depends on competition, and when absolutely no explanation is given on what in fact gives rise to this connection between competition and the institution of inheritance? Actually, the institution of inheritance presumes the existence of private property, and the latter arises only with the appearance of exchange. Its basis is in the already incipient specialisation of social labour and the alienation of products on the market. So long, for instance, as all the members of the primitive American Indian community produced in common all the articles they required, private property was impossible. But when division of labour invaded the community and its members proceeded, individually, to engage in the production of some one article and to sell it on the market, this material isolation of the commodity producers found expression in the institution of private property. Both private property and inheritance are categories of a social order in which

separate, small (monogamous) families have already been formed and exchange has begun to develop. Mr. Mikhailovsky's example proves exactly the opposite of what he wanted to prove.

Mr. Mikhailovsky gives another factual reference—and this too is a gem in its way! "As regards gentile ties," he says, continuing to put materialism right, "they paled in the history of civilised peoples partly, it is true, under the rays of the influence of the forms of production" (another subterfuge, only more obvious still. Exactly what forms of production? An empty phrase!), "but partly they became dissolved in their own continuation and generalisation—in national ties." And so, national ties are a continuation and generalisation of gentile ties! Mr. Mikhailovsky, evidently, borrows his ideas on the history of society from the tales taught to school children. The history of society—this copybook maxim runs—is that first there was the family, that nucleus of every society,* then—we are told—the family grew into the tribe, and the tribe grew into the state. If Mr. Mikhailovsky with a solemn air repeats this childish nonsense, it merely shows—apart from everything else—that he has not the slightest notion of the course taken even by Russian history. While one might speak of gentile life in ancient Rus, there can be no doubt that by the Middle Ages, the era of the Moscovite tsars, these gentile ties no longer existed, that is to say, the state was based on associations that were not gentile at all, but local: the landlords and the monasteries acquired peasants from various localities, and the communities thus formed were purely territorial associations. But one could hardly speak of national ties in the true sense of the term at that time: the state split into separate "lands," sometimes even principalities, which preserved strong traces of the former autonomy, peculiarities of administration, at times their own troops (the local boyars went to war at the head of their own companies), their own tariff frontiers, and so forth. Only the modern period of

* This is a purely bourgeois idea: separate, small families came to predominate only under the bourgeois regime; they were entirely non-existent in prehistoric times. Nothing is more characteristic of the bourgeois than the application of the features of the modern system to all times and peoples.

Russian history (approximately from the seventeenth century) is characterised by the actual amalgamation of all such regions, lands and principalities into one whole. This amalgamation, most esteemed Mr. Mikhailovsky, was brought about not by gentile ties, nor even by their continuation and generalisation: it was brought about by the increasing exchange among regions, the gradually growing circulation of commodities, and the concentration of the small local markets into a single, all-Russian market. Since the leaders and masters of this process were the merchant capitalists, the creation of these national ties was nothing else than the creation of bourgeois ties. By both his factual references Mr. Mikhailovsky has only belaboured himself and given us nothing but examples of bourgeois banality; "banality," because he explained the institution of inheritance by procreation and its psychology, and nationality by gentile ties; "bourgeois," because he took the categories and superstructures of one historically definite social formation (that based on exchange) for categories as general and eternal as the upbringing of children and "directly" sexual ties.

What is highly characteristic here is that as soon as our subjective philosopher tried to pass from phrases to concrete facts he got himself into a mess. And apparently he feels very much at ease in this not over-clean position: there he sits, preening himself and splashing filth all around him. He wants, for instance, to refute the thesis that history is a succession of episodes of the class struggle, and so, declaring with an air of profundity that this is "extreme," he says: "The International Working Men's Association,[40] formed by Marx and organised for the purposes of the class struggle, did not prevent the French and German workers from cutting each other's throats and despoiling each other"—something, he avers, which proves that materialism has not settled accounts "with the demon of national vanity and national hatred." Such an assertion reveals the critic's utter failure to understand that the very real interests of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie constitute the principal basis of this hatred, and that to talk of national sentiment as an independent factor is only to obscure the essence of the matter. Incidentally, we have already seen what a profound idea

of nationality our philosopher has. Mr. Mikhailovsky cannot refer to the International except with the irony of a Burenin.[41] "Marx was the head of the International Working Men's Association, which, it is true, has fallen to pieces, but is due to be resurrected." Of course, if the nec plus ultra of international solidarity is to be seen in a system of "fair" exchange, on which the chronicler of home affairs expatiates with philistine banality in No. 2 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, and if it is not understood that exchange, fair or unfair, always presupposes and includes the rule of the bourgeoisie, and that the cessation of international clashes is impossible unless the economic organisation based on exchange is destroyed, then it is understandable that there should be nothing but sneers for the International. Then one can understand that Mr. Mikhailovsky cannot grasp the simple truth that there is no other way of combating national hatred than by organising and uniting the oppressed class for a struggle against the oppressor class in each separate country, than by uniting such national working-class organisations into a single international working-class army to fight international capital. As to the statement that the International did not prevent the workers from cutting each other's throats, it is enough to remind Mr. Mikhailovsky of the events of the Commune, which showed the true attitude of the organised proletariat to the ruling classes engaged in war.

What is particularly disgusting in all this polemic of Mr. Mikhailovsky's is the methods he employs. If he is dissatisfied with the tactics of the International, if he does not share the ideas in the name of which the European workers are organising, let him at least criticise them bluntly and openly, and expound his idea of what would be more expedient tactics and more correct views. As it is, no definite and clear objections are made, and all we get is senseless jibes scattered here and there among a welter of phrase-mongering. What can one call this but filth, especially if we bear in mind that defence of the ideas and tactics of the International is not legally allowed in Russia? Such too are the methods Mr. Mikhailovsky employs when he argues against the Russian Marxists: without taking the trouble to formulate any of their theses conscientiously and accurately, so as to subject them to direct and definite criticism, he prefers to fasten

on fragments of Marxist arguments he happens to have heard and to garble them. Judge for yourselves: "Marx was too intelligent and too learned to think that it was he who discovered the idea of the historical necessity and conformity to law of social phenomena.... The lower rungs" (of the Marxist ladder)* "do not know this" (that "the idea of historical necessity is not something new, invented or discovered by Marx, but a long established truth"), "or, at least, they have only a vague idea of the centuries of intellectual effort and energy spent on the establishment of this truth."

Of course, statements of this kind may very well make an impression on people who hear of Marxism for the first time, and in their case the aim of the critic may be easily achieved, namely, to garble, scoff and "conquer" (the word used, it is said, about Mr. Mikhailovsky's articles by contributors to *Russkoye Bogatstvo*). Anybody who has any knowledge at all of Marx will immediately perceive the utter falsity and sham of such methods. One may not agree with Marx, but one cannot deny that he formulated with the utmost precision those of his views which constitute "something new" in relation to the earlier socialists. The something new consisted in the fact that the earlier socialists thought that to substantiate their views it was enough to show the oppression of the masses under the existing regime, to show the superiority of a system under which every man would receive what he himself had produced, to show that this ideal system harmonised with "human nature," with the conception of a rational and moral life, and so forth. Marx found it impossible to content himself with such a socialism. He did not confine himself to describing the existing system, to judging it and condemning it; he gave a scientific explanation of it, reducing that existing system, which differs in

* Regarding this meaningless term it should be stated that Mr. Mikhailovsky gives a special place to Marx (who is too intelligent and too learned for our critic to be able to criticise any of his propositions directly and openly), after whom he places Engels ("not such a creative mind"), next—more or less independent men like Kautsky—and then the other Marxists. Well, can such a classification have any serious value? If the critic is dissatisfied with the popularisers of Marx, what prevents him from correcting them on the basis of Marx? He does nothing of the kind. He evidently meant to be witty—but his wit fell flat.

the different European and non-European countries, to a common basis—the capitalist social formation, the laws of the functioning and development of which he subjected to an objective analysis (he showed the *necessity* of exploitation under that system). In just the same way he did not find it possible to content himself with asserting that only the socialist system harmonises with human nature, as was claimed by the great utopian socialists and by their wretched imitators, the subjective sociologists. By this same *objective* analysis of the capitalist system, he proved the *necessity* of its transformation into the socialist system. (Exactly how he proved this and how Mr. Mikhailovsky objected to it is something we shall have to refer to again.) That is the source of those references to necessity which are frequently to be met with among Marxists. The distortion which Mr. Mikhailovsky introduced into the question is obvious: he omitted the whole factual content of the theory, its whole essence, and presented the matter as though the whole theory amounts to the one word "necessity" ("one cannot refer to this alone in complex practical affairs"), as though the *proof* of the theory is that this is what historical necessity demands. In other words, saying nothing about the content of the doctrine, he seized only on its label, and again started to pull faces at that which was "simply the worn-out coin," he had worked so hard to transform into Marx's teaching. We shall not, of course, try to follow up his clowning, because we are already sufficiently acquainted with that sort of thing. Let him cut capers for the amusement and satisfaction of Mr. Burenin (who not without good reason patted Mr. Mikhailovsky on the back in *Novoye Vremya*),[42] let him, after paying his respects to Marx, yelp at him from round the corner: "his controversy with the utopians and idealists is one-sided as it is," i.e., as it is without the Marxists repeating its arguments. We cannot call such sallies anything else but yelping, because he does not adduce *one single* factual, definite and verifiable objection to this polemic, so that however willing we might be to discuss the subject, since we consider this controversy extremely important for the settlement of Russian socialist problems—we simply cannot reply to the yelping, and can only shrug our shoulders and say:

Mighty must the pug-dog be, if at the elephant barketh he![43]

Not without interest is the next thing Mr. Mikhailovsky has to say about historical necessity, because it reveals, if only partly, the real ideological stock-in-trade of "our well-known sociologist" (the title enjoyed by Mr. Mikhailovsky, equally with Mr. V. V., among the liberal members of our "cultured society"). He speaks of "the conflict between the idea of historical necessity and the significance of individual activity": socially active figures err in regarding themselves as active, when as a matter of fact they are "activated," "marionettes, manipulated from a mysterious underground by the immanent laws of historical necessity"—such, he claims, is the conclusion to be drawn from this idea, which he therefore characterises as "sterile" and "diffuse." Probably not every reader knows where Mr. Mikhailovsky got all this nonsense about marionettes and the like. The point is that this is one of the favourite hobby-horses of the subjective philosopher—the idea of the conflict between determinism and morality, between historical necessity and the significance of the individual. He has filled reams of paper on the subject and has uttered an infinite amount of sentimental, philistine nonsense in order to settle this conflict in favour of morality and the role of the individual. Actually, there is no conflict here at all; it has been invented by Mr. Mikhailovsky, who feared (not without reason) that determinism would cut the ground from under the philistine morality he loves so dearly. The idea of determinism, which postulates that human acts are necessitated and rejects the absurd tale about free will, in no way destroys man's reason or conscience, or appraisal of his actions. Quite the contrary, only the determinist view makes a strict and correct appraisal possible instead of attributing everything you please to free will. Similarly, the idea of historical necessity does not in the least undermine the role of the individual in history: all history is made up of the actions of individuals, who are undoubtedly active figures. The real question that arises in appraising the social activity of an individual is: what conditions ensure the success of his actions, what guarantee is there that these actions will not remain an isolated act lost in a welter of contrary acts? This also is

a question answered differently by Social-Democrats and by the other Russian socialists: how must actions aimed at bringing about the socialist system attract the masses in order to yield serious fruits? Obviously, the answer to this question depends directly and immediately on the way in which the grouping of social forces in Russia and the class struggle which forms the substance of Russian reality are understood; and here too Mr. Mikhailovsky merely wanders all round the question, without even attempting to formulate it precisely and furnish an answer. The Social-Democratic answer to the question is based, as we know, on the view that the Russian economic system constitutes a bourgeois society, from which there can be only one way out, the one that necessarily follows from the very nature of the bourgeois system, namely, the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Obviously, criticism that is serious should be directed either against the view that ours is a bourgeois system, or against the conception of the nature of this system and the laws of its development; but Mr. Mikhailovsky does not even dream of dealing with serious questions. He prefers to dispose of matters with vapid phrase-mongering about necessity being too general a bracket and so on. But then, Mr. Mikhailovsky, any idea will be too general a bracket if you treat it like an egg from which you throw out the meat and then begin playing with the shell! This outer shell, which hides the really serious and burning questions of the day, is Mr. Mikhailovsky's favourite sphere, and with particular pride he stresses the point, for example, that "economic materialism ignores or throws a wrong light on the question of heroes and the crowd." Pray note—the question which are the conflicting classes that make up contemporary Russian reality and what is its basis, is probably too general for Mr. Mikhailovsky, and he evades it. On the other hand, the question of what relations exist between the hero and the crowd—whether it is a crowd of workers, peasants, factory owners, or landlords, is one that interests him extremely. Maybe these questions are "interesting," but to rebuke the materialists for devoting all their efforts to the settlement of problems that directly concern the liberation of the labouring class is to be an admirer of philistine science, nothing more. Concluding his "criticism" (?) of ma-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

terialism, Mr. Mikhailovsky makes one more attempt to misrepresent the facts and performs one more manipulation. Having expressed doubt about the correctness of Engels' opinion that *Capital* was hushed up by the official economists[44] (a doubt he justifies on the curious grounds that there are numerous universities in Germany!), Mr. Mikhailovsky says: "Marx did not have this particular circle of readers" (workers) "in view, but expected something from men of science too." That is absolutely untrue. Marx understood very well how little impartiality and scientific criticism he could expect from the bourgeois scientists and in the Afterword to the second edition of *Capital* he expressed himself very definitely on this score. There he says: "The appreciation which *Das Kapital* rapidly gained in wide circles of the German working class is the best reward of my labours. Herr Mayer ... who in economic matters represents the bourgeois point of view, in a pamphlet published during the Franco-German War, aptly expounded the idea that the great capacity for theory (der grosse theoretische Sinn), which used to be considered a hereditary German possession, had almost completely disappeared amongst the so-called educated classes in Germany, but that amongst its working class, on the contrary, that capacity was celebrating its revival."[45]

The manipulation again concerns materialism and is entirely in the style of the first sample. "The theory (of materialism) has never been scientifically substantiated and verified." Such is the thesis. The proof: "Individual good pages of historical content in the works of Engels, Kautsky and some others also (as in the esteemed work of Blos) might well dispense with the label of economic materialism, since" (note the "since"!), "in fact" (sic!), "they take the sum-total of social life into account, even though the economic note predominates in the chord." And the conclusion—"Economic materialism has not justified itself in science."

A familiar trick! To prove that the theory lacks foundation, Mr. Mikhailovsky first distorts it by ascribing to it the absurd intention of not taking the sum-total of social life into account, whereas quite the opposite is the case: the materialists (Marxists) were the first socialists to raise the issue of the need to analyse all aspects of social life,

and not only the economic*—then he declares that "in fact" the materialists have "effectively" explained the sum-total of social life by economics (a fact which obviously demolishes the author)—and finally he draws the conclusion that materialism "has not justified itself." Your manipulations, however, Mr. Mikhailovsky, have justified themselves magnificently!

This is all that Mr. Mikhailovsky advances in "refutation" of materialism. I repeat, there is no criticism here, it is nothing but empty and pretentious babbling. If we were to ask anybody at all what objections Mr. Mikhailovsky has raised against the view that production relations form the basis of all others; how he has refuted the correctness of the concept of the social formation and of the natural-historical development of these formations elaborated by Marx using the materialist method; how he has proved the fallacy of the materialist explanations of various historical problems given, for instance, by the writers he has mentioned—the answer would have to be that Mr. Mikhailovsky has raised no objections, has advanced no refutation, indicated no fallacies. He has merely beaten about the bush, trying to cover up the essence of the matter with phrases, and in passing has invented various paltry subterfuges.

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* This has been quite clearly expressed in *Capital* and in the tactics of the Social-Democrats, as compared with the earlier socialists. Marx directly demanded that matters must not be confined to the economic aspect. In 1843, when drafting the programme for a projected magazine,[46] Marx wrote to Ruge: "The whole socialist principle is again only one aspect.... We, on our part, must devote equal attention to the other aspect, the theoretical existence of man, and consequently must make religion, science, and so forth an object of our criticism.... Just as *religion* represents the table of contents of the theoretical conflicts of mankind, the *political state* represents the table of contents of man's practical conflicts. Thus, the political state, within the limits of its form expresses sub specie rei publicae (from the political standpoint) all social conflicts, needs and interests. Hence to make a most special political question—e.g., the difference between the social-estate system and the representative system—an object of criticism by no means implies descending from the hauteur des principes (the height of principles.—*Ed.*) since this question expresses in *political* language the difference between the rule of man and the rule of private property. This means that the critic not only may but must deal with these political questions (which the inveterate socialist considers unworthy of attention)."

We can hardly expect anything serious of such a critic when he continues in No. 2 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* to refute Marxism. The only difference is that his inventiveness in the sphere of manipulations is already exhausted and he is beginning to use other people's.

He starts out by holding forth on the ''complexity'' of social life: why, he says, even galvanism is connected with economic materialism, because Galvani's experiments "produced an impression" on Hegel, too. Wonderful wit! One could just as easily connect Mr. Mikhailovsky with the Emperor of China! What follows from this, except that there are people who find pleasure in talking nonsense?!

"The essence of the historical process," Mr. Mikhailovsky continues, "which is elusive in general, has also eluded the doctrine of economic materialism, although this apparently rests on two pillars: the discovery of the all-determining significance of the forms of production and exchange and the incontrovertibility of the dialectical process."

And so, the materialists rest their case on the "incontrovertibility" of the dialectical process! In other words, they base their sociological theories on Hegelian triads.[47] Here we have the stock method of accusing Marxism of Hegelian dialectics, an accusation that might be thought to have been worn threadbare enough by Marx's bourgeois critics. Unable to advance any fundamental argument against the doctrine, these gentlemen fastened on Marx's manner of expression and attacked the origin of the theory, thinking thereby to undermine its essence. And Mr. Mikhailovsky makes no bones about resorting to such methods. He uses a chapter from Engels' *Anti-Dühring*[48] as a pretext. Replying to Dühring, who had attacked Marx's dialectics, Engels says that Marx never dreamed of "proving" anything by means of Hegelian triads, that Marx only studied and investigated the real process, and that the sole criterion of theory recognised by him was its conformity to reality. If, however, it sometimes happened that the development of some particular social phenomenon fitted in with the Hegelian scheme, namely, thesis—negation—negation of the negation, there is nothing surprising about that, for it is no rare thing in nature at all. And Engels proceeds to cite examples from

natural history (the development of a seed) and the social sphere—as, for instance, that first there was primitive communism, then private property, and then the capitalist socialisation of labour; or that first there was primitive materialism, then idealism, and then scientific materialism, and so forth. It is clear to everybody that the main weight of Engels' argument is that materialists must correctly and accurately depict the actual historical process, and that insistence on dialectics, the selection of examples to demonstrate the correctness of the triad, is nothing but a relic of the Hegelianism out of which scientific socialism has grown, a relic of its manner of expression. And, indeed, once it has been categorically declared that to "prove" anything by triads is absurd, and that nobody even thought of doing so, what significance can attach to examples of "dialectical" processes? Is it not obvious that this merely points to the origin of the doctrine and nothing more? Mr. Mikhailovsky himself sees it when he says that the theory should not be blamed for its origin. But in order to discern in Engels' arguments something more than the origin of the theory, proof should obviously be offered that the materialists have settled at least one historical *problem* by means of triads, and not on the strength of the pertinent facts. Did Mr. Mikhailovsky attempt to prove this? Not a bit of it. On the contrary, he was himself obliged to admit that "Marx filled the empty dialectical scheme so full with factual content that it can be removed from this content like a lid from a bowl without changing anything" (as to the exception which Mr. Mikhailovsky makes here—regarding the future—we shall deal with it anon). If that is so, why is Mr. Mikhailovsky making so much fuss about this lid that changes nothing? Why does he say that the materialists "rest" their case on the incontrovertibility of the dialectical process? Why, when he is combating this lid, does he declare that he is combating one of the "pillars" of scientific socialism, which is a downright untruth?

It goes without saying that I shall not examine how Mr. Mikhailovsky analyses the examples of triads, because, I repeat, this has no connection whatever either with scientific materialism or with Russian Marxism. But there is one interesting question: what grounds had Mr. Mikhailovsky for so distorting the attitude of Marxists to dialectics?

Two grounds: firstly, Mr. Mikhailovsky, as the saying goes, heard the tolling of a bell, but whence it came he could not tell; secondly, Mr. Mikhailovsky performed (or, rather, borrowed from Dühring) one more piece of subterfuge.

Ad 1)* When reading Marxist literature, Mr. Mikhailovsky constantly came across references to the "dialectical method" in social science, "dialectical thinking," again in the sphere of social problems (which alone is in question), and so forth. In his simplicity of heart (it were well if it were only simplicity) he took it for granted that this method consists in solving all sociological problems in accordance with the laws of the Hegelian triad. Had he been just a little more attentive to the matter in hand he could not but have become convinced of the absurdity of this notion. What Marx and Engels called the dialectical method—as against the metaphysical—is nothing else than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a state of constant development (and not as something mechanically concatenated and therefore permitting all sorts of arbitrary combinations of separate social elements), an organism the study of which requires an objective analysis of the production relations that constitute the given social formation and an investigation of its laws of functioning and development. We shall endeavour below to illustrate the relation between the dialectical method and the metaphysical (to which concept the subjective method in sociology undoubtedly also belongs) by Mr. Mikhailovsky's own arguments. For the present we shall only observe that anyone who reads the definition and description of the dialectical method given either by Engels (in the polemic against Dühring: *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*) or by Marx (various comments in *Capital*, in the Afterword to the second edition, and in *The Poverty of Philosophy*)[49] will see that the Hegelian triads are not even mentioned, and that it all amounts to regarding social evolution as the natural historical process of development of social-economic formations. In confirmation of this I shall cite in extenso the description of the dialectical method given in *Vestnik Yevropy*, 1872, No. 5 (in the article "The Standpoint

* As to the first point.—*Ed.*

of Karl Marx's Critique of Political Economy"),[50] which Marx quotes in the Afterword to the second edition of *Capital*. Marx says that the method he employed in *Capital* had been poorly understood. "German reviews, of course, shriek out at 'Hegelian sophistics'." And in order to illustrate his method more clearly, Marx quotes the description of it given in the article mentioned. The one thing of importance to Marx, it is there stated, is to find the law governing the phenomena he is investigating, and of particular importance to him is the law of change, the development of those phenomena, of their transition from one form into another, from one order of social relations to another. Consequently, Marx is concerned with one thing only: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of the given order of social relations, and to establish, as fully as possible, the facts that serve him as fundamental points of departure. For this purpose it is quite enough if, while proving the necessity of the present order of things, he at the same time proves the necessity of another order which must inevitably grow out of the preceding one regardless of whether men believe in it or not, whether they are conscious of it or not. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intentions, but, rather, on the contrary, determining the will, consciousness and intentions of men. (This for the information of the subjectivist gentlemen, who separate social evolution from the evolution of natural history merely because man sets himself conscious "aims" and is guided by definite ideals.) If the conscious element plays so subordinate a part in the history of civilisation, it is self-evident that a critique whose subject is civilisation, can least of all take as its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the external, objective phenomenon alone can serve as its point of departure. Criticism must consist in comparing and contrasting the given fact with another fact and not with the idea; the one thing of moment is that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, in respect of each other, different moments of development; but most important of all is that an equally accurate investigation be made of the whole series of known states,

their sequence and the relation between the different stages of development. Marx rejects the very idea that the laws of economic life are one and the same for the past and the present. On the contrary, every historical period has its own laws. Economic life constitutes a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. Earlier economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Setting himself the task of investigating the capitalist economic organism from this point of view, Marx thereby formulates, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in disclosing the special (historical) laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher organism.

Such is the description of the dialectical method which Marx fished out of the mass of magazine and newspaper comments on *Capital*, and which he translated into German, because this description of the method, as he himself says, is absolutely correct. The question arises, is so much as even a single word said here about triads, trichotomies, the incontrovertibility of the dialectical process and suchlike nonsense, which Mr. Mikhailovsky battles against so valiantly? Following this description, Marx says plainly that his method is the "direct opposite" of Hegel's method. According to Hegel the development of the idea, in conformity with the dialectical laws of the triad, determines the development of the real world. And it is only in that case, of course, that one can speak of the importance of the triads, of the incontrovertibility of the dialectical process. "With me, on the contrary," says Marx, "the ideal is nothing but the reflection of the material." And the whole matter thus amounts to an "affirmative recognition of the existing state of things and of its inevitable development"; no other role is left for the triads than that of the lid and the shell ("I coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to Hegel," Marx says in this same Afterword), in which only philistines could be interested. How, then, we may ask, should

we judge a man who set out to criticise one of the "pillars" of scientific materialism, i.e., dialectics, and began to talk about all sorts of things, even about frogs and Napoleon, but not about what dialectics is, whether the development of society is really a process of natural history, whether the materialist concept of social-economic formations as special social organisms is correct, whether the methods of objective analysis of these formations are right, whether social ideas really do not determine social development but are themselves determined by it, and so forth? Can one assume only a lack of understanding in this case?

Ad 2)* After this "criticism" of dialectics, Mr. Mikhailovsky imputes these methods of proving things "by means of" Hegelian triads to Marx, and, of course, victoriously combats them. "Regarding the future," he says, "the immanent laws of society are based purely on dialectics." (This is the exception referred to above.) Marx's arguments on the inevitability of the expropriation of the expropriators by virtue of the laws of development of capitalism are "purely dialectical." Marx's "ideal" of the common ownership of land and capital "in the sense of its inevitability and indubitability rests entirely at the end of the Hegelian three-term chain."

This argument *is taken in its entirety* from Dühring, who expounds it in his "Kritische Geschichte der Nationaloekonomie und des Sozialismus" (3-te Aufl., 1879. S. 486-87).** But Mr. Mikhailovsky says not a word about Dühring. Perhaps, incidentally, he arrived independently at this way of garbling Marx?

Engels gave a splendid reply to Dühring, and since he also quotes Dühring's criticism we shall confine ourselves to Engels' reply.[51] The reader will see that it fully applies to Mr. Mikhailovsky.

"'This historical sketch' (of the genesis of the so-called primitive accumulation of capital in England) 'is relatively the best part of Marx's book,'" says Dühring, "'and would be even better if it had not relied on the dialectical crutch to

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* As to the second point.—*Ed.*

** *A Critical History of National Economy and Socialism* (3rd edition, 1879, pp. 486-87).—*Ed.*

help out its scholarly crutch. The Hegelian negation of the negation, in default of anything better and clearer, has in fact to serve here as the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the past. The abolition of "individual property," which since the sixteenth century has been effected in the way indicated above, is the first negation. It will be followed by a second, which bears the character of a negation of the negation, and hence of a restoration of "individual property," but in a higher form, based on common ownership of land and of the instruments of labour. Herr Marx calls this new "individual property" also "social property," and in this there appears the Hegelian higher unity, in which the contradiction is supposed to be sublated'" (aufgehoben—a specific Hegelian term), "'that is to say, in the Hegelian verbal jugglery, both overcome and preserved....

"'According to this, the expropriation of the expropriators is, as it were, the automatic result of historical reality in its materially external relations.... It would be difficult to convince a sensible man of the necessity of the common ownership of land and capital, on the basis of credence in Hegelian word-juggling such as the negation of the negation.... The nebulous hybrids of Marx's conceptions will not, however, appear strange to anyone who realises what nonsense can be concocted with Hegelian dialectics as the scientific basis, or rather what nonsense must necessarily spring from it. For the benefit of the reader who is not familiar with these artifices, it must be pointed out expressly that Hegel's first negation is the catechismal idea of the fall from grace, and his second is that of a higher unity leading to redemption. The logic of facts can hardly be based on this nonsensical analogy borrowed from the religious sphere.... Herr Marx remains cheerfully in the nebulous world of his property which is at once both individual and social and leaves it to his adepts to solve for themselves this profound dialectical enigma.' Thus far Herr Dühring.

"So," Engels concludes, "Marx has no other way of proving the necessity of the social revolution, of establishing the common ownership of land and of the means of production produced by labour, except by using the Hegelian negation of the negation; and because he bases his socialist theory on these nonsensical analogies borrowed from religion, he arrives at

the result that in the society of the future there will be dominant an ownership at once both individual and social, as the Hegelian higher unity of the sublated contradiction.*

"But let the negation of the negation rest for the moment, and let us have a look at the 'ownership' which is 'at once both individual and social.' Herr Dühring characterises this as a 'nebulous world,' and curiously enough he is really right on this point. Unfortunately, however, it is not Marx but again Herr Dühring himself who is in this 'nebulous world.'... He can put Marx right à la Hegel, by imputing to him the higher unity of a property, of which there is not a word in Marx.

"Marx says: 'It is the negation of the negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era; i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production. The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised production, into socialised property.' That is all. The state of things brought about through the expropriation of the expropriators is therefore characterised as the re-

* That this formulation of Dühring's views applies fully to Mr. Mikhailovsky is proved by the following passage in his article "Karl Marx Being Tried by Y. Zhukovsky." Objecting to Mr. Zhukovsky's assertion that Marx is a defender of private property, Mr. Mikhailovsky refers to this scheme of Marx's and explains it in the following manner. "In his scheme Marx employed two well-known tricks of Hegelian dialectics: firstly, the scheme is constructed according to the laws of the Hegelian triad; secondly, the synthesis is based on the identity of opposites—individual and social property. This means that the word 'individual' here has the specific, purely conditional meaning of a term of the dialectical process, and absolutely nothing can be based on it." This was said by a man possessed of the most estimable intentions, defending, in the eyes of the Russian public, the "sanguine" Marx from the bourgeois Mr. Zhukovsky. And with these estimable intentions he explains Marx as basing his conception of the process on "tricks"! Mr. Mikhailovsky may draw from this what is for him the not unprofitable moral that, whatever the matter in hand, estimable intentions alone are rather inadequate.

establishment of individual property, but *on the basis* of the social ownership of the land and of the means of production produced by labour itself. To anyone who understands German" (and Russian too, Mr. Mikhailovsky, because the translation is absolutely correct) "this means that social ownership extends to the land and the other means of production, and individual ownership to the products, that is, the articles of consumption. And in order to make the matter comprehensible even to children of six, Marx assumes on page 56" (Russ. ed., p. 30).[52] "'a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community,' that is, a society organised on a socialist basis; and he continues: 'The total product of our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and *remains social*.' But another portion is consumed by the members as means of subsistence. '*A distribution of this portion among them is consequently necessary*.' And surely that is clear enough even for Herr Dühring....

"The property which is at once both individual and social, this confusing hybrid, this nonsense which necessarily springs from Hegelian dialectics, this nebulous world, this profound dialectical enigma, which Marx leaves his adepts to solve for themselves—is yet another free creation and imagination on the part of Herr Dühring....

"But what role," Engels continues, "does the negation of the negation play in Marx? On page 791 and the following pages" (Russ. ed., p. 648 et seq.)[53] "he sets out the final conclusions which he draws from the preceding 50" (Russ. ed., 35) "pages of economic and historical investigation into the so-called primitive accumulation of capital. Before the capitalist era, petty industry existed, at least in England, on the basis of the private property of the labourer in his means of production. The so-called primitive accumulation of capital consisted there in the expropriation of these immediate producers, that is, in the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner. This became possible because the petty industry referred to above is compatible only with narrow and primi-

tive bounds of production and society and at a certain stage brings forth the material agencies for its own annihilation. This annihilation, the transformation of the individual and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, forms the prehistory of capital. As soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, the further socialisation of labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production" (into capital), "and therefore the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. 'That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the concentration of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this concentration, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil; the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. *Capital* becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Concentration of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.'

"And now I ask the reader: where are the dialectical frills and mazes and conceptual arabesques; where the mixed

and misconceived ideas according to which everything is all one and the same thing in the end; where the dialectical miracles for his faithful followers; where the mysterious dialectical rubbish and the maze in accordance with the Hegelian Logos doctrine, without which Marx, according to Herr Dühring, is unable to put his exposition into shape? Marx merely shows from history, and here states in a summarised form, that just as formerly petty industry by its very development, necessarily created the conditions of its own annihilation ... so now the capitalist mode of production has likewise itself created the material conditions from which it must perish. The process is a historical one, and if it is at the same time a dialectical process, this is not Marx's fault, however annoying it may be to Herr Dühring.

"It is only at this point, after Marx has completed his proof on the basis of historical and economic facts, that he proceeds: 'The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation'—and so on (as quoted above).

"Thus, by characterising the process as the negation of the negation, Marx does not intend to prove that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: only after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future, he in addition characterises it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law That is all. It is therefore once again a pure distortion of the facts by Herr Dühring when he declares that the negation of the negation has to serve here as the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the past, or that Marx wants anyone to be convinced of the necessity of the common ownership of land and capital ... on the basis of credence in the negation of the negation" (p. 125).

The reader will see that Engels' splendid rebuttal of Dühring applies in its entirety to Mr. Mikhailovsky, who also asserts that with Marx the future rests exclusively

at the end of the Hegelian chain and that the conviction of its inevitability can be founded only on faith.*

The whole difference between Dühring and Mr. Mikhailovsky reduces itself to the following two small points: firstly, Dühring, despite the fact that he could not speak of Marx without foaming at the mouth, nevertheless considered it necessary to mention in the next section of his *History* that Marx in the Afterword[54] categorically repudiated the accusation of Hegelianism. Mr. Mikhailovsky, however, has nothing to say about the (above quoted) absolutely definite and clear statements by Marx on what he conceives the dialectical method to be.

Secondly, another peculiarity of Mr. Mikhailovsky's is that he concentrated all his attention on the use of tenses. Why, when he speaks of the future, does Marx use the present tense?—our philosopher demands with an air of triumph. You may find the answer to this in any grammar, most worthy critic: you will find that the present tense is used instead of the future when the future is regarded as inevitable and undoubted. But why so, why is it undoubted?—Mr. Mikhailovsky anxiously asks, desiring to convey such profound agitation as would justify even a distortion. But on this point, too, Marx gave an absolutely definite reply. You may consider it inadequate or wrong, but in that case you must show *how exactly* and *why exactly* it is wrong, and not talk nonsense about Hegelianism.

Time was when Mr. Mikhailovsky not only knew himself what this reply was, but lectured others on it. Mr. Zhukovsky, he wrote in 1877, had good grounds for regarding Marx's conception of the future as conjectural, but he "had no moral right" to ignore the question of the socialisation of labour, "to which Marx attributes vast

* It is worth while, I think, to note in this connection that the entire explanation given by Engels is contained in the same chapter in which he discusses the seed, the teaching of Rousseau, and other examples of the dialectical process. It would seem that the absurdity of accusing Marxism of Hegelian dialectics would have been made quite evident by merely comparing these examples with the clear and categorical statements by Engels (and by Marx, to whom the manuscript was read before printing), and there can be no question of trying *to prove* anything by triads or of inserting in the depiction of the real process the "conditional members" of these triads.

importance." Well, of course! Zhukovsky in 1877 had no moral right to evade the question, but Mr. Mikhailovsky in 1894 has this moral right! Perhaps, quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi?!*

I cannot help recalling here a strange notion of this socialisation once expressed in *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*.[55] In No. 7, 1883, this magazine published "A Letter to the Editor," from a certain Mr. Postoronny[56] who, like Mr. Mikhailovsky, regarded Marx's "conception" about the future as conjectural. "Essentially," this gentleman argues, "the social form of labour under capitalism amounts to this, that several hundreds or thousands of workers grind, hammer, turn, place on, place under, pull and perform numerous other operations under one roof. As to the general character of this regime it is excellently expressed by the saying: 'Every man for himself, and God for all.' Where does the social form of labour come in?"

Well, you can see at once that the man has grasped what it is all about! "The social form of labour" "amounts" to "working under one roof"!! And when such preposterous ideas are expressed in one of the, so far, best Russian magazines, they still want to assure us that the theoretical part of *Capital* is generally recognised by science. Yes, as it was unable to raise the slightest serious objection to *Capital*, "generally recognised science" began to bow and scrape to it, at the same time continuing to betray the most elementary ignorance and to repeat the old banalities of school economics. We must dwell on this question somewhat in order to show Mr. Mikhailovsky what is the essence of the matter which he, by force of habit, has passed over entirely.

The socialisation of labour by capitalist production does not at all consist in people working under one roof (that is only a small part of the process), but in the concentration of capital being accompanied by the specialisation of social labour, by a decrease in the number of capitalists in each given branch of industry and an increase in the number of separate branches of industry—in many

* What Jove may do, the bull may not.—*Ed.*

separate production processes being merged into one social production process. When, in the days of handicraft weaving, for example, the small producers themselves spun the yarn and made it into cloth, we had a few branches of industry (spinning and weaving were merged). But when production becomes socialised by capitalism, the number of separate branches of industry increases: cotton spinning is done separately and so is weaving; this very division and the concentration of production give rise to new branches—machine building, coal mining, and so forth. In each branch of industry, which has now become more specialised, the number of capitalists steadily decreases. This means that the social tie between the producers becomes increasingly stronger, the producers become welded into a single whole. The isolated small producers each performed several operations simultaneously, and were therefore relatively independent of each other: when, for instance, the handicraftsman himself sowed flax, and himself spun and wove, he was almost independent of others. It was this (and only this) regime of small, dispersed commodity producers that justified the saying: "Every man for himself, and God for all," that is, an anarchy of market fluctuations. The case is entirely different under the socialisation of labour that has been achieved due to capitalism. The manufacturer who produces fabrics depends on the cotton-yarn manufacturer; the latter depends on the capitalist planter who grows the cotton, on the owner of the engineering works, the coal mine, and so on and so forth. The result is that no capitalist can get along without others. It is clear that the saying "every man for himself" is quite inapplicable to such a regime: here each works for all and all for each (and no room is left for God—either as a supermundane fantasy or as a mundane "golden calf"). The character of the regime changes completely. When, during the regime of small, isolated enterprises, work came to a standstill in any one of them, this affected only a few members of society, it did not cause any general confusion, and therefore did not attract general attention and did not provoke public interference. But when work comes to a standstill in a large enterprise, one engaged in a highly specialised branch of industry and therefore working almost for the whole of

society and, in its turn, dependent on the whole of society (for the sake of simplicity I take a case where socialisation has reached the culminating point), work is bound to come to a standstill in all the other enterprises of society, because they can only obtain the products they need from this enterprise, they can only dispose of all their own commodities if its commodities are available. All production processes thus merge into a single social production process; yet each branch is conducted by a separate capitalist, it depends on him and the social products are his private property. Is it not clear that the form of production comes into irreconcilable contradiction with the form of appropriation? Is it not evident that the latter must adapt itself to the former and must become social, that is, socialist? But the smart philistine of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* reduces the whole thing to work under one roof. Could anything be wider of the mark! (I have described only the material process, only the change in production relations, without touching on the social aspect of the process, the fact that the workers become united, welded together and organised, since that is a derivative and secondary phenomenon.)

The reason such elementary things have to be explained to the Russian "democrats" is that they are so badly stuck in the mud of petty-bourgeois ideas that to imagine any but a petty-bourgeois order of things is quite beyond them.

Let us return, however, to Mr. Mikhailovsky. What objections did he make to the facts and arguments on which Marx based the conclusion that the socialist system is inevitable by virtue of the very laws of capitalist development? Did he show that in reality, under a commodity organisation of social economy, there is no growing specialisation of the social labour process, no concentration of capital and enterprises, no socialisation of the whole labour process? No, he did not advance a single argument in refutation of these facts. Did he shake the proposition that anarchy, which is irreconcilable with the socialisation of labour, is an inherent feature of capitalist society? He said nothing about this. Did he prove that the amalgamation of the labour processes of all the capitalists into a single social labour process is compatible with private property, or that some solution to the contradiction is possible

and conceivable other than that indicated by Marx? No, he did not say a word about this.

On what, then, does his criticism rest? On manipulations, distortion, and on a spate of words which are nothing more than the noise of a rattle.

How else, indeed, are we to characterise methods employed by the critic who, after first talking a lot of nonsense about triple successive steps of history, demands of Marx with a serious air: "And what next?"—that is, how will history proceed beyond that final stage of the process he has described? Please note that from the very outset of his literary and revolutionary activities Marx most definitely demanded that sociological theory should accurately depict the real process—and nothing more (cf., for instance, the *Communist Manifesto* on the communists' criterion of theory).[57] He strictly adhered to this demand in his *Capital*: he made it his task to give a scientific analysis of the capitalist form of society—and there he stopped, after showing that the development of this organisation actually going on before our eyes has such and such a tendency, that it must inevitably perish and turn into another, a higher organisation. But Mr. Mikhailovsky, evading the whole substance of Marx's doctrine, puts his stupid question: "And what next?" And he adds profoundly: "I must frankly confess that I am not quite clear what Engels' reply would be." We, however, on our part must frankly confess, Mr. Mikhailovsky, that we are quite clear about what the spirit and methods of such "criticism" are!

Or take the following argument: "In the Middle Ages, Marx's individual property based on the proprietor's own labour was neither the only nor the predominating factor, even in the realm of economic relations. There was much more besides, but the dialectical method in Marx's interpretation" (and not in Mr. Mikhailovsky's garbled version of it?) "does not propose returning to it.... It is obvious that all these schemes do not present a picture of historical reality, or even of its proportions; they simply satisfy the tendency of the human mind to think of every object in its past, present and future states." Even your way of distorting things, Mr. Mikhailovsky, is monotonous to the point of nausea! Into Marx's scheme, which claims to formulate nothing

but the actual process of development of capitalism,* he first insinuates the intention of proving everything by triads, then declares that Marx's scheme does not conform to the plan foisted on it by Mr. Mikhailovsky (the third stage restores only *one* aspect of the first stage, omitting all the others), and then in the most blatant manner draws the conclusion that "the scheme obviously does not present a picture of historical reality"!

Is any serious polemic thinkable with a man who (as Engels said of Dühring) cannot quote accurately, even by way of exception? Can there be any arguing, when the public is assured that the scheme "obviously" does not conform to reality, without even an attempt being made to show its faultiness in any respect?

Instead of criticising the real content of Marxist views, Mr. Mikhailovsky exercises his ingenuity on the subject of the categories past, present and future. Engels, for instance, arguing against the "eternal truths" of Herr Dühring, says that the "morality ... preached to us today" is a threefold morality: Christian-feudal, bourgeois and proletarian, so that the past, present and future have their own theories of morality.[58] In this connection, Mr. Mikhailovsky reasons as follows: "I think that it is the categories past, present and future that lie at the basis of all triple divisions of history into periods." What profundity! Who does not know that if any social phenomenon is examined in its process of development, relics of the past, foundations of the present and germs of the future will always be discovered in it? But did Engels, for instance, think of asserting that the history of morality (he was speaking, we know, only of the "present") was confined to the three factors indicated, that feudal morality, for example, was not preceded by slave morality, and the latter by the morality of the primitive-communist community? Instead of seriously criticising Engels' attempt to elucidate modern trends in

* The other features of the economic system of the Middle Ages are omitted because they belonged to the feudal social formation whereas Marx investigates only the *capitalist* formation. In its pure form the process of capitalist development actually began—in England, for instance—with the system of small, isolated commodity producers and their individual labour property.

moral ideas by explaining them materialistically, Mr. Mikhailovsky treats us to the most empty phrase-mongering!

In respect of such methods of "criticism" employed by Mr. Mikhailovsky, criticism which begins with the statement that he does not know where, in what work, the materialist conception of history is expounded, it would perhaps be worth while to recall that there was a time when the author knew one of these works and was able to appraise it more correctly. In 1877, Mr. Mikhailovsky expressed the following opinion of *Capital*: "If we remove from *Capital* the heavy, clumsy and unnecessary lid of Hegelian dialectics" (How strange! How is it that "Hegelian dialectics" were "unnecessary" in 1877, while in 1894 it appears that materialism rests on "the incontrovertibility of the dialectical process"?), "then, apart from the other merits of this essay, we shall observe in it splendidly elaborated material for an answer to the general question of the relation of forms to the material conditions of their existence, and an excellent formulation of this question for a definite sphere." "The relation of forms to the material conditions of their existence"—why, that is the very problem of the interrelation between the various aspects of social life, of the superstructure of ideological social relations on the basis of material relations, a problem whose well-known solution constitutes the doctrine of materialism. Let us proceed.

"In point of fact, *the whole of* '*Capital*'" (my italics) "is devoted to an inquiry into how a form of society, once it has emerged, continues to develop and accentuates its typical features, subjecting to itself and assimilating discoveries, inventions and improvements in methods of production, new markets and science itself and compels them to work for it, and of how, finally, the given form cannot stand up against further changes in material conditions."

An astonishing thing! In 1877, "the whole of *Capital* was devoted to a materialist inquiry into a particular form of society (what else does materialism consist in, if not in explaining forms of society by material conditions?), whereas in 1894 it appears that it is not even known where, in what work, an exposition of this materialism should be sought!

In 1877, *Capital* contained an "inquiry into" how "a particular form" (the capitalist form, is it not?) "cannot" (mark that!) "stand up against further changes in material conditions,"—whereas in 1894 it turns out that there has been no inquiry at all and that the conviction that the capitalist form cannot withstand any further development of the productive forces—rests "entirely at the end of the Hegelian triad"! In 1877, Mr. Mikhailovsky wrote that "the analysis of the relations of the given form of society to the material conditions of its existence will *for ever*" (my italics) "remain a monument to the author's logical powers and vast erudition," whereas in 1894 he declares that the doctrine of materialism has never and nowhere been scientifically verified and proved.

An astonishing thing! What does it really mean? What has happened?

Two things have happened. Firstly, the *Russian*, peasant socialism of the seventies—which "snorted" at freedom because of its bourgeois character, fought the "clear-browed liberals" who zealously covered up the antagonistic nature of Russian life, and dreamed of a peasant revolution—has completely decayed and has begotten that vulgar, philistine liberalism which discerns an "encouraging impression" in the progressive trends of peasant farming, forgetting that they are accompanied (and determined) by the wholesale expropriation of the peasantry. Secondly, in 1877 Mr. Mikhailovsky was so engrossed in his task of defending the "sanguine" (i.e., revolutionary socialist) Marx from the liberal critics that he failed to observe the incompatibility of Marx's method and his own. And then this irreconcilable contradiction between dialectical materialism and subjective sociology was explained to him—explained by Engels' articles and books, and by the Russian Social-Democrats (one often meets with very apt comments on Mr. Mikhailovsky in Plekhanov's writings)—and Mr. Mikhailovsky, instead of seriously sitting down to reconsider the whole question, simply took the bit between his teeth. Instead of welcoming Marx (as he did in 1872 and 1877)[59] he now barks at him under cover of dubious praise, and rages and splutters against the Russian Marxists for refusing to rest content with the defence of the economically weakest," with warehouses

and improvements in the countryside, with museums and artels for handicraftsmen, and similar well-meaning philistine ideas of progress, and for wanting to remain "sanguine" people, advocates of social revolution, and to teach, guide and organise the really revolutionary elements of society.

After this brief excursion into the realm of the distant past, one may, we think, conclude this examination of Mr. Mikhailovsky's "criticism" of Marx's theory. Let us then try to sum up and recapitulate the critic's "arguments."

The doctrine he set out to demolish is based, firstly, on the materialist conception of history, and, secondly, on the dialectical method.

As to the first, the critic began by declaring that he did not know in which work materialism was expounded. Not having found such an exposition anywhere, he himself set about concocting an explanation of what materialism is. In order to give an idea of the excessive claims of this materialism, he concocted the story that the materialists claim to have explained the entire past, present and future of mankind—and when it was subsequently shown by reference to the authentic statements of the Marxists that they regard only one social formation as having been explained, the critic decided that the materialists narrow the scope of materialism, whereby, he asserts, they defeat themselves. In order to give an idea of the methods by which this materialism was worked out, he invented the story that the materialists themselves had confessed to the inadquacy of their knowledge for the elaboration of scientific socialism, despite the fact that Marx and Engels confessed only to the insufficiency of their knowledge (in 1845-1846) of economic history in general, and despite the fact that they never published the essay which testified to the insufficiency of their knowledge. After these preludes, we were treated to the criticism itself: *Capital* was annihilated because it dealt with only one period, whereas the critic wants to have all periods; and also because it did not affirm economic materialism, but simply touched upon it—arguments, evidently, so weighty and serious as to compel the recognition that materialism had never been scientifical-

ly substantiated. Then the fact was cited against materialism that a man totally unconnected with this doctrine, having studied prehistoric times in an entirely different country, also arrived at materialist conclusions. To show, further, that it was absolutely wrong to drag procreation into materialism, that this was nothing but a verbal artifice, the critic proceeded to prove that economic relations are a superstructure based on sexual and family relations. The statements made thereupon by our weighty critic for the edification of the materialists enriched us with the profound truth that inheritance is impossible without procreation, that a complex psychology "adheres" to the products of this procreation, and that children are brought up in the spirit of their fathers. In passing, we also learnt that national ties are a continuation and generalisation of gentile ties. Continuing his theoretical researches into materialism, the critic noted that the content of many of the Marxists' arguments consisted in the assertion that oppression and exploitation of the masses were "necessary" under the bourgeois regime and that this regime must "necessarily" turn into a socialist regime, after which he hastened to declare that necessity is too general a bracket (if we omit what, exactly, people consider necessary) and that therefore Marxists are mystics and metaphysicians. The critic also declared that Marx's polemic against the idealists was "one-sided," but he did not say a word about the relation of these idealists' views to the subjective method and the relation of Marx's dialectical materialism to these views.

As to the second pillar of Marxism—the dialectical method—one push by the bold critic was enough to cast it to the ground. And the push was very well directed: the critic toiled and moiled with prodigious effort to disprove the notion that anything can be proved by triads, ignoring the fact that the dialectical method does not consist in triads at all, but that it consists precisely in the rejection of the methods of idealism and subjectivism in sociology. Another push was specially directed at Marx: with the help of the valorous Herr Dühring, the critic ascribed to Marx the incredible absurdity of having tried to prove the necessity of the doom of capitalism by means of triads—and then victoriously combated this absurdity.

Such is the epic of the brilliant "victories" of "our well-known sociologist"! How very "edifying" (Burenin) it was to contemplate these victories!

We cannot refrain at this point from touching on another circumstance, which has no direct bearing on the criticism of Marx's doctrine, but is extremely characteristic for an understanding of the critic's ideals and of his conception of reality. It is his attitude to the working-class movement in the West.

Above we quoted Mr. Mikhailovsky's statement that materialism had not justified itself in "science" (perhaps in the science of the German "friends of the people"?); but this materialism, argues Mr. Mikhailovsky, "is really spreading very rapidly among the working class." How does Mr. Mikhailovsky explain this fact? "The success," he says, "enjoyed by economic materialism in breadth, so to speak, and its dissemination in a critically unverified form, are chiefly due to the day-to-day practice established by prospects for the future, and not to science." What other meaning can there be in this clumsy phrase about practice "established" by prospects for the future than that materialism is spreading not because it correctly explains reality, but because it turns away from reality towards prospects? And he goes on to say: "These prospects require of the German working class which is adopting them and of those who take a warm interest in its future neither knowledge nor the effort of critical thinking. They require only faith." In other words, the spread of materialism and scientific socialism in breadth is due to the fact that this doctrine promises the workers a better future! But a most elementary acquaintance with the history of socialism and of the working-class movement in the West is enough to reveal the utter absurdity and falsity of this explanation. Everybody knows that scientific socialism never painted any prospects for the future as such: it confined itself to analysing the present bourgeois regime, to studying the trends of development of the capitalist social organisation, and that is all. "We do not say to the world," Marx wrote as far back as 1843, and he fulfilled this programme to the letter, "we do not say to the world: 'Cease struggling—your whole struggle is senseless.' All we do is to provide it with a true slo-

gan of struggle. We only show the world what it is actually struggling for, and consciousness is a thing which the world must acquire, whether it likes it or not."[60] Everybody knows that *Capital*, for instance—the chief and basic work in which scientific socialism is expounded—restricts itself to the most general allusions to the future and merely traces those already existing elements from which the future system grows. Everybody knows that as far as prospects for the future are concerned incomparably more was contributed by the earlier socialists, who described future society in every detail, desiring to inspire mankind with a picture of a system under which people get along without conflict and under which their social relations are based not on exploitation but on true principles of progress that conform to the conditions of human nature. Nevertheless, despite the whole phalanx of very talented people who expounded these ideas, and despite the most firmly convinced socialists, their theories stood aloof from life and their programmes were not connected with the political movements of the people until large-scale machine industry drew the mass of proletarian workers into the vortex of political life, and until the true slogan of their struggle was found. This slogan was found by Marx, "not a utopian, but a strict and, in places, even dry scientist" (as Mr. Mikhailovsky called him in the long distant past—in 1872); and it was certainly not found by means of prospects, but by a scientific analysis of the present bourgeois regime, by an elucidation of the *necessity* of exploitation under this regime, by an investigation of the laws of its development. Mr. Mikhailovsky may, of course, assure the readers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* that neither knowledge nor an effort of thinking is required to understand this analysis, but we have already seen in his own case (and shall see it to a still greater extent in the case of his economist collaborator[61]) so gross a lack of understanding of the elementary truths established by this analysis that such a statement, of course, can only provoke a smile. It remains an indisputable fact that the working-class movement spreads and develops precisely where and to the extent that large-scale capitalist machine industry develops; the socialist doctrine is successful precisely when it stops arguing about social conditions that conform to

human nature and sets about making a materialist analysis of contemporary social relations and explaining the necessity for the present regime of exploitation.

Having tried to evade the real reasons for the success of materialism among the workers by ascribing the attitude of this doctrine to "prospects" in a manner directly contrary to the truth, Mr. Mikhailovsky goes on to scoff in the most vulgar and philistine way at the ideas and tactics of the West-European working-class movement. As we have seen, he was unable to adduce a single argument against Marx's proofs of the inevitability of the capitalist system being transformed into a socialist system as a result of the socialisation of labour. And yet he jeers in the most blatant manner at the idea of an "army of proletarians" preparing to expropriate the capitalists, "whereupon all class conflict will cease and peace on earth and goodwill among men will reign." He, Mr. Mikhailovsky, knows far simpler and surer paths to the achievement of socialism than this: all that is required is that the "friends of the people" should indicate in greater detail the "clear and unalterable" paths of the "desired economic evolution"—and then these friends of the people will most likely "be called in" to solve "practical economic problems" (see the article "Problems of Russia's Economic Development" by Mr. Yuzhakov in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 11) and meanwhile—meanwhile the workers must wait, must rely on the friends of the people and not begin, with "unjustified self-assurance," an independent struggle against the exploiters. Desiring to strike a deathblow at this "unjustified self-assurance," our author waxes highly indignant at "this science that can almost fit into a pocket dictionary." How terrible, indeed! Science—and Social-Democratic penny pamphlets that can fit into the pocket!! Is it not obvious how unjustifiably self-assured are those who value science only insofar as it teaches the exploited to wage an independent struggle for their emancipation, teaches them to keep away from all "friends of the people" engaged in glossing over class antagonisms and desirous of taking the whole business upon themselves—those who, therefore, expound this science in penny publications which so shock the philistines? How different it would be if the workers placed their fate in the hands of

the "friends of the people"! They would show them a real, voluminous, university and philistine science; they would acquaint them in detail with a social organisation that conforms to human nature, provided only—the workers agreed to wait and did not themselves begin the struggle with such unjustified self-assurance!

Before passing to the second part of Mr. Mikhailovsky's "criticism," which this time is not directed against Marx's theory in general but against the Russian Social-Democrats in particular, we shall have to make a little digression. When criticising Marx, Mr. Mikhailovsky not only made no attempt to give an exact exposition of Marx's theory but horribly distorted it, and in just the same way he now most unscrupulously garbles the ideas of the Russian Social-Democrats. The truth must be restored. This can be done most conveniently by comparing the ideas of the earlier Russian socialists with the ideas of the Social-Democrats. I borrow an account of the former from an article by Mr. Mikhailovsky in *Russkaya Mysl*, 1892, No. 6, in which he also spoke of Marxism (and spoke of it—be it said in reproach to him—in a decent tone, without dealing with problems which, in a censored press, can be treated only in Burenin fashion, without confusing the Marxists with all sorts of riffraff) and expounded his own views in opposition to Marxism—or, at least, if not in opposition to, then parallel to Marxism. Of course, I have not the least desire to offend either Mr. Mikhailovsky, by classing him among the socialists, or the Russian socialists, by putting Mr. Mikhailovsky on a par with them; but I think that the *line of argument* is essentially the same in both cases, the difference being only in the degree of firmness, straightforwardness and consistency of their convictions.

Describing the ideas of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, Mr. Mikhailovsky wrote: "We included the ownership of the land by the tiller and of the implements of labour by the producer among moral and political ideals." The point of departure, as you see, is most well-intentioned, inspired by the best

wishes.... "The medieval forms of labour* still existing in our country had been seriously shaken, but we saw no reason to put a complete end to them for the sake of any doctrine whatever, liberal or non-liberal."

Strange argument! Obviously, "forms of labour" of any kind can be shaken only if they are superseded by some other forms; yet we do not find our author (nor would we find any of his like-minded friends, for that matter) even attempting to analyse and to explain these new forms, or to ascertain why they supplant the old. Stranger still is the second half of the tirade: "We saw no reason to put an end to these forms for the sake of any doctrine." What means do "we" (i.e., the socialists—see the above reservation) possess to "put an end" to forms of labour, that is, to reconstruct the existing production relations between the members of society? Is not the idea of remaking these relations in accordance with a doctrine absurd? Listen to what comes next; "Our task is not to rear, out of our own national depths, a civilisation that is positively 'original'; but neither is it to transplant Western civilisation to our own country in toto, together with all the contradictions that are tearing it apart; we must take what is good from wherever we can; and whether it be our own or foreign is not a matter of principle, but of practical convenience. Surely, this is so simple, clear and understandable that there is nothing even to discuss." Indeed, how simple it is! "Take" what is good from everywhere—and the trick is done! From the medieval forms "take" the labourer's ownership of the means of production, and from the new (i.e., capitalist) forms "take" liberty, equality, enlightenment and culture. And there is nothing to discuss! Here the whole subjective method in sociology is as clear as daylight: sociology starts with a utopia—the labourer's ownership of the land—and indicates the conditions for realising the desirable, namely, "take" what is good from here and from there. This philosopher takes a purely metaphysical view of social relations as of a simple

* "By medieval forms of labour"—the author explains in another place—"are meant not only communal landownership, handicraft industry and artel organisation. All these are undoubtedly medieval forms, but to them must be added all forms of ownership of land or implements of production by the labourer."

mechanical aggregation of various institutions, a simple mechanical concatenation of various phenomena. He plucks out one of these phenomena—the cultivator's ownership of the land in its medieval forms—and thinks that it can be transplanted to all other forms, just as a brick can be transferred from one building to another. But that is not studying social relations; it is mutilating the material to be studied. In reality, there was no such thing as the cultivator's ownership of the land existing separately and independently, as you have taken it; it was only one of the links in the then existing production relations, which consisted in the land being divided up among large landed proprietors, landlords, who allotted it to the peasants in order to exploit them, so that the land was, as it were, wages in kind: it provided the peasant with necessary products, so that he might be able to produce a surplus product for the landlord; it provided the means for the peasants to render feudal service to the landlord. Why did the author not follow up this system of production relations, instead of confining himself to plucking out one phenomenon and thus presenting it in an absolutely false light? Because the author does not know how to handle social problems: he (I repeat, I am using Mr. Mikhailovsky's arguments only as an example for criticising Russian socialism as a *whole*) does not set out at all *to explain* the then existing "forms of labour" and to present them as a definite system of production relations, as a definite social formation. To use Marx's expression, the dialectical method, which requires us to regard society as a living organism in its functioning and development, is alien to him.

Without even asking himself why the old forms of labour are supplanted by the new, he repeats exactly the same error when he discusses these new forms. For him it is enough to note that these forms "shake" the cultivator's ownership of the land—that is, speaking more generally, find expression in the separation of the producer from the means of production—and to condemn this for not conforming to the ideal. And here again his argument is utterly absurd: he plucks out one phenomenon (land dispossession), without even attempting to present it as an element of a now different system of production relations based on *commodity economy*, which

necessarily begets competition among the commodity producers, inequality, the ruin of some and the enrichment of others. He noted one thing, the ruin of the masses, and put aside the other, the enrichment of the minority, and this made it impossible for him to understand either.

And such methods he calls "seeking answers to the questions of life clothed in flesh and blood" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 1), when, as a matter of fact, quite the contrary is the case: unable and unwilling to explain reality, to look it straight in the face, he ignominiously fled from these questions of life, with its struggle of the propertied against the propertyless, to the realm of innocent utopias. This he calls "seeking answers to the questions of life in the ideal treatment of their burning and complex actual reality" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 1), when, as a matter of fact, he did not even attempt to analyse and explain this actual reality.

Instead, he presented us with a utopia contrived by senselessly plucking individual elements from various social formations—taking one thing from the medieval form, another from the "new" form, and so on. It is obvious that a theory based on this was bound to stand aloof from actual social evolution, for the simple reason that our utopians had to live and act not under social relations formed from elements taken from here and from there, but under those which determine the relation of the peasant to the kulak (the enterprising muzhik), of the handicraftsman to the buyer-up, of the worker to the factory owner, and which they completely failed to understand. Their attempts and efforts to remould these un-understood relations in accordance with their ideal were bound to end in failure.

Such, in very general outline, was how the problem of socialism stood in Russia when "the Russian Marxists appeared on the scene."

What they began with was a criticism of the subjective methods of the earlier socialists. Not satisfied with merely stating the fact of exploitation and condemning it, they desired *to explain* it. Seeing that the whole post-Reform history of Russia consisted in the ruin of the masses and the enrichment of a minority, observing the colossal expropriation of the small producers side by side with universal technical progress, noting that these polarising tendencies

arose and increased wherever, and to the extent that, commodity economy developed and became consolidated, they could not but conclude that they were confronted with a bourgeois (capitalist) organisation of social economy, *necessarily* giving rise to the expropriation and oppression of the masses. Their practical programme was directly determined by this conviction; this programme was to join in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the struggle of the propertyless classes against the propertied, which constitutes the principal content of economic reality in Russia, from the most out-of-the-way village to the most up-to-date and perfected factory. How were they to join in? The answer was again suggested by reality. Capitalism had brought the principal branches of industry to the stage of large-scale machine industry; by thus socialising production, it had created the material conditions for a new system and had at the same time created a new social force—the class of factory workers, the urban proletariat. Being subjected to the same bourgeois exploitation—for such, in its economic essence, is the exploitation to which the whole working population of Russia is subjected—this class, however, has been placed in a special, favourable position as far as its emancipation is concerned: it no longer has any ties with the old society based entirely on exploitation; the very conditions of its labour and the circumstances of life organise it, compel it to think and enable it to step into the arena of political struggle. It was only natural that the Social-Democrats should direct all their attention to, and base all their hopes on, this class, that they should reduce their programme to the development of its class consciousness, and direct all their activities towards helping it rise to wage a direct political struggle against the present regime, and towards drawing the whole Russian proletariat into this struggle.

Let us now see how Mr. Mikhailovsky fights the Social-Democrats. What arguments does he level against their theoretical views, against their political, socialist activity?

The theoretical views of the Marxists are set forth by the critic in the following manner:

"The truth" (the Marxists are represented as declaring) "is that in accordance with the immanent laws of historical necessity Russia will develop her own capitalist production, with all its inherent contradictions and the swallowing up of the small capitalists by the large, and meanwhile the muzhik, divorced from the land, will turn into a proletarian, unite, become 'socialised,' and the trick is done, the hat reappears, and it only remains to put the hat on the head of now happy mankind."

And so, if you please, the Marxists do not differ in any way from the "friends of the people" in their conception of reality; they differ only in their idea of the future: they do not deal at all, it appears, with the present, but only with "prospects." There can be no doubt that this is Mr. Mikhailovsky's idea; the Marxists, he says, "are fully convinced that there is nothing utopian in their forecasts of the future, and that everything has been weighed and measured in accordance with the strict dictates of science"; finally and even more explicitly: the Marxists "believe in, and profess, the immutability of an abstract historical scheme."

In a word, we have before us that most banal and vulgar accusation against the Marxists long employed by all who have nothing substantial to bring against their views. "The Marxists profess the immutability of an abstract historical scheme!!"

But this is a downright lie and invention!

No Marxist has ever argued anywhere that there "must be" capitalism in Russia "because" there was capitalism in the West, and so on. No Marxist has ever regarded Marx's theory as some universally compulsory philosophical scheme of history, as anything more than an explanation of a particular social-economic formation. Only Mr. Mikhailovsky, the subjective philosopher, has managed to display such a lack of understanding of Marx as to attribute to him a universal philosophical theory; and in reply to this, he received from Marx the quite explicit explanation that he was knocking at the wrong door. No Marxist has ever based his Social-Democratic views on anything but the conformity of theory with reality and the history of the given, i.e., the Russian, social and economic relations; and he could not have done so, because this demand on theory was quite defi-

nitely and clearly proclaimed and made the corner-stone of the whole doctrine by the founder of "Marxism" himself—Marx.

Of course, Mr. Mikhailovsky may refute these statements as much as he pleases, by arguing that he has heard "with his own ears" the profession of an abstract historical scheme. But what does it matter to us, Social-Democrats, or to anybody else, that Mr. Mikhailovsky has had occasion to hear all sorts of absurd nonsense from people he has talked to? Does it not merely show that he is very fortunate in the choice of the people he talks to, and nothing more? It is very possible, of course, that the witty interlocutors of the witty philosopher called themselves Marxists, Social-Democrats, and so forth—but who does not know that nowadays (as was noted long ago) every scoundrel likes to array himself in "red" garments?* And if Mr. Mikhailovsky is so perspicacious that he cannot distinguish these "mummers" from Marxists, or if he has understood Marx so profoundly as not to have noticed this criterion—most emphatically advanced by Marx—of the whole doctrine (the formulation of "what is going on before our eyes"), it only proves again that Mr. Mikhailovsky is not clever, and nothing else.

At any rate, since he undertook a polemic in the press against the "Social-Democrats," he should have had in mind the group of socialists who have long borne that name and have borne it alone—so that others cannot be confused with them—and who have their literary representatives, Plekhanov and his circle.[62] And had he done so—and that obviously is what anybody with any decency should have done—and had he even consulted the first Social-Democratic work, Plekhanov's *Our Differences*, he would have found in its very first pages a categorical declaration made by the author on behalf of all the members of the circle:

"We in no case wish to cover our programme with the authority of a great name" (i.e., the authority of Marx). Do you understand Russian, Mr. Mikhailovsky? Do you understand the difference between professing abstract

* All this is said on the assumption that Mr. Mikhailovsky has indeed heard professions of abstract historical schemes and has not invented anything. But I consider it absolutely imperative in this connection to make the reservation that I give this only for what it is worth.

schemes and entirely disclaiming the authority of Marx when passing judgement on Russian affairs?

Do you realise that you acted dishonestly by representing the first opinion you happened to hear from your interlocutors as Marxist, and by ignoring the published declaration made by a prominent member of Social-Democracy on behalf of the whole group?

And then the declaration becomes even more explicit:

"I repeat," Plekhanov says, "that the most consistent Marxists may disagree in the appraisal of the present Russian situation"; our doctrine is the "first attempt at applying this particular scientific theory to the analysis of very complicated and entangled social relations."

It would seem difficult to speak more clearly: the Marxists unreservedly borrow from Marx's theory only its invaluable methods, without which an elucidation of social relations is impossible, and, consequently, they see the criterion of their judgement of these relations not in abstract schemes and suchlike nonsense at all, but in its fidelity and conformity to reality.

Perhaps you think that in making these statements the author actually had something else in mind? But that is not so. The question he was dealing with was—"must Russia pass through the capitalist phase of development?" Hence, the question was not given a Marxist formulation at all, but was in conformity with the subjective methods of various native philosophers of ours, who see the criterion of this "must" in the policy of the authorities, or in the activities of "society," or in the ideal of a society that "corresponds to human nature," and similar twaddle. So it is fair to ask, how should a man who believes in abstract schemes have answered such a question? Obviously, he would have spoken of the incontrovertibility of the dialectical process, of the general philosophical importance of Marx's theory, of the inevitability of every country passing through the phase of ... and so on and so forth.

And how did Plekhanov answer it?

In the only way a Marxist could.

He left aside entirely the question of the "must," as being an idle one that could be of interest only to subjectivists, and dealt exclusively with real social and economic

relations and their actual evolution. And that is why he gave no direct answer to this wrongly formulated question, but instead replied: "Russia *has entered* the capitalist path."

And Mr. Mikhailovsky talks with the air of an expert about belief in abstract historical schemes, about the immanent laws of necessity, and similar incredible nonsense! And he calls this "a polemic against the Social-Democrats"!!

If this is a polemicist, then I simply cannot understand what a windbag is!

One must also observe in connection with Mr. Mikhailovsky's argument quoted above that he presents the views of the Social-Democrats as being: "Russia *will develop* her own capitalist production." Evidently, in the opinion of this philosopher, Russia has not got "her own" capitalist production. The author apparently shares the opinion that Russian capitalism is confined to one and a half million workers. We shall later on again meet with this childish idea of our "friends of the people," who class all the other forms of exploitation of free labour under heaven knows what heading. "Russia will develop her own capitalist production with all its inherent contradictions, and meanwhile the muzhik, separated from the land, will turn into a proletarian." The farther in the wood, the more trees there are! So there are no "inherent contradictions" in Russia? Or, to put it plainly, there is no exploitation of the mass of the people by a handful of capitalists, there is no ruin of the vast majority of the population and no enrichment of a few? The muzhik has still to be separated from the land? But what is the entire post-Reform history of Russia, if not the wholesale expropriation of the peasantry, proceeding with unparalleled intensity? One must possess great courage indeed to say such things publicly. And Mr. Mikhailovsky possesses that courage: "Marx dealt with a ready-made proletariat and a ready-made capitalism, whereas we have still to create them." Russia has still to create a proletariat?! In Russia—the only country where such a hopeless poverty of the masses and such shameless exploitation of the working people can be found; which has been compared (and legitimately so) to England as regards the condition of the poor; and where the starvation of millions of people is a permanent thing existing side by side, for instance,

with a steady increase in the export of grain—in Russia there is no proletariat!!

I think Mr. Mikhailovsky deserves to have a monument erected to him in his own lifetime for these classic words!*

We shall, incidentally, see later that it is a constant and most consistent tactic of the "friends of the people" to shut their eyes pharisaically to the intolerable condition of the working people in Russia, to depict this condition as having merely been "shaken," so that only the efforts of "cultured society" and the government are needed for everything to be put on the right track. These knights think that if they shut their eyes to the fact that the condition of the working masses is bad not because it has been "shaken," but because these masses are being shamelessly robbed by a handful of exploiters, that if they bury their heads in the sand like ostriches so as not to see these exploiters, the exploiters will disappear. And when the Social-Democrats tell them that it is shameful cowardice to fear to look reality in the face, when they take the fact of exploitation as their starting-point and say that its only possible explanation lies in the bourgeois organisation of Russian society, which is splitting the mass of the people into a proletariat and a bourgeoisie, and in the class character of the Russian state, which is nothing but the organ of the rule of this bourgeoisie, and that therefore *the only way out* lies in the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie—these "friends of the people" begin to howl that the Social-Democrats want to dispossess the people of their land!! that they want to destroy our people's economic organisation!!

We now come to the most outrageous part of all this indecent, to say the least, "polemic," namely, Mr. Mikhai-

* But perhaps here too, Mr. Mikhailovsky may try to wriggle out by declaring that he had no intention of saying that there was no proletariat at all in Russia, but only that there was no capitalist proletariat? Is that so? Then why did you not say so? The *whole question* is one of whether the Russian proletariat is a proletariat characteristic of the bourgeois or of some other organisation of social economy. Who is to blame if in the course of two whole articles you did not utter a *word* about this, the only serious and important question, but preferred instead to talk all sorts of nonsense, and reach the craziest conclusions?

lovsky's "criticism" (?) of the political activities of the Social-Democrats. Everybody realises that the activities carried on among the workers by socialists and agitators cannot be honestly discussed in our legal press, and that the only thing a decent censored periodical can do in this connection is to "maintain a tactful silence." Mr. Mikhailovsky has forgotten this very elementary rule, and has not scrupled to use his monopoly contact with the reading public in order to sling mud at the socialists.

However, means of combating this unscrupulous critic will be found even if outside of legal publications.

"As far as I understand," Mr. Mikhailovsky says with assumed näiveté, "the Russian Marxists can be divided into three categories: Marxist spectators (indifferent observers of the process), passive Marxists (they only "allay the birth pangs"; they "are not interested in the people on the land, and direct their attention and hopes to those who are already separated from the means of production"), and active Marxists (who bluntly insist on the further ruin of the countryside)."

What is this?! Mr. Critic must surely know that the Russian Marxists are socialists whose point of departure is the view that the reality of our environment is capitalist society, and that there is only one way out of it—the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. How, then, and on what grounds, does he mix them up with some sort of senseless vulgarity? What right (moral, of course) has he to extend the term Marxists to people who obviously do not accept the most elementary and fundamental tenets of Marxism, people who have never and nowhere acted as a distinct group and have never and nowhere announced a programme of their own?

Mr. Mikhailovsky has left himself a number of loopholes for justifying such outrageous methods.

"Perhaps," he jokes with the easy air of a society fop, "these are not real Marxists, but they consider and proclaim themselves as such." Where have they proclaimed it, and when? In the liberal and radical salons of St. Petersburg? In private letters? Be it so. Well, then, talk to them in your salons and in your correspondence! But you come out publicly and in the press against people who (under the ban-

ner of Marxism) have never come out publicly anywhere. And you have the effrontery to claim that you are polemising against "Social-Democrats," although you know that this name is borne only by *one* group of revolutionary socialists, and that nobody else should be confused with them!*

Mr. Mikhailovsky twists and turns like a schoolboy caught red-handed: I am not the least to blame here—he tries to make the reader believe—I "heard it with my own ears and saw it with my own eyes." Excellent! We are quite willing to believe that there is nobody in your field of vision but vulgarians and scoundrels. But what have we, Social-Democrats, to do with it? Who does not know that "at the present time, when" not only socialist activity, but any social activity that is at all independent and honest evokes political persecution—for every one actually working under some banner—be it Narodovolism,[63] Marxism, or even, let us say, constitutionalism—there are several score phrase-mongers who under cover of that name conceal their liberal cowardice, and, in addition, perhaps, several downright rascals who are feathering their own nests? Is it not obvious that only the meanest vulgarity could make any of these trends responsible for the fact that its banner is being soiled (privately and secretly, at that) by all sorts of riffraff? Mr. Mikhailovsky's whole argument is one chain of distortions, misrepresentations, and manipulations. We saw above that he completely distorted the "truths" which are the Social-Democrats' starting-point, presenting them

* I shall dwell on at least one *factual* reference which occurs in Mr. Mikhailovsky's article. Anybody who has read that article will have to admit that he includes even Mr. Skvortsov (author of *The Economic Causes of Starvation*) among the "Marxists." But, as a matter of fact, this gentleman does not call himself a Marxist, and the most elementary acquaintance with the works of the Social-Democrats is sufficient for anybody to see that from their standpoint he is nothing but a most vulgar bourgeois. What sort of Marxist is he if he does not understand that the social environment for which he projects his progressive schemes is a bourgeois environment, and that therefore all "agricultural improvements" actually to be observed even in peasant farming are bourgeois progress, which improves the position of a minority but proletarianises the masses! What sort of Marxist is he if he does not understand that the state to which he addresses his projects is a class state, capable only of supporting the bourgeoisie and oppressing the proletariat!

in a way in which no Marxist at any time or place has, or could have, presented them. And if he had set forth the actual Social-Democratic conception of Russian reality, he could not but have seen that one can "conform" to these views *in only one way*, namely, by helping to develop the class consciousness of the proletariat, by organising and uniting it for the political struggle against the present regime. He has, however, one other trick up his sleeve. With an air of injured innocence he pharisaically lifts up his eyes to heaven and unctuously declares: "I am very glad to hear that. But I cannot understand what you are protesting against" (that is exactly what he says in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 2). "Read my comment on passive Marxists more attentively and you will see that I say: from the ethical standpoint, no objection can be made."

This, of course, is nothing but a rehash of his former wretched subterfuges.

Tell us, please, how one would characterise the conduct of a person who declared that he was criticising social-revolutionary Narodism (at a time when no other type of Narodism had yet appeared—I take such a period), and who proceeded to say approximately the following:

"The Narodniks, as far as I understand, are divided into three categories: the consistent Narodniks, who completely accept the ideas of the muzhik and, in exact accordance with his desires, make a general principle of the birch and wife-beating and generally further the abominable policy of the government of the knout and the club, which, you know, has been called a people's policy; then, shall we say, the cowardly Narodniks, who are not interested in the opinions of the muzhik, and are only striving to transplant to Russia an alien revolutionary movement by means of associations and suchlike—against which, however, no objection can be made from the ethical standpoint, unless it be the slipperiness of the path, which may easily convert a cowardly Narodnik into a consistent or courageous one; and, lastly, the courageous Narodniks, who carry out to the full the people's ideals of the enterprising muzhik, and accordingly settle on the land in order to live as kulaks in good earnest." All decent people, of course, would characterise this as vile and vulgar scoffing. And if, furthermore, the person

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

who said such things could not be rebutted by the Narodniks in the same press; if, moreover, the ideas of these Narodniks had hitherto been expounded only illegally, so that many people had no exact idea of what they were and might easily believe whatever they were told about the Narodniks—then whoever would agree that such a person is....

But perhaps Mr. Mikhailovsky himself has not yet quite forgotten the word that fits here.

But enough! Many similar insinuations by Mr. Mikhailovsky still remain, but I know of no job more fatiguing, more thankless and more disgusting than to have to wade through this filth, to collect insinuations scattered here and there, to compare them and to search for at least one serious objection.

Enough!

April 1894

PUBLISHER'S NOTE [64]

In the text of the article the reader will find references to a further examination of certain questions, whereas actually no such examination is made.

The reason is that the present article is only the first part of a reply to articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* about Marxism. Acute shortage of time prevented the timely appearance of this article, but we do not consider it possible to delay any longer; we are two months late as it is. That is why we have decided to issue an examination of Mr. Mikhailovsky's "criticism" in the meantime without waiting until the whole article is printed.

In the 2nd and 3rd parts, now in course of preparation, the reader will find, in addition to the examination here presented, a further one dealing with the social and economic views of other leading figures of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, Messrs. Yuzhakov and S. Krivenko, in connection with an essay on the economic situation in Russia and the "ideas and tactics of the Social-Democrats" that follow therefrom.

NOTE TO THE PRESENT EDITION [65]

The present edition is an exact reproduction of the first. Having had no share whatever in compiling the text, we have not considered ourselves entitled to alter it in any way and have confined ourselves simply to the work of publication. Our motive for undertaking this work has been the confidence that the present pamphlet will serve to bring about some revival of our Social-Democratic propaganda.

Believing that one indispensable corollary of Social-Democratic convictions should be a readiness to promote such propaganda, we appeal to all who share the views of the author of the present pamphlet to assist by every means (especially, of course, by republication) in securing the widest possible circulation both of the present work and of all organs of Marxist propaganda in general. The present moment is particularly opportune. *Russkoye Bogatstvo* is assuming an increasingly provocative tone towards us. In an effort to paralyse the spread of Social-Democratic ideas in society, that magazine has gone so far as to accuse us outright of being indifferent to the interests of the proletariat and of insisting on the ruination of the masses. We make bold to think that by such methods it will only injure itself and pave the way for our victory. However, it should not be forgotten that these slanderers command all the material means for the most widespread propaganda of their slanders. They possess a magazine with a circulation of several thousand; they have reading-rooms and libraries at their disposal. Hence, if we are to prove to our enemies that even the advantages of a privileged position do not always ensure the success of insinuation, we must exert our every effort. We are fully confident that this effort will be forthcoming.

July 1894

PART III

Let us, in conclusion, make the acquaintance of Mr. Krivenko, another "friend of the people," who also launches open war against the Social-Democrats.

However, we shall not examine his articles ("Our Cultural Free Lances," in No. 12, 1893, and "Travel Letters," in No. 1, 1894) as we did those of Messrs. Mikhailovsky and Yuzhakov. An analysis in toto of their articles was essential to get a clear idea, in the first case, of the substance of their objections to materialism and Marxism in general, and, in the second, of their political-economic theories. Now, to get a complete idea of the "friends of the people," we shall have to acquaint ourselves with their tactics, their practical proposals and their political programme. This programme they have not anywhere set forth directly and as consistently and fully as they have set out their theoretical views. I am therefore obliged to take it from various articles in a magazine whose contributors are unanimous enough not to contradict each other. I shall give preference to the above-mentioned articles of Mr. Krivenko's merely because they furnish more material and because their author is as typical of the magazine as a practical man and a politician, as Mr. Mikhailovsky is a socialist and Mr. Yuzhakov is an economist.

However, before passing on to their programme, there is one more theoretical point we consider it absolutely essential to deal with. We have seen how Mr. Yuzhakov disposes of matters with meaningless phrases about people's land renting that supports people's economy, etc., using them to cover up the fact that he does not understand the economic life of our peasants. He did not deal with the handicraft industries, but confined himself to data on the growth of large-scale factory industry. Now Mr. Krivenko repeats

exactly the same sort of phrases about handicraft industries. He flatly contrasts "our people's industry," i.e., handicraft industries, to capitalist industry (No. 12, pp. 180-81). "People's production" (sic!), says he, "in the majority of cases arises naturally," whereas capitalist industry "is very often created artificially." In another passage he contrasts "small-scale people's industry" to "large-scale, capitalist industry." If you were to ask what is the distinguishing feature of the former, you would only learn that it is "small"* and that the instruments of labour are united with the producer (I borrow this latter definition from Mr. Mikhailovsky's above-mentioned article). But this is certainly far from defining its economic organisation—and, moreover, is absolutely untrue. Mr. Krivenko says, for example, that "small-scale people's industry to this day yields a much larger total output and employs more hands than large-scale capitalist industry." The author is evidently referring to data on the number of handicraftsmen, which is as many as 4 million, or, according to another estimate, 7 million. But who does not know that the form of economy predominating in our handicraft industries is the domestic system of large-scale production? that the bulk of the handicraftsmen occupy a position in production that is not independent at all, but, completely dependent, subordinate, that they do not process their own material but that of the merchant, who merely pays the handicraftsman a wage? Data on the predominance of this form have been cited even in legal literature. Let me quote, for example, the excellent work by the well-known statistician, S. Kharizomenov, published in *Yuridichesky Vestnik*[66] (1883, Nos. 11 and 12). Summarising the published data on our handicraft industries in the central gubernias, where they are most highly developed, S. Kharizomenov reached the conclusion that there is an absolute predominance of the domestic system of large-scale production, i.e., an unquestionably capitalist form of industry. "Defining the economic role of small-scale independent industry," he says, "we arrive

* The only other thing you would learn is this: "From it may develop a real (sic!) people's industry," says Mr. Krivenko. A common trick of the "friends of the people" is to utter idle and senseless phrases instead of giving a precise and direct description of reality.

at the following conclusions: in Moscow Gubernia 86.5% of the annual turnover of handicraft industry is accounted for by the domestic system of large-scale production, and only 13.5% by small-scale independent industry. In the Alexandrov and Pokrov uyezds of Vladimir Gubernia, 96% of the annual turnover of handicraft industry falls to the share of the domestic system of large-scale production and manufacture, and only 4% is accounted for by small-scale independent industry."

Nobody, as far as we know, has tried to refute these facts; nor can they be refuted. How, then, can one ignore these facts, and say nothing about them, call such industry "people's" in contradistinction to capitalist, and talk about the possibility of its developing into real industry?

There can be only one explanation of this direct ignoring of facts, namely, the general tendency of the "friends of the people," as of all Russian liberals, to gloss over class antagonism and the exploitation of the working people in Russia by representing all this as just plain "defects." But perhaps, an additional cause lies in so profound a knowledge of the subject as is revealed, for instance, by Mr. Krivenko when he calls the "Pavlovo cutlery trade"—"a trade of a semi-artisan character." The lengths of distortion to which the "friends of the people" will go are simply phenomenal! How can one speak here of artisan character, when the Pavlovo cutlers produce for the market and not to order? Or perhaps Mr. Krivenko regards as artisan industry the system under which a merchant orders articles from the handicraftsman and then sends them to Nizhni-Novgorod Fair? Funnily enough, this seems to be the case. As a matter of fact, the making of cutlery has least of all (compared with other Pavlovo industries) preserved the small-scale handicraft form, with its (seeming) independence of the producers. "The production of table and industrial cutlery,"* says N. F. Annensky, "is already largely approaching the factory, or, more correctly, the manufactory form." Of the 396 handicraftsmen engaged in the making of table cutlery in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, only 62

* The largest of the Pavlovo trades, which produces 900,000 rubles' worth of goods out of a total output of 2,750,000 rubles.

(16%) work for the market, 273 (69%) work for a master,* and 61 (15%) are wage-workers. Hence, only one-sixth of them are not directly enslaved to an employer. As to the other branch of the cutlery industry—the production of folding-knives (penknives)—the same author says that it "occupies a position midway between the table-knife and the lock: the majority of the handicraftsmen in this branch are working for a master, but along with them there are still quite a number of independent handicraftsmen who have to do with the market."

In Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia there are in all 2,552 handicraftsmen producing this sort of cutlery, of whom 48% (1,236) work for the market, 42% (1,058) work for a master, and 10% (258) are wage-workers. Consequently, here too the independent (?) handicraftsmen are in the minority. And those who work for the market are, of course, only apparently independent; actually they are no less enslaved to the *capital* of buyers-up. If we take the data for the industries of the entire Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, where 21,983 working people, or 84.5%, *of all who work*,** are engaged in industries, we get the following (exact data on the economics of the industry are available for only 10,808 workers, in the following industries: metal, leather goods, saddlery, felt, and hemp spinning): 35.6% of the handicraftsmen work for the market, 46.7% work for a master, and 17.7% are wage-workers. Thus, *here too we see the predominance of the domestic system of large-scale production, the predominance of relations under which labour is enslaved to capital.*

Another reason why the "friends of the people" so freely ignore facts of this kind is that their conception of capitalism has not advanced beyond the commonplace vulgar idea that a capitalist is a wealthy and educated employer who runs a large machine enterprise—and they refuse to

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* I.e., for the merchant who supplies the handicraftsmen with materials and pays them ordinary wages for their labour.

** Exceptionalist Russian economists, who measure Russian capitalism by the number of factory workers (sic!), unceremoniously classify these working people, and the multitudes like them, as part of the agricultural population, who do not suffer from the yoke of capital but from pressure artificially exerted on the "people's system" (???!!)



Выпускъ III.

ЧТО ТАКОЕ „ДРУЗЬЯ НАРОДА"

и

КАКЪ ОНИ ВОЮТЪ ПРОТИВЪ

СОЦІАЛ - ДЕМОКРАТОВЪ.

Сентябрь 1894.

Изданіе
провинціальной группы
соціал-демократовъ.

Cover of Part III, hectographed edition, of Lenin's *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, 1894
Reduced

consider the scientific content of the term. In the preceding chapter we saw that Mr. Yuzhakov dates the beginning of capitalism directly from machine industry, omitting simple co-operation and manufacture. This is a widespread error, which, incidentally, results in the capitalist organisation of our handicraft industries being ignored.

It goes without saying that the domestic system of large-scale production is a capitalist form of industry: here we have all its features—commodity economy already at a high level of development, the concentration of the means of production in the hands of individuals, and the expropriation of the mass of the workers, who have no means of production of their own and therefore apply their labour to those of others, working not for themselves but for the capitalist. Obviously, in its organisation, handicraft industry is pure capitalism; it differs from large-scale machine industry in being technically backward (chiefly because of the preposterously low wages) and in the fact that the workers retain diminutive farms. This latter circumstance particularly confuses the "friends of the people," who, as befits true metaphysicians, are accustomed to think in naked and direct contrasts: "Yea, yea—nay, nay, and whatsoever is more than these comes from the evil one."

If the workers have no land—there is capitalism; if they have land—there is no capitalism. And they confine themselves to this soothing philosophy, losing sight of the whole social organisation of economy and forgetting the generally-known fact that ownership of land does not in the least do away with the dire poverty of these landowners, who are most shamelessly robbed by other such "peasant" landowners.

They do not know, it seems, that capitalism—while still at a comparatively low level of development—was nowhere able to completely separate the worker from the land. For Western Europe, Marx established the law that only large-scale machine industry expropriates the worker once and for all. It is therefore obvious that the stock argument of there being no capitalism in our country since "the people own land" is quite meaningless, because the capitalism of simple co-operation and manufacture has never been connected anywhere with the worker's complete separa-

tion from the land, and yet, needless to say, it has not on that account ceased to be capitalism.

As to large-scale machine industry in Russia—and this form is rapidly being assumed by the biggest and most important branches of our industry—here too, despite all the specific features of our life, it possesses the same property as everywhere in the capitalist West, namely, it absolutely will not tolerate the retention of the worker's tie with the land. This fact has been proved, incidentally, by Dementyev with precise statistical material, from which he has drawn (quite independently of Marx) the conclusion that machine production is inseparably connected with the worker's complete separation from the land. This investigation has demonstrated once again that Russia is a capitalist country, that the worker's tie with the land in Russia is so feeble and unreal, and the power; of the man of property (the money owner, the buyer-up, the rich peasant, the manufactory owner, etc.) so firmly established, that one more technical advance will be enough for the "peasant" (?? who has long been living by the sale of his labour-power) to turn into a worker pure and simple.* The failure of the "friends of the people" to understand the economic organisation of our handicraft industries is far, however, from being confined to this. Their idea even of those industries where work is not done "for a master" is just as superficial as their idea of the cultivator (which we have already seen above). This, by the way, is quite natural in the case of gentlemen who presume to hold forth on questions of political economy when all they know, it seems, is that there is such a thing in the world as means of production, which "may" be united with the working people—and that is very good; but which "may" also be searated from them—and that is very bad. That will not take you far.

Speaking of industries that are becoming capitalist and of those that are not (where "small-scale production can

* The domestic system of large-scale production is not only a capitalist system, but the worst kind of capitalist system, one under which the most intense exploitation of the working people is combined with the minimum opportunity for the workers to wage a struggle for their emancipation.

freely exist"), Mr. Krivenko says, for one thing, that in certain branches "the basic expenditure on production" is very inconsiderable and that small-scale production is therefore possible. He cites as an example the brick industry, where the expenditure, he says, may be one-fifteenth of the annual turnover of the brickyards.

As this is almost the only reference the author makes to facts (it is, I repeat, the most characteristic feature of subjective sociology that it fears a direct and precise description and analysis of reality, preferring to soar into the sphere of the "ideals" ... of the petty bourgeois), let us take it, in order to show what a false conception the "friends of the people" have of reality.

We find a description of the brick industry (the making of bricks from white clay) in the economic statistics of the Moscow Zemstvo (*Returns*, Vol. VII, Book 1, Part 2, etc.). The industry is chiefly concentrated in three volosts of Bogorodskoye Uyezd, where there are 233 establishments, employing 1,402 workers (567, or 41%, being family workers,* and 835, or 59%, hired), with an annual aggregate output valued at 357,000 rubles. The industry is an old one, but has developed particularly during the past fifteen years owing to the building of a railway, which has greatly facilitated marketing. Before the railway was built the family form of production predominated, but it is now giving way to the exploitation of wage-labour. This industry, too, is not exempt from the dependence of the small industrialists on the bigger ones for marketing: owing to "lack of funds" the former sell the latter their bricks (sometimes "crude"—unbaked) on the spot at terribly low prices.

However, we are also able to acquaint ourselves with the organisation of the industry apart from this dependence, thanks to the house-to-house census of handicraftsmen which is appended to the essay, where the number of workers and the annual aggregate output of each establishment are indicated.

To ascertain whether the law that commodity economy is capitalist economy—i.e., is inevitably converted into the latter at a certain stage of development—applies to

* By "family" workers, as against hired, are meant working members of the masters' families.

this industry, we must compare the size of the establishments: the problem is precisely one of the relation between the small and the large establishments according to their role in output and their exploitation of wage-labour. Taking the number of workers as a basis, we divide the establishments of the handicraftsmen into three groups: I) establishments employing 1 to 5 workers (both family and hired); 11) employing 6 to 10 workers, and III) employing over 10 workers.

Examining the size of establishments, the complement of workers and the value of the output in each group, we obtain the following data:

Groups of handicraftsmen according to number of workers	Avg. number workers per establishment	Per cent			Percentage distribution			Absolute figures		
		Estabs. employing w.-wkrs.	Wage-workers	Ann. output per worker (rubles)	Establishments	Workers	Total output	Number of establishments*	Number of workers	Total output (rubles)
I. Employing 1-5 workers	2.8	25	19	251	72	34	34	167/43	476/92	119,500
II. Employing 6-10 workers	7.3	90	58	249	18	23	22	43/39	317/186	79,000
III. Employing over 10 workers	26.4	100	91	260	10	43	44	23/23	609/557	158,500
Total	6.0	45	59	254	100	100	100	233/105	1,402/835	357,000

Take a glance at these figures and you will perceive the bourgeois, or, what is the same, the capitalist organisation of the industry: the larger the establishments, the higher the productivity of labour** (the middle group is an

* The denominators indicate the number of establishments employing wage-workers and the number of wage-workers. Same in the next table.

** The annual output per worker in Group I is 251 rubles; in II—249, in III—260.

exception), the greater the exploitation of wage-labour,* the greater the concentration of production.**

The third group, which almost entirely bases its economy on wage-labour, comprises 10% of the total number of establishments but accounts for 44% of the aggregate output.

This concentration of the means of production in the hands of a minority, which is connected with the expropriation of the majority (the wage-workers); explains both the dependence of the small producers on buyers-up (the big industrialists are in fact buyers-up) and the oppression of labour in this industry. Hence we see that the *cause* of the expropriation of the working people and of their exploitation lies in the production relations themselves.

The Russian Narodnik socialists, as we know, held the opposite view and considered that the cause of the oppression of labour in the handicraft industries did not lie in production relations (which were proclaimed to be based on a principle which precludes exploitation), but in something else—in policy, namely, agrarian and fiscal policy and so on. The question arises, what was, and is, the basis of the persistence of this opinion, which has now acquired almost the tenacity of a prejudice? Maybe it is the prevalence of a *different* concept of production relations in the handicraft industries? Not at all. It persists only because no attempt whatever is made *to give an accurate and definite description of the facts*, *of the real forms of economic organisation*; it persists only because the production relations are not singled out and submitted to an independent analysis. In a word, it persists solely due to a failure to understand the only scientific method of social science, namely, the materialist method. We can now understand the train of thought of our old socialists. As far as the handicraft industries are concerned, they attribute the cause of exploitation to things lying *outside* production relations; as far as large-scale, factory capitalism

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* The proportion of establishments employing wage-labour is 25% in Group I, 90% in II and 100% in III; the proportion of wage-workers is 19%, 58% and 91% respectively.

** Group I, comprising 72% of the total establishments, accounts for 34% of the total output; II: 18% of the establishments, 22% of the output; III: 10% of the establishments, 44% of the output.

is concerned, they could not help seeing that *there* the cause of exploitation lies precisely in the production relations. The result was an irreconcilable contradiction, an incongruity; where this large-scale capitalism could have come from, since there was nothing capitalist in the production relations of the handicraft industries (which had not been studied!)—passed comprehension. The conclusion follows naturally: failing to understand the connection between handicraft and capitalist industry they contrasted the former to the latter, as "people's" to "artificial" industry. The idea appears that capitalism contradicts our "people's system"—an idea that is very widespread and was quite recently presented to the Russian public in a revised and improved edition by Mr. Nikolai—on. This idea persists by inertia, despite its phenomenal illogicality: factory capitalism is judged on the basis of what it actually is in reality, whereas handicraft industry is judged on the basis of what it "might be"; the former on the basis of an analysis of production relations, the latter without even an attempt to examine the production relations separately, the matter being directly transferred to the sphere of politics. We have only to turn to an analysis of these production relations to find that the "people's system" consists of these very same capitalist production relations, although in an undeveloped, embryonic state; that—if we reject the naïve prejudice that all handicraftsmen are equal, and accurately set forth the differences among them—the difference between the "capitalist" of the factory and works and the "handicraftsman" will at times prove to be less than the difference between one "handicraftsman" and another; and that *capitalism does not contradict the "people's system" but is the direct, next and immediate continuation and development of it.*

Perhaps, however, it will be argued that the example quoted is unsuitable; we may be told that the percentage of wage-workers in the given case is altogether too high?* But, as a matter of fact, the important thing here is not the absolute figures but the *relations* they disclose, rela-

* This is scarcely true of the industries of Moscow Gubernia, but it may be true, perhaps, with regard to the less developed industries of the rest of Russia.

tions which are bourgeois in essence, and which do not cease to be such whether their bourgeois character is strongly or weakly marked.

If you like, I shall take another example—one deliberately chosen for its weak bourgeois character. I take (from Mr. Isayev's book on the industries of Moscow Gubernia) the pottery industry, "a purely domestic industry," as the professor calls it. This industry may, of course, be taken as representative of the small-scale peasant industries: its technique is the simplest, its equipment quite small and the articles it produces of universal and essential use. Well then, thanks to the house-to-house census of the potters giving the same particulars as in the previous case, we are in a position to study the economic organisation of this industry too, one that is undoubtedly quite typical of the numerous Russian small, "people's" industries. We divide the handicraftsmen into groups: I) those employing 1 to 3 workers (family and hired); II) those employing 4 to 5 workers, and III) those employing over 5 workers—and make the same calculation:

Groups of handicraftsmen according to number of workers	Avg. number workers per establishment	Per cent			Percentage distribution			Absolute figures		
		Estabs. employing w.-wkrs.	Wage-workers	Ann. output per worker (rubles)	Establishments	Workers	Total output	Number of establishments*	Number of workers	Total output (rubles)
I. Employing 1-3 workers	2.4	39	19	468	60	38	36	72/28	174/33	81,500
II. Employing 4-5 workers	4.3	48	20	498	27	32	32	33/16	144/29	71,800
III. Employing over 5 workers	8.4	100	65	533	13	30	32	16/16	134/87	71,500
Total	3.7	49	33	497	100	100	100	121/60	452/149	224,800

Obviously, the *relations* in this industry too—and similar examples could be quoted indefinitely—are bourgeois: we find the same break-up arising out of commodity economy and it is a specifically capitalist break-up, leading to the exploitation of wage-labour, which already plays a primary part in the top group, where one-eighth of all the establishments and 30% of the total workers produce nearly one-third of the total output, and the productivity of labour is considerably above the average. These production relations alone are enough to explain the appearance and power of the buyers-up. We see how a minority, owning larger and more profitable establishments, and receiving a "net" income from the labour of others (in the top group of potters there is an average of 5.5 wage-workers per establishment), accumulate "savings," while the majority are ruined, and even the petty masters (not to mention the wage-workers) are unable to make ends meet. It is obvious and inevitable that the latter should be enslaved to the former—inevitable precisely because of the capitalist character of the given production relations. These relations are: the product of social labour, organised by commodity economy, passes into the hands of individuals and in their hands serves as an instrument for oppressing and enslaving the working people, as a means of personal enrichment by the exploitation of the masses. And do not think that this exploitation, this oppression, is any less marked because relations of this kind are still poorly developed, because the accumulation of *capital*, concomitant with the ruination of the producers, is negligible. Quite the contrary. This only leads to cruder, serf forms of exploitation, to a situation where capital, not yet able to subjugate the worker directly, by the mere purchase of his labour-power at its value, enmeshes him in a veritable net of usurious extortion, binds him to itself by kulak methods, and as a result robs him not only of the surplus-value, but of an enormous part of his wages, too, and, what is more, grinds him down by preventing him from changing his "master," and humiliates him by compelling him to regard as a boon the fact that capital "gives" (sic!) him work. It is obvious that not a single worker would ever consent to exchange his status for that of a Russian "independent" handicraftsman in "real," "peo-

ple's" industry. It is equally obvious that all the favourite measures of the Russian radicals either will not in the least affect the exploitation of the working people and their enslavement to capital, and will remain isolated experiments (artels), or will worsen the conditions of the working people (inalienability of allotments), or, lastly, will only refine, develop and consolidate the given capitalist relations (improvement of technique, loans, etc.).

The "friends of the people," however, will never be able to grasp the fact that despite its general wretchedness, its comparatively tiny establishments and extremely low productivity of labour, its primitive technique and small number of wage-workers, peasant industry is *capitalism*. They simply cannot grasp the point that *capital* is a certain relation between people, a relation which remains the same whether the categories under comparison are at a higher or a lower level of development. Bourgeois economists have never been able to understand this; they have always objected to such a definition of capital. 1 recall how one of them, writing in *Russkaya Mysl* about Sieber's book (on Marx's theory), quoted this definition (capital is a relation), and indignantly put exclamation marks after it.

To regard the categories of the bourgeois regime as eternal and natural is most typical of bourgeois philosophers. That is why, for capital, too, they adopt such definitions as, for example, accumulated labour that serves for further production—that is, describe it as an eternal category of human society, thereby obscuring that specific, historically definite economic formation in which this "accumulated labour," organised by commodity economy, falls into the hands of those who do not work and serves for the exploitation of the labour of others. That is why, instead of an analysis and study of a definite system of production relations, they give us a series of banalities applicable to any system, mixed with the sentimental pap of petty-bourgeois morality.

And now look at this—why do the "friends of the people" call this industry "people's," and why do they contrast it to capitalist industry? It is only because these gentlemen are petty-bourgeois ideologists and cannot even conceive

that these small producers live and operate under a system of commodity economy (that is why I call them petty bourgeois) and that their relations to the market necessarily and inevitably split them into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. Why don't you try studying the real organisation of our "people's" industries instead of phrase-mongering about what they "might" lead to, then we will see whether you can *find in Russia any branch of handicraft industry, at all developed, which is not organised on capitalist lines*.

And if you do not agree that the monopolising of the means of production by a minority, their alienation from the majority, and the exploitation of wage-labour (speaking more generally, the essence of capitalism is the appropriation by individuals of the product of social labour organised by commodity economy) are necessary and adequate features for this concept, then be good enough to give your "own" definition and your "own" history of capitalism.

Actually, the organisation of our "people's" handicraft industries furnishes an excellent illustration to the general history of the development of capitalism. It clearly demonstrates the latter's origin, its inception, for example, in the form of simple co-operation (the top group in the pottery industry); it further shows how the "savings" that—thanks to commodity economy—accumulate in the hands of separate individuals become *capital*, which first monopolises marketing ("buyers-up" and traders), owing to the fact that only the owners of these "savings" possess the necessary funds for wholesale disposal, which enable them to wait until the goods are sold in distant markets; how, further, this merchant capital enslaves the mass of producers and organises capitalist manufacture, the capitalist domestic system of large-scale production; and how, finally, the expansion of the market and increasing competition lead to improved techniques, and how this merchant capital becomes industrial capital and organises large-scale machine production. And when this capital, having grown strong and enslaved millions of working people and whole districts, begins openly and brazenly to exert pressure on the government and turns it into its lackey—our ingenious "friends of the

people" raise a howl about "the implanting of capitalism," about its "artificial creation"!

A timely discovery, indeed!

So that when Mr. Krivenko talks about people's, real, proper, etc., industry, he is simply trying to conceal the fact that our handicraft industries are nothing but capitalism at various stages of development. We have already become sufficiently acquainted with these methods in the case of Mr. Yuzhakov, who, instead of studying the peasant Reform, used empty phrases about the fundamental aim of the momentous Manifesto,[67] etc.; who, instead of studying land renting, dubbed it people's renting; and who, instead of studying how a home market is being formed for capitalism, philosophised about the latter's inevitable collapse from lack of markets, and so on.

To show how far Messrs. the "friends of the people" distort the facts, I shall dwell on one more example.* Our subjective philosophers so rarely condescend to give us precise references to facts that it would be unfair to ignore one of these most precise references of theirs, namely, the one Mr. Krivenko makes (No. 1, 1894) to the budgets of the Voronezh peasants. Here, on the basis of data selected by themselves, we may make quite sure which idea of reality is more correct—that of the Russian radicals and "friends of the people," or that of the Russian Social-Democrats.

Mr. Shcherbina, a Voronezh Zemstvo statistician, appends to his description of peasant farming in Ostrogozhsk Uyezd 24 budgets of typical peasant households, and analyses them in the text.**

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* Although this example concerns the break-up of the peastry, about which much has already been said, I consider it necessary to analyse *their own data* in order to show clearly what an insolent lie it is to assert that the Social-Democrats are interested not in reality but in "prophesying the future," and what charlatan methods the "friends of the people" use when in their controversies with us they ignore the substance of our views and dispose of them with nonsensical phrases.

** *Statistical Returns for Voronezh Gubernia*, Vol. II, Part II. *Peasant Farming in Ostrogozhsk Uyezd*, Voronezh, 1887. The budgets are given in the appendices, pp. 42-49, and the analysis in Chapter XVIII: "Composition and Budgets of Peasant Households."

Mr. Krivenko reproduces this analysis, failing, or rather refusing, to see that its methods are entirely unsuited to the purpose of getting an idea of the economy of our peasant farmers. The fact is that these 24 budgets depict entirely different households—prosperous, middle and poor—as Mr. Krivenko himself points out (p. 159); but, like Mr. Shcherbina, he simply employs *average* figures, lumping together the most different types of households, and thus completely disguises the fact of their differentiation. Yet the differentiation of our small producers is such a general, such a major fact (to which the Social-Democrats have long been drawing the attention of Russian socialists. See the works of Plekhanov.) that it is brought out quite distinctly even by the scanty data selected by Mr. Krivenko. Instead, when dealing with the *farming* of the peasants, of dividing them into categories according to the size of their farms and type of farming, he, like Mr. Shcherbina, divides them into legal categories—former state and former landlords' peasants—directing all his attention to the greater prosperity of the former as compared with the latter, and loses sight of the fact that the differences among the peasants within these categories are far greater than the differences between the categories.* To prove this, I divide these 24 budgets into three groups. I pick out a) 6 prosperous peasants, then b) 11 peasants of average prosperity (Nos. 7 to 10 and 16 to 22 in Shcherbina's table) and c) 7 poor peasants (Nos. 11 to 15, 23 and 24 in Shcherbina's table of budgets). Mr. Krivenko says, for example, that the expenditure per farm of the former state peasants is 541.3 rubles, and of the former landlords' peasants 417.7 rubles. But he overlooks the fact that the expenditures of different peasants are far from being equal: among the former state peasants, for instance, there is one with an expenditure of 84.7 rubles and another with an expenditure *ten times as large*—887.4 rubles (even if we leave out the

* Undoubtedly, the farm of a peasant who lives exclusively by agricultural pursuits and employs a labourer differs in type from the farm of a peasant who lives as a farm labourer and gets three-fifths of his earnings by farm-labouring. And among these 24 peasants there are both types. Judge for yourselves what kind of "science" will result if we lump together farm labourers and farmers who employ labourers, and make use of a general average!

German colonist with an expenditure of 1,456.2 rubles). What meaning can an average have if it is derived by lumping such magnitudes together? If we take the division into categories that I give, we find that the average expenditure per farm of a prosperous peasant is 855.86 rubles, of a middle peasant 471.61 rubles, and of a poor peasant 223.78 rubles.*

The ratio is, roughly, 4 : 2 : 1.

Let us proceed. Following in Shcherbina's footsteps, Mr. Krivenko gives the expenditure on personal requirements among the various legal categories of peasants: among the former state peasants, for example, the annual expenditure per person on vegetable food is 13.4 rubles, and among the former landlords' peasants 12.2 rubles. But if we take them according to economic categories, the figures are: a) 17.7; b) 14.5 and c) 13.1 The expenditure on meat and dairy produce per person among the former landlords' peasants is 5.2 rubles and among the former state peasants 7.7 rubles. Taken by economic categories the figures are 11.7, 5.8 and 3.6 respectively. It is obvious that calculation according to legal categories merely conceals these huge divergences and nothing more. It is, therefore, obviously worthless. The income of the former state peasants is greater than the income of the former landlords' peasants by 53.7 per cent—says Mr. Krivenko: the general average (for the 24 budgets) is 539 rubles; and for the two categories, over 600 rubles and about 400 rubles, respectively. But if graded according to economic strength, the incomes are a) 1,053.2 rubles, b) 473.8 rubles and c) 202.4 rubles, or a fluctuation of 10 : 2, and not 3 : 2.

"The capital value of a peasant farm among the former state peasants is 1,060 rubles, and among the former landlords' peasants 635 rubles," says Mr. Krivenko. But if we take the economic categories,** the figures are a) 1,737.91 rubles, b) 786.42 rubles and c) 363.38 rubles—again a fluctuation of 10 : 2, and not 3 : 2. By dividing the "peasantry" into legal categories the author prevented himself from

* The fluctuation in the size of the average family is much less: a) 7.83, b) 8.36, and c) 5.28 persons per family.

** The divergence is greater still in the value of implements owned. The average is 54.83 rubles per household. But among the

forming a correct judgement of the economics of this "peasantry."

If we examine the farms of the various types of peasants according to economic strength, we find that the prosperous families have an average income of 1,053.2 rubles, and expenditure of 855.86 rubles, or a net income of 197.34 rubles. The middle family has an income of 473.8 rubles and an expenditure of 471.61 rubles, or a net income of 2.19 rubles per farm (and that without counting credit debts and arrears)—obviously, it can barely make ends meet: out of 11 farms, 5 have a deficit. The bottom, poor, group run their farms at a direct loss: with an income of 202.4 rubles their expenditure is 223.78 rubles, which means a deficit of 21.38 rubles.* It is evident that if we lump farms together and strike a general average (net income—44.11 rubles) we completely distort the real picture. We then overlook the fact (as Mr. Krivenko has done) that all the six prosperous peasants who secure a net income employ farm labourers (8 of them)—a fact which reveals the character of their farming (they are in process of becoming capitalist farmers), which yields them a net income and relieves them almost entirely of the need to resort to "industries." These farmers all together cover only 6.5% of their budgets by industries (412 rubles out of a total of 6,319.5); moreover, these industries—as Mr. Shcherbina in one place remarks—are of such a type as "carting," or even "dealing in sheep," that is, such as, far from indicating dependence, presuppose the exploitation of others (precisely in the second case: accumulated "savings" are converted into merchant *capital*). These peasants own 4 industrial establishments, which yield an income of 320 rubles (5% of the total).**

The economy of the middle peasants is of a different type: they, as we have seen, can barely make ends meet.

well-to-do peasants it is twice as much—111.80 rubles, and among the poor peasants one-third the amount—16.04 rubles. Among the middle peasants it is 48.44 rubles.

* It is interesting to note that the budgets of the farm labourers—two out of the seven poor peasants—show no deficit: income 99 rubles and expenditure 93.45 rubles per family. One of the farm labourers is fed, clothed and shod by his master.

** See Appendix I (p. 301 of this volume.—*Ed.*).

Farming does not cover their needs, and 19% of their income is from so-called industries. What sort of industries these are we learn from Mr. Shcherbina's article. They are given for 7 peasants: only two engage in independent industries (tailoring and charcoal-burning); the remaining 5 sell their labour-power ("went mowing in the lowlands,"* "works at a distillery," "does day-labouring at harvest-time," "herds sheep," "worked on the local estate"). These are already half peasants, half workers. Side occupations divert them from their farming and thus undermine it completely.

As to the poor peasants, they farm at a dead loss, the significance of "industries" in their budgets is still greater (providing 24% of the income), and these industries amount almost entirely (except in the case of one peasant) to the sale of labour-power. In the case of two of them, "industries" (farm-labouring) predominate, providing two-thirds of their income.

It is quite clear that what we have here is a process of the complete differentiation of the small producers, the upper groups of whom are being turned into a bourgeoisie, the lower into a proletariat. Naturally, if we take general averages we shall see nothing of this and get no idea of the economics of the countryside.

It was only his operations with these fictitious averages that enabled the author to adopt the following method. To determine the place of these typical farms in the peasant farming of the uyezd as a whole, Mr. Shcherbina groups the peasants according to the size of their allotments, and it transpires that the level of prosperity (general average) of the 24 farms selected is higher by about one-third than the average in the uyezd. This calculation cannot be regarded as satisfactory, both because there is great divergence among these 24 peasants and because the classification according to size of allotment conceals the differentiation of the peasantry: the author's thesis that the "allotments are the prime cause of the prosperity" of the peasant is absolutely wrong. Everybody knows that the "equal" distribution of land within the village community does not in any way prevent its horseless members from giv-

* Peasants from Voronezh Gubernia hired themselves out to rich Cossacks in the Don lowlands for the haymaking.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

ing up the land, letting it, going away to work and turning into proletarians; or the members with many horses from renting large tracts of land and running big and profitable farms. If, for example, we take our 24 budgets, we shall see that one rich peasant, with 6 dessiatines of allotment land, has a total income of 758.5 rubles; a middle peasant, with 7.1 dessiatines of allotment land, 391.5 rubles; and a poor peasant, with 6.9 dessiatines of allotment land, 109.5 rubles. In general, we have seen that the ratio of the incomes of the various groups is 4 : 2 : 1; while the ratio of allotment land is 22.1 : 9.2 : 8.5, which equals 2.6 : 1.08 : 1. This is quite natural, for we find, for example, that the rich peasants, with 22.1 dessiatines of allotment land per housebold, rent an additional 8.8 dessiatines each, whereas the middle peasants, who have smaller allotments (9.2 dessiatines), rent less—7.7 dessiatines, and the poor peasants, with still smaller allotments (8.5 dessiatines), rent only 2.8 dessiatines.* And so, when Mr. Krivenko says: "Unfortunately, the data given by Mr. Shcherbina cannot serve as an accurate measure of the general state of affairs even in the uyezd, let alone the gubernia"—all that we can say is that they cannot serve as a measure only when you resort to the wrong method of calculating general averages (a method which Mr. Krivenko should not have resorted to), but that, generally speaking, Mr. Shcherbina's data are so comprehensive and valuable that they enable us to arrive at correct conclusions and that if Mr. Krivenko has not done so, it is not Mr. Shcherbina who is to blame.

The latter, for example, gives on page 197 a classification of the peasants according to draught animals and not according to allotment land, that is, a classification on economic, not legal lines—and this gives us every ground for asserting that the ratios between the various categories of the selected 24 typical households are absolutely identical with the ratios between the various economic groups throughout the uyezd.

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* Of course, I do not mean to say that the data for the 24 farms are *alone* enough to refute the thesis that the allotments are of prime importance. But above we cited data for several uyezds which totally refute it.[68]

The classification is as follows:*

Ostrogozhsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia

Groups of householders according to number of draught animals owned	Number		Per household			Average family (persons)	Percentage of households					
	Householders	Percentage	Head of cattle	Land (dess.) Allotment	Land (dess.) Rented		With farm labourers	With com. or ind. estabs.	With no house	With no working member	Cultivating no land	With no implements
I. With no draught animals	8,728	26.0	0.7	6.2	0.2	4.6	0.6	4.0	9.5	16.6	41.6	98.5
II. With 1 draught animal	10,510	31.3	3.0	9.4	1.3	5.7	1.4	5.4	1.4	4.9	2.9	2.5
III. With 2 or 3 draught animals	11,191	33.3	6.8	13.8	3.6	7.7	8.3	12.3	0.4	1.3	0.4	—
IV. With 4 or more draught animals . . .	3,152	9.4	14.3	21.3	12.3	11.2	25.3	34.2	0.1	0.4	0.3	—
Total . . .	33,581	100.0	4.4	11.2	2.5	6.7	5.7	10.0	3.0	6.3	11.9	23.4
Of the 24 typical households**	Farm labourers		0.5	7.2	0.0	4.5						
	Poor peasants		2.8	8.7	3.9	5.6						
	Middle peasants		8.1	9.2	7.7	8.3						
	Prosperous peasants		13.5	22.1	8.8	7.8						
	Total		7.2	12.2	6.6	7.3***						

* The comparison of the 24 typical households with the categories of farms for the whole uyezd has been made by the same methods as Mr. Shcherbina used in comparing the average of the 24 farms with groups based on size of allotment.

** Two farm labourers (Nos. 14 and 15 of Shcherbina's budgets) have here been eliminated from the group of poor peasants, so that only 5 poor peasants remain.

*** It must be noted in connection with this table that here too we find that the amount of rented land increases in proportion to growing prosperity, *despite* the increase in allotment land. Thus, the facts for one more uyezd confirm the fallacy of the idea that the allotments are of prime importance. On the contrary we find that the proportion of allotment land to the total holding of a given

There can be no doubt that the general averages of the 24 typical farms are superior to the general run of peasant farm in the uyezd. But if, instead of these fictitious averages, we take economic categories, a comparison becomes possible.

We find that the farm labourers on typical farms are somewhat below the peasants who have no draught animals,

group diminishes as the prosperity of the group increases. Adding allotment land to rented land, and calculating the percentage of allotment land to the total, we obtain the following figures by groups: I) 96.8%; II) 85.0%; III) 79.3%; IV) 63.3%. And this is quite natural. We know that with the emancipation Reform, land in Russia became a commodity. Whoever has money can always buy land; and allotment land too must be bought. It is obvious that the prosperous peasants concentrate land in their hands, and that this concentration is more marked in the case of rented land because of the medieval restrictions on the transfer of allotments. The "friends of the people," who favour these restrictions, do not realise that this senseless reactionary measure only worsens the condition of the poor peasants: the ruined peasants, possessing no agricultural implements, are obliged, in any case, to lease their land, and any prohibition on such leasing (or sale) will lead either to land being leased secretly, and, consequently, on worse terms for those who lease it, or to the poor peasants surrendering their land for nothing to the "village community," i.e., again to the kulak.

I cannot refrain from quoting a profoundly true comment made by Hourwich on this vaunted "inalienability":

"To see our way clearly through the question at issue, we have to discover who are the buyers of the land sold by peasants. We have seen that only a minor portion of the quarterly lots have been purchased by merchants. As a rule, the small lots sold by the nobility are acquired by peasants only. The question at issue is thus one that has been settled as between peasants alone, and that affects neither the interests of the nobility nor those of the capitalistic class. In such cases it may well please the Russian government to throw a sop to the peasantists [Narodniks]. This mésallance of oriental paternalism with some queer sort of state socialistic prohibitionism, however, would be apt to meet with opposition from the very ones who were supposed to be benefited. As the process of dissolution is obviously spreading from within, and not from without the village, inalienability of peasant land would simply mean gratuitous expropriation of the poor for the benefit of the wealthy members of the community.

"We notice that the percentage of emigrants among the quarterly possessors[69] who have enjoyed the right of alienating their land has been far greater than that among the former state peasants who live in agrarian communism: namely, in the Ranenburg district (Ryazan Gubernia) the percentage of emigrants among the former is

but approach them very closely. The poor peasants approximate very closely to the owners of one draught animal (the number of cattle is less by 0.2—the poor peasants have 2.8 and the one-horse peasants 3.0—but on the other hand, their total land, both allotment and rented, is somewhat more—12.6 dessiatines as against 10.7 dessiatines). The middle peasants are only slightly above those with two or three draught animals (they have slightly more cattle and a little less land), while the prosperous peasants approximate to those who have four or more draught animals, being a little *below* them. We are therefore entitled to draw the conclusion that in the uyezd as a whole not less than one-tenth of the peasants engage in regular, profitable farming and have no need for outside work. (Their income—it is important to note—is expressed in money, and therefore presupposes agriculture of a commercial character.) To a large extent they conduct

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17, among the latter it is 9. In the Dankov district among the former it is 12 and among the latter it is 5.

"To what is this difference due? A single concrete example will clear up the matter.

"In 1881 a small community of 5 households, former serfs of Grigorov, emigrated from the village of Bigildino, district of Dankov. Their land, 30 dessiatines, was sold to a rich peasant in consideration of 1,500 rubles. The emigrants could not make a living at home, and most of them were yearly labourers. (*Statistical Report*, Part II, pp. 115, 247.) According to Mr. Grigoryev (*Emigration of the Peasants of Ryazan Gubernia*), 300 rubles, the price of an average peasant holding of 6 dessiatines, is sufficient to enable a peasant family to start farming in Southern Siberia. A peasant who has been absolutely ruined is thus enabled, through the sale of his lot in the communal land, to rise to the position of a farmer in the new country. Devotion to the sacred customs of forefathers would hardly be able to withstand such a temptation as this, but for the helpful right hand of the most gracious Bureaucracy.

"I shall, of course, be charged with pessimism, as I have been recently on account of my views on the emigration of the peasants. (*Severny Vestnik*, 1892, No. 5, in an article by A. Bogdanovsky.) The usual method of reasoning followed takes some such course as this: Granted that the case is presented true to life as it actually stands, the evil consequences" (of emigration) "are nevertheless due to the present abnormal condition of the peasantry, and under normal circumstances, the objections are 'no good.' Unhappily, however, these very 'abnormal' conditions are developing spontaneously, while the creation of 'normal' conditions is beyond the jurisdiction of the well-wishers of the peasantry." (Op. cit., p. 137.[70])

their farming with the help of hired labourers: not less than one-fourth of all the households employ regular farm labourers, and the number employing temporary day labourers is not known. Further, more than half the peasants in the uyezd are poor (nearly six-tenths: horseless and one-horse peasants, 26%+31.3%=57.3%), who conduct their farming at a dead loss and are consequently sinking into ruin, steadily and inexorably being expropriated. They are obliged to sell their labour-power and about one-fourth of the peasants already gain their livelihood more by wage-labour than by agriculture. The remaining are middle peasants, who carry on somehow, farming at a regular loss made up by outside earnings, and who, consequently, have no economic stability whatever.

I have deliberately dwelt on these data in such detail in order to show how distorted is Mr. Krivenko's picture of the real situation. Without stopping to think, he takes general averages and operates with them. Naturally, the result is not even a fiction but a downright falsehood. We have seen, for example, that the net income (+197.34 rubles) of one prosperous peasant (from among the typical budgets) covers the deficits of *nine* poor households (—21.38×9= —192.42), so that 10% of rich peasants in the uyezd will not only cover the deficits of 57% of poor peasants but even yield a certain surplus. And Mr. Krivenko, deriving from the average budget of the 24 farms a surplus of 44.14 rubles—or, deducting credit debts and arrears, 15.97 rubles—simply speaks of the "decline" of the middle and lower-than-middle peasants. Actually, however, one can talk of decline only in reference, perhaps, to the middle peasants,* whereas in the case of the mass of poor peasants we observe direct *expropriation*, accompanied, moreover, by the concentration of the means of production in the hands of a minority who own comparatively large and firmly-established farms.

Because he ignored this latter circumstance, the author failed to observe another very interesting feature of these budgets, namely, that they likewise prove that *the differ-*

* And even this would scarcely be true, because decline implies a temporary and casual loss of stability, whereas the middle peasants as we have seen, are always in a stale of instability, on the verge of ruin.

entiation of the peasantry is creating a home market. On the one hand, as we pass from the top group to the bottom, we observe the growing importance of income from industries (6.5%, 18.8% and 23.6% of the total budget of the prosperous, middle and poor peasants, respectively), that is, chiefly from the sale of labour-power. On the other hand, as we pass from the bottom to the top groups, we observe the growing commodity (nay, more: *bourgeois*, as we have seen) character of agriculture and an increase in the proportion of produce disposed of: the total income from agriculture of the categories is *a*) $\frac{3{,}861.7}{1{,}774.4}$, *b*) $\frac{3{,}163.8}{899.9}$, *c*) $\frac{689.9}{175.25}$. The denominator indicates the money part of the income,* which constitutes 45.9%, 28.3% and 25.4% respectively, passing from the top category to the bottom.

Here we again see clearly how the means of production taken from the expropriated peasants turn *into capital.*

It is quite obvious that Mr. Krivenko could not draw correct conclusions from the material used—or, rather, misused—in this way. After describing the money character of peasant farming in Novgorod Gubernia on the basis of what he was told by a peasant from those parts with whom he travelled by rail, he was forced to draw the correct conclusion that it is precisely this circumstance, commodity economy, that "cultivates" "special abilities" and gives rise to one preoccupation: "to get it (the hay) mown as cheaply as possible" and "sell it as dear as possible" (n. 156).** This

* A fairly complex calculation was required to arrive at the money income from agriculture (which Shcherbina does not give). It was necessary to exclude from the total income from crops the income derived from straw and chaff, which, according to the author are used as cattle feed. The author himself excludes them in Chapter XVIII, but only for the total figures for the uyezd, and not for the given 24 households. Taking his total figures, I determined the proportion of income from grain (compared with the total income from the crops, i.e., both from grain and from straw and chaff) and on this basis excluded straw and chaff in the present case. This proportion is, for rye 78.98%, for wheat 72.67%, for oats and barley 73.32% and for millet and buckwheat 77.78%. The amount of grain sold was then determined by excluding the amount consumed on the farm itself.

** "The worker must be hired cheap and the most made out of him," Mr. Krivenko quite rightly remarks in the same passage.

serves as a "school" which "awakens" (quite true!) "and refines commercial gifts." "Talented people come to the fore to become the Kolupayevs, the Derunovs[71] and other types of blood-suckers,* while the simple-hearted and simple-minded fall behind, deteriorate, become impoverished and pass into the ranks of the farm labourers" (p. 156).

The data for a gubernia in which entirely different conditions prevail—an agricultural one (Voronezh)—lead to exactly the same conclusions. One would have thought the situation was quite clear: the system of commodity economy stands out distinctly as the main background of the economic life of the country in general and of the "community" "peasantry" in particular; the *fact* also stands out that this commodity economy, *and it alone*, is splitting the "people" and the "peasantry" into a proletariat (they become ruined, enter the ranks of the farm labourers) and a bourgeoisie (blood-suckers), i.e., it is turning into capitalist economy. But the "friends of the people" never dare look *realities* in the face and call a spade a spade (that would be too "harsh")! And Mr. Krivenko argues as follows:

"Some people consider this state of affairs quite natural" (he should have added: a quite natural consequence of the capitalist character of production relations. Then it would have been an accurate description of the views of "some people," and then it would have been impossible for him to dispose of these views with empty phrases and he would have had to make a real analysis of the matter. When the author did not deliberately set out to combat these "some people," he himself bad to admit that money economy is precisely the "school" that produces "talented" blood-suckers and "simple-hearted" farm labourers) "and regard it as the irresistible mission of capitalism." (Well, of course! To believe that the struggle has to be waged against this "school" and the "blood-suckers" who dominate it, together with their administrative and intellectual lackeys, is to consider that capitalism cannot be overcome! But to leave the capitalist

* Mr. Yuzhakov, how's this! Here is your colleague saying that "talented people" become "blood-suckers, "whereas you assured us that people become so only because they have "uncritical minds." That won't do, gentlemen, contradicting each other like this in one and the same magazine!

"school" with its blood-suckers in complete immunity and to want to eliminate its capitalist products by means of liberal half-measures is to be a true "friend of the people"!) "We look at the matter somewhat differently. Capitalism undoubtedly does play an important part here, as we pointed out above" (this refers to the remark about the school of blood-suckers and farm labourers), "but it cannot be said that its role is so all-embracing and decisive that no other factors are responsible for the changes taking place in the national economy, and that the future holds out no other solution" (p. 160).

There you are! Instead of giving an exact and straightforward description of the present system, instead of giving a definite answer to the question of why the "peasantry" is splitting into blood-suckers and farm labourers, Mr. Krivenko disposes of the matter with meaningless phrases. "It cannot be said that the role of capitalism is decisive." Why, that is the whole question: can it be said, or can it not?

To uphold your opinion you should have indicated what other factors are "decisive," what other "solution" there can be besides the one indicated by the Social-Democrats, namely, the class struggle of the proletariat against the blood-suckers.* But nothing is indicated. Unless, perhaps, the author regards the following as an indication? Amusing as it may be, you can expect anything from the "friends of the people."

"The first to fall into decline, as we have seen, are the weak farms poor in land"—namely, with allotments of less than five dessiatines. "But the typical farms of the state peasants, with allotments of 5.7 dessiatines, are distinguished for their stability.... True, to secure such an income (a net income of 80 rubles) they rent an additional five dessiatines but that only shows what they need."

What does this "amendment," which links up the notorious "land poverty" with capitalism, amount to? Only to

* If only urban factory workers are as yet capable of assimilating the idea of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, while the rural "simple-hearted and simple-minded" farm labourers i.e., the people who have actually lost those charming qualities so closely bound up with the "age-old basis" and the "community spirit," are not—it only proves the correctness of the Social-Democrats' theory of the progressive and revolutionary role of Russian capitalism.

this, that those who have little lose that little, while those who have much (15.7 dessiatines each) acquire still more.* But, then, this is a meaningless paraphrase of the statement that some sink into ruin while others grow rich!! It is high time to abandon this meaningless talk about land poverty, which explains nothing (because the peasants are not given allotments free but have to buy them); it only describes a process, and moreover describes it inaccurately, because one should not speak about the land alone, but about the means of production in general, and not say that the peasants have a "poor" supply of them, but that they are being *freed* from them, are *being expropriated* by growing capitalism. "We have no intention of saying," Mr. Krivenko remarks, concluding his philosophical discourse, "that agriculture should and can, under all circumstances, remain 'natural' and separated from manufacturing industry" (another phrase! Was it not you who were just obliged to admit that a school of money economy already exists, which presupposes exchange and, consequently, the separation of agriculture from manufacturing industry? Why again this sloppy talk of what can be and what should be?); "all we say is that to create a separate industry artificially is irrational" (it would be interesting to know: is the industry of the Kimry and Pavlovo handicraftsmen "separate," and who "artificially created" it, and how and when?), "and that the separation of the labourer from the land and the instruments of production is being effected not by capitalism alone, but also by other factors that precede and promote it."

Here most likely he again had in mind the profound idea that if the labourer is separated from the land, which passes into the hands of the blood-sucker, this happens because the former is "poor" and the latter is "rich" in land.

And this kind of philosophy charges the Social-Democrats with "narrowness" for regarding capitalism as the decisive factor!... I have dwelt once more in such detail on the differentiation of the peasants and handicraftsmen just because it was necessary to bring out clearly how the Social-Democrats picture the matter and how they explain

* Not to mention the absurdity of the idea that peasants with equal allotments are equal and are not also divided into "blood-suckers" and "farm labourers."

it. It was necessary to show that the facts which to the subjective sociologist mean that the peasants have "grown poor," while the "money chasers" and "blood-suckers" "derive profits for their own advantage," to the materialist mean the bourgeois differentiation of the commodity producers necessitated by commodity production itself. It was necessary to show what facts serve as the basis for the thesis (quoted above in Part 1)* that the struggle between the propertied and the propertyless is going on everywhere in Russia, not only in the mills and factories, but even in the most remote villages, and that everywhere this struggle is one between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that emerge as a result of commodity economy. The break-up, the depeasantisation of our peasants and handicraftsmen, which can be depicted accurately thanks to the admirable material provided by Zemstvo statistics, furnishes *factual* proof of the correctness of precisely the Social-Democratic conception of Russian reality, the conception that the peasant and the handicraftsman are *petty producers* in the "categorical" meaning of the term, that is, are *petty bourgeois*. This thesis may be called the central point of the theory of **WORKING-CLASS SOCIALISM** as against the old peasant socialism, which understood neither the conditions of commodity economy in which the petty producers live, nor their capitalist differentiation due to these conditions. And, therefore, whoever wanted to criticise Social-Democracy seriously should have concentrated his argument on this, and shown that from the angle of political economy Russia is not a system of commodity economy, that it is not this which causes the break-up of the peasantry, and that the expropriation of the mass of the population and the exploitation of the working people can be explained by something other than the bourgeois, capitalist organisation of our social (including peasant) economy.

Well, just try it, gentlemen!

There is another reason why it was the data on peasant and handicraft economy that I preferred to take in illustration of the Social-Democratic theory. It would be a departure from the materialist method were I, when criticising the

* See p. 191 of this volume.—*Ed.*

views of the "friends of the people," to confine myself to contrasting their ideas with the Marxist ideas. One must in addition explain the "Narodnik" ideas, demonstrate their **MATERIAL** basis in our present social-economic relations. Illustrations and examples of the economy of our peasants and handicraftsmen show what this "peasant" is whose ideologists the "friends of the people" want to be. They demonstrate the bourgeois character of our rural economy and thus confirm the correctness of classifying the "friends of the people" as ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie. But this is not all; they show that there is the closest connection between the ideas and programmes of our radicals and the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. It is this connection, which will become even clearer after a detailed examination of their programme, that explains why these radical ideas are so widespread in our "society"; it also admirably explains the political servility of the "friends of the people" and their readiness for compromise.

There was, lastly, one other reason for dwelling in such detail on the economics of precisely those sides of our social life where capitalism is least developed and from which the Narodniks have usually drawn the material for their theories. A study and description of these economics was the simplest way to reply in substance to one of the most widespread objections to Social-Democracy current among people here. Proceeding from the usual idea that capitalism contradicts the "people's system," and observing that the Social-Democrats regard large-scale capitalism as progressive, that it is large-scale capitalism that they want to have as their basis in combating the present robber regime—our radicals, without more ado, accuse the Social-Democrats of ignoring the interests of the mass of the peasant population, of desiring "to put every muzhik through the factory melting pot," etc.

All these arguments are based on the amazingly illogical and strange procedure of judging capitalism by what it really is, but the countryside by what it "might be." Naturally, there could be no better reply to this than to show them the *real* countryside and its *real* economics

Anybody who studies these economics dispassionately and scientifically will be bound to admit that rural Russia

constitutes a system of small, scattered markets (or small branches of a central market), which regulate the social and economic life of separate small districts. And in each of these districts we find all the phenomena that are, in general, peculiar to the social-economic organisation whose regulator is the market: we find the division of the once equal, patriarchal direct producers into rich and poor; we find the rise of *capital*, especially of merchant capital, which spins its web around the working people and sucks the life-blood out of them. When you compare the descriptions of peasant economy given by our radicals with precise first-hand data on rural economic life, you are astonished that there is no place in the criticised system of views for that mass of small hucksters who swarm in each of these markets, all these higglers and chafferers or whatever else the peasants call them in different localities, for all that mass of petty exploiters who dominate the markets and ruthlessly oppress the working people. They are usually simply brushed aside with the remark—"These are no longer peasants, but hucksters." Yes, you are quite right: these are "no longer peasants." But try to treat all these "traders" as a distinct group, that is, speaking in the precise language of political economy, those who engage in commercial enterprise and who appropriate, to whatever extent, the labour of others; try to express in precise figures the economic strength of this group and the part it plays in the entire economic life of the district; and then try to treat as an opposite group all those who also are "no longer peasants" because they bring their labour-power to the market, because they work for others and not for themselves—try to fulfil these elementary requisites of a dispassionate and serious inquiry and you will get such a vivid picture of bourgeois differentiation that not a trace of the "people's system" myth will remain. This mass of small rural exploiters represents a terrible force, especially terrible because they oppress the isolated, single toiler, because they fetter him to themselves and deprive him of all hope of deliverance; terrible because this exploitation, in view of the barbarism of the countryside due to the low labour productivity characteristic of the system described and to the absence of communications, constitutes not only robbery of labour, but also the Asiatic abuse of human dignity that

is constantly encountered in the countryside. Now, if you compare this *real* countryside with our capitalism you will understand why the Social-Democrats regard the work of our capitalism as progressive when it draws these small, scattered markets together into one nation-wide market, when, in place of the legion of small well-meaning blood-suckers, it creates a handful of big "pillars of the fatherland," when it socialises labour and raises its productivity, when it shatters the subordination of the working people to the local blood-suckers and subordinates them to large-scale *capital*. This subordination is progressive compared with the former—despite all the horrors of the oppression of labour, of gradual extinction, brutalisation, and the crippling of the bodies of women and children, etc.—because it **AWAKENS THE MIND OF THE WORKER**, converts dumb and incoherent discontent into conscious protest, converts scattered, petty, senseless revolt into an organised class struggle for the emancipation of all working folk, a struggle which derives its strength from the very conditions of existence of this large-scale capitalism, and therefore can undoubtedly count upon **CERTAIN SUCCESS**.

In reply to the accusation of ignoring the mass of the peasantry, Social-Democrats would be quite justified in quoting the words of Karl Marx:

> "*Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers which adorned the chain, not that man should wear his letters denuded of fanciful embellishment, but that he should throw off the chain and reach for the living flower.*"[72]

The Russian Social-Democrats are plucking from our countryside the imaginary flowers that adorn it, are combating idealisations and fantasies, and are performing the destructive work for which they are so mortally detested by the "friends of the people," not in order that the mass of the peasantry shall remain in their present state of oppresion, gradual extinction and enslavement, but in order that the proletariat may understand what sort of chains everywhere fetter the working people, that they may understand how these chains are forged, and be able to rise against them, to throw them off and reach out for the real flower.

When they bring this idea to those representatives of the working people who by virtue of their position are alone capable of acquiring class-consciousness and of launching a class struggle, they are accused of wanting to put the muzhik through the factory melting pot.

And who are the accusers?

People who themselves base their hopes for the emancipation of the working people on the "government" and on "society," that is, on the organs of that very bourgeoisie which has everywhere fettered the working people!

And these spineless creatures have the presumption to talk of the Social-Democrats having no ideals!

Let us now pass to the political programme of the "friends of the people," to whose theoretical views we have, we think, devoted far too much time. By what means do they propose to "put out the fire"? What way out do they propose in place of the one, which they claim is wrong, proposed by the Social-Democrats?

"The reorganisation of the Peasants' Bank," says Mr. Yuzhakov in an article entitled "The Ministry of Agriculture" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10), "the establishment of a Colonisation Department, the regulation of state land leasing in the interest of people's farming ... the study and regulation of land letting—such is the programme for the restoration of people's farming and its protection from the economic violence" (sic!) "of the nascent plutocracy." And in the article "Problems of Economic Development" this programme for "the restoration of people's farming" is supplemented by the following "first, but essential steps": "Removal of all restrictions that now encumber the village community; its release from tutelage, adoption of common cultivation (the socialisation of agriculture) and the development of the communal processing of raw materials obtained from the soil." And Messrs. Krivenko and Karyshev add: "Cheap credit, the artel form of farming, an assured market, the possibility of dispensing with employers' profit" (this will be dealt with separately below), "the invention of cheaper engines and other technical improvements," and, finally, "museums, warehouses, commission agencies."

Examine this programme and you will find that these gentlemen wholly and completely adopt the position of modern society (i.e., that of the capitalist system, without realising it), and want to settle matters by mending and patching it up, failing to understand that all their progressive measures—cheap credit, improved machinery, banks, and so on—can only serve to strengthen and develop the bourgeoisie.

Nik.—on is quite right, of course, when he says—and this is one of his most valuable theses, against which the "friends of the people" could not help protesting—that no reforms under the present system are of any use, and that credit, migration, tax reform, the transfer of all the land to the peasants, will not appreciably change anything, but, on the contrary, are bound to strengthen and develop capitalist economy, retarded as it now is by excessive "tutelage," survivals of feudal dues, the tying of the peasantry to the land, etc. Economists, he says, who, like Prince Vasilchikov (an undoubted "friend of the people" in his ideas), desire the extensive development of credit, want the same thing as the "liberal," i.e., bourgeois, economists, and "are striving for the development and consolidation of capitalist relations." They do not understand the antagonistic character of our production relations (within the "peasantry" as within the other social estates), and instead of trying to bring this antagonism out into the open, instead of simply joining with those who are enslaved as a result of this antagonism and trying to help them rise in struggle, they dream of stopping the struggle by measures that would satisfy everybody, to achieve reconciliation and unity. The result of all these measures is naturally a foregone conclusion: one has but to recall the examples of differentiation given above to be convinced that all these credits,* improvements, banks and similar "progressive"

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* This idea—of utilising credit to foster "people's farming," i.e., the farming of petty producers, where capitalist relations exist (and the "friends of the people," as we have already seen, can no longer deny that they do exist)—this meaningless idea, which reveals an inability to understand the elementary truths of theoretical political economy, quite clearly shows how vulgar is the theory advanced by those gentlemen who try to sit between two stools.

measures will be available only to the one who, possessing a properly-run and established farm, has certain "savings," i.e., the representative of an insignificant minority, the petty bourgeoisie. And however much you reorganise the Peasants' Bank and similar institutions, you will not in the least alter the fundamental and cardinal fact that the mass of the population have been and continue to be expropriated, and lack means even of subsistence, let alone of farming on proper lines.

The same must be said of "artels," and "common cultivation." Mr. Yuzhakov called the latter "the socialisation of agriculture." This is merely funny, of course, because socialisation requires the organisation of production on a wider scale than the limits of a single village, and because it necessitates the expropriation of the "blood-suckers" who have monopolised the means of production and now direct Russian social economy. And this requires struggle, struggle and struggle, and not paltry philistine moralising.

And that is why such measures of theirs turn into mild, liberal half-measures, barely subsisting on the generosity of the philanthropic bourgeois, and do much more harm by diverting the exploited from the struggle than good from the possible improvement in the position of a few individuals, an improvement that cannot but be meagre and precarious on the general basis of capitalist relations. The preposterous extent to which these gentlemen attempt to hide the antagonism in Russian life—doing so, of course, with the very best intentions in order to put an end to the present struggle, i.e., with the sort of intentions with which the road to hell is paved—is shown by the following argument of Mr. Krivenko:

"The intelligentsia direct the manufacturers' enterprises, and they could direct popular industry."

The whole of their philosophy amounts to whining that struggle and exploitation exist but that they "might" not exist if ... if there were no exploiters. Really, what did the author mean by this meaningless phrase? Can it be denied that year after year the Russian universities and other educational establishments turn out a brand of "intelligentsia" (??) whose only concern is to find someone to feed them? Can it be denied that today, in Russia, the means for maintaining this "intelligentsia" are owned only by the bourgeois

minority? Can the bourgeois intelligentsia in Russia be expected to disappear because the "friends of the people" say that they "might" serve somebody other than the bourgeoisie? Yes, they "might," *if* they were not a bourgeois intelligentsia. They "might" not be a bourgeois intelligentsia, "if" there were no bourgeoisie and no capitalism in Russia! And they are content to spend their whole lives just repeating these "ifs" and "ans." What is more, these gentlemen not only decline to attach decisive importance to capitalism, but totally refuse to see anything wrong in it. If certain "defects" were removed, they would perhaps not fare so badly under it. How do you like the following statement by Mr. Krivenko:

"Capitalist production and the capitalisation of industries are by no means gates through which manufacturing industry can only depart from the people. It can depart, of course, but it can also enter the life of the people and come into closer proximity to agriculture and the raw materials industry. This can be contrived in various ways, and these gates, as well as others, can serve this purpose" (p. 161). Mr. Krivenko has a number of very good qualities—as compared with Mr. Mikhailovsky; for example, frankness and straightforwardness. Where Mr. Mikhailovsky would have filled reams with smooth and glib sentences, wriggling around the subject without ever touching it, the businesslike and practical Mr. Krivenko hits straight from the shoulder, and without a twinge of conscience spreads before the reader all the absurdities of his views without reservation. "Capitalism can enter the life of the people"—if you please! That is, capitalism is possible without the working people being divorced from the means of production! This is positively delightful! At least, we now are absolutely clear as to what the "friends of the people" want. They want commodity economy without capitalism—capitalism without expropriation and without exploitation, with nothing but a petty bourgeoisie peacefully vegetating under the wing of humane landlords and liberal administrators. And, with the serious mien of a departmental official who intends to confer a boon on Russia, they set about contriving schemes under which the wolves have their fill and the sheep their skins. To get some idea of the character of these

schemes we must turn to the article by the same author in No. 12 ("Our Cultural Free Lances"): The artel and state form of industry," argues Mr. Krivenko—apparently under the impression that he has already been "called upon" to "solve practical economic problems"—"is by no means all that can be imagined in the present instance. For example, the following scheme is possible...." And he goes on to relate how an engineer visited the offices of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* with a plan for the technical exploitation of the Don Region by a joint-stock company with shares in small denominations (not exceeding 100 rubles). The author was recommended to modify his scheme roughly as follows: "The shares shall not belong to private persons, but to village communities; that part of the village population employed in the company's enterprises shall receive ordinary wages, the village communities guaranteeing that their connection with the land is maintained."

What administrative genius, is it not? With what admirable simplicity and ease capitalism is introduced into the life of the people and all its pernicious attributes eliminated! All that is required is that the rural rich should buy shares* through the communities and receive dividends from the enterprise, in which a "part of the population" will be employed and their tie with the land guaranteed—a "tie" insufficient to assure a livelihood from the land (otherwise who would go to work for "ordinary wages"?), but sufficient to bind a man to his locality, enslave him to

* I say the rich will buy the shares, despite the author's stipulation that the shares shall be owned by the communities, because after all, he speaks of the purchase of shares with money, which only the rich have. Hence, whether the business is conducted through the agency of the communities or not, only the rich will be able to pay, just as the purchase or renting of land by the community in no way prevents the rich from monopolising this land. The dividends too must go to those who have paid—otherwise the shares will not be shares. And I understand the author's proposal to mean that a certain part of the profits will be earmarked for "guaranteeing the worker their tie with the land." If the author does not mean this (although it inevitably follows from what he says), but that the rich shall pay for the shares and not receive dividends, then all his scheme amounts to is that the rich shall share with the poor. This reminds one of the anecdote about the fly-killer which requires that you first catch the fly and put it in the dish—and it will die instantly.

the local capitalist enterprise and deprive him of the possibility of changing masters. I say master, capitalist, quite legitimately, for he who pays the labourer *wages* cannot be called anything else.

The reader is perhaps annoyed with me already for dwelling so long on such nonsense, nonsense that would seem to be undeserving of any attention. But I must say that although it is nonsense, it is a type of nonsense that is useful and necessary to study, because it reflects the social and economic relations actually existing in Russia and, as a consequence, is one of the social ideas, very widespread in our country, that Social-Democrats will have to reckon with for a long time to come. The point is that the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production in Russia gave rise, and to some extent still gives rise, to a situation for the working people in which the peasant, being unable to obtain a livelihood from the land and *to pay dues from it to the landlord* (and *he pays them to this very day*), was compelled to resort to "outside employments," which at first, in the good old days, took the form either of independent occupations (for example, carting), or labour which was not independent but, owing to the poor development of these types of employment, was comparatively well paid. Under this condition the peasantry were assured of a certain well-being as compared with things today—the well-being of serfs, who peacefully vegetated under the tutelage of a hundred thousand noble police chiefs and of the nascent gatherers of Russia's land—the bourgeoisie.

And the "friends of the people" idealise this system, simply disregarding its dark sides, dream about it—"dream," because it has long ceased to exist, has long been destroyed by capitalism, which has given rise to the wholesale expropriation of the peasant farmers and turned the former "employments" into the unbridled exploitation of abundantly offered "hands."

Our petty-bourgeois knights want to preserve the peasant's "tie" with the land; but they do not want the serfdom that alone ensured this tie, and which was broken only by the commodity production and capitalism, which made this tie impossible. They want outside employments that do not take the peasant away from the land, that—while work

is done for the market—do not give rise to competition, do not create *capital* and do not enslave the mass of the population to it. True to the subjective method in sociology, they want to "take" what is good from here and from there; but actually, of course, this childish desire only leads to reactionary dreaming which ignores realities, to an inability to understand and utilise the really progressive, revolutionary aspects of the new system, and to sympathy for measures which perpetuate the good old system of semi-serf, semi-free labour—a system that was fraught with all the horrors of exploitation and oppression, and held out no possibility of escape.

To prove the correctness of this explanation, which classes the "friends of the people" among the reactionaries, I shall quote two examples.

In the Moscow Zemstvo statistics we can read a description of the farm of a certain Madame K. (in Podolsk Uyezd), which (the farm, not the description) aroused the admiration both of the Moscow statisticians and of Mr. V. V., if my memory does not deceive me (he wrote about it, I think, in a magazine article).

This notorious farm of Madame K.'s was regarded by Mr. V. Orlov as "convincing practical confirmation" of his favourite thesis that "where peasant farming is in a sound condition, the private landowners' farms are also better conducted." From Mr. Orlov's account of this lady's estate, it appears that she runs her farm with the labour of the local peasants, who till her land in return for a winter loan of flour, etc. The lady is extraordinarily kind to these peasants and helps them, so that they are now the most prosperous in the volost and have enough grain "to last them almost until the new harvest (formerly, it did not even last until St. Nicholas' day)."

The question arises, does "such an arrangement" preclude "the antagonism of interests of peasant and landowner," as Messrs. N. Kablukov (Vol. V, p. 175) and V. Orlov (Vol. II, pp. 55-59 and elsewhere) think? Obviously not, because Madame K. lives on the labour of her peasants. Hence, exploitation has not been abolished at all. Madame K. may be forgiven for failing to see the exploitation behind her kindness to the exploited, but not so an economist and

statistician who, in his ecstasy over the case in question, takes up exactly the same stand as those Menschenfreunde* in the West who go into ecstasies over the kindness of a capitalist to a worker, rapturously relate cases where a factory owner shows concern for his workers, provides them with general stores, dwellings, etc. To conclude from the existence (and therefore "possibility") of such "facts" that there is no antagonism of interests, is not to see the wood for the trees. That is the first point.

The second point is that we learn from Mr. Orlov's account that Madame K.'s peasants, "thanks to excellent crops (the landlady gave them good seed), have acquired livestock" and have "prosperous" farms. Let us assume that these "prosperous peasants" have become not "almost," but completely prosperous, that not the "majority," but all of them have enough grain, not "almost" until, but right until the new harvest. Let us assume that these peasants now have enough land, and that they have "cattle runs and pastures"—which they have not got at present (fine prosperity!), and which they rent from Madame K., making payment in labour. Does Mr. Orlov really believe that in that case—that is, if the peasant farming were really prosperous—these peasants would agree to "perform all the jobs on Madame K.'s estate thoroughly, punctually and swiftly," as they do now? Or perhaps gratitude to the kind lady who sweats the life-blood out of these prosperous peasants with such maternal care will be a no less potent incentive than the hopelessness of the present condition of the peasants, who, after all, cannot dispense with pastures and cattle runs?

Evidently, the ideas of the "friends of the people" are, in essence, the same: as true petty-bourgeois ideologists, they do not want to abolish exploitation, but to mitigate it, they do not want conflict, but conciliation. Their broad ideals, from the standpoint of which they so vigorously fulminate against the narrow-minded Social-Democrats, go no further than the "prosperous" peasant who performs his "duties" to the landlords and capitalists, provided the landlords and capitalists treat him fairly.

Take the other example. Mr. Yuzhakov, in his quite

* Philanthropists.—*Ed.*

well-known article, "Quotas for People's Landownership in Russia" (*Russkaya Mysl*, 1885, No. 9), expounded his views on what should be the dimensions of "people's" landownership, i.e., in the terminology of our liberals, the kind of landownership that excludes capitalism and exploitation. Now, after the excellent explanation given by Mr. Krivenko, we know that he too regarded things from the standpoint of "introducing capitalism into the life of the people." As the minimum for "people's" landownership he took such allotments as would cover "cereal food and payments,"* while the rest, he said, could be obtained by "employments."... In other words, he simply resigned himself to a state of affairs in which the peasant, by maintaining connection with the land, is subjected to a double exploitation—partly by the landlord, on the "allotment," and partly by the capitalist, in "employments." This state of the small producers, who are subjected to a double exploitation, and whose conditions of life, moreover, are such as inevitably breed a cowed and crushed spirit, killing all hope that the oppressed class will fight, let alone be victorious—this semi-medieval condition is the nec plus ultra of the outlook and ideals of the "friends of the people." Well then, when capitalism, which developed with tremendous rapidity throughout the whole of Russia's post-Reform history, began to uproot this pillar of old Russia—the patriarchal, semi-serf peasantry—to drag them out of these medieval and semi-feudal conditions and to place them in a modern, purely capitalist environment, compelling them to abandon their old homes and wander over the face of Russia in search of work, breaking the chains of enslavement to the local "work-giver" and disclosing the basis of exploitation in general, of class exploitation as distinct from the depredations of a particular viper—when capitalism began to draw the rest of the peasant population, cowed and forced down to the

* To show the relation between these outlays and the rest of the peasant budget, let me quote again the 24 budgets of Ostrogozhsk Uyezd. The average expenditure per family is 495.39 rubles (in kind and in cash). Of this, 109.10 rubles go for the maintenance of cattle, 135.80 rubles are spent on vegetable food and taxes, and the remaining 250.49 rubles on other expenses—non-vegetable food, clothes, implements, rent etc. Mr. Yuzhakov allows the hay-fields and other grounds to account for the maintenance of cattle.

level of cattle, en masse into the vortex of increasingly complex social and political life, then our knights began to howl and wail about the fall and destruction of the old pillars. And they continue to this day to howl and wail about the good old times, although now, it seems, one must be blind not to see the revolutionary side of this new mode of life, not to see how capitalism is creating a new social force, which has no ties with the old regime of exploitation and is in a position to fight it.

The "friends of the people," however, show no trace of a desire for any radical change in the present system. They are entirely satisfied with liberal measures on the existing basis, and in the invention of such measures Mr. Krivenko really displays the administrative abilities of a native Jack-in-office.

"Generally speaking"—he argues, about the need for a "detailed study and radical transformation" of "our people's industry"—"this question calls for special investigation, and for the division of industries into those that can be applied to the life of the people" (sic!!) "and those whose application encounters serious obstacles."

Mr. Krivenko himself gives us an example of such a division when he divides the various industries into those which are not capitalised, those in which capitalisation has already taken place, and those which can "contend with large-scale industry for existence."

"In the first case," this administrator decides, "petty production can exist freely"—but can it be free of the market, whose fluctuations split the petty producers into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat? Can it be free of the expansion of the local markets and their amalgamation into a big market? Can it be free of technical progress? Or perhaps this technical progress—wider commodity production—need not be capitalistic? In the last case, the author demands the "organisation of production on a large scale too": "Clearly," he says, "what is needed here is the organisation of production on a large scale too, what is needed is fixed and circulating capital, machinery, etc., or something else that will counterbalance these conditions; cheap credit, the elimination of superfluous middlemen, the artel form of farming and the possibility of dispensing

with employers' profit, an assured market, the invention of cheaper engines and other technical improvements, or, finally, some reduction in wages, provided it is compensated by other benefits."

This sort of reasoning is highly characteristic of the "friends of the people," with their broad ideals in words and their stereotyped liberalism in deeds. As you see, our philosopher starts out from nothing more nor less than the possibility of dispensing with employers' profit and from the organisation of large-scale farming. Excellent: this is **EXACTLY** what the Social-Democrats want, too. But how do the "friends of the people" want to achieve it? To organise large-scale production without employers, it is necessary, first of all, to abolish the commodity organisation of social economy and to replace it by communal, communist organisation, under which production is not regulated by the market, as it is at present, but by the producers themselves, by the society of workers itself, and the means of production are owned not by private individuals, but by the whole of society. Such a change from the private to the communal *form of appropriation* apparently requires that the *form of production first* be changed, that the separate, small, isolated processes of production of petty producers be merged into *a single social productive process*; in a word, it requires the very material conditions which capitalism creates. But the "friends of the people" have no intention of basing themselves on capitalism. How then do they propose to act? They do not say. They do not even mention the abolition of commodity economy: evidently, their broad ideals are quite unable to transcend the bounds of this system of social production. Moreover, to abolish employers' profit it would be necessary to expropriate the employers, who obtain their "profits" precisely because they have monopolised the means of production. And to expropriate these pillars of our fatherland, a popular revolutionary movement against the bourgeois regime is required, a movement of which only the working-class proletariat, which has no ties with this regime, is capable. But the "friends of the people" have no struggle in mind at all, and do not even suspect that other types of public men, apart from the administrative organs of the employers themselves, are possible and necessary,

Clearly, they have not the slightest intention of taking any serious measures against "employers' profit." Mr. Krivenko simply allowed his tongue to run away with him. And he immediately corrected himself: why, such a thing as "the possibility of dispensing with employers' profit" can be "counterbalanced"—"by something else," namely credits, organised marketing, technical improvements. Thus everything is arranged quite satisfactorily: instead of abolish ing the sacred right to "profit," a procedure so offensive to Messrs. the employers, there appear such mild, liberal measures as will only supply capitalism with better weapons for the struggle, and will only strengthen, consolidate and develop our petty, "people's" bourgeoisie. And so as to leave no doubt that the "friends of the people" champion the interests of this petty bourgeoisie alone, Mr. Krivenko adds the following remarkable explanation. It appears that the abolition of employers' profit may be "counterbalanced" ... "by a reduction in wages"!!! At first glance this seems to be sheer gibberish. But, no. It is the consistent application of petty-bourgeois ideas. The author observes a fact like the struggle between big capital and small and, as a true "friend of the people," he, of course, takes the side of small ... *capital*. He has further heard that one of the most powerful weapons of the small capitalist is wage reduction—a fact that has been quite correctly observed and confirmed in a large number of industries in Russia, too, parallel to lengthening the working day. And so, desiring at all costs to save the small ... *capitalists*, he proposes "some reduction in wages, provided it is compensated by other benefits"! Messrs. the employers, about whose "profit" some queer things seemed to have been said at first, need not worry. They would, I think, be quite willing to install this brilliant administrator, who plans to fight *against* the employers by a reduction in wages, in the post of Minister of Finance.

One could quote another example of how the pure-blooded bourgeois peeps out of the humane and liberal administrators of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* as soon as they have to deal with any practical question. "The Chronicle of Home Affairs" in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 12, deals with the subject of monopoly.

"Monopoly and the syndicate," says the author, "such are

the ideals of developed industry." And he goes on to express his surprise that these institutions are appearing in Russia, too, although there is no "keen competition among the capitalists" here. "Neither the sugar industry nor the oil industry has developed to any great extent yet. The consumption of sugar and kerosene here is still practically in the embryo, to judge by the insignificant per capita consumption of these goods here as compared with that of other countries. It would seem that there is still a very large field for the development of these branches of industry and that they could still absorb a large amount of capital."

It is characteristic that as soon as it comes to a practical question, the author forgets the favourite idea of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* about the shrinking of the home market. He is compelled to admit that this market still has the prospect of tremendous development, and not of shrinkage. He arrives at this conclusion from a comparison with the West, where consumption is greater. Why? Because culture is on a higher level. But what is the material basis of this culture if not the development of capitalist technique, the growth of commodity economy and exchange, which bring people into more frequent intercourse with each other and break down the medieval isolation of the separate localities? Was not culture in France, for example, on a level no higher than ours before the Great Revolution, when the semi-medieval peasantry had still not finally split into a rural bourgeoisie and a proletariat? And if the author had examined Russian life more closely he could not have helped noticing, for example, that in localities where capitalism is developed the requirements of the peasant population are much higher than in the purely agricultural districts. This is noted unanimously by all investigators of our handicraft industries in all cases where they develop so far as to lay an industrial impress on the whole life of the population.*

The ''friends of the people" pay no attention to such "trifles," because, as far as they are concerned, the expla-

* As an example let me refer, say, to the Pavlovo handicraftsmen as compared to the peasants of the surrounding villages. See the works of Grigoryev and Annensky. I again deliberately give the example of the countryside in which a specific "people's system" supposedly exists.

nation is "simply" culture or the growing complexity of life in general, and they do not even inquire into the material basis of this culture and this complexity. But if they were to examine, at least, the economics of our countryside they would have to admit that it is the break-up of the peasantry into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat that creates the home market.

They must think that the growth of the market does not by any means imply the growth of a bourgeoisie. "In view of the low level of development of production generally," continues the above-mentioned chronicler of home affairs, "and the lack of enterprise and initiative, monopoly will still further retard the development of *the country's forces*." Speaking of the tobacco monopoly, the author calculates that it "would take 154,000,000 rubles out of *people*'s circulation." Here sight is altogether lost of the fact that the basis of our economic system is commodity economy, the leader of which, here as everywhere else, is the bourgeoisie. And instead of speaking about the bourgeoisie being hampered by monopoly, he speaks about the "country," instead of speaking about commodity, bourgeois circulation, he speaks about "people's" circulation.* A bourgeois is never able to detect the difference between these two terms, great as it is. To show how obvious this difference really is, I will quote a magazine which is an authority in the eyes of the "friends of the people," namely, *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*. In No. 2 of that magazine, 1872, in the article "The Plutocracy and Its Basis," we read the following:

"According to Marlo, the most important characteristic of the plutocracy is its love for a liberal form of government, or at all events for the principle of freedom of acquisition. If we take this characteristic and recall what the position was some eight or ten years ago, we shall find that in respect of liberalism we have made enormous strides.... No matter what newspaper or magazine you take up, they all seem more or less to represent democratic principles, they are all out for the interests of the people. But side by side with these democratic views, and even under the cloak of

* The author must be particularly blamed for this use of terms because *Russkoye Bogatstvo* loves the word "people's" as opposed to bourgeois.

them" (*mark* this), "time and again, intentionally or unintentionally, plutocratic aspirations are pursued."

The author quotes as an example the address presented by St. Petersburg and Moscow merchants to the Minister of Finance, expressing the gratitude of this most venerable body of the Russian bourgeoisie for his having "based the financial position of Russia on the widest possible expansion of private enterprise, which alone is fruitful." And the author of the article concludes: "Plutocratic elements and proclivities undoubtedly exist in our society, and in plenty."

As you see, your predecessors in the distant past, when the impressions of the great emancipatory Reform (which, as Mr. Yuzhakov has discovered, should have opened up peaceful and proper paths of development for "people's" production, but which in fact only opened up paths for the development of a plutocracy) were still vivid and fresh, were themselves forced to admit the plutocratic, i.e., bourgeois character of private enterprise in Russia.

Why have you forgotten this? Why, when you talk about "people's" circulation and the development of the "country's forces" thanks to the development of "enterprise and initiative," do you not mention the antagonistic character of this development, the exploiting character of this enterprise and this initiative? Opposition to monopolies and similar institutions can, and should, of course, be expressed, for they undoubtedly worsen the condition of the working people; but it must not be forgotten that besides all these medieval fetters the working people are shackled by still stronger ones, by modern, bourgeois fetters. Undoubtedly, the abolition of monopolies would be beneficial to the whole "people," because, bourgeois economy having become the basis of the economic life of the country, these survivals of the medieval system only add to the capitalist miseries still more bitter medieval miseries. Undoubtedly, they must definitely be abolished—and the quicker and more radically, the better—in order, by ridding bourgeois society of its inherited semi-feudal fetters, to untie the hands of the working class, to facilitate its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

That is how one should talk, calling a spade a spade—saying that the abolition of monopolies and of all sorts of

other medieval restrictions (and in Russia their name is legion) is absolutely essential for the working class in order to facilitate its struggle against the bourgeois system. That is all. None but a bourgeois could see only the solidarity of the interests of the whole "people" against medieval, feudal institutions and forget the profound and irreconcilable antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat within this "people."

Incidentally, it would be absurd to think of putting the "friends of the people" to shame with this, when, for example, they say things like the following about the needs of the countryside:

"When, a few years ago," Mr. Krivenko informs us, "certain newspapers discussed what professions and what type of intellectual people the countryside needed, the list proved to be a very long and varied one and embraced nearly every walk of life: men and women doctors were followed by feldshers, then came lawyers, followed by teachers, librarians and booksellers, agronomists, forestry experts and agricultural experts generally, technicians of the most varied branches (a very extensive sphere, almost untouched as yet), organisers and managers of credit institutions, warehouses, etc."

Let us stop to consider, say, those "intellectuals" (??) whose activities directly pertain to the economic sphere, all those forestry experts, agricultural experts, technicians, etc. And how these people are needed in the countryside! But in **WHAT** countryside? It goes without saying in the countryside of the landowners, the countryside of the enterprising muzhiks, who have "savings" and can afford to pay for the services of all these "technicians" whom Mr. Krivenko is pleased to call "intellectuals." *This* countryside has, indeed, long been thirsting for technicians, for credits, for warehouses; all our economic literature testifies to this. But there is another countryside, much larger, and it would not harm the "friends of the people" to think of it a little more often; it is the countryside of the ruined, ragged and fleeced peasants, who not only have no "savings" with which to pay for the labour of "intellectuals," but have not even bread enough to save themselves from starvation. And it is *this* countryside that you want to assist with *warehouses*!! What will our one-horse and horseless peasants put in them?

Their clothes? They pawned them as far back as 1891 to the rural and urban kulaks who at that time, in fulfilment of your humane and liberal recipe, set up regular "warehouses" in their homes, taverns, and shops. All they have left is their "hands"; but even the Russian bureaucrats have so far failed to invent "warehouses" for this sort of commodity....

It would be hard to imagine more striking proof of the utter banality of these "democrats" than this sentimentality about technical progress among the "peasantry" and closing of eyes to the wholesale expropriation of this very "peasantry." For example, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 2 ("Sketches," § XII), Mr. Karyshev, with the fervour of a liberal cretin, tells of cases of "perfections and improvements" in peasant farming—of the "spread on peasant farms of improved sorts of seed," such as American oats, Vasa rye, Clydesdale oats, etc. "In some places the peasants set special plots apart for seed and after careful tilling, they hand-plant selected samples of grain on them." "Many and very varied innovations" are noted "in the sphere of improved implements and machines,"* such as cultivators, light ploughs, threshing-machines, winnowing-machines, seed sorters. Mention is made of "a greater variety of fertilisers"—phosphates, glue waste, pigeon manure, etc. "Correspondents urge the necessity for setting up local Zemstvo stores in the villages for the sale of phosphates—and Mr. Karyshev, quoting from Mr. V. V.'s book, *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming* (Mr. Krivenko also refers to this book), is affected by all this touching progress almost to the point of fervour:

"These reports, which we have been able to give only in brief, make a heartening and at the same time saddening impression.... Heartening, because these people, impoverished, debt-laden, very many of them horseless, work with might and main, do not give way to despair, do not change their occupation, but remain true to the land, realising that in it, in the proper treatment of it, lies their future,

* I remind the reader of how these improved implements are distributed in Novouzensk Uyezd: 37% of the peasants (the poor), or 10,000 out of 28,000 households, have 7 implements out of 5,724, that is, one-eighth of one per cent! Four-fifths of the implements are monopolised by the rich, who constitute only one-fourth of the total households.

their strength, their wealth." (Why, of course! It goes without saying that it is just the impoverished and horseless muzhik who buys phosphates, seed sorters, threshing-machines and Clydesdale oat seed! O, sancta simplicitas! And this is not written by a ladies' college damsel, but by a professor, a Doctor of Political Economy! No, say what you like, it can't all be due to sacred simplicity.) "They are feverishly searching for ways of effecting that proper treatment, searching for new ways, methods of cultivation, seed, implements, fertilisers, everything that will lend fertility to the soil that feeds them and that will sooner or later reward them a hundredfold....* Saddening, because" (perhaps you think that here at least this "friend of the people" mentions the wholesale expropriation of the peasantry that accompanies and engenders the concentration of land in the hands of the enterprising muzhiks, its conversion into *capital*, into the basis of *improved* farming—the expropriation that throws on the market the "free" and "cheap" "hands" which make for the success of native "enterprise" which employs all these threshing-machines, seed sorters and winnowing-machines?—Nothing of the kind!) "because ... it is we ourselves who must be roused. Where is our aid to the muzhik who is striving to improve his farming? We have at our disposal science, literature, museums, warehouses, commission agencies." (Yes, gentlemen, that's how he puts them, side by side: "science" and "commission agencies."... The time to study the "friends of the people" is not when they are fighting the Social-Democrats, because on such occasions they don a uniform sewn from tatters of their "fathers'

* You are profoundly right venerable Mr. Professor, when you say that improved farming will reward a *hundredfold* the "people" who do not "give way to despair" and "remain true to the land." But have you not observed, 0, great Doctor of Political Economy, that to acquire all these phosphates and so on, the "muzhik" must stand out from among the mass of the starving poor in having *spare* money—and money, after all, is a product of *social* labour that falls into private hands; that the appropriation of the "reward" for improved farming will be the appropriation of *other people*'s labour and that only the most contemptible hangers-on of the bourgeoisie can see the source of this abundant reward in the personal effort of the husbandman, who "working with might and main," "fertilises the soil that feeds him"?

ideals," but in their everyday clothes, when they are discussing in detail the affairs of daily life. Then you get the full colour and flavour of these petty-bourgeois ideologists.) "Is there anything of that sort at the disposal of the muzhik? Of course, there are the rudiments of them, but somehow they are developing very slowly. The muzhik wants an example—where are our experimental fields, our model farms? The muzhik is seeking the printed word—where is our popular agronomic literature?... The muzhik is seeking fertilisers, implements, seed—where are our Zemstvo stores for all these things, wholesale buying, purchasing and distributing conveniences?... Where are you, men of affairs, private and Zemstvo? Go forth and work, the time for it has long been ripe, and

> Hearty thanks will be your meed
> From Russia's "people!"[73]
>
> N. Karyshev (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 2, p. 19.)

Here they are, these friends of the petty "people's" bourgeoisie, revelling in their petty-bourgeois progress!

One would think that, even apart from an analysis of our rural economy, it is enough to observe this striking fact in our modern economic history—namely, the generally-noted progress in peasant farming, parallel to the tremendous expropriation of the "peasantry"—to become convinced of the absurdity of picturing the "peasantry" as a single harmonious and homogeneous whole, to become convinced of the bourgeois character of all this progress! But the "friends of the people" remain deaf to all this. Having lost the good features of the old Russian social-revolutionary Narodism, they cling tightly to one of its grave errors—its failure to understand the class antagonism within the peasantry.

"The peasantist [Narodnik] of 'the seventies,'" Hourwich aptly remarks, "had no idea of class antagonism within the ranks of the peasantry themselves, regarding it as confined entirely to the 'exploiter'—kulak or *miroyed*—and his victim, the peasant imbued with the communistic spirit.* Gleb Uspensky stood alone in his scepticism, op-

* "There have arisen opposite social classes within the village community," says Hourwich elsewhere (p. 104). I quote Hourwich only to supplement the facts given above.

posing his ironical smile to the universal illusion. With his perfect knowledge of the peasantry, and his extraordinary artistic talent that penetrated to the very heart of the phenomena, he did not fail to see that individualism had become the basis of economic relations, not only as between the usurer and the debtor, but among the peasants at large. Cf. his article "Casting in One Mould" (Ravneniye pod odno), *Russkaya Mysl*, 1882, No. 1." (Op. cit., p. 106.)

It was pardonable and even natural to succumb to this illusion in the sixties and seventies, when relatively accurate information about rural economy was so scarce, and when the differentiation of the peasantry had not yet become so marked, but today one must deliberately close one's eyes not to see this differentiation. It is extremely characteristic that it is precisely of late, when the ruin of the peasantry seems to have reached its peak, that one hears so much on all sides about progressive trends in peasant farming. Mr. V. V. (also a most indubitable "friend of the people" has written a whole book on this subject. And you cannot accuse him of factual inaccuracy. On the contrary, the technical, agronomical progress of the peasantry is an undoubted fact, but so is the fact of the wholesale expropriation of the peasantry. And there you are—the "friends of the people" concentrate all their attention on the fact that the "muzhik" is feverishly searching for new methods of cultivation to help him fertilise the soil that feeds him—losing sight of the reverse side of the medal, namely, the feverish separation of that very "muzhik" from the soil. They bury their heads in the sand like ostriches so as to avoid looking facts in the face, so as not to notice that they are witnessing the process of the transformation into capital of the land from which the peasant is being separated, the process of creation of a home market.* Try to disprove the *existence* of these two opposite processes among our community peasantry, try *to explain* them in any other way than by the bourgeois character of our society! That would be too much!

* The reason the search for "new methods of cultivation" is becoming "feverish" is that the enterprising muzhik has to run a larger farm, and cannot cope with it by the old methods; that he is compelled by competition to seek new methods, inasmuch as agriculture is increasingly acquiring a commodity, bourgeois character.

Chanting hallelujahs and effusing humanitarian and benevolent phrases are the alpha and omega of their "science," of their whole political "activity."

And they even elevate this modest, liberal patching up of the present order to a regular philosophy. "Minor, genuine activity," says Mr. Krivenko, with an air of profundity, "is much better than major inactivity." How new and clever! Moreover, he goes on to say, "minor activity is by no means synonymous with minor purpose." And as examples of such "extension of activity," when minor performance becomes "proper and good," he quotes the work of a certain lady in organising schools, lawyers' activities among the peasants eliminating pettifoggers, lawyers' plans to accompany circuit courts into the provinces to act as defendant's counsel, and, lastly, what we have already heard about, the organisation of handicraftsmen's warehouses: in this case the extension of activity (to the dimensions of a great purpose) is to consist in opening warehouses "by the combined efforts of the Zemstvos in the busiest centres."

All this, of course, is very lofty, humane and liberal—"liberal," because it will free the bourgeois economic system from all its medieval handicaps and thus make it easier for the worker to fight the system itself, which, of course, will be strengthened rather than hurt by such measures; and we have long been reading about all this in all Russian liberal publications. It would not be worth opposing it if the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* gentlemen did not compel us to do so; they began advancing these "modest beginnings of liberalism" **AGAINST** the Social-Democrats and, as a lesson to them, simultaneously rebuking them for renouncing "the ideals of their fathers." That being the case, we cannot help saying that it is, at the very least, amusing to oppose the Social-Democrats with proposals and suggestions for such moderate and meticulous *liberal* (that is, bourgeois-serving) activity. As for the fathers and their ideals, it should be said that however erroneous and utopian the old theories of the Russian Narodniks were, at all events they were **ABSOLUTELY** opposed to such "modest beginnings of liberalism." I have borrowed the latter expression from Mr. N. K. Mikhailovsky's article "About the Russian Edition of K. Marx's Book" (*Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, 1872, No. 4)—an

article written in a very lively and brisk style (compared with his present writings), and strongly protesting against the proposal not to offend our young liberals.

But that was long ago, so long ago that the ''friends of the people" have managed to forget all about it, and have glaringly demonstrated, by their tactics, that when there is no materialist criticism of political institutions, and when the class character of the modern state is not understood, it is only one step from political radicalism to political opportunism.

Here are a few examples of this opportunism.

"The transformation of the Ministry of State Properties into the Ministry of Agriculture," declares Mr. Yuzhakov, "may profoundly influence the course of our economic development, but it may also prove to be nothing but a reshuffling of officials." (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10.)

Everything depends, consequently, on who will be "called upon"—the friends of the people or the representatives of the interests of the landlords and capitalists. The interests themselves need not be touched.

"The protection of the economically weak from the economically strong is the first natural task of state interference," continues this same Mr. Yuzhakov in the same article; and he is supported in the same terms by the chronicler of home affairs in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 2. And so as to leave no doubt that his interpretation of this philanthropic nonsense* is the same as that of his worthy associates, the West-European liberal and radical petty-bourgeois ideologists, he at once adds:

"Gladstone's Land Bills,[74] Bismarck's workers' insurance, factory inspection, the idea of our Peasants' Bank, the organisation of migration, measures against the kulak—all these are attempts to apply this same principle of stale interference for the protection of the economically weak."

This at least has the merit of being frank. The author bluntly states that, like the Gladstones and Bismarcks, he wants to adhere to the present social relations, like them he wants to patch up and darn present-day society

* It is nonsense because the strength of the "economically strong" lies, among other things, in his possession of political power. Without it he could not maintain his economic rule.

(bourgeois society—something he does not understand any more than the West-European followers of the Gladstones and Bismarcks do), and not combat it. In complete harmony with this, their fundamental theoretical tenet, is the fact that they regard as an instrument of reform an organ which has its basis in this present-day society and protects the interests of its ruling classes—the state. They positively believe the state to be omnipotent and above all classes, and expect that it will not only "assist" the working people, but create a real and proper system (as we have heard from Mr. Krivenko). But then, of course, nothing else is to be expected of them, dyed-in-the-wool petty-bourgeois ideologists that they are. For it is one of the fundamental and characteristic features of the petty bourgeoisie—one, incidentally, which makes it a reactionary class—that the petty producers, disunited and isolated by the very conditions of production and tied down to a definite place and to a definite exploiter, cannot understand the class character of the exploitation and oppression from which they suffer, and suffer sometimes no less than the proletarian; they cannot understand that in bourgeois society the state too is bound to be a class state.*

Why is it then, most worthy "friends of the people," that till now—and with particular energy since this very emancipatory Reform—our government has "supported, protected and created" only the bourgeoisie and capitalism? Why is it that such unseemly conduct on the part of this absolute, allegedly supraclass, government has coincided precisely with a historical period characterised in the country's internal life by the development of commodity economy, commerce and industry? Why do you consider these latter changes in

* That is why the "friends of the people" are arch-reactionaries when they say that it is the state's natural task to protect the economically weak (that is what it *should be* according to their banal old wives' morality), whereas Russia's entire history and home policy testify that the task of our state is to protect only the feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie, and to punish with the utmost brutality every attempt of the "*economically weak*" to stand up for their rights. And that, of course, is its *natural* task, because absolutism and the bureaucracy are thoroughly saturated with the feudal-bourgeois spirit, and because in the economic sphere the bourgeoisie hold undivided sway and keep the workers "as quiet as lambs."

internal life to be the effect and the government's policy the cause, despite the fact that these changes were so deep down in society that the government did not even notice them and put innumerable obstacles in their way, and despite the fact that this very same "absolute" government, under other conditions of internal life, "supported," "protected" and "created" another class?

Oh, the "friends of the people" never concern themselves with such questions! All this, you see, is materialism, dialectics, "Hegelianism," "mysticism and metaphysics." They simply think that if you plead with this government nicely enough and humbly enough, it will put everything right. And as far as humbleness is concerned, one must do *Russkoye Bogatstvo* justice: truly, it stands out even among the Russian liberal press for its inability to display the slightest independence. Judge for yourselves:

"The abolition of the salt tax, the abolition of the poll-tax and the reduction of the land redemption payments" are described by Mr. Yuzhakov as "a considerable relief to people's farming." Well, of course! But was not the abolition of the salt tax accompanied by the imposition of a host of new indirect taxes and an increase in the old ones? Was not the abolition of the poll-tax accompanied by an increase in the payments made by the former state peasants, under guise of placing them on a redemption basis? And is there not even now, after the famous reduction of redemption payments (by which the government did not even return to the peasants the profit it had made out of the redemption operations), a discrepancy between the payments and the income from the land, i.e., a direct survival of feudal quitrent? Never mind! What is important, you see, is "the first step," the "principle." As for the rest ... the rest we can plead for later on!

These, however, are only the blossoms. Now for the fruit.

"The eighties eased the people's burden" (that's by the above measures!) "and thus saved them from utter ruin."

This is another phrase classic for its shameless servility, one that can only be placed, say, alongside Mr. Mikhailovsky's statement, quoted above, that we have still to create a proletariat. One cannot help recalling in this connection Shchedrin's incisive description of the evolution of the Rus-

sian liberal! This liberal starts out by pleading with the authorities to grant reforms "as far as possible," then he goes on to beg for "well, at least something," and ends by taking up an eternal and unshakable stand on "anything, however mean." And what else can one say of the "friends of the people" but that they have adopted this eternal and unshakable stand when, fresh from the impressions of a famine affecting millions of people, towards which the government's attitude was first one of a huckster's stinginess and then of a huckster's cowardice, they say in print that the government has saved the people from utter ruin!! Several years more will pass, marked by the still more rapid expropriation of the peasantry; the government, in addition to establishing a Ministry of Agriculture, will abolish one or two direct and impose several new indirect taxes; the famine will then affect 40 million people—and these gentlemen will write in the same old way: you see, 40 and not 50 million are starving, that is because the government has eased the people's burden and has saved them from utter ruin; it is because the government has hearkened to the "friends of the people" and established a Ministry of Agriculture!

Another example:

In *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 2, the chronicler of home affairs arguing that Russia is "fortunately" (sic!) a backward country, "which has preserved elements that enable her to base her economic system on the principle of solidarity,"* says that she is therefore able to act "in international affairs as an exponent of economic solidarity" and that Russia's chances for this are enhanced by her undeniable "political might"!!

It is the gendarme of Europe, that constant and most reliable bulwark of all reaction, who has reduced the Russian people, themselves oppressed at home, to the shameful position of serving as an instrument for oppressing the peoples in the West—it is this gendarme who is described as an exponent of economic solidarity!

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* Between whom? The landlord and the peasant, the enterprising muzhik and the tramp, the mill owner and the worker? To understand what this classical "principle of solidarity" means, we must remember that solidarity between the employer and the workman is achieved by "a reduction in wages."

This is indeed beyond all limit! Messrs. the "friends of the people" will outdo all liberals. They not only plead with the government, they not only eulogise it, they positively pray to it, pray with such obeisance, with such zeal that a stranger cannot help feeling eerie at the sound of their loyal foreheads cracking on the flagstones.

Do you remember the German definition of a philistine?

Was ist der Philister?
Ein hohler Darm
Voll Furcht und Hoffnung,
Dass Gott erbarm.*

This definition does not quite apply to our affairs. God ... God takes a back seat with us. But the authorities ... that's a different matter. And if in this definition we substitute the word "authorities" for the word "God" we shall get an exact description of the ideological stock-in-trade, the moral level and the civic courage of the Russian humane and liberal "friends of the people."

To this absolutely preposterous view of the government, the "friends of the people" add a corresponding attitude toward the so-called "intelligentsia." Mr. Krivenko writes: "Literature ... " should "appraise phenomena according to their social meaning and encourage every active effort to do good. It has harped, and continues to harp, on the shortage of teachers, doctors, technicians, on the fact that the people are sick, poor" (there are few technicians), "illiterate, etc.; and when people come forward who are weary of sitting at card tables, participating in private theatricals and eating sturgeon patties at parties given by Marshals of Nobility, and who go out to work with rare self-sacrifice and in face of numerous obstacles" (think of it: they have sacrificed card tables, theatricals and patties!), "literature should welcome them."

Two pages later, with the business-like air of an old campaigner grown wise by experience, he reproves those who "wavered when confronted with the question whether or not to accept office as Zemsky Nachalniks,[75] town mayors, or

* What is a philistine? A hollow gut, full of fear and of hope in God's mercy (Goethe).—*Ed.*

chairmen or members of Zemstvo Boards under the new regulations. In a society with a developed consciousness of civic requirements and duties" (really, gentlemen, this is as good as the speeches of famous Russian Jacks-in-office like the Baranovs and Kosiches!), "such wavering and such an attitude to affairs would be inconceivable, because it would assimilate in its own way every reform that had any vital side to it at all, that is, would take advantage of and develop those sides of the reform that are expedient; as to the undesirable sides, it would convert them into a dead letter; and if there were nothing whatever vital in the reform it would remain an entirely alien body."

What on earth do you make of that! What miserable twopenny-ha'penny opportunism, what indulgence in self-admiration! The task of literature is to collect all the drawing-room gossip about the wicked Marxists, to bow and cringe to the government for saving the people from utter ruin, to welcome people who have grown weary of sitting at card tables, to teach the "public" not to fight shy even of such posts as that of *Zemsky Nachalnik*.... What is this I am reading—*Nedelya*,[76] or *Novoye Vremya*? No, it is *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, the organ of the advanced Russian democrats....

And such gentlemen talk about the "ideals of their fathers," claim that they, and they alone, guard the traditions of the days when France poured the ideas of socialism all over Europe[77]—and when, in Russia, the assimilation of these ideas produced the theories and teachings of Herzen and Chernyshevsky. This is a downright disgrace and would be positively outrageous and offensive—if *Russkoye Bogatstvo* were not so utterly amusing, if such statements in the columns of a magazine of this type did not arouse Homeric laughter, and nothing else. Yes, indeed, you are besmirching those ideals! What were actually the ideals of the first Russian socialists, the socialists of the epoch which Kautsky so aptly described in the words:

"When every socialist was a poet and every poet a socialist."

Faith in a special social order, *in the communal system of Russian life*; hence—*faith in the possibility of a peasant socialist revolution*—that is what inspired them and roused dozens and hundreds of people to wage a heroic struggle

against the government. And you, you cannot reproach the Social-Democrats with failing to appreciate the immense historical services of these, the finest people of their day, with failing to respect their memory profoundly. But I ask you, where is that faith now? It has vanished. So utterly, that when Mr. V. V. tried to argue last year that the village community trains the people to common effort and is a centre of altruistic sentiments, etc.,[78] even Mr. Mikhailovsky's conscience was pricked and he shamefacedly began to lecture Mr. V. V. and to point out that "no *investigation* has shown a connection between our village community and altruism."[79] And, indeed, no investigation has. Yet there was a time when people had faith, implicit faith, without making any investigation.

How? Why? On what grounds?...

"Every socialist was a poet and every poet a socialist."

Moreover, adds the same Mr. Mikhailovsky, all conscientious investigators agree that the countryside is splitting up, giving rise, on the one hand, to a mass of proletarians, and, on the other, to a handful of "kulaks" who keep the rest of the population under their heel. And again he is right: the countryside is indeed splitting up. Nay more, the countryside long ago split up completely. And the old Russian peasant socialism split up with it, making way for workers' socialism, on the one hand, and degenerating into vulgar petty-bourgeois radicalism, on the other. This change cannot be described as anything but degeneration. From the doctrine that peasant life is a special social order and that our country has taken an exceptional path of development, there has emerged a sort of diluted eclecticism, which can no longer deny that commodity economy has become the basis of economic development and has grown into capitalism, but which refuses to see the bourgeois character of all the relations of production, refuses to see the necessity of the class struggle under this system. From a political programme calculated *to arouse the peasantry* for the socialist revolution *against the foundations of modern society** there has

* That, substantially, was what all our old revolutionary programmes amounted to—from those, say, of the Bakuninists and the rebels,[80] to those of the Narodniks, and finally the Narodovoltsi,

emerged a programme calculated to patch up, to "improve" the conditions of the peasantry *while preserving the foundations of modern society*.

Strictly speaking, all this should already suffice to give an idea of the kind of "criticism" to be expected from these gentlemen of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* when they undertake to "demolish" the Social-Democrats. They do not make the slightest attempt to give a straightforward and conscientious exposition of the Social-Democrats' conception of Russian realities (they could quite well do so, and get round the censorship, if they laid special stress on the economic side and kept to the general, partly allegorical terms in which they have conducted all their "polemics") and to argue against its substance, to argue against the correctness of the practical conclusions drawn from it. They prefer instead to confine themselves to the most vacuous phrases about abstract schemes and belief in them, about the conviction that every country has to pass through the phase ... and similar nonsense, with which we have already become sufficiently familiar in the case of Mr. Mikhailovsky. Often we get downright distortions. Mr. Krivenko, for example, declares that Marx "admitted that, if we desired it" (?!! So, *according to Marx*, the evolution of social and economic relations depends on human will and consciousness?? What is this—abysmal ignorance or unparalleled effrontery?!), "and acted accordingly, we could avoid the vicissitudes of capitalism and proceed by a different and more expedient path (sic!!!)."

Our knight was able to talk such nonsense by indulging in deliberate distortion. Citing the passage from the well-known "K. Marx's Letter" (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1888, No. 10), where Marx speaks of his high esteem for Chernyshevsky, who thought it possible for Russia not to "undergo the tortures of the capitalist system," Mr. Krivenko closes the quotation marks, i.e., ends the reproduction of what Marx actually said (the last words of which were: "he [Chernyshevsky] pronounces in favour of this latter solution")—

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for whom the conviction that the peasants would send an overwhelming majority of socialists to a future Zemsky Sobor[81] also occupied no small place in their thoughts.

and adds: "And I, says Marx, *share*" (Krivenko's italics) "these views" (p. 186, No. 12).

What Marx actually said was this: "And my honourable critic would have had at least as much reason for inferring from my esteem for this 'great Russian scholar and critic' that I shared his views on the question, as for concluding from my polemic against the Russian 'literary man' and Pan-Slavist[82] that I rejected them." (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1888, No. 10, p. 271.)

And so Marx said that Mr. Mikhailovsky had no right to regard him as an opponent of the idea of Russia's special line of development because he also respected those who held this idea; but Mr. Krivenko misconstrues this to mean that Marx "admitted" this special line of development. This is an out-and-out distortion. Marx's statement quoted above shows quite clearly that he evaded the question as such: "Mr. Mikhailovsky could have taken as a basis either of the two contradictory remarks, i.e., he had no grounds for basing his conclusions as to my views on Russian affairs in general on either of them." And in order that these remarks should provide no occasion for misinterpretation, Marx, in this very same "letter," gave a direct reply to the question of how his theory could be applied to Russia. This reply very clearly shows that Marx avoided answering the question as such, avoided examining Russian data, which alone could decide the question: "If Russia," he replied, "is tending to become a capitalist nation on the pattern of the West-European countries—and during the last years she has been taking much trouble in this respect—she will not succeed without having first transformed a good part of her peasants into proletarians."[83]

This, I think, is perfectly clear: the question was whether Russia was tending to become a capitalist nation, whether the ruin of her peasants was the process of the creation of a capitalist system, of a capitalist proletariat; and Marx says that "if" she was so tending, she would have to transform a good part of her peasants into proletarians. In other words, Marx's theory is to investigate and explain the evolution of the economic system of certain countries, and its "application" to Russia can be only the **INVESTIGATION** of Russian production relations and their evolution, **EMPLOYING**

the established practices of the **MATERIALIST** method and of **THEORETICAL** political economy.*

The elaboration of a new theory of methodology and political economy marked such gigantic progress in social science, such a tremendous advance for socialism, that almost immediately after the appearance of *Capital* "the destiny of capitalism in Russia" became the principal theoretical problem for Russian socialists; the most heated debates raged around this problem, and the most important points of programme were decided in accordance with it. And it is noteworthy that when (some ten years ago) a separate group of socialists appeared who answered in the affirmative the question of whether Russia's evolution was capitalist, and based this answer on the data of Russian economic reality, it encountered no direct and definite criticism of the point at issue, no criticism which accepted the same general methodological and theoretical principles and gave a different explanation of the data.

The "friends of the people," who have launched a veritable crusade against the Marxists, likewise do not argue their case by examining the facts. As we saw in the first article, they dispose of the matter with phrases. Mr. Mikhailovsky, moreover, never misses an opportunity to display his wit about the Marxists lacking unanimity and about their failure to agree among themselves. And "our well-known" N. K. Mikhailovsky laughs heartily over his joke about Marxists "real" and "not real." It is true that complete unanimity does not reign among the Marxists. But, firstly, Mr. Mikhailovsky misrepresents this fact; and, secondly, it demonstrates the strength and vitality of Russian Social-Democracy and not its weakness. A particularly characteristic feature of the recent period is that socialists are arriving at Social-Democratic views by various paths and for that reason, while unreservedly agreeing on the fundamental and principal thesis that Russia is a bourgeois society which has grown out of the feudal system, that its political form is a class state, and that the only way to end the exploitation

* I repeat that this conclusion could not but be clear to anybody who had read the *Communist Manifesto*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and *Capital*, and that a special explanation was required only for the benefit of Mr. Mikhailovsky.

of the working people is through the class struggle of the proletariat—they differ on many particular problems both in their methods of argument and in the detailed interpretation of this or that phenomenon of Russian life. I can therefore delight Mr. Mikhailovsky in advance by stating that, within the limits of the above-mentioned thesis, which is fundamental and common to all Social-Democrats, differences of opinion exist also on the problems that have been touched upon in these cursory notes, for example, the peasant Reform, the economics of peasant farming and handicraft industries, land renting, etc. The unanimity of people who content themselves with the unanimous acceptance of "lofty truths" such as: the peasant Reform *might* open for Russia peaceful paths of proper development; the state *might* call, not upon the representatives of capitalist interests, but upon the "friends of the people"; the village community *might* socialise agriculture and manufacturing industry, which *might* be developed into large-scale production by the handicraftsman; *people*'s land renting supports *people*'s farming—this touching and moving unanimity has been replaced by disagreements among persons who are seeking for an explanation of Russia's *actual*, *present* economic organisation as a system of definite production relations, for an explanation of her *actual* economic evolution, of her political and all other types of superstructure.

And if such work—while leading people from different angles to the acceptance of the common position which undoubtedly dictates joint political action and consequently confers on all who accept it the right and duty to call themselves "**SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS**"—still leaves a wide field for differences of opinion on a host of particular problems open to various solutions, it merely demonstrates, of course, the strength and vitality of Russian Social-Democracy.*

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* For the simple reason that *no solution* of these problems *has so far been found*. Indeed, you cannot regard as a solution of the land-renting problem the assertion that "people's land renting supports people's farming," or the following description of the system of cultivating the landlord's land with the peasants' implements: "The peasant has proved to be stronger than the landlord," who "has sacrificed his independence for the benefit of the independent peasant";

Moreover, it would be hard to imagine anything more difficult than the conditions under which this work is being done: there is not, nor can there be, an organ to unite the various aspects of the work; in view of prevailing police conditions, private intercourse is extremely difficult. It is only natural that Social-Democrats cannot properly discuss and reach agreement on details, that they contradict each other....

This is indeed funny, is it not?

Mr. Krivenko's references, in his "polemic" against the Social-Democrats, to "neo-Marxists" may cause some perplexity. Some readers may think that something in the nature of a split has taken place among the Social-Democrats, and that "neo-Marxists" have broken away from the old Social-Democrats. Nothing of the kind. At no time or place has anybody in a public defence of Marxism criticised the theories and programme of Russian Social-Democracy, or advocated any other kind of Marxism. The fact is that Messrs. Krivenko and Mikhailovsky have been listening to drawing-room gossip about the Marxists, have been observing various liberals who use Marxism to cover up their liberal inanity, and, with their characteristic cleverness and tact, have set out with this stock-in-trade to "criticise" the Marxists. It is not surprising that this "criticism" consists of a regular chain of absurdities and filthy attacks.

"To be consistent," argues Mr. Krivenko, "we should give an affirmative answer to this" (to the question: "should we not strive for the development of capitalist industry?"), and "not shrink from buying up peasants' land or opening shops and taverns"; we should "rejoice at the success of the numerous inn-keepers in the Duma and assist the still more numerous buyers-up of the peasants' grain."

Really, that is amusing. Try to tell such a "friend of the people" that everywhere in Russia the exploitation of the working people is by its nature capitalistic, that the enterprising muzhiks and buyers-up should be classed among the representatives of capitalism because of such and such political-

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"the peasant has wrested large-scale production from the grasp of the landlord", "the people are the victors in the struggle for the form of agricultural technique." This idle liberal chatter is to be found in the *Destiny of Capitalism*, the work of "our well-known" Mr. V. V.

economic features, which prove the bourgeois character of the splitting up of the peasantry—why, he would raise a howl, call it outrageous heresy, shout about the indiscriminate borrowing of West-European formulas and abstract schemes (while at the same time most carefully evading the actual meaning of the "heretical" argument). But when pictures of the "horrors" caused by the wicked Marxists have to be painted, lofty science and pure ideals may be left aside, and it may be admitted that buyers-up of peasants' grain and peasants' land really are representatives of capitalism, and not merely "hankerers" after other people's goods.

Try and prove to this "friend of the people" that not only are the Russian bourgeoisie already in control of the people's labour everywhere, due to the concentration of the means of production in their hands alone, but they also bring pressure to bear upon the government, initiating, compelling and determining the bourgeois character of its policy—why, he would fly into a real rage, begin to shout about the omnipotence of our government, about fatal misunderstanding and unlucky chance alone causing it always to "call upon" representatives of the interests of capitalism and not upon the "friends of the people," about its artificially implanting capitalism.... But on the sly they are themselves compelled to recognise as representatives of capitalism the inn-keepers in the Duma, i.e., one of the elements of this very government that is supposed to stand above classes. But, gentlemen, are the interests of capitalism in Russia represented only in the "Duma," and only by "inn-keepers"?...

As to filthy attacks, we have had quite enough of them from Mr. Mikhailovsky, and we get them again from Mr. Krivenko, who, for example, in his eagerness to annihilate the hated Social-Democracy, relates that "some go into the factories (when, of course, they can get soft jobs as technicians or office workers), claiming that their sole purpose is to accelerate the capitalist process." There is no need, of course, to reply to such positively indecent statements. All we can do is to put a full stop here.

Keep on in the same spirit, gentlemen, keep boldly on! The imperial government, the one which, as you have just told us, has already taken measures (even though they have flaws in them) to save the people from utter ruin, will

take measures, this time without any flaws whatever, to save your banality and ignorance from exposure. "Cultured society" will gladly continue as hitherto, in the intervals between sturgeon patties and the card table, to talk about the "younger brother" and to devise humane projects for "improving" his condition; its representatives will be pleased to learn from you that by taking up positions as Zemsky Nachalniks or other supervisors of the peasants' purses they display a developed consciousness of civic requirements and duties. Keep on! You may be certain not only of being left in peace but even of approval and praise ...from the lips of the Messrs. Burenins.

In conclusion it will perhaps be worth while replying to a question which has probably occurred already to more than one reader. Did it pay to argue so long with such gentlemen? Was it worth while replying seriously to this stream of liberal and censor-protected filth which they were pleased to call polemics?

I think it was, not for their sake, of course, or for the sake of the "cultured" public, but for the useful lesson which Russian socialists can and should learn from this onslaught. It provides most striking and most convincing proof that the period of Russia's social development, when democracy and socialism were merged in one inseparable and indissoluble whole (as was the case, for example, in Chernyshevsky's day), has gone never to return. Today there are absolutely no grounds for the idea, which Russian socialists here and there still cling to and which most harmfully affects their theories and practical work, that there is no profound qualitative difference in Russia between the ideas of the democrats and those of the socialists.

Quite the contrary; a wide gulf divides these ideas, and it is high time the Russian socialists understood this, understood that a **COMPLETE** and **FINAL RUPTURE** with the ideas of the democrats is **INEVITABLE** and IM-**PERATIVE**!

Let us see what this Russian democrat actually was in the days which gave rise to this idea, and what he has now

become. The "friends of the people" provide enough material for such a comparison.

Extremely interesting in this connection is Mr. Krivenko's attack on Mr. Struve who, in a German publication, opposed Mr. Nik.—on's utopianism (his article "On Capitalist Development in Russia," "Zur Beurtheilung der kapitalistischen Entwicklung Russlands," appeared in *Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt*,[84] III, No. 1, October 2, 1893). Mr. Krivenko launches out against Mr. Struve for, as he alleges, classing the ideas of those who "stand for the village community and the allotment" as "national socialism" (which, he says, is of a "purely utopian nature"). This terrible accusation of being concerned with socialism drives our worthy author into a rage:

"Were there," he exclaims, "no others" (apart from Herzen, Chernyshevsky and the Narodniks), "who stood for the village community and the allotment? What about those who drew up the regulation for the peasants, who made the community and the peasants' economic independence the basis of the Reform; what about the investigators of our history and of contemporary life who support these principles, and almost the whole of our serious and respectable press, which also supports these principles—are they all victims of the delusion called 'national socialism'?"

Calm yourself, most worthy "friend of the people"! You were so scared by the awful accusation of being concerned with socialism that you did not even take the trouble to read Mr. Struve's "little article" carefully. And, indeed, what a crying injustice it would be to accuse those who stand for "the village community and the allotment" of being concerned with socialism! Pray, what is there socialistic in this? Socialism, as we know, is the name given to the protest and struggle against the exploitation of the working people, a struggle for the complete abolition of this exploitation—while "to stand for the allotment" means supporting the peasant's payment of redemption money for all the land they used to have at their disposal. But even if one does not stand for land redemption but for the gratuitous retention of the land the peasants possessed before the Reform, there is nothing socialistic in it, for it is this peasant ownership of land (which evolved during the feudal period) that has everywhere in the West,

as here in Russia,* been the basis of bourgeois society. "To stand for the village community," i.e., to protest against police interference in the customary methods of distributing the land—what is there socialistic in that, when everyone knows that exploitation of the working people can very well exist and is engendered within this community? That is stretching the word "socialism" to mean anything; maybe Mr. Pobedonostsev,[85] too, will have to be classed as a socialist!

Mr. Struve is not guilty of such an awful injustice at all. He speaks of the "utopianism of the national socialism" of the *Narodniks*, and we can see whom he classes as Narodniks from the fact that he refers to Plekhanov's *Our Differences* as a polemic against the Narodniks. Plekhanov, undoubtedly, polemised against socialists, against people who had nothing in common with the "serious and respectable" Russian press. Mr. Krivenko, therefore, had no right to take as applying to himself what was meant for the Narodniks. If, however, he was so anxious to know Mr. Struve's opinion about the trend to which he himself adheres, I am surprised that he paid no attention to, and *did not translate for Russkoye Bogatstvo*, the following passage in Mr. Struve's article:

"As capitalist development advances," says the author, "the philosophy" (Narodnik philosophy) "just described is bound to lose its basis. It will either degenerate (wird herabsinken) into a rather colourless reformist trend, capable of compromise and seeking for compromise,** promising rudiments of which have long been observable, or it will admit that the actual development is inevitable and will draw the theoretical and practical conclusions that necessarily follow from this—in other words, will cease to be utopian."

If Mr. Krivenko cannot guess where, in Russia, are to be found the rudiments of the trend that is only capable of compromise, I would advise him to glance at *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, at the theoretical views of that magazine, which represent a pitiful attempt to piece together fragments of the Narodnik doctrine with the recognition of Russia's cap-

* Proof—the break-up of the peasantry.

** Ziemlich blaße kompromißfähige und kompromißsüchtigeReformrichtung—I think this might be rendered in Russian as *kulturnichesky opportunizm* [uplift opportunism].

italist development, and at its political programme, which aims at improving and restoring the economy of the small producers on the basis of the present capitalist system.*

One of the most characteristic and significant phenomena of our social life in recent times is, generally speaking, the degeneration of Narodism into petty-bourgeois opportunism.

Really, if we take the substance of the programme of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*—the regulation of migration, land renting, cheap credit, museums, warehouses, technical improvement, artels, common land cultivation and all the rest—we shall find that it is indeed very widely circulated in the whole "serious and respectable press," i.e., in the whole liberal press, the publications that are not the organs of the feudal landlords and do not belong to the reptile press.[86] The idea that all these measures are necessary, useful, urgent, "innocuous," has taken deep root among the entire intelligentsia and is extremely widespread. You will meet with it in provincial sheets and newspapers, in all Zemstvo

* Mr. Krivenko cuts an altogether sorry figure in his attempt to wage war on Mr. Struve. He betrays a childish inability to bring forward any really valid objections, and an equally childish irritation. For example, Mr. Struve says that Mr. Nik.—on is a "utopian," and gives very explicit reasons for calling him so: 1) because he ignores the "actual development of Russia," and 2) because he does not understand the class character of our state and appeals to "society" and the "state." What arguments does Mr. Krivenko bring against this? Does he deny that our development is really capitalist? Does he say that it is of some other kind? Does he say that ours is not a class state? No. He prefers to avoid these questions altogether and to battle with comical wrath against "stereotyped patterns" of his own invention. Another example. Besides charging Mr. Nik.—on with not understanding the class struggle, Mr. Struve reproaches him with grave errors of theory in the sphere of "purely economic facts." He points out, among other things, that in speaking of the smallness of our non-agricultural population, Mr. Nik.—on "fails to observe that the capitalist development of Russia will smooth out this difference between 80%" (rural population of Russia) "and 44%" (rural population of America): "that, one might say, is its historical mission." Mr. Krivenko, firstly, garbles this passage by speaking of "our" (?) mission to deprive the peasant of his land, whereas the fact of the matter is that capitalism tends to reduce the rural population, and, secondly, without saying a single word on the substance of the question (whether a capitalism that does not lead to a reduction of the rural population is possible), he talks a lot of nonsense about "doctrinaires," etc. See Appendix II (p. 308 of this volume.—*Ed* .).

researches, abstracts, descriptions, etc., etc. If *this* is to be regarded as Narodism, then undoubtedly its success is enormous and indisputable.

Only it is not Narodism at all (in the old, customary meaning of that term), and its success and tremendously widespread character have been achieved at the cost of vulgarising Narodism, converting social-revolutionary Narodism, which was sharply opposed to our liberalism, into uplift opportunism, that merges with this liberalism and expresses only the interests of the petty bourgeoisie.

To convince ourselves of this we need but turn to the pictures of differentiation among the peasants and handicraftsmen given above—and these pictures by no means depict isolated or new facts, but are simply an attempt to portray in terms of political economy that "school" of "blood-suckers" and "farm labourers" whose existence in our countryside is not denied even by our opponents. It goes without saying that the "Narodnik" measures can only serve to strengthen the petty bourgeoisie; or else (artels and common cultivation) are bound to be miserable palliatives, remain pitiful experiments of the kind which the liberal bourgeoisie cultivated so tenderly everywhere in Europe for the simple reason that they do not in the least affect the "school" itself. For the same reason, even the Messrs. Yermolovs and Wittes[87] cannot object to progress of this kind. Quite the contrary. Do us the favour, gentlemen! They will even give you money "for experiments," if only these will divert the "intelligentsia" from revolutionary work (emphasising the antagonism, explaining it to the proletariat, attempting to bring this antagonism out on to the high road of direct political struggle) to such patching up of: the antagonism, to conciliation and unification. Do us the favour!

Let us dwell a little on the process which led to this degeneration of Narodism. When it first arose, in its original form, it was a fairly well-knit theory: starting from the view of a specific way of life of the people, it believed in the communist instincts of the "communal" peasant and for that reason regarded the peasantry as a natural fighter for socialism. But it lacked theoretical elaboration and confirmation in the facts of Russian life, on the one hand, and

experience in applying a political programme based on these assumed qualities of the peasant, on the other.

The development of the theory, therefore, proceeded along the two lines, the theoretical and the practical. The theoretical work was directed mainly towards studying that form of land*ownership* in which they wanted to see the rudiments of communism; and this work yielded a wealth of factual material of the most varied kind. But this material, which mainly concerned the form of land*ownership*, completely obscured the *economics* of the countryside from the investigators' eyes. This happened all the more naturally, because, firstly, the investigators lacked a sound theory of method in social science, a theory showing the need to single out and make a special study of production relations; and because, secondly, the collected factual material furnished direct evidence of the immediate needs of the peasantry, of the immediate hardships which had a depressing effect upon peasant economy. All the investigators' attention was concentrated on studying these hardships—land poverty, high payments, lack of rights, and the crushed and downtrodden condition of the peasants. All this was described, studied and explained with such a wealth of material, in such minute detail, that if ours were not a class state, if its policy were determined not by the interests of the ruling classes, but by the impartial discussion of the "people's needs," it should, of course, have been convinced a thousand times over of the need for eliminating these hardships. The naïve investigators, believing in the possibility of "convincing" society and the state, were completely submerged in the details of the facts they had collected, and lost sight of one thing, the political-economic structure of the countryside, lost sight of the main background of the economy that really was being crushed by these immediate hardships. The result, naturally, was that defence of the interests of an economy crushed by land poverty, etc., turned out to be a defence of the interests of the class that held this economy in its hands, that alone could endure and develop under the given social-economic relations *within* the community, under the given economic system in the country.

Theoretical work directed towards the study of the institution which was to serve as the basis and support for the abolition of exploitation led to a programme being drawn

up which expresses the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., the very class upon which this system of exploitation rests!

At the same time, practical revolutionary work also developed in quite an unexpected direction. Belief in the communist instincts of the muzhik naturally demanded of the socialists that they set politics aside and "go among the people." A host of extremely energetic and talented persons set about fulfilling this programme, but practice convinced them of the naïveté of the idea of the muzhik's instincts being communist. It was decided, incidentally, that they did not have to do with the muzhik, but with the government—and the entire activity was then concentrated on a fight against the government, a fight then waged by the intellectuals alone; they were sometimes joined by *workers*. At first this fight was waged in the name of socialism and was based on the theory that the people were ready for socialism and that it would be possible, merely by seizing power, to effect not only a political, but also a social revolution. Latterly, this theory is apparently becoming utterly discredited, and the struggle waged by the Narodovoltsi against the government is becoming a struggle of the radicals for political liberty.

Hence, in this case, too, the work led to results diametrically opposite to its point of departure; in this case, too, there emerged a programme expressing only the interests of radical bourgeois democracy. Strictly speaking, this process is not yet complete, but is already, I think, clearly defined. This development of Narodism was altogether natural and inevitable, because the doctrine was based on the purely mythical idea of peasant economy being a special (communal) system: the myth dissolved when it came into contact with reality, and peasant socialism turned into radical-democratic representation of the petty-bourgeois peasantry.

Let me give examples of the democrat's evolution:

"We must see to it," argues Mr. Krivenko, "that instead of an integral man we do not get an all-Russian jelly-fish filled only with a vague ferment of good sentiments but incapable either of real self-sacrifice or of doing anything durable in life." The homily is an excellent one, but let us see what it is applied to. "In regard to the latter,"

continues Mr. Krivenko, "I am acquainted with the following vexatious fact": in the South of Russia there lived some young people "who were inspired by the very best intentions and by a love for the younger brother; they showed the greatest attention and respcct for the muzhik; they treated him as the guest of honour, ate out of the same bowl with him, treated him to jam and biscuits; they paid him higher prices than others did; they gave him money—as loans, or as tips, or for no reason at all, they told him about European institutions and workers' associations, etc. In the same locality there lived a young German named Schmidt, the steward of an estate, or rather just a gardener, a man without any humanitarian ideas, a real, narrow, formal German soul" (sic??!!), etc. Three or four years passed, and these people separated and went their different ways. Another twenty years passed, and the author, on revisiting the locality, learned that "Mr. Schmidt" (as a reward for his useful activities gardener Schmidt had been promoted to Mr. Schmidt) had taught the peasants grape growing, from which they now obtain "some income," 75 to 100 rubles a year, and on this account they had preserved "kind memories" of him, whereas of the "gentlemen who merely cherished kind sentiments for the muzhik but did nothing tangible (!) for him, not even the memory was left."

A calculation shows that the events described occurred about 1869-1870, that is, roughly at the time when the Russian Narodnik socialists were trying to introduce into Russia the most advanced and most important of "European institutions"—the International.[88]

Clearly, the impression created by Mr. Krivenko's account is a little too harsh, and so he hastens to make a reservation:

"I do not suggest, of course, that Schmidt was better than these gentlemen. I merely point out why, for all his defects, he left a more lasting impression in the locality and on the population." (I do not suggest that he was better, I merely point out that he left a more lasting impresion—what nonsense?!) "Nor do I say that he did anything important; on the contrary, I cite what he did as an example of a most trifling, incidental deed, which cost him nothing, but which for all that was undoubtedly vital."

The reservation, you see, is very ambiguous; the point, however, is not its ambiguity, but the fact that the author, in contrasting the fruitlessness of the one activity with the success of the other, apparently does not suspect that there is a fundamental difference of tendency between these two types of activity. That is the whole point, which makes the story so characteristic in defining the contemporary democrat's physiognomy.

The young people who talked to the muzhik about "European institutions and workers' associations" evidently wanted to inspire in the muzhik a desire to alter the forms of social life (the conclusion I draw may be wrong in this instance, but everyone will agree, l think, that it is a legitimate one, for it follows inevitably from Mr. Krivenko's story), they wanted to stir him to undertake a social revolution against contemporary society, which engenders such disgraceful exploitation and oppression of the working people, accompanied by universal rejoicing over all sorts of liberal progress. "Mr. Schmidt," on the other hand, true husbandman that he was, merely wanted to help others arrange their affairs—and nothing more. Well, but how can one compare, juxtapose these two types of activity, which have diametrically opposite aims? Why, it is just as though somebody were to start comparing the failure of a person who tried to destroy a given building with the success of one who tried to reinforce it! To draw a comparison with any sense in it, he should have inquired why the efforts of the young men and women who went among the people to stimulate the peasants to revolution were so unsuccessful—whether it was because they erroneously believed that the "peasantry" really represented the working people and exploited population, whereas in fact the peasantry does not constitute a single class (—an illusion only to be explained, perhaps, by the reflected influence of the epoch of the fall of serfdom, when the peasantry did indeed come forward as a *class*, but only as a class of feudal society), for within it a bourgeois and a proletarian class are forming—in a word, he should have examined the old socialist theories and the Social-Democratic criticism of these theories. Instead, Mr. Krivenko moves heaven and earth to prove that "Mr. Schmidt's" work was "undoubtedly vital." But pardon me,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

most worthy Mr. "friend of the people," why hammer at an open door? Whoever doubts it? To lay out a vineyard and get an annual income of 75 to 100 rubles from it—what could be more vital?*

And the author goes on to explain that if one peasant lays out a vineyard, that is isolated activity; but if several do, that is common and widespread activity, which transforms a small job into real and proper work, *just as*, *for example*, A. N. Engelhardt[89] not only used phosphates on his estate but got others to use them.

Now, isn't this democrat really splendid!

Let us take another example, one from opinions on the peasant Reform. What attitude towards it had Chernyshevsky, a democrat of that epoch, when democracy and socialism were undivided? Unable to express his opinion openly, he *kept silent*, but gave the following roundabout description of the contemplated reform:

"*Suppose I was interested in taking measures to protect the provisions out of which your dinner is made. It goes without saying that if I was prompted to do so by my kind disposition towards you, then my zeal was based on the assumption that the provisions belonged to you and that the dinner prepared from them would be wholesome and beneficial to you. Imagine my feelings, then, when I learn that the provisions do not belong to you at all, and that for every dinner prepared from them you are charged a price which not only exceeds the cost of the dinner*" (this was written *before* the Reform. Yet the Messrs. Yuzhakovs assert *now* that its fundamental principle was to give security to the peasants!!) "*but which you are not able to pay at all without extreme hardship. What thoughts enter my head when I make such strange discoveries?... How stupid I was to bother about the matter when the conditions did not exist to ensure its usefulness! Who but a fool would bother about the retention of property in certain hands without first satisfying himself that those hands will receive the*

* You should have tried to thrust your offer of this "vital" work on *those* young people who talked to the muzhik about European associations! What a welcome, what a splendid retort they would have given you! You would have been as mortally afraid of their ideas as you now are of materialism and dialectics!

property, and on favourable terms? ... Far better if all these provisions are lost, for they will only cause harm to my dear friend! Far better be done with the whole business, for it will only cause your ruin!"

I have emphasised the passages which show most saliently how profoundly and splendidly Chernyshevsky understood the realities of his time, how he understood the significance of the peasants' payments, how he understood the antagonism between the social classes in Russia. It is also important to note his ability to expound such purely revolutionary ideas in the censored press. He wrote the same thing in his illegal works, but without circumlocution. In *A Prologue to the Prologue*, Volgin (into whose mouth Chernyshevsky puts his ideas) says:

"*Let the emancipation of the peasant be placed in the hands of the landlords' party. It won't make much difference.*"* And in reply to his interlocutor's remark that, on the contrary, the difference would be tremendous, because the landlords' party was opposed to allotting land to the peasants, he replies emphatically:

"*No, not tremendous, but insignificant. It would be tremendous if the peasants obtained the land without redemption payments. There is a difference between taking a thing from a man and leaving it with him, but if you take payment from him it is all the same. The only difference between the plan of the landlords' party and that of the progressists is that the former is simpler and shorter. That is why it is even better. Less red tape and, in all probability, less of a burden on the peasants. Those peasants who have money will buy land. As to those who have none—there's no use compelling them to buy it. It will only ruin them. Redemption is nothing but purchase.*"

It required the genius of a Chernyshevsky to understand so clearly at that time, when the peasant Reform was only being introduced (when it had not yet been properly elucidated even in Western Europe), its fundamentally bourgeois character, to understand that already at that time Russian

* I quote from Plekhanov's article "N. G. Chernyshevsky," in *Social-Demokrat*.[90]

"society" and the Russian "state" were ruled and governed by social classes that were irreconcilably hostile to the working people and that undoubtedly predetermined the ruin and expropriation of the peasantry. Moreover, Chernyshevsky understood that the existence of a government that screens our antagonistic social relations is a terrible evil, which renders the position of the working people ever so much worse.

"*To tell the truth*," Volgin continues, "*it would be better if they were emancipated without land*." (That is, since the feudal landlords in this country are so strong, it would be better if they acted openly, straightforwardly, and said all they had in mind, instead of hiding their interests as serf owners behind the compromises of a hypocritical absolute government.)

"*The matter is put in such a way that I see no reason for getting excited, even over whether the peasants are emancipated or not, let alone over whether the liberals or the landlords are to emancipate them. To my mind it is all the same. It will even be better if the landlords do it*."

Here is a passage from "Unaddressed Letters": "*They say: emancipate the peasants.... Where are the forces for it? Those forces do not yet exist. It is useless tackling a job when the forces for it are lacking. Yet you see the way things are going. They will start emancipating. But what will come of it? Well, judge for yourself what comes of tackling a job which is beyond your powers. You just botch it—and the result will be vile*."[91]

Chernyshevsky understood that the Russian feudal, bureaucratic state was incapable of emancipating the peasants, that is, of overthrowing the feudal serf owners, that it was only capable of something "vile," of a miserable compromise between the interests of the liberals (redemption is nothing but purchase) and of the landlords, a compromise employing the illusion of security and freedom to deceive the peasants, but actually ruining them and completely betraying them to the landlords. And he protested, execrated the Reform, wanted it to fail, wanted the government to get tied up in its equilibristics between the liberals and the landlords, and wanted a crash to take place that would bring Russia out on the high road of open class struggle.

Yet *today*, when Chernyshevsky's brilliant predictions have become fact, when the history of the past thirty

years has ruthlessly shown up all economic and political illusions, our contemporary "democrats" sing the praises of the Reform, regard it as a sanction for "people's" production, contrive to draw proof from it of the possibility of finding a way which would *get around* the social classes hostile to the working people. I repeat, their attitude towards the peasant Reform is most striking proof of how profoundly bourgeois our democrats have become. These gentlemen have learned nothing, but have forgotten very, very much.

For the sake of comparison, I will take *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* for 1872. I have already quoted passages from the article "The Plutocracy and Its Basis," dealing with the successes in respect of liberalism (which screened plutocratic interests) achieved by Russian society in the very first decade after the "great emancipatory" Reform.

While formerly, wrote the same author in the same article, one would often find people who whined over the reforms and wailed for the good old days, they are to be found no longer. "Everybody is pleased with the new order; everybody is happy and satisfied." And the author goes on to show how literature "itself is becoming an organ of the plutocracy," advocating the interests and aspirations of the plutocracy "under the cloak of democracy." Examine this argument a little more closely. The author is displeased with the fact that "everybody" is pleased with the new order brought about by the Reform, that "everybody" (the representatives of "society" and of the "intelligentsia," of course, not of the working people) is happy and satisfied, notwithstanding the obvious antagonistic, bourgeois features of the new order: the public fail to notice that liberalism merely screens "freedom of acquisition," acquisition, of course, at the expense and to the disadvantage of the mass of working people. And he protests. It is this protest, characteristic of the socialist, that is valuable in his argument. Observe that this protest against a plutocracy screened by democracy contradicts the general theory of the magazine: for they deny that there are any bourgeois features, elements or interests in the peasant Reform, they deny the class character of the Russian intelligentsia and of the Russian state, they deny that there is a basis for capitalism in Russia—nevertheless, they cannot but sense and perceive the capitalism and bourgeoisdom.

And to the extent that *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, sensing the antagonism in Russian society, fought bourgeois liberalism and bourgeois democracy—to that extent it fought in a cause common to all our pioneer socialists, who, although they could not understand this antagonism, nevertheless realised its existence and desired to combat the very organisation of society which gave rise to it; to that extent *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* was progressive (from the point of view of the proletariat, of course). The "friends of the people" have forgotten this antagonism; they have lost all sensibility of the fact that in this country, too, in Holy Russia, the pure-blooded bourgeois hide "under the cloak of democracy"; and that is why they are now reactionary (in relation to the proletariat), for they gloss over the antagonism, and talk, not of struggle, but of conciliatory, "uplift" activity.

But, gentlemen, has the Russian clear-browed liberal, the democratic representative of the plutocracy of the sixties, ceased to be the ideologist of the bourgeoisie in the nineties just because his brow has become clouded with civic grief?

Does "freedom of acquisition" on a large scale, freedom to acquire big credits, big capital, big technical improvements, cease to be liberal, i.e., bourgeois, while the present social-economic relations remain unchanged, merely because its place is taken by freedom to acquire small credits, small capital, small technical improvements?

I repeat, it is not that they have altered their opinions under the influence of a radical change of views or a radical change in our order of things. No, they have simply forgotten.

Having lost the only feature that once made their predecessors progressive—notwithstanding the utter unsoundness of their theories and their naïve and utopian outlook on reality—the "friends of the people" have learnt absolutely nothing during all this time. And yet, quite apart from a political-economic analysis of Russian realities, the political history of Russia during the past thirty years alone should have taught them a great deal.

At that time, in the era of the "sixties," the power of the feudal landlords was sapped: they suffered defeat, not complete, it is true, but so decisive that they had to slink from the stage. The liberals, on the contrary, raised their

heads. Streams of liberal phrase-mongering flowed about progress, science, goodness, struggle against injustice, the interests of the people, the conscience of the people, the forces of the people, etc., etc.—the very phrases which now, too, at moments of particular depression, are vomited forth by our radical snivellers in their salons, and by our liberal phrase-mongers at their anniversary dinners, and in the columns of their magazines and newspapers. The liberals proved strong enough to mould the "new order" in their own fashion—not entirely, of course, but in fair measure. Although "the clear light of the open class struggle" did not shine in Russia at that time, there was more light then than there is now, so that even those ideologists of the working people who had not the faintest notion of this class struggle, and who preferred to dream of a better future rather than *explain* the vile present, could not help seeing that liberalism was a cloak for plutocracy, and that the new order was a bourgeois order. It was the removal from the stage of the feudal landlords, who did not divert attention to still more crying evils of the day, and did not prevent the new order from being observed in its pure (relatively) form, that enabled this to be seen. But although our democrats of that time knew how to denounce plutocratic liberalism, they could not understand it and explain it scientifically; they could not understand that it was inevitable under the capitalist organisation of our social economy; they could not understand the progressive character of the new system of life as compared with the old, feudal system; they could not understand the revolutionary role of the proletariat it created; and they limited themselves to "snorting" at this system of "liberty" and "humanity," imagined that its bourgeois character was fortuitous, and expected social relations of some other kind to reveal themselves in the "people's system."

And then history showed them these other social relations. The feudal landlords, not completely crushed by the Reform, which was so outrageously mutilated in their interests, revived (for a time) and showed vividly what these other than bourgeois social relations of ours were, showed it in the form of such unbridled, incredibly senseless and brutal reaction that our democrats caught fright, subsided, instead of advancing and remoulding their naïve democ-

racy—which was able to sense what was bourgeois but was unable to understand it—into Social-Democracy, went backwards, to the liberals, and are now proud of the fact that their snivelling—i.e., I want to say, their theories and programmes—is shared by "the whole serious and respectable press." One would have thought the lesson was a very impressive one: the illusions of the old socialists about a special mode of life of the people, about the socialist instincts of the people, and about the fortuitous character of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, had become too obvious; one would have thought that the facts could now be looked straight in the face and the admission be openly made that there had not been and were not any other social-economic relations than bourgeois and moribund feudal relations in Russia, and that, therefore, there could be no road to socialism except through the working-class movement. But these democrats had learned nothing, and the naïve illusions of petty-bourgeois socialism gave way to the practical sobriety of petty-bourgeois progress.

Today, the theories of these petty-bourgeois ideologists, when they come forward as the spokesmen of the interests of the working people, are positively reactionary. They obscure the antagonism of contemporary Russian social-economic relations and argue as if things could be improved by general measures, applicable to all, for "raising," "improving," etc., and as if it were possible to reconcile and unite. They are reactionary in depicting our state as something standing above classes and therefore fit and capable of rendering serious and honest aid to the exploited population.

They are reactionary, lastly, because they simply cannot understand the necessity for a struggle, a desperate struggle of the working people themselves for their emancipation. The "friends of the people," for example, seem to think they can manage the whole thing themselves. The workers need not worry. Why, an engineer has even visited the offices of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, and there they have almost completely worked out a "scheme" for "introducing capitalism into the life of the people." Socialists must make a **DECISIVE** and **COMPLETE** break with all petty-bourgeois ideas and theories—**THAT IS THE PRINCIPAL USEFUL LESSON** to be drawn from this campaign.

I ask you to note that I speak of a break with petty-bourgeois ideas and not with the "friends of the people" or with their ideas—because there can be no breaking with something with which there has never-been any connection. The "friends of the people" are only one of the representatives of one of the trends of this sort of petty-bourgeois socialist ideas. And if, in this case, I draw the conclusion that it is necessary to break with petty-bourgeois socialist ideas, with the ideas of the old Russian peasant socialism *generally*, it is because the campaign now launched against the Marxists by the representatives of the old ideas, scared by the growth of Marxism, has induced them to give particularly full and vivid expression to petty-bourgeois ideas. Comparing these ideas with contemporary socialism and with the facts of contemporary Russian reality, we see with astonishing clarity how outworn these ideas have become, how they have lost every vestige of an integral theoretical basis and have sunk to the level of a pitiful eclecticism, of a most ordinary opportunist uplift programme. It may be said that this is not the fault of the old socialist ideas in general, but of the gentlemen in question, whom no one thinks of classing as socialists; but such an argument seems to me quite unsound. I have throughout tried to show that such a degeneration of the old theories was inevitable. I have throughout tried to devote as little space as possible to criticism of these gentlemen in particular and as much as possible to the general and fundamental tenets of the old Russian socialism. And if the socialists should find that I have defined these tenets incorrectly or inaccurately, or have left something unsaid, then I can only reply with the following very humble request: please, gentlemen, define them yourselves, state them fully and properly!

Indeed, no one would be more pleased than the Social-Democrats of an opportunity to enter into a polemic with the socialists.

Do you think that we like answering the "polemics" of these gentlemen, or that we would have undertaken it if they had not thrown down a direct, persistent and emphatic challenge?

Do you think that we do not have to force ourselves to read, re-read and grasp the meaning of this repulsive

mixture of stereotyped liberal phrase-mongering and philistine moralising?

Surely, we are not to blame for the fact that only such gentlemen now take upon themselves the job of vindicating and expounding these ideas. I ask you also to note that I speak of the need for a break with petty-bourgeois ideas about *socialism*. The petty-bourgeois theories we have examined are **ABSOLUTELY** reactionary **INASMUCH AS** they claim to be socialist theories.

But if we understand that actually there is absolutely nothing socialist in them, i.e., that all these theories completely fail to explain the exploitation of the working people and therefore cannot serve as a means for their emancipation, that as a matter of fact all these theories reflect and further the interests of the petty bourgeoisie—then our attitude towards them must be different, and we must ask: *what should be the attitude of the working class towards the petty bourgeoisie and its programmes*? And this question cannot be answered unless the dual character of this class is taken into consideration (here in Russia this duality is particularly marked owing to the antagonism between the big bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie being less developed). It is progressive insofar as it puts forward general democratic demands, i.e., fights against all survivals of the medieval epoch and of serfdom; it is reactionary insofar as it fights to preserve its position as a petty bourgeoisie and tries to retard, to turn back the general development of the country along bourgeois lines. Reactionary demands of this kind, such, for example, as the notorious inalienability of allotments, as well as the many other projects for tutelage over the peasants, are usually covered up by plausible talk of protecting the working people but actually, of course, they only worsen their condition, while at the same time hampering them in their struggle for emancipation. A strict distinction should be drawn between these two sides of the petty-bourgeois programme and, while denying that these theories are in any way socialist in character, and while combating their reactionary aspects, we should not forget their democratic side. I shall give an example to show that, although the Marxists completely repudiate petty-bourgeois theories, this does not prevent them from including democracy in their

programme, but, on the contrary, calls for still stronger insistence on it. We have mentioned above the three main theses that always formed the theoretical stock-in-trade of the representatives of petty-bourgeois socialism, viz., land poverty, high payments and the tyranny of the authorities.

There is absolutely nothing socialist in the demand for the abolition of these evils, for they do not in the least explain expropriation and exploitation, and their elimination will not in the least affect the oppression of labour by capital. But their elimination will free this oppression of the medieval rubbish that aggravates it, and will facilitate the worker's direct struggle against capital, and for that reason, as a democratic demand, will meet with the most energetic support of the workers. Generally speaking, the question of payments and taxes is one to which only the petty bourgeois can attach any particular significance; but in Russia the payments made by the peasants are, in many respects, simply survivals of serfdom. Such, for example, are the land redemption payments, which should be immediately and unconditionally abolished; such, too, are the taxes which only the peasants and the small townspeople pay, but from which the "gentry" are exempt. Social-Democrats will always support the demand for the elimination of these relics of medieval relations, which cause economic and political stagnation. The same can be said of land poverty. I have already given proof at length of the bourgeois character of the wailing on this score. There is no doubt, however, that the peasant Reform, for example, by permitting the cutting-off of lands[92] positively robbed the peasants for the benefit of the landlords, rendering service to this tremendous reactionary force both directly (by snatching land from the peasants) and indirectly (by the clever way the allotments were marked out). And Social-Democrats will most strenuously insist on the immediate return to the peasants of the land taken from them and on the complete abolition of landed proprietorship—that bulwark of feudal institutions and traditions. This latter point, which coincides with the nationalisation of the land, contains nothing socialist, because the capitalist-farming relations already taking shape in our country would in that case only flourish more rapidly and abundantly; but it is extremely important

from the democratic standpoint as the only measure capable of completely breaking the power of the landed nobility. Lastly, only the Yuzhakovs and V. V.s, of course, can speak of the peasants' lack of rights as the cause of their expropriation and exploitation. As for the oppression of the peasantry by the authorities, it is not only an unquestionable fact, but is something more than mere oppression; it is treating the peasants as a "base rabble," for whom it is natural to be subject to the landed nobility; to whom general civil rights are granted only as a special favour (migration,* for example), and whom any Jack-in-office can order about as if they were workhouse inmates. And the Social-Democrats unreservedly associate themselves with the demand for the complete restoration of the peasants' civil rights, the complete abolition of all the privileges of the nobility, the abolition of bureaucratic tutelage over the peasants, and the peasants' right to manage their own affairs.

In general, the Russian communists, adherents of Marxism, should more than any others call themselves **SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS**, and in their activities should never forget the enormous importance of **DEMOCRACY**.**

In Russia, the relics of medieval, semi-feudal institutions are still so enormously strong (as compared with Western Europe), they are such an oppressive yoke upon the proletariat and the people generally, retarding the growth of political thought in all estates and classes, that one cannot but insist on the tremendous importance which the struggle against all feudal institutions, absolutism, the social-estate system, and the bureaucracy has for the workers. The workers must be shown in the greatest detail what a terribly reactionary force these institutions are, how they intensify

* One cannot help recalling here the purely Russian feudal arrogance with which Mr. Yermolov, now Minister of Agriculture, objects to migration in his book *Crop Failures and the Distress of the People*. Migration cannot be regarded as rational from the standpoint of the state, be says, when the landlords in European Russia still experience a shortage of labour. And, indeed, what do the peasants exist for, if not to work and feed the idle landlords and their "high-placed" servitors?

** This is a very important point. Plekhanov is quite right when he says that our revolutionaries have two enemies: old prejudices that have not yet been entirely eradicated, on the one hand, and a narrow understanding of the new programme, on the other." Appendix III (p. 326 of this volume.—*Ed.*).

the oppression of labour by capital, what a degrading pressure they exert on the working people, how they keep capital in its medieval forms, which, while not falling short of the modern, industrial forms in respect of the exploitation of labour, add to this exploitation by placing terrible difficulties in the way of the fight for emancipation. The workers must know that unless these pillars of reaction* are overthrown, it will be utterly impossible for them to wage a successful struggle against the bourgeoisie, because so long as they exist, the Russian rural proletariat, whose support is an essential condition for the victory of the working class, will never cease to be downtrodden and cowed, capable only of sullen desperation and not of intelligent and persistent protest and struggle. And that is why it is the direct duty of the working class to fight side by side with the radical democracy against absolutism and the reactionary social estates and institutions—a duty which the Social-Democrats must impress upon the workers, while not for a moment ceasing also to impress upon them that the struggle against all these institutions is necessary only as a means of facilitating the struggle against the bourgeoisie, that the worker needs the achievement of the general democratic demands only to clear the road to victory over the working people's chief enemy, over an institution that is purely democratic by nature, *capital*, which here in Russia is particularly in-

* A particularly imposing reactionary institution, one to which our revolutionaries have paid relatively little attention, is our *bureaucracy*, which de facto rules the Russian state. The bureaucracy being made up mainly of middle-class intellectuals are profoundly bourgeois both in origin and in the purpose and character of their activities; but absolutism and the enormous political privileges of the landed nobility have lent them particularly pernicious qualities. They are regular weathercocks, who regard it as their supreme task to combine the interests of the landlord and the bourgeois. They are Judushkas[93] who use their feudal sympathies and connections to fool the workers and peasants, and employ the pretext of "protecting the economically weak" and acting as their "guardian" against the kulak and usurer to carry through measures which reduce the working people to the status of a "base rabble," handing them over to the feudal landlords and making them all the more defenceless against the bourgeoisie. The bureaucracy are most dangerous hypocrites, who have imbibed the experience of the West-European champion reactionaries, and skilfully conceal their Arakcheyev[94] designs behind the fig-leaves of phrases about loving the people.

clined to sacrifice its democracy and to enter into alliance with the reactionaries in order to suppress the workers, to still further impede the emergence of a working-class movement.

What has been said is, I think, sufficient to define the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards absolutism and political liberty, and also towards the trend which has been growing particularly strong of late, that aims at the "amalgamation" and "alliance" of all the revolutionary groups for the winning of political liberty.[95]

This trend is rather peculiar and characteristic.

It is peculiar because proposals for "alliance" do not come from a definite group, or definite groups, with definite programmes which coincide on one point or another. If they did, the question of an alliance would be one for each separate case, a concrete question to be settled by the representatives of the uniting groups. Then there could be no special "amalgamation" trend. But such a trend exists, and simply comes from people who have cut adrift from the old, and have not moored to anything new. The theory on which the fighters against absolutism have hitherto based themselves is evidently crumbling, and is destroying the conditions for solidarity and organisation which are essential for the struggle. Well then, these "amalgamators" and "alliance advocates" would seem to think that the easiest way to create such a theory is to reduce it to a protest against absolutism and a demand for political liberty, while evading all other questions, socialist and non-socialist. It goes without saying that the bottom will inevitably be knocked out of this naïve fallacy at the very first attempts at such unity.

But what is characteristic is that this "amalgamation" trend represents one of the last stages in the process of transformation of militant, revolutionary Narodism into politically radical democracy, a process which I have tried to outline above. A durable amalgamation of all the non-Social-Democratic revolutionary groups under the banner mentioned will be possible only when a durable programme of *democratic* demands has been drawn up that will put an end to the prejudices of the old Russian exceptionalism. Of course, the Social-Democrats believe that the formation of such a democratic party would be a useful step forward; and their anti-Narodnik activity should further it, should

further the eradication of all prejudices and myths, the grouping of the socialists under the banner of Marxism and the formation of a democratic party by the other groups.

The Social-Democrats, who consider essential the independent organisation of the workers into a separate workers' party, could not, of course, "amalgamate" with such a party, but the workers would most strongly support any struggle waged by the democrats against reactionary institutions.

The degeneration of Narodism into the most ordinary petty-bourgeois radical theory—of which (degeneration) the "friends of the people" furnish such striking testimony—shows what a tremendous mistake is made by those who spread among the workers the idea of fighting absolutism without at the same time explaining to them the antagonistic character of our social relations by virtue of which the ideologists of the bourgeoisie also favour political liberty—without explaining to them the historical role of the Russian worker as a fighter for the emancipation of the whole working population.

The Social-Democrats are often accused of wanting to monopolise Marx's theory, whereas, it is argued, his economic theory is accepted by all socialists. But the question arises; what sense is there in explaining to the workers the form of value, the nature of the bourgeois system and the revolutionary role of the proletariat, if here in Russia the exploitation of the working people is generally and universally explained not by the bourgeois organisation of social economy, but by, say, land poverty, redemption payments, or the tyranny of the authorities?

What sense is there in explaining to the worker the theory of the class struggle, if that theory cannot even explain his relation to the employer (capitalism in Russia has been artificially implanted by the government), not to mention the mass of the "people," who do not belong to the fully established class of factory workers?

How can one accept Marx's economic theory and its corollary—the revolutionary role of the proletariat as the organiser of communism by way of capitalism—if people in our country try to find ways to communism other than through the medium of capitalism and the proletariat it creates?

Obviously, under such conditions to call upon the worker to fight for political liberty would be equivalent to call-

ing upon him to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the progressive bourgeoisie, for it cannot be denied (typically enough, even the Narodniks and the Narodovoltsi did not deny it) that political liberty will primarily serve the interests of the bourgeoisie and will not ease the position of the workers, but ... will ease only the conditions for their struggle ... *against this very bourgeoisie*. I say this as against those socialists who, while they do not accept the theory of the Social-Democrats, carry on their agitation among the workers, having become convinced empirically that only among the latter are revolutionary elements to be found. The theory of these socialists contradicts their practice, and they make a very serious mistake by distracting the workers from their direct task of **ORGANISING A SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY.***

It was a mistake that arose naturally at a time when the class antagonisms of bourgeois society were still quite undeveloped and were held down by serfdom, when the latter was evoking the unanimous protest and struggle of the entire intelligentsia, thus creating the illusion that there was something peculiarly democratic about our intelligentsia, and that there was no profound gulf between the ideas of the liberals and of the socialists. Now that economic development has advanced so far that even those who formerly denied a basis for capitalism in Russia admit our having entered the capitalist path of development—illusions on this score are no longer possible. The composition of the "intelligentsia" is assuming just as clear an outline as that of society engaged in the production of material values: while the latter is ruled and governed by the capitalist, among the former the fashion is set by the rapidly growing

* There are two ways of arriving at the conclusion that the worker must be roused to fight absolutism: *either* by regarding the worker as the sole fighter for the socialist system, and therefore seeing political liberty as one of the conditions facilitating his struggle; that is the view of the Social-Democrats; *or* by appealing to him simply as the one who suffers most from the present system, who has nothing more to lose and who can display the greatest determination in fighting absolutism. But that would mean compelling the worker to drag in the wake of the bourgeois radicals, who refuse to see the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat behind the solidarity of the whole "people" against absolutism.

horde of careerists and bourgeois hirelings, an "intelligentsia" contented and satisfied, a stranger to all wild fantasy and very well aware of what they want. Far from denying this fact, our radicals and liberals strongly emphasise it and go out of their way to prove its immorality, to condemn it, strive to confound it, shame it ... and destroy it. These naïve efforts to make the bourgeois intelligentsia *ashamed* of being bourgeois are as ridiculous as the efforts of our petty-bourgeois economists to frighten our bourgeoisie (pleading the experience of "elder brothers") with the story that it is moving towards the ruin of the people, towards the poverty, unemployment and starvation of the masses; this trial of the bourgeoisie and its ideologists is reminiscent of the trial of the pike, which was sentenced to be thrown into the river. Beyond these bounds begin the liberal and radical "intelligentsia," who pour out innumerable phrases about progress, science, truth, the people, etc., and who love to lament the passing of the sixties, when there was no discord, depression, despondency and apathy, and when all hearts were aflame with democracy.

With their characteristic simplicity, these gentlemen refuse to understand that the cause of the unanimity that then prevailed was the then existing material conditions, gone never to return: serfdom pressed down everybody equally—the serf steward who had saved a little money and wanted to live in comfort; the enterprising muzhik, who hated the lord for exacting tribute, for interfering in and tearing him from his business; the proletarianised manor-serf and the impoverished muzhik who was sold into bondage to the merchant; it brought suffering to the merchant manufacturer and the worker, the handicraftsman and the subcontractor. The only tie that linked all these people together was their hostility to serfdom; beyond that unanimity, the sharpest economic antagonism began. How completely one must be lulled by sweet illusions not to perceive this antagonism even today when it has become so enormously developed; to weep for the return of the days of unanimity at a time when the situation demands struggle, demands that everyone who does not want to be a **WILLING** or **UNWILLING** myrmidon of the bourgeoisie shall take his stand on the side of the proletariat.

If you refuse to believe the flowery talk about the "interests

of the people" and try to delve deeper, you will find that you are dealing with the out-and-out ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, who dream of improving, supporting and restoring their ("people's" in their jargon) economy by various innocent progressive measures, and who are totally incapable of understanding that under prevailing production relations the only effect such progressive measures can have is to proletarianise the masses still further. We cannot but be grateful to the "friends of the people" for having done much to reveal the class character of our intelligentsia and for having thereby fortified the Marxist theory that our small producers are petty bourgeois. They must inevitably hasten the dissipation of the old illusions and myths that have so long confused the minds of Russian socialists. The "friends of the people" have so mauled, overworked and soiled these theories that Russian socialists who held them are confronted with the inexorable dilemma of either revising them, or abandoning them altogether and leaving them to the exclusive use of the gentlemen who announce with smug solemnity, urbi et orbi, that the rich peasants are buying improved implements, and who with serious mien assure us that we must welcome people who have grown weary of sitting at the card tables. And in this strain they talk about a "people's system" and the "intelligentsia"—talk, not only with a serious air, but in pretentious, stupendous phrases about broad ideals, about an ideal treatment of the problems of life!...

The socialist intelligentsia can expect to perform fruitful work only when they abandon their illusions and begin to seek support in the actual, and not the desired development of Russia, in actual, and not possible social-economic relations. Moreover, their **THEORETICAL** work must be directed towards *the concrete study of all forms of economic antagonism in Russia*, *the study of their connections and successive development*; *they must reveal this antagonism wherever it has been concealed by political history*, *by the peculiarities of legal systems or by established theoretical prejudice*. They must *present an integral picture of our realities as a definite system of production relations*, *show that the exploitation and expropriation of the working people are essential under this system*, *and show the way out of this system that is indicated by economic development*.

This theory, based on a detailed study of Russian history and realities, must furnish an answer to the demands of the proletariat—and if it satisfies the requirements of science, then every awakening of the protesting thought of the proletariat will inevitably guide this thought into the channels of Social-Democracy. The greater the progress made in elaborating this theory, the more rapidly will Social-Democracy grow; for even the most artful guardians of the present system cannot prevent the awakening of proletarian thought, because this system itself necessarily and inevitably entails the most intense expropriation of the producers, the continuous growth of the proletariat and of its reserve army—and this parallel to the progress of social wealth, the enormous growth of the productive forces, and the socialisation of labour by capitalism. However much has still to be done to elaborate this theory, the socialists will do it; this is guaranteed by the spread among them of materialism, the only scientific method, one requiring that every programme shall be a precise formulation of the actual process; it is guaranteed by the success of Social-Democracy, which has adopted these ideas—a success which has so stirred up our liberals and democrats that, as a certain Marxist has put it, their monthly magazines have ceased to be dull.

In thus emphasising the necessity, importance and immensity of the theoretical work of the Social-Democrats, I by no means want to say that this work should take precedence over **PRACTICAL** work,*—still less that the latter should be postponed until the former is completed. Only the admirers of the "subjective method in sociology," or the followers of utopian socialism, could arrive at such a conclusion. Of course, if it is presumed that the task of the socialists is to seek "different" (from actual) "paths of development" for the country, then, naturally, practical work becomes possible only when philosophical geniuses discover and indicate these "different paths"; and conversely, once these paths are discovered and indicated theoretical work ends, and the work of those who are to direct the "fatherland" along the "newly-discovered" "different paths"

* On the contrary, the practical work of propaganda and agitation must always take precedence, because, firstly, theoretical work only

begins. The position is altogether different when the task of the socialists is to be the ideological leaders of the proletariat in its actual struggle against actual and real enemies who stand in the *actual* path of social and economic development. Under these circumstances, theoretical and practical work merge into one aptly described by the veteran German Social-Democrat, Liebknecht, as:

Studieren, Propagandieren, Organisieren.*

You cannot be an ideological leader without the abovementioned theoretical work, just as you cannot be one without directing this work to meet the needs of the cause, and without spreading the results of this theory among the workers and helping them to organise.

Such a presentation of the task guards Social-Democracy against the defects from which socialist groups so often suffer, namely, dogmatism and sectarianism.

There can be no dogmatism where the supreme and sole criterion of a doctrine is its conformity to the actual process of social and economic development; there can be no sectarianism when the task is that of promoting the organisation of the proletariat, and when, therefore, the role of the "intelligentsia" is to make special leaders from among the intelligentsia unnecessary.

Hence, despite the existence of differences among Marxists on various theoretical questions, the methods of their political activity have remained unchanged ever since the group arose.

The political activity of the Social-Democrats lies in promoting the development and organisation of the working-class movement in Russia, in transforming this movement from its present state of sporadic attempts at protest, "riots" and strikes devoid of a guiding idea, into an organised struggle of the **WHOLE** Russian working **CLASS** directed against the bourgeois regime and working for the

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supplies answers to the problems raised by practical work, and, secondly, the Social-Democrats, for reasons over which they have no control, are so often compelled to confine themselves to theoretical work that they value highly every moment when practical work is possible.

* Study, propaganda, organisation.—*Ed.*

expropriation of the expropriators and the abolition of the social system based on the oppression of the working people. Underlying these activities is the common conviction of Marxists that the Russian worker is the sole and natural representative of Russia's entire working and exploited population.*

Natural because the exploitation of the working people in Russia *is everywhere capitalist in nature*, if we leave out of account the moribund remnants of serf economy; but the exploitation of the mass of producers is on a small scale, scattered and undeveloped, while the exploitation of the factory proletariat is on a large scale, socialised and concentrated. In the former case, exploitation is still enmeshed in medieval forms, various political, legal and conventional trappings, tricks and devices, which hinder the working people and their ideologists from seeing the essence of the system which oppresses the working people, from seeing where and how a way can be found out of this system. In the latter case, on the contrary, exploitation is fully developed and emerges in its pure form, without any confusing details. The worker cannot fail to see that he is oppressed by *capital*, that his struggle has to be waged against the bourgeois *class*. And this struggle, aimed at satisfying his immediate economic needs, at improving his material conditions, inevitably demands that the workers organise, and inevitably becomes a war not against individuals, but against a *class*, the class which oppresses and crushes the working people not only in the factories, but everywhere. That is why the factory worker is none other than the foremost representative of the entire exploited population. And in order that he may fulfil his function of representative in an organised, sustained struggle it is by no means necessary to enthuse him with "perspectives"; all that is needed is simply *to make him understand his position*, to make him understand the political and economic structure of the system that oppresses him, and the necessity and inevitability of class antagonisms under this system. This position of the factory worker

* Russia's man of the future is the muzhik—thought the representatives of peasant socialism, the Narodniks in the broadest sense of the term. Russia's man of the future is the worker—think the Social-Democrats. That is how the Marxist view was formulated in a certain manuscript.

in the general system of capitalist relations makes him the sole fighter for the emancipation of the working class, for only the higher stage of development of capitalism, large-scale machine industry, creates the material conditions and the social forces necessary for this struggle. Everywhere else, where the forms of capitalist development are low, these material conditions are absent; production is scattered among thousands af tiny enterprises (and they do not cease to be scattered *enterprises* even under the most equalitarian forms of communal land*ownership*), for the most part the exploited still possess tiny enterprises, and are thus tied to the very bourgeois system they should be fighting: this retards and hinders the development of the social force capable of overthrowing capitalism. Scattered, individual, petty exploitation ties the working people to one locality, divides them, prevents them from becoming conscious of class solidarity, prevents them from uniting once they have understood that oppression is not caused by some particular individual, but by the whole economic system. Large-scale capitalism, on the contrary, inevitably severs all the workers' ties with the old society, with a particular locality and a particular exploiter; it unites them, compels them to think and places them in conditions which enable them to commence an organised struggle. Accordingly, it is on the working class that the Social-Democrats concentrate all their attention and all their activities. When its advanced representatives have mastered the ideas of scientific socialism, the idea of the historical role of the Russian worker, when these ideas become widespread, and when stable organisations are formed among the workers to transform the workers' present sporadic economic war into conscious class struggle—then the Russian **WORKER**, rising at the head of all the democratic elements, will overthrow absolutism and lead the **RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT** (side by side with the proletariat of **ALL COUNTRIES**) *along the straight road of open political struggle to* **THE VICTORIOUS COMMUNIST REVOLUTION.**

The End

1894

ными хозяйствами при самыхъ уравнительныхъ формахъ общиннаго землевладѣнія), эксплуатируемый большею частью владѣетъ еще крошечнымъ хозяйствомъ и так. обр. привязывается къ той самой буржуазной системѣ, противъ к-рой долженъ вести борьбу: это задерживаетъ и затрудняетъ развитіе тѣхъ соціальныхъ силъ, к-рыя способны ниспровергнуть капитализмъ. Раздробленная, единичная, мелкая эксплуатація привязываетъ трудящихся къ мѣсту, разобщаетъ ихъ, не даетъ имъ возможности уразумѣть своей классовой солидарности, не даетъ возможности объединиться, понявъ, что причина угнетенія — не та или другая личность, - а вся хозяйственная система. Напротивъ, крупный капитализмъ неизбѣжно разрываетъ всякую связь рабочаго со старымъ обществомъ, съ опредѣленнымъ мѣстомъ и опредѣленнымъ эксплуататоромъ, объединяетъ его, заставляетъ мыслить и ставить въ условія, дающія возможность начать организованную борьбу. На классъ рабочихъ и обращаютъ соціалъ-демократы все свое вниманіе и всю свою дѣятельность. Когда передовые представители его усвоятъ идеи научнаго соціализма, идею объ исторической роли русскаго рабочаго, когда эти идеи получатъ широкое распространеніе и среди рабочихъ создадутся прочныя организаціи, преобразующія теперешнюю разрозненную экономическую войну рабочихъ въ сознательную классовую борьбу, - тогда русскій РАБОЧІЙ, поднявшись во главѣ всѣхъ демократическихъ элементовъ, свалитъ абсолютизмъ и поведетъ РУССКІЙ ПРОЛЕТАРІАТЪ (рядомъ съ Пролетаріатомъ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ) прямой дорогой открытой политической борьбы къ ПОБѢДОНОСНОЙ

КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦІИ.

Конецъ.

1894.

Last page of Part III, hectographed edition, of Lenin's *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, 1894
Reduced

Appendix I

The annexed table contains the data for the 24 budgets referred to in the text.

Composition and budgets of 24 typical peasant households in Ostrogozhsk Uyezd—Summary

Explanation of the table

1) The first 21 columns have been taken bodily from the Statistical Abstract. Column 22 combines the columns in the Abstract on: rye, wheat, oats and barley, millet and buckwheat, other grain crops, potatoes, vegetables, and hay (8 columns). How the income from grain crops (Column 23), excluding chaff and straw, was computed has been explained in the text. Column 24 combines the columns in the Abstract on: horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry, hides and wool, back fat and meat, dairy produce, butter (9 columns). Columns 25-29 have been taken bodily from the Abstract. Columns 30-34 combine the columns in the Abstract on: expenditure on rye, wheat, millet and buckwheat, potatoes, vegetables, salt, butter, fat and meat, fish, dairy produce, vodka and tea (12 columns). Column 35 combines the columns in the Abstract giving expenditure on: soap, kerosene candles, clothing, and utensils (4 columns). The remaining columns require no explanation.

2) Column 8 was arrived at by adding together the area, in dessiatines, of rented land and the amount of arable in the allotment (for which there is a special column in the Abstract).

3) The bottom rows of figures in the columns "Sources of Income" and "Distribution of expenditure" indicate the *money part of income and expenditure*. In Columns 25 to 28 and 37 to 42 the income (or expenditure) is wholly monetary. The money part was calculated (the author does not show it separately) by deducting from gross income the amount consumed by the household itself.

CATEGORIES OF HOUSEHOLDERS AND THEIR NUMBER		Number of persons, both sexes	Number of working persons, males	Farm labourers	
				Households with farm labourers	Number (both sexes)
		1	2	3	4
6 prosperous householders	Total	47	11	6	8
	Average per householder	7.83	1.8	—	—
11 middle householders	Total	92	26	2	2
	Average per householder	8.36	2.4	—	—
7 poor householders	Total	37	10	2	2
	Average per householder	5.28	1.4	—	—
Total 24 householders	Total	176	47	10	12
	Average per householder	7.33	1.9	—	—
2 farm labourers (included among poor householders)	Total	9	2	—	—
	Average per householder	4.5	1	—	—

Allotted land (dess.)	Leased land		Total tillage	Number of buildings	Number of industrial establishments	Number of agricultural implements	Animals (head of)	
	Households	dess.					Draught animals	Total, in terms of cattle
5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
132.6	6	52.8	123.4	52	4	224	35	81
22.1	—	8.8	20.6	8.6	—	37.3	5.8	13.5
101.2	10	85.5	140.2	7.0	—	338	40	89.1
9.2	—	7.7	12.7	6.4	—	30.7	3.6	8.1
57.8	4	19.8	49.8	31	—	108	7	15.3
8.5	—	2.8	7.1	4.4	—	15.4	1	2.2
291.6	20	158.1	313.4	153	4	670	82	185.4
12.1	—	6.6	13	6.4	—	27.9	3.4	7.7
14.4	—	—	6.8	6	—	11	—	1.1
7.2	—	—	3.4	3	—	5.5	—	0.5

CATEGORIES OF HOUSEHOLDERS AND THEIR NUMBER		Value in rubles						
		Buildings	Other immovable property	Implements	Utensils	Clothing	Livestock and bees	Total
		14	15	16	17	18	19	20
6 prosperous householders	Total .	2,696	2,237	670.8	453	1,294.2	3,076.5	10,427.5
	Av. per h.holder	449.33	372.83	111.80	75.5	215.7	512.75	1,737.91
11 middle householders	Total .	2,362	318	532.9	435.9	2,094.2	2,907.7	8,650.7
	Av. per h.holder	214.73	28.91	48.44	39.63	190.38	264.33	786.42
7 poor householders	Total .	835	90	112.3	254	647.1	605.3	2,543.7
	Av. per h.holder	119.28	12.85	16.04	36.29	92.45	86.47	363.38
Total 24 householders	Total .	5,893	2,645	1,316	1,142.9	4,035.5	6,589.5	21,621.9
	Av. per h.holder	245.55	110.21	54.83	47.62	168.14	274.56	900.91
2 farm labourers (incl. among poor householders)	Total .	155	25	6.4	76.8	129.3	9.1	401.6
	Av. per h.holder	77.5	12.5	3.2	38.4	64.65	4.55	200.8

Arrears in loans (rubles)	Sources of income							
	From agriculture		From stock farming	From bee-keeping and gardening	From industries	From establishmentss	From various sources	Total (rubles)
	Total	Of which grain crops						
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
80	61.2% 3,861.7 1,774.4	2,598.2 1,774.4	15.4% 972.6 396.5	4.3% 271	6.5% 412	5% 320	7.6% 482.2	100% 6,319.5 3,656.1
13.3	643.6	—	162.1	45.2	68.6	53.3	80.4	1,053.2 609.3
357	60.7% 3,163.8 899.9	2,203.8 899.9	16.1% 837.5 423.2	0.7% 36.1	18.8% 979.3	—	3.7% 195.5	100% 5,212.2 2,534
32.4	287.7	—	76.1	3.2	89	—	17.8	473.8 230
233.6	48.7% 689.9 175.25	502.08 175.24	22.9% 324.2 216.6	1.9% 27	23.8% 336.8	—	2.7% 39	100% 1,416.9 794.64
33.4	98.5	—	46.3	3.9	48.1	—	5.5	202.4 113.5
670.6	59.6% 7,715.4 2,849.54	5,304.8 2.849.54	16.5% 2,134.3 1,036.3	2.6% 334.1	13.3% 1,728.1	2.5% 320	5.5% 716.7	100% 12,948.6 6,984.74
27.9	321.5	—	88.9	13.9	72	13.3	29.9	589.5 291.03
50	59.5 3	—	5.7 4.8	—	128.8	—	4	198 140.6
25	29.75	—	2.85	—	64.4	—	2	99 70.3

CATEGORIES OF HOUSEHOLDERS AND THEIR NUMBER		Distribution					
		Food					Clothes and domestic needs
		Total	Vegetable	Other	Of which: Milk, meat, etc.	Of which: Salt, vodka, tea	
		30	31	32	33	34	35
6 prosperous householders	Total ..	29.2% 1,500.6 218.7	823.8	676.8	561.3 103.2	115.5	8.2% 423.8 58.6
	Av. per h.holder	250.1	—	—	—	—	70.63
11 middle householders	Total ..	37.6% 1,951.9 257.7	1,337.3 33.4	614.6	534.3 144	80.3	10.6% 548.1 49.5
	Av. per h.holder	177.45	—	—	—	—	49.83
7 poor householders	Total ..	42.1% 660.8 253.46	487.7 160.96	173.1	134.4 53.8	38.7	14.6% 229.6 26.8
	Av. per h.holder	94.4	—	—	—	—	32.8
Total 24 householders	Total ..	34.6% 4,113.3 729.86	2,648.8	1,464.5	1,230	234.5	10.1% 1,201.5 134.9
	Av. per h.holder	171.39	110.37	61.02	51.25	9.77	50.06
2 farm labourers (included among poor h. holders)	Total ..	81.7 50.7	72.1 42.5	9.6	6.1 4.7	3.5	14.91 4.6
	Av. per h.holder	40.85	—	—	—	—	7.45

of expenditures								Surplus (+) or deficit (−)
Mainte-nance of livestock	Implements and livestock	On labourers and shep-herds	Rent	Taxes and Duties	Payments to priests	Miscellan-eous	Total (rubles)	
36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	
24.9% 1,276.6	9.4% 484.5	13.5% 691.7	6.5% 332	4.9% 253.5	1.1% 56	2.3% 116.5	100% 5,135.2 2,211.5	+1,184.3
212.76	80.75	115.29	55.33	42.25	9.33	19.42	855.86 368.6	+ 197.34
21.2% 1,098.2	5% 256	0.9% 47.6	6.8% 351.7	4.9% 254.9	1.3% 69.9	11.7% 609.4	100% 5,187.7 1,896.7	+ 24.5
99.84	23.27	4.33	31.97	23.17	6.35	55.4	471.6 172.5	+ 2.19
15.6% 243.7	7.1% 110.6	1.6% 24.3	6% 94.5	6.5% 101.8	1.8% 28	4.7% 73.2	100% 1,566.5 712.66	− 149.6
34.81	15.8	3.47	13.5	14.54	4	10.46	223.78 101.8	− 21.38
22.2% 2,618.5	7.1% 851.3	6.4% 763.6	6.5% 778.2	5.1% 610.2	1.3% 153.9	4.7% 799.1	100% 11,889.4 4,820.86	+1.059.2
109.1	35.46	31.82	32.43	25.43	6.41	33.29	495.39 200.87	+ 44.11
8	53.2	0.4	—	22.6	2.8	3.3	186.9 137.6	+ 11.1
4	26.6	0.2	—	11.3	1.4	1.65	93.45 68.8	+ 5.55

Appendix II

Mr. Struve quite rightly makes the corner-stone of his criticism of Nik.—on the thesis that "Marx's doctrine of the class struggle and the state is completely foreign to the Russian political economist." I do not possess the boldness of Mr. Krivenko to make this one (four-column) article by Mr. Struve the basis for a judgement of his system of views (I am not acquainted with his other articles) and I must say that I do not agree with all the statements he makes; and can, therefore, support only certain fundamental propositions he advances and not his article as a whole. But the circumstance mentioned has, at any rate, been quite correctly assessed: Mr. Nik.—on's *basic error* is, indeed, his failure to understand the class struggle inherent in capitalist society. The correction of this one error would be sufficient to ensure that Social-Democratic conclusions would be drawn from even his theoretical propositions and investigations. To overlook the class struggle is indeed to reveal a gross misunderstanding of Marxism, a misunderstanding for which Mr. Nik.—on must be all the more blamed since he is so very anxious to pass himself off as a strict adherent of Marx's principles. Can anyone with the least knowledge of Marx deny that the doctrine of the class struggle is the pivot of his whole system of views?

Mr. Nik.—on could, of course, have accepted Marx's theory with the exception of this point, on the grounds, let us say, that it does not conform to the facts of Russian history and reality. But then, in the first place, he could not have said that Marx's theory explains our system; he could not even have spoken of this theory and of capitalism, because it would have been necessary to remould the theory and to work out a conception of a different capital-

ism, in which antagonistic relations and the class struggle were not inherent. At any rate he should have made an explicit reservation and explained why, having accepted the *A* of Marxism he refuses to accept *B*. Mr. Nik.—on made no attempt to do anything of the kind.

And Mr. Struve quite rightly concluded that failure to understand the class struggle makes Mr. Nik.—on a *utopian*, for anybody who ignores the class struggle in capitalist society eo ipso ignores all the real content of the social and political life of this society and, in seeking to fulfil his desideratum, is inevitably doomed to hover in the sphere of pious wishes. This failure to understand the class struggle makes him a *reactionary*, for appeals to "society" and to the "state," that is, to bourgeois ideologists and politicians, can only confuse the socialists, and cause them to accept the worst enemies of the proletariat as their allies, can only hamper the workers' struggle for emancipation instead of helping to strengthen, clarify and improve the organisation of that struggle.

Since we have mentioned Mr. Struve's article, we cannot but deal with Mr. Nik.—on's reply in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 6.*

"It appears," argues Mr. Nik.—on, citing data about the slow increase in the number of factory workers, an increase lagging behind the growth of the population, "that in our country capitalism, far from fulfilling its 'historic mission,' is itself setting limits to its own development. That, incidentally, is why those who seek 'for their fatherland a path of development distinct from that which Western Europe followed and still follows' are a thousand times right." (And this is written by a man who

* Generally speaking, by his articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, Mr. Nik.—on is apparently trying hard to prove that he is by no means as remote from petty-bourgeois radicalism as one might think; that he too is capable of discerning in the growth of a peasant bourgeoisie (No. 6, p. 118—the spread among the "peasants" of improved implements, phosphates, etc.) symptoms indicating that "the *peasantry* itself" (the peasantry that is being expropriated wholesale?) "realises the necessity of finding a way out of the position it is in."

admits that Russia is following this very capitalist path!) This "historic mission" is not being fulfilled, according to Mr. Nik.—on, because "the economic trend hostile to the village community (i.e., capitalism) is destroying the very foundations of its existence without providing that modicum of unifying significance so characteristic of Western Europe and which is beginning to manifest itself with particular force in North America."

In other words, what we have here is the standard argument against the Social-Democrats invented by the celebrated Mr. V. V., who regarded capitalism from the standpoint of a government official settling the state problem of the "introduction of capitalism into the life of the people"—if it is fulfilling its "mission," let it in; if not, "keep it out!" Apart from all the other virtues of this clever argument, the very "mission" of capitalism was understood by Mr. V. V., and is apparently understood by Mr. Nik.—on in an impossibly and preposterously false and narrow fashion. And again, of course, these gentlemen unceremoniously ascribe the narrowness of their own understanding to the Social-Democrats, who can be maligned like the dead since the legal press is closed to them!

As Marx saw it, the progressive and revolutionary work of capitalism consists in the fact that, in socialising labour, it at the same time "disciplines, unites and organises the working class" by the mechanism of that very process, it trains them for the struggle, organises their "revolt," unites them to "expropriate the expropriators," seize political power and wrest the means of production from the "few usurpers" and turn them over to society (*Capital*, p. 650).[96]

That is how Marx formulates it.

Nothing, of course, is said here about the "number of factory workers": Marx speaks of the concentration of the means of production and of the socialisation of labour. It is quite clear that these criteria have nothing in common with the "number of factory workers."

But our exceptionalist interpreters of Marx misinterpret this to mean that the socialisation of labour under capitalism amounts to factory workers labouring under one roof, and that the progressiveness of the work of capitalism is therefore to be measured by ... the number of factory

workers!!! If the number of factory workers is increasing, capitalism is doing its progressive work well; if the number is decreasing, it is "fulfilling its historic mission badly" (p. 103 of Mr. Nik.—on's article), and it behoves the "intelligentsia" "to seek different paths for their fatherland."

And so the Russian intelligentsia set out to seek "different paths." It has been seeking and finding them for decades, trying with might and main to prove* that capitalism is a "false" line of development, for it leads to unemployment and crises. We faced a crisis, they say, in 1880, and again in 1893; it is time to leave this path, for obviously things are going badly with us.

The Russian bourgeoisie, however, like the cat in the fable, "listens but goes on eating":[97] of course things are going "badly" when fabulous profits can no longer be made. So it echoes the song of the liberals and radicals and, thanks to available and cheaper capital, energetically sets about building new railways. Things are going badly with "us" because in the old places "we" have already picked the people clean and now have to enter the field of industrial capital, which cannot enrich us as much as merchant capital. And so "we" will go to the eastern and northern border regions of European Russia, where "primitive accumulation," which yields a profit of hundreds per cent, is still possible, where the bourgeois differentiation of the peasantry is still far from complete. The intelligentsia perceive all this and ceaselessly threaten that "we" are again heading for a crash. And a new crash is really upon us. Very many small capitalists are being crushed by the big capitalists, very many peasants are being squeezed out of agriculture, which is increasingly passing into the hands of the bourgeoisie; the sea of poverty, unemployment

* These proofs are wasted, not because they are wrong—the ruin, impoverishment and starvation of the people are unquestionable and inevitable concomitants of capitalism—but because they are addressed to thin air. "Society," even under the cloak of democracy, furthers the interests of the plutocracy, and, of course, the plutocracy will hardly take up the cudgels against capitalism. The "government" ... I will cite the comment of an opponent, Mr. N. K. Mikhailovsky: however little we know the programmes of our government, he once wrote, we know them enough to be certain that the "socialisation of labour" has no part in them.

and starvation is increasing immensely—and the "intelligentsia," with a clear conscience, point to their prophecies and ceaselessly complain about a wrong path, citing the absence of foreign markets as proof of the instability of our capitalism.

The Russian bourgeoisie, however, "listens but goes on eating." While the "intelligentsia" seek new paths, the bourgeoisie undertake gigantic projects for the construction of railways to their colonies, where they create a market for themselves, introducing the charms of the bourgeois system to the young countries and there, too, creating an industrial and agricultural bourgeoisie with exceptional rapidity, and casting the mass of the producers into the ranks of the chronically starving unemployed.

Will the socialists really continue to confine themselves to complaining about wrong paths, and try to prove ... by the slow increase in the number of factory workers that capitalism is unstable!!?

Before discussing this childish idea,* I cannot but mention that Mr. Nik.—on very inaccurately quoted the passage from Mr. Struve's article that he criticised. This article says literally the following:

"When the author (i.e., Mr. Nik.—on) points to the difference in the occupational composition of the Russian and American populations—for Russia 80% of the total gainfully-employed population (erwerbsthätigen) are taken as engaged in agriculture, and in the United States only 44%—he does not observe that the capitalist development of Russia will work to obliterate this difference between 80% and 44%; that, one might say, is its historic mission."

It may be held that the *word* "mission" is very inappropriate here, but Mr. Struve's idea is clear: Mr. Nik.—on did not notice that the capitalist development of Russia

* How can this idea be called anything but childish, when the progressive work of capitalism is not judged by the degree of socialisation of labour, but by such a fluctuating index of the development of only one branch of national labour! Everybody knows that the number of workers cannot be anything but extremely inconstant under the capitalist mode of production, and that it depends upon a host of secondary factors such as crises, the size of the reserve army, the degree of the exploitation of labour, the degree of its intensity, and so on and so forth.

(he himself admits that this development is really a capitalist one) will reduce the rural population, whereas in fact it is a general law of capitalism. Consequently, to refute this objection, Mr. Nik.—on should have shown *either* 1) that he had not overlooked this tendency of capitalism, *or* 2) that capitalism has no such tendency.

Instead, Mr. Nik.—on sets about analysing the data on the number of our factory workers (1% of the population, according to his estimate). But was Mr. Struve speaking of factory workers? Does the 20% of the population in Russia and the 56% in America represent factory workers? Are the terms "factory workers" and "population not engaged in agriculture" identical? Can it be denied that the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture is diminishing in Russia too?

Having made this correction, which I consider all the more necessary because Mr. Krivenko has already garbled this passage in this very magazine, let us pass to Mr. Nik.—on's idea itself—"our capitalism is fulfilling its mission badly."

Firstly, it is absurd to identify the number of factory workers with the number of workers engaged in capitalist production, as is done by the author of the *Sketches*.* This is repeating (*and even aggravating*) the error of the Russian petty-bourgeois economists who make large-scale machine industry the very beginning of capitalism. Are not the millions of Russian handicraftsmen who work for merchants, with the latter's material and for ordinary wages, engaged in capitalist production? Do the regular farm labourers and day labourers in agriculture not receive wages from their employers, and do they not surrender surplus-value to them? Are not the workers in the building industry (which has rapidly developed in our country since the Reform) subjected to capitalist exploitation? And so on.**

Secondly, it is absurd to compare the number of factory workers (1,400,000) with the total population and to

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* N. F. Danielson, *Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*, St. Petersburg, 1893.—*Ed.*

** I confine myself here to criticising Mr. Nik.—on's *method* of judging "the unifying significance of capitalism" by the number of factory workers. I cannot undertake an analysis of the figures because I have not got Mr. Nik.—on's sources handy. One cannot.

express the ratio as a percentage. That is simply comparing incommensurables: the able-bodied population with the non-able-bodied, those engaged in the production of material values with the "liberal professions," and so on. Do not the factory workers each maintain a certain number of non-working members of the family? Do not the factory workers maintain—apart from their employers and a whole flock of traders—a host of soldiers, civil servants and similar gentry, whom you assign to the agricultural population, contrasting this hotchpotch to the factory population? And then, are there not in Russia such industries as fishing and so forth, which it is again absurd to con-

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however, refrain from noting that he has hardly selected these sources happily. He first takes data for 1865 from the *Military Statistical Abstract* and those for 1890 from the *Directory of Factories and Works* of 1894. The number of workers he gets (exclusive of mine-workers) is 829,573 and 875,764, respectively. The increase of 5.5% is much less than the increase in population (from 61,420,000 to 91,000,000, or 48.1%). But on the *next page* different figures are taken both for 1865 and 1890 from the *Directory* of 1893. According to these data, the number of workers is 392,718 and 716,792, respectively—an increase of 82%. But this does not include industries paying excise duties, in which the number of workers (p. 104) was 186,053 in 1865 and 144,332 in 1890. Adding these figures to the preceding ones we get the following total numbers of workers (except mine-workers): 578,771 in 1865 and 861 124 in 1890. An increase of 48.7% with a population increase of 48.1% . Thus in the space of five pages the author uses some data that show an increase of 5% and others showing an increase of 48%! And on the basis of such contradictory figures he finds that our capitalism is unstable!!

And then why did not the author take the data on the number of workers quoted in the *Sketches* (Tables XI and XII), and from which we see that it increased by 12-13% in *three years* (1886-1889) an increase that far outstrips the growth of population? The author may perhaps say that the time interval was too short. But then, in the first place, these data are homogeneous, comparable and more reliable, and in the second place did not the author himself use these same data, despite the short time interval, to form a judgement of the growth of factory industry?

Obviously, if such a fluctuating index as the number of workers is used to indicate the state of only one branch of national labour those data cannot be anything but shaky. And one must be a naïve dreamer indeed to base one's hopes on such data—hopes that our capitalism will collapse, crumble to dust spontaneously, without a desperate and stubborn struggle—and to use these data to question the indisputable domination and development of capitalism in all branches of national labour!

trast with factory industry and to combine with agriculture? If you wanted to get an idea of the occupational composition of the population of Russia, you should, firstly, have singled out into a special group the population engaged in the production of material values (excluding, consequently, the non-working population, on the one hand, and soldiers, civil servants, priests, etc., on the other); and, secondly, you should have tried to divide them among the various branches of national labour. If the data for this were not available, you should have refrained from undertaking such calculations,* instead of talking nonsense about

*Mr. Nik.—on attempted such a calculation in the Sketches, but very unsuccessfully. On p. 302, we read:

"An attempt was recently made to determine the total number of free workers in the 50 gubernias of European Russia (S. A. Korolenko, *Hired Labour*, St. Petersburg 1892). An investigation made by the Department of Agriculture estimates the able-bodied rural population in the 50 gubernias of European Russia at 35,712,000, whereas the total number of workers required in agriculture and in the manufacturing, mining, transport and other industries is estimated at only 30,124,000. Thus the number of absolutely superfluous workers reaches the huge figure of 5,588,000, which, together with their families, according to the accepted standard, would amount to no less than 15,000,000 persons." (Repeated on p. 341.)

If we turn to this "investigation," we shall find that only the hired labour employed by the landlords was "investigated"; Mr. S. Korolenko supplemented the investigation with an "agricultural and industrial survey" of European Russia. This survey makes an attempt (not on the basis of some "investigation," but on the basis of old available data) to class the working population of European Russia by occupation, the results arrived at by Mr. S. A. Korolenko are as follows: the total number of workers in the 50 gubernias of European Russia is 35,712,000, engaged in:

agriculture		27,435,400	30,124 thous.
cultivation of special crops		1,466,400	
factory and mining industry		1,222,700	
Jews		1,400,400	
lumbering	about	2,000,000	
stock-breeding	"	1,000,000	
railways	"	200,000	
fishing	"	200,000	
local and outside employment, hunting, trapping, and miscellaneous others		787,200	
Total		35,712,100	

Thus Mr. Korolenko (rightly or wrongly) classed *all* the workers by occupation, but Mr. Nik.—on arbitrarily takes the first three head-

1% (??!!) of the population being engaged in factory industry.

Thirdly—and this is the chief and most outrageous distortion of Marx's theory of the progressive and revolutionary work of capitalism—where did you get the idea that the "unifying significance" of capitalism is expressed in uniting only the factory workers? Can it be that you borrow your idea of Marxism from the articles in *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* on the socialisation of labour? Can it be that you, too, identify it with work under one roof?

But no. It would appear that Nik.—on cannot be accused of this, because he accurately describes the socialisation of labour by capitalism on the second page of his article in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 6, correctly indicating both features of this socialisation: 1) work for the whole of society, and 2) the uniting of individual labourers so as to obtain the product of common labour. But if that is so, why judge the "mission" of capitalism by the number of factory workers, when this "mission" is fulfilled by the development of capitalism and the socialisation of labour in general, by the creation of a proletariat in general, in relation to which the factory workers play the role only of front-rankers, the vanguard. There is, of course, no doubt that the revolutionary movement of the proletariat depends on the number of these workers, on their concentration, on the degree of their development, etc.; but all this does not give us the slightest right *to equate the "unifying significance" of capitalism with the number of factory workers*. To do so would be to narrow down Marx's idea impossibly.

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ings and talks about 5,588,000 "absolutely superfluous" (??) workers!

Apart from this defect one cannot refrain from noting that Mr. Korolenko's estimates are extremely rough and inaccurate: the number of agricultural workers is computed in accordance with one general standard for the whole of Russia; the non-producing population has not been classed separately (under this heading Mr. Korolenko, in deference to official anti-Semitism, classed ... *the Jews*! There must be more than 1,400,000 non-producing workers: traders, paupers, vagabonds, criminals, etc.); the number of handicraftsmen (the last heading—outside and local employment) is preposterously low, etc. It would be better not to quote such estimates at all.

I will give you an example. In his pamphlet *Zur Wohnungsfrage*,* Frederick Engels speaks of German industry and points out that in no other country—he is referring only to Western Europe—do there exist so many wage-workers who own a garden or a plot of land. "*Rural domestic industry carried on in conjunction with kitchen-gardening or ... agriculture*," he says, "*forms the broad basis of Germany's new large-scale industry*." This domestic industry grows increasingly with the growing distress of the German small peasant (as is the case in Russia, let us add), but the **COMBINATION** of industry with agriculture is the basis not of the **WELL-BEING** of the domestic producer, the handicraftsman, but on the contrary, of his greater **OPPRESSION**. Being tied to his locality, he is compelled to accept any price, and therefore surrenders to the capitalist not only surplus-value but a large part of his wages as well (as is the case in Russia, with her vast development of the domestic system of large-scale production). "*That is one side of the matter*," Engels continues, "*but it also has its reverse side.... With the expansion of domestic industry, one peasant area after another is being dragged into the present-day industrial movement. It is this revolutionising of the rural areas by domestic industry which spreads the industrial revolution in Germany over a far wider territory than was the case in England and France.... This explains why in Germany, in contrast to England and France, the revolutionary working-class movement has spread so tremendously over the greater part of the country instead of being confined exclusively to the urban centres. And this in turn explains the tranquil, certain and irresistible progress of the movement. It is perfectly clear that in Germany a victorious rising in the capital and in the other big cities will be possible only when the majority of the smaller towns and a great part of the rural districts have become ripe for the revolutionary change.*"[98]

So you see, it appears that not only the "unifying significance of capitalism," but also the success of the working-class movement depends not only on the number of factory workers, but also on the number of ... *handicraftsmen*! Yet our exceptionalists, ignoring the purely capitalist organisa-

* *The Housing Question.—Ed.*

tion of the vast majority of the Russian handicraft industries, contrast them, as a sort of "people's" industry, to capitalism and judge "the percentage of the population at the direct disposal of capitalism" by the number of factory workers! This is reminiscent of the following argument by Mr. Krivenko: the Marxists want all attention to be directed to the factory workers; but as there are only one million of them out of 100 million people, they constitute only a small corner of life, and to devote oneself to it is just like confining oneself to work in estate or charitable institutions (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 12). Mills and factories are just as small a corner of life as estate and charitable institutions!! What a genius you are, Mr. Krivenko! No doubt it is the estate institutions that produce goods for the whole of society? No doubt it is the state of affairs in the estate institutions that explains the exploitation and expropriation of the working people? No doubt it is in the estate institutions that one must look for the advanced representatives of the proletariat who are capable of raising the banner of working-class emancipation.

It is not surprising to hear such things from the lips of the minor bourgeois philosophers; but it is a pity to have to read that sort of thing in the writings of Mr. Nik.—on.

On p. 393 of *Capital*,[99] Marx quotes figures of the composition of the English population. In 1861 there was a total of 20 million people in England and Wales. Of these, 1,605,440 persons were employed in the main branches of factory industry.* Furthermore, there were 1,208,648 members of the servant class, and in a footnote to the second edition Marx refers to the very rapid growth of this class. Now just imagine that there were "Marxists" in England who divided 1,600,000 by 20,000,000 to judge the "unifying significance of capitalism"!! The result would

* There were 642,607 persons employed in the textile, hosiery and lace industries (in our country tens of thousands of women engaged in stocking- and lace-making are incredibly exploited by the "tradeswomen" for whom they work. Wages are sometimes as low as *three* [sic!] kopeks a day! Do you mean to say, Mr. Nik.—on, that they are not "at the direct disposal of capitalism"?), and in addition 565,835 persons were employed in coal and ore mines, and 396,998 persons in all metal works and manufactures.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

be 8%—*less than one-twelfth*!!! How can one speak of the "mission" of capitalism when it has not united even one-twelfth of the population, and when, moreover, there is a more rapid increase in the "domestic slave" class—representing a dead loss of "national labour," which shows that "we," the English, are following the "wrong path"! Is it not clear that "we" must "seek different," non-capitalist "paths of development for our fatherland"?!

There is yet another point in Mr. Nik.—on's argument: when he says that capitalism here does not yield the unifying significance which is "so characteristic of Western Europe and *is beginning to manifest itself with particular force in North America*," he is apparently referring to the working-class movement. And so, we must seek different paths because capitalism here does not give rise to a working-class movement. This argument, it seems to me, was anticipated by Mr. Mikhailovsky. Marx operated with a ready-made proletariat—he admonished the Marxists. And when a Marxist told Mikhailovsky that all he saw in poverty was poverty, his reply was: this remark, as usual, was taken bodily from Marx. But if we turn to this passage in *The Poverty of Philosophy* we shall find that it is not applicable in our case and that our poverty is just poverty. As a matter of fact, however, you will still find nothing to bear you out in *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Marx there says of the communists of the old school that they saw in poverty nothing but poverty without seeing its revolutionary, destructive side, which would overthrow the old society.[100] Evidently, Mr. Mikhailovsky takes the absence of any "manifestation" of a working-class movement as grounds for asserting that it is not applicable in our case. In reference to this argument, let us remark, firstly, that only a most superficial acquaintance with the facts can give rise to the idea that Marx operated with a ready-made proletariat. Marx's communist programme was drawn up before 1848. What working-class movement* was there in Germany then? There

* The smallness of the working class at that time may be judged from the fact that *27 years later*, in 1875, Marx wrote that "the majority of the toiling people in Germany consists of peasants, and not of proletarians.[101] That is what, "operating (??) with a ready-made proletariat" comes down to!

was not even political liberty at that time, and the activities of the communists were confined to secret circles (as in our country today). The Social-Democratic labour movement, which made the revolutionary and unifying role of capitalism quite clear to everybody, began two decades later, when the doctrine of scientific socialism had definitely taken shape, when large-scale industry had become more widespread, and there emerged numerous talented and energetic disseminators of this doctrine among the working class. In addition to presenting historical facts in a false light and forgetting the vast amount of work done by the socialists in lending consciousness and organisation to the working-class movement, our philosophers foist upon Marx the most senseless fatalistic views. In his opinion, they assure us, the organisation and socialisation of the workers occur spontaneously, and, consequently, if we see capitalism but do not see a working-class movement, that is because capitalism is not fulfilling its mission, and not because we are still doing too little in the matter of organisation and propaganda among the workers. This cowardly petty-bourgeois artifice of our exceptionalist philosophers is not worth refuting: it is refuted by all the activities of the Social-Democrats in all countries; it is refuted by every public speech made by any Marxist. Social-Democracy—as Kautsky very justly remarks—is a fusion of the working-class movement and socialism. And in order that the progressive work of capitalism may "manifest" itself in this country too, our socialists must set to work with the utmost energy; they must work out in greater detail the Marxist conception of the history and present position of Russia, and make a more concrete investigation of all forms of the class struggle and exploitation, which are particularly complex and masked in Russia. They must, furthermore, popularise this theory and make it known to the worker; they must help the worker to assimilate it and devise *the form of organisation* most **SUITABLE** *under our conditions for disseminating Social-Democratic ideas and welding the workers into a political force*. And the Russian Social-Democrats, far from ever having said that they have already completed, fulfilled this work of the ideologists of the working class (there is no end to this work), have always stressed the fact

that they are only just beginning it, and that much effort by many, many persons will be required to create anything at all lasting.

Besides its unsatisfactory and preposterously narrow conception of the Marxist theory, this common objection that progressive work is lacking in our capitalism seems to be based on the absurd idea of a mythical "people's system."

When the "peasants" in the notorious "village community" are splitting up into paupers and rich, into representatives of the proletariat and of capital (especially merchant capital), they refuse to see that this is embryonic, medieval capitalism, and, evading the political-economic structure of the countryside, they chatter, in their search for "different paths for the fatherland," about changes in the form of peasant land*ownership*, with which they unpardonably confuse the form of economic organisation, as though a purely bourgeois differentiation of the peasantry were not in full swing within the "equalitarian village community" itself. And at a time when this capitalism is developing and outgrowing the narrow forms of medieval, village capitalism, shattering the feudal power of the land and compelling the peasant, long stripped clean and starving, to abandon the land to the community for equalitarian division among the triumphant kulaks, to leave home, to tramp the whole of Russia, unemployed for many a long day, and to hire himself now to a landlord, tomorrow to a railway contractor, then as an urban labourer or as farm labourer to a rich peasant, and so on; when this "peasant," who changes masters all-over Russia, sees that wherever he goes he is most shamefully plundered; when he sees that other paupers like himself are plundered; that it is not necessarily the "lord" who robs him, but also "his brother muzhik," if the latter has the money to buy labour-power; when he sees how the government always serves his masters, restricting the rights of the workers and suppressing as riots every attempt to protect their most elementary rights; when he sees the Russian worker's labour becoming more and more arduous, and wealth and luxury growing more and more rapidly, while the worker's conditions are becoming steadily worse, expropriation more intense and unemployment a regular thing—at a time like this our critics of Marxism are seeking different

paths for the fatherland; at a time like this they are occupied in pondering over the profound question of whether we can admit that the work of capitalism is progressive seeing how slow is the growth in the number of factory workers, and whether we should not reject our capitalism and consider it a false path because "it is fulfilling its historic mission badly, very, very badly."

A lofty and broadly humane occupation, is it not?

And what narrow doctrinaires these wicked Marxists are when they say that to seek different paths for the fatherland when capitalist exploitation of the working people exists all over Russia means to flee from realities to the sphere of utopia; when they find that it is not our capitalism but rather the Russian socialists who are fulfilling their mission badly, those socialists who refuse to understand that to dream about the age-old economic struggle of the antagonistic classes of Russian society dying down is tantamount to sinking to Manilovism,[102] and who refuse to realise that we must strive to impart organisation and understanding to this struggle, and to this end set about Social-Democratic work.

In conclusion, we cannot but note another attack by Mr. Nik.—on on Mr. Struve in this same issue, No. 6, of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*.

"We cannot help drawing attention," Mr. Nik.—on says, "to a certain peculiarity in Mr. Struve's methods of controversy. He was writing for the German public, in a serious German magazine; but the methods he employed seem entirely inappropriate. We may take it that not only the German but even the Russian public has grown to 'man's estate,' and will not be impressed by all the 'bugbears' in which his article abounds. 'Utopia,' 'reactionary programme' and similar expressions are to be met with in every column. But today, alas, these 'terrible words' simply do not produce the effect on which Mr. Struve apparently counts" p. 128).

Let us try to examine whether "inappropriate methods" have been employed in this controversy between Messrs, Nik.—on and Struve, and, if they have, by whom.

Mr. Struve is accused of employing "inappropriate methods" on the grounds that in a serious article he tries to impress the public with "bugbears" and "terrible words."

To employ "bugbears" and "terrible words" means describing an opponent in terms of severe disapproval that at the same time are not clearly and precisely motivated and do not follow inevitably from the writer's standpoint (one that has been definitely stated), but simply express a desire to abuse, to dress down.

Obviously, it is only this last feature which turns epithets of severe disapproval into "bugbears." Mr. Slonimsky spoke severly of Mr. Nik.—on, but as he clearly and definitely formulated his point of view, that of an ordinary liberal who is absolutely incapable of understanding the bourgeois character of the present order, and quite explicitly formulated his phenomenal arguments; he may be accused of anything you like, but not of "inappropriate methods." Mr. Nik.—on, on his part, spoke severely of Mr. Slonimsky, quoting, incidentally, for his edification and instruction, Marx's words—which have been "justified in our country too" (as Mr. Nik.—on admits)—about the *reactionary* and *utopian* character of the defence of the small handicraft industry and small peasant landownership which Mr. Slonimsky wants, and accusing him of "narrow-mindedness," "*naïveté*," and the like. Look, Mr. Nik.—on's article "abounds" in the same epithets (underscored) as Mr. Struve's; but we cannot speak of "inappropriate methods" in this case, because it is all motivated, it all follows from the author's definite standpoint and system of views, which may be false, but which, if accepted, necessarily lead to regarding one's opponent as a naïve, narrow-minded and reactionary utopian.

Let us see how matters stand with Mr. Struve's article. Accusing Mr. Nik.—on of utopianism that leads inevitably to a reactionary programme, and of naïveté, he quite clearly indicates the grounds which led him to such an opinion. Firstly: desiring the "socialisation of production," Mr. Nik.—on "appeals to society" (sic!) "and the state." This "proves that Marx's doctrine of the class struggle and the state is completely foreign to the Russian political economist." Our state is the "representative of the ruling

classes." Secondly: "If we contrast to *real* capitalism an *imaginary* economic system which *must* come about simply because we *want* it to, in other words, if we want the socialisation of production without capitalism, this is only evidence of a naïve conception, which does not conform to history." With the development of capitalism, the elimination of natural economy and the diminution of the rural population, "the modern state will emerge from the twilight in which, in our patriarchal times, it is still enveloped (we are speaking of Russia), and step out into the clear light of the open class struggle, and other forces and factors will have to be sought for the socialisation of production."

Well, is this not a sufficiently clear and precise motivation? Can one dispute the truth of Mr. Struve's specific references to the author's ideas? Did Mr. Nik.—on really take account of the class struggle inherent in capitalist society? He did not. He speaks of society and the state, and forgets this struggle, excludes it. He says, for example, that the state supported capitalism instead of socialising labour through the village community, and so on. He evidently believes that the state could have behaved this way or that, and, consequently, that it stands *above classes*. Is it not clear that to accuse Mr. Struve of resorting to "bugbears" is a *crying* injustice? Is it not clear that a man who believes that ours is a class state cannot regard one who appeals to that state to socialise labour, that is, to abolish the ruling classes as anything but a naïve and reactionary utopian? More, when one accuses an opponent of resorting to "bugbears," and *says nothing* about the views from which his opinion follows, despite the fact that he has clearly formulated these views; and when, moreover, one accuses him in a censored magazine, where these views cannot appear—should we not rather regard this as "an absolutely inappropriate method"?

Let us proceed. Mr. Struve's second argument is formulated no less clearly. That the socialisation of labour apart from capitalism, through the village community, is an imaginary system cannot be doubted, for it does not exist in reality. This reality is described by Mr. Nik.—on himself as follows: prior to 1861 the productive units were the "family" and the "village community" (*Sketches*, pp. 106-

107). This "small, scattered, self-sufficing production could not develop to any considerable extent, and its extremely routine nature and low productivity were therefore typical." The subsequent change meant that "the social division of labour became deeper and deeper." In other words, capitalism broke out of the narrow bounds of the earlier productive units and socialised labour throughout society. *Mr. Nik.—on, too, admitted this socialisation of labour by our capitalism*. Therefore, in wanting to base the socialisation of labour not on capitalism, which *has already socialised labour*, but on the village community, *the breakdown of which for the first time brought about the socialisation of labour throughout society*, he is a reactionary utopian. That is Mr. Struve's idea. One may regard it as true or false, but it cannot be denied that his severe comment on Mr. Nik.—on followed with logical inevitability from this opinion, and it is, therefore, out of place to talk of "bugbears."

Furthermore, when Mr. Nik.—on concludes his controversy with Mr. Struve by attributing to his opponent the desire to dispossess the peasantry of the land ("if by a progressive programme is meant dispossessing the peasantry of the land ... then the author of the *Sketches* is a conservative"), despite Mr. Struve's explicit statement that he desires the socialisation of labour, desires it through capitalism, and therefore desires to base himself on the forces that will be visible in "the clear light of the open class struggle"—that can only be called a version diametrically opposed to the truth. And if we bear in mind that Mr. Struve could not in the censored press speak of the forces which come forward in the clear light of the open class struggle, and that, consequently, Mr. Nik.—on's opponent was gagged—it can scarcely be denied that Mr. Nik.—on's method is altogether "inappropriate."

Appendix III

When I speak of a narrow understanding of Marxism, I have the Marxists themselves in mind. One cannot help remarking in this connection that Marxism is most atrociously narrowed and garbled when our liberals and radicals undertake to expound it in the pages of the legal press. What an exposition it is! Just think how this revolutionary doctrine has to be mutilated to fit it into the Procrustean bed of Russian censorship! Yet our publicists light-heartedly perform that operation! Marxism, as they expound it, is practically reduced to the doctrine of how individual property, based on the labour of the proprietor, undergoes its dialectical development under the capitalist system, how it turns into its negation and is then socialised. And with a serious mien, they assume that the whole content of Marxism lies in this "scheme," ignoring all the specific features of its sociological method, the doctrine of the class struggle, and the direct purpose of the inquiry, namely, to disclose all the forms of antagonism and exploitation in order to help the proletariat abolish them. It is not surprising that the result is something so pale and narrow that our radicals proceed to mourn over the poor Russian Marxists. We should think so! Russian absolutism and Russian reaction would not be absolutism and reaction if it were possible, while they exist, to give a full, accurate and complete exposition of Marxism, setting forth its conclusions without reservation! And if our liberals and radicals knew Marxism properly (if only from German literature), they would be ashamed thus to distort it in the pages of the censored press. If a theory may not be expounded—keep silent, or make the reservation that you are giving a far from complete exposition

of it, that you are omitting its most essential features; but why expound only fragments of it and then howl about its being narrow?

That, indeed, is the only explanation of the absurdity, possible only in Russia, that people are regarded as Marxists who have no idea of the class struggle, of the antagonism necessarily inherent in capitalist society, and of the development of this antagonism; people who have no notion of the revolutionary role of the proletariat; even people who come out with purely bourgeois projects, provided they contain such catchwords as "money economy," its "necessity," and similar expressions, which require all the intellectual profundity of a Mr. Mikhailovsky to be regarded as specifically Marxist.

Marx, on the other hand, considered the whole value of his theory to lie in the fact that it is "in its essence critical* and revolutionary."[103] And this latter quality is indeed completely and unconditionally inherent in *Marxism*, for this theory directly sets itself the task of *disclosing* all the forms of antagonism and exploitation in modern society, tracing their evolution, demonstrating their transitory character, the inevitability of their transformation into a different form, *and thus serving the proletariat as a means of ending all exploitation as quickly and easily as possible*. The irresistible attraction of this theory, which draws to itself the socialists of all countries lies precisely in the fact that it combines the quality of being strictly and supremely scientific (being the last word in social science) with that of being revolutionary, it does not combine them accidentally and not only because the founder of the doctrine combined in his own person the qualities of a scientist and a revolutionary, but does so intrinsically and inseparably. Is it not a fact that the task of theory, the aim of science,

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* Note that Marx is speaking here of materialist criticism, which alone he regards as scientific—that is, criticism which compares the political, legal, social, conventional and other facts, with economies, with the system of production relations, with the interests of the classes that inevitably take shape on the basis of all the antagonistic social relations. That Russian social relations are antagonistic can hardly be doubted. But nobody has yet tried to take them as a basis for *such* criticism.

is here defined as assistance for the oppressed class in its actual economic struggle.

> "*We do not say to the world: Cease struggling—your whole struggle is senseless. All we do is to provide it with a true slogan of struggle.*"[104]

Hence, the direct task of science, according to Marx, is to provide a true slogan of struggle, that is, to be able to present this struggle objectively as the product of a definite system of production relations, to be able *to understand* the necessity of this struggle, its content, course and conditions of development. It is impossible to provide a "slogan of struggle" unless we study every separate form of the struggle minutely; unless we trace every stage of the struggle during the transition from one form to another, so that we can define the situation at any given moment, without losing sight of the general character of the struggle and its general aim, namely, the complete and final abolition of all exploitation and all oppression.

Try to compare with Marx's "critical and revolutionary" theory the colourless trash which "our well-known" N. K. Mikhailovsky, in his "criticism," expounded and which he then did battle with, and you will be astonished that there can really be people who regard themselves as "ideologists of the working people," and confine themselves ... to that "worn-out coin" into which our publicists transform the Marxist theory by obliterating everything that is vital in it.

Try to compare with the demands of this theory our Narodnik literature, which, after all, is also prompted by the desire to be the ideological spokesman of the working people, a literature devoted to the history and to the present state of our economic system in general and of the peasantry in particular, and you will be astonished that socialists could be satisfied with a theory that confines itself to studying and describing distress and to moralising over it. Serfdom is depicted not as a definite form of economic organisation which gave rise to such and such exploitation, such and such antagonistic classes, certain political, legal and other systems, but simply as abuses by the landlords and injustice to the peasants. The peasant Reform is depicted not as a clash of definite economic forms and of definite economic

classes, but as a measure taken by the authorities, who "chose" a "wrong path" by mistake, despite their very best intentions. Post-Reform Russia is depicted as a deviation from the true path, accompanied by the distress of the working people and not as a definite system of antagonistic relations of production with a certain development.

Now, however, there can be no doubt that this theory is discredited, and the sooner Russian socialists realise that with the present level of knowledge there can be no revolutionary theory apart from Marxism, the sooner they devote all their efforts to applying this theory to Russia, theoretically and practically—the surer and quicker will be the success of revolutionary work.

To give a clear illustration of the corruption the "friends of the people" have caused in the "meagre Russian thought" of today by their call to the intelligentsia to exert a cultural influence on the "people" so as to "create" a real and proper industry, etc.—let us cite the opinion of people who hold views sharply distinct from ours, namely, the "Narodopravtsi," these direct and immediate offspring of the Narodovoltsi. See pamphlet, *An Urgent Issue*, 1894, published by the Narodnoye Pravo party.

After giving a splendid rebuttal to the kind of Narodniks who say that "under no circumstances, not even on condition of broad liberty, must Russia part with her economic organisation, which ensures (!) the working people an independent place in production," and that "what we need is not political reforms but systematic and planned economic reforms," the Narodopravtsi go on to say:

"We are not defenders of the bourgeoisie, still less are we admirers of their ideals; but if a malicious fate were to present the people with the choice of 'planned economic reforms' under the protection of Zemsky Nachalniks who zealously guard them from the encroachments of the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie themselves on the basis of political liberty, that is, under conditions which *ensure* the people the organised defence of their interests—we think the people would obviously gain by choosing the latter. At the moment, we have no 'political reforms' which threaten to deprive the

people of their pseudo-independent economic organisation; what we do have is what everybody everywhere is accustomed to regard as bourgeois policy, expressed in the grossest exploitation of the people's labour. We have neither broad nor narrow liberty; what we do have is the protection of social-estate interests, which the agrarians and capitalists of constitutional countries have ceased to dream of. We have no 'bourgeois parliamentarianism'—society is not allowed within cannon-shot of the administrative machine; what we do have is the Messrs. Naidenovs, Morozovs, Kazis and Byelovs, who demand that a Chinese Wall be set up for the safeguarding of their interests, side by side with representatives of 'our loyal nobility,' who go so far as to demand free-credits for themselves to the tune of 100 rubles per dessiatine. They are invited to serve on commissions, they are listened to with respect, and they have a decisive voice in cardinal questions affecting the economic life of the country. Yet who stands up in defence of the interests of the people, and where? Is it not they, the Zemsky Nachalniks? Is it not for the people that agricultural labour squads are being projected? Has it not only just been declared, with a frankness bordering on cynicism, that the only reason the people have been granted allotments is to enable them to pay taxes and to perform services, as the Governor of Vologda put it in one of his circulars? He only formulated and expressed aloud the policy that the autocracy, or, more correctly, bureaucratic absolutism, is fatally pursuing."

However nebulous the Narodopravtsi's notions still are about the "people," whose interests they want to defend, and about "society," which they continue to regard as a trustworthy organ for the protection of the interests of labour, one cannot but admit that the formation of the Narodnoye Pravo party is a step forward, a step towards the complete abandonment of the illusions and dreams about "different paths for the fatherland," towards the fearless recognition of the real paths, and towards the search on their basis for elements for a revolutionary struggle. Here we clearly see a striving to form a democratic party. I speak only of a "striving," because, unfortunately, the Narodopravtsi do not implement their basic thesis consistently. They still talk of amalgamation and alliance with the socialists, refusing

to realise that to draw the workers into mere political radicalism would only mean severing the worker intellectuals from the mass of the workers and condemning the working-class movement to impotence; for it can be strong only by defending the interests of the working class completely and in every way, by engaging in economic struggle against capital, a struggle inseparably bound up with a political struggle against the servants of capital. They refuse to realise that the "amalgamation" of all the revolutionary elements can be much better achieved by the separate organisation of the representatives of the different interests* and by the joint action of the two parties in particular cases. They still go on calling their party a "social-revolutionary" party (see the Manifesto of the Narodnoye Pravo party, dated February 19, 1894), although at the same time they confine themselves exclusively to political reforms and most carefully evade our "cursed" socialist problems. A party which so ardently calls for a fight against illusions should not foster illusions in others by the very first words of its "manifesto"; it should not speak of *socialism* where there is nothing but *constitutionalism*. But, I repeat, one cannot form a correct judgement of the Narodopravtsi unless one bears in mind that they spring from the Narodovoltsi. It must, therefore, be admitted that they are taking a step forward by basing an exclusively political struggle—unrelated to socialism—on an exclusively political programme. The Social-Democrats whole-heartedly wish the Narodopravtsi success, wish that their party may grow and develop, that they may form closer ties with those social elements which take their stand by the present economic system** and whose

* They themselves protest against faith in the miracle-working powers of the intelligentsia; they themselves talk of the need to draw the people themselves into the struggle. But this requires that the struggle be bound up with definite everyday interests and, consequently, that a distinction be made between the different interests, and that they be drawn separately into the struggle.... But if these separate interests are obscured by bare political demands that only the intelligentsia understand, will this not mean again turning back, again confining everything to the struggle of the intelligentsia alone whose impotence has only just been admitted?

** (I.e., the capitalist system)—and not by the necessary rejection of this system and the waging of a ruthless struggle against it.

everyday interests really are most intimately bound up with *democracy*.

The conciliatory, cowardly, sentimental and dreamy Narodism of the "friends of the people" will not stand up long when attacked from both sides: by the political radicals for being capable of expressing confidence in the bureaucracy and for not realising the absolute necessity of political struggle; and by the Social-Democrats, for attempting to represent themselves almost as socialists, although they have not the slightest relation to socialism and not the slightest inkling of the causes of the oppression of the working people or of the character of the class struggle now in progress.

THE ECONOMIC CONTENT OF NARODISM AND THE CRITICISM OF IT IN MR. STRUVE'S BOOK

(THE REFLECTION OF MARXISM IN BOURGEOIS LITERATURE)

P. Struve, *Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia's Economic Development*. St. Peteersburg, 1984[105]

Written: end of 1894-beginning of 1895

First published over the signature of K. Tulin in the miscellany entitled *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development*. St. Petersburg, 1895

Published according to *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development*.

МАТЕРІАЛЫ

КЪ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКѢ

НАШЕГО ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННАГО РАЗВИТІЯ.

СБОРНИКЪ СТАТЕЙ.

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ
Типографія П. П. Сойкина, Стремянная ул., № 12
1895

Title page of the miscellany in which Lenin's *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book*, 1895, was published

Title page of the miscellany in which Lenin's The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book, 1895, was published

Mr. Struve's book is a systematic criticism of Narodism —this word to be understood in its broad sense, as a theoretical doctrine that gives a particular solution to highly important sociological and economic problems, and as "a system of dogmas of economic policy" (p. VII). The very posing of such a problem would have made the book of outstanding interest, but of still greater importance is the standpoint from which the criticism is made. Of this the author in his Preface says the following:

"While adhering, on certain basic issues, to views that have been quite definitely established in literature, he (the author) does not consider himself bound in the least by the word and letter of any doctrine whatsoever. He is not infected with orthodoxy" (IX).

The contents of the book make it clear that these "views that have been quite definitely established in literature" are those of Marxism. The question arises: which, exactly, are the "certain basic" tenets of Marxism that the author accepts, and which are those he rejects? Why and to what extent? He gives no direct answers to these questions. That is why a detailed examination will be necessary in order to make clear exactly what there is in the book that may be classed as Marxist—which of the doctrine's tenets the author accepts and how consistently he adheres to them—and which of them he rejects, and what are the results when he does so.

The contents are exceedingly varied: the author gives us, firstly, an exposition of "the subjective method in sociology"

as accepted by our Narodniks, criticises it and sets against it the method "of historico-economic materialism." Then he gives an economic criticism of Narodism, firstly on the strength of "human experience" (p. IX) and, secondly, on the basis of the facts of Russia's economic history and present-day reality. A criticism of the dogmas of Narodnik economic policy is given in passing. The varied character of the contents (something quite inevitable when criticising a major trend in our public thought) determines the form in which the examination is made: we shall have to follow the author's exposition step by step, dwelling on each series of arguments.

Before, however, proceeding to examine the book, I consider it necessary to give a preliminary explanation in somewhat greater detail. The task of the present article is to criticise Mr. Struve's book from the viewpoint of one who "adheres to views that have been quite definitely established in literature" on *all* (and not merely on "certain") "basic issues."

These views have been expounded on more than one occasion for the purpose of criticism in the columns of the liberal and Narodnik press, and this exposition has abominably obscured them—has; indeed, distorted them by involving what has nothing whatever to do with them, namely, Hegelianism, "faith in the necessity of each country having to pass through the phase of capitalism" and much other purely *Novoye Vremya* nonsense.

It is above all the practical side of the doctrine, its application to Russian affairs, that has been badly distorted. Our liberals and Narodniks refused to understand that the starting-point of the Russian Marxist doctrine is a totally different concept of Russian reality, and by looking at that doctrine from the standpoint of their old views of this reality, reached conclusions that were not only absolutely absurd but that in addition levelled the most preposterous accusations at the Marxists.

It seems to me, therefore, that unless I define my attitude to Narodism exactly, it will be impossible to set about an examination of Mr. Struve's book. Furthermore, a prelimi-

nary comparison of the Narodnik and Marxist viewpoints is necessary to explain many passages in the book under review, which confines itself to the objective side of the doctrine and leaves practical conclusions almost entirely untouched.

The comparison will show us what points of departure Narodism and Marxism have in common, and in what they differ fundamentally. It will be more convenient to take the old Russian Narodism, since, firstly, it is immeasurably superior to that of today (as represented by publications such as *Russkoye Bogatstvo*) in consistency and forthrightness, and, secondly, it gives a fuller picture of the best aspects of Narodism, aspects which in some respects Marxism also adheres to.

Let us take one of the professions de foi* of the old Russian Narodism and follow the author step by step.

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* Creeds.—*Ed.*

CHAPTER I

A LINE-BY-LINE COMMENTARY ON A NARODNIK PROFESSION DE FOI

Volume CCXLII of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski** contains an unsigned article entitled "New Shoots in the People's Fields," which graphically sets forth the progressive aspects of Narodism as against Russian liberalism.

The author begins by saying that "now" it is considered "almost treachery" to protest against "those who emerge from the midst of the people and reach a higher level of society."

"Not long ago a certain literary donkey kicked at *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* for displaying *pessimism towards the people*, as he expressed himself regarding a brief review of a book by Zlatovratsky which contained nothing pessimistic apart from pessimism towards usury and the corrupting influence of money in general; and when, later, Gleb Uspensky wrote a commentary to his latest articles (*Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, No. 11, 1878), the liberal bog heaved and surged, just as in the fairy-tale ... and all of a sudden, so many defenders of the people appeared that, verily, we were surprised to find that our people had so many friends.... I cannot but sympathise ... with the way of posing the problem of the beauteous countryside and of the attitude of the literary lads towards it, or, to put it better, not lads but old roués from among Messrs. the nobility and lackeys, and the young merchants.... To sing serenades to the countryside and "to make eyes at it" does not at all mean to love and respect it, just as pointing to its defects does not mean to be hostile towards it. Should you ask the very same Uspensky ... what is closest to his heart, where he sees the greatest guarantees for the future ... in the countryside or in the old-nobility and the new middle-class strata, can there be any doubt at all that he would say: 'The countryside.'"

This is a very typical passage. Firstly, it shows clearly the essence of Narodism: it is protest against serfdom (the

* 1879, No. 2, *Contemporary Review*, pp. 125-52.

old-nobility stratum) and bourgeoisdom (the new middle-class stratum) in Russia *from the peasant's, the small producer's, point of view*. Secondly, it shows at the same time that this protest is based on fantasy, that it turns its back on the facts.

Does the "countryside" exist somewhere *outside of* the "old-nobility" or "new middle-class" regimes? Was it not the "countryside" that representatives of both the one and the other built and are still building each after their own fashion? The countryside is in fact a "stratum" that is partly "old-nobility," and partly "new middle-class." Whichever way you look at the countryside, if you confine yourself to stating the actual situation (that is all that is at issue) and not to possibilities, you will not be able to find anything else, any third "stratum," in it. And if the Narodniks *do*, it is only because they cannot see the wood for the trees, the form of land *tenure* in the separate peasant communities prevents them from seeing the economic organisation of Russian social economy. This organisation turns the peasant into a commodity producer, transforms him into a petty bourgeois, a petty isolated farmer producing for the market. This organisation, therefore, makes it impossible to look *backwards* for "guarantees for the future" and makes it essential to look for them *ahead*. They should not be sought in the "countryside," where the combination of the "old-nobility" and "new middle-class" strata terribly worsens the position of labour and deprives it of the opportunity of fighting against the masters of the "new middle-class" order, for here the antithesis between their interests and those of labour is insufficiently developed. But they should be sought in the fully-developed stratum which is completely "new middle-class" and has entirely disposed of the blessings of the "old-nobility," has socialised labour, has brought to a head and clarified that social contradiction which, in the countryside, is still in an embryonic, suppressed condition.

Now we must indicate the theoretical differences existing between the doctrines that *lead* to Narodism and to Marxism, between the different *conceptions* of Russian reality and history.

Let us follow the author further.

He assures "spiritually indignant gentlemen" that Uspensky understands the relation between the poverty and the morality of the people

> "better than many admirers of the countryside, for whom ... the countryside ... is something like the liberal passport which all intelligent and practical bourgeois usually provide themselves with in an epoch like the present."

You, Mr. Narodnik, are wondering why something so lamentable and hurtful should take place—that a man who wants to represent the interests of labour should see that which he regards as "guarantees for the future" transformed into a "liberal passport." That future has to rule out the bourgeoisie—but the way in which you wish to arrive at this future, far from being given a hostile reception by the "practical and intelligent bourgeois," is accepted willingly, is accepted as a "passport."

Do you think such a scandalous thing would be possible if you were to point to the "guarantees for the future," not where the social contradictions inherent in the system dominated by the "practical and intelligent bourgeois" are still in an undeveloped, embryonic state, but where they are developed thoroughly, to nec plus ultra, where, consequently, one cannot confine oneself to palliatives or half-measures, where the desiderata of the working people cannot be utilised for one's own benefit, and where the issue is squarely put?

Do you not yourself say further on:

> "The passive friends of the people refuse to understand the simple thing that in society all active forces usually add up to two equally operating, mutually opposite ones, and that the passive forces which apparently take no part in the struggle, merely serve the force preponderant at the given moment" (p. 132).

Does not this description apply to the countryside, or is the countryside some specific kind of world devoid of these "mutually opposite forces" and struggle, a countryside that can be spoken of indiscriminately, without fear of playing into the hands of the "preponderant force"? Is it sound, since we are talking about struggle, to begin where the content of this struggle is cluttered up with a host of extraneous circumstances that prevent those mutually opposite forces from

being definitely and finally separated from one another, that prevent the chief enemy from being clearly seen? Is it not obvious that the programme advanced by the author at the end of his article—education, expansion of peasant land tenure, reduction of taxes—can have no effect on the one who is preponderant, while the last point of the programme—"organisation of people's industry"—presumes, does it not, that the struggle has not only taken place, but, furthermore, has already ended in victory? Your programme fights shy of the antagonism whose existence you yourself could not help admitting. That is why it holds no terrors for the masters of the "new middle-class stratum." Your programme is a petty-bourgeois dream. That is why it is only good enough to be a "liberal passport."

"People for whom the countryside is an abstract concept, and the muzhik an abstract Narcissus, even think badly when they say that the countryside should only be praised and be told that it is standing up splendidly to all influences destructive to it. If the countryside is placed in such a position that it must fight every day for a kopek, if it is skinned by the usurers, deceived by the kulaks, oppressed by the landlords, if it is sometimes flogged in the Volost offices, can this be without influence to its moral side?... If the ruble, that capitalist moon, sails to the forefront of the rural landscape, if all eyes, all thoughts and spiritual forces are focussed on it, if it becomes the aim of life and the yardstick of individual abilities, can the fact be hidden and can we say that the muzhik is such an altruist that he needs no money at all? If in the countryside there are visible tendencies towards conflict, if kulakdom is in full bloom and is striving to enslave the weakest peasants and turn them into labourers, to wreck the village community, etc., can we, I ask, conceal all these facts?! We may wish for a more detailed and comprehensive investigation of them, we may explain them to ourselves by the oppressive conditions of poverty (hunger drives people to theft, murder, and in extreme cases even to cannibalism), but we cannot conceal them at all. To conceal them means to defend the status quo, to defend the notorious laissez faire, laissez aller until the sad phenomena assume terrible proportions. To colour the truth is never worth while."

Once again, how fine is this description of the countryside and how petty the conclusions drawn from it! How well are the facts observed and how paltry the explanation, the understanding of them! Here again we see the gigantic abyss between the desiderata of the defence of labour, and the means of fulfilling them. Capitalism in the countryside,

so far as the author is concerned, is no more than a "sad phenomenon." Despite the fact that he sees the same sort of capitalism in the towns on a big scale, that he sees how capitalism has subordinated to itself not only all spheres of the people's labour but even "progressive" literature, which presents the measures of the bourgeoisie in the name and in behalf of the people, despite this, he refuses to admit that it is a matter of the specific organisation of our social economy, and consoles himself with dreams about its being merely a sad phenomenon called into existence by "oppressive conditions." And if, says he, one does not cling to the theory of non-interference, then these conditions may be eliminated. Yes, *if* ifs and ans! But Russia has never yet witnessed a policy of non-interference; there always has been interference ... for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, and only sweet dreams of "after-dinner tranquillity" can give rise to hopes of changing this without a "redistribution of the social force between the classes," as Mr. Struve puts it.

"We forget that our society needs ideals—political, civic and others—mainly so that, having acquired a stock of them, it may be able to think of nothing; that society seeks them not with youthful eagerness, but with after-dinner tranquillity, that society is not disillusioned in them with torments of the soul but with the lightness of a prince of Arcady. Such, at least, is the overwhelming majority of our society. Actually it requires no ideals because it is sated and is fully satisfied by digestive processes."

A superb description of our liberal-Narodnik society.

The question arises, who is more consistent now: the "Narodniks," who continue to fuss and bother with this "society," who regale it with a picture of the horrors of "oncoming" capitalism, of the "threatening evil,"* as the author of the article expressed it, who call on its representatives to leave the wrong road on to which "we" have deviated, etc.—or the Marxists, who are so "narrow" that they sharply fence themselves off from society and consider it necessary to address themselves exclusively to those who are not "satisfied" and *cannot be satisfied* with "digestive proc-

* Threatening what? The digestive processes? Capitalism not only does not "threaten" them, but, on the contrary, promises the most refined and dainty victuals.

esses," for whom ideals are a necessity, for whom they are a matter of daily life.

That is the attitude of a ladies' college damsel—continues the author. That

> "testifies to profound corruption of thought and feelings ... never has there been such decent, polished, such innocent and at the same time profound corruption. This corruption is entirely the property of our recent history, the property of middle-class culture" [i.e., of the bourgeois, capitalist order, to be more exact. K. T.*] "that has grown up on the soil of landlordism, the sentimentality ignorance and indolence of the nobility. The middle class have introduced their own science, their own moral code and their own sophisms into life."

One would have thought that the author had so well assessed the situation that he should have understood the only possible conclusion to be drawn. If it is all a matter of our bourgeois culture, there can be no other "guarantees for the future" except in the "antipode" of this bourgeoisie, because it alone has been totally "differentiated" from this "middle-class culture," is finally and irrevocably hostile to it and is incapable of any of the compromises out of which it is so convenient to fashion "liberal passports."

But no. One may still dream. "Culture" is certainly nothing but "middle- class," nothing but corruption. But this is only because it comes from the old landlordism (he himself has just admitted that this culture is a product of contemporary history, of that history, in fact, that destroyed the old landlordism) and from indolence—something, therefore, that is fortuitous and has no firm roots, etc., etc. Then come phrases that have no meaning other than turning one's back on the facts and sentimental dreaming that ignores the *existence* of "mutually opposite forces." Listen:

> "They (the middle class) have to instal them (science, the moral code) in the university chairs, in literature, in the courts and in other spheres of life." [Above we have seen that they *have already installed them* in such a profound "sphere of life" as the countryside. K. T.] "First and foremost, they do not find a sufficient number of people suitable for this, and of necessity address themselves to people of other traditions." [Is it the Russian bourgeoisie that "does not find people"?! This is

* K. T. (K. Tulin)—V. I. Lenin.—*Ed.*

not worth refuting, especially as the author refutes himself further on. K. T.] "These people have no knowledge of business" [the Russian capitalists?! K. T.], "their steps are uncertain, their movements clumsy "[their "knowledge of business" is sufficient for them to get tens and hundreds per cent profit; they are sufficiently "experienced" to practise the truck-system[106] everywhere, they are sufficiently astute to secure preferential tariffs. Only somebody who has no *immediate and direct* experience of oppression by these people, only a petty bourgeois could entertain such a fantasy. K. T.]; "they try to copy the West-European bourgeoisie, order books, study" [here the author has himself to admit the fantastic character of the dream he has now concocted about "middle-class culture" having grown up in Russia in the soil of *ignorance*. That is untrue. It is precisely the *middle-class culture* that brought culture and "education" to post-Reform Russia. "To colour the truth," to picture the enemy as impotent and devoid of foundation is "never worth while." K. T.]; "at times they become regretful about the past and at times uneasy about the future, because voices are heard from somewhere saying that the middle class are only the impertinent parvenus of the day, that their science will not bear criticism, while their moral code is no use at all."

Is it the Russian bourgeoisie that commits the sin of being "regretful about the past" and "uneasy about the future"?! You don't say! Don't some people like pulling their own legs by spreading such wholesale slander about the poor Russian bourgeoisie being embarrassed by voices proclaiming the "uselessness of the middle class." Is not the opposite the case: were not these "voices" "embarrassed" when they were given a good bawling out, is it not they who display "uneasiness about the future"?...

And gentlemen of this sort even express surprise and pretend they do not understand why they are called romantics!

"Yet we must save ourselves. The middle class do not ask, but order people, on pain of destruction, to go to work.* If you refuse, you will go without bread and will stand in the middle of the street, crying out, "Spare something for an ex-soldier!" or die of starvation altogether. And so work begins, you hear a squeaking, creaking, and clanking, there is a turmoil. The job is an urgent one that brooks no delay. Finally, the machine is set going. There seems to be less creaking and fewer strident sounds, the parts seem to work, all you hear is the din of something

* Note that, reader. When a Narodnik says that here, in Russia, "the middle class order people to go to work," that is the truth. But should a Marxist say that the capitalist mode of production prevails in Russia—then Mr. V. V. will set up a howl about his trying to "replace the democratic (sic!!) system by the capitalist."

clumsy. But that makes it all the more fearsome because the planks bend more and more, screws get loose and, look!—before you know where you are the whole thing may fall to pieces."

This passage is particularly typical in that it contains in graphic, laconic, and elegant form the line of argument which the Russian Narodniks like to clothe in scientific dress. Starting out from facts which are indisputable, which are beyond all doubt, and which prove the existence of contradictions under the capitalist system, the existence of oppression, starvation, unemployment, etc., they exert every effort to prove that capitalism is an exceedingly bad thing, is "clumsy" [cf. V. V., *Kablukov* (*The Workers in Agriculture*), and *partly* Mr. Nikolai—on], and "look, before you know where you are it may fall to pieces."

We are looking, we have been looking for many, many years, and see that this force, which orders the Russian people to go to work, keeps growing stronger and bigger, boasts to the whole of Europe about the might of the Russia *it* is creating, and is glad, of course, that "voices are heard" only about the need to hope that "the screws will get loose."

"Weak people are terror-stricken. 'All the better,' say reckless people. 'All the better,' say the bourgeoisie:—'the sooner we order new machinery from abroad, the sooner we prepare platforms, planks and other rough parts from our own material, the sooner we shall get skilled engineers.' In the meantime, the moral aspect of society is in a very bad way. Some people acquire a taste for the new activity and make frantic efforts, some lag behind and become disillusioned with life."

Poor Russian bourgeoisie! They make "frantic" efforts to appropriate surplus-value! and feel in a bad way in the moral sense! (Don't forget that a page earlier all this morality amounted to digestive processes and corruption.) It is clear that here there is no need for a struggle—and for a class struggle at that—against them; all that is needed is to chide them properly, and they will stop overdoing it.

"In the meantime practically nobody thinks of the people, yet, according to the rules of the bourgeoisie, everything is done for the people, on their account; yet all prominent public and literary people consider it their duty to hold forth on the people's welfare.... This coquettish liberalism has crushed all other trends and become predominant. In

our *democratic age* not only does Mr. Suvorin publicly 'confess his love for the people and say: I have always had but one love, and I shall have it till I die—that love is the people. I myself came from the people' (which in itself does not prove anything at all); even *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[107] seems to have quite a different attitude to them ... and in its own way, of course, concerns itself with their well-being. At the present time there is not one single paper like the late *Vest*, i.e., openly unfriendly to the people. But the obviously unfriendly attitude was better because the enemy was then plainly visible, as on the palm of your hand: you could see in what way he was a fool, and in what way he was a knave. Now all are friends and at the same time enemies; everything is mixed up in a general chaos. The people, as Uspensky says, are, in fact, enveloped in a sort of fog in which the inexperienced person may go astray. Formerly they saw themselves faced with just outspoken lawlessness. Now they are told that they are as free as the landlord, they are told that they manage their own affairs, they are told that they are being raised from insignificance and being put on their feet, whereas running through all these manifestations of concern there is a thin but tenacious thread of endless deceit and hypocrisy.

There's no gainsaying that!

"At that time far from everybody was engaged in organising loan-and-savings societies that encouraged the kulaks and left the genuinely poor without credits."

At first one might have thought that the author understood the bourgeois character of credit and so was bound to give a wide berth to all such bourgeois measures. But the distinctive and basic feature of the petty bourgeois is to battle against bourgeoisdom with the instruments of bourgeois society itself. That is why the author, like the Narodniks in general, *corrects* bourgeois activity by demanding more extensive credits, credits for the genuinely poor!

"... they did not talk of the need for intensive farming, which is hindered by the redistribution of fields and by the village community (?); they did not dwell on the burden of the poll-tax and did not propose an income tax, keeping silent about indirect taxation and the fact that income tax is usually turned in practice into a tax on the very same poor people, they did not speak of the need for credits with which the peasants could purchase land from the landlords at abnormally high prices, etc.... The same is the case in society: there, too, the people have such a multitude of friends that you can only marvel.... Very likely the pawnbrokers and tapsters will soon start talking about love for the people...."

This protest against bourgeoisdom is superb; but the conclusions are paltry: the bourgeoisie reign supreme both in everyday life and in society. One would have thought that the thing to do is to turn away from society and go to the antipode of the bourgeoisie.

No, the thing to do is to propagate credits for the "genuinely poor"!

"It is difficult to decide who is more to blame for such a confused state of affairs—literature or society—and it is, moreover, quite useless. They say that a fish starts rotting at the head, but I attach no significance to this purely culinary observation."

Bourgeois society is rotting—that, then, is the author's idea. It is worth emphasising that this is the starting-point of the Marxists.

"Yet while we are flirting with the countryside and making eyes at it, the wheel of history is turning, spontaneous forces are at work, or to speak more clearly and simply, all sorts of tricksters are insinuating themselves into life and remaking it after their own fashion. While literature argues about the countryside, about the kind-heartedness of the muzhik and his lack of knowledge, while the publicists exhaust bucketfuls of ink on the village community and the forms of land tenure, while the tax commission continues its discussion on tax reform, the countryside will be utterly ruined."

There you have it! "While we are talking, the wheel of history is turning, spontaneous forces are at work."

What a howl, my friends, you would raise, were it I that spoke thus![108]

When Marxists speak of the "wheel of history and spontaneous forces," and explain specifically that the "spontaneous forces" are the forces of the rising bourgeoisie, Messrs. the Narodniks prefer to say nothing about whether or not the growth of these "spontaneous forces" is true and whether this fact has been rightly estimated; and they blather interminable asininities about those who dare to speak of "the wheel of history" and "spontaneous forces," calling them "mystics and metaphysicians."

The difference—and a very substantial one—between the above-cited admission of the Narodnik and the ordinary proposition of the Marxists is only this—for the Narodnik these "spontaneous forces" boil down to "tricksters" who

"insinuate themselves into life," whereas for the Marxist the spontaneous forces are embodied in the bourgeois *class*, which is a product and expression of social "life," which in its turn constitutes the capitalist social formation, and do not "insinuate themselves into life" by accident or from somewhere outside. The Narodnik, who keeps to the surface of credits, taxes, forms of land tenure, redistribution, improvements, and so forth, cannot see that the bourgeoisie are deeply rooted in Russia's production relations and for that reason soothes himself with childish illusions about their being no more than "tricksters." And, naturally, from *this* point of view it really will be absolutely incomprehensible where the class struggle comes in, when it is all a matter of merely eliminating "tricksters." Naturally, Messrs. the Narodniks answer the Marxists' emphatic and repeated references to this struggle with the totally incomprehending silence of one who sees only the "trickster" and not the class.

A class can only be fought by *another class*, and only by one that is already totally "differentiated" from its enemy, totally opposite to it, whereas the police alone, and in an extreme case "society" and the "state," are, of course, enough to fight the "tricksters."

We shall soon see, however, what these "tricksters" are like from the description given by the Narodnik himself, how deeply rooted they are and how universal their social functions.

Then, immediately after the above-quoted words about "passive friends of the people," the author continues:

> "This is something worse than armed neutrality in politics, worse because in this case active aid is always rendered to the strongest. However sincere a passive friend may be in his sentiments, however modest and unobtrusive a position he may try to assume in everyday life, he will nevertheless injure his friends...."
>
> "For individuals of greater or lesser integrity and who sincerely love the people,* such a state of affairs finally becomes intolerably

* How vague are the features which here distinguish the "passive friends"! Among them, to be sure, there are also people of "integrity" who undoubtedly "love the people sincerely." From the previous comparison it obviously follows that we should contrast to the passive friend the one who participates in the struggle of "mutually opposite" *social forces*. Hier liegt der Hund begraben (That's the skeleton in the cupboard.—*Ed.*).

repugnant. They become ashamed and disgusted to hear this wholesale and sugary confession of love that is repeated from year to year, repeated daily in offices, fashionable salons, and in restaurants over bottles of Clicquot, and is never translated into action. That is why they finally come to the sweeping denial of all this hotchpotch."

This description of the attitude of the former Russian Narodniks to the liberals would fit the attitude of the Marxists to the present-day Narodniks almost completely. The Marxists, too, now find it "intolerable" to listen to talk of aid for the "people" in the shape of credits, land purchases, technical improvements, artels, common tillage,* etc. They also demand a "sweeping denial" of all this liberal-Narodnik hotchpotch from individuals desirous of siding ... not with the "people," no, but with him whom the bourgeoisie order to go to work. They find it "intolerable" hypocrisy to talk of choosing paths for Russia, of misfortunes from "threatening" capitalism, of the "needs of people's industry," when in all spheres of this people's industry we see the reign of capital, a smouldering battle of interests, that one must not hide but expose—one must not dream that "it would be better without struggle,"** but must *develop* the stability, continuity, consistency, and, chiefly, ideological nature of that struggle.

"That is why certain civic canons finally appear, certain categorical demands for decency, demands that are strict and on occasion even narrow, and for this reason are particularly disliked by liberals in the grand style who love wide shady spaces and forget that the demands have a logical origin."

Superb wish! There is an undoubted need for demands that are "strict" and "narrow."

The trouble, however, is that all the superb intentions of the Narodniks have remained in the realm of "pious wishes." Despite the fact that they have recognised the need for such demands, despite the fact that they have had quite enough time to give effect to them, they have not yet drawn

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* G. Yuzhakov in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, issue No. 7, 1894.

** Mr. Krivenko's expression (*Russkoye Bogatstvo* 1894, No. 10) in reply to Mr. Struve's phrase about "the stern struggle of social classes."

them up, they have steadily merged with Russian liberal society by a whole series of gradual transitions, and continue to do so to this day.*

Therefore, they have only themselves to blame if the Marxists now put forward demands *against* them that are really very "strict" and "narrow," demands for *exclusive* service to one class *exclusively* (the class that is "differentiated from life"), to its independent development and thinking, demands that they should make a complete break with the "civic decency" of the "decent" bourgeois of Russia.

"However narrow these canons may be on particular points, at any rate one cannot say anything against the following general demand: 'one of two things: either be real friends, or turn into open enemies!'

"We are now passing through an exceedingly important historical process, namely, that of the formation of a third estate. The selection of representatives is going on before our eyes, and the organisation of the new social force that is preparing to govern life is taking place."

Only just "preparing"? But who does "govern"? What other "social force"?

Surely not the one that was expressed in newspapers of the *Vest* type? That is impossible. We are not in 1894, but in 1879, on the eve of "the dictatorship of the heart";[110] the time when, to use the expression of the author of the article, "extreme conservatives have fingers pointed at them in the street," and are "loudly laughed at."

Surely not the "people," not the working population? A negative reply is provided by the whole of the author's article.

Can they still say after that: "preparing to govern"?! No, that force "finished preparing" ages ago and has been "governing" for ages; it is only the Narodniks who "are preparing"

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* Certain naïve Narodniks, who in their simplicity do not understand that their words are directed against themselves, even boast of this:

"Our intelligentsia in general, and literature in particular," writes Mr. V. V. against Mr. Struve, "even the representatives of the most bourgeois trends, bear, so to speak, a Narodnik character" (*Nedelya*, 1894, No. 47, p. 1506).

Just as in everyday life the small producer merges with the bourgeoisie by a series of imperceptible transitions, so in literature the pious wishes of the Narodniks become a "liberal passport" for the receptacles of digestive processes, skimmers,[109] etc.

to select the best paths to be followed by Russia, and they will, presumably, spend their time getting ready until the consistent development of class contradictions sweeps aside, jettisons all those who fight shy of them.

"This process, which began in Europe much earlier than ours did, has come to an end* in many countries; in others it is still being held up by the debris of feudalism and by the resistance of the working classes, but the wheel of history is there, too, year by year breaking up these debris to an ever greater extent and paving the way for the new order."

That is the extent to which our Narodniks misunderstand the West-European labour movement! It "holds up" capitalism, you see—and, as "debris," it is placed on a par with feudalism!

This is clear proof that in respect of not only Russia, but also of the West, our Narodniks are incapable of understanding how one can fight capitalism by speeding up its development, and not by "holding it up," not by pulling it back, but by pushing it forward, not in reactionary, but in progressive fashion.

"In its general features this process consists of the following: between the nobility and the people a new social stratum is being formed of elements that descend from above and of elements that rise from below, who, as it were, are of equal relative weight, if one may so express oneself, these elements are welding themselves closely together, are joining forces, undergoing a profound inner change and beginning to change both the upper and the lower strata, adapting them to their requirements. This process is extremely interesting in itself, but for us it is of particularly great significance. For us a whole series of questions arise: does the rule of the third estate constitute a fatal and inevitable stage in the civilisation of each people?..."

What sort of rubbish is this?! Where does "fatal inevitability" come from, and what has it to do with the matter? Did not the author himself describe, and will he not in still

* What's the meaning of "has come to an end"? Does it mean that its end is visible, that a "new force" is assembling already? In that case it is coming to an end in Russia, too. Or that there the third estate is no longer growing?—that is wrong, because there, too, small producers still exist from whom come handfuls of bourgeoisie and masses of proletarians.

greater detail describe, the domination of the third estate in *our country*, in holy Russia, in the seventies?

The author apparently accepts the theoretical arguments behind which the representatives of our bourgeoisie have hidden themselves.

Now, what else is it but dreamy superficiality to accept such inventions at their face value? Not to understand that behind these "theoretical" arguments stand *interests*, the interests of the society that has now been so rightly assessed, the interests of the bourgeoisie?

Only a romantic can think that interests are to be combated by syllogisms.

"... cannot the state pass directly from one state to another without any of the somersaults that our over-prudent philistines see at every step, and without paying heed to the fatalists who see in history just fatal order, a consequence of which is that the domination of the third estate is as inevitable to the state as old age or youth is to man?..."

That's the kind of profound understanding the Narodniks have of our reality! If the state assists the development of capitalism it is not at all because the bourgeoisie possess material force enabling them to "send" the people "to work" and bend policy in their own will. Nothing of the sort! It is simply that the Vernadskys, the Chicherins, the Mendeleyevs and other professors hold wrong theories about a "fatal" order, and the state "takes heed" of them.

"... cannot, finally, the negative aspects of the advancing order be softened, somehow altered or the period of its domination shortened? Is the state really something so inert, involuntary and helpless that it cannot influence its own destiny and change it; is it really something like a spinning-top, released by providence, that moves only along a definite road, only for a certain time, and performs a certain number of revolutions, or like an organism of very limited will-power, is it really directed by something resembling a huge iron wheel which crushes every audacious person who dares to seek the nearest roads to human happiness?!"

This is a highly typical passage that shows with particular clarity *the reactionary, petty-bourgeois character* of the way in which the direct producers' interests have been and are being represented by the Russian Narodniks. Being hostile to capitalism, the small producers

constitute a transitory class that is closely connected with the bourgeoisie and for that reason is incapable of understanding that the large-scale capitalism it dislikes is not fortuitous, but is a direct product of the entire contemporary economic (and social, and political, and juridical) system arising out of the struggle of mutually opposite social forces. Only inability to understand this can lead to such absolute stupidity as that of appealing to the "state" as though the political system is not rooted in the economic, does not express it, does not serve it.

Is the state really something inert? the small producer asks in despair, when he sees that as regards *his* interests it really is remarkably inert.

No, we might answer him, the state can on no account be something inert, it always acts and acts very energetically, it is always active and never passive—and the author himself a page earlier described this vigorous activity, its bourgeois character, its natural fruits. The only bad thing is that he refuses to see the connection between the character it has and the capitalist organisation of the Russian social economy, and that he is, therefore, so superficial.

Is the state really a top, is it really an iron wheel? asks the Kleinburger, when he sees that the "wheel" turns in a direction quite different from what he would like.

Oh no, we might answer him—it is not a top, nor a wheel, nor the law of fate, nor the will of providence: it is moved by "living individuals," "through a lane of obstacles"* (such, for example, as the resistance of the direct producers, or the representatives of the stratum of the old nobility), by precisely those "living individuals" who belong to the preponderant social force. And so, in order to compel the wheel of history to turn in the other direction, one must appeal to "living individuals" against "living individuals" (i.e., against social elements who do not belong to the liberal professions, but who directly reflect vital economic

* Mr. N. Mikhailovsky, in Mr. Struve's book, p. 8: "The living individual with all his thoughts and feelings becomes a history-maker at his own risk. He and not some mystic force, sets aims in history and pushes events towards them through a lane of obstacles placed before him by the spontaneous forces of nature and of historcal conditions."

interests), appeal to a class against a class. For this, good and pious wishes about "nearest roads" are highly inadequate; this requires a "redistribution of the social force among the classes," this requires that one becomes the ideologist not of the direct producer who stands apart from the struggle, but of the one who stands in the midst of heated struggle, who has already become totally "differentiated from life" of bourgeois society. This is the *only*, and hence the nearest "road to human happiness," a road along which one can not only soften the negative aspects of the existing state of things, not only cut its existence short by speeding up its development, but put an end to it altogether, by compelling the "wheel" (not of state, but of social forces) to turn in quite another direction.

"... We are interested only in the process of organising the third estate, in individuals, even, who emerge from the midst of the people and take their places in its ranks. These are very important individuals: they fulfil exceedingly important social functions, and the degree of the intensity of bourgeois order is directly dependent on them. No country where this order was installed could manage without them. If a country has none or insufficient of them, they have to be obtained from the ranks of the people, conditions have to be created in the life of the people to help them emerge and take shape, and then they have to be protected and assisted to grow until they get on their feet. Here we meet with direct interference in historical destiny by the most energetic individuals, who take advantage of circumstances and of the moment to serve their own interests. These circumstances consist mainly of the need for industrial progress (the replacement of handicraft production by manufacture and manufacture by factory production, the replacement of one system of farming by another, a more rational one), without which a country really cannot manage if it has a population of a certain density if it maintains international relations and if there is political and moral dissension conditioned both by economic factors and the growth of ideas. It is these changes, urgent in political life, that shrewd people usually connect with themselves and with a certain order; this order could undoubtedly be replaced, and always can be replaced, by another, if other people are wiser and more energetic than they have been hitherto."

So then, the author cannot but admit that the bourgeoisie perform "important social functions"—functions that can be generally expressed as: the subordination to themselves of the people's labour, the direction of it and the raising of its productivity. The author cannot but see that

economic "progress" is really "bound up" with these elements, i.e., that our bourgeoisie really are the vehicle of economic, or more exactly, technical progress.

Here, however, begins a radical distinction between the ideologist of the small producer and the Marxist. The Narodnik explains this *fact* (the connection between the bourgeoisie and progress) by asserting that "shrewd people" "take advantage of circumstances and of the moment to serve their own interests"—in other words, he considers this accidental and for that reason draws the following naïvely bold conclusion: "undoubtedly these people can always (!) be replaced by others" who will also provide progress, but not bourgeois progress.

The Marxist explains this fact by those social relations of people in the production of material values that take form in commodity economy, that convert labour into a commodity, subordinate it to capital and raise its productivity. He does not regard it as an accident, but a necessary product of the capitalist system of our social economy. He therefore sees a way out not in fairy-tales about what "undoubtedly can" be done by individuals who replace the bourgeois (the latter, bear in mind, have still to be "replaced"—and mere words or appeals to society and the slate are not enough), but in the development of the class contradictions of the present economic order.

Everybody understands that these two explanations are diametrically opposed to each other, that from them follow two mutually exclusive systems of action. The Narodnik, who considers the bourgeoisie an accident, sees no connection between them and the state, and with the credulity of a "simple-minded muzhik" appeals for aid precisely to the one who guards bourgeois interests. His activity boils down to the modest and precise, official liberal activity that is on a par with philanthropy, for it does not seriously affect the "interests" and holds no terror for them at all. The Marxist turns his back on this hotchpotch, and says that there can be no other "guarantees for the future" than the "stern struggle of economic classes."

It is also understandable that if these differences in systems of action follow directly and inevitably from differences in *explaining* the fact of the domination of our bour-

geoisie, the Marxist, when conducting a *theoretical dispute*, confines himself to proving the necessity and inevitability (under the given organisation of social economy) of this bourgeoisie (that was the case with Mr. Struve's book); and that if the Narodnik, avoiding the issue of these different methods of explanation, engages in talk about Hegelianism and about "cruelty towards the individual,"* this is merely a clear indication of his impotence.

"The history of the third estate in Western Europe is an exceedingly long one.... We, of course, shall not repeat all this history, despise the teaching of the fatalists; nor will the enlightened representatives of our third estate proceed, of course, to utilise the same means for achieving their aims as were resorted to previously, and will only take from them those that are most suitable and correspond to the conditions of place and time. To deprive the peasantry of the land and create a factory proletariat they will not, of course, resort to crude military force or the no less crude clearing of estates."

"Will not resort"...?!! Only among the theoreticians of sugary optimism can one meet such deliberate forgetfulness of past and present *facts* that have already said their "aye"—and rose-spectacled trustfulness that the future will, of course, yield "no." Of course that is false.

"... but they will resort to the abolition of communal landownership, to the creation of capitalist farmers a numerically small class of wealthy peasants,** and will, in general, resort to means that allow the economically weak to perish of himself. They will not now start setting up guilds but will organise credit, raw-material, consumers' and producers' associations which, with their promise of general happiness, will only help the strong to become still stronger, and the weak to become still weaker. They will not bother about the patrimonial court, but will bother about legislation to encourage assiduity, sobriety and education, which will be pursued only by the young bourgeoisie, since the masses will continue as hitherto to get drunk, will be ignorant and will work for others."

How well described are all these credit, raw-material, and miscellaneous other associations, all these measures for encouraging assiduity, sobriety and education, towards

* Mr. Mikhailovsky in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, 1894.

** That is being superbly put into effect even without the abolition of the village community which does not in the least eliminate the split among the peasantry—as has been established by Zemstvo statistics.

which such a touching attitude is displayed by our contemporary liberal-Narodnik press, including the *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. All that remains for the Marxist is to emphasise what has been said, to agree fully that *all this is mere representation of the third estate*, and, consequently, those who show tender concern for it are nothing more than *little bourgeois* people.

This quotation is a sufficient answer to the present-day Narodniks, who draw the conclusion from the contemptuous attitude of the Marxists to such measures that they want to be mere "spectators" and do nothing. True enough, they will never set their hands to bourgeois activity; as far as that is concerned they will always be "spectators."

"The role of this class (these offspring of the people—the petty bourgeoisie), which forms the outposts, the sharpshooters and vanguard of the bourgeois army, has been, unfortunately, of very little interest to historians and economists, whereas its role, we repeat, is an exceedingly important one. When the destruction of the village community and the alienation of the peasants' land took place, it was not done by the lords and knights alone, but by their own folks, i.e., again by offspring of the people, offspring endowed with practical shrewdness and a flexible spine, who had been awarded by the lord's grace, who had fished some capital out of troubled waters or had acquired it by plunder, individuals to whom the upper estates and the legislature stretched out their hands. They were called the most industrious, capable and sober elements of the people...."

This observation is a very true one as far as the facts go. Really, the alienation of the peasants' land was done mainly by "their own folks," by the petty bourgeois. But the Narodnik understands this fact unsatisfactorily. He does not distinguish two antagonistic classes, the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie, the representatives of the "old-nobility" and of the "new middle-class" systems, does not distinguish between different systems of economic organisation, does not see the progressive significance of the second class as compared with the first. That is the first point. Secondly, he attributes the rise of the bourgeoisie to plunder, to shrewdness, servility, etc., whereas small-scale farming based on commodity production makes a petty bourgeois of the most sober, hard-working peasant: he accumulates "savings" and by virtue of environmental relations they turn into *capital*. Read about this in the de-

scriptions of handicraft industries and peasant farming, in the works of our Narodnik men of letters.

"... They are not the sharpshooters and vanguard even, they are the main bourgeois army, the lower ranks, formed into units under the command of staff and senior officers, commanders of separate units and the General Staff, made up of publicists, speakers and scientists.* Without this army the bourgeoisie could have done nothing. Could the English landlords, who number less than 30,000 have been able to govern the hungry mass of tens of millions without the capitalist farmers?! The farmer is a real fighting man in the political sense and a little expropriating nucleus in the economic sense.... In the factories the role of the farmers is fulfilled by the foremen and assistant foremen, who get a very good wage not only for more skilled work, but for keeping a watch on the workers, for being the last to leave the bench for preventing the workers from putting forward demands for wage increases or for reduction of working hours, and for enabling the employers to say as they point at them: 'See how much we pay those who work and are of benefit to us'; by the shopkeepers, who maintain the closest relations with the employers and factory managements; by the office staff, all sorts of supervisors and suchlike small fry, in whose veins workers' blood still flows, but over whose minds capital has already taken complete control." [Quite true! K. T.] "Of course, the things we see in Britain are also to be seen in France, Germany and other countries." [Quite true! And in Russia, too. K. T.] "The only difference in some cases is in details, and even those in greater part remain unchanged. The French bourgeoisie, who at the end of last century triumphed over the nobility, or to put it better, who took advantage of the people's victory, produced from among the people a petty bourgeoisie that helped to fleece the people, and themselves fleeced the people and delivered them into the hands of adventurers.... At a time when in literature hymns were being sung to the French people, when their greatness, magnanimity and love of liberty were being lauded to the skies, when all this adulation was enveloping France in a cloud, the bourgeois cat was eating the chicken, disposing of it almost entirely and leaving only the bones for the people. The much vaunted people's land tenure turned out to be microscopic, measured in metres and often incapable even of covering taxation expenditure...."

Let us pause here.

Firstly, we would like to ask the Narodnik: who in our country "took advantage of the victory over serfdom," over

* And administrators and the bureaucracy, it should be added. Otherwise the reference to the composition of the "General Staff" will suffer from an impossible incompleteness—impossible in the conditions peculiar to Russia.

the "old-nobility stratum"? Not the bourgeoisie, of course? What was going on in our country among the "people" when "hymns," now quoted by the author, "were being sung in literature" about the people, love for the people, magnanimity, community peculiarities and qualities, the "social mutual adaptation and joint activity" within the village community, about Russia being a single artel, and the community being "all that is in the minds and actions of village folk," etc., etc., etc., hymns that continue to be sung to this day (though in a minor key) in the columns of the liberal-Narodnik press? The land, of course, was not taken from the peasantry; the bourgeois cat, of course, did not make a hearty meal of the chicken, did not dispose of it almost entirely; "the much vaunted people's land tenure" did not "turn out to be microscopic," it contained no excess of expenditure over income?* No, only "mystics and metaphysicians" are capable of asserting that, of considering it to be a fact, of making that fact the starting-point of their opinions about our affairs, of their activity, which is aimed not at seeking for "different paths for the fatherland," but at working along the present, now quite established, capitalist path.

Secondly. It is interesting to compare the author's *method* and the *method* of the Marxists. One can far better understand wherein they differ on the basis of specific judgements than by way of abstract thinking. Why does the author say of the French "bourgeoisie" that it triumphed at the end of last century over the nobility? Why is activity that consisted chiefly and almost exclusively of the activity of the intelligentsia, called bourgeois? And then, was it not the government that acted, depriving the peasantry of the land, and imposing heavy payments, etc.? Finally, these personalities surely spoke of their love for the people, of equality and universal happiness, as the Russian liberals and Narodniks did and are doing now? Under these circumstances can one see just the "bourgeoisie" in all this? Is not this view a "narrow" one, reducing political and ideological movements to Plusmacherei?** Just note, these are the same questions

* And not only "often," as in France, but as a general rule, the excess running not only into tens, but into hundreds per cent.

** Profit-hunting.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

as those with which the Russian Marxists are flooded when they say identical things about our peasant Reform (seeing it as differing merely in "details"), about post-Reform Russia in general. I speak here, I repeat, not of the factual correctness of our view, but of the *method* used in the given case by the Narodnik. He takes as his *criterion* the results ("it turned out" that the people's land tenure was microscopic, the cat "was eating" and "ate up" the chicken), and what is more—exclusively economic *results*.

The question arises: why does he apply this *method* only to France, and refuse to employ it for Russia, too? Surely, the method should be universal. If in France you seek for *interests* behind the activity of the *government* and the *intelligentsia*, why do you *not seek* them in holy Russia? If *there* your criterion raises the question of what the character of people's land tenure "*turned out*" to be, why is what it "may" turn out to be made the criterion *here*? If there, phrases about the people and its magnanimity, while the "chicken was being eaten," fill you with legitimate disgust, why do you not *here* turn your backs, as you would on bourgeois philosophers, on those who, while the "eating" undoubtedly exists and is recognised by you, can talk of "social mutual adaptation," the "community spirit of the people," the "*needs of people's industry*" and suchlike things?

There is only one answer. It is because you are an ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie, because your ideas, i.e., Narodnik ideas in general, and not the ideas of Tom, Dick, and Harry—are the result of their reflecting the interests and the viewpoint of the small producer, and not at all the result of "pure"* thought.

"But particularly instructive for us in this respect is Germany, which was late, as we were, with her bourgeois reform and for that reason made use of the experience of other nations, in the negative and not the positive sense, of course." The composition of the peasantry in Germany—says the author, paraphrasing Vasilchikov—was heterogeneous: the peasants were divided up according to their rights and the land they held, i.e., the size of their allotments. The entire process led to the formation of a "peasant aristocracy," an "estate of small landowners not of noble origin," to the transformation of the

* Mr. V. V.'s expression. See *Our Trends*, and also *Nedelya*, Nos. 47-49, 1894.

mass from "householders to unskilled labourers." "Finally the finishing touch was given, and all legal roads to an improvement of the workers conditions were cut off by the semi-aristocratic, semi-middle-class constitution of 1849, which gave the vote only to the nobility and the wealthy middle class."

An original way of arguing. The constitution "*cut off*" legal roads?! This again is a reflection of the good old theory of the Russian Narodniks, according to which the "intelligentsia" were invited to sacrifice "freedom," since, we are told, it would be of service to them alone, while the people would be surrendered to the "wealthy middle class." We are not going to argue against this stupid and reactionary theory, because it has been rejected by the contemporary Narodniks in general and our immediate opponents, Messrs. the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, in particular. We must, however, note that by rejecting this idea, by taking a step towards openly recognising Russia's *existing* paths instead of palavering about the possibility of different paths, these Narodniks reveal their petty-bourgeois nature once and for all; their insistence on paltry, middle-class reforms, arising out of their absolute inability to understand the class struggle, places them on the side of the liberals against those who take the side of the "antipode," seeing in it the only creator, so to speak, of the good things in question.

"In Germany, too, there were many people at that time who only waxed enthusiastic over the emancipation, and did so for ten, twenty, thirty years and more; people who considered all scepticism, all dissatisfaction with the Reform playing into the hands of reaction and cursed the sceptics and the grumblers. The simple-minded among them imagined the people as a horse that had been set at liberty and could be put back into the stable again and could go once more into the mail-coach (something by no means always possible). But there were also knaves who flattered the people and who, pursuing another line on the quiet, tacked themselves on to these simpletons who were full of sincere love of the people, and could be tricked and exploited. Oh, those sincere simpletons! When civic struggle begins, by no means everybody is ready for it and by no means everybody has an aptitude for it."

Splendid words that give a good summary of the best traditions of the old Russian Narodism and that we can utilise to characterise the attitude of the Russian Marxists to

contemporary Russian Narodism. To make such use of them not much has to be changed—so *identical* is the process of capitalist development in both countries; so *identical* are the social and political ideas reflecting this process.

In our country, too, "progressive" literature is governed and guided by individuals who talk of "fundamental differences between our peasant Reform and that of the West," about the "sanction of people's (sic!) production," about the great "allotment of land" (land redemption is called that!!), etc., and who therefore await the dispensation by their superiors of a miracle called the "socialisation of labour," wait for "ten, twenty, thirty years and more," while the cat—of which we have spoken earlier—eats the chicken, looking with the tenderness of a sated and satisfied animal at the "sincere simpletons" who talk of the need to choose another path for the fatherland, of the harm of "threatening" capitalism, and of measures for assisting the people with credits, artels, common cultivation of the land and suchlike innocent patching. "Oh, those sincere simpletons!"

"And now we, too, and mainly our peasantry, are experiencing this process of the formation of a third estate. Russia is in this respect behind the whole of Europe, even behind its college companion, or to be more exact 'teacher-in-training,' Germany. The towns were the main breeding ground and ferment of the third estate everywhere in Europe. In our country the opposite is the case"—we have far fewer urban inhabitants.... "The chief cause of this difference is our people's system of land tenure, which keeps the population in the countryside. The increase in the urban population in Europe is closely bound up with the separation of the people from the land and with factory industry which, under capitalist conditions of production, requires cheap labour and a surplus of it. The European peasantry, driven out of the villages, went to earn a living in the towns, whereas our peasantry keep to the land as long as they possibly can. Land tenure by the people is the principal strategic point, the principal key to the peasant position, a key whose significance is perfectly well understood by the leaders of the middle class, and that is why they direct all their art and all their energy against it. This is the origin of all these attacks on the village community, this is the source of the great number of projects of a different kinds about the alienation of the peasants' land, for the sake of rational farming, for the sake of industrial prosperity, for the sake of national progress and glory!"

This shows clearly the superficiality of the Narodnik theory which, as a result of dreams about "different paths,"

quite wrongly assesses the real situation: it sees the "principal point" in such juridical institutions, which play no fundamental role, as the forms of peasant land *tenure* (community or household); it sees something peculiar in our small peasant economy, as though it is not the ordinary economy of small producers, of the same kind—as to the type of their political and economic organisation—as the economy of the West-European handicraftsmen and peasants, but some "people's" (?!) system of land tenure. According to the terminology established in our liberal and Narodnik press, the meaning of the word "people's" is one that rules out the exploitation of the one who works—so that by the definition he gives the author actually conceals the undoubted fact that in our peasant economy there is the very same appropriation of surplus-value, the very same work for others as prevail outside of the "community," and so opens the doors wide to sentimental and unctuous Pharisaism.

"Our present village community, land-poor and weighed down by taxation, is not much of a guarantee. The peasant had little land as it was, but now, as a result of the growing population and declining fertility, has still less, and the burden of taxation is not lessening; but increasing; there are few industries; there are still fewer local employments; life in the countryside is becoming so difficult that the peasants of entire villages go far away in search of employment, leaving only their wives and children at home. In this way entire uyezds become deserted.... Influenced by these hard conditions of life, on the one hand, a special class of people emerges from among the peasantry—the young bourgeoisie, who try to buy land on the side, each on his own, try to engage in other occupations—trade, usury, the organisation of workers' artels headed by themselves, to get all sorts of contracts and in similar petty business."

It is worth dwelling in great detail on this passage.

We see here, firstly, the statement of certain facts that can be expressed in a couple of words: the peasants are fleeing; secondly, an assessment of the facts (a negative one), and thirdly, an explanation of them from which there directly follows an entire programme, here not expounded, but well enough known (add land, reduce taxes; "raise" and "develop" peasant industries).

It must be emphasised that from the viewpoint of the Marxist both the *first* and the *second* are wholly and undoubtedly correct (except, as we shall see, that they are

expressed in an extremely unsatisfactory way). But the *third** is absolutely useless.

Let me explain this. The first is correct. The fact is correct that our village community is no guarantee, that the peasantry are abandoning the village, leaving the land; he should have said: are being expropriated because they possessed (on a private property basis) certain means of production and are losing them (among them land by special right, which, however, allowed land *redeemed* by the community to be also privately exploited). It is correct that handicraft industries "are declining", i.e., the peasants here too are being expropriated, are losing their means and instruments of production, are giving up domestic weaving and are leaving to work on railway construction jobs or hiring themselves out as bricklayers, unskilled labourers, etc. The means of production from which the peasants are freed pass into the hands of an insignificant minority, and serve as a source of exploitation of labour-power—*as capital*. That is why the author is right when he says that the owners of these means of production become a "bourgeoisie," i.e., a class which under the capitalist organisation of social economy holds in its hands the "people's" labour. All these facts are correctly stated and truly assessed for their exploiting significance.

But from the description given the reader has, of course, seen that the Marxist *explains* these facts in a totally different way. The Narodnik sees the causes of these things in that "there is little land," taxes are burdensome, and "earnings" are falling—i.e., in peculiarities *of policy*—land, taxation, industrial—and not in the peculiarities *of the social organisation of production*, an organisation from which the *given* policy inevitably follows.

There is little land—argues the Narodnik—and it is becoming less. (I do not even necessarily take the statement made by the author of the article, but the general proposition of the Narodnik doctrine.) Quite correct, but why do you merely say that there is *little* land, and not add that there is *little on sale*. Surely you are aware that

* That is why the theoreticians of Marxism, in combating Narodism, lay the stress on explanation and understanding, on the objective side.

our peasants are *redeeming* their allotments from the landlords. Why, then, do you concentrate your attention mainly on what there is *little* of, and not on what is *on sale*?

The very fact of sale, of redemption by purchase points to the domination of principles (the acquisition of the means of production for money) which, in any case, leave the peasants without the means of production whether few or many of them are sold. By ignoring this fact you ignore the capitalist mode of production on which basis alone the sale became possible. By ignoring this you take the side of that bourgeois society and turn into a plain political jobber who argues about whether much or little land should be on sale. You do not see that the very fact of the redemption by purchase proves that "*capital* has already taken complete control" over the "minds" of those in whose interests the "great" Reform was carried through, who themselves accomplished it; you do not see that it is the "capitalist moon" that casts the only light existing for all this liberal-Narodnik "society" which bases itself on the system created by the Reform speechifying on how to make various improvements in that system. That is why the Narodnik so savagely attacks those who adhere consistently to a basis that is different in principle. He raises a cry about their not being concerned about the people, about their wanting to take the land away from the peasants!!

He, the Narodnik, is concerned about the people, he does not want the peasant to lose his land, he wants him to have more of it (*sold* to him). He is an honest shopkeeper. True, he keeps silent about the fact that land is sold and not supplied gratis, but then, does anybody in the corner shops say that goods have to be paid for? As it is, everybody knows it.

It is understandable that he hates the Marxists, who say that we must address ourselves exclusively to those who are already "differentiated" from this shopkeepers' society, "excommunicated" from it, if one may use these highly characteristic petty-bourgeois expressions of the Messrs. Mikhailovskys and Yuzhakovs.*

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* Apart from ignoring and failing to understand the capitalist character of land redemption, Messrs. the Narodniks also modestly

Let us proceed. "There are few industries"—such is the Narodnik's viewpoint on handicraft industries. And again he is silent on the way the industries are organised. He complacently shuts his eyes to the fact that both the industries that are "declining" and those that "are developing" are similarly organised on capitalist lines, labour being totally enslaved to the capital of buyers-up, merchants, etc., and confines himself to petty-bourgeois demands for progressive measures, improvements, artels, etc., as though such measures can in any way influence the *fact* of the domination of capital. In the sphere of both agriculture and of manufacturing industry he accepts their existing organisation, and does not fight against the organisation itself, but against its various imperfections. As to taxes, here the Narodnik has refuted himself by bringing into sharp relief the basic characteristic feature of Narodism—the capacity for compromise. Earlier on he himself asserted that every tax (even income tax) would hit at the workers where a system of appropriating surplus-value exists—nevertheless, he does not in the least object to discussing with the members of liberal society whether taxes are large or small and to offering, with "civic decency," the appropriate advice to the Department of Taxes and Levies.

In short, the cause—in the Marxist's view—lies neither in policy, nor in the state, nor in "society," but in the present system of Russia's economic organisation; the point is not that "shrewd people" or "tricksters" fish in troubled waters, but that the "people" constitute two opposite, mutually exclusive, classes: "in society all active forces add up to two equally operating, mutually opposite ones."

"People who are interested in installing the bourgeois order, when they see the collapse of their projects,* do not stop at that:

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avoid the fact that side by side with the peasants' "land poverty" there are some very nice pieces of land in the possession of the representatives of the "old nobility" stratum.

* So then, the collapse of the project to abolish the village community means victory over those who want to "install the bourgeois order"!!

Having concocted a petty-bourgeois utopia about the "community," the Narodnik goes so far in his dreams as to ignore reality that he sees in the project against the community nothing less than the in-

they hourly repeat to the peasantry that the blame for everything lies with the community, collective responsibility, the redistribution of the fields, the whole system of the village community, which favour idlers and drunkards; they organise loan-and-savings societies for the prosperous peasants and busy themselves about small land credits for plot holders; in the towns they arrange technical, handicraft and various other schools, entrance to which is again available only to the children of well-to-do folk, whereas the mass are without schools; they help the rich peasants to improve their cattle by means of exhibitions, prize awards, supplying pure-bred sires on hire from depots, etc. All these petty efforts go to make up a considerable force that has a degenerating effect on the countryside and increasingly splits the peasantry into two."

The description of the "petty efforts" is a good one. The author's idea that all these petty efforts (which *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and our entire liberal and Narodnik press now uphold so zealously) signify, express and further the "new middle-class" stratum, the capitalist system, is quite a correct one.

This is precisely the reason for the Marxists' negative attitude to such efforts. And the fact that these "efforts" are undoubtedly the immediate desiderata of the small producers—proves, in their view, that their main thesis is correct that the representative of the idea of labour is not to be seen in the peasant, since he, being a petty bourgeois under the capitalist organisation of economy, takes, accordingly, the side of this system, adheres in certain aspects of his life (and of his ideas) to the bourgeoisie.

It will be worth while to utilise this passage to stress the following. The negative attitude of Marxists to "petty

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stalling of the bourgeois order, whereas it is simply political jobbery based on the already fully "installed" bourgeois system.

To him the most forceful argument against the Marxist is the question that he asks with an air of final triumph: just tell me, now, do you want to destroy the community or not, yes or no? For him the whole question is that of "installation." He absolutely refuses to understand that from the Marxist's viewpoint the "installation" is a long-established and irrevocable fact that will not be affected either by the destruction or the consolidation of the community—just as the domination of capital is the same in the community village and in a village consisting of individual peasant households.

The Narodnik tries to advance a profounder protest against "installation" by an apology for the installation. A drowning man clutches at a straw.

efforts" particularly evokes complaints from the Narodnik gentlemen. By reminding them of their forefathers we show that there was a time when the Narodniks took a different view of this, when they were not so eager and zealous in their compromises [although they did compromise even then, as the same article proves], when they—I will not say understood—but at least sensed the bourgeois character of all such efforts, and when the denial of them was condemned as "pessimism towards the people" by only the most naïve of liberals.

The pleasant intercourse of the Narodnik gentlemen with the latter, as representatives of "society," apparently yielded good fruit.

The fact that one cannot content oneself with the "petty efforts" of bourgeois progress by no means signifies absolute rejection of partial reforms. Marxists by no means deny that these measures are of some (albeit miserable) benefit; they can result in some (albeit miserable) improvement in the working people's conditions; they speed up the process of extinction of particularly backward forms of capital, usury, bondage, etc., they speed up their transformation into the more modern and humane forms of European capitalism. That is why Marxists, if they were asked whether such measures should be adopted, would, of course, answer: they should—but would thereupon explain their attitude in general to the capitalist system that is improved by these measures, would motivate their agreement by their desire to speed up the development of this system, and, consequently its downfall.*

"If we bear in mind that in this country, as in Germany, the peasantry are divided up according to rights and tenure, into various categories (state, appanage and former landlords' peasants, among them being those who received full allotments, medium and quarter lots, as well as manor serfs), that our community way of life is not the universal way of life; that in the south-west, among private landowners, we again meet with peasants owning draught animals, and footers,** market gardeners, farm labourers and *chinsh* peasants,[111]

* This refers not only to "technical and other schools," to technical improvements for peasants and handicraftsmen but also to "the extension of peasant land tenure and to "credit," etc.

** See p. 45 of this volume.—*Ed.*

some of whom possess 100 dessiatines and more, while others have not an inch of soil that in the Baltic gubernias the agrarian system is a perfect copy of the German agrarian system, etc., then we shall see that we too have a basis for a bourgeoisie."

One cannot but note here that fanciful exaggeration of the significance of the community from which the Narodniks have always suffered. The author expresses himself as though "community life" ruled out a bourgeoisie, ruled out the splitting up of the peasants! Now that is totally untrue!

Everybody knows that the community peasants are also split up according to rights and allotments; that in every village where the community is strong the peasants are again split up both "according to rights" (landless, allotment-holding, ex-manor serfs, paid-up allotment-holder, registered, etc., etc.) and "according to tenure": peasants who have rented out their allotments, who have been deprived of them for arrears in taxes or for not cultivating and letting them fall into neglect or who lease the allotments of others; peasants who own land in "perpetuity" or who "purchase a few dessiatines for several years"; lastly, homeless peasants, peasants owning no cattle, peasants owning no horses and those owning many horses. Everybody knows that in every village where the community is strong this economic fragmentation and commodity economy provide a basis for the full blossoming of usury capital, for bondage in all its forms. And the Narodniks continue telling sugary tales about something they call "community life"!

"Our young bourgeoisie is indeed growing by leaps and bounds, and is growing not only in the Jewish border areas, but in the heart of Russia. As yet it is difficult to express their number in figures, but when we look at the growing number of landowners, at the increasing number of commercial certificates, at the increasing number of complaints from the villages about the kulaks and the blood-suckers and other evidence,* there are grounds for thinking that their number is already considerable."

* To which should be added purchases with the aid of the Peasant Bank, "progressive trends in peasant farming" such as technical and agronomical improvements, introduction of improved implements, grass-growing, etc., the development of small-scale credits and organisation of a market for handicraftsmen, etc.

Quite true! It is this fact, that was true in 1879 and is still more true in 1895, that serves as one of the mainstays of the Marxist understanding of Russian reality.

Our attitude to this fact is equally negative; we are both agreed that it expresses phenomena opposed to the interests of the direct producers—but we *understand* these facts in quite different ways. I have already described the theoretical aspect of the difference above, and I shall now turn to the practical aspect.

The bourgeoisie, especially those of the countryside, are **still** weak in this country; they are only just coming into existence, says the Narodnik. Hence one can **still** wage a struggle against them. The bourgeois trend is still not very strong—therefore we can **still** turn back. It is not too late.

Only the metaphysical sociologist (who in practice becomes a cowardly reactionary romanticist) can argue that way. I shall not bother to say that the "weakness" of the bourgeoisie in the countryside is to be explained by the departure of their strong elements, their top-rankers, to the towns—that only the "rank and file" are in the villages, whereas in the towns we have the "general staff"—I shall not bother to speak of all these thoroughly obvious distortions of fact by the Narodniks. There is another mistake in this argument, one that makes it metaphysical.

We are faced with a certain social relation, a relation between the village petty bourgeois (the rich peasant, shopkeeper, kulak, blood-sucker, etc.), and the "labouring" peasant, labouring "for others," of course.

This relation exists—the Narodnik will not be able to deny its generally widespread character. But it is weak, says he, and for that reason may *still* be corrected.

History is made by "living individuals," we tell this Narodnik, offering him his own wares. It is, of course, possible to correct, to change social relations, but only when such action originates *from the people themselves whose social relations are being corrected or changed*. This is as clear as the clearest daylight. The question arises: can the "labouring" peasant change this relation? What does it consist of? Of the fact that two small producers operate under the system of commodity production, that this com-

modity economy splits them into "two," to one it gives *capital*, and the other it compels to work "for others."

How can our labouring peasant change this relation if he himself is half-rooted in what has to be changed? how can he understand that isolation and commodity economy are no good to him if he himself is isolated and works at his own risk and responsibility for the market? if these conditions of life evoke in him "thoughts and feelings" that are peculiar to one who works on his own for the market? if he is isolated by the very material conditions, by the size and character of his farm, and if by virtue of this his contradiction to capital is still so little developed that he cannot understand that he is faced by *capital* and not merely by "tricksters" and shrewd people?

Is it not obvious that one should turn to where *this same* (N. B.) social relation is *fully* developed, where those involved in this social relation, the immediate producers, are themselves fully "differentiated" and "excommunicated" from the bourgeois order, where the contradiction is already so far developed as to be self-evident, and where it is impossible to raise the problem like a dreamer, in half-hearted fashion? And when the immediate producers in these advanced conditions are "differentiated from life" of bourgeois society not only *in fact* but also *in their minds*—then the labouring peasantry, who are in backward and worse conditions, will see "how it is done," and will join with their fellow workers "for others."

"When people speak here of cases of peasants buying land, and explain that the peasantry buy land privately or as a whole community, they almost never add that purchases by the community are only rare and insignificant exceptions to the general rule of private purchases."

The author further quoted figures to show that the number of private landowners was 103,158 in 1861 and reached a total of 313,529 according to data for the sixties; he said that the explanation of this is that small proprietors of peasant origin were not included under serfdom but were included on the second occasion and continued:

"These are our young rural bourgeoisie, who immediately border on and are linked up with the small landed nobility."

True—is what we say to that—quite true, especially that about them ''bordering on" and being "linked up"! And that is why we class as petty-bourgeois ideologists those who attach serious importance (in the sense of the interests of the immediate producers) to "the extension of peasant land tenure," i.e., including the author, who on page 152 says just this.

That is why we consider as no more than political jobbers people who discuss the problem of purchases made privately and by the community as though "installing" the bourgeois order depended on it in the slightest degree. We place both the one and the other case in the bourgeois category, for purchase is purchase, money is money in both cases, i.e., the sort of commodity that only falls into the hands of the petty bourgeois,* irrespective of whether he is united with others by the community "for social mutual adaptation and joint activity" or is isolated by having a plot of land of his own.

"Incidentally, they (the young rural bourgeoisie) are not shown here to the full. The word 'blood-sucker' (*miroyed*) is not new in Russia, but it has never had the meaning it now has, it has never exerted such pressure on fellow villagers as it does now compared with the blood sucker of today, the old miroyed was a patriarchal sort of individual who was always subordinated to the community and was sometimes merely an idler who did not particularly hunt after profit. The word miroyed has now acquired a different meaning and, in the majority of gubernias, is merely a generic term that is relatively little used and has been replaced by such words as: kulak, welsher merchant, publican, cat-skinner, contractor, pawnbroker, etc. This splitting up of one term into several, into words, some of which are not new either, and some quite new or have not hitherto been current among peasants, shows first and foremost that a division of labour has taken place in the exploitation of the people, and that there has been an extensive development of rapacity and that it has become specialised. In almost every village and every hamlet there are one or several such exploiters."

Without a doubt the fact of the development of rapacity has been correctly noted. It is, however, to no purpose that the author, like all Narodniks, refuses despite all these facts to understand that this systematic, universal, regular (even with division of labour) kulak activity is a manifestation of capitalism in agriculture, is the domination of capital

* This does not refer, of course, to such money as merely serves for the acquisition of necessary articles of consumption, but to *free* money that can be saved for the purchase of means of production.

in its primary forms, capital which, on the one hand, engenders the urban, banking, and in general European, capitalism that the Narodniks consider to be something adventitious, and, on the other hand, is supported and fed by this capitalism—in a word that it is one of the aspects of the capitalist organisation of the Russian national economy.

In addition, the description of the "evolution" of the blood-sucker enables us to catch the Narodnik once again.

In the Reform of 1861 the Narodnik sees the sanction of people's production, discerns in it features that are fundamentally different from those of Western reform.

The measures that he now thirsts for amount equally to similar "sanction"—of the community, etc., and to similar "provisions of allotments" and means of production in general.

Why, then, Mr. Narodnik, did the Reform, which "sanctioned people's (and not capitalist) production," merely result in the "patriarchal idler" turning into a relatively energetic, lively, civilisation-adorned vulture? merely result in a change in the *form* of rapacity, as did the corresponding great reforms in the West?

Why do you imagine that the next steps in "sanctioning" (which are quite possible in the shape of an extension of peasant land tenure, migration to other areas, regulation of land rentings and other undoubtedly progressive measures—although they are bourgeois progressive measures)—why do you imagine that they will lead to something other than a further change in the *form*, a further Europeanisation of *capital*, its transformation from merchant's into productive, from medieval into modern?

It cannot be otherwise—for the simple reason that such measures do not in the least affect *capital*, i.e., that relation between people under which money, the product of *social* labour organised by commodity economy, is accumulated in the hands of some, while others have nothing but free "hands,"* free precisely of the product that is concentrated in the possession of the previous category.

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* *The masses* will, *as hitherto* ... work *for others*" (see article under discussion, p. 135): If they were not "free" (free de facto, though de jure they may even be "provided with an allotment"), this, of course, could not take place.

... "Of them (of these kulaks, etc.) the smaller fry possessing no capital usually attach themselves to the big merchants, who supply them with credit or instruct them to make purchases on their account; the more prosperous ones carry on independently, are themselves in touch with big commercial cities and ports, send waggonloads there in their own name and go themselves for goods required locally. If you travel on any railway line you will invariably meet in the 3rd (rarely in the 2nd) class dozens of people of this type on their way somewhere on business. You will recognise them by the specific clothes they wear, by their extremely bad manners, and by their boisterous laughter at some lady who asks them not to smoke or at a *muzhichok*"* [that's what it says: muzhichok. K. T.] who is on his way somewhere to get work and who is 'ignorant' because he understands nothing of commerce, and wears bast shoes. You will also recognise these people by their conversation. They usually talk about calf-hides, vegetable oils, leather, smelt, millet, etc., and you will hear cynical stories about the swindling they do and the way they fake their goods, about how 'strong smelling' salt beef was 'palmed off on a factory,' about how 'anybody can give tea a colour if you show him once,' about how you can add three pounds' weight of water to a sugar loaf in such a way that the customer won't notice anything,' etc. All this is spoken of with such frankness and impudence that you can easily see that the only reason why these people do not steal spoons from public dining-rooms and do not turn out station gas lamps is because they are afraid of landing in jail. Morally these people are below the most elementary standards, their morals are all based on the ruble and are limited to aphorisms, such as: trading means twisting; keep your eyes skinned; don't miss your chance, look for what you can easily lay your hands on; use the moment when nobody's looking; don't pity the weak; bow and scrape when necessary." An item is then quoted from a newspaper about how a publican and usurer named Volkov set fire to his house which he had insured for a big sum. This person "... is considered to be their most respected acquaintance by the local teacher and priest," one "teacher in return for wine, writes his legal letters for him." "The Volost Clerk promises to bamboozle the Mordovians for him." "A Zemstvo agent, at the same time a member of the Zemstvo Board, insures him his old house for 1,000 rubles," and so on. "Volkov is no isolated example, but a type. There is no locality without its Volkovs, where they tell you not only about similar fleecing and enslaving of the peasants, but also of cases of the same sort of fires...."

"... But what is the attitude of the peasantry to such people? If they are stupid, grossly heartless and petty like Volkov, the peasantry have no love for them, and rear them, because those people can play all sorts of dirty tricks on them, while they can do nothing in return; the homes of those people are insured, they have fast horses, strong locks, fierce dogs and connections with the local authorities.

* *Muzhichok*—a diminutive of muzhik, a peasant.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

But if those people are cleverer and more cunning than Volkov, if they give their fleecing and enslaving of the peasantry a decent form, if, while robbing them of a ruble, they make an ostensible reduction of a farthing, and if they do not begrudge an extra supply of vodka or a couple of buckets of millet for a burnt-out village, they are held in honour and respect and enjoy authority among the peasants as benefactors, as fathers of the peasant poor, who, no doubt, would be lost without them. The peasantry regard them as clever people, and even let their children be trained by them, considering it an honour for their boy to have a job in a shop, and fully confident that it will make a man of him."

I deliberately copied out the author's argument in great detail so as to cite a description of our young bourgeoisie made by an *opponent* of the proposition that the organisation of Russia's social economy is bourgeois. An examination of this description can clear up many points in the theory of Russian Marxism, in the character of the current attacks made on it by *contemporary* Narodism.

It would seem from the beginning of this description that the author understands how deeply-rooted this bourgeoisie is, understands its connections with the big bourgeoisie, to which the petty bourgeoisie "attaches itself," and its connections with the peasantry, who let their "children be trained" by them. The examples given by the author show, however, that he is far from adequately appraising the strength and stability of this phenomenon.

The examples he gives deal with crime, swindling, arson, etc. One gets the impression that the "fleecing and enslaving" of the peasantry is a matter of accident, the result (as the author expressed himself above) of severe conditions of living, of the "grossness of moral ideas," of obstacles to "making literature accessible to the people" (p. 152), etc.—in a word, that all this does not inevitably result from the present-day organisation of our social economy.

The Marxist adheres to this latter view; he asserts that all this is no accident at all, but a necessity, a necessity conditioned by the capitalist mode of production prevailing in Russia. Once the peasant becomes a commodity producer (and all peasants have already become such), his "morality" will inevitably be "based on the ruble," and we have no grounds for blaming him for this, as the very conditions of life compel him to catch this ruble by all sorts of trading

devices.* Under these conditions, without resort to any crime, servility, or falsification, the "peasantry" split into rich and poor. The old equality cannot hold out against the fluctuations of the market. This is not mere talk—it is a fact. And it is a fact that under these conditions the "wealth" of the few becomes *capital*, while the "poverty" of the masses compels them to sell their hands, to work for other people. Thus, from the Marxist's viewpoint capitalism has already taken firm root, taken definite shape not only in factory industry but also in the countryside and all over Russia in general.

You can imagine now how witty the Narodniks are when, in reply to the Marxist's argument that the cause of all these "unfortunate things" in the villages is not politics, land poverty, payments, or bad "personalities," but capitalism, that all this is *necessary* and inevitable where the capitalist mode of production exists, where the bourgeois class prevails—when in reply to this the Narodnik begins to howl that the Marxists want to deprive the peasantry of the land, that they "prefer" the proletarian to the "independent" peasant, that they display—as provincial ladies say and as Mr. Mikhailovsky does in reply to Mr. Struve—"contempt and cruelty" towards the "individual."

In this picture of the countryside, which is interesting because it has been drawn by an opponent, we see clearly the absurdity of the current objections made against the Marxists, how artificial they are—they avoid the facts, and forget their earlier statements—all in order to save, coûte que coûte,** the theories made up of dreams and compromises which fortunately no power is now able to save.

When they talk of capitalism in Russia the Marxists borrow ready-made schemes, dogmatically repeat propositions that are copied from quite different conditions. They make capitalist production in Russia, which is infinitesimal in development and significance (all told, 1,400,000 people are employed in our factories and works), cover the mass of the peasantry, who still own land. Such is one of the favourite objections raised in the liberal and Narodnik camp.

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* Cf. Uspensky.[112]

** At all costs.—*Ed.*

Now from that same picture of the countryside we see that when the Narodnik describes the way of life of the "community" and "independent" peasants, he cannot manage without this very category of the bourgeoisie derived from abstract schemes and alien dogmas, he cannot avoid stating that it is a village type and not an isolated case, that it is bound by the strongest ties to the big urban bourgeoisie, that it is also bound to the peasantry, who "let their children be trained by them," and from whom, in other words, this young bourgeoisie emerge. We see, consequently, that the young bourgeoisie grow within our "community," and not outside of it, that they are brought into existence by the very social relations that exist among the now commodity-producing peasantry; we see that not only "1,400,000 people," but the entire mass of Russian village folk work for *capital*, are "superintended" by it. Who is it that draws more correct conclusions from these facts, which are not stated by some "mystic and metaphysician," not stated by a Marxist, who believes in "triads," but by a Narodnik exceptionalist who is well able to appreciate the peculiarities of Russian life? Is it the Narodnik, when he talks of the choice of a better path, as though capital has not already made its choice—when he talks of the turn to another system expected from "society" and the "state," i.e., from such elements as have arisen only on the basis of this choice and *in support of it*?—or the Marxist, who says that to dream of different paths means to be a naïve romanticist, since reality shows most obviously that the "path" has already been chosen, that the domination of capital is a fact not to be evaded by reproaches and censures, a fact that only direct producers can reckon with?

Another current reproach. The Marxists consider large-scale Russian capitalism to be progressive. They thus prefer the proletarian to the "independent" peasant, favour the alienation of the land from the people and, from the viewpoint of a theory that makes its ideal the ownership of the means of production by the workers, favour the separation of the worker from the means of production, i.e., fall into an irreconcilable contradiction.

Yes, the Marxists do consider large-scale capitalism progressive—not, of course, because it replaces "independence" by dependence, but because it creates conditions for

abolishing dependence. As to the "independence" of the Russian peasant, it is a sugary Narodnik fairy-tale, and nothing else; actually it is non-existent. And the picture that has been cited (as well as all works about and investigations of the economic condition of the peasantry) also contains an admission of this fact (that actually independence is non-existent): the peasantry, like the workers, work "for others." This was admitted by the old Russian Narodniks. But they failed to understand the causes and character of this *lack* of independence, failed to understand that it is also *capitalist* lack of independence, differing from that of the towns in being less developed, and containing greater relics of medieval, semi-feudal forms of capital, and nothing more. Let us compare, say, the village depicted by the Narodnik with the factory. The only difference (as regards independence) is that in the former we see "small fry" and in the latter large, in the former exploitation singly, by semi-feudal methods—in the latter, exploitation of the masses, and what is more, purely capitalist exploitation of course, the latter is progressive: the very capitalism that is undeveloped in the village and, therefore, abounds in usury, etc., is developed in the factory; the very antagonism existing in the countryside is fully expressed in the factory; here the split is complete and the question cannot be posed in the half-hearted way that satisfies the small producer (and his ideologist), who is capable of upbraiding, reproaching and cursing capitalism, but not of abandoning the basis* of this capitalism, of abandoning his faith in its servants, of abandoning his roseate dreams about its being "better without struggle," as the splendid Mr. Krivenko said. *Here* dreams are not possible—and that alone is a tremendous step forward; here it is clearly evident which side possesses the strength, and there can be no talk of choosing the path, for it is clear that at first this strength has to be "redistributed."

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* To avoid misunderstanding let me explain that by "basis" of capitalism I infer the social relation that in various forms prevails in capitalist society and which Marx expressed in the formula: money—commodity—money with a surplus.

The measures proposed by the Narodniks *do not touch* on this relation, and do not affect either commodity production, which places

"Sugary optimism"—is the way Mr. Struve described Narodism, and it is profoundly true. What else is it but optimism when the complete domination of capital in the countryside is ignored, passed over in silence, pictured as something accidental, when all sorts of credits, artels, and common land cultivation are proposed, just as if all these kulaks, vampires, merchants, publicans, contractors, pawnbrokers, etc., as though all this "young bourgeoisie" did not already hold "every village" "in their hands." What else is it but sugary talk when people continue to talk of "ten, twenty, thirty years and more," of "better without struggle," at the very time when the struggle is already on, a smouldering struggle, it is true, unconscious, and not illumined by an idea.

"Cross over now to the towns, reader. There you will encounter the young bourgeoisie in still larger numbers and still greater variety. All who become literate and consider themselves suitable for more honourable activity, all who consider themselves worthy of a better fate than the miserable lot of the rank-and-file peasant, all, finally who under these conditions find no place in the countryside, now make their way to the towns...."

Nevertheless, the Narodnik gentlemen engage in sugary talk about the "artificial character" of urban capitalism, about its being a "hothouse plant," that will die of itself if not looked after, etc. One has only to take a plainer view of the *facts* to see clearly that this "artificial" bourgeoisie is simply the village blood-suckers who have settled in the towns, and who are growing quite spontaneously on soil illumined by the "moon of capitalism" which compels every rank-and-file peasant to buy cheaper and sell dearer.

... "Here you meet salesmen, clerks, petty tradesmen, pedlars, all sorts of contractors (plasterers, carpenters, bricklayers, etc.), conductors, senior porters, policemen, artel captains, owners of ferry-boats, eating- and lodging-houses, proprietors of various workshops, factory foremen, etc., etc. All these are the real young bourgeoisie, with

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money—the product of social labour—into the hands of private individuals, or the split of the people into paupers and owners of this money.

The Marxist turns to the most developed form of this relation to the form that is the quintessence of all the other forms, and shows the producer that the aim and object to follow is the abolition of this relation and its replacement by another.

all their characteristic features. Their code of morals is not a very broad one either: their entire activity is based on the exploitation of labour,* and their object in life is to acquire capital, big or small, with which stupidly to pass away their time...." "I know that many people rejoice when they look at them, see cleverness, energy and enterprise in them, consider them to be the most progressive elements among the people, see in them a straight and natural step forward in their country's civilisation, the unevenness of which will be smoothed out by time. Oh! I have long known that a top-rank bourgeoisie has been formed in this country out of educated people, merchants and nobles who either failed to sustain the crisis of 1861 and went under, or were caught by the spirit of the period; that this bourgeoisie has already formed cadres of a third estate and that all it lacks is precisely those elements from the people which it likes because it can do nothing without them...."

A loophole has been left here, too, for "sugary optimism": the big bourgeoisie "lacks only" bourgeois elements from the people!! But where did the big bourgeoisie come from, if not from the people? Surely the author will not deny the ties between our "merchants" and the peasantry!

We see here a tendency to depict this rise of a young bourgeoisie as a matter of chance, the result of policy, etc. This superficiality in understanding things, incapable of seeing the roots of the phenomenon in the very economic structure of society, capable of giving a most detailed enumeration of the different representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, but incapable of understanding that the peasant's and the handicraftsman's small independent undertaking itself is not, under the present economic order, a "people's" undertaking at all, but a *petty-bourgeois* one—is highly typical of the Narodnik.

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* Not exact. What distinguishes the petty from the big bourgeois is that he works himself, as the categories enumerated by the author do. There is, of course, exploitation of labour, but more than mere exploitation.

One more remark. The object in life of those who are not satisfied with the peasant's lot is to acquire capital. This is what the Narodnik says (in his sober moments). The tendency of the Russian peasantry is not towards the community, but towards the petty-bourgeois system. That is what the Marxist says.

What is the difference between these two propositions? Is it not merely that the former constitutes an empirical observation of life while the latter generalises the facts observed (which express the real "thoughts and feelings" of real "living individuals") and makes of them a law of political economy?

... "I know that many descendants of ancient families are now engaged in distilling and in running taverns, railway concessions, and in prospecting, have ensconced themselves on the boards of joint-stock banks, have even established themselves in the literary sphere and are now singing other songs. I know that many of the literary songs are extremely tender and sentimental, that they deal with the needs and desires of the people; but I also know that it is the duty of decent literature to lay bare the intention of offering the people a stone instead of bread."

What an Arcadian idyll! Only the "*intention*" as yet of offering?!

And how it harmonises: he "knows" that a bourgeoisie has "long" been formed—and still thinks that his task is to "lay bare the intention" of establishing a bourgeoisie!

And this is what is called "serenity of the spirit" when in sight of the already mobilised army, in sight of the arrayed "rank and file" united by a "long" established "general staff," people still talk of "laying bare intentions," and not of an already fully disclosed battle of interests.

... "The French bourgeoisie also identified themselves with the people and always presented their demands in the name of the people, but always deceived them. We consider the bourgeois trend taken by our society in recent years to be harmful and dangerous to the people's morals and well-being."

The petty-bourgeois character of the author is, I imagine, most clearly expressed in these sentences. He declares the bourgeois trend to be "harmful and dangerous" to the morals and well-being of the people! Which "people," respected Mr. Moralist? Those who worked for the landlords under the serfdom that fostered the "family hearth," "settled living" and the "sacred duty of labour,"* or those who subsequently went away to earn money to pay off land redemption fees? You are well aware that the payment of this money was the main and chief condition of the "emancipation," and that the peasant could only get this money from Mr. Coupon.[113] You yourself have described how this gentleman carried on his business, how "the middle class have introduced their own science, their own moral code and their own sophisms into life," how a literature has already been formed praising the "cleverness, enterprise and energy" of the bourgeoisie. Clearly,

* Terms used by Mr. Yuzhakov.

it all boils down to one form of social organisation being succeeded by another: the system of appropriating the surplus labour of tied-to-the-land serf peasants created feudal morality; the system of "free labour for others," for the owners of money, created bourgeois morality to replace it.

The petty bourgeois, however, is afraid to look things straight in the face, and to call a spade a spade. He turns his back on these undoubted facts, and begins to dream. He considers only small independent undertakings (*for the market*—he keeps a modest silence about that) to be "moral," while wage-labour is "immoral." He does not understand the tie—an indissoluble tie—between the one and the other, and considers bourgeois morality to be a chance disease, and not a direct product of the bourgeois order that grows out of commodity economy (which, in fact, he has nothing against).

So he begins his old-womanish sermon about its being "harmful and dangerous."

He does not compare the modern form of exploitation with the previous one, that of serfdom; he does not look at the changes that it has introduced into the relations between the producer and the owner of the means of production—he compares it with a senseless, philistine utopia, with the sort of "small independent undertakings" that, while being commodity economy, should not lead to what it actually does lead to (see above: "kulakdom is in full bloom, is striving to enslave the weakest, and turn them into farm labourers," etc.). That is why his protest against capitalism (as such, as a protest, it is quite legitimate and fair) becomes a reactionary lamentation.

He does not understand that, by replacing the form of exploitation which tied the working man to his locality with one that flings him from place to place all over the country, the "bourgeois trend" has done a good job; that, by replacing the form of exploitation under which the appropriation of the surplus product was tangled up in the personal relations between the exploiter and the producer, in mutual civic political obligations, in the "provision of an allotment," etc.,—by replacing this with a form of exploitation that substitutes "callous cash payment" for all that and

equates labour-power with any other commodity or thing, the "bourgeois trend" strips exploitation of all its obscurities and illusions, and that to do so is a great service.

Then, take note of the statement that the bourgeois trend has been taken by our society "in recent years." Only "in recent years"? Was it not quite clearly expressed in the sixties, too? Was it not predominant throughout the seventies?

The petty bourgeois tries to smooth things out here as well, to present the bourgeois features that have characterised our "society" during the entire post-Reform period as some temporary infatuation, fashion. Not to see the wood for the trees is the main feature of the petty-bourgeois doctrine. Behind the protest against serfdom and bitter attacks on it, he (the ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie) does not see bourgeois reality, the reason being that he fears to look straight at the economic basis of the system that has been built up while he has been shouting vociferously. Behind the talk in all advanced ("liberal-coquettish," p. 129) literature about credits, and loan-and-savings societies, about the burden of taxation, about the extension of landownership and other such measures of helping the "people" he only sees the bourgeois features of "recent years." Finally, behind the complaints about "reaction," behind the wailing about the "sixties" he totally fails to see the bourgeois features underlying all this, and that is why he merges increasingly with this "society."

Actually, during all these three periods of post-Reform history our ideologist of the peasantry has always stood and marched alongside "society," not understanding that the bourgeois features of this "society" rob his protest against them of all strength and inevitably doom him either to dream or indulge in miserable petty-bourgeois compromises.

Many people find this closeness of our Narodniks (who "in principle" are hostile to liberalism) to liberal society very touching, and Mr. V. V. (cf. his article in *Nedelya*, 1894, Nos. 41-49) continues to find it so even to this day. From this the conclusion is drawn that the bourgeois intelligentsia in this country are weak or maybe even non-existent, a point that these people connect with the absence of a basis for Russian capitalism. Actually,

however, the very opposite is the case. This closeness is a powerful argument against Narodism, a direct confirmation of its petty-bourgeois character. Just as in everyday life the small producer merges with the bourgeoisie by the fact of his isolated production of commodities for the market, by his chances of getting on in the world, and of becoming a big proprietor, so the ideologist of the small producer becomes a liberal when discussing problems of credits, artels, etc.; just as the small producer is incapable of fighting the bourgeoisie and hopes for such measures of assistance as tax reduction, land extension, etc., so the Narodnik places his trust in liberal "society" and its chatter, clothed in "endless deceit and hypocrisy," about the "people." If he occasionally abuses "society," he immediately adds that only "in recent years" has it become spoilt, but that generally speaking it is not bad in itself.

"*Sovremenniye Izvestia* [*Contemporary News*] recently made a study of the new economic class that has taken shape in this country since the Reform and gave the following good description of it: 'Modest and bearded, wearing well-greased top boots, the old-time millionaire, who humbled himself before a junior official, has rapidly turned into the European type of jaunty and even offhanded and haughty entrepreneur, occasionally wearing a very noticeable decoration and holding a high office. When you take a good look at these unexpectedly thriving people you notice with surprise that most of these luminaries are yesterday's publicans, contractors, stewards, etc. The new arrivals have enlivened, but not improved, urban life. They have introduced hustle into it, and extreme confusion of concepts. Increased turnover and capital requirements have intensified the feverish activity of the enterprises, which has turned into the excitement of a gamble. The numerous fortunes have been made overnight, have increased the appetite for profit beyond all bounds, etc....

"Undoubtedly, such people exert a most ruinous influence on public morals" [that's the trouble—the spoiling of morals, and not capitalist production relations at all! K. T.] "and while we do not doubt the fact that town workers are more corrupted than village workers, there is still less doubt, of course, that this is due to their being much more surrounded by such people, breathing the same air, and living the life that they established."

Clear confirmation of Mr. Struve's opinion about the reactionary character of Narodism. The "corruption" of the town workers scares the petty bourgeois, who prefers the "family hearth" (with its immorality and club rule),

"settled life" (accompanied by crushing oppression and savagery) and does not understand that the awakening of the man in "the beast of burden,"[114] an awakening of such enormous and epoch-making significance that all sacrifices made to achieve it are legitimate, cannot but assume tempestuous forms under capitalist conditions in general, and Russian in particular.

"The Russian landlord was distinguished for his barbarism, and required but a little scratching for the Tatar in him to be seen whereas the Russian bourgeois does not even need to be scratched. The old Russian merchant class created a realm of darkness, whereas now with the aid of the new bourgeoisie, it will create darkness in which all thought, all human feeling will perish."

The author is sadly mistaken. The past tense should be used here, not the future, and should have been used when those words were written, in the seventies.

"The hordes of new conquerors disperse in all directions and meet with no opposition anywhere or from anybody. The landlords patronise them and give them a welcome reception; the Zemstvo people give them huge insurance bonuses; school-teachers write their legal papers, the priests visit them, while District Clerks help them to bamboozle the Mordovians."

Quite a correct description! "far from meeting with opposition from anybody," they meet with support from the representatives of "society" and the "state," of whom the author gives a rough list. Hence—exceptionalist logic!—in order to change matters, we should advise the choosing of another path, advise "society" and the "state" to do so.

"What, however, is to be done against such people?"

... "To await the mental development of the exploiters and an improvement in public opinion is impossible from the viewpoint either of justice, or of the morals and politics which the state must adopt."

Please note: the state must adopt a "moral and political viewpoint"! This is nothing but phrase-mongering. Do not the representatives and agents of the "state" just described (from the District Clerks upwards) possess a "political" viewpoint [cf. above ... "many people rejoice ... consider them to be the most progressive elements among the people, see in them a straight and natural step forward in their country's civilisation"] and a "moral" one [cf. ibid.:

"cleverness, energy, enterprise"]? Why do you obscure the split in moral and political ideas which are just as hostile to those "whom the bourgeoisie order to go to work" as "new shoots" are undoubtedly hostile in life? Why do you cover up the battle of these ideas, which is only a superstructure to the battle of social classes?

All this is the natural and inevitable result of the petty-bourgeois viewpoint. The petty producer suffers severely from the present system, but he stands apart from the forthright, fully disclosed contradictions, fears them, and consoles himself with naïvely reactionary dreams that "the state must adopt a moral point of view," namely, the viewpoint of the morality that is dear to the small producer.

No, you are not right. The state to which you address yourselves, the contemporary, the present state *must* adopt the viewpoint of the morality that is dear to the top bourgeoisie, *must* because such is the distribution of strength among the existing classes of society.

You are indignant. You start to howl about the Marxist defending the bourgeoisie, when he admits this "must," this necessity.

You are wrong. You feel that the facts are against you, and so resort to trickery: to those who refute your petty-bourgeois dreams about choosing a path without the bourgeoisie by referring to the domination of the latter as a *fact*; to those who refute the suitability of your petty, paltry measures against the bourgeoisie by referring to their deep roots in the economic structure of society, to the economic struggle of classes that is the basis of "society" and the "state," to those who demand of the ideologists of the toiling class that they make a complete break with these elements and exclusively serve those who are "differentiated from life" in bourgeois society—to all these you attribute a desire to defend the bourgeoisie.

> "We do not, of course, consider the influence of literature to be quite powerless, but if it is not to be powerless it must, firstly, better understand its mission and not confine itself to merely (sic!!!) educating the kulaks, but must rouse public opinion."

There you have the petit bourgeois in the pure form! If literature educates the kulaks, it is because it badly un-

derstands its mission!! And these gentlemen are surprised when they are called naïve, and when people say of them that they are romantics!

On the contrary, respected Mr. Narodnik: the "kulaks"* educate literature—they give it ideas (about cleverness, energy, enterprise, about the natural step forward in their country's civilised development), they give it resources. Your reference to literature is just as ridiculous as if somebody, in full sight of two opposing armies, were to address to the enemy field marshal's aide the humble request to "act in greater harmony." That is just what it is like.

The same is true of the desire—"to rouse public opinion." The opinion of the society that "seeks ideals with after-dinner tranquillity"? That is the customary occupation of Messrs. the Narodniks, one to which they have devoted themselves with such splendid success for "ten, twenty, thirty years and more."

Try a little more, gentlemen! The society that delights in after-dinner slumber sometimes bellows—that very likely means that it is ready to act in harmony against the kulaks. Talk a little more with that society. Allez toujours.**

... "and secondly, it must enjoy greater freedom of speech and greater access to the people."

A good wish. "Society" sympathises with this "ideal." But since it "seeks" this ideal, too, with after-dinner tranquillity, and since it fears more than anything else to have this tranquillity disturbed ... it hastens very slowly, progresses so wisely that with every passing year it gets farther and farther behind. Messrs. the Narodniks imagine that this is an accident, and that their after-dinner slumber will soon end and real progress begin. So keep waiting!

"Nor do we consider the influence of education and training to be quite powerless, but we presume, first of all: 1) that education should be given to each and every person, and not merely to exceptional persons, taking them out of their environment and turning them into kulaks...."

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* This is too narrow a term. The more precise and definite term "bourgeoisie" should have been used.

** Keep going!—*Ed.*

"Each and every person" ... that is what the Marxists want. But they think this is unattainable under the present social and economic relations, because even if tuition is free and compulsory, money will be needed for "education," and only the "offspring of the people" have that. They think that here, too, there is no way out except "the stern struggle of social classes."

... "2) That public schools should be accessible not only to retired parsons, officials, and all sorts of good-for-nothings, but also to individuals who are really decent and sincerely love the people."

Touching! But surely those who see "cleverness, enterprise and energy" in the "offspring of the people," also assert (and not always insincerely) that they "love the people," and many of them are undoubtedly "really decent" people. Who will be the judge? Critically thinking and morally developed personalities? But did not the author himself tell us that you cannot influence these offspring with scorn?*

We again, in conclusion, meet with the same basic feature of Narodism which we noted at the very outset, namely, that it turns its back on the facts.

When a Narodnik gives us a description of the facts, he is always compelled to admit that reality belongs to capital, that our actual evolution is capitalist, that strength is in the hands of the bourgeoisie. This has now been admitted, for example, by the author of the article under review, who established the point that "middle-class culture" has been set up in this country, that the people are ordered to go to work by the bourgeoisie, that bourgeois society is occupied only with digestive processes and after-dinner slumber, that the "middle class" have even created bourgeois science, bourgeois morals, bourgeois political sophisms, and bourgeois literature.

Nevertheless, *all* Narodnik arguments are *always* based on the opposite assumption, viz.: that strength is not on the side of the bourgeoisie, but on the side of the "people." The Narodnik talks about the choice of the path (while at the same time admitting the capitalist character of the actual path), about the socialisation of labour (which is

* P. 151: "... do they not scorn in advance (take good note of the "in advance") those who might scorn them?"

under the "management" of the bourgeoisie), about the state having to adopt a moral and political point of view, and about its being the Narodniks who have to teach the people, etc.—as though strength were already on the side of the working people and their ideologists, and all that remained was to indicate the "immediate," "expedient," etc., methods of using this strength.

This is a sickening lie from beginning to end. One can well imagine that such illusions had a raison d'être half a century ago, in the days when the Prussian Regierungsrat[115] was exploring the "village community" in Russia; but now, after a history of over thirty years of "free" labour, it is either a mockery, or Pharisaism and sugary hypocrisy.

It is the basic theoretical task of Marxism to destroy this lie, however good the intentions and however clear the conscience of its author. The prime task of those who wish to seek "roads to human happiness" is not to hoodwink themselves, but to have the courage openly to admit the existence of what exists.

And when the ideologists of the toiling class have understood and felt this, then they will admit that "ideals" do not mean constructing better and immediate paths, but the formulation of the aims and objects of the "stern struggle of social classes" that is going on before our eyes in our capitalist society; that the measure of the success of one's aspirations is not the elaboration of advice to "society" and the "state," but the degree to which these ideals are spread in a definite class of society; that the loftiest ideals are not worth a brass farthing so long as you fail to merge them indissolubly with the interests of those who participate in the economic struggle, to merge them with those "narrow" and petty everyday problems of the given class, like that of a "fair reward for labour," which the grandiloquent Narodnik regards with such sublime disdain.

... "But that is not enough; intellectual development, as we unfortunately see at every step, does not guarantee man against rapacious proclivities and instincts. Hence, immediate measures must be taken to safeguard the countryside against rapacity; measures must be taken, above all, to safeguard our village community, as a form of public life that helps correct the moral imperfection of human nature. The village community must be safeguarded once and for all. But that, too, is not enough. The village community, under its present

economic conditions and tax burdens, cannot exist, and so measures should be taken to extend peasant ownership of land, to reduce the taxes, and to organise people's industry.

Such are the measures against the kulaks with which all decent literature must be at one about and stand for. These measures are, of course, not new; the point, however, is that they are the only ones of their kind, but far from everybody is as yet convinced of this." (End.)

There you have the programme of the grandiloquent Narodnik! From the description of the facts we have seen that a complete contradiction of economic interests is everywhere revealed—"everywhere" meaning not only in both town and country, both within and without the village community, both in factory and in "people's" industry, but also outside the bounds of economic phenomena—in both literature and "society," in the sphere of moral, political, juridical and other ideas. Our petty-bourgeois knight, however, sheds bitter tears and appeals for "immediate measures to be taken to safeguard the countryside." The petty-bourgeois superficiality of understanding, and the readiness to resort to compromise is perfectly evident. The countryside itself, as we have seen, constitutes a split and a struggle, constitutes a system of opposite interests—but the Narodnik does not see the root of the evil in the system itself, but in its particular shortcomings, and does not build up his programme to provide an ideological basis for the struggle that is now going on, but makes "safeguarding" the countryside against chance, illegitimate, extraneous "plunderers" his basis! And who, worthy Mr. Romantic, should take measures to safeguard? Should it be the "society" that is content with digestive processes at the expense of just those who should be safeguarded? Or the Zemstvo, Volost and all other sorts of agents who live off fractions of surplus-value and therefore, as we have just seen, offer assistance but not resistance?

The Narodnik finds that this is a lamentable accident, and nothing more—the result of a poor "understanding of the mission"; that it is sufficient to issue a call to "be at one and work as a team," for all such elements to "leave the wrong path." He refuses to see that in economic relations the Plusmacherei system has taken shape, a system under which only the "offspring of the people" can have the means

and the leisure for education, while the "masses" have "to remain ignorant and work for others"; the direct and immediate consequence is that only members of the former make their way into "society," and that it is only from this same "society" and from the "offspring" of the people that there can be recruited the District Clerks, Zemstvo agents and so on whom the Narodnik is naïve enough to consider as people standing *above* economic relations and classes, *over* them.

That is why his appeal to "safeguard" is directed to quite the wrong quarter.

He satisfies himself either with petty-bourgeois palliatives (struggle against the kulaks—see above about loan-and-savings societies, credits, legislation to encourage temperance, industry and education; extension of peasant land-ownership—see above about land credits and land purchase; tax reduction—see above about income tax), or with rosy, ladies' college dreams of "organising people's industry."

But is it not already organised? Have not all the young bourgeoisie described above already organised this "people's industry" after their own, bourgeois fashion? Otherwise how could they "hold every village in their hands"? How could they "order people to go to work" and appropriate surplus-value?

The Narodnik reaches the height of righteous indignation. It is immoral—he howls—to consider capitalism to be an "organisation" when it is based on the anarchy of production, on crises, on permanent, regular and ever-increasing mass unemployment, on the utmost deterioration of the conditions of the working people.

On the contrary. It is immoral to colour the truth, to picture the order that characterises the whole of post-Reform Russia as something accidental and incidental. That every capitalist nation is a vehicle of technical progress and of the socialisation of labour, but at the cost of crippling and mutilating the producer, is something that was established long ago. But to turn this *fact* into material for discussing morals with "society," and, closing one's eyes to the struggle going on, to murmur with after-dinner composure: "safeguard," "ensure," "organise"—means to be a romantic, and a naïve and reactionary romantic at that.

It will very likely seem to the reader that this commentary has no connection whatever with an analysis of Mr. Struve's book. In my opinion, only an external connection is missing.

Mr. Struve's book does not discover Russian Marxism at all. It merely introduces into our press for the first time theories that have taken shape and been stated previously.* This introduction was preceded, as has already been noted, by a furious criticism of Marxism in the liberal and Narodnik press, a criticism that confused and distorted matters.

Unless this criticism was answered, it was impossible, firstly, to approach the contemporary position of the problem; secondly, it was impossible to understand Mr. Struve's book, its character and designation.

The old Narodnik article was taken as the subject for reply because a principled article was required, and, moreover, one retaining at least some of the old Russian Narodnik precepts that are valuable to Marxism.

By means of this commentary we have tried to show the artificiality and absurdity of the current methods of liberal and Narodnik polemics. Arguments about Marxism being connected with Hegelianism,** with belief in triads, in abstract dogmas and schemes that do not have to be proved by facts, in the inevitability of every country passing through the phase of capitalism, etc., turn out to be empty blather.

Marxism sees its criterion in the *formulation* and theoretical *explanation* of the struggle between social classes and economic interests that is going on before our eyes.

Marxism does not base itself on anything else than the facts of Russian history and reality; it is also the ideology of the labouring class, only it gives a totally different explanation of the generally known facts of the growth and achievements of Russian capitalism, has quite a different understanding of the tasks that reality in this country places before the ideologists of the direct producers. That is why, when the Marxist speaks of the necessity, inevita-

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* Cf. V. V. *Essays on Theoretical Economics*. St. Petersburg, 1895, pp. 257-58.[116]

** I am speaking, of course, not of the historical origin of Marxism, but of its content today.

bility, and progressiveness of Russian capitalism, he proceeds from generally established facts which are not always cited precisely because of their being generally established, because of their not being new; his explanation is different from the one that has been told and retold in Narodnik literature—and if the Narodnik replies by shouting that the Marxist refuses to face the facts, he can be exposed even by simply referring to any principled Narodnik article of the seventies.

Let us now pass to an examination of Mr. Struve's book.

CHAPTER II

A CRITICISM OF NARODNIK SOCIOLOGY

The "essence" of Narodism, its "main idea," according to the author, lies in the "theory of Russia's exceptional economic development." This theory, as he puts it, has "two main sources: 1) a definite doctrine of the role of the individual in the historical process, and 2) a direct conviction that the Russian people possess a specific national character and spirit and a special historical destiny" (2). In a footnote to this passage the author declares that "Narodism is characterised by quite definite social ideals,"* and adds that he gives the economic world outlook of the Narodniks later on in the book.

This description of the essence of Narodism, it seems to me, requires some correction. It is too abstract and idealistic; it indicates the prevailing theoretical ideas of Narodism, but does not indicate either its "essence" or its "source." It remains absolutely unclear why the ideals indicated were combined with a belief in an exceptional Russian development and with a specific doctrine of the role of the individual, and why these theories became "the most influential" trend in our social thought. If, when speaking of "the socio-

* Of course, this expression "quite definite ideals" must not be taken literally, that is, as meaning that the Narodniks "quite definitely" knew what they wanted. That would be absolutely untrue. "Quite definite ideals" should be understood as meaning nothing more than the ideology of direct producers, even though this ideology is a very vague one.

logical ideas of Narodism" (the title of the first chapter), the author was unable to confine himself to purely sociological questions (method in sociology), but also dealt with the Narodniks' views on Russian economic reality, he should have explained to us the essence of these views. Yet in the footnote referred to this is only half accomplished. The essence of Narodism is that it represents the producers' interests from the standpoint of the small producer, the petty bourgeois. In his German article on Mr. N.—on's book (*Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt*, 1893, No. 1), Mr. Struve called Narodism "national socialism" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1893, No. 12, p. 185). Instead of "national" he should have said "peasant" in reference to the old Russian Narodism, and "petty bourgeois" in reference to contemporary Russian Narodism. The "source" of Narodism lies in the predominance of the class of small producers in post-Reform capitalist Russia.

This description requires explanation. I use the expression "petty bourgeois" not in the ordinary, but in the political-economic sense. A small producer, operating under a system of commodity economy—these are the two features of the concept "petty bourgeois," Kleinbürger, or what is the same thing, the Russian *meshchanin*. It thus includes both the peasant and the handicraftsman, whom the Narodniks always placed on the same footing—and quite rightly, for they are both producers, they both work for the market, and differ only in the degree of development of commodity economy. Further, I make a distinction between the old* and contemporary Narodism, on the grounds that the former was to some extent a well-knit doctrine evolved in a period when capitalism was still very feebly developed in Russia, when nothing of the petty-bourgeois character of peasant economy had yet been revealed, when the practical side of the doctrine was purely utopian, and when the Narodniks gave liberal "society" a wide berth and "went among the people." It is different now: Russia's capitalist path of development is no longer denied by anybody, the break-up of the

* By the old Narodniks I do not mean those who backed the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, for instance, but those who "were among the people."

countryside is an undoubted fact. Of the Narodniks' well-knit doctrine, with its childish faith in the "village community," nothing but rags and tatters remain. From the practical aspect, utopia has been replaced by a quite un-utopian programme of petty-bourgeois "progressive" measures, and only pompous phrases remind us of the historical connection between these paltry compromises and the dreams of' better and exceptional paths for the fatherland. In place of aloofness from liberal society we observe a touching intimacy with it. Now it is this change that compels us to distinguish between the ideology of the peasantry and the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie.

It seemed all the more necessary to make this correction concerning the real content of Narodism since Mr. Struve's aforementioned abstractness of exposition is his fundamental defect. That is the first point. And secondly, "certain basic" tenets of the doctrine by which Mr. Struve is not bound demand that social ideas be reduced to social-economic relations.

And we shall now endeavour to show that unless this is done it is impossible to understand even the purely theoretical ideas of Narodism, such as the question of method in sociology.

Having pointed out that the Narodnik doctrine of a special method in sociology is best expounded by Mr. Mirtov[117] and Mr. Mikhailovsky, Mr. Struve goes on to describe this doctrine as "subjective idealism," and in corroboration quotes from the works of the authors mentioned a number of passages on which it is worth while dwelling.

Both take as a corner-stone the thesis that history was made by "solitary fighting individuals." "Individuals make history" (Mirtov). Mr. Mikhailovsky is even more explicit: "The living individual, with all his thoughts and feelings, becomes a history-maker on his own responsibility. He, and not some mysterious force, sets aims in history and moves events towards them through a lane of obstacles placed before him by the elemental forces of nature and of historical conditions" (8). This thesis that history is made by individuals is absolutely meaningless from the theoretical standpoint. All history consists of the actions of individuals, and it is the task of social science to explain these actions,

so that the reference to "the right of interfering in the course of events" (Mr. Mikhailovsky's words, quoted by Mr. Struve on p. 8), is but empty tautology. This is very clearly revealed in Mr. Mikhailovsky's last effusion. The living individual, he argues, moves events through a lane of obstacles placed by the elemental forces of historical conditions. And what do these "historical conditions" consist of? According to the author's logic, they consist in their turn of the actions of other "living individuals." A profound philosophy of history, is it not? The living individual moves events through a line of obstacles placed by other living individuals! And why are the actions of some living individuals called elemental, while of the actions of others it is said that they "move events" towards previously set aims? It is obvious that to search for any theoretical meaning here would be an almost hopeless undertaking. The fact of the matter is that the historical conditions which provided our subjectivists with material for the "theory" consisted (as they still consist) of antagonistic relations and gave rise to the expropriation of the producer. Unable to understand these antagonistic relations, unable to find *in these latter* the social elements with which the "solitary individuals" could join forces, the subjectivists confined themselves to concocting theories which consoled the "solitary" individuals with the statement that history is made by "living individuals." The famous "subjective method in sociology" expresses nothing, absolutely nothing, but good intentions and bad understanding. Mr. Mikhailovsky's further reasoning, as quoted by the author, is striking confirmation of this.

European life, Mr. Mikhailovsky says, "took shape just as senselessly and immorally as a river flows or a tree grows in nature. A river flows along the line of least resistance, washes away whatever it can, even if it be a diamond mine, and flows around whatever it cannot wash away, even if it be a dunghill. Sluices, dams, outlet and inlet canals are built on the initiative of human reason and sentiment. Such reason and sentiment, it may be said, were absent (?—P. S.) when the present economic system in Europe arose. They were in an embryonic state, and their influence on the natural elemental course of things was insignificant" (9).

Mr. Struve inserts a mark of interrogation, but what

perplexes us is why he inserts it only after one word and not after all of them, so meaningless is this whole effusion! What nonsense it is to say that reason and sentiment were absent when capitalism arose! Of what does capitalism consist if not of definite relations between people—and people without reason and sentiments are so far unknown. And what an untruth it is to say that only "insignificant" influence of the reason and sentiment of "individuals living" at that time was brought to bear on the "course of things"! Quite the contrary. People in sound mind and judgement then erected extremely well-made sluices and dams, which forced the refractory peasant into the mainstream of capitalist exploitation; they created extremely artful by-pass channels of political and financial measures through which swept capitalist accumulation and capitalist expropriation that were not content with the action of economic laws alone. In a word, all Mr. Mikhailovsky's statements here quoted are so preposterously false that they cannot be attributed to theoretical mistakes alone. They are entirely due to the author's petty-bourgeois standpoint. Capitalism has already revealed its tendencies quite clearly; it has developed its inherent antagonism to the full; the contradiction of interests has already begun to assume definite forms, and is even reflected in Russian legislation, but the small producer stands apart from this struggle. He is still tied to the old bourgeois society by his tiny farm, and for that reason, though he is oppressed by the capitalist system, he is unable to understand the real causes of his oppression and consoles himself with illusions about the whole trouble lying in the fact that the reason and sentiment of people are still in an "embryonic state."

"Of course," continues the ideologist of this petty bourgeois, "people have always endeavoured to influence the course of things in one way or another."

But "the course of things" consists of nothing else but actions and "influences" of people, and so this again is an empty phrase.

"But they were guided in this by the promptings of the most meagre experience and by the grossest interests; and it is obvious that it was very rarely and only by chance that these guides could indicate the path suggested by modern science and modern moral ideas" (9).

This is a petty-bourgeois morality, which condemns "grossness of interests" because it is unable to connect its "ideals" with any immediate interests—it is a petty-bourgeois way of shutting one's eyes to the split which has already taken place and which is clearly reflected both in modern science and in modern moral ideas.

Naturally, the peculiarities of Mr. Mikhailovsky's reasoning remain unchanged even when he passes to Russia. He "welcomes with all his heart" the equally strange stories of a Mr. Yakovlev that Russia is a tabula rasa, that she can begin from the beginning, avoid the mistakes of other countries, and so on and so forth. And all this is said in the full knowledge that this tabula rasa still affords a very firm foothold for representatives of the "old-nobility" system, with its large-scale landed proprietorship and tremendous political privileges, and that it provides the basis for the rapid development of capitalism, with all its diverse "progress." The petty bourgeois faint-heartedly closes his eyes to these *facts* and flies to the realm of innocent daydreams, such as that "we are beginning to live, now that science has already mastered certain truths and gained some prestige."

And so, the class origin of the sociological ideas of Narodism is already clear from those arguments of Mr. Mikhailovsky's which Mr. Struve quotes.

We must object to a remark which Mr. Struve directs against Mr. Mikhailovsky. "According to his view," the author says, "there are no insurmountable historical tendencies which, as such, should serve on the one hand as a starting-point, and on the other as unavoidable bounds to the purposeful activity of individuals and social groups" (11).

That is the language of an objectivist, and not of a Marxist (materialist). Between these conceptions (systems of views) there is a difference, which should be dwelt on, since an incomplete grasp of this difference is one of the fundamental defects of Mr. Struve's book and manifests itself in the majority of his arguments.

The objectivist speaks of the necessity of a given historical process; the materialist gives an exact picture of the given social-economic formation and of the antagonistic relations to which it gives rise. When demonstrating the ne-

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cessity for a given series of facts, the objectivist always runs the risk of becoming an apologist for these facts: the materialist discloses the class contradictions and in so doing defines his standpoint. The objectivist speaks of "insurmountable historical tendencies"; the materialist speaks of the class which "directs" the given economic system, giving rise to such and such forms of counteraction by other classes. Thus, on the one hand, the materialist is more consistent than the objectivist, and gives profounder and fuller effect to his objectivism. He does not limit himself to speaking of the necessity of a process, but ascertains exactly what social-economic formation gives the process its content, *exactly what class* determines this necessity. In the present case, for example, the materialist would not content himself with stating the "insurmountable historical tendencies," but would point to the existence of certain classes, which determine the content of the given system and preclude the possibility of any solution except by the action of the producers themselves. On the other hand, materialism includes partisanship, so to speak, and enjoins the direct and open adoption of the standpoint of a definite social group in any assessment of events.*

From Mr. Mikhailovsky the author passes to Mr. Yuzhakov, who represents nothing independent or interesting. Mr. Struve quite justly describes his sociological arguments as "florid language" "devoid of all meaning." It is worth dwelling on an extremely characteristic (for Narodism in general) difference between Mr. Yuzhakov and Mr. Mikhailovsky. Mr. Struve notes this difference by calling Mr. Yuzhakov a "nationalist," whereas, he says, "all nationalism has always been absolutely alien" to Mr. Mikhailovsky, for whom, as he himself says, "the question of the people's truth embraces not only the Russian people but the labouring folk of the whole civilised world." It seems to me that behind this difference there is also visible the reflection of the dual position of the small producer, who is a progressive element inasmuch as he begins, to use Mr. Yuzhakov's unconsciously

* Concrete examples of Mr. Struve's incomplete application of materialism and the lack of consistency in his theory of the class struggle will be given below in each particular instance.

apt expression, "to differentiate from society," and a reactionary element inasmuch as he fights to preserve his position as a small proprietor and strives to retard economic development. That is why Russian Narodism, too, is able to combine progressive, democratic features in its doctrine with the reactionary features which evoke the sympathy of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. As to the latter features, it would be difficult, it seems to me, to express them more graphically than was done by Mr. Yuzhakov in the following passage, quoted by Mr. Struve.

"Only the peasantry has always and everywhere been the vehicle of the pure idea of labour. Apparently, this same idea has been brought into the arena of modern history by the so-called fourth estate, the urban proletariat. But the substance of the idea has undergone such considerable changes that the peasant would hardly recognise it as the customary basis of his way of life. The *right* to work, instead of the sacred *duty* of working, the duty of earning one's bread by the sweat of one's brow" [so that is what was concealed behind the "pure idea of labour"! The purely feudal idea of the "duty" of the peasant to earn bread ... so as to perform his services? This "sacred" duty is preached to the poor beast of burden that is browbeaten and crushed by it!!*]; "then, the separation and rewarding of labour, all this agitation about a fair reward for labour, as though labour does not create its own reward in its fruits"; ["What is this?" Mr. Struve asks, "sancta simplicitas, or something else?" Worse. It is the apotheosis of the docility of the labourer tied to the soil and accustomed to work for others for almost nothing]; "the differentiation of labour from life into some abstract (?!—P.S.) category depicted by so many hours of work in the factory and having no other (?!—P.S.) relation, no tie with the daily interests of the worker" [the purely petty-bourgeois cowardice of the small producer, who at times suffers very severely from the modern capitalist organisation, but who fears nothing on earth more

* The author—as befits a little bourgeois—is presumably unaware that the West-European toiling folk have long outgrown the stage of development in which they demanded the "right to work," and that they are now demanding the "right to be lazy," the right, to rest from the excessive toil which cripples and oppresses them.

than a serious movement against this organisation on the part of elements who have become completely "differentiated" from every tie with it]; "finally, the absence of a settled life, a domestic hearth created by labour, the changing field of labour—all this is entirely alien to the idea of peasant labour. The labour hearth, inherited from their fathers and forefathers; labour, whose interests permeate the whole of life and build its morals—love of the soil, watered by the sweat of many generations—all this, which constitutes an inalienable and distinguishing feature of peasant life, is absolutely unknown to the proletarian working class; and, therefore, although the life of the latter is a worker's life, it is built up on bourgeois morality (an individualist morality based on the principle of acquired right) or, at best, on abstract philosophical morality, but peasant morality has its basis in labour—in the logic of labour and its demands" (18). Here the reactionary features of the small producer appear in their pure form: his wretchedness, which induces him to believe that he is fated for ever to the "sacred duty" of being a beast of burden; his servility, "inherited from his fathers and forefathers"; his attachment to a tiny individual farm, the fear of losing which compels him to renounce even the very thought of a "fair reward" and to be an enemy of all "agitation," and which, because of the low productivity of labour and the fact of the labouring peasant being tied to one spot, turns him into a savage and, by virtue of economic conditions alone, necessarily engenders his wretchedness and servility. The breakdown of these reactionary features must unquestionably be placed to the credit of our bourgeoisie; the progressive work of the latter consists precisely in its having severed all the ties that bound the working people to the feudal system and to feudal traditions. It replaced, and is still replacing, the medieval forms of exploitation—which were concealed by the *personal* relations of the lord to his vassal, of the local kulak and buyer-up to the local peasants and handicraftsmen, of the patriarchal "modest and bearded millionaire" to his "lads," and which as a result gave rise to ultra-reactionary ideas—replacing them by the exploitation of the "European type of jaunty entrepreneur," exploitation which is impersonal, naked and unconcealed, and which therefore shatters absurd illusions and dreams. It has destroyed the old iso-

lation ("settled life") of the peasant, who refused to know, *and could not* know, anything but his plot of land, and has begun—by socialising labour and vastly increasing its productivity—to force the producer into the arena of social life.

With respect to Mr. Yuzhakov's argument here given, Mr. Struve says: "Thus Mr. Yuzhakov quite clearly documents the Slavophil roots of Narodism" (18); and later, summarising his exposition of the sociological ideas of Narodism, he adds that the belief in "Russia's exceptional development" constitutes a "historical tie between Slavophilism and Narodism," and that therefore the dispute between the Marxists and the Narodniks is "a natural continuation of the differences between Slavophilism and Westernism" (29). This latter statement, it seems to me, requires limitation. It is indisputable that the Narodniks are very much to blame for a jingoism of the lowest type (Mr. Yuzhakov, for instance). It is also indisputable that to ignore Marx's sociological method and his presentation of questions concerning the direct producers is, to those Russian people who desire to represent the interests of these direct producers, equivalent to complete alienation from Western "civilisation." But the essence of Narodism lies deeper, it does not lie in the doctrine of exceptional development nor in Slavophilism, but in representing the interests and ideas of the Russian small producer. This is why among the Narodniks there were writers (and they were the best of the Narodniks) who, as Mr. Struve himself admitted, had nothing in common with Slavophilism, and who even admitted that Russia had entered the same road as Western Europe. You will never understand Russian Narodism through the medium of such categories as Slavophilism and Westernism. Narodism reflected a fact in Russian life which was almost non-existent in the period of the rise of Slavophilism and Westernism, namely, the contradiction between the interests of labour and of *capital*. It reflected this *fact* through the prism of the living conditions and interests of the small producer, and therefore did so in a distorted and cowardly way, creating a theory which did not give prominence to the antagonism of social interests, but to sterile hopes in a different path of development. And it is our duty to correct this mistake of

Narodism, to show which social group can become the real representative of the interests of the direct producers.

Let us now pass to the second chapter of Mr. Struve's book.

The author's plan of exposition is as follows: first he outlines the general considerations which lead us to regard materialism as the only correct method of social science; then he expounds the views of Marx and Engels; and, finally, he applies the conclusions reached to certain phenomena of Russian life. In view of the particular importance of the subject of this chapter, we shall endeavour to analyse its contents in greater detail and to note those points which provoke disagreement.

The author begins with the entirely correct contention that a theory which reduces the social process to the actions of "living individuals," who "set themselves aims" and "move events," is the result of a misunderstanding. Nobody, of course, ever thought of ascribing to "a social group an existence independent of the individuals forming it" (31), but the point is that "the concrete individual is a product of all past and contemporary individuals, i.e., of a social group" (31). Let us explain the author's idea. History, Mr. Mikhailovsky argues, is made by "the living individual with all his thoughts and feelings." Quite true. But what determines these "thoughts and feelings"? Can one seriously support the view that they arise accidentally and do not follow necessarily from the given social environment, which serves as the material, the object of the individual's spiritual life, and is reflected in his "thoughts and feelings" positively or negatively, in the representation of the interests of one social class or another? And further, by what criteria are we to judge the *real* "thoughts and feelings" of *real* individuals? Naturally, there can be only one such criterion—the *actions* of these individuals. And since we are dealing only with social "thoughts and feelings," one should add: the *social actions* of individuals, i.e., *social facts*. "When we separate the social group from the individual," says Mr. Struve, "we understand by the former all the varied interactions between individuals which arise out of social life and acquire objective form in custom and law,

in morals and morality, in religious ideas" (32). In other words: the materialist sociologist, taking the definite social relations of people as the object of his inquiry, by that very fact also studies the real *individuals* from whose actions these relations are formed. The subjectivist sociologist, when he begins his argument supposedly with "living individuals," actually begins by endowing these individuals with such "thoughts and feelings" as he considers rational (for by isolating his "individuals" from the concrete social environment he deprived himself of the possibility of studying their *real* thoughts and feelings), i.e., he "starts with a utopia," as Mr. Mikhailovsky was obliged to admit.* And since, further, this sociologist's own ideas of what is rational reflect (without his realising it) the given social environment, the final conclusions he draws from his argument, which seem to him a "pure" product of "modern science and modern moral ideas" in fact only reflect the standpoint and interests ... of the petty bourgeoisie.

This last point—i.e., that a special sociological theory about the role of the individual, or about the subjective method, replaces a critical, materialist inquiry by a utopia—is particularly important and, since it has been omitted by Mr. Struve, it deserves to be dwelt on a little.

Let us take as an illustration the common Narodnik argument about the handicraftsman. The Narodnik describes the pitiable condition of this handicraftsman, the miserable level of his production, the monstrous way in which he is exploited by the buyer-up, who pockets the lion's share of the product and leaves the producer a few coppers for a 16 to 18 hour working day, and concludes that the wretched level of production and the exploitation of the handicraftsman's labour are an ugly side of the present system. But the handicraftsman is not a wage-worker; that is a good side. The good side must be preserved and the bad side destroyed, and for this purpose handicraft artels must be organised. Here you have the complete Narodnik argument.

The Marxist argues differently. Acquaintance with the condition of an industrial pursuit evokes in him, in addition

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* *Works*, Vol. III, p. 155, "Sociology Must Start with Some Utopia."

to the question of whether it is good or bad, the question of how the industry is organised, i.e., what are the relations between the handicraftsmen in the production of the given product *and why just these and no others*. And he sees that this organisation is commodity production, i.e., production by *separate* producers, connected with one another by the *market*. The product of the individual producer, destined for consumption by others, can reach the consumer and give the producer the right to receive another social product only after assuming the form of *money*, i.e., after undergoing preliminary social evaluation, both qualitatively and quantitatively. And this evaluation takes place behind the back of the producer, through market fluctuations. These market fluctuations, which are unknown to the producer and independent of him, are bound to cause inequality among the producers, are bound to accentuate this inequality, impoverishing some and putting others in possession of money=the product of social labour. The cause of the power of the money owner, the buyer-up, is therefore clear: it is that he alone, among the handicraftsmen who live from day to day, at most from week to week, possesses money, i.e., the product of earlier *social* labour, which in his hands becomes *capital*, an instrument for appropriating the surplus product of other handicraftsmen. Hence, the Marxist concludes, under such a system of social economy the expropriation and the exploitation of the producer are absolutely inevitable, and so are the subordination of the propertyless to the propertied and the contradiction between their interests which provides the content of the *scientific* conception of the *class struggle*. And, consequently, the interests of the producer do not, in any way, lie in reconciling these contradictory elements, but, on the contrary, in developing the contradiction and in developing the consciousness of this contradiction. We see that the growth of commodity production leads to such a development of the contradiction here in Russia, too: as the market widens and production grows, merchant capital becomes industrial capital. Machine industry, by finally destroying small, isolated production (it has already been radically undermined by the buyer-up), socialises labour. The system of Plusmacherei, which in handicraft production is obscured by the apparent independence of the hand-

icraftsman and the apparent fortuitousness of the power of the buyer-up, now becomes clear and is fully revealed. "Labour," which even in handicraft industry participated in "life" only by presenting the surplus product to the buyers-up, is now finally "differentiated from life" of bourgeois society. This society discards it with utter frankness, giving full fruition to its basic principle that the producer can secure the means of subsistence only when he finds an owner of money who will condescend to appropriate the surplus product of his labour. And what the handicraftsman [and his ideologist—the Narodnik] could not understand—the profound class character of the aforementioned contradiction—becomes self-evident to the producer. That is why the interests of the handicraftsman can be represented only by this advanced producer.

Let us now compare these arguments from the angle of their sociological method.

The Narodnik assures us that he is a realist. "History is made by living individuals," and I, he declares, begin with the "feelings" of the handicraftsman, whose attitude is hostile to the present system, and with his thoughts about the creation of a better system, whereas the Marxist argues about some sort of necessity and inevitability; he is a mystic and a metaphysician.

It is true, this mystic rejoins, that history is made by "living individuals"—and I, when examining why social relations in handicraft industry have assumed such a form and no other (you have not even raised this question!), in fact examined *how* "living individuals" *have made their history* and are still making it. And I had a reliable criterion to show that I was dealing with real, "living" individuals, with real thoughts and feelings: this criterion was that their "thoughts and feelings" had already found expression in actions and had created definite social relations. True, I never say that "history is made by living individuals" (because it seems to me that this is an empty phrase), but when I investigate *actual* social relations and their *actual* development, I am in fact examining the product of the activities of living individuals. But though you talk of "living individuals," you actually make your starting-point not the "living individual," with the "thoughts and feelings" actually

created by his conditions of life, by the given system of relations of production, but a marionette, and stuff its head with your own "thoughts and feelings." Naturally, such a pursuit only leads to pious dreams; life passes you by, and you pass life by.* But that is not all. Just see *what* you are stuffing into the head of this marionette, and what measures you are advocating. In recommending the artel as "the path suggested by modern science and modern moral ideas," you did not pay attention to one little circumstance, namely, the whole organisation of our social economy. Since you did not understand that this is a capitalist economy, you did not notice that *on this basis* all possible artels are nothing but petty palliatives, which do not in the least remove either the concentration of the means of production, including money, in the hands of a minority (this concentration is an indisputable fact), or the complete impoverishment of the vast mass of the population—palliatives which at best will only elevate a handful of individual handicraftsmen to the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. From an ideologist of the working people you turn into an ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie.

Let us, however, return to Mr. Struve. Having shown the emptiness of the Narodniks' arguments regarding the "individual," he continues: "That sociology does indeed always strive to reduce the elements of individuality to social sources is corroborated by every attempt to explain any big phase in historical evolution. When the 'historical individual' or the 'great man' is referred to, there is always a tendency to represent him as the 'vehicle' of the spirit of a certain era, as the representative of his time—and his actions, his successes and failures, as a necessary result of the whole preceding course of affairs" (32). This general tendency of every attempt to *explain* social phenomena, i.e., to create a social science, "is clearly expressed in the doctrine that the class struggle is the basic process in social evolution. Since

* "Practice mercilessly curtails it" ("the possibility of a new historical path"); "it shrinks, one might say, from day to day" (Mr. Mikhailovsky, as quoted by P. Struve, p. 16). What shrinks, of course, is not the "possibility," which never existed, but illusions, And a good thing, too.

the individual had been discarded, some other element had to be found. The social group proved to be such an element" (33). Mr. Struve is absolutely right when he says that the theory of the class struggle crowns, so to speak, the general endeavour of sociology to reduce "the elements of individuality to social sources." Furthermore, the theory of the class struggle for the first time pursues this endeavour so completely and consistently as to raise sociology to the level of a science. This was achieved by the materialist definition of the concept "group." In itself, this concept is still too indefinite and arbitrary: religious, ethnographical, political, juridical and other phenomena may also be considered as criteria distinguishing "groups." There is no firm token by which particular "groups" in each of these spheres can be distinguished. The theory of the class struggle, however, represents a tremendous acquisition for social science for the very reason that it lays down the methods by which the individual can be reduced to the social with the utmost precision and definiteness. Firstly, this theory worked out the concept of the *social-economic formation*. Taking as its starting-point a fact that is fundamental to all human society, namely, the mode of procuring the means of subsistence, it connected up with this the relations between people formed under the influence of the given modes of procuring the means of subsistence, and showed that this system of relations ("relations of production," to use Marx's terminology) is the *basis* of society, which clothes itself in political and legal forms and in definite trends of social thought. According to Marx's theory, each such system of production relations is a specific social organism, whose inception, functioning, and transition to a higher form, conversion into another social organism, are governed by specific laws. This theory applied to social science that objective, general scientific criterion of repetition which the subjectivists declared could not be applied to sociology. They argued, in fact, that owing to the tremendous complexity and variety of social phenomena they could not be studied without separating the important from the unimportant, and that such a separation could be made only from the viewpoint of "critically thinking" and "morally developed" individuals. And they thus happily succeeded in transforming social

science into a series of sermons on petty-bourgeois morality, samples of which we have seen in the case of Mr. Mikhailovsky, who philosophised about the inexpediency of history and about a path directed by "the light of science." It was these arguments that Marx's theory severed at the very root. The distinction between the important and the unimportant was replaced by the distinction between the economic structure of society, as the *content*, and the political and ideological *form*. The very concept of the economic structure was exactly explained by refuting the views of the earlier economists, who saw laws of nature where there is room only for the laws of a specific, historically defined system of relations of production. The subjectivists' arguments about "society" in general, meaningless arguments that did not go beyond petty-bourgeois utopias (because even the possibility of generalising the most varied social systems into special types of social organisms was not ascertained), were replaced by an *investigation* of definite forms of the structure of society. Secondly, the actions of "living individuals" within the bounds of each such social-economic formation, actions infinitely varied and apparently not lending themselves to any systematisation, were generalised and reduced to the actions of groups of individuals differing from each other in the part they played in the system of production relations, in the conditions of production, and, consequently, in their conditions of life, and in the interests determined by these conditions—in a word, to the actions of *classes*, the struggle between which determined the development of society. This refuted the childishly naïve and purely mechanical view of history held by the subjectivists, who contented themselves with the meaningless thesis that history is made by living individuals, and who refused to examine what social conditions determine their actions, and exactly in what way subjectivism was replaced by the view that the social process is a process of natural history—a view without which, of course, there could be no social science. Mr. Struve very justly remarks that "ignoring the individual in sociology, or rather, removing him from sociology, is essentially a particular instance of the striving for scientific knowledge" (33), and that "individualities" exist not only in the spiritual but also in the physical world. The whole point is

that the reduction of "individualities" to certain general laws was accomplished for the physical realm long ago, while for the social realm it was firmly established only by Marx's theory.

Another objection made by Mr. Struve to the sociological theory of the Russian subjectivists is that, in addition to all the above-mentioned arguments, "sociology cannot *under any circumstances* recognise what we call individuality as a primary fact, since the very concept of individuality (which is not subject to further explanation) and the fact that corresponds to it are the result of a long social process" (36). This is a very true thought, and is all the more worthy of being dwelt en because the author's argument contains certain inaccuracies. He cites the views of *Simmel*, who, he declares, proved in his *Social Differentiation* the direct interdependence between the development of the individual and the differentiation of the group to which the individual belongs. Mr. Struve contrasts this thesis with Mr. Mikhailovsky's theory of the inverse dependence between the development of the individual and the differentiation ("heterogeneity") of society. "In an undifferentiated environment," Mr. Struve objects, "the individual will be 'harmoniously integral' ... in his 'homogeneity and impersonality.' A real individual cannot be 'an aggregate of all the features inherent in the human organism in general,' simply because such a fulness of content exceeds the powers of the real individual" (38-39). "In order that the individual may be differentiated, he must live in a differentiated environment" (39).

It is not clear from this exposition how exactly Simmel formulates the question and how he argues. But as transmitted by Mr. Struve the formulation of the question suffers from the same defect that we find in Mr. Mikhailovsky's case. Abstract reasoning about how far the development (and well-being) of the individual depends on the differentiation of society is quite unscientific, because no correlation can be established that will suit every form of social structure. The very concepts "differentiation," "heterogeneity," and so on, acquire absolutely different meanings, depending on the particular social environment to which they are applied. Mr. Mikhailovsky's fundamental error consists precisely in the abstract dogmatism of his reasoning, which en-

deavours to embrace "progress" in general, instead of studying the concrete "progress" of some concrete social formation. When Mr. Struve sets his own general theses (described above) against Mr. Mikhailovsky, he repeats the latter's mistake by abandoning the depiction and explanation of a concrete progress in the realm of nebulous and unfounded dogmas. Let us take an example: "The harmonious integrity of the individual is determined as to its content by the degree of development, i.e., differentiation of the group," says Mr. Struve, and puts this phrase in italics. But what are we to understand here by the "differentiation" of the group? Has the abolition of serfdom accentuated or weakened this "differentiation"? Mr. Mikhailovsky answers the question in the latter sense ("What Is Progress?"); Mr. Struve would most likely answer it in the former sense, on the grounds of the increased social division of labour. The former had in mind the abolition of social-estate distinctions; the latter, the creation of economic distinctions. The term, as you see, is so indefinite that it can be stretched to cover opposite things. Another example. The transition from capitalist manufacture to large-scale machine industry may be regarded as diminution of "differentiation," for the detailed division of labour among specialised workers ceases. Yet there can be no doubt that the conditions for the development of the individuality are far more favourable (for the worker) precisely in the latter case. The conclusion is that the very formulation of the question is incorrect. The author himself admits that there is also an antagonism between the individual and the group (to which Mr. Mikhailovsky also refers). "But life," he adds, "is never made up of *absolute* contradictions: in life everything is *mobile* and *relative*, and at the same time all the separate sides are in a state of constant interaction" (39). If that is so, why was it necessary to speak of absolute interrelations between the group and the individual, interrelations having no connection with the strictly defined phase in the development of a definite social formation? Why could not the whole argument have been transferred to the concrete process of evolution of Russia? The author has made an attempt to formulate the question in this way, and had he adhered to it consistently his argument would have gained a great deal. "It was only the division of labour—

mankind's fall from grace, according to Mr. Mikhailovsky's doctrine—that created the conditions for the development of the 'individual' in whose name Mr. Mikhailovsky justly protests against the modern forms of division of labour" (38). That is excellently put; only in place of "division of labour" he should have said "capitalism," and, even more narrowly, *Russian capitalism*. Capitalism is progressive in its significance precisely because it has destroyed the old cramped conditions of human life that created mental stultification and prevented the producers from taking their destinies into their own hands. The tremendous development of trade relations and world exchange and the constant migrations of vast masses of the population have shattered the age-old fetters of the tribe, family and territorial community, and created that variety of development, that "variety of talents and wealth of social relationships,"* which plays so great a part in the modern history of the West. In Russia this process has been fully manifested in the post-Reform era, when the ancient forms of labour very rapidly collapsed and prime place was assumed by the purchase and sale of labour-power, which tore the peasant from the patriarchal, semi-feudal family, from the stupefying conditions of village life and replaced the semi-feudal forms of appropriation of surplus-value by purely capitalist forms. This economic process has been reflected in the social sphere by a "general heightening of the sense of individuality," by the middle-class intellectuals squeezing the landlord class out of "society," by a heated literary war against senseless medieval restrictions on the individual, and so on. The Narodniks will probably not deny that it was post-Reform Russia which produced this heightened sense of individuality, of personal dignity. But they do not ask themselves what material conditions led to this. Nothing of the kind, of course, could have happened under serfdom. And so the Narodnik welcomes the "emancipatory" Reform, never noticing that he is guilty of the same short-sighted optimism as the bourgeois historians of whom Marx wrote that they regarded the peasant Reform through the clair-obscure of "emancipation," without observing that this "emancipation" only consisted

* K. Marx, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire*, S. 98, u.s.w.[118]

in the replacement of one form by another, the replacement of the feudal surplus product by bourgeois surplus-value. Exactly the same thing has happened in our country. The "old-nobility" economy, by tying men to their localities and dividing the population into handfuls of subjects of individual lords, brought about the suppression of the individual. And then capitalism freed him of all feudal fetters, made him independent in respect of the market, made him a commodity owner (and as such the equal of all other commodity owners), and thus heightened his sense of individuality. If the Narodnik gentlemen are filled with pharisaic horror when they hear talk of the progressive character of Russian capitalism, it is only because they do not reflect on the material conditions which make for those "benefits of progress" that mark post-Reform Russia. When Mr. Mikhailovsky begins his "sociology" with the "individual" who protests against Russian capitalism as an accidental and temporary deviation of Russia from the right path, he defeats his own purpose because he does not realise that it was capitalism alone that created the conditions which made possible this protest of the individual. From this example we see once again the changes needed in Mr. Struve's arguments. The question should have been made entirely one of Russian realities, of ascertaining what actually exists and why it is so and not otherwise. It was not for nothing that the Narodniks based their whole sociology not on an analysis of reality but on arguments about what "might be"; they could not help seeing that reality was mercilessly destroying their illusions.

The author concludes his examination of the theory of "individuals" with the following formulation: "To sociology, the individual is a function of the environment," "the individual is here a formal concept, whose content is supplied by an investigation of the social group" (40). This last comparison brings out very well the contrast between subjectivism and materialism. When they argued about the "individual," the subjectivists defined the *content* of this concept (i.e., the "thoughts and feelings" of the individual, his social acts) a priori, that is, they insinuated their utopias instead of "investigating the social group."

Another "important aspect" of materialism, Mr. Struve continues, "consists in economic materialism subordinating the idea to the fact, and consciousness and what should be to being" (40). Here, of course, "subordinating the idea" means assigning to it a subordinate position in the explanation of social phenomena. The Narodnik subjectivists do exactly the opposite: they base their arguments on "ideals," without bothering about the fact that these ideals can only be a certain reflection of reality, and, consequently, must be verified by facts, must be based on facts. But then this latter thesis will be incomprehensible to the Narodnik without explanation. How is that?— he asks himself; ideals should condemn facts, show how to change them, they should verify facts, and not be verified by them. To the Narodnik, who is accustomed to hover in the clouds, this appears to be a compromise with facts. Let us explain.

The existence of "working for others," the existence of exploitation, will always engender ideals opposite to this system both among the exploited themselves and among certain members of the "intelligentsia."

These ideals are extremely valuable to the Marxist; he argues with Narodism only on the basis of these ideals; he argues exclusively about the construction of these ideals and their realisation.

The Narodnik thinks it enough to note the fact that gives rise to such ideals, then to refer to the legitimacy of the ideal from the standpoint of "modern science and modern moral ideas" [and he does not realise that these "modern ideas" are only concessions made by West-European "public opinion" to the new rising force], and then to call upon "society" and the "state" to ensure it, safeguard it, organise it!

The Marxist proceeds from the same ideal; he does not compare it with "modern science and modern moral ideas, however,"* but *with the existing class contradictions*, and therefore does not formulate it as a demand put forward by

* Engels, in *Herrn E. Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* [*Anti-Dühring*]—*Ed.*) very aptly points out that this is the old psychological method of comparing one's own concept with another concept, with a cast of another fact, and not with the fact it reflects.[119]

"science," but by such and such a class, a demand engendered by such and such social relations (which are to be objectively investigated), and achievable only in such and such a way in consequence of such and such properties of these relations. If ideals are not based on facts *in this way*, they will only remain pious wishes, with no chance of being accepted by the masses and, hence, of being realised.

Having thus stated the general theoretical propositions which compel the recognition of materialism as the only correct method of social science, Mr. Struve proceeds to expound the views of Marx and Engels, quoting principally the works of the latter. This is an extremely interesting and instructive part of the book.

The author's statement that "nowhere does one meet with such misunderstanding of Marx as among Russian publicists" (44) is an extremely just one. In illustration, he first of all cites Mr. Mikhailovsky, who regards Marx's "historico-philosophical theory" as nothing more than an explanation of the "genesis of the capitalist system." Mr. Struve quite rightly protests against this. Indeed, it is a highly characteristic fact. Mr. Mikhailovsky has written about Marx many times, but he has never even hinted at the relation of *Marx's method* to the "subjective method in sociology." Mr. Mikhailovsky has written about *Capital* and has declared his "solidarity" (?) with Marx's economic doctrine, but he has passed over in complete silence the question—for example—of whether the Russian subjectivists are not following the method of Proudhon, who wanted to refashion commodity economy in accordance with his ideal of justice.* In what way does this criterion (of justice—justice éternelle) differ from Mr. Mikhailovsky's criterion: "modern science and modern moral ideas"? Mr. Mikhailovsky has always protested vigorously against identifying the method of social sciences with that of the natural sciences, so why did he not object to Marx's statement that Proudhon's method is as absurd as would be that of a chemist who wanted to transform metabolism in accordance with the laws of "affinity" instead of studying the "real laws of metabolism"? Why did he not object to Marx's view that the social process is a "process of

* *Das Kapital*, I. B. 2te Aufl. S. 62, Anm. 38.[120]

natural history"? It cannot be explained by non-acquaintance with the literature; the explanation evidently lies in an utter failure or refusal to understand. Mr. Struve, it seems to me, is the first in our literature to have pointed this out—and that is greatly to his credit.

Let us now pass to those of the author's statements on Marxism which evoke criticism. "We cannot but admit," says Mr. Struve, "that a *purely philosophical proof* of this doctrine has not yet been provided, and that it has not yet coped with the vast concrete material presented by world history. What is needed, evidently, is a reconsideration of the facts from the standpoint of the new theory; what is needed is a criticism of the theory from the angle of the facts. Perhaps much of the one-sidedness and the over-hasty generalisations will be abandoned" (46). It is not quite clear what the author means by "a purely philosophical proof." From the standpoint of Marx and Engels, philosophy has no right to a separate, independent existence, and its material is divided among the various branches of positive science. Thus one might understand philosophical proof to mean *either* a comparison of its premises with the firmly established laws of other sciences [and Mr. Struve himself admitted that even psychology provides propositions impelling the abandonment of subjectivism and the adoption of materialism], *or* experience in the application of this theory. And in this connection we have the statement of Mr. Struve himself that "materialism will always be entitled to credit for having provided a profoundly scientific and truly *philosophical* (author's italics) interpretation of a number (N.B.) of vastly important historical facts" (50). This latter statement contains the author's recognition that materialism is the only scientific method in sociology, and hence, of course, a "reconsideration of the facts" is required from this standpoint, especially a reconsideration of the facts of Russian history and present-day reality, which have been so zealously distorted by the Russian subjectivists. As regards the last remark about possible "one-sidedness" and "over-hasty generalisations," we shall not dwell on this general, and therefore vague, statement, but shall turn directly to one of the amendments made by the author, "who is not

infected with orthodoxy," to the "over-hasty generalisations" of Marx.

The subject is the state. Denying the state, "Marx and his followers ... went ... too far in their criticism of the *modern state*" and were guilty of "one-sidedness." "The state," Mr. Struve says, correcting this extravagance, "is first of all the *organisation of order*; it is, however, the organisation of rule (class rule) in a society in which the subordination of certain groups to others is determined by its economic structure" (53). Tribal life, in the author's opinion, knew the state; and it will remain even after classes are abolished, for the criterion of the state is coercive power.

It is simply amazing that the author, criticising Marx from his professorial standpoint, does so with such a surprising lack of arguments. First of all, he quite wrongly regards coercive power as the distinguishing feature of the state: there is a coercive power in every human community; and there was one in the tribal system and in the family, but there was no state. "An essential feature of the state," says Engels in the work from which Mr. Struve took the quotation about the state, "is a public power distinct from the mass of the people" (*Ursprung der Familie* u.s.w., 2te Aufl., S. 84. Russ. trans., p. 109);[121] and somewhat earlier he speaks of the institution of the naucrary[122] and says that it "undermined the tribal system in two ways: firstly, by creating a public power (*öffentliche Gewalt*), which simply no longer coincided with the sum-total of the armed people" (ib., S. 79; Russ. trans., p. 105).[123] Thus the distinguishing feature of the state is the existence of a separate class of people in whose hands *power* is concentrated. Obviously, nobody could use the term "state" in reference to a community in which the "organisation of order" is administered in turn by *all* its members. Furthermore, Mr. Struve's arguments are still more unsubstantial in relation to the modern state. To say of it that it is "first of all (sic!?!) the organisation of order" is to fail to understand one of the most important points in Marx's theory. In modern society the bureaucracy is the particular stratum which has power in its hands. The direct and intimate connection between this organ and the bourgeois class, which dominates in modern society, is apparent both from history (the bureaucracy was the first political instrument of the bourgeoi-

sie against the feudal lords, and against the representatives of the "old-nobility" system in general, and marked the first appearance in the arena of political rule of people who were not high-born landowners, but commoners, "middle class") and from the very conditions of the formation and recruitment of this class, which is open only to bourgeois "offspring of the people," and is connected with that bourgeoisie by thousands of strong ties.* The author's mistake is all the more unfortunate because it is precisely the Russian Narodniks, against whom he conceived the excellent idea of doing battle, who have no notion that every bureaucracy, by its historical origin, its contemporary source, and its purpose, is purely and exclusively a bourgeois institution, an institution to which only ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie are capable of turning in the interests of the producer.

It is also worth while to dwell a little on the attitude of Marxism to ethics. On pp. 6-65 the author quotes the excellent explanation given by Engels of the relation between freedom and necessity: "Freedom is the appreciation of necessity."[125] Far from assuming fatalism, determinism in fact provides a basis for reasonable action. One cannot refrain from adding that the Russian subjectivists could not understand even such an elementary question as freedom of will. Mr. Mikhailovsky helplessly confused determinism with fatalism and found a solution ... in trying to sit between two stools; not desiring to deny the functioning of laws, he asserted that freedom of will is a fact of our consciousness (properly speaking, this is Mirtov's idea borrowed by Mr. Mikhailovsky) and can therefore serve as a basis of ethics. It is clear that, applied to sociology, these ideas could provide nothing but a utopia or a vapid morality which ignores the class struggle going on in society. One therefore cannot deny the justice

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* Cf. K. Marx, *Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich*, S. 23, Leipzig, 1876, and *Der achtzehnte Brumaire*, S. 45-46. Hamburg, 1885).[124] "But it is precisely with the maintenance of that extensive state machine in its numerous ramifications" [referring to the bureaucracy] "that the *material interests* of the French bourgeoisie are interwoven in the closet fashion. Here it finds posts for its surplus population and makes up in the form of state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the form of profits, interest, rents and honorariums."

of Sombart's remark that "in Marxism itself there is not a grain of ethics from beginning to end"; theoretically, it subordinates the "ethical standpoint" to the "principle of causality"; in practice it reduces it to the class struggle.

Mr. Struve supplements his exposition of materialism by an evaluation from the materialist standpoint of "two factors which play a very important part in all Narodnik arguments"—the "intelligentsia" and the "state" (70). This evaluation again reflects the author's "unorthodoxy" noted above in regard to his objectivism. "If ... all social groups in general represent a real force only to the extent that ... they constitute social classes or adhere to them, then, evidently, 'the non-estate intelligentsia' is not a real social force" (70). Of course, in the abstract and theoretical sense the author is right. He takes the Narodniks at their word, so to speak. You say it is the intelligentsia that must direct Russia along "different paths"—but you do not understand that since it does not adhere to any class, it is a cipher. You boast that the Russian non-estate intelligentsia has always been distinguished for the "purity" of its ideas—but that is exactly why it has always been impotent. The author's criticism is confined to comparing the absurd Narodnik *idea* of the omnipotence of the intelligentsia with his own perfectly correct *idea* of the "impotence of the intelligentsia in the economic process" (71). But this comparison is not enough. In order to judge of the Russian "non-estate intelligentsia" as a special group in Russian society which is so characteristic of the whole post-Reform era—an era in which the noble was finally squeezed out by the commoner—and which undoubtedly played and is still playing a certain historical role, we must compare the ideas, and still more the programmes, of our "non-estate intelligentsia" *with the position and the interests of the given classes of Russian society.* To remove the possibility of our being suspected of partiality, we shall not make this comparison ourselves, but shall confine ourselves to referring to the Narodnik whose article was commented on in Chapter I. The conclusion that follows from all his comments is quite definite, namely, that Russia's advanced, liberal, "democratic" intelligentsia was a bourgeois intelligentsia. The fact of the intelligentsia being "non-estate" in no way precludes the class origin of its ideas. The

bourgeoisie has always and everywhere risen against feudalism in the name of the abolition of the social estates—and in our country, too, the old-nobility, social-estate system was opposed by the non-estate intelligentsia. The bourgeoisie always and everywhere opposed the obsolete framework of the social estates and other medieval institutions in the name of the whole "people," within which class contradictions were still undeveloped. And it was right, both in the West and in Russia, because the institutions criticised were actually hampering *everybody*. As soon as the social-estate system in Russia was dealt a decisive blow (1861), antagonism within the "people" immediately became apparent, and at the same time, and by virtue of this, antagonism became apparent within the non-estate intelligentsia—between the liberals and the Narodniks, the ideologists of the peasants (among whom the first Russian ideologists of the direct producers did not see, and, indeed, it was too early for them to see, the formation of opposed classes). Subsequent economic development led to a more complete disclosure of the social contradictions within Russian society, and compelled the recognition of the fact that the peasantry was splitting into a rural bourgeoisie and a proletariat. Narodism has rejected Marxism and has become almost completely the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. The Russian "non-estate intelligentsia," therefore, represents "a real social force" *inasmuch as it defends general bourgeois interests*.* If, nevertheless, this force was not *able* to create institutions suitable to the interests it defended, if it was unable to change "the atmosphere of contemporary Russian culture" (Mr. V. V.), if "active democracy in the era of the political struggle" gave way to "social indifferentism" (Mr. V. V. in *Nedelya*, 1894, No. 47), the cause of this lies not only in the dreaminess of

* The petty-bourgeois nature of the vast majority of the Narodniks' wishes has been pointed out in Chapter I. Wishes that do not come under this description (such as "socialisation of labour") hold a minute place in modern Narodism. Both *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (1893, Nos. 11-12, *Yuzhakov*'s article on "Problems of Russia's Economic Development") and Mr. V. V. (*Essays on Theoretical Economics*, St. Petersburg, 1895) protests against Mr. N.—on, who commented "severely" (Mr. Yuzhakov's word) on the outworn panacea of credits, extension of land tenure, migration, etc.

our native "non-estate intelligentsia," but, and chiefly, in the position of those classes from which it emerged and from which it drew its strength, in their duality. It is undeniable that the Russian "atmosphere" brought them many disadvantages, but it also gave them certain advantages.

In Russia, the class which, in the opinion of the Narodniks, is not the vehicle of the "pure idea of labour" has an especially great historical role; its "activity" cannot be lulled by tempting promises. Therefore, the references of the Marxists to this class, far from "breaking the democratic thread"—as is asserted by Mr. V. V., who specialises in inventing the most incredible absurdities about the Marxists—catch up this "thread," which an indifferent "society" allows to fall from its hands, and demand that it be developed, strengthened and brought closer to life.

Connected with Mr. Struve's incomplete appraisal of the intelligentsia is his not altogether happy formulation of the following proposition: "It must be proved," he says, "that the disintegration of the old economic system is inevitable" (71). Firstly, what does the author mean by "the old economic system"? Serfdom? But its disintegration does not have to be proved. "People's production"? But he himself says later, and quite justly, that this word combination—"does not correspond to any real historical system" (177), that in other words, it is a myth, because after "serfdom" was abolished in Russia, commodity economy began to develop very rapidly. The author was probably referring to that stage in the development of capitalism when it had not yet entirely disentangled itself from medieval institutions, when merchant capital was still strong and when the majority of the producers were still engaged in small-scale production. Secondly, what does the author regard as the criterion of this inevitability? The rule of certain classes? The properties of the given system of production relations? In either case it amounts to *recording the existence* of one or another (capitalist) system; it amounts to *recording a fact*, and under no circumstances should it have been transplanted to the realm of reflections about the future. Such reflections should have left the monopoly of the Narodnik gentlemen, who are seeking "different paths for the fatherland." The author himself says on the very next page that every state is "an

expression of the rule of definite social classes" and that "there must be a redistribution of the social force between various classes for the state to radically change its course" (72). All this is profoundly true and very aptly aimed at the Narodniks, and the question should accordingly have been put in a different way: the *existence* (and not the "inevitability of disintegration," etc.) of capitalist production relations in Russia must be proved; it must be proved that the Russian data also justify the law that "commodity economy is capitalist economy," i.e., that in our country, too, commodity economy is growing everywhere into capitalist economy; it must be proved that everywhere a system prevails which is bourgeois in essence, and that it is the rule of this class, and not the famous Narodnik "chance happenings" or "policy," etc., that lead to the liberation of the producer from the means of production and to his working everywhere for others.

With this let us conclude our examination of the first part of Mr. Struve's book, which is of a general character.

CHAPTER III

THE PRESENTATION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BY THE NARODNIKS AND BY MR. STRUVE

After finishing with sociology, the author proceeds to deal with more "concrete economic problems" (73). He considers it "natural and legitimate" to start from "general propositions and historical references," from "indisputable premises established by human experience," as he says in the preface.

One cannot but note that this method suffers from the same abstractness noted at the beginning as being the main defect of the book under review. In the chapters we are now coming to (the third, fourth, and fifth), this defect has resulted in undesirable consequences of a twofold nature. On the one hand, it has weakened the definite theoretical propositions advanced by the author against the Narodniks. Mr. Struve argues *in general*, describes the transition from natural to commodity economy, points out that, as a rule, such and such happened on earth, and with a few cursory remarks proceeds to deal with Russia, applying

to it, too, the general process of the "historical development of economic life." There can be no doubt that it is quite legitimate to apply the process in this way, and that the author's "historical references" are absolutely necessary for a criticism of Narodism, which falsely presents history, and not only Russian history. These propositions should, however, have been expressed more concretely, and been more definitely set against the arguments of the Narodniks, who say that it is wrong to apply the general process to Russia; the Narodniks' particular way of understanding Russian reality should have been compared with the Marxists' *other* way of understanding *that same* reality. On the other hand, the abstract character of the author's arguments leads to his propositions being stated incompletely, to a situation where, though he correctly indicates the existence of a process, he does not examine what classes arose while it was going on, what classes were the vehicles of the process, overshadowing other strata of the population subordinate to them; in a word, the author's objectivism does not rise to the level of materialism—in the above-mentioned significance of these terms.*

Proof of this appraisal of the above-mentioned chapters of Mr. Struve's work will be adduced as we examine some of its most important propositions.

Very true is the author's remark that "almost from the outset of Russian history we find that the direct producers' dependence (juridical and economic) on the lords has been the historical accompaniment of the idyll of 'people's production'" (81). In the period of natural economy the peasant was enslaved to the landowner, he worked for the boyar, the monastery, the landlord, but not for himself,

* This relation between objectivism and materialism was indicated, incidentally, by Marx in his preface to his *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*. Marx, after mentioning that Proudhon wrote of the same historical event (in his *Coup d'état*), says the following of how the latter's viewpoint is opposed to his own:

"Proudhon, for his part, seeks to represent the coup d'état [of Dec. 2] as the result of an antecedent historical development. Unnoticeably, however, his historical construction of the coup d'état becomes a historical *apologia* for its hero. Thus be falls into the error of our so-called *objective* historians. I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the *class struggle* in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part" (Vorwort).[126]

and Mr. Struve has every right to set this *historical fact* against the tales of our exceptionalist sociologists about how "the means of production belonged to the producer" (81). These tales constitute one of the distortions of Russian history, meant to suit the philistine utopia in which the Narodniks have always lavishly indulged. Fearing to look reality in the face, and fearing to give this oppression its proper name, they turned to history, but pictured things as though the producer's ownership of means of production was an "ancient" principle, was the "age-old basis" of peasant labour, and that the modern expropriation of the peasantry is therefore to be explained not by the replacement of the feudal surplus product by bourgeois surplus-value, not by the capitalist organisation of our social economy, but by the accident of unfortunate policy, by a temporary "diversion from the path prescribed by the entire historical life of the nation" (Mr. Yuzhakov, quoted by P. Struve, p. 15). And they were not ashamed to tell these absurd stories about a country which had but recently seen the end* of the feudal exploitation of the peasantry in the grossest, Asiatic forms, when not only did the means of production not belong to the producer but the producers themselves differed very little from "means of production." Mr. Struve very pointedly sets against this "sugary optimism" Saltykov's sharp rejoinder about the connection between "people's production" and serfdom, and about how the "plenty" of the period of the "age-old basis" "fell only" [note that!] "to the lot of the descendants of the leibkampantsi[127] and other retainers" (83).

Further, let us note Mr. Struve's following remark, which definitely concerns definite facts of Russian reality and contains an exceptionally true thought. "When the producers start working for a distant and indefinite and not for a local, exactly delimited market, and competition, the struggle for a market develops, these conditions lead to technical progress.... Once division of labour is possible,

* Even today it cannot be said to have ended altogether. On the one hand, we have the land-redemption payments (and it is well known that they include not only the price of the land, but also the redemption from serfdom); on the other hand, labour service by the peasants in return for the use of "cut-off lands," for example, are a direct survival of the feudal mode of production.

it has to be carried out as widely as possible, but before production is technically reorganised, the influence of the new conditions of exchange (marketing) will be felt in the fact of the producer becoming economically dependent on the merchant (the buyer-up), and socially this point is of decisive significance. This is lost sight of by our 'true Marxists' like Mr. V. V., who are blinded by the significance of purely technical progress" (98). The reference to the decisive significance of the appearance of the buyer-up is profoundly true. It is decisive in that it proves beyond doubt that we have here the capitalist organisation of production, it proves the applicability to Russia, too, of the proposition that "commodity economy is money economy, is capitalist economy," and creates that subordination of the producer to capital from which there can be no other way out than through the independent activity of the producer. "From the moment that the capitalist entrepreneur comes between the consumer and the producer—and this is inevitable when production is carried on for an extensive and indefinite market—we have before us one of the forms of capitalist production." And the author rightly adds that "if *handicraft* production is understood as the kind under which the producer, who works for an indefinite and distant market, enjoys *complete economic independence*, it will, I think, be found that in Russian *reality* there is none of this true handicraft production." It is only a pity that use is made here of the expression "I think," along with the future tense: the predominance of the domestic system of large-scale production and of the utter enslavement of the handicraftsmen by buyers-up is the all-prevailing *fact* of the actual organisation of our handicraft industries. This organisation is not only capitalist, but as the author rightly says, is also one that is "highly profitable to the capitalists," ensuring them enormous profits, abominably low wages and hindering in the highest degree the organisation and development of the workers (pp. 99-101). One cannot help noting that the fact of the predominance of capitalist exploitation in our handicraft industries has long been known, but the Narodniks ignore it in the most shameless fashion. In almost every issue of their magazines and newspapers dealing with this subject, you

come across complaints about the government "artificially" supporting large-scale capitalism [whose entire "artificiality" consists in being large-scale and not small, factory and not handicraft, mechanical and not hand-operated] and doing nothing for the "needs of *people's* industry." Here stands out in full relief the narrow-mindedness of the petty bourgeois, who fights for small against big *capital* and stubbornly closes his eyes to the categorically established fact that a similar opposition of interests is to be found in this "people's" industry, and that consequently the way out does not lie in miserable credits, etc. Since the small proprietor, who is tied to his enterprise and lives in constant fear of losing it, regards all of this as something awful, as some sort of "agitation" in favour of "a fair reward for labour, as though labour itself does not create that reward in its fruits," it is clear that only the producer employed in the "artificial," "hothouse" conditions of factory industry can be the representative of the working handicraftsmen.*

Let us deal further with Mr. Struve's argument about agriculture. Steam transport compels a transition to exchange economy, it makes agricultural production commodity production. And the commodity character of production unfailingly requires "its economic and technical rationality" (110). The author considers this thesis a particularly important argument against the Narodniks, who triumphantly claim that the advantages of large-scale production in agriculture have not been proved. "It ill becomes those," says the author in reply, "who base themselves on Marx's teachings, to deny the significance of the economic and technical peculiarities of agricultural production thanks to which small undertakings in some cases possess economic advantages over big ones—even though Marx himself denied the importance of these peculiarities" (111). This passage is very unclear. What peculiarities is the author speaking of? Why does he not indicate them exactly? Why does he not indicate where and how Marx expressed his

* "The entire process is expressed in the fact of petty production (handicraft) approximating to 'capitalism' in some respects, and in others to wage-labour separated from the means of production" (p. 104).

views on the matter and on what grounds it is considered necessary to correct those views?

"Small-scale agricultural production," continues the author, "must increasingly assume a commodity character, and the small agricultural undertakings, if they are to be viable *enterprises*, must satisfy the general requirements of economic and technical rationality" (111). "It is not at all a matter of whether the small agricultural enterprises are absorbed by the big ones—one can hardly anticipate such an outcome to economic evolution—but of the metamorphosis to which the entire national economy is subjected under the influence of exchange. The Narodniks overlook the fact that the ousting of natural economy by exchange economy in connection with the above-noted 'dispersal of industry' completely alters the entire structure of society. The former ratio between the agricultural (rural) and non-agricultural (urban) population is changed in favour of the latter. The very economic type and mental make-up of the agricultural producers is radically changed under the influence of the new conditions of economic life" (114).

The passage cited shows us what the author wished to say by his passage about Marx, and at the same time clearly illustrates the statement made above that the dogmatic method of exposition, not supported by a description of the concrete process, obscures the author's thoughts and leaves them incompletely expressed. His thesis about the Narodniks' views being wrong is quite correct, but incomplete, because it is not accompanied by a reference to the new forms of class antagonism that develop when irrational production is replaced by rational. The author, for example, confines himself to a cursory reference to "economic rationality" meaning the "highest rent" (110), but forgets to add that *rent* presupposes the *bourgeois organisation of agriculture*, i.e., firstly, its complete subordination to the market, and, secondly, the formation in agriculture of the same classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, as are peculiar to capitalist industry.

When the Narodniks argue about the non-capitalist, as they believe, organisation of our agriculture, they pose the problem in an abominably narrow and wrong way, reducing everything to the ousting of the small farms by the

big, and nothing more. Mr. Struve is quite right in telling them that when they argue that way they overlook the general character of agricultural production, which can be (and really is in our country) bourgeois even where production is small-scale, just as West-European peasant farming is bourgeois. The conditions under which small-scale independent enterprise ("people's"—to use the expression of the Russian intelligentsia) becomes bourgeois are well known. They are, firstly, the prevalence of commodity economy, which, with the producers isolated* from one another, gives rise to competition among them, and, while ruining the mass, enriches the few; secondly, the transformation of labour-power into a commodity, and the means of production into capital, i.e., the separation of the producer from the means of production, and the capitalist organisation of the most important branches of industry. Under these conditions the small independent producer acquires an exceptional position in relation to the mass of producers—just as now *really independent* proprietors constitute in our country an exception among the masses, who work for others and, far from owning "independent" enterprises, do not even possess means of subsistence sufficient to last a week. The condition and interests of the independent proprietor isolate him from the mass of the producers, who live *mainly* on wages. While the latter raise the issue of a "fair reward," which is necessarily the gateway to the fundamental issue of a different system of social economy, the former have a far more lively interest in quite different things, namely, credits, and particularly small "people's" credits, improved and cheaper implements, "organisation of marketing," "extension of land tenure," etc.

The very law of the superiority of large enterprises over small is a law of commodity production alone and consequently is not applicable to enterprises not yet entirely drawn into commodity production, not subordinated to

* This, of course, refers to their being isolated *economically*. Community *landownership* does not eliminate this in the least. Even where the land re-allotments are "equalitarian" in the highest degree the peasant farms single-handed on his own strip of land; hence he is an isolated producer working on his own.

the market. That is why the line of argument (in which, by the way, Mr. V. V. also exercised himself) that the decline of the nobles' farms after the Reform and the renting of privately-owned land by the peasants refute the view of the capitalist evolution of our agriculture, merely proves that those who resort to it have absolutely no understanding of things. Of course, the destruction of feudal relations, under which *cultivation* had been in the hands of the peasants, caused a crisis among the landlords. But, apart from the fact that this crisis merely led to the increasing employment of farm labourers and day labourers, which replaced the obsolescent forms of semi-feudal labour (labour service); apart from this, the peasant farm itself began to change fundamentally in character: it was compelled to work for the market, a situation that was not long in leading to the peasantry splitting into a rural petty bourgeoisie and a proletariat. This split settles once and for all the issue of capitalism in Russia. Mr. Struve explains the process in Chapter V, where he remarks: "There is differentiation among the small farmers: there develops, on the one hand, an 'economically strong'" [he should have said: bourgeois] "peasantry, and, on the other—a proletarian type of peasantry. Features of people's production are combined with capitalist features to form a single picture, above which is clearly visible the inscription: here comes Grimy" (p. 177).

Now it is to this aspect of the matter, to the *bourgeois organisation* of the new, "rational" agriculture that attention should have been directed. The Narodniks should have been shown that by ignoring the process mentioned they change from ideologists of the peasantry into ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie. "The improvement of people's production," for which they thirst, can only mean, under such an organisation of peasant economy, the "improvement" of the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, those who point to the producer who lives under the most highly developed capitalist relations, correctly express the interests not only of this producer, but also of the vast mass of the "proletarian" peasantry.

Mr. Struve's exposition is unsatisfactory in character, is incomplete and sketchy; on account of this, when dealing

with rational agriculture, he does not describe its social and economic organisation, and, when he shows that steam transport replaces irrational by rational production, natural by commodity production, he does not describe the new form of class antagonism that then takes shape.

This same defect in the presentation of problems is to be observed in most of the arguments in the chapters under examination. Here are some more examples to illustrate this. Commodity economy—says the author—and extensive social division of labour "develop on the basis of the institution of private property, the principles of economic freedom, and the sense of individualism" (91). The progress of national production is bound up with the "extent to which the institution of private property dominates society." "Maybe it is regrettable, but that is how things happen in actual life, it is empirically, historically established coexistence. At the present time, when the ideas and principles of the eighteenth century are treated so light-heartedly—the mistake it made being in fact repeated—this cultural-historical tie between economic progress and the institution of private property, the principles of economic freedom, and the sense of individualism is too often forgotten. Only by ignoring this tie can one expect economic progress to be possible in an economically and culturally undeveloped society, without the principles mentioned being put into effect. We feel no particular sympathy for these principles and perfectly well understand their historically *transient* character, but at the same time we cannot help seeing in them a tremendous cultural force, of not only a negative, but also a positive character. Only idealism which, in its hypotheses, imagines it has no ties with any historical succession, can fail to see it" (91).

The author is quite right in his "objective" statement of "historical coexistences"; all the more pity that his argument is incompletely stated. One would like to say to him: complete the argument! reduce all these general propositions and historical notes to a definite period of our Russian history, formulate them in such a way as to show why and in precisely what way your conception differs from that of the Narodniks, contrast them with the reality that has to serve as the criterion for the Russian Marxist,

show the class contradictions that are concealed by all these examples of progress and of culture.*

The "progress" and the "culture" that post-Reform Russia brought in its train are undoubtedly bound up with the "institution of private property"—it was not only introduced for the first time in all its fulness by the creation of a new "contentious" civil process which ensured the same sort of "equality" in the courts as was embodied in life by "free labour" and its sale to capital; it covered the holdings both of the landlords, rid of all obligations and duties to the state, and of the peasants, turned into peasant *proprietors*; it was even made the basis of the political rights of "citizens" to participate in local government (the qualification), etc. Still more undoubted is the "lie" between our "progress" and the "principles of economic freedom" we have already heard in Chapter I from our Narodnik how this "freedom" consisted in liberating the "modest and bearded" gatherers of Russia's land from the need to "humble themselves to a junior police official." We have already spoken of how the "sense of individualism" was created by the development of commodity economy. By combining all these features of, Russia's progress, one cannot but reach the conclusion (drawn, too, by the Narodnik of the seventies) that this progress and culture were thoroughly bourgeois. Contemporary Russia is far better than pre-Reform Russia, but since all this improvement is wholly and exclusively due to the bourgeoisie, to its agents and ideologists, the producers have not profited by it. As far as they are concerned the improvements have only meant a change in the form of the surplus product, have only meant improved and perfected methods of separating the producer from the means of production. That is why the Narodnik gentlemen display the most incredible "flippancy" and forgetfulness when they address their protest against Russian capitalism and bour-

* Contra principia negantem disputari non potest (you cannot argue against one who denies principles.—*Ed.*)—says the author about an argument with the Narodniks. That depends on how these principia are formulated—as general propositions and notes, or as a *different understanding* of the *facts* of Russian history and present-day reality.

geoisdom to those who in fact were their vehicles and exponents. All you can say of them is: "they came unto their own, and their own received them not."

To agree with that description of post-Reform Russia and "society" will be beyond the capacity of the contemporary Narodnik. And to challenge it, he would have to deny the bourgeois character of post-Reform Russia, to deny the very thing for which his distant forefather, the Narodnik of the seventies, rose up and "went among the people" to seek "guarantees for the future" among the direct producers themselves. Of course, the *contemporary* Narodnik will possibly not only deny it, but will perhaps seek to prove that a change for the better has taken place in the relation under review; by doing so, however, he would merely show all who have not yet seen it, that he is absolutely nothing more than the most ordinary *little bourgeois* individual.

As the reader sees, I have only to round off Mr. Struve's propositions, to formulate them in another way, "to say the same thing, only differently." The question arises: is there any need for it? Is it worth while dealing in such detail with these additions and conclusions? Do they not follow automatically?

It seems to me that it is worth while, for two reasons. Firstly, the author's narrow objectivism is extremely dangerous, since it extends to the point of forgetting the line of demarcation between the old professorial arguments about the paths and destiny of the fatherland, so rooted in our literature, and a precise characterisation of the actual process impelled by such and such classes. This narrow objectivism, this inconsistency in relation to Marxism, is the main defect of Mr. Struve's book, and it will be necessary to dwell on it in particularly great detail, so as to show that it originates not from Marxism but from its inadequate application; not from the author seeing criteria of his theory other than reality, from his drawing other practical conclusions from the doctrine (they are impossible, I repeat, unthinkable unless you mutilate all its main tenets), but from the fact that the author has limited himself to one, the most general aspect of the theory, and has not applied it quite consistently. Secondly, one cannot but agree with the idea which the author ex-

pressed in his preface that before criticising Narodism on secondary issues, it was necessary "to disclose the very fundamentals of the disagreement" (VII) by way of a "principled polemic." But in order to ensure that the author's aim should not remain unachieved a more concrete meaning must be given to almost all his propositions, all his rather general remarks must be applied to the concrete problems of Russian history and present-day reality. On all these problems the Russian Marxists still have much to do to "reconsider the facts" from the materialist standpoint—to disclose the class contradictions in the activities of "society" and the "state" that lay behind the theories of the "intelligentsia," and, finally, to establish the tie between all the separate, endlessly varied forms of appropriating the surplus product in Russia's "people's" enterprises, and the advanced, most developed, capitalist form of this appropriation, which contains the "guarantees for the future" and now puts in the forefront the idea and the historical task of the "producer." Consequently, however bold the attempt to indicate the solution of these problems may seem, however numerous the changes and corrections that result from further, detailed study, it is none the less worth indicating specific problems, so as to evoke as general and broad a discussion of them as possible.

The culminating point of Mr. Struve's narrow objectivism, which gives rise to his wrong presentation of problems, is the way he argues about List, about his "splendid doctrine" concerning a "confederation of national productive forces," about the importance for agriculture of developing factory industry, and about the superiority of the manufacturing and agricultural state over the purely agricultural, etc. The author finds that this "doctrine" very "convincingly speaks of the historical inevitability and legitimacy of capitalism in the broad sense of the term" (123), and about the "cultural-historical might of triumphant commodity production" (124).

The professorial character of the arguments of the author, who rises, as it were, above all definite countries, definite historical periods, and definite classes, stands out here in particular relief. However you look at this argument—whether from the purely theoretical or from the practi-

cal aspect, such an assessment will be equally correct. Let us begin from the former. Is it not strange to think of being able to "convince" anybody at all of the "historical inevitability and legitimacy of capitalism" in a particular country by advancing abstract, dogmatic propositions about the significance of factory industry? Is it not a mistake to raise the problem in this way, so beloved of the liberal professors of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*? Is it not obligatory for a Marxist to reduce everything to ascertaining what is, and why it is so, and not otherwise?

The Narodniks consider capitalism in this country to be an artificial, hothouse plant, because they cannot understand the connection between it and the entire commodity organisation of our social economy, and fail to see its roots in our "people's production." Show them these connections and roots, show them that capitalism also dominates in its least developed and therefore worst form in people's production, and you will prove the "inevitability" of Russian capitalism. Show them that this capitalism, by raising labour productivity and socialising labour, develops and renders clear the class, social contradiction that has come into being everywhere in "people's production"—and you will prove the "legitimacy" of Russian large-scale capitalism. As to the practical aspect of this argument, which touches on the problem of commercial policy, the following may be noted. Although they stress primarily and most emphatically that the problem of free trade and protection is a capitalist problem, one of bourgeois policy, the Russian Marxists must stand for free trade, since the reactionary character of protection, which retards the country's economic development, and serves the interests not of the entire bourgeois class, but merely of a handful of all-powerful magnates, is very strongly evident in Russia, and since free trade means accelerating the process that yields the means of deliverance from capitalism.

The last section (XI) of the third chapter is devoted to an examination of the concept "capitalism." The author very rightly remarks that this word is used "very loosely" and cites examples of a "very narrow" and "very broad"

way of understanding it, but lays down no precise attributes of it; the concept "capitalism," despite the author's analysis, has not been analysed. Yet, one would have thought it should present no particular difficulty, since the concept was introduced into science by Marx, who substantiated it by facts. But here, too, Mr. Struve would not let himself be infected with "orthodoxy." "Marx himself," says he, "viewed the process of the transformation of *commodity* production into *commodity-capitalist* production as perhaps more precipitate and straightforward than it is in actual fact" (p. 127, footnote). Perhaps. But since it is the only view substantiated scientifically and supported by the history of capital, and since we are unacquainted with other views, which "perhaps" are less "precipitate" and "straightforward," we turn to Marx. The essential features of capitalism, according to his theory, are (1) commodity production, as the *general* form of production. The product assumes the form of a commodity in the most diverse social production organisms, but only in capitalist production is that form of the product of labour *general*, and not exceptional, isolated, accidental. The second feature of capitalism (2)—not only the product of labour, but also labour itself, i.e., human labour-power, assumes the form of a commodity. The degree to which the commodity form of labour-power is developed is an indication of the degree to which capitalism is developed.* With the aid of this definition we shall easily see our way among the examples of incorrect understanding of this term cited by Mr. Struve. Undoubtedly, the contrasting of the Russian system to capitalism, a contrast based on the technical backwardness of our national economy, on the predominance of hand production, etc., and so often resorted to by the Narodniks, is quite absurd, since capitalism exists both where technical development is low and where it is high; in *Capital* Marx repeatedly stresses the point that capital first subordinates production as it finds it, and only subsequently

* *Das Kapital*, II Band (1885), S. 93. The reservation must be made that in the passage referred to Marx gives no *definition* of capitalism. In general, he did not offer definitions. Here he only refers to the relation between commodity and capitalist production, the point dealt with in the text.[128]

transforms it technically. Undoubtedly, the German Hausindustrie and the Russian "domestic system of large-scale production" are capitalist-organised industry, for not only does commodity production dominate, but the owner of money also dominates the producers and appropriates surplus-value. Undoubtedly, when the Russian "land-holding" peasantry is contrasted to West-European capitalism—something the Narodniks are so fond of doing—that, too, merely shows a lack of understanding of what capitalism is. As the author quite rightly remarks, "peasant semi-natural economy" (124) is also to be found in some places in the West, but neither in the West nor in Russia does this do away with either the predominance of commodity production, or the subordination of the overwhelming majority of the producers to capital: before this subordination reaches the highest, peak level of development, it passes through many stages that are usually ignored by the Narodniks despite the very precise explanation given by Marx. The subordination begins with *merchant's* and *usury capital*, then grows into industrial capitalism, which in its turn is at first technically quite primitive, and does not differ in any way from the old systems of production, then organises manufacture—which is still based on hand labour, and on the dominant handicraft industries, without breaking the tie between the wage-worker and the land—and completes its development with large-scale machine industry. It is this last, highest stage that constitutes the culminating point of the development of capitalism, *it alone* creates the fully expropriated worker* who is as free as a bird, *it alone* gives rise (both materially and socially) to the "unifying significance" of capitalism that the Narodniks are accustomed to connect with capitalism in general, *it alone* opposes capitalism to its "own child."

The fourth chapter of the book, "Economic Progress and Social Progress," is a direct continuation of the third chapter, and covers that part of the book which advances data of "human experience" against the Narodniks. We shall

* The Narodniks always describe things as though the worker separated from the land is a necessary condition of capitalism *in general*, and not of machines industry alone.

have to deal here in detail, firstly, with the author's wrong view [or clumsy expression?] concerning Marx's followers and, secondly, with the way the tasks of the economic criticism of Narodism are formulated.

Mr. Struve says that Marx conceived the transition from capitalism to the new social system as the sudden downfall, the collapse of capitalism. (He thinks that "certain passages" in Marx give grounds for this view; as a matter of fact, it runs through *all the works* of Marx.) The followers of Marx fight *for reforms*. An "important correction has been made" to the viewpoint that Marx held in the forties: instead of the "chasm" separating capitalism from the new system, a "number of transitional stages" have been admitted.

We cannot under any circumstances admit this to be right. No "correction" whatever, either important or unimportant, has been made to Marx's viewpoint by the "followers of Marx." The fight for reforms does not in the least imply a "correction," does not in the least correct the doctrine of the chasm and sudden downfall, because this struggle is waged with a frankly and definitely admitted aim, that of reaching the "fall"; and the fact that this requires a "number of transitional stages"—from one phase of the struggle to another, from one stage to the next—was admitted by Marx himself in the forties when he said in the *Manifesto* that the movement towards the new system cannot be *separated* from the working-class movement (and, hence, from the struggle for reforms), and when he himself, in conclusion, proposed a number of practical measures.[129]

If Mr. Struve wanted to indicate the *development* of Marx's viewpoint, he was, of course, right. But then, this is not a "*correction*" to his views, but the very opposite—their *application*, their *realisation*.

Nor can we agree with the author's attitude towards Narodism.

"Our Narodnik literature," he says, "seized upon the contrast between national wealth and the well-being of the people, social progress and progress in distribution" (131).

Narodism did not "seize upon" this contrast, but merely *stated* the fact that in post-Reform Russia the same contradiction was to be observed between progress, culture,

wealth and—the separation of the producer from the means of production, the diminution of the producer's share in the product of the people's labour, and the growth of poverty and unemployment—as that which had led to this contrast being made in the West, too.

"...Owing to its humanity and its love for the people, this literature immediately settled the problem in favour of the well-being of the people, and as certain forms of people's economy (village community, artel) apparently embodied the ideal of economic equality and thus guaranteed the well-being of the people, and as the progress of production under the influence of increased exchange held out no promise for these forms, whose economic and psychological foundations it abolished, the Narodniks, pointing to the sad experience of the West in regard to industrial progress based on private property and economic liberty, countered commodity production—capitalism, with a so-called 'people's industry' that guarantees the well-being of the people, as a social and economic ideal for the preservation and further development of which the Russian intelligentsia and the Russian people should fight."

This argument clearly reveals the flaws in Mr. Struve's thesis. Narodism is depicted as a "humane" theory which "seized upon" the contrast between national wealth and the poverty of the people and "settled the problem" in favour of distribution, because the "experience of the West" "held out no promise" for the well-being of the people. And the author begins to argue against this "settlement" of the problem, forgetting that he is only arguing against the idealist and, moreover, naïve daydreams that are the cloak of Narodism, and not against its content, forgetting that he is committing a serious error by presenting the question in the professorial manner usually adopted by the Narodniks. As we have already stated, the *content* of Narodism reflects the viewpoint and the interests of the Russian small producer. The "humanity and love for the people" expressed in the theory derive from the downtrodden condition of our small producer, who has suffered severely both from the "old-nobility" system and traditions, and from the oppression of big capital. The attitude of Narodism towards the "West" and towards its influence

upon Russia was determined, of course, not by the fact that it "seized upon" this or that idea coming from the West, but by the small producer's conditions of life: he saw that he was up against large-scale capitalism which was borrowing West-European technique,* and, oppressed by it, built up naïve theories which explained capitalism by politics instead of capitalist politics by capitalist economy, and which declared large-scale capitalism to be something alien to Russia, introduced from outside. The fact that he was tied to his separate, small enterprise prevented him from understanding the true character of the state, and he appealed to it to help develop small ("people's") production. Owing to the undeveloped condition of class antagonisms characteristic of Russian capitalist society, the theory of those petty bourgeois ideologists was put forward as representing the interests of labour in general.

Instead of showing the absurdity of Narodniks' presentation of the problem and explaining their "settlement" of it by the material conditions of the small producer's life, the author himself, in his own presentation of the problem, betrays a dogmatism which reminds one of the Narodniks' "*choice*" between economic and social progress.

"The task of criticising the economic principles of Narodism ... is ... to prove the following:

"1) Economic progress is a necessary condition for social progress: the latter emerges historically from the former, and, at a certain stage of development, organic interaction between, interdependence of, these two processes should, and in fact does, manifest itself" (133).

Speaking generally, this is, of course, a perfectly true statement. But it indicates the tasks of criticising the sociological rather than the economic principles of Narodism: in essence, it is a different way of formulating the doctrine that the development of society is determined by the development of the productive forces which we discussed in chapters I and II. It is, however, inadequate for the criticism of the "*economic principles* of Narodism." The problem must be formulated more concretely, it must be reduced from progress in general to the "progress" of

* Cf. above-mentioned article in *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

capitalist society in Russia, to those errors in understanding *this* progress which gave rise to the ridiculous Narodnik fables about the tabula rasa, about "people's production," about Russian capitalism having no basis, etc. Instead of talk about interaction manifesting itself between economic and social progress, the definite symptoms of social progress in Russia of which the Narodniks fail to see *such and such* economic roots, must be shown (or at least indicated).*

"2) For that reason, the question of the organisation of production and of the level of labour productivity is one that takes precedence over the question of distribution; under certain historical conditions, when the productivity of the people's labour is extremely low, both absolutely and relatively, the predominant importance of the factor of production makes itself felt very acutely."

The author here bases himself on Marx's doctrine of the subordinate importance of distribution. As an epigraph to Chapter IV a passage is taken from Marx's criticism of the Gotha Programme[130] where he contrasts vulgar socialism to scientific socialism, which attaches no great importance to distribution, explains the social system by the way the *relations of production* are organised and considers that such organisation already includes a definite system of distribution. This idea, as the author quite justly remarks, runs through the whole of Marx's theory, and is extremely important for an understanding of the petty-bourgeois content of Narodism. But the second part of Mr. Struve's sentence greatly obscures this idea, particularly because of the vague term he uses, "the factor of production." Some confusion may arise as to the sense in which this term is to be understood. The Narodnik adopts the viewpoint of the small producer, whose explanations of the misfortunes he suffers are very superficial; for example, he is "poor," while his neighbour, the buyer-up, is "rich";

* It may be argued that I am running too far ahead, for did not the author say that he intended to proceed gradually from general problems to concrete ones, which he examines in Chapter VI? The point is, however, that the abstractness of Mr. Struve's criticism to which I refer, is a distinguishing feature of the *whole* of his book—of Chapter VI and even of the concluding part. What most of all requires correcting is his way of *presenting problems*.

the "authorities" only help big capital, etc.; in a word, his misfortunes are due to the specific features of distribution, to mistakes in policy, etc. What viewpoint does the author oppose to that of the Narodnik? The viewpoint of big capital, who looks down with contempt upon the miserable little enterprise of the peasant-handicraftsman and who is proud of the high degree of development of his own industry, proud of the "service" he has rendered by raising the absolute and relative low productivity of the people's labour? Or the viewpoint of its antipode, who is now living in relationships which are so far developed that he is no longer satisfied with references to policy and distribution, and who is beginning to understand that the causes lie much deeper, in the very organisation (social) of production, in the very system of social economy based on individual property and controlled and guided by the market? This question might quite naturally arise in the reader's mind, especially since the author sometimes uses the term "factor of production" side by side with the word "economy" (see p. 171: the Narodniks "ignore the factor of production to a degree that is tantamount to denying the existence of any system of economy"), and especially since, by comparing "irrational" with "rational" production, the author sometimes obscures the relationship between the small producer and the producer who has lost the means of production altogether. It is perfectly true that from the *objective point of view* the author's exposition is no less correct on account of this and that it is easy for anyone who understands the antagonism inherent in the capitalist system to picture the situation from the angle of the latter relationship. But, as it is well known that the Russian Narodnik gentlemen do not understand this, it is desirable in controversy with them to be more definite and thorough and to resort to the fewest possible general and abstract postulates.

As we tried to show by a concrete example in Chapter I, the difference between Narodism and Marxism lies *wholly in the character of their criticism of Russian capitalism*. The Narodnik thinks that to criticise capitalism it is sufficient to indicate the existence of exploitation, the interaction between exploitation and politics, etc. The Marxist thinks it necessary to explain and also to link together

the phenomena of exploitation as a system of certain relations in production, as a special social-economic formation, the laws of the functioning and development of which have to be studied objectively. The Narodnik thinks it sufficient, in criticising capitalism, to condemn it from the angle of his ideals, from the angle of "modern science and modern moral ideas." The Marxist thinks it necessary to trace in detail the classes that are formed in capitalist society, he considers valid only criticism made from the viewpoint of a definite class, criticism that is based on the precise formulation of the social process actually taking place and not on the ethical judgement of the "individual."

If, with this as our starting-point, we tried to formulate the tasks of criticising the economic principles of Narodism, they would be defined approximately as follows:

It must be shown that the relation between large-scale capitalism in Russia and "people's production" is the relation between a completely developed and an undeveloped phenomenon, between a higher stage of development of the capitalist social formation and a lower stage;* that the separation of the producer from the means of production and the appropriation of the product of his labour by the owner of money are to be explained, both in the factory and even in the village community, not by politics, not by distribution, but by the production relations that necessarily take shape under commodity economy, by the formation of classes with antagonistic interests which is characteristic of capitalist society;** that the reality (small production) which

* An analysis of the economic side should, of course, be supplemented by an analysis of the social, juridical, political, and ideological superstructures. The failure to understand the connection between capitalism and "people's production" gave rise among the Narodniks to the idea that the peasant Reform, state power, the intelligentsia, etc., were *non-class* in character. A materialist analysis, which reduces all these phenomena to the class struggle, must show concretely that our Russian post-Reform "social progress" has only been the result of capitalist "economic progress."

** A "reconsideration of the facts" of Russian economic realities, especially those from which the Narodniks obtain the material for their schoolgirl dreams, i.e., peasant and handicraft economy, should show that the cause of the producer's oppressed condition does not lie in distribution ("the muzhik is poor, the buyer-up is rich"), but

the Narodniks want to raise to a higher level, bypassing capitalism, already contains capitalism with its antagonism of classes and clashes between them—only the antagonism is in its worst form, a form which hampers the independent activity of the producer; and that by ignoring the social antagonisms which have already arisen and by dreaming about "different paths for the fatherland," the Narodniks become utopian reactionaries, because large-scale capitalism only develops, purges and clarifies the content of these antagonisms, which exist all over Russia.

Directly connected with the over-abstract formulation of the tasks of the economic criticism of Narodism is the author's further exposition, in which he seeks to prove the "inevitability" and "progressive character," not of Russian capitalism, but of West European. Without directly touching on the economic content of the Narodnik doctrine, this exposition contains much that is interesting and instructive. In Narodnik literature voices have been heard time and again expressing distrust towards the West-European labour movement. This was most strikingly expressed during the recent polemics of Messrs. Mikhailovsky and Co. (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1893-1894) against the Marxists. We have seen no good from capitalism yet, Mr. Mikhailovsky wrote at that time.* The absurdity of these petty-bourgeois views is excellently proved by Mr. Struve's data, especially since they are drawn from the latest bour-

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in the very production relations, in the very social organisation of present-day peasant and handicraft economy. This will show that in "people's" production, too, "the problem of the organisation of production takes precedence over the problem of distribution."

* We must mention that in Mr. Struve's reply Mr. Mikhailovsky finds that Engels betrays "self-admiration" when he says that the dominating, overwhelming fact of modern times, which makes these times better than any other epoch and justifies the history of their origin, is the working-class movement in the West.

This positively atrocious reproach hurled at Engels is extremely typical of contemporary Russian Narodism.

These people can talk a lot about "people's truth," they know how to talk to our "society" and to reprove it for making a wrong selection of the path for the fatherland, they can sing sweetly about "now or never," and sing it for "ten, twenty, thirty years and more," but they are absolutely incapable of understanding the all-embracing significance of independent action by those in whose name these sweet songs have been sung.

geois literature, which can in no account be accused of exaggeration. The passages quoted by the author show that in the West everybody, even the bourgeois, realises that the transition of capitalism to a new social-economic formation is inevitable.

The socialisation of labour by capital has advanced so far that even bourgeois literature loudly proclaims the necessity of the "planned organisation of the national economy." The author is quite right when he says that this is a "sign of the times," a sign of the complete break-up of the capitalist system. He quotes extremely interesting statements by bourgeois professors and even by conservatives who are compelled to admit that which Russian radicals to this very day like to deny—the fact that the working-class movement was created by the material conditions brought into existence by capitalism and not "simply" by culture or other political conditions.

After all that has been said, it is hardly necessary for us to deal with the author's argument that distribution can make progress only if based on rational production. Clearly, the meaning of this postulate is that only large-scale capitalism based on rational production creates conditions that enable the producer to raise his head, to give thought and show concern both for himself and for those who, owing to the backward state of production, do not live in such conditions.

Just a word or two about the following sentence which occurs in Mr. Struve's book: "The extreme inequality of distribution, which retards economic progress, was not created by capitalism: capitalism inherited it" from the epoch which romantics picture as flowing with milk and honey (p, 159). That is true if all the author wanted to say was that unequal distribution existed even before capitalism, something Narodnik gentlemen are inclined to forget. But it is not true if it includes a denial that capitalism has increased this inequality. Under serfdom there was not nor could there be, that sharp inequality between the absolutely impoverished peasant or tramp, and the bank, railway, or industrial magnate, which has been created by post-Reform capitalist Russia.

Let us pass to Chapter V. Here the author gives a general description of "Narodism as an economic philosophy." "The Narodniks," in Mr. Struve's opinion, are the "ideologists of natural economy and primitive equality" (167).

We cannot agree with this description. We shall not repeat here the arguments advanced in Chapter I, proving that the Narodniks are the ideologists of the small producer. In that chapter we showed exactly how the small producer's material conditions of life, his transitory, intermediate position between the "masters" and the "workers" lead to the Narodniks' failure to understand class antagonisms, and the queer mixture of progressive and reactionary points in their programme.

Here let us merely add that its former, i.e., progressive, side brings Narodism close to West-European democracy, and for that reason the brilliant description of democracy given over forty years ago in connection with events in French history can be applied to it in its entirety:

"The democrat, because he represents the petty bourgeoisie, that is, a *transition class*, in which the interests of two classes are simultaneously mutually blunted, imagines himself elevated above class antagonism generally. The democrats concede that a privileged class confronts them, but they, along with all the rest of the nation, form the *people*. What they represent is the *people's rights*; what interests them is the *people's interests*. Accordingly ... they do not need to examine the interests and positions of the different classes. They do not need to weigh their own resources too critically....* If in the performance their interests prove to be uninteresting and their potency *impotent*, then either the fault lies with pernicious sophists, who split the *indivisible people* into different hostile

* The Russian Narodniks are exactly the same. They do not deny that there are classes in Russia which are antagonistic to the producer, but they lull themselves with the argument that these "pirates" are insignificant compared with the "people" and refuse to make a careful study of the position and interests of the respective classes, to examine whether the interests of a certain category of producers are interwoven with the interests of the "pirate" thus weakening the former's power of resistance against the latter.

camps* ... or the whole thing has been wrecked by a detail in its execution, or else an unforeseen accident has this time spoilt the game. In any case, the democrat comes out of the most disgraceful defeat just as immaculate as he was innocent when he went into it, with the newly-won conviction that he is bound to win, not that he himself and his party have to give up the old standpoint, but, on the contrary, that conditions have to ripen to suit him" (ihm entgegenzureifen haben. *Der achtzehnte Brumaire*, *u.s.w.*, S. 39).[131]

The very examples which the author himself quotes prove that the description of the Narodniks as ideologists of natural economy and primitive equality is wrong. "As a *curiosity* it is worth mentioning," says Mr. Struve, "that to this day Mr. —on calls Vasilchikov a liberal economist" (169). If we examine the *real essence* of this designation we shall find that it is by no means curious. In his programme Vasilchikov has the demand for cheap and widespread credit. Mr. Nikolai—on cannot fail to see that in the capitalist society which Russian society is, credit will only strengthen the bourgeoisie, will lead to "the development and consolidation of capitalist relationships" (*Sketches*, p. 77). By the practical measures he proposes, Vasilchikov, like all the Narodniks, represents nothing but the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. The only thing that is curious about this is that Mr. —on, sitting as he does side by side with the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* publicists, has "to this day" not noticed that they are exactly the same type of little "liberal economists" as Prince Vasilchikov. Utopian theories easily reconcile themselves in practice with petty-bourgeois progress. This description of Narodism is still further confirmed by Golovachov, who admits that to distribute allotments to everybody is absurd and suggests that "cheap credits be provided for working folk." In criticising this "astonishing" theory, Mr. Struve calls attention to the absurdity

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* In the opinion of the Russian Narodniks the pernicious Marxists are to blame for artificially implanting capitalism and its class antagonisms in the soil in which the flowers of "social mutual adaptation" and "harmonious activity" bloom so beautifully (Mr. V. V., quoted by Struve, p. 161).

of the theory, but he appears not to have observed its petty-bourgeois content.

When speaking of Chapter V, we too cannot help dealing with Mr. Shcherbina's "law of average requirements." This is important in estimating Mr. Struve's Malthusianism, which stands out clearly in Chapter VI. The "law" is as follows: when you classify the peasants *according to allotment* you get very little fluctuation (from group to group) in the average magnitude of peasant family requirements (i.e., of expenditure on various needs); Mr. Shcherbina calculates this expenditure per head of the population.

Mr. Struve emphasises with satisfaction that this "law" is "tremendously important," since, he avers, it confirms the "well-known" law of Malthus that "the living standard and the reproduction of the population are determined by the means of subsistence they have at their disposal."

We cannot understand why Mr. Struve is so pleased with this law. We cannot understand how one can see a "law," and what is more, a "tremendously important" one, in Mr. Shcherbina's calculations. It is quite natural that where the manner of life of different peasant families does not differ very considerably we get averages that vary little if we divide the peasants into groups; particularly if, when making the division into groups, we take as the basis the size of the allotment, which is no direct index of a family's living standard (since the allotment may be leased out, or additional land may be rented) and is equally available to both the rich and the poor peasant possessing an equal number of taxable members in the family. Mr. Shcherbina's calculations merely prove that he chose a wrong method of classification. If Mr. Shcherbina thinks he has discovered some law here, it is very strange. It is equally strange to find confirmation of the law of Malthus here, as though one can judge of the "means of subsistence at the peasant's disposal" from the size of the allotment when one disregards the leasing out of land, "outside employments," the peasant's economic dependence on the landlord and the buyer-up. About this "law" of Mr. Shcherbina's (the way Mr. Shcherbina expounds this "law" indicates that the author attaches incredibly great importance to his average figures, which prove absolutely nothing) Mr. Struve says;

"'People's production' in the present case simply means production without the employment of wage labour. It is undoubted that where production is organised in that way the 'surplus-value' remains in the hands of the producer" (176). And the author points out that where labour productivity is low, this does not prevent the representative of such "people's production" living worse than the worker. The author is carried away by the Malthusian theory, and this has led him to formulate inexactly the proposition cited. Merchant's and usury *capital* subordinates labour to itself in every Russian village and—without turning the producer into a wage-worker—deprives him of as much surplus-value as industrial capital takes from the working man. Mr. Struve rightly indicated earlier on that capitalist production sets in from the moment the *capitalist* steps between the producer and the consumer, even though he buys the ready-made ware from the independent (apparently independent) producer (p. 99 and note 2), and it would be no easy job to find among the Russian "independent" producers those that do not work for a capitalist (merchant, buyer-up, kulak, etc.). One of the biggest mistakes of the Narodniks is that they do not see the very close and indissoluble tie between the capitalist organisation of Russian social economy and the absolute dominion of merchant's capital in the countryside. The author therefore is perfectly correct when he says that the "very combination of the words 'people's production' in the sense they are used by the Narodnik gentlemen does not fit in with any actual historical order. Here in Russia 'people's production' before 1861 was closely connected with serfdom, and then after 1861 there was a rapid development of commodity economy, which could not but distort the purity of people's production" (177). When the Narodnik says that the ownership of the means of production by the producer is the age-old basis of the Russian way of life, he is simply distorting history to suit his utopia, and does so by playing tricks with words: under serfdom means of production were supplied to the producer by the landlord *in order that* the producer could engage in corvée service for him; the allotment was a sort of wages in kind—the "age-old" means of appropriating the surplus product.

The abolition of serfdom did not mean the "emancipation" of the producer at all; it only meant a *change in the form* of the surplus product. While in, say, England the fall of serfdom gave rise to really independent and free peasants, our Reform immediately effected the transition from the "shameful" feudal surplus product to "free" bourgeois surplus-value.

CHAPTER IV

HOW MR. STRUVE EXPLAINS SOME FEATURES OF RUSSIA'S POST-REFORM ECONOMY

The last (sixth) chapter of Mr. Struve's book is devoted to the most important problem, that of Russia's economic development. Its theoretical contents are divided up into the following sections: 1) over-population in agricultural Russia, its character and causes; 2) the differentiation of the peasantry, its significance and causes; 3) the part played by industrial capitalism in ruining the peasantry; 4) private-landowner farming; the character of its development, and 5) the problem of markets for Russian capitalism. Before proceeding to examine Mr. Struve's line of argument on each of these problems, let us examine what he says about the peasant Reform.

The author voices his protest against the "idealistic" understanding of the Reform and points to the requirements of the state, which needed greater labour productivity, to *land redemption*, and to the pressure "from below." It is a pity the author did not make his legitimate protest a thorough one. The Narodniks explain the Reform by the development in "society" of "humane" and "emancipatory" ideas. This is an undoubted fact, but thus *to explain* the Reform means to slip into empty tautology and to reduce "emancipation" to "emancipatory" ideas. The materialist requires a special examination of the *content* of the measures effected to put those ideas into practice. History has never known a single important "reform," even though it has been of a class character, which has not had lofty words and lofty ideas advanced in its support. This is equally true of the peasant Reform. If we pay attention to the

actual content of the changes it has effected, we shall see that their character is as follows: some of the peasants were deprived of the land, and—this is the chief thing—the rest of the peasants, who retained part of their land, had to *redeem* it from the landlords, as though it was something to which they had absolutely no right, and what is more, to redeem it at an artificially high price. Not only here in Russia, but also in the West, such reforms were invested with theories about "freedom" and "equality," and it has already been shown in *Capital* that it was commodity production that provided the basis for the ideas of freedom and equality. At any rate, however complicated the bureaucratic machine that put the Reform into effect in Russia, however *apparently** distant it was from the bourgeoisie themselves, it remains an undoubted fact that only the *bourgeois system* could develop on the basis of *such* a reform. Mr. Struve is quite right in pointing out that the stock way of contrasting the peasant Reform in Russia to those in Western Europe is wrong: "it is quite wrong (*in so general a form*) to assert that in Western Europe the peasants were emancipated without the land, or, in other words, were deprived of the land by legislation" (196). I underscore the words "in so general a form," because separation of the peasants from the land by legislation was an undoubted historical fact wherever a peasant Reform was carried through, but it is not a universal fact, for in the West *part* of the peasants, when emancipated from feudal dependence, *redeemed* the land from the landlords, and are doing so in Russia. Only the bourgeoisie are capable of hiding the fact of *redemption* and of asserting that the "emancipation of the peasants with land** made a tabula rasa of Russia" (the words of a Mr. Yakovlev, "heartily welcomed" by Mr. Mikhailovsky—see p. 10 of P. Struve's work).

* Actually, as has already been indicated, this machine could only serve the bourgeoisie by virtue both of its composition and of its historical origin.

** To speak the truth one should say: make it possible for *part* of the peasants to *redeem part of their* allotment land from the landlords *at double the proper price*. And even the words "make it possible" are no good, because the peasant who refused such "provision of an allotment" was faced with the threat of a flogging at the Volost Administration offices.

I

Let us proceed to Mr. Struve's theory about the "character of over-population in agrarian Russia." This is one of the most important points in which Mr. Struve departs from the "doctrine" of Marxism for that of Malthusianism. The essence of his views, developed by him in his controversy with Mr. N.—on, is that over-population in agricultural Russia is "not capitalist, but, so to speak, simple over-population, that goes with natural economy."*

Since Mr. Struve says that his objection to Mr. N.—on "fully conforms with F. A. Lange's general objection to Marx's theory of relative over-population" (p. 183, footnote), we shall first turn to this "general objection" of Lange's and examine it.

Lange discusses Marx's law of population in his *Labour Problem*, Chapter V (Russian trans., pp. 14-78). He begins with Marx's main proposition that "every special historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its limits alone. An abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only."[132] Lange's comment is:

"May we be permitted to note firstly that, strictly speaking, there is no abstract law of population for plants and animals either, since abstraction is, on the whole, merely the extraction of the general from a whole number of similar phenomena" (143), and Lange explains in detail to Marx what abstraction is. Evidently, he simply did not understand the meaning of Marx's statement. In this respect Marx contrasts man to plants and animals on the grounds that the former lives in *diverse* historically successive *social organisms* which are determined by the system of social production, and, hence, distribution. The conditions for human reproduction are directly dependent on the structure of the different social organisms; that is why the law of population must be studied in relation to each organism separately, and not "abstractly," without

* That is how it is formulated by Mr. Struve in his article in *Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt* (1893, No. 1 of October 2). He adds that he does not consider this view to be "Malthusian."

regard to the historically different forms of social structure. Lange's explanation that abstraction means to extract the general from *similar* phenomena turns right against himself: only the conditions of existence of animals and plants can be considered similar, but this is not so with regard to man, because we know that he has lived in organisationally different types of social association.

Having expounded Marx's theory of relative over-population in a capitalist country, Lange goes on to say: "At first sight it may seem that this theory breaks the lengthy thread that runs through the whole of organic nature up to man, that it explains the basis of the labour problem as though general investigations into the existence, reproduction and perfection of the human race were quite superfluous to our purpose, i.e., to an understanding of the labour problem" (154).*

The thread that runs through the whole of organic nature up to man is not at all-broken by Marx's theory, which merely requires that the "labour problem"—since it only exists as such in capitalist society—be solved not on the basis of "general investigations" into human reproduction, but on the basis of specific investigations of the laws of capitalist relations. Lange, however, is of a different opinion: "Actually, however," says he, "this is not so. Above all it is clear that factory labour from the very outset presumes *poverty*" (154). And Lange devotes a page and a half to proving this proposition, which is self-evident and does not advance us a single hair's breadth: firstly, we know that poverty is created by capitalism itself at a stage of its development prior to the factory form of production, prior to the stage at which the machines create surplus population; secondly, the form of social structure preceding capitalism—the feudal, serf system—itself created a poverty of its own, one that it handed down to capitalism.

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* And what can these "general investigations" consist of? If they ignore the specific economic formations of human society, they will be mere banalities. And if they are to embrace several formations, it is obvious that they must be preceded by specific investigations of each separate formation.

"But even with such a powerful assistant [i.e., want], only in rare cases does the first employer succeed in winning over large numbers of workers to the new kind of activity. Usually what happens is the following. From the locality where factory industry has already won itself citizenship rights the employer brings with him a contingent of workers; to them he adds a few landless peasants,* who at the moment are workless, and the further supplementation of the existing factory contingent is done from among the *rising generation*" (156). Lange places the last two words in italics. Evidently, the "general investigations into the existence, reproduction and perfection of the human race" were expressed in precisely the postulate that the factory owner recruits new workers among the "rising generation," and not among decrepit old folk. The good Lange spends a whole page more (157) on these "general investigations" and tells the reader that parents try to give their children an assured existence, that the idle moralists are wrong in condemning those who try to work their way out of the condition into which they were born, that it is quite natural to try to arrange for children to earn their own living. Only after we have got over all these reflections, which may be in place in copybooks, do we get down to business:

"In an agrarian country where the soil belongs to small and big owners—provided that the tendency of voluntary birth-control has not firmly gripped the people's morals—there inevitably arises a constant surplus of hands and consumers who wish to exist on the products of the given territory" (157-58). This purely Malthusian proposition is put forward by Lange without offering any proof. He repeats it again and again and says: "In any case, even if such a country is thinly populated in the absolute sense, there are usually signs of relative over-population" and "on the market the supply of labour is *constantly in excess* and the demand insignificant" (158)—but all these

* By the way, where have these "landless peasants" come from? Very likely, Lange imagines, they are not the left-overs of the serf system, or the product of the rule of capital, but the result of the fact that "the tendency towards voluntary birth-control has not firmly gripped the people's morals" (p. 157)?

assertions are totally unsupported. Whence does it follow that a "surplus of workers" was really "inevitable"? Whence does the connection arise between this surplus and the absence in the people's morals of a tendency to voluntary birth-control? Ought he not, before arguing about the "people's morals," to take a glance at the production relations in which the people live? Let us imagine, for example, that the small and big proprietors to whom Lange refers were connected in the production of material values as follows: the small proprietors received allotments from the big landowners on which they could exist, and in return engaged in corvée service for the big landowners, cultivating their fields. Let us imagine, further, that these relations have been shattered, that humane ideas have turned the heads of the big proprietors to such an extent that they have "emancipated their peasants with land," i.e., have cut off approximately 20% of the allotment land of the peasants, and compelled them to pay for the remaining 80% a purchase price that has been raised 100%. Naturally, with such a guarantee against the "ulcer of the proletariat" the peasants still have to continue working for the big proprietors in order to exist, although they do not now work on the instructions of the feudal steward, as formerly, but on the basis of free contract—hence they snatch the work out of one another's hands, since they are no longer bound together, and each one farms on his own account. This way of snatching up work inevitably forces some peasants out: because their allotments have grown smaller and their payments bigger, they have become weaker in relation to the landlord, and so competition among them increases the rate of surplus product, and the landlord can manage with a smaller number of peasants. However much the tendency to voluntary birth-control becomes entrenched in the people's morals, the formation of a "surplus" is inevitable. Lange's line of argument, which ignores social-economic relations, merely serves as striking proof that his methods are useless. And apart from such arguments he gives us nothing new. He says that the factory owners willingly transfer industry into the depths of the countryside, because there "*the requisite amount of child labour is always ready to hand for any undertaking*" (161), without inves-

tigating what history, what mode of social production has created this "readiness" on the part of parents to place their children in bondage. The methods he uses are most clearly seen from the following of his arguments: he quotes Marx, who says that machine industry, by enabling capital to buy female and child labour, makes the worker a "slave-dealer."

"So that's what he's getting at?" cries Lange triumphantly. "But is it to be expected that the worker, whom want forces to sell his own labour-power, would so lightly sell his wife and children, if he were not impelled to take this step by want, on the one hand, and by temptation, on the other?" (163).

The good Lange has carried his zeal to the point of defending the worker against Marx, to whom he proves that the worker is "prompted by want."

... "And what, indeed, is this ever-growing want but the metamorphosis of the struggle for existence?" (163).

Such are the discoveries resulting from "general investigations into the existence, reproduction and perfection of the human race"! Do we learn anything at all about the causes of "want," about its political-economic content and course of development if we are told that it is the metamorphosis of the struggle for existence? Why, that can be said about anything you like—about the relation of the worker to the capitalist, the landowner to the factory owner and to the peasant serf, etc., etc. We get nothing but such vapid banalities or naïveties from Lange's attempt to correct Marx. Let us now see what Lange's follower, Mr. Struve, gives us in support of this correction, in discussing the specific problem of over-population in agrarian Russia.

Commodity production, begins Mr. Struve, increases the capacity of the home market. "Exchange exerts such an effect not only by the complete technical and economic reorganisation of production, but also in those cases where the technique of production remains at the former level, and natural economy retains its former dominant role in the general economy of the population. In that case, however, 'over-population' inevitably sets in after a brief revival; but if commodity production is to blame, it is only: 1) as the *exciter*, 2) as the complicating factor" (182). Over-pop-

ulation would set in without commodity economy: it is non-capitalist in character.

Such are the propositions advanced by the author. From the very outset one is struck with the fact that these propositions are just as unsubstantiated as those of Lange. The assertion is made that over-population is inevitable under natural economy, but no explanation is given of exactly what process gives rise to it. Let us turn to the facts in which the author finds confirmation of his views.

The data for 1762-1846 show that the population in general did not multiply so rapidly, the annual increase being from 1.07 to 1.5%. What is more, the increase was more rapid, according to Arsenyev, in the "grain-growing" gubernias. This "fact," concludes Mr. Struve, "is highly characteristic of the primitive forms of people's economy, where reproduction is directly dependent on natural fertility, a dependence which one can feel with one's hands, so to speak." This is the action of "the law of the correlation of the growth of the population with the means of subsistence" (185). "The wider the expanse of territory, and the higher the natural fertility of the soil, the greater is the natural growth of the population" (186). The quite unsubstantiated conclusion drawn is the following: the one fact that in the central gubernias of European Russia the growth of the population between 1790 and 1846 was smallest in Vladimir and Kaluga gubernias is made the basis for a whole law correlating the growth of the population with the means of subsistence. But can one judge of the population's means of subsistence from the "expanse of territory"? (Even if we were to admit that such few data enable us to draw general conclusions.) The "population," after all, did not divert to their own use the products of the "natural fertility" they had secured: they shared them with the landlords, with the state. Is it not clear that the different types of landlord farming—quitrent or corvée, the size of tributes and the methods of exacting them, etc.—exerted a far greater influence on the amount of "means of subsistence" available to the population than the expanse of territory, which was not in the exclusive and free possession of the producers? More than that. Irrespective of the social relations that were expressed in serfdom, the popu-

lation was bound together, even then, by exchange: "The separation of manufacturing industry from agriculture," rightly says the author, "i.e., the social, national division of labour, existed in the pre-Reform period, too" (189). The question, then, arises why should we presume that the marsh-dwelling Vladimir handicraftsman or cattle-dealer had a less abundant supply of "means of subsistence" than the rude tiller of Tambov with all his "natural fertility of the soil"?

Then Mr. Struve cites data about the decline in the serf population before the emancipation. The economists whose opinion he quotes attribute this to a "decline in living standards" (189). The author concludes:

"We have stopped to deal with the fact of the decline in the serf population before the emancipation, because, in our view, it throws clear light on the economic situation in Russia at that time. A considerable part of the country had ... the maximum population for the given technical-economic and social-juridical conditions: the latter were very unfavourable for any rapid increase as far as almost 40% of the population was concerned" (189). What has the Malthusian "law" of the correlation of population increase and means of subsistence to do with the matter, when the feudal social order directed these means of subsistence into the possession of a handful of big landowners, and passed over the mass of the population, the growth of which is under investigation? Can any value be attached, for example, to the author's argument that the growth in population was smallest either in the less-fertile gubernias where industry was poorly developed, or in the thickly populated and purely agricultural gubernias? Mr. Struve wishes to see in this a manifestation of "non-capitalist over-population," which was bound to have set in even without commodity economy, and which "corresponds to natural economy." But one might say with equal, if not greater, justice that this over-population corresponded to feudal economy, that the slow increase in the population was due most of all to the increased exploitation of peasant labour that resulted from the growth of commodity production on the landlords' farms, when they began using corvée labour to produce grain *for sale*, and not merely for their own needs, The author's

examples tell against him: they tell of the impossibility of constructing an abstract law of population, according to the formula about correlation of growth and the means of subsistence, while ignoring historically specific systems of social relations and the stages of their development.

Passing to the post-Reform period, Mr. Struve says: "In the history of the population following the collapse of serfdom we see the same basic feature as before the emancipation. The dynamics of population increase are directly dependent on the expanse of territory and the land allotment" (198). This is proved by a small table, which groups the peasants according to size of allotment, and shows that the greater the size of the allotment, the greater the increase in population. "*And it cannot be otherwise under natural*, 'self-consumer' ... economy that serves primarily to satisfy the direct needs of the producer himself" (199).

Truly, *if this were so*, if the allotments served primarily to satisfy the direct needs of the producer, if they were the only source of satisfying these needs, one could then, and only then, evolve a general law of population increase from these data. But we know that this is not the case. The allotments serve "primarily" to satisfy the needs of the landlords and the state: they are taken away from their owners, if these "needs" are not satisfied on time; payments are levied on the allotment in excess of the peasants' paying capacity. Further, they are not the peasants' only resources. A farming deficit—says the author—is bound to be reflected preventively and repressively on the population. Furthermore, outside employments, by diverting the adult male population, retard reproduction (199). But if the deficit from allotment farming is covered by renting land or by outside earnings, the peasant's means of subsistence may prove to be adequate enough for "energetic reproduction." Undoubtedly, such a favourable turn of events may be the lot of only a minority of the peasants, but, where no special examination is made of production relations existing within the peasantry, there is nothing to show that this growth proceeds evenly, that it is not called forth mainly by the prosperity of the minority. Finally, the author himself makes natural economy a condition of the demonstrability of his thesis, whereas after the Reform, on his own

admission, commodity production penetrated in a broad stream into the hitherto existing life. The author's data are obviously quite inadequate *for establishing a general law of reproduction*. More, the abstract "simplicity" of this law which presumes that the means of production in the society under review "serve primarily to satisfy the direct needs of the producer himself" gives absolutely wrong, and totally unsupported, treatment of highly complicated facts. For example, after the emancipation—says Mr. Struve—it was to the landlords' advantage to lease their land to the peasants. "Thus, the food area available to the peasantry, i.e., their means of subsistence, has increased" (200). To assign the whole of the rented land in this forthright way to the category of "food area" is quite unfounded and wrong. The author himself points out that the landlords appropriated the lion's share of the produce raised on their land (200), so that it is still a question whether such renting of land (on a labour-service basis, for example) has not worsened the conditions of the tenants, whether it has not placed obligations on them that have led, in the final analysis, to the food area declining. Further, the author himself points out that the renting of land is only within the capacity of the prosperous (216) peasants, in whose hands it serves as a means of expanding commodity farming rather than consolidating "self-consumer" farming. Even if it were proven that generally speaking the renting of land improved the position of the "peasantry," of what importance could that be when, to use the words of the author himself, the peasant poor have been ruined by renting land (216)—i. e., improvement for some meant worsening for others? Evidently in the peasant renting of land the old, feudal and the new, capitalist relationships intertwine; the author's abstract reasoning, which takes no account of either the one or the other, confuses matters instead of helping to achieve clarity about these relationships.

There remains one more reference by the author to data supposedly confirming his views. It is where he says that "the old word *land-poverty* is merely the term commonly used to express what science calls over-population" (186). The author thus based himself, as it were, on the whole of our Narodnik literature, which established the fact beyond doubt

that the peasant allotments were "inadequate," and which "fortified" thousands of times over their desire for the "expansion of peasant land tenure" with the "simple" argument: the population has increased; the allotments have been split up—naturally, the peasants are being ruined. However, this hackneyed Narodnik argument about "land-poverty" can hardly be of any scientific* value, it can hardly be of use for anything but "loyal speeches" in a commission dealing with the painless advance of the fatherland along the right road. In this argument the wood cannot be seen for the trees, the basic social-economic background of the picture cannot be seen for the outer contours of the object. The fact of a huge mass of land belonging to members of the "old-nobility" system, on the one hand, and the acquisition of land by purchase, on the other—such is the basic background under which every "expansion of land tenure" will be a miserable palliative. Both the Narodnik arguments about land-poverty, and the Malthusian "laws" about population increase being correlated to the means of subsistence are at fault in their abstract "simplicity," which ignores the given, specific social-economic relations.

This review of Mr. Struve's arguments leads us to the conclusion that his thesis—over-population in agrarian Russia is to be explained by reproduction not being correlated to the means of subsistence—is absolutely unproved. He concludes his arguments as follows: "And so, we are faced with a picture of natural-economic over-population complicated by commodity-economic factors and other important features inherited from the social structure of the feudal-epoch" (200). Of course, one can say that any economic phenomenon in a country undergoing a transition from "natural" to "commodity" economy is a "natural-economic" phenomenon complicated by "commodity-economic factors." The opposite can also be said: "a commodity-economic" phenomenon "complicated by natural-economic factors,"—but all this, far from giving a "picture," cannot give even

* That is to say, this argument is of no use whatever as an *explanation* of the ruin of the peasantry and of over-population, though the very fact of "insufficiency" is beyond argument, just as is its accentuation as a result of the growth of the population. What is needed is not a statement of the fact, but an explanation of its origin,

the slightest idea of *exactly how* over-population is created on the basis of the *given social-economic relations*. The author's final conclusion against Mr. N.—on and his theory of capitalist over-population in Russia reads: "Our peasants produce insufficient food" (237).

The peasants' agricultural work continues to this day to yield produce that goes to the landlords, who, through the medium of the state, receive redemption payments; peasant production serves as a constant object of merchant's and usury *capital* operations, depriving vast masses of the peasantry of a considerable part of their produce; finally, among the "peasantry" itself this production is distributed in so complicated a fashion that the general and average gain (renting) turns out to be a loss for the masses, and Mr. Struve cuts all this network of social relations, like a Gordian knot, with the abstract and totally unsupported solution: "production is insufficient." But no, this theory will not hold water at all: it merely encumbers that which is to be investigated, namely, production relations in peasant agricultural economy. The Malthusian theory pictures matters as though we are confronted by a tabula rasa, and not by feudal and bourgeois relations interwoven in the contemporary organisation of Russian peasant economy.

It goes without saying that we cannot be satisfied with merely criticising Mr. Struve's views. We must in addition ask ourselves the questions: what is the basis of his mistakes? And who of the contending parties (Mr. N.—on and Mr. Struve) is right in his explanation of over-population?

Mr. N.—on bases his explanation of over-population on the fact of masses of workers being "freed" because of the capitalisation of the peasant industries. And he merely cites data relating to the growth of large-scale factory industry, and disregards the parallel fact of the growth of handicraft industries, which expresses the deepening of the social division of labour.* He transfers his expla-

* It is a known fact that our handicraft industries have grown and that a mass of new ones have appeared since the Reform. The theoretical explanation of this fact and of the capitalisation of other peasant industries is also known it was given by Marx to explain the creation of the home market for industrial capital" [*Das Kapital*, 2. Aufl., S. 776 u. ff.].[133]

nation to agriculture, without even attempting to give an exact description of its social-economic organisation and the *degree of its development*.

Mr. Struve indicates in reply that "capitalist over-population in Marx's sense is closely connected with technical progress" (183), and since he, together with Mr.—on, finds that the "technique" of peasant "farming has made practically no progress" (200), he refuses to recognise the over-population in agricultural Russia to be capitalist, and seeks for other explanations.

Mr. Struve's remarks in reply to Mr. N.—on are correct. Capitalist over-population is due to *capital* taking possession of production; by reducing the number of necessary workers (necessary for the production of a given quantity of products) it creates a surplus population. Marx, speaking of capitalist over-population in agriculture, says the following:

"As soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture, and in proportion to the extent to which it does so, the demand for an agricultural labouring population falls absolutely, while the accumulation of the capital employed in agriculture advances, without this repulsion being, as in non-agricultural industries, compensated by a greater attraction. Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban, or manufacturing proletariat....* (Manufacture is used here in the sense of all non-agricultural industries.) This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing. But the constant flow towards the towns presupposes, in the country itself, a constant latent surplus population, the extent of which becomes evident only when its channels of outlet open to exceptional width. The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism" (*Das Kapital*, 2 Aufl. S. 668).[134]

* Incidentally. Observation of this fact very likely gave Lange an excuse to concoct an amendment to Marx's theory, which he did not fully understand. When analysing this fact he should have made his starting-point the given (capitalist) mode of social production and followed its manifestation in agriculture; instead he took it into his head to invent all sorts of peculiarities in the "people's morals."

Mr. N.—on *did not prove* the capitalist character of over-population in agrarian Russia, because he did not connect it with capitalism in agriculture: confining himself to a cursory and incomplete reference to the capitalist evolution of private-landowner farming, he completely overlooked the bourgeois features of the organisation of peasant farming. Mr. Struve should have corrected this unsatisfactory feature of Mr. N.—on's exposition, which is of very great importance, for ignoring capitalism in agriculture, its domination, and at the same time its still weak development, naturally led to the theory of the absence or the contraction of the home market. Instead of reducing Mr. N.—on's theory to the concrete data of our agricultural capitalism, Mr. Struve fell into another error—he denied the capitalist character of over-population completely.

The invasion of agriculture by *capital* is characteristic of the entire history of the post-Reform period. The landlords went over (whether slowly or quickly is another matter) to hired labour, which became very widespread and even determined the character of the major part of peasant earnings; they introduced technical improvements and brought machines into use. Even the dying feudal system of economy—the provision of land to the peasants in return for labour service—underwent a bourgeois transformation due to competition among the peasants; this led to a worsening of the position of tenants, to severer conditions,* and, consequently, to a decline in the number of workers. In peasant economy the splitting up of the peasantry into a village bourgeoisie and proletariat was quite clearly revealed. The "rich" extended their tillage, improved their farms [cf. V. V., *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming*] and were compelled to resort to wage-labour. All these are long established, generally recognised facts which (as we shall see in a moment) are referred to by Mr. Struve himself. Let us take as a further example the following

* See, for example, Karyshev (*Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations*, Vol. II, p. 266)—reference in the Rostov-on-Don Uyezd Abstract to the gradual reduction in the peasant's share in *skopshchina*.[135] Ibid. Chapter V, § 9—additional payments made in the form of labour by peasants engaged in share-cropping.

case, a usual one in the Russian village: a "kulak" has wrested the best slice of allotment land from the "village community," or more exactly, community members of the proletarian type, and is farming it with the labour and the implements of the very same "allotment-provided" peasants who have become enmeshed in debts and obligations and are tied to their benefactor—for social mutual adaptation and common action—by the strength of the community principles beloved of the Narodniks. His farm is better run, of course, than those of the ruined peasants, and far fewer workers are required than when this slice of land was held by several small peasant farmers. No Narodnik can deny that these are not isolated but common facts. Their theories are exceptionalist only in their refusal to call facts by their real name, in their refusal to see that these facts signify the *domination of capital in agriculture*. They forget that the initial form of *capital* has always and everywhere been merchant's, money capital, that capital always takes the technical process of production as it finds it, and only subsequently subjects it to technical transformation. They therefore do not see that by "upholding" (in words, of course—no more than that) the contemporary agricultural order against "oncoming" (?!) capitalism, they are merely upholding *medieval* forms of capital against the onslaught of its latest, purely bourgeois forms.

Thus, one cannot deny the capitalist character of overpopulation in Russia, just as one cannot deny the domination of capital in agriculture. But it is quite ridiculous, of course, to ignore the *degree of the development of capital*, as Mr. N.—on does; in his enthusiasm he presents it as almost completed and for that reason concocts a theory about the contraction or the absence of the home market, whereas actually, though capital is dominant, it is in a relatively very undeveloped form; there are still many intermediate phases before it reaches full development, before the producer is completely divorced from the means of production, and every step forward by agricultural capitalism means a *growth* of the home market, which, according to Marx's theory, is created precisely by agricultural capitalism—and which in Russia is not contracting, but, on the contrary, is taking shape and developing.

Further, we see from this albeit very general description of our agricultural capitalism* that it does not embrace *all* social-economic relations in the countryside. Alongside of it we still see feudal relations—in both the economic sphere (e.g., the leasing of cut-off lands in return for labour service and payments in kind—here you have all the features of feudal economy: the natural "exchange of services" between the producer and the owner of the means of production, and the exploitation of the producer by *tying* him to the land, and not separating him from the means of production), and still more in the social and the juridical-political sphere (compulsory "provision of allotment," *tying* to the land, i.e., absence of freedom of movement, payment of redemption money, i.e., the same quitrent paid to the landlord, subordination to the privileged landowners in the courts and administration, etc.); these relations also undoubtedly lead to the ruin of the peasants and to unemployment, an "over-population" of farm labourers tied to the land. The capitalist basis of contemporary relations should not hide these still powerful relics of the "old-nobility" stratum which have *not yet been destroyed* by capitalism precisely because it is undeveloped. The undeveloped condition of capitalism, "Russia's backwardness," considered by the Narodniks to be "good fortune,"** is only "good fortune" for the titled exploiters. Contemporary "over-population," consequently, contains feudal in addition to its basic capitalist features.

If we compare this latter thesis with Mr. Struve's thesis that "over-population" contains natural-economic features and commodity-economic features, we shall see that the former do not rule out the latter, but, on the contrary, are included in them: serfdom relates to "natural-economic," and capitalism to "commodity-economic" phenomena. Mr. Struve's thesis, on the one hand, does not exactly indicate precisely which *relations* are natural-economic and which commodity-economic, and, on the other hand, leads us back to the unfounded and meaningless "laws" of Malthus.

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* It will be dealt with in greater detail further on, taking the peasants and the landlords separately.

** Mr. Yuzhakov in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*.

These defects naturally gave rise to the unsatisfactory character of the following passage. "In what way," asks the author, "on what basis *can* our national economy be reorganised?" (202) A strange question, formulated again in a very professorial style, precisely as Messrs. the Narodniks are accustomed to put questions when they proclaim the unsatisfactory character of the present situation and select the best paths for the fatherland. "Our national economy" is a capitalist economy, the organisation and "reorganisation" of which is determined by the bourgeoisie, who "manage" this economy. Instead of the question of possible reorganisation, what should have been put is the question of the successive stages of the development of this bourgeois economy; and it should have been put from the viewpoint of precisely that theory in whose name the author so splendidly replies to Mr. V. V., who describes Mr. N.—on as an "undoubted Marxist," that this "undoubted Marxist" has no idea of the class struggle and of the class origin of the state. Had the author altered the manner of posing the question in the sense indicated it would have saved him from the confused arguments about the "peasantry" that we read on pages 202-04.

The author begins with the statement that the peasantry have insufficient allotment land, that even if they cover this insufficiency by renting land, "a considerable part of them" nevertheless *always* have a deficit; one cannot talk of the peasantry as a whole, for that means to talk of a fiction* (p. 203). And the conclusion directly drawn from this is:

"In any case, insufficient production is the *basic and dominating* fact of our national economy" (p. 204). This is quite unfounded and totally unconnected with what was said earlier: why is not the fact that the peasantry as one whole is a fiction, because antagonistic classes are taking shape within it, made the "basic and dominating fact"? The author draws his conclusion without any data, without any analysis of the facts relating to "insufficient production" [which, however, does not prevent a minority from becoming affluent at the expense of the majority], or to the splitting up

* "The main defect of Mr. Golubev's arguments in his fine articles is that he cannot rid himself of this fiction" (203).

of the peasantry—simply due to some prejudice in favour of Malthusianism. "Therefore," he continues, "an increase in the productivity of agricultural labour is a plain benefit and blessing to the Russian peasantry" (204). We are at a loss: the author has only just advanced against the Narodniks the serious (and to the highest degree legitimate) accusation of arguing about a "fiction"—the "peasantry" in general—and now he himself introduces this fiction into his analysis! If the relations within the ranks of this "peasantry" are such that a minority become "economically strong," while the majority become proletarians, if a minority expand their landownership and wax rich, while the majority always have a deficit and become ruined, how can one speak of the process in general being a "benefit and blessing"? Very likely the author wanted to say that the process is of benefit to both the one and the other section of the peasantry. But then, firstly, he should have examined the position of each group and have investigated it separately, and, secondly, in view of the antagonism existing between the groups he should have definitely established from *which* group's viewpoint reference is made to the "benefit and blessing." This example goes to confirm over and over again the unsatisfactory and incomplete character of Mr. Struve's objectivism.

Since Mr. N.—on holds an opposite view on this subject and asserts that an "increase in the productivity of agricultural labour* cannot serve to raise the national well-being if the goods are produced as commodities" (*Sketches*, p. 266), Mr. Struve now proceeds to refute this opinion.

Firstly, he says, the peasant who has been hit by the full weight of the contemporary crisis, produces grain for his own consumption; he does not sell grain, but buys extra supplies of it. For such peasants—and they constitute as much as 50% (one-horse and horseless) and certainly not less than 25% (horseless)—increased labour productivity is at any rate beneficial, despite the drop in the price of grain.

Yes, of course, an increase in productivity would be beneficial to such a peasant, if he could retain his farm and

* "However desirable and necessary" it "may be," adds Mr. N.—on.

raise it to a higher level. But the trouble is that the one-horse and horseless peasants do not enjoy these conditions. They are not able to retain their present farms, with their primitive implements, careless cultivation of the soil, etc., let alone improve their farming technique. Technical improvement is the result of the growth of commodity economy. And if, at the present stage of the development of commodity economy, even those peasants who have to buy extra supplies for themselves find it necessary to sell grain, then, at the following stage, such sales will be still more essential (the author himself recognises the need for a transition from natural to commodity economy), and the competition of peasants who have improved their farming methods will inevitably and immediately expropriate proletarians who are tied to the land and turn them into proletarians who are as free as birds. I have no wish to say that such a change will be of no benefit *to them*. On the contrary, once the producer has fallen into the clutches of capital—and this is an undoubtedly accomplished fact as regards the group of the peasantry under examination—complete freedom, which enables him to change masters, and gives him a free hand, is very much of "a benefit and a blessing" to him. But the controversy between Messrs. Struve and N.—on is not at all conducted around *such* considerations.

Secondly, continues Mr. Struve, Mr. N.—on "forgets that an increase in the productivity of agricultural labour is only possible by effecting changes in the *technique* and in the *system* of farming or crop growing" (206). Certainly, Mr. N.—on forgets that, but this consideration merely strengthens the thesis of the inevitability of the total expropriation of the economically weak peasants, the "proletarian type" of peasants. To effect technical improvements money resources must be available, but these peasants do not even possess enough food resources.

Thirdly, concludes the author, Mr. N.—on is wrong in asserting that a rise in the productivity of agricultural labour will compel competitors to lower prices. For such a price reduction—Mr. Struve rightly remarks—it is necessary that the productivity of our agricultural labour should not only catch up with that of Western Europe

[in that case we shall sell produce at the level of socially necessary labour], but even outstrip it. That objection is quite a sound one, but it tells us nothing whatever about which particular section of the "peasantry" will benefit from this technical improvement and why.

"In general, Mr. N.—on has no reason to fear an increase in the productivity of agricultural labour" (207). He does so, in Mr. Struve's view, because he cannot imagine agricultural progress except as the progress of extensive agriculture, accompanied by the ever-increasing elimination of workers by machines.

The author very aptly describes Mr. N.—on's attitude to the growth of agricultural technique with the word "fear"; he is quite right in saying that this fear is absurd. But his line of argument does not, we think, touch the basic error of Mr. N.—on.

While Mr. N.—on apparently adheres to the strict letter of the doctrine of Marxism, he none the less draws a sharp distinction between the capitalist evolution of agriculture and the evolution of manufacturing industry in capitalist society, the distinction being that he recognises the progressive work of capitalism with regard to the latter—the socialisation of labour—and does not do so with regard to the former. That is why he "does not fear" an increase in the productivity of labour with regard to manufacturing industry, but "does fear" it as regards agriculture, *although the social-economic aspect of the matter and the reflection of this process on the different classes of society are exactly the same in both cases*.... Marx expressed this point very strikingly in the following remark: "Philanthropic English economists like Mill, Rogers, Goldwin Smith, Fawcett, etc., and liberal manufacturers like John Bright and Co., ask the English landed proprietors, as God asked Cain after Abel, where are our thousands of freeholders gone? But where do *you* come from, then? From the destruction of those freeholders. Why don't you ask further, where are the independent weavers, spinners, and artisans gone?" (*Das Kapital*, I, S. 780, Anm. 237.)[136] The last sentence clearly identifies the fate of the small producers in agriculture with the fate of those in manufacturing industry, and emphasises the formation of the classes of bourgeois society

in both cases.* Mr. N.—on's chief error lies precisely in the fact that he ignores these classes, their formation among our peasantry, and does not set himself the aim of following, with the utmost precision, every successive stage in the development of the antithesis between those classes.

But Mr. Struve deals wish the problem quite differently. Far from correcting the error of Mr. N.—on that we have mentioned, he *himself repeats it*, arguing from the viewpoint of a professor standing *above* classes about the "benefit" of progress to the "peasantry." This attempt to rise above classes leads the author to extreme haziness in stating his points, a haziness so great that the following bourgeois conclusions may be drawn from them: in opposition to the undoubtedly correct thesis that capitalism in agriculture (as capitalism in industry) worsens the conditions of the producer, he advances the thesis of the "benefit" of these changes *in general*. This is the same as if someone were to argue about machines in bourgeois society and refute the romantic economist's theory that they worsen the conditions of the working people by proofs of the "benefit and blessing" of progress in general.

In reply to Mr. Struve's view the Narodnik will very likely say: what Mr. N.—on fears is not increased productivity of labour, but bourgeoisdom.

There is no doubt that technical progress in agriculture under our capitalist system is connected with bourgeoisdom, but the "fear" displayed by the Narodniks is, of course, quite absurd. Bourgeoisdom is a fact of actual life, labour is subordinated to capital in agriculture too, and what is to be "feared" is not bourgeoisdom, but the producer's lack of consciousness of this bourgeoisdom, his inability to defend his interests against it. That is why it is not the retardation of the development of capitalism that is to be desired, but on the contrary, its full development, its thorough development.

To show with as great detail and precision as possible the basis of the error committed by Mr. Struve in treating agriculture in capitalist society, let us try to depict (in

* See particularly § 4 of Chapter XXIV: "Genesis of the Capitalist Farmer." Pp. 773-76.[137]

the most general outline) the process of the formation of classes together with the technical changes that gave grounds for the argument. In this connection Mr. Struve distinguishes strictly extensive agriculture and intensive, seeing the root of Mr. N.—on's misapprehensions in his refusal to recognise anything but extensive agriculture. We shall endeavour to prove that Mr. N.—on's *chief* error lies not in this, and that as agriculture becomes intensive the formation of the classes of bourgeois society is essentially identical with that taking place as extensive agriculture develops.

There is no need to say much about extensive agriculture, because Mr. Struve also admits that here the "peasantry" are ousted by the bourgeoisie. Let us merely note two points. Firstly, technical progress is evoked by commodity economy; to bring it about the proprietor must have free, surplus *monetary* resources [surplus in relation to his consumption and the reproduction of his means of production]. Where can these resources be got? Obviously from no other source than the conversion of the cycle: commodity—money commodity into the cycle: money—commodity—money with a surplus. In other words, these resources can be got exclusively from capital, *from merchant's and usury capital*, from the same "welshers, kulaks, merchants," etc., whom the naïve Russian Narodniks assign *not* to capitalism *but* to ''rapacity'' (as though capitalism is not rapacity! as though Russian reality does not show us the interconnection of all possible varieties of this "rapacity"—from the most primitive and primeval kulakdom to the very latest, rational enterprise!)* Secondly, let us note Mr. N.—on's strange

* Messrs. the Narodniks have another, very profound, method of covering up the roots of our industrial capitalism in "people's production," i.e., in "people's" usury and kulakdom. The kulak takes his "savings" to the state bank, his deposits enable the bank, by basing itself on the growth of the people's wealth, people's savings, people's enterprise people's solvency, to borrow money from the Englishman. The "state" directs the borrowed money to the aid of ... —what a short-sighted policy! what deplorable ignoring of "modern science" and "modern moral ideas"!—... *the capitalists*. The question now arises: is it not clear that if the state directed this money (of the capitalists) not to capitalism but to "people's production," — we here in Russia would have not capitalism but "people's production"!

attitude to this question. In the second note to page 233 he refutes V. Y. Postnikov, author of *Peasant Farming in South Russia*, who points out that machines have exactly doubled the working area of the peasant household, from 10 to 20 dessiatines per worker, and that for that reason the cause of "Russia's poverty" is "the small size of the peasant farm." In other words, technical progress in bourgeois society leads to the expropriation of the small and backward farms. Mr. N.—on objects: tomorrow technique may raise the working area three times over. Then the 60-dessiatine farms will have to be turned into 200- and 300-dessiatine farms. Such an argument against the thesis of our agriculture being bourgeois is as ridiculous as somebody setting out to prove the weakness and impotence of factory capitalism on the grounds that the steam-engine of today will have to be replaced "tomorrow" by the electric motor. "Nor is it known where the millions of released labourers get to"—adds Mr. N.—on, who sets himself up as judge of the bourgeoisie and forgets that the producer himself is the only one to judge them. The formation of a reserve army of unemployed is just as necessary a result of the use of machinery in bourgeois agriculture as in bourgeois industry.

And so, with regard to the development of extensive agriculture there is no doubt that technical progress under commodity economy leads to the transformation of the "peasant" into a capitalist farmer, on the one hand (understanding by farmer the entrepreneur, the capitalist in agriculture), and a farm labourer or day labourer, on the other. Let us now examine the case where extensive agriculture becomes intensive. It is from this process that Mr. Struve expects "benefit" for the "peasant." To prevent any argument about the suitability of the material we are using to describe this transition, let us make use of Mr. A. I. Skvortsov's* *The Influence of Steam Transport on*

* It is customary in our literature to regard him as a Marxist. There is just as little grounds for that as there is for placing Mr. N.—on among the Marxists. Mr. A. Skvortsov is also unacquainted with the theory of the class struggle and the class character of the state. His practical proposals in his *Economic Studies* are no different from ordinary bourgeois proposals. He takes a far more sober view of Rus-

Agriculture, who has earned such boundless praise from Mr. Struve.

In Chapter 3 of the fourth section of his book, Mr. A. Skvortsov examines the "change in agricultural technique under the influence of steam transport" in countries employing extensive and intensive farming. Let us take his description of this change in the *thickly-populated extensive countries*. One might think that central European Russia would fit into that category. Mr. Skvortsov foresees for such a country the changes that, in Mr. Struve's opinion, will inevitably take place in Russia too, namely, transformation into a country of intensive agriculture with developed factory production.

Let us follow Mr. A. Skvortsov (§§ 4-7, pp. 440-51).

A country of extensive* agriculture. A very considerable part of the population is engaged in agriculture. Uniformity of occupation leads to the absence of a market. The population is poor, firstly, because of the small size of the farms and, secondly, because of the absence of exchange: "requirements other than food, which is raised by the agriculturist himself, are satisfied exclusively, it can he said, by the products of primitive artisan establishments, known as handicraft industry in Russia."

The building of a railway raises the price of agricultural produce and, consequently, increases the purchasing power of the population. "Together with the railway the country is flooded with the cheap products of the manufactories and mills," which ruin the local handicraftsmen. This is the first cause of the "collapse of many farms."

The second cause of the collapse is crop failures. "Agriculture has also been conducted hitherto in a primitive

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sian reality than Messrs. the Narodniks do, but then on those grounds *alone* B. Chicherin and many others should also be regarded as Marxists.

* Mr. A. Skvortsov points out that by a country employing extensive agriculture a thinly-populated one is usually understood (footnote to page 439). He considers this a wrong definition and gives the following as the features of extensive farming: 1) considerable harvest fluctuations, 2) homogeneity of crops and 3) absence of home markets, i.e., of big towns where manufacturing industry is concentrated.

fashion, i.e., always in an irrational way and, consequently, harvest failures are no rare occurrence, but with the building of the railway line the rise in the price of the product, that formerly resulted from crop failure, either does not take place at all or in any case is considerably smaller. That is why the natural consequence of the very first crop failure is usually the collapse of many farms. The smaller the surpluses left from normal harvests and the more the population have had to count on earnings from handicraft industries, the more rapidly the collapse occurs."

In order to manage without handicraft industries and to guarantee oneself against crop failures by going over to intensive (rational) agriculture, the following are necessary: firstly, big monetary surpluses (from the sale of agricultural produce at higher prices), and, secondly, the intellectual force of the population, without which no increased rationality and intensity is possible. The mass of the population do not, of course, enjoy these conditions: they apply to a minority only.*

"The surplus population thus formed" [i.e., as a result of the "liquidation" of many farms ruined by the failure of handicraft industries and by the greater demands on agriculture] "will partly be swallowed up by the farms that emerge from this situation more happily and that are able to increase the intensity of production" (i.e., of course they will be "swallowed up" as wage-workers, farm labourers and day labourers. Mr. A. Skvortsov does not say that, maybe because he considers it too obvious). A great expenditure of human energy will be required, since the proximity of the market brought about by improved communications makes it possible to raise perishable produce, and "the latter, in most cases, entails a considerable expenditure of manpower." "Usually, however," continues Mr. Skvortsov, "the process of destruction proceeds much more rapidly than the process of improving the surviving farms, and part of the ruined peasants have to move, at least to the towns, if not right out of the country. It is this part that has con-

* "For such a country (with a population dense for the given level of economic efficiency) we must assume that on the one hand small surpluses, and, on the other, the population's low educational level force many farms into liquidation under the changed conditions" (442).

stituted the main contingent added to the population of European cities since the railways were built."

Further. "Surplus population means cheap hands." "The soil being fertile (and the climate favourable ...) all the conditions are created for the cultivation of plants and in general of raising agricultural produce that requires a large expenditure of labour-power per land unit" (443), especially since the small size of the farms ("although they will perhaps increase as compared with their former size") makes the introduction of machines difficult. "In addition to this, fixed capital will not remain unchanged, and first and foremost it is farm implements that will change their character." And apart from machines "the need for better cultivation of the soil will lead to the replacement of the former primitive implements by more up-to-date ones, and of wood by iron and steel. This transformation will lead of necessity to the establishment here of factories engaged in the production of such implements, for they cannot be produced even tolerably well by handicraft methods." The development of this branch of industry is favoured by the following conditions: 1) the need to get a machine or part of it rapidly; 2) ''hands are here in abundance, and they are cheap"; 3) fuel, buildings and land are cheap; 4) "the small size of the economic units leads to an increased demand for implements, for it is well known that small farms require relatively more equipment." Other kinds of industries also develop. "In general there is a development of urban life." There is a development, out of necessity, of *mining industries*, "since, on the one hand, a mass of free hands is available and, on the other, thanks to the railways and the development of the mechanised manufacturing and other industries there is an increased demand for the products of the mining industry.

"Thus, such a district, which before the railway was built was thickly populated and whose agriculture was extensive, turns more or less quickly into a district of very intensive agriculture with more or less developed factory production." Increased intensity is manifested by the change in the system of crop raising. The three-field system is impossible because of harvest fluctuations. A transition has to be made to a "crop rotation system," which does away

with harvest fluctuations. Of course, the *complete crop rotation system*,* which requires a very high level of intensity, cannot be introduced immediately. At first, therefore, *grain crop rotation* [proper succession of crops] is introduced; cattle-raising, and the *planting of fodder crops* are developed.

"Finally, therefore, our thickly-populated extensive farming district turns more or less rapidly, as railways develop, into one of highly intensive farming, and its intensity, as has been said, will grow primarily on account of an increase in variable capital."

This detailed description of the process of development of intensive farming shows clearly that in this case, too, technical progress under commodity production leads to bourgeois economy, splits the direct producers into the *farmer*, who enjoys all the advantages of intensive farming, improvement of implements, etc., and the *worker*, who with his "freedom" and his "cheapness" provides the most "favourable conditions" for the "progressive development of the entire national economy."

Mr. N.—on's chief error is not that he ignores intensive agriculture and confines himself to extensive agriculture, but his vapid lamentations about "us" going the wrong way to which he treats the reader, instead of analysing the class contradictions in the sphere of Russian agricultural production. Mr. Struve repeats this error by obscuring the class contradictions with "objective" arguments, and only corrects Mr. N.—on's secondary errors. It is all the more strange since he himself quite rightly chides this "undoubted Marxist" with failing to understand the theory of the class struggle. It is all the more regrettable since Mr. Struve, by that error, weakens the force of his quite correct idea that "fear" of technical progress in agriculture is absurd.

To finish with this problem of capitalism in agriculture, let us sum up what has been said. How does Mr. Struve pose the problem? He starts out from the a priori, unfounded explanation of over-population being the result of population increases not conforming to the means of subsistence;

* Its distinctive features are: 1) all the land is put under the plough; 2) fallow is eliminated as far as possible, 3) there is a regular succession of crops in the rotation; 4) cultivation is as thorough as possible; 5) cattle are kept in stalls.

then he points out that the production of food by our peasant is "inadequate," and settles the problem by arguing that technical progress is beneficial to the "peasantry," and that "agricultural productivity must be raised" (211). How should he have presented the problem had he been "bound by the doctrine" of Marxism? He should have *begun* with an analysis of the given production relations in Russian agriculture, and, after showing that the oppression of the producer is to be explained not by chance or by politics but by the domination of *capital*, which necessarily comes into being on the basis of commodity economy—he should then have shown how this capital destroys small production and what forms class contradictions assume in the process. He should then have shown how further development leads to capital growing from merchant's into industrial (assuming such and such forms under extensive farming, and such and such under intensive), developing and accentuating the class contradiction whose basis was firmly laid under its old form, and once and for all opposing "free" labour to "rational" production. It would then have been sufficient simply to contrast these two successive forms of bourgeois production and bourgeois exploitation, in order that the "progressive" character of the change, its "advantage" to the producer should be quite evident: in the first case the subordination of labour to capital is covered up by thousands of the remnants of medieval relations, which prevent the producer from seeing the essence of the matter and arouse in his ideologist's mind absurd and reactionary ideas about the possibility of expecting aid from "society," *etc.*; in the second case this subordination is quite free of medieval fetters, and the producer is enabled to engage in and understands the necessity for independent, conscious activity against his "antipode." Instead of arguments about a "difficult and painful transition" to capitalism we would have had a theory that not only spoke of class contradictions but also really disclosed them in each form of "irrational" and "rational" production, and of "extensive" and "intensive" farming.

The results we reach from our examination of the first part of Chapter VI of Mr. Struve's book, which is devoted to the "character of over-population in agrarian Russia," can be formulated as follows: 1) Mr. Struve's Malthusianism is

not supported by any factual data and is based on methodologically incorrect and dogmatic postulates. 2) Over-population in agrarian Russia is explained by the domination of capital and not by a lack of conformity between the increase in the population and the means of subsistence. 3) Mr. Struve's thesis about the natural-economic character of over-population is only true in the sense that the survival of feudal relations holds back agricultural capital in forms that are undeveloped and are therefore particularly hard for the producer. 4) Mr. N.—on did not prove the capitalist character of over-population in Russia because he did not investigate the domination of capital in agriculture. 5) Mr. N.—on's main error, repeated by Mr. Struve, is that he did not analyse the classes that come into being where bourgeois agriculture develops. 6) This ignoring of class contradictions by Mr. Struve naturally led to the fact that the quite correct thesis of the progressiveness and desirability of technical improvements was expressed in an extremely vague and unsatisfactory form.

II

Let us now pass to the second part of Chapter VI, which is devoted to the problem of the break-up of the peasantry. This part is directly and immediately connected with the previous part, and serves as additional material on the problem of capitalism in agriculture.

Indicating the rise in the prices of agricultural produce during the first 20 years following the Reform, and to the extension of commodity production in agriculture, Mr. Struve quite rightly says that "in the main it was the landowners and prosperous peasants who benefited" from it (214). "Differentiation among the peasant population had to increase, and its first successes relate to this epoch." The author cites the remarks of local investigators to the effect that the building of railway lines merely raised the living standard of the prosperous part of the peasantry, that the renting of land gives rise to a "regular battle" among the peasants, which always leads to the victory of the economically strong elements (216-17). He cites V. Postnikov's research, according to which the farms of the prosperous peasants are

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

already so far subordinated to the market that 40% of the sown area yields produce for sale, and, adding that at the opposite pole the peasants "lose their economic independence and, by selling their labour-power, are on the verge of becoming farm labourers," rightly concludes: "Only the penetration of exchange economy explains the fact that the economically strong peasant farms can derive benefit from the ruin of the weak households" (223). "The development of money economy and the growth of the population," says the author, "lead to the peasantry splitting into two parts: one that is economically strong and consists of representatives of a new force, of capital in all its forms and stages, and the other, consisting of semi-independent peasants and real farm labourers" (239).

Brief as they are, the author's remarks on this "differentiation" nevertheless enable us to note the following important features of the process under examination: 1) It is not confined just to the creation of property inequality: a "new force" is created—*capital*. 2) The creation of this new force is accompanied by the creation of new types of peasant farms: firstly, of a prosperous, economically strong type that engages in developed commodity economy, crowds out the peasant poor in the renting of land, and resorts to the exploitation of the labour of others;* secondly, of a "proletarian" peasantry, who sell their labour-power to capital. 3) All these phenomena have grown directly and immediately on the basis of commodity production. Mr. Struve himself has pointed out that without commodity production they were impossible, but with its penetration into the countryside they became necessary. 4) These phenomena (the "new force," the new types of peasantry) relate to the sphere of *production*, and are not confined to the sphere of exchange, commodity circulation: capital is manifested in agricultural *production*; the same is true of the sale of labour-power.

* Mr. Struve makes no mention of this feature. It is also expressed in the use of wage-labour, which plays no small part on the farms of the prosperous peasants, and in the operations of the usury and merchant's capital in their hands, which likewise deprives the producer of surplus-value. In the absence of this feature we cannot speak of "capital."

It would seem that these features of the process are a direct indication that we have to do with a purely capitalist phenomenon, that the *classes* typical of capitalist society, bourgeoisie and proletariat, are taking shape within the peasantry. Moreover, these facts bear witness not only to the domination of capital in agriculture, but also to capital having already taken a second step, if one may put it that way. From merchant's it turns into industrial capital, from a dominant force on the market into a dominant force in production; the class antithesis between the rich buyer-up and the poor peasant turns into the antithesis between the rational bourgeois employer and the free seller of free hands.

Even here Mr. Struve cannot get along without his Malthusianism; in his view only *one side* of the matter finds expression in the process mentioned ("only the progressive side"), but in addition to it he sees another, the "technical irrationality of all peasant economy": "in it expression is given, so to speak, to the retrogressive side of the whole process," it "levels" the peasantry, smooths out inequality, operating "in connection with the growth of the population" (223-24).

The only thing that is clear in this rather hazy argument is that the author prefers extremely abstract propositions to concrete statements, that he tacks on to everything the "law" that increases in population conform to the means of subsistence. I say "tacks on" because, even if we confine ourselves strictly to the facts cited by the author himself, we can find no indication of any concrete features of the process that do not fit in with the "doctrine" of Marxism and that require the recognition of Malthusianism. Let us go over this process once again: we start with natural producers, peasants more or less of one type.* The penetration of commodity production into the countryside makes the wealth of the individual peasant household dependent on the market, thus

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* *Working for the landlord*. This aspect is set aside, in order that the transition from natural to commodity economy may stand out in greater relief. It has already been said that the remnants of the "old-nobility" relations worsen the conditions of the producers and make their ruin particularly onerous.

creating inequality by means of market fluctuations and accentuating it by concentrating free money in the hands of some, and ruining others. This money naturally serves for the exploitation of the propertyless, turns into capital. Capital can exploit peasants in the grip of ruin as long as they retain their farms, and, letting them carry on as before, on the old, technically irrational basis, can exploit them by purchasing the product of their labour. But the peasant's ruin finally develops to such a degree that he is compelled to give up his farm altogether: he can no longer sell the product of his labour; all he can do is to sell his labour. Capital then takes charge of the farm, and is now compelled, by virtue of competition, to organise it on rational lines; it is enabled to do so thanks to the free monetary resources previously "saved"; capital no longer exploits the peasant farmer but a farm labourer or a day labourer. One can well ask: what are the two sides the author finds in this process? How does he find it possible to draw the monstrous Malthusian conclusion that "the technical irrationality of the farm, and not capitalism" [note the "and not"] "is the enemy that deprives our peasantry of their daily bread" (224). As though this daily bread ever went in its entirety to the producer, and was not divided into the necessary product and the surplus, the latter being acquired by the landlord, the kulak, the "strong" peasant, the capitalist!

One must, however, add that on the question of "levelling" the author gives some further explanation. He says that the "result of the levelling referred to above" is the "*decline* or *even the disappearance of the middle section of the peasant population* noted in many places" (225). Citing a passage from a Zemstvo publication which notes "a still greater increase in the distance separating the rural rich from the landless and horseless proletariat," he concludes: "The *levelling* in the present case is, of course, at the same time *differentiation*, but on the basis of *such* differentiation only *bondage* develops, which can be nothing more than a brake on economic progress" (226). And so it now turns out that the differentiation created by commodity economy should not be contrasted to "levelling," but to differentiation as well, only differentiation of *another kind*, namely,

bondage. But since bondage is a "brake" on "economic progress," the author calls this "side" "regressive."

The argument is based on extremely strange methods that are not Marxist at all. A comparison is made between "bondage" and "differentiation" as between two independent, special "systems"; one is praised for assisting "progress"; the other is condemned for being a brake on progress. What has become of Mr. Struve's demand for an analysis of class contradictions, for lack of which he so rightly attacked Mr. N.—on; of the theory of the "spontaneous process" of which he spoke so well? Why, this bondage which he has now demolished as retrogressive is nothing but the initial manifestation of capitalism in agriculture, of that very same capitalism which leads later to sweeping technical progress. And what, indeed, is bondage? It is the dependence of the peasant who owns his means of production, and is compelled to work for the market, on the owner of money—a dependence that, however differently it may express itself (whether in the form of usury capital or of the capital of the buyer-up, who monopolises marketing)—always leads to an enormous part of the product of labour falling into the hands of the owner of money and not of the producer. Hence, it is purely capitalist in essence,* and the entire peculiarity consists in the fact that this initial, embryonic form of capitalist relations is totally enmeshed in the feudal relations of former times: here there is no free contract, but a forced deal (sometimes by order of "those at the top," sometimes by the desire to keep their undertakings, sometimes by old debts, etc.); the producer is here tied to a definite place and to a definite exploiter: as against the impersonal charac-

* All the features are here present: commodity production as the basis; monopoly of the product of social labour in the form of money as the result the turning of this money into capital. I do not in the least forget that in some cases these initial forms of *capital* were encountered even before the capitalist system came into being. The point, however, is that in contemporary Russian peasant economy they are not isolated cases but the rule, the dominant system of relations. They have now linked up (through commercial deals and the banks) with large-scale factory machine capitalism and have thereby shown their tendency; they have shown that the representatives of this bondage are merely rank-and-file soldiers of the army of the bourgeoisie one and indivisible.

ter of the commodity deal that is peculiar to purely capitalist relations, here the deal always has the personal character of "aid," "benefaction,"—and this character of the deal inevitably places the producer in a position of personal, semi-feudal dependence. Such of the author's expressions as "levelling," "brake on progress," "regression," mean nothing but that capital first takes hold of production on the old basis, and subordinates the technically backward producer. The author's remark that the presence of capitalism does not entitle us "to blame it for all misfortunes" is true in the sense that our peasant who works for others suffers not only from capitalism, but also from the insufficient development of capitalism. In other words, among the huge mass of the peasantry there are now practically none who produce independently for themselves; in addition to work for "rational" bourgeois farmers we only see work for the owners of money capital, i.e., also capitalist exploitation, but exploitation which is undeveloped and primitive, and because of this it, firstly, worsens the conditions of the labouring peasant tenfold, involving him in a network of specific and additional encumbrances, and, secondly, prevents him (and his ideologist, the Narodnik) from understanding the class character of the "annoyances" inflicted on him and from regulating his activities in accordance with this character of the annoyances. Consequently, the "progressive side" of "differentiation" (to use the language of Mr. Struve), is that it brings into the light of day the contradiction hidden behind the bondage and deprives the former of its "old-nobility" features. Narodism, which stands for levelling out the peasants (before ... the kulak), is "regressive" because it desires to keep capital within those medieval forms that combine exploitation with scattered, technically backward production and with personal pressure on the producer. In both cases (in the case of "bondage" and of "differentiation") the cause of oppression is *capitalism* and the author's statements to the contrary, that it is "not capitalism" but "technical irrationality," that "it is not capitalism that is to blame for the poverty of the peasants," etc., merely show that Mr. Struve has been carried too far in his support of the correct idea that developed capitalism is to be preferred to undeveloped, and as a result of the abstractness of his propositions he has

contrasted the former to the latter not as two successive stages of the development of the given phenomenon, but as two separate cases.*

III

The author also lets himself get carried away in the following argument, when he says that it is not large-scale capitalism which causes the ruin of the peasantry. He enters here into a controversy with Mr. N.—on.

The cheap production of manufactured goods, says Mr. N.—on, speaking of factory-made clothing, has caused a reduction in their domestic production (p. 227 of Mr. Struve's book).

"Here the cart is put before the horse," exclaims Mr. Struve, "as can be proved without difficulty. The reduction in the peasant output of spinning materials led to an increase in the production and consumption of the goods of the capitalist cotton industry, and not the other way round" (227)

The author hardly puts the issue properly, hiding the essence of the matter under details of secondary importance. If we start from the fact of the development of factory industry (and Mr. N.—on makes precisely the observation of that fact his starting-point), we cannot deny that the cheapness of factory goods also speeds up the growth of commodity economy, speeds up the ousting of home-made goods. By objecting to this statement of Mr. N.—on's, Mr. Struve merely weakens his argument against that author, whose main error is that he tries to present the "factory" as something isolated from the "peasantry," as something that has come down upon them accidentally, from outside, whereas, in fact, the "factory" (both according to the theory that Mr. N.—on desires loyally to support, and according to

* On what grounds, the reader will possibly ask, does this relate only to Mr. Struve's being *carried away*? On the ground that the author quite definitely recognises capitalism to be the main background against which all the phenomena described take place. He quite clearly pointed to the rapid growth of commodity economy, to the splitting-up of the peasantry, and to the "spread of improved implements" (245), etc., on the one hand—and to the "separation of the peasants from the land, the creation of a rural proletariat" (238), on the other. He himself, finally, characterised it as the creation of a new force—*capital*, and noted the decisive importance of the appearance of the capitalist between the producer and the consumer.

the data of Russian history) is merely the final stage of the development of the commodity organisation of the entire social and, consequently, peasant economy. Large-scale bourgeois production in the "factory" is the direct and immediate continuation of petty-bourgeois production in the village, in the notorious "village community" or in handicraft industry. "In order that the 'factory form' should become 'cheaper,'" Mr. Struve quite rightly says, "the peasant has to adopt the viewpoint of economic rationality, on condition that money economy exists." "If the peasantry had adhered to ... natural economy ... no textile fabrics ... would have tempted them."

In other words, the "factory form" is nothing more than *developed* commodity production, and it developed from the *undeveloped* commodity production of peasant and handicraft economy. The author wishes to prove to Mr. N.—on that the "factory" and the "peasantry" are interconnected, that the economic "principles" of their organisation are not contradictory,* but identical. To do that he should have reduced the problem to that of peasant economic organisation, and opposed Mr. N.—on by the thesis that our small producer (the peasant-agriculturist and the handicraftsman) is a petty bourgeois. By posing the problem that way he would have transferred it from the sphere of arguments on what "should" be, what "may" be, etc., into the sphere of explaining *what is*, and *why it is that way*, *and not otherwise*. To refute this thesis the Narodniks would have either to deny generally-known and undoubted facts about the growth of commodity economy and the splitting-up of the peasantry [*and these facts prove* the petty-bourgeois character of the peasantry], or else to deny the elementary truths of political economy. To accept this thesis would mean to admit the absurdity of contrasting "capitalism" to the "people's system," to admit the reactionary character of schemes to "seek different paths for the fatherland" and address requests for "socialisation" to bourgeois "society" or to a "state" that is still half "old-nobility" in character.

* The Narodniks said this openly and directly, but the "undoubted Marxist," Mr. N.—on, presents this same nonsense in vague phrases about a "people's system" and "people's production" garnished with quotations from Marx.

Instead, however, of beginning at the beginning,* Mr. Struve begins at the end: "We reject," says he, "one of the most fundamental postulates of the Narodnik theory of Russia's economic development, the postulate that the development of large-scale manufacturing industry ruins the peasant agriculturist" (246). Now that means, as the Germans say, to throw out the baby with the bath water! "The development of large-scale manufacturing industry" means and expresses the development of capitalism. And that it is capitalism which ruins the peasant is by no means a corner-stone of Narodism, but of *Marxism*. The Narodniks saw and continue to see the causes of the separation of the producer from the means of production in the policy of the government, which, according to them, was a failure ("we" went the wrong way, etc.), in the stagnancy of society which rallied insufficiently against the vultures and tricksters, etc., and not in that specific organisation of the Russian social economy which bears the name of capitalism. That is why their "measures" amounted to action to be taken by "society" and the "state." On the contrary, when it is shown that the existence of the capitalist organisation of social economy is the cause of expropriation this leads inevitably to the theory of the *class struggle* (cf. Struve's book, pp. 101, 288 and many other pages). The author expresses himself inexactly in speaking of the "*agriculturist*" in general, and not of the opposing classes in bourgeois agriculture. The Narodniks say that capitalism ruins *agriculture* and for that reason is incapable of embracing the country's entire production and leads this production the wrong way; the Marxists say that capitalism, both in manufacturing industry and in agriculture, oppresses the *producer*, but by- raising production to a higher level creates the conditions and the forces for "socialisation."**

* That is to say, beginning with the petty-bourgeois character of the "peasant agriculturist" as proof of the "inevitability and legitimacy" of large-scale capitalism.

** The rationalising of agriculture, on the one hand, which makes it for the first time capable of operating on a social scale, and the reduction *ad absurdum* of property in land, on the other, are the great achievements of the capitalist mode of production. Like all of its other historical advances, it also attained these by first complete ly impoverishing the direct producers" (*Das Kapital*, III. B., 2. Th. p. 157).[138]

Mr. Struve's conclusion on this point is as follows: "One of Mr. N.—on's cardinal errors is that he has completely transferred notions and categories from the *established* capitalist system to the contemporary economy of the peasant, which to this day is more natural than money economy" (237).

We have seen above that only Mr. N.—on's complete ignoring of the concrete data of Russian agricultural capitalism led to the ridiculous mistake of talking about a "contraction" of the home market. He did not, however, make that mistake because he applied all the categories of capitalism to the peasantry, but because he did not apply any *categories of capitalism* to the data on agriculture. The classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are, of course, a most important "category" of capitalism. Mr. N.—on not only did not "transfer" them to the "peasantry" (i.e., did not give an analysis of exactly to what groups or sections of the peasantry these categories apply and how far they are developed), but, on the contrary, he argued in purely Narodnik fashion, ignoring the opposite elements within the "village community," and arguing about the "peasantry" in general. It was this that led to his thesis on the capitalist character of over-population, on capitalism as the cause of the expropriation of the agriculturist, remaining unproven and merely serving to build a reactionary utopia.

IV

In § VIII of the sixth chapter, Mr. Struve sets forth his ideas about private-landowner farming. He quite rightly shows how closely and directly the forms assumed by this sort of farming depend on the ruin of the peasants. The ruined peasant no longer "tempts" the landlord with "fabulous rental prices," and the landlord goes over to the employment of farm labourers. Extracts in proof of this are cited from an article by Raspopin, who analysed Zemstvo statistical data on landlord economy, and from a Zemstvo publication on current statistics which notes the "enforced" character of the increase in the cultivation of landlord estates on capitalist lines. In reply to Messrs. the Narodniks, who so willingly hide the fact of capitalism's present domi-

nation in agriculture beneath arguments about its "future" and its "possibility," the author makes a precise reference to the *actual situation*.

We must stop here just to deal with the author's estimation of this phenomenon, who calls it the "progressive trends in private-landowner farming" (244) and says that these trends are created by the "inexorable logic of economic evolution" (240). We fear that these quite correct propositions, by reason of their abstractness, will be unintelligible to the reader who is not acquainted with Marxism; that the reader will not understand—unless definite reference is made to the succession of such and such systems of economy, such and such forms of class antagonism—why the given trend is "progressive" (from the only viewpoint, of course, from which the Marxist can pose the problem, from the viewpoint of a definite class), why, exactly, is the evolution that is taking place "inexorable." Let us therefore try to depict this succession (at least in the most general outline) parallel to the Narodnik representation of the matter.

The Narodnik presents the process of the development of the economy of farm labourers as a transition from "independent" peasant farming to dependent farming, and, naturally, considers this to be regression, decline, etc. Such a picture of the process *is quite untrue in fact*, does not correspond to reality at all, and hence the conclusions drawn from it are also absurd. By presenting things in this optimistic way (optimistic in relation to the past and the present), the Narodnik simply *turns his back on the facts* established by Narodnik literature itself, and turns his face towards utopias and possibilities.

Let us start from pre-Reform feudal economy.

The main content of the production relations at that time was as follows: the landlord supplied the peasant with land, timber for building, the means of production in general (sometimes even the means of livelihood) for each separate household and, while letting the peasant gain his own livelihood, compelled him to work *all the surplus time* doing corvée service for him, the landlord. I underscore the words "all the surplus time" in order to note that there can be no question, under this system, of the peasant's

"independence."* The "allotment" with which the landlord "supplied" the peasant was nothing more than *wages in kind*, served wholly and exclusively for the exploitation of the peasant by the landlord, to "supply" the landlord with hands and actually never to provide for the peasant himself .**

Then, however, came the invasion of commodity economy. The landlord began to produce grain for sale and not for himself. This gave rise to intensified exploitation of peasant labour and then to difficulties with the allotment system, since it had become unprofitable for the landlord to supply members of the rising generation of peasants with allotments, and it was possible to settle accounts in money. It became more convenient to separate the peasants' land once and for all from that of the landlord (particularly if in the process part of the allotments were cut off and if they were redeemed at a "fair" price) and to use the labour of *the very same* peasants, placed in materially worse conditions and forced to compete with former manor serfs, "gilt-landers,"[139] the more prosperous former state, appanage peasants, etc.

Serfdom collapses.

The system of economy—now serving the market (and this is very important)—changed, but did not do so at once. New features and "principles" were added to the old. These new features consisted of the following: the supplying of the peasant with means of production was no longer made the basis of Plusmacherei, but, on the contrary, it was his "separation" from the means of production, his need of money; the basis was no longer natural economy, natural exchange of "services" (the landlord gives the peasant land, while the peasant provides the products of his surplus labour, grain, linen, etc.), but commodity, "free" money contract. It was this form of economy, which combined old and new features, that has been predominant in Russia since the Reform. The old-time methods of lending out land in return for work (farming in return for cut-off lands, for

* I confine myself *exclusively* to the economic aspect of the matter.

** That is why reference to the feudal "allotment of land" as proof of the means of production belonging to the producer "from time immemorial" is false through and through.

example) were supplemented by "winter hire"—the lending of money in return for work when the peasant is in particular need of money and sells his labour for a song, the lending of grain in return for labour service, etc. The social-economic relations in the former "patriarchal estate" were reduced, as you see, to the most ordinary *usurer's* deal: they consisted of operations quite analogous to the operations of the buyer-up in relation to the handicraftsmen.

There can be no doubt that this form of economy has become typical since the Reform, and our Narodnik literature has supplied superb *descriptions* of this particularly unattractive form of Plusmacherei combined with feudal traditions and relations, and with the utter helplessness of the peasant tied to his "allotment."

But the Narodniks refused, and still refuse, to see the precise economic basis of these relations.

The basis of domination is now not only the possession of the land, as in the old days, but also the possession of money, which the peasant is in need of (and money is a product of the social labour organised by commodity economy), and the "separation" of the peasant from the means of livelihood. Obviously, this is a capitalist, bourgeois relationship. The "new" features are nothing but the initial form of the domination of *capital* in agriculture, a form not yet freed of the "old-nobility" fetters, a form that has created the class contradiction peculiar to capitalist society, but has not yet finally established it.

With the development of commodity economy, however, the ground slips from under this initial form of the domination of capital: the impoverishment of the peasantry has now developed to the point of utter ruin, the point when the peasants have lost their implements, by which the feudal and the bonded forms of labour were maintained—and the landlord is thus compelled to go over to the use of his own implements, and the peasant to become a farm labourer.

That this transition has begun in post-Reform Russia is again an undoubted fact. This fact shows the line of development of the bonded form, which the Narodniks view in a purely metaphysical way—disregarding connections with the past, disregarding the urge to develop; this same fact shows the *further* development of capitalism, the further

development of the class contradiction that is peculiar to our capitalist society and that in the preceding epoch was expressed in the relation between the "kulak" and the peasant, and is now beginning to find expression in the relation between the rational farmer and the farm labourer and day labourer.

Now it is this latter change that evokes the despair and horror of the Narodnik, who begins to howl about "deprivation of the land," "loss of independence," "installation of capitalism" and the ills "threatening" as a result, etc., etc.

Look at these arguments impartially and you will see, firstly, that they contain a *falsehood*, even though a well-intentioned one, since the economy of farm labourers is not preceded by peasant "independence" but by other ways of handing the surplus product over to some one who takes no part in its production. Secondly, you will see the superficiality and the pettiness of the Narodnik protest, which make it vulgar socialism, as Mr. Struve aptly puts it. Why is this "installation" merely seen in its second form, and not in both forms? Why is the protest not directed against the basic historical fact that concentrated the means of production in the hands of "private landowners," instead of merely against one of the methods of utilising this monopoly? Why is the root of the evil not seen in production relations that subordinate labour far and wide to the owner of money, instead of merely in the inequality of distribution that stands out in such relief in the *latest* form of these relations? It is this basic circumstance—a protest against capitalism based on those same capitalist relations—that makes the Narodniks the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, who do not fear bourgeois reality, but merely its accentuation, which alone leads to a fundamental change.

V

Let us pass to the last point in Mr. Struve's theoretical arguments, namely, to the "problem of markets for Russian capitalism" (245).

The author begins his examination of the Narodnik-devised theory about there being no markets in this country, with the question: "What does Mr. V. V. understand by capi-

talism?" That question is a very relevant one, since Mr. V. V. (and all Narodniks in general) have always compared the Russian order of things with some "English form" (247) of capitalism and not with its basic features, which have a different appearance in each country. It is only a pity that Mr. Struve does not give a complete definition of capitalism, but points in general to the "domination of exchange economy" [that is one feature; the second is the appropriation of surplus-value by the owner of money, his domination over labour], to "the system we see in Western Europe" (247), "with all its consequences," with the "concentration of industrial production, capitalism in the narrow sense of the word" (247).

"Mr. V. V.," says the author, "did not go into an analysis of the concept 'capitalism,' but took it from Marx, who mainly had in view capitalism in the narrow sense, as the already fully established product of relations developing on the basis of the subordination of production to exchange" (247). One cannot agree with that. Firstly, had Mr. V. V. really taken his idea of capitalism from Marx, he would have had a correct idea of it, and could not have confused the "English form" with capitalism. Secondly, it is quite unfair to assert that Marx mainly had in view the "centralisation or concentration of industrial production" [that is what Mr. Struve understands by capitalism in the narrow sense!. On the contrary, he followed up the development of commodity economy from its initial steps, he analysed capitalism in its primitive forms of simple co-operation and manufacture—forms centuries apart from the concentration of production by machines—and he showed the connection between capitalism in industry and in agriculture. Mr. Struve himself narrows down the concept of capitalism when he says: "The object of Mr. V. V.'s study was the *first* steps of the national economy on the path from natural to commodity organisation." He should have said: the *last* steps. Mr. V. V., as far as we know, only studied Russia's post-Reform economy. *The beginning of commodity* production relates to the pre-Reform era, as Mr. Struve himself indicates (189-90), and even the *capitalist* organisation of the cotton industry took shape before the emancipation of the peasants. The Reform gave an impulse to the *final* development in this sense; it pushed the commodity form of labour-

power and not the commodity form of the product of labour to the forefront; it sanctioned the domination of capitalist and not of commodity production. The hazy distinction between capitalism in the broad and in the narrow sense* leads Mr. Struve apparently to regard Russian capitalism as something of the future and not of the present, not as something already and definitely established. He says, for example:

"Before posing the question: is it inevitable for Russia to have capitalism in the English form, Mr. V. V. should have posed and settled a different one, a more general and hence more important question: is it inevitable for Russia to pass from natural to money economy, and what is the relation between capitalist production sensu stricto and commodity production in general?" (247). That is hardly a convenient way of posing the question. If the present, existing system of production relations in Russia is clearly explained, then the problem of whether this or that line of development is "inevitable" will be settled eo ipso. If, however, it is not explained, then it will be insoluble. Instead of arguments about the future (arguments beloved of Messrs. the Narodniks) an *explanation* of the present should be given. An outstanding fact in post-Reform Russia has been the outward, if one may so call it, manifestation of capitalism, i.e., manifestation of its "heights" (factory production, railways, banks, etc.), and theoretical thought was immediately faced with the problem of capitalism in Russia. The Narodniks have tried to prove that these heights are something accidental, unconnected with the entire economic system, without basis and therefore impotent; and they have used the term "capitalism" in too narrow a sense, forgetting that the enslavement of labour to capital covers very long and diverse stages from merchant's capital to the "English form." It is the job of Marxists to prove that these heights are nothing more than the last step in the development of the commodity economy that took shape

* There is nothing to show what criterion the author uses to distinguish these concepts. If by capitalism in the narrow sense is meant only machine industry then it is not clear why manufacture should not be singled out, too. If by capitalism in the broad sense is meant only commodity economy, then there is no capitalism in it.

long ago in Russia and *everywhere*, in all branches of production, gives rise to the subordination of labour to capital.

Mr. Struve's view of Russian capitalism as something of the future and not of the present was expressed with particular clarity in the following argument: "So long as the contemporary village community exists, registered and consolidated by law, relations will develop on the basis of it that have nothing in common with the 'people's well-being.' [Surely not just "will develop"; did they not develop so long ago that the whole of Narodnik literature, from its very outset, over a quarter of a century ago, described them and protested against them?] "In the West we have several examples of the existence of individual farmsteads alongside of large-scale capitalist farming. Our Poland and our southwest territory belong to the same order of things. It may be said that in Russia, both the community villages and those consisting of individual farms approach this type, inasmuch as the impoverished peasantry remain on the land and levelling influences among them are proving stronger than differentiating influences" (280). Is it merely a matter of approaching, and not of already being that *type* at this very moment? To determine "type," one has, of course, to take the basic economic features of the system, and not legal forms. If we look at these basic features of the economy of the Russian countryside, we shall see the isolated economy of the peasant households on small plots of land, we shall see growing commodity economy that already plays a dominant role. It is these features that give content to the concept "small individual farming." We shall see further the same peasant indebtedness to usurers, the same expropriation to which the data of the West testify. The whole difference lies in the specific character of our juridical system (the peasants' civic inequality; forms of land tenure), which retains stronger traces of the "old regime" as a result of the weaker development of our capitalism. But these specific features do not in the least disturb the uniformity of *type* of our peasant system and that of the West.

Proceeding to deal with the theory of markets itself, Mr. Struve notes that Messrs. V. and N.—on are caught in a vicious circle: while the development of capitalism re-

quires the growth of the market, capitalism ruins the population. The author very unsuccessfully corrects this vicious circle with his Malthusianism, placing the blame for the ruin of the peasantry on the "growth of the population" and not on capitalism!! The mistake of the authors mentioned is quite a different one: capitalism not only ruins, but *splits* the peasantry into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. This process does not cut down the home market, but *creates* it: commodity economy grows at both poles of the differentiating peasantry, both among the "proletarian" peasantry, who are compelled to sell "free labour," and among the bourgeois peasantry, who raise the technical level of their farms (machinery, equipment, fertilisers, etc. Cf. Mr. V. V.'s *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming*) and develop their requirements. Despite the fact that this conception of the process is directly based on Marx's theory of the relation between capitalism in industry and in agriculture, Mr. Struve ignores it—possibly because he has been led astray by Mr. V. V.'s "theory of markets." This latter person, supposedly basing himself on Marx, has presented the Russian public with a "theory" claiming that in developed capitalist society a "surplus of goods" is inevitable; the home market cannot be sufficient, a foreign one is necessary. "This theory is a true one" (?!), declares Mr. Struve, "inasmuch as it states the fact that surplus-value cannot be realised from consumption either by the capitalists or by the workers, but presumes consumption by third persons" (251). We cannot agree with this statement at all. Mr. V. V.'s "theory" (if one may speak of a theory here) is simply that of ignoring the distinction between personal and productive consumption, the distinction between the means of production and articles of consumption, a distinction without which it is impossible to understand the reproduction of the aggregate social capital in capitalist society. Marx showed this in the greatest detail in Volume II of *Capital* (Part III: "The Reproduction and Circulation of the Aggregate Social Capital") and dealt with it vividly in Volume I as well, when criticising the thesis of classical political economy according to which the accumulation of capital consists only of the transformation of surplus-value into wages, and not into constant capital (means of production)

plus wages. To confirm this description of Mr. V. V.'s theory let us confine ourselves to two quotations from the articles mentioned by Mr. Struve.

"Each worker," says Mr. V. V. in his article "The Excess in the Market Supply of Commodities," "produces more than he consumes himself, and all these surpluses accumulate in few hands; the owners of these surpluses consume them themselves, for which purpose they exchange them within the country and abroad for the most varied objects of necessity and comforts; but however much they eat, drink or dance (sic!!)—they cannot dispose of the whole of the surplus-value" (*Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, 1883, No. 5, p. 14), and "to be more convincing" the author "examines the chief expenditures" of the capitalist, such as dinners, travelling, etc. We get it still more vividly in the article "Militarism and Capitalism": "The Achilles' heel of the capitalist organisation of industry is the impossibility of the employers consuming the whole of their income" (*Russkaya Mysl*, 1889, No. 9, p. 80). "Rothschild could not consume the entire increment to his income ... for the simple reason that this ... increment constitutes such a considerable mass of articles of consumption that Rothschild, whose every whim is satisfied as it is, would find himself in very great difficulties," etc.

All these arguments, as you see, are based on the naïve view that the capitalist's purpose is only personal consumption and not the accumulation of surplus-value, on the mistaken idea that the social product splits up into $v+s$ (variable capital+surplus-value) as was taught by Adam Smith and all the political economists before Marx, and not into $c+v+s$ (constant capital, means of production, and then into wages and surplus-value), as was shown by Marx. Once these errors are corrected and attention is paid to the circumstance that in capitalist society an enormous and ever-growing part is played by the means of production (the part of the social products that is used for productive and not personal consumption, not for consumption by people but by capital) the whole of the notorious "theory" collapses completely. Marx proved in Volume II that capitalist production is quite conceivable without foreign markets, with the growing accumulation of wealth and without any "third

persons," whose introduction by Mr. Struve is extremely unfortunate. Mr. Struve's reasoning on this subject evokes amazement, especially as he himself points to the overwhelming significance of the home market for Russia and catches Mr. V. V. tripping on the "programme of development of Russian capitalism" based on a "strong peasantry." The process of the formation of this "strong" (that is, bourgeois) peasantry that is now taking place in our countryside clearly shows us the rise of capital, the proletarianisation of the producer and the *growth of the home market*: the "spread of improved implements," for example, signifies precisely the accumulation of capital as means of production. On this problem it was particularly necessary, instead of dealing with "possibilities," to outline and explain the actual process expressed in the creation of a home market for Russian capitalism.*

With this we conclude our examination of the theoretical part of Mr. Struve's book, and can now try to give a general, comprehensive, so to speak, description of the main methods used in his arguments, and thus approach the solution of the problems raised at the outset: "Exactly what in this book may be assigned to Marxism?" "Which of the doctrine's (Marxism's) tenets does the author reject, supplement or correct, and with what results?"

The main feature of the author's arguments, as we noted from the start, is his narrow objectivism, which is confined to proving the inevitability and necessity of the process and makes no effort to reveal at each specific stage of this process the form of class contradiction inherent in it—an objectivism that describes the process in general, and not each of the antagonistic classes whose conflict makes up the process.

We understand perfectly well that the author had his grounds for confining his "notes" to just the "objective" and, what is more, the most general side; his grounds were, firstly, that in his desire to confront the Narodniks with the principles of hostile views, he set forth principia and

* As this is a very important and complicated problem, we intend to devote a special article to it.[140]

nothing more, leaving their development and more concrete examination to the further development of the controversy, and, secondly, we tried in Chapter I to show that *all* that distinguishes Narodism from Marxism is the *character of the criticism* of Russian capitalism, the different *explanation* of it—from which it naturally follows that the Marxists sometimes confine themselves just to general "objective" propositions, and lay emphasis exclusively on what distinguishes our understanding (*of generally-known facts*) from that of the Narodniks.

Mr. Struve, however, it seems to us, went too far in this respect. Abstractness of exposition frequently yielded propositions that could not but cause misunderstanding; the way the problem was posed did not differ from the methods current and dominant in our literature, the method of arguing in professorial style, from on high, about the paths and destiny of the fatherland and not about specific classes pursuing such and such a path; the more concrete the author's arguments, the more impossible did it become to explain the principia of Marxism and remain on the heights of general abstract propositions, the more necessary it was to make definite reference to such and such a condition of such and such classes of Russian society, to such and such a relation between the various forms of Plusmacherei and the interests of the producers.

That is why we thought that an attempt to supplement and explain the author's thesis, to follow his exposition step by step, so as to show the need for a *different* way of posing the problem, the need for a *more consistent* way of applying the theory of class contradictions, would not be out of place.

As to Mr. Struve's direct deviations from Marxism—on problems of the state, over-population, and the home market—sufficient has already been said about them.

VI

In addition to a criticism of the theoretical content of Narodism, Mr. Struve's book contains, among other things, several remarks relating to Narodnik economic policy. Although these remarks are given cursorily and are not devel-

oped by the author, we nevertheless must touch on them in order to leave no room for any misunderstanding.

These remarks contain references to the "rationality," progressiveness, "intelligence," etc., of the liberal, i.e., bourgeois policy as compared to the policy of the Narodniks.*

The author evidently wanted to contrast two policies that keep to the existing relations—and *in this sense* he quite rightly pointed out that a policy is "intelligent" if it develops and does not retard capitalism, and it is "intelligent" not because it serves the bourgeoisie by increasingly subordinating the producer to them [the way in which various "simpletons" and "acrobats" try to explain it], but because, by accentuating and refining capitalist relations, it brings clarity to the *mind* of the one on whom alone change depends, and gives him a free hand.

It must, however, be said that this quite true proposition is badly expressed by Mr. Struve, that owing to the abstractness peculiar to him he voices it in such a way that one sometimes wishes to say to him: let the dead bury the dead. In Russia there has never yet been a shortage of people who have devoted themselves, heart and soul, to creating theories and programmes that express the interests of our bourgeoisie, that express all these "urgent needs" of strong and big capital to crush small capital and to destroy its primitive and patriarchal methods of exploitation.

If the author had here also adhered strictly to the requirements of the Marxist "doctrine," demanding that exposition be reduced to the formulation of the actual process, and that the class contradictions behind each "intelligent," "rational"

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* Let us indicate some examples of these remarks: "If the state ... desires to strengthen small but not large landownership, then under the present economic conditions it cannot achieve this aim by chasing alter unrealisable economic equality among the peasantry, but only by supporting its viable elements, by creating an economically strong peasantry out of them" (240). "I cannot fail to see that the policy which is aimed at creating *such* a peasantry (namely, "economically strong adapted to commodity production") will be the only intelligent and progressive policy" (281). "Russia must be transformed from a poor capitalist country into a rich capitalist country" (250), etc., up to the concluding phrase: "Let us go and learn from capitalism."

and progressive policy be disclosed, he would have expressed the same thought differently, would have posed the question in another way. He would have drawn a parallel between those theories and programmes of liberalism, i.e., of the bourgeoisie, which have sprung up like mushrooms since the great Reform, and factual data on the development of capitalism in Russia. In this way he would have used the Russian example to show the connection between social ideas and economic development, something he tried to prove in the first chapters and that can only be fully established by a materialist analysis of Russian data. In this way he would have shown, secondly, how naïve the Narodniks are when they combat bourgeois theories in their publications, and do so as though these theories are merely mistaken reasoning, and do not represent the interests of a powerful class which it is foolish to admonish, and which can only be "convinced" by the imposing force of another class. In this way he would have shown, thirdly, which class actually determines "urgent needs" and "progress" in this country, and how ridiculous the Narodniks are when they argue about which "path" "to choose."

Messrs. the Narodniks have seized on these expressions of Mr. Struve's with particular delight, gloating over the fact that the unhappy way they have been formulated has enabled various bourgeois economists (like Mr. Yanzhul) and champions of serfdom (like Mr. Golovin) to seize upon some phrases torn out of the general context. We have seen in what way Mr. Struve's position, that has placed such a weapon into the hands of his opponents, is unsatisfactory.

The author's attempts to criticise Narodism merely as a theory that wrongly indicates the path for the fatherland,* led to the hazy formulation of his attitude to the "economic policy" of Narodism. This may be regarded as a wholesale denial of the policy, and not only of a half of it. It is, therefore, necessary to dwell on this point.

Philosophising about the possibility of "different paths for the fatherland" is merely the outer vestment of Naro-

* The author of *Critical Remarks* indicates the economic basis of Narodism (pp. 166-67), but in our view does so inadequately.

dism. But its content is representation of the interests and viewpoint of the Russian small producer, the petty bourgeois. That is why the Narodnik, in matters of theory, is just as much a Janus, looking with one face to the past and the other to the future, as in real life the small producer is, who looks with one face to the past, wishing to strengthen his small farm without knowing or wishing to know anything about the general economic system and about the need to reckon with the class that controls it—and with the other face to the future, adopting a hostile attitude to the capitalism that is ruining him.

It is clear from this that it would be absolutely wrong to reject the whole of the Narodnik programme indiscriminately and in its entirety. One must clearly distinguish its reactionary and progressive sides. Narodism is reactionary insofar as it proposes measures that tie the peasant to the soil and to the old modes of production, such as the inalienability of allotments, etc.,* insofar as it wants to retard the development of money economy, and insofar as it expects not partial improvements, but a change of the path to be brought about by "society" and by the influence of representatives of the bureaucracy (example: Mr. Yuzhakov, who argued in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 7, about common tillage as projected by a Zemsky Nachalnik and engaged in introducing amendments to these projects). Unconditional warfare must, of course, be waged against such points in the Narodnik programme. But there are also other points, relating to self-government, to the "people's" free and broad access to knowledge, to the "raising" of the "people's" (that is to say, small) economy by means of cheap credits, technical improvements, better regulation of marketing, etc., etc. That such general democratic measures are progressive is fully admitted, of course, by Mr. Struve, too. They will not retard, but accelerate Russia's economic development along the capitalist path, accelerate the establishment of a home market, accelerate the growth of technique and machine industry by improving the conditions of the

* Mr. Struve very rightly says that these measures might merely "bring to fruition the ardent dreams of certain West-European and Russian landowners about farm labourers who are strongly bound to the land" (279).

working man and raising the level of his requirements, accelerate and facilitate his independent thinking and action.

The only question that might here arise is: who indicates such undoubtedly desirable measures with greater accuracy and ability—the Narodniks or publicists like Skvortsov who has so much to say in favour of technical progress and to whom Mr. Struve is so extremely well disposed? It seems to me that from the Marxist viewpoint there can be no doubt that Narodism is absolutely to be preferred *in this respect*. The measures proposed by the Messrs. Skvortsov relate to the interests of the entire class of small producers, the petty bourgeoisie, in the same measure as the programme of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* relates to those of the big bourgeoisie. They are designed not for all,* but only for certain of the elect, who are vouchsafed the attention of the authorities. They are, lastly, abominably crude because they presume police interference in the economy of the peasants. Taken all in all, these measures provide no serious guarantees and chances of the "productive progress of peasant economy."

The Narodniks *in this respect* understand and represent the interests of the small producers far more correctly, and the Marxists, while rejecting all the reactionary features of their programme, must not only accept the general democratic points, but carry them through more exactly, deeply and further. The more resolute such reforms are in Russia, the higher they raise the living standard of the working masses—the more sharply and clearly will the most important and fundamental (already today) social antagonism in Russian life stand out. The Marxists, far from "breaking the democratic thread" or trend, as Mr. V. V. slanderously asserts they do, want to develop and strengthen this trend, they want to bring it closer to life, they want to take up the "thread" that "society" and the "intelligentsia" are letting slip out of their hands.**

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* That is to say, of course, for all *to whom* technical progress *is accessible*.

** In *Nedelya*, No. 47, 1894, Mr. V. V. writes: "In the post-Reform period of our history, social relations in some respects have approx-

This demand—not to discard the "thread," but, on the contrary, to strengthen it—is not the accidental result of the personal mood of some "Marxists" or other, but is necessarily determined by the position and interests of the class they wish to serve, is necessarily and unconditionally dictated by the fundamental requirements of their "doctrine." I cannot, for reasons that are easily understandable, pause here to examine the first part of this proposition, to characterise the "position" and "interests"; here, I think, matters speak for themselves. I shall only touch on the second part, namely, the relation of the Marxist doctrine to problems that express the "breaking thread."

The Marxists must *raise* these problems *differently* than Messrs. the Narodniks do. The latter pose the problem from the viewpoint of "modern science, modern moral ideas"; the matter is presented as though there are no profound causes of the failure to implement such reforms, causes contained within *production relations* themselves, as though the obstacle lies only in grossness of feelings, in the feeble "ray of reason," etc.; as though Russia is a tabula rasa on which nothing has to be done except properly outline the right paths. *That way of presenting the problem*, of course, guaranteed it the "purity" of which Mr. V. V. boasts, and which is merely the "purity" of ladies' college daydreams, of the kind that makes Narodnik reasoning so fit for armchair conversations.

The way these same problems are posed by the Marxists must necessarily be quite different.* Obliged to seek for the roots of social phenomena in production relations obliged to reduce them to the *interests* of definite classes, they must formulate these desiderata as being the "desires" of

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imated to those of Western Europe, with active democracy in the epoch of political struggle and with social indifferentism in the subsequent period." We tried to show in Chapter I that this "indifferentism" is no accident, but an inevitable result of the position and the interests of the class from which the representatives of "society" emerge and which in addition to disadvantages derives by no means unimportant advantages from contemporary relations.

* If they pursue their theory consistently. We have already said much about Mr. Struve's exposition being unsatisfactory precisely because of big failure to adhere to this theory with greatest strictness.

such and such social elements and meeting the opposition of such and such elements and classes. Such a way of posing the problem will absolutely eliminate the possibility of their "theories" being utilised for professorial arguments that rise *above* classes, for projects and reports that promise "splendid success."* That, of course, is just an indirect merit of the change of viewpoint referred to, but it is also a very great one, if we bear in mind how steep is the slope down which *contemporary* Narodism is slipping into the bog of opportunism. But the matter is not limited to mere indirect merit. If the same problems are posed in their application to the theory of class antagonism land this, of course, requires a "reconsideration of the facts" of Russian history and reality], then the replies to them will provide a formulation of the vital interests of certain classes; these replies will be intended for practical utilisation** by those interested classes and by them alone—these replies will, to use the splendid expression of a certain Marxist, break out of the "cramped chamber of the intelligentsia" towards those who themselves participate in production relations in their most highly developed and pure form, towards those who are most strongly affected by the "breaking of the thread," and who "need" "ideals" because they are badly off without them. Such a way of raising issues will instil a new stream of life into all these old problems—taxes, passports, migration, Volost boards of administration, etc.—problems that our "society" has discussed and interpreted, chewed over again and again, solved and re-solved, and for which it has now begun to lose all taste.

So then, no matter how we approach the problem, whether we examine the content of the system of economic relations prevalent in Russia and the various forms of this system in

* Mr. Yuzhakov's expression.

** Of course, for *this* "utilisation" to take place a tremendous amount of preparatory work is required, and what is more, work that by its very nature goes unseen. *Before* this utilisation takes place a more or less considerable period may pass during which we shall say outright that there is no force capable of providing better paths for the fatherland—as against the "sugary optimism" of Messrs. the Narodniks who assert that such forces exist and that all that remains to be done is to advise them to "leave the wrong path."

their historical connection and in their relation to the interests of the working people, or whether we examine the problem of the "breaking of the thread" and the reasons for its "breaking," we arrive, in either case, at one conclusion, that of the great significance of the historical task of "labour differentiated from life," a task advanced by the epoch in which we live, that of the universal significance of the idea of this class.

NOTES

[1] The article *New Economic Developments in Peasant Life*. (On V. Y. Postnikov's *Peasant Farming In South Russia*) is the earliest of V. I. Lenin's works that has been preserved. It was written in Samara in the spring of 1893, and the manuscript was read in circles attended by young Marxists of that town. Lenin intended to have it printed in the liberal magazine *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*), published in Moscow, but it was rejected by the editorial board "as unsuited to the policy of the magazine." In a letter dated May 30, 1894, Lenin said the following: "I was even naïve enough to send it to *Russkaya Mysl*, but of course they turned it down. The thing became quite clear to me when I read in No. 2 of that magazine an article about Postnikov by 'our well-known' liberal vulgarian, Mr. V. V. One must surely be an artist to be able to completely distort magnificent material and to obscure all the facts with phrase-mongering!"

The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U. possesses two manuscript copies of the article *New Economic Developments in Peasant Life*. The first (rough) copy was found among Lenin's personal papers; the second, which contains some additions made by Lenin when it was finally copied, was handed by him to S. I. Mickiewicz, from whom it was confiscated during a search on December 3, 1894. The manuscript was discovered in 1923 in the records of the Moscow Law Court, and was then published for the first time in the miscellany *The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the First Party Congress* (*1898–1923*). In the present edition, the article *New Economic Developments in Peasant Life* is printed according to the text of the second manuscript, as corrected by V. I. Lenin.

The Institute of Marxism-Leninism also possesses a copy of V. Y. Postnikov's book *Peasant Farming in South Russia* bearing Lenin's comments.

Lenin used the most important material of this article in the second chapter of his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, written in 1896-1899 and published in March 1899. p. 11

[2] *Zemstvos*—local self-government bodies, in which the nobility dominated. The Zemstvos were established in 1864 in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia, their competence being confined to purely local economic affairs (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). They functioned under the control of the Gubernia

Governors and the Minister of Home Affairs, who could invalidate decisions undesirable to the government.

The statistical sections, bureaux, and commissions of Gubernia and Uyezd Zemstvo Boards, engaged in statistical research (house-to-house censuses of peasant farms and handicraft establishments, determination of profitability of lands, revaluations of land and property liable to Zemstvo taxation, study of peasant budgets, etc.) and issued numerous reviews and statistical abstracts covering uyezds or gubernias, and containing a wealth of factual material.

Lenin had a high opinion of the Zemstvo statistical data, and pointed out that "a close study of Russian Zemstvo statistics by Europeans would no doubt give a strong impetus to the progress of social statistics in general." (*The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx*." See present edition, Vol. 5.) At the same time Lenin criticised the methods of analysing and grouping statistical data used by the Zemstvo statisticians. "This is the greatest weakness of our Zemstvo statistics, that are magnificent in the thoroughness and detail with which they are compiled," wrote Lenin. (*The Tasks of Zemstvo Statistics*. See present edition, Vol. 20.) The Zemstvo statisticians, many of whom were Narodniks in outlook, were frequently biassed in their approach to the statistical data. In their treatment of these data, essential differences and features of the various peasant groups formed in the course of capitalist development were hidden behind columns of figures.

Lenin studied, checked and analysed Zemstvo statistical data, made his own calculations, drew up tables and summaries, and gave a Marxist analysis and scientific classification of data on peasant farms and handicraft establishments. He used the wealth of material contained in the Zemstvo statistics to expose the far-fetched schemes of the Narodniks, and drew a real picture of Russia's economic development. He made extensive use of the data in his writings, and especially in his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. (On Zemstvo statistics see V. I. Lenin's paper *The Tasks of Zemstvo Statistics*, written in 1914.) p. 13

[3] Reference is made to the collection entitled *Results of the Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data*, of which Vol. I is: V. V.—*The Peasant Community*; Vol. II: N. Karyshev—*Peasant Rentings of Non-Allotment Land*, Dorpat, 1892. Both the books expressed liberal-Narodnik views. V. V. was the pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov, an ideologist of liberal Narodism of the 1880s and 1890s. p. 14

[4] The *village community* (*obshchina* or *mir*) in Russia was the communal form of peasant use of the land, characterised by compulsory crop rotation, and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective responsibility (compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants for making their payments in full and on time, and the performance of various services to the state and the landlords), the regular redistribution of the land with no right to refuse the allotment given, the prohibition of its purchase and sale.

The Russian village community was known in ancient times, and in the course of historical development gradually became one of the pillars of feudalism in Russia. The landlords and the tsarist government used the village community to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze redemption payments and taxes out of the people. Lenin pointed out that the village community "does not save the peasant from turning into a proletarian; actually it serves as a medieval barrier dividing the peasants, who are as if chained to small associations and to 'categories' which have lost all 'reason for existence.'" (*The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century*. See present edition, Vol. 15.)

The problem of the village community aroused heated arguments and was the subject of an extensive economic literature. The Narodniks displayed particularly great interest in the village community, seeing in it the guarantee of Russian development to socialism by a special path. By tendentiously gathering and falsifying facts, and employing so-called "average figures," the Narodniks sought to prove that the community peasantry in Russia possessed a special sort of "steadfastness," and that the peasant community protected the peasants against the penetration of capitalist relations into the village, and "saved" the peasants from ruin and class differentiation. As early as the 1880s, G. V. Plekhanov showed how unfounded were the Narodniks' illusions about "community socialism," while in the 1890s V. I. Lenin completely destroyed the Narodniks' theories. Lenin cited a tremendous amount of factual and statistical material to show how capitalist relations were developing in the Russian village, and how capital, by penetrating into the patriarchal village community, was splitting the peasantry into the antagonistic classes of kulaks and poor peasants.

In 1906 the tsarist minister Stolypin issued a law benefiting the kulaks; it allowed peasants to leave the community and to sell their allotments. This law laid the basis for the official abolition of the rural community system and intensified the differentiation among the peasantry. In nine years following the adoption of the law, over two million peasant householders withdrew from the communities. p. 19

[5] This refers to *registered* males subject to the poll-tax in feudal Russia (the peasantry and lower urban categories were chiefly affected), and to this end recorded in special censuses (so-called "registrations"). Such "registrations" began in 1718, the tenth and last being made in 1857-1859. In a number of districts redistribution of the land within the village communities took place according to the number of registered males in the family. p. 20

[6] *Dessiatiners*—peasants in South Russia who rented land for part of the harvest and not for a money payment. p. 28

[7] *Mennonites*—members of a religious sect who came to Russia from West Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. Their name was derived from that of their founder, the Dutchman Menno Simons. They settled mainly in the Yekaterinoslav and Taurida gubernias,

The farms of the Mennonite colonists were mostly prosperous, kulak farms. p. 34

[8] *The Peasant Reform of 1861*, which abolished serfdom in Russia was effected by the tsarist government in the interests of the serf-owning landlords. The Reform was made necessary by the entire course of Russia's economic development and by the growth of a mass movement among the peasantry against feudal exploitation. The "peasant Reform" was feudal in character, but by force of the economic development that had drawn Russia on to the capitalist path the feudal form was given a capitalist content, and "this was the more evident the *less* the land was filched from the peasants the *more fully* the land of the peasants was separated from that of the landlords, the *less* the tribute (i.e., "redemption") paid to the serf owners." (See present edition, Vol. 17, *The "Peasant Reform" and Proletarian-Peasant Revolution*.) The "peasant Reform" marked a step towards Russia's transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. On February 19, 1861, Alexander II signed a Manifesto and "Regulations" for the peasants, who were being released from serf dependence. In all, 22,500,000 serfs, formerly belonging to landlords, were "emancipated." Landed proprietorship, however, remained, the peasants' lands were declared the property of the landlords and the peasant could only get a land allotment of the size established by law (and even then by agreement with the landlord) for which he had to pay (redeem). The peasants made their redemption payments to the tsarist government, which had paid the established sums to the landlords. Approximate estimates show that after the Reform, the nobility possessed 71,500,000 dessiatines of land and the peasants 33,700,000 dessiatines. Thanks to the Reform the landlords cut off and appropriated from one to two-fifths of the lands formerly cultivated by the peasants.

The Reform merely undermined but did not abolish the old corvée system of farming. The landlords secured possession of the best parts of the peasants' allotments (the "cut-off lands," woods, meadows, watering-places, grazing grounds, and so on), without which the peasants could not engage in independent farming. Until the redemption arrangements were completed the peasants were considered to be "temporarily bound," and rendered services to the landlord in the shape of quitrent and corvée service. To compel the peasants to redeem their own allotments was sheer plunder on the part of the landlords and the tsarist government. The peasants were given a period of 49 years in which to pay off the debt, with an interest of 6%. Arrears grew from year to year. The former landlords' peasants alone paid the tsarist government a total of 1,900 million rubles in redemption money, whereas the market price of the land that passed into their possession did not exceed 544 million rubles. The peasants had to pay hundreds of millions of rubles for what was actually their own land; this ruined their farms and resulted in the impoverishment of the peasant masses.

The Russian revolutionary democrats, headed by N. G. Chernyshevsky, criticised the "peasant Reform" for its feudal character.

V. I. Lenin called the "peasant Reform" of 1861 the first mass act of violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture—the landlords were "clearing the estates" for capitalism. p. 35

[9] The manuscript contained some slight inaccuracies in the figures used to illustrate Lenin's argument. The total area under crops should be 1,651 dessiatines; the volume of the money demand on the market, reckoning only farms with over 5 dessiatines per household under crops—22,498 rubles. The total area under crops, reckoning farms with over 5 dessiatines per household under crops should be 1,603 dessiatines. The general conclusions, however, are not affected by these inaccuracies. p. 42

[10] *Yoking*—an old elementary form of joint work by the village poor. Several peasant households combined their working animals and other means of production for farm work. V. I. Lenin, in the second chapter of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, calls yoking "the co-operation of tottering farms which are being ousted by the peasant bourgeoisie." (See present edition, Vol. III.) p. 45

[11] *Village court* (in Russian: *rasprava*)—a special court for state-owned peasants founded in tsarist Russia according to the Regulation of 1838, and consisting of the village elder (chairman) and two elected peasants. The village court, being a court of first instance examined unimportant civil cases and misdemeanours, imposed fines, passed sentences of hard labour or flogging. The village court of second instance was the volost (district) court. In 1858 these courts were abolished, but the term rasprava continued to be used as referring to the primary village courts. p. 49

[12] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly magazine, liberal-Narodnik in trend; appeared in Moscow from 1880 onwards. In the 1890s, during the polemics between the Marxists and the liberal Narodniks, the Narodnik editors of the magazine occasionally allowed articles by Marxists to be published in its columns. Items by the progressive writers A. M. Gorky, V. G. Korolenko, D. N. Mamin-Sibiryak, G. I. Uspensky, A. P. Chekhov, and others, were published in the magazine's literature section.

After the 1905 Revolution, *Russkaya Mysl* became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet party, and was edited by P. B. Struve. It was closed down in the middle of 1918. p. 54

[13] *Long-tract system*—peasant allotments that stretched in a narrow tract for many miles on either side of the village, some of them being 15-20 miles away in one direction or another. The long-tract system was common in the southern and the eastern steppe regions of Russia, where big villages prevailed, each embracing several hundred peasant households. p. 58

[14] *Vestnik Yevropy* (*European Messenger*)—a monthly magazine devoted to politics, history and literature, bourgeois liberal in trend, that appeared in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. It published articles directed against the revolutionary Marxists. p. 62

[15] *Uyezd Boards of Peasants' Affairs* were established in tsarist Russia in 1874 to supervise the village and volost "peasant public administration" bodies. The Boards were directed by Uyezd Marshals of the Nobility and consisted of police chiefs, justices of the peace, and chairmen of Uyezd Zemstvo Boards. The Uyezd Boards of Peasants' Affairs were subordinate to the Gubernia Boards, which were headed by the governors. p. 67

[16] Reference is made to the famine of 1891 which was very severe in the eastern and south-eastern gubernias of Russia. This famine was more extensive than any similar natural calamity the country had ever experienced. The working people suffered incredible hardships as a result of the famine, which ruined masses of peasants and at the same time hastened the creation of a home market for the development of capitalism in Russia. p. 69

[17] Lenin's work *On the So-Called Market Question* was written in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1893.

The main points contained in this work were first outlined by Lenin at a circle meeting of St. Petersburg Marxists (known as the circle of "the ancients") when a discussion took place on G. B. Krasin's lecture on "The Market Question." According to participants in the circle meeting, Lenin's paper created a tremendous impression on all present. N. K. Krupskaya wrote in her reminiscences of Lenin:

"The question of markets was treated with ultra-concreteness by our new Marxist friend. He linked it up with the interests of the masses, and in his whole approach one sensed just that live Marxism which takes phenomena in their concrete surroundings and in their development." (N. K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, Moscow, 1959, p. 12.)

In his speech at the circle meeting, and also in the paper entitled *On the So-Called Market Question*, Lenin pointed to the errors of Krasin, who considered the existence of foreign markets to be a necessary condition of capitalist production and denied any connection between the two subdivisions of social production. At the same time, Lenin severely criticised the views of the liberal Narodniks on the destiny of capitalism in Russia, and also the outlook of the representatives of nascent "Legal Marxism."

Lenin's work *On the So-Called Market Question* went the rounds of the Social-Democratic circles in St. Petersburg and other cities, and was a powerful weapon in the fight against Narodism and "Legal Marxism." The principal conclusions drawn in this work were developed later by Lenin in his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.

The manuscript of *On the So-Called Market Question*, which for a time was considered lost, came into the possession of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U. only in 1937.

It was first published in the journal *Bolshevik*, issue No. 21, 1937, and in 1938 was issued in book form by the Institute. p. 75

[18] The scheme of expanded reproduction taking account of technical progress is given exactly as it is in V. I. Lenin's manuscript; occa-

sional inaccuracies in figures do not affect the line of argument and the general conclusions. p. 87

[19] The column "Means of production as means of consumption" contains the total sum I (v+m), which includes the part intended for accumulation. It should be borne in mind that part of the newly-created value in Department I is embodied in instruments and materials which are not means of production for Department II, but additional means of production (exceeding replacement) for Department I. The part of the produced means of production intended for Department II, and that remaining in Department I can be seen from the magnitude of the constant capital that actually functions in both Departments in the following year.

Two errors slipped into V. I. Lenin's manuscript, viz.: 3,172 instead of $3{,}172\frac{1}{2}$, and $10{,}828\frac{1}{2}$ instead of 10,830, as can be seen from the scheme given in the text. p. 87

[20] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 438. p. 89

[21] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 106. p. 100

[22] *Nik.—on* or *N.—on* was the pseudonym of N. F. Danielson, one of the ideologists of liberal Narodism of the 1880s and 1890s. The book by Nikolai—on quoted here is called *Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*, St. Petersburg, 1893. p. 101

[23] *Plyushkin*, a character in N. V. Gogol's *Dead Souls*. The name Plyushkin, a tight-fisted landlord, has come to typify extreme avarice. p. 105

[24] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 316 (footnote 32). p. 106

[25] V. I. Lenin's book *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (Reply to Articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* Opposing the Marxists) was written in 1894 (the first part was finished in April, and the second and the third in the summer). Lenin started working on this book in Samara in 1892-93. In the Samara Marxist circle he delivered lectures in which he severely criticised the anti-Marxist liberal Narodniks V V. (Vorontsov), Mikhailovsky, Yuzhakov, and Krivenko. These lectures served as preparatory material for the book.

In the autumn of 1894 Lenin read his work, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, to members of the St. Petersburg Marxist circle. "I remember," wrote N. K. Krupskaya in her reminiscences, "how it thrilled us all. The aims of the struggle were set forth in the pamphlet with admirable clarity. Hectographed copies of it circulated afterwards from hand to hand under the name of "The Yellow Copy-Books." They were unsigned. Fairly widely read, they undoubtedly had a strong influence on the Marxist youth at the time." (N. K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, Moscow, 1959, p. 15.)

Lenin's book was published in separate parts. The first part

was hectographed in June 1894 in St. Petersburg, and was illegally circulated there and in other cities. A second edition of this first part, printed the same way, appeared in July 1894. About 100 copies of the first and second parts were printed by A. A. Ganshin in August in Gorki (Vladimir Gubernia) and in September in Moscow. In September of the same year A. A. Vaneyev, in St. Petersburg, hectographed 50 more copies of the first part (that was the fourth edition), and approximately the same number of copies of the third part. This edition of the book had the following note on the cover: "Published by a provincial group of Social-Democrats." This was made necessary by the illegal conditions under which the book was produced. Local organisations made copies of Lenin's work by various means, some parts being handwritten, others typewritten, etc. A group of Social-Democrats in Borzna Uyezd of Chernigov Gubernia hectographed copies of the book in 1894; copies of this edition were circulated in Chernigov, Kiev, and St. Petersburg. At the end of 1894 the book was being read in Vilno; in 1895 in Penza; and at about the same time in Vladimir. In 1895-1896 it circulated among Marxist students in Tomsk. At the same time it was being read in Rostov-on-Don, in 1896, in Poltava and other towns.

Lenin's book was well known to the Emancipation of Labour group, and also to other Russian Social-Democratic organisations abroad.

Copies of the hectographed edition of the first and the third parts of the book were discovered in the early part of 1923 in the archives of the Berlin Social-Democratic organisation, and almost simultaneously in the State Saltykov-Shchedrin Public Library in Leningrad.

In the first, second and third editions of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works*, it was printed according to the hectographed editions of 1894 discovered in 1923.

In 1936, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism acquired a further copy of the hectographed edition of 1894. This copy contains numerous editorial corrections, apparently made by Lenin when preparing to have the book published abroad.

The text of *What the "Friends of the People" Are* published in the present edition conforms to the text of the hectographed copy acquired by the Institute in 1936, account being taken of the corrections made. According to the authorised copy, inverted commas have been replaced in some passages by italics, while a number of interpolations that were in brackets in the text have been given as footnotes. Lenin's explanation to the table (Appendix I), omitted from previous editions, is also given.

The second part of the book has still not been found. p. 129

[26] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the beginning of the 1890s it became the organ of the liberal Narodniks, and was edited by S. N. Krivenko and N. K. Mikhailovsky. The magazine advocated reconciliation with the tsarist government and waged a bitter struggle against Marxism and the Russian Marxists.

In 1906 it became the organ of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist party. p. 133

[27] The article referred to is N. K. Mikhailovsky's "Literature and Life," published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, 1893. Marxists commented on the article in letters addressed to Mikhailovsky. Some of the letters were published in the magazine *Byloye* (*The Past*), No. 23, 1924. p. 133

[28] The article referred to is N. K. Mikhailovsky's "Karl Marx Being Tried by Y. Zhukovsky," published in the magazine *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (*Fatherland Notes*), No. 10, October 1877. p. 135

[29] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, Preface to the first German edition, p. 10. p. 136

[30] The article referred to is K. Marx's *A Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, written in Kreuznach in the summer of 1843. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the C.C. C.P.S.U. possesses the unfinished manuscript of this essay containing an exhaustive critical analysis of §§261-313 of Hegel's *Principles of the Philosophy of Law*. Marx intended to prepare for publication an extensive essay, *A Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, following the appearance, of the Introduction to this work in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (*German-French Yearbooks*) in 1844. He was, however, unable to carry out his intention. Marx's manuscript was published for the first time in the language of the original in 1927, by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 138

[31] Lenin's quotation is from the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 362-63.) p. 139

[32] *Contrat social*—one of the chief works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Its full title is *Du contrat social*; *ou*, *Principes du droit politique*. (*The Social Contract*, *or the Principles of Political Law*.) It was published in Amsterdam in 1762 and translated into Russian in 1906. The main idea in the book was the assertion that every social system should be the result of a free agreement, of a contract between people. Fundamentally idealistic though it was, the "social contract" theory, advanced in the eighteenth century on the eve of the French bourgeois revolution, nevertheless played a revolutionary role. It expressed the demand for bourgeois equality, the abolition of the privileges of the feudal estates, and the establishment of a bourgeois republic. p. 139

[33] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 373. p. 146

[34] *Letter from Karl Marx to the Editorial Board of "Otechestvenniye Zapiski"* was written at the end of 1877 in connection with N. K. Mikhailovsky's article "Karl Marx Being Tried by Y. Zhukovsky." The letter was copied and sent to Russia by Engels after Marx's death. Engels stated that this letter "for a long time circulated in Russia in manuscript copies taken from the French original, and later a Russian translation of it was published in *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli* (*People's Will Messenger*), (No. 5.—*Ed.*) in 1886, in Geneva, and subsequently in Russia. This letter, like everything that

came from Marx's pen aroused considerable attention in Russian circles." (*Internatonales aus dem Volksstaat* (1871-1875), Berlin 1894, S. 68.) It was first published in Russian in the magazine *Yuridichesky Vestnik* (*The Legal Messenger*), No. 10, 1888. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, pp. 376-79.) p. 146

[35] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (Part II. Political Economy, Chapter One. Subject Matter and Method), Moscow, 1954, pp. 207-8. p. 146

[36] *German Ideology* was written jointly by Marx and Engels in the years 1845-1846.

The manuscript, amounting to nearly 800 printed pages, was in two volumes, the first of which was mainly devoted to an elaboration of the basic theses of historical materialism and to a criticism of the philosophical views of Ludwig Feuerbach, B. Bauer and M. Stirner, and the second, to a criticism of the views of various representatives of "true socialism."

In 1846-1847 Marx and Engels made repeated attempts to find a publisher in Germany who would issue their work. They were, however, unsuccessful due to the obstacles raised by the police and because the publishers, themselves interested parties, were champions of the very trends combated by Marx and Engels and refused to handle it. Only one chapter appeared during the lifetime of Marx and Engels. That was Chapter IV, Volume II of *German Ideology*, which was published in the magazine *Das Westphalische Dampfboot* (*Westphalean Steamer*), August and September 1847. The manuscript was pigeonholed for dozens of years in the archives of the German Social-Democratic Party. The German text was first published in full in 1932 by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U. A Russian translation appeared in 1933.

The characterisation of *German Ideology* given by Engels is taken from the Preface to his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 359.) p. 147

[37] See F. Engels, Preface to the first German edition of "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State." (K .Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 171.) p. 148

[38] *The gentile, clan organisation of society*. This was the system of primitive communism, or the first social-economic formation in human history. The clan system began to take shape when the modern type of man was fully formed. The clan community was a collective unit of blood relations united by economic and social ties. In its development, the clan system passed through two periods, matriarchy and patriarchy. Patriarchy came to an end when primitive society became class society and the state emerged. The basis of production relations in the primitive-communal system was the social ownership of the means of production and the equal distribution of products. In the main this corresponded to the low level of development of the productive forces, and to their character at that period. Stone implements, and later the bow and arrow, ruled

out the possibility of men combating natural forces and wild animals individually.

On the system of primitive communism, see K. Marx's *Synopsis of L. H. Morgan's "Ancient Society"* and F. Engels' *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.* p. 150

[39] The *fief* (*pomestye*) system—the specific system of feudal landownership that arose and became firmly established in Russia in the fifteenth, and particularly the sixteenth century. The fief system was closely bound up with the formation of a centralised state and the establishment of a centralised army. The fief lands, considered the property of the feudal ruler, were distributed by the government among those who served in the armed forces or at court. The amount of land received depended on the duties of the landholder. The fief, as distinct from the *votchina*, the absolute and hereditary landed property of the boyar, was the conditional and temporary property of a nobleman who had rendered these services.

From the middle of the sixteenth century the fief was gradually transformed into an hereditary estate, and increasingly approximated to the votchina. In the seventeenth century the difference between these two forms of feudal landownership disappeared, and the feudal rights of votchina and fief owners became identical. Following Peter I's ukase on inheritance issued in 1714 the fief once and for all became the private property of the landed nobility. The term fief (pomestye) continued to be used in Russia throughout the entire feudal epoch. p. 153

[40] *The First International—The International Working Men's Association*—the first international organisation of the proletariat, founded by Karl Marx in 1864 at an international workers' conference in London convened by British and French workers. The First International was the result of years of hard work by Marx and Engels to establish a revolutionary working-class party. As V. I. Lenin noted, the First International "laid the foundation of an international organisation of the workers for the preparation of their revolutionary onslaught on capital," "laid the foundation of the proletarian, international struggle for socialism." (*The Third International and Its Place in History.* See present edition, Vol. 29.)

The central directing body of the First International was the General Council of the International Working Men's Association, of which Marx was a life member. Marx worked to overcome the petty-bourgeois influences and sectarian tendencies then prevailing in the working-class movement (craft unionism in Britain, and Proudhonism and Anarchism in the Romance countries), gathering round himself the most class-conscious members of the General Council (including F. Lessner, E. Dupont, and H. Jung). The First International directed the economic and political struggle of the workers of different countries and strengthened the bonds of solidarity between them. It played a tremendous part in disseminating Marxism, in introducing socialism into the working-class movement.

After the defeat of the Paris Commune the working class was faced with the task of organising national mass parties based on the principles advanced by the First International. "... As I view European conditions it is quite useful to let the formal organisation of the International recede into the background for the time being." (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 348.) In 1876, at a conference held in Philadelphia, the First International was officially liquidated. p. 155

[41] Lenin used the name of V. Burenin a contributor to the reactionary paper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*), as a synonym for dishonest methods of controversy. p. 156

[42] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily paper that appeared in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917, it belonged to different publishers at different times and repeatedly changed its political line. At first it was moderately liberal, but from 1876 it became the organ of reactionary circles among the aristocracy and the bureaucracy. From 1905 it became the organ of the Black Hundreds. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, it gave full support to the counter-revolutionary policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and conducted a furious campaign against the Bolsheviks. On November 8 (October 26, old style), 1917, it was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* a typical example of the venal press.

In an item, "Critical Notes," published in *Novoye Vremya* of February 4, 1894, V. Burenin praised Mikhailovsky for fighting the Marxists. p. 158

[43] The words are from I. A. Krylov's fable "The Elephant and the Pug-Dog." p. 159

[44] See F. Engels Preface to the first edition of "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State." (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 170.) p. 161

[45] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 13. p. 161

[46] Reference is to the journal *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (*German-French Yearbooks*) published in Paris under the editorship of K. Marx and A. Ruge in the German language. Only one issue, a double number, appeared in February 1844. The main reason why publication was discontinued, was Marx's differences in principle with the bourgeois radical Ruge. p. 162

[47] *Triad* (Greek, *trias*)—in philosophy it is the formula of three-stage development. The idea of three-stage development was firs formulated by the Greek Neo-Platonic philosophers, particularly by Proclus, and was expressed in the works of the German idealist philosophers Fichte and Schelling. The triad was, however, developed most fully in the idealist philosophy of Hegel, who considered that every process of development traverses three stages—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The second stage is the negation of the first, which transformed into its opposite by transition to the second stage. The third stage is the negation of the second, i.e., the nega-

tion of the negation, which means a return to the form exiting at the outset that is now enriched by a new content and is on a higher level. Hegel's triad is a scheme into which reality was fitted artificially; the arbitrary construction of the triad scheme distorted the real development of nature and society. K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin had a high opinion of the rational elements in Hegel's dialectics, but they critically refashioned his dialectical method and created materialist dialectics, which reflect the most general laws of the development of the objective world and human thought. p. 163

[48] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (First Part. Philosophy. Chapter Thirteen. Dialectics. Negation of the Negation). p. 163

[49] A systematic exposition and further development of the Marxist dialectical method is given in V. I. Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, *Philosophical Notebooks*, *Karl Marx*, etc. p. 165

[50] The author of the article (I. K.—n) was Professor I. I. Kaufman of St. Petersburg University. In Marx's view, the article was one of the best expositions of the dialectical method. (See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959. Afterword to the second edition pp. 17-19.) p. 166

[51] Further on in the text (on pages 168-73 of the present volume) V. I. Lenin cites an extract from F. Engels' *Anti-Dühring* (Part One. Philosophy. Chapter Thirteen. Dialectics. Negation of the Negation). p. 168

[52] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 78. p. 171

[53] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 761-63. p. 171

[54] Reference is made to the Afterword to the second edition of Volume I of K. Marx's *Capital*. p. 174

[55] *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (*Fatherland Notes*)—a literary-political magazine that began publication in St. Petersburg in 1820. From 1839 it became the best progressive publication of its day. Among its contributors were V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen, T. N. Granovsky, and N. P. Ogaryov. Following Belinsky's departure from the editorial board in 1846, *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* began to lose its significance. In 1868 the magazine came under the direction of N. A. Nekrasov and M. Y . Saltykov-Shchedrin. This marked the onset of a period in which the magazine flourished anew, gathering around itself the revolutionary-democratic intellectuals of Russia. When Nekrasov died (in 1877), the Narodniks gained dominant influence in the magazine.

The *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* was continually harassed by the censors, and in April 1884 was closed down by the tsarist government. p. 175

[56] *Postoronny* (*Outsider*)—pen-name of N. K. Mikhailovsky. p. 175

[57] Reference is made to the following theses formulated by Marx and Engels in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*:

"The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way

based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered by this or that would-be universal reformer.

"They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes." (See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 46.) p. 178

[58] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (Part One. Philosophy. Chapter Nine. Morality and Law. Eternal Truths), Moscow, 1959, p. 130. p. 179

[59] Reference is made to N. K. Mikhailovsky's articles "About the Russian Edition of Karl Marx's Book" (*Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, No. 4, April 1872), and "Karl Marx Being Tried by Y. Zhukovsky" (*Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, No. 10, October 1877). p. 181

[60] Lenin quotes from K. Marx's letter to A. Ruge (dated September 1843). p. 185

[61] Lenin refers to S. N. Yuzhakov, whose political and economic views he criticised more particularly in the second part of *What the "Friends of the People" Are*. Neither the manuscript, nor a copy of the hectographed edition of the second part of this book has been found. p. 185

[62] Reference is made to the Emancipation of Labour group, the first Russian Marxist group, founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva in 1883. Apart from Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. I. Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov belonged to the group.

The Emancipation of Labour group played a great part in disseminating Marxism in Russia. The group translated into Russian, published abroad and distributed in Russia the works of the founders of Marxism: *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels; *Wage-Labour and Capital* by Marx; *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* by Engels, etc. Plekhanov and his group dealt a severe blow to Narodism. In 1883 and 1885 Plekhanov wrote two drafts of a programme for Russian Social-Democrats, which were published by the Emancipation of Labour group. This was an important step forward in preparing the ground for, and in the establishment of, a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. An important part in spreading Marxist views in Russia was played by Plekhanov's essays: *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885) and *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895). The Emancipation of Labour group, however, committed serious errors; they clung to remnants of the views of the Narodniks, underestimated the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry, and overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie. These errors were the embryo of the future Menshevik views held by Plekhanov and other members of the group. The Emancipation of Labour group had no practical ties with the working-class movement. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the Emancipation of Labour group "only theoretically founded the Social-Democracy and took the first step in the direction of the working-class movement." (*The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement*. See present edition, Vol. 20.)

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in August 1903, the Emancipation of Labour group announced that it had ceased its activity as a group. p. 193

[63] *Narodovolism*, the tenets of the *Narodovoltsi*—members of the secret Narodnik terrorist political organisation Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) which arose in August 1879, following the split in the secret society Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty). The Narodnaya Volya was headed by an Executive Committee which included A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya, A. A. Kvyatkovsky. The immediate object of the Narodnaya Volya was the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy, while their programme provided for the organisation of a "permanent popular representative body" elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the land to be given to the people; and the elaboration of measures for factories to pass into the hands of the workers. The Narodovoltsi were unable, however, to find the road to the masses of the people, and took to political conspiracy and individual terror. The terroristic struggle of the Narodovoltsi was not supported by a mass revolutionary movement, and enabled the government to crush the organisation by resorting to fierce persecution, death sentences and provocation.

After 1881 the Narodnaya Volya fell to pieces. Repeated attempts to revive it during the 1880s ended in failure—for example, the terrorist group organised in 1886, headed by A. I. Ulyanov (V. I. Lenin's brother) and P. Y. Shevyryov, which shared these traditions. After an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III, the group was exposed, and its active members executed.

While he criticised the erroneous, utopian programme of the Narodovoltsi, Lenin expressed great respect for the selfless struggle waged by its members against tsarism. In 1899, in the "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats," he pointed out that "the representatives of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory that served as the banner of the movement." ("A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats." See present edition, Vol. 4.) p. 198

[64] *Publisher's Note*—the Afterword to the first edition of the first part of V. I. Lenin's *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*. p. 201

[65] *Note to the present edition*—Afterword to the second edition of the first part of *What the "Friends of the People" Are* written in July 1894. p. 202

[66] *Yuridichesky Vestnik* (*The Legal Messenger*)—a monthly magazine, bourgeois-liberal in trend, published in Moscow from 1867 to 1892. p. 206

[67] The Manifesto abolishing serfdom in Russia signed by Tsar Alexander II on February 19, 1861. p. 219

[68] The *data for several uyezds*, dealing with the differentiation of the peasantry, mentioned by V. I. Lenin, were included in the second part (not yet found) of *What the "Friends of the People" Are*.

In his *Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin deals with this problem in detail particularly in the second chapter: "The Differentiation of the Peasantry." p. 224

[69] State peasants with quarter holdings—the name given in tsarist Russia to the category of former state peasants, descendants of lower-rank servicemen who in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries were settled in the border lands of the state of Muscovy. For their services in guarding the state frontiers the settlers (Cossacks, musketeers, soldiers) were given the usufruct of small plots of land either temporarily or in perpetuity. The area of such a plot amounted to a so-called *quarter* [11.35 acres]. From the year 1719 such settlers were called *odnodvortsi* [i.e., those possessing only their own farmsteads]. Formerly they enjoyed various kinds of privileges and had the right to own peasants, but during the course of the nineteenth century were gradually deprived of these rights and reduced to the status of ordinary peasants. By a regulation of the year 1876 the quarter lots were recognised as the private property of the former *odnodvortsi* (quarter-lot peasants) and their descendants. p. 226

[70] Here and in other parts of the present volume, V. I. Lenin quotes from I. A. Hourwich's *The Economics of the Russian Village*, published in New York in 1892. A Russian translation of this book appeared in 1896. Lenin had a high opinion of Hourwich's book which contains valuable factual material. p. 227

[71] *Kolupayev and Derunov*—types of capitalist sharks portrayed in the works of the Russian satirist M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 230

[72] V. I. Lenin quotes from Karl Marx's *A Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*. (See Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. I, Abt. 1, Erster Halbband, S. 608 2 bas.) p. 236

[73] From "To the Sowers" by the Russian poet N. A. Nekrasov. p. 255

[74] The *Gladstone Land Bills*—the land laws adopted in Britain by Gladstone's Liberal Ministry in the 1870s and 1880s. With a view to mitigating the struggle between the tenant farmers and the landlords and to securing the votes of the former, the Gladstone government introduced some minor measures limiting the tyranny of the landlords, who had driven masses of tenants off the land. The government also promised to regulate the question of tenants' arrears, to set up special land courts that would establish "fair" rents, etc. The Gladstone Land Bills were typical of the social demagogy of the liberal bourgeoisie. p. 258

[75] In 1889, the tsarist government, desirous of strengthening the landlords' power over the peasants, introduced the administrative post of Zemsky Nachalnik. The Zemsky Nachalniks, who were appointed from among the local landlord nobility, were given tremendous powers both administrative and juridical to deal with the peasants.

These powers included the right to arrest peasants and administer corporal punishment. p. 262

[76] *Nedelya* (*Week*)—a liberal-Narodnik political and literary newspaper. Appeared in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1901. Was opposed to fighting the autocracy, and advocated the so-called theory of "minor matters," i.e., appealed to the intelligentsia to abstain from revolutionary struggle and to engage in "cultural activity." p. 263

[77] This refers to French utopian socialism, which was widespread at the beginning of the nineteenth century and was one of the main ideological trends of the time.

The social-economic basis to which French utopian socialism owed its origin was the increased exploitation of the toiling masses, the appearance of irreconcilable contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The most prominent representatives of French utopian socialism were Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier whose views were widely held not only in France, but also in other countries. The French utopian socialists were, however, unable to expose the essence of capitalist relations and capitalist exploitation with consistency or to discover the basic contradiction of the capitalist mode of production. In conformity with the utopian character of their social and political ideals, they based the need for the socialist reorganisation of society on the need for reason to conquer ignorance, for truth to conquer falsehood. The immaturity of their views is to be explained by the social conditions of the epoch, by the insufficient development of large-scale capitalist industry, and of the industrial proletariat. For a more detailed account of French socialism, see F. Engels' *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* and *Anti-Dühring*. Lenin described the teachings of the French utopian socialists, in connection with French revolutionary teachings in general, as one of the mainsprings of Marxism.

The Russian revolutionary democrats A. I. Herzen, V. G. Belinsky, N. G. Chernyshevsky, and N. A. Dobrolyubov accepted the ideas of the French Enlighteners, but differed from the representatives of many West-European trends of utopian socialism in advocating the idea of mass struggle to overthrow the autocracy, the idea of a peasant revolution. However, they mistakenly imagined that the path to socialism lay through the semi-feudal peasant community. Since Russia's economic development was still weak the Russian revolutionary democrats, headed by Chernyshevsky, were unable to show the decisive role of the working class in the building of socialist society. p. 263

[78] This refers to V. V.'s (V. P. Vorontsov's) *Our Trends*, which appeared in 1893. p. 264

[70] N. K. Mikhailovsky replied to V. V. in the article "Literature and Life" published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, issue No. 10, 1893. p. 264

[80] *The Bakuninists and the rebels*—supporters and followers of M. A. Bakunin (1814-1876), the ideologist of anarchism and a bitter enemy of Marxism and scientific socialism. The Bakuninists carried

on a stubborn struggle against the Marxist theory and tactics of the working-class movement. The main plank of the Bakuninist platform was the complete rejection of any form of state, including the dictatorship of the proletariat. They did not understand the epoch-making role of the proletariat. Bakunin put forward the idea of the "levelling" of classes, the organisation of "free associations" from below. In the Bakuninists' view, a secret revolutionary society, made up of "outstanding" individuals, was to direct popular revolts, which were to take place immediately. Thus the Bakuninists believed that the peasantry in Russia were ready to rise up in rebellion without delay. Their tactics of conspiracy-making, of hasty revolts and of terrorism were adventurist and hostile to Marxist teachings on insurrection. Bakuninism was close to Proudhonism, the petty-bourgeois trend that reflected the ideology of the ruined petty proprietor. One of the Bakuninists in Russia, S. G Nechayev, was in close contact with Bakunin, who lived abroad. The Bakuninists expounded the programme of the conspiratorial society in the "Revolutionary Catechism." In 1869 Nechayev tried to found a narrow conspiratorial "People's Reprisal" organisation in Russia. He succeeded, however in organising only a few circles in Moscow. "The People's Reprisal" was soon exposed, and in December 1869 was broken up by the tsarist government. The theory and tactics of the Bakuninists were severely condemned by Marx and Engels. Lenin described Bakuninism as the world outlook "of the petty bourgeois who despairs of his salvation." (*In Memory of Herzen*. See present edition, Vol. 18.) Bakuninism was one of the ideological sources of Narodism. p. 264

[81] A central representative assembly is referred to. In 1873 Marx and Engels wrote the following on this subject: "At that time the demand was raised for the convention of a Zemsky Sobor. Some demanded it with a view to settling financial difficulties, others—so as to end the monarchy. Bakunin wanted it to demonstrate Russia's unity and to consolidate the tsar's power and might." (L'alliance de la Démocratie Socialiste et l'association Internationale des travailleurs. Rapport et documents publiés par ordre du congrès international de la Haye. 1873. p. 113.)

Many Russian revolutionaries equated the convocation of a Zemsky Sobor with the overthrow of the tsarist dynasty.

The convocation of a Zemsky Sobor representing all citizens to draw up a constitution was one of the programmatic demands of the Russian Social-Democratic Party. p. 264

[82] Reference is made to N. G. Chernyshevsky and A. I. Herzen. See Marx's letter to the editorial board of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 377) p. 266

[83] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, pp. 378-79. p. 266

[84] *Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt* (*Central Social Political Sheet*)—organ of the Right wing of German Social-Democracy. First appeared in 1892. p. 272

[85] *Pobedonostsev*, *K. P.*—Procurator General of the Synod, an extreme reactionary who inspired the feudal policy of Alexander III. p. 273

[86] Lenin refers to the venal press—newspapers and magazines that were in the pay of the tsarist government and fawned on it. p. 274

[87] *Yermolov*, *A. S.*—Minister of Agriculture and State Properties in 1893-1905; he voiced the interests of the feudal landlords and his policy was one of retaining the relics of serfdom.

Witte, *S. Y.*—an influential Minister in tsarist Russia, was for many years (1892-1903) Minister of Finance. The measures he adopted in the sphere of finance, customs policy, railway construction, etc., were in the interests of the big bourgeoisie and promoted the development of capitalism in Russia. p. 275

[88] Lenin refers to the *Group of Narodnik Socialists*, Russian revolutionary émigrés headed by N. I. Utin, A. D. Trusov, and V. I. Bartenev. This group published the magazine *Narodnoye Dyelo* (*People's Cause*) in Geneva. At the beginning of 1870 it set up the Russian section of the International Workingmen's Association (First International). On March 22 1870, the General Council of the International accepted the affiliation of the Russian section. At the section's request, Marx undertook to serve as its representative on the General Council. "I gladly accept the honourable duty that you offer me, that of your representative on the General Council," wrote Marx on March 24, 1870, to the members of the Committee of the Russian section (Marx-Engels, *Ausgewahlte Briefe*, M.-L., 1934, S. 234). The members of the Russian section of the First International supported Marx in his struggle against the Bakuninist anarchists, propagated the revolutionary ideas of the International, did what they could to strengthen the ties between the Russian revolutionary movement and the West-European, and took part in the working-class movements of Switzerland and France. However, the members of the Russian section were not consistent Marxists, their views still contained much of Narodnik utopianism; specifically they idealised the village community, calling it "a great achievement of the Russian people." The section failed to establish close ties with the revolutionary movement in Russia, which, in the final analysis, was the main reason for its collapse in 1872. p. 278

[89] *Engelhardt*, *A. N.*—a Narodnik publicist, who became widely known for his social and agronomic activities and his experiment in organising rational farming on his own estate in Batishchevo, Smolensk Gubernia. A description of the farming methods is given by Lenin in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (See present edition, Vol. 3, Chapter 3). p. 280

[90] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—a literary political review published abroad (London-Geneva) by the Emancipation of Labour group in 1890-1892. It played a great part in spreading Marxist ideas in Russia. In all, four issues appeared. The leading contributors to the magazine were G. V. Plekhanov P. B. Axelrod and V. I. Zasulich.

Lenin here quotes Plekhanov's article "N. G. Chernyshevsky" (See *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, 1890, pp. 138-39). p. 281

[91] From N. G. Chernyshevsky's novel *Prologue*. p. 282

[92] See Note 8. p. 289

[93] Lenin refers to *Judas Golovlyov*—a sanctimonious, hypocritical landlord serf owner described in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 291

[94] Lenin uses as an epithet the name Arakcheyev—the brutal favourite of tsars Paul I and Alexander I; a period of reactionary police despotism and gross domination of the military is connected with his activities. A characteristic feature of the Arakcheyev regime was the brutal measures employed against the revolutionary movement of the oppressed masses and against any manifestation of liberty. p. 291

[95] Lenin refers to the Narodnoye Pravo (People's Right) party, an illegal organisation of the Russian democratic intelligentsia founded in the summer of 1893. Among the founders were such former Narodovoltsi as O. V. Aptekman, A. I. Bogdanovich, A. V. Gedeonovsky, M. A. Natanson and N. S. Tyutchev. The members of the Narodnoye Pravo set themselves the aim of uniting all opposition forces, with a view to conducting a struggle for political reform. The Narodnoye Pravo party issued two programme documents, a "Manifesto" and "An Urgent Issue." In the spring of 1894 the party was broken up by the tsarist government. For Lenin's assessment of Narodnoye Pravo as a political party see pages 329-32 of the present volume, and also the pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (Vol. 2). The majority of the Narodnoye Pravo members subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 292

[96] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 763. p. 310

[97] Lenin quotes from I. A. Krylov's fable "The Cat and the Cook." p. 311

[98] Here and further on Lenin quotes from the Preface to the second edition of F. Engels' *The Housing Question*. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp 550, 554-55) p. 317

[99] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 446. p. 318

[100] Lenin refers to the principles expressed by Marx in the second chapter of *The Poverty of Philosophy*, an essay directed against Proudhon. (See K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 140-41.) p. 319

[101] Lenin quotes from Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 31.) p. 319

[102] *Manilovism*—derived from the name of Manilov, one of the characters in N. V. Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Manilov is a sentimental, "high-souled" landlord in whom Gogol has embodied the typical

features of the weak-willed dreamer, empty visionary, and inert tattler. Lenin uses the name Manilov as an epithet to describe the liberal Narodniks. p. 322

[103] See Afterword to the second edition of Volume One of Marx's *Capital* (K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 20). p. 327

[104] Lenin quotes from Marx's letter to Ruge (dated September 1843). Fuller quotations from this letter will be found on pages 184-85 of this volume. p. 328

[105] The essay, *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book* (*The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature*). *P. Struve: Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia's Economic Development*, St. Petersburg, 1894, was written by V. I. Lenin in St. Petersburg at the end of 1894 and the beginning of 1895. It was the first of Lenin's works to be printed legally. In this essay Lenin continued the criticism of Narodnik views that he had begun in his previous writings, and gave a comprehensive criticism of the mistaken views of the legal Marxists. Lenin was the first to recognise the liberal-bourgeois nature of legal Marxism. As early as 1893, in his work *On the So-Called Market Question* Lenin not only exposed the views of the liberal Narodniks, but also criticised the legal Marxist outlook that was then emerging.

In the autumn of 1894 Lenin read a paper in the St. Petersburg Marxists' circle directed against Struve and other legal Marxists. This paper served as the basis for the essay *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book*. Lenin wrote the following in 1907 about his reading of the paper in the St. Petersburg Marxists' circle: "In this circle I read a paper entitled *The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature*." As the heading shows, the controversy with Struve was here far sharper and more definite (as to Social-Democratic conclusions) than in the article printed in the spring of 1895. It was toned down partly because of censorship considerations and partly due to the "alliance" with legal Marxism for joint struggle against Narodism. That the "push to the left" then given to Mr. Struve by the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats was not entirely without result is clearly shown by Mr. Struve's article in the Miscellany which was burned (1895), and some of his articles in *Novoye Slovo* (*New Word*) (1897). *Preface to the Miscellany* "*Twelve Years*." (See present edition, Vol. 13.)

The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book was printed (under the pen-name of *K. Tulin*) in the Miscellany entitled *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development*. An edition of 2,000 copies of the Miscellany was printed in April 1895, but its circulation was banned by the tsarist government, which, after retaining the ban for a full year, confiscated the edition and had it burned. It only proved possible to save about 100 copies, which were secretly circulated among Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg and other cities.

Lenin's article was the most militant and politically acute in the Miscellany. The censor, in his report on *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development*, dwells in particular detail on

Lenin's work. Pointing out that the contributors to the Miscellany put forward Marx's theory about the inexorable advance of the capitalist process, the censor stated that K. Tulin's article contained the most outspoken and complete programme of the Marxists.

At the end of 1907, Lenin included *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book* in Volume One of the Miscellany *Twelve Years*, and gave it the sub-heading "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature." The first volume of this Miscellany was published by the Zerno Book Publishers in the middle of November 1907 (the title-page is dated 1908). Of the three volumes intended for publication, the publishers succeeded in issuing only Volume One, and part one of Volume Two. Apart from the paper mentioned, Volume One contained the following works by Lenin: *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, *The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism*, *What Is To Be Done?*, *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan*, and *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. Volume One was confiscated soon after its appearance, but a considerable part of the edition was salvaged, and the book continued to circulate illegally. p. 333

[106] The *truck-system*—the system of paying the workers wages in the shape of goods and foodstuffs from the employer's shop. This system was an additional means of exploiting the workers, and was particularly widespread in Russia, in the areas where there was handicraft industry. p. 346

[107] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a Russian newspaper of long standing, first issued in 1756 as a small sheet by Moscow University. From the 1860s it pursued a monarchist-nationalist line, its views being those of the most reactionary landlords and clergy. From 1905 onwards it was one of the principal organs of the Black Hundreds. Continued publication until the October Revolution of 1917.

Vest (*News*)—a reactionary feudalist newspaper that appeared in Russia in the 1860s and 1870s. p. 348

[108] Lenin quotes from I. A. Krylov's fable "The Wolf and the Shepherds." p. 349

[109] *Skimmers*—ironical expression repeatedly used by. M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin in his works to describe the bourgeois liberal press and its representatives. In Chapter V of *The Diary of a Provincial in St. Petersburg*, Saltykov-Shchedrin bitterly derides the liberals, and writes: "For want of real work to do, and by way of an innocent pastime they have established a learned literary society, "The Free League of Skimmers." Saltykov-Shchedrin describes the "duties" of this "League" as follows: "Not to miss a single contemporary problem, but to discuss everything in such a manner as to ensure that no result shall ever be achieved." p. 352

[110] *Dictatorship of the heart*—ironical term used to indicate the short-lived policy of flirting with the liberals pursued by the tsarist official Loris-Melikov. In 1880 he was first appointed chief of the Supreme Control Commission for combating "sedition," and then

Minister of Home Affairs. Loris-Melikov tried to base his policy on promises of "concessions" to the liberals and on ruthless persecution of revolutionaries. The revolutionary situation of 1879-80 gave rise to this balancing policy, the purpose of which was to weaken the revolutionary movement and to win over to tsarism the oppositional liberal bourgeoisie. After suppressing the revolutionary wave of 1879-1880, the tsar's government abandoned the policy of the "dictatorship of the heart" and hastened to issue a manifesto on the "inviolability" of the autocracy. In April 1881, Loris-Melikov had to resign. p. 352

[111] *Chinsh* peasants—those entitled to the hereditary possession of the land in perpetuity, and who had to pay a quitrent that rarely changed, known as chinsh. In tsarist Russia, the chinsh system operated mainly in Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Black Sea littoral of the Ukraine. p. 370

[112] See, for example, Gleb Uspensky's stories and essays "From a Village Diary," "Cheque-Book," "Mid-Journey Letters," "Unbroken Ties," "Living Figures." p. 378

[113] *Mr. Coupon*— a term adopted in the literature of the 1880s and 1890s to indicate capital and capitalists. The expression "Mr. Coupon" was put in circulation by the writer Gleb Uspensky in his essays "Grave Sins." p. 383

[114] "*Beast of burden*"—the downtrodden poor peasant, exhausted by excessive toil, typified by M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin in his satirical tale *Konyaga* (literally—overworked nag). In this tale the author speaks allegorically of the "unmoving enormity of the fields" which shall keep man in bondage until he releases the "magic force" from captivity. At the same time Saltykov-Shchedrin derides the Narodniks' vulgar arguments that the "real labour" which the "konyaga" found for himself is the guarantee of the peasant's invulnerability, spiritual equilibrium, clarity and integrity. p. 387

[115] *The Prussian Regierungsrat* (*State Counsellor*)—refers to the German economist, Baron A. Haxthausen, who visited Russia in the 1840s. In his book *Studies of Internal Relations in Popular Life and Particularly of Rural Institutions of Russia*, Haxthausen gave a detailed description of the Russian village community, in which he saw a means of consolidating feudalism. He sang the praises of Russia under Tsar Nicholas I, considering it to be superior to Western Europe in that it did not suffer from the "ulcer of proletarianism." Marx and Engels showed the reactionary character of Haxthausen's conclusions, and his views were also severely criticised by A. I. Herzen and N. G. Chernyshevsky. p. 391

[116] Owing to the censorship, Lenin could make no direct reference to the Marxist works published by the Emancipation of Labour group. He refers the reader to V. V.'s (Vorontsov's) work *Essays on Theoretical Economics* (St. Petersburg, 1895), which, on pages 251-58, contains a lengthy extract from Plekhanov's article "Domestic Review," that appeared in the *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*), Book Two, August 1890. p. 394

[117] *Mirtov*—pseudonym of P. L. Lavrov (1820-1900); a Narodnik ideologist in the 1870s. Was a member of the Narodnik secret society Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty), and then of the Narodnaya Volya (People s Will) party. In the 1870s be advocated the need to "go among the people." Was the founder of the idealist subjective school in sociology. p. 397

[118] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 334. p. 414

[119] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 133. p. 416

[120] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, pp. 84-85, Footnote 2. p. 417

[121] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 272. p. 419

[122] *Naucrary*—small territorial districts in the ancient Athenian Republic. Naucraries were united in phyles. The collegium of naucrars (naucrary chiefs) conducted the finances of the Athenian State. It was the duty of each naucrary to build, equip, and man a warship and to provide two horsemen to meet the military needs of the state. p. 419

[123] See K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 269. p. 419

[124] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Civil War in France" and "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow. 1958, pp. 284, 516-17. p. 420

[125] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 157. p. 420

[126] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 244. The book by Proudhon mentioned in the text is called *The Social Revolution Demonstrated by the Coup d'État*. p. 425

[127] *Leibkampantsi*, from Leibkompanie (personal bodyguard), the title of honour bestowed on the Grenadier Company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment in 1741 by Tsarina Yelizaveta Petrovna for having placed her on the Russian throne. They were given estates and all sorts of special privileges, while those of them who were not of noble origin were made hereditary nobles. The nickname Leibkampantsi was put in circulation by M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin in his *Poshekhon Tales*. p. 426

[128] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 116-17. p. 437

[129] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 53-54. p. 439

[130] *Gotha Programme*—the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party adopted in 1875 at the Gotha congress, where unity was established between the two German socialist parties that had previously existed separately; they were the Eisenachers (who were led by Bebel and Liebknecht, and were under the ideological influence of Marx and Engels), and the Lassalleans. The programme suffered from eclecticism, and was opportunist, since the Eisenachers made

concessions to the Lassalleans and accepted their formulations on vitally important points. Marx and Engels subjected the Gotha draft programme to withering criticism, for they regarded it as a considerable step backwards even as compared with the Eisenach programme of 1869. (See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 13-48.) p. 442

[131] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 278-79. p. 448

[132] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 632. p. 453

[133] Lenin refers to Chapter XXX, Vol I, *Capital* (Reaction of the Agricultural Revolution on Industry. Creation of the Home Market for Industrial Capital). (See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 745.) p. 463

[134] K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 642. p. 464

[135] *Skopshchina*—the name given in the southern parts of Russia to a type of rent in kind, on terms of bondage, the tenant paying the landowner *s kopny* (from the corn-shock) a portion of the harvest (a half, and sometimes more), and usually fulfilling miscellaneous labour services in addition. p. 465

[136] K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 749, Footnote 2. p. 471

[137] K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, pp. 742-44. p. 472

[138] K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 604. p. 488

[139] *Gift-landers or gift-land peasants*, peasants who were formerly landlords' serfs and who, at the time of the Reform of 1861, by "agreement with their landlords received allotments gratis (without having to pay redemption money for them). The gift-lander received a miserable strip amounting in all to a quarter of the so-called "top" or "statutory" allotment established by law for the given locality. All the rest of the lands that had constituted the peasants' allotments before the Reform were seized by the landlord, who held his "gift-landers," forcibly dispossessed of their land, in a state of economic bondage even after serfdom was abolished. The "gift-land" allotment came to be known among the people as a "quarter," "orphan's," "cat's," or "gagarin" allotment (the last epithet being derived from the name of the initiator of the law on "gift-land" allotments, Prince P. P. Gagarin). p. 491

[140] Lenin deals with this problem in detail in his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899). See present edition, Vol. 3. p. 499

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*1870-1894*)

1870

April 10 (22 new style)	Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin), born in Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk).

1879

August 16(28)	Lenin is accepted into Simbirsk classical Gymnasium.

1886

January 12(24)	Ilya Nikolayevich Ulyanov, Lenin's father, dies.

1887

March 1(13)	Lenin's elder brother Alexander Ilyich Ulyanov, is arrested for participating in an attempt on the life of Alexander III.
May 8(20)	Alexander Ulyanov and other participants in the attempt are executed.
June 10(22)	Lenin graduates Simbirsk Gymnasium, winning a Gold Medal.
End of June	The Ulyanov family moves to Kazan.
August 13(25)	Lenin enters Kazan University.
September-November	Lenin participates in a revolutionary students' circle in Kazan.
December 4(16)	Lenin participates in a students' rally in Kazan University.
December 5(17)	Lenin is arrested for participation in the students' revolutionary movement.

December 7(19)	Lenin is expelled from the university and exiled from Kazan to the village of Kokushkino, under the secret surveillance of the police.

1888

September 23 (October 5)	Lenin's application for permission to go abroad "to continue my education" is rejected by Police Department.
Beginning October	of Lenin receives permission to return from Kokushkino village to Kazan, where the Ulyanov family settle.
Autumn	Lenin studies K. Marx's *Capital*, and joins a Marxist circle organised by N. Y. Fedoseyev.

1889

May 3-4(15-16)	Lenin moves from Kazan to a hamlet near the village of Alakayevka, Samara Gubernia.
June 14(26)	Lenin is informed of the rejection of his application to go abroad "for treatment."
July 13(25)	N. Y. Fedoseyev and members of the Marxist circles he organised in Kazan are arrested. Among the arrested are members of the circle to which Lenin had belonged.
October 11(23)	Lenin moves from the hamlet near Alakayevka village to Samara.

1890

End of 1889-1890	In Samara Lenin continues his study of Marx and Engels, translates *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, which is subsequently read in illegal circles in Samara (no copy of the translation remains). Lenin becomes acquainted with A. P. Sklyarenko and engages in Marxist propaganda among the youth of Samara.
May 17(29)	Lenin receives permission to sit for the final examinations at the Law Faculty of St. Petersburg University as an external student.
End of August (beginning of September)	Lenin's first visit to St. Petersburg in connection with the examinations at St. Petersburg University.

August 26-September 1 (Sept. 7-13)	On his way to St. Petersburg Lenin stops in Kazan.
October 24 (November 5)	Lenin leaves St. Petersburg to return to Samara.

1891

April 4-24 (April 16-May 6)	Lenin sits for the final examinations at the Law Faculty of St. Petersburg University (spring session).
May 17 (29)	Lenin leaves St. Petersburg for Samara.
Summer-beginning of September	Lenin lives in Samara and at the hamlet near the village of Alakayevka.
September 16 (28)-November 9 (21)	Lenin sits for the last of the examinations at St. Petersburg University (autumn session).
November 12 (24)	Lenin returns from St. Petersburg to Samara.

1892

January 14 (26)	Lenin receives a University Graduation Diploma, First Class, from the Head Office of the St. Petersburg Educational District.
January 30 (February 11)	By decision of the Samara Circuit Court Lenin is entered on the rolls of Junior Barristers.
July 23 (August 4)	Lenin granted the right to practise law.
Summer of 1892-winter of 1892-1893	Lenin writes papers criticising the views of the Narodniks, and reads them at meetings of illegal circles. These papers constitute the preparatory material for work *What the "Friends of the People" Are.*

1893

Spring-Summer	First circle of Samara Marxists (including A. P. Sklyarenko and A. K. Lalayants) is formed. Lenin is central figure in the circle. He prepares and reads the paper (article) entitled *New Economic Developments in Peasant Life* (on V. Y. Postnikov's Book).
End of August (beginning of September)	On his way from Samara to St. Petersburg Lenin stops at Nizhni-Novgorod and makes the acquaintance of local Marxists.

August 31 (*September 12*)	Lenin arrives in St. Petersburg.
September 3 (*15*)	Lenin is registered as Junior Barrister to M. F. Wolkenstein.
September 25 (*October 7*)	Lenin travels to Vladimir for a meeting with N. Y. Fedoseyev which does not take place because Fedoseyev was still not released from prison.
Autumn	In St. Petersburg Lenin joins a Marxist circle of Technological Institute students (S. I. Radchenko, V. V. Starkov, P. K. Zaporozhets, G. M. Krzhizhanevsky and others), and at a circle meeting criticises G. B. Krasin's paper "The Market Question." Lenin writes the paper "On the So-Called Market Question," which he reads to the Marxist circle.
Autumn and Winter 1893-	Lenin establishes contact with progressive workers of St. Petersburg factories (V. A. Shelgunov, I. V. Babushkin and others). Lenin's speeches strongly impress participants in Marxist circles of St. Petersburg. His exceptionally profound knowledge of Marxist theory, his ability to apply Marxism constructively to Russia's economic and political situation, his fervent and unshakable belief in the victory of the workers' cause, his outstanding organisational talent—all this makes Lenin the recognised leader of the St. Petersburg Marxists.

1894

Beginning of January	Lenin comes to Moscow for the winter holidays.
January 9 (*21*)	At an illegal meeting in Moscow Lenin opposes the Narodnik V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov), subjecting his views to annihilating criticism.
January	Lenin visits Nizhni-Novgorod and reads a paper at the local Marxist circle on V. V.'s book *The Destiny of Capitalism in Russia*. Lenin returns to St. Petersburg where he leads the St. Petersburg group of Social-Democrats and the central workers' circle, and conducts workers' classes outside the Nevskaya Toll gates and in other parts of the city.
March-June	Lenin writes *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, the first part of which appeared that spring.

First half of the year	In a Marxist circle in St. Petersburg, Lenin reads a paper in which he critically analyses the book by the Narodnik N. Karyshev *Peasant Rentings of Non-Allotment Land*.
June 14 (26)	Lenin leaves for Moscow to spend the summer with relatives. He also visits Samara.
July	The second edition of part one of *What the "Friends of the People" Are* appears in St. Petersburg.
August 27 (September 8)	Lenin returns from Moscow to St. Petersburg.
End of August (first half of September)	The first edition of part two and the third edition of part one of Lenin's *What the "Friends of the People" Are* appear (in Gorki, Vladimir Gubernia).
September	The first edition of part three and the fourth edition of part one of Lenin's *What the "Friends of the People" Are* appear in St. Petersburg.
October	Lenin reads *What the "Friends of the People" Are* to the members of a St. Petersburg Marxist circle.
Autumn	At a meeting of a St. Petersburg Marxists' circle Lenin reads his paper "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature" in which he severely criticises the bourgeois distortions of Marxism in Struve's book *Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia's Economic Development*.
After December 24 (after January 5)	Assisted by the worker I. V. Babushkin, Lenin drafts a leaflet to the workers of the Semyannikov factory dealing with the unrest there. This is the first leaflet issued by Russian Marxists.
End of 1894-beginning of 1895	Lenin writes *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book*.

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 1

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LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

2

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME 2

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PREFACE

Volume two contains Lenin's works of the 1895-97 period.

The first group of works in the volume, namely, *Frederick Engels*, *Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party*, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, and *The Heritage We Renounce*—is devoted to an elaboration of the tasks of the Russian Marxists as far as their programme, tactics and organisation are concerned.

A considerable part of the present volume is made up of Lenin's economic writings directed against the Narodniks: *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of "Handicraft" Industry*, *Gems of Narodnik Project-Mongering*, etc.

The third group contains agitational works by Lenin—the pamphlets *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers*, and *The New Factory Law*, the leaflets *To the Working Men and Women of the Thornton Factory* and *To the Tsarist Government*, and the article *What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?*

In 1897 and 1898, when preparing the legally published editions of *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*, Lenin was compelled, because of the censorship, to replace the words "Marxist theory" by "modern theory"; to replace "Marx" by "a well-known German economist," and "this socialism" by "this doctrine," etc. For the 1908 edition, Lenin either corrected a considerable number of these expressions in the text or explained them in footnotes. In the

second and third Russian editions of the *Collected Works* these corrections of Lenin's were given as footnotes. In the present edition they have been included in the text itself.

In the previous editions of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works* the text of *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* was taken from a copy of Lenin's manuscript. The copy contains slips of the pen and other mistakes by the copier. In the present edition the text of the pamphlet published in 1902, which was read and corrected by Lenin, has been used.

FREDERICK ENGELS

Written in autumn 1895

First published in 1896
in the miscellany *Rabotnik*,[1]
No. 1-2

Published according
to the text in *Rabotnik*



V. I. LENIN

1897

ПРОЛЕТАРІИ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ!

РАБОТНИКЪ

№№ 1 и 2.

НЕПЕРІОДИЧЕСКІЙ СБОРНИКЪ

Съ портретомъ Фридриха Энгельса.

Изданіе „Союза Русскихъ Соціальдемократовъ".

ЖЕНЕВА
Типографія „Союза Русскихъ Соціальдемократовъ".
1896

The title-page of the *Rabotnik* miscellany in which Lenin's obituary, *Frederick Engels,* was first published 1896

What a torch of reason ceased to burn,
What a heart has ceased to beat![2]

On August 5 (new style), 1895, Frederick Engels died in London. After his friend Karl Marx (who died in 1883), Engels was the finest scholar and teacher of the modern proletariat in the whole civilised world. From the time that fate brought Karl Marx and Frederick Engels together, the two friends devoted their life's work to a common cause. And so to understand what Frederick Engels has done for the proletariat, one must have a clear idea of the significance of Marx's teaching and work for the development of the contemporary working-class movement. Marx and Engels were the first to show that the working class and its demands are a necessary outcome of the present economic system, which together with the bourgeoisie inevitably creates and organises the proletariat. They showed that it is not the well-meaning efforts of able-minded individuals, but the class struggle of the organised proletariat that will deliver humanity from the evils which now oppress it. In their scientific works, Marx and Engels were the first to explain that socialism is not the invention of dreamers, but the final aim and necessary result of the development of the productive forces in modern society. All recorded history hitherto has been a history of class struggle, of the succession of the rule and victory of certain social classes over others. And this will continue until the foundations of class struggle and of class domination—private property and anarchic social production—disappear. The interests of the proletariat demand the destruction of these foundations, and therefore the conscious class struggle of the organised workers must be directed against them. And every class struggle is a political struggle.

These views of Marx and Engels have now been adopted by all proletarians who are fighting for their emancipation.

But when in the forties the two friends took part in the socialist literature and the social movements of their time, they were absolutely novel. There were then many people, talented and without talent, honest and dishonest, who, absorbed in the struggle for political freedom, in the struggle against the despotism of kings, police and priests, failed to observe the antagonism between the interests of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat. These people would not entertain the idea of the workers acting as an independent social force. On the other hand, there were many dreamers, some of them geniuses, who thought that it was only necessary to convince the rulers and the governing classes of the injustice of the contemporary social order, and it would then be easy to establish peace and general well-being on earth. They dreamt of a socialism without struggle. Lastly, nearly all the socialists of that time and the friends of the working class generally regarded the proletariat only as an *ulcer*, and observed with horror how it grew with the growth of industry. They all, therefore, sought for a means to stop the development of industry and of the proletariat, to stop the "wheel of history." Marx and Engels did not share the general fear of the development of the proletariat; on the contrary, they placed all their hopes on its continued growth. The more proletarians there are, the greater is their strength as a revolutionary class, and the nearer and more possible does socialism become. The services rendered by Marx and Engels to the working class may be expressed in a few words thus: they taught the working class to know itself and be conscious of itself, and they substituted science for dreams.

That is why the name and life of Engels should be known to every worker. That is why in this collection of articles, the aim of which, as of all our publications, is to awaken class-consciousness in the Russian workers, we must give a sketch of the life and work of Frederick Engels, one of the two great teachers of the modern proletariat.

Engels was born in 1820 in Barmen, in the Rhine Province of the kingdom of Prussia. His father was a manufacturer. In 1838 Engels, without having completed his high-school studies, was forced by family circumstances to enter a commercial house in Bremen as a clerk. Commercial affairs did

not prevent Engels from pursuing his scientific and political education. He had come to hate autocracy and the tyranny of bureaucrats while still at high school. The study of philosophy led him further. At that time Hegel's teaching dominated German philosophy, and Engels became his follower. Although Hegel himself was an admirer of the autocratic Prussian state, in whose service he was as a professor at Berlin University, Hegel's *teachings* were revolutionary. Hegel's faith in human reason and its rights, and the fundamental thesis of Hegelian philosophy that the universe is undergoing a constant process of change and development, led some of the disciples of the Berlin philosopher—those who refused to accept the existing situation—to the idea that the struggle against this situation, the struggle against existing wrong and prevalent evil, is also rooted in the universal law of eternal development. If all things develop, if institutions of one kind give place to others, why should the autocracy of the Prussian king or of the Russian tsar, the enrichment of an insignificant minority at the expense of the vast majority, or the domination of the bourgeoisie over the people, continue for ever? Hegel's philosophy spoke of the development of the mind and of ideas; it was *idealistic*. From the development of the mind it deduced the development of nature, of man, and of human, social relations. While retaining Hegel's idea of the eternal process of development,* Marx and Engels rejected the preconceived idealist view; turning to life, they saw that it is not the development of mind that explains the development of nature but that, on the contrary, the explanation of mind must be derived from nature, from matter.... Unlike Hegel and the other Hegelians, Marx and Engels were materialists. Regarding the world and humanity materialistically, they perceived that just as material causes underlie all natural phenomena, so the development of human society is conditioned by the development of material forces, the productive forces. On the development of the productive forces depend the relations into which

* Marx and Engels frequently pointed out that in their intellectual development they were much indebted to the great German philosophers, particularly to Hegel. "Without German philosophy," Engels says, "scientific socialism would never have come into being."[3]

men enter with one another in the production of the things required for the satisfaction of human needs. And in these relations lies the explanation of all the phenomena of social life, human aspirations, ideas and laws. The development of the productive forces creates social relations based upon private property, but now we see that this same development of the productive forces deprives the majority of their property and concentrates it in the hands of an insignificant minority. It abolishes property, the basis of the modern social order, it itself strives towards the very aim which the socialists have set themselves. All the socialists have to do is to realise which social force, owing to its position in modern society, is interested in bringing socialism about, and to impart to this force the consciousness of its interests and of its historical task. This force is the proletariat. Engels got to know the proletariat in England, in the centre of English industry, Manchester, where he settled in 1842, entering the service of a commercial firm of which his father was a shareholder. Here Engels not only sat in the factory office but wandered about the slums in which the workers were cooped up, and saw their poverty and misery with his own eyes. But he did not confine himself to personal observations. He read all that had been revealed before him about the condition of the British working class and carefully studied all the official documents he could lay his hands on. The fruit of these studies and observations was the book which appeared in 1845: *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. We have already mentioned what was the chief service rendered by Engels in writing *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Even before Engels, many people had described the sufferings of the proletariat and had pointed to the necessity of helping it. Engels was the *first* to say that the proletariat is *not only* a suffering class; that it is, in fact, the disgraceful economic condition of the proletariat that drives it irresistibly forward and compels it to fight for its ultimate emancipation. And the fighting proletariat *will help itself*. The political movement of the working class will inevitably lead the workers to realise that their only salvation lies in socialism. On the other hand, socialism will become a force only when it becomes the aim of the *political* struggle

of the working *class*. Such are the main ideas of Engels' book on the condition of the working class in England, ideas which have now been adopted by all thinking and fighting proletarians, but which at that time were entirely new. These ideas were set out in a book written in absorbing style and filled with most authentic and shocking pictures of the misery of the English proletariat. The book was a terrible indictment of capitalism and the bourgeoisie and created a profound impression. Engels' book began to be quoted everywhere as presenting the best picture of the condition of the modern proletariat. And, in fact, neither before 1845 nor after has there appeared so striking and truthful a picture of the misery of the working class.

It was not until he came to England that Engels became a socialist. In Manchester he established contacts with people active in the English labour movement at the time and began to write for English socialist publications. In 1844, while on his way back to Germany, he became acquainted in Paris with Marx, with whom he had already started to correspond. In Paris, under the influence of the French socialists and French life, Marx had also become a socialist. Here the friends jointly wrote a book entitled *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique*. This book, which appeared a year before *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, and the greater part of which was written by Marx, contains the foundations of revolutionary materialist socialism, the main ideas of which we have expounded above. "The holy family" is a facetious nickname for the Bauer brothers, the philosophers, and their followers. These gentlemen preached a criticism which stood above all reality, above parties and politics, which rejected all practical activity, and which only "critically" contemplated the surrounding world and the events going on within it. These gentlemen, the Bauers, looked down on the proletariat as an uncritical mass. Marx and Engels vigorously opposed this absurd and harmful tendency. In the name of a real, human person—the worker, trampled down by the ruling classes and the state—they demanded, not contemplation, but a struggle for a better order of society. They, of course, regarded the proletariat as the force that is capable of waging this struggle and that is interested in it. Even before

the appearance of *The Holy Family*, Engels had published in Marx's and Ruge's *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*[4] his "Critical Essays on Political Economy,"[5] in which he examined the principal phenomena of the contemporary economic order from a socialist standpoint, regarding them as necessary consequences of the rule of private property. Contact with Engels was undoubtedly a factor in Marx's decision to study political economy, the science in which his works have produced a veritable revolution.

From 1845 to 1847 Engels lived in Brussels and Paris, combining scientific work with practical activities among the German workers in Brussels and Paris. Here Marx and Engels established contact with the secret German Communist League,[6] which commissioned them to expound the main principles of the socialism they had worked out. Thus arose the famous *Manifesto of the Communist Party* of Marx and Engels, published in 1848. This little booklet is worth whole volumes: to this day its spirit inspires and guides the entire organised and fighting proletariat of the civilised world.

The revolution of 1848, which broke out first in France and then spread to other West-European countries, brought Marx and Engels back to their native country. Here, in Rhenish Prussia, they took charge of the democratic *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[7] published in Cologne. The two friends were the heart and soul of all revolutionary-democratic aspirations in Rhenish Prussia. They fought to the last ditch in defence of freedom and of the interests of the people against the forces of reaction. The latter, as we know, gained the upper hand. The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was suppressed. Marx, who during his exile had lost his Prussian citizenship, was deported; Engels took part in the armed popular uprising, fought for liberty in three battles, and after the defeat of the rebels fled, via Switzerland, to London.

Marx also settled in London. Engels soon became a clerk again, and then a shareholder, in the Manchester commercial firm in which he had worked in the forties. Until 1870 he lived in Manchester, while Marx lived in London, but this did not prevent their maintaining a most lively interchange of ideas: they corresponded almost daily. In this correspond-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ence the two friends exchanged views and discoveries and continued to collaborate in working out scientific socialism. In 1870 Engels moved to London, and their joint intellectual life, of the most strenuous nature, continued until 1883, when Marx died. Its fruit was, on Marx's side, *Capital*, the greatest work on political economy of our age, and on Engels' side, a number of works both large and small. Marx worked on the analysis of the complex phenomena of capitalist economy. Engels, in simply written works, often of a polemical character, dealt with more general scientific problems and with diverse phenomena of the past and present in the spirit of the materialist conception of history and Marx's economic theory. Of Engels' works we shall mention: the polemical work against Dühring (analysing highly important problems in the domain of philosophy, natural science and the social sciences),* *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (translated into Russian, published in St. Petersburg, 3rd ed., 1895),[10] *Ludwig Feuerbach* (Russian translation and notes by G. Plekhanov, Geneva, 1892),[11] an article on the foreign policy of the Russian Government (translated into Russian in the Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Nos. 1 and 2),[12] splendid articles on the housing question,[13] and finally, two small but very valuable articles on Russia's economic development (*Frederick Engels on Russia*, translated into Russian by Zasulich, Geneva, 1894).[14] Marx died before he could put the final touches to his vast work on capital. The draft, however, was already finished, and after the death of his friend, Engels undertook the onerous task of preparing and publishing the second and the third volumes of *Capital*. He published Volume II in 1885 and Volume III in 1894 (his death prevented the preparation of Volume IV).[15] These two volumes entailed a vast amount of labour. Adler, the Austrian Social-Democrat, has rightly remarked that by publishing volumes II and III of *Capital* Engels erected a majestic monument to the genius who had been his friend, a monument on which, without intending it, he indelibly carved his own name. Indeed

* This is a wonderfully rich and instructive book.[8] Unfortunately, only a small portion of it, containing a historical outline of the development of socialism, has been translated into Russian (*The Development of Scientific Socialism*, 2nd ed., Geneva, 1892).[9]

these two volumes of *Capital* are the work of two men: Marx and Engels. Old legends contain various moving instances of friendship. The European proletariat may say that its science was created by two scholars and fighters, whose relationship to each other surpasses the most moving stories of the ancients about human friendship. Engels always—and, on the whole, quite justly—placed himself after Marx. "In Marx's lifetime," he wrote to an old friend, "I played second fiddle."[16] His love for the living Marx, and his reverence for the memory of the dead Marx were boundless. This stern fighter and austere thinker possessed a deeply loving soul.

After the movement of 1848-49, Marx and Engels in exile did not confine themselves to scientific research. In 1864 Marx founded the International Working Men's Association,[17] and led this society for a whole decade. Engels also took an active part in its affairs. The work of the International Association, which, in accordance with Marx's idea, united proletarians of all countries, was of tremendous significance in the development of the working-class movement. But even with the closing down of the International Association in the seventies, the unifying role of Marx and Engels did not cease. On the contrary, it may be said that their importance as the spiritual leaders of the working-class movement grew continuously, because the movement itself grew uninterruptedly. After the death of Marx, Engels continued alone as the counsellor and leader of the European socialists. His advice and directions were sought for equally by the German socialists, whose strength, despite government persecution, grew rapidly and steadily, and by representatives of backward countries, such as the Spaniards, Rumanians and Russians, who were obliged to ponder and weigh their first steps. They all drew on the rich store of knowledge and experience of Engels in his old age.

Marx and Engels, who both knew Russian and read Russian books, took a lively interest in the country, followed the Russian revolutionary movement with sympathy and maintained contact with Russian revolutionaries. They both became socialists after being *democrats*, and the democratic feeling of *hatred* for political despotism was exceedingly strong in them. This direct political feeling, combined

the a profound theoretical understanding of the connection between political despotism and economic oppression, and also their rich experience of life, made Marx and Engels uncommonly responsive *politically*. That is why the heroic struggle of the handful of Russian revolutionaries against the mighty tsarist government evoked a most symthetic echo in the hearts of these tried revolutionaries. On the other hand, the tendency, for the sake of illusory economic advantages, to turn away from the most immediate and important task of the Russian socialists, namely, the winning of political freedom, naturally appeared suspicious to them and was even regarded by them as a direct betrayal of the great cause of the social revolution. "The emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself"—Marx and Engels constantly taught.[18] But in order to fight for its economic emancipation, the proletariat must win itself certain *political* rights. Moreover, Marx and Engels clearly saw that a political revolution in Russia would be of tremendous significance to the West-European working-class movement as well. Autocratic Russia had always been a bulwark of European reaction in general. The extraordinarily favourable international position enjoyed by Russia as a result of the war of 1870, which for a long time sowed discord between Germany and France, of course only enhanced the importance of autocratic Russia as a reactionary force. Only a free Russia, a Russia that had no need either to oppress the Poles, Finns, Germans, Armenians or any other small nations, or constantly to set France and Germany at loggerheads, would enable modern Europe, rid of the burden of war, to breathe freely, would weaken all the reactionary elements in Europe and strengthen the European working class. That was why Engels ardently desired the establishment of political freedom in Russia for the sake of the progress of the working-class movement in the West as well. In him the Russian revolutionaries have lost their best friend.

Let us always honour the memory of Frederick Engels, a great fighter and teacher of the proletariat!

EXPLANATION OF THE LAW ON FINES IMPOSED ON FACTORY WORKERS[19]

Written in autumn 1895

First published in pamphlet form, St. Petersburg, 1895

Published according to the 1895 edition checked with the 1897 edition

ОБЪЯСНЕНІЕ

ЗАКОНА

О

ШТРАФАХЪ, ВЗИМАЕМЫХЪ

съ

рабочихъ на фабрикахъ и заводахъ.

ХЕРСОНЪ.
Типографія К. Н. Субботина, Екатерин. ул. д. Калинина.
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The title-page of Lenin's pamphlet *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers.* 1895

I

WHAT ARE FINES?

If we were to ask a worker whether he knows what fines are, the question would very likely astonish him. How can he not know what fines are, when he constantly has to pay them? What is there to ask about?

However, it only seems that there is nothing to ask about. Actually, most workers do not properly understand fines.

It is usually thought that a fine is a payment made to the employer for damage done to him by the worker. That is not true. A fine and compensation for damage are two different things. If a worker does some damage to another worker, the latter may demand compensation for the damage (e.g., for a piece of cloth which has been spoiled), but cannot fine him. Similarly, if one factory owner does damage to another (e.g., fails to deliver goods on time), the latter can demand compensation, but he cannot fine the first factory owner. Compensation for damage is demanded of an equal, whereas a fine can only be imposed on a subordinate. Hence, compensation for damage must be claimed in court, whereas a fine is imposed by the employer out of court. A fine is sometimes imposed when the employer has suffered no damage (e.g., a fine for smoking. A fine is a penalty, and not compensation for damage. If a worker, let us say, is careless while smoking and burns the employer's cloth, the employer not only fines him for smoking, but in addition makes a deduction for the burnt cloth. This example clearly shows the difference between a fine and compensation for damage.

Fines are not imposed to compensate for damage but to establish discipline, i.e., to secure subordination

of the workers to the employer, to force the worker to fulfil the employer's orders, to obey him during working hours. The law on fines in fact says that a fine is a "monetary penalty imposed by the factory management on its own authority with a view to the maintenance of order." And the amount of the fine depends, therefore, not on the amount of the damage, but on the extent of the worker's misdemeanour: the greater the misdemeanour, the greater the disobedience to the employer or departure from the employer's demands, the greater the fine. If anybody goes to work for an employer, it is clear that he loses his freedom; he must obey his employer, and the employer may punish him. The peasant serfs worked for landlords, and the landlords punished them. The workers work for capitalists, and the capitalists punish them. The only difference is that formerly it was a man's back that suffered, whereas now it is his purse.

It will perhaps be objected that joint work by a mass of workers at a mill or factory is impossible without discipline: order is needed on the job, somebody has to see that order is kept and that those who violate it are punished. Hence—we shall be told—fines are imposed not because the workers are not free, but because joint work requires order.

The objection is quite groundless, although at first sight people may be misled by it. It is only put forward by people who wish to conceal from the workers that they are not free agents. Order is certainly necessary wherever work is done jointly. But is it necessary that people who work should be subordinated to the tyranny of the factory owners, i.e., of people who do not work themselves and who are only strong because they have taken hold of all the machines, instruments and materials? Joint work cannot be done unless there is order, unless all submit to it; but work can be done in common without subordinating the workers to the factory owners. Joint work does, indeed, require that there is supervision to ensure the maintenance of order, but it does not at all require that the power to supervise others should always be vested in the one who does not work himself, but lives on the labour of others. Hence it can be seen that fines are imposed not because people work together, but because, under the present capitalist system, all

working folk possess no property: all the machines, instruments, raw materials, land, and bread belong to the rich. The workers have to sell themselves to them so as not to starve. Once, however, they have sold themselves, they are of course obliged to subordinate themselves to them and suffer punishment at their hands.

Every worker desirous of understanding what fines are should be clear on this point. He must know this so as to refute the usual (and very mistaken) argument that fines are necessary since without them joint work is impossible. He must know this, so as to be able to explain to every worker the difference between a fine and compensation for damage, and why fines mean that the workers are not free, that they are subordinated to the capitalists.

II

HOW WERE FINES IMPOSED FORMERLY AND WHAT GAVE RISE TO THE NEW LEGISLATION ON FINES?

The fines laws were introduced recently, only nine years ago. Before 1886 there were no such laws at all. Factory owners were able to impose fines for what they pleased and to any extent they wished. They did so on a monstrous scale and collected enormous sums for themselves out of it. Fines were sometimes imposed simply "at the employer's discretion," without the reason for the fine being given. Fines occasionally amounted to *as much as half the earnings* of the worker, so that the latter gave up to the employer fifty kopeks out of every ruble earned in the shape of fines. There were cases when extra fines, over and above the ordinary ones, were imposed; for example, 10 rubles for leaving the factory. Whenever the employer's affairs were in a bad way, he would have no scruple about reducing wages, despite the existence of a contract. He would compel the foremen to be stricter in fining and in rejecting work done which had just the same effect as reducing the worker's wages.

The workers long tolerated all this oppression, but as more and more big mills and factories, particularly weaving

mills, were built, forcing out the small establishments and hand weavers, the workers' indignation at the tyranny and oppression mounted. Some ten years ago there was a *hitch* in the affairs of the merchants and factory owners, what is called a crisis: goods were left on their hands; the factory owners suffered losses and began to increase fines with still greater energy. The workers, whose earnings were small enough as it was, could not bear the additional oppression, with the result that workers' revolts took place in the Moscow, Vladimir and Yaroslavl gubernias. That was in 1885-86. Their patience exhausted, the workers stopped work and wreaked terrible vengeance on their oppressors, wrecking factory premises and machinery, sometimes setting fire to them, attacking managerial personnel, etc.

One of the most remarkable of these strikes was at the well-known Nikolskoye Mill belonging to Timofei Savvich Morozov (in the township of Nikolskoye, near Orekhovo Station on the Moscow-Nizhni Novgorod Railway). From 1882 onwards Morozov started reducing wages, and by 1884 there had been five reductions. At the same time fines were imposed with increasing severity, amounting in the whole mill to almost a quarter of the earnings (24 kopeks in fines for every ruble earned), and in the case of some workers to a half their earnings. To cover up these disgraceful fines, the mill office in the year preceding the outbreak did the following: workers who had been fined to the extent of half their earnings were discharged, but were given their jobs back again sometimes on the same day, together with new pay-books. In this way books that contained records of outrageous fines were destroyed. Where workers were absent without leave, deductions were made at the rate of 3 days' pay for each day's absence; for smoking, the fine amounted to 3, 4 or 5 rubles each time. Their patience exhausted, the workers struck work on January 7, 1885, and over several days wrecked the factory foodstore, foreman Shorin's home and several other factory buildings. This terrific outbreak of some ten thousand workers (up to 11,000 were affected) greatly frightened the government, and was immediately followed by the appearance on the scene in Orekhovo-Zuyevo of troops, the Governor, a prosecutor from Vladimir, and one from Moscow. During negotiations with the strikers,

the crowd presented the management with "conditions drawn up by the workers themselves." In these the workers demanded that fines imposed from Easter 1884 onwards be refunded, that thenceforward fines should not exceed 5% of earnings, i.e., should not amount to more than 5 kopeks per ruble earned, and that for one day's absence without permission the fine should not exceed one ruble. Further, the workers demanded a return to the wage rates of 1881-82, they demanded that the employer pay for idle days for which he was to blame, that 15 days' clear notice be given before dismissal, and that goods produced be accepted by the management in the presence of witnesses from among the workers, etc.

This huge strike made a very great impression on the government, which saw that when the workers act in unison they constitute a dangerous force, particularly when the mass of the workers, acting in concert, advance their demands directly. The employers also sensed the workers' strength and became more careful. The newspaper *Novoye Vremya*,[20] for example, published the following report from Orekhovo-Zuyevo: "The significance of last year's outbreak" (i.e., the outbreak at Morozov's in January 1885) "is that it immediately changed the old order in the factories, both in Orekhovo-Zuyevo and its environs." That is to say, not only the owners of the Morozov mill had to change the abominable system when the workers jointly demanded its abolition, but even the neighbouring mill owners agreed to concessions, out of fear of outbreaks taking place at their factories, too. "The main thing," stated the same newspaper, "is that a more human attitude to the workers has now been established, something that previously distinguished few of the factory managers."

Even *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[21] (this newspaper always supports the employers and blames the workers themselves for everything) understood the impossibility of retaining the old system and had to admit that arbitrary fining is an "evil that leads to disgraceful abuses," that "factory stores are downright robbery," that therefore a law and regulations concerning fines must be introduced.

The tremendous impression created by this strike was further heightened as a result of the trial of several workers. For

violent behaviour during the strike, for attacking a military patrol (some of the workers were arrested during the strike and locked in a building, but they broke down the door and made off), 33 workers were brought to trial. This took place in Vladimir in May 1886. The jury found all the accused not guilty, since the testimony of the witnesses, including the owner of the mill, T. S. Morozov, manager Dianov and many of the weavers, shed light on all the abominable oppression to which the workers had been subjected. This verdict of the court was a direct condemnation not only of Morozov and his managers but of the old factory system as a whole.

The alarm and fury of the supporters of the mill owners was thoroughly aroused. The very same *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, which after the outbreak had admitted the iniquity of the old system, now took a very different line. "The Nikolskoye Mill," it asserted, "is one of the best mills. The workers' relation to the factory is not a feudal or a compulsory one at all; they come voluntarily and leave without hindrance. Fines—but fines are essential in the mills; without them the workers would get out of hand, and you might as well close the mill." All the blame, it asserted, lay with the workers themselves, who were "profligate, drunken and careless." The verdict of the court could only "corrupt the masses of the people."* "But it is dangerous to joke with the masses of the people," ejaculated *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. "What must the workers think, following the not-guilty verdict of the Vladimir court? The news of this decision spread like lightning through the whole of this manufacturing area. Our correspondent, who left Vladimir immediately after the announcement of the verdict, heard of it at all the stations...."

Thus, the employers tried to scare the government by saying that if one concession were made to the workers, the next day they would demand another.

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* The employers and their supporters have always considered that if the workers begin to think about their conditions, begin to work for their rights and join forces in resisting the abominations and oppression of the employers, it is all nothing but "corruption." It is, of course, an advantage to the employers if the workers give no thought to their conditions and have no understanding of their rights.

But the workers' outbreaks were even more frightening, and so the government had to make concessions.

In June 1886 a new fines law appeared, which indicated in what cases the imposition of fines was permissible, specified the maximum fines, and laid it down that the fines must not go into the employer's pocket, but must go to cover the needs of the workers themselves.

Many workers are not aware of this law, while those who are, imagine that the relief gained in the matter of fines is the handiwork of the government, and that thanks for this relief should be accorded to the authorities. We have seen that this is wrong. Despite the iniquity of the old factory system, the authorities did absolutely nothing to bring relief to the workers until the latter began to revolt against it, until the workers in their fury went so far as to start wrecking the factories and machinery, setting fire to goods and materials, and attacking managers and mill owners. *Only then did the government get scared and make concessions*. For the easing of their lot the workers should thank not the authorities but their comrades who worked for and secured the abolition of this disgraceful treatment.

The history of the outbreaks of 1885 shows us what a colossal force is the workers' united protest. All that is required is to ensure that this force is used more consciously, that it is not wasted on wreaking vengeance on some particular factory owner, on wrecking some hated factory, that the whole force of this indignation and this hatred is directed against all factory owners combined, against the entire *class* of them, that it is expended on regular and persistent struggle against them.

Let us now make a detailed examination of our fines legislation. To acquaint ourselves with it, we must examine the following questions: 1) In what cases or on what grounds does the law permit the imposition of fines? 2) What, according to the law, should be the size of the fines? 3) What procedure for imposing fines is laid down in the law? i.e., who, according to the law, may fix the fine? May an appeal be lodged against it? What arrangements must be made to acquaint the worker in advance with the list of fines? How must the fines be recorded? 4) On what must fines be

expended according to the law? Where is the money kept? How is it expended on the workers' needs, and on what needs? Finally, the last question, 5) Does the fines law cover all workers?

When we have examined all these questions, we shall know not only what a fine is, but also all the particular rules and detailed regulations of Russian legislation on fines. And the workers need to know this, so that their reaction to each case of unjust fining may be an informed one, so that they may be able to explain to their comrades why there is injustice of one kind or another—whether because the factory management are violating the law, or because the law itself contains such unjust regulations—and so that they may be able accordingly to choose a suitable form of struggle against oppression.

III

ON WHAT GROUNDS MAY THE FACTORY OWNER IMPOSE FINES?

The law says that the grounds for imposing fines, i.e., the misdemeanours for which the factory owner is entitled to fine workers may be the following: 1) defective work; 2) absenteeism; 3) offences against good order. "No penalties," says the law, "may be imposed on other grounds."* Let us examine more closely each of these three grounds separately.

The first ground is defective work. The law states that "defective work is considered to be the production by the worker, through negligence, of defective articles and damage done by him when working to materials, machinery or other instruments of production." The words "through negligence" should be remembered. They are very important. A fine may be imposed, accordingly, only for negligence. If the article proves to be of low quality not because of the worker's negligence, but because, for example, the em-

* The law that we are speaking of is Rules for Industry, which is included in Part Two, Volume II of the Russian Code of Laws. The law is stated in various articles, which are numbered. Fines are dealt with in articles 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151 and 152.

ployer has supplied poor material, then the employer has no right to impose a fine. It is necessary that the workers should well understand this, and, if a fine is imposed for defective work, where the defect is due not to the worker's fault, or his negligence, they must lodge a protest, because to impose a fine in that case is a direct violation of the law. Let us take another example: the worker is doing his job at a lathe near an electric bulb. A piece of iron flies off, hits the bulb and smashes it. The employer imposes a fine "for damage of materials." Has he the right to do so? No, he has not, because it was not through negligence that the worker smashed the bulb: the worker is not to blame that the bulb was not protected at all against bits of iron, which are always flying off when work is in progress.*

The question now arises, does this law adequately protect the worker? Does it protect him against the employer's arbitrary conduct and the unjust imposition of fines? Of course not, because the employer decides at his discretion whether the article is of good or bad quality; fault-finding is always possible, it is always possible for the employer to increase fines for defective work and through their medium get more work done for the same pay. The law leaves the worker unprotected, and gives the employer a loophole for oppressing him. Clearly the law is partial, has been drawn up to the employers' advantage and is unjust.

How should the worker be protected? The workers have shown that long ago: during the 1885 strike the weavers at Morozov's Nikolskoye Mill advanced, among other demands, the following: "that the good or bad quality of articles be established when they are handed in, in case of disagreement, with witnesses from among the operatives working close at hand, all this to be recorded in the goods receipt book." (This demand was recorded in an exercise-book filled up "by general agreement of the workers" and handed in from the crowd to the prosecutor during the strike. The contents of the exercise-book were read out in court.) This demand is

* There was a case of that sort in St. Petersburg, in the port (New Admiralty), where the Harbourmaster, Verkhovsky, is well known for his oppression of the workers. After a strike he replaced fines for breaking bulbs by deductions for broken bulbs from all the workers in the shop. Obviously, these deductions are just as illegal as the fines.

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quite a fair one, because there can be no other way of averting the employer's arbitrary conduct than to bring in witnesses when a dispute arises about quality, the witnesses without fail having to come from the workers' ranks: foremen or clerks would never dare to oppose the employer.

The second ground for the imposition of fines is absenteeism. What does the law call absenteeism. "Absenteeism," states the law, "as distinct from unpunctuality or unauthorised quitting of work, is failure to appear at work for not less than one half of the working day." The law considers that unpunctuality or unauthorised quitting of work is, as we shall soon see, an "offence against good order," and the fine, therefore, is a smaller one. If the worker is several hours late coming to the factory, but arrives before midday, this will not be absenteeism, but merely an offence against good order; if, however, he only arrives at midday, then it is absenteeism. Similarly, if the worker quits work without permission after midday, i.e., is away for several hours, this will be an offence against good order, but if he leaves for a full half-day it is absenteeism. The law states that if the worker is absent for more than three days consecutively or for more than six days all told in a month, the employer is entitled to discharge him. The question arises, is absence for half or the whole of a day always to be considered absenteeism? No. Only when there are no valid reasons for non-appearance at work. Valid reasons for non-appearance are enumerated in the law. They are as follows: 1) "loss of liberty by the worker." That is to say, if the worker, for example, is arrested (on orders of the police or by sentence of a magistrate), the employer is not entitled when dismissing the worker to fine him for absenteeism, 2) "unexpected loss of property due to a serious accident," 3) "fire," 4) "flood." E.g., if a worker during the spring thaws cannot get across the river, the employer is not entitled to fine him, 5) "sickness which makes it impossible for the worker to leave home" and 6) "death or severe illness of parents, husband, wife or children." In all these six cases the worker is considered to have a valid excuse for non-appearance. But to avoid being fined for absenteeism, the worker has to produce evidence: they will not take his word for it in the office that he had a valid excuse for not appearing at work. A certificate should be secured from the

doctor (in case of sickness, for example) or from the police (in case of fire, etc.). If a certificate cannot be obtained at once, it should be submitted later, and a demand made that no fine be imposed, and if it already has been, that it be cancelled.

Regarding these rules about valid reasons for non-appearance, it should be noted that they are as severe as if they applied to soldiers in barracks, and not to free men. They have been copied from those governing non-appearance in court: if anybody is accused of a crime, he is summoned by the investigator, and, as the accused, he is obliged to appear. Non-appearance is only permitted in precisely the same cases as those in which workers are permitted to absent themselves.* That is to say, the attitude of the law is just as strict to workers as it is to all sorts of swindlers, thieves, etc. Everybody understands why the rules about appearance in court are so strict; it is because the prosecution of crime concerns the whole of society. The failure, however, of a worker to appear at his place of work does not concern the whole of society, but only a single employer, and what is more, one worker can easily be replaced by another to prevent a stoppage of work. Which means that there was no need for the laws to have the strictness of military law. The capitalists, however, do not confine themselves to depriving the worker of all his time, so that he may work in the factory; they also want to deprive him of his will, of all interests and thoughts other than those connected with the factory. The worker is treated as though he were not a free man. That is why such fault-finding, bureaucratic rules, reminiscent of barrack life, are drawn up. For example, we have just seen that the law recognises the "death or severe sickness of parents, husband, wife or children" to be a valid reason for non-appearance. It says that in the law on appearance in court. Exactly the same is said in the law about the worker's appearance at work. That is to say, if, for example, the worker's sister, and not his wife, dies, he must not dare to miss a day's work, must not dare to spend time on funeral arrangements: his time belongs not to

* Except in the one case of "fire," which is not mentioned in the law about the summoning of accused persons.

himself, but to the employer. As to burial, the police may deal with it—no need to bother about that. According to the law on appearance in court, the interests of the family must yield place to the interests of society, for which the prosecution of criminals is necessary. According to the law on appearance at work, the interests of the worker's family must yield place to the interests of the employer, who must have his profits. And after this, the fine gentlemen who draw up, execute and support such laws, dare to accuse the workers of not valuing family life!...

Let us see whether the law on fines for absenteeism is a fair one. If the worker stays away from work for a day or two, that is considered absenteeism, and he is punished accordingly, and if he is away for more than three consecutive days he may be dismissed. Well, and if the employer stops the job (e.g., for lack of orders) or provides work only five days a week, instead of the established six? If the workers really possessed rights equal to those of the employers, then the law should be the same for the employer as for the worker. If the worker stops work, he loses his pay and pays a fine. So then, if the employer arbitrarily stops the job, he should, firstly, have to pay the worker his full wage for the whole period that the factory is at a standstill, and, secondly, he should be liable to be fined. But neither is laid down in the law. This example clearly confirms what we said previously about fines, namely that they signify the enslavement of the workers by the capitalist, they signify that the workers constitute a lower class without rights, condemned throughout their lives to work for the capitalists and to create their wealth, receiving in return a mere pittance that is insufficient to make life even tolerable. There can be no question of the employers paying fines for arbitrarily stopping jobs. But they do not even pay the workers their wages when work is stopped through no fault of theirs. That is a most outrageous injustice. The law only contains the rule that the contract between the employer and the worker ceases "where there is a stoppage of work at the factory for more than 7 days, due to fire, flood, boiler explosion, or similar cause." The workers should strive to get a rule adopted making it obligatory on the factory owners to pay them wages

during stoppages of work. This demand was publicly advanced by the Russian workers on January 11, 1885, during the well-known strike at T. S. Morozov's mill.* The exercise-book of workers' demands contained the following point: "that the deduction for absenteeism shall not exceed one ruble, and the employer shall pay for days idle through his fault, e.g., when machinery is stopped or undergoing repairs, in which connection each idle day to be recorded in the pay-book." The workers' first demand (that the fine for absenteeism shall not exceed one ruble) was implemented, becoming part of the fines law of 1886. The second demand (that the employer pay for days idle through his fault) was not implemented and the workers still have to fight for its adoption. To ensure that the struggle for this demand is a success, all workers should clearly understand the injustice of the law, should clearly understand what must be demanded. In each separate case when some factory is at a standstill and the workers get no wages, they should raise the question of the injustice of it, they should insist that so long as the contract with the employer has not been annulled, the latter is obliged to pay for each day, they should report the matter to the inspector, whose explanation will confirm to the workers the point that in fact the law does not deal with this matter and will give rise to discussion of the law by the workers. They should appeal to the courts when the possibility exists, requesting the exaction of payment of wages from the employer, and, finally, advance general demands for payment for idle days.

The third ground for the imposition of a fine is "offences against good order." According to the law, such offences include the following 8 cases: 1) "unpunctuality or unauthorised quitting of work" (we have already indicated the dif-

* It should be noted that at that time (1884-85) cases of factory stoppages through no fault of the workers were quite frequent, as there was a commercial and industrial crisis: the mill owners could not dispose of their stocks, and they tried to cut down production. For example, in December 1884 the big Voznesenskoye Mill (Moscow Gubernia, near Talitsa Station on the Moscow-Yaroslavl Railway) cut down the working week to 4 days. The workers, who were on piece rates, met this with a strike that ended at the beginning of January 1885 in a concession from the owner.

ference between this and absenteeism); 2) "failure to observe on the factory premises the established rules regarding fire precautions, in those cases where the factory management, by virtue of Note 1 to Article 105, do not consider it necessary to annul the contract of hire concluded with the workers." This means that where the worker violates the rules regarding fire precautions, the law gives the employer the choice of either fining the worker or of dismissing him ("to annul the contract of hire," as the law says); 3) "failure to observe cleanliness and tidiness on the factory premises"; 4) "breaking of silence while work is in progress by noisiness, shouting, bawling, quarrelling, or fighting"; 5) "disobedience." It should be noted of this point that the employer has the right to fine the worker for "disobedience" only when the latter has not fulfilled a legitimate request, i.e., one based on the contract. If some arbitrary demand is made, not based on the contract between the worker and the employer, then no fine may be imposed for "disobedience." Suppose the worker is doing a job at piece rates. The foreman tells him to drop the job and do another one. The worker refuses. In that case, to fine the worker for disobedience would be wrong since he contracted to do one particular job and, since he is on piece rates, for him to transfer to another would mean working for nothing; 6) "appearance at work drunk"; 7) "organisation of unauthorised games for money (cards, pitch and toss, etc.)" and 8) "failure to observe factory regulations." These regulations are drawn up by the owner of each factory or mill and are confirmed by the factory inspector. Extracts from them are printed in the pay-books. The workers should read these regulations and know them, so as to check whether fines imposed on them for violation of factory regulations are legitimate or not. These regulations must be distinguished from the law, which is the same for all mills and factories; internal regulations differ for each factory. The law is endorsed or annulled on the authority of the tsar; factory regulations, by the factory inspector. Hence, if these regulations prove to be oppressive to the workers their annulment may be secured by appeal to the inspector (should he refuse to take action, an appeal may be lodged with the Factory Board). To show the need for

distinguishing between the law and factory regulations, let us take an example. Suppose a worker is fined for failure to put in an appearance on a holiday or to work overtime at the demand of the foreman. Is such a fine proper or not? To answer this question we have to know the factory regulations. If they say nothing about the worker's being obliged, on demand, to work overtime, then the fine is unlawful. If, however, the regulations state that the worker is obliged, on demand of the management, to appear on holidays or to work overtime, then the fine will be a legitimate one. To secure the annulment of this obligation, the workers must not direct their complaint against the fines, but demand that the factory regulations be amended. All the workers must be unanimous in this, and then, if they act together, they will be able to get the above regulations cancelled.

IV

HOW BIG MAY FINES BE?

We now know all the cases in which the law permits the fining of workers. Let us see what the law says about the size of the fines. The law does not fix one level for all factories. It only sets a maximum. This maximum is indicated separately for each of the three cases where fines may be imposed (defective work, absenteeism and offences against good order). For absenteeism the maximum fines are the following: under time rates, not more than six days' earnings (reckoning fines for the whole month), that is to say, in the course of one month fines for absenteeism cannot be imposed to the amount of more than six days' earnings.* If, however, payment is by the piece, then the maximum fine for absenteeism is 1 ruble per day and not more than a total of 3 rubles per month. Moreover, where the worker does not put in an appearance, he forfeits his pay for all the time missed. Further, the maximum fine for offences against good order is one ruble for each separate violation.

* The maximum fine for one day's absenteeism under time rates is not indicated. All that is said is: "corresponding to the worker's wages." The exact size of the fines, as we shall soon see, is displayed in each factory in a table of penalties.

Finally, as regards fines for defective work, no maximum is indicated in the law at all. One more maximum is indicated, a general one embracing all fines: for non-appearance, offences against good order, and defective work combined. All these penalties combined "shall not exceed *one-third* of the earnings to which the worker is actually entitled on payday." In other words, if, say, 15 rubles are due to the worker fines may not, according to the law, amount to more than 5 rubles—for all violations, absenteeism and defects combined. If more than that amount in fines has accumulated, the employer must reduce them accordingly. In that case, however, the law gives the owner another right, namely, that of cancelling the contract where the fines total more than one-third of the worker's earnings.*

These regulations concerning maximum fines are, it must be said, too severe on the worker, and protect the employer at his expense. Firstly, the law permits too high a level of fines, amounting to as much as one-third of earnings. This is a disgracefully high level. Let us compare this maximum with well-known cases of particularly big fines. The factory inspector of Vladimir Gubernia, Mr. Mikulin (who has written a book about the new law of 1886), speaks of the high level of factory fines before the law was adopted. Fines were heaviest in the weaving industry, and the heaviest fines at a weaving mill amounted to 10%, i.e., *one-tenth of the workers' earnings*. The factory inspector of Vladimir Gubernia, Mr. Peskov, in his report** cites the following examples of particularly heavy fines. The heaviest of them was one of 5 rubles 31 kopeks, out of earnings totalling 32 rubles 31 kopeks. This equals 16.4% (16 kopeks per ruble), i.e., just *less than a sixth of the earnings*. That fine was called a heavy one, and not by the worker, but by the inspector. Yet our law permits fines to be *twice* as heavy, to amount to *one-third of earnings*, or 33⅓ kopeks per

* The worker who considers this cancellation of the contract to be wrong, may appeal to the courts, but the period during which such an appeal may be lodged is a very short one—one month (counting, of course, from the day of dismissal).

** The first report for 1885. Only the first reports of factory inspectors were printed, the government having immediately stopped further printing. The state of affairs in the factories must have been wonderful, if they were afraid of a description of it being published.

ruble! Evidently, no more or less decent factory has imposed such fines as are permitted by our laws. Let us take the data on fines at T. S. Morozov's Nikolskoye Mill before the strike of January 7, 1885. The fines at this mill were heavier, according to witnesses, than at the surrounding mills. They were so outrageous that 11,000 workers completely lost their patience. We shall very likely not err if we take this mill as an example of one where fines were outrageous. But how heavy were the fines there? Foreman weaver Shorin testified in court, as we have already stated, that fines amounted to anything up to half the earnings, and, generally speaking, ran from 30% to 50%, from 30 to 50 kopeks per ruble. But in the first place, this testimony was not confirmed by precise data; and, secondly, it relates either to specific cases or to one workshop. When the strikers were tried, some data on fines were read out in court. The earnings (monthly) and fines of 17 workers were cited: the earnings totalled 179 rubles 6 kopeks, while the fines totalled 29 rubles 65 kopeks. This means 16 kopeks in fines per ruble earned. The biggest fine of all these 17 cases was 3 rubles 85 kopeks out of 12 rubles 40 kopeks earnings. This equals 31½ kopeks per ruble, and is at any rate less than what is permitted by our law. It is better, however, to take the data for the whole factory. Fines imposed in the year 1884 were heavier than in previous years and amounted to 23¼ kopeks per ruble (this was the highest figure: the fines constituting from 20¾ to 23¼ per cent of earnings). So then, at a factory which became notorious for its abominably high fines, these were at any rate lower than those permitted by Russian law!... There's no gainsaying that the workers are well protected by such a law! The strikers at Morozov's demanded that "fines should not exceed 5% of earnings; furthermore, the worker must be warned about bad work and be called in not more than twice a month." The fines permitted by our legislation can only be compared with the interest drawn by usurers. It is hardly likely that any employer will dare to pile up fines to that extent; the law allows it, but the workers will not permit it.*

* One cannot but note in this regard that Mr. Mikhailovsky, formerly Chief Factory Inspector of the St. Petersburg area, considers it quite proper to call this law "a truly philanthropic reform,

What distinguishes our laws on the size of fines is not only their abominable oppressiveness but also their gross injustice. If the fine is too big (more than one-third), the employer may cancel the contract; the worker, however, is not given a similar right, i.e., the right to leave the factory if fines are imposed on him to such an amount that they exceed a third of his earnings. It is clear that the law is only concerned about the factory owner, as though fines are due only to the fault of the workers. Actually, however, everybody knows that the factory owners frequently impose fines without the workers being to blame at all, e.g., in order to speed up the workers. The law only protects the factory owner against the bad worker, but does not protect the worker against the all too oppressive employer. In the latter case, therefore, the workers have nobody to turn to for protection. They must take thought for themselves and for the struggle against the employers.

V

WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING FINES?

We have already stated that by law fines are imposed "on the authority" of factory managements "themselves." Regarding appeals against their instructions the law says that "there is no appeal against fines imposed on the workers by factory managers. If, however, on visiting a factory, officials of the Factory Inspectorate discover from the statements of workers that fines have been imposed on them in contravention to the requirements of the law, the manager shall be prosecuted." This provision, as you see, is very unclear and contradictory.

which does supreme honour to the Russian Imperial Government's concern for the working classes." (This view is expressed in the book on Russian manufacturing industry published by the Russian Government for the Chicago World Fair of 1893.) Such is the concern of the Russian Government!!! Before the law was adopted, when there was no law at all, there were avaricious employers who robbed the workers of 23 kopeks per ruble. Yet the law in its concern for the workers says: do not retain more than 33⅓ (thirty-three and a third) kopeks per ruble! But thirty-three kopeks without the third can be retained now by law. "A truly philanthropic reform" indeed!

On the one hand, the worker is told that there can be no appeal against a fine imposed. Yet on the other hand he is told that the workers may "make statements" to the inspector about fines imposed "in contravention to the law." Anybody who has not had occasion to acquaint himself with Russian laws may ask what is the difference between "to make a statement about unlawful action" and "to appeal against unlawful action"? There is none, but the purpose of this pettifogging provision of the law is very clear: the law is meant to curtail the worker's right to appeal against unfair and unlawful fining by factory owners. Now if a worker should complain to an inspector about a fine unlawfully imposed, the inspector could reply that "the law does not permit appeals against fining." Are there many workers acquainted with this tricky law who could reply in turn: "I am not appealing, I am merely making a statement"? Inspectors are appointed for the express purpose of ensuring the observance of the laws regulating the relations between workers and employers. It is the duty of inspectors to accept all statements concerning the non-observance of the law. The inspector, according to regulations (see Instructions to Factory Inspectorate Officials,[22] endorsed by the Minister of Finance), must have reception days, not less than one a week, on which to give oral explanations to persons requiring them; furthermore, an announcement of these days must be displayed in each factory. Thus, if the workers know the law and are determined not to permit any departures from it, then the trickery of the law now referred to will be in vain, and the workers will be able to secure the observance of the law. Are they entitled to the return of fines paid, if these were wrongly imposed? The common-sense answer should, of course, be "yes." The employer must surely not be allowed to fine the worker wrongly and to refuse to return money wrongly exacted. It turns out, however, that when the law was discussed in the Council of State,[23] it was *deliberately* decided to be silent on this point. The members of the Council of State found that to afford the workers the right to demand the return of wrongly exacted money "will lower in the workers' eyes the importance with which it is intended to endow the factory manager, with a view to maintaining order among

the workers." That is how statesmen judge the workers! If a factory owner has wrongly penalised a worker, the latter should not be given the right to demand the return of his money. But why deprive the worker of his money? Because complaints "will lower the importance of the managers"! That is to say, "the importance of the managers" and "the maintenance of order in the factories" are only based on the workers not knowing their rights and "not daring" to complain against those in charge, even if they violate the law! So the statesmen are positively afraid lest the workers take it into their heads to see to the proper imposition of fines! The workers should thank the members of the Council of State for their forthrightness in showing them what the workers may expect of the government. The workers must show that they consider themselves human beings just as much as the factory owners do, and that they have no intention of allowing themselves to be treated as dumb cattle. Therefore the workers must make it their duty not to let a single case of wrongful fining pass without appeal, and unfailingly present a demand for the return of their money—either to the inspector, or, in case of his refusal, to the courts. Even if the workers achieve nothing, either from the inspectors, or from the courts, their efforts will still not be in vain, but will open the eyes of the workers, and will show them how our laws treat the workers' rights.

So then, we now know that fines are imposed on the managers' "own authority." But at each factory the fines may be of different amounts (since the law merely indicates the maximum above which fines may not be imposed) and there may be different factory regulations. That is why the law requires that all violations liable to fines, and the measure of the fine for each violation be indicated in advance in the *table of penalties*. This table is drawn up by each factory owner separately, and is endorsed by the factory inspector. It must be displayed, according to law, in each workshop.

To render possible a check on whether fines are being imposed properly, and in what number, it is necessary that all the fines without exception be properly recorded. The law requires that fines must be recorded in the worker's pay-book " not later than three days following the date of

imposition." This record must indicate, first, the grounds for the imposition of the fine (i.e., for what the fine has been imposed—for defective work and for exactly what work, for absenteeism, or for violating regulations, and exactly which), and, secondly, the amount of the penalty. The registration of fines in the pay-book is necessary to enable the workers to check whether fines are properly imposed and to enter an appeal in good time in case of any illegal action. Further, the fines must all be recorded in a special book with numbered pages which has to be kept in each factory to make it possible for all fines to be checked by the Inspectorate.

In this regard it may not be superfluous to say a couple of words about appeals against factory owners and inspectors, since the bulk of the workers do not know how to appeal and to whom. According to the law, appeals against any violations of the law at a factory should be addressed to the factory inspector. He is obliged to accept verbal and written complaints. Should the factory inspector fail to meet the request, a statement may be addressed to a senior inspector, who is also obliged to have reception days for hearing statements. In addition, the senior inspector's office must be open *daily* for persons who need to make inquiries or to receive explanations or to make statements (see Instructions to Factory Inspectorate Officials, p. 18). Appeals against the inspector's decision may be addressed to the Gubernia Factory Affairs Board.* The time limit for these appeals, as provided by law, is one month counting from the day the inspector announces his decision. Further, appeals against decisions of the Factory Board may be made to the Minister of Finance, the time limit being the same.

As you see, the law contains the names of many people to whom appeals may be addressed. And the right to appeal belongs alike to the factory owner and the worker. The only trouble is that this protection is merely a paper one. The

* Who constitute the Factory Board? The Governor, the Prosecutor, the Chief of the Police Administration, the Factory Inspector and *two factory owners*. If we were to add the prison governor and the officer commanding the Cossacks, we would have all the officials who give effect to "the concern of the Russian Imperial Government for the working classes."

factory owner is fully able to present his appeals—he has time to spare, funds to get a lawyer's services, etc., and that is why the factory owners really present appeals against the inspectors, go all the way to the minister and have already secured preferential treatment of various kinds. As far as the worker is concerned, however, this right to present appeals is merely a paper one. First of all, he has no time to make the round of the inspectors and offices. He works and is fined for "absenteeism." He lacks the money to obtain a lawyer's services. He does not know the laws, and therefore cannot stand up for his rights. The authorities, on the other hand, not only do nothing to acquaint the workers with the laws, but on the contrary try to hide them from the workers. To anybody who refuses to believe this we shall cite the following regulation from the Instructions to Factory Inspectorate Officials (these instructions were endorsed by the minister and explain the rights and duties of factory inspectors): "All explanations to the owner of an industrial establishment, or to the manager of same, relating to cases of violation of the law and to obligatory regulations published in pursuance of it are made by the factory inspector, but only in the absence of the worker."* There you have it. If the factory owner violates the law, the inspector must not dare speak to him of it *in the presence of the workers*—the minister forbids it! Otherwise the workers may perhaps really get to know the law and start demanding that it be put into effect! Small wonder that *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* wrote that that would be nothing but "corruption"!

Every worker knows that appeals, especially against the inspector, are almost completely beyond his reach. Of course, we do not wish to say that the workers should not appeal: on the contrary, whenever any possibility at all exists, they should certainly lodge appeals, because only in that way will the workers get to know their rights and learn to understand in whose interests the factory laws are written. All we wish to say is that appeals cannot secure any serious and general improvement in the workers' conditions. To achieve that

* Note to Article 26 of the Instructions.

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only one way exists, namely, that the workers unite to uphold their rights, to combat oppression by the employers, and to win more decent earnings and shorter working hours.

VI

WHAT, ACCORDING TO LAW, SHOULD THE FINES BE SPENT ON?

Let us now turn to the last question concerning fines. How are the fines spent? We have already said that before 1886 the money went into the pockets of the factory owners. But this system resulted in such a mass of abuses, and exasperated the workers to such a degree that the employers themselves began to appreciate the need for abolishing it. At some factories the practice arose spontaneously of using the fines to pay benefits to the workers. For example, at that same Morozov mill the established practice even before the 1885 strike was that fines for smoking and for bringing vodka on the premises should go towards benefits for the crippled and fines for defective work, to the employer.

The new law of 1886 laid down the general rule that fines must not go into the employer's pocket. It states that "penalties imposed on the workers go in each factory to form a special fund in the charge of the factory management. This fund may be used, by permission of the inspector, only for the needs of the workers themselves, according to regulations published by the Minister of Finance in agreement with the Minister of Internal Affairs." So then, fines, according to law, must only go to meet the needs of the workers themselves. The fines are the workers' own money, deductions from their earnings.

The regulations for the expenditure of the fines fund mentioned in the law were only issued in 1890 (December 4), i.e., a total of 3½ years after the promulgation of the law. The regulations state that the fines are expended, *in the main*, on the following needs of the workers: "a) on grants to workers who have become totally incapacitated or who have temporarily lost the ability to work because of illness." At the present time workers who have been injured are usu-

ally without any means of subsistence. In order to take the factory owner to court they usually live at the expense of the lawyers who are in charge of their case and who, in return for the sops they give to the workers, get the bulk of the compensation awards. And if the worker is only likely to get a small compensation through the court, he will not even find a lawyer. In such cases use should always be made of the fines money; if the worker gets a grant from the fines fund he will manage somehow for a time and will be able to secure the services of a lawyer to conduct his case against the employer, without his poverty driving him out of the clutches of the employer into those of the lawyer. Workers who lose their jobs through sickness should also secure grants from their fines fund.*

In interpretation of this first point of the regulations, the St. Petersburg Factory Board decided that grants should be made on the basis of a doctor's certificate, to the extent of not more than half the previous earnings. Let us note in parenthesis that the St. Petersburg Factory Board adopted this decision at its session of April 26, 1895. The interpretation was accordingly given 4½ years after the issue of the regulations, while the regulations were made 3½ years after issue of the law. Consequently, *eight years in all were required merely for the law to be adequately interpreted*!! How many years will now be required for the law to become generally known, and to be actually applied?

Secondly, disbursements from the fines fund are made "b) for grants to working women in the last period of pregnancy and who have ceased work 2 weeks before confinement." According to the interpretation of the St. Petersburg Factory Board, disbursements must only be made during a period of 4 weeks (two before and two after confinement) and to the extent of half the previous earnings.

Thirdly, grants are made "c) where property is lost or damaged due to fire or other misfortune." According to the interpretation of the St. Petersburg Board, a police certificate is presented as evidence in such cases and the size of the

* It stands to reason that the fact of securing a grant from the fines fund does not deprive the worker of the right to demand compensation from the employer in case, for example, of injury.

grant must not exceed two-thirds of a half-year's earnings (i.e., four months' earnings).

Fourthly, and finally, grants are made "d) for burial." According to the interpretation of the St. Petersburg Board, these grants are made only in the case of workers who were employed and died at the factory in question, or of their parents and children. The amount of the grants is from 10 to 20 rubles.

Such are the four cases mentioned in the regulations in which grants are made. But the workers have the right to receive grants in other cases, too: the regulations state that grants are made "in the main" in those 4 cases. The workers are entitled to receive grants for all sorts of requirements, and not only for those enumerated. The St. Petersburg Board in its interpretation of the regulations concerning fines (this interpretation is hung up in factories) also says that "the allocation of grants in all other cases is made by permission of the Inspectorate," and the Board added that grants should under no circumstances reduce the factory's disbursements on various institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals, etc.) and compulsory expenditures (e.g., on keeping premises occupied by the workers in proper repair, on medical aid, etc.). This means that the making of grants from the fines fund does not entitle the factory owner to consider this an expenditure of his own; it is not his expenditure but that of the workers themselves. The factory owner's disbursements must remain as before.

The St. Petersburg Board laid down one more regulation—"the total regular grants made must not exceed one half of the annual receipts from fines." Here a distinction is made between regular grants (which are made over a definite period, for example, to a sick or injured person) and lump-sum grants (which are made once, e.g., for burial or in case of fire). In order to leave funds for lump-sum grants, the regular grants must not exceed half the total fines.

How can grants be got from the fines fund? The workers must, according to the regulations, apply for grants to the employer, who makes them by permission of the inspector. If the employer refuses, an appeal should be made to the inspector, who may award a grant on his own authority.

The Factory Board may allow reliable employers to make small grants (of up to 15 rubles) without requesting the inspector's permission.

Fines to a total of 100 rubles are kept in the employer's possession, while larger sums are placed in a savings bank.

Should any factory close down, the fines fund is transferred to the gubernia general workers' fund. It is not stated in the regulations how this "workers' fund" (about which the workers do not and cannot know anything) is expended. It should, we are told, be kept in the State Bank "pending further instructions." If even in the capital it required 8 years for regulations to be made about the disbursement of the fines funds at the different factories, more than a dozen years will very likely be required before regulations are devised for the disbursement of the "gubernia general workers' fund."

Such are the regulations concerning the disbursement of the fines money. As you see, they are distinguished by their extreme complexity and intricacy; no wonder, therefore, that to this day the workers are almost totally unaware of their existence. This year (1895) notices about these regulations are being put up at the factories of St. Petersburg.* The workers themselves must now try to make these regulations generally known, must ensure that the workers learn to view grants from the fines fund properly—not as sops from the owners, not as charity, but as their own money made up of deductions from their earnings and disbursed only to meet their needs. The workers have every right to demand that this money be distributed to them.

Regarding these regulations we must speak, firstly, of how they are applied, and of what inconveniences and what abuses arise. Secondly, we must see whether they have been drawn up fairly, and whether they adequately uphold the interests of the workers.

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* Thus, in St. Petersburg it was only in 1895 that steps were taken to implement the fines law of 1886. Yet Mr. Mikhailovsky, the Chief Inspector, whom we mentioned above, said in 1893 that the law of 1886 "is now being scrupulously put into effect." This little example shows us what an impudent lie is contained in the Chief Factory Inspector's book, intended as it is to acquaint the Americans with the Russian factory system.

As to the application of the regulations we must point first of all to the following interpretation given by the St. Petersburg Factory Board: "If at any particular moment no fines money is available ... the workers may not present any claims to the factory managements." The question, however, arises: how will the workers know whether or not fines money is available, and if it is, how much there is of it? The Factory Board argues as though the workers know this—yet it has taken no trouble to let the workers know the state of the fines fund, nor has it obliged the factory owners to hang up notices about the fines money. Does the Factory Board really imagine that it is sufficient for the workers to learn about it from the employer, who will drive applicants away when there is no fines money in hand? That would be disgraceful because the employers would then treat workers desirous of receiving grants as though they were beggars. The workers must ensure that at each factory an announcement is displayed monthly about the state of the fines fund, indicating how much cash is in hand, how much has been received in the past month, and how much has been expended and "on what items." Otherwise the workers will not know how much they can get; they will not know whether the fines fund can meet all their requirements or only part of them, in which case it would be fairest to choose the most urgent items. Some of the best organised factories have themselves introduced such announcements: in St. Petersburg, I think, it is done at the Siemens and Halske works and at the government cartridge factory. If every time the worker has a discussion with the inspector, he insistently draws attention to this and urges the need for displaying a notice, the workers as a whole will certainly secure the adoption of it everywhere. Further, it would be very convenient for the workers if printed forms* were available at factories for applications for grants from the fines fund. Such forms have been introduced, for example, in Vladimir Gubernia. It is not easy for the worker himself to put the whole

* That is to say, forms on which the application is already printed, blank spaces being left in which to write the name of the factory, the grounds for the application, address, signature, etc.

application in writing, and what is more he won't know how to write all that is required, whereas the form contains all items, and all he has to do is to fill in a few words in the blank spaces. If forms are not introduced, many workers will have to get clerks to write their applications for them, and this involves expenditure. Of course, the applications may, according to the regulations, be oral; but, firstly, the worker has in any case to get the police or doctor's certificate required by the regulations (where an application form is used, the certifying statement is recorded on the form itself), and, secondly, where the application is oral, some employer will perhaps refuse to reply, whereas he is obliged to reply to one made in writing. Applications made to the factory office on printed forms will deprive them of the mendicant character which the employers try to attach to them. Many factory owners are particularly dissatisfied with the fact that the fines money—according to the law—goes not into their pockets, but to serve the needs of the workers. That is why many dodges and devices have been invented for bamboozling the workers and inspectors and evading the law. As a warning to the workers we shall mention a few such devices.

Some factory owners have not recorded fines as such but as money issued to the worker. The worker is fined a ruble, but the record made in the book says that he has been issued a ruble. When deducted from the pay this ruble remains in the employer's pocket. That is not just evasion of the law, it is downright cheating, fraud.

Other factory owners do not record fines for absenteeism; instead they do not credit the worker with all his days worked, i.e., if, say, the worker absents himself one day in the week, he is not credited with five days' work, but with four, the wage of one day (which should have been a fine for absenteeism and should have gone to the fines fund) going to the employer. This again is sheer fraud. Incidentally let us note that the workers are quite helpless against such fraud,* because they are not told of the state of the fines fund. Only if detailed monthly notices are posted (in-

* That such fraud is practised is related by none other than Mr. Mikulin, the *Factory Inspector* of Vladimir Gubernia, in his book about the new law of 1886.

dicating the number of fines imposed each week in each separate workshop) can the workers see to it that the fines really go to the fines fund. Indeed, who will see to it that all these records are correct, if not the workers themselves? The factory inspectors? But how is the inspector to discover that such and such a figure has been fraudulently entered into the book? Mr. Mikulin, a factory inspector, in dealing with such fraud, remarks:

"In all such cases it was exceedingly difficult to discover the abuses, if there was no direct reference to same in the shape of workers' complaints." The inspector himself admits his inability to discover fraud if the workers do not point it out. And the workers cannot do so if the factory owners are not obliged to put up notices about fines imposed.

Still other factory owners have invented more convenient methods of duping the workers and evading the law, methods so cunning and underhanded as to make it difficult to find fault with them. Many cotton mill owners in Vladimir Gubernia applied for the inspector's endorsement of two or even three rates instead of only one for each kind of cotton cloth; in a footnote to the list it was stated that weavers producing cloth that is faultless are paid the top rate, those producing cloth that is faulty are paid rate No. 2, while cloth that is considered damaged is paid for at the lowest rate.* It is clear why this cunning arrangement was invented: the difference between the top and bottom rates went into the owner's pocket, while the difference actually meant a penalty for defective work and therefore should have gone into the fines fund. This was clearly a gross evasion of the law, and not only of the fines law, but also of the law on rate endorsement; the rate is endorsed so as to prevent the employer arbitrarily altering the wages, whereas if not one, but several rates exist, he obviously is given the fullest license.

The factory inspectors saw that such rates were "*evidently* aimed at evading the law" (all this is related by the selfsame Mr. Mikulin in the above-mentioned books; nevertheless, they "*considered they had no right*" to oppose the respected factory-owning "gentlemen."

* Such rates are in operation in some St. Petersburg mills; for example, it is stated that for such and such a quantity of cloth the worker gets from 20 to 50 kopeks.

Why, of course. It is no easy matter opposing the owners (not one, but several employers simultaneously hit on this way of doing things!). But suppose the workers, and not "Messrs." the Mill Owners, tried to evade the law? It would be interesting to know whether there would be a single factory inspector throughout the Russian Empire who would "*consider he had no right*" to oppose the workers in an attempt to evade the law.

Thus, these two- and three-storey rates were endorsed by the Factory Inspectorate and put into operation. It turned out, however, that Messrs. the Mill Owners, who invent ways of evading the law, and Messrs. the Inspectors, who do not consider they have the right to hinder the owners in their good intention, are not alone in their interest in the rate problem ... the workers, too, are interested. The workers proved to lack that gentle tolerance of the mill owners' knavish tricks, and "considered they had the right" to prevent these mill owners from swindling them.

These rates, Mr. Inspector Mikulin tells us, "aroused such dissatisfaction among the workers that it was one of the chief causes of the violent disorders which broke out and *required* the intervention of armed force."

That's the sort of thing which is going on! At first they "considered they had no right" to prevent Messrs. the Mill Owners from violating the law and bamboozling the workers—but when the workers, indignant at these iniquities, revolted, armed force was "required"! But why was this armed force "required" against the workers, who were upholding their *lawful* rights, and not against the mill owners, who were obviously violating the law? At all events, it was only after the workers revolted that "rates of this kind were abolished by order of the Governor." The workers stood their ground. The law was not introduced by Messrs. the Factory Inspectors, but by the workers themselves, who had shown that they would not permit anybody to slight them and would stand up for their rights. "Subsequently," relates Mr. Mikulin, "the Factory Inspectorate refused to endorse such rates." Thus the workers taught the inspectors to give effect to the law.

It was, however, only the Vladimir mill owners who were taught that lesson. Yet factory owners are the same every-

where, whether they are in Vladimir, Moscow, or St. Petersburg. The attempt of the Vladimir mill owners to circumvent the law was a failure, but the method they devised not only remained, but was even improved on by a certain St. Petersburg factory owner of genius.

What was the method of the Vladimir mill owners? It was that of not using the word fine, but of replacing it by other words. If I say that the worker, in case of defective work, gets a ruble less, that will be a fine, and it will have to go into the fines fund. But if I say that, in case of defective work, the worker is paid at a lower rate, then that will not be a fine, and the ruble will land in my pocket. That was how the Vladimir mill owners argued, but the workers rebuffed them. One can argue in a slightly different way, too. One can say: where work is defective the worker will be paid *without* bonus; then again this will not be a fine, and the ruble will land in the employer's pocket. That is the line of argument devised by Yakovlev, the artful owner of a St. Petersburg engineering works. He says the following: you will get a ruble a day, but if you are not guilty of any misdemeanours, absenteeism, incivility, or defective work, you will get a "bonus" of 20 kopeks. If, however, a misdemeanour does take place, the employer deducts twenty kopeks, and, of course, puts them in his pocket—because, after all, it is "bonus" money and not a fine. All laws indicating what are the misdemeanours for which penalties may be imposed, and in what measure, and how they should be spent on the workers' needs, are non-existent so far as Mr. Yakovlev is concerned. The laws refer to "fines," and he is dealing with "bonuses." The astute factory owner continues to this day to swindle the workers by his pettifogging tricks. The St. Petersburg Factory Inspector very likely also did "*not consider he had the right*" to prevent this evasion of the law. Let us hope that the workers of St. Petersburg will not lag behind those of Vladimir and will teach the inspector and the factory owner how to observe the law.

To show what huge sums of money are collected out of the fines, let us quote reports on the size of fines funds in Vladimir Gubernia.

Grants began to be distributed there in February 1891. By October 1891, grants had been made to 3,665 persons to a total of 25,458 rubles 59 kopeks. By October 1, 1891, the fines fund totalled 470,052 rubles 45 kopeks. Incidentally, reference should be made to another of the uses to which the fines fund is put. At a certain factory the fines fund amounted to 8,242 rubles 46 kopeks. The factory went bankrupt, and the workers were left to face the winter without food or work. Then grants totalling 5,820 rubles of this fund were distributed among the workers, of whom there were as many as 800.

From October 1, 1891, to October 1, 1892, fines totalling 94,055 rubles 47 kopeks, were imposed, while grants made to 6,312 persons amounted to only 45,200 rubles 52 kopeks. The grants were distributed as follows: 208 persons were given monthly disability pensions to a total of 6,198 rubles 20 kopeks, that is to say an average annual grant of 30 rubles per person (these beggarly grants are made while tens of thousands of rubles, fines money, are lying unused!). Further, in connection with loss of property 1,037 persons were given a total of 17,827 rubles 12 kopeks, an average of 18 rubles per person. Expectant mothers received 10,641 rubles 81 kopeks, in 2,669 cases, an average of 4 rubles (that is, for three weeks, one before confinement and two after). Sickness grants were made to 877 workers to a total of 5,380 rubles 68 kopeks, an average of 6 rubles. Funeral grants totalled 4,620 rubles—to 1,506 workers (3 rubles each), and miscellaneous—532 rubles 71 kopeks to 15 persons.

Now we have fully acquainted ourselves with the fines regulations and with the way these regulations are applied. Let us see whether the regulations are fair, and whether the workers' rights are adequately protected.

We know that the law states that the fines money does not belong to the employer, and that it can only go to serve the workers' needs. Regulations dealing with the expenditure of the money had to be endorsed by the ministers.

What, however, came of the regulations? The money is collected from the workers and is expended on their needs—but the regulations do not even state that the employers are obliged to inform the workers of the state of the fines fund. The workers do not possess the right to elect

representatives, who will see to the proper flow of money into the fines fund, and who will accept applications from workers and distribute grants. The law states that grants are made "by permission of the inspector," but according to the regulations issued by the ministers, it turns out that applications for grants have to be addressed to the *employer*. But why should applications be made to the employer? Surely the money is not the employer's, but the workers', made up of deductions from their earnings. The employer himself has no right to touch this money: if he spends it, he is responsible for doing so, as for misappropriation and embezzlement, just as if he has spent somebody else's money. The reason the ministers issued these regulations is apparently because they wanted to do a service to the employers: now the workers have *to ask* the employer for grants, just as if they were asking for doles. True, if the employer refuses, the inspector may allocate the grant himself. But then the inspector himself does not know the facts—and he will be told by the owner that the worker is such and such a kind of person, that he does not deserve a grant, and the inspector will believe the owner.* And then, are there many workers who will bother to address complaints to the inspector, losing working time to visit him, and writing applications and so forth? Actually, thanks to the ministerial regulations, we only get a new form of workers' dependence on the employers. The employers are enabled to victimise those workers with whom they are dissatisfied, maybe for refusing to take things lying down: by rejecting a worker's application the employer will certainly cause him lots of extra trouble, and maybe succeed in depriving him of a grant altogether. On the other hand, the

* In the printed application for grants which, as we have said, was circulated to the factories by the Vladimir Factory Board and which constitutes the implementation of the "regulations" that is most suitable for the workers, we read: "the factory office testifies to the signature and the contents of the application, and adds that in its opinion, the applicant deserves a grant of such and such a sum."

That is to say, the office can always write, without giving any explanation, that "in its opinion" the applicant does not deserve a grant.

Grants will not be got by those who are in need of them, but by those who, "in the employers' opinion, deserve them."

employer may allow quite big grants to be made to those workers who curry favour with him and kowtow to him, and who act as informers on their workmates even in cases where other applications would be rejected. Instead of abolishing the workers' dependence on the employers in the matter of fines, we get a new dependence, which splits the workers and creates the servile and the go-getter types. And then, take note of the awful red tape that, according to the regulations, surrounds the receipt of grants: on each occasion the worker requiring a certificate has to approach a doctor, who will very likely give him a rough reception, or the police, who do nothing without bribes. Let us repeat, the law says nothing about that; it has been established by the ministerial regulations, which have obviously been drawn up to suit the factory owners, and which are clearly aimed at supplementing dependence on the employers with the dependence of the workers on officials, at barring the workers from all participation in the expenditure on their needs of the fines money taken from themselves, and at weaving a web of senseless formalities that stupefies and demoralises* the workers.

To give the employer the right to authorise the making of grants from the fines money is a crying injustice. The workers must strive for the legal right to choose deputies who shall see that the fines go into the fines fund, receive and check workers' applications for grants, and report to the workers about the state of the fines fund and its expenditure. At those factories where deputies now exist, they should pay attention to the fines money and demand that they be given all data relating to the fines, and that they should accept workers' applications and deliver them to the management.

VII

DO THE FINES LAWS APPLY TO ALL WORKERS?

The fines laws, like most other Russian laws, do not apply to all factories, do not apply to all workers. When it issues a law, the Russian Government is always afraid that

* Splits, creates servility, and develops bad habits.

it will hurt the gentlemen who own the factories, is afraid that the network of cunning office regulations and officials' rights and duties will clash with some other office regulations (and we have countless numbers of them), with the rights and duties of some other officials, who will be terribly hurt if some new official bursts into their domain, and will consume barrels of official ink and mounds of paper on correspondence about "departmental delimitation." For that reason a law is rarely introduced in this country for the whole of Russia at once, without exceptions, without cowardly delays, without ministers and other officials being permitted to depart from the law.

All this particularly affected the fines law, which, as we have seen, aroused such dissatisfaction among the capitalist gentlemen, and was only adopted under the pressure of portentous workers' revolts.

Firstly, the fines law only covers a small part of Russia.* This law was issued, as we have said, on June 3, 1886, and became operative as from October 1, 1886, *in only three gubernias*, those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Vladimir. *Five years* later the law was extended to Warsaw and Petrokov gubernias (June 11, 1891). Then, *three years* still later it was extended to 13 more gubernias (of the Central gubernias—Tver, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Nizhni-Novgorod, and Ryazan; of the Ostsee gubernias[24]—Estland and Lifland; of the Western gubernias—Grodno and Kiev; and of the Southern gubernias—Volhynia, Podolsk, Kharkov and Kherson)—according to the law of March 14, 1894. In 1892 the fines regulations were extended to cover private ironworks and mines.

The rapid development of capitalism in the south of Russia, and the tremendous development of mining is bringing together masses of workers there, and compelling the government to hurry.

The government is evidently very slow in abandoning the old factory system. And it should be noted that it is

* This law is part of the so-called "special regulations concerning the relations between factory owners and workers." These "special regulations" only cover "localities marked by a considerable development of factory industry," to which we shall refer below in the text.

abandoning that system only under the pressure of the workers: the growth of the working-class movement and the strikes in Poland caused the extension of the law to the Warsaw and Petrokov gubernias (the town of Lodz is in Petrokov Gubernia). The huge strike at the Khludov Mill, Yegoryevsk Uyezd, Ryazan Gubernia, immediately resulted in the law being extended to Ryazan Gubernia. The government evidently also does "not consider it has the right" to deprive Messrs. the Capitalists of the right to uncontrolled (arbitrary) fining until the workers themselves interfere.

Secondly, the fines law, like all the factory inspection regulations, does not cover crown and government establishments. Government factories have their own chiefs "concerned with the welfare" of the workers, people whom the law does not wish to bother with fines regulations. Indeed, why supervise government factories, when the factory chief is an official himself? The workers can complain about him to himself. Small wonder that among these chiefs of government factories one can find such mischief-makers as, for example, the St. Petersburg Harbourmaster, Mr. Verkhovsky.

Thirdly, the regulations concerning fines funds spent on the workers themselves do not cover workers employed in the shops of those railways which have pensions or savings and mutual benefit funds. The fines are paid into these funds.

All these exceptions still seemed insufficient and so the law contains the decision that the ministers (of Finance and of Internal Affairs) have the right, on the one hand, "to remove unimportant factories from subordination" to these regulations "where really necessary" and, on the other hand, to extend the operation of these regulations to "important" artisan establishments.

Thus, not only did the law instruct the minister to draw up the fines money regulations—it also gave the ministers the right to free some factory owners from subordination to the law! Such is the extent of our law's kindness to the factory-owning gentry! In one of his interpretations the minister states that he only frees such factory owners regarding whom the Factory Board "*is certain that the owner of the establishment will not transgress the workers' inter-*

ests." The factory owners and inspectors are such close boon companions that they take each other's word. Why burden the factory owner with regulations, when he "gives the assurance" that he will not transgress the workers' interests? Now, what if the worker should try to require of the minister or the inspector that he be released from the regulations, after "giving the assurance" that he will not transgress the factory owner's interests? Such a worker would very likely be considered insane.

That is called "the possession of equal rights" by the workers and the factory owners.

As to the extension of the fines regulations to important artisan establishments, these regulations, so far as is known, have hitherto (in 1893) only been applied to distribution offices which supply warp to home-working weavers. The ministers are in no hurry to extend the operation of the fines regulations. The entire mass of workers doing jobs at home for employers, big stores, etc., continue under the old conditions, totally subordinate to the tyranny of the employers. It is more difficult for these workers to join forces, to arrive at agreement as to their needs, to undertake a common struggle against oppression by the employers—that is why no attention is paid to them.

VIII

CONCLUSION

We have now acquainted ourselves with our fines laws and regulations, with all this exceptionally complicated system that frightens the worker away with its dryness and unattractive official language.

We can now return to the question raised at the outset, to that of fines being a product of capitalism, i.e., of such a social order under which the people are divided into two classes, the owners of the land, machines, mills and factories, materials and supplies—and those who have no property, and who therefore have to sell themselves to the capitalists and work for them.

Has it always been the case that workers in the service of an employer have had to pay him fines for all sorts of detects?

In small establishments—for example, among the urban artisans or workers—no fines are imposed. There is no complete alienation of the worker from the master, they live and work together. The master does not dream of introducing fines, because he himself keeps an eye on the job and can always force the correction of what he does not like.

But such small establishments and trades are gradually disappearing. The handicraftsmen and artisans, and also the small peasants, cannot withstand the competition of the big factories and big employers who use improved instruments and machines and combine the labour of masses of workers. That is why we see that handicraftsmen, artisans and peasants are increasingly being ruined, and are becoming workers in factories, are abandoning their villages and migrating to the towns.

At the big factories the relations between the employer and the workers are quite unlike those in the small workshops. The employer is so far above the worker in wealth and social status that a veritable abyss lies between them, and frequently they do not even know one another and have nothing in common. The worker has no opportunity of making his way into the employers' ranks: he is doomed to remain impoverished for all time, working for rich men whom he does not know. Instead of the two or three workers employed by the small master there are now masses of workers, who come from various localities and constantly replace one another. Instead of separate instructions from the master, general regulations appear that are made obligatory for all workers. The former constancy of the relations between master and worker disappears: the master sets no great store by the worker at all, because he can always easily find another one among the crowd of unemployed ready to hire themselves to anybody. Thus, the power of the employer over the workers increases, and the employer makes use of this power, resorting to fines in order to drive the worker into the narrow confines of factory work. The worker has to submit to this new limitation of his rights and of his earnings, because he is now helpless against the employer.

And so fines appeared on earth not very long ago—together with the big factories, together with large-scale

capitalism, together with the complete split between the rich masters and the ragged workers. Fines are the result of the complete development of capitalism and the complete enslavement of the worker.

However, this development of the big factories and intensification of pressure by the employers brought still other consequences in their train. The workers, totally helpless as against the factory owners, began to understand that utter disaster and poverty awaited them if they continued to be divided. The workers began to understand that there was only one means of saving themselves from the starvation and degeneration that capitalism held in store for them—and that was to join forces in order to fight the factory owners for higher wages and better living conditions.

We have seen what disgraceful oppression of the workers our factory owners resorted to in the eighties, how they turned fines into a means of lowering the workers' wages and did not confine themselves to just reducing rates. The oppression of the workers by the capitalists reached its apex.

But this oppression evoked the workers' resistance. The workers rose up against their oppressors and were victorious. The terrified government conceded their demands and hastened to issue a law regulating fines.

That was a concession to the workers. The government imagined that by issuing the fines laws and regulations, by introducing grants from the fines money it would immediately satisfy the workers and make them forget their common workers' cause, their struggle against the factory owners.

However, such hopes of the government, which poses as the protector of the workers, will not be justified. We have seen how unjust the new law is to the workers, how small are the concessions to the workers by comparison with even the demands advanced by the Morozov strikers; we have seen how loopholes were left everywhere for mill owners anxious to violate the law, how grants regulations that supplement the employers' tyranny with that of the officials were drawn up in the employers' interests.

When this law and these regulations are put into effect, when the workers acquaint themselves with them and begin to learn from their clashes with the managements how the law oppresses them, then they will begin steadily to realise

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

that they are in a position of dependence. They will understand that only poverty has compelled them to work for the rich and to be content with crumbs for their heavy labour. They will understand that the government and its officials are on the side of the factory owners, and that the laws are drawn up in such a way as to make it easier for the employer to oppress the worker.

And the workers will appreciate, finally, the point that the law does nothing to improve their status, so long as the workers' dependence on the capitalists continues to exist, because the law will always be partial to the capitalist employers, because the latter will always succeed in devising ruses for evading the law.

Once they have understood this, the workers will see that only one means remains for defending themselves, namely, to join forces for the struggle against the factory owners and the unjust practices established by the law.

GYMNASIUM FARMS AND CORRECTIVE GYMNASIA[25]

(*RUSSKOYE BOGATSTVO*)[26]

The solution to the problem of capitalism in Russia proposed by the Narodniks and represented latterly most strikingly by *Russkoye Bogatstvo* has long been known. While not denying the existence of capitalism, for they are compelled to admit its development, the Narodniks consider our capitalism not to be a natural and necessary process crowning the age-long development of commodity economy in Russia, but an accident, a phenomenon not firmly rooted and merely indicative of a departure from the path prescribed by the nation's entire historical life. "We must," say the Narodniks, "choose different paths for the fatherland," leave the capitalist path and "communalise" production, making use of the existing forces of the "whole" of "society," which, so they say, is already beginning to be convinced that there is no basis for capitalism.

Obviously, if a different path may be chosen for the fatherland, if the whole of society is beginning to understand the need for this, then the "communalising" of production presents no great difficulties and requires no preparatory historical period. One has only to draw up a plan of such communalisation and to convince the appropriate persons of its feasibility—and the "fatherland" will turn from the mistaken path of capitalism to the road of socialisation.

Everybody understands how tremendously interesting a plan must be that promises such radiant perspectives; that is why the Russian public should be very thankful to Mr. Yuzhakov, one of the regular contributors of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, for having undertaken the job of drawing up

such a plan. In the May issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* we find his article "Educational Utopia," with the sub-heading "Plan for Nation-Wide Compulsory Secondary Education."

What connection has this with the "communalising" of production?—the reader will ask. The most direct connection, since Mr. Yuzhakov's plan is a very broad one. The author plans to set up in every volost a gymnasium embracing the entire male and female population of school age (from 8 to 20 years, and to a maximum of 25 years). Such gymnasia should be productive associations that engage in farming and moral undertakings, that by their labour not only maintain the population of the gymnasia (which, according to Mr. Yuzhakov, constitutes *a fifth* of the entire population), but additionally provide resources for the maintenance of the *entire child population*. The detailed account made by the author for a typical volost gymnasium (or "gymnasium farm," or "agricultural gymnasium") shows that all in all the gymnasium will maintain *over a half of the entire local population*. If we bear in mind that each such gymnasium (20,000 dual, i.e., 20,000 male and 20,000 female gymnasia, are projected for Russia) is provided with land and means of production (it is intended to issue 4½ per cent government-guaranteed Zemstvo[27] bonds with ½ per cent redemption per annum)—then we shall understand how truly "enormous" the "plan" is. Production is socialised for a total of half the population. At one blow, then, a different path is chosen for the fatherland! And that is achieved "without any expenditure (sic!) on the part of the government, Zemstvo, or people." It "may seem a utopia only at first sight," but actually it is "far more feasible than nation-wide elementary education." Mr. Yuzhakov testifies that the financial operation required for this "is no chimera or utopia," and is achieved not only, as we have seen, without expenditure, without any expenditure, but even without any change in the "established educational plans"!! Mr. Yuzhakov quite justly remarks that "all this is of no little importance when one wishes not to confine oneself to an experiment, but to achieve really nation-wide education." He says, it is true, that "I have not set myself the aim of drawing up a working plan," but he does give us the proposed number of male and female pupils per gymnasium, an estimate of the

manpower required to maintain the entire population of the gymnasia and enumerations of the pedagogical and administrative staffs, and indicates both the rations in kind for gymnasia members and the salaries in cash for tutors, doctors, technicians and craftsmen. The author makes a detailed calculation of the number of working days required for agricultural pursuits, the amount of land needed for each gymnasium, and the financial resources needed to get them installed. He provides, on the one hand, for members of national minorities and sects who cannot enjoy the blessings of nation-wide secondary education, and, on the other hand, for persons excluded from the gymnasia because of bad conduct. The author's calculations are not confined to one typical gymnasium. Not at all. He raises the issue of establishing all the 20,000 dual gymnasia and indicates how to get the land required for this and how to secure a "satisfactory contingent of tutors, administrators and managers."

One can understand the enthralling interest of such a plan, an interest that is not only theoretical (evidently, the plan for communalising production drawn up so concretely is intended to finally convince all sceptics and to demolish all who deny the feasibility of such plans), but also genuinely practical. It would be strange if the supreme government paid no attention to the project for organising nationwide compulsory secondary education, particularly when the author of the proposal definitely asserts that the thing can be done "without any expenditure" and "will meet with obstacles not so much from the financial and economic circumstances of the task, as from the cultural circumstances," which, however, are "not insuperable." Such a project directly concerns not only the Ministry of Public Education, but equally the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, and even, as we shall see below, the War Ministry. The projected "corrective gymnasia" will, most likely, have to go to the Ministry of Justice. There can be no doubt that the rest of the ministries will also be interested in the project, which, in Mr. Yuzhakov's words, "will answer all the above-enumerated requirements (i.e., of education and maintenance) and, very likely, many others too."

We are therefore certain that the reader will not complain if we set about a detailed examination of this very striking project.

Mr. Yuzhakov's chief thought is the following: no studies whatever take place in the summer time, which is devoted to agricultural work. Further, pupils, on graduating the gymnasium, are left to work there for some time; they do winter work and are used for industrial jobs that supplement agricultural work and enable each gymnasium by its own labours to maintain all the pupils and workers, the entire teaching and administrative staff and to cover expenditure on education. Such gymnasia, Mr. Yuzhakov justly remarks, would be large agricultural artels. This last expression does not, by the way, leave the slightest doubt about our being right in regarding Mr. Yuzhakov's plan as the first steps in the Narodnik "communalisation" of production, as part of the new path that Russia is to choose so as to avoid the vicissitudes of capitalism.

"At the present time," argues Mr. Yuzhakov, "the pupils are graduated from the gymnasium at the age of 18 to 20, and occasionally there is a delay of one or two years. Under compulsory education ... the delay will become still more widespread. People will be graduated later, while the three senior classes will be made up of the 16- to 25-year age groups, if 25 years becomes the age limit, after reaching which they must leave without finishing the course. Thus, if we bear in mind the additional contingent of adult fifth-class pupils one may boldly consider about one-third of the pupils in the gymnasium to be ... of working age." Even if the proportion is reduced to one quarter, the author calculates further, by adding to the eight gymnasium classes the two classes for preparatory elementary school (illiterate eight-year-old children would be admitted), we would still get a very large number of workers who, assisted by semi-workers, could cope with the summer work. But the "ten-class gymnasium farm," Mr. Yuzhakov remarks justly, "necessarily requires a certain contingent of winter workers." Where are they to be got? The author proposes two solutions: 1) the hire of workers ("some of the more deserving of whom might be given a share in the proceeds"). The gymnasium farm should be a profitable undertaking and be able to pay for such

hire. But the author "considers another solution of greater importance": 2) those who have finished the gymnasium course will be obliged to work to cover the expenditure on their tuition and their keep while in the junior classes. That is their "direct duty," adds Mr. Yuzhakov—a duty, of course, only for those who cannot pay the cost of tuition. It is they who will constitute the necessary contingent of winter workers and the supplementary contingent of summer workers.

Such is the first feature of the projected organisation that is to "communalise" one-fifth of the population into agricultural artels. It already enables us to see what sort of different path for the fatherland will be chosen. Wage-labour, which at the present time serves as the only source of livelihood for people who "cannot pay the cost of tuition" and living, is replaced by compulsory unpaid labour. But we must not be disturbed by that: it should not be forgotten that in return the population will enjoy the blessings of universal secondary education.

To proceed. The author projects separate male and female gymnasia, intending to adopt the prejudice prevalent on the European continent against co-education, which actually would be more rational. "Fifty pupils per class or 500 for all the ten classes, or 1,000 per gymnasium farm (500 boys and 500 girls) will be quite a normal composition" for an average gymnasium. It will have 125 "pairs of workers" and a corresponding number of semi-workers. "If I mention," says Yuzhakov, "that this number of workers is capable of cultivating the 2,500 dessiatines of land under cultivation in Malorossiya* for example, everybody will understand what a tremendous force is provided by the labour of the gymnasium"!...

But in addition to these workers there will be "regular workers," who "work off" their education and keep. How many of them will there be? The number graduated annually will be 45 pupils, male and female. A third of the pupils will undergo military service for a period of three years (now a quarter do so. The author raises this number to one-third by cutting down the length of service to three years). "It will only be fair to place the remaining two-thirds in

* The Ukraine.—*Ed.*

similar conditions, i.e., in keeping them at the gymnasium to work off the cost of their education, and of the education of their comrades who have been called to the colours. All the girls may also be retained for the same purpose."

The pattern of the new system, arranged for the fatherland that has chosen a different path, is assuming increasingly clear outlines. Now all Russian citizens are obliged to undergo military service and, since the number of persons of military age is larger than the number of soldiers required, the latter are chosen by lot. In communalised production the recruits will also be selected by lot, but as for the rest, it is proposed "to place them in the same conditions," i.e., to make it obligatory for them to spend three years in service, not military, it is true, but doing work in the gymnasium. They have to work off the cost of keeping their comrades who have been called to the colours. Have all to do so? No. Only those who cannot pay the cost of the tuition. The author has already advanced this proviso above, and below we shall see that for people who are able to pay for tuition, he plans separate gymnasia altogether, of the old type. Why, the question arises, does the keep of comrades called to the colours have to be worked off by those who cannot pay the cost of tuition? and not by those who can? The reason is very understandable. If the gymnasium pupils are divided into paying and non-paying, it is evident that the contemporary structure of society will not be affected by the Reform; that is quite well understood by Mr. Yuzhakov himself. In that case, it is understandable that the state's general expenditure (on the soldiers) will be borne by those who are without the means of livelihood,* just as they bear it now in the shape, for example, of indirect taxes, etc. In what way is the new system different? In the fact that nowadays those who have no resources can sell their labour-power, while under the new system they will be *obliged* to work *gratis* (i.e., for their keep alone). There cannot be the slightest doubt that Russia will thus avoid all the vicissitudes of the capitalist system. Hired labour, which contains the threat of the "ulcer of the

* Otherwise the domination of the former over the latter would not be maintained.

proletariat" is driven out and makes way for ... unpaid compulsory labour.

And there is nothing surprising in the fact that people placed in relationships in which labour is compulsory and unpaid should find themselves in conditions corresponding to these relationships. Just listen to what we are told by the Narodnik ("friend of the people") immediately after the foregoing:

"If marriages are allowed between young people who have finished the course and remain at the gymnasium for three years; if separate premises are arranged for the family workers; and if the profits of the gymnasium allow them to be given at least a modest allowance in cash and kind when they leave it, then such a three years' stay there will be far less burdensome than military service...."

Is it not obvious that such advantageous conditions will impel the population to bend every effort to gain admittance to the gymnasia? Judge for yourselves: firstly, they will be permitted to marry. True, according to the now existing civil legislation such permission (from the authorities) is not required at all. But bear in mind that these will be *gymnasium pupils*, *male* and *female*, true, as old as 25 years, but still gymnasium pupils. If university students are not permitted to marry, could gymnasium pupils be permitted to do so? And what is more, the permission will depend on the school authorities, consequently, on people with a higher education: obviously, there are no grounds for fearing abuses. Those who graduate the gymnasium and remain as regular workers there, are, however, no longer pupils. Nevertheless, they too, people between 21 and 27 years of age, have to obtain permission to marry. We cannot but recognise that the new path selected by the fatherland involves some curtailment of the civil rights of Russian citizens, but, after all, it must be admitted that the blessings of universal secondary education cannot be acquired without sacrifices. Secondly, separate premises will be provided for family workers, probably no worse than the cubicles now inhabited by factory workers. And thirdly, the regular workers get a "modest allowance" for this. Undoubtedly, the population will prefer the advantages of a quiet life under the wing of the authorities to the turmoils of capitalism, will prefer

them to such a degree that some worker's will stay permanently at the gymnasium (very likely out of gratitude for being allowed to marry): "The small contingent of regular workers, who remain at the gymnasium altogether and associate (sic!!) themselves with it, supplements these labour forces of the gymnasium farm. Such are the possible and by no means utopian labour forces of our agricultural gymnasium."

Have mercy on us! What is there "utopian" in all this? Regular unpaid workers, who have "associated themselves" with their masters, by whom they are permitted to marry—just ask any old peasant, and he will tell you from his own experience that all this is quite feasible.

(*To be continued.*)*

Written in autumn 1895

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* No continuation followed in the newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik*.—*Ed.*

TO THE WORKING MEN AND WOMEN OF THE THORNTON FACTORY[28]

Working men and women of the Thornton Factory!

November 6th and 7th should be memorable days for all of us.... The weavers, by their solid resistance to the employer's pressure have proved that at a difficult moment there are still people in our midst who can uphold our common interests as workers, that our worthy employers have not yet succeeded in turning us for all time into the miserable slaves of their bottomless purses. Let us, then, comrades, stand firm and steadfast and carry on to the very end, let us remember that we can improve our conditions only by our common and concerted efforts. Above all, comrades, don't fall into the trap so cunningly prepared for you by Messrs. Thornton. They reason as follows: "There is a hitch now in disposing of our goods, so that if we keep to our previous working conditions we shall not get the profits we got previously.... And we are not ready to take anything less.... So then, we'll have to tighten up on the workers, let them shoulder the cost of the bad prices on the market.... But the job has to be done cleverly and not in any old way, so that the worker, in the simplicity of his mind, will not understand what sort of a titbit we are preparing for him.... If we tackle all of them at once, they will all rise up at once, and we shan't be able to handle them, so we shall first dupe those miserable weavers, and then the others won't get away.... We are not accustomed to restrain ourselves in dealing with these creatures, and what for, anyhow? New brooms sweep cleaner here...." So then, the employers, who are so full of con-

cern for the worker's well-being, want to quietly and steadily impose on the workers of all departments what they have already imposed on the weavers.... That is why, if we all remain indifferent to the fate of the weaving sheds, we shall dig with our own hands a pit into which we, too, shall soon be thrown, Latterly the weavers have been earning, in round figures, 3 rubles 50 kopeks a fortnight, and during the same period families of seven have contrived somehow to live on 5 rubles, and families consisting of husband, wife and child on 2 rubles in all. They have sold the last of their clothes and used up the last coppers they earned by their hellish labour at a time when their benefactors, the Thorntons, were adding millions to the millions they already had. To crown it all ever-new victims of the employers' avarice have been thrown out on the streets before their eyes, and the pressure has been regularly increased with the most heartless cruelty.... Without any explanation, they have started mixing noils[29] and clippings with the wool, which slows the job down terribly; delays in getting the warp have increased as though inadvertently; finally, they have begun without ado to introduce short time, and now the pieces have to be five instead of nine schmitz[30] long, so that the weaver has to fuss around longer and oftener in obtaining and fixing the warps, for which, as is known, not a kopek is paid. They want to wear our weavers down, and the earnings of 1 ruble 62 kopeks per fortnight, which have already begun to appear in the pay-books of some of the weavers, may, in the near future, become general in the weaving sheds.... Comrades, do you, too, want to see the day when you get this sort of kindness from the employers? If not, if, finally, your hearts have not entirely turned to stone in face of the suffering of poor folks like yourselves, rally solidly round our weavers, let us put forward our common demands, and on every suitable occasion let us wrest better conditions from our oppressors. Workers of the spinning sheds, don't delude yourselves about the stability and slight increase in your earnings.... After all, almost two-thirds of your number have already been dismissed, and your better earnings have been purchased at the cost of the starvation of your own spinners who have been thrown out of work. This again is a cunning trick of the employers and is not difficult to

understand if you only count how much was earned by the entire mule-spinning department previously, and how much now. Workers of the new dyeing department! Twelve rubles a month, all told, is what you now earn, at the cost of 14¼ hours' daily work, saturated from head to foot with the murderous fumes of dyes! Pay attention to our demands: we also want to end the illegal deductions made from you due to your foreman's inefficiency. Labourers, and all unskilled workers generally! Do you really expect to retain your 60-80 kopeks a day, when the skilled weaver has to content himself with 20 kopeks a day? Comrades, don't be blind, don't swallow the employers' bait, stand up for one another more firmly, otherwise it will go badly for all of us this winter. We must all keep a most watchful eye on the employers' manoeuvres aimed at reducing rates, and with all our strength resist every tendency in this direction for it spells ruin for us.... Turn a deaf ear to all their pleadings about business being bad: for them it only means less profit on their capital, for us it means starvation and suffering for our families who are deprived of their last crust of stale bread. Can there be any comparison between the two things? They are now putting pressure on the weavers first of all, and we must secure:

1) an increase in weavers' rates to their spring level, i.e., by about 6 kopeks per schmitz;

2) that the weavers, too, be brought under the law which says that the worker must be told how much he can earn on a job before he begins it. Let the rates list, bearing the factory inspector's signature, exist not only on paper, but in reality, as required by law. For weaving, for example, the existing rates should be accompanied by information about the quality of the wool, the quantity of noils and clippings in it, and there should be an estimate of the time required for preparatory work;

3) that the working time be so distributed that we do not stand idle through no fault of our own; now, for example, things are so arranged that on each piece the weaver loses a day waiting for warp, and since the piece is becoming almost half its former size, the weaver will suffer a double loss, regardless of the rates list. If the boss wants to rifle our earnings this way, let him do so outright, in such a

manner that we definitely know what he wants to squeeze out of us;

4) that the factory inspector sees to it that there is no trickery about the rates, that there are no double rates. That means, for example, that the rates list should not contain two different rates for one and the same kind of article, only with different names. For example, we got 4 rubles 32 kopeks a piece for weaving Bieber, and only 4 rubles 14 kopeks for Ural,[31]—yet as far as work goes isn't it one and the same thing? A still more impudent piece of trickery is the double price given for goods of one denomination. That way Messrs. Thornton dodged the fines laws, which state that a fine may only be imposed for such damage as results from the worker's carelessness and that the deduction has to be recorded in his pay-book under the heading "fines" not later than three days after it is imposed. A strict record has to be kept of all the fines, the total sum of which is not to go into the employer's pocket, but must be used to cover the needs of the workers of the factory concerned. With us, however—we have but to look at our books—there are empty spaces, there are no fines, and one might think our employers are the most kind-hearted of all. Actually, however, due to our lack of knowledge, they dodge the law and easily fix things to suit themselves.... We are not fined, you see, yet deductions are made from us, the smaller rate being paid and as long as two rates have existed, a smaller and a bigger one, there has been nothing at all to cavil at, they have kept on deducting the money and putting it into their own pockets;

5) that in addition to introducing a single rate, let each deduction be registered in the fines column, with an indication of why it is made.

Then wrong fining will be obvious, less of our work will be done for nothing, and there will be a drop in the number of disgraceful things being done now, as, for example, in the dyeing department, where the workers' earnings are lower on account of the foreman's inefficiency, which cannot, according to law, be a reason for non-payment of labour, since there can be no question here of the worker's carelessness. And haven't all of us had deductions for which we are not in the least to blame?

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6) we demand that the payment we make for lodgings be on the pre-1891 level, that is to say, one ruble per person per month, because our earnings being what they are we positively have nothing to pay the two rubles with, and in any case, what for?... For the filthy, smelly, crowded kennel always in danger of fire? Don't forget, comrades, that all over St. Petersburg it is considered enough to pay a ruble a month, and that only our considerate bosses are not satisfied with that—so we must force them here, too, to cut down their greed. In defending these demands, comrades, we are not rebelling at all; we are merely demanding that we be given what all the workers of other factories now enjoy by law, the return of what has been taken from us by those who placed all their hopes on our inability to uphold our own rights. Let us, then, show on this occasion that our "benefactors" are mistaken.

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to the text of the leaflet,
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WHAT ARE OUR MINISTERS THINKING ABOUT?[32]

Written at the end of 1895
for the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo*
First published in 1924

Published according to a copy
found in the archives
of the Police Department

Minister of Internal Affairs Durnovo wrote a letter to Procurator General of the Holy Synod Pobedonostsev. The letter, numbered 2603, was written on March 18, 1895, and bears the inscription "strictly confidential." The minister, therefore, wanted the letter to remain a strict secret. But there proved to be people who do not share the minister's views that Russian citizens should not know the government's intentions, with the result that a handwritten copy of this letter is now circulating everywhere.

What did Mr. Durnovo write to Mr. Pobedonostsev about?

He wrote to him about the Sunday schools. The letter reads: "Information secured during recent years goes to show that, following the example of the sixties, politically unreliable individuals and also a section of the student youth of a certain trend, are endeavouring to enter the Sunday schools as teachers, lecturers, librarians, etc. This concerted attempt, which cannot be inspired by a desire to earn money since the duties in such schools are undertaken gratis, proves that the activity above indicated, on the part of anti-government elements, constitutes a legal means of struggle against the system of state and public order existing in Russia."

That is how the minister argues. Among educated people there are those who want to share their knowledge with the workers, who want their knowledge to be of benefit not to themselves alone, but to the people—and the minister immediately decides that there are "anti-government elements" here, i.e., that it is conspirators of some kind who

are inciting people to enter the Sunday schools. Could not the desire to teach others really arise in the minds of some educated people without incitement? But the minister is disturbed because the Sunday-school teachers get no salaries. He is accustomed to the spies and officials in his service only working for their salaries, working for whoever pays them best, whereas all of a sudden people work, render services, teach, and all ... gratis. Suspicious! thinks the minister, and sends spies to explore the matter. The letter goes on to say: "It is established from the following information" (received from spies, whose existence is justified by the receipt of salaries) "that not only do persons of a dangerous trend find their way into the teachers' ranks, but often the schools themselves are under the unofficial direction of a whole group of unreliable persons, who have no connection at all with the official personnel, who deliver lectures in the evenings and give lessons to the pupils on the invitation of the men and women teachers they themselves have installed there.... The fact that outside people are allowed to give lectures offers full scope for the infiltration of persons from frankly revolutionary circles as lecturers."

So then, if "outside people," who have not been endorsed and examined by priests and spies, want to give lessons to workers—that is downright revolution! The minister regards the workers as gunpowder, and knowledge and education as a spark; the minister is convinced that if the spark falls into the gunpowder, the explosion will be directed first and foremost against the government.

We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of noting that in this rare instance we totally and unconditionally agree with the views of His Excellency.

Further in his letter the minister cites "proofs" of the correctness of his "information." Fine proofs they are!

Firstly, "a letter of a Sunday-school teacher whose name has still not been ascertained." The letter was confiscated during a search. It refers to a programme of history lectures, to the idea of the enslaving and emancipation of the social estates, and reference is made to the revolt of Razin and of Pugachov.[33]

Evidently these latter names scared the good minister so much that he very likely had a nightmare of peasants armed with pitchforks.

The second proof:

"The Ministry of Internal Affairs is in possession of a programme, privately received, for public lectures in a Moscow Sunday school on the following points: 'The origin of society. Primitive society. The development of social organisation. The state and what it is needed for. Order. Liberty. Justice. Forms of political structure. Absolute and constitutional monarchy. Labour—the basis of the general welfare. Usefulness and wealth. Production, exchange and capital. How wealth is distributed. The pursuit of private interest. Property and the need for it. Emancipation of the peasants together with the land. Rent, profit, wages. What do wages and their various forms depend on? Thrift.'

"The lectures in this programme, which is undoubtedly unfit for an elementary school, give the lecturer every opportunity gradually to acquaint his pupils with the theories of Karl Marx, Engels, etc., while the person present on behalf of the diocesan authorities will hardly be in a position to detect the elements of Social-Democratic propaganda in the lectures."

The minister is evidently very much afraid of the "theories of Marx and Engels," if he notices "elements" of them even in the sort of programme where not a trace of them is to be seen. What did the minister find "unfit" in it? Very likely the problem of the forms of political structure and the constitution.

Just take any geography textbook, Mr. Minister, and you will find those problems dealt with there! May adult workers not know the things that children are taught?

But the minister places no reliance on persons from the Diocesan Department: "They will very likely fail to understand what is said."

The letter ends with an enumeration of the "unreliable" teachers at the parish Sunday school of the Moscow mill of the Prokhorov Textile Company, the Sunday school in the town of Yelets and the proposed school in Tiflis. Mr. Durnovo advises Mr. Pobedonostsev to undertake "a detailed check

of the individuals permitted to take classes in the schools." Now, when you read the list of teachers, your hair stands on end: all you get is ex-student, again an ex-student, and still again an ex-student of Courses for Ladies. The minister would like the tutors to be ex-drill sergeants.

It is with particular horror that the minister says that the school in Yelets "is situated beyond the river Sosna, where the population is mainly the common" (o horror!) "and working people, and where the railway workshops are."

The schools must be kept as far away as possible from the "common and working people."

Workers! You see how mortally terrified are our ministers at the working people acquiring knowledge! Show everybody, then, that no power will succeed in depriving the workers of class-consciousness! Without knowledge the workers are defenceless, with knowledge they are a force!

DRAFT AND EXPLANATION OF A PROGRAMME FOR THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY[34]

Written in prison in 1895-96
First published in 1924

The *Draft Programme* is published according to the manuscript written in invisible ink between the lines of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*,[35] No. 5, 1900 and the *Explanation of the Programme*, according to a hectographed notebook

DRAFT PROGRAMME

A. 1. Big factories are developing in Russia with ever-growing rapidity, ruining the small handicraftsmen and peasants, turning them into propertyless workers, and driving ever-increasing numbers of the people to the cities, factory and industrial villages and townlets.

2. This growth of capitalism signifies an enormous growth of wealth and luxury among a handful of factory owners, merchants and landowners, and a still more rapid growth of the poverty and oppression of the workers. The improvements in production and the machinery introduced in the big factories, while facilitating a rise in the productivity of social labour, serve to strengthen the power of the capitalists over the workers, to increase unemployment and with it to accentuate the defenceless position of the workers.

3. But while carrying the oppression of labour by capital to the highest pitch, the big factories are creating a special class of workers which is enabled to wage a struggle against capital, because their very conditions of life are destroying all their ties with their own petty production, and, by uniting the workers through their common labour and transferring them from factory to factory, are welding masses of working folk together. The workers are beginning a struggle against the capitalists, and an intense urge for unity is appearing among them. Out of the isolated revolts of the workers is growing the struggle of the Russian working class.

4. This struggle of the working class against the capitalist class is a struggle against all classes who live by the labour of others, and against all exploitation. It can only end

in the passage of political power into the hands of the working class, the transfer of all the land, instruments, factories, machines, and mines to the whole of society for the organisation of socialist production, under which all that is produced by the workers and all improvements in production must benefit the working people themselves.

5. The movement of the Russian working class is, according to its character and aims, part of the international (Social-Democratic) movement of the working class of all countries.

6. The main obstacle in the struggle of the Russian working class for its emancipation is the absolutely autocratic government and its irresponsible officials. Basing itself on the privileges of the landowners and capitalists and on subservience to their interests, it denies the lower classes any rights whatever and thus fetters the workers' movement and retards the development of the entire people. That is why the struggle of the Russian working class for its emancipation necessarily gives rise to the struggle against the absolute power of the autocratic government.

B. 1. The Russian Social-Democratic Party declares that its aim is to assist this struggle of the Russian working class by developing the class-consciousness of the workers, by promoting their organisation, and by indicating the aims and objects of the struggle.

2. The struggle of the Russian working class for its emancipation is a political struggle, and its first aim is to achieve political liberty.

3. That is why the Russian Social-Democratic Party will, without separating itself from the working-class movement, support every social movement against the absolute power of the autocratic government, against the class of privileged landed nobility and against all the vestiges of serfdom and the social-estate system which hinder free competition.

4. On the other hand, the Russian Social-Democratic workers' party will wage war against all endeavours to patronise the labouring classes with the guardianship of the absolute government and its officials, all endeavours to retard the development of capitalism, and consequently the development of the working class.

5. The emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself.

6. What the Russian people need is not the help of the absolute government and its officials, but emancipation from oppression by it.

C. Making these views its starting-point, the Russian Social-Democratic Party demands first and foremost:

1. The convening of a Zemsky Sobor made up of representatives of all citizens so as to draw up a constitution.

2. Universal and direct suffrage for all citizens of Russia who have reached 21 years of age, irrespective of religion or nationality.

3. Freedom of assembly and organisation, and the right to strike.

4. Freedom of the press.

5. Abolition of social estates, and complete equality of all citizens before the law.

6. Freedom of religion and equality of all nationalities. Transfer of the registration of births, marriages and deaths to independent civic officials, independent, that is, of the police.

7. Every citizen to have the right to prosecute any official, without having to complain to the latter's superiors.

8. Abolition of passports, full freedom of movement and residence.

9. Freedom of trades and occupations and abolition of guilds.

D. For the workers, the Russian Social-Democratic Party demands:

1. Establishment of industrial courts in all industries, with elected judges from the capitalists and workers, in equal numbers.

2. Legislative limitation of the working day to 8 hours.

3. Legislative prohibition of night work and shifts. Prohibition of work by children under 15 years of age.

4. Legislative enactment of national holidays.

5. Application of factory laws and factory inspection to all industries throughout Russia, and to government factories, and also to handicraftsmen who work at home.

6. The Factory Inspectorate must be independent and not be under the Ministry of Finance. Members of industrial

courts must enjoy equal rights with the Factory Inspectorate in ensuring the observance of factory laws.

7. Absolute prohibition everywhere of the truck system.

8. Supervision, by workers' elected representatives, of the proper fixing of rates, the rejection of goods, the expenditure of accumulated fines and the factory-owned workers' quarters.

A law that all deductions from workers' wages, whatever the reason for their imposition (fines, rejects, etc.), shall not exceed the sum of 10 kopeks per ruble all told.

9. A law making the employers responsible for injuries to workers, the employer being required to prove that the worker is to blame.

10. A law making the employers responsible for maintaining schools and providing medical aid to the workers.

E. For the peasants, the Russian Social-Democratic Party demands:

1. Abolition of land redemption payments[36] and compensation to the peasants for redemption payments made. Return to the peasants of excess payments made to the Treasury.

2. Return to the peasants of their lands cut off in 1861.

3. Complete equality of taxation of the peasants' and landlords' lands.

4. Abolition of collective responsibility[37] and of all laws that prevent the peasants from doing as they will with their lands.

EXPLANATION OF THE PROGRAMME

The programme is divided into three main parts. Part one sets forth all the tenets from which the remaining parts of the programme follow. This part indicates the position occupied by the working class in contemporary society, the meaning and significance of their struggle against the employers and the political position of the working class in the Russian state.

Part two sets forth the *Party's aim*, and indicates the Party's relation to other political trends in Russia. It deals with what should be the activity of the Party and of all class-conscious workers, and what should be their

attitude to the interests and strivings of the other classes in Russian society.

Part three contains the Party's practical demands. This part is divided into three sections. The first section contains demands for nation-wide reforms. The second section states the demands and programme of the working class. The third section contains demands in the interests of the peasants. Some preliminary explanations of the sections are given below, before proceeding to the practical part of the programme.

A 1. The programme deals first of all with the rapid growth of big factories, because this is the main thing in contemporary Russia that is completely changing all the old conditions of life, particularly the living conditions of the labouring class. Under the old conditions practically all the country's wealth was produced by petty proprietors, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. The population lived an immobile life in the villages, the greater part of their produce being either for their own consumption, or for the small market of neighbouring villages which had little contact with other nearby markets. These very same petty proprietors worked for the landlords, who compelled them to produce mainly for their consumption. Domestic produce was handed over for processing to artisans, who also lived in the villages or travelled in the neighbouring areas to get work.

But after the peasants were emancipated, these living conditions of the mass of the people underwent a complete change: the small artisan establishments began to be replaced by big factories, which grew with extraordinary rapidity; they ousted the petty proprietors, turning them into wage-workers, and compelled hundreds and thousands of workers to work together, producing tremendous quantities of goods that are being sold all over Russia.

The emancipation of the peasants destroyed the immobility of the population and placed the peasants in conditions under which they could no longer get a livelihood from the patches of land that remained in their possession. Masses of people left home to seek a livelihood, making for the factories or for jobs on the construction of the railways which connect the different corners of Russia and carry the output

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of the big factories everywhere. Masses of people went to jobs in the towns, took part in building factory and commercial premises, in delivering fuel to factories, and in preparing raw materials for them. Finally, many people were occupied at home, doing jobs for merchants and factory owners who could not expand their establishments fast enough. Similar changes took place in agriculture; the landlords began to produce grain for sale, big cultivators from among the peasants and merchants came on the scene, and grain in hundreds of millions of poods began to be sold abroad. Production required wage-workers, and hundreds of thousands and millions of peasants, giving up their tiny allotments, went to work as regular or day labourers for the new masters engaged in producing grain for sale. Now it is these changes in the old way of life that are described by the programme, which says that the big factories are ruining the small handicraftsmen and peasants, turning them into wage-workers. Small-scale production is being replaced everywhere by large-scale, and in this large-scale production the masses of the workers are just hirelings employed for wages by the capitalist, who possesses enormous capital, builds enormous workshops, buys up huge quantities of materials and fills his pockets with all the profit from this mass-scale production by the combined workers. Production has become capitalist, and it exerts merciless and ruthless pressure on all the petty proprietors, destroying their immobile life in the villages, compelling them to travel from one end of the country to the other as ordinary unskilled labourers, selling their labour-power to capital. An ever-increasing part of the population is being separated once and for all from the countryside and from agriculture, and is concentrating in the towns, factory and industrial villages and townlets, forming a special propertyless class of people, a class of hired proletarian workers, who live only by the sale of their labour-power.

These are what constitute the tremendous changes in the country's life brought about by the big factories—small-scale production is being replaced by large-scale, the petty proprietors are turning into wage-workers. What, then, does this change mean for the whole of the work-

ing population, and where is it leading? This is dealt with further in the programme.

A 2. Accompanying the replacement of small- by large-scale production is the replacement of small financial resources in the hands of the individual proprietor by enormous sums employed as capital, the replacement of small, insignificant profits by profits running into millions. That is why the growth of capitalism is leading everywhere to the growth of luxury and riches. A whole class of big financial magnates, factory owners, railway owners, merchants, and bankers has arisen in Russia, a whole class of people who live off income derived from money capital loaned on interest to industrialists has arisen; the big landowners have become enriched, drawing large sums from the peasants by way of land redemption payments, taking advantage of their need of land to raise the price of the land leased to them, and setting up large beet-sugar refineries and distilleries on their estates. The luxury and extravagance of all these wealthy classes have reached unparalleled dimensions, and the main streets of the big cities are lined with their princely mansions and luxurious palaces. But as capitalism grew, the workers' conditions became steadily worse. If earnings increased in some places following the peasants' emancipation, they did so very slightly and not for long, because the mass of hungry people swarming in from the villages forced rates down, while the cost of foodstuffs and necessities continued to go up, so that even with their increased wages the workers got fewer means of subsistence; it became increasingly difficult to find jobs, and side by side with the luxurious mansions of the rich (or on city outskirts) there grew up the slums where the workers were forced to live in cellars, in overcrowded, damp and cold dwellings, and even in dug-outs near the new industrial establishments. As capital grew bigger it increased its pressure on the workers, turning them into paupers, compelling them to devote all their time to the factory, and forcing the workers' wives and children to go to work. This, therefore, is the first change towards which the growth of capitalism is leading: tremendous wealth is accumulating in the coffers of a small handful of capitalists, while the masses of the people are being turned into paupers.

The second change consists in the fact that the replacement of small- by large-scale production has led to many improvements in production. First of all, work done singly, separately in each little workshop, in each isolated little household, has been replaced by the work of combined labourers working together at one factory, for one landowner, for one contractor. Joint labour is far more effective (productive) than individual, and renders it possible to produce goods with far greater ease and rapidity. But all these improvements are enjoyed by the capitalist alone, who pays the workers next to nothing and appropriates all the profit deriving from the workers' combined labour. The capitalist gets still stronger and the worker gets still weaker because he becomes accustomed to doing some one kind of work and it is more difficult for him to transfer to another job, to change his occupation.

Another, far more important, improvement in production is the introduction of *machines* by the capitalist. The effectiveness of labour is increased manifold by the use of machines; but the capitalist turns all this benefit against the worker: taking advantage of the fact that machines require less physical labour, he assigns women and children to them, and pays them less. Taking advantage of the fact that where machines are used far fewer workers are wanted, he throws them out of the factory in masses and then takes advantage of this unemployment to enslave the worker still further, to increase the working day, to deprive the worker of his night's rest and to turn him into a simple appendage to the machine. Unemployment, created by machinery and constantly on the increase, now makes the worker utterly defenceless. His skill loses its worth, he is easily replaced by a plain unskilled labourer, who quickly becomes accustomed to the machine and gladly undertakes the job for lower wages. Any attempt to resist increased oppression by the capitalist leads to dismissal. On his own the worker is quite helpless against capital, and the machine threatens to crush him.

A 3. In explaining the previous point, we showed that on his own the worker is helpless and defenceless against the capitalist who introduces machines. The worker has at all costs to seek means of resisting the capitalist, in order

to defend himself. And he finds such means in *organisation*. Helpless on his own, the worker becomes a force when organised with his comrades, and is enabled to fight the capitalist and resist his onslaught.

Organisation becomes a necessity for the worker, now faced by big capital. But is it possible to organise a motley mass of people who are strangers to one another, even if they work in one factory? The programme indicates the conditions that prepare the workers for unity and develop in them the capacity and ability to organise. These conditions are as follows: 1) the large factory, with machine production that requires regular work the whole year round, completely breaks the tie between the worker and the land and his own farm, turning him into an absolute proletarian. The fact of each farming for himself on a patch of land divided the workers and gave each one of them a certain specific interest, separate from that of his fellow worker, and was thus an obstacle to organisation. The worker's break with the land destroys these obstacles. 2) Further, the joint work of hundreds and thousands of workers in itself accustoms the workers to discuss their needs jointly, to take joint action, and clearly shows them the identity of the position and interests of the entire mass of workers. 3) Finally, constant transfers of workers from factory to factory accustom them to compare the conditions and practices in the different factories and enable them to convince themselves of the identical nature of the exploitation in all factories, to acquire the experience of other workers in their clashes with the capitalist, and thus enhance the solidarity of the workers. Now it is because of these conditions, taken together, that the appearance of big factories has given rise to the organisation of the workers. Among the Russian workers unity is expressed mainly and most frequently in strikes (we shall deal further with the reason why organisation in the shape of unions or mutual benefit societies is beyond the reach of our workers). The more the big factories develop, the more frequent, powerful and stubborn become the workers' strikes; the greater the oppression of capitalism and the greater the need for joint resistance by the workers. Strikes and isolated revolts of the workers, as the programme states, now constitute the

most widespread phenomenon in Russian factories. But, with the further growth of capitalism and the increasing frequency of strikes, they prove inadequate. The employers take joint action against them: they conclude agreements among themselves, bring in workers from other areas, and turn for assistance to those who run the machinery of state, who help them crush the workers' resistance. Instead of being faced by the one individual owner of each separate factory, the workers are now faced by the *entire capitalist class* and the government that assists it. The entire *capitalist class* undertakes a struggle against the entire *working class*; it devises common measures against the strikes, presses the government to adopt anti-working-class legislation, transfers factories to more out-of-the-way localities, and resorts to the distribution of jobs among people working at home and to a thousand and one other ruses and devices against the workers. The organisation of the workers of a separate factory, even of a separate industry, proves inadequate for resisting the entire capitalist class, and joint action by the *entire working class* becomes absolutely necessary. Thus, out of the isolated revolts of the workers grows the struggle of the entire working class. The struggle of the workers against the employers turns into a *class struggle*. All the employers are united by the one interest of keeping the workers in a state of subordination and of paying them the minimum wages possible. And the employers see that the only way they can safeguard their interests is by joint action on the part of the entire employing class, by acquiring influence over the machinery of state. The workers are likewise bound together by a common interest, that of preventing themselves being crushed by capital, of upholding their right to life and to a human existence. And the workers likewise become convinced that they, too, need unity, joint action by the entire class, the working class, and that to that end they must secure influence over the machinery of state.

A 4. We have explained how and why the struggle between the factory workers and the employers becomes a class struggle, a struggle of the working class—the proletarians—against the capitalist class—the bourgeoisie. The question arises, what significance has this struggle for the entire people and for all working people? Under the

contemporary conditions, of which we have already spoken in the explanation of point 1, production by wage-workers increasingly ousts petty economy. The number of people *who live by wage-labour* grows rapidly, and not only does the number of regular factory workers increase, but there is a still greater increase in the number of peasants who also have to search for work as wage-labourers, in order to live. At the present time, work for hire, work for the capitalist, has already become the most widespread form of labour. The domination of capital over labour embraces the bulk of the population not only in industry, but also in agriculture. Now it is this exploitation of wage-labour underlying contemporary society that the big factories develop to the utmost. All the methods of exploitation used by all capitalists in all industries, and which the entire mass of Russia's working-class population suffers from, are concentrated, intensified, made the regular rule right in the factory and spread to all aspects of the worker's labour and life, they create a whole routine, a whole system whereby the capitalist sweats the worker. Let us illustrate this with an example: at all times and places, anybody who undertakes work for hire, rests, leaves his work on a holiday if it is celebrated in the neighbourhood: It is quite different in the factory. Once the factory management has engaged a worker, it disposes of his services just as it likes, paying no attention to the worker's habits, to his customary way of life, to his family position, to his intellectual requirements. The factory drives the employee to work when it needs his labour, compelling him to fit in his entire life with its requirements, to tear his rest hours to pieces, and, if he is on shifts, to work at night and on holidays. All the imaginable abuses relating to working time are set into motion by the factory and at the same time it introduces its "rules," its "practices," which are obligatory for every worker. The order of things in the factory is deliberately adapted to squeezing out of the hired worker all the labour he is capable of yielding, to squeezing it out at top speed and then to throwing him out! Another example. Everybody who takes a job, undertakes, of course, to submit to the employer, to do everything he is ordered. But when anybody hires himself out on a temporary job, he does not surrender his will at all; if he finds his employer's

demands wrong or excessive, he leaves him. The factory, on the other hand, demands that the worker surrender his will altogether; it introduces discipline within its walls, compels the worker to start or to stop work when the bell rings, assumes the right itself to punish the worker, and subjects him to a fine or a deduction for every violation of rules which it has itself drawn up. The worker becomes part of a huge aggregate of machinery. He must be just as obedient, enslaved, and without a will of his own, as the machine itself.

Yet another example. Anybody who takes a job has frequent occasion to be dissatisfied with his employer, and complains about him to the court or a government official. Both the official and the court usually settle the dispute in the employer's favour, support him, but this promotion of the employer's interests is not based on a general regulation or a law, but on the subservience of individual officials, who at different times protect him to a greater or lesser degree, and who settle matters unjustly in the employer's favour, either because they are acquaintances of his, or because they are uninformed about working conditions and cannot understand the worker. Each separate case of such injustice depends on each separate clash between the worker and the employer, on each separate official. The factory, on the other hand, gathers together such a mass of workers, carries oppression to such a pitch, that it becomes impossible to examine every separate case. General regulations are established, a law is drawn up on relations between the workers and the employers, a law that is obligatory for all. In this law the promotion of the employer's interests is backed up by the authority of the state. The injustice of individual officials is replaced by the injustice of the law itself. Regulations appear, for example, of the following type: if the worker is absent from work, he not only loses wages, but has to pay a fine in addition, whereas the employer pays nothing if he sends the workers home for lack of work; the employer may dismiss the worker for using strong language, whereas the worker cannot leave the job if he is similarly treated; the employer is entitled on his own authority to impose fines, make deductions or demand that overtime be worked, etc.

All these examples show us how the factory intensifies the exploitation of the workers and makes this exploitation universal, makes a whole "*system*" of it. The worker now has to deal, willy-nilly, not with an individual employer and his will and oppression, but with the arbitrary treatment and oppression he suffers from the entire employing class. The worker sees that his oppressors are not some one capitalist, but the entire capitalist class, because the system of exploitation is the same in all establishments. The individual capitalist cannot even depart from this system: if, for example, he were to take it into his head to reduce working hours, his goods would cost him more than those produced by his neighbour, another factory owner, who makes his employees work longer for the same wage. To secure an improvement in his conditions, the worker now has to deal with the entire social system aimed at the exploitation of labour by capital. The worker is now confronted not by the individual injustice of an individual official, but by the injustice of the state authority itself, which takes the entire capitalist class under its protection and issues laws, obligatory for all, that serve the interests of that class. Thus, the struggle of the factory workers against the employers inevitably turns into a struggle against the entire capitalist class, against the entire social order based on the exploitation of labour by capital. That is why the workers' struggle acquires a social significance, becomes a struggle on behalf of all working people against all classes that live by the labour of others. That is why the workers' struggle opens up a new era in Russian history and is the dawn of the workers' emancipation.

What, however, is the domination of the capitalist class over the entire mass of working folk based on? It is based on the fact that all the factories, mills, mines, machines, and instruments of labour are in the hands of the capitalists, are their private property; on the fact that they possess enormous quantities of land (of all the land in European Russia, more than one-third belongs to landed proprietors, who do not number half a million). The workers possess no instruments of labour or materials, and so they have to sell their labour-power to the capitalists, who only pay the workers what is necessary for their keep, and place all the surplus

produced by labour in their pockets; thus they pay for only part of the working time they use, and appropriate the rest. The entire increase in wealth resulting from the combined labour of the masses of workers or from improvements in production goes to the capitalist class, while the workers, who toil from generation to generation, remain propertyless proletarians. That is why there is only one way of ending the exploitation of labour by capital, and that is to abolish the private ownership of the instruments of labour, to hand over all the factories, mills, mines, and also all the big estates, etc., to the whole of society and to conduct socialist production in common, directed by the workers themselves. The articles produced by labour in common will then go to benefit the working people themselves, while the surplus they produce over and above their keep will serve to satisfy the needs of the workers themselves, to secure the full development of all their capabilities and equal rights to enjoy all the achievements of science and art. That is why the programme states that the struggle between the working class and the capitalists can end only in this way. To achieve that, however, it is necessary that political power, i.e., the power to govern the state, should pass from the hands of a government which is under the influence of the capitalists and landowners, or from the hands of a government directly made up of elected representatives of the capitalists, into the hands of the working class.

Such is the ultimate aim of the struggle of the working class, such is the condition for its complete emancipation. This is the ultimate aim for which class-conscious, organised workers should strive; here in Russia, however, they still meet with tremendous obstacles, which hinder them in their struggle for emancipation.

A 5. The fight against the domination of the capitalist class is now being waged by the workers of all European countries and also by the workers of America and Australia. Working-class organisation and solidarity is not confined to one country or one nationality: the workers' parties of different countries proclaim aloud the complete identity (solidarity) of interests and aims of the workers of the whole world. They come together at joint congresses, put forward common demands to the capitalist class of all countries, have

established an international holiday of the entire organised proletariat striving for emancipation (May Day), thus welding the working class of all nationalities and of all countries into one great workers' army. The unity of the workers of all countries is a necessity arising out of the fact that the capitalist class, which rules over the workers, does not limit its rule to one country. Commercial ties between the different countries are becoming closer and more extensive; capital constantly passes from one country to another. The banks, those huge depositories that gather capital together and distribute it on loan to capitalists, begin as national institutions and then become international, gather capital from all countries, and distribute it among the capitalists of Europe and America. Enormous joint-stock companies are now being organised to set up capitalist enterprises not in one country, but in several at once; international associations of capitalists make their appearance. Capitalist domination is international. That is why the workers' struggle in all countries for their emancipation is only successful if the workers fight jointly against international capital. That is why the Russian worker's comrade in the fight against the capitalist class is the German worker, the Polish worker, and the French worker, just as his enemy is the Russian, the Polish, and the French capitalists. Thus, in the recent period foreign capitalists have been very eagerly transferring their capital to Russia, where they are building branch factories and founding companies for running new enterprises They are flinging themselves greedily on this young country in which the government is more favourable and obsequious to capital than anywhere else, in which they find workers who are less organised and less capable of fighting back than in the West, and in which the workers' standard of living, and hence their wages, are much lower, so that the foreign capitalists are able to draw enormous profits, on a scale unparalleled in their own countries. International capital has already stretched out its hand to Russia. The Russian workers are stretching out their hands to the international labour movement.

A 6. We have already spoken of how the big factories carry capital's oppression of labour to the highest pitch, how they establish a whole system of methods of

exploitation; how the workers, in their revolt against capital, inevitably arrive at the need to unite all workers, at the need for joint struggle by the entire working class. In this struggle against the capitalist class, the workers come up against the general laws of the state, which protect the capitalists and their interests.

But then, if the workers are strong enough to force concessions from the capitalists, to resist their attacks by joint action, they could also, by their unity, influence the laws of the state, and secure their alteration. That is what the workers of all other countries are doing. The Russian workers, however, cannot exert direct influence on the state. The conditions of the Russian workers are such that they are deprived of the most elementary civil rights. They must not dare to gather together, to discuss their affairs together, to organise unions, to publish statements; in other words, the laws of the state have not only been drawn up in the interests of the capitalist class, but they frankly deprive the workers of all possibility of influencing these laws and of securing their alteration. The reason this happens is that in Russia (and in Russia alone of all European countries) the absolute power of an autocratic government continues to this day, that is, a system of state exists under which laws that are obligatory for the entire people may be issued by the tsar alone, at his discretion, while only officials appointed by him may give effect to them. The citizens are not allowed to take any part in issuing laws, in discussing them, in proposing new or in demanding the repeal of old laws. They have no right to demand of officials an account of their activity, to check their activity, and to prosecute them. Citizens do not even possess the right to discuss affairs of state: they must not dare to organise meetings or unions without the permission of those same officials. The officials are thus irresponsible in the full sense of the term; they constitute a special caste, as it were, placed above the citizens. The irresponsibility and arbitrary conduct of the officials, and the fact that the population itself is inarticulate, give rise to such scandalous abuse of power by officials and such a violation of the rights of the common people as are hardly possible in any European country,

Thus, according to law, the Russian Government has absolute authority, and is considered to be quite independent, as it were, of the people, standing above all social estates and classes. If, however, that were really the case, why should the law and the government in all conflicts between the workers and the capitalists take the side of the capitalists? Why should the capitalists meet with ever-growing support as their numbers and their wealth grow, whereas the workers meet with ever-increasing resistance and restriction?

Actually the government does not stand above classes, it protects one class against the other, protects the propertied class against the propertyless, the capitalists against the workers. An absolute government could not rule such a huge country if it did not give all sorts of privileges and favours to the propertied classes.

Although the government, according to law, possesses absolute and independent power, actually the capitalists and landowners possess thousands of means of influencing the government and affairs of state. They have their own social-estate associations—noblemen's and merchants' societies, chambers of trade and manufactures, etc.—recognised by law. Their elected representatives either become officials outright, and take part in governing the state (for example, marshals of the nobility), or are given posts in government institutions of every kind: for example, the law provides for factory owners to participate in factory courts (the chief authority over the Factory Inspectorate), to which they elect their representatives. But they do not confine themselves to this direct participation in ruling the state. In their societies they discuss laws of state, draft bills, and the government usually consults them on each issue, submits draft bills to them with a request for their views.

The capitalists and landed proprietors organise all-Russian congresses, where they discuss their affairs and devise various measures of benefit to their class, and on behalf of all the landed nobility, or of the "merchants of all Russia," petition for the adoption of new laws and for the amendment of old ones. They can discuss their affairs in the newspapers, for however much the government hampers the press with

its censorship, it would never dare think of depriving the propertied classes of the right to discuss their affairs. They have all sorts of ways and means of approaching the top representatives of the governmental authorities, they can more easily discuss the arbitrary conduct of lower officials, and can easily secure the repeal of particularly oppressive laws and regulations. And while there is no country in the world where there are so many laws and regulations, such unexampled police supervision by the government, a supervision that extends to all sorts of petty details and robs every undertaking of its individuality, there is no country in the world where these bourgeois regulations are so easily violated and where these police laws are circumvented so easily by just the gracious assent of the supreme authorities. And this gracious assent is never refused.[38]

B 1. This is the most important, the paramount, point of the programme, because it indicates what should constitute the activity of the Party in defending the interests of the working class, the activity of all class-conscious workers. It indicates how the striving for socialism, the striving for the abolition of the age-old exploitation of man by man, should be linked up with the popular movement engendered by the living conditions created by the large-scale factories.

The Party's activity must consist in promoting the workers' class struggle. The Party's task is not to concoct some fashionable means of helping the workers, but to join up with the workers' movement, to bring light into it, to assist the workers in the struggle they themselves have already begun to wage. The Party's task is to uphold the interests of the workers and to represent those of the entire working-class movement. Now, what must this assistance to the workers in their struggle consist of?

The programme says that this assistance must consist, firstly, in developing the workers' class-consciousness. We have already spoken of how the workers' struggle against the employers becomes the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

What is meant by workers' class-consciousness follows from what we have said on the subject. The workers' class-consciousness means the workers' understanding that

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the only way to improve their conditions and to achieve their emancipation is to conduct a struggle against the capitalist and factory-owner class created by the big factories. Further, the workers' class-consciousness means their understanding that the interests of all the workers of any particular country are identical, that they all constitute one class, separate from all the other classes in society. Finally, the class-consciousness of the workers means the workers' understanding that to achieve their aims they have to work to influence affairs of state, just as the landlords and the capitalists did, and are continuing to do now.

By what means do the workers reach an understanding of all this? They do so by constantly gaining experience from the very struggle that they begin to wage against the employers and that increasingly develops, becomes sharper, and involves larger numbers of workers as big factories grow. There was a time when the workers' enmity against capital only found expression in a hazy sense of hatred of their exploiters, in a hazy consciousness of their oppression and enslavement, and in the desire *to wreak vengeance* on the capitalists. The struggle at that time found expression in isolated revolts of the workers, who wrecked buildings, smashed machines, attacked members of the factory management, etc. That was the *first*, the initial, form of the working-class movement, and it was a necessary one, because hatred of the capitalist has always and everywhere been the first impulse towards arousing in the workers the desire to defend themselves. The Russian working-class movement has, however, already outgrown this original form. Instead of having a hazy hatred of the capitalist, the workers have already begun to understand the antagonism between the interests of the working class and of the capitalist class. Instead of having a confused sense of oppression, they have begun to distinguish *the ways and means* by which capital oppresses them, and are revolting against various forms of oppression, placing limits to capitalist oppression, and protecting themselves against the capitalist's greed. Instead of wreaking vengeance on the capitalists they are now turning to the fight for concessions, they are beginning to face the capitalist class with one demand after another, and are

demanding improved working conditions, increased wages, and shorter working hours. Every strike concentrates all the attention and all the efforts of the workers on some particular aspect of the conditions under which the working class lives. Every strike gives rise to discussions about these conditions, helps the workers to appraise them, to understand what capitalist oppression consists in in the particular case, and what means can be employed to combat this oppression. Every strike enriches the experience of the entire working class. If the strike is successful it shows them what a strong force working-class unity is, and impels others to make use of their comrades' success. If it is not successful, it gives rise to discussions about the causes of the failure and to the search for better methods of struggle. This transition of the workers to the steadfast struggle for their vital needs, the fight for concessions, for improved living conditions, wages and working hours, now begun all over Russia, means that the Russian workers are making tremendous progress, and that is why the attention of the Social-Democratic Party and all class-conscious workers should be concentrated mainly on this struggle, on its promotion. Assistance to the workers should consist in showing them those most vital needs for the satisfaction of which they should fight, should consist in analysing the factors particularly responsible for worsening the conditions of different categories of workers, in explaining factory laws and regulations the violation of which (added to the deceptive tricks of the capitalists) so often subject the workers to double robbery. Assistance should consist in giving more precise and definite expression to the workers' demands, and in making them public, in choosing the best time for resistance, in choosing the method of struggle, in discussing the position and the strength of the two opposing sides, in discussing whether a still better choice can be made of the method of fighting (a method, perhaps, like addressing a letter to the factory owner, or approaching the inspector, or the doctor, according to circumstances, where direct strike action is not advisable, etc.).

We have said that the Russian workers' transition to such struggle is indicative of the tremendous progress they have made. This struggle places (leads) the working-class

movement on to the high road, and is the certain guarantee of its further success. The mass of working folk learn from this struggle, firstly, how to recognise and to examine one by one the methods of capitalist exploitation, to compare them with the law, with their living conditions, and with the interests of the capitalist class. By examining the different forms and cases of exploitation, the workers learn to understand the significance and the essence of exploitation as a whole, learn to understand the social system based on the exploitation of labour by capital. Secondly, in the process of this struggle the workers test their strength, learn to organise, learn to understand the need for and the significance of organisation. The extension of this struggle and the increasing frequency of clashes inevitably lead to a further extension of the struggle, to the development of a sense of unity, a sense of solidarity—at first among the workers of a particular locality, and then among the workers of the entire country, among the entire working class. Thirdly, this struggle develops the workers' political consciousness. The living condition of the mass of working folk places them in such a position that they do not (cannot) possess either the leisure or the opportunity to ponder over problems of state. On the other hand, the workers' struggle against the factory owners for their daily needs automatically and inevitably spurs the workers on to think of state, political questions, questions of how the Russian state is governed, how laws and regulations are issued, and whose interests they serve. Each clash in the factory necessarily brings the workers into conflict with the laws and representatives of state authority. In this connection the workers hear "political speeches" for the first time. At first from, say, the factory inspectors, who explain to them that the trick employed by the factory owner to defraud them is based on the exact meaning of the regulations, which have been endorsed by the appropriate authority and give the employer a free hand to defraud the workers, or that the factory owner's oppressive measures are quite lawful, since he is merely availing himself of his rights, giving effect to such and such a law, that has been endorsed by the state authority that sees to its implementation. The political explanations of Messrs. the Inspectors are occasionally

supplemented by the still more beneficial "political explanations" of the minister,[39] who reminds the workers of the feelings of "Christian love" that they owe to the factory owners for their making millions out of the workers' labour. Later, these explanations of the representatives of the state authority, and the workers' direct acquaintance with the facts showing for whose benefit this authority operates, are still further supplemented by leaflets or other explanations given by socialists, so that the workers get their political education in full from such a strike. They learn to understand not only the specific interests of the working class, but also the specific place occupied by the working class in the state. And so the *assistance* which the Social-Democratic Party can render to the class struggle of the workers should be: to develop the workers' class-consciousness by assisting them in the fight for their most vital needs.

The second type of *assistance* should consist, as the programme states, in promoting the organisation of the workers. The struggle we have just described necessarily requires that the workers be organised. Organisation becomes necessary for strikes, to ensure that they are conducted with great success, for collections in support of strikers, for setting up workers' mutual benefit societies, and for propaganda among the workers, the distribution among them of leaflets, announcements, manifestoes, etc. Organisation is still more necessary to enable the workers to defend themselves against persecution by the police and the gendarmerie, to conceal from them all the workers' contacts and associations and to arrange the delivery of books, pamphlets, newspapers, etc. To assist in all this—such is the Party's second task.

The third consists in indicating the real aims of the struggle, i.e., in explaining to the workers what the exploitation of labour by capital consists in, what it is based on, how the private ownership of the land and the instruments of labour leads to the poverty of the working masses, compels them to sell their labour to the capitalists and to yield up gratis the entire surplus produced by the worker's labour over and above his keep, in explaining, furthermore, how this exploitation inevitably leads to the class struggle be-

tween the workers and the capitalists, what the conditions of this struggle and its ultimate aims are—in a word, in explaining what is briefly stated in the programme.

B 2. What is meant by these words: the struggle of the working class is a political struggle? They mean that the working class cannot fight for its emancipation without securing influence over affairs of state, over the administration of the state, over the issue of laws. The need for such influence has long been understood by the Russian capitalists, and we have shown how they have been able, despite all sorts of prohibitions contained in the police laws, to find thousands of ways of influencing the state authority, and how this authority serves the interests of the capitalist class. Hence it naturally follows that the working class, too, cannot wage its struggle, cannot even secure a lasting improvement of its lot unless it influences state authority.

We have already said that the workers' struggle against the capitalists will inevitably lead to a clash with the government, and the government itself is exerting every effort to prove to the workers that only by struggle and by joint resistance can they influence state authority. This was shown with particular clarity by the big strikes that took place in Russia in 1885-86. The government immediately set about drawing up regulations concerning workers, at once issued new laws about factory practices, yielded to the workers' insistent demands (for example, regulations were introduced limiting fines and ensuring proper wage payment); in the same way the present strikes (in 1896) have again caused the government's immediate intervention, and the government has already understood that it cannot confine itself to arrests and deportations, that it is ridiculous to regale the workers with stupid sermons about the noble conduct of the factory owners (see the circular issued by Finance Minister Witte to factory inspectors. Spring 1896). The government has realised that "organised workers constitute a force to be reckoned with" and so it already has the factory legislation under review and is convening in St. Petersburg a Congress of Senior Factory Inspectors to discuss the question of reducing working hours and other inevitable concessions to the workers.

Thus we see that the struggle of the working class against the capitalist class must necessarily be a political struggle. Indeed, this struggle is already exerting influence on the state authority, is acquiring political significance. But the workers' utter lack of political rights, about which we have already spoken, and the absolute impossibility of the workers openly and directly influencing state authority become more clearly and sharply exposed and felt as the working-class movement develops. That is why the most urgent demand of the workers, the primary objective of the working-class influence on affairs of state must be *the achievement of political freedom*, i.e., the direct participation, guaranteed by law (by a constitution), of all citizens in the government of the state, the guaranteed right of all citizens freely to assemble, discuss their affairs, influence affairs of state through their associations and the press. The achievement of political freedom becomes the "*vital task of the workers*" because without it the workers do not and cannot have any influence over affairs of state, and thus inevitably remain a rightless, humiliated and inarticulate class. And if even now, when the workers are only just beginning to fight and to close their ranks, the government is already hastening to make concessions to the workers, in order to check the further growth of the movement, there can be no doubt that when the workers fully close their ranks and unite under the leadership of one political party, they will be able to compel the government to surrender, they will be able to win political freedom for themselves and the entire Russian people!

The preceding parts of the programme indicated the place occupied by the working class in contemporary society and the contemporary state, what is the aim of the struggle of the working class, and what constitutes the task of the Party that represents the workers' interests. Under the absolute rule of the government there are not, nor can there be openly functioning political parties in Russia, but there are political trends which express the interests of other classes and which exert influence over public opinion and the government. Hence, in order to make clear the position of the Social-Democratic Party, it is necessary now to indicate its attitude towards the remaining political trends

in Russian society, so as to enable the workers to determine who may be their ally and to what extent, and who their enemy. That is indicated in the two following points of the programme.

B 3. The programme declares that the workers' allies are, firstly, all those social strata which oppose the absolute power of the autocratic government. Since this absolute rule is the main obstacle to the workers' fight for their emancipation, it naturally follows that it is in the direct interest of the workers to support every social movement against absolutism (absolute means unlimited; absolutism is the unlimited rule of the government). The stronger the development of capitalism, the deeper become the contradictions between this bureaucratic administration and the interests of the propertied classes themselves, the interests of the bourgeoisie. And the Social-Democratic Party proclaims that it will support all strata and grades of the bourgeoisie who oppose the absolute government.

It is infinitely more to the workers' advantage for the bourgeoisie to *influence* affairs of state *directly*, than for their influence to be exerted, as is the case now, through a crowd of venal and despotic officials. It is far more advantageous to the workers for the bourgeoisie to *openly* influence policy than, as is the case now, to exert a *concealed* influence, concealed by the supposedly all-powerful "independent" government, which is called a government "by the grace of God," and hands out "its graces" to the suffering and industrious landlords and the poverty-stricken and oppressed factory owners. The workers need *open struggle* against the capitalist class, in order that the entire Russian proletariat may see for whose interests the workers are waging the struggle, and may learn how to wage the struggle properly; in order that the intrigues and aspirations of the bourgeoisie may not be hidden in the ante-rooms of grand dukes, in the saloons of senators and ministers, and in departmental offices barred to the public, and in order that they may come to the surface and open the eyes of all and sundry as to who really inspires government policy and what the capitalists and landlords are striving for. And so, down with everything that hides the present influence of the capitalist class, and our support for any representative of the bourgeoisie

who *comes out* against the bureaucracy, the bureaucratic administration, against the absolute government! But, while proclaiming its support for every social movement against absolutism, the Social-Democratic Party recognises that it does not separate itself from the working-class movement, because the working class has its specific interests, which are opposed to the interests of all other classes. While rendering support to all representatives of the bourgeoisie in the fight for political freedom, the workers should remember that the propertied classes can only be their allies for a time, that the interests of the workers and the capitalists cannot be reconciled, that the workers need the abolition of the government's absolute rule only in order to wage an open and extensive struggle against the capitalist class.

Further the Social-Democratic Party proclaims that it will render support to all who rise up against the class of the privileged landed nobility. The landed nobility in Russia are considered to be the first estate in the land. The remnants of their feudal power over the peasants weigh down the masses of the people to this day. The peasants continue to make land redemption payments for emancipation from the power of the landlords. The peasants are still tied to the land, in order that the landed gentry may not suffer any shortage of cheap and submissive farm labourers. Rightless and treated as juveniles, the peasants to this day are at the mercy of officials who look after their own pockets and interfere in peasant life so as to ensure that the peasants make their redemption payments or pay quit-rent to the feudal landlords "punctually," that they do not dare to "shirk" working for the landlords, do not dare, for example, to leave the district and so perhaps compel the landlords to hire outside workers, who are not so cheap or so oppressed by want. The landlords keep millions, tens of millions of peasants in their service, enslaving them and keeping them without rights, and in return for their display of prowess in this sphere enjoy the highest privileges of state. The landed nobility are the principal holders of the highest posts in the state (what is more, by law the nobility, as a social estate, enjoy priority in the civil service); the aristocratic landlords are closest to the Court and more directly and easily than anybody else influence government policy in their own direction. They

utilise their close connections with the government to plunder the state coffers and to secure out of public funds gifts and grants that run into millions of rubles, sometimes in the shape of huge estates distributed for services, at other times in the shape of "concessions."*

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* The hectographed text in the notebook in the possession of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. breaks off here.—*Ed.*

TO THE TSARIST GOVERNMENT[40]

This year, 1896, the Russian Government has already made two announcements to the public on the workers' struggle against the factory owners. In other countries such announcements are no rarity—there they do not hide what is going on in the country, and the press freely publishes items about strikes. In Russia, however, the government fears more than the plague publicity for factory practices and incidents. It banned the publication of strike news in the press, it forbade factory inspectors to publish their reports, and it even put a stop to the hearing of strike cases in the ordinary courts open to the public; in a word, it took all measures to make a strict secret of all that was going on in the factories and among the workers. And of a sudden, all the devices of the police burst like soap bubbles, and the government itself was compelled to speak out openly of the fact that the workers were engaged in a struggle against the factory owners. What caused this change? In 1895 workers' strikes were particularly numerous. Yes, that is quite true, but strikes also took place previous to this, yet the government succeeded in preventing the secret becoming known, and the mass of the workers as a whole were kept in the dark about the strikes. The present strikes are much bigger than the previous ones and are concentrated in one area. Yes, that is quite true, but strikes as big as these also took place previously, in 1885-86, for example, in Moscow and Vladimir gubernias. Yet the government held out and refused to say a word about the workers' struggle against the employers. What, then, has made it talk this time? The fact is that this time the social-

ists have assisted the workers, have helped them to explain their case, to spread the news about it everywhere, both among the workers and among the public, to formulate the workers' demands exactly, to show everybody how dishonest the government is, and what brute violence it employs. When the government saw that it was becoming quite ridiculous to keep silent, since the strikes were common knowledge, it also fell into line behind the rest. The socialist leaflets called the government to account, and the government appeared and gave its account.

Let us see what sort of an account it was.

At first the government tried to avoid doing so openly and publicly. One of the ministers, Minister of Finance Witte, sent out a circular to the factory inspectors, in which he called the workers and the socialists "the worst enemies of public order," advised the factory inspectors to try to scare the workers, to assure them that the government would forbid the employers to make concessions, to tell them of the employers' good motives and noble intentions, of how concerned the employers are about the workers and their needs, and of how full the employers are of "good sentiments." Of the strikes themselves the government said nothing, it said not one word about the cause of the strikes, about the facts of abominable oppression and violation of the law by the employers, and about the aims of the workers; in a word, it simply *misrepresented* all the strikes that took place in the summer and autumn of 1895, tried to get away with hackneyed stock phrases about violent and "illegal" actions by the workers, although the workers committed no violence. It was only the police who resorted to violence. The minister wanted to keep the circular a secret, but the very officials to whom he entrusted it failed to keep the secret, and so the circular made the rounds of the public. Then it was printed by the socialists. Whereupon the government, seeing that as usual it had been made a fool of with its "open secrets," had it published in the press. That, as we have already stated, was the government's answer to the summer and autumn strikes of 1895. In the spring of 1896, however, strikes broke out again, on a much bigger scale.[41] The rumours about them were supplemented by socialist leaflets. At first the government maintained

a cowardly silence, waiting to see how the matter would end, and then, when the workers' revolt had died down, it belatedly made public its bureaucratic wisdom, as it would a delayed police protocol. On this occasion it had to speak out openly, and what is more, to do so collectively. Its announcement appeared in issue No. 158 of *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*.[42] On this occasion it could not misrepresent the workers' strikes as previously. It had to tell the full story, to give the facts of the employers' oppressive measures and make known the workers' demands; it had to admit that the workers had behaved "decently." Thus the workers taught the government to give up lying in the vile manner of the police; when they rose up en masse, when they employed leaflets to make their case public, they compelled it to admit the truth. That was a great success. The workers will now know what is their only means of getting a public statement of their needs, of letting the workers throughout Russia know of their struggle. The workers will know now that the government's lies are only refuted by the united struggle of the workers themselves to secure their rights and by their class-consciousness. When the ministers had spoken about the events they started inventing excuses, they proceeded to assert in their statement that the strikes were only caused by "the peculiarities of cotton-spinning and thread production." Indeed! And not by the peculiarities of the whole of Russian *production*, not by the peculiarities of the Russian political system, which permits the police to hound and to seize peaceful workers who are defending themselves against oppression? Why, then, good ministers, did the workers snatch up, read and ask for more leaflets which did not deal with cotton and threads at all, but with the rightless position of Russian citizens and the arbitrary and brutal conduct of a government which fawns on the capitalists. No, this new excuse is perhaps worse, viler than the one with which Finance Minister Witte tried to settle matters in his circular by placing all the blame on "agitators." Minister Witte argues about the strike just like any police official who has had his palm greased by the factory owners: agitators came, runs the explanation, and a strike broke out. Now, when all the ministers saw a strike of 30,000 workers, they began to think, and finally came to the con-

clusion that strikes do not break out because socialist agitators come on the scene, but that socialist agitators come on the scene because strikes break out, because the workers' struggle breaks out against the capitalists. The ministers now assert that the socialists subsequently "joined" the strikes. That is a good lesson for Finance Minister Witte. Be careful, Mr. Witte, learn the lesson well! Learn to get clear in advance about the cause of the strike, learn to examine the workers' demands and not the reports of your police rats, whom you yourself have not a bit of faith in. The ministers tell the public that it was only "ill-intentioned persons" who tried to give the strikes a "criminally political character," or as they say in one passage, a "social character" (the ministers wanted to say a socialist character, but, whether from ignorance or from bureaucratic cowardice, said social, the result being an absurdity: socialist means that which supports the workers in the struggle against capital, whereas social simply means public. How can a strike be given a social character? Why, it's just the same as giving ministers ministerial rank!). That is amusing! The socialists give strikes a political character! Why, before any socialists did, the government itself took all possible measures to give the strikes a political character. Did it not set about seizing peaceful workers, just as though they were criminals? Did it not arrest and deport them? Did it not send spies and provocateurs all over? Did it not arrest all who fell into its hands? Did it not promise to help the factory owners in order that they might not yield? Did it not persecute workers for simply collecting money in aid of the strikers? The government itself was ahead of everybody else in explaining to the workers that the war they were waging against the factory owners must inevitably be a war against the government. All that the socialists had to do was to confirm this and publish it in leaflet form. That is all. The Russian Government, however, had already had an extensive experience in the art of dissembling, and the ministers tried to keep silent about the methods by which our government "gave the strikes a political character"; it told the public the dates of the socialists' leaflets. But why did it not tell the dates of the orders issued by the City Governor and other bashi-bazouks for the arrest of peaceful workers, putting the troops under

arms, the dispatch of spies and provocateurs? They gave details to the public about the number of leaflets issued by the socialists; why did they give no details about the number of workers and socialists seized, about the number of ruined families, the number deported or imprisoned without trial? Why? Because even the Russian ministers, devoid as they are of all shame, are wary of telling the public about such bandit exploits. Peaceful workers who stood up for their rights and defended themselves against the factory owners' tyranny had the entire strength of the state power, with police and troops, gendarmes and public prosecutors, hurled against them; workers who held out on their own coppers and those of their comrades, the British, Polish, German and Austrian workers—had aimed against them the entire strength of the state treasury, which promised assistance to the poor factory owners.

The workers were not united. They were unable to arrange collections, to enlist the help of other cities and other workers, they were hounded everywhere, they had to yield to the entire strength of state authority. The ministerial gentlemen are rejoicing that the government has achieved victory.

A fine victory! The entire strength of the government, the entire wealth of the capitalists—against thirty thousand peaceful, penniless workers! The ministers would be wiser if they waited before boasting of such a victory; their boasting really reminds one very much of that of the policeman, who brags about having got away from the strike *un*hurt.

The "incitements" of the socialists were ineffective, triumphantly declares the government to soothe the capitalists. Why, is our reply to this, no incitements could have created one-hundredth part of the impression created on all St. Petersburg, all Russian workers by the government's conduct in this affair! The workers saw through the government's policy of keeping silent about the workers' strikes and of misrepresenting them. The workers saw how their united struggle forced the abandonment of hypocritical police lies. They saw whose interests were safeguarded by the government, which promised assistance to the factory owners. They understood who was their real foe when they, who were

not violating law and order, had the troops and police sent against them, just as though they were the country's enemies. However much ministers may talk of the struggle being a failure, the workers see how the factory owners everywhere have quietened down, and know that the government is already calling the factory inspectors together to discuss what concessions should be made to the workers, for it sees that concessions are necessary. The strikes of 1895-96 have not been in vain. They have been of tremendous service to the Russian workers, they have shown them how to wage the struggle for their interests. They have taught them to understand *the political situation and the political needs of the working class.*

November 1896.

The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class.[43]

Written in prison in summer 1896
Mimeographed in November 1896

Published according to the text of the leaflet

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A CHARACTERISATION OF ECONOMIC ROMANTICISM

(SISMONDI AND OUR NATIVE SISMONDISTS)[44]

Written in the spring 1897

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

The cover of *Novoye Slovo* in which Lenin's *Characterisation of Economic Romanticism* and *About a Certain Newspaper Article* were printed. 1897

Reduced

The Swiss economist Sismondi (J.-C.-L. Simonde de Sismondi), who wrote at the beginning of the present century, is of particular interest in considering a solution of the general economic problems which are now coming to the forefront with particular force in Russia. If we add to this that Sismondi occupies a special place in the history of political economy, in that he stands apart from the main trends, being an ardent advocate of small-scale production and an opponent of the supporters and ideologists of large-scale enterprise (just like the present-day Russian Narodniks), the reader will understand our desire to outline the main features of Sismondi's doctrine and its relation to other trends—both contemporary and subsequent—in economic science. A study of Sismondi is today all the more interesting because last year (1896) an article in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* also expounded his doctrine (B. Ephrucy: "The Social and Economic Views of Simonde de Sismondi," *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, Nos. 7 and 8).*

The contributor to *Russkoye Bogatstvo* states at the very outset that no writer has been "so wrongly appraised" as Sismondi, who, he alleges, has been "unjustly" represented, now as a reactionary, then as a utopian. The very opposite is true. Precisely this appraisal of Sismondi is quite correct. The article in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, while it gives an accurate and detailed account of Sismondi's views, pro-

* Ephrucy died in 1897. An obituary was published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, March 1897.

vides a completely incorrect picture of his theory,* idealises the very points of it in which he comes closest to the Narodniks, and ignores and misrepresents his attitude to subsequent trends in economic science. Hence, our exposition and analysis of Sismondi's doctrine will at the same time be a criticism of Ephrucy's article.

CHAPTER I

THE ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ROMANTICISM

The distinguishing feature of Sismondi's theory is his doctrine of revenue, of the relation of revenue to production and to the population. The title of Sismondi's chief work is: *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population* (Seconde édition. Paris, 1827, 2 vol. The first edition was published in 1819)—*New Principles of Political Economy, or Wealth in Relation to Population*. This subject is almost identical with the problem known in Russian Narodnik literature as the "problem of the home market for capitalism." Sismondi asserted that as a result of the development of large-scale enterprise and wage-labour in industry and agriculture, production inevitably outruns consumption and is faced with the insoluble task of finding consumers; that it cannot find consumers within the country because it converts the bulk of the population into day labourers, plain workers, and creates unemployment, while the search for a foreign market becomes increasingly difficult owing to the entry of new capitalist countries into the world arena. The reader will see that these are the very same problems that occupy the minds of the Narodnik economists headed by Messrs. V. V. and N. —on.[46] Let us, then, take a closer look at the various points of Sismondi's argument and at its scientific significance.

* It is quite true that Sismondi was not a socialist, as Ephrucy states at the beginning of his article, repeating what was said by Lippert (see *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, V. Band, Artikel "Sismondi" von Lippert, Seite 678) (*Dictionary of Political Science*, Vol. V, article by Lippert entitled "Sismondi," p. 678.—*Ed.*).

I

DOES THE HOME MARKET SHRINK BECAUSE OF THE RUINATION OF THE SMALL PRODUCERS?

Unlike the classical economists, who in their arguments had in mind the already established capitalist system and took the existence of the working class as a matter of course and self-evident, Sismondi particularly emphasises the ruination of the small producer—the process which led to the formation of the working class. That Sismondi deserves credit for pointing to this contradiction in the capitalist system is beyond dispute; but the point is that as an economist he failed *to understand* this phenomenon and covered up his inability to make a consistent analysis of it with "pious wishes." In Sismondi's opinion, the ruination of the small producer proves that the home market shrinks.

"If the manufacturer sells at a cheaper price," says Sismondi in the chapter on "How Does the Seller Enlarge His Market?" (ch. III, livre IV, t. 1, p. 342 et suiv.),* "he will sell more, because the others will sell less. Hence, the manufacturer always strives to save something on labour, or on raw materials, so as to be able to sell at a lower price than his fellow manufacturers. As the materials themselves are products of past labour, his saving, in the long run, always amounts to the expenditure of a smaller quantity of labour in the production of the same product." "True, the individual manufacturer tries to expand production and not to reduce the number of his workers. Let us assume that he succeeds, that he wins customers away from his competitors by reducing the price of his commodity. What will be the 'national result' of this?... The other manufacturers will introduce the same methods of production as he employs. Then some of them will, of course, have to discharge some of their workers to the extent that the new machine increases the productive power of labour. If consumption remains at the same level, and if the same amount of labour is performed by one-tenth of the former number of hands, then the income of this section

* All subsequent quotations, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the above-mentioned edition of *Nouveaux Principes*.

of the working class will be curtailed by nine-tenths, and all forms of its consumption will be reduced to the same extent.... The result of the invention—if the nation has no foreign trade, and if consumption remains at the same level—will consequently be a loss for all, a decline in the national revenue, which will lead to a decline in general consumption in the following year" (I, 344). "Nor can it be otherwise: labour itself is an important part of the revenue" (Sismondi has wages in mind), "and therefore the demand for labour cannot be reduced without making the nation poorer. Hence, the expected gain from the invention of new methods of production is nearly always obtained from foreign trade" (I, 345).

The reader will see that in these words he already has before him all that so-familiar "theory" of "the shrinkage of the home market" as a consequence of the development of capitalism, and of the consequent need for a foreign market. Sismondi very frequently reverts to this idea, linking it with his theory of crises and his population "theory"; it is as much the key point of his doctrine as it is of the doctrine of the Russian Narodniks.

Sismondi did not, of course, forget that under the new relationships, ruination and unemployment are accompanied by an increase in "commercial wealth" that the point at issue was the development of large-scale production, of capitalism. This he understood perfectly well and, in fact, asserted that it was the growth of capitalism that caused the home market to shrink: "Just as it is not a matter of indifference from the standpoint of the citizens' welfare whether the sufficiency and consumption of all tend to be equal, or whether a small minority has a superabundance of all things, while the masses are reduced to bare necessities, so these two forms of the distribution of revenue are not a matter of indifference from the viewpoint of the development of *commercial wealth* (richesse commerciale).* Equality in consumption must always lead to the expansion of the producers' market, and inequality, to the *shrinking of the market*" (de le [le marché] resserrer toujours davantage) (I, 357).

* Italics here and elsewhere are ours, unless otherwise stated.

Thus, Sismondi asserts that the home market shrinks owing to the inequality of distribution inherent in capitalism, that the market must be created by equal distribution. But how can this take place when there is *commercial wealth*, to which Sismondi imperceptibly passed (and he could not do otherwise, for if he had done he could not have argued about the *market*)? This is something he does not investigate. How does he prove that it is possible to preserve equality among the producers if commercial wealth exists, *i.e.*, competition between the individual producers? He does not prove it at all. He simply decrees that that is what *must occur*. Instead of further analysing the contradiction he rightly pointed to, he begins to talk about the undesirability of contradictions in general. "It is possible that when small-scale agriculture is superseded by large-scale and more capital is invested in the land a larger amount of wealth is distributed among the entire mass of agriculturists than previously" ... (i.e., "it is possible" that the home market, the dimension of which is determined after all by the absolute quantity of *commercial* wealth, has expanded—expanded along with the development of capitalism?).... "But for the nation, the consumption of one family of rich farmers plus that of fifty families of poor day labourers is not equal to the consumption of fifty families of peasants, not one of which is rich but, on the other hand, not one of which lacks (a moderate) a decent degree of prosperity" (une honnête aisance) (I, 358). In other words: perhaps the development of capitalist farming does create a home market for capitalism. Sismondi was a far too knowledgeable and conscientious economist to deny this fact; but—but here the author drops his investigation, and for the "nation" of commercial wealth directly substitutes a "nation" of peasants. Evading the unpleasant fact that refutes his petty-bourgeois point of view, he even forgets what he himself had said a little earlier, namely, that the "peasants" became "farmers" thanks to the development of commercial wealth, "The first farmers," he said, "were simple labourers.... They did not cease to be peasants.... They hardly ever employed day labourers to work with them, they employed only servants (des domestiques), always chosen from among their equals, whom they treated as

equals, ate with them at the same table ... constituted one class of peasants" (I, 221). So then, it all amounts to this, that these patriarchal muzhiks, with their patriarchal servants, are much more to the author's liking, and he simply turns his back on the changes which the growth of "commercial wealth" brought about in these patriarchal relationships.

But Sismondi does not in the least intend to admit this. He continues to think that he is investigating the laws of commercial wealth and, forgetting the reservations he has made, bluntly asserts:

"Thus, as a result of wealth being concentrated in the hands of a small number of proprietors, *the home market shrinks increasingly* (!), and industry is increasingly compelled to look for foreign markets, where great revolutions (des grandes révolutions) await it" (1, 361). "Thus, the home market cannot expand except through national prosperity" (I, 362). Sismondi has in mind the prosperity of the people, for he had only just admitted the possibility of "national" prosperity under capitalist farming.

As the reader sees, our Narodnik economists say the same thing word for word.

Sismondi reverts to this question again at the end of his work, in Book VII *On the Population*, chapter VII; "On the Population Which Has Become Superfluous Owing to the Invention of Machines."

"The introduction of large-scale farming in the countryside has in Great Britain led to the disappearance of the class of peasant farmers (fermiers paysans), who worked themselves and nevertheless enjoyed a moderate prosperity; the population declined considerably, but its consumption declined more than its numbers. The day labourers who do all the field work, receiving only bare necessities, do not by any means give the same encouragement to urban industry as the rich peasants gave previously" (II, 327). "Similar changes also took place among the urban population.... The small tradesmen, the small manufacturers disappear, and one big entrepreneur replaces hundreds of them who, taken all together, were perhaps not as rich as he. Nevertheless, taken together they were bigger consumers than he. The luxury he indulges in encourages industry far less than

the moderate prosperity of the hundred households he has superseded" (ibid.).

The question is: what does Sismondi's theory that the home market shrinks with the development of capitalism amount to? To the fact that its author, who had hardly attempted to look at the matter squarely, avoided analysing the conditions that belong to capitalism ("commercial wealth" plus large-scale enterprise in industry and agriculture, for Sismondi does not know the word "capitalism." Identity of concepts makes this use of the term quite correct, and in future we shall simply say "capitalism"), and replaced an analysis by his own petty-bourgeois point of view and his own petty-bourgeois utopia. The development of commercial wealth and, consequently, of competition, he says, should leave intact the average, uniform peasantry, with its "moderate prosperity" and its patriarchal relations with its farm servants.

It goes without saying that this innocent desire remained the exclusive possession of Sismondi and the other romanticists among the "intelligentsia"; and that day after day it came into increasing conflict with the reality that was developing the contradictions of which Sismondi was not yet able to gauge the depth.

It goes without saying that theoretical political economy, which in its further development* joined that of the classical economists, established precisely what Sismondi wanted to deny—that the development of capitalism in general, and of capitalist farming in particular, does not restrict the home market, but *creates* it. The development of capitalism proceeds simultaneously with the development of commodity economy, and to the extent that domestic production gives way to production for sale, while the handicraftsman is superseded by the factory, a market is created for *capital*. The "day labourers" who are pushed out of agriculture by the conversion of the "peasants" into "farmers" provide labour-power for capital, and the farmers are purchasers of the products of industry, not only of articles of consumption (which were formerly produced by the peas-

* This refers to Marxism. (Author's footnote to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

ants at home, or by village artisans), but also of instruments of production, which could not remain of the old type after small farming had been superseded by large-scale farming.* The last point is worth emphasising, for it is the one that Sismondi particularly ignored when, in the passage we have quoted, he talked about "consumption" by peasants and farmers as if only *personal* consumption (the consumption of bread, clothing, etc.) existed and as if the purchase of machines, implements, etc., the erection of buildings, warehouses, factories, etc., were not also consumption, except that it is of a different kind, i.e., *productive consumption*, consumption by capital and not by people. And again we must note that it is precisely this mistake, which, as we shall soon see, Sismondi borrowed from Adam Smith, that our Narodnik economists took over in toto.**

II

SISMONDI'S VIEWS ON NATIONAL REVENUE AND CAPITAL

The arguments adduced by Sismondi to prove that capitalism is impossible and that it cannot develop are not confined to this. He also drew the same conclusions from his revenue theory. It must be said that Sismondi took over in its entirety Adam Smith's labour theory of value and three forms-of revenue: rent, profit and wages. Here and there he even attempts to group together the first two forms of revenue and contrast them to the third: thus, he sometimes combines them and opposes them to wages (I, 104-05); sometimes he even uses the term mieux-value (surplus-value) to describe them (I, 103). We must not, however, exaggerate the importance of this terminology as, we think, Ephrucy does when he says that "Sismondi's theory

* Thus, simultaneously the elements of both variable capital (the "free" worker) and constant capital are formed; the means of production from which the small producer is freed pertain to the latter.

** Ephrucy says nothing at all concerning this part of Sismondi's doctrine—the shrinking of the home market as a result of the development of capitalism. We shall see again and again that he left out what is most typical of Sismondi's *viewpoint* and of the attitude of Narodism towards his doctrine.

stands close to the theory of surplus-value" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 41). Properly speaking, Sismondi did not advance a single step beyond Adam Smith, who also said that rent and profit are "deductions from the produce of labour," the share of the value which the worker adds to the product (see *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Russian translation by Bibikov, Vol. I, chap. VIII: "Of the Wages of Labour," and chap. VI: "Of the Component Parts of the Price of Commodities"). Nor did Sismondi go further than this. But he tried to link up this division of the newly-created product into surplus-value and wages with the theory of the social revenue, the home market and the realisation of the product in capitalist society. These attempts are extremely important for an appraisal of Sismondi's scientific significance, and for an understanding of the connection between his doctrine and that of the Russian Narodniks. It is therefore worth while analysing them in greater detail.

In everywhere pushing into the forefront the question of revenue, of its relation to production, to consumption and to the population, Sismondi was also naturally obliged to analyse the theoretical basis of the concept "revenue." And so at the very beginning of his work we find three chapters devoted to the question of revenue (l. II, ch. IV-VI). Chapter IV, entitled "How Revenue Originates from Capital," deals with the difference between capital and revenue. Sismondi begins straight away to deal with this subject in relation to the whole of society. "Inasmuch as each works for all," he says, "what is produced by all must be consumed by all.... The difference between capital and revenue is material for society" (I, 83). But Sismondi has a feeling that this "material" difference is not as simple *for society* as it is for the individual entrepreneur, "We are approaching," he makes the reservation, "the most abstract and most difficult problem of political economy. The nature of capital and that of revenue are constantly interwoven in our minds: we see that *what is revenue for one becomes capital for another*, and the same object, in passing from hand to hand, successively acquires different names" (I, 84), i.e., is called "capital" at one moment and "revenue" at another. "But to confuse them," asserts

Sismondi, "is ruinous" (leur confusion est ruineuse, p. 477). "The task of distinguishing between the capital and revenue of society is as important as it is difficult" (I, 84).

The reader has probably noticed wherein lies the difficulty which Sismondi speaks of: if the revenue of the individual entrepreneur is his profit, which he spends on various kinds of articles of consumption,* and if the revenue of the individual worker is his wages, can these two forms of revenue be added together to form the "revenue of society"? What, then, about those capitalists and workers who produce machines, for example? Their product exists in a form that cannot be consumed (i.e., consumed personally). It cannot be added to articles of consumption. These products are meant to serve as capital. Hence, while being the *revenue* of their producers (that is, that part which is the source of profit and wages) they become the *capital* of their purchasers. How can we straighten out this confusion, which prevents us from defining the concept of social revenue?

As we have seen, Sismondi merely approached the question and at once shrank from it, limiting himself to stating the "difficulty." He says plainly that "usually, three kinds of revenue are recognised: rent, profit and wages" (I, 85), and then goes on to expound Adam Smith's doctrine concerning each. The question of the difference between the capital and the revenue of society remained unanswered. The exposition now proceeds without any strict division between social revenue and individual revenue. But Sismondi reverts once again to the question he abandoned. He says that, as there are different kinds of revenue, so there are "different kinds of wealth" (1, 93), namely, *fixed capital*—machines, implements, etc., *circulating capital*—which, unlike the former, is consumed quickly and changes its form (seed, raw materials, wages) and, lastly, *revenue from capital*, which is consumed without being reproduced. Here it is not important to us that Sismondi repeats all the mistakes Adam Smith made in the theory of fixed and circulating capital, that he confuses these categories, which

* To be more exact: that *part* of profit which is not used for accumulation.

belong to the process of circulation, with the categories which spring from the process of production (constant and variable capital). What interests us is Sismondi's theory of revenue. And on this question, he draws the following conclusion from the division of wealth into three kinds that has just been made.

"It is important to note that these three kinds of wealth go similarly into consumption; for everything that has been produced is of value to man only insofar as it serves his needs, and these needs are satisfied only by consumption. But fixed capital serves this purpose indirectly (d'une manière indirecte); it is consumed slowly, helping man to reproduce what serves for his consumption" (I, 94-95), whereas circulating capital (Sismondi already identifies it with variable capital) is converted into the "*worker's consumption fund*" (I, 95). It follows, therefore, that, as distinct from individual consumption, there are two kinds of *social consumption*. These two kinds differ very greatly. What matters, of course, is not that fixed capital is consumed slowly, but that it is consumed without forming *revenue* (a consumption fund) for any class of society, that it is not used personally, but productively. But Sismondi fails to see this, and realising that he has again strayed from the path* in quest of the difference between social capital and revenue, he helplessly exclaims: "This movement of wealth is so abstract, it requires such considerable attention to grasp it fully (pour le bien saisir), that we deem it useful to take the simplest example" (I, 95). And indeed, he does take the "simplest" example: a single farmer (un fermier solitaire) harvested a hundred sacks of wheat; part of the wheat he consumed himself, part went for sowing, and part was consumed by the workers he hired. Next year he harvested two hundred sacks. Who is to consume them? The farmer's family cannot grow so quickly. Using this extremely ill-chosen example to show the difference between

* Sismondi had only just separated *capital* from *revenue*. The first goes to production, the second to consumption. But we are talking about society, and society also "consumes" fixed capital. The distinction drawn falls to the ground, and the social-economic process which transforms "capital for one" into "revenue for another" remains unexplained.

fixed capital (seed), circulating capital (wages) and the farmer's consumption fund, Sismondi says:

"We have seen three kinds of wealth in an individual family; let us now examine each kind in relation to the whole nation and see how the national revenue can result from this distribution" (I, 97). But all he says after this is that in society, too, it is necessary to reproduce the same three kinds of wealth: fixed capital (and Sismondi emphasises that a certain amount of labour has to be expended on it, but he does not explain how fixed capital will exchange for the articles of consumption required by both the capitalists and the workers engaged in this production); then come raw materials (Sismondi isolates these especially); then the workers' maintenance and the capitalists' profit. This is all we get from chapter IV. Obviously, the question of the national revenue remained open, and Sismondi failed to analyse, not only distribution, but even the *concept* of revenue. He immediately forgets the theoretically extremely important reference to the need to reproduce also the fixed capital of society; and in his next chapter, in speaking of the "distribution of the national revenue among the different classes of citizens" (ch. V), he goes straight on to speak of three kinds of revenue and, combining rent and profit, he says that the national revenue consists of two parts: profit from wealth (i.e., rent and profit in the proper sense) and the workers' means of subsistence (I, 104-05). He says, moreover, that:

"Similarly, the annual product, or the result of all the work done by the nation during the year, consists of two parts: one is ... the profit that comes from wealth; the other is the capacity to work (la puissance de travailler) which is assumed to equal the part of wealth for which it is exchanged, or the means of subsistence of those who work.... Thus, the national revenue and the annual product balance each other and represent equal magnitudes. The entire annual product is consumed in the course of the year, but partly by the workers, who, giving their labour in exchange, turn the product into capital and reproduce it, and partly by the capitalists, who, giving their revenue in exchange, destroy it" (I, 105).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Thus, Sismondi simply thrusts aside the question of distinguishing between national capital and revenue, which he himself so definitely considered to be extremely important and difficult, and forgets entirely what he had said a few pages previously! And then he does not see that by thrusting this question aside, he reduced the problem to utter absurdity: how can the annual product be totally consumed by the workers and capitalists in the shape of revenue, if production needs capital, or, to be more exact, means and instruments of production? They have to be produced, and they are produced every year (as Sismondi himself has only just admitted). And now all these instruments of production, raw materials, etc., are suddenly discarded and the "difficult" problem of the difference between capital and revenue is settled by the absolutely incongruous assertion that the annual product equals the national revenue.

This theory, that the entire product of capitalist society consists of two parts—the workers' part (wages, or variable capital, to use modern terminology) and the capitalists' part (surplus-value), is not peculiar to Sismondi. It does not belong to him. He borrowed it in its entirety from Adam Smith, and even took a step backward from it. The whole of subsequent political economy (Ricardo, Mill, Proudhon and Rodbertus) repeated this mistake, which was disclosed only by the author of *Capital*, in Part III of Volume II. We shall expound the principles underlying his views later on. At present let us observe that this mistake is repeated by our Narodnik economists. It is of special interest to compare them with Sismondi, because they draw from this fallacious theory *the very same conclusions that Sismondi himself drew**: the conclusion that surplus-value cannot be realised in capitalist society; that social wealth cannot be expanded; that the foreign market must be resorted to *because* surplus-value cannot be realised within the country; and lastly, that crises occur because the product, it is alleged, cannot be realised through consumption by the workers and the capitalists.

* And which were prudently avoided by the other economists who repeated Adam Smith's mistake.

III

SISMONDI'S CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FALLACIOUS THEORY OF TWO PARTS OF THE ANNUAL PRODUCT IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

To give the reader an idea of Sismondi's doctrine as a whole, we shall first state the most important conclusions which he draws from this theory, and then deal with the manner in which his chief error is rectified in Marx's *Capital*.

First of all, Sismondi draws from Adam Smith's fallacious theory the conclusion that production must correspond to consumption, that production is determined by revenue. He goes on reiterating this "truth" (which proves his complete inability to understand the nature of capitalist production) throughout the whole of his next chapter, chapter VI: "The Mutual Determination of Production by Consumption, and Expenditure by Revenue." Sismondi directly applies the ethics of the frugal peasant to capitalist society, and sincerely believes that in this way he has corrected Adam Smith's doctrine. At the very beginning of his work, when speaking about Adam Smith in the introductory part (Book I, *History of Science*), he says that he "supplements" Smith with the proposition that "consumption is the sole aim of accumulation" (I, 51). "Consumption," he says, "determines reproduction" (I, 119-20), "the national expenditure must regulate the national revenue" (I, 113), and the whole of the work is replete with similar assertions. Two more characteristic features of Sismondi's doctrine are directly connected with this: firstly, disbelief in the development of capitalism, failure to understand that it causes an ever-increasing growth of the productive forces and denial that such growth is possible—in exactly the same way as the Russian romanticists "teach" that capitalism leads to a waste of labour, and so forth.

"Those who urge unlimited production are mistaken," says Sismondi (I, 121). Excess of production over revenue causes over-production (I, 106). An increase in wealth is beneficial only "when it is gradual, when it is proportionate to itself, when none of its parts develops with excessive rapidity" (I, 409). The good Sismondi thinks that

"disproportionate" development is not development (as our Narodniks also do); that this disproportion is not a law of the present system of social economy, and of its development, but a "mistake" of the legislator, etc.; that in this the European governments are artificially imitating England, a country that has taken the wrong path.* Sismondi wholly denies the proposition which the classical economists advanced, and which Marx's theory wholly accepted, namely, that capitalism develops the productive forces. In fact, he goes to the length of regarding all accumulation as being possible only "little by little," and is quite unable to explain the process of accumulation. This is the second highly characteristic feature of his views. The way he argues about accumulation is extremely amusing:

"In the long run, the total product of a given year always exchanges only for the total product of the preceding year" (I, 121). Here accumulation is wholly denied: it follows that the growth of social wealth is impossible under capitalism. The Russian reader will not be very much surprised by this assertion, because he has heard the same thing from Mr. V. V. and from Mr. N. —on. But Sismondi, was, after all, a disciple of Adam Smith. He has a feeling that he is saying something utterly incongruous, and he wants to correct himself:

"If production grows gradually," he continues, "then annual exchange causes only a slight loss (une petite perte) each year, while at the same time improving the conditions for the future (en même temps qu'elle bonifie la condition future). If this loss is slight and well distributed, everybody will bear it without complaint.... If, however, the discrepancy between the new production and the preceding one is great, capital perishes (sont entamés), suffering is caused, and the nation retrogresses instead of progressing" (I, 121). It would be difficult to formulate the fundamental thesis of romanticism and of the petty-bourgeois view of capitalism more vividly and more plainly than is done in

* See for example, II, 456-57, and many other passages. Later we shall quote specimens of them, and the reader will see that even in their mode of expression our romanticists, like Mr. N. —on, differ in no way from Sismondi.

the above tirade. The more rapid the process of accumulation, *i.e.*, the excess of production over consumption, the better, taught the classical economists, who, though they were not clear about the process of the social production of capital, and though they were unable to free themselves from Adam Smith's mistaken view that the social product consists of two parts, nevertheless advanced the perfectly correct idea that production creates a market for itself and itself determines consumption. And we know also that Marx's theory, which recognised that the more rapid the growth of wealth, the fuller the development of the productive forces of labour and its socialisation, and *the better the position of the worker*, or as much better as it can be under the present system of social economy, took over this view of accumulation from the classical economists. The romanticists assert the very opposite, and base all their hopes on the feeble development of capitalism; they call for its *retardation*.

Further, the failure to understand that production creates a market for itself leads to the doctrine that surplus-value cannot be realised. "From reproduction comes revenue, but *production in itself is not yet revenue*: it acquires this name" (ce nom! Thus the difference between production, i.e., the product, and revenue lies only in the word!) "and functions as such (elle n'opère comme telle) only after it is realised, after each article produced finds a consumer who has the need or the desire for it" (qui en avait le besoin ou le désir) (I, 121). Thus, the identification of revenue with "production" (i.e., with all that is produced) leads to the identification of realisation with *personal* consumption. Sismondi has already forgotten that the realisation of such products as, for example, iron, coal, machines, etc., the realisation of means of production in general, takes place in a different way, although he had been very close to this idea earlier. The identification of realisation with *personal* consumption naturally leads to the doctrine that it is *surplus-value* that the capitalists cannot realise, because, of the two parts of the social product, wages are realised through workers' consumption. And indeed, Sismondi reached this conclusion (subsequently amplified in greater detail by Proudhon and constantly repeated by our

Narodniks). In controversy with MacCulloch, Sismondi makes the allegation that the latter (in expounding Ricardo's views) does not explain the realisation of profit. MacCulloch had said that, with the division of social labour, one branch of production provides a market for another: the producers of bread realise their commodities in the product of the producers of clothing and vice versa.* "The author," says Sismondi, "presupposes labour without profit (un travail sans bénéfice), reproduction which only replaces the *workers*' consumption" (II, 384, Sismondi's italics) ... "he leaves nothing for the master ... we are investigating what becomes of the excess of the workers' production over their consumption" (ibid.). Thus, we find that this first romanticist already makes the very definite statement that the capitalists cannot realise *surplus-value*. From this proposition Sismondi draws the further conclusion—again the very same as that drawn by the Narodniks—that *the very conditions of realisation* make it necessary *for capitalism to have a foreign market*. "As labour itself is an important component of revenue, the demand for labour cannot be reduced without making the nation poorer. Hence, the expected gain from the invention of new methods of production nearly always relates to *foreign trade*" (I, 345). "The nation which is the first to make some discovery is able, for a considerable time, to expand its market in proportion to the number of hands that are released by each new invention It employs them forthwith to produce that larger quantity of products which its invention enables it to produce more cheaply. But at last the time will come when the whole civilised world forms a single market, and it will no longer be possible to acquire new purchasers in any new nation. Demand in the world market will then be a constant (précise) quantity, for which the different

* See supplement to *Nouveaux Principes*, 2nd ed., Vol. II: "Eclaircissements relatifs à la balance des consommations avec les productions" ("Explanations Relative to the Balance of Consumption and Production."—*Ed.*), where Sismondi translates and disputes the essay by Ricardo's disciple (MacCulloch) published in the *Edinburgh Review* entitled "An Inquiry into the Question as to Whether the Power to Consume Always Grows in Society Simultaneously with the Power to Produce."[47]

industrial nations will compete against each other. If one nation supplies a larger quantity of products, it will do so to the detriment of another. The total sales cannot be increased except by an increase in general prosperity, or by the transfer of commodities, formerly the exclusive possession of the rich, to the sphere of consumption by the poor" (II, 316). The reader will see that Sismondi presents the very doctrine that our romanticists have learned so well, namely, that the foreign market provides *the way out of the difficulty* of realising the product in general, and surplus-value in particular.

Lastly, this same doctrine that national revenue and national production are identical led to Sismondi's theory of crises. After what has been said above, we need scarcely quote from the numerous passages in Sismondi's work which deal with this subject. His theory that production must conform to revenue naturally led to the view that crises are the result of the disturbance of this balance, the result of an excess of production over consumption. It is evident from the passage just quoted that it is this discrepancy between production and consumption that Sismondi regarded as the main cause of crises; and in the forefront he placed the underconsumption of the masses of the people, the workers. This explains why Sismondi's theory of crises (which Rodbertus also adopted) is known in economic science as an example of the theories which ascribe crises to underconsumption (Unterkonsumption).

IV

WHEREIN LIES THE ERROR OF ADAM SMITH'S AND SISMONDI'S THEORIES OF NATIONAL REVENUE?

What is the fundamental error that led Sismondi, to all these conclusions?

Sismondi took over his theory of national revenue and of its division into two parts (the workers' and the capitalists') bodily from Adam Smith. Far from adding anything to Adam Smith's theses, he even took a step backward and omitted Adam Smith's attempt (albeit unsuccessful) to substantiate this proposition theoretically. Sismondi ap-

pears not to notice how this theory contradicts that of production in general. Indeed, according to the theory which deduces value from labour, the value of a product consists of three components: the part which replaces the raw materials and instruments of labour (constant capital), the part which replaces wages, or the maintenance of the workers (variable capital), and "surplus-value" (Sismondi calls it mieux-value). Such is the analysis of the individual product in terms of value made by Adam Smith and repeated by Sismondi. The question is: how can the *social* product, which is the sum-total of *individual* products, consist only of the two latter parts? What has become of the first part—constant capital? As we have seen, Sismondi merely beat about the bush on this question, but Adam Smith gave an answer to it. He asserted that this part exists independently only in the individual product. If, however, we take the aggregate social product, this part, in its turn, resolves itself into wages and surplus-value—of precisely those capitalists who produce this constant capital.

But in giving this answer Adam Smith did not explain why, when resolving the value of constant capital, say of machines, he again leaves out the constant capital, i.e., in our example, the iron out of which the machines are made, or the instruments used up in the process, etc.? If the value of each product includes the part which replaces constant capital (and all economists agree that it does) then the exclusion of that part from any sphere of social production whatever is quite arbitrary. As the author of *Capital* pointed out, "when Adam Smith says that the instruments of labour resolve themselves into wages and profit, he forgets to add: *and into that constant capital* which is used up in their production. Adam Smith simply sends us from Pontius to Pilate, from one line of production to another, from another to a third,"[48] failing to notice that this shifting about does not alter the problem in the least. Smith's answer (accepted by all the subsequent political economists prior to Marx) is simply an evasion of the problem, avoidance of the difficulty. And there is indeed a difficulty here. It lies in that the concepts of capital and revenue cannot be directly transferred from the

individual product to the social product. The economists admit this when they say that from the social point of view what is "capital for one becomes revenue for another" (see Sismondi, as quoted above). This phrase, however, *formulates* the difficulty but does not solve it.*

The solution is that when examining this question from the social point of view, we must no longer speak of products in general, irrespective of their material forms. Indeed, we are discussing the social revenue, i.e., the product which becomes available for consumption. But surely not all products can be consumed through *personal consumption*: machines, coal, iron, and similar articles are not consumed personally, but productively. From the individual entrepreneur's point of view this distinction was superfluous: when we said that the workers would consume variable capital, we assumed that on the market they would acquire articles of consumption with the money the capitalist had paid them, the money which he, the capitalist, had received for the machines made by the workers. Here the exchange of machines for bread does not interest us. But from the social point of view, this exchange cannot be *assumed*: we cannot say that the entire capitalist class which produces machines, iron, etc., sells these things, and in this way realises them. The whole question is *how* realisation takes place—*that is*, the replacement of all parts of the social product. Hence, the point of departure in discussing social capital and revenue—or, what is the same thing, the realisation of the product in capitalist society—must be the distinction between two entirely different types of social product: *means of production* and *articles of consumption*. The former can be consumed only productively, the latter *only* personally. The former can serve *only* as capital, the latter must become revenue, i.e., must be destroyed in consumption by the workers and capitalists. The former go entirely to the capitalists, the latter are shared between the workers and the capitalists.

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* We give here only the *gist* of the new theory which provides this solution, leaving ourselves free to present it in greater detail elsewhere. See *Das Kapital*, II. Band, III, Abschnitt.[49] (For a more detailed exposition, see *The Development of Capitalism*, chap. I.)[50]

Once this difference is understood and we rectify the error made by Adam Smith, who left its constant part (i.e., the part which replaces constant capital) out of the social product, the question of the realisation of the product in capitalist society becomes clear. Obviously, we cannot speak of wages being realised through consumption by the workers, and surplus-value through consumption by the capitalists, and *nothing more*.* The workers can consume wages and capitalists surplus-value only when the product consists of articles of consumption, i.e., only in one department of social production. They cannot "consume" the product which consists of means of production: this *must be exchanged for articles of consumption*. But for which part (in terms of value) of the articles of consumption can they exchange their product? Obviously, only for the *constant part* (constant capital), since the other two parts constitute the consumption fund of the workers and capitalists who produce articles of consumption. By realising the surplus-value and wages in the industries which produce means of production, this exchange thereby realises the constant capital in the industries which produce articles of consumption. Indeed, for the capitalist who manufactures, say, sugar, that part of the product which is to replace constant capital (i.e., raw materials, auxiliary materials, machines, premises, etc.) exists in the shape of *sugar*. To realise this part, he must receive corresponding *means of production* in return for it. The realisation of this part will therefore consist in exchanging the *article of consumption* for products which serve as *means of production*. Now the realisation of only one part of the social product, namely, the constant capital in the

* That is just how our Narodnik economists Messrs. V. V. and N. —on reason. Above we deliberately dealt in great detail with Sismondi's wandering around the question of productive and personal consumption, of articles of consumption and means of production (Adam Smith came even closer to distinguishing between them than Sismondi did). We wanted to show the reader that the *classical* representatives of this fallacious theory *felt* that it was unsatisfactory, saw the contradiction in it, and made attempts to extricate themselves. But our "original" theoreticians not only see nothing and feel nothing, but know nothing about either the theory or the history of the question they prate about so zealously.

department which manufactures means of production, remains unexplained. This is partially realised by part of the product going back again into production in its natural form (for example, part of the coal produced by a mining firm is used to produce more coal; the grain obtained by farmers is used for seed, and so forth); and partly it is realised by exchange between individual capitalists in the same department: for example, coal is needed for the production of iron, and iron is needed for the production of coal. The capitalists who produce these two products realise by mutual exchange that part of their respective products which replaces their constant capital.

This analysis (which, we repeat, we have summarised in the most condensed form for the reason given above) solved the difficulty which all the economists felt when they formulated it in the phrase: "capital for one becomes revenue for another." This analysis revealed the utter fallacy of reducing social production solely to personal consumption.

We can now proceed to examine the conclusions drawn by Sismondi (and the other romanticists) from his fallacious theory. But first let us quote the opinion of Sismondi expressed by the author of the above analysis, after a most detailed and comprehensive examination of Adam Smith's theory, to which Sismondi added absolutely nothing, merely leaving out Adam Smith's attempt to justify his contradiction:

"Sismondi, who occupies himself particularly with the relation of capital to revenue, and in actual fact makes the peculiar formulation of this relation the differentia specifica of his *Nouveaux Principes*, did not say *one* scientific word" (author's italics), "did not contribute one iota to the clarification of the problem" (*Das Kapital*, II, S. 385, 1-te Auflage).[51]

V

ACCUMULATION IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

The first erroneous conclusion from the fallacious theory relates to accumulation. Sismondi did not in the least understand capitalist accumulation, and in his heated

controversy on this subject with Ricardo truth was really on the side of the latter. Ricardo asserted that production creates a market for itself, whereas Sismondi denied this, and based his theory of crises on this denial. True, Ricardo was also unable to correct the above-mentioned fundamental mistake of Adam Smith, and, therefore, was unable to solve the problem of the relation between social capital and revenue and of the realisation of the product (nor did Ricardo set himself these problems); but he instinctively characterised the quintessence of the bourgeois mode of production by noting the absolutely indisputable fact that accumulation is the excess of production over revenue. From the viewpoint of the modern analysis that is how matters stand. Production does indeed create a market for itself: production needs means of production, and they constitute a special department of social production, which occupies a certain section of the workers, and produces a special product, realised partly within this same department and partly by exchange with the other department, which produces articles of consumption. Accumulation is indeed the excess of production over revenue (articles of consumption). To expand production (to "accumulate" in the categorical meaning of the term) it is first of all necessary to produce means of production,* and for this it is consequently necessary to expand that department of social production which manufactures means of production, it is necessary *to draw into it* workers who immediately *present a demand for articles of consumption, too*. Hence, "consumption" develops *after* "accumulation," or *after* "production"; strange though it may seem, it cannot be otherwise in capitalist society. Hence, the rates of development of these two departments of capitalist production do not have to be proportionate, on the contrary, they must inevitably be disproportionate. It is well known that the law of development of capital is that constant capital grows faster

* We would remind the reader how Sismondi approached this; he distinctly singled out these means of production for an individual family and tried to do the same for society, too. Properly speaking it was Smith who "approached," and not Sismondi, who only related what Smith had said.

than variable capital, that is to say, an ever larger share of newly-formed capital is turned into that department of the social economy which produces means of production. Hence, this department necessarily grows faster than the department which manufactures articles of consumption, i.e., what takes place is exactly that which Sismondi declared to be "impossible," "dangerous," etc. Hence, products for personal consumption occupy an ever-diminishing place in the total mass of capitalist output. And this fully corresponds to the historical "mission" of capitalism and to its specific social structure: the former is to develop the productive forces of society (production for production); the latter precludes their utilisation by the mass of the population.

We can now fully appraise Sismondi's view of accumulation. His assertion that *rapid* accumulation leads to disaster is absolutely wrong and is solely the result of his failure to understand accumulation, as are his repeated statements and demands that production must not outstrip consumption, because consumption determines production. Actually, the very opposite is the case, and Sismondi simply turns his back on reality in its specific, historically determined form and substitutes petty-bourgeois moralising for an analysis. Particularly amusing are Sismondi's attempts to clothe this moralising in a "scientific" formula. "Messrs. Say and Ricardo," he says in his preface to the second edition of *Nouveaux Principes*, "came to believe ... that consumption had no other limits than those of production, whereas actually it is limited by revenue.... They should have warned producers that they must count only on consumers who have a revenue" (I, XIII).* Nowadays, such naïveté only raises a smile. But are not the writings of our contemporary romanticists, like Messrs. V. V. and N. —on, replete with the same sort of thing? "Let the banking entrepreneurs ponder well" ... over whether they will find a market for their commodities (II, 101-02).

* As we know, on this question (as to whether production creates a market for itself) the modern theory fully agrees with the classical economists, who answered this question in the affirmative, *in opposition* to romanticism, which answered it in the negative. "*The real barrier* of capitalist production is *capital itself*" (*Das Kapital*, III, I, 231).[52]

"When it is assumed that the aim of society is to increase wealth, the aim is always sacrificed for the means" (II, 140). "If, instead of expecting an impetus from the demand created by labour" (i.e., an impetus to production from the workers' demand for products), "we expect it to come from preceding production, we shall be doing almost the same thing as we would do to a clock if, instead of turning back the wheel that carries the chain (la roue qui porte la chainette), we turn back another wheel—we would thereby break the whole machine and stop it" (II, 454). Sismondi says that. Let us now hear what Mr. Nikolai —on has to say. "We have overlooked the factors due to which this development" (i.e., the development of capitalism) "is taking place; we have also forgotten the aim of all production ... an extremely fatal blunder..." (N. —on, *Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*, 298). Both these authors talk about capitalism, about capitalist countries; both reveal their complete inability to understand the essence of capitalist accumulation. But would one believe that the latter is writing seventy years after the former?

An example which Sismondi quotes in chapter VIII: "The Results of the Struggle to Cheapen Production" (Book IV, *Of Commercial Wealth*) vividly demonstrates how failure to understand capitalist accumulation is linked up with the error of reducing all production to the production of articles of consumption.

Let us assume, says Sismondi, that the owner of a manufactory has a circulating capital of 100,000 francs, which brings him 15,000, of which 6,000 represent interest on capital and are paid to the capitalist, and 9,000 constitute the profit obtained by the manufacturer as the entrepreneur. Let us assume that he employs the labour of 100 workers, whose wages total 30,000 francs. Further, let there be an increase in capital, an expansion of production ("accumulation"). Instead of 100,000 francs the capital will be = 200,000 francs invested in fixed capital and 200,000 francs in circulating capital, making a total of 400,000 francs; profit and interest = 32,000 + 16,000 francs, for the rate of interest has dropped from 6% to 4%. The number of workers employed has doubled, but wages have dropped from 300 francs to 200 francs, hence, making a

total of 40,000 francs. Thus, production has grown fourfold.* And Sismondi counts up the results: "revenue," or "consumption," in the first case amounted to 45,000 francs (30,000 wages + 6,000 interest + 9,000 profit); it is now 88,000 francs (40,000 wages + 16,000 interest + 32,000 profit). "Production has increased fourfold," says Sismondi, "but consumption has not even doubled. *The consumption of the workers who made the machines should not be counted. It is covered by the 200,000 francs* which have been used for this purpose; it is already included in the accounts of another manufactory, where the facts will be the same" (I, 405-06).

Sismondi's calculation shows a diminution of revenue with an increase in production. The fact is indisputable. But Sismondi does not notice that the example he gives defeats his own theory of the realisation of the product in capitalist society. Curious is his observation that the consumption of the workers who made machines "should not be counted." Why not? Because, firstly, it is *covered* by the 200,000 francs. Thus, capital is transferred to the department which manufactures means of production—this Sismondi does not notice. Hence, the "home market," which "shrinks," as Sismondi says, does not consist solely of articles of consumption, but also of *means of production*. These means of production constitute a special product which is *not* "realised" by *personal consumption*; and the more rapidly accumulation proceeds, the more intense, consequently, is the development of that department of capitalist production which manufactures products not for personal but for productive consumption. Secondly, answers Sismondi, it is the workers of the other manufactory, where the facts will be the same (où les mêmes faits pourront se représent-

* "The first result of competition," says Sismondi, "is a reduction in wages and at the same time an increase in the number of workers" (I, 403). We shall not dwell here on Sismondi's wrong calculation: he calculates, for example, that profit will be 8 per cent on fixed capital and 8% on circulating capital, that the number of workers rises in proportion to the increase of circulating capital (which he cannot properly distinguish from variable capital), and that fixed capital goes entirely into the price of the product. In the present case all this is unimportant, because the conclusion arrived at is correct: a diminution in the share of variable capital in the total capital, as a necessary result of accumulation.

er). As you see, Sismondi repeats Adam Smith in sending the reader "from Pontius to Pilate." But this "other manufactory" also consumes *constant capital*, and its production also provides a market for that department of capitalist production which manufactures means of production! However much we shift the question from one capitalist to another, and then to a third—this department does not disappear, and the "home market" does not reduce itself just to articles of consumption. Therefore, when Sismondi says that "this calculation refutes ... one of the axioms that has been most insisted upon in political economy, namely, the freer competition, the more profitable the development of industry" (I, 407), he does not notice that "this calculation" also refutes what he himself says. It is an undisputed fact that by displacing workers the introduction of machines worsens their conditions; and it is indisputably to Sismondi's credit that he was one of the first to point to this. But this does not in the least prevent his theory of accumulation and of the home market from being absolutely incorrect. His own calculation clearly indicates the very phenomenon which Sismondi not only denied but even turned into an argument against capitalism, when he said that accumulation and production must correspond to consumption, otherwise a crisis will ensue. His calculation shows, precisely, that accumulation and production *outstrip* consumption, and that it cannot be otherwise, for accumulation takes place mainly through means of production which do not enter into "consumption." What seemed to Sismondi to be simply an error, a contradiction in Ricardo's doctrine—that accumulation is excess of production over revenue—actually corresponds in full to reality and expresses the contradiction inherent in capitalism. This excess is *necessary* for all accumulation, which opens a new market *for means of production without correspondingly expanding the market for articles of consumption, and even contracting this market.** Furthermore,

* From the above analysis it automatically follows that such a case is also possible, depending upon the proportion in which the new capital is divided up into a constant and a variable part, and the extent to which the diminution of the relative share of the variable capital affects the old industries.

in rejecting the theory of the advantages of free competition, Sismondi does not notice that, together with groundless optimism, he throws overboard the undoubted truth that free competition *develops the productive forces of society*, as is again evident from his own calculation. (Properly speaking, this is only another way of expressing the same fact that a special department of industry is created which manufactures means of production, and that this department develops with particular rapidity.) This development of the productive forces of society without a corresponding development of consumption is, of course, a contradiction, but the sort of contradiction that exists in reality, that springs from the very nature of capitalism, and that cannot be brushed aside by means of sentimental phrases.

But this is just how the romanticists try to brush it aside. And to give the reader no grounds for suspecting us of levelling unsupported charges against contemporary economists in connection with the mistakes of such an "obsolete" author as Sismondi, let us quote a little sample of the writings of that "modern" author Mr. N. —on. On page 242 of his *Sketches* he discusses the development of capitalism in the Russian flour-milling industry. Referring to the appearance of large steam flour-mills with improved implements of production (since the seventies about 100 million rubles have been spent on reconstructing the flour-mills) and with a more than twofold increase in the productivity of labour, the author describes this phenomenon as follows: "the flour-milling industry has not developed, it has merely become concentrated in large enterprises"; he then applies this description to *all* industries (p. 243) and draws the conclusion that "in all cases without exception, a mass of workers are displaced and find no employment" (243), and that "capitalist production has developed at the expense of the people's consumption" (241). We ask the reader: does this argument differ in any way from Sismondi's argument just quoted? This "modern" author registers two facts, those very facts which, as we have seen, were used by Sismondi, and brushes both these facts aside with exactly the same sentimental phrase. Firstly, the example he gives shows that capitalism develops through the means of production. This means that capitalism develops the

productive forces of society. Secondly, his example shows that this development proceeds along the specific road of contradictions that is typical of capitalism: there is a development of production (an expenditure of 100 million rubles constitutes a home market for products realised by non-personal consumption) without a corresponding development of consumption (the people's food deteriorates), i.e., what we have is production for the sake of production. And Mr. N. —on thinks that this contradiction will vanish from life if he, with old Sismondi's naïveté, presents it merely as a contradiction in doctrine, merely as "a fatal blunder": "we have forgotten the aim of production"!! What can be more characteristic than the phrase: "has not developed, it has *merely* become concentrated"? Evidently, Mr. N. —on knows of a capitalism in which development *could proceed otherwise* than by *concentration*. What a pity he has not introduced us to this "original" capitalism, which was unknown to all the political economists who preceded him!

VI

THE FOREIGN MARKET AS THE "WAY OUT OF THE DIFFICULTY" OF REALISING SURPLUS-VALUE

Sismondi's next error, which springs from his fallacious theory of social revenue and the product in capitalist society, is his doctrine that the product in general, and surplus-value in particular, cannot possibly be realised, and that consequently it is necessary to find a foreign market. As regards the realisation of the product in general, the foregoing analysis shows that the "impossibility" is due entirely to the mistaken exclusion of constant capital and means of production. Once this error is corrected, the "impossibility" vanishes. The same, however, must be said in particular about surplus-value: this analysis explains how it too is realised. There are no reasonable grounds whatever for separating surplus-value from the total product so far as its realisation is concerned. Sismondi's (and our Narodniks') assertion to the contrary is simply a misunderstanding of the fundamental laws of realisation

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

in general, an inability to divide the product into three (and not two) parts in terms of value, and into two kinds in terms of material form (means of production and articles of consumption). The proposition that the capitalists cannot consume surplus-value is merely a vulgarised repetition of Adam Smith's perplexity regarding realisation in general. Only *part* of the surplus-value consists of articles of consumption; the other part consists of means of production (for example, the surplus-value of the ironmaster). The "consumption" of *this latter* surplus-value is effected *by applying it to production*; the capitalists, however, who manufacture products in the shape of means of production do not consume surplus-value, but *constant capital* obtained by exchange with other capitalists. Hence, the Narodniks too, in arguing that surplus-value cannot be realised, ought logically to admit that constant *capital* also cannot be realised—and in this way they would safely go back to Adam.... It goes without saying that such a return to the "father of political economy" would be a gigantic step forward for writers who present us with old errors in the guise of truths they have "arrived at by themselves."...

But what about the foreign market? Do we deny that capitalism needs a foreign market? Of course not. But the question of a foreign market has *absolutely nothing to do with the question of realisation*, and the attempt to link them into one whole merely expresses the romantic wish to "retard" capitalism, and the romantic inability to think logically. The theory which has explained the question of realisation has proved this up to the hilt. The romanticist says: the capitalists cannot consume surplus-value and therefore must dispose of it abroad. The question is: do the capitalists supply foreigners with products gratis, or do they throw them into the sea? They sell them—hence, they receive an equivalent; they export certain kinds of products—hence, they import other kinds. If we speak of the realisation of the social product, we thereby exclude the circulation of money and assume only the exchange of products for products, since the problem of realisation consists in analysing the *replacement* of all parts of the social product in terms of value and in terms of material form. Hence, to commence the argument about realisation

and to end it by saying that they "will market the product for money" is as ridiculous as answering the question about realising constant capital in the shape of articles of consumption by saying: "they will sell." This is simply a gross logical blunder: people wander away from the question of the realisation of the aggregate social product to the viewpoint of the individual entrepreneur, who has no other interest than that of "selling to the foreigner." To link foreign trade, exports, with the question of realisation means evading the issue, merely *shifting* it to a wider field, *but doing nothing towards clearing it up*.* The problem of realisation will not be made one iota clearer if, instead of the market of one country, we take the market of a certain group of countries. When the Narodniks assert that the foreign market is "the way out of the difficulty"** which capitalism raises for itself in the realisation of the product, they merely use this phrase to cover up the sad fact that for them "the foreign market" is "the way out of the difficulty" into which they fall owing to their failure to understand theory.... Not only that. The theory which links the foreign market with the problem of the realisation of the aggregate social product not only reveals a failure to understand this realisation, but, in addition, reveals an *extremely superficial understanding of the contradictions inherent in this realisation*. "The workers will consume wages, but the capitalists cannot consume surplus-value." Ponder over this "theory" from the point of view of the foreign market. How do we know that "the workers will consume wages"? What grounds have we for thinking that the products intended by the entire capitalist class of a given country for consumption by all the workers of that country will really *equal their wages in value* and will replace them,

* This is so clear that even Sismondi was conscious of the need to disregard foreign trade in analysing realisation. "To trace these calculations more exactly," he says on the point about production corresponding to consumption "and to simplify the question, we have hitherto completely excluded foreign trade; we have presupposed an isolated nation; human society itself is such an isolated nation, and whatever relates to a nation without foreign trade is equally true of the human race" (I, 115).

** N.—on, p. 205.

that there will be no need for a foreign market for *these* products? There are absolutely no grounds for thinking so, and actually it is not so at all. Not only the products (or part of the products) which replace surplus-value, but also those which replace variable capital; not only products which replace variable capital, but also those which replace constant capital (forgotten by our "economists" who also forget their kinship ... with Adam); not only products that serve as articles of consumption but also those that serve as means of production—all these products are realised in the same way, in the midst of "difficulties," in the midst of continuous fluctuations, which become increasingly violent as capitalism grows, in the midst of fierce competition, which *compels* every entrepreneur to strive to expand production unlimitedly, to go beyond the bounds of the given country, to set out in quest of new markets in countries not yet drawn into the sphere of capitalist commodity circulation. This brings us to the question of why a capitalist country needs a foreign market. Certainly not because the product cannot be realised at all under the capitalist system. That is nonsense. A foreign market is needed because it is *inherent* in capitalist production to strive for *unlimited* expansion—unlike all the old modes of production, which were limited to the village community, to the patriarchal estate, to the tribe, to a territorial area, or state. Under all the old economic systems production was every time resumed in the same form and on the same scale as previously; under the capitalist system, however, this resumption in the same form becomes *impossible*, and *unlimited* expansion, perpetual progress, becomes the law of production.*

Thus, different conceptions of realisation (more exactly, the understanding of it, on the one hand, and complete misunderstanding of it by the romanticists, on the other) lead to two diametrically opposite views on the significance of the foreign market. For some (the romanticists), the foreign market is an indication of the "difficulty" which capitalism *places in the way of* social development. For others, on the contrary, the foreign market shows how

* Cf. Sieber, *David Ricardo*, *etc.*, St. Petersburg, 1885, p. 466, footnote.

capitalism *removes* the difficulties of social development provided by history in the shape of various barriers—communal, tribal, territorial and national.*

As you see, the difference is only one of the "point of view."... Yes, "only"! The difference between the romanticist judges of capitalism and the others is, in general, "only" one of the "point of view,"—"only" that some judge from the rear, and the others from the front, some from the viewpoint of a system which capitalism is destroying, the others from the viewpoint of a system which capitalism is creating.**

The romanticists' wrong understanding of the foreign market usually goes hand in hand with references to the "specific features" of the international position of capitalism in the given country, to the impossibility of finding markets, etc.; the object of all these arguments is to "dissuade" the capitalists from seeking foreign markets. Incidentally, we are not being exact in saying "references," for the romanticist gives us no actual analysis of the country's foreign trade, of its progress in the sphere of new markets, its colonisation, etc. He has no interest whatever in studying the actual process and in explaining it; all he wants is a *moral condemnation of this process*. So that the reader can convince himself of the complete identity between this moralising of contemporary Russian romanticists and that of the French romanticist, we shall quote some specimens of the latter's arguments. We have already seen how Sismondi warned the capitalists that they would find no market. But this is not all he asserted. He also claimed that "the world market is already sufficiently supplied" (II, 328) and argued that it was impossible to proceed along the capitalist path, that it was necessary to choose another path.... He assured the British employers that capitalism would not be able to give jobs to all the agricultural labourers displaced by capitalist farming (I, 255-56). "Will those to whom the agriculturists are sacri-

* Cf. later: *Rede über die Frage des Freihandels* (Karl Marx, *On Free Trade.—Ed.*).

** I am speaking here only of the appraisal of capitalism and not of an understanding of it. In the latter respect the romanticists, as we have seen, stand no higher than the classical economists.

ficed derive any benefit from it? Are not the agriculturists the nearest and most reliable consumers of English manufactures? The cessation of their consumption would strike industry a blow more fatal than the closing of one of the biggest foreign markets" (I, 256). He assured English farmers that they would not be able to withstand the competition of the poor Polish peasant, whose grain costs him almost nothing (II, 257) and that they were menaced by the even more frightful competition of Russian grain from the Black Sea ports. He exclaimed: "The Americans are following the new principle: to produce without calculating the market (produire sans calculer le marché), and to produce as much as possible," and here is "the characteristic feature of United States' trade, from one end of the country to the other—an excess of goods of every kind over what is needed for consumption ... constant bankruptcies are the result of this excess of commercial capital which cannot be exchanged for revenue" (I, 455-56). Good Sismondi! What would he say about present-day America—about the America that has developed so enormously, thanks to the very "home market" which, according to the romanticists' theory, should have "shrunk"!

VII

CRISIS

Sismondi's third mistaken conclusion, drawn from the wrong theory which he borrowed from Adam Smith, is the theory of crises. Sismondi's view that accumulation (the growth of production in general) is determined by consumption, and his incorrect explanation of the realisation of the aggregate social product (which he reduces to the workers' share and the capitalists' share of revenue) naturally and inevitably led to the doctrine that crises are to be explained by the discrepancy between production and consumption. Sismondi fully agreed with this theory. It was also adopted by Rodbertus, who formulated it somewhat differently: he explained crises by saying that with the growth of production the workers' share of the product diminishes, and wrongly divided the aggregate social product, as Adam Smith did, into wages and "rent" (according to his terminology "rent" is surplus-value,

i.e., profit and ground-rent together). The scientific analysis of accumulation in capitalist society* and of the realisation of the product undermined the whole basis of this theory, and also indicated that it is precisely in the periods which precede crises that the workers' consumption rises, that underconsumption (to which crises are allegedly due) existed under the most diverse economic systems, whereas crises are the distinguishing feature of only one system—the capitalist system. This theory explains crises by another contradiction, namely, the contradiction between the social character of production (socialised by capitalism) and the private, individual mode of appropriation. The profound difference between these theories would seem to be self-evident, but we must deal with it in greater detail because it is the Russian followers of Sismondi who try *to obliterate* this difference and to confuse the issue. The two theories of which we are speaking give totally different explanations of crises. The first theory explains crises by the contradiction between production and consumption by the working class; the second explains them by the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of appropriation. Consequently, the former sees the root of the phenomenon *outside of* production (hence, for example, Sismondi's general attacks on the classical economists for ignoring consumption and occupying themselves only with production); the latter sees it precisely in the conditions of production. To put it more briefly, the former explains crises by underconsumption (Unterkonsumption), the latter by the anarchy of production. Thus, while both theories explain crises by a *contradiction* in the economic system itself, they differ entirely on the nature of the contradiction. But the question is: does the second theory deny the fact of a contradiction between production and consumption,

* The mistaken conception of "accumulation of individual capital" held by Adam Smith and the economists who came after him is connected with the theory that the total product in capitalist economy consists of two parts. It was they who taught that the accumulated part of profit is spent entirely on wages, whereas actually it is spent on: 1) constant capital and 2) wages. Sismondi repeated this mistake of the classical economists as well.

does it deny the fact of underconsumption? *Of course not*. It fully recognises this fact, but puts it in its proper, subordinate, place as a fact that only relates to one department of the whole of capitalist production. It teaches us that this fact cannot explain crises, which are called forth by another and more profound contradiction that is fundamental in the present economic system, namely, the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of appropriation. What, then, should be said of those who, while they adhere essentially to the first theory, cover this up with references to the point that the representatives of the second theory note the existence of a contradiction between production and consumption? Obviously, these people have not *pondered over* the essence of the difference between the two theories, and do not properly understand the second theory. Among these people is, for example, Mr. N. —on (not to speak of Mr. V. V.). That they are followers of Sismondi has already been indicated in our literature by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky (*Industrial Crises*, p. 477, with the strange reservation relative to Mr. N. —on: "evidently"). But in talking about "the shrinking of the home market" and "the decline in the people's consuming capacity" (the central points of his views), Mr. N. —on, nevertheless, refers to the representatives of the second theory who *note* the fact of the contradiction between production and consumption, the fact of underconsumption. It goes without saying that such references merely reveal the ability, characteristic in general of this author, to cite inappropriate quotations and nothing more. For example, all readers who are familiar with his *Sketches* will, of course, remember his "citation" of the passage where it says that "the labourers as buyers of commodities are important for the market. But as sellers of their own commodity—labour-power—capitalist society tends to keep them down to the minimum price" (*Sketches*, p. 178), and they will also remember that Mr. N. —on wanted to deduce from this both "the shrinkage of the home market" (ibid., p. 203 et. al.) and crises (p. 298 et. al.). But while quoting this passage (which, as we have explained, proves nothing), our author, moreover, *leaves out the end* of the footnote from which his quotation was

taken. This quotation was from a *note inserted in the manuscript* of Part II of Volume II of *Capital*. It was inserted "for future amplification" and the publisher of the manuscript put it in as a footnote. *After the words quoted above, the note goes on to say*: "*However, this pertains to the next part*,"* i.e., to the third part. What is this third part? It is precisely the part which contains a criticism of Adam Smith's theory of two parts of the aggregate social product (together with the above-quoted opinion about Sismondi), and an analysis of "the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital," i.e., of the realisation of the product. Thus, in confirmation of his views, which are a repetition of Sismondi's, our author quotes a note that pertains "to the part" which refutes Sismondi: "to the part" in which it is shown that the capitalists *can* realise surplus-value, and that to introduce foreign trade in an analysis of realisation is absurd....

Another attempt to obliterate the difference between the two theories and to defend the old romanticist nonsense by referring to modern theories is contained in Ephrucy's article. Citing Sismondi's theory of crises, Ephrucy shows that it is wrong (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 7, p. 162); but he does so in an extremely hazy and contradictory way. On the one hand, he repeats the arguments of the opposite theory and says that national demand is not limited to articles of direct consumption. On the other hand, he asserts that Sismondi's explanation of crises "points to only one of the many circumstances which hinder the distribution of the national product in conformity with the demand of the population and with its purchasing power." Thus, the reader is invited to think that the explanation of crises is to be found in "distribution," and that Sismondi's mistake was only that he did not give a full list of the causes which hinder this distribution! But this is not the main thing.... "Sismondi," says Ephrucy, "did not confine himself to the above-mentioned explanation. Already in the first edition of *Nouveaux Principes* we find a highly enlightening chapter entitled 'De la connaissance du marché.'**

* *Das Kapital*, II. Band, S. 304.[53] Russ. trans., p. 232. Our italics.

** "About Knowledge of the Market."—*Ed.*

In this chapter Sismondi reveals to us the main causes that disturb the balance between production and consumption" (note this!) "with a clarity that we find among only a few economists" (ibid.). And quoting the passages which say that the manufacturer cannot know the market, Ephrucy says: "Engels says almost the same thing" (p. 163), and follows this up with a quotation saying that the manufacturer cannot know the demand. Then, quoting some more passages about "other obstacles to the establishment of a balance between production and consumption" (p. 164), Ephrucy assures us that "these give us the very explanation of crises which is becoming increasingly predominant"! Nay, more: Ephrucy is of the opinion that "on the question of the causes of crises in the national economy, we have every right to regard Sismondi as the founder of the views which were subsequently developed more consistently and more clearly" (p. 168).

But by all this Ephrucy betrays a complete failure to understand the issue! What are crises? Overproduction, the production of commodities which cannot be realised, for which there is no demand. If there is no demand for commodities, it shows that when the manufacturer produced them he did not know the demand. The question now arises: is this indication of the condition which makes crises possible an explanation of the crises? Did Ephrucy really not understand the difference between stating the possibility of a phenomenon and explaining its inevitability? Sismondi says: crises are possible, because the manufacturer does not know the demand; they are inevitable, because under capitalist production there can be no balance between production and consumption (i.e., the product cannot be realised). Engels says: crises are possible, because the manufacturer does not know the demand; they are inevitable, but certainly not because the product cannot be realised at all. For it is not true: the product can be realised. Crises are inevitable because the collective character of production comes into conflict with the individual character of appropriation. And yet we find an economist who assures us that Engels says "almost the same thing"; that Sismondi gives the "very same explanation of crises"! "I am therefore surprised," writes Ephrucy, "that Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky ... lost sight

of this most important and valuable point in Sismondi's doctrine" (p. 168). But Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky did not lose sight of anything.* On the contrary, he pointed very exactly to the fundamental contradiction to which the new theory reduces matters (p. 455 et. al.), and explained the significance of Sismondi, who at an earlier stage indicated the contradiction which reveals itself in crises, but was unable to give it a correct explanation (p. 457—Sismondi, before Engels, pointed to the fact that crises spring from the contemporary organisation of the economy; p. 491—Sismondi expounded the conditions which make crises possible, but "not every possibility becomes a fact"). Ephrucy, however, completely misunderstood this, and after lumping everything together he is "surprised" that what he gets is confusion! "True," says the economist of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, "we do not find Sismondi using the terms which have now received universal right of citizenship, such as 'anarchy of production,' 'unplanned production' (Planlosigkeit); but the substance behind these terms is noted by him quite clearly" (p. 168). With what ease the modern romanticist restores the romanticist of former days! The problem is reduced to one of a difference in terms! Actually, the problem boils down to the fact that Ephrucy does not understand the meaning of the terms he repeats. "Anarchy of production," "unplanned production"—what do these expressions tell us? They tell us about the contradiction between the social character of production and the individual character of appropriation. And we ask every one who is familiar with the economic literature we are examining: did Sismondi, or Rodbertus, recognise this contradiction? Did they deduce crises from this contradiction? No, they did not, and could not do so, because *neither of them had any understanding of this contradiction*. The very idea that the criticism of capitalism cannot be based on phrases

* In *The Development of Capitalism* (pp. 16 and 19) (see present edition, Vol. 3, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, chap. I, section VI.—*Ed.*) I have already noted Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's inexactitudes and errors which subsequently led him to go right over to the camp of the bourgeois economists. (Author's footnote to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

about universal prosperity,* or about the fallacy of "circulation left to itself,"** but must be based on the character of the evolution of production relations, was absolutely alien to them.

We fully understand why our Russian romanticists exert every effort to obliterate the difference between the two theories of crises mentioned. It is because fundamentally different attitudes towards capitalism are most directly and most closely linked with the theories mentioned. Indeed, if we explain crises by the impossibility of realising products, by the contradiction between production and consumption, we are thereby led to deny reality, the soundness of the path along which capitalism is proceeding; we proclaim this path to be a "false one," and go out in quest of "different paths." In deducing crises from this contradiction we are bound to think that the further it develops *the more difficult* will be the way out of the contradiction. And we have seen how Sismondi, with the utmost naïveté, expressed exactly this opinion when he said that if capital accumulated slowly it was tolerable; but if it accumulated rapidly, it would become unbearable.—On the other hand, if we explain crises by the contradiction between the social character of production and the individual character of appropriation, we thereby recognise that the capitalist road is real and progressive and reject the search for "different paths" as nonsensical romanticism. We thereby recognise that the further this contradiction develops *the easier* will be the way out of it, and that it is the development of this system which provides the way out.

As the reader sees, here, too, we meet with a difference in "points of view."...

It is quite natural that our romanticists should seek

* Cf. Sismondi, loc. cit., I, 8.

** Rodbertus. Incidentally, let us mention that Bernstein, who in general is restoring the prejudices of bourgeois political economy, has introduced confusion into this problem too by asserting that Marx's theory of crises does not differ very much from the theory of Rodbertus (*Die Voraussetzungen, etc.* Stuttg. 1899, S. 67) (E. Bernstein, *The Premises of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy.* Stuttgart, 1899, p. 67.—*Ed.*), and that Marx contradicts himself by recognising the ultimate cause of crises to be the limited consumption of the masses. (Author's footnote to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

theoretical confirmation of their views. It is quite natural that their search should lead them to the old rubbish which Western Europe has discarded long, long ago. It is quite natural that, feeling this to be so, they should try to renovate this rubbish, some times by actually embellishing the romanticists of Western Europe, and at others by smuggling in romanticism under the flag of inappropriate and garbled citations. But they are profoundly mistaken if they think that this sort of smuggling will remain unexposed.

With this we bring to a close our exposition of Sismondi's *basic* theoretical doctrine, and of the chief theoretical conclusions he drew from it; but we must make a slight addition, again relating to Ephrucy. In his other article about Sismondi (a continuation of the first), he says: "Still more interesting (than the theory on revenue from capital) are Sismondi's views on the different kinds of revenue" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 42). Sismondi, he says, like Rodbertus, divides the national revenue into two parts: "one goes to the owners of the land and instruments of production, the other goes to the representatives of labour" (ibid.). Then follow passages in which Sismondi speaks of such a division, not only of the national revenue, but of the aggregate product: "The annual output, or the result of all the work done by the nation during the year, also consists of two parts," and so forth (*Nouveaux Principes*, I, 105, quoted in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 43). "The passages we have quoted," concludes our economist, "clearly show that Sismondi fully assimilated (!) the very same classification of the national revenue which plays such an important role in the works of the modern economists, namely, the division of the national revenue into revenue from labour and non-labour revenue—arbeitsloses Einkommen. Although, generally speaking, Sismondi's views on the subject of revenue are not always clear and definite, we nevertheless discern in them a consciousness of the difference that exists between private revenue and national revenue" (p. 43).

The passage quoted, say we in answer to this, clearly shows that Ephrucy has fully assimilated the wisdom of the German textbooks, but in spite of that (and, perhaps, just because of it), he has completely overlooked the theoreti-

cal difficulty of the question of national revenue as distinct from individual revenue. Ephrucy expresses himself very carelessly. We have seen that in the first part of his article he applied the term "modern economists" to the theoreticians of one definite school. The reader would be right in thinking that he is referring to them this time too. Actually, however, the author has something entirely different in mind. It is now the German Katheder-Socialists[54] who figure as the modern economists. The author's defence of Sismondi consists in closely identifying his theory with theirs. What is the theory of these "modern" authorities that Ephrucy quotes? That the national revenue is divided into two parts.

But this is the theory of Adam Smith and not of the "modern economists"! In dividing revenue into wages, profit and rent (Book I, chap. VI of *The Wealth of Nations*; Book II, chap. II), Adam Smith opposed the two latter to the former precisely as non-labour revenue; he called them both deductions from the produce of labour (Book I, chap. VIII) and challenged the opinion that profit is also wages for a special kind of labour (Book I, chap. VI). Sismondi, Rodbertus and the "modern" authors of German textbooks simply repeat Smith's doctrine. The only difference between them is that Adam Smith was aware that he was not quite successful in his efforts to separate the national revenue from the national product; he was aware that by excluding constant capital (to use the modern term) from the national product after having included it in the individual product, he was slipping into a contradiction. The "modern" economists, however, in repeating Adam Smith's mistake, have merely clothed his doctrine in a more pompous phrase ("classification of the national revenue") and lost the awareness of the contradiction which brought Adam Smith to a halt. These methods may be scholarly, but they are not in the least scientific.

VIII

CAPITALIST RENT AND CAPITALIST OVERPOPULATION

We continue our survey of Sismondi's theoretical views. All his chief views, those which distinguish him from all other economists, who have already examined. The others

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

either do not play such an important role in his general theory, or are deduced from the preceding ones.

Let us note that Sismondi, like Rodbertus, did not agree with Ricardo's theory of rent. While not advancing a theory of his own, he tried to shake Ricardo's theory with arguments that were, to say the least, feeble. In this he acts as the pure ideologist of the small peasant; it is not so much a refutation of Ricardo as a complete rejection of the application of the categories of commodity economy and of capitalism to agriculture. In both respects his point of view is extremely characteristic of the romanticists. Chapter XIII of Book III* deals with "Mr. Ricardo's ground-rent theory." Stating at once that Ricardo's doctrine completely contradicts his own theory, Sismondi advances the following objections: the general level of profit (on which Ricardo's theory is based) is never established, there is no free movement of capital in agriculture. In agriculture we must discern the intrinsic value of the product (la valeur intrinsèque), which does not depend upon market fluctuations and provides the-owner with a "net product" (produit net), the "labour of nature" (I, 306). "The labour of nature is a power, the source of the net product of the land regarded intrinsically" (intrinsèquement) (I, 310). "We regarded rent (le fermage), or more correctly, the net product, as originating directly from the land for the owner's benefit; it takes no share either from the farmer or the

* His very system of exposition is characteristic: Book III treats of "territorial wealth" (richesse territoriale), of wealth in the shape of land, i.e., of agriculture. The next book, Book IV, treats of "commercial wealth" (de la richesse commerciale), of industry and commerce. As though the produce of the land, and land itself, have not also become commodities under the rule of capitalism! For this reason, there is no harmony between these two books. Industry is dealt with only in its capitalist form as it existed in Sismondi's time. Agriculture, however, is described in the form of a motley enumeration of all sorts of systems of exploiting the land: patriarchal, slave, half-crop, corvée, quit-rent, capitalist farming and emphyteutic (the granting of land on a perpetual hereditary lease). The result is utter confusion: the author gives us neither a history of agriculture, for all these "systems" are unconnected, nor an analysis of agriculture under capitalist economy although the latter is the real subject of his work, and though he speaks of industry only in its capitalist form.

consumer" (I, 312). And this repetition of the old physiocratic prejudices concludes with the moral: "In general, in political economy, one should guard against (se défier) absolute assumptions, as well as against abstractions" (1, 312)! There is really nothing to examine in such a "theory," since Ricardo's brief remark about the "labour of nature" is more than enough.* It is simply a refusal to analyse and a gigantic step back compared with Ricardo. Here, too, the romanticism of Sismondi is quite clearly revealed, for he hastens to condemn the process, but is afraid to touch it with an analysis. Note that he does not deny the fact of agriculture developing on capitalist lines in England, of the peasants there being displaced by capitalist farmers and day labourers, and of things developing in the same direction on the Continent. He simply turns his back on these facts (which he was in duty bound to examine since he was discussing capitalist economy) and prefers talking sentimentally of the advantages of the patriarchal system of exploiting the land. Our Narodniks behave in exactly the same way: none of them have attempted to deny the fact that commodity economy is penetrating into agriculture, that it must produce a radical change in the social character of agriculture; but at the same time none of them, in discussing the capitalist economy, raise the question of the growth of commercial farming, preferring to make shift with moralising about "people's production." Since we are confining ourselves for the moment to an analysis of Sismondi's theoretical economy, we shall postpone a more detailed examination of this "patriarchal exploitation" to a later occasion.

Another theoretical point around which Sismondi's exposition revolves is the doctrine of population. Let us

* Ricardo, *Works*, Sieber's (Russian) translation, p. 35: "Does nature do nothing for man in manufactures? Are the powers of wind and water, which move our machinery, and assist navigation, nothing? The pressure of the atmosphere and the elasticity of steam, which enable us to work the most stupendous engines—are they not the gifts of nature? To say nothing of the effects of the matter of heat in softening and melting metals, of the decomposition of the atmosphere in the process of dyeing and fermentation. There is not a manufacture which can be mentioned, in which nature does not give her assistance to man, and give it too, generously and gratuitously."

note Sismondi's attitude towards the Malthusian theory, and towards the surplus population created by capitalism.

Ephrucy assures us that Sismondi agrees with Malthus only on the point that the population can multiply with exceeding rapidity, and be the cause of terrible suffering. "Beyond this they are poles apart. Sismondi puts the whole population problem on a socio-historical basis" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 7, p. 148). In this formula, too, Ephrucy completely obscures Sismondi's characteristic (namely, petty-bourgeois) point of view and his romanticism.

What does this mean—"to put the population problem on a socio-historical basis"? It means studying the law of population of each historical system of economy separately, and studying its connection and interrelation with the given system. Which system did Sismondi study? The capitalist system. Thus, the contributor to *Russkoye Bogatstvo* assumes that Sismondi studied the capitalist law of population. There is a grain of truth in this assertion but only *a grain*. And as Ephrucy did not think of trying to discover what was lacking in Sismondi's argument about population, and as Ephrucy asserts that "here Sismondi is the predecessor of the most outstanding modern economists"* (p. 148), the result is exactly the same sort of embellishment of the petty-bourgeois romanticist as we saw in respect of the questions of crises and of national revenue. Wherein lies the similarity between Sismondi's doctrine and the new theory on these problems? In that Sismondi indicated the contradictions inherent in capitalist accumulation. This similarity Ephrucy noted. Wherein lies the difference between Sismondi's doctrine and the new theory? Firstly, in that it did not advance the scientific analysis of these contradictions one iota, and in some respects even took a step back compared with the classical economists; and secondly, in that he covered up his own inability to make an analysis (partly his unwillingness to do so) with petty-bourgeois moralising about the need for balancing national revenue

* Incidentally, we make the reservation that we cannot know for certain whom Ephrucy has in mind when he speaks of "the most Outstanding modern economist," the representative of a certain school which is absolutely alien to romanticism, or the author of the bulkiest Handbuch.

with expenditure, production with consumption, and so forth. This difference Ephrucy *did not note* on a single one of the points mentioned, and thereby totally misrepresented Sismondi's real significance and his relation to the modern theory. We see exactly the same thing on the present problem. Here, too, the similarity between Sismondi's view and the modern theory is limited to *an indication of the contradiction*. And here, too, the difference lies in the absence of a scientific analysis and in the substitution of petty-bourgeois moralising for the analysis. Let us explain this.

The development of capitalist machine industry since the end of the last century led to the formation of a surplus population, and political economy was confronted with the task of explaining this phenomenon. Malthus, as we know, tried to explain it by attributing it to natural-historical causes; he denied absolutely that it sprang from a certain, historically determined system of social economy and simply shut his eyes to the contradictions revealed by this fact. Sismondi indicated these contradictions and the displacement of the population by machines. This is indisputably to his credit, for in the period in which he wrote this was new. But let us see what his attitude towards this fact was.

In Book VII (*On the Population*), chapter VII speaks particularly "on the population which has become superfluous owing to the invention of machines." Sismondi states that "machines displace men" (p. 315, II, VII), and at once asks whether the invention of machines is a boon or a bane to a nation. It goes without saying that the "answer" to this question for all countries and all times whatever, and not for a capitalist country, is a most meaningless piece of banality: it is a boon when "consumers' demand exceeds the population's means of production" (les moyens de produire de la population) (II, 317), and a bane "when production is quite sufficient for consumption." In other words: Sismondi notes the contradiction, but this merely serves as a pretext for arguing about some abstract society in which there are no longer any contradictions, and to which the ethics of the thrifty peasant can be applied! Sismondi makes no attempt to analyse this contradiction, to examine how it arises, what it leads to, etc., in the existing capitalist

society. On the contrary, he uses this contradiction merely as material for his moral indignation against such a contradiction. Beyond this the chapter tells us absolutely nothing about this theoretical problem, and contains nothing but regrets, complaints and innocent wishes. The displaced workers were consumers ... the home market shrinks ... as regards the foreign market, the world is already sufficiently supplied ... if the peasants were moderately prosperous, this would be a better guarantee of a market ... there is no more amazing and terrible example than England, which is being followed by the Continental countries—such is the moralising we get from Sismondi, instead of an analysis of the phenomenon! His attitude towards the subject is exactly the same as that of our Narodniks. The Narodniks also confine themselves to stating the fact of a surplus population, and use it merely as a reason to voice lamentations about and complaints against capitalism (cf. N. —on, V. V., and others). Sismondi makes no attempt even to analyse the relation between this surplus population and the requirements of capitalist production, neither do our Narodniks ever set themselves such a problem.

The scientific analysis of this contradiction revealed the absolute falsity of this method. The analysis showed that surplus population, being undoubtedly a contradiction (along with surplus production and surplus consumption) and being an inevitable result of capitalist accumulation, is at the same time *an indispensable component part* of the capitalist machine.* The further large-scale industry de-

* As far as we know, this point of view about the surplus population was first expressed by Engels in *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England* (1845) (*The Condition of the Working Class in England.—Ed.*). After describing the ordinary industrial cycle of English industry the author says:

"From this it is clear that English manufacture must have, at all times save the brief periods of highest prosperity, an unemployed reserve army of workers, in order to be able to produce the masses of goods required by the market in the liveliest months. This reserve army is larger or smaller, according as the state of the market occasions the employment of a larger or smaller proportion of its members. And if at the moment of highest activity of the market the agricultural districts ... and the branches least affected by the general prosperity temporarily supply to manufacture a number of workers, these

velops the greater is the fluctuation in the demand for workers, depending upon whether there is a crisis or a boom in national production as a whole, or in any one branch of it. This fluctuation is a law of capitalist production, which *could not exist* if there were no surplus population (i.e., a population exceeding capitalism's *average* demand for workers) ready at any given moment to provide hands for any industry, or any factory. The analysis showed that a surplus population is formed in all industries into which capitalism penetrates and in agriculture as well as in industry—and that the surplus population exists in different forms. There are three chief forms*: *Floating overpopulation*. To this category belong the unemployed workers in industry. As industry develops their numbers inevitably grow. 2) *Latent overpopulation*. To this category belong the rural population who lose their farms with the development of capitalism and are unable to find non-agricultural employment. This population is always ready to provide hands for any factory. 3) *Stagnant overpopulation*. It has "extremely irregular" employment, under conditions below the average level.[57] To this category belong, mainly, people who work at home for manufacturers and stores, including both rural and urban inhabitants. The sum-total of all these strata of the population constitutes the *relative surplus population, or reserve army*. The latter term distinctly shows what population is referred to. They are the workers needed by capitalism for the *potential* expansion of enterprises, but who can never be regularly employed.

Thus, on this problem, too, theory arrived at a conclusion diametrically opposed to that of the romanticists. For the latter, the surplus population signifies that capitalism is impossible, or a "mistake." Actually, the oppo-

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are a mere minority, and these too belong to the reserve army, with the single difference that the prosperity of the moment was required to reveal their connection with it."[55]

It is important to note in the last words that the part of the *agricultural* population which turns temporarily to industry is regarded as belonging to the reserve army. This is precisely what the modern theory has called the *latent* form of the surplus population (see Marx's *Capital*).[56]

* Cf. Sieber's *David Ricardo, etc.*, pp. 552-53. St. Petersburg, 1885.

site is the case: the surplus population, being a necessary concomitant of surplus production, is an indispensable attribute to the capitalist economy, *which could neither exist nor develop without it*. Here too Ephrucy totally misrepresented the issue by saying nothing about this thesis of the modern theory.

A mere comparison of these two points of view is sufficient to enable one to judge which of them our Narodniks adhere to. The chapter from Sismondi's work dealt with above could with every right figure in Mr. N. —on's *Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*.

While noting the formation of a surplus population in post-Reform Russia, the Narodniks have never raised the issue of capitalism's need of a reserve army of workers. Could the railways have been built if a permanent surplus population had not been formed? It is surely known that the demand for this type of labour fluctuates greatly from year to year. Could industry have developed without this condition? (In boom periods it needs large numbers of building workers to erect new factories, premises, warehouses, etc., and all kinds of auxiliary day labour, which constitutes the greater part of the so-called outside non-agricultural employments.) Could the capitalist farming of our outlying regions, which demands hundreds of thousands and millions of day labourers, have been created without this condition? And as we know, the demand for this kind of labour fluctuates enormously. Could the entrepreneur lumber merchants have hewn down the forests to meet the needs of the factories with such phenomenal rapidity if a surplus population had not been formed? (Lumbering like other types of hired labour in which rural people engage is among the occupations with the lowest wages and the worst conditions.) Could the system, so widespread in the so-called handicraft industries, under which merchants, mill owners and stores give out work to be done at home in both town and country, have developed without this condition? In all these branches of labour (which have developed mainly since the Reform) the fluctuation in the demand for hired labour is extremely great. Yet the degree of fluctuation in this demand determines the dimensions of the surplus population *needed* by capitalism.

The Narodnik economists have nowhere shown that they are familiar with this law. We do not, of course, intend to make an examination of the substance of these problems here.* This does not enter into our task. The subject of our article is West-European romanticism and its relation to Russian Narodism. In this case, too, this relation is the same as in all the preceding cases: on the subject of surplus population, the Narodniks adhere entirely to the viewpoint of romanticism, which is diametrically opposite to that of the modern theory. Capitalism gives no employment to displaced workers, they say. This means that capitalism is impossible, a "mistake," etc. But it does not "mean" that at all. Contradiction does not mean impossibility (Widerspruch is not the same as Widersinn). Capitalist accumulation, i.e., real production for the sake of production, is also a contradiction. But this does not prevent it from existing and from being the law of a definite system of economy. The same must be said of all the other contradictions of capitalism. The Narodnik argument we have quoted merely "means" that the Russian intelligentsia have become deeply imbued with the vice of using empty phrases to get over all these contradictions.

Thus, Sismondi contributed absolutely nothing to the *theoretical analysis* of overpopulation. But how did he regard it? His view is a queer combination of petty-bourgeois sentiment and Malthusianism. "The great vice of the present social organisation," says Sismondi, "is that a poor man can never know what demand for labour he can count upon" (II, 261), and Sismondi sighs for the times when "the village shoemaker" and the small peasant knew the exact amount of their revenues. "The more a poor man is bereft of all property, the more is he in danger of falling into error concerning his revenue and of contributing to the formation of a population (contribuer à accroître une population...) which, being out of proportion to the demand for labour, will not find means of subsistence" (II, 263-64). You see: this ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie is not satisfied with wanting to retard the whole of social development for

* That is why we do not deal here with the very original circumstance that Narodnik economists, as grounds for *not counting* all these very numerous workers, advanced the fact that they are not registered.

the sake of preserving the patriarchal relationships of a semi-barbarous population. He is ready to prescribe any device you please for crippling human nature, as long as it helps to preserve the petty bourgeoisie. Here are several more excerpts, which leave no doubt about this last point:

The weekly payment of wages at the factory to the semi-pauperised worker has accustomed the latter to look no further into the future than the next Saturday: "this has blunted his moral qualities and sense of sympathy" (II, 266), which, as we shall see in a moment, consist of "connubial prudence"!... "The more his family becomes a burden upon society the more it will grow; and the nation will suffer (gémira) from the burden of a population which is out of proportion (disproportionnée) to its means of subsistence" (II, 267). Preserve small property at all costs—such is Sismondi's slogan—even at the cost of reducing the standard of living and of distorting human nature! And Sismondi, who, with the air of a statesman, has told us when an increase in the population is "desirable," devotes a special chapter to attacking religion for having failed to condemn "imprudent" marriages. Once his ideal—the petty bourgeois—is affected, Sismondi becomes more Malthusian than Malthus himself. "Children who are born only for poverty are also born only for vice," says Sismondi, admonishing religion. "Ignorance in matters concerning the social system has induced them" (the representatives of religion) "to strike chastity from the list of virtues that are proper to marriage, and has been one of the constantly operating causes which destroy the naturally established balance between the population and its means of subsistence" (II, 294). "Religious morality should teach people that having produced a family, it is their duty to live no less chastely with their wives than celibates with women who do not belong to them" (II, 298). And Sismondi, who, in general, lays claim to the title not only of a theoretician in political economy, but also to that of wise administrator, immediately proceeds to calculate that "producing a family" requires "in general, and on the average, three births," and he advises the government "not to deceive the people with the hope of an independent status which will permit them to

raise a family when that illusory institution (cet établissement illusoire) leaves them at the mercy of suffering, poverty and death" (II, 299). "When the social organisation did not separate the labouring class from the class which owned some property, public opinion alone was enough to avert the scourge (le fléau) of poverty. For the agriculturist to sell the heritage of his fathers and for the artisan to squander his small capital has always been regarded as something shameful.... But under the system at present prevailing in Europe ... people who are condemned never to possess any property can feel no shame whatever at being reduced to pauperism" (II, 306-07). It would be difficult to express more vividly the stupidity and hard-heartedness of the small proprietor! Here Sismondi changes from the theoretician into the practical counsellor, who preaches the morals which, we know, are practised with such success by the French peasant. This is not only Malthus, but Malthus deliberately cut to the measure of the petty bourgeois. Reading these chapters of Sismondi's, one cannot help recalling the passionately angry invective of Proudhon, who argued that Malthusianism was the preaching of the connubial practice of ... a certain unnatural vice.*

IX

MACHINES IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Related to the problem of surplus population is that of the significance of *machines* in general.

Ephrucy dilates upon Sismondi's "brilliant observations" concerning machines, and asserts that "to regard him as an opponent of technical improvements is unjust" (No. 7, p. 155), that "Sismondi was not an enemy of machines and inventions" (p. 156). "Sismondi repeatedly stressed the idea that machines and inventions are not in themselves harmful to the working class, but become so only because of the conditions of the existing system of economy, under which an

* See supplement to the Russian translation of Malthus' *Essay on Population* (Bibikov's translation, St. Petersburg, 1868). Excerpt from Proudhon's essay *On Justice*.

increase in the productivity of labour leads neither to an increase in working class consumption nor to a reduction of working hours" (p. 155).

All these observations are quite correct. But again, *this* appraisal of Sismondi is a wonderfully vivid revelation of how the Narodnik absolutely failed *to understand the romanticist*, to understand the *point of view* on capitalism specific to romanticism, and the radical difference between this point of view and that of scientific theory. The Narodnik could not understand this, because Narodism itself has not gone beyond romanticism. But while Sismondi's observations concerning the contradictory nature of the capitalist employment of machines marked a great step forward in the 1820s, it is quite unpardonable today to confine oneself to such a primitive criticism and not to see its narrow petty-bourgeois character.

In this respect (i.e., in respect of the difference between Sismondi's doctrine and the modern theory)* Ephrucy keeps firmly to his own ground. He cannot even present the problem. He says that Sismondi saw the contradiction, and rests content with that; as if history had not shown the most diverse ways and means of criticising the contradictions of capitalism. In saying that Sismondi did not regard machines as being harmful in themselves, but harmful in their operation under the present social system, Ephrucy does not even see what a primitive, superficially sentimental point of view he expresses in this one argument alone. Sismondi did indeed inquire: are machines harmful, or not? And he "answered" the question with the maxim: machines are useful only when production is commensurate with consumption (cf. quotations in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 7, p. 156). After all that has been said above, there is no need for us to prove here that such an "answer" is nothing more nor less than substituting a petty-bourgeois utopia for a scientific analysis of capitalism. Sismondi cannot be blamed for not having made such an analysis. Historical services are not judged by the contributions historical personalities *did not make* in respect of modern

* We have already repeatedly seen that Ephrucy tried *everywhere* to draw this comparison between Sismondi and the modern theory.

requirements, but by *the new contributions they did make* as compared with their predecessors. Here, however, we are judging neither Sismondi nor his primitive, sentimental point of view, but the economist of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, who to this day does not understand the difference between this point of view and the modern one. He does not understand that to bring out this difference he should not have asked whether Sismondi was an enemy of machines or not, but whether Sismondi understood the significance of machines under the capitalist system, whether he understood the role played by machines as *a factor of progress under this system*? Had the economist of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* done that, he might have noted that Sismondi, owing to his *petty-bourgeois*, *utopian* point of view, *could not even raise* such questions, and that what distinguishes the new theory is that it does raise and answer them. In that case Ephrucy might have understood that by substituting the question of the conditions under which machines can, in general, be "profitable" and "useful" for that of the historical role played by machines in existing capitalist society, Sismondi naturally arrived at the theory that capitalism and the capitalist employment of machines were "dangerous" and urged the necessity of "retarding," "moderating" and "regulating" the growth of capitalism, and, as a consequence, he became a *reactionary*. The fact that Sismondi's doctrine fails to understand the historical role of machines as a factor of progress is one of the reasons for the modern theory regarding it as *reactionary*.

We shall not here, of course, expound the modern theory (i.e., Marx's theory) of machine production. We refer the reader to, say, the above-mentioned study by N. Sieber, chapter X: "Machines and Large-Scale Industry," and particularly chapter XI: "An Examination of the Theory of Machine Production."* We shall merely give the gist of it in briefest outline. It boils down to two points: first, to a historical analysis, which established the place machine pro-

* "To tell the truth," says Sieber at the beginning of this chapter, "the theory of machines and of large-scale industry outlined here, represents such an inexhaustible source of new thinking and original research, that if anybody took it into his head to weigh up the relative merits of this theory in full he would have to write almost a whole book on this subject alone" (p. 473).

duction occupies as one of the stages in the development of capitalism, and the relation of machine industry to the preceding stages (capitalist simple co-operation and capitalist manufacture); secondly, to an analysis of the part played by machines under capitalist economy, and in particular, to an analysis of the changes which machine industry effects in all the conditions of life of the population. On the first point, the theory established that machine industry is only one stage (namely, the highest) of capitalist production, and showed how it arose out of manufacture. On the second point, the theory established that machine industry marks gigantic progress in capitalist society not only because it increases the productive forces enormously and socialises labour throughout society,* but also because it destroys the manufactory division of labour, compels the workers to go from occupations of one kind to others, completes the destruction of backward patriarchal relationships, particularly in the rural districts,** and gives a most powerful impetus to the progress of society, both for the reasons stated and as a consequence of the concentration of the industrial population. This progress, like the progress capitalism makes in every other field, is accompanied by the "progress" of contradictions, i.e., by their intensification and expansion.

Perhaps the reader will ask: what interest is there in examining Sismondi's views on such a universally known question and in such a brief reference to the modern theory, with which everybody is "familiar," and with which everybody "agrees"?

Well, to see what this "agreement" looks like we shall take Mr. N. —on, the most prominent Narodnik economist, who claims that he strictly applies the modern theory. In his *Sketches*, it will be remembered, Mr. N. —on sets himself as one of his special tasks the study of the capital-

* Comparing "associated labour" in the village community and in capitalist society that has machine industry, Sieber quite rightly observes "There is approximately the same difference between the 'component' of a village community and the 'component' of society with machine production as there is, for example, between *the unit* 10 and *the unit* 100" (p. 495).

** Sieber, op. cit., p. 467.

isation of the Russian textile industry, the characteristic feature of which is precisely that it employs machines on the biggest scale.

The question is: what is Mr. N. —on's point of view on this subject: the point of view of Sismondi (whose viewpoint, as we have seen, he shares on very many aspects of capitalism), or the point of view of modern theory? Is he, on this important subject, a romanticist or ... a realist*?

We have seen that the first thing that distinguishes the modern theory is that it is based on a historical analysis of the development of machine industry from capitalist manufacture. Did Mr. N. —on raise the problem of the development of Russian machine industry? No. True, he did say that it was preceded by work in the home for the capitalist, and by the hand-labour "factory"**; but he not only failed to explain the relation of machine industry to the preceding stage, he even failed to "notice" that it was wrong in scientific terminology to apply the term *factory* to the *preceding stage* (production by hand in the home or in the capitalist's workshop), which should undoubtedly be described as *capitalist manufacture*.***

Let the reader not think that this "omission" is unimportant. On the contrary, it is of enormous importance. Firstly, Mr. N. —on thereby identifies *capitalism with machine industry*. This is a gross mistake. What constitutes the importance of the scientific theory is that it cleared up the real place of machine industry as *one of the stages* of capitalism. If Mr. N. —on shared the point of

* The word "realist" was used here instead of the word *Marxist* exclusively for censorship reasons. For the same reason, instead of referring to *Capital*, we referred to Sieber's book, which summarised Marx's *Capital*. (Author's footnote to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

** P. 108. Quoted from *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Part III, p. 32 (the statisticians here summarise Korsak's *Forms of Industry*): "Since 1822 the very organisation of industry has undergone a complete change—instead of being independent handicraft producers, the peasants are becoming merely the performers of several operations of large-scale factory production and only receive wages."

*** Sieber quite rightly indicated that the ordinary terminology (factory, works, etc.) is unsuitable for scientific research, and urged the need for drawing a distinction between machine industry and capitalist manufacture: p. 474.

view of *this theory*, could he have depicted the growth and victory of *machine industry as "the struggle between two economic forms"*: between some unknown "form based on the peasantry's ownership of instruments of production"* and "capitalism" (pp. 2, 3, 66, 198 et al.), whereas, in fact, we see *a struggle between machine industry and capitalist manufacture*? Mr. N. —on says not a word about this *struggle*; although this replacement of *one form of capitalism by another* took place, on his own showing, precisely in the textile industry, the sphere of his special study (p. 79), Mr. N. —on misrepresented it, calling it the replacement of "people's production" by "capitalism." Is it not evident that at bottom the problem of the *actual* development of machine industry did not interest him in the least, and that the term "people's production" covers up a utopia entirely to the taste of Sismondi? Secondly, if Mr. N. —on had raised the question of the historical development of Russian machine industry, could he have spoken of "implanting capitalism" (pp. 331, 283, 323 et al.), basing his case on facts of governmental support and assistance—facts which have also occurred in Europe? The question is: is he copying Sismondi who also talked in exactly the same way about "implanting," or is he copying the representative of the modern theory who studied the replacement of manufacture by machine industry? Thirdly, if Mr. N. —on had raised the problem of the historical development of the forms of capitalism in Russia (in the textile industry), could he have ignored the existence of capitalist manufacture in the Russian "handicraft industries"**? And if he had *really* followed theory and attempted to apply a scientific analysis to at least a small corner of this production—

* N. —on, p. 322. Does this differ even one iota from Sismondi's idealisation of patriarchal peasant economy?

** We assume that there is no need here to prove this commonly known fact. It is sufficient to recall the Pavlovo metalworkers, the Bogorodsk leather and the Kimry boot and shoe trade, the hat-making district of Molvitino, the Tula accordion and samovar trades, the Krasnoye Selo and Rybnaya Sloboda jewelry trade, the Semyonov spoon trade, the horn trade in "Ustyanshchina," the felt trade in Semyonov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, etc. We are quoting from memory; if we made an investigation of handicraft industries, we could prolong this list to infinity.

which is also "people's production"—what would have become of this picture of Russian social economy, daubed in cheap and inartistic Suzdal style, which depicts a nebulous "people's production" and an isolated from it "capitalism" which embraces only a "handful" of workers (p. 326 et al.)?

To sum up: On the first point which distinguishes the modern theory of machine industry from the romantic theory, Mr. N. —on *can on no account be regarded as a follower of the former*, for he does not even realise the need to present the question of the rise of machine industry as a *special stage of capitalism*, and is silent about the existence of capitalist manufacture, the stage of capitalism which preceded that of the machines. Instead of an historical analysis, he palms off the utopia of "people's production."

The second point relates to the modern theory of the changes brought about in social relations by machine industry. Mr. N. —on did not even attempt to examine this problem. He complained a great deal about capitalism and deplored the appearance of the factory (exactly as Sismondi did), but he did not even attempt to study the change in social conditions brought about by the factory.* To do that it would have been necessary to compare machine industry with *the preceding stages*, which Mr. N. —on does not refer to. Similarly, the viewpoint of the modern theory on machines as a factor of progress in *present-day capitalist society* is also totally alien to him . Here, too, he did not even present the question,** *nor could he do so*, for this question can arise only out of a historical study of the replacement of *one form of capitalism* by another, whereas according to Mr. N. —on "capitalism" tout court*** replaces ... "people's production."

If, *on the basis of Mr. N. —on's "study" of the capitalisation of the textile industry in Russia*, we were to ask: how does Mr. N. —on regard machines?—we could re-

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* We ask the reader not to forget that the scientific meaning of this term is not the same as the ordinary one. Science limits its application exclusively to large-scale machine industry.

** As has been done, for example, by A. Volgin, *The Substantiation of Narodism in the Works of Mr. Vorontsov* (*V. V.*). St. Petersburg, 1896.

*** Simply.—*Ed.*

ceive no other reply than that with which we are already familiar from Sismondi's work. Mr. N.—on admits that machines increase the productivity of labour (not to do so is more than he dare!)—just as Sismondi did. Mr. N.—on says that it is not machines that are harmful, but the capitalist employment of them—just as Sismondi did. Mr. N.—on believes that in introducing machines "we" have lost sight of the fact that production must correspond to "the people's consuming capacity"—just as Sismondi did.

And that is all. Mr. N.—on does not believe anything more. He will not hear of the problems that have been raised and solved by modern theory, because he did not even attempt to examine either the historical succession of different forms of capitalist production in Russia (using, say, the example of the textile industry that he chose), or the role of machines as a factor of progress under the *present* capitalist system.

Thus, on the question of machines—this supremely important question of theoretical political economy—Mr. N.—on also shares Sismondi's point of view. Mr. N.—on *argues exactly like a romanticist*, which, of course, does not prevent him from quoting and quoting.

This applies not to the example of the textile industry alone, but to all Mr. N.—on arguments. Take, say, the above-mentioned example of the flour-milling industry. Mr. N.—on pointed to the introduction of machines only as an excuse for the sentimental lamentation that this increase in the productivity of labour did not correspond to the "people's consuming capacity." As regards the changes in the social system which machine industry introduces in general (and has actually introduced in Russia), he did not even think of analysing them. The question of whether the introduction of these machines is a progressive step in present-day capitalist society is something quite incomprehensible to him.*

What we have said about Mr. N.—on applies *a fortiori***

* The text contains an outline criticism of Mr. N.—on views based on Marx's theory; this I subsequently completed in *The Development of Capitalism*. (Author's footnote to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

** All the more.—*Ed.*

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to the other Narodnik economists: on the question of machines, Narodism to this day adheres to the viewpoint of petty-bourgeois romanticism and replaces an economic analysis by sentimental wishes.

X

PROTECTION

The last theoretical problem that interests us in Sismondi's system of views is that of protection. No little space is devoted to this problem in *Nouveaux Principes*, but there it is examined mostly from the practical aspect, in connection with the anti-Corn-Laws movement in Britain. We shall examine this latter problem later on, for it includes other, broader problems. What interests us here at the moment is only Sismondi's *point of view* on protection. What is of interest in this problem is not a new economic concept of Sismondi's, that has not been discussed, but his understanding of the relation between "economics" and the "superstructure." Ephrucy assures the readers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* that Sismondi was "one of the first and most talented forerunners of the modern historical school," that he was "opposed to the isolation of economic phenomena from all other social factors." "The view is expressed in the works of Sismondi that economic phenomena must not be isolated from other social factors, that they must be studied in connection with facts of a socio-political character" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, pp. 38-39). Well, we shall see from the example we have taken, how Sismondi understood the connection between economic and socio-political phenomena.

"The prohibition of imports," says Sismondi in the chapter "Of Customs" (1. IV, ch. XI), "is as unwise and as ruinous as the prohibition of exports: it was invented in order to give the nation manufacture, something it did not yet possess; and it cannot be denied that for nascent industry it is on a par with the most powerful encouragement bonus. This manufacture produces, perhaps, scarcely one-hundredth part of a certain kind of goods consumed by the nation: one hundred buyers will have to compete with

each other to obtain commodities from the sole vendor, and the ninety-nine to whom he refuses to sell will have to make shift with contraband goods. In that case, the nation's loss will be equal to one hundred, and its gain equal to one. No matter how much the nation may gain from this new manufacture, there can be no doubt that this gain will be too small to justify such great sacrifice. One could always find less wasteful means of stimulating such manufacture to activity" (I, 440-41).

You see how simply Sismondi solves this problem: protection is "unwise" because the "nation" stands to lose by it!

What "nation" does our economist speak of? What economic relations does he connect the given socio-political fact with? He takes no definite relations, he argues *in general*, about a nation as it *should be*, *according to his conception of what should be*. And as we know, this conception of what should be is based on the exclusion of capitalism and on the reign of small independent production.

But it is utterly absurd to associate a socio-political factor which belongs to a given economic system, and to it alone, with some imaginary system. Protection is a "socio-political factor" of capitalism, but Sismondi does not associate it with capitalism, he associates it with some nation *in general* (or with a nation of small independent producers). He could, perhaps, have associated protection with, say, the Indian village community, and have obtained a still more striking example of its "folly" and "ruination"; but this "folly" would again have been that of his association and not of protection. Sismondi makes a childish calculation to show that protection is profitable to a very few at the expense of the masses. There is no need to do so, for this is already evident from the very concept protection (whether it takes the form of a direct subsidy or the form of eliminating foreign competitors makes no difference). That protection expresses a social contradiction is beyond dispute. But are there no contradictions in the economic life of the system which created protection? On the contrary, it is full of contradictions, and Sismondi himself indicated these contradictions throughout his book. Instead of *deducing* this contradiction from those of the economic system which he himself indicated, Sismondi

ignores economic contradictions and reduces his argument to totally meaningless "innocent wishes." Instead of associating this institution which, according to him, benefits a small group, with the position occupied by this group in the country's economy, and with the interests of this group, he associates it with the abstract principle of the "common weal." We see, therefore, that, contrary to Ephrucy's assertion, Sismondi does *isolate* economic phenomena from the rest (by regarding protection apart from the economic system) and has *no conception of the connection* between economic and socio-political facts. The tirade we have quoted contains *all* that he, as a theoretician, could contribute to the problem of protection: all the rest is merely a paraphrase of this. "It is doubtful whether governments fully realise what price they pay for this gain" (the development of manufacture) "and what frightful sacrifices they impose upon the consumers" (I, 442-43). "The governments of Europe wanted to violate nature" (faire violence à la nature). Which nature? Is it the nature of capitalism that protection "violates"? "The nation was forced, in a way (en quelque sorte), into false activity" (I, 448). "Some governments have gone to the length of paying their merchants in order to enable them to sell more cheaply; the stranger this sacrifice and the more it contradicts the simplest calculation, the more it is ascribed to high politics.... The government pays its merchants at the expense of its subjects" (I, 421), and so on and so forth. This is the kind of argument Sismondi treats us to! In other parts of his work, as if drawing the conclusion from these arguments, he calls capitalism "artificial" and "implanted" (I, 379, opulence factice), "a hothouse product" (II, 456) and so forth . Starting out by substituting innocent wishes for an analysis of the given contradictions, he reaches the point of positively distorting reality to suit those wishes. According to him capitalist industry, which is so zealously "supported," is feeble, without a basis, and so forth, it does not play a predominant role in the country's economy and, *consequently*, this predominant role is played by small-scale production, and so forth. The undoubted and indisputable fact that protection was created only by a definite economic system, and by the definite contradictions of that

system, that it expresses the real interests of a real class, which plays the *predominant* role in the national economy, is reduced to nothing, even to its opposite, by means of a few sentimental phrases! Here is another specimen (concerning the protection of agriculture—I, 265, chapter on the Corn Laws):

"The English would have us believe that their big farms are the only means of improving agriculture, that is to say, of providing themselves with a greater abundance of agricultural produce at a cheaper price—actually, however, they do the opposite, they produce at a higher price."...

This passage, which so strikingly reveals the romanticist way of arguing that the Russian Narodniks have taken over in its entirety, is wonderfully characteristic! The development of capitalist farming and the technical progress connected with it are depicted as a deliberately introduced system: the English (i.e., the English economists) would have us believe that this system is the only means of improving agriculture. Sismondi wants to say that "there could be" other means of improving agriculture besides capitalist farming, i.e., again "there could be" in some abstract society, but not in the real society of a definite historical period, in the "society" based on commodity production of which the English economists speak, and of which Sismondi too should have spoken. "Improvement of agriculture, *that is to say*, providing themselves" (the nation?) "with a greater abundance of produce." Not "that is to say," at all. Improvement of agriculture and improved food for the masses are by no means the same thing; that the two will not coincide, is not only possible, it is inevitable under the economic system which Sismondi so zealously wants to avoid. For example, an increase in potato cultivation may signify an increase in labour productivity in agriculture (introduction of root crops) and an increase in surplus-value, simultaneously with a deterioration of the workers' food. It is another example of the habit of the Narodnik—that is to say, the romanticist—to dismiss the contradictions of real life with phrases.

"Actually," continues Sismondi, "these farmers, who are so rich, so intelligent and so much supported (secondés)

by all scientific progress, and whose horses are so fine, whose hedges so solid and whose fields so thoroughly cleared of weeds, cannot compete against the wretched Polish peasant, ignorant, crushed by slavery, who seeks consolation only in drink, and whose agriculture is still in the infant stage of the art. The corn harvested in central Poland, after paying freight for many hundreds of leagues by river, by land and by sea, and after paying import duties amounting to 30 and 40 per cent ad valorem, is still cheaper than the corn of the richest counties of England" (I, 265). "The English economists are amazed at this contrast." They refer to taxes and so forth. But this is not the point. "The system of exploitation itself is bad, it rests on a dangerous foundation.... Lately, all writers have presented this system as an object worthy of our admiration, but we, on the contrary, must study it well in order to avoid imitating it" (I, 266).

Really, how infinitely naïve is this romanticist, who presents English capitalism (commercial farming) as a mistaken system of the economists, who imagines that the "amazement" of the economists who shut their eyes to the contradictions of commercial farming is a sufficiently strong argument *against* the farmers! How superficial is his understanding; instead of seeking an explanation of economic processes in the interests of different groups, he looks for it in the errors of economists, authors and governments! Good Sismondi wants to prick the conscience of the English and also of the continental farmers and put them to shame in order to discourage them from "imitating" such "bad" systems!

Do not forget, incidentally, that this was written seventy years ago, that Sismondi was witnessing the first steps of these, as yet, totally new phenomena. *His* naïveté is excusable, for even the classical economists (his contemporaries) no less naïvely regarded these new phenomena as the product of the eternal and natural qualities of human nature. But, we ask, have our Narodniks added even one original word to Sismondi's arguments in their "objections" to capitalism developing in Russia?

Thus, Sismondi's arguments about protection show that the historical point of view was totally alien to him. In-

deed, he argues quite abstractly, exactly like the eighteenth-century philosophers and economists, differing from them only in proclaiming the society of small independent producers and not bourgeois society to be normal and natural. Hence, he understands nothing of the connection between protection and a definite economic system; and he disposes of this contradiction in the socio-political sphere with sentimental phrases about "the false," "the perilous," the mistaken, the unwise, etc., similar to those with which he disposed of the contradictions in economic life. Hence, he draws an extremely superficial picture of the matter and presents the problem of protection and Free Trade as one of the "wrong" or the "right" path (i.e., to use his terminology, the problem of capitalism, or the non-capitalist path).

Modern theory has fully exposed these delusions, by revealing the connection between protection and a definite historical system of social economy, between protection and the interests of the predominant class in that system which enjoy the support of governments. It showed that protection or Free Trade is an issue *between* entrepreneurs (sometimes between the entrepreneurs of different countries, sometimes between different factions of entrepreneurs in a given country).

Comparing these two points of view on protection with the attitude towards it adopted by the Narodnik economists, we find that here too they fully share the romanticist viewpoint and associate protection not with a capitalist country, but with some abstraction, with "consumers" tout court, and proclaim it to be the "mistaken" and "unwise" support of "hothouse" capitalism, and so forth. On the subject, for example, of duty-free imports of agricultural machines, which cause conflict between industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs, the Narodniks, *of course*, stand solidly for the agricultural ... entrepreneurs. We do not want to say that they are wrong. But it is a question of fact, a question concerning the present historical moment, a question as to which faction of the entrepreneurs expresses the more general interests of the development of capitalism. Even if the Narodniks are right, it is certainly not because the imposition of customs duties signifies

"artificial" "support for capitalism," whereas the lifting of such duties signifies support for an "age-old" people's industry, but simply because the development of agricultural capitalism (which needs machines), by accelerating the extinction of medieval relationships in the rural districts and the creation of a home market for industry, signifies a wider, freer and more rapid development of capitalism in general.

We foresee one objection to this classing of the Narodniks with the romanticists on this question. It will probably be said that here it is necessary to make special mention of Mr. N.—on, who, after all, openly says that the problem of Free Trade and protection is a capitalist problem, and says so more than once, and who even "quotes."... Yes, yes, Mr. N.—on even quotes! But if we are shown this passage from his *Sketches* we shall cite *other passages* in which he proclaims that to give support to capitalism is to "implant" it (and this in his "Summary and Conclusions"! pp. 331, 323 and also 283), and states that the encouragement of capitalism is "a fatal blunder" because "we have overlooked," "we have forgotten," "our minds have been obscured," and so forth (p. 298. Compare this with Sismondi!). How can this be reconciled with the assertion that support for capitalism (with export bonuses) is "one of the numerous contradictions with which our economic life teems*; this one, like all the rest, owes its existence to the form which all production is assuming" (p. 286)? Note: *all production*! We ask any impartial person: what is the point of view of this author, who proclaims support of "*the form which all production is assuming*" to be a "blunder"? Is it the point of view of Sismondi, or of scientific theory? Here, too (as on the subjects we examined above), Mr. N.—on's "quotations" turn out to be irrelevant, clumsy interpolations, which do not in the least express a real conviction that these "quotations" are applicable to Russian reality. Mr. N.—on's "quotations" from modern theory are window-

* In the same way as *Sketches* "teem" with exhortations to "us," with the exclamations "we," and similar phrases, which ignore these contradictions.

dressing and can only mislead the reader. It is an awkwardly worn "realist" costume under which the thoroughbred romanticist hides.*

XI

SISMONDI'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

We are now familiar with all of Sismondi's main propositions relating to economic theory. Summing up, we see that, everywhere, Sismondi remains absolutely true to himself, that his point of view remains unchanged. On the one hand, on all points he differs from the classical economists in that he indicates the contradictions of capitalism. On the other hand, on no point is he able (or willing) to extend the analysis of the classical economists, and therefore confines himself to a sentimental criticism of capitalism from the viewpoint of the petty bourgeois. This substitution of sentimental complaints and lamentations for a scientific analysis results in his conception being extremely superficial. Modern theory accepted his references to the contradictions of capitalism, subjected them to a scientific analysis, and on all points reached conclusions which radically differ from Sismondi's, and for that reason lead to a diametrically opposite point of view concerning capitalism.

In *A Critique of Some of the Propositions of Political Economy* (*Zur Kritik*,[59] Russ. trans., Moscow, 1896) Sismondi's place in the history of the science is described as follows:

"Sismondi is no longer labouring under Boisguillebert's idea that labour which creates exchange value is adulterated

* We have a suspicion that Mr. N. —on regards these "quotations" as a talisman which protects him from all criticism. It is difficult otherwise to explain the fact that, on hearing from Messrs. Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky that his doctrine had been compared with Sismondi's, Mr. N. —on, in one of his articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (1894, No. 6, p. 88), "quoted" the opinion of a representative of the modern theory who describes Sismondi as a petty-bourgeois reactionary and utopian.[58] Evidently, he is profoundly convinced that by means of such a "quotation" he "refuted" the comparison made between himself and Sismondi.

by money; but just as Boisguillebert denounced money, so does Sismondi denounce large industrial capital" (p. 36).

The author wants to say: Just as Boisguillebert superficially regarded barter as a natural system and was up in arms against money, which was to him an "extraneous element" (p. 30, ibid.), so Sismondi regarded small-scale production as a natural system and was up in arms against big capital, which he regarded as an extraneous element. Boisguillebert did not understand the inseparable and natural connection between money and commodity exchange, did not understand that he was contrasting two forms of "bourgeois labour" as extraneous elements (ibid., pp. 30-31). Sismondi failed to understand the inseparable and natural connection between big capital and small independent production, failed to understand that these are two forms of commodity economy. Boisguillebert "is up in arms against bourgeois labour in one form while, utopian-like, he praises it in another" (ibid.). Sismondi is up in arms against big capital, i.e., against commodity economy in one form, its most developed form, while, utopian-like, he praises the small producer (especially the peasantry), i.e., commodity economy in another form, its rudimentary form.

"In Ricardo," continues the author of the *Critique*, "political economy reached its climax, after recklessly drawing its ultimate conclusions, while Sismondi supplemented it by impersonating its doubts" (p. 36).

Thus, the author of the *Critique* reduces the significance of Sismondi to the fact that he *raised the question* of the contradictions of capitalism, and thereby set the task of making a further analysis. The author we have quoted regards all the independent views of Sismondi, who also wanted *to answer* this question, as unscientific and superficial, and as reflecting his reactionary petty-bourgeois point of view (see the above-quoted opinions, and one quoted below in connection with a "quotation" by Ephrucy).

Comparing Sismondi's theory with Narodism, we find on nearly all points (except his repudiation of Ricardo's theory of rent and his Malthusian admonitions to the peasants) an astonishing similarity, which sometimes goes as far as identity of terms. The Narodnik economists fully share Sismondi's point of view. We shall be still more

convinced of this later, when we pass from theory to Sismondi's views on practical problems.

And lastly, as regards Ephrucy, on no point has he given a correct appraisal of Sismondi. Pointing to Sismondi's emphasis on, and condemnation of, the contradictions of capitalism, Ephrucy was quite unable to understand either the sharp difference between his theory and the theory of scientific materialism, or that the romanticist and scientific points of view on capitalism are diametrically opposite. The fellow feeling of the Narodnik for the romanticist, their touching unanimity, prevented the author of the essays in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* from correctly characterising this classical representative of romanticism in economic science.

We have just quoted the opinion on Sismondi that "he impersonated the doubts" of classical political economy.

But Sismondi did not think of confining himself to this role (which gives him an honourable place among the economists). As we have seen, he tried to solve the doubts, but did so very unsuccessfully. Not only that. His accusation against the classical economists and their science was not that they halted before an analysis of the contradictions, but that they employed wrong methods. "The old science does not teach us either to understand or avert" new disasters (I, XV), says Sismondi in the preface to the second edition of his book, and he does not explain this fact by indicating that the analysis made by this science is incomplete and inconsistent but by claiming that it "plunged into abstractions" (I, 55: the new disciples of Adam Smith in England plunged [se sont jetés] into abstractions, forgetting about "man") and was "proceeding along a wrong path" (II, 448). What is the charge levelled by Sismondi against the classical economists which permits him to draw this conclusion?

"The economists, the most celebrated of them, devoted too little attention to consumption and to the market" (I, 124).

This accusation has been repeated innumerable times since Sismondi's day. It has been deemed necessary to separate "consumption" from "production" as a special department of the science; it has been said that production depends upon

natural laws, whereas consumption is determined by distribution, which depends upon the will of man, and so on, and so forth. It is common knowledge that our Narodniks hold the same views and put distribution in the forefront.*

What meaning is there to this accusation? It is based solely on an extremely unscientific conception of the very subject of political economy. Its subject is not by any means "the production of material values," as is often claimed (that is the subject of technology), but the social relations between men in production. Only by interpreting "production" in the former sense can one separate "distribution" from it, and when that is done, the "department" of production does not contain the categories of historically determined forms of social economy, but categories that relate to the labour process in general: usually, such empty banalities merely serve later to obscure historical and social conditions. (Take, for example, the concept of capital.) If, however, we consistently regard "production" as social relations in production, then both "distribution" and "consumption" lose all independent significance. Once relations in production have been explained, both the share of the product taken by the different classes and, consequently, "distribution" and "consumption" are *thereby* explained. And vice versa, if production relations remain

* It goes without saying that Ephrucy did not miss the opportunity to praise Sismondi for this as well. "The important thing in Sismondi's doctrine," we read in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 56, "is not so much the various special measures which he proposed, as the general spirit which permeates the whole of his system. Contrary to the classical school, he lays special emphasis on the interests of distribution and not on those of production." In spite of his repeated "references" to the "modern" economists, Ephrucy did not understand their theory at all, and continued to busy himself with the sentimental nonsense which distinguishes the primitive critique of capitalism. Here, too, our Narodnik wants to save himself by comparing Sismondi with "many prominent representatives of the historical school"; and so you see, "Sismondi went further" (ibid.), and Ephrucy is quite content with that! "Went further—than the German professors—what more do you want? Like all the Narodniks, Ephrucy tries to lay the main emphasis on the point that Sismondi criticised capitalism. The economist of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* evidently has no idea that capitalism can be criticised in different ways, that it can be criticised from both the sentimental and the scientific point of view.

unexplained (for example, if the process of the production of the aggregate social capital is not understood), all arguments about consumption and distribution turn into banalities, or innocent, romantic wishes. Sismondi was the originator of such arguments. Rodbertus also talked a lot about the "distribution of the national product," and Ephrucy's "modern" authorities even formed special "schools," one of the principles of which was to pay special attention to distribution.* But none of these theoreticians of "distribution" and "consumption" were able to solve even the fundamental problem of the difference between social capital and social revenue; all continued to grope in the contradictions before which Adam Smith had come to a halt.** The problem was solved only by the economist who never singled out distribution, and who protested most vigorously against the "vulgar" arguments about "distribution" (cf. Marx's criticism of the Gotha Programme quoted by P. Struve in his *Critical Remarks*, p. 129, epigraph to chapter IV).[60] Not only that. The very solution of the problem consisted of an analysis of the *reproduction* of social capital. The author did not make a special problem of either consumption or distribution, but both were fully explained after the analysis of *production* had been carried to its conclusion.

"... Scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of production demonstrates ... that the distribution relations essentially coincident with these production relations are their opposite side, so that both share the same historically

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* Ingram quite rightly likens Sismondi to the "Katheder-Socialists" (p. 212, *A History of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1891) when he naïvely observed: "... We are ready (!!) to admit Sismondi's view of the state as a power ... charged also with the mission of extending the benefits of the social union and of modern progress as widely as possible through all classes of the community" (215). What profundity distinguishes these "views" of Sismondi's we have already seen in the case of protection.

* See, for example, R. Meyer's article "Income" in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft* (Russian translation in the collection of articles entitled *Promyshlennost* [*Industry*]), which reveals the hopeless confusion in the arguments of the "modern" German professors on this subject. It is curious that R. Meyer, who refers directly to Adam Smith and mentions in his bibliography *the very chapters* of Volume II of *Capital* which contain a complete refutation of Smith, makes no mention of this in the text.

transitory character." "The wage presupposes wage-labour, and profit—capital. These definite forms of distribution thus presuppose definite social characteristics (Charaktere) of production conditions, and definite social relations of production agents. The specific distribution relations are thus merely the expression of the specific historical production relations." ... "Every form of distribution disappears with the specific form of production from which it is descended and to which it corresponds."

"The view which regards only distribution relations as historical, but not production relations, is, on the one hand, solely the view of the initial, but still handicapped (inconsistent, befangen) criticism of bourgeois economy. On the other hand, it rests on the confusion and identification of the process of social production with the simple labour-process, such as might even be performed by an abnormally isolated human being without any social assistance. To the extent that the labour-process is solely a process between man and Nature, its simple elements remain common to all social forms of development. But each specific historical form of this process further develops its material foundations and social forms" (*Capital*, Vol. III, 2, pp. 415, 419 and 420, German original).[61]

Sismondi was no more fortunate in attacks of another sort against the classical economists, attacks which occupy still more space in his *Nouveaux Principes*. "The new disciples of Adam Smith in England plunged into abstractions, forgetting about man..." (I, 55). For Ricardo "wealth is everything and men nothing" (II, 331). "They" (the economists who advocate Free Trade) "often sacrifice men and real interests to an abstract theory" (II, 457), and so forth.

How old these attacks are, and yet how new! I have in mind their renewal by the Narodniks, who have made such a noise over the frank admission that the capitalist development of Russia is her real, actual and inevitable development. Have they not repeated the same thing in different keys when shouting about "apologetics of the money power," about "social-bourgeois character," and so forth?[62] The remark addressed to the sentimental critics of capitalism in general is applicable to them to an *even greater extent* than to Sismondi: Man schreie nicht zu sehr über den Zy-

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nismus! Der Zynismus liegt in der Sache, nicht in den Worten, welche die Sache bezeichnen! But do not make an outcry at the cynicism of it. The cynicism is in the facts and not in the words which express the facts.[63]

"To an even greater extent," we say. This is because the West-European romanticists did not have before them a scientific analysis of the contradictions of capitalism, because they were the first to indicate these contradictions, because they denounced (in "plaintive words," incidentally) the people *who did not see* these contradictions.

Sismondi violently attacked Ricardo for drawing all the conclusions from his observations and study of bourgeois society with ruthless frankness: he noted frankly both the existence of production for production and the transformation of labour-power into a commodity similar to any other commodity and the fact that the net revenue, that is, the amount of profit, is the only thing of importance to "society."* But Ricardo spoke the absolute truth: *actually everything is exactly as he says*. If this truth seemed to Sismondi to be a "base truth," he should not have sought for the causes of this baseness in Ricardo's theory at all, and should not have directed his attacks at "abstractions"; the exclamations he addressed to Ricardo belong entirely to the sphere of "the deception which exalts us."

* Ephrucy, for example, repeats with an important air Sismondi's sentimental phrases about an increase in the net revenue of the entrepreneur not being a gain for the national economy, and so forth and reproaches him merely for having "realised" this "not quite clearly yet" (p. 43, No. 8).

Would you not like to compare with this the results of the scientific analysis of capitalism:

The gross income (Roheinkommen) of society consists of wages + profit + rent. The net income (Reineinkommen) is surplus-value.

"Viewing the income of the whole society, national income consists of wages plus profit plus rent, thus, of the gross income. But even this is an abstraction to the extent that the entire society, on the basis of capitalist production bases itself on the capitalist standpoint and thereby considers only the income resolved into profit and rent as net income" (III, 2, 375-76)."[64]

Thus, the author fully sides with Ricardo and his definition of the "net income" of "society," sides with the very definition which evoked Sismondi's "celebrated objection" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 44): "What? Wealth is everything and men nothing?" (II. 331). In modern society—yes, certainly.

Well, what about our modern romanticists? Do they think of denying the reality of the "money power"? Do they think of denying that this power is omnipotent not only among the industrial population, but also among the agricultural population of any "village community" and of any remote village you like? Do they think of denying that there is a necessary connection between this *fact* and commodity economy? They have not even attempted to subject this to doubt. They simply try not to talk of it. They are afraid of calling things by their real names.

We fully understand their fear: the frank admission of reality would completely cut the ground from under the sentimental (Narodnik) criticism of capitalism. It is not surprising that they so ardently rush into battle before they have had time to clean the rusty weapon of romanticism. It is not surprising that they are unscrupulous in their methods and want to present hostility towards *sentimental* criticism as hostility towards criticism in general. After all, they are fighting for their right to existence.

Sismondi even tried to elevate his sentimental criticism to the plane of *a special method of social science*. We have already seen that he did not reproach Ricardo with bringing his objective analysis to a halt when faced with the contradictions of capitalism (such a reproach would have been justified), but reproached him for the *objectivity* of his analysis. Sismondi said that Ricardo "forgets about man." In his preface to the second edition of *Nouveaux Principes* we find the following tirade:

"I deem it necessary to protest against the customary methods, so often superficial, so often false, of judging a work relating to the social sciences. The problem which they have to solve is incomparably more complex than all the problems of the natural sciences; at the same time it appeals as much to the heart as it does to the mind" (I, XVI). How familiar to the Russian reader is this idea of contrasting the natural sciences to the social sciences, and of the latter appealing to the "heart"!* Sismondi here expresses the very ideas

* "Political economy is not simply a science of calculation (n'est pas une science de calcul) but a moral science.... It achieves its object only when the feelings, needs, and passions of men are taken into consideration" (I, 313). These sentimental phrases which Sismondi

which were to be "newly discovered" several decades later in the far east of Europe by the "Russian school of sociologists" and figure as a special "subjective method in sociology." ... Sismondi, like our native sociologists, of course appeals "to the heart as well as to the mind."* But we have already seen that on all the most important problems, the "heart" of the petty bourgeois triumphed over the "mind" of the economist theoretician.

POSTSCRIPT**

That the appraisal given here of the sentimental Sismondi in relation to scientifically "objective" Ricardo is correct, is fully confirmed by the opinion Marx expressed in the second volume of *Theories of Surplus-Value*, which appeared in 1905 (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. B., I. Th., S. 304 u. ff. "Bemerkungen über die Geschichte der Entdeckung des sogenannten Ricardoschen Gesetzes").*** Contrasting Malthus as a wretched plagiarist, a paid advocate of the rich and a shameless sycophant, to Ricardo as a man of science, Marx said:

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and the Russian sociologists of the subjective school who utter exactly the same exclamations regard as new conceptions of social science actually show that criticism of the bourgeoisie was still in an infantile primitive state. Does not a scientific analysis of contradictions, while remaining a strictly objective "calculation," provide firm ground for understanding "the feelings, needs and passions," and the passions not of "men" in general—that abstraction to which both the romanticist and the Narodnik ascribe a specifically petty-bourgeois content—but of *the men of definite classes*? The point is, however, that Sismondi *could not theoretically refute* the economists and therefore confined himself to sentimental phrases. "Utopian dilettantism was forced to make theoretical concessions to any more or less learned defender of the bourgeois order. In order to allay the consciousness of his own impotence that was rising within him, the utopian consoled himself by reproaching his opponents with objectivity: let us admit that you are more learned than I, but in return I am kinder" (Beltov, p. 43).[65]

* As if the "problems" which arise from the natural sciences do not also appeal to the "heart"!

** This postscript was written for the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*

*** *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 304, et seq. "Notes on the History of the Discovery of the So-called Ricardian Law."[66]—*Ed.*

"Ricardo regards the capitalist mode of production as the most advantageous for production in general, as the most advantageous for the creation of wealth, and for his time Ricardo is quite right. He wants *production for the sake of production*, and he is right. To object to this, as Ricardo's sentimental opponents did, by pointing to the fact that production as such is not an end in itself, means to forget that production for the sake of production is nothing more nor less than the development of the productive forces of mankind, i.e., *the development of the wealth of human nature as an end in itself*. If this end is set up in contrast to the welfare of individuals, as Sismondi did, it is tantamount to asserting that the development of the whole human race must be *retarded* for the sake of ensuring the welfare of individuals, that, consequently, no war, we shall say for example, can be waged, because war causes the death of individuals. Sismondi is right only in opposition to those economists who *obscure* this antagonism, deny it" (S. 309). From his point of view Ricardo has every right to put the proletarians on a par with machines, with commodities in capitalist production. "Es ist dieses stoisch, objektiv, wissenschaftlich," "this is stoicism, this is objective, this is scientific" (S. 313). It goes without saying that this appraisal applies only to a definite period, to the very beginning of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER II

THE CHARACTER OF THE ROMANTICISTS' CRITICISM OF CAPITALISM

We have already dealt sufficiently with Sismondi's "mind." Let us now take a closer look at his "heart." Let us attempt to collect all the references to his *point of view* (which we have studied till now only as an element touching on theoretical problems), to his *attitude* towards capitalism, to his social sympathies, to his conception of the "socio-political" problems of the period in which he was active.

I
THE SENTIMENTAL CRITICISM OF CAPITALISM

The distinguishing feature of the period in which Sismondi wrote was the rapid development of *exchange* (money economy, to use modern terminology), which was manifested with particular sharpness after the remnants of feudalism were destroyed by the French Revolution. Sismondi unambiguously condemned this development and growth of exchange, denounced "fatal competition," called upon the "government to protect the population from the consequences of competition" (ch. VIII, I. VII), and so forth. "Rapid exchanges corrupt the good faith of the people. Constant concern for selling at a profit cannot but lead to attempts to demand too high a price and to cheat, and the harder life becomes for the one who gains his livelihood by constant exchanges, the more he is tempted to resort to cheating" (I, 169). Such was the naïveté required to attack money economy in the way our Narodniks attack it! "... Commercial wealth is only of secondary importance in the economic system; and land wealth (territoriale) which provides the means of subsistence must increase first. The whole of that numerous class which lives by commerce must be called upon to participate in the fruits of the earth only to the extent that these fruits exist; it" (this class) "must grow only to the extent that this produce grows" (I, 322-23). Has Mr. N. —on, who fills page after page with complaints about the growth of commerce and industry outpacing the development of agriculture, taken even one step beyond this patriarchal romanticist? These complaints of the romanticist and of the Narodnik merely testify to a complete *misunderstanding* of capitalist economy. *Can there be* a capitalism under which the development of commerce and industry *does not* outpace agriculture? Why, the growth of capitalism is the growth of commodity economy, *that is to say*, of a social division of labour which *separates* from agriculture one branch of the processing of raw materials after another, breaking up the *single* natural economy in which the production, processing and consumption of these raw materials were combined. That is why capitalism *always and everywhere* signifies a *more rapid* development

of commerce and industry than of agriculture, a *more rapid* growth of the commercial and industrial population, a *greater* weight and importance of commerce and industry in the social economic system as a whole.* *Nor can it be* otherwise. By repeating such complaints, Mr. N. —on proves again and again that in his economic views he has not gone beyond superficial, sentimental romanticism. "This unwise spirit of enterprise (esprit d'entreprise), this excess of trading of every kind, which causes so many bankruptcies in America, is due, without a doubt, to the increase in the number of banks and to the ease with which illusory credit takes the place of real property" (fortune réelle) (II, 111), and so forth endlessly. Why did Sismondi attack money economy (and capitalism)? What does he offer in place of it? Small independent production, the natural economy of the peasants in the countryside, artisan production in the towns. Here is what he says of the former in the chapter headed "Of Patriarchal Agriculture" (ch. III, l. III, "De l'exploitation patriarcale"—the patriarchal exploitation of the land. Book III treats of "territorial" or land wealth):

"The first owners of land were themselves tillers, all the field work was done by the labour of their children and their servants. No social organisation** guarantees more happiness and more virtue to the most numerous

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* As capitalism develops, agriculture always and everywhere, *lags behind* commerce and industry, it is always subordinate to them and is exploited by them and it is always *drawn* by them, only later on, onto the path of capitalist *production*.

** Note that Sismondi—exactly like our Narodniks—at once transformed the peasants' independent economy into a "social organisation." Obvious juggling. What is it that links together these peasants from different localities? The division of social labour and the commodity economy that superseded feudal ties. We at once see the elevation of one division of the commodity-economy system to utopian heights and the failure to understand the other divisions. Compare this with what Mr. N. —on says on p. 322: "The form of industry based on the ownership of the instruments of production by the peasantry." Mr. N. —on does not even suspect that this ownership of the instruments of production by the peasantry is—historically and logically—*the starting-point* of that same *capitalist* production!

class of the nation, a larger prosperity (opulence) to all, greater stability to the public order.... In those countries where the farmer is the owner (où le fermier est propriétaire) and where the produce belongs entirely (sans partage) to the people who perform all the work, i.e, in those countries whose agriculture we call patriarchal, we see at every step signs of the tiller's love for the house in which he lives, for the land which he tills.... Work itself is a pleasure to him.... In those happy countries where agriculture is patriarchal, the particular nature of every field is studied, and this knowledge is passed on from father to son.... Large-scale farming, directed by richer men, will perhaps rise above prejudice and routine. But knowledge (l'intelligence, i.e., knowledge of agriculture) will not reach the one who works and will be badly applied.... Patriarchal economy improves the morals and character of that numerous section of the nation which has to do all the work in the fields. Property cultivates habits of order and frugality, constant abundance destroys the taste for gluttony (gourmandise) and intemperance.... Entering into exchange almost exclusively with nature he" (the tiller) "has less reason than any industrial worker to distrust men and to resort to the weapon of dishonesty against them" (I, 165-70). "The first farmers were simple labourers; they themselves performed the hulk of the agricultural work; they kept the size of their enterprises commensurate with the working capacity of their families.... They did not cease to be peasants: they themselves followed the plough (tiennent eux-mêmes les cornes de leur charrue); they themselves tended their cattle, both in the fields and in the barns, they lived in the pure air and got accustomed to constant labour and to modest food, which create sturdy citizens and stalwart soldiers.* They hardly ever employed day labourers to work with them, but only servants (des domestiques), always chosen from among their equals, whom they treated as equals, who ate with them at the same table, drink the same wine and wear the same kind of

* Reader, compare with these honeyed grandmother's tales the statements of the "progressive" publicist of the late nineteenth century whom Mr. Struve cites in his *Critical Remarks*, p. 17.[67]

clothes as they did. Thus, the farmers and their servants constituted one class of peasants, inspired by the same feelings, sharing the same pleasures, subjected to the same influences and bound to their country by the same ties" (I, 221).

Here, then, you have the famous "people's production"! Let it not be said that Sismondi does not understand the need to unite the producers: he says plainly (see below) that "he too" (like Fourier, Owen, Thompson and Muiron) "wants association" (II, 365). Let it not be said that he stands for *property*: on the contrary, he places the weight of emphasis on small economy (cf. II, 355) and not upon small property. It goes without saying that this idealisation of small peasant economy looks different under different historical and social conditions. But there can be no doubt that it is small peasant economy that is glorified by both romanticism and Narodism.

Similarly, Sismondi idealises primitive artisan production and guilds.

"The village shoemaker, who is at once merchant, factory owner and worker, will not make a single pair of shoes without an order" (II, 262), whereas capitalist manufacture, not knowing the demand, may suffer bankruptcy. "Undoubtedly, from both the theoretical and the factual standpoint, the institution of guilds (corps de métier) prevented, and was bound to prevent, the formation of a surplus population. It is also beyond doubt that such a population exists at the present time, and that it is the necessary result of the present system" (I, 431). Many more excerpts of a similar nature could be quoted, but we shall postpone our examination of Sismondi's practical recipes until later. Here let us confine ourselves to what we have quoted in order to probe Sismondi's point of view. The arguments we have quoted may be summed up as follows: 1) money economy is condemned for destroying the small producers' security and the close relations among them (in the shape of the nearness of the artisan to his customers, or of the tiller to other tillers, his equals); 2) small production is extolled for ensuring the independence of the producer and eliminating the contradictions of capitalism.

Let us note that both these ideas constitute an essen-

tial part of Narodism,* and endeavour to probe their meaning.

The criticism of money economy by the romanticists and the Narodniks amounts to the following: it points to the fruits of that economy—individualism** and antagonism (competition), and also the producer's insecurity and the instability of the social economy.***

First about "individualism." Usually, the contrast is made between the association of the peasants in a given community, or of the artisans (or the handicraftsmen) of a given craft, and capitalism, which destroys the ties that bind them, and puts competition in their place. This argument is a repetition of the typical error of romanticism, namely: the conclusion that since capitalism is torn by contradictions it is not a *higher form of social organisation*. Does not capitalism, which destroys the medieval village community, guild, artel and similar ties, substitute others for them? Is not commodity economy already a *tie* between the producers, a tie established by the *market*?**** The antagonistic character of *this tie*, which is full of fluctuations and contradictions, gives one no right to deny *its existence*. And we know that it is the development of contradictions that with ever-growing force reveals the strength of this tie, *compels* all the individual elements and classes of society to strive to unite, and to unite no longer within the narrow limits of one village community,

* On this question, too, Mr. N.—on is guilty of such a heap of contradictions that one can choose from them *any number* of propositions in no way connected with each other. But there can be no doubt about his idealisation of peasant economy by the use of the hazy term "people's production." A haze is a particularly suitable atmosphere in which to don all sorts of disguises.

** Cf. N.—on, p. 321, in f. (in fine—at the end.—*Ed.*) and others.

*** ibid., 335. P. 184: capitalism "robs of stability." And many others.

**** "In actual fact, *society, association* are denominations which can be given to every society, to feudal society as well as to bourgeois society, which is association founded on competition. How then can there be writers, who, by the single word *association*, think they can refute competition?" (Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie*.)[68] Sharply criticising the sentimental condemnation of competition, the author plainly stresses its *progressive aspect*, its driving force, which promotes "technical progress and social progress."

or of one district, but to unite all the members of the given class *in a whole nation* and even in different countries. Only a romanticist, with his reactionary point of view, can deny the existence of these ties and their deeper importance, which is based on the common role played in the national economy and not upon territorial, professional, religious and other such interests. If arguments of this kind earned the name of romanticist for Sismondi, who wrote at a time when these new ties engendered by capitalism were still in the embryo, all the more do our Narodniks deserve such an estimation; for *today*, the enormous importance of these ties can only be denied by those who are totally blind.

As regards insecurity and instability, and so forth, that is the same old song we dealt with when discussing the foreign market. Attacks of this kind betray the romanticist who fearfully condemns precisely that which scientific theory values most in capitalism: its inherent striving for development, its irresistible urge onwards, its inability to halt or to reproduce the economic processes in their former, rigid dimensions. Only a utopian who concocts fantastic plans for spreading medieval associations (such as the village community) to the whole of society can ignore the fact that it is the "instability" of capitalism that is an enormously progressive factor, one which accelerates social development, draws larger and larger masses of the population into the whirlpool of social life, compels them to ponder over its structure, and to "forge their happiness" with their own hands.

Mr. N.—on's phrases about the "instability" of capitalist economy, about the lack of proportion in the development of exchange, about the disturbance of the balance between industry and agriculture, between production and consumption, about the abnormality of crises, and so forth, testify beyond all doubt to the fact that he still shares the viewpoint of *romanticism* to the full. Hence, the criticism of European romanticism applies *word for word* to his theory too. Here is the proof:

"Let us hear what old Boisguillebert says:

"'The price of commodities,' he says, 'must always be *proportionate*; for it is such mutual understanding alone

that can enable them to reciprocally give birth to one another.... As wealth, then, is nothing but this continual intercourse between man and man, craft and craft, etc., it is a frightful blindness to go looking for the cause of misery elsewhere than in the cessation of such traffic brought about by a disturbance of proportion in prices.'

"Let us listen also to a modern* economist:

"'The great law as necessary to be affixed to production, that is, the law of *proportion*, which alone can preserve the continuity of value.... The equivalent must be guaranteed.... All nations have attempted, at various periods of their history, by instituting numerous commercial regulations and restrictions, to effect, in some degree, the object here explained.... But the natural and inherent selfishness of man ... has urged him to break down all such regulations. Proportionate Production is the realisation of the entire truth of the Science of Social Economy' (W. Atkinson, *Principles of Political Economy*, London, 1840, pp. 170 and 195).

"Fuit Troja!** This true proportion between supply and demand, which is beginning once more to be the object of so many wishes, ceased long ago to exist. It has passed into the stage of senility. It was possible only at a time when the means of production were limited, when the movement of exchange took place within very restricted bounds. With the birth of large-scale industry this true proportion had to (musste) come to an end, and production is inevitably compelled to pass in continuous succession through vicissitudes of prosperity, depression, crisis, stagnation, renewed prosperity, and so on.

"Those who, like Sismondi, wish to return to the true proportion of production, while preserving the present basis of society, are reactionary, since, to be consistent, they must also wish to bring back all the other conditions of industry of former times.

"What kept production in true, or more or less true, proportions? It was demand that dominated supply, that preceded it. Production followed close on the heels of con-

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* Written in 1847.

** Troy is no more!—*Ed.*

sumption. Large-scale industry, forced by the very instruments at its disposal to produce on an ever-increasing scale, can no longer wait for demand. Production precedes consumption, supply compels demand.

"In existing society, in industry based on individual exchange, anarchy of production, which is the source of so much misery, is at the same time the source of all progress.

"Thus, one or the other: either you want the true proportions of past centuries with present-day means of production, in which case you are both reactionary and utopian.

"Or, you want progress without anarchy: in which case, in order to preserve the productive forces, you must abandon individual exchange" (*Das Elend der Philosophie*, S. 46-48).[69]

The last words apply to Proudhon, with whom the author is polemising, thus formulating the difference between his own viewpoint and the views both of Sismondi and of Proudhon. Mr. N. —on would not, of course, approximate to either one or the other in all his views.* But look into the content of the passage given. What is the main thesis of the author we have quoted, his basic idea, which brings him into irreconcilable opposition to his predecessors? Undoubtedly, it is that he places the question of the instability of capitalism (which *all these three* authors admit) on a *historical* plane and regards this instability as a *progressive factor*. In other words: he recognises, firstly, that existing capitalist development, which proceeds through disproportion, crises, etc., is *necessary development*, and says that the very character of the means of production (machines) gives rise to the desire for an unlimited expansion of production and the constant anticipation of demand by supply. Secondly, he recognises *elements of progress* in this development, which are: the development of the productive forces, socialisation of labour within the bounds of the whole of society, increased mobility of the population and the growth of its consciousness, and so forth. These two points ex-

* Although it is a big question as to *why* he would not do so. Is it not only because these authors raised problems on a wider plane, having in mind the existing economic system in general, its place and significance in the development of the whole of mankind, and did not limit their outlook to *one country*, for which one may supposedly invent a *special* theory?

haust the difference between him and Sismondi and Proudhon, who agree with him in indicating the "instability" of capitalism and the contradictions it engenders, and in their sincere desire to eliminate these contradictions Their failure to understand that this "instability" is a *necessary* feature of all capitalism and commodity economy in general brought them to *utopia*. Their failure to understand the elements of progress *inherent* in this instability makes their theories *reactionary*.*

And now we invite Messrs. the Narodniks to answer this question: Does Mr. N. —on agree with the views of scientific theory on the two points mentioned? Does he regard instability as a characteristic of the present system, and of present-day development? Does he admit the existence of elements of progress in this instability? Everybody knows that he does not, that, on the contrary, Mr. N. —on proclaims this "instability" of capitalism to be simply an abnormality, a digression, and so forth, and regards it as decadence, retrogression (cf. above: "*robs of* stability") and idealises that very economic stagnation (recall the "age-old foundations," "time-hallowed principles," and so forth) whose destruction is the historical merit of "unstable" capitalism. It is clear, therefore, that we were quite right in including him among the romanticists and that no "quotations" and "references" on his part will change *this character of his own arguments*.

We shall deal again with this "instability" later (in connection with the hostility of romanticism and Narodism to the diminution of the agricultural population to the advantage of the industrial population); at present let us quote a passage from *A Critique of Some of the Propositions of Political Economy* in which the *sentimental* attacks on money economy are examined.

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* This term is employed in its *historico-philosophical* sense, describing only the *error* of the theoreticians who take models for their theories from *obsolete* forms of society. It does not apply at all to the personal qualities of these theoreticians, or to their programmes. Everybody knows that neither Sismondi nor Proudhon were reactionaries in the ordinary sense of the term. We are explaining these elementary truths because, as we shall see below, the Narodnik gentlemen have not grasped them to this day.

"These definite social functions" (namely, of the seller and buyer) "are no outgrowths of human nature, but are the products of exchange relations between men who produce their goods in the form of commodities. They are so far from being purely individual relations between buyer and seller that both enter into these relations only to the extent that their individual labour is disregarded and is turned into money as labour of no individual. Therefore, just as it is childish to regard these bourgeois economic roles of buyer and seller as eternal social forms of human individuality, so it is, on the other hand, preposterous to lament over them as the cause of the extinction of individuality.

"How deeply some beautiful souls are wounded by the merely superficial aspect of the antagonism which asserts itself in buying and selling may be seen from the following abstract from M. Isaac Pereire's *Leçons sur l'industrie et les finances*, Paris, 1832. The fact that the same Isaac in his capacity of inventor and dictator of the 'Crédit mobilier'* has acquired the reputation of the wolf of the Paris Bourse shows what lurks behind the sentimental criticism of economics. Says M. Pereire, at the time an apostle of Saint-Simon: 'Since individuals are isolated and separated from one another both in their labours and in consumption, exchange takes place between them in the products of their respective industries. From the necessity of exchange arises the necessity of determining the relative value of things. The ideas of value and exchange are thus intimately connected and both express in their actual form individualism and antagonism.... The determination of values of products takes place only because there are sales and purchases, or, to put it differently, because there is an antagonism between different members of society. One has to occupy himself with price and value only where there is sale and purchase, that is to say, where every individual is obliged *to struggle* to procure for himself the objects necessary for the maintenance of his existence'" (op. cit., p. 68).[70]

The question is: wherein lies Pereire's *sentimentality*? He talks only about the individualism, antagonism and con-

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*A bank which grants loans on the security of movable property.—*Ed.*

flict inherent in capitalism, he says the very thing our Narodniks say in different keys, and, moreover, they seem to be speaking the truth, because "individualism, antagonism and conflict" are indeed necessary attributes of exchange, of commodity production. His sentimentality lies in that this Saint-Simonist, carried away by his condemnation of the contradictions of capitalism, *fails to discern behind these contradictions* the fact that *exchange* also expresses a special form of *social economy*, that it, consequently, *not only disunites* (it does that only in respect of the medieval associations, which capitalism destroys), *but also unites* men, compelling them to enter into intercourse with each other through the medium of the market.* It was this superficial understanding, caused by their eagerness to "trounce" capitalism (from the utopian point of view) that gave the above-quoted author occasion to call Pereire's criticism *sentimental*.

But why should we worry about Pereire, the long-forgotten apostle of long-forgotten Saint-Simonism? Would it not be better to take the modern "apostle" of Narodism?

"Production ... was robbed of its popular character and assumed an individual, capitalist character" (Mr. N. —on, *Sketches*, pp. 321-22).

You see how this disguised romanticist argues: "people's production became individual production." And as by "people's production" the author wants to imply the village community,[71] he points to the decline of the *social* character of production, to the shrinking of the *social* form of production.

But is that so? The "village community" provided (*if it did provide*; but we are ready to make any concession to the author) for organised production only in the one individual community, isolated from all the other communities. The social character of production embraced *only the members of the one village community*.** Capitalism, however,

* Substituting unity along the lines of social status and social interests of a whole country, and even of the whole world, for local and social-estate associations.

** According to the Zemstvo statistics (Blagoveshchensky's *Combined Returns*), the average size of a village community, for 123 uyezds in 22 gubernias, is 53 households, with a population of 323 of both sexes.

gives production a social character in a whole country. "Individualism" means the destruction of social ties; but these ties are destroyed by the *market*, which replaces them by ties between *masses of individuals* who are not bound together by a village community, a social estate, a given trade, the restricted area of a given industry, etc. The tie created by capitalism manifests itself in the form of contradictions and antagonism, and *therefore*, our romanticist refuses to see this tie (although the village community, too, as a form of organisation of production never existed without the other forms of contradictions and antagonism inherent in the old modes of production). The utopian point of view transforms his criticism of capitalism, as well, into a *sentimental* one.

II

THE PETTY-BOURGEOIS CHARACTER OF ROMANTICISM

The idealisation of small production reveals to us another typical feature of romanticist and Narodnik criticism, namely, its *petty-bourgeois character*. We have seen that the French and the Russian romanticists are unanimous in converting small production into a "social organisation," into a "form of production," and *in contrasting it to capitalism*. We have also seen that this contrasting of one to the other is nothing but the expression of an extremely superficial understanding, that it is the artificial and incorrect singling out of one form of commodity economy (large-scale industrial capital) and condemnation of it, while utopianly idealising *another form of the same* commodity economy (small production). The misfortune of both the European romanticists of the early nineteenth century and of the Russian romanticists of the late nineteenth century is that they invent for themselves a sort of abstract small production existing outside of the social relations of production, and *overlook* the trifling circumstance that this small production actually exists in an environment of *commodity production*—this applies both to the small economy on the European continent in the 1820s and to Russian peasant economy in the 1890s. *Actually*, the small producer,

whom the romanticists and the Narodniks place on a pedestal, is therefore a *petty bourgeois* who exists in the same antagonistic relations as every other member of capitalist society, and who also defends his interests by means of a struggle which, on the one hand, is constantly creating a small minority of big bourgeois, and on the other, pushes the majority into the ranks of the proletariat. Actually, as everybody sees and knows, there are no small producers who do not stand *between* these two opposite classes, and this middle position necessarily determines the specific character of the petty bourgeoisie, its dual character, its two-facedness, its gravitation towards the minority which has emerged from the struggle successfully, its hostility towards the "failures," i.e., the majority. The more commodity economy develops, the more strongly and sharply do these qualities stand out, and the more evident does it become that the idealisation of small production merely expresses a reactionary, *petty-bourgeois* point of view.

We must make no mistake about the meaning of these terms, which the author of *A Critique of Some of the Propositions of Political Economy* applied specifically to Sismondi. These terms do not at all mean that Sismondi *defends* the backward petty bourgeois. *Nowhere does Sismondi defend them*: he wants to take the point of view of the labouring classes in general, he expresses his sympathy for all the members of these classes, he is pleased, for example, with factory legislation, he attacks capitalism and exposes its contradictions. In a word, his point of view is exactly the same as that of the modern Narodniks.

The question is: on what grounds, then, is he described as a petty bourgeois? On the grounds that he does not understand the connection between small production (which he idealises) and big capital (which he attacks). On the grounds that he *does not see* that his beloved small producer, the peasant, is in reality becoming a petty bourgeois. We must never forget the following explanation about reducing the theories of various authors to the interests and points of view of different classes:

"Only one must not form the narrow-minded notion that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather, it believes that the *special*

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conditions of its emancipation are the *general* conditions within the frame of which alone modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the relationship between the *political and literary representatives* of a class and the class they represent" (Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, translated into Russian by Bazarov and Stepanov, pp. 179-80).[72]

Hence, those Narodniks who think that the sole object of referring to petty-bourgeois character is to say something exceptionally venomous, that it is simply a polemical ruse, cut a very comical figure. By this attitude they reveal their misconception of the general views of their opponents, and chiefly their misconception of the basis of *that very* criticism of capitalism with which they all "agree," and of the way in which it *differs* from sentimental and petty-bourgeois criticism. The mere fact that they strive so hard to evade the very problem of these latter forms of criticism, of their existence in Western Europe, of their relation to the scientific criticism, clearly shows *why* the Narodniks do not want to understand this difference.*

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* For example, Ephrucy wrote two articles on the subject of "how Sismondi regarded the growth of capitalism" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 7, p. 139), and yet *absolutely failed to understand* exactly *how* Sismondi did regard it. *Russkoye Bogatstvo*'s contributor *did not notice* Sismondi's petty-bourgeois point of view. But since Ephrucy is undoubtedly familiar with Sismondi; since he (as we shall see later) is familiar with that very representative of the modern theory who characterised Sismondi in that way; since he, too, wishes to "agree" with this representative of the new theory—his failure to understand acquires a quite definite significance. The Narodnik could not see in the romanticist what he does not see in himself.

Let us explain the above with an example. In the bibliographical section of R*usskaya Mysl*[73] for 1896, No. 5 (p. 229, et seq.), it is stated that among the intelligentsia "a group has lately appeared and is growing with amazing rapidity" which in principle is unreservedly hostile to Narodism. The reviewer points in the briefest outline to the causes and character of this hostility, and one cannot but note with appreciation that he gives quite correctly the *gist* of the point of view hostile to Narodism.* The reviewer does not share this point of view. He does not understand that the ideas of class interests, etc., should compel us to deny "people's ideals" ("simply *people*'s but not Narodnik"; ibid., p. 229), which he says, are the welfare, freedom and consciousness of the peasantry, i.e., of the majority of the population.

"We shall be told, of course, as others have been told," says the reviewer, "that the ideals of the peasant author" (this is a reference to the wishes expressed by a certain peasant) "are petty-bourgeois and that, therefore, to this day our literature has represented and defended the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. But this is simply a bogey, and who, except those possessing the world outlook and mental habits of a Zamoskvorechye merchant's wife, can be frightened by such a bogey?..."

Strongly spoken! But let us hear what he has to say further:

"...The basic criterion, both of the conditions of human intercourse and of deliberate social measures, is not economic categories, borrowed, moreover, from conditions alien to the country, and formed under different circumstances, but the happiness and welfare, material and spiritual, of the majority of the population. And if a certain mode of life, and certain measures for maintaining and developing this mode of life, lead to this happiness, call them petty-bourgeois, or what you will, it will not alter the situation: they—this mode of life and these measures—will

* It sounds very strange, of course, to praise a man for correctly conveying somebody else's ideas!! But what would you have? Among the ordinary controversialists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and of the old *Novoye Slovo*, Messrs. Krivenko and Vorontsov, *such* a method of controversy is indeed a rare exception.

still be essentially progressive, and for that very reason will represent the *highest ideal attainable by society under existing conditions and in its present state*" (ibid., pp. 229-30, author's italics).

Does the reviewer really not see that in the heat of controversy he has jumped over the problem?

Although the accusation that Narodism is petty-bourgeois is described by him with supreme severity as "simply a bogey," he produces no proof of this assertion, except the following incredibly amazing proposition: "The criterion ... is not economic categories, but the happiness of the majority." Why, this is the same as saying: the criterion of the weather is not meteorological observations, but the way the majority feels! What, we ask, are these "economic categories" if not the *scientific formulation* of the population's conditions of economy and life, and moreover, not of the "population" in general, but of *definite* groups of the population, which occupy a definite place under the *present* system of social economy? By opposing the highly abstract idea of "the happiness of the majority" to "economic categories," the reviewer simply strikes out the entire development of social science since the end of the last century and reverts to naïve rationalistic speculation, which ignores the existence and the development of definite social relationships. With one stroke of the pen he wipes out all that the human mind, in its attempt *to understand* social phenomena, has achieved at the price of centuries of searching! And after thus relieving himself of all scientific encumbrances, the reviewer *believes the problem is solved*. Indeed, he bluntly concludes: "If a certain mode of life ... leads to this happiness, call it what you will, it will not alter the situation." What do you think of that? But the whole question was: *what* mode of life? The author himself had only just said that those who regarded peasant economy as a special mode of life ("people's production," or whatever you like to call it) were opposed by others who asserted that it is not a special mode of life, but just the ordinary *petty-bourgeois* mode of life, similar to that of every other kind of small production in a country of commodity production and capitalism. If it automatically follows from the form-

er view that "this mode of life" ("people's production") "leads to happiness," then it also automatically follows from the latter view that "this mode of life" (the petty-bourgeois mode) leads to capitalism and to nothing else, leads to the "majority of the population" being forced into the ranks of the proletariat and to the conversion of the minority into a rural (or industrial) bourgeoisie. Is it not obvious that the reviewer fired a shot into the air, and amidst the noise of the shot took as proven exactly what is denied by the second view, which is so unkindly declared to be "simply a bogey"?

Had he wanted to examine the second view seriously, he obviously should have proved one of two things: either that "petty bourgeoisie" is a wrong scientific category, that one can conceive of capitalism and commodity economy *without* a petty bourgeoisie (as indeed the Narodniks actually do, and thereby completely revert to Sismondi's point of view), *or* that this category is *inapplicable* to Russia, i.e., that here we have neither capitalism nor the prevalence of commodity economy, that the small producers do not become commodity producers, that the above-mentioned process of ousting the majority and of strengthening the "independence" of the minority is not taking place among them. Now, however, having seen that he treats the reference to the petty-bourgeois character of Narodism simply as a desire to "offend" the Narodniks, and having read the above-quoted phrase about the "bogey," we involuntarily recall the well-known utterance: "Pray, Kit Kitych![74] Who would offend you? You yourself can offend anybody!"

III

THE PROBLEM OF THE GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL POPULATION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION

Let us return to Sismondi. In addition to his idealisation of the petty bourgeoisie, in addition to his romanticist failure to understand how, under the present social system of economy, the "peasantry" is transformed into a petty bourgeoisie, he holds an extremely characteristic

view about the diminution of the agricultural population to the advantage of the industrial population. It is common knowledge that this phenomenon —one of the most striking manifestations of a country's capitalist development— is observed in all civilised countries, and also in Russia.*

Sismondi, an outstanding economist of his time, must, of course, have seen this fact. He openly records it, but fails completely to understand the necessary connection between it and the development of capitalism (to put it even more generally: between it and the division of social labour, the growth of commodity economy called forth by this phenomenon). He simply *condemns* it as a defect in the "system."

After pointing to the enormous progress made by English agriculture, Sismondi says:

"While admiring the carefully cultivated fields, we must look at the people who cultivate them; they constitute only half the number to be seen in France on an equal area. Some economists regard this as again; in my opinion it is a loss" (I, 239).

We can understand why the ideologists of the bourgeoisie regarded this thing as a gain (we shall soon see that such is also the view of the scientific critique of capitalism): in this way they formulated the growth of bourgeois wealth, commerce and industry. While hastening to *condemn* this phenomenon, Sismondi forgets to think about its causes.

"In France and in Italy," he says, "where, it is calculated, four-fifths of the population belong to the agricultural class, four-fifths of the nation will have the national bread to eat, no matter what the price of foreign grain may be" (I, 264). Fuit Troja! is what can be said of this.

* The percentage of the urban population in European Russia has been growing in the post-Reform period. Here we must confine ourselves merely to pointing to this most commonly known symptom, although it expresses the phenomenon *far from completely*, in that it does not include important features specific to Russia as compared with Western Europe. This is not the place to examine these specific features (the peasants' lack of freedom of movement, the existence of industrial and factory villages, internal colonisation of the country, and so forth).

There are now no countries (even the most highly agricultural) which are not entirely dependent upon *the price of grain*, i.e., upon world capitalist production of grain.

"If a nation cannot increase its commercial population except by demanding from each a larger amount of work for the same pay, it must fear an increase in its industrial population" (I, 322). As the reader sees, this is merely kind advice devoid of all sense and meaning, for here the concept "nation" is based on the artificial exclusion of the antagonisms between the classes which constitute this "nation." As always, Sismondi simply *wriggles out* of these antagonisms by means of the well-meaning wish that ... there should be no antagonisms.

"In England, agriculture employs only 770,199 families, commerce and industry employ 959,632, the other estates in society 413,316. It is truly frightful (effrayante) that such a large proportion of the population, out of a total of 2,143,147 families, or 10,150,615 persons, exists on commercial wealth. Happily, France is still far from having such an enormous number of workers depending upon luck in a remote market" (I, 434). Here Sismondi even seems to forget that this "happiness" is due entirely to the lag in France's capitalist development.

Depicting the changes in the existing system which are "desirable" from his point of view (we shall discuss these later), Sismondi says that "the result" (of reforms to suit the romantic taste) "would undoubtedly be that more than one country living merely by industry would have to successively close down many workshops, and that the urban population, which had increased excessively, would rapidly decline, whereas the rural population would begin to grow" (II, 367).

This example brings out in particular relief the helplessness of the sentimental criticism of capitalism and the impotent vexation of the petty bourgeois! Sismondi simply *complains** that things are going one way and not another. His grief at the destruction of the Eden of the rural population's patriarchal dullness and downtrodden condition is

* "Ultimately ... this form of Socialism" (namely the trend of petty-bourgeois criticism, of which Sismondi was the head) "ended in a miserable fit of the blues."[75]

so great that our economist does not even discern why it takes place. He therefore overlooks the fact that the increase in the industrial population is necessarily and inseverably connected with commodity economy and capitalism. Commodity economy develops to the degree that the social division of labour develops. And the division of labour means precisely that one industry after another, one form of processing the raw product after another, *separates* from agriculture, becomes independent, and consequently gives rise to an industrial population. Therefore, to discuss commodity economy and capitalism and ignore the law of the relative growth of the industrial population, means to have no notion whatever of the *fundamental* characteristics of the *present* system of social economy.

"It is in the nature of capitalist production to continually reduce the agricultural population as compared with the non-agricultural, because in industry (in the strict sense) the increase of constant capital in relation to variable capital goes hand in hand with an absolute increase, though relative decrease,* in variable capital; on the other hand, in agriculture the variable capital required for the exploitation of a certain plot of land decreases absolutely; it can thus only increase to the extent that new land** is taken into cultivation, but this again requires as a prerequisite a still greater growth of the non-agricultural population" (III, 2, 177).[76]

On this point modern theory takes a view diametrically opposite to that of romanticism with its sentimental

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* From this the reader can judge the wit of Mr. N. —on who, in his *Sketches*, without ceremony transforms the *relative* decrease of variable capital and of the number of workers into an *absolute* one, and from this draws a host of the absurdest conclusions concerning the "shrinking" of the home market, and so forth.

** It was this condition that we had in mind when we said that the internal colonisation of Russia hindered the manifestation of the law of the greater growth of the industrial population. It is enough to recall the difference between Russia's long-settled central areas, where the industrial population grew not so much in the towns as in the factory villages and townships, and, say, Novorossiya, which has been settled in the post-Reform period, and where the towns are growing at a pace comparable with that of America. We hope to deal with this problem in greater detail elsewhere.

complaints. When we understand that something is inevitable, we naturally adopt a totally different attitude towards it and are able to appraise its different aspects. The phenomenon we are now discussing is one of the most profound and most general of the contradictions of the capitalist system. The separation of town from country, their oppositeness, and the exploitation of the countryside by the town—these universal concomitants of developing capitalism—are a necessary product of the preponderance of "commercial wealth" (to use Sismondi's term) over "territorial wealth" (agricultural wealth). Therefore, the predominance of the town over the countryside (economically, politically, intellectually, and in all other respects) is a universal and inevitable thing in all countries where there is commodity production and capitalism, including Russia: only sentimental romanticists can bewail this. Scientific theory, on the contrary, points to the *progressive* aspect given to this contradiction by large-scale industrial capital. "Capitalist production, by collecting the population in great centres, and causing an ever-increasing preponderance of town population ... concentrates the historical motive-power of society"[77] (die geschichtliche Bewegungskraft der Gesellschaft).* If the predominance of the town is inevitable, only the attraction of the population to the towns can neutralise (and, as history shows, does in fact neutralise) the one-sided character of this predominance. If the town necessarily gains itself a privileged position, leaving the village subordinate, undeveloped, helpless and downtrodden, only the influx of the village population into the towns, only this mingling and merging of the agricultural with the non-agricultural population, can lift the rural population out of its helplessness. Therefore, in reply to the reactionary complaints and lamentations of the romanticists, modern theory in

* Cf. also the particularly striking characterisation of the progressive role played by industrial centres in the intellectual development of the population in *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, 1845.[78] That the recognition of this role did not prevent the author of *The Condition of the Working Class in England* from profoundly understanding the contradiction manifested in the separation of town from country, is proved by his polemical book against Dühring.[79]

dicates exactly how this narrowing of the gap between the conditions of life of the agricultural and of the non-agricultural population creates the conditions for eliminating the antithesis between town and country.

The question now is: what is the point of view of our Narodnik economists on this problem? Undoubtedly, that of the sentimental romanticist. Far from understanding that the growth of the industrial population is *necessary* under the present system of social economy, they even *try to close their eyes* to the phenomenon itself, like the bird which hides its head under its wing. As was to be expected, no answer was forthcoming to P. Struve's statement that Mr. N. —on, in his arguments about capitalism, commits a gross error when he asserts that there is an *absolute* diminution of variable capital (*Critical Remarks*, p. 255), and that it is absurd to contrast Russia with the West in respect of the former's smaller percentage of industrial population and at the same time to ignore the *growth* of this percentage as a result of the development of capitalism* (*Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt*,[80] 1893, No. 1). While constantly harping upon the specific features of Russia, the Narodnik economists have not even been able to present the problem of the *actual* specific features of the formation of an industrial population in Russia,** to which we briefly referred above. Such is the Narodniks' *theoretical* attitude towards this problem. Actually, however, when the Narodniks, untrammelled by theoretical doubts, discuss the conditions of the peasants in the post-Reform countryside, they admit that the peasants who are ousted from agriculture migrate to the towns and to factory areas, but they confine themselves to *bewailing* this state of affairs, just as Sismondi *bewailed* it.*** They do not notice at all either the economic

* Let the reader recall that *this is the mistake* made by Sismondi when he said that "happily" eighty per cent of the population of France were agricultural, as if this was a specific feature of some "people's production," and so forth, and not a reflection of lag in capitalist development.

** Cf. Volgin, *The Substantiation of Narodism in the Works of Mr. Vorontsov*. St. Petersburg, 1896, pp. 215-16.

*** In fairness, however, it must be said that Sismondi observes the growth of the industrial population in several countries, and recognises its universal nature and reveals here and there an under-

or (what is perhaps more important) the moral and educational significance of the profound change that has taken place in the conditions of life of the masses of the population in post-Reform Russia—a process which, for the first time, has disturbed the peasantry's settled life, their position of being tied to their localities, given them mobility, and narrowed the gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural labourers, the rural and the urban workers.* All they have derived from it is an occasion for sentimental-romanticist lamentations.

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standing of the fact that this is not merely some "anomaly," and so forth, but a profound change in the people's conditions of life—a change which admittedly has something good in it. At all events, the following observation of his on the harmfulness of the division of labour reveals views far more profound than those of Mr. Mikhailovsky, for example, who invented a general "formula of progress," instead of analysing the definite forms assumed by the division of labour in different formations of social economy and at different periods of development.

"Although the uniformity of the operations to which all the workers' activities in the factories are reduced must obviously harm their mental development (intelligence), nevertheless, it must be said in fairness that according to the observations of the best judges the manufactory workers in England are superior in intelligence education and morals to the agricultural workers" (ouvriers des champs) (1, 397). And Sismondi indicates the cause of this: Vivant sans cesse ensemble, moins épuisés par la fatigue et pouvant se livrer davantage à la conversation, les idées ont circulé plus rapidement entre eux (Living constantly together, they are less fatigued, and having greater opportunities of conversing with each other ideas have spread more rapidly among them.—*Ed.*). But, he adds in a melancholy tone aucun attachement à l'ordre établi (they display no attachment to the established order.—*Ed.*).

* The forms assumed by this process are also different in the central parts of European Russia as compared with the border regions. It is mainly *agricultural* workers from the central black-earth gubernias and partly *non-agricultural* workers from the industrial gubernias who migrate *to the border regions*, where they spread their knowledge of "their trades" and "implant" industry among the purely agricultural population. The migrants *from the industrial region* are *non-agricultural* workers, part of whom scatter to all parts of Russia but most of whom stream into the metropolitan cities and the large industrial centres; and this industrial current, if one may so express it, is so strong, that it creates a shortage of *agricultural* workers, who migrate *to the industrial gubernias* (Moscow, Yaroslavl and other gubernias) from the central black-earth gubernias. See S. A. Korolenko, *Hired Labour*, etc.

IV

PRACTICAL PROPOSALS OF ROMANTICISM

We shall now endeavour to sum up Sismondi's point of view on capitalism (a task which, as the reader remembers, Ephrucy, too, set himself) and examine the practical programme of romanticism.

We have seen that Sismondi's merit lay in his being one of the first *to point* to the contradictions of capitalism. But in pointing to them he not only made no attempt to analyse them and explain their origin, development and trend, but even regarded them as unnatural, or mistaken digressions from the normal. He naïvely protested against these "digressions" with moralising phrases, denunciations, advice to eliminate them, and so forth, as if these contradictions did not express the *real interests* of real groups of the population occupying a definite place in the general system of social economy of the present day. This is the most outstanding feature of romanticism—to regard antagonism of interests (which is deeply rooted in the very system of social economy) as a contradiction or an error of doctrine, system, even of measures, and so forth. Here the narrow outlook of the Kleinbürger,* who stands aloof from developed contradictions and occupies an intermediary, transitional position between the two poles, is combined with a naïve idealism—we are almost ready to say a bureaucratic outlook—which attributes the existence of a social system to the opinions of men (especially of the powers that be) and not vice versa. We shall quote examples of all Sismondi's arguments of this kind.

"In forgetting men for the sake of things, has not England sacrificed the aim to the means?

"The example of England is all the more striking in that this nation is free, enlightened and well governed, and that all her misfortunes are due solely to her pursuit of a *wrong* economic line" (I, p. IX). In general Sismondi uses England as an example to frighten the Continent with—just like our romanticists, who imagine that they are contributing something new and not the oldest kind of rubbish.

* Petty bourgeois.—*Ed.*

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"In drawing my readers' attention to England, I wanted to show ... the history of our own future, if we continue to act on the principles she has followed" (I, p. XVI).

"...The Continental countries deem it necessary to follow England in her career of manufacture" (II, 330). "There is no more astonishing, no more frightful spectacle than that presented by England" (II, 332).*

"It must not be forgotten that wealth is merely that which represents (n'est que la représentation) the pleasures and amenities of life" (here wealth in general is substituted for bourgeois wealth!), "and to create artificial wealth and thereby doom a nation to all that which actually represents poverty and suffering, means taking the name for the thing itself" (prendre le mot pour la chose) (I, 379).

"...As long as nations followed only the dictates (commands, indications) of nature and enjoyed the advantages provided by climate, soil, location and the possession of raw materials, they did not place themselves *in an unnatural position* (une position forcée), they did not seek *apparent wealth* (une opulence apparente) which for the masses becomes real poverty" (I, 411). Bourgeois wealth is only apparent wealth!! "It is dangerous for a nation to close its doors to foreign trade: this compels the nation to engage, in a way (en quelque sorte) *in false activity*, which leads to its ruin" (I, 448).**

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* To show clearly the relation between *European* and Russian romanticism we shall quote, in footnotes, passages from Mr. N. —on. "We have refused to learn the lesson taught us by the course of economic development of Western Europe. We have been so dazzled by the brilliance of the development of capitalism in England, and we are so astonished by the immeasurably more rapid development of capitalism in the American States," etc. (323). As you see, even Mr. N. —on's expressions are not distinguished for their novelty! He is "astonished" by the same thing that "astonished" Sismondi at the beginning of the century.

** "...The economic path we have pursued for the past thirty years has been a wrong one" (281).... "We have too long identified the interests of capitalism with those of the national economy—an extremely fatal blunder.... *The apparent results* of the protection of industry ... *have obscured our vision* to such a degree that we have totally lost sight of the popular-social aspect ... we have lost sight of the price paid for this development, we have forgotten the aim of all production" (298)—except capitalist production!

"...Wages contain a necessary part which must sustain the life, strength and health of those who receive them.... Woe to the government that encroaches upon this part—it sacrifices everything (il sacrifie tout ensemble)—men, and hope of future wealth.... This difference enables us to understand how wrong is the policy of those governments which have reduced the wages of the working classes to the limit required to increase the net revenues of factory owners, merchants and property owners" (II, 169).*

"The time has come at last to ask: whither are we going?" (où l'on veut aller) (II, 328).

"Their separation" (the separation of the property-owning class from the working people), "the antagonism of their interests, is the result of the present-day artificial organisation which we have given human society.... The natural order of social progress did not by any means tend to separate men from things, or wealth from labour; in the rural districts the property owner could remain a tiller of the soil; in the towns the capitalist could remain an artisan; the separation of the working class from the leisured class was not absolutely indispensable for the existence of society, or for production; we introduced it for the greatest benefit of all; it devolves upon us (il nous appartient) to regulate it so that this benefit may be really achieved" (II, 348).

"Having been put in opposition to each other, the producers" (i.e., the masters and the workers) "were compelled to proceed along a path *diametrically opposed* to the interests of society.... In this constant struggle to reduce wages, the public interest, in which, however, all participate, is forgotten by all" (II, 359-60). And this too is preceded by mention of the paths bequeathed by history: "At the beginning of social life *every man possesses capital*, through which he applies his labour, and nearly all artisans live on

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"Disdain for one's own past ... the implanting of capitalism" ... (283).... "We ... have resorted to all means to implant capitalism"... (323).... "We have overlooked" ... (ibid.).

* "...We have not hindered the development of the capitalist forms of production in spite of the fact that they are based upon the expropriation of the peasantry" (323).

a revenue consisting equally of profit and wages" (II, 359).*

Enough, it seems.... We can be certain that a reader who is familiar neither with Sismondi nor with Mr. N. —on will find it difficult to say which of the points of view of the two romanticists, the one in the footnote or the one in the text, is the more primitive and naïve.

Sismondi's practical proposals, to which he devoted so much space in his *Nouveaux Principes*, fully conform to this.

The difference between us and Adam Smith, says Sismondi in the very first book of his work, is that "we nearly always call for that very governmental interference which Adam Smith rejected" (I, 52). "The state does not rectify distribution" (I, 80).... "The legislator could ensure the poor man some guarantees against universal competition" (I, 81). "Production must be commensurate with social revenue, and those who encourage unlimited production without taking the trouble to ascertain what this revenue is, are pushing the nation to ruin, though they think they are opening to it the road to wealth (le chemin des richesses)" (I, 82). "When the progress of wealth is gradual (gradué), when it is proportionate to itself, when none of its parts develops with excessive rapidity, it disseminates universal prosperity.... Perhaps it is the duty of governments to restrain (ralentir!!) this movement in order to regulate it" (I, 409-10).

Of the enormous historical importance of the development of the productive forces of society, which takes place precisely through these contradictions and disproportions, Sismondi has not the faintest idea!

"If the government exercises a regulating and moderating influence upon the pursuit of wealth, it can be infinite-

* "Instead of adhering firmly to our age-old traditions; instead of developing the principle of a close tie between the means of production and the direct producer ... instead of increasing the productivity of its (*the peasantry*'s) labour by concentrating the means of production in its hands ... instead of that, we have taken the *absolutely opposite* path" (322-23). "We have mistaken the development of capitalism for the development of the whole of people's production ... we *have overlooked* the fact that the development of one ... can only proceed at the expense of the other" (323). Our italics.

ly beneficial" (I, 413). "Some of the measures to regulate trade which are nowadays condemned by public opinion, although meriting condemnation as a stimulus to industry, may, perhaps, be justified as a curb" (I, 415).

These arguments of Sismondi's already reveal his astonishing lack of historical sense: he has not the faintest idea that liberation from medieval regulation constituted the entire historical significance of the period contemporary to him. He does not realise that his arguments bring grist to the mill of the defenders of the ancien régime, who at that time were still so strong even in France, not to speak of the other countries of the West-European continent where they ruled.*

Thus, the starting-point of Sismondi's practical proposals is—tutelage, restraint, regulation.

This point of view follows quite naturally and inevitably from the whole of Sismondi's range of ideas. He lived at the very time when large-scale machine industry was taking its first steps on the European continent, when there began that sharp and abrupt change of all social relations under the influence of machines (note, under the influence of machine industry, and not of "capitalism" in general),** a change which is known in economic science as the *industrial revolution*.*** Here is how it is described by one of the first economists able fully to appreciate the profundity of the revolution which created modern European societies in place of the patriarchal semi-medieval societies:

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* Ephrucy discerned "civic courage" in these regrets and longings of Sismondi (No. 7, p. 139). So the expression of sentimental longings calls for civic courage!! Open any high-school textbook on history and you will read that in the first quarter of the nineteenth century the West-European countries were organised on lines which the science of constitutional law designates by the term: Polizeistaat (police state.—*Ed.*). You will read that the historical task not only of that quarter, but also of the subsequent quarter of the century, was to combat it. You will understand then that Sismondi's point of view smacks of the dull-wittedness of the small French peasant of the Restoration period; that Sismondi exemplifies the combination of petty-bourgeois sentimental romanticism with phenomenal civic immaturity.

** Capitalism in England dates not from the end of the eighteenth century but from a far earlier period.

*** These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

"Such, in brief, is the history of English industrial development in the past sixty years" (this was written in 1844), "a history which has no counterpart in the annals of humanity. Sixty, eighty years ago, England was a country like every other, with small towns, few and simple industries, and a thin but proportionally large agricultural population. Today it is a country like *no* other, with a capital of two and a half million inhabitants; with vast manufacturing cities; with an industry that supplies the world, and produces almost everything by means of the most complex machinery; with an industrious, intelligent, dense population, of which two-thirds are employed in trade and commerce, and composed of classes wholly different; forming, in fact, with other customs and other needs, a different nation from the England of those days. The industrial revolution is of the same importance for England as the political revolution for France, and the philosophical revolution for Germany; and the difference between England in 1760 and in 1844 is at least as great as that between France, under the ancien régime and during the revolution of July."*

This was the complete "break-up" of all the old, deep-rooted relationships, whose economic basis had been small production. Naturally, with his reactionary, petty-bourgeois point of view, Sismondi could not understand the significance of this "break-up." Naturally, he first of all, and most of all, wished, urged, pleaded, demanded that this "break-up should be stopped."**

But how should this "break-up be stopped"? First of all, of course, by supporting the people's ... that is to say, "patriarchal production," the peasantry and small farming in general. Sismondi devotes a whole chapter (t. II, l. VII, ch. VIII) to the subject of "how the government should protect the population from the consequences of competition."

"In relation to the agricultural population, the government's general task is to ensure those who work (à ceux qui travaillent) a part of the property, or to support (favoriser)

* Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*."[81]

** We make so bold as to hope that Mr. N. —on will not resent our borrowing this expression from him (p. 345), as we think it extremely apt and characteristic.

what we have called patriarchal agriculture in preference to all other kinds" (II, 340).

"A Statute of Elizabeth, which was disregarded, prohibited the building of *cottages** in England unless each was allotted a four-acre plot of land. Had this law been obeyed, no day labourer could have married without receiving a *cottage*,* and no *cottager** would have been reduced to extreme poverty. This would have been a step forward (c'est quelque chose), but it would not have been enough; under the English climate, the peasant population would have lived in want on four acres per family. Today, most of the English cottagers have only one and a half to two acres of land, for which they pay a fairly high rent.... The law should compel ... the landlord, when he distributes his field among many *cottagers*,* to give each one enough land to live on" (II, 342-43).**

The reader will see that the proposals of romanticism are absolutely *identical* with the proposals and programme of the Narodniks: they too ignore *actual* economic development, and in the epoch of large-scale machine industry,

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* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** "Adhere to our age-old traditions;" (is it not patriotism?) "... develop our inherited principle of close connection between the means of production and the direct producers"... (Mr. N. —on, 322). "We have turned from the path we have followed for many centuries we have begun to eliminate production based on the close connection between the direct producer and the means of production, on the close connection between agriculture and manufacturing industry, and have based our economic policy on the principle of developing capitalist production, which is based on the alienation of the means of production from the direct producers, with all its accompanying disasters, from which Western Europe is now suffering" (281). Let the reader compare this with the above-quoted view of the "West Europeans" themselves on these "disasters from which Western Europe is suffering," and so forth "The principle ... of allotting land to the peasants or ... providing the producers with implements of labour" (p. 2) ... "the-age old foundations of the people's life" (75).... "Hence, we have in these figures" (i.e., figures showing "the minimum amount of land needed under present economic conditions to ensure the material security of the rural population") "one of the elements for the solution of the economic problem, but only one of the elements" (65). As you see the West-European romanticists were no less fond than the Russian of seeking in "age-old traditions" "sanctions for people's production.

fierce competition and conflict of interests they fatuously presume the preservation of conditions which reproduce the patriarchal conditions of the hoary past.

V

THE REACTIONARY CHARACTER OF ROMANTICISM

It goes without saying that Sismondi could not but realise how actual development was proceeding. Therefore, in demanding "encouragement for small farming" (II, 355), he plainly said that it was necessary "to direct agriculture along a road diametrically opposite to that which it is following in England today" (II, 354-55).*

"Happily, England possesses means for doing a great deal for her rural poor by dividing among them her vast common lands (ses immenses communaux).... If her common lands were divided up into free allotments (en propriétés franches) of twenty to thirty acres they" (the English) "would see the revival of that proud and independent class of countrymen, the *yeomanry*,** whose almost complete extinction they now deplore" (II, 357-58).

The "plans" of romanticism are depicted as very easily realisable—precisely because they ignore real interests, and this is the essence of romanticism. "Such a proposal" (to allot small plots of land to day labourers and to impose the duty of guardianship over the latter upon the landowners) "will probably rouse the indignation of the big landowners, who alone enjoy legislative power today in England; nevertheless, it is a just one.... The big landowners alone need the services of day labourers; they created them—let them, therefore, maintain them" (II, 357).

One is not surprised to read such naïve things written at the beginning of the century: the "theory" of romanticism conforms to the primitive state of capitalism in general, which conditioned such a primitive point of view. At that time there was still conformity between the actual

* Cf. Mr. V. V.'s Narodnik programme "to drag history along another line." Cf. Volgin, loc. cit., p. 181.

** The word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

development of capitalism—the theoretical conception of it—and the attitude towards capitalism, and Sismondi, at all events, appears as a writer who is consistent and true to himself.

"We have already shown," says Sismondi, "the protection that this class" (i.e., the class of artisans) "once found in the establishment of guilds and corporations (des jurandes et des maîtrises).... We are not proposing that their strange and restrictive organisation should be restored.... But the legislator should set himself the aim of increasing the reward for industrial labour, of extricating those engaged in industry from the precarious (précaire) position in which they are living and, finally, of making it easier for them to acquire what they call a *status** (un état).... Today, the workers are born and die workers, whereas formerly, the status of worker was merely the preliminary stage, the first rung to a higher status. It is this ability to advance (cette faculté progressive) that it is important to restore. Employers must be given an incentive to promote their workers to a higher status; to arrange it so that a man who hires himself to work in a manufactory shall actually start by working simply for wages, but that he should always have the hope, provided his conduct is good, of sharing in the profits of the enterprise" (II, 344-45).

It would be difficult to express the viewpoint of the petty bourgeois more strikingly! The guilds are Sismondi's ideal, and the reservation he makes about the undesirability of restoring them obviously means only that the principle, the idea of the guilds should be taken (exactly as the Narodniks want to take the principle, the idea of the village community, and not the contemporary fiscal association called the village community) and that its monstrous medieval features should be discarded. The absurdity of Sismondi's plan is not his wholesale defence of the guilds, nor his wanting to restore them in their entirety—he did not set out to do that. The absurdity lies in his making his model an *association* which arose out of the local artisans' narrow, primitive need for organisation, and wanted to apply this yardstick, this model, to capitalist society, whose organis-

* Author's italics.

ing, socialising element is large-scale machine industry, which breaks down medieval barriers and obliterates differences of place, origin and trade. Appreciating the need for association, for organisation in general, in one form or another, the romanticist takes as a model the association which satisfied the narrow need for organisation in patriarchal, immobile society, and wants to apply it to a totally transformed society, a society with a mobile population, and with labour socialised within the bounds not of a village community, or a corporation, but of a whole country, and even beyond the bounds of a single country.*

It is this mistake that quite justly earns for the romanticist the designation of *reactionary*, although this term is not used to indicate a desire simply to restore medieval institutions, but the attempt to measure the new society with the old patriarchal yardstick, the desire to find a model in the old order and traditions, which are totally unsuited to the changed economic conditions.

Ephrucy understood nothing of this circumstance. He understood the characterisation of Sismondi's theory as reactionary in the crude, vulgar sense. Ephrucy was abashed.... What do you mean? he argued, how can Sismondi be called a reactionary when he plainly says that he does not want to restore the guilds? And Ephrucy decided that it was

* An exactly similar mistake is made by the Narodniks in relation to another association (*the village community*), which satisfied the narrow need of association of local peasants linked to each other by the joint ownership of land, pastures, etc. (but chiefly by the joint rule of the landlords and bureaucrats), but which does not in any way satisfy the needs of the commodity economy and capitalism that breaks down all local, social-estate and other such barriers and introduces a profound economic antagonism of interests *within* the village community. The need for association, for organisation, has not diminished in capitalist society; on the contrary in has grown immeasurably. But it is utterly absurd to use the old yardstick for the purpose of satisfying this need of the new society. This new society is already demanding, firstly, that the association shall not be according to locality, social estate, or other such category; secondly, that its starting-point shall be the difference in status and interests that has been created by capitalism and by the differentiation of the peasantry. Local, social-estate association, on the other hand, which links together peasants who differ sharply from each other in economic status and interests, now, because of its *compulsory nature*, becomes *harmful* for the peasants themselves and for social development as a whole.

unfair to "accuse" Sismondi of being "retrogressive," that, on the contrary, Sismondi's attitude "to the guild organisation was correct" and that he "fully appreciated its historical importance" (No. 7, p. 147), as has been proved, he says, by the historical researches of such and such professors into the good sides of the guild organisation.

Quasi-scientific writers often possess an amazing ability not to see the wood for the trees! Sismondi's point of view on the guilds is characteristic and important precisely because he links his practical proposals with them.* *That is why* his theory is described as *reactionary*. But Ephrucy begins to talk without rhyme or reason about modern historical works on the guilds!

The result of these inappropriate and quasi-scientific arguments was that Ephrucy by-passed the very substance of the question, namely: is it or is it not fair to describe Sismondi's theory as reactionary? He overlooked the very thing that is most important—Sismondi's *point of view*. "I have been accused," says Sismondi, "of being an enemy of social progress in political economy, a partisan of barbarous and coercive institutions. No, I do not want what has already been, but I want something better than the present. I cannot judge the present otherwise than by comparing it with the past, but I am far from wishing to restore the old ruins when I refer to them in order to demonstrate the eternal needs of society" (II, 433). The *wishes* of the romanticists are very good (as are those of the Narodniks). Their recognition of the contradictions of capitalism places them above the blind optimists who deny the existence of these contradictions. And it is not because he wanted to return to the Middle Ages that he was regarded as a reactionary, but because, in his practical proposals, he "compared the present with the past" and not with the future; because he "demonstrated the eternal needs of society"** *by referring* to "ruins" and not *by referring* to the trends of modern development; It was this petty-bourgeois viewpoint of Sismondi's which sharply distinguishes him from the other authors, who also demon-

* See above, at least the title of the chapter from which we quoted the arguments about the guilds (quoted also by Ephrucy: p 147).

** The fact that he *demonstrated* the existence of these needs places him, we repeat, far above the narrow-minded bourgeois economists.

strated, in his time and after, the "eternal needs of society," that Ephrucy failed to understand.

This mistake of Ephrucy's was due to the very same narrow interpretation of the terms "petty-bourgeois" doctrine and "reactionary" doctrine referred to above in connection with the first of these terms. They by no means imply the selfish greed of the small shopkeeper, or a desire to halt social development, to turn back: they simply indicate the given author's *mistaken* point of view, his limited understanding and narrow outlook, which prompt the choice of means (for the achievement of very good aims) that cannot be effective in practice, and that can satisfy only the small producer or be of service to the defenders of the past. Sismondi, for example, is not at all a fanatical advocate of small *proprietorship*. He understands the need for organisation and for association no less than our contemporary Narodniks do. He expresses the wish that "half the profits" of industrial enterprises should be "distributed among the associated workers" (II, 346). He openly advocates a "system of association" under which all the "achievements of production benefit the one engaged in it" (II, 438). In speaking of the relation between his doctrine and the doctrines, then well known, of Owen, Fourier, Thompson and Muiron, Sismondi says: "I, like they, want to see association instead of mutual opposition among those who produce a given article in common. But I do not think that the means which they proposed for the achievement of this object could ever lead to it" (II, 365).

The difference between Sismondi and these authors is precisely one of *viewpoint*. It is quite natural, therefore, that Ephrucy, who does not understand this viewpoint, should completely misinterpret Sismondi's attitude to these authors.

"That Sismondi exercised too little influence upon his contemporaries," we read in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 57, "that the social reforms he proposed were not put into effect, is due mainly to the fact that he was a long way ahead of his time. He wrote at a time when the bourgeoisie was enjoying its honeymoon.... Naturally, under these circumstances, the voice of a man who was demanding social reforms could not but remain a voice crying in the wilder-

ness. But we know that posterity has not treated him much better. This, perhaps, is due to Sismondi's having been, as we have already said above, an author who wrote in a transitional period; although he wanted big changes, he could not completely discard the past. Moderate people therefore thought he was too radical, whereas in the opinion of the representatives of more extreme trends, he was too moderate."

Firstly, to say that Sismondi was "ahead of his time" with the reforms he proposed indicates a complete misunderstanding of the very substance of the doctrine of Sismondi, who himself stated that he compared the present with the past. One must indeed be infinitely short-sighted (or infinitely partial to romanticism) to overlook the general spirit and general significance of Sismondi's theory only because Sismondi favoured factory legislation,* and so forth.

Secondly, Ephrucy thus assumes that the difference between Sismondi and the other authors is only in the *degree of radicalness* of the reforms they proposed: they went further, but he did not entirely discard the past.

That is not the point. The difference between Sismondi and these authors is a much deeper one—it is not that some went further and others were timid,** but that they regarded the *very character* of reforms from two *diametrically opposite* points of view. Sismondi demonstrated the "eternal needs of society." So, too, did these authors. Sismondi was a utopian, he based his proposals on an abstract idea and not on real interests. So were these authors; they also based their plans on an abstract idea. But it was the *character* of their respective plans that differed entirely, because they

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* But even on this subject Sismondi was not "ahead" of his day, for he merely approved of what was already being practised in England, but was unable to understand the connection that existed between these changes and large-scale machine industry and the progressive historical work it was doing.

** We do not wish to say that there is no difference in this respect between the authors referred to, but it *does not explain the point* and misrepresents the relation between Sismondi and the other authors: it is made to appear that they held the same point of view and differed only in the radicalness and consistency of the conclusions they drew. But the point is not that Sismondi "did *not* go" *so far*, but that he "went" *back*, whereas the other authors referred to "went" *forward*.

regarded modern economic development, which presented the question of "eternal needs," from *diametrically opposite* angles. The authors referred to anticipated the future; with the foresight of genius they divined the trend that would be taken by the "break-up" which the machine industry of that period was effecting before their eyes. They looked in the direction in which development was in fact proceeding; they, indeed, *were ahead* of that development. Sismondi, however, *turned his back* on this development; his utopia did not anticipate the future, but restored the past; he did not look forward, he looked backward, and dreamed of "stopping the break-up," that very "break-up" *from which* the authors mentioned deduced their utopias.* That is why Sismondi's utopia is regarded—and quite rightly—as reactionary. The grounds for this characterisation, we repeat once again, *are merely* that Sismondi did not understand the progressive significance of that "break-up" of the old semi-medieval, patriarchal social relations in the West-European countries which at the end of last century large-scale machine industry began to effect.

This specific viewpoint of Sismondi's can be discerned even in his arguments about "association" in general. "I want," he says, "the ownership of the manufactories (la propriété des manufactures) to be shared among a large number of medium capitalists, and not concentrated in the hands of one man who owns many millions..." (II, 365). The viewpoint of the petty bourgeois is still more strikingly reflected in the following utterance: "Not the poor class, but the day-labourer class should be abolished; it should be brought back to the propertied class" (II, 308) To be "*brought back*" to the propertied class—these words express the sum and substance of Sismondi's doctrine!

It goes without saying that Sismondi himself must have felt that his fine wishes were impracticable, he must have

* "Robert Owen," says Marx, "the father of Co-operative Factories and Stores, but who ... in no way shared the illusions of his followers with regard to the bearing (Tragweite) of these isolated elements of transformation, not only practically made the factory system the sole foundation of his experiments, but also declared that system to be theoretically the starting-point of the 'social revolution.'"[82]

been conscious that they were incompatible with the contemporary conflict of interests. "The task of reuniting the interests of those who associate in the same process of production (qui concourent à la même production) ... is undoubtedly a difficult one, but I do not think this difficulty is as great as is supposed" (II, 450).* The consciousness of this incompatibility of his desires and aspirations and the actual conditions and their development naturally stimulates the desire to prove that it is "not yet too late ... to go back," and so forth. The romanticist tries to base himself upon the *undeveloped state* of the contradictions of the existing system, upon the *backwardness* of the country. "The nations have won a system of freedom into which we have entered" (this refers to the fall of feudalism); "but at the time they destroyed the yoke that they had borne for so long, the labourers (les hommes de peine) were not bereft of all property. In the rural districts they possessed land for a half share in the crops, were chinsh peasants (censitaires),[83] and tenant farmers (ils se trouverent associés à la propriété du sol). In the towns, as members of corporations and trade guilds (métiers) which they formed for mutual protection, they were independent tradesmen (ils se trouverent associés à la propriété de leur industrie). Only in our days, only in the most recent times (c'est dans ce moment même) is the progress of wealth and competition breaking up all these associations. But this break-up (révolution) is not yet half accomplished" (II, 437).

"True, only one nation is in this unnatural position today; only in one nation do we see this permanent contrast between apparent wealth (richesse apparente) and the frightful poverty of a tenth of the population, which is forced to live on public charity. But this nation, so worthy of emulation in other respects, so dazzling even in its errors, has, by its example, tempted all the statesmen of the Continent. And if these reflections cannot now benefit her, I shall at least, I think, render a service to mankind and to my fellow

* "The task which Russian society has to fulfil is becoming more and more complicated every day. Capitalism is extending its conquests day after day..." (ibid.).

countrymen by pointing to the danger of the path she is following, and by showing from her own experience that to base political economy on the principle of unrestricted competition means to sacrifice the interests of mankind to the simultaneous operation of all personal passions" (II, 368).* That is how Sismondi concludes his *Nouveaux Principes*.

The general significance of Sismondi and of his theory was distinctly formulated by Marx in the following comment, which first outlines the conditions of West-European economic life that gave rise to such a theory (and did so exactly at the time when capitalism was only just beginning to create large-scale machine industry there), and then gives an appraisal of it.**

"The medieval burgesses and the small peasant proprietors were the precursors of the modern bourgeoisie. In those countries which are but little developed, industrially and commercially, these two classes still vegetate side by side with the rising bourgeoisie.

"In countries where modern civilisation has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

"In countries like France, where the peasants constitute far more than half of the population, it was natural that writers who sided with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie should use, in their criticism of the bourgeois regime, the standard of the peasant and petty bourgeois, and from the standpoint of these intermediate classes should take up the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* "Russian society has to fulfil a great task, one that is extremely difficult but not impossible—to develop the productive forces of the population in such a form as to benefit not an insignificant minority, but the entire people" (N. —on, 343).

** Cf. quotations in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 57, and also Mr. N. —on 's article in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 6, p. 94.

cudgels for the working class. Thus arose petty-bourgeois Socialism. Sismondi was the head of this school, not only in France but also in England.

"This doctrine dissected with great acuteness the contradictions in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects of machinery and division of labour; the concentration of capital and land in a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy in production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities.*

"In its positive aims, however, this form of Socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange, within the framework of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and utopian.

"Its last words are: corporate guilds for manufacture; patriarchal relations in agriculture."**

We tried to prove that this description is correct as we examined each separate item of Sismondi's doctrine. Here let us merely note the curious trick employed by Ephrucy to crown all the blunders he made in his exposition, criticism and appraisal of romanticism. The reader will remember that at the very beginning of his article (in

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* Ephrucy quotes this passage in No. 8 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, p. 57 (from the beginning of this paragraph).

** Cf. *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 6, p. 88, article referred to. In the translation of this passage Mr. N. —on is guilty of two mistranslations and of one omission. Instead of "petty-bourgeois" and "petty-peasant" he translates "narrow-burgher and "narrow-peasant." Instead of "cudgels for the workers" he translates "cudgels for the people," although in the original we have the word Arbeiter. (In the English translation of 1888, authorized by Engels, it is "working class."—*Ed.*) He omitted the words: "were bound to be exploded" (gesprengt werden mussten).[84]

Russkoye Bogatstvo, No. 7), Ephrucy stated that it was "unfair" and "incorrect" to include Sismondi among the reactionaries and utopians (loc. cit., p. 138). To prove this thesis Ephrucy firstly contrived to say nothing at all about the main thing—the connection between Sismondi's *point of view* and the position and interests of a special class in capitalist society, the small producers; secondly, in examining the various tenets of Sismondi's theory Ephrucy in part presented his attitude to modern theory in a totally wrong light, as we have shown above, and in part, simply ignored the modern theory and defended Sismondi with references to German scholars who "went no further" than Sismondi; thirdly and lastly, Ephrucy was pleased to sum up his appraisal of Sismondi in the following way: "Our (!) opinion of the importance of Simonde de Sismondi," he says, "we can (!!) sum up in the following words" of a German economist (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 57), and then follows the passage indicated above, i.e., *only a part* of the characterisation given by that economist; but the part which explains the connection between Sismondi's theory and a special class in modern society, and the part where the final conclusion is drawn that Sismondi is reactionary and utopian, are omitted! More than that. Ephrucy did not confine himself to taking a *fragment* of the comment, which gives no idea of the comment *as a whole*, and thereby presenting this economist's attitude towards Sismondi in a totally wrong light; he tried, further, to embellish Sismondi, while pretending that he was merely conveying the opinion of that economist.

"Let us add to this," says Ephrucy, "that in some of his theoretical views, Sismondi is the predecessor of the most outstanding modern economists*: let us recall his views on revenue from capital and on crises, his classification of national revenue, and so forth" (ibid.). Thus, instead of *supplementing* this German economist's reference to Sismondi's merits with the same economist's reference to Sismondi's petty-bourgeois point of view, and to the reactionary character of his utopia, Ephrucy *supplements* the list of Sismondi's *merits with precisely those parts of his theory* (such as his

* Such as Adolph Wagner?—*K. T.*

"classification of the national revenue") *which*, in the opinion of this same economist, contain *not a single scientific word*.

We may be told: Ephrucy may not in the least share the opinion that the explanation of economic doctrines must be sought in economic reality; he may be profoundly convinced that A. Wagner's theory of the "classification of the national revenue" is the "most outstanding" theory. We are quite willing to believe this. But what right had he to flirt with the theory which the Narodnik gentlemen are so fond of saying they "agree" with, when in fact, he completely misunderstood that theory's attitude to Sismondi, and did everything possible (and even impossible) to present this attitude in a totally wrong light?

We would not have devoted so much space to this question had it concerned only Ephrucy—an author whose name we meet in Narodnik literature perhaps for the first time. It is not Ephrucy's personality, nor even his views, that are important for us, but *the Narodniks' attitude in geneal towards the theory of the famous German economist which, they claim, they agree with*. Ephrucy is by no means an exception. On the contrary, his is quite a typical case, and to prove this we have throughout drawn a parallel between Sismondi's viewpoint and theory and Mr. N. —on's viewpoint and theory.* The similarity proved to be complete: the theoretical views, the viewpoint regarding capitalism, and the character of the practical conclusions and proposals of both authors proved to be *identical*. And as Mr. N. —on's views may be described as the last word in Narodism, we have a right to conclude that *the economic theory of the Narodniks is but a Russian variety of European romanticism*.

It goes without saying that Russia's specific historic and economic features, on the one hand, and her incomparably greater backwardness, on the other, lend Narodism particularly marked distinctive features. But these distinctions are no more than those between varieties within the same

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* Mr. V. V., another Narodnik economist, is quite in accord with Mr. N. —on on the extremely important questions referred to above, and differs from him only in that his point of view is even more primitive.

species and, therefore, do not disprove the *similarity* between Narodism and petty-bourgeois romanticism.

Perhaps the most outstanding and striking distinction is the effort the Narodnik economists make to disguise their romanticism by stating that they "agree" with modern theory and by *referring* to it as often as possible, although this theory sharply disapproves of romanticism and has grown up in the course of a fierce struggle against petty-bourgeois doctrines of every variety.

The analysis of Sismondi's theory is of special interest precisely because it provides an opportunity to examine the *general methods* used in wearing this disguise.

We have seen that *both* romanticism and the modern theory *indicate the same* contradictions existing in contemporary social economy. The Narodniks take advantage of this when they *point* to the fact that modern theory recognises the contradictions which manifest themselves in crises, in the quest for a foreign market, in the growth of production simultaneously with a decline in consumption, in protective tariffs, in the harmful effects of machine industry, and so on, and so forth. And the Narodniks are quite right: modern theory does indeed *recognise all these* contradictions, which romanticism also recognised. But the question is: has a single Narodnik ever asked wherein lies the difference between the scientific analysis of these contradictions, which reduces them to the different interests that spring from the present system of economy, and the utilisation of these references to contradictions merely in order to utter good wishes? No, we do not find a single Narodnik who has examined this question of the difference between the modern theory and romanticism. The Narodniks likewise utilise their references to contradictions merely in order to utter good wishes.

The next question is: has a single Narodnik ever asked wherein lies the difference between the sentimental criticism of capitalism and the scientific, dialectical criticism of it? Not one of them has raised this question of the second major difference between modern theory and romanticism. Not one of them has considered it necessary to use the present development of social and economic relations as the criterion of his theories (yet it is the

application of this criterion that constitutes the chief distinguishing feature of scientific criticism).

And the last question is: has a single Narodnik ever asked wherein lies the difference between the viewpoint of romanticism, which idealises small production and bewails the "break-up" of its foundations by "capitalism," and the viewpoint of the modern theory, which takes large-scale capitalist machine production as its point of departure and proclaims this "break-up of foundations" to be progressive? (We employ this generally accepted Narodnik term. It vividly describes the process of change in social relations resulting from the influence of large-scale machine industry which *everywhere*, and not only in Russia, has taken place with an abruptness and sharpness that have astonished public opinion.) Again no. Not a single Narodnik has asked himself this question, not one of them has attempted to apply to the Russian "break-up" those yardsticks which made people acknowledge the West-European "break-up" as progressive. They all weep about the foundations, advise that this break-up be stopped, and assure us through their tears that this is the "modern theory."...

The comparison of Sismondi's theory and their "theory," which they have presented as a new and independent solution of the problem of capitalism based on the last word of West-European science and life, clearly demonstrates to what a primitive stage of the development of capitalism and public thought the origin of that theory belongs. But the point is not that this theory is old. There are quite a few very old European theories that would be very new for Russia. The point is that even *when that theory appeared, it was a petty-bourgeois and reactionary theory.*

VI

CORN TARIFFS IN ENGLAND AS APPRAISED BY ROMANTICISM AND BY SCIENTIFIC THEORY

We shall supplement our comparison between the theory of the romanticism on the main points of contemporary economics and the modern theory with a comparison between their treatment of a certain *practical* problem. Such a comparison will be all the more interesting because, on the one

hand, this practical problem is one of the biggest, most fundamental problems of capitalism, and on the other hand, because the two most outstanding exponents of these hostile theories have expressed their opinion on this subject.

We are referring to the *Corn Laws* in England and their repeal.[85] In the second quarter of the present century this problem deeply interested not only English but also Continental economists; they all realised that this was by no means a specific problem relating to tariff policy, but the general problem of Free Trade, of free competition, of the "destiny of capitalism." It was a matter of crowning the edifice of capitalism by giving full effect to free competition; of clearing the road for the completion of that "break-up" which large-scale machine industry began in England at the end of the last century; of removing the obstacles that were hindering this "break-up" in *agriculture*. It was *in this way* that the two Continental economists of whom we intend to speak viewed the problem.

In the second edition of his *Nouveaux Principes* Sismondi added a chapter specially devoted to "laws governing trade in grain" (l. III, ch. X).

First of all, he emphasises the urgency of the problem: "Half the English people today are demanding the repeal of the Corn Laws, demanding it with extreme irritation against those who support them; but the other half are demanding that they be retained, and cry out indignantly against those who want them repealed" (I, 251).

In examining the problem, Sismondi points out that the interests of the English farmers demanded corn tariffs to ensure them a *remunerating price*.* The interests of the manufacturers, however, demanded the repeal of the Corn Laws, because the manufactories could not exist without foreign markets, and the further development of English exports was being retarded by the laws, which restricted imports: "The manufactory owners added that the glut in the market was the result of these same Corn Laws; that wealthy people on the Continent could not buy their goods because they could not find a market for their corn" (I, 254).**

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** One-sided as may be this explanation given by the English manufacturers, who ignore the deeper causes of crises and their inev-

"The opening of the market to foreign corn will probably ruin the English landowners and reduce all rents to an infinitely low price. This, undoubtedly, is a great calamity, but it is not an injustice" (I, 254). And Sismondi proceeds to argue in the naïvest manner that the revenues of the landowners should be commensurate with the service (sic!!) they render "society" (capitalist?), and so forth "The farmers," continues Sismondi, "will withdraw their capital, or part at least, from agriculture."

This argument of Sismondi's (and he contents himself with this argument) reveals the main flaw in romanticism, which does not pay sufficient attention to the process of economic development that is actually taking place. We have seen that Sismondi himself points to the gradual development and growth of capitalist farming in England. But he hastens to denounce this process instead of studying its causes. It is only this haste, the desire to thrust his innocent wishes upon history, that can explain the fact that Sismondi overlooks the general trend of capitalist development in agriculture and the inevitable *acceleration of this process* with the repeal of the Corn Laws, i.e., the capitalist progress of agriculture instead of its decline, which Sismondi prophesies.

But Sismondi remains true to himself. He had no sooner approached the contradiction inherent in this capitalist process than he immediately set about naïvely "refuting" it in his endeavour to prove at all costs that the path being followed by the "English fatherland" was a wrong one.

"What will the day labourer do?... Work will stop, the fields will be converted into pastures.... What will become of the 540,000 families who will be denied work?* Even assum-

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itability when the expansion of the market is slight, it, nevertheless, undoubtedly contains the absolutely correct idea that the realisation of the product by its sale abroad demands, *on the whole*, corresponding imports from abroad.

We bring this explanation of the English manufacturers to the notice of those economists who brush aside the problem of the realisation of the product in capitalist society with the profound remark: "They will sell abroad."

* To "prove" the unsoundness of capitalism, Sismondi forthwith makes an approximate calculation (such as our Russian romanticist, Mr. V. V., for example, is so fond of doing). Six hundred thou-

ing that they will be fit for any kind of industrial work, is there, at the present time, an industry capable of absorbing them?... Can a government be found that will voluntarily subject half the nation it governs to such a crisis?... Will those to whom the agriculturists are thus sacrificed benefit by it to any extent? After all, these agriculturists are the nearest and most reliable consumers of English manufactures. The cessation of their consumption would strike industry a blow more fatal than the closing of one of the biggest foreign markets" (255-56). The notorious "shrinking of the home market" appears upon the scene. "How much will the manufactories lose by the cessation of the consumption of the whole class of English agriculturists, who constitute nearly half the nation? How much will the manufactories lose by the cessation of the consumption of wealthy people, whose revenues from agriculture will be almost wiped out?" (267). The romanticist moves heaven and earth to prove to the manufacturers that the contradictions inherent in the development of their industry, and of their wealth, merely express their error, their short-sightedness. And to "convince" the manufacturers of the "danger" of capitalism, Sismondi dilates on the threatening competition of Polish and Russian grain (pp. 257-61). He resorts to every possible argument; he even wants to touch the pride of Englishmen. "What will become of England's honour if the Emperor of Russia is in a position, whenever be wishes, to obtain some concession or other from her, to starve her by closing the Baltic ports?" (268). Let the reader recall how Sismondi tried to prove that the "apologists of the money power" were wrong, by contending that it was quite easy to cheat when selling.... Sismondi wants to "refute" the theoretical interpreters of capitalist farming by arguing that the rich farmers cannot withstand the competition of the wretched peasants (quoted above), and in the end arrives at his favourite conclusion, evidently convinced that he has proved that the

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sand families, he says, are engaged in agriculture. When the fields are converted into pastures, no more than a tenth of this number will be "wanted." ... The less the understanding of the process in all its complexity shown by this author, the more eagerly he resorts to childish "rule of thumb" calculations.

path being followed by the "English fatherland" is a "wrong one." "The example of England shows us that this practice" (the development of money economy, to which Sismondi contrasts l'habitude de se fournir soi-même, "the habit of providing for oneself") "is not without its dangers" (263). "The very system of economy" (namely, capitalist farming) "is bad, rests on a dangerous foundation, and this is what one should try to change" (266).

The concrete problem evoked by the conflict of definite interests in a definite system of economy is thus submerged in a flood of innocent wishes! But the interested parties themselves raised the issue so sharply that to confine oneself to such a "solution" (as romanticism does on all other problems) became utterly impossible.

"But what is to be done?" Sismondi asks in despair. "Open England's ports, or close them? Doom the manufacturing or the rural workers of England to starvation and death? It is, indeed, a dreadful question; the position in which the English Cabinet finds itself is one of the most delicate that statesmen can possibly face" (260). And Sismondi again and again reverts to the "general conclusion" that the system of capitalist farming is "dangerous," that it is "dangerous to subordinate the whole of agriculture to a system of speculation." But "how it is possible, in England, to take measures, effective but at the same time gradual, such as would raise the significance (remettraient en honneur) of the small farms, when one half of the nation, employed in the manufactories, is suffering hunger and the measures they demand doom the other half of the nation, engaged in agriculture, to starvation—I do not know. I think the Corn Laws should be considerably amended; but I advise those who are demanding their complete repeal to study the following problems carefully" (267)—then follow the old complaints and apprehensions about the decline of agriculture, the shrinking of the home market, and so forth.

Thus, at the very first impact with reality, romanticism suffered utter fiasco. It was obliged to issue to itself a testimonium paupertatis and itself acknowledge receipt of it. Recall how easily and simply romanticism "solved" all problems in "theory"! Protection is unwise, capitalism is a fatal blunder, the road England has taken is wrong and

dangerous, production must keep in step with consumption, while industry and commerce must keep in step with agriculture, machines are advantageous only when they lead to a rise in wages or to a reduction of the working day, means of production should not be alienated from the producer, exchange must not run ahead of production, must not lead to speculation, and so on, and so forth. Romanticism countered every contradiction with an appropriate sentimental phrase, answered every question with an appropriate innocent wish, and called the sticking of these labels upon all the facts of current life a "solution" to the problems. It is not surprising that these solutions were so charmingly simple and easy: they ignored only one little circumstance—the real interests, the conflict of which constituted the contradiction. And when the development of this contradiction brought the romanticist face to face with one of these particularly violent conflicts, such as was the struggle between the parties in England that preceded the repeal of the Corn Laws, our romanticist lost his head altogether. He felt perfectly at ease in the haze of dreams and good wishes, he so skilfully composed maxims applicable to "society" in general (but inapplicable to any historically determined system of society); but when he dropped from his world of fantasy into t he maelstrom of real life and conflict of interests, he did not even have a criterion of how concrete problems are to be solved. The habit of advancing abstract propositions and of reaching abstract solutions reduced the problem to the bare formula: which part of the population should be ruined—the agricultural or the manufacturing? And, of course, the romanticist could not but conclude that neither part should be ruined, that it was necessary to "turn from the path" ... but the real contradictions encompassed him so tightly that he was unable to ascend again into the haze of good wishes, and the romanticist was obliged *to give an answer*. Sismondi even gave two answers: first—"I do not know"; second—"on the one hand, it cannot but be recognised; on the other hand, it must be admitted."[86]

On January 9, 1848, Karl Marx delivered a "speech on Free Trade"* at a public meeting in Brussels. Unlike the romanticists, who declared that "political economy is not a science of calculation, but a science of morality," he took as the point of departure of his exposition precisely the plain and sober *calculation of interests*. Instead of regarding the problem of the Corn Laws as one concerning a "system" chosen by a nation or as one of legislation (as Sismondi looked upon it), the speaker began by presenting it as a conflict of interests between manufacturers and landowners, and showed how the English manufacturers tried to raise the issue as the affair of the entire nation, tried to assure the workers that they were acting in the interests of the national welfare. Unlike the romanticists, who had presented the problem in the shape of the considerations which a legislator must have in mind when carrying out the reform, the speaker reduced the problem to the conflict between the real interests of the different classes of English society. He showed that the entire problem sprang from the necessity of cheapening raw materials for the manufacturers. He described the distrust of the English workers who regarded "these self-sacrificing gentlemen, Bowring, Bright and their colleagues, as their worst enemies...."

"The manufacturers build great palaces at immense expense, in which the *Anti-Corn-Law League*[88] takes up, in some respects, its official residence; they send an army of missionaries to all corners of England to preach the gospel of Free Trade; they have printed and distributed gratis thousands of pamphlets to enlighten the worker upon his own interests, they spend enormous sums to make the press favourable to their cause; they organise a vast administrative system for the conduct of the Free Trade movement, and they display all their wealth of eloquence at public meetings. It was at one of these meetings that a worker cried out: 'If the landlords were to sell our bones, you manufacturers would be the first to buy them in order to put them through a steam-mill and make flour of them.' The English workers have very well understood the significance of the struggle between the landlords and the industrial capital-

* "Discours sur la libre-échange."[87] We are using the German translation: "Rede über die Frage des Freihandels."

ists. They know very well that the price of bread was to be reduced in order to reduce wages, and that industrial profit would rise by as much as rent fell."

Thus the very *presentation of the problem* is quite different from that of Sismondi. The aims the speaker set himself were, firstly, to explain the attitude of the different classes of English society towards the problem from the angle of their interests; and secondly, to throw light on the significance of the reform in the general evolution of the English social economy.

The speaker's views on this last point coincide with those of Sismondi in that he, too, does not see in this a particular problem, but the *general one* of the development of capitalism in general, of "Free Trade" as a system. "The repeal of the Corn Laws in England is the greatest triumph of Free Trade in the nineteenth century."[89] "...By the repeal of the Corn Laws, free competition, the present social economy is carried to its extreme point."* Hence, the issue presents itself to these authors as a question of whether the *further development of capitalism is desirable* or should be retarded, whether "different paths" should be sought, and so forth. And we know that their affirmative answer to this question was indeed the solution of the general fundamental problem of the "destiny of capitalism" and not of the specific problem of the Corn Laws in England, for the point of view established here was also applied much later in relation to other countries The authors held such views in the 1840s in relation to Germany, and in relation to America,** and declared that free competi-

* *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England* (1845).[90] This work was written from exactly the same point of view *before* the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), whereas the speech dealt with in the text was delivered *after* they were repealed. But the difference in time is of no importance to us: it is sufficient to compare the above-quoted arguments of Sismondi, advanced in 1827, with this speech of 1848, to see the complete identity of the *elements of the problem* in the case of both authors. The idea of comparing Sismondi with a later German economist was borrowed by us from *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, B. V., Art. "Sismondi" von Lippert, Seite 679. The parallel he drew was of such thrilling interest that Mr. Lippert's exposition at once lost all its woodenness ... that is to say, "objectivity," and became interesting, vivacious, and even fervid.

** Cf. *Neue Zeit*,[91] the recently discovered articles of Marx in *Westphälisches Dampfboot*.[92]

tion was progressive for that country; with respect to Germany one of them wrote, as late as the sixties, that she suffered not only from capitalism, but also from the insufficient development of capitalism.

Let us return to the speech we have been dealing with. We pointed to the fundamentally different point of view of the speaker, who reduced the problem to one of the interests of the different classes in English society. We see the same profound difference in his presentation of the purely theoretical problem of the significance of the repeal of the Corn Laws to the social economy. For him it is not the abstract question of which *system* England should adopt, what path she should choose (as the question is put by Sismondi, who forgets that England has a past and a present, which already determine that path). No, he forthwith presents the question on the basis of the *present-day social and economic system*; he asks himself: what *must be the next step* in the development of this system following the repeal of the Corn Laws?

The difficultly involved in this question was that of determining how the repeal of the Corn Laws would affect *agriculture*, for as regards industry its effect was clear to everybody.

To prove that this repeal would benefit agriculture as well, the *Anti-Corn-Law League** offered a prize for the three best essays on the beneficial effect the repeal of the Corn Laws would have upon English agriculture. The speaker briefly outlined the views of the three prize-winners, Hope, Morse, and Greg, and at once singled out the last-named, whose essay most scientifically and most strictly followed the principles laid down by classical political economy.

Writing mainly for big farmers, Greg, himself a big manufacturer, showed that the repeal of the Corn Laws would thrust the small farmers out of agriculture and they would turn to industry, but it would benefit the big farmers who would be able to rent land on longer leases, invest more capital in the land, employ more machines and get along with less labour, which was bound to become cheaper with the fall in the price of corn. The landlords, however, would have to be content with a lower rent because land of poorer

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

quality would drop out of cultivation, as it would be unable to withstand the competition of cheap imported grain.

The speaker proved to be quite right in regarding this forecast and this open defence of capitalism in agriculture as the most scientific. History has confirmed his forecast. "The repeal of the Corn Laws gave a marvellous impulse to English agriculture.... A positive decrease of the agricultural population went hand in hand with increase of the area under cultivation, with more intensive cultivation, unheard-of accumulation of the capital incorporated with the soil, and devoted to its working, an augmentation in the products of the soil without parallel in the history of English agriculture, plethoric rent-rolls of landlords, and growing wealth of the capitalist farmers.... Greater outlay of capital per acre, and, as a consequence, more rapid concentration of farms, were essential conditions of the new method."*

But the speaker, of course, did not confine himself to recognising Greg's arguments as being the most correct. Coming from the mouth of Greg, they were the reasoning of a Free Trader who was discussing English agriculture in general, and was trying to prove that the repeal of the Corn Laws would benefit the nation as a whole. After what we have said above it is evident that these were not the views of the speaker.

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* This was written in 1867.[93] To explain the rise in rents, one must bear in mind the law established by the modern analysis of differential rent, namely, that *a rise in rent is possible simultaneously with a reduction in the price of corn*. "When the English corn duties were abolished in 1846 the English manufacturers believed that they had thereby turned the landowning aristocracy into paupers. Instead, they became richer than ever. How did this occur? Very simply. In the first place, the farmers were now compelled by contract to invest £12 per acre annually instead of £8. And, secondly, the landlords, being strongly represented in the Lower House too, granted themselves a large government subsidy for drainage projects and other permanent improvements of their land. Since no total displacement of the poorest soil took place, but rather, at worst, it became employed for other purposes—and mostly only temporarily—rents rose in proportion to the increased investment of capital, and the landed aristocracy consequently was better off than ever before" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 259).[94]

He explained that a reduction in the price of corn, so glorified by the Free Traders, meant an inevitable reduction in wages, the cheapening of the commodity "labour" (more exactly: labour-power); that the drop in the price of corn would never be able to compensate the workers for the drop in wages, firstly, because with the drop in the price of corn it would be more difficult for the worker to save on the consumption of bread with a view to buying other articles; secondly, because the progress of industry cheapens articles of consumption, substituting spirits for beer, potatoes for bread, cotton for wool and linen, and, by all this, lowering the worker's standard of requirements and living.

Thus we see that *apparently* the speaker establishes the elements of the problem just as Sismondi does: he *too* admits that the ruination of the small farmers and the impoverishment of the workers in industry and agriculture will be the inevitable consequences of Free Trade. It is here that our Narodniks, who are also distinguished for their inimitable skill in "citing," usually stop quoting "excerpts," and with complete satisfaction declare that they fully "agree." But these methods merely show that they do not understand, firstly, the tremendous difference in the presentation of the problem, which we indicated above; secondly, they overlooked the fact that *it is only here* that the radical difference between the new theory and romanticism *begins*: the romanticist turns from the concrete problems of actual development to dreams, whereas the realist takes the established facts as his criterion in definitely solving the concrete problem.

Pointing to the forthcoming improvement in the conditions of the workers the speaker went on to say:

"Thereupon the economists will tell you:

" 'Well, we admit that competition among the workers, which will certainly not have diminished under Free Trade, will very soon bring wages into harmony with the low price of commodities. But, on the other hand, the low price of commodities will increase consumption, the larger consumption will require increased production, which will be followed by a larger demand for hands, and this larger demand for hands will be followed by a rise in wages.'

"The whole line of argument amounts to this: *Free Trade increases productive forces*. If industry keeps growing, if wealth, if the productive power, if, in a word, productive capital increases the demand for labour, the price of labour, and consequently the rate of wages, rise also. *The most favourable condition for the worker is the growth of capital. This must be admitted.** If capital remains stationary, industry will not merely remain stationary but will decline and in this case the worker will be the first victim. He goes to the wall before the capitalist. And in the case where capital keeps growing, in the circumstances which we have said are the *best* for the worker, what will be his lot? He will go to the wall just the same...." And quoting data given by English economists the speaker went on to explain in detail how the concentration of capital increases the division of labour, which cheapens labour-power by substituting unskilled for skilled labour, how the machines oust the workers, how big capital ruins the small industrialists and small rentiers and leads to the intensification of crises, which still further increase the number of unemployed. The conclusion he drew from his analysis was that Free Trade signifies nothing but freedom for the development of capital.

Thus, the speaker was able to find a criterion for the solution of the problem which at first sight seemed to lead to the hopeless dilemma that brought Sismondi to a halt: both Free Trade and its restraint equally lead to the ruin of the workers. *The criterion is the development of the productive forces*. It was immediately evident that the problem was treated from the historical angle: instead of comparing capitalism with some abstract society as it should be (i.e., fundamentally with a utopia), the author compared it with the *preceding stages* of social economy, compared the different stages of capitalism as they successively replaced one another, *and established the fact that the productive forces of society develop thanks to the development of capitalism*. By applying scientific criticism to the arguments of the Free Traders he was able to avoid the

* Our italics.

mistake usually made by the romanticists who, denying that the arguments have any importance, "throw out the baby with the bath water"; he was able to pick out their sound kernel, i.e., the undoubted fact of enormous technical progress. Our Narodniks, with their characteristic wit, would, of course, have concluded that this author, who had so openly taken *the side of big capital against the small producer*, was an "apologist of money power," the more so that he was addressing continental Europe and applying the conclusions he drew from English life to his own country, where at that time large-scale machine industry was only taking its first timid steps. And yet, precisely this example (like a host of similar examples from West-European history) could help them study the thing they are not at all able to understand (perhaps they do not wish to do so?), namely, that to admit that big capital is progressive as compared with small production, is very, very far from being "apologetics."

It is sufficient to recall the above-quoted chapter from Sismondi and this speech to be convinced that the latter is superior both from the standpoint of theory and of hostility towards every kind of "apologetics." The speaker described the contradictions that accompany the development of big capital much more exactly, fully, straightforwardly and frankly than the romanticists ever did. But he never descended to uttering a single sentimental phrase bewailing this development. He never uttered a word anywhere about a possibility of "diversion from the path." He understood that by means of such phrases people merely cover up the fact that they themselves are "diverting" from the problem reality confronts them with, i.e., a certain economic reality, a certain economic development and certain interests that spring from this development.

The above-mentioned fully scientific criterion enabled him to solve this problem while remaining a consistent realist.

"Do not imagine, gentlemen," said the speaker, "that in criticising freedom of trade we have the least intention of defending the system of protection." And he went on to point out that under the contemporary system of social economy both Free Trade and protection rested on the same basis, briefly referred to the "breaking-up" process

of the old economic life and of the old semi-patriarchal relationships in West-European countries carried through by capitalism in England and on the Continent, and indicated the social fact that under certain conditions Free Trade *hastens* this "break-up."* And he concluded with the words: "It is in this sense alone, gentlemen, that I vote in favour of Free Trade."[96]

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* This progressive significance of the repeal of the Corn Laws was also clearly indicated by the author of "Die Lage" *even before the repeal took place* (loc. cit., p. 179)[95] and he specially stressed the influence it would have upon the consciousness of the producers.

THE NEW FACTORY LAW[97]

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ПРОЛЕТАРІИ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ!

НОВЫЙ
Фабричный Законъ

Изданіе Россійской Соціальдемократической Рабочей Партіи.

ЖЕНЕВА
Типографія „Союза Русскихъ Соціальдемократовъ"
1899

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet *The New Factory Law*.
1899

I

WHY WAS THE NEW FACTORY LAW PASSED?

On June 2, 1897, a new factory law was passed reducing working hours in mills and factories and establishing holidays. The workers of St. Petersburg have long been waiting for this law, which the government promised in 1896, after the fright it received from the mass workers' strike in the spring of that year. This mass strike at the cotton-spinning and cotton-weaving mills was followed by others, and in all cases the workers demanded shorter working hours. The government took savage reprisals against the strikers; it arrested masses of workers right and left and exiled them without trial. It also tried, in its fright, to influence the workers by silly talk about the employers' Christian love for the workers (Minister Witte's circular to the factory inspectors issued in 1895-96). But the workers only jeered at this talk, and no amount of persecution could check the movement, in which tens and hundreds of thousands of workers were involved. It was then that the government realised that it would have to yield and concede to at least some of the workers' demands. In addition to the lies and cant and savage persecution of strikers, the St. Petersburg workers received in answer to their strikes the government's promise of a law to reduce working hours. This promise was announced to the workers with unusual solemnity in special notices[98] from the Minister of Finance, which were posted up in the factories. The workers waited impatiently for the fulfilment of the promise, they expected the law to be promulgated by April 19, 1897, and were already prepared to believe that this government promise, like numerous other government statements, was a gross lie. This time, however,

the government kept its promise, a law was promulgated—but *what kind* of a law we shall see further on. But first we must examine the circumstances which prompted the government to keep its promise.

Our government began to occupy itself with the problem of reducing working hours long before 1896. The problem was raised fifteen years ago: the St. Petersburg employers petitioned for a law of this kind as far back as 1883. Similar petitions were made on several other occasions by other employers, too (notably the Polish), but they were all pigeon-holed, as were a host of other projects for improving the workers' conditions. The Russian Government does not hurry to deal with such projects; they lie pigeon-holed for decades. Now when it comes to handing over several million rubles to loyal Russian landowners who "petition" for doles from the public funds, or to granting a subsidy or bonus to the "downtrodden" employers, then the Russian Government does hurry, and the wheels of the bureaucratic and ministerial machine begin to revolve at full speed, as though "greased" with "palm-oil." When matters concern the workers, however, not only are draft laws pigeon-holed for years and decades (for example, the Employers' Liability Bill has been in the "drafting stage," I think, for over ten years), but even laws already passed are not enforced, for the officials of His Imperial Majesty's Government are loath to incommode Messrs. the Employers (for example, the law of 1886, which makes it incumbent upon employers to provide hospitals for their workers, has in the vast majority of cases not been enforced to this day). The question is, what caused action on a long-standing issue to be taken so quickly on this occasion? Why was it settled at once, given priority over other measures and pushed through the Ministry and the Council of State? Why did it at once assume the form of a bill and become law? Obviously, there was some force that spurred on the officials, stirred them into action, broke down their stubborn reluctance to "pester" our native employers with new demands. This force was the St. Petersburg workers and the huge strikes they conducted in 1895-96, which, thanks to the assistance the workers received from the Social-Democrats (through the League of Struggle), were accompanied by the presenta-

tion of definite demands to the government and by the distribution of socialist proclamations and leaflets among the workers. The government realised that no amount of police persecution would break the determination of the working masses, once they had become conscious of their interests, had united for a struggle, and were led by the party of Social-Democrats, the champions of the workers' cause. The government was forced to make concessions. The workers *compelled* the government to pass the new factory law, they *won* it from their bitterest enemy, just as they did in the case of the law of June 3, 1886, passed eleven years ago, on factory rules, fines, wage rates, etc. At that time the workers' struggle was waged most vigorously in Moscow and Vladimir gubernias. It took the form of numerous strikes; then, too, the workers presented plain and precise demands to the government, and during the famous Morozov strike, conditions drawn up by the workers themselves were handed up to the inspector from the crowd. These conditions stated, for example, that the workers demanded a reduction of fines. The law of June 3, 1886, passed soon after, was a direct *answer* to the workers' demands and contained regulations governing fines.*

And so it is today. In 1896, the workers demanded a reduction of working hours, and backed their demands by huge strikes. The government *is* now *answering* this demand by promulgating a law reducing working hours. At that time, in 1886, the workers' revolts compelled the government to yield, and it tried to reduce its concessions to a minimum, to leave loopholes for the employers, to delay the introduction of the new regulations, to do the workers out of as many of their demands as possible. Today, in 1897, the government is in the same way yielding only to the workers' revolts, and in the same way is trying by all the means in its power to reduce the concessions to the workers, *to haggle*, to do them out of an hour or two, even to lengthen working hours as compared with those proposed by the employers; it is trying to give the employers the benefit of a few more holidays by not making them compulsory; it is trying to delay

* See pamphlet *Explanation of the Law on Fines*. (In the present volume, p. 29.—*Ed.*)

the introduction of the new system by postponing the operation of the principal regulations, pending future instructions by the ministers. Thus the laws of June 3, 1886, and of June 2, 1897—which are the principal factory acts in Russia—are both forced concessions, won by the Russian workers from the police government. Both show *how* the Russian Government treats the most legitimate demands of the workers.

II

WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WORKING TIME?

Let us examine in detail the law of June 2, 1897.* As we have said, the new law, firstly, limits the working day for all workers, and, secondly, establishes compulsory rest-days on Sundays and holidays. Before laying down rules about the amount of working time the law must first define what is meant by working time. The new law lays down the following rule: "Working time, or the number of working hours per day, shall in the case of every worker be deemed to be the time during which, according to the labour contract, he is obliged to be on the premises of the establishment and at the disposal of the manager for the performance of work." Hence, all the time that the worker spends at the factory, either according to schedule or at the manager's demand, is to be considered as working time.

Whether the worker, during this time, is engaged at his actual or customary work, or whether the manager orders him to do some other job, or even to just *wait*, makes no difference: all the time the worker spends at the factory must be considered as working time. For example, in some factories, after the bell goes on Saturdays, the workers remain to clean the machines. According to the law, time spent on cleaning machines is also to be regarded as *part of working time*. Consequently, if an employer does not pay the worker for cleaning machines, it means that he is *making gratuitous use of the hired worker's working time*. Hence, if an employer who has hired a worker at piece rates compels him to wait, or to do some other job without special

* It comes into force in November 1898.

pay (every worker knows that this often happens), it means that the employer is *making gratuitous use of the hired worker's working time*. The workers should remember this definition of working time as laid down in the new law and, on the strength of it, resist every attempt on an employer's part to make gratuitous use of labour-power. Naturally, such a definition of working time should follow logically from the labour contract: some workers may think this so obvious that it is not worth talking about. But the government, in its anxiety to serve the capitalists, deliberately obscures a great deal of what is obvious to every worker. So here too the government has tried to leave a little loophole for those gentlemen, the employers. The law defines working time as the time the worker *is obliged under the labour contract* to be in the factory. But what if the labour contract does not specify how many hours a day the worker is obliged to be in the factory? It often happens at engineering plants, for example, that all the contract between the workers and the employer says is that the workers undertake to make a certain article (a machine part, a certain number of bolts or nuts, etc.) at a certain price; *but nothing is said* about how much time the worker has to spend on the job. Is the new law about the number of working hours per day applicable in such cases? Common sense, of course, would suggest that it is; after all, the worker is employed in the factory—how can this not be considered working time? But the "common sense" of the capitalists, and of the government that supports them, is of a special brand. According to the letter of the clause we have quoted, the law on the reduction of working hours can easily be evaded in such cases. The employer may argue that in the contract he did not *oblige* the worker to be in the factory—and there you are. And since not every employer is so smart as to see this trick, the officials of the Ministry of Finance hastened to draw the attention of Russia's merchants to this useful little loophole in the new law. The Ministry of Finance has long been issuing its own special sheet, *Vestnik Finansov*, *Promyshlennosti i Torgovli*[99]—one of those official periodicals which, besides publishing government decisions, do their best to magnify the achievements of the Russian capitalists and to extol the government's solicitude for the pockets of

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the bankers, factory owners, merchants and landowners, under the guise of solicitude for the people. Shortly after the new law was passed this sheet published an article on it (*Vestnik Finansov*, No. 26, 1897) explaining its significance at length and arguing that it was precisely the government's function to be concerned about the health of the workers. Well, it was in this article that the officials did their best to show the employers how to get round the new law. This article clearly explains that the new law cannot be applied in those cases where the labour contract says nothing about working time, for when a worker contracts to do a definite job "*he is not a hired worker, but a person who accepts an order*." Thus, it is not very hard for an employer to dispense with the inconvenient law: all he has to do is to call the worker a "person who accepts an order" and not a worker! Instead of stating that working time is deemed to be the time *a worker is in the factory* at the disposal of the employer, the law is *deliberately* worded more vaguely and speaks of the time during which the worker *is obliged under contract* to be in the factory. One would think that this amounts to the same thing, but actually, here again they have not scrupled to resort to deliberate vagueness to the workers' detriment!

III

TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE NEW LAW REDUCE WORKING HOURS?

The law of June 2, 1897, restricts working time on daywork to 11½ hours. On Saturdays, and on the eve of holidays, it restricts it to 10 hours. Hence, the reduction of working hours under the new law is miserly. There are quite a number of workers—and in St. Petersburg they most likely form the majority—for whom this law will mean *no reduction* of working hours at all; rather the contrary, it threatens to lengthen them. The ordinary working day in St. Petersburg factories is 10 to 10½ hours. The legislative enactment of such excessive working hours clearly shows that this law was an answer to the demands of workers at the St. Petersburg cotton-spinning and cotton-weaving mills. *For these* workers, the new law does perhaps mean a reduc-

tion of working hours, since most of them worked 12 to 14 hours a day. (We shall explain later why we say "perhaps.") The law lays down a ten-hour day for artisans, and also for factories under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. The government, however, decided that factory workers might be made to work longer hours! Even the St. Petersburg employers petitioned the government for a reduction of the working day to 11 hours! The government decided to throw in an extra half-hour for the benefit of the Moscow employers, who compel their workers to keep going, in two shifts, right round the clock, and whom the workers apparently have not yet taught a proper lesson. The Russian Government, which boasts of its solicitude for the workers' welfare, has in fact proved to be as stingy as a petty huckster. It has proved to be more stingy than the employers themselves, who squeeze extra thousands out of the workers as a result of every extra half-hour of work. The workers can clearly see from this example that the government not only protects the interests of the employers, but protects the interests of the *worst* of them, and that it is a far worse enemy of the workers than the capitalist class. The St. Petersburg workers would have won *shorter hours* for themselves and for all Russian workers had *not the government interfered*. The united workers had forced the employers to yield; the St. Petersburg employers were prepared to concede the workers' demands; but the government forbade the employers to yield, so as not to create a precedent for the workers. Then the majority of the St. Petersburg employers realised that they would have to make concessions to the workers, and petitioned the government to reduce the working day to 11 hours. But the government protects the interests of the employers of all Russia, and not only of St. Petersburg, and since there are employers in Holy Russia who are far more stingy than those of St. Petersburg, the government, in its desire to be "fair," could not allow the St. Petersburg employers to rob the workers *too little*. The employers of St. Petersburg must not run too far ahead of those in the rest of Russia; and so the government adds a half-hour to the working day requested by the capitalists. Clearly, the workers must draw three lessons from this conduct of the government:

First lesson: Russia's advanced workers must do their utmost to draw the more backward workers into the movement. Unless the entire mass of Russian workers is enlisted in the struggle for the workers' cause, the advanced workers of the capital cannot hope to win much, even if they force *their* employers to yield; for the government is so exceedingly "fair" that it does not allow the better employers to make substantial concessions to the workers. Second lesson: the Russian Government is a far worse enemy of the Russian workers than the Russian employers are, for the government not only protects the interests of the employers, not only resorts, for this purpose, to brutal persecution of the workers, to arrests, deportations and the use of troops against unarmed workers, but what is more, protects the interests of the *most stingy* employers and resists any tendency of the better employers to yield to the workers. Third lesson: in order to win themselves *human* working conditions and an eight-hour day, for which the workers are now striving all over the world, the Russian workers must rely on the strength of their own organisation alone and steadily win one concession after another from the government. The government is, as it were, bargaining with the workers, trying to see whether it can impose an extra half-hour or so. But the workers will show that they know how to stand up for their demands. The government is, as it were, testing the workers' patience, to see whether it can get off with quite a cheap concession. But the workers will show that they have patience enough for a most stubborn struggle, since to them it is a fight for their lives, a fight to prevent the working people from being utterly downtrodden and oppressed.

IV

WHAT DOES THE LAW CONSIDER "NIGHT-TIME" FOR THE WORKERS?

"Night-time shall mean the period between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. when one shift operates, and between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. when two or more shifts operate." So runs the new law. "Night" for the common people, who have to toil all their lives for others, and "night" for the fine folk, who live on the

labour of others, are, according to the "law," two entirely different things. During the greater part of the year both in St. Petersburg and in Moscow it is still quite dark, still night at 4 a.m. But the Russian law lays it down that the worker must adjust his whole life to the interests of capital; the worker must believe that day-time begins *without fail* after four in the morning, even if it may still be several hours before sunrise. And if the worker does not live in the factory grounds, he has to get up at *three* o'clock, and even earlier, in order to be at the factory at four! For St. Petersburg officials the "day" begins at noon, or even at 1 p.m.; but then, officials are a special type of people.... The workers' "day" only ends at ten at night, and if the streets are quite dark when he leaves the factory, he should not be disconcerted by this: he should remember and believe that the "day" has only just ended—for so the law decrees. Why not pass a law that makes the worker's "day" begin when the factory whistle summons him to work, and end when that same whistle summons a new shift? That would be franker and fairer. In Switzerland they already have a law which defines what night-time is for the worker; but how can you expect the Swiss to be up to all the tricks devised by Russian police officials? It appears that among these terrible Swiss a working man's "night" is the same as that of other people, namely, from 8 p.m. to 5 (or 6) a.m, The only restriction on "night-work" in the new law is that workers engaged even part of the night shall not work more than ten hours. That is all. The law does not prohibit night-work. In this respect, too, the law falls short of the *petitions* of the St. Petersburg employers, who fourteen years ago (in 1883) appealed for the prohibition of night-work for adults. Consequently, the St. Petersburg workers would have won more from the employers in this respect too, *had not the government interfered* in order to protect the interests of the most retrograde employers in Russia. The government would not listen to the employers of St. Petersburg, for it did not want to offend those in Moscow, most of whom compel their workers to work at night. As usual, the government tried to mask its subservience to the interests of the *worst* employers by deceptive talk and assurances. In an article explaining the new law, *Vestnik*

Finansov, published by the Ministry of Finance, stated that in other countries (France, for instance) night-work is forbidden. But, it declared, our law cannot do this. "It is not always possible to forbid establishments to work a full twenty-four hours: a large number of industries, by their very nature, require continuous operation."

This is obviously quite a lame excuse. We are not discussing special industries which require continuous operation, but industries in general. Even under the present law continuous operation is impossible when work is done in two shifts unless overtime is worked, since day-work has been fixed at 11½ hours and night-work at 10 hours, or 21½ hours in all. That is why the new law makes special provision for industries in which continuous operation is necessary (through special ministerial regulations, of which more anon). Consequently, there was absolutely nothing to make the prohibition of night-work "impossible." We have already said that the government would have us believe that it is concerned for the workers' health. Here is what the Ministry of Finance says about night-work: "Night-work is undoubtedly more fatiguing and unhealthy and, in general, less natural than work by daylight; and it is more detrimental the longer and more systematic it is. It might seem that in view of the detrimental character of night-work, it would be better to prohibit it for adult male workers too (just as it is prohibited for women and for adolescents of both sexes in some industries, and in the case of children everywhere). But there are no grounds for this even from the standpoint of the worker's general welfare; moderate night-work is less detrimental to him than excessively long hours of day-work for the same pay." You see how skilful Russian Government officials are in throwing dust into the eyes of the people! Even their protection of the interests of the worst employers is presented as solicitude for the "worker's welfare." And how brazen is the justification invented by the Ministry: "moderate night-work," don't you see, "is less detrimental than excessively long hours of day-work for the same pay." The Ministry wants to say that the worker is driven to work at night by low wages, so low that the *worker* cannot get along without working excessively long hours. And so, the Ministry, confident that this will always be so, that

the worker will never succeed in winning better wages, cynically declares: since the worker has to toil monstrously long hours to feed his family, is it not all the same to him whether he works the extra hours in the day-time or at night? Of course, if the majority of the Russian workers go on earning the same miserable wages as at present, want will drive them to work extra hours. But how insolent it is to justify the sanctioning of night-work on the plea of the worker's downtrodden condition! "The pay for the work will be the same"—that is the main thing for the servitors of capital—"and with the present level of wages, the worker cannot get along without working extra hours." And bureaucrats like these, who concoct kulak arguments in the interests of the stingy employers, have the audacity to talk about the "standpoint of the worker's general welfare." But are they not too confident in hoping that the worker will always be so downtrodden, that he will always agree to this "same pay," that is, to the same beggarly remuneration for his labour? Low wages and long hours always go hand in hand; the one is impossible without the other. When pay is low, the worker is forced to work extra hours, and to work at night, in order to earn enough to live on. When working hours are excessively long, pay will always be low, because when working long hours the worker produces less articles per hour and of far worse quality than in a short working day, and because the worker, crushed as he is by excessive toil, will always remain downtrodden and powerless under the yoke of capital. Consequently, when the Ministry, which serves the Russian factory owners, proposes to preserve the present preposterously low wages of the Russian workers, and at the same time talks about the "workers' welfare," it shows as clearly as clear can be that its phrases are sheer cant and lies.

V

HOW DOES THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE TRY TO PROVE THAT TO RESTRICT OVERTIME WOULD BE "UNFAIR" TO THE WORKER?

We have referred to the new law as a law to reduce the working day. We have said that it restricts the working day to 11½ hours (10 hours in the case of night-work). But

actually this is not so, it is far worse. All the restrictions provided for in the law relate only to ordinary, normal, regular work, but not to *overtime*. Consequently, the employer's "right" to compel the workers to work any number of hours, even twenty-four at a stretch, *is not restricted at all*. Here is what the law says about overtime: "Overtime shall mean work performed by the worker in an industrial establishment during hours other than those in which he is obliged to work by factory rules. Overtime shall be permitted only by special agreement between the manager of the industrial establishment and the worker. The labour contract may contain stipulations only as regards such overtime work as is necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry." This is a highly important clause of the new law, and its edge is directed entirely against the workers, leaving the employer a free hand. Hitherto overtime has been regulated by custom; there has been no mention of it in any law. Now the government has *legalised* overtime. The stipulation in the law that such work shall require a "special agreement" between worker and employer is just an empty and utterly meaningless phrase. All work is done "by agreement" between the workers and the employers. The workers are not serfs (although many a Russian official would like nothing better than to turn them into such); they work for hire, that is, by agreement. There was no point in stipulating that overtime shall be done by agreement. The government inserted that meaningless phrase into the law in order to create the impression that it wants to restrict overtime. As a matter of fact the law does not restrict it at all. Formerly the master used to say to the worker: "If you want to work overtime, all right; if not, here's your discharge!"—and now he will say the same. Only formerly it was done by custom; now it will be done with the sanction of the *law*. Formerly, an employer who dismissed a worker for refusing to work overtime could not claim the support of the law; now the law directly suggests to him how he can oppress the worker. Instead of restricting overtime, this clause of the law may easily render it more prevalent. The law even permits the employer to include the demand for overtime in the contract when "it is necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry," This reservation will cause no

inconvenience to the employer at all. How is one to decide which work is "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry," and which is not? Who will investigate it? If an employer states that the job he has given a worker to do out of hours is "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry," how can he be refuted? Nobody will investigate it, nobody will check the employer's statement. The law has only *strengthened* the arbitrary powers of the employers by suggesting to them a *particularly reliable* way of oppressing the workers.

Now, all the employer has to do is to stipulate in the contract that the worker has no right to refuse to work overtime when "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry," and the trick is done! Let the worker decline to work overtime—he will simply be discharged. And where (thinks the employer) will you find a worker who will attempt to prove that the work was not "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry"! The very idea of a worker making such a complaint is ridiculous. Needless to say, there will never be any such complaints, and they would be useless if they were made. The government has therefore quite legally endowed the employers with arbitrary powers as regards overtime. How eager the Ministry of Finance is in its haste to serve the employers and to teach them how to make the widest use of overtime under the protection of the new legislation is very clearly shown by the following argument in *Vestnik Finansov*: "Overtime is also necessary in the case of rush orders, which the employers cannot possibly foresee* in industries operating for definite and brief seasons, if the owner of the establishment finds it impossible or difficult to increase the number of workers."

You see how skilfully the law is "interpreted" by the zealous lackeys of the employers installed in the Ministry of Finance! The law only speaks of overtime necessitated by technical conditions, but the Ministry of Finance hastens to consider as "necessitated" overtime due to "unforeseen" (?!)

* The old song! Every year Russian factories—especially those in the central regions—receive rush orders for the Nizhni-Novgorod Fair; and every year they solemnly assure all the simpletons who believe them, or who pretend to believe them, that they were unable to foresee this!...

orders, and even when the employer finds it "difficult" to increase the number of workers! Why, that is simply making fools of the workers! Any astute employer can *always* say that he finds it "difficult." Increasing the number of workers means hiring others, which means reducing the number of unemployed hanging round the factory gate, means lessening competition among workers, making them more exacting in their demands and, perhaps, having to agree to pay higher wages. It goes without saying that there is not an employer who would not consider this to be "difficult" for him. With such arbitrary powers for the employers to demand overtime, the law on the reduction of the working day is robbed of all value. There will be no reduction at all for vast numbers of workers, since they will continue to work 15 to 18 hours a day and more, remaining at the factory at night to do overtime. The absurdity of a law to reduce the working day which does not forbid (or at least restrict) overtime is so obvious that in all the preliminary drafts of the law it was proposed to restrict overtime. As far back as 1883, the St. Petersburg employers (the employers themselves!) petitioned to have overtime restricted to *one hour* a day. The government, scared by the St. Petersburg strikes of 1895-96, immediately appointed a commission to draft a bill to reduce working hours; this commission also recommended that overtime be restricted, namely, to 120 hours a year.* By rejecting every proposal to restrict overtime in any degree whatsoever, the government definitely set out to protect the interests of the worst of the employers, openly legalised the complete subjection of the workers, and made it quite clear that it intended to leave everything as it was before and to make shift with meaningless phrases. In its anxiety to serve the interests of the employers, the Ministry of Finance went so far as to try to prove that any restriction of overtime would be "unfair to the worker himself." Here are its arguments, which should give every worker food for thought. "To deprive the worker of the right to work at the factory more than a fixed number of hours a day would be

* Even the Ministry of Finance itself, in its interpretation of the new law, was obliged to admit that "the sanctioning of overtime seems to be inappropriate" (*Vestnik Finansov*).

difficult in practice" (Why? Because the factory inspectors are very remiss in the performance of their duties, fearing nothing so much as to offend the employers? Or because so long as the Russian worker has no rights and is inarticulate, it will be difficult to carry out any reforms for his benefit? The Ministry of Finance has unwittingly let the cat out of the bag: indeed, as long as the Russian workers, like the Russian people in general, stand disfranchised in face of a police government, as long as they have no political rights, no reforms can be effective) ... "and would be unfair to the workers: a man should not be punished for seeking the means of subsistence, for occasionally exerting his strength even above the limit beyond which his work may prove detrimental to his health." See how humane and philanthropic the Russian Government is! Bow in gratitude, Russian workers! The government is so merciful, that it "does not rob" you of the "right" to work 18 hours a day, even 24 if you like. The government is so fair that it does not want to punish you when the employer forces you to overstrain yourself at the job! In all other countries, it is the employer, not the worker, who *is punished* if work is done at the factory over and above the regular hours. Our officials have forgotten that. Indeed, how could Russian officials take the risk of *punishing* the employers! Perish the thought! We shall soon see that the employers will not be punished even if they break every clause of this new law. In all other countries, the workers, in their "search for the means of subsistence," have the right to organise unions, mutual benefit societies, to openly resist the employer, to present their demands to him, to conduct strikes. In our country this is not allowed. On the other hand, however, our workers have been granted the "right" to work any number of "extra" hours a day. Why did these humane officials forget to add that our fair government "does not rob" the Russian worker of the "right" to be sent to prison without trial, or to be beaten up by any police bashi-bazouk for every attempt to protect himself from the oppression of the capitalists?

VI

WHAT POWERS DOES THE NEW LAW GRANT THE MINISTERS?

We have already shown that on the most essential points the new law has not laid down any obligatory, hard and fast rules. The government has preferred to grant the fullest possible powers to the administration (namely, the ministers) to establish all sorts of rules and privileges in the interests of employers, to hamper the application of the new law, etc. The powers granted to the ministers by the new law are extremely broad and extensive. The ministers (namely, the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Railways, etc., in concurrence with the Minister of Internal Affairs) are "empowered" to issue detailed regulations governing the application of the new law. A host of questions relating to all the clauses of the new law in *all* and *sundry* respects are left entirely to the discretion of the ministers. The powers of the ministers are so vast that they are virtually the sole executors of the new law; if they want to, they can issue regulations which will really enforce it; or, if they want to, they can act so that the law will be scarcely enforced at all. And, indeed, see what regulations the ministers are empowered to issue "in pursuance of the present law" (that is the way the law puts it. We have already seen how smart the Ministry of Finance can be when acting "in pursuance" of the law—it will act in such a way that the workers, in its opinion, will only have to be thankful that the government does not punish them for working too much and does not "deprive them of the right" to work even 24 hours a day). We would enumerate all the various categories of these regulations if that were possible; but the fact is that, in addition to the questions enumerated in the law which are to be settled by the ministerial regulations, the law also empowers them to issue *other regulations* without any restriction. The ministers may issue regulations governing working hours. That is to say, it is not enough to have a law governing working hours; there are to be ministerial regulations for the same thing. The ministers may issue regulations concerning shifts; but, of course, they may also not, so as not to inconvenience the employers. The ministers have been empowered to issue regulations govern-

ing the number of shifts a day, meal times, etc. That is what the *law* says: et cetera (*and so forth*); in other words, the ministers are empowered to issue any regulations they like. If they don't like, there will be no regulations on meal times at all, and the employers will go on oppressing the workers as they do now, not allowing them to go home for dinner, and not allowing mothers to go home to feed their children. It is left to the ministers to issue regulations governing overtime, namely, indicating when it shall be permitted, how frequently, and what record shall be kept. Consequently, here the ministers have a perfectly free hand. They may even *alter* the requirements of the law, that is, they may strengthen or *mitigate* them (the law deliberately stipulates the right of the ministers to mitigate the requirements of the new law in respect of the employers) in three cases: firstly, "when same is deemed necessary owing to the character of the industry (continuity and so forth)." This "and so forth" is also in the law, thus enabling the ministers to plead any "character of the industry" they like. Secondly, "owing to the nature of the work (tending of boilers or transmission belts, current and emergency repairs, and so forth)." Here we have "and so forth" again! Thirdly, "and in other important and exceptional cases." Further, the ministers may determine which industries are particularly detrimental to the health of the workers (or they may not: the law does not compel, but only authorises them to do so ... although they had that authority before, but never wanted to exercise it!) and to issue special regulations for these industries. The workers now see why we said that it is impossible to enumerate the questions left to be settled by the ministers: the law is strewn with "et ceteras" and "and so forths." Russian laws in general may be divided into two categories: those which grant some rights to the workers and the common people generally, and others which prohibit something, or allow officials to prohibit it. In the laws of the first category, even the most trivial rights of the workers *are enumerated with the utmost precision* (even, for example, the worker's right to absent himself from work with good cause) and *not the least* departure is permitted on pain of the severest penalties. In these laws you will not find a single "et cetera" or "and so forth," In the laws of the second

category, only general prohibitions are *invariably* indicated, *without any precise enumeration*, so that the management may prohibit *anything it likes*; in these laws you will always find small but very important additions: "et cetera," "and so forth." These little phrases are striking testimony of the almighty power exercised by Russian officials over the people, and of the latter's utter rightlessness in regard to them; of the senseless and savage character of the abominable bureaucracy and red tape in which every institution of the Imperial Russian Government is steeped through and through. Any law which may be of the slightest benefit is invariably so wrapped up in red tape that its enforcement is endlessly delayed. More, the enforcement of the law is left to the complete discretion of the officials, who, as everybody knows, are ready heart and soul to "serve" any moneybag, and to play every possible dirty trick on the common people. The ministers, be it remembered, are only empowered to issue all these regulations "in pursuance of the present law"; that is, they may issue them or they may not. The law does not bind them to anything. The law does not fix any date: they may issue the regulations now, or they may do so in ten years' time. Naturally, the *few* rules enumerated in the law lose all meaning and importance: they are empty words that merely conceal the government's desire to frustrate the law in its practical application. Vast powers are granted to our ministers by practically every law affecting the life of the workers. And we understand perfectly why the government does so: it wants to be of the greatest possible service to the employers. After all, it is much easier for an employer to influence the official responsible for enforcing the law, than to influence the passage of the law itself. Everybody knows how easily our capitalist magnates gain access to the drawing-rooms of Messrs. the Ministers and there engage in pleasant conversations, how hospitably they entertain each other at dinners, what gracious little presents to the tune of tens and hundreds of thousands of rubles are made to the corrupt officials of the Imperial Government (either directly, in the shape of bribes, or indirectly, in the shape of shares to company "founders," or of honorary and lucrative posts in these companies). Consequently, the broader the rights the new law confers on the officials in respect of

its enforcement, the more advantageous it is both for the *officials* and for the *factory owners*: the advantage to the officials is that they can grab more, and to the factory owners that they can more easily secure privileges and exemptions. In illustration, let us remind the workers of two cases which show what these ministerial regulations issued "*in pursuance* of the law" lead to in practice. The law of June 3, 1883, laid it down that the fines money belongs to the workers and must be expended on their needs. The minister "pursued" this law in such a way that in St. Petersburg, for instance, it was not enforced for ten years, and when at last it began to be enforced, the whole matter was put into the hands of the employer, whom the worker has to beg for his money as though it were a dole. Second example: this same law (of June 3, 1886) lays it down that wages must be paid not less than twice a month; but the minister "pursued" the law in such a way as to give the employers the right to withhold the wages of a new worker for six weeks. Every worker now clearly understands why this time, too, the ministers have been empowered to "pursue" the law. The employers also understand this perfectly, and they have already set their machinery going. We have seen that the ministers are "empowered" to issue regulations on overtime. The employers have already begun to bring pressure to bear on the government to induce it *not to restrict* overtime. *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, a newspaper which always zealously defends the interests of the worst employers, persistently eggs on the government to the most savage and brutal actions, and enjoys such immense influence "in high spheres" (that is, among the higher officials, ministers, etc.), has now launched a regular campaign against the imposition of restrictions on overtime. The employers have thousands of ways of exerting pressure on the government: they have their societies and associations; employers are members of numerous government commissions and boards (for example, the Factory Boards), they have personal access to ministers; they may write as much as they like in the press about their wishes and demands, and the press has tremendous influence in our times. As to the workers, they have *no* legal means of exerting pressure on the government. There is only one thing the workers can do, and that is to

join forces, to spread the consciousness of their interests as members of one class among all the workers, and to put up united resistance to the government and the employers. Every worker can now see that the enforcement of the new law will depend entirely on who exerts strongest pressure on the government, the employers or the workers. It was only by struggle, by a conscious and staunch struggle, that the workers secured the *passage* of this law. Only by struggle will they be able to secure the actual enforcement of the law, and its enforcement in the interests of the workers. Without a stubborn struggle, without the staunch resistance of the united workers to every claim the employers make, the new law will remain a scrap of paper, one of those false and pretentious signboards with which our government tries to embellish the utterly rotten edifice of police tyranny and the rightless and oppressed state of the workers.

VII

HOW OUR "CHRISTIAN" GOVERNMENT CURTAILS THE WORKERS' HOLIDAYS

Besides regulations on working hours, the new law also contains a regulation concerning compulsory rest-days for factory workers on Sundays and holidays. The grovelling hacks, of whom there are so many among our Russian newspapermen and journalists, have hastened to mark this regulation by lauding our government and its humaneness to the skies. We shall presently see that actually this humane law tends *to curtail* holidays for the workers. But first let us examine the general regulations concerning Sunday and holiday rest. First of all, it should be noted that the St. Petersburg employers petitioned for the establishment of legal rest-days on Sundays and holidays fourteen years ago (in 1883). In other words, here too, the Russian Government only delayed, postponed and *resisted* reform as long as it was possible. According to the law, the list of holidays on which work is forbidden explicitly includes all Sundays and fourteen other holidays, of which we shall speak at greater length later. The law does not absolutely forbid work on holidays, but permits it on the following condi-

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tions: firstly, "mutual agreement" between the employer and the workers is required; secondly, work on a holiday is permitted, provided it is "compensated by a week-day"; thirdly, the agreement to replace the holiday by a week-day must be immediately reported to the factory inspector. Hence, under the law, work on holidays must on no account be allowed to reduce the number of rest-days, for the employer is obliged to compensate the workers for working on a holiday by giving them a free week-day. The workers must always bear this in mind, and also the fact that the law demands the mutual consent of the employer and the workers for such an arrangement. In other words, the workers may always quite legally *refuse to agree* to such an arrangement, and the employer has *no right* to compel them to do so. In practice, of course, the employer will be able to extort the workers' consent in the following way: he will ask the workers one by one to agree, and each worker will be afraid to refuse, for fear of being discharged. In doing this, the employers will of course be acting illegally, for the law demands the *consent of the workers*, that is, of all the workers jointly. But how can all the workers in one factory (and there are sometimes hundreds and even thousands of them, working in many different places) make their common consent known? The law does not say how, and here again it has placed in the hands of the employers another means of oppressing the workers. The workers have only one way of preventing such oppression: in every such case they must demand the election of workers' deputies to convey the *general* decision of all the workers to the employer. The workers can base this demand on the law, for the latter speaks of the consent of all the *workers*, and all the workers cannot speak to the employer at once. This system of electing workers' deputies will, in general, be very beneficial to the workers, and will be useful for all kinds of other negotiations with the employers and the office, inasmuch as it is very difficult, and often quite impossible, for the individual worker to present his demands, claims, etc. Further, as regards workers of "non-Orthodox persuasion," the law "permits" that days which are not celebrated by their Church may not be included in the list of holidays. But then there are other holidays which are celebrated by Catholics, and

not by Orthodox people. The law says nothing about this and, therefore, makes an attempt to discriminate somewhat against non-Orthodox workers. Even more marked is the discrimination against non-Christian workers: for them the law "permits" other days in the week instead of Sunday to be included in the list of holidays. Only "permits"! Our Christian government so savagely persecutes persons who do not profess the ruling religion that very likely this too is an attempt to oppress non-Christians by making the law vague. The law is indeed very obscure on this point. It should be interpreted as meaning that one day in the week must be a compulsory rest-day, and that all that is permitted is the substitution of some other day for Sunday. But the "ruling" religion only grants privileges to the "rulers"; as for the working man, it will never miss an opportunity to invent some sort of a trap for him. Let us see *which holidays* the law says must be included in the list. It is all very well talking about establishing Sunday and holiday rest; but even before this the workers did not as a rule, in the majority of cases, work either on Sundays or on holidays. The law, after all, may fix the rest-days in such a way that the total number of *compulsory* holidays may prove to be far fewer than the number of *customary* holidays. *This is exactly what our Christian government has done in the new law*. It has established 66 holidays in the year: 52 Sundays, 8 fixed holidays (January 1 and 6, March 25, August 6 and 15, September 8, and December 25 and 26) and 6 movable holidays (Friday and Saturday in Passion Week, Easter Monday and Tuesday, Ascension Day and Descent of the Holy Ghost). But how many *customary* holidays a year have there been in our factories till now? We have precise information on this score for Moscow and Smolensk gubernias, and that only for a few factories. But as the difference between the factories, and even between the two gubernias, is very small, this information is quite sufficient to enable us to form an opinion about the real value of the new law. In Moscow Gubernia, figures were collected for 47 large factories, employing a total of over 20,000 workers. It was found that in hand-operated factories, the number of holidays per year is 97, and in the machine-operated factories the number is 98. The lowest number of holidays per year is 78, These 78 holidays are celebrated at

all the investigated factories *without exception*. In Smolensk Gubernia, the information relates to 15 factories, employing a total of about 5,000 to 6,000 workers. The average number of holidays per year is 86, or nearly as many as in Moscow Gubernia. The lowest number of holidays was found at one of the factories, where it was 75. Corresponding to this number of holidays per year, which is *customary* for Russian factories, is the number of holidays established for factories under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry, where 88 annual holidays are the rule. The laws of our country recognise practically the same number of days for civil servants as non-working (87 a year). Consequently, each year the workers had the same number of *customary* holidays as other citizens. In its solicitude for the workers' health, our "Christian government" cut out a fourth of these customary holidays, 22 in all, leaving only 66 compulsory holidays. Let us enumerate the customary holidays cut out by the government in the new law. Of the fixed holidays the following have been cut out: February 2—Candlemas; May 9—St Nicholas' day; June 29—St Peter's day; July 8—the Feast of Our Lady of Kazan; July 20—St Elijah's day; August 29—St John the Baptist's day; September 14—the Feast of the Holy Cross; October 1—the Feast of the Intercession (even this holiday the government deemed superfluous and non-compulsory. We may be certain that not a single employer will be found who will dare compel his employees to work on that day. Here again the government is protecting the interests and mean practices of the worst employers); November 21—Presentation of the Blessed Virgin, and December 6—St Nicholas' day. Thus, 10 fixed holidays have been cut out.* Further, of the movable holidays, the following have been cut out: Shrove Saturday and Wednesday of the last week of Lent, i.e., two holidays. In all, therefore, 12 holidays have been cut out from the *minimum* hitherto allowed the workers as rest-days according to prevailing custom. Our government is so fond of calling itself a "Christian" govern-

* We have enumerated only the holidays that have been observed by *all* factories till now. There are many other holidays that have been observed by the *overwhelming majority* of factories, for example, pre-Lent days, Shrove Friday; Thursday, Friday and Saturday of Easter week, and many others.

ment; when addressing the workers, the ministers and other officials sweeten their speeches with phrases about the "Christian love" and "Christian sentiments" of the employers and of the government towards the workers, etc. But as soon as action takes the place of phrases, all this hypocritical and canting talk is sent to blazes, and the government becomes a huckster trying to extort something from the workers wherever possible. The employers themselves, that is, the best of them, long long ago petitioned for the establishment of legal rest-days on Sundays and holidays. After fifteen years of procrastination, the government has at last passed a law establishing *compulsory* rest on Sundays and holidays, but while making this concession to the workers it does not miss the opportunity of injuring them by cutting out one-fourth of the customary holidays from the list of those that are compulsory. Thus, the government is behaving like a real usurer: while making one concession, it does its best to make up for it by some other extortion. With such a law, it may very easily happen that at some of the factories the employers will try *to reduce* the number of workers' rest-days and compel the workers to work on holidays which have hitherto been kept but which the law has not included in the compulsory list of holidays. To prevent their conditions from being worsened, the workers must, in this respect too, always be ready to resist every attempt to reduce the number of holidays. The law only specifies the compulsory holidays; but the workers have the right to demand others as well. Only they must see to it that all the holidays are stipulated in the rules of the factory and should place no trust in verbal promises. The workers can be sure of not being compelled to work on a holiday only when that holiday has been included in the factory rules. Just as in the case of holidays, so in the case of half-holidays, the law attempts to leave matters where they were before, and even in some respects to worsen them. The law provides for only one half-holiday—Christmas eve: on that day work must cease not later than noon. This has been the case until now at the majority of factories, and if any factory did not release the workers at noon on Christmas eve, in most cases it allowed them a half-holiday on the eve of some other big holiday. Generally speaking, one half-holiday in the year has hitherto

been the rule at the majority of the factories. Further, the new law says that on Saturdays and the eve of holidays the working day is limited to ten hours, that is, 1½ hours less than the ordinary working day. Here, too, the law has not improved the workers' conditions, and, if anything, has worsened them: hitherto, *at nearly all the factories*, work on Saturday ceased earlier than usual. One investigator, who has collected a great deal of information on this subject and who is generally well acquainted with factory life, states that it may be safely concluded that, on the average, work on Saturdays ceases two hours before the usual time. Consequently, here, too, the law did not miss the opportunity, while converting a *customary* rest period into a *compulsory* one, to extort from the workers at least one half-hour as compensation for this concession. One half-hour a week amounts to 23 hours a year (counting 46 working weeks), that is, two days extra work for the employer's benefit.... Not a bad present for our poor, indigent employers! We may be quite sure that these knights of the moneybag will not hesitate to accept this present and will do their best to compensate themselves in this way for the "sacrifices" demanded of them by the new law (as they are fond of putting it), and, therefore, in this respect too, the workers must rely only on themselves, on the strength of their organisation. Without a stubborn struggle, the working class, in this respect too, will fail to achieve any improvement in their condition, notwithstanding the new law.

VIII

HOW IS THE OBSERVANCE OF THE NEW LAW GUARANTEED?

How is the observance of laws guaranteed in general? Firstly, by supervision over the observance, and secondly, by punishment of infringements, of the law. Let us see how matters stand with regard to the new factory law. Supervision over the observance of laws has been entrusted to the factory inspectors. Hitherto, the regulations governing factory supervision issued in 1886 have not been extended to the whole of Russia by far, but only to a few

gubernias, the most highly industrialised ones. The extension of the area of factory supervision has always followed the extension of the area of the working-class movement and of workers' strikes. On the very date that the law to reduce the working hours was promulgated (that is, June 2, 1897), another law was issued extending factory supervision to the whole of Russia and to the entire Kingdom of Poland. This extension of the factory regulations to the whole of Russia and the institution of Factory Inspection is, of course, a step forward. The workers will take advantage of this to inform a larger number of their comrades about their conditions, about the labour laws, about the attitude of the government and its officials towards the workers, etc. The application of the same rules that govern the advanced workers (of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir and other gubernias) to all factory workers in Russia will, of course, also help the working-class movement to spread more rapidly to all Russian workers. As to how far *effectively* the factory inspectors supervise the observance of the law, we shall not go into this in detail. A separate pamphlet should be written on this subject (it is so wide), and perhaps we shall find some other opportunity to discuss the question of Factory Inspection with the workers. Let us only briefly remark that so few factory inspectors are appointed in Russia that they are very rarely to be seen at the factories. The factory inspectors are completely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, which turns them into servitors of the employers, compels them to report strikes and unrest to the police, to prosecute workers for leaving the factory even when the employer himself does not prosecute them; in a word, it turns them, in a manner of speaking, into police officials, into factory police. The employer has thousands of ways of exerting influence on the factory inspectors and of forcing them to do what he wants. The workers, however, have no means of influencing the factory inspectors, and cannot have such means as long as the workers do not enjoy the right of free assembly, the right to form their unions, to discuss their affairs in the press, and to issue workers' newspapers. So long as these rights are withheld, no supervision by officials over the employers can ever be serious and effective. But supervision alone is not enough to secure

the observance of the law. Strict penalties for non-observance of the law must also be imposed. Otherwise, what is the good of a factory inspector telling the employer that he is acting wrongly? The employer will simply ignore him and go on acting as before. That is why, when a new law is passed, the penalties imposed on those who infringe it are always stipulated. *The new law of June 2, 1897, reducing working hours and establishing rest-days, however, contains no penalties for its infringement.* The workers can see from this how different is the government's attitude to the employers and to the workers. When a law is passed, say, forbidding the worker to leave the factory before his time is up, the penalty in case he does leave is fixed at once, including even so severe a penalty as arrest. For going on strike, for example, the workers are liable, under the law, to arrest and even imprisonment, but the employer is only fined for the infringement of the regulations which causes the strike. So in this case, too, the requirement of the law that the employers shall allow the workers to rest on Sundays and holidays and not make them work more than 11½ hours a day is not supported by any penalties for its infringement. What will be done to an employer who is guilty of infringing this law? At the most, he may be hauled before the magistrate, who cannot levy a fine exceeding 50 rubles, or the Factory Board may itself impose a penalty in the shape of a fine. But will a fine of 50 rubles deter an employer? Why, he makes far much more than 50 rubles profit by compelling all his workers to work a night or on a holiday! It will actually benefit the factory owner to break the law and pay a fine. The failure of the law to stipulate the penalty for its infringement by the employer is a crying injustice, which plainly shows that our government is anxious to delay the enforcement of the law as long as possible, that it does not intend to demand strict observance of the law by the employers. It happened in other countries, too, in times long past, that a government would pass factory laws without stipulating any penalties for their infringement. And, in fact, such laws were not observed at all and remained mere scraps of paper. That is why this ridiculous custom of passing laws without ensuring their enforcement has long been abandoned in other countries. Today the Russian Government is resorting to this

same old trick in the hope that the workers will not notice it. But this hope is unfounded. As soon as the workers become acquainted with the new law, they themselves will see to it that it is observed; they will not allow the slightest departure from it and will refuse to work until its provisions are complied with. Such supervision by the workers themselves will be far more effective than that of any factory police. Without such supervision the law will not be observed.

IX

WILL THE NEW LAW IMPROVE THE WORKERS' CONDITION?

At first glance, it may even seem strange that we raise this question. The law reduces working hours and establishes compulsory rest-days on Sundays and holidays. Surely this is an improvement of the workers' condition? But we have already shown in detail above how vague and indefinite are the provisions of the new law, how often the law, while laying down rules to improve the workers' condition, itself frustrates those rules by leaving the employer's arbitrary power untouched, or by limiting the compulsory holidays to a number far smaller than is customary.

Let us try and calculate whether working time will be reduced by the introduction of the new law if the number of rest-days is no more than the number established by the law, that is, if the workers are given rest-days only on the compulsory holidays established by the law, and the employers succeed in compelling them to work on the other, customary holidays. Whether they succeed or not is, of course, an open question. That will depend on what resistance the workers put up. But that the employers will try to compensate themselves for the reduction in working hours by reducing the number of holidays, is beyond doubt. That the law does its utmost to assist this noble endeavour of the capitalists to oppress the workers, is also beyond doubt. Well, let us see what the effect of this would be. To compare working time under the old system with that

under the new (i.e., under the law of June 2, 1897), we must take *the number of working hours per year*. Only in this way can account be taken of all the holidays and shorter working days on the eve of holidays. How many hours a year does the Russian factory worker usually work now, that is, before the operation of the law of June 2, 1897? It goes without saying that exact information on this point is not available, for it is impossible to calculate the number of working hours of every worker. We must avail ourselves of the information collected for *a few* factories, and assume that the number of hours at other factories is approximately the same as that at the factories investigated. Let us take the information collected for Moscow Gubernia. The number of working days in the year was calculated exactly in the case of 45 big factories. It was found that the total number of working days in the year at all these 45 factories together was 12,010, that is, an average of 267 working days per factory.* The number of working hours per week (as shown by data for several hundred factories) averages 74, or 12⅓ hours a day. Hence, in the year there were $267 \times 12\frac{1}{3} = 3{,}293$ working hours, or in round numbers 3,300. In the city of Odessa, we reckoned up the figures for 54 large factories for which we have information regarding the number of working days in the year, and the number of hours. We found that the average number of working hours per year in all these factories is 3,139, or considerably less than in Moscow Gubernia. In Odessa the working day is shorter, in most cases 10½ hours, the average for these 54 factories being 10.7 hours. Hence the number of working hours per year is lower, although there are fewer holidays. Let us see how many working hours we get under the new law. First of all, let us count up the number of working days in the year. For this purpose, we must deduct from 365, firstly, 66 holidays; secondly, half a day on Christmas eve, and, thirdly, the free time the worker

* If the number of working days in the year is 267, the number of non-working days, holidays, must be 98. We said above that there were 89 holidays, but we arrived at this figure by taking, firstly, only machine-operated factories, and secondly, not the average number of holidays for all factories, but the number of holidays most often met with.

enjoys by ceasing work 1½ hours earlier on the eve of holidays. The number of holiday eves will be 60 (not 66, for about 6 holidays coincide with other rest-days). Hence, the reduced hours on the eve of holidays amount to $60 \times 1\frac{1}{2} = 90$ working hours, or 8 working days. Thus, in all, from the 365 days in the year, we have to deduct 74½ holidays ($66 + \frac{1}{2} + 8 = 74\frac{1}{2}$). The result is 290½ working days, or $290\frac{1}{2} \times 11\frac{1}{2} = 3{,}340$ working hours. Thus we find that if the number of holidays is reduced to the compulsory number established by the law, *the condition of the workers will be worsened rather than improved by the introduction of the new law*. On the whole, the number of working hours per year will remain what it was before, or will even be *increased*! Of course, this calculation is only approximate; it cannot be made with complete accuracy. But it is based on quite reliable data and clearly shows what a smart device the government has invented to oppress the workers by reducing the number of compulsory holidays as compared with the customary number. This calculation clearly shows that if the workers do not firmly stand up for one another and offer joint resistance to the employers, their condition may be worsened by the introduction of the new law! And please note in addition, that in this calculation we have taken only *day*-work, that is, *ordinary* working hours. But what about overtime? As we have seen, the law placed no restrictions on this, and we do not know whether the ministers will introduce any restrictions in the regulations which they have been "empowered" to issue. It is this absence of any restrictions on overtime which chiefly leads us to doubt whether the new law will improve the condition of the workers. If, with the reduction of the normal (ordinary) working day, the wages of the majority of the Russian workers remain as preposterously low as they are at present, *the worker will be compelled by want to consent to work overtime, and his condition will not improve*. What the worker needs is to work no more than eight hours a day, and to have time for rest, for his development, and for the enjoyment of his rights as a human being, a family man, and a citizen. What the worker needs is to get not a beggarly wage, but enough to live a decent human life, himself to enjoy the advantage of the improvements introduced in production, and not to surren-

der all the profit to his exploiters. If in order to earn the same pay the worker has to work the same number of hours as before, is it not all the same to him whether his excessive toil is called ordinary time or overtime? The law to reduce the working day will then remain *a dead letter*, *a scrap of paper*. The new law will then not affect the employers in the slightest, and will not compel them to concede anything to the working people. And the officials of the Ministry of Finance, in their servility to the capitalists, *are evidently already hinting at this*. In the same *Vestnik Finansov* article they reassure the employers by saying: "The new law, while restricting freedom of contract in the hiring of workers for ordinary jobs, does not deprive the employer of the opportunity to operate his establishment at any time of the day or night and even, in case of need" (yes, yes! our poor downtrodden employers so often experience the "need" for the unpaid labour of the Russian workers) ... "on holidays by entering into special agreements" (to work overtime) "with the workers."

You see how these lackeys bow and scrape to the moneybags! Please don't be much disturbed, Messrs. the Employers, they as much as say: you may "operate your establishment at any time of the day or night"; all you have to do is to call *overtime* what used to be considered ordinary time. *You merely have to change the name, that is all!*

The most amazing thing in this statement is the brazenness of the officials; they are convinced in advance that there will be no restriction whatever on overtime (if overtime is restricted, the employers will not be able to operate at any time of the day or night!). They are convinced in advance that their frank and cynical advice to the employers not to stand on ceremony will not reach the ears of the workers! In this, even the officials of the Ministry of Finance, we think, have excelled themselves! It will be very instructive for the workers to learn *how* officials talk to the employers and *what* advice they give them. On learning this, the workers will realise that under cover of the new law their old enemies are attacking them, in pursuit of their old striving to enslave the workers on the most "*legal grounds*."

X

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW LAW?

We have now acquainted ourselves with the new law in all its details. All that remains is to discuss *what significance* this law has for the workers and the working-class movement in Russia.

The significance of the new factory law lies, on the one hand, in its being a forced concession by the government, in its having been *won* from the police government by the united and class-conscious workers. The promulgation of this law shows the *success* of the working-class movement in Russia; it shows what tremendous power lies in the class-conscious and staunch demand of the working masses. No amount of persecution, no wholesale arrests and deportations, no grandiose political trials, no hounding of the workers have been of any avail. The government set all its forces and resources into motion. It hurled itself upon the St. Petersburg workers with all the weight of the tremendous power it commands. It hounded and persecuted the workers without trial and with unparalleled ferocity in the endeavour at all costs to *knock* the spirit of protest, of struggle, *out* of the workers, to *crush* the workers' incipient socialist movement against the employers and the government. It was all to no avail, and the government was compelled to realise that no amount of persecution of individual workers would eradicate *the workers' movement* and that it would have to make concessions. This autocratic government, considered to be all-powerful and independent of the people, had to yield to the demands of several tens of thousands of St. Petersburg workers. We have seen how insignificant and ambiguous these concessions are. But this is only the first step. The working-class movement has long ago spread beyond St. Petersburg; it is growing and expanding, embracing the masses of industrial workers with growing thoroughness *all over the country*. And when all these masses, led by one party, the socialist party, present their joint demands, the government will no longer be able to get away with such an insignificant concession!

On the other hand, the significance of the new law lies in the fact that it necessarily and inevitably *gives a fresh*

impetus to the Russian working-class movement. We have seen how the law tries wherever possible to leave loopholes for the employers, to leave the most important points vague and indefinite. Everywhere there is bound to be conflict between the employers and the workers over the application of this law; and this conflict will embrace a far larger area, for the law applies to the whole of Russia. The workers will be able to wage the struggle consciously and firmly, to insist on their demands, and to evade the snares which our anti-strike police laws have set for them. The introduction of new factory regulations, the change in the ordinary, regular working day in the vast majority of factories all over Russia will be of tremendous benefit: it will stir up the most backward sections of the workers; everywhere it will awaken a most lively interest in questions of factory life and factory regulations; it will provide a splendid, convenient and *lawful* opportunity for the workers to present their *demands*, to uphold *their interpretation of the law*, to uphold the *old customs* when they are more advantageous to the worker (as, for example, the *customary holidays* and the cessation of work on Saturdays not 1½ but 2 and more hours earlier), to press for more favourable terms when concluding *new agreements* on overtime, and to press for *higher pay*, so that the reduction of the working day may really benefit the workers and not be detrimental to them in any way.

APPENDIX

I

The pamphlet on the new factory law (the law of June 2, 1897) had already been written when, in the beginning of October, there were published *regulations governing the application* of this law, as endorsed by the Ministry of Finance in agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs on September 20, 1897. We have already spoken about the enormous importance these regulations must have for the law as a whole. This time the Ministry hastened to issue regulations before the new law came into force, because these regulations (as we shall see presently) indicate the cases in which departures from the requirements of the new law are permitted, i.e., when the employers are permitted "to operate" for longer hours than stipulated by law. If the factory owners did not urgently need these regulations, the workers, of course, would have had to wait long before they were issued. The publication of the "regulations" was soon followed by the publication of Instructions to Factory Inspectorate Officials concerning the application of the law of June 2, 1897, ostensibly for the purpose merely of *explaining* to the factory inspectors how the law should be applied; these instructions legally give the officials a perfectly free hand and are directed entirely *against the workers*, for they permit the employers to evade the law in every way. The Imperial Government is very fond of drafting laws in magnificent terms and then of permitting these laws to be evaded by substituting *instructions* for them. A detailed examination of the regulations reveals to us that this is precisely the nature of the new instructions. Let us also point out that these "instructions" are largely *copied word for word* from the article in *Vestnik Finansov* which we referred

to on many occasions in the pamphlet on the new law. Thus, in the pamphlet we showed how *Vestnik Finansov* suggested a trick to the employers, namely: the newspaper explained that the new law did not apply in those cases where no mention was made of the length of the working day in the contract between the worker and the employer, since in that case, it suggested, the worker was not "a hired worker, but a person who accepts an order." This pettifogging explanation is repeated word for word in the "instructions." The regulations consist of twenty-two clauses, many of which, however, simply repeat in their entirety the clauses of the law of June 2, 1897. Let us observe that these regulations apply only to employers "who come within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance"; they do not apply to mining and metallurgical plants, or to railway workshops, or to government factories. A strict distinction must be drawn between these regulations and the law itself: the regulations have been issued only *in pursuance* of the law, and the ministers who issued them may supplement and amend them, or issue new ones. The regulations deal with the following five subjects: 1) meal times; 2) Sunday and holiday rest; 3) departures from the new law; 4) shifts and 5) overtime. Let us examine the regulations on each subject in detail and show in each case how the Ministry of Finance, in its instructions, recommends that these regulations be applied.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

II

Concerning meal times, the following regulations are laid down: first, that meal times do not count as part of working hours, that the worker is free during meal times; the meal times must be indicated in the factory rules; second, that meal times are obligatory only in those cases when the working day exceeds ten hours, and the meal time must not be less than of one hour's duration. This regulation does not improve the workers' condition in the least. If anything, it does the opposite. An hour's break is very little: most factories allow an hour and a half for dinner, and in some cases also half an hour for lunch. The ministers did

their best to make the break as short as possible! Quite often the worker scarcely has time to go home to dinner in an hour.

It goes without saying that the workers will not permit such a short break to be established and will demand a longer one. Another reservation concerning compulsory meal hours also threatens to encroach upon the workers' rights: according to the ministers' regulations, a break for meals is *obligatory* only when the working day exceeds ten hours! Hence, where the working day is ten hours, the employer is entitled not to give the workers a break for meals! Again, the workers themselves will have to see to it that the employers will not be able and will not dare to take advantage of this right. The workers can refuse to agree to such regulations (when they are included in the factory rules) and can demand more frequent breaks for meals. The ministers were not satisfied even with these restrictions. In a "note" to this regulation it is added that "in cases where considerable obstacles are encountered, departures from this requirement are *permitted*," i.e., Messrs. the Employers are *permitted* to give the workers no breaks for meals at all! The ministers permit this, but it is hardly likely that the workers will *permit it*. Moreover, the ministers also *permit* departures when the demand for a break is recognised as burdensome for the workers. Oh, these solicitous ministers! Our ministers thought about the "burden" which meal-time breaks would impose upon the workers, but Messrs. the Ministers do not say a word about the "burden" imposed upon the workers by having to get their dinner within an hour, or about the still greater "burden" of working *ten hours* without a break! A third regulation governing meal times requires that the worker be given the opportunity to take food at intervals of no more than six hours. But the regulations do not call for a *break* every six hours; what, then, is the sense of such a regulation? How can a worker take food without a break? Messrs. the Ministers did not trouble about that. If there is no break (the regulations say), the worker "must be given an opportunity to take food during working time, and the factory rules must indicate the place for taking food." The whole of this regulation is so absurd that one can only express astonishment! One of two things: *either* this "place for taking food" will be indi-

cated as *one other than where the worker works*; in that case a break will be inevitable. Or the place will be indicated as *the one where the worker works*; in that case, what is the sense of indicating the place? If the worker has no right to interrupt his work—how can he eat *without interrupting* his work? Messrs. the Ministers regard the workers as machines: a machine can be fed with oil while it is working, why then (think our "solicitous" ministerial hangers-on of the capital) cannot the worker stuff himself with food while working? The only hope left to the workers is that such a stupid regulation could only have been invented in Russian bureaucratic offices, and will not actually be put into force. The workers will demand that the *indicated* "place for taking food" *will not be where they work*: the workers will demand a *break for meals* every six hours. This, then, is all the regulations say about meal times. The ministers have pursued the law in such a way that it can only worsen the workers' condition, unless the workers themselves stand up, and stand up together, for their rights and not for the ministerial regulations.

III

Concerning Sundays and holidays, there is only one brief regulation, namely, that on Sundays and holidays the workers must be free from work for no less than twenty-four hours at a stretch. This was *the least* that could be ordered "in pursuance" of the law governing Sundays and holidays. It could not be less. It never occurred to the ministers to give the workers longer rest periods (for example, thirty-six hours, as is the case in some other countries). As regards non-Christians, the regulations say nothing.

IV

On the subject of departures from the law, there are many regulations, very many in fact, and drawn up in great detail. Let us remind the workers that the law gave the ministers power to permit, in the regulations, departures from the law, by *extending* the requirements of the law (i.e., demanding

more for the workers from the employers) and *reducing* the requirements of the law (i.e., demanding *less* for the workers from the employers). Let us see what the ministers have done. First regulation. Departures from the law are permitted in those cases where "the workers are engaged on *continuous* operations, i.e., such operations as cannot arbitrarily be interrupted without damage to instruments, materials, or goods." In such cases, Messrs. the Employers may "operate" for periods longer than that provided for in the law. All that the regulation demands in such a case is, firstly, that the working hours during the course of two consecutive days should not exceed twenty-four hours (and in the case of broken shifts—thirty hours). Why it says twenty-four hours in two days and not twelve hours in one day we shall see in the paragraph dealing with shifts. Secondly, the regulation demands that where operations are continuous, the worker must be freed from work four days a month, if his working day exceeds eight hours. Thus, for workers who are engaged on *continuous* operations, the number of rest-days is *greatly reduced*: four a month, forty-eight a year, whereas *even* the law (with all its restricted holidays) allows sixty-six compulsory holidays a year. What reasonable grounds did the ministers have for reducing this number of holidays? None whatever; in any case, the *continuity of operations* is broken even with four holidays a month, i.e., in any case the employers must hire other workers for the holidays (if the operation is *indeed* continuous, i.e., if it cannot be *interrupted*). Thus, Messrs. the Ministers cut the workers' holidays still more *only in order* to "restrict" the employers as little as possible, to reduce the number of cases when *other* workers must be hired! More than that. The "instructions" go so far as to permit the factory inspectors to sanction factory rules which provide for *even fewer rest-days for the workers*! The factory inspector must merely report such cases to the Department of Commerce and Industry. This is a very striking example, which shows why our government is fond of meaningless laws and detailed regulations and instructions: to alter an inconvenient regulation, it is sufficient to apply to the Department ... of Palm-Greasing!! Similarly, the factory inspector may (according to the instructions!) permit the term continuous

to be applied to such operations as are not included in the list appended to the instructions: it is sufficient to report to the Department.... A note to this regulation says that the continuous operations must be *specially indicated* in the factory rules. "Departures from this law are only permitted insofar as they are really necessary" (this is what the ministers' regulation says). But who is to see whether they are *really* necessary or not? Nobody but the workers: they must not permit reservations regarding continuous operations to be included in the factory rules unless they are *really* necessary. Second regulation. Departures from the law are permitted in cases where the workers are engaged on auxiliary operations in various kinds of production (current repairs, tending of boilers, motors and transmission belts, heating, lighting, water supply, watch and fire service, and so forth). These departures must also be *especially indicated* in the factory rules. As regards rest-days for these workers, *the regulations do not say a word.* Again, the workers themselves must see to it that they get rest-days, i.e., must not agree to factory rules which do not provide rest-days for such workers. Third regulation. Departures from the regulations governing the length of the working day and rest on Sundays and holidays and from the factory rules are permitted in two other cases: first, in case of sudden damage to machines, tools, etc., which causes a stoppage of work in the whole factory, or in one of its departments. In such cases, the necessary *repairs* may be made regardless of the regulations. Secondly, permission is given, regardless of the regulations, to perform "temporary work in any department of the establishment, in those cases when, as a consequence of fire, break-down and similar unforeseen circumstances, the work in one or another department of the establishment is reduced or entirely stopped for a time, and when that is essential for the full running of the other departments of the establishment." (In such cases, the employer must that very day report the matter to the factory inspector, who *sanctions* such work.) This last regulation shows what tremendous "solicitude" our ministers display to ensure that the employers do not expend an extra ruble. Suppose there was a fire in one department of a factory. Work is stopped. After

the repairs are made the employer wants to make up for lost time. *Therefore*, the minister permits him to squeeze as much extra labour out of the workers as he likes by compelling them to work even as long as eighteen hours a day. But what have the workers got to do with it? When the employer makes more profit, does he share it with the workers, does he shorten the working day? Why, then, should the working day *be lengthened* for the workers when the employer suffers loss? Why, that means—I take the profit, but I make the workers bear the losses. If it is necessary to make up for lost time, why not hire additional workers? The "solicitude" displayed by the Russian ministers for the pockets of the employers is amazing! Fourth regulation. Departures from the new law may also be made "in other especially important and exceptional cases." (What are these cases? So many especially important and exceptional cases have been enumerated that one might think no more would be left!) Such departures are permitted in each separate case by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Internal Affairs. Thus the employer will make a request, the ministers will grant permission, and all's well. The workers are not even asked: can the "gentry" be expected to ask the opinion of the common people? The vulgar mob must work for the capitalists and not argue about whether it is an "exceptional" case or just the ordinary lust for gain that compels the employer to go begging. Such are the ministers' regulations about departures from the new law. As we see, all these regulations indicate how and when the law may not be obeyed, how and when the law's demands on the employers for the workers' benefit may be reduced. The ministers say *not a single word* about increasing the legal demands upon the employers for the workers' benefit. Let the workers recall what was said in the pamphlet on the new factory law about the purpose for which the law gives the ministers such great powers!

V

As regards shifts, there is only one short regulation which, in cases where 18 hours' work is done in two shifts, permits an *increase* in the number of hours to 12 a day with the

proviso that the working time for two weeks shall not exceed 9 hours per day for each worker. Thus, this regulation also permits *lengthening* of the working day. How many regulations have there been *to lengthen* the working day, but not one to shorten it—and there will be none! According to this regulation, the workers may be compelled to work 12 hours a day for a whole week, and the "instructions" again add that the factory inspectors may permit other departures from the law, provided they report these to the Director.... The question of shifts is also covered by the above-mentioned regula ion which fixes the working time on continuous operations at-*24 hours in two days*. The instructions explain why it says 24 hours in two days and not 12 hours in one day. This is said in order to leave in force the scandalous system that prevails in some factories of working a continuous *double shift with an interval of eight hours*: under this system, a worker works 16 hours one day and 8 hours the next, without ever having proper rest or proper sleep. It is difficult to imagine anything more scandalous than such shifts; but far from doing anything to restrict this scandalous system, the ministers even had the insolence to say in the "instructions" that under many circumstances such shifts are more convenient for the workers!! How solicitous the ministers are for the *convenience of the workers*!

VI

As regards overtime, the regulations at first sight appear to give the most precise directions. The limitation of overtime is the chief thing required not only in the ministerial regulations, but also in the new law as a whole. We have already spoken above about the utter vagueness of the law itself on this point, about the original intention of the Ministry of Finance not to issue any additional overtime regulations. It now turns out that the ministers have after all limited overtime, have limited it in precisely the way proposed by the commission which drafted the new law, i.e., to 120 hours a year. But, on the other hand, in his "instructions," the Minister of Finance reproduced from *Vestnik Finansov*, for the edification of the factory inspectors, all the

traps and tricks *against the workers* which we quoted in the pamphlet on the new law: the "instructions," we repeat, are copied from *Vestnik Finansov*.

The first regulation concerns the point in the new law which permits the employer to include in the contract with the worker the stipulation to work such overtime as is necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry. We have already mentioned the vagueness of this. And yet, this clause of the law is of enormous importance: if the stipulation to work overtime is included in the factory rules, then overtime becomes *obligatory* for the worker, and *the entire law remains entirely unenforced in this respect*. The ministerial regulations now interpret this term in the following way: only such work may be regarded as "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry" as is called forth "exclusively by departures from its normal course which are accidental and dependent upon the nature of the industry." Thus, for example, departures called forth by an increased influx of orders are not affected (as they are not dependent upon the nature of the industry). Departures called forth by a fire, break-down and so forth, are also not affected, because they, too, do not depend upon the nature of the industry itself. *Common sense* would suggest that this is how the regulation should be interpreted. But here the "instructions" come to the employers' aid. The "instructions" so brilliantly increase the number of cases when overtime may be made compulsory for the workers, including it in the terms of hire, i.e., in the factory rules, that *absolutely anything you like* can be classed among these cases. Indeed, let the workers recall how the law *was pursued* in the *Vestnik Finansov* article and compare the "instructions" with the latter. First, the "instructions" speak of work "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry"—and then, imperceptibly, it substitutes another term: "work that is absolutely essential" (Is that so? But who is to judge what is essential?)—and further on the instructions give petty examples of what is "absolutely essential": it turns out that this includes those cases when the employer finds it "impossible, or difficult" (our old acquaintance!) "to increase the number of workers," when there is rush and urgent work (in seasonal work, for example);

when a print-shop has to issue a newspaper daily; when the job could not be foreseen in advance, and so forth. In short, if you want anything, ask for it. The shameless hangers-on of the capitalists in the Ministry of Finance *have pursued* the law in such a way that the employer *has the right* to include in his factory rules the demand *for any amount of overtime. And once such a demand is included in the factory rules, the whole new law goes to blazes and everything remains as before*. The workers must not permit these demands to be included in the factory rules, otherwise their conditions, far from being improved, will be worsened. This example shows the workers how the employers and government officials conspire to enslave the workers again on a legal basis. The "instructions" clearly reveal this conspiracy, this subservience of the Ministry of Finance to the interests of the capitalists.

The second overtime regulation lays down that the overtime by each worker shall not exceed 120 hours per year, but this figure *does not include*, firstly, the overtime stipulated in the contract as obligatory for the worker due to "the technical conditions of the industry," and we have just seen that the ministers have permitted this term to be applied to *any number* of cases which have nothing to do with the "technical conditions of the industry"; secondly, it does not include the overtime worked in case of fire, breakdown, and so forth, or to make up for time lost in case of a stoppage in some department.

Taken together, all these overtime regulations remind us astonishingly of the fable about how the lion shared the prey "equally" among his fellow hunters; the first portion he took by right; the second portion he took for being the king of beasts; the third for being strongest of all; and as for the fourth—whoever dared as much as stretch his paw towards it would not get away alive.[100] This is exactly how our employers will now argue about overtime. First, they will squeeze overtime out of the workers "by right," on the plea that it is "necessitated by the technical conditions of the industry," i.e., any amount of overtime, as long as it is provided for in the factory rules. Second, they will squeeze overtime out of the workers in "special cases," i.e., when they want to throw the burden of their losses

on the workers. Third, they will squeeze another 120 hours per year out of them on the grounds that they are rich and the workers are poor. Fourth, in "exceptional cases" they will receive special privileges from the ministers. And then the workers may "freely" enjoy what remains out of the 24 hours of the day after all this—bearing well in mind that the fair government does not by any means "deprive them of their right" to work even 24 hours a day.... *To legalise* this squeezing of overtime out of the workers it is ordered that the employers shall keep special *registers* of all these forms of overtime. In one register they will record what they squeeze out of the workers "by right"; in another register, what they squeeze out in "special cases"; in a third, what they squeeze out by "special agreement" (not more than 120 hours per year); in a fourth, what they squeeze out of them in "exceptional cases." Instead of an improvement in the workers' condition, we get nothing but red tape and bureaucratic correspondence (as is always the case with all the reforms introduced by the autocratic Russian Government). The factory policemen will visit the factories and "inspect" ... these registers (which the devil himself will not be able to make head or tail of), and during the time that they are free from this useful occupation they will report to the Director of the Department of Commerce and Manufacture suggesting new sops for the employers, and to the Department of Police about workers' strikes. How shrewd are these people, these hucksters and bashi-bazouks who constitute our government! For a reasonable price they will now hire a foreign representative who will shout at all the crossroads of "Europe" about the laws for the workers' benefit that we have in this country,

VII

In conclusion let us make a general survey of the ministerial regulations. Let us recall what regulations the new law provides the ministers with. Three categories of regulations: 1) regulations to interpret the law; 2) regulations to increase or reduce the demands made by the new law on employers; 3) regulations concerning trades especially harmful to the

workers' health. What use have the ministers made of the powers granted them by this law?

As to the first category, they have confined themselves to the most essential, to the very minimum below which they could not go. They have permitted overtime on a very wide and elastic scale—120 hours per year and, moreover, by means of the instructions have introduced such a host of exceptions that they rob the regulations of all meaning. They have done their best to cut down the workers' meal times, they have left the scandalous shift system as it was, if they have not actually made it worse.

As to the second category of regulations, the ministers *have done all they could* to reduce the demands of the new law on the employers, i.e., *they have done all they could for the employers* and *absolutely nothing for the workers*: in no single case do the regulations increase the demands of the new law upon the employers for the workers' benefit.

As to the third category of regulations (i.e., those for the benefit of the workers who are compelled to work at the most harmful occupations), the ministers have done absolutely nothing, they have said not a single word about them. All that the instructions say is that the factory inspectors may report to the Department about especially injurious trades! As far as "reporting" goes the factory inspectors could formerly also report anything they liked, only till now, for some inexplicable reason, these factory policemen "reported" about workers' strikes and about methods of terrorising the workers, and not about protecting the workers in the especially injurious trades.

From this the workers can see for themselves what they may expect from the officials of the police government. To secure an eight-hour day and the complete banning of overtime the Russian workers still have a long and stubborn struggle to wage.

ABOUT A CERTAIN NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

Issue No. 239 of *Russkiye Vedomosti*[101] (dated August 30) contains a short article by Mr. N. Levitsky entitled "Certain Problems Affecting the Life of the People." "Living in the country and being in constant contact with the people" the author "long ago came up against" certain problems affecting the life of the people, the solution of which by means of appropriate "measures" is an "urgent necessity," a "pressing need." The author expresses the conviction that his "brief remarks" on a subject of such importance "will meet with a response among those who are interested in the people's needs," and he expresses the desire to provoke an exchange of opinion on the problems he advances.

The "lofty style" in which Mr. N. Levitsky's article is written and the high-sounding words in which it abounds lead one to expect that it deals with some really important, urgent, vital problems of modern life. Actually, however, the author's proposals merely provide one more example, and an exceedingly striking one at that, of the truly Manilovian[102] fantasy to which the Narodnik journalists have accustomed the Russian public. That is why we thought it would be useful to voice our views on the problems that Mr. N. Levitsky raises.

Mr. N. Levitsky enumerates five "problems" (point by point) and he not only provides an "answer" for every "problem," but also indicates very definitely the appropriate "measure" to be taken. The first problem is—"cheap and accessible" credit, the elimination of the tyranny of money-lenders, "kulaks, and all sorts of sharks and parasites." The measure to be taken is—"to devise a simpler type of

village peasants' loan and saving bank," and the author proposes that the branches of the State Bank should issue savings-bank books not to individuals, but to specially organised associations, which will make deposits and receive loans through a single treasurer.

And so the author's long "contact with the people" enabled him to draw this conclusion on the hackneyed problem of credit—"devise" a new type of loan and savings bank! Evidently the author imagines that not enough paper and ink is being wasted in this country on drafting endless "types," "models," "rules," "model rules," "normal rules," etc., etc. "Living in the country," our practical man failed to see any of the more important problems raised by the desire to replace the "kulak" by "cheap and accessible credit." We shall not, of course, discuss here the importance of credit: we take the author's aim *for granted*; we shall merely examine from the purely practical aspect the remedies he proposes with such pomp. Credit is an institution of developed commodity circulation. The question is—is it possible to establish such an institution among our peasantry, whom the countless survivals of laws and prohibitions that spring from the division of society into social estates have placed in conditions that *rule out* regular, free, extensive and developed commodity circulation? Is it not ridiculous, when speaking of the urgent and pressing needs of the people, to reduce the problem of credit to devising "rules" of a new type and to say nothing whatever about the need *to abolish* the entire mass of "rules" which hinder regular commodity circulation among the peasantry, hinder the free purchase and sale of property—real estate and personal property—hinder the peasants from moving freely from place to place and from one occupation to another, and hinder individuals from other classes and social estates from joining the peasant communities? What can be more comical than fighting "kulaks, usurers, parasites and sharks" by perfecting the "rules" of credit banks? Usury in its worst forms is most tenacious in our rural districts, and is so precisely because of the exclusiveness of the estate system there, because of the thousand fetters which shackle the development of commodity circulation—and yet our practical-minded author says not a word about these fetters, but declares that the drafting of *new* rules is

the urgent problem of rural credit. In all probability the developed capitalist countries, where the rural districts have long been placed in conditions that facilitate the circulation of commodities, and where credit has been extensively developed, in all probability these countries achieved this success thanks to the multitude of "rules" drafted by benevolent officials!

The second problem is—"the helpless position of a peasant family when the head of the family dies," and also "the urgent necessity" of "safeguarding and preserving the peasant working agricultural population by all possible means and methods." As you see, the further he goes the wider and more majestic become Mr. Levitsky's "problems"! The first problem concerned a very ordinary bourgeois institution, the value of which we could only admit with very considerable reservation; but here we have a problem of such gigantic importance that "in principle" we fully admit its urgency and cannot suppress a warm feeling for the author for *raising* it. But the Narodnik's gigantic problem is matched by a "measure" of gigantic ... what is the mildest way we can put it? ... unwisdom. Listen: "...there arises the urgent need to organise and introduce compulsory (sic!) *mutual life insurance for the entire peasant population on a mass scale at the cheapest possible rates** (societies, associations, artels, etc.). And it is necessary to ascertain the role and part to be played in this business by a) private insurance companies, b) the Zemstvos, and c) the state."

Our muzhiks are so dull-witted! They give no thought to the fact that if the head of the family dies the rest will have to go begging; that if the crop fails they will starve, and that even if they have a good crop sometimes, they will have to go begging just the same on returning from abortive quests for "earnings." These stupid muzhiks have no idea that there is such a thing as "life insurance," to which many good gentlemen have long had recourse and out of which other good gentlemen (shareholders in insurance companies) make money. Starving "Sysoika"[103] has no idea that all he has to do is to join with "Mityai," who is starving like himself, in organising a mutual life insurance company (with low, very

* Author's italics.

low contributions!), and their families will be provided for in the event of their death. Luckily, the thinking for these dull-witted muzhiks is done by our enlightened Narodnik intelligentsia, one of whose representatives "living in the country and being in constant contact with the people," "long ago came up against" this tremendous, this astounding and stupendous "project"!

Third problem. "In connection with this problem it is necessary to raise and discuss the problem of establishing *an imperial capital fund for insuring the lives of the peasant population** on the same lines as the existing imperial food and fire funds." It goes without saying that to deal with insurance, we must discuss the question of capital. But it seems to us that our highly esteemed author is guilty here of an important omission. Is it not also "necessary to raise and discuss" the question as to which ministry and which department will be in charge of the proposed institution? Firstly, there can be no doubt that the Economic Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should be in charge of it. Secondly, the Zemstvo Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is also closely interested. Thirdly, the Ministry of Finance should also be in charge of insurance affairs. In view of this, would it not be more advisable to propose the establishment of a special Chief Administration of State Compulsory Mutual Life Insurance for the Entire Peasant Population, on the lines, say, of the *Chief State Horse-Breeding Administration*?

Fourth problem. "Further, in view of the tremendously widespread character of all sorts of artels throughout Russia, and also in view of their undoubted usefulness and importance to the national economy, the urgent need has arisen 4) of organising a separate, special *Society for the Promotion of Agricultural and Other Artels*." That artels of all sorts are beneficial to the classes of the population who organise them is undoubted. It is also undoubted that to unite the representatives of the various classes will also be of great benefit to the entire national economy. Only the author waxes far too enthusiastic when he talks about "the tremendously widespread character of all sorts of artels throughout

* Author's italics.

Russia." Everybody knows that, compared with any West-European country, the number of "all sorts of artels" is *incredibly, phenomenally small* in Russia.... "Everybody knows this" ... except the dreamy Manilov. The editors of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, for example, know it since they published *above* Mr. N. Levitsky's article a very interesting and highly informative item, entitled "Syndicates in France." From this article Mr. N. Levitsky might have learned how immensely "*all sorts of artels*" are developed in capitalist France (compared with non-capitalist Russia). I underline "all sorts," for it can easily be seen from this article that there are four sorts of syndicates in France: 1) workers' syndicates (2,163 syndicates with 419,172 members); 2) employers' syndicates (1,622 with 130,752 members); 3) agricultural syndicates (1,188 with 398,048 members) and 4) mixed syndicates (173 with 31,126 members). Add up all these figures, Mr. Levitsky! You will get a total of nearly a million people (979,000) organised in "all sorts of artels." And now tell us, with your hand on your heart, are you really not ashamed of the phrase you let slip about the "tremendously widespread character of all sorts (sic!!!) of artels throughout Russia"? Do you really fail to see what a comical, sadly comical impression your article creates by the side of the bare figures of the "syndicates in France"? These poor Frenchmen, whom, evidently, the canker of capitalism has deprived of the "tremendously widespread character of all sorts of artels," would probably burst into Homeric laughter at the proposal to establish a "separate special society" ... for promoting the establishment of all sorts of societies! It goes without saying, however, that this laughter would only be a demonstration of the notorious frivolity of the French, who are incapable of understanding Russian thoroughness. These frivolous Frenchmen form "all sorts of artels," not only without first setting up "societies for the promotion of artels" but even—horribile dictu!—without first drawing up "model," "normal" rules and "simplified types" of societies of various kinds!

Fifth problem ... (the urgent need has arisen) "to publish, under the auspices of this society (or separately), *a special organ ... devoted exclusively to the study of the co-operative movement in Russia and abroad*."... Yes, yes, Mr. Levitsky!

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When a disordered stomach prevents a person from having a proper meal, he has no alternative but to read about how other people eat. But in all probability, the doctors would not allow a person who is so sick to read about the dinners other people eat, for such reading might stimulate an inordinate appetite not commensurate with the diet prescribed.... And the doctors would be quite consistent in doing so.

We have expounded Mr. Levitsky's short article in sufficient detail. The reader will probably ask whether it was worth dealing at such length with a casual newspaper article, whether it was worth devoting such a lengthy comment to it. Indeed, what importance is there in the fact that somebody (who, generally speaking, is prompted by the best intentions) happened to talk nonsense about some sort of compulsory mutual life insurance for the entire peasant population? We have heard very similar opinions expressed on analogous subjects. These opinions are, to say the least, groundless. Maybe it is an accident that our "progressive journalists" every now and again positively vomit up such phenomenally wild "projects" on the lines of "feudal socialism" that one can only shrug one's shoulders in amazement? Maybe it is an accident that organs like *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and *Russkiye Vedomosti*, which are by no means ultra-Narodnik, which always protest against the extremes of Narodism and against the conclusions drawn from Narodism à la Mr. V. V., and which are even not averse to covering up the rags and tatters of their Narodism with the bright new label of some "ethico-sociological school," that even such organs periodically, with punctilious regularity, present the Russian public now with some "educational utopia" proposed by Mr. S. Yuzhakov[104]—a scheme for compulsory secondary education in agricultural gymnasia in which indigent peasants are to pay the tuition fees by work—and now with this project of Mr. N. Levitsky's for compulsory mutual life insurance for the entire peasant population?*

It would be too naïve to put this down to accident. There is a Manilov in every Narodnik. Disdain for conditions as they really are and for economic evolution as it really is,

* Comparing these two fantasy-weavers of Narodnik journalism one cannot help giving preference to Mr. N. Levitsky, whose project is *a trifle cleverer* than that of Mr. S. Yuzhakov.

unwillingness to analyse the real interests of the different classes of Russian society in their inter-relationships, the habit of laying down the law *from above* about the "needs" and "destiny" of the fatherland, of boasting about the miserable survivals of medieval associations that exist in the Russian village communities and artels, together with a disdainful attitude towards the incomparably more highly developed associations characteristic of more highly developed capitalism—all these features are to be found in a greater or lesser degree in *every* Narodnik. That is why it is so edifying to watch some not over-clever, but very naïve, writer, with a fearlessness worthy of a better cause, carrying these features to their full logical development and embodying them in the dazzling picture of some "project." These projects always turn out to be dazzling, so dazzling that merely to *show* them to the reader is *to prove* how harmful contemporary petty-bourgeois Narodism is to our social thought and social development. Such projects always contain much that is comical; in most cases a superficial reading of them creates no other impression than a desire to laugh. But try to get at their real meaning and you will say: "It would all be funny were it not so sad!"[105]

Written in exile in September 1897

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Signed: K. T—n

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THE TASKS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[106]

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at the end of 1897

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by Vl. Ilyin, 1907

ПРОЛЕТАРІИ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ!

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ.

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ.

ЗАДАЧИ РУССКИХЪ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТОВЪ

Изданіе 2-е.

СЪ ПРЕДИСЛОВІЯМИ

АВТОРА

И

П. Б. АКСЕЛЬРОДА.

Изданіе Загран. Лиги Русск. Революціонной Соціальдемократіи.

ЖЕНЕВА

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1902 г.

Cover of the second edition of Lenin's *Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats.* 1902

Cover of the second edition of Lenin's
Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats. 1902

The second half of the nineties witnessed a remarkable increase in the work being done on the presentation and solution of the problems of the Russian revolution. The appearance of a new revolutionary party, Narodnoye Pravo,[107] the growing influence and successes of the Social-Democrats, the evolution within Narodnaya Volya[108]—all this has evoked a lively discussion on questions of programme both in study circles of socialist intellectuals and workers and in illegal literature. Regarding the latter sphere, reference should be made to "An Urgent Question" and the "Manifesto" (1894) of the Narodnoye Pravo Party, to the *Leaflet of the Narodnaya Volya Group*, to *Rabotnik* published abroad by the League of Russian Social-Democrats,[109] to the increasing output of revolutionary pamphlets in Russia, mainly for workers, and the agitation conducted by the Social-Democratic League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in St. Petersburg around the important strikes there in 1896, etc.

At the present time (the end of 1897), the most urgent question, in our opinion, is that of the *practical* activities of the Social-Democrats. We emphasise the *practical* side of Social-Democracy, because on the theoretical side the most critical period—the period of stubborn refusal by its opponents to understand it, of strenuous efforts to suppress the new trend the moment it arose, on the one hand, and of stalwart defence of the fundamentals of Social-Democracy, on the other—is now apparently behind us. Now the *main and basic features* of the theoretical views of the Social-Demo-

crats have been sufficiently clarified. The same cannot be said about the *practical* side of Social-Democracy, about its political *programme*, its methods, its tactics. It is in this sphere, we think, that misapprehension and mutual misunderstanding mostly prevail, preventing a complete rapprochement between Social-Democracy and those revolutionaries who in theory have completely renounced the principles of the Narodnaya Volya and in practice are either led by the very force of circumstances to carry on propaganda and agitation among the workers—nay, more: to conduct their activities among the workers on the basis of the *class struggle*—or else strive to base their whole programme and revolutionary activities on *democratic* tasks. If we are not mistaken, the latter description fits the two revolutionary groups which are operating in Russia at the present time, parallel to the Social-Democrats, namely, the Narodnaya Volya and Narodnoye Pravo.

We, therefore, think it particularly opportune to try to explain the *practical* tasks of the Social-Democrats and to state the grounds on which we consider their programme to be the most rational of the three now existing and the arguments advanced against it to be based very largely on misunderstanding.

The object of the practical activities of the Social-Democrats is, as is well known, to lead the class struggle of the proletariat and to organise that struggle in both its manifestations: socialist (the fight against the capitalist class aimed at destroying the class system and organising socialist society), and democratic (the fight against absolutism aimed at winning political liberty in Russia and democratising the political and social system of Russia). We said *as is well known*. And indeed, from the very moment they appeared as a separate social-revolutionary trend, the Russian Social-Democrats have always quite definitely indicated this object of their activities, have always emphasised the dual manifestation and content of the class struggle of the proletariat and have always insisted on the inseparable connection between their socialist and democratic tasks—a connection clearly expressed in the name they have adopted. Nevertheless, to this day you often meet socialists who have the most distorted notions about the Social-Democrats

and accuse them of ignoring the political struggle, etc. Let us, therefore, dwell a little on a description of both aspects of the practical activities of Russian Social-Democracy.

Let us begin with socialist activity. One would have thought that the character of Social-Democratic activity in this respect had become quite clear since the Social-Democratic League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in St. Petersburg began its activities among the St. Petersburg workers. The socialist activities of Russian Social-Democrats consist in spreading *by propaganda* the teachings of scientific socialism, in spreading among the workers a proper understanding of the present social and economic system, its basis and its development, an understanding of the various *classes* in Russian society, of their interrelations, of the struggle between these classes, of the role of the working class in this struggle, of its attitude towards the declining and the developing classes, towards the past and the future of capitalism, an understanding of the historical task of international Social-Democracy and of the Russian working class. Inseparably connected with propaganda is *agitation* among the workers, which naturally comes to the forefront in the present political conditions of Russia and at the present level of development of the masses of workers. Agitation among the workers means that the Social-Democrats take part in all the spontaneous manifestations of the working-class struggle, in all the conflicts between the workers and the capitalists over the working day, wages, working conditions, etc., etc. Our task is to merge our activities with the practical, everyday questions of working-class life, to help the workers understand these questions, to draw the workers' attention to the most important abuses, to help them formulate their demands to the employers more precisely and practically, to develop among the workers consciousness of their solidarity, consciousness of the common interests and common cause of all the Russian workers as a united working class that is part of the international army of the proletariat. To organise study circles among workers, to establish proper and secret connections between them and the central group of Social-Democrats, to publish and distribute working-class literature, to organise the receipt of correspondence from all

centres of the working-class movement, to publish agitational leaflets and manifestos and to distribute them, and to train a body of experienced agitators—such, in broad outline, are the manifestations of the socialist activities of Russian Social-Democracy.

Our work is primarily and mainly directed to the factory, urban workers. Russian Social-Democracy must not dissipate its forces; it must concentrate its activities on the industrial proletariat, who are most susceptible to Social-Democratic ideas, most developed intellectually and politically, and most important by virtue of their numbers and concentration in the country's large political centres. The creation of a durable revolutionary organisation among the factory, urban workers is therefore the first and most urgent task confronting Social-Democracy, one from which it would be highly unwise to let ourselves be diverted at the present time. But, while recognising the necessity of concentrating our forces on the factory workers and opposing the dissipation of our forces, we do not in the least wish to suggest that the Russian Social-Democrats should ignore other strata of the Russian proletariat and working class. Nothing of the kind. The very conditions of life of the Russian factory workers very often compel them to enter into the closest relations with the handicraftsmen, the industrial proletariat scattered outside the factory in towns and villages, and whose conditions are infinitely worse. The Russian factory worker also comes into direct contact with the rural population (very often the factory worker's family live in the country) and, consequently, he cannot but come into close contact with the rural proletariat, with the many millions of regular farm workers and day labourers, and also with those ruined peasants who, while clinging to their miserable plots of land, have to work off their debts and take on all sorts of "casual jobs," i.e., are also wage-labourers. The Russian Social-Democrats think it inopportune *to send* their forces among the handicraftsmen and rural labourers, but they do not in the least intend to ignore them; they will try to enlighten the advanced workers also on questions affecting the lives of the handicraftsmen and rural labourers, so that when these workers come into contact with the more backward strata of the proletariat, they will imbue them with the

ideas of the class struggle, socialism and the political tasks of Russian democracy in general and of the Russian proletariat in particular. It is impractical to send agitators among the handicraftsmen and rural labourers when there is still so much work to be done among the factory, urban workers, but in numerous cases the socialist worker comes willy-nilly into contact with these people and must be able to take advantage of these opportunities and understand the general tasks of Social-Democracy in Russia. Hence, those who accuse the Russian Social-Democrats of being narrow-minded, of trying to ignore the mass of the labouring population for the sake of the factory workers, are profoundly mistaken. On the contrary, agitation among the advanced sections of the proletariat is the surest and the only way to rouse (as the movement expands) the entire Russian proletariat. The dissemination of socialism and of the idea of the class struggle among the urban workers will inevitably cause these ideas to flow in the smaller and more scattered channels. This requires that these ideas take deeper root among the better prepared elements and spread throughout the vanguard of the Russian working-class movement and of the Russian revolution. While concentrating all its forces on activity among the factory workers, Russian Social-Democracy is ready to support those Russian revolutionaries who, in practice, come to base their socialist activities on the class struggle of the proletariat; but it does not in the least conceal the point that no practical alliances with other groups of revolutionaries can, or should, lead to compromises or concessions on matters of theory, programme or banner. Convinced that the doctrine of scientific socialism and the class struggle is the only revolutionary theory that can today serve as the banner of the revolutionary movement, the Russian Social-Democrats will exert every effort to spread this doctrine, to guard it against false interpretation and to combat every attempt to impose vaguer doctrines on the still young working-class movement in Russia. Theoretical reasoning proves and the practical activities of the Social-Democrats show that all *socialists* in Russia should become *Social-Democrats*.

Let us now deal with the *democratic* tasks and with the democratic work of the Social-Democrats. Let us repeat,

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once again, that this work is *inseparably* connected with socialist activity. In conducting *propaganda* among the workers, the Social-Democrats *cannot* avoid political problems, and they would regard any attempt to avoid them, or even to push them aside, as a profound mistake and a departure from the basic principles of international Social-Democracy. Simultaneously with the dissemination of scientific socialism, Russian Social-Democrats set themselves the task of propagating *democratic ideas* among the working-class masses; they strive to spread an understanding of absolutism in all its manifestations, of its class content, of the necessity to overthrow it, of the impossibility of waging a successful struggle for the workers' cause without achieving political liberty and the democratisation of Russia's political and social system. In conducting *agitation* among the workers on their immediate *economic* demands, the Social-Democrats inseparably link this with agitation on the immediate political needs, the distress and the demands of the working class, agitation against police tyranny, manifested in every strike, in every conflict between workers and capitalists, agitation against the restriction of the rights of the workers as Russian citizens in general and as the class suffering the worst oppression and having the least rights in particular, agitation against every prominent representative and flunkey of absolutism who comes into direct contact with the workers and who clearly reveals to the working class its condition of political slavery. Just as there is no issue affecting the life of the workers in the economic field that must be left unused for the purpose of economic agitation, so there is no issue in the political field that does not serve as a subject for political agitation. These two kinds of agitation are inseparably connected in the activities of the Social-Democrats as the two sides of the same medal. Both economic and political agitation are equally necessary to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat; both economic and political agitation are equally necessary for guiding the class struggle of the Russian workers, because every class struggle is a political struggle. By arousing the class-consciousness of the workers, by organising, disciplining and training them for united action and for the fight for the ideals of Social-Democracy, both

kinds of agitation will enable the workers to test their strength on immediate issues and immediate needs, to wring partial concessions from their enemy and thus improve their economic conditions, compel the capitalists to reckon with the strength of the organised workers, compel the government to extend the workers' rights, to pay heed to their demands and keep the government in constant fear of the hostility of the masses of workers led by a strong Social-Democratic organisation.

We have pointed to the inseparably close connection between *socialist* and *democratic* propaganda *and* agitation, to the complete parallelism of revolutionary activity in both spheres. Nevertheless, there is a big difference between these two types of activity and struggle. The difference is that in the economic struggle the proletariat stands absolutely alone against both the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie, except, perhaps, for the help it receives (and by no means always) from those elements of the petty bourgeoisie which gravitate towards the proletariat. In the democratic, *political* struggle, however, the Russian working class does not stand alone; at its side are all the political opposition elements, strata and classes, since they are hostile to absolutism and are fighting it in one form or another. Here *side by side* with the proletariat stand the opposition elements of the bourgeoisie, or of the educated classes, or of the petty bourgeoisie, or of the nationalities, religions and sects, etc., etc., persecuted by the autocratic government. The question naturally arises of what the attitude of the working class towards these elements should be. Further, should it not combine with them in the common struggle against the autocracy? After all, all Social-Democrats admit that the political revolution in Russia must precede the socialist revolution; should they not, therefore, combine with all the elements in the political opposition to fight the autocracy, setting socialism aside for the time being? Is not this essential in order to strengthen the fight against the autocracy?

Let us examine these two questions.

The attitude of the working class, as a fighter against the autocracy, towards all the other social classes and groups in the political opposition is very precisely determined by

the basic principles of Social-Democracy expounded in the famous *Communist Manifesto*. The Social-Democrats support the progressive social classes against the reactionary classes, the bourgeoisie against the representatives of privileged landowning estate and the bureaucracy, the big bourgeoisie against the reactionary strivings of the petty bourgeoisie. This support does not presuppose, nor does it call for, any compromise with non-Social-Democratic programmes and principles—it is support given to an ally against a *particular* enemy. Moreover, the Social-Democrats render this support in order to expedite the fall of the common enemy, but expect nothing *for themselves* from these temporary allies, and concede nothing to them. The Social-Democrats support every revolutionary movement against the present social system, they support all oppressed nationalities, persecuted religions, downtrodden social estates, etc., in their fight for equal rights.

Support for all elements of the political opposition will be expressed in the propaganda of the Social-Democrats by the fact that, in showing that the autocracy is hostile to the workers' cause, they will also point to its hostility towards various other social groups; they will point to the solidarity of the working class with these groups on *a particular issue*, *in a particular task*, etc. In agitation, this support will be expressed by the Social-Democrats' taking advantage of every manifestation of the police tyranny of the autocracy to point out to the workers how this tyranny affects all Russian citizens *in general*, and the representatives of the exceptionally oppressed social estates, nationalities, religions, sects, etc., in particular; and how that tyranny affects *the working class* especially. Finally, in practice, this support is expressed in the readiness of the Russian Social-Democrats to enter into alliances with revolutionaries of other trends for the purpose of achieving certain particular aims, and this readiness has been shown in practice on more than one occasion.

This brings us to the second question. While pointing to the solidarity of one or other of the various opposition groups with the workers, the Social-Democrats will always single out the workers from the rest, they will always point out that this solidarity is temporary and conditional, they will

always emphasise the independent class identity of the proletariat, who tomorrow may find themselves in opposition to their allies of today. We shall be told that "such action will *weaken* all the fighters for political liberty at the present time." We shall reply that such action will *strengthen* all the fighters for political liberty. Only those fighters are strong who rely on the *consciously recognised* real interests of certain *classes*, and any attempt to obscure these class interests, which already play a predominant role in contemporary society, will only weaken the fighters. That is the first point. The second point is that, in the fight against the autocracy, the working class must single itself out, for it is the *only* thoroughly consistent and unreserved enemy of the autocracy, *only* between the working class and the autocracy is no compromise possible, *only* in the working class can democracy find a champion who makes no reservations, is not irresolute and does not look back. The hostility of all other classes, groups and strata of the population towards the autocracy is *not unqualified*; their democracy always looks back. The bourgeoisie cannot but realise that industrial and social development is being retarded by the autocracy, but it fears the complete democratisation of the political and social system and can at any moment enter into alliance with the autocracy against the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie is two-faced by its very nature, and while it gravitates, on the one hand, towards the proletariat and democracy, on the other, it gravitates towards the reactionary classes, tries to hold up the march of history, is apt to be seduced by the experiments and blandishments of the autocracy (for example, the "people's policy"[110] of Alexander III), is capable of concluding an alliance with the ruling classes against the proletariat *for the sake of* strengthening its own *small-proprietor* position. Educated people, and the "intelligentsia" generally, cannot but revolt against the savage police tyranny of the autocracy, which hunts down thought and knowledge; but the material interests of this intelligentsia bind it to the autocracy and to the bourgeoisie, compel it to be inconsistent, to compromise, to sell its oppositional and revolutionary ardour for an official salary, or a share of profits or dividends. As for the democratic elements among the oppressed nationalities and

the persecuted religions, everybody knows and sees that the class antagonisms within these categories of the population are much deeper-going and stronger than the solidarity binding all classes within any one category against the autocracy and in favour of democratic institutions. The proletariat alone can be—and because of its class position must be—a consistently democratic, determined enemy of absolutism, incapable of making any concessions or compromises. The proletariat alone can be the *vanguard fighter* for political liberty and for democratic institutions. Firstly, this is because political tyranny bears most heavily upon the proletariat whose position gives it no opportunity to secure a modification of that tyranny—it has no access to the higher authorities, not even to the officials, and it has no influence on public opinion. Secondly, the proletariat alone is capable of bringing about the *complete* democratisation of the political and social system, since this would place the system in the hands of the workers. That is why the *merging* of the democratic activities of the working class with the democratic aspirations of other classes and groups would *weaken* the democratic movement, would *weaken* the political struggle, would make it less determined, less consistent, more likely to compromise. On the other hand, if the working class *stands out* as the vanguard fighter for democratic institutions, this will *strengthen* the democratic movement, will *strengthen* the struggle for political liberty, because the working class will *spur on* all the other democratic and political opposition elements, will push the liberals towards the political radicals, will push the radicals towards an irrevocable rupture with the whole of the political and social structure of present society. We said above that all *socialists* in Russia should become *Social-Democrats*. We now add: all true and consistent *democrats* in Russia should become *Social-Democrats*.

We will illustrate what we mean by quoting the following example. Take the civil service, the bureaucracy, as representing a special category of persons who specialise in the work of administration and occupy a privileged position as compared with the people. We see this institution everywhere, from autocratic and semi-Asiatic Russia to cultured, free and civilised England, as an essential organ of

bourgeois society. The *complete lack of rights* of the people in relation to government officials and the *complete* absence of control over the privileged bureaucracy correspond to the backwardness of Russia and to its absolutism In England powerful popular control is exercised over the administration, but even there that control *is far from being complete*, even there the bureaucracy retains not a few of its privileges, and not infrequently is the master and not the servant of the people. Even in England we see that powerful social groups support the privileged position of the bureaucracy and hinder the complete democratisation of that institution. Why? Because it is in the interests of the proletariat alone to democratise it *completely*; the most progressive strata of the bourgeoisie defend certain prerogatives of the bureaucracy and are opposed to the election of all officials, opposed to the complete abolition of electoral qualifications, opposed to making officials directly responsible to the people, etc., because these strata realise that the proletariat will take advantage of such complete democratisation in order to use it *against* the bourgeoisie. This is the case in Russia, too. Many and most diverse strata of the Russian people are opposed to the omnipotent, irresponsible, corrupt, savage, ignorant and parasitic Russian bureaucracy. But except for the proletariat, *not one* of these strata would agree to the complete democratisation of the bureaucracy, because all these strata (bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, the "intelligentsia" in general) have some ties with the bureaucracy, because all these strata are *kith and kin* of the Russian bureaucracy. Who does not know how easy it is in Holy Russia for a radical intellectual, or socialist intellectual, to turn into an official of the Imperial Government, an official who takes comfort from the thought that he does "good" within the limits of office routine, an official who pleads this "good" in justification of his political indifference, his servility towards the government of the knout and the whip? *The proletariat* alone is unreservedly hostile to the autocracy and the Russian bureaucracy, *socialists proletariat* alone has no *ties* with these organs of aristocratic-bourgeois society and the proletariat alone is capable of irreconcilable hostility towards them and of waging a determined struggle against them.

When we show that the proletariat, led in its class struggle by Social-Democracy, is the vanguard fighter of Russian democracy, we encounter the very widespread and very strange opinion that Russian Social-Democracy relegates political tasks and political struggle to the background. As we see, this opinion is the very opposite of the truth. How are we to explain this astonishing failure to understand the principles of Social-Democracy that have often been expounded and were expounded in the very first Russian Social-Democratic publications, in the pamphlets and books published abroad by the Emancipation of Labour group?[111] In our view, the explanation of this amazing fact lies in the following three circumstances.

First, it lies in the general failure of the representatives of old revolutionary theories to understand the principles of Social-Democracy, accustomed as they are to base their programmes and plans of activity on abstract ideas and not on an exact appraisal of the actual classes operating in the country, classes that have been placed in certain relationships by history. This lack of realistic discussion of the *interests* which support Russian democracy can only give rise to the opinion that Russian Social-Democracy leaves the democratic tasks of Russian revolutionaries in the background.

Second, it lies in the failure to understand that when economic and political issues, and socialist and democratic activities, are united into one whole, into the single *class struggle of the proletariat*, this does not weaken but strengthens the democratic movement and the political struggle, by bringing it closer to the real interests of the mass of the people, dragging political issues out of the "stuffy studies of the intelligentsia" into the street, into the midst of the workers and labouring classes, and replacing abstract ideas by real manifestations of political oppression from which the greatest sufferers are the proletariat, and on the basis of which the Social-Democrats conduct their agitation. It often seems to the Russian radical that instead of frankly and directly calling upon the advanced workers to join the political struggle, the Social-Democrat points to the task of developing the working-class movement, of organising the class struggle of the proletariat, and thereby *retreats* from his democracy, relegates the political struggle

to the background. But if this is *retreat*, it is the kind of retreat that is meant in the French proverb: "Il faut reculer pour mieux sauter!" (Step back in order to leap farther forward.)

Third, the misunderstanding arises from the fact that the very term "political struggle" means something different to the Narodovoltsi and Narodopravtsi, on the one hand, and to the Social-Democrats, on the other. The Social-Democrats understand the political struggle differently, they understand it *much more broadly* than do the representatives of the old revolutionary theories. A clear illustration of this seeming paradox is provided by the *Leaflet of the Narodnaya Volya Group*, No. 4, December 9, 1895. While heartily welcoming this publication, which testifies to the profound and fruitful thinking that is going on among the present-day Narodovoltsi, we cannot refrain from mentioning P. L. Lavrov's article, "Programme questions" (pp. 19-22), which vividly reveals the different conception of the political struggle entertained by the old-style Narodovoltsi.* "...Here," writes P. L. Lavrov, speaking of the relation of the Narodnaya Volya programme to the Social-Democratic programme, "one thing and one thing alone is material, viz., is it possible to organise a strong workers' party under the autocracy and to do so apart from the organisation of a revolutionary party directed against the autocracy?" (p. 21, col. 2); also a little before that (in col. 1): "...to organise a Russian workers' party while autocracy reigns without at the same time organising a revolutionary party against this autocracy." We cannot at all understand these distinctions which seem to be of such cardinal importance to P. L. Lavrov. What is the meaning of "a workers' party *apart from* a revolutionary party against the autoc-

* P. L. Lavrov's article in No. 4 is, in fact, only an "excerpt" from a long letter written by him for *Material*.[112] We have heard that the full text of this letter and a reply by Plekhanov were also published abroad this summer (1897) but we have seen neither the one nor the other. Nor do we know whether *Leaflet of the Narodnaya Volya Group*, No. 5, in which the editors promised to publish an editorial article on P. L. Lavrov's letter, has appeared yet. See No. 4, p. 22, col. 1, footnote.

racy"?? Is not a workers' party itself a revolutionary party? Is it not directed against the autocracy? This queer idea is explained in the following passage in P. L. Lavrov's article: "A Russian workers' party will have to be organised under the rule of the autocracy with all its charms. If the Social-Democrats succeeded in doing this without at the same time organising a political *conspiracy** against the autocracy, with all that goes with such a *conspiracy*,* then, of course, their political programme would be a fit and proper programme for Russian socialists, since the emancipation of the workers by the efforts of the workers themselves would be accomplished. But this is very doubtful, if not impossible" (p. 21, col. 1). So that's the point! To the Narodovoltsi, the term political struggle is synonymous with the term political *conspiracy*! It must be confessed that in these words P. L. Lavrov has managed to bring out in bold relief the fundamental difference between the tactics in the political struggle adopted by the Narodovoltsi and by the Social-Democrats. Blanquist,[113] conspiratorial traditions are fearfully strong among the former, so much so that they cannot conceive of political struggle except in the form of political conspiracy. The Social-Democrats, however, are not guilty of such a narrow outlook; they do not believe in conspiracies; they think that the period of conspiracies has long passed away, that to reduce political struggle to conspiracy means, on the one hand, immensely restricting its scope, and, on the other hand, choosing the most unsuitable methods of struggle. Everyone will understand that P. L. Lavrov's remark that "the Russian Social-Democrats take the activities of the West as an unfailing model" (p. 21, col. 1) is nothing more than a polemical manoeuvre, and that actually the Russian Social-Democrats have never forgotten the political conditions here, they have never dreamed of being able to form a workers' party in Russia legally, they have never separated the task of fighting for socialism from that of fighting for political liberty. But they have always thought, and continue to think, that this fight must be waged not by conspirators, but by a revolutionary party based on the working-

* Our italics.

class movement. They think that the fight against the autocracy must consist not in organising conspiracies, but in educating, disciplining and organising the proletariat, in political agitation among the workers which denounces every manifestation of absolutism, which pillories all the knights of the police government and compels this government to make concessions. Is this not precisely the kind of activity being conducted by the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class? Does not this organisation represent the embryo of a revolutionary party based on the working-class movement, which leads the class struggle of the proletariat against capital and against the autocratic government without hatching any conspiracies, while deriving its strength from the *combination* of socialist and democratic struggle into the single, indivisible class struggle of the St. Petersburg proletariat? Brief as they may have been, have not the activities of the League already shown that the proletariat, led by Social-Democracy, is a big political force with which the government is already compelled to reckon, and to which it hastens to make concessions? Both the haste with which the law of June 2, 1897, was passed, and the content of that law clearly reveal its significance as a concession wrung by the proletariat, as a position won from the enemy of the Russian people. This concession is a very tiny one, the position won is very small, but the working-class organisation that has succeeded in forcing this concession is also not distinguished for breadth, stability, long standing or wealth of experience or resources. As is well known, the League of Struggle was formed only in 1895-96, and its appeals to the workers have been confined to hectographed or lithographed leaflets. Can it he denied that an organisation like this, if it united, at least, the biggest centres of the working-class movement in Russia (the St. Petersburg, Moscow-Vladimir, and the southern areas, and also the most important towns like Odessa, Kiev, Saratov, etc.), if it had a revolutionary organ at its disposal and enjoyed as much prestige among the Russian workers generally as the League of Struggle does among the St. Petersburg workers—can it be denied that such an organisation would be a tremendous political factor in contemporary Russia, a

factor that the government would have to reckon with in its entire home and foreign policy. By leading the class struggle of the proletariat, developing organisation and discipline among the workers, helping them to fight for their immediate economic needs and to win position after position from capital, by politically educating the workers and systematically and unswervingly attacking the autocracy and making life a torment for every tsarist bashi-bazouk who makes the proletariat feel the heavy paw of the police government—such an organisation would at one and the same time be a workers' party organisation adapted to our conditions, and a powerful revolutionary party directed against the autocracy. To discuss in advance what methods this organisation will resort to in order to deliver a smashing blow at the autocracy, whether, for example, it will prefer insurrection, a mass political strike, or some other form of attack, to discuss these things in advance and to decide this question now would be empty doctrinairism. It would be akin to generals calling a council of war before they had mustered their troops, mobilised them, and undertaken a campaign against the enemy. When the army of the proletariat fights unswervingly and under the leadership of a strong Social-Democratic organisation for its economic and political emancipation, that army will itself indicate the methods and means of action to the generals. Then, and then only, will it be possible to decide the question of striking the final blow at the autocracy; for the solution of the problem depends on the state of the working-class movement, on its breadth, on the methods of struggle developed by the movement, on the qualities of the revolutionary organisation leading the movement, on the attitude of other social elements to the proletariat and to the autocracy, on the conditions governing home and foreign politics—in a word, it depends on a thousand and one things which cannot be guessed, and which it would be useless to try to guess in advance.

That is why the following argument of P. L. Lavrov's is also extremely unfair:

"If, however, they" (the Social-Democrats) "have, in one way or another, not only to group the workers' forces for the struggle against capital, but also to rally revolu-

tionary individuals and groups for the struggle against the autocracy, the Russian Social-Democrats will *actually* be adopting the programme of their opponents, the Narodnaya Volya, no matter what they may call themselves. Differences of opinion concerning the village community, the destiny of capitalism in Russia and economic materialism are points of detail of very little importance to the real cause, either facilitating or hindering the solution of particular problems, particular methods of preparing the main points, but nothing more" (p. 21, col. 1).

It is strange to have to challenge this last proposition—that differences of opinion on the fundamental questions of Russian life and of the development of Russian society, on the fundamental problems of the conception of history, concern only "points of detail"! It was said long ago that without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement, and it is hardly necessary to advance proof of this truth *at the present time*. The theory of the class struggle, the materialist conception of Russian history and the materialist appraisal of the present economic and political situation in Russia, recognition of the need to relate the revolutionary struggle strictly to the definite interests of a definite class and to analyse its relation to other classes—to call these great revolutionary questions "points of detail" is so colossally wrong and unexpected, coming from a veteran of revolutionary *theory*, that we are almost prepared to regard this passage as a lapsus. As for the first part of the tirade quoted, its unfairness is still more astonishing. To state in print that the Russian Social-Democrats only group the workers' forces for the struggle against capital (i.e., only for the economic struggle!) and do not rally revolutionary individuals and groups for the struggle against the autocracy, means that the author either does not know or does not want to know generally known facts concerning the activities of the Russian Social-Democrats. Or, perhaps, P. L. Lavrov does not regard the Social-Democrats who are engaged in practical work in Russia as "revolutionary individuals" and "revolutionary groups"?! Or (and this, perhaps, is more likely) by "struggle" against the autocracy he means only conspiracies against it? (Cf. p. 21, col. 2: "... it is a matter of ... organising a revolutionary *conspiracy*";

our italics.) Perhaps, in P. L. Lavrov's opinion, those who do not organise political conspiracies are not engaged in political struggle? We repeat once again: opinions like these fully correspond to the old-time traditions of the old-time Narodnaya Volya, but do not correspond at all either to contemporary conceptions of the political struggle or to contemporary conditions.

We have still to say a few words about the Narodopravtsi. P. L. Lavrov is quite right, in our opinion, when he says that the Social-Democrats "recommend the Narodopravtsi as being more frank, and are ready to support them, without, however, merging with them" (p. 19, col. 2); he should only have added: as more frank *democrats*, and *to the degree that* the Narodopravtsi act as consistent democrats. Unfortunately, this condition is more a matter of the desired future than of the actual present. The Narodopravtsi expressed a desire to free the democratic tasks from Narodism and from the obsolete forms of "Russian socialism" generally; but they themselves were still far from being freed from old prejudices, and were far from consistent when they described their party, exclusively a party for political reforms, as a "social (??!)-revolutionary" party (see their "Manifesto" dated February 19, 1894), and declared in their "Manifesto" that "the term people's rights includes the organisation of people's industry" (we are obliged to quote from memory) and thus introduced Narodnik prejudices sub rosa. Hence, P. L. Lavrov was, perhaps, not altogether wrong when he described them as "masquerade politicians" (p. 20, col. 2). But perhaps it would be fairer to regard the doctrine of Narodnoye Pravo as transitional, to the credit of which it must be said that it was ashamed of the original character of the Narodnik doctrines and openly gave battle to those most abominable Narodnik reactionaries who, despite the existence of absolute rule by the police and the upper class, have the audacity to speak of the desirability of economic and not political reforms (see "An Urgent Question," published by the Narodnoye Pravo Party). If the Narodnoye Pravo Party does not really contain anybody but ex-socialists who conceal their socialist banner for tactical considerations, and who merely don the mask of non-socialist politicians

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

(as P. L. Lavrov assumes, p. 20, col. 2), then, of course, that party has no future whatever. If, however, the party also contains not masquerade, but real non-socialist politicians, non-socialist democrats, then this party can do no little good by striving to draw closer to the political opposition among our bourgeoisie, by striving to arouse the political consciousness of our petty bourgeoisie, small shopkeepers, small artisans, etc.—the class which, everywhere in Western Europe, played a part in the democratic movement and, in Russia, has made exceptionally rapid progress in cultural and other respects in the post-Reform period, and which cannot avoid feeling the oppression of the police government that gives its cynical support to the big factory owners, the magnates of finance and industrial monopoly. All that is needed for this is that the Narodopravtsi should make it their task to draw closer to various strata of the population and should not confine themselves to the very same "intelligentsia" whose impotence, owing to their isolation from the real interests of the masses, is admitted even in "An Urgent Question." What is needed is that the Narodopravtsi abandon all idea of merging different social elements and of pushing socialism aside in favour of political tasks, that they abandon the false shame which prevents them from drawing closer to the bourgeois strata of the population, i.e., that they not only talk about a programme for non-socialist politicians, but act according to this programme, rousing and developing the class-consciousness of those social groups and classes for whom socialism is quite unnecessary, but who, as time goes on, increasingly feel the oppression of the autocracy and the need for political liberty.

Russian Social-Democracy is still very young. It is only just emerging from its embryonic state in which theoretical questions predominated. It is only just beginning to develop its practical activity. In place of criticism of Social-Democratic theories and programmes, revolutionaries of other parties have of necessity moved on to criticism of the *practical activity* of the Russian Social-Democrats. And it

must be admitted that this latter criticism differs most sharply from the criticism of theory, differs so much, in fact, that it was possible to float the comical rumour that the St. Petersburg League of Struggle is not a Social-Democratic organisation. The very fact that such a rumour appeared shows how unfounded is the accusation now current that the Social-Democrats ignore the political struggle. The very fact that such a rumour appeared shows that many revolutionaries whom the Social-Democrats' *theory* could not convince are beginning to be convinced by their *practice*.

Russian Social-Democracy is still faced with an enormous, almost untouched field of work. The awakening of the Russian working class, its spontaneous striving for knowledge, organisation, socialism, for the struggle against its exploiters and oppressors becomes more widespread, more strikingly apparent every day. The enormous progress made by Russian capitalism in recent times is a guarantee that the working-class movement will grow uninterruptedly in breadth and depth. We are apparently now passing through the period in the capitalist cycle when industry is "prospering," when business is brisk, when the factories are working at full capacity and when countless new factories, new enterprises, joint-stock companies, railway enterprises, etc., etc., are springing up like mushrooms. One need not be a prophet to foretell the inevitable and fairly sharp crash that is bound to succeed this period of industrial "prosperity." This crash will ruin masses of small owners, will throw masses of workers into the ranks of the unemployed, and will thus confront all the workers in an acute form with the problems of socialism and democracy which have long faced every class-conscious, every thinking worker. Russian Social-Democrats must see to it that when this crash comes the Russian proletariat is more class-conscious, more united, able to understand the tasks of the Russian working class, capable of putting up resistance to the capitalist class—which is now reaping huge profits and always strives to burden the workers with the losses—and capable of leading Russian democracy in a decisive struggle against the police autocracy, which binds and fetters the Russian workers and the whole of the Russian people.

And so, to work, comrades! Let us not lose precious time! Russian Social-Democrats have much to do to meet the requirements of the awakening proletariat, to organise the working-class movement, to strengthen the revolutionary groups and their mutual ties, to supply the workers with propaganda and agitational literature, and to unite the workers' circles and Social-Democratic groups scattered all over Russia into a single *Social-Democratic Labour Party*!

TO THE WORKERS AND SOCIALISTS OF ST. PETERSBURG FROM THE LEAGUE OF STRUGGLE

The St. Petersburg revolutionaries are experiencing hard times. It seems that the government has concentrated all its forces for the purpose of crushing the recently born working-class movement which has given such a display of strength. Arrests are being made on an unprecedented scale and the prisons are overcrowded. Intellectuals, men and women, and masses of workers are being dragged off and exiled. Almost every day brings news of ever new victims of the police government, which has flung itself in fury upon its enemies. The government has set itself the aim of preventing the new trend in the Russian revolutionary movement from gaining strength and getting on its feet. The public prosecutors and gendarmes are already boasting that they have smashed the League of Struggle.

This boast is a lie. The League of Struggle is intact, despite all the persecution. With deep satisfaction we declare that the wholesale arrests are doing their job—they are a powerful weapon of agitation among the workers and socialist intellectuals, that the places of the fallen revolutionaries are being taken by new people who are ready, with fresh energy, to join the ranks of the champions of the Russian proletariat and of the entire people of Russia. There can be no struggle without sacrifice, and to the brutal persecution of the tsarist bashi-bazouks we calmly reply: Revolutionaries have perished—long live the revolution!

So far, increased persecution has only been able to cause a temporary weakening of certain functions of the League of Struggle, a temporary shortage of agents and agitators. This is the shortage that we now feel and that impels us to call upon all class-conscious workers and all intellectuals desirous of devoting their energies to the revolutionary cause. The League of Struggle needs agents. Let all study circles and all individuals desirous of working in any sphere of revolutionary activity, even the most restricted, inform those in touch with the League of Struggle. (Should any group be unable to contact such individuals—this is very unlikely—they can do so through the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad.) People are needed for all kinds of work, and the more strictly revolutionaries specialise in the various aspects of revolutionary activity, the more strictly they give thought to their methods of underground work and ways of screening it, the more selflessly they concentrate on the minor, unseen, particular jobs, the safer will the whole thing be and the more difficult will it be for the gendarmes and spies to discover the revolutionaries. In advance the government has enmeshed not only the existing centres of anti-government elements, but also possible and probable ones, in a network of agents. The government is steadily developing the size and range of the activities of those of its lackeys who are hounding revolutionaries, is devising new methods, introducing more provocateurs, trying to exert pressure on the arrested by means of intimidation, confrontation with false testimony, forged signatures, planting faked letters, etc., etc. Without a strengthening and development of revolutionary discipline, organisation and underground activity, struggle against the government is impossible. And underground activity demands above all that groups and individuals specialise in different aspects of work and that the job of co-ordination be assigned to the central group of the League of Struggle, with as few members as possible. The aspects of revolutionary work are extremely varied. Legal agitators are needed who can talk to the workers in a way that *does not render* them liable to prosecution, and can say just *a*, leaving it to others to say *b* and *c*. Literature and leaflet distributors are needed. Organisers of workers' study circles and groups are needed.

Correspondents are needed who can give a complete picture of events in all factories. People are needed who will keep an eye on spies and provocateurs. People are needed who will arrange underground meeting places. People are needed to deliver literature, transmit instructions, and to arrange all kinds of contacts. Fund collectors are needed. Agents are needed to work among the intelligentsia and government officials, people in contact with the workers and factory life, with the administration (with the police, factory inspectors, etc.). People are needed for contact with the different towns of Russia and other countries. People are needed to arrange various ways of running off all sorts of literature. People are needed to look after literature and other things, etc., etc. The smaller and more specific the job undertaken by the individual person or individual group, the greater will be the chance that they will think things out, do the job properly and guarantee it best against failure, that they will consider all the details of underground work and use all possible means of hoodwinking and misleading the gendarmes, the more will success be assured, the harder will it be for the police and gendarmes to keep track of the revolutionaries and their links with their organisations, and the easier for the revolutionary party to replace, without prejudice to the cause as a whole, agents and members who have fallen. We know that specialisation of this kind is a very difficult matter, difficult because it demands from the individual the greatest endurance and selflessness, demands the giving of all one's strength to work that is inconspicuous, monotonous, that deprives one of contact with comrades and subordinates the revolutionary's entire life to a grim and rigid routine. But it was only in conditions such as these that the greatest men of revolutionary practice in Russia succeeded in carrying out the boldest undertakings, spending years on all-round preparation, and we are profoundly convinced that the Social-Democrats will prove no less self-sacrificing than the revolutionaries of previous generations. We are also aware that the preliminary period envisaged by our system during which the League of Struggle will collect the necessary information about individuals or groups offering their services and give them something to do by way of trial will be a very

difficult one for many people eager to devote their energies to revolutionary work. But without this preliminary testing, revolutionary activity in present-day Russia is impossible.

In suggesting this system of work to our new comrades we are expressing a view arrived at after long experience, being deeply convinced that it best of all guarantees successful revolutionary work.

Владиміръ Ильинъ.

ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКІЕ ЭТЮДЫ И СТАТЬИ.

Къ характеристикѣ экономическаго романтизма. — Пермская кустарная перепись — Перлы народническаго прожектерства. — Отъ какого наслѣдства мы отказываемся? — Къ вопросу о нашей фабрично-заводской статистикѣ.

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ.
Типо-литографія А. Лейферта. Бол. Морская, 65.
1899.

Cover of *Economic Studies and Essays*
by V. Ilyin (V. I. Lenin)

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THE HANDICRAFT CENSUS OF 1894-95 IN PERM GUBERNIA AND GENERAL PROBLEMS OF "HANDICRAFT" INDUSTRY[114]

Written in exile 1897

First published in 1898 in the miscellany *Economic Studies and Essays* by Vladimir Ilyin

Published according to the text in *Economic Studies and Essays* checked with the text in the miscellany *The Agrarian Question* by Vl. Ilyin, 1908

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ARTICLE ONE

(I. General Data.—II. The "Handicraftsman" and Wage-Labour.—III. "Communal-Labour Continuity")

Perm scientific societies, assisted by the Zemstvo, have undertaken the preparation of an extensive handbook for the 1896 Exhibition in Nizhni-Novgorod under the general title: *A Survey of Perm Territory*. Enough material has been collected to fill well over three thousand pages, and the whole edition is to consist of eight volumes. As was to be expected, the work was not completed in time for the exhibition, and so far only the first volume, a sketch of the handicraft industries of the gubernia,* has been published. For the novelty, wealth and fulness of the material on which it is based, the *Sketch* is a work of outstanding interest. The material was obtained through a special *handicraft census* financed by the Zemstvo and taken in 1894-95. This was a house-to-house census, each householder being questioned individually. The information was collected by the Zemsky Nachalniks.[115] The programme of this house-to-house investigation was very broad, embracing the members of the families of master handicraftsmen, the wage-labour employed by them, agriculture, information on the purchase of raw materials, the technique of production, distribution of work according to the months of the year, sale of products, dates on which the establishments were founded, and the indebtedness of handicraftsmen. As far as we are aware, this is perhaps the first time such abun-

* *A Survey of Perm Territory. A Sketch of the State of Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*. Published out of funds provided by the Perm Gubernia Zemstvo. Perm, 1896, pp. II+365+232 pp. of tables, 16 diagrams and a map of Perm Gubernia. Price: 1 ruble 50 kopeks.

dant information has been published in our literature. But to whom much is given, much is required. The very wealth of the material entitles us to demand its thorough analysis by the investigators, but the *Sketch* is a long way from meeting this demand. Both in the tabulated data and in the method of grouping and analysing them there are many gaps, which the present author has had in part to fill by selecting material from various parts of the book and computing the appropriate data.

Our purpose is to acquaint the reader with the material of the census, the methods by which it has been analysed, and the conclusions to be drawn from the data relative to the *economic realities* of our "handicraft industries." We underscore the words "economic realities," because we only deal with what exists in reality, and why that reality is what it is, and not something else. As to extending the conclusions drawn from the data on Perm Gubernia to "our handicraft industries" in general, the reader will see from what follows that such an extention is quite legitimate, for the forms of "handicraft industry" in Perm Gubernia are exceedingly varied and embrace *every possible* form ever mentioned in the literature on the subject.

But there is one request we must earnestly make, namely, that the reader draw the strictest possible distinction between two aspects of the following commentary: the study and analysis of the actual facts, on the one hand, and the discussion of the Narodnik views held by the authors of the *Sketch*, on the other.

I
GENERAL DATA

The handicraft census of 1894-95 embraced 8,991 families (excluding the families of wage-workers) in all uyezds of the gubernia, or, in the opinion of the investigators, about 72 per cent of the total number of Perm handicraftsmen; other data point to the existence of 3,484 families more. The basic division according to type adopted in the *Sketch* is as follows: two *groups* of handicraftsmen are distinguished (indicated in the tables by the Roman numerals I and

II): those who have a farm (I) and those who have not (II); then three *sub-groups* of each group (Arabic numerals 1, 2 and 3): 1) those who produce for the market; 2) those who work to order for private customers, and 3) those who work to order for buyers-up. In the last two sub-groups the raw material is usually supplied by the customer or the buyer-up. Let us take a look at this method of classifying. The division of handicraftsmen into those who farm land and those who do not is, of course, a sound and necessary method. The large number of landless handicraftsmen in Perm Gubernia, frequently concentrated in industrial settlements, has led the authors to stick to this classification and to use it in the tables. We learn, for example, that 6,638 persons, or one-third of the total number of handicraftsmen (19,970 working members of families and wage-workers in 8,991 establishments) do not farm land.* This fact alone shows the fallacy of the common assumptions and assertions that the connection between handicraft industry and agriculture is universal; this connection is sometimes stressed as a specifically Russian feature. If we exclude the rural (and urban) artisans who have been wrongly classed as "handicraftsmen," we find that 2,268 of the remaining 5,566 families, or over two-fifths of the total number of industrialists working for the market, are landless. Unfortunately, even this basic classification is not adhered to consistently in the *Sketch*. Firstly, it is applied only to master craftsmen, no similar data being given for wage-workers. This omission is due to the fact that, in general, the census registered only the establishments, the owners, and ignored the wage-workers and their families. In place of these terms, the *Sketch* employs the very inaccurate expression "families engaged in handicraft industries." This is inaccurate because families whose members are employed by handicraftsmen as wage-workers are no less "engaged in handicraft industries" than the families which hire them. The absence of house-to-house information on the families of wage-workers (who constitute one-fourth of the total number of workers) is a grave omission in the census. This omission is

* Actually, more than one-third are landless, for the census covered only one town. But of that more anon.

highly characteristic of the Narodniks, who at once adopt the viewpoint of the small producer and leave wage-labour in the shade. Below we shall find frequent gaps of this kind in the information on wage-workers, but for the moment let us confine ourselves to the remark that although the absence of information on wage-workers' families is a common feature of the literature on handicrafts, there are exceptions. In the Moscow Zemstvo statistics one occasionally comes across systematic information on wage-workers' families, and even more so in the well-known inquiry of Messrs. Kharizomenov and Prugavin, *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, which contains house-to-house censuses that register wage-workers' families on a par with those of masters. Secondly, by including the mass of landless industrialists under the heading of handicraftsmen, the investigators naturally removed the grounds for the common, although absolutely incorrect, method of excluding the *urban* industrialists from this category. And, indeed, we find that the 1894-95 census includes one town—Kungur (p. 33 of the tables)—but *only one*. No explanation is given in the *Sketch*, and it remains a mystery why the census was taken for one town only, and why this particular town was chosen—whether by chance or for some sound reason. This causes no little confusion, and seriously detracts from the value of the general data. On the whole, therefore, the handicraft census repeats the usual Narodnik mistake of separating the country ("handicraftsmen") from the town, although often enough an industrial district embraces a town and the surrounding villages. It is high time to abandon this distinction, which is due to prejudice and an exaggeration of outdated divisions into social estates.

We have already referred on several occasions to rural and urban artisans, sometimes excluding them from the number of handicraftsmen, and sometimes not. The fact is that these fluctuations are characteristic of all literature on "handicraft" industries, and demonstrate the unsuitability of a term like "handicraftsman" for the purposes of scientific investigation. The generally accepted opinion is that only those who work for the market, the commodity producers, should be regarded as handicraftsmen; but in practice it would be hard to find all investigation of the handicraft

industries in which artisans, that is, producers who work for private customers (2nd sub-group in the *Sketch*) are not counted as handicraftsmen. Both in the *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into the Handicraft Industry* and the *Industries of Moscow Gubernia* you will find artisans classed as "handicraftsmen." We consider it useless to argue about the meaning of the word "handicraft," for, as we shall see later, *there is no form of industry* (except perhaps machine industry) which has not been included under this traditional term, a term that is absolutely useless for scientific investigation. It is certain that a strict distinction must be made between commodity producers who work for the market (1st sub-group) and artisans who fulfil the orders of private customers (2nd sub-group), because of the complete difference in the social and economic significance of these forms of industry. The attempts made in the *Sketch* to obliterate this distinction (cf. pp. 13 and 177) are very unsuccessful; far more correct is the remark made in another Zemstvo statistical publication on the Perm handicraftsmen to the effect that "the artisans have very few points of contact with the sphere of handicraft industry—fewer than the latter has with factory industry."* Both factory industry and the 1st sub-group of "handicraftsmen" relate to *commodity production*, which is non-existent in the 2nd sub-group. A no less strict distinction must be made in the case of the 3rd sub-group, the handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up (and manufacturers) and who differ *essentially* from those of the first two sub-groups. It would be desirable for all investigators of so-called "handicraft" industry to adhere strictly to this division and use precise political-economic terminology, instead of assigning an arbitrary meaning to colloquial terms.

The following table shows the division of the "handicraftsmen" into groups and sub-groups:

Before proceeding to draw conclusions from these figures,

* *The Handicraft Industries of Perm Gubernia at the Siberian-Urals Science and Industry Exhibition in Ekaterinburg*, 1887, by Y. Krasnoperov, in three parts, Perm, 1888-89, Part I, p. 8. We shall quote from this valuable publication, briefly referring to it as *Handicraft Industries* and indicating the part and the page.

	Group I				Group II				Grand total
	Sub-group			Total	Sub-group			Total	
	1	2	3		1	2	3		
Number of establishments	2,285 37.3	2,821 46.1	1,013 16.6	6,119 100	935 32.6	604 21.0	1,333 46.4	2,872 100	8,991 —
Number of:									
Family workers	4,201	4,146	1,957	10,304	1,648	881	2,233	4,762	15,066
Wage-workers	1,753	681	594	3,028	750	282	844	1,876	4,904
Total	5,954	4,827	2,551	13,332	2,398	1,163	3,077	6,638	19,970
Number of establishments employing wage-worker	700	490	251	1,441	353	148	482	983	2,424

let us recall that the town of Kungur was included in Group II, which thus consists of a mixture of urban and rural industrialists. We see from the table that although there is a preponderance of agriculturists (Group I) among the *rural* industrialists and artisans, they are more backward in the development of forms of industry than those who do not cultivate the land (Group II). Among the former primitive artisanship is far more prevalent than production for the market. The greater development of capitalism among the non-agriculturists is shown by the larger proportion of establishments employing wage-workers, of the wage-workers themselves, and of handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up. It may therefore be concluded that the tie with agriculture tends to preserve the more backward forms of industry, and vice versa, that the development of capitalism in industry leads to a break with agriculture. Unfortunately, exact information on this subject is not available, and we have perforce to content ourselves with indirect indications. For example, the *Sketch* tells us nothing about the division of the rural population of Perm Gubernia into agriculturists and landless people, and so we cannot determine in which of these categories the industries are most developed. There is a similar neglect of the highly interesting question of the territorial distribution of industry (the investigators were in possession of the most exact information on this point, for each village separately), of the concentra-

tion of industrialists in the non-agricultural, factory, or trade and industrial settlements generally, of the centres of each branch of industry, and of the spread of the industries from these centres to the surrounding villages. If we add to this that the household statistics showing when the establishments were founded (see § III below) provided an opportunity to determine how the industries developed, that is, whether they spread from the centres to the surrounding villages or vice versa, whether they spread mostly among agriculturists or non-agriculturists, etc., then one cannot help regretting the inadequate analysis of the data. The only information we are able to obtain concerns the distribution of industries by uyezds. To acquaint the reader with these figures we shall group the uyezds as suggested in the *Sketch* (p. 31): 1) the five "uyezds where the proportion of handicraftsmen working for the market is largest and where, simultaneously, the development of handicraft industry is relatively high"; 2) the five "uyezds where the development of the handicraft industry is relatively weak, and where the handicraftsmen working for the market predominate"; 3) the two "uyezds where it is also at a low level, but where the majority often consists of handicraftsmen who fulfil orders for private customers." Summarising the principal data for these groups of uyezds we get the following table (see p. 364).

This table enables us to draw the following interesting conclusions. The more highly rural industry is developed in a group of uyezds, 1) the smaller the proportion of rural artisans, i.e., artisan production is to a greater extent replaced by commodity production; 2) the larger the proportion of handicraftsmen who belong to the non-agricultural population, and 3) the more marked the development of capitalist relations and the larger the proportion of dependent handicraftsmen. In the third group of uyezds the rural artisans predominate (77.7% of all the handicraftsmen); in this case agriculturists predominate (only 5.7% are non-agriculturists) and capitalism is poorly developed: only 7.2% are wage-workers and only 2.7% of the handicraftsmen's families work for buyers-up, i.e., a total of only 9.9% are dependent handicraftsmen. In the second group of uyezds, on, the contrary, commodity production

Groups of uyezds	Number of craftsmen												Percentages of handicraftsmen		Number of persons, both sexes in families		
	Producing for the market			Producing for buyers-up			Producing for private customers			In all							
	Members of families	Wage-workers	Total	Members of families	Wage-workers	Total	Members of families	Wage-workers	Total	Members of families	Wage-workers	Total	Producing for the market	Dependent (see footnote)	With own farm	Farming no land	Total
1) Five uyezds in which handicraft industry is most highly developed	4,160	1,702	5,862	3,930	1,397	5,327	2,501	623	3,124	10,591	3,722	14,313	78.2	53.4	21,320	15,483	36,803
	—	—	—	27.4	—	—	—	—	21.8	—	26.0	100	—	—	57.9	42.1	100
2) Five uyezds in which handicraft industry is less highly developed	1,436	904	2,340	259	158	417	1,077	252	1,329	2,772	1,314	4,086	67.5	38.4	7,335	3,740	11,075
	—	—	—	6.3	—	—	—	—	32.5	—	32.1	100	—	—	66.2	33.8	100
3) Two uyezds in which artisan production predominates	340	59	399	56	—	56	1,499	88	1,587	1895	147	2,042	22.3	9.9	5,998	364	6,362
	—	—	—	2.7	—	—	—	—	77.7	—	7.2	100	—	—	94.3	5.7	100
In all	5,936	2,665	8,601	4,245	1,555	5,800	5,077	963	6,040	15,258	5,183	20,441	70.5	46.1	34,653	19,587	54,240
	—	—	—	20.8	—	—	—	—	29.5	—	25.3	100	—	—	63.9	36.1	100

1) The first group consists of Shadrinsk, Kungur, Krasnoufimsk, Ekaterinburg and Osa uyezds; the second of Verkhoturye, Perm, Irbit, Okhansk and Cherdyn uyezds, and third, Solikamsk and Kamyshlov uyezds.
2) By "dependent" handicraftsmen we mean: a) wage-workers and b) members of the handicraftsman's family who produce for buyers-up.
3) The number of handicraftsmen in the table differs from that given above since the figures for the uyezds given in the *Sketch* (pp. 30-31) differ from the totals in the appended table.

predominates and is already eliminating handicraft: only 32.5% are artisans. The percentage of handicraftsmen engaged in agriculture drops from 94.3% to 66.2%, the proportion of wage-workers increases more than fourfold—from 7.2% to 32.1%; there is an increase, although not so large, in the proportion of family workers who work for buyers-up, so that the aggregate proportion of dependent handicraftsmen is 38.4%, or nearly two-fifths of the total. Lastly, in the first group of uyezds, natural artisan production is still further eliminated by commodity production and employs only one-fifth of the total number of "handicraftsmen" (21.8%), and at the same time the number of non-agricultural industrialists increases to 42.1%; the proportion of wage-workers drops somewhat (from 32.1% to 26%), but on the other hand there is an enormous increase in the proportion of family workers dependent on buyers-up, namely, from 6.3% to 27.4%, so that the aggregate number of dependent handicraftsmen is more than half the total—53.4%. The district with the largest (absolute and relative) number of "handicraftsmen" is the one where capitalism is most developed: the growth of commodity production forces artisan production into the background, leads to the development of capitalism and to the transfer of industries to non-agriculturists, in other words, to the separation of industry from agriculture (or, perhaps, to the concentration of industries among the non-agricultural population). The reader may doubt whether it is right to regard capitalism as being more developed in the first group of uyezds, where there are fewer wage-workers than in the second, but where more handicraftsmen work for buyers-up. Domestic industry, it may be objected, is a lower form of capitalism. But we shall see below that many of these buyers-up are manufacturers who own large capitalist establishments. Here domestic industry is an *adjunct of the factory*, and signifies a higher degree of concentration of production and capital (some of the buyers-up have 200, 500, even 1,000 persons and more, working for them), a higher degree of division of labour, and, consequently, a more highly developed form of capitalism. This form is to the small workshop of the owner who employs wage-workers as capitalist manufacture is to capitalist simple co-operation.

The figures quoted are sufficient to refute the attempt of the compilers of the *Sketch* to draw a fundamental contrast between "the handicraft form of production" and "capitalist production"—an assertion which repeats the traditional prejudice of all the Russian Narodniks, headed by Messrs. V. V. and N. —on. The Perm Narodniks assume that the "basic difference" between these two forms is that under handicraft production "labour owns both the instruments and materials of production and all the fruits of labour in the shape of the produce of production" (p. 3). We are now in a position to declare quite emphatically that this is false. Even if we include artisans among the handicraftsmen *the majority of them do not fit this definition*: this applies, firstly, to the wage-workers, and they represent 25.3%; secondly, to family workers who work for buyers-up, for they own neither the materials of production nor the fruits of their labour, but are merely paid wages—and they constitute 20.8%; and, thirdly, to the family workers of the first and second sub-groups who employ wage-workers, for they own the "fruits" of other labour in addition to their own. They probably constitute about 10% (1,691 of the 6,645 establishments in the first and second sub-groups, or 25.4%, employ wage-workers; in the 1,691 establishments there are probably not less than 2,000 family workers). And so we already have 25.3%+20.8%+10%=56.1% of the "handicraftsmen," or more than half, who do not fit this definition. In other words, even in a remote and economically backward gubernia like Perm, the "handicraftsmen" who either hire themselves out or hire others, who exploit or are exploited, *are already preponderant today*. But it would be far more correct for such a computation to exclude artisan production and to take commodity production alone. Artisan production is such an archaic form of industry that even among our native Narodniks, who have repeatedly proclaimed that backwardness is Russia's good fortune (à la Messrs. V. V., Yuzhakov and Co.), there has not been a single one who has frankly and openly risked defending it and proclaiming it a "pledge" of his ideals. Artisan production in Perm Gubernia is still very widespread as compared with Central Russia: we need only mention the dyeing industry, for instance. This is a purely artisan indus-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

try for the dyeing of peasant homespuns, which in less out-of-the-way parts of Russia have long been superseded by factory-made prints. But even in Perm Gubernia artisan production has been pushed far into the background: even in rural industry, only 29.5%, or less than one-third, of the producers are artisans. If we exclude the artisans, then, we get 14,401 persons who work for the market; of these, 29.3% are wage-workers and 29.5% family workers who work for buyers-up, in other words, 58.8% are dependent "handicraftsmen," while another 7% or 8% are small masters employing wage-workers. Thus, about 66%, or nearly *two-thirds*, of the "handicraftsmen" have *two* fundamental *points of similarity*, and not of difference, with capitalism: firstly, they are all commodity producers, and capitalism is nothing but commodity production developed to the full; secondly, the specifically capitalist relations of the purchase and sale of labour-power apply to *a large number* of them. The compilers of the *Sketch* try hard to assure the reader that for "weighty" reasons, wage-labour in "handicraft" production has a significance all of its own. We shall examine these assurances and the examples they quote in their proper place (§ VII). Here it will be enough to mention that wherever commodity production prevails and wage-labour is not casually but systematically employed, we have all the features of capitalism. One may say that it is undeveloped, embryonic, that it possesses specific forms, but it is a distortion of the truth to assume a "basic difference" when in reality there is a *basic similarity*.

Let us, incidentally, mention one other distortion. On p. 5 of the *Sketch* it is said that "the products of the handicraftsman ... are made from materials that are chiefly procured locally." But the *Sketch* itself provides us with the data to check this point, it shows how the distribution of handicraftsmen engaged in processing livestock produce compares with the distribution of livestock and agricultural produce in the uyezds of the gubernia, how the distribution of those who process plant products compares with the distribution of forests; and how the distribution of those engaged in metal-working compares with the distribution of the pig-iron and malleable iron produced in the gubernia. This comparison shows that 68.9% of the

handicraftsmen engaged in processing livestock products are concentrated in three uyezds, which account for only 25.1% of the livestock population, and only 29.5% of the cultivated area. In other words, we find that the very contrary of the above assertion is true, and the *Sketch* itself at this point declares that "the high degree of development of the industries engaged in processing livestock produce is chiefly dependent on raw materials brought from outside—for instance, in the Kungur and Ekaterinburg uyezds on the raw hides dressed by the local leather factories and handicraft tanneries, from which the material for the boot industry, the principal handicraft in these uyezds, is obtained" (24-25). Hence, handicraft industry in these parts is based not only on the large turnover of the local capitalist leather merchants, but also on semi-manufactures obtained from factory owners, i.e., handicraft industry is a sequel or adjunct to developed commodity circulation and to capitalist leather establishments. "In Shadrinsk Uyezd, the raw material brought from outside is wool, which furnishes the material for the chief industry of the uyezd—the making of felt boots." Further, 61.3% of the handicraftsmen engaged in processing plant produce are concentrated in four uyezds. Yet these four uyezds contain only 20.7% of the total forest area of the gubernia. On the other hand, in the two uyezds where 51.7% of the forest area is concentrated, there are only 2.6% of the handicraftsmen engaged in processing plant produce (p. 25). In other words, here too we find the contrary to be the case, and here too the *Sketch* states that the raw material is brought from outside (p. 26).* Hence, we observe the very interesting fact that a deep-rooted *commodity circulation* precedes the development of the handicraft industries (and is a condition for their development). This fact is very important, for it shows, firstly, that commodity economy is long established, handicraft industry being only one of its elements; it shows also how absurd it is to depict our handicraft industry as a sort of tabula rasa still "able" to take a different path. The investigators report, for example, that "handicraft industry"

* These two types of handicraftsmen—those processing livestock and plant produce—make up 33%+28%=61% of the total number. Metal-working engages 25% of the handicraftsmen (p. 20).

in Perm Gubernia "continues to reflect the influence of those means of communication which determined the commercial and industrial physiognomy of the area not only in the pre-railway days, but even in pre-Reform days" (p. 39). Actually, the town of Kungur was the road junction in the Cis-Urals area: through it passes the Siberian highway which connects Kungur with Ekaterinburg, with branches to Shadrinsk; another commercial highway from Kungur, that of Blagodatnaya Gora, connects the town with Osa. Lastly, the Birsk highway connects Kungur with Krasnoufimsk. "We thus find that the handicraft industry of the gubernia became concentrated in districts around the highway junctions: in the Cis-Urals area—in the uyezds of Kungur, Krasnoufimsk and Osa and in the Trans-Urals area—in the uyezds of Ekaterinburg and Shadrinsk" (p. 39). Let us remind the reader that it is these five uyezds that constitute the group that is first in its development of handicraft industry, and that 70% of the total number of handicraftsmen are concentrated in them. Secondly, this fact shows us that the "organisation of exchange" in handicraft industry, about which the handicraft friends of the muzhik chatter so frivolously, *has already been created* and by none other than the Russian merchant class itself. Later on we shall find much to confirm this. Only in the third category of handicraftsmen (those who process metal) do we find that the distribution of raw material production and its processing by handicraftsmen correspond: 70% of this category of handicraftsmen are concentrated in the four uyezds producing 70.6% of the total pig-iron and malleable iron. But here the raw material is itself a product of the large-scale metallurgical industry, which, as we shall see, has its "own views" on the "handicraftsman."

II

THE "HANDICRAFTSMAN" AND WAGE-LABOUR

Let us now summarise the data on wage-labour in the handicraft industries of Perm Gubernia. Without repeating the absolute figures already cited, let us confine ourselves to indicating the most interesting percentages;

	Group I				Group II				Total
	Sub-group			In all	Sub-group			In all	
	1	2	3		1	2	3		
Percentage of establishments: Employing wage-workers	30.6	17.4	24.1	23.6	37.8	24.4	36.1	34.2	26.9
Percentage of establishments: Employing only wage-workers	1.3	1.2	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.4	0.3	1.0	1.1
Percentage of establishments: Employing six or more wage-workers	2.0	0.1	1.4	1.1	1.3	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.9
Wage-workers	29.4	14.1	23.2	22.7	31.2	29.3	27.4	28.3	24.5
Average number of workers per establishment: Family	1.8	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.6
Average number of workers per establishment: Wage	0.75	0.23	0.57	0.48	0.78	0.43	0.63	0.63	0.52
Average number of workers per establishment: Total	2.6	1.7	2.5	2.1	2.5	1.8	2.2	2.2	2.1
Percentage of establishments with three or more family workers	20.3	7.8	20.9	15.1	18.5	8.6	14.3	14.6	14.9

We thus see that the percentage of wage-workers is *higher* among the non-agriculturists than among the agriculturists, and that the difference is *chiefly* accounted for by the second sub-group: among the farming artisans the proportion of wage-workers is 14.1%, and among the non-agriculturists it is 29.3%, or over twice as high. In the other two sub-groups, the proportion of wage-workers in Group II is slightly higher than in Group I. It has already been said that this results from capitalism being less developed among the agricultural population. Of course, the Perm Narodniks, like all other Narodniks, declare this to be of advantage to the agriculturists. We shall not, at this point, enter into a controversy on the general subject of whether the under-development and backwardness of the given social and economic relations may be regarded as an advantage; we shall merely say that the figures we quote below will show that this is an advantage that gives the agriculturists low earnings.

It is interesting to note that insofar as the employment of wage-labour is concerned the difference *between the*

groups is less than the difference *between the sub-groups of the same group*. In other words, the economic structure of the industry (artisans—commodity producers—workers for buyers-up) has a greater influence on the extent to which wage-labour is employed than the existence or absence of ties with agriculture. For example, the small agriculturist commodity producer is more akin to the small non-agriculturist commodity producer than to the agriculturist artisan. The proportion of wage-workers in the first sub-group is 29.4% in Group I and 31.2% in Group II, whereas in the second sub-group of Group I it is only 14.1%. Similarly, the agriculturist who works for a buyer-up is more akin to the non-agriculturist who does the same (23.2% and 27.4% wage-workers respectively) than to the agriculturist artisan. This shows us that the general prevalence of capitalist commodity relations in the country tends to reduce to one level the agriculturist and the non-agriculturist engaged in industry. This levelling process is brought out even more saliently by the data on the incomes of handicraftsmen. The second sub-group, as we have said, is an exception; but if, instead of the figures showing the percentage of wage-workers, we take the average number of wage-workers per establishment, we shall find that the agriculturist artisans are more akin to the non-agriculturist artisans (0.23 and 0.43 wage-workers per establishment respectively) than to the agriculturists in the other sub-groups. The average number of workers per establishment among the artisans of both groups is almost the same (1.7 and 1.8), whereas in the sub-groups of each group this average differs very considerably (Group I—2.6 and 1.7; Group II—2.5 and 1.8).

The average figures per establishment in each sub-group also reveal the interesting fact that the number is lowest among the artisans of both groups: 1.7 and 1.8 workers per workshop respectively. This means that production is most scattered among artisans, the individual producers are most isolated, and co-operation in production least practised. First place in this respect is held by the first sub-group of each group, that is, by the small masters who produce for the market. The number of people engaged in the workshops in these sub-groups is the largest (2.6 and 2,5 persons); here handi-

craftsmen with big families are the most numerous (20.3% and 18.5% have 3 or more workers in the family; the third sub-group of Group I—20.9%—is something of an exception); at the same time the employment of wage-labour is the largest (0.75 and 0.78 wage-workers per workshop); and there is also the largest proportion of big establishments (2.0% and 1.3% of establishments employ six or more wage-workers). Consequently, co-operation in production is here most widespread, because of the most extensive employment of wage-labour, and of members of the family (1.8 and 1.7 family workers per establishment; the third sub-group of Group I, with 1.9 persons, is something of an exception).

This latter circumstance brings us to the highly important question of the relation between family labour and wage-labour employed by "handicraftsmen," a relation which prompts us to doubt the correctness of the prevailing Narodnik doctrine that wage-labour in handicraft production merely "supplements" family labour. The Perm Narodniks support this view when they argue on p. 55 that "the identification of the interests of the handicraftsmen with those of the kulaks" is refuted by the fact that the most prosperous handicraftsmen (Group I) have the largest number of family workers, whereas "if the handicraftsman were prompted solely by the profit motive, the sole incentive of the kulak, and not by the desire to consolidate and develop his establishment with the aid of all the members of his family, we should expect the proportion of members of the family who devoted their labours to production to be smallest in this sub-group of establishments" (?!). A strange conclusion! How can any conclusion regarding the role of "personal participation in work" (p. 55) be drawn if nothing is said about wage-labour? If the prosperity of handicraftsmen with large families did not indicate kulak tendencies, we should find among them the *lowest* proportion of wage-workers, the *lowest* proportion of establishments employing them, the *lowest* proportion of establishments with a large number of workers (more than five), and the *smallest* average number of workers per establishment. Actually, however, the most prosperous handicraftsmen (first sub-group) hold *first, and not last* place *in all these respects*, and this despite the fact that they have the largest families and the

largest number of family workers, and constitute the largest proportion of handicraftsmen with three or more family workers! Clearly, the facts point to the very opposite of what the Narodniks would have them mean: the handicraftsman does, in fact, strive for profit, and by kulak methods; he takes advantage of his greater prosperity (one of the conditions for which is the possession of a large family) to employ wage-labour on a *larger* scale. Having a larger number of family workers than the other handicraftsmen he uses this to oust the others by hiring the *largest* number of workers. "Family co-operation, "about which Mr. V. V. and the other Narodniks speak so unctuously (cf. *Handicraft Industries*, I, p. 14), is a guarantee of the development of capitalist co-operation. This, of course, will seem a paradox to the reader who is used to Narodnik prejudices; but it is a fact. To obtain precise data on this subject, one should know not only the distribution of the establishments according to the number of family and of wage-workers (which is given in the *Sketch*), but also according to the *combination* of family and wage-labour. The house-to-house returns furnished every opportunity of making such a combination, of calculating the number of establishments in each category employing one, two, etc., wage-workers and classifying them according to the number of family workers. Unfortunately, this was not done. In order to make up for this omission, if only partially, let us turn to the work already mentioned, *Handicraft Industries*, where we do find combined tables of establishments classified according to the number of family and wage-workers. The tables are given for five industries, embracing a total of 749 establishments with 1,945 workers (op. cit., 1, pp. 59, 78 and 160; III, pp. 87 and 109). In order to analyse these data with reference to the problem we are now considering, namely, the relation between family labour and wage-labour, we must divide all the establishments into groups according to the total number of workers (for it is the total number of workers which shows the size of the workshop and the degree of co-operation in production), and determine the role of family labour and wage-labour in each group. Let us take four groups: 1) establishments with one worker; 2) establishments with two to four workers; 3) establishments with five to nine workers, and 4) establish-

ments with ten or more workers. This division according to the total number of workers is all the more necessary, as the establishments with one worker and those with ten, for example, obviously represent entirely different economic types; to combine them and strike "averages" would be utterly absurd as we shall see later in the case of the figures given in the *Sketch*. Grouping the data as indicated, we get the following table:

Establishments grouped according to total number of workers	Number of establishments	Number of			Number of establishment employing wage-workers	Per cent	Number per establishment of		
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total			Family workers	Wage-workers	Total
Establishments with 1 worker	345	343	2	345	2	0.5	0.995	0.005	1.00
" 2 to 4 workers	319	559	251	810	143	44.8	1.76	0.78	2.54
" 5 to 9 workers	59	111	249	360	53	89.8	1.88	4.22	6.10
" 10 or more workers	26	56	374	430	26	100	2.15	14.38	16.53
Total	749	1,069	876	1,945	224	29.9	1.43	1.16	2.59

These detailed figures fully confirm the proposition advanced above, which seemed so paradoxical at first glance, i.e., the larger the total number of workers in an establishment, the larger the number of family workers employed in it, and the more extensive, consequently, the "family co-operation"; but, at the same time, capitalist co-operation also increases, and does so far more rapidly. Despite the fact that they have a large number of family workers, the more prosperous handicraftsmen employ many additional wage-workers. "Family co-operation" is thus the pledge and foundation of *capitalist co-operation*.

Let us examine the data of the 1894-95 census relating to family and wage-labour. The establishments are divided according to the number of family workers as follows:

				%
Establishments with	0	family workers	97	1.1
” ”	1	” ”	4,787	53.2
” ”	2	” ”	2,770	30.8
” ”	3	” ”	898	10.0
” ”	4	” ”	279	3.1
” ”	5 or more	”	160	1.8
		Total	8,991	100.0

The preponderance of one-man establishments should be noted: they constitute more than half the total. Even if we were to assume that all the establishments that combine family labour with wage-labour have no more than one family worker each, we would still find that 2,500 of them would be run by one man. These are the representatives of the most scattered producers, representatives of the most disunited small workshops—a disunity that is generally characteristic of the much-vaunted “people’s production.” Let us take a glance at the opposite pole, the largest workshops:

			%		Number of wage-workers*		Wage-workers per establishment	
Establishments with								
0 wage-workers	6,567		73.1		—		—	
1 ” ”	1,537		17.2		1,537		1	
2 ” ”	457		2.1		914		2	
3 ” ”	213		2.3		639		3	
4 ” ”	88		0.9		352		4	
5 ” ”	44		0.5		220		5	
6-9 ” ”	41	85	0.4	0.9	290	1,242	7.1	14.6
10 or more ”	44		0.5		952		21.7	
Total	8,991		100		4,904		0.5	

Thus we see that the “small” establishments of the handicraftsmen sometimes attain imposing dimensions: nearly one-fourth of the total number of wage-workers is concentrated in the 85 largest establishments; on an average, each such establishment employs 14.6 wage-workers. These handicraftsmen

* Computed from the data in the *Sketch* (p. 54 and total number of wage-workers).

are already employers, owners of capitalist establishments.* Co-operation on capitalist lines is widely employed in them: with 15 workers per establishment, division of labour is possible on a fairly extensive scale, there is a big saving on premises and tools, of which a larger quantity and greater variety can be used. Their purchase of raw material and the sale of the product are necessarily conducted on a large scale; this considerably reduces the cost of raw material and its delivery, facilitattes sales, and makes proper commercial relations possible. When we come to consider the data on incomes we shall find confirmation of this in the 1894-95 census. At the moment it will be sufficient to mention these generally-known theoretical propositions. It should, therefore, be clear that the technical and economic features of these establishments also differ radically from those of the one-man workshops, and it is really astonishing that the Perm statisticians should nevertheless have decided *to combine* them and compute general "averages" from them. It may be said a priori that such averages will be absolutely fictitious, and that the analysis of the household statistics, in addition to dividing the handicraftsmen into groups and sub-groups, should also have divided them into categories based upon the number of workers per establishment (both family and wage-workers). Unless such a division is made, there can be no question of obtaining accurate data on incomes, or on the conditions of purchase of raw material and sale of products, or on the technique of production, or on the relative status of the wage-worker and the owner of the one-man establishment, or on the relation between the big and small workshops—all of which are items of the highest importance for a study of the economics of "handicraft industry." The Perm investigators endeavour, of course, to underrate the importance of the capitalist workshops. If there are establishments with five or more family workers, they argue, that means that competition between the "capitalist" and the "handicraft

* The overwhelming majority of our "factories" (so called in the official statistics), actually 15,000 out of 21,000, employ less than 16 workers. See *Directory of Factories for 1890*.

form of production" (sic!) can only have significance when the number of wage-workers exceeds five per establishment, and such establishments constitute only 1% of the total. The argument is purely artificial: in the first place, establishments with five family workers and five wage-workers are a pure abstraction, resulting from an inadequate analysis of the facts, for wage-labour is combined with family labour. An establishment with three family workers will, by hiring another three workers, have more than five workers and, compared with the one-man establishments, will occupy an exceptional competitive position. Secondly, if the statisticians really wanted to investigate the question of "competition" between the various establishments, dividing them according to the number of wage-workers they employ, why did they not make use of the data of the house-to-house census? Why did they not group the establishments according to the number of workers and show the size of their incomes? Would it not have been more appropriate for statisticians who had such rich material at their disposal to make a real study of the facts, instead of treating the reader to all sorts of stuff of their own invention and hastily abandoning facts in order to "do battle" with the adversaries of Narodism?

"...From the standpoint of the supporters of capitalism, this percentage may, perhaps, be considered sufficient ground for the prediction that the handicraft form must inevitably degenerate into the capitalist form; but in this respect it does not actually represent an alarming symptom at all, especially in view of the following circumstances..." (p. 56).

Charming, is it not? Instead of taking the trouble to sift the available material for precise data *on the capitalist* establishments, the authors *combined* them with the one-man establishments and then began to controvert imaginary "predictors"!—We do not know what these "supporters of capitalism" who are so repugnant to the Perm statisticians are likely "to predict," but for our part we can only say that all these phrases merely cover an attempt to evade the facts. And the facts show that there is no special "handicraft form of production" (that is an invention of "handicraft" economists), that the small commodity producers give rise to

large capitalist establishments (in the tables we found a handicraftsman employing 65 wage-workers!—p. 169), and that it was the investigators' duty to group the data in such a way that we could examine this process and compare the various establishments *insofar as they approximate capitalist enterprises*. The Perm statisticians not only failed to do this themselves, but even deprived us of the opportunity of doing so, for in the tables all the establishments in a given sub-group are lumped together so that it is impossible to separate the factory owner from the one-man producer. The compilers cover up the omission with meaningless aphorisms. The large establishments, you see, constitute only 1% of the total, so that if they are excluded, the conclusions based on the remaining 99% will not be affected (p. 56). But this one per cent, this one-hundredth part, is not commensurate with the others! One large establishment is equal to more than 15 establishments of the one-man producers who account for over 30 "hundredths" (of the total number of establishments)! This calculation relates to the number of workers. And if we take the gross output, or net income, we shall find that one large establishment is not equal to 15, but perhaps to 30 other establishments.* *One-fourth* of all the wage-workers is concentrated in this "one-hundredth" of the establishments, an average of 14.6 workers per establishment. To give the reader some idea of the significance of this latter figure, let us take the figures given for Perm Gubernia in the *Collection of Data on Factory Industry in Russia* (published by the Department of Commerce and Manufactures). As the figures vary considerably from year to year, we shall take the average for seven years (1885-91). The result for Perm Gubernia is 885 "factories and works" (as understood by the official statistics), with an aggregate output of 22,645,000 rubles and a total of 13,006 wage-workers, which gives us an "average" of 14.6 workers per factory.

* We shall presently give data showing the distribution of establishments according to net income. We learn that the aggregate net income of 2,376 establishments with the lowest income (up to 50 rubles) = 77,900 rubles, while that of 80 establishments with the highest income = 83,150 rubles. The average per "establishment," therefore, is 32 rubles and 1,039 rubles respectively.

In confirmation of their opinion that the large establishments are of no great significance, the compilers of the *Sketch* refer to the fact that very few (8%) of the number of wage-workers employed by the handicraftsmen are employed by the year, the majority being piece-workers (37%), seasonal workers (30%) and day labourers (25%, p. 51). The piece-workers "usually work in their own homes with their own implements and maintain themselves," while the day labourers are engaged "temporarily," like agricultural labourers. That being the case, "we cannot regard the relatively large number of wage-workers as unquestionable proof that these establishments are of the capitalist type" (56).... "It is our conviction that neither the piece-workers, nor the day labourers in general constitute the cadres of a working class similar to the West-European proletariat; only those who work regularly throughout the year can form these cadres."

All praises to the Perm Narodniks for their interest in the relation between the Russian wage-workers and the "West-European proletariat." The question is an interesting one, there's no gainsaying that! Nevertheless, from statisticians we would have preferred to hear statements based on fact, and not on "conviction." For, after all, the mere utterance of one's "conviction" will not always convince others.... Would it not have been better to give more facts, instead of telling the reader about the "convictions" of Mr. X or Mr. Y? How incredibly few facts on the position of the wage-workers, working conditions, working hours in the establishments of various size, the families of the wage-workers, etc., are given in the *Sketch*. If the only purpose of the argument on the difference between the Russian workers and the West-European proletariat was to hide this omission, we should have to retract our praise....

All we learn about wage-workers from the *Sketch* is their division into four categories: annual, seasonal, piece and day workers. To get some idea of these categories, we have to turn to the data scattered throughout the book. The number of workers in each category and their earnings are given for 29 industries (out of 43). In these 29 industries there are 4,795 wage-workers, earning a total of 233,784 rubles. In all the 43 industries, there are 4,904 wage-workers

with aggregate earnings amounting to 238,992 rubles. Thus, our summary embraces 98% of the wage-workers and their earnings. Here, en regard,* are the figures of the *Sketch*** and of our summary:

			Figures of our summary				
	Number of wage-workers according to *Sketch*	%	Number of wage-workers	%	Their earnings Total (rubles)	Their earnings Per worker (rubles)	%***
Annual	379	8	351	7.4	26,978	76.8	100
Seasonal	1,496	30	1,432	29.8	40,958	28.6	37
Piece	1,812	37	1,577	32.9	92,357	58.5	76.1
Day	1,217	25	1,435	29.9	73,491	51.2	66.7
Total	4,904	100	4,795	100	233,784	48.7	

In the *Sketch* summary there are either mistakes or misprints. But that is by the way. The point of chief interest is the data on earnings. The earnings of the piece-workers, of whom the *Sketch* says that "essentially, piece-work is the nearest stage on the road to economic independence" (p. 51—also, no doubt, "according to our conviction"?), are *considerably lower* than those of the worker employed by the year. If the statement of the statisticians that the master usually finds board for the annual worker, whereas the piece-worker has to find his own, is based on fact and not merely on "conviction," the difference will be even greater. The Perm master handicraftsmen have chosen a queer way to place their workers on the "road to independence"! It consists in *lowering wages*.... The fluctuations in the working season, as we shall see, are not big enough to explain this difference. Further, it is very interesting to note that a day labourer's earnings equal 66.7% of an annual worker's. Hence, each day labourer is occupied on an average for about eight months in the year. Obviously, it would be far more correct to refer to this as a "temporary" diversion from industry (if the day labourers are really diverted

* For purposes of comparison.—*Ed.*

** P. 50. The *Sketch* does not summarise the figures for earnings.

*** The earnings of an annual worker are taken as 100.

from industry of their own accord, and not because the master does not furnish them with work), than as the "predominance of the seasonal element in wage-labour" (p 52).

III

"COMMUNAL-LABOUR CONTINUITY"

The data collected by the handicraft census which indicate the foundation dates of practically all the establishments investigated are of great interest. Here are the general data on the subject:

Number of establishments founded before	1845	640
	in 1845-55	251
	" 1855-65	533
	" 1865-75	1,339
	" 1875-85	2,652
	" 1885-95	3,469
	Total	8,840

Thus, we see that the post-Reform period has stimulated a big development in handicraft industry. It seems the conditions favouring this development have been and are operating with ever-growing force as time goes on, since each succeeding decade has witnessed the opening of more and more establishments. This fact is clear evidence of the intensity with which the development of commodity production, the separation of agriculture from industry, and the growth of commerce and industry in general are proceeding among the peasantry. We say "separation of agriculture from industry," for this separation begins earlier than the separation of the agriculturists from the industrialists: every enterprise which produces for the market gives rise to exchange between agriculturists and industrialists. Hence, the appearance of such an enterprise implies that the agriculturists cease to produce articles in their homes and purchase them in the market, and to make such purchases the peasant has to sell agricultural produce. The growing number of commercial and industrial establishments thus

implies a growing social division of labour, the general basis of commodity economy and of capitalism.*

The opinion has been expressed in Narodnik literature that the rapid development of *small production* in industry since the Reform is not a phenomenon of a capitalist nature. The argument is that the growth of small production proves its strength and vitality, as compared with large-scale production (Mr. V. V.). This argument is absolutely false. The growth of small production among the peasantry signifies the appearance of new industries, the conversion of new branches of raw material processing into independent spheres of industry, progress in the social division of labour, the initial process of capitalist development, while the swallowing-up of small by large establishments implies a further step forward by capitalism, leading to the triumph of its higher forms. The spread of small establishments among the peasantry extends commodity economy and prepares the ground for capitalism (by creating petty masters and wage-labourers), while the swallowing-up of small establishments by manufactories and factories implies that big capitalism is utilising ground that has been prepared. The simultaneous existence of these two, seemingly contradictory, processes in one country actually has nothing contradictory in it: it is quite natural that in a more developed part of the country, or in a more developed sphere of industry, capitalism should progress by drawing small handicraftsmen into the mechanised factory, while in more remote regions, or in backward branches of industry, the process of capitalist development is only in its initial stage and manifests itself in the appearance of new branches and new industries. Capitalist manufacture "conquers but partially the domain of national production, and always rests on the handicrafts of the town and the domestic industry of the rural districts as its ultimate basis (Hintergrund). If it destroys these in one form, in particular branches, at certain points, it calls them up again elsewhere..." (*Das Kapital*, I², S. 779).[116]

* Consequently, if Mr. N.—on's attacks on the "separation of industry from agriculture" were not the platonic lamentations of a romanticist, he should also bewail the appearance of every handicraft establishment.

The figures showing the dates the establishments were founded are also inadequately treated in the *Sketch*: all the information given is for uyezds, and not for groups or sub-groups; nor is there any other grouping (according to size of establishment, whether located in the centre of the industry or in the surrounding villages, etc.). Although they did not analyse the census data in accordance with their own system of groups and sub-groups, the Perm Narodniks here too found it necessary to treat the reader to sermons that are amazing for their ultra-Narodnik unctuousness and ... absurdity. The Perm statisticians have made the discovery that in the "handicraft form of production" there prevails a specific "form of continuity" of establishments, namely, "communal-labour continuity," whereas the system that prevails in capitalist industry is "property-inheritance continuity," and that "communal-labour continuity organically converts the wage-worker into an independent master" (sic!), which finds expression in the fact that when the owner of an establishment dies and there are no family workers among the heirs, the industry passes to another family, "perhaps to that of a wage-worker employed in the very same establishment," and also in the fact that "community land tenure guarantees the labour industrial independence of both the owner of a handicraft industrial establishment and his wage-worker" (pp. 7, 68, et al.).

We have no doubt that this "communal-labour principle of continuity in the handicraft industries," as invented by the Perm Narodniks, will occupy a fitting place in the history of literature, alongside the sentimental theory of "people's production" propounded by Messrs. V. V., N. —on, and others. Both theories are of the same mould, both embellish and distort the truth with the help of Manilovian phrases. Everybody knows that the establishments, materials, tools, etc., of the handicraftsmen are private *property* which is transmitted by *inheritance*, and not by some sort of communal law; that the village community in no way guarantees independence even in agriculture, let alone industry, and that the same economic struggle and exploitation goes on within the community as outside it. What has been turned into the special theory of the "communal-

labour principle" is the simple fact that the small master, owning very little capital, has to work himself, and that the wage-worker *may* become a master (if he is thrifty and abstemious, of course); examples of this are cited in the *Sketch* on p. 69.... All the theoreticians of the petty bourgeoisie have always consoled themselves with the fact that in small production a worker *may* become a master, and none of their ideals have ever gone beyond the conversion of the workers into small masters. The *Sketch* even makes an attempt to cite "statistical data confirming the principle of communal-labour continuity" (45). These data relate to the tanning industry. Out of 129 establishments, 90 (i.e., 70%) have been founded since 1870; yet in 1869 there were 161 handicraft tanneries (according to the "list of inhabited places"), while in 1895 there were 153. That is to say, tanneries have been transferred from some families to others—and this is regarded as the "principle of communal-labour continuity." It would be absurd, of course, to argue against this anxiety to detect some special "principle" in the fact that small establishments are easily opened and just as easily shut down, freely pass from one hand to another, and so on. Let us only add, with regard to the tanning industry in particular, that, firstly, the dates of origin of the establishments indicate that this industry developed far *more slowly* than the other industries, and that, secondly, it is absolutely useless to compare 1869 with 1895, for the term "handicraft tannery" is constantly confused with the term "leather factory." In the 1860s the overwhelming majority of the "leather factories" in Perm Gubernia (according to the factory statistics) had an output valued at less than 1,000 rubles (see the *Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Part I, St. Petersburg, 1869. Tables and notes); in the 1890s establishments with an output of less than 1,000 rubles were, on the one hand, excluded from the list of factories, and the list of "handicraft tanneries," on the other, happened to include many establishments with an output of over 1,000 rubles, some even with an output of 5,000 rubles, 10,000 rubles and more (*Sketch*, p. 70, and pp. 149 and 150 of the tables). What is the use of comparing data for 1869 and 1895 when no definite distinction is made between handicraft and factory-type tanneries?

Thirdly, even if it were true that the number of tanneries has decreased, might this not mean that many small establishments have been closed down and that larger establishments have been gradually opened in their place? Are we to believe that such a "change" also confirms the "principle of communal-labour continuity"?

And the crowning incongruity is that all this sugary talk about the "communal-labour principle," the "guarantee of communal-labour independence," and the like, refers to the tanning industry, where the agriculturist handicraftsmen represent the purest type of petty bourgeois (see below), an industry which is highly concentrated in *three* large establishments (factories) that have been included in the list side, by side with the one-man handicraft and artisan establishments. Here are the figures showing this concentration:

In all, there are 148 establishments in this industry. Workers: 267 family+172 wage-workers = 439; aggregate output = 151,022 rubles; net income = 26,207 rubles. Among these establishments there are 3 with 0 family workers+65 wage-workers = 65. Value of output = 44,275 rubles; net income = 3,391 rubles (p. 70 of the text, and pp. 149 and 150 of the tables).

In other words, in *three* establishments out of 148 ("only 2.1%," as the *Sketch* reassuringly puts it—p. 76) there is a concentration of *nearly one-third* of the total output of the "handicraft tanning industry," yielding their owners thousands of rubles of income without their taking any part in production. We shall encounter many similar incongruities in relation to other industries, too. But in describing this industry, the authors of the *Sketch* paused, by way of exception, to discuss the three establishments mentioned. With regard to one of them we are told that the owner (an agriculturist!) "is apparently occupied exclusively in commerce, having his leather shops in the village of Beloyarskoye and the city of Ekaterinburg" (pp. 76-77). This is a specimen of how capital invested in production combines with capital invested in commerce—a fact that should be noted by the authors of the *Sketch*, who depict "kulakdom" and commercial operations as something adventitious, divorced from production! In another establishment, the family

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

consists of five males, not one of whom works at the trade "the father is engaged in commercial operations connected with his industry, and the sons (varying in age from 18 to 53), all of them educated, have apparently taken to other and more congenial pursuits than transferring hides from one vat to another and washing them" (p. 77). The authors magnanimously concede that these establishments are "capitalist in character"—"but how far the future of these enterprises is ensured on the principle of transmission as inherited property is a question to which only the future can give its decisive answer" (76). How profound! "The future is a question to which only the future can give an answer." The sacred truth! But does it warrant a distortion of the present?

ARTICLE TWO

(IV. The Agriculture of "Handicraftsmen." — V. Large and Small Establishments.—The Incomes of the Handicraftsmen)

IV

THE AGRICULTURE OF "HANDICRAFTSMEN"

The house-to-house census of master handicraftsmen, big and small, provide very interesting data on the agriculture they engage in. Here are the figures, divided according to the sub-groups, as given in the *Sketch*:

Sub-groups	Per household			Percentage of households	
	Area cultivated (desiatines)	Horses*	Cows*	Owning no horses	Owning no cows
1. Commodity producers	7.1	2.1	2.2	7.4	5
2. Artisans	6.2	1.9	2.1	9.0	6
3. Working for a buyer-up	4.5	1.4	1.3	16.0	13
In all	6.3	1.8	2.0	9.5	6

We thus see that the more prosperous the handicraftsmen are as industrialists, the more prosperous they are as agriculturists. The lower they rank in production, the lower they rank in agriculture. The handicraft census data, therefore, fully confirm the opinion already expressed in literature, namely, that the differentiation of the handicraftsmen in industry goes hand in hand with their differentiation as peasants in agriculture (A. Volgin, *The Substantiation of Narodism*, *etc.*, pp. 211, et. seq.). As the wage-workers employed by the handicraftsmen are on an even lower (or not higher) level than the handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up, we are entitled to conclude that the

* In the *Sketch* there is an obvious misprint in this column (see p. 58), which we have corrected.

proportion of impoverished agriculturists among them is even higher. The house-to-house census, as we have already said, did not cover the wage-workers. At any rate, even the figures cited clearly show how ludicrous is the assertion in the *Sketch* that "community land tenure guarantees the labour industrial independence of both the owner of a handicraft industrial establishment and his wage-worker."

The absence of detailed information on the agricultural activity of the one-man producers and small and large masters is very acutely felt in the data now under examination. To fill the gap, if only partially, we must turn to the data for the separate industries; sometimes in the *Sketch* we come across information on the number of agricultural labourers employed by masters,* but no general summary is given.

Take the tanner agriculturists—131 households. They employ 124 agricultural labourers, they cultivate 16.9 dessiatines and possess 4.6 horses per household; they have 4.1 cows each (p. 71). The wage-workers (73 annual and 51 seasonal) receive 2,492 rubles in wages, or 20.1 rubles each, whereas the average wage of a worker in the tanning industry is 52 rubles. Here too, therefore, we observe the phenomenon common to all capitalist countries—the status of the agricultural labourer is lower than that of the industrial labourer. The "handicraft" tanners obviously represent the purest type of peasant bourgeoisie, and the celebrated "combination of industry with agriculture" so highly praised by the Narodniks is nothing more than the prosperous owners of commercial and industrial establishments transferring *capital* from commerce and industry to agriculture, and paying their farm labourers incredibly low wages.**

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* It is well known that among the peasants even industrial workers are often compelled to perform agricultural work. Cf. *Handicraft Industries*, *etc.*, III, p. 7.

** The seasonal labourer in agriculture always receives more than half the yearly wage. But let us assume that in this case the seasonal labourers receive only half the wage of the annual worker. The wage of an annual worker will then be $\left(2{,}492 : (73 + \frac{51}{2})\right) = 25.5$ rubles. According to the Department of Agriculture, the average wages over a period of 10 years (1881-91) for a farm labourer employed by the year in Perm Gubernia was 50 rubles with board.

Take the handicraft oil-millers. The agriculturists among them number 173. A household, on the average, cultivates 10.1 dessiatines and possesses 3.5 horses and 3.3 cows. There is no household without at least one horse and a cow. Together, they employ 98 labourers (annual and seasonal) who receive in wages a total of 3,438 rubles, or an average of 35.1 rubles each. "The refuse, or oil-cake that remains after the milling process, serves as excellent cattle feed, thanks to which it is possible to manure the fields on a larger scale. Thus the household derives a triple advantage from the industry: the income from the industry itself, the income from livestock, and a higher yield from the fields" (164). "Agriculture is carried on by them" (the oil-millers) "on a wide scale, and many of them, not contenting themselves with the community allotments they get, also rent land from the poor households" (168). The data showing the distribution of flax and hemp growing by uyezds reveal "a certain connection between the area under flax and hemp and the distribution of the oil-milling industry among the uyezds of the gubernia" (170).

Hence, the commercial and industrial enterprises in this case are those known as technical agricultural industries, the development of which is always characteristic of the progress of commercial and capitalist agriculture.

Take the flour-millers. Most of them engage in agriculture—385 out of 421. A household, on the average, cultivates 11.0 dessiatines and possesses 3.0 horses and 3.5 cows. They employ 307 workers who are also agriculturists and who receive wages totalling 6,211 rubles. Like the oil-milling industry, "flour-milling serves the millers as a means of marketing the produce of their own farms in the most profitable form" (178).

These examples, we think, should be quite sufficient to show how absurd it is to regard the term "handicraftsman agriculturist" as signifying something homogeneous and uniform. All the agriculturists we have cited are representatives of the agricultural petty bourgeoisie, and to combine these types with the rest of the peasantry, including even the ruined households, is to obscure the most characteristic features of reality.

In the concluding part of their description of the oil-

milling industry, the compilers try to argue against the "capitalist doctrine" that the stratification of the peasants is capitalist evolution. This proposition, they claim, is based on the "absolutely arbitrary assertion that this stratification is a factor of most recent times and is an obvious symptom of the rapid de facto spread of the capitalist regime among the peasantry despite the existence of de jure community land tenure" (176). The compilers argue that the village community has never precluded property stratifications, but it "does not perpetuate them, does not give rise to classes"; "these transitory stratifications have not become more marked with the lapse of time, but, on the contrary, have been gradually obliterated" (177). Naturally, such an assertion, in substantiation of which the artels (of which more anon, § VII), family divisions (sic!) and land redivisions (!) are cited, can only evoke a smile. To say that the claim that differentiation of the peasantry is growing and spreading is an "arbitrary" one, means to ignore well-known facts: peasants lose their horses and abandon the land on a mass scale and this is coupled with "technical progress in peasant farming" (cf. *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming* by Mr. V. V.); the increase in the letting and mortgaging of allotments is coupled with increased land renting; the increase in the number of commercial and industrial establishments is coupled with an increase in the number of migratory industrialists, i.e., vagrant wage-workers; etc., etc.

The house-to-house census should have provided a wealth of material on the highly interesting question of how the incomes and earnings of the agriculturist handicraftsmen compare with the incomes of the non-agriculturists. All the data on this subject are to be found in the tables, but the *Sketch* gives no summary, and we have had to compile one from the material contained in the book. This summary was based, firstly, on those given in the *Sketch* for the individual industries. All we had to do in this case was to add together the data for the various industries. But such summaries are not given in tabular form for all industries. In some cases it was clear that mistakes or misprints had crept in—which is only natural in the absence of check totals. Secondly, the summary was based on a selection of

figures contained in the descriptions of certain industries. Thirdly, where neither of these sources was available, we had to turn directly to the tables (for example, in the case of the last industry: "mining"). It goes without saying that owing to this diversity in the character of the material contained in our summary, mistakes and inaccuracies were bound to have crept in. Nevertheless, we believe that although the grand totals of our summary do not coincide with the totals of the table, the deductions drawn from it may fully serve their purpose, for whatever corrections might be introduced, the average magnitudes and proportions (and it is these alone that we use for our deductions) would be but slightly changed. For example, according to the totals of the tables in the *Sketch*, the gross income per worker is 134.8 rubles, and according to our summary it is 133.3 rubles; the net income per family worker is 69.0 rubles and 68.0 rubles respectively; the earnings per wage-worker are 48.7 rubles and 48.6 rubles respectively.

Here are the results of our summary showing gross income, net income, and the earnings of wage-workers in each group and sub-group (see table on page 392).

The chief results of this tabulation are as follows:

1) The non-agricultural industrial population takes an incomparably bigger part in industry (relative to their numbers) than the agricultural population. The number of non-agriculturist workers is less than half the number of agriculturist workers. But they account for nearly half the gross output: 1,276,772 rubles out of a total of 2,655,007 rubles, or 48.1%. As regards income from production, that is, the net income of the masters plus the workers' wages, the non-agriculturists even surpass the agriculturists, accounting for 647,666 rubles out of a total of 1,260,335 rubles, or 51.4%. Consequently, we find that, while they are a minority in numbers, the non-agricultural industrialists do not lag behind the agriculturists in volume of output. This fact is of great importance when we come to judge the traditional Narodnik theory that agriculture is the "main foundation" of so-called handicraft industry.

From this, other conclusions follow naturally:

2) The gross output per non-agriculturist worker (gross income) is considerably higher than that of the agricultur-

Group	Sub-group	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income (rubles)		Net income (rubles)		Wages (rubles)		Net income and wages combined	Number of households in debt
			Family workers	Wage workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	Total	Per wage-worker		
I	1 . . .	2,239	4,122	1,726	5,848	758,493	129.7	204,004	49.5	74,558	43.2	278,563	225
I	2 . . .	2,841	4,249	712	4,961	383,441	77.3	186,719	43.9	34,937	49.0	221,656	93
I	3 . . .	1,016	1,878	586	2,464	236,361	95.9	91,916	48.9	20,535	35.0	112,451	304
Total for Group I		6,096	10,249	3,024	13,273	1,378,235	103.8	482,639	47.1	130,030	43.0	612,669	622
II	1 . . .	959	1,672	738	2,410	605,509	251.2	220,713	132.0	45,949	62.2	266,662	176
II	2 . . .	595	876	272	1,148	178,916	155.8	90,203	102.9	18,404	67.6	108,607	51
II	3 . . .	1,320	2,231	852	3,083	492,347	159.7	229,108	102.7	43,289	50.8	272,397	262
Total for Group II		2,874	4,779	1,862	6,641	1,276,772	192.2	540,024	113.0	107,642	57.8	647,666	489
Grand Total		8,970	15,028	4,886	19,914	2,655,007	133.3	1,022.663	68.0	237.672	48.6	1.260.335	1.111

ist: 192.2 rubles as against 103.8 rubles, or nearly *twice* as much. As we shall see later, the working season of the non-agriculturists is longer than that of the agriculturists, but the difference is by no means so very great, so that the higher labour productivity of the non-agriculturists is beyond all doubt. This difference is smallest in the third sub-group—the handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up—which is quite natural.

3) The net income of the non-agriculturist masters, big and small, is *more than double* that of the agriculturists: 113.0 rubles, as against 47.1 rubles (nearly two-and-a-half times as much). This difference is to be observed in all the sub-groups, but it is the biggest in the first, among the handicraftsmen who produce for the market. It goes without saying that this difference is least of all to be explained by the difference in the length of working periods. There can be no doubt that it is due to the fact that *the tie with the land lowers the incomes of the industrialists*; the market discounts the incomes derived by the handicraftsmen from agriculture, and the agriculturists have to content themselves with lower earnings. This is probably aggravated by the fact that the agriculturists suffer bigger losses on sales, spend more for materials and are more dependent on the merchants. In any case, it is a fact that the *handicraftsman's tie with the land reduces his earnings*. There is no need to say more about the enormous significance of this fact which throws a true light on the meaning of the "power of the soil" in modern society. We need only recall what a tremendous factor low earnings are in preserving methods of production that are primitive and entail bondage, in retarding the use of machinery, and in lowering the workers' standard of living.*

* On this last point (which is the first in importance) we would say that it is unfortunate that the *Sketch* furnishes no data on the standard of living of the agriculturists and non-agriculturists. But other investigators have noted that it is a common phenomenon for the living standard of the non-agriculturist industrialists to be incomparably higher than that of the "raw" agriculturists, and this is equally true of Perm Gubernia. Cf. *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry in Russia* published by the Ministry of Agriculture and State Property, Vol. III, Yegunov's article. The author points to the completely "urban" standard of living in some

4) The wages of non-agriculturist wage-workers are also everywhere higher than those of agriculturists, but the difference is by no means as great as in the case of the incomes of the masters. Generally, in all three sub-groups, the wage-worker employed by the agriculturist handicraftsman earns an average of 43.0 rubles, while the wage-worker employed by the non-agriculturist earns 57.8 rubles, or one-third more. This difference *may* to a large extent (*but not entirely*) be due to the difference in the length of the working season. As to the relation between this difference and the tie with the land, we cannot form a judgement, for we have no data on agriculturist and non-agriculturist wage-workers. Apart from the length of the working season, the difference in the level of requirements, of course, also plays its part.

5) The difference between the size of the masters' incomes and workers' wages is incomparably larger in the case of the non-agriculturists than in that of the agriculturists: taking all three sub-groups, the income of a non-agriculturist master is almost double a worker's wages (113 rubles and 57.8 rubles respectively), whereas among the agriculturists the income of the master is only slightly higher—*4.1 rubles* more (47.1 and 43.0)! If these figures are astonishing, even more so are those relating to the agriculturist artisans (I, 2), where the income of the master is *less* than a worker's wages! But the reason for this will become quite clear later, when we cite data showing the tremendous difference between the size of incomes in large and small establishments. By increasing productivity of labour, the large establishments make it possible to pay wages exceeding the income of the poor, individual handicraftsmen working alone, whose "independence," in view of their subjection to the market, is quite fictitious. This vast difference between the incomes of the large and the small establishments is to be observed in both groups, but much more so in the case of the agriculturists (due to the more depressed state of

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of the landless villages, to the endeavour of the non-agriculturist handicraftsman to dress and live "as decent people do" (European clothes, even to the starched shirt- samovar, larger consumption of tea, sugar, white bread, beef, etc.). The author draws on the family budgets contained in Zemstvo statistical publications.

the small handicraftsmen). The negligible difference between the income of the small master and the wages of the worker clearly shows that the income of the *small* agriculturist handicraftsman who employs no wage-workers is *not higher*, *and often even lower* than the wages of a hired worker. As a matter of fact, the net income of the master (47.1 rubles per family worker) is the *average* for all establishments, large and small, for both the owners of factories and of one-man workshops. Naturally, in the case of the big masters, the difference between their net income and the wages of their workers is not 4 rubles, but anything from ten to one hundred times as much, which means that the income of the small one-man workshop is considerably below 47 rubles; in other words, this income is *not higher*, *but often even lower* than the wages of a worker. Handicraft census data on the division of establishments according to net income (see below, § V) fully bear out this seemingly paradoxical conclusion. But these data relate to all the establishments in general, to agriculturists and non-agriculturists alike, and that is why this deduction from the above table is so important: we have learnt that it is the agriculturists whose earnings are lowest, in other words, that "the tie with the land" greatly reduces earnings.

We have already said, when discussing the difference between the incomes of the agriculturists and the non-agriculturists, that this difference cannot be explained by the difference in the length of the working periods. Let us now examine the census data on this subject. One of the items in the census programme, as we learn from the "introduction," was the investigation of the "intensity of production throughout the year, on the basis of the number of family members and wage-workers engaged in production each month" (p. 14). Since this was a house-to-house census, in other words, since each establishment was investigated separately (unfortunately, a specimen of the house-to-house census forms is not appended to the *Sketch*), it must be assumed that information regarding the number of workers engaged each month, or the number of working months in the year, was gathered in the case of each establishment. In the *Sketch* these data are gathered in one table (pp. 57 and 58), in which the number of workers (family and wage-workers together) *engaged*

in each month of the year is given for each of the sub-groups of both groups.

The attempt of the 1894-95 handicraft census to determine with such precision how many months in the year the handicraftsmen work is highly instructive and interesting. Indeed, without such information the data on incomes and earnings would be incomplete, and the statistical calculations would be only approximate. But, unfortunately, the data on working periods have been very scantily analysed: apart from this general table, all we are given is information on the number of workers engaged each month in only a few industries, sometimes divided according to groups, sometimes not; division according to sub-groups has not been made for any industry. The separation of the large establishments from the small would have been particularly valuable in this instance, for we have every reason to expect—both a priori and on the basis of data provided by other investigators of handicraft industry—that the working periods of the big and the small handicraftsmen are not the same. Furthermore, the table itself on page 57 is apparently not free from mistakes or misprints (for example, in the months February, August and November; columns 2 and 3 of Group II have evidently been mixed up, for the number of workers in the third sub-group is larger than in the second). Even when these inaccuracies are corrected (and the corrections are sometimes only approximate), the table gives rise to no little misgiving, which renders the use of it risky. For instance, when we examine the data in the table by sub-groups, we find that in the third sub-group (Group I) the maximum number of workers, 2,911, are engaged in December. Yet, according to the *Sketch*, the total number of workers in the third sub-group is 2,551. Similarly, in the third sub-group of Group II: maximum number of workers 3,221, actual number 3,077. On the other hand, in the sub-groups the *maxima* engaged in one of the months are less than the actual number of workers. How is this to be explained? Is it because information on this subject was not gathered for all the establishments? That is very likely, although there is no hint of it in the *Sketch*. In the case of the second sub-group of Group II, not only is the maximum number of workers (February) larger than the actual number

(1,882 and 1,163 respectively), but even the *average number* of workers engaged in one month (i.e., the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of workers engaged in the twelve months by 12) is *higher* than the actual number of workers (1,265 and 1,163 respectively)!! Which figure, one asks, did the registrars regard as actual: the average number of workers for the year, the average for some period (winter, say), or the number actually employed in some particular month? An investigation of the monthly number of workers engaged in the separate industries does not help to clear up the puzzle. In the majority of the twenty-three industries for which this information is furnished, the maximum number of workers engaged in any one month of the year is less than the actual number of workers. In the case of two industries, the maximum is *higher* than the actual number of workers: in the copper-working industry (239 and 233 respectively) and in the forges (Group II—1,811 and 1,269 respectively). The maximum is equal to the actual number of workers in the case of two industries (rope-making and oil-milling, Group II).

This being the case, we cannot use the data showing the number of workers engaged month by month for a comparison with their earnings, with the actual number of workers employed, etc. All that remains is to treat these data regardless of others, and to compare the maximum and the minimum numbers of workers engaged in each month. This is what is done in the *Sketch*, but the separate months are compared. We consider it more correct to compare winter and summer; for that will enable us to determine how far agriculture diverts workers from industry. We took the average number of workers engaged in winter (October to March) as the standard, and, applying this standard to the number of workers engaged in summer, we arrived at the number of summer working months. By adding up the number of winter and summer months we got the number of working months in the year. Let us illustrate this by an example. In the first sub-group of Group I there were 18,060 workers engaged in the six winter months, which gives us an average of (18,060: 6 =) 3,010 workers in one month. In the summer, 12,345 workers were employed; in other words, the summer working season is equal to (12,345:3,010) 4.1 months. Hence,

the working period in the first sub-group of Group I amounts to 10.1 months in the year.

This method of analysing the data seemed to us both the most correct and the most convenient. It is the most correct, because it is based on a comparison of winter and summer months, and hence, on an exact determination of the extent to which agriculture diverts workers from industry. That the winter months have been correctly taken is confirmed by the fact that in the October-March period the number of workers in both groups is higher than the average for the year. There is the greatest increase in the number of workers from September to October, and the greatest decrease from March to April. Incidentally, the choice of other months would have had little effect on the conclusions. We consider the method chosen to be the most suitable because it gives an exact figure for the working period which allows us to compare the groups and sub-groups in this respect.

Here are the data obtained by this method:

	Group I Sub-groups			Average	Group II Sub-groups			Average	For the two groups
	1	2	3		1	2	3		
Working period (months)	10.1	9.6	10.5	10.0	10.0	10.4	10.9	10.5	10.2

These figures lead us to conclude that the difference between the working periods for agriculturists and non-agriculturists is *very small*: that of the non-agriculturists is only 5% longer. The smallness of this difference gives rise to doubt as to the correctness of the figures. In order to verify them, we have made some calculations and summaries of material scattered throughout the book and have arrived at the following results:

The *Sketch* furnishes data on the monthly employment of workers in 23 of the 43 industries, the data are given according to groups in the case of 12 (13)* of them but not in the case of the remaining 10 groups. We find that in three of the industries (pitch and tar, dyeing and brick-making) the number of workers is higher in summer than in winter:

* There is only one group in the horn industry—Group I.

in the six winter months only 1,953 workers are engaged in all three industries as against 4,918 in the six summer months. In these industries there is a great preponderance of agriculturists over non-agriculturists, the former constituting 85.9% of the total number of workers. It was obviously quite wrong to combine these, so to speak, summer industries with the others in the grand totals for groups, as that meant combining unlike things and artificially raising the number of summer workers in all industries. There are two ways of correcting the error which results from this. The first is to deduct the figures for these three industries from the totals given in the *Sketch* for Groups I and II.* The result is a working period of 9.6 months for Group I, and of 10.4 months for Group II. Here the difference between the two groups is bigger, but still very small—8.3%. The second method of correcting the error is to combine the figures for the twelve industries for which the *Sketch* gives information on the monthly employment of workers in Groups I and II separately. This will embrace 70% of the total number of handicraftsmen, and, what is more, the comparison between Groups I and II will be more correct. We find that in the case of these twelve industries the working period in Group I is only 8.9 months, and in Group II, 10.7 months, while for the two groups together it is 9.7 months. The working period of the non-agriculturists is now 20.2% longer than that of the agriculturists. The agriculturists do not work for 3.1 months in summer, the non-agriculturists for only 1.3 months. Even if we take the maximum difference in the working periods in Groups II and I as the standard, we shall find that not only the differences in the gross output of the workers of Groups I and II, or in the net incomes of their establishments, but even the differences in the wages of agriculturist and non-agriculturist wage-workers *cannot be explained by the difference in the length of the working periods*. Consequently, the conclusion drawn above, namely, that the tie with the land reduces the handicraftsmen's earnings, remains fully valid.

* The distribution of the workers in these three industries between Group I and Group II is done approximately, 85.9% being taken as the standard for Group I.

We must therefore conclude that the compilers of the *Sketch* are mistaken in their desire to explain the difference between the earnings of the agriculturists and non-agriculturists by the difference in the length of the working periods. Their mistake was due to their not attempting to express the differences in the working periods by exact figures, and this led them astray. For example, on page 106 of the *Sketch* it is stated that the difference between the earnings of the agriculturist and the non-agriculturist furriers "is chiefly determined by the number of working days devoted to industry." Yet the earnings of the non-agriculturists in this industry are from two to four times greater than those of the agriculturists (65 and 280 rubles respectively per family worker in the first sub-group, and 27 and 62 rubles in the second sub-group), whereas the working period of the non-agriculturists is longer by only 28.7% (8.5 months as compared with 6.6).

The fact that the tie with the land lowers earnings could not escape the attention even of the compilers of the *Sketch*; but they expressed it in the usual Narodnik formula on the "superiority" of the handicraft to the capitalist form: "by combining agriculture with industry, the handicraftsman ... is able to sell his wares cheaper than those of the factory" (p. 4); in other words, he can manage on smaller earnings. But where is the "superiority" of the tie with the land, if the market already so dominates the whole of the country's industrial life that it discounts this tie by lowering the earnings of the agriculturist handicraftsman; if capital can take advantage of this "tie" to exert greater pressure on the agriculturist handicraftsman, who is less able to defend his interests, to choose a different master, a different customer, or a different occupation? The lowering of wages (and of industrial earnings in general) when the worker (or the small industrialist) has a plot of land is something common to all capitalist countries, and is perfectly well known to all employers who have long ago appreciated the vast "superiority" of workers tied to the land. Only in the decadent West do they bluntly call a spade a spade, but in our country the lowering of wages, the lowering of the living standard of the working population, the delay in introducing machinery, and the perpetuation

of all sorts of bondage is referred to as the "superiority" of "people's production," which "combines agriculture with industry."...

In concluding our review of the 1894-95 census data on the working period, we cannot refrain from once again expressing our regret that the data obtained have been so incompletely analysed, nor from voicing the hope that this defect will not deter other investigators of this interesting problem. One cannot but admit that the method of investigation—determination of the number of workers employed each month—was very well chosen. Above we have given data for the working period by groups and sub-groups. There was some possibility of verifying the data for the groups. But it is utterly impossible to verify the data for the sub-groups, since the book furnishes absolutely no information on the differences in the length of the working period in the various sub-groups. Therefore, in citing these data, we make the reservation that we cannot guarantee their absolute reliability; and if we draw further conclusions, it is only for the purpose of raising this question and drawing the investigators' attention to it. The most important conclusion is that the smallest difference in the working periods in Groups I and II is in the first sub-group (only 1% in all: 10.1 months and 10.0 months); in other words, It is the most prosperous handicraftsmen and the biggest and *wealthiest agriculturists* who are *least diverted from agriculture*. The difference is largest in the case of the artisans (second sub-group: 9.5 months and 10.4 months), that is, the industrialists and *middle* agriculturists least affected by commodity production. It would appear that the prosperous agriculturists are diverted so little from agriculture either because of their larger families or their greater exploitation of wage-labour in industry or their hiring of agricultural labourers, and that the artisans are most diverted from agriculture because they have been less differentiated as agriculturists, have retained patriarchal relations to a great extent, and work directly for agricultural customers who reduce their orders in the summer.*

* There is an exception: the dyeing industry is run entirely by artisans, and summer work is greater than winter work.

The "tie with agriculture," the census reveals, has a very marked influence on the *literacy* of the handicraftsmen;—literacy among wage-labourers has *unfortunately* not been investigated. It appears that the non-agricultural population* is *far more literate* than the agricultural, and this feature is to be observed for both men and women in all sub-groups without exception, Here are the census figures (in percentages) on this subject in extenso (n. 62):

		Group I (agriculturalist)				Group II (non-agriculturalist)				Both groups
		Sub-groups			Average	Sub-groups			Average	
		1	2	3		1	2	3		
"Percentage of literate persons to total"	Males	32	33	20	31	41	45	33	39	33
	Females	9	6	4	7	17	22	14	17	9
"Percentage of literate persons among those directly engaged in production"	Males	39	37	26	36	44	57	51	49	40
	Females	13	17	4	10	53	21	23	30	19
Percentage of families with literate members		49	43	34	44	55	63	50	55	47

It is interesting to note that in the case of the non-agricultural population literacy is spreading far more rapidly among the women than among the men. The proportion of literate males in Group II is 1½ to 2 times as great as in Group I, while the proportion of literate females is 2½ to 5¾ times as great.

Summarising the conclusions drawn from the 1894-95 census on the subject of "agriculture connected with industry," we may take it as demonstrated that the tie with agriculture:

1) preserves the most backward forms of industry and retards economic development;

2) reduces the handicraftsmen's earnings and income, so that the *most* prosperous sub-groups of agriculturist masters earn, in general and on the average, less than the *least*

* We would remind the reader that only one town (and that an uyezd centre) was here included by way of exception: only 1,412, or 29.6 per cent, of the 4,762 family workers in Group II are town dwellers.

prosperous non-agriculturist sub-groups of *wage-workers*, to say nothing of the non-agriculturist masters. The masters of Group I have very low incomes even when compared with the wage-workers of that group—sometimes they are slightly higher and sometimes even lower than the workers' wages;

3) retards the cultural development of the population whose consumption level is lower than that of the non-agriculturists and whose standard of literacy is far behind that of the latter.

These conclusions will be useful later for our assessment of the Narodnik programme of industrial policy.

4) Differentiation among the agriculturist handicraftsmen is seen to run parallel to that of the industrialists. The higher (more prosperous) categories of agriculturists constitute a pure type of peasant bourgeoisie who employ regular and day labourers to run their farms.

5) The working period of the agriculturists is shorter than that of the non-agriculturists, but the difference is very small (5% to 20%).

V

LARGE AND SMALL ESTABLISHMENTS.—THE INCOMES OF THE HANDICRAFTSMEN

We must dwell in greater detail on the data of the 1894-95 census on *incomes* from handicrafts. The attempt to collect household data on incomes is very instructive, and it would be quite wrong to confine ourselves to general "averages" for the sub-groups (given above). We have already, on more than one occasion, referred to the fictitious nature of "averages" derived by adding together individual handicraftsmen and owners of big establishments and then dividing the total obtained by the number of the components. Let us endeavour to assemble the data contained in the *Sketch* on this subject in order to illustrate this method clearly and prove its fictitious nature and to demonstrate that in scientific investigations and in analysing house-to-house census data handicraftsmen must be grouped in categories according to number of workers (family and wage-workers) employed in the workshop, and all the census data arranged in accordance with these categories.

The compilers of the *Sketch* must have noted the all too obvious fact of higher incomes in the big establishments, and tried to minimise its significance. Instead of giving precise census data on the large establishments (which they could have selected with no difficulty), they again confined themselves to general discussions, arguments and inventions against conclusions which the Narodniks find unpleasant. Let us examine these arguments.

"If in such" (big) "establishments we meet with a family income disproportionately larger than that of the small establishments, we must not lose sight of the fact that a considerable part of this income is mainly the reproduction of the value, firstly, of a certain portion of the fixed capital transmitted to the product, secondly, of the labour and expenses connected with commerce and transport which play no part in production, and, thirdly, of the value of food supplied to wage-workers who receive their board from the masters. These facts" (facts, indeed!) "limit the possibility of certain illusions arising which give an exaggerated notion of the advantages of wage-labour in handicraft industry or, what amounts to the same thing, of the capitalist element" (p. 15). That it is highly desirable in all investigations "to limit" the possibility of illusions is something which nobody, of course, doubts, but for this it is necessary to combat "illusions" by means of *facts*, facts taken from the household census, and not by citing one's own opinions, which are themselves sometimes mere "illusions." Is not, indeed, the authors' argument about commercial and transport expenses an illusion? Who does not know that these expenses per unit of product are far smaller for the big producer than the small producer,* that the former buys his material cheaper and sells his product dearer, knowing how (and being in a position) to choose time and place? The handicraft census, too, mentions these generally known facts—cf. pp. 204 and 263, for example—and one cannot but regret that the *Sketch* contains no *facts* about expenses on the purchase of raw materials and the sale of the product by

* It goes without saying that only handicraftsmen *in the same sub-group* can be compared, and that a commodity producer cannot be compared with an artisan or a handicraftsman who works for a buyer-up.

big and small industrialists, by handicraftsmen and buyers-up. Further, as regards the wear and tear of fixed capital, here again the authors, while combating illusions, are themselves the victims of an illusion. Theory tells us that large expenditures on fixed capital diminish the part of the value per unit of product that represents wear and tear and is transmitted to the product. "An analysis and comparison of the prices of commodities produced by handicrafts or manufactures, and of the prices of the same commodities produced by machinery, shows generally that, in the product of machinery, the value due to the instruments of labour increases relatively, but decreases absolutely. In other words, its absolute amount decreases, but its amount, relatively to the total value of the product, of a pound of yarn, for instance, increases" (*Das Kapital*, I^2, S. 406).[117] The census also reckoned the costs of production, which include (p. 14, point 7) "repair of tools and fixtures." What reason is there to believe that omissions in the registration of this point are to be met with more frequently among the big than among the small masters? Would not rather the contrary be the case? As to board provided for wage-workers, there are no *facts* on this point in the *Sketch* at all: we do not know exactly how many workers board with their masters, how frequent are the omissions in the census on this point, how often agriculturist masters feed their wage-workers with produce from their farms, and how often the masters entered the workers' board under expenditure on production. Similarly, no *facts* on the inequality in the length of the working period in the big and the small establishments are given. We do not deny that the working period in the big establishments is very likely longer than in the small ones, but, firstly, the differences in income are out of all proportion to the differences in the length of the working period; and, secondly, it remains to be stated that the Perm statisticians have been unable to offer a single weighty argument, based on precise data, against the precise *facts* of the house-to-house census (given below), and in support of the Narodnik "illusions."

We have obtained the data for the large and small establishments in the following way: we examined the tables appended to the *Sketch*, noted the large establish-

ments (wherever they could be picked out, that is, wherever they were not lumped together with the mass of establishments in a general total), and compared them with the general totals given in the *Sketch* for all the establishments of *the same* group and sub-group. This question is so important that we hope the reader will not reproach us for the numerous tables we give below: in tables the facts stand out more saliently and compactly.

Felt-boot industry:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages of wage-workers		Net income		Reference to page of Sketch
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
					Rubles						
Total	58	99	95	194	22,769	117.3	4,338	45.6	7,410	75.0	P.112 of text
Large establishments	10	14	65	79	13,291	168.0	3,481	53.5	3,107	222.0	Pp. 214, 215 and 154 of tables
Other establishments not including the large	48	85	30	115	9,478	82.4	857	28.5	4,303	41.2	

Thus, the "average" income per family worker, 75 rubles, was obtained by adding together incomes of 222 rubles and 41 rubles. It appears that, after deducting the ten large establishments* with 14 family workers, the remaining establishments show a *net income* that is *below* the wages of a wage-worker (41.2 against 45.6 rubles), while in the large establishments wages are still higher. The productivity of labour in the large establishments is more than double

* But these are by no means the largest establishments. From the division of establishments according to number of wage-workers (p. 113) it may be calculated that in three establishments there are 163 wage-workers, or an average of 54 per establishment. Yet these are also regarded as "handicraft establishments" and are added together with the one-man workshops (of which there are no less than 460 in the industry) to obtain general "average"!

(168.0 and 82.4 rubles), the earnings of a wage-worker nearly double (53 rubles and 28 rubles), while the net income is five times higher (222 and 41 rubles). Obviously, no talk about differences in the working period or any other argument can eliminate the fact that the big establishments have the highest labour productivity* and the highest income, while the small handicraftsmen, for all their "independence" (first sub-group: those who work independently for the market) and their tie with the land (Group I), earn less than wage-workers.

In the carpentry trade the "net income" of the first sub-group of Group I "averages" 37.4 rubles per family worker, whereas the average earnings of a wage-worker in the same sub-group are 56.9 rubles (p. 131). It is impossible to pick out the big establishments from the tables, but it can scarcely be doubted that this "average" income per family worker was obtained by combining the highly profitable establishments employing wage-workers (who, after all, are not paid 56 rubles for nothing) with the dwarf workshops of the small "independent" handicraftsmen, who get much less than a wage-worker.

Next comes the bast-matting industry:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income		Reference to page of *Sketch*
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
Total	99	206	252	458	38,681	84.4	6,664	26.4	10.244	49.7	P. 151 of text
Large establishments	11	11	95	106	18,170	171.4	2,520	26.5	3,597	327.0	Pp. 95, 97 and 136 of tables
Others	88	195	157	352	20,511	58.2	4,144	26.4	6,647	34.0	

Thus, almost half the total output is concentrated in eleven of the ninety-nine establishments. In them, productivity of labour is more than double; the wages of the workers are also higher; and net income is more than six times the "average"

* "In one of the establishments" the introduction of a wool-carding machine was mentioned (p. 119).

and nearly ten times as high as that of the others, i.e., the smaller establishments. The latter have incomes but slightly higher than a worker's wages (34 and 26 rubles respectively).

Rope and string industry*:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income		Reference to page of *Sketch*
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
Total	58	179	106	285	81,672	286	4,338	65.6	16,127	90.1	P. 158 of text*
Large establishments	4	5	56	61	48,912	800	4,695	83.8	5,599	1,119.0	Pp. 40, and 188 of tables
Other	48	85	30	115	9,478	146	857	45.0	10,528	60.5	

Thus, here too the general "averages" show a higher income for the family workers than for the wage-workers (90 against 65.6 rubles). But 4 of the 58 establishments account for *over half* the total output. In these establishments (capitalist manufactories of the pure type)** productivity of labour is almost three times the average (800 and 286 rubles) and over five times that of the remaining, i.e., smaller, establishments (800 and 146 rubles). Workers' wages are much higher in the factories than in the small masters' workshops (84 and 45 rubles). The net income of the manufacturers is over 1,000 rubles per family as compared with the "average" of 90 rubles and with the 60.5 rubles of the

* There is apparently a misprint or error in the table on p. 158: in Irbit Uyezd the net income is more than the 9,827 rubles shown in the total. We had to change this table according to the data in the tables appended to the *Sketch*.

** Cf. *Handicraft Industries*, pp. 46-47, as well as the description of the industry given in the *Sketch*, p. 162, et. seq. It is most typical that "these employers were once real handicraftsmen and that is why they have always been fond ... of giving themselves that name."

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

small handicraftsmen. The income of the small handicraftsman is, therefore, lower than a worker's wages (60.5 and 65.6 rubles).

The pitch and tar industry:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income		Reference to page of *Sketch*
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
Total	167	319	980	399	22,076	55.3	2,150	26.8	10,979	34.4	Pp. 189 of text
Large establishments	999	910	16	26	4,440	170.7	654	40.8	2,697	269.7	Pp. 100, 101, 137, 160, 161, and 220 of tables
Others	158	309	64	373	17,636	47.3	1,496	23.2	8,282	36.8	

Although this industry is, in general, a small one that employs very few wage-workers (20%) we again find the same purely capitalist phenomenon of the superiority of the large (relatively large) establishments of the independent handicraftsmen in the agricultural group. And yet pitch and tar production is a purely peasant, "people's" industry! In the large establishments labour productivity is over three times, workers' wages about one-and-a-half times and net income about eight times the "average"; their net income, moreover, is ten times as high as that of other handicraft families who earn no more than the average wage-worker, and *less than a wage-worker in the larger establishments*. Let us note that pitch and tar production is chiefly a summer occupation, so that differences in the working period cannot be very great.*

* It may be seen from the *Sketch* that in the pitch and tar industry both the primitive method of distilling pitch *in pits* and the more perfected *cauldron*, and even *cylindrical boiler*, methods are employed (p. 195). The household census furnished material showing the distribution of these different methods, but it was not utilised, the large establishments not being treated separately.

The baking industry:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income		Reference to page of *Sketch*
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
Total	27	63	55	188	44,619	378.1	2,497	45.4	7,484	118.8	P. 215 of text
Large establishments	4	7	42	26	25,740	525	2,050	48.8	4,859	694	Pp. 68 and 229 of tables
Others	23	56	13	373	18,879	273	447	34.4	2,625	46.8	

Thus, here again, the averages for the entire sub-group are absolutely fictitious. The large establishments (of small capitalists) account for over half the total output, yield a net income six times the average and 14 times that of the small masters, and pay their workers *wages exceeding the incomes of the small handicraftsmen*. We do not mention productivity of labour; three or four of the large establishments produce a more valuable product—treacle.

The pottery industry. Here again we have a typical small peasant industry with an insignificant number of wage-workers (13%), very small establishments (less than two workers per establishment) and a predominance of agriculturists. And here too we get the same picture:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income		Reference to page of *Sketch*
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
Total	97	163	31	194	12,414	63.9	1,830	59	6,657	41	P. 291 of text
Large establishments	7	9	17	26	4,187	161.0	1,400	80.2	1,372	152	Pp. 168 and 206 of tables
Others	90	154	14	168	8,227	48.9	430	30.0	5,285	34.3	

Here, consequently, it is at once apparent from the "average" figures that the wage-worker's earnings are higher than the family worker's income. By treating the large establishments separately, we get the explanation of this contradiction, which we have already recorded in numerous instances. In the large establishments labour productivity, wages and masters' incomes are all incomparably higher, while the small handicraftsmen get less than the wage-workers *and less than half the earnings of the wage-workers in the best-organised shops*.

The brick industry:

Group I Sub-group I	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income		Reference to page of *Sketch*
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per worker	Total	Per family worker	
Total	229	558	218	766	17,606	22.6	4,560	20.9	10,126	18.1	P. 299 of text
Large establishments	8	9	45	54	3,130	57.9	1,415	31.4	1,298	144	Pp. 46 120, 169 and 183 of tables
Others	221	549	173	722	14,476	20.0	3,145	18.2	8,282	16.0	

Thus, here too, the "average" income of a family worker is lower than the earnings of a wage-worker. Here again it is to be explained by combining the big establishments—which are distinguished by a considerably higher labour productivity, higher payment of wage-workers, and a very high (comparatively) income—and the small establishments, the income of whose owners is about half the earnings of the wage-workers in the big establishments.

We might go on citing figures for other industries too,* but we think that those given are more than enough.

* Cf. vehicle building, p. 308 of the text and pp. 11 and 12 of the tables; chest making, p. 335; tailoring, p. 344, etc.

Let us now summarise the conclusions that follow from the facts examined:

1) The combining of large and small establishments results in absolutely fictitious "average" figures, which give no conception of the real state of affairs, obscure cardinal differences, and present as homogeneous something that is heterogeneous, of mixed composition.

2) The data for a number of industries show that the large establishments (where a large number of workers are engaged) are distinguished from the average and small establishments:

a) by an incomparably higher productivity of labour;

b) by better payment of wage-workers, and

c) by a far higher net income.

3) All the large establishments we have selected, without exception, employ wage-labour on an incomparably larger scale (than the average-sized establishments in the given industry), the proportion of wage-labour being substantially greater than that of family labour. The value of their output is as much as 10,000 rubles, while the number of wage-workers employed is ten and more per establishment. These large establishments, therefore, represent capitalist workshops. The census data consequently reveal *the prevalence of purely capitalist laws and relations* in the celebrated "handicraft" industry; they reveal the absolute superiority of the capitalist workshops, based on the co-operation of wage-workers, over the one-man workshops and small workshops in general—a superiority both in productivity of labour and in remuneration for labour, even of wage-workers.

4) In the case of a number of the industries the earnings of the small *independent* handicraftsmen prove to be no higher, and often even lower, than the earnings of wage-workers in the same industry. This difference would be even greater if to the wage-workers' earnings were added the value of the board received by some of them.

We have dealt with this last conclusion separately because the first three concern phenomena that are universal and inevitable under the laws of commodity production, whereas the last does not contain phenomena that are every-

where inevitable. We accordingly formulate this concept as follows: because of lower labour productivity in small establishments and the defenceless position of their owners in the market (especially in the case of agriculturists), it is possible that the earnings of an independent handicraftsman may be lower than those of a wage-worker—and the facts show that this very often is the case.

The validity of our calculations is beyond question, for we have taken a number of industries, not choosing them at random, but taking all those where the tables allowed us to deal with the large establishments separately; we have not taken individual establishments, but all those of the same kind, and in every case compared with them several large establishments in different uyezds. But it would be desirable to express the phenomena described in a more general and more precise form. Fortunately, the *Sketch* contains material that enables us to satisfy this desire *in part*. This is the material on the *division of establishments according to net income*. In the case of certain industries, the *Sketch* indicates how many establishments have a net income of up to 50, 100, 200 rubles, etc. It is these data that we have combined. We find that there are data available for 28 industries,* embracing 8,364 establishments, or 93.2% of the total number (8,991). In all, in these 28 industries there are 8,377 establishments (income figures are not given for 13 establishments), with 14,135 family and 4,625 wage-workers, or 18,760 in all, which constitutes 93.9% of the total number of workers. Naturally, from these data covering 93% of the handicraftsmen we are fully entitled to draw conclusions regarding all of them, for there are no grounds for assuming that the remaining 7% differ from these 93%. Before presenting our summary, it is necessary to make the following remarks:

1) In thus classifying the material, the compilers of the *Sketch* have not always strictly adhered to uniform and identical headings for the groups. For example, they have "up

* These data are also available for the lace-, lock- and accordion-making industries, but we omit them, as they do not record establishments according to the number of family workers.

to 100 rubles," "less than 100 rubles," and sometimes even "100 rubles each." The top and bottom limits of the category are not always indicated, that is, sometimes the classification begins with the category "up to 100 rubles," sometimes with that of "up to 50 rubles," "up to 10 rubles," and so on; sometimes the classification ends with the category "1,000 rubles and over," sometimes the categories "2,000 to 3,000 rubles" and others are introduced. None of these inaccuracies is of any serious importance. We have unified all the categories contained in the *Sketch* (there are fifteen of them: up to 10, up to 20, up to 50, up to 100, up to 200, up to 300, up to 400, up to 500, up to 600, up to 700, up to 800, up to 900, up to 1,000, 1,000 and over, and 2,000 to 3,000 rubles), and we have eliminated all minor inaccuracies and misunderstandings by assigning them to one or another of these categories.

2) The *Sketch* only indicates the *number of establishments* in certain income categories, but does not indicate the *income* of all the establishments in each category. Yet it is these latter figures that we need most. We have therefore assumed that the aggregate income of the establishments in any category is determined with sufficient accuracy by multiplying the number of establishments by the average income, that is, by the arithmetical mean of the maximum and minimum of the given category (for example, 150 rubles in the case of the 100 to 200 ruble category, etc.). Only in the case of the lowest two categories (up to 10 rubles and up to 20 rubles) have the maximum incomes (10 rubles and 20 rubles respectively) been taken instead of the averages. Verification has shown that this method (one generally permissible in statistical calculations) yields results that approximate very closely to reality. For instance, the aggregate net income of the handicraft families in these 28 industries, according to the *Sketch*, amounts to 951,653 rubles, while according to our approximate figures, based on the income categories, it amounts to 955,150 rubles, an excess of 3,497 rubles = 0.36%. Consequently, the difference or error is less than 4 kopeks in 10 rubles.

From our summary we learn the average income per family (in each category), but not per family worker. To

determine the latter, another approximate calculation had to be made. Knowing the division of families according to the number of family workers (and separately—according to the number of wage-workers employed), we assumed that the lower the income of a family, the smaller its size (i.e., the smaller the number of family workers per establishment) and the fewer the establishments employing wage-workers. On the contrary, the higher the income per family, the larger the number of establishments employing wage-workers and the larger the family, that is, the number of family workers per establishment is larger. Obviously, this assumption is the most favourable for anyone who might want to contest our conclusions. In other words, *whatever* other assumption was made, it would only help to reinforce our conclusions.

We now give a summary showing the division of the handicraftsmen according to the income of their establishments.

Category (rubles)	Number of establishments	Average income per establishment (Approximately)	Income of all establishments (Approximately)	Category (rubles)	Number of establishments	Average income per establishment (Approximately)	Income of all establishments (Approximately)
Up to 10	127	10	1,270	Up to 600	40	550	22,000
" " 20	139	20	2,780	" " 700	38	650	24,700
" " 50	2,110	35	78,850	" " 800	22	750	16,500
" " 100	3,494	75	262,050	" " 900	20	850	17,000
" " 200	1,414	150	212,100	" " 1,000	17	950	16,150
" " 300	602	250	150,050	1,000 and over	19	1,500	28,500
" " 400	208	350	72,800	2,000-3,000	2	2,500	5,000
" " 500	112	450	50,400				
All establishments					8,364	—	955,150

These data are too detailed and have therefore to be combined under simpler and clearer headings. Let us take five income categories of handicraftsmen: a) poor, with incomes of up to 50 rubles per family; b) in straitened circumstances, with incomes of 50 to 100 rubles per family; c) medium, with incomes of 100 to 300 rubles per family; d) well-to-do, with incomes of 300 to 500 rubles per family, and e) affluent, with incomes of over 500 rubles per family.

According to the data showing the incomes of establishments we shall add to these categories a rough division of establishments according to the number of family and wage-workers they employ.* We get the following table (see p. 417).

These data lead to very interesting conclusions, which we shall now enumerate, taking the handicraftsmen category by category:

a) Over one-fourth of the families (28.4%) come under the category of *poor*, with an average income of about 33 rubles per family. Let us assume that this is the income of only one family worker, that all in this category are one-man producers. In any case the earnings of these handicraftsmen are *considerably lower* than the average earnings of wage-workers employed by handicraftsmen (45.85 rubles). If the majority of these one-man producers belong to the lower (3rd) sub-group, that is, work for buyers-up, this means that the "masters" pay those who work at home less than wage-workers employed in the workshop. Even if we assume that the working period of this category is the shortest, their earnings are nevertheless at the poverty level.

b) Over two-fifths of the total number of handicraftsmen (41.8%) belong to the group of families in straitened circumstances, who have an average income of 75 rubles per family. Not all of these are one-man establishments (the previous category was assumed to consist solely of

* The 8,377 establishments in the 28 industries are divided according to the number of family and wage-workers as follows: no family workers—95 establishments; 1 worker—4,362; 2 workers—2,632; 3 workers—870; 4 workers—275; 5 workers and over—143. The establishments employing wage-workers number 2,228, and are divided as follows: 1 wage-worker—1,359; 2 workers—447; 3 workers—201; 4 workers—96; 5 workers and more—125. The wage-workers total 4,625, and their aggregate wages total 212,096 rubles (45.85 rubles per worker).

Categories of handicrafts-men according to size of income	Number		Net income		Average income		Rough division of families										
							According to number of family workers						According to number of wage-workers				
	Families	%	Rubles	%	Per family	Per family worker (approx.)	1	2	3	4	5 or more	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more
a) Poor	2,376	28.4	77,900	8.2	32.7	32.7	2,376	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
b) In straitened circumstances	3,494	41.8	262,050	27.4	75.0	50	1,986	1,598	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
c) Medium	2,016	24.1	362,150	37.9	179.6	72.0	—	1,124	870	22	—	—	1,359	392	—	—	—
d) Well-to-do	320	3.8	123,200	12.9	385.0	100.0	—	—	—	253	67	—	—	55	201	64	—
d) Affluent	158	1.9	129,850	13.6	821.8	348	—	—	—	—	76	82	—	—	—	32	125
e) *Total*	8,364	100	955,150	100	114.2	67.5	4,362	2,632	870	275	143	82	1,359	447	201	96	125

one-man producers): about half the families have two family workers each, and hence the average earnings per family worker are only about 50 rubles, *i.e.*, *not more, or even less*, *than the earnings of a wage-worker employed by a handicraftsman* (apart from wages, amounting to 45.85 rubles, part of the wage-workers also receive their board). *Thus*, *judged by their earnings*, *seven-tenths of the total number of handicraftsmen are on a par with*, *and some even at a lower level than*, *the wage-workers employed by handicraftsmen*. Astonishing as this conclusion is, it fully conforms to the facts quoted above on the superiority of large establishments over small. The low income level of these handicraftsmen can be judged by the fact that the average wage of an agricultural labourer employed by the year in Perm Gubernia is 50 rubles, in addition to board.* Consequently, the standard of living of seven-tenths of the "independent" handicraftsmen is no higher than that of agricultural labourers!

The Narodniks, of course, will say that these earnings are only supplementary to agriculture. But in the first place, has it not been established long ago that only a minority of the peasants are able to derive enough from agriculture to maintain their families, after land redemption payments, rent and farm expenses are deducted? And please note that we are comparing the handicraftsman's earnings with the wages of a farm labourer who receives his board from his master. Secondly, seven-tenths of the total number of handicraftsmen must also include non-agriculturists. Thirdly, even if it turns out that agriculture covers the maintenance of the agriculturist handicraftsmen of these categories, the drastic effect of the tie with the land in reducing earnings still remains beyond all doubt.

Another comparison: in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, the average earnings of a wage-worker employed by a handicraftsman are 33.2 rubles (p. 149 of the tables), while the average earnings of a person employed at "his own" works, that is, of an ironworker from among the former possessional[118] peasants, are estimated by the Zemstvo statisticians at

* The cost of board is 45 rubles per annum, according to the figures—average for 10 years (1881-91)—of the Department of Agriculture. (See S. A. Korolenko, *Hired Labour*, *etc.*)

78.7 rubles (*Material for a Statistical Survey of Perm Gubernia. Krasnoufimsk Uyezd. Zavodsk District*, Kazan, 1894), or over twice as much. And it is a generally known fact that the wages of ironworkers from among the former possessional peasants are always lower than wages of "free" workers in the factories. One can, therefore, see that reduced consumption, a miserable standard of living, is the price paid for the celebrated "independence" of the Russian handicraftsman "based on an organic tie between industry and agriculture"!

c) In the category of "medium" handicraftsmen we have included families with incomes of 100 to 300 rubles, or an average of about 180 rubles per family. They constitute almost one-fourth of the total number (24.1%). Absolutely, their income is very, very low: counting two-and-a-half family workers per establishment, it amounts to about 72 rubles per family worker—a very inadequate sum, and one which no factory worker would envy. Compared, however, with the incomes of the mass of handicraftsmen this sum is fairly high! It appears that even this meagre "sufficiency" is only secured at the expense of others: the majority of the handicraftsmen in this category employ wage-workers (roughly about 85% of the masters employ wage-labourers, and the average for the 2,016 establishments is over one wage-worker per establishment). Hence, in order to fight their way out of the mass of poverty-stricken handicraftsmen, this category, under the existing commodity-capitalist relations, have to win a "sufficiency" for themselves from others, have to engage in economic struggle, to squeeze out the mass of the small producers still further and become petty bourgeois. Either poverty and the lowering of their standard of living to the nec plus ultra, or (*for a minority*) the building-up of their (absolutely very meagre) welfare at the expense of others—such is the dilemma with which commodity production confronts the small producer. Such is the language of facts.

d) The category of well-to-do handicraftsmen embraces only 3.8% of the families, those with an average income of about 385 rubles, or about 100 rubles per family worker (assuming that under this heading come masters with 4 or 5 family workers per establishment). Such an income,

about double the earnings of a wage-worker, is already based on a considerable employment of wage-labour: all the establishments in this category employ an average of about 3 wage-workers per establishment.

e) The affluent handicraftsmen, those with an average income of 820 rubles per family, constitute only 1.9% of the total. This category partly includes establishments with 5 family workers, and partly establishments with no family workers at all, that is, those based exclusively on wage-labour. On an average, this amounts to about 350 rubles of income per family worker. The high incomes of these "handicraftsmen" accrue from the large number of wage-workers employed, averaging about 10 persons per establishment.* These are already small manufacturers, owners of capitalist workshops, and to include them among the "handicraftsmen," together with the one-man establishments, rural artisans and even domestic producers who work for manufacturers (and sometimes, as we shall see below, for these same affluent handicraftsmen!) only testifies, as we have already remarked, to the utter vagueness and haziness of the term "handicraft."

In concluding our examination of the census data on handicraftsmen's incomes we must make the following remark. It might be said that the concentration of incomes in the handicraft industries is not very high: 5.7% of the establishments account for 26.5% of the total income, and 29.8% for 64.4%. Our reply to this is that, firstly, even this degree of concentration shows how totally unsuitable and unscientific are sweeping arguments about "handicraftsmen," and "average" figures relating to them. Secondly, we should not lose sight of the fact that these data *do not include buyers-up*, with the result that the income division is highly inaccurate. We have seen that 2,346 families and 5,628 workers work for buyers-up (third sub-group); consequently, here it is the buyers-up who get the principal income. Their separation from the mass of the producers is absolutely artificial and entirely unwarranted. Just as it would

* Of the 2,228 establishments employing wage-workers in these 28 industries, 46 employ 10 wage-workers or more—a total of 887, or an average of 19.2 wage-workers per establishment.

be wrong to describe the economic relations in large-scale factory industry without mentioning the size of the manufacturers' incomes, so is it wrong to describe the economics of "handicraft" industry without mentioning the incomes of the buyers-up—incomes obtained from the same industry in which handicraftsmen are also engaged, and constituting part of the value of goods produced by handicraftsmen. We are therefore entitled, in fact we are obliged, to conclude that the actual distribution of incomes in handicraft industry is far more uneven than was shown above, for the categories which include the largest industrialists of all have been omitted.

ARTICLE THREE

(VI. What Is a Buyer-Up?—VII. "Gratifying Features" of Handicraft Industry.—VIII. The Narodnik Programme of Industrial Policy)

VI

WHAT IS A BUYER-UP?

Above we called the buyers-up the biggest of the industrialists. From the ordinary Narodnik viewpoint, this is heresy. It is customary to depict our buyers-up as individuals who take no part in production, who are extraneous and alien to industry itself, and depend "solely" on exchange.

This is not the place to dwell in detail on the theoretical fallacies contained in this view, which is based on a failure to understand the general and principal groundwork, foundation, or background of present-day industry (handicraft industry included)—namely, *commodity economy*, of which merchant capital is an essential component, and not a casual and incidental adjunct. Here we must stick to the facts and figures of the handicraft census, and our task will now be to examine and analyse the data on buyers-up. A circumstance favouring this examination is the fact that handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up have been put into a separate sub-group (the third). But this advantage is outweighed by the great number of omissions and uninvestigated factors, which rather seriously complicates our inquiry. No data are available on the number of buyers-up, on large buyers-up and small, on their ties with the well-to-do handicraftsmen (ties of origin, ties between the commercial operations of the buyer-up and production in his workshop, etc.), on the *business* of the buyer-up. The Narodnik prejudice of treating the buyer-up as extraneous prevented most investigators of handicraft industry from examining business done by buyers-up, although this is obviously a prime and prin-

cipal question for the economist. A careful and detailed study should be made of the *business* methods of the buyer-up, how his capital is built up, how this capital operates in the purchase of raw material and the sale of the product, what are the conditions (social and economic) in which capital operates in these spheres, what expenses he incurs in organising purchases and sales, how these expenses vary according to the amount of merchant capital and the volume of purchases and sales, and what conditions sometimes induce the buyer-up to process the raw material partly in his own workshops and then to give out the semi-finished product to domestic workers for further processing (the final finishing process sometimes being done by the buyer-up himself), and sometimes to sell the raw material to small industrialists, in order, later, to buy their wares in the market. A comparison should be made between the cost of production of an article turned out by a small handicraftsman, by a large producer in a workshop where several wage-workers are employed, and by a buyer-up who gives out material to be worked up by domestic workers. The unit of investigation should be each *enterprise*, that is, each separate buyer-up, and it is necessary to determine the amount of his turnover, the number of persons working for him in his workshop or workshops, or in their own homes, the number of workers he employs to acquire raw materials, to store them and the finished product, and to sell the latter. A comparison should be made between the technique of production (number and quality of implements and fixtures, *division of labour*, etc.) used by the small master, the workshop owner who employs wage-workers, and by the buyer-up. Only such an *economic investigation* can give an exact scientific answer to the questions: what is a buyer-up, what is his significance in the economic process and in the historical development of the forms of industry under commodity production. The absence of such information in the conclusions of the house-to-house census, which made a detailed study of all these questions for each handicraftsman, cannot but be regarded as a serious omission. Even if it was impossible (for some reason or another) to register and investigate the business of each buyer-up, much of this information could have been drawn from the household data on handicraftsmen who

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work for buyers-up. Instead, we find nothing in the *Sketch* but hackeyed Narodnik phrases, such as: the "kulak" is "essentially alien to production itself" (p. 7)—the kulak category being extended to include both buyers-up and owners of assembly workshops, on the one hand, and usurers, on the other; "wage-labour is governed not by its technical concentration, as in the case of the factory (?), but by the monetary dependence of the handicraftsmen ... one of the forms of kulakism" (309-10); "the source of the exploitation of labour ... lies in the function of exchange, and not in the function of production" (101); or what we often meet with in the handicraft industries is not the "capitalisation of production," but the "capitalisation of the process of exchange" (265). Of course, we have no intention of accusing the *Sketch* investigators of originality: they simply borrowed wholesale the maxims scattered so profusely in the works of, say, "our well-known" Mr. V. V.

In order to judge the true value of such phrases, we have only to remember, for example, that in one of our principal industries, textiles, the "buyer-up" was the immediate forerunner, the father, of the big manufacturer engaged in large-scale machine production. All our textile industries began with supplying yarn to be worked up by handicraftsmen at home; this, in other words, was work for the "buyer-up," for the "kulak," who, while possessing no workshop of his own ("was alien to production"), "merely" supplied the yarn, and took the finished goods. Our good Narodniks did not even attempt to investigate the origin of these buyers-up, their genealogical connections with the owners of small workshops, their role as organisers of the buying of raw materials and the selling of products, the role of their capital in concentrating means of production, in gathering together masses of scattered small handicraftsmen, in introducing division of labour, and in creating the elements of what is not only large-scale production but which is also becoming machine production. Our good Narodniks confined themselves to whining and complaining about this "deplorable," "artificial," etc., etc., phenomenon; they consoled themselves with the belief that this was not the "capitalisation" of production, but "merely" of the process of exchange, and talked sentimentally about "different paths for the fatherland." Meanwhile

these "artificial" and "unsubstantial" "kulaks" kept on following their old path, continued to concentrate capital, to "gather together" means of production and producers, to extend their purchases of raw materials, to further the division of production into separate operations (warping, weaving, dyeing, finishing, etc.) and to transform scattered, technically backward *capitalist manufacture*, based on hand labour and servitude, into *capitalist machine industry*.

An exactly similar process is now taking place in the bulk of our so-called "handicraft" industries; and the Narodniks in just the same way shun an investigation of realities as they develop, in just the same way replace a discussion of the origin of existing relations and their evolution by a discussion of what *might* be (*if* what is were not), in just the same way-console themselves with the thought that so far these are "merely" buyers-up, and in just the same way idealise and paint in rosy colours the worst forms of capitalism—worst in technical backwardness, economic imperfection, and the social and cultural conditions of the working masses.

Let us turn to the data of the Perm handicraft census. Wherever necessary, we shall endeavour to make good the above-mentioned omissions by drawing upon *Handicraft Industries of Perm Gubernia*, *etc.*, a book to which we have already referred. Let us first of all pick out the industries which account for the bulk of the handicraftsmen employed by buyers-up (third sub-group). For this purpose we shall have to turn to our own summary, which (as already mentioned) does not coincide with the *Sketch* figures.

Industry	Numbers of families working for buyers-up		
	Group I	Group II	Total
Bootmaking	31	605	636
Felt-boot	607	12	619
Ironworking	70	412	482
Bast-matting	132	10	142
Carpentry and joinery.	38	49	87
Vehicle building	32	28	60
Tailoring	4	42	46
Total for 7 industries . . .	914	1,158	2,072
Total number of handicraftsmen in third sub-group . . .	1,016	1,320	2,336

Thus, about nine-tenths of the handicraftsmen working for buyers-up are concentrated in these seven industries. It is to these industries that we shall turn first.

Let us begin with the bootmaking industry. The overwhelming majority of the bootmakers who work for buyers-up are in Kungur Uyezd, the centre of the leather industry in Perm Gubernia. A large number of handicraftsmen work for leather manufacturers: on p. 87 of the *Sketch* mention is made of 8 buyers-up, who have 445 establishments working for them.* All these buyers-up have been leather goods manufacturers "for ages," and their names may be found in the *Directory of Factories* for 1890 and 1879, and in the notes to the *Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Issue I for 1869.[119] The leather goods manufacturers cut out the leather and in this form distribute it to the "handicraftsmen" to be sewn. The lasting is done separately, by several families, who work to the order of the manufacturers. Generally speaking, a whole number of "handicraft" industries are connected with the leather goods factories, that is, a whole series of operations are done in the home. These include 1) dressing of hides and skins; 2) sewing of uppers; 3) gluing of leather clippings into boards for stiffeners; 4) making of screws for boots; 5) making of brads for boots; 6) last making; 7) preparation of ash for the tanneries; 8) making of "tan" (from willow bark). The scrap and waste of the leather industry are used by the felt and glue-making industries (*Handicraft Industries*, III, pp. 3-4, et al.). In addition to detailed division of labour (i.e., division of the production of an article into several operations performed by different persons), a commodity division of labour has arisen in this industry: each family (sometimes even each street in a handicraft village) produces one kind of footwear. There is an amusing point we must mention—in *Handicraft Industries*, *etc.*, the "Kungur leather industry" is declared to be a "typical expression of the idea of the organic connection between factory and handicraft industry to their mutual advantage" (sic!) ... the factory entering into a

* These include two buyers-up (Ponomaryov and Fominsky) who have 217 establishments working for them. Altogether, there are 470 bootmaking establishments working for buyers-up in Kungur Uyezd.

correct (sic!) association with handicraft industry, with the object, in its own interests (exactly!), of developing and not reducing ... its capacity (III, p. 3). For example, Fominsky, the manufacturer, was awarded a gold medal at the 1887 Ekaterinburg Exhibition not only for the excellent quality of his leather, but also for his "extensive operations, *which furnish work for the surrounding population*" (ibid., p. 4, author's italics). Indeed, of the 1,450 persons he employed, 1,300 were domestic workers. Of the 120 persons employed by Sartakov, another manufacturer, 100 were domestic workers, etc. Hence the Perm manufacturers vie very successfully with the Narodnik intellectuals in implanting and developing handicraft industries....

The organisation of the bootmaking industry in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd (*Handicraft Industries*, I, pp. 148-49) is in every way analogous; the leather goods manufacturers also stitch leather boots, partly in their workshops, partly by giving the work out to domestic workers. One of the biggest of the owners of a leather and boot establishment employs about 200 regular workers.

We are now in a position to form a fairly clear idea of the economic organisation of the bootmaking and of many other allied "handicraft" industries. They are nothing but *branches* of large capitalist workshops ("factories," according to the terminology used in our official statistics), performing nothing but *detailed operations* in the large-scale capitalist manufacture of leather goods. The entrepreneurs have organised the buying of materials on a broad scale, have set up factories for tanning the hides, and have established a whole organisation for the further processing of the leather based on the division of labour (as the technical condition) and wage-labour (as the economic condition): some of the operations (such as cutting out leather for boots) are performed in their workshops, others are performed by "handicraftsmen" who work for them in their homes, the employers determining the amount of output, the rates of payment, the kind of goods to be made, and the quantity of each kind. They have also organised the wholesale marketing of the product. Obviously, in scientific terminology this is nothing but *capitalist manufacture*, in part already passing into the higher form of *factory* industry (inasmuch as machines and machinery

are used in production: the big leather factories have steam engines). To single out parts of this system of manufacture as a separate "handicraft" form of production is a patent absurdity, which only obscures the basic fact that wage-labour prevails in the leather goods production and bootmaking and that the *entire* trade is under the sway of big capital. Instead of comical arguments on the desirability of a "co-operative organisation of exchange" in this industry (*Sketch*, p 93), it would not be amiss to make a detailed study of its actual organisation, a study of the conditions which make it preferable for the manufacturers to give out work to be done in the home. The manufacturers undoubtedly find it more profitable, and we shall understand why if we bear in mind the low earnings of the handicraftsmen in general, and in particular of the handicraft agriculturists and those of the third sub-group. By giving out material to be worked up at home, the employers lower wages, economise on premises, partly on implements, and on supervision, evade the not always welcome demands made on manufacturers (they are not manufacturers but merchants!), get workers who are more scattered, disunited, and less capable of self-defence, and also unpaid taskmasters for these workers—"middlemen," "subcontractors" (as they are called in our textile industry under the system of giving out yarn to be used in the home)—in the shape of those handicraftsmen they employ and who, *in their turn*, *employ wage-workers* (it was found that the 636 families who make boots for buyers-up employ 278 wage-workers). We have already seen from the general table that these wage-workers (in the third sub-group) receive the lowest wages of all. And this is not surprising, for they are subjected to double exploitation: exploitation by their own employer who squeezes his "own little profit" out of the workers, and exploitation by the leather goods manufacturer who gives out material to the small masters. We know that these small middlemen, who are well familiar with local conditions and with the personal characteristics of the workers, are particularly prolific in inventing different forms of extortion, in practising bondage hiring, the *truck system*,*[120] etc. The excessive working hours in these workshops and

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

"handicraftsmen's huts" are common knowledge, and one cannot help regretting that the 1894-95 handicraft census has furnished practically no information on subjects so important for the study of our native *sweating system*,* with its host of middlemen who intensify the pressure on the workers and its utterly shameless and unrestricted exploitation.

On the organisation of the felt-boot industry (the second largest as regards the absolute number of families working for buyers-up) the *Sketch*, unfortunately, gives practically no information whatever. We have seen that in this industry there are handicraftsmen who employ dozens of wage-workers, but whether they give out work to be done at home, get part of the operations done outside their workshops,** was not made clear. Let us only note a fact mentioned by the investigators, that the sanitary conditions in the felt-boot-industry are extremely unsatisfactory (*Sketch*, p. 119; *Handicraft Industries*, III, 16)—intolerable heat, excessive dust, stifling atmosphere. And this in the cottages the handicraftsmen live in! The natural result is that they are unable to stand more than fifteen years of this work and end as consumptives. I. I. Molleson, an investigator of workshop sanitary conditions, says: "The chief contingent of felt-boot makers consists of workers between the ages of 13 and 30. They are nearly all easily recognisable by their pallor, dull complexion, and their languid and *sickly appearance*" (III,-p. 145, author's italics). The practical conclusion drawn by this investigator is: "It should be made incumbent on the employers to build workshops (felt-boot) of much larger size, so as to provide a specified constant volume of air per worker"; the "workshops should be designed exclusively for work, and it should be strictly forbidden to allow workers to sleep in them at night" (ibid.). In other words, the sanitary inspectors demand the building of factories for these handicraftsmen and the prohibition of work in the home. One cannot help hoping that this recommendation will be acted

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** The felt industry in the Arzamas and Semyonov uyezds of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia is organised on those lines. See *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry* and the *Material* of the Nizhni-Novgorod Zemstvo Statistical Department.

upon, for it would promote technical progress by eliminating a host of middlemen and would pave the way for the regulation of working hours and working conditions; in a word, it would eliminate the most crying abuses in our "people's" industry.

Among the buyers-up in the bast-matting industry is a merchant named Butakov, who, we learn from information for 1879, had a bast-matting factory in the town of Osa, which employed 180 workers.* Has this manufacturer to be regarded as "alien to production itself," just because he has found it more profitable to give out the work to be done at home? It would also be interesting to know in what way the buyers-up who have been thrown out of the list of handicraftsmen differ from those "handicraftsmen" who, having no family workers, "purchase bast and give it out to craftsmen to make into matting and sacks on their own looms" (*Sketch*, 152)—a striking illustration of the confusion into which the investigators have been led by Narodnik prejudices. The sanitary conditions in this industry will also not bear criticism—overcrowding, filth, dust, damp, foul smells and long working hours (12 to 15 a day), all of which turns the centres of the industry into veritable "hotbeds of famine typhus,"** of which, in fact, there have been frequent outbreaks.

On the organisation of work for buyers-up in the ironworking industry, we again learn nothing from the *Sketch* and are again obliged to turn to *Handicraft Industries, etc.*, which contains a very interesting description of this industry in Nizhni-Tagil. The manufacture of trays and other articles is divided among several establishments: *forging*, *tinning*, and *decorating*. Some of the handicraft masters have establishments of all these kinds, and are consequently manufacturers of the pure type. Others perform one of the operations in their own workshops and then give out the articles to handicraftsmen for tinning and decorating in their homes. Here, consequently, the uniformity of the economic organisation of the industry—both when the work is given out to be done in the home and when several detail

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* *Directory of Factories for 1879*. The matting makers working for buyers-up are mostly concentrated in Osa Uyezd.

** *Sketch*, p. 157.

workshops belong to one master—stands out very clearly. The handicraftsmen who act as buyers-up, giving out work to be done at home, are among the biggest masters (of whom there are 25) who have organised the most profitable purchase of raw material and the marketing of the product on a large scale; these twenty-five handicraftsmen (and they alone) take their goods to the fair or have their own shops. In addition to them, the big "manufacturer traders" are also buyers-up; they exhibited their wares at the Factory Department of the Ekaterinburg Exhibition. The author of the book classes them under "factory-handicraft (sic!) industry" (*Handicraft Industries*, I, pp. 98-99). Thus, on the whole, we get a very typical picture of capitalist manufacture, interwoven in the most diverse and fantastic ways with small establishments. In order to demonstrate clearly how little the division of industrialists into "handicraftsmen" and "manufacturers," into producers and "buyers-up," helps us to understand these complex relations, let us take the figures given in this book and show the economic relations in the industry in a table:

Independent production for the market					Production for buyers-up			
Establishments	Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total output (thousand rubles)	Establishments	Family workers	Wage-workers	Total
A. "Factory-handicraft industry"								
?	?	?	?	60 + 7				
("manufacturer traders")					a) 29	51	39	90
					b) 39	53	79	132
B. "Handicraft industry"								
25	(handicraftsman buyers-up)			95 + 30	68	104	118	222
16	88	161	249	8				
				163 + 37				
				200,000 rubles = total output of the entire Nizhni-Tagil industry				

a) Handicraftsmen dependent on others for marketing.
b) Handicraftsmen dependent on others for both marketing and production.

And now we shall be told that the buyers-up, like the usurers, are "alien to production itself," that their domination merely implies the "capitalisation of the process of exchange," and not the "capitalisation of production"!

Another highly typical instance of capitalist manufacture is the chest-making industry (*Sketch*, pp. 334-39; *Handicraft Industries*, I, pp. 31-40). It is organised as follows: a few big proprietors who own workshops employing wage-workers purchase the materials, *partly* manufacture the goods in their own workshops, but mainly give out material to small detailed workshops, subsequently assembling the various parts of the chest in their own workshops and sending the finished article to market. Division of labour—the typical condition and technical basis of manufacture—is widely employed in production: the making of a complete chest is divided into ten or twelve detailed operations each performed by different handicraftsmen. Thus, the organisation of the industry consists in combining detail workers (Theilarbeiter, as they are called in *Das Kapital*) under the command of *capital*. Why capital prefers to give out work to be done at home rather than employ wage-workers in a workshop is made quite clear by the data provided in the 1894-95 handicraft census on the establishments of the Nevyansk Factory, Ekaterinburg Uyezd (one of the centres of the industry), where, *side by side* with assembly workshops, we also meet with detail handicraftsmen. Hence a comparison between the two is quite possible. Here are comparative figures given in a table (on p. 173 of the tables):

Chest-makers of Nevyansk Factory	Group	Sub-group	Number of establishments	Number of			Gross income		Wages		Net income	
				Family workers	Wage-workers	Total	Total	Per worker	Total	Per wage-worker	Total	Per family worker
"Buyers-up"	II	1	2	1	13	14	5,850	418	1,300	100	1,617	808.5*
"Handicraftsmen"	II	3	8	11	8	19	1,315	70.3	351	44	984	89.4

* Per establishment.

Before examining this table, we must say that if we had taken the data for the entire first and third sub-groups (*Sketch*, p. 335) and not for the Nevyansk Factory alone, the conclusions would have been the same. The gross income in the two sub-groups obviously cannot be compared, for the same material passes through the hands of various detail workers and through the assembly workshops. But the data for incomes and wages are characteristic. We find that the wages of hired workers in the assembly workshops are higher than the incomes of the dependent handicraftsmen (100 rubles and 89 rubles respectively), notwithstanding the fact that the latter exploit wage-workers in their turn. But the wages of these latter are *less than half* those of the workers in the assembly workshops. Why, then, should our employers not prefer "handicraft" industry to factory industry, when the former yields them such substantial "advantages"! We find a fully analogous organisation of production for the buyers-up in the vehicle-building industry (*Sketch*, p. 308, et. seq.; *Handicraft Industries*, I, p. 42, et. seq.)—the same assembly workshops, whose owners are "buyers-up" (and work-distributors, work-givers) in relation to the handicraftsmen who make the parts, and the earnings of the wage-worker in the workshop are again higher than the income of the dependent handicraftsman (not to mention his wage-worker). These higher wages are recorded for both agriculturists (Group I) and non-agriculturists (Group II). In the cabinet-making industry, the buyers-up are the furniture shops in the city of Perm (*Sketch*, 133; *Handicraft Industries*, II, 11) that supply the handicraftsmen with models when placing orders, and in this way, incidentally, have "gradually improved the technique of production."

In the tailoring trade, the ready-made clothing shops in Perm and Ekaterinburg give out material to be made up by handicraftsmen. As we know, an exactly similar organisation of the tailoring and dressmaking industry also exists in other capitalist countries, in Western Europe and America. The difference between the "capitalist" West and Russia, with her "people's industry," is that this state of affairs

is called the Schwitz-system* in the West and means are sought to combat this worst of all systems of exploitation; the German tailors, for example, demand that the masters should build factories (that is, are "artificially implanting capitalism," as the Russian Narodnik would put it)—whereas in our country this "sweating system" is benignly called "handicraft industry" and its superiority to capitalism is argued and discussed.

We have now examined all the industries in which the vast majority of handicraftsmen employed by buyers-up are engaged. What are the results of our review. We have become convinced of the absolute unsoundness of the Narodnik contention that the buyers-up, and even the assembly workshop masters, are mere usurers, elements alien to production, and so on. Despite the above-mentioned inadequacy of the *Sketch* data, despite the absence in the census programme of questions about the business conducted by the buyers-up, we have succeeded in establishing, for most of the industries, intimate ties between the buyers-up and production—even their direct participation in production, "participation" as owners of shops which employ wage-workers. Nothing could be more absurd than the opinion that working for buyers-up is merely the result of some abuse, of some accident, of some "capitalisation of the process of exchange" and not of production. The contrary is true: working for a buyer-up is *a special form of production*, a special organisation of economic relations in production—an organisation which has directly sprung from small commodity production ("petty people's production," as it is customary to call it in our lofty literature), and which to this day is connected with it by a thousand threads; for it is the most prosperous petty masters, the most go-ahead "handicraftsmen," who lay the basis for this system by extending their operations through supplying work to domestic workers. Work for buyers-up is directly associated with the capitalist work-

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* Sweating system.—*Ed.*

shop employing wage-workers, and often just constitutes an extension of it or one of its departments; it is simply an *adjunct of the factory*, understanding this latter expression in the generally accepted and not the scientific sense. In the scientific classification of forms of industry in their successive development, work for buyers-up belongs to a considerable extent to *capitalist manufacture*, since 1) it is based on hand production and on the existence of many small establishments; 2) it introduces division of labour between these establishments and develops it also within the workshop; 3) it places the merchant at the head of production, as is always the case in manufacture, which presupposes production on an extensive scale, and the wholesale purchase of raw material and marketing of the product; 4) it reduces those who work to the status of wage-workers engaged either in a master's workshop or in their own homes. These features, as we know, are typical of the scientific conception of manufacture as a special stage in the development of capitalism in industry (see *Das Kapital*, I, Kapital XII).[121] This form of industry, then, already implies the deep-going rule of capitalism, being the direct predecessor of its last and highest form—large-scale machine industry. Work for the buyer-up is consequently a backward form of capitalism, and in contemporary society this backwardness has the effect of seriously worsening the conditions of the working people, who are exploited by a host of middlemen (the *sweating system**, are disunited, are compelled to content themselves with the lowest wages and to work under the most insanitary conditions and for extremely long hours, and—what is most important—under conditions which render public control of production extremely difficult.

We have now concluded our review of the 1894-95 handicraft census data. This review has fully confirmed the statement made above regarding the utter meaninglessness of the term "handicraft industry," We have seen that this

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

term has been used to cover the most diverse forms of industry, we might even say: *practically every form of industry known to science*. And, indeed, the term has been made to include patriarchal artisans who work for private customers using the customers' own materials and receiving remuneration sometimes in kind, sometimes in cash. Further, it has been made to include representatives of an entirely different form of industry—the small commodity producers who work together in families. It has been made to include owners of capitalist workshops who employ wage-workers, and also these wage-workers themselves, who sometimes number several dozen to an establishment. It has been made to include manufactory owners who possess capital in considerable quantity and command a whole system of detail workshops. It has likewise been made to include workers employed at home for capitalists. In all these subdivisions, both agriculturists and non-agriculturists, peasants and town dwellers have equally been regarded as "handicraftsmen." The confusion is by no means peculiar to this particular investigation of the Perm handicrafts. Not at all. It is to be met with *whenever* and *wherever* anything is said or written about "handicraft" industry. Anybody who is familiar, for example, with the *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry* knows that it, too, classes all these categories as handicraftsmen. And it is a favourite method of our Narodnik economists to lump together this endless variety of forms of industry, to call this jumble "handicraft," "people's" industry, and—risum teneatis, amici!*—*to contrast* this meaningless hodgepodge with "capitalism," with "factory industry." This admirable method, which testifies to the remarkable profundity and erudition of its initiator, was, if we are not mistaken, "theoretically justified" by Mr. V. V., who on the very first pages of his *Essays on Handicraft Industry* takes the official figures for the number of "factory" workers in Moscow, Vladimir and other gubernias, compares them with the number of "handicraftsmen," and finds, of course, that "people's industry" in Holy Russia is developed to a far greater extent than "capitalism." But our "authoritative" economist

* Restrain your laughter, friends!—*Ed.*

very wisely remains silent on the fact, established time and again by investigators,* that the overwhelming majority of these "handicraftsmen" *also work for manufacturers*. The compilers of the *Sketch*, faithful to Narodnik prejudices, have used the same method. Although the total annual output of "handicraft" industry in Perm Gubernia amounts to only 5 million rubles,** and that of "factory" industry to 30 million rubles, "the number of persons employed in factory industry amounts to 19,000 and in handicraft industry, to 26,000" (p. 364). The classification, you see, is almost touching in its simplicity:

a) Factory workers	19,000
b) Handicraftsmen	26,000
Total	45,000

Naturally, such a classification offers endless scope for reflections on the "possibility of a different path for the fatherland"!

But it is not for nothing that we have before us the data of the handicraft household census which investigated the forms of industry. We shall attempt to give a classification that *corresponds* to the census data (of which the Narodnik classification is a sheer mockery) and to the various forms of industry. We shall apply the percentages revealed by the census for 20,000 workers, to the higher figure of 26,000 derived by the authors from other sources.

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* If nothing more, see Mr. Kharizomenov's article, "The Importance of Handicraft Industry," in *Yuridichesky Vestnik*,[122] 1883, Nos. 11 and 12, which contains a summary of the statistical material then available.

** Not to mention the curious way in which this figure was arrived at. For instance, the largest component is the flour-milling industry (1,200,000 rubles), arrived at by including the total value of the grain ground by the millers! In the tables and in the description given in the *Sketch*, only the gross income of 143,000 rubles was taken (see p. 358 and note). The bootmaking industry accounts for 430,000 rubles, a substantial part of which consists of the turnover of the Kungur *factory owners*; and so on, and so forth.

A. Commodity Production

	Number of workers	
I. Workers capitalistically employed.		
(1) "Factory" workers (average, according to statistics for the seven years, 1885-91, 14.6 workers per establishment)	19,000 **42.2%**	
(2) Wage-workers employed by "handicraftsmen" (25% of total). (One-fourth of these are employed in establishments averaging 14.6 workers per establishment)	6,500 **14.4%**	30,700 68.2%
(3) Workers engaged at home in the employ of buyers-up, i.e., working members of handicraftsmen's families in the third sub-group—20%. (Many of these work *for the same employers* as the workers under items 1 and 2)	5,200 **11.6%**	
II. Small commodity producers, i. e., handicraftsmen's families in the first sub-group—30%. (About one-third of these employ wage-workers)	7,800 **17.4%**	
B. Artisan Production Rural (and partly urban) artisans, i. e., handicraftsmen's families in the second sub-group—25%. (A small proportion of these also employ wage-workers)	6,500 **14.4%**	
Total	45,000 **100%**	

We are fully aware that there are errors even in this classification: it does not include factory owners, but does include handicraftsmen who employ dozens of wage-workers; some manufactory owners have been included accidentally, but not specified, while others have not been included

having been discarded as "buyers-up"; it includes urban artisans of one town, but not of eleven other towns, and so on. At any rate, this classification is based on the census *data* on *forms of industry*, and the errors mentioned are errors in these data, and not errors of classification.* In any case, this classification gives an accurate idea of the real state of affairs, it explains the real social and economic relations of the various participants in industry, and, consequently, their status and their interests—and such an explanation is the supreme task of any scientific economic investigation.

VII

"GRATIFYING FEATURES" OF HANDICRAFT INDUSTRY

We might be accused of one-sidedness, of accentuating only the dark sides of handicraft industry, were we to pass over in silence the facts mentioned in the *Sketch* which are intended to stress its "bright side" and "gratifying features."

We are told, for example, that wage-labour in handicraft industry has a character of its own, for here the wage-worker lives in "close contact" with the master, and "may" himself become a master. The "gratifying feature" here, then, is the benign wish to turn all workers into small masters!** Incidentally, not all—only some, for "the tendency to exploit the labour of others is undoubtedly characteristic of all men in general, including the handicraftsman" (*Sketch*, p. 6). This sentence is simply inimitable for the naïveté with which "all men" are without further ado identified with the petty bourgeois! It is not surprising that those who look at the world through petty-bourgeois spectacles should discover such remarkable truths. On p. 268, a small factory employing

* The objection may be raised that the wage-workers employed by artisan handicraftsmen (20% of the wage-workers employed by handicraftsmen) should be classed under artisan and not commodity production. But here labour-power is itself a commodity, and its purchase and sale is an essential feature of capitalism.

** Not a word is said as to how this "close contact" reacts on the system and correctness of payment, the methods of hire, the enslavement of the worker, the *truck system* [these words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*], and so on.

eight wage-workers and with an output of 10,000 rubles is proclaimed to be "by its labour situation (sic!) a handicraft enterprise in the strict sense of the term." On pp. 272-74, we are told how another small manufacturer (employing seven wage-workers and five apprentices, and with an output of 7,000 rubles) erected a blast furnace on a site rented from a village community and applied to the Handicraft Bank for a loan of 5,000 rubles with which to erect a furnace, explaining that his "whole enterprise is of purely local interest, inasmuch as the ore will be mined on community allotments by the local peasants themselves." The bank refused the loan for purely formal reasons. And the *Sketch* uses this as a peg on which to hang an attractive picture of the conversion of this enterprise into a co-operative: "this will undoubtedly please the employer, as one who has at heart the interests of the fellow community members around him and not only those of the industry." The enterprise "embraces numerous labour interests of the fellow community members, who will be mining ore and felling timber and carrying them to the factory." "Householders will deliver ore, charcoal, etc., to the factory, just as the womenfolk deliver milk to the public cheese factory. Of course, this presupposes a more complex organisation than that of a public cheese factory, especially if the local skilled and unskilled labourers are employed in running the business itself, that is, smelting iron from ore." How idyllic! Manual labourers ("fellow community members") will "deliver" ore, fuel and the rest "to the factory," just as peasant women deliver milk to the cheese factory! We will not deny that the Handicraft Bank can (if its bureaucratic organisation does not prevent it) perform the same sort of service as other banks in developing commodity production and capitalism, but it would be very sad indeed if it were at the same time to develop the pharisaism and Manilov chit-chat of loan-seeking employers.

So far we have seen how enterprises employing large numbers of wage-workers have been proclaimed "handicraft" on the ground that their owners work themselves. But for petty-bourgeois people this condition would be rather restrictive, and so the *Sketch* endeavours to expand it: it appears that an enterprise which "is conducted solely with the help of

wage-labour" may also be a handicraft enterprise, provided that its "success" depends upon the owner's "personal participation" (p. 295), or even if the owners "are obliged to confine their participation to the various worries involved in running the industry" (p. 301). Our Perm Narodniks are making splendid "progress," are they not? "Personal labour"—"personal participation"—"various worries." Mein Liebchen, was willst du noch mehr?*[123] Wage-labour in the brick industry, it appears, yields "special advantages" (302) to the wage-labourers, whom the brick kilns provide with "supplementary earnings"; yet the owners of these kilns often experience "a shortage of money for the hire of workers." The *Sketch* concludes that such owners should be granted credit facilities by the Handicraft Bank, "assigning such enterprises, according to a note to Article 7, point 3 of the Handicraft Bank Statutes, to specially deserving cases" (p. 302). Not very well put, but very impressive and portentous! "In conclusion," we read at the end of the description of the brick industry, "we find sufficient grounds for declaring that among the peasants in the brick industry the interests of masters and wage-workers have so much in common that although no artels have been formally registered in this industry, actually there is a strong tie of companionship between the masters and their wage-workers" (305). We would refer the reader to the statistical picture of these "ties of companionship" given above. It is also a curious fact—as a specimen of the confusion existing in Narodnik economic concepts—that the *Sketch* defends wage-labour and paints it in rosy colours by asserting that the kulak is not a master employing wage-workers, but an owner of money capital who "exploits labour in the person of the master handicraftsman and his wage-workers" (!), and at the same time launches into the most irrational and immoderate defence of the kulaks: "kulakism, in whatever gloomy colours it may be painted, is so far a necessary wheel in the exchange mechanism of handicraft production.... Kulakism should undoubtedly be regarded as a blessing insofar as the successes of the handicraft industry are concerned, when compared with a situation under which the handicraftsman would be without work were

* What more would you have, my dear?—*Ed.*

there no kulak or no finances available" (p. 8).* How long will this "insofar" last? If it were said that merchant and usury capital is a necessary factor in the development of capitalism, a necessary wheel in the mechanism of a *poorly developed* capitalist society (such as ours), that would be true. Thus interpreted, the word "insofar" would mean: *insofar* as the innumerable restrictions on freedom of industry and freedom of competition (especially among the peasantry) continue to preserve the most backward and most pernicious forms of capitalism in our country. Only we fear that this interpretation will not be to the liking of-the Perm or any other Narodniks!

Let us now go over to the artels, those most direct and most important expressions of the alleged community principles which the Narodniks insist on finding in the handicraft industries. It will be interesting to examine the handicraft *household* census data for the entire gubernia, a census whose programme specifically included the registration and study of artels (p. 14, point 2). We are accordingly in a position not only to acquaint ourselves with the various types of artels, but also to learn how widespread they are.

Take the oil-milling industry. "Domestic artels in the strict sense of the term": in the villages of Pokrovskoye and Gavryata, two oil-mills are owned by five brothers, who have separated to form individual households, but who use the mills in turn. These facts are of "profound interest," for "they throw light on the contract conditions of communal-labour continuity in the handicraft industries." Obviously, such domestic "artels are an important precedent to the spreading of factory-type industries among the handicraftsmen on co-operative lines" (pp. 175-76). So then, the artel, in the strict sense of the term, as a precedent to co-operation and, as an

* We find the same idea expressed in *Handicraft Industries*, I, p. 39, et. seq., in a controversy with the newspaper *Dyelovoi Korrespondent*,[124] which said that the kulaks (masters of assembly workshops in the chest-making industry) should not be included in the Handicraft Section. "Our entire handicraft industry," we read in reply, "is in bondage to private capital, so that if only those handicraftsmen who trade in their own goods were included in the Handicraft Section it would be as empty as an eggshell." A highly significant admission, is it not? Using the data of the census, we have shown above the meaning of this "bondage to private capital" which holds the handicraft industries in its grip.

expression of the communal principle, consists in *property held in common by unseparated heirs*!! If that is so, then obviously the true palladium of the "communal principle" and "co-operation" is Roman civil law and Volume X of our code,[125] with its institutions of the condominium, i.e., property held in common by heirs and non-heirs!

"In the flour-milling industry ... the peasants' artel spirit of enterprise found most vivid expression in peculiar domestic forms." Many of the mills are jointly used by associations or even by whole villages. Use of the mills: the most widespread method is by rotation; then comes division of the net proceeds into shares proportionate to the expenses incurred by each partner; in "such cases the associated owners very rarely take part themselves in production which is usually done by wage-labour" (p. 181; the same is true of the pitch-boiling artels—p. 197). Truly an amazing peculiarity, and an amazing display of the artel principle—the common property of petty owners who jointly hire workers! On the contrary, the fact that the handicraftsmen use the mills, pitch-boiling plants and smithies *in rotation* testifies to the astonishing disunity of the producers, whom even common property cannot induce to work co-operatively.

"One of the forms of artel organisation" is the "artel smithies" (239). With the object of economising fuel, the master smiths jointly operate one smithy, hiring one labourer to work the bellows (economy in workers!) and renting both the premises and the hammer from the smithy owner in return for a special payment. And so, the hiring out of articles that are the private property of one person to others for money is "artel organisation"! Verily, Roman law fully deserves to be called the code of "artel organisation"! ... "In the artel organisation ... we find fresh evidence of the absence of class crystallisation in production among the handicraftsmen—evidence of the same merging of different strata of agriculturists and handicraftsmen that we observed in the case of the artel flour mills" (239). And after this, there are malicious persons who still dare to speak of the differentiation of the peasantry!

Hitherto, therefore, we have not had a single instance of handicraftsmen *combining* to buy raw materials or to market the product, not to mention combination in production

itself! Nevertheless, such combinations exist. The Perm Gubernia handicraft household census registers *as many as four of them*. They were *all* formed with the help of the Handicraft Bank—three in the vehicle-building trade, and one in the production of agricultural machines. One of the artels employs wage-labour (two apprentices and two hired "auxiliary" workers). In another, two partners use a smithy and a workshop belonging to a third partner, for which he receives special payment. They buy raw material and market the product in common, but they work in separate workshops (except in the case of the smithy and workshop rented for cash). Together, these four artels embrace 21 family workers. The Perm Handicraft Bank has functioned for several years. Let us assume that it will now "unite" (for the renting of a neighbour's smithy) not 20, but 50 family workers *a year*. All the 15,000 handicraft family workers will then be "united" in "artel organisations" in exactly 300 years. And when that job is done, they will begin "to unite" the handicraftsmen's wage-workers.... And the Perm Narodniks exult: "These cardinal economic conceptions, evolved by the independent workings of the handicraftsmen's minds, serve as a firm pledge of the economic progress of industry among them, based on labour's independence of capital, for these facts speak not only of an elemental, but of a fully conscious aspiration of the handicraftsmen for labour independence" (p. 333). Have mercy, gentlemen! It is impossible, of course, to picture Narodism without Manilovian phrase-mongering, but, after all, there's a limit to everything! *Not one* of the artels, as we have seen, expresses the "principle of labour's independence of capital": they are all artels of masters and small masters, many of them employing wage-workers. There is no co-operation in these artels; even the joint purchase of raw materials and sale of the product is ridiculously rare and embraces a surprisingly insignificant number of masters. It may be safely said that there is no capitalist country in the world where a register of nearly 9,000 small establishments, with 20,000 workers, would reveal *such astonishing dispersion and backwardness* of the producers; where among the latter one would find only a score or so cases of *property owned in common*, and *less than a dozen* cases of three to five owners uniting to buy raw materials and sell the product! Such dispersion

would be the *surest indication of unrelieved economic and cultural stagnation*, if we did not, fortunately, see that capitalism is day by day uprooting patriarchal handicraft, with the parochialism of its small self-sufficing proprietors, and breaking down the small local markets (on which small production depends), replacing them by the national and the world market, *compelling* the producers, not only of a village like Gavryata, but of a whole country, and even of several countries, to enter into association with each other, forming associations that are no longer merely of masters, big and small, and confronting them with far wider problems than that of buying timber or iron more cheaply, or selling nails or carts more profitably.

VIII

THE NARODNIK PROGRAMME OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Since practical recommendations and measures are always connected with what is considered to be "gratifying" and promising in reality, one knows a priori what wishes for the handicraft industry would be expressed in the *Sketch* since it has reduced all "gratifying features" to drawing a rose-coloured picture of wage-labour in petty economy and an exalted notion of the extremely scanty and one-sided associations of small proprietors. These wishes, a rehash of the usual Narodnik recipes, amaze one by their contradictory character, on the one hand, and by their inordinate exaggeration of commonplace "measures," converted by phrase-mongering into solutions of great problems, on the other. At the very beginning of the *Sketch*, in the introduction, before the census data are even dealt with, we meet with verbose statements about the "task of handicraft credit" being "to overcome (sic!) the money shortage," about the "co-operative organisation of exchange between production and consumption" (p. 8), about "spreading artel organisations," establishing handicraft warehouses, technical advice bureaus, technical schools, and the like (p. 9). These statements recur in the book over and over again. "The economics of the industry must be so reorganised as to place the handicraftsmen in possession of money; or, to put it more plainly, to emancipate the handicraftsman from the kulak" (119) "The task of our

time" is to effect "the emancipation of the handicraftsman by means of credit," etc. (267). "Exchange processes must be rationalised," measures must be adopted "to implant rational principles of credit, exchange and production in peasant farming" (362); what is needed is the "economic organisation of labour" (sic!!—p. 363), "the rational arrangement of the economics of the national economy," and so on, and so forth. All this, as we see, is the familiar Narodnik panacea, tacked on to the census data. And, as though in final confirmation of their Narodnik orthodoxy, the compilers did not fail to condemn money economy in general, and for the reader's edification inform him that artisan production "performs a valuable service to the national economy, by affording it the opportunity to avoid the conversion of natural economy into money economy." "The national economy is vitally interested in demanding that the raw materials it produces be worked up on the spot, as far as possible without the intervention of money in the exchange processes" (p. 360).

Here we have the Narodnik programme expounded with a fullness and frankness that leave nothing to be desired! We say the "Narodnik programme," for we are interested, not in what distinguishes the compilers of the *Sketch* from other Narodniks, but, on the contrary, in what they have in common. What interests us is the practical Narodnik programme for the handicraft industries in general. It is easy to see that the main features of this programme are saliently stressed in the *Sketch*: 1) condemnation of money economy and sympathy for natural economy and primitive artisan production; 2) various measures for the encouragement of small peasant production, such as credits, technical developments, etc.; 3) the spreading of associations and societies of all kinds among the masters, big and small—raw material, warehousing, loan-and-savings, credit, consumers' and producers' societies; 4) "organisation of labour"—a current phrase in all and sundry Narodnik good intentions. Let us examine this programme.

To take first the condemnation of money economy: as far as industry is concerned, it is already of a purely Platonic character. Even in Perm Gubernia, artisan production has already been forced far into the background by commodity production, and is in such a pitiful state that we find the

Sketch itself talking about the desirability of "emancipating the handicraftsman from dependence," in other words, of abolishing the artisan's dependence on the private customer "by seeking means of extending the marketing area beyond the local consumption demand" (p. 33). In other words, condemnation of money economy in theory and a desire to convert artisan production into commodity production in practice! And this contradiction is by no means peculiar to the *Sketch*, it is characteristic of all Narodnik projects: however much they may kick against commodity (money) economy, realities driven out of the door fly in at the window, and the measures they advocate only serve to develop commodity production. Credit is an illustration of this. In their plans and proposals the Narodniks cannot dispense with commodity economy. The *Sketch*, for example, does not even hint that the proposed reforms should not be based on commodity economy. On the contrary, all it wants is rational principles of *exchange*, the co-operative organisation of *exchange*. Commodity economy remains, and is only to be reformed on *rational* lines. There is nothing new in this utopia; it had many an eminent exponent in the old economic literature. Its theoretical unsoundness was disclosed long ago, so that there is no need to dwell on the subject here. Instead of uttering absurd phrases about the necessity of "rationalising" economy, would they not do better first "to rationalise" their notions of the *existing* economy, of the socio-economic relations existing among that extremely variegated and dissimilar mass of "handicraftsmen" whose destinies our Narodniks wish to decide so bureaucratically and frivolously from above? Has not actual life shown us time and again that Narodnik practical measures, concocted in accordance with supposedly "pure" ideas on "organisation of labour," etc., lead in practice to nothing but encouragement and support for the "enterprising muzhik," the small manufacturer or the buyer-up and all the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie in general? This is not fortuitous, it is not because individual measures are imperfect or unsuitable. On the contrary, given the general basis of commodity economy, it is the petty bourgeois above all and before all who inevitably and necessarily make use of credits, warehouses, banks, technical advice and the like.

But, it may be objected, if that is so, if the Narodniks in the practical measures they suggest, unconsciously and involuntarily serve to develop the petty bourgeoisie, and, hence, capitalism in general, why should their programme be attacked by people who on principle regard the development of capitalism as a progressive process? Is it reasonable to attack practical and useful programmes because their ideological integument is wrong, or, to put it mildly, debatable, for surely nobody will deny the "usefulness" of technical education, credits and of producers' societies and associations?

These are not imaginary objections. In one form or another, in one connection or another, they are constantly to be heard in the replies to the arguments levelled against the Narodniks. We shall not dwell here on the point that even if such objections were justified, they do not in the least refute the fact that the dressing-up of petty-bourgeois projects as the most exalted social panaceas is in itself a cause of grave social harm. We intend to put the question on the practical footing of the vital and immediate needs of the times, and to judge the Narodnik programme from this *deliberately* narrowed viewpoint.

Although many of the Narodnik measures are of practical value in serving to develop capitalism, nevertheless, taken as a whole, they are 1) supremely inconsistent, 2) lifelessly doctrinaire, and 3) paltry compared with the actual problems with which developing capitalism confronts our industry. Let us explain. We have shown, firstly, how inconsistent the Narodniks are as *practical* men. Side by side with the measures indicated above, which are usually described as a liberal economic policy, and which have always been inscribed on the banners of bourgeois leaders in the West, the Narodniks contrive to cling to their intention of *retarding* contemporary economic development, of *preventing* the progress of capitalism, and of *supporting* small production, which is being bled white in the struggle against large-scale production. They advocate laws and institutions which restrict the freedom of the mobilisation of land and freedom of movement, and which retain the peasantry as a closed social estate, etc. Are there, we ask, any reasonable grounds for *retarding* the development of capitalism and big industry? We have seen from the census data that the notorious "inde-

pendence" of the handicraftsmen is no guarantee that they will not be subordinated to merchant capital, to exploitation in its worst form; that *actually* the condition of the vast bulk of these "independent" handicraftsmen is often *more wretched* than that of the handicraftsmen's wage-workers, and that their earnings are astonishingly low, their working conditions (from the standpoint of sanitation and hours) highly unsatisfactory, and production scattered, technically primitive and undeveloped. Are there, we ask, any reasonable grounds for perpetuating the police laws which reinforce the "tie with the land," and *forbid* the breaking of a tie that appeals so strongly to the Narodniks?* The data of the 1894-95 "handicraft census" in Perm Gubernia are clear proof of the utter absurdity of artificial measures to tie the peasants to the land. All these measures do is reduce their earnings, which, wherever the "tie with the land" exists, are less than half those of the non-agriculturists; they lower the standard of living, increase the isolation and disunity of producers scattered throughout the villages and render them more defenceless than ever against the buyer-up and subcontractor. At the same time, the fact that the peasants are tied to the land hinders the development of agriculture, without, however, being able to prevent the rise of a rural petty-bourgeois class. The Narodniks avoid raising the question: should the development of capitalism be retarded or not? They prefer to discuss "the possibility of different paths for the fatherland." But anybody who begins to talk about immediate practical measures thereby adopts the *existing path*.** Do whatever you like "to drag" the fatherland on to a different path! Such efforts will arouse no criticism (except the criticism

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* The *Sketch*, too, speaks very enthusiastically of the advantages of the village community and of the harm of the "freedom to mobilise" landed property, which, it claims, would result in the emergence of a "proletariat" (p. 6). This contrasting of the community with freedom to dispose of land is an excellent illustration of the most reactionary and noxious feature of the "community." It would be interesting to know whether there is a single capitalist country in which a "proletarian" earning from 33 to 50 rubles a year would not be classed as a *pauper*?

** And that this existing path is the development of capitalism has not, as far as we know, been denied by the Narodniks themselves, either by Mr. N. —on, or by Mr. V. V., or by Mr. Yuzhakov, etc., etc.

of laughter). But do not defend that which artificially *retards* present-day development, do not drown the problem of removing the obstacles from the existing path in talk about a "different path."

Here is another thing that should be borne in mind-when judging the Narodniks' practical programme. We have already seen that the Narodniks try to formulate their ideas as abstractly as possible, to present them as the abstract demands of "pure" science or "pure" justice, and not as the real needs of real classes having definite interests. Credit—that vital need of every master, big and small, in capitalist society—is presented by the Narodnik as a sort of element in the system of the organisation of labour; masters' associations and societies are depicted as the embryonic expression of the idea of co-operation in general, of the idea of "handicraft emancipation," etc., whereas everybody knows that all such associations actually pursue aims which have nothing in common with such lofty matters, but are simply connected with the size of these masters' incomes, with the growing strength of their position and with their increasing profits. To thus convert commonplace bourgeois and petty-bourgeois wishes into a sort of social panacea only *emasculates* them, robs them of their vitality, of the guarantee of their urgency and practicability. The Narodnik endeavours to present the urgent needs of each proprietor, buyer-up, or merchant (credits, associations, technical assistance) as general questions towering above individual interests. The Narodnik imagines that he is thereby enhancing their significance, exalting them, whereas actually he is only converting a vital matter that *interests* certain specific groups of the population into a philistine wish, into armchair speculation, bureaucratic "reflections on the benefits" of things. Directly connected with this is a third circumstance. Not realising that such practical measures as credits and artels, technical assistance, etc., reflect the needs of developing capitalism, the Narodnik is unable to voice the general and fundamental needs of this development, and instead proposes paltry, casually selected, half-measures which in themselves are incapable of exerting any serious influence and are inevitably doomed to failure. Had the Narodnik openly and consistently adopted the standpoint of an exponent of the needs of social development along

capitalist lines, he would have been able to note *the general conditions*, *the general demands* of this development, and he would have seen that, given these general conditions (the chief of them, in the present case, being freedom of industry), all his petty projects and measures would be achieved automatically, that is, by the activities of the interested parties themselves, whereas, by ignoring these general conditions and proposing nothing but practical measures of an utterly incidental character, he is only beating about the bush. Let us, by way of illustration, take the question of the freedom of industry. On the one hand, it is so much the general and fundamental question of questions concerning industrial policy, that an examination of it is particularly appropriate. On the other hand, the specific conditions of the Perm area furnish interesting corroboration of the cardinal importance of this question.

The metallurgical industry, as we know, is the major feature of the economic life of the area and has laid a very specific impress on it. Both the history of the area's colonisation and its present condition are closely connected with the needs of the Urals iron industry. "Generally speaking, the peasants were settled in the Urals in order to furnish hands for the ironmasters," we read in the letter of Babushkin, a resident of Nizhniye Sergi, quoted in the *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry*.* And these artless words very faithfully depict the tremendous part played by the ironmasters in the life of the area, their significance as landlords and factory owners combined, accustomed to undivided and unrestricted rule, as monopolists who base their industry on possessional rights and not on capital and competition. The monopoly basis of the Urals metallurgical industry has been reflected in law, in the well-known Article 394 of Volume VII of the Code of Laws (Mining Statute), an article about which so much has been and is still being written in literature on the Urals. This law, promulgated in 1806, provides, firstly, that the sanction of the mining authority shall be required for mining towns to open any factory and, secondly, forbids the opening in the ironworks area of "any manufactory or

* Part XVI, pp. 594-95. Cited in *Handicraft Industries*, I, p. 140.

FROM MARX TO MAO NEW HAR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

factory whose operation chiefly depends on the action of fire, necessitating the use of coal or wood." In 1861 the Urals ironmasters particularly insisted on the inclusion of this law in the terms governing the emancipation of the peasants, and Article 11 of the regulations for ironworkers reiterates the same prohibition.* The report of the Board of the Handicraft Industrial Bank for 1895 states, among other things, that "most numerous of all, however, are complaints against the ban imposed by officials of the Department of Mines and the possessional works owners on the *opening* of fire-using establishments within the areas under their jurisdiction, and against all sorts of restrictions on the operations of the metal trades" (*Sketch*, p. 223). Thus, the traditions of the "good old days" have been preserved intact in the Urals to this day, and the attitude towards small peasant industry in this region fully harmonises with the "organisation of labour" which ensured the ironmasters a supply of factory workers tied to their locality. These traditions are very strikingly illustrated in the following report in *Permskiye Gubernskiye Vedomosti*,[126] No. 183, 1896, quoted in the *Sketch* and rightly referred to there as being "highly eloquent." Here it is: "The Ministry of Agriculture and State Property requested the Urals ironmasters to discuss the possibility of the ironworks taking measures to encourage the development of handicraft production in the Urals. The ironmasters informed the Ministry that the development of handicraft industry in the Urals would be detrimental to big industry, for even today, when handicrafts are poorly developed in the Urals, the population are unable to furnish

* See *Handicraft Industries*, I pp. 18-19.—*Sketch*, pp. 222, 223, and 244.—Yegunov's article in Volume III of *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry in Russia* published by the Ministry of State Property and Agriculture. In publishing Yegunov's article, the Ministry, in a comment, makes the reservation that the author's views "substantially differ from the opinion and information of the Department of Mines." In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, for example, as many as 400 smithies were closed down under these laws. Cf. *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry*, Part XVI, article by V. D. Belov, "Handicraft Industry in the Urals and Its Connection with Metallurgy." The author relates that the handicraftsmen, fearing to incur the severity of the law, hide their machines. One handicraftsman built a furnace *on wheels* to cast ironware, so as to make it easier to hide (op. cit., p. 18)!

the works with the required number of hands*; if the population were to find jobs that could be done at home, the ironworks would risk being brought to a complete standstill" (*Sketch*, p. 244). This report evoked the following exclamation from the compilers of the *Sketch*: "Of course, freedom of industry is a prime and essential condition of all industry, whether *large*, *medium* or *small*.... In the name of freedom of industry, *all its branches* should be legally equal.... The metal-working handicraft industries of the Urals should be freed from all *exceptional* fetters imposed by the ironmasters to restrict their *natural* development" (ibid. Our italics). Reading this heartfelt and perfectly just defence of "freedom of industry," we were reminded of the story about the metaphysical philosopher who delayed climbing out of a pit while he pondered over the nature of the rope that had been thrown him. At last he decided: "It is nothing but a rope"[127] In the same way, the Perm Narodniks ask disdainfully about freedom of industry, freedom of capitalist development, freedom of competition: What is freedom of industry?—Simply a bourgeois demand! Their aspirations soar much higher; it is not freedom of competition they want (what a low, narrow, bourgeois aspiration!), but "organisation of labour."... But these Manilovian dreams have only to come "face to face" with prosaic and unadorned reality, and that reality immediately smells of such an "*organisation of labour*" that the Narodnik forgets all about the "harmfulness" and "danger" of capitalism, about the "possibility of different paths for the fatherland," and calls for "*freedom of industry*."

We repeat, we regard this desire as fully justified and consider that this view (shared not only by the *Sketch*, but by practically every author who has written on this subject) does credit to the Narodniks. But ... what is one to do? It is impossible to say a word in praise of the Narodniks without immediately following it up with a big "but"—but we have two important remarks to make in this connection.

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* Let us explain for the benefit of the reader that our iron industry statistics have repeatedly shown that the number of workers employed in proportion to output is considerably higher in the Urals than in the Southern or Polish iron districts. Low wages—the result of the workers being tied to the land—keeps the Urals at a much lower technical level than the South or Poland.

First. We can be sure that the overwhelming majority of the Narodniks will indignantly deny the correctness of our identifying "freedom of industry" with "freedom of capitalism." They will say that the abolition of monopolies and of the survivals of serfdom is "simply" a demand for equality, that it is in the interest of the "entire" national economy in general and of peasant economy in particular, and not of capitalism at all. We know that the Narodniks will say this. But it will be untrue. Over a hundred years have elapsed since the days when "freedom of industry" was regarded in this idealistic abstract way, as a fundamental and natural (cf. the word italicised in the *Sketch*) "right of man." Since then the demand for "freedom of industry" has been advanced and achieved in a number of countries, and everywhere this demand has expressed the discrepancy between growing capitalism and the survivals of monopoly and regulation, everywhere it has served as the watchword of the advanced bourgeoisie, and everywhere it has resulted in the complete triumph of capitalism, and nothing else. Theory has since fully explained the absolute naïveté of the illusion that "freedom of industry" is a demand of "pure reason," of abstract "equality," and has shown that freedom of industry is a capitalist issue. The achievement of "freedom of industry" is by no means a "legal" reform only; it is a profound economic reform. The demand for "freedom of industry" is always indicative of a discrepancy between the legal institutions (which reflect production relations that have already outlived their day) and *the new production relations*, which have developed in spite of the old institutions, have outgrown them and demand their abolition. If the order of things in the Urals is now evoking a general cry for "freedom of industry," it means that the traditional regulations, monopolies and privileges that benefit the landlord ironmasters are restricting e*xisting economic relations*, *existing* economic forces. What are these relations and forces? These relations are the *relations of commodity economy*. These forces are the forces of *capital*, which guides commodity economy. We have only to remember the "confession" of the Perm Narodnik quoted above: "Our entire handicraft industry is in bondage to private capital." And, even without this confession, the handicraft census data speak quite eloquently for themselves.

Second remark. We welcome the defence of freedom of industry by the Narodniks. But we make this welcome contingent on its being *conducted consistently*. Does "freedom of industry" merely consist in abolishing the ban on the opening of fire-using establishments in the Urals? Does not the fact that the peasant has no right to leave his village community, or to engage in any industry or pursuit he likes, constitute a far more serious restriction on "freedom of industry"? Does not the absence of freedom of movement, the fact that the law does not recognise the right of every citizen to choose any town or village community in the country as his place of domicile, constitute a restriction on freedom of industry? Does not the peasant community, with its social-estate exclusiveness—the fact that members of the trading and industrial class cannot enter it—constitute a restriction on freedom of industry? And so on, and so forth. We have enumerated far more serious, more general and widespread restrictions on freedom of industry, restrictions that affect all Russia, and the entire mass of the peasantry most of all. If "large, medium and small" industries are to have equal rights, should not the small industries be granted the same right to alienate land as is enjoyed by the large industries? If the Urals mining laws are "exceptional fetters, restricting natural development," do not collective responsibility, the inalienability of allotments and the special social-estate laws and regulations governing trades and occupations, migration and transfer from one social estate to another, constitute "exceptional fetters"? Do they not "restrict natural development"?

The truth is that on this question, too, the Narodniks have betrayed the half-heartedness and two-facedness that are characteristic of every Kleinbürger ideology. On the one hand, the Narodniks do not deny that in our society there are a host of survivals of the "organisation of labour" whose origin dates back to the days of apanage rights, and which are in crying contradiction to the modern economic system and to the country's entire economic and cultural development. On the other hand, they cannot help seeing that this economic system and development threaten to ruin the small producer, and, fearful for the fate of this palladium of their "ideals," the Narodniks try to drag history back, to halt

development, beg and plead that it be "forbidden," "not allowed," and cover up this pitiful reactionary prattle with talk about "organisation of labour," talk that can only sound as a bitter mockery.

The chief and fundamental objection we have to make to the *practical* Narodnik programme for modern industry should now, of course, be clear to the reader. Insofar as the Narodnik measures are part of, or coincide with, the reform which, since the days of Adam Smith, has been known as *freedom of industry* (in the broad sense of the term), they are progressive. But, firstly, in that case, they contain nothing specifically "Narodnik," nothing that gives special support to small production and "special paths" for the fatherland. Secondly, this favourable side of the Narodnik programme is weakened and distorted by the substitution of partial and minor projects and measures for a general and fundamental solution of the problem—freedom of industry. Insofar, however, as Narodnik aspirations run counter to freedom of industry and endeavour to retard modern development, they are reactionary and meaningless, and their achievement can bring nothing but harm. Let us illustrate this by examples. Take credit. Credit is an institution of most developed commodity circulation, of the most developed, nation-wide turnover of commodities. Wherever achieved, "freedom of industry" inevitably leads to the formation of credit institutions as commercial enterprises, to the breaking-down of the peasants' social-estate exclusiveness, to their mingling with the classes which make most frequent resort to credit, to the independent formation of credit societies by interested persons, and so on. On the other hand, what value can there be in credit measures conferred on the "muzhiks" by Zemstvo officials and other "intellectuals" if the laws and institutions keep the peasant ry in a condition which *precludes the possibility* of a proper, developed commodity circulation, in a condition in which *labour service* is far easier, far more practicable, attainable and workable than property responsibility (the foundation of credit)? Under these conditions, credit measures will always be something adventitious, an alien growth planted in absolutely uncongenial soil; they will be still-born, something only dreamy intellectual Manilovs and well-meaning officials could give birth to, and which the real *traders in*

money capital will always jeer at. So as to make no unfounded assertion, let us quote the opinion of Yegunov (in the article mentioned above) whom nobody can suspect of—"materialism." Speaking in reference to handicraft warehouses, he says: "Even under the most favourable local conditions, a stationary warehouse, and the only one in the whole uyezd at that, never can and never will replace a perpetually mobile and personally interested trader." In reference to the Perm Handicraft Bank, we are told that in order to obtain a loan the handicraftsman must hand in an application to the bank or its agent and name his guarantors. The agent comes, verifies his statement, gathers detailed information about his business, etc., "and this whole pile of documents is sent, at the handicraftsman's expense, to the head office of the bank." If it decides to grant the loan, the bank sends (through the agent, or through the volost administration) a bond for signature, and only when the borrower has signed it (his signature being certified by the volost authorities) and sent it back to the bank, does he receive his money. If an artel applies for a loan, a copy of the articles of association is required. It is the function of the agents to see that loans are expended for the specific purposes for which they have been granted, that the business of clients is run on sound lines, etc. "Obviously, in no way can it be said that handicraftsmen can *easily obtain* bank loans; it may be safely said that the handicraftsman will far more readily turn to the local moneyed man for a loan than submit to all the trying formalities we have described, pay postage, notary's and local government fees, patiently wait all the months that elapse between the moment the need for the loan arises and the day it is granted, and put up with supervision for the whole period of the loan" (op. cit., p. 170). The Narodnik view on some sort of anti-capitalist credit is just as absurd as the incongruous, clumsy and useless attempts (using wrong methods) to get done by "intellectuals" and officials things that have everywhere and always been the business of traders.

Technical education. There is hardly need, we think, to dwell on this subject ... except to remind the reader of the project, worthy of "eternal memory," of our well-known progressive writer, Mr. Yuzhakov, to implant agricultural gymnasia in Russia, at which poor peasant men and women

would *work off* the cost of their education by serving, for example, as cooks or laundresses.* ...Artels: but who does not know that the chief obstacle to their spreading is the traditions of the very same "organisation of labour" which has found expression in the Urals mining laws? Who does not know that wherever freedom of industry has been introduced in full it has always led to an unparalleled blossoming and development of all sorts of societies and associations? It is very comical at times to see our Narodniks trying to represent their opponents as enemies of artels, associations, etc., in general. The boot, of course, is on the other foot! The fact is that if you want to look for the idea of association and for the means of implementing it, you must not look back, to the past, to patriarchal artisan and small production, which are the cause of the extreme isolation, disunity and backwardness of the producers, but forward, to the future, towards the development of large-scale industrial capitalism.

We are perfectly aware of the haughty contempt with which the Narodnik will regard this programme of industrial policy that is being opposed to his own. "Freedom of industry"! What an old-fashioned, narrow, Manchester School** bourgeois aspiration! The Narodnik is convinced that for him this is an überwundener Standpunkt,*** that he has succeeded in rising above the transient and one-sided interests on which this aspiration is based, that he has risen to a profounder and purer idea of "organisation of labour." ...Actually, however, he has only *sunk* from progressive bourgeois ideology to reactionary petty-bourgeois ideology, which helplessly vacillates between the desire to accelerate modern economic development and the desire to retard it, between the interests of small masters and the interests of labour. On this question, the latter coincide with the interests of big industrial capital.

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* See next article.

** There will be some, no doubt, who think that "freedom of industry" precludes such measures as factory legislation, etc. By "freedom of industry" is meant the abolition of all *survivals of the past* that hinder the development of capitalism. But factory legislation, like the other measures of modern so-called Socialpolitik, *presupposes* an advanced development of capitalism and, in its turn, *furthers* that development.

*** Discarded viewpoint.—*Ed.*

GEMS OF NARODNIK PROJECT-MONGERING

(S. N. YUZHAKOV, EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS. JOURNALISTIC ESSAYS.—SECONDARY-SCHOOL REFORM.—SYSTEMS AND AIMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—GYMNASIUM TEXT-BOOKS.—THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL EDUCATION.—WOMEN AND EDUCATION. ST. PETERSBURG, 1897, PP. VIII + 283. PRICE 1 RUBLE 50 KOPEKS.)[128]

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I

Under the above title Mr. Yuzhakov has published a collection of his articles that appeared in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* in the years 1895-97. The author believes that his articles "embrace the most important of these problems," i.e., "educational problems," and, "taken together, constitute a sort of review of the most timely and urgent, but still inadequately satisfied needs of our intellectual culture." (Preface, p. V.) On page 5, it is once more stressed that the author intends to dwell "chiefly on problems of principle." But all these phrases merely show Mr. Yuzhakov's predilection for a broad sweep of thought, or rather, not so much of thought as of the pen. Even the title of the book is too broad. As a matter of fact—as can be seen from the list of articles in the subtitle to the book—the author does not deal with "educational problems" at all, but solely with the problem of the schools, and only of the secondary and higher schools at that. Of all the articles in the book, the most practical one is that on the textbooks used in our gymnasia. The author goes into a detailed examination of the current textbooks of the Russian language, geography and history, and demonstrates their utter worthlessness. This article would make the more interesting reading if it, too, were not made irksome by the author's usual verbosity. We intend to draw the reader's attention to only two of the articles in the book, one on the reform in secondary education, and the other on universal education, for these articles really do touch upon problems of principle and are very typical for an explanation of the favourite ideas of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. The Grineviches and Mikhailovskies are reduced to digging in the muck-heap of Russian

doggerel for examples of preposterously stupid conclusions drawn from a hostile doctrine. We, however, do not need to engage in such dreary excavations for the same purpose: we have only to turn to the magazine *Russkoye Bogatstvo*—and to only one of its undoubted "pillars" at that.

II

Section II of the article "Principles of Reform in Secondary Education" has been entitled by Mr. Yuzhakov "Aims of Secondary Education. Class Interests and Class Schools" (see Contents). The theme, as you see, is of absorbing interest, promising as it does to explain one of the cardinal problems, not only of education, but of social life in general, a problem, moreover, that is the source of one of the major disagreements between the Narodniks and the "disciples."[129] Let us then see what conception this contributor to *Russkoye Bogatstvo* has of "class interests and class schools."

The author quite rightly says that the formula, "the school should prepare a man for life," is quite meaningless, and that the question is what is needed for life, and "who needs it" (6). "Who needs secondary education?—means: in whose interests, for whose benefit and advantage is education given to secondary-school pupils?" (7). A splendid formulation of the question, and we would give our heartfelt praise to the author if ... if all these preludes did not later prove to be just empty talk: "It may be to the benefit and advantage of the state, the nation, of some particular social class, or of the individual who is being educated." Here the muddle begins: we have to conclude that a class-divided society is compatible with a non-class state, with a non-class nation, with individuals standing outside of classes! We shall soon see that this is by no means a slip of Mr. Yuzhakov's pen, that he actually does hold this absurd opinion. "If class interests are kept in mind when drawing up the school curriculum, there can of course be no question of one general type of state secondary school. In that case the educational establishments are necessarily of the social-estate type, providing not only instruction, but also education in the wider sense, for they not only have to impart an education adapted to the special interests and

aims of the estate, but also social-estate habits and a social-estate esprit de corps" (7). The first conclusion to be drawn from this harangue is that Mr. Yuzhakov does not understand the difference between estates and classes, and therefore hopelessly muddles these quite different concepts. The same misunderstanding is revealed in other parts of the article (see p. 8, for example), and this is all the more surprising as Mr. Yuzhakov in this same article comes very close to the essential distinction between these concepts. "It should be borne in mind," Mr. Yuzhakov informs us on page 11, "that often (although not necessarily) political, economic and religious organisations sometimes constitute legal privileges, sometimes the actual prerogatives of special groups of the population. In the first instance we have estates, in the second classes." Here *one* of the differences between class and social estate has been correctly noted, namely, that what distinguishes classes from one another is not legal privileges, but actual conditions, and that, consequently, classes in modern society presume *legal equality*. And there is another difference between social estates and classes which Mr. Yuzhakov apparently does not ignore: "...And at that time" (i.e., after the abolition of serfdom) "...we renounced the feudal and social-estate structure of national life, and with it the system of exclusive social-estate schools. Today, the introduction of the capitalist process is dividing the Russian nation, not so much into estates, as into economic classes..." (8). Here another distinction between estates and classes in European and Russian history is correctly indicated, namely, that the social estates are a feature of feudal, and classes of capitalist society.* If Mr. Yuzhakov had given even a little thought to these distinctions, and had not surrendered himself so easily to the sway of his agile pen and his Kleinbürger** heart, he would have written neither the above-quoted tirade, nor the rest of the twaddle, such as that class curricula in schools are bound to mean one curriculum for the rich and another for the poor, that in Western Europe

* Social estates presuppose the division of society into classes, being themselves one of the forms of class distinction. When we speak simply of classes, we always presume the non-estate classes of capitalist society.

** Petty bourgeois.—*Ed.*

class curricula are a failure, that class schools presume class exclusiveness, and so on and so forth. All this shows as clearly as can be that despite the promising title, despite his high-flown phrases, Mr. Yuzhakov has no conception of the nature of class schools. It is, most worthy Mr. Narodnik, that education is organised in one and the same way, and is equally accessible to all the *wealthy*. It is this last word alone that explains the nature of class schools, as distinct from social-estate schools. It is therefore the purest nonsense on Mr. Yuzhakov's part to say, as he did in the above-mentioned tirade, that where the schools follow class interests "there can be no question of one general type of state secondary school." Just the opposite: class schools—if adhered to consistently, that is, if they are freed of every survival of the social-estate system—necessarily presume one general type of school. Full legal *equality*, full equality of rights for all citizens, with education fully equal and accessible to all the wealthy—these constitute the essence of class society (and, consequently, of class education). Estate schools demand that the pupils shall belong to a given social estate. The class school knows no estates, it only knows citizens. Of all pupils it demands *one thing only*, namely, that they should pay for their education. A difference in curricula for rich and poor is by no means essential for class schools, since those who have not the wherewithal to pay for tuition, for textbooks and for the pupil's maintenance during the whole tuition period are simply barred by the class school from secondary education. The class school by no means presumes class exclusiveness: on the contrary, unlike social estates, classes always leave the road quite free for the transfer of individuals from one class to another. The class schools do not close their doors to anybody who has the means to pay for tuition. To say that in Western Europe "no success attends these dangerous programmes of semi-education and of the class moral and intellectual segregation of the various sections of the people" (9) is an utter perversion of the truth; for everybody knows that, both in the West and in Russia, the secondary schools are essentially class schools and serve the interests of only a very small part of the population. In view of the incredible confusion of ideas betrayed by Mr. Yuzhakov, we even think it worth while to give the follow-

The house in Shushenskoye village in which Lenin lived in exile

ing supplementary explanation for his benefit: in modern society, even the secondary schools which charge no tuition fees are nonetheless class schools, for the cost of maintaining the pupil for seven or eight years is immeasurably greater than the tuition fee, and is only within the reach of a very small minority. If Mr. Yuzhakov is anxious to be a practical adviser to contemporary reformers of the secondary schools, if he wants to treat the problem from the angle of present-day realities (as he does), he should only speak of the substitution of class schools for estate schools—*only* of that, or else remain entirely silent on this ticklish question of "class interests and class schools." And even so, these problems of principle have very little in common with the substitution of modern languages, for the classical languages, which Mr. Yuzhakov recommends in this article. Had he confined himself to this recommendation, we would have had no objection, and would have even been ready to forgive him his unrestrained rhetoric. But since he has *himself* raised the question of "class interests and class schools," let him bear the responsibility for all his absurd utterances.

Mr. Yuzhakov's utterances on this theme are by no means confined to what has already been said. Faithful to the fundamental ideas of the "subjective method in sociology," Mr. Yuzhakov, having touched on the subject of classes, rises to a "broad point of view" (12, p. 15), so broad, that he can superbly ignore class differences; so broad that it enables him to speak, not of individual classes (fie, how narrow!), but of the nation in general. This magnificent "broadness" of view is attained by the hackneyed method of all moralists, big and small, and by the Kleinbürger moralists in particular. Mr. Yuzhakov sternly condemns this division of society into classes (and its reflection in education), holding forth with supreme grandiloquence and incomparable fervour on the "danger" (9) of this thing; on the point that "the class system of education in all its shapes and forms is fundamentally hostile to the interests of the state, the nation and the individuals to be educated"* (8); on the "inexpediency and

* One or the other, most worthy Mr. Kleinbürger: either you are talking about a society that is divided into classes, or about one that is not. In the first case, there can be no such thing as non-

danger from both the state and the national standpoint" (9) of class curricula in schools; on the point that historical examples illustrate only "that exceptionally anti-national development of the class system and class interests of which we have spoken, and which has already been admitted as dangerous to the national welfare and to the state itself" (11); on the point that "the class system of administration has been abolished in one form or another everywhere" (11); on the point that this "dangerous" division into classes arouses "antagonism between the various groups of the population" and gradually obliterates "the sense of national solidarity and national patriotism" (12); on the point that "broadly, correctly and far-sightedly understood, the interests of the nation as a whole, of the state, and of individual citizens in general should not be mutually contradictory (at least in the modern state)" (15), and so on and so forth. This is all sheer cant, empty phrase-mongering, which obscures the very essence of contemporary reality with the senseless "aspirations" of the Kleinbürger, aspirations that imperceptibly find their way into the description of things as they are. To find an analogy for the sort of outlook which gives rise to such phrase-mongering we have to turn to the exponents of that "ethical" school[130] in the West which was the natural and inevitable expression of the theoretical cowardice and political perplexity of the bourgeoisie there.

We, however, shall confine ourselves to comparing the following little fact with this magnificent eloquence and lofty-mindedness, this remarkable perspicacity and far-sightedness. Mr. Yuzhakov touched on the subject of social-estate and class schools. As regards the first, precise statistics are available—at least as far as male gymnasia, progymnasia and modern schools are concerned. Here are the figures, which we have borrowed from a publication of the Ministry of Finance: *Productive Forces of Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1896, Part XIX, Public Education, p. 31):

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class education. In the second case, there can be neither a class state, nor a class nation, nor individuals who do not belong to one of the classes. And in both cases the phrase is meaningless and only expresses the innocent wish of a Kleinbürger who timidly closes his eyes to the most prominent features of contemporary reality.

"The division of students according to social estate (as percentages of the total number) may be seen from the following table:

Children of	In the male gymnasia and progymnasia of of the Ministry Public Education			In modern schools		
	1880	*1884*	*1892*	*1880*	*1884*	*1892*
Hereditary and life nobles and officials	47.6	49.2	56.2	44.0	40.7	38.0
Clergy	5.1	5.0	3.9	2.6	1.8	0.9
Urban estates . .	33.3	35.9	31.3	37.0	41.8	43.0
Rural estates (including non-Russian and minor officials)	8.0	7.9	5.9	10.4	10.9	12.7
Foreigners	2.0	2.0	1.9	3.0	4.8	5.4
Other estates . . .	2.0	Included in previous		3.0	Included in previous	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0"

This table shows clearly how incautious Mr. Yuzhakov was when he said that we had immediately and resolutely (??) "renounced social-estate schools." On the contrary, the social-estate system prevails in our secondary schools to this day, even if 56 per cent of the students in the gymnasia (not to mention the privileged educational establishments for the nobility, etc.) are sons of nobles and officials. Their only serious rival is the urban estates, who now predominate in the modern schools. The proportion of the rural estates—especially if we bear in mind their vast numerical superiority over the other estates—is altogether insignificant. This table, therefore, clearly shows that anybody who sets out to discuss the character of our contemporary secondary schools should be perfectly clear in his own mind that it is only estate and class schools that are in question, and that insofar as "we" actually do renounce estate schools, it is exclusively in the interests of class schools. It goes without saying that we do not by any means intend to claim that the question of superseding the estate schools by class schools, and of improving the latter, is of no importance or concern to those classes

that do not and cannot enjoy the advantages of secondary education: on the contrary, it is not a matter of unconcern to them either, for the estate system lays a particularly heavy burden on them both in life and in school, and the superseding of estate schools by class schools is only one of the links in the general and all-round Europeanisation of Russia. All we want is to show how Mr. Yuzhakov distorted the facts, and that actually his supposedly "broad" point of view is immeasurably inferior even to the bourgeois view on the question. Incidentally, on the subject of the bourgeois views. Mr. A. Manuilov simply cannot understand why P. B. Struve, who so explicitly revealed the one-sidedness of Schulze-Gävernitz, nevertheless "propagates his bourgeois ideas" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 11, p. 93). Mr. A. Manuilov's failure to understand this is solely and exclusively due to his failure to understand the fundamental views not only of the Russian, but of all the West-European "disciples," and not only of the disciples, but of the teacher as well. Or perhaps Mr. Manuilov will deny that one of the fundamental views of the "teacher"—views that run like a scarlet thread through all his theoretical, literary and practical activities—is an ineradicable hatred of those lovers of "broad points of view" who with the help of sugary phrases obscure the class division of modern society? Or that another of his fundamental views is a firm recognition of the progressiveness and preferability of frank and consistent "bourgeois ideas" as compared with the ideas of those Kleinbürger who are so anxious to retard and halt capitalism? If this is not clear to Mr. Manuilov, let him ponder, say, over the writings of his fellow magazine contributor, Mr. Yuzhakov. Let him imagine that, on the subject now of interest to us, we see alongside Mr. Yuzhakov a frank and consistent exponent of "bourgeois ideas," who upholds the class character of the contemporary school, seeking to prove that nothing better could be imagined, and striving to eliminate the estate schools completely and to make the class schools more widely accessible (in the sense referred to above). Really, such ideas would be far superior to those of Mr. Yuzhakov's: attention would be drawn to the contemporary school's real needs, namely, to the abolition of its social-estate exclusiveness, and not to the vague "broad point of view" of the Kleinbürger. A frank elucida-

tion and defence of the one-sided character of the contemporary school would present a proper picture of reality, and by its very one-sidedness would help to enlighten the minds of the other side.* Mr. Yuzhakov's "broad" effusions, on the contrary, only help to pervert social consciousness. Lastly, as to the practical side of the matter ... but Mr. Yuzhakov does not go one jot beyond the limits of the class school, not only in this article, but also in his "utopia," which we shall now proceed to consider.

III

Mr. Yuzhakov's article dealing with "the problem of universal education" (see the title of the book) is called: "An Educational Utopia. A Plan for Universal Compulsory Secondary Education." The very heading shows that this highly edifying article of Mr. Yuzhakov's promises a lot. But, actually, Mr. Yuzhakov's "utopia" promises even far more. "Nothing less, dear readers, without concession or compromise..." —is the way the author begins his article.—"A complete gymnasium education for the entire population of both sexes, compulsory for all, and involving no expenditure by the state, Zemstvo or people—such is my grand educational utopia" (201)! The worthy Mr. Yuzhakov evidently thinks that the crux of the matter is that of "expenditure"; on this same page he repeats that universal elementary education entails expenditure, but that universal secondary education, according to his "plan," entails no expenditure at all. But not only does

* We are fully aware that it is very, very hard for *Russkoye Bogatstvo* contributors to understand an argument of this character. That again is due to their failure to understand not only the "disciples," but also the "teacher."

Here, for example, is how one of the "teachers" sought, as far hack as 1845, to prove that the English workers gained from the repeal of the Corn Laws. This repeal, he wrote, involves the farmers' transformation into "Liberals, i.e., conscious bourgeois," and this growth of class-consciousness on the one side necessarily involves a similar growth of class-consciousness on the other (F. Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*. New York, 1887, p. 179).[131] How is it that you, gentlemen contributors to *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, just bow and scrape before the "teachers," but do not expose them for "propagating bourgeois ideas"?

Mr. Yuzhakov's plan entail no expenditure: it promises something far more than secondary education for the entire people. In order to give an idea of the full scope of what the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* contributor promises, we must anticipate and quote the author's own triumphant exclamations after he has set forth his plan in full and stands back to admire it. Mr. Yuzhakov's plan is to combine gymnasium education with the productive labour of the "gymnasium students," who are to maintain themselves: "...The cultivation of the school land ... will ensure abundant, palatable and wholesome food for the entire younger generation from birth to graduation from the gymnasium and also for the young people working off the cost of their education" (about this institution of the Yuzhakov Zukunftsstaat,* more anon) "and for the whole staff of administrators, teachers and managers. Furthermore, they will all be supplied with footwear, and clothes will be made for them. In addition, the school land will yield about 20,000 rubles, to wit, 15,000 rubles from surplus milk and spring wheat ... and about 5,000 rubles from the sale of skins, bristle, feathers, and other by-products" (216). Just think, reader, the *entire* younger generation to be maintained until graduation from the gymnasium, that is, until the ages of 21-25 (p. 203)! Why, that means maintaining *half* the country's total population.** The maintenance and education of scores of millions—that is real "organisation of labour" for you! Mr. Yuzhakov, evidently, was seriously annoyed with the wicked people who asserted that the Narodnik projects for the "organisation of labour" are nothing but the empty twaddle of empty windbags, and so he decided to annihilate these wicked people completely by publishing a full "plan" for this "organisation of labour"—to be achieved "without any expenditure." ... But even that is not all: "...In the process, we enlarged the task; we had this same organisation assume the cost of maintaining the entire child population; we took care to ensure dowries for young people about to be married—one that is quite good for the countryside; we found it

* State of the future.—*Ed.*

** According to Bunyakovsky, for every thousand inhabitants in Russia there are 485 between the ages of 0 and 20 years, and 576 between the ages of 0 and 25 years.

possible out of the same funds to appoint in every gymnasium, that is, in every rural area, a doctor, a veterinary surgeon, a trained agronomist, a trained gardener, a technologist and six artisans, no less (who will raise the level of culture and satisfy the corresponding requirements of the whole locality).... And the financial and economic problems involved in realising these aims will all be solved by the adoption of our plan...."* How disgraced those evil tongues will now be that insinuated that the celebrated Narodnik "we" was a "mysterious stranger," a Jew with two skull-caps, and the like! What unseemly slander! Henceforth a mere reference to Mr. Yuzhakov's "plan" will be enough to prove the almighty power of this "we" and the feasibility of "our" projects.

Maybe the reader will have his doubts about this word: feasibility? Maybe the reader will say that by calling his creation a utopia, Mr. Yuzhakov eliminated the question of feasibility?—That would be so if Mr. Yuzhakov himself had not made highly substantial reservations about the word "utopia," and if he had not repeatedly stressed the feasibility of his plan throughout his essay. "I make bold to think," he says at the very beginning of his article, "that this plan for universal secondary education will seem a utopia only at first glance" (201).... What more do you want?... "I make even bolder to assert that education on these lines for the entire population is far more feasible than universal elementary education, which has nevertheless already been realised in Germany, France, England and the United States, and is very near to being realised in several of the gubernias of Russia" (201). Mr. Yuzhakov is so convinced of the feasibility of his plan (apparently, after having said that "plan" is a more appropriate word than utopia is), that he does not neglect even the most minor "practical conveniences" in the elaboration of that plan, deliberately preserving, for example, the system of two gymnasia, for boys and girls, in deference to the "prejudice prevailing on the European continent against co-education," and insistently stresses that his plan would "make it possible to leave the established curricula of the male and female gymnasia undisturbed, and would provide

* P. 237. Both eloquent lines of dots in this effusion belong to Mr. Yuzhakov. We would not have dared to omit a single letter.

more lessons, and, therefore, higher remuneration, for the teaching staffs."... "All this is of no mean importance, given the desire not to confine it to a mere experiment, but to achieve really universal education" (205-06). There have been many utopians in the world who vied in the attractiveness and elegance of their utopias, but hardly one of them will be found to have betrayed so much solicitude for the "established curricula" and the remuneration of teaching staffs. We are convinced that future generations will long continue to point to Mr. Yuzhakov as a truly practical and truly business-like "utopian."

Obviously, in view of these promises of the author, his plan for universal education deserves the most careful examination.

IV

The principle from which Mr. Yuzhakov proceeds is that the gymnasium should at the same time be an agricultural establishment and ensure its own maintenance by the summer labour of its pupils. That is the fundamental idea of the plan. "That this idea is a correct one, can scarcely be doubted" (237), Mr. Yuzhakov opines. And we agree with him that this is indeed a correct idea; only, it should not necessarily be tacked on to the "gymnasia," or to the possibility of making them "pay" by their pupils' labour. The correct idea is that an ideal future society cannot be conceived without the combination of education with the productive labour of the younger generation: neither training and education without productive labour, nor productive labour without parallel training and education could be raised to the degree required by the present level of technology and the state of scientific knowledge. This thought was already expressed by the great utopians of the past; and it is fully shared by the "disciples," who for this reason, incidentally, do not object in principle to female and juvenile labour in industry, regard attempts to completely forbid such labour as reactionary, and only insist on the proper hygienic conditions being created for it. Mr. Yuzhakov is therefore wrong when he says: "I only wanted to suggest the idea" (237).... The idea was suggested long ago, and we hesitate to believe (until the contrary is demonstrated) that Mr. Yuzhakov could

have been unfamiliar with it. What this *Russkoye Bogatstvo* contributor wanted to suggest, and did suggest, was an absolutely independent *plan for implementing* this idea. Only in this sense is it to be regarded as original, but here its originality goes as far ... as the Pillars of Hercules.

If universal productive labour is to be combined with universal education, then obviously the duty of sharing in productive labour should be laid upon *all*. That, one would think, is self-evident. But no, it appears not. Our "Narodnik's" solution of the matter is that the duty of physical labour should indeed be established as a general principle; *but not for all*, *only for people without means*.

The reader may think we are joking? Not a bit of it!

"The purely urban gymnasia for people of means who are prepared to pay the full cost of education in money, might be preserved in their present form" (229). On page 231 "people of means" are classed without more ado as "categories of the population" not liable to compulsory education in the "agricultural gymnasia." Thus, in our Narodnik's opinion, compulsory productive labour is not a condition for general and all-round human development, but simply a means of paying the cost of gymnasium education. That is how he puts it. At the very beginning of his article, Mr. Yuzhakov discusses the problem of the winter workers needed by the agricultural gymnasia. The most "logical" of all, in his opinion, is the following method of ensuring winter workers for the gymnasia. The pupils of the junior classes do not work, and consequently receive their maintenance and tuition free, paying nothing towards the expenditures incurred by the school. "That being so, is it not his direct duty to work off these expenditures at the end of the course? This duty, carefully thought out and firmly established for everybody *who is unable to pay the cost of tuition*, will assure the gymnasium farm the necessary contingent of winter workers and an additional contingent of summer workers.... Regarded theoretically, this is very simple, comprehensible and quite incontrovertible" (205, our italics). Mercy on us, what could be "simpler"? Pay if you have the money, work if you have not!—every shopkeeper will agree that nothing could be more "comprehensible." And how wonderfully practical it all is! Only—where does the "utopia" come in? And why does Mr., Yuzha-

kov, by such plans, besmirch the grand fundamental idea which he intended to make the basis of his utopia?

Labour service performed by students without means is the basis of Mr. Yuzhakov's whole plan. True, he admits another method of acquiring winter workers—by hire,* but gives it a secondary place. Labour service, however—for three years (and if necessary even for four)—is to be compulsory for all who are not called up for military service, in other words, for two-thirds of the male students and for all the girls. "This system alone," Mr. Yuzhakov bluntly declares, "furnishes the key to the problem of universal education—and secondary, not just elementary, education at that" (207-08). "A small contingent of regular workers, who have remained on at the gymnasium altogether, and have identified their lives with it (!?), will supplement these labour forces of the gymnasium farm. Such are the potential, and by no means utopian, labour resources of our agricultural gymnasium" (208). And, it goes without saying, that with no shortage of things to be done, they will also do other jobs: "Auxiliary personnel for kitchen and laundry, as well as postmen, may easily be selected from among the three-year workers who have been graduated from the gymnasium" (209). The gymnasia will need tradesmen: tailors, bootmakers, carpenters, etc. Of course, "assistants may be supplied them from among those performing their three years' labour service" (210).

What will these farm-hands (or agricultural gymnasium students? I really don't know what to call them) receive in return for their labour? Everything required for their subsistence—"abundant and palatable food." Mr. Yuzhakov calculates it all to a nicety, on the basis of the rations "usually allowed an agricultural labourer." True, he "does not propose to feed the gymnasium on these lines" (210), but he nevertheless retains these rations, for after all the students will also

* "A gymnasium farm, directed by an experienced and trained manager, equipped with all modern improvements and supplied with a contingent of skilled and educated workers, should be a profitable undertaking and justify the hire of the necessary contingent of workers, some of the more deserving (sic!) of whom might be given a share in the proceeds. To a certain extent this method would probably have to be practised, especially in regard to landless peasants graduated from this gymnasium" (204).

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

gather potatoes, peas and lentils from their land, will sow hemp and sunflower for vegetable oil, and in addition, on non-fast days will receive half a pound of meat and two glasses of milk each. Don't think, reader, that Mr. Yuzhakov just touches lightly on this question, only by way of illustration. No, he has it all calculated down to the last detail—the number of calves, yearlings and two-year-olds, the maintenance of the sick, feed for poultry, and all the rest. He has forgotten neither the kitchen swill, nor the animal entrails, nor the vegetable peelings (212). Nothing is overlooked. Furthermore, clothes and footwear may be made in the gymnasium itself. "But cotton goods for underwear, bed linen, table linen and summer clothes, and more substantial material for winter clothing, and skins—if only sheepskin—for winter top clothes will, of course, have to be bought. Naturally, the teachers and other personnel and their families will have to provide their own materials, although they may be granted the services of the workshops. Properly speaking, for the students and three-year workers, this expenditure may, without stinting, be calculated at 50 rubles a year, or about 60,000 rubles for the whole establishment annually" (213).

We are positively beginning to be thrilled by the practical sense of our Narodnik. Just imagine: "we," "society," are instituting organisation of labour on such a grand scale, we are endowing the people with universal secondary education; and all this without any expenditure whatever, and with such immense moral advantages! What a splendid lesson it will be to "our" present agricultural labourers—who, in their ignorance, rudeness and boorishness, refuse to work for less than 61 rubles a year with board*—when they see labourers with a gymnasium education working for 50 rubles a year! We may be sure that even Korobochka[132] herself will agree with Mr. Yuzhakov that the theoretical basis of his plan is thoroughly "comprehensible."

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* According to the Department of Agriculture and Rural Industry, the average annual wage of an agricultural labourer employed by the year in European Russia is 61 rubles 29 kopeks (average for the ten years 1881-91), plus board, valued at 46 rubles.

V

How will the economy of the gymnasia be run, and how will they be administered? The economy, as we have already seen, will be mixed: part natural and part cash economy. Mr. Yuzhakov, of course, goes very thoroughly into this important question. On page 216, he calculates minutely, item by item, that each gymnasium will need 160,000 to 170,000 rubles in cash, so that for all the 15,000 to 20,000 gymnasia, a sum of about 3,000 million rubles will be required. Well, of course, they will sell agricultural produce and receive money in return. Our author is so provident as to take account of the general conditions of modern commodity-capitalist economy! "Gymnasia situated in the vicinity of towns or railway stations, on lines not remote from large centres, would be of an entirely different type. Vegetable and fruit growing, dairy farming and handicrafts may well replace field cultivation" (228). Trade, as we see, will be on no mean scale. Who is to run it, the author does not say. It is to be presumed that the pedagogical councils of the gymnasia will also act in part as commercial councils. Sceptics may want to know what is to happen if schools go bankrupt, and whether they are able to engage in trade at all. But that, of course, would be unwarranted cavilling: if uneducated merchants can carry on trade, can success be doubted if representatives of our intellectual society get down to the job?

The gymnasia will naturally require land for their farms. Mr. Yuzhakov writes: "I think ... that if this idea is destined to be put to practical test, for experimental purposes the first of these agricultural gymnasia should be granted plots of 6,000 to 7,000 dessiatines each" (228). For a population of 109 million—20,000 gymnasia—about 100 million dessiatines would be required. But it should not be forgotten that only 80 million persons are engaged in agricultural labour. "It is only their children who should be put through the agricultural gymnasia."

Then, various categories of the population,* amounting

* Here is a full list of these categories of fortunates who are to be exempted from the agricultural gymnasia: "people of means, people undergoing correction, Mahommedan girls, non-Russians belonging

to nearly another 8 million, will have to be excluded, which will leave 72 million. They will need only 60 million to 72 million dessiatines. "And that, of course, is a lot" (231). But Mr. Yuzhakov is not dismayed. After all, the state, too, has lots of land; only it is not very conveniently situated. "For example, in Northern Polesye there are 127,600,000 dessiatines, and here, especially if, where necessary, a system of exchanging private and even peasant land for state land were adopted with the object of placing the former at the disposal of the schools, it would very likely not be difficult to supply our agricultural gymnasia with land gratis. The situation is equally good" ... in the south-east (231). Hm ... "good"! So send them off to Archangel Gubernia! True, hitherto it has served more as a place of exile, and the state forests there for the most part have not even been "opened up"—but that's a detail. As soon as gymnasium students in the charge of learned teachers are sent there they will cut down all these forests, clear the ground, and implant civilisation!

And in the central region a system of land redemption might be arranged; after all, not more than about 80 million dessiatines are required. Issue a "guaranteed loan," the payments on which, it need scarcely be said, to be apportioned among the "gymnasia receiving free land" (232)—and the trick's done! Mr. Yuzhakov assures us that there is no need to be alarmed at the "immensity of the financial operation. It is neither a chimera nor a utopia" (232). "Actually speaking," it will be "a gilt-edged mortgage." We should say so! But, once again, why talk about a "utopia"? And

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to small nationalities, members of fanatical sects, the blind, deaf and dumb, idiots, insane, chronic inebriates, the diseased, and criminals" (231). We read this list with a clutch at the heart. Heavens, we thought, shall we manage to get at least our own kith and kin included in the list of exempted!—Under the first category, perhaps?—but no, our means will scarcely allow that. Well, we might manage with a little cunning to get the womenfolk classed as Mahommedan girls; but what about the males? The only hope is the third category. Mr. Yuzhakov's fellow contributor to the magazine Mr. Mikhailovsky, as we know, has already simply classed P. B. Struve as a non-Russian national, so perhaps he will be gracious enough to class us also at least as "non-Russians belonging to small nationalities," and so exempt our kith and kin from the agricultural gymnasia!

does Mr. Yuzhakov seriously think that our peasants are so downtrodden and ignorant as to give their consent to such a plan?? There are the redemption payments to be made for the land, and the "payments on the loan to cover inauguration expenditures,"* and to maintain the entire school, and to pay the salaries of all the teachers, and, to cap it all, in return for all this (in return for having hired paid teachers?), to perform labour service for a trifle of three years each! Isn't this going it a little too strong, Mr. Enlightened "Narodnik"? When, in 1897, you reprinted your creative effort that had appeared in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* in 1895—did you think where your characteristic Narodnik fondness for financial operations and instalment schemes would lead you? Let us recall, dear reader, that what he promised was universal education "involving no expenditure by the state, Zemstvo or people."And our financial genius really does not demand a single ruble from state or Zemstvo. But what about "the people"—or, more precisely, the *peasants without means*?** It is with their money that the land is bought, and the gymnasia inaugurated (for it is they who pay interest on and the redemption of the capital employed for the purpose), and it is they who pay the teachers and maintain all the gymnasia. And labour service in addition. What for? Because—our inexorable financier answers—you paid nothing for your education and maintenance in the junior classes (204). But, firstly, the non-working ages include only the "preparatory and first two gymnasium classes" (206)—and then come the semi-workers. And, secondly, these children, after all, are maintained by their elder brothers, who also pay the teachers for the tuition of the young. No, Mr. Yuzhakov, such a plan would be absolutely *unfeasible* not only in our day, but even in Arakcheyev's time,[133] for it is indeed a *feudal* "utopia."

Mr. Yuzhakov has very little to say about the administration of the gymnasia. It is true that he enumerates the teaching staff in great detail and appoints a salary for each, a "comparatively small" one (for they get free quarters, mainte-

* P. 216—10,000 rubles per gymnasium.

** Since those with means are excluded. Mr. Yuzhakov himself suspects that "a certain proportion of the agricultural population, too, will prefer to send their children to urban secondary schools that charge fees" (230). We should think so!

nance of their children and "half the expenditures on clothing")—50 rubles per annum, you might think? No, a little more: "the head-master, head-mistress and chief agronomist 2,400 rubles each, the inspector," etc., according to rank, descending the hierarchic ladder down to 200 rubles for minor employees (214). Not a bad career, you see, for those representatives of educated society who have "preferred" the fee-charging urban schools to the agricultural gymnasia! Pay attention to this "half the expenditures on clothing," which the teachers are guaranteed. According to our Narodnik's plan, they are to enjoy the services of the workshops (as we have already seen), in other words, the right to have their apparel sewn or repaired by the "gymnasium pupils." How solicitous Mr. Yuzhakov is—for the welfare of the teachers! However, he is also solicitous for the welfare of the "gymnasium students"—just as a good farmer is solicitous for the welfare of his cattle: they have to be fed, watered, housed and ... coupled. Listen to this:

"If ... marriage is allowed between young people who have completed the course and remain at the gymnasium for another three years ... this three-year stay will be far less onerous than military service" (207). "If marriage is allowed"!! That is, it may not be allowed? But in that case, worthy Mr. Progressivist, a new law would be required to restrict the civic rights of the peasants. But need we be surprised at this "slip of the pen"(?) on Mr. Yuzhakov's part, when all through his "utopia," amidst the most minute examination of teachers' salaries, labour service by the pupils, etc., it never once occurred to him that it might not be amiss—at any rate in the "utopia"—to allow a certain share in administering the "gymnasium" and in managing the farm to the "pupils" themselves, who, after all, maintain the whole establishment and are graduated from it at from 23 to 25 years of age; that they are not only "gymnasium pupils," but also *citizens*. Our Narodnik forgot all about this trifle! But on the other hand, he went very thoroughly into the problem of "pupils" guilty of bad conduct. "A fourth type" (of gymnasium) "would have to be instituted for students who have been expelled from the ordinary schools for bad conduct. Since it is obligatory for the whole younger generation to undergo a course of secondary education, it would

be irrational to release students from it on the ground of bad conduct. In the upper classes, this might be a direct temptation and stimulus to bad conduct." (Believe it or not, that is what is printed on page 229!!) "The institution of special gymnasia for students expelled for bad conduct would be a logical complement to the whole system." They would be called "corrective gymnasia" (230).

Is it not incomparable, this "educational utopia" in the Russian taste, with its corrective gymnasia for ruffians who may be "tempted" by the prospect of obtaining "release"—from education!?

VI

The reader perhaps has not forgotten a certain project for the direction of industry which was rightly described as a revival of mercantilism,[134] as a project for a "bourgeois-bureaucratic-socialist organisation of home industry"[135] (p. 238). To describe Mr. Yuzhakov's "plan" an even more complex term is required. It has to be called a *feudal-bureaucratic-bourgeois-socialist* experiment. A rather clumsy, four-storeyed term—but what would you have? The plan itself is clumsy. But, on the other hand, this term *accurately* conveys all the characteristic features of Mr. Yuzhakov's "utopia." Let us begin the examination from the fourth storey. "One of the chief features of the *scientific* conception of socialism is the planned regulation of social production," quite rightly remarks the author just quoted.* This feature is to be found in the "utopia," since the enterprise of tens of millions of workers is to be organised in advance according to one general plan. The bourgeois character of the utopia is beyond doubt: firstly, according to Mr. Yuzhakov's "plan," the secondary school *remains a class school.* And this after all the pompous phrases poured out by Mr. Yuzhakov "against" the class school in his first article!! One school for the rich, another for the poor, if you have money, pay for tuition—if you have not, work! More: the schools for the rich, as we saw, are to retain their "present form." In the present secondary schools of the Ministry of Public Education, for example, the tuition fees cover only 28.7% of the total expenditures; 40.0% is sup-

* *Novoye Slovo*, April 1897. Review of Home Affairs.

plied by the treasury; 21.8% by donations from individuals, institutions and societies; 3.1% is derived from interest on capital, and 6.4% from other sources *(Productive Forces*, Section XIX, p. 35). Mr. Yuzhakov, therefore, *has accentuated* the class character of the secondary schools *as compared with what now exists*: according to his "plan," the rich will pay only 28.7% of the cost of their tuition, while the poor will pay the *total* cost of theirs, and perform labour service into the bargain! Not bad for a "Narodnik" utopia! Secondly, the plan envisages the hire of winter workers by the gymnasia, especially from among landless peasants. Thirdly, the distinction between town and country—that foundation of the social division of labour—is retained. Since Mr. Yuzhakov is introducing the planned organisation of social labour, since he is devising a "utopia" for the combination of education and productive labour, the retention of this distinction is absurd, and shows that our author has not the slightest conception of the subject he has undertaken to discuss. Not only did the "teachers" of the present-day disciples criticise this absurdity in their writings, but so did the old utopians, and even our great Russian utopian.[136] But that is nothing to Mr. Yuzhakov! Fourthly—and this is the major reason for calling this "utopia" a bourgeois one—*side by side* with attempting the planned organisation of social production, it proposes to retain commodity production. The gymnasia will produce for the *market*. Consequently, social production will be governed by the laws of the market, to which the "gymnasia" will also have to submit! But that is nothing to Mr. Yuzhakov! Where do you get the idea, he will no doubt say, that production will be governed by certain laws of the market? Sheer nonsense! Production will be governed by the orders of the worthy directors of the agricultural schools, and not by the laws of the market. Voilà tout. Of the purely bureaucratic structure of Mr. Yuzhakov's utopian gymnasia we have already spoken. The "Educational Utopia," it is to be hoped, will do a useful service by showing the Russian reading public the full profundity of the "democracy of our contemporary Narodniks. The feudal feature in Mr. Yuzhakov's "plan" is the labour service to be rendered by the poor in return for tuition. Had this sort of project been drafted by a consistent bourgeois, it would have contained

neither a first nor a second storey, and it would have been far superior to this Narodnik utopia, and far more useful. Labour service is the economic essence of the serf system. In capitalist society, a man who has no means has to sell his labour-power in order to buy the means of subsistence. In feudal society, a man who has no means has to perform labour service in return for the means of subsistence he receives from his lord. Labour service necessarily means that the one who performs it is compelled to work, has fewer rights; it involves what the author of *Das Kapital* called "ausserökonomischer Zwang"* (III, 2, 324). Hence, in Russia as well, inasmuch as labour service still survives, a necessary complement to it is the peasant's inferiority in respect of civic rights—the fact of his being tied to the land, corporal punishment, and the right to assign him to compulsory labour. Mr. Yuzhakov does not understand this connection between labour service and inferiority of rights, but the shrewd sense of a "practical" man suggested to him that, since the gymnasium students will have to perform labour service, it will not be amiss to introduce corrective gymnasia for those who dare try to avoid education; and that adult "student" workers should be kept in the position of little schoolboys.

It would be interesting to know why our utopian needed the first three storeys of his creation? Had he left only the fourth, not a word of objection could have been raised, for, after all, the man himself told us frankly and in advance that he was writing a "utopia"! But here his Kleinbürger nature betrayed him. On the one hand, a "utopia" is a good thing, but, on the other, teachers' salaries for our worthy intellectuals are not a bad thing either. On the one hand, we have "no expenditure for the people," but, on the other—no, friend, just you pay the interest and return the debt in full, and do three years' labour service in the bargain! On the one hand, we have grandiloquent declamations on the danger and harm of class division, while, on the other, a purely class "utopia." Such perpetual vacillations between the old and the now, such curious claims to reach above one's own stature, that is, to rise superior to all classes, are the essence of every Kleinbürger outlook.

* * *

* Other than economic pressure.

Are you familiar, reader, with Mr. Sergei Sharapov's *The Russian Farmer. Some Thoughts on the Organisation of Farming in Russia on New Lines* (free supplement to the magazine *Sever*[137] for 1894), St .Petersburg, 1894? We would strongly recommend *Russkoye Bogatstvo* contributors in general, and Mr. Yuzhakov in particular, to acquaint themselves with it. The first chapter is entitled: "Moral Conditions for Russian Farming." Here the author rehashes ideas very much akin to those of "Narodism"—that Russia and the West differ radically, that pure commercial calculation prevails in the West, and that there masters and workers are not preoccupied with moral questions. Here, in Russia, on the contrary, thanks to the allocation of land to the peasants in 1861 "their existence has acquired an aim entirely different from that in the West" (8). "Our peasant who has obtained land has acquired an independent aim in life." In a word, sanction was given to people's production—as Mr. Nikolai —on put it far more plainly. The landlord in our country—Mr. Sharapov goes on to develop his idea—is interested in the peasant's welfare because this peasant cultivates the landlord's estate with his own implements. "His" (the landlord's) "calculations include not only the profit he personally derives from his enterprise, but also a *moral*, or rather a *psychological*, *element*" (12, author's italics). And Mr. Sharapov declares with fervour (not inferior to that of Mr. Yuzhakov's) that capitalism in our country is impossible. What is possible, and necessary, in our country is not capitalism, but an "alliance of lord and muzhik" (the title of chapter II of Mr. Sharapov's book). "Economy should be based on a close solidarity between lord and muzhik" (25): it is the duty of the lord to spread enlightenment, and of the muzhik—well, the duty of the muzhik, of course, is to work! And so he, Mr. Sergei Sharapov, "after repeated and painful mistakes," at last established on his own estate the "said alliance between lord and muzhik" (26). He introduced a rational crop rotation, etc., etc., and concluded a contract with the peasants, under which the latter receive meadows, pasture and arable from the landlord, and also seed for so many dessiatines, etc. The peasants, on their part, undertake to do all the work on the landlord's farm (to cart manure, spread phosphates, plough, sow, reap, carry the sheaves to "my barn," thresh, etc., etc., so many dessiatines of each crop),

and over and above this to pay, at first 600 rubles, then 800, 850, 1,100, and finally 1,200 rubles (i.e., an annual increment). These sums are payable in instalments—coinciding with the dates of payment of interest into the Nobles' Bank (36, et seq.). It goes without saying that the author is a "convinced supporter of the village community" (37). We say, "it goes without saying," because such farms would be impossible without laws that tie the peasants to their allotments and that secure the peasant community's exclusiveness as a social estate. Mr. Sharapov is guaranteed the due receipt of payments from the peasants by the existence of a "prohibition on the sale of produce without his consent, which makes it incumbent on them to store everything in my barns" (36). Since it would be extremely difficult to exact payment from the poor peasants, Mr. Sharapov has arranged to receive it from the rich peasants: these rich peasants themselves select a group of weaker ones, form an artel and place themselves at the head of it (38), and pay the landlord with great promptitude, inasmuch as they can always get back what is due from the poor peasants when they sell the produce (39). "It is very hard for many of the poor peasants, especially those with small families, to work for me. It is a very big strain on them, but evasion is out of the question, for the peasants would refuse to accept the cattle of a defaulting householder into the herd. Nor would I, the peasants would insist on that, and willy-nilly the poor peasant has to work. That, of course, is compulsion in a way, but do you know what the effect is? A year or two of renting land, and the poor peasant has paid off his arrears of taxes, has redeemed his things from pawn, finds himself in possession of money, begins to rebuild his cottage and—lo and behold! he has ceased to be a poor peasant" (39). And Mr. Sharapov "points with pride" to the fact that "his" peasants (he keeps referring to them as "my peasants") are flourishing, that he is spreading enlightenment, introducing clover, phosphates, and so on, whereas "left to themselves, the peasants would have done nothing" (35). "All the work, moreover, has to be done at my orders and instructions. I decide on the time for sowing, manuring and reaping. All summer, serfdom is practically restored—except, of course, that there is no manhandling and no floggings in the stable" (p. 29).

As you see, Mr. Sharapov, the blunt squire, is a little more outspoken than Mr. Yuzhakov, the enlightened publicist. But is there much difference between the types of farming on the estate of the former and in the utopia of the latter? In both cases the whole essence lies in labour service; in both cases we have *compulsion*, either by the pressure of the rich men who dominate the "village community," or the threat of being consigned to a corrective gymnasium. The reader may object that Mr. Sharapov runs his farm for profit, whereas the officials in Mr. Yuzhakov's utopia do so from zeal for the common good. One moment. Mr. Sharapov says outright that he farms from moral motives, that he surrenders half the proceeds to the peasants, and so on; and we have neither the reason nor the right to believe him less than Mr. Yuzhakov, who, after all, also provides his utopian teachers with by no means utopian "lucrative posts." And if some landlord follows Mr. Yuzhakov's advice and lets his land be used as an agricultural gymnasium, and receives interest from the "students" for payment into the Nobles' Bank (a "gilt-edged mortgage," in Mr. Yuzhakov's own words), the difference will practically disappear. Of course, a tremendous difference in "educational problems" still remains—but, heavens, would not Mr. Sergei Sharapov prefer to hire educated labourers at 50 rubles than uneducated ones at 60 rubles?

And so, if Mr. Manuilov does not understand even now why the Russian (and not only the Russian) disciples consider it necessary, in the interests of labour, to support consistent bourgeois people and consistent bourgeois ideas, as *against* those survivals of the past which are responsible for farms like Mr. Sharapov's and "utopias" like Mr. Yuzhakov's, then, we must confess, it is difficult even to argue with him, for we are evidently talking different languages. Mr. Manuilov presumably reasons on the lines of the celebrated recipe of the celebrated Mr. Mikhailovsky: take what is good from here and from there—like Gogol's young lady,[138] who wanted to take the nose from one suitor and stick it above the chin of another. To us, however, it seems that such reasoning is nothing but the Kleinbürger's comic effort to rise superior to the definite classes that have fully evolved in our midst and that have assumed quite a definite place in the process of historical development going on before our eyes. The "uto-

pias" naturally and inevitably engendered by such reasoning are, however, no longer comic, but harmful, especially when they lead to utterly unbridled bureaucratic inventions. For quite understandable reasons this phenomenon is to be met with in Russia with particular frequency; but it is not confined to Russia. Not for nothing did Antonio Labriola, in his excellent book *Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l'histoire* (Paris, Giard et Brière, 1897), say in reference to Prussia, that the pernicious forms of utopia against which the "teachers" fought half a century ago have now been supplemented by one other: "a bureaucratic and fiscal utopia, a utopia of cretins" (l'utopie bureaucratique et fiscale, l'utopie des crétins. Page 105, note).

VII

In conclusion, let us revert once more to educational problems, but not to Mr. Yuzhakov's book, which has that title. It has already been remarked that this title is too broad, for educational problems are by no means identical with questions of schooling; education is not confined to schooling. Had Mr. Yuzhakov really dealt with "educational problems" from the standpoint of principle, and examined the relations between the various classes, he could not have avoided the part played by Russia's capitalist development in the matter of educating the labouring masses. This problem was touched upon by another *Russkoye Bogatstvo* contributor, Mr. Mikhailovsky, in No. 11, 1897. Writing in reference to the statement by Mr. Novus[139] that Marx did not fear, and rightly so, to speak of the "idiocy of rural life,"[140] and considered it one of the merits of capitalism and of the bourgeoisie that they had "rescued" a considerable part of the population from this "idiocy," Mr. Mikhailovsky says:

"I do not know where Marx used this coarse (?) expression" —a characteristic confession that he is not acquainted with one of Marx's cardinal writings (*Manifesto*)! But what follows is even more characteristic: "...but it has long been known that there is no need to break furniture even if Alexander the Great was a hero. Generally speaking, Marx was unfastidious in his expressions, and, of course, to imitate him in

this respect would be, to say the least, unwise. But even so, I am certain" (hear, hear!) "that this expression was simply a boutade on Marx's part. And if the generation that worried so much, along with Mr. Zlatovratsky, over the intricate problems of rural life suffered much woe in vain, no less—though different—is the woe of the generation being educated in a spirit of contempt for the idiocy of rural life'" (p. 139)....

It is highly characteristic of Mr. Mikhailovsky that, having proclaimed his agreement with Marx's economic doctrine time and again, he is so utterly ignorant of this doctrine as to express the "certainty" that the words of Marx quoted by Novus were due simply to his being carried away, simply to an unfastidious choice of expressions, and were simply a boutade! No, Mr. Mikhailovsky, you are grievously mistaken. These words of Marx are no boutade, but an expression of one of the most cardinal and fundamental features of his whole outlook, both theoretical and practical. These words clearly express a recognition of the *progressive nature* of the diversion of the population from agriculture to industry, from country to town, one of the most characteristic features of capitalist development, that is to be observed both in the West and in Russia. In my article, "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism," I have already had occasion to show how important is this view of Marx's, which has been adopted by all the "disciples," and how sharply contradictory it is to absolutely all romantic theories, ranging from those of old Sismondi to those of Mr. N. —on. There I pointed out (p. 39[141]) that this view is also quite definitely expressed by Marx in *Das Kapital* (I. Band, 2-te Aufl., S. 527-28[142]), and by Engels in his *Condition of the Working Class in England*. To this might be added Marx's *Der Achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* (Hamb. 1885. Cf. S. 98[143]).* Both these

* Mr. Novus could not have guessed, of course, that Mr. Mikhailovsky was so ignorant of the works of Marx, or else he would have quoted the passage in full: Die Bourgeoisie hat das Land der Herrschaft der Stadt unterworfen. Sie hat enorme Städte geschaflen, sie hat die Zahl der städtischen Bevölkerung gegenüber der ländlichen in hohem Grade vermehrt und so einen bedeutenden Theil der Bevölkerung dem Idiotismus des Landlebens entrissen. (The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared

writers expressed their views on this subject at such length, repeated them so often on the most varied occasions, that it could only have occurred to a man who is absolutely unfamiliar with their teachings to declare that the word "idiocy" in the passage quoted is simply a piece of "coarseness" and a "boutade." Lastly, Mr. Mikhailovsky might also have recalled the fact that all these writers' followers have expressed themselves on a large number of practical issues in the spirit of this doctrine, advocating, for example, complete freedom of movement, and protesting against plans to endow the worker with a plot of land or a house of his own, and the like.

Further, in the tirade we have quoted, Mr. Mikhailovsky accuses Novus and his supporters of educating the present generation "in a spirit of contempt for the idiocy of rural life." *This is not true*. The "disciples" would, of course, be deserving of censure if they were "contemptuous" of rural inhabitants, crushed as they are by want and ignorance, but Mr. Mikhailovsky could not prove a single one of them guilty of such an attitude. While speaking of the "idiocy of rural life," the disciples at the same time point the way out of this state of affairs opened up by the development of capitalism. Let us repeat what we said above in the article on economic romanticism: "If the predominance of the town is necessarily so, only the attraction of the population to the towns can neutralise (and, as history shows, does in fact neutralise) the one-sided character of this predominance. If the town necessarily gains for itself a privileged position, only the influx of the village population into the towns, only this mingling and merging of the agricultural with the non-agricultural population can lift the rural population out of its helplessness. Therefore, in reply to the reactionary complaints and lamentations of the romanticists, the modern theory indicates exactly how this narrowing of the gap between the conditions of life of the agricultural and of the non-agricultural population creates the conditions for eliminating the distinction between town and country."*

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with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.—*Manifesto of the Communist Party*.—*Ed*.)

* See p. 229 in this book.—*Ed*.

This is not a contemptuous attitude towards the "idiocy of rural life" at all, but a desire to find a way out of it. The only "contempt" that follows from these views is towards the doctrines which recommend "seeking paths for the fatherland," instead of seeking a way out along the *existing* path and its further course.

The difference between the Narodniks and the "disciples" as to the significance of the process of diversion of population from agriculture to industry is a difference in solving the *practical issues* connected with this process, and not only in theoretical principles and in assessing the facts of Russian history and realities. The "disciples" naturally insist on the need for abolishing all the antiquated restrictions on peasant travel and migration from the countryside to the towns, whereas the Narodniks either openly uphold these restrictions, or cautiously avoid the subject altogether (which in practice amounts to the same thing). This example, too, might have helped Mr. Manuilov to understand the, to him, astonishing fact that the "disciples" express their solidarity with spokesmen of the bourgeoisie. A consistent bourgeois will always stand for the abolition of these restrictions on movement—and as far as the worker is concerned, his most vital interests demand their abolition. Hence, solidarity between them is quite natural and inevitable. On the other hand, the agrarians (big and small, down to the enterprising muzhik inclusive) find this process of diversion of population to industry a disadvantage, and zealously try to retard it, having Narodnik theories to back them.

To conclude: on this great question of the diversion of the population from agriculture by capitalism, Mr. Mikhailovsky betrayed a complete misunderstanding of Marx's teachings, and avoided the issue of the difference between the Russian "disciples" and the Narodniks both on the theoretical and practical aspects of the question, with the help of meaningless phrases.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE HERITAGE WE RENOUNCE[144]

Written in exile at the end of 1897

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Referring, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, 1897, to a comment by Mr. Minsky on the "dialectical materialists," Mr. Mikhailovsky says: "He" (Mr. Minsky) "must know that these people do not acknowledge any continuity with the past and emphatically renounce the heritage" (p. 179)—that is, the "heritage of the 1860-70s," which Mr. V. Rozanov solemnly renounced in 1891 in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (p. 178).

Mr. Mikhailovsky's statement about the "Russian disciples" is a falsehood. True, he is not the only, and not the independent, author of the falsehood that "the Russian disciples renounce the heritage"—it has been reiterated for quite a long time now by practically all the representatives of the liberal-Narodnik press when fighting the "disciples." As far as we remember, when Mr. Mikhailovsky began his fierce war on the "disciples" he had not yet invented this falsehood but others had done so before him. Later he, too, chose to seize upon it. The further the "disciples" developed their views in Russian literature, the more minutely and thoroughly they set forth their opinions on a number of issues, both theoretical and practical, the more rarely did one find the hostile press objecting in substance to the fundamental tenets of the new trend, to the view that Russian capitalism is progressive, that the Narodnik idealisation of the small producer is absurd, that the explanation of trends of social thought and of legal and political institutions must be sought in the material interests of the various classes of Russian society. These fundamental tenets were hushed up,

it was—and still is—thought best to say nothing about them, but fabrications to discredit the new trend were concocted with all the greater fertility. One of these fabrications—"shabby fabrications"—is the modish phrase that "the Russian disciples renounce the heritage," that they have broken with the best traditions of the best, the most progressive section of Russian society, that they have severed the democratic thread, etc., etc., and all the many other ways in which this is expressed. The fact that such phrases are so widely used prompts us to undertake a detailed examination and refutation of them. In order that our exposition may not appear unsupported, we shall begin by drawing an historico-literary parallel between two "essayists of the countryside," chosen in order to describe the "heritage." Let us say in advance that we shall confine ourselves exclusively to economic and social questions, that of the "heritage," we shall examine only these, leaving aside philosophical, literary, aesthetic and other problems.

I

ONE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "HERITAGE"

Thirty years ago, in 1861, *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*[145] began publishing a series of essays by Skaldin, under the title *In the Backwoods and in the Capital*. The essays appeared over a period of three years, 1867-69. In 1870 the author gathered them together in a single volume bearing the same title.* A perusal of this book, now almost forgotten, is extremely instructive from the angle of the subject under discussion, i.e., the relation in which the representatives of the "heritage" stand to the Narodniks and the "Russian disciples." The title of the book is inaccurate. The author himself was conscious of this, and he explains in a foreword that his theme is the attitude of the "capital" to the "countryside," in other words, that his book is a series of social essays on rural conditions, and that he does not propose to

* Skaldin, *In the Backwoods and in the Capital*, St. Petersburg, 1870 (p. 451). We have not been able to obtain copies of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* for this period and have used only the book.

speak of the capital specifically. Or rather, he might have proposed to do so, but does not find it expedient: ὡς δύναμαι—οὐ βούλομαι, ὡς δὲ βούλομαι—οὐ δύναμαι (for I will not write as I may, and may not write as I will), Skaldin says, borrowing the words of a Greek writer to explain the inexpediency.

Let us give a brief exposition of Skaldin's views.

We shall begin with the peasant Reform[146]—that initial point from which all who wish to expound their general views on economic and social problems must, even to this day, inevitably begin. Very much space is devoted to the peasant Reform in Skaldin's book. He was perhaps the first writer who—on a broad basis of fact and a detailed examination of all aspects of life in the countryside—systematically showed the poverty-stricken state of the peasants *after* the Reform, the deterioration of their conditions, the new forms of their subjection, economic, legal and in daily life—the first, in a word, to show all that has since been elucidated and demonstrated in such detail and thoroughness in numerous investigations and surveys. Today all these truths are no longer new. At that time they were not only new, but aroused distrust in liberal society, which feared that behind these references to the so-called "defects of the Reform" lurked a condemnation of it and concealed support for serfdom . Skaldin's views are the more interesting because he was a contemporary of the Reform (and even perhaps had a hand in it. We have no historical or literary information or biographical data about him at our disposal). Consequently, his views are based on direct observation both of the "capital" and the "countryside" of the time, and not on an armchair study of printed material.

What first of all strikes the contemporary reader, who is accustomed to the Narodniks' sickly gushing over the peasant Reform, is the extreme *sobriety* of Skaldin's views on the subject. He looks at the Reform without any illusions or idealisation; he sees it as a transaction between two parties, the landlords and the peasants, who until then had used the land in common on definite terms and now had divided it, the division being accompanied by a change in the legal status of both parties. The factor which determined the mode of division and the size of the share of each party was their

respective interests. These interests determined the ambitions of both parties, while the fact that one of them was able to have a direct hand in the Reform itself, and in the practical working-out of the various questions connected with its implementation, determined, among other things, that party's dominant position. That is how Skaldin understands the Reform. He dwells in particular detail on the principal question of the Reform, the allotments and land redemption payments, reverting to it time and again in the course of his essays. (Skaldin's book is divided into eleven essays, each of them self-contained, their form reminding one of letters from the countryside. The first essay is dated 1866, and the last, 1869.) It goes without saying that on the subject of the so-called "land-poor" peasants, there is nothing in Skaldin's book that is new to the contemporary reader, but at the end of the sixties his testimony was both new and valuable. We shall not, of course, recapitulate it, but shall only remark on that feature of his description of the facts which distinguishes him—to his advantage—from the Narodniks. Skaldin does not talk about "land poverty," but about the "excessive amount of land cut off from the peasants' allotments" (p. 213, also p. 214 and many other places; cf. title of the third essay), and says that the largest allotments established by the Regulations[147] proved to be smaller than those they had before (p. 257), incidentally citing some extremely characteristic and typical opinions of peasants on this aspect of the Reform.* Skaldin's explanations and proofs of this fact are very circumstantial, forceful and even vehement for a writer who as a rule is extremely moderate and temperate, and whose general outlook is undoubtedly bourgeois. The fact, then, must have been too starkly evident, if such a writer as Skaldin speaks of it so emphatically. Skaldin also speaks very emphatically and circumstantially of the severe burden of the payments, and supports his statements with

* "'Our land has been so trimmed down by *him*'"(author's italics) "'that we can't live without this cut-off land; he has surrounded us on all sides with his fields and we have nowhere to pasture our cattle; so you have to pay for your allotment, and on top of that you have to pay for the cut-off land, just as much as he asks.'" "'How does that better us?' said one literate and experienced muzhik, a former quit-renter. 'We are paying the same quit-rent as before, though our land has been trimmed down.'"

many facts. "Inordinate taxation," reads a sub-title to the third essay (1867), "is the chief cause of their" (the peasants') "poverty," and Skaldin shows that taxation is higher than the peasants' returns from the land, and he cites from the *Proceedings of the Commission on Taxation* data relative to the incidence of taxation of the upper and lower classes in Russia which show that 76% of the taxation falls on the lower classes and 17% on the upper, whereas in Western Europe the correlation is everywhere incomparably more favourable to the lower classes. A sub-title to the seventh essay (1868) reads, "Excessive money dues are one of the chief causes of poverty among the peasants," and the author shows that the new conditions of life at once demanded money, money and more money of the peasant, that the Regulation made it a principle to compensate the landlords for the abolition of serfdom as well (252), and that the amount of the quit-rent was based "on sworn information supplied by the landlords, their stewards and village elders, that is, on absolutely arbitrary data not deserving of the slightest credence" (255), in consequence of which the average quit-rents computed by the commissions were higher than the existing average quit-rents. "Added to the burden of quit-rent borne by the peasants was the loss of land which they had used for centuries" (258). "Had the redemption price of the land not been assessed on the basis of the capitalised amount of the quit-rents, but on the basis of its actual value at the time of the emancipation, the redemption could have been paid off very easily and would not even have required the assistance of the government, or the issue of credit certificates" (264). "Redemption, which was designed by the Regulation of February 19 to make things easier for the peasants and to consummate the work of improving their conditions, in reality often has the effect of putting them into even more straitened circumstances" (269). We cite these excerpts—which, in themselves, are of little interest and are in part out-of-date—in order to show how energetically the peasants' interests were defended by a writer who was hostile to the village community and whose opinions on a whole number of questions were those of a true member of the Manchester School. It is very instructive to note that nearly all the useful and non-reactionary precepts of

Narodism fully coincide with those of this Mancunian. It goes without saying that, such being Skaldin's opinion of the Reform, he could not possibly sentimentally idealise it in the way the Narodniks did, and still do, when they say that it sanctioned people's production, that it was superior to the West-European peasant reforms, that it made a tabula rasa of Russia, and so on. Skaldin did not and could not say anything of the kind; further, he said plainly that in our country peasant Reform was less advantageous, less beneficial to the peasants than in the West. "The question will be put plainly," he wrote, "if we ask ourselves why the beneficial consequences of the emancipation in our country are not growing with the steady speed with which they did, say, in Prussia or Saxony in the first quarter of the present century" (221). "In Prussia, and throughout Germany, the peasants paid not for the redemption of their allotments, which had long been recognised as their property by law, but for the redemption of their compulsory services to the landlords" (272).

Let us now pass from the economic to the legal aspect of the Reform, as Skaldin sees it. Skaldin is a bitter foe of collective responsibility, of the passport system, and of the patriarchal power of the peasant "community" (and of the urban community) over its members. In the third essay (1867) he insists on the abolition of collective responsibility, the poll tax and the passport system, on the necessity for an equitable property tax, and on the replacement of passports by free and permanent certificates. "In no other civilised country is there a tax on internal passports" (109). We know that this tax was only abolished in 1897. In the title to the fourth essay, we read: "arbitrary actions of village communities and urban dumas in sending out passports and levying taxes on absentee payers."... "Collective responsibility is a heavy burden which efficient and industrious husbandmen have to bear on account of idlers and wastrels" (126). Skaldin is disposed to attribute the differentiation of the peasantry, which was already to be observed at that time, to the personal qualities of those who get on or go under. He describes in detail the difficulties peasants living in St. Petersburg experience in obtaining or prolonging passports, and repudiates those who would retort that "thank God, all this multitude of landless peasants have not been regis-

tered in the towns, have not increased the numbers of propertyless town-dwellers" (130).... "This barbarous collective responsibility..." (131). ... "Can people placed in such a position be called free citizens? Are they not the same old glebae adscripti?*" (132). The peasant Reform is blamed. "But is the peasant Reform to blame for the fact that the law, having released the peasant from his bond to the landlord has devised nothing to deliver him from his bond to his community and place of registration?... Where are the attributes of civil liberty, if the peasant is not free to decide either his place of domicile or manner of occupation?" (132). Skaldin very accurately and aptly calls our peasant a "settled proletarian" (231).** In the heading to the eighth essay (1868) we read: "the fact that the peasants are tied to their communities and allotments prevents improvement of their conditions.... It is an obstacle to the development of outside industries." "Apart from the ignorance of the peasants and the burden of progressively mounting taxation, one of the causes retarding the development of peasant labour and, consequently, of peasant prosperity, is the fact that they are tied to their communities and allotments. The tying of the labourer to one place and the shackling of the rural community in unbreakable fetters—this in itself is an extremely unfavourable condition for the development of labour, private enterprise and small landed property" (284). "Bound to their allotments and communities, and unable to apply their labour where it would be more productive and of greater advantage to themselves, the peasants are, as it were, frozen in that congested, herdlike, unproductive form of life in which they emerged from serfdom" (285).

* Peasants in the Roman Empire were bound to definite plots of land which they could not abandon however unprofitable their cultivation might be.—*Ed.*

** Skaldin very circumstantially demonstrates the correctness not only of the first, but also of the second part of this definition (proletarian). He devotes much space in his essays to a description of the peasants' dependent status and their poverty, to a description of the hard lot of the agricultural labourer, to a "description of the 1868 famine" (heading of the fifth essay) and of the diverse forms of peasant bondage and humiliation. There were people in the sixties as there are in the nineties, who sought to hush up or deny the existence of famine. Skaldin passionately opposes them. It would of course be superfluous to give detailed excerpts on this point.

Skaldin, consequently, regards these aspects of peasant life from the purely bourgeois standpoint, but in spite of that (and, perhaps, because of it), his assessment of the harm caused to all social development and to the peasants themselves by the fact that the latter are tied down is very accurate. And it causes particular harm (let us add) to the lowest sections of the peasantry, the rural proletariat. Skaldin says very aptly: "the concern of the law that the peasants shall not remain without land is admirable; but it should not be forgotten that the concern of the peasants themselves on this score is incomparably greater than that of any legislator" (286). "Apart from the fact that the peasant is bound to his allotment and his community, even his temporary departure to earn something elsewhere involves considerable difficulty and expense, owing to collective responsibility and the passport system" (298). "For many peasants, in my opinion, a way out of their difficult situation would be opened if ... measures were taken to make it easier for peasants to give up their land" (294). Here Skaldin is expressing a wish that runs sharply counter to the Narodnik projects, which all tend in the very opposite direction, namely, to perpetuate the village community, to make the allotments inalienable, etc. There has been ample evidence since then to show that Skaldin was perfectly right: the fact that the peasant remains tied to the land, and that the peasant community is an exclusive social estate only worsens the position of the rural proletariat and retards the country's economic development, while being unable in any degree to protect the "settled proletarian" from the worst forms of bondage and subjection, or from the decline of his wages and living standards to the very lowest level.

The reader may have already seen from the above-quoted excerpts that Skaldin is a foe of the village community. He objects to the community and to land redistribution because he favours private property, enterprise and so on (p. 142, et seq.). To the defenders of the village community Skaldin retorts that "the ancient common law" has outlived its day. "In all countries," he writes, "as the rural dwellers came into contact with a civilised environment, their common law lost its primeval purity and became subject to corruption and distortion. The same is to be observed in our coun-

try: the power of the community is gradually being turned into the power of the village exploiters and rural clerks and, instead of protecting the person of the peasant, is a heavy burden upon him" (143)—a very true observation, corroborated by endless facts in these thirty years. In Skaldin's opinion, "the patriarchal family, communal ownership of the land and common law" have been irrevocably condemned by history. "Those who would preserve these venerable monuments of past centuries for us in perpetuity, show thereby that they are more capable of being carried away by an idea than of penetrating into realities and grasping the irresistible march of history" (162), and to this correct observation Skaldin adds hot Manchester School philippics. "Community land tenure," he says elsewhere, "places every peasant in slavish subjection to the whole community" (222). Therefore, Skaldin's unreserved hostility to the village community from the purely bourgeois standpoint is combined with his consistent defence of the peasants' interests. Hostile though he is to the village community, Skaldin does not advance foolish projects for forcibly abolishing the community and forcibly introducing some other, similar system of land ownership, such as are usually concocted by the present-day opponents of the village community, who favour gross interferences in the peasants' life and attack the village community from anything but the standpoint of the peasants' interests. Skaldin, on the contrary, strongly protests against being classed with the believers in "forcible abolition of communal land tenure" (144). "The Regulation of February 19," he says, "very wisely left it to the peasants themselves ... to pass ... from communal to family tenure. Indeed, none but the peasants themselves can properly decide the best time for such passage." Consequently, Skaldin is opposed to the village community only for the reason that it hampers economic development, prevents the peasant from withdrawing from the community and giving up his land, that is, for the same reason that the "Russian disciples" are opposed to it today; this hostility has nothing in common with defence of the selfish interests of the landlords, with defence of the survivals and the spirit of serfdom, with advocacy of interference in the life of the peasants. It is very important to note this difference, because the present-day

Narodniks, who are accustomed to seeing enemies of the village community only in the camp of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* and the like, very willingly pretend to be oblivious to *any other* kind of hostility to the village community.

Skaldin's general opinion about the causes of the peasants' distressed condition is that they are all survivals of serfdom. Describing the famine of 1868, he remarks that the serf-owners pointed to it with malicious glee, ascribing it to the dissoluteness of the peasants, to the abolition of the landlords' tutelage, and so on. Skaldin heatedly refutes these views. "The causes of the impoverishment of the peasants," he says, "*were inherited from serfdom* (212), and are not the result of its abolition; they are the general causes which keep the majority of our peasants at a level bordering on that of the proletariat"—and he repeats the above-quoted opinions of the Reform. It is absurd to attack the family division of the land: "Even if divisions do injure the peasants' material interests for a while, they save their personal freedom and the moral dignity of the peasant family, that is, those higher human blessings without which no civil progress is possible" (217), and Skaldin rightly points to the real reasons for the campaign against land divisions: "many landlords highly exaggerate the harm caused by divisions, blaming them, as well as drunkenness, for all the consequences of the various causes of the peasants' poverty, which the landlords are so unwilling to recognise" (218). To those who say that much is being written today about the peasants' poverty, but that formerly it was not so and that therefore the peasants' conditions must have deteriorated, Skaldin replies that: "In order to form a judgement of the results of the peasants' emancipation from the landlords' power, by comparing the peasants' present with their former condition, it would have been necessary, while serfdom still prevailed, to trim down the peasants' allotments as they have been now trimmed down, and to tax the peasants with all the duties which have appeared since the emancipation, and then see how the peasant serfs would have borne such conditions" (219). It is a supremely characteristic and important feature of Skaldin's views that he reduces *all* the causes of the deterioration in the peasants' condition to survivals of serfdom, to its legacy of labour service, quit-

rent, cut-off land, and the peasants' lack of rights, and immobility. Skaldin not only does not see that the causes of the peasants' impoverishment might be found in the very structure of the new socio-economic relations, in the very structure of the post-Reform economy; he absolutely refuses to entertain the thought, being profoundly convinced that the complete abolition of all these survivals of serfdom would usher in an era of universal well-being. His views, in fact, are negative: remove the obstacles to the free development of the peasantry, remove the shackles bequeathed by serfdom, and everything will be for the best in this best of possible worlds. Skaldin writes: "Here" (i.e., in relation to the peasantry) "there is only one course the government can follow: *to eliminate* steadily and unflaggingly *the causes* which have reduced our peasants to their present state of dullness and poverty and which do not allow them to rise to their feet" (224, my italics). Highly characteristic in this respect is the reply given by Skaldin to those who defend the "community" (that is, binding the peasants to the village communities and allotments) on the ground that, without it, "a rural proletariat will emerge." "This objection," Skaldin says, "falls to the ground when we remember what boundless tracts of land lie idle in our country from lack of hands to cultivate them. If the law did not hamper the natural distribution of manpower, the only people who would be real proletarians in Russia would be the professional beggars or the incorrigibly vicious and dissipated" (144)—the typical view of the eighteenth-century economists and "enlighteners," who believed that abolition of serfdom and all its survivals would usher in a reign of universal well-being on earth. The Narodnik would no doubt look down on Skaldin with disdain and say that he was simply a bourgeois. Yes, of course, Skaldin was a bourgeois, but he was a representative of the progressive bourgeois ideology which the Narodniks have replaced by one that is petty-bourgeois and, on a whole number of points, reactionary. And this "bourgeois" had a better idea than the Narodnik of how to defend those practical and real interests of the peasants which coincided, and coincide now, with the requirements of social development generally!*

* And vice versa, all the progressive practical measures that we find the Narodniks advocating are, in substance, *fully bourgeois*,

To complete our account of Skaldin's views, let us add that he is opposed to the system of social estates, advocates a single court of justice for all of them, sympathises "theoretically" with the idea that the volost authorities should not be constituted on the basis of social estates, is an ardent advocate of public education, especially general education, favours local self-government and Zemstvo institutions, and believes that land credits, especially small, should be widely available, for there is a strong desire among the peasants to buy land. Here, too, Skaldin is a true "Mancunian": he says, for instance, that Zemstvo and municipal banks are "a patriarchal or primitive form of bank" and should give way to private banks, which are "vastly superior" (80). The land might be endowed with value "through the stimulation of industrial and commercial activity in our provinces" (71), and so on.

To sum up. In outlook, Skaldin may be called a bourgeois enlightener. His views are very reminiscent of those of the eighteenth-century economists (correspondingly refracted, of course, in the prism of Russian conditions), and he reflected the general "enlightenment" character of the "heritage" of the sixties quite vividly. Like the West-European enlighteners and the majority of the literary representatives of the sixties, Skaldin was imbued with a violent hostility to serfdom and *all its* economic, social and legal products. That was the first characteristic feature of the "enlightener." The second characteristic feature common to all the Russian enlighteners was ardent advocacy of education, self-government, liberty, European forms of life and all-round Europeanisation of Russia generally. And the third characteristic feature of the "enlightener" was his defence of the interests of the masses, chiefly of the peasants (who, in the days of the enlighteners, were not yet fully emancipated or only in process of being emancipated), the sincere belief that abolition of serfdom and its survivals would be followed by universal well-being, and a sincere desire to help bring this about. These three features constitute the

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that is, they conduce to the capitalist line of development, and no other. Only petty-bourgeois people could concoct the theory that extension of peasant land tenure, tax reduction, resettlement, credits, technical progress, marketing arrangements and suchlike measures would serve the interests of so-called "people's production."

FROM MARXIST TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

essence of what in our country is called "the heritage of the sixties," and it is important to emphasise that *there is nothing whatsoever of Narodism in this heritage*. There are quite a number of Russian writers whose views are characterised by these features and who have never had anything in common with Narodism. Where the outlook of a writer bears these features, he is always recognised by everyone as having "preserved the traditions of the sixties," quite irrespective of what his attitude to Narodism may be. Nobody, of course, would think of saying that Mr. M. Stasyulevich, for instance, whose jubilee was recently celebrated, had "renounced the heritage" merely because he was an opponent of Narodism or was indifferent to the questions advanced by Narodism. We have taken Skaldin* as an example precisely because, while he was *undoubtedly* a representative of the "heritage," he was at the same time a confirmed enemy of those ancient institutions which the Narodniks have taken under their protection.

We have said that Skaldin was a bourgeois. Ample proof of this description has been given above, but it must be observed that this word is often understood very incorrectly, narrowly and unhistorically, it being associated (*without distinction of historical period*) with a selfish defence of the interests of a minority. It must not be forgotten that at the time when the eighteenth-century enlighteners (who are by general consent included among the leaders of the bour-

* It might perhaps be objected that Skaldin is not typical of the sixties because of his hostility to the village community and because of his tone. But it is not a question of the village community alone. It is a question of the views common to all the enlighteners, which Skaldin shared. As to his tone, it really is not typical in its calm reasonableness, moderation, emphasis on gradualness, etc. It was not without reason that Engels called Skaldin a *Liberalkonservativ*.[148] However, the selection of a representative of the heritage with a more typical tone would, firstly, be inconvenient for various reasons, and might, secondly, give rise to misunderstanding when comparing him with the present-day Narodniks.[149] Because of the very character of our task, the *tone* (contrary to the proverb) *does not make the music*, and Skaldin's untypical tone serves to bring out his "music," that is, the substance of his views, more distinctly. And it is only the substance that interests us. It is only on the basis of the substance of writers' views (and not of their tone) that we intend to draw the comparison between the representatives of the heritage and the present-day Narodniks.

geoisie) wrote, and at the time when our enlighteners of the forties and sixties wrote, *all* social problems amounted to the struggle against serfdom and its survivals. At that time the new socio-economic relations and their contradictions were still in embryo. No selfishness was therefore displayed at that time by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, both in the West and in Russia, they quite sincerely believed in universal well-being and sincerely desired it, they sincerely did not see (partly could not yet see) the contradictions in the system which was growing out of serfdom. It is not for nothing that Skaldin in one part of his book quotes Adam Smith: we have seen that both his views and the character of his arguments in many respects repeat the theses of that great ideologist of the progressive bourgeoisie.

And so, if we compare Skaldin's practical suggestions with the views of the present-day Narodniks, on the one hand, and with the attitude to them of the "Russian disciples," on the other, we shall find that the "disciples" will always support Skaldin's suggestions, since the latter reflect the interests of the progressive social classes, and the vital interests of social development generally along the present, i.e., capitalist, path. The things that the Narodniks have changed in Skaldin's practical wishes, or in his presentation of problems, are *a change for the worse*, and are rejected by the "disciples." It is not against the "heritage" that the disciples "hurl themselves" (that is an absurd fabrication), but against the romantic and petty-bourgeois additions to the heritage made by the Narodniks. To these additions we shall now pass.

II

NARODISM'S ADDITION TO THE "HERITAGE"

From Skaldin, let us pass to Engelhardt. His *Letters from the Countryside* are likewise essays on the social aspects of rural life, so that in substance and even in form his book very much resembles that of Skaldin's. Engelhardt is much more talented than Skaldin, and his letters from the country are incomparably more lively and imaginative. The lengthy disquisitions of the serious author of *In the*

Backwoods and in the Capital are not to be found in Engelhardt's book, which, for its part, is replete with deft delineation and imagery. It is not surprising that Engelhardt's book enjoys the steady sympathy of the reading public, and only recently appeared in a fresh edition, while Skaldin's book is almost completely forgotten, although it was only two years after its publication that *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* began printing Engelhardt's letters. There is therefore no need for us to acquaint the reader with the contents of Engelhardt's book, and we shall confine ourselves to a brief exposition of two aspects of his views: first, views that are characteristic of the "heritage" in general, and common to Engelhardt and Skaldin in particular; and, second, views that are specifically Narodnik. Engelhardt is *already a Narodnik*, but his views still contain so much that is common to all the enlighteners, so much that has been discarded or altered by contemporary Narodism, that one is at a loss how to class him—with the representatives of the "heritage" in general, without the Narodnik tinge, or with the Narodniks.

What makes Engelhardt akin to the former is, primarily, the remarkable sobriety of his views, his plain and direct descriptions of realities, his relentless exposure of all the bad sides of the "foundations" in general, and of the peasantry in particular—of those very "foundations," the false idealisation and embellishment of which is an essential component of Narodism. Engelhardt's very feebly and timidly expressed Narodism is therefore in direct and crying contradiction to the picture of rural *realities* that he paints with such talent, and if some economist or sociologist were to base his opinions of the countryside on Engelhardt's *facts* and *observations*,* he would find it impossible to draw Narodnik conclusions from such material. Idealisation of the peasant and his village community is one of the essen-

* Incidentally, this would be not only extremely interesting and instructive, but also perfectly legitimate on the part of an economic investigator. If scientists trust the data of questionnaires—the answers and opinions of numerous proprietors, who all too often are biassed and ill-informed, have not developed a consistent outlook or intelligently thought out their views—why not trust the observations gathered for a full eleven years by a man with splendid powers of observation, who is unquestionably sincere and has made a superb study of what he is talking about.

tial components of Narodism, and Narodniks of all shades, from Mr. V. V. to Mr. Mikhailovsky, have given full rein to this effort to idealise and embellish the "community." There is not the slightest trace of such embellishment in Engelhardt. As against the fashionable talk about the communal spirit of our peasantry, the current contrasting of this "communal spirit" to the individualism of the town, the competition of capitalist economy, etc., Engelhardt is absolutely relentless in exposing the amazing *individualism* of the small farmer. He shows at length that our "peasants in matter of ownership have the keenest possible sense of property" (p. 62, 1885 ed.), that they cannot tolerate "gang work," hate it from narrowly selfish and egoistic motives: in gang work each is "afraid of doing more than the others" (p. 206). This fear of doing more work than others goes to comical (or, rather, tragicomical) extremes; the author, for instance, tells of women living under one roof and bound by ties of common residence and kinship, each of whom washes only her particular part of the table at which they eat, or who milk the cows in turn, each getting milk for her *own* child (for fear that others may hide some of the milk) and preparing porridge for her own child separately (p. 323). Engelhardt brings out these features in such detail, and corroborates them with such a mass of examples, that there can be no question of their being exceptional instances. One or the other: either Engelhardt is a worthless observer who deserves no credence, or the tale about the communal spirit and communal virtues of our muzhik are sheer imagination, which transfers to *economic practice* features abstracted from the form of *land tenure* (and from this form of landholding there are additionally abstracted all the fiscal and administrative aspects). Engelhardt shows that in his economic activity the muzhik aims at becoming a kulak. "There is a definite dose of the kulak in every peasant," he says (p. 491), "kulak ideals prevail among the peasants."... "I have said time and again that individualism, egoism, the urge to exploit are strongly developed among the peasants."... "Each prides himself on being a pike and strives to swallow the tiddler." Engelhardt demonstrates superbly that the trend among the peasantry is not towards the "communal" system, not towards "people's production," but towards the most or-

dinary petty-bourgeois system inherent in all capitalist societies. He describes and proves incontrovertibly the tendency of the well-to-do peasant to launch into trade (363), to loan grain in return for work, to buy the labour of the poor muzhik (pp. 457, 492, etc.)—or, in economic language, the conversion of enterprising muzhiks into a rural bourgeoisie. "If," says Engelhardt, "the peasants do not adopt the artel form of economy and each continues to conduct his own farm in isolation, then, even if there is an abundance of land, there will be both landless peasants and farm labourers among the peasant tillers. Further, I believe that the difference in status among the peasants will be even wider than it now is. Despite communal ownership of the land, side by side with the 'rich,' there will be many virtually landless farm labourers. What benefit is it to me or my children if I have the right to land, but neither the capital nor the implements with which to cultivate it? It is like giving a blind man land and saying—eat it!" (p. 370). With a sort of melancholy irony, the "artel form of economy" figures forlornly in this passage as a pious and innocent wish which, far from following from the facts about the peasantry, is directly repudiated and ruled out by them.

Another feature which makes Engelhardt akin to the representatives of the heritage without any Narodnik tinge is his belief that the chief and fundamental cause of the distressed condition of the peasantry is the survivals of serfdom and the reglementation characteristic of it. Do away with these survivals and this reglementation, and all will be well. Engelhardt's absolute hostility to reglementation and his caustic scoffing at all attempts to confer happiness on the muzhik through reglementation from above, are in the sharpest contrast to the Narodniks' faith in "the reason and conscience, the knowledge and patriotism of the ruling classes" (the words of Mr. Yuzhakov, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, No. 12, p. 106), to their fantastic projects for "organising production," etc. Let us recall Engelhardt's sarcastic denunciation of the rule that vodka should not be sold at flour-mills, a rule intended for the muzhik's "good"; or the disgust with which he speaks of the obligatory order issued by several Zemstvos in 1880 forbidding the sowing of rye before August 15, of that gross in-

terference by armchair "scientists"—also actuated by consideration for the muzhik's good—in the farming of "millions of peasant proprietors" (424). Referring to such rules and orders as those forbidding smoking in pine forests, pike fishing in spring, cutting birch for the May festival, bird-nest pillaging and so on, Engelhardt sarcastically remarks: ... "solicitude for the muzhik is and always has been the principal concern of intellectual minds. Who lives for himself? Everybody lives for the muzhik!... The muzhik is stupid, he cannot manage his own affairs. If nobody looks after him, he will burn down all the forests, kill off all the birds, denude the rivers of fish, ruin the land, and himself die out" (398). Do you think, reader, that this writer could have had any sympathy for laws so dear to the hearts of the Narodniks, as, say, those forbidding alienation of allotments? Could his pen have written anything like the phrase of one of the pillars of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* quoted above? Could he have shared the view of Mr. N. Karyshev, another pillar of the same journal, who flung the reproach at our gubernia Zemstvos (in the nineties!) that they "find no room" "for regular large and substantial expenditure on the organisation of agricultural labour"?*

Let us mention another feature which makes Engelhardt akin to Skaldin: his unconscious attitude to many purely bourgeois aspirations and measures. Not that Engelhardt tries to gild the petty bourgeois or to concoct excuses (à la Mr. V. V.) for not applying this designation to any particular entrepreneur—far from it. As a practical farmer, Engelhardt is simply infatuated with every progressive innovation, every improvement in farming methods, and completely fails to realise that the social form of these improvements is the most effective refutation of his own theory that capitalism is impossible in our country. Let us recall, for instance, how delighted he was with the success he achieved on his farm thanks to the introduction of the *piece-rate system of paying* his workers (for flax scutching, threshing, etc.). Engelhardt does not even suspect that the substitution of piece rates for time rates is one of the most

* *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, No. 5, May. Mr. Karyshev's article about gubernia Zemstvo expenditure on economic measures. P. 20.

widespread methods by which a developing capitalist economy heightens the intensification of labour and increases the rate of surplus-value. Another example. Engelhardt scoffs at the programme of *Zemledelcheskaya Gazeta*[150]: "discontinuation of leasing fields for cycle cultivation[151]; farming based on employment of labourers; introduction of improved machines, implements and cattle breeds and of multi-field system; improvement of meadows and pastures, etc., etc." "All this, however, is nothing but general talk!" Engelhardt exclaims (128). Yet it was this programme that Engelhardt adopted in his own practical farming; he achieved technical progress on his own farm precisely by basing it on the employment of farm labourers: Or again: we know how frankly and faithfully Engelhardt exposed the real tendencies of the enterprising muzhik; but that did not prevent him from asserting that "it is not factories that are needed, but *small*" (Engelhardt's italics) "rural distilleries, oil mills," etc. (p. 336), that is, what is "needed" is that the rural bourgeoisie should go in for agricultural industries—which has always and everywhere been one of the major indications of agricultural capitalism. Here we have the influence of the fact that Engelhardt was not a theoretician but a practical farmer. It is one thing to argue that progress is possible without capitalism, and another thing to farm yourself. Having set himself the aim of conducting his farm on rational lines, Engelhardt *was compelled*, by virtue of surrounding circumstances, to strive for this by purely capitalistic methods and to leave aside all his theoretical and abstract misgivings concerning the "employment of farm labourers." In the field of theory Skaldin argued like a typical member of the Manchester School, completely failing to realise both that his arguments were of just this character, and that they corresponded to the needs of Russia's capitalist evolution. In the field of practice Engelhardt was compelled to act as a typical Mancunian, despite his theoretical protest against capitalism and his desire to believe that his fatherland was following a path of its own.

Engelhardt did believe this, and it is this that induces us to call him a Narodnik. He had already clearly perceived the *real* trend of economic development in Russia, and sought *to explain away* the contradictions of this develop-

ment. He endeavoured to prove that agricultural capitalism was impossible in Russia, that "there is no Knecht in our country" (p. 556)—though he himself refuted in the greatest detail the story that our workers are expensive, and himself showed how miserably he paid his cattleman, Pyotr, who with his family, after their keep, had only 6 rubles a year left "with which to buy salt, vegetable oil, clothing" (p. 10). "Yet even he is envied, and if I turned him off, fifty others would immediately be found eager to take his place" (p. 11). Speaking of the success of his farm, and of the skilful way his workers handle the plough, Engelhardt triumphantly exclaims: "And who are these ploughmen? Ignorant, unconscientious Russian peasants" (p. 225).

Though his own farming experience and his exposure of the peasant's individualism refuted all illusions concerning the "community spirit," Engelhardt not only "believed" that the peasants could adopt an artel form of economy, but expressed the "conviction" that such would indeed be the case, and that we, the Russians, would accomplish this great feat and introduce a new mode of farming. "It is this that constitutes the exceptional character, the specific nature of our economy" (p. 349). Engelhardt the realist turns into Engelhardt the romanticist, who replaces the complete lack of "exceptional character" in his own methods of farming, and in the peasants' farming methods as he observed them by "faith" in a future "exceptional character"! From this faith it is only a stone's throw to the ultra-Narodnik features which—though very few—one finds in Engelhardt, to a narrow nationalism bordering on chauvinism ("We'll give Europe a drubbing, and "in Europe, too, the muzhik will be on our side" (p . 387)—said Engelhardt to a landlord with whom he was discussing the prospect of war), and even to idealisation of labour service! Yes, this selfsame Engelhardt who devoted so many superb pages of his book to describing the downtrodden and degraded condition of the peasant who has taken a loan of money or grain to be paid off in work and is compelled to toil almost for nothing in the very worst conditions of personal dependence*—this selfsame Engelhardt goes to the length

* Remember the picture of the village elder (i.e., the landlord's steward) summoning a peasant to work when the latter's own grain

of saying that "it would be a good thing if the doctor" (he was talking of the benefit of and need for doctors in the countryside. *V. I.*) "had a farm of his own, so that the muzhik could pay for the treatment with his labour" (p. 41). Comment is superfluous.

—All in all, comparing the above-enumerated good features of Engelhardt's outlook (i.e., those he has in common with the representatives of the "heritage" without any Narodnik tinge) with the bad (i.e., the Narodnik features) we have to admit that the former unquestionably predominate in the author of *Letters from the Countryside*, while the latter are an extraneous and accidental admixture, as it were, which has drifted in from without and is at odds with the general tone of his book.

III

HAS THE "HERITAGE" GAINED FROM ASSOCIATION WITH NARODISM?

"But what do you understand by Narodism?" the reader will probably ask. "The meaning attached to the concept 'heritage' was defined above, but no definition of the concept 'Narodism' has been given."

By Narodism we mean a system of views which comprises the following three features: 1) *Belief that capitalism in Russia represents a deterioration, a retrogression*. Hence the urge and desire to "retard," "halt," "stop the break-up" of the age-old foundations by capitalism, and similar reactionary cries. 2) *Belief in the exceptional character of the Russian economic system in general, and of the peasantry, with its village community, artel, etc., in particular*. It is not considered necessary to apply to Russian economic relationships the concepts elaborated by modern science concerning the different social classes and their conflicts. The village-community peasantry is regarded as something higher and

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is already overripe and spoiling, and he is compelled to go merely because, if he does not, the volost authorities will "take his pants down."

better than capitalism; there is a disposition to idealise the "foundations." The existence among the peasantry of contradictions characteristic of every commodity and capitalist economy is denied or slurred over; it is denied that any connection exists between these contradictions and their more developed form in capitalist industry and capitalist agriculture. 3) *Disregard of the connection between the "intelligentsia" and the country's legal and political institutions, on the one hand, and the material interests of definite social classes, on the other.* Denial of this connection, lack of a materialist explanation of these social factors, induces the belief that they represent a force capable of "dragging history along another line" (Mr. V. V.), of "diversion from the path" (Mr. N. —on, Mr. Yuzhakov, etc.), and so on.

That is what we mean by "Narodism." The reader will consequently see that we use this term in its broad sense, just as all the "Russian disciples" use it when opposing a whole system of views, and not individual representatives of this system. Among these individual representatives there are differences, of course, and sometimes important ones. Nobody ignores these differences. But the afore-mentioned views are common to all the most diverse representatives of Narodism, from—well, Mr. Yuzov, let us say, to Mr. Mikhailovsky. To these objectionable features of their views, the Yuzovs, Sazonovs, V. V., etc., add others, which are not shared, for instance, either by Mr. Mikhailovsky or by other contributors to the present-day *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. To deny these differences between the Narodniks in the narrow sense and the Narodniks in general would, of course, be wrong; but it would be wronger still to ignore the fact that the *fundamental* socio-economic views of all Narodniks coincide on the afore-mentioned major points. And since it is these fundamental views that the "Russian disciples" reject, and not only "deplorable deviations" from them in a worse direction, they are obviously fully entitled to employ the term "Narodism" in its wider meaning. Not only are they entitled to do so; they cannot do otherwise.

Turning to the fundamental views of Narodism outlined above, the first thing we must note is that the "heritage"

has absolutely no part in them. There are a whole number of undeniable representatives and guardians of the "heritage" who have nothing in common with Narodism, who do not pose the question of capitalism at all, who do not believe in the exceptional character of Russia, the peasant community, etc., and who do not regard the intelligentsia and our legal and political institutions as a factor capable of "diversion from the path." Above we named in illustration the editor and publisher of *Vestnik Yevropy*,[152] who might be accused of anything save violation of the traditions of the heritage. On the other hand, there are people whose views resemble the afore-mentioned fundamental principles of Narodism, yet who plainly and frankly "renounce the heritage"—we might mention, for example, the same Mr. Y. Abramov to whom Mr. Mikhailovsky refers, or Mr. Yuzov. The Narodism which the "Russian disciples" battle against did not even exist when the heritage was (to use a legal term) "bequeathed," that is, in the sixties. Germs, rudiments of Narodism existed, of course, not only in the sixties, but in the forties and even earlier*—but it is not the history of Narodism that concerns us here. We repeat, what is important for us is to establish that the "heritage" of the sixties, in the sense outlined above, has nothing in common with Narodism, i.e., that there is nothing in common in the substance of their views, that they pose different problems. There are guardians of the "heritage" who are not Narodniks, and there are Narodniks who "have renounced the heritage." Of course, there are also Narodniks who guard the "heritage," or who pretend to do so. That is why we speak of a connection between the heritage and Narodism. Let us see what has been the effect of this connection.

First, Narodism made a big *step forward* compared with the heritage *by posing* for the attention of society problems which the guardians of the heritage were partly (in their time) not yet able to pose, or partly did not, and do not, pose because of their inherent narrowness of outlook. In *posing* these problems the Narodniks performed a great *historical* service, and it is quite natural and understanda-

* Cf. Tugan-Baranovsky's *The Russian Factory* (St. Petersburg, 1898).

ble, that, having offered a solution (whatever it may be worth) for these problems, Narodism *thereby* occupied a foremost place among the progressive trends of Russian social thought.

But the solution of these problems proposed by Narodism proved to be worthless, to be based on backward theories, long ago discarded in Western Europe, on a romantic and petty-bourgeois criticism of capitalism, on a disregard for the cardinal facts of Russian history and reality. So long as the development of capitalism in Russia and of its inherent contradictions was still very weak, this primitive criticism of capitalism could hold its ground. But Narodism is absolutely incapable of measuring up to the contemporary development of capitalism in Russia, the contemporary state of our knowledge of Russian economic history and reality, the contemporary demands made on sociological theory. Once progressive, as the first to pose the problem of capitalism, nowadays Narodism is a *reactionary* and *harmful* theory which misleads social thought and plays into the hands of stagnation and Asiatic backwardness. Today the reactionary character of its criticism of capitalism has even lent Narodism features; that make it *inferior* to the outlook which confines itself to faithful guardianship of the heritage.* That this is so we shall now endeavour to prove by analysing each of the three basic features of the Narodnik outlook mentioned above.

The first feature—the belief that in Russia capitalism represents a deterioration, a retrogression. Very soon after the problem of capitalism in Russia had been posed, it became clear that our economic development was capitalistic, and the Narodniks proclaimed this development a retrogression, a mistake, a deviation from the path supposedly prescribed by the whole history of the nation's life, from the path supposedly hallowed by age-old foundations, and so on and so forth. The enlighteners' ardent faith in this course of social development was replaced by distrust

* I have already had occasion to remark above in the article on economic romanticism that our opponents display remarkable short-sightedness in regarding the terms *reactionary* and *petty-bourgeois* as polemical abuse, when they have a perfectly definite historico-philosophical meaning. (See p. 217 of the present volume.—*Ed.*)

of it; historical optimism and cheerfulness were replaced by pessimism and dejection founded on the fact that the farther matters proceeded as they were proceeding, the harder and more difficult would it be to solve the problems raised by the new development; appeals were made to "retard" and "halt" this development; the theory was advanced that Russia's backwardness was her good fortune, and so forth. All these features of the Narodnik outlook, far from having anything in common with the "heritage," flatly contradict it. The belief that Russian capitalism represents a "deviation from the path," a deterioration, etc., leads to a misrepresentation of Russia's whole economic evolution, to a misrepresentation of that "change-over" which is taking place before our eyes. Carried away by their desire to retard and stop the break-up of the age-old foundations by capitalism, the Narodniks display an amazing lack of historical tact, they forget that *antecedent* to this capitalism there was nothing but the same exploitation combined with countless forms of bondage and personal dependence, which burdened the position of the labourer, nothing but routine and stagnation in social production and, hence, in all spheres of social life. Contending against capitalism from their romantic, petty-bourgeois angle, the Narodniks throw all historical realism overboard and always compare the *reality* of capitalism with a *fiction* of the pre-capitalist order. The "heritage" of the sixties with their ardent faith in the progressive character of the existing course of social development, their relentless enmity directed wholly and exclusively against the relics of the past, their conviction that these relics had only to be swept clean away and everything would go splendidly—this "heritage," far from having any part in the aforementioned views of Narodism, runs directly counter to them.

The second feature of Narodism is belief in Russia's exceptionalism, idealisation of the peasantry, the village community, etc. The doctrine of Russia's exceptionalism induced the Narodniks to seize upon out-dated West-European theories, prompted them to regard many of the achievements of West-European culture with amazing levity: the Narodniks reassured themselves with the thought that, if we lacked some of the features of civilised humanity, "we are

destined," on the other hand, to show the world new modes of economy, etc. Not only was the analysis of capitalism and all its manifestations given by progressive West-European thought not accepted in relation to Holy Russia; every effort was made to invent excuses for not drawing the same conclusions about Russian capitalism as were made regarding European capitalism. The Narodniks bowed and scraped to the authors of this analysis and calmly continued to remain romanticists of the same sort as these authors had all their lives contended against. Again, this doctrine of Russia's exceptionalism, which is shared by all the Narodniks, far from having anything in common with the "heritage," runs directly counter to it. The "sixties," on the contrary, desired to Europeanise Russia, believed that she should adopt the general European culture, were concerned to have the institutions of this culture transferred to our anything but exceptional soil. Any doctrine that teaches that Russia is exceptional is completely at variance with the spirit and the tradition of the sixties. Even more at variance with this tradition is Narodism's idealisation and over-embellishment of the countryside. This false idealisation, which desired at all costs to see something specific in our rural system, something quite unlike the rural system in every other country in the period of pre-capitalist relations, is in naked contradiction to the traditions of the sober and realistic heritage. The wider and more deeply capitalism developed, the more distinctly did the countryside display the contradictions common to every commodity-capitalist society, the more and more glaringly did the antithesis stand out between the Narodniks' honeyed talk about the peasant's "community spirit," "artel spirit," etc., on the one hand, and the actual division of the peasantry into a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat on the other; and the more rapidly did the Narodniks, who continued to look upon things with the eyes of the peasant, change from sentimental romanticists into ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, because in modern society the small producer changes into a commodity producer. Their false idealisation of the countryside and romantic dreams about the "community spirit" led the Narodniks to adopt an extremely frivolous attitude towards the peas-

ants' real needs arising from the existing course of economic development. In theory one might talk to one's heart's content about the strength of the foundations, but in practice every Narodnik sensed very well that the elimination of the relics of the past, the survivals of the pre-Reform system, which to this day bind our peasantry from head to foot, would open the way to precisely the capitalist course of development, and no other. Better stagnation than capitalist progress—this, essentially, is every Narodnik's attitude to the countryside, although of course not every Narodnik would venture to say so frankly and bluntly, with the naïve forthrightness of a Mr. V. V. "Tied to their allotments and communities, and unable to apply their labour where it would be more productive and of greater advantage to themselves, the peasants are, as it were, frozen in that congested, herd-like, unproductive form of life in which they emerged from serfdom." That is how one of the representatives of the "heritage" saw it from his characteristic "enlightener's" standpoint.[153] "Better that the peasants remain frozen in their routine, patriarchal form of life, than clear the way for capitalism in the countryside"—that, essentially, is how every Narodnik sees it. Indeed, probably not a single Narodnik would venture to deny that social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant community, with its collective responsibility and its ban on the sale of land and on the right to refuse an allotment, stands in the sharpest contradiction to contemporary economic *realities*, to contemporary commodity-capitalist relations and their development. To deny this contradiction is impossible, but the whole point is that the Narodniks are mortally afraid of this presentation of the question, of this contrasting of the legal status of the peasantry with economic realities and the present course of economic development. The Narodnik is stubbornly determined to believe in a non-existent non-capitalist development which is a figment of his romantic imagination, and therefore ... and therefore he is prepared to retard the present development, which is proceeding along capitalist lines. The Narodnik's attitude to such problems as the social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant community, collective responsibility, and the peasant's right to sell and give up his allotment, is not only one of extreme caution

and fear for the fate of the "foundations" (the foundations of routine and stagnation); more than this, the Narodnik falls so low that he even welcomes the police rule forbidding the peasants to sell land. To such a Narodnik, one might retort in the words of Engelhardt: "The muzhik is stupid, he cannot manage his own affairs. If nobody looks after him, he will burn down all the forests, kill off all the birds, denude the rivers of fish, ruin the land and himself die out." Here the Narodnik quite definitely "renounces the heritage," becomes a reactionary. And note that with the progress of economic development, this destruction of the social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant community increasingly becomes an imperative necessity for the rural proletariat, while the inconveniences arising therefrom for the peasant bourgeoisie are not at all considerable. The "enterprising muzhik" may easily rent land on the side, open an establishment in some other village, and travel on business wherever he likes and whenever he likes. But for the "peasant" who lives chiefly from the sale of his labour-power, being tied to his allotment and community is an enormous restriction on his economic activity, makes it impossible for him to find a better employer, and compels him to sell his labour-power only to local purchasers, who invariably pay less and seek all sorts of ways and means of reducing him to bondage. Having surrendered to the sway of romantic dreaming and set himself the aim of maintaining and preserving the foundations despite the course of economic development, the Narodnik, without himself observing it, had slipped down this inclined plane until he found himself side by side with the agrarian, who yearns with all his heart and soul for the preservation and consolidation of the "peasant's tie with the land." It is worth recalling, for example, that this social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant community has bred specific methods of hiring workers: factory and farm owners send out agents to the villages, especially those heavily in arrears, to hire labourers on the most advantageous terms. Fortunately, the development of agricultural capitalism, by breaking down the "settled state" of the proletarian (such is the effect of the so-called agricultural outside employments), is gradually substituting free hire for this form of bondage.

Another, and perhaps no less striking corroboration of our contention that the present-day Narodnik theories are pernicious, is to be found in the common tendency among the Narodniks to *idealise labour services*. We have already given an example of how Engelhardt, consummating his Narodnik fall from grace, went so far as to say that "it would be a good thing" to develop labour services in the countryside! We find the same thing in Mr. Yuzhakov's famous project for agricultural gymnasia (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1895, No. 5).* In serious economic articles in the same journal, a fellow contributor of Engelhardt's, Mr. V. V., indulged in similar idealisation when he declared that the peasant had scored a victory over the landlord, who had supposedly wanted to introduce capitalism; but the whole trouble was that the peasant undertook to cultivate the landlord's land in return for land received from him "on lease"—in other words, was restoring the very same mode of economy as existed under serfdom. These are some of the most glaring illustrations of the Narodniks' reactionary attitude to problems concerning our agriculture. In less glaring form, you will find this idea advocated by every Narodnik. Every Narodnik says that capitalism in our agriculture is pernicious and dangerous, because capitalism, you see, substitutes the farm labourer for the independent peasant. The *reality* of capitalism (the "farm labourer") is contrasted to the *fiction* of the "independent" peasant: and this fiction is based on the peasant ownership of means of production in the pre-capitalist era, the fact being modestly ignored that the peasant has to pay double their value for these means of production; that these means of production serve for the performance of labour service; that the living standard of this "independent" peasant is so low that in any capitalist country he would be classed as a pauper; and that added to the hopeless poverty and intellectual inertness of this "independent" peasant is the personal dependence that inevitably accompanies pre-capitalist forms of economy.

The third characteristic feature of Narodism—disregard of the connection between the "intelligentsia" and the

* See pp. 73-80 and 459-89 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO BUT NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

country's legal and political institutions, on the one hand, and the material interests of definite social classes, on the other—is bound up indissolubly with the previous ones: only this unrealistic attitude to sociological problems could have bred the doctrine that Russian capitalism is a "mistake," and that "diversion from the path" is possible. This Narodnik view, too, bears no relation to the "heritage" and traditions of the sixties; on the contrary, it *runs directly counter to these traditions*. A natural corollary to this view is the Narodniks' attitude to the numerous survivals of the pre-Reform reglementation of Russian life, an attitude which the representatives of the "heritage" could not possibly have shared. To illustrate this attitude, we shall take the liberty of borrowing the excellent remarks of Mr. V. Ivanov in his article "A Shabby Fabrication" (*Novoye Slovo*, September 1897). The author refers to Mr. Boborykin's novel *A Different Way*, and exposes his misconception of the dispute between the Narodniks and the "disciples." Mr. Boborykin makes his hero, a Narodnik, reproach the "disciples" for supposedly dreaming of "a barrack regime with the intolerable despotism of reglementation." Mr. V. Ivanov observes in this connection that:

"Far from saying that the 'dream' of their opponents was the intolerable despotism of 'reglementation,' they" (the Narodniks) "*cannot and will not say so as long as they remain Narodniks*. The substance of their dispute with the 'economic materialists' *in this respect* is that, in the opinion of the Narodniks, the remaining survivals of the old reglementation may serve as the basis for its further development. The intolerableness of the old reglementation is veiled from their eyes, on the one hand, by their conviction that the very 'peasant soul (single and indivisible) is evolving' towards reglementation, and, on the other, by their belief in the existing or coming moral beauty of the 'intelligentsia,' 'society,' or the 'leading classes' generally. They accuse the economic materialists of being infatuated not with 'reglementation,' but, on the contrary, with the West-European system, which is based on freedom from reglementation. And the economic materialists really do assert that the survivals of the old reglementation, which

sprang from a natural form of economy, are daily becoming more 'intolerable' in a country that has passed over to a money economy, entailing countless changes both in the actual status and in the mental and moral complexion of the various sections of its population. They are therefore convinced that the conditions necessary for the rise of a new and beneficial 'reglementation' of the country's economic life cannot develop out of the survivals of a reglementation which was adapted to a natural economy and serfdom, and can only evolve in such an atmosphere of wide and comprehensive freedom from the old reglementation as exists in the advanced countries of Western Europe and America. That is how matters stand with the question of 'reglementation' in the dispute between the Narodniks and their opponents" (pp. 11-12, loc. cit.). This attitude of the Narodniks to "the survivals of the old reglementation is, perhaps, their most flagrant departure from the traditions of the "heritage." The representatives of this heritage were, as we have seen, distinguished by their ineradicable and fierce aversion for every survival of the old reglementation. Consequently, in this respect the "disciples" are incomparably closer to the "traditions" and "heritage" of the sixties than the Narodniks are.

In addition to the highly important error of the Narodniks mentioned above, their lack of sociological realism impels them to a specific manner of thinking and reasoning about social affairs and problems which might be called narrow intellectual self-conceit or, perhaps, the bureaucratic mentality. The Narodnik is always dilating on the path "we" should choose for our country, the misfortunes that would arise if "we" directed the country along such-and-such a path, the prospects "we" could ensure ourselves if we avoided the dangers of the path old Europe has taken, if we "take what is good" both from Europe and from our ancient village-community system, and so on and so forth. Hence the Narodnik's complete distrust and contempt for the independent trends of the various social classes which are shaping history in accordance with their own interests. Hence the amazing levity with which the Narodnik (forgetting the conditions surrounding him) advances all sorts of social projects, from the "organisation of agricultural

labour" to the "communalisation of production" through the good offices of our "society." "Mit der Gründlichkeit der geschichtlichen Action wird also der Umfang der Masse zunehmen, deren Action sie ist"*—these words express one of the profoundest and most important precepts of that historico-philosophical theory which our Narodniks will not and cannot understand. As man's history-making activity grows broader and deeper, the size of that mass of the population which is the conscious maker of history is bound to increase. The Narodnik, however, always regarded the population in general, and the working population in particular, as the object of this or that more or less sensible measure, as something to be directed along this or that path, and never regarded the various classes of the population as independent history-makers on the existing path, never asked which conditions of the present path might stimulate (or, on the contrary, paralyse) the independent and conscious activity of these history-makers.

And so, although Narodism, by *posing* the question of capitalism in Russia, made a big step forward compared with the "heritage" of the enlighteners, the *solution* of the question it offered has proved so unsatisfactory, because of its petty-bourgeois outlook and sentimental criticism of capitalism, that on a number of cardinal questions of social life it *lags behind* the "enlighteners." Narodism's association with the heritage and traditions of our enlighteners has proved in the end to be a *drawback*: the new questions with which Russian social thought has been confronted by Russia's post-Reform economic development, Narodism has not solved, confining itself to sentimental and reactionary lamentations over them; while Narodnik romanticism has obscured the old questions already posed by the enlighteners, thus retarding their full solution.

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* Marx, *Die heilige Familie*, p. 120. Quoted from Beltov, p. 235. ("With the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass whose action it is will therefore increase." Marx, *The Holy Family*.[154]—*Ed.*)

IV

THE "ENLIGHTENERS," THE NARODNIKS, AND THE "DISCIPLES"

We may now sum up the results of our comparisons. Let us endeavour to give a brief description of the relationship in which each of the trends of social thought enumerated in the sub-title stands to the others.

The enlightener believes in the present course of social development, because he fails to observe its inherent contradictions. The Narodnik fears the present course of social development, because he is already aware of these contradictions. The "disciple" believes in the present course of social development, because he sees the only earnest of a better future in the full development of these contradictions. The first and last trends therefore strive to support, accelerate, facilitate development along the present path, to remove all obstacles which hamper this development and retard it. Narodism, on the contrary, strives to retard and halt this development, is afraid of abolishing certain obstacles to the development of capitalism. The first and last trends are distinguished by what may be called historical optimism: the farther and the quicker things go as they are, the better it will be. Narodism, on the contrary, naturally tends to historical pessimism: the farther things go as they are, the worse it will be. The "enlighteners" never posed questions concerning the character of post-Reform development and confined themselves exclusively to warring against the survivals of the pre-Reform system, to the negative task of clearing the way for a European type of development in Russia. Narodism posed the question of capitalism in Russia, but answered it in the sense that capitalism is reactionary, and therefore could not wholly accept the heritage of the enlighteners: the Narodniks always warred against people who in general strove to Europeanise Russia from the standpoint of a "single civilisation"; warred against them not only because they, the Narodniks, could not confine themselves to these people's ideals (such a war would have been just), but because they did not want to go so far in the development of this, i.e., capitalist, civilisation. The "dis-

ciples" answer the question of capitalism in Russia in the sense that it is progressive, and they therefore not only can, but must, accept the heritage of the enlighteners in its entirety, supplementing it with an analysis of the contradictions of capitalism from the standpoint of the propertyless producers. The enlighteners did not single out any one class of the population for special attention; they not only spoke of the people in general, but even of the nation in general. The Narodniks were desirous of representing the interests of labour, but they did not point to any definite groups in the contemporary economic system; actually, they always took the standpoint of the small producer, whom capitalism converts into a commodity producer. The "disciples" not only take the interests of labour as their criterion, but in doing so point to quite definite economic groups in the capitalist economy, namely, the propertyless producers. By the nature of their aims, the first and last trends correspond to the interests of the classes which are created and developed by capitalism; Narodism, by its nature, corresponds to the interests of the class of small producers, the petty bourgeoisie, which occupies an intermediate position among the classes of contemporary society. Consequently, Narodism's contradictory attitude to the "heritage" is not accidental, but is a necessary result of the very nature of the Narodnik views: we have seen that one of the basic features of the enlighteners' views was the ardent desire to Europeanise Russia, but the Narodniks cannot possibly share this desire fully without ceasing to be Narodniks.

We have in the end arrived at the conclusion which we have repeatedly indicated above in particular instances, namely, that the *disciples are much more consistent and faithful guardians of the heritage than the Narodniks*. Far from renouncing the heritage, they consider it one of their principal duties to refute the romantic and petty-bourgeois fears which induce the Narodniks on very many and very important points to reject the European ideals of the enlighteners. But it goes without saying that the "disciples" do not guard the heritage in the way an archivist guards an old document. Guarding the heritage does not mean confining oneself to the heritage, and the "disciples" add to their defence

of the general ideals of Europeanism an analysis of the contradictions implicit in our capitalist development, and an assessment of this development from the specific standpoint indicated above.

V

MR. MIKHAILOVSKY ON THE "DISCIPLES'" RENUNCIATION OF THE HERITAGE

Let us, in conclusion, return to Mr. Mikhailovsky and examine his statements on the subject under consideration. Not only does Mr. Mikhailovsky declare that these people (the disciples) "do not acknowledge any continuity with the past and emphatically renounce the heritage" (loc. cit., 179); he also affirms that "they" (together with other persons of the most diverse trends, up to and including Mr. Abramov, Mr. Volynsky and Mr. Rozanov) "hurl themselves against the heritage with the greatest fury" (180). To which heritage is Mr. Mikhailovsky referring? To the heritage of the sixties and seventies, the heritage which *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* solemnly renounced and renounces (178).

We have already said that if it is a question of the "heritage" that has fallen to the people of today, then one must distinguish between *two heritages*: one is the heritage of the enlighteners in general, of the people who were absolutely hostile to the whole pre-Reform order, who stood for European ideals and for the interests of the broad mass of the population. The other heritage is Narodism. We have already shown that to confuse these two different things would be a gross error, for everyone knows that there have been, and still are, people who guard the "traditions of the sixties" but have nothing in common with Narodism. All Mr. Mikhailovsky's observations are founded wholly and exclusively upon a confusion of these totally different heritages. And since Mr. Mikhailovsky must be aware of this difference, his sally is not only absurd, but definitely slanderous. Did *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* hurl itself against Narodism specifically? Not at all: it hurled itself no less, if not more, against the enlighteners in general, and

Vestnik Yevropy, which absolutely abhors Narodism, is in its eyes no less an enemy than the Narodnik *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* would, of course, disagree on many points with the Narodniks who most emphatically renounce the heritage—Yuzov, for example—but it would hardly hurl itself against him with fury, and in any case, it would praise him for that which distinguishes him from the Narodniks who desire to guard the heritage. Did Mr. Abramov or Mr. Volynsky hurl himself against Narodism? Not at all. The former is himself a Narodnik; and both hurled themselves against the enlighteners in general. Did the "Russian disciples" hurl themselves against the Russian enlighteners? Did they ever renounce the heritage which enjoins unreserved hostility to the pre-Reform way of life and its survivals? Far from hurling themselves against it, they denounced the Narodniks for desiring to maintain some of these survivals out of a petty-bourgeois fear of capitalism. Did they ever hurl themselves against the heritage which enjoins European ideals generally? Far from hurling themselves against it, they denounced the Narodniks because on many very important issues, instead of espousing general European ideals, they concoct the most arrant nonsense about Russia's exceptional character. Did they ever hurl themselves against the heritage which enjoins concern for the interests of the labouring masses of the population? Far from hurling themselves against it, they denounced the Narodniks because their concern for these interests is inconsistent (owing to their confirmed tendency to lump together the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat); because the value of their concern is diminished by their habit of dreaming of what might be, instead of turning their attention to what is; because their concern is extremely circumscribed, since they have never been able properly to appraise the conditions (economic and other) which make it easier or harder for these people to care for their own interests themselves.

Mr. Mikhailovsky may not agree with these denunciations—being a Narodnik, he certainly will not agree with them—but to assert that certain people "furiously" attack the "heritage of the sixties and the seventies," when, actually, they "furiously" attack *only Narodism*, and attack it for having

failed to solve the new problems posed by post-Reform history *in the spirit of this heritage and without contradicting it*—such an assertion is a direct misrepresentation of the truth.

Mr. Mikhailovsky most amusingly complains that the "disciples" readily confuse "us" (i.e., the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* writers) with the "Narodniks" and other persons who have no connection with *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (p. 180). This curious attempt at dissociation from the "Narodniks," while at the same time preserving all the basic views of Narodism, can evoke nothing but laughter. Everyone knows that all the "Russian disciples" employ the words "Narodnik" and "Narodism" in the broad sense. That there are quite a number of different shades among the Narodniks has not been forgotten or denied by anybody: in their books neither P. Struve nor N. Beltov, for instance, "confused" Mr. N. Mikhailovsky with Mr. V. V., or even for that matter with Mr. Yuzhakov; that is, they did not gloss over the differences between them, or ascribe the views of one to the other. P. B. Struve even expressly drew attention to the difference between Mr. Yuzhakov's views and those of Mr. Mikhailovsky. It is one thing to confuse different views; it is another to generalise and class in one category writers who, despite their differences on many questions, are at one on the fundamental and principal points, points which the "disciples" oppose. What is important for the "disciple" is not to show the worthlessness of the views which distinguish, for instance, a Mr. Yuzov from the other Narodniks, but to refute the views *common to Mr. Yuzov and Mr. Mikhailovsky and all the Narodniks in general*—that is, their attitude to Russia's capitalist evolution, their discussion of economic and social problems from the standpoint of the small producer, their failure to understand social (or historical) materialism. *These features* are the common property of a whole trend of social thought which has played a big historical role. This broad trend contains the most varied shades: right and left flanks, people who have sunk to nationalism and anti-semitism, etc., and people who are not guilty of these things; people who have been contemptuous of many of the behests of the "heritage," and people who have striven their utmost (that is, the utmost possible to a Narodnik) to guard these behests. Not one of the "Rus-

sian disciples" has denied these differences of shade; not one of them has Mr. Mikhailovsky been able to convict of ascribing the views of a Narodnik of one shade to a Narodnik of another shade. But since we oppose the fundamental views *common* to all these different shades, why should we be expected to speak of partial differences within the general trend? That, surely, is an absolutely senseless demand! Long before the appearance of the "disciples," our literature had noted many times that writers who were far from unanimous on everything held common views on Russian capitalism, the peasant "community," the almighty power of so-called "society," and not only noted it, but praised it as a happy peculiarity of Russia. Again, in its broad sense, the term "Narodism" was employed in our literature long before the appearance of the "disciples." Not only did Mr. Mikhailovsky contribute for many years to a journal along with the "Narodnik" (in the narrow sense) Mr. V. V., but the outlook of both bore the same fundamental features mentioned above. Though, both in the eighties and the nineties, he objected to some of Mr. V. V.'s conclusions, and denied the correctness of his excursions into the field of abstract sociology, Mr. Mikhailovsky, both in the eighties and the nineties, made the reservation that his criticism was not directed against Mr. V. V.'s economic works, that he was at one with his basic views on Russian capitalism. Consequently, if the pillars of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, who have done so much to develop, reinforce and disseminate the views of Narodism (in the broad sense), now think that they can escape the criticism of the "Russian disciples" simply by declaring that they are not "Narodniks" (in the narrow sense), that they constitute a quite specific "ethico-social school"—such subterfuges, of course, can only expose to justified ridicule people who are so brave and at the same time so diplomatic.

On p. 182 of his article, Mr. Mikhailovsky also levels the following phenomenal argument against the "disciples." Mr. Kamensky venomously attacks the Narodniks[155]; that, you see, "indicates that he is angry, which he is not entitled (sic!!) to be. We, the 'subjective oldsters,' as well as the 'subjective youngsters,' can permit ourselves this weakness without being guilty of self-contradiction. But the repre-

sentatives of a doctrine which 'prides itself on its inexorable objectivity'" (the expression of one of-the "disciples") "are in a different position."

What is this?! If people insist that views on social phenomena must be based upon an inexorably objective analysis of *realities* and the real course of development, then it follows that they are not entitled to be angry?! Why, this is utter twaddle, the sheer gibberish! Have you not heard, Mr. Mikhailovsky, that the famous work on *Capital* is considered to be one of the finest specimens of inexorable objectivity in the investigation of social phenomena? It is precisely the inexorable objectivity of the work that is regarded by many scientists and economists as its principal and basic defect. Yet rarely will you find in a scientific work so much "feeling," so much heated and passionate polemical attacks on representatives of backward views, on representatives of the social classes which, in the author's convinced opinion, are hampering social development. A writer who shows with inexorable objectivity that the opinions of Proudhon, say, are a natural, understandable and inevitable reflexion of the views and sentiments of the French petit bourgeois, nevertheless "hurls himself" against that ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie with tremendous passion and fiery wrath. Does Mr. Mikhailovsky believe that Marx is here guilty of "self-contradiction"? If a certain doctrine demands of everyone taking part in public life an inexorably objective analysis of realities and of the relationships between the various classes arising from these realities, by what miracle can the conclusion be drawn from this that they must not sympathise, are "not entitled" to sympathise with one or another class? It is ridiculous in this connection even to talk of duty, for no living person *can help taking the side* of one class or another (once he has understood their interrelationships), can help rejoicing at the successes of that class and being disappointed by its failures, can help being angered by those who are hostile to that class, who hamper its development by disseminating backward views, and so on and so forth. Mr. Mikhailovsky's nonsensical sally only shows that he still fails to grasp the very elementary distinction between determinism and fatalism.

"'Capital is coming'!—that is certain," writes Mr. Mikhailovsky,—"but (sic!!) the question is, how shall we greet it" (p. 189).

Mr. Mikhailovsky makes a great discovery, points to a "question" to which the "Russian disciples" have evidently given no thought whatever! As though it were not on this question that the "Russian disciples" have parted ways with the Narodniks! One can "greet" the capitalism developing in Russia only in two ways: one can regard it either as progressive, or as retrogressive; either as a step forward on the right road, or as a deviation from the true path; one can assess it either from the standpoint of the class of small producers which capitalism destroys, or from the standpoint of the class of propertyless producers which capitalism creates. There is no middle way.* Consequently, if Mr. Mikhailovsky denies the correctness of the attitude to capitalism which the "disciples" insist on, it means that he accepts the Narodnik attitude which he has many a time expressed quite definitely in his earlier articles. He has not made any additions or amendments to his old views on this subject, and continues to remain a Narodnik. But nothing of the kind! He is not a Narodnik, heaven forbid! He is a representative of an "ethico-sociological school."...

"Let no one talk," Mr. Mikhailovsky continues, "of those future (??) benefits which the further development of capitalism will (?) bring."

Mr. Mikhailovsky is no Narodnik. He only reiterates all the Narodniks' errors and fallacious methods of argument. How many times have the Narodniks been told that this talk of the "future" is wrong, that it is not a question of "future," but of actual progressive changes already taking place in the pre-capitalist relationships changes which the development of capitalism in Russia is bringing (not, will bring). By transplanting the question to the "future,"

* We say nothing, of course, of the greeting given it by those who do not consider it necessary to be guided by the interests of labour, or to whom the very generalisation denoted by the term "capitalism" is incomprehensible and unintelligible. However important such trends of thought may be in Russian life, they have nothing whatever to do with the dispute between the Narodniks and their opponents, and there is no point in bringing them into it.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Mikhailovsky in point of fact takes for granted the very assertions which the "disciples" contest. He takes it for granted that in reality, in what is taking place under our eyes, the development of capitalism *is not bringing* any progressive changes into the old socio-economic relations. This is what constitutes the Narodnik view, and it is against this that the "Russian disciples" argue and demonstrate that the contrary is true. There is not a book put out by the "Russian disciples" which does not affirm and demonstrate that the replacement of labour service by wage-labour in agriculture, and the replacement of what is called "handicraft" industry by factory industry, is a real phenomenon which is taking place (and, moreover, at a tremendous speed) now, under our eyes, and not merely "in the future"; that this change is in all respects progressive, that it is breaking down routine, disunited, small-scale hand production which has been immobile and stagnant for ages; that it is increasing the productivity of social labour, and thereby creating the possibility of higher living standards for the working man; that it is also creating the conditions which convert this possibility into a necessity—namely, by converting the "settled proletarian" lost in the "backwoods," settled physically and morally, into a mobile proletarian, and by converting Asiatic forms of labour, with their infinitely developed bondage and diverse forms of personal dependence, into European forms of labour; that "the European manner of thought and feeling is no less necessary (note, necessary. *V. I.*) for the effective utilisation of machines than steam, coal, techniques,"* etc. All this, we repeat, is affirmed and demonstrated by every "disciple," but, presumably, does not apply to Mr. Mikhailovsky "and company"; all this is only written against "Narodniks" who are "not connected" with *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, you see, is an "ethico-sociological school," whose essence is that it serves up the old rubbish under a new guise.

As we observed above, the purpose of this article is to refute the allegation so widespread in the liberal-Narodnik press that the "Russian disciples" abjure the "heritage,"

* The words of Schulze-Gävernitz in an article on the Moscow-Vladimir cotton industry in *Schmollers Jahrbuch*,[156] 1896.

break with the best traditions of the best section of Russian society, and so forth. It is not without interest to observe that, in reiterating these hackneyed phrases, Mr. Mikhailovsky in point of fact says exactly the same thing as was said much earlier and much more emphatically by a "Narodnik" "not connected" with *Russkoye Bogatstvo*—Mr. V. V. Are you familiar, dear reader, with the articles which this writer contributed to *Nedelya*[157] three years ago, at the close of 1894, in reply to P. B. Struve's book? If you are not, I must confess that, in my opinion, you have lost absolutely nothing. The basic idea of these articles is that the "Russian disciples" are breaking the democratic thread which runs through all the progressive trends of Russian social thought. Is this not exactly what Mr. Mikhailovsky says, only in somewhat different terms, when he accuses the "disciples" of renouncing the "heritage," against which *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* hurls itself with fury? Actually, as we have seen, the inventors of this allegation blame others for their own sins when they assert that the "disciples'" irrevocable break with *Narodism* signifies a break with the best traditions of the best section of Russian society. Is it not the other way round, sirs? Does not such a break signify that these best traditions are being *purged of Narodism*?

NOTES

[1] The obituary, "Frederick Engels," written by Lenin In the autumn of 1895, was published in *Rabotnik* (*The Worker*), No. 1-2, that appeared not earlier than March 1896.

The miscellany *Rabotnik* was published at irregular intervals outside of Russia by the League of Russian Social-Democrats in the years 1896-99 and it was edited by the Emancipation of Labour group. Its actual initiator was Lenin, who in 1895, while abroad, reached an agreement with G. V. Plekhanov and P. B. Axelrod on the editing and publication of the miscellany by the group. On his return to Russia Lenin did much to secure financial support for the publication, and to ensure the receipt of articles and correspondence from Russia. Before his arrest in December 1895, Lenin prepared the "Frederick Engels" obituary and several items of correspondence, which he sent to the editors of *Rabotnik*. Some of these appeared in Nos. 1-2 and 5-6 of the miscellany.

Altogether there were six issues of *Rabotnik* in three volumes, and ten numbers of *Listok "Rabotnika*."

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[2] Lenin's epigraph to the article "Frederick Engels" is taken from N. A. Nekrasov's poem "In Memory of Dobrolyubov."

p. 19

[3] Frederick Engels, *Prefatory Note to "The Peasant War in Germany*." Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 652.

p. 21

[4] The *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbrücher* (*German-French Yearbooks*) appeared in Paris in the German language, edited by K. Marx and A. Ruge. Only the first issue, a double number, appeared in February 1844.

The magazine ceased publication chiefly because of differences of principle between Marx and Ruge, who was a bourgeois radical.

p. 24

[5] Frederick Engels, "Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie." Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Band 1, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1956, S. 499-524.

p. 24

[6] *The Communist League*—the first international organisation of the revolutionary proletariat. Preparatory to the foundation of the League Marx and Engels did much to weld together the socialists and the workers of all lands both ideologically and organisationally. In the early part of 1847, Marx and Engels joined the secret German society The League of the Just. At the beginning of June 1847, a League of the Just congress took place in London, at which it was renamed The Communist League while its former hazy slogan "All Men Are Brothers" was replaced by the militant internationalist slogan of "Working Men of All Countries, Unite!"

The aims of The Communist League were the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of the old bourgeois society based on class antagonisms, and the establishment of a new society in which there would be neither classes nor private property. Marx and Engels took part in the work of the Second Congress of the League, which was held in London in November and December 1847, and on its instructions wrote the League's programme—*Manifesto of the Communist Party*—which was published in February 1848. The Communist League played a great historical role as a school of proletarian revolutionaries, as the embryo of the proletarian party and the predecessor of the International Working Men's Association (First International); it existed until November 1852. The history of the League is contained in the article by F. Engels "On the History of the Communist League" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 338-57).

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[7] *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared in Cologne from June 1, 1848, until May 19, 1849. The managers of this newspaper were K. Marx and F. Engels, and the chief editor was Marx. As Lenin put it, the newspaper was "the best, the unsurpassed organ of the revolutionary proletariat"; it educated the masses, roused them to fight the counter-revolution and its influence was felt throughout Germany. From the first months of its existence, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, because of its resolute and irreconcilable position, and of its militant internationalism, was persecuted by the feudal-monarchist and liberal-bourgeois press, and also by the government. The deportation of Marx by the Prussian Government, and the repressive measures against its other editors were the cause of the paper ceasing publication. About the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* see the article by Engels "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-1849)." Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 328-37.

p. 24

[8] Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* (*Anti-Dühring*).

p. 25

[9] The Russian edition of F. Engels' *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, a pamphlet consisting of three chapters from his *Anti-Dühring*, appeared under this title in 1892. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 116-55.

p. 25

[10] Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 170-327.

p. 25

[11] Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 358—402.

p. 25

[12] Frederick Engels' article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" appeared in two issues of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*).

Sotsial-Demokrat—a literary and political review, published by the Emancipation of Labour group in London and Geneva in the years 1890-92. Four issues appeared. It played a big part in spreading Marxist ideas in Russia. G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, and V. I. Zasulich were the chief figures associated with its publication.

p. 25

[13] Frederick Engels, *The Housing Question*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 546-635.

p. 25

[14] Lenin refers to Frederick Engels' article "On Social Relations in Russia," and the postscript to it, contained in the book *Frederick Engels on Russia*, Geneva, 1894.

p. 25

[15] *Volume IV of "Capital"* is the designation given by Lenin, in accordance with the view expressed by Engels, to Marx's *Theories of Surplus-Value* written in the years 1862-63. In the preface to Volume II of *Capital* Engels wrote: "After eliminating the numerous passages covered by Books II and III, I intend to publish the critical part of this manuscript as Book IV of *Capital*" (*Theories of Surplus-Value*) (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, p. 2). Engels, however, did not succeed in preparing Volume IV for the press and it was first published in German, after being edited by Kautsky, in 1905 and 1910. In this edition the basic principles of the scientific publication of a text were violated and there were distortions of a number of the tenets of Marxism.

The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. is

issuing a new (Russian) edition of *Theories of Surplus-Value* (Volume IV of *Capital*) in three parts, according to the manuscript of 1862-63 (Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value* [Volume IV of *Capital*]). Part I appeared in 1955 and Part II in 1957.

p. 25

[16] The letter from F. Engels to I. F. Becker dated October 15, 1884.

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[17] *International Working Men's Association* (First International)—the first international organisation of the proletariat, founded by K. Marx in 1864 at an international workers' meeting convened in London by English and French workers. The foundation of the First International was the result of many years of persistent struggle waged by K. Marx and F. Engels to establish a revolutionary party of the working class. Lenin said that the First International "laid the foundation of an international organisation of the workers for the preparation of their revolutionary onslaught on capital," "laid the foundation for the proletarian, international struggle for socialism" (V. I. Lenin, *The Third International and Its Place in History*. See present edition, Vol. 29).

The central, leading body of the First International was the General Council, of which Marx was a permanent member. In the course of the struggle against the petty-bourgeois influences and sectarian tendencies then prevalent in the working-class movement (narrow trade unionism in England, Proudhonism and anarchism in the Romance countries), Marx rallied around himself the most class-conscious of the General Council members (F. Lessner, E. Dupont, G. Jung, and others). The First International directed the economic and political struggle of the workers of different countries, and strengthened their international solidarity. A tremendous part was played by the First International in disseminating Marxism, in linking-up socialism with the working-class movement.

When the Paris Commune was defeated, the working class was faced with the problem of creating, in the different countries, mass parties based on the principles advanced by the First International. "As I view European conditions," wrote Marx in 1873, "it is quite useful to let the formal organisation of the International recede into the background for the time being" (Marx to F. A. Sorge. September 27, 1873). In 1876 the First International was officially disbanded at a conference in Philadelphia.

p. 26

[18] Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, and Karl Marx, *General Rules of the International Working Men's Association*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 32 and 386.

p. 27

[19] The pamphlet *Explanation of the Law on Fines imposed on Factory Workers* was written by Lenin in the autumn of 1895. It was printed in 3,000 copies in December of that year at the Lahta Press

in St. Petersburg. This printshop was an illegal one belonging to the Narodnaya Volya group, which at that time had established relations with the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, and printed the latter's publications. The original of the pamphlet was burned, like all others, after being set up in type.

For purposes of secrecy fictitious information was printed on the cover. For example, it was stated that the pamphlet was published by A. Y. Vasilyev's book warehouse in Kherson, that it was printed at K. N. Subbotin's Press, Ekaterinoslav St., on premises belonging to a certain Kalinin; that it was on sale in all bookshops in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The title-page contained the inscription: "Permitted by the Censor. Kherson, November 14, 1895." In 1897 the pamphlet was re-issued in Geneva by the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad.

It had a wide circulation, as is shown by the fact that according to reports of the Police Department, copies of it were found in the years 1895-1905 during searches and arrests in St. Petersburg, Kiev, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kazan, Sormovo, Nizhni-Novgorod, Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Saratov, Krasnoyarsk, Perm, and other Russian towns.

p. 29

[20] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper that appeared in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917. It belonged to different publishers at different times and repeatedly changed its political line. At first it was moderately liberal, but in 1876, when A. S. Suvorin began to publish it, it became an organ of reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. From 1905 it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. Following the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917, it gave the fullest support to the bourgeois Provisional Government's counter-revolutionary policy and conducted a furious campaign of slander against the Bolsheviks. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8, new style), in 1917. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* a typical example of the venal press.

p. 37

[21] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—one of the oldest Russian newspapers, originally issued (in 1756) as a small sheet by Moscow University. In the 1860s its line became monarchist-nationalist, reflecting the views of the most reactionary sections of the landlords and the clergy. In 1905 it became one of the leading papers of the Black Hundreds, and continued to appear until the October Revolution in 1917.

p. 37

[22] *Instructions to Factory Inspectorate Officials*. These contained a list of the duties of factory inspectors. Endorsed by the Minister of Finance S. Y. Witte, they were published in June 1894.

p. 51

[23] *Council of State*—a legislative-consultative body in tsarist Russia, whose members were appointed by the tsar. It consisted in the main of big landowners and tsarist dignitaries.

p. 51

[24] *Ostsee gubernias*—the name given in tsarist Russia to Estland, Courland and Lifland gubernias of the Baltic region. They now constitute the territory of the Latvian and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics.

p. 67

[25] "*Gymnasium Farms and Corrective Gymnasia*" was written in the autumn of 1895 in answer to S. N. Yuzhakov's article "An Educational Utopia. A Plan for Universal, Compulsory Secondary Education," published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*) for May 1895.

Lenin severely criticised the plan advanced by Yuzhakov who proposed compulsory secondary education in agricultural high schools (gymnasia), the poorer students having to cover the cost of their tuition by labour service, and showed its reactionary character. At the end of 1897, when in exile in Siberia, Lenin returned to this subject in the article "Gems of Narodnik Project-Mongering" (see pp. 459-89 of this volume).

The article was published over the signature of K. T—in on November 25 (December 7), 1895, in the *Samarsky Vestnik* (*Samara Herald*).

The newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik* appeared in Samara (now the city of Kuibyshev) from 1883 to 1904. From the end of 1896 to March 1897 it was controlled by the "legal Marxists" (P. P. Maslov, R. Gvozdyov [R. E. Zimmerman], A. A. Sanin, V. V. Portugalov and others). In the 1890s it published occasional articles by Russian revolutionary Marxists.

p. 73

[26] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early 1890s it became the organ of the liberal Narodniks and was edited by S. N. Krivenko and N. K. Mikhailovsky. The journal advocated reconciliation with the tsarist government and waged a bitter struggle against Marxism and the Russian Marxists.

In 1906 it became the organ of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist" Party.

p. 73

[27] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility and their powers were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics insurance, etc.) Their activities were controlled by the provincial Governors and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which could pre-

vent the implementation of any decisions disapproved by the government.

p. 74

[28] The leaflet "*To the Working Men and Women of the Thornton Factory*" was written after November 7(19), 1895, in connection with a strike of about 500 weavers that broke out on November 6 (18) against bad conditions and the new oppressive measures introduced by the factory management. The strike was directed by the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Before the strike broke out, the League of Struggle issued a leaflet, written by 0. M. Krzhizhanovsky, containing the weavers' demands, but so far it has not been possible to find a copy of it.

Lenin's leaflet was issued several days later and circulated in the factory when the strike was over. The facts about the workers' conditions were carefully collected by Lenin himself.

The leaflet was mimeographed, and in the spring of 1896 was reprinted abroad in No. 1-2 of the *Rabotnik* miscellany.

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[29] *Noils*—short-staple combings separated from the long wool fibres by carding.

p. 82

[30] *Schmitz*—a measure of 5 arshins (about 11½ feet) used in fixing weavers' rates.

p. 82

[31] "*Bieber*" and "*Ural*"—names of sorts of woollen cloth.

p. 84

[32] "*What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?*"—an article Lenin intended for the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*). An issue of the paper was prepared by the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class by agreement with the Narodnaya Volya group. The first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was prepared and edited by Lenin, who wrote all the main articles, including the leading article "To the Russian Workers," "What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?", "Frederick Engels," and "The Yaroslavl Strike in 1895." Articles were also written by other members of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, G M. Krzhizhanovsky, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, L. Martov (Y. O. Zederbaum), and M. A. Silvin. Lenin wrote the following regarding the first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* in his *What Is To Be Done?*:

"This issue was ready to go to press when it was seized by the gendarmes, who, on the night of December 8, 1895, raided the house of one of the members of the group, Anatoly Alexeyevich Vaneyev, and so the original *Rabocheye Dyelo* was not destined to see the light of day. The leading article in this issue (which per-

haps in some thirty years' time some *Russkaya Starina* [*The Russian Antiquary*] will unearth in the archives of the Police Department) described the historical tasks of the working class in Russia, and regarded the achievement of political liberty as the most important. This issue also contained an article entitled 'What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?' which dealt with the breaking-up of the elementary education committees by the police. In addition there was some correspondence not only from St. Petersburg but from other parts of Russia too (for example, a letter about the assault on the workers in Yaroslavl Gubernia)" (see present edition Vol. 5, *What Is To Be Done?*, chapter II).

With the exception of a copy of the article "What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?" discovered in January 1924 in the Police Department records on the League of Struggle the manuscripts of these articles have not yet been found.

p. 87

[33] *Stepan Razin* and *Yemelyan Pugachov* were the leaders of extensive peasant revolts in Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

p. 90

[34] The "*Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party*" were written by Lenin while in prison in St. Petersburg. The "Draft Programme" was written in December 1895, some time after the 9th (21st) of that month. The "Explanation of the Programme" was written in June-July 1896. The reminiscences of N. K. Krupskaya and A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova show that the text was written in milk between the lines of some book. Lenin's original text was evidently first developed and then copied.

In the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. there are three copies of the "Draft Programme." The first one, found among Lenin's personal papers for the period of 1900-04, was written by an unknown hand in invisible ink between the lines of S. Chugunov's article "The Human Cervical Vertebra from the Viewpoint of the Theory of Evolution" in issue No. 5, 1900, of the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*. There is no heading to this copy. The pages are numbered in pencil in Lenin's handwriting and were placed in an envelope with the inscription, also in Lenin's handwriting: "Old (1895) Draft Programme."

The second copy was also found among Lenin's personal papers for the period 1900-04, it was typed on tissue paper and headed: "Old (1895) Draft Programme for the Social-Democratic Party."

The third copy, found in the Geneva archives of the R.S.D.L.P., consists of 39 sheets of hectographed text. As distinct from the other two copies, this one contains not only the "Draft Programme," but also an "Explanation of the Programme," which together constitute one integral whole.

p. 93

[35] *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (*Science Review*) a journal that appeared in St. Petersburg from 1894 to 1903, at first weekly, then monthly. It had no definite line, but "to be in the fashion" (Lenin's expression) allowed Marxists to use its columns. It published several letters and articles by Marx and Engels, and also three articles by V. I. Lenin: "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory," "Once More on the Theory of Realisation," "Uncritical Criticism."

p. 93

[36] *Land redemption payments* were established by the Regulation Governing Redemption by Peasants Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence..., adopted on February 19, 1861. The tsarist government compelled the peasants, in return for the allotments assigned to them, to pay redemption to the landlords amounting to several times the real price of the land. When the purchase deal was concluded, the government paid the landlords the purchase price, which was considered a debt owed by the peasants, to be repaid over a period of 49 years. The instalments to be paid annually by the peasants were called land redemption payments. These were an intolerable burden on the peasants and caused their ruin and impoverishment en masse. The peasants formerly belonging to landlords alone paid nearly 2,000 million rubles to the tsarist government, whereas the market price of the land that the peasants received did not exceed 544 million rubles. In view of the fact that the adoption of the redemption scheme by the peasants did not take place at once, but dragged on until 1883, the redemption payments were only to have ended by 1932. However the peasant movement during the first Russian revolution, in 1905-07, compelled the tsarist government to abolish the redemption payments as from January 1907.

p. 98

[37] *Collective responsibility* was a compulsory measure making the peasants of each village community collectively responsible for timely and full payments and for the fulfilment of all sorts of services to the state and the landlords (payment of taxes and of land redemption instalments, provision of recruits for the army, etc.). This form of bondage, which was retained even after serfdom had been abolished, remained in force until 1906.

p. 98

[38] The copyist apparently could not decipher several words following the word "refused." The hectographed notebook continues as follows: "[blank]* . . . the rule of irresponsible officials than any interference by society in government affairs, the more readily does it present the opportunity . . . [blank II]."

p. 112

[39] Lenin refers to the circular to factory inspectors issued by Minister of Finance S. Y. Witte following the strikes in the summer and autumn of 1895. Comments on the circular are given on pp. 123-24 of this volume.

p. 116

[40] Lenin wrote the leaflet "*To the Tsarist Government*" in prison at a date previous to November 25 (December 7), 1896. It was mimeographed by the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class.

The leaflet was a reply to S. Y. Witte's circular addressed to factory inspectors, and to the report of the 1896 summer strikes in St. Petersburg published on July 19 (31), 1896, in issue No. 158 of *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* (*Government Herald*).

p. 122

[41] Lenin called the strikes that took place in May-June 1896 "the famous St. Petersburg industrial war." They were caused by the employers' refusal to pay the workers in full for holidays on the occasion of the coronation of Nicholas II. A strike that broke out at the Russian Cotton-Spinning Mill (Kalinkin) rapidly spread to all the main cotton-spinning and weaving mills of St. Petersburg. For the first time the proletariat of that city undertook a struggle against their exploiters on a broad front, embracing over 30,000 workers, who struck work under the leadership of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. The League issued leaflets and manifestoes calling on the workers to stand solidly and steadfastly in defence of their rights; it published and distributed the strikers' main demands, which included the 10½-hour working day, increased rates, and payment of wages on time. The St. Petersburg strikes gave an impetus to the working-class movement in Moscow and other Russian towns, and forced the government to speed up the review of the factory laws and the issue of the law of June 2 (14), 1897, by which the working day at factories and mills was reduced to 11½ hours. The strikes, as Lenin subsequently wrote, "ushered in an era of steady advance in the working-class movement, that most powerful factor in the whole of our revolution."

p. 123

[42] *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* (*Government Herald*)—a daily newspaper, official organ of the tsarist government; appeared in St. Petersburg from 1869 to 1917.

p. 124

[43] *The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class*, organised by Lenin in the autumn of 1895, consisted of about twenty Marxist workers' circles in St. Petersburg. The entire work of the League was based on the principles of centralism and strict discipline. The League was headed by a central group consisting of V. I. Lenin, A. A. Vaneyev, N. K. Zaporozhets, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. K. Krupskaya, L. Martov (Y. O. Zederbaum), M. A. Silvin, V. V. Starkov, and others. The entire work of the League was, however, under the direct leadership of five members of the group headed by Lenin. The League was divided into several district organisations. Such front-rank class-conscious workers as I. V. Babushkin, V. A. Shelgunov connected the groups with the facto-

ries, where there were organisers in charge of gathering information and distributing literature. Workers' study-circles were established in the big plants.

For the first time in Russia the League set about introducing socialism into the working-class movement, effecting a transition from the propagation of Marxism among small numbers of advanced workers attending study-circles to political agitation among the broad masses of the proletariat. It directed the working-class movement, and linked up the workers' struggle for economic demands with the political struggle against tsarism. A strike was organised in November 1895 at the Thornton woollen mill. It was under the leadership of the League that the famous St. Petersburg textile workers' strike, involving over 30,000 workers, took place in the summer of 1896. The League issued leaflets and pamphlets; and prepared the ground for the issue of the newspaper Rabocheye Dyelo (The Workers' Cause). The League publications were issued under V. I. Lenin's editorship. The League's influence spread far beyond St. Petersburg, workers' study-circles having united, on its initiative, into similar Leagues in Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav and other cities and parts of Russia.

Late in the night of December 8 (20), 1895, the tsarist government dealt a severe blow to the League by arresting a considerable number of its leading members, headed by Lenin.

An issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* ready for the press was also seized. The League replied to the arrest of Lenin and the other members by issuing a leaflet containing political demands, in which reference was made for the first time to the existence of the League.

While in prison Lenin continued to lead the work of the League, helped it with his advice, got coded letters and leaflets smuggled out of prison, wrote the pamphlet *On Strikes* and the "Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party."

The League was significant, as Lenin put it, because it was the first real rudiment of a revolutionary party which had the support of the working-class movement and directed the class struggle of the proletariat.

p. 127

[44] The essay "*A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*" was written by Lenin while in exile in Siberia in the spring of 1897. It appeared in four issues (Nos. 7-10) of the "legal Marxist" magazine *Novoye Slovo* (*New Word*) for April-July 1897, over the signature K. T—n. It was included later in the miscellany entitled *Economic Studies and Essays* by Vladimir Ilyin which appeared in October 1898 (though the date given on the cover and the title-page is 1899). Early in 1908 it appeared, slightly amended and abridged, along with other items in *The Agrarian Question* by Vl. Ilyin. The parts of it omitted in this miscellany were section three, chapter II, "The Problem of the Growth of the Industrial Population at the Expense of the Agricultural Population," and the end of section five, chapter II, "The Reactionary Character of Romanticism." A postscript was added to chapter I.

When preparing the editions legally published in 1897 and 1898, Lenin was compelled for censorship reasons to substitute the term "modern theory" for "Marx's theory" and "the well-known German economist" for "Marx," "realist" for "Marxist" the word "paper" for *Capital*, and so on. In the 1908 edition Lenin either altered a considerable number of these expressions in the text or added the necessary footnotes. In the second and third Russian editions of the *Collected Works*, the corrections were given in footnotes. In the present edition the corrections have been introduced into the text.

p. 129

[45] *Novoye Slovo* (*New Word*)—a monthly scientific, literary and political journal, published originally in St, Petersburg from 1894 by the liberal Narodniks. In the early part of 1897 it was taken over by the "legal Marxists" (P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, and others). *Novoye Slovo* published two of Lenin's articles when he was in exile in Siberia—"A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" and "About a Certain Newspaper Article." The journal also carried the writings of G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, L. Martov, A. M. Gorky, and others. In December 1897 it was closed down by the tsarist government.

p. 129

[46] *V. V.* (pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov) and *N.—on* (pseudonym of N. F. Danielson) were ideologists of liberal Narodism of the 1880s and 1890s.

p. 134

[47] Lenin refers to MacCulloch's polemical article "Mr. Owen's Plans for Relieving the National Distress," published anonymously in 1819 in *The Edinburgh Review* (Vol. XXXII), to which Sismondi replied.

The Edinburgh Review or Critical Journal was a scientific, literary and political journal that appeared from 1802 to 1929.

p. 149

[48] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 373; Vol. III, Moscow 1959, p. 821.

p. 151

[49] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 351-523.

p. 152

[50] In the 1897 and 1898 editions Lenin referred to M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky's *Industrial Crises*, Part II. In the 1908 edition Lenin introduced a change by referring instead to his own book, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, which appeared in 1899 (see present edition, Vol. 3).

p. 152

[51] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 391.

p. 154

[52] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 245.

p. 156

[53] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 316.

p. 169

[54] *Katheder-Socialists*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois political economy of the 1870s and 1880s who, under the guise of socialism, advocated bourgeois-liberal reformism from university chairs. (*Katheder* in German). The fear aroused among the exploiting classes by the spread of Marxism in the working-class movement and the growth of that movement brought Katheder-Socialism into being; it united the efforts of bourgeois ideologists to find fresh means of keeping the working people in subjugation.

Among the Katheder-Socialists were A. Wagner, G. Schmoller, L. Brentano, and V. Sombart who asserted that the bourgeois state is above classes, can reconcile mutually hostile classes, and can gradually introduce "socialism" without affecting the interests of the capitalists but at the same time taking the demands of the working people as far as possible Into consideration. They suggested the legalisation of police-regulated wage-labour, and the revival of the medieval guilds. Marx and Engels exposed Katheder-Socialism, showing how essentially reactionary it was. Lenin called the Katheder-Socialists the bed bugs of "police-bourgeois university science" who hated Marx's revolutionary teachings. In Russia the views of the Katheder-Socialists were advocated by the "legal Marxists."

p. 174

[55] Marx and Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow. 1953. p. 119.

p. 180

[56] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1958, p. 642.

p. 180

[57] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow 1958, p. 643.

p. 180

[58] The quotations referred to were taken from the estimation of Sismondi's petty-bourgeois socialism given in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 57). N. F. Danielson used them in his article "Something About the Conditions of Our Economic Development" in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 6 1894.

p. 199

[59] *Zur Kritik*—initial words of the title of Marx's *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*. Lenin cites passages from P. P. Rumyantsev's Russian translation of this book published in 1896 (K. Marx, *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Moskau-Leningrad, 1934, S. 49).

p. 199

[60] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 24-25.

In the 1897 and 1898 editions Lenin, in view of the censorship, did not refer directly to Marx, but to Struve. In the 1908 edition, however, he referred to Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. This correction has been made in the present edition.

p. 203

[61] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 856, 860, 861.

p. 204

[62] Lenin refers to Narodnik polemical articles directed against the Marxists: N. F. Danielson, "An Apology for Money Power as a Sign of the Times," published under the pseudonym Nikolai-on in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 1-2, 1895; V. P. Vorontsov, "German Social-Democratism and Russian Bourgeoisism," published under the pseudonym V. V. in the newspaper *Nedelya* (*Week*), Nos. 47-49, 1894.

p. 204

[63] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 55.

p. 205

[64] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 819.

p. 205

[65] G. V. Plekhanov (N. Beltov), *The Development of the Monist View of History*, Moscow, 1956, p. 60.

p. 207

[66] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, Bd. I, Hb. 2, S. 304, 1923. For pages cited here see pp. 309 and 313.

p. 207

[67] "*Progressive*" *publicist of the late nineteenth century* is an ironical reference to the liberal Narodnik S. N. Yuzhakov. An extract from his article "Problems of Hegemony at the End of the Nineteenth Century," published in *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*), Nos. 3-4, 1885, was quoted by P. B. Struve.

p. 211

[68] Karl Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 167-68.

Because of the censorship Lenin substituted the word "writers" for "socialists" (in the German original—*Sozialisten*).

p. 213

[69] Karl Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 74.

p. 216

[70] Karl Marx, *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Moskau-Leningrad, 1934, S. 85.

p. 218

[71] The *village* (land) *community* (*obshchina* or *mir*) in Russia was the communal form of peasant use of the land, characterised by compulsory crop rotation, and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective responsibility, the periodical redistribution of the land with no right to refuse the allotment given, and prohibition of its purchase and sale.

The Russian village community dates back to ancient times, and in the course of historical development gradually became one of the mainstays of feudalism in Russia. The landlords and the tsarist government used the village community to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze land redemption payments and taxes out of the people. Lenin pointed out that the village community "does not save the peasant from turning into a proletarian; actually it serves as a medieval barrier dividing the peasants, who are as if chained to small associations and to categories which have lost all 'reason for existence'." (V. I. Lenin, *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century*. See present edition, Vol. 15).

The problem of the village community aroused heated arguments and brought an extensive economic literature into existence. Particularly great interest in the village community was displayed by the Narodniks, who saw in it the guarantee of Russia's socialist evolution by a special path. By tendentiously gathering and falsifying facts and employing so-called "average figures," the Narodniks sought to prove that the community peasantry in Russia possessed a special sort of "steadfastness," and that the peasant community protected the peasants against the penetration of capitalist relations into their lives, and "saved" them from ruin and class differentiation. As early as the 1880s G. V. Plekhanov showed that the Narodnik illusions about "community socialism" were unfounded and in the 1890s Lenin completely refuted the Narodnik theories. Lenin made use of a tremendous amount of statistical material and countless facts to show how capitalist relations were developing in the Russian village, and how capital, by penetrating into the patriarchal village community, was splitting the peasantry into two antagonistic classes, the kulaks and the poor peasants.

In 1906 tsarist minister Stolypin issued a law favouring the kulaks that allowed peasants to leave the community and to sell their allotments. This law laid the basis for the official abolition of the village community system and intensified the differentiation among the peasantry. In nine years following the adoption of the law, over two million peasant families withdrew from the communities.

p. 219

[72] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 275.

p. 222

[73] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly literary and political journal published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918; up to 1905 it was liberal Narodnik in trend. In the nineties, during the polemic between the Marxists and the liberal Narodniks, the editors of the journal, while adhering to the Narodnik outlook, occasionally allowed articles by Marxists to be published in its columns. Items by the progressive writers A. M. Gorky, V. G. Korolenko, D. N. Mamin-Sibiryak, G. I. Uspensky, A. P. Chekhov, and others were published in the journal's literature section.

After the 1905 Revolution, *Russkaya Mysl* became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party, and was edited by P. B. Struve. It was closed down in the middle of 1918.

p. 223

[74] *Kit Kitych*—the nickname of Tit Titych, a rich merchant, one of the characters in A. N. Ostrovsky's comedy *Shouldering Another's Troubles*. Lenin gives this epithet to the capitalist moneybags.

p. 225

[75] Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 57.

p. 227

[76] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 622.

p. 228

[77] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 505.

p. 229

[78] Marx and Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 1-336.

p. 229

[79] Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1954, pp. 402-14.

p. 229

[80] *Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt* (*Central Social-Political Sheet*)—organ of the Right wing of German Social-Democracy. First appeared in 1892.

p. 230

[81] Marx and Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 49-50.

p. 237

[82] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, pp. 503-04.

In the 1897 and 1898 editions, because of the censorship, Lenin replaced the words social revolution" (*der sozialen Revolution*)

by the words "social transformation." In the 1908 edition Lenin translated the words as "social revolution." This correction has been made in the present edition.

p. 245

[83] *Chinsh peasants*—those entitled to the hereditary possession of the land in perpetuity, and who had to pay an almost fixed quit-rent, known as chinsh. In tsarist Russia, the chinsh system operated mainly in Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia, and the Black Sea littoral of the Ukraine.

p. 246

[84] Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party. Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 57.

p. 248

[85] *The Corn Laws*, which were introduced in England in 1815, established high tariffs on imported corn, and at times prohibited corn imports. They enabled the big landowners to increase grain prices on the home market and to secure enormous rents. They also strengthened the political position of the landed aristocracy. There was a fierce and protracted struggle between the big landowners and the bourgeoisie over the Corn Laws which ended in their repeal in 1846.

p. 253

[86] "*On the one hand, it cannot but be recognised, on the other hand, it must be admitted*"—an ironical expression used by M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin in his stories "The Diary of a Provincial in St. Petersburg" and "Funeral."

p. 257

[87] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 234-53.

p. 258

[88] *The Anti-Corn-Law League* (this term is in English in the original) was founded in 1838 by the textile manufacturers Cobden and Bright. Its headquarters were in Manchester, the centre of the Free-Trade movement.

The Anti-Corn-Law League, as its name indicates, fought to secure the repeal of the Corn Laws, and stood for Free Trade, demagogically asserting that it would improve the workers' standard of living, although reduced corn prices could only result in reduced wages for the workers and increased profits for the capitalists. The conflict over this issue between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy ended in the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Marx's views on the anti-Corn-Law movement are given in his speech "On Free Trade" (see Appendix to *The Poverty of Philosophy* by Karl Marx, Moscow, pp. 234-53).

p. 258

[89] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 264.

p. 259

[90] Marx and Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow. 1953. p. 303.

p. 259

[91] *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—theoretical journal of German Social-Democracy. Appeared in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Prior to October 1917 was edited by K. Kautsky, then by H. Cunow. In 1885-95, articles by K. Marx and F. Engels appeared in its columns. Engels frequently made suggestions to the editors of Die Neue Zeit, and severely criticised them for departing from Marxism. The journal also published articles by F. Mehring, P. Lafargue, G. V. Plekhanov, and other leading figures of the international working-class movement. In the late 1890s the journal made a practice of publishing articles by revisionists. During the First World War (1914-18) the journal adopted a centrist, Kautskian position in support of the soci al-chauvinists.

p. 259

[92] The articles mentioned by V. I. Lenin are: "The Anti-Kriege Circular" by K. Marx and F. Engels, and chapter IV, Vol. II of *German Ideology*, both of which appeared in *Das Westphälische Dampfboot* for July 1846 and August-September 1847, while extracts from them were reprinted in Nos. 27 and 28 of *Die Neue Zeit*, 1895-96 (MEGA, Erste Abteilung, Band 6, S. 10, 11, 12, 13; Band 5, S. 500, 501, 502).

Das Westphälische Dampfboot (*Westphalian Steamer*)—a monthly magazine, organ of one of the trends of petty-bourgeois German, or "true," socialism; was edited by O. Lüning in Bielefeld and Paderborn (Germany) from January 1845 to March 1848.

p. 259

[93] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 677-78.

p. 261

[94] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 09.

p. 261

[95] Marx and Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow. 1953. pp. 302-03.

p. 265

[96] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 253.

For censorship reasons Lenin changed (or excluded) words from the section of Marx's "On Free Trade" cited here. Thus, he translated the words "hastens the social revolution" as "hastens this 'break-up'" and the phrase "in this revolutionary sense alone" as "in this sense alone."

p. 265

[97] Lenin wrote the pamphlet *The New Factory Law* in the summer of 1897 while in exile in Siberia, and the supplement in the autumn of the same year. Judging from P. B. Axelrod's preface to the first edition of Lenin's pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, the manuscript of the pamphlet appeared abroad only in autumn 1898. It was printed in 1899 in Geneva by the Emancipation of Labour group at the press of The League of Russian Social-Democrats.

p. 267

[98] Lenin refers to the notices that appeared at the beginning of January 1897 in all St. Petersburg spinning and weaving mills introducing the 11½-hour working day as from April 16 (28), i.e., shortly before May Day (April 19), the day of the international solidarity of the working people of all countries.

p. 271

[99] *Vestnik Finansov, Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* (*Finance, Industry and Trade Herald*)—a weekly journal published by the Ministry of Finance in St. Petersburg from November 1883 to 1917 (until January 1885 it was called *Ukazatel Pravitelstvennykh Rasporyazheny po Ministerstvu Finansov* [*Record of Government Instructions—Ministry of Finance*]). Government regulations, economic articles and reviews were published in its columns.

p. 275

[100] Lenin paraphrases I. A. Krylov's fable "The Lion's Share."

p. 313

[101] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards; it expressed the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia. Among its contributors in the 1880s and 1890s were the democratic writers V. G. Korolenko, M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin and G. I. Uspensky. It also published items written by liberal Narodniks. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the bourgeois Cadet Party. Lenin said that *Russkiye Vedomosti* was a peculiar combination of "Right-wing Cadetism and a strain of Narodism." In 1918 it was closed down together with other counter-revolutionary newspapers.

p. 316

[102] *Manilov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, typifying the weak-willed, hollow dreamer and inert windbag.

p. 316

[103] *Sysoika*—one of the chief characters in F. M. Reshetnikov's *Poliipovtsi*, typifying the ignorant and rightless poor peasant who is weighed down by want and unbearable toil.

p. 318

[104] See Note 25.

p. 321

[105] Lines from M. Y. Lermontov's poem "To A. O. Smirnova."

p. 322

[106] The pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* was written by Lenin in exile (Siberia) at the close of 1897, and was first published in 1898 by the Emancipation of Labour group in Geneva. It circulated widely among Russia's advanced workers. According to Police Department data for the years 1898-1905, copies of the pamphlet were discovered during searches and arrests made in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Smolensk, Kazan, Orel, Kiev, Vilno, Feodosia, Irkutsk, Archangel, Sormovo, Kovno and other towns.

The original manuscript of the pamphlet has not been found but there is a copy made by some unknown hand. In 1902 a second edition of it appeared in Geneva, and in 1905 a third edition each with a preface by V. I. Lenin. The pamphlet was also included in the miscellany: Vl. Ilyin, *Twelve Years*, published in November 1907 (the cover and title-page of which are dated 1908). The 1902, 1905 and 1907 editions do not contain the leaflet "To the St. Petersburg Workers and Socialists from the League of Struggle" included in the copy of the manuscript, and as a supplement to the first edition of the pamphlet. The leaflet was published in all the previous editions of the *Collected Works* and is also included in the present edition. The copy made from the manuscript contains several slips of the pen. Inaccuracies also appeared in the first edition of the pamphlet, which was published abroad by the Emancipation of Labour group, but these were corrected by Lenin in the subsequent editions.

p. 323

[107] *Narodnoye Pravo* (People's Right)—an illegal organisation of Russian democratic intellectuals founded in the summer of 1893, its initiators including O. V. Aptekman, A. I. Bogdanovich, A. V. Gedeonovsky, M. A. Natanson, and N. S. Tyutchev who had formerly belonged to the Narodnaya Volya. The Narodopravtsi, as the members of the party were called, set themselves the aim of uniting all opposition forces to fight for political reforms. Their organisation issued two programme documents, "Manifesto" and "An Urgent Question." In the spring of 1894 the group was broken up by the tsarist government. Lenin's estimation of the Narodnoye Pravo as a political party will be found in his *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (see present edition, Vol. 1) and on page 344 of the present volume. Most of the Narodopravtsi subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

p. 327

[108] *The Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) group (Narodovoltsi) came into existence In St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1891 with its own programme. Its original membership included M. S. Olminsky (Alexan-

drov), N . L. Meshcheryakov, Y. M. Alexandrova, A. A. Fedulov, and A. A. Yergin. Pamphlets and *Rabochy Sbornik* (*Workers' Miscellany*) and two issues of *Letuchy Listok* (*The Leaflet*) were published illegally by the group's press. In April 1894 the group was broken up by the police, but soon renewed its activities. At that period it was in process of abandoning Narodnaya Volya views for Social-Democracy. The last issue of *The Leaflet*, No. 4, that appeared in December 1895, clearly bore traces of Social-Democratic influence. The group established contact with the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, used its press to issue several of the League's publications, for example, Lenin's *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers* (see pp. 29-72 of the present volume), and negotiated with the League about the joint publication of the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo*. It was intended to use the group's press to issue Lenin's pamphlet *On Strikes*, which was smuggled out of prison in May 1896. But the suggestion fell through in view of the police discovery and destruction of the press, and the arrest of members of the group in June 1896. The group then went out of existence, and some of its members (P. F. Kudelli, N. L. Meshcheryakov, M. S. Olminsky, and others) later became active figures in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, although the majority joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

p. 327

[109] *The League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was founded in 1894 in Geneva, on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group, and had its own press where it printed revolutionary literature. At first the Emancipation of Labour group guided the League and edited its publications. The League issued the *Rabotnik* miscellanies and the *Listki* "*Rabotnika*," and published Lenin's *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers* (1897), Plekhanov's *New Drive Against Russian Social-Democracy* (1897), etc. The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held in March 1898, recognised the League as the Party's representative abroad. As time proceeded the opportunist elements—the "economists," or so-called "young" group, secured the upper hand in the League. At the First Congress of the League held in Zurich in November 1898, the Emancipation of Labour group announced their refusal to edit League publications, with the exception of No. 5-6 of *Rabotnik* and Lenin's pamphlets *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* and *The New Factory Law*, which the group undertook to publish. From then on the League published *Rabocheye Dyelo*, a magazine of the "economists." The Emancipation of Labour group finally broke with the League and left its ranks in April 1900, at the League's Second Congress held in Geneva, when the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters left the Congress and established an independent *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation. In 1903 the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a decision to disband the League.

p. 327

[110] This passage refers to the policy pursued by N. P. Ignatyev, Minister of Internal Affairs in 1881-82, which was intended, as Lenin put it, "to bamboozle" the liberals; by playing at democracy it was hoped to hide the fact that the government of Alexander III had gone over entirely to the side of reaction. Part of the policy was the calling of conferences of "knowledgeable people" which included Marshals of the Nobility, representatives of the Zemstvo Administrations and similar people to discuss problems relating to a reduction in land redemption payments, the proper organisation of migration, and local government reform. A suggestion was even made to convene a so-called Zemsky Sobor, to be attended by a crowd of three thousand strong. All these devices, however, ended in Ignatyev's resignation, followed by a period of "unbridled, incredibly senseless and brutal reaction" (see *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, present edition, Vol. 1).

p. 335

[111] *The Emancipation of Labour group* was the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov in 1883, and included P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, Vera Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov.

The group did much to spread Marxism in Russia. It translated such Marxist works as *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels, *Wage-Labour and Capital* by Marx, and *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, by Engels, etc., published them abroad and organised their distribution in Russia. Plekhanov and his group seriously undermined Narodism. In 1883 Plekhanov drafted a programme for the Russian Social-Democrats and in 1885 made another draft. The two drafts were published by the Emancipation of Labour group and marked an important step towards the establishment of a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. Plekhanov's Socialism and the Political Struggle (1883), *Our Differences* (1885), *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) played a considerable part in disseminating Marxist views. The group, however, made some serious mistakes. It clung to remnants of Narodnik views, underestimated the revolutionary role of the peasantry, and overestimated the part played by the liberal bourgeoisie. These errors were the germs of the future Menshevik views held by Plekhanov and other members of the group. The group played a great part in imbuing the Russian working class with revolutionary class-consciousness but it had no practical ties with the working-class movement. Lenin pointed out that the Emancipation of Labour group "only theoretically founded the Social-Democracy and took the first step in the direction of the working-class movement." The group established ties with the international labour movement, and represented Russian Social-Democracy at all congresses of the Second International from the first held in Paris in 1889 onwards.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P held in August 1903, the Emancipation of Labour group announced its dissolution.

p. 338

[112] Lenin refers to collections of articles entitled *Material for a History of the Russian Social-Revolutionary Movement*, published in Geneva in the years 1893-96 by the Group of Old Narodnaya Volya Members (P. L. Lavrov, N. S. Rusanov, and others). In all, four collections appeared in five volumes (seventeen were originally planned).

p. 339

[113] *Blanquism*—a trend in the French socialist movement headed by the outstanding revolutionary and prominent representative of French utopian communism, Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805-81).

The Blanquists denied the class struggle, and awaited "mankind's emancipation from wage slavery by a conspiracy of a small minority of intellectuals and not by the class struggle of the proletariat" (V. I. Lenin, *Results of the Congress*. See present edition, Vol. 10). They did not take account of the concrete situation requisite for the victory of an uprising and showed their disdain for ties with the masses, substituting the actions of a clandestine handful of conspirators for the activity of a revolutionary party.

p. 340

[114] The article "*The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of 'Handicraft' Industry*" was written by Lenin when in exile in Siberia in August and September 1897, not later than the 7th (19th) of the latter month. The material contained in this article was used by him in his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.

The article was first published in 1898 in the miscellany *Economic Studies and Essays*, and reprinted in 1908 in the miscellany *The Agrarian Question*.

p. 355

[115] In 1889 the tsarist government introduced the administrative post of Zemsky Nachalnik in order to increase the power of the landlords over the peasants. The Zemsky Nachalniks were appointed from among the local landed nobility, and were given enormous power, not only administrative but also juridical, over the peasants, including the right to have peasants arrested and flogged.

p. 357

[116] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 748.

p. 382

[117] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 390.

p. 405

[118] By a decree of Peter I issued in 1721 merchant factory owners were given the right to purchase peasants for work in their factories. The feudal workers attached to such enterprises under the possessional right were called "possessional peasants."

p. 418

[119] The *Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Issue I, St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 225.

p. 426

[120] The *truck system*—the system of paying the workers wages in the shape of goods and foodstuffs from the employer's shop. This system was additional exploitation of the workers, and in Russia, was particularly widespread in the areas where handicraft industry flourished.

p. 428

[121] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 336-68.

p. 435

[122] *Yuridichesky Vestnik* (*The Legal Messenger*)—a monthly magazine, bourgeois-liberal in trend, published in Moscow from 1867 to 1892.

p. 437

[123] Lenin quotes from Heine's poem "Du hast Diamanten und Perlen..." ("Thou hast diamonds and pearls").

p. 441

[124] *Dyelovoi Korrespondent* (*Business Correspondent*)—a commercial and industrial newspaper that appeared in Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk) from 1886 to 1898. Its columns contained informative items, announcements, articles on economic problems, and reviews.

p. 442

[125] Vol. X, part I, of the *Code of Laws of the Russian Empire*.

p. 443

[126] *Permskiye Gubernskiye Vedomosti* (*Perm Gubernia Record*)—an official paper that appeared weekly, and then daily, in Perm from 1838 to 1917.

p. 452

[127] Cf. I. I. Khemnitser's fable "The Metaphysician," in which the metaphysician is the embodiment of empty theorising.

p. 453

[128] The article "*Gems of Narodnik Project-Mongering*" was written at the close of 1897 during Lenin's exile in Siberia. He wrote it for *Novoye Slovo*, being unaware that the government had closed that magazine down in December 1897.

In 1898 Lenin included the article in his miscellany *Economic Studies and Essays*.

p. 459

[129] The "*disciples*"—the term used in the 1890s as a legal way of referring to the followers of Marx and Engels.

p. 462

[130] In this passage Lenin refers to the historico-ethical school in political economy that grew up in Germany in the 1870s. This school attached great importance to ethical (moral) principles in economic life. Its exponents were G. Schmoller, L. Brentano and other Katheder-Socialists.

p. 466

[131] Marx and Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953, p. 303.

p. 469

[132] *Korobochka*—a character in N. V. Gogol's *Dead Souls*. A petty landlady, tight-fisted, pettifogging and stupid, she was "block-headed," to use Gogol's expression. The name Korobochka has become an epithet indicating petty miserliness and stupidity.

p. 475

[133] Lenin refers to the period of absolute police despotism and gross licence of the military associated with the name and activity of A. A. Arakcheyev, the powerful favourite of Paul I and Alexander I. Characteristic of the Arakcheyev regime were the brutal measures employed against the revolutionary movement of the oppressed masses and against all free thinking.

Arakcheyev was particularly notorious for having established military settlements designed to cheapen the cost of maintaining the army. Besides fulfilling their military duties, the settlers had to maintain themselves by farmwork. Unparalleled brutality, rigorous discipline, and regulation of the settlers' lives down to the smallest details prevailed in the military settlements.

p. 478

[134] *Mercantilism*—a system of economic views and the economic policy current in a number of European states from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century to assist the accumulation of capital and the development of commerce. The advocates of mercantilism identified the nation's wealth with money, their opinion being that the public wealth is contained exclusively in money in the shape of precious metals. The states that adhered to the mercantile system tried to regulate trade in such a way as to ensure that exports exceeded imports. With this aim, they pursued a policy of protecting home industry by regulating the import of foreign goods through the imposition of tariffs, the granting of subsidies to the manufactories, and so forth. The mercantilist economic policy helped to intensify the exploitation of the working people.

p. 480

[135] This was the expression used by P. B. Struve to describe the plan suggested by Guryev, a member of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Finance, in an article "Current Problems of our Country's Life," signed P. B. (see *Novoye Slovo*, No. 7, April 1897, p. 238).

p. 480

[136] By the great Russian utopian is meant N. G. Chernyshevsky (1828-89), the great Russian revolutionary democrat, scholar, writer and literary critic. One of the outstanding predecessors of Russian Social-Democracy, Chernyshevsky was the ideological inspirer and leader of the revolutionary-democratic movement in Russia in the 1860s. A utopian socialist, he considered the transition to socialism possible through the medium of the peasant community. At the same time, as a revolutionary democrat he was able to exert a revolutionary influence on all the political events of his day, overcoming all the obstacles and obstructions of the censorship and advocating the idea of a peasant revolution, the idea of a mass struggle to overthrow all the old authorities (V. I. Lenin, "The 'Peasant Reform' and Proletarian-Peasant Revolution." See present edition, Vol. 17). Chernyshevsky wrathfully exposed the feudal character of the "peasant" Reform of 1861, and called on the peasants to revolt. In 1862 he was arrested by the tsarist government and was confined to the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he spent nearly two years, after which he was sentenced to seven years penal servitude and to permanent exile in Siberia. He was only allowed to return from exile towards the end of his life. To the end of his days Chernyshevsky was a passionate fighter against social injustice, against all manifestations of political and economic oppression.

Chernyshevsky's services in developing Russian materialist philosophy were tremendous, his views being the summit of pre-Marxist materialist philosophy. His materialism was of a revolutionary and active character. He vigorously criticised idealist theories, and tried to refashion Hegelian dialectics in the materialist spirit. Magnificent specimens of a dialectical approach to the study of reality are to be found in Chernyshevsky's writings on political economy, aesthetics, art criticism, and history.

Marx made a study of Chernyshevsky's works, had a very high opinion of them, and called Chernyshevsky a great Russian scholar. Lenin wrote of him that he was "the only really great Russian writer who, from the fifties up to 1888, succeeded in keeping to the level of an integral philosophic materialism.... But, continued Lenin, "due to the backwardness of Russian life, Chernyshevsky was unable to, or rather, could not, rise to the heights of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels" (V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*. See present edition, Vol. 14).

Chernyshevsky's literary and critical works exerted tremendous influence on the development of Russian literature and art. His novel *What Is To Be Done?* (1863) helped to politically educate more than one generation of revolutionaries in Russia and other countries.

p. 481

[137] *Sever* (*North*)—a weekly literary and art journal that appeared in St. Petersburg from 1888 to 1914.

p. 483

[138] *Gogol's young lady*—Agaphia Tikhonovna, a character in Gogol's comedy *Marriage*.

p. 485

[139] *Novus*—a pseudonym of P. B. Struve.

p. 486

[140] Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 38.

Further on Lenin quotes this passage in greater detail (see footnote to p. 487 of the present volume).

p. 486

[141] Lenin refers here to page 39 of the magazine *Novoye Slovo*, No. 9, June 1897, which contains a passage from his essay "Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" (see p. 229 of the present volume).

p. 487

[142] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 504-06.

p. 487

[143] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 334.

p. 487

[144] The article "*The Heritage We Renounce*" was written at the close of 1897 when in exile in Siberia. In 1898 it was published in the miscellany *Economic Studies and Essays*.

p. 491

[145] *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (*Fatherland Notes*)—a literary-political magazine that began publication in St. Petersburg in 1820. From 1839 it became the best progressive journal of its day. Among its contributors were V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen, T. N. Granovsky, and N. P. Ogaryov. Following Belinsky's departure from the editorial board in 1846, the importance of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* began to diminish. In 1868 the journal came under the direction of N. A. Nekrasov and M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin. This marked the onset of a period in which the journal flourished anew, gathering around itself the revolutionary democratic intellectuals of Russia. When Nekrasov died (in 1877), the Narodniks gained dominant influence in the journal.

Otechestvenniye Zapiski was continually harassed by the censors, and in April 1884 was closed down by the tsarist government.

p. 494

[146] *The "peasant Reform" of 1861*, which abolished serfdom in Russia, was effected by the tsarist government in the interests of the serf-owning landlords. The Reform was made necessary by the entire course of Russia's economic development and by the growth of a mass movement among the peasantry against feudal exploitation. In

its form the "peasant Reform" was feudal, but the force of economic development that had drawn Russia on to the capitalist path gave the feudal form a capitalist content, and this content became the more evident the *less* land was filched from the peasants, the *more fully* the land of the peasants was separated from that of the landlords, the *less* the tribute" (i.e., redemption) paid to the feudalists" ("The 'Peasant Reform' and Proletarian-Peasant Revolution." See present edition, Vol. 17). The "peasant Reform" marked a step towards Russia's transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. On February 10,1861, Alexander II signed a Manifesto and Regulations for the peasants, who had been freed from feudal dependence. In all, 22,500,000 serfs, formerly belonging to landowners, were "emancipated." Landed proprietorship, however, remained. The peasants' lands were declared the property of the landlords. The peasant could only get a land allotment according to the standard established by law (and even then by agreement with the landlord), and had to redeem it, that is, pay for it. The peasants made their redemption payments to the tsarist government, that had paid the established sums to the landlords. Approximate estimates show that after the Reform, the nobility possessed 71,500,000 dessiatines of land and the peasants 33,700,000 dessiatines. The Reform enabled the landlords to cut off and appropriate one-fifth or even two-fifths of the land formerly cultivated by the peasants.

The Reform merely undermined, but did not abolish, the old corvée system of farming. The landlords secured possession of the best parts of the peasants' allotments (the "cut-off lands," woods, meadows, watering places, grazing grounds, and so on), without which the peasants could not engage in independent farming. Until the redemption arrangements were completed the peasants were considered to be "temporarily bound," and rendered services to the landlord in the shape of quit-rent or corvée service.

The Russian revolutionary democrats, headed by N. G. Chernyshevsky, criticised the "peasant Reform" for its feudal character. V. I. Lenin called the "peasant Reform" of 1861 the first mass act of violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture—the landlords were "clearing the estates" for capitalism.

For material on the 1861 Reform, see F. Engels' article "Socialism in Germany" (*Die Neue Zeit*, Jg. X, Bd. I, 1891, H. 19) and V. I. Lenin's "The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Downfall of Serfdom," "The Jubilee," "The 'Peasant Reform' and Proletarian-Peasant Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 17).

p. 495

[147] The Regulations of February 19, 1861, were legislative acts on the abolition of serfdom in Russia.

p. 496

[148] Engels describes Skaldin as a moderate conservative in his article

"Soziales aus Russland" ("On Social Relations in Russia"). Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 58.
p. 505

[149] When speaking of the ideological "heritage" of the 1860s Lenin was compelled, for censorship reasons, to make reference to Skaldin. Actually Lenin considered Chernyshevsky to be the principal representative of this "heritage." In a letter to A. N . Potresov dated January 26, 1899, from exile in Siberia, Lenin wrote: "...nowhere, however, do I suggest accepting the heritage from Skaldin. There can be no doubt that it should be accepted from other people. I think that the footnote on p. 237" (p. 505 of the present volume), "in which I had Chernyshevsky in mind and explained why it was not convenient to take him for purposes of comparison, will make it easier for me to defend myself (against possible attacks by opponents)."
p. 505

[150] *Zemledelcheskaya Gazeta* (*Agricultural News*)—organ of the Ministry of State Properties (from 1894—of the Ministry of State Properties and Agriculture); appeared in St. Petersburg from 1834 to 1917.
p. 511

[151] *Cycle cultivation*—an enslaving form of labour-service rendered to the landlord by the peasant as rental for land obtained from him. The landlord lent the peasant land or made him a loan in cash or kind for which the peasant undertook to cultivate a "cycle" using his own implements and draught animals: this meant cultivating one dessiatine of spring crops and one of winter crops, occasionally supplemented by reaping a dessiatine of crops.
p. 511

[152] *Vestnik Yevropy* (*European Messenger*)—a monthly historico-political and literary magazine, bourgeois-liberal in trend. Appeared In St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. The magazine published articles directed against the revolutionary Marxists. The magazine's editor and publisher until 1908 was M. M. Stasyulevich.
p. 515

[153] These words are from Skaldin's book, *In the Backwoods and in the Capital*, St. Petersburg, 1870, p. 285.
p. 519

[154] Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1955, p. 110.
p. 524

[155] N. Kamensky was one of the pseudonyms used by G. V. Plekhanov. The article referred to is his "Materialist Conception of History," published in 1897 in issue No. 12 (September) of *Novoye Slovo*.
p. 530

[156] *Schmollers Jahrbuch*—its full title is *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich* (*Legislative, Administrative and Economic Yearbook for the German Empire*)—a magazine dealing with political economy, published from 1877 onwards by the German bourgeois economists and Katheder-Socialists, F. Holtzendorf and L. Brentano, and from 1881 by G. Schmoller.

p. 533

[157] *Nedelya* (*Week*)—a liberal-Narodnik political and literary newspaper. Appeared in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1901. Was opposed to fighting the autocracy, and advocated the so-called theory of "minor matters," i.e., appealed to the intelligentsia to abstain from revolutionary struggle and to engage in "cultural activity."

p. 534

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*1895-1897*)

1895

February 18 or 19 (March 2 or 3, new style)	Lenin participates in a meeting of members of Social-Democratic groups in various Russian towns held in St. Petersburg. The problems discussed are: the transition from Marxist propaganda in narrow study circles to political agitation among the masses and the publication of popular literature for workers.
April	Lenin's *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book* is published in the miscellany *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development* under the pseudonym of K. Tulin. The miscellany was seized by the tsarist censors and almost the entire edition was burned.
April 25 (May 7)	Lenin goes abroad to establish contact with the Emancipation of Labour Group, and to acquaint himself with the West-European working-class movement.
May	While in Switzerland Lenin makes the acquaintance of members of the Emancipation of Labour group (G. V. Plekhanov and others), and arranges for regular contacts with them, and for the publication abroad of the miscellany *Rabotnik*.
End of May-June (June-beginning of July	Lenin lives in Paris. Becomes acquainted with Paul Lafargue.
July	Lenin takes a cure at a Swiss sanatorium.
Latter half of July-beginning of September (first half of August-middle of September	During his stay in Berlin, Lenin works in the public library, acquaints himself with Marxist literature, and attends workers' meetings.

July 22 (August 3)	Lenin attends a Social-Democratic meeting held in the Niederbarnim suburb of Berlin.
September 7 (19)	Lenin returns to Russia carrying with him a portmanteau with a false bottom containing illegal Marxist literature.
Between 7 and 29 of September (September 19 and October 11)	Lenin visits Vilno Moscow and Orekhovo-Zuyevo where he establishes contact with members of local Social-Democratic groups and gets their agreement to support the miscellany *Rabotnik* then being published abroad.
September 29 (October 11)	Lenin returns to St. Petersburg.
Autumn	Lenin founds the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in St. Petersburg.
November	Lenin sends abroad a series of items dealing with the working-class movement in Russia, for publication in the *Rabotnik* miscellany.
Not before November 7 (19)	The St. Petersburg League of Struggle issues the leaflet written by Lenin entitled "To the Working Men and Women of the Thornton Factory."
November 25 (December 7)	Lenin's article "*Gymnasium Farms and Corrective Gymnasia*" is published in the newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik*.
November-beginning of December (November-middle of December)	Lenin prepares the publication of the first issue of the illegal newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo*, organ of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle; he writes the leading article "To the Russian Workers" the article "What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?" and others. He edits the whole issue.
December 3 (15)	The publication of Lenin's pamphlet *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers* is begun.
December 8 (20)	Meeting of the leading group of the League of Struggle headed by Lenin, at which the first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, prepared for the press is discussed.
In the night of December (20-21)	Lenin and other members of the St. Petersburg 8-9 League of Struggle are arrested. During the search and arrest of A. A. Vaneyev the police seize the material for the first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, then ready for the press. Lenin is remanded under arrest.
December 21 (January 2 1896)	Lenin's first interrogation in prison.
End of the year	Lenin drafts a programme for the Social-Democratic Party.

1896

1896	While in prison, Lenin establishes contact with members of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle who escaped arrest, helps the League with advice and instruction, and has pamphlets and leaflets written by him smuggled out.
Beginning of January	While in prison Lenin begins preparations for his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.*
Not before March	Lenin's obituary "Frederick Engels," written in 1895, is published in the miscellany *Rabotnik*, No. 1-2.
March 30 (April 11)	Lenin's second interrogation in prison.
May 7 (19)	Third interrogation.
May 27 (June 8)	Fourth interrogation.
Summer	Lenin writes an explanation of the programme for the Social-Democratic Party.
Before November 25 (December 7)	The St. Petersburg League of Struggle issues a leaflet "To the Tsarist Government," written by Lenin while in prison.

1897

January 29 (February 10)	The tsarist government issues an order exiling Lenin to East Siberia under police surveillance for three years.
February 13 (25)	Lenin is informed of his sentence to exile in East Siberia.
February 14 (26) (February 26-March 1)	Lenin is released from remand imprisonment and allowed to remain in St. Petersburg until the evening of February 17 (March 1).
February 14-17	Lenin has a meeting in St. Petersburg with the other "old" League of Struggle members who have been released before being sent into exile and with "young" members. At a meeting of "old" and "young" League members Lenin severely criticises the "economism" trend that is beginning to appear among the "young" members.
February 17 (March 1)	Lenin leaves St. Petersburg for exile in Siberia via Moscow.
February 18-22 (March 2-6)	On his way to exile a halt is made in Moscow, where Lenin has permission to stay for a while with his mother. He stays two days longer than allowed by the police.
February 22 (March 6)	Lenin leaves Moscow for Siberia, where he is to live in exile.

March 4 (16)	Lenin arrives in Krasnoyarsk.
March 9-April 30 (March 21-May 12)	While in Krasnoyarsk Lenin studies problems relating to Russia's economic development, using for this purpose books in the private library of G. V. Yudin, a local merchant.
April-July	Lenin's *Characterisation of Economic Romanticism* is published in *Novoye Slovo*, issues 7-10.
April 30 (May 12)	Lenin leaves Krasnoyarsk via Minusinsk for the village of Shushenskoye, the place to which he has been exiled.
May 6 (18)	Lenin arrives in Minusinsk.
May 8 (20)	Lenin arrives in the village of Shushenskoye, Minusinsk Province, Yenisei Gubernia.
Summer and Autumn	Lenin writes his pamphlet The New Factory Law and the appendix to it.
September 27-28 (October 9-10)	Lenin travels to Minusinsk, where he makes the acquaintance of exiled members of the Narodnaya Volya and Narodnoye Pravo organisations.
September 29-October 4 (October 11-16)	From Minusinsk Lenin arrives in the village of Tesinskoye, where he spends five days among exiled Social-Democrats.
November	Lenin leaves Shushenskoye village and visits Minusinsk "without permission."
Second half of the year	Lenin writes the pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* and the articles "The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of 'Handicraft' Industry," "Gems of Narodnik Project-Mongering," and "The Heritage We Renounce."
1897	While in exile, Lenin maintains contact with the leading bodies of the working-class movement in Russia and with the Emancipation of Labour group abroad, and also corresponds with Social-Democrats in other, places of exile; he continues preparations for his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Lenin gives legal advice to the peasants of Shushenskoye village and the surrounding region, and enjoys great prestige among them.

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 2

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

3

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Издание четвертое

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО
ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW

V. I. LENIN
1897

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Necessary amendments have been made to some of the texts and notes in accordance with the fifth edition of the *Collected Works* of V. I. Lenin: some further editorial comments have also been added.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA

THE PROCESS OF THE FORMATION OF A HOME MARKET FOR LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY[1]

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ИЗДАНІЕ М. И. ВОДОВОЗОВОЙ.

ВЛАДИМІРЪ ИЛЬИНЪ.

РАЗВИТІЕ КАПИТАЛИЗМА

ВЪ РОССІИ.

Процессъ образованія внутренняго рынка для крупной промышленности.

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С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ.
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Cover of the first edition of Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, 1899

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

In the work here presented, the author has set himself the aim of examining the question of how a home market is being formed for Russian capitalism. As we know, this question was raised long ago by the principal exponents of Narodnik views (chief among them being Messrs. V. V. and N.—on[2]), and it will be our task to criticise these views. We have not considered it possible to limit ourselves in this criticism to examining the mistakes and misconceptions in our opponents' views; in answering the question raised it seemed to us that it was not enough to adduce facts showing the formation and growth of a home market, for the objection might be raised that such facts had been selected arbitrarily and that facts showing the contrary had been omitted. It seemed to us that it was necessary to examine the whole process of the development of capitalism in Russia, to endeavour to depict it in its entirety. It goes without saying that such an extensive task would be beyond the powers of a single person, were a number of limitations not introduced. Firstly, as the title itself shows, we treat the problem of the development of capitalism in Russia exclusively from the standpoint of the home market, leaving aside the problem of the foreign market and data on foreign trade. Secondly, we limit ourselves purely to the post-Reform period. Thirdly, we deal mainly and almost exclusively with data concerning the interior, purely Russian, gubernias. Fourthly, we limit ourselves exclusively to the economic aspect of the process. But even with all the limitations

indicated the topic that remains is an extremely broad one. The author does not close his eyes at all to the difficulty, and even the danger, of dealing with so broad a topic, but it seemed to him that to elucidate the problem of the home market for Russian capitalism it was absolutely necessary to show the connection between, and interdependence of, the various aspects of the process taking place in all spheres of the social economy. We therefore limit ourselves to an examination of the main features of the process, leaving a more specific study of it to further investigations.

The plan of our work is as follows: in Chapter I we shall examine, as briefly as possible, the basic theoretical propositions of abstract political economy on the subject of the home market for capitalism. This will serve as a sort of introduction to the rest of the work, the factual part of it, and will relieve us of the need to make repeated references to theory in our further exposition. In the three following chapters we shall endeavour to describe the capitalist evolution of agriculture in post-Reform Russia, namely, in Chapter II we shall examine Zemstvo statistical data on the differentiation of the peasantry; in Chapter III data on the transitional state of landlord economy, and on the replacement of the corvée system of this economy by the capitalist; and in Chapter IV data on the forms in which the formation of commercial and capitalist agriculture is proceeding. The next three chapters will be devoted to the forms and stages of the development of capitalism in our industry: in Chapter V we shall examine the first stages of capitalism in industry, namely, *in small peasant* (*known as handicraft*) *industry*; in Chapter VI data on capitalist manufacture and on capitalist domestic industry, and in Chapter VII data on the development of large-scale machine industry. In the last chapter (VIII), we shall make an attempt to indicate the connection between the various aspects of the process that have been described and to present a general picture of that process.

P. S.[3] To our extreme regret we have not been able to use for this work the excellent analysis of "the development of agriculture in capitalist society" made by K. Kautsky in his book *Die Agrarfrage* (Stuttgart, Dietz, 1899; I. Abschn.

"Die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft"*).**

This book (which we received when the greater part of the present work had already been set up in type) is, after Vol. III of *Capital*, the most noteworthy contribution to recent economic literature. Kautsky investigates the "main tendencies" in the capitalist evolution of agriculture; his purpose is to examine the diverse phenomena in modern agriculture as "particular manifestations of one general process" (Vorrede,*** VI). It is interesting to note how far the main features of this general process in Western Europe and in Russia are identical, notwithstanding the tremendous peculiarities of the latter, in both the economic and non-economic spheres. For example, typical of modern capitalist agriculture in general is the progressive division of labour and the employment of machinery (Kautsky, IV, b, c), a phenomenon also noticeable in post-Reform Russia (see later, Chapter III, §§VII and VIII; Chapter IV, particularly §IX). The process of the "proletarisation of the peasantry" (the heading of Chapter VIII of Kautsky's book) is manifested everywhere in the spread of wage-labour in every form among the small peasants (Kautsky, VIII, b); we see the parallel of this in Russia in the formation of a huge class of allotment-holding wage-workers (see later, Chapter II). The existence of a small peasantry in every capitalist society is due not to the technical superiority of small production in agriculture, but to the fact that the small peasants reduce the level of their requirements below that of the wage-workers and tax their energies far more than the latter do (Kautsky, VI, b; "the agricultural wage-worker is better off than the small peasant," says Kautsky repeatedly: S. 110, 317, 320); the same thing is also to be observed in Russia (see later, Chapter II, §XI, C[4]). It is natural, therefore, that West-European and Russian Marxists should agree in their appraisal of such phenomena as "agricultural outside employments," to use the Russian term, or the "agricultural wage-labour of migratory peasants,"

* *The Agrarian Question*, Part I. "The Development of Agriculture in Capitalist Society."—*Ed.*

** There is a Russian translation.

*** Preface.—*Ed.*

as the Germans say (Kautsky, S. 192; cf. later, Chapter III, §X); or of such a phenomenon as the migration of workers and peasants from the villages to the towns and factories (Kautsky, IX, especially S. 343; and many other places. Cf. later, Chapter VIII, §II); the transplantation of large-scale capitalist industry to the rural districts (Kautsky, S. 187. Cf. later, VII, §VIII). This is quite apart from the same appraisal of the *historical* significance of agricultural capitalism (Kautsky, passim, especially S. 289, 292, 298. Cf. later, Chapter IV, §IX), from the same recognition of the *progressive* nature of capitalist relations in agriculture as compared with pre-capitalist relations [Kautsky, S. 382: "The ousting des Gesindes (of personally dependent farm labourers, servants) and der Instleute ("midway between the farm labourer and the tenant cultivator": the peasant who rents land, making payment by labour-service) by day labourers who outside of working hours are free men, would mark great social progress." Cf. later, Chapter IV, §IX, 4]. Kautsky categorically declares that the adoption by the village community of large-scale modern agriculture conducted communally "is out of the question" (S. 338); that the agronomists in Western Europe who demand the consolidation and development of the village community are not socialists at all, but people representing the interests of the big landowners, who want to tie down the workers by granting them patches of land (S. 334); that in all European countries those who represent the landowners' interests want to tie down the agricultural workers by allotting them land and are already trying to give legislative effect to the appropriate measures (S. 162); that all attempts to help the small peasantry by introducing handicraft industry (Hausindustrie)—that worst form of capitalist exploitation—"should be most resolutely combated" (S. 181). We consider it necessary to emphasise the complete unanimity of opinion between the West-European and the Russian Marxists, in view of the latest attempts of the spokesmen of Narodism to draw a sharp distinction between the two (see the statement made by Mr. V. Vorontsov on February 17, 1899, at the Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Trade, *Novoye Vremya* [*New Times*], No. 8255, February 19, 1899).[5]

Ульянов

Владиміръ Ильинъ.

РАЗВИТІЕ КАПИТАЛИЗМА въ Россіи.

Процессъ образованія внутренняго рынка для крупной промышленности.

ИЗДАНІЕ ВТОРОЕ, ДОПОЛНЕННОЕ.

Цѣна 2 р. 25 к.

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ.
КНИГОИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО „ПАЛЛАДА".
1908.

Cover of the second edition of Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, 1908, autographed by the author

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION[6]

This book was written in the period preceding the Russian Revolution, during the slight lull that set in after the outbreak of the big strikes of 1895-1896. At that time the working-class movement withdrew, as it were, into itself, spreading in breadth and depth and paving the way for the beginning in 1901 of the demonstration movement.

The analysis of the social-economic system and, consequently, of the class structure of Russia given in this work on the basis of an economic investigation and critical analysis of statistics, has now been confirmed by the open political action of all classes in the course of the revolution. The leading role of the proletariat has been fully revealed. It has also been revealed that the strength of the proletariat in the process of history is immeasurably greater than its share of the total Population. The economic basis of the one phenomenon and the other is demonstrated in the present work.

Further, the revolution is now increasingly revealing the dual position and dual role of the peasantry. On the one hand, the tremendous survivals of corvée economy and all kinds of survivals of serfdom, with the unprecedented impoverishment and ruin of the peasant poor, fully explain the deep sources of the revolutionary peasant movement, the deep roots of the revolutionary character of the peasantry as a mass. On the other hand, in the course of the revolution, the character of the various political parties, and the numerous ideological-political trends reveal the inherently contradictory class structure of this mass, its petty-bourgeois character, the antagonism between the proprietor and the proletarian trends within it. The vacillation of the impoverished small master between the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat is as inevitable

as the phenomenon existent in every capitalist society that an insignificant minority of small producers wax rich, "get on in the world," turn into bourgeois, while the overwhelming majority are either utterly ruined and become wage-workers or paupers, or eternally eke out an almost proletarian existence. The economic basis of both these trends among the peasantry is demonstrated in the present essay.

With this economic basis the revolution in Russia is, of course, inevitably a bourgeois revolution. This Marxist proposition is absolutely irrefutable. It must never be forgotten. It must always be applied to all the economic and political problems of the Russian Revolution.

But one must know how to apply it. A concrete analysis of the status and the interests of the different classes must serve as a means of defining the precise significance of this truth when applied to this or that problem. The opposite mode of reasoning frequently met with among the Right-wing Social-Democrats headed by Plekhanov, i.e., the endeavour to look for answers to concrete questions in the simple logical development of the general truth about the basic character of our revolution, is a vulgarisation of Marxism and downright mockery of dialectical materialism. Of such people, who from the general truth of the character of this revolution deduce, for example, the leading role of the "bourgeoisie" in the revolution, or the need for socialists to support the liberals, Marx would very likely have repeated the words once quoted by him from Heine: "I have sown dragon's teeth and harvested fleas."[7]

With the present economic basis of the Russian Revolution, two main lines of its development and outcome are objectively possible:

Either the old landlord economy, bound as it is by thousands of threads to serfdom, is retained and turns slowly into purely capitalist, "Junker" economy. The basis of the final transition from labour-service to capitalism is the internal metamorphosis of feudalist landlord economy. The entire agrarian system of the state becomes capitalist and for a long time retains feudalist features. Or the old landlord economy is broken up by revolution, which destroys all the relics of serfdom, and large landownership in the first place. The basis of the final transition from labour-service to

FROM MARX TO MAO
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capitalism is the free development of small peasant farming, which has received a tremendous impetus as a result of the expropriation of the landlords' estates in the interests of the peasantry. The entire agrarian system becomes capitalist, for the more completely the vestiges of serfdom are destroyed the more rapidly does the differentiation of the peasantry proceed. In other words: either—the retention, in the main, of landed proprietorship and of the chief supports of the old "superstructure"; hence, the predominant role of the liberal-monarchist bourgeois and landlord, the rapid transition of the well-to-do peasantry to their side, the degradation of the peasant masses, not only expropriated on a vast scale but enslaved, in addition, by one or other kind of Cadet[8]-proposed land-redemption payments, and downtrodden and dulled by the dominance of reaction; the executors of such a bourgeois revolution will be politicians of a type approximating to the Octobrists.[9] Or—the destruction of landlordism and of all the chief supports of the corresponding old "superstructure"; the predominant role of the proletariat and the peasant masses, with the neutralising of the unstable or counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie; the speediest and freest development of the productive forces on a capitalist basis, under the best circumstances for the worker and peasant masses at all conceivable under commodity production;—hence, the establishment of the most favourable conditions for the further accomplishment by the working class of its real and fundamental task of socialist reorganisation. Of course, infinitely diverse combinations of elements of this or that type of capitalist evolution are possible, and only hopeless pedants could set about solving the peculiar and complex problems arising merely by quoting this or that opinion of Marx about a different historical epoch.

The essay here presented to the reader is devoted to an analysis of the pre-revolutionary economy of Russia. In a revolutionary epoch, life in a country proceeds with such speed and impetuosity that it is impossible to define the major results of economic evolution in the heat of political struggle. Messrs. the Stolypins[10], on the one hand, and the liberals on the other (and not only Cadets à la Struve, but all the Cadets in general), are working systematically, doggedly and consistently to accomplish the revolution

according to the first pattern. The coup d'etat of June 3, 1907, that we have recently witnessed, marks a victory for the counter-revolution,[11] which is striving to ensure the complete predominance of the landlords in the so-called representative body of the Russian people. But how far this "victory" is a lasting one is another matter; the struggle for the second outcome of the revolution goes on. Not only the proletariat, but also the broad masses of the peasantry are striving, more or less resolutely, more or less consistently, and more or less consciously, for this outcome. However much the counter-revolution tries to strangle the direct mass struggle by outright violence, however much the Cadets try to strangle it by means of their despicable and hypocritical counter-revolutionary ideas, that struggle, in spite of all, is breaking out, now here and now there, and laying its impress upon the policy of the "labour," Narodnik parties, although the top circles of petty-bourgeois politicians are undoubtedly contaminated (especially the "Popular Socialists" and Trudoviks[12]) with the Cadet spirit of treachery, Molchalinism[13] and smugness characteristic of moderate and punctilious philistines or bureaucrats.

How this struggle will end, what the final result of the first onset of the Russian Revolution will be—it is at present impossible to say. Hence, the time has not yet come (moreover, the immediate Party duties of a participant in the working-class movement leave no leisure) for a thorough revision of this essay.* The second edition cannot overstep the bounds of a characterisation of Russian economy before the revolution. The author had to confine himself to going over and correcting the text and also to making the most essential additions from the latest statistical material. These are recent horse-census data, harvest statistics, returns of the 1897 census of the population of Russia, *new data* from factory statistics, etc.

July 1907 ***The Author***

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* Such a revision will possibly require a sequel to the present work. In that case the first volume would have to be confined to an analysis of Russian economy before the revolution, and the second volume devoted to a study of the results and achievements of the revolution.

Das Kapital.

Kritik der politischen Oekonomie.

Von

Karl Marx.

Dritter Band, erster Theil.

Buch III:
Der Gesammtprocess der kapitalistischen Produktion.
Kapitel I bis XXVIII.

Herausgegeben von **Friedrich Engels.**

Das Recht der Uebersetzung ist vorbehalten.

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Cover of the German edition (1894) of K. Marx's *Capital*, Vol. III, Part 1, used by Lenin

CHAPTER I

THE THEORETICAL MISTAKES OF THE NARODNIK ECONOMISTS[14]

The market is a category of commodity economy, which in the course of its development is transformed into capitalist economy and only under the latter gains complete sway and universal prevalence. Therefore, in order to examine basic theoretical propositions concerning the home market we must proceed from simple commodity economy and trace its gradual transformation into capitalist economy.

I. THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

The basis of commodity economy is the social division of labour. Manufacturing industry separates from the raw materials industry, and each of these subdivides into small varieties and subvarieties which produce specific products as commodities, and exchange them for the products of all the others. Thus, the development of commodity economy leads to an increase in the number of separate and independent branches of industry; the tendency of this development is to transform into a special branch of industry the making not only of each separate product, but even of each separate part of a product—and not only the making of a product, but even the separate operations of preparing the product for consumption. Under natural economy society consisted of a mass of homogeneous economic units (patriarchal peasant families, primitive village communities, feudal manors), and each such unit engaged in all forms of economic activity, from the acquisition of various

kinds of raw material to their final preparation for consumption. Under commodity economy heterogeneous economic units come into being, the number of separate branches of economy increases, and the number of economic units performing one and the same economic function diminishes. It is this progressive growth in the social division of labour that is the chief factor in the process of creating a home market for capitalism. ". . . Where the basis is commodity production and its absolute form, capitalist production," says Marx, ". . . products are commodities, or use-values, which have an exchange-value that is to be realised, to be converted into money, only in so far as other commodities form an equivalent for them, that is, other products confront them as commodities and values; thus, in so far as they are not produced as immediate means of subsistence for the producers themselves, but as commodities, as products which become use-values only by their transformation into exchange-values (money), by their alienation. *The market for these commodities develops through the social division of labour*; the division of productive labours mutually transforms their respective products into commodities, into equivalents for each other, *making them mutually serve as markets*" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 177-178. Russ. trans., 526.[15] Our italics, as in all quotations, unless otherwise stated).

It goes without saying that the above-mentioned separation of the manufacturing from the raw materials industry, of manufacture from agriculture, transforms agriculture itself into an industry, into a *commodity*-producing branch of economy. The process of specialisation that separates from each other the diverse varieties of the manufacture of products, creating an ever-growing number of branches of industry, also manifests itself in agriculture, creating specialised agricultural districts (and systems of farming)* and

* For example, I. A. Stebut in his *Principles of Crop Farming* distinguishes farming systems according to the principal product marketed. There are three main farming systems: 1) crop growing (grain farming, as Mr. A. Skvortsov calls it); 2) livestock raising (the principal product marketed being livestock produce); and 3) industrial (technical farming, as Mr. A. Skvortsov calls it); the principal product marketed being agricultural produce that undergoes technical processing. See A. Skvortsov, *The Influence of Steam Transport on Agriculture*, Warsaw, 1890, p. 68 and foll.

giving rise to exchange not only between the products of agriculture and industry but also between the various products of agriculture. This specialisation of *commercial* (and capitalist) agriculture manifests itself in all capitalist countries, in the international division of labour; this is true of post-Reform Russia as well, as we shall show in detail below.

Thus, the social division of labour is the basis of the entire process of the development of commodity economy and of capitalism. It is quite natural, therefore, that our Narodnik theoreticians, who declare this process to be the result of artificial measures, the result of a "deviation from the path," and so on and so forth, have tried to gloss over the fact of the social division of labour in Russia or to belittle its significance. Mr. V. V., in his article "Division of Agricultural and Industrial Labour in Russia" (*Vestnik Yevropy* [*European Messenger*], 1884, No. 7), "denied" "the dominance in Russia of the principle of the social division of labour" (p. 347), and declared that in this country the social division of labour "has not sprung from the depths of the people's life, but has attempted to thrust itself into it from outside" (p. 338). Mr. N.—on, in his *Sketches*, argued as follows about the increase in the quantity of grain offered for sale: "This phenomenon might imply that the grain produced is more evenly distributed over the country, that the Archangel fisherman now consumes Samara grain, and that the Samara farmer supplements his dinner with Archangel fish. *Actually*, *however*, *nothing of the kind is happening*" (*Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 37). Without any data and contrary to generally known facts, the categorical assertion is bluntly made here that there is no social division of labour in Russia! The Narodnik theory of the "artificial character" of capitalism in Russia could only have been evolved by rejecting, or proclaiming as "artificial," the very foundation of all commodity economy, namely, the social division of labour.

II. THE GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL POPULATION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE AGRICULTURAL

In view of the fact that in the epoch preceding commodity economy, manufacturing is combined with the raw materials industry, and the latter is headed by agriculture, the development of commodity economy takes the shape of the separation from agriculture of one branch of industry after another. The population of a country in which commodity economy is poorly developed (or not developed at all) is almost exclusively agricultural. This, however, must not be understood as meaning that the population is engaged solely in agriculture: it only means that the population engaged in agriculture, also process the products of agriculture, and that exchange and the division of labour are almost non-existent. Consequently, the development of commodity economy eo ipso means the divorcement of an ever-growing part of the population from agriculture, i.e., the growth of the industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population. "*It is in the nature of capitalist production to continually reduce the agricultural population* as compared with the non-agricultural, because in industry (in the strict sense) the increase of constant capital at the expense of variable capital goes hand in hand with an absolute increase in variable capital despite its relative decrease; on the other hand, in agriculture the variable capital required for the exploitation of a certain plot of land decreases absolutely; it can thus only increase to the extent that new land is taken into cultivation, but this again requires as a prerequisite a still greater growth of the non-agricultural population" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 177. Russ. trans., p. 526).[16] Thus one cannot conceive of capitalism without an increase in the commercial and industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population, and everybody knows that this phenomenon is revealed in the most clear-cut fashion in all capitalist countries. It need hardly be proved that the significance of this circumstance as regards the problem of the home market is enormous, for it is bound up inseparably both with the evolution of industry and with the evolution of agriculture; the formation of industrial centres, their

numerical growth, and the attraction of the population by them cannot but exert a most profound influence on the whole rural system, and cannot but give rise to a growth of commercial and capitalist agriculture. All the more noteworthy is the fact that the exponents of Narodnik economics completely ignore this law both in their purely theoretical arguments and in their arguments about capitalism in Russia (we shall deal at length with the specific manifestations of this law in Russia later on, in Chapter VIII). The theories of Messrs. V. V. and N.—on regarding the home market for capitalism overlook a mere trifle—the diversion of the population from agriculture to industry, and the influence exerted by this fact on agriculture.*

III. THE RUIN OF THE SMALL PRODUCERS

So far we have dealt with simple commodity production. Now we pass to capitalist production, that is, we presume that instead of simple commodity producers we have, on the one hand, the owner of means of production and, on the other, the wage-worker, the seller of labour-power. The conversion of the small producer into a wage-worker presumes that he has lost the means of production—land, tools, workshop, etc.—i.e., that he is "impoverished," "ruined." The view is advanced that this ruin "diminishes the purchasing power of the population," "diminishes the home market" for capitalism (Mr. N.—on, loc. cit., p. 185. Also pp. 203, 275, 287, 339-340, etc. The same view is held by Mr. V. V. in the majority of his writings). We do not deal here with the factual data relating to this process in Russia—they will be examined in detail in later chapters. At the moment the question is posed purely theoretically, i.e., it relates to commodity production in general where it is transformed into capitalist production. The writers mentioned also pose this question theoretically, i.e., from the mere

* We have pointed to the identical attitude of the West-European romanticists and Russian Narodniks to the problem of the growth of industrial population in our article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism. Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists," (See present edition, Vol. 2.—*Ed.*)

fact of the ruin of the small producers they deduce a shrinkage of the home market. This view is absolutely incorrect, and its persistent survival in our economic literature can only be explained by the romantic prejudices of Narodism (see the article referred to in the footnote). It is forgotten that the "freeing" of one section of the producers from the means of production necessarily presumes the passage of the latter into other hands, their conversion into capital; presumes, consequently, that the new owners of these means of production produce as commodities the products formerly consumed by the producer himself, i.e., expand the home market; that in expanding production the new owners of the means of production present a demand to the market for new implements, raw materials, means of transport, etc., and also for articles of consumption (the enrichment of these new owners naturally presumes an increase in their consumption). It is forgotten that it is by no means the well-being of the producer that is important for the market but his possession of money; the decline in the well-being of the patriarchal peasant, who formerly conducted a mainly natural economy, is quite compatible with an increase in the amount of money in his possession, for the more such a peasant is ruined, the more he is compelled to resort to the sale of his labour-power, and the greater is the share of his (albeit scantier) means of subsistence that he must acquire in the market. "With the setting free (from the land) of a part of the agricultural population, therefore, their former means of nourishment were also set free. They were now transformed into material elements of variable capital" (capital spent on the purchase of labour-power) (*Das Kapital*, I, 776). "The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; *it also created the home market*" (ibid. 778).[17] Thus, from the standpoint of abstract theory, the ruin of the small producers in a society of developing commodity economy and capitalism means the very opposite to what Messrs. N.—on and V. V. want to deduce therefrom; it means the creation and not the shrinkage of the home market. If the very same Mr. N.—on, who declares a priori that the ruin of the Russian small producers means the

shrinkage of the home market, nevertheless cites the just-quoted contrary assertions of Marx (*Sketches*, pp. 71 and 114), it only proves the remarkable ability of that writer to belabour himself with quotations from *Capital*.

IV. THE NARODNIK THEORY OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF REALISING SURPLUS-VALUE

The next question in the theory of the home market is the following. We know that the value of a product in capitalist production resolves into three parts: 1) the first part replaces the constant capital, i.e., the value that existed previously in the shape of raw and auxiliary materials, machines and instruments of production, etc., and that is merely reproduced in a certain part of the finished product; 2) the second part replaces the variable capital, i.e., covers the maintenance of the worker; and, lastly, 3) the third part constitutes the surplus-value, which belongs to the capitalist. It is usually granted (we state the question in the spirit of Messrs. N.—on and V. V.) that the realisation (i.e., the finding of a corresponding equivalent, sale in the market) of the first two parts presents no difficulty, because the first part goes into production, and the second into consumption by the working class. But how is the third part—surplus-value—realised? It cannot, surely, be consumed in its entirety by the capitalists! So our economists come to the conclusion that "the way out of the difficulty" of realising surplus-value is "the acquisition of a foreign market" (N.—on, *Sketches*, Part II, §XV in general, and p. 205 in particular; V. V., "The Excess in the Market Supply of Commodities" in *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* [*Fatherland Notes*], 1883, and *Essays on Theoretical Economics*, St. Petersburg, 1895, p. 179 and foll.). The writers mentioned explain the need for a capitalist nation to have a foreign market by the suggestion that the capitalists cannot realise their products in any other way. The home market in Russia, they say, is shrinking because of the ruin of the peasantry and because of the impossibility of realising surplus-value without a foreign market, while the foreign market is closed to a young country that enters the path of

capitalist development too late—and so, it is declared as proven that Russian capitalism has no basis, is still-born, a claim founded on mere a priori (and, moreover, theoretically incorrect) assumptions!

When expressing his views on realisation, Mr. N.—on evidently had in mind Marx's theory on this subject (although he said not a single word about Marx in this part of his *Sketches*), but he absolutely failed to understand it and distorted it beyond recognition, as we shall see in a moment. This explains the curious fact that his views coincided in all essentials with those of Mr. V. V., who cannot possibly be accused of "not understanding" theory, for it would be the height of injustice to suspect him of even the slightest acquaintance with it. Both authors expound their theories as though they are the first to have dealt with the subject, and have reached certain solutions "all by themselves"; both of them most sublimely ignore the arguments of the old economists on the subject, and both repeat old errors that have been most thoroughly refuted in Volume II of *Capital*.* Both authors reduce the whole problem of the realisation of the product to the realisation of surplus-value, evidently imagining that the realisation of constant capital presents no difficulties. This naïve opinion contains a most profound error, one that is the source of all further errors in the Narodnik theory of realisation. As a matter of fact, the difficulty of explaining realisation is precisely one of explaining the realisation of constant capital. In order to be realised, constant capital must be put back again into production, and that is directly practicable only in the case of that capital whose product consists of means of production. If, however, the product which makes good the constant part of capital consists of articles of consumption, it cannot be directly put back into production;

* Particularly astonishing in this connection is Mr. V. V.'s audacity, which transcends all bounds of literary decency. After enunciating his theory, and betraying his utter unfamiliarity with Volume II of *Capital*, which deals specifically with realisation, he goes on to make the quite unfounded statement that "in building up my propositions I used" Marx's theory!! (*Essays on Theoretical Economics*, Essay III. "The Capitalist Law (sic!?!) of Production, Distribution and Consumption," p. 162.)

what is required is *exchange* between the department of social production that makes means of production and that which makes articles of consumption. It is this point that constitutes the whole difficulty of the problem, a difficulty *unnoticed* by our economists. Mr. V. V. presents the matter, generally speaking, as if the aim of capitalist production is not accumulation but consumption, advancing the profound argument that "into the hands of a minority flows a mass of material objects in excess of the consuming power of the organism" (sic!) "at the given stage of their development" (loc. cit., 149) and that "it is not the moderation and abstemiousness of the manufacturers which are the cause of the superfluity of products, but the limitations and insufficient elasticity of the human organism (!!), which fails to increase its consuming power at the rate at which surplus-value grows" (ibid., 161). Mr. N.—on tries to present the matter as though he does not regard consumption as the aim of capitalist production, as though he takes account of the role and significance of means of production in regard to the problem of realisation; as a matter of fact, however, he has no clear idea whatsoever about the process of the circulation and reproduction of the aggregate social capital, and has become entangled in a host of contradictions. We shall not stop to examine all these contradictions in detail (pp. 203-205 of Mr. N.—on's *Sketches*); that would be too thankless a task (and one already performed in part by Mr. Bulgakov* in his book *Markets Under Capitalist Production*, Moscow, 1897, pp. 237-245), and furthermore, to prove the justice of the appraisal given here of Mr. N.—on's arguments, it will suffice to examine his final conclusion, namely, that the foreign market is the way out of the difficulty of realising surplus-value. This conclusion of Mr. N.—on's (essentially a mere repetition of the one drawn by Mr. V. V.) shows in most striking fashion that he did not in any way understand either the realisation of the product in capitalist society (i.e., the theory of the home market)

* It will not be superfluous to remind the contemporary reader that Mr. Bulgakov, and also Messrs. Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky, whom we shall quote rather often later on, tried to be Marxists in 1899. Now they have all safely turned from "critics of Marx" into plain bourgeois economists. (*Note to 2nd edition.*[18])

or the role of the foreign market. Indeed, is there even a grain of common sense in this dragging of the foreign market into the problem of "realisation"? The problem of realisation is how to find for each part of the capitalist product, in terms of value (constant capital, variable capital and surplus-value) and in its material form (means of production, and articles of consumption, specifically necessities and luxuries), that other part of the product which replaces it on the market. Clearly, foreign trade must here be excluded,- for dragging it in does not advance the solution of the problem one iota, but merely retracts it by extending the problem from one country to several. The very same Mr. N.—on who discovered in foreign trade "the way out of the difficulty" of realising surplus-value, argues about wages, for example, as follows: with the part of the annual product which the direct producers, the workers, receive in the shape of wages "only that part of the means of subsistence can be drawn from circulation which is equal in value to the sum-total of wages" (203). How, the question arises, does our economist know that the capitalists of a given country will produce means of subsistence in just the quantity and of just the quality requisite for their realisation by wages? How does he know that in this connection the foreign market can be dispensed with? Obviously, he cannot know this, and has simply brushed aside the problem of the foreign market, for in discussing the realisation of variable capital the important thing is the replacement of one part of the product by another, and not at all whether this replacement takes place in one country or in two. With respect to surplus-value, however, he departs from this necessary premise, and instead of solving the problem, simply evades it by talking of the foreign market. The sale of the product in the foreign market itself needs explanation, i.e., the finding of an equivalent for that part of the product which is being sold, the finding of another part of the capitalist product that can replace the first. That is why Marx says that in examining the problem of realisation, the foreign market, foreign trade "must be entirely discarded," for "the involvement of foreign commerce in analysing the annually reproduced value of products can . . . only confuse without contributing any new element of the problem, or of its

solution" (*Das Kapital*, II, 469).[19] Messrs. V. V. and N.—on imagined that they were giving a profound appraisal of the contradictions of capitalism by pointing to the difficulties of realising surplus-value. Actually, however, they were giving an extremely superficial appraisal of the contradictions of capitalism, for if one speaks of the "difficulties" of realisation, of the crises, etc., arising therefrom, one must admit that these "difficulties" are not only possible but are necessary as regards all parts of the capitalist product, and not as regards surplus-value alone. Difficulties of this kind, due to disproportion in the distribution of the various branches of production, constantly arise, not only in realising surplus-value, but also in realising variable and constant capital; in realising not only the product consisting of articles of consumption, but also that consisting of means of production. Without "difficulties" of this kind and crises, there cannot, in general, be any capitalist production, production by isolated producers for a world market unknown to them.

V. THE VIEWS OF ADAM SMITH ON THE PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION OF THE AGGREGATE SOCIAL PRODUCT IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND MARX'S CRITICISM OF THESE VIEWS

In order properly to understand the theory of realisation we must start with Adam Smith, who laid the foundation of the erroneous theory on this subject that held undivided sway in political economy until Marx. Adam Smith divided the price of a commodity into only two parts: variable capital (wages, in his terminology) and surplus-value (he does not combine "profit" and "rent," so that actually he counted three parts in all.)* Similarly, he divided the sum-

* Adam Smith, *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 4th ed., 1801, Vol. I, p. 75, Book I: "Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labor, and of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally distributed among the different Ranks of the People," Chapter VI, "Of the component Parts of the Price of Commodities," Bibikov's Russian translation (St. Petersburg, 1866), Vol. I, p. 171.

total of commodities, the total annual social product, into the same parts and allocated them directly to the "revenue" of the two classes of society: the workmen and the capitalists (undertakers and landlords, as Smith calls them).*

On what did he base his omission of the third component of value, constant capital? Adam Smith could not fail to observe this part, but he assumed that it also is made up of wages and surplus-value. Here is how he argued on this subject: "In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord, another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer. These three parts seem either immediately or ultimately to make up the whole price of corn. A fourth part, it may perhaps be thought, is necessary for replacing the stock of the farmer, or for compensating the wear and tear of his labouring cattle, and other instruments of husbandry. But it must be considered that the price of any instrument of husbandry, such as a labouring horse, is itself made up of the same three parts" (namely, rent, profit and wages). "Though the price of the corn, therefore, may pay the price as well as the maintenance of the horse, the whole price still resolves itself either immediately or ultimately into the same three parts of rent, labour and profit."** Marx calls this theory of Smith's "astonishing." "His proof consists simply in the repetition of the same assertion" (II, S. 366).[20] Smith sends us "from pillar to post" (I. B., 2. Aufl., S. 612***).[21] In saying that the price of farming instruments *itself* resolves into the same three parts, Smith forgets to add: and also into the price of the means of production employed in the making of these instruments. The erroneous exclusion by Adam Smith (and also by subsequent economists) of the constant part of capital from the price of the product is due to an erroneous conception of accumulation in capitalist economy, i.e., of the expansion of production, the transformation of surplus-value into capital. Here too Adam Smith omitted constant capital, assuming that the

* Loc. cit., I, p. 78. Russ. trans., I, p. 174.
** Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 75-76. Russ. trans., I, p. 171.
*** Vol. I, 2nd ed., p, 612.—*Ed.*

accumulated part of surplus-value, the part converted into capital, is entirely consumed by the productive workers, i.e., goes entirely in wages, whereas actually the accumulated part of surplus-value is expended on constant capital (instruments of production, raw and auxiliary materials) plus wages. Criticising this view of Smith (and also of Ricardo, Mill and others) in *Capital*, Volume I (Part VII, "The Accumulation of Capital," Chapter 22, "Conversion of Surplus-Value into Capital," § 2, "Erroneous Conception, by Political Economy, of Reproduction on a Progressively Increasing Scale"), Marx there states that in Volume II "it will be shown that Adam Smith's dogma, inherited by all his successors, prevented political economy from understanding even the most elementary mechanism of the process of social reproduction" (I, 612).[22] Adam Smith committed this error because he confused the value of the product with the newly created value: the latter does indeed resolve itself into variable capital and surplus-value, whereas the former includes constant capital in addition. This error had been earlier exposed by Marx in his analysis of value, when he drew a distinction between abstract labour, which creates new value, and concrete, useful labour, which reproduces the previously existing value in the new form of a useful product.[23]

An explanation of the process of the reproduction and circulation of the total social capital is particularly necessary to settle the problem of the national revenue in capitalist society. It is extremely interesting to note that, when dealing with the latter problem, Adam Smith could no longer cling to his erroneous theory, which excludes constant capital from the country's total product. "The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends the whole annual produce of their land and labor; the neat revenue, what remains free to them after deducting the expense of maintaining; first, their fixed; and, secondly, their circulating capital; or what, without encroaching upon their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate consumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements" (A. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Book II. "Of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock," Chapter II, Vol. II, p. 18. Russ. trans., II, p. 21). Thus, from

the country's total product Adam Smith excluded capital, asserting that it resolves itself into wages, profit and rent, i.e., into (net) revenue; but in the gross revenue of society he includes capital, separating it from articles of consumption (= net revenue). This is the contradiction in which Marx catches Adam Smith: how can there be *capital* in the *revenue* if there was no *capital* in the *product*? (Cf. *Das Kapital*, II, S. 355.)[24] Without noticing it himself, Adam Smith here recognises three component parts in the value of the total product: not only variable capital and surplus-value, but also constant capital. Further on, Adam Smith comes up against another very important difference, one of enormous significance in the theory of realisation. "The whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital," he says, "must evidently be excluded from the neat revenue of the society. Neither the materials necessary for supporting their useful machines and instruments of trade, their profitable buildings, etc., *nor the produce of the labor necessary for fashioning those materials into the proper form*, *can ever make any part of it*. The price of that labor may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen so employed may place the whole value of their wages in their stock reserved for immediate consumption." But in other kinds of labour, both the "price" (of labour) "and the produce" (of labour) "go to this stock, the price to that of the workmen, the produce to that of other people" (A. Smith, *ibid.*). Here we find a gleam of recognition of the need to distinguish two kinds of labour: one that produces articles of consumption which may enter into the "neat revenue," and another which produces "useful machines and instruments of trade . . . buildings, etc.," i.e., articles that can never be used for personal consumption. From this it is only one step to the admission that an explanation of realisation absolutely requires that two forms of consumption be distinguished: personal and productive (= putting back into production). It was the rectification of these two mistakes made by Smith (the omission of constant capital from the value of the product, and the confusing of personal with productive consumption) that enabled Marx to build up his brilliant theory of the realisation of the social product in capitalist society.

As for the other economists, those between Adam Smith

and Marx, they all repeated Adam Smith's error* and for that reason did not advance one step. Of the confusion that consequently reigns in the theories of revenue we shall speak later. In the controversy as to the possibility of a general overproduction of commodities that was waged by Ricardo, Say, Mill and others, on the one hand, and by Malthus, Sismondi, Chalmers, Kirchmann and others, on the other, both sides adhered to Smith's erroneous theory, and consequently, as Mr. S. Bulgakov justly remarks, "in view of the false premises and the wrong formulation of the problem itself, these controversies could only lead to empty and scholastic wordspinning" (loc. cit., p. 21. See an account of this wordspinning in Tugan-Baranovsky's *Industrial Crises*, etc., St. Petersburg, 1894, pp. 377-404).

VI. MARX'S THEORY OF REALISATION

It follows automatically from what has been said that the fundamental premises on which Marx's theory is based are the following two propositions. The first is that the total product of a capitalist country, like the individual product, consists of the following three parts: 1) constant capital, 2) variable capital, and 3) surplus-value. To those who are familiar with the analysis of the process of production of capital given in Vol. I of Marx's *Capital* this proposition is self-evident. The second proposition is that two major departments of capitalist production must be distinguished, namely (Department I), the production of means of production—of articles which serve for productive consumption, i.e., are to be put back into production, articles which are consumed, not by people, but by capital; and (Department II) the production of articles of consumption, i.e., of articles used for personal consumption. "There is more theoretical meaning in this division alone than in all the preceding

* For example, Ricardo asserted that "the whole produce of the land and labour of every country is divided into three portions: of these, one portion is devoted to wages another to profits, and the other to rent" (*Works*, Sieber's translation, St. Petersburg, 1882, p. 221.

controversies over the theory of markets" (Bulgakov, loc. cit., p. 27). The question arises as to why such a division of products according to their natural form is now necessary to analyse the reproduction of social capital, when the analysis of the production and reproduction of individual capital dispensed with such a division and left the question of the natural form of the product entirely on one side. On what grounds can we introduce the question of the natural form of the product into a theoretical investigation of capitalist economy, which is based entirely on the exchange-value of the product? The fact is that when the production of individual capital was analysed, the question of where and how the product would be sold, and of where and how articles of consumption would be bought by the workers and means of production by the capitalists, was set aside as making no contribution to this analysis and as having no relation to it. All that had to be examined then was the problem of the value of the separate elements of production and of the results of production. Now, however, the question is: where will the workers and the capitalists obtain their articles of consumption, where will the capitalists obtain their means of production, how will the finished product meet all these demands and enable production to expand? Here, consequently, we have not only "a replacement of value, but also a replacement in material" (Stoffersatz.—*Das Kapital*, II, 389),[25] and hence it is absolutely essential to distinguish between products that play entirely different parts in the process of social economy.

Once these basic propositions are taken into account, the problem of the realisation of the social product in capitalist society no longer presents any difficulty. Let us first assume simple reproduction, i.e., the repetition of the process of production on its previous scale, the absence of accumulation. Obviously, the variable capital and the surplus-value in Department II (which exist in the form of articles of consumption) are realised by the personal consumption of the workers and capitalists of this department (for simple reproduction presumes that the whole of the surplus-value is consumed, and that no portion of it is converted into capital). Further, the variable capital and the surplus-value which exist in the form of means of production

(Department I) must, in order to be realised, be exchanged for articles of consumption for the capitalists and workers engaged in the making of means of production. On the other hand, neither can the constant capital existing in the form of articles of consumption (Department II) be realised except by an exchange for means of production, in order to be put back again into production the following year. Thus we get variable capital and surplus-value in means of production exchanged for constant capital in articles of consumption: the workers and the capitalists (in the means of production department) in this way obtain means of subsistence, while the capitalists (in the articles of consumption department) dispose of their product and obtain constant capital for further production. Under simple reproduction, the parts exchanged must be equal: the sum of variable capital and surplus-value in means of production must be equal to the constant capital in articles of consumption. On the other hand, if we assume reproduction on a progressively increasing scale, i.e., accumulation, the first magnitude must be greater than the second, because there must be available a surplus of means of production with which to begin *further* production. Let us revert, however, to simple reproduction. There has been left unrealised one more part of the social product, namely, constant capital in means of production. This is realised partly by exchange among the capitalists of this same department (coal, for example, is exchanged for iron, because each of these products serves as a necessary material or instrument in the production of the other), and partly by being put directly into production (for example, coal extracted in order to be used in the same enterprise again for the extraction of coal; grain in agriculture, etc.). As for accumulation, its starting-point, as we have seen, is a surplus of means of production (taken from the surplus-value of the capitalists in this department), a surplus that also calls for the conversion into capital of part of the surplus-value in articles of consumption. A detailed examination of how this additional production will be combined with simple reproduction we consider to be superfluous. It is no part of our task to undertake a special examination of the theory of realisation, and the foregoing is enough to elucidate the error of the

Narodnik economists and to enable us to draw certain theoretical conclusions regarding the home market.*

On the problem of interest to us, that of the home market, the main conclusion from Marx's theory of realisation is the following: capitalist production, and, consequently, the home market, grow not so much on account of articles of consumption as on account of means of production. In other words, the increase in means of production outstrips the increase in articles of consumption. Indeed, we have seen that constant capital in articles of consumption (Department II) is exchanged for variable capital + surplus-value in means of production (Department I). According, however, to the general law of capitalist production, constant capital grows faster than variable capital. Hence, constant capital in articles of consumption has to increase faster than variable capital and surplus-value in articles of consumption, while constant capital in means of production has to increase fastest of all, outstripping both the increase of variable capital (+ surplus-value) in means of production and the increase of constant capital in articles of consumption. The department of social production which produces means of production has, consequently, to grow faster than that producing articles of consumption. For capitalism, therefore, the growth of the home market is to a certain extent "independent" of the growth of personal consumption, and takes place mostly on account of productive consumption. But it would be a mistake to understand this "independence" as meaning that productive consumption is entirely divorced from personal consumption: the former can and must increase

* See *Das Kapital*, II. Band, III. Abschn.,[26] where a detailed investigation is made of accumulation, the division of articles of consumption into necessities and luxuries, the circulation of money, the wear and tear of fixed capital, etc. Readers who are unable to familiarise themselves with Volume II of *Capital* are recommended to read the exposition of Marx's theory of realisation contained in Mr. S. Bulgakov's book quoted above. Mr. Bulgakov's exposition is more satisfactory than that of Mr. M. Tugan-Baranovsky (*Industrial Crises*, pp. 407-438), who in building up his schemes has made some very ill-judged departures from Marx and has inadequately explained Marx's theory; it is also more satisfactory than the exposition given by Mr. A. Skvortsov (*Fundamentals of Political Economy*, St. Petersburg, 1898, pp 281-295), who holds wrong views on the very important questions of profit and rent.

faster than the latter (and there its "independence" ends), but it goes without saying that, in the last analysis, productive consumption is always bound up with personal consumption. Marx says in this connection: ". . . We have seen (Book II, Part III) that continuous circulation takes place between constant capital and constant capital. . ." (Marx has in mind constant capital in means of production, which is realised by exchange among capitalists in the same department). "It is at first independent of individual consumption because it never enters the latter. But this consumption definitely limits it nevertheless, since constant capital is never produced for its own sake but solely because more of it is needed in spheres of production whose products go into individual consumption" (*Das Kapital*, III, 1, 289. Russ. trans., p. 242).[27]

This larger consumption of constant capital is nothing but a higher level of the development of the productive forces, one expressed in terms of exchange-value, because the rapidly developing "means of production" consist, in the main, of materials, machines, instruments, buildings and all sorts of other accessories for large-scale, especially machine, production. It is quite natural, therefore, that capitalist production, which develops the productive forces of society and creates large-scale production and machine industry, is also distinguished by a particular expansion of that department of social wealth which consists of means of production. . . . "In this case" (namely, the production of means of production), "what distinguishes capitalist society from the savage is not, as Senior thinks, the privilege and peculiarity of the savage to expend his labour at times in a way that does not procure him any products resolvable (exchangeable) into revenue, i.e., into articles of consumption. No, the distinction consists in the following:

"a) Capitalist society employs more of its available annual labour in the production of means of production (ergo, of constant capital) which are not resolvable into revenue in the form of wages or surplus-value, but can function only as capital.

"b) When a savage makes bows, arrows, stone hammers, axes, baskets, etc., he knows very well that he did not spend the time so employed in the production of articles

of consumption, but that he has thus stocked up the means of production he needs, and nothing else" (*Das Kapital*, II, 436. Russ. trans., 333).[28] This "very good knowledge" of one's relation to production has disappeared in capitalist society owing to the latter's inherent fetishism, which presents the social relations of men as relations of products—owing to the conversion of every product into a commodity produced for an unknown consumer and to be realised in an unknown market. And as it is a matter of the utmost indifference to the individual entrepreneur what *kind* of article he produces—every product yields a "revenue,"—this same superficial, individual point of view was adopted by the economist-theoreticians in relation to the whole of society and prevented the process of the reproduction of the total social product in capitalist economy from being understood.

The development of production (and, consequently, of the home market) chiefly on account of means of production seems paradoxical and undoubtedly constitutes a contradiction. It is real "production as an end in itself"—the expansion of production without a corresponding expansion of consumption. But it is a contradiction not of doctrine, but of actual life; it is the sort of contradiction that corresponds to the very nature of capitalism and to the other contradictions of this system of social economy. It is this expansion of production without a corresponding expansion of consumption that corresponds to the historical mission of capitalism and to its specific social structure: the former consists in the development of the productive forces of society; the latter rules out the utilisation of these technical achievements by the mass of the population. There is an undoubted contradiction between the drive towards the unlimited extension of production inherent in capitalism, and the limited consumption of the masses of the people (limited because of their proletarian status). It is this contradiction that Marx records in the propositions so readily quoted by the Narodniks and which are supposed to corroborate their views on the shrinkage of the home market, the non-progressive character of capitalism, etc., etc. Here are some of these propositions: "Contradiction in the capitalist mode of production: the labourers as buyers of commodities are important for the market. But as sellers of their own

commodity—labour-power—capitalist society tends to keep them down to the minimum price" (*Das Kapital*, II, 303).[29]

". . . The conditions of realisation are limited by the proportional relation of the various branches of production and the consumer power of society. . . . But the more productiveness develops, the more it finds itself at variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of consumption rest" (ibid., III, 1, 225-226).[30] "The limits within which the preservation and self-expansion of the value of capital resting on the expropriation and pauperisation of the great mass of producers can alone move—these limits come continually into conflict with the methods of production employed by capital for its purposes, which drive towards unlimited extension of production, towards production as an end in itself, towards unconditional development of the social productivity of labour. . . . The capitalist mode of production is, for this reason, a historical means of developing the material forces of production and creating an appropriate world market, and is, at the same time, a continual conflict between this its historical task and its own corresponding relations of social production." (III, 1, 232. Russ. trans., p. 194).[31] "The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses as opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop the productive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of society constituted their outer limit"*

* It is this passage that the famous Ed. Bernstein (famous after the fashion of Herostratos) quoted in his *Premises of Socialism* (*Die Voraussetzungen*, *etc.*, Stuttgart, 1899, S. 67).[32] Our opportunist, of course, turning away from Marxism towards the old bourgeois economics, hastened to announce that this is a contradiction in Marx's theory of crises, that Marx's view "does not differ very much from Rodbertus's theory of crises." Actually, however, the only "contradiction" here is between Bernstein's pretentious claims, on the one hand, and his senseless eclecticism and refusal to delve into the meaning of Marx's theory, on the other. How far Bernstein failed to understand the theory of realisation is evident from his truly strange argument that the enormous increase in the aggregate surplus product must *necessarily* imply an increase in the number of affluent people (or an improvement in the living standard of the workers), for the capitalists themselves, if you please, and their "servants" (sic! Seite 51-52) cannot "consume" the entire surplus product!! (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

(III, 2, 21. Russ. trans., p. 395).[33] These propositions all speak of the contradiction we have mentioned, namely, the contradiction between the unrestricted drive to expand production and limited consumption—and of nothing else.* Nothing could be more senseless than to conclude from these passages in *Capital* that Marx did not admit the possibility of surplus-value being realised in capitalist society, that he attributed crises to under-consumption, and so forth. Marx's analysis of realisation showed that the circulation between constant capital and constant capital is definitely limited by personal consumption; but this same analysis showed the true character of this "limitedness,"[34] it showed that, compared with means of production, articles of consumption play a minor role in the formation of the home market. And, furthermore, there is nothing more absurd than to conclude from the contradictions of capitalism that the latter is impossible, non-progressive, and so on—to do that is to take refuge from unpleasant, but undoubted realities in the transcendental heights of romantic dreams. The contradiction between the drive towards the unlimited expansion of production and limited consumption is not the only contradiction of capitalism, which cannot exist and develop at all without contradictions. The contradictions of capitalism testify to its historically transient character, and make clear the conditions and causes of its collapse and transformation into a higher form; but they by no means rule out either the possibility of capitalism, or its progressive character as compared with preceding systems of social economy.**

VII. THE THEORY OF THE NATIONAL INCOME

Having outlined the main propositions of Marx's theory of realisation, we still have briefly to point to its enormous importance in the theory of national "consumption,"

* Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky is mistaken in thinking that in advancing this proposition Marx contradicts his own analysis of realisation (see article "Capitalism and the Market" in *Mir Bozhy* [*God's Earth*] 1898, No. 6, p. 123). Marx does not contradict himself at all, for the connection between productive consumption and personal consumption is also indicated in the analysis of realization.

** Cf. "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism. Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists." (See present edition, Vol. 2.—*Ed.*)

"distribution," and "income". All these problems, particularly the last, have hitherto been a veritable stumbling-block for economists. The more they have spoken and written about it, the greater has been the confusion caused by Adam Smith's fundamental error. We shall cite here some examples of this confusion.

It is interesting to note, for example, that Proudhon repeated essentially the same error, except that he formulated the old theory somewhat differently. He said:

"A (which stands for all property owners, entrepreneurs and capitalists) starts an enterprise with 10,000 francs, and with them makes advance payment to the workers, who must produce goods in return; after A has thus converted his money into commodities he must, at the end of the production process, at the end, say, of a year, convert the commodities again into money. To whom does he sell his commodities? To the workers, of course, for there are only two classes in society—the entrepreneurs on the one hand, and the workers on the other. These workers, having for the product of their labour received 10,000 francs as pay, which covers their essential requirements of life, must now, however, pay more than 10,000 francs, that is, they must pay for the addition that A receives in the shape of the interest and other profits he counted on at the beginning of the year. The worker can cover these 10,000 francs only by borrowing, and, as a consequence, he sinks deeper and deeper into debt and poverty. One of two things must necessarily take place: either the worker may consume 9, although he produced 10, or he pays the entrepreneur only the amount of his wages, in which case the entrepreneur himself suffers bankruptcy and disaster, for he does not receive interest on capital, which he on his part, however, must pay." (Diehl, Proudhon, II, 200, quoted from the compilation "Industry." Articles from *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*,* Moscow, 1896, p. 101.)

As the reader sees, this is the same difficulty—how surplus-value is to be realised—that Messrs. V. V. and N.—on are fussing over. Proudhon only expressed it in a somewhat specific form. And this specific character of his formulation

* Dictionary of Political Sciences.—*Ed.*

brings our Narodniks still closer to him: they too, like Proudhon, consider the "difficulty" to lie in the realisation of surplus-value (interest or profit, in Proudhon's terminology) and do not understand that the confusion they have acquired from the old economists prevents them from explaining the realisation not only of surplus-value, but also of *constant capital*, i.e., that their "difficulty" is in their not understanding the whole process of the realisation of the product in capitalist society.

Regarding this "theory" of Proudhon's, Marx sarcastically observes:

"Proudhon exposes his inability to grasp this" (namely, the realisation of the product in capitalist society) "in the ignorant formulation: l'ouvrier ne peut pas racheter son propre produit (the labourer cannot buy back his own product), because the interest which is added to the prix-de-revient (cost-price) is contained in the product" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 379. Russ. trans., 698, in which there are mistakes).[35]

And Marx quotes the remark directed against Proudhon by a certain vulgar economist named Forcade, who "quite correctly generalises the difficulty put forward in so narrow a form by Proudhon." Forcade said that the price of commodities contains not only something over and above the wages—the profit—but also the part that replaces constant capital. Hence, concludes Forcade in opposition to Proudhon, the capitalist is also unable to buy back commodities with his profit (not only did Forcade not solve the problem, he did not even understand it).

Neither did Rodbertus make any contribution to the solution of the problem. While laying particular stress on the thesis that "ground-rent, profit on capital and wages are income,"* he proved quite unable to arrive at a clear understanding of the concept "income." Stating his view as to what the tasks of political economy would have been had it pursued "a correct method" (loc. cit., S. 26), he also speaks about the distribution of the national product. "It" (i.e.,

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* Dr. Rodbertus-Jagetzow, *Zur Beleuchtung der sozialen Frage*, Berlin, 1875, S. 72 u. ff. (*On the Elucidation of the Social Problem*, Berlin, p. 72 and foll.—*Ed.*)

the true "science of the *national* economy"—Rodbertus's italics) "should have shown how out of the total national product one part always goes to *replace* the capital consumed in production or worn out, while the other, as *national income*, goes to satisfy the direct requirements of society and of its members" (ibid., S. 27). But although true science should have shown this, Rodbertus's "science" did nothing of the kind. The reader will see that he merely repeated Adam Smith word for word, evidently not even seeing that this is only the beginning of the problem. Which workers "replace" the national capital? How is their product realised? Not a word did he say about this. Summing up his theory (diese neue Theorie, die ich der bisherigen gegenüberstelle,* S. 32) in the shape of separate theses, Rodbertus first speaks of the distribution of the national product as follows: "Rent" (by this, as we know, Rodbertus meant what is usually termed surplus-value) "and wages are, consequently, the parts into which the product resolves itself, in so far as it is income" (S. 33). This extremely important reservation should have suggested a very vital question to him: he had only just said that by income he meant articles which serve "to satisfy direct requirements"; hence, there are products that do not serve for personal consumption. How are they realised? But Rodbertus sees no unclarity here and soon forgets this reservation, speaking outright of the "*division of the product into three parts*" (wages, profit and rent) (S. 49-50 and others). Thus Rodbertus virtually repeated Adam Smith's theory together with his fundamental mistake and explained nothing at all regarding the question of income. The promise of a new, full and better theory of the *distribution of the national product*** proved to be just empty talk. As a matter of fact, Rodbertus did not advance the theory

* —this new theory, which I set against those that have existed hitherto.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., S. 32: "...bin ich genötigt der vorstehenden Skizze einer besseren Methode auch noch eine voilständige, solcher besseren Methode entsprechende Theorie, wenigstens der *Verteilung des Nationalprodukts*, hinzuzufügen." (Ibid., p. 32: "... I am obliged to add to the present outline of a better method, a full theory, corresponding to this better method, of at least the *distribution of the national product*."—*Ed.*)

of this subject a single step. How confused were his conceptions of "income" is shown by his lengthy speculations in his Fourth Social Letter to von Kirchmann (*Das Kapital*, Berlin, 1884) about whether *money* should be included in the national income, and whether wages are taken from capital or from income—speculations of which Engels said that they "belong to the domain of scholasticism" (Vorwort to Vol. II, *Capital*, S. XXI).*[36]

Utter confusion on the problem of the national income reigns supreme among economists to this day. For example, in his article on "Crises" in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (the afore-mentioned compilation, p. 81), Herkner, speaking of the realisation of the product in capitalist society (§ 5, "distribution"), expresses the opinion that the speculations of K. H. Rau are "sound," although he merely repeats Adam Smith's mistake by dividing the whole product of society into incomes. R. Meyer, in his article on "income" (ibid., p. 283 and foll.), quotes the confused definitions of A. Wagner (who also repeats Adam Smith's error) and frankly admits that "it is difficult to distinguish income from capital," and that "the most difficult thing is to distinguish between returns (Ertrag) and income (Einkommen)."

We thus see that the economists who have discoursed at length on the inadequate attention paid by the classical economists (and Marx) to "distribution" and "consumption" have not been able to give the slightest explanation of the most fundamental problems of "distribution" and "consumption." That is understandable, for one cannot even discuss "consumption" unless one understands the process of the reproduction of the total social capital and of the replacement of the various component parts of the social product. This example once again proved how absurd it is to single out "distribution" and "consumption" as though they were independent branches of science corresponding to certain independent processes and phenomena of economic life. It is not with "production" that political economy deals,

* That is why K. Diehl is absolutely wrong when he says that Rodbertus presented "a new theory of the distribution of income." (*Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Art. "Rodbertus," B. V., S. 448.)

but with the social relations of men in production, with the social system of production. Once these social relations have been ascertained and thoroughly analysed, the place in production of every class, and, consequently, the share they get of the national consumption, are *thereby* defined. And the solution of the problem which brought classical political economy to a halt, and which has not been advanced a hair's breadth by all sorts of experts on "distribution" and "consumption," is provided by the theory which comes directly after those of the classical economists and which completes the analysis of the production of capital, individual and social.

The problem of "national income" and of "national consumption," which is absolutely insoluble when examined independently, and has engendered nothing but scholastic speculations, definitions and classifications, proves to be solved in its entirety when the process of the production of the total social capital has been analysed. Furthermore, it ceases to exist as a separate problem when the relation of national consumption to the national product and the realisation of each separate part of this product have been ascertained. All that remains is to *give names* to these separate parts.

"In order to avoid unnecessary difficulty, one should distinguish gross output (Rohertrag) and net output from gross income and net income.

"The gross output, or gross product, is the total reproduced product. . . .

"The gross income is that portion of value and that portion of the gross product" (Bruttoprodukts oder Rohprodukts) measured by it which remains after deducting that portion of value and that portion of the product of total production measured by it which replaces the constant capital advanced and consumed in production. The gross income, then, is equal to wages (or the portion of the product destined to again become the income of the labourer)+profit+rent. The net income, on the other hand, is the surplus-value, and thus the surplus-product, which remains after deducting wages, and which, in fact, thus represents the surplus-value realised by capital and to be divided with the landlord, and the surplus-product measured by it.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

". . . Viewing the income of the whole society, national income consists of wages plus profit plus rent, thus, of the gross income. But even this is an abstraction to the extent that the entire society, on the basis of capitalist production, bases itself on the capitalist standpoint and thereby considers only the income resolved into profit and rent as net income" (III, 2, 375-376. Russ. trans., pp. 695-696).[37]

Thus, the explanation of the process of realisation also made clear the question of income and removed the main difficulty that had prevented the achievement of clarity on this question, namely: how does "income for one become capital for another"?, how can the product which consists of articles of personal consumption and resolves itself totally into wages, profit and rent, also include the constant part of capital, which can never be income? The analysis of realisation given in *Capital*, Volume II, Part III, gave a full answer to these questions, and in the concluding part of Volume III of *Capital*, which deals with "revenues," Marx had only to give names to the separate parts of the social product and refer the reader to the analysis given in Volume II.*

VIII. WHY DOES THE CAPITALIST NATION NEED A FOREIGN MARKET?

Regarding the above-stated theory of the realisation of the product in capitalist society, the question may arise: Does not this theory contradict the proposition that the capitalist nation cannot dispense with foreign markets?

It must be remembered that the analysis given of the realisation of the product in capitalist society proceeded from the assumption that there is no foreign trade: this assumption has already been mentioned above and it has been shown to be *essential* in such an analysis. Obviously, imports and exports would only have confused the issue, without in the

* See *Das Kapital*, III, 2, VII. Abschnitt: "Die Revenuen," Chapter 49: "Zur Analyse des Produktionsprozesses" (Russ. trans., pp. 688-706). Here Marx also points to the circumstances that prevented the earlier economists from understanding this process (pp. 379-382. Russ. trans., 698-700).[38]

least helping to clear up the problem. The mistake made by Messrs. V. V. and N.—on is that they bring in the foreign market to *explain* the realisation of surplus-value: while explaining absolutely nothing, this reference to the foreign market merely conceals their theoretical mistakes; that is one point. Another point is that it enables them, with the aid of these mistaken "theories," to avoid the need to *explain* the fact of the development of a home market for Russian capitalism.* The "foreign market" merely serves them as a pretext for obscuring the development of capitalism (and, consequently, of the market) inside the country—a pretext all the more convenient in that it also relieves them of the need to examine the facts which show that Russian capitalism is winning foreign markets.**

The need for a capitalist country to have a foreign market is not determined at all by the laws of the realisation of the social product (and of surplus-value in particular), but, firstly, by the fact that capitalism makes its appearance only as a result of widely developed commodity *circulation*, which transcends the limits of the state. It is therefore impossible to conceive a capitalist nation without foreign trade, nor is there any such nation.

As the reader sees, this reason is of a historical order. And the Narodniks could not escape it with a couple of threadbare phrases about "the impossibility of the capitalists consuming surplus-value." Had they really wanted to raise the question of the foreign market, they would have had to examine the history of the development of foreign trade, the history of the development of commodity circulation. And having examined this history, they could not have, of course, depicted capitalism as a casual deviation from the path.

Secondly, the conformity between the separate parts of social production (in terms of value and in their natural form) which was necessarily assumed by the theory of the

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* Mr. Bulgakov very correctly observes in the above-quoted book: "Till now the cotton industry, which supplies the peasant market, has been growing steadily, so that the absolute diminution of popular consumption..." (which Mr. N.—on talks about) "...is conceivable only theoretically" (pp, 214-215).

** Volgin, *The Substantiation of Narodism in the Works of Mr. Vorontsov*, St. Petersburg, 1896, pp. 71-76.[39]

reproduction of social capital, and which is actually established only as the average magnitude of a number of continual fluctuations—this conformity is constantly disturbed in capitalist society owing to the separate existence of different producers working for an unknown market. The various branches of industry, which serve as "markets" for one another, do not develop evenly, but outstrip one another, and the more developed industry seeks a foreign market. This does not mean at all "the impossibility of the capitalist nation realising surplus-value,"—the profound conclusion so readily drawn by the Narodnik. It merely indicates the lack of proportion in the development of the different industries. If the national capital were distributed *differently*, the same quantity of products could be realised within the country. But for capital to abandon one sphere of industry and pass into another there must be a crisis in that sphere; and what can restrain the capitalists threatened by such a crisis from seeking a foreign market, from seeking subsidies and bonuses to facilitate exports, etc.?

Thirdly, the law of pre-capitalist modes of production is the repetition of the process of production on the previous scale, on the previous technical basis: such are the corvée economy of the landlords, the natural economy of the peasants, the artisan production of the industrialists. The law of capitalist production, on the contrary, is constant transformation of the modes of production, and the unrestricted growth of the scale of production. Under the old modes of production, economic units could exist for centuries without undergoing any change either in character or in size, and without extending beyond the landlord's manor, the peasant village or the small neighbouring market for the rural artisans and small industrialists (the so-called handicraftsmen). The capitalist enterprise, on the contrary, inevitably outgrows the bounds of the village community, the local market, the region, and then the state. Since the isolation and seclusion of the states have already been broken down by commodity circulation, the natural trend of every capitalist industry brings it to the necessity of "seeking a foreign market."

Thus, the necessity of seeking a foreign market by no means proves that capitalism is unsound, as the Narodnik

economists like to picture matters. Quite the contrary. This necessity demonstrates the progressive historical work of capitalism, which destroys the age-old isolation and seclusion of systems of economy (and, consequently, the narrowness of intellectual and political life), and which links all countries of the world into a single economic whole.

From this we see that the two latter causes of the need for a foreign market are again causes of a historical character. In order to understand them one must examine each separate industry, its development within the country, its transformation into a capitalist industry—in short, one must take the *facts* about the development of capitalism in the country; and it is not surprising that the Narodniks take the opportunity to evade these facts under cover of worthless (and meaningless) phrases about the "impossibility" of both the home and the foreign markets.

IX. CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER I

Let us now sum up the theoretical propositions examined above, which have a direct bearing on the problem of the home market.

1) The basic process of the formation of a home market (i.e., of the development of commodity production and of capitalism) is the social division of labour. This consists of various forms of processing raw materials (and various operations in this processing) separating from agriculture one after another and becoming independent branches of industry, which exchange their products (now *commodities*) for the products of agriculture. Thus, agriculture itself becomes industry (i.e., produces commodities), and the same process of specialisation takes place in it.

2) A direct conclusion from the preceding proposition is the law governing all developing commodity economy, and the more so capitalist economy—the industrial (i.e., non-agricultural) population grows faster than the agricultural and diverts an ever-growing part of the population from agriculture to manufacturing industry.

3) The separation of the direct producer from the means of production, i.e., his expropriation, signifying the transition

from simple commodity production to capitalist production (and constituting the necessary condition for this transition), *creates* the home market. The process of this *creation* of the home market proceeds in two directions: on the one hand, the *means of production* from which the small producer is "freed" are converted into capital in the hands of their new owner, serve to produce commodities and, consequently, are themselves converted into commodities. Thus, even the simple reproduction of these means of production now requires that they be purchased (previously, these means of production were reproduced in greater part in the natural form and partly were made at home), i.e., provides a market for means of production, and then the product now produced with the aid of these means of production is also converted into a commodity. On the other hand, the *means of subsistence* of the small producer become the material elements of the variable capital, i.e., of the sum of money expended by the employer (whether a landowner, contractor, lumber-dealer, factory owner, etc., makes no difference) on hiring workers. Thus, these means of subsistence are now also converted into commodities, i.e., create a home market for articles of consumption.

4) The realisation of the product in capitalist society (and, consequently, the realisation of surplus-value) cannot be explained without clearing up the point—1) that the social product, like the individual product, resolves itself in terms of value into three parts and not two (constant capital + variable capital + surplus-value, and not only into variable capital + surplus-value, as taught by Adam Smith and the entire school of political economy that came after him and before Marx), and 2) that in its natural form it must be divided into two big departments: means of production (consumed productively) and articles of consumption (consumed personally). By establishing these main theoretical propositions, Marx fully explained the process of realisation of the product in general and of surplus-value in particular in capitalist production, and revealed that it is utterly wrong to drag the foreign market into the problem of realisation.

5) Marx's theory of realisation also threw light on the problem of national consumption and income.

From what has been said above, it follows automatically that the problem of the home market as a separate, self-sufficient problem not depending on that of the degree of capitalist development does not exist at all. That is why Marx's theory does not anywhere or ever raise this problem separately. The home market appears when commodity economy appears; it is created by the development of this commodity economy, and the degree to which the social division of labour is ramified determines the level of its development; it spreads with the extension of commodity production from products to labour-power, and only in proportion as the latter is transformed into a commodity does capitalism embrace the entire production of the country, developing mainly on account of means of production, which occupy an increasingly important place in capitalist society. The "home market" for capitalism is created by developing capitalism itself, which deepens the social division of labour and resolves the direct producers into capitalists and workers. The degree of the development of the home market is the degree of development of capitalism in the country. To raise the question of the limits of the home market separately from that of the degree of the development of capitalism (as the Narodnik economists do) is wrong.

That is why the question of how a home market is being formed for Russian capitalism reduces itself to the following: How and in what direction are the diverse aspects of the Russian national economy developing? What constitutes the connection between and interdependence of these diverse aspects?

The next chapters will be devoted to an examination of data containing the answers to these questions.

CHAPTER II

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY

We have seen that in capitalist production the basis for the formation of a home market is the process of the disintegration of the small cultivators into agricultural entrepreneurs and workers. Almost every work on the economic position of the Russian peasantry in the post-Reform period refers to the so-called "differentiation" of the peasantry. It must consequently be our task to study the principal features of this phenomenon and to determine its significance. In the following exposition we employ the statistical data of Zemstvo house-to-house censuses.[40]

I. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR NOVOROSSIA[41]

Mr. V. Postnikov, in his book *Peasant Farming in South Russia* (Moscow, 1891),[42] has collected and processed the Zemstvo statistics for the Taurida and partly the Kherson and the Ekaterinoslav gubernias. This book should be given first place in the literature on the differentiation of the peasantry, and we consider it necessary to arrange according to the system we have adopted the data gathered by Mr. Postnikov, supplementing them occasionally with data from Zemstvo publications. The Zemstvo statisticians of Taurida have grouped the peasant households according to area under crops—a very sound method, one that renders it possible to form a precise judgement of the economy of each group due to the predominance in that locality of grain cultivation with extensive farming. Here

are the general data for the economic groups of the Taurida peasantry.*

Groups of peasants		*Dnieper Uyezd* Per household			*Three uyezds*					
	Groups of peasants	% of total households	persons of both sexes	working males	% of total households	Average area under crops per household. Dessiatines**	Total area under crops. Dessiatines	Same as % of total		% of total households
I.	Cultivating no land	9	4.6	1.0	7.5	—	—	—	12.1	40.2
II.	" up to 5 dess.	11	4.9	1.1	11.7	3.5	34,070	2.4		
III.	" 5 to 10 "	20	5.4	1.2	21	8.0	140,426	9.7		
IV.	" 10 to 25 "	41.8	6.3	1.4	39.2	16.4	540,093	37.6	37.6	39.2
V.	" 25 to 50 "	15.1	8.2	1.9	16.9	34.5	494,095	34.3	50.3	20.6
VI.	" over 50 "	3.1	10.1	2.3	3.7	75.0	230,583	16.0		
	Total . . .	100	6.2	1.4	100	17.1	1,439,267	100		

The unevenness in the distribution of the area under crops is very considerable: 2/5 of the total households (comprising about 3/10 of the population, for the size of these families is below the average) possess about 1/8 of the total area under crops; they belong to the poor group, cultivating little land, who cannot cover their needs with their income from farming. Further, there are the middle peasants, also constituting about 2/5 of the total households, who cover their average expenditure by income from the land (Mr. Postnikov considers that a family requires from 16 to 18 dessiatines under crops to cover its average expenditure). Lastly, there are the well-to-do peasants (about 1/5 of the households and 3/10 of the population), who concentrate in their hands over half the area cultivated, the crop area per household clearly indicating the "commercial" character of the farming done by this group. In order exactly to estimate the extent of this commercial agriculture in the various groups,

* The following data relate mostly to the three northern mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, namely the Berdyansk, Melitopol and Dnieper, or to the latter one alone.

** Dessiatine = 2.70 acres.—*Ed.*

Mr. Postnikov employs the following method. From the total crop area of the farm, he separates the following: the food area (which provides sustenance for the family and the farm labourers), the fodder area (which provides fodder for the cattle) and the farm-service area (seed-plot, land occupied by buildings, etc.), and thus arrives at the size of the *market or commercial* area, the produce of which goes for sale. It is shown that in the group with 5 to 10 dess. under crops, only 11.8% of the cultivated area yields produce for the market, whereas this percentage grows with the increase in the area under crops (by groups) as follows: 36.5%—52%—61%. Consequently, the well-to-do peasants (the top two groups) engage in what is commercial cultivation, and secure a gross money income ranging from 574 to 1,500 rubles per annum. This commercial cultivation then becomes capitalist farming, for the areas cultivated by the well-to-do peasants exceed the family labour norm (i.e., the amount of land that a family can cultivate by its own labour), and compel them to *resort to the hiring of workers*: in the three northern uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, the author estimates, the well-to-do peasants hire over 14,000 rural workers. The poor peasants, on the contrary, "provide workers" (over 5,000), that is, resort to the sale of their labour-power, since the income from cultivating the land amounts, in the 5 to 10 dess. group, for example, to only about 30 rubles in cash per household.* We observe here, consequently, the very process of the creation of a home market that is dealt with by the theory of capitalist production—the "home market" grows as a result of the conversion into a commodity of the product of commercial, entrepreneur farming, on the one hand, and of the conversion into a commodity of the labour-power sold by the badly-off peasants, on the other.

In order to acquaint ourselves more closely with this phenomenon, let us examine the position of each separate group of the peasantry. Let us start with the top group. Here are the data for the amount of land it owns and uses:

* Mr. Postnikov rightly observes that in reality the differences between the groups as to size of money income from the land are much more considerable, for the computations assume 1) equal yield, and 2) equal price for grain sold, actually, however, the well-to-do peasants secure better yields and sell their grain to greater advantage.

Groups of households	*Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia* Area cultivated per household (dessiatines) Allotment	Purchased	Rented	Total
I. Cultivating no land	6.4	0.9	0.1	7.4
II. " up to 5 dess.	5.5	0.04	0.6	6.1
III. " 5 to 10 "	8.7	0.05	1.6	10.3
IV. " 10 to 25 "	12.5	0.6	5.8	18.9
V. " 25 to 50 "	16.6	2.3	17.4	36.3
VI. " over 50 "	17.4	30.0	44.4	91.4
IV. " 10 to 25 "	12.5	0.6	5.8	18.9
Average	11.2	1.7	7.0	19.9

We see, accordingly, that the well-to-do peasants, notwithstanding the fact that they are best provided with allotment land,[43] concentrate in their hands the bulk of the purchased and the rented land and turn into small landowners and capitalist farmers.* On the renting of 17 to 44 dess. of land there is an annual expenditure, at local prices, of about 70 to 160 rubles. Obviously we are dealing here with a commercial transaction: the land becomes a commodity, "a money-making machine."

Let us take the data for livestock and implements:

Groups of households	*Three uyezds, Taurida Gubernia In Dnieper* Animals per household Draught	Other	Total	% households with no draught animals	There are per household Carting implements**	Ploughing
I. Cultivating no land	0.3	0.8	1.1	80.5	—	—
II. " up to 5 dess.	1.0	1.4	2.4	48.3	—	—
III. " 5 to 10 "	1.9	2.3	4.2	12.5	0.8	0.5
IV. " 10 to 25 "	3.2	4.1	7.3	1.4	1.0	1.0
V. " 25 to 50 "	5.8	8.1	13.9	0.1	1.7	1.5
VI. " over 50 "	10.5	19.5	30.0	0.03	2.7	2.4
Average	3.1	4.5	7.6	15.0		

* We would point out that the relatively considerable amount of purchased land held by those who cultivate no land is due to the fact that this group includes shopkeepers, owners of industrial establishments, and so forth. The mixing of such "peasants" with real cultivators is a common defect of Zemstvo statistics. We shall refer again to this defect later on.

** Carting: carts, covered and open waggons, etc. Ploughing: iron ploughs, scarifiers (cultivators), etc.

Thus the well-to-do peasantry are far better supplied with implements than the poor and even the middle peasantry. It is sufficient to glance at this table to see how totally fictitious are the "average" figures which people are so fond of bringing into play when they talk of the "peasantry". The commercial cultivation of the peasant bourgeoisie is accompanied here by commercial livestock farming, namely, the breeding of coarse-wool sheep. Regarding implements, we shall quote in addition figures for improved implements, which we have taken from Zemstvo statistical returns.* Out of the total reaping and mowing machines (3,061), 2,841, or 92.8%, belong to the peasant bourgeoisie (1/5 of the total households).

It is quite natural that the well-to-do peasantry also employ a *farming technique* much above the average (larger size of farm, more plentiful supply of implements, available financial resources, etc.); that is to say, the well-to-do peasants "do their sowing faster, make better use of favourable weather, sow the seed in more humid soil," and reap their harvest in proper time; they thresh their grain as it is carted in from the field, etc. It is also natural that the expenditure on the production of agricultural produce diminishes (per unit of product) as the size of the farm increases. Mr. Postnikov proves this proposition in particular detail, using the following system of calculation: he determines the number of people working (including hired labourers), the number of draught animals, implements, etc., per 100 dessiatines of crop area in the various groups of the peasantry. It is proved that these numbers diminish as the size of the farm increases. For example, those cultivating under 5 dessiatines have per 100 dessiatines of allotment land 28 people working, 28 draught animals, 4.7 ploughs and scarifiers, and 10 carts, whereas those cultivating over 50 dessiatines have 7 people working, 14 draught animals, 3.8 ploughs and scarifiers, and 4.3 carts. (We omit more detailed data for all groups, referring those interested in the details to Mr. Postnikov's book.) The author's general

* *Statistical Returns for Melitopol Uyezd*, Simferopol, 1885 (*Statistical Returns for Taurida Gubernia*, Vol. I),[44]—*Statistical Returns for Dnieper Uyezd*, Vol. II, Simferopol, 1886.

conclusion is: "With the increase in the size of the farm and in the area cultivated by the peasant, the expenditure on the maintenance of labour-power, human and animal, that prime item of expenditure in agriculture, progressively decreases, and, among the groups that cultivate large areas, drops to nearly one half per dessiatine under crops of the expenditure among the groups with small cultivated areas" (op. cit., p. 117). To this law of the greater productivity and, hence, of the greater stability of the big peasant farms Mr. Postnikov quite rightly attaches great importance, proving it with very detailed data not only for Novorossia alone, but also for the central gubernias of Russia.* The further the penetration of commodity production into crop cultivation, and, consequently, the keener the competition among the agriculturists, the struggle for land and for economic independence, the more vigorously must this law be manifested, a law which leads to the ousting of the middle and poor peasants by the peasant bourgeoisie. It must, however, be noted that technical progress in agriculture expresses itself in different ways, depending on the system of agriculture, on the system of field cultivation. Whereas in the case of grain growing and extensive cultivation this progress may find expression in a mere expansion of the crop area

* "Zemstvo statistics prove incontrovertibly that the larger the scale of the peasant farm, the smaller the number of implements, workers, and draught animals employed on a given tillage area" (op. cit., p. 162).

It is interesting to note how this law is reflected in Mr. V. V.'s arguments. In the above-quoted article (*Vestnik Yevropy*, 1884, No. 7) he makes the following comparison: In the central black-earth belt there are 5-7-8 dess. of arable per peasant horse, whereas "according to the rules of three-field crop rotation" there should be 7-10 dess. (Batalin's *Calendar*). "Consequently, the decline in horse-ownership by part of the population of this area of Russia must to a certain extent be regarded as the restoration of the normal proportion between the number of draught animals and the area to be cultivated" (p. 346 in the article mentioned). Thus the ruin of the peasantry leads to progress in agriculture. Had Mr. V. V. paid attention not only to the agronomic but also to the social-economic aspect of this process he could have seen that this is the progress of capitalist agriculture, for "the restoration of the normal proportion" between draught animals and arable is achieved either by landlords who acquire their own implements, or by big peasant crop growers, i.e., by the peasant bourgeoisie.

and reduction of the number of workers, animals, etc., per unit of crop area, in the case of livestock or industrial-crop farming, with the adoption of intensive agriculture, this same progress may find expression, for example, in the cultivation of root crops, which require more workers per unit of crop area, or in the acquisition of dairy cattle, the cultivation of fodder grasses, etc., etc.

The description of the top group of the peasantry must be supplemented by indicating the considerable employment of wage-labour. Here are the data for the three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia:

Groups of households	Percentage of farms employing workers	Proportion (%) of crop area belonging to each group
I. Cultivating no land	3.8	—
II. " up to 5 dess. . . .	2.5	2
III. " 5 to 10 "	2.6	10
IV. " 10 to 25 "	8.7	38
V. " 25 to 50 "	34.7	34 } 50
VI. " over 50 "	64.1	16 }
Total	12.9	100

Mr. V. V., in the above-mentioned article, argued about this question as follows: he took the farms employing workers as a percentage of the total number of peasant farms and arrived at the conclusion that "the number of peasants resorting to hired labour for the cultivation of the land, as compared to the aggregate mass of the people, is quite insignificant: 2 to 3, a maximum of 5 peasant farmers out of 100 are all that represent peasant capitalism . . . it" (peasant farming in Russia employing labourers) "is not a system firmly rooted in contemporary economic life, but something fortuitous, such as occurred 100 and 200 years ago" (*Vestnik Yevropy*, 1884, No. 7, p. 332). What sense is there in comparing the number of farms employing workers with the total number of "peasant" farms, when the latter figure also includes the plots of farm labourers? Why, by this method one could also get rid of capitalism in Russian industry: one would only need to take the families engaging in industries who employ wage-workers (i.e., the families

of manufacturers, large and small) as a percentage of the total number of families engaging in industries in Russia; the result would be a "quite insignificant" percentage of the "mass of the people." It is far more correct to compare the number of farms employing labourers with the number of actually independent farms, i.e., of those living on agriculture alone and not resorting to the sale of their labour-power. Furthermore, Mr. V. V. lost sight of a trifle, namely, that the peasant farms employing labourers are among the biggest: the percentage of farms employing labourers, "insignificant" when taken "in general and on the average," turns out to be very imposing (34-64%) among the well-to-do peasantry, who account for more than half of the total production and produce large quantities of grain for sale. One can therefore judge how absurd is the opinion that farming based on the employment of labourers is "fortuitous," something that occurred 100 to 200 years ago! Thirdly, only by disregarding the real specific features of cultivation can one take as the criterion of "peasant capitalism" only farm labourers, i.e., regular workers, and ignore the day labourers. It is commonly known that the hiring of day labourers plays a particularly important role in agriculture.*

Let us take the bottom group. It consists of peasants who cultivate no land or who cultivate little; they "do not differ much in economic status . . . both groups serve as farm labourers for their fellow villagers, or engage in outside, mainly agricultural employments" (p. 134, op. cit.), i.e., belong to the rural proletariat. Let us note, for example, that in Dnieper Uyezd the bottom group constitutes 40% of the households, and those having no ploughing implements 39% of the total households. In addition to selling their labour-power, the rural proletariat obtain an income from leasing their allotment land:

* England is the classic land of agricultural capitalism. And in that country 40.8% of the farmers employ no hired labour; 68.1% employ not more than 2 workers; 82% employ not more than 4 workers (Yanson, *Comparative Statistics*, Vol. II, pp. 22-23; quoted from Kablukov, *The Workers in Agriculture*, p. 16). But he would be a fine economist, indeed, who forgot the mass of agricultural proletarians, both migratory and also resident (i.e., such as get "employments" in their own villages), who hire themselves out by the day.

Groups of households	*Dnieper Uyezd* Percentages of householders leasing their allotment land	of leased allotment land
I. Cultivating no land	80	97.1
II. " up to 5 dess. . . .	30	38.4
III. " 5 to 10 "	23	17.2
IV. " 10 to 25 "	16	8.1
V. " 25 to 50 "	7	2.9
VI. " over 50 "	7	13.8
For uyezd	25.7	14.9

In the three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, the land leased (in 1884-86) amounted to 25% of the total peasant arable; this does not include land leased, not to peasants, but to middle-class intellectuals. In all, nearly ⅓ of the population in these three uyezds lease land; the allotments of the rural proletariat are rented mainly by the peasant bourgeoisie. Here are data in this regard:

	In three uyezds of Taurida Gubernia allotment land rented from neighbors (dessiatines)	as %
by peasants cultivating up to 10 dess. per household	16,594	6
" " " " " 10 to 25 dess. "	89,526	35
" " " " " 25 and more "	150,596	59
Total	256,716	100

Allotment land is now an object of extensive speculation among the South-Russian peasants. Land is used as security for loans on promissory notes. . . . Land is leased, or sold, for one or two years and for longer periods—8, 9 or 11 years" (p. 139, op. cit.). Thus, the peasant bourgeoisie is also a representative of merchant's and usurer's capital.* Here we have a striking refutation of the Narodnik prejudice

* And itself resorts to the "very numerous" village banks and loan-and-savings societies, which render "substantial assistance" to "prosperous peasants." "The economically weak peasants cannot find guarantors and do not get loans" (p. 368, op. cit.).

that the "kulak" and the "usurer" have nothing in common with the "enterprising muzhik." On the contrary, the threads both of merchant's capital (the loaning of money on the security of land, the buying-up of various products, etc.) and of industrial capital (commercial agriculture with the aid of wage-workers, etc,.) merge in the hands of the peasant bourgeoisie. It depends on surrounding circumstances, on the greater or lesser degree to which the Asiatic way of life is eliminated and culture is widespread in our countryside as to which of these forms of capital will develop at the expense of the other.

Let us examine, finally, the position of the middle group (cultivating from 10 to 25 dess. per household, with an average of 16.4 dess.). Its position is a transitional one: its money income from agriculture (191 rubles) is somewhat lower than the sum annually spent by the average Tauridian (200 to 250 rubles). Here draught animals work out at 3.2 head per household, whereas for a full team 4 are required. Hence the position of the middle peasant's farm is an unstable one, and to till his land he has to resort to "yoking."*[45]

The cultivation of the land on a "yoking" basis is, it goes without saying, less productive (time lost in moving from place to place, shortage of horses, etc.), so that in one village, for example, Mr. Postnikov was informed that "yokers often scarify no more than one dessiatine per day, which is half the normal rate."** If to this we add that in the middle group about 1/5 of the households have no ploughing implements, that this group provides more workers than it hires (according to Mr. Postnikov's calculations), its unstable character and its transitional position between

* In Melitopol Uyezd, out of 13,789 households in this group only 4,218 till their land with their own animals; 9,201 "yoke." In Dnieper Uyezd, out of 8,234 households, 4,029 till the land with their own animals, and 3,835 "yoke." See Zemstvo statistical returns for Melitopol Uyezd (p. B. 195) and for Dnieper Uyezd (p. B. 123).

** In the above-mentioned article Mr. V. V. argues a great deal about yoking being the "principle of co-operation," etc. It is really so simple to hush up the fact that the peasantry are breaking up into sharply distinct groups, that yoking is the co-operation of tottering farms which are being ousted by the peasant bourgeoisie, and then to talk in general about the "principle of co-operation"—probably co-operation between the rural proletariat and the rural bourgeoisie!

the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat will be clear. We shall quote somewhat more detailed data about the ousting of the middle group (see Table on p. 81).

Thus, the distribution of allotment land is the most "equalised," although here, too, the ousting of the bottom group by the top ones is marked. But the situation radically changes when we pass from this *compulsorily-held* land to the *free*, i.e., to the purchased and the rented land. The concentration of this land is enormous, and as a result, the distribution of the total land in use by the peasants is quite unlike the distribution of the allotment land: the middle group is pushed into second place (46% of allotment land—41% of land in use), the well-to-do group very considerably enlarges its holdings (28% of allotment land—46% of land in use), while the poor group is being pushed out of the ranks of the cultivators (25% of allotment land—12% of land in use).

The table reveals an interesting phenomenon, one that we shall meet again, namely, the decline in the role of allotment land in peasant farming. In the bottom group this is due to the leasing out of land; in the top group to the fact that in the total farming area purchased and rented land is overwhelmingly predominant. The remnants of the pre-Reform system (the tying of the peasants to the land, and equalised, tax-assessed land tenure) are being utterly destroyed by the penetration of capitalism into agriculture.

As for land renting in particular, the figures given enable us to clear up a very common mistake in the arguments of the Narodnik economists on this subject. Take the arguments of Mr. V. V. In the article quoted above he bluntly raised the issue of the relation of the renting of land to the break-up of the peasantry. "Does the renting of land help to differentiate the peasant farms into big and small and to destroy the average, typical group?" (*Vestnik Yevropy*, loc. cit., pp. 339-340.) Mr. V. V. answered this question in the negative. Here are his arguments: 1) "The large percentage of persons who resort to the renting of land." Examples: 38 to 68%; 40 to 70%; 30 to 66%; 50 to 60% respectively in different uyezds of different gubernias.—2) The small size of the rented plots per household: 3 to 5 dess., according to Tambov

*Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia**

	% of total		Allotment land		Purchased land		Rented land		Land leased out		Total land used by group		Area under crops	
	Householders	Persons of both sexes	Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%	Dessiatines	%
Poor . .	39.9	32.6	56,445	25.5	2,003	6	7,839	6	21,551	65.5	44,736	12.4	38,439	11
Middle .	41.7	42.2	102,794	46.5	5,376	16	48,398	35	8,311	25.3	148,257	41.2	137,344	43
Well-to-do	18.4	25.2	61,844	28	26,531	78	81,646	59	3,039	9.2	166,982	46.4	150,614	46
Total for uyezd	100	100	221,083	100	33,910	100	137,883	100	32,901	100	395,975	100	326,397	100

* Data taken from the Zemstvo Statistical Returns. They cover the whole uyezd, including settlements not embraced by volosts.[46] The figures in the column "Total land used by group" have been calculated by myself, by adding together the allotment, rented and purchased land, and subtracting the leased land.

statistical returns. — 3) The peasants with small allotments rent more land than those with big ones.

To enable the reader clearly to judge the appropriateness of such arguments, let alone their soundness, we quote the corresponding figures for Dnieper Uyezd.*

	% of renting households	Arable per renting household (dess.)	Price per dessiatines (rubles)
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	25	2.4	15.25
" 5 to 10 "	42	3.9	12.00
" 10 to 25 "	69	8.5	4.75
" 25 to 50 "	88	20.0	3.75
" over 50 "	91	48.6	3.55
For uyezd	56.2	12.4	4.23

The question arises, of what importance can "average" figures be here? Does the fact that those who rent land are "many"—56%—really do away with the concentration of the rented land in the hands of the rich? Is it not ridiculous to take the "average" area of rented land [12 dess. per renting household. Very often it is not even per renting household, but per existing household that is taken. That is what Mr. Karyshev, for example, does in his work "Peasant Rentings of Non-Allotment Land" (Dorpat, 1892; Vol. II of *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations*)] by putting together peasants of whom one takes *2 dessiatines* at a fabulous price (15 rubles), evidently out of dire need, on ruinous terms, while another takes *48 dessiatines*, over and above his own adequate amount of land, "buying" the land *wholesale* at the incomparably lower price of 3.55 rubles per dessiatine? No less hollow is the third argument: Mr. V. V. himself took care to refute it by admitting that figures relating "to entire village communities" (in classifying the peasants according to allotment) "do not present a true picture of what is taking place in the community itself" (p. 342, op. cit.).**

* The data for the Melitopol and Berdyansk uyezds are analogous.

** Mr. Postnikov cites an interesting example of a similar mistake

It would be a great mistake to imagine that the concentration of rented land in the hands of the peasant bourgeoisie is limited to individual renting and does not apply to renting by the village community. Nothing of the kind. The rented land is always distributed "according to where the money lies," and the relation between the groups of the peasantry does not change in the least where land is rented by the community. Hence, the argument of Mr. Karyshev, for example, that the relation between community renting and individual renting expresses a "conflict between two principles (!?), the communal and the individual" (p. 159, loc. cit.), that community renting "is characterised by the labour principle and the principle of even distribution of rented land among the community members" (ibid., 230)—this argument belongs entirely to the sphere of Narodnik prejudices. Notwithstanding the task he set himself of summing up the "results of Zemstvo statistical investigation," Mr. Karyshev carefully avoided all the abundant Zemstvo statistical material about the concentration of rented land in the hands of small groups of well-to-do peasants. Let us quote an example. In the three indicated uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, state lands rented by peasant *communities* are distributed among the groups as follows:

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made by Zemstvo statisticians. Noting the fact of commercial farming by the well-to-do peasants and their demand for land, he points out that "the Zemstvo statisticians, evidently regarding such manifestations in peasant life as something illegitimate, try to belittle their importance" and to prove that the renting of land is determined not by the competition of rich peasants but by the peasants' need for land. To prove this, Mr. Werner, the compiler of *Taurida Gubernia Handbook* (1889), classified the peasants of the entire Taurida Gubernia *according to size of allotment*, taking the group of peasants with 1 or 2 people working and 2 or 3 draught animals. It turned out that, within the bounds of this group, as the size of the allotment increases the number of renting households and the amount of rented land decrease. Obviously, such a method of calculation proves nothing at all, since only peasants with an equal number of draught animals are taken, and it is the extreme groups that are omitted. It is quite natural that where the number of draught animals is equal the amount of cultivated land must also be equal, and consequently, the smaller the allotment, the larger the amount of rented land. The question is how the rented land is distributed among households with *unequal* numbers of draught animals, implements, etc.

	No. of renting households	No. of dessiatines	As % of total		Dess. per renting household
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	83	511	1	4	6.1
" 5 to 10 "	444	1,427	3		3.2
" 10 to 25 "	1,732	8,711	20		5.0
" 25 to 50 "	1,245	13,375	30	76	10.7
" over 50 "	632	20,283	46		32.1
Total	4,136	44,307	100		10.7

A little illustration of the "labour principle" and of the "principle of even distribution"!

Such are the Zemstvo statistical data on peasant farming in South Russia. No room is left by these data for doubting the complete differentiation of the peasantry, the complete domination in the countryside of the peasant bourgeoisie.* Highly interesting, therefore, is the attitude of Messrs. V. V. and N. —on towards these data, the more so that formerly both these writers admitted the need of raising the problem of the differentiation of the peasantry (Mr. V. V. in the abovementioned article of 1884, and Mr. N. —on in *Slovo* [*The Word*] in 1880, when he remarked on the interesting phenomenon in the village community itself that the "unenterprising" muzhiks neglect their land, while the "enterprising" ones take the best land for themselves; cf. *Sketches*, p. 71). It should be noted that Mr. Postnikov's work is of a dual character: on the one hand the author skilfully gathered and carefully processed extremely valuable Zemstvo statistics and managed, in doing so, to escape the "tendency to regard the peasant community as something integral and homogeneous, as it is still held to be by our urban intelligentsia" (p. 351, op. cit.). On the other hand, the author, not being guided by theory, failed totally to appraise the data he had processed, and regarded them from the extremely narrow point of view of "measures," proceeding to concoct projects

* It is usually said that the data for Novorossia do not permit the drawing of general conclusions, because of the specific features of that locality. We do not deny that the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry is more marked here than in the rest of Russia; but it will be seen from what follows that the specific nature of Novorossia is by no means so great as is sometimes imagined.

about "agricultural-handicraft-factory communities" and about the necessity of "restricting," "enjoining," "observing," etc., etc. Well then, our Narodniks did their best to ignore the first, the positive part of Mr. Postnikov's work and concentrated their attention on the second part. Both Mr. V. V. and Mr. N.—on began with highly serious air to "refute" Mr. Postnikov's absolutely unserious "projects" (Mr. V. V. in *Russkaya Mysl* [*Russian Thought*], 1894, No. 2; Mr. N.—on in his *Sketches*, p. 233, footnote), accusing him of the evil intention of introducing capitalism into Russia, and carefully avoiding the data which revealed the prevalence of capitalist relations in the countryside of South Russia today.*

II. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR SAMARA GUBERNIA

From the country's southern outer area let us pass to the eastern region, to Samara Gubernia. Let us take Novouzensk Uyezd, the last one investigated; in the statistical report for this uyezd we find the most detailed classification of the peasants according to economic status.** Here are the general data on the groups of the peasantry (the data that follow cover 28,276 allotment-holding households, numbering 164,146 persons of both sexes, i.e., only the Russian population of the uyezd, without Germans or farmsteaders—householders who farm both on community land and on separate non-community farmsteads. The inclusion

* "It is interesting," wrote Mr. N.—on, that Mr. Postnikov "has projects for 60-dessiatine peasant farms." But "since agriculture has fallen into the hands of capitalists," productivity of labour may grow still more "tomorrow," "and it will be necessary (!) to convert the 60-dessiatine into 200- or 300-dessiatine farms." You see how simple it is: *because* the petty bourgeoisie of today in our countryside will be threatened tomorrow by the big bourgeoisie, *therefore* Mr. N.—on refuses to recognise either today's petty or tomorrow's big bourgeoisie!

** *Statistical Returns for Samara Gubernia*, Vol. VII, *Novouzensk Uyezd*, Samara, 1890. An analogous classification is also given for Nikolayevsk Uyezd (Vol. VI, Samara, 1889), but the data are much less detailed. The *Combined Returns for Samara Gubernia* (Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Samara, 1892) contains only a classification according to size of allotment, the unsatisfactory nature of which we shall deal with later on.

of the Germans and the farmsteaders would considerably heighten the picture of differentiation).

Groups of householders		% of total households		Average area under crops per household (dessiatines)	% of total area under crops	
Poor	With no draught animals	20.7	37.1%	2.1	2.8	8.0%
	” 1 ” animal	16.4		5.0	5.2	
Middle	” 2 or 3 ” animals	26.6	38.2%	10.2	17.1	28.6%
	” 4 ” ”	11.6		15.9	11.5	
Rich	” 5 to 10 ” ”	17.1	24.7%	24.7	26.9	63.4%
	” 10 to 20 ” ”	5.8		53.0	19.3	
	” 20 and more ” ”	1.8		149.5	17.2	
Total		100		15.9	100	

The concentration of agricultural production turns out to be very considerable: the “community” capitalists (1/14 of the total households, namely, households with 10 and more draught animals) possess 36.5% of the area under crops—as much as do 75.3%, the poor and middle peasantry put together! Here, too, as always, the “average” figure (15.9 dess. under crops per household) is absolutely fictitious and creates the illusion of universal prosperity. Let us examine other data on the economy of the various groups.

Groups of householders	% of peasants cultivating entire allotment with own implements	% of peasants owning improved implements	Total animals (in terms of cattle) per household	% of total animals	
With no draught animals . . .	2.1	0.03	0.5	1.5	6.4%
” 1 ” animal . . .	35.4	0.1	1.9	4.9	
” 2 or 3 ” animals . . .	60.5	4.5	4.0	16.8	28.6%
” 4 ” ” . . .	74.7	19.0	6.6	11.8	
” 5 to 10 ” ” . . .	82.4	40.3	10.9	29.2	65.0%
” 10 to 20 ” ” . . .	90.3	41.6	22.7	20.4	
” 20 and more ” ” . . .	84.1	62.1	55.5	15.4	
Total	52.0	13.9	6.4	100	

Thus, in the bottom group there are very few independent peasant farmers; the poor peasants have no improved implements at all, while the middle peasantry have them in insignificant numbers. The concentration of animals is still greater than the concentration of area under crops; the well-to-do peasants evidently combine capitalist livestock raising with their large-scale capitalist cropping. At the opposite pole we have "peasants" who ought to be classed as allotment-holding farm labourers and day labourers, for their main source of livelihood is the sale of their labour-power (as we shall see in a moment), and the landowners sometimes give one or two animals to their labourers to tie them down to their farms and to reduce wages.

It goes without saying that the peasant groups differ not only as to the size of their farms, but also in their methods of farming: firstly, in the top group a very large proportion of the peasant farmers (40 to 60%) are supplied with improved implements (mainly iron ploughs, and also horse and steam threshers, winnowing machines, reapers, etc.). In the hands of 24.7% of the households, the top group, are concentrated 82.9% of the total improved implements; 38.2% of the households, the middle group, possess 17% of the improved implements; 37.1%, the poor, possess 0.1% (7 implements out of 5,724).* Secondly, the peasants with few horses are compelled by necessity to carry on "a different system of farming, a system of economic activity" entirely different from that of the peasants with many horses, as the compiler of Returns for Novouzensk Uyezd says (pp. 44-46). The well-to-do peasants "let their land rest . . . plough in the autumn

* It is interesting to note that from these very data Mr. V. V. (*Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming*, St. Petersburg, 1892, p. 225) concluded that there was a movement by the "peasant masses" to replace obsolete implements by improved ones (p. 254). The method by which this absolutely false conclusion was reached is very simple: Mr. V. V. took the total figures from the Zemstvo returns, without troubling to look at the tables showing how the implements were distributed! The progress of the capitalist farmers (community members), who employ machines to cheapen the cost of producing commodity grain, is transformed by a stroke of the pen into the progress of the "peasant masses." And Mr. V. V. did not hesitate to write "Although the machines are acquired by the well-to-do peasants; they are used by all (sic!!) the peasants" (221). Comment is superfluous

. . . plough it again in the spring and sow after harrowing . . . roll the ploughed land when the soil has aired . . . plough twice for rye," whereas the badly-off peasants "do not let their land rest but sow Russian wheat year after year . . . for wheat they plough in the spring once . . . for rye they provide neither fallow nor ploughed land, but merely break the surface before sowing . . . for wheat they plough in the late spring, and as a result the corn often does not come up . . . for rye they plough once, or merely break the surface and not at the proper time . . . they plough the same plot of land unwisely year after year, without allowing it to rest." "And so on and so forth without end," the compiler concludes this list. "The facts enumerated concerning the radical difference between the farming systems of the better- and the badly-off peasants result in grain of poor quality and bad harvests for the latter and comparatively better harvests for the former" (ibid.).

But how could such a big bourgeoisie arise under the agricultural community system? The answer is supplied by the figures for land possessed and in use according to groups. The peasants in the section taken by us (76 households) have a total of 57,128 dess. of purchased land and 304,514 dess. of rented land, of which 177,789 dess. are non-allotment land rented by 5,602 households; 47,494 dess. of the allotment land rented from other village communities are held by 3,129 households, and 79,231 dess. of the allotment land rented in their own village communities are held by 7,092 households. The distribution of this enormous area of land, constituting more than $^2/_3$ of the peasants' total area under crops, is as follows (see Table on p. 89).

We see here an enormous concentration of purchased and rented land. More than $^9/_{10}$ of the total purchased land is in the hands of 1.8% of the households, the very richest. Of all the rented land, 69.7% is concentrated in the hands of peasant capitalists, and 86.6% is in the hands of the top group of the peasantry. A comparison of the figures on the renting and the leasing-out of allotment land clearly reveals the passage of the land into the hands of the peasant bourgeoisie. Here, too, the conversion of the land into a commodity leads to the cheapening of the wholesale purchase price of land (and, consequently, to profiteering in land). If we determine the price of one dessiatine of rented non-allotment land

Groups of householders	% of households with purchased land	Dessiatines per household	% of total purchased land	Renting of non-allotment land: % of households renting	Renting of non-allotment land: Dessiatines per household	Renting of allotment land: In other communities: % of households	Renting of allotment land: In other communities: Dessiatines per household	Renting of allotment land: In own community: % of households	Renting of allotment land: In own community: Dessiatines per household	Renting of allotment land: % of total rented land	% of non-farming households leasing out land
With no draught animals	0.02	100	0.2	2.4	1.7	1.4	5.9	5	3	0.6	47.0
” 1 ” animal	0.3	751	100	19.8	31.7	11.0	15.1	25	11	100	12
” 2 to 3 ” animals	0.02	93	0.5	19.8	3.8	9.4	5.6	21	5	5.8	2.0
” 4 ” ”	0.07	29	0.1	27.9	6.6	15.8	6.9	34	6	5.4	0.8
” 5–10 ” ”	0.1	101	0.9	30.4	14.0	19.7	11.6	44	9	16.9	0.4
” 10–20 ” ”	1.4	151	6.0	45.8	54.0	29.6	29.4	58	21	24.3	0.2
” 20 and more ” ”	8.2	1,254	92.3	65.8	304.2	36.1	67.4	58	74	45.4	0.1
Total	0.3	751	100	19.8	31.7	11.0	15.1	25	11	100	12

we get the following figures, counting from the bottom group to the top: 3.94; 3.20; 2.90; 2.75; 2.57; 2.08; 1.78 rubles. To show what mistakes the Narodniks fall into by thus ignoring the concentration of rented]and, let us quote by way of example the arguments of Mr. Karyshev in the well-known symposium *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices on Certain Aspects of the Russian National Economy* (St. Petersburg, 1897). When grain prices fall, with an improvement of the harvest, and renting prices rise, the entrepreneur renters, concludes Mr. Karyshev, have to reduce demand and hence the renting prices had been raised by the representatives of consumers' economy (I, 288). The conclusion is absolutely arbitrary: it is quite possible that the peasant bourgeoisie raise renting prices in spite of a drop in grain prices, for an improvement in the harvest may compensate for the drop in prices. It is quite possible that the well-to-do peasants raise renting prices even when there is no such compensation, reducing the cost of production of grain by introducing machinery. We know that the employment of machines in agriculture is growing and that these machines are concentrated in the hands of the peasant bourgeoisie. Instead of studying the differentiation of the peasantry, Mr. Karyshev introduces arbitrary and incorrect premises about an average peasantry. That is why all the conclusions and deductions similarly arrived at by him in the publication quoted are of no value whatever.

Having ascertained that diverse elements exist among the peasantry, we can now easily get clarity on the question of the home market. If the well-to-do peasants control about $^2/_3$ of the total agricultural production, it is obvious that they must account for an incomparably larger share of the grain on sale. They produce grain for sale, whereas the badly-off peasants have to buy additional grain and sell their labour-power. Here are the data:*

* We identify with the sale of labour-power what the statisticians call "agricultural industries" (local and away from the village). That by these "industries is meant *employment as regular* and *day labourers* is clear from the table of industries (*Combined Returns for Samara Gubernia*, Vol. VIII): of 14,063 males engaged in "agricultural industries," 13,297 are farm labourers and day labourers (including shepherds and ploughmen).

Groups of householders	% of householders employing hired labourers	% of working males engaged in agricultural industries
With no draught animals	0.7	71.4
" 1 " animal	0.6	48.7
" 2–3 " animals	1.3	20.4
" 4 " "	4.8	8.5
" 5–20 " "	20.3	5.0
" 10–20 " "	62.0	3.9
" 20 and more " "	90.1	2.0
Total	9.0	25.0

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

We suggest that the reader compare the arguments of our Narodniks with these data regarding the process of the formation of the home market. . . . "If the muzhik is prosperous, the factory flourishes, and vice versa" (V. V., *Progressive Trends*, p. 9). Mr. V. V. is evidently not in the least interested in the social form of the wealth which the "factory" needs and which is created only by the conversion of the product and the means of production, on the one hand, and of labour-power, on the other, into a commodity. Mr. N.—on, when speaking of the sale of grain, consoles himself with the thought that this grain is produced by the "muzhik-farmer" (*Sketches*, p. 24), that by transporting this grain "the railways live at the expense of the muzhik" (p. 16). Really, are not these "community-member" capitalists "muzhiks"? "Some day we shall have occasion to point out," wrote Mr. N.—on in 1880, and reprinted it in 1893, "that in the localities where communal land tenure prevails, agriculture based on capitalist principles is almost completely absent (sic!!) and that it is possible only where communal ties have either been entirely broken or are breaking down" (p. 59). Mr. N.—on has never had this "occasion," nor could he have had, for the facts point precisely to the development of capitalist agriculture *among* "community members"* and

* Novouzensk Uyezd, which we have taken as an illustration, reveals a particular "tenacity of the village community" (to use the terminology of Messrs. V. V. & Co.): from the table in the *Combined Returns* (p. 26) we find that in this uyezd 60% of the communities have redivided the land, whereas in the other uyezds only 11 to 23% have done so (for the gubernia 13.8% of the communities).

to the complete adaptation of the notorious "communal ties" to the farms of big crop growers that employ labourers.

The relationship between the peasant groups proves to be absolutely analogous in Nikolayevsk Uyezd (cited statistical returns, p. 826 and foll.; we leave out those living away from home and the landless). For example, 7.4%, the rich households (having 10 and more draught animals), comprising 13.7% of the population, concentrate in their hands 27.6% of the total livestock and 42.6% of the rented land, whereas 29%, the poor households (horseless and one-horse), comprising 19.7% of the population, have only 7.2% of the livestock and 3% of the rented land. Unfortunately, the tables for Nikolayevsk Uyezd, we repeat, are too scanty. To finish with Samara Gubernia, let us quote the following highly instructive description of the position of the peasantry from the *Combined Returns* for Samara Gubernia.

". . . The natural increase in the population, augmented by the Immigration of land-poor peasants from the western gubernias, in connection with the appearance in the sphere of agricultural production of money-grubbing speculators in land, has with every passing year complicated the forms of the renting of land, raised its worth and converted the land into a commodity which has so quickly and immensely enriched some and ruined many others. To illustrate the latter point, let us indicate the area cultivated by some of the southern merchant- and peasant-owned farms, where the tillage of 3,000 to 6,000 dessiatines is no rarity, while some practise the cultivation of 8-10-15 thousand dessiatines of land, renting several tens of thousands of state-owned land.

"The existence and the growth of the agricultural (rural) proletariat in Samara Gubernia are to a considerable extent the product of recent times, with their increasing production of grain for sale, rise in renting prices, ploughing up of virgin and pasture land, clearing of forests, and so forth. The landless households throughout the gubernia number 21,624 in all, whereas the non-farming ones number 33,772 (of those households that have allotments), while the horseless and one-horse households together number 110,604 families, with a total of 600,000 persons of both sexes, counting five and a fraction persons per family. We take the liberty of counting these, too, as proletarians, although legally they

have a share of communal land; actually, these are day labourers, ploughmen, shepherds, reapers and similar workers on big farms who cultivate ½ to 1 dessiatine of their own allotments so as to feed their families who remain at home" (pp. 57-58).

Thus, the investigators regard as proletarians not only the horseless peasants, but also those who have one horse. We note this important conclusion, which fully coincides with that of Mr. Postnikov (and with the data in the classified tables) and points to the real social-economic significance of the bottom group of the peasantry.

III. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR SARATOV GUBERNIA

We now pass to the central black-earth belt, to Saratov Gubernia. We take Kamyshin Uyezd, the only one for which a fairly complete classification of the peasants according to draught animals held is available.*

Here are the data for the whole uyezd (40,157 households, 263,135 persons of both sexes. Area under crops, 435,945 dessiatines, i.e., 10.8 dessiatines per "average" household):

Groups of householders	% of households		% of population, both sexes	Average area under crops (dess.)	% of total area under crops		% of households with no land under crops	Animals (in terms of large cattle) per household	% of total animals	
With no draught animals . .	26.4	46.7	17.6	1.1	2.8	12.3	72.3	0.6	2.9	11.8
" 1 draught animal . .	20.3		15.9	5.0	9.5		13.1	2.3	8.9	
" 2 draught animals . .	14.6	32.2	13.8	8.8	11.8	34.4	4.9	4.1	11.1	32.1
" 3 draught animals . .	9.3		10.3	12.1	10.5		1.5	5.7	9.8	
" 4 draught animals . .	8.3		10.4	15.8	12.1		0.6	7.4	11.2	
" 5 and more draught animals . .	21.1	21.1	32.0	27.6	53.3	53.3	0.2	14.6	56.1	56.1
Total . . .	100		100	10.8	100		22.7	5.2	100	

* For the other four uyezds of this gubernia the classification according to draught animals held merges the middle and well-to-do peasantry. See *Combined Statistical Returns for Saratov Gubernia*, Part I, Saratov, 1888. B. Combined Tables for Saratov Gubernia

Thus, here again we see the concentration of land under crops in the hands of the big crop growers: the well-to-do peasantry, constituting only a fifth of the households (and about a third of the population),* hold more than half the total area under crops (53.3%), the size of this area clearly indicating the commercial character of the farming: an average of 27.6 dess. per household. The well-to-do peasantry have also a considerable number of animals per household: 14.6 head (in terms of cattle, i.e., counting 10 head of small domestic animals for one of cattle), and of the total number of peasants' cattle in the uyezd, nearly 3/5 (56%) is concentrated in the hands of the peasant bourgeoisie. At the opposite pole in the countryside, we find the opposite state of affairs; the complete dispossession of the bottom group, the rural proletariat, who in our example comprise a little less than 1/2 of the households (nearly 1/3 of the population), but who have only 1/8 of the total area under crops, and even less (11.8%) of the total number of animals. These are mainly allotment-holding farm labourers, day labourers and industrial workers.

Side by side with the concentration of crop areas and with the enhancement of the commercial character of agriculture there takes place its transformation into capitalist agriculture. We see the already familiar phenomenon: the sale of

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according to categories of peasants.—The Saratov statisticians compiled their combined tables as follows: all the householders are divided into six *categories* according to size of allotment, each category is divided into six *groups* according to the number of draught animals, and each group is divided into four *subdivisions* according to the number of working males in the family. Summarised data are given only for the *categories*, so that we have to calculate those for the *groups* ourselves. We shall deal with the significance of this table later on.

* Let us note that when classifying households according to economic strength, or to size of farm, we always get *larger* families among the well-to-do strata of the peasantry. This phenomenon points to the connection between the peasant bourgeoisie and large families, which receive a larger number of allotments; partly it shows the opposite: it indicates the lesser desire of the well-to-do peasantry to divide up the land. One should not, however, exaggerate the significance of large families among the well-to-do peasants, who, as our figures show, resort in the greatest measure to the employment of hired labour. The "family co-operation" of which our Narodniks are so fond of talking is thus the basis of capitalist co-operation.

labour-power in the bottom groups and its purchase in the top ones.

Groups of householders	% of peasants employing male wage-workers	% of farms engaging in industries
With no draught animals	1.1	90.9
" 1 " animal	0.9	70.8
" 2 " animals	2.9	61.5
" 3 " "	7.1	55.0
" 4 " "	10.0	58.6
" 5 and more "	26.3	46.7
Total	8.0	67.2

Here an important explanation is needed. P. N. Skvortsov has quite rightly noted in one of his articles that Zemstvo statistics attach far too "wide" a meaning to the term "industry" (or "employments"). In fact, *all sorts* of occupations engaged in by the peasants outside their allotments are assigned to the category of "industries"; factory owners and workers, owners of flour mills and of melon fields, day labourers, regular farm labourers; buyers-up, traders and unskilled labourers; lumber-dealers and lumbermen; building contractors and building workers; members of the liberal professions, clerks, beggars, etc., all these are "industrialists"! This barbarous misuse of words is a survival of the traditional—and we have the right even to say: official—view that the "allotment" is the "real," "natural" occupation of the muzhik, while all other occupations are assigned indiscriminately to "outside" industries. Under serfdom this use of the word had its raison d'être, but now it is a glaring anachronism. Such terminology is retained partly because it harmonises wonderfully with the fiction about an "average" peasantry and *rules right out the possibility* of studying the differentiation of the peasantry (particularly in those places where peasant "outside" occupations are numerous and varied. Let us remind the reader that Kamyshin Uyezd is a noted centre of the sarpinka industry[47]). The processing* of

* We say "*processing*" because the data on peasant industries collected in the house-to-house censuses are very comprehensive and detailed.

household returns on peasant farming will be unsatisfactory so long as peasant "industries" are not classified according to their economic types, so long as among the "industrialists" *employers* are not separated from *wage-workers*. This is the minimum number of economic types without discriminating between which economic statistics cannot be regarded as satisfactory. A more detailed classification is, of course, desirable; for example; proprietors employing wage-workers—proprietors not employing wage-workers—traders, buyers-up, shopkeepers, etc., artisans, meaning industrialists who work for customers, etc.

Coming back to our table, let us observe that after all we had some right to consider "industries" as being the sale of labour-power, for it is usually wage-workers who predominate among peasant "industrialists." If it were possible to single the wage-workers out of the latter, we would, of course, obtain an incomparably smaller percentage of "industrialists" in the top groups.

As to the data regarding wage-workers, we must note here the absolutely mistaken character of Mr. Kharizomenov's opinion that the "short-term hire [of workers] for reaping, mowing and day labouring, which is too widespread a phenomenon, cannot serve as a characteristic criterion of the strength or weakness of a farm" (p. 46 of "Introduction" to the *Combined Returns*). Theoretical considerations, the example of Western Europe, and the facts of Russia (dealt with below) compel us, on the contrary, to regard the hiring of day labourers as a very characteristic feature of the rural bourgeoisie.

Lastly, as regards rented land, the data show, here too, the same concentration of it in the hands of the peasant bourgeoisie. Let us note that the combined tables of the Saratov statisticians do not show the number of peasants who rent land and lease it out, but only the total land rented and leased out*; we have, therefore, to determine the amount of land rented and leased per *existing*, and not per renting household.

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* The total amount of arable leased out in the uyezd is 61,639 dess., i.e., about 1/6, of the aggregate allotment arable (377,305 dess.).

Groups of householders	Dessiantines per allotment household: Allotment arable	Rented land	Leased land	% of total land: Allotment		Rented		Leased		Total land in use (allotment + rented - leased) %	
With no draught animals	5.4	0.3	3.0	16		1.7		52.8		5.5	
" 1 " animal	6.5	1.6	1.3	14		6		17.8		10.3	
" 2 " animals	8.5	3.5	0.9	13		9.5		8.4		12.3	
" 3 " "	10.1	5.6	0.8	10	34	9.5	30.1	4.8	17.3	10.4	34.6
" 4 " "	12.5	7.4	0.7	11		11.1		4.1		11.9	
" 5 and more animals	16.1	16.6	0.9	36		62.2		12.3		49.6	
Total	9.3	5.4	1.5	100		100		100		100	

Thus we see, here too, that the wealthier the peasants the *more* they rent land, *despite* the fact that they are better provided with allotment land. Here too we see that the well-to-do are ousting the middle peasantry, and that the role of allotment land in peasant farming tends to diminish at both poles of the countryside.

Let us examine in greater detail these data on land renting. With them are connected the very interesting and important investigations and arguments of Mr. Karyshev (quoted *Results*) and Mr. N.—on's "corrections" to them.

Mr. Karyshev devotes a special chapter (III) to "the dependence of land renting on the prosperity of the lessees." The general conclusion he arrives at is that, "*other things being equal*, the struggle for rentable land tends to go in favour of the better-off" (p. 156). "The relatively more prosperous households . . . push the less prosperous ones into the background" (p. 154). We see, consequently, that the conclusion drawn from a general review of Zemstvo statistical data is the same as that to which we are led by the data we are studying. Moreover, a study of the dependence of the amount of rented land on the size of the allotment led Mr. Karyshev to the conclusion that classification according to allotment "obscures the meaning of the phenomenon that interests us" (p. 139): "land renting . . . is more resorted to by a) the *categories* that are *worse* provided with land, but by b) the *groups* within them that are *better* provided. Evidently, we have here two diametrically opposed influences, the confusion of which

prevents the understanding of either" (ibid.). This conclusion follows naturally if we consistently adhere to the viewpoint that distinguishes the peasant groups *according to economic strength*; we have seen everywhere in our data that the well-to-do peasants grab rentable land, despite the fact that they are better provided with allotment land. It is clear that the degree of prosperity of the household is the *determining factor* in the renting of land, and that this factor merely undergoes a change but does not cease to be determining, with the change in the conditions of land allotment and renting. But, although Mr. Karyshev investigated the influence of "prosperity," he did not adhere consistently to the viewpoint mentioned, and therefore characterised the phenomenon *inaccurately*, speaking of the direct connection between the degree to which the lessee is supplied with land and the renting of land. This is one point. Another point is that the one-sidedness of Mr. Karyshev's investigation prevented him from appraising the full significance of the way rentable land is grabbed by the rich peasants. In his study of "non-allotment renting", he limits himself to summarising the Zemstvo statistics on land renting, without taking account of the lessees' own farms. Naturally, with such a method of study, a more formal one, the problem of the relation between land renting and the "prosperity," of the commercial character of land renting could not be solved. Mr. Karyshev, for example, was in possession of the same data on Kamyshin Uyezd as we are, but he limited himself to reproducing absolute figures only of land renting (see Appendix No. 8, p. XXXVI) and to calculating the *average* amount of rented land per allotment-holding household (text, p. 143). The concentration of land renting in the hands of the well-to-do peasants, its industrial character, its connection with land leasing by the bottom group of the peasantry, were all overlooked. Thus, Mr. Karyshev could not but see that the Zemstvo statistics refute the Narodnik notion of land renting and show that the poor are ousted by the well-to-do peasants; but he gave an inaccurate description of this phenomenon, did not study it from all sides and came into conflict with the data, repeating the old song about the "labour principle," etc. But even the mere statement of the fact of economic discord and conflict among the peasantry seemed heresy to the Narodniks, and they pro-

ceeded to "correct" Mr. Karyshev in their own way. Here is how Mr. N.—on does it, "using," as he says (p. 153, note), Mr. N. Kablukov's arguments against Mr. Karyshev. In §IX of his *Sketches*, Mr. N.—on discusses land renting and the various forms it assumes. "When a peasant," he says, "has sufficient land to enable him to obtain his livelihood by tilling his own, he does not rent any land" (152). Thus, Mr. N.—on flatly denies the existence of entrepreneur activity in peasant land renting and the grabbing of rentable land by rich peasants engaged in commercial crop growing. His proof? Absolutely none: the theory of "people's production" is not proved, but laid down as law. In answer to Mr. Karyshev, Mr. N.—on quotes a table from the Zemstvo abstract for Khvalynsk Uyezd showing that "the number of draught animals being equal, the smaller the allotment the more must this deficiency be compensated by renting" (153),* and again, "if the peasants are placed in absolutely identical conditions as regards the possession of animals, and if they have sufficient workers in their households, then the smaller the allotment they have, the more the land they rent" (154). The reader will see that such "conclusions" are merely a quibble at Mr. Karyshev's inaccurate formulation, that Mr. N.—on's empty trifles simply obscure the issue of the connection between land renting and prosperity. Is it not self-evident that where an *equal* number of draught animals is possessed, the less land a household has, the more it rents? That goes without saying, for it is the very *prosperity whose differences* are under discussion that is taken as equal. Mr. N.—on's assertion that peasants with sufficient land do not rent land is not in any way proved by this, and his tables merely show that he does not understand the figures he quotes: by comparing the peasants as to amount of allotment land held, he brings out the more strikingly the role of "prosperity" and the grabbing of rentable land in connection with the leasing of land by the poor (leasing it to these same well-to-do peasants, of course.)** Let the reader recall the data we have quoted on

* An exactly similar table is given by the statisticians for Kamyshin Uyezd. *Statistical Returns for Saratov Gubernia*, Vol. XI Kamyshin Uyezd, p. 249 and foll. We can just as well, therefore, make use of the data for the uyezd we have taken.

** That the data quoted by Mr. N.—on refute his conclusions has already been pointed to by Mr. P. Struve in his *Critical Remarks*.

the distribution of rented land in Kamyshin Uyezd; imagine that we have singled out the peasants with "an equal number of draught animals" and, dividing them into categories according to allotment and into subdivisions according to the number of persons working, we declare that the less land a peasant has, the more he rents, etc. Does such a method result in the disappearance of the group of well-to-do peasants? Yet Mr. N. —on, with his empty phrases, has succeeded in bringing about its disappearance and has been enabled to repeat the old prejudices of Narodism.

Mr. N. —on's absolutely useless method of computing the land rented by peasants per household according to groups with 0, 1, 2, etc., persons working is repeated by Mr. L. Maress in the book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices, etc.* (I, 34). Here is a little example of the "averages" boldly employed by Mr. Maress (as by the other contributors to this book, written from a biassed Narodnik point of view). In Melitopol Uyezd, he argues, the amount of rented land per renting household is 1.6 dess. in households having no working males, 4.4 dess. in households having one working male, 8.3 in households having two, and 14.0 in households having three (p. 34). And the conclusion is that there is an "approximately equal per-capita distribution of rented land"!! Mr. Maress did not think it necessary to examine the *actual* distribution of rented land according to groups of households of different economic strength, although he was in a position to learn this both from Mr. V. Postnikov's book and from the Zemstvo abstracts. The "average" figure of 4.4 dess. of rented land per renting household in the group of households having one working male was obtained by *adding together* such figures as *4 dess.* in the group of households cultivating 5 to 10 dess. and with 2 to 3 draught animals, and *38 dess.* in the group of households cultivating over 50 dess. of land and with 4 and more draught animals. (See Returns for Melitopol Uyezd, p. D. 10-11.) It is not surprising that by *adding together* the rich and the poor and dividing the total by the number of items added, one can obtain "equal distribution" wherever desired!

Actually, however, in Melitopol Uyezd 21% of the households, the rich ones (those with 25 dess. and more under crops), comprising 29.5% of the peasant population, account—despite the fact that they are best provided with

allotment and purchased land—for 66.3% of the total rented arable (Returns for Melitopol Uyezd, p. B. 190-194). On the other hand, 40% of the households, the poor ones (those with up to 10 dess. under crops), comprising 30.1 % of the peasant population, account—despite the fact that they are worst provided with allotment and purchased land—for 5.6% of the total rented arable. As can be seen, this closely resembles "equal per-capita distribution"!

Mr. Maress bases all his calculations of peasant land-renting on the "assumption" that "the renting households are mainly in the two groups worst provided" (provided with *allotment land*; that "among the renting population there is equal per-capita (sic!) distribution of rented land"; and that "the renting of land enables the peasants to pass from the groups worst provided to those best provided" (34-35). We have already shown that *all these "assumptions" of Mr. Maress directly contradict the facts*. Actually, the very contrary is the case, as Mr. Maress could not but have noted, had he—in dealing with inequalities in economic life (p. 35)—taken the data for the classification of households according to economic indices (instead of according to allotment *tenure*), and not limited himself to the unfounded "assumption" of Narodnik prejudices.

Let us now compare Kamyshin Uyezd with other uyezds in Saratov Gubernia. The ratios between the peasant groups are everywhere the same, as is shown by the following data for the four uyezds (Volsk, Kuznetsk, Balashov and Serdobsk) in which, as we have said, the middle and the well-to-do peasants are combined:

Four uyezds in Saratov Gubernia

Groups of householders	as % % of total						
	Households	Population, both sexes	Total animals	Allotment land	Rented land	Total land in use	Area under crops
With no draught animals	24.4	15.7	3.7	14.7	2.1	8.1	4.4
" 1 " animal	29.6	25.3	18.5	23.4	13.9	19.8	19.2
" 2 and more animals	29.6	25.3	18.5	23.4	13.9	19.8	19.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Hence, we see everywhere the ousting of the poor by the prosperous peasants. But in Kamyshin Uyezd the well-to-do peasantry are more numerous and richer than in the other uyezds. Thus, in five uyezds of the gubernia (including the Kamyshin Uyezd) the households are distributed according to draught animals held as follows: with no draught animals —25.3%; with 1 animal—25.5%; with 2—20%; with 3—10.8%; and with 4 and more—18.4%, whereas in Kamyshin Uyezd, as we have seen, the well-to-do group is larger, and the badly-off group somewhat smaller. Further, if we combine the middle and well-to-do peasantry, i.e., if we take the households with 2 draught animals and more, we get the following data for the respective uyezds:

Per household with 2 and more draught animals

	Kamyshin	Volsk	Kuznetsk	Balashov	Serdobsk
Draught animals	3.8	2.6	2.6	3.9	2.6
Total "	9.5	5.3	5.7	7.1	5.1
Allotment land (dess.) . . .	12.4	7.9	8	9	8
Rented " " . . .	9.5	6.5	4	7	5.7
Area under crops " . . .	17	11.7	9	13	11

This means that in Kamyshin Uyezd the prosperous peasants are richer. This uyezd is one of those with the greatest abundance of land: 7.1 dess. of allotment land per registered person,[48] male, as against 5.4 dess. for the gubernia. Hence, the land-abundance of the "peasantry" merely means the greater numbers and greater wealth of the peasant bourgeoisie.

In concluding this review of the data for Saratov Gubernia, we consider it necessary to deal with the classification of the peasant households. As the reader has probably observed, we reject a limine* any classification according to allotment and exclusively employ classification according to economic strength (draught animals, area under crops). The reasons for adopting this system must be given. Classification according

* At once.—*Ed.*

to allotment is far more widespread in our Zemstvo statistics, and in its defence the two following, at first sight very convincing, arguments are usually advanced.* It is said, firstly, that to study the life of the agricultural peasants it is natural and necessary to classify them according to land. This argument ignores a fundamental feature of Russian life, namely, the unfree character of allotment-land tenure, in that by force of law it bears an equalitarian character, and that the purchase and sale of allotment land is hindered in the extreme. The whole process of the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry is one of real life evading these legal bounds. In classifying the peasants according to allotment, we lump together the poor peasant who leases out land and the rich peasant who rents or buys land; the poor peasant who abandons the land and the rich peasant who "gathers" land; the poor peasant who runs his most wretched farm with an insignificant number of animals and the rich peasant who owns many animals, fertilises his soil, introduces improvements., etc., etc. In other words, we lump together the rural proletarian and the members of the rural bourgeoisie. The "averages" thus obtained *obscure the differentiation*, and are therefore purely fictitious.** The combined tables of the Sara-

* See, for example, the introductions to the *Combined Returns* for Saratov Gubernia, to the *Combined Returns* for Samara Gubernia, and to *Evaluation Returns* for four uyezds of Voronezh Gubernia, and other Zemstvo statistical publications.

** We take this rare opportunity of expressing our agreement with Mr. V. V., who in his magazine articles of 1885 and subsequent years welcomed "the new type of Zemstvo statistical publications," namely, the combined tables, which make it possible to classify household data not only according to allotment, but also according to economic strength. "The statistical data," wrote Mr. V. V. at that time, "must be adapted *to the groups themselves and not to such a conglomeration of the most diverse economic groups of peasants as the village or the village community.*" (V. V., "A New Type of Local Statistical Publication," pp. 189 and 190 in *Severny Vestnik* [*Northern Herald*], 1885, No. 3. Quoted in the "Introduction" to the *Combined Returns* for Saratov Gubernia, p. 36). To our extreme regret in none of his later works has Mr. V. V. made any effort to glance at the data on the various groups of the peasantry, and, as we have seen, he has even ignored the factual part of the book by Mr. V. Postnikov, who was probably the first to attempt the arrangement of the data according to the various groups of the peasantry and not according to "conglomerations of the most diverse groups". Why is this?

tov statisticians described above enable us to demonstrate clearly the uselessness of classification according to allotment. Take, for example, the category of non-allotment peasants in Kamyshin Uyezd (see *Combined Returns*, p. 450 and foll., the Returns for Kamyshin Uyezd, Vol. XI, p. 174 and foll.). The compiler of the *Combined Returns*, in describing this category, says that the area under crops is "very negligible" ("Introduction", p. 45), i.e., he assigns it to the category of the poor. Let us take the tables. The "average" area under crops in this category is 2.9 dess. per household. But see how this "average" was reached: by adding together the big crop growers (18 dess. per household in the group with 5 and more draught animals; the households in this group constitute about ⅛ of the whole category, but they possess about half of this category's area under crops) and the poor, the horseless peasants, with 0.2 dess. per household! Take the households employing farm labourers. There are very few of them in this category—77 in all, or 2.5%. But of these 77 there are 60 in the top group, in which the area cultivated is 18 dess. per household; and in this group the households employing farm labourers constitute 24.5%. Clearly, we obscure the differentiation of the peasantry, depict the propertyless peasants in a better light than they actually are (by adding the rich to them and striking averages), while, on the contrary, we depict the well-to-do peasants as being of lesser strength, because the category of peasants with large allotments includes, in addition to the majority, the well-off, also the badly-off (it is a known fact that even the large-allotment village communities always include indigent peasants). We are now clear, too, as to the incorrectness of the second argument in defence of classification according to allotment. It is argued that by such classification the indices of economic strength (number of animals, area under crops, etc.) always show a regular increase according to the increase in the size of the allotment. That is an undoubted fact, for the allotment is one of the major factors of well-being. Where, consequently, the peasants are large-allotment holders there are always more members of the peasant bourgeoisie and, as a result, the "average" allotment figures for the whole category are raised. All this, however, gives no grounds whatever for

inferring that a method combining the rural bourgeoisie with the rural proletariat is correct.

We conclude: in systematising peasant household statistics one should not limit oneself to classification according to allotment. Economic statistics must necessarily take the *scale and type of farm* as the basis of classification. The indices for distinguishing these types should be taken in conformity with local conditions and forms of agriculture, while in dealing with extensive grain farming, one can limit oneself to classifying according to area under crops (or to the number of draught animals); under other conditions one must take account of the area under industrial crops, the technical processing of agricultural produce, the cultivation of root crops or of fodder grasses, dairy farming, vegetable growing, etc. When the peasantry combine agricultural and industrial occupations on a large scale, a combination of the two systems of classification is necessary, i.e., of classification according to the scale and type of agriculture, and of classification according to the scale and type of "industries." The methods of summarising peasant household returns are not such a narrowly specific and second-rate problem as one might imagine at first sight. On the contrary, it will be no exaggeration to say that at the present time it is the basic problem of Zemstvo statistics. The completeness of household returns and the technique of collecting them* have reached a high degree of perfection, but owing to unsatisfactory summarising, a vast amount of most valuable information is simply lost, and the investigator has at his disposal merely "average" figures (for village communities, volosts, categories of peasants, size of allotment, etc.). But these "averages," as we have seen already, and shall see later, are often absolutely fictitious.

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* About the technique of Zemstvo censuses see, in addition to the above-mentioned publications, the article by Mr. Fortunatov in Vol. I of *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigation*. Specimens of household registration cards are reproduced in the "Introduction" to the *Combined Returns for Samara Gubernia* and to the *Combined Returns for Saratov Gubernia*, in the *Statistical Returns for Orel Gubernia* (Vol. II, Yelets Uyezd) and in *Material for the Statistical Survey of Perm Gubernia*, *Krasnoufimsk Uyezd*, Vol. IV. The Perm registration card is particularly comprehensive.

IV. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR PERM GUBERNIA

In our review of Zemstvo statistics let us now turn to a gubernia where conditions are totally different: Perm Gubernia. Let us take Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, for which we have a household classification made according to scale of farming.* Here are the general data regarding the agricultural part of the uyezd (23,574 households, 129,439 persons of both sexes).

Animals per household

Groups of householders	% of households	% of population of both sexes	Area under crops per household (dess.)	% of total area under crops			Draught	Total number of animals in terms of cattle	% of total animals		
Cultivating											
no land	10.2	6.5	—	—	8.9		0.3	0.9	1.7	15.4	
" up to 5 dess.	30.3	24.8	1.7	8.9			1.2	2.3	13.7		
" 5 to 10 "	27.0	26.7	4.7	22.4			2.1	4.7	24.5		
" 10 to 20 "	22.4	27.3	9.0	35.1			3.5	7.8	33.8		
" 20 to 50 "	9.4	13.5	17.8	28.9	33.6	68.7	6.1	12.8	23.2	26.3	60.1
" over 50 "	0.7	1.2	37.3	4.7			11.2	22.4	3.1		
Total	100	100	5.8	100			2.4	5.2	100		

Hence, here too, notwithstanding the considerably smaller areas under crops, we find the same ratios between the groups, the same concentration of crop areas and animals in the hands of a small group of well-to-do peasants. The ratio between the land held and the land in actual economic use is the same as in the gubernias with which we are already familiar.**

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* *Material for the Statistical Survey of Perm Gubernia, Krasnoufimsk Uyezd*, Vol. III: Tables, Kazan, 1894. For purposes of comparison we shall quote later the main data for Ekaterinburg Uyezd, for which the same classification is given. *Statistical Returns for Ekaterinburg Uyezd, Perm Gubernia*. Published by the Zemstvo of Ekaterinburg Uyezd, Ekaterinburg, 1891.

** The total allotment land held by these peasants (all groups) is 410,428 dess., i.e., an "average" of 17.5 dess. per household. Then the peasants rent 53,882 dess. of arable and 597,180 dess. of meadow land, making a total of 651,062 dess. (households renting arable—8,903, and renting meadow land—9,167) and they lease out allotment land—arable—50,548 dess. (8,553 peasants) and meadow land—7,186 dess. (2,180 peasants), making a total of 57,734 dess.

Groups of householders	Percentages of total land					
	Households	Population of both sexes	Allotment	Rented	Leased out	In use
Cultivating no land	10.2	6.5	5.7	0.7	21.0	1.6
" up to 5 dess.	30.3	24.8	22.6	6.3	46.0	10.7
" 5 to 10 "	27.0	26.7	26.0	15.9	19.5	19.8
" 10 to 20 "	22.4	27.3	28.3	33.7	10.3	32.8
" 20 to 50 "	9.4	13.5	15.5	36.4	2.9	29.8
" over 50 "	0.7	1.2	1.9	7.0	0.3	5.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The same grabbing of rentable land by the well-to-do peasants, those already best provided; the same transfer of allotment land (by leasing) from the poor to the affluent peasantry; the same diminution of the role of allotment land, proceeding in two different directions, at both poles of the countryside. To enable the reader to get a more concrete picture of these processes, we give the data on land renting in greater detail:

Groups of householders	Per household					
	Persons of both sexes	Allotment land (dess.)	% of households renting arable	Arable per renting household (dess.)	% of households renting meadow land	Meadow land per renting household (dess.)
Cultivating no land	3.51	9.8	0.0	0.7	7.0	27.8
" up to 5 dess.	4.49	12.9	19.7	1.0	17.7	31.2
" 5 to 10 "	5.44	17.4	34.2	1.8	40.2	39.0
" 10 to 20 "	6.67	21.8	61.1	4.4	61.4	63.0
" 20 to 50 "	7.86	28.8	87.3	14.2	79.8	118.2
" over 50 "	9.25	44.6	93.2	40.2	86.6	261.0
Total	5.49	17.4	37.7	6.0	38.9	65.0

In the top groups of peasants (who, as we know, concentrate in their hands most of the rented land), land renting is consequently of an obviously industrial, entrepreneur character, despite the widespread view to the contrary of the Narodnik economists.

Let us pass to the data on hired labour, which are particularly valuable as regards this uyezd owing to their completeness (specifically, data have been added on the hiring of day labourers):

Groups of households	No. of working males per household	No. of farms hiring labourers				% of farms hiring labourers			
		seasonal	for mowing	for reaping	for threshing	seasonal	for mowing	for reaping	for threshing
Cultivating no land	0.6	4	16	—	—	0.15	0.6	—	—
" up to 5 dess.	1.0	51	364	340	655	0.7	5.1	4.7	9.2
" 5–10 "	1.2	268	910	1,385	1,414	4.2	14.3	20.1	22.3
" 10–20 "	1.5	940	1,440	2,325	1,371	17.7	27.2	43.9	25.9
" 20–50 "	1.7	1,107	1,043	1,542	746	50.0	47.9	69.6	33.7
" over 50 "	2.0	143	111	150	77	83.1	64.5	87.2	44.7
Total	1.2	2,513	3,884	5,742	4,263	10.6	16.4	24.3	18.8

We see here a clear refutation of the view of the Saratov statisticians that the hiring of day labourers is not a characteristic index of a farm's strength or weakness. On the contrary, it is a supremely characteristic index of the peasant bourgeoisie. In all forms of hiring by the day we observe that the percentage of peasants who hire labourers increases together with the increase in economic strength, despite the fact that the most affluent peasants are best provided with workers in their families. Here, too, family co-operation is the basis of capitalist co-operation. Further, we see that the number of farms hiring day labourers is *2½ times* (average for the uyezd) the number hiring seasonal workers—we take the hiring of day labourers for reaping; unfortunately, the statisticians did not give the total number of farms hiring day labourers, although this information was available. In the three top groups, of 7,679 households 2,190 employ farm labourers, while 4,017 households, i.e., the majority of the peasants in the well-to-do group, hire day labourers for reaping. Of course, the hiring of day labourers is by no means specific to Perm Gubernia, and if we have seen above that in the well-to-do

peasant groups from 2 to 6 and 9 tenths of the total number of proprietors employ farm labourers, the direct conclusion is the following. The *majority* of the well-to-do peasant households employ hired labour in one form or another. *The formation of a body of regular farm labourers and day labourers is an essential condition for the existence of the well-to-do peasantry.* Lastly, it is extremely interesting to note that the ratio between the number of farms hiring day labourers and the number employing regular farm labourers *diminishes from the bottom peasant groups to the top.* In the bottom groups the number of farms hiring day labourers always exceeds, many times over, the number employing regular farm labourers. In the top groups, on the contrary, the number of farms employing regular farm labourers is sometimes even larger than the number hiring day labourers. This fact clearly points to the formation in the top groups of the peasantry of farms employing labourers, farms based on the regular employment of wage-labour; wage-labour is more evenly distributed over the seasons of the year, and it becomes possible to dispense with the more costly and more troublesome hiring of day labourers. Let us quote, incidentally, the returns on hired labour for Elabuga Uyezd, Vyatka Gubernia (the well-to-do peasants are here merged with the middle peasants).

Groups of householders	Households			Hired labourers						% of households	
				seasonal		day					
	No.	%	% of persons of both sexes	No.	%	No.	%	% of total animals	% of allotment arable	renting land	leasing out land
Horseless . .	4,258	12.7	8.3	56	3.2	16,031	10.6	1.4	5.5	7.9	42.3
With 1 horse	12,851	38.2	33.3	218	12.4	28,015	18.6	24.5	27.6	23.7	21.8
With several horses . .	16,484	49.1	58.4	1,481	84.4	106,318	70.8	74.1	66.9	35.3	9.1
Total . .	33,593	100	100	1,755	100	150,364	100	100	100	27.4	18.1

Assuming that every day labourer works one month (28 days), the number of day labourers will be three times the number of seasonal workers. Let us note in passing that in Vyatka Gubernia, too, we find the already familiar ratios

between the groups as regards both the hiring of workers and the renting and leasing of land.

Very interesting are the household data on the use of manure, cited by the Perm statisticians. Here is the result of an analysis of these data:

Groups of householders	% of farms using manure	Cart-loads of manure used per (manure-using) household
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	33.9	80
" 5 to 10 "	66.2	116
" 10 to 20 "	70.3	197
" 20 to 50 "	76.9	358
" over 50 "	84.3	732
Total	51.7	176

Thus, here too, we see a profound difference in the systems and methods of farming employed by the poor and the affluent peasants. And this difference must exist everywhere, since the well-to-do peasants everywhere concentrate in their hands the greater part of the peasant-owned animals, and have more opportunities for expending-their labour on farm improvements. Therefore, if we learn, for example, that the post-Reform "peasantry" have at one and the same time created a group of horseless and cattleless households and "raised agricultural efficiency" by adopting the practice of manuring the soil (described in detail by Mr. V. V. in his *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming*, pp. 123-160 and foll.), this quite clearly shows us that the "progressive trends" simply indicate the progress of the rural bourgeoisie. This is seen even more distinctly in the distribution of improved agricultural implements, data regarding which are also available in the Perm statistics. These data, however, have been collected not for the whole of the agricultural part of the uyezd, but only for its 3rd, 5th and 4th districts, comprising 15,076 households out of 23,574. The following improved implements are registered: winnowers 1,049, seed-sorters 225, threshers 354, totalling 1,628. They are distributed among the groups as follows:

Groups of householders	Number of improved implements per 100 farms	Total improved implements	% of total improved implements	
Cultivating no land	0.1	2	0.1	
" up to 5 dess. . . .	0.2	10	0.6	
" 5 to 10 " . . .	1.8	60	3.7	
" 10 to 20 " . . .	9.2	299	18.4	
" 20 to 50 " . . .	50.4	948	58.3	77.2
" over 50 " . . .	180.2	309	18.9	
Total	10.8	1,628	100	

One more illustration of Mr. V. V.'s "Narodnik" thesis that improved implements are used by "all" peasants!

The data on "industries" enable us this time to single out two main types of "industries," indicating 1) the transformation of the peasantry into a rural bourgeoisie (ownership of commercial and industrial establishment), and 2) the transformation of the peasantry into a rural proletariat (sale of labour-power, the so-called "agricultural industries"). The following table shows the distribution by groups of these diametrically opposite types of "industrialists"*:

Groups of householders	Commercial & industrial establishments per 100 peasants	Distribution of commercial and industrial establishments by groups as % of total		% of farms engaging in agricultural industries
Cultivating no land	0.5	1.7		52.3
" up to 5 dess. . . .	1.4	14.3		26.4
" 5 to 10 " . . .	2.4	22.1		5.0
" 10 to 20 " . . .	4.5	34.3		1.4
" 20 to 50 " . . .	7.2	23.1	61.9	0.3
" over 50 " . . .	18.0	4.5		—
Total	2.9	100		16.2

A comparison of these data with those showing the distribution of the area under crops and the hiring of workers once again shows that the differentiation of the peasantry creates a home market for capitalism.

* "Agricultural industries" are also singled out only for the last three districts. The commercial and industrial establishments total 692, namely 132 watermills, 16 oilmills, 97 pitch and tar works, 283 "smithies, etc." and 164 "shops, taverns, etc."

We see also how profoundly the facts are distorted when the most varied types of occupations are lumped together under the heading of "industries" or "employments," when the "combination of agriculture with industries" is depicted (as, for example, by Messrs. V. V. and N. —on) as something uniform, identical in nature and precluding capitalism.

Let us point in conclusion to the similarity of the data for Ekaterinburg Uyezd. If from the 59,709 households in the uyezd we subtract the landless (14,601 households), those having only meadow land (15,679 households), and those neglecting their allotments entirely (1,612 households), we get for the remaining 27,817 households the following data: the 20,000 households that cultivate no land or cultivate little (up to 5 dess.) have an aggregate area under crops of 41,000 dess. out of 124,000 dess., i.e., less than 1/3. On the other hand, 2,859 well-to-do households (with over 10 dess. under crops) have 49,751 dess. under crops, and 53,000 dess. of rented land out of a total of 67,000 dess. (including 47,000 dess. out of 55,000 dess. of rented peasant land). The distribution of the two opposite types of "industries" and also of the households employing farm labourers in Ekaterinburg Uyezd is shown to be quite similar to the distribution of these indices of differentiation for Krasnoufimsk Uyezd.

V. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR OREL GUBERNIA

We have at our disposal two volumes of statistics, for the Yelets and Trubchevsk uyezds of this gubernia, which classify the peasant households according to the number of draught horses owned.*

Combining the two uyezds, we give the following joint data by groups.

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* *Statistical Returns for Orel Gubernia*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1887. Yelets Uyezd, and Vol. III, Orel, 1887. Trubchevsk Uyezd. For the latter uyezd the data do not include those for the suburban village communities. We take joint data for the renting of land, combining the allotment and non-allotment rented land. We have determined the amount of leased land approximately, from the number of households leasing out the whole of their allotments. The figures obtained constitute the basis for determining the amount of land in use by each group (allotment+purchased land+rented land—land leased out).

Groups of householders	% of families	% of population, both sexes	Allotment land per household (dess.)	% of land			% of land		Total land in use		Animals (in terms of cattle) per household	% of total animals
				allotment	purchased	% of land renting households	rented	leased out	as %	per household		
Horseless	22.9	15.6	5.5	14.5	3.1	11.2	1.5	85.8	4.0	1.7	0.5	3.8
With 1 horse	33.5	29.4	6.7	28.1	7.2	46.9	14.1	10.0	25.8	7.5	2.3	23.7
With 2 or 3 horses	36.4	42.6	9.6	43.8	40.5	77.4	50.4	3.0	49.3	13.3	4.6	51.7
With 4 and more	7.2	12.4	15.2	13.6	49.2	90.2	34.0	1.2	20.9	28.4	9.3	20.8
Total	100	100	8.6	100	100	52.8	100	100	100	9.8	3.2	100

From this we see that the general relations between the groups are the same as those we have seen earlier (the concentration of purchased and rented land in the hands of the well-to-do, the transfer of the land to them from the poor peasants, etc.). Quite similar, too, are the relations between the groups as regards hired labour, "industries," and "progressive trends" in farming.

Groups of householders	% of farms with hired workers	% of households engaging in industries	commercial & industrial establishments per 100 farms	Improved implements (Yelets Uyezd)	
				Implements per 100 farms	% of total implements
Horseless	0.2	59.6	0.7	0.01	0.1
With 1 horse	0.8	37.4	1.1	0.2	3.8
" 2 or 3 horses	4.9	32.2	2.6	3.5	42.7
" 4 and more	19.4	30.4	11.2	36.0	53.4
Total	3.5	39.9	2.3	2.2	100

And so, in Orel Gubernia also we see the differentiation of the peasantry into two directly opposite types: on the one hand, into a rural proletariat (abandonment of land and sale of labour-power), and, on the other, into a peasant bourgeoisie (purchase of land, renting on a considerable scale,

especially of allotment land, improved methods of farming, hiring of regular farm labourers and day labourers, here omitted, and the combining of commercial and industrial enterprises with agriculture. The scale of farming by the peasants here, however, is generally much smaller than in the above-quoted cases; there are far fewer big crop growers, and the differentiation of the peasantry, to judge by these two uyezds, therefore seems weaker. We say "seems" on the following grounds: firstly, though we observe here that the "peasantry" turn more rapidly into a rural proletariat and produce hardly perceptible groups of rural bourgeois, we have, on the other hand, already seen examples of the reverse, where this latter pole of the countryside becomes particularly perceptible. Secondly, here the differentiation of the *agricultural* peasantry (we confine ourselves in this chapter to the agricultural peasantry) is obscured by the "industries," the development of which is particularly extensive (40% of the families). And the "industrialists" here too include, besides a majority of wage-workers, a minority of merchants, buyers-up, entrepreneurs, proprietors, etc. Thirdly, here the differentiation of the peasantry is obscured because of the absence of data regarding the aspects of local agriculture that are most closely connected with the market. Commercial, market cultivation is not developed here to expand the crop areas to produce grain for sale but for the production of hemp. The largest number of commercial operations are bound up with this crop but the data of the tables given in the volume do not single out *this particular* aspect of agriculture among the various groups. "Hemp growing is the main source of the peasants' income" (that is, money income. *Returns for Trubchevsk Uyezd*, p. 5 of descriptions of villages, and many others), "the peasants devote their attention mainly to the cultivation of hemp. . . . All the manure . . . is used on the hemp fields" (ibid., 87), everywhere loans are contracted "on security of hemp," and debts are paid with hemp (ibid., passim). For the manuring of their hemp fields the well-to-do peasants buy manure from the poor (*Returns for Orel Uyezd*, Vol. VIII, Orel, 1895, pp. 91-105), hemp fields are leased out and rented in home and outside village communities (ibid., 260), and the processing of the hemp is done by part of the "industrial establishments" of whose concentration we have

spoken. It is clear how incomplete is that picture of differentiation which gives no information about the main commercial product of local agriculture.*

VI. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR VORONEZH GUBERNIA

The returns for Voronezh Gubernia are distinguished for their exceptionally complete information and abundance of classifications. In addition to the usual classification according to allotment, we have for several uyezds a classification according to draught animals, to persons working (working strength of family), to industries (not engaged in industries; engaged in industries: a—agricultural, b—mixed and c—commercial and industrial), to farm labourers (farms with members employed as farm labourers;—with no farm labourers and with no members employed as such;—households employing farm labourers). The last classification is given for the largest number of uyezds, and at first glance one might think that it is the most suitable for studying the differentiation of the peasantry. Actually, however, this is not the case: the group of farms providing farm labourers does not by any means embrace the whole of the rural proletariat, for it does not include farms providing day labourers, unskilled labourers, factory workers, builders' labourers, navvies, domestic servants, etc. Farm labourers constitute only a part of the wage-workers provided by the "peasantry." The group of farms that employ farm labourers is also very incomplete, for it does not include farms that hire day labourers. The neutral group (which neither provides nor employs farm labourers) lumps together in each uyezd tens of thousands of

* The compiler of the returns for Orel Uyezd states (Table No. 57) that the well-to-do peasants obtain *nearly twice* as much manure per head of cattle as do the poor (391 poods per head where there are 7.4 animals per household, as against 208 poods per head where there are 2.8 animals per household. And this conclusion was reached by classifying according to allotment, which obscures the real depth of differentiation). This is due to the fact that the poor are compelled to use straw and dung as fuel, to sell it, etc. Consequently, only the peasant bourgeoisie secure the "normal" quantity of manure (400 poods) per head of cattle. In this connection, too, Mr. V. V. might argue (as he does about the decline in horse possession) about "the restoration of the normal proportion" between the number of animals and the quantity of manure.

families, combining thousands of peasants who own no horses with thousands who own many, peasants who rent land and peasants who lease land, cultivators and non-cultivators, thousands of wage-workers and a minority of employers, etc. General "averages" for the entire neutral group are obtained, for example, by adding together landless households or those possessing 3 to 4 dess. per household (of allotment and purchased land in all) and households possessing 25, 50 and more dessiatines of allotment land and purchasing additionally tens and hundreds of dessiatines of land (Returns for Bobrov Uyezd, p. 336, Col. No. 148; for Novokhopersk Uyezd, p. 222)—by adding together households with 0.8 to 2.7 animals per family and those with 12 to 21 animals (ibid.). Naturally, one cannot depict the differentiation of the peasantry with the aid of such "averages," and so we have to take the classification according to draught animals as the one most closely approximating classification according to scale of farming. We have at our disposal four volumes of returns with this classification (for Zemlyansk, Zadonsk, Nizhnedevitsk and Korotoyak uyezds), and from these we must choose Zadonsk Uyezd, because no separate returns are given for the others on the purchase and leasing of land according to groups. Below we shall give combined data for all these four uyezds and the reader will see that the conclusions they yield are the same. Here are general data for the groups in Zadonsk Uyezd (15,704 households, 106,288 persons of both sexes, 135,656 dess. of allotment land, 2,882 dess. of purchased land, 24,046 dess. of rented, and 6,482 dess. of land leased out).

Groups of house-holders	% of households	Per household persons both sexes	% of population, both sexes	Allotment land per household (dess.)	% of land				Total land in use		Total land culti-vated		Total animals per household
					allotment	purchased	rented	leased out	per house-hold (dess.)	%	per house-hold (dess.)	%	
Horseless	24.5	4.5	16.3	5.2	14.7	2.0	1.5	36.9	4.7	11.2	1.4	8.9	0.6
With 1 horse	40.5	6.1	36.3	7.7	36.1	14.3	19.5	41.9	8.2	32.8	3.4	35.1	2.5
With 2 or 3 horses	31.8	8.7	40.9	11.6	42.6	35.9	54.0	19.8	14.4	45.4	5.8	47.0	5.2
With 4 and more	3.2	13.6	6.5	17.1	6.6	47.8	25.0	1.4	33.2	10.6	11.1	9.0	11.3
Total	100	6.8	100	8.6	100	100	100	100	10.1	100	4.0	100	3.2

The relations between the groups are similar here to those in the gubernias and uyezds already mentioned (concentration of purchased and of rented land, the transfer of allotment land from the poor peasants, who lease out land, to the renting and affluent peasants, etc.); but here the significance of the affluent peasants is very much smaller. The extremely negligible scale of peasant farming even raises the question, nd naturally so, of whether the local peasants do not belong to the "industrialists" rather than to the tillers of the soil. Here are data on the "industries," first of all on their distribution according to groups:

Groups of house-holders	Improved implements		% of farms			% of farms			% of money income from	
	per 100 farms	% of total	hiring farm labourers	providing farm labourers	Commercial & industrial establishments per 100 farms	engaging in industries	selling grain	buying grain	industries	sale of agricultural produce
Horseless	–	–	0.2	29.9	1.7	94.4	7.3	70.5	87.1	10.5
With 1 horse	0.06	2.1	1.1	15.8	2.5	89.6	31.2	55.1	70.2	23.5
With 2 or 3 horses	1.6	43.7	7.7	11.0	6.4	86.7	52.5	28.7	60.0	35.2
With 4 and more	23.0	54.2	28.1	5.3	30.0	71.4	60.0	8.1	46.1	51.5
Total	1.2	100	3.8	17.4	4.5	90.5	33.2	48.9	66.0	29.0

The distribution of improved implements and of the two opposite types of "industries" (the sale of labour-power and commercial and industrial enterprise) is the same as in the data examined above. The enormous percentage of households engaging in "industries," the preponderance of grain-purchasing over grain-selling farms, the preponderance of money income from "industries" over money income from agriculture*—all this gives us grounds for regarding this uyezd as "industrial" rather than agricultural. Let us, however,

* In the numerically small top group of the peasantry we see the opposite: the preponderance of grain sales over purchase, the receipt of *money* income mainly from the land, and a high percentage of peasants employing farm labourers, possessing improved implements, and owning commercial and industrial establishments. All the typical features of the peasant bourgeoisie are clearly visible here too (despite its small numbers); they are visible in the shape of the growth of commercial and capitalist agriculture.

see what sort of industries these are. The *Evaluation Returns on Peasant Landownership in Zemlyansk, Zadonsk, Korotoyak and Nizhnedevitsk Uyezds* (Voronezh, 1889) contains a list of all the trades of the "industrialists," working locally and away from home (222 trades in all), classified in groups according to allotment, and indicating the size of earnings in each trade. This list shows that the *overwhelming majority of the peasant "industries" consist of work for hire*. Of 24,134 "industrialists" in Zadonsk Uyezd, 14,135 are farm labourers, carters, shepherds and unskilled labourers, 1,813 are builders' labourers, 298 are town, factory and other workers, 446 are engaged in private service, 301 are beggars, etc. In other words, the overwhelming majority of the "industrialists" are members of the rural proletariat, *allotment-holding wage-workers*, who sell their labour-power to rural and industrial employers.* Thus, if we take the ratio between the different groups of the peasantry in a given gubernia or a given uyezd, we find *everywhere* the typical features of differentiation, both in the land-abundant steppe gubernias with their relatively huge peasant crop areas, and in the most land-poor localities with their miniature peasant "farms"; despite the most pro-

* To supplement what has been said above about the term "industries" as used in Zemstvo statistics, let us quote more detailed data on peasant industries in this locality. The Zemstvo statisticians have divided them into six categories: 1) Agricultural industries (59,277 persons out of a total of 92,889 "industrialists" in the 4 uyezds). The overwhelming majority are wage-workers, but among them we also find proprietors (melon growers, vegetable growers, bee-keepers, perhaps some coachmen, etc.). 2) Artisans and handicraftsmen (20,784 persons) Among the genuine artisans (= those who work on orders for *customers*) are included very many wage-workers, particularly building workers, etc. Of the latter we have counted over 8,000 (the figure probably includes some proprietors: bakers, etc.). 3) Servants—1,737 persons. 4) Merchants and master-industrialists—7,104 persons. As we have said, it is particularly necessary to single out this category from the general mass of "industrialists." 5) Liberal professions—2,881 persons, including 1,090 beggars; in addition to these there are tramps, gendarmes, prostitutes, policemen, etc. 6) Town, factory and other workers—1,106 persons, local industrialists—71,112, migratory industrialists—21,777, males—85,255, females—7,634. The earnings are the most varied: for example, in Zadonsk Uyezd 8,580 unskilled labourers earn 234,677 rubles, while 647 merchants and master-industrialists earn 71,799 rubles. One can imagine the confusion that results when all these most diverse "industries" are lumped together—but that is what is usually done by our Zemstvo statisticians and our Narodniks.

found difference in agrarian and agricultural conditions, the ratio between the top group of the peasantry and the bottom is everywhere the same. If, however, we compare the different localities, in some we see with particular clarity the formation of rural entrepreneurs from among the peasants and in others we see the formation of a rural proletariat. It goes without saying that in Russia, as in every other capitalist country, the latter aspect of the process of differentiation embraces an incomparably larger number of small cultivators (and very likely a larger number of localities) than the former.

VII. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR NIZHNI-NOVGOROD GUBERNIA

For three uyezds of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia—the Knyaginin, Makaryev and Vasil uyezds—the Zemstvo house-to-house census returns have been reduced to one table, which divides the peasant farms (only allotment-holding and only of peasants living in their own villages) into five groups according to draught animals held (*Material for the Evaluation of the Lands of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia. Economic Section.* Vols. IV, IX and XII, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1888, 1889, 1890).

Combining these three uyezds, we get the following data on the groups of households (in the three uyezds mentioned the data cover 52,260 households and 294,798 persons of both sexes. Allotment land—433,593 dess., purchased—51,960 dess., rented—86,007 dess., counting all kinds of rented land, allotment and non-allotment, arable and meadow land; land leased out—19,274 dess.):

Groups of house-holders	% of households	Persons of both sexes per household	% of population of both sexes	Allot-ment land		Pur-chased land	% of total land		Total land in use by group		Total animals	
				Dess. per household	% of total	% of total	Rented	Leased out	Dess. per household	% of total	No. per household	% of total
Horseless	30.4	4.1	22.2	5.1	18.6	5.7	3.3	81.7	4.4	13.1	0.6	7.2
With 1 horse	37.5	5.3	35.2	8.1	36.6	18.8	25.1	12.4	9.4	34.1	2.4	33.7
" 2 horses	22.5	6.9	27.4	10.5	28.5	29.3	38.5	3.8	13.8	30.2	4.3	34.9
" 3 "	7.3	8.4	10.9	13.2	11.6	22.7	21.2	1.2	21.0	14.8	6.2	16.5
" 4 and more	2.3	10.2	4.3	16.4	4.7	23.5	11.9	0.9	34.6	7.8	9.0	7.7
Total	100	5.6	100	8.3	100	100	100	100	10.3	100	2.7	100

Here too, consequently, we see that the well-to-do peasants, despite their better provision with allotment land (the percentage of allotment land in the top groups is larger than the percentage these groups constitute in the population), concentrate in their hands the purchased land (the well-to-do households, 9.6% of the total, have 46.2% of the purchased land, whereas the poor peasants, ⅔ of the households, have less than a quarter), as well as concentrate the rented land, and "gather" the allotment land leased by the poor. As a result of all this the *actual* distribution of the land in use by the "peasantry" is quite unlike the distribution of the allotment land. The horseless peasants have actually less land at their disposal than the allotment guaranteed them by law. The one-horse and two-horse peasants increase their holdings by only 10 to 30% (from 8.1 dess. to 9.4 dess., and from 10.5 dess. to 13.8 dess.), whereas the well-to-do peasants increase their holdings *one and a half times to double*. While the differences in the allotment land of the groups are negligible, the differences *in the actual scale of cultivation* are enormous, as can be seen from the above-quoted data on animals and from the following data on area under crops:

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Groups of householders	Area under crops per household (dess.)	% of total area under crops	% of households employing labourers	% of peasants with commercial & industrial establishments*	% of hhlds with outside employments
Horseless	1.9	11.4	0.8	1.4	54.4
With 1 horse	4.4	32.9	1.2	2.9	21.8
" 2 horses	7.2	32.4	3.9	7.4	21.4
" 3 "	10.8	15.6	8.4	15.3	21.4
" 4 and more	16.6	7.7	17.6	25.1	23.0
Total	5.0	100	2.6	4.6	31.6

* For Knyaginin Uyezd only.

When assessed by the area under crops the differences between the groups are seen to be even greater than when assessed by the amount of land actually held and in use, to say nothing of the differences in the size of the allotments.* This shows again and again the utter uselessness of classification by allotment holding, the "equality" of which has now become a legal fiction. The other columns of the table show how the "combination of agriculture with industry" is taking place among the peasantry: the well-to-do peasants combine commercial and capitalist agriculture (the high percentage of households employing farm labourers) with commercial and industrial undertakings, whereas the poor combine the sale of their labour-power ("outside employments") with crop growing on an insignificant scale, that is, are converted into allotment-holding farm labourers and day labourers. Let us observe that the absence of a proportionate diminution in the percentage of the households with outside employments is explained by the extreme variety of these "employments" and "industries" of the Nizhni-Novgorod peasantry: besides agricultural workers, unskilled labourers, building and shipbuilding workers, etc., the industrialists here include a relatively very large number of "handicraftsmen," owners of industrial workshops, merchants, buyers-up, etc. Obviously, the lumping together of "industrialists" of such diverse types distorts the data on "households with outside earnings."**

On the question of the differences in cultivation by the various groups of peasants, let us observe that in the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, "manuring the land . . . is one of the chief conditions determining the degree of productivity" of the ploughlands (p. 79 of the Returns for Knyaginin Uyezd). The

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* If we take the size of the allotment of the horseless peasants (per household) as 100, the allotments of the higher groups will be expressed by the figures: 159, 206, 259, 321. The corresponding figures for land actually held by each group will be as follows: 100, 214, 314, 477, 786; and for area under crops the figures for the groups will be: 100, 231, 378, 568, 873.

** On the "industries" of the Nizhni-Novgorod peasantry, see Mr. Plotnikov's *Handicraft Industries of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia* (Nizhni-Novgorod, 1894), tables at the end of the book, also Zemstvo statistical returns, particularly for the Gorbatov and Semyonov uyezds.

average rye yield grows in proportion to the increase in the amount of manure used: with 300 to 500 cart-loads of manure per 100 dess. of allotment land, the rye crop amounts to 47.1 meras* per dess.; with 1,500 cart-loads and more, to 62.7 meras (ibid., p. 84). Clearly, therefore, the difference between the groups in the scale of their agricultural production should be still greater than the difference in area under crops, and the Nizhni-Novgorod statisticians made a big mistake in studying the produce of the peasant fields in general, and not of the fields of the poor and the well-to-do peasantry separately.

VIII. REVIEW OF ZEMSTVO STATISTICS FOR OTHER GUBERNIAS

As the reader will have observed, in studying the process of the differentiation of the peasantry we use exclusively Zemstvo house-to-house census statistics, if they cover more or less extensive areas, if they give sufficiently detailed information on the most important indices of differentiation, and if (which is particularly important) they have been processed in such a way as to make it possible to single out the various groups of peasants according to their economic strength. The data given above, relating to seven gubernias, exhaust the Zemstvo statistical material that answers these conditions and that we have been able to use. For the sake of completeness, let us now point briefly to the remaining, less complete, data of a similar kind (i.e., based on house-to-house censuses).

For Demyansk Uyezd of Novgorod Gubernia we have a table on peasant farms grouped according to the number of horses (*Material for Evaluating the Farmlands of Novgorod Gubernia*, *Demyansk Uyezd*, Novgorod, 1888). There is no information here on land renting and leasing (in dessiatines), but the data given reveal the complete similarity of the relations between the well-to-do and the indigent peasants in this gubernia, as compared with the other gubernias. Here too, for example, as we proceed from the bottom group to the top (from the horseless households to those with 3 and more horses), there is an increase in the percentage of farms with purchased and

* 1 mera = 204 pounds—*Ed.*

rented land, despite the fact that those with many horses have an amount of allotment land above the average. Households with 3 or more horses, 10.7% of the total number of households and 16.1 % of the population, possess 18.3% of all allotment land, 43.4% of the purchased land, 26.2% of the rented land (to judge from the area under rye and oats on rented land), and 29.4% of the total "industrial buildings." On the other hand 51.3 %, the horseless and one-horse households, constituting 40.1% of the population, have only 33.2% of the allotment land, 13.8% of the purchased land, 20.8% of the rented land (in the sense indicated above), and 28.8% of the "industrial buildings." In other words, here too the well-to-do peasants "gather" the land and combine commercial and industrial "trades" with agriculture, while the poor abandon the land and turn into wage-workers (the percentage of "persons engaged in industries" diminishes as we pass from the bottom group to the top—from 26.6 % among the horseless peasants to 7.8% among those having 3 and more horses). The incompleteness of these data compels us to omit them from the following summary of the material on the differentiation of the peasantry.

For the same reason we omit the data on *part* of Kozelets Uyezd, Chernigov Gubernia (*Material for Evaluating Farmlands, Compiled by the Chernigov Statistical Department of the Gubernia Zemstvo Board*, Vol. V, Chernigov, 1882; the data on the number of draught animals are classified for 8,717 households of the black-earth district of the uyezd). The relationships between the groups are the same here too: 36.8% of the households, with no draught animals and constituting 28.8% of the population, have 21% of their own and allotment land and 7% of the rented land, but account for 63% of the total land let out on lease by these 8,717 households. On the other hand, 14.3% of the households, with 4 and more draught animals and constituting 17.3 % of the population, have 33.4% of their own and allotment land and 32.1% of the rented land, and account for only 7% of the land let out on lease. Unfortunately, the other households (owning 1 to 3 draught animals) are not subdivided into smaller groups.

In *Material for an Investigation of the Land-Usage and Domestic Life of the Rural Population of Irkutsk and Yenisei*

Gubernias there is a very interesting table (classification according to number of draught horses) of peasant and settler farms in four regions of Yenisei Gubernia (Vol. III, Irkutsk, 1893, p. 730 and foll.). It is very interesting to observe that the relationship between the well-to-do Siberian and the settler (and in this relationship the most ardent Narodnik would hardly dare to seek the famous community principle!) is essentially the same as that between our well-to-do village community members and their horseless and one-horse "brethren." By combining the settlers and the peasant old-timers (such a combination is necessary because the former serve as labour-power for the latter), we get the familiar features of the top and bottom groups. Of the households, 39.4%, the bottom groups (those with no horses, and with 1 or 2), constituting 24% of the population, have only 6.2% of the total arable and 7.1% of the total animals, whereas 36.4% of the households, those with 5 and more horses, constituting 51.2% of the population, have 73% of the arable and 74.5% of the total cattle. The latter groups (5 to 9, 10 and more horses), cultivating 15 to 36 dess. per household, resort extensively to wage-labour (30 to 70% of the farms employ wage-workers), whereas the bottom three groups, cultivating 0—0.2—3—5 dess. per household *provide* workers (20—35—59% of the farms). The data on the renting and leasing out of land are the only exception we have met to the rule (of the concentration of rented land in the hands of the well-to-do), and this is the sort of exception that proves the rule. The point is that in Siberia there are none of the conditions that created this rule, there is no compulsory and "equalitarian" allotment of land, there is no established private property in land. The well-to-do peasant neither purchases nor rents land, but appropriates it (at least that has been the case till now); the leasing out and the renting of land are rather of the character of neighbourly exchange, and that is why the group data on the renting and the leasing of land display no consistency.*

* "The locally collected material giving facts on the leasing and renting of farmland was considered to be unworthy of especial treatment, because the phenomenon exists only in a rudimentary form; isolated cases of leasing out and renting occur now and again, but are of an utterly fortuitous character and exercise no influence yet on the economic life of Yenisei Gubernia" (*Material*, Vol. IV, Part 1, p. V,

For three uyezds of Poltava Gubernia we can determine approximately the way the area under crops is distributed (knowing the number of farms with different areas under crops —indicated in the statistical reports as "from—to" so many dessiatines—and multiplying the number of households in each division by the average area under crops within the limits indicated). We get the following data for 76,032 households (villagers, excluding non-peasants) with 362,298 dess. under crops: 31,001 households (40.8%) cultivate no land or only up to 3 dess. per household, to a total of 36,040 dess. under crops (9.9%); 19,017 households (25%) cultivate over 6 dess. per household and have 209,195 dess. under crops (57.8%). (See *Economic Statistical Returns for Poltava Gubernia*, Konstantinograd, Khorol and Piryatin uyezds.)[50] The *distribution* of area under crops is very much the same as what we have seen in the case of Taurida Gubernia, despite the basically smaller *areas* under crops. Naturally, such an uneven distribution is possible only where the purchased and rented land is concentrated in the hands of a minority. We have no complete data on this, since the statistics do not classify households according to economic strength and must therefore confine ourselves to the following data on Konstantinograd Uyezd. In the chapter of farming by the rural social-estates (Chapter II, §5, "Agriculture") the compiler of the abstract states: "In general, if rented plots are divided into three categories: area per lessee of 1) up to 10 dess., 2) from 10 to 30 dess. and 3) over 30 dess., the data for each will be as follows*:

	Ratio of		Rented land	
	leasees %	rented land %	per leasee (dess.)	sub-leased in %
Small rented plots (up to 10 dess.)	86.0	35.5	3.7	6.6
Medium rented plots (10 to 30 dess.)	8.3	16.6	17.5	3.9
Big rented plots (over 30 dess.)	5.7	47.9	74.8	12.9
Total	100	100	8.6	9.3

Introduction). Of 424,624 dess. of soft arable land belonging to the peasant old-timers of Yenisei Gubernia, 417,086 dess. are "appropriated family" land.[49] Renting (2,686 dess.) nearly equals leasing 2,639 dess.) and represents not even one per cent of the total land appropriated.

* Abstract, p. 142.

Comment is superfluous.

For Kaluga Gubernia we have only the following very fragmentary and incomplete data on grain-sowing by 8,626 households (about 1/20 of the total number of peasant households in the gubernia*).

	Groups of households according to area under crops						
	Sowing winter crops (meras)						
	non-sowing	up to 15	15 to 30	30 to 45	45 to 60	over 60	Total
% of households	7.4	30.8	40.2	13.3	5.3	3.0	100
% of persons of both sexes . .	3.3	25.4	40.7	17.2	8.1	5.3	100
% of area under crops . .	—	15.0	39.9	22.2	12.3	10.6	100
% of total draught horses	0.1	21.6	41.7	19.8	9.6	7.2	100
% of gross income from crops	—	16.7	40.2	22.1		21.0	100
Area (dessiatines) under crops per household .	—	2.0	4.2	7.2	9.7	14.1	—

That is to say, 21.6% of the households, constituting 30.6% of the population, possess 36.6% of the draught horses, 45.1% of the area under crops and 43.1% of the gross income from crops. Clearly, these figures also point to the concentration of purchased and rented land in the hands of the well-to-do peasantry.

For Tver Gubernia, despite the wealth of information in the statistical returns the house-to-house censuses have been very inadequately processed; there is no classification of households according to economic strength. This defect is used by Mr. Vikhlyayev in the *Statistical Returns for Tver Gubernia* (Vol. XIII, Part 2, *Peasant Farming*, Tver, 1897) to deny "differentiation" among the peasantry, to detect a drive towards "greater equality," and to sing hymns in praise of "people's production" (p. 312) and "natural economy." Mr. Vikhlyayev enters into the most hazardous and unfounded

* *Statistical Survey of Kaluga Gubernia for 1896*, Kaluga, 1897, p. 43 and foll., 83, 113 of appendices.

arguments on stratification," not only without citing any precise data on the peasant groups, but without even having made clear for himself the elementary truth that differentiation is taking place within the village community, and that therefore to talk about "stratification" and to classify exclusively according to village communities or to volosts is simply ridiculous.*

IX. SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE ZEMSTVO STATISTICS ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY

In order to compare and combine the above-quoted data on the differentiation of the peasantry, we obviously cannot take absolute figures and put them into groups: for that we should require complete data for the whole group of districts and identical methods of classification. We can only compare and juxtapose the *relation of the top to the bottom groups* (as regards possession of land, animals, implements, etc.). The relationship expressed, for example, in the fact that 10% of the households have 30% of the area under crops, does away with the difference in the absolute figures and is therefore suitable for comparison with every similar relationship in any locality. But to make such a comparison we must single out in the other locality 10% of the households, too, neither more nor less. But the sizes of the groups in the different uyezds and gubernias are not equal. And

* As a curiosity, let us quote one sample, Mr. Vikhlyayev's "general conclusion" reads: "The purchase of land by the peasants of Tver Gubernia tends to equalise the size of holdings" (p. 11). Proof?—If we take the *groups of village communities* according to size of allotment, we shall find that the *small-allotment communities* have a larger percentage of households with purchased land. Mr. Vikhlyayev does not even suspect that it is the *well-to-do* members of the small-allotment communities who buy land! Of course, there is no need to examine such "conclusions" of an out-and-out Narodnik, the more so that Mr. Vikhlyayev's boldness has embarrassed even the economists in his own camp. Mr. Karyshev, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* [*Russian Wealth*] (1898, No. 8), although expressing his profound sympathy with the way Mr. Vikhlyayev "orientates himself well among the problems with which the economy of the country is faced at the present time," is yet compelled to admit that Mr. Vikhlyayev is too great an "optimist," that his conclusions about the drive towards equality are "not very convincing," that his data "tell us nothing," and that his conclusions "are groundless."

so, we have to *split up* these groups so as to take in each locality *an equal percentage of households*. Let us agree to take 20% of the households for the well-to-do peasants and 50% for the poor, i.e., let us form out of the top groups one of 20% of the households, and out of the bottom groups one of 50%. Let us illustrate this method by an example. Suppose we have five groups of the following proportions, from the bottom to the top: 30%, 25%, 20%, 15% and 10% of the households (S=100%). To form a bottom group, we take the first group and 4/5 of the second group ($30+\frac{25\times4}{5}=50\%$), and to form a top group we take the last group and 2/3 of the penultimate group ($10+\frac{15\times2}{3}=20\%$), the percentages for area under crops, animals, implements, etc., being determined, of course, in the same way. That is to say, if the percentages for area under crops corresponding to the above-stated percentages of the households are as follows: 15%, 20%, 20%, 21% and 24% (S=100%), then our top group, 20% of the households, will account for ($24+\frac{21\times2}{3}=38\%$) of the area under crops, while our bottom group, 50% of the households, will account for ($15+\frac{25\times4}{5}=31\%$) of the area under crops. Obviously, in splitting up the groups in this manner, we *do not change by one iota the actual relationship* between the bottom and top strata of the peasantry.* This splitting up is necessary, firstly, because in this way, instead of 4—5—6—7 different groups, we get three large groups with clearly defined indices**; secondly, because only in this way are data on the differentiation of the peasantry in the most varied localities under the most varied conditions comparable.

* This method involves a slight error, as a consequence of which the differentiation appears to be *less* than it really is. Namely: to the top group are added average, and not the top members of the next group; to the bottom group are added average, and not the bottom members of the next group. Clearly the error becomes greater as the groups become larger and the number of groups smaller.

** In the next section we shall see that the proportions of the groups we have taken come very close to those of the groups of the Russian peasantry as a whole, divided according to the number of horses per household.

Итоги по раіонамъ, сословіямъ и уѣзду.

№	% отношенія посѣвовъ.							Распредѣленіе хоз. по размѣру						
	Рожь.	Оз. пшеницы.	Яр. пшеницы.	Ячменя.	Овса.	Гречихи.	Прич. хлѣбовъ.	Число хоз. безъ посѣвъ.	Съ посѣвомъ менѣе 1 дес.	1 и менѣе 3 дес.	3 и менѣе 6 дес.	6 и менѣе 9 дес.	9 и менѣе 15 дес.	
	144	145	146	147	148	149	150							
1	88,1	6,7	33,4	13,1	3,4	3,2	0,4	45	—	—	2	3	1	3
2	29,1	5,1	34,4	19,7	3,4	3,2	4,1	222	3	23	20	45	18	13
3	23,4	10,1	26,4	14,9	16,2	3,2	6,4	76	—	1	2	8	2	1
4	42,1	4,1	25,4	13,7	6,3	1,7	6,4	63	—	6	4	9	3	7
	33,4	5,7	30,3	16,2	6,4	2,1	4,4	406	3	30	28	66	26	24
1	36,1	4,1	31,4	20,7	1,4	3,2	1,4	793	21	69	61	244	146	153
2	32,4	2,1	26,1	26,7	4,1	4,4	3,4	2448	110	930	1745	5505	2857	1560
3	37,4	2,1	23,4	22,1	7,1	2,4	3,1	809	46	535	799	2207	1063	613

Pages 276-277 of the *Statistical Review of Poltava Gubernia* (Vol. XIV, 1894) with V. I. Lenin's notes

Итоги по раіонамъ, сословіямъ и уѣзду.

	№	%, отношенія посѣвовъ. Рожь.	Оз. пшеницы.	Яр. пшеницы.	Ячменя.	Овса.	Гречихи.	Проч. хлѣбовъ.	Распредѣленіе хоз. по размѣру посѣвъ. Число хоз. безъ посѣвъ. 144	Съ посѣвомъ менѣе 1 дес. 145	1 и менѣе 2 дес. 146	2 и менѣе 3 дес. 147	3 и менѣе 6 дес. 148	6 и менѣе 9 дес. 149	9 и менѣе 15 дес. 150	15 и менѣе 20 дес. 151	20 и менѣе 50 дес. 152	50 и болѣе дес. 153	Залежи. Хоз., жущ. со снопа. Изъ безпосѣвн. и не имѣющ. поля. 154	Имѣющ. менѣе 3 дес. поля. 155	Имѣющ. 3 6 дес. поля. 156	Имѣющ. 6 и бол. дес. поля. 157	Итого залежащихъ.	% къ числу всѣхъ хоз.
	1	38,[illegible]	6,[illegible]	33,[illegible]	13,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	0,[illegible]	45	—	—	2	3	1	3	3	6	1	14	—	—	—	14	21,[illegible]
	2	29,[illegible]	5,[illegible]	34,[illegible]	19,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	222	3	23	20	46	18	13	5	4	3	50	4	1	—	55	15,[illegible]
	3	23,[illegible]	10,[illegible]	26,[illegible]	14,[illegible]	16,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	6,[illegible]	76	—	1	2	8	2	1	—	1	2	1	—	—	—	1	1,[illegible]
	4	42,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	25,[illegible]	13,[illegible]	6,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	6,[illegible]	63	—	6	4	9	5	7	2	9	5	7	1	—	—	8	7,[illegible]
		33,[illegible]	5,[illegible]	30,[illegible]	16,[illegible]	6,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	406	3	30	28	66	26	24	10	20	11	72	5	1	—	78	12,[illegible]
Уѣздъ	Всего посѣвъ десятинъ	1	36,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	31,[illegible]	20,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	1,[illegible]	793	21	69	61	244	146	133	61	80	17	559	86	7	—	652	39,[illegible]
		2	32,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	26,[illegible]	26,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	2448	110	930	1745	5505	2857	1560	290	223	36	356	292	139	39	846	5,[illegible]
		3	37,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	23,[illegible]	22,[illegible]	7,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	.3,[illegible]	809	46	535	799	2207	1063	615	125	81	9	37	17	17	2	73	1,[illegible]
		4	44,[illegible]	0,[illegible]	23,[illegible]	21,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	894	31	299	486	1884	1129	683	190	162	18	125	100	67	8	300	5,[illegible]
Хлѣбодарно-крестьянскій	158.325	1	36,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	25,[illegible]	24,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	4538	205	1803	3063	9774	5169	2987	656	526	69	1005	490	249	49	1793	6,[illegible]
		2	36,[illegible]	2,[illegible]	25,[illegible]	24,[illegible]	4,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	3,[illegible]	4944	208	1833	3091	9840	5195	3011	666	546	80	1077	495	250	49	1871	6,[illegible]
Промышленскій	115.597								3,837	633	2,341	3,796	8,519	3,092	2,271	202	105	3						
Хозяйственскій	94.376								4,912	619	2,357	3,357	7,826	2,946	1,494	327	237	33						
По 3-ей группѣ	368.298								13,787	1,497	6,501	10,216	26,019	11,139	5,302	1,285	868	105						
		Среднедѣсятинное количество посѣвъ на 1 Хозяина							—	0,5	1,5	2,5	4,5	7,5	12.	17,5	35	56,8						
		Среднее число у группы							—	749	9,751	25,540	117,063	83,692	68,424	22,737	30,380	50,076						

Всего 28.790 к.у.
~~Итого~~ 23.684. п.у.
23.558 пр.
= 76.032

Σ по 3 у. 342.298 − 356.325 / 5.972 = 56,8

Итоги по раіонамъ, сословіямъ и уѣзду.

кромѣ хлѣбопашества.																			
Хозяйствъ, отпуск. членовъ на дальн. заработки.							Извозъ.		Профессіон. занятія.			Батрачество.				Дальніе заработки.			№
												Муж.							
Изъ безземель. и не имѣющ. пахат. земли.	Имѣющ. менѣе 3 дес. пахатной земли.	Имѣющ. 3—6 дес. пах. земли.	Имѣющ. 6—9 дес. пах. земли.	Имѣющ. 9 и болѣе дес. пахатной земли.	Итого отпускающ. на дальн. заріб.	% къ числу всѣхъ хоз.	Хозяйствъ.	Лицъ.	Мужчинъ.	Женщинъ.	% ремесл. муж. къ числу муж. раб.	Взрослыхъ.	Подрабочихъ.	Женщинъ.	% батрач. муж. къ числу муж. раб.	Мужчинъ.	Женщинъ.	% уходящ. муж. къ числу муж. раб.	
158	159	160	161	162			163	164	165	166		167	168	169		170	171		
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	6	37	4	43,0	1	1	3	1,0	—	—	—	1
6	1	—	—	—	7	2,0	5	5	214	20	49,0	40	18	10	9,0	7	—	1,0	2
2	—	—	—	—	2	2,0	—	—	71	1	67,0	7	4	1	6,0	2	—	1,0	3
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	76	1	58,0	3	4	3	2,0	—	—	—	4
8	1	—	—	—	9	1,0	11	11	398	26	53,0	51	27	17	6,0	9	—	1,0	
3	1	—	—	—	4	0,0	101	105	529	24	24,0	30	65	82	1,0	4	—	0,0	1
57	34	99	49	22	261	1,0	232	234	1675	105	7,0	1217	739	753	5,0	207	89	1,0	2
16	71	45	17	3	152	2,0	162	166	602	29	6,0	578	386	296	6,0	166	29	1,0	3
8	5	13	7	10	43	0,0	254	254	934	26	11,0	596	346	238	7,0	50	7	0,0	4
76	110	157	73	35	451	1,0	738	748	3342	156	8,0	2370	1509	1352	5,0	418	125	1,0	1
84	111	157	73	35	460	1,0	749	759	3740	182	9,0	2421	1536	1369	5,0	427	125	1,0	2

Хозяйства	%	Земля	%
безземельн. 20.785	13,3	10.500	2,9
1-3 дес. 10.216	13,5	25.590	7,0
3-6 дес. 26.019	34,2	117.063	32,5
6-9 дес. 11.157	14,3	83.682	23,1
9 и > дес. 7.860	10,5	125.513	34,5
76.032	100	352.298	100

у 50% м — 18% земли

у 20% ф — 50% земли.

To judge the interrelation between the groups we take the following data, the most important on the question of differentiation: 1) number of households; 2) number of persons of both sexes of the peasant population; 3) amount of allotment land; 4) purchased land; 5) rented land; 6) *land leased out*; 7) total land owned or in use by the group (allotment + purchased + rented — land leased out); 8) area under crops; 9) number of draught animals; 10) total number of animals; 11) number of households employing farm labourers; 12) number of *households with employments* (singling out as far as possible those forms of "employment" among which work for hire, sale of labour-power predominates); 13) commercial and industrial establishments and 14) improved agricultural implements. The items given in italics ("leasing of land" and "employments") are of *negative* significance, since they indicate the decline of the farm, the ruin of the peasant and his conversion into a worker. All the other data are of *positive* significance, since they indicate the expansion of the farm and the conversion of the peasant into a rural entrepreneur.

On all these points we compute for each group of farms the percentages of the total for the uyezd or for several uyezds of one gubernia, and then ascertain (by the method we have described) what percentage of the land, area under crops, animals, etc., falls to the 20% of the households of the top groups and to the 50% of the households of the bottom groups.*

We give a table drawn up in this manner covering the data for 21 uyezds in 7 gubernias, with a total of 558,570 peasant farms and a population of 3,523,418 persons of both sexes.

* We beg the reader not to forget that now we are dealing not with absolute figures, but with relationships between the top and the bottom strata of the peasantry. Therefore, for example, we now take the number of households employing farm labourers (or with "employments") as percentages, not of the number of households in the given group, but of the total number of households employing farm labourers (or with "employments") in the uyezd. In other words, what we now ascertain is not the extent to which each group employs wage-labour (or resorts to the sale of labour-power) but merely the relationships between the top and bottom groups as to the employment of wage-labour (or to participation in "employments," in the sale of labour-power).

Table A .* Of the *top* groups a group has been

Gubernias	Uyezds	No. of line in chart	Percentages			
			Land leased out	Households with "employments"	Total Households	Population of both sexes
Taurida	Dnieper, Melitopol & Berdyansk	1	9.7	12.6	20	27.0
Samara	Novouzensk	—	0.7	—	20	28.4
	Nikolayevsk	—	0.3	4.1	20	29.7
	Average	2	0.5	4.1	20	29
Saratov	Kamyshin	3	11.7	13.8	20	30.3
Perm	Krasnoufimsk	—	7.8	0.6	20	26.8
	Ekaterinburg	—	—	4.3	20	26.1
	Average	4	7.8	2.4	20	26.4
Orel	Yelets & Trubchevsk	5	2.7	15.8	20	27.4
Voronezh	Zadonsk	6	11.9	11.6	20	28.1
	Zadonsk, Zemlyansk, Korotoyak & Nizhnedevitsk	—	12.5	12.6	20	28.1
Nizhni-Novgorod	Knyaginin, Vasil & Makaryev	7	3.8	13.7	20	27.8

* For notes to table, see p. 134.

formed of 20% of the households

of total for uyezds or groups of uyezds									
Land				Area under crops	Animals		Commercial and industrial establishments	Households employing farm labourers	Improved implements
Allotment	Purchased	Rented	Total in use		Draught	Total			
36.7	78.8	61.9	49.0	49.1	42.3	44.6	—	62.9	85.5
—	99	82	—	56	62	57	—	78.4	72.5
—	—	60.1	—	—	48.6	47.1	—	62.7	—
—	99	71	—	56	55.3	52.0	—	70.5	72.6
34.1	—	59	47	50.5	57.4	53.2	—	65.9	—
30	—	58.3	49.6	49.2	42.5	41.2	42.8	66.4	86.1
—	—	83.7	—	55.1	42.3	41.8	37.0	74.9	—
30	—	71	49.6	52.1	42.4	41.5	39.9	70.6	86.1
29.0	63.4	51.7	38.2	—	42.1	37.8	49.8	57.8	75.5
29.1	66.8	53.6	34.6	33.9	41.7	39.0	47.4	56.5	77.3
30.9		49.2	34.1	—	38	37.2	45.9	48.4	70.1
29.4	59.7	50.8	36.5	38.2	46.3	40.3	51.2	54.5	—

Table B .* Of the *bottom* groups a group has been

Gubernias	Uyezds	No. of line in chart	Percentages			
			Land leased out	Households with "employments"	Total Households	Population of both sexes
Taurida	Dnieper, Melitopol & Berdyansk	1	72.7	68.2	50	41.6
Samara	Novouzensk	—	93.8	74.6	50	39.6
	Nikolayevsk	—	98	78.6	50	38
	Average	2	95.9	76.6	50	38.8
Saratov	Kamyshin	3	71.5	60.2	50	36.6
	Volsk Kuznetsk Balashov & Serdobsk	—	64.6	—	50	37.6
Perm	Krasnoufimsk	—	74	93.5	50	40.7
	Ekaterinburg	—	—	65.9	50	44.7
	Average	4	74	79.7	50	42.7
Orel	Yelets & Trubchevsk	5	93.9	59.3	50	39.4
Voronezh	Zadonsk	6	63.3	65.3	50	39.2
	Zadonsk, Zemlyansk, Korotoyak & Nizhne-devitsk	—	67	63.8	50	37.2
Nizhni-Novgorod	Knyaginin, Vasil & Makaryev	7	88.2	65.7	50	40.6

* For notes to table, see p. 134.

formed of 50% of the households

of total for uyezds or groups of uyezds									
Land				Area under crops	Animals		Commercial and industrial establishments	Households employing farm labourers	Improved implements
Allotment	Purchased	Rented	Total in use		Draught	Total			
33.2	12.8	13.8	23.8	21.5	26.6	26	—	15.6	3.6
—	0.4	5.0	—	16.3	11.3	14.4	—	4.4	2.8
—	—	11.1	—	—	17.8	20.3	—	7.1	—
—	0.4	8	—	16.3	14.5	17.3	—	5.7	2.8
33	—	9.8	18.6	14.6	9.6	14.3	—	7.5	—
35	—	14.1	25.2	21	14.7	19.7	—	—	—
37.4	—	6.5	19.2	16.7	23.1	24	23.8	6.1	2
—	—	8.7	—	21.2	30.5	30.8	35.6	10.4	—
37.4	—	7.6	19.2	18.9	26.8	27.4	29.7	8.2	2
37.2	8.9	12.9	24.9	—	17.7	23	20.2	7.8	2.4
37.5	11	13.8	31.9	31	20	24.6	23.2	9.1	1.3
33.6		15.4	29.9	—	20.3	23.4	17.3	13.1	3.6
37.7	15.4	16.4	30.9	28.6	17.2	24.8	16.1	18.9	—

Notes to tables A and B

1. For Taurida Gubernia the returns for land leased out concern only two uyezds: Berdyansk and Dnieper.
2. For the same gubernia the category of improved implements includes mowers and reapers.
3. For the two uyezds of Samara Gubernia instead of the percentage of land leased out the percentage of allotment-leasing non-farming households has been taken.
4. For Orel Gubernia the amount of land leased out (and consequently of the total land in use) has been determined approximately. The same applies to the four uyezds of Voronezh Gubernia.
5. For Orel Gubernia the returns for improved implements exist for only Yelets Uyezd.
6. For Voronezh Gubernia, instead of the number of households with employments we have taken (for three uyezds: Zadonsk, Korotoyak and Nizhnedevitsk) the number of households providing farm labourers.
7. For Voronezh Gubernia returns for improved implements exist for only two uyezds: Zemlyansk and Zadonsk.
8. For Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, instead of households engaged in "industries" in general, we have taken the households engaging in outside employments.
9. For some of the uyezds, instead of the number of commercial and industrial establishments, we have had to take the number of households with commercial and industrial establishments.
10. Where the statistical returns give several columns of "employments" we have tried to single out those "employments" which most exactly indicate work for hire, the sale of labour-power.
11. All rented land, as far as possible, has been taken—allotment and non-allotment, arable and meadow land.
12. We would remind the reader that for Novouzensk Uyezd farmstead peasants and Germans are excluded, for Krasnoufimsk Uyezd only the agricultural part of the uyezd has been taken for Ekaterinburg Uyezd landless peasants and those possessing a share in meadow land alone are excluded, for Trubchevsk Uyezd suburban village communities are excluded, for Knyaginin Uyezd the industrial village of Bolshoye Murashkino is excluded, etc. These exclusions are partly ours, and are partly due to the nature of the material. Obviously, therefore, the differentiation of the peasantry must actually be more pronounced than appears in our table and chart.

To illustrate this combined table and to show clearly the complete similarity, of the relationship of the top to the bottom peasant groups in the most varied localities, we have drawn the following chart on which are plotted the percentages in the table. To the right of the column indicating the percentages of total households, runs a curve showing the *positive* indices of economic strength (enlargement of

holding, increase in the number of animals, etc.), while to the left runs a curve showing the *negative* indices of economic strength (leasing out of land, sale of labour-power; these columns are shaded). The distance from the *top* horizontal line of the chart to each *continuous* curve shows the share of the *well-to-do* groups in the sum-total of peasant farming, while the distance from the *bottom* horizontal line to each *broken* curve shows the share of the poor groups in that sum-total. Lastly, to give a clear picture of the general character of the combined data, we have plotted an "average" curve (arrived at by calculating arithmetical averages from the percentages indicated in the chart. To distinguish it from the others, this "average" curve is in red). This "average" curve indicates, so to speak, the typical differentiation of the Russian peasantry today.

Now, in order to sum up the data on differentiation given above (§§ I-VII), let us examine this chart column by column.

The first column to the right of the one indicating the percentages of households shows the proportion of the *population* belonging to the top and the bottom groups. We see that everywhere the size of the families of the well-to-do peasantry is above the average and that of the poor below the average. We have already spoken of the significance of this fact. Let us add that it would be wrong to take as the unit for all comparisons the individual (as the Narodniks are fond of doing) and not the household, the family. While the expenditure of the well-to-do family grows because of the larger size of the family, the mass of expenditure, on the other hand, in the large-family household diminishes (on buildings, domestic effects, household needs, etc., etc. The economic advantages of large families are particularly stressed by Engelhardt in his *Letters From the Countryside*,[51] and by Trirogov in his book, *The Village Community and the Poll Tax*, St. Petersburg, 1882). Therefore, to take the individual as the unit for comparisons, and to take no account of this diminution, means artificially and falsely to identify the condition of the "individual" in the large and in the small families. Incidentally, the chart clearly shows that the well-to-do group of peasants concentrate in their hands a far larger share of agricultural production than would follow from a calculation per head of population.

The next column refers to allotment land. In its distribution we see the greatest degree of equality, as should be the case by virtue of the legal status of allotment land. But even here the process of the poor being ousted by the well-to-do peasants is beginning: *everywhere* we find that the top groups hold a somewhat larger share of the allotment land than the share they represent in the population, while the bottom groups hold a somewhat smaller one. The "village community" tends to serve the interests of the peasant bourgeoisie. Compared, however, with the *actual* land tenure the inequality in the distribution of allotment land is still quite insignificant. The distribution of allotment land does not (as is clearly evident from the chart) give any idea of the actual distribution of land and farm property.*

Then comes the column for purchased land. In all cases this land is concentrated in the hands of the well-to-do: one-fifth of the households have about 6 or 7 tenths of all peasant-owned purchased land, whereas the poor peasants, constituting half the households, account for a maximum of 15%! One can judge, therefore, the significance of the "Narodnik" fuss about enabling the "peasantry" to buy as much land as possible and as cheaply as possible.

The next column is that for rented land. Here too we see everywhere the concentration of the land in the hands of the well-to-do (one-fifth of the households account for 5 to 8 tenths of the total rented land) who, moreover, rent land at cheaper rates, as we have seen above. This grabbing of rentable land by the peasant bourgeoisie clearly demonstrates that "peasant renting" *carries an industrial character* (the purchase of land for the purpose of selling the product.)** In saying this, however, we do not at all deny

* A single glance at the chart is sufficient to see how useless is classification according to allotment for a study of the differentiation of the peasantry.

** Very curious in Mr. Karyshev's book on the subject of rentings is the *Conclusion* (Chapter VI). After all his assertions about the absence of an industrial character in peasant renting, assertions devoid of foundation and contradicting Zemstvo statistics, Mr. Karyshev advances a "theory of rent" (borrowed from W. Roscher, etc.), in other words, serves up with a scientific sauce the desiderata of West-European capitalist farmers: "long leases" ("what is needed is ... 'efficient' use of the land by ... the peasant," p. 371) and moderate

the fact of land renting being due to want. On the contrary, the chart shows the entirely *different* character of renting by the poor, who cling to the land (half the households account for 1 to 2 tenths of the total rented land). There are peasants and peasants.

The contradictory significance of land renting in "peasant farming" stands out particularly vividly when we compare the column on land renting with that on the *leasing out of land* (first column to the *left*, i.e., among the negative indices). Here we see the very opposite: the principal lessors of land are the bottom groups (half the households account for 7 to 8 tenths of the land leased), who strive to get rid of their allotments, which pass (despite legal prohibitions and restrictions) into the hands of employer farmers. Thus, when we are told that the "peasantry" rent land and that the "peasantry" lease out their land, we know that the first applies mainly to the peasant bourgeoisie and the second to the peasant proletariat.

The relation of purchased, rented and leased land to the allotment determines *also the actual land held* by the groups (5th column to the right). In all cases we see that the actual distribution of the total land at the disposal of the peasants has nothing in common with the "equality" of the allotments. Of the households 20% account for 35% to 50% of the total land, while 50% account for 20% to 30%. In the distribution of *area under crops* (next column) the ousting of the bottom group by the top stands out in still greater relief, probably because the poor peasantry are

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rents that leave the tenant enough to cover wages, interest and the repayment of invested capital, and employer's profit (373). And Mr. Karyshev is not in the least disturbed by the fact that this sort of theory" appears side by side with the usual Narodnik recipe: "avert" (398). In order to "avert" capitalist farming Mr. Karyshev advances the "theory" of capitalist farming! This sort of "conclusion" naturally crowned the basic contradiction in the book by Mr. Karyshev who, on the one hand, shares all the Narodnik prejudices and wholeheartedly sympathises with such classical theoreticians of the petty bourgeoisie as Sismondi (see Karyshev, *Perpetual Hereditary Land-Hire on the European Continent*, Moscow, 1885), but on the other hand, cannot avoid the admission that land renting gives an "impetus" (p. 396) to the differentiation of the peasantry, that the "better-off strata" oust the poorer, and that the development of agrarian relations leads precisely to agricultural wage-labour (p. 397)

often unable to make economic use of their land and abandon it. Both columns (total land held and area under crops) show that the purchase and the renting of land lead to a *diminution* of the share of the bottom groups in the general system of economy, i.e., to their being ousted by the well-to-do minority. The latter now play a dominant role in the peasant economy, concentrating in their hands almost as much of the area under crops as do all the rest of the peasants put together.

The next two columns show the distribution of draught and other animals among the peasantry. The percentages of animals differ very slightly from those of area under crops; nor could it be otherwise, for the number of draught animals (and also of other animals) determines the area under crops, and in its turn is determined by it.

The next column shows the share of the various groups of the peasantry in the total number of commercial and industrial establishments. One-fifth of the households (the well-to-do group) concentrate in their hands about half of these establishments, while half the households, the poor, account for about 1/5,* that is to say, the "industries" that express the conversion of the peasantry into a bourgeoisie are concentrated mainly in the hands of the most affluent cultivators. The well-to-do peasants, consequently, invest capital in agriculture (purchase and renting of land, hire of workers, improvement of implements, etc.), industrial establishments, commerce, and usury: merchant's and entrepreneur capital are closely connected, and surrounding conditions determine which of these forms of capital becomes predominant.

The data on households with "employments" (the first column to the *left*, among the negative indices) also characterise the "industries," which are, however, of opposite significance, and mark the conversion of the peasant into a proletarian. *These* "industries" are concentrated in the hands of the poor (they constitute 50% of the households and ac-

* Even this figure (about 1/5 of all the establishments) is, of course, an exaggeration, for the category of non-sowing and horseless and one-horse peasants lumps agricultural labourers, unskilled labourers, etc., together with non-cultivators (shopkeepers, artisans, etc.).

count for 60% to 90% of the total households with employments), whereas the part played in them by the well-to-do groups is insignificant (it must not be forgotten that we have not been able to draw an exact line of demarcation between masters and workers in this category of "industrialists" either). One has only to compare the data on "employments" with the data on "commercial and industrial establishments" to see how utterly opposite are these two types of "industries," and to realise what incredible confusion is created by the customary lumping together of these types.

Households employing farm labourers are in all cases concentrated in the group of well-to-do peasants (20% of the households account for 5 to 7 tenths of the total number of farms employing labourers), who (despite their having larger families) cannot exist without a class of agricultural labourers to "supplement" them. Here we have a striking confirmation of the proposition expressed above: that to compare the number of farms employing labourers with the total number of peasant "farms" (including the "farms" of the agricultural labourers) is absurd. *It is much more correct* to compare the number of farms employing labourers with *one-fifth* of the peasant households, for the well-to-do minority account for about 3/5, or even 2/3, of the total of such farms. The entrepreneur hiring of labourers from among the peasantry far exceeds hiring from necessity, that is, because of a shortage of workers in the family: the poor and *small-family* peasants, constituting 50% of the households, account for only about 1/10 of the total number of farms employing labourers (here too, incidentally, shopkeepers, industrialists, etc., who do not hire workers on account of necessity, are included among the poor).

The last column, showing the distribution of improved implements, we could have headed "progressive trends in peasant farming," following the example of Mr. V. V. The "fairest" distribution of these implements is that in Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, where the well-to-do households, constituting one-fifth of the total, have only 73 out of 100 implements, whereas the poor, constituting half the households, have as many as three out of a hundred.

Let us now compare the degree of peasant differentiation in the different localities. In the chart two types of localities stand out very clearly in this regard: in Taurida, Samara, Saratov and Perm gubernias the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry is markedly more intense than in Orel, Voronezh and Nizhni-Novgorod gubernias. The curves of the first four gubernias in the run below the red average line, while those of the last three gubernias run above the average, i.e., show a smaller concentration of farming in the hands of the well-to-do minority. The localities of the first type are the most land-abundant and strictly agricultural (in Perm Gubernia the agricultural parts of the uyezds have been singled out), with extensive farming. With farming of this character the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry is easily noted and therefore clearly visible. Conversely, in the localities of the second type we see, on the one hand, a development of commercial agriculture such as is not noted in our data; for example, the sowing of hemp in Orel Gubernia. On the other hand, we see the tremendous significance of "industries," both in the sense of work for hire (Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia) and in the sense of non-agricultural occupations (Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia). The significance of both these circumstances for the question of the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry is enormous. Of the former (the different forms of commercial agriculture and agricultural progress in the different localities) we have already spoken. The significance of the latter (the role of the "industries") is no less obvious. If in a given locality the bulk of the peasants are allotment-holding farm labourers, day labourers or wage-workers in industries, the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry will, of course, be marked very feebly.* But to get a proper idea of the matter, these typical representatives of the rural proletariat must be compared with typical representatives of the peasant bourgeoisie. The allotment-holding Voronezh day labourer who goes

* It is quite possible that in the central black-earth gubernias, like Orel, Voronezh and others, the differentiation of the peasantry is indeed much feebler, because of land-poverty, heavy taxation and the wide prevalence of the labour-service system: all these are circumstances retarding differentiation.

south in search of odd jobs must be compared with the Taurida peasant who cultivates huge tracts of land. The Kaluga, Nizhni-Novgorod and Yaroslavl carpenter must be compared with the Yaroslavl or Moscow vegetable grower or peasant who keeps cows to sell the milk, etc. Similarly, if the bulk of the peasants in a locality are engaged in the manufacturing industries, their allotments providing them with only a small part of their means of livelihood, the data on the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry must be supplemented with data on the differentiation of those who engage in industries. In Chapter V we shall deal with this latter question; at the moment we are concerned only with the differentiation of the typically agricultural peasantry.

X. SUMMARY OF ZEMSTVO STATISTICS AND ARMY-HORSE CENSUS RETURNS[52]

We have shown that the relation of the top to the bottom group of the peasantry bears the very features that characterise the relation of the rural bourgeoisie to the rural proletariat; that these relationships are remarkably similar in the most varied localities with the most varied conditions; that even their numerical expression (i.e., percentages of the groups in the total area under crops, number of animals, etc.) fluctuates within limits that, comparatively speaking, are very small. The question naturally arises: how far can these data on the *relationships* between the groups in the different localities be utilised for forming an idea of the *groups* into which the entire Russian peasantry is divided? In other words, what returns can enable us to judge the composition of, and the interrelation between, the top and the bottom groups of the entire Russian peasantry?

There are very few of these returns, for no agricultural censuses are taken in Russia that register all the crop-raising farms in the country. The only material by which we can judge into which economic groups our peasantry is divided is the combined Zemstvo statistics and the army-horse census returns showing the distribution of draught animals (or horses) among the peasant households. Meagre

as this material is, one can nevertheless draw from it conclusions (certainly very general, approximate, aggregate) that are not without interest, particularly since the ratio of peasants with many horses to those with few has already been analysed and found to be remarkably similar in the most varied localities.

According to the data in Mr. Blagoveshchensky's *Combined Zemstvo House-to-House Census Economic Returns* (Vol. I, *Peasant Farming*, Moscow, 1893),[53] the Zemstvo censuses covered 123 uyezds in 22 gubernias, having 2,983,733 peasant households and a population of 17,996,317 persons of both sexes. But the data on the distribution of households according to draught animals are not everywhere of the same kind. Thus, in three gubernias we have to omit 11 uyezds* where the households are classified not in four, but in only three groups. For the remaining *112 uyezds in 21 gubernias* we get the following combined figures covering nearly 2½ million households with a population of 15 million:

Groups of farms	Households	% of households		Draught animals. No. possessed**	Draught animals, % of total	Draught animals per household
With no draught animals	613,238	24.7	53.3	—	—	—
" 1 " animal	712,256	28.6		712,256	18.6	1
" 2 " animals	645,900	26.0		1,291,800	33.7	2
" 3 and more "	515,521	20.7		1,824,969	47.7	3.5
Total	2,486,915	100		3,829,025	100	1.5

These data cover slightly less than one-fourth of the total peasant households in European Russia (the *Combined Statistical Material on the Economic Position of the Rural Population in European Russia*, published by the Chan-

* 5 uyezds in Saratov Gubernia, 5 in Samara Gubernia, and 1 in Bessarabia Gubernia.

** To horses are added oxen, calculated at a pair for one horse.

cellery of the Committee of Ministers, St. Petersburg, 1894, considers that in the 50 gubernias of European Russia there are 11,223,962 households in the volosts, including 10,589,967 peasant households). For the whole of Russia we have data on the distribution of horses among the peasants in *Statistics of the Russian Empire*. XX. *Army-Horse Census of 1888* (St. Petersburg, 1891), and *Statistics of the Russian Empire*. XXXI. *Army-Horse Census of 1891* (St. Petersburg, 1894). The first publication contains an analysis of the data collected in 1888 for 41 gubernias (including the 10 gubernias in the Kingdom of Poland), and the second for 18 gubernias in European Russia, plus the Caucasus, the Kalmyk Steppe and the Don Military Region.

Singling out 49 gubernias in European Russia (the returns for Don Region are not complete) and combining the data for 1888 and 1891, we get the following picture of the distribution of the total number of horses belonging to the *peasants in village communities*.

In 49 Gubernias of European Russia

Groups of farms	Peasant households			Horses owned			Horses per household
	Total	%		Total	%		
Horseless	2,777,485	27.3	55.9	—	—		—
With 1 horse	2,909,042	28.6		2,909,042	17.2		1
" 2 horses	2,247,827	22.1		4,495,654	26.5		2
" 3 "	1,072,298	10.6	22.0	3,216,894	18.9	56.3	3
" 4 and more	1,155,907	11.4		6,339,198	37.4		5.4
Total	10,162,559	100		16,960,788	100		1.6

Thus, all over Russia the distribution of draught horses among the peasantry is very close to the "average" degree of differentiation we have depicted in our chart. Actually, the disintegration is even somewhat deeper: in the hands of 22 per cent of the households (2.2 million out of 10.2 million) are concentrated 9½ million horses out of 7 million, i.e., 56.3% of the total number. A vast mass of 2.8 million households has none at all, while 2.9 million

one-horse households have only 17.2% of the total number of horses.*

Taking as our basis the above-established regularities in the relationship between the groups, we can now ascertain the real significance of these data. If a fifth of the households possesses a half of the total number of horses, one may unerringly conclude that no less (and probably more) than half the total peasant agricultural production is in their hands. Such a concentration of production is possible only where this well-to-do peasantry concentrates in its hands the major part of the purchased lands and of peasant-rented land, both non-allotment and allotment. It is this well-to-do minority who mainly do the buying and renting of land, despite the fact that in all probability they are best supplied with allotment land. While the "average" Russian peasant in the very best of times barely makes ends meet (and it is doubtful whether he does), the well-to-do minority, whose circumstances are considerably above the average, not only cover all their expenditure by independent farming, but also obtain a surplus. And this means that they are commodity producers, that they grow agricultural produce for sale. More, they turn into a rural bourgeoisie, combining with relatively large-scale crop farms commercial and industrial enterprises,—we have seen that it is precisely "industries" of this kind that are most typical of the Russian "enterprising" muzhik. Despite the fact that their families are the largest, that they have the largest number of family workers (these features have always been characteristic of the well-to-do peasantry, and the 1/5 of the households should account for a large share of the

* The way the distribution of horses among the peasantry has been changing latterly can be judged from the following data of the army-horse census of 1893-1894 (*Statistics of the Russian Empire*, XXXVII). In 38 gubernias of European Russia there were in 1893-1894: 8,288,987 peasant households; of these, horseless were 2,641,754, or 31.9%; one-horse—31.4%; 2-horse—20.2%; 3-horse—8.7%; 4-horse and over—7.8%. The horses owned by the peasants numbered 11,560,358, of which 22.5% belonged to the one-horse peasants, 28.9% to the 2-horse; 18.8% to the 3-horse and 29.8% to those with many horses. Thus, 16.5% of the peasants, the well-to-do, owned 48.6% of the total number of horses.



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

ING TABLES A & B

EZDS OR GROUPS OF UYEZDS:

TOTAL IN USE	AREA UNDER CROPS	ANIMALS		COMMERCIAL AND INDUST. ESTABS.	HOUSEHOLDS EMPLOYING FARM-WORKERS	IMPROVED IMPLEMENTS
		DRAUGHT	TOTAL			

Continuous lines indicate in percentages (counting from the top horizontal line) the share of the *well-to-do* peasantry in the total land, area under crops, animals, etc.

Broken lines indicate in percentages (counting from the bottom horizontal line) the share of the *poor* peasantry in the total land, area under crops, animals, etc.

Black lines indicate the degree of differentiation in the individual uyezds or groups of uyezds, the numbers of which (1—7) are shown in Tables A and B.

Red line indicates the "average" degree of differentiation (i.e., the arithmetical averages of the percentages shown in the chart.



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population, approximately 3/10), the well-to-do minority employ permanent farm labourers and day labourers on the biggest scale. Of the total number of Russian peasant farms that resort to the hiring of labourers, a considerable majority should be those of this well-to-do minority. We are justified in drawing this conclusion both on the basis of the preceding analysis and from a comparison between the proportion of the population represented by this group and the share it has of the total number of draught animals, and hence of the cultivated area, of farming in general. Lastly, only this well-to-do minority can take a steady part in the "progressive trends in peasant farming."[54] Such should be the relation between this minority and the rest of the peasantry; but it goes without saying that this relation assumes different forms and manifests itself in other ways depending on differences in agrarian conditions, systems of farming and forms of commercial agriculture.* The main trends of peasant differentiation are one thing; the forms it assumes, depending on the different local conditions, are another.

The position of the horseless and one-horse peasants is the very opposite. We have seen above that the Zemstvo statisticians put even the latter (to say nothing of the former) in the category of the rural proletariat. Thus, we hardly exaggerate in our approximate calculation, which places in the category of the rural proletariat all the horseless and up to 3/4 of the one-horse peasants (about half the total households). These peasants, who are worst provided with allotment land, often lease out their allotments because of lack of implements, seed, etc. Of the total peasant-rented and purchased land theirs are but miserable scraps. Their farms will never yield enough for subsistence, and their main source of livelihood is "industries" or "employments," i.e., the sale of their labour-power. These are a class of wage-workers with allotments, permanent farm labourers, day labourers, unskilled labourers, building workers, etc., etc.

* It is quite possible, for example, that in dairy-farming districts it would be much more correct to classify according to the number of cows held and not according to the number of horses. Where market gardening prevails, neither index can be satisfactory, etc.

XI. A COMPARISON OF THE ARMY-HORSE CENSUSES OF 1888-1891 AND 1896-1900

The army-horse censuses of 1896 and 1899-1900 enable us now to compare the latest data with those quoted above.

By combining the 5 southern gubernias (1896) with 43 of the rest (1899-1900), we get the following data for 48 gubernias of European Russia:

1896-1900

Groups of farms	Peasant households Total	%		Horses owned Total	%		Horses per household
Horseless	3,242,462	29.2	59.5	—	—		—
With 1 horse	3,361,778	30.3		3,361,778	19.9		1
" 2 horses	2,446,731	22.0		4,893,462	28.9		2
" 3 horses	1,047,900	9.4	18.5	3,143,700	18.7	51.2	3
" 4 and more	1,013,416	9.1		5,476,503	32.5		5.4
Total	11,112,287	100		16,875,443	100		1.5

For 1888-1891 we cited data for 49 gubernias. Of these, the latest data are lacking only for one, namely, Archangel Gubernia. Subtracting the figures for this gubernia from those given above, we get for the same 48 gubernias in 1888-1891 the following picture:

1888-1891

Groups of farms	Peasant households Total	%		Horses owned Total	%		Horses per household
Horseless	2,765,970	27.3	55.8	—	—		—
With 1 horse	2,885,192	28.5		2,885,192	17.1		1
" 2 horses	2,240,574	22.2		4,481,148	26.5		2
" 3 horses	1,070,250	10.6	22.0	3,210,750	18.9	56.4	3
" 4 and more	1,154,674	11.4		6,333,106	37.5		5.5
Total	10,116,660	100		16,910,196	100		1.6

A comparison of 1888-1891 and 1896-1900 reveals the growing *expropriation* of the peasantry. The number of households increased by nearly 1 million. The number of horses diminished, although very slightly. The number of horseless households increased with particular rapidity, and their percentage rose from 27.3 to 29.2. Instead of 5.6 million poor peasants (horseless and one-horse), we now have

6.6 million. The entire increase in the number of households has gone to enlarging the number of poor ones. The percentage of households rich in horses diminished. Instead of 2.2 million households with many horses, we have only 2 million. The number of middle and well-to-do households combined (with 2 and more horses) remained almost stationary (4,465,000 in 1888-1891 and 4,508,000 in 1896-1900).

Thus the conclusions to be drawn from these data are as follows.

The increasing poverty and expropriation of the peasantry is beyond doubt.

As for the relation of the top group of the peasantry to the bottom one, this remained almost unchanged. If, in the manner described above, we constitute the bottom groups of 50% of the households and the top groups of 20% of the households, we shall get the following: in 1888-1891 the poor, 50% of the households, had 13.7% of the horses. The rich, 20% of the households, had 52.6%. In 1896-1900 the poor, 50% of the households, also had 13.7% of the total peasant-owned horses, while the rich, 20% of the households, had 53.2% of the total number of horses. Consequently, the relationship between the groups remained almost unchanged.

Lastly, the peasantry as a whole became poorer in horses. Both the number and the percentage of the many-horse households decreased. On the one hand, this evidently marks the decline of peasant farming generally in European Russia. On the other hand, one must not forget that the number of horses employed in agriculture in Russia is abnormally high for the area cultivated. It could not be otherwise in a small-peasant country. The drop in the number of horses consequently represents to a certain degree "the restoration of the normal proportion between the number of draught animals and the amount of arable" *among the peasant bourgeoisie* (see Mr. V. V.'s arguments on this point above, in Chapter II, §1).

It will be appropriate here to touch on the arguments on this question in the latest works of Mr. Vikhlyayev ("Sketches of Russian Agricultural Reality," St. Petersburg, published by the magazine *Khozyain* [*Farmer*]) and of

Mr. Chernenkov (*A Characterisation of Peasant Farming*, Part I, Moscow, 1905). They were so carried away by the diversity of the figures on the distribution of horses among the peasantry that they turned economic analysis into a statistical exercise. Instead of studying the types of peasant farm (day labourer, middle peasant, entrepreneur), they make a study, like amateurs, of endless columns of figures, just as though they have set out to astonish the world by their arithmetical zeal.

Only thanks to such play with figures was Mr. Chernenkov able to fling the objection at me that I am "prejudiced" in interpreting "differentiation" as a new (and not old) and for some reason completely capitalist phenomenon. Mr. Chernenkov was, of course, free to think that I was drawing conclusions from statistics and forgetting economics! — that I was proving something from a mere change in the number and the distribution of horses! To view intelligently the differentiation of the peasantry, one must take the picture as a whole: the renting of land, the purchase of land, machines, outside employments, the growth of commercial agriculture, and wage-labour. Or maybe Mr. Chernenkov considers these also are neither "new" nor "capitalist" phenomena?

XII. ZEMSTVO STATISTICS ON PEASANT BUDGETS

To finish with the problem of the differentiation of the peasantry, let us examine it from yet another aspect—that of the highly specific data of peasant budgets. We shall thus see clearly how profound is the difference between the types of peasantry under discussion.

In the appendix to *Evaluation Returns on Peasant Landownership in Zemlyansk, Zadonsk, Korotoyak and Nizhnedevitsk Uyezds* (Voronezh, 1889) there are "statistics on the composition and budgets of typical farms," which are distinguished for their extraordinary completeness.* Of the

* A big defect of these data is, firstly, lack of classification according to different indices; secondly, lack of text giving that information about the farms selected which could not be included in the tables (that sort of text is supplied, for example, to the data on the budgets for Ostrogozhsk Uyezd). Thirdly, extremely inadequate

67 budgets we leave out one, as being quite incomplete (budget No. 14 for Korotoyak Uyezd), and divide the rest into six groups according to draught animals, as follows: *a*—with no hoses; *b*—with 1 horse; *c*—with 2 horses; *d*—with 3 horses; *e*—with 4 horses and *f*—with 5 horses and more (we shall designate the groups only by these letters *a* to *f*). True, classification along these lines is not quite suitable for this locality (in view of the enormous significance of "industries" in the economy of both the bottom groups and the top), but we have to take it for the sake of comparing the budget data with the above-examined house-to-house census data. Such a comparison can only be made by dividing the "peasantry" into groups, whereas general and all-round "averages" are purely fictitious, as we have seen and shall see further on.* Let us note here, incidentally, the interesting phenomenon that "average" budget figures nearly always characterise the farm of above-average type, i.e., they picture the facts in a better light than they actually are.** This happens, probably, because the very term "budget" presupposes a farm that is balanced to at least a minimum degree, a kind that is not easily found among the poor. To illustrate this let us compare the budget and other data of the households, classified according to draught animals held.

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treatment of data on all non-agricultural occupations and all sorts of "employments" (all "industries" are given *only 4 columns*, whereas the description of clothing and footwear alone takes up 152 columns!).

* "Averages" of exclusively this kind are used, for example, by Mr. Shcherbina both in the publications of the Voronezh Zemstvo and in his article on peasant budgets in the book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, *etc.*

** This applies, for example, to the budget data for Moscow Gubernia (*Returns*, Vols. VI and VII), Vladimir Gubernia (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*), Ostrogozhsk Uyezd of Voronezh Gubernia (Returns, Vol. II, Part 2), and particularly to the budgets cited in the *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry*[55] (of Vyatka, Kherson, Nizhni-Novgorod, Perm and other gubernias). The budgets given by Messrs. Karpov and Manokhin in the *Transactions* and also by Mr. P. Semyonov (in *Material for a Study of the Village Community*, St. Petersburg, 1880) and by Mr. Osadchy (*Shcherbani Volost*, *Elisavetgrad Uyezd*, *Kherson Gubernia*) compare favourably with the others in that they describe the various groups of peasants.

Number of Budgets
in percentages

Groups of farms	Total: Number	Total: as %		In 4 uyezds of Voronezh Gubernia	In 9 uyezds of Voronezh Gubernia	In 112 uyezds of 21 gubernias	In 49 gubernias of European Russia
With no draught animals	12	18.18		17.9	21.7	24.7	27.3
" 1 animal	18	27.27		34.7	31.9	28.6	28.6
" 2 animals	17	25.76		28.6	23.8	26.0	22.1
" 3 "	9	13.64					
" 4 "	5	7.575	28.79	18.8	22.6	20.7	22.0
" 5 and more animals	5	7.575					
Total	66	100		100	100	100	100

This makes it clear that the budget figures can only be used by striking the average for each separate group of peasants. This is what we have done with the data mentioned. We give them under three headings: (A) general budget results; (B) characterisation of crop farming; and (C) characterisation of the standard of living.

(A) The general data regarding the magnitude of expenditure and income are as follows:

Per farm (rubles)

	Persons of both sexes per family	Gross: Income	Gross: Expenditure	Gross: Net Income	Money: Income	Money: Expenditure	Money: Balance	Debts (rubles)	Arrears
f)	16.00	1,766.79	1,593.77	173.02	1,047.26	959.20	+88.06	210.00	6
a)	4.08	118.10	109.08	9.02	64.57	62.29	+ 2.28	5.83	16.58
b)	4.94	178.12	174.26	3.86	73.75	80.99	— 7.24	11.16	8.97
c)	8.23	429.72	379.17	50.55	196.72	165.22	+31.50	13.73	5.93
d)	13.00	753.19	632.36	120.83	318.85	262.23	+56.62	13.67	2.22
e)	14.20	978.66	937.30	41.36	398.48	439.86	—41.38	42.00	—
f)	16.00	1,766.79	1,593.77	173.02	1,047.26	959.20	+88.06	210.00	6
	8.27	491.44	443.00	48.44	235.53	217.70	+17.83	28.60	7.74

Thus, the sizes of the budgets of the different groups vary enormously; even if we leave aside the extreme groups, the

budget in *e* is over five times that in *b*, whereas the size of the family in *e* is less than three times that in *b*.

Let us examine the distribution of expenditures*:

Average expenditure per farm

	On food		On remaining personal consumption		On farm		Taxes and dues		Total	
	Rbs.	%	Rbs.	%	Rbs.	%	Rbs.	%	Rbs.	%
a)	60.98	55.89	17.51	16.05	15.12	13.87	15.47	14.19	109.08	100
b)	80.98	46.47	17.19	9.87	58.32	33.46	17.77	10.20	174.26	100
c)	181.11	47.77	44.62	11.77	121.42	32.02	32.02	8.44	379.17	100
d)	283.65	44.86	76.77	12.14	222.39	35.17	49.55	7.83	632.36	100
e)	373.81	39.88	147.83	15.77	347.76	37.12	67.90	7.23	937.30	100
f)	447.83	28.10	82.76	5.19	976.84	61.29	86.34	5.42	1,593.77	100
	180.75	40.80	47.30	10.68	180.60	40.77	34.35	7.75	443.00	100

It is sufficient to glance at the farm expenditure as compared with the total expenditure for each group to see that here we have both proletarians and *proprietors*: in group a the farm expenditure is only 14% of the total expenditure, whereas in group *f* it is 61%. The differences in the absolute figures of farm expenditure go without saying. Such expenditure is negligible in the case not only of the horseless but also of the one-horse peasant, and the one-horse "peasant" is much closer to the ordinary type (in capitalist countries) of allotment-holding farm labourer and day labourer. Let us also note the very considerable differences in the *percentage* of expenditure on food (a's nearly double *f*'s); as we know, a big percentage is evidence of *a* low standard of living and is what most sharply differentiates the budget of the *proprietor* from that of the *worker*.

* The *Returns* separate all "expenditure on personal and farm needs other than food" from expenditure on the maintenance of animals, and under the first heading, expenditures on lighting and on rent, for example, are put side by side. This is obviously wrong. We have separated *personal* from *farm* ("productive") consumption, and under the latter heading we have included expenditure on tar, rope, horse-shoeing, building repairs, implements, harness; on labourers and job workers, on herdsman, on the renting of land, and on the maintenance of animals and poultry.

Now let us take the items of income*:

	Average income per farm				Items of income from "industries			
	from agriculture[56]	from "industries"	balance from previous years	Total	"from personal industries"	"from carting"	"from industrial establishments and undertakings"	"miscellaneous incomes"
a)	57.11	59.04	1.95	118.10	36.75	—	—	22.29
b)	127.69	49.22	1.21	178.12	35.08	6	2.08	6.06
c)	287.40	108.21	34.11	429.72	64.59	17.65	14.41	11.56
d)	469.52	146.67	110	753.19	48.77	22.22	48.88	26.80
e)	698.06	247.60	33	978.66	112	100	35	0.60
f)	698.39	975.20	93.20	1,766.79	146	34	754.40	40.80
	292.74	164.67	34.03	491.44	59.09	19.36	70.75	15.47

Thus, income from "industries" exceeds the gross income from agriculture in the two extreme groups: the proletarian-horseless peasant, and the rural entrepreneur. The "personal industries" of the bottom peasant groups consist, of course, mainly of work for hire, while *income from the leasing of land* is an important item in the "miscellaneous incomes." The group of "independent farmers" even includes those whose income from the leasing of land is slightly less, and sometimes even more, than the gross income from agriculture. For example, in the case of one horseless peasant, the gross income from agriculture is 61.9 rubles, and from the leasing of land 40 rubles; in the case of another, the income from agriculture is 31.9 rubles and from the leasing of land 40 rubles. It must not be forgotten, furthermore, that the income from the leasing of land and from farm labouring goes entirely to cover the personal needs of the "peasant," while from the gross agricultural income we must deduct expenditure on the conduct of the farm. After making this deduction, we shall find that the net income of the

* The item "balances from previous years" consists of grain (in kind) and cash; here the total figures are given, as we are dealing with gross expenditure and income, in cash and kind.

The four columns relating to "industries" are copied from the *Returns*, which give *no other information* about the "industries." Let us observe that in group *e*, carting should obviously be put under the heading of industrial establishments; it furnishes two members of this group with 250 rubles income each, and one of them employs a farm labourer.

horseless peasant from agriculture is 41.99 rubles, and from "industries" 59.04 rubles, and in the case of the one-horse peasant, 69.37 and 49.22 rubles. The mere juxtaposition of these figures shows that we have before us types of agricultural labourers with allotments which cover part of the subsistence expenditure (and because of this reduce wages). To confuse such types of peasants with *proprietors* (agriculturists and industrialists) means blatantly to disregard all the requirements of scientific research.

At the other pole of the countryside we see just such *proprietors* as combine with independent crop farming commercial and industrial operations which yield an income that is considerable (under the given standard of living) and amounts to several hundred rubles. The utter indefiniteness of the heading "personal industries" conceals the differences between the bottom and the top groups in this respect, but the very size of the incomes from these "personal industries" reveals the extent of this difference (let us remind the reader that in the Voronezh statistics the category "personal industries" may include begging, agricultural labouring, service as steward, manager, etc., etc.).

As regards the size of net income, the horseless and one-horse peasants again stand out very sharply, with their most miserable "balances" (1 to 2 rubles) and even deficits on the money side. The resources of these peasants are no larger, if not smaller, than those of wage-workers. Only beginning with the 2-horse peasants do we see at least some net incomes and balances of a few dozen rubles (without which there cannot be the slightest question of proper farming). Among the well-to-do peasantry net incomes reach sums (120 to 170 rubles) that raise them well above the general level of the Russian working class.*

* An apparent exception is provided by category *e* with its big deficit (41 rubles), which, however, is covered by a loan. This is explained by the fact that in three of the households (out of the 5 in this category) they celebrated weddings that cost 200 rubles. (The total deficit of these 5 households amounted to 206 rubles 90 kopeks.) As a result, this group's expenditure on personal consumption, other than food, rose to the very high figure of 10 rubles 41 kopeks per person of both sexes, whereas in no other group, not excepting the rich group (*f*), does this expenditure amount to even 6 rubles. Consequently, this deficit is quite opposite in character to that of the poor peasants.

Naturally, the combining of workers and employers in one category and the striking of an "average" budget provide a picture of "moderate sufficiency" and of a "moderate" net income: income 491 rubles, expenditure 443 rubles, balance 48 rubles, including 18 rubles in cash. But that sort of average is absolutely fictitious. It simply conceals the utter poverty of the mass of peasants in the bottom groups (*a* and *b*, i.e., 30 budgets out of 66), who with their trivial incomes (120 to 180 rubles per family gross income) are unable to make ends meet and live mainly by regular farm labouring and day labouring.

An exact calculation of income and expenditure in cash and kind enables us to determine the relation of the differentiation of the peasantry to the *market*, for which only cash income and expenditure are important. The proportion of the cash part of the budget to the total budget in the various groups is as follows:

Percentage of cash part

	of expenditure to gross expenditure	of income to gross income
a)	57.10	54.6
b)	46.47	41.4
c)	43.57	45.7
d)	41.47	42.3
e)	46.93	40.8
f)	60.18	59.2
	49.14	47.9

We see, consequently, that the percentage of the cash income and expenditure increases (expenditure with particular regularity) *from the middle groups to the extreme ones*. The farming is of the most sharply expressed commercial character in the case of the peasant with no horses and of the one with many. This means that both live mainly by selling commodities, except that in the one instance the commodity

It is a deficit resulting not from inability to satisfy minimum requirements, but from increased requirements out of proportion to the income of the given year.

is labour-power, while in the other it is goods produced for sale, with (as we shall see) a considerable employment of wage-labour, i.e., a product that assumes the form of capital. In other words, these budgets also show that the *differentiation of the peasantry creates a home market for capitalism* by converting the peasant into a farm labourer, on the one hand, and into a small-commodity producer, a petty bourgeois, on the other.

Another, and no less important, deduction from these data, is that *in all the peasant groups farming has to a very large extent become commercial*, has become dependent upon the market: in *no case* does the cash part of income or expenditure fall below 40%. And this percentage must be regarded as a high one, for we are discussing the gross incomes of small agriculturists, in which even the maintenance of cattle is included, i.e., straw, bran, etc.* Evidently, even the peasantry in the central black-earth belt (where money economy is, on the whole, more feebly developed than in the industrial belt, or in the outlying steppe regions) cannot exist at all without buying and selling and are already completely dependent on the market, on the *power of money*. It is needless to say how tremendously important this fact is, and how grave the error our Narodniks commit when they try to hush it up,** being carried away by their sympathies for the natural economy which has passed out of existence never to return. In modern society it is impossible to exist without selling, and anything that retards the development of commodity production merely results in a worsening of the conditions of the producers. "The disadvantages of the capitalist mode of production," says Marx, speaking of the peasant, ". . . coincide here therefore with the disadvantages occasioned by the imperfect development of the capitalist mode of production. The peasant turns merchant and industrialist without the

* Expenditure on the maintenance of cattle is almost entirely in kind: of a total expenditure of 6,316.21 rubles on this item by the 66 households, only 1,535.2 rubles were spent in cash, and *of this sum 1,102.5 rubles* were spent by one *farmer*-entrepreneur who kept 20 horses, evidently for industrial use.

** This error was particularly often met with in the debates (of 1897) on the significance of low grain prices.[57]

conditions enabling him to produce his products as commodities" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 346. Russ. trans., p. 671).[58]

Let us observe that the budget data utterly refute the view, still fairly widespread, that taxes play an important part in the development of commodity production. Undoubtedly, quit-rents and taxes were at one time an important factor in the development of exchange, but at the present time commodity economy has become firmly established, and the *indicated* importance of taxes is becoming altogether secondary. A comparison of the expenditure on taxes and duties with the peasants' total cash expenditure shows a ratio of 15.8% (for the respective groups it is: *a*—24.8%; *b*—21.9%; *c*—19.3%; *d*—18.8%; *e*—15.4% and *f*—9.0%). Hence, the maximum expenditure on taxes is one-third of the remaining cash expenditure unavoidably incurred by the peasant under the present conditions of social economy. If, however, we do not take the role of taxes in the development of exchange, but take them relative to the income, we shall see that it is an excessively high one. How heavily the traditions of the pre-Reform epoch weigh down upon the peasant of today is seen most strikingly in the existence of taxes which absorb one-seventh of the *gross* expenditure of the small farmer, or even of the allotment-holding farm labourer. Moreover, the distribution of taxes within the village community is astonishingly uneven: the better off the peasant, the smaller the part of his total expenditure that goes in taxes. The horseless peasant pays in proportion to his income nearly three times as much as the peasant owning many horses (see above, table on distribution of expenditure). We speak of the distribution of taxes within the village community, because if we calculate the amount of taxes and duties per dessiatine of allotment land, it will be found to be nearly uniform. After all that has been stated, this unevenness should not astonish us; it is inevitable in our village community, so long as the village community retains its compulsory, feudal character. As we know, the peasants share all taxes according to land held: share of taxes and share of land merge in their minds in the one concept "soul," or person.* As

* See V. Orlov, *Peasant Farming*, *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. IV, Pt. I.—Trirogov, *The Village Community and*

we have seen, however, the differentiation of the peasantry leads to a diminution of the role of allotment land at both poles of the contemporary countryside. Naturally, under such conditions the distribution of taxes according to allotment land held (which is inseparably connected with the compulsory nature of the village community) leads to the shifting of the tax burden from the well-to-do peasants to the poor. The village community (i.e., collective responsibility[59] with no right to refuse land) becomes more and more *harmful* to the peasant poor.*

(B) Passing to the characterisation of peasant farming, let us start by citing general data on the farms:

Groups	No. of peasants	Persons of both sexes per family	Workers per family			Households employing farm labourers	Number of peasants		Allotment land per household (dess.)	Area under crops per household (dess.)		Total	Dess. under crops per capita, both sexes	% of rented to own land
			own	hire	total		leasing out land	renting land		on own land	on rented land			
a)	12	4.08	1	—	1	—	5	—	5.9	1.48	—	1.48	0.36	—
b)	18	4.94	1	0.17	1.17	3	3	5	7.4	2.84	0.58	3.42	0.69	20.5
c)	17	8.23	2.17	0.12	2.29	2	—	9	12.7	5.62	1.31	6.93	0.84	23.4
d)	9	13.00	2.66	0.22	2.88	2	—	6	18.5	8.73	2.65	11.38	0.87	30.4
e)	5	14.20	3.2	0.2	3.4	1	—	5	22.9	11.18	6.92	18.10	1.27	61.9
f)	5	16.00	3.2	1.2	4.4	2	—	3	23	10.50	10.58	21.08	1.32	100.7
Total	66	8.27	1.86	0.21	2.07	10	8	30	12.4	5.32	2.18	7.5	0.91	41.0

the Poll Tax.—Keussler, *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des bäuerlichen Gemeindebesitzes in Russland* (*A Contribution to the History and Critique of Peasant Communal Landownership in Russia.—Ed.*).—V. V., *The Peasant Community* (*Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigation*, Vol. I).

*It goes without saying that still greater harm will be done to the peasant poor by Stolypin's (November 1906) breaking up of the village community. This is the Russian "enrichissez-vous" ("enrich yourselves".—*Ed.*). Black Hundreds—rich peasants! Loot all you can, so long as you bolster up tottering absolutism! (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

From this table it is evident that the relationship existing between the groups in regard to the leasing out and the renting of land, size of families and area under crops, hiring of farm labourers, etc., is identical with that shown by the budget data and the above-examined mass data. But that is not all: the absolute figures on the economy of each group also prove to be very close to the data for whole uyezds. Here is a comparison of the budget and above-examined data:

*Per household**

	Those with no horses have				Those with one horse have			
	persons of both sexes	rented land (dess.)	area under crops (dess.)	total animals	persons of both sexes	rented land (dess.)	area under crops (dess.)	total animals
The budgets	4.1	—	1.5	0.8	4.9	0.6	3.4	2.6
4 uyezds, Voronezh Gubernia	4.4	0.1	1.4	0.6	5.9	0.7	3.4	2.7
Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia	3.9	0.3	2.1	0.5	4.7	1.4	5.0	1.9
4 uyezds, Saratov Gubernia	3.9	0.4	1.2	0.5	5.1	1.6	4.5	2.3
Kamyshin Uyezd, Samara Gubernia	4.2	0.3	1.1	0.6	5.1	1.6	5.0	2.3
3 uyezds, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia	4.1	0.2	1.8	0.7	5.2	1.1	4.4	2.4
2 uyezds, Orel Gubernia	4.4	0.1	?	0.5	5.7	1.0	?	2.3

Thus, the position of the horseless and one-horse peasants in all the localities indicated is almost identical, so that the budget data may be regarded as sufficiently typical.

We cite data on the property and implements of the peasant farms in the different groups.

* Area under crops not for 4 uyezds, but only for Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia.

Groups	Per farm value (rubles) of						In rubles			No. of buildings per farm	Total animals in terms of cattle per farm	Value of one draught horse	No. of peasants without implements	No. of peasants with improved implements	Value of implements
	buildings	implements	animals and poultry	utensils	clothes	total	per head, both sexes	implements and livestock	ditto per dess. under crops						
a)	67.25	9.73	16.87	14.61	39.73	148.19	36.29	26.60	18.04	3.8	0.8	—	8	—	—
b)	133.28	29.03	62.04	19.57	61.78	305.70	61.83	91.07	26.56	5.9	2.6	27	—	—	—
c)	235.76	76.35	145.89	51.95	195.43	705.38	85.65	222.24	32.04	7.6	4.9	37	—	—	—
d)	512.33	85.10	368.94	54.71	288.73	1,309.81	100.75	454.04	39.86	10.2	9.1	61	—	1	50
e)	495.80	174.16	442.06	81.71	445.66	1,639.39	115.45	616.22	34.04	11.4	12.8	52	—	1	50
f)	656.20	273.99	934.06	82.04	489.38	2,435.67	152.23	1,208.05	57.30	13.0	19.3	69	—	3	170.3
Total	266.44	74.90	212.13	41.42	184.62	779.33	94.20	287.03	38.20	7.5	5.8	52	8	5	270.3

This table graphically illustrates the difference in the extent to which the various groups are provided with implements and livestock, a point we mentioned above on the basis of the mass data. We see here the completely different degree to which the various groups hold property, this difference being such that even the horses of the poor peasant are very different from those of the affluent peasant.* The horse of the one-horse peasant is a veritable "living fraction"—not a "quarter of a horse," to be sure, but fully "twenty-seven fifty-seconds" of a horse!**[61]

* German agricultural literature includes several monographs by Drechsler containing data on the *weight* of the cattle owned by farmers of various groups, classified according to amount of land held.[60] These data show even more strikingly than the figures we have cited from Russian Zemstvo statistics the *immeasurably inferior* quality of the cattle owned by the small peasants as compared with those owned by the big peasants, particularly by the landlords. I hope to analyse these data for the press in the near future. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

** If these budget standards of the value of buildings, implements and animals to be found in the various groups of peasants were applied to the summary data for 49 gubernias of European Russia that were cited above, it would be seen that one-fifth of the peasant households owns a considerably larger quantity of means of production than all the rest of the peasantry.

Let us take further the data regarding the items of farm expenditure.*

Composition of farm expenditure (rubles) per household

Groups	On herdsmen and sundries	Replenishments and repairs: buildings	Replenishments and repairs: Implements and livestock	Replenishments and repairs: Total	On renting of land	On labourers and job-work	In all	On cattle feed	Total
a)	0.52	2.63	0.08	2.71	0.25	3.52	7.00	8.12	15.12
b)	2.94	4.59	5.36	9.95	6.25	2.48	21.62	36.70	58.32
c)	5.73	14.38	8.78	23.16	17.41	3.91	50.21	71.21	121.42
d)	12.01	18.22	9.70	27.92	49.32	6.11	95.36	127.03	222.39
e)	19.32	13.60	30.80	44.40	102.60	8.20	174.52	173.24	347.76
f)	51.42	56.00	75.80	131.80	194.35	89.20	466.77	510.07	976.84
Total	9.37	13.19	13.14	26.33	35.45	10.54	81.69	98.91	180.60

These data are very eloquent. They strikingly reveal to us how utterly wretched is the "farm" not only of the horseless but also of the one-horse peasant; and how utterly wrong is the customary method of lumping such peasants with the few but powerful peasants who spend hundreds of rubles on their farms, are in a position to improve their implements, hire "working folk," and "buy in" land on a large scale, renting to the amount of 50, 100 and 200 rubles a year.** Let us note, by the way, that the relatively high expenditure of the horseless peasant on "labourers and job-work" is very likely to be explained by the fact that the statisticians have placed under this heading two entirely different things: the hiring of a worker who has to work with his employer's implements, i.e., the hiring of a farm labourer or day labourer; and the hiring of a neighbouring peasant who has with his own implements to cultivate the hirer's land. These types of "hire," diamet-

* Expenditure on the maintenance of livestock is mostly in kind, the rest of the farm expenditure is mostly in money.

** How dear to the heart of such an "enterprising muzhik" must be Mr. Karyshev's "theory of rent" which advocates long leases, lower rents, compensation for improvements, etc. That is just what he needs.

A page from V. I. Lenin's copy-book with notes and calculations from N. A. Blagoveshchensky's book *Combined Statistical Returns* (1895).

Бал. с 133.

Чтобы непроиграть подчи
раз. окаф (по 4-по рублей) ту
4 Сирота в коих данных вилах о 3-х у
10 Сарат. ту. Цр 10 уездов ни

{Union ва-
кансия
5 уездов} По 5 уу.:

7 Самарская ту.
Цр 7 уу. доплата по 9 уу (Сам. уезд
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кансия 5 уу.} По 2 уу

1 Тесар ту. 1 у. оба доплат
вакансия.

18. у чем
по 11 уу. по
ивы, а по
7 сем. / Итого выкинуть 11 уу. А по 7 уу.:

А по оставшимся 105 уу.:

Итого по 112 уу.:
в 21 губернии

Кроме поселений
в сумме 24 876 915 дес.
от. 14 995 897 дес.
| Сб. Сб. Стер. |

Следовательно, у них ра
свыше из

1) Дворовых в Саратов 80 737 и Сам. 47 595
всего 806 076, а у 8 бал. 806 676 (с. 134). Ф
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	Двигателей					Всего	
	бензин.	нефт.	газ.	спирт.	3.		
	36.912 -	37.351 -	29.331 -	42.586 -		146.180	232.548 - 86.618
	11.040 -	17.141 -	16.309 -	24.941		69.431	165.430 - 3.978.
	—	—	—	—		—	—

	565.286	657.764	600.262	447.994	2.271.304	2.930.616	776.265
	613.238	712.256	645.900	515.521	2.486.921	3.395.539	866.862
	24.7%	28.0%	26.0%	20.7%	100%		
	—	712.256	1.229.180	1.824.969		3.829.025	
	—	18.6%	33.7%	47.7%		100%	

[illegible] 1 пару [illegible] за 1 [illegible].

Если сложить прямые [illegible] и вольные, то получится [illegible] всего раб. скота: 4.262.456
из них у частновладельцев: 2.258.400
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rically opposite in significance, must be strictly distinguished from one another, as is done, for example, by V. Orlov (see *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. 1).

Let us now examine the data on income from agriculture. Unfortunately, in the *Returns* these data are far too inadequately analysed (partly, maybe, because of their paucity). For example, the question of yield is not examined: there is no information on the sale of each particular kind of produce and on the conditions of sale. Let us therefore confine ourselves to the following brief table:

Income from agriculture (rubles)

	Total		Cash income		
Groups	Per farm	Per head, both sexes	Per farm	% of total income from agriculture	Income from industries per farm
a)	57.11	13.98	5.53	9.68	59.04
b)	127.69	25.82	23.69	18.55	49.22
c)	287.40	34.88	54.40	18.93	108.21
d)	496.52	38.19	91.63	18.45	146.67
e)	698.06	49.16	133.88	19.17	247.60
f)	698.39	43.65	42.06	6.02	975.20
	292.74	35.38	47.31	16.16	164.67

What immediately strikes one in this table is the glaring exception: the huge drop in the percentage of cash income from agriculture in the top group, despite the fact that it cultivates the biggest area. Farming on the biggest scale is thus apparently in the greatest degree natural economy. It will be extremely interesting to make a closer examination of this seeming exception, which throws light on the highly important question of the connection between agriculture and "industries" of an entrepreneur character. As we have already seen, the significance of industries of this type is particularly great in the budgets of the peasants owning many horses. Judging from the data under examination, especially typical of the peasant bourgeoisie in this locality is the tendency to combine agriculture with

commercial and industrial enterprises.* It is not difficult to see, firstly, that it is wrong to compare farmers of this type with cultivators pure and simple, and, secondly, that agriculture under such circumstances very often only seems to be natural economy. When agriculture is combined with the technical processing of agricultural produce (flour-milling, oil-pressing, potato-starch manufacture, distilling, etc.), the money income from such farming may be assigned to income from the industrial establishments and not from agriculture. Actually, indeed, the agriculture in this case will be commercial, not natural, economy. The same thing has to be said of the farm in which a mass of agricultural produce is consumed in kind on the maintenance of farm labourers and of horses employed on some industrial enterprise (for example, mail-carrying). And it is precisely this type of farm that we have among the top group (budget No. 1 in Korotoyak Uyezd. Family of 18 persons, 4 working members, 5 farm labourers, 20 horses; income from agriculture—1,294 rubles, nearly all in kind, and from industrial enterprises—2,675 rubles. And such a "natural-economy peasant farm" is combined with the horseless and one-horse farms for the purpose of striking a general "average"). This example shows us once again how important it is to combine classification according to scale and type of agricultural activity with classification according to scale and type of "industrial" activity.

(C) Let us now examine the data on the peasants' standard of living. Expenditure on food in kind is given incompletely in the *Returns*. We single out the most important items: agricultural produce and meat.**

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* Of the 12 horseless peasants not one obtains any income from industrial establishments and undertakings; of the 18 with one horse each, one does; of the 17 with two horses two do; of the 9 with three horses three do; of the 5 with four horses two do; of the 5 owning more than 4 horses four do.

** Under this head we combine the following items in the *Returns*: beef, mutton, pork and lard. Where other cereals are calculated in terms of rye it is according to the standards in Yanson's *Comparative Statistics* adopted by the Nizhni-Novgorod statisticians (see *Material* for Gorbatov Uyezd. Basis of calculation: percentage of absorbable protein).[62]

Per head of both sexes

	cereal produce					same in terms of rye (poods)			
Groups	Rye flour (meras)	Barley and millet flour (poods)	Millet and buck-wheat (meras)	Wheat and fine-wheat flour (pounds)	Potatoes (meras)	Rye and wheat	Other cereals	Total	Meat (poods)
a)	13.12	0.12	1.92	3.49	13.14	13.2	4.2	17.4	0.59
b)	13.21	0.32	2.13	3.39	6.31	13.4	3.0	16.4	0.49
c)	19.58	0.27	2.17	5.41	8.30	19.7	3.5	23.2	1.18
d)	18.85	1.02	2.93	1.32	6.43	18.6	4.2	22.8	1.29
e)	20.84	—	2.65	4.57	10.42	20.9	4.2	25.1	1.79
f)	21.90	—	4.91	6.25	3.90	22.0	4.2	26.2	1.79
	18.27	0.35	2.77	4.05	7.64	18.4	3.8	22.2	1.21

This table shows that we were right in combining the horseless and one-horse peasants and contrasting them to the rest. The distinguishing feature of the groups of peasants mentioned is insufficiency of food and its inferior quality (potatoes). The food of the one-horse peasant is in some respects even worse than that of the horseless peasant. The general "average" even on this question is entirely fictitious, the insufficient nourishment of the mass of the peasants being obscured by the satisfactory nourishment of the well-off peasantry, who consume almost one and a half times as much agricultural produce and three times as much meat* as do the poor peasants.

For the purpose of comparing the remaining data on the peasants' food, all produce must be taken at its value—in rubles:

* The extent to which the meat consumption of the village peasants is smaller than that of town dwellers is seen from even the following fragmentary data. In Moscow in 1900, cattle weighing about 4 million poods and of a total value of 18,986,714 rubles 59 kopeks were slaughtered in the city abattoirs (*Moskovskiye Vedomosti* [*Moscow Recorder*], 1901, No. 55). This works out per head, both sexes, at about 4 poods or nearly 18 rubles per annum. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

Per head (rubles)

Groups	Flour, all kinds and cereals	Vegitables, vegitable oil and fruit	Potatoes	Total agricultural produce	Total livestock produce*	Total purchased produce**	All produce	Of which in money	cash expenditure On agricultural produce	cash expenditure On livestock produce
a)	6.62	1.55	1.62	9.79	3.71	1.43	14.93	5.72	3.58	0.71
b)	7.10	1.49	0.71	9.30	5.28	1.79	16.37	4.76	2.55	0.42
c)	9.67	1.78	1.07	12.52	7.04	2.43	21.99	4.44	1.42	0.59
d)	10.45	1.34	0.85	12.64	6.85	2.32	21.81	3.27	0.92	0.03
e)	10.75	3.05	1.03	14.83	8.79	2.70	26.32	4.76	2.06	—
f)	12.70	1.93	0.57	15.20	6.37	6.41	27.98	8.63	1.47	0.75
	9.73	1.80	0.94	12.47	6.54	2.83	21.84	5.01	1.78	0.40

Thus, the general data on the peasants' food confirm what has been said above. Three groups stand out clearly: the bottom group (horseless and one-horse), the middle group (two- and three-horse), and the top group, whose food is nearly twice as good as that of the bottom one. The general "average" wipes out both extreme groups. *Cash* expenditure on food is highest, both absolutely and relatively, in the two extreme groups—among the rural proletarians and the rural bourgeoisie. The former *buy more*, *although they consume less*, than the middle peasants; they buy the most essential agricultural produce, that of which they suffer a shortage. The latter buy more because they consume more, increasing particularly their consumption of non-agricultural produce. A comparison of these two extreme groups shows us clearly how a home market is created in a capitalist country for articles of personal consumption.***

* Beef, pork, lard, mutton, butter, dairy produce, poultry and eggs.

** Salt, salted and fresh fish, herrings, vodka, beer, tea and sugar.

*** Of the money expenditure on agricultural produce first place goes to the purchase of rye, mainly by the poor, then the purchase of vegetables Expenditure on vegetables is valued at 85 kopeks per head of both sexes (ranging from 56 kopeks in group b to 1 ruble 31 kopeks in group *e*), including 47 kopeks in money. This interesting fact shows us that even among the rural population, not to speak of the urban, a market is created for the produce of one of the forms of commercial agriculture, namely, market gardening. Expenditure on vegetable oil is 2/3 in kind; that is to say, in this sphere domestic production and primitive handicraft still prevail.

The remaining items of expenditure on personal consumption are as follows:

Per head, both sexes (rubles)

Groups	expenditure on property, clothing	fuel (straw)	clothing, footwear	lighting	other domestic needs	total personal consumption other than of food	of which in money	Total on food and other consumption	of which in money
a)	9.73	0.95	1.46	0.23	1.64	4.28	3.87	19.21	9.59
b)	12.38	0.52	1.33	0.25	1.39	3.49	3.08	19.86	7.84
c)	23.73	0.54	2.47	0.22	2.19	5.42	4.87	27.41	9.31
d)	22.21	0.58	1.71	0.17	3.44	5.90	5.24	27.71	8.51
e)	31.39	1.73	4.64	0.26	3.78	10.41	8.93	36.73	13.69
f)	30.58	1.75	1.75	0.21	1.46	5.17	3.10	33.15	11.73
	22.31	0.91	2.20	0.22	2.38	5.71	4.86	27.55	9.87

It is not always correct to calculate this expenditure per head of both sexes, because the cost of fuel, lighting, household effects, etc., for example, is not proportionate to the number of members of the family.

These data also show the division of the peasantry (according to standard of living) into three different groups. Moreover, the following interesting peculiarity comes to light: the cash part of the expenditure on all personal consumption is highest in the *bottom* groups (in group *a* about half the expenditure is in money), whereas in the top groups the cash expenditure does not increase, amounting to only about a third. How can this be reconciled with the above-noted fact that, in general, the percentage of money expenditure increases in both extreme groups? Obviously in the top groups the *cash* expenditure is incurred mainly on *productive consumption* (expenditure on the farm), whereas in the bottom groups it is on *personal consumption*. Here are the exact data on this:

Groups	Cash expenditure per farm (rubles)				Same in %				% of cash part in expenditure on	
	on personal consumption	on the farm	on taxes and duties	Total	on personal consumption	on the farm	on taxes and duties	Total	personal consumption	the farm
a)	39.16	7.66	15.47	62.29	62.9	12.3	24.8	100	49.8	50.6
b)	38.89	24.32	17.77	80.98	48.0	30.0	22.0	100	39.6	41.7
c)	76.79	56.35	32.02	165.16	46.5	34.1	19.4	100	34.0	46.4
d)	110.60	102.07	49.55	262.22	42.2	39.0	18.8	100	30.7	45.8
e)	190.84	181.12	67.90	439.86	43.4	41.2	15.4	100	38.0	52.0
f)	187.83	687.03	84.34	959.20	19.6	71.6	8.8	100	35.4	70.3
	81.27	102.23	34.20	217.70	37.3	46.9	15.8	100	35.6	56.6

Consequently, the transformation of the peasantry into a rural proletariat creates a market mainly for articles of consumption, whereas its transformation into a rural bourgeoisie creates a market mainly for means of production. In other words, among the bottom groups of the "peasantry" we observe the transformation of labour-power into a commodity, and in the top ones the transformation of means of production into capital. Both these transformations result in precisely that process of the creation of a home market which theory has established for capitalist countries in general. That is why F. Engels, writing on the famine of 1891, said that it signified *the creation of a home market for capitalism*[63]—a proposition that is unintelligible to the Narodniks, who regard the ruin of the peasantry merely as the decay of "people's production," and not as the transformation of patriarchal into capitalist economy.

Mr. N. —on has written a whole book on the home market, without noticing the process of the creation of a home market by the differentiation of the peasantry. In his article "How Are We to Explain the Increase in Our State Revenues?" (*Novoye Slovo* [*New Word*], 1896, No. 5, February) he deals with this question in the following argument: the tables of the income of the American worker show that the lower the income, the larger is the relative expenditure on food. Consequently, with a decline in food

consumption there is a still greater decline in the consumption of other products. And in Russia there is a decline in the consumption of bread and vodka; hence there is also a decline in the consumption of other products, from which it follows that the greater consumption of the well-to-do "stratum" (p. 70) of the peasantry is more than balanced by the diminution of the consumption of the masses.—This argument contains three errors: firstly, by substituting the worker for the peasant, Mr. N. —on skips over the question; the point at issue is the process of the *creation* of workers and *employers*. Secondly, by substituting the worker for the peasant, Mr. N. —on reduces all consumption to personal consumption and forgets about productive consumption, about the market for means of production. Thirdly, Mr. N. —on forgets that the process of the differentiation of the peasantry is at the same time one of the displacement of natural by commodity economy, that, consequently, the market cannot be created by increasing consumption, but by transforming consumption in kind (even if more abundant) into cash or paying consumption (even if less abundant). We have just seen that the horseless peasants consume less, but buy more articles of personal consumption than the middle peasantry. They become poorer, but at the same time receive and spend more money,—and both these sides of the process are necessary for capitalism.*

In conclusion, let us make use of the budget figures to compare the standard of living of the peasants and the rural workers. Calculating the extent of personal consumption, not per head, but per adult working person (according to the rates of the Nizhni-Novgorod statisticians in the abovementioned compilation), we get the following table:

* This fact, which at first sight seems a paradox, is actually fully in keeping with the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, which are met with at every step in real life. That is why close observers of rural life have been able to note this fact quite independently of theory. "For the development of his activities," says Engelhardt about the kulak, the huckster, etc., "it is important that the peasants should be poor ... that the peasants should receive much money" (*Letters from the Countryside*, p. 493). Engelhardt's sympathy for a substantial (sic!!) agricultural life" (ibid.) did not prevent him at times from disclosing the most profound contradictions within the celebrated village community.

Per adult working person

	produce consumed							expenditure in rubles		
Groups	Rye flour (meras)	Barley and millet flour (poods)	Millet and buck-wheat flour (meras)	Wheat and fine-wheat flour (poods)	Potatoes (meras)	Total agricultural produce in terms of rye	Meat (poods)	On food	On remaining personal consumption	Total
a)	17.3	0.1	2.5	4.7	17.4	23.08	0.8	19.7	5.6	25.3
b)	18.5	0.2	2.9	4.7	8.7	22.89	0.7	22.7	4.8	27.5
c)	26.5	0.3	3.0	7.3	12.2	31.26	1.5	29.6	7.3	36.9
d)	26.2	1.4	4.3	2.0	9.0	32.21	1.8	30.7	8.3	39.0
e)	27.4	—	3.4	6.0	13.6	32.88	2.3	32.4	13.9	46.3
f)	30.8	—	6.9	8.5	5.5	36.88	2.5	39.3	7.2	46.5
	24.9	9.5	3.7	5.5	10.4	33.78	1.4	29.1	7.8	36.9

To compare the data on the standard of living of rural workers with this, we may take, firstly, average prices of labour. For 10 years (1881-1891) the average pay of a farm labourer hired by the year in Voronezh Gubernia was 57 rubles, and including keep, 99 rubles,* so that keep cost 42 rubles. The amount of personal consumption by allotment-holding farm labourers and day labourers (horseless and one-horse peasants) is below this level. The total cost of a family's keep amounts to only 78 rubles in the case of the horseless "peasant" (in a family of 4) and 98 rubles in the case of the one-horse "peasant" (in a family of 5), i.e., *less than the cost of a farm labourer's keep*. (We have omitted from the budgets of the horseless and one-horse peasants farm expenditure and also taxes and duties, for in this locality the allotment is leased at not less than the amount of the taxes.) As was to be expected, the position of the labourer who is tied to his allotment is worse than that of the labourer who is free from such tie (we say nothing of the tremendous degree to which the tying of people down to allotments develops relations of bondage and personal dependence). The cash expenditure of the farm labourer is far higher than the cash expenditure on personal consumption of the one-horse and horseless peasant.

* *Agricultural and Statistical Information Obtained from Farmers*. Published by the Department of Agriculture. Vol. V, St. Petersburg, 1892, S. A. Korolenko, *Hired Labour on Farms*, *etc.*

Consequently, the tying of people down to allotments retards the growth of the home market.

Secondly, we can make use of Zemstvo statistics on consumption by farm labourers. Let us take from the *Statistical Returns for Orel Gubernia* the data on Karachev Uyezd (Vol. V, Pt. 2, 1892), which are based on information concerning 158 cases of agricultural wage-labour.* Converting the monthly ration into one for a year, we get the following:

	Keep of a farm labourer in Orel Gubernia			Keep of a "peasant" in Voronezh Gubernia		
	minim.	maxim.	average	having one horse		having no horse
Rye flour (poods)	15.0	24.0	21.6	18.5		17.3
Cereals (poods)	4.5	9.0	5.25	2.9	lbs. fine-	2.5
Millet (poods)	1.5	1.5	1.5	+4.8	wheat flour	4.9
Potatoes (meras)	18.0	48.0	26.9	8.7		17.4
Total in terms of rye**	22.9	41.1	31.8	22.8		23.0
Lard (pounds)	24.0	48.0	33.0	28.0		32.0
Annual cost of all food (rubles)	—	—	40.5	27.5		25.3

Consequently, the standard of living of the one-horse and horseless peasants is *not higher than that of farm labourers*, and if anything rather approximates to the minimum standard of living of the latter.

The general conclusion from our review of the data on the bottom group of the peasantry is, accordingly, the following: both in its relation to the other groups, which are ousting the bottom section of the peasantry from agriculture, in its scale of farming, which covers only part of the expenditure on maintaining the family, in its source of livelihood (sale of labour-power), and, lastly, in its

* The difference between the conditions in Orel and Voronezh gubernias is slight, and, as we shall see, the data given are of the usual kind. We do not take the data in the above-mentioned work of S. A. Korolenko (see the juxtaposition of those data in Mr. Maress's article in *The Influence of Harvests, etc.*, I, 11), for even the author himself admits that Messrs. the landowners from whom these data were obtained sometimes "were carried away"....

** Computed in the manner stated above.

standard of living, this group should be assigned to the *allotment-holding farm labourers and day labourers*.*

In thus concluding our exposition of the Zemstvo statistics on peasant budgets, we cannot but stop to examine the methods of treating the budget data employed by Mr. Shcherbina, the compiler of *Evaluation Returns* and author of the article on peasant budgets in the well-known book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, *etc.* (Vol. II).[64] Mr. Shcherbina states on some point in the Returns that he is using the theory "of the well-known political economist K. Marx" (p. 111); as a matter of fact, he positively distorts this theory, confusing the difference between constant and variable capital with the difference between fixed and circulating capital (ibid.), and quite senselessly applying these terms and categories of developed capitalism to peasant farming (passim), etc. The whole of Mr. Shcherbina's treatment of the budget figures is nothing but a gross and incredible abuse of "average magnitudes." All the evaluation returns concern the "average" peasant. The income from the land computed for the 4 uyezds is divided by the number of farms (recall that for the horseless peasant this income is about 60 rubles per family, and for the rich peasant about 700 rubles). The "magnitude of constant capital" (sic!!?) "per farm" (p. 114), i.e., the value of the whole property, is determined; the "average" value of implements, the average value of commercial and industrial establishments (sic!) is determined as 15 rubles per farm. Mr. Shcherbina ignores the detail that these establishments are the private property of the well-to-do minority, and divides them among all "equally"! The "average" expenditure on the renting of land (p. 118) is determined;

* The Narodniks will probably draw from our comparison between the standard of living of farm labourers and that of the bottom group of the peasantry, the conclusion that we "stand for" dispossessing the peasantry of the land, etc. Such a conclusion will be a wrong one. All that follows from what has been said is that we "stand for" abolishing all restrictions on the peasants' right freely to dispose of their land, to give up their allotments, and to leave the village community. Only the peasant himself can be the judge of whether it is more advantageous to be a farm labourer with an allotment or without one. Hence such restrictions can on no account and in no way be justified. The defence of these restrictions by the Narodniks, on the other hand, turns the latter into servants of the interests of our agrarians.

as we have seen, it amounts to 6 rubles in the case of the one-horse peasant and to 100 to 200 rubles in the case of the rich peasant. All this is added together and divided by the number of farms. Even the "average" expenditure on "repair of capitals" is determined (ibid.). The Lord alone knows what that means! If it means replenishment and repair of implements and livestock, here are the figures we have already cited: with the horseless peasant this expenditure equals *8* (*eight*) *kopeks* per farm, and with the rich peasant *75 rubles*. Is it not evident that if we add such "peasant farms" together and divide by the number of items added, we shall get the "law of average requirements" discovered by Mr. Shcherbina in the returns for Ostrogozhsk Uyezd (Vol. II, Pt. 2, 1887) and so brilliantly applied subsequently? And from such a "law" it will not be difficult to draw the conclusion that "the peasant satisfies not his minimum requirements, but their average level" (p. 123 and many others), that peasant farming is a special "type of development" (p. 100), etc., etc. This ingenuous device of "equalising" the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie is reinforced by the already familiar classification according to allotment. Had we applied it, for example, to the budget data, we would have combined in one group such peasants, for example (in the category of those having large allotments, with 15 to 25 dess. per family), as: one who leases half his allotment (of 23.5 dess.) sows 1.3 dess., lives mainly by means of "personal industries" (how surprisingly well this sounds!) and secures an income of 190 rubles for 10 persons of both sexes (budget No. 10 in Korotoyak Uyezd); and another who rents an additional 14.7 dess., sows 23.7 dess., employs farm labourers and has an income of 1,400 rubles for 10 persons of both sexes (budget No. 2 in Zadonsk Uyezd). Is it not clear that we shall get a special "type of development" if we add the farms of farm labourers and day labourers to those of peasants employing workers, and divide the total by the number of items added? One has only to make regular and exclusive use of "average" data on peasant farming, and all "false ideas" about the differentiation of the peasantry will be eliminated once and for all. That is exactly what Mr. Shcherbina does by adopting this method en grand*

* Extensively.—*Ed.*

in his article in the book *The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.* Here a huge effort is made to calculate the budgets of the whole of the Russian peasantry—and all by means of the very same, tried and tested, "averages." The future historian of Russian economic literature will note with astonishment that the prejudices of Narodism caused the most elementary requirements of economic statistics to be forgotten, namely, that a strict distinction be drawn between employers and wage-workers, regardless of the form of land tenure that unites them, and regardless of the multiplicity and variety of the intermediary types between them.

XIII. CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER II

Let us sum up the main points that follow from the data examined above:

1) The social-economic situation in which the contemporary Russian peasantry find themselves is that of commodity economy. Even in the central agricultural belt (which is most backward in this respect as compared with the south-eastern border regions or the industrial gubernias), the peasant is completely subordinated to the market, on which he is dependent as regards both his personal consumption and his farming, not to mention the payment of taxes.

2) The system of social-economic relations existing among the peasantry (agricultural and village-community) shows us the presence of all those contradictions which are inherent in every commodity economy and every order of capitalism: competition, the struggle for economic independence, the grabbing of land (purchasable and rentable), the concentration of production in the hands of a minority, the forcing of the majority into the ranks of the proletariat, their exploitation by a minority through the medium of merchant's capital and the hiring of farm labourers. There is not a single economic phenomenon among the peasantry that does not bear this contradictory form, one specifically peculiar to the capitalist system, i.e., that does not express a struggle and antagonism of interests, that does not imply advantage for some and disadvantage for others. It is the case with the renting of land, the purchase of land, and with "industries" in their diametrically opposite types; it is also the case with the technical progress of farming.

We attach cardinal importance to this conclusion not only as regards capitalism in Russia, but also as regards the significance of the Narodnik doctrine in general. It is these contradictions that show us clearly and irrefutably that the system of economic relations in the "community" village does not at all constitute a special economic form ("people's production," etc.), but is an ordinary petty-bourgeois one. Despite the theories that have prevailed here during the past half-century, the Russian community peasantry are not antagonists of capitalism, but, on the contrary, are its deepest and most durable foundation. The deepest—because it is here, remote from all "artificial" influences, and in spite of the institutions which restrict the development of capitalism, that we see the constant formation of the elements of capitalism within the "community" itself. The most durable—because agriculture in general, and the peasantry in particular, are weighed down most heavily by the traditions of the distant past, the traditions of patriarchal life, as a consequence of which the transformative effects of capitalism (the development of the productive forces, the changing of all social relations, etc.) manifest themselves here most slowly and gradually.*

3) The sum-total of all the economic contradictions among the peasantry constitutes what we call the differentiation of the peasantry. The peasants themselves very aptly and strikingly characterise this process with the term "depeasantising."** This process signifies the utter dissolution of the old, patriarchal peasantry and the creation of *new types* of rural inhabitants.

Before we proceed to describe these types, let us note the following. Reference to this process was made in our literature long ago and has been repeated very often. For example, in his day Mr. Vasilchikov, who made use of the works of the Valuyev Commission,[66] noted the formation of a "rural proletariat" in Russia and the "differentiation of the peasant social estate" (*Landownership and Agriculture*, 1st ed., Vol. I, Chapter IX). This fact was also mentioned by V. Orlov (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. IV, Pt. 1, p. 14) and by many others. But all these

* Cf. *Das Kapital*, I^2, S. 527.[65]

** *Agricultural Survey of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia for 1892.*

references were very fragmentary. No attempt was ever made to study this phenomenon systematically, and that is why we lack, to this day, adequate information about this phenomenon notwithstanding the wealth of data provided by the Zemstvo house-to-house censuses. Connected with this is the fact that the majority of the writers who have dealt with this problem regard the break-up of the peasantry simply as the emergence of property inequality, as simple "differentiation," to use the favourite term of the Narodniks in general and of Mr. Karyshev in particular (see his book on *Rentings* and his articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*). Undoubtedly, the emergence of property inequality is the starting-point of the whole process, but the process is not at all confined to property "differentiation." The old peasantry is not only "differentiating," it is being completely dissolved, it is ceasing to exist, it is being ousted by absolutely new types of rural inhabitants—types that are the basis of a society in which commodity economy and capitalist production prevail. These types are the rural bourgeoisie (chiefly petty bourgeoisie) and the rural proletariat—a class of commodity producers in agriculture and a class of agricultural wage-workers.

It is extremely instructive that the purely theoretical analysis of the process of the formation of agricultural capitalism points to the differentiation of the small producers as an important factor in this process. We have in mind one of the most interesting chapters in Vol. III of *Capital*, namely Chapter 47, "Genesis of Capitalist Ground-Rent." As the starting-point of this genesis Marx takes *labour-rent* (Arbeitsrente)*—". . . where the direct producer, using instruments of labour (plough, cattle, etc.) which actually or legally belong to him, cultivates soil actually owned by him during part of the week, and works during the remaining days upon the estate of the feudal lord without

* In the Russian translation (p. 651 and foll.) this term is given as "trudovaya renta" ("trudovaya" is the adjectival form of "trud"—labour.—*Ed.*). We think that our translation ("otrabotochnaya renta"—from "otrabotat," to work off, to pay off by labour.—*Ed.*) is more correct, for the Russian language contains the specific term "otrabotki" (labour-service) which means precisely the work of the dependent peasant for the landowner.[67]

any compensation from the feudal lord. . ." (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 323. Russ. trans., 651). The next form of rent is *rent in kind* (Produktenrente), when the direct producer produces the entire product on land which he himself exploits, and gives up to the landowner the whole of the surplus product in kind. The producer here becomes more independent and is enabled to acquire by his labour a certain surplus over and above the amount of produce that satisfies his indispensable needs. "Similarly, this form" of rent "will give rise to greater differences in the economic position of the individual direct producers. At least the possibility for such a differentiation exists, and the possibility for the direct producer to have in turn acquired the means to exploit other labourers directly" (S. 329. Russ. trans., 657.)[68] And so, while natural economy still prevails, at the very first expansion of the independence of the dependent peasants, there already appear the germs of their differentiation. But these germs can develop only under the next form of rent, *money rent*, which represents a mere change in the form of rent in kind. The direct producer gives up to the landowner not produce, but the price of this produce.* The basis of this type of rent remains the same: the direct producer is as hitherto the traditional possessor of the land, but "the basis of this type of rent . . . is approaching its dissolution" (330). Money rent "presupposes a considerable development of commerce, of urban industry, of commodity production in general, and thereby of money circulation" (331).[69] The traditional, common-law relationship between the dependent peasant and the landowner is transformed here into a purely cash, contract-based

* A strict distinction must be drawn between money rent and capitalist ground-rent the latter presupposes the existence in agriculture of capitalists and wage-workers; the former the existence of dependent peasants. Capitalist rent is that part of surplus-value which remains after the deduction of the employer's profit, whereas money rent is the price of the entire surplus product paid by the peasant to the landowner. An example of money rent in Russia is the quitrent paid by the peasant to the landlord. Undoubtedly, the taxes which our peasants now have to pay represent, in part, money rent. Sometimes peasant renting of land also approximates to the paying of money rent; that is when the high rent the peasant has to pay for the land leaves him no more than a meagre wage.

relationship. This leads, on the one hand, to the expropriation of the old peasantry, and, on the other, to the peasant buying out his land and his liberty. The transformation of rent in kind into money rent is furthermore not only inevitably accompanied, but even anticipated, by the formation of a class of propertyless day labourers, who hire themselves out for money. During their genesis, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the more prosperous peasants subject to rent payments (rentepflichtigen) of exploiting agricultural wage-labourers for their own account. . . . In this way, they gradually acquire the possibility of accumulating a certain amount of wealth and themselves becoming transformed into future capitalists. The old self-employed possessors of land themselves thus give rise to a nursery school for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned by the general development of capitalist production beyond the bounds of the countryside" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 332. Russ. trans., 659-660).[70]

4) The differentiation of the peasantry, which develops the latter's extreme groups at the expense of the middle "peasantry," creates two new types of rural inhabitants. The feature common to both types is the commodity, money character of their economy. The first new type is the rural bourgeoisie or the well-to-do peasantry. These include the independent farmers who carry on commercial agriculture in all its varied forms (the principal ones of which we shall describe in Chapter IV), then come the owners of commercial and industrial establishments, the proprietors of commercial enterprises, etc. The combining of commercial agriculture with commercial and industrial enterprises is the type of "combination of agriculture with industries" that is specifically peculiar to *this* peasantry. From among these well-to-do peasants a class of capitalist farmers is created, since the renting of land for the sale of grain plays (in the agricultural belt) an enormous part in their farms, often a more important part than the allotment. The size of the farm, in the majority of cases, requires a labour force larger than that available in the family, for which reason the formation of a body of farm labourers, and still more of day labourers, is a necessary condition for the existence

of the well-to-do peasantry.* The spare cash obtained by these peasants in the shape of net income is either directed towards commercial operations and usury, which are so excessively developed in our rural districts, or, under favourable conditions, is invested in the purchase of land, farm improvements, etc. In a word, these are small agrarians. Numerically, the peasant bourgeoisie constitute a small minority of the peasantry, probably not more than one-fifth of the total number of households (which is approximately three-tenths of the population), although, of course, the proportion fluctuates considerably according to district. But as to their weight in the sum-total of peasant farming, in the total, quantity of means of production belonging to the peasantry, in the total amount of produce raised by the peasantry, the peasant bourgeoisie are undoubtedly predominant. They are the masters of the contemporary countryside.

5) The other new type is the rural proletariat, the class of *allotment-holding wage-workers*. This covers the poor peasants, including those that are completely landless; but the most typical representative of the Russian rural proletariat is the allotment-holding farm labourer, day labourer, unskilled labourer, building worker or other allotment-holding worker. Insignificant farming on a patch of land, with the farm in a state of utter ruin (particularly evidenced by the leasing out of land), inability to exist without the sale of labour-power (= "industries" of the indigent peasants), an extremely low standard of living (probably lower even than that of the worker without an allotment)—such are the distinguishing features of this type.** One must assign not less than half the total peasant households (which is

* Let us note that the employment of wage-labour is not an essential feature of the concept "petty bourgeoisie." This concept covers all independent production for the market, where the social system of economy contains the contradictions described by us above (Sec. 2), particularly where the mass of producers are transformed into wage-workers.

** To prove that it is correct to assign the indigent peasants to the class of allotment-holding wage-workers, one must show not only how, and what sort of, peasants sell labour-power, but also how and what sort of, employers buy labour-power. This will be shown in subsequent chapters.

approximately 4/10 of the population) to membership of the rural proletariat, i.e., all the horseless and a large part of the one-horse peasants (this, of course, is only a wholesale, approximate calculation, one subject to more or less considerable modifications in the different areas, according to local conditions). The grounds which compel us to believe that such a considerable proportion of the peasantry already belong to the rural proletariat have been advanced above.* It should be added that our literature frequently contains too stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical proposition that capitalism requires the free, landless worker. This proposition is quite correct as indicating the main trend, but capitalism penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly and in extremely varied forms. The allotment of land to the rural worker is very often to the interests of the rural employers themselves, and that is why the allotment-holding rural worker is a type to be found in all capitalist countries. The type assumes different forms in different countries: the English cottager is not the same as the small-holding peasant of France or the Rhine provinces, and the latter again is not the same as the Knecht in Prussia. Each of these bears traces of a specific agrarian system, of a specific history of agrarian relations—but this does not prevent the economist from classing them all as one type of agricultural proletarian. The juridical basis of his right to his plot of land is absolutely immaterial to such a classification. Whether the land is his full property (as a

* Prof. Conrad considers the criterion for the real peasant in Germany to be ownership of a pair of draught animals (Gespannbauerngüter), see *Landownership and Agriculture* (Moscow, 1896, pp. 84-85). For Russia the criterion should rather be put higher. In defining the concept "peasant," what Conrad takes is the percentage of persons or households engaged in "hired labour" or "subsidiary industries" generally (ibid.),—Prof Stebut, who cannot be denied authority on questions of fact, wrote *in 1882*: "Since the fall of serfdom, the peasant with his small economic unit, engaged exclusively in growing grain, that is to say, principally in the central black-earth belt of Russia, has in the majority of cases become an artisan, a farm labourer or a day labourer, for whom agriculture is only a subsidiary occupation" ("Articles on Russian Agriculture, Its Defects and the Measures for Its Improvement," Moscow, 1883, p. 11) Evidently the artisans here also include wage-workers in industry (building, etc.) However incorrect this use of terms, it is very widespread in our literature, even in specifically economic literature.

small-holding peasant), or whether he is only allowed the use of it by the landlord or the Rittergutsbesitzer,* or, finally, whether he possesses it as a member of a Great-Russian peasant community—makes no difference at all.** In assigning the indigent peasants to the rural proletariat we are saying nothing new. This term has already been used repeatedly by many writers, and only the Narodnik economists persist in speaking of the peasantry in general, as of something anti-capitalist, and close their eyes to the fact that the mass of the "peasantry" have already taken a quite definite place in the general system of capitalist production, namely, as agricultural and industrial wage-workers. In our country, people are very fond of singing the praises of our agrarian system, which retains the village community and the peasantry, etc., and of contrasting this to the Ostsee system, with its capitalist organisation of agriculture. It will not be without interest, therefore, to see what types of the agricultural population in the Ostsee region[72] are sometimes assigned to the class of farm labourers and day labourers. The peasants in the Ostsee gubernias are divided into those with large plots (25 to 50 dess. in separate lots), cottagers (with plots of 3 to 10 dess.) and landless peasants. As Mr. S. Korolenko

* Lord of the manor.—*Ed.*

** Let us quote examples of the various European forms of wage-labour in agriculture from the *Handwört der Staatswiss.* (*Landownership and Agriculture*, Moscow, 1896). "The peasants' holding," says J. Conrad, "must be distinguished from the *parcel*, from the patch of the 'landless peasant' or the 'market gardener,' the owner of which is obliged to seek additionally outside occupation and employment" (pp. 83-84). "In France, according to the 1881 census, 18 million persons, i.e., somewhat less than half the population, obtained their livelihood in agriculture about 9 million owners of land, 5 million tenant farmers and half-croppers, 4 million day labourers and owners of small plots, or tenants obtaining their livelihood mainly by wage-labour.... It is assumed that at least 75% of the agricultural labourers in France have their own land" (p. 233, Goltz). In Germany, the rural workers include the following categories *who possess land*: 1) cottars, cottagers, gardeners [something like our gift-land peasants]; 2) contract day labourers; they possess land, and hire themselves out for a definite part of the year [cf. our "three-dayers"].[71] "Contract day labourers constitute the bulk of the agricultural labourers in those parts of Germany where big landed property predominates" (p. 236); 3) agricultural labourers who do their farming on rented land (p. 237).

quite rightly remarks, the cottager "most closely approximates to the general type of Russian peasant of the central gubernias" (*Hired Labour*, p. 495); he is everlastingly compelled to divide his time between seeking employment and cultivating his plot of land. But what is particularly interesting to us is the economic position of the *farm labourers*. The fact is that the landlords themselves find it advantageous to *allot them land* on account of wages. Here are some examples of the holdings of Ostsee farm labourers: 1) 2 dess. of land (we have converted Loftstelle into dessiatines: 1 Loftstelle = 1/3 dess.); the husband works 275 days and the wife 50 days a year at a wage of 25 kopeks per day; 2) 2 2/3 dess. of land; "the farm labourer keeps 1 horse, 3 cows, 3 sheep and 2 pigs" (pp. 508, 518); the farm labourer works alternate weeks and the wife works 50 days; 3) 6 dess. of land (Bauska Uyezd, Courland Gubernia), "the farm labourer keeps 1 horse, 3 cows, 3 sheep and several pigs" (p. 518), he works 3 days a week and his wife 35 days a year; 4) in Hasenpoth Uyezd, Courland Gubernia—8 dess. of land, "in all cases the farm labourers get their flour milled gratis and free medical aid and medicine, and their children attend school" (p. 519), etc. We draw the reader's attention to the *size of the holdings and the scale of the farming* of these farm labourers, i.e., to the very conditions that, in the opinion of the Narodniks, set our peasants apart from the general European agrarian system, which corresponds to capitalist production. We combine all the examples given in the publication quoted: 10 farm labourers own 31.5 dess. of land, that is, an average of 3.15 dess. per labourer. The farm labourers here include peasants who work the *lesser part of the year* for the landlord (the husband half the year, and the wife 35 to 50 days) and also one-horse peasants who own 2 and even 3 cows each. The question arises: what constitutes the notorious difference between our "community peasant" and the Ostsee farm labourer of this type? In the Ostsee region they call things by their proper names, whereas in Russia one-horse farm labourers are combined with wealthy peasants, "averages" are struck, and sentimental talk is indulged in about the "community spirit," the "labour principle," "people's production" and the "combination of agriculture with industries"....

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6) The intermediary link between these post-Reform types of "peasantry" is the *middle peasantry*. It is distinguished by the *least* development of commodity production. The independent agricultural labour of this category of peasant covers his maintenance in perhaps only the best years and under particularly favourable conditions, and that is why his position is an extremely precarious one. In the majority of cases the middle peasant cannot make ends meet without resorting to loans, to be repaid by labour-service, etc., without seeking "subsidiary" employment on the side, which also consists partly in the sale of labour-power, etc. Every crop failure flings masses of the middle peasants into the ranks of the proletariat. In its social relations this group fluctuates between the top group, towards which it gravitates but which only a small minority of lucky ones succeed in entering, and the bottom group, into which it is pushed by the whole course of social evolution. We have seen that the peasant bourgeoisie *oust* not only the bottom group, but also the middle group, of the peasantry. Thus a process specifically characteristic of capitalist economy takes place, the middle members are swept away and the extremes are reinforced—the process of "depeasantising."

7) *The differentiation of the peasantry creates a home market for capitalism*. In the bottom group, this formation of a market takes place on account of articles of consumption (the market of personal consumption). The rural proletarian, by comparison with the middle peasantry, *consumes less*, and, moreover, consumes food of worse quality (potatoes instead of bread, etc.), *but buys more*. The formation and development of a peasant bourgeoisie creates a market in twofold fashion: firstly and mainly on account of means of production (the market of productive consumption), since the well-to-do peasant strives to convert into capital those means of production which he "gathers" from both landlords "in straitened circumstances" and peasants in the grip of ruin. Secondly, a market is also created here on account of personal consumption, due to the expansion of the requirements of the more affluent peasants.*

* Only this fact that a home market is created by the differentiation of the peasantry can explain, for example, the enormous growth of the home market for cotton goods, the manufacture of which

8) On the question of whether the differentiation of the peasantry is progressing, and if so at what rate, we have no precise statistics that can be compared with the data in the combined tables (§§ I-VI). This is not surprising, for till now (as we have already remarked) no attempt whatever has been made to study even the statics of the differentiation of the peasantry systematically and to indicate the forms in which this process is taking place.* But all the general data on the economy of our rural districts indicate an uninterrupted and rapidly increasing differentiation: on the one hand, the "peasants" are abandoning and leasing out their land, the number of horseless peasants is growing, the "peasants" are fleeing to the towns, etc.; on the other hand, the "progressive trends in peasant farming" are also taking their course, the "peasants" are buying land, improving their farms, introducing iron ploughs, developing grass cultivation, dairy farming, etc. We now know which "peasants" are taking part in these two diametrically opposite sides of the process.

Furthermore, the development of the migration movement is giving a tremendous impetus to the differentiation of the peasantry, and especially of the agricultural peasantry. It is well known that the migration of peasants is mainly from the agricultural gubernias (migration from the industrial gubernias is quite negligible), and precisely from the densely populated central gubernias, where there is the greatest development of labour-service (which retards the differentiation of the peasantry). That is the first point. The second point is that it is mainly the peasants in *medium circumstances* who are leaving the areas of emi-

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has grown so rapidly in the post-Reform period along with the wholesale ruin of the peasantry. Mr. N. —on, who illustrates his theories about the home market with this very example of our textile industry, was totally unable to explain the existence of this contradictory phenomenon.

* The sole exception is I. Hourwich's splendid work *The Economics of the Russian Village*, New York, 1892. Russ. trans. «Экономическое положение русской деревни.» Moscow, 1896. One must marvel at the skill with which Mr. Hourwich processed the Zemstvo statistical returns, which furnish no combined tables of groups of peasants according to economic strength.

gration and mainly the extreme groups who are remaining at home. Thus, migration is accelerating the differentiation of the peasantry in the areas of emigration and is carrying the elements of differentiation to the new places (the agricultural wage-labour of settlers in Siberia in the first period of their new life.* This connection between migration and the differentiation of the peasantry is fully proved by I. Hourwich in his superb research work, *Peasant Migration to Siberia* (Moscow, 1888). We strongly recommend to the reader this book which our Narodnik press has strenuously tried to hush up.**

9) A tremendous part, as is known, is played in our rural districts by merchant's and usurer's capital. We consider it superfluous to cite numerous facts and indicate sources relating to this phenomenon: the facts are well known and do not directly concern our theme. The only question of interest to us is the following: What relation has merchant's and usurer's capital in our countryside to the differentiation of the peasantry? Is there any connection between the relations among the various groups of peasants described above and the relations between peasant creditors and peasant debtors? Is usury a factor and a motive force of differentiation, or does it retard this differentiation?

Let us first indicate how theory presents this question. In the analysis of capitalist production given by the author of *Capital* very great significance was attached, as we know, to merchant's and usurer's capital. The main points of Marx's views on this subject are the following: 1) merchant's and usurer's capital, on the one hand, and industrial capital [i.e., capital invested in production, whether agricultural or industrial], on the other, represent a single type of economic phenomenon, which is covered by the general formula: the buying of commodities in order to sell at a profit (*Das Kapital*, I, 2. Abschnitt, Chapter IV, especially pp. 148-149 of the second German edition[73]). 2) Merchant's and usurer's capital always historically precede

* Restriction of migration thus has an enormously retarding effect upon the differentiation of the peasantry.

** See also Mr. Preemak's *Material in Figures for a Study of Migration to Siberia*. (*Note to 2nd edition*.)

the formation of industrial capital and are logically the *necessary* premise of its formation (*Das Kapital*, III, 1, S. 312-316; Russ. trans., pp. 262-265; III, 2, 132-137, 149; Russ. trans., pp. 488-492, 502)[74]; but in themselves neither merchant's capital nor usurer's capital represents a *sufficient* premise for the rise of industrial capital (i.e., capitalist *production*); they do not always break up the old mode of production and replace it by the capitalist mode of production; the formation of the latter "depends entirely upon the stage of historical development and the attendant circumstances" (ibid., 2, 133; Russ. trans., p. 489).[75] "To what extent they" (commercial and merchant's capital) "bring about a dissolution of the old mode of production depends on their solidity and internal structure. And whither this process of dissolution will lead, in other words, what new mode of production will replace the old, does not depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production itself" (ibid., III, 1, 316; Russ. trans., 265).[76] 3) The independent development of merchant's capital is inversely proportional to the degree of development of capitalist *production* (ibid., S. 312; Russ. trans., 262)[77]; the greater the development of merchant's and usurer's capital, the smaller the development of industrial capital (=capitalist *production*), and vice versa.

Consequently, as applied to Russia, the question to be answered is: Is merchant's and usurer's capital being linked up with industrial capital? Are commerce and usury, in disintegrating the old mode of production, leading to its replacement by the capitalist mode of production, or by some other system?* These are questions of fact, questions that must be answered in regard to all aspects of

* Mr. V. V. touched upon this question on the very first page of *The Destiny of Capitalism*, but neither in this nor in any other of his works did he attempt to examine the facts about the relation between merchant's and industrial capital in Russia. Mr. N.—on, although claiming to be a faithful follower of Marx's theory, preferred, however, to replace the precise and clear category "merchant's capital" by the vague and diffuse term of his own coinage—"capitalisation" or "the capitalisation of income"; and under cover of this hazy term successfully evaded, positively evaded, this question. The predecessor of capitalist production in Russia, according to him, is not merchant's capital, but ... "people's production."[78]

the national economy of Russia. As regards peasant cultivation the data reviewed above contain the reply, and an affirmative reply, to this question. The ordinary Narodnik view that the "kulak" and the "enterprising muzhik" are not two forms of one and the same economic phenomenon, but totally unconnected and opposite types of phenomena, is absolutely without foundation. It is one of those Narodnik prejudices which no one has ever even attempted to prove by an analysis of precise economic data. The data indicate the contrary. Whether the peasant hires workers for the purpose of expanding production, whether he trades in land (recall the data quoted above on the large scale of land renting among the rich) or in groceries, or whether he trades in hemp, hay, cattle, etc., or money (usurer), he represents a single economic type, and his operations amount, at bottom, to one and the same economic relation. Furthermore, that in the Russian community village the role of capital is not confined to bondage and usury, that capital is also invested in production, is apparent from the fact that the well-to-do peasant puts his money into the improvement of his farm, into the purchase and renting of land, the acquisition of improved implements, the hiring of workers, etc., and not only into trading establishments and undertakings (see above). If capital in our countryside were incapable of creating anything but bondage and usury, we could not, from the data on production, establish the differentiation of the peasantry, the formation of a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat; the whole of the peasantry would represent a fairly even type of poverty-stricken cultivators, among whom only usurers would stand out, and they only to the extent of money owned and not to the extent and organisation of agricultural production. Finally, from the above-examined data follows the important proposition that the independent development of merchant's and usurer's capital in our countryside *retards* the differentiation of the peasantry. The further the development of commerce proceeds, bringing the country closer to the town, eliminating the primitive village markets and undermining the monopoly of the village shopkeeper, and the more there develop forms of credit that accord with European standards, displacing the village usurer, the further

and deeper must the differentiation of the peasantry proceed. The capital of the well-to-do peasants, forced out of petty trade and usury, will flow more abundantly into production, whither it is already beginning to flow.

10) Another important phenomenon in the economy of our countryside that retards the differentiation of the peasantry is the survivals of corvée economy, i.e., labour-service. Labour-service is based on the payment of labour in kind, hence, on a poor development of commodity economy. Labour-service presupposes and requires the middle peasant, one who is not very affluent (otherwise he would not agree to the bondage of labour-service) but is also not a proletarian (to undertake labour-service one must have one's own implements, one must be at least in some measure a "sound" peasant).

When we said above that the peasant bourgeoisie are the masters of the contemporary countryside, we disregarded the factors retarding differentiation: bondage, usury, labour-service, etc. Actually, the real masters of the contemporary countryside are often enough not the representatives of the peasant bourgeoisie, but the village usurers and the neighbouring landowners. It is, however, quite legitimate to disregard them, for otherwise it is impossible to study the internal system of economic relationships among the peasantry. It is interesting to note that the Narodnik also employs this procedure, only he stops half-way and does not carry his reasoning to its logical conclusion. Speaking of the burden of taxes, etc., in *The Destiny of Capitalism*, Mr. V. V. observes that due to these reasons "the conditions for a natural (sic!) life no longer exist" (287) for the village community, for the "*mir*". Excellent! But the whole question is precisely: what are these "natural conditions" that do not yet exist in our countryside? To obtain a reply to this question one must study the system of economic relationships within the village community, lifting away, if one may so express it, the survivals of pre-Reform times which obscure these "natural conditions" of life in our countryside. Had Mr. V. V. done this, he would have seen that this system of village relationships reveals the absolute differentiation of the peasantry, that

the more completely bondage, usury, labour-service, etc., are forced out, the more profoundly will the differentiation of the peasantry proceed.* Above we have shown, on the basis of Zemstvo statistics, that this differentiation is already an accomplished fact, that the peasantry have completely split up into opposite groups.

* Incidentally. In speaking of Mr. V. V.'s *The Destiny of Capitalism*, and particularly of Chapter VI, from which the quotation is taken, one cannot but indicate that it contains very good and quite fair pages. These are the pages where the author does *not* deal with the "destiny of capitalism" and *not* even with capitalism at all, but with the methods of exacting taxes. It is characteristic that Mr. V. V. does not notice the inseparable connection between these methods and the survivals of corvée economy, *which latter* (as we shall see below) *he is capable of idealising*!

Вытѣсненіе барщиннаго хозяйства капиталистическимъ въ современномъ русскомъ земледѣліи *).

I.

За исходный пунктъ при разсмотрѣніи современной системы помѣщичьяго хозяйства необходимо взять тотъ строй этого хозяйства, который господствовалъ въ эпоху крѣпостного права. Сущность тогдашней хозяйственной системы состояла въ томъ, что вся земля данной единицы земельнаго хозяйства, т. е. данной вотчины, раздѣлялась на барскую и крестьянскую; послѣдняя отдавалась въ надѣлъ крестьянамъ, которые (получая сверхъ того и другія средства производства—напримѣръ, лѣсъ, иногда скотъ и т. п.) своимъ трудомъ и своимъ инвентарем обрабатывали ее, получая съ нея свое содержаніе. Продуктъ этого труда крестьянъ представлялъ изъ себя необходимый продуктъ, по терминологіи теоретической политической экономіи; необходимый — для крестьянъ, какъ дающій имъ средства къ жизни,—для помѣщика, какъ дающій ему рабочія руки; совершенно точно такъ же, какъ продуктъ, возмѣщающій перемѣнную часть стоимости капитала, является необходимымъ продуктомъ въ капиталистическомъ обществѣ. Прибавочный же трудъ крестьянъ состоялъ въ обработкѣ ими тѣмъ же инвентаремъ помѣщичьей земли; продуктъ этого труда шелъ въ пользу помѣщика. Прибавочный трудъ отдѣлялся здѣсь, слѣдовательно, пространственно отъ необходимаго: на помѣщика обрабатывали барскую землю, на себя — свои надѣлы; на помѣщика работали одни дни недѣли, на себя—другіе. «Надѣлъ» крестьянина служилъ такимъ образомъ въ этомъ хозяйствѣ, какъ бы натуральной заработной платой (выражаясь примѣнительно къ современнымъ понятіямъ), или средствомъ обезпеченія помѣщика рабочими руками. «Собственное хозяйство крестьянъ на своемъ надѣлѣ было условіемъ помѣщичьяго хозяйства, имѣло цѣлью «обезпеченіе» не крестьянина — средствами къ жизни, а помѣщика—рабочими руками **).

*) Настоящая статья представляетъ отрывокъ изъ большого изслѣдованія автора о развитіи капитализма въ Россіи. *Ред.*

**) Чрезвычайно рельефно характеризуетъ этотъ строй хозяйства А. Энгельгардтъ въ своихъ «Письмахъ изъ деревни» (Спб. 1882, стр. 554). Онъ совершенно справедливо указываетъ, что крѣпостное хозяйство было извѣстной планомѣрной и законченной системой, распорядителемъ которой былъ помѣщикъ, надѣлявшій крестьянъ землей и назначавшій ихъ на тѣ или на другія работы.

Page 96 from the magazine *Nachalo*, No. 3 for 1899, in which the first six sections of Chapter III of Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* were published

CHAPTER III[79]

THE LANDOWNERS' TRANSITION FROM CORVÉE TO CAPITALIST ECONOMY

From peasant economy we must now pass to landlord economy. Our task is to examine, in its main features, the present social-economic system of landlord economy and to describe the nature of the evolution of this system in the post-Reform epoch.

I. THE MAIN FEATURES OF CORVÉE ECONOMY

As our starting-point in examining the present system of landlord economy we must take the system of that economy which prevailed in the epoch of serfdom. The essence of the economic system of those days was that the entire land of a given unit of agrarian economy, i.e., of a given estate, was divided into the lord's and the peasants' land; the latter was distributed in allotments among the peasants, who (receiving other means of production in addition, as for example, timber, sometimes cattle, etc.) cultivated it with their own labour and their own implements, and obtained their livelihood from it. The product of this peasants' labour constituted the necessary product, to employ the terminology of theoretical political economy; necessary—for the peasants in providing them with means of subsistence, and for the landlord in providing him with hands; in exactly the same way as the product which replaces the variable part of the value of capital is a necessary product in capitalist society. The peasants' surplus labour, on the other hand, consisted in their cultivation, with the same implements, of the landlord's land; the product of that labour went to the landlord. Hence, the surplus

labour was separated then in space from the necessary labour: for the landlord they cultivated his land, for themselves their allotments; for the landlord they worked some days of the week and for themselves others. The peasant's allotment in this economy served, as it were, as wages in kind (to express oneself in modern terms), or as a means of providing the landlord with hands. The peasants' "own" farming of their allotments was a condition of the landlord economy, and its purpose was to "provide" not the peasant with means of livelihood but the landlord with hands.*

It is this system of economy which we call corvée [Russ.: barshchina] economy. Its prevalence obviously presumes the following necessary conditions: firstly, the predominance of natural economy. The feudal estate had to constitute a self-sufficing, self-contained entity, in very slight contact with the outside world. The production of grain by the landlords for sale, which developed particularly in the latter period of the existence of serfdom, was already a harbinger of the collapse of the old regime. Secondly, such an economy required that the direct producer be allotted the means of production in general, and land in particular; moreover, that he be tied to the land, since otherwise the landlord was not assured of hands. Hence, the methods of obtaining the surplus product under corvée and under capitalist economy are diametrically opposite: the former is based on the producer being provided with land, the latter on the producer being dispossessed of the land.** Thirdly, a

* An extremely vivid description of this system of economy is given by A. Engelhardt in his *Letters from the Countryside* (St. Petersburg 1885, pp. 556-557). The author quite rightly points out that feudal economy was a definite, regular and complete system, the director of which was the landlord, who allotted land to the peasants and assigned them to various jobs.

** In opposing the view of Henry George, who said that the expropriation of the mass of the population is the great and universal cause of poverty and oppression, Engels wrote in 1887: "This is not quite correct historically.... In the Middle Ages, it was not the expropriation of the people *from*, but on the contrary, their appropriation *to* the land which became the source of feudal oppression. The peasant retained his land, but was attached to it as a serf or villein, and made liable to tribute to the lord in labour and in produce" (*The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844*, New York, 1887, Preface, p. III).[80]

condition for such a system of economy was the personal dependence of the peasant on the landlord. If the landlord had not possessed direct power over the person of the peasant, he could not have compelled a man who had a plot of land and ran his own farm to work for him. Hence, "other than economic pressure," as Marx says in describing this economic regime, was necessary (and, as has already been indicated above, Marx assigned it to the category of *labour-rent*; *Das Kapital*, III, 2, 324).[81] The form and degree of this coercion may be the most varied, ranging from the peasant's serf status to his lack of rights in the social estates. Fourthly, and finally, a condition and a consequence of the system of economy described was the extremely low and stagnant condition of technique, for farming was in the hands of small peasants, crushed by poverty and degraded by personal dependence and by ignorance.

II. THE COMBINATION OF THE CORVÉE AND THE CAPITALIST SYSTEMS OF ECONOMY

The corvée system of economy was undermined by the abolition of serfdom. All the main foundations of this system were undermined: natural economy, the self-contained and the self-sufficient character of the landed estate, the close connection between its various constituents, and the landlord's power over the peasants. The peasant's farm was separated from that of the landlord; the peasant was to buy back his land and become the full owner of it; the landlord, to adopt the capitalist system of farming, which, as has just been observed, has a diametrically opposite basis. But such a transition to a totally different system could not, of course, take place at once, and for two different reasons. First, the conditions required for capitalist production did not yet exist. A class of people was required who were accustomed to work for hire; the peasants' implements had to be replaced by those of the landlord; agriculture had to be organised on the same lines as any other commercial and industrial enterprise and not as the business of the lord. All these conditions could only take shape gradually, and the attempts of some landlords,

immediately after the Reform, to import machinery and even workers from abroad could not but end in a fiasco. The other reason why the transition to the capitalist conduct of affairs was not possible at once was that the old corvée system of economy had been undermined, but not yet completely destroyed. The peasants' farms were not entirely separated from those of the landlords, for the latter retained possession of very essential parts of the peasants' allotments: the "cut-off lands,"[82] the woods, meadows, watering places, pastures, etc. Without these lands (or easement rights) the peasants were absolutely unable to carry on independent farming, so that the landlords were able to continue the old system of economy in the form of labour-service. The possibility of exercising "other than economic pressure" also remained in the shape of the peasants' temporarily-bound status,[83] collective responsibility, corporal punishment, forced labour on public works, etc.

Thus, capitalist economy could not emerge at once, and corvée economy could not disappear at once. The only possible system of economy was, accordingly, a transitional one, a system combining the features of both the corvée and the capitalist systems. And indeed, the post-Reform system of farming practised by the landlords bears precisely these features. With all the endless variety of forms characteristic of a transitional epoch, the economic organisation of contemporary landlord farming amounts to two main systems, in the most varied combinations—the *labour-service** system and the *capitalist* system. The first consists in the landlord's land being cultivated with the implements of the neighbouring peasants, the form of payment not altering the essential nature of this system (whether payment is in money, as in the case of job-hire, or in produce, as in the case of half-cropping, or in land or grounds, as in the case of labour-service in the narrow sense of the term). This is a direct survival of corvée economy,** and the economic characterisation of the latter,

* We are now replacing the term "corvée" by the term "labour-service" since the latter expression corresponds in greater measure to post-Reform relations and is by now generally accepted in our literature.

** Here is a particularly striking example: "In the south of Yelets Uyezd (Orel Gubernia)," writes a correspondent of the Department

given above, is applicable almost entirely to the labour-service system (the only exception being that in one of the forms of the labour-service system one of the conditions of corvée economy disappears, namely, under job-hire, where labour instead of being paid in kind is paid in money). The capitalist farming system consists of the hire of workers (annual, seasonal, day, etc.) who till the land with the owner's implements. The systems mentioned are actually interwoven in the most varied and fantastic fashion: on a mass of landlord estates there is a combination of the two systems, which are applied to different farming operations.* It is quite natural that the combination of such dissimilar and even opposite systems of economy leads in practice to a whole number of most profound and complicated conflicts and contradictions, and that the pressure of these contradictions results in a number of the farmers going bankrupt, etc. All these are phenomena characteristic of every transitional period.

If we raise the question as to the relative incidence of the two systems, we shall have to say, first of all, that no precise statistics are available on the matter, and it is not likely that they could be collected: that would require a registra-

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of Agriculture, "on the big landlords' farms, side by side with cultivation with the aid of annual labourers, a considerable part of the land is tilled by peasants in return for land leased to them. The ex-serfs continue to rent land from their former landlords, and in return till their land Such villages continue to bear the name of '*corvée*' of such-and-such a landlord" (S. A. Korolenko, *Hired Labour*, *etc.*, p. 118) Here is one more example: "On my farm," writes another landlord, "all the work is done by my former peasants (8 villages with approximately 600 persons); in return for this they get the use of pastures for their cattle (from 2,000 to 2,500 dess.); except that seasonal workers do the first ploughing and sow with seed drills" (ibid., p. 325. From Kaluga Uyezd).

* "Most of the estates are managed in the following way: part, although a very small part, of the land is cultivated by the owners with their own implements, with the aid of labourers hired by the year" and other "workers, but all the rest of the land is leased to peasants for cultivation either on a half-crop basis" or in return for land, or for money (*Hired Labour*, ibid., 96).... "On the majority of estates simultaneous resort is made to nearly all, or at any rate many, forms of hire" (i.e., methods of "providing the farm with man power"). *Agriculture and Forestry in Russia* published by the Department of Agriculture for the Chicago Exhibition, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 79.

tion not only of all estates, but of all economic operations performed on all the estates. Only approximate data are available, in the shape of general descriptions of individual localities as to the predominance of one or another system. Data of this kind are given in a summarised form for the whole of Russia in the above-mentioned publication of the Department of Agriculture, *Hired Labour*, *etc.* On the basis of these data, Mr. Annensky has drawn up a very striking chart showing the incidence of these systems (*The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.*,[84] I, 170). Let us summarise these data in a table, and supplement them with figures on the cultivated area on private owners' lands in 1883-1887 (according to *Statistics of the Russian Empire*, IV. The average harvest in European Russia in the five years 1883-1887. St. Petersburg, 1888).*

Gubernia groups according to system of economy predominant on landowners' estates	Number of gubernias in black-earth belt	Number of gubernias in non-black-earth belt	Number of gubernias Total	Area under all cereals and potatoes on private owners' estates (thous. dess.)
I. Gubernias where the *capitalist* system predominates	9	10	19	7,407
II. Gubernias where a *mixed* system predominates	3	4	7	2,222
III. Gubernias where the *labour-service* system predominates	12	5	17	6,281
Total . .	24	19	43	15,910

* Of the 50 gubernias of European Russia the following are excluded: Archangel, Vologda, Olonets, Vyatka, Perm, Orenburg and Astrakhan. In these gubernias the area cultivated in 1883-1887 amounted to 562,000 dess. on private owners' estates out of a total of 16,472,000 dess. cultivated on such land in the whole of European Russia.—Group I includes the following: the 3 Baltic gubernias, the 4 Western (Kovno, Vilna, Grodno and Minsk), the 3 South-Western (Kiev, Volhynia, Podolsk), the 5 Southern (Kherson, Taurida, Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Don), and 1 South-Eastern (Saratov); then follow the St. Petersburg, Moscow and Yaroslavl gubernias. Group II includes: Vitebsk, Mogilev, Smolensk, Kaluga, Voronezh, Poltava and Kharkov. Group III includes the rest of the gubernias.—To be more exact one should deduct from the total area cultivated on private owners' land the gown area belonging to tenants, but no such statistics are available. We would add that such a correction would

Thus, although the labour-service system predominates in the purely Russian gubernias, the capitalist system of landlord farming must be considered the predominant one at present in European Russia as a whole. Moreover, our table gives a far from complete picture of this predominance, for Group I of the gubernias includes some in which the labour-service system is not applied at all (the Baltic gubernias, for example), whereas Group III includes not a single gubernia, and in all probability not a single farmed estate in which the capitalist system is not applied at least in part. Here is an illustration of this based on Zemstvo statistics (Raspopin; "Private-Landowner Farming in Russia According to Zemstvo Statistics," in *Yuridichesky Vestnik* [*Legal Messenger*], 1887, Nos. 11-12. No. 12, p. 634):

Uyezds in Kursk Gubernia	% of estates hiring labourers		% of estates employing farm labourers	
	medium	large	medium	large
Dmitrovsk	53.3	84.3	68.5	85.0
Fetezh	77.1	88.2	86.0	94.1
Lgov	58.7	78.8	73.1	96.9
Sudzha	53.0	81.1	66.9	90.5

Lastly, it must be observed that sometimes the labour-service system passes into the capitalist system and merges with it to such an extent that it becomes almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. For example, a peasant rents a plot of land, undertaking in return to perform a definite number of days' work (a practice which, as we know, is most widespread; see examples in the next section). How are we to draw a line of demarcation between such a "peasant" and the West-European or Ostsee "farm labourer" who receives a plot of land on undertaking to work a definite number of days? Life creates forms that unite in themselves with remarkable gradualness systems of economy whose basic features constitute opposites. It becomes impossible to say where "labour-service" ends and where "capitalism" begins.

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hardly alter our conclusion as to the predominance of the capitalist system, since a large part of the landowners' fields in the black-earth belt is rented, and the labour-service system predominates in the gubernias of this belt.

Having established the fundamental fact that the whole variety of forms of contemporary landlord farming amounts to two systems—the labour-service and the capitalist systems, in various combinations, we shall now proceed to give an economic description of the two systems and determine which of them is eliminating the other under the influence of the whole course of economic evolution.

III. DESCRIPTION OF THE LABOUR-SERVICE SYSTEM

Labour-service, as has already been observed above, is of exceedingly varied types. Sometimes peasants undertake for a money payment to cultivate with their own implements the fields of the landowner—so-called "job-hire," "dessiatine employments,"* cultivation of "cycles"**[85] (i.e., one dessiatine of spring crop and one of winter crop), etc. Sometimes the peasant borrows grain or money, undertaking to work off either the entire loan or the interest on it.*** Under this form a feature peculiar to the labour-service system in general stands out with great clarity—the bondage, the usurious character of this sort of hire of labour. In some cases the peasants work "for trespass" (i.e., undertake to work off the legally established fine for cattle trespass), or work simply "out of respect" (cf. Engelhardt, loc. cit., 56), i.e., gratis, or just for a drink, so as not to lose other "employments" by the landowner. Lastly, labour-service in return for land is very widespread in the shape either of half-cropping or directly of work for land rented, for grounds used, etc.

Very often the payment for rented land assumes the most diverse forms, which sometimes are even combined, so that side by side with money rent we find rent in kind and "labour-service." Here are a couple of examples: for every dessiatine, 1½ dess. to be cultivated+10 eggs+

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* *Statistical Returns for Ryazan Gubernia.*

** Engelhardt, loc. cit.

*** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. V, Pt. I, Moscow, 1879, pp, 186-189. We give these references only as an illustration. A mass of similar information is to be found in all the literature on peasant and private-landowner farming.

1 chicken+1 day's female labour; for 43 dess. of spring-crop land 12 rubles per dess., and 51 dess. of winter-crop land 16 rubles per dess. in cash+threshing of so many stacks of oats, 7 stacks of buckwheat and 20 stacks of rye+manuring of not less than 5 dessiatines of rented land with manure from own animals, at the rate of 300 cart-loads per dessiatine (Karyshev, *Rentings*, p. 348). In this case even the peasant's manure is converted into a constituent part of the private landowner's farm! The widespread and varied character of labour-service is indicated by the abundance of terms used for it: otrabotki, otbuchi, otbutki, barshchina, basarinka, posobka, panshchina, postupok, viyemka, etc. (ibid., 342). Sometimes the peasant pledges himself to perform "whatever work the owner orders" (ibid., 346), or in general to "pay heed," "give ear" to him, to "help out." Labour-service embraces the "whole cycle of jobs in rural life. It is as labour-service that all operations relating to field-cultivation and grain and hay harvesting get done, firewood is stocked and loads are carted" (346-347), roofs and chimneys are repaired (354, 348), and the delivery of poultry and eggs is undertaken (ibid.). An investigator of Gdov Uyezd, St. Petersburg Gubernia, quite justly remarks that the types of labour-service to be met with are of the "former, pre-Reform, corvée character" (349).*

Particularly interesting is the form of labour-service for land, so-called labour-service renting and rent payment in kind.** In the preceding chapter we have seen how capitalist relations are manifested in peasant renting of land; here we see "renting" which is simply a survival of

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* It is noteworthy that the enormous variety of forms of labour-service in Russia, and of forms of land renting with all sorts of supplementary payments, etc., are covered *in their entirety* by the main forms of pre-capitalist relations in agriculture indicated by Marx in Chapter 47, Vol. III of *Capital*. In the preceding chapter, we have indicated that there are three main forms: 1) labour-rent, 2) rent in kind, and 3) money rent. It is, therefore quite natural that Marx should want specifically Russian data as illustrations for the section dealing with ground-rent.

** According to *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations* (Vol II), of all the land rented by peasants, 76% is paid for in money; 3 to 7% by labour-service, 13 to 17% with part of the product and, finally, 2 to 3% by a combination of methods.

corvée economy,* and which sometimes passes imperceptibly into the capitalist system of providing the estate with agricultural workers by alloting patches of land to them. Zemstvo statistics establish beyond doubt this connection between such "renting" and the lessors' own farming. "With the development of their own farming on the private landowners' estates, the owners had to *guarantee themselves a supply of workers at the required time*. Hence, there develops in many places the tendency among them to distribute land to the peasants on the labour-service basis, or for a part of the crop together with labour-service. . . ." This system of farming ". . . is fairly widespread. The more frequently the lessors do their own farming, the smaller the amount of land available for leasing and the greater the demand for such land, the more widely does this form of land renting develop" (ibid., p. 266, cf. also 367). Thus, we have here renting of a very special kind, under which the landowner does not abandon his own farm, but which expresses the *development of private-landowner cultivation*, expresses not the consolidation of the peasant farm by the enlargement of area held, but the *conversion of the peasant into an agricultural labourer*. In the preceding chapter we have seen that on the peasant's farm the renting of land is of contradictory significance: for some it is a profitable expansion of their farms; for others it is a deal made out of dire need. Now we see that on the landlord's farm, too, the leasing of land is of contradictory significance: in some cases it is the transfer of the farm to another person for a payment of rent; in others it is a method of conducting one's own farm, a method of providing one's estate with manpower.

Let us pass to the question of the payment of labour under labour-service. The data from various sources are at one in testifying to the fact that the payment of labour where it is hired on a labour-service and bonded basis is always *lower* than under capitalist "free" hire. Firstly, this is proved by the fact that rent in kind, i.e., on the basis of labour-service and half-cropping (which, as we have just

* Cf. examples given in footnote to pp. 194-195. When corvée economy existed, the landlord gave the peasant land so that the peasant might work for him. When land is leased on the labour-service basis, the economic aspect of the matter is obviously the same.

seen, is merely labour-service and bonded hire), is everywhere, as a general rule, *more costly* than money rent, very much more costly (ibid., p. 350), sometimes twice as much (ibid., 356, Rzhev Uyezd, Tver Gubernia). Secondly, rent in kind is developed to the greatest degree among the poorest groups of peasants (ibid., 261 and foll.). This is renting from dire need, "renting" by the peasant who is no longer able to resist his conversion, in this way, into an agricultural wage-worker. The well-to-do peasants do what they can to rent land for money. "The tenant takes advantage of every opportunity to pay his rent in money, and thus to reduce the cost of using other people's land" (ibid., 265)—and we would add, not only to reduce the cost of renting the land, but also to escape bonded hire. In Rostov-on-Don Uyezd the remarkable fact was even observed of money rent being abandoned in favour of skopshchina,[86] as rents went up, *despite a drop in the peasants' share of the harvest* (ibid., p. 266). The significance of rent in kind, which utterly ruins the peasant and turns him into a farm labourer, is quite clearly illustrated by this fact.* Thirdly,

* The summary of the latest data on land renting (Mr. Karyshev in the book: *The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.*, Vol 1) has fully confirmed the fact that it is only want that compels peasants to rent land on a half-crop or a labour-service basis, and that the well-to-do peasants prefer to rent land for money (pp. 317-320), as rent in kind is everywhere incomparably more costly for the peasant than in cash (pp. 342-346). All these facts, however, have not prevented Mr. Karyshev from presenting the situation as though "the poor peasant ... is better able to satisfy his need for food by slightly extending his crop area to other people's land on a half-crop basis" (321). Such are the fantastic ideas to which a bias in favour of "natural economy" can lead one! It has been proved that the payment of rent in kind is more costly than payment in cash, that it constitutes a sort of truck-system in agriculture, that the peasant is completely ruined and turned into a farm labourer—and yet our economist talks of improving "food"! Half-crop payment for rent, if you please, "helps ... the needy section of the rural population to obtain" land by renting it (320). Our economist here calls it "help" to obtain land on the worst conditions, on the condition that the peasant is turned into a farm labourer. The question arises: what is the difference between the Russian Narodniks and the Russian agrarians, who always have been and always are ready to render the "needy section of the rural population" this kind of "help"? By the way, here is an interesting example. In Khotin Uyezd, Bessarabia Gubernia, the average daily earnings of a half-cropper are estimated at 60 kopeks, and a day labourer in the summer

a direct comparison between the price of labour in the case of labour-service hire and of capitalist "free" hire shows the latter to be greater. In the above-quoted publication of the Department of Agriculture, *Hired Labour*, *etc.*, it is calculated that the average pay for the complete cultivation, with the peasant's own implements, of a dessiatine of land under winter grain is 6 rubles (data for the central black-earth belt for the 8 years, 1883-1891). If, however, we calculate the cost of the same amount of work on a hired labour basis, we get 6 rubles 19 kopeks for the work of the labourer alone, not counting the work of the horse (the pay for the horse's work cannot be put at less than 4 rubles 50 kopeks, loc. cit., 45). The compiler rightly considers this to be "absolutely abnormal" (ibid.). We would merely observe that the fact that payment for labour under purely capitalist hire is greater than under all forms of bondage and under other pre-capitalist relations has been established not only in agriculture, but also in industry, and not only in Russia, but also in other countries. Here are more precise and more detailed Zemstvo statistics on this question (*Statistical Returns for Saratov Uyezd*, Vol. I, Pt. III, pp. 18-19. Quoted from Mr. Karyshev's *Rentings*, p. 353). (See Table on p. 203.)

Thus, under labour-service (just as under bonded hire combined with usury) the prices paid for labour are usually less than half those under capitalist hire.* Since labour

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at 35 to 50 kopeks. "It seems that *the earnings of a half-cropper are, after all, higher than the wages of a farm labourer*" (344; Mr. Karyshev's italics). This "after all" is very characteristic. But, unlike the farm labourer, the half-cropper has his farm expenses, has he not? He has to have a horse and harness, has he not? Why was no account taken of these expenses? Whereas the average daily wage in the summer in Bessarabia Gubernia is 40 to 77 kopeks (1883-1887 and 1888-1892), the average wage of a labourer with horse and harness is 124 to 180 kopeks (1883-1887 and 1888-1892). Does it not rather "seem" that the farm labourer "after all" earns more than the half-cropper? The average daily wage of a labourer working without a horse of his own (average for a whole year) is estimated at 67 kopeks for Bessarabia Gubernia in the period 1882-1891 (ibid., 178).

* After this, what can one do but describe as reactionary the criticism of capitalism made, for instance, by a Narodnik like Prince Vasilchikov? The very word "hired," he exclaims pathetically, is contradictory, for hire presupposes non-independence, and non-

Saratov Uyezd

Category of work	Average prices (in rubles) paid for cultivating one dessiatine				
	Under winter contract, 80 to 100% of wages being advanced	Under labour-service for the rent of arable		Hired labour, according to statements of:	
		according to written terms	according to statements of tenants	hirers	hired
Complete cultivation and harvesting, with carting and threshing	9.6	—	9.4	20.5	17.5
Ditto, without threshing (spring crops)	6.6	—	6.4	15.3	13.5
Ditto, without threshing (winter crops)	7.0	—	7.5	15.2	14.3
Tilling	2.8	2.8	—	4.3	3.7
Harvesting (reaping and carting) . . .	3.6	3.7	3.8	10.1	8.5
Reaping (without carting)	3.2	2.6	3.3	8.0	8.1
Mowing (without carting)	2.1	2.0	1.8	3.5	4.0

service can only be undertaken by a local peasant, and one who must be "provided with an allotment," the fact of the tremendous drop in pay clearly indicates the importance of the allotment as wages in kind. The allotment, in such cases, continues to this day to serve as a means of "guaranteeing" the landowner a supply of cheap labour. But the difference between free and "semi-free"* labour is far from exhausted by the difference in pay. Of enormous importance also is the circumstance that the latter form of labour always presupposes the personal dependence of the one hired upon the one who hires him, it always presupposes the greater or lesser retention of "other than economic pressure." Engelhardt very aptly says that the lending of money for repayment by labour-service is explained by the greater security of such debts: to extract payment from the peasant on a distraint order is a difficult matter, "but the authorities *will compel* the peasant to perform the work he

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independence rules out "freedom." This Narodnik-minded landlord forgets, of course, that capitalism substitutes free non-independence for bonded non-independence.

* An expression employed by Mr. Karyshev, loc. cit. It is a pity Mr. Karyshev did not draw the conclusion that half-crop renting "helps" the survival of "semi-free" labour!

has undertaken to do, even if his own grain remains ungathered" (loc. cit., 216). "Only long years of slavery, of serf labour for the lord, have been able to produce the indifference" (only apparent) with which the cultivator leaves his own grain in the rain to go carting somebody else's sheaves (ibid., 429). Without one or other form of binding the population to their domiciles, to the "community," without a certain lack of civic rights, labour-service as a system would be impossible. It stands to reason that an inevitable consequence of the above-described features of the labour-service system is low productivity of labour: methods of farming based on labour-service can only be the most stereotyped; the labour of the bonded peasant cannot but approximate, in quality, to the labour of the serf.

The combination of the labour-service and the capitalist systems makes the present system of landlord farming extremely similar in its economic organisation to the system that prevailed in our textile industry before the development of large-scale machine industry. There, part of the operations was done by the merchant with his own implements and with wage-workers (fixing the yarn, dyeing and finishing the fabric, etc.), and part with the implements of peasant handicraftsmen who worked for him, using his material. Here, part of the operations is performed by wage-workers, using the employer's implements, and another part by the labour and the implements of peasants working on the land of others. There, combined with industrial capital was merchant's capital, and the handicraftsman, besides being weighed down by capital, was burdened with bondage, the operations of the subcontractor, the truck-system, etc. Here, likewise, combined with industrial capital is merchant's and usurer's capital accompanied by all forms of pay reduction and intensification of the producer's personal dependence. There, the transitional system lasted for centuries, being based on a primitive hand-labour technique, and was smashed in some three decades by large-scale machine industry; here, labour-service has continued almost since the rise of *Rus* (the landowners forced the villeins into bondage as far back as the time of *Russkaya Pravda*[87]), perpetuating routine technique, and has begun rapidly to give way to capitalism only in the post-Reform epoch. In both

cases, the old system merely implies stagnation in the forms of production (and, consequently, in all social relations), and the domination of the Asiatic way of life. In both cases, the new, capitalist forms of economy constitute enormous progress, despite all the contradictions inherent in them.

IV. THE DECLINE OF THE LABOUR-SERVICE SYSTEM

The question now arises: in what relation does the labour-service system stand to the post-Reform economy of Russia?

First of all, the growth of commodity economy conflicts with the labour-service system, since the latter is based on natural economy, on unchanging technique, on inseparable ties between the landlord and the peasant. That is why this system is totally impracticable in its complete form, and every advance in the development of commodity economy and commercial agriculture undermines the conditions of its practicability.

Next we must take account of the following circumstance. From the foregoing it follows that labour-service, as practised in present-day landlord farming, should be divided into two types: 1) labour-service that can only be performed by a peasant farmer who owns draught animals and implements (e.g., cultivation of "cycle dessiatine," ploughing, etc.), and 2) labour-service that can be performed by a rural proletarian who has no implements (for example, reaping, mowing, threshing, etc.). It is obvious that for both peasant and landlord farming, the first and the second type of labour-service are of opposite significance, and that the latter type constitutes a direct transition to capitalism, merging with it by a number of quite imperceptible transitions. In our literature labour-service is usually referred to in general, without this distinction being made. Yet in the process of the elimination of labour-service by capitalism the shifting of the centre of gravity from the first type of labour-service to the second is of enormous importance. Here is an example from *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*: "On the *majority* of the estates . . . the cultivation of the fields and the crops, i.e., the jobs on the careful

fulfilment of which the harvest depends, are done by regular workers, whereas the harvesting, i.e., the job in the performance of which promptness and speed are the prime consideration, is given to neighbouring peasants to be done in return for money lent, or for the use of pasture and other grounds" (Vol. V, Pt. 2, p. 140). On such farms most of the hands are hired on the labour-service basis, but the capitalist system undoubtedly predominates, and the "neighbouring peasants" are at bottom turned into rural workers, similar to the "contract day labourers" in Germany, who also have land and also hire themselves out for a definite part of the year (see above, p. 179, footnote). The enormous drop in the number of horses owned by peasants and the increase in the number of horseless households as a result of the crop failures of the 90s* could not but exert great influence in accelerating this process of the elimination of labour-service by the capitalist system.**

Finally, one of the most important reasons for the decline of the labour-service system should be sought in the

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* The horse census of 1893-1894 in 48 gubernias revealed a drop of 9.6% in the number of horses possessed by all horse owners, and a drop of 28,321 in the number of horse owners. In Tambov, Voronezh, Kursk, Ryazan, Orel, Tula and Nizhni-Novgorod gubernias, the decline in the number of horses between 1888 and 1893 was 21.2%. In seven other gubernias of the black-earth belt the decline between 1891 and 1893 was 17%. In 38 gubernias of European Russia in 1888-1891 there were 7,922 260 peasant households, of which 5,736,436 owned horses; in 1893-1894, there were in these gubernias 8,288,987 households, of which 5,647,233 owned horses. Consequently, the number of horse-owning households dropped by 89,000, while the number of horseless increased by 456,000 The percentage of horseless households rose from 27.6% to 31.9% (*Statistics of the Russian Empire*, XXXVII. St. Petersburg, 1896.) Above we have shown that in 48 gubernias of European Russia the number of horseless households rose from 2.8 million in 1888-1891 to 3.2 million in 1896-1900—i.e., from 27.3% to 29.2%. In four southern gubernias (Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Kherson), the number of horseless households rose from 305,800 in 1896 to 341,600 in 1904, i.e., from 34.7% to 36.4%. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

** Cf. also S. A. Korolenko, *Hired Labour*, *etc.*, pp. 46-47, where, on the basis of the horse censuses of 1882 and 1888, examples are cited of how the drop in the number of horses possessed by peasants is accompanied by an increase in the number of horses possessed by private landowners.

differentiation of the peasantry. The connection between labour-service (of the *first* type) and the middle group of the peasantry is clear and a priori—as we have already observed above—and can be proved by Zemstvo statistics. For example, the abstract for Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, gives returns of the number of farms doing job-work, in the various groups of peasantry. Here are the data in percentages:

Group of householders	% of peasants taking job-work to total peasants in group	% of total number of households	% of total households taking job-work
Horseless	9.9	24.5	10.5
1-horse	27.4	40.5	47.6
With 2-3 horses . .	29.0	31.8	39.6
" 4 "	16.5	3.2	2.3
In uyezd	23.3	100	100

From the above it is clear that participation in job-work is less prevalent in the two extreme groups. The largest percentage of households taking job-work is to be found in the middle group of the peasantry. Since job-work is also frequently assigned in Zemstvo statistical abstracts to the category of "employments" in general, we see here, consequently, an example of the typical "employments" of the middle peasantry—exactly as in the preceding chapter we acquainted ourselves with the typical "employments" of the bottom and top groups of the peasantry. The types of "employments" examined there express the development of capitalism (commercial and industrial establishments and the sale of labour-power), whereas the type of "employments" mentioned here, on the contrary, expresses the backwardness of capitalism and the predominance of labour-service (if we assume that in the sum-total of "job-work" the predominant jobs are such as we have assigned to labour-service of the first type).

The greater the decline of natural economy and of the middle peasantry, the more vigorously is labour-service bound to be eliminated by capitalism. The well-to-do peasants cannot, naturally, serve as a basis for the labour-service system, for it is only dire need that compels the peasant to undertake the worst-paid jobs, jobs that are ruinous for his own farm. But the rural proletariat are equally

unsuitable for the labour-service system, though for another reason: having no farm of his own, or possessing a miserable patch of land, the rural proletarian is not tied down to it to the extent that the "middle" peasant is, and, as a consequence, it is far easier for him to go elsewhere and hire himself out on "free" terms, i.e., for higher pay and without bondage at all. Hence the universal dissatisfaction of our agrarians at the peasants leaving for the towns or for "outside employments" generally, hence their complaints that the peasants have "little attachment" (see below, p. 250). The development of purely capitalist wage-labour saps the very roots of the labour-service system.*

* Here is a particularly striking example. Zemstvo statisticians explain the comparative incidence of money renting and renting in kind in various parts of Bakhmut Uyezd, Ekaterinoslav Gubernia, in the following way:

"Money renting is most widespread ... in the coal and salt-mining districts, and least widespread in the steppe and purely agricultural area The peasants, in general, are not eager to go out to work for others, and are particularly reluctant to accept irksome and badly-paid work on private estates. Work in the coal mines, in ore-mining and in metallurgy generally, is arduous and injurious to the worker's health, but, generally speaking, it is better paid, and attracts the worker with the prospect of monthly or weekly wages in cash, as he does not usually get money when he works on the landlord's estate, for the reason that there he is either working in payment of the 'bit' of land he has rented, or of straw or grain he has borrowed, or has managed to get his pay in advance to cover his ordinary needs, etc.

"All this induces the worker to avoid working on estates, and he does avoid doing so when there is an opportunity of earning money in some place other than the landlord's 'estate.' And this opportunity occurs mostly where there are many mines, at which the workers are paid 'good' money. With the 'pence' the peasant earns in the mines, he can rent land, without having to pledge himself to work on an estate, and in this way renting for money establishes its sway" (quoted from *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations*, Vol. II, p. 265). In the steppe, non-industrial divisions of the uyezd, on the other hand, land renting on a skopshchina and a labour-service basis establishes its sway.

Thus, to escape labour-service the peasant is ready to flee even to the mines! Prompt payment in cash, the impersonal form of hire and regular working hours "attract" the worker to such an extent that he *even* prefers the mines underground to agriculture, the agriculture about which our Narodniks wax so idyllic. The whole point is that the peasant knows from bitter experience the real value of the labour-service idealised by the agrarians and the Narodniks, and he knows how much better are purely capitalist relations.

It is supremely important to note that this inseparable connection between the differentiation of the peasantry and the elimination of labour-service by capitalism—a connection so obvious in theory—has long been noted by agricultural writers who have observed the various methods of farming on the landlord estates. In the preface to his collection of articles on Russian agriculture written between 1857 and 1882, Prof. Stebut points out that . . . "In community peasant agriculture the *farmer-industrialists are becoming differentiated from the farm labourers*. The former, who are becoming cultivators on a big scale, are beginning to employ farm labourers and usually cease to take job-work, unless they find it absolutely necessary to enlarge their crop area somewhat, or to obtain the use of pasture land, which in most cases cannot be done except by taking job-work; the latter, on the other hand, cannot take any job-work for lack of horses. *Hence the obvious necessity for a transition*, *and a speedy transition*, *to farming based on wage-labour*, since the peasants who still take job-work by the dessiatine are, due to the feeble state of their horses and to the multitude of jobs they undertake, beginning to turn out work that is bad from the viewpoint both of quality and of promptness of fulfilment" (p. 20).

References to the fact that the ruin of the peasantry is leading to the elimination of labour-service by capitalism are also made in current Zemstvo statistical material. In Orel Gubernia, for example, it has been observed that the drop in grain prices ruined many tenants and that the landowners were compelled to increase the area cultivated on capitalist lines. "Simultaneously with the expansion of the area cultivated by the landlords, we observe everywhere a tendency to replace job-work by the labour of regular farm-hands and to do away with the use of peasants' implements . . . a tendency to improve the cultivation of the soil by the introduction of up-to-date implements . . . to change the system of farming, to introduce grass crops, to expand and improve livestock farming and to make it profitable" (*Agricultural Survey of Orel Gubernia for 1887-88*, pp. 124-126. Quoted from P. Struve's *Critical Remarks*, pp. 242-244). In Poltava Gubernia, in 1890, when grain prices were low, there was observed "a diminution in peasant renting of land . . . through-

out the gubernia. . . . Correspondingly, in many places, despite the severe drop in grain prices, there was an increase in the area cultivated by landowners employing regular labour" (*The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.*, I, 304). In Tambov Gubernia, a considerable increase has been observed in the prices paid for work done by horses: for the three years 1892-1894, these prices were 25 to 30% higher than for the three years 1889-1891 (*Novoye Slovo*, 1895, No. 3, p. 187). This rise in the cost of work done by horses, a natural result of the decline in the number of peasant horses, cannot but entail the ousting of labour-service by the capitalist system.

It is by no means our intention, of course, to use these separate references in order to prove that labour-service is being eliminated by capitalism: no complete statistics on this subject are available. We are merely using them to illustrate the point that there is a *connection* between the differentiation of the peasantry and the elimination of labour-service by capitalism. General and mass-scale data, which prove irrefutably that this elimination is going on, relate to the employment of machinery in agriculture and to the employment of labour freely hired. But before passing to these data, we must first deal with the views of the Narodnik economists on contemporary farming by private landowners in Russia.

V. THE NARODNIK ATTITUDE TO THE PROBLEM

The point that the labour-service system is simply a survival of corvée economy is not denied even by the Narodniks. On the contrary, it is admitted—although in an insufficiently general form—by Mr. N. —on (*Sketches*, § IX) and by Mr. V. V. (particularly explicitly in his article "Our Peasant Farming and Agronomy," in *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, 1882, No. 8-9). The more astonishing is it that the Narodniks do their utmost to avoid admitting the clear and simple fact that the present system of private-landowner farming is a combination of the labour-service and the capitalist systems, and that, consequently, the more developed the former, the weaker the latter, and vice versa. They avoid analysing the relation of each of these systems to the productivity of labour, to the payment of the worker's labour,

to the basic features of the post-Reform economy of Russia, etc. To put the question on this basis, on the basis of recognising the "*change*" *actually taking place*, meant to admit the inevitability of the progressive elimination of labour-service by capitalism. To avoid drawing that conclusion, the Narodniks did not stop even at *idealising the labour-service system*. This monstrous idealisation is the basic feature of the Narodnik views on the evolution of landlord economy. Mr. V. V. even went so far as to write that "the people . . . are the victors in the struggle for the form of agricultural technique, although their victory has resulted in their greater ruin" (*The Destiny of Capitalism*, p. 288). To admit *such* a "victory" is more eloquent than to admit defeat! Mr. N. —on discerned in the allotment of land to the peasants under corvée and under labour-service economy the "principle" "of linking the producer and the means of production," but he forgot the tiny circumstance that this allotting of land served as a means of guaranteeing a supply of labour for the landlords. As we have indicated, Marx, in describing pre-capitalist systems of agriculture, analysed *all* the forms of economic relations that, in general, exist in Russia, and clearly emphasised the necessity of small-scale production and of a tie between the peasant and the land in the case of both labour-rent, rent in kind and money rent. But could it ever have entered his head to elevate this allotting of land to the dependent peasant into a "principle" of an eternal tie between the producer and the means of production? Did he forget even for a moment that *this* tie between the producer and the means of production was the source of, and condition for, medieval exploitation, constituted the basis for technical and social stagnation and necessarily required all sorts of "other than economic, pressure"?

An exactly similar idealisation of labour-service and of bondage is displayed by Messrs. Orlov and Kablukov in Moscow Zemstvo *Returns* when they quote as a model the farm of a certain Mme. Kostinskaya in Podolsk Uyezd (see Vol. V, Pt. I, pp. 175-176, and Vol. II, pp. 59-62, Sect. II). In Mr. Kablukov's opinion, this farm proves "that it is possible to arrange matters in such a way as to preclude (sic!!) such an antagonism" (i.e., antagonism of interests

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between landlord and peasant farming) "and assist in achieving a flourishing (sic!) condition of both peasant and private farming" (Vol. V, Pt. I, pp. 175-176). It seems, then, that the flourishing condition of the peasants consists in . . . labour-service and bondage. They have *no pastures or cattle-runs* (Vol. II, pp. 60-61),—which does not prevent Messrs. the Narodniks from regarding them as "sound" peasants—and rent these grounds, for which they pay the proprietress *in work*, performing "all the jobs on her estate . . . thoroughly, punctually and promptly."*

That is the limit in idealising an economic system which is a direct survival of corvée service!

The methods employed in all such Narodnik reasoning are very simple; we have only to forget that the allotment of land to the peasant is one of the conditions of corvée or labour-service economy, we have only to omit the circumstance that this allegedly "independent" cultivator must render labour-rent, rent in kind or money rent,—and we get the "pure" idea of "the tie between the producer and the means of production." But the actual relation between capitalism and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation does not change in the least from the fact of simply omitting these forms.**

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* Cf. Volgin, op. cit., pp. 280-281.

** "It is said that the spread of labour-service renting in place of money renting ... is a retrogressive fact. But do we say that it is desirable or beneficial? We ... have never asserted that it is progressive," stated Mr. Chuprov on behalf of all the authors of *The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.* (see Verbatim Report of the Debates in the F. E. S. of March 1 and 2, 1897,[88] p. 38) This statement is untrue even formally, for Mr. Karyshev (see above) described labour-service as "help" to the rural population. And in substance this statement absolutely contradicts the actual content of all the Narodnik theories with their idealisation of labour-service. It is to the great credit of Messrs. T.-Baranovsky and Struve that they have correctly *presented* the question (1897) of the significance of low grain prices: the criterion for appraising them must be whether such prices promote the elimination of labour-service by capitalism or not. Such a question is obviously one of fact, and in answering it we differ somewhat from the writers mentioned. On the basis of the data given in the text (see particularly § VII of this chapter and also Chapter IV), we consider it possible and even probable that the period of low grain prices will be marked by a no less, if not more, rapid elimination of labour-service by capitalism than was the preceding historical period of high grain prices.

Let us deal somewhat with another, very curious, argument of Mr. Kablukov. We have seen that he idealises labour-service; but it is remarkable that when he, as a statistician, describes *real* types *of purely capitalist* farms in Moscow Gubernia, his description, in spite of himself, and in a distorted way, is a reflection of the very facts that prove the progressive nature of capitalism in Russian agriculture. We beg the reader's attention, and apologise in advance for our rather lengthy quotations.

Besides the old types of farms employing hired labour, there is to be found in Moscow Gubernia

> "a new, recent, emergent type of farm that has totally broken with all tradition and regards things simply, in the way people regard every industry that is to serve as a source of income. Agriculture in this case is not regarded as ... a lord's hobby, as an occupation anybody may engage in. . . . No, here the necessity is recognised of having ... special knowledge.... The basis of calculation" (as to the organisation of production) "is the same as in all other forms of production" (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. V, Pt. I, pp. 185-186).

Mr. Kablukov does not notice that this description of the new type of farm which has only "recently emerged," in the 70s, proves precisely the progressive nature of capitalism in agriculture. It was capitalism that first turned agriculture from a "lord's hobby" into ordinary industry, it was capitalism that first compelled people "to regard things simply," "to break with tradition" and to equip themselves with "special knowledge." Before capitalism this was both unnecessary and impossible, because the farms of the different manors, village communities and peasant families were "self-sufficing," were not dependent on other farms, and no power on earth could drag them out of their age-long stagnation. Capitalism was the force which created (through the medium of the market) the social accounting of the output of the individual producers, and compelled them to reckon with the demands of social development. It is this that constitutes the progressive role of capitalism in agriculture in all European countries.

Listen now to the way Mr. Kablukov describes our purely capitalist farms:

"Only then is account taken of labour-power as a necessary factor in acting upon nature; without this factor all organisation of the landlord's estate will be fruitless. Thus, with all appreciation of its significance, this element, at the same time, is not regarded as an independent source of income, as was the case under serfdom, or as is the case now in those instances when what is made the basis of the estate's profitability is not the product of labour, the obtaining of which is the direct purpose of its application, not the striving to apply this labour to the production of its more valuable products and thereby to enjoy its results, but the striving to reduce the share of the product which the worker gets for himself, the desire to reduce the cost of labour to the master as near as possible to zero" (p. 186). Reference is made to farming based on labour in return for the use of cut-off lands. "Under these circumstances, for a farm to be profitable the owner requires neither knowledge nor special qualities. All that is obtained from this labour represents clear income for the owner, or at all events such income as is obtained almost without any expenditure of circulating capital. But such farming cannot, of course, be well conducted and cannot be called farming in the strict sense of the term, any more than the leasing of all pasture and other grounds can be called such; there is no economic organisation here" (186). And quoting examples of the leasing of cut-off lands in return for labour-service, the author concludes: "The main emphasis in the farm economy, the manner of extracting an income from the soil, is rooted in the exertion of influence upon the worker rather than upon matter and its forces" (189).

This argument is an extremely interesting example of how distorted is the picture of actual facts when viewed from the angle of a wrong theory. Mr. Kablukov confuses production with the social system of production. Under every social system production consists in "the exertion of influence" upon matter and its forces. Under every social system only the surplus product can be the landowner's source of "income." In both respects the labour-service system of economy is fully identical with the capitalist system, Mr. Kablukov's opinion notwithstanding. The real difference between them is that labour-service necessarily presupposes the lowest productivity of labour; hence, no possibility exists for increasing income by increasing the surplus product; that can only be done by one means, namely, by employing all sorts of bonded forms of hire. Under purely capitalist economy, on the contrary, bonded forms of hire must go by the board, for the proletarian, not being tied to the land, is useless as an object of bondage;—to raise the productivity of labour becomes not only possible, but also

necessary as the sole means of increasing income and withstanding severe competition. Thus, the description of our purely capitalist farms, given by the very Mr. Kablukov who so zealously tried to idealise labour-service, fully confirms the fact that Russian capitalism is *creating* the social conditions which necessarily *demand* the rationalisation of agriculture and the abolition of bondage, whereas labour-service, on the contrary, *precludes* the possibility of rationalising agriculture and perpetuates technical stagnation and the producer's condition of bondage. Nothing could be more frivolous than the customary Narodnik exultation over the fact that capitalism in our agriculture is weak. So much the worse if it is weak, for it only indicates the strength of pre-capitalist forms of exploitation, which are incomparably more burdensome to the producer.

VI. THE STORY OF ENGELHARDT'S FARM

Quite a special place among the Narodniks is held by Engelhardt. To criticise his appraisal of labour-service and capitalism would mean to repeat what has already been said in the preceding section. We think it far more expedient to set against Engelhardt's Narodnik views the story of Engelhardt's own farm. Such a critique will also be of positive value, because the evolution of this farm reflects in miniature, as it were, the main features of the evolution of all private-landowner farming in post-Reform Russia.

When Engelhardt settled down on the farm it was based on the traditional labour-service and bondage, which preclude "proper farming" (*Letters from the Countryside*, 559). Labour-service was the cause of the poor condition of cattle-raising, of the poor cultivation of the soil and of the monotonous persistence of obsolete systems of field cultivation (118). "I saw that it was impossible . . . to go on farming in the old way" (118). The competition of grain from the steppe regions was bringing down prices and making farming unprofitable (p. 83).* We would observe that from the

* This fact that the competition of cheap grain serves as the motive for change in technique and, *consequently*, for replacing labour-service by free hire, deserves special attention. The competition of grain from the steppe regions was also felt even in the years of high

very outset, along with the labour-service system a certain part was played on the farm by the capitalist system: wage-workers, although very few in number, were also employed on the farm when it was run in the old way (the cowman and others), and Engelhardt asserts that the wages of his farm labourer (drawn from among allotment-holding peasants) were "fabulously low" (11), low because "*it was impossible to give more*" considering that cattle-raising was in a bad way. The low productivity of labour made it impossible to raise wages. Thus, the starting-point on Engelhardt's farm was the features, familiar to us, of all Russian farms: labour-service, bondage, the very lowest productivity of labour, "incredibly low" payment of labour, routine farming.

What changes did Engelhardt introduce into this state of things? He began to sow flax—a commercial and industrial crop requiring the employment of labour on a big scale. The commercial and capitalist character of the cultivation was accordingly enhanced. But how was he to obtain labour? Engelhardt tried at first to employ in the new (commercial) cultivation the old system, that of labour-service. Nothing came of that; the work was badly done, the "dessiatine" proved to be beyond the strength of the peasants, who resisted with all their might "gang work" and bonded terms of labour. "The system had to be changed. Meanwhile I got on my feet. I acquired my own horses, harness, carts, ploughs and harrows and was already in a position to run the farm with regular workers. I began to produce flax, partly with my regular workers and partly on a job basis, hiring labourers for definite jobs" (218). Thus, the transition to the new system of farming and to commercial cultivation demanded the replacement of labour-service by the capitalist system. To increase productivity of labour, Engelhardt resorted to the well-tried method of capitalist production: piece work. Women were engaged to work by the stack, or the pood, and Engelhardt (not without some naïve triumph) tells of the success of this system; the cost of cultivation increased (from 25 rubles per dess. to 35 rubles), but profit also increased by 10 to 20 rubles; the women's productivity

grain prices; the period of low prices, however, lends this competition particular force.

of labour increased following the change from bonded to hired labour (from half a pood per night to a whole pood) and the earnings of the women increased to 30-50 kopeks per day ("unprecedented in our parts"). The local textile merchant was full of praise for Engelhardt: "Your flax has given a great fillip to trade" (219).

Applied at first to the cultivation of the commercial crop, hired labour gradually began to embrace other agricultural operations. One of the first operations to be withdrawn by capital from the labour-service system was threshing. It is well known that on all farms run by private landowners this work is mostly performed on capitalist lines. "Part of the land," wrote Engelhardt, "I lease to peasants for cultivation in cycles, for otherwise I would find it hard to cope with the reaping of the rye" (211). Thus, labour-service functions as a direct transition to capitalism, by ensuring the farmer a supply of day labourers in the busiest season. At first cycle-cultivation included threshing, but here, too, the poor quality of the work done compelled the farmer to resort to hired labour. Land began to be leased for cycle-cultivation without threshing, which latter was done partly by farm labourers and partly, through the medium of a contractor, by a team of wage-workers, at piece rates. Here, too, the results of replacing labour-service by the capitalist system were: 1) an increase in the productivity of labour: formerly 16 people threshed 900 sheaves per day, now 8 did 1,100 sheaves; 2) an increase in the yield; 3) a reduction in threshing time; 4) an increase in the worker's earnings; 5) an increase in the farmer's profits (212).

Further, the capitalist system also embraced tillage operations. Iron ploughs were introduced in place of the old wooden ones, and the work passed from the bound peasant to the farm labourer. Engelhardt triumphantly reports the success of his innovation, the diligence of the labourers, and quite justly shows that the customary accusations flung at the labourer of being lazy and dishonest are due to the "brand of serfdom" and to bonded labour "for the lord," and that the new organisation of farming also demands something of the farmer: a display of enterprise, a knowledge of people and ability to handle them, a knowledge of the job and its scope, acquaintance with the technical and commercial

aspects of agriculture—i.e., qualities that were not and could not be possessed by the Oblomovs[89] of the feudal or bondage-suffering countryside. The various changes in the technique of agriculture are inseparably connected with one another and inevitably lead to the transformation of its economy. For example, let us suppose you introduce the cultivation of flax and clover—that will immediately necessitate numerous other changes, and if these are not made, the business will not run smoothly. The ploughing implements will have to be changed and iron ploughs substituted for wooden ones, iron harrows for wooden ones, and this in turn will require a different type of horse, a different type of labourer, *a different system of farming as regards the hire of labourers*, etc." (154-155).

The change in the technique of agriculture thus proved to be inseparably bound up with the elimination of labour-service by capitalism. Particularly interesting in this regard is the gradualness with which this elimination takes place: the system of farming, as hitherto, combines labour-service and capitalism, but the main weight gradually shifts from the former to the latter. Here is a description of how Engelhardt's reorganised farm operated:

Nowadays I have much work to do, because I have changed the whole system of farming. A considerable part of the work is done by regular labourers and day labourers. The work is extremely varied. I clear brushwood for wheat growing, uproot birches for flax growing. I have rented meadow land by the Dnieper, and have sown clover, lots of rye and much flax. I need an enormous number of hands. To secure them, you have to make arrangements in good time, for when the busy season starts everybody will be occupied either at home or on other farms. This recruitment of labour is done by advancing money or grain for work to be done" (pp. 116-117).

Labour-service and bondage remained, consequently, even on a "properly" conducted farm; but, firstly, they now occupied a subordinate position as compared with free hire, and, secondly, the very labour-service underwent a change; it was mainly the second type of labour-service which remained, that implying the labour not of peasant farmers, but of regular labourers and agricultural day labourers.

Thus, Engelhardt's own farm is better than all arguments in refuting Engelhardt's Narodnik theories. He set out to farm on rational lines, but was unable to do so, under the given social and economic conditions, except by organising the farm on the basis of employing farm labourers. The raising of the technical level of agriculture and the supplanting of labour-service by capitalism proceeded hand in hand on this farm, as it does on all private-landowner farms in general in Russia. This process is most clearly reflected in the employment of machinery in Russian agriculture.

VII. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE

The post-Reform epoch is divided into four periods as regards the development of agricultural machinery production and the employment of machinery in agriculture.* The first period covers the years immediately preceding the peasant Reform and the years immediately following it. The landlords at first rushed to purchase foreign machinery so as to get along without the "unpaid" labour of the serfs and to avoid the difficulties connected with the hiring of free workers. This attempt ended, of course, in failure; the fever soon died down, and beginning with 1863-1864 the demand for foreign machinery dropped. The end of the 70s saw the beginning of the second period, which continued until 1885. It was marked by an extremely steady and extremely rapid increase in machinery imports from abroad; home production also grew steadily, but more slowly than imports. From 1881 to 1884 there was a particularly rapid increase in

* See *Historico-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry*, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1883 (published for 1882 exhibition), article by V. Chernyayev: "Agricultural Machinery Production."—Ditto, Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1886, in group IX.—*Agriculture and Forestry in Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1893, published for Chicago Exhibition), article by V. Chernyayev: "Agricultural Implements and Machines."—*Productive Forces of Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1896, published for 1896 exhibition), article by Mr. Lenin: "Agricultural Implements and Machines" (sect. 1).—*Vestnik Finansov* [*Financial Messenger*], 1896, No. 51 and 1897 No. 21.—V. Raspopin, article cited. Only the last-mentioned article puts the question on a political-economic basis; all the previous ones were written by agricultural experts.

imports of agricultural machinery, due partly to the abolition, in 1881, of the duty-free import of pig-iron and cast-iron for the needs of factories producing agricultural machinery. The third period extended from 1885 to the beginning of the 90s. Agricultural machinery, hitherto imported duty-free, now had an import duty imposed (of 50 kopeks gold per pood) . The high duty caused an enormous drop in machinery imports, while home production developed slowly owing to the agricultural crisis which set in at that time. Finally, the beginning of the 90s evidently saw the opening of a fourth period, marked by a fresh rise in the import of agricultural machinery, and by a particularly rapid increase of its home production.

Let us cite statistics to illustrate these points. Average annual imports of agricultural machinery at various periods were as follows:

Periods	Thousand poods	Thousand rubles
1869-1872	259.4	787.9
1873-1876	566.3	2,283.9
1877-1880	629.5	3,593.7
1881-1884	961.8	6,318
1885-1888	399.5	2,032
1889-1892	509.2	2,596
1893-1896	864.8	4,868

There are, unfortunately, no such complete and precise data on the production of agricultural machinery and implements in Russia. The unsatisfactory state of our factory-and-works statistics, the confusing of the production of machinery in general with the production of specifically agricultural machinery, and the absence of any firmly established rules for distinguishing between "factory" and "handicraft" production of agricultural machinery—all this prevents a complete picture of the development of agricultural machinery production in Russia being obtained. Combining all the data available from the above-mentioned sources, we get the following picture of the development of agricultural machinery production in Russia:

Production, imports and employment of agricultural machinery and implements

Year	In Kingdom of Poland	In 3 Baltic gubernias	In 4 southern steppe gubernias: Don, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Kherson	In the remaining gubernias of European Russia	Total in 50 gubernias of European Russia and in Kingdom of Poland	Imports of agricultural machinery	Employment of agricultural machinery
	Thousands of rubles						
1876	646	415	280	988	2,329	1,628	3,957
1879	1,088	433	557	1,752	3,830	4,000	7,830
1890	498	217	2,360	1,971	5,046	2,519	7,565
1894	381	314	6,183	2,567	9,445	5,194	14,639

These data show the vigorousness of the process in which primitive agricultural implements are giving way to improved ones (and, consequently, primitive forms of farming to capitalism). In 18 years the employment of agricultural machinery increased more than 3.5-fold, and this was mainly because of the expansion of home production, which more than quadrupled. Noteworthy, too, was the shifting of the main centre of such production from the Vistula and Baltic gubernias to the south-Russian steppe gubernias. Whereas in the 70s the main centre of agricultural capitalism in Russia was the western outer gubernias, in the 1890s still more outstanding areas of agricultural capitalism were created in the purely Russian gubernias.*

It is necessary to add, regarding the data just cited, that although they are based on official (and, as far as we know, the only) information on the subject under examination, they are far from complete and are not fully comparable for the different years. For the years 1876-1879 returns are available that were *specially* compiled for the 1882 exhibition; they are the most comprehensive, covering not only "factory"

* To make possible a judgement of the way the situation has changed in recent years, we quote data from the *Yearbook of Russia* (published by Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1906), for 1900-1903. The value of the output of agricultural machinery in the Empire is estimated at 12,058,000 rubles, and of imports in 1902 at 15,240,000 rubles, and in 1903 at 20,615,000 rubles. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

but also "handicraft" production of agricultural implements; it was estimated that in 1876-1879 there were, on the average, 340 establishments in European Russia and the Kingdom of Poland, whereas according to "factory" statistical data there were in 1879 not more than 66 factories in European Russia producing agricultural machinery and implements (computed from Orlov's *Directory of Factories and Works* for 1879). The enormous difference in these figures is explained by the fact that of the 340 establishments less than one-third (100) were counted as possessing steam power, and more than half (196) as being operated by hand labour; 236 establishments of the 340 had no foundries of their own and had their castings made outside (*Historico-Statistical Survey*, loc. cit.). The data for 1890 and 1894, on the other hand, are from *Collections of Data on Factory Industry in Russia* (published by Department of Commerce and Industry).* These data do not fully cover even the "factory" production of agricultural machinery and implements; for example, in 1890, according to the *Collection*, there were in European Russia 149 works engaged in this industry, whereas Orlov's *Directory* mentions more than 163 works producing agricultural machinery and implements; in 1894, according to the first-mentioned returns, there were in European Russia 164 works of this kind (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 21, p. 544), but according to the *List of Factories and Works* there were in 1894-95 over 173 factories producing agricultural machinery and implements. As for the small-scale, "handicraft" production of agricultural machinery and implements, this is not included in these data at all.** That

* In the *Vestnik Finansov*, No. 21, for 1897, comparative data are given for 1888-1894, but their source is not given specifically.

** The total number of workshops engaged in the manufacture and repair of agricultural implements was given for 1864 as 64; for 1871 as 112; for 1874 as 203; for 1879 as 340; for 1885 as 435; for 1892 as 400; and for 1895 as approximately 400 (*Agriculture and Forestry in Russia*, p. 358, and *Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 51). The *Collections*, on the other hand, estimated that in 1888-1894 there were only from 157 to 217 factories of this kind (average of 183 for the 7 years). Here is an example illustrating the ratio of "factory" production of agricultural machinery to "handicraft" production: it was estimated that in Perm Gubernia in 1894 there were only 4 "factories," with a combined output of 28,000 rubles, whereas for this branch of industry the 1894-95 census showed 94 "handicraft establishments," with a

is why there can be no doubt that the data for 1890 and 1894 greatly understate the actual facts; this is confirmed by the opinion of experts, who considered that in the beginning of the 1890s agricultural machinery and implements were manufactured in Russia to a sum of about 10 million rubles (*Agriculture and Forestry*, 359), and in 1895 to a sum of nearly 20 million rubles (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 51).

Let us quote somewhat more detailed data on the types and quantity of agricultural machinery and implements manufactured in Russia. It is considered that in 1876 there were produced 25,835 implements; in 1877—29,590; in 1878—35,226; in 1879—47,892 agricultural machines and implements. How far these figures are exceeded at the present time may be seen from the following: in 1879 about 14,500 iron ploughs were manufactured, and in 1894—75,500 (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 21). "Whereas five years ago the problem of the measures to be taken to bring about the wider use of iron ploughs on peasant farms was one awaiting solution, today it has solved itself. It is no longer a rarity for a peasant to buy an iron plough; it has become a common thing, and the number of iron ploughs now acquired by peasants every year runs into thousands."* The mass of primitive agricultural implements employed in Russia still leaves a wide field for the production and sale of iron ploughs.** The progress made in the use of ploughs has even raised the issue of the employment of electricity. According to a report in the *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta* [*Commercial and Industrial News*] (1902, No. 6), at the Second Congress of Electrical Engineers "considerable interest was aroused by a paper read by V. A. Rzhevsky on 'Electricity in Agriculture.'" The lecturer illustrated by means of some excellent drawings the tillage of fields in Germany with the aid of electric ploughs, and, from the plan and estimates he had

combined output of 50,000 rubles, and what is more, the number of "handicraft" establishments included such as employed 6 wage-workers and had an output of over 8,000 rubles. (*A Sketch of the Condition of Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*, Perm, 1896.)

* *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry in Russia*. Published by Ministry of State Properties, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1892, p. 202. The production of ploughs by peasants is simultaneously declining, being forced out by factory production.

** *Agriculture and Forestry in Russia*, p. 360.

drawn up at a landowner's request for his estate in one of 3 the southern gubernias, cited figures showing the economies to be effected by this method of tilling the land. According to this plan, it was proposed to plough 540 dess. annually, and a part of this twice a year. The depth of furrow was to be from 4½ to 5 vershoks.* The soil was pure black earth. In addition to ploughs, the plan provided for machinery for other field-work, and also for a threshing machine and a mill, the latter of 25 h.p., calculated to operate 2,000 hours per annum. The cost of completely equipping the estate, including six versts of overhead cable of 50-mm. thickness, was estimated at 41,000 rubles. The cost of ploughing one dessiatine would be 7 rubles 40 kopeks if the mill were put up, and 8 rubles 70 kopeks with no mill. It was shown that at the local costs of labour, draught animals, etc., the use of electrical equipment would in the first case effect a saving of 1,013 rubles, while in the second case, less power being used without a mill, the saving would be 966 rubles.

No such sharp change is to be noted in the output of threshing and winnowing machines, because their production was relatively well established long ago.** In fact, a special centre for the "handicraft" production of these machines was established in the town of Sapozhok, Ryazan Gubernia, and the surrounding villages, and the local members of the peasant bourgeoisie made plenty of money at this "industry" (cf. *Reports and Investigations*, I, pp. 208-210). A particularly rapid expansion is observed in the production of reaping machines. In 1879, about 780 of these machines were produced; in 1893 it was estimated that 7,000 to 8,000 were sold a year, and in 1894-95 about 27,000. In 1895, for example, the works belonging to J. Greaves in the town of Berdyansk, Taurida Gubernia, "the largest works in Europe in this line of production" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 51) i.e., in the production of reaping machines, turned out 4,464 reapers. Among the peasants in Taurida Gubernia reaping machines have become so widespread that a special

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* 7.8 to 8.7 inches.—*Ed.*

** In 1879 about 4,500 threshing machines were produced, and in 1894-1895 about 3,500. The latter figure, however, does not include output by handicraft industry.

occupation has arisen, namely, the mechanical reaping of other people's grain.*

Similar data are available for other, less widespread, agricultural implements. Broadcast seeders, for example, are now being turned out at dozens of works, and the more perfect row drills, which were produced at only two works in 1893 (*Agriculture and Forestry*, 360), are now turned out at seven works (*Productive Forces*, I, 51), whose output has again a particularly wide sale in the south of Russia. Machinery is employed in all branches of agriculture and in all operations connected with the production of some kinds of produce: in special reviews reference is made to the extended use of winnowing machines, seed-sorters, seed-cleaners (trieurs), seed-driers, hay presses, flax-scutchers, etc. In the *Addendum to the Report on Agriculture* for 1898,

* In 1893, for example, "700 peasants gathered with their machines on the Uspensky estate belonging to Falz-Fein (who owned 200,000 dessiatines) and offered their services, but half of them went away empty-handed, as only 350 were engaged" (Shakhovskoi, *Agricultural Outside Employments*, Moscow, 1896, p. 161). In the other steppe gubernias, however, especially the Transvolga gubernias, reaping machines are not widely used as yet. Still, in recent years these gubernias too have been trying very hard to overtake Novorossia. Thus, the Syzran-Vyazma railway carried agricultural machinery, traction-engines and parts weighing 75,000 poods in 1890, 62,000 poods in 1891, 88,000 poods in 1892, 120,000 poods in 1893, and 212,000 poods in 1894; in other words, in a matter of five years the quantities carried almost trebled. Ukholovo railway station dispatched agricultural machinery of local manufacture to the extent of about 30,000 poods in 1893, and about 82,000 poods in 1894, whereas up to and including 1892 the weight of agricultural machinery dispatched from that station was even less than 10,000 poods per annum. "Ukholovo station dispatches mainly threshing machines produced in the villages of Kanino and Smykovo, and partly in the uyezd town of Sapozhok, Ryazan Gubernia. In the village of Kanino there are three foundries, belonging to Yermakov, Karev and Golikov, mainly engaged on agricultural-machinery parts. The work of finishing and assembling the machines is done in the above-mentioned two villages (Kanino and Smykovo), of which almost the entire populations are thus employed" (*Brief Review of the Commercial Activity of the Syzran-Vyazma Railway* in 1894, Pt. IV, Kaluga, 1896, pp. 62-63). Interesting in this example are, first, the fact of the enormous increase in production precisely in recent years, which have been years of low grain prices; and, second, the fact of the connection between "factory" and so-called "handicraft" production. The latter is nothing more nor less than an "annex" to the factory.

published by the Pskov Gubernia Zemstvo Administration (*Severny Kurier* [*Northern Courier*], 1899, No. 32), the increasing use of machinery is noted, particularly of flax-scutchers, in connection with the transition from flax production for home use to that for commercial purposes. There is an increase in the number of iron ploughs. Reference is made to the influence of migration in augmenting the number of agricultural machines and in raising wages. In Stavropol Gubernia (ibid., No. 33), agricultural machinery is being employed on an increasing scale in connection with the growing immigration into this gubernia. In 1882, there were 908 machines: in 1891-1893, an average of 29,275; in 1894-1896, an average of 54,874; and in 1895, as many as 64,000 agricultural implements and machines.

The growing employment of machines naturally gives rise to a demand for engines: along with steam-engines, "oil engines have latterly begun to spread rapidly on our farms" (Productive Forces, I, 56), and although the first engine of this type appeared abroad only seven years ago, there are already 7 factories in Russia manufacturing them. In Kherson Gubernia in the 70s only 134 steam-engines were registered in agriculture (*Material for the Statistics of Steam-Engines in the Russian Empire*, St. Petersburg, 1882), and in 1881 about 500 (*Historico-Statistical Survey*, Vol. II, section on agricultural implements). In 1884-1886, in three uyezds of the gubernia (out of six), 435 steam threshing machines were registered. "At the present time (1895) there must be at least twice as many" (Tezyakov, *Agricultural Workers and the Organisation of Sanitary Supervision over Them, in Kherson Gubernia*, Kherson, 1896, p. 71). The *Vestnik Finansov* (1897, No. 21) states that in Kherson Gubernia, "there are about 1,150 steam-threshers, and in the Kuban Region the number is about the same, etc. . . . Latterly the acquisition of steam-threshers has assumed an industrial character. . . . There have been cases of a five-thousand-ruble threshing machine with steam-engine fully covering its cost in two or three good harvest years, and of the owner immediately getting another on the same terms. Thus, 5 and even 10 such machines are often to be met with on small farms in the Kuban Region. There they have become an essential accessory of every farm that is at all well

organised." "Generally speaking, in the south of Russia today, more than ten thousand steam-engines are in use for agricultural purposes" (*Productive Forces*, IX, 151).*

If we remember that the number of steam-engines in use in agriculture throughout European Russia in 1875-1878 was only 1,351 and that in 1901, according to incomplete returns (*Collection of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1903*), the number was 12,091, in 1902—14,609, in 1903—16,021 and in 1904—17,287, the gigantic revolution brought about by capitalism in agriculture in this country during the last two or three decades will be clear to us. Great service in accelerating this process has been rendered by the Zemstvos. By the beginning of 1897, Zemstvo agricultural machinery and implement depots "existed under the auspices of 11 gubernia and 203 uyezd Zemstvo boards, with a total working capital of about a million rubles" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 21). In Poltava Gubernia, the turnover of the Zemstvo depots increased from 22,600 rubles in 1890 to 94,900 rubles in 1892 and 210,100 rubles in 1895. In the six years, 12,600 iron ploughs, 500 winnowing machines and seed-sorters, 300 reaping machines, and 200 horse-threshers were sold. "The principal buyers of implements at the Zemstvo depots are Cossacks and peasants; they account for 70% of the total number of iron ploughs and horse-threshers sold. The purchasers of seeding and reaping machines were mainly landowners, and large ones at that, possessing over 100 dessiatines" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 4).

* Cf. an item from Perekop Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, in *Russkiye Vedomosti* [*Russian Gazette*] of August 19, 1898 (No. 167). "Owing to the widespread use of reaping machines and steam- and horse-threshing machines among our farmers ... field-work is proceeding very rapidly. The old-fashioned method of the threshing with 'rollers' is a thing of the past.... Every year the Crimean farmer increases his crop area and therefore has willy-nilly to resort to the aid of improved agricultural implements and machines. While it is not possible with rollers to thresh more than 150 to 200 poods of grain per day, a 10-h.p. steam-thresher will do from 2,000 to 2,500 poods, and a horse-thresher from 700 to 800 poods. That is why the demand for agricultural implements, reapers and threshers is growing so rapidly from year to year that the factories and works producing agricultural implements exhaust their stocks, as has happened this year, and are unable to satisfy the farmers' demand." The drop in grain prices, which *compels* farmers to reduce production costs, must be regarded as one of the most important causes of the increased use of improved implements.

According to the report of the Ekaterinoslav Gubernia Zemstvo Board for 1895, "the use of improved agricultural implements in the gubernia is spreading very rapidly." For example, in the Verkhne-Dnieper Uyezd there were:

		1894	*1895*
Ploughs, scarifiers and cultivators:			
" " " "	private landowners'	5,220	6,752
" " " "	peasants'	27,271	30,112
Horse-threshers:			
" "	private landowners'	131	290
" "	peasants'	671	838

(*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 6)

According to the data of the Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo Board, peasants in Moscow Gubernia in 1895 owned 41,210 iron ploughs; 20.2% of all householders owned such ploughs (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 31). In Tver Gubernia, according to a special record made in 1896, there were 51,266 iron ploughs, owned by 16.5% of the total number of householders. In Tver Uyezd there were only 290 iron ploughs in 1890, and 5,581 in 1896 (*Statistical Returns for Tver Gubernia*, Vol. XIII, Pt. 2, pp. 91, 94). One can judge, therefore, how rapid is the consolidation and improvement of the farms of the peasant bourgeoisie.

VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE

Having established the fact of the extremely rapid development of the production of agricultural machinery and of the employment of machines in Russia's post-Reform agriculture, we must now examine the social and economic significance of this phenomenon. From what has been said above regarding the economics of peasant and landlord farming, the following conclusions may be drawn: on the one hand, capitalism is the factor giving rise to, and extending the use of, machines in agriculture; on the other, the application of machinery to agriculture is of a capitalist character, i.e., it leads to the establishment of capitalist relations and their further development.

Let us dwell on the first of these conclusions. We have seen that the labour-service system of economy and the patriarchal peasant economy inseparably connected with it are by their very nature based on routine technique, on the preservation of antiquated methods of production. There is nothing in the internal structure of that economic regime to stimulate the transformation of technique; on the contrary, the secluded and isolated character of that system of economy, and the poverty and downtrodden condition of the dependent peasant preclude the possibility of improvements. In particular, we would point to the fact that the payment of labour under the labour-service system is much lower (as we have seen) than where hired labour is employed; and it is well known that low wages are one of the most important obstacles to the introduction of machines. And the facts do indeed show us that an extensive movement for the transformation of agricultural technique only commenced in the post-Reform period of the development of commodity economy and capitalism. The competition that is the product of capitalism, and the dependence of the cultivator on the world market made the transformation of technique a necessity, while the drop in grain prices made this necessity particularly urgent.*

To explain the second conclusion, we must examine landlord and peasant farming separately. When a landlord introduces a machine or an improved implement, he replaces the implements of the peasant (who has worked for him) with his own; he goes over, consequently, from labour-service to the capitalist system of farming. The spread of agricultural machines means the elimination of labour-

* "In the past two years, under the influence of low grain prices and of the need to cheapen agricultural jobs at all costs, reaping machines have also ... begun to be so widely employed that depots are unable to meet all requirements on time" (Tezyakov, loc cit., p. 71). The present agricultural crisis is a capitalist crisis. Like all capitalist crises, it ruins capitalist farmers and peasants in one locality, in one country, in one branch of agriculture, and at the same time gives a tremendous impulse to the development of capitalism in another locality, in another country, in other branches of agriculture. It is the failure to understand this fundamental feature of the present crisis and of its economic nature that constitutes the main error in the reasoning on this theme of Messrs. N. —on, Kablukov, etc., etc.

service by capitalism. It is possible, of course, that a condition laid down, for example, for the leasing of land is the performance of labour-service in the shape of day-work at a reaping machine, thresher, etc., but this will be labour-service of the second type, labour-service which converts the peasant into a day labourer. Such "exceptions," consequently, merely go to prove the general rule that the introduction of improved implements on the farms of private landowners means converting the bonded ("independent" according to Narodnik terminology) peasant into a wage-worker—in exactly the same way as the acquisition of his own instruments of production by the buyer-up, who gives out work to be done in the home, means converting the bonded "handicraftsman" into a wage-worker. The acquisition by the landlord farm of its own implements leads inevitably to the undermining of the middle peasantry, who get means of subsistence by engaging in labour-service: We have already seen that labour-service is the specific "industry" of the middle peasant, whose implements, consequently, are a component part not only of peasant, but also of landlord, farming.* Hence, the spread of agricultural machinery and improved implements and the expropriation of the peasantry are inseparably connected. That the spread of improved implements among the peasantry is of the same significance hardly requires explanation after what has been said in the preceding chapter. The systematic employment of machinery in agriculture ousts the patriarchal "middle" peasant as inexorably as the steam-power loom ousts the handicraft weaver.

The results of the employment of machinery in agriculture confirm what has been said, and reveal all the typical features of capitalist progress with all its inherent contra-

* Mr. V. V. expresses this truth (that the existence of the middle peasant is largely conditioned by the existence of the labour-service system of farming among the landlords) in the following original way: "the owner shares, so to speak, the cost of maintaining his (the peasant's) implements." "It appears," says Mr. Sanin, in a just comment on this, "that it is not the labourer who works for the landowner, but the landowner who works for the labourer." A. Sanin, *Some Remarks on the Theory of People's Production*, in the appendix to the Russian translation of Hourwich's *Economics of the Russian Village*, Moscow, 1896, p. 47.

dictions. Machines enormously increase the productivity of labour in agriculture, which, before the present epoch, was almost entirely untouched by social development. That is why the mere fact of the growing employment of machines in Russian agriculture is sufficient to enable one to see how utterly unsound is Mr. N.—on's assertion that there is "absolute stagnation" (*Sketches*, p. 32) in grain production in Russia, and that there is even a "decline in the productivity" of agricultural labour. We shall return to this assertion, which contradicts generally established facts and which Mr. N.—on needed for his idealisation of the pre-capitalist order.

Further, machines lead to the concentration of production and to the practice of capitalist co-operation in agriculture. The introduction of machinery, on the one hand, calls for capital on a big scale, and consequently is only within the capacity of the big farmers; on the other hand, machines pay only when there is a huge amount of products to be dealt with; the expansion of production becomes a necessity with the introduction of machines. The wide use of reaping machines, steam-threshers, etc., is therefore indicative of the concentration of agricultural production—and we shall indeed see later that the Russian agricultural region where the employment of machines is particularly widespread (Novorossia) is also distinguished by the quite considerable size of its farms. Let us merely observe that it would be a mistake to conceive the concentration of agriculture in just the one form of extensive enlargement of the crop area (as Mr. N.—on does); as a matter of fact, the concentration of agricultural production manifests itself in the most diverse forms, depending on the forms of commercial agriculture (see next chapter on this point). The concentration of production is inseparably connected with the extensive co-operation of workers on the farm. Above we saw an example of a large estate on which the grain was harvested by setting *hundreds* of reaping machines into operation simultaneously. "Threshers drawn by 4 to 8 horses require from 14 to 23 and even more workers, half of whom are women and boys, i.e., semi-workers. . . . The 8 to 10 h. p. steam-threshers to be found on all large farms" (of Kherson Gubernia), "require simultaneously from 50

to 70 workers, of whom more than half are semi-workers, boys and girls of 12 to 17 years of age" (Tezyakov, loc. cit., 93). "Large farms, on each of which from 500 to 1,000 workers are gathered together simultaneously, may safely be likened to industrial establishments," the same author justly observes (p. 151).* Thus, while our Narodniks were arguing that the "village community" "could easily" introduce co-operation in agriculture, life went on in its own way, and capitalism, splitting up the village community into economic groups with opposite interests, created large farms based on the extensive co-operation of wage-workers.

From the foregoing it is clear that machines *create* a home market for capitalism: first, a market for means of production (for the products of the machine-building industry, mining industry, etc., etc.), and second, a market for labour-power. The introduction of machines, as we have seen, leads to the replacement of labour-service by hired labour and to the creation of peasant farms employing labourers. The mass-scale employment of agricultural machinery presupposes the existence of a mass of agricultural wage-workers. In the localities where agricultural capitalism is most highly developed, this process of the *introduction* of wage-labour along with the introduction of machines is intersected by another process, namely, the ousting of wage-workers by the machine. On the one hand, the formation of a peasant bourgeoisie and the transition of the landowners from labour-service to capitalism *create* a demand for wage-workers; on the other hand, in places where farming has long been based on wage-labour, machines *oust* wage-workers. No precise and extensive statistics are available to show what is the general effect of both these processes for the whole of Russia, i.e., whether the number of agricultural wage-workers is increasing or decreasing. There can be no doubt that hitherto the number has been increasing (see next section). We imagine that now too it is continuing to increase**: firstly, data on the ousting of wage-workers in

* Cf. also next chapter, § 2, where more detailed data are given on the size of capitalist farms in this part of Russia.

** It hardly needs to be explained that in a country with a mass of peasantry, an absolute increase in the number of agricultural wage-workers is quite compatible not only with a relative, but also with an absolute, decrease of the rural population.

agriculture by machines are available only for Novorossia, while in other areas of capitalist agriculture (the Baltic and western region, the outer regions in the East, some of the industrial gubernias) this process has not yet been noted on a large scale. There still remains an enormous area where labour-service predominates, and in that area the introduction of machinery is giving rise to a demand for wage-workers. Secondly, the growth of intensive farming (introduction of root crops, for example) enormously increases the demand for wage-labour (see Chapter IV). A decline in the absolute number of agricultural (as against industrial) wage-workers must, of course, take place at a certain stage in the development of capitalism, namely, when agriculture throughout the country is fully organised on capitalist lines and when the employment of machinery for the most diverse agricultural operations is general.

As regards Novorossia, local investigators note here the usual consequences of highly developed capitalism. Machines are ousting wage-workers and creating a capitalist reserve army in agriculture. "The days of fabulous prices for hands have passed in Kherson Gubernia too. Thanks to . . . the increased spread of agricultural implements . . ." (and other causes) "*the prices of hands are steadily falling*" (author's italics). . . . "The distribution of agricultural implements, which makes the large farms independent of workers* and at the same time reduces the demand for hands, places the workers in a difficult position" (Tezyakov, loc. cit., 66-71). The same thing is noted by another Zemstvo Medical Officer, Mr. Kudryavtsev, in his work *Migrant Agricultural Workers at the Nikolayev Fair in the Township of Kakhovka, Taurida Gubernia, and Their Sanitary Supervision in 1895* (Kherson, 1896). "The prices of hands . . . continue to fall, and a considerable number of migrant workers find

* Mr. Ponomaryov expresses himself on this score thus. "Machines, by regulating the harvesting price, in all probability discipline the workers at the same time" (article in *Selskoye Khozyaistvo i Lesovodstvo* [*Agriculture and Forestry*], quoted in *Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 14). It will be remembered that the "Pindar of the capitalist factory,"[90] Dr. Andrew Ure, welcomed machines as creating "order" and "discipline" among the workers. Agricultural capitalism in Russia has already managed to create not only "agricultural factories," but also the "Pindars" of these factories.

themselves without employment and are unable to earn anything; i.e., there is created what in the language of economic science is called a reserve army of labour—artificial surplus-population" (61). The drop in the prices of labour caused by this reserve army is sometimes so great that "many farmers possessing machines preferred" (in 1895) "to harvest with hand labour rather than with machines" (ibid., 66, from *Sbornik Khersonskogo Zemstva* [*Kherson Zemstvo Symposium*], August 1895)! More strikingly and convincingly than any argument this fact reveals how profound are the contradictions inherent in the capitalist employment of machinery!

Another consequence of the use of machinery is the growing employment of female and child labour. The existing system of capitalist agriculture has, generally speaking, given rise to a certain hierarchy of workers, very much reminiscent of the hierarchy among factory workers. For example, on the estates in South Russia there are the following categories: a) *full workers*, adult males capable of doing all jobs b) *semi-workers*, women and males up to the age of 20; semi-workers are divided again into two categories: aa) 12, 13 to 15, 16 years of age—these are semi-workers in the stricter sense of the term—and bb) *semi-workers of great strength*; "in the language used on the estates, 'three-quarter' workers,"* from 16 to 20 years of age, capable of doing all the jobs done by the full worker, except mowing. Lastly, c) semi-workers rendering *little help*, children not under 8 and not over 14 years of age; these act as swine-herds, calf-herds, weeders and plough-boys. Often they work merely for their food and clothing. The introduction of agricultural implements "lowers the price of the full worker's labour" and renders possible its replacement by the cheaper labour of women and juveniles. Statistics on migrant labour confirm the fact of the displacement of male by female labour: in 1890, of the total number of workers registered in the township of Kakhovka and in the city of Kherson, 12.7% were women; in 1894, for the whole gubernia women constituted 18.2% (10,239 out of 56,464); in 1895, 25.6% (13,474 out of 48,753). Children in 1893 constituted 0.7% (from 10 to 14 years of

* Tezyakov, loc. cit., 72.

age), and in 1895, 1.69% (from 7 to 14 years of age). Among local workers on estates in Elisavetgrad Uyezd, Kherson Gubernia, children constituted 10.6% (ibid.).

Machines increase the intensity of the workers' labour. For example, the most widespread type of reaping machine (with hand delivery) has acquired the characteristic name of "lobogreyka" or "chubogreyka,"* since working with it calls for extraordinary exertion on the part of the worker: he takes the place of the delivery apparatus (cf. *Productive Forces*, I, 52). Similarly, intensity of labour increases with the use of the threshing machine. The capitalist mode of employing machinery creates here (as everywhere) a powerful stimulus to the lengthening of the working day. Night work, something previously unknown, makes its appearance in agriculture too. "In good harvest years . . . work on some estates and on many peasant farms is carried on even at night" (Tezyakov, loc. cit., 126), by artificial illumination—torchlight (92). Finally, the systematic employment of machines results in traumatism among agricultural workers; the employment of young women and children at machines naturally results in a particularly large toll of injuries. The Zemstvo hospitals and dispensaries in Kherson Gubernia, for example, are filled, during the agricultural season, "almost exclusively with traumatic patients" and serve as "field hospitals, as it were, for the treatment of the enormous army of agricultural workers who are constantly being disabled as a result of the ruthless destructive work of agricultural machines and implements" (ibid., 126). A special medical literature is appearing that deals with injuries caused by agricultural machines. Proposals are being made to introduce compulsory regulations governing the use of agricultural machines (ibid.). The large-scale manufacture of machinery imperatively calls for public control and regulation of production in agriculture, as in industry. Of the attempts to introduce such control we shall speak below.

Let us note, in conclusion, the extremely inconsistent attitude of the Narodniks towards the employment of machinery in agriculture. To admit the benefit and progressive nature of the employment of machinery, to defend all

* Literally "brow-heater" or "forelock-heater."—*Ed.*

measures that develop and facilitate it, and at the same time to ignore the fact that machinery in Russian agriculture is employed in the capitalist manner, means to sink to the viewpoint of the small and big agrarians. Yet what our Narodniks do is precisely to ignore the capitalist character of the employment of agricultural machinery and improved implements, without even attempting to analyse what types of peasant and landlord farms introduce machinery. Mr. V. V. angrily calls Mr. V. Chernyayev "a representative of capitalist technique" (*Progressive Trends*, 11). Presumably it is Mr. V. Chernyayev, or some other official in the Ministry of Agriculture, who is to blame for the fact that the employment of machinery in Russia is capitalist in character! Mr. N. —on, despite his grandiloquent promise "not to depart from the facts" (*Sketches*, XIV), has preferred to ignore the fact that it is capitalism that has developed the employment of machinery in our agriculture, and he has even invented the amusing theory that exchange reduces the productivity of labour in agriculture (p. 74)! To criticise this theory, which is proclaimed without any analysis of the facts, is neither possible nor necessary. Let us confine ourselves to citing a small sample of Mr. N. —on's reasoning. "If," says he, "the productivity of labour in this country were to double, we should have to pay for a chetvert (about six bushels) of wheat not 12 rubles, but six, that is all" (234). Not all, by far, most worthy economist. "In this country" (as indeed in any society where there is commodity economy), the improvement of technique is undertaken by individual farmers, the rest only gradually following suit. "In this country," only the rural entrepreneurs are in a position to improve their technique. "In this country," this progress of the rural entrepreneurs, small and big, is inseparably connected with the ruin of the peasantry and the creation of a rural proletariat. Hence, if the improved technique used on the farms of rural entrepreneurs were to become socially necessary (only on that condition would the price be reduced by half), it would mean the passing of almost the whole of agriculture into the hands of capitalists, it would mean the complete proletarisation of millions of peasants, it would mean an enormous increase in the non-agricultural population and an increase in the number of factories (for the

productivity of labour in our agriculture to double, there must be an enormous development of the machine-building industry, the mining industry, steam transport, the construction of a mass of new types of farm buildings, shops, warehouses, canals, etc., etc.). Mr. N. —on here repeats the little error of reasoning that is customary with him: he skips over the consecutive steps that are necessary with the development of capitalism, he skips over the intricate complex of social-economic changes which necessarily accompany the development of capitalism, and then weeps and wails over the danger of "destruction" by capitalism.

IX. WAGE-LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE

We now pass to the principal manifestation of agricultural capitalism—to the employment of hired labour. This feature of post-Reform economy was marked most strongly in the outer regions of south and east European Russia, in that mass shift of agricultural wage-workers known as the "agricultural migration." For this reason we shall first cite data concerning this main region of agricultural capitalism in Russia and then examine the data relating to the whole of Russia.

The tremendous movements of our peasants in search of work for hire have long ago been noted in our literature. Reference to them was made by Flerovsky (*Condition of the Working Class in Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1869), who tried to determine their relative incidence in the various gubernias. In 1875, Mr. Chaslavsky gave a general review of "agricultural outside employments" (*Compendium of Political Knowledge*, Vol. II) and noted their real significance ("there was formed . . . something in the nature of a semi-vagrant population . . . something in the nature of future farm labourers"). In 1887, Mr. Raspopin gathered together Zemstvo statistics on this phenomenon and regarded them not as "employments" of the peasants in general, but as a process of the formation of a class of wage-workers in agriculture. In the 90s, the works of Messrs. S. Korolenko, Rudnev, Tezyakov, Kudryavtsev and Shakhovskoi appeared, thanks to which a much fuller study of this phenomenon was made.

The principal area to which agricultural wage-workers

migrate embraces Bessarabia, Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, Don, Samara, Saratov (southern part) and Orenburg gubernias. We confine ourselves to European Russia, but it must be observed that the movement spreads, ever further afield (especially in the recent period), and covers the North Caucasus and the Ural region, etc. Data concerning capitalist agriculture in this area (the area of commercial grain farming) will be given in the next chapter; there, too, we shall point to other localities to which agricultural labourers migrate. The principal area from which agricultural labourers migrate is the central black-earth gubernias: Kazan, Simbirsk, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev, Podolia and Volhynia.* Thus the movement of workers proceeds from the most thickly-populated to the most thinly-populated localities, the ones being colonised; from the localities where serfdom was most developed to those where it was least developed**; from localities where labour-service is most developed to localities where it is little developed and capitalism is highly developed. Hence, the workers flee from "semi-free" to free labour. It would be a mistake to think that this flight amounts exclusively to a movement from thickly-populated to thinly-populated areas. A study of the movement of workers (Mr. S. Korolenko, loc. cit.) has revealed the singular and important fact that workers migrate from many areas in such great numbers as to create a shortage of hands in these places, one that is compensated by the arrival of workers from other places. Hence, the departure of workers expresses not only the tendency of the population to spread more evenly over the given territory, but also the tendency of the workers to go to areas where conditions are better. This tendency will become quite clear to us if we recall that in the area of departure, the area of labour-service, agricultural workers' wages are

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* In Chapter VIII, where we examine the movement of wage-workers in Russia as an entire process, we shall describe in greater detail the character and direction of migration from the various localities.

** In his day Chaslavsky pointed out that in the localities in which workers arrived, serfs constituted from 4 to 15% of the total, and in the localities which workers left, from 40 to 60%.

particularly low, while in the area of attraction, the area of capitalism, wages are far higher.*

As to the extent of "agricultural migration," general data exist only in the above-mentioned book by Mr. S. Korolenko, who calculates the surplus of workers (relative to the local demand for them) at 6,360,000 for the whole of European Russia, including 2,137,000 in the above-enumerated 15 gubernias of agricultural emigration, whereas in the 8 gubernias of immigration the shortage of workers is estimated at 2,173,000 persons. Despite the fact that Mr. S. Korolenko's methods of calculation are by no means always satisfactory, his general conclusions (as we shall see repeatedly below) must be regarded as approximately correct, and the number of migratory workers not only not an exaggeration, but if anything an understatement of the facts. There can be no doubt that part of these two million workers who come to the South are non-agricultural workers. But Mr. Shakhovskoi (loc. cit.) estimates quite arbitrarily, approximately, that industrial workers account for half this number. Firstly, we know from all sources that the workers who migrate to this region are *mainly* agricultural, and secondly, agricultural workers come there not only from the gubernias mentioned above. Mr. Shakhovskoi himself quotes a figure which confirms Mr. S. Korolenko's calculations. He states that in 11 black-earth gubernias (which are included in the above-described area from which agricultural workers emigrate) there were issued in 1891 a total of 2,000,703 passports and identity cards (loc. cit., p. 24), whereas according to Mr. S. Korolenko's calculations the number of workers who left these gubernias was only 1,745,913. Consequently, Mr. S. Korolenko's figures are not in the least exaggerated, and the total number of migratory rural workers in Russia must obviously be over 2 million.** The

* See table of data for 10 years in Chapter VIII, § IV: the formation of a home market for labour-power.

** There is another way of checking Mr. S. Korolenko's figure. We learn from the above-quoted books of Messrs. Tezyakov and Kudryavtsev that the number of agricultural workers who in their search for "employments" use the railways at least in part, is about 1/10 of the total workers (combining the figures of both authors, we get the result that out of 72,635 workers interrogated, only 7,827 travelled at least part of the journey by rail). Yet the number of workers

existence of such a mass of "peasants" who abandon their homes and allotments (where they have homes and allotments) vividly testifies to the tremendous process of the conversion of small cultivators into rural proletarians, of the enormous demand by growing agricultural capitalism for wage-labour.

The question now arises, what is the total number of rural wage-workers in European Russia, both migratory and resident? The only attempt to answer this question that we know is the one made in Mr. Rudnev's work *Peasant Industries in European Russia (Sbornik Saratovskogo Zemstva* [*Symposium of the Saratov Zemstvo*], 1894, Nos. 6 and 11). This work, an extremely valuable one, gives a summary of the Zemstvo statistics for 148 uyezds in 19 gubernias of European Russia. The total number of "industrialists" is put at 2,798,122, out of 5,129,863 working males (18 to 60 years of age), i.e., 55% of the total number of working peasants.* Under "agricultural industries" the author includes only work as *hired* agricultural labourers (farm labourers, day labourers, herdsmen, stockyard workers). An estimate of the percentage of agricultural workers to the total number of males of working age in various gubernias and districts of Russia, leads the author to the conclusion

carried in 1891 by the three principal railways in the direction examined does not exceed 200,000 (170,000 to 189,000)—as we are told by Mr. Shakhovskoi (loc. cit., p. 71, according to railway returns). Consequently, the total number of workers leaving for the South must be about 2 million. Incidentally, the very small proportion of agricultural workers who travel by rail points to the incorrectness of Mr. N. —on's view when he assumed that the passenger traffic on our railways is in the main that of agricultural workers. Mr. N. —on lost sight of the fact that non-agricultural workers receive higher wages and therefore make greater use of the railways and that the migration season of these workers (for example, builders, navvies, stevedores and many others) is also spring and summer.

* By "industries," as Mr. Rudnev also points out, are meant all sorts ot occupations by peasants except cultivation on their own, purchased or rented land. Undoubtedly, the majority of these "industrialists" are wage-workers in agriculture or in industry. We therefore call the reader's attention to the closeness of these figures to our estimate of the number of rural proletarians: in Chapter II, it was assumed that the latter constitute about 40% of the peasants. Here we see that "industrialists" constitute 55%, and of these, in all probability, over 40% are engaged in all sorts of hired labour.

that in the black-earth belt about 25% of all working males are engaged in hired agricultural labour, and in the non-black-earth area about 10%. This gives us the number of agricultural workers in European Russia as 3,395,000, or, in round numbers, 3½ million (Rudnev, loc. cit., p. 448. This number is about 20% of the total number of males of working age). It must be observed in this connection that, according to Mr. Rudnev, "day labour and agricultural job-work were placed in the category of industries by the statisticians only when they were the chief occupation of the given person or family" (loc. cit., 446).*

Mr. Rudnev's figure should be regarded as the minimum, because, firstly, the Zemstvo census returns are more or less out-of-date, relating to the 80s and at times even to the 70s, and because, secondly, in determining the percentage of agricultural workers, no account whatever was taken of the Baltic and Western gubernias, where agricultural capitalism is highly developed. For want of other data, however, we are obliged to take this figure of 3½ million.

It appears, consequently, that about *one-fifth* of the peasants have already reached a position where their "chief occupation" is that of wage-labour for rich peasants and landlords. We see here the first group of the entrepreneurs who present a demand for the labour-power of the rural proletariat. These are the rural entrepreneurs, who employ *about half of the bottom group of the peasantry*. Thus, there is to be observed a complete interdependence between the formation of a class of rural entrepreneurs and the expansion of the bottom group of the "peasantry," i.e., the increase in the number of rural proletarians. Among these rural entrepreneurs a prominent part is played by the peasant bourgeoisie: for example, in 9 uyezds of Voronezh Gubernia, 43.4% of the farm labourers are employed by peasants (Rudnev, 434). Were we to take this percentage as the standard for all rural workers and for the whole of Russia, it would be seen that the peasant bourgeoisie present a demand for

* This figure does not include, therefore, the mass of peasants for whom hired agricultural labour is not the chief occupation, but one of equal importance with their own farms.

some one and a half million agricultural workers. One and the same "peasantry" throws on to the market millions of workers in search of employers—and presents an impressive demand for wage-workers.

X. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HIRED LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE

Let us now attempt to depict the principal features of the new social relations that take shape in agriculture with the employment of hired labour, and to define their significance.

The agricultural workers who come to the South in such masses belong to the poorest strata of the peasantry. Of the workers who come to Kherson Gubernia, 7/10 make the journey on foot, since they lack the money for railway fare; "they tramp for hundreds and thousands of versts along the railway track and the banks of navigable rivers, admiring the splendid pictures of rapidly-moving trains and smoothly-gliding ships" (Tezyakov, 35). On the average, the worker takes with him about 2 rubles*; often enough he even lacks the money to pay for a passport, and gets a monthly identity card for ten kopeks. The journey takes from 10 to 12 days, and after such a long tramp (sometimes undertaken barefoot in the cold spring mud), the traveller's feet swell and become calloused and bruised. About 1/10 of the workers travel on *dubi* (large boats made out of rough boards, holding from 50 to 80 persons and usually packed to the limit). The reports of an official commission (the Zvegintsev Commission)[91] note the grave danger of this form of travel: "not a year passes but that one, two or even more of these overcrowded *dubi* go to the bottom with their passengers" (ibid., 34). The overwhelming majority of the workers have allotments, but of absolutely insignificant dimensions. "As a matter of fact," Mr. Tezyakov quite justly observes, "all these thousands of agricultural workers are landless village proletarians, for whom outside employ-

* Money for the journey is obtained by the sale of property, even household goods, by mortgaging the allotment, by pawning things, clothes, etc., and even by borrowing money, to be repaid in labour, from priests, landlords and local kulaks" (Shakhovskoi, 55).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ments are now the sole means of livelihood. . . . Landlessness is growing rapidly, and at the same time is swelling the ranks of the rural proletariat" (77). Striking confirmation of the rapidity of this growth is the number of worker novices, i.e., of those seeking employment for the first time. These novices constitute as many as 30%. Incidentally, this figure enables us to judge how rapid is the process that creates bodies of *permanent* agricultural workers.

The mass migration of workers has given rise to special forms of hire peculiar to highly-developed capitalism. In the South and South-East, numerous labour markets have arisen where thousands of workers gather and employers assemble. These markets are usually held in towns, industrial centres, trading villages and at fairs. The industrial character of the centres is of particular attraction to the workers, who readily accept employment on non-agricultural jobs, too. Thus, in Kiev Gubernia, labour markets are held in Shpola and Smela (large centres of the beet-sugar industry), and in the town of Belaya Tserkov. In Kherson Gubernia, they are held in the commercial villages (Novoukrainka, Birzula and Mostovoye, where on Sundays over 9,000 workers gather, and many other villages), at railway stations (Znamenka, Dolinskaya, etc.), and in towns (Elisavetgrad, Bobrinets, Voznesensk, Odessa, and others). In the summer, townspeople, labourers and "cadets" (the local name for tramps) from Odessa also come to hire themselves out for agricultural work. In Odessa rural workers hire themselves out in what is called Seredinskaya Square (or the "Mowers' Market"). "The workers make for Odessa, avoiding other markets, in the hope of getting better earnings here" (Tezyakov, 58). The township of Krivoi Rog is an important centre where workers are hired for agriculture and mining. In Taurida Gubernia, the township of Kakhovka is particularly noted for its labour market, where formerly as many as 40,000 workers gathered; in the nineties from 20,000 to 30,000 gathered there, and now, judging from certain data, the number is still smaller. In Bessarabia Gubernia, mention should be made of the town of Akkerman; in Ekaterinoslav Gubernia, of the town of Ekaterinoslav, and Lozovaya Station; in Don Gubernia, of Rostov-on-Don, frequented every year by as many as 150,000 workers. In

North Caucasus, of the towns of Ekaterinodar and Novorossiisk, Tikhoretskaya Station, and other places. In Samara Gubernia, of the village of Pokrovskaya (opposite Saratov), the village of Balakovo and other places. In Saratov Gubernia, of the towns of Khvalynsk and Volsk. In Simbirsk Gubernia, of the town of Syzran. Thus, capitalism has created in the outer regions a new form of the "combination of agriculture with industries," namely, the combination of agricultural and non-agricultural hired labour. Such a combination is possible on a wide scale only in the period of the final and highest stage of capitalism, that of large-scale machine industry, which attenuates the importance of skill, of "hand labour," facilitates the transition from one occupation to another, and levels the forms of hire.*

Indeed, the forms of hire in this locality are very peculiar and very characteristic of capitalist agriculture. All the semi-patriarchal, semi-bonded forms of hired labour which one so frequently meets in the central black-earth belt disappear here. The only relationships left are those between hirers and hired, a commercial transaction for the purchase and sale of labour-power. As always under developed capitalist relations, the workers prefer hire by the day, or by the week, which enables them to make the pay correspond more exactly to the demand for labour. "Prices are fixed for the area of each market (within a radius of about 40 versts) with mathematical precision, and it is very hard for the employers to beat down the price, because the muzhik who has come to the market prefers to lie around or go on to another place rather than work for lower pay" (Shakhovskoi, 104). It goes without saying that violent fluctuations in prices paid for labour cause innumerable breaches of contract—only not on one side, as the employers usually claim, but on both sides: "concerted action is taken by both sides": the labourers agree among themselves

* Mr. Shakhovskoi refers to another form of the combination of agricultural and non-agricultural labour. Thousands of rafts are floated down the Dnieper to the towns in the lower reaches of the river. On every raft there are from 15 to 20 workers (raftsmen), mostly Byelorussians and Great-Russians from Orel Gubernia. "For the whole voyage they get practically nothing"; they count chiefly on getting employment at reaping and threshing. These hopes are rewarded only in "good" years.

to demand more, and the employers—to offer less (ibid., 107).* How openly "callous cash payment" reigns here in the relations between the classes may be seen, for example, from the following fact: "experienced employers know very well" that the workers will "give in" only when they have eaten up their food stock. "A farmer related that when he came to the market to hire workers . . . he walked among them, poking with his stick at their knapsacks (sic !): if they had bread left, he would not talk to them; he would leave the market" and wait "until the knapsacks in the market were empty" (from the *Selsky Vestnik* [*Rural Herald*], 1890, No. 15, ibid., 107-108).

As under developed capitalism anywhere, so here, we see that the worker is particularly oppressed by small capital. The big employer is forced by sheer commercial considerations** to abstain from petty oppression, which is of little advantage and is fraught with considerable loss should disputes arise. That is why the big employers, for example (those employing from 300 to 800 workers), try to keep their workers from leaving at the end of the week, and themselves fix prices according to the demand for labour; some even adopt a system of wage increases if the price of labour in the area goes up—and all evidence goes to show that these increases are more than compensated by better work and the absence of disputes (ibid., 130-132; 104). A small employer, on the contrary, sticks at nothing. "The farmsteaders and German colonists carefully 'choose' their workers and pay them 15 or 20% more; but the amount of work they 'squeeze' out of them is 50 per cent more" (ibid., 116). The "wenches" who work for such an employer

* "At harvest time in a good year the worker triumphs, and it is a hard job to get him to give way. He is offered a price, but he won't consider it; he keeps repeating: give me what I ask and it's a go. And that is not because labour is scarce, but because, as the workers say, 'it's our turn now.'" (Reported by a volost clerk; Shakhovskoi, 125.)
"If the crop is a bad one and the price of labour has dropped, the kulak employer takes advantage of this condition to discharge the worker before the contract has expired, and the worker loses the season either in seeking work in the same district or in tramping the country," a landlord correspondent confesses (ibid., 132).

** Cf. Fr. Engels, *Zur Wohnungsfrage*. Vorwort. (F. Engels, *The Housing Question*. Preface.—*Ed.*)[92]

"don't know day from night," as they themselves say. The colonists who hire mowers get their sons to follow on their heels (i.e., to speed up the workers!) in *shifts*, so that the speeders-up, replacing one another three times a day, come with renewed energy to drive the workers on: "that is why it is so easy to recognise those who have worked for the German colonists by their haggard appearance. Generally speaking, the farmsteaders and the Germans avoid hiring those who have formerly worked on landowners' estates. '*You'll not stand the pace with us*,' they say quite frankly" (ibid.).*

Large-scale machine industry, by concentrating large masses of workers, transforming the methods of production, and destroying all the traditional, patriarchal cloaks and screens that have obscured the relations between classes, always leads to the directing of public attention towards these relations, to attempts at public control and regulation. This phenomenon, which has found particularly striking expression in factory inspection, is also beginning to be observed in Russian capitalist agriculture, precisely in the region where it is most developed. The question of the workers' sanitary conditions was raised in Kherson Gubernia as early as 1875 at the Second Gubernia Congress of Doctors of the Kherson Zemstvo, and was dealt with again in 1888; in 1889 there was drawn up a programme for the study of the workers' conditions. The investigation of sanitary conditions that was carried out (on a far from adequate scale) in 1889-1890 slightly lifted the veil concealing the conditions of labour in the remote villages. It was seen, for instance, that in the majority of cases the workers have no living quarters; where barracks are provided, they are usually very badly built from a hygienic point of view, and "not

* The same characteristics are displayed by the "Cossacks" of the Kuban Region: "The Cossack resorts to every possible method to force down the price of labour, acting either individually or through the community" (sic! What a pity we lack more detailed information about this latest function of the "community"!): "cutting down the food, increasing the work quota, docking the pay, retaining the workers' passports, adopting public resolutions prohibiting specific farmers from employing workers, on pain of a fine, at above a definite rate, etc." ("Migrant Workers in the Kuban Region" by A. Beloborodov, in *Severny Vestnik*, February 1896, p. 5.)

infrequently" *dug-outs* are met with—they are inhabited, for example, by shepherds, who suffer severely from dampness, overcrowding, cold, darkness and the stifling atmosphere. The food provided is very often unsatisfactory. The working day, as a rule, is from 12½ to 15 hours, which is much longer than the usual working day in large-scale industry (11 to 12 hours). An interval during the hottest part of the day is met with only "as an exception"—and cases of brain diseases are no rarity. Work at machines gives rise to occupational division of labour and occupational diseases. For example, working at threshing machines are "drummers" (they put the sheaves into the drum; the work is very dangerous and most laborious: thick corn-dust beats into their faces), and "pitchers" (they pitch up the sheaves; the work is so heavy that the shifts have to be changed every hour or two). Women sweep up the straw, which boys carry aside, while from 3 to 5 labourers stack it in ricks. The number employed on threshing in the whole gubernia must exceed 200,000 (Tezyakov, 94).* Mr. Tezyakov's conclusions regarding the sanitary conditions of agricultural work, are as follows: "Generally speaking, the opinion of the ancients that the labour of the husbandman is "the pleasantest and healthiest of occupations' is hardly sound at the present time, when the capitalist spirit reigns in agriculture. With the introduction of machinery into agriculture, the sanitary conditions of agricultural labour have not improved, but have changed for the worse. Machinery has brought into the field of agriculture a specialisation of labour so little known here before that it has had the effect of developing among the rural population occupational diseases and a host of serious injuries" (94).

A result of the investigations into sanitary conditions (after the famine year and the cholera) was the attempt to organise medical and food depots, at which the labourers were to be registered, placed under sanitary supervision and provided with cheap dinners. However modest the scale and the results of this organisation may be and however

* Let us observe, in passing, that this operation, threshing, is most frequently done by hired labourers. One can judge, therefore how large must be the number employed on threshing all over Russia!

precarious its existence,* it remains an important historical fact, revealing the trends of capitalism in agriculture. At the Congress of Doctors of Kherson Gubernia it was proposed, on the basis of data gathered by practitioners: to recognise the importance of medical and food depots and the need for improving their sanitary condition and extending their activities to give them the character of labour exchanges providing information on the prices of labour and their fluctuations; to extend sanitary inspection to all more or less big farms employing considerable numbers of labourers, "as is done in industrial establishments" (p. 155); to issue strict regulations governing the employment of agricultural machines and the registration of accidents; to raise the question of the workers' right to compensation and of providing better and cheaper steam transport. The Fifth Congress of Russian Doctors passed a resolution calling the attention of the Zemstvos concerned to the activities of the Kherson Zemstvo in the organisation of medical and sanitary inspection.

In conclusion, let us return to the Narodnik economists. Above we have seen that they idealise labour-service and close their eyes to the progressive nature of capitalism as compared with that system. Now we must add that they are unfavourably disposed to the "migration" of workers, and favour local "employments." Here, for example, is how this usual Narodnik view is expressed by Mr. N.—on: "The peasants . . . set off in quest of work. . . . How far, one may ask, is it advantageous from the economic point of view? Not personally for each individual peasant, but how far is it advantageous for the peasantry as a whole, from the national-economic point of view? . . . What we want is to point to the purely economic disadvantage of the annual peregrination, God knows where to, for the entire summer, when it would seem that one could find plenty of occupations at hand. . ." (23-24).

* Of the six uyezd Zemstvo assemblies in Kherson Gubernia, whose views on the question of organising supervision over workers are reported by Mr. Tezyakov, four declared against this system. The local landowners accused the gubernia Zemstvo board of "turning the workers into absolute idlers," etc.

We assert, the Narodnik theory notwithstanding, that the "peregrination" of the workers not only yields "purely economic" advantages to the workers themselves, but in general should be regarded as progressive; that public attention should not be directed towards replacing outside employments by local "occupations close at hand," but, on the contrary, towards removing all the obstacles in the way of migration, towards facilitating it in every way, towards improving and reducing the costs of all conditions of the workers' travel, etc. The grounds for our assertion are as follows:

1) "Purely economic" advantage accrues to the workers from "peregrination" in that they go to places where wages are higher, where their position as seekers of employment is a more advantageous one. Simple as this argument is, it is too often forgotten by those who love to rise to a higher, allegedly "national-economic" point of view.

2) "Peregrination" destroys bonded forms of hire and labour-service.

Let us recall, for example, that formerly, when migration was little developed, the southern landowners (and other employers) readily resorted to the following system of hiring labourers: they sent their agents to the northern gubernias and (through the medium of rural officials) hired tax-defaulters on terms extremely disadvantageous to the latter.* Those offering employment consequently enjoyed the advantage of free competition, but those seeking it did not. We have quoted instances of the peasant's readiness to flee from labour-service and bondage even to the mines.

It is not surprising, therefore, that on the question of "peregrination" our agrarians go hand in hand with the Narodniks. Take Mr. S. Korolenko, for example. In his book he quotes numerous opinions of landlords in opposition to the "migration" of workers, and adduces a host of "arguments" against "outside employments": "dissipation,"

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* Shakhovskoi, loc. cit., 98 and foll. The author cites even the list of "fees" paid to clerks and village elders for the hire of peasants on advantageous terms.—Tezyakov: loc. cit., 65.—Trirogov *The Village Community and the Poll Tax*; article entitled "Bondage in the National Economy."

"rowdy habits," "drunkenness," "dishonesty," "the striving to leave the family in order to get rid of it and escape parental supervision," "the craving for amusement and a brighter life," etc. But here is a particularly interesting argument: "Finally, as the proverb says, 'if it stay at one spot, a stone will gather moss,' and a man who stays at one spot will certainly amass property and cherish it" (loc. cit., p. 84). The proverb does indeed very strikingly indicate what happens to a man who is tied to one spot. Mr. S. Korolenko is particularly displeased with the phenomenon we referred to above, namely, that "too" many workers leave certain gubernias and that the shortage thus created is made good by the arrival of workers from other gubernias. In noting this fact as regards, for example, Voronezh Gubernia, Mr. S. Korolenko points to one of the reasons for this, namely, the large number of peasants possessing gift-land allotments. "Evidently such peasants, who are relatively worse off materially and are not worried about their all too meagre property, more frequently fail to carry out the obligations they undertake and in general more readily leave for other gubernias, even when they could find plenty of employment at home." "Such peasants, having little attachment (sic!) to their own inadequate allotments, and sometimes not even possessing implements, more readily abandon their homes and go to seek their fortunes far from their native villages, without troubling about employment locally, and sometimes even about obligations undertaken, since they have nothing on which distraint can be made" (ibid.).

"Little attachment!" That's just the term.

It should give food for thought to those who talk about the disadvantages of "peregrination" and the preferableness of local "occupations close at hand"!*

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* Here is another example of the pernicious influence of Narodnik prejudices. Mr. Tezyakov, whose splendid work we have frequently quoted, notes the fact that from Kherson Gubernia many local workers go to that of Taurida, although there is a great shortage of labour in the former gubernia. He calls this "an extremely queer phenomenon": it means a loss to the employers and a loss to the workers, who abandon jobs at home and risk finding none in Taurida" (33). We, on the contrary, think that Mr. Tezyakov's statement is extremely queer. Do the workers really not understand what is to their advantage,

3) "Peregrinations" mean creating mobility of the population. Peregrinations are one of the most important factors preventing the peasants from "gathering moss," of which more than enough has been fastened on them by history. Unless the population becomes mobile, it cannot develop, and it would be naïve to imagine that a village school can teach people what they can learn from an independent acquaintance with the different relations and orders of things in the South and in the North, in agriculture and in industry, in the capital and in the backwoods.

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and have they not the right to seek the most advantageous conditions of employment they can get? (In Taurida Gubernia the wages of agricultural workers are higher than in Kherson Gubernia.) Are we really to think that it is *obligatory* for the muzhik to live and work where he is registered and "provided with an allotment"?

CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE

Having examined the internal economic structure of peasant and landlord economy, we must now take up the question of the changes in agricultural production and ask: do these changes express a growth of capitalism and of the home market?

I. GENERAL DATA ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN POST-REFORM RUSSIA AND ON THE TYPES OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE

Let us glance first of all at the general statistics on grain production in European Russia. The considerable harvest fluctuations render the data for individual periods or for individual years quite useless.* It is necessary to take different periods and the data for a whole number of years. We have at our disposal the following data: for the period of the 60s, the data for 1864-1866 (*Military Statistical Abstract*, IV, St. Petersburg, 1871, data of gubernatorial reports). For the 70s, the returns of the Department of Agriculture for the entire decade (*Historico-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry*, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1883). And lastly, for the 1880s, we have data for the five years of 1883-1887 (*Statistics of the Russian Empire*, IV); this five-year period can represent the whole of the eighties, since the average harvest for the ten years, 1880-1889, is even somewhat higher than for the five years 1883-1887 (see *Agricul-*

* If only for this reason, Mr. N. —on is absolutely wrong in drawing the boldest conclusions from the returns for 8 years of one decade (1871-1878)!

ture and Forestry in Russia, published for the Chicago Exhibition, pp. 132 and 142). Further, in order to judge of the trend of evolution in the 90s we take the data for the decade 1885-1894 (*Productive Forces*, I, 4). Lastly, the data for 1905 (*Yearbook of Russia*, 1906) are quite adequate for a judgement of the present time. The 1905 harvest was only a little lower than the average for the five years 1900-1904.

Let us compare all these data.*

Fifty gubernias of European Russia[93]

Million chetverts

Period	Population (both sexes, millions)	Sown	Net yield	Sown	Net yield	Net per capita yield, in chetverts, of		
		All crops, i.e., cereals plus potatoes		Potatoes		Cereals	Potatoes	All crops
1864-1866	61.4	72.2	152.8	6.9	17.0	2.21	0.27	2.48
1870-1879	69.8	75.6	211.3	8.7	30.4	2.59	0.43	3.02
1883-1887	81.7	80.3	255.2	10.8	36.2	2.68	0.44	3.12
1885-1894	86.3	92.6	265.2	16.5	44.3	2.57	0.50	3.07
(1900-1904) -1905	107.8	103.5	396.5	24.9	93.9	2.81	0.87	3.68

We see from this that until the 1890s the post-Reform era is characterised by an undoubted increase in the production both of cereals and potatoes. The productivity of agricultural labour rises: firstly, the size of the net yield grows faster than that of the sown area (with occasional exceptions); secondly, we must bear in mind that the proportion of the population engaged in agricultural production steadily diminished during this period owing to the diversion of the population from agriculture to commerce and industry, and also owing to the migration of peasants beyond the bounds of European Russia.** What is particularly

* For the period 1883-1887 we have taken the population of 1885; the increase is taken at 1.2%. The difference between the data of the gubernatorial reports and those of the Department of Agriculture is, as we know, inconsiderable. The figures for 1905 have been arrived at by converting poods into chetverts (about six bushels each.—*Ed.*)

** Mr. N. —on is quite wrong when he asserts that "there are no grounds whatever for assuming a decline in their number" (the number of persons engaged in agricultural production), "quite the contrary" (*Sketches*, 33, note). See Chapter VIII, §II.

noteworthy is the fact that it is *commercial* agriculture that is growing: there is an increase in the amount of grain gathered (after subtracting seed) per head of the population, while among this population there is an ever-growing division of social labour; there is an increase in the commercial and industrial population; the agricultural population splits up into rural entrepreneurs and a rural proletariat; there is an extension of specialisation in agriculture itself, so that the amount of grain produced for sale grows far more rapidly than the total amount of grain produced in the country. The capitalist character of the process is strikingly illustrated by the increased share of potatoes in the total agricultural production.* The increase in the area under potatoes signifies, on the one hand, an improvement in agricultural technique (the introduction of root-crops) and increased technical processing of agricultural produce (distilling and the manufacture of potato starch). On the other hand, it is, from the viewpoint of the rural entrepreneur class, the production of relative surplus-value (cheapening of the cost of maintaining labour-power, deterioration of the people's nourishment). The data for the decade 1885-1894 show further that the crisis of 1891-1892, which tremendously intensified the expropriation of the peasantry, led to a considerable reduction in the output of cereals and to a reduction in the yield of all crops; but the process of the displacement of cereals by potatoes continued with such force that the per-capita output of potatoes increased, notwithstanding the reduced yield. Finally, the last five years (1900-1904) also show an increase in agricultural production, an increase in the productivity of agricultural labour

* The net per-capita potato crop increased between 1864-1866 and 1870-1879 in all areas of European Russia without exception. Between 1870-1879 and 1883-1887 the increase took place in 7 areas out of 11 (the Baltic, Western, Industrial, North-Western, Northern, Southern, Steppe, Lower- and Transvolga areas).

Cf. *Agricultural Statistical Information Based on Material Obtained from Farmers*, Vol. VII, St. Petersburg, 1897 (published by Ministry of Agriculture).[94] In 1871, in the 50 gubernias of European Russia, the area under potatoes was 790,000 dess. in 1881—1,375,000 dess. and in 1895—2,154,000 dess, i.e., an increase during the 15 years of 55%. Taking the potato crop in 1841 as 100, we get the following figures for the later years: 1861—120; 1871—162; 1881—297; 1895—530.

and a worsening of the conditions of the working-class (increase in the part played by potatoes).

As we have noted above, the growth of commercial agriculture manifests itself in the specialisation of agriculture. Mass-scale and gross data on the production of all crops can give (and then not always) only the most general indications of this process, since the specific features of the different areas thereby disappear. Yet it is precisely the segregation of the different agricultural areas that is one of the most characteristic features of post-Reform agriculture in Russia. Thus, the *Historico-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry* (Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1883), quoted by us, enumerates the following agricultural areas: the flax area, "the region where stock farming predominates," and where, in particular, "dairy farming is considerably developed"; the region where grain crops predominate, particularly the three-field area and the area with the improved fallow or multi-field grass system (part of the steppe belt, which "is characterised by the production of the most valuable, so-called élite grains, mainly intended for the foreign market"); the beet area, and the area in which potatoes are cultivated for distilling purposes. "The economic areas indicated have arisen in European Russia comparatively recently, and with every passing year continue increasingly to develop and become more segregated" (loc. cit., p. 15).* Our task should now be, consequently, to study this process of the specialisation of agriculture, and we should ascertain whether a growth of commercial agriculture is to be observed in its various forms, whether capitalist agriculture comes into existence in the process, and whether agricultural capitalism bears the features we indicated above in analysing the general data on peasant and landlord farming. It goes without saying that for our purposes it will be sufficient if we confine ourselves to describing the principal areas of commercial agriculture.

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* Cf. also *Agriculture and Forestry in Russia*, pp. 84-88; here a tobacco area is added. The maps drawn by Messrs. D. Semyonov and A. Fortunatov show the areas according to the particular crops predominating in them; for example the rye, oat and flax area, Pskov and Yaroslavl gubernias; the rye, oat and potato area, Grodno and Moscow gubernias, and so on.

But before examining the data for the separate areas, let us note the following: the Narodnik economists, as we have seen, do all they can to evade the fact that the characteristic feature of the post-Reform period is the growth of commercial agriculture. Naturally, in doing so they also ignore the circumstance that the drop in grain prices is bound to stimulate the specialisation of agriculture and the drawing of agricultural produce into the sphere of exchange. Here is an instance. The authors of the well-known book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices* all proceed from the postulate that the price of grain is of no importance to natural economy, and they repeat this "truism" endlessly. One of them, Mr. Kablukov, has observed, however, that *under the general conditions of commodity production* this postulate is substantially wrong. "It is possible, of course," he writes, "that the grain placed on the market has cost less to produce than that grown on the consumer's farm, in which case it would appear to be in the interest also of the consuming farm to change from cultivating cereals to other crops" (or to other occupations, we would add), "and, consequently, for it too the market price of grain assumes importance as soon as it fails to coincide with *its* cost of production" (I, 98, note, author's italics). "But we cannot take that into account," he says peremptorily. Why is that? Because, it seems: 1) a change-over to other crops is possible "only where certain conditions exist." By means of this empty truism (everything on earth is possible only under certain conditions!) Mr. Kablukov calmly evades the fact that the post-Reform period in Russia has created, and continues to create, the very conditions that call for the specialisation of agriculture and the diversion of the population from agriculture. . . . 2) Because "in our climate it is impossible to find a crop equal to cereals in food value". The argument is highly original, expressing a mere evasion of the issue. What has the food value of other crops to do with the matter, if we are dealing with the sale of these other crops and the purchase of cheap grain? . . . 3) Because "grain farms of the consuming type always have a rational basis for their existence." In other words, because Mr. Kablukov "and colleagues" regard natural economy as "rational." The argument, as you see, is irrefutable. . . .

II. THE COMMERCIAL GRAIN-FARMING AREA

This area covers the outer region in the south and the east of European Russia, the steppe gubernias of Novorossia and the Transvolga. Agriculture is distinguished here for its extensive character and the enormous scale of the production of grain for sale. If we take the eight gubernias of Kherson, Bessarabia, Taurida, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Saratov, Samara and Orenburg, we shall find that in 1883-1887 the net crop of cereals (not including oats) for a population of 13,877,000 amounted to 41.3 million chetverts, i.e., more than one-fourth of the total net yield of the 50 gubernias of European Russia. The crop most commonly sown here is wheat—the principal export grain.* Agriculture develops here fastest of all (by comparison with the other areas of Russia), and these gubernias relegate the central black-earth gubernias, formerly in the lead, to the background:

Areas of gubernias	Net per capita cereal crop in the periods**		
	1864-1866	*1870-1879*	*1883-1887*
Southern-steppe	2.09	2.14	3.42
Lower Volga and Transvolga	2.12	2.96	3.35
Central black-earth	3.32	3.88	3.28

Thus there is a *shifting* of the principal centre of grain production: in the 1860s and 1870s the central black-earth gubernias were ahead of all the rest, but in the 1880s they yielded priority to the steppe and Lower Volga gubernias: their production of grain began to *diminish*.

This interesting fact of the enormous growth of agricultural production in the area described is to be explained by the circumstance that in the post-Reform period the outer steppe regions have been *colonies* of the central, long-settled part of European Russia. The abundance of free land has attracted an enormous stream of settlers, who

* Except for Saratov Gubernia, with 14.3% under wheat, in the rest of the gubernias mentioned we find 37.6% to 57.8% under wheat.

** Sources given above. Areas of gubernias according to *Historico-Statistical Survey*. The "Lower Volga and Transvolga area is badly constituted, for to the steppe gubernias, with their enormous production of grain, have been added that of Astrakhan (lacking grain for its food requirements) and of Kazan and of Simbirsk, which should more appropriately be included in the central black-earth belt.

have quickly increased the area under crops.* The extensive development of *commercial* crops was possible only because of the close economic ties of these colonies with central Russia, on the one hand, and the European grain-importing countries, on the other. The development of industry in central Russia and the development of commercial farming in the outer regions are inseparably connected and create a market for each other. The industrial gubernias received grain from the South, selling there the products of their factories and supplying the colonies with labour, artisans (see Chapter V, § III on the migration of small industrialists to the outer regions), and means of production (timber, building materials, tools, etc.). Only because of this social division of labour could the settlers in the steppe localities engage exclusively in agriculture and sell huge quantities of grain in the home and particularly in the foreign market. Only because of their close connection with the home and foreign markets could the economic development of these localities proceed so rapidly; and it was precisely capitalist development, for along with the growth of commercial farming there was an equally rapid process of the diversion of the population into industry, the process of the growth of towns and of the formation of new centres of large-scale industry (see below, Chapters VII and VIII).**

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* See Mr. V. Mikhailovsky's material (*Novoye Slovo*, [*New Word*], June 1897) on the enormous increase in the population of the outer regions and on the migration to these parts, from 1885 to 1897, of hundreds of thousands of peasants from the interior gubernias. On the increase in the area under crops, see the above-mentioned work by V. Postnikov, the Zemstvo statistical returns for Samara Gubernia; Grigoryev's *Peasant Migration from Ryazan Gubernia*. On Ufa Gubernia, see Remezov's *Sketches of the Life of Wild Bashkiria*—a vivid description of how the "colonisers" felled timber for shipbuilding and transformed the fields "cleared" of "wild" Bashkirs into "wheat factories." This is a sample of colonial policy that bears comparison with any of the Germans' exploits in a place like Africa.

** Cf. Marx, *Das Kapital*, III, 2, 289,—one of the basic features of the capitalist colony is abundance of free land easily accessible to settlers (the Russian translation of this passage, p. 623, is quite wrong).[95] Also see III, 2, 210. Russ. trans., p. 553,—the enormous grain surplus in the agricultural colonies is to be explained by the fact that their entire population is at first "almost exclusively engaged in farming, and particularly in producing agricultural mass products," which

As to the question of whether the growth of commercial farming in this area is bound up with technical progress in agriculture and with the creation of capitalist relations, that has been dealt with above. In Chapter II we saw how large the areas cultivated by peasants in these localities are and how sharply capitalist relations manifest themselves there even within the village community. In the preceding chapter we saw that in this area there has been a particularly rapid development in the use of machinery, that the capitalist farms in the outer regions attract hundreds of thousands and millions of wage-workers, with huge farms created on a scale unprecedented in agriculture, on which there is extensive co-operation of wage-workers, etc. We have little left now to add in completion of this picture.

In the outer steppe regions the privately-owned estates are not only distinguished occasionally for their enormous size, but are also the scene of farming on a very big scale. Above we made reference to crop areas of 8, 10 and 15 thousand dessiatines in Samara Gubernia. In Taurida Gubernia, Falz-Fein owns 200,000 dess., Mordvinov 80,000 dess.; two individuals own 60,000 dess. each, "and many proprietors have from 10,000 to 25,000 dessiatines" (Shakhovskoi, 42). An idea of the scale of farming can be obtained, for example, from the fact that in 1893 there were 1,100 machines (of which 1,000 belonged to the peasantry) haymaking for Falz-Fein. In Kherson Gubernia there were 3.3 million dessiatines under cultivation in 1893, of which 1.3 million dess. belonged to private owners; in five uyezds of the gubernia (without Odessa Uyezd) there were 1,237 medium-sized farms (250 to 1,000 dess. of land), 405 big farms (1,000 to 2,500 dess.) and 226 farms each of over 2,500 dess. According to data gathered in 1890 on 526 farms, they employed 35,514 workers, i.e., an average of 67 workers per farm, of whom from 16 to 30 were annual labourers. In 1893, 100 more or less big farms in Elisavetgrad Uyezd employed 11,197 workers (an average of 112 per farm!), of whom 17.4% were annual,

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are exchanged for industrial products "They [the colonial states] receive through the world market finished products ... which they would have to produce themselves under other circumstances."[96]

39.5% seasonal, and 43.1% day labourers.* Here are data on the distribution of crop area among all the agricultural undertakings in the uyezd, both of private landowners and of peasants.**

			Approximate area under crops (in thousand dess.)	
Farms with no cultivation	15,228		—	
" " up to 5 dess. sown	26,963		74.6	
" " 5 to 10 " "	19,194		144	
" " 10 to 25 " "	10,234		157	
" " 25 to 100 " "	2,005	2,387	91	215
" " 100 to 1,000 " "	372		110	
" " over 1,000 " "	10		14	
Total for uyezd	74,006		590.6	

Thus, a little over 3 per cent of the peasants (and if we count only those who cultivated, 4 per cent) concentrate in their hands more than a third of the total area under crops, for the tilling and harvesting of which masses of seasonal and day labourers are required.

Lastly, here are the data for Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia. In Chapter II we took only Russian peasants farming community allotments; now we add Germans and farmstead peasants (those farming non-community holdings). Unfortunately no data are available for the farms of private landowners.***

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* Tezyakov, loc. cit.

** *Material for Evaluating the Lands of Kherson Gubernia*, Vol. II, Kherson 1886. The number of dessiatines cultivated by each group was determined by multiplying the average area under crops by the number of farms. The number of groups has been reduced.

*** Returns for Novouzensk Uyezd.—All rented land, state, privately-owned and allotment, has been taken. Here is a list of the improved implements owned by the Russian farmstead peasants: 609 iron ploughs, 16 steam threshers, 89 horse-threshers, 110 mowers, 64 horse-drawn rakes, 61 winnowers and 64 reaping machines. The number of employed workers did not include day labourers.

Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia	Households	Land		Area cultivated	Animals (total, in terms of cattle)	Improved agricultural implements	Employed workers	Average per household			
								Land			
		purchased	rented					purchased	rented	Area culti-vated	Animals (total, in terms of cattle)
		Dessiatines						Dessiatines			
Total for uyezd	51,348	130,422	751,873	816,133	343,260	13,778	8,278	2.5	14.6	15.9	6.7
Farms with 10 and more draught animals	3,958	117,621	580,158	327,527	151,744	10,598	6,055	29	146	82	38
Of which—Russian farmstead peasants with 20 and more draught animals	218	57,083	253,669	59.137	39,520	1,013	1,379	261	1,163	271	181

There is no need, apparently, to comment on these data. We have had occasion to observe that the area described is the most typical of agricultural capitalism in Russia—typical not in the agricultural sense, of course, but in the social-economic sense. These colonies, having developed with the greatest freedom, show us what relations could and should have developed in the rest of Russia, had not the numerous survivals of pre-Reform life retarded the development of capitalism. The forms, however, of agricultural capitalism, as will be seen from what follows, are extremely varied.

III. THE COMMERCIAL STOCK-FARMING AREA. GENERAL DATA ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF DAIRY FARMING

We now pass to another very important area of agricultural capitalism in Russia, namely, the region in which not cereal, but livestock produce is of predominant significance. This region embraces, apart from the Baltic and the western gubernias, the northern, the industrial and parts of some of the central gubernias (Ryazan, Orel, Tula, and Nizhni-Novgorod). Here animals are kept for dairy produce, and the whole character of agriculture is adapted to obtaining as large a quantity as possible of the more valuable market

produce of this sort.* "Before our very eyes a marked transition is taking place from stock farming for manure to stock farming for dairy produce; it has been particularly noticeable during the past ten years" (work quoted in previous footnote, ibid.). It is very difficult by the use of statistics to describe the various regions of Russia in this respect, because it is not the total number of horned cattle that is here important, but the number of dairy cattle and their quality. If we take the total number of animals per hundred inhabitants, we shall find that it is biggest in the outer steppe regions of Russia and smallest in the non-black-earth belt (*Agriculture and Forestry*, 274); we shall find that as time goes on the number *diminishes* (*Productive Forces*, III, 6. Cf. *Historico-Statistical Survey*, I). Hence, we observe here what Roscher noted in his day, namely, that the number of animals per unit of the population is largest in districts of "extensive livestock farming" (W. Roscher, *Nationaloekonomik des Ackerbaues*. 7-te Aufl., Stuttg., 1873, S. 563-564**). We, however, are interested in intensive livestock farming, and in dairy farming in particular. We are compelled, therefore, to confine ourselves to the *approximate* computation made by the authors of the above-mentioned, *Sketch*, without claiming to make an exact estimate of the phenomenon; such a computation clearly illustrates the relative positions of the various regions of Russia as to degree of dairy-farm development. We quote this computation in extenso, supplementing it with some averages arrived at and data on the cheese-making industry in 1890 according to "factory" statistics.

* In other parts of Russia stock farming is of a different kind. For example, in the extreme South and South-East, the most extensive form of stock farming has become established, namely, cattle-fattening for beef. Further north, horned cattle are used as draught animals. Lastly, in the central black-earth belt cattle are used as "manure-making machines." V. Kovalevsky and I. Levitsky, *Statistical Sketch of Dairy Farming in the Northern and Central Belts of European Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1879). The authors of this work, like the majority of agricultural experts, display very little interest in the social-economic aspect of the matter or understanding of this aspect It is quite wrong, for example, to draw from the fact of farms becoming more profitable the direct conclusion that they ensure "the people's well-being and nutriment" (p. 2).

** W. Roscher, *Economics of Agriculture*, 7th edition, Stuttgart 1873, pp. 563-564.—*Ed.*

Groups of gubernias	Population, both sexes (thous.) (1873)	Milch cows (thous.)	Amount of		Average milk yield per cow (vedros)	Per 100 inhabitants			Approximate output of cheese, soft cheese and butter in 1879	Cheese output in 1890
			milk in thous. vedros*	butter in thous. poods		milch cows	milk, vedros	butter, poods	Thousand rubles	
I. Baltic and Western (9)	8,127	1,101	34,070	297	31	13.6	420	3.6	?	469
II. Northern (10) . . .	12,227	1,407	50,000	461	35	11.4	409	3.7	3,370.7	563
III. Industrial (non-black-earth (7) . . .	8,822	662	18,810	154	28	7.5	214	1.7	1,088	295
IV. Central (black-earth) (8)	12,387	785	16,140	133	20	6.3	130	1.0	242.7	23
V. South black-earth, South-West, South-ern and East-steppe (16).	24,087	1,123	20,880	174	18	4.6	86	0.7	—	—
Total for 50 gubernias of European Russia . .	65,650	5,078	139,900	1,219	27	7.7	213	1.8	4,701.4	1,350

* 1 vedros = 2.6 gallons.—*Ed.*

This table clearly illustrates (though the data are very obsolete) the emergence of special dairy-farming areas, the development there of commercial farming (the sale of milk and milk-processing) and the increase in the productivity of dairy cattle.

To judge the development of dairy farming, we can only make use of data on butter production and cheese making. This industry arose in Russia at the very end of the 18th century (1795); cheese making on landlords' estates began to develop in the 19th century, but suffered a severe crisis in the 1860s, which opened the period of cheese making by peasants and merchants.

The number of cheese-making establishments in the 50 gubernias of European Russia was as follows:*

In 1866	72	with	226	workers	and	output	valued	at	119,000 rbs.
" 1879	108	"	289	"	"	"	"	"	225,000 "
" 1890	265	"	865	"	"	"	"	"	1,350,000 "

Thus, in 25 years production increased more than tenfold; only the dynamics of the phenomenon may be judged from these data, which are extremely incomplete. Let us quote some more detailed material. In Vologda Gubernia an improvement in dairy farming began, properly speaking, in 1872, when the Yaroslavl-Vologda railway was opened; since then "farmers have begun to see to the improvement of their herds, to introduce grass cultivation, to acquire improved implements . . . and have tried to place dairy farming on a purely commercial basis" (*Statistical Sketch*,

* Data from *Military Statistical Abstract* and Mr. Orlov's *Directory* (1st and 3rd eds.). Concerning these sources, see Chapter VII. Let us merely observe that the figures quoted minimise the actual rapidity of development, since the term "factory" or "works" was employed in a narrower sense in 1879 than in 1866; and in 1890 in a still narrower sense than in 1879. The 3rd ed of the *Directory* contains information on the date of establishment of 230 factories; it appears that only 26 were established before 1870, 68 in the 70s, 122 in the 80s and 14 in 1890. This speaks of a rapid increase in production. As for the latest *List of Factories and Works* (St. Petersburg, 1897), utter chaos reigns there: cheese making is registered for two or three gubernias and for the rest omitted altogether.

20). In Yaroslavl Gubernia "the ground was prepared" by the so-called "cheese-making artels" of the 70s, and "cheese making continues to develop on the basis of private enterprise, merely retaining the title of 'artel'" (25); cheese-making "artels" figure—may we add—in the *Directory of Factories and Works* as establishments employing wage-workers. Instead of 295,000 rubles, the authors of the *Sketch* estimate the output of cheese and butter, according to *official* returns, at 412,000 rubles (computed from figures scattered throughout the book); correction of the figure brings the value of the output of fresh butter and cheese to 1,600,000 rubles, and if we add clarified butter and soft cheese, to 4,701,400 rubles, not counting either the Baltic or the western gubernias.

For the later period let us quote the following opinions from the above-cited publication of the Department of Agriculture *Hired Labour*, *etc.* Concerning the industrial gubernias in general we read: "A complete revolution in the position of the farms in this area has been brought about by the development of dairy farming"; it "indirectly has also helped to bring about an improvement in agriculture"; "dairy farming in the area is developing with every year" (258). In Tver Gubernia "there is to be observed the tendency both among private landowners and peasants to improve the methods of maintaining cattle"; the income from stock farming is estimated at 10 million rubles (274). In Yaroslavl Gubernia "dairy farming . . . is developing with every year. . . . Cheese and butter making have even begun to assume something of an industrial character . . . milk . . . is bought up from neighbours and even from peasants. One comes across cheese factories run by a whole company of owners" (285). "The general trend of private-landowner farming here," writes a correspondent from Danilov Uyezd, Yaroslavl Gubernia, "is marked at the present time by the following: 1) the transition from three-field to five- and seven-field crop rotation, with the sowing of herbage in the fields; 2) the ploughing up of disused lands; 3) the introduction of dairy farming, and as a consequence, the stricter selection of cattle and an improvement in their maintenance" (292). The same thing is said of Smolensk Gubernia, where the value of the output of cheese and butter amounted to

240,000 rubles in 1889—according to a report of the Governor (according to statistical returns, 136,000 rubles in 1890). The development of dairy farming is noted in the Kaluga, Kovno, Nizhni-Novgorod, Pskov, Esthland and Vologda gubernias. The value of the output of butter and cheese in the last-mentioned gubernia was estimated at 35,000 rubles according to statistics for 1890, to 108,000 rubles according to the Governor's report, *and to 500,000 rubles* according to local returns for 1894, which gave a total of *389 factories*. "That is what the statistics say. Actually, however, there are far more factories, since, according to investigations by the Vologda Zemstvo Board, there are 224 factories in Vologda Uyezd alone." Production is developed in three uyezds, and has partly penetrated a fourth.* One can judge from this how many times the above-quoted figures need to be multiplied in order to approach the real situation. The plain view of an expert that at the present time the number of butter and cheese-making establishments "amounts to several thousand" (*Agriculture and Forestry in Russia*, 299), gives a truer picture of the facts than the allegedly exact figure of 265.

Thus the data leave not the slightest doubt about the enormous development of this special type of commercial farming. The growth of capitalism was accompanied here too by the transformation of routine technique. "In the sphere of cheese making," we read, for example, in *Agriculture and Forestry*, "more has been done in Russia during the last 25 years than perhaps in any other country" (301). Mr. Blazhin says the same thing in his article "Technical Progress in Dairy Farming" (*Productive Forces*, III, 38-45). The principal change is that the "age-old" method of leaving cream to settle has been replaced by the system of

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* *Nedelya* [*Week*], 1896, No. 13. Dairy farming is so profitable that urban traders have rushed into the business and, incidentally, have introduced such methods as the settlement of accounts in goods. One local landowner, who has a large factory, organised an artel "with prompt cash payment for milk" in order to release the peasants from bondage to buyers-up and to "capture new markets." A characteristic example, showing the real significance of artels and of the celebrated "organisation of sales," namely, "emancipation" from merchant's capital *through* the development of industrial capital.

separating cream in centrifugal machines (separators);* The machine has enabled the work to be carried on irrespective of atmospheric temperature, increased the butter yield from milk by 10%, improved the quality of the product, reduced the cost of butter production (the machine requires less labour, space, and ice, as well as fewer utensils), and has led to the concentration of production. Large peasant butteries have grown up, handling "as much as 500 poods of milk a day, which was physically impossible . . . when the milk was left to settle" (ibid.). Improvements are being made in the instruments of production (permanent boilers, screw presses, improved cellars), and production is being assisted by bacteriology, which is providing pure cultures of the type of lactic-acid bacilli needed for fermenting cream.

Thus, in the two areas of commercial farming we have described, the technical improvements called into being by the requirements of the market were effected primarily in those operations that were easiest to change and are particularly important for the market: reaping, threshing and winnowing in commercial grain farming, and the technical processing of animal produce in the area of commercial stock farming. As to the keeping of cattle, capital finds it more profitable for the time being to leave that to the small producer: let him "diligently" and "industriously" tend "his" cattle (and charm Mr. V. V. with his diligence—see *Progressive Trends*, p. 73), let him bear the brunt of the hardest and roughest work of tending the milk-yielding machine. Capital possesses the latest improvements and methods not only of separating the cream from the milk, but also of separating the "cream" from this "diligence", of separating the milk from the children of the peasant poor.

IV. CONTINUATION. THE ECONOMY OF LANDLORD FARMING IN THE AREA DESCRIBED

We have cited the evidence of agronomists and farmers to the effect that dairy farming on the landlord estates leads to the rationalisation of agriculture. Let us

* Until 1882 there were hardly any separators in Russia. From 1886 onward they spread so rapidly as to displace the old method utterly. In the 1890s even butter-extractor separators appeared.

add here that the analysis of the Zemstvo statistics on this question made by Mr. Raspopin* fully confirms this conclusion. We refer the reader to Mr. Raspopin's article for detailed data and give here only his main conclusion. "The interdependence of the condition of stock raising and dairy farming, on the one hand, and the number of dilapidated estates and the intensity of farming, on the other, is beyond question. The uyezds (of Moscow Gubernia) where dairy cattle raising, dairy farming, is most developed show the smallest percentage of dilapidated farms and the highest percentage of estates with highly developed field cultivation. Throughout Moscow Gubernia ploughland is being reduced and turned into meadow and pastureland, while grain rotations are yielding place to multi-field herbage rotations. Fodder grasses and dairy cattle, and not grain, are now predominant . . . not only on the farming estates in Moscow Gubernia but throughout the Moscow industrial district" (loc. cit.).

The scale of butter production and cheese making is particularly important precisely because it testifies to a complete revolution in agriculture, which becomes entrepreneur farming and breaks with routine. Capitalism subordinates to itself one of the products of agriculture, and all other aspects of farming are fitted in with this principal product. The keeping of dairy cattle calls forth the cultivation of grasses, the change-over from the three-field system to multi-field systems, etc. The waste products of cheese making go to fatten cattle for the market. Not only milk processing, but the whole of agriculture becomes a commercial enterprise.** The influence of cheese production and

* This problem also has been *raised* by Mr. Raspopin (perhaps for the first time in our literature) from the correct, theoretically sound point of view. At the very outset he observes that "the enhancement of the productivity of stock farming—in particular, the development of dairy farming—is proceeding in this country along *capitalist* lines and serves as one of the most important indices of the penetration of capital into agriculture.

** Dr. Zhbankov says in his *Sanitary Investigation of Factories and Works of Smolensk Gubernia* (Smolensk, 1894, Vol. I, p. 7) that "the number of workers engaged in cheese making proper ... is very inconsiderable.... There are far more auxiliary workers, needed both for cheese making and for agriculture; these are herdsmen, milkmaids,

butter making is not confined to the farms on which they are carried on, since milk is often bought up from the surrounding peasants and landlords. By buying up the milk, capital subordinates to itself the small agriculturists too, particularly with the organisation of the so-called "amalgamated dairies," the spread of which was noted in the 70s (see *Sketch* by Messrs. Kovalevsky and Levitsky). These are establishments organised in big towns, or in their vicinity, which process very large quantities of milk brought in by rail. As soon as the milk arrives the cream is skimmed and sold fresh, while the skimmed milk is sold at a low price to poorer purchasers. To ensure that they get produce of a certain quality, these establishments sometimes conclude contracts with the suppliers, obliging them to adhere to certain rules in feeding their cows. One can easily see how great is the significance of large establishments of this kind: on the one hand they capture the public market (the sale of skimmed milk to the poorer town-dwellers), and on the other hand they enormously expand the market for the rural entrepreneurs. The latter are given a tremendous impetus to expand and improve commercial farming. Large-scale industry brings them into line, as it were, by demanding produce of a definite quality and forcing out of the market (or placing at the mercy of the usurers) the small producer who falls below the "normal" standard. There should also operate in the same direction the grading of milk as to quality (fat content, for example), on which technicians are so busily engaged, inventing all sorts of lacto-densimeters, etc., and of which the experts are so heartily in favour (cf. *Productive Forces*, III, 9 and 38). In this respect the role of the amalgamated dairies in the development of capitalism is quite analogous to that of elevators in commercial grain farming. By sorting grain as to quality the elevators turn it into a product that is not individual

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etc.; in all the [cheese] factories these workers outnumber the cheese makers proper, two, three and even four times over." Let us note in passing that according to Dr. Zhbankov's description, the conditions of labour here are very insanitary, and the working day is excessively long (16 to 17 hours), etc. Thus, in the case of this area of commercial agriculture, too, the traditional notion of the idyllic occupation of the agriculturist is a false one.

but generic (res fungibilis,[97] as the lawyers say), i.e., for the first time they adapt it fully to exchange (cf. M. Sering's article on the grain trade in the United States of America in the symposium *Landownership and Agriculture*, p. 281 and foll.). Thus, the elevators give a powerful impetus to commodity-grain production and spur on its technical development by also introducing grading for quality. Such a system strikes a double blow at the small producer. Firstly, it sets up as a standard, legalises, the higher-quality grain of the big crop sowers and thereby greatly depreciates the inferior grain of the peasant poor. Secondly, by organising the grading and storing of grain on the lines of large-scale capitalist industry, it reduces the big sowers' expenses on this item and facilitates and simplifies the sale of grain for them, thereby placing the small producer, with his patriarchal and primitive methods of selling from the cart in the market, totally at the mercy of the kulaks and the usurers. Hence, the rapid development of elevator construction in recent years means as big a victory for capital and degradation of the small commodity-producer in the grain business as does the appearance and development of capitalist "amalgamated dairies."

From the foregoing material it is clear that the development of commercial stock farming *creates* a home market,* firstly, for means of production—milk-processing equipment, premises, cattle sheds, improved agricultural implements required for the change-over from the routine three-field system to multi-field crop rotations, etc.; and secondly, for labour-power. Stock farming placed on an industrial footing requires a far larger number of workers

* The market *for* commercial stock farming is created chiefly by the growth of the industrial population, with which we shall deal in detail later on (Chapter VIII, § II). As regards foreign trade, let us confine ourselves to the following remarks: cheese exports in the early part of the post-Reform period were much below imports; but in the 90s they almost equalled them (for the 4 years 1891-1894, the annual average imports amounted to 41,800 poods, and exports to 40,600 poods; in the five years 1886-1890, exports even exceeded imports). The exports of cow and ewe butter have always greatly exceeded imports; these exports are rapidly increasing: in 1866-1870 the average annual exports amounted to 190,000 poods and in 1891-1894 to 370,000 poods (*Productive Forces*, III, 37).

than the old stock farming "for manure." The dairy farming area—the industrial and north-western gubernias—does really attract masses of agricultural labourers. Very many people go to seek agricultural work in the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yaroslavl and Vladimir gubernias; fewer, but nevertheless a considerable number, go to the Novgorod, Nizhni-Novgorod and other non-black-earth gubernias. According to correspondents of the Department of Agriculture in the Moscow and other gubernias private-landowner farming is actually conducted in the main by labourers from other areas. This paradox—the migration of agricultural workers from the agricultural gubernias (they come mostly from the central black-earth gubernias and partly from the northern) to the industrial gubernias to do agricultural jobs in place of industrial workers who abandon the area en masse—is an extremely characteristic phenomenon (see S. A. Korolenko on this point, loc. cit). It proves more convincingly than do any calculations or arguments that the standard of living and the conditions of the working people in the central black-earth gubernias, the least capitalist ones, are incomparably lower and worse than in the industrial gubernias, the most capitalist ones; it proves that in Russia, too, the following has become a universal fact, namely, the phenomenon characteristic of all capitalist countries, that the conditions of the workers in industry are better than those of the workers in agriculture (because in agriculture oppression by capitalism is supplemented by the oppression of pre-capitalist forms of exploitation). That explains the flight from agriculture to industry, whereas not only is there no flow from the industrial gubernias towards agriculture (for example, there is no migration from these gubernias at all), but there is even a tendency to look down upon the "raw" rural workers, who are called "cowherds" (Yaroslavl Gubernia), "cossacks" (Vladimir Gubernia) and "land labourers" (Moscow Gubernia).

It is important also to note that cattle herding requires a larger number of workers in winter than in summer. For that reason, and also because of the development of agricultural processing trades, the demand for labour in the area described not only grows, but is *more evenly distributed over the whole year* and over a period of years. The most reliable

FROM MARX TO MAO
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material for judging this interesting fact is the data on wages, if taken for a number of years. We give these data, confining ourselves to the groups of Great-Russian and Little-Russian gubernias.[98] We omit the western gubernias, owing to their specific social conditions and artificial congestion of population (the Jewish pale of settlement), and quote the Baltic gubernias only to illustrate the relations that arise where capitalism is most highly developed.*

Groups of gubernias	Averages for 10 years (1881-1891)			Averages for 8 years (1883-1891)					
	Pay of worker in rubles		summer pay, % of yearly pay	Pay of day labourer during harvesting, in kopeks		Difference	Pay of day labourer in kopeks		Difference
	hired by the year	hired for the summer		lowest average	highest average		During sowing	Average during harvesting	
I. Southern and eastern outer regions	78	50	*64%*	64	181	*117*	45	97	*52*
II. Central black-earth gubernias	54	38	*71%*	47	76	*29*	35	58	*23*
III. Non-black-earth gubernias	70	48	*68%*	54	68	*14*	49	60	*11*
Baltic gubernias	82	53	*65%*	61	70	*9*	60	67	*7*

* Group I (the area of capitalist grain farming) consists of 8 gubernias: Bessarabia, Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav, Don, Samara, Saratov and Orenburg. Group II (the area where capitalism is least developed) consists of 12 gubernias: Kazan, Simbirsk, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, Kharkov, Poltava and Chernigov. Group III (the area of capitalist dairy farming and industrial capitalism) consists of 10 gubernias: Moscow, Tver, Kaluga, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Nizhni-Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Novgorod and Pskov. The figures showing wages are average gubernia figures. Source: Department of Agriculture publication *Hired Labour*, *etc.*

Let us examine this table, in which the three principal columns are printed in italics. The first column shows the proportion of summer to yearly pay. The *lower* this proportion is, and the nearer the summer pay approximates to half the yearly pay, the more evenly is the demand for labour spread over the entire year and *the less the winter unemployment*. The least favourably placed in this respect are the central black-earth gubernias—the area where labour-service prevails and where capitalism is poorly developed.* In the industrial gubernias, in the dairy-farming area the demand for labour is higher and winter unemployment is less. Over a period of years, too, the pay is most stable here, as may be seen from the second column, which shows the difference between the lowest and the highest pay in the harvest season. Lastly, the difference between the pay in the sowing season and the pay in the harvest season is also least in the non-black-earth belt, i.e., the demand for workers is more evenly distributed over the spring and summer. In all respects mentioned the Baltic gubernias stand even higher than the non-black-earth gubernias, while the steppe gubernias, with their immigrant workers and with harvest fluctuations of the greatest intensity, are marked by the greatest instability of wages. Thus, the data on wages testify that agricultural capitalism in the area described not only creates a demand for wage-labour, but also distributes this demand more evenly over the whole year.

Lastly, reference must be made to one more type of dependence of the small agriculturist in the area described upon the big farmer. This is the replenishment of landlords' herds by the purchase of cattle from peasants. The landlords find it more profitable to buy cattle from peasants driven by need to sell "at a loss" than to breed cattle themselves—just as our buyers-up in so-called handicraft industry often prefer to buy finished articles from the handicraftsmen at

* A similar conclusion is drawn by Mr. Rudnev: "In those localities where the work of labourers hired by the year is given a relatively high valuation the wages of the summer worker approximate more closely to half the yearly pay. Hence, on the contrary, in the western gubernias, and in nearly all the densely-populated central black-earth gubernias, the worker's labour in the summer is given a very low valuation" (loc. cit., 455).

a ruinously cheap price rather than manufacture them in their own workshops. This fact, which testifies to the extreme degradation of the small producer, and to his being able to keep going in modern society only by endlessly reducing his requirements, is turned by Mr. V. V. into an argument in favour of small "people's" production! . . . "We are entitled to draw the conclusion that our big farmers . . . do not display a sufficient degree of independence. . . . The peasant, however . . . reveals greater ability to effect real farming improvements" (*Progressive Trends*, 77). This lack of independence is expressed in the fact that "our dairy farmers . . . buy up the peasants' (cows) at a price rarely amounting to half the cost of raising them—usually at not more than a third, and often even a quarter of this cost" (ibid., 71). The merchant's capital of the stock farmers has made the small peasants completely dependent, it has turned them into its cowherds, who breed cattle for a mere song, and has turned their wives into its milkmaids.* One would think that the conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is no sense in retarding the transformation of merchant's capital into industrial capital, no sense in supporting small production, which leads to forcing down the producer's standard of living below that of the farm labourer. But

* Here are two descriptions of the living standard and living conditions of the Russian peasant in general. M. Y. Saltykov, in *Petty Things of Life*, writes about the "enterprising muzhik" as follows: "The muzhik needs everything, but what he needs most of all ... is the ability to exhaust himself, not to stint his own labour.... The enterprising muzhik simply expires at it" (work). "His wife and grown up children, too, all toil worse than galley-slaves."

V. Veresayev, in a story entitled "Lizar" (*Severny Kurier* [*Northern Courier*], 1899, No. 1), tells the story of a muzhik in the Pskov Gubernia named Lizar, who advocates the use of drops, etc., "to prevent an increase." "Subsequently," observes the author, "I heard from many Zemstvo doctors, and particularly from midwives, that they frequently have similar requests from village husbands and wives." "Moving in a certain direction, life has tried all roads and at last has reached a blind alley. There is no escape from it. And so a new solution of the problem is naturally arising and increasingly maturing."

The position of the peasant in capitalist society is indeed hopeless, and in Russia with its village communities, as in France with its smallholders, leads "naturally" not to an unnatural ... solution of the problem," of course, but to an unnatural means of postponing the doom of small economy. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

Mr. V. V. thinks otherwise. He is delighted with the "zeal" (p. 73, loc. cit.) of the peasant in tending his cattle; he is delighted with the "good results from livestock farming" obtained by the peasant woman who "spends all her life with her cow and sheep" (80). What a blessing, to be sure! To "spend all her life with her cow" (the milk of which goes to the improved cream separator), and as a reward for this life, to receive "one-fourth of the cost" of tending this cow! Now really, how after that can one fail to declare in favour of "small people's production"!

V. CONTINUATION. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY IN THE DAIRY-FARMING AREA

In the literature dealing with the effect of dairy farming on the conditions of the peasantry, we constantly come up against contradictions: on the one hand reference is made to progress in farming, the enlargement of incomes, the improvement of agricultural technique and the acquisition of improved implements; on the other hand, we have statements about the deterioration of food, the creation of new types of bondage and the ruin of the peasants. After what was stated in Chapter II, we should not be surprised at these contradictions: we know that these opposite opinions relate to opposite groups of the peasantry. For a more precise judgement of the subject, let us take the data showing the classification of peasant households according to the number of cows per household.*

* Zemstvo statistics taken from Mr. Blagoveshchensky's *Combined Returns*.[99] About 14,000 households in these 18 uyezds are not classified according to the number of cows owned: the total is not 289,079 households, but 303,262. Mr. Blagoveshchensky cites similar data for two other uyezds in the black-earth gubernias, but these uyezds are evidently not typical. In 11 uyezds of Tver Gubernia (*Statistical Returns*, XIII, 2) the percentage of allotment households owning no cows is not high (9.8), but 21.9% of the households, having 3 and more cows, concentrate in their hands 48.4% of the total number of cows. Horseless households constitute 12.2%; households with 3 and more horses constitute only 5.1% and they own only 13.9% of the total number of horses. Let us note, in passing, that a smaller concentration of horses (as compared with that of cows) is also to be observed in other non-black-earth gubernias.

Groups of households	18 uyezds of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver and Smolensk gubernias					St. Petersburg Gubernia, 6 uyezds				
	No. of households	%	No. of cows	%	Cows per household	No. of households	%	No. of cows	%	Cows per household
Households with no cows	59,336	20.5	—	—	—	15,196	21.2	—	—	—
" " 1 cow	91,737	31.7	91,737	19.8	1	17,579	24.6	17,579	13.5	1
" " 2 cows	81,937	28.4	163,874	35.3	2	20,050	28.0	40,100	31.0	2
" " 3 cows and more	56,069	19.4	208,735	44.9	3.7	18,676	26.2	71,474	55.5	3.8
Total	289,079	100	464,346	100	1.6	71,501	100	129,153	100	1.8

Thus, the distribution of cows among the peasants in the non-black-earth belt is found to be very similar to the distribution of draught animals among the peasants in the black-earth gubernias (see Chapter II). Moreover, the concentration of dairy cattle in the area described proves to be greater than the concentration of draught animals. This clearly points to the fact that it is with the local form of commercial farming that the differentiation of the peasantry is closely connected. The same connection is evidently indicated by the following data (unfortunately, not sufficiently complete). If we take the aggregate Zemstvo statistics (given by Mr. Blagoveshchensky; for 122 uyezds of 21 gubernias), we get an average of 1.2 cows per household. Hence, in the non-black-earth belt the peasantry evidently own more cows than in the black-earth belt, and in Petersburg Gubernia they are better off than in the non-black-earth belt in general. On the other hand, in 123 uyezds of 22 gubernias the cattleless households constitute 13%, while in the 18 uyezds we have taken, they amount to 17%, and in the 6 uyezds of Petersburg Gubernia 18.8%. Hence, the differentiation of the peasantry (in the respect we are now examining) is most marked in Petersburg Gubernia, followed by the non-black-earth belt in general. By this indication, *commercial* farming is the principal factor in the differentiation of the peasantry.

The data show that about half the peasant households (those having no cows, or one cow) can take only a

negative part in the benefits of dairy farming. The peasant with one cow will sell milk only out of need, to the detriment of his children's nourishment. On the other hand, about one-fifth of the households (those with 3 cows and more) concentrate in their hands probably more than half the total dairy farming since the quality of their cattle and the profitableness of their farms should be higher than in the case of the "average" peasant.* An interesting illustration of this conclusion is provided by the data on a locality where dairy farming and capitalism in general are highly developed. We refer to Petersburg Uyezd.** Dairy farming is particularly widely developed in the summer residential part of the uyezd, inhabited mainly by Russians; here the most widely cultivated crops are: grasses (23.5% of the allotment arable, as against 13.7% for the uyezd), oats (52.3% of the arable) and potatoes (10.1%). Agriculture is directly influenced by the St. Petersburg market, which needs oats, potatoes, hay, milk and horse traction (loc. cit., 168). The families of the registered population are 46.3% engaged "in the milk industry." Of the total number of cows 91% provide milk for the market. The income from this industry amounts to 713,470 rubles (203 rubles per family, 77 rubles per cow). The nearer the locality is to St. Petersburg, the higher is the quality of the cattle and the better the attention they receive. The milk is sold in two ways: 1) to buyers-up on the spot and 2) in St. Petersburg to "dairy farms," etc. The latter type of marketing is much

* These data regarding the opposite groups of peasants should be borne in mind when one meets sweeping statements like the following: "An annual income from dairy stock farming ranging from 20 to 200 rubles per household is, over the enormous area of the northern gubernias, not only a most considerable means of extending and improving stock farming, but has also had the effect of improving field cultivation and even of reducing migration in search of employment, by providing the population with work at home—both in tending cattle and in bringing hitherto neglected land into a properly cultivated condition" (*Productive Forces*, III, 18). On the whole, migration is not decreasing, but increasing. In some localities, however, the decrease may be due either to the increase in the percentage of well-to-do peasants, or to the development of "work at home," i.e., work for local rural entrepreneurs.

** *Material for Statistics on the Economy in St. Petersburg Gubernia*, Vol. V, Pt. II, St. Petersburg, 1887.

more profitable, but "the majority of the farms having one or two cows, and sometimes more, are not . . . able to deliver their milk to St. Petersburg direct"—they have no horses, it does not pay to cart small quantities, etc. The buyers-up of the milk include not only specialist merchants, but individuals with dairies of their own. The following data are for two volosts in the uyezd:

Two volosts in St. Petersburg Uyezd	No. of families	No. of cows belonging to them	Cows per family	"Earnings" of these families (rubles)	Earnings	
					Per family	Per cow
Families selling milk to buyers-up	441	1,129	2.5	14,884	33.7	13.2
Families selling milk in St. Petersburg . . .	119	649	5.4	29,187	245.2	44.9
Total	560	1,778	3.2	44,071	78.8	24.7

One can judge from this how the benefits of dairy farming are distributed among all the peasants in the non-black-earth belt, among whom, as we have seen, the concentration of dairy cattle is even greater than among these 560 families. It remains for us to add that 23.1% of the peasant families in St. Petersburg Uyezd hire workers (most of whom, here, as everywhere in agriculture, are day labourers). Bearing in mind that agricultural workers are hired almost exclusively by families having fully-operating farms" (constituting only 40.4% of the total number of families in the uyezd) "the conclusion must be that more than half of such farms do not manage without hired labour" (158).

Thus, at opposite ends of Russia, in the most varying localities, in St. Petersburg and, say, Taurida gubernias, the social and economic relations within the "village community," prove to be absolutely identical. The "muzhik-cultivators" (Mr. N. —on's term) in both places differentiate into a minority of rural entrepreneurs and a mass of rural proletarians. The specific feature of agriculture is that capitalism subjugates one aspect of rural economy

in one district, and another aspect in another, which is why identical economic relations are manifested in the most varied forms of agronomy and everyday life.

Having established the fact that in the area described, too, the peasantry splits up into opposite classes, we shall easily achieve clarity about the contradictory opinions usually expressed as to the role of dairy farming. Quite naturally, the well-to-do peasantry receive an incentive to develop and improve their farming methods and as a result grass cultivation is widespread and becomes an essential part of commercial stock-farming. The development of grass cultivation is observed, for example, in Tver Gubernia; in Kashin Uyezd, the most progressive in that gubernia, as many as one-sixth of all peasant households plant clover (*Returns*, XIII, 2, p. 171). It is interesting, moreover, to note that on the purchased lands a larger proportion of arable is occupied by herbage than on the allotments: the peasant bourgeoisie naturally prefer private ownership of land to communal tenure.* In the *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia* (Vol. II, 1896) we also find numerous references to the increase in grass cultivation, and again mainly on purchased and rented lands.** In the same publication we find references to the spread of improved implements: iron ploughs, threshing machines, rollers, etc. Butter and cheese making, etc., are developing very considerably. In Novgorod Gubernia it was noted as far back as the beginning of the 80s that along with a general deterioration and diminution of peasant stock-breeding, there was an improvement in certain individual localities where there was a profitable market for milk and where the milk-feeding of calves was an old-established industry (Bychkov: *An Essay in the House-to-House Investigation of the Economic Position and Farming of the Peasants*

* A substantial improvement in the maintenance of cattle is observed only where there has been a development in the production of milk for sale (pp. 219, 224).

** Pp. 39, 65, 136, 150, 154, 167, 170, 177 and others. Our pre-Reform system of taxation retards the progress of agriculture here too. "Owing to the congestion of the farmsteads," writes a correspondent, "grass cultivation has been introduced all over the volost; the clover, however, is sold to cover tax arrears (91). The taxes in this gubernia are sometimes to high that the peasant who leases his land has himself to pay a sum to the new holder of the allotment.

in Three Volosts of Novgorod Uyezd, Novgorod, 1882). The milk-feeding of calves, which is also a type of commercial livestock farming, is, generally speaking, a fairly widespread industry in the Novgorod and Tver gubernias and in other places not far from the big cities (see *Hired Labour*, *etc*., published by the Department of Agriculture). "This industry," says Mr. Bychkov, "by its very nature, brings an income to the already well-provided peasants possessing considerable numbers of cows, since with one cow, and sometimes even with two of poor yield, the milk-feeding of calves is unthinkable" (loc. cit., 101).*

But the most outstanding index of the economic successes of the peasant bourgeoisie in the area described is the hiring of labourers by peasants. The local landowners feel that they are being confronted by competitors, and in their communications to the Department of Agriculture they sometimes even attribute the shortage of workers to the fact that these are snatched up by the well-to-do peasants (*Hired Labour*, 490). The hiring of labourers by peasants is noted in the Yaroslavl, Vladimir, St. Petersburg and Novgorod gubernias (loc. cit., passim). A mass of such references is also scattered throughout the *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*.

This progress of the well-to-do minority, however, is a heavy burden upon the mass of the poor peasants. In Koprin Volost, Rybinsk Uyezd, Yaroslavl Gubernia, for example, one finds the spread of cheese making—on the initiative of "V. I. Blandov, the well-known founder of cheese-making artels."** "When the poorer peasants, with only one cow each, deliver . . . their milk (to the cheese

* Let us note, by the way, that the variety of "industries" of the local peasantry prompted Mr. Bychkov to distinguish two types of industrialists, according to the amount of earnings. It appeared that less than 100 rubles was earned by 3,251 persons (27.4% of the population); their earnings totalled 102,000 rubles, or an average of 31 rubles per person. Over 100 rubles was obtained by 454 (3.8% of the population): their earnings totalled 107,000 rubles, or an average of 236 rubles per person The first group consisted mainly of wage-workers of every kind, the second of traders, hay merchants, timber dealers, etc.

** The "cheese-making artels" of Koprin Volost are mentioned in the *Directory of Factories and Works*, and the Blandovs are the largest firm in the cheese-making industry: in 1890 they owned 25 factories in six gubernias.

factory) they do so, of course, to the detriment of their own nourishment"; whereas the well-to-do peasants improve their cattle (pp. 32-33). Among the types of wage-labour undertaken, one finds employment away from home, at cheese-making establishments; from among the young peasants a body of skilled cheese makers is arising. In the Poshekhonye Uyezd "the number . . . of cheese and butter establishments is increasing from year to year," but "the benefits accruing to peasant farming from cheese and butter making hardly compensate for the disadvantages to peasant life resulting from our cheese and butter establishments." On the peasants' own admission they are often compelled to starve, for with the opening of a cheese or butter factory in some locality, the milk is sent there and the peasants usually drink diluted milk. The system of payment in kind is coming into vogue (pp. 43, 54, 59 and others), so that it is to be regretted that our "people's" petty production is not covered by the law prohibiting payment in kind in "capitalist" factories.*

Thus, the opinions of people directly acquainted with the matter confirm our conclusion that the majority of the peasants play a purely negative part in the progress of local agriculture. The progress of commercial farming worsens the position of the bottom groups of peasants and forces them out of the ranks of the cultivators altogether. Be it noted that reference has been made in Narodnik literature to this contradiction between the progress of dairy

* Here is the characteristic view of Mr. Stary Maslodel [Old Butter Maker]: "Whoever has seen and knows the countryside today and remembers what it was 40 or 50 years ago will be amazed at the difference. In the old villages all the houses were the same both outside and inside; today, however side by side with hovels stand fine houses, side by side with the indigent live the rich, side by side with the downtrodden and despised live those who feast and make merry. In former times one often came across villages in which there was not a single landless peasant; now in every village there are no less than five and sometimes a full dozen. And to tell the truth, butter making is much to blame for this transformation of the villages. In 30 years butter making has enriched many, has beautified their homes; many peasants who supplied milk during the period of development of the butter industry have become prosperous, acquired more cattle, and purchased land on a community or individual basis; but many more have fallen into poverty; landless peasants and beggars have appeared in the villages" (*Zhizn* [*Life*], 1899, No. 8 quoted from *Severny Krai* [*Northern Region*], 1899, No. 223). (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

farming and the deterioration of the peasants' nourishment (for the first time, I think, by Engelhardt). But it is precisely this example that enables one to see the narrowness of the Narodnik appraisal of the phenomena occurring among the peasantry and in agriculture. They note a contradiction in one form, in one locality, and do not realise that it is typical of the entire social and economic system, manifesting itself everywhere in different forms. They note the contradictory significance of one "profitable industry," and strongly urge the "implanting" among the peasantry of all sorts of other "local industries." They note the contradictory significance of one form of agricultural progress and do not understand that machines, for example, have exactly the same political and economic significance in agriculture as in industry.

VI. THE FLAX-GROWING AREA

We have described the first two areas of capitalist agriculture in fairly great detail because of their widespread character and of the typical nature of the relations observed there. In our further exposition we shall confine ourselves to briefer remarks on some highly important areas.

Flax is the chief of the so-called "industrial crops." The very term indicates that we are dealing here with *commercial* farming. For example, in the "flax" gubernia of Pskov, flax has long been the peasants' "first money," to use a local expression (*Military Statistical Abstract*, 260). Flax growing is simply a means of making money. The post-Reform period is marked on the whole by an undoubted increase in commercial flax growing. Thus, at the end of the 60s, the output of flax in Russia was estimated at approximately 12 million poods of fibre (ibid., 260); at the beginning of the 80s at 20 million poods of fibre (*Historico-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry*, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1883, p. 74); at the present time, in the 50 gubernias of European Russia over 26 million poods of fibre are gathered.* In the flax-growing area proper (19 gubernias of the

* The average for 1893-1897 was 26,291,000 poods, according to the figures of the Central Statistical Committee. See *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 9, and 1898, No. 6. Formerly the statistics for flax produc-

non-black-earth belt) the area under flax has changed in recent years as follows; 1893—756,600 dess.; 1894—816,500 dess.; 1895—901,800 dess.; 1896—952,100 dess., and 1897—967,500 dess. For the whole of European Russia (50 gubernias) the figure for 1896 was 1,617,000 dess. under flax and for 1897—1,669,000 dess. (*Vestnik Finansov*, ibid., and 1898, No. 7), as against 1,399,000 dess. at the beginning of the 1890s (*Productive Forces*, I, 36). Similarly, general opinions expressed in publications also testify to the growth of commercial flax growing. Thus, regarding the first two decades after the Reform, the *Historico-Statistical Survey* states that "the region of flax cultivation for industrial purposes has been enlarged by several gubernias" (loc. cit., 71), which is due particularly to the extension of the railways. Concerning the Yuryev Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, Mr. V. Prugavin wrote at the beginning of the eighties: "The cultivation of flax . . . has become very widespread here during the past 10 to 15 years." "Some large-family households sell flax to the extent of 300 to 500 rubles and more per annum. . . . They buy" (flax seed) "in Rostov. . . . The peasants in these parts are very careful in selecting seed" (The Village Community, *Handicraft Industries and Agriculture of Yuryev Uyezd*, *Vladimir Gubernia*, Moscow, 1884, pp. 86-89). *The Zemstvo Statistical Returns for Tver Gubernia* (Vol. XIII, Pt. 2) notes that "the most important spring grain crops, barley and oats, are yielding place to potatoes and flax" (p. 151); in some uyezds flax occupies from ⅓ to ¾ of the area under spring crops, for example, in Zubtsov, Kashin and other uyezds, "in which flax growing

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tion were very inexact; that is why we have preferred to take approximate estimates based on comparisons of the most varied sources made by experts. The amount of flax produced fluctuates considerably year by year. For that reason Mr. N. —on, for example, who set out to draw the boldest conclusions about the "diminution" of flax production and "the reduction of the area under flax" (*Sketches*, p. 236 and foll.) from figures for some six years, slipped into the most curious errors (see P. B. Struve's examination of them in *Critical Remarks*, p. 233 and foll.). Let us add to what has been said in the text that according to the data cited by Mr. N. —on, the maximum area under flax in the 1880s was 1,372,000 dess. and the weight of gathered fibre 19,245,000 poods, whereas in 1896-1897 the area was 1,617,000-1,669,000 dess., and the weight of gathered fibre 31,713,000-30,139,000 poods.

has assumed the clearly expressed speculative character of an industry" (p. 145), developing particularly on rented virgin and disused land. Moreover, it is noted that in some gubernias, where free land is still available (virgin soil, wasteland, forest-cleared tracts), flax growing is particularly expanding, but in some of the old established flax-growing gubernias "the cultivation of flax is either on the old scale or is even yielding place, for example, to the newly-introduced cultivation of root-crops, vegetables, etc." (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 6, p. 376, and 1897, No. 29), i.e., to other types of commercial farming.

As for flax exports, during the first two decades after the Reform they increased with remarkable rapidity: from an average of 4.6 million poods in the years 1857-1861 to 8.5 million poods in the years 1867-1871 and to 12.4 million poods in the years 1877-1881; but then exports seemed to become stationary, amounting in the years 1894-1897 to an average of 13.3 million poods.* The development of commercial flax growing led, naturally, to exchange not only between agriculture and industry (sale of flax and purchase of manufactured goods), but between *different types of commercial agriculture* (sale of flax and purchase of grain). The following data concerning this interesting phenomenon clearly demonstrate that a home market for capitalism is created not only by the diversion of population from agriculture to industry, but also by the specialisation of commercial farming.**

Railway traffic to and from Pskov ("flax") Gubernia. (Averages, in thousand poods)

Periods	Outgoing flax	Incoming grain and flour
1860-1861	255.9	43.4
1863-1864	551.1	464.7
1865-1866	793.0	842.6
1867-1868	1,053.2	1,157.9
1869-1870	1,406.9	1,809.3

* The figures are for the exports of flax, flax-combings and tow. See *Historico-Statistical Survey*, P. Struve, *Critical Remarks* and *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 26, and 1898, No. 36.

** See N. Strokin, *Flax Growing in Pskov Gubernia*, St. Petersburg, 1882. The author borrowed these data from the *Proceedings* of the Commission on Taxation.

How does this growth of commercial flax growing affect the peasantry, who, as we know, are the principal flax producer?* "Travelling through Pskov Gubernia and observing its economic life, one cannot help noticing that side by side with occasional large and rich units, hamlets and villages, there are extremely poor units; *these extremes are a characteristic feature of the economic life of the flax area.*" "Flax growing has taken a speculative turn," and "the greater part" of the income from flax "is pocketed by buyers-up and by those who lease out land for flax growing" (Strokin, 22-23). The ruinous rents constitute real "money rent" (see above), and the mass of the peasants are in a state of "complete and hopeless dependence" (Strokin, ibid.) upon the buyers-up. The sway of merchant's capital was established in this locality long ago,** and what distinguishes the post-Reform period is the enormous concentration of this capital, the undermining of the monopoly of the former small buyers-up and the formation of "flax agencies" which have captured the whole flax trade. The significance of flax growing, says Mr. Strokin about Pskov Gubernia, "is expressed . . . in the concentration of capital in a few hands" (p. 31). Turning flax growing into a gamble, capital ruined vast numbers of small agriculturists, who worsened the quality of the flax, exhausted the land, were reduced to leasing out their allotments and finally swelled the ranks of "migratory" workers. On the other hand, a slight minority of well-to-do peasants and traders were able—and competition made it necessary—to introduce technical improvements. Couté scutchers, both hand-worked (costing up to 25 rubles) and horse-operated (three times dearer), were introduced. In 1869 there were only 557 such machines in Pskov Gubernia, in 1881 there were 5,710 (4,521 hand-worked and 1,189 horse-

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* Of 1,399,000 dess. under flax, 745,400 dess. are in the non-black-earth belt, where only 13% belongs to private landowners. In the black-earth belt, of 609,600 dess. under flax 44.4% belongs to private owners (*Productive Forces*, 1, 36).

** The *Military Statistical Abstract* in its day pointed to the fact that the "flax sown by the peasants very often really belongs to the *bulinyas*" (local name for small buyers-up), "while the peasant is merely a labourer on his field" (595). Cf. *Historico-Statistical Survey*, p. 88.

operated).* "Today," we read in the *Historico-Statistical Survey*, "every sound peasant family engaged in flax growing has a Couté hand-machine, which has actually come to be called the 'Pskov scutcher'" (loc. cit., 82-83). What proportion this minority of "sound" householders who acquire machines is to the rest of the peasantry, we have already seen in Chapter II. Instead of the primitive contrivances which cleaned the seeds very badly, the Pskov Zemstvo began to introduce improved seed-cleaners (trieurs), and "the more prosperous peasant industrialists" now find it profitable to buy these machines themselves and to hire them out to flax growers (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 29, p. 85). The bigger buyers-up of flax establish drying rooms and presses and hire workers to sort and scutch the flax (see example given by Mr. V. Prugavin, loc. cit., 115). Lastly, it should be added that the processing of flax-fibre requires quite a large number of workers: it is estimated that the cultivation of one dessiatine of flax requires 26 working days of agricultural work proper, and 77 days to extract the fibre from stalks (*Historico-Statistical Survey*, 72). Thus, the development of flax growing leads, on the one hand, to the farmer being more fully occupied during the winter and, on the other, to the creation of a demand for wage-labour on the part of those landlords and well-to-do peasants who engage in flax growing (see the example in Chapter III, § VI).

Thus, in the flax-growing area, too, the growth of commercial farming leads to the domination of capital and to the differentiation of the peasantry. A tremendous obstacle to the latter process is undoubtedly the ruinously high renting prices of land,** the pressure of merchant's capital, the tying of the peasant to his allotment and the high payments for the allotted land. Hence, the wider the development

* Strokin, 12.

** At the present time renting prices of flax land are falling due to the drop in the price of flax, but the area of land under flax, in the Pskov flax area in 1896, for example, has not diminished (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 29).

of land purchase by the peasants,* and of migration in search of employment,** and the more widespread the use of improved implements and methods of cultivation, the more rapidly will merchant's capital be supplanted by industrial capital, and the more rapidly will a rural bourgeoisie be formed from among the peasantry, and the system of labour-service for the landlord replaced by the capitalist system.

VII. THE TECHNICAL PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE

Above we have already had occasion to note (Chapter I, § I) that writers on agriculture, in classifying systems of farming according to the principal market product, assign the industrial or technical system of farming to a special category. The essence of this system is that the agricultural product, before going into consumption (personal or productive), undergoes technical processing. The establishments which effect this processing either constitute part of the very farms on which the raw material is produced or belong to special industrialists who buy up the raw material from the peasant farmers. From the standpoint of political economy the difference between these two types is unimportant. The growth of agricultural technical trades is extremely important as regards the development of capitalism. Firstly, this growth represents one of the forms of the development of commercial farming, and is, moreover, the form that shows most vividly the conversion of agriculture into a branch of

* Pskov Gubernia is one of the foremost in Russia in the development of the purchase of land by peasants. According to the *Combined Statistical Material on the Economic Position of the Rural Population* (published by Chancellery of the Committee of Ministers), the lands purchased by peasants amount here to 23% of the total allotment arable, this is the maximum for all the 50 gubernias. It works out at an average of 0.7 dess. of purchased land per head of the male peasant population as of January 1, 1892. In this respect only Novgorod and Taurida gubernias exceed Pskov Gubernia.

** The number of males leaving Pskov Gubernia in search of employment increased, statistics show from 1865-1875 to 1896 *nearly fourfold* (*Industries of the Peasant Population of Pskov Gubernia*, Pskov, 1898, p. 3).

industry of capitalist society. Secondly, the development of the technical processing of agricultural produce is usually connected intimately with technical progress in agriculture: on the one hand, the very production of the raw material for processing often necessitates agricultural improvement (the planting of root-crops, for example); on the other hand, the waste products of the processing are frequently utilised in agriculture, thus increasing its effectiveness and restoring, at least in some measure, the equilibrium, the interdependence, between agriculture and industry, the disturbance of which constitutes one of the most profound contradictions of capitalism.

We must accordingly now describe the development of technical agricultural trades in post-Reform Russia.

1) Distilling

Here we regard distilling only from the point of view of agriculture. Accordingly, there is no need for us to dwell on the rapid concentration of distilling in large plants (partly due to excise requirements), on the rapid progress of factory technique, with the consequent cheapening of production, and the increase in excise duties which has outstripped this cheapening of production and because of its excessive amount has retarded the growth of consumption and production.

Here are data for "agricultural" distilling in the whole of the Russian Empire*:

Distilleries in 1896-97	No. of distilleries		Spirit distilled (thousand vedros)	
Agricultural	1,474	1,878	13,521	24,331
Mixed	404		10,810	
Industrial	159		5,457	
Total	2,037		29,788	

* The law of June 4, 1890, laid down the following criteria of agricultural distilling: 1) distilling season, from September 1 to June 1, when no field-work is done; 2) proportion between the quantity of spirits distilled and the number of dessiatines of arable land on the estate. Plants carrying on partly agricultural and partly industrial

Thus, over 9/10 of the distilleries (accounting for over 4/5 of the total output) are directly connected with agriculture. Being large capitalist enterprises, these establishments lend the same character to all the landlord farms on which they are set up (the distilleries belong almost without exception to landlords, mainly to members of the nobility). The type of commercial farming under review is particularly developed in the central black-earth gubernias, in which are concentrated over 1/10 of the total number of distilleries in the Russian Empire (239 in 1896-97, of which 225 were agricultural and mixed), producing over a quarter of the total output of spirits (7,785,000 vedros in 1896-97, of which 6,828,000 at agricultural and at mixed distilleries). Thus in the area where labour-service predominates, the commercial character of agriculture most frequently (as compared with other areas) manifests itself in the distilling of vodka from grain and potatoes. Distilling from potatoes has undergone a particularly rapid development since the Reform, as may be seen from the following data relating to the whole of the Russian Empire*:

		Materials used for distilling (thousand poods)		
		All crops	Potatoes	% Potatoes
In 1867		76,925	6,950	9.1
Average for 10 years	1873-74 and 1882-83	123,066	65,508	53
	1882-83 and 1891-92	128,706	79,803	62
In 1893-94		150,857	115,850	76
" 1896-97		144,038	101,993	70.8

Thus, with a general twofold increase in the quantity of crops distilled, the quantity of potatoes used increased about 15-fold. This fact strikingly corroborates the proposition established above (§I in this chapter) that the enormous increase in the potato area and crop signifies the growth of precisely commercial and capitalist farming, along with improvement of agricultural technique, with the replacement of the three-field system by multi-field crop rotation,

distilling are called mixed distilleries (cf. *Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 25, and 1898, No. 10).

* Sources: *Military Statistical Abstract*, 427; *Productive Forces*, IX, 49, and *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 14.

etc.* The area of the biggest development of distilling is also distinguished for the biggest (in the Russian gubernias, i.e., not counting the Baltic and the western gubernias) net per-capita harvest of potatoes. Thus in the northern black-earth gubernias the figures for 1864-1866, 1870-1879 and 1883-1887 were 0.44, 0.62 and 0.60 chetverts respectively, whereas for the whole of European Russia (50 gubernias) the corresponding figures were 0.27, 0.43 and 0.44 chetverts. As far back as the beginning of the 80s the *Historico-Statistical Survey* noted that "the region marked by the greatest expansion of potato cultivation covers all the gubernias of the central and northern parts of the black-earth belt, the Volga and Transvolga gubernias and the central non-black-earth gubernias" (loc. cit., p. 44).**

The expansion of potato cultivation by landlords and well-to-do peasants means an increase in the demand for hired labour; the cultivation of a dessiatine of potatoes absorbs much more labour*** than the cultivation of a dessiatine of cereals and the use of machinery in, for example,

* Cf. Raspopin, loc. cit.,—*Historico-Statistical Survey*, loc. cit., p. 14. The by-products of distilling (wash) are often used (even by commercial and not only agricultural establishments) in commercial beef-cattle raising.—Cf. *Agricultural Statistical Information*, Vol. VII, p. 122 and passim.

** The great rapidity with which the use of potatoes for distilling has increased in the central agricultural gubernias can be seen from the following data. In six gubernias: Kursk, Orel, Tula, Ryazan, Tambov and Voronezh, during the period 1864-65 to 1873-74 an average of 407,000 poods of potatoes was distilled per annum; during 1874-75 to 1883-84—7,482,000 poods; during 1884-85 to 1893-94, 20,077,000 poods. For the whole of European Russia the corresponding figures are: 10,633,000 poods, 30,599,000 poods and 69,620,000 poods. The number of distilleries using potatoes in the above gubernias averaged 29 per annum in the period 1867-68 to 1875-76; in the period 1876-77 to 1884-85, 130; and in the period 1885-86 to 1893-94, 163. For the whole of European Russia the corresponding figures are: 739, 979, 1,195 (see *Agricultural Statistical Information*, Vol. VII).

*** For example, according to the Zemstvo statistical returns for Balakhna Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, the cultivation of one dess. of potatoes requires 77.2 working days, including 59.2 working days of a woman occupied in planting, hoeing, weeding and digging. The greatest increase, therefore, is in the demand for the day labour of local peasant women.

the central black-earth area is still very slight. Thus, while the number of workers engaged in the distilling industry proper has decreased,* the elimination of labour-service by the capitalist system of farming, with the cultivation of root-crops, has increased the demand for rural day labourers.

2) Beet-Sugar Production

The processing of sugar-beet is even more highly concentrated in big capitalist enterprises than distilling is, and is likewise an adjunct of the landlords' (mainly noblemen's) estates. The principal area of this industry is the south-western gubernias, and then the southern black-earth and central black-earth gubernias. The area under sugar-beet amounted in the 60s to about 100,000 dess.,** in the 70s to about 160,000 dess.***; in 1886-1895 to 239,000 dess.,**** in 1896-1898 to 369,000 dess.,(*) in 1900 to 478,778 dess., in 1901 to 528,076 dess. (*Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta*, 1901, No. 123), in 1905-06 to 483,272 dess. (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1906, No. 12). Hence, in the period following the Reform the area cultivated has increased more than 5-fold. Incomparably more rapid has been the growth of the amount of sugar-beet harvested and processed: on an average the weight of sugar-beet processed in the Empire in the years

* In 1867 the number of workers in European Russia employed in distilleries was estimated at 52,660 (*Military Statistical Abstract*. In Chapter VII we shall show that this source tremendously overstates the number of factory workers), and in 1890 at 26,102 (according to Orlov's *Directory*). The workers engaged in distilling proper are few in number and, moreover, differ but little from rural workers. "All the workers employed in the village distilleries," says Dr. Zhbankov, for example, "which, moreover, do not operate regularly, since the workers leave for field-work in the summer, differ very distinctly from regular factory workers they wear peasant clothes, retain their rural habits, and do not acquire the particular polish characteristic of factory workers" (loc. cit., II, 121).

** *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Vol. I.—*Military Statistical Abstract.—Historico-Statistical Survey*, Vol. II.

*** *Historico-Statistical Survey*, I.

**** *Productive Forces*, I, 41.

(*) *Vestnik Finansov* [*Financial Messenger*], 1897, No. 27, and 1898, No 36. In European Russia, without the Kingdom of Poland, there was in 1896-1898 an area of 327,000 dess, under sugar-beet.

1860-1864 was 4.1 million berkovets*; in 1870-1874—9.3 million; in 1875-1879—12.8 million; in 1890-1894—29.3 million; and in 1895-96 and 1897-98—35 million.** The amount of processed sugar-beet has grown since the 60s more than 8-fold. Hence, there has been an enormous increase in the beet yield, i.e., in labour productivity, on the big estates organised on capitalist lines.*** The introduction of a root-plant like beet into the rotation is indissolubly linked with the transition to a more advanced system of cultivation, with improved tillage and cattle feed, etc. "The tillage of the soil for beetroot," we read in the *Historico-Statistical Survey* (Vol. I), "which, generally speaking, is rather complicated and difficult, has been brought to a high degree of perfection on many beet farms, especially in the south-western and Vistula gubernias. In different localities, various more or less improved implements and ploughs are used for tilling; in some cases even steam ploughing has been introduced" (p. 109).

This progress of large-scale capitalist farming gives rise to quite a considerable increase in the demand for agricultural wage-workers—regular and particularly day labourers—the employment of female and child labour being particularly extensive (cf. *Historico-Statistical Survey*, II, 32). Among the peasants of the neighbouring gubernias a special type of migration has arisen, known as migration "to sugar" (ibid., 42). It is estimated that the complete cultivation of a morg (= 2/3 dess.)**** of beet land requires 40 working days (*Hired Labour*, 72). The *Combined Material on the Position of the Rural Population* (published by Committee of Ministers) estimates that the cultivation of one dessiatine of beet land, when done by machine, requires 12, and when by hand 25, working days of males, not counting women and juveniles (pp. X-XI). Thus, the cultivation of the total beet area in Russia probably engages not less than 300,000 agricultural day labourers, men and women.

* Berkovets—360 lbs.—*Ed.*

** In addition to above sources see *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 32.

*** Taking the average for the period 1890-1894, out of 285,000 dess. under beet in the Empire, 118,000 dess. belonged to refineries and 167,000 dess. to planters (*Productive Forces*, IX, 44).

**** 1.8 acres.—*Ed.*

But the increase in the number of dessiatines under beet is not enough to give a complete idea of the demand for hired labour, since some jobs are paid for at so much per berkovets. Here, for example, is what we read in *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry in Russia* (published by Ministry of State Properties, Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 82).

"The female population both of the town, and of the uyezd" (the town of Krolevets, Chernigov Gubernia, is referred to) "think highly of work on the beet fields; in the autumn the cleaning of beets is paid at 10 kopeks per berkovets, and two women clean from six to ten berkovets a day, but some contract to work during the growing season as well, weeding and hoeing; in that case, for the full job, including digging and cleaning, they get 25 kopeks per berkovets of cleaned beets." The conditions of the workers on the beet plantations are extremely bad. For instance, the *Vrachebnaya Khronika Kharkovskoi Gubernii** (September 1899, quoted in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, 1899, No. 254) cites "a number of exceedingly deplorable facts about the conditions *of those working on the red-beet plantations*. Thus, the Zemstvo physician, Dr. Podolsky, of the village of Kotelva, Akhtyrka Uyezd, writes: 'In the autumn *typhus* usually breaks out among *young people employed on the red-beet plantations of the well-to-do peasants*. The sheds assigned for the workers' leisure and sleeping quarters are kept by such planters in a very filthy condition; by the time the job ends the straw used for sleeping is literally converted into dung, for it is never changed: this becomes a breeding ground of infection. Typhus has had to be diagnosed immediately in the case of four or five patients brought in from one and the same plantation.' In the opinion of this doctor, 'most of the syphilis cases come from the red-beet plantations.' Mr. Feinberg rightly asserts that 'work on the plantations, which is no less injurious to the workers themselves and to the surrounding population than work in the factories, has particularly disastrous consequences, because large numbers of women and juveniles are engaged in it, and because the workers here are without the most elementary protection from society and the State'; in view of this, the author wholly

* *Medical Chronicle of Kharkov Gubernia.—Ed.*

supports the opinion expressed by Dr. Romanenko at the Seventh Congress of Doctors of Kharkov Gubernia that 'in issuing *compulsory* regulations, *consideration* must also be given *to the conditions of the workers on the beet plantations*. These workers lack the most essential things; they live for months under the open sky and eat from a common bowl.'"

Thus, the growth of beet cultivation has enormously increased the demand for rural workers, converting the neighbouring peasantry into a rural proletariat. The increase in the number of rural workers has been but slightly checked by the inconsiderable drop in the number of workers engaged in the beet-sugar industry proper.*

3) Potato-Starch Production

From branches of technical production conducted exclusively on landlord farms let us pass to such as are more or less within the reach of the peasantry. These include, primarily, the processing of potatoes (partly also wheat and other cereals) into starch and treacle. Starch production has developed with particular rapidity in the post-Reform period owing to the enormous growth of the textile industry, which raises a demand for starch. The area covered by this branch of production is mainly the non-black-earth, the industrial, and, partly, the northern black-earth gubernias. The *Historico-Statistical Survey* (Vol. II) estimates that in the middle of the 60s, there were about 60 establishments with an output valued at about 270,000 rubles, while in 1880 there were 224 establishments with an output valued at 1,317,000 rubles. In 1890, according to the *Directory of Factories and Works* there were 192 establishments employing 3,418 workers, with an output valued at 1,760,000 rubles.** "In the past 25 years," we read in the

* In European Russia 80,919 workers were employed in 1867 at beet-sugar factories and refineries (*The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I. *The Military Statistical Abstract* overstated the figure here too, giving it as 92,000, evidently counting the same workers twice). The figure for 1890 is 77,875 workers (Orlov's *Directory*).

** We take the data given in the *Historico-Statistical Survey* as being the most uniform and comparable. *The Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance* (1866, No. 4, April), on the basis of

Historico-Statistical Survey, "the number of establishments engaged in starch production has increased 4½ times and the total output 10¾ times; nevertheless, this productivity is far from covering the demand for starch" (p. 116), as evidenced by the increased starch imports from abroad. Analysing the data for each gubernia, the *Historico-Statistical Survey* reaches the conclusion that our production of potato-starch (unlike that of wheat-starch) is of an agricultural character, being concentrated in the hands of peasants and landlords. "Showing promise of extensive development" in the future, "it is even now furnishing our rural population with considerable advantages" (126).

We shall see in a moment who enjoys these advantages. But first let us note that two processes must be distinguished in the development of starch production: on the one hand, the appearance of new small factories and the growth of peasant production, and on the other, the concentration of production in large steam-powered factories. For instance, in 1890 there were 77 steam-powered factories, with 52% of the total number of workers and 60% of the total output concentrated in them. Of these works only 11 were established before 1870, 17 in the 70s, 45 in the 80s, and 2 in 1890 (Mr. Orlov's *Directory*).

To acquaint ourselves with the economy of peasant starch production, let us turn to local investigations. In Moscow Gubernia, in 1880-81, 43 villages in 4 uyezds engaged in starch making.* The number of establishments was

official data of the Department of Commerce and Manufacture, estimated that in 1864 there were in Russia 55 starch-making establishments whose output was valued at 231,000 rubles. The *Military Statistical Abstract* estimates that in 1866 there were 198 establishments with an output valued at 563,000 rubles, but this undoubtedly included small establishments, not now reckoned as factories. Generally speaking, the statistics of this trade are very unsatisfactory: small factories are some times counted, and at others (much more often) are not. Thus, Orlov's *Directory* gives the number of establishments in Yaroslavl Gubernia in 1890 as 25 (the *List* for 1894-95 gives 20), while according to the *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia* (Vol. II, 1896), in Rostov Uyezd alone there were 810 starch and treacle establishments. Hence, the figures given in the text can indicate only the dynamics of the phenomenon, but not the actual development of the industry.

* *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Moscow, 1882.

estimated at 130, employing 780 workers and having an output valued at not less than 137,000 rubles. The industry spread mainly after the Reform; its technique gradually improved and larger establishments were formed requiring more fixed capital and showing a higher productivity of labour. Hand graters were replaced by improved ones, then horse power appeared, and finally the *drum* was introduced, considerably improving and cheapening production. Here are data we have compiled from a house-to-house census of "handicraftsmen," according to size of establishment:

Categories of establishments*	No. of establishments	No. of workers			Workers per establishment			Average number of working weeks	Output (rubles)		
		Family	Hired	Total	Family	Hired	Total		Total	Per establishment	Per worker in 4 weeks
Small	15	30	45	75	2	3	5	5.3	12,636	842	126
Medium	42	96	165	261	2.2	4	6.2	5.5	55,890	1,331	156
Large	11	26	67	93	2.4	6	8.4	6.4	61,282	5,571	416
Total	68	152	277	429	2.2	4.1	6.3	5.5	129,808	1,908	341

Thus we have here small capitalist establishments in which, as production expands, the employment of hired labour increases and the productivity of labour rises. These establishments bring the peasant bourgeoisie considerable profit, and also improve agricultural technique. But the situation of the workers in these workshops is very unsatisfactory, owing to the extremely insanitary working conditions and the long working day.**

The peasants who own "grating" establishments farm under very favourable conditions. The planting of potatoes (on

* See Appendix to Chapter V, Industry No. 24.

** Loc. cit., p. 32. The working day in the peasant workshops is 13 to 14 hours, while in the big works in the same industry (according to Dementyev[100]) a 12-hour working day prevails.

allotment, and chiefly on rented land) yields a considerably larger income than the planting of rye or oats. To enlarge their business the workshop owners rent a considerable amount of allotment land from the poor peasants. For example, in the village of Tsybino (Bronnitsy Uyezd), 18 owners of starch workshops (out of 105 peasant families in the village) rent allotments from peasants who have left in search of employment, and also from horseless peasants, thus adding to their own 61 allotments 133 more, which they have rented; concentrated in their hands are a total of 194 allotments, i.e., 44.5% of the total number of allotments in the village. "Exactly similar things," we read in the *Returns*, "are met with in other villages where the starch industry is more or less developed" (loc. cit., 42).* The owners of the starch workshops have twice as much livestock as the other peasants: they average 3.5 horses and 3.4 cows per household, as against 1.5 horses and 1.7 cows among the local peasants in general. Of the 68 workshop owners (covered by the house-to-house census) 10 own purchased land, 22 rent non-allotment land and 23 rent allotment land. In short, these are typical representatives of the peasant bourgeoisie.

Exactly analogous relations are to be found in the starch-making industry in the Yuryev Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia (V. Prugavin, loc. cit., p. 104 and foll.). Here, too, the workshop owners carry on production mainly with the aid of wage-labour (out of 128 workers in 30 workshops, 86 are hired); and here, too, the workshop owners are far above the mass of the peasantry as far as stock-breeding and agriculture are concerned; they use potato pulp as feed for their cattle. Even real capitalist farmers emerge from among the peasants. Mr. Prugavin describes the farm of a peasant who owns a starch works (valued at about 1,500 rubles) employing 12 wage-workers. This peasant grows potatoes on his own farm, which he has enlarged by renting land. The crop rotation is seven-field and includes clover. For the farm work he employs from 7 to 8 workers, hired from spring to

* Compare with this statement the general view of V. Orlov on Moscow Gubernia as a whole (*Returns*, Vol. IV, Pt. 1, p. 14): the prosperous peasants frequently rent the allotments of the peasant poor, and sometimes hold from 5 to 10 rented allotments.

autumn ("from end to end"). The pulp is used as cattle feed, and the owner intends to use the waste water for his fields.

Mr. Y. Prugavin assures us that this works enjoys "quite exceptional conditions." Of course, in any capitalist society the rural bourgeoisie will always constitute a very small minority of the rural population, and in this sense will, if you like, be an "exception." But this term will not eliminate the fact that in the starch-making area, as in all the other commercial farming areas in Russia, a class of rural entrepreneurs is being formed, who are organising capitalist agriculture.*

4) Vegetable-Oil Production

The extraction of oil from linseed, hemp, sunflower and other seeds is also frequently an agricultural industry. One can gauge the development of vegetable-oil production in the post-Reform period from the fact that in 1864 the vegetable-oil output had an estimated value of 1,619,000 rubles, in 1879 of 6,486,000 rubles, and in 1890 of 12,232,000 rubles.** In this branch of production, too, a double process of development is to be observed: on the one hand, small peasant (and sometimes also landlord) oil presses producing oil for sale are established in the villages. On the other hand, large steam-driven works develop, which concentrate production and oust the small establishments.*** Here

* As a matter of interest, let us mention that both Mr. Prugavin (loc. cit., 107), the author of the description of the Moscow industry (loc. cit., 45), and Mr. V. V. (*Essays on Handicraft Industry*, 127), have discerned the "artel principle" in the fact that some grating establishments belong to several owners. Our sharp-eyed Narodniks have contrived to observe a special "principle" in the association of rural entrepreneurs, and have failed to see any new social-economic "principles" in the very existence and development of a class of rural entrepreneurs.

** *Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance*, *1866*, no. 4, Orlov's *Directory*, 1st and 3rd editions. We do not give figures for the number of establishments because our factory statistics confuse small agricultural oil-pressing establishments with big industrial ones, at times including the former, and at others not including them for different gubernias at different times. In the 1860s, for example, a host of small oil presses were included in the category of "works."

*** For example, in 1890, 11 works out of 383 had an output valued at 7,170,000 rubles out of 12,232,000 rubles. This victory of the industrial over the rural entrepreneurs is causing profound

we are interested solely in the agricultural processing of oil-bearing plants. "The owners of the hempseed oil presses," we read in the *Historico-Statistical Survey* (Vol. II), "belong to the well-to-do members of the peasantry"; they attach particular value to vegetable-oil production because it enables them to obtain excellent feed for their cattle (oil-cake). Mr. Prugavin (loc. cit.), noting the "extensive development of the production of linseed oil" in the Yuryev Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, states that the peasants derive "no little advantage" from it (pp. 65-66), that crop and stock raising is conducted on a far higher level by peasants who own oil presses than by the bulk of the peasantry and that some of the oil millers also resort to the hire of rural workers (loc. cit., tables, pp. 26-27 and 146-147). The Perm handicraft census for 1894-95 also showed that crop raising is conducted on a much higher level by handicraft oil millers than by the bulk of the peasants (larger areas under crops, far more animals, better harvests, etc.), and that this improvement in cultivation is accompanied by the hiring of rural workers.* In the post-Reform period in Voronezh Gubernia, there has been a particular development of the *commercial* cultivation of sunflower seed, which is crushed for oil in local presses. The area under sunflowers in Russia in the 70s was estimated at about 80,000 dess. (*Historico-Statistical Survey*, I), and in the 80s at about 136,000 dess., of which ⅔ belonged to peasants. "Since then, however, judging by certain data, the area under this plant has considerably increased, in some places by 100 per cent and even more" (*Productive Forces*, I, 37). "In the village of Alexeyevka alone" (Biryuch Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia), we read in the *Historico-Statistical*

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dissatisfaction among our agrarians (e.g., Mr. S. Korolenko, loc. cit.) and our Narodniks (e.g., Mr. N. —on's *Sketches*, pp. 241-242). We do not share their views. The big works will raise the productivity of labour and socialise production. That is one point. Another is that the workers conditions in the big works will probably be better, and not only from the material angle, than at the small agricultural oil presses.

* V. Ilyin, *Economic Studies and Essays*, St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 139-140. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of "Handicraft" Industry.—Ed.*

Survey, Vol. II, "there are more than 40 oil presses, and Alexeyevka itself, solely owing to sunflowers, has prospered and grown from a wretched little hamlet into a rich township, with houses and shops roofed with sheet iron" (p. 41). How this wealth of the peasant bourgeoisie was reflected in the condition of the mass of the peasantry may be seen from the fact that in 1890, in the village of Alexeyevka, out of 2,273 families registered (13,386 persons of both sexes), 1,761 had no draught animals, 1,699 had no implements, 1,480 cultivated no land, and only 33 families did not engage in industries.*

In general, it should be stated that peasant oil presses usually figure, in Zemstvo house-to-house censuses, among the "commercial and industrial establishments," of whose distribution and role we have already spoken in Chapter II.

5) Tobacco Growing

In conclusion, let us make some brief observations on the development of tobacco growing. The average crop in Russia for the years 1863-1867 was 1,923,000 poods from 32,161 dess.; for 1872-1878 it was 2,783,000 poods from 46,425 dess.; for the 80s, it was 4 million poods from 50,000 dess.** The number of plantations in the same periods was estimated at 75,000, 95,000 and 650,000 respectively, which evidently indicates a very considerable increase in the number of small cultivators drawn into this type of commercial farming. Tobacco growing requires a considerable number of workers. Among the types of agricultural migration note is

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* *Statistical Returns for Biryuch Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia.*—The number of industrial establishments counted in the village was 153. According to Mr. Orlov's *Directory* for 1890 there were in this village 6 oil presses employing 34 workers, with output valued at 17,000 rubles, and according to the *List of Factories and Works* for 1894-95 there were 8 oil presses employing 60 workers, with an output valued at 151,000 rubles.

** *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I.—*Historico-Statistical Survey*, Vol. I.—*Productive Forces*, IX, 62. The area under tobacco fluctuates considerably from year to year: for example, the average for 1889-1894 was 47,813 dess. (crop—4,180,000 poods), and for 1892-1894 was 52,516 dess. with a crop of 4,878,000 poods. See *Returns for Russia*, 1896, pp. 208-209.

therefore made of migration to tobacco plantations (particularly to the outer gubernias in the South, where the cultivation of tobacco has recently expanded with exceptional rapidity). Reference has already been made in publications to the fact that the workers on the tobacco plantations lead a very hard life.*

In the *Survey of Tobacco Growing in Russia* (Parts II and III, St. Petersburg, 1894, published by order of the Department of Agriculture), there are very detailed and interesting data on tobacco growing as a branch of commercial farming. Mr. V. S. Shcherbachov, describing tobacco growing in Malorossia, gives wonderfully precise information on three uyezds of Poltava Gubernia (Priluki, Lokhvitsa and Romny). This information, gathered by the author and arranged by the Bureau of Statistics, Poltava Gubernia Zemstvo Board, covers 25,089 peasant farms in the three uyezds that grow tobacco; they have 6,844 dessiatines under tobacco and 146,774 dessiatines under cereals. The farms are distributed as follows:

Three uyezds of Poltava Gubernia (1888)

Groups of farms according to area under cereals	No. of farms	Area in dessiatines under tobacco	Area in dessiatines under cereals
Less than 1 dess.	2,231	374	448
From 1 to 3 "	7,668	895	13,974
" 3 to 6 "	8,856	1,482	34,967
" 6 to 9 "	3,319	854	22,820
Over 9 "	3,015	3,239	74,565
Total	25,089	6,844	146,774

We see an enormous concentration of both the tobacco and the cereal area in the hands of the capitalist farms. Less than one-eighth of the farms (3,000 out of 25,000) hold more than half the area under cereals (74,000 dess. out of 147,000), with an average of nearly 25 dess. per farm.

* Beloborodov, above-mentioned article in *Severny Vestnik*, 1896, No. 2. *Russkiye Vedomosti*, 1897, No. 127 (May 10) reported a trial in which 20 working women sued the owner of a tobacco plantation in the Crimea, and stated that "numerous facts were revealed in court, depicting the impossible hard life of the plantation workers."

Almost half the area under tobacco (3,200 dess. out of 6,800) belongs to these farms, the average per farm being over 1 dessiatine, whereas for all the other groups the area under tobacco does not exceed one- to two-tenths of a dessiatine per household.

Mr. Shcherbachov, in addition, gives data showing the same farms grouped according to area under tobacco:

Groups of tobacco plantations	No. of plantations		Area under tobacco (dessiatines)	
0.01 dess and less	2,919		30	
From 0.01 to 0.10 dess.	9,078		492	
" 0.10 to 0.25 "	5,989		931	
" 0.25 to 0.50 "	4,330		1,246	
" 0.50 to 1.00 "	1,834	2,773	1,065	4,145
" 1.00 to 2.00 "	615		720	
" 2.00 and more "	324		2,360	
Total	25,089		6,844	

From this it can be seen that the concentration of the tobacco area is considerably greater than that of the cereal area. The branch of specifically commercial agriculture in this locality is concentrated in the hands of capitalists to a greater extent than is agriculture in general. Out of 25,000 farms, 2,773 account for 4,145 dess. under tobacco out of 6,844 dess., or more than three-fifths. The biggest tobacco planters, numbering 324 (a little over one-tenth of all the planters), have 2,360 dess. under tobacco, or over one-third of the total area. This averages *over 7 dessiatines under tobacco* per farm. To judge of the sort of farm it must be, let us recall that tobacco cultivation requires *at least two workers* for a period of 4 to 8 summer months, depending on the grade of tobacco.

The owner of 7 dessiatines under tobacco must therefore have at least 14 workers; in other words, he must undoubtedly base his farm on wage-labour. Some grades of tobacco require not two but three seasonal workers per dessiatine, and day labourers in addition. In a word, we see quite clearly that the greater the degree to which agriculture becomes commercial, the more highly developed is its capitalist organisation.

The preponderance of small and tiny farms among the tobacco growers (11,997 farms out of 25,089 have *up to one-tenth* of a dessiatine planted) does not in the least refute the fact of the capitalist organisation of this branch of commercial agriculture; for this mass of tiny farms accounts for an insignificant share of the output (11,997, i.e., nearly half the farms, have in all 522 dess. out of 6,844, or less than one-tenth). Nor do "average" figures, to which people so often confine themselves, provide a picture of the real situation (the average per farm is a little over ¼ dessiatine under tobacco).

In some uyezds the development of capitalist agriculture and the concentration of production are still more marked. In the Lokhvitsa Uyezd, for example, 229 farms out of 5,957 each have 20 dessiatines and more under cereals. Their owners have 22,799 dess. under cereals out of a total of 44,751, i.e., more than half. Each farmer has about 100 dess. under crops. Of the land under tobacco they have 1,126 dess. out of 2,003 dess. And if the farms are grouped according to area under tobacco, we have in this uyezd 132 farmers out of 5,957 with two and more dessiatines under tobacco. These 132 farmers have 1,441 dess. under tobacco out of 2,003, i.e., 72% and more than *ten* dessiatines under tobacco per farm. At the other extreme of the same Lokhvitsa Uyezd we have 4,360 farms (out of 5,957) having up to one-tenth of a dessiatine each under tobacco, and altogether 133 dessiatines out of 2,003, i.e., 6%.

It goes without saying that the capitalist organisation of *production* is accompanied here by a very considerable development of *merchant's* capital and by all sorts of exploitation outside the sphere of production. The small tobacco growers have no drying sheds, are unable to give their tobacco time to ferment and to sell it (in 3 to 6 weeks) as a finished product. They sell the unfinished product at *half the price* to buyers-up, who very often plant tobacco themselves on rented land. The buyers-up "squeeze the small planters in every way" (p. 31 of cited publication). Commercial agriculture is commercial capitalist production: this relation can be clearly traced (if only one is able to select the proper methods) in this branch of agriculture too.

VIII. INDUSTRIAL VEGETABLE AND FRUIT GROWING; SUBURBAN FARMING

With the fall of serfdom, "landlord fruit growing," which had been developed on quite a considerable scale, "suddenly and rapidly fell into decline almost all over Russia."* The construction of railways changed the situation, giving a "tremendous impetus" to the development of new, commercial fruit growing, and brought about a "complete change for the better" in this branch of commercial agriculture.** On the one hand, the influx of cheap fruit from the South undermined the industry in the centres where it was formerly conducted***; and on the other hand, industrial fruit growing developed, for example, in the Kovno, Vilna, Minsk, Grodno, Mogilev and Nizhni-Novgorod gubernias, along with the expansion of the fruit market.**** Mr. V. Pashkevich points out that an investigation into the condition of fruit farming in 1893-94 revealed a considerable development of it as an industrial branch of agriculture in the previous ten years, an increase in the demand for gardeners, undergardeners, etc.(*) Statistics confirm such views: the amount of fruit carried by the Russian railways is increasing,(**) fruit imports, which increased in the first decade after the Reform, are declining.(***)

It stands to reason that commercial vegetable growing, which provides articles of consumption for incomparably larger masses of the population than fruit growing does, has developed still more rapidly and still more extensively. Industrial vegetable growing becomes widespread, firstly, near the towns(****); secondly, near factory and commercial

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* *Historico-Statistical Survey*, I, p. 2.

** Ibid.

*** For example, in Moscow Gubernia. See S. Korolenko, *Hired Labour, etc.*, p. 262.

**** Ibid., pp. 335, 344, etc.

(*) *Productive Forces*, IV, 13.

(**) Ibid., p. 31, also *Historico-Statistical Survey*, p. 31 and foll.

(***) In the 60s imports amounted to nearly 1 million poods; in 1878-1880 to 3.8 million poods; in 1886-1890 to 2.6 million poods; in 1889-1893 to 2 million poods.

(****) Anticipating somewhat, let us note here that in 1863 there were in European Russia 13 towns with populations of 50,000 and over and in 1897 there were 44 (See Chapter VIII, §II).

and industrial settlements* and also along the railways; and thirdly, in certain villages, scattered throughout Russia and famous for their vegetables.** It should be observed that there is a demand for this type of produce not only among the industrial, but also among the agricultural population: let us recall that the budgets of the Voronezh peasants show a per-capita expenditure on vegetables of 47 kopeks, more than half of this expenditure being on *purchased* produce.

To acquaint ourselves with the social and economic relations that arise in this type of commercial agriculture we must turn to the data of local investigations in the particularly developed vegetable-growing areas. Near St. Petersburg, for example, frame and hot-house vegetable growing is widely developed, having been introduced by migratory vegetable growers from Rostov. The number of frames owned by big growers runs into thousands, and by medium growers, into hundreds. "Some of the big vegetable growers supply tens of thousands of poods of pickled cabbage to the army."*** According to Zemstvo statistics in Petersburg Uyezd 474 households of the local population are engaged in vegetable growing (about 400 rubles income per household) and 230 in fruit growing. Capitalist relations are very extensively developed both in the form of merchant's capital (the industry is "ruthlessly exploited by profiteers") and in the form of hiring workers. Among the immigrant population, for example, there are 115 master vegetable growers (with an income of over 3,000 rubles each) and 711 worker vegetable growers (with an income of 116 rubles each.)****

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* See examples of settlements of this type in Chapters VI and VII.

** See references to such villages of the Vyatka, Kostroma, Vladimir, Tver, Moscow, Kaluga, Penza, Nizhni-Novgorod and many other gubernias, to say nothing of Yaroslavl Gubernia, in *Historico-Statistical Survey*, 1, p. 13 and foll., and in *Productive Forces*, IV, 38 and foll. Cf. also Zemstvo statistical returns for Semyonov, Nizhni-Novgorod and Balakhna uyezds of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia.

*** *Productive Forces*, IV, 42.

**** *Material for Statistics on the Economy in St. Petersburg Gubernia*, Vol. V. Actually there are far more vegetable growers than stated in the text, for most of them have been classed under private-landowner farming, whereas the data cited refer only to peasant farming.

The peasant vegetable growers near Moscow are the same sort of typical members of the rural bourgeoisie. "According to an approximate estimate, over 4 million poods of vegetables and greens reach Moscow's markets every year. Some of the villages do a big trade in pickled vegetables: Nogatino Volost sells nearly a million vedros of pickled cabbage to factories and barracks, and even sends consignments to Kronstadt. . . . Commercial vegetable growing is widespread in all the Moscow uyezds, chiefly in the vicinity of towns and factories."* "The cabbage is chopped by hired labourers who come from Volokolamsk Uyezd" (*Historico-Statistical Survey*, I, p. 19).

Exactly similar relations exist in the well-known vegetable-growing district in Rostov Uyezd, Yaroslavl Gubernia, embracing 55 vegetable-growing villages—Porechye, Ugodichi and others. All the land, except pastures and meadows, has long been turned into vegetable fields. The technical processing of vegetables—preserving—is highly developed.** Together with the product of the land, the land itself and labour-power are converted into commodities. Despite the "village community," the inequality of land tenure, for example, in the village of Porechye, is very great: in one case a family of 4 has 7 "vegetable plots," in another a family of 3 has 17; this is explained by the fact that no periodical land redistribution takes place here; only private redivisions take place, and the peasants "freely exchange" their "vegetable plots" or "patches" (*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, 97-98).*** "A large part of the field-work . . . is done by male and female day labourers, many of whom come

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* *Productive Forces*, IV, 49 and foll. It is interesting to note that different villages specialise in producing particular kinds of vegetables.

** *Historico-Statistical Survey*, I—Mr. Orlov's *Directory of Factories.—Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry*, Vol XIV, article by Mr. Stolpyansky.—*Productive Forces*, IV, 46 and foll.—*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, Vol. 2, Yaroslavl, 1896. A comparison of the data given by Mr. Stolpyansky (1885) and by the *Directory* (1890) shows a considerable increase in the factory production of canned goods in this area.

*** Thus the publication mentioned has fully confirmed Mr. Volgin's "doubt" as to whether "the land occupied by vegetable plots is often redivided" (op. cit., 172, footnote).

to Porechye in the summer season both from neighbouring villages and from neighbouring gubernias" (ibid., 99). It is estimated that in the whole of Yaroslavl Gubernia 10,322 persons (of whom 7,689 are from Rostov) engaged in "agriculture and vegetable growing" are *migratory* workers—i.e., in the majority of cases are wage-workers in the given occupation.* The above quoted data on the migration of rural workers to the metropolitan gubernias,[101] Yaroslavl Gubernia, etc., should be brought into connection with the development not only of dairy farming but also of commercial vegetable growing.

Vegetable growing also includes the hot-house cultivation of vegetables, an industry that is rapidly developing among the well-to-do peasants of Moscow and Tver gubernias.** In the first-named gubernia the 1880-81 census showed 88 establishments with 3,011 frames; there were 213 workers, of whom 47 (22.6%) were hired; the total output was valued at 54,400 rubles. The average hot-house vegetable grower had to put at least 300 rubles into the "business." Of the 74 peasants for whom house-to-house returns are given, 41 possess purchased land, and as many rent land, there is an average of 2.2 horses per peasant. It is clear from this that the hot-house vegetable industry is only within the reach of members of the peasant bourgeoisie.***

In the south of Russia melon growing also comes within the type of commercial agriculture under review. Here are some brief observations about its development in a district described in an interesting article in the *Vestnik Finansov*

* Here, too, a characteristic specialisation of agriculture is to be observed: "It is noteworthy that in places where vegetable growing has become the special occupation of part of the peasant population, the others grow hardly any vegetables at all, but buy them at local markets and fairs" (S. Korolenko, loc. cit., 285).

** *Productive Forces*, IV, 50-51. S. Korolenko, loc. cit., 273.—*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol VII, Pt. 1.—*Statistical Returns for Tver Gubernia*, Vol. VIII, Pt. 1, Tver Uyezd: the census of 1886-1890 counted here something over 4,426 frames belonging to 174 peasants and 7 private landowners, i.e., an average of about 25 frames per owner. "In peasant farming it (the industry) is a big help, but only for the well-to-do peasants.... If there are more than 20 frames, workers are hired" (p. 167).

*** See data on this industry in appendix to Chapter V, Industry No. 9.

(1897, No. 16) on "industrial melon growing." This branch of production arose in the village of Bykovo (Tsarev Uyezd, Astrakhan Gubernia) at the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s. The melons, which at first went only to the Volga region, were consigned, with the coming of the railways, to the capital cities. In the 80s the output "increased at least tenfold" owing to the enormous profits (150 to 200 rubles per dess.) made by the initiators of the business. Like true petty bourgeois, they did all they could to prevent the number of growers from increasing and were most careful in guarding from their neighbours the "secret" of this new and profitable occupation. Of course, all these heroic efforts of the "muzhik cultivator"* to stave off "fatal competition"** were in vain, and the industry spread much wider—to Saratov Gubernia and the Don region. The drop in grain prices in the 90s gave a particularly strong impetus to production, compelling "local cultivators to seek a way out of their difficulties in crop rotation systems."*** The expansion of production considerably increased the demand for hired labour (melon growing requires a considerable amount of labour, so that the cultivation of one dessiatine costs from 30 to 50 rubles), and still more considerably increased the profits of the employers and ground-rent. Near "Log" Station (Gryazi-Tsaritsyn Railway), the area under water-melons in 1884 was 20 dess., in 1890 between 500 and 600 dess., and in 1896 between 1,400 and 1,500 dess., while rent rose from 30 kopeks to between 1.50 and 2 rubles and to between 4 and 14 rubles per dess. for the respective years. The over-rapid expansion of melon planting led at last, in 1896, to overproduction and a crisis, which finally confirmed the capitalist character of this branch of commercial agriculture. Melon prices fell to a point where they did not cover railway charges. The melons were left ungathered in the fields. After tasting tremendous profits the entrepreneurs now learned what losses were like. But the most interesting thing is the means they have chosen for combating the crisis: the means chosen is to win new markets, to effect such a cheapening of produce

* Mr. N.—on's term for the Russian peasant.

** Mr. V. Prugavin's term.

*** Better tilth is required to raise water-melons and this renders the soil more fertile when sown later to cereals.

and of railway tariffs as to transform it from an item of luxury into an item of consumption for the people (and at points of production, into cattle feed). "Industrial melon growing," the entrepreneurs assure us, "is on the road to further development; apart from high railway tariffs there is no obstacle to its further growth. On the contrary, the Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya Railway now under construction . . . opens a new and extensive area for industrial melon growing." Whatever the further destiny of this "industry" may be, at any rate the history of the "melon crisis" is very instructive, constituting a miniature picture, it is true, but a very vivid one, of the capitalist evolution of agriculture.

We still have to say a few words about *suburban farming*. The difference between it and the above-described types of commercial agriculture is that in their case the entire farm is adapted to some one chief market product. In the case of suburban farming, however, the small cultivator trades in bits of everything: he trades in his house by letting it to summer tenants and permanent lodgers, in his yard, in his horse and in all sorts of produce from his fields and farmyard: grain, cattle feed, milk, meat, vegetables, berries, fish, timber, etc.; he trades in his wife's milk (baby-farming near the capitals), he makes money by rendering the most diverse (not always even mentionable) services to visiting townsfolk,* etc., etc.** The complete transformation by capitalism of the ancient type of patriarchal farmer, the complete subjugation of the latter to the "power of money" is expressed here so vividly that the suburban peasant is usually put in a separate category by the Narodnik who says that he is "no longer a peasant." But the difference between this type and all preceding types is only one of form. The political and economic essence of the all-round transfor-

* Cf. Uspensky, *A Village Diary*.

** Let us refer, in illustration, to the above-quoted *Material* on peasant farming in Petersburg Uyezd. The most varied types of petty traffic have here assumed the form of "industries"; summer-letting, boarding, milk-selling, vegetable-selling, berry-selling, "horse employments," baby-farming, crayfish-catching, fishing, etc. Exactly similar are the industries of the suburban peasants of Tula Uyezd: see article by Mr. Borisov in Vol. IX of *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry*.

mation effected in the small cultivator by capitalism is everywhere the same. The more rapid the increase in the number of towns, the number of factory, commercial and industrial townships, and the number of railway stations, the more extensive is the area of the transformation of our "village-community man" into this type of peasant. We should not forget what was said in his day by Adam Smith—that improved communications tend to convert every village into a suburb.* Remote areas cut off from the outside world, already an exception, are with every passing day increasingly becoming as rare as antiquities, and the cultivator is turning with ever-growing rapidity into an industrialist subjected to the general laws of commodity production.

In thus concluding the review of the data on the growth of commercial agriculture, we think it not superfluous to repeat here that our aim has been to examine the main (by no means all) forms of commercial agriculture.

IX. CONCLUSIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE

In chapters II-IV the problem of capitalism in Russian agriculture has been examined from two angles. First we examined the existing system of social and economic relations in peasant and landlord economy, the system which has taken shape in the post-Reform period. It was seen that the peasantry have been splitting up at enormous speed into a numerically small but economically strong rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat. Inseparably connected with this "depeasantising" process is the landowners' transition from the labour-service to the capitalist system of farming. Then we examined this same process from another angle: we took as our starting-point the manner in which agriculture is transformed into commodity production, and examined the social and economic relations characteristic of each of the principal forms of commercial agriculture. It was shown that the very same processes were conspicuous in both

* "Good roads, canals and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of carriage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those in the neighbourhood of the town." Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 228-229.

peasant and private-landowner farming under a great variety of agricultural conditions.

Let us now examine the conclusions that follow from all the data given above.

1) The main feature of the post-Reform evolution of agriculture is its growing commercial, entrepreneur character. As regards private-landowner farming, this fact is so obvious as to require no special explanation. As regards peasant farming, however, it is not so easily established, firstly, because the employment of hired labour is not an absolutely essential feature of the small rural bourgeoisie. As we have observed above, this category includes every small commodity-producer who covers his expenditure by independent farming, provided the general system of economy is based on the capitalist contradictions examined in Chapter II. Secondly, the small rural bourgeois (in Russia, as in other capitalist countries) is connected by a number of transitional stages with the small-holding "peasant," and with the rural proletarian who has been allotted a patch of land. This circumstance is one of the reasons for the viability of the theories which do not distinguish the existence of a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat among "the peasantry."*

2) From the very nature of agriculture its transformation into commodity production proceeds in a special way, unlike the corresponding process in industry. Manufacturing industry splits up into separate, quite independent branches, each devoted exclusively to the manufacture of one product or one part of a product. The agricultural industry, however, does not split up into quite separate branches, but merely specialises in one market product in one case, and in another market product in another, all the other aspects of agriculture being adapted to this principal (i.e., market) product. That is why the forms of commercial agriculture show immense diversity, varying not only in

* The favourite proposition of the Narodnik economists that "Russian peasant farming is in the majority of cases purely natural economy" is, incidentally, built up by ignoring this fact. (*The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, I, 52.) One has but to take "average" figures, which lump together both the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat—and this proposition will pass as proved!

different areas, but also on different farms. That is why, when examining the question of the growth of commercial agriculture, we must on no account confine ourselves to gross data for agricultural production as a whole.*

3) The growth of commercial agriculture creates a home market for capitalism. Firstly, the specialisation of agriculture gives rise to exchange between the various agricultural areas, between the various agricultural undertakings, and between the various agricultural products. Secondly, the further agriculture is drawn into the sphere of commodity circulation the more rapid is the growth of the demand made by the rural population for those products of manufacturing industry that serve for personal consumption; and thirdly, the more rapid is the growth of the demand for means of production, since neither the small nor the big rural entrepreneur is able, with the old-fashioned "peasant" implements, buildings, etc., etc., to engage in the new, commercial agriculture. Fourthly and lastly, a demand is created for labour-power, since the formation of a small rural bourgeoisie and the change-over by the landowners to capitalist farming presuppose the formation of a body of regular agricultural labourers and day labourers. Only the fact of the growth of commercial agriculture can explain the circumstance that the post-Reform period is characterised by an expansion of the home market for capitalism (development of capitalist agriculture, development of factory industry in general, development of the agricultural engineer-

* It is to data of this kind that the authors of the book mentioned in the preceding note confine themselves when they speak of "the peasantry." They assume that every peasant sows *just* those cereals that he consumes, that he sows *all those* types of cereals that he consumes, and that he sows them *in just that proportion* in which they are consumed. It does not require much effort to "deduce" from such "assumptions" (which contradict the facts and ignore the main feature of the post-Reform period) that natural economy predominates.

In Narodnik literature one may also encounter the following ingenious method of argument: each *separate* type of commercial agriculture is an "exception"—by comparison with agriculture as a whole. *Hence*, all commercial agriculture in general, it is averred, must be regarded as an exception, and natural economy must be considered the general rule! In college textbooks on logic, in the section on sophisms, numerous parallels of such lines of reasoning are to be found.

ing industry in particular, development of the so-called peasant "agricultural industries," i.e., work for hire, etc.).

4) Capitalism enormously extends and intensifies among the agricultural population the contradictions without which this mode of production cannot exist. Notwithstanding this, however, agricultural capitalism in Russia, in its historical significance, is a big progressive force. Firstly, capitalism has transformed the cultivator from a "lord of the manor," on the one hand, and a patriarchal, dependent peasant, on the other, into the same sort of *industrialist* that every other proprietor is in present-day society. Before capitalism appeared, agriculture in Russia was the business of the gentry, a lord's hobby for some, and a duty, an obligation for others; consequently, it could not be conducted except according to age-old routine, necessarily involving the complete isolation of the cultivator from all that went on in the world beyond the confines of his village. The labour-service system—that living survival of old times in present-day economy—strikingly confirms this characterisation. Capitalism for the first time broke with the system of social estates in land tenure by converting the land into a commodity. The farmer's product was put on sale and began to be subject to social reckoning—first in the local, then in the national, and finally in the international market, and in this way the former isolation of the uncouth farmer from the rest of the world was completely broken down. The farmer was compelled willy-nilly, on pain of ruin, to take account of the sum-total of social relations both in his own country and in other countries, now linked together by the world market. Even the labour-service system, which formerly guaranteed Oblomov an assured income without any risk on his part, without any expenditure of capital, without any changes in the age-old routine of production, now proved incapable of saving him from the competition of the American farmer. That is why one can fully apply to post-Reform Russia what was said half a century ago about Western Europe—that agricultural capitalism hag been "the motive force which has drawn the idyll into the movement of history."*

* *Misère de la philosophie* (Paris, 1896), p. 223; the author contemptuously describes as reactionary jeremiads, the longings of those

Secondly, agricultural capitalism has for the first time undermined the age-old stagnation of our agriculture; it has given a tremendous impetus to the transformation of its technique, and to the development of the productive forces of social labour. A few decades of "destructive work" by capitalism have done more in this respect than entire centuries of preceding history. The monotony of routine natural economy has been replaced by a diversity of forms of commercial agriculture; primitive agricultural implements have begun to yield place to improved implements and machines; the immobility of the old-fashioned farming systems has been undermined by new methods of agriculture. The course of all these changes is linked inseparably with the above-mentioned phenomenon of the specialisation of agriculture. By its very nature, capitalism in agriculture (as in industry) cannot develop evenly: in one place (in one country, in one area, on one farm) it pushes forward one aspect of agriculture, in another place another aspect, etc. In one case it transforms the technique of some, and in other cases of other agricultural operations, divorcing them from patriarchal peasant economy or from the patriarchal labour-service. Since the whole of this process is guided by market requirements that are capricious and not always known to the producer, capitalist agriculture, in each separate instance (often in each separate area, sometimes even in each separate country), becomes more one-sided and lopsided than that which preceded it, but, taken as a whole, becomes immeasurably more many-sided and rational than patriarchal agriculture. The emergence of

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who thirst for a return to the good old patriarchal life, simple manners, etc., and who condemn the "subjection of the soil to the laws which dominate all other industries."[102]

We are fully aware that to the Narodniks the whole of the argument given in the text may appear not only unconvincing but positively unintelligible, But it would be too thankless a task to analyse in detail such opinions as, for example, that the purchase-and-sale of the land is an "abnormal" phenomenon (Mr. Chuprov, in the debate on grain prices, p. 39 of the verbatim report), that the inalienability of the peasants' allotments is an institution that can be defended, that the labour-service system of farming is better, or at all events no worse, than the capitalist system, etc. All that has been said above goes to refute the political and economic arguments advanced by the Narodniks in support of such views.

separate types of commercial agriculture renders possible and inevitable capitalist crises in agriculture and cases of capitalist overproduction, but these crises (like all capitalist crises) give a still more powerful impetus to the development of world production and of the socialisation of labour.*

Thirdly, capitalism has for the first time created in Russia large-scale agricultural production based on the employment of machines and the extensive co-operation of workers. Before capitalism appeared, the production of agricultural produce was always carried on in an unchanging, wretchedly small way—both when the peasant worked for himself and when he worked for the landlord—and no "community character" of land tenure was capable of destroying this tremendously scattered production. Inseparably linked with this scattered production was the scattered nature of the farmers themselves.** Tied to their allotment, to their tiny "village community," they were completely fenced off even from the peasants of the neighbouring village

* The West-European romanticists and Russian Narodniks strongly emphasise in this process the one-sidedness of capitalist agriculture, the instability created by capitalism, and crises—and on this basis deny the progressive character of capitalist advance as compared with pre-capitalist stagnation.

** Accordingly, notwithstanding the difference in the forms of land tenure, one can fully apply to the Russian peasant what Marx said of the small French peasant: "The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production (Produktionsfeld), the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient, it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes." (*Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*, Hmb., 1885, S. 98-99.)[103]

community by the difference in the categories to which they belonged (former landowners' peasants, former state peasants, etc.), by differences in the size of their holdings—by differences in the terms on which their emancipation took place (which terms were sometimes determined simply by the individual attributes of the landlords and by their whims). Capitalism for the first time broke down these purely medieval barriers—and it was a very good thing that it did. Now the differences between the various grades of peasants, between the various categories based on the size of allotment holdings, are far less important than the economic differences within each grade, each category and each village community. Capitalism destroys local seclusion and insularity, and replaces the minute medieval divisions among cultivators by a major division, embracing the whole nation, that divides them into classes occupying different positions in the general system of capitalist economy.* The mass of cultivators were formerly tied to their place of residence by the very conditions of production, whereas the creation of diverse forms and diverse areas of commercial and capitalist agriculture could not but cause the movement of enormous masses of the population throughout the country; and unless the population is mobile (as we have said above) there can be no question of developing its understanding and initiative.

Fourthly, and lastly, agricultural capitalism in Russia for the first time cut at the root of labour-service and the personal dependency of the farmer. This system of labour-service has held undivided sway in our agriculture from the days of *Russkaya Pravda*** down to the present-day cultivation of the fields of private landowners with the

* "The need for association, for organisation in capitalist society, has not diminished but, on the contrary, has grown immeasurably. But it is utterly absurd to measure this need of the new society with the old yardstick. This new society is already demanding firstly, that the association shall not be according to locality, social-estate or category; secondly, that its starting-point shall be the difference in status and interests that has been created by capitalism and by the differentiation of the peasantry." [V. Ilyin, loc. cit., pp. 91-92, footnote. (See present edition, Vol. 2, "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism."—*Ed.*)]

** *Russian Law.—Ed.*

peasants' implements; the wretchedness and uncouthness of the farmer, degraded by his labour being "semi-free" if not feudal, in character, are inevitable concomitants of this system; if the civil rights of the cultivator had not been impaired (by, for example, his belonging to the lowest social estate; corporal punishment; assignment to public works; attachment to allotment, etc.) the labour-service system would have been impossible. That is why agricultural capitalism in Russia has performed a great historical service in replacing labour-service by hired labour.* Summing up what has been said above on the progressive historical role of Russian agricultural capitalism, it may be said that it is socialising agricultural production. Indeed, the fact that agriculture has been transformed from the privileged occupation of the top estate or the duty of the bottom estate into an ordinary commercial and industrial occupation; that the product of the cultivator's labour has become subject to social reckoning on the market; that routine, uniform agriculture is being converted into technically transformed and diverse forms of commercial farming; that the local seclusion and scattered nature of the small farmers is breaking down; that the diverse forms of bondage and personal dependence are being replaced by impersonal transactions in the purchase and sale of labour-power, these are all links in a single process, which is socialising agricultural labour and is increasingly intensifying the contradiction between the anarchy of market fluctuations, between the individual character of the separate agricultural enterprises and the collective character of large-scale capitalist agriculture.

Thus (we repeat once more), in emphasising the progressive historical role of capitalism in Russian agriculture

* One of Mr. N.—on's innumerable plaints and lamentations over the destructive work of capitalism in Russia deserves special attention: "... Neither the strife among the appanage princes nor the Tartar invasion affected the forms of our economic life" (*Sketches*, p. 284); only capitalism has displayed "contempt for its own historical past" (p. 283). The sacred truth! Capitalism in Russian agriculture is progressive precisely because it has displayed "contempt" for the "age-old", "time-hallowed" forms of labour-service and bondage, which, indeed, no political storms, the "strife among the appanage princes" and the "Tartar invasion" inclusive, were able to destroy.

we do not in the least forget either the historically transient character of this economic regime or the profound social contradictions inherent in it. On the contrary, we have shown above that it is precisely the Narodniks who, capable only of bewailing the "destructive work" of capitalism, give an extremely superficial appraisal of these contradictions, glossing over the differentiation of the peasantry, ignoring the capitalist character of the employment of machinery in our agriculture, and covering up with such expressions as "agricultural industries" and "employments" the emergence of a class of agricultural wage-workers.

X. NARODNIK THEORIES ON CAPITALISM IN AGRICULTURE. "THE FREEING OF WINTER TIME"

The foregoing positive conclusions regarding the significance of capitalism must be supplemented by an examination of certain special "theories" on this question current in our literature. Our Narodniks in most cases have been totally unable to digest Marx's fundamental views on agricultural capitalism. The more candid among them have bluntly declared that Marx's theory does not cover agriculture (Mr. V. V. in *Our Trends*), while others (like Mr. N. —on) have preferred diplomatically to evade the question of the relation between their "postulates" and Marx's theory. One of the postulates most widespread among the Narodnik economists is the theory of "the freeing of winter time." The essence of it is as follows.*

Under the capitalist system agriculture becomes a separate industry, unconnected with the others. However, it is not carried on the whole year but only for five or six months. Therefore, the capitalisation of agriculture leads to "the freeing of winter time," to the "limitation of the working time of the agricultural class to part of the working year," which is the "fundamental cause of the deterioration of the economic conditions of the agricultural classes"

* V. V., *Essays on Theoretical Economics*, p. 108 and foll. N. —on, Sketches, p. 214 and foll. The same ideas are to be found in Mr. Kablukov's *Lectures on Agricultural Economics*, Moscow, 1897, p. 55 and foll.

(N. —on, 229), of the "diminishing of the home market" and of "the wastage of the productive forces" of society (Mr. V. V.).

Here you have the whole of this celebrated theory, which bases the most sweeping historical and philosophical conclusions solely on the great truth that in agriculture jobs are distributed over the year very unevenly! To take this *one* feature, to reduce it to absurdity by means of abstract assumptions, to discard all the other specific features of the complex process which transforms patriarchal agriculture into capitalist agriculture—such are the simple methods used in this latest attempt to restore the romantic theories about pre-capitalist "people's production."

To show how inordinately narrow this abstract postulate is, let us indicate briefly those aspects of the actual process that are either entirely lost sight of, or are underrated by our Narodniks. Firstly, the further the specialisation of agriculture proceeds, the more the agricultural population decreases, becoming an ever-diminishing part of the total population. The Narodniks forget this, although in their abstractions they raise the specialisation of agriculture to a level it hardly ever reaches in actual fact. They assume that only the operations of sowing and reaping grain have become a separate industry; the cultivation and the manuring of the soil, the processing and the carting of produce, stock raising, forestry, the repair of buildings and implements, etc., etc.—all these operations have been turned into *separate* capitalist industries. The application of such abstractions to present-day realities will not contribute much towards explaining them. Secondly, the assumption that agriculture undergoes such complete specialisation presupposes a purely capitalist organisation of agriculture, a complete division into capitalist farmers and wage-workers. To talk under such circumstances about "the peasant" (as Mr. N. —on does, p. 215) is the height of illogicality. The purely capitalist organisation of agriculture presupposes, in its turn, a more even distribution of jobs throughout the year (due to crop rotation, rational stock raising, etc.), the combination with agriculture, in many cases, of the technical processing of produce, the application of a greater quantity of labour to the preparation

of the soil, etc.* Thirdly, capitalism presupposes the complete separation of agricultural from industrial *enterprises*. But whence does it follow that this separation does not permit the combination of agricultural and industrial *wage-labour*? We find such a combination in developed capitalist society everywhere. Capitalism separates the skilled workers from the plain labourers, the unskilled, who pass from one occupation to another, now drawn into jobs at some large enterprise, and now thrown into the ranks of the workless.** The greater the development of capitalism and large-

* To make no bald assertion, let us give examples of our private landowner farms whose organisation approximates in the greatest measure to the purely capitalist type. Let us take Orel Gubernia (*Zemstvo Statistical Returns for Kromy Uyezd*, Vol. IV, Pt. 2, Orel 1892). The estate of Khlyustin, a member of the nobility, covers 1,129 dess., of which 562 are under crops, there are 8 buildings, and various improved implements. Artificial grass cultivation. Stud farm. Stock raising. Marsh drainage by ditch-cutting and other measures ("drainage is mainly done in spare time," p. 146). The number of workers in summer, 50 to 80 per day, in winter, up to 30. In 1888 there were 81 workers employed, of whom 25 were for the summer. In 1889 there were 19 carpenters employed.—Estate of Count Ribopier: 3,000 dess., 1,293 under crops, 898 leased to peasants. Twelve-crop rotation system. Peat-cutting for manure, extraction of phosphorites. Since 1889 operation of experimental field of 30 dess. Manure carted in winter and spring. Grass cultivation. Proper exploitation of forests (200 to 300 lumbermen employed from October to March). Cattle raising. Dairy farming. In 1888 had 90 employees, of whom 34 were for the summer.—Menshchikov estate in Moscow Gubernia (*Returns*, Vol. V, Pt. 2), 23,000 dess. Manpower in return for "cut-off" lands, and also hired. Forestry. "In the summer the horses and the permanent workers are busy round the fields; in late autumn and partly in winter they cart potatoes and starch to the drying sheds and starch factory, and also cart timber from the woods to the ... station; thanks to all this, the work is spread fairly evenly now over the whole year" (p. 145), as is evident, incidentally, from the register showing the number of days worked monthly: average number of horse days, 293 per month; fluctuations: from 223 (April) to 362 (June). Average male days, 216; fluctuations: from 126 (February) to 279 (November). Average female days 23; fluctuations: from 13 (January) to 27 (March). Is this reality anything like the abstraction the Narodniks are busying themselves with?

** Large-scale capitalist industry creates a nomad working class. It is formed from the rural population, but is chiefly engaged in industrial occupations. "They are the light infantry of capital, thrown by it, according to its needs, now to this point, now to that.... Nomad labour is used for various operations of building and draining, brick-making, lime-burning, railway-making, etc." (*Das Kapital*, I^2, S.

scale industry, the greater, in general, are the fluctuations in the demand for workers not only in agriculture, but also in industry.* Therefore, if we presuppose the maximum development of capitalism, we must also presuppose the maximum facility for the transfer of workers from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations, we must presuppose the formation of a general reserve army from which labour-power is drawn by all sorts of employers. Fourthly, if we take the present-day rural employers, it cannot, of course, be denied that sometimes they experience difficulty in providing their farms with workers. But it must not be forgotten, either, that they have a means of tying the workers to their farms, namely, by allotting them patches of land, etc. The allotment-holding farm labourer or day labourer is a type common to all capitalist countries. One of the chief errors of the Narodniks is that they ignore the formation of a similar type in Russia. Fifthly, it is quite wrong to discuss the freeing of the farmer's winter time independently of the general question of capitalist surplus-population. The formation of a reserve army of unemployed is characteristic of capitalism in general, and the specific features of agriculture merely give rise to special forms of this phenomenon. That is why the author of *Capital*, for instance, deals with the distribution of employment in agriculture in connection with the question of "relative surplus-population,"** as well as in a special chapter where he

692[104].) "In general such large-scale undertakings as railways withdraw a definite quantity of labour-power from the labour-market, which can come only from certain branches of economy, for example, agriculture ..." (ibid., II. B., S. 303).[105]

* For example the Moscow Medical Statistics placed the number of factory workers in this gubernia at 114,381; this was the number at work; the highest figure was 146,338 and the lowest, 94,214 (*General Summary*, etc., Vol. IV, Pt. I, p. 98); in percentages: 128%—100%—82%. By increasing, in general, the fluctuations in the number of workers, capitalism evens out, in this respect too, the differences between industry and agriculture.

** For example, in regard to the agricultural relations of England, Marx says: "There are always too many agricultural labourers for the ordinary, and always too few for the exceptional or temporary needs of the cultivation of the soil" (I^2, 725),[106] so that, notwithstanding the permanent "relative surplus-population," the countryside seems to be inadequately populated. As capitalist production takes possession of agriculture, says Marx in another place, a surplus rural

discusses the difference between the "working period" and the "time of production" (*Das Kapital*, II. B., Chapter 13). The working period is the period in which labour is applied to the product; the time of production is the time during which the product is in production, including the period in which labour is not applied to it. The working period does not coincide with the time of production in very many industries, among which agriculture is merely the most typical, but by no means the only one.* In Russia, as compared with other European countries, the difference between the working period in agriculture and the time of production is a particularly big one. "When capitalist production later accomplishes the separation of manufacture and agriculture, the rural labourer becomes ever more dependent on merely casual accessory employment and his condition deteriorates thereby. For capital . . . all differences in the turnover are evened out. Not so for the labourer" (ibid., 223-224).[109] So then, the only conclusion that follows from the specific features of agriculture in the instance under review is that the position of the agricultural worker must be even worse than that of the industrial worker. This is still a very long way from Mr. N.—on's "theory" that the freeing of winter time is the "fundamental reason" for the deterioration of the conditions of the "agricultural classes" (?!). If the working period in our agriculture equalled 12 months, the process of the development of capitalism would go on exactly as it does now; the entire difference would be that the conditions of the agricultural worker would come somewhat closer to those of the industrial worker.**

population is formed. "Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat" (ibid., 668)[107]; this part of the population suffers chronically from unemployment; the work it gets is extremely irregular and is the worst paid (e.g., working at home for shops, etc.)

* Particularly noteworthy in this connection is Marx's observation that in agriculture too there are ways of distributing the demand for labour more evenly over the entire year," namely, by raising a greater variety of products, by substituting crop rotation for the three-field system, cultivating root-crops, grasses, etc. But all these methods "require an increase of the circulating capital advanced in production, invested in wages, fertilisers, seed, etc." (ibid., S. 225-226).[108]

** We say "somewhat," because the deterioration of the conditions of the agricultural worker is far from being due to irregularity of employment alone.

Thus the "theory" of Messrs. V. V. and N. —on makes absolutely no contribution whatever even to the general problem of the development of agricultural capitalism. As for the specific features of Russia, it not only does not explain them, but on the contrary obscures them. Winter unemployment among our peasantry depends not so much on capitalism as on the inadequate development of capitalism. We have shown above (§ IV of this chapter), from the data on wages, that of the Great-Russian gubernias, winter unemployment is most prevalent in those where capitalism is least developed and where labour-service prevails. That is quite understandable. Labour-service retards the development of labour productivity, retards the development of industry and agriculture, and, consequently, the demand for labour-power, and at the same time, while tying the peasant to his allotment, provides him neither with employment in winter time nor with the possibility of existing by his wretched farming.

XI. CONTINUATION.— THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY.— MARX'S VIEWS ON SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURE.— ENGELS'S OPINION OF THE CONTEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL CRISIS

"The community principle prevents capital from seizing agricultural production,"—that is how Mr. N. —on (p. 72) expresses another current Narodnik theory, formulated in just as abstract a fashion as the previous one. In Chapter II we quoted a series of facts showing the fallacy of this stock premise. Now let us add the following. It is a great mistake to think that the inception of agricultural capitalism itself requires some special- form of land tenure. "But the form of landed property with which the incipient capitalist mode of production is confronted does not suit it. It first creates for itself the form required by subordinating agriculture to capital. It thus transforms feudal landed property, clan property, small-peasant property in mark communes* (Markgemeinschaft)—no matter

* In another place Marx points out that "common lands (Gemeineigentum) constitute the second supplement of the management of land parcels." (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 341).[110]

how divergent their juristic forms may be—into the economic form corresponding to the requirements of this mode of production" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 156). Thus, by the very nature of the case, no peculiarities in the system of land tenure can serve as an insurmountable obstacle to capitalism, which assumes different forms in accordance with the different conditions in agriculture, legal relationships and manner of life. One can see from this how wrong is the very *presentation* of the question by our Narodniks, who have created a whole literature on the subject of "village community *or* capitalism?" Should some Anglomaniac aristocrat happen to offer a prize for the best work on the introduction of capitalist farming in Russia, should some learned society come forward with a scheme to settle peasants on farmsteads, should some idle government official concoct a project for 60-dessiatine holdings, the Narodnik hastens to throw down the gauntlet and fling himself into the fray against these "bourgeois projects" to "introduce capitalism" and destroy that Palladium of "people's industry," the village community. It has never entered the head of our good Narodnik that capitalism has been proceeding on its way while all sorts of projects have been drafted and refuted, and the community village has been turning, and has actually turned,* into the village of small agrarians.

That is why we are very indifferent to the question of the form of peasant land tenure. Whatever the form of land tenure may be, the relation between the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat will not undergo any essential change. The really important question concerns not the form of land tenure at all, but the remnants of the purely

* If we are told that we are running ahead in making such an assertion, our reply will be the following. Whoever wants to depict some living phenomenon in its development is inevitably and necessarily confronted with the dilemma of either running ahead or lagging behind. There is no middle course. And if all the facts show that the character of the social evolution is precisely such that this evolution has already gone very far (see Chapter II), and if, furthermore, precise reference is made to the circumstances and institutions that retard this evolution (excessively high taxes, social-estate exclusiveness of the peasantry, lack of full freedom in the purchase and sale of land, and in movement and settlement), then there is nothing wrong in such running ahead.

medieval past, which continue to weigh down upon the peasantry—the social-estate seclusion of the peasant communities, collective responsibility, excessively high taxation of peasant land out of all proportion to the taxation of privately-held land, the absence of full freedom in the purchase and sale of peasant lands, and in the movement and settlement of the peasantry.* All these obsolete institutions, while not in the least safeguarding the peasantry against break-up, only lead to the multiplication of diverse forms of labour-service and bondage, to tremendous delay in social development as a whole.

In conclusion we must deal with an original Narodnik attempt to give an interpretation to some statements made by Marx and Engels in Volume III of *Capital*, in favour of their views that small-scale agriculture is superior to large-scale, and that agricultural capitalism does not play a progressive historical role. Quite often, with this end in view, they quote the following passage from Volume III of *Capital*:

"The moral of history, also to be deduced from other observations concerning agriculture, is that the capitalist system works against a rational agriculture, or that a rational agriculture is incompatible with the capitalist system (although the latter promotes technical improvements in agriculture), and needs either the hand of the small farmer living by his own labour (selbst arbeitenden) or the control of associated producers" (III, 1, 98. Russ. trans., 83).[111]

What follows from this assertion (which, let us note in passing, is an absolutely isolated fragment that has found its way into a chapter dealing with the way changes in the prices of raw materials affect profits, and not into Part VI, which deals specifically with agriculture)? That capitalism is incompatible with the rational organisation of agriculture (as also of industry) has long been known; nor is that the point at issue with the Narodniks. And the progressive *historical* role of capitalism in agriculture is

* The defence of some of these institutions by the Narodniks very glaringly reveals the reactionary character of their views, which is gradually bringing them closer and closer to the agrarians.

especially emphasised by Marx here. There remains Marx's reference to the "small peasant living by his own labour." None of the Narodniks who have referred to this point has taken the trouble to explain how he understands this, has taken the trouble to connect this point with the context, on the one hand, and with Marx's general theory of small-scale agriculture, on the other.—In the passage quoted from *Capital* the point dealt with is how considerably the prices of raw materials fluctuate, how these fluctuations disturb the proportionality and systematic working of production, how they disturb the conformity of agriculture and industry. *It is only in this respect*—in respect of the proportionality, systematic working and planned operation of production—that Marx places small peasant economy on a par with the economy of "associated producers." In this respect, even small medieval industry (handicraft) is similar to the economy of "associated producers" (cf. *Misère de la philosophie*, edition cited, p. 90), whereas capitalism differs from both these systems of social economy in its anarchy of production. By what logic can one draw the conclusion from this that Marx admitted the viability of small-scale agriculture,* that he did not acknowledge the progressive historical role of capitalism in agriculture? Here is what Marx said about this in the special part dealing with agriculture, *in the special section on small peasant economy* (Chapter 47, §V):

"Proprietorship of land parcels by its very nature excludes the development of social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, large-scale cattle raising, and the progressive application of science.

"Usury and a taxation system must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite fragmentation of means of production, and isolation of the producers themselves. Monstrous waste of human energy.

* Let us recall that Engels, shortly before his death, and at a time when the agricultural crisis connected with the drop in prices was fully manifest, considered it necessary to protest emphatically against the French "disciples," who had made some concessions to the doctrine of the viability of small-scale agriculture.[112]

Progressive deterioration of conditions of production and increased prices of means of production—an inevitable law of proprietorship of parcels. Calamity of seasonal abundance for this mode of production" (III, 2, 341-342. Russ. trans., 667).[113]

"Small landed property presupposes that the overwhelming majority of the population is rural, and that not social, but isolated labour predominates; and that, therefore, under such conditions wealth and development of reproduction, both of its material and spiritual prerequisites, are out of the question, and thereby also the prerequisites for rational cultivation" (III, 2, 347. Russ. trans., p. 672).[114]

The writer of these lines, far from closing his eyes to the contradictions inherent in large-scale capitalist agriculture, ruthlessly exposed them. But this did not prevent him from appreciating the *historical* role of capitalism:

"...One of the major results of the capitalist mode of production is that, on the one hand, it transforms agriculture from a mere empirical and mechanical self-perpetuating process employed by the least developed part of society into the conscious scientific application of agronomy, in so far as this is at all feasible under conditions of private property; that it divorces landed property from the relations of dominion and servitude, on the one hand, and, on the other, totally separates land as an instrument of production from landed property and landowner. . . . The rationalising of agriculture, on the one hand, which makes it for the first time capable of operating on a social scale, and the reduction ad absurdum of property in land, on the other, are the great achievements of the capitalist mode of production. Like all of its other historical advances, it also attained these by first completely impoverishing the direct producers" (III, 2, 156-157. Russ. trans., 509-510).[115]

One would think that after such categorical statements by Marx there could be no two opinions as to how he viewed the question of the progressive historical role of agricultural capitalism. Mr. N. —on, however, found one more subterfuge: he quoted Engels's opinion on the present agricultural crisis, which should, in his view, refute the

proposition of the progressive role of capitalism in agriculture.*

Let us see what Engels actually says. After summarising the main propositions of Marx's theory of differential rent, Engels establishes the law that "the more capital is invested in the land, and the higher the development of agriculture and civilisation in general in a given country, the more rents rise per acre as well as in total amount, and the more immense becomes the tribute paid by society to the big landowners in the form of surplus-profits" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 258. Russ. trans., 597).[116] This law, says Engels, explains "the wonderful vitality of the class of big landowners," who accumulate a mass of debts and nevertheless "land on their feet" in all crises; for example, the abolition of the Corn Laws in England, which caused a drop in grain prices, far from ruining the landlords, exceedingly enriched them.

It might thus seem that capitalism is unable to weaken the power of the monopoly represented by landed property.

"But everything is transitory," continues Engels. "Transoceanic steamships and the railways of North and South America and India" called forth new competitors. The North American prairies and the Argentine pampas, etc., flooded the world market with cheap grain. "And in face of this competition—coming from virgin plains as well as from Russian and Indian peasants ground down by taxation—the European tenant farmer and peasant could not prevail

* See *Novoye Slovo*, 1896, No. 5, February, letter to editors by Mr. N. —on, pp. 256-261. Here also is the "quotation" on the "moral of history." It is remarkable that neither Mr. N. —on nor any other of the numerous Narodnik economists who have tried to use the present agricultural crisis to refute the theory of the progressive historical role of capitalism in agriculture, has ever once raised the question in a straightforward manner, on the basis of a definite economic theory; has ever once stated the grounds which induced Marx to admit the progressiveness of the historical role of agricultural capitalism, or has definitely indicated just which of these grounds he repudiates, and why. In this, as in other cases, the Narodnik economists prefer not to oppose Marx's theory outright, but confine themselves to casting vague hints at the "Russian disciples." Confining ourselves in this work to the economy of Russia, we have given above the grounds for our opinions on this question.

at the old rents. A portion of the land in Europe fell decisively out of competition as regards grain cultivation, and rents fell everywhere; our second case, variant 2—falling prices and falling productivity of the additional investment of capital—became the rule for Europe; and therefore the lament of landlords from Scotland to Italy and from the south of France to the east of Prussia. Fortunately, the plains are far from being entirely brought under cultivation; there are enough left to ruin all the big landlords of Europe and the small ones into the bargain" (ibid., 260. Russ. trans., 598, where the word "fortunately" is omitted.)[117]

If the reader has read this passage carefully it should be clear to him that Engels says the very opposite of what Mr. N. —on wants to foist on him. In Engels's opinion the present agricultural crisis is reducing rent and is even tending to abolish it altogether; in other words, agricultural capitalism is pursuing its natural tendency to abolish the monopoly of landed property. No, Mr. N. —on is positively out of luck with his "quotations." Agricultural capitalism is taking another, enormous step forward; it is boundlessly expanding the commercial production of agricultural produce and drawing a number of new countries into the world arena; it is driving patriarchal agriculture out of its last refuges, such as India or Russia; it is creating something hitherto unknown to agriculture, namely, the purely industrial production of grain, based on the co-operation of masses of workers equipped with the most up-to-date machinery; it is tremendously aggravating the position of the old European countries, reducing rents, thus undermining what seemed to be the most firmly established monopolies and reducing landed property "to absurdity" not only in theory, but also in practice; it is raising so vividly the need to socialise agricultural production that this need is beginning to be realised in the West even by representatives of the propertied classes.* And Engels, with his characteristic cheerful irony, *welcomes* the latest steps of world

* Are not, indeed, such manifestations as the celebrated Antrag Kanitz (Kanitz plan—*Ed.*) proposed in the German Reichstag,[118] or the proposal of the American farmers that all elevators be made state property typical signs of the times"?

capitalism: fortunately, he says, there is still enough uncultivated prairie land left to enable things to continue as they have been doing. But our good Mr. N. —on, à propos des bottes,* sighs for the "muzhik cultivator" of yore, for the "time-hallowed" . . . stagnation of our agriculture and of all the various forms of agricultural bondage which "neither the strife among the appanage princes nor the Tartar invasion" could shake, and which now—oh, horror!—are beginning to be most thoroughly shaken by this monstrous capitalism! O, sancta simplicitas!

* Without rhyme or reason.—*Ed.*

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST STAGES OF CAPITALISM IN INDUSTRY

Let us now pass from agriculture to industry. Here, too, our task is formulated as in the case of agriculture: we have to analyse the forms of industry in post-Reform Russia, that is, to study the present system of social and economic relations in manufacturing industry and the character of the evolution of that system. Let us start with the most simple and primitive forms of industry and trace their development.

I. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY AND HANDICRAFTS

By domestic industry we mean the processing of raw materials in the household (peasant family) that produces them. Domestic industries are a necessary adjunct of natural economy, remnants of which are nearly always retained where there is a small peasantry. It is natural, therefore, that in Russian economic literature one should meet repeated references to this type of industry (the domestic production of articles from flax, hemp, wood, etc., for consumption in the home). However, the existence of domestic industry on any extensive scale is rarely found nowadays and only in the most remote localities; until very recently, Siberia, for example, was one of them. Industry as a profession does not yet exist in this form: industry here is linked inseparably with agriculture, together they constitute a single whole.

The first form of industry to be separated from patriarchal agriculture is artisan production, i.e., the production

of articles to the order of a consumer.* The raw materials may belong either to the customer-consumer or to the artisan, and payment for the latter's work is made either in cash or in kind (artisan's premises and keep, remuneration with part of the product, for example, flour, etc.). While constituting an essential part of urban life, artisan production is to be met on a considerable scale in the rural districts too, where it serves as a supplement to peasant farming. A certain percentage of the rural population consists of specialist-artisans engaged (sometimes exclusively, sometimes in conjunction with agriculture) in tanning, bootmaking, tailoring, blacksmithery, dyeing of homespun fabrics, finishing of peasant-made woollens, flour-milling, etc. Owing to the extremely unsatisfactory state of our economic statistics we have no precise data on the degree to which artisan production is spread throughout Russia; but isolated references to this form of industry are scattered through nearly all descriptions of peasant farming and investigations of what is called "handicraft" industry,** and are even to be found in official factory statistics.*** The Zemstvo statistical returns, in registering peasant industries, sometimes single out a special group, "artisans" (cf. Rudnev, loc. cit.), but this category (according

* Kundenproduktion. Cf. Karl Bücher, *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*, Tübingen, 1893. (Work done to order. Cf. Karl Bücher, *The Rise of the National Economy*.—*Ed*.)[119]

** It would be impossible to cite quotations in support of this: innumerable references to artisan production are scattered throughout all investigations of handicraft industry, although according to the most accepted view, artisans do not come within the category known as handicraftsmen. We shall have more than one occasion to see how hopelessly indefinite is the term "handicraft."

*** The chaotic condition of these statistics is illustrated particularly vividly by the fact that no criteria have yet been decided on for distinguishing handicraft from factory establishments. In the 60s, for example, village dyeing sheds of a purely handicraft type were classified with the latter (*The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Vol. I, pp. 172-176), and in 1890, peasant fulling mills were mixed up with woollen factories (Orlov's *Directory of Factories and Works*, 3rd ed., p. 21), etc. Nor is the latest *List of Factories* (St. Petersburg, 1897) free from this confusion. For examples, see our *Studies*, pp. 270-271. [See also present edition, Vol, 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed*.]

to current terminology) includes all building workers. From the viewpoint of political economy this is utterly wrong, for the bulk of the building workers belong to the category, not of independent industrialists working on orders from customers, but of wage-workers employed by contractors. Of course, it is not always easy to distinguish the village-artisan from the small commodity-producer or from the wage-worker; this requires an economic analysis of the data concerning every small industrialist. A noteworthy attempt to draw a strict line of demarcation between artisan production and the other forms of small industry is the analysis of the returns of the Perm handicraft census of 1894-95.* The number of local village artisans was estimated at approximately one per cent of the peasant population, and (as might have been expected) the largest percentage of artisans was found in the uyezds where industry was least developed. As compared with the small commodity-producers, the artisans are more closely connected with the land: 80.6 per 100 artisans engage in agriculture (among the other "handicraftsmen" the percentage is lower). The employment of wage-labour is met with among artisans too, but is less developed among industrialists of this type than among the others. The size of establishments (taking the number of workers) is also smaller among the artisans. The average earnings of the artisan-cultivator are estimated at 43.9 rubles per year, and of the non-cultivator at 102.9 rubles.

We confine ourselves to these brief remarks, since a detailed examination of artisan production does not enter into our task. In this form of industry commodity production does not yet exist; here only commodity circulation makes its appearance, in the case where the artisan receives payment in money, or sells the share of the product he has received for work done and buys himself raw materials and instruments of production. The product of the artisan's

* We have devoted a special article to this census in our Studies, pp. 113-199. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of "Handicraft" Industry.—Ed.*) All the facts cited in the text concerning the Perm "handicraftsmen" are taken from that article.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

labour does not appear in the market, hardly ever leaving the sphere of peasant natural economy.* It is natural, therefore, that artisan production is characterised by the same routine, fragmentation and narrowness as small patriarchal agriculture. The only element of development native to this form of industry is the migration of artisans to other areas in search of employment. Such migration was fairly widely developed, particularly in the old days, in our rural districts; usually it led to the organisation of independent artisan establishments in the areas of attraction.

II. SMALL COMMODITY-PRODUCERS IN INDUSTRY. THE CRAFT SPIRIT IN THE SMALL INDUSTRIES

We have seen that the artisan appears on the market, although not with the wares he produces. Naturally, once he comes into contact with the market, he begins in time to produce for the market, i.e., becomes a *commodity-producer*. This transition takes place gradually, at first as an experiment: goods are sold which are left on his hands by chance, or are produced in his spare time. The gradualness of the transition is heightened by the fact that the market for wares is at first extremely restricted, so that the distance between the producer and the consumer increases very slightly, and the product passes as hitherto directly from the producer to the consumer, its sale sometimes being preceded by its exchange for agricultural produce.** The further

* The closeness of artisan production to the natural economy of the peasants sometimes leads to attempts on their part to organise such production for the whole village, the peasants providing the artisan with his keep, he undertaking to work for all the inhabitants of the village concerned. Nowadays this system of industry is to be met with only by way of exception, or in the most remote border regions (for example, the blacksmith's trade is organised on these lines in some of the villages in Transcaucasia. See *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry in Russia*, Vol. II, p. 321).

** E.g., the exchange of earthenware utensils for grain, etc. When grain was cheap the equivalent of a pot was sometimes considered to be the amount of grain the pot would hold. Cf. *Reports and Investigations*, I, 340.—*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, V, 140.—*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, I, 61.

development of commodity production is expressed in the expansion of commerce in the appearance of specialist-merchants, buyers-up; the market for wares is not the small village bazaar or the district fair,* but the whole region, then the whole country, and sometimes even other countries. The production of industrial wares in the shape of commodities is the first step to the separation of industry from agriculture, and to mutual exchange between them. Mr. N. —on, with his characteristically stereotyped and abstract way of understanding things, limits himself to declaring that the "separation of industry from agriculture" is a quality of "capitalism" in general, without taking the trouble to examine either the different forms of this separation or the different stages of capitalism. It is important to note, therefore, that commodity production on the smallest scale in the peasant industries already begins to separate industry from agriculture, although at that stage of development the industrialist does not, in the majority of cases, separate from the agriculturist. Later on we shall show how the more developed stages of capitalism lead to the separation of industrial from agricultural enterprises, to the separation of industrial workers from agriculturists.

In the rudimentary forms of commodity production, competition among the "handicraftsmen" is still very slight, but as the market expands and embraces wide areas, this competition grows steadily stronger and disturbs the small industrialist's patriarchal prosperity, the basis of which is his virtually monopolist position. The small commodity-producer feels that his interests, as opposed to the interests of the rest of society, demand the preservation of this monopolist position, and he therefore *fears* competition. He exerts every effort, individually and with others, to check competition, "not to let" rivals into his district, and to consolidate his assured position as a small master possessing a

* An investigation of one of these country fairs showed that 31% of the total turnover (about 15,000 rubles out of 50,000 rubles) was accounted for by "handicraft" goods. See *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, I, 38. How restricted the market is at first for the small commodity-producers is seen, for example, from the fact that the Poltava boot-makers sell their wares within a radius of some 60 vorsts from their village, *Reports and Investigations*, I, 287.

definite circle of customers. This fear of competition so strikingly reveals the true social nature of the small commodity-producer that we think it necessary to examine the relative facts in greater detail. In the first place, let us quote an example relative to handicraft. The Kaluga sheepskin dressers go off to other gubernias to treat sheepskins; this industry has declined since the abolition of serfdom; the landlords, when they released serfs for "sheepskinning," in return for a sizable tribute, took great care that the sheepskinners knew their "definite places" and did not permit other dressers to invade their districts. Organised on these lines the industry was so profitable that "places" were transferred for as much as 500 and 1,000 rubles, and if an artisan came to a district other than his own, it sometimes led to sanguinary clashes. The abolition of serfdom undermined this medieval prosperity: "the convenience of railway travel in this case also aids competition."* One of the phenomena of the same type observed in a number of industries and bearing fully the character of a general rule, is the desire of the small industrialists to keep technical inventions and improvements secret, to conceal profitable occupations from others, in order to stave off "fatal competition." Those who establish a new industry or introduce some improvement in an old one, do their utmost to conceal these profitable occupations from their fellow-villagers and resort to all sorts of devices for this purpose (e.g., as a make-believe they keep the old arrangements in the establishment), let no one enter their workshops, work in garrets and say nothing about their work even to their own children.** The slow development of the

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, I, 35-36.

** See *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, I, 81. V, 460; IX, 25-26.—*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, 6-7; 253; Vol. VI, Pt. 2, 142; Vol. VII, Pt. 1, Sec. 2 about the founder of the "printing industry."—*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, I, 145, 149.—*Reports and Investigations*, I, 89.—Grigoryev: *Handicraft Lock- and Cutlery-Making in Pavlovo District* (Supplement to *Volga* publication, Moscow, 1881), p. 39.—Mr. V. V. cited some of these facts in his *Essay on Handicraft Industry* (St. Petersburg, 1886), p. 192 and foll.; the only conclusion he draws from them is that the handicraftsmen are not afraid of innovations; it never enters his head that these facts characterise the class position and the class interests of the small commodity-producers in contemporary society.

brush-making industry in Moscow Gubernia "is usually attributed to the present producers' objection to having new competitors. It is said that they do all they can to conceal their work from strangers, and so only one producer has apprentices from outside."* Concerning the village of Bezvodnoye, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, famous for its metalware industry, we read the following: "It is remarkable that to this day" (the beginning of the 80s; the industry has existed since the beginning of the 50s) "the inhabitants of Bezvodnoye carefully conceal their craft from the neighbouring peasants. They have made more than one attempt to induce the volost administration to issue an instruction making it a punishable offence to carry the craft to another village; though they have failed to get this formality adopted, each of them seems to be morally bound by such an instruction, in virtue of which they refrain from giving their daughters in marriage to inhabitants of neighbouring villages, and as far as possible avoid taking girls in marriage from those villages."**

The Narodnik economists have not only tried to obscure the fact that the bulk of the small peasant industrialists belong to the category of commodity-producers, but have even created quite a legend about some profound antagonism allegedly existing between the economic organisation of the small peasant industries and large-scale industry. The unsoundness of this view is also evident, by the way, from the above-quoted data. If the big industrialist stops at nothing to ensure himself a monopoly, the peasant engaging in "handicrafts" is in this respect his twin brother; the petty bourgeois endeavours with his petty resources to uphold substantially the same class interests the big manufacturer seeks to protect when he clamours for protection, bonuses,-privileges, etc.***

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* *Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VI, 2, 193.

** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX, 2404.

*** Sensing that competition will be fatal to him, the petty bourgeois strives to stave it off, just as his ideologist, the Narodnik, senses that capitalism is fatal to the "foundations" so dear to his heart, and for that reason strives to "avert," to prevent, to stave off, etc., etc.

III. THE GROWTH OF SMALL INDUSTRIES AFTER THE REFORM. TWO FORMS OF THIS PROCESS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

From the foregoing there also emerge the following features of small production that merit attention. The appearance of a new industry signifies, as we have already observed, a process of growing social division of labour. Hence, such a process must necessarily take place in every capitalist society, to the extent that a peasantry and semi-natural agriculture still remain to one degree or other, and to the extent that diverse ancient institutions and traditions (due to bad means of communication, etc.) prevent large-scale machine industry from directly replacing domestic industry. Every step in the development of commodity economy inevitably leads to the peasantry producing an ever-increasing number of industrialists from their ranks; this process turns up new soil, as it were, prepares new regions in the most backward parts of the country, or new spheres in the most backward branches of industry, for subsequent seizure by capitalism. The very same growth of capitalism manifests itself in other parts of the country, or in other branches of industry, in an entirely different way; not in an increase but in a decrease in the number of small workshops and of home workers absorbed by the factory. It is clear that a study of the development of capitalism in the industry of a given country requires that the strictest distinction be made between these processes; to mix them up is to lead to an utter confusion of concepts.*

* Here is an interesting example of how these two different processes occur in one and the same gubernia, at one and the same time and in one and the same industry. The spinning-wheel industry (in Vyatka Gubernia) is ancillary to the domestic production of fabrics. The development of this industry marks the rise of commodity production, which embraces the making of one of the instruments for the production of fabrics. Well, we see that in the remote parts of the gubernia, in the north, the spinning wheel is almost unknown (*Material for a Description of the Industries of Vyatka Gubernia*, II, 27) and there "the industry might newly emerge," i.e., might make the first breach in the patriarchal natural economy of the peasants. Meanwhile, in other parts of the gubernia this industry is already declining, and the investigators believe that the probable cause of the decline is "the increasingly widespread use among the peasantry

In post-Reform Russia the growth of small industries, expressing the first steps in the development of capitalism, has manifested, and manifests, itself in two ways: firstly, in the migration of small industrialists and handicraftsmen from the central, long-settled and economically most advanced gubernias, to the outer regions; secondly, in the formation of new small industries and the spread of previously existing industries among the local population.

The first of these processes is one of the manifestations of the colonisation of the border regions to which we have referred (Chapter IV, § II). The peasant industrialist in the Nizhni-Novgorod, Vladimir, Tver, Kaluga and other gubernias, sensing the increased competition accompanying the growth of the population, and the growth of capitalist manufacture and of the factory that constitute a menace to small production, leaves for the South, where "artisans" are still few, earnings high and the living cost low. In the new locality a small establishment was set up which laid the foundations for a new peasant industry that spread later in the village concerned and in its environs. The central districts of the country, possessing an industrial culture of long standing, thus helped the development of the same culture in new parts of the country, where settlement was beginning. Capitalist relations (which, as we shall see below, are also characteristic of the small peasant industries) were thus carried to the entire country.*

Let us pass to the facts that express the second of the above-mentioned processes. We shall first say that although

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of factory-made cotton fabrics" (p 26). Here, consequently, the growth of commodity production and of capitalism is manifested in the elimination of petty industry by the factory.

* See, for example, S. A. Korolenko, loc. cit., on the movement of industrial workers to the outer regions, where part of them settle. *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. I (on the preponderance in Stavropol Gubernia of industrialists from the central gubernias), Vol. III, pp. 33-34 (the migration of boot-makers from Viyezdnaya, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, to the Lower-Volga towns); Vol. IX (tanners from the village of Bogorodskoye in the same gubernia established tanneries all over Russia). *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, IV, 136 (Vladimir potters carried their trade into Astrakhan Gubernia). Cf. *Reports and Investigations*, Vol. I, pp. 125, 210; Vol. II, pp. 160-165, 168, 222 for general remarks on the preponderance "all over the South" of industrialists from the Great-Russian gubernias.

we note the growth of small peasant establishments and industries, we do not as yet deal with their economic organisation: from what follows it will be evident that these industries either lead to the formation of capitalist simple co-operation and merchant's capital or constitute a component part of capitalist manufacture.

The fur industry in Arzamas Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, began in the town of Arzamas and then gradually spread to the surrounding villages, embracing an ever larger area. At first there were few furriers in the villages and they employed numerous workers; labour was cheap, since people hired themselves out in order to learn the trade. After learning it they left and opened small establishments of their own, thus preparing a wider field for the domination of capital, which now controls a large section of the industrialists.* Let us note in general that this abundance of wage-workers in the first establishments of a rising industry and the subsequent transformation of these wage-workers into small masters is a very widespread phenomenon, bearing the character of a general rule.** Obviously, it would be a profound error to deduce from this that "in spite of various historical considerations . . . it is not big establishments that absorb small ones, but small ones that grow out of big ones."*** The large size of the first establishments expresses no concentration of the industry; it is explained by the solitary character of these establishments and by the eagerness of local peasants to learn a profitable trade in them. As to the process of the spread of peasant industries from their old centres to the surrounding villages, it is observed in many cases. For example, the post-Reform period saw the development (as regards the number of villages involved in industry, the number of industrialists, and the total output) of the following exceptionally important

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* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III.

** For example, the same thing has been noted in the dyeing industry of Moscow Gubernia (*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VI, I, 73-99), in the hat (ibid., VI, Pt. I), in the fur (ibid., VII, Pt. I, Sec. 2), in the Pavlovo lock and cutlery industries (Grigoryev, loc. cit., 37-38), and others.

*** Mr. V. V. hastened to draw this conclusion from a fact of this kind in his *Destiny of Capitalism*, 78-79.

industries: the lock and cutlery industry of Pavlovo, tanning and boot-making in the village of Kimry, the knitting of woollen slippers in the town of Arzamas and in its environs,[120] the metalware industry of the village of Burmakino, the cap-making industry of the village and of the district of Molvitino, the glass, hat and lace industries of Moscow Gubernia, the jewellery industry of Krasnoselskoye District, etc.* The author of an article on handicraft industries in seven volosts of Tula Uyezd notes as a general phenomenon "an increase in the number of artisans since the peasant Reform," "the appearance of artisans and handicraftsmen in places where there were none in pre-Reform times."** A similar view is expressed by Moscow statisticians.*** We can support this view with statistics regarding the date of origin of 523 handicraft establishments in 10 industries of Moscow Gubernia.****

Total number of establishments	No. of establishments founded								
	at date unknown	long ago	in 19th century, in the						
			10s	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s
523	13	46	3	6	11	11	37	121	275

* A. Smirnov: *Pavlovo and Vorsma*, Moscow, 1864.—N. Labzin: *An Investigation of the Cutlery Industry, etc.*, St. Petersburg, 1870.—Grigoryev, loc. cit.—N. Annensky, *Report, etc.*, in No. 1 of *Nizhegorodsky Vestnik Parokhodstva i Promyshlennosti* [*The Nizhni-Novgorod Steam-Shipping and Industrial Journal*] for 1891.—*Material* of Zemstvo statistics for Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1892.—A. N. Potresov, Report in the St. Petersburg Branch of the Loan and Savings Society Committee in 1895.—*Statistical Chronicle of the Russian Empire*, II, Vol. 3, St. Petersburg, 1872.—*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, VIII.—*Reports and Investigations*, I, III.—*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, VI, XIII.—*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VI, Pt. I, p. 111, ibid., 177; VII, Pt II, p. 8.—*Historico-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry*, II, Col. VI, Industry 1.—*Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 42. Cf. also *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III 18-19 and others.

** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX, 2303-2304.

*** *Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VII, Pt. I, Sec. 2, 196.

**** The data on the brush, pin, hook, hat, starch, boot, spectacle frame, harness, fringe and furniture industries have been selected from the handicraft house-to-house census material quoted

Similarly, the Perm handicraft census revealed (according to data showing the time of origin of 8,884 small artisan and handicraft establishments) that the post-Reform period is characterised by a particularly rapid growth of small industries. It will be interesting to take a closer glance at this process of the rise of new industries. The production of woollen and semi-silk fabrics in Vladimir Gubernia began recently, in 1861. At first this was a peasant outside occupation, but later "subcontractors" made their appearance in the villages, who distributed yarn. One of the first "factory owners" at one time traded in groats, buying them up in the Tambov and Saratov "steppes." With the building of railways, grain prices were levelled out, the grain trade became concentrated in the hands of millionaires, and so our merchant decided to invest his capital in an industrial weaving enterprise; he went to work in a factory, learnt the business and became a "subcontractor."* Thus, the formation of a new "industry" in this locality was due to the fact that the general economic development of the country was forcing capital out of trade and directing it towards industry.** The investigator of the industry we have taken as an example points out that the case he has described is by no means an isolated one: the peasants who earned their living by outside employments "were pioneers in all sorts of industries, carried their technical knowledge to their native villages, got new labour forces to follow their example and migrate, and fired the imagination of the rich muzhiks with stories of the fabulous profits which the industry brought the workroom owner and the subcontractor. The rich muzhik, who used to store his money away in a chest, or traded in grain, paid heed to these stories and put his money into industrial undertakings" (ibid.). The boot and felt industries in Alexandrov Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, arose in some places in the following way: the owners of calico

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in *Industries of Moscow Gubernia* and in Mr. Isayev's book of the same title.

* *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 242-243.

** In his researches into the historical destiny of the Russian factory, M. I. T.-Baranovsky showed that merchant's capital was a necessary historical condition for the formation of large-scale industry. See his *The Factory*, *etc.*, St. Petersburg, 1898.

workrooms or of small yarn-distributing shops, seeing that handweaving was declining, opened workshops of another kind, sometimes hiring craftsmen so as to get to know the trade and to teach their children.* To the extent that large-scale industry forces small capital out of the branch of production, this capital flows into others and stimulates their development in the same direction.

The general conditions of the post-Reform period which called forth the development of small industries in the rural districts are very vividly described by investigators of Moscow industries. "On the one hand, the conditions of peasant life have greatly deteriorated during this period," we read in a description of the lace industry, "but on the other, the requirements of the population, of that part which lives under more favourable conditions, have considerably increased.** And the author, using the data of the region he has taken, notes an increase in the number of those owning no horses and raising no crops, side by side with an increase in the number of peasants owning many horses and in the total number of cattle belonging to peasants. Thus, on the one hand, there was an increase in the number of persons in need of "outside earnings" and in search of industrial work, while on the other, a minority of prosperous families grew rich, accumulated "savings," and were "able to hire a worker or two, or give out work to poor peasants to be done at home." "Of course," the author explains, "we are not dealing here with cases where individuals who are known as kulaks, or blood-suckers, develop from among such families; we are merely examining most ordinary phenomena among the peasant population."

So then, local investigators point to a connection between the differentiation of the peasantry and the growth of small peasant industries. And that is quite natural. From the data given in Chapter II it follows that the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry had necessarily to be supplemented by a growth of small peasant industries. As natural economy declined, one form of raw-material processing after another turned into separate branches of industry; the formation of

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* *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, II, 25, 270.

** *Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. II, Pt. II, p. 8 and foll.

a peasant bourgeoisie and of a rural proletariat increased the demand for the products of the small peasant industries, while at the same time supplying free hands for these industries and free money.*

IV. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE SMALL COMMODITY-PRODUCERS. DATA ON HOUSE-TO-HOUSE CENSUSES OF HANDICRAFTSMEN IN MOSCOW GUBERNIA

Let us now examine the social and economic relations that develop among the small commodity-producers in industry. The task of defining the character of these relations is similar to the one outlined above, in Chapter II, in relation to the small farmers. Instead of the scale of farming, we must now take as our basis the size of the industrial establishments; we must classify the small industrialists according to the size of their output, ascertain the part wage-labour plays in each group, the conditions of technique, etc.** The handicraft house-to-house censuses that we need for such an analysis are available for Moscow Gubernia.*** For

* The fundamental theoretical error made by Mr. N. —on in his arguments about the "capitalisation of industries" is that he ignores the initial steps of commodity production and capitalism in its consecutive stages. Mr. N. —on leaps right over from "people's production" to "capitalism," and then is surprised, with amusing naïvety, to find that he has got a capitalism that is without basis that is artificial, etc.

** Describing "handicraft" industry in Chernigov Gubernia, Mr. Varzer notes "the variety of economic units" (on the one hand, families with incomes from 500 to 800 rubles, and on the other, "almost paupers") and makes the following observation: "Under such circumstances, the only way to present a full picture of the economic life of the craftsmen is to make a house-to-house inventory and to classify their establishments in a number of average types with all their accessories. Anything else will be either a fantasy of casual impressions or arm-chair exercises in arithmetical calculations based on a diversity of average norms ..." (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. V, p. 354).

*** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vols. VI and VII. Industries of Moscow Gubernia, and A. Isayev's *Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, Moscow, 1876-1877, 2 vols. For a small number of industries similar information is given in *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*. It goes without saying that in the present chapter we confine ourselves to an examination of only those industries in which the small

a number of industries the investigators quote precise statistics on output, and sometimes also on the farms of each separate craftsman (date of origin of establishment, number of workers, family and hired, total annual output, number of horses owned by craftsmen, method of cultivating the soil, etc.). The investigators provide no classified tables, however, and we have therefore been obliged to compile them ourselves, dividing the craftsmen in each industry into grades (I, bottom; II, middle and III, top) according to the number of workers (family and hired) per establishment, and sometimes according to the volume of output, technical organisation, etc. In general, the criteria according to which the craftsmen have been divided into grades are based on all the data given in the description of the industry; but in different industries we have found it necessary to take different criteria for dividing the craftsmen into grades. For example, in very small industries we have placed in the bottom grade establishments with 1 worker, in the middle grade those with 2, and in the top grade those with 3 and more; whereas in the bigger industries we have placed in the bottom grade establishments with 1 to 5 workers, in the middle grade those with 6 to 10, etc. Had we not employed different methods of classification we could not have presented for *each* industry data concerning establishments of different size. The table drawn up on these lines is given in the Appendix (see Appendix I); it shows the criteria according to which the craftsmen in each industry are divided up into grades, gives for each grade in each industry absolute figures of the number of establishments, workers (family and hired combined), aggregate output, establishments employing wage-workers, number of wage-workers. To describe the farms of the handicraftsmen we have calculated the average number of horses per peasant household in each grade and the percentage of craftsmen who cultivate their land with the aid of "a labourer" (i.e.,

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commodity-producers work for the market and not for buyers-up,—at all events, in the overwhelming majority of cases. Work for buyers-up is a more complicated phenomenon, one that we shall examine separately later on. The house-to-house censuses of handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up are unsuitable for judging the relations existing among small commodity-producers.

resort to the hire of rural workers). The table covers a total of 37 industries, with 2,278 establishments and 11,833 employed and an aggregate output valued at over 5 million rubles; but if we subtract the 4 industries not included in the general list because of incompleteness of data, or because of their exceptional character,* there is a total of 33 industries, 2,085 establishments, 9,427 workers and an aggregate output of 3,466,000 rubles, or, with corrections (in the case of 2 industries), about 3¾ million rubles.

Since there is no need to examine the data for all the 33 industries, and as it would be too arduous a task, we have divided these industries into four categories: 1) 9 industries with an average of 1.6 to 2.5 workers (family and hired combined) per establishment; 2) 9 industries with an average of 2.7 to 4.4 workers; 3) 10 industries with an average of 5.1 to 8.4 workers; and 4) 5 industries with an average of 11.5 to 17.8 workers. Thus, in each category we have combined industries that are fairly similar as regards the number of workers per establishment, and in our further exposition we shall limit ourselves to the data for these four categories of industries. We give these data in extenso. (See Table on p. 347.)

This table combines those principal data on the relations between the top and bottom grades of handicraftsmen that will serve us for our subsequent conclusions. We can illustrate the summarised data for all four categories with a chart drawn up in exactly the same way as the one with which, in Chapter II, we illustrated the differentiation of the agricultural peasantry. We ascertain what percentage each grade constitutes of the total number of establishments, of the total number of family workers, of the total number of establishments with wage-workers, of the total number of workers (family and wage combined), of the aggregate output and of the total number of wage-workers, and we indicate these percentages (in the manner described in Chapter II) on the chart (see chart on p. 349).

* On these grounds the pottery "industry," in which 20 establishments employ 1,817 wage-workers, has been excluded. It is characteristic of the confusion of terms prevailing among us that the Moscow statisticians included this industry, too, among the "handicraft" industries (see combined tables in Part III of Vol. VII, loc. cit.).

Categories of industries	Absolute figures* of a) establishments b) workers c) aggregate output (rubles)	% distribution** of a) establishments b) workers c) aggregate output				a) % of establishments with wage-workers b) % of wage-workers				Average output (rubles) a) per establishment b) per worker				Average number of workers per establishment a) family b) wage c) total			
		Total	by grades			Total	by grades			Total	by grades			Total	by grades		
			I	II	III		I	II	III		I	II	III		I	II	III
1st (9 industries)	831	100	57	30	13									1.9	1.28	2.4	3.3
	1,776	100	35	37	28	12	2	19	40	430	243	527	1,010	0.2	0.02	0.2	1.2
	357,890	100	32	37	31	11	1	9	27	202	182	202	224	2.1	1.3	2.6	4.5
2nd (9 industries)	348	100	47	34	19									2.5	1.9	2.9	3.7
	1,242	100	30	35	35	41	25	43	76	1,484	791	1,477	3,291	1.0	0.3	0.8	3.0
	516,268	100	25	34	41	26	13	21	45	415	350	399	489	3.5	2.2	3.7	6.7
3rd (10 industries)	804	100	53	33	14									2.4	2.0	2.7	2.3
	4,893	100	25	37	38	64	35	95	100	2,503	931	2,737	8,063	3.7	0.8	3.9	14.9
	2,013,918	100	20	37	43	61	25	59	86	411	324	411	468	6.1	2.8	6.6	17.2
4th (5 industries)	102	100	38	33	29									2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1
	1,516	100	15	24	61	84	61	97	100	5,666	1,919	3,952	12,714	12.7	3.5	8.7	29.6
	***577,930	100	13	23	64	85	60	81	93	381	331	363	401	14.8	5.7	10.8	31.7
Total for all categories (33 industries)	2,085	100	53	32	15									2.2	1.8	2.6	2.9
	9,427	100	26	35	39	40	21	57	74	1,664	651	1,756	5,029	2.3	0.4	2.2	9.0
	3,466,066	100	21	34	45	51	20	46	75	367	292	362	421	4.5	2.2	4.8	11.9

* The letters a) b) c) indicate that figures relating respectively to the items mentioned in the heading follow successively in the given column.

** These are percentages of the total number of establishments and workers in the given category of industries or in the given grade.

*** For two industries, instead of the value of the product (= aggregate output) the figures of the value of the raw material used are given. This reduces the aggregate output by about 300,000 rubles.

Let us now examine the conclusions to be drawn from these data.

We begin with the role of wage-labour. In the 33 industries wage-labour predominates over family labour: 51% of the workers are hired; for the "handicraftsmen" of Moscow Gubernia this percentage is even lower than the actual one. We have computed the data for 54 industries of Moscow Gubernia for which exact figures as to wage-workers employed are available, and got the figure of 17,566 wage-workers out of a total of 29,446 workers, i.e., 59.65%. For Perm Gubernia the percentage of wage-workers among all handicraftsmen and artisans combined was established as 24.5%, and among commodity-producers alone, as from 29.4 to 31.2%. But these gross figures, as we shall see below, embrace not only small commodity-producers, but also capitalist manufacture. Far more interesting, therefore, is the conclusion that the *role of wage-labour rises parallel to the increase in the size of establishments*: this is observed both in comparing one category with another and in comparing the different grades in the same category. The larger the establishments, the higher the percentage of those employing wage-workers and the higher the percentage of wage-workers. The Narodnik economists usually limit themselves to declaring that among the "handicraftsmen" small establishments with exclusively family workers prevail, and in support of this often cite "average" figures. As is evident from the data given, these "averages" are unsuitable for characterising the phenomenon in this regard, and the numerical preponderance of small establishments with family workers does not in the least eliminate the basic fact that the *tendency of small commodity production is towards the ever-growing employment of wage-labour*, *towards the formation of capitalist workshops*. Moreover, the data cited also refute another, no less widespread, Narodnik assertion, namely, that wage-labour in "handicraft" production really serves to "supplement" family labour, that it is resorted to not for the purpose of profit-making, etc.* Actually, however, it turns out that among the small

* See, for example, *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, p. 21.

CHART OF SUMMARIZED DATA GIVEN IN PRECEDING TABLE

The continuous line indicates the percentages (from above downwards) the share of the top, third, grade of handicraftsmen in the total number of establishments, workers, etc. for the 33 industries.

The continuous line indicates the percentages (from below upwards) the share of the top, third, grade of handicraftsmen in the total number of establishments, workers, etc. for the 33 industries.



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— — — The continuous line indicates the percentages (from below upwards) the share of the top, third, grade of handicraftsmen in the total number of establishments, workers, etc. for the 33 industries.

industrialists—just as among the small agriculturists—the *growing employment of wage-labour runs parallel to the increase in the number of family workers*. In the majority of industries we see that the employment of wage-labour increases as we pass from the bottom grade to the top, *notwithstanding* the fact that the number of family workers per establishment also increases. The employment of wage-labour does not smooth out differences in the size of the "handicraftsmen's" families, but accentuates them. The chart very clearly shows this common feature of the small industries: the top grade employs the bulk of the wage-workers, despite the fact that it is best provided with family workers. "*Family co-operation*" *is thus the basis of capitalist co-operation*.* It goes without saying, of course, that this "law" applies only to the smallest commodity-producers, only to the rudiments of capitalism; this law proves that the tendency of the peasantry is to turn into petty bourgeois. As soon as workshops with a fairly large number of wage-workers arise, the significance of "family co-operation" must inevitably decline. And we see, indeed, from our data that this law does not apply to the biggest grades of the top categories. When the "handicraftsman" turns into a real capitalist employing from 15 to 30 wage-workers, the part played by family labour in his workshops declines and becomes quite insignificant (for example, in the top grade of the top category, family workers constitute only 7% of the total number of workers). In other words, to the extent that the "handicraft" industries are so small that "family co-operation" predominates in them, this family co-operation is the surest guarantee of the development of capitalist co-operation. Here, consequently, stand out in full relief the dialectics of commodity production, which transform "working with our own hands" into working with others' hands, into exploitation.

Let us pass to the data on productivity of labour. The data on total output per worker in each grade show that *with the increase in the size of the establishment labour productivity improves*. This is to be observed in the overwhelm-

* The same conclusion follows from the data regarding the Perm "handicraftsmen", see our *Studies*, pp. 126-128. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

ing majority of the industries, and in all categories of industries without exception; the chart graphically illustrates this law, showing that the share of the top grade in total output is greater than is its share in the total number of workers; in the bottom grade the reverse is the case. The total output per worker in the establishments of the top grades is from 20 to 40 per cent higher than that in the bottom grade establishments. It is true that the big establishments usually have a longer working period and sometimes handle more valuable material than do the small ones, but these two circumstances cannot eliminate the fact that labour productivity is considerably higher in the big workshops than in the small ones.* Nor can it be otherwise. The big establishments have from 3 to 5 times as many workers (family and hired combined) as the small ones, and co-operation on a larger scale cannot but increase the productivity of labour. The big workshops are always better equipped technically, they have better implements, tools, accessories, machines, etc. For example, in the brush industry, a "properly organised workshop" must have as many as 15 workers, and in hook-making 9 to 10 workers. In the toy industry the majority of handicraftsmen make shift with ordinary stoves for drying their goods; the bigger toy-makers have special drying ovens, and the biggest makers have special drying premises. In metal toy-making, 8 makers out of 16 have special workshops, divided as follows: I) 6 have none; II) 5 have 3; and III) 5 have 5. A total of 142 mirror and picture-frame makers have 18 special workshops, the figures by grades being: I) 99 have 3; II) 27 have 4; and III) 16 have 11. In the screen-plaiting industry screens are plaited by hand (in grade I), and woven mechanically (in grades II and III). In the tailoring industry the number of sewing-machines per owner according to grade is as follows: I) 1.3; II) 2.1; and III) 3.4, etc., etc. In investigating the furniture industry, Mr. Isayev notes that the one-man business suffers the following disadvantages: 1) lack of a

* For the starch-making industry, which is included in our tables, data are available on the duration of the working period in establishments of various sizes. It appears (as we have seen above) that even in an equal period the output per worker in a big establishment is higher than that in a small one.

complete set of tools; 2) limited assortment of articles made, because there is no room in the craftsman's hut for bulky articles; 3) much higher cost of materials when bought retail (30 to 35% higher); 4) necessity of selling wares cheaper, partly due to lack of confidence in the small "handicraftsman" and partly to his need of money.* It is well known that exactly the same sort of thing is to be observed not only in the furniture industry, but also in the vast majority of small peasant industries. Lastly, it must be added that the value of the goods produced per worker not only increases from the bottom to the top grade in the majority of industries, but also from the small to the big industries. In the first category of industries the average output per worker is 202 rubles, in the second and third about 400 rubles, and in the fourth over 500 rubles (the figure 381 should, for the reason stated above, be increased by about fifty per cent). This circumstance points to the connection between the rise in the price of raw materials and the ousting of the small establishments by the big ones. Every step in the development of capitalist society is inevitably accompanied by a rise in the price of such materials as timber, etc., and thus hastens the doom of the small establishments.

From the foregoing it follows that the relatively big capitalist establishments also play a tremendous part in the small peasant industries. While constituting a small minority of the total number of establishments, they concentrate, however, quite a big share of the total number of workers, and a still bigger share of the total output. Thus, in 33 industries of Moscow Gubernia, the top-grade establishments, constituting 15% of the total, account for 45% of the aggregate output; while the bottom-grade establishments, constituting 53% of the total, account for only 21% of the aggregate output. It goes without saying that the distribution of the net income from the industries must be far more uneven. The data of the Perm handicraft census of 1894-95 clearly illustrate this. Selecting the largest

* The small producer tries to make up for these unfavourable conditions by working longer hours and with greater intensity (loc. cit., p 38). Under commodity production, the small producer both in agriculture and in industry carries on only by cutting down his requirements.

establishments in 7 industries we get the following picture of the relations between the small and big establishments.*

Establishments	Number of establishments	Number of workers			Gross income		Wages		Net Income	
		family	hired	total	total	per worker	total	per wage-worker	total	per family worker
					Rubles		Rubles		Rubles	
All establishments	735	1,587	837	2,424	239,837	98.9	28,985	34.5	69,027	43
Big ones	53	65	366	401	117,870	293	16,215	48.2	22,529	346
The rest	682	1,522	501	2,023	121,967	60.2	12,770	25.4	46,498	30.5

An insignificant number of big establishments (less than 1/10 of the total number), which employ about 1/5 of the total number of workers, account for almost half the total output and nearly 2/5 of the total income (combining the workers' wages and the employers' incomes). The small proprietors obtain a net income considerably below the wages of the hired workers employed in the big establishments; elsewhere we have shown in detail that this phenomenon is no exception but is a general rule for small peasant industries.**

* See our *Studies*, p. 153 and foll. (see present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*) where data are given for each industry separately. Let us note that all these data refer to handicraftsmen cultivators who work for the market.

** From the data given in the text it can be seen that in the small peasant industries a tremendous, and even predominant, part is played by establishments with an output exceeding 1,000 rubles. Let us recall that in our official statistics establishments of this kind have always been, and still are, classed among "factories and works" [cf. *Studies*, pp. 267 and 270 (see present edition, Vol. 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed.*) and Chapter VII, § II]. Thus, if we thought it permissible for an economist to use the current, traditional terminology beyond which our Narodniks have never gone, we would be entitled to establish the following "law": among peasant, "handicraft" establishments a predominant part is played by "factories and works," not included in official statistics because of their unsatisfactory nature.

Summing up the conclusions that follow from the data we have analysed, we must say that the economic system of the small peasant industries is typically petty bourgeois, the same as that which we have seen among the small farmers. The expansion, development and improvement of the small peasant industries cannot take place in the present social and economic atmosphere except by generating a minority of small capitalists on the one hand, and a majority of wage-workers, or of "independent craftsmen" who lead a harder and worse life than the wage-workers, on the other. We observe, consequently, in the smallest peasant industries the most pronounced rudiments of capitalism—of that very capitalism which various economists of the Manilov[121] type depict as something divorced from "people's production." From the viewpoint of the home market theory the facts we have examined are also of no little importance. The development of small peasant industries leads to an expansion of the demand by the more prosperous industrialists for means of production and for labour-power, which is drawn from the ranks of the rural proletariat. The number of wage-workers employed by village artisans and small industrialists all over Russia should be quite impressive, if in the Perm Gubernia alone, for example, there are about 6,500.*

* Let us add that in other gubernias, besides Moscow and Perm, the sources note quite analogous relations among the small commodity-producers. See, for instance, *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, Vol. II, house-to-house censuses of shoemakers and fullers; *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol II—on the wheelwrights of Medyn Uyezd; Vol. II—on the sheepskin dressers of the same uyezd; Vol. III—on the furriers of Arzamas Uyezd, Vol. IV—on the fullers of Semyonov Uyezd and on the tanners of Vasil Uyezd, etc. Cf. *Nizhni-Novgorod Handbook*, Vol. IV, p. 137,—A. S. Gatsisky's general remarks about the small industries speak of the rise of big workshops. Cf, Annensky's report on the Pavlovo handicraftsmen (mentioned above), on the classification of families according to weekly earnings, etc., etc. All these sources differ from the house-to-house census data we have examined only in their incompleteness and poverty. The essence of the matter, however, is identical everywhere.

V. CAPITALIST SIMPLE CO-OPERATION

The establishment by small commodity-producers of relatively large workshops marks the transition to a higher form of industry. Out of scattered small production rises *capitalist simple co-operation*. "Capitalist production only then really begins . . . when each individual capital employs simultaneously a comparatively large number of labourers; when consequently the labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale and yields, relatively, large quantities of products. A greater number of labourers working together, at the same time, in one place (or, if you will, in the same field of labour), in order to produce the same sort of commodity under the mastership of one capitalist, constitutes, both historically and logically, the starting-point of capitalist production. With regard to the mode of production itself, manufacture, in its strict meaning, is hardly to be distinguished, in its earliest stages, from the artisan trades of the guilds, otherwise than by the greater number of workmen simultaneously employed by one and the same individual capital. The workshop of the medieval master handicraftsman is simply enlarged" (*Das Kapital*, I[2], S. 329).[122]

It is this starting-point of capitalism that is to be seen, consequently, in our small peasant ("handicraft") industries. The different historical situation (absence or slight development of guild handicrafts) merely changes the way in which identical capitalist relations are made manifest. The difference between the capitalist workshop and the workshop of the small industrialist lies at first only in the number of workers simultaneously employed. That is why the first capitalist establishments, being numerically in the minority, are submerged, as it were, in the general mass of small establishments. However, the employment of a larger number of workers inevitably leads to consecutive changes in production itself, to the gradual transformation of production. Under primitive hand technique differences between the individual workers (in strength, dexterity, skill, etc.) are always very considerable; if only for this reason the position of the small industrialist is extremely precarious; his dependence upon market fluctuations

assumes the most burdensome forms. Where, however, several workers are employed in an establishment, the individual differences between them are smoothed out in the workshop itself: "the collective working day of a large number of workmen simultaneously employed . . . gives one day of average social labour,"[123] and as a consequence, the manufacture and sale of the products of the capitalist workshop acquire incomparably greater regularity and stability. It becomes possible to make fuller use of premises, warehouses, implements, instruments of labour, etc.; and this leads to a cheapening of production costs in the larger workshops.* The organisation of production on a larger scale and the simultaneous employment of many workers require the accumulation of a fairly large capital, which is often formed, not in the sphere of production, but in the sphere of trade, etc. The size of this capital determines the form in which the proprietor himself takes part in the enterprise—whether he himself is a worker, if his capital is still very small, or whether he gives up working himself and specialises in commercial and entrepreneur functions. "One can establish a connection between the position of the workshop owner and the number of his workers"—we read, for example, in a description of the furniture industry. "The employment of 2 or 3 workers provides the proprietor with such a small surplus that he has to work alongside of them. . . . The employment of 5 workers already gives the proprietor enough to enable him to give up manual labour in some measure, to

* For example, concerning the metal-beaters[124] of Vladimir Gubernia, we read: "With the employment of a larger number of workers a considerable reduction in expenditure may be effected; this concerns expenditure on light, blocks, anvil-stone and casing" (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 188). In the copper-beating industry of Perm Gubernia a one-man establishment needs a complete set of tools (16 items); for two workers "a very small addition" is required. "For workshops employing 6 or 8 persons three or four sets of tools are required.... Only one lathe is kept even in a workshop employing 8 men" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, X, 2939). The fixed capital of a big workshop is estimated at 466 rubles, of a medium workshop at 294 rubles, and of a small one at 80 rubles; and the total output at 6,200 rubles, 3,655 rubles, and 871 rubles respectively. That is to say, in the small workshops the output is 11 times the amount of the fixed capital, in the medium ones 12 times, and in the big ones 14 times.

take it easy somewhat, and to engage mainly in the last two business functions" (i.e., purchase of materials and sale of goods). "As soon as the number of wage-workers reaches 10 or exceeds this figure, the proprietor not only gives up manual labour but practically ceases to supervise his workers: he appoints a foreman for the purpose. . . . He now becomes a small capitalist, a 'born master'" (Isayev, *Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, I, 52-53). The statistics we have cited graphically confirm this description, showing a decline in the number of family workers with the appearance of a considerable number of wage-workers.

The general significance of capitalist simple co-operation in the development of capitalist forms of industry is described by the author of *Capital* as follows:

"Historically, however, this form is developed in opposition to peasant agriculture and to the carrying on of independent handicrafts whether in guilds or not. . . . Just as the social productive power of labour that is developed by co-operation, appears to be the productive power of capital, so co-operation itself, contrasted with the process of production carried on by isolated independent labourers, or even by small employers, appears to be a specific form of the capitalist process of production. It is the first change experienced by the actual labour-process, when subjected to capital. . . . The simultaneous employment of a large number of wage-labourers, in one and the same process, which is a necessary condition of this change, also forms the starting-point of capitalist production. . . . If then, on the one hand, the capitalist mode of production presents itself to us historically, as a necessary condition to the transformation of the labour-process into a social process, so, on the other hand, this social form of the labour-process presents itself, as a method employed by capital for the more profitable exploitation of labour, by increasing that labour's productiveness.

"In the elementary form, under which we have hitherto viewed it, co-operation is a necessary concomitant of all production on a large scale, but it does not, in itself, represent a fixed form characteristic of a particular epoch in the development of the capitalist mode of production. At the most it appears to do so, and that only approximately, in

the handicraft-like beginnings of manufacture. . ." (*Das Kapital*, I², 344-345).[125]

We shall see later how closely small "handicraft" establishments in Russia which employ wage-workers are connected with incomparably more highly developed and more widespread forms of capitalism. As for the role of these establishments in the small peasant industries, the statistics already given show that these establishments create fairly wide capitalist co-operation in place of the previous scattered production and considerably raise the productivity of labour.

Our conclusion as to the tremendous role of capitalist co-operation in the small peasant industries and as to its progressive significance is in sharp contrast to the widespread Narodnik doctrine of the predominance of all sorts of manifestations of the "artel principle" in the small peasant industries. As a matter of fact, the reverse is the case; the distinguishing feature of small industry (and handicrafts) is the extremely scattered nature of the individual producers. In support of the contrary view Narodnik literature could advance nothing more than a collection of individual examples, the overwhelming majority of which do not apply to co-operation at all, but to temporary, miniature associations of masters, big and small, for the common purchase of raw materials, for the building of a common workshop, etc. Such artels do not in the least affect the predominant significance of capitalist co-operation.* To obtain an exact idea of how widely the "artel principle" is actually applied it is not enough to cite examples taken at random here and

* We do not think it worth our while to support the statement made in the text with examples, a host of which may be found in Mr. V. V.'s *The Artel in Handicraft Industry* (St. Petersburg, 1895). Mr. Volgin has dealt with the true significance of the examples cited by Mr. V. V. (op. cit., p. 182 and foll.) and has shown the very negligible part played by the "artel principle" in our "handicraft" industry. Let us merely note the following assertion by Mr. V. V.: "...the amalgamation of several independent handicraftsmen into one production unit ... is not imperatively dictated by competition, as is proved by the absence in the majority of industries of workshops of any size employing wage-workers" (93). To advance such a bald and sweeping thesis is, of course, much easier than to analyse the house-to-house census data available on this question.

there; it is necessary to take the data for some area which has been thoroughly investigated, and to examine the relative incidence and significance of the various forms of co-operation. Such, for example, are the data of the Perm "handicrafts" census of 1894-95; and we have shown elsewhere (*Studies*, pp. 182-187*) what an amazing dispersion of small industrialists was revealed by the census, and what importance attaches to the very few big establishments. The conclusion we have drawn as to the role of capitalist co-operation is based not on isolated examples, but on the precise data of the house-to-house censuses, which embrace scores of the most diverse industries in different localities.

FROM MARX TO MAO

VI. MERCHANT'S CAPITAL IN THE SMALL INDUSTRIES

As we know, the small peasant industries in many cases give rise to special buyers-up, who are particularly engaged in the commercial operations of marketing products and purchasing raw materials, and who usually in one way or another subject the small tradesmen to themselves. Let us see what connection this phenomenon has with the general system of small peasant industries and what its significance is.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The principal economic operation of the buyer-up is to buy goods (finished products or raw materials) in order to resell them. In other words, the buyer-up is a representative of merchant's capital. The starting-point of all capital —both industrial and merchant's—is the accumulation of free money in the hands of individuals (by free money we mean that money which is not needed for personal consumption, etc.). How this property differentiation takes place in our rural districts has been shown in detail above by the data on the differentiation of the agricultural and the industrial peasantry. These data revealed one of the conditions giving rise to the appearance of the buyer-up, namely: the scattered nature, the isolation of the small producers, the existence of economic conflict and strife among them.

* See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*

Another condition relates to the character of the functions performed by merchant's capital, i.e., to the marketing of wares and to the purchase of raw materials. Where the development of commodity production is slight, the small producer limits himself to disposing of his wares in the small local market, sometimes even to disposing of them directly to the consumer. This is the lowest stage of the development of commodity production, hardly to be distinguished from artisan production. As the market expands, this petty, scattered marketing (which fully conforms to petty, scattered production) becomes *impossible*. In the big market, selling must he on a big, on a mass scale. And so the petty character of production proves to be in irreconcilable contradiction with the need for big, wholesale marketing. Under the existing social and economic conditions, with the isolation of the small producers and their differentiation, this contradiction could only be resolved by the well-to-do minority taking charge of marketing, concentrating it in their hands. By buying-up goods (or raw materials) on a large scale, the buyers-up thus cheapened marketing costs and transformed marketing from a petty, casual and irregular operation into a large and regular one; and this purely economic advantage of large-scale marketing inevitably led to the small producer finding himself cut off from the market and defenceless in face of the power of merchant's capital. Thus, under commodity economy, the small producer inevitably falls into dependence upon merchant's capital by virtue of the purely economic superiority of large, mass-scale marketing over scattered, petty marketing.* It goes without saying that actually the profits of the buyers-up are often far from limited to the difference between the returns of mass sales

* Regarding the significance of trading, merchant's capital in the development of capitalism in general we would refer the reader to *Capital*, Vol. III. See especially III, I, S. 253-254 (Russ. trans., 212), on the essence of commodity-trading capital; S. 259 (Russ. trans., 217), on the cheapening of marketing by merchant's capital, S. 278-279 (Russ. trans., 233-234), on the economic necessity of the phenomenon that "concentration appears earlier historically in the merchant's business than in the industrial workshop"; S. 308 (Russ. trans., 259) and S. 310-311 (Russ. trans., 260-261), on the historical role of merchant's capital as necessary "premises for the development of capitalist production."[126]

and those of petty sales, just as the profits of the industrial capitalists often consist of deductions from normal wages. Nevertheless, to explain the profits of the industrial capitalists we must assume that labour-power is sold at its real value. Similarly, to explain the role of the buyer-up we must assume that he buys and sells goods in accordance with the general laws of commodity exchange. Only these economic causes of the domination of merchant's capital can provide the key to an understanding of the variety of forms which it assumes in real life, and among which we constantly meet (there can be no doubt of that) the plainest fraud. To proceed otherwise, as the Narodniks usually do, that is, to confine oneself to enumerating the various tricks of the "kulaks," and on these grounds completely to brush aside the economic nature of the phenomenon would be to adopt the viewpoint of vulgar economics.*

To substantiate our thesis concerning a necessary causal relation between small production for the market and the domination of merchant's capital, lot us deal in greater detail with one of the best descriptions of how the buyer-up appears and of the part he plays. We have in mind the investigation of the lace industry in Moscow Gubernia (*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. II). The "tradeswomen" came into being in the following way. In the 1820s, when this industry first developed, and later, when the number of lace-makers was still small, the principal buyers were the landlords, the "gentry". The consumer was in the neighbourhood of the producer. As the industry spread, the peasants began to send their lace to Moscow "as chance offered," for example, through comb-makers. The inconvenience of

* The preconceived viewpoint of the Narodniks, who have idealised the "handicraft" industries and pictured merchant's capital as a sort of deplorable deviation and not as a necessary accessory to small production for the market is unfortunately reflected in statistical investigations. Thus, we have a number of house-to-house censuses of handicraftsmen (for Moscow, Vladimir and Perm gubernias) which carefully investigated the business of each small industrialist, but ignored the *business* of the buyers-up, did not investigate how his capital is built up and what determines its magnitude, what are the sales' receipts and purchase costs of the buyer-up etc. Cf. our *Studies*, p. 169 (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*).

this primitive form of marketing very soon made itself felt: "how can a muzhik not engaged in this business go from house to house?" The sale of the lace was entrusted to one of the lace-makers, who was compensated for the time she lost. "She also brought back thread for the lace." Thus the inconveniences of isolated marketing led to turning trade into a special function performed by one person who gathered the wares from many lace-makers. The patriarchal proximity of these women workers one to the other (relatives, neighbours, fellow-villagers, etc.) at first gave rise to attempts at the co-operative organisation of sales, to attempts at entrusting this function to one of the women workers. But money economy at once causes a breach in the age-old patriarchal relations, at once gives rise to the phenomena we noted above when examining the mass-scale data on the differentiation of the peasantry. Production for sale teaches that time is money. It becomes necessary to compensate the intermediary for her lost time and labour; she becomes accustomed to this occupation and begins to make it her profession. "Journeys of this kind, repeated several times, gave rise to the *tradeswoman* type" (loc. cit., 30). The woman who has been to Moscow several times establishes the permanent connections which are so necessary for proper marketing. "Thus the need and habit of living on earnings from commission operations develops." In addition to commission earnings, the tradeswoman "does what she can to advance the price of materials, paper, thread"; she sells the lace above the set price and pockets the difference; the tradeswomen declare that the price received was less than the one agreed on: "take it or leave it," they say. "The tradeswomen begin . . . to bring goods from the towns and make a considerable profit." The commission agent thus becomes an independent trader who now begins to monopolise sales and to take advantage of her monopoly to subjugate the lace-makers completely. Usurious operations appear alongside commercial operations—the lending of money to the lace-makers, the taking of goods from them at reduced prices, etc. "The girls . . . pay 10 kopeks per ruble as a commission for sales. . . . They know very well that the tradeswoman makes even more out of them by selling the lace at a higher price. But they simply do not know how to arrange things differently. When

I suggested that they should take turns in going to Moscow, they replied that this would be worse, because they did not know where to sell the lace, whereas the tradeswoman already knew all the places. She sells the finished lace for them and brings back orders, materials, patterns, etc.; she always gives them money in advance, or on loan, and one can even sell her a piece of lace outright, should the need arise. Thus, on the one hand, the tradeswoman becomes a most needed, indispensable person; on the other, she gradually develops into a person who cruelly exploits the labour of others—a woman kulak" (32). To this it should be added that such types develop from among the small producers themselves: "However many enquiries we made, we found that all the tradeswomen had formerly been lace-makers themselves, and consequently, were familiar with the trade; they came from the ranks of these same lace-makers; they had had no capital to start with, and had only gradually begun to trade in calico and other goods, as they made money out of their commissions" (31).* There can, therefore, be no doubt that under commodity economy, not only prosperous industrialists in general, but also, and particularly, representatives of merchant's capital emerge from among the small producers.** And once they have emerged, the elimination of small, scattered marketing by large-scale, wholesale marketing becomes inevitable.*** Here are a few examples of how marketing is organised by the bigger "handicraft" proprietors who are at the same time buyers-up. The marketing of abacuses by craftsmen of Moscow Gubernia (see the statistics

* The emergence of buyers-up from among the small producers themselves is a common thing noted by investigators almost everywhere as soon as they touch upon this question. See, for example, the same remark about "distributors" in the kid-glove industry (*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. II, pp. 175-176), about the buyers-up in the Pavlovo industry (Grigoryev, loc. cit., 92), and many others.

** Korsak (*Forms of Industry*) in his day quite rightly noted the connection between the unprofitableness of small-scale marketing (and of small-scale buying of raw materials) and the "general character of small, scattered production" (pp. 23 and 239).

*** Very often the big handicraft proprietors whom we discussed in detail above are also in some measure buyers-up. For instance, the purchase of the wares of small industrialists by big ones is a very widespread practice.

relating to them in our table; Appendix I) is done mainly at fairs all over Russia. To do business oneself at a fair one must have, firstly, a considerable amount of capital, as only wholesale trade is conducted at the fairs; and, secondly, one must have an agent to buy up wares where they are made, and to send them on to the merchant. These requirements are met "by the one merchant-peasant," who is also a "craftsman," possesses a considerable amount of capital and engages in finishing the abacuses (i.e., fitting the frames and beads) and marketing them; his six sons are "engaged exclusively in commerce," so that two persons have to be hired to cultivate the allotment. "It is not surprising," observes the investigator, "that he is able to sell his wares . . . at all the fairs, whereas the smaller traders usually sell theirs at nearby markets" (*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VII, Pt. I, Sec. 2, p. 141). In this case the representative of merchant's capital was still so little differentiated from the general mass of "muzhik cultivators" that he even continued to retain his allotment farm and his large patriarchal family. The spectacle-frame makers of Moscow Gubernia are entirely dependent upon the industrialists to whom they sell their wares. These buyers-up are at the same time "craftsmen" possessing their own workshops; they lend raw materials to the poor on condition that the finished articles are delivered to them, the "masters," etc. The small industrialists made an attempt to sell their wares in Moscow themselves, but failed; it did not pay to sell goods in small quantities amounting to a matter of 10 or 15 rubles (ibid., 263). In the lace industry of Ryazan Gubernia the tradeswomen make profits amounting to 12 to 50% of the lace-makers' earnings. The "substantial" tradeswomen have established regular-connections with marketing centres and send goods by mail, which saves travelling expenses. How necessary wholesale marketing is can be seen from the fact that the traders consider that even sales amounting to 150 and 200 rubles do not cover marketing expenses (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, VII, 1184). The marketing of Belyov lace is organised as follows. In the town of Belyov there are three grades of tradeswomen: 1) The distributor, who hands out small orders, makes the round of the lace-makers herself and delivers the finished article to the

bigger tradeswomen. 2) The subcontractor, who places orders herself, or buys up goods from the distributors and delivers them to the big cities, etc. 3) The big tradeswomen (2 or 3 "firms"), who do business with commission agents, to whom they send lace and from whom they receive big orders. It is "practically impossible" for the provincial tradeswomen to sell their goods to the big shops: "the shops prefer to do business with the wholesale buyers-up who deliver the wares in big quantities . . . of the most diverse patterns"; the tradeswomen are obliged to sell to these "suppliers"; "it is from them that they learn all the requirements of the market; it is they who fix prices; in short, but for them, there is no way out" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, X, pp. 2823-2824). Numerous such examples could be given. But those given are quite sufficient to show how utterly impossible is small, scattered marketing where production is for big markets. In view of the scattered state of the small producers and of their complete differentiation* large-scale marketing can only be organised by large *capital*, which, by virtue of this, reduces the handicraftsmen to a position of utter helplessness and dependence. One can therefore judge how absurd are the current Narodnik theories which recommend helping the "handicraftsmen" by "organising marketing." From the purely theoretical aspect such theories belong to the category of petty-bourgeois utopias, based on a failure to understand the indissoluble connection between *commodity* production and *capitalist* marketing.** As for the facts of Russian reality, the authors of such theories simply ignore them: they ignore the scattered state of the small commodity-producers and

* Mr. V. V. asserts that the handicraftsman who is under the sway of merchant's capital "suffers losses that are fundamentally quite superfluous" (*Essays on Handicraft Industry*, 150). Maybe Mr. V. V. imagines that the differentiation of the small producers is "fundamentally" a "quite superfluous" phenomenon, i.e., fundamentally as regards the commodity economy under which the small producer lives?

** "It is not a matter of the kulak, but of the shortage of capital among the handicraftsmen," say the Perm Narodniks (*A Sketch of the Condition of Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*, p. 8). But what is a kulak if not a handicraftsman with capital? The trouble is just that the Narodniks refuse to investigate the process of differentiation of the small producers which yields entrepreneurs and "kulaks" from their ranks.

their utter differentiation; they ignore the fact that it is from their very midst that "buyers-up" have emerged and continue to emerge; that in capitalist society marketing can only be organised by big capital. It is natural that if one leaves out of account all these features of the unpleasant but undoubted reality, it is not difficult to conjure up phantasies* ins Blaue hinein.**

We are unable here to go into descriptive details showing exactly how merchant's capital manifests itself in our "handicraft" industries, and how helpless and wretched is the position in which it places the small industrialist. Moreover, in the next chapter we shall have to describe the dominance of merchant's capital at a higher stage of development, where (as an adjunct of manufacture) it organises capitalist domestic industry on a mass scale. Here let us confine ourselves to indicating the main forms assumed by mer-

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* Among the quasi-economic arguments advanced in support of the Narodnik theories is the one about the small amount of "fixed" and "circulating" *capital* needed by the "independent handicraftsman." The line of this extremely widespread argument is as follows: handicraft industries greatly benefit the peasant and therefore should be implanted. (We do not dwell on the amusing notion that the mass of the peasantry which is being steadily ruined can be helped by turning some of their number into small commodity-producers.) And in order to implant these industries one must know how much "capital" the handicraftsman needs to carry on his business. Here is one of numerous calculations of this sort. The Pavlovo handicraftsman, says Mr. Grigoryev for our edification, needs a fixed "capital" of 3 to 5 rubles, 10-13-15 rubles, etc., counting cost of implements, and a circulating "capital" of 6 to 8 rubles, counting *weekly* expenditure on food and raw materials. "Thus, the amount of the fixed and circulating capital (sic!) in Pavlovo District is so small that it is very easy to acquire the tools and materials needed for independent (sic!!) production" (loc. cit., 75). And indeed, what could be "easier" than such an argument? With a stroke of the pen the Pavlovo proletarian is turned into a "capitalist"; all that was needed was to call his weekly keep and miserably cheap tools "capital." But the real *capital* of the big buyers-up who have monopolised sales, who alone are able to be "independent" de facto, and who handle capital running into the thousands this real capital the author simply passes over! Queer people, indeed, these well-to-do Pavlovians: for generations they have used, and continue to use, every foul means to pile up thousands of rubles of capital, whereas according to the latest discoveries it seems that a "capital" of a few dozen rubles is sufficient to make one "independent"!

** at random.—*Ed.*

chant's capital in the small industries. The first and simplest form is the purchase of wares by the merchant (or owner of a big workshop) from the small commodity producers. Where buying-up is poorly developed, or where there are numerous competing buyers-up, the sale of goods to the merchant may not differ from any other sale; but in the vast majority of cases the local buyer-up is the only person to whom the peasant can regularly dispose of his wares, and then the buyer-up takes advantage of his monopoly position to force the price he pays to the producer down to rock bottom. The second form of merchant's capital consists in its combination with usury: the peasant, who is constantly in need of money, borrows it from the buyer-up and repays the debt with his goods. The sale of his goods in this case (which is very widespread) always takes place at artificially reduced prices, which often do not leave the handicraftsman as much as a wage-worker could get. Moreover, the relations of the creditor to the debtor inevitably lead to the personal dependence of the latter, to bondage, to the creditor taking advantage of specific occasions of the debtor's need, etc. The third form of merchant's capital is payment for wares with goods, a common practice among village buyers-up. The specific feature of this form is that it is typical not only of the small industries but of absolutely all undeveloped stages of commodity production and capitalism. Only large-scale machine industry, which has socialised labour and broken radically with all patriarchal usages, has eliminated this form of bondage by causing it to be legally prohibited in large industrial establishments. The fourth form of merchant's capital is payment by the merchant with the particular kinds of goods that are needed by the "handicraftsman" for production (raw or auxiliary materials, etc.). The sale of materials of production to the small industrialist may also be an independent operation of merchant's capital, quite analogous to the operation of buying-up finished goods. When, however, the buyer-up of finished goods begins to pay for them with the raw materials needed by the "handicraftsman," this marks a very big step in the development of capitalist relations. Having cut off the small industrialist from the finished-goods market, the buyer-up now cuts him off from the raw-materials market, and thereby

brings him completely under his sway. It is only one step from this form to that higher form of merchant's capital under which the buyer-up directly hands out materials to the "handicraftsmen" to be worked up for a definite payment. The handicraftsman becomes de facto a wage-worker, working at home for the capitalist; the merchant's capital of the buyer-up is here transformed into industrial capital.* Capitalist domestic industry arises. In the small industries it is met with more or less sporadically; its introduction on a mass scale, however, relates to the next and higher stage of capitalist development.

VII. "INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE"

Such is the usual heading of special sections in descriptions of peasant industries. In view of the fact that at the initial stage of capitalism which we are examining the industrialist has hardly yet become differentiated from the peasant, his connection with the land is something indeed highly characteristic and requires special examination.

Let us begin with the data given in our table (see Appendix I). To characterise the farms of the "handicraftsmen" there are given here, firstly, data on the average number of horses owned by the industrialists of each grade. By combining the 19 industries for which such data are available we get an all-round average per industrialist (master or petty-master) of 1.4 horses, and for the grades: I) 1.1; II) 1.5 and III) 2.0. Thus the higher the proprietor's position in respect to the size of his industrial establishment, the higher his position as an agriculturist. The biggest industrialists have almost twice as many draught animals as the small ones. But with regard to their farms even the smallest industrialists (grade I) are above the middle peasantry, for the general average for Moscow Gubernia in 1877 was 0.87 horses per peasant household.** Thus it is only the relatively

* The pure form of merchant's capital is the purchase of a commodity in order to sell *this same* commodity at a profit. The pure form of industrial capital is the purchase of a commodity in order to sell it in *worked-up form*, hence the purchase of raw materials, etc., and the purchase of labour-power, which processes the material.

** See *Combined Statistical Material on the Economic Position of the Rural Population*, published by the Committee of Ministers, Appendix I: Data of Zemstvo house-to-house investigations, pp. 372-373.

prosperous peasants who become master and petty-master industrialists. The poor peasants, on the other hand, do not, in the main, provide master industrialists but worker industrialists (wage-workers employed by "handicraftsmen," migratory workers, etc.). Unfortunately, for the overwhelming majority of Moscow industries no data are available on the farms of the wage-workers engaged in small industries. An exception is the hat industry (see general data on it in our table, Appendix I). Here are exceedingly instructive data on the farms of master hat-makers and worker hat-makers.

Status of hat-makers	No. of households	No. of animals per household			No. of per capita allotments	Of this number there are		No. of households			No. of horseless ones	Arrears (rubles)
		horses	cows	sheep		cultivated	uncultivated	cultivating allotments		not engaging in farming		
								themselves	by hiring neighbors			
Masters	18	1.5	1.8	2.5	52	4	6	17	—	1	—	54
Workers	165	0.6	0.9	0.8	389	249	140	84	18	63	17	2,402

Thus, the master industrialists belong to the category of very "sound" farmers, i.e., are members of the peasant bourgeoisie, whereas the wage-workers are recruited from the mass of ruined peasants.* Still more important for characterising the relations described are the data on the methods by which the master industrialists cultivate their land. The Moscow investigators distinguished three methods of cultivating the soil: 1) by means of the personal labour

* It is characteristic that the author of the description of the hat industry "did not observe" even here the differentiation of the peasantry both in agriculture and in industry. Like all Narodniks, he limited himself in his conclusions to the absolutely vapid banality that "industry does not prevent one from engaging in agriculture" (*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VI, I, p. 231) The social and economic contradictions *both* in the system of industry *and* in the system of agriculture were thus safely passed over.

of the householder; 2) by "hiring," i.e., by hiring some neighbour who tills the land of the "distressed" householder with his own implements. This method of cultivation is characteristic of the poor peasant who is being steadily ruined. Of opposite significance is the third method, namely, cultivation with the aid of a "labourer," i.e., the hire of agricultural ("land") labourers by the farmer. These workers are usually hired for the whole summer; and, particularly in the busy season, the master usually reinforces them with employees from his workshop. "Thus, the method of cultivating the soil with the aid of the 'land' labourer is quite a profitable one" (*Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, VI, I, 48). In our table we have assembled the data on this method of cultivation for 16 industries, in 7 of which there are no masters who hire "land labourers." In all these 16 industries the master industrialists who hire rural labourers constitute 12% of the total, and by grades: I) 4.5%; II) 16.7% and III) 27.3%. The better off the industrialists are, the more often we find rural entrepreneurs among them. The analysis of the data on the industrial peasantry consequently reveals the same picture of parallel differentiation in both industry and agriculture that we observed in Chapter II on the basis of the data on the agricultural peasantry.

The hiring of "land labourers" by "handicraft" masters is very widespread in all the industrial gubernias. We meet, for example, with references to the hiring of agricultural labourers by the rich bast-matting makers of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia. The furriers of the same gubernia hire agricultural labourers, who usually come from the purely agricultural surrounding villages. The "village-community peasants of Kimry Volost engaged in the boot industry find it profitable to hire for the cultivation of their fields men and women labourers who come to Kimry in large numbers from Tver Uyezd and neighbouring . . . localities." The pottery decorators of Kostroma Gubernia send their wage-workers, when not occupied at their regular jobs, to work in the fields.* "The independent masters" (metal-beaters of Vladimir Gubernia) "keep special field workers";

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III, 57, 112; VIII, 1354; IX, 1931, 2093, 2185.

that is why their fields are well cultivated, although they themselves "quite often can neither plough nor mow."* In Moscow Gubernia, the hiring of "land labourers" is resorted to by many industrialists apart from those about whom data are given in our table; for example, pin-makers, felt-makers and toy-makers send their workers to jobs in the fields too; the glass-bead-makers, metal-beaters, button-makers, cap-makers and harness-makers employ agricultural labourers, etc.** The significance of this fact—the hiring of *agricultural* workers by peasant *industrialists*—is very great. It shows that even in the small peasant industries the phenomenon characteristic of all capitalist countries is beginning to be manifested, and that goes to confirm the progressive historical role of capitalism, namely, a rise in the standard of living of the population, an increase in its requirements. The industrialist is beginning to look down upon the "raw" agriculturist with his coarse patriarchal manners and is trying to rid himself of the hardest and worst-paid agricultural jobs. In the small industries, in which capitalism is least developed, this is to be observed very slightly as yet; the industrial worker is only just beginning to be differentiated from the agricultural worker. In the succeeding stages of development of capitalist industry this phenomenon, as we shall see, is to be observed on a mass scale.

The importance of the "tie between agriculture and industry" compels us to review in greater detail the data relating to other gubernias besides Moscow.

Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia. Among the mass of bast-matting makers agriculture is on the decline, and they are neglecting the land; about 1/3 of the winter-crop area and 1/2 of the spring-crop area are "wasteland." For the "well-to-do muzhiks," however, "the land is no longer a wicked stepmother, but a mother bountiful": they have enough animals, they have manure, they rent land, they try to keep their strips out of the periodical redistribution and tend them better. "Now the wealthy muzhik has become a landlord, while the other muzhik, the poor one, is in serf dependence

* *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 187, 190.
** *Industries of Moscow Gubernia*, loc. cit.

upon him" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III, 65). The furriers "are bad farmers," but here too we must single out the bigger proprietors who "rent land from their poor fellow-villagers," etc. The following is a summary of typical budgets of furriers of different groups:

Types of families according to economic strength	No. of persons, both sexes	Workers male	Wage workers	Land (dess.)	Rented Land	Leased Land	Income (in rubles) in kind	Income (in rubles) in cash	Income (in rubles) from agriculture	Income (in rubles) from industry	Income (in rubles) from total	Expenditure (in rubles) in kind	Expenditure (in rubles) in cash	Expenditure (in rubles) total	Balance	Cash expenditure as %
Rich	14	3	2 hired	19	5	—	212.8	697	409.8	500	909.8	212.8	503	715.8	+194	70
Medium	10	2	—	16	—	—	88*	120	138	70	208	88	124	212	—4	58
Poor	7	2	hiring themselves out	6	—	6	15*	75	50	40	90	15	111	126	—36	88

The parallel process of differentiation of the agriculturists and industrialists stands out here in bold relief. Concerning the blacksmiths, the investigator says that "industry is more important than agriculture" for the rich masters, on the one hand, and for the "landless" labourers, on the other (ibid., IV, 168).

In *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia* the question of the relation between industry and agriculture is dealt with much more thoroughly than in any other work of investigation. For a whole number of industries precise data are given on the farms, not only of "handicraftsmen" in general (such "average" figures, as is clear from all the aforesaid, are quite fictitious), but of the various grades and groups of "handicraftsmen," such as: big masters, small masters, wage-

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III, 38, and foll. The figures are approximate and have been arrived at on the author's estimate as to how long the family's own grain suffices.

workers; workroom owners and weavers; master industrialists and the rest of the peasantry; households engaged in local and in outside industries, etc. The general conclusion drawn by Mr. Kharizomenov from these data is that if the "handicraftsmen" are divided into three categories, viz.—1) big industrialists; 2) small and medium industrialists; 3) wage-workers, there is to be observed a *deterioration of agriculture* as from the first category to the third, a diminution in the amount of land and animals, an increase in the proportion of "distressed" farms, etc.* Unfortunately, Mr. Kharizomenov examined these data too restrictedly and one-sidedly, and paid no attention to the parallel and independent process of the differentiation of the peasant agriculturists. That is why he failed to draw from these data the conclusion that inevitably follows from them, namely, that the peasantry both in agriculture and in industry are splitting up into a petty bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat.** That is why, in describing the different industries, he quite often sinks to the traditional Narodnik arguments about the influence of "industry" in general over "agriculture" in general

* See *Yuridichesky Vestnik* [*The Legal Messenger*], 1883, Vol. XIV, Nos. 11 and 12.

** How near Mr. Kharizomenov was to drawing such a conclusion may be seen from the following description of post-Reform economic development which he gives in speaking of the silk trade: "Serfdom evened out the economic level of the peasantry: it tied the hands of the rich peasant, sustained the poor peasant and prevented the family division of property. Natural economy narrowed too much the arena for commercial and industrial activity. The local market did not provide sufficiently wide scope for enterprise. The peasant merchant or industrialist accumulated money—without risk, it is true, but very slowly—accumulated it and put it away in his chest. Beginning with the 60s conditions change. Serfdom comes to an end; credit and the railways, by creating an extensive and distant market, provide scope for the enterprising peasant merchant and industrialist. All those who have been above the average economic level quickly get on their feet, develop trade and industry and extend their exploiting activities quantitatively and qualitatively. All those who have been below that level fall, sink, drop into the ranks of the landless, the non-farming, the horseless. The peasantry split up into the groups of kulaks, semi-prosperous peasants and farmless proletariat. The kulak element of the peasantry rapidly copy all the habits of a cultured milieu; they live in grand style, and from them a huge class is formed of the semi-cultured sections of Russian society" (III, 20, 21).[127]

(see, for example, *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, II, 288; III, 91), i.e., to the ignoring of the profound contradictions in the very system of *both* industry and agriculture, the existence of which he himself was obliged to admit. Another investigator of the industries of Vladimir Gubernia, Mr. V. Prugavin, is a typical spokesman of the Narodnik views on this subject. Here is a sample of his reasoning. The cotton-weaving industry in Pokrov Uyezd "cannot be regarded at all as a harmful factor (sic!!) in the agricultural life of the weavers" (IV, 53). The data testify to the poor farms of the mass of weavers, and to the fact that among the workroom owners, farming is conducted at a level far above the general (ibid.); from the tables it is evident that some workroom owners hire agricultural labourers too. Conclusion: "industry and agriculture march hand in hand, conditioning each other's development and prosperity" (60). A fine specimen of the phrases used to obscure the fact that the development and prosperity of the peasant bourgeoisie go hand in hand both in industry and in agriculture.*

The data of the Perm handicraft census of 1894-95 revealed the same thing: it is among the small commodity-producers (masters and petty masters) that the level of agriculture is highest and rural labourers are met with; among the artisans agriculture is on a lower level, while among the craftsmen who work for buyers-up the condition of agriculture is worst (as to the agriculture of the wage-workers and of various groups of masters, no data, unfortunately, have been gathered). The census also revealed that the "handicraftsmen" who do not engage in agriculture differ from those who do in that 1) their labour productivity is higher, 2) their net incomes from industry are incomparably higher, and 3) their level of culture and literacy is higher. All these are evidences which confirm the conclusion drawn above,

* Mr. V. V. confines himself to the same sort of phrases in dealing with this subject in Chapter VIII of his *Essays on Handicraft Industry*. "Farming ... is sustained by industry" (205). "Handicraft industries are one of the most reliable mainstays of agriculture in the industrial gubernias" (219). Proof? Any amount: take, for example, the *master* tanners, starch-makers, oil-millers (ibid., 224), etc, and you will find that their farming is on a higher level than that of the masses!

namely, that even the initial stage of capitalism manifests the tendency of industry to raise the population's standard of living (see *Studies*, p. 138 and foll.).*

Lastly, the following point is connected with the question of the relation of industry to agriculture. The larger establishments usually have a longer working period. For example, in the furniture industry of Moscow Gubernia, the working period of those working in plain wood equals 8 months (the average workshop staff here is 1.9 workers); for the bent-wood establishments it is 10 months (2.9 workers per establishment), and in the heavy-furniture trade it is 11 months (4.2 workers per establishment). In the shoe industry of Vladimir Gubernia the working period in 14 small workshops equals 40 weeks, and that in 8 large ones (9.5 workers per establishment, as against 2.4 in the small workshops) 48 weeks, etc.** Naturally, this fact is connected with the large number of workers (family, hired industrial and hired agricultural) in the big establishments and explains the great stability of these establishments and their tendency to specialise in industrial activities.

Let us now sum up the data given above on "industry and agriculture." It is usual at the lower stage of capitalism which we are reviewing for the industrialist still to be scarcely differentiated from the peasant. The combination of industry with agriculture plays an extremely important part in aggravating and accentuating the differentiation of the peasantry: the prosperous and the well-off peasants open workshops, hire workers from among the rural proletariat, and accumulate money for commercial and usurious transactions. The peasant poor, on the other hand, provide the wage-workers, the handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up, and the bottom groups of petty-master handicraftsmen, those most crushed by the power of merchant's capital. Thus, the combination of industry with agriculture consolidates

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* See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*

** Sources are indicated above. The same thing is revealed by the household censuses of the basket-makers, guitar-makers and starch-makers in Moscow Gubernia. The Perm handicraft census also mentions the longer working period of the large workshops (see *Sketch of Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*, p. 78. No precise data, unfortunately, are given).

and develops capitalist relations, spreading them from industry to agriculture and vice versa.* That characteristic feature of capitalist society, the separation of industry from agriculture, manifests itself at this stage in the most rudimentary form, but it does manifest itself and—what is particularly important—in a way totally different from what the Narodniks imagine. When the Narodnik says that industry does no "damage" to agriculture, he discerns damage in the abandonment of agriculture for profitable industry. But such a notion is an invention (and not a deduction from the facts), and a bad invention at that, for it ignores the contradictions which permeate the entire economic system of the peasantry. The separation of industry from agriculture takes place in connection with the differentiation of the peasantry, and does so by different paths at the two poles of the countryside: the well-to-do minority open industrial establishments, enlarge them, improve their farming methods, hire farm labourers to till the land, devote an increasing part of the year to industry, and—at a certain stage of the development of the industry—find it more convenient to separate their industrial from their agricultural undertakings, i.e., to hand over the farm to other members of the family, or to sell farm buildings, animals, etc., and adopt the status of burghers, of merchants.** The separation of industry from agriculture is preceded in this case by the formation of entrepreneur relations in agriculture. At the other pole of the countryside the separation of industry from agriculture consists in the fact that the poor peasants are being ruined and turned into wage-workers (industrial and agricultural). At this pole of the countryside

* For instance, in the woollen trade of Vladimir Gubernia the big "factory owners" and subcontractors are distinguished by the fact of their farming being on the highest level. "During periods of stagnation in production the subcontractors try to buy estates, to engage in farming, and to give up industry altogether" (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, II, 131). This instance is worth noting, since facts of this kind sometimes lead the Narodniks to conclude that "the peasants are going back to agriculture," that the "exiles from the soil must be restored to the land" (Mr. V. V. in *Vestnik Yevropy*, No. 7, 1884).

** "The peasants explained that latterly some of the prosperous master industrialists had moved to Moscow to carry on their business." *The Brush Industry According to the Investigation of 1895*, p. 5.

it is not the profitableness of industry, but need and ruin, that compels the peasant to abandon the land, and not only the land but also independent industrial labour; here the process of the separation of industry from agriculture is one of the expropriation of the small producer.

VIII. "THE COMBINATION OF INDUSTRY WITH AGRICULTURE"

Such is the favourite Narodnik formula with the aid of which Messrs. V. V., N. —on and Co. hope to solve the problem of capitalism in Russia. "Capitalism" separate industry from agriculture; "people's production" combines them in the typical and normal peasant farm—in this ingenuous contra-position lies a good part of their theory. We are now in a position to sum up as regards the question of how in reality our peasantry "combine industry with agriculture," since a detailed examination has been made above of the typical relations existing among the agricultural and among the industrial peasantry. Let us enumerate the diverse forms of the "combination of industry with agriculture" to be observed in the economics of Russian peasant farming.

1) Patriarchal (natural) agriculture is combined with domestic industries (i.e., with the working up of raw materials for home consumption) and with corvée service for the landowner.

This form of combining peasant "industries" with agriculture is most typical of the medieval economic regime, of which it is an essential component.* In post-Reform Russia all that is left of such patriarchal economy—in which there is as yet absolutely no capitalism, commodity production, or commodity circulation—is vestiges in the shape of the domestic industries of the peasants and labour-service.

2) Patriarchal agriculture is combined with industry in the form of artisan production.

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* Korsak, in Chapter IV of the book mentioned above, cites historical evidence of the following nature, for example: "the abbot gave out (in the village) flax for spinning"; the peasants were bound to yield to the landowner "work or wares,"

This form of combination is still very close to the preceding one, differing from it only in that here commodity circulation manifests itself—when the artisan is paid in money and appears on the market to purchase tools, raw materials, etc.

3) Patriarchal agriculture is combined with the small-scale production of industrial products for the market, i.e., with commodity production in industry. The patriarchal peasant is transformed into a small commodity-producer, who, as we have shown, tends to the employment of wage-labour, i.e., to capitalist production. A condition for this transformation is now a certain degree of differentiation among the peasantry: we have seen that the small masters and petty masters in industry belong, in the majority of cases, to the prosperous or to the well-off group of peasants. In its turn, the development of small commodity production in industry gives a further impetus to the differentiation of the peasant agriculturists.

4) Patriarchal agriculture is combined with work for hire in industry (and also in agriculture).*

This form is a necessary addition to the preceding one: there it is the product that becomes a commodity, here it is labour-power. Small-scale commodity production in industry is necessarily accompanied, as we have seen, by the appearance of wage-workers and of handicraftsmen who work for buyers-up. This form of the "combination of agriculture with industry" is characteristic of all capitalist countries,

* As has been shown above, such confusion of terminology prevails in our economic literature and economic statistics that the category peasants' "industries" is used to cover domestic industry, labour-service, handicrafts, small commodity production, trading, work for hire in industry, work for hire in agriculture, etc. Here is an example of how the Narodniks take advantage of this confusion. Mr. V. V., singing the praises of the "combination of industry with agriculture," points, in illustration, to the "timber industry" and "unskilled labour": "He (the peasant) is strong and accustomed to hard work; that is why he can do all kinds of unskilled labour" (*Essays on Handicraft Industry*, 26). And this sort of fact figures among a heap of others to back the conclusion that: "We observe a protest against the splitting-up of occupations," "the durability of the organisation of production that arose when natural economy still predominated" (41). Thus, even the conversion of the peasant into a lumberworker and unskilled labourer was passed off, among other things, as evidence of the durability of natural economy!

and one of the most striking features of the post-Reform history of Russia is the extremely rapid and extremely wide incidence of this form.

5) Petty-bourgeois (commercial) agriculture is combined with petty-bourgeois industries (small commodity production in industry, petty trade, etc.).

The difference between this form and the third is that here petty-bourgeois relations embrace not only industry but also agriculture. Being the most typical form of the combination of industry with agriculture in the economy of the small rural bourgeoisie, this form is therefore characteristic of all capitalist countries. The honour of discovering a capitalism *without* a petty bourgeoisie fell to the Russian Narodnik economists alone.

6) Wage-labour in agriculture is combined with wage-labour in industry. We have already discussed how such a combination of industry and agriculture manifests itself and what it signifies.

Thus, the forms of the "combination of agriculture with industry" among our peasantry are extremely varied: there are those which express the most primitive economic system with the dominance of natural economy; there are those which express a high development of capitalism; there are a whole number of transitional stages between the former and the latter. By confining oneself to general formulas such as: the "combination of industry with agriculture," or the "separation of industry from agriculture"), one cannot advance a single step in explaining the actual process of development of capitalism.

IX. SOME REMARKS ON THE PRE-CAPITALIST ECONOMY OF OUR COUNTRYSIDE

The essence of the problem of "the destiny of capitalism in Russia" is often presented as though prime importance attaches to the question: *how fast*? (i.e., how fast is capitalism developing?). Actually, however, far greater importance attaches to the question: *how exactly*? and to the question: *where from*? (i.e., what was the nature of the pre-capitalist economic system in Russia?). The

principal errors of Narodnik economics are the false replies given to precisely these two questions, i.e., in a wrong presentation of exactly how capitalism is developing in Russia, in a false idealisation of the pre-capitalist order. In Chapter II (and partly in III) and in the present one we have examined the most primitive stages of capitalism in small-scale agriculture and in the small peasant industries; in doing so we could not avoid many references to the features of the pre-capitalist order. If we now try to summarise these features we shall arrive at the conclusion that the pre-capitalist countryside constituted (from the economic point of view) *a network of small local markets which linked up tiny groups of small producers, severed from each other by their separate farms, by the innumerable medieval barriers between them, and by the remnants of medieval dependence.*

As to the scattered nature of the small producers, it stands out in boldest relief in their differentiation both in agriculture and in industry, which we established above. But their fragmentation is far from being confined to this. Although united by the village community into tiny administrative, fiscal and land-holding associations, the peasants are split up by a mass of diverse divisions into grades, into categories according to size of allotment, amount of payments, etc. Let us take, for example, the Zemstvo statistical returns for Saratov Gubernia; there the peasants are divided into the following grades: gift-land, owner, full owner and state peasants, state peasants with community holdings, state peasants with quarter holdings,[128] state peasants that formerly belonged to landlords, appanage, state-land tenant, and landless peasants, owners who were formerly landlords' peasants, peasants whose farmsteads have been redeemed, owners who are former appanage peasants, colonist freeholder, settler, gift-land peasants who formerly belonged to landlords, owners who were former state peasants, manumitted, those who did not pay quitrent, free tiller,[129] temporarily bound, former factory-bound, etc.; further, there are registered peasants, migrant, etc. All these grades differ in the history of their agrarian relations, in size of allotments, amount of payments, etc., etc. And within the grades there are innumerable differences of

a similar kind: sometimes even the peasants of one and the same village are divided into two quite distinct categories: "Mr. X's former peasants" and "Mrs. Y's former peasants." All this diversity was natural and necessary in the Middle Ages, in the remote past; at the present time, however, the preservation of the social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant communities is a crying anachronism and greatly worsens the conditions of the toiling masses, while at the same time not in the least safeguarding them against the burdens of the new, capitalist era. The Narodniks usually shut their eyes to this fragmentation, and when the Marxists express the view that the splitting up of the peasantry is progressive, the Narodniks confine themselves to hackneyed outcries against "supporters of land dispossession," thereby covering up the utter fallacy of their views about the pre-capitalist countryside. One has only to picture to oneself the amazing fragmentation of the small producers, an inevitable consequence of patriarchal agriculture, to become convinced of the progressiveness of capitalism, which is shattering to the very foundations the ancient forms of economy and life, with their age-old immobility and routine, destroying the settled life of the peasants who vegetated behind their medieval partitions, and creating new social classes striving of necessity towards contact, unification, and active participation in the whole of the economic (and not only economic) life of the country, and of the whole world.

If we take the peasants who are handicraftsmen or small industrialists we shall find the same thing. Their interests do not transcend the bounds of the small area of surrounding villages. Owing to the insignificant area covered by the local market they do not come into contact with the industrialists of other districts; they are in mortal terror of "competition," which ruthlessly destroys the patriarchal paradise of the small handicraftsmen and industrialists, who live lives of stagnant routine undisturbed by anybody or anything. With respect to these small industrialists, competition and capitalism perform a useful historical function by dragging them out of their backwoods and confronting them with all the issues that already face the more developed strata of the population.

A necessary attribute of the small local markets is, apart from primitive forms of artisan production, primitive forms of merchant's and usury capital. The more remote a village is, the further away it is from the influence of the new capitalist order, from railways, big factories and large-scale capitalist agriculture, the greater the monopoly of the local merchants and usurers, the more they subjugate the surrounding peasantry, and the cruder the forms of this subjugation. The number of these small leeches is enormous (when compared with the meagre produce of the peasants), and there is a rich variety of local names to designate them. Recall all these "prasols," "shibais," "shchetinniks," "mayaks," "ivashes," "bulinyas," etc., etc. The predominance of natural economy, which accounts for the scarcity and dearness of money in the countryside, results in the assumption of an importance by all these "kulaks" out of all proportion to the size of their capital. The dependence of the peasants on the money owners inevitably acquires the form of bondage. Just as one cannot conceive of developed capitalism without large-scale merchant's capital in the form of commodities or money so the pre-capitalist village is inconceivable without small traders and buyers-up, who are the "masters" of the small local markets. Capitalism draws these markets together, combines them into a big national market, and then into a world market, destroys the primitive forms of bondage and personal dependence, develops in depth and in breadth the contradictions which in a rudimentary form are also to be observed among the community peasantry—and thus paves the way for their resolution.

CHAPTER VI

CAPITALIST MANUFACTURE AND CAPITALIST DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

I. THE RISE OF MANUFACTURE AND ITS MAIN FEATURES

By manufacture is meant, as we know, co-operation based on division of labour. In origin, manufacture belongs directly to the above-described "first stages of capitalism in industry." On the one hand, workshops with a more or less considerable number of workers gradually introduce division of labour, and in this way capitalist simple co-operation grows into capitalist manufacture. The statistics on the Moscow industries quoted in the preceding chapter clearly show the process of this genesis of manufacture: the larger workshops in all fourth category industries, in some of the third category, and in individual cases of the second category, systematically apply division of labour on a wide scale and must therefore be classed as types of capitalist manufacture. More detailed data on the technique and the economics of some of these industries will be given below.

On the other hand, we have seen how merchant's capital in the small industries, upon reaching its highest stage of development, reduces the producer to the position of a wage-worker processing the raw material of others for payment by the piece. If further development leads to the introduction of systematic division of labour into production

and transforms the technique of the small producer, if the "buyer-up" singles out certain detailed operations and gets them done by wage-workers in his own workshop, if, parallel with the distribution of work to be done in the home, and inseparably connected with it, big workshops with division of labour emerge (belonging very often to these same buyers-up), we are confronted with a process of the genesis of capitalist manufacture of another kind.*

Manufacture is highly important in the development of capitalist forms of industry, as the link between handicrafts and small commodity production with primitive forms of capital, and large-scale machine industry (the factory). Manufacture is closer to the small industries because it continues to be based on hand technique, so that the big establishments cannot, therefore, fully displace the small ones, cannot completely divorce the industrialist from agriculture. "Manufacture was unable, either to seize upon the production of society to its full extent, or to revolutionise that production to its very core (in ihrer Tiefe). It towered up as an economic work of art, on the broad foundation of the town handicrafts, and of the rural domestic industries."** What brings manufacture closer to the factory is the rise of the big market, of big establishments with wage-workers, of big capital, which has brought masses of propertyless workers under its complete domination.

In Russian literature the prejudice regarding the isolation of so-called "factory" production from "handicraft"

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* For a description of this process of the genesis of capitalist manufacture, see Marx's *Das Kapital*, III, 318-320. Russ. trans., 267-270.[130]

"It was not even in the bosom of the old guilds that manufacture was born. It was the merchant that became the head of the modern workshop, and not the old guild-master." (*Misère de la philosophie*, 190.[131] We have had occasion elsewhere to enumerate the principal features of the concept manufacture according to Marx. [*Studies*, 179 (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)]

** *Das Kapital,* I², S. 383.[132]

production, regarding the "artificiality" of the former and the "people's" character of the latter, is so widespread that we think it particularly important to examine the data on all the more important branches of manufacturing industry and to show their economic organisation after they had grown out of the stage of small peasant industries, and before they were transformed by large-scale machine industry.

II. CAPITALIST MANUFACTURE IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY

Let us begin with the industries that process fibres.

1) The Weaving Industries

The weaving of linen, wool, cotton and silk fabrics, galloons, etc., was organised everywhere in Russia as follows (before the appearance of large-scale machine industry). The industry was headed by big capitalist workshops employing tens and hundreds of wage-workers; the owners of these workshops, possessing sizable capital, undertook the large-scale purchase of raw material, partly working it up in their own establishments, and partly giving out yarn and warp to small producers (workroom owners, middlemen,[133] subcontractors, peasant-"handicraftsmen" etc.) who wove the cloth at home or in small workshops at piece rates. The work itself was done by hand, and the following operations were distributed among the workers: 1) yarn-dyeing; 2) yarn-winding (very often women and children specialised in this operation); 3) yarn-fixing ("fixers"); 4) weaving; 5) weft-winding for weavers (bobbin hands, mostly children). Sometimes in the big workshops there were special "threaders" (who threaded the warp through the eyes of the batten and reed.)* Division of labour is usually applied, not only to single operations, but to wares, that is, the

* Cf. *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. III (Moscow, 1883), pp. 63-64.

weavers specialise in producing various sorts of cloth. The selection of some operations to be done in the home does not, of course, make any change whatever to the economic structure of this type of industry. The workrooms or homes where the weavers work are simply external departments of the manufactory. The technical basis of such industry is hand production with extensive and systematic division of labour; from the economic point of view we see here the formation of large capital which controls the purchase of raw materials and the sale of wares on an extremely extensive (national) market, and under whose complete sway are a mass of proletarian weavers; a few large establishments (manufactories in the narrow sense of the term) dominate a mass of small ones. Division of labour leads to the emergence of specialist artisans from among the peasantry; non-agricultural centres of manufacture arise, such as the village of Ivanovo in Vladimir Gubernia (in 1871 it became the town of Ivanovo-Voznesensk and is now a centre of large-scale machine industry), the village of Velikoye in Yaroslavl Gubernia, and many other villages in Moscow, Kostroma, Vladimir and Yaroslavl gubernias, which have now turned into factory towns.* In our economic literature and statistics the industry organised in this way is usually split up into two parts: peasants who work in their homes, or in not particularly big workrooms, workshops, etc., are classed under "handicraft" industry, while the bigger workrooms and workshops are placed among the "factories and works" (and, moreover, quite fortuitously, since no definitely established and uniformly applied rules exist as to the separation of small establishments from big ones, of workrooms from manufactories, of workers occupied in their homes from workers occupied in the workshop of the capitalist).** Naturally, such classification, which places some wage-workers on one side, and some masters who hire these very wage-workers (in addition to the workers in their establishments) on the other, is nonsense from the scientific viewpoint.

* For a list of the most important towns of this type, see next chapter.

** Examples of such confusion will be given in the next chapter.

Let us illustrate this by detailed data regarding one of the "handicraft weaving" industries, namely, silk-weaving in Vladimir Gubernia.* The "silk industry" is a typical specimen of capitalist manufacture. Hand labour prevails. Of the total number of establishments the small ones constitute the majority (179 out of 313, or 57% of the total, have from 1 to 5 workers), but in greater part they are not independent and are far behind the big ones in their significance to the industry as a whole. Establishments with 20 to 150 workers constitute 8% of the total (25), but in them 41.5% of the aggregate number of workers are concentrated, and they account for 51% of the total output. Of the total number of workers in the industry (2,823) there are 2,092 wage-workers, i.e., 74.1%. "On the job we meet with division of labour both in wares and in individual operations." Weavers are rarely able to make both "velvet" and "satin" (the two principal lines in this trade). "The division of labour into separate operations within the workshop is most strictly practised only in the big factories" (i.e., manufactories) "that employ wage-workers." The fully independent proprietors number only 123, who alone buy the raw materials themselves and sell the finished article; they have 242 family workers and "employ 2,498 wage-workers, who in greater part are paid by the piece," a total, consequently, of 2,740 workers, or 97% of the aggregate number of workers. It is thus clear that the distribution by these manufactory owners, through the medium of "middle-men" (workroom owners), of work to be done in the home is no special form of industry at all, but is merely one of the operations of capital in manufacture. Mr. Kharizomenov rightly observes that the "mass of small establishments (57%) alongside the small number of big ones (8%), and the insignificant number of workers employed

* See *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III. It would be impossible and superfluous to give detailed data on all the weaving industries described in the literature on our handicraft industry. Moreover, in the majority of these industries the factory now reigns supreme. On the subject of "handicraft weaving" see also *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vols. VI and VII.—*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission—Material on Hand-Labour Statistics*.[134]—*Reports and Investigations*.—Korsak, loc. cit.

per establishment (7½) conceal the true character of the trade" (loc. cit., 39). The specialisation characteristic of manufacture is seen here clearly in the separation of the industrialists from agriculture (the land is abandoned, on the one hand by the impoverished weavers, and on the other by the big manufactory owners) and in the formation of a special type of industrial population, who live much more "decently" than do the agriculturists, and look down upon the muzhik (loc. cit., 106). Our factory statistics have always registered only a very casually selected fraction of this industry.*

The "galloon industry" in Moscow Gubernia is capitalist manufacture organised in a quite analogous fashion.** Such precisely is the case with regard to the printed calico industry in Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia. According to the *Directory* for 1890, there were here 31 "factories" with 4,250 workers and output totalling 265,000 rubles, while according to the *List* there was one "work-distributing office" with 33 workers in the establishment and an output totalling 47,000 rubles. (In other words, in 1890 workers employed in the establishment and on the side were lumped together!) According to local investigators, in 1888 nearly 7,000 looms were engaged in producing printed calico,*** an output totalling 2 million rubles, and "the

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* The *Military Statistical Abstract* managed to count in Vladimir Gubernia, in 1866, 98 silk factories (!) with 98 workers and a total output of 4,000 rubles(!). The *Directory* for 1890 gives 35 factories, 2,112 workers, and 936,000 rubles. According to the List for 1894-95 there were 98 factories, 2,281 workers, with an output of 1,918,000 rubles, and in addition, 2,477 workers "outside of establishments, on the side." Just try to distinguish "handicraftsmen" here from "factory workers"!

** According to the *Directory* for 1890 there were outside of Moscow 10 galloon factories, with 303 workers and an output totalling 58,000 rubles. But according to *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia* (Vol. VI, Pt. II), there were 400 establishments, with 2,619 workers (of whom 72.8% were wage-workers) and with an output totalling 963,000 rubles.

*** The *Collection of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1903* (St. Petersburg, 1906) states that in Saratov Gubernia there were 33 distributing offices with 10,000 workers. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

whole business is run by a few manufacturers," who employ "handicraftsmen" too, including children of 6 and 7 years of age for a payment of 7 to 8 kopeks per day (*Reports and Investigations*, Vol. I).* And so forth.

2) Other Branches of the Textile Industry. The Felt Trade

To judge by official factory statistics, felt production shows a very poor development of "capitalism": in all European Russia there are altogether 55 factories, with 1,212 workers and an output totalling 454,000 rubles (*Directory* for 1890). But these figures merely show a casually picked fragment of a widely developed capitalist industry. Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia occupies first place for the development of "factory" felt production, and in that gubernia the principal centre of the industry is the town of Arzamas and the suburb Viyezdnaya Sloboda (where there are 8 "factories" with 278 workers and an output totalling 120,000 rubles; in 1897 there were 3,221 inhabitants; and in the village of Krasnoye, 2,835). It is in the environs of these centres that "handicraft" felt-making is developed, in some 243 establishments, employing 935 workers, with an output totalling 103,847 rubles (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, V). To illustrate clearly the economic organisation of felt-making in this district, let us try the graphic method and indicate by specific symbols the producers who occupy special places in the general structure of the industry.

It is clear, therefore, that the separation of "factory" and "handicraft" industry is purely artificial, that what we have before us is a single and integral structure of industry which fully fits into the concept of capitalist manu-

* The centre of this industry is Sosnovka Volost, where the Zemstvo census of 1886 counted 4,626 households, with a population of 38,000 persons of both sexes; 291 industrial establishments. Altogether in the volost 10% of the households were houseless (as against 6.2% in the uyezd), and 44.5% of the households cultivated on land (as against 22.8% in the uyezd). See *Statistical Returns for Saratov Gubernia*, Vol. XI.—Capitalist manufacture has, consequently, created industrial centres here too which divorce the workers from the land.

Diagram illustrating the organisation of the felt industry



Fully independent proprietors, who buy wool at first hand.

Independent proprietors, who buy wool at second hand (wavy line indicates for whom).

Non-independent producers, who work at piece rates for proprietors whose materials they use (straight line indicates for whom).

Wage-workers (two straight lines indicates for whom).

The figures show the number of workers (approximately).*
The date given inside the dotted rectangles are for so-called handicraft industry, the rest for so-called "factory-and-works" industry.



FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

facture.** From the technical aspect it is hand production. The organisation of the work is that of co-operation based on division of labour, which is here observed in two forms: as to wares (some villages specialise in plain felt, others

* The sources are shown in the text. The number of establishments is about half the number of independent workers (52 establishments in Vasilyev Vrag, 5+55+110 in Krasnoye village and 21 establishments in the 4 small villages). On the other hand, the figures for the town of Arzamas and Viyezdnaya Sloboda stands for the number of "factories," and not of workers.

** Let us note that the diagram given is typical of all Russian industries organised on the lines of capitalist manufacture: everywhere at the head of the industry we find big establishments (sometimes classed among "factories and works"), and a mass of small

in boots, hats, socks, etc.), and as to individual operations (for example, the whole village of Vasilyev Vrag *shapes* hats and socks for the village of Krasnoye, where the semi-prepared article is finished, etc.). This is capitalist co-operation, for it is headed by big capital, which has created large manufactories and has brought under its sway (by an intricate web of economic relations) a mass of small establishments. The overwhelming majority of the producers have been transformed into *workers performing one operation* and producing for entrepreneurs under extremely insanitary conditions.* The long standing of the industry and the fully established capitalist relations result in the separation of the industrialists from agriculture: in the village of Krasnoye agriculture is in utter ruin, and the life of the inhabitants differs from that of the agricultural population.**

Quite analogous is the organisation of the felt industry in a number of other districts. In 363 village communities of Semyonov Uyezd in the same gubernia, the industry in 1889 was carried on by 3,180 households, with 4,038 persons working. Of 3,946 workers, only 752 worked for the market, 576 were wage-workers and 2,618 worked for masters on the basis, in greater part, of using the latter's materials; 189 households gave out work to 1,805 households. The big owners have workshops with as many as 25 wage-

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establishments completely under their sway—in a word, capitalist co-operation based on division of labour and hand production. Non-agricultural centres are formed by manufacture in exactly the same way, not only here, but also in the majority of other industries.

* They are naked as they work in a temperature of 22° to 24° Réaumur. The air is full of fine and also coarse dust, wool and other stuff. The floors in the "factories" are earthen (in the washing sheds of all places), etc.

** It is not without interest to note here the specific jargon of the inhabitants of Krasnoye; this is characteristic of the territorial isolation peculiar to manufacture. "In the village of Krasnoye factories are given the *Matroisk* name of *povarnyas* (lit. kitchens—*Ed.*).... *Matroisk* is one of the numerous branches of the Ophen dialect, the three main branches of which are *Ophen* proper, spoken mainly in Vladimir Gubernia; *Galivon*, in Kostroma Gubernia; and *Matroisk*, in the Nizhni-Novgorod and Vladimir gubernias" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, V, p 465). Only large-scale machine industry completely destroys the local character of social ties and replaces them by national (and international) ties.

workers, and buy wool to a value of some 10,000 rubles per year.* The big owners are called *thousanders*; their turnover runs to from 5,000 to 100,000 rubles; they have their own wool warehouses, and their own booths for the sale of wares.** For Kazan Gubernia the *List* gives 5 felt "factories," with 122 workers and an output totalling 48,000 rubles, as well as 60 outside workers. Evidently the latter are also included among the "handicraftsmen," concerning whom we read that they often work for "buyers-up" and that there are establishments having 60 workers.*** Of 29 felt "factories" in Kostroma Gubernia, 28 are concentrated in Kineshma Uyezd, and have 593 workers employed in the establishments and 458 outside (*List*, pp. 68-70; two of the enterprises have only outside workers. Steam-engines already appear). From the *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission* (XV) we learn that out of a total of 3,908 wool-carders and felt-makers in this gubernia, 2,008 are concentrated in Kineshma Uyezd. The Kostroma felt-makers are in greater part dependent or work for wages in extremely insanitary workshops.**** In Kalyazin Uyezd, Tver Gubernia, we find, on the one hand, that home work is done for "factory owners" (*List*, 113), and, on the other, that precisely this uyezd is a centre of "handicraft" felt-makers; as many as 3,000 of them come from this uyezd, passing through the wasteland called "Zimnyak" (in the 60s it was the site of Alexeyev's cloth mill), and forming "an enormous labour market of wool-carders and felt-makers."(*) In Yaroslavl Gubernia outside work for "factory owners is also done" (*List*, 115) and there are "handicraftsmen" who work for merchant proprietors, using the latter's wool, etc.

3) The Hat-and-Cap and Hemp-and-Rope Trades

Above we gave statistics for the hat industry of Moscow Gubernia.(**) They show that two-thirds of the total output and of the total number of workers are concentrated

* *Material for Evaluation of the Lands of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia*, Vol. XI, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1893, pp. 211-214.

** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, VI.

*** *Reports and Investigations*, III.

**** *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, Vol. II.

(*) *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, Vol. II, p. 271.

(**) See Appendix I to Chapter V, Industry No. 27.

in 18 establishments, which have an average of 15.6 wage-workers.* The "handicraft" hat-makers perform only part of the hat-making operations: they make the *shapes*, which are sold to Moscow merchants who have their own "finishing establishments"; on the other hand, "clippers" (women who clip the down) work at home for the "handicraft" hat-makers. Thus, all in all, we find here capitalist co-operation based on division of labour and entangled in a whole network of diverse forms of economic dependence. In the centre of the industry (the village of Klenovo, Podolsk Uyezd) the separation of the industrialists (mainly wage-workers) from agriculture** is clearly to be seen, together with a rise in the level of the population's requirements: they live "more decently," dress in calico and even in cloth, buy samovars, abandon ancient customs, etc., thereby evoking the bitter complaints of the local admirers of old times.*** The new era even occasioned the appearance of migratory hat-makers.

A typical example of capitalist manufacture is the cap industry in the village of Molvitino, Bui Uyezd, Kostroma Gubernia.**** "The principal . . . occupation in the village of Molvitino and in . . . 36 hamlets is the cap industry." Agriculture is being abandoned. Since 1861 the industry has greatly developed; sewing-machines have become widely used. In Molvitino 10 workshops are busy all year round with 5 to 25 male and 1 to 5 female workers each. "The best workshop . . . has a turnover of about 100,000 rubles per annum."(*) Work is also distributed to homes (for example, materials for the crowns are made by women in their homes). Division of labour cripples the workers, who work under the most insanitary conditions and usually contract tuberculosis. The lengthy existence of the industry (for over 200 years) has produced highly skilled craftsmen; the Molvitino craftsmen are known in the big cities and in the remote outer regions.

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* Some of these establishments were occasionally included among "factories and works." See, for example, the *Directory* for 1879, p. 126.

** See above, Chapter V, §VII.

*** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, IV, Pt. I, pp. 282-287.

**** See *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX, and *Reports and Investigations*, III.

(*) By some accident, such workshops have not yet been included among "factories and works."

The centre of the hemp industry in the Medyn Uyezd, Kaluga Gubernia, is the village of Polotnyani Zavod. This is a large village (according to the census of 1897 it had 3,685 inhabitants) with a population that is landless and highly industrial (over 1,000 "handicraftsmen"); it is the centre of the "handicraft" industries of Medyn Uyezd.* The hemp industry is organised in the following way: the big proprietors (of whom there are three, the biggest being Yerokhin) have workshops employing wage-workers and circulating capital of more or less considerable dimensions for purchasing raw materials. The hemp is combed in the "factory," spun by spinners in their homes, and twisted both in the factory and in the home. It is warped in the factory and woven both in the factory and in the home. In 1878 a total of 841 "handicraftsmen" was counted in the hemp industry; Yerokhin is considered to be both a "handicraftsman" and a "factory owner," employing 94-64 workers in 1890 and in 1894-1895; according to *Reports and Investigations* (Vol. II, p. 187), "hundreds of peasants" work for him.

In Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, the rope industry is also centred in non-agricultural industrial villages, Nizhni Izbylets and Verkhni Izbylets in the Gorbatov Uyezd.** According to Mr. Karpov (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. VIII), the Gorbatov-Izbylets district is one large rope-making area; part of the inhabitants of the town of Gorbatov are also engaged in the industry, and the villages of Verkhni Izbylets and Nizhni Izbylets are, in fact, "almost part of the town of Gorbatov"; the inhabitants live like townspeople, drink tea every day, wear clothing bought in the shops, and eat white bread. Altogether, as many as two-thirds of the inhabitants of 32 villages are engaged in the industry, a total of 4,701 working (2,096 men and 2,605 women) with an output of about 1½ million rubles. The industry has been in existence

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, II.

** According to Zemstvo statistics (Vol. VII of *Material*, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1892) in these villages in 1889 there were 341 and 119 households, numbering respectively 1,277 and 540 persons of both sexes. There were 253 and 103 allotment households. Households participating in industries numbered 284 and 91, of which 257 and 32 did not engage in agriculture. There were 218 and 51 horseless households. Those leasing their allotments numbered 237 and 53.

for nearly 200 years, and is now declining. It is organised as follows: all work for 29 proprietors, using the latter's materials, are paid by the piece, are "totally dependent upon the proprietors" and work from 14 to 15 hours a day. According to Zemstvo statistics (1889) the industry employs 1,699 male workers (plus 558 females and males of non-working age). Of 1,648 working only 197 work for sale, 1,340 work for proprietors* and 111 are wage-workers employed in the workshops of 58 proprietors. Of 1,288 *allotment* households, only 727, or a little over half, cultivate all their land themselves. Of 1,573 allotment-holding working persons, 306, or 19.4%, do not engage in agriculture at all. Turning to the question as to who these "proprietors" are, we must pass from the sphere of "handicraft" industry to that of "factory" industry. According to the *List* for 1894-95 there were two rope factories there, with 231 workers employed on the premises and 1,155 working outside, with an output totalling 423,000 rubles. Both these establishments have installed motors (which they did not have either in 1879 or in 1890), and we therefore clearly see here the transition from capitalist manufacture to capitalist machine industry, and the transformation of "handicraft" work distributors and buyers-up into real factory owners.

In Perm Gubernia the handicraft census of 1894-95 registered 68 peasant rope-and-string yards, with 343 workers (of whom 143 were hired) and an output totalling 115,000 rubles.** These small establishments are headed by big manufactories, which are reckoned together, viz.: 6 owners employ 101 workers (91 hired) and have an output totalling 81,000 rubles.*** The system of production in these big establishments may serve as the most striking example of "serial manufacture" (as Marx calls it[135]), i.e., the sort of manufacture in which different workers perform different

* Cf. *Nizhni-Novgorod Handbook*, Vol IV, article by Rev. Roslavlev.

** *Sketch of Condition of Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*, p. 158; in the table totals there is a mistake or a misprint.

*** ibid., pp. 40 and 188 of table. To all appearances these same establishments also figure in the *List*, p. 152. For the purpose of comparing the big establishments with the small ones we have singled out the agriculturist commodity-producers, see *Studies*, p. 156. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

consecutive operations in working up the raw material: 1) hemp scutching; 2) combing; 3) spinning; 4) coiling; 5) tarring; 6) winding on drum; 7) passing threads through perforated board; 8) passing threads through iron bush; 9) stranding of plaits, twisting and gathering of ropes.*

The organisation of the hemp industry in Orel Gubernia is evidently similar: from among the considerable number of small peasant establishments big manufactories emerge, principally in the towns, and are included among the "factories and works" (according to the *Directory* for 1890 there were in Orel Gubernia 100 hemp-scutching factories, with 1,671 workers and an output totalling 795,000 rubles). The peasants work in the hemp industry "for merchants" (probably for the very same manufacturers), using the latter's materials, at piece rates, the work being divided up into special operations: "scutchers" scutch the hemp; "spinners" spin it; "bearders" trim it, "wheelmen" turn the wheel. The work is very hard; many contract consumption and "rupture." The dust is so thick that "unless accustomed you will not stay in it for a quarter of an hour." The work is done in ordinary sheds from dawn to dusk, from May to September.**

4) The Wood-Working Trades

The most typical example of capitalist manufacture in this sphere is the chest-making industry. According to the data, for instance, of the Perm investigators, "this industry is organised as follows: a few big proprietors, owning workshops that employ wage-workers, purchase materials, *partly* make the wares on their own premises, but mainly give out material to small workshops making parts, and in their own shops assemble them and, after finishing, send the ready article to market. Division of labour . . . is employed

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* *The Handicraft Industries of Perm Gubernia at the Siberian-Urals Exhibition*, Pt. III, p. 47 and foll.

** See Zemstvo statistical returns for Trubchevsk, Karachev and Orel uyezds of Orel Gubernia. The connection between the big manufactories and the small peasant establishments is also evident from the fact that the employment of wage-labour develops in the latter as well: for example, in Orel Uyezd, 16 peasant master spinners employ 77 workers.

on the job extensively: the making of the entire chest is divided into ten or twelve operations, each separately performed by handicraftsmen. The organisation of the industry consists in the combination of workers performing one operation (Teilarbeiter, as they are called in *Das Kapital*) under the command of *capital*."* This is heterogeneous manufacture (heterogene Manufaktur, as Marx calls it[136]), in which the different workers do not perform consecutive operations in turning the raw material into the product, but make the various parts of the product, which are afterwards assembled. The preference of the capitalists for the domestic work of "handicraftsmen" is to be explained partly by the above-mentioned character of manufacture, and partly (and mainly) by the cheaper labour of the home workers.** Let us observe that the relatively big workshops in this industry are sometimes also included among "factories and works."***

In all probability, the chest-making industry is organised similarly in Vladimir Gubernia, in Murom Uyezd where, according to the *List*, there are 9 "factories" (all hand-operated), with 89 workers on the premises and *114 outside*, and an output totalling 69,810 rubles.

The carriage industry, in Perm Gubernia, for example, is organised on similar lines: from among the mass of small establishments there emerge assembly workshops employing wage-workers; the small handicraftsmen are workers who make parts of the carriages both out of their own materials, and out of materials supplied by the "buyers-up" (i.e., owners of the assembly workshops.)**** We read about the Poltava "handicraft" carriage builders that in the suburb of Ardon there are workshops that employ wage-workers and also distribute work to homes (the bigger masters having as many as 20 outside workers).(*) *In Kazan Gubernia*, division

* V. Ilyin, *Studies*, p. 176. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*).

** See precise data on Perm handicraft census about this, ibid., p. 177 (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

*** See *Directory* and *List* on Perm Gubernia and the village of Nevyansky Zavod (non-agricultural), which is the centre of this "handicraft industry."

**** Cf. our *Studies*, pp. 177-178. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*).

(*) *Reports and Investigations*, I.

of labour as to wares is to be observed in the building of town carriages: some villages specialise in sleighs, others in wheeled vehicles, etc. "The town carriages, completely assembled in the villages (but without the metalwork, wheels or shafts), are sent to Kazan merchant customers, who in turn send them to blacksmiths for the metalwork. The carriages are then sent back again to the shops and workshops in the town, where they are finished off, i.e., are upholstered and painted. . . . Kazan, where town carriages were formerly iron-mounted, gradually passed this work on to handicraftsmen, who work at home for a smaller payment than do the town craftsmen. . . ."* Hence, capital prefers to distribute work to home workers because this reduces the cost of labour-power. The organisation of the carriage industry, as is evident from the data quoted, constitutes, in the majority of cases, a system of handicraftsmen making parts, who are under the sway of capital.

The large industrial village of Vorontsovka, Pavlovsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia (9,541 inhabitants in 1897), constitutes, as it were, a single manufactory of wooden articles (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, *etc.*, Vol. IX, article by Rev. M. Popov). Over 800 houses are engaged in the industry (as well as some households in the suburb of Alexandrovka, which has over 5,000 inhabitants). They make carts, tarantasses, wheels, chests, etc., to a total of about 267,000 rubles. Less than one-third are independent masters; hired workers in masters' workshops are rare.** The majority work to order for peasant merchants at piece rates. The workers are in debt to the proprietors and are worn out by arduous toil: the people are growing feebler. The inhabitants of the suburb are industrial, not of the rural type, and scarcely engage in agriculture at all (except to work vegetable plots), since their allotments are miserably small. The industry has been long in existence,

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* *Reports and Investigations*, III.

** There are 14 big timber merchants. These have *timber-seasoning rooms* (costing about 300 rubles), of which there are 24 in the village, each employing 6 workers. These merchants also give out materials to workers, whom they get into their grip by advancing them money.

diverting the population from agriculture and increasingly widening the rift between the rich and the poor. The people subsist on meagre food; they dress "more smartly than before," "but beyond their means," in clothing that is entirely bought. "The population has succumbed to the spirit of industry and trade." "Nearly all who have no craft carry on some trading. . . . Under the influence of industry and trade, the peasant has, generally speaking, become more unreserved, and this has made him more developed and resourceful."*

The celebrated wooden-spoon industry of the Semyonov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, is close to capitalist manufacture in its organisation. True, there are no big workshops standing out from among the mass of small workshops and dominating them, but we find a deeply-rooted division of labour and the complete subjection of the mass of part-job workers to capital. Before it is ready, the spoon passes through no less than 10 hands, the buyers-up getting some of the operations done by specially hired workers or giving them out to specialist workers (for example, for varnishing); some of the villages specialise in particular operations (for example, the village of Dyakovo specialises in spoon-finishing to the order of the buyer-up, at piece rates; the villages of Khvostikovo, Dianovo and Zhuzhelka specialise in varnishing, etc.). The buyers-up purchase the timber wholesale in the Samara and other gubernias, where they send parties of hired workers; they own warehouses for raw material and manufactured goods, supply the most valuable material to handicraftsmen for processing, etc. The mass of workers doing part jobs merge into a single, complex mechanism of production, entirely under the sway of capital. "It is all the same to the spoon-makers whether they work for hire at the master's cost and on his premises, or are occupied in their own cottages, for in this industry, as in others, everything has been weighed, measured and counted. The spoon-maker never earns more than

* It will be appropriate here to note in general the process of development of capitalism in the *timber industry*. The timber merchants do not sell the timber raw; they hire workers to dress it and to make various wooden articles, which they then sell. See *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission, etc.*, VIII, pp. 1268, 1314. Also *Statistical Returns for Orel Gubernia, Trubchevsk Uyezd*.

just enough to keep body and soul together."* It is quite natural that under such conditions the capitalists who dominate the whole trade are in no hurry to open their own workshops, and the industry, based on hand skill and traditional division of labour, stagnates in its seclusion and immobility. Tied to the land, the "handicraftsmen" seem to have become petrified in their routine: as in 1879, so in 1889, they still count money in the old style, in banknotes and not in silver.

The toy industry in Moscow Gubernia is headed similarly by establishments of the capitalist-manufactory type.** Of 481 workshops, 20 have over 10 workers each. Division of labour, both as to wares and as to individual operations, is practised on a very wide scale, enormously raising the productivity of labour (at the cost of crippling the worker). For example, it is estimated that a small workshop yields a return of 26% of the selling price, and a big workshop, one of 58%.*** Of course, the fixed capital of the big proprietors is also much larger; technical devices are met with (for example, drying sheds). The centre of the industry is a non-agricultural township, the suburb of Sergiyevsky (where there are 1,055 workers out of a total of 1,398, with an output to the amount of 311,000 rubles out of a total of 405,000 rubles; the population, according to the 1897 census, numbers 15,155). The author of the article on this industry, referring to the prevalence of small workshops, etc., considers it more, but still not very, likely that the industry will develop into manufacture rather than into factory industry. "In the future, too," he says, "the small producers will always be able to compete more or less successfully with large-scale production" (loc. cit., 93). The author forgets that in manufacture the technical basis is always the same hand-production that obtains in the small industries; that the division of labour can never be such a

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol II, 1879. See also Zemstvo statistical *Material* for Semyonov Uyezd, Vol. XI, 1893.

** The statistics we have given (Appendix I to Chapter V, Industries Nos. 2, 7, 26) cover only a small fraction of the toy-makers; but these data show the appearance of workshops with 11 to 18 workers.

*** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. II, p. 47.

decisive advantage that it will entirely eliminate the small producers, particularly if the latter resort to such means as lengthening the working day, etc.; and that manufacture is never in a position to embrace the whole of production, but remains a mere superstructure over the mass of small establishments.

5) The Processing of Livestock Produce. The Leather and Fur Trades

The most extensive areas of the leather industry present particularly striking examples of the complete merging of "handicraft" and factory industry, examples of capitalist manufacture highly developed (in depth and in breadth). What is characteristic is the fact that the gubernias which are conspicuous for the size of their "factory" leather industry (Vyatka, Nizhni-Novgorod, Perm and Tver) are marked by a particular development of "handicraft" industries in this sphere.

In the village of Bogorodskoye, Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, there were, according to the *Directory* for 1890, 58 "factories" with 392 workers and an output totalling 547,000 rubles; according to the *List* for 1894-95 there were 119 "works," with 1,499 workers on the premises and 205 outside, and with an output totalling 934,000 rubles (the latter figures covering only the processing of livestock produce, the principal local industry). But these data deal only with the *top levels* of capitalist manufacture. Mr. Karpov in 1879 computed in this village and its environs over 296 establishments, with 5,669 workers (a large number of whom worked at home for capitalists), and with an output totalling about 1,490,000 rubles* in the following industries: tanning, shingle-gluing, basket-weaving (for packing goods), harness-making, horse-collar-making, mitten-making and, standing by itself, pottery. The Zemstvo census of 1889 listed 4,401 industrialists for this district, and of 1,842 workers for whom detailed information is given, 1,119 work for hire in other people's workshops and 405 work at home for masters.** "Bogorodskoye,

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX.

** *Material for the Evaluation of the Lands* in Gorbatov Uyezd.

with its population of 8,000, is a huge tannery in continuous operation."* To be more precise, it is a "serial" manufactory controlled by a few big capitalists who buy the raw materials, tan the hides, and turn them into a variety of articles, hiring several thousand absolutely propertyless workers for the job and ruling over the small establishments.** This industry has had a very long existence, since the 17th century; particularly memorable in the industry's history are the Sheremetevs (beginning of the 19th century), landlords who helped considerably to develop the industry and, incidentally, protected the proletariat, which came into existence here long ago, from the local rich. After 1861 the industry greatly developed, and particularly did big establishments grow at the expense of the small ones; centuries of industrial activity produced from among the population remarkably skilled craftsmen who have carried the trade all over Russia. The firmly-rooted capitalist relations have led to the separation of industry from agriculture: hardly any farming is done in Bogorodskoye village itself, which, on the contrary, divorces neighbouring peasants who move into this "town" from the land.*** Mr. Karpov notes in this village "a complete absence of peasant characteristics among the inhabitants," so that "you would never think you were in a village and not a town." This village leaves Gorbatov and all the other uyezd towns of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia far behind, with the exception, perhaps, of Arzamas. It is "one of the consid-

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX.

** Thus, at the head of the horse-collar industry are 13 big proprietors, each with 10 to 30 wage-workers and 5 to 10 outside workers. The big mitten-makers do the cutting in their own workshops (employing 2 or 3 wage-workers) and get the mittens sewn off the premises by from 10 to 20 women; these are divided into *thumb-makers* and *stitchers*, the former taking the work from the owners and subdividing it among the latter, whom they exploit (information for 1879)

*** In 1889, of 1,812 households (with 9,241 inhabitants) 1,469 cultivated no land (in 1897 there were 12,342 inhabitants). The villages of Pavlovo and Bogorodskoye differ from the other villages of Gorbatov Uyezd in that very few of their inhabitants leave them; on the contrary, of all the peasants of the Gorbatov Uyezd who have left their villages, 14.9% live in Pavlovo and 4.9% in Bogorodskoye. The increase of the population between 1858 and 1889 was 22.1% for the uyezd, but 42% for the village of Bogorodskoye. (See Zemstvo statistical *Material*.)

erable commercial and industrial centres in the gubernia, and its industry and commerce run into the millions." "The radius of the industrial and commercial influence of Bogorodskoye is very wide; but most closely connected with the industry of Bogorodskoye is that of its environs within a radius of 10 to 12 versts. These industrial environs are, as it were, a continuation of Bogorodskoye itself." "The inhabitants of Bogorodskoye do not in the least resemble the ordinary, raw muzhiks: they are artisans of the burgher type, shrewd, experienced people, who look down on the peasants. The manner of life and the ethical standards of the Bogorodskoye inhabitants are completely urban." To this we must add that the industrial villages of Gorbatov Uyezd are marked by a relatively high level of literacy among the population. Thus, the percentage of literate and student men and women is, in the villages of Pavlovo, Bogorodskoye and Vorsma, 37.8% and 20% respectively, as against 21.5% and 4.4% in the rest of the uyezd (see Zemstvo statistical *Material*).

Quite analogous (only on a smaller scale) are the relations in the leather-processing industries of the villages of Katunki and Gorodets (Balakhna Uyezd), Bolshoye Murashkino (Knyaginin Uyezd), Yurino (Vasil Uyezd), and Tubanayevka, Spasskoye, Vatras and Latyshikha in the same uyezd. These are similar non-agricultural centres with a "ring" of surrounding agricultural villages, and with similar diverse industries and numerous small establishments (and also workers in the home) subordinated to big entrepreneurs, whose capitalist workshops are occasionally included among "factories and works."* Without going into statistical details, which will provide nothing new compared with what has already been said, let us merely quote the following extremely interesting description of the village of Katunki:**

"A certain patriarchal simplicity in the relations between masters and workmen, which, however, is not so noticeable at first sight

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* See Zemstvo statistical *Material* for uyezds mentioned.—*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX and VI.—*Directory* and *List.—Reports and Investigations*, II.

** In 1889 it had 380 households (none cultivating land) with 1,305 inhabitants In the whole of the Katunki Volost, 90.6% of the

and is, unfortunately (?), disappearing increasingly every year ... testifies to the handicraft character of the industries (?). It is only recently that the factory character both of the industries and of the population has begun to be observed, under the influence, in particular, of the town, intercourse with which has been facilitated by the inauguration of the steamboat service. Today the village looks like a regular industrial township: there is no sign of agriculture whatever, the houses are built close together as in the towns; the fine brick houses of the rich, and alongside of them the miserable hovels of the poor; the long wooden and brick buildings of the factories crowded in the middle of the village—all this sharply distinguishes Katunki from the neighbouring villages and clearly points to the industrial character of the local population. The inhabitants themselves possess features of character that also call to mind the type of "factory hand" who has already taken shape in Russia: a certain showiness in house furniture, in clothes and manners, spendthrift habits of life in most cases, and little care for the morrow, a forwardness and often affectation in speech, a certain superciliousness towards the country yokel—all these features are possessed by them in common with all Russian factory people."*

In the town of Arzamas, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, the "factory" statistics listed in 1890 a total of 6 tanneries, employing 64 workers (*Directory*); this is only a small fraction of the capitalist manufacture which embraces the fur, boot-making and other industries. The same factories employ workers in the home, both in the town of Arzamas (in 1878, estimated at 400) and in 5 suburban villages, where out of the 360 furrier households, 330 work for Arzamas merchants, using their materials and working 14 hours a day for 6 to 9 rubles per month**; that is why the furriers are pallid, feeble and degenerating folk. In the suburb

households are engaged in industries, 70.1% of working people being occupied in industries alone (i.e., not engaging in agriculture). As regards literacy, this volost stands far above the average for the uyezd, yielding in this respect only to the Chernoretsk Volost, which is also non-agricultural and has highly developed boat-building industries. The village of Bolshoye Murashkino had in 1887 a total of 856 households (of which 853 cultivated no land) with 3,473 persons of both sexes. According to the 1897 census, the population of Gorodets was 6,330, of Bolshoye Murashkino 5,341, of Yurino 2,189, of Spasskoye 4,494 and of Vatras 3,012.

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX, p. 2567. Information for 1880.

** The conditions of the workers in the Arzamas factories are better than those of the rural workers (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III, p. 133).

of Viyezdnaya Sloboda, of the 600 boot-maker households, 500 work for masters, from whom they receive the cut-out leather. The industry is of long standing, being about 200 years old, and is still growing and developing. The inhabitants hardly engage in agriculture at all; their whole manner of life is purely urban, and they live "in grand style." The same applies to the furrier villages mentioned above, the inhabitants of which "look down with disdain upon the peasant and call him a 'country bumpkin'."*

We find exactly the same thing in Vyatka Gubernia. The Vyatka and Slobodskoi uyezds are centres both of "factory" and of "handicraft" leather and fur trades. In the Vyatka Uyezd, the handicraft tanneries are concentrated on the outskirts of the town and "supplement" the industrial activities of the big works,** for example, by working for the big owners; working for the latter also, in the majority of cases, are the handicraft harness-makers and glue-makers. The fur factory owners have hundreds working for them in the home, sewing sheepskins, etc. This is just a single capitalist manufactory with branches: sheepskin-dressing and sheepskin-coat-making, leather and harness, etc. Still more striking are the relations existing in the Slobodskoi Uyezd (the centre of the industries is the suburb of Demyanka); here we see a small number of big factory owners*** at the head of handicraft tanners (numbering 870), boot- and mitten-makers (855), sheepskin-dressers (940), and tailors (309 make short sheepskin coats to order from capitalists). Generally speaking, such organisation of the production of leather goods is evidently very widespread: thus, in the town of Sarapul, Vyatka Gubernia, the *List* gives 6 tanneries, also making footwear, which employ, in addition to 214 workers on the premises, 1,080 outside workers (p. 495). What would become of our "handicraftsmen," those representatives of "people's" industry who are

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III, p. 76.

** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. XI, p. 3084. (Cf. Directory for 1890). Included among the handicraftsmen is the peasant-agriculturist Dolgushin, who owns a works employing 60 workers. There are several handicraftsmen of this type.

*** According to the *Directory* for 1890, there were some 27 masters employing over 700 workers.

depicted in such bright hues by all sorts of Manilovs, if all the Russian merchants and factory owners were to compute with equal detail and precision the outside workers employed by them?*

Reference should be made here to the industrial village of Rasskazovo, Tambov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia (population in 1897 was 8,283), a centre both of "factory" industry (cloth mills, soap-works, tanneries and distilleries) and of "handicraft" industry, the latter being closely connected with the former; and to the industries: tanning, felt-making (as many as 70 masters, and establishments employing from 20 to 30 workers), glue-making, boot-making, stocking knitting (there is not a household where stockings are not knit from wool that "buyers-up" give out by weight), etc. Near this village is the suburb of Belaya Polyana (300 households), celebrated for industries of the same kind. In Morshansk Uyezd, the centre of the handicraft industries is the village of Pokrovskoye-Vasilyevskoye, which is also the centre of factory industry (see *Directory* and *Reports and Investigations*, Vol. III). In Kursk Gubernia, noteworthy as industrial villages and centres of "handicraft" industries are the suburbs: Veliko-Mikhailovka (Novy Oskol Uyezd; population in 1897 was 11,853), Borisovka (Graivoron Uyezd—18,071 inhabitants), Tomarovka (Belgorod Uyezd, 8,716 inhabitants), Miropolye (Sudzha Uyezd, over 10,000 inhabitants. See *Reports and Investigations*, Vol. I, Information for 1888-1889). In the same villages you will also find leather "works" (see *Directory* for 1890). The principal "handicraft" industry is leather and boot-making. It arose as

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* Cf. also *List*, p. 489, regarding the well-known "handicraft" village of Dunilovo, Shuya Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia. The *Directory* for 1890 listed here 6 fur factories employing 151 workers, while according to the *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission* (Vol. X) there are about 2,200 furriers and 2,300 sheepskin-coat-makers in this district; in 1877 as many as 5,500 "handicraftsmen" were counted. Probably, the making of hair sieves in this uyezd is organised in the same way; in this industry there are engaged about 40 villages and as many as 4,000 people, known as "Mardassers" (from the name of this district). We have described the similar organisation of the leather and cobbling industries in Perm Gubernia in our *Studies*, p. 171 and foll. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

far back as the first half of the 18th century and reached the peak of its development in the 60s of the 19th century having become "a stable organisation of a purely commercial character." The whole business was monopolised by contractors, who bought the leather and gave it out to be processed by handicraftsmen. The railways destroyed this monopoly character of capital, and the capitalist contractors transferred their capital to more profitable undertakings. Today it is organised as follows: there are about 120 big entrepreneurs; they own workshops where wage-workers are employed, and also distribute work to homes; there are as many as 3,000 small independent masters (who, however, buy their leather from the big ones); there are 400 people who work at home (for the big masters), and as many wage-workers; then there are the apprentices. The total number of boot-makers is over 4,000. In addition, there are handicraft potters, icon-case makers, icon painters, table-cloth weavers, etc.

A highly characteristic and typical example of capitalist manufacture is the squirrel-fur industry in Kargopol Uyezd, Olonets Gubernia, described with such knowledge of the facts, and with truthful and artless presentation of the whole life of the industrial population by a craftsman and teacher in the *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission* (Vol. IV). According to his description (in 1878), the industry has existed since the beginning of the 19th century: 8 masters employ 175 workers, in addition to which they have as many as 1,000 seamstresses and some 35 families of furriers working for them at home (in different villages), 1,300 to 1,500 persons in all, with an output totalling 336,000 rubles. As a point of interest, it should be noted that when this was a flourishing industry it was not included in the "factory" statistics. The *Directory* for 1879 makes no mention of it. But when it began to decline the statistics included it. The *Directory* for 1890 listed for the town and the uyezd of Kargopol 7 works, with 121 workers and an output totalling 50,000 rubles, whereas the *List* gave 5 works, with 79 workers (plus 57 outside) and an output totalling 49,000 rubles.* The order of things prevailing in this branch of

* Here is some information about the "handicraftsmen" relating to 1894. "The squirrel furs are sewn by some of the poorest women

capitalist manufacture is very instructive as a specimen of what goes on in our age-old, purely native "handicraft industries," that have been left stranded in one of Russia's numerous rural backwoods. The craftsmen work 15 hours a day in a very unhealthy atmosphere and earn 8 rubles per month, less than 60 or 70 rubles per year. The masters' incomes amount to about 5,000 rubles per annum. The relations between masters and workers are "patriarchal": according to ancient custom, the master gives the workers kvass and salt gratis, which they have to beg from his cook. As a mark of gratitude to the master (for "giving" them work) the workers come, without pay, to pull squirrel tails, and also clean furs after work. The workers live in the workshop all the week, and the masters knock them about, seemingly in a joke (p. 218, loc. cit.), make them do all sorts of jobs, such as raking hay, shovelling snow, fetching water, rinsing clothes, etc. Labour is astonishingly cheap in Kargopol itself, and the peasants in the vicinity "are ready to work for next to nothing." Work is done by hand, there is systematic division of labour, and there is a lengthy apprenticeship (8 to 12 years); the lot of the apprentices can easily be imagined.

6) The Remaining Livestock Processing Trades

A particularly noteworthy example of capitalist manufacture is the celebrated boot industry of the village of Kimry, Korcheva Uyezd, Tver Gubernia, and its environs.*

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in the town of Kargopol and by peasant women of the Pavlovo Volost. They are paid the very lowest price," so that a seamstress earns only from 2 rubles 40 kopeks to 3 rubles per month, providing her own food, and for this pay (at piece rates) she has to sit without a break for 12 hours a day. "The work is very exhausting, for it calls for great strain and assiduity." The number of seamstresses is now about 200 (*Handicraft Industry in Olonets Gubernia*, Essay by Messrs. Blagoveshchensky and Garyazin. Petrozavodsk, 1895, pp. 92-93).

* See *Statistical Chronicle of the Russian Empire*, II, Vol. III, St. Petersburg, 1872. Material for the Study of Handicraft Industry and Hand-Labour in Russia. Compiled by *L. Maikov*. Article by V. A. Pletnev. This work is the best for clarity of description of the whole *organisation* of the industry. The latest works give valuable

The industry is a very old one, having existed since the 16th century. Since the Reform, it has continued to grow and develop. In the early 70s Pletnev counted 4 volosts in the area covered by this industry, but in 1888 the area included 9 volosts. Basically the organisation of the industry is as follows. It is headed by the owners of big workshops employing wage-workers; they distribute the cut-out leather to be made up by outside workers. Mr. Pletnev counted 20 such masters, employing 124 adults and 60 boys, with an output totalling 818,000 rubles, while the number of workers occupied at home for these capitalists is estimated by the author approximately at 1,769 adults and 1,833 boys. Then come the small masters, each with 1 to 5 wage-workers and 1 to 3 boys. These masters dispose of their goods mainly in the village market in Kimry; they number 224 and have 460 adults and 301 boys working for them; output totals 187,000 rubles. Hence, there are 244 masters altogether, employing 2,353 adults (of whom 1,769 work at home) and 2,194 boys (of whom 1,833 work at home), with an output totalling 1,005,000 rubles. Further, there are workshops which do various individual operations: currying (skin-cleaning with scraper); chipping (gluing of chips left from currying); special carting (4 masters, with 16 employees and up to 50 horses); special carpentry (box-making), etc.* Pletnev calculated the total output at 4.7 million rubles for the whole district. In 1881 the number of handicraftsmen was computed at 10,638, and with migrants, 26,000, with an output totalling 3.7 million rubles. As to conditions

statistics and facts of the people's life, but give a less satisfactory exposition of the economic structure of this complex industry. See, further, *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. VIII, article by Mr. Pokrovsky.—*Reports and Investigations*, Vol. I.

* Cf. *Reports and Investigations*: 7 groups of industrialists: 1) traders in leather goods; 2) buyers-up of footwear; 3) masters of big workshops (5-6 of them), who stock leather and distribute it to home workers; 4) masters of small workshops employing wage-workers; also give out material to home workers; 5) one-man establishments—working either for the market or for masters (sub 3 and 4); 6) wage-workers (craftsmen, journeymen, boys); 7) "last-makers, notchers, and also owners and workers in currying, greasing and gluing workshops" (p. 227, loc. cit.). The population of Kimry village, according to the 1897 census, is 7,017.

of labour, it is important to note the excessively long working day (14 to 15 hours) and the extremely insanitary working conditions, payment in goods, etc. The centre of the industry, Kimry village, "is more like a small town" (*Reports and Investigations*, I, 224); the inhabitants are poor agriculturists, and are engaged in their industry all the year round; only the rural handicraftsmen give up the industry during haymaking. The houses in Kimry village are urban, and the inhabitants are distinguished for their urban habits of life (such as "showiness"). Until very recently this industry was not included in "factory" statistics, probably because the masters "readily style themselves handicraftsmen" (ibid., 228). The *List* has for the first time included 6 boot workshops in Kimry district, with 15 to 40 workers each on the premises, and with no outside workers. Of course, it contains no end of gaps.

Manufacture also includes the button industry of Moscow Gubernia, Bronnitsi and Bogorodskoye uyezds—the making of buttons from hoofs and rams' horns. Engaged in this industry are 487 workers, employed in 52 establishments; the output totals 264,000 rubles. Establishments with fewer than 5 employees number 16; those with 5 to 10—26; those with 10 and more—10. Masters who do without wage-workers number only 10; these work for big masters, using the latter's materials. Only the big industrialists (who, as is evident from the figures given, should have from 17 to 21 workers per establishment) are quite independent. It is they, evidently, who figure in the *Directory* as "factory owners" (see p. 291: 2 establishments with an output totalling 4,000 rubles and with 73 workers). This is "serial manufacture"; the horns are first steamed in what is called the "smithy" (a wooden hut with a furnace); then they are passed on to the *workshop* where they are cut up, after which they go to a stamping press, where the pattern is imprinted, and, lastly, are finished and polished on lathes. The industry has its apprentices. The working day is 14 hours. Payment in goods is a regular thing. The relations between masters and men are patriarchal, as seen in the following: the master calls the workers "boys," and the pay-book is called the "boys' book"; when the master pays

the workers, he lectures them and never grants in full their "requests" for payment.

The horn industry, which is included in our table of small industries (Appendix I to Chapter V, Industries Nos. 31 and 33), is also of the same type. "Handicraftsmen" employing dozens of wage-workers figure also in the *Directory* as "factory owners" (p. 291). Division of labour is practised; work is also given out to home workers (horn trimmers). The centre of the industry in Bogorodsk Uyezd is the big village of Khoteichi, where agriculture is receding into the background (population in 1897 was 2,494). The Moscow Zemstvo publication stated quite rightly: *Handicraft Industries of Bogorodsk Uyezd*, *Moscow Gubernia*, *in 1890*, that this village "*is nothing but a large comb manufactory*" (p. 24, our italics). In 1890, over 500 industrialists were counted in this village, with an output of from 3.5 to 5.5 million combs. "More often than not, the horn dealer is also a buyer-up of finished goods, and in many cases a big comb-maker as well." The position of those makers who are compelled to take horns "at piece rates" is particularly bad: "their position is actually worse than that of the wage-workers in the big establishments." Dire need compels them to exploit the labour of their whole families beyond measure, to *lengthen their working day* and to put juveniles to work. "During the winter, work in Khoteichi starts at one o'clock in the morning, and it is hard to say for certain when it ends in the cottage of the 'independent' craftsman doing 'piece-work.'" Payment in goods is widely practised. "This system, eliminated with such difficulty from the factories, is still in full force in the small handicraft establishments" (27). Probably, the horn goods industry is organised on similar lines in Kadnikov Uyezd, Vologda Gubernia, in the area of Ustye village (known as "Ustyanshchina"), where there are 58 hamlets. Mr. V. Borisov (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. IX) counts 388 handicraftsmen here, with an output totalling 45,000 rubles; all the handicraftsmen work for capitalists, who buy horns in St. Petersburg and tortoise-shell abroad.

At the bead of the brush industry in Moscow Gubernia (see Appendix I to Chapter V, Industry No. 20) we find big establishments with a large number of wage-workers and

with systematic division of labour.* It is interesting to note at this point the changes that took place in the organisation of this industry between 1879 and 1895 (see Moscow Zemstvo publication: *The Brush Industry According to the Investigation of 1895*). Some well-to-do industrialists went to Moscow to carry on the industry there. The number of industrialists increased 70%, the increase being particularly large in the number of women (+170%) and girls (+159%). The number of big workshops with wage-workers diminished: the proportion of establishments with wage-workers dropped from 62% to 39%. This was due to the fact that the masters began to *distribute work to be done in the home*. The introduction into general use of the drilling machine (for making holes in brush blocks) accelerated and facilitated one of the main processes in brushmaking. The demand for "setters" (craftsmen who "set" bristle in the block) increased; and this operation, which became increasingly specialised, fell to the lot of women, their labour being cheaper. The women began to work at home setting bristle, and were paid by the piece. Thus, the growing resort to domestic industry was caused in this case by progress in technique (drilling machine), progress in division of labour (the women do nothing but set bristle), and progress in capitalist exploitation (the labour of women and girls being cheaper). This example shows very clearly that *domestic industry by no means eliminates the concept of capitalist manufacture*, but, on the contrary, is sometimes even *a sign of its further development*.

7) The Processing of Mineral Products

In the section relating to ceramics we get an example of capitalist manufacture in the industries of the Gzhel district (an area of 25 villages Bronnitsi and Bogorodskoye uyezds, Moscow Gubernia). The relevant statistics are given in our table of small industries (Appendix I to Chapter V, Industries Nos. 15, 28 and 37). From these data it is evident

* The "sawyer" saws the brush blocks; the "borer" bores holes in them; the "cleaner" cleans the bristle; the "setter" "sets" the bristle; the "joiner" glues wooden strips on the brush backs (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. I, p. 18).

that despite the enormous differences between the three Gzhel industries: pottery, porcelain and decorative, these differences disappear as we pass from one grade of establishment to another in each industry, and we get a series of workshops of successively increasing dimensions. Here are the average numbers of workers per establishment according to grade in these three industries: 2.4—4.3—8.4—4.4.—7.9—13.5—18—69—226.4. In other words, the workshops range from the very smallest to the very biggest. There is no doubt that the big establishments belong to the category of capitalist manufacture (inasmuch as they have not introduced machines, have not developed into factories); what is important, however, is not only this, but also that the *small establishments are connected with the big ones*; that we have a *single system of industry* here and not separate workshops of one or other type of economic organisation. "Gzhel constitutes a single economic whole" (Isayev, loc. cit., 138), and the big workshops in the district have grown slowly and gradually out of the small ones (ibid., 121). The work is done by hand,* with considerable *division of labour*: among the potters we find wheel hands (specialising in different sorts of pottery), kilnmen, etc., and sometimes special workers for preparing colours. In the manufacture of porcelain-ware division of labour is extremely detailed: crushers, wheel hands, feeders, kilnmen, decorators, etc. The wheel hands even specialise in the various kinds of porcelain ware (cf. Isayev, loc. cit., 140: in one case division of labour increases productivity of labour by 25%). The decorators' shops work for the porcelain makers and are, therefore, only departments of the latter's manufactories, performing a special detailed operation. It is characteristic of developed capitalist manufacture that physical strength itself becomes a speciality. Thus, in Gzhel, some of the villages are engaged

* Let us observe that in this industry, as in the above-described weaving industries, capitalist manufacture is, strictly speaking, the economy of yesterday. Characteristic of the post-Reform era is the transformation of this manufacture into large-scale machine industry. The number of Gzhel potteries using steam-engines was 1 in 1866, 2 in 1879 and 3 in 1890 (according to data in *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Vol. I, and *Directory* for 1879 and 1890).

(almost to a man) in clay digging; for heavy work not requiring special skill (grinding), workers from the Tula and Ryazan gubernias are employed almost exclusively, being superior in strength and vigour to the not very robust Gzhelians. Payment in goods is widely practised. Agriculture is in a bad way. "The Gzhelians are a degenerating race" (Isayev, 168)—weak-chested, narrow-shouldered, feeble; the decorators lose their sight at an early age, etc. Capitalist division of labour breaks up the worker and deforms him. The working day is from 12 to 13 hours.

8) The Metal Trades. The Pavlovo Industries

The celebrated Pavlovo lock and cutlery industries cover the whole of Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, and Murom Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia. These industries originated very long ago. Smirnov states that as far back as 1621 there were (according to the cadastres[137]) 11 smithies in Pavlovo. By the middle of the 19th century these industries constituted a far-flung network of fully developed capitalist relations. After the Reform, the industries in this district continued to develop and expand. According to the Zemstvo census of 1889, in Gorbatov Uyezd 13 volosts and 119 villages were engaged in industry; a total of 5,953 households, 6,570 male workers (54% of the total number working in these villages) and 2,741 old men, juveniles and women, 9,311 persons in all. In the Murom Uyezd, Mr. Grigoryev in 1881 registered 6 industrial volosts, 66 villages, 1,545 households and 2,205 male workers (39% of the total number working in these villages). Not only were large, non-agricultural industrial villages formed (Pavlovo, Vorsma), but even the surrounding peasants were diverted from agriculture: outside of Pavlovo and Vorsma, in Gorbatov Uyezd, 4,492 persons were engaged in industries, of whom 2,357, or more than half did not engage in agriculture. Life in centres like Pavlovo has become quite urban and has given rise to incomparably more developed requirements, more cultured environment, clothes, manner of life, etc., than among the surrounding "raw" peasants.*

* See above regarding the greater literacy of the population of Pavlovo and Vorsma and the migration of peasants from the villages to these centres.

Turning to the economic organisation of the Pavlovo industries, we must first of all note the indubitable fact that the "handicraftsmen" are headed by the most typical capitalist manufactories. For example, in the Zavyalovs' establishment (which already in the 60s employed over 100 workers at the bench and has now introduced a steam-engine) a penknife passes through 8 or 9 hands: the forger, blade-maker, handle-maker (usually an outside worker), hardener, facer, polisher, finisher, grinder and marker. This is extensive capitalist co-operation based on division of labour, with a considerable number of the workers performing individual operations employed at home and not in the capitalist's workshop. Here are facts given by Mr. Labzin (in 1866) on the bigger establishments in the villages of Pavlovo, Vorsma and Vacha, covering all branches of production in this district: 15 proprietors had 500 workers occupied on the premises and 1,134 workers outside, making a total of 1,634, with an output totalling 351,700 rubles. How far this description of economic relations is applicable to the whole district at the present time may be seen from the following data*:

Districts	Number of persons engaged in industries and working					Approximate total output (million rubles)
	for the market	for proprietors	as wage-workers	for proprietors and as wage-workers	Total	
Pavlovo	3,132	2,819	619	3,438	6,570	2
District around village of Selitba	41	60	136	196	237	
Murom	500	?	?	2,000	2,500	1
Total	3,673	—	—	5,634	9,307	3

* Data from Zemstvo statistical *Material*, and Mr. Annensky's *Report*, and also A. N. Potresov's researches (cited above). The figures for the Murom district are approximate. The number of inhabitants, according to the 1897 census, was 4,674 in Vorsma, and 12,431 in Pavlovo.

Thus, the organisation of the industry as outlined by us prevails in all the districts. All in all, about *three-fifths* of the total number of workers are employed capitalistically. Here too, consequently, we find manufacture predominating in the general structure of the industry* and holding masses of workers under its sway, without, however, being able to eradicate small production. The relative tenacity of the latter is fully explained, firstly, by the fact that in some branches of the Pavlovo industry mechanised production has not yet been introduced at all (for instance, in lock-making); and, secondly, by the fact that the small producer tries to save himself from sinking by resorting to means that cause him to sink far lower than the wage-worker. These means are: lengthening the working day, and reducing the standard of living and of general requirements. "The earnings of the group of handicraftsmen who work for proprietors are less subject to fluctuation (Grigoryev, loc. cit., 65); at Zavyalovs', for example, the lowest-paid worker is the handle-maker; "he works at home, and that is why he is satisfied with lower earnings" (68). The handicrafts-men who work "for factory owners" are "able to earn some-what more than the average earnings of the one who takes his products to the market. Larger earnings are particularly noticeable among the workers who live in the factories" (70).** The working day in the "factories" is from 14½ to 15 hours, with a maximum of 16 hours. "The working day of the home-working handicraftsmen, on the other hand, is never less than 17 hours and sometimes as much as 18 and even 19 hours" (ibid.). It would not be in the

* The data we have given by no means express this predominance to the full: as will presently be seen, the handicraftsmen who work for the market are subjugated to capital *even more* than those who work for proprietors, and the latter handicraftsmen *even more* than the wage-workers. The Pavlovo industries show in strong relief that inseparable connection between merchant's and industrial capital which in general is characteristic of capitalist manufacture in its relation to the small producers.

** Connection with the land is also an important factor in reducing earnings. The village handicraftsmen "on the whole earn less than the Pavlovo locksmiths" (Annensky, *Report*, p. 61). True, we must bear in mind that the former grow their own grain, but even so "the conditions of the ordinary village handicraftsman can scarcely be considered better than those of the average Pavlovo locksmith" (61).

least surprising if the law of June 2, 1897[138] caused an increase here in home-work; it is high time these "handicraftsmen" directed their efforts towards compelling the proprietors to organise factories! Let the reader also recall the notorious Pavlovo "loan-purchase," "exchange," "wife-pawning" and similar forms of bondage and personal degradation which grind down the quasi-independent small producer.* Fortunately, rapidly developing large-scale machine industry does not so readily tolerate these worst forms of exploitation as manufacture does. Running ahead a little, let us quote data on the growth of factory production in this district.**

Years	No. of "factories and works"	No. of workers employed			Total output (thousand rubles)	No. of steam-power establishments	No. of establishments with 15 and more workers
		on premises	outside	total			
1879	31	?	?	1,161	498	2	12
1890	38	about 1,206	about 1,155	2,361	594	11	24
1894-95	31	1,905	2,197	4,102	1,134	19	31

We thus see that ever-increasing numbers of workers are being drawn into large establishments, which are going over to the use of machines.***

* During crises it also happens that they work literally without pay, exchange "white for black," i.e., finished goods for raw materials; this happens "quite often" (Grigoryev, ibid., 93).

** Data taken from *Directory* and *List* for the whole district, including the villages of Selitba and Vacha and their environs. The *Directory* for 1890 undoubtedly included outside workers in the total number of factory workers; we have estimated the number of outside workers approximately, confining ourselves to a correction only for the two biggest establishments (the Zavyalovs and F. Varypayev). To compare the figures for "factories and works" in the *List* and the *Directory*, only establishments with 15 and more workers must be taken (this is examined in greater detail in our *Studies*, article: "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics"). (See present edition, Vol. 4.—*Ed.*)

*** In one branch of the Pavlovo industry, lock-making, there is, on the contrary, a decline in the number of workshops employing

9) Other Metal Trades

The industries of Bezvodnoye village, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia and Uyezd also come under the head of capitalist manufacture. This is also an industrial village, the majority of whose inhabitants do not engage in agriculture at all, and which serves as the centre of an industrial area of several villages. According to the Zemstvo census of 1889 (*Material*, Vol. VIII, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1895), in the Bezvodnoye Volost (581 households) 67.3% of the households cultivated no land, 78.3% had no horses, 82.4% engaged in industries, and 57.7% had literate persons and schoolchildren in the family (as against an average for the uyezd of 44.6%). The Bezvodnoye industries are devoted to the production of various metal goods: chains, fish-hooks, and metal fabrics; the output was estimated at 2½ million rubles in 1883* and 1½ million rubles in 1888-89.** The organisation of the industry is as follows: work for proprietors, using their materials, which is distributed among a number of workers performing single operations and done partly in the employers' workshops and partly in the home. For example, in the making of fish-hooks the various operations are performed by "benders," "cutters" (who work in a special shed) and "pointers" (women and children who sharpen the hook-points in their homes); all these work at piece rates for the capitalist, while the bender gives out work on his own account to the cutters and pointers. "Metal wire is now done by horse-driven windlasses; formerly the wire was drawn by blind men, who were brought here in large numbers. . . ." One of the "specialities" of capitalist manufacture! "The conditions under which this work is done differ very much from those in all the other trades.

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wage-workers. A. N. Potresov (loc. cit.), who recorded this fact in detail, pointed to its cause—the competition of the lock-making *factory* in Kovno Gubernia (Schmidt Brothers, which in 1890 had 500 workers, with an output of 500,000 rubles, and in 1894-95 had 625 workers, with an output of 730,000 rubles).

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX. The population of Bezvodnoye village in 1897 was 3,296.

** *Reports and Investigations*, Vol. I.—The *List* gives 4 "factories" for this district, with 21 workers on premises and 29 outside workers, and output totalling 68,000 rubles.

People have to work in a stifling atmosphere filled with the harmful vapours emanating from accumulated horse dung."* Organised on the same lines of capitalist manufacture are the screen,** the pin,*** and the gold-thread industries.**** In the last-named industry at the beginning of the 80s there were 66 establishments, employing 670 workers (of whom 79% were hired), with an output totalling 368,500 rubles; some of these capitalist establishments were occasionally also included among the "factories and works."(*)

The locksmith industries of the Burmakino Volost (and surrounding volosts) of Yaroslavl Gubernia and Uyezd are probably organised on the same lines. At all events, here we observe the same division of labour (blacksmiths, blowers and locksmiths), the same extensive development of wage-labour (of 307 smithies in the Burmakino Volost, 231 employ wage-workers), the same predominance of big capital over all these detail workers (the buyers-up are at the top; the blacksmiths work for them, and the locksmiths for the blacksmiths), the same combination of the buying-up of wares with the production of wares in capitalist workshops, some of which are occasionally included among the "factories and works."(**)

In the appendix to the preceding chapter, statistics were given on the tray and the copper industries (***) of Moscow Gubernia (the latter in the district known as "Zagarye"). The data show that wage-labour plays a predominant part in these industries, that the industries are headed by large workshops employing an average of from 18 to 23 wage-workers per establishment, with an average output of from

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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* *Reports and Investigations*, I, p. 186.

** Appendix I to Chapter V, Industry No. 29.

*** ibid., No. 32.

**** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. 1, Sec. 2, and *Industries of Bogorodsk Uyezd in 1890*.

(*) See, for example, the *List*, No. 8819.

(**) *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. VI, investigation of 1880.—*Reports and Investigations*, Vol. I (1888-1889), cf. p. 271: "nearly the whole trade ... is concentrated in workshops employing wage-workers." Cf. also *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, Vol. II, Yaroslavl, 1896, pp. 8, 11.—*List*, p. 403.

(***) Appendix I to Chapter V, Industries Nos. 19 and 30.

16,000 to 17,000 rubles. If we add to this that division of labour is very widely practised here,* it will be clear that what we have is capitalist manufacture.** "The small industrial units, which are an anomaly under the existing conditions of technique and division of labour, can only hold out alongside the big workshops by lengthening the working day to the utmost" (Isayev, loc. cit., p. 33)—among the tray-makers, for example, for as long as 19 hours. The ordinary working day here is from 13 to 15 hours; with the small proprietors it is from 16 to 17 hours. Payment in goods is widely practised (both in 1876 and in 1890).*** Let us add that the lengthy existence of this industry (it arose at the beginning of the 19th century, at the latest) and extensive specialisation have, in this case too, produced highly skilled workers; the Zagarians are famed for their craftsmanship. Specialities have also sprung up in the industry which need no preliminary training and are within the grasp of even under-age workers. "This very possibility," Mr. Isayev rightly observes, "of becoming an under-age worker at once and acquiring a trade, as it were, without having to study, indicates that the handicraft spirit, which demands the training of labour-power, is disappearing; the simplicity of many of the detailed operations is a symptom of the transition of handicraft to manufacture" (loc. cit., 34). Let us only observe that to a certain degree the "handicraft spirit" always remains in manufacture, for its basis is the same hand production.

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* A copper-smith's workshop needs five operatives to do the different jobs; a tray-maker's at least 3, while a "normal workshop" needs 9 workers. "In the large establishments" a "fine division" (of labour) is practised "with the object of increasing productivity" (Isayev, loc. cit., 27 and 31).

** The *Directory* for 1890 gives for the district of Zagarye 14 factories employing 184 workers, with an output totalling 37,000 rubles. A comparison of these figures with the above-quoted Zemstvo statistics shows that in this case too the factory statistics covered only the upper strata of widely developed capitalist manufacture.

*** Cf. *Handicraft Industries of Bogorodsk Uyezd*.

10) The Jewellery, Samovar and Accordion Trades

The village of Krasnoye, Kostroma Gubernia and Uyezd, is one of the industrial villages usually held up as centres of our "people's" capitalist manufacture. This large village (in 1897 it had 2,612 inhabitants) is purely urban in character; the inhabitants live like townspeople and (with very few exceptions) do not engage in agriculture. Krasnoye is the centre of the jewellery industry which covers 4 volosts and 51 villages (including Sidorovskoye Volost of Nerekhta Uyezd), and in them 735 households and about 1,706 workers.* "The principal representatives of industry," said Mr. Tillo, "are undoubtedly the big industrialists of the village of Krasnoye: the Pushilovs, Mazovs, Sorokins, Chulkovs and other merchants. They buy materials (gold, silver and copper), employ craftsmen, buy up finished articles, distribute orders for work to be done in the home, supply samples, etc." (2043). The big industrialists have their workshops, so-called "rabotorni" (laboratories), where the metal is smelted and forged, then to be given out for finishing to "handicraftsmen"; they have technical appliances, such as "pretsi" (presses and dies for stamping), "punches" (for embossing designs), "rollers" (for stretching the metal), benches, etc. Division of labour is widely practised: "Nearly every article passes through several hands in an established order in the course of manufacture. For example, in the making of ear-rings, the master industrialist first sends the silver to his own workshop, where part of it is rolled and part drawn into wire; then on receipt of an order the material is given to a craftsman who, if he has a family, divides the work among several persons; one uses a punch to cut the silver plates into the shapes for the ear-rings, another bends the wire into the rings with which the ear-rings are attached

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. IX, article by Mr. A. Tillo.—*Reports and Investigations*, Vol. III (1893). The industry continues to develop. Cf. letter to *Russkiye Vedomosti*, 1897, No. 231. *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 42. Output totals over 1 million rubles, of which about 200,000 rubles is received by the workers and about 300,000 rubles by buyers-up and merchants.

to the ears, a third solders these parts, and, lastly, a fourth polishes the finished ear-rings. None of this work is difficult, or requires much training; very often the soldering and the polishing are done by women and by children of 7 or 8 years of age" (2041).* Here, too, the working day is excessively long, usually as much as 16 hours. Payment in provisions is common.

The following statistics (published quite recently by a local assay inspector) clearly illustrate the economic structure of the industry:[139]

Group of craftsmen	No. of craftsmen	%	Total workers (approx.)	%	Total articles (poods)	%
Who submitted no wares.	404	66.0	1,000	58	—	—
Who submitted up to 12 lbs. of wares. . .	81				11	1.3
Who submitted 12 to 120 lbs.	194	26.4	500	29	236	28.7
Who submitted 120 lbs. and over.	56	7.6	206	13	577	70.0
Total	735	100	1,706	100	824	100

"Both the first groups (about two-thirds of the total number of craftsmen) should be classed as home-working factory workers rather than as handicraftsmen." In the top group "wage-labour occurs more and more frequently. . . . The craftsmen have begun to buy articles made by others"; in the upper strata of this group "buying-up

* "Among the Krasnoye handicraftsmen every kind of article and even every part is made by a specific craftsman, and therefore one rarely finds, for example, rings and ear-rings, bracelets and brooches, etc., made in the same house; usually a particular article is made in parts by different worker-specialists who live not only in different houses but even in different villages" (*Reports and Investigations*, Vol. III, p. 76).

predominates," and "four of the buyers-up have no workshops at all."*

The samovar and accordion industries in Tula town and environs are highly typical examples of capitalist manufacture. Generally speaking, the "handicraft" industries in this district have a long history, dating back to the 15th century.** They evidenced a particularly rapid development in the middle of the 17th century; Mr. Borisov considers that the second period in the development of the Tula industries then began. In 1637 the first iron foundry was built (by the Dutchman Vinius). The Tula gunsmiths formed a separate smiths' suburb, constituted a separate social estate, enjoying special rights and privileges. In 1696 the first iron foundry was erected in Tula by a famous Tula blacksmith, and the industry spread to the Urals and Siberia.*** Then began the third period in the history of the Tula industries. The craftsmen set up their own workshops and taught the trade to surrounding peasants. In the 1810s and 1820s the first samovar factories were started. "By 1825 there were in Tula 43 different factories that belonged to gunsmiths, while those in existence at the present time nearly all belong to one-time gunsmiths, now Tula merchants" (loc. cit., 2262). Here, consequently, we observe a direct continuity and connection between the old guild-masters and the principals of subsequent capitalist manufacture. In 1864 the Tula gunsmiths were freed from serf dependence[140] and assigned to the burgher estate; earnings dropped as a consequence of the severe competition of the village handicraftsmen (which caused a reverse flow of industrialists from town to country); the workers turned to the samovar, lock, cutlery, and accordion industries (the first Tula accordions appeared in 1830-1835).

The samovar industry is at present organised as follows. It is headed by big capitalists who own workshops employ-

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* *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 42.

** See Mr. V. Borisov's article in *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. IX.

*** The Tula blacksmith, Nikita Demidov Antufyev, won Peter the Great's favour by building an ironworks near the town of Tula; in 1702 he was granted the Nevyansk works. His descendants were the famous Urals iron manufacturers, the Demidovs.

ing tens and hundreds of wage-workers, but they also distribute many separate operations to be done by workers, urban and rural, in their homes; those who perform these operations sometimes still have their own workshops and employ wage-workers. Naturally, side by side with the big there are small workshops, with all the consecutive stages of dependence upon the capitalists. Division of labour is the general basis of the whole structure of this trade. The process of samovar-making is divided into the following separate operations: 1) rolling the copper sheets into tubes (tubing); 2) soldering the tubes; 3) filing the seams; 4) fitting the bottoms; 5) beating out the shapes; 6) cleaning the insides: 7) turning the bodies and necks; 8) plating; 9) press-punching the vents in the bottoms and the covers; 10) assembling the samovars. Further, there are the separate processes of casting the small copper parts: a) preparing the moulds and b) casting.* Where work is given out to be done in the home, each of these operations may constitute a special "handicraft" industry. One of these "industries" was described by Mr. Borisov in Vol. VII of the *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*. This industry (samovar tubing) consists in peasants doing at piece rates one of the operations we have described, using merchants' materials. The handicraftsmen left Tula town to work in the countryside after 1861; the cost of living and standard of requirements were lower in the countryside (loc. cit., p. 893). Mr. Borisov quite rightly attributes this tenacity of the "handicraftsman" to the retention of hand-labour in the beating out of samovars; "it will always be profitable for the manufacturer to employ the village handicraftsman, because he works at from 10 to 20% below the rate of the urban artisan" (916).

Mr. Borisov estimated the value of the output of samovars in 1882 at approximately 5 million rubles, the number of workers (handicraftsmen included) totalling from 4,000 to 5,000. In this case also the factory statistics cover only

* The *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. X, contain an excellent description by Mr. Manokhin of the samovar industry in Suksun, Perm Gubernia. Its organisation is the same as that in Tula Gubernia. Cf. ibid., Vol. IX, Mr. Borisov's article on handicraft industries at the 1882 exhibition.

a fraction of capitalist manufacture. The *Directory* for 1879 counted in Tula Gubernia 53 samovar "factories" (all hand-operated) with 1,479 workers and an output totalling 836,000 rubles. The *Directory* for 1890 gives 162 factories, 2,175 workers, and an output of 1.1 million rubles; the list of firms, however, contains only 50 factories (1 steam-operated), with 1,326 workers and an output totalling 698,000 rubles. Evidently, some hundred small establishments were in this case classed as "factories." Lastly, the *List* gives the following for 1894-95: 25 factories (4 steam-operated), 1,202 workers (+607 outside), and an output totalling 1,613,000 rubles. In these data neither the number of factories nor the number of workers are comparable (for the reason given above, and also because of the lumping together in previous years of workers on the premises and outside). The only thing beyond doubt is that manufacture is being steadily displaced by large-scale machine industry: in 1879, there were 2 factories with 100 and more workers; in 1890 there were 2 (one steam-operated) and in 1894-95 there were 4 (three steam-operated).*

The accordion industry, which is at a lower stage of economic development, is organised in precisely the same way.** "In the making of accordions there are over ten separate trades" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IX, 236); the making of the different parts of an accordion or the performance of some of the operations constitute separate, quasi-independent "handicraft" industries. "When things are quiet all the handicraftsmen work

* Evidently there are analogous features in the organisation of the mechanical trades in Tula and its environs. Mr. Borisov in 1882 estimated that the number of workers employed in these industries was from 2,000 to 3,000, producing wares to a value of nearly 2½ million rubles. These "handicraftsmen" are very much under the heel of merchant's capital. The hardware "factories" in Tula Gubernia sometimes also have outside workers (cf. *List*, pp. 393-395).

** The development of accordion-making is also interesting as a process of the elimination of primitive folk instruments and of the creation of a wide, national market; without this market there could have been no division of labour by processes, and without division of labour the finished article could not have been produced cheaply: "Owing to their cheapness ... the accordions have nearly everywhere displaced the primitive string folk instrument, the balalaika" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. IX, p. 2276).

for factories or for more or less big workshops, the owners of which supply them with materials; when, however, there is a brisk demand for accordions, a large number of small producers appear, who buy up parts from the handicraftsmen, assemble them and take the finished articles to the local shops where accordions are very readily purchased" (ibid.). Mr. Borisov in 1882 estimated from 2,000 to 3,000 workers in this industry, with an output totalling about 4 million rubles; factory statistics in 1879 showed two "factories," with 22 workers and an output totalling 5,000 rubles; in 1890, 19 factories, with 275 workers and an output totalling 82,000 rubles; in 1894-95 one factory, with 23 workers (plus 17 outside) and an output totalling 20,000 rubles.* Steam-engines are not employed at all. All these figure variations indicate a purely haphazard picking of individual establishments which are component parts of the complex organism of capitalist manufacture.

III. TECHNIQUE IN MANUFACTURE. DIVISION OF LABOUR AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Let us now draw conclusions from the foregoing data and see whether they are really indicative of a special stage in the development of capitalism in our industry.

The feature common to all the industries we have examined is the retention of hand production and systematic, widely practised division of labour. The process of production is split up into several single operations performed by different specialist craftsmen. The training of such specialists takes a fairly long time, and therefore a natural concomitant of manufacture is *apprenticeship*. It is well known that under the general conditions of commodity economy and capitalism this gives rise to the worst forms of

* The Tula town census of November 29, 1891, gave 36 establishments selling accordions and 34 accordion workshops (see Tula Gubernia Handbook for 1895, Tula, 1895).

personal dependence and exploitation.* The disappearance of apprenticeship is connected with a higher development of manufacture and with the advent of large-scale machine industry, when machines reduce the period of training to a minimum or when such simple single operations arise as can be done even by children (see above example of Zagarye).

The retention of hand production as the basis of manufacture explains its comparative immobility, which is particularly striking when compared with the factory. The development and extension of division of labour proceeds very slowly, so that for whole decades (and even centuries) manufacture retains its form once it has been adopted; as we have seen, quite a number of the industries examined are of quite ancient origin, yet no great changes in methods of production have been observed in the majority of them until recently.

As for division of labour, we shall not repeat here the commonly known tenets of theoretical economics concerning the part it plays in the process of development of the productive powers of labour. On the basis of hand production no other progress in technique was possible except by division of labour.** Let us merely note the two major circumstances that make clear the need for division of labour as a preparatory stage for large-scale machine industry. Firstly, the introduction of machines is possible only when the production process has been split into a number of the simplest, purely mechanical operations; machines are

* Let us confine ourselves to one example. In the village of Borisovka, Graivoron Uyezd, Kursk Gubernia, there is an icon-painting industry, employing about 500 persons. The majority of the craftsmen hire no workers, but keep apprentices, who work from 14 to 15 hours a day. When a proposal was made to set up an art school, these craftsmen strongly opposed it, for fear of losing the gratuitous labour-power of their apprentices (*Reports and Investigations*, I, 333). In domestic industry the conditions of children under capitalist manufacture are no better than those of apprentices, since the domestic worker is compelled to lengthen the working day and exert all the efforts of his family to the utmost.

** "The domestic form of large-scale production and manufacture are an inevitable and to a certain extent even a desirable way out for small independent industry when it covers a large district" (Kharizomenov, in *Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1883, No. 11, p. 435).

first used for the simplest operations and their spread to the more complicated processes is very gradual. For example, in weaving, the power-loom has long predominated in the production of plain fabrics, whereas silk weaving continues to be carried on mainly by hand; in the engineering trade the machine is applied first of all to one of the simplest operations—grinding, etc. But this splitting of production into the simplest operations, while being a necessary preparatory step to the introduction of large-scale machine production, leads at the same time to a growth of small industries. The surrounding population is enabled to perform such detailed operations in its homes, either to order of the manufactory owners, using their materials (bristle-setting in brush manufacture, sewing sheepskins, sheepskin coats, mittens, boots, etc., in the leather trade, horn-trimming in comb manufacture, samovar "tubing," etc.), or even "independently" buying the materials, making certain parts of the product and selling them to the manufacturers (in the hat, carriage, accordion and other industries, etc.). It seems paradoxical that the growth of small (sometimes even "independent") industries should be an expression of the growth of capitalist manufacture: nevertheless it is a fact. The "independence" of such "handicraftsmen" is quite fictitious. Their work could not be done, and their product would on occasion even have no use-value, *if there were no connection* with other detailed operations, with other parts of the product. And only *big capital*, ruling (in one form or another) over a mass of workers performing separate operations was able* to and did create this connection. One of the main errors of Narodnik economics is that it ignores or obscures the fact that the "handicraftsman" performing a single operation is a constituent part of the capitalist manufactory.

The second circumstance that must particularly be stressed is that manufacture trains skilled workers. Large-scale machine industry could not have developed so quickly

* Why is it that only capital was *able to* create this connection? Because, as we have seen, commodity production gives rise to the scattered condition of the small producers and to their complete differentiation, and because the small industries bequeathed to manufacture a heritage of capitalist workshops and merchant's capital.

in the post-Reform period had it not been preceded by a long period in which manufacture trained workers. For instance, the investigators of the "handicraft" weaving industry of the Pokrov Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, note the remarkable "technical skill and experience" of the weavers of Kudykino Volost (where the village of Orekhovo and the famous Morozov mills are situated): "nowhere. . . do we find such intensity . . . of labour . . . ; a strict division of labour between the weaver and the bobbin-hand is invariably practised here. . . ." "The past . . . has imparted to the Kudykinians . . . expert skill in the technique of production . . . an ability to cope with all sorts of difficulties."* "Factories cannot be erected in any village and in any number," we read in reference to silk weaving: "the factory must follow the weaver into the villages where, due to migratory labour" (or, let us add, due to domestic industry), "a contingent of proficient workers has been formed."** Establishments like the St. Petersburg boot factory[141]*** could not have developed so quickly if in the district around Kimry village, say, skilled workers who have now taken to migration had not been developing for centuries, etc. That, incidentally, is why very great importance attaches to the formation by manufacture of a whole number of large districts which specialised in certain trades and trained large numbers of skilled workers.****

Division of labour in capitalist manufacture disfigures and cripples the worker, including the "handicraftsman" who makes single parts. It produces virtuosi and cripples; the former as rare exceptions, whose skill arouses the

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* *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, IV, 22.

** Ibid., III, 63.

*** In 1890 it had 514 workers and an output of 600,000 rubles; in 1894-95, 845 workers, output 1,288,000 rubles.

**** This is very aptly described by the term "wholesale crafts." "Beginning with the 17th century," writes Korsak, "rural industry began to develop more perceptibly; whole villages, especially those near Moscow and situated along the high roads, began to engage in some particular industry; the inhabitants of some became tanners, of others weavers, and of still others dyers, cartwrights, smiths, etc.... Towards the close of the last century very many of these *wholesale crafts*, as some call them, had developed in Russia" (loc. cit., 119-121).

astonishment of investigators,* and the latter in the shape of the mass of "handicraftsmen,"—weak-chested, with inordinately developed arms, "curvature of the spine,"** etc., etc.

IV. THE TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR AND THE SEPARATION OF AGRICULTURE FROM INDUSTRY

Directly connected with division of labour in general is, as has been noted, territorial division of labour—the specialisation of certain districts in the production of some one product, of one sort of product and even of a certain part of a product. The predominance of hand production, the existence of a mass of small establishments, the preservation of the worker's connection with the land, the tying of the craftsman to a given trade,—all this inevitably gives rise to the seclusion of the different industrial districts of manufacture; sometimes this local seclusion amounts to complete isolation from the rest of the world,*** with which only the merchant masters have dealings.

In the following effusion Mr. Kharizomenov underrates the significance of the territorial division of labour: "The vast distances of the Empire go hand in hand with sharp differences of natural conditions: one locality is rich in timber and wild animals, another in cattle, while a third abounds in clay or iron. These natural features determined the character of industry. The great distances and incon-

* Let us confine ourselves to two examples: Khvorov, the celebrated Pavlovo locksmith, made 24 locks to a weight of one zolotnik (4.25 grammes.—Ed.); some of the parts of these locks were no larger than a pin's head (Labzin, loc. cit., 44). One toy-maker in Moscow Gubernia spent nearly all his life finishing harnessed horses and achieved such dexterity that he could finish 400 a day (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. II, pp. 38-39).

** This is how Mr. Grigoryev describes the Pavlovo handicraftsmen. "I met one of these workers ... who for six years had been working at the same vice and had with his bare left foot worn more than halfway through the board on which he stood; with bitter irony he said that the employer intended to get rid of him when he had worn the board right through" (op. cit., pp. 108-109).

*** The squirrel-fur industry in Kargopol Uyezd, the wooden-spoon industry in Semyonov Uyezd.

veniences of communication made the transport of raw materials impossible, or extremely costly. As a result, industry had necessarily to nestle where an abundance of raw material was close at hand. Hence the characteristic feature of our industry—the specialisation of commodity production in large and compact areas" (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*, loc. cit., p. 440).

Territorial division of labour is not a characteristic feature of our industry, but of manufacture (both in Russia and in other countries); the small industries did not produce such extensive districts, while the factory broke down their seclusion and facilitated the transfer of establishments and masses of workers to other places. Manufacture not only creates compact areas, but introduces specialisation within these areas (division of labour as to wares). The availability of raw materials in the given locality is not at all essential for manufacture, and is hardly even usual for it, for manufacture presupposes fairly wide commercial intercourse.*

Connected with the above-described features of manufacture is the circumstance that this stage of capitalist evolution is marked by a specific form of separation of agriculture from industry. It is no longer the peasant who is the most typical industrialist, but the non-farming "artisan" (and at the other pole—the merchant and the workshop owner). In most cases (as we have seen) the industries organised on the lines of manufacture have non-agricultural centres: either towns or (much more often) villages, whose inhabitants hardly engage in agriculture at all, and which should be classed as settlements of a commercial and industrial character. The separation of industry from agriculture is here deeply rooted in the technique of manufacture, in its economy, and in the peculiarities of its way of life (or culture). Technique ties the worker to one trade and therefore, on the one hand, renders him unfit for agriculture (physically weak, etc.), and, on the

* Imported (i.e., not local) raw material is used in the weaving industries, the Pavlovo and Gzhel industries, the Perm leather industries, and many others (cf. *Studies*, pp. 122-124). (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

other, demands continuous and long pursuit of the craft. The economic structure of manufacture is characterised by a far deeper differentiation among the industrialists than is the case in the small industries; and we have seen that in the small industries, differentiation in industry is paralleled by differentiation in agriculture. With the utter pauperisation of the mass of producers, which is a condition and a consequence of manufacture, its working personnel cannot be recruited from among farmers who are at all economically sound. Among the cultural peculiarities of manufacture are, firstly, the very lengthy (sometimes age-old) existence of the industry, which leaves its impress upon the population; and secondly, the higher standard of living of the population.* We shall deal with the latter circumstance in greater detail further on, but first let us note that manufacture does not bring about the complete separation of industry from agriculture. Under hand technique the big establishments cannot eliminate the small ones completely, especially if the small handicraftsmen lengthen their working day and reduce the level of their requirements: under such conditions, manufacture, as we have seen, even develops the small industries. It is natural, therefore, that in the majority of cases we see around the non-agricultural centre of manufacture a whole region of agricultural settlements, the inhabitants of which also engage in industries. Hence, in this respect, too, we find clearly revealed the transitional character of manufacture between small hand production and the factory. If even in

* Mr. V. V. in his *Essays on Handicraft Industry*, assures us that "in our country ... there are very few localities of handicraft industry where agriculture has been entirely abandoned (36)—we have shown above that, on the contrary, there are very many—and that "the slight manifestations of division of labour that we observe in our country must be ascribed not so much to the energy of industrial progress as to the immobility of the size of peasant holdings..." (40). Mr. V. V. fails to notice that these "localities of handicraft industry" are distinguished by a special system of technique, economy and culture, and that they characterise a specific stage in the development of capitalism. The important thing is that the majority of "industrial villages" received the "smallest allotments" (39)—(in 1861, after their industrial life had proceeded for scores and in some cases hundreds of years!)—and of course, had there not been this connivance of the authorities there would have been no capitalism.

the West the manufacturing period of capitalism could not bring about the complete separation of the industrial workers from agriculture,* in Russia, with the preservation of many institutions that tie the peasants to the land, such separation could not but be retarded. Therefore, we repeat, what is most typical of Russian capitalist manufacture is the non-agricultural centre which attracts the population of the surrounding villages—the inhabitants of which are semi-agriculturists and semi-industrialists—and dominates these villages.

Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the fact of the higher cultural level of the population of such non-agricultural centres. A higher degree of literacy, a considerably higher standard of requirements and life, vigorous dissociation from the "rawness" of "native village soil"—such are the usual distinguishing features of the inhabitants of such centres.** One can understand the enormous

* *Das Kapital*, I², 779-780.[142]

** The importance of this fact impels us to supplement the data given in §II with the following. Buturlinovka settlement, Bobrov Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, is one of the centres of leather production. There are 3,681 households, of which 2,383 do not engage in agriculture. Population over 21,000. Households with literate persons constitute 53%, as against 38% for the uyezd (Zemstvo statistical returns for Bobrov Uyezd). Pokrovskaya settlement and Balakovo village, Samara Gubernia, each have over 15,000 inhabitants, of whom very many are from outside. Non-farming households—50% and 42%. Literacy is above average. The statistical materials state that the commercial and industrial villages in general are distinguished for their higher literacy and the "mass-scale appearance of non-farming households" (Zemstvo statistical returns for Novouzensk and Nikolayevsk uyezds). Regarding the higher cultural level of "handicraftsmen" cf. additionally *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, III, p. 42; VII, p. 914; Smirnov, loc. cit., p. 59; Grigoryev, loc. cit., p. 106 and foll.: Annensky, loc. cit., p. 61, *Nizhni-Novgorod Handbook*, Vol. II, pp. 223-239; *Reports and Investigations*, II, p. 243; III, 151. Then *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, p. 109, giving a lively account of the conversation of the investigator, Mr. Kharizomenov, with his driver, a silk-weaver. This weaver strongly and bitterly declaimed against the "drab" life of the peasants, the scantiness of their requirements, their backwardness, etc., and wound up with the exclamation: "Good Lord, to think what these people live for!" It has long been observed that what the Russian peasant is poorest in is consciousness of his own poverty. Of the artisan in the capitalist manufactory (not to mention the factory), it must be said that *in this respect* he is, comparatively speaking, very rich.

significance of this fact, which clearly demonstrates the progressive historical role of capitalism, and moreover of purely "people's" capitalism, which even the most ardent Narodnik would scarcely dare characterise as "artificial," since the overwhelming majority of the centres described are usually classified under the heading of "handicraft" industry! The transitional character of manufacture is revealed here too, since it merely begins the transformation of the mentality of the population, and only large-scale machine industry completes it.

V. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURE

In all the industries organised on the lines of manufacture that we have examined, the vast mass of the workers are not independent, are subordinated to capital, and receive only wages, owning neither raw material nor finished product. At bottom, the overwhelming majority of the workers in these "industries" are *wage-workers*, although this relationship never achieves in manufacture the completeness and purity characteristic of the factory. In manufacture, merchant's capital is combined with industrial capital, is interwoven with it in the most diverse ways, and the dependence of the operative on the capitalist assumes a host of forms and shades, from work for hire in another person's workshop, to work at home for a "master," and finally to dependence in the purchase of raw material or in the sale of the product. Under manufacture, side by side with the mass of dependent workers, there always remains a more or less considerable number of quasi-independent producers. But all this diversity of forms of dependence merely covers up the main feature of manufacture, the fact that the split between the representatives of labour and of capital is already manifested in full force. By the time the emancipation of the peasants took place this split in the larger centres of Russian manufacture had already been sealed by a continuity of several generations. In all the "industries" above examined we see a mass of people whose only means of livelihood is to work in a condition of dependence upon members of the propertied class;

on the other hand, we see a small minority of well-to-do industrialists who control (in one form or another) nearly the whole industry of the given district. It is this fundamental fact that imparts to our manufacture a pronounced capitalist character, as distinct from the preceding stage. Dependence on capital and work for hire existed then too, but it had not yet taken definite shape, had not yet embraced the mass of industrialists, the mass of the population, had not given rise to a split among the various groups of individuals participating in production. Moreover, production itself in the preceding stage still preserves its small dimensions—the difference between the master and the worker is relatively small—there are scarcely any big capitalists (who always head manufacture)—nor are there any workers tied to a single operation and thereby tied to capital, which combines these detailed operations into a single mechanism of production.

Here is an old writer's evidence which strikingly confirms this characterisation of the data cited by us above: "In the village of Kimry, as in other so-called rich Russian villages, Pavlovo, for example, half the population are beggars who live entirely on alms. . . . If an operative falls sick, and moreover lives alone, he risks going the next week without a crust of bread."*

Thus, the main feature of the economy of Russian manufacture was already fully revealed by the 60s—the contrast between the "wealth" of a whole number of "celebrated" "villages" and the complete proletarisation of the overwhelming majority of "handicraftsmen." Connected with this feature is the circumstance that the most typical workers in manufacture (namely, artisans who have entirely or virtually broken with the land) are already gravitating towards the next, and not the preceding, stage of capitalism, that they stand closer to the worker in large-scale machine industry than to the peasant. The above-quoted data on

* N. Ovsyannikov, "Relation of the Upper Volga Area to the Nizhni-Novgorod Fair." Article in *Nizhni-Novgorod Handbook*, Vol. II (Nizhni-Novgorod, 1869). The author bases himself on data for Kimry village for 1865. This author supplements his review of the fair with a description of the social and economic relations in the industries represented there.

the cultural level of the handicraftsmen are striking proof of this. But that description cannot be extended to the whole mass of the working personnel in manufacture. The retention of a vast number of small establishments and small masters, the retention of connection with the land and the exceedingly extensive development of work in the home—all this leads to large numbers of "handicraftsmen" in manufacture gravitating still towards the peasantry, towards becoming small masters, towards the past and not the future,* and clinging to all sorts of illusions about the possibility (by supreme exertion, by thrift and resourcefulness) of becoming independent masters.** Here is a remarkably fair appraisal of these petty-bourgeois illusions given by an investigator of the "handicraft industries" of Vladimir Gubernia:

"The final victory of large-scale industry over small industry, the bringing together of the workers, scattered in numerous work rooms, within the walls of a single silk mill, is only a matter of time, and the sooner this victory is achieved the better it will be for the weavers.

"Characteristic of the present organisation of the silk industry are the instability and indefiniteness of economic categories, the struggle between large-scale production, and small production and agriculture. This struggle drags the small master and the weaver into fevers of excitement, yielding them nothing but divorcing them from the land, dragging them into debt and overwhelming them in periods of depression. Concentration of production will not reduce the weaver's wages, but will make it unnecessary to entice workers and intoxicate them, to attract them with advances that do not correspond to their annual earnings. With the diminution of mutual competition factory owners lose interest in expending considerable sums on involving the weaver in debt. Moreover, large-scale production so clearly counterposes the interests of the factory owner and the workers, the wealth of the one and the poverty of the others, that the weaver cannot develop the desire to become a factory owner himself. Small production gives the weaver no more than large-scale production does, but it lacks the stability of the latter and for that reason corrupts the worker much more deeply. False hopes arise in the mind of the handicraft weaver, he looks forward to the opportunity of setting up *his own loom*. To achieve this ideal he strains himself to the utmost, falls into debt, steals, lies, regards his fellow-weavers not as

* Exactly like their Narodnik ideologists.

** For isolated heroes of individual endeavour (such as Duzhkin in V. Korolenko's *Pavlovo Sketches*) this is still possible in the period of manufacture, but, of course, not for the mass of propertyless workers who perform a single operation.

friends in misfortune, but as enemies, as competitors for the very wretched loom that he sees in his mind's eye in the remote future. The small master does not understand his economic insignificance; he cringes to the buyers-up and the factory owners, hides from his fellow-weavers where and on what terms he buys his raw materials and sells his product. Imagining that he is an independent master, he becomes a voluntary and wretched tool, a plaything in the hands of the big traders. No sooner does he succeed in dragging himself out of the mire, in acquiring three or four looms, than he begins to talk about the troubles of the employer, the laziness and drunkenness of the weavers, about the necessity of insuring the factory owner against non-payment of debts. The small master is the incarnation of industrial servility, just as in the good old days the butler and the housekeeper were the incarnation of serf servility. So long as the instruments of production are not entirely divorced from the producer and the latter still has opportunities of becoming an independent master, so long as the economic gulf between the buyer-up and the weaver is bridged by proprietors, small masters and middle-men, who direct and exploit the lower economic categories and are subject to the exploitation of the upper ones, the social consciousness of those who work is obscured and their imagination is distorted by fictions. Competition arises where there should be solidarity, and the interests of what are really antagonistic economic groups are united. Not confining itself to economic exploitation, the present organisation of silk production finds its agents among the exploited and lays upon them the task of obscuring the minds and corrupting the hearts of those who work" (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, Vol. III, pp. 124-126).

VI. MERCHANT'S AND INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL IN MANUFACTURE. THE "BUYER-UP" AND THE "FACTORY OWNER"

From the data given above it is evident that along with big capitalist workshops we always find an extremely large number of small establishments at this stage of capitalist development; numerically, these, as a rule, even predominate, although they play a quite subordinate role in the sum-total of production. This retention (and even, as we have seen above, development) of small establishments under manufacture is quite a natural phenomenon. Under hand production, the large establishments have no decisive advantage over the small ones; division of labour, by creating the simplest detailed operations, facilitates the rise of small workshops. For this reason, a *typical* feature of capitalist manufacture is precisely the small number of relatively large establishments side by side with a considerable

number of small establishments. Is there any connection between the one and the other? The data examined above leave no doubt that the connection between them is of the closest, that it is out of the small establishments that the large ones grow, that the small establishments are sometimes merely outside departments of the manufactories, that in the overwhelming majority of cases the connection between them is maintained by merchant's capital, which belongs to the big masters and holds sway over the small ones. The owner of the big workshop *has to* buy raw materials and sell his wares on a large scale; the bigger his turnover, the smaller (per unit of product) are his expenses on the purchase and sale of goods, on sorting, warehousing, etc., etc.; and so there arises the retail reselling of raw materials to small masters, and the purchase of their wares, which the manufactory owner resells as his own.* If (as is often the case) bondage and usury are linked with these transactions in the sale of raw materials and the purchase of wares, if the small master gets materials on credit and delivers wares in payment of debt, the big manufactory owner obtains a high level of profit on his capital such as he could never obtain from wage-workers. Division of labour gives a fresh impetus to the development of such relations of dependence of the small masters upon the big ones: the latter either distribute materials in the homes for making up (or for the performance of certain detailed operations), or buy up from the "handicraftsmen" parts of products,

* Let us supplement the above by one other example. In the furnishing industry of Moscow Gubernia (information dated 1876, from Mr. Isayev's book), the biggest industrialists are the Zenins, who introduced the making of costly furniture and "trained generations of skilled artisans." In 1845 they established a sawmill of their own (in 1894-95—12,000 rubles output, 14 workers, steam-engine). Let us note that altogether in this industry there were 708 establishments, 1,979 workers, of whom 846, or 42.7%, were hired, and an output totalling 459,000 rubles. In the beginning of the 60s the Zenins began to buy raw materials wholesale in Nizhni-Novgorod. They bought timber in waggon-loads at 13 rubles per hundred planks and sold it to small handicraftsmen at 18-20 rubles. In 7 villages (where 116 are at work) the majority sell furniture to Zenin, who has a furniture and plywood warehouse in Moscow (established in 1874) with a turnover reaching 40,000 rubles. About 20 one-man jobbers are working for the Zenins.

special sorts of products, etc. In short, *the closest and most inseparable tie between merchant's and industrial capital* is one of the most characteristic features of manufacture. The "buyer-up" nearly always merges here with the manufactory owner (the "factory owner," to use the current but wrong term, which classifies every workshop of any size as a "factory"). That is why, in the overwhelming majority of cases, data on the scale of production of the big establishments *in themselves give no idea* of their real significance in our "handicraft industries,"* for the owners of such establishments have at their command the labour, not only of the workers employed in their establishments, but of a mass of domestic workers, and even (de facto) of a mass of quasi-independent small masters, in relation to whom they are buyers-up."** The data on Russian manufacture thus bring out in striking relief the law established by the author of *Capital*, namely, that the degree of development of merchant's capital is inversely proportional to the degree of development of industrial capital.[143] And indeed, we may characterise all the industries described in § II as follows: the fewer the big workshops in them, the more is "buying-up" developed, and vice versa; all that changes is the form of capital that dominates in each case and that

* Here is an example illustrating what has been said above. In the village of Negino, Trubchevsk Uyezd, Orel Gubernia, there is an oil works employing 8 workers, with an output of 2,000 rubles (*Directory* for 1890). This small works would seem to indicate that the role of capital in the local oil-pressing industry is very slight But the slight development of industrial capital is merely indicative of an enormous development of merchant's and usurer's capital. From the Zemstvo statistical returns we learn of this village that of 186 households 160 are completely in the grip of the local factory owner, who even *pays all their taxes for them*, lends them *all they need* (and that over many, many years), receiving help at a reduced price in payment of debt. The mass of the peasants in Orel Gubernia are in a similar state of bondage. Can one, under such circumstances, rejoice over the slight development of industrial capital?

** One can therefore imagine what sort of picture one gets of the economic organisation of such "handicraft industries" if the big manufactory owners are left out of account (after all, this is not handicraft, but factory industry!), while the "buyers-up" are depicted as being "virtually quite superfluous and called into being solely by the failure to organise the sale of products" (Mr. V. V., *Essays on Handicraft Industry*, 150)!

places the "independent" handicraftsman in conditions which often are incomparably worse than those of the wage-worker.

The fundamental error of Narodnik economics is that it ignores, or glosses over, the connection between the big and the small establishments, on the one hand, and between merchant's and industrial capital, on the other. "The factory owner of the Pavlovo area is nothing more than a complex type of buyer-up," says Mr. Grigoryev (loc. cit., p. 119). That is true, not only of Pavlovo, but of the majority of industries organised on the lines of capitalist manufacture; the reverse is likewise true: the buyer-up in manufacture is a complex type of "factory owner"; this, incidentally, is one of the fundamental differences between the buyer-up in manufacture and the buyer-up in the small peasant industries. But to see in this fact of the connection between the "buyer-up" and the "factory owner" some argument in favour of small industry (as Mr. Grigoryev and many other Narodniks do) means drawing absolutely arbitrary conclusions and distorting facts to fit preconceived notions. A host of facts testify, as we have seen, to the point that the combination of merchant's capital with industrial capital makes the position of the direct producer considerably worse than that of the wage-worker, lengthens his working day, reduces his earnings, and retards economic and cultural development.

VII. CAPITALIST DOMESTIC INDUSTRY AS AN APPENDAGE OF MANUFACTURE

Capitalist domestic industry—i.e., the processing at home, for payment by the piece, of raw materials obtained from an entrepreneur—is also met with, as indicated in the preceding chapter, in the small peasant industries. Later we shall see that it is met with again (and on a large scale) alongside the factory, i.e., large-scale machine industry. Thus, capitalist domestic industry is met with at all stages of the development of capitalism in industry, but is most characteristic of manufacture. Both the small peasant industries and large-scale machine industry manage very easily without domestic industry. The manufactory

period, however, of capitalist development, with its characteristic retention of the worker's connection with the land, and with an abundance of small establishments around big ones—can be imagined with difficulty, or hardly at all, without the distribution of home work.* And the facts of Russia do indeed show, as we have seen, that in the industries organised on the lines of capitalist manufacture the distribution of home work is particularly widespread. That is why we think it most appropriate to examine in precisely this chapter the characteristic features of capitalist domestic industry, although some of the examples quoted below cannot be assigned specifically to manufacture.

Let us point, first of all, to the multitude of middlemen between the capitalist and the worker in domestic industry. The big entrepreneur cannot himself distribute materials to hundreds and thousands of workers, scattered sometimes in different villages; what is needed is the appearance of middle-men (in some cases even of a hierarchy of middle-men) to take the materials in bulk and distribute them in small quantities. We get a regular sweating system,** a system of the severest exploitation: the "subcontractor" (or "workroom owner," or "tradeswoman" in the lace industry, etc., etc.), who is close to the worker, knows how to take advantage even of specific cases of his distress and devises such methods of exploitation as would be inconceivable in a big establishment, and as absolutely preclude all possibility of control or supervision.***

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* In Western Europe also, as we know, the manufactory period of capitalism was distinguished by the extensive development of domestic industry—in the weaving industries for instance. It is interesting to note that in describing clock-making, which he cites as a classic example of manufacture, Marx points out that the dial, spring and case are rarely made in the manufactory itself, and that, in general, the detail worker often works at home (*Das Kapital*, I, 2-te Aufl., S. 353-354).[144]

** These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

*** That, incidentally, is why the factory fights such middlemen, as, for example, the "jobbers," workers who hire workmen on their own account. Cf. Kobelyatsky: *Handbook for Factory Owners, etc.*, St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 24 and foll. All the literature on the handicraft industries teems with facts testifying to the extreme exploitation

Alongside the sweating system, and perhaps as one of its forms, should be placed the truck system*—the system of payment in provisions—which is prohibited in factories, but continues to reign in handicraft industries, especially where the work is distributed to homes. Above, in describing the various industries, instances were given of this widespread practice.

Further, capitalist domestic industry inevitably entails extremely insanitary working conditions. The utter poverty of the worker, the utter impossibility of controlling working conditions by regulations of any kind, and the combination of the living and working premises, such are the conditions that convert the dwellings of the home workers into hotbeds of infection and occupational disease. In the large establishments one can fight such things; domestic industry, however, is in this respect the most "liberal" form of capitalist exploitation.

An excessively long working day is also an essential feature of domestic work for the capitalist and of the small industries in general. Instances have been given illustrating the comparative length of the working day in the "factories" and among the "handicraftsmen."

The drawing of women and of children of the tenderest age into production is nearly always observed in domestic industry. To illustrate this, let us cite some facts from a description of the women's industries of Moscow Gubernia. There are 10,004 women engaged in cotton winding; children start work at the age of 5 or 6 (!); daily earnings are 10 kopeks, yearly 17 rubles. The working day in the women's industries in general is as much as 18 hours. In the knitting industry children start work from the age of six, daily earnings are 10 kopeks, yearly 22 rubles. Altogether 37,514 females are employed in the women's industries; they begin working from the age of 5 or 6 (in 6 out of 19 industries, which 6 industries account for 32,400 female workers);

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of craftsmen by middle-men where work is distributed to homes. Let us cite as an example Korsak's general opinion, loc. cit., .p. 258, the description of "handicraft" weaving (quoted above), the descriptions of the women's industries in Moscow Gubernia (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vols. VI and VII), and many others.

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

the average daily earnings are 13 kopeks, yearly 26 rubles 20 kopeks.*

One of the most pernicious aspects of capitalist domestic industry is that it leads to a reduction in the level of the worker's requirements. The employer is able to recruit workers in remote districts where the popular standard of living is particularly low and where the worker's connection with the land enables him to work for a bare pittance. For example, the owner of a village stocking establishment explains that in Moscow rents are high and that, besides, the knitters "have to be . . . supplied with white bread . . . whereas here the workers do the job in their own cottages and eat black bread. . . . Now how can Moscow compete with us!"** In the cotton-winding industry the explanation of the very low wages is that for the peasants' wives, daughters, etc., this is merely a supplementary source of income. "Thus, the system prevailing in this trade forces down to the utmost limit the wages of those for whom it is the sole means of livelihood, reduces the wages of those who obtain their livelihood exclusively by factory labour below their minimum needs, or retards the raising of their standard of living. In both cases it creates extremely abnormal conditions."*** "The factory seeks cheap weavers," says Mr. Kharizomenov, "and it finds them in their native villages, far from the centres of industry. . . . That wages drop steadily as one moves from the industrial centres to the outer regions is an undoubted fact."**** Hence, the employers are perfectly well able to take advantage of the conditions which artificially tie the population to the rural districts.

The isolation of the home workers is a no less pernicious aspect of this system. Here is a graphic description of this aspect of the matter, as given by buyers-up

* Mme. Gorbunova, who has described the women's industries, wrongly gives the earnings as 18 kopeks and 37 rubles 77 kopeks respectively, for she takes only the average figures for each industry and leaves out of account the different numbers of women working in the different industries.[145]

** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. II, p. 104.

*** Ibid., p. 285.

**** *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 63. Cf. ibid., 250.

themselves: "The operations of both" (the small and the big buyers-up of nails from the Tver blacksmiths) "are organised according to one system—when they collect the nails, they pay partly in money and partly in iron, and *to make the blacksmiths more tractable* always have them working in their homes."* These words provide a simple clue to the "vitality" of our "handicraft" industry!

The isolation of the home workers and the abundance of middle-men naturally lead to widespread bondage, to all kinds of personal dependence, which usually accompany "patriarchal" relationships in remote rural districts. Workers' indebtedness to employers is extremely widespread in the "handicraft" industries in general, and in domestic industry in particular.** Usually the worker is not only a Lohnsklave but also a Schuldsklave.*** Instances were given above of the conditions in which the worker is placed by the "patriarchal character" of rural relationships.****

Passing from the description of capitalist domestic industry to the conditions making for its spread, we must first make mention of the connection between this system and the tying of the peasant to his allotment. The lack of freedom of movement, the necessity of occasionally suffering monetary loss in order to get rid of land (when payments for the land exceed returns from it, so that a peasant who leases his allotment finds himself paying a sum to the lessee), the social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant community—all this artificially enlarges the sphere of

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* *Reports and Investigations*, 1, 218. Cf. ibid., 280: statement by factory owner Irodov that he finds it more profitable to give out work to hand weavers working in their homes.

** Examples of workers' indebtedness to employers in the brush industry of Moscow Gubernia (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. I, p. 32), the comb industry (ibid., 261), the toy industry (Vol. VI, Pt. II, 44), the stone-setting industry, etc., etc. In the silk industry the weaver is up to his ears in debt to the factory owner, who pays his taxes and, in general, "rents the weaver as one rents land," etc. (Industries of Vladimir Gubernia, III, 51-55).

*** Not only a wage-slave, but also a debt-slave.—*Ed.*

**** "Of course," we read of the blacksmiths of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, "here, too, the master exploits the worker's labour, but to a lesser degree (?), and moreover it is done patriarchally, as it were, by common consent (!) without any misunderstandings" (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, IV, 199).

application of capitalist home-work, artificially binds the peasant to these worst forms of exploitation. Obsolete institutions and an agrarian system that is thoroughly saturated with the social-estate principle thus exert a most pernicious influence in both agriculture and industry, perpetuating technically backward forms of production which go hand in hand with the greatest development of bondage and personal dependence, with the hardest lot and the most helpless position of the working people.*

Furthermore, there is also an undoubted connection between home-work for capitalists and the differentiation of the peasantry. Extensive incidence of home-work presupposes two conditions: 1) the existence of a mass of rural proletarians who *have to* sell their labour-power, and to sell it cheaply; 2) the existence of *well-to-do* peasants, well acquainted with local conditions, who can undertake the function of agents in distributing work. A salesman sent in by the merchant will not always be able to fulfil this function (particularly in the more or less complex industries) and will hardly ever be able to fulfil it with such "virtuosity" as can a local peasant, "one of themselves."** The big entrepreneurs would probably be unable to carry out half their operations in distributing work to home workers if they did not have at their command a whole army of small entrepreneurs who can be trusted with goods on credit or on commission, and who greedily clutch at every opportunity of enlarging their small commercial operations.

Finally, it is extremely important to point to the significance of capitalist domestic industry in the theory of the

* Of course, in all capitalist society there will always be a rural proletariat that agrees to take home-work on the worst terms; but obsolete institutions enlarge the sphere of application of domestic industry and hinder the struggle against it. Korsak, as far back as 1861, pointed to the connection between the tremendously widespread nature of domestic industry in Russia and our agrarian system (loc. cit., 305-307).

** We have seen that the big master-industrialists, the buyers-up, workroom owners and subcontractors are at the same time well-to-do agriculturists. "The subcontractor," we read, for example, in a description of galloon-weaving in Moscow Gubernia (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. II, p. 147), "is a peasant just like his weaver, but has a cottage, a horse and a cow more than the weaver has, and perhaps is able with his whole family to drink tea twice a day."

surplus-population created by capitalism. No one has talked so much about the "freeing" of the Russian workers by capitalism as have Messrs. V. V., N. —on and other Narodniks, but none of them has taken the trouble to analyse the specific forms of the "reserve army" of labour that have arisen and are arising in Russia in the post-Reform period. None of the Narodniks has even noticed the trifling detail that home workers constitute what is, perhaps, the largest section of our "reserve army" of capitalism.* By distributing work to be done in the home the entrepreneurs are enabled to increase production immediately to the desired dimensions without any considerable expenditure of capital and time on setting up workshops, etc. Such an immediate expansion of production is very often dictated by the conditions of the market, when increased demand results from a livening up of some large branch of industry (e.g., railway construction), or from such circumstances as war, etc.** Hence, another aspect of the process which

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* This error of the Narodniks is all the more gross in that the majority of them want to follow the theory of Marx, who most emphatically stressed the capitalist character of "modern domestic industry" and *pointed especially to the fact that these home workers constitute one of the forms of the relative surplus-population characteristic of capitalism*. (*Das Kapital*, I², S. S. 503 u. ff.; 668 u. ff.; Chapter 23, §4 particularly.)[146]

** A small example. In Moscow Gubernia, the tailoring industry is widespread (Zemstvo statistics counted in the gubernia at the end of the 1870s a total of 1,123 tailors working locally and 4,291 working away from home); most of the tailors worked for the Moscow ready-made clothing merchants. The centre of the industry is the Perkhushkovo Volost, Zvenigorod Uyezd (see data on the Perkhushkovo tailors in Appendix I to Chapter V, Industry No. 36). The Perkhushkovo tailors did particularly well during the war of 1877. They made army tents to the order of special contractors; subcontractors with 3 sewing-machines and ten women day workers "made" from 5 to 6 rubles a day. The women were paid 20 kopeks per day. "It is said that in those busy days over 300 women day workers from various surrounding villages lived in Shadrino (the principal village in the Perkhushkovo Volost)" (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VI, Pt. II, loc. cit., 256). "At that time the Perkhushkovo tailors, that is, the owners of the workshops, made so much money that nearly all of them built themselves fine homes" (ibid.). These hundreds of women day workers who, perhaps, would have a busy season once in 5 to 10 years, must always be available, in the ranks of the reserve army of the proletariat.

we described in Chapter II as the formation of an agricultural proletariat of millions, is, incidentally, the enormous development in the post-Reform period of capitalist domestic industry. "What has become of the hands released from the occupations of domestic, strictly natural economy, which had in view the family and the few consumers in the neighbouring market? The factories overcrowded with workers, the *rapid expansion of large-scale domestic industry* provide a clear answer" (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 20. Our italics). The figures given in the following section will show how great the number of workers employed by entrepreneurs in domestic industry must be in Russia today.

VIII. WHAT IS "HANDICRAFT" INDUSTRY?

In the two preceding chapters we dealt mainly with what in Russia is usually called "handicraft" industry; we may now try to answer the question put in the heading.

Let us begin with some statistics, so as to judge which of the forms of industry analysed above figure in publications among the general mass of "handicraft industries."

The Moscow statisticians, in concluding their investigation of the peasant "industries," summarised *all and sundry* non-agricultural occupations. They listed altogether 141,329 persons (Vol. VII, Pt. III) engaged in local industries (in the making of commodities), but among these were included artisans (a section of the shoe-makers, glaziers and many others), wood sawyers, etc., etc. Not fewer than 87,000 (according to our calculations of the different industries) were domestic workers employed by capitalists.* The number of wage-workers in the 54 industries for which we have been able to combine the data is 17,566, out of 29,446, i.e., 59.65%. For Vladimir Gubernia we have obtained the following results (from five issues of *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*): altogether, 18,286 engaged in 31 industries; of these 15,447 were engaged in

* Let us recall that Mr. Kharizomenov (article quoted above) calculated that of 102,245 persons engaged in 42 industries of Moscow Gubernia, 66% were engaged in industries where there was an absolute predominance of the domestic system of large-scale production.

industries in which capitalist domestic industry predominates (including 5,504 wage-workers, i.e., hirelings of the second degree, so to speak). Further, there are 150 rural artisans (of whom 45 are hired) and 2,689 small commodity-producers (of whom 511 are hired). The total number of capitalistically engaged workers is (15,447+45+511=) 16,003, i.e., 87.5%.* In Kostroma Gubernia (on the basis of Mr. Tillo's tables in the *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*), there are 83,633 local industrialists, of whom 19,701 are lumber-workers (fine "handicraftsmen"!), while 29,564 work in their homes for capitalists; some 19,954 are engaged in industries in which small commodity-producers predominate, and some 14,414 are village artisans.** In 9 uyezds of Vyatka Gubernia there are (according to the same *Transactions*) 60,019 local industrialists; of these, 9,672 are millers and oil-pressers; 2,032 are pure artisans (engaged in fabric-dyeing); 14,928 are partly artisans and partly commodity-producers, the overwhelming majority working independently; 14,424 engage in industries partly subordinated to capital; 14,875 engage in industries entirely subordinated to capital; 4,088 engage in industries in which wage-labour completely predominates.** On the basis of the data in the *Transactions* regarding the other gubernias we have compiled a table of those industries on

* Unfortunately, we are unable to acquaint ourselves with the latest work on handicraft industry in Yaroslavl Gubernia (*Handicraft Industries*. Published by Statistical Bureau of Yaroslavl Gubernia Zemstvo. Yaroslavl, 1904). Judging from the detailed review in *Russkiye Vedomosti* (1904, No. 248), it is an extremely valuable piece of research. The number of handicraftsmen in the gubernia is estimated as 18,000 (the number of factory workers in 1903 was placed at 33,898). Industries are on the decline. One-fifth of the enterprises employ wage-workers. One quarter of the total number of handicraftsmen are wage-workers. Of the total number of handicraftsmen 15% are engaged in establishments with 5 and more workers. Exactly one half of all the handicraftsmen work for masters, with materials supplied by the latter. Agriculture is on the decline; one-sixth of the handicraftsmen have neither horses nor cows, one-third cultivate by hiring a neighbour; one-fifth have no land under crops. The earnings of a handicraftsman are 1½, rubles a week! (*Note to 2nd edition*.)

** All these figures are approximate, for the source does not give precise figures. Among the village artisans are included millers, blacksmiths, etc., etc.

the organisation of which more or less detailed information is available. We get 97 industries employing 107,957 persons, with an output totalling 21,151,000 rubles. Of these, industries in which wage-labour and capitalist domestic industry predominate employ 70,204 persons (18,621,000 rubles); industries in which wage-workers and workers occupied at home for capitalists constitute only a minority employ 26,935 persons (1,706,000 rubles); and, finally, industries in which independent labour almost completely predominates employ 10,818 persons (824,000 rubles). According to Zemstvo statistical materials regarding 7 industries of Gorbatov and Semyonov uyezds of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, there are 16,303 handicraftsmen, of whom 4,614 work for the local market; 8,520 work "for a master," and 3,169 as wage-workers; in other words, 11,689 are capitalistically employed workers. According to the returns of the 1894-95 Perm handicraft census, of 26,000 handicraftsmen, 6,500 (25%) are wage-workers, and 5,200 (20%) work for buyers-up, in other words, 45% are capitalistically employed workers.*

Fragmentary as the data are (no others were available), they nevertheless clearly show that, taken as a whole, *a mass of capitalistically employed workers* are classified among the "handicraftsmen." For instance, those working at home for capitalists number (according to the above-quoted data) *over 200,000*. And this is for some 50 or 60 uyezds, by no means all of which have been investigated thoroughly. For the whole of Russia the number of workers of this type must be something like two million.** If to these are added

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* See *Studies*, pp. 181-182. The figures for "handicraftsmen" here include artisans (25%). If we exclude the artisans, we get 29.3% wage-workers and 29.5% working for buyers-up (p. 122), i.e., 58.8% are capitalistically employed workers. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

** For example, capitalist work in the home is particularly developed in the ready-made clothing industry, which is growing rapidly. "The demand for such an article of prime necessity as ready-made clothing is increasing from year to year" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897 No. 52, Survey of Nizhni-Novgorod Fair). The enormous development of this industry has taken place only since the 80s. At the present time, in Moscow alone ready-made clothing is produced to a total value of not less than 16 million rubles, with some 20,000 workers employed. It is estimated that for the whole of Russia the

the wage-workers employed by "handicraftsmen"—and, as may be seen from the above-quoted figures, their number is by no means as small as is sometimes thought here in Russia—we shall have to concede that the figure of 2 million industrial workers capitalistically employed outside the so-called "factories and works" is, if anything, a minimum figure.*

To the question—"What is handicraft industry?"—the data quoted in the last two chapters compel us to give the answer that the term used is absolutely unsuitable for purposes of scientific investigation, and is one usually employed to cover all and sundry forms of industry, from domestic industries and handicrafts to wage-labour in very large manufactories.** This lumping together of the most diverse types of economic organisation, which prevails in a host of descriptions of "handicraft industries,"*** was

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output reaches the sum of 100 million rubles (*Successes of Russian Industry According to Surveys of Expert Commissions*, St. Petersburg, 1897, pp. 136-137). In St. Petersburg, the 1890 census gave the number employed in ready-made clothing (Group XI, Classes 116-118) as 39,912, counting members of industrialists families, including 19,000 workers, and 13,000 one-man producers with their families (*St. Petersburg According to the Census of December 15, 1890*). The 1897 census shows that the total number of persons employed in the clothing industry in Russia was 1,158,865, the members of their families numbering 1,621,511; total 2,780,376. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

* Let us recall that the number of "handicraftsmen" in Russia is estimated at no less than 4 million (Mr. Kharizomenov's figure Mr. Andreyev gave the figure of 7½ million, but his methods are too sweeping)[147]; consequently, the total figures given in the text cover about one-tenth of the total number of "handicraftsmen."

** Cf. *Studies*, p. 179 and foll. (See present edition, Vol, 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

*** The desire to retain the term "handicraftsmanship" for the purpose of scientifically defining forms of industry has led in our publications to purely scholastic arguments about, and definitions of, this "handicraftsmanship." One economist "understood" handicraftsmen to mean only commodity-producers, while another included artisans in this term; one considered connection with the land as an essential feature, while another allowed for exceptions; one excluded wage-labour, while another allowed for it where, for example, there were up to 16 workers, etc., etc. It goes without saying that arguments of this sort (instead of investigation of the different forms of industry) could lead nowhere. Let us observe that the tenacity of the special term "handicraftsmanship" is to be explained most of all by the social-estate divisions in Russian society; a "handicrafts-

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taken over quite uncritically and quite senselessly by the Narodnik economists, who made a tremendous step backward by comparison, for example, with a writer like Korsak, and availed themselves of the prevailing confusion of terms to evolve the most curious theories. "Handicraft industry" was regarded as something economically homogeneous, something sufficient unto itself, and was "*counterposed*" (sic!) to "capitalism," which without further ado was taken to mean "factory" industry. Let us take Mr. N. —on, for instance. On p. 79 of his *Sketches* we find the heading "Capitalisation (?) of Industries,"* and then, without any reservation or explanation, "Data on Factories.". . . The simplicity is positively touching: "capitalism" = "factory industry," and factory industry = what is classified under this heading in official publications. And *on the basis* of such a profound "analysis" the masses of capitalistically employed workers included among the "handicraftsmen" are wiped off capitalism's account. *On the basis* of this sort of "analysis" the question of the different forms of industry in Russia is completely evaded. *On the basis* of this sort of "analysis" one of the most absurd and pernicious prejudices is built up concerning the distinction between our "handicraft" industry and our "factory" industry, the divorcement of the latter from the former, the "artificial character" of "factory" industry, etc. It is a prejudice because no one has ever so much as attempted to examine the data, which in all branches of

man" is an industrialist belonging to the lower estates, a person who may be patronised and in relation to whom schemes may be concocted without compunction; the form of industry is left out of account. The merchant, however and the member of the nobility (even though they be small industrialists) are rarely classified as "handicraftsmen." By "handicraft" industries are usually meant all sorts of *peasant*, and only peasant, industries.

* This term "capitalisation," of which Messrs. V. V. and N. —on are so fond, is permissible in a newspaper article, for the sake of brevity, but it is totally out of place in an economic investigation of which the whole purpose is to analyse the various forms and stages of capitalism, their significance, their connection, and their consecutive development. "Capitalisation" may be taken to mean anything in the world: the hiring of a single "labourer," buying-up, and a steam-driven factory. How can one make head or tail of it, with all these things jumbled together!

industry show a very close and inseparable connection between "handicraft" industry and "factory" industry.

The object of this chapter has been to show in what precisely this connection consists and precisely which specific technical, economic and cultural features are represented by the form of industry that in Russia stands between small-scale industry and large-scale machine industry.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-SCALE MACHINE INDUSTRY

I. THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF THE FACTORY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "FACTORY" STATISTICS[148]

Before dealing with large-scale machine (factory) industry, we must first establish the fact that the scientific conception of the term does not correspond at all to its common, everyday meaning. In our official statistics, and in literature generally, a factory is taken to mean any more or less big industrial establishment with a more or less considerable number of wage-workers. According to Marx's theory, however, the term large-scale machine (factory) industry applies only to a definite stage of capitalism in industry, namely, the highest stage. The principal and most important feature of this stage is the employment of a system of machines for production.* The transition from the manufactory to the factory signifies a complete technical revolution, which does away with the craftsman's manual skill that has taken centuries to acquire, and this technical revolution is inevitably followed by the most thoroughgoing destruction of social production relations, by a final split among the various groups of participants in production, by a complete break with tradition, by an intensification and extension of all the dark aspects of capitalism, and at the same time by a mass socialisation of labour by capitalism. Large-scale machine industry is thus the last word of capitalism, the last word of its "elements of social progress"** and regress.

From this it is clear that the transition from the manufactory to the factory is particularly important when we

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* *Das Kapital*, I, Chapter 13 [Chap. 15, Eng. ed.—*Ed.*].

** Ibid., I^2, S. 499.[149]

deal with the development of capitalism. Whoever confuses these two stages deprives himself of the possibility of understanding the transforming, progressive role of capitalism. That is the mistake made by our Narodnik economists, who, as we have seen, naïvely identify capitalism generally with "factory" industry and propose to solve the problem of the "mission of capitalism" and even of its "unifying significance"* by simply referring to factory statistics. Apart from the fact that on matters of factory statistics these writers (as we shall show in detail below) have betrayed astonishing ignorance, they commit a still graver error in their amazingly stereotyped and narrow understanding of Marx's theory. In the first place, it is ridiculous to reduce the problem of the development of large-scale machine industry to mere factory statistics. It is a question not only of statistics, but of the forms assumed and the stages traversed by the development of capitalism in the industry of the country under consideration. Only after the substance of these forms and their distinguishing features have been made clear is there any sense in illustrating the development of this or that form by means of properly compiled statistics. If, however, they restrict themselves to Russian statistics, this inevitably leads to lumping together the most diverse forms of capitalism, to not seeing the wood for the trees. Secondly, to reduce the whole mission of capitalism to that of increasing the number of "factory" workers means to betray as profound an understanding of theory as did Mr. Mikhailovsky when he expressed surprise as to why people talk about the socialisation of labour by capitalism, when all that this socialisation amounts to, he averred, is that several hundred or thousand workers saw, chop, cut, plane, etc., under one roof.**

The task of our further exposition is twofold: on the one hand, we shall examine in detail the condition of our factory statistics and the question of their suitability.

* Mr. N. —on in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 6, pp. 103 and 119.—See also his *Sketches*, and Mr. V. V.'s *Destiny of Capitalism*, passim.

** *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, 1883, No. 7, Letter to the editor from Mr. Postoronny [Outsider].

This, largely negative, work is necessary because the data involved are positively abused in our literature. On the other hand, we shall examine the data attesting to the growth of large-scale machine industry in the post-Reform period.

II. OUR FACTORY STATISTICS

The main source of factory statistics in Russia is the returns supplied annually by owners of factories and works to the Department of Commerce and Manufacture, in conformity with the law passed at the very beginning of the present century.* The very detailed regulations in this law concerning the submission of information by factory owners are nothing but a pious wish, and to this day the factory statistics are organised on the old, purely pre-Reform lines and are simply appendices to gubernatorial reports. There is no precise definition of the term "factory-and-works," and consequently gubernia and even uyezd authorities employ it in the most diverse ways. There is no central body to direct the proper and uniform collection, and verification, of returns. The distribution of industrial establishments among various departments (Mining, Department of Commerce and Manufacture, Miscellaneous Taxes Department, etc.) still further increases the confusion.**

In Appendix II we cite the data on our factory industry in the post-Reform period that are to be found in official publications, namely, for the years of 1863-1879 and 1885-1891. These data relate only to trades not subject to excise duty; moreover, for different periods information is given for a different number of trades (the returns for

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* For a detailed review of the sources of our factory statistics, see in *Statistical Chronicle of the Russian Empire*, Series II, Vol. VI, St. Petersburg, 1872, *Material for the Statistics of Factory Industry in European Russia for 1868*. Compiled by Mr. Bok. Introduction, pp. I-XXIII.

** See article "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics" in *Studies*, where the latest publication of the Department of Commerce and Manufacture on our factory industries is examined in detail. (See present edition, Vol. 4.—*Ed*.)

1864-1865 and for 1885 and subsequent years being the fullest); that is why we have singled out 34 trades for which data are available for 1864-1879 and 1885-1890, i.e., for 22 years. To judge the value of these data, let us first examine the most important publications on our factory statistics. Let us begin with the 60s.

The compilers of factory statistics in the 60s fully appreciated the extremely unsatisfactory nature of the returns they were handling. In their unanimous opinion the number of workers and the total output were considerably understated in the factory-owners' reports; "there is no uniform definition, even for the different gubernias, of what should be regarded as a factory and a works, since many gubernias include among the factories and works, for example, windmills, brick-making sheds and small industrial establishments, while others take no account of them, with the result that even comparative data on the total numbers of factories and works in the different gubernias are valueless."* Still more trenchant is the criticism by Bushen, Bok and Timiryazev,** who, in addition, point to the inclusion of those occupied at home among the factory workers, to the fact that some factory owners supply returns only for workers who live on the factory premises, etc. "There are no correct official statistics on manufactory and factory industry," says Mr. Bushen, "and there will be none until there is a change in the main principles on which the primary material is gathered."*** "The tables of factories and works for many trades include, evidently by misunderstanding, numerous purely artisan and handicraft establishments that possess nothing of the character of a factory or works."**** In view of this, the editors of the *Yearbook* refused even to summarise the data printed, "not desiring to pass on to the public incorrect and obviously exaggerated figures."**** To give the reader a precise idea of the extent

* P. Semyonov in the preface to *Statistical Chronicle*, I, 1866, p. XXVII.

** *Statistical Atlas of Main Branches of Factory Industry of European Russia, with List of Factories and Works*, 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1869, 1870 and 1873.

*** *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I, p. 140.

**** Ibid., p. 306.

of this obvious exaggeration, let us turn to the data given in the *Yearbook*, which differs to advantage from all other sources, in that it contains a list of factories with an output exceeding 1,000 rubles. At the present time (since 1885), establishments with a smaller total output are not counted as factories. An estimate of these small establishments according to the *Yearbook* reveals that 2,366 were included in the general list of factories, employing 7,327 workers and an output amounting to 987,000 rubles. The total number of factories, however, in 71 trades, according to the *Yearbook*, was 6,891, with 342,473 workers and an output totalling 276,211,000 rubles. Consequently, the small establishments represent 34.3% of the total number of establishments, 2.1% of the total number of workers, and 0.3% of the total output. It stands to reason that it is absurd to regard such small establishments (with an average per establishment of a little over 3 workers and less than 500 rubles output) as factories, and that there can be no question of there being anything like a complete registration of them. Not only have such establishments been classed as factories in our statistics, but there have even been cases of hundreds of handicraftsmen being quite artificially and arbitrarily combined as a "factory." For example, this very *Yearbook* mentions in the rope-making trade of the Izbylets Volost, Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, a factory "of the peasants of the Izbylets Volost; 929 workers; 308 spinning wheels; output 100,400 rubles" (p. 149); or in the village of Vorsma in the same uyezd, a factory of "temporarily bound peasants of Count Sheremetev; 100 smithies; 250 carpenters' benches (in homes); 3 horse-operated and 20 hand-operated grindstones; 902 workers; output 6,610 rubles" (p. 281). One can imagine what an idea of the real situation such statistics give!*

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* As to understatements by factory owners in their returns regarding the number of employed workers and the output, the above-mentioned sources make two interesting attempts at verification. Timiryazev compared the returns made by over a hundred big factory owners for the official statistics with the returns they made for the 1865 Exhibition. The latter figures proved to be 22% higher than the former (loc. cit., I, pp. IV-V). In 1868 the Central Statistical

A special place among the sources of factory statistics of the 60s is held by the *Military Statistical Abstract* (Vol. IV. Russia, St. Petersburg, 1871). It gives data on all the factories and works of the Russian Empire, including mining and excise-paying establishments, and estimates that in 1866 there were in European Russia no more nor less than 70,631 factories, 829,573 workers, with an output totalling 583,317,000 rubles!! These curious figures were arrived at, firstly, because they were taken, not from the reports of the Ministry of Finance, but from the special returns of the Central Statistical Committee (these returns were never published in any of the Committee's publications, nor is it known by whom, how and when they were gathered and processed);* secondly, because the compilers of the *Military Statistical Abstract* did not hesitate in the least to class even the smallest establishments as factories. (*Military Statistical Abstract*, p. 319) and furthermore supplemented the basic returns with other material: returns of the Department of Commerce and Manufacture, returns of the Commissariat, returns of the Ordnance and Naval Departments, and finally, returns "from the most diverse sources" (ibid., p. XXIII).** Therefore, in using

Committee, as an experiment, instituted a special investigation of factory industry in Moscow and Vladimir gubernias (where in 1868 nearly half of all the workers and of the total output of the factories and works of European Russia were concentrated). If we take the trades for which data are given both by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Committee, we get the following figures: according to the Ministry of Finance there were 1,749 factories, 186,521 workers, with an output totalling 131,568,000 rubles, whereas according to the investigation by the Central Statistical Committee there were 1,704 factories, 196,315 workers on premises plus 33,485 outside workers, and an output totalling 137,758,000 rubles.

* It is very possible that these returns were simply taken from gubernatorial reports, which, as we shall see below, always enormously exaggerate the number of factories and works.

** How widely the *Military Statistical Abstract* applied the term "factory" becomes particularly evident through the following: the *Yearbook* statistics are called "the statistics of our *large* establishments" (p. 319, authors' italics). As we have seen, 1/3, of these "large" establishments have an output of less than 1,000 rubles!! We omit more detailed proof of the point that the figures given in the *Military Statistical Abstract* must not be used for purposes of comparison with present-day factory statistics, since this task has already been

the data of the *Military Statistical Abstract* for purposes of comparison with present-day data, Messrs. N.—on,* Karyshev** and Kablukov*** revealed their total unfamiliarity with the principal sources of our factory statistics and their utterly uncritical attitude towards these statistics.

During the debate in the Free Economic Society on the paper read by M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, who pointed to the completely erroneous character of the figures in the *Military Statistical Abstract*, several speakers declared that even if there was an error in the number of workers, it was only a slight one—10 to 15%. That was said, for example, by Mr. V. V. (see verbatim report of debate, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 1). He was "joined" by Mr. V. Pokrovsky, who also confined himself to a bald statement (p. 3). Without even attempting a critical examination of the various sources of our factory statistics, these people and their supporters contented themselves with generalities about the unsatisfactory nature of factory statistics, and about the data having recently become more exact (??) and so forth. The main issue, the crude error of Messrs. N.—on and Karyshev, was thus simply *glossed over*, as P. B. Struve quite rightly observed (p. 11). We therefore think it worth while to calculate those exaggerations in the data of the *Military Statistical Abstract* which could and should have been noticed by anybody handling the sources attentively. For 71 trades we have the parallel statistics for 1866 both of the Ministry of Finance (*Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I) and of unknown origin (*Military Statistical Abstract*). For these trades, leaving out the metallurgical, the *Military Statistical Abstract* exaggerated the number of workers employed in factories and works in European Russia by *50,000*. Further, for those trades for which the *Yearbook* gave only gross figures for the Empire, refusing to analyse them in detail

performed by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky (see his book *The Factory*, *etc.*, p. 336 and foll.). Cf. *Studies*, pp. 271 and 275. (See present edition, Vol. 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed.*)

* *Sketches*, p. 125 and *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 6.

** *Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1889, No. 9, and *Material on the Russian National Economy*, Moscow, 1898.

*** *Lectures on Agricultural Economics*, Moscow, 1897, p. 13.

in view of their "obvious exaggeration" (*Yearbook*, p. 306), the *Military Statistical Abstract* gives *95,000* workers *over and above* these figures. In brick-making the number of workers is exaggerated *by a minimum of 10,000*; to convince oneself of this, one should compare the data by gubernias given in the *Military Statistical Abstract* and those in *Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance*, No. 4 of 1866 and No. 6 of 1867. For the metallurgical trades the *Military Statistical Abstract* exaggerated *the number of workers by 86,000* as compared with that in the *Yearbook*, having evidently included some of the mine workers in its figure. For the excise-paying trades the *Military Statistical Abstract*, as we shall show in the next section, exaggerates the number of workers by *nearly 40,000*. Altogether there is an exaggeration of *280,000*. This is a *minimum* and incomplete figure, for we lack material to verify the data of the *Military Statistical Abstract* for *all* trades. One can therefore judge to what extent those who assert that the error of Messrs. N.—on and Karyshev is trifling are informed on this subject!

In the 1870s much less was done to combine and analyse factory statistics than in the 1860s. *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook* contains data for only 40 trades (not subject to excise duty) for 1867-1879 (Vols. VIII, X and XII; see Appendix II), the exclusion of the other trades being ascribed to the "extremely unsatisfactory nature of the material" for industries "which are connected with agricultural life, or are appendages of artisan and handicraft industries" (Vol. VIII, p. 482; same, Vol. X, p. 590). The most valuable source for the 1870s is Mr. P. Orlov's *Directory of Factories and Works* (1st edition, St. Petersburg, 1881, returns for 1879 taken from the same reports of factory owners to the Department of Commerce and Manufacture). This publication lists all establishments with an output of not less than 2,000 rubles. The others, being small and inseparable from handicraft establishments, are not enumerated in this list, *but are included in the summarised data* given by the *Directory*. Since no separate totals are given for establishments with an output of 2,000 rubles and over, the general data of the *Directory*, like those of previous publications, combine the small

establishments with the large ones; for different trades and different gubernias unequal numbers of small establishments are included (quite fortuitously, of course) in the statistics.* Regarding trades connected with agriculture, the *Directory* repeats (p. 396) the *Yearbook*'s reservation and refuses to give "*even approximate* totals" (author's italics) owing to the inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data.** This view (quite a legitimate one, as we shall see below) did not, however, prevent the inclusion in the *Directory*'s general totals of all these particularly unreliable figures, which are thus lumped together with relatively reliable ones. Let us give the *Directory*'s total figures for European Russia, with the observation that, unlike previous figures, they also embrace excise-paying trades (the second edition of the *Directory*, 1887, gives the returns for 1884; the third, 1894, those for 1890):

Years	No. of factories and works	Total output (thousand rubles)	No. of workers
1879***	27,986	1,148,134	763,152
1884	27,235	1,329,602	826,794
1890	21,124	1,500,871	875,764

We shall show further that the drop in the number of factories indicated by these data was actually fictitious; the whole point is that at different times different numbers of small establishments were classed as factories. Thus, the number of establishments with an output exceeding 1,000 rubles was estimated in 1884 at 19,277, and in 1890, at 21,124; with an output of 2,000 rubles and over: in 1884 at 11,509, and in 1890 at 17,642.****

* Examples will be given in the next section. Here let us refer to p. 679 and foll. of the *Directory*; a glance at these pages will readily convince anyone of the justice of what has been said in the text.

** In the third edition of the *Directory* (St. Petersburg, 1894), this reservation is not repeated, regrettably so, for the data are as unsatisfactory as ever.

*** Certain missing data have been added approximately; see *Directory*, p. 695.

**** See classification of factories according to total output in the second and third editions of the *Directory*.

In 1889 the Department of Commerce and Manufactures began to issue in separate editions *Collections of Data on Factory Industry in Russia* (for 1885 and subsequent years). These data are based on the material mentioned (factory owners' reports), and their treatment is far from satisfactory, being inferior to that in the above-mentioned publications of the 60s. The only improvement is that the small establishments, i.e., those with an output of under 1,000 rubles, are not included among the factories and works, and information regarding them is given separately, without their being distributed according to trades.* This, of course, is a totally inadequate criterion of what a "factory" is; a *complete* registration of establishments with an output exceeding 1,000 rubles is out of the question under the present system of gathering information; the separation of "factories" in trades connected with agriculture is done quite haphazardly—for instance, for some gubernias and in some years watermills and windmills are classed as factories, while in others they are not.** The author of the section "Chief Results of Factory Industry in Russia for 1885-1887" (in the *Collections* for these years) falls repeatedly into error in disregarding the fact that the data for the different gubernias are dissimilar and not comparable. Finally, to our characterisation of the *Collections* let us add that till 1891 inclusive they only covered trades not subject to excise duty, while from 1892 onwards they cover all trades, including mining and excise-paying; no special mention is made of data

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* It goes without saying that the data on the small establishments are quite haphazard: in some gubernias and in some years their number is given in hundreds and thousands, in others in tens and units. For example, in Bessarabia Gubernia, from 1887 to 1890: 1,479—272—262—1,684; in Penza Gubernia, from 1885 to 1891: 4—15—0—1,127—1,135—2,148—2,264, etc., etc.

** Cf. examples in *Studies*, p. 274. (See present edition, Vol. 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed.*) Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky was somewhat mistaken in asserting that the number of actual factories dropped between 1885 and 1891 (*The Factory*, p. 350), and comparing the average number of workers per factory for different trades at different times (ibid., 355). The data in the *Collection* are too chaotic for use, without being specially processed, in drawing such conclusions.

comparable with others given previously, and no explanation whatever is given of the methods by which ironworks are included in the total number of factories and works (for instance, ironworks statistics have never given the value but merely the volume of works' output. How the compilers of the *Collections* arrived at the value of the output is unknown).

In the 1880s there was still another source of information about our factory industry, one deserving attention for its negative qualities and because Mr. Karyshev used data from this source.* This is the *Returns for Russia for 1884-85* (St. Petersburg, 1887. Published by the Central Statistical Committee), which gives in one of its tables the "totals of output of factory industry in European Russia, 1885" (Table XXXIX); the number of factories and of workers is given only for Russia as a whole, without being distributed according to gubernias. The source of information is "data of reports of Messrs. the Governors" (p. 311). The data cover all trades, including both excise-paying and mining, and for every trade the "average" number of workers and output per works is given for the whole of European Russia. Now it is these "averages" that Mr. Karyshev proceeded to "analyse." To judge their value, let us compare the data in the *Returns* with those in the *Collection* (to make such a comparison we must subtract from the first-mentioned data the metallurgical, excise-paying, fishing and "other" trades; this will leave 53 trades; the data are for European Russia):

Sources	Number of factories	Number of workers	Output (thousand rubles)
"Returns for Russia" . . .	54,179	559,476	569,705
"Collection of Department of Commerce and Manufacture"	14,761	499,632	672,079
	+39,418	+59,844	—102,374
	+267%	+11.9%	—15.2%

* N. A. Karyshev, "Statistical Survey of the Distribution of the Principal Branches of Manufacturing Industry in Russia." *Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1889, No. 9, September. Together with Mr. Karyshev's latest work, examined by us in our *Studies*, this article serves as an example of how not to handle our factory statistics.

Thus, the gubernatorial reports included tens of thousands of small agricultural and handicraft establishments among the "factories"! Of course, such establishments were included among the factories quite fortuitously for the various trades, and for the various gubernias and uyezds. Here are examples of the number of works according to the *Returns* and the *Collection*, in some trades: fur—1,205 and 259; leather—4,079 and 2,026; mat-and-bag—562 and 55; starch-and-treacle—1,228 and 184; flour-milling—17,765 and 3,940; oil-pressing—9,341 and 574; tar-distilling—3,366 and 328; brick-making—5,067 and 1,488; pottery and glazed tile—2,573 and 147. One can imagine the sort of "statistics" that will be obtained if one estimates the "size of establishments"* in our factory industry by taking "average figures" based on such a method of computing "factories"! But Mr. Karyshev forms his estimate in precisely this manner when he classes under large-scale industry only those trades in which the above-mentioned "*average number*" of workers per factory (for the whole of Russia) is *over one hundred*. By this phenomenal method the conclusion is reached that only a quarter of the total output is provided by "large-scale industry as understood within the above-indicated limits"!! (p. 47 of article cited).** Further on we shall show that factories with 100 and more workers actually account for more than half the total output of our factory industry.

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* Section IV of Mr. Karyshev's article. Let us observe that for comparison with the *Returns* we could, instead of the *Collection*, have taken Mr. Orlov's *Directory*, the second edition of which (1884) is quoted by Mr. Karyshev too.

** "Thus, three quarters of the latter" (total annual output) "is provided by establishments of a relatively small type. This phenomenon may have its roots in many extremely important elements of Russian national economy. To them, by the way, should be assigned the *system of land tenure of the mass of the population*, the tenacity of the village community (sic!), which raises serious obstacles to the development of a professional class of factory workers in our country. With this is combined (!) the *widespread character of the domestic form of the processing of products* in the very (central) zone of Russia in which our factories and works are mainly concentrated" (ibid., Mr. Karyshev's italics). Poor "village community"! It alone must bear all the blame for everything, even for the statistical errors of its learned admirers!

Let us observe, incidentally, that the data of the local gubernia statistical committees (which are used for the gubernatorial reports) are always distinguished by the utter vagueness of the term "factory-and-works" and by the casual registration of small establishments. Thus, in Smolensk Gubernia, for 1893-94, some uyezds counted dozens of small oil-presses as factories, while others did not count any; the number of tar "works" in the gubernia was given as 152 (according to *Directory* for 1890, not one), with the same casual registration in the various uyezds, etc.* For Yaroslavl Gubernia, the local statisticians in the 90s gave the number of factories as 3,376 (against 472 in the *Directory* for 1890), including (for some uyezds) hundreds of flour-mills, smithies, small potato-processing works, etc.**

Quite recently our factory statistics have undergone a reform which has changed the plan for the gathering of information, changed the significance of the term "factory-and-works" (new criteria have been adopted; the presence of an engine or of not less than 15 workers), and enlisted factory inspectors in the work of gathering and verifying information. We refer the reader for details to the above-mentioned article in our *Studies**** where a detailed examination is made of the *List of Factories and Works* (St. Petersburg, 1897)***** compiled according to the new plan, and where it is shown that despite the reform, improvements in our factory statistics are *scarcely noticeable*; that the term "factory-and-works" has remained absolutely vague; that the data are very often still quite haphazard and must, therefore, be handled with extreme caution.(*)

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* Data from Mr. D Zhbankov's *Sanitary Investigation of Factories and Works of Smolensk Gubernia* (Smolensk, Vol. I, 1896).

** *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, Vol. II, Yaroslavl, 1896. Cf. also *Tula Gubernia Handbook for 1895* (Tula, 1895), Sec. VI; pp. 14-15: *Factory Returns for 1893*.

*** See present edition, Vol. 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed*.

**** According to Mr. Karyshev's calculations, the totals of the figures given in the *List* relating to European Russia are: 14,578 factories, with 885,555 workers and an output totalling 1,345,346,000 rubles.

(*) The collections of factory inspectors' reports published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (for 1901-1903) give data on

Only a proper industrial census, organised on European lines, can extricate our industrial statistics from their chaotic condition.*

It follows from the review of our factory statistics that the data they contain cannot in the overwhelming majority of cases be used without being specially processed, the principal object of which should be to separate the relatively useful from the utterly useless. In the next section we shall examine in this respect the data on the most important trades, but at the moment we put the question: is the number of factories in Russia increasing or decreasing? The main difficulty in answering this question is that in our factory statistics the term "factory" is employed in the most chaotic manner; that is why the negative replies to this question which are sometimes given on the basis of factory statistics (e.g., by Mr. Karyshev) cannot be of any use. We must first establish some definite criterion for the term "factory"; without that condition it would be absurd to illustrate the development of large-scale machine industry with

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the number of factories and works, as well as workers employed in them (for 64 gubernias of Russia), the factories and works being classified according to the number of workers (up to 20; 21-50; 51-100; 101-500- 501-1,000; over 1,000). This is a big step forward in our factory statistics. The data for large workshops (21 workers and over) are probably reliable, at least in some degree. The data for "factories" with fewer than 20 workers are obviously casual and utterly worthless. For example, in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia the number of factories employing fewer than 20 workers in 1903 is given as 266; the number of workers employed in them—1,975, or an average of fewer than 8 workers. In Perm Gubernia there are 10 such factories with 159 workers! Ridiculous, of course. The total for 1903 for 64 gubernias: 15,821 factories with 1,640,406 workers; and if we deduct factories and works employing fewer than 20 workers, we get 10,072 factories and works with 1,576,754 workers. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

* Cf. *Vestnik Finansov*, 1896, No. 35. Reports of papers and debates at Nizhni-Novgorod congress. Mr. Mikhailovsky very vividly described the chaotic condition of factory statistics, showing how the questionnaire travels "down to the lowest police official, who circulates it at last, getting a receipt, of course, to those industrial establishments which he deems worthy of attention, but most often in those of them which he circularised the previous years";—how the replies given to the various questions are either: "same as last year"—(it is enough to go over the *Collections* of the Department of Commerce and Manufacture for the various trades in various gubernias to be convinced of the truth of this)—or are absolutely meaningless, etc.

data for establishments of which the totals have at various times included various numbers of small flour-mills, oil-presses, brick-sheds, etc., etc. Let us take as a criterion the employment of not fewer than 16 workers in the establishment, and then we shall see that the number of such industrial establishments in European Russia in 1866 was a maximum of from 2,500 to 3,000, in 1879 about 4,500, in 1890 about 6,000, in 1894-95 about 6,400, and in 1903 about 9,000.* Consequently, *the number of factories in Russia in the post-Reform period is growing, and growing fairly rapidly.*

III. AN EXAMINATION OF HISTORICO-STATISTICAL DATA ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY

We have noted above that to judge the development of large-scale industry from factory statistics it is necessary to separate the relatively useful material in these statistics from the utterly useless. Let us, with this in view, examine the main branches of our manufacturing industry.

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* The data concern all trades (i.e., including excise-paying) except mining. For 1879, 1890 and 1894-95 we have computed the data from *Directories* and the *List*. From the data in the *List* we have excluded printing works, of which no account was taken formerly in factory statistics (see *Studies*, p. 273) [See present edition, Vol 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed.*]. For 1866 we have according to the data in the *Yearbook* for 71 trades, 1,861 establishments each employing 16 and more workers, out of a total of 6,891 establishments; in 1890 these 71 trades accounted for about four-fifths of the total number of establishments with 16 and more workers. The criterion adopted by us for the term "factory" is, in our view, the most exact, since the most varied programmes for our factory statistics have undoubtedly accepted the inclusion of establishments with 16 and more workers among the factories, and this for all branches of industry. There can be no doubt that the factory statistics never could, and cannot now, register *all* establishments employing 16 and more workers (see instances in Chapter VI, § II), but we have no grounds for thinking that there were more omissions formerly than now. For 1903 the data are from the *Collection of Factory Inspectors' Reports*. In the 50 gubernias of European Russia there were 8,856 factories and works with over 20 workers 41 each.

1) Textile Trades

At the head of the wool trades is cloth production, which in 1890 had an output of over 35 million rubles and employed 45,000 workers. The historico-statistical data on this trade indicate a considerable drop in the number of workers, namely, from 72,638 in 1866 to 46,740 in 1890.* To appraise this phenomenon we must take account of the fact that up to the 1860s inclusive, felt cloth production was organised on specific and original lines: it was concentrated in relatively large establishments which, however, did not in any way come under the category of capitalist factory industry, since they were based on the labour of serfs, or of temporarily bound peasants. In the surveys of the "factory" industry of the 60s we therefore meet with the division of cloth mills into 1) those owned by landlords or nobles, and 2) those owned by merchants. The former produced mainly army cloth, the government contracts having been distributed equally among the mills in proportion to the number of machines. Compulsory labour was the cause of the technical backwardness of such establishments and of their employing a much larger number of workers than the merchant mills based on the employment of hired labour.** The principal drop in the number of workers, engaged in felt cloth production took place in the gubernias with landlord factories; thus, in the 13 such gubernias (enumerated in the *Survey of Manufactory Industries*), the number of workers dropped from 32,921 to 14,539 (1866 and 1890), while in the 5 gubernias with merchant factories

* In all cases, unless otherwise stated, we take the data of the *Yearbook* for 1866 and those of the *Directories* for 1879 and 1890.—The *Historico-Statistical Survey* (Vol. II) gives annual information on cloth production from 1855 to 1879; the following are the five-year averages of workers employed from 1855-1859 to 1875-1879: 107,433; 96,131; 92,117; 87,960 and 81,458.

** See *A Survey of Various Branches of Manufactory Industry in Russia*, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1862, particularly pp. 165 and 167. Cf. also *Military Statistical Abstract*, D. 357 and foll. At the present time we rarely meet in the lists of cloth manufacturers the celebrated noble families that constituted the overwhelming majority in the 1860s.

(Moscow, Grodno, Liflandia, Chernigov and St. Petersburg) it dropped from 31,291 to 28,257. From this it is clear that we have here two opposite trends, both of which, however, indicate the development of capitalism—on the one hand, the decline of landlord establishments of a manorial-possessional character,[150] and on the other, the development of purely capitalist factories out of merchant establishments. A considerable number of the workers employed in felt cloth production in the 60s were not *factory* workers at all in the strict sense of the term; they were dependent peasants working for landlords.* Cloth production is an example of that specific phenomenon of Russian history—the employment of serf labour in industry. Since we are dealing only with the post-Reform period, the above brief remarks will suffice to show the way in which this phenomenon is reflected in factory statistics.** We shall now quote some figures drawn from statistics on steam-engines in order to estimate the development of large-scale machine production in this industry: in 1875-1878, in the wool-spinning and cloth industries of European Russia there were 167 mechanised establishments using 209 steam-engines with a total of 4,632 h.p., and in 1890 there were 197 establishments using

* The following examples are taken from Zemstvo statistical material. Concerning N. P. Gladkov's cloth factory in Volsk Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia (in 1866 it had 306 workers), we read in the Zemstvo statistical abstract for this uyezd (p. 275) that peasants were forced to work in the factory belonging to the lord. "They worked in the factory until they married, and then became tax-paying members of the peasant community." In the village of Ryassy, Ranenburg Uyezd, Ryazan Gubernia, there was in 1866 a cloth factory employing 180 workers. The peasants performed their corvée by working in the mill, which was closed down in 1870 (*Statistical Returns for Ryazan Gubernia*, Vol. II, Pt. I, Moscow, 1882, p. 330).

** See Nisselovich, *A History of the Factory Legislation of the Russian Empire*, Pts. I and II, St. Petersburg, 1883-1884.—A. Semyonov, *A Study of Historical Data on Russian Foreign Trade and Industry*, St. Petersburg, 1858-1859, 3 parts.—V. I. Semevsky, *The Peasants in the Reign of Catherine II*, St. Petersburg, 1881.—*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*. Sanitary Statistical Sec, Vol. IV, Pt. I (general summary), Moscow, 1890, article by A. V. Pogozhev, "The Manorial-Possessional Factories of Moscow Gubernia."—M. Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory*, St. Petersburg, 1898, Vol. I.

341 steam-engines with a total of 6,602 h.p. The use of steam power, therefore, did not make very rapid progress; this is to be explained partly by the traditions of landlord factories and partly by the displacement of felt cloth by the cheaper worsted and mixed fabrics.* In the years 1875-1878 there were seven mechanised establishments using 20 steam-engines with a total of 303 h.p., and in 1890 there were 28 mechanised establishments employing 61 steam-engines to a total of 1,375 h.p.**

In regard to the woollen-goods industry let us also take note of felt-making, a branch that shows in particularly striking fashion the impossibility of comparing factory statistics for different times: the figures for 1866 are 77 factories with a total of 295 workers, while for 1890 they are 57 factories with 1,217 workers. The former figure includes 60 small establishments employing 137 workers with an output of under 2,000 rubles, while the latter includes an establishment with four workers. In 1866 39 small establishments were recorded in Semyonov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, where felt-making is now highly developed but is regarded as a "handicraft" and not a "factory" industry (see Chapter VI, § II, 2).

Further, a particularly important place in the textile trades is held by cotton processing, a branch which now employs over 200,000 workers. Here we observe one of the biggest errors of our factory statistics, namely, the combining of factory workers and capitalistically occupied home workers. Large-scale machine industry developed here (as in many other cases) by drawing home workers into the factory. It is obvious how distorted this process will appear if work-distributing offices and workrooms are classed as "factories," if home workers are lumped

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* Cf. *Successes of Russian Industry According to Surveys of Expert Commissions*, St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 60.

** The data on steam-engines in this and the following instances are taken from *Material for the Statistics of Steam-Engines in the Russian Empire* published by the Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1882; for 1890 they are taken from *Collection of Data on Factory Industry*; data on mechanised establishments are from the *Directory*.

together with factory workers! For 1866 (according to the *Yearbook*) up to 22,000 home workers were included among factory workers (by no means the full number, for the *Yearbook*, evidently by pure accident, omits in the case of Moscow Gubernia those notes about "work from village to village" which are so abundant for Vladimir Gubernia). For 1890 (according to the *Directory*) we found only about 9,000 such workers. Clearly, the figures given in the factory statistics (1866—59,000 workers in the cotton-weaving mills; 1890—75,000) *underrate* the increase in the number of *factory* workers that actually took place.* Here are data showing what different establishments were classed at different times as cotton-weaving "factories":**

Years	Total cotton-weaving "factories"	These include		
		factories	offices	workrooms
1866	436	256	38	142
1879	411	209	66	136
1890	311	283	21	7

Thus, the decrease in the number of "factories" shown by the "statistics" actually indicates the displacing of distributing offices and workrooms by the factory. Let us illustrate this by the example of two factories:

* Cf. Tugan-Baranovsky, loc. cit., p. 420.—The total number of village hand weavers working for capitalists was estimated by Semyonov at approximately 385,857 in 1859 (loc. cit., III, 273); to these he added another 200,000 village workers engaged "in other factory trades" (ibid., p. 302). At the present time, as we have seen above, the number of capitalistically employed home workers is much larger.

** Establishments with an output of under 2,000 rubles are classed as workrooms. The data of the special investigation of factories and works in Moscow and Vladimir gubernias made in 1868 by the Central Statistical Committee contain the repeated statement that the output figures of the small weaving establishments merely indicate pay for work done. Establishments that distribute work to home workers are classed as offices. For 1866 the figure given for these establishments is far from complete, owing to obvious omissions in the case of Moscow Gubernia.

Years	I. M. Terentyev's factory in Shuya						I. N. Garelin's factory in Ivanovo-Voznesensk					
		Number of power-looms	Number of workers			Total output (thousand rubles)		Number of power-looms	Number of workers			Total output (thousand rubles)
			on premises	outside	total				on premises	outside	total	
1866	Hand	—	205	670	875	130	Distributing offices	—	?	1,917	1,917	158
1879	Steam	648	920	—	920	1,346	Steam	893	1,274	—	1,274	2,137
1890	"	1,502	1,043	—	1,043	1,244	"	1,141	1,483	—	1,483	2,058
1894-95	"	?	1,160	—	1,160	1,878	"	?	2,134	—	2,134	2,933

Hence, to assess the development of large-scale machine production in this branch of industry it is best to take the data giving the number of power-looms. In the 1860s there were about 11,000,* and in 1890 about 87,000. Large-scale machine industry was consequently developing at enormous speed. In cotton spinning and weaving there was recorded in 1875-1878 a total of 148 mechanised establishments, having 481 steam-engines totalling 20,504 h.p., and in 1890, 168 mechanised establishments, having 554 steam-engines with a total of 38,750 h.p.

Precisely the same mistake is made in Russian statistics in relation to linen production, wherein a decrease in the number of factory workers is erroneously shown (1866—17,171; 1890—15,497). Actually, in 1866, of 16,900 looms belonging to linen-mill owners only 4,749 were kept in their establishments, the remaining 12,151 being held by work-room owners.** The number of factory workers for 1866, therefore, included about 12,000 home workers, and for 1890 only about 3,000 (computed from *Directory*). The number of power-looms, however, grew from 2,263 in 1866 (computed from *Military Statistical Abstract*) to 4,041 in

* *Military Statistical Abstract*, 380.—*Survey of Manufactory Industry*, Vol, II, St. Petersburg, 1863, p. 451.—In 1898 the number of power-looms used in cotton weaving (for the whole Empire, evidently) was reckoned at 100,630. *Successes of Russian Industry*, p. 33.

** *Military Statistical Abstract*, pp. 367-368: Commissariat returns.

1890, and of spindles from 95,495 to 218,012. In flax-spinning and linen-weaving in the years 1875-1878 there were 28 mechanised establishments, having 47 steam-engines with a total of 1,604 h.p., while in 1890 there were 48 mechanised establishments, having 83 steam-engines with a total of 5,027 h.p.*

Lastly, of the textile trades mention should be made of dyeing, printing and finishing, in which trades the factory statistics combine factories and the very smallest handicraft establishments with only 1 or 2 workers each and an output of a few hundred rubles.** Naturally, this causes no little confusion and obscures the rapid growth of large-scale machine industry. The following figures reflect this growth: in the wool-cleaning, dyeing, bleaching and finishing trades in 1875-1878 there were 80 mechanised establishments with 255 steam-engines totalling 2,634 h.p.; in 1890 there were 189 mechanised establishments with 858 steam-engines totalling 9,100 h.p.

2) Wood-Working Industries

In this section the most reliable data are those on saw-milling, although in the past small establishments were also included here.*** The enormous development of this trade in the post-Reform period (1866—4 million rubles; 1890—19 million rubles), accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of workers (4,000 and 15,000) and in the number of steam-powered establishments (26 and 430), is particularly interesting, in that it affords striking evidence of the growth of the lumber industry. Saw-milling is but one of the operations of the lumber industry, which is a necessary concomitant of the first steps of large-scale machine industry.

As to the rest of the trades in this section, namely,

* In silk-weaving in 1879 there were 495 power-looms and 5,996 hand-looms (*Historico-Statistical Survey*), and in 1890 there were 2,899 of the former and over 7,500 of the latter.

** For example, in 1879 the number of factories computed in these trades was 729; of this number, 466 had 977 workers and an output of 170,000 rubles. Even today one can find many such "factories"—for instance, in the description of the handicraft industries of Vyatka and Perm gubernias.

*** Cf. *Military Statistical Abstract*, p. 389. *Survey of Manufactory Industry*, I, 309.

furnishing and carpentry, bast-matting, and pitch and tar—the factory statistics relating to them are distinguished for their particularly chaotic condition. The small establishments so numerous in these trades were formerly included among the "factories" in numbers fixed arbitrarily, and the same is sometimes done even today.*

3) Chemical, Livestock-Product and Ceramic Industries

The statistics on the chemical industry proper are distinguished for their relative reliability. The following returns show its growth: in 1857 chemical products were consumed in Russia to a total of 14 million rubles (3.4 million rubles home produced and 10.6 million rubles imported); in 1880, to a total of 36¼ million rubles (7½ million rubles home produced and 28¾ imported); and in 1890, to a total of 42.7 million rubles (16.1 million rubles home produced and 26.6 imported).** These data are particularly interesting because the chemical industries are extremely important as producers of auxiliary materials for large-scale machine industry, i.e., articles of *productive* (and not personal) consumption. As to potash and saltpetre production, let us remark that the number of factories given is unreliable, again due to the inclusion of small establishments.***

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* Thus in 1879, of 91 bast-matting factories 39 had an output of less than 1,000 rubles each (Cf. *Studies*, p. 155). [See present edition Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*] In the pitch-and-tar trade for 1890 there were computed 140 factories, all with an output exceeding 2,000 rubles; for 1879, 1,033 were computed, of which 911 had an output of less than 2,000 rubles; for 1866 the number listed was 669 (for the Empire), while the *Military Statistical Abstract* even gave the figure of 3,164!! (Cf. *Studies*, pp. 156 and 271.) [See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia*, and Vol. 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics.—*Ed.*]

** *Military Statistical Abstract*, *Historico-Statistical Survey* and *Productive Forces*, IX, 16.—The number of workers in 1866—5,645; in 1890—25,471; in 1875-1878—38 mechanised establishments, with 34 steam-engines to a total of 332 h.p.; and in 1890—141 mechanised establishments, with 208 steam-engines to a total of 3,319 h.p.

*** Cf. *Directory* for 1879 and 1890 about potash production. The production of saltpetre is now concentrated in one factory in St. Petersburg, whereas in the 60s and 70s saltpetre was obtained from burti (dungheaps).

The tallow trade has undoubtedly declined in the post-Reform period. Thus, the value of output of the tallow-candle and tallow-boiling trade was estimated in 1866-1868 at 13.6 million rubles, and in 1890 at 5 million rubles.* This decline is to be explained by the growing use of mineral oils for lighting, which are displacing the old-time tallow candle.

For leather production (1866: 2,308 establishments with 11,463 workers and an output totalling 14.6 million rubles; 1890: 1,621 establishments with 15,564 workers and an output totalling 26.7 million rubles) statistics constantly lump together factories and small establishments. The relatively high cost of raw materials, which explains the high total output, and the fact that this trade requires very few workers, make it particularly difficult to draw a line of demarcation between the handicraft establishments and the factories. In 1890, of the total number of factories (1,621), only 103 had an output of less than 2,000 rubles; in 1879 there were 2,008 out of a total of 3,320**; in 1866, of 2,308 factories*** 1,042 had an output of less than 1,000 rubles (these 1,042 factories employed 2,059 workers and had an output totalling 474,000 rubles). Thus, the number of factories increased, although the factory statistics show a decrease. As for the small leather establishments, their number is still very large today: for instance, *The Factory Industry and Trade of Russia*, published by the Ministry of Finance (St. Petersburg, 1893), gives a total of nearly 9,500 handicraft works, with 21,000 workers and an output of 12 million rubles. These "handicraft" establishments are much larger than those which in the 60s were included among "factories and works." Since small establishments

* Here, too, the number of factories in the 60s and 70s included a host of small establishments.

** In 1875, Prof. Kittary, in his *Map of Leather Production in Russia*, gave an aggregate of 12,939 establishments, with output totalling 47½ million rubles, whereas the factory statistics gave 2,764 establishments, with output totalling 26½ million rubles (*Historico-Statistical Survey*). In the fur trade, another in this section, a similar lumping is observed of small establishments together with factories: Cf. *Directory* for 1879 and for 1890.

*** The *Military Statistical Abstract* gave an aggregate of even 3,890!!

are included among the "factories and works" in unequal numbers in the different gubernias and in different years, the statistics on this trade should be treated with great caution. The steam-engine statistics for 1875-1878 gave for this industry 28 mechanised establishments with 33 steam-engines to a total of 488 h.p. and in 1890 there were 66 mechanised establishments with 82 steam-engines to a total of 1,112 h.p. In these 66 factories 5,522 workers (more than a third of the total) were concentrated with an output totalling 12.3 million rubles (46% of the total), so that the concentration of production was very considerable, and the productivity of labour in the large establishments far above the average.*

The ceramic trades fall into two categories in accordance with the character of the factory statistics: in some, there is hardly any combining of small-scale production with large. That is why these statistics are fairly reliable. This applies to the following industries: glass, porcelain and chinaware, plaster and cement. Particularly remarkable is the rapid growth of the last-mentioned trade, which is evidence of the development of the building industry: the total output in 1866 was estimated at 530,000 rubles (*Military Statistical Abstract*), and in 1890 at 3,826,000 rubles; the number of power-operated establishments in 1875-1878 was 8, and in 1890 it was 39. On the other hand, in the pottery and brick trades the inclusion of small establishments is observed on a tremendous scale, and for that reason the factory statistics are very unsatisfactory, being particularly exaggerated for the 60s and 70s. Thus, in the pottery trade in 1879 there were listed 552 establishments, with 1,900 workers and an output totalling 538,000 rubles, and in 1890, 158 establishments with 1,978 workers and an output totalling 919,000 rubles. If we subtract the small establishments (those with an output of less than 2,000 rubles) we get: 1879—70 establishments, with

* If we distribute the factories shown in the *Directory* as for 1890 according to date of establishment we get the following: of 1,506 factories the number established at dates unknown was 91, before 1850—331; in the 1850s—147; in the 60s—239; in the 70s—320; in the 80s—351; in 1890—21. In every succeeding decade more factories were established than in the preceding one.

840 workers and an output of 505,000 rubles; 1890—143 establishments, with 1,859 workers and an output of 857,000 rubles. That is to say, instead of the decrease in the number of "factories" and stagnation in the number of workers shown in the statistics, there was actually a considerable increase in both the one and the other. In brick-making the official data for 1879 showed 2,627 establishments, with 28,800 workers and an output totalling 6,963,000 rubles; for 1890—1,292 establishments, with 24,334 workers and an output of 7,249,000 rubles; and without the small establishments (those with an output of less than 2,000 rubles) we get for 1879—518 establishments, with 19,057 workers and an output of 5,625,000 rubles; and for 1890—1,096 establishments, with 23,222 workers and an output of 7,240,000 rubles.*

4) Metallurgical Industries

In the factory statistics for the metallurgical industries the sources of confusion are, firstly, the inclusion of small establishments (exclusively in the 60s and 70s),** and, secondly and mainly, the fact that metallurgical plants are "subject, not to the jurisdiction" of the Department of Commerce and Manufacture, but to that of the Department of Mines. The returns of the Ministry of Finance usually omit ironworks "on principle"; but there have never been uniform and invariable rules for the separation of ironworks from the other works (and it would hardly

* The small establishments in these industries are now classed with the handicrafts. Cf., for instance, the table of small industries (Appendix I) or *Studies*, pp. 158-159. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*). *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook* (Vol. I) refused to give totals for these industries because the figures were obviously exaggerated. Progress in statistics since then is expressed in an increased boldness and disregard of the quality of material used.

** Thus, in the 60s, dozens of smithies were classed for some gubernias as "ironworks." See *Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance*, 1866, No. 4, p. 406; 1867, No. 6 p. 384.—*Statistical Chronicle*, Series II, Vol. 6.—Cf. also the example quoted above (§ II) where the *Yearbook* for 1866 includes the small handicraftsmen of the Pavlovo district among the "factory owners:"

be possible to devise them). That is why the factory statistics published by the Ministry of Finance always include ironworks to some extent, although the actual degree to which they are included varies for different gubernias and for different years.* General data on the increased use of steam-engines in metallurgy since the Reform will be given below, when we deal with the mining and metallurgical industry.

5) Food Industries

These industries merit special attention for the question that concerns us, since the confusion in factory statistics attains here its maximum. And yet, these industries occupy a prominent place in our factory industry as a whole.

Thus, according to the *Directory* for 1890 these industries account for 7,095 factories, with 45,000 workers and an output totalling 174 million rubles out of a total for European Russia of 21,124 factories, with 875,764 workers and an output of 1,501 million rubles. The fact is that the principal trades of this group—flour-milling, groat-milling and oil-pressing—consist of the processing of agricultural produce. There are hundreds and thousands of small establishments in Russia engaged in this processing in every gubernia, and since there are no generally established rules for selecting the "factories and works" from among them, the statistics pick out such small establishments *quite fortuitously*. That is why the numbers of "factories and works" for different years and for different gubernias fluctuate enormously. Here, for example, are the figures for the flour-milling trade for various years, as taken from various sources: 1865—857 mills (*Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance*); 1866—2,176 (*Yearbook*); 1866—18,426 (*Military Statistical Abstract*); 1885—3,940 (*Collection*); 17,765 (*Returns for Russia*); 1889, 1890 and 1891—5,073,

* See examples in *Studies*, p. 269 and p. 284 (see present edition, Vol. 4, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed.*), where Mr. Karyshev's error in ignoring this circumstance is examined. The *Directory* for 1879, for instance, includes the Kulebaki and Vyksa ironworks, or departments of them (pp. 356 and 374), which are omitted in the *Directory* for 1890.

5,605 and 5,201* (*Collection*); 1894-95—2,308 (*List*). Among the 5,041 mills listed in 1892 (*Collection*), 803 were steam-, 2,907 water-, 1,323 wind- and 8 horse-operated! Some gubernias counted only steam-mills, others included watermills (in numbers ranging from 1 to 425), still others (the minority) included also windmills (from 1 to 530) and horse-operated mills. One can imagine the value of such statistics, and of conclusions based on a credulous use of the data they provide!** Obviously, to judge the growth of large-scale machine industry we must first establish a definite criterion for the term "factory." Let us take as such a criterion the employment of steam-engines: steam-mills are a characteristic concomitant of the epoch of large-scale machine industry.***

We get the following picture of the development of *factory* production in this branch of industry.****

Fifty gubernias of European Russia

Years	No. of steam-mills	No. of workers	Total output (thousand rubles)
1866	126	?	?
1879	205	3,621	21,353
1890	649	10,453	67,481
1892	803	11,927	80,559

The statistics for the oil-pressing trade are unsatisfactory for the same reason. For instance, in 1879 2,450 works were listed with 7,207 workers and an output totalling 6,486,000 rubles, and in 1890 there were 383 works, with 4,746 workers and an output totalling 12,232,000 rubles. But this decrease in the number of factories and of workers is

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* And in addition 32,957 "small windmills," not counted among the "factories and works."

** See examples of such conclusions drawn by Mr. Karyshev in the above-quoted article in the *Studies*. (See present edition, Vol. 4, op. cit.—*Ed.*)

*** Large watermills are also in the nature of factories, of course, but we have no data to enable us to single them out from among the small ones. In the *Directory* for 1890 we saw listed 250 watermills each employing 10 and more workers. They employed 6,378 workers.

**** *Military Statistical Abstract*, *Directories* and *Collection*. According to the *List* for 1894-95, there are 1,192 steam-mills in European Russia. The statistics for steam-engines gave the number of steam-mills in European Russia in 1875-1878 as 294.

only apparent. If the data for 1879 and 1890 are made comparable, i.e., if we exclude establishments with an output of less than 2,000 rubles (not included in the lists) we get for 1879: 272 works, with 2,941 workers and an output totalling 5,771,000 rubles, and for 1890—379 works, with 4,741 workers and an output totalling 12,232,000 rubles. That large-scale machine industry has developed in this trade no less rapidly than in flour-milling is evident, for example, from the statistics for steam-engines; in 1875-1878 there were 27 steam-powered works, with 28 steam-engines of 521 h.p., while in 1890 there were 113 mechanised works, with 116 steam-engines totalling 1,886 h.p.

The other trades of this group are relatively small. Let us note that in the mustard and fish-products trades, for instance, the statistics of the 60s included hundreds of small establishments such as have nothing whatever in common with factories and are now not classed as such. The extent to which our factory statistics for various years need correction is evident from the following: with the exception of flour-milling, the *Directory* for 1879 gave in this section a total of 3,555 establishments with 15,313 workers, and for 1890—1,842 establishments with 19,159 workers. For 7 trades,* small establishments (with an output of less than 2,000 rubles) were included as follows: in 1879—2,487 with 5,176 workers and an output totalling 916,000 rubles and in 1890, seven establishments, employing ten workers and with an output totalling two thousand rubles! To make the data comparable, one should, consequently, subtract in one case five thousand workers, and in the other, ten persons!

6) Excise-Paying and Other Trades

In some of the excise-paying trades we observe a decrease in the number of factory workers between the 1860s and the present day, but the decrease is not nearly as considerable as is asserted by Mr. N.—on,** who blindly

* Oil-pressing, starch, treacle, malt, confectionery, preserves and vinegar.

** *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 6, pp. 104-105.

believes every figure in print. The fact is that for the majority of excise-paying trades the only source of information is the *Military Statistical Abstract*, which, as we know, tremendously exaggerates the totals in the factory statistics. Unfortunately, however, we have little material with which to verify the data in the *Abstract*. In distilling, the *Military Statistical Abstract* counted in 1866 a total of 3,836 distilleries with 52,660 workers (in 1890—1,620, with 26,102 workers), but the number of distilleries does not coincide with the data of the Ministry of Finance, which in 1865-66 calculated 2,947 operating distilleries and in 1866-67—3,386.* Judging by this, the number of workers is exaggerated by some 5,000 to 9,000. In vodka distilling, the *Military Statistical Abstract* computes 4,841 distilleries, with 8,326 workers (1890: 242 distilleries with 5,266 workers); of these Bessarabia Gubernia has 3,207 distilleries with 6,873 workers. The absurdity of these figures is glaring. In fact, we learn from material published by the Ministry of Finance** that the actual number of vodka distilleries in Bessarabia Gubernia was 10 or 12, and in the whole of European Russia 1,157. The number of workers was consequently exaggerated by *a minimum of 6 thousand*. The cause of this exaggeration is, evidently, that the Bessarabian "statisticians" included vineyard owners among the owners of distilleries (see below on tobacco-making). In beer- and mead-brewing, the *Military Statistical Abstract* counts 2,374 breweries, with 6,825 workers (1890—918 breweries, with 8,364 workers), whereas *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook* estimates a total of 2,087 breweries in European Russia for 1866. The number of workers is exaggerated here too.*** In the beet-sugar and sugar-refining trades, the *Military Statistical Abstract* exaggerates the number of workers *by 11 thousand*, counting 92,126 per-

* *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I, pp. 76 and 82. The total number of distilleries (including those not in operation) was 4,737 and 4,646 respectively.

** *Yearbook*, I, p. 104.

*** E.g., in Simbirsk Gubernia, the *Military Statistical Abstract* computes 218 distilleries (!) with 299 workers and an output totalling 21,600 rubles. (According to the *Yearbook* there were 7 distilleries in the gubernia.) Very likely, these were small domestic or peasant establishments.

sons, as against 80,919 according to the data of *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook* (1890—77,875 workers). In tobacco-making, the *Military Statistical Abstract* gives 5,327 factories, with 26,116 workers (1890—281 factories, with 26,720 workers); of these, 4,993 factories with 20,038 workers are in Bessarabia Gubernia. Actually, the number of tobacco factories in Russia in 1866 was 343, and in Bessarabia Gubernia 13.* The number of workers has been exaggerated by *about 20 thousand*, and even the compilers of the *Military Statistical Abstract* themselves indicated that "the factories shown in Bessarabia Gubernia . . . are nothing but tobacco plantations" (p. 414). Mr. N.—on evidently thought it superfluous to glance at the text of the statistical publication he uses; that is why he failed to notice the error, and discoursed with a highly serious air about a "slight increase in the number of workers in the . . . tobacco factories" (article cited, p. 104)!! Mr. N.—on simply takes the total number of workers in the excise-paying trades from the *Military Statistical Abstract* and the *Directory* for 1890 (186,053 and 144,332) and calculates the percentage of decrease. . . . "In a period of 25 years there has been a considerable drop in the number of workers employed. It has diminished by 22.4%. . . . "Here" (i.e., in the excise-paying trades) "we see no signs of an increase, the plain fact being that the number of workers has simply declined by a quarter of its previous magnitude" (ibid.). Indeed, what could be "simpler"! Take the first figure you lay your hands on, and calculate a percentage! As for the trifling circumstance that the figure given in the *Military Statistical Abstract* exaggerates the number of workers by *some forty thousand*, that can be ignored.

7) Conclusions

The criticism of our factory statistics given in the last two sections leads us to the following main conclusions:

* *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, p. 61. Cf. *Survey of Manufactory Industry* (Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1863), which gives detailed information for 1861: 534 factories, with 6,937 workers; and in Bessarabia Gubernia, 31 factories, with 73 workers. The number of tobacco factories fluctuates greatly from year to year.

1. *The number of factories in Russia has been rapidly growing in the post-Reform period.*

The opposite conclusion, which follows from our factory statistics, is erroneous. The point is that the figures we are given of factories include small artisan, handicraft and agricultural establishments, and *the further back we go from the present day, the larger the number of small establishments included in the number of factories.*

2. *The number of factory workers and the volume of output of factories and works are likewise exaggerated for the past period in our statistics.* This is due, firstly, to the fact that formerly a greater number of small establishments were included. Hence, the data for the industries that merge with handicrafts are particularly unreliable.* Secondly, it is due to the fact that in the past more capitalistically employed home workers were classified as factory workers than today.

3. It is customary in this country to think that if figures are taken from the official factory statistics they must be considered comparable with other figures taken from the same source, and must be regarded as more or less reliable, until the contrary is proved. What has been said above, however, leads to the opposite conclusion, namely, that all comparisons of our factory statistics for different times and for different gubernias must be regarded as unreliable until the reverse is proved.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINING INDUSTRY**

In the initial period of Russia's post-Reform development the principal centre of ore-mining was the Urals. Constituting a single area, until quite recently separated sharply

* If we take the gross figures for all trades and for long periods, the exaggeration resulting from the cause mentioned will not be great, for the small establishments account for a small percentage of the total number of workers and the total output. It goes without saying that one presumes a comparison of figures taken from similar sources (there can be no question of comparing the returns of the Ministry of Finance with those of gubernatorial reports, or of the *Military Statistical Abstract*).

** Sources: Semyonov, *A Study of Historical Data on Russian Trade and Industry*, Vol. III, St. Petersburg, 1859, pp. 323-339. *Military Statistical Abstract*, section on mining industry. *The*

from Central Russia, it has at the same time an original industrial structure. For ages the basis of the "organisation of labour" in the Urals was serfdom, which to this day, the very end of the 19th century, leaves its impress on quite important aspects of life in this mining area. In the old days serfdom was the basis of the greatest prosperity of the Urals and of its dominant position, not only in Russia, but partly also in Europe. In the 18th century iron was one of Russia's principal items of export; in 1782 nearly 3.8 million poods of iron were exported; in 1800-1815 from 2 to 1½ million poods; in 1815-1838 about 1⅓ million poods. Already "in the 20s of the 19th century Russia was producing 1½ times as much pig-iron as France, 4½ times as much as Prussia and 3 times as much as Belgium." But the very serfdom that helped the Urals to rise to such heights when European capitalism was in its initial period was the very cause of the Urals' decline when capitalism was in its heyday. The iron industry in the Urals developed very slowly. In 1718 Russia's output of pig-iron was about 6½ million poods, in 1767 about 9½ million poods, in 1806—12 million poods, in the 30s—9 to 11 million poods, in the 40s—11 to 13 million poods, in the 50s—12 to 16 million poods, in the 60s—13 to 18 million poods, in 1867—17½ million poods. In one hundred years the output was not even doubled, and Russia dropped far behind other European

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Ministry of Finance Yearbook, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1869. *Statistical Returns for Mining*, for 1864-1861, St. Petersburg, 1864 1867 (published by the Scientific Committee of the Corps of Mining Engineers). I. Bogolyubsky, *Essay in Mining Statistics for the Russian Empire*, St. Petersburg, 1878. *Historico-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry*, St. Petersburg, 1883, Vol. I (article by Keppen). *Statistical Returns for the Mining and Metallurgical Industries of Russia in 1890*, St. Petersburg, 1892. Ditto for 1901 (St. Petersburg, 1904) and for 1902 (St. Petersburg, 1905). K. Skalkovsky, *Mining and Metallurgical Productivity of Russia in 1877*, St. Petersburg, 1879. *The Mining and Metallurgical Industry of Russia*, published by the Department of Mines for the Chicago Exhibition, St. Petersburg, 1893 (compiled by Keppen). *Returns for Russia for 1890*, published by the Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1890. Ditto for 1896, St. Petersburg, 1897. *Productive Forces of Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1896, Section VII. *Vestnik Finansov* for 1896-1897. Zemstvo Statistical Returns for Ekaterinburg and Krasnoufimsk uyezds of Perm Gubernia, and others.

countries, where large-scale machine industry had given rise to a tremendous development of metallurgy.

The main cause of stagnation in the Urals was serfdom; the ironmasters were at once feudal landlords and industrialists, and their power was based not on capital and competition, but on monopoly* and their possessional right. The Ural ironmasters are big landowners even today. In 1890, the 262 ironworks in the Empire had 11.4 million dessiatines of land (including 8.7 million dessiatines of forestland), of which 10.2 million belonged to 111 Urals ironworks (forestland covering 7.7 million dessiatines). On the average, consequently, each Urals works possesses vast latifundia covering some hundred thousand dessiatines. The allotment of land to the peasants from these estates has to this day not been completed. Labour is obtained in the Urals, not only by hire, but also on the *labour-service* basis. The Zemstvo statistics for Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, for example, estimate that there are thousands of peasant farms that have the use of factory-owned land, pastures, woodland, etc., either gratis, or at a low rent. It stands to reason that this free use of the land actually has a very high cost, for it serves to reduce wages to a very low level; the ironworks get their "own" workers, tied down to the works and cheaply paid.**

* When the peasants were emancipated, the Ural ironmasters particularly insisted on, and secured the retention of, a law prohibiting the opening of any coal- and wood-burning establishments within the area of their undertakings. For some details, see *Studies*, pp. 193-194. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*)

** The Ural worker "is ... partly a cultivator, so that work in the mines is of good assistance to him on his farm, although the pay is lower than in the other mining-and-metal districts" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 8). As we know, the terms on which the Ural peasants were emancipated from serf dependence were made to correspond to their position in the mining industry. The mining and works population was divided into workmen having no land, who had to work in the industry all year round, and agricultural labourers, having allotments, who had to do auxiliary jobs. Highly characteristic is the term that has survived to this day, namely, of Ural workers being "debtbound." When, for example, one reads in the Zemstvo statistics "information about a team of workers bound by debt to their jobs in the shops of the Arta works" one involuntarily turns to the title-page to see the date: Is it really ninety-four, and not, say, forty-four?[151]

Here is the way Mr. V. D. Belov describes these relationships:

The Urals enjoy the advantage, says Mr. Belov, of having workers who have been moulded by their "original" history. "Workers in other factories, abroad, or even in St. Petersburg, have not the interests of their factory at heart: they are here today and gone tomorrow. While the factory is running they work; when losses take the place of profits, they take up their knapsacks and go off as fast and as readily as they came. They and their employers are permanent enemies.... The position is entirely different in the case of the Ural workers. They are natives of the place and in the vicinity of the works they have their land, their farms and their families. Their own welfare is closely, inseparably, bound up with the welfare of the works. If it does well, they do well; if it does badly, it is bad for them; but they cannot leave it (sic!): they have more here than a knapsack (sic!); to leave means to wreck their whole world, to abandon the land, farm and family.... And so they are ready to hang on for years to work at half pay, or, what amounts to the same thing, to remain unemployed half their working time so that other local workers like themselves may earn a crust of bread. In short, they are ready to accept any terms the employers offer, so long as they are allowed to remain.... Thus, there is an inseparable bond between the Ural workers and the works; the relationships are the same today as they were in the past, before their emancipation from serf dependence; only the form of these relationships has changed, nothing more. The former principle of serfdom has been superseded by the lofty principle of mutual benefit."*

This lofty principle of mutual benefit manifests itself primarily in reduction of wages to a particularly low level. "In the South . . . a worker costs twice and even three times as much as in the Urals"—for example, according to data covering several thousand workers, 450 rubles (annually per worker) as against 177 rubles. In the South "at the first opportunity of earning a decent wage in the fields of their native villages or anywhere else, the workers leave the iron-works, and coal- or ore-mines" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 17, p. 265). In the Urals, however, a decent wage is not to be dreamt of.

Naturally and inseparably connected with the low wages and servile status of the Ural workers is the technical backwardness of the Urals. There pig-iron is smelted mostly

* *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry*, Vol. XVI, St. Petersburg, 1887, pp. 8-9 and foll. The same author later goes on to talk about "healthy people's" industry!

with the aid of wood fuel, in old-fashioned furnaces with cold or slightly heated blast. In 1893, the number of cold-blast furnaces in the Urals was 37 out of 110, while in the South, there were 3 out of 18. A mineral-fuel furnace had an average output of 1.4 million poods per year, while a wood-fuel furnace had one of 217,000 poods. In 1890 Mr. Keppen wrote: "The refining process of smelting pig-iron is still firmly established in the ironworks of the Urals, whereas in other parts of Russia it has been almost entirely displaced by the puddling process."[152] Steam-engines are used to a far less extent in the Urals than in the South. Lastly, we cannot but note the seclusion of the Urals, its isolation from the centre of Russia owing to the vast distance and the absence of railways. Until quite recently the products of the Urals were transported to Moscow mainly by the primitive method of "floating" by river once a year.*

Thus the most direct survivals of the pre-Reform system, extensive practice of labour-service, bonded condition of the workers, low productivity of labour, backwardness of technique, low wages, prevalence of hand production, primitive and rapaciously antediluvian exploitation of the region's natural wealth, monopolies, hindrances to competition, seclusion and isolation from the general commercial and industrial march of the times—such is the general picture of the Urals.

The mining area in the South** is in many respects the very opposite of the Urals. The South is in the period of

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* For a description of this floating see *Crags* by Mr. Mamin-Sibiryak. In his writings this author vividly portrays the specific life of the Urals, which differs very little from that of the pre-Reform period, with the lack of rights, ignorance and degradation of a population tied down to the factories, with the "earnest, childish dissipations" of the "gentry," and the absence of that middle stratum of society (middle class and other intellectuals) which is so characteristic of capitalist development in all countries, not excluding Russia.

** In mining statistics the term "South and South-West Russia" means the Volhynia, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Podolsk, Taurida, Kharkov, Kherson and Chernigov gubernias. It is to these that the quoted figures apply. All that is said further on about the South could also be said (with slight modifications) of Poland, which forms another mining area of outstanding significance in the post-Reform period.

formation and is as young as the Urals are old and the system prevailing there "time-hallowed." The purely capitalist industry which has arisen here during recent decades recognises no traditions, no social-estate or national divisions, no seclusion of definite sections of the population. There has been a mass influx of foreign capital, engineers and workers into South Russia; and in the present period of boom (1898) entire factories are being brought there from America.* International capital has not hesitated to settle within the tariff wall and establish itself on "foreign" soil: ubi bene, ibi patria**. . . . The following are statistics on the displacement of the Urals by the South[153]:

Years	Output of pig-iron (thousand poods)						Total coal output for Empire (million poods)
	Total for Empire	%	In Urals	%	In South	%	
1867	17,028	100	11,084	65.1	56	0.3	26.7
1877	24,579	100	16,157	65.7	1,596	6.5	110.1
1887	37,389	100	23,759	63.5	4,158	11.1	276.8
1897	114,782	100	41,180	35.8	46,349	40.4	683.9
1902	158,618	100	44,775	28.2	84,273	53.1	1,005.21

These figures clearly show what a technical revolution is now taking place in Russia, and what an enormous capacity for the development of productive forces is possessed by large-scale capitalist industry. The predominance of the Urals meant the predominance of serf labour, technical backwardness and stagnation.*** On the contrary, we now

* *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 16: The Nikopol-Mariupol Co. ordered a pipe-rolling mill in America and had it brought to Russia.

** Where it is well, there is my country.—*Ed.*

*** It goes without saying that the Ural ironmasters depict the situation somewhat differently. Here is a sample of their eloquent

see that the development of metallurgical industry is proceeding faster in Russia than in Western Europe and in some respects even faster than in the United States. In 1870 Russia produced 2.9% of the world output of pig-iron (22 million poods out of 745 million), and in 1894—5.1% (81.3 million poods out of 1,584.2) (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 22). In the last 10 years (1886-1896) Russia has trebled her output of pig-iron (32½ to 96½ million poods), whereas it took France, for example, 28 years to do so (1852-1880), the U.S.A. 23 years (1845-1868), England 22 (1824-1846) and Germany 12 (1859-1871; see *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 50). The development of capitalism in the young countries is greatly *accelerated* by the example and the aid of the old countries. Of course, the last decade (1888-1898) has been a period of exceptional boom, which, like all capitalist prosperity, will inevitably lead to a crisis; but capitalist development cannot proceed at all except in spurts.

The introduction of machinery into production and the increase in the number of workers have been much more rapid in the South than in the Urals.*

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complaints at last year's congresses: "The historical services rendered by the Urals are common knowledge. For two hundred years all Russia ploughed and reaped, hammered, dug and hewed with the products of Ural factories. The Russian people wore on their breasts crosses made of Ural copper, rode on Ural axles, used fire-arms made of Ural steel, cooked pancakes on Ural frying-pans, and rattled Ural pennies in their pockets The Urals satisfied the requirements of the entire Russian people ..." (who used scarcely any iron. In 1851 the consumption of pig-iron in Russia was estimated at about 14 pounds per inhabitant, in 1895—1.13 poods, and in 1897—1.33 poods) "... producing articles to suit their needs and tastes. The Urals generously (?) squandered their natural wealth, without chasing after fashion, or being carried away by the making of rails, fire grates and monuments. And in return for their centuries of service—they found themselves one fine day forgotten and neglected" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 32; *Results of Mining Congresses in the Urals*). Indeed, what neglect of "time-hallowed" institutions. And it is all the fault of insidious capitalism, which has introduced such "instability" into our national economy. How much nicer it would be to live in the old way, without "being carried away by the making of rails," and to cook oneself pancakes on Ural frying-pans!

* Mr. Bogolyubsky estimates the number of steam-engines used in mining in 1868 at 526 with a total of 13,575 h.p.

Years	Steam-engines and h. p. employed in mining						No. of mine-workers employed (not including salt miners)		
	in whole of Russia		in Urals		in South				
	steam-engines	total h. p.	steam-engines	total h. p.	steam-engines	total h. p.	in whole of Russia	in Urals	in South
1877	895	27,880	286	8,070	161	5,129	256,919	145,455	13,865
1893	2,853	115,429	550	21,330	585	30,759	444,646	238,630	54,670

Thus we see that in the Urals the increase in the use of steam-power was only some 2½ times, whereas in the South it was *sixfold*; the increase in the number of workers in the Urals was 1⅔ times, whereas in the South it was nearly *fourfold*.* Consequently, it is capitalist large-scale industry that rapidly increases the number of workers, at the same time enormously increasing the productivity of their labour.

Alongside of the South, mention should be made of the Caucasus, which is also characterised by an amazing growth of the mining industry in the post-Reform period. The output of oil, which in the 60s did not even reach a million poods (557,000 in 1865), was in 1870—1.7 million poods, in 1875—5.2 million poods, in 1880—21.5 million poods, in 1885—116 million poods, in 1890—242.9 million poods, in 1895—384 million poods and in 1902—637.7 million poods. Nearly all the oil is obtained in Baku Gubernia, and Baku "from an insignificant town has turned into a first-class Russian industrial centre, with 112,000 inhabitants."** The

* The number of workers in iron production in the Urals in 1886 was 145,910, and in 1893—164,126, in the South 5,956 and 16,467. The increases are ⅓ (approx.) and 2¾-fold. For 1902 there are no data on the number of steam-engines and horse-power. The number however, of mine workers employed (not including saltminers) in 1902 in the whole of Russia was 604,972, including 249,805 in the Urals and 145,280 in the South.

** *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 21. In 1863 the population of Baku was 14,000 and in 1885—45,700.

enormous development of the extraction and processing of oil has given rise in Russia to a greater consumption of kerosene that has completely ousted the American product (increase of personal consumption with the cheapening of the product by factory processing), and to a still greater consumption of oil by-products as fuel in factories, in works and on the railways (increase of productive consumption).* The number of workers in the mining industry of the Caucasus has also grown very rapidly: from 3,431 in 1877 to 17,603 in 1890, i.e., has increased *fivefold*.

To illustrate the structure of industry in the South let us take the data for the coal industry in the Donets Basin (where the average mine is smaller than in any other part of Russia). Classifying the mines according to number of workers employed, we get the following picture:** (See Table on p. 493.)

Thus, in this area (and in this one only) there are extremely small peasants' mines, which, however, despite their great number, play an absolutely insignificant part in the total output (104 small mines account for only 2% of the total coal output) and are marked by an exceedingly low productivity of labour. On the other hand, the 37 largest mines employ nearly 3/5 of the total number of workers and produce over 70% of the total coal output. Productivity of labour increases parallel with the increase in the size of the mines, even irrespective of whether machinery is used or not (cf., for example, categories V and III of mines, as to quantity of steam-power and output per worker). Concentration of production in the Donets Basin is steadily increasing: thus, in the four years 1882-1886, of 512 coal consigners, 21 dispatched over 5,000 wagon-loads (i.e., 3 million poods) each, making 229,700 wagon-loads out

* In 1882, over 62% of the locomotives were fuelled with wood; in 1895-96, however, wood fuelled 28.3%, oil 30% and coal 40.9% of the locomotives (*Productive Forces*, XVII, 62). After capturing the home market, the oil industry went in quest of foreign markets, and the export of oil to Asia is growing very rapidly (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 32) in spite of the a priori predictions of certain Russian economists who love to talk about the absence of foreign markets for Russian capitalism.

** Data taken from list of mines in *Returns for the Mining and Metallurgical Industries in 1890*.

Groups of mines according to number of workers	In Donets Basin						Average per mine				Output per worker (thousand poods)
	Number of			Coal output (thousand poods)	No. of steam-engines	total h. p.	workers	Coal output (thousand poods)	steam-engines	total h. p.	
	mines	pits and drifts	workers								
I. Mines with up to 10 workers	27	31	172	178	—	—	6.4	6.6	—	—	1.0
II. " " 10 to 25 workers	77	102	1,250	3,489	8	68	16.2	45.3	0.1	0.3	2.8
III. " " 25 to 100 workers	119	339	5,750	28,693	62	766	48.3	241.1	0.5	6.4	4.9
IV. " " 100 to 500 workers	29	167	6,973	59,130	87	1,704	240.4	2,038.9	3	58.7	8.4
V. " " 500 to 1,000 workers	5	67	3,698	23,164	24	756	739.6	4,632.8	4.8	151.2	6.3
V. " " 1,000 and more workers	3	16	5,021	53,605	29	1,724	1,673.7	17,868.3	9.6	574.6	10.6
Mines with unknown number . . .	9	40	? (2,296)	15,008	18	808					
Total	269	762	25,167	183,267	228	5,826	93.5	681.3	0.9	21.6	7.3

of 480,800, i.e., less than half. In the four years 1891-1895, however, there were 872 consigners, of whom 55 dispatched over 5,000 wagon-loads each, making 925,400 wagon-loads out of 1,178,000, i.e., over 8/10 of the total number.*

The foregoing data on the development of the mining industry are particularly important in two respects: firstly, they reveal with exceptional clarity the essence of the change in social-economic relations that is taking place in Russia in all spheres of the national economy; secondly, they illustrate the theoretical proposition that in a developing capitalist society there is a particularly rapid growth of those branches of industry which produce *means of production*, i.e., articles not of personal, but of productive, consumption. The replacement of one form of social economy by another is particularly clear in the mining industry, because here the typical representatives of the two forms are distinct areas. In one area there is the old pre-capitalist world, with its primitive, routine technique, personal dependence of a population tied to place of residence, firmly established social-estate traditions, monopolies, etc.; while in the other area one finds a complete break with all tradition, a technical revolution, and the rapid growth of purely capitalist machine industry.** This example brings out in bold relief the mistake of the Narodnik economists. They deny the progressive nature of capitalism in Russia, pointing to the fact that in agriculture our entrepreneurs readily resort to labour-service and in industry to the distribution of home work and that in mining they seek to secure the tying down of the worker, legislative prohibition of competition by small

* From data of N. S. Avdakov: *Brief Statistical Survey of the Donets Coal Industry*, Kharkov, 1896.

** Latterly the Urals, too, have begun to change under the influence of the new conditions of life; and this change will be still more rapid when the Urals are tied closer to "Russia" by railway lines. Of particular importance in this respect will be the proposed connection by rail of the Urals and the South with a view to the exchange of Ural iron-ore for Donets coal. Till now the Urals and the South have scarcely competed with each other, having worked for different markets and existed mainly on government contracts. But the abundant rain of government contracts will not go on for ever.

establishments, etc., etc. The illogicality of such arguments and their flagrant distortion of historical perspective are glaring. Whence, indeed, does it follow that the efforts of our entrepreneurs to utilise the advantages of pre-capitalist methods of production should be charged to our capitalism, and not to those survivals of the past which retard the development of capitalism and which in many cases are preserved by force of law? Can one be surprised, for instance, at the southern mine owners being eager to tie the workers down and to secure the legislative prohibition of competition by small establishments, when in the other mining area such tying down and such prohibitions have existed for ages, and exist to this day, and when in another area the ironmasters, by using more primitive methods and employing cheaper and more docile labour, get a profit on their pig-iron, without effort, of "kopek per kopek and sometimes even one and a half kopeks per kopek"?* Should we not, on the contrary, be surprised at the fact that, under these circumstances, there are people who are capable of idealising the pre-capitalist economic order in Russia, and who shut their eyes to the most urgent and pressing necessity of abolishing all obsolete institutions that hinder the development of capitalism?**

On the other hand, the data on the growth of the mining industry are important because they clearly reveal a more rapid growth of capitalism and of the home market on account of articles of productive consumption than on account of articles of personal consumption. This circumstance is ignored by Mr. N. —on, for instance, who argues that the satisfaction of the entire home demand for the products of the mining industry "will probably take place very soon" (*Sketches*, 123). The fact is that the consumption of metals, coal, etc. (per inhabitant), does not and cannot remain stationary in capitalist society, but necessarily

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* Article by Yegunov in *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry*, Vol. III, p. 130.

** For example, Mr. N. —on levelled all his complaints solely against capitalism (cf., in particular, his observations on the southern mine owners, *Sketches*, pp. 211 and 296) and thus utterly distorted the relation between Russian capitalism and the pre-capitalist structure of our mining industry.

increases. Every new mile of railway, every new workshop, every iron plough acquired by a rural bourgeois *increases* the demand for the products of ore-mining. Although from 1851 to 1897 the consumption of pig-iron, for example, in Russia increased from 14 pounds per head to 1⅓ poods, even this latter amount will have to increase very considerably before it approaches the size of the demand for pig-iron in the advanced countries (in Belgium and England it is over 6 poods per inhabitant).

V. IS THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN LARGE CAPITALIST ENTERPRISES GROWING?

Having examined the statistics of the factory and mining industries, we can now attempt to answer this question, one which has so much engaged the attention of the Narodnik economists, and which they have answered in the negative (Messrs. V. V., N. —on, Karyshev and Kablukov have asserted that the number of factory workers in Russia is increasing—if it is increasing—more slowly than the population). Let us observe first of all that the question must be whether an increase is taking place in the commercial and industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population (of this below), or whether an increase is taking place in the number of workers employed in large-scale machine industry. It cannot be asserted that the number of workers in small industrial establishments or in manufactories must increase in a developing capitalist society, for the factory constantly eliminates the more primitive forms of industry. Our factory statistics, however, as was shown in detail above, do not always refer to the *factory* in the scientific sense of the term.

To examine the data on the question that interests us, we must take, firstly, the returns for all branches, and, secondly, the returns for a long period. Only if we do that is there a guarantee that the data will be more or less comparable. We take the years 1865 and 1890, a stretch of twenty-five years in the post-Reform period. Let us sum up the available statistics. The factory statistics give the fullest data for 1865; for European Russia they

showed 380,638 factory workers in all trades except distilling, brewing, beet-sugar and tobacco.* To determine the number of workers in these trades, we have to take the only data available, those of the *Military Statistical Abstract*, which, as has been shown above, must be corrected. By adding the 127,935 workers in the trades mentioned,** we get the total number of factory workers in European Russia in 1865 (in excise-paying and non-excise-paying trades) as *508,573.**** For 1890 the corresponding figure will be *839,730.***** The increase is 65%, much greater than the increase in population. It must, however, be borne in mind that *actually the increase was undoubtedly bigger than these figures show*: above it was demonstrated in detail that the factory statistics for the 1860s are exaggerated due to their inclusion of small handicraft, artisan and agricultural establishments, as well as home workers. Unfortunately, we are unable, for lack of material, to correct all these exaggerations in full, and prefer not to correct them in part, especially as more exact data will be given below regarding the number of workers in large factories.

Let us pass to the mining and metallurgical statistics. For 1865 the number of mine workers was given only for the copper and iron trades, as well as the gold and platinum fields; for European Russia it was *133,176*.(*) In 1890,

* *Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance*, 1867, No. 6. It has been shown above that for comparison with contemporary data one can only take data from the same source, i.e., those of the Ministry of Finance.

** The number of workers in brewing is 6,825, this figure is also exaggerated, but it cannot be corrected for lack of data; in beet-sugar making—68,334 (according to *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*); tobacco-making—6,116 (corrected) and distilling—46,660 (corrected).

*** Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky quotes for 1866 the figure given by Mr. Veshnyakov—493,371 (*The Factory*, p. 339). We do not know how this figure was arrived at; it differs very slightly from the one we give.

**** According to the *Directory* for 1890. From the total of 875,764 we have to subtract the number of workers duplicated in mining statistics, viz., 291 in asphalt, 3,468 in salt, and 32,275 in rails production.

(*) For the number of mine workers in the 60s, see *Statistical Chronicle*, I, 1866; *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I; *Statistical Returns for Mining*, for 1864-1867, St. Petersburg, 1864-1867, published by the Mining Scientific Committee.

there were in the same trades *274,748 workers*,* *i.e.*, *more than twice as many*. The latter figure represents 80.6% of the total number of mine workers in European Russia in 1890; if we assume that in 1865 the trades mentioned also covered 80.6% of the total mine workers,** we get the total number of mine workers for 1865 as *165,230* and for 1890 as *340,912*. An increase of 107%.

Further, railway workers also belong to the category of workers in big capitalist enterprises. In 1890, in European Russia, together with Poland and the Caucasus, they numbered *252,415*.*** The figure for 1865 is unknown, but it can be determined with a sufficient degree of approximation, since the number of railway workers employed per verst of railway fluctuates very slightly. Counting 9 workers per verst, we get the total number of railway workers in 1865 as *32,076*.****

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* *Statistical Returns for the Mining and Metallurgical Industries in 1890*, St. Petersburg, 1892. According to this source the total for European Russia is 342,166, and if we subtract the number of workers at the kerosene refineries (included in the *Directory*) and correct certain minor errors, the total will be 340,912.

** Among the other branches of mining industries there are some in which the number of workers has probably increased slightly (salt mining), there are some in which the number must have increased very considerably (coal-mining, stone-quarrying), and some which did not exist at all in the 1860s (such as quicksilver-mining).

*** *Statistical Survey of Railways and Inland Waterways*, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 22. Published by Ministry of Communications. Unfortunately, we lack the data to separate European Russia. Under railway workers we include, not only permanent, but temporary (10,447) and day labourers (74,504). The average annual pay of a temporary worker is 192 rubles, and of a day labourer 235 rubles. The average daily pay is 78 kopeks. Consequently, both the temporary and the day workers are engaged for the greater part of the year, so that to disregard them, as Mr. N.—on does (*Sketches*, p. 124), is wrong.

**** The number of workers per verst employed on the railways in 1886 was 9.0, in 1890—9.5; in 1893—10.2 in 1894—10.6; in 1895—10.9; thus the number obviously tends to grow. See *Returns for Russia* for 1890 and 1896, and *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 39.—Let us make the reservation that in this section we are concerned exclusively with comparing the data for 1865 and 1890, it is therefore absolutely immaterial whether we take the number of railway workers for the whole of the Empire or only for European Russia; whether we take 9 workers per verst or fewer, or whether we take all branches of mining or only those for which data exist for 1865.

Let us sum up our calculations.

Number of workers in large capitalist enterprises (in thousands)

Years	In factory industry	In mining	On railways	Total
1865	509	165	32	706
1890	840	340	252	1,432

Thus, in 25 years the number of workers in large capitalist enterprises more than doubled, i.e., it increased not only much faster than the population in general, but even faster than the urban population.* The steadily increasing diversion of workers from agriculture and from the small industries to big industrial enterprises is consequently beyond doubt.** This is indicated by the very statistics that are so often resorted to and abused by our Narodniks. But the culminating point of their abuse of the statistics is the following truly phenomenal device: they work out the proportion of *factory workers* to the *total population* (!) and on the basis of the figure arrived at (about 1%) expatiate on how insignificant this "handful"*** of workers is! Mr. Kablukov, for example, after repeating the calculation of

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* In European Russia the urban population in 1863 was 6.1 million, and in 1897, 12.0 million.

** The latest data on the number of workers in large capitalist enterprises are as follows for 1900 data exist regarding the number of factory workers in non-excise-paying enterprises; for 1903, data are available for excise-paying enterprises. On workers in the mining and metallurgical industries data exist for 1902. The number of railway workers may be determined by reckoning 11 men per verst (information as of January 1, 1904). See *Yearbook of Russia*, 1906, and *Returns for the Mining and Metallurgical Industries*, for 1902.

Summing up these data, we get the following: in the 50 gubernias of European Russia in 1900-1903 there were 1,261,571 factory workers; 477,025 mining workers; 468,941 railway workers. Total, 2,207,537. In the entire Russian Empire there were 1,509,516 factory workers, 626,929 mining workers, 655,929 railway workers. Total, 2,792,374. These figures, too, fully bear out what is said in the text. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

*** N. —on, loc. cit., 326 and others.

the proportion of "factory workers in Russia"* to the population, goes on to say: "In the West, however (!!), the number of workers engaged in manufacturing industry . . ." (is it not obvious to every schoolboy that "factory workers" and "workers engaged in manufacturing industry" are not one and the same thing at all?) . . . "constitute quite a different proportion of the population," namely, from 53% in Britain to 23% in France. "It is not difficult to see that the difference in the proportion of the class of factory workers (!!) there and here is so great that it is out of the question to identify the course of our development with that of Western Europe." And this is written by a professor and specialist in statistics! With extraordinary valour he perpetrates two misrepresentations at one blow: 1) factory workers are replaced by workers engaged in manufacturing industry, and 2) the latter are replaced by the population engaged in manufacturing industry. Let us explain the meaning of these categories to our learned statisticians. In France, according to the census of 1891, the workers engaged in manufacturing industry numbered 3.3 million—less than one-tenth of the population (36.8 million classified according to occupation; and 1.3 million not classified according to occupation). These are workers employed in all industrial establishments and enterprises, and not only factory workers. The population, however, that is engaged in manufacturing industry numbered 9.5 million (about 26% of the total population). Added here to the number of workers are employers, etc. (1 million); then office employees, clerks, etc., 0.2 million; *dependents in household*, 4.8 million; and domestic servants, 0.2 million.** To illustrate the corresponding proportions in Russia, we must take particular centres as our examples, for we have no statistics showing the occupations of the whole population. Let us take one urban and one rural centre. In Petersburg the factory statistics for 1890 gave the number of factory workers as 51,760 (according to the *Directory*), whereas according to the St. Petersburg census of December 15, 1890, the number of persons of both sexes

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* *Lectures on Agricultural Economics*, Moscow, 1897, p. 14.
** *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1897, p. 472.

engaged in manufacturing industry was 341,991, distributed as follows:*

	Number of persons of both sexes		
	Independent (i.e., self-supporting)	Members of families and domestic servants	Total
Employers	13,853	37,109	50,962
Managements staffs (clerks)	2,226	4,574	6,800
Workers	148,111	61,098	209,209
One-man producers	51,514	23,506	75,020
Total	215,704	126,287	341,991

Another example: In Bogorodskoye village, Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia (which, as we have seen, does not engage in agriculture, but constitutes "a single tannery as it were"), there are, according to the *Directory* for 1890, *392 factory workers*, whereas the population engaging in industries, according to the Zemstvo census of 1889, numbers nearly 8,000 (the total population equals 9,241; more than 9/10 of the families engage in industries). Let these figures give food for thought to Messrs. N.—on, Kablukov and Co.!

Addendum to second edition. We now have the returns of the national census of 1897, giving statistics on the occupations of the entire population. Here are the data, summarised by us, for the whole of the Russian Empire** (in millions):

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* *St. Petersburg According to the Census of 1890*. St. Petersburg, 1893. We have taken the total of groups II to XV. The total number of persons engaged in industrial occupations is 551,700, of whom 200,748 are engaged in commerce, carting and innkeeping.—"One-man producers" refers to small producers who employ no workers.

** *General Summary for the Empire of the Results of the Examination of the First General Population Census, January 28, 1897*. Published by the Central Statistical Committee, Vol. II, Table XXI, p. 296. I have arranged the groups of occupations as follows: a) 1, 2 and 4; b) 3 and 5-12; c) 14 and 15; d) 16 and 63-65; e) 46-62; f) 41-45; g) 13; h) 17-21; i) 22-40.

Occupations	Independent	Members of families	Total population
	Both sexes		
a) Government officials and armed forces	1.5	0.7	2.2
b) Clergy and liberal professions	0.7	0.9	1.6
c) Rentiers and pensioners	1.3	0.9	2.2
d) Persons in custody, prostitutes, indefinite, unknown	0.6	0.3	0.9
Total unproductive population	*4.1*	*2.8*	*6.9*
e) Commerce	1.6	3.4	5.0
f) Railways and communication	0.7	1.2	1.9
g) Private service, domestic servants, and day labours	3.4	2.4	5.8
Total semi-productive population	*5.7*	*7.0*	*12.7*
h) Agriculture	18.2	75.5	93.7
i) Industry	5.2	7.1	12.3
Total productive population	*23.4*	*82.6*	*106.0*
Grand total	33.2	92.4	125.6

Needless to say, these data fully confirm what has been said above regarding the absurdity of the Narodnik device of comparing the number of factory workers with the whole population.

It will be interesting, first of all, to group the data on the occupational distribution of the whole population of Russia, in a way that will illustrate the *division of social labour* as the basis of the whole of commodity production and capitalism in Russia. From this point of view, the entire population should be distributed into three large subdivisions: I. Agricultural. II. Commercial and industrial. III. Unproductive (more precisely, not participating in economic activity). Of the nine groups given (*a* to *i*), only one cannot be directly and entirely assigned to any one of these three main subdivisions. That is group *g*: private service, domestic servants and day labourers. This group has to be distributed *approximately* between the commercial-and-industrial and the agricultural population. We have assigned to the former the section of this group which is shown as residing in towns

(2.5 million), and to the latter those residing in rural areas (3.3 million). We then get the following picture of the distribution of the total population of Russia:

Agricultural population of Russia	97.0	million
Commercial and industrial	21.7	"
Unproductive	6.9	"
Total	125.6	million

This picture clearly shows, on the one hand, that commodity circulation and, hence, commodity production are firmly implanted in Russia. Russia is a capitalist country. On the other hand, it follows from this that Russia is still very backward, as compared with other capitalist countries, in her economic development.

To proceed. After the analysis we have made in the present work, the statistics of the occupations of the whole population of Russia can and should be used to determine *approximately* the *main* categories into which the entire population of Russia is divided according to *class* status, i.e., according to their status in the social system of production.

It is possible to determine these categories—only approximately, of course—because we know the main economic groups into which the peasantry are divided. And the entire mass of the agricultural population of Russia may safely be regarded as peasants, for the number of landlords in the sum-total is quite negligible. Quite a considerable section of landlords, moreover, are included in the category of rentiers, government officials, high dignitaries, etc. In the peasant mass of 97 millions, however, one must distinguish three main groups: the bottom group—the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the population; the middle group—the poor small peasant farmers; and the top group—the well-to-do small peasant farmers. We have analysed above the main economic features of these groups as distinct *class* elements. The bottom group is the propertyless population, which earns its livelihood mainly, or half of it, by the *sale of labour-power*. The middle group comprises the poor small peasant farmers, for the middle peasant in

the best of years just barely manages to make ends meet, but the *principal* means of livelihood of this group is "independent" (supposedly independent, of course) *small-scale farming*. Finally, the top group consists of the well-to-do small peasant farmers, who exploit more or less considerable numbers of allotment-holding farm labourers and day labourers and all sorts of wage-labourers in general.

These groups constitute approximately 50%, 30% and 20% respectively of the total. Above we invariably took the share of each group in the total number of households or farms. Now we shall take them as a proportion of the population. This change effects an increase in the bottom group and a decrease in the top one. But this, undoubtedly, is precisely the change that has taken place in Russia in the past decade, as is proved incontrovertibly by the decline in horse-ownership and by the ruin of the peasantry, the growth of poverty and unemployment in the rural districts, etc.

That is to say, among the agricultural population we have about 48.5 million proletarians and semi-proletarians; about 29.1 million poor small peasant farmers and their families, and about 19.4 million of the population on the well-to-do small farms.

Now the question is how to distribute the commercial and industrial and the unproductive population. The latter group contains sections of the population who obviously belong to the big bourgeoisie: all the rentiers ("living on income from capital and real estate"—first subdivision of group 14 in our statistics: 900,000), then part of the bourgeois intelligentsia, the high military and civil officials, etc. Altogether, these will number about 1½ million. At the opposite pole of this group of unproductive population are the lower ranks of the army, navy, gendarmerie and police (about 1.3 million), domestics and numerous servants (about ½ million altogether), nearly ½ million beggars, tramps, etc., etc. Here we can only roughly distribute the groups that most closely approximate to the main economic types: about 2 million will go to the proletarian and semi-proletarian population (partly lumpen-proletarians), about 1.9 million to the poor small proprietors, and about

1.5 million to the well-to-do small proprietors, including the bulk of the clerks, managerial personnel, bourgeois intellectuals, etc.

Lastly, among the commercial and industrial population the largest section is undoubtedly the proletariat, and the gulf is widest between the proletariat and the big bourgeoisie. But the census returns supply no data as to the distribution of this section of the population into employers, one-man producers, workers, etc. We have no alternative but to take as a model the above-quoted data on the industrial population of St. Petersburg, classified according to position in production. On the basis of these data we may roughly assign about 7% to the big bourgeoisie, 10% to the well-to-do petty bourgeoisie, 22% to the poor small proprietors and 61% to the proletariat. In Russia as a whole, small production in industry is, of course, much more tenacious than it is in St. Petersburg, but then we do not assign to the semi-proletarian population the mass of one-man producers and handicraftsmen who work in their homes for masters. Hence, on the whole, the proportions taken will in all probability not differ very much from what they actually are. For the commercial and industrial population we shall then get about 1.5 million big bourgeoisie, about 2.2 million well-to-do, about 4.8 million needy small producers, and about 13.2 million belonging to the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the population.

By combining the agricultural, commercial and industrial, and unproductive sections of the population, we shall get the following approximate distribution of the entire population of Russia according to class status:

	Total population, both sexes		
Big bourgeoisie, landlords, high officials, etc.	about	3.0	million
Well-to-do small proprietors	"	23.1	"
Poor small proprietors	"	35.8	"
Proletarians* and semi-proletarians . .	"	63.7	"
Total	"	125.6	million

* These number not less than 22 million. See further on.

We have no doubt that our Cadet and quasi-Cadet economists and politicians will raise their voices in indignation against this "over-simplified" concept of the economy of Russia. After all, it is so convenient, so advantageous to gloss over the profundity of economic contradictions in a detailed analysis and at the same time to complain of the "crudity" of socialist views on these contradictions *as a whole*. Such criticism of the conclusion we have reached is, of course, without scientific value.

Differences of opinion are, of course, possible about the *degree of approximation* of various figures. It is of interest to note, from this point of view, the work of Mr. Lositsky, *Studies of the Population of Russia Based on the Census of 1897* (*Mir Bozhy*,* 1905, No. 8). The author took the bare census figures of the number of workers and servants, and from these estimated the proletarian population in Russia at 22 million; the peasant and land-owning population at 80 million, employers and clerks in commerce and industry at about 12 million, and the population not engaged in industry at about 12 million.

The number of proletarians according to these figures comes quite close to the figure we have arrived at.** To deny the existence of a vast mass of semi-proletarians among the poor peasants who are dependent upon "employments," among the handicraftsmen, etc., would be to scoff at all the data on the Russian economy. One need but recall the 3¼ million horseless *households* in European Russia alone, the 3.4 million one-horse households, the sum-total of Zemstvo statistics on rented land, "employments," budgets, etc., to abandon all doubt about the huge size of the semi-proletarian population. To agree that the proletarian and semi-proletarian population taken together comprises one-half of the peasantry is probably no understatement and no exaggeration of its numbers. And outside

* *Wide World.—Ed.*

** This is not the place to go into details concerning the statistics on workers and servants used by Mr. Lositsky. These statistics evidently err in very considerably *understating* the number of workers.

of the agricultural population, the proletarians and semi-proletarians undoubtedly constitute a still higher percentage.

Further, if we are not to replace the complete economic picture by petty details, we should include among the well-to-do small proprietors a considerable section of the commercial and industrial managerial personnel, clerks, bourgeois intellectuals, government officials, and so on. Here we have perhaps been too cautious and fixed the number of this group of the population too high: it is quite possible that we-should have put the poor small proprietors at a higher figure and the well-to-do at a lower. But, of course, in making such divisions one does not lay claim to absolute statistical accuracy.

Statistics should illustrate the socio-economic relations established by an all-round analysis, and not be made an end in themselves, as too often happens in our country. To gloss over the large numbers of the petty-bourgeois strata in the population of Russia would be simply to falsify the picture of our real economic situation.

VI. STEAM-ENGINE STATISTICS

The employment of steam-engines in production is one of the most characteristic features of large-scale machine industry. It will be interesting therefore to examine the data available on this subject. For the years 1875-1878 the number of steam-engines is supplied by *Material for the Statistics of Steam-Engines in the Russian Empire* (St. Petersburg, 1882. Published by the Central Statistical Committee).* For 1892 we have the figures of *Collection of Data on Factory Industry*, which cover all factory and mining trades.

Here are these data compared:

* Of the 13 groups of trades we omit, for purposes of comparison with 1892, the following groups: I (agriculture), XII (printing and lithography) and XIII ("plumbing," etc.). Locomobiles are counted with steam-engines.

Number of steam-engines in industry

	1875-1878			1892		
	Steam-boilers	Steam-engines	h. p. capacity	Steam-boilers	Steam-engines	h. p. capacity
European Russia (50 gubernias)	7,224	5,440	98,888	11,272	10,458	256,469
Poland	1,071	787	14,480	2,328	1,978	81,346
Caucasus	115	51	583	514	514	5,283
Siberia and Turkestan	100	75	1,026	134	135	2,111
Total in Empire	8,510	6,353	114,977	14,248	13,085	345,209

In 16 years the total h.p. capacity of steam-engines in Russia increased *threefold* and in European Russia *2½ times*. The number of steam-engines increased to a lesser degree, so that the average capacity per steam-engine rose considerably: in European Russia from 18 h.p. to 24 h.p., and in the Kingdom of Poland from 18 h.p. to 41 h.p. Large-scale machine industry, consequently, developed very rapidly during this period. As regards steam-power capacity, the following gubernias, in 1875-1878, were in the lead: St. Petersburg (17,808 h.p.), Moscow (13,668), Kiev (8,363), Perm (7,348) and Vladimir (5,684)—the total for these five gubernias being 52,871 h.p. or about ⅗ of the total for European Russia. Then follow the Podolsk (5,480), Petrokov (5,071) and Warsaw (4,760) gubernias. In 1892 the order changed: Petrokov (59,063), St. Petersburg (43,961), Ekaterinoslav (27,839), Moscow (24,704), Vladimir (15,857) and Kiev (14,211)—the total for the last five gubernias being 126,572 h.p., or nearly ½ the total for European Russia. Then follow the gubernias of Warsaw (11,310) and Perm (11,245). These figures clearly indicate the formation of two new industrial centres: in Poland and in the South. In Petrokov Gubernia, the total capacity increased 11.6-fold, and in the Ekaterinoslav and Don gubernias taken together,* from 2,834 to 30,932 h.p. or 10.9-fold. These industrial centres, which have grown so rapidly,

* We combine these gubernias because their boundaries have changed since 1878.

have moved up from the bottom to the top places and have supplanted the old industrial centres. Let us observe that these data, too, reveal the particularly rapid growth of the industries producing articles of *productive* consumption, namely, the mining and metallurgical industries. In 1875-78 these industries employed 1,040 steam-engines with a total of 22,966 h.p. (in European Russia) and in 1890 1,960 steam-engines with a total of 74,204 h.p., i.e., an increase in 14 years that exceeds the increase in the total number of steam-engines in industry as a whole in 16 years. The industries producing means of production constitute an ever-growing part of industry as a whole.*

VII. THE GROWTH OF LARGE FACTORIES

The unsatisfactory nature of our factory statistics, as demonstrated above, has compelled us to resort to more complex calculations in order to determine the development of large-scale machine industry in Russia since the Reform. We have selected data for 1866, 1879, 1890 and 1894-95 on the largest factories, namely, those with 100 and more workers per establishment.** Outside workers are strictly separated only in the data of the *List* for 1894-95;

* The progress made in the employment of steam-engines in Russia since 1892 may be seen from the fact that in 1904, according to the factory inspectors' reports, there were in 64 gubernias 27,579 factory steam-boilers; the total, not including those employed in agriculture, was 31,887. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

** Sources: *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I (data only for 71 trades); *Directories*, first and third editions—data for all trades, as well as those in the *List*; but for a comparison of the data in the *List* and in the *Directory*, the manufacture of rails must be omitted from the trades given in the latter establishments for which home workers were included among the factory workers are omitted. In some cases the inclusion of home workers is specifically indicated in footnotes in the publications mentioned; in others the fact emerges from a comparison of the data for different years: cf., for instance, the data on cotton weaving in Saratov Gubernia for 1879, 1890, and 1894-95. (Cf. Chapter VI, § II, 1.)—Sinzheimer (*Ueber die Grenzen der Weiterbildung des fabrikmässigen Grossbetriebes in Deutschland*, Stuttgart, 1893) [*On the Limits of Extension of Large-Scale Factory Production in Germany*, Stuttgart, 1893.—*Ed.*] classifies under large factories enterprises with 50 and more workers. We do not think this standard low, but owing to the difficulties involved in calculating Russian data, we have had to limit ourselves to the largest factories.

Largest factories in European Russia in the years

Groups of factories according to number of workers	1866				1879				1890				1894-95			
	No. of factories		No. of workers	Output (thousand rubles)	No. of factories		No. of workers	Output (thousand rubles)	No. of factories		No. of workers	Output (thousand rubles)	No. of factories		No. of workers	Output (thousand rubles)
	Total	with steam-engines			Total	with steam-engines			Total	with steam-engines			Total	with steam-engines		
A) With 100 to 499 workers	512	204	109,061	99,830	641	354	141,727	201,542	712	455	156,699	186,289				
B) " 500 to 999 workers	90	68	59,867	48,359	130	119	91,887	117,830	140	140	94,305	148,546				
C) " 1,000 and more workers	42	35	62,801	52,877	81	76	156,760	170,533	99	99	213,333	253,130				
*Total**	644	307	231,729	201,066	852	549	390,374	489,905	951	964	464,337	587,965				
A) With 100 to 499 workers					981	534	219,735	289,006	1,133	769	252,656	355,258				
B) " 500 to 999 workers					166	145	115,586	142,648	183	183	121,553	190,265				
C) " 1,000 and more workers					91	83	174,322	198,272	115	115	248,937	313,065				
*Total***					1,238	762	509,643	629,926	1,431	1,067	623,146	858,588				
A) With 100 to 499 workers					979	532	219,436	288,759	1,131	767	252,063	352,526	1,136	935	252,676	374,444
B) " 500 to 999 workers					164	144	113,936	140,791	182	182	120,936	186,115	215	212	143,453	229,363
C) " 1,000 and more workers					86	78	163,044	177,537	108	108	226,207	276,512	117	117	259,541	351,426
*Total****					1,229	754	496,416	607,087	1,421	1,057	599,206	815,153	1,468	1,264	655,670	955,233

* Data for 1866, 1879, 1890 cover 71 trades for which information is available for 1866.
** Data for 1879 and 1890 cover all trades, both excise-paying and non-excise-paying.
*** Data for 1879, 1890, 1894-95 cover all trades except rail (steel) production.

hence, the data for previous years (particularly 1866 and 1879) may still be somewhat exaggerated, notwithstanding the corrections referred to in the footnote.

We give the returns on these largest factories (p. 510).

Let us commence our analysis of this table with the data for the years 1866, 1879 and 1890. The total number of large factories changed during these years as follows: 644, 852, 951, or in percentages: 100, 132, 147. In the course of 24 years the number of large factories increased, consequently, by nearly fifty per cent. Moreover, if we take the data for the different categories of large factories, we shall see that the larger the factories, the faster their number grows (A: 512, 641, 712 factories; B: 90, 130, 140; C: 42, 81, 99). This indicates a growing concentration of production.

The number of mechanised establishments grows more rapidly than the total number of factories; in percentages as follows: 100, 178, 226. An increasing number of large factories introduce steam-engines. The larger the factories, the greater the number of mechanised establishments among them; if we calculate the percentage of these establishments to the total number of factories in the given category, we obtain the following: A) 39%, 53%, 63%; B) 75%, 91%, 100%; C) 83%, 94%, 100%. The employment of steam-engines is closely bound up with the expansion of the volume of output, with the expansion of co-operation in production.

The number of workers in all large factories changed in percentages as follows: 100, 168, 200. During the 24 years the number of workers doubled, i.e., exceeded the increase in the total number of "factory workers." The average number of workers per large factory was by years: 359, 458, 488, and by categories: A) 213, 221, 220; B) 665, 706, 673; C) 1,495, 1,935, 2,154. An increasing number of workers are thus being concentrated in the largest factories. In 1866, factories with 1,000 workers and over employed 27% of the total number of workers in large factories; in 1879, 40%; in 1890, 46%.

The change in the output of all large factories expressed in percentages will be: 100, 243, 292; and by categories: A) 100, 201, 187; B) 100, 245, 308; C) 100, 323, 479. Hence, the volume of output of all large factories increased almost threefold, and the larger the factory, the more rapid the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

increase. But if we compare the productivity of labour for each separate year according to the different categories, we shall get a somewhat different picture. The average output per worker in all large factories will be: 866 rubles, 1,250, 1,260; and by categories: A) 901, 1,410, 1,191; B) 800, 1,282, 1,574; C) 841, 1,082, 1,188. Thus, for each separate year we observe no increase in output (per worker) as we pass from the bottom category to the top. This is because the various categories include, in unequal proportions, factories in industries using raw materials of different value and obtaining, therefore, an annual output per worker of different value.*

We do not think it worth while to examine in equal detail the data for the years 1879-1890 and for the years 1879-1890-1894-1895, since this would mean repeating all that has been said above for somewhat different percentages.

Latterly, the *Collection of Factory Inspectors' Reports* has supplied data on the distribution of factories and works into groups according to the number of workers employed. Here are the data for 1903:

Groups of establishments	In 64 gubernias of Russia		In 50 gubernias of European Russia[154]	
	No. of establishments	No. of workers	No. of establishments	No. of workers
Under 20 workers	5,749	63,652	4,533	51,728
21 to 50 "	5,064	158,602	4,253	134,194
51 to 100 "	2,271	156,789	1,897	130,642
101 to 500 "	2,095	463,366	1,755	383,000
501 to 1,000 "	404	276,486	349	240,440
Over 1,000 "	238	521,511	210	457,534
Total	15,821	1,640,406	12,997	1,397,538

A comparison of these with the afore-cited data will involve a certain inaccuracy, a slight one, it is true. At all events, they show that the number of large factories (those with over 99 or over 100 workers) and the number of workers employed in them are rapidly increasing. The concentration of workers and, consequently, of production, also increases in the largest of these large factories.

Comparing the data on the large factories with those on all "factories and works" given in our of official statistics,

* Thus, in 1866, category A included 17 sugar-refineries, where the average annual output per worker was about 6,000 rubles, whereas in the textile factories (included in the top categories) the average annual output per worker ranged from 500 to 1,500 rubles.

100 — 201 — 187; B) 100 — 245 — 308; C) 100 — 320 — 477. Слѣд., сумма производства всѣхъ крупныхъ фабрикъ возрасла почти втрое, причемъ чѣмъ крупнѣе фабрики, тѣмъ быстрѣе шло это возрастаніе. Но если мы сравнимъ производительность труда за каждый отдѣльный годъ по различнымъ разрядамъ, то увидимъ нѣсколько иное. Средняя величина суммы производства, приходящаяся на одного рабочаго во всѣхъ крупныхъ фабрикахъ, будетъ: 866 руб.—1.250—1.260, а по разрядамъ: A) 901—1.410—1.191; B) 800—1.282—1.574; C) 841—1.082—1.188. Слѣд., за каждый отдѣльный годъ не наблюдается повышенія суммы производства (приходящейся на одного рабочаго) отъ низшаго разряда къ высшему. Происходитъ это отъ того, что въ разные разряды попадаютъ въ неравномъ отношеніи фабрики разныхъ производствъ, отличающихся различной стоимостью сырого матеріала, а, слѣдовательно, и различной величиной годового производства на одного рабочаго *).

Разбирать столь же подробно данныя за 1879—1890 гг. и за 1879—1890—1894—5 гг. мы находимъ лишнимъ, такъ какъ это значило бы повторять по поводу нѣсколько иныхъ процентныхъ отношеній все сказанное выше.

Въ послѣднее время въ „Сводѣ отчетовъ фабричныхъ инспекторовъ" приводятся данныя о распредѣленіи фабрикъ и заводовъ на группы по числу рабочихъ. Вотъ эти данныя за 1903-й годъ:

	Группы ф.-з. заведеній.	Въ 64 губ. Россіи. Число заведеній.	Число рабочихъ.	Въ 50 губ. Евр. Росс. Число заведеній.	Число рабочихъ.
5.701 — 63.357	Менѣе 20 рабоч.	5.749	63.652	4.533	51.729
4.559 — 152.803	21—50 »	5.064	158.062	4.253	134.194
2.112 — 150.913	51—100 »	2.271	156.789	1.897	130.642
2.159 — 496.329	101—500 »	2.095	463.366	1.755	383.000
633 — 280.639	501—1000 »	404	276.486	349	240.440
299 — 683.291	Свыше 1000 »	238	521.511	210	457.534
14.985 — 1.848.109	Всего . . .	15.821	1.640.406	12.997	1.397.538

Данныя эти могутъ быть сравниваемы съ вышеприведенными лишь при допущеніи нѣкоторой невѣрности, правда, ничтожной. Во всякомъ случаѣ эти данныя показываютъ, что число крупныхъ

*) Напр., за 1866 г. въ разрядъ *A* вошло 17 сахарорафинадныхъ заводовъ, въ которыхъ на 1 рабочаго приходится около 6 тыс. руб. годового производства, тогда какъ на текстильныхъ фабрикахъ (вошедшихъ въ высшіе разряды) приходится 500—1.500 р. годового производства на одного рабочаго.

1908 — 2.901 - 1.440.853

1903 — 2.737 - 1.261.163

Page 405 of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1908 edition) with V. I. Lenin's notes

(*Reduced*)

we see that in 1879 the large factories, constituting 4.4% of all "factories and works" concentrated 66.8% of the total number of factory workers and 54.8% of the total output. In 1890 they constituted 6.7% of the total number of "factories and works," and concentrated 71.1% of all factory workers and 57.2% of the total output. In 1894-95 they constituted 10.1% of all "factories and works," and concentrated 74% of all factory workers and 70.8% of the total output. In 1903, the large factories in European Russia, those with over 100 workers, constituted 17% of the total number of factories and works and concentrated 76.6% of the total number of factory workers.* Thus, the large, mostly steam-powered, factories, despite their small numbers, concentrate an overwhelming and ever-growing proportion of the workers and output of all "factories and works." The tremendous rapidity with which these large factories have been growing in the post-Reform period has already been noted. Let us now cite data on the equally large enterprises in the mining industry.**

Largest industrial enterprises in European Russia in 1890

Groups of factories, works, mines, pits, etc., according to number of workers	In the mining industry			In factory and mining industries		
	No. of enterprises		No. of workers	No. of enterprises		No. of workers
	Total	Employing steam power		Total	Employing steam power	
A) From 100 to 499 workers	236	89	58,249	1,369	858	310,906
B) " 500 to 999 workers	73	38	50,607	256	221	172,160
C) " 1000 workers and more	71	49	149,098	186	164	398,035
Total	380	176	257,954	1,810	1,243	881,101

* The total figures for our factory industry as given by the *Directory* and the *List* were quoted above, in § II [Cf. *Studies*, p. 276 (See present edition, Vol. 4 "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics."—*Ed.*)]. We would point out that the rise in the percentage of large factories in the total number of "factories and works" indicates above all that this latter term is gradually acquiring a more restricted meaning in our statistics.

** These data have been compiled from *Statistical Returns for*

In the mining industry the concentration of workers in large enterprises is still greater (although the percentage of enterprises employing steam-engines is smaller); 258,000 workers out of 305,000, i.e., 84.5%, are concentrated in enterprises with 100 and more workers; almost half of the mine workers (145,000 out of 305,000) are employed in a few very large establishments each employing 1,000 and more workers. And of the total number of factory and mining workers in European Russia (1,180,000 in 1890), *three-fourths* (74.6%) are concentrated in enterprises employing 100 workers and over; nearly half (570,000 out of 1,180,000) are concentrated in enterprises each employing 500 and more workers.*

We think it worth while to deal here with the question raised by Mr. N. —on concerning a "slowing down" of the development of capitalism and of the growth of the "factory population" in the period of 1880-1890, as compared with that of 1865-1880.** From this remarkable discovery Mr. N. —on contrived, thanks to the original logic that distinguishes him, to draw the conclusion that "the facts fully confirm" the assertion made in *Sketches* that "capitalism, after reaching certain limits of its development, effects a shrinkage of its own home market."—Firstly, it is absurd to argue that a "slowing down in the rate of increase" indi-

the Mining and Metallurgical Industries in 1890, enterprises enumerated in the *Directory* having been excluded. By this exclusion, the total number of mining workers in European Russia is reduced by 35,000 (340,000-35,000=305,000).

* The industrial census for 1895 for the *whole* of German industry, including mine development, which is not registered in Russia, recorded a total of 248 establishments with 1,000 and more workers; the aggregate number of workers in these establishments was 430,286. Hence, the largest factories in Russia are larger than those in Germany.

** *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 6, p. 101 and foll. The data for large factories which we have given above also indicate a lower percentage of growth in 1879-1890 as compared with 1866-1879.

cates a shrinkage of the home market. If the number of factory workers is growing faster than the population (and this is precisely the case according to Mr. N.—on's own data; an increase between 1880 and 1890 of 25%), this shows that the population is being diverted from agriculture and that the home market is growing even for articles of personal consumption. (We say nothing of the market for means of production.) Secondly, a "decline in the growth," expressed in percentages always has to take place in a capitalist country at a certain stage of development, for small magnitudes always grow faster, in percentages, than big ones. The only deduction one can draw from the fact that the initial steps in the development of capitalism are particularly rapid is that the young country is striving to overtake the older ones. It is wrong, however, to take the percentage increase in the initial period as a standard for subsequent periods. Thirdly, *the fact itself of a "decline in the growth" is not proved at all by comparing the periods taken by Mr. N.—on*. The development of capitalist industry cannot proceed except in cycles; therefore, to compare different periods, one must take data for a whole number of years,* so that the particularly prosperous, boom years and the slump years may stand out distinctly. Mr. N.—on did not do this and slipped into profound error, for he overlooked the fact that the year 1880 was a high boom year. Moreover, Mr. N.—on did not even hesitate to "concoct" the opposite assertion. "We must also note," he argues, "that the intervening year (between 1865 and 1890) of 1880 was a year of crop failure, so that the number of workers registered in that year was below the normal"!! (ibid., pp. 103-104). Mr. N.—on had only to glance at the text of the very publication from which he plucked the figures for 1880 (*Directory*, 3rd edition), to read there that 1880 was marked by a "spurt" in industry, particularly in leather and machine building (p. IV), and that this was due to the enhanced demand for goods after the war and to increased government orders. It is sufficient to look through the

* As Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky, for example, did in his *Factory*, p. 307 and chart. The chart clearly shows that 1879, and especially 1880 and 1881, were years of particular boom.

Directory for 1879 to get a clear idea of the extent of this spurt.* But Mr. N.—on does not hesitate completely to distort the facts to suit his romantic theory.

VIII. THE DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY

Besides the concentration of production in very large establishments, the concentration of production in separate factory industrial centres and the different types of factory centres are also important in characterising large-scale machine industry. Unfortunately, our factory statistics not only supply unsatisfactory and incomparable material, but arrange it in a far from adequate manner. For example, in contemporary publications the distribution of industry is shown only by gubernias (and not by towns and uyezds as was done in the best publications of the 60s, which, in addition, illustrated the distribution of factory industry with maps). But in order to present an accurate picture of the distribution of large-scale industry, the data must be taken for separate centres, i.e., for separate towns, industrial settlements, or groups of industrial settlements situated close together; gubernias or uyezds are too big as territorial units.** In view of this, we thought it

* See, for instance, felt cloth production—increased output of army cloth; tanning—enormous activity, leather goods—a large factory produces goods to the amount of 2.5 million rubles "for the War Department" (p. 288). The Izhevsk and the Sestroretsk works turn out artillery supplies to the value of 7½ million rubles, as against 1¼ million rubles in 1890. In copper-working one notes the production of supplies for the troops and of military instruments pp. 388-389); explosive factories work at full capacity, etc.

** "... In the uyezds (of Moscow Gubernia) the factories and works are far from evenly distributed: in highly industrialised uyezds, side by side with localities which, because of the more or less considerable concentration there of factory establishments, can be called real factory centres, one comes across entire volosts almost wholly devoid of factory industry; and, on the contrary, in uyezds generally poor in factories and works, there are districts with a more or less considerable development of one industry or another; side by side with handicraft cottages and workrooms larger establishments have arisen possessing all the attributes of large-scale production." (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Section of sanitation Statistics, vol. IV, Sec. 1, Moscow, 1890, p. 141.) This publication, the

advisable to compute from the *Directory* for 1879 and 1890 data on the concentration of our factory industry in the most important centres. The table given in the appendix (Appendix III) contains data for 103 factory centres in European Russia, centres in which about half the total number of factory workers are concentrated.*

The table shows three main types of factory centres in Russia. 1) The towns. These take first place, being distinguished for the greatest concentration of both workers and establishments. Particularly outstanding in this respect are the large towns. In each of the metropolitan cities (including the suburbs) about 70,000 factory workers are concentrated; Riga has 16,000, Ivanovo-Voznesensk 15,000 and Bogorodsk had 10,000 in 1890; the other towns have fewer than 10,000 each. It is sufficient to take a cursory glance at the official figures on factory workers in several large cities (Odessa—8,600 in 1890, Kiev—6,000, Rostov-on-Don—5,700, etc.) to be convinced that these figures are ridiculously low. The instance of St. Petersburg given above shows how many times these figures would have to be multiplied for the correct number of industrial workers in these centres to be obtained. In addition to the towns, the suburbs must also be indicated. The suburbs of large towns are very often big industrial centres, but from the data we possess we have been able to separate only one such centre, the suburbs of St. Petersburg, where in 1890 the number of workers was 18,900. Several of the settlements in the Moscow Uyezd included in our table are also actually suburbs.**

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best in contemporary factory statistical literature, illustrates the distribution of large-scale industry with the aid of a detailed map. The only thing lacking for a complete picture of the distribution of factory industry is a classification of centres according to the number of factories, workers and total output.

* The table includes only establishments with a minimum output of 2,000 rubles, and of the flour-mills only the steam-powered ones. Outside workers are excluded wherever it has been stated that they are included among factory workers; such exclusions are indicated by an asterisk (*). The industrial boom of 1879 could not but affect these data, too.

** "... The large village of Cherkizovo in the vicinity of Moscow is, according to the local inhabitants, one large factory, and is a con-

The second type of centre is the factory villages, which are particularly numerous in the Moscow, Vladimir and Kostroma gubernias (of the 63 most important rural centres included in our table, 42 are in these gubernias). These centres are headed by the township of Orekhovo-Zuyevo (in the table, Orekhovo and Zuyevo are given separately, but they are actually one centre); as to the number of workers, it comes second only to the capitals (26,800 in 1890).* In the three gubernias indicated, as also in the Yaroslavl and Tver gubernias, the majority of the rural factory centres are formed by huge textile mills (cotton-spinning and weaving, linen, wool-weaving, etc.). Formerly, there were almost always work-distributing offices in such villages, i.e., centres of capitalist manufacture, which held sway over masses of neighbouring hand weavers. In those cases where the statistics do not confuse home workers with factory workers, the data on the development of such centres clearly reveal the growth of large-scale machine industry which attracts thousands of peasants from the surrounding areas and transforms them into factory workers. Further, a considerable number of rural factory centres are formed by large mining and metallurgical plants (Kolomna Works in the village of Bobrovo, Yuzovka Works, Bryansk Works, and others); the majority of these are classified under mining, and for that reason were not included in our table. The beet-sugar refineries situated in the villages and townships of the south-western gubernias also form quite a number of village factory centres; for our example we have taken one of the largest, the township of Smela, in Kiev Gubernia.

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tinuation of Moscow in the literal sense of the word.... Nearby, beyond the Semyonovskaya Tollgate ... again a large number of diverse factories are clustered.... At no great distance from here we see the village of Izmailovo, with its weaving sheds, and the enormous Izmailovo Textile Mill." That is to the north of Moscow. To the south, "beyond the Serpukhov Tollgate, what we meet first is the immense Danilov Textile Mill, in itself a whole township.... Further on, at no great distance from each other, are a whole ring of large brick-works," etc. (*Statistical Returns*, IV, Sec. I, pp. 143-144). Thus, the concentration of factory industry is actually more considerable than we were able to indicate in our table.

* In 1879, only 10,900 were recorded here. Evidently, different methods of registration were employed.

The third type of factory centre is the "handicraft" villages, the largest establishments in which are often classified as "factories and works." In our table, the villages of Pavlovo, Vorsma, Bogorodskoye and Dubovka serve as examples of such centres. A comparison between the number of factory workers in such centres and the total of their industrial population was made above in the case of Bogorodskoye village.

If we group the centres given in our table according to number of workers in each centre and according to the type of centre (town or village), we get the following data (see next page).

The table shows that in 1879 there were 356,000 workers (out of a total of 752,000) concentrated in these 103 centres, while in 1890 there were 451,000 (out of 876,000). Accordingly, the number of workers increased by 26.8%, whereas in the large factories in general (of 100 and more workers) the increase was only 22.2%, while the total number of workers increased over this period by only 16.5%. Thus the workers are being concentrated in the largest centres. In 1879, only 11 centres had over 5,000 workers; in 1890 there were 21. Particularly striking is the increase in the number of centres with from 5,000 to 10,000 workers. This occurred for two reasons: 1) because of the exceptional growth of factory industry in the South (Odessa, Rostov-on-Don, etc.); and 2) because of the growth of the factory villages in the central gubernias

A comparison between the urban and the rural centres shows that in 1890 the latter embraced *about one-third* of the total number of workers in the leading centres (152,000 out of 451,000). For the whole of Russia this proportion should be higher, i.e., more than one-third of the factory workers must be outside of the towns. Indeed, all the outstanding urban centres are included in our table, whereas rural centres with several hundred workers each, apart from those we have mentioned, exist in exceedingly large numbers (settlements with glass-works, brickworks, distilleries, beet-sugar refineries, etc.). Mining workers are also to be found mainly outside of towns. One may consider, therefore, that of the total number of factory and mining workers in European Russia not less (and maybe more) than half are to

Leading centres of factory industry in European Russia

Categories of centres according to number of workers and to type of centres	1879						1890					
	No. of centres			No. of factories and works	Output (thousand rubles)	No. of workers	No. of centres			No. of factories and works	Output (thousand rubles)	No. of workers
	In towns	In settlements	Total				In towns	In settlements	Total			
Centers with 10,000 workers and more .	4	1	5	1,393	279,398	158,670	6	1	7	1,644	361,371	206,862
Centers with 5,000 to 10,000 workers . . .	6	—	6	148	65,974	49,340	10	4	14	931	151,029	90,229
Centers with 1,000 to 5,000 workers . . .	22	37	59	1,029	174,171	133,712	17	48	65	804	186,422	144,255
Total centres with 1,000 workers and more	32	38	70	2,570	519,543	431,722	33	53	86	3,379	698,822	441,346
Centres with under 1,000 workers . . .	8	20	28	260	17,144	14,055	6	10	16	259	8,159	9,898
Centres with no workers workers	—	5	5	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—
Total . . .	40	63	103	2,831	536,687	355,777	40	63	103	3,638	706,981	451,244
Towns (and outskirts) .	40	—	40	2,574	421,310	257,181	40	—	40	3,327	535,085	298,651
Settlements (suburbs and townships) . . .	—	63	63	257	115,377	98,596	—	63	63	311	171,896	152,593

be found outside of towns. This conclusion is very important, for it shows that the industrial population in Russia greatly exceeds the urban population.*

If we now turn to the pace at which factory industry develops in urban and in rural centres, we see that it is undoubtedly faster in the latter. The number of urban centres with 1,000 workers and over in the period taken grew very slightly (from 32 to 33), while the number of rural centres in this category grew very considerably (from 38 to 53). The number of workers in the 40 urban centres grew by only 16.1 % (from 257,000 to 299,000), while in the 63 rural centres it grew by 54.7% (from 98,500 to 152,500). The average number of workers per urban centre rose only from 6,400 to 7,500, whereas the average number per rural centre rose from 1,500 to 2,400. Thus, factory industry evidently tends to spread with particular rapidity outside the towns, to create new factory centres and to push them forward faster than the urban centres, and to penetrate deep into remote rural areas that would seem to be isolated from the world of big capitalist enterprises. This supremely important circumstance shows us, firstly, the rapidity with which large-scale machine industry transforms social and economic relationships. What formerly took ages to take shape now springs up in a decade or so. We have only to compare, for instance, the formation of such non-agricultural centres as the "handicraft villages" indicated in the previous chapter—Bogorodskoye, Pavlovo, Kimry, Khoteichi, Velikoye and others—with the process of the establishment of new centres by the modern factory, which at once draws the rural population by the thousands into industrial settlements.** Social division of labour

* The population census of January 28, 1897, fully confirmed this conclusion. The urban population throughout the Empire was given as 16,828,395 persons of both sexes. The commercial and industrial population, as we showed above, is 21.7 millions. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

** "In the township of Krivoi Rog the population grew between 1887 and 1896 from 6,000 to 17,000, at the Kamenka Works of the Dnieper Company—from 2,000 to 18,000; near Druzhkovka station, where as late as 1892 there was nothing but station buildings, there is now a settlement of 6,000 people; at the Gdantsevka Works there

receives a tremendous impetus. Mobility of the population replaces the former immobility and isolation as a necessary condition of economic life. Secondly, the transfer of factories into the rural districts shows that capitalism is surmounting the obstacles which the social-estate seclusion of the peasant community creates for it, and is even deriving benefit from this seclusion. While the erection of factories in the countryside involves quite a few inconveniences, it does, however, guarantee a supply of cheap labour. The muzhik is not allowed to go to the factory, so the factory goes to the muzhik.* The muzhik lacks complete freedom (thanks to the collective-responsibility system and the obstacles to his leaving the community) to seek the employer who gives the greatest advantage; but the employer has a perfect way of seeking out the cheapest worker. Thirdly, the large number of rural factory centres and their rapid growth proves groundless the opinion that the Russian factory is isolated from the mass of the peasantry, that it exercises little influence over them. The specific char-

are nearly 3,500 people; near Konstantinovka station, where a number of works have been erected, a new settlement is being formed; Yuzovka is now a town with a population of 29,000.... On the sandy wasteland at Nizhne-Dnieprovsk, near Ekaterinoslav, where a number of factories are now situated, a new settlement has sprung up with a population of 6,000. The works at Mariupol has attracted a new population of 10,000, etc. Populated centres are springing up around the coal mines" (*Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 50). According to the *Russkiye Vedomosti* (November 21, 1897, No. 322), the Bakhmut Uyezd Zemstvo Assembly has filed an application for the status of townships to be granted to commercial settlements with a population of 1,000 and the status of towns to those with a population of 5,000.... "There is to be observed here ... an unparalleled growth of commercial and factory settlements.... Altogether, there are by now as many as thirty settlements, which have been springing up and growing at a truly American pace.... In Volyntsevo, where a huge metallurgical works with 2 blast furnaces, a foundry and a rolling mill is nearing completion and will be started in the beginning of November, there is a population of from 5,000 to 6,000, which has settled on what only recently was almost uninhabited steppe. With the influx of a factory population we also observe an influx of traders, handicraftsmen and small industrialists in general, who anticipate an easy and rapid sale to the working population of all kinds of goods."

* "The factory seeks cheap weavers, and finds them in their native villages.... The factory must follow the weaver...." (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 63.)

acter of the distribution of our factory industry shows, on the contrary, that its influence is very widespread, and that it is far from being confined to the walls of the factory.* On the other hand, however, this specific character of the distribution of our factory industry cannot but result in a temporary retardation of the transforming influence of large-scale machine industry on the population it employs. By converting the backwoodsman-muzhik into a factory worker *at one stroke*, the factory may for a time ensure for itself a supply of the cheapest, least developed and least exacting "hands." It is obvious, however, that such retardation cannot go on for long, and that it is purchased at the price of a still greater expansion of the area subjected to the influence of large-scale machine industry.

IX. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LUMBER AND BUILDING INDUSTRIES

One of the necessary conditions for the growth of large-scale machine industry (and a highly characteristic concomitant of its advance) is the development of the industry for the supply of fuel and building materials, as well as of the building industry. Let us begin with the lumber industry.

The felling and preliminary dressing of trees for their own needs has been an occupation of the peasantry from time immemorial, one that nearly everywhere forms part of the tiller's round of work. By the lumber industry, however, we mean exclusively the preparation of lumber *for sale*. Characteristic of the post-Reform period is a particularly rapid growth of this industry, the demand for timber having grown rapidly both for personal consumption (the growth of towns, the increase of the non-agricultural population in the villages, and the loss of woodland by the peasants upon their emancipation) and, particularly, for

* Let us recall the fact cited above (Chapter III, § IV, p. 208, footnote) of the influence exerted by the mining industry in Bakhmut Uyezd, Ekaterinoslav Gubernia, on the local agricultural system.—Characteristic also are the common complaints of landowners about the factories "spoiling" the population.

productive consumption. The development of commerce, industry, urban life, military requirements, railroads, etc., etc., has led to an enormous increase in the demand for timber to be used, not by human beings, but by capital. In the industrial gubernias, for instance, the price of wood fuel has risen "by leaps and bounds": "in the last five years (up to 1881) the price of wood fuel has more than doubled".* "The price of timber has begun to rise enormously."** In Kostroma Gubernia "with the huge consumption of wood fuel by the factories the price has doubled in the past seven years,"*** etc. Timber exports rose from 5,947,000 rubles in 1856 to 30,153,000 rubles in 1881 and 39,200,000 rubles in 1894, i.e., in the ratio 100: 507: 659.**** The amount of building timber and wood fuel transported along the inland waterways of European Russia in 1866-1868 averaged 156 million poods per year(*) and in 1888-1890, 701 million poods per year,(**) i.e., there was a more than fourfold increase. The amount transported by railway in 1888-1890 averaged 290 million poods,(***) whereas in 1866-1868 it was probably no more than 70 million poods.(****) That is to say, total timber freights in the 60s amounted to about 226 million poods, and in 1888-1890 to 991 million poods—a more than fourfold increase. The vast growth of the lumber industry in precisely the post-Reform period is thus beyond doubt.

How is this industry organised? On purely capitalist lines. Forestland is bought from landowners by entrepreneurs—"lumber industrialists," who hire workers to fell and saw the timber, to float it, etc. In Moscow Gubernia,

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* *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, I, 61.

** Ibid., IV, 80.

*** Zhbankov, *The Influence of Industries Employing Migratory Workers on the Movement of the Population*, Kostroma, 1887, p. 25.

**** *Productive Forces*. Russia's Foreign Trade, p. 39. Timber exports in 1902—55.7 million rubles; in 1903—66.3 million rubles. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

(*) *Military Statistical Abstract*, pp. 486-487.

(**) *Statistical Survey of Railways and Inland Waterways*, St. Petersburg, 1893 (published by Ministry of Communications), p. 40.

(***) Ibid., p. 26.

(****) Assuming that it amounted approximately to 1/5, of total railway freights (*Military Statistical Abstract*, p. 511; cf. 518-519).

for example, the Zemstvo statisticians listed only 337 lumber industrialists out of 24,000 peasants engaged in lumber industries.* In Slobodskoi Uyezd, Vyatka Gubernia, 123 lumber industrialists were listed ("the small ones are mostly subcontractors of the big ones," of whom there were only 10), while the number of workers engaged in lumbering was 18,865, with average earnings of 19½ rubles per worker.** Mr. S. Korolenko calculated that in the whole of European Russia as many as 2 million peasants were engaged in lumbering,*** and this figure is hardly an exaggeration if, for instance, in 9 uyezds of Vyatka Gubernia (out of 11) about 56,430 lumber workers were listed, and in the whole of Kostroma Gubernia, about 47,000.**** Lumbering is one of the worst paid occupations; the sanitary conditions are atrocious, and the workers' health is severely affected. Left to toil in the remote forest depths, these workers are in a totally defenceless position, and in this branch of industry bondage, the truck system, and such-like concomitants of the "patriarchal" peasant industries prevail. In confirmation of this description, let us quote some opinions of local investigators. Moscow statisticians mention the "compulsory purchase of provisions," which usually reduces to a marked degree the lumber workers' earnings. The Kostroma lumbermen "live in teams in the forests, in hastily and badly erected shanties, where there are no stoves, and which are heated by open hearths. Bad food, consisting of bad soup and of bread which is like stone by the end of the week, fetid air . . . constantly damp clothes . . . all this is bound to have a disastrous effect upon the health of the lumber industrialists." The people live in "much dirtier" conditions in the "lumber" volosts than in the industrial volosts (i.e., the volosts in which outside employment predominates).(*)

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* *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. I, Sec. 2. Frequently in this country no distinction is made in lumbering between masters and workers, the latter also being described as lumber industrialists.

** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, XI, 397.

*** *Hired Labour*.

**** Calculated from *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*.

(*) Loc. cit., pp. 19-20 and 39. Cf. a quite analogous opinion in *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, XII, 265.

Regarding Tikhvin Uyezd, Novgorod Gubernia, we read: "Agriculture . . . constitutes an auxiliary source of income, although in all official statistics you will find that the people engage in farming. . . . All that the peasant gets to meet his essential needs is earned in felling and floating lumber for the lumber industrialists. But a crisis will set in soon: in some five or ten years, no forests will be left. . . ." "The men who work in the lumber camps are more like boatmen[155]; they spend the winter in the forest-encircled lumber camps . . . and in the spring, having lost the habit of working at home, are drawn to the work of lumber floating; harvesting and haymaking alone make them return to their homes. . . ." The peasants are in "perpetual bondage" to the lumber industrialists.* Vyatka investigators note that the hiring season for lumbering is usually arranged to coincide with tax-paying time, and that the purchase of provisions from the employer greatly reduces earnings. . . . "Both the tree-fellers and the wood-choppers receive about 17 kopeks per summer day, and about 33 kopeks per day when they work with their own horses. . . . This paltry pay is an inadequate remuneration for labour, if we bear in mind the extremely insanitary conditions under which it is done,"** etc., etc.

Thus, the lumber workers constitute one of the big sections of the rural proletariat; they have tiny plots of land and are compelled to sell their labour-power on the most disadvantageous terms. The occupation is extremely irregular and casual. The lumbermen, therefore, represent that form of the reserve army (or relative surplus-population in

* *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, VIII, pp. 1372-1373, 1474. "Thanks to the requirements of the lumber industry there have developed in Tikhvin Uyezd the blacksmith, tanning, fur and partly the boot trades; the first makes boat-hooks, and the others boots, sheepskin coats and mittens." Incidentally, we see here an example of how the making of means of production (i.e., the growth of Department I in capitalist economy) gives an impetus to the making of articles of consumption (i.e., Department II). It is not production that follows consumption, but consumption that follows production.

** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, XI, pp. 399-400, 405, 147. Cf. the numerous references in the Zemstvo Returns for Trubchevsk Uyezd, Orel Gubernia, to the fact that "agriculture is of secondary importance," and that the principal part is played by industries, particularly lumbering (*Statistical Returns for Trubchevsk Uyezd*, Orel, 1887, particularly remarks on villages).

capitalist society) which theory describes as *latent**; a certain (and, as we have seen, quite large) section of the rural population must always be ready to undertake such work, must always be in need of it. That is a condition for the existence and development of capitalism. To the extent that the forests are destroyed by the rapacious methods of the lumber industrialists (which proceeds with tremendous rapidity), an ever-growing need is felt for replacing wood by coal, and the coal industry, which alone is capable of serving as a firm basis for large-scale machine industry, develops at an ever faster rate. Cheap fuel, obtainable at any time and in any quantity, at a definite and little fluctuating price—such is the demand of the modern factory. The lumber industry is not in a position to meet this demand.** That is why its predominance over the coal industry as a source of fuel supply corresponds to a low level of capitalist development. As for the social relations of production, in this respect the lumber industry is to the coal industry approximately what capitalist manufacture is to large-scale machine industry. The lumber industry means a technique of the most elementary kind, the exploitation of natural resources by primitive methods; the coal industry leads to a complete technical revolution and to the extensive use of machinery. The lumber industry leaves the producer a peasant; the coal industry transforms him into a factory hand. The lumber industry leaves all the old, patriarchal way of life practically intact, enmeshing in the worst forms of bondage the workers left to toil in the remote forest depths and taking advantage of their ignorance, defencelessness and isolation. The coal industry creates mobility of the population, establishes large industrial centres and inevitably leads to the introduction of public control over

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* *Das Kapital*, I², S. 668.[156]

** Here is an illustration of this taken from the *Report of the Members of the Commission of Inquiry into Factory Industry in the Kingdom of Poland* (St. Petersburg, 1888, Pt. I). Coal in Poland costs half the Moscow price. The average expense of fuel per pood of yarn in Poland is 16 to 37 kopeks, and in the Moscow area—50 to 73 kopeks. In the Moscow area fuel is stocked for 12 to 20 months, in Poland for not more than 3 months, and in most cases for 1 to 4 weeks.

production. In a word, the change-over described is of the same progressive significance as the replacement of the manufactory by the factory.*

Building was originally also part of the peasant's round of domestic occupations, and it continues to be so to this day wherever semi-natural peasant economy is preserved. Subsequent development leads to the building workers' turning into specialist *artisans*, who work to customers' orders. In the villages and small towns the building industry is largely organised on these lines even today; the artisan usually maintains his connection with the land and works for a very narrow circle of small clients. With the development of capitalism, the retention of this system of industry becomes impossible. The growth of trade, factories, towns and railways creates a demand for types of buildings that are architecturally and dimensionally different from the old buildings of the patriarchal epoch. The new buildings require very diverse and costly materials, the co-operation of masses of workers of the most varied specialities and a considerable length of time for their completion; the distribution of these new buildings does not correspond at all to the traditional distribution of the population; they are erected in large towns or suburbs, in uninhabited places, along railways in process of construction, etc. The local artisan turns into a migratory worker and is hired by an entrepreneur *contractor*, who gradually thrusts himself in between

* Mr. N.—on, in dealing with the replacement of the lumber by the coal industry (*Sketches*, 211, 243), confined himself, as usual, to mere lamentations. Our romanticist tries not to notice the trifling fact that behind the capitalist coal industry stands the equally capitalist lumber industry, which is marked by incomparably worse forms of exploitation. But he dwells at length on the "number of workers"! What are some 600,000 British miners compared to the millions of unemployed peasants?—he asks (211). To this we reply: that capitalism creates a relative surplus-population is beyond doubt, but Mr. N.—on has absolutely failed to see the connection between this and the requirements of large-scale machine industry. To compare the number of peasants engaged in various occupations even casually and irregularly with the number of specialist miners engaged exclusively in coal extraction, is absolutely senseless. Mr. N.—on resorts to such devices only in order to hide the fact of the rapid growth in Russia of both the number of factory and mine workers, and of the commercial and industrial population in general, since that mars his theory.

the consumer and the producer and becomes a real capitalist. The spasmodic development of capitalist economy, the alternation of prolonged periods of bad business with periods of "building booms" (like the one we are experiencing now, in 1898) tremendously accelerate the expansion and deepening of capitalist relationships in the building industry.

Such, according to the material of Russian economic literature, has been the post-Reform evolution of the industry under review.* This evolution finds particularly striking expression in the territorial division of labour, in the formation of large areas in which the working population specialises in some particular branch of building.** This specialisation of areas presupposes the formation of large markets for building work and, in this connection, the rise of capitalist relationships. To illustrate this point let us quote data for one such area. Pokrov Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, has long been celebrated for its carpenters, who already at the beginning of the century constituted more than half the total population. After the Reform carpentry continued to spread.*** In "the carpenters' area the contractors are an element analogous to the subcontractors and factory owners"; they are usually drawn from among the most enterprising members of carpenters' artels. "Cases are not rare of contractors in ten years accumulating from 50,000 to 60,000 rubles and more of clear profit. Some of the contractors employ from

* As we have had occasion to state above, it is difficult to establish this evolution because in our literature building workers in general are often called "artisans," wage-workers being quite incorrectly classified in this category.—Regarding the analogous development of the organisation of the building industry in the West see, for instance Webb, *Die Geschichte des britischen Trade Unionismus*, Stuttgart, 1895, S. 7.[157]

** In Yaroslavl Gubernia, for instance, Danilov Uyezd is particularly famous for its stove builders, plasterers and bricklayers, its different volosts mainly supplying specialists in one or other of these trades. Quite a large number of painters come from the Transvolga part of Yaroslavl Uyezd; carpenters come from the central part of Mologa Uyezd, etc. (*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, Vol II, Yaroslavl, 1896, p. 135 and others.)

*** At the end of the 50s, about 10,000 carpenters used to leave the Argunovo district (Argunovo Volost is the centre of the industry). In the 60s, out of 548 villages in the Pokrov Uyezd, 503 were engaged in carpentry (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, IV, p. 161, and foll.).

300 to 500 carpenters and have become real capitalists. . . . It is not surprising that the local peasants say that '*nothing pays so well as trading in carpenters*.'"* It would be hard to give a more striking characterisation of the quintessence of the present organisation of the industry! "Carpentry has left a deep impress upon the whole of peasant life in this locality. . . . The peasant carpenter devotes less and less time to agriculture, and eventually gives it up altogether." Life in the cities has laid the impress of culture on the carpenter: he lives a much cleaner life than do the surrounding peasants, and is conspicuous for his "cultured appearance," for "his relatively high mental development."**

The total number of building workers in European Russia must be very considerable, judging from the fragmentary data available. In Kaluga Gubernia the number of building workers in 1896 was estimated at 39,860, both local and migratory. In Yaroslavl Gubernia there were in 1894-95—according to official data—20,170 migratory. In Kostroma Gubernia there were about 39,500 migratory. In 9 uyezds of Vyatka Gubernia (out of 11), there were about 30,500 migratory (in the 80s). In 4 uyezds in Tver Gubernia (out of 12), there were 15,585, both local and migratory. In Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, there were 2,221, both local and migratory. The number of carpenters alone who left Ryazan Gubernia every year to work in other districts was, according to official figures for 1875 and 1876, not less than 20,000. In Orel Uyezd, Orel Gubernia, there are 2,000

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* Ibid., pp. 164-165. Our italics.

** Ibid., 165-166. Similar descriptions may be found in other sources. See Zhbankov: *The Influence of Industries Employing Migratory Workers on the Movement of the Population of Kostroma Gubernia in 1866-1883*, Kostroma, 1887.—*Urban Peasant Employments in Soligalich Uyezd, Kostroma Gubernia*, in *Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1890, No. 9.—*Women's Country, Kostroma*, 1891.—*Essay in Drafting a General Programme for the Investigation of Peasant Outside Employments.—Industries Employing Migratory Workers in Smolensk Gubernia in 1892-1895*, Smolensk, 1896.—*The Influence of Industries Employing Migratory Workers on the Movement of the Population*, in *Vrach* (*Physician*), 1895, No. 25.—See also above-mentioned *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, *Statistical Survey of Kaluga Gubernia for 1896*, Kaluga, 1897; *Agricultural Survey of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia for 1896*, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1897, and other Zemstvo statistical publications.

building workers. In 3 uyezds of Poltava Gubernia (out of 15), there are 1,440. In Nikolayevsk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, there are 1,339.* Judging by these figures, the number of building workers in European Russia must be *not less than one million*.** This figure must rather be considered a minimum, for all the sources show that the number of building workers has grown rapidly in the post-Reform period.*** The building workers are industrial proletarians in the making, whose connection with the land—already very slight today****—is becoming slighter every year. The conditions of building workers are very different from those of lumber workers and are more like those of factory workers. They work in large urban and industrial centres, which, as we have seen, considerably raise their cultural standards. While the declining lumber industry typifies weakly developed forms of a capitalism that still tolerates the patriarchal way of life, the developing building industry typifies a higher stage of capitalism, leads to the formation of a new class of industrial workers, and marks a deep-going differentiation of the old peasantry.

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* Sources, apart from those mentioned in the preceding footnote, are Zemstvo returns. Mr. V. V. (*Essays on Handicraft Industry*, 61) cites data for 13 uyezds in Poltava, Kursk and Tambov gubernias. The total number of building workers (Mr. V. V. classifies them all, and wrongly so, as "small industrialists") is 28,644, ranging from 2.7% to 22.1% of the total adult male population of the uyezds. If we take the average percentage (8.8%) as the standard, the number of building workers in European Russia would be 1⅓ million (counting 15 million adult male workers). The gubernias mentioned occupy a position midway between those where the building industries are most developed and those where they are least developed.

** The census of January 28, 1897 (*General Summary*, 1905), gives the number of the *independent* population (those earning their own livelihood) engaged in the building industry throughout the Empire as 717,000, plus 469,000 cultivators occupied in this industry as a side line. (*Note to 2nd edition*.)

*** Fire insurance figures may, to some extent, help us to gauge the dimensions of the building industry. The value of buildings covered by fire insurance amounted to 5,968 million rubles in 1884, and to 7,854 million rubles in 1893. (*Productive Forces*, XII, 65.) This shows an annual increase of 188 million rubles.

**** In Yaroslavl Gubernia, for example, 11 to 20% of the total population, or 30 to 56%, of the male workers, leave their homes in search of work; 68.7% of those who leave are away *all the year round* (*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*). Obviously, all these are "peasants only by *official designation*" (p. 117).

X. THE APPENDAGE TO THE FACTORY

By the appendage to the factory we mean those forms of wage-labour and small industry whose existence is directly connected with the factory. These include, first of all (in part), the lumber and building workers, of whom we have spoken and who in some cases directly form part of the industrial population of factory centres, and in others belong to the population of surrounding villages.* Further, they include workers employed on peat bogs—which are sometimes worked by factory owners themselves**; carters, loaders, packers, and so-called labourers generally, who always constitute a fairly considerable part of the population of industrial centres. In St. Petersburg, for instance, the census of December 15, 1890, registered 44,814 persons (of both sexes) in the group of "day labourers and labourers"; then 51,000 persons (of both sexes) in the carting industry, of whom 9,500 are specially engaged in carting heavy and miscellaneous loads. Further, certain auxiliary work is done for factories by small "independent" industrialists; in factory centres or their environs such industries spring up as barrel-making for oil-mills and distilleries,*** basket-making for packing glassware,**** packing-case making for hardware, the making of wooden

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* For instance, in Ryazan Gubernia "at the Khludov factory alone" (1894-95—4,849 workers, output 6 million rubles), "as many as 7,000 horses are engaged in the winter in wood-carting, most of them belonging to peasants of the Yegoryevsk Uyezd"[158] (*Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, VII, pp. 1109-1110).

** Chaos also reigns in the statistics for the peat industry. As a rule this industry is not classified among the "factory" trades (cf. Kobelyatsky, *Handbook*, p. 15), although at times it is. For instance, the List gives 12 peat fields employing 2,201 workers in Vladimir Gubernia and in that gubernia alone, although peat is extracted in other gubernias as well. According to Svirsky (*Factories and Works of Vladimir Gubernia*), in 1890 there were 6,038 persons employed in extracting peat in Vladimir Gubernia. The total number of workers in Russia employed in the extraction of peat must be many times greater.

*** *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*, Vol. VI.

**** Ibid., Vol. VIII, in Novgorod Gubernia.

handles for joiners' and fitters' tools,* the making of brads for footwear factories, and of "tanning" for leather works, etc.,** the weaving of bast-matting for the packing of factory wares (in the Kostroma and other gubernias), the making of "sticks" for matches (in the Ryazan, Kaluga and other gubernias), cardboard-box making for tobacco factories (in the environs of St. Petersburg),*** the making of wood-dust for vinegar factories,**** the spinning of waste yarn in small spinning sheds (in Lodz), which has developed owing to the demand created by the big mills,(*) etc., etc. All these small industrialists, like the wage-workers referred to above, belong either to the industrial population of factory centres, or to the semi-agricultural population of the surrounding villages. Furthermore, when a factory's work is limited to the production of a semi-manufactured article, small industries are sometimes called into existence which engage in treating it further; for example, machine spinning has given an impetus to handicraft weaving, and "handicraft" producers of metal goods cluster around ironworks, etc. Finally, capitalist domestic industry is often an appendage to the factory.(**) The epoch of large-scale machine industry is marked in all countries by the extensive development of capitalist domestic industry in such branches as, for

* Ibid., Vol. IX, in the suburban volosts of Tula Uyezd.

** In Perm Gubernia, near the town of Kungur, in Tver Gubernia in the village of Kimry, etc.

*** See *Report of the Zemstvo Board of the St. Petersburg Uyezd for 1889*. Mr. Voinov's report on Medical District V.

**** *Reports and Investigations*, I, p. 360.

(*) *Reports of Inquiry into Factory Industry in the Kingdom of Poland*, St. Petersburg, 1888, p. 24.

(**) In the *List* we counted 16 factories, each employing 1,000 and more workers on their premises, which had additionally a total of 7,857 outside workers. Fourteen factories, each with from 500 to 999 workers, employed 1,352 outside workers. The registration of outside work by the *List* is quite haphazard and full of gaps. The *Collection of Factory Inspectors' Reports* estimates for 1903 a total of 632 work-distributing offices, giving work to 65,115 workers. These data are very incomplete, of course; nevertheless, it is characteristic that the overwhelming majority of these offices, and the workers they employ, relate to centres of factory industry (Moscow area: 503 offices 49,345 workers; Saratov Gubernia—Sarpinka fabrics—33 offices, 10,000 workers). (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

example, ready-made clothing. We have spoken above of the wide extent of such industry in Russia, of the conditions peculiar to it and of the reason for considering it more correct to describe it in the chapter on manufacture.

In order to give anything like a full description of the appendage to the factory one needs complete statistics on the occupations of the population, or monographic descriptions of the entire economic life of factory centres and their environs. But even the fragmentary data with which we have had to content ourselves show the incorrectness of the opinion widespread here that factory industry is isolated from other forms of industry, that the factory population is isolated from the population not employed in factories. The development of forms of industry, like that of all social relationships in general, cannot but proceed very gradually, among a mass of interlocking, transitional forms and seeming reversions to the past. Thus, the growth of small industries may express (as we have seen) the progress of capitalist manufacture; now we see that the factory, too, may sometimes develop small industries. Work for the "buyer-up," is also an appendage to both the manufactory and the factory. To give a proper assessment of the significance of such phenomena, we must consider them in conjunction with the whole structure of industry at the given stage of its development and with the main trends of this development.

XI. THE COMPLETE SEPARATION OF INDUSTRY FROM AGRICULTURE

The complete separation of industry from agriculture is effected only by large-scale machine industry. The Russian facts fully confirm this thesis, which was established by the author of *Capital* for other countries,* but which is usually ignored by the Narodnik economists. Mr. N. —on in his *Sketches* talks in and out of season about "the separation of industry from agriculture," without, however, taking the trouble to examine, on the basis of precise data,

* *Das Kapital*, I², S. 779-780.[159]

how this process is actually taking place and what different forms it assumes. Mr. V. V. points to the connection of our industrial worker with the land (*in manufacture*; our author does not think it necessary to distinguish the various stages of capitalism, although he pretends he is following the theory of the author of *Capital*!) and declaims in this regard about the "shameful (sic!) dependence" "of *our* (author's italics) capitalist industry" upon the worker-farmer, etc. (*Destiny of Capitalism*, p. 114 and others). Mr. V. V. has apparently not heard, or has forgotten if he has beard, that not only in "our country" but everywhere in the West, capitalism failed to bring about the complete separation of the workers from the land before large-scale machine industry was established. Finally, Mr. Kablukov has quite recently presented his students with the following amazing distortion of the facts: "Whereas in the West work in the factory is the sole means of livelihood for the worker, in our country, *with relatively few exceptions* (sic!!!), the worker regards work in the factory as a subsidiary occupation, *he is more attracted to the land*."*

A factual analysis of this question has been made in Mr. Dementyev's essay on the "factory workers' connection with agriculture" in the Moscow sanitary statistics.** Systematically collated statistics embracing about 20,000 workers have shown that only 14.1% of the factory workers leave for agricultural employment. But far more important is the fact, proved in the greatest detail in the work mentioned, that *it is precisely machine production that divorces the workers from the land*. Of a whole series of figures quoted in proof of this fact we select the following most striking ones.***

* *Lectures on Agricultural* (sic!) *Economics*, edition for students, Moscow, 1897, p, 13. Perhaps our learned statistician thinks that we may regard as "relatively few exceptions" 85% of all cases (see further in text)?

** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Section of Sanitation Statistics, Vol. IV, Sec. II, Moscow, 1893. Reprinted in Mr. Dementyev's well-known work: *The Factory*, *etc.*

*** *Statistical Returns*, loc. cit., p. 292. *The Factory*, 2nd ed., p. 36.

Factories and Works	Per cent leaving for work in fields	
Hand cotton-weaving and dying	72.5	Hand production
Silk-weaving	63.1	
Porcelain and pottery	31.0	
Hand calico-printing and warp-distribution offices	30.7	
Felt cloth (complete production)	20.4	
Cotton spinning and power-loom weaving	13.8	Machine production
Power-loom weaving, including printing and finishing	6.2	
Engineering works	2.7	
Calico-printing and finishing by machine	2.3	

We have supplemented the author's table by dividing 8 of the trades into those carried on by hand and those by machinery. As regards the ninth, felt cloth production, let us note that it is conducted partly by hand and partly by machinery. Of the weavers in hand-loom factories about 63% leave for field-work, while of those working on power-looms *not one leaves*; of the workers in departments of cloth mills that are mechanised 3.3% leave. "Thus, the most important reason for factory workers breaking their ties with the land is the transition from hand to machine production. Despite the still relatively considerable number of factories with hand production, the number of workers employed in them, as compared with the number in factories with machine production, is quite negligible, that is why, of those who leave for field-work, we get proportions as small as 14.1% of adult workers in general and 15.4% of adult workers belonging exclusively to the peasant social estate."* Let us recall that the returns of the sanitary inspection of factories in Moscow Gubernia gave the following figures: mechanical factories, 22.6% of the total (including 18.4% using steam-engines); in these, 80.7% of the total number of workers are concentrated. Hand-labour factories constitute 69.2%, employing only 16.2% of the total number of workers. At the 244 mechanised factories there are 92,302 workers (378 workers per factory), while at the 747 hand-labour factories there are 18,520 workers (25 workers per

* *Returns*, p. 280. *The Factory*, p. 26.

factory).* We have shown above the considerable concentration of all Russian factory workers in the largest enterprises, mostly mechanised, which have an average of 488 and more workers per establishment. Mr. Dementyev has studied in detail the influence of the workers' place of birth on their separation from the land, differences between local-born and migrant workers, differences in social estate (burgher or peasant), etc., and it turned out that all these differences are eclipsed by the influence of the main factor: the transition from hand to machine production.** "Whatever causes may have helped to turn the former cultivator into a factory worker, these special workers already exist. They are merely counted as peasants, but their only connection with the village is by way of the taxes they pay when renewing their passports, for actually they have no farm in the village, and very often not even a house, which has usually been sold. Even their right to land they retain only juridically, so to speak, and the disorders that took place in 1885-1886 at many factories showed that these workers themselves feel totally alien to the village, just as the peasants in their turn regard them, offspring of their fellow-villagers, as strangers. We are consequently faced with an already crystallised class of workers, possessing no homes of their own and virtually no property, a class bound by no ties and living from hand to mouth. And its origin does not date from yesterday. It has its factory genealogy, and a fairly large section of it is already in its third generation."*** Lastly, interesting material on the separation of the factory from agriculture

* *Returns*, Vol. IV, Sec. I, pp. 167, 170, 177.

** Mr. Zhbankov, in his *Sanitary Investigation of Factories and Works of Smolensk Gubernia* (Smolensk, 1894-1896), estimates the number of workers who leave for field-work at approximately a mere 10 to 15% at the Yartsevo Textile Mill only (Vol II, pp. 307, 445; in 1893-1894 the Yartsevo Mill employed 3,106 out of the 8,810 factory workers in Smolensk Gubernia). Of the men 28% (average for all factories, 29%) and of the women 18.6% (average for all factories, 21%) employed in this factory were casual workers, (See Vol. II, p. 469.) It should be noted that the casual workers include 1) those employed at the factory for less than a year; 2) those who leave for summer work in the fields; 3) those "who for various reasons ceased work at the factory for several years" (II, 445).

*** *Returns*, p. 296. *The Factory*, pp. 44-46.

is provided by the latest factory statistics. The *List of Factories and Works* (data for 1894-95) gives information on the number of days in the year during which each factory operates. Mr. Kasperov hastened to use these data in support of the Narodnik theories when he calculated that "on the average, the Russian factory works 165 days a year," that "35% of the factories in this country work less than 200 days a year."* It goes without saying that in view of the vagueness of the term "factory," such overall figures are practically valueless, since they do not indicate how many workers are employed for specific numbers of days in the year. We have computed the appropriate figures of the *List* for those large factories (with 100 and more workers) which, as we have seen above (§ VII), employ about ¾ of the total number of factory workers. It turns out that the average number of working days per year in the different categories was as follows: A) 242; B) 235; C) 273,** and for all the large factories, 244. If we calculate the average number of working days per worker we will get 253 working days per year as the average number per worker of a large factory. Of the 12 sections into which the various trades are divided in the *List*, only in one is the average number of working days, for the bottom categories, below 200, namely in section XI (food products): A) 189; B) 148; C) 280. Factories in categories *A* and *B* in this section employ 110,588 workers, which is 16.2% of the total number of workers in the large factories (655,670). We would point out that this section combines quite diverse trades, e.g., beet-sugar and tobacco, distilling and flour-milling, etc. For the remaining sections the average number of working days per factory is as follows: A) 259; B) 271; C) 272. Thus, the larger the factories the greater the number of days they operate in the course of the year. The general data for all the biggest factories in European Russia, therefore, confirm the conclusions of the Moscow sanitary statistical returns

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* *Statistical Summary of Russia's Industrial Development*. A paper read by M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, member of the Free Economic Society, and the debate on this paper at the sessions of section III. St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 41.

** Let us recall that category *A* includes factories with 100 to 499 workers, *B*, with 500 to 999, and *C*, with 1,000 and more.

and prove that the factory creates a class of permanent factory workers.

So then, the data on Russian factory workers fully confirm the theory of *Capital* that it is large-scale machine industry that brings about a complete and definite revolution in the conditions of life of the industrial population, separating it once and for all from agriculture and from the century-old traditions of patriarchal life connected with it. But, by destroying patriarchal and petty-bourgeois relationships, large-scale machine industry creates, on the other hand, conditions which draw wage-workers in agriculture and industry closer together: firstly, it introduces into the rural districts generally the commercial and industrial way of life which has first arisen in the non-agricultural centres; secondly, it creates mobility of the population and large markets for the hiring of both agricultural and industrial workers; thirdly, by introducing machinery into agriculture, large-scale machine industry brings into the rural districts skilled industrial workers, distinguished for their higher standard of living.

XII. THREE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY

Let us now sum up the main conclusions to be drawn from the data on the development of capitalism in our industry.*

There are three main stages in this development: small commodity-production (small, mainly peasant industries); capitalist manufacture; and the factory (large-scale machine industry). The facts utterly refute the view widespread here in Russia that "factory" and "handicraft" industry are isolated from each other. On the contrary, such a division is purely artificial. The connection and continuity between the forms of industry mentioned is of the most direct and intimate kind. The facts quite clearly show that the main trend of small commodity-production is towards the development of capitalism, in particular, towards the rise of manufacture; and manufacture is

* Confining ourselves, as stated in the preface, to the post-Reform period, we leave aside the forms of industry that were based on the labour of the serf population.

growing with enormous rapidity before our very eyes into large-scale machine industry. Perhaps one of the most striking manifestations of the intimate and direct connection between the consecutive forms of industry is the fact that many of the big and even the biggest factory owners were at one time the smallest of small industrialists and passed through all the stages from "popular production" to "capitalism." Savva Morozov was a peasant serf (he purchased his freedom in 1820), a cowherd, a carter, a worker weaver, a handicraft weaver who used to journey to Moscow on foot in order to sell his goods to buyers-up; then he became the owner of a small establishment, a work-distributing office, a factory. When he died in 1862, he and his numerous sons owned two large factories. In 1890, the 4 factories belonging to his descendants employed 39,000 workers, producing goods to the value of 35 million rubles.* In the silk industry of Vladimir Gubernia, a number of big factory owners were formerly worker weavers or "handicraft" weavers.** The biggest factory owners in Ivanovo-Voznesensk (the Kuvayevs, Fokins, Zubkovs, Kokushkins, Bobrovs and many others) were formerly handicraftsmen.*** The brocade factories in Moscow Gubernia all grew out of handicraft workrooms.**** The factory owner Zavyalov, of Pavlovo district, still had in 1864 "a vivid recollection of the time when he was a plain employee of craftsman Khabarov."(*) Factory owner Varypayev used to be a small handicraftsman.(**) Kondratov was a handicraftsman who used to walk to Pavlovo carrying his wares in a bag.(***) Millowner Asmolov used to be a pedlars' horse-driver, then a small trader, then proprietor of a small tobacco workshop, and finally owner of a factory with a turnover of many millions.(****)

* *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, IV, 5-7.—*Directory* for 1890.—Shishmaryov: *A Brief Sketch of Industry in the Region of the Nizhni-Novgorod and Shuya-Ivanovo Railways*, St. Petersburg, 1892, pp. 28-32.

** *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, p. 7 and foll.

*** Shishmaryov, 56-62.

**** *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. III, Moscow, 1883, pp. 27-28.

(*) A. Smirnov, *Pavlovo and Vorsma*, p. 14.

(**) Labzin, loc. cit., p. 66.

(***) Grigoryev, loc. cit., p. 36.

(****) *Historico-Statistical Survey*, Vol. II, p. 27.

And so on and so forth. It would be interesting to see how, in these and similar cases, the Narodnik economists would determine where "artificial" capitalism begins and "people's" industry ends.

The three main forms of industry enumerated above differ first of all in their systems of technique. Small commodity-production is characterised by its totally primitive, hand technique that remained unchanged almost from time immemorial. The small producer in industry remains a peasant who follows tradition in his methods of processing raw material. Manufacture introduces division of labour, which effects a substantial change in technique and transforms the peasant into a factory-hand, a "labourer performing one detailed operation." But production by hand remains, and, on its basis, progress in methods of production is inevitably very slow. Division of labour springs up spontaneously and is passed on by tradition just as peasant labour is. Large-scale machine industry alone introduces a radical change, throws manual skill overboard, transforms production on new, rational principles, and systematically applies science to production. So long as capitalism in Russia did not organise large-scale machine industry, and in those industries in which it has not done so yet, we see almost complete stagnation in technique, we see the employment of the same hand-loom and the same watermill or windmill that were used in production centuries ago. On the other hand, in industries subordinated to the factory we observe a complete technical revolution and extremely rapid progress in the methods of machine production.

We see that the different stages of the development of capitalism are connected with different systems of technique. Small commodity-production and manufacture are characterised by the prevalence of small establishments, from among which only a few large ones emerge. Large-scale machine industry completely eliminates the small establishments. Capitalist relationships arise in the small industries too (in the form of workshops employing wage-workers and of merchant's capital), but these are still poorly developed and are not crystallised in sharp oppositions between the groups participating in production. Neither big capital nor extensive proletarian strata as yet exist.

In manufacture we see the rise of both. The gulf between the one who owns the means of production and the one who works now becomes very wide. "Wealthy" industrial settlements spring up, the bulk of whose inhabitants are poor working people. A small number of merchants, who do an enormous business buying raw materials and selling finished goods, and a mass of detail workers living from hand to mouth—such is the general picture of manufacture. But the multitude of small establishments, the retention of the tie with the land, the adherence to tradition in production and in the whole manner of living—all this creates a mass of intermediary elements between the extremes of manufacture and retards the development of these extremes. In large-scale machine industry all these retarding factors disappear; the acuteness of social contradictions reaches the highest point. All the dark sides of capitalism become concentrated, as it were: the machine, as we know, gives a tremendous impulse to the greatest possible prolongation of the working day; women and children are drawn into industry; a reserve army of unemployed is formed (and must be formed by virtue of the conditions of factory production), etc. However, the socialisation of labour effected on a vast scale by the factory, and the transformation of the sentiments and conceptions of the people it employs (in particular, the destruction of patriarchal and petty-bourgeois traditions) cause a reaction: large-scale machine industry, unlike the preceding stages, imperatively calls for the planned regulation of production and public control over it (a manifestation of the latter tendency is factory legislation).*

The very character of the development of production changes at the various stages of capitalism. In the small industries this development follows in the wake of the development of peasant economy; the market is extremely narrow, the distance between the producer and the consumer is short, and the insignificant scale of production easily adapts itself to the slightly fluctuating local demand. That

* On the connection between factory legislation and the conditions and relationships brought into being by large-scale machine industry, see Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's book, *The Russian Factory*, Chapter II, Part 2, and especially the article in *Novoye Slovo* of July 1897.

is why industry at this stage is characterised by the greatest stability, but this stability is tantamount to stagnation in technique and the preservation of patriarchal social relationships tangled up with all sorts of survivals of medieval traditions. The manufactories work for a big market—sometimes for the whole country—and, accordingly, production acquires the instability characteristic of capitalism, an instability which attains the greatest intensity under factory production. Large-scale machine industry can only develop in spurts, in alternating periods of prosperity and of crisis. The ruin of small producers is tremendously accelerated by this spasmodic growth of the factory; the workers are drawn into the factory in masses during a boom period, and are then thrown out. The formation of a vast reserve army of unemployed, ready to undertake any kind of work, becomes a condition for the existence and development of large-scale machine industry. In Chapter II we showed from which strata of the peasantry this army is recruited, and in subsequent chapters we indicated the main types of occupations for which capital keeps these reserves ready. The "instability" of large-scale machine industry has always evoked, and continues to evoke, reactionary complaints from individuals who continue to look at things through the eyes of the small producer and who forget that it is this "instability" alone that replaced the former stagnation by the rapid transformation of methods of production and of all social relationships.

One of the manifestations of this transformation is the separation of industry from agriculture, the liberation of social relations in industry from the traditions of the feudal and patriarchal system that weigh down on agriculture. In small commodity-production the industrialist has not yet emerged at all from his peasant shell; in the majority of cases he remains a farmer, and this connection between small industry and small agriculture is so profound that we observe the interesting law of the parallel differentiation of the small producers in industry and in agriculture. The formation of a petty bourgeoisie and of wage-workers proceeds simultaneously in both spheres of the national economy, thereby preparing the way, at both poles of differentiation, for the industrialist to break with agriculture.

Under manufacture this break is already very considerable. A whole number of industrial centres arise that do not engage in agriculture. The chief representative of industry is no longer the peasant, but the merchant and the manufactory owner on the one hand, and the "artisan" on the other. Industry and the relatively developed commercial intercourse with the rest of the world raise the standard of living and the culture of the population; the peasant is now regarded with disdain by the manufactory workman. Large-scale machine industry completes this transformation, separates industry from agriculture once and for all, and, as we have seen, creates a special class of the population totally alien to the old peasantry and differing from the latter in its manner of living, its family relationships and its higher standard of requirements, both material and spiritual.* In the small industries and in manufacture we always find survivals of patriarchal relations and of diverse forms of personal dependence, which, in the general conditions of capitalist economy, exceedingly worsen the condition of the working people, and degrade and corrupt them. Large-scale machine industry, which concentrates masses of workers who often come from various parts of the country, absolutely refuses to tolerate survivals of patriarchalism and personal dependence, and is marked by a truly "contemptuous attitude to the past." It is this break with obsolete tradition that is one of the substantial conditions which have created the possibility and evoked the necessity of regulating production and of public control over it. In particular, speaking of the transformation brought about by the factory in the conditions of life of the population, it must be stated that the drawing of women and juveniles into production** is, at bottom, progressive. It is

* Regarding the "factory hand" type cf. above, Chapter VI, § II, 5, pp. 404-405.—Also *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. VII, Pt. III, Moscow, 1883, p. 58 (the factory hand is a moralist, a "smart alec").—*Nizhni-Novgorod Handbook*, I, pp. 42-43- Vol. IV, p. 335.—*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 113-114 and elsewhere.—*Novoye Slovo*, Oct. 1897, p. 63.—Cf. also the above-mentioned works of Mr. Zhbankov which describe the workers who go off to the towns to commercial and industrial occupations.

** According to the *Directory*, the factories and works of European Russia in 1890 employed a total of 875,764 workers of whom 210,207 (24%) were women, 17,793 (2%) boys, and 8,216 (1%) girls.

indisputable that the capitalist factory places these categories of the working population in particularly hard conditions, and that for them it is particularly necessary to regulate and shorten the working day, to guarantee hygienic conditions of labour, etc.; but endeavours completely to ban the work of women and juveniles in industry, or to maintain the patriarchal manner of life that ruled out such work, would be reactionary and utopian. By destroying the patriarchal isolation of these categories of the population who formerly never emerged from the narrow circle of domestic, family relationships, by drawing them into direct participation in social production, large-scale machine industry stimulates their development and increases their independence, in other words, creates conditions of life that are incomparably superior to the patriarchal immobility of pre-capitalist relations.*

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* "The poor woman-weaver follows her father and husband to the factory and works alongside of them and independently of them. She is as much a breadwinner as the man is." "In the factory ... the woman is quite an independent producer, apart from her husband." Literacy spreads among the women factory workers with remarkable rapidity. (*Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, III, 113, 118, 112 and elsewhere.) Mr. Kharizomenov is perfectly right in drawing the following conclusion: industry destroys "the economic dependence of the woman on the family ... and on the husband.... At the factory, the woman is the equal of the man; this is the equality of the proletarian.... The capitalisation of industry is an important factor in woman's struggle for her independence in the family." "Industry creates a new position for the woman in which she is completely independent of her family and husband." (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1883, No. 12, pp. 582, 596.) In the *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia* (Vol. VII, Pt. II, Moscow, 1882, pp. 152, 138-139), the investigators compare the position of women engaged in making stockings by hand and by machine. The daily earnings of hand workers are about 8 kopeks, and of machine workers, 14 to 30 kopeks. The working woman's conditions under machine production are described as follows: "... Before us is a free young woman, hampered by no obstacles, emancipated from the family and from all that constitutes the peasant woman's conditions of life, a young woman who at any moment may leave one place for another, one employer for another, and may at any moment find herself without a job ... without a crust of bread.... Under hand production, the knitter's earnings are very meagre, insufficient to cover the cost of her food, earnings only acceptable if she, as a member of an allotment-holding and farming family, enjoys in part the product of that land; under machine production the working woman, in

The settled character of the population is typical of the first two stages of industrial development. The small industrialist, remaining a peasant, is bound to his village by his farm. The artisan under manufacture is usually tied to the small, isolated industrial area which is created by manufacture. In the very system of industry at the first and second stages of its development there is nothing to disturb this settled and isolated condition of the producer. Intercourse between the various industrial areas is rare. The transfer of industry to other areas is due only to the migration of individual small producers, who establish new small industries in the outlying parts of the country. Large-scale machine industry, on the other hand, necessarily creates mobility of the population; commercial intercourse between the various districts grows enormously; railways facilitate travel. The demand for labour increases on the whole—rising in periods of boom and falling in periods of crisis, so that it becomes a necessity for workers to go from one factory to another, from one part of the country to another. Large-scale machine industry creates a number of new industrial centres, which grow up with unprecedented rapidity, sometimes in unpopulated places, a thing that would be impossible without the mass migration of workers. Further on we shall speak of the dimensions and the significance of the so-called outside non-agricultural industries. At the moment we shall limit ourselves to a brief presentation of Zemstvo sanitation statistics for Moscow Gubernia. An inquiry among 103,175 factory workers showed that 53,238, or 51.6% of the total, were born in the uyezd in which they worked. Hence, nearly half the workers had migrated from one uyezd to another. The number of workers who were born in Moscow Gubernia was 66,038, or 64%.* More than a third of the workers came from other gubernias (chiefly from gubernias of the central industrial zone adjacent to Moscow

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addition to food and tea, gets earnings which enable ... her to live away from the family and to do without the family's income from the land.... Moreover, the woman worker's earnings in machine industry, under present conditions, are more secure."

* In the less industrialised Smolensk Gubernia, an inquiry among 5,000 factory workers showed that 80% of them were natives of that gubernia (Zhbankov, loc. cit., II, 442).

Gubernia). A comparison of the different uyezds shows the most highly industrialised ones to be marked by the lowest percentage of locally-born workers. For example, in the poorly industrialised Mozhaisk and Volokolamsk uyezds from 92 to 93% of the factory workers are natives of the uyezd where they work. In the very highly industrialised Moscow, Kolomna and Bogorodsk uyezds the percentage of locally-born workers drops to 24%, 40% and 50%. From this the investigators draw the conclusion that "the considerable development of factory production in an uyezd encourages the influx of outside elements."* These facts show also (let us add) that the movement of industrial workers bears the same features that we observed in the movement of agricultural workers. That is to say, industrial workers, too, migrate not only from localities where there is a surplus of labour, but also from those where there is a shortage. For example, the Bronnitsi Uyezd attracts 1,125 workers from other uyezds of Moscow Gubernia and from other gubernias, while at the same time providing 1,246 workers for the more highly industrialised Moscow and Bogorodsk uyezds. Hence, workers leave not only because they do not find "local occupations at hand," but also because they make for the places where conditions are better. Elementary as this fact is, it is worth while giving the Narodnik economists a further reminder of it, for they idealise local occupations and condemn migration to industrial districts, ignoring the progressive significance of the mobility of the population created by capitalism.

The above-described characteristic features which distinguish large-scale machine industry from the preceding forms of industry may be summed up in the words—socialisation of labour. Indeed, production for an enormous national and international market, development of close commercial ties with various parts of the country and with different countries for the purchase of raw and auxiliary materials, enormous technical progress, concentration of production and of the population in colossal enterprises, demolition of the worn-out traditions of patriarchal life,

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* *Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Sanitary Statistical Section, Vol. IV, Sec. I (Moscow, 1890), p. 240.

creation of mobility of the population, and improvement of the worker's standard of requirements and his development—all these are elements of the capitalist process which is increasingly socialising production in the country, and with it those who participate in production.*

On the problem of the relation of large-scale machine industry in Russia to the home market for capitalism, the data given above lead to the following conclusion. The rapid development of factory industry in Russia is creating an enormous and ever-growing market for means of production (building materials, fuel, metals, etc.) and is increasing with particular rapidity the part of the population engaged in

* The data quoted in the last three chapters show, in our opinion, that the classification of the capitalist forms and stages of industry given by Marx is more correct and sound than the now current classification which confuses the manufactory with the factory and regards working for a buyer-up as a special form of industry (Held, Bücher). To confuse the manufactory with the factory is to make purely superficial features the basis for classification and to ignore the essential features of technique, economy and social life which distinguish manufacture from the machine period of capitalism. As to capitalist domestic industry, it undoubtedly plays a very important part in the mechanism of capitalist industry. Just as undoubtedly, work for the buyer-up is particularly characteristic of pre-machine capitalism; but it is also to be met with (and on no small scale) in the most diverse periods of capitalist development. The significance of work for the buyer-up is not to be understood unless studied in connection with the whole structure of industry in the given period, or at the given stage of capitalist development. The peasant who weaves baskets to the order of the village shopkeeper, the Pavlovo artisan who makes knife-handles in his home to the order of Zavyalov, the woman worker who makes clothes, footwear, gloves or boxes to the order of big mill owners or merchants—all work for buyers-up, but in all these instances capitalist domestic industry bears a different character and has a different significance. We do not, of course, in the least deny the merits of Bücher, for example, in studying *pre*-capitalist forms of industry, but we think his classification of capitalist forms of industry is wrong.—We cannot agree with the views of Mr. Struve (see *Mir Bozhy*, 1898, No. 4) inasmuch as he adopts Bücher's theory (in the part mentioned) and applies it to Russian "handicraftism." (Since these lines were written, in 1899, Mr. Struve has managed to complete the cycle of his scientific and political development. From a person oscillating between Bücher and Marx, between liberal and socialist economics, he has become a liberal bourgeois of the purest water. The writer of these lines is proud of having helped, as far as has been in his power, to purge Social-Democracy of such elements. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

making articles of productive and not personal consumption. But the market for articles of personal consumption is also growing rapidly, owning to the growth of large-scale machine industry, which is diverting an increasingly large part of the population from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations. As for the home market for factory-made products, the process of the formation of that market was examined in detail in the early chapters of this book.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMATION OF THE HOME MARKET

We now have to sum up the data examined in the preceding chapters and to try to give an idea of the interdependence of the various spheres of the national economy in their capitalist development.

I. THE GROWTH OF COMMODITY CIRCULATION

It is well known that commodity circulation precedes commodity production and constitutes one of the conditions (but not the sole condition) of the rise of the latter. In the present work we have confined ourselves to an examination of data on commodity and capitalist production, and for that reason do not intend to deal in detail with the important problem of the growth of commodity circulation in post-Reform Russia. In order to give a general idea of how rapidly the home market has grown, the following brief data will suffice.

The length of the Russian railway system increased from 3,819 kilometres in 1865 to 29,063 km. in 1890,* i.e., more than 7-fold. Similar progress was made by Britain in a longer period (1845—4,082 km.; 1875—26,819 km., a 6-fold increase), by Germany in a shorter period (1845—2,143 km.; 1875—27,981 km., a 12-fold increase). The length of new railway opened per year differed considerably in different periods; for example, in the 5 years 1868-1872

* *Uebersichten der Weltwirtschaft* (*Surveys of World Economy.—Ed.*), loc. cit. In 1904 the length was 54,878 kilometres in European Russia (including the Kingdom of Poland, the Caucasus and Finland) and 8,351 in Asiatic Russia. (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

8,806 versts of new railway were opened and in the 5 years 1878-1882, only 2,221.* The extent of this fluctuation enables us to judge what an enormous reserve army of unemployed is required by capitalism, which now expands, and then contracts the demand for labour. There have been two boom periods in railway development in Russia: the end of the 60s (and the beginning of the 70s), and the latter half of the 90s. From 1865 to 1875, the average annual increase in the length of the Russian railway system was 1,500 kilometres, and from 1893 to 1897, about 2,500 kilometres.

The amount of railway freight carried was as follows: 1868—439 million poods; 1873—1,117 million poods; 1881—2,532 million poods; 1893—4,846 million poods; 1896—6,145 million poods; 1904—11,072 million poods. No less rapid has been the growth of passenger traffic: 1868—10.4 million passengers; 1873—22.7; 1881—34.4; 1893—49.4; 1896—65.5; 1904—123.6 million.**

The development of water transport is as follows (data for the whole of Russia):***

Years	Steamers		Number of other craft	Carrying capacity in million poods			Value of craft (million rubles)			Number of men in crews		
	Number	Total h. p.		steam	other craft	Total	steam	other craft	Total	steam	other craft	Total
1868	646	47,313	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1884	1,246	72,105	20,095	6.1	362	368.1	48.9	32.1	81	18,766	94,099	112,865
1890	1,824	103,206	20,125	9.2	401	410.2	75.6	38.3	113.9	25,814	90,356	116,170
1895	2,539	129,759	20,580	12.3	526.9	539.2	97.9	46.0	143.9	32,689	85,608	118,297

* V. Mikhailovsky, *The Development of the Russian Railway System in Transactions of Free Economic Society*, 1898, No. 2.

** *Military Statistical Abstract*, 511.— Mr. N. —on, *Sketches*, appendix to *Productive Forces*, XVII, p. 67.—*Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 43.—*Yearbook of Russia* for 1905, St. Petersburg, 1906.

*** *Military Statistical Abstract*, 445.—*Productive Forces*, XVII, 42.—*Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 44.

The amount of freight carried on inland waterways in European Russia in 1881 was 899.7 million poods; in 1893—1,181.5 million poods; in 1896—1,553 million poods. The value of these freights was 186.5 million rubles; 257.2 million rubles; 290 million rubles.

Russia's merchant marine in 1868 consisted of 51 steamers with a capacity of 14,300 lasts,[160] and of 700 sailing ships with a capacity of 41,800 lasts; and in 1896 of 522 steamers with a capacity of 161,600 lasts.*

The development of mercantile shipping at all ports on the outer seas was as follows: during the five years 1856-1860 the number of homeward plus outward bound vessels averaged 18,901, with a total capacity of 3,783,000 tons; for the period 1886-1890 it averaged 23,201 vessels (+23%) with a total capacity of 13,845,000 tons (+266%). Capacity, therefore, increased 3⅔ times. In 39 years (from 1856 to 1894) capacity grew 5.5-fold, and if we take Russian and foreign vessels separately, it is seen that during these 39 years the number of the former grew 3.4-fold (from 823 to 2,789), while their capacity grew 12.1-fold (from 112,800 tons to 1,368,000 tons), whereas the number of the latter grew by 16% (from 18,284 to 21,160) and their capacity 5.3-fold (from 3,448,000 tons to 18,267,000 tons).** Let us remark that the capacity of homeward and outward bound vessels also fluctuates very considerably from year to year (e.g., 1878—13 million tons; 1881—8.6 million tons), and these fluctuations enable us to gauge in part the fluctuations in the demand for unskilled labourers, dockers, etc. Here, too, capitalism requires the existence of a mass of people always in want of work and ready at the first call to accept it, however casual it may be.

The development of foreign trade can be seen from the following data:***

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* *Military Statistical Abstract*, 758, and *The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, I, 363.—*Productive Forces*, XVII, 30.

** *Productive Forces*. Russia's Foreign Trade, p. 56, and foll.

*** Ibid., p. 17. *Yearbook of Russia* for 1904, St. Petersburg, 1905.

Years	No. of inhabitants of Russia without Finland (millions)	Value of exports and imports combined (million credit rubles)	Value of total foreign trade turnover per inhabitant (rubles)
1856-1860	69.0	314.0	4.55
1861-1865	73.8	347.0	4.70
1866-1870	79.4	554.2	7.00
1871-1875	86.0	831.1	9.66
1876-1880	93.4	1,054.8	11.29
1881-1885	100.6	1,107.1	11.00
1886-1890	108.9	1,090.3	10.02
1897-1901	130.6	1,322.4	10.11

The following data give a general idea of the volume of bank turnover and capital accumulation. Total withdrawals from the State Bank rose from 113 million rubles in 1860-1863 (170 million rubles in 1864-1868) to 620 million rubles in 1884-1888, and total deposits on current account from 335 million rubles in 1864-1868 to 1,495 million rubles in 1884-1888.* The turnover of loan and savings societies and banks (rural and industrial) grew from 2¾ million rubles in 1872 (21.8 million rubles in 1875) to 82.6 million rubles in 1892., and 189.6 million rubles in 1903.** Mortgages increased from 1889 to 1894 as follows: the assessment of mortgaged land rose from 1,395 million rubles to 1,827 million rubles, and total loans from 791 million rubles to 1,044 million rubles.*** The operations of savings banks grew particularly in the 80s and 90s. In 1880 there were 75 savings banks, in 1897—4,315 (of which 3,454 were post-office banks). In 1880, deposits amounted to 4.4 million rubles, in 1897 to 276.6 million rubles. Balance on account at the end of the year totalled 9.0 million rubles in 1880, and 494.3 million rubles in 1897. The annual capital increase is particularly striking in the *famine* years 1891 and 1892 (52.9 and 50.5 million rubles), and in the last two years (1896—51.6 million rubles; 1897—65.5 million rubles).****

* *Returns for Russia*, 1890, CIX.
** *Returns for Russia*, 1896. Table CXXVII.
*** Ibid.
**** *Vestnik Finansov*, 1898, No. 26.

The latest statistics show an even greater development of the savings banks. In 1904, over the whole of Russia there were 6,557 savings banks with 5.1 million depositors and total deposits of 1,105.5 million rubles. Incidentally, in this country both the old Narodniks and the new opportunists in the socialist movement have frequently been very naïve (to put it mildly) in talking about the increase in the number of savings banks constituting a sign of the "people's" well-being. It will perhaps not be out of place, therefore, to compare the distribution of savings-bank deposits in Russia (1904) with that of France (1900. Information from *Bulletin de l'Office du travail*, 1901, No. 10).

In Russia:

Size of deposits	No. of depositors (thousands)	%	Total deposits (million rubles)	%
Under 25 rubles	1,870.4	38.7	11.2	1.2
25 to 100 "	967.7	20.0	52.8	5.4
100 to 500 "	1,380.7	28.6	308.0	31.5
Over 500 "	615.5	12.7	605.4	61.9
Total	4,834.3	100	977.4	100

In France:

Size of deposits	No. of depositors (thousands)	%	Total deposits (million francs)	%
Under 100 fr.	5,273.5	50.1	143.6	3.3
100 to 500 "	2,197.4	20.8	493.8	11.4
500 to 1,000 "	1,113.8	10.6	720.4	16.6
Over 1,000 "	1,948.3	18.5	2,979.3	68.7
Total	10,533.0	100	4,337.1	100

What a wealth of material there is here for Narodnik-Revisionist-Cadet apologists! It is interesting, in passing, to note that in Russia deposits are also divided into 12 groups according to the occupations and professions of depositors. It appears that the largest sum of deposits—228.5 million rubles—is that of persons engaged in agriculture and rural industries, and these deposits are growing with particular rapidity. The village is becoming civilised, and to make the

muzhik's ruin a source of business is becoming increasingly profitable.

But let us return to our immediate theme. As we see, the data indicate an enormous growth of commodity circulation and capital accumulation. How the field for the employment of capital in all branches of the national economy was created and how merchant's capital was transformed into industrial capital, i.e., was directed into production and created capitalist relationships between those taking part in production, has been shown above.

II. THE GROWTH OF THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL POPULATION

We have stated above that the growth of the industrial population at the expense of the agricultural is a requisite phenomenon of every capitalist society. In what way the separation of industry from agriculture steadily takes place has also been examined, and now all that remains is to sum up on this question.

1) The Growth of the Towns

The most striking expression of the process under examination is the growth of the towns. Here are data on this growth in European Russia (50 gubernias) in the post-Reform period*:

* For 1863 the figures are from the *Statistical Chronicle* (I, 1866) and the *Military Statistical Abstract*. The figures of the urban population of the Orenburg and Ufa gubernias have been corrected according to the tables of towns. That is why our figure for the total urban population is 6,105,100 and not 6,087,100 as given in the *Military Statistical Abstract*.—For 1885 the data are from *Returns for Russia for 1884-85*.—For 1897 the figures are those of the returns of the census of January 28, 1897. (*First General Census of the Population of the Russian Empire, 1897*, Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1897 and 1898, Pts. 1 and 2.) The permanent urban population, according to the 1897 census, was 11,830,500, i.e., 12.55%. We have taken the existing population of the towns.—Let us observe that we cannot vouch for the figures for 1863, 1885 and 1897 being absolutely uniform and comparable. For that reason we limit our comparison to the most general proportions and give the data for the big towns separately.

Years	Population of European Russia (thousands)			Percentage of urban population	No. of towns with population:				Population of large towns (thousands)				Population of 14 towns that in 1863 were largest (thousands)
	Total	In town	In uyezds		Over 200,000	100,000 to 200,000	50,000 to 100,000	Total of large towns	Over 200,000	100,000 to 200,000	50,000 to 100,000	Total	
1863	61,420.5	6,105.1	55,315.4	9.94	2	1	10	13	891.1	119.0	683.4	1,693.5	1,741.9
1885	81,725.2	9,964.8	71,760.4	12.19	3	7	21	31	1,854.8	998.0	1,302.7	4,155.5	3,103.7
1897	94,215.4	12,027.1	82,188.3	12.67	5	9	30	44	3,238.1	1,177.0	1,982.4	6,397.5	4,266.3



V. I. Lenin's grouping of towns in European Russia according to the population census of 1897

Thus, the percentage of urban population is constantly growing, that is, the population is being diverted from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations.* The population of the towns is growing twice as fast as that of the rest of the country: from 1863 to 1897 the total population increased 53.3%, the rural 48.5%, while the urban increased 97%. Over a period of 11 years (1885-1897) "the influx, at a minimum, of the rural population into the towns" was 2½ million persons, according to Mr. V. Mikhailovsky's estimate,** i.e., more than 200,000 per annum.

The population of towns that are important industrial and commercial centres is growing much more rapidly than the urban population generally. The number of towns with 50,000 and more inhabitants more than trebled between 1863 and 1897 (13 and 44). In 1863, of the total urban population only about 27% (1.7 million out of 6.1) were concentrated in such large centres; in 1885 it was nearly 41% (4.1 million out of 9.9),*** and in 1897 it was already more than half, about 53% (6.4 million out of 12 million). In the 1860s, therefore, the smaller towns provided the general pattern of the urban population, but in the 1890s they were completely outweighed by the big cities. The population of the 14 towns that had been the biggest in 1863 increased from 1.7 million inhabitants to 4.3 million, i.e., by 153%, whereas the overall urban population increased by only 97%. Hence, the enormous growth of large industrial centres and the emergence of a large number of new centres is one of the most characteristic features of the post-Reform period.

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* "The number of urban settlements of an agricultural character is extremely small and the number of their inhabitants is quite insignificant compared with the total number of town-dwellers." (Mr. Grigoryev in *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, Vol. II, p. 126.)

** *Novoye Slovo*, June 1897, p. 113.

*** Mr. Grigoryev gives a table (loc, cit., 140) which shows that in 1885 of all towns 85.6% had less than 20,000 inhabitants each; 38% of all town-dwellers were living in them; 12.4% of the towns (82 out of 660) had less than 2,000 inhabitants each, and only 1.1% of all town-dwellers (110,000 out of 9,962,000) were living in them.

2) The Significance of Home Colonisation

As we have pointed out above (Chapter I, § II, p. 40), theory deduces the law that the industrial population grows at the expense of the agricultural from the fact that in industry variable capital increases absolutely (the growth of variable capital means a growth of the number of industrial workers and a growth of the total commercial and industrial population), whereas in agriculture the "variable capital required for the exploitation of a certain plot of land decreases absolutely." "It can thus only increase," Marx adds, "to the extent that new land is taken into cultivation, but this again requires as a prerequisite a still greater growth of the non-agricultural population."[161] Hence it is clear that the growth of the industrial population is a phenomenon observable in its pure form only when we have before us an already populated territory in which all the land is already occupied. The inhabitants of such a territory, when forced-out of agriculture by capitalism, have no other alternative but to migrate to the industrial centres or to other countries. But the situation is essentially different when we have before us a territory in which not all the land is occupied, and which is not yet fully populated. The inhabitants of such a territory, when forced out of agriculture in a populated area, may remove to an unpopulated part of that territory and set about "taking new land into cultivation." The result will be an increase in the agricultural population, and this increase may be (for some time) no less, if not more, rapid than the increase in the industrial population. In that case, we have before us two different processes: 1) the development of capitalism in the old, populated country or part of the country; 2) the development of capitalism on "new land." The first process expresses the further development of established capitalist relationships; the second, the rise of new capitalist relationships on new territory. The first process means the development of capitalism in depth, the second, in breadth. Obviously, to confuse these two processes must inevitably lead to a wrong conception of the process which diverts the population from agriculture to commercial and industrial occupations.

Post-Reform Russia affords us an example of the two processes going on simultaneously. At the beginning of the post-Reform period, in the 60s, the southern and eastern outer regions of European Russia were largely unpopulated, and there was an enormous influx into those areas of migrants from the central agricultural part of Russia. It was this formation of a new agricultural population on new territory that to some extent obscured the parallel process of the diversion of the population from agriculture to industry. To get a clear picture, from data on the urban population, of the specific feature of Russia here described, we must divide the 50 gubernias of European Russia into separate groups. We give data on the urban population in 9 areas of European Russia in 1863 and in 1897 (see p. 564).

As far as the question that interests us is concerned, the greatest importance attaches to three areas: 1) the non-agricultural industrial area (the 11 gubernias in the first two groups, including the 2 metropolitan gubernias).* This is an area from which migration to other areas has been very slight. 2) The central agricultural area (the 13 gubernias in group 3). Migration from this area has been very considerable, partly to the previous area, but mainly to the next. 3) The agricultural outer regions (the 9 gubernias in group 4) constitute an area that has been colonised in the post-Reform period. The percentage of urban population in all these 33 gubernias differs very little, as the table shows, from the percentage of urban population in European Russia as a whole.

In the first area, the non-agricultural or industrial, we observe a particularly rapid rise in the percentage of urban population: from 14.1% to 21.1%. The growth of the rural population is here very slight, being little more than half of that for the whole of Russia. The growth of the urban

* That we are right in combining with the metropolitan gubernias the non-agricultural gubernias taken by us is borne out by the fact that the population of the metropolitan cities is augmented chiefly by migrants from these gubernias. According to the Petersburg census of December 15,1890, there were in that city 726,000 members of the peasant and the burgher estates, of these, 544,000 (i.e., three-fourths) were members of the peasant and the burgher estates from the 11 gubernias out of which we constituted area No. 1.

Groups of gubernias of European Russia	No. of gubernias	Population (thousands)						Urban population as %		% increase of population between 1863 and 1897		
		1863			1897							
		Total	In settlements	In towns	Total	In settlements	In towns	1863	1897	Total	Rural	Urban
I. Metropolitan	2	2,738.4	1,680.0	1,058.4	4,541.0	1,989.7	2,551.3	38.6	56.2	65	18	141
II. Industrial non-agricultural	9	9,890.7	9,165.6	725.1	12,751.8	11,647.8	1,104.0	7.3	8.6	29	26	52
Metropolitan gubernias, non-agricultural and industrial	11	12,629.1	10,845.6	1,783.5	17,292.8	13,637.5	3,655.3	14.1	21.1	36	25	105
III. Central agricultural, Malorossia and Middle Volga	13	20,491.9	18,792.5	1,699.4	28,251.4	25,464.3	2,787.1	8.3	9.8	38	35	63
IV. Novorossia, Lower Volga and Eastern	9	9,540.3	8,472.6	1,067.7	18,386.4	15,925.6	2,460.8	11.2	13.3	92	87	130
Total for first four groups	33	42,661.3	38,110.7	4,550.6	63,930.6	55,027.4	8,903.2	10.5	13.9	49	44	95.6
V. Baltic	3	1,812.3	1,602.6	209.7	2,387.0	1,781.6	605.4	11.5	25.3	31	11	188
VI. Western	6	5,548.7	4,940.3	608.2	10,126.3	8,931.6	1,194.7	10.9	11.8	82	81	96
VII. South-Western	3	5,483.7	4,982.8	500.9	9,605.5	8,693.0	912.5	9.1	9.5	75	74	82
VIII. Urals	2	4,359.2	4,216.5	142.7	6,086.0	5,794.6	291.4	3.2	4.7	39	37	105
IX. Far North	3	1,555.5	1,462.5	93.0	2,080.0	1,960.0	120.0	5.9	5.8	33	34	29
Total	50	61,420.5	55,315.4	6,105.1	94,215.4	82,188.2	12,027.2	9.94	12.76	53.3	48.5	97.0

Gubernias included in groups: I) St. Petersburg and Moscow; II) Vladimir, Kaluga, Kostroma, Nizhni-Novgorod, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl; III) Voronezh, Kazan, Kursk, Orel, Penza, Poltava, Ryazan, Saratov, Simbrisk, Tambov, Tula, Kharkov, Chernigov; IV) Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Orenburg, Samara, Taurida, Kherson, Ufa; V) Kurland, Livonia, Esthland; VI) Vilna, Vitebsk, Grodno, Kovno, Minsk, Mogilev; VII) Volhynia, Podolsk, Kiev; VIII) Vyatka, Perm; IX) Archangel, Vologda, Olonets.

population, on the other hand, is considerably above the average (105% as against 97%). If Russia is to be compared with West-European industrial countries (as is often done here), then these countries should be compared with just this one area, for it alone has conditions approximately similar to those of the industrial capitalist countries.

In the second, the central agricultural area, we see a different picture. The percentage of urban population here is very low and grows with less than average rapidity. The increase in the population between 1863 and 1897, both urban and rural, was much below the average for Russia. This is to be explained by the vast stream of migrants from this area to the border regions. According to Mr. V. Mikhailovsky's calculations, between 1885 and 1897 *nearly 3 million people*, or more than one-tenth of the population left these parts.*

In the third area, the outer regions, we see that the percentage of urban population underwent an increase that "was slightly *below the average* (from 11.2% to 13.3%, i.e., in the proportion of 100 : 118, whereas the average is from 9.94 to 12.76, i.e., in the proportion of 100 : 128). And yet the absolute growth of the urban population here, far from being less, was *considerably above the average* (+130% as against +97%). The diversion of population from agriculture to industry has, consequently, been very intense, but it is hidden by the enormous growth of the agricultural population as a result of influx: in this area the rural population increased by 87%, as against an average for Russia of 48.5%. In certain gubernias this obscuring of the process of the industrialisation of the population is still more striking. For instance, in Taurida Gubernia the percentage of urban population was the same in 1897 as in 1863 (19.6%), and in Kherson Gubernia actually declined (from 25.9% to 25.4%), although the growth of the towns in both the gubernias was not far behind that of the metropolitan cities (+131%, +135%, as against +141% in the two metropolitan gubernias). The rise of a new agricultural population on new territory thus leads, in turn, to a still greater growth of the non-agricultural population.

* Loc. cit., p. 109. "This movement has no parallel in the modern history of Western Europe" (110-111).

3) The Growth of Factory and of Commercial and Industrial Townships and Villages

In addition to the towns, the following have the significance of industrial centres: firstly, suburbs, which are not always counted with the towns and which are spreading in an increasing area around the big towns; and secondly, factory townships and villages. Such industrial centres* are particularly numerous in the industrial gubernias where the percentage of urban population is extremely low.** The above table containing the data, by areas, of the town population shows that in the 9 industrial gubernias the percentage in 1863 was 7.3% and in 1897, 8.6%. The fact is that the commercial and industrial population of these gubernias is concentrated mainly, not in towns, but in industrial villages. Among the "towns" of Vladimir, Kostroma, Nizhni-Novgorod and other gubernias there are not a few with less than 3,000, 2,000 or even 1,000 inhabitants, whereas there are numerous "villages" in each of which there are 2,000, 3,000 or 5,000 factory workers alone. In the post-Reform period, rightly observes the compiler of the *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia* (Vol. II., 191), "the towns have begun to grow still faster, and in addition there has been the growth of settlements of a new type, a type of factory centre midway between the town and the village." We have cited data showing the enormous growth of these centres and the number of factory workers concentrated in them. We have seen that there are quite a few centres of this kind throughout Russia, not only in the industrial gubernias, but also in the South. In the Urals the percentage of urban population is lowest: in Vyatka and Perm gubernias it was 3.2% in 1863 and 4.7% in 1897. But here is an example of the relative size of the "urban" and the industrial populations: in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the urban population numbers 6,400 (1897), whereas according to the Zemstvo census of 1888-1891, the population of the

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* See above, Chapter VII, §VIII, and Appendix III to Chapter VII.

** On the significance of this circumstance, to which Korsak in his day drew attention, compare the just remarks of Mr. Volgin (loc. cit., pp. 215-216).

industrial section of the uyezd numbers 84,700, of whom 56,000 do not engage in agriculture at all, and only 5,600 obtain their livelihood mainly from the land. In Ekaterinburg Uyezd, according to the Zemstvo census, 65,000 inhabitants are landless and 81,000 have only meadow land. Hence, the industrial non-urban population of two uyezds alone is larger than the urban population of the whole gubernia (in 1897 it was 195,600!).

Finally, in addition to factory settlements, the significance of industrial centres attaches to the trading and industrial villages, which are either at the head of large handicraft districts, or have developed rapidly since the Reform, owing to their situation on the banks of rivers, near railway stations, etc. Several examples of such villages were given in Chapter VI, §II, and we saw that, like the towns, they attract the rural population, and that they are usually marked by a level of literacy among the population above the average.* As a further example let us quote data on Voronezh Gubernia in order to show the relative importance

* How numerous in Russia are villages that constitute very big centres of population may be judged from the following (though obsolete) data of the *Military Statistical Abstract*: in 25 gubernias of European Russia there were in the 60s a total of 1,334 villages with over 2,000 inhabitants each. Of them, 108 had from 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, 6 from 10,000 to 15,000, 1 from 15,000 to 20,000 and 1 over 20,000 (p. 169). The development of capitalism in all countries, not only in Russia, has led to the rise of new industrial centres not officially classified as towns. "Differences between town and country are obliterated, near growing industrial towns this takes place due to the removal of industrial enterprises and workers' dwellings to the suburbs and outskirts of the towns; near declining small towns it takes place due to the merging of the latter with the surrounding villages and also to the development of large industrial villages.... Differences between the urban and rural populated areas are eliminated due to numerous transitional formations. Statisticians have recognised this long ago, and instead of the historico-juridical concept of the town have adopted the statistical concept, which distinguishes centres of population solely according to the number of inhabitants" (Bücher, *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*, Tübingen, 1893, S. 296-297 and 303-304). In this respect also Russian statistics lag far behind European statistics. In Germany and in France (*Statesman's Yearbook*, pp. 536, 474) under towns are placed centres of population having more than 2,000 inhabitants, and in England "net urban sanitary districts," i.e., also factory villages, etc. Hence, Russian data on the "urban" population are not at all comparable with European.

of urban and non-urban industrial and commercial centres of population. The *Combined Returns* for Voronezh Gubernia gives a combined table classifying the *villages* in 8 uyezds of the gubernia. In these uyezds there are 8 towns, with a population of 56,149 (in 1897). Of the villages, on the other hand, 4 stand out with 9,376 households, and with 53,732 inhabitants, i.e., they are much bigger than the towns. In 5 these villages there are 240 commercial and 404 industrial establishments. Of the total households, 60% do not cultivate at all, 21% cultivate by neighbour-hire or on a half-crop basis, 71% have neither draught animals nor implements, 63% buy grain all year round, 86% engage in industries. By placing the entire population of these centres in the category of commercial and industrial, we not only do not exaggerate, but rather minimise, the size of the latter, for altogether in these 8 uyezds 21,956 households cultivate no land at all. Nevertheless, in the agricultural gubernia we have taken, the commercial and industrial population outside the towns turns out to be not less than that inside the towns.

4) Non-Agricultural Outside Employments

But even if we add to the towns the factory and commercial and industrial villages and townships we are far from exhausting the total industrial population of Russia. The lack of freedom of movement and the social-estate exclusiveness of the village community fully explain the remarkable characteristic of Russia that we have to include no small part of the rural population in its industrial population, that part which obtains its livelihood by working in industrial centres and spends part of the year in these centres. We refer to the so-called non-agricultural "outside employments." From the official point of view, these "industrialists" are peasant farmers who merely have "subsidiary employments," and the majority of the Narodnik economists have, without further ado, adopted that viewpoint. There is no need, after what has been said above, to prove in detail how unsound it is. At all events, however much opinions on it may vary, there cannot be the slightest doubt that it

indicates a *diversion of the population from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations*.* How far this fact changes our idea of the size of the industrial population in the towns may be seen from the following example. In Kaluga Gubernia the percentage of urban population is much lower than the average for Russia (8.3%, as against 12.8%). Now the *Statistical Survey* of that gubernia for 1896 calculates, on the basis of passport data, the total number of months during which migratory workers were absent from their homes. It appears that the total is 1,491,600 months; divided by 12 this will give an absent population of 124,300 persons, i.e., "*nearly 11% of the total population*" (loc. cit., 46)! Add this number to the urban population (in 1897—97,900), and the percentage of industrial population will be a very considerable one.

Of course, a certain part of the migratory non-agricultural workers are registered among the existing town population, and are also part of the population of the non-urban industrial centres to which we have already referred. But only a part, for owing to the mobile character of this section of the population, it is difficult to cover them by any local census; furthermore, population censuses are usually taken in the winter, whereas most of these industrial workers leave their homes in the spring. Here are data for some of the principal gubernias of non-agricultural migration.**

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* Mr. N.—on *has not noticed* at all in Russia the process of the industrialisation of the population! Mr. V. V. observed it and admitted that the growth of migration expresses a diversion of the population from agriculture (*The Destiny of Capitalism*, 149); however, far from including this process in the sum-total of his views on the "destiny of capitalism," he tried to hush it up with lamentations about the point that "there are people who find all this very natural" (for capitalist society? Can Mr. V. V. imagine capitalism without this phenomenon?) "and almost desirable" (ibid.). It is desirable without the "almost," Mr. V. V.!

** *Residential Permits Issued to the Peasant Population of Moscow Gubernia in 1880 and 1885.—Statistical Yearbook of Tver Gubernia for 1897.*—Zhbankov: *Industries Employing Migratory Workers in Smolensk Gubernia*, Smolensk, 1896.—Same author's: *The Influence of Industries Employing Migratory Workers, etc.*, Kostroma, 1887.—*Industries of the Peasant Population of Pskov Gubernia*, Pskov, 1898.—Mistakes in the percentages for Moscow Gubernia could not be corrected because there were no absolute figures.—For

Percentage distribution of residential permits issued									
Season	Moscow Gubernia (1885)		Tver (1897)	Smolensk (1895)	Pskov (1895) passports		Kostroma (1880)		
							Male		Female passports and cards
	Male	Female	Male and female		Male	Female	Passports	Cards	
Winter	19.3	18.6	22.3	22.4	20.4	19.3	16.2	16.2	17.3
Spring	*32.4*	*32.7*	*38.0*	*34.8*	*30.3*	*27.8*	*43.8*	*40.6*	*39.4*
Summer	20.6	21.2	19.1	19.3	22.6	23.2	15.4	20.4	25.4
Autumn	27.8	27.4	20.6	23.5	26.7	29.7	24.6	22.8	17.9
Total	100.1	99.9	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The number of passports issued reaches the maximum everywhere in the spring. Hence, a large part of the temporarily absent workers are not included in the censuses of the towns.* But these temporary town-dwellers may also more legitimately be assigned to the urban rather than the rural population. "A family which gets its livelihood throughout the year, or during the greater part of it, in the town has far more reason to regard the town, which provides its subsistence, as its place of domicile than the village, with which it has only family and fiscal ties."** The enormous significance these fiscal ties have to this day can be seen from the fact, for instance, that among migratory

Kostroma Gubernia only uyezd figures are available, and then only in percentages. We had, therefore, to take the average of the uyezd figures, and for this reason we give the data for Kostroma Gubernia separately. As regards Yaroslavl Gubernia, it is estimated that of the migratory industrialists 68.7% are absent all year round: 12.6% in the autumn and winter, and 18.7% in the spring and summer. We would observe that the data for Yaroslavl Gubernia (*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, Vol. II, Yaroslavl, 1896) are not comparable with the preceding ones, since they are based on the statements of priests, etc., and not on passport data.

* It is known, for instance, that in the suburbs of St. Petersburg the population increases very considerably in the summer.

** *Statistical Survey of Kaluga Gubernia for 1896*, Kaluga, 1897, p. 18 in Sec. II.

Kostroma people "it is a rare thing for peasants to get for it [the land] some small part of the taxes to be paid; usually they lease it on the sole condition that the tenants put it to use, the owner himself paying all the taxes" (D. Zhbankov, *Women's Country*, Kostroma, 1891, p. 21). In the *Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia* (Vol. II, Yaroslavl, 1896), we also find repeated references to migratory industrial workers having to purchase their release from their villages and allotments (pp. 28, 48, 149, 150, 166 and others).*

How many migratory non-agricultural workers are there? The number of people engaged in all kinds of industries employing migratory workers is not less than from *5 to 6 millions*. In fact, in 1884, about 4.67 million passports and

* "Industries employing migratory workers ... are a form that obscures the uninterrupted growth of the towns.... Communal land tenure and various peculiarities of the financial and administrative life of Russia do not allow the peasant to become a town-dweller as easily as in the West.... Legal threads sustain his (the migratory worker's) tie with the village, but actually by occupation, habits and tastes he has become completely assimilated with the town and often regards this tie with his village as irksome" (*Russkaya Mysl*, 1896, No. 11, p. 227). That is very true, but for a publicist is not enough. Why did not the author declare definitely for complete freedom of movement, for the freedom of the peasant to leave the village community? Our liberals are still afraid of our Narodniks. But they have no reason to be.

And here, for purposes of comparison, are the views of a sympathiser with Narodism, Mr. Zhbankov: "Migration to the towns is, as it were, a lightning conductor (sic!) against the rapid growth of the capitals and big cities and the increase of the urban and landless proletariat. Both from the sanitary and from the social and economic points of view, this influence of industries employing migratory workers should be regarded as beneficial: so long as the masses of the people are not completely divorced from the land, which provides the migratory workers with some security" (a "security" they pay money to break with!), "these workers cannot become the blind instruments of capitalist production, and the hope remains of organising agricultural-industrial communes" (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1890, No. 9, p. 145). Is not the retention of petty-bourgeois hopes really beneficial? As for "*blind* instruments," the experience of Europe and all the facts observed in Russia show that this description is far more applicable to the worker who retains his ties with the land and with patriarchal relationships than to the one who has broken these ties. The figures and facts given by Mr. Zhbankov himself show that the migratory "Petersburger" is more literate, cultured and developed than the settled Kostromer in some "backwoods" uyezd.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

identity cards were issued in European Russia,* and passport revenue grew between 1884 and 1894 by more than one-third (from 3.3 to 4.5 million rubles). In 1897 the total number of passports and cards issued in Russia was 9,495,700 (of which 9,333,200 were issued in the 50 gubernias of European Russia). In 1898 the number was 8,259,900 (European Russia, 7,809,600).** The number of workers superfluous (as compared with local demand) in European Russia has been estimated by Mr. S. Korolenko at 6.3 million. Above we have seen (Chapter III, § IX, p. 239) that in 11 agricultural gubernias the number of passports issued exceeded Mr. Korolenko's estimate (2 million as against 1.7 million). Now we can add the data for 6 non-agricultural gubernias: Mr. Korolenko sets the number of superfluous workers in these at 1,287,800, while the number of passports issued was 1,298,600.*** Thus, in 17 gubernias of European Russia (11 black-earth, plus 6 non-black-earth) there are, according to Mr. Korolenko, 3 million workers who are superfluous (as against the local demand). In the 90s, however, the number of passports and cards issued in these 17 gubernias was 3.3 million. In 1891, these gubernias provided 52.2% of the total passport revenue. Hence, *the number of migratory workers in all probability exceeds 6 million*. Finally, Zemstvo statistical data (most of which are obsolete) led Mr. Uvarov to the conclusion that Mr. Korolenko's figure was close to the truth, and that the figure of 5 million migratory workers was "very highly probable."****

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* L. Vesin, *The Significance of Industries Employing Migratory Workers*, *etc.*, *Dyelo* (*Business*), 1886, No. 7, and 1887, No. 2.

** *Statistics of Excise-Paying Trades*, *etc.*, *for 1897-1898*, St. Petersburg, 1900. Published by Head Office of Non-Assessed Taxes Department.

*** Gubernias: Moscow (1885, obsolete data), Tver (1896), Kostroma (1892), Smolensk (1895), Kaluga (1895), Pskov (1896). The sources have been indicated above. The data refer to all departure permits, male and female.

**** *Vestnik obshchestvennoi gigieny*, *sudebnoi i prakticheskoi meditsiny* (*Journal of Public Hygiene and of Forensic and Practical Medicine*), July, 1896. M. Uvarov: *The Influence of Industry Employing Migratory Workers on the Sanitary Conditions of Russia*. M. Uvarov gathered the data for 126 uyezds of 20 gubernias.

The question now arises: how large is the number of non-agricultural and of agricultural migratory workers? Mr. N. —on very boldly and quite mistakenly asserts that "the overwhelming majority of peasant outside employments are agricultural" (*Sketches*, p. 16). Chaslavsky, whom Mr. N. —on cites, expresses himself much more cautiously; he cites no data and limits himself to general remarks about the size of the areas which provide workers of one type or another. On the other hand, Mr. N. —on's railway passenger traffic data prove absolutely nothing, for non-agricultural workers also leave their homes mainly in spring and, moreover, use the railways much more than agricultural workers do.* We presume, on the contrary, that the majority (although not the "overwhelming" majority) of the migratory workers are probably non-agricultural workers. This view is based, firstly, on data concerning the distribution of passport revenue, and, secondly, on Mr. Vesin's data. Years ago Flerovsky, on the basis of the returns for 1862-63 showing the distribution of revenue from "miscellaneous duties" (more than one-third of which was obtained from the issue of passports), drew the conclusion that the greatest movement of peasants in search of work was from the metropolitan and the non-agricultural gubernias.** If we take the 11 non-agricultural gubernias which we combined above (part 2 of this section) into a single area, and which non-agricultural workers leave in large numbers, we shall see that these gubernias in 1885 contained only 18.7% of the population of all European Russia (in 1897—18.3%), whereas they accounted for 42.9% of the passport revenue in 1885 (in 1891—40.7%).*** Non-agricultural workers are provided by very many other gubernias, and we must therefore conclude that agricultural workers constitute less than half of the migrants. Mr. Vesin divides 38 gubernias of European Russia (which account for 90% of the departure

* Cf. above, p. 239, footnote.

** *The Condition of the Working Class in Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 400 and foll.

*** Data on passport revenue taken from *Returns for Russia* for 1884-85 and for 1896. In 1885, passport revenue in European Russia amounted to 37 rubles per 1,000 inhabitants; in the 11 non-agricultural gubernias it was 86 rubles per 1,000 inhabitants.

permits) into groups according to the different types of migration that predominate, and obtains the following results.*

Groups of gubernias	No. of departure permits issued in 1884 (thousands)			Population in 1885 (thousands)	Permits per 1,000 inhabitants
	Passports	Cards	Total		
I. 12 gubernias with predominance of non-agricultural migration	967.8	794.5	1,762.3	18,643.8	94
II. 5 gubernias—intermediate	423.9	299.5	723.4	8,007.2	90
III. 21 gubernias with predominance of agricultural migration	700.4	1,046.1	1,746.5	42,518.5	41
38 gubernias . . .	2,092.1	2,140.1	4,232.2	69,169.5	61

"These figures show that industries employing migratory workers are more prevalent in the first group than in the third. . . . These figures also show that there is a

* The last two columns in the table have been added by us. Group I includes the following gubernias: Archangel, Vladimir, Vologda, Vyatka, Kaluga, Kostroma, Moscow, Novgorod, Perm, St. Petersburg, Tver, Yaroslavl; group II: Kazan, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ryazan, Tula, Smolensk; group III: Bessarabia, Volhynia, Voronezh, Ekaterinoslav, Don, Kiev, Kursk, Orenburg, Orel, Penza, Podolsk, Poltava, Samara, Saratov, Simbirsk, Taurida, Tambov, Ufa, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov.—We must mention that this classification contains some inaccuracies exaggerating the proportion of migration for agricultural work. The gubernias of Smolensk, Nizhni-Novgorod and Tula should be included in group I (cf. *Agricultural Survey of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia for 1896*, Chapter XI—*Tula Gubernia Handbook for 1895*, Section VI, p. 10: the number of persons leaving for work away from their homes is given as 188,000—but Mr. Korolenko calculated that there were only 50,000 superfluous workers!—the 6 northern, non-black-earth uyezds accounting for 107,000 migrants.) Kursk Gubernia should be included in group II (S. Korolenko, loc. cit.: from 7 uyezds the majority leave for handicraft, and from the remaining 8 all leave for agricultural industries). Unfortunately, Mr. Vesin does not give the number, by gubernias, of departure permits issued.

diversity in the duration of absence to secure employment corresponding to the difference in the groups. Where non-agricultural industries employing migratory workers predominate, the length of absence is much greater" (*Dyelo*, 1886, No. 7, p. 134).

Finally, the statistics given above for excise-paying trades, etc., enable us to classify the residential permits issued in all the 50 gubernias of European Russia. Making the indicated corrections to Mr. Vesin's classification, and distributing among these same groups the 12 gubernias for which figures are lacking for 1884 (Olonets and Pskov gubernias to group I; the 9 Baltic and North-West gubernias to group II; and Astrakhan Gubernia to group III), we get the following picture:

Groups of gubernias	Total residential permits issued	
	1897	*1898**
I. 17 gubernias with predominance of non-agricultural migration . .	4,437,392	3,369,597
II. 12 gubernias—intermediate . . .	1,886,733	1,674,231
III. 21 gubernias with predominance of agricultural migration	3,009,070	2,765,762
Total for 50 gubernias	9,333,195	7,809,590

Migration for work away from home, according to these data, is much more prevalent in group I than in group III.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the mobility of the population is far greater in Russia's non-agricultural zone than in the agricultural. The number of non-agricultural migratory workers must be greater than that of the agricultural, and must be *not less than three million*.

The enormous and ever-increasing growth of migration is confirmed by all sources. Passport revenue increased

* Incidentally, the author of the survey of these data (loc. cit., Chapter VI, p. 639) ascribes the decrease in the number of passports issued in 1898 to the drop in the migration of summer workers to the southern gubernias resulting from the bad harvest and the widespread use of machinery in agriculture. This explanation is of no value whatever, since the number of residential permits issued declined least in group III and most in group I. Are the methods of registration in 1897 and in 1898 comparable? (*Note to 2nd edition.*)

from 2.1 million rubles in 1868 (1.75 million rubles in 1866) to 4.5 million rubles in 1893-94, i.e., it more than doubled. The number of passports and identity cards issued increased in Moscow Gubernia between 1877 and 1885 by 20% (males) and 53% (females); in Tver Gubernia, between 1893 and 1896 by 5.6%, in Kaluga Gubernia, between 1885 and 1895 by 23% (and the number of months of absence by 26%); in Smolensk Gubernia, from 100,000 in 1875 to 117,000 in 1885 and 140,000 in 1895; in Pskov Gubernia, from 11,716 in 1865-1875 to 14,944 in 1876 and to 43,765 in 1896 (males). In Kostroma Gubernia, in 1868, 23.8 passports and cards per 100 males were issued and 0.85 per 100 females, and in 1880—33.1 and 2.2. And so on and so forth.

Like the diversion of the population from agriculture to the towns, non-agricultural migration is a *progressive phenomenon*. It tears the population out of the neglected, backward, history-forgotten remote spots and draws them into the whirlpool of modern social life. It increases literacy among the population,* heightens their understanding,** and gives them civilised habits and requirements.***

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* Zhbankov: *The Influence of Industries Employing Migratory Workers*, *etc.*, p. 36 and foll. The percentage of literate males in the uyezds of Kostroma Gubernia from which there is migration is 55.9%; in the factory uyezds, 34.9%, in the settled (forest) uyezds, 25.8%; of literate females: 3.5%, 2.0% and 1.3%; school children: 1.44%, 1.43%, and 1.07%. Children in uyezds from which there is migration also attend school in St. Petersburg.

** "The literate Petersburgers take a positively better and more intelligent attitude to medical treatment" (ibid., 34), so that infectious diseases are not so fatal among them as in the "*little-cultured*" volosts (author's italics).

*** "The uyezds from which there is migration are much superior to the agricultural and forest localities in the arrangement of their lives.... The clothes of the Petersburgers are much cleaner, smarter and more hygienic.... The children are kept cleaner, and that is why the itch and other skin diseases are not so frequent among them" (ibid., 39. Cf. *Industries Employing Migratory Workers in Smolensk Gubernia*, p. 8). "The villages from which there is migration differ considerably from those from which there is none: houses, clothes, habits and amusements remind one more of town than of village life" (*Industries Employing Migratory Workers in Smolensk Gubernia*, p. 3). In the volosts of Kostroma Gubernia from which there is migration "you find paper, ink, pencils and pens in half the houses" (*Women's Country*, 67-68).

The peasants are induced to migrate by "motives of a higher order," i.e., by the greater smartness and polish of the Petersburger; they look for places where "things are better." "Life and work in Petersburg are considered to be easier than in the country."* "All country-folk are called *raw*, and the strange thing is that they are not in the least offended at this, but refer to themselves as such and complain that their parents did not send them to St. Petersburg to study. It should be stated, however, that these raw country people are not nearly so raw as those in the purely agricultural districts; they unconsciously copy the outward appearance and the habits of the Petersburgers; the light of the metropolis falls indirectly on them."** In Yaroslavl Gubernia (apart from examples of people growing rich) "there is still another cause which drives everyone from his home. That is—public opinion, which dubs a bumpkin to the end of his days anybody who has not lived in Petersburg, or somewhere else, but engages in agriculture or some handicraft, and such a man finds it hard to get a wife" (*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, II, 118). Migration to the town elevates the peasant as a citizen, releasing him from the host of patriarchal and personal relationships of dependence and social-estate divisions so strongly entrenched in the rural districts. . . .*** "A prime factor that fosters migration is the growing sense of human dignity among the people. Liberation from serf dependence, and the long-standing association of the more active section of the rural population with town life, have long since roused the desire in the Yaroslavl peasant to uphold his 'ego,' to get away from the state of poverty and dependence to which rural life has doomed him, to a state of sufficiency, independence and respect. . . . The peasant who lives on outside earnings feels freer and more on a level of equality with people belonging to other social estates, which is why the rural

* *Women's Country*, 26-27, 15.

** Ibid., p. 27.

*** For example, the Kostroma peasants are prompted to become registered as burghers, among other things by possible "corporal punishment," which is "even more awful to the flashy Petersburger than to the raw country dweller" (ibid., 58).

youth are so eager to go to the town" (*Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, II, 189-190).

Migration to the towns loosens the old patriarchal family ties and places women in a more independent position, on an equal footing with men. "Compared with those in the localities of no migration, the families of Soligalich and Chukhloma" (the uyezds of Kostroma Gubernia where migration is greatest) "are much less closely knit, not only in the sense of the patriarchal authority of the older, but even in the relations between parents and children, husband and wife. One cannot, of course, expect strong affection for their parents and attachment to the parental home from sons who are sent to Petersburg from the age of 12; unconsciously they become cosmopolitans: 'where it is well, there is my country.'"* "Accustomed to dispense with the authority and assistance of her husband, the Soligalich woman is quite unlike the downtrodden peasant woman of the agricultural zone: she is independent and self-reliant. . . . Wife-beating is a rare exception here. . . . Generally speaking, equality between women and men is to be observed almost everywhere and in all things."**

Last but not least,*** non-agricultural migration raises the wages not only of the wage-workers who migrate *but also of those who stay behind.*

This fact is most strikingly reflected in the general circumstance that the non-agricultural gubernias where wages are higher than in the agricultural gubernias, attract agricultural workers from the latter.**** Here are some interesting data for Kaluga Gubernia:

Groups of uyezds according to scale of migration	% of migratory male workers to total male population	Monthly earnings in rubles	
		of migratory industrialist	of rural worker employed by the year
I.	38.7	9	5.9
II.	36.3	8.8	5.3
III.	32.7	8.4	4.9

* Ibid., 88.

** *Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1890, No. 9, p. 142.

*** This expression is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

**** Cf. Chapter IV, §IV, pp. 270-271.

"These figures fully illustrate the phenomena . . . 1) that migration for work in industry helps to raise wages in agriculture, and 2) that it attracts the best forces of the population."* Not only money wages, but real wages also rise. In the group of uyezds from which not fewer than 60 out of every 100 working people migrate the average wage of the farm labourer employed by the year is 69 rubles, or 123 poods of rye; in the uyezds where from 40 to 60% migrate, it is 64 rubles, or 125 poods of rye; in the uyezds which supply less than 40% of the migrants, it is 59 rubles, or 116 poods of rye.** In these same groups of uyezds the percentage of letters of complaint about a shortage of labour steadily drops: 58%, 42% and 35%. In manufacturing industry wages are higher than in agriculture, and "the industries, according to the statements of numerous correspondents, help to develop new requirements (tea, calico, boots, clocks, etc.) among the peasant population, raise their general standard of living, and in this way bring about a rise in wages."*** Here is a typical view by a correspondent: "The shortage [of labour] is always acute, and the reason is that the suburban population is spoilt, it works in the railway workshops and serves on the railways. The nearness of Kaluga and its markets always attract the surrounding inhabitants, who come to sell eggs, milk, etc., and then engage in orgies of drunkenness in the taverns; the reason is that everybody wants to get the highest pay for the least work. To be an agricultural labourer is considered a *disgrace*: all strive to get to the town, where they swell the ranks of the proletariat and the riff-raff; the countryside, on the other hand, suffers from a shortage of capable and healthy labourers."**** We would be quite justified in describing this appraisal of industries employing migratory workers as *Narodist*. Mr. Zhbankov, for instance, while pointing out that those who migrate are not superfluous but "necessary" workers whose places are taken by entering peasants, considers it "obvious" that "such mutual replacements are

* *Statistical Survey of Kaluga Gubernia for 1896*, Sec. II, p. 48.
** Ibid., Sec. I, p. 27.
*** Ibid., p. 41.
**** Ibid., p. 40, author's italics.

very disadvantageous."* For whom, dear Mr. Zhbankov? "Life in the capitals cultivates many civilised habits of the lower order and an inclination to luxury and showiness, and this results in a useless (sic!!) waste of money"**, the expenditure on this showiness, etc., is largely "unproductive" (!!)*** Mr. Hertzenstein positively howls about the "sham culture," "the riotous living," "wild carousing," "orgies of drunkenness and filthy debauchery," etc.**** From the fact of wholesale migration the Moscow statisticians draw the outright conclusion that it is necessary to take "measures that would diminish the need for migratory labour."(*) Mr. Karyshev argues about migratory labour as follows: "Only an increase in the peasants' holdings to a size sufficient to provide the main (!) requirements of their families can solve this most serious problem of our national economy.(**)

And it does not occur to any of these serene-spirited gentlemen that before talking about "solving most serious problems," one must see to it that the peasants obtain complete freedom of movement, freedom to give up their land and leave the community, freedom to settle (without having

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* *Women's Country*, 39 and 8. "Will not these genuine peasants (newly-entered) exert a sobering influence, by the prosperous life they lead, upon the native population, who regard not the land but employment away from home as their main source of livelihood?" (p. 40). "Incidentally," remarks the author sadly, "we have already cited an example of the opposite influence." Here is the example. Vologda folk bought land and lived "very prosperously." "In reply to the question I put to one of them as to why, though well-off, he let his son go to St. Petersburg, he said: 'It's true we are not poor, but life is very dull here, and my son, seeing others go, wanted to get educated himself; at home too he was the one with knowledge'" (p. 25). Poor Narodniks! How can they help deploring the fact that even the example of well-to-do, land-purchasing muzhik farmer cannot "sober" the youth, who, in their desire to "get educated," flee from the "allotment that secures them their livelihood"!

** *The Influence of Industries Employing Migratory Workers, etc.*, 33, author's italics.

*** *Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1890, No. 9, 138.

**** *Russkaya Mysl* (not *Russky Vestnik*, but *Russkaya Mysl*),[162] 1887, No. 9, p. 163.

(*) *Residential Permits*, etc., p. 7.

(**) *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, No. 7, p. 18. So then, the "main" requirements are to be met by the allotment, and the rest apparently by "local employments" secured in the "countryside," which "suffers from a shortage of capable and healthy labourers"!

to pay "riddance" money) in any community, urban or rural, whatsoever!

And so the diversion of the population from agriculture is expressed, in Russia, in the growth of the towns (a growth partly obscured by home colonisation), suburbs, factory and commercial and industrial villages and townships, as well as in non-agricultural migration. All these processes, which have been and are rapidly developing in breadth and depth in the post-Reform period, are necessary components of capitalist development and are profoundly progressive as compared with the old forms of life.

III. THE GROWTH OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF WAGE-LABOUR

In considering the development of capitalism, perhaps the greatest importance attaches to the extent to which wage-labour is employed. Capitalism is that stage in the development of commodity-production in which labour-power, too, becomes a commodity. The main tendency of capitalism is to apply the sum-total of labour-power in the national economy to production only after it has been sold and has been purchased by the employers. Above, we made an attempt to show in detail how this tendency has manifested itself in post-Reform Russia; now, we must draw the necessary conclusions. Firstly, let us compute the data on the number of sellers of labour-power given in the preceding chapters and then (in the next section) describe the purchasers of labour-power.

The sellers of labour-power are provided by the country's working population engaged in the production of material values. It is estimated that this population numbers about 15.5 million adult male workers.* In Chapter II we showed

* The figure given in the *Combined Statistical Material*, etc. (published by Chancellory of the Committee of Ministers, 1894), is 15,546,618. This figure was reached in the following way. The urban population was taken as equal to the population not participating in the production of material values. The adult male peasant population was reduced by 7% (4.5% on military service and 2.5% in civilian service).

that the bottom group of the peasantry is nothing else than a rural proletariat; and we stated (p. 177, footnote) that the forms in which this proletariat sells its labour-power would be examined later. Let us now combine the categories of wage-workers previously enumerated: 1) agricultural wage-workers. These number about 3½ million (in European Russia). 2) Factory, mining and railway workers—about 1½ million. Total, five million professional wage-workers. Further: 3) building workers—about 1 million. 4) Lumber workers (tree-fellers, log trimmers, rafters, etc.), navvies, railway builders, goods loaders and unloaders, and in general all kinds of "unskilled" labourers in industrial centres. These number about 2 million.* 5) Workers occupied at home for capitalists, and also those working for wages in the manufacturing industries not included in "factory industry." These number about 2 million.

Total—*about ten million wage-workers*. If we deduct the women and children, say one-fourth,** we get *7½ million adult male wage-workers*, i.e., *about half* the total adult male population that is engaged in the production of material values*** in the country. Part of this vast mass of wage-workers have completely broken with the land, and live entirely by the sale of their labour-power. They include the great majority of factory (undoubtedly also of mining and railway) workers, then a section of the building and shipbuilding workers, and unskilled labourers; finally, a fairly large section of the workers employed in capitalist

* Above we saw that lumber workers alone are estimated at about 2 million. The number of workers employed in the last two groups of occupations we have indicated should be larger than the total number of non-agricultural migratory workers, for part of the building workers, unskilled labourers, particularly lumber workers are local and not migratory workers. And we have seen that the number of non-agricultural migratory workers is not less than 3 million.

** In factory industry, as we have seen, women and children constitute a little over ¼ of the total number of workers. In the mining, building and lumber industries, etc., few women and children are employed. In capitalist domestic industry, on the other hand, they are probably more numerous than men.

*** To avoid misunderstanding, let us make the reservation that we do not claim these figures to be statistically exact. We merely wish to show approximately the diversity of the forms of wage-labour and the numbers of those engaged in it.

manufactories and the inhabitants of non-agricultural centres engaged in home work for capitalists. The other, and larger, section has not yet broken with the land, covers its expenditures in part with the produce that comes from farming tiny plots of land, and, consequently, forms the type of allotment-holding wage-worker which we attempted to describe in detail in Chapter II. In earlier remarks it was shown that this vast mass of wage-workers has been formed mainly in the post-Reform period and that it continues to grow rapidly.

It is important to note the significance of our conclusion regarding the relative surplus-population (or reserve army of unemployed) created by capitalism. The data regarding the total number of wage-workers in all branches of the national economy bring out very clearly the basic error committed by the Narodnik economists on this point. As we have had occasion to observe elsewhere (*Studies*, pp. 38-42),* this error lies in the fact that the Narodnik economists (Messrs. V. V., N. —on and others), who have talked a great deal about capitalism "freeing" the workers, have not thought of investigating the concrete forms of capitalist over-population in Russia; as well as in the fact that they failed completely to understand that the very existence and development of capitalism in this country require an enormous mass of reserve workers. By means of paltry phrases and curious calculations as to the number of "factory" workers,** they have transformed one of the basic conditions for the development of capitalism into proof

* Cf. present edition, Vol. 2, "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism."—*Ed.*

** Let us recall the argument of Mr. N. —on about the "handful" of workers, and also the following, truly classic, calculation by Mr. V. V. (*Essays on Theoretical Economics*, p. 131). In the 50 gubernias of European Russia there are 15,547,000 adult male workers belonging to the peasant estate; of these, 1,020,000 (863,000 in factory industry+ 160,000 railway workers) are "united by capital"; the rest are the "agricultural population." With the "complete capitalisation of the manufacturing industries" "capitalist factory industry" will employ twice as many hands (13.3% in place of 7.6%, while the remaining 86.7% of the population "will remain on the land and be idle during half the year"). Obviously, comment could only spoil the impression created by this wonderful specimen of economic science and economic statistics.

that capitalism is impossible, is an error, is devoid of foundation, etc. Actually, however, Russian capitalism could never have developed to its present level, could not have survived a single year, had the expropriation of the small producers not created an army of many millions of wage-workers ready at the first call to satisfy the maximum demand of the employers in agriculture, lumbering, building, commerce and in the manufacturing, mining, and transport industries, etc. We say the maximum demand, because capitalism can only develop spasmodically, and consequently, the number of producers who need to sell their labour-power must always exceed capitalism's average demand for workers. We have now estimated the total number of the various categories of wage-workers, but in doing so do not wish to say that capitalism is in a position to give regular employment to them all. There is not, nor can there be, such regularity of employment in capitalist society, whichever category of wage-worker we take. Of the millions of migratory and resident workers a certain section is constantly in the reserve army of unemployed, and this reserve army now swells to enormous dimensions—in years of crisis, or if there is a slump in some industry in a particular district, or if there is a particularly rapid extension of machine production, which displaces workers—and now shrinks to a minimum, even causing that "shortage" of labour which is often the subject of complaint by employers in some industries, in some years, in some parts of the country. It is impossible to determine even approximately the number of unemployed in an average year, owing to the complete absence of anything like reliable statistics; but there is no doubt that the number must be a very large one, as is evidenced by both the tremendous fluctuations in capitalist industry, trade and agriculture, to which repeated reference was made above, and by the usual deficits in the budgets of the bottom-group peasants recorded by Zemstvo statistics. The increase in the number of peasants thrown into the ranks of the industrial and rural proletariat, and the increase in the demand for wage-labour, are two sides of one medal. As for the forms of wage-labour, they are extremely diverse in n capitalist society still everywhere enmeshed in survivals and institutions of the pre-

capitalist regime. It is a profound error to ignore this diversity of forms, and that is the error of those who, like Mr. V. V., argue that capitalism has "fenced off a corner for itself with some one to one-and-a-half million workers and never emerges from it."* Here we have large-scale machine industry instead of capitalism. But how arbitrarily and how artificially are these million and a half workers fenced off into a special "corner" that is supposedly in no way connected with the remaining spheres of wage-labour! As a matter of fact, the connection is a very close one, and it will be sufficient, in order to characterise it, to mention two basic features of the present economic system. Firstly, this system is based on money economy. The "power of money" manifests itself in full force in both industry and agriculture, in both town and country, but it reaches its full development, completely eliminates the remnants of patriarchal economy, is concentrated in a few gigantic institutions (banks) and is directly connected with large-scale social production only in the sphere of large-scale machine industry. Secondly, the economic system of today is based on the purchase and sale of labour-power. If we take even the smallest producers in agriculture or in industry, we will find that the one who does not hire himself out, or himself hire others, is the exception. But here again, these relationships reach full development and become completely separated from previous forms of economy only in large-scale machine industry. Hence, the "corner" which seems so small to some Narodnik actually embodies the quintessence of modern social relationships, and the population of this "corner," i.e., the proletariat, is, in the literal sense of the word, the vanguard of the whole mass of toilers and exploited.**

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* *Novoye Slovo*, 1896, No. 6, p. 21.

** Mutatis mutandis, the same may be said of the relation between wage-workers in large-scale machine industry and the rest of the wage-workers as the Webbs say of the relation between trade unionists in Britain and non-unionists: "The trade unionists number about 4 per cent of the total population ... the trade unionists number about 20 per cent of the adult male manual working class." But "Die Gewerkschaftler ... zählen ... in der Regel die Elite des Gewerbes in ihren Reihen. Der moralische und geistige Einfluss, den sie auf die Masse ihrer Berufsgenossen ausüben, steht deshalb ausser jedem Verhältniss zu ihrer numerischen Stärke" (S. & B. Webb: *Die Geschichte des britischen*

Therefore, only by examining the whole of the present economic system from the angle of the relationships that have grown up in this "corner" can one become clear about the main relations between the various groups of persons taking part in production, and, consequently, trace the system's main trend of development. On the other hand, whoever turns his back on this "corner" and examines economic phenomena from the angle of petty patriarchal production, is turned by the march of history into either an innocent dreamer or an ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie and the agrarians.

IV. THE FORMATION OF A HOME MARKET FOR LABOUR-POWER

To sum up the data given earlier on this problem we shall confine ourselves to the picture of the movement of workers over the territory of European Russia. Such a picture is supplied by the Department of Agriculture's publication* based on statements by employers. The picture of the movement of workers will give a general idea of how the home market for labour-power is being formed; using the material of the publication mentioned, we have only tried to draw a distinction between the movement of agricultural and non-agricultural workers, although the map appended to the publication and illustrating the movement of the workers does not show this distinction.

The main movements of *agricultural* workers are the following: 1) From the central agricultural gubernias to

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Trade Unionismus, Stuttgart, Dietz, 1895, S. S. 363, 365, 381) ["the trade unionists ... include, as a general rule, the picked men in each trade. The moral and intellectual influence which they exercise on the rest of their class is, therefore, out of all proportion to their numbers." (S. and B. Webb: *The History of Trade Unionism*, London, 902, pp. 409, 411, 430).—*Ed.*]

* "Agricultural and statistical information based on material obtained from farmers. Vol. V. *Hired Labour* on private-landowner farms and the movement of workers, according to a statistical and economic survey of agriculture and industry in European Russia." Compiled by S. A. Korolenko. Published by Department of Agriculture and Rural Industries, St. Petersburg, 1892.

the southern and eastern outer regions. 2) From the northern black-earth gubernias to the southern black-earth gubernias, from which, in turn, the workers go to the border regions (cf. Chapter III, § IX, pp. 237-238 and § X, pp. 242-243). 3) From the central agricultural gubernias to the industrial gubernias (cf. Chapter IV, § IV, pp. 270-271). 4) From the central and the south-western agricultural gubernias to the area of sugar-beet plantations (workers come in part to these places even from Galicia).

The main movements of *non-agricultural* workers are: 1) To the metropolitan cities and the large towns, chiefly from the non-agricultural gubernias, but to a considerable degree also from the agricultural gubernias. 2) To the industrial area, to the factories of Vladimir, Yaroslavl and other gubernias from the same localities. 3) To new centres of industry or to new branches of industry, to centres of non-factory industry, etc. These include the movement: a) to the beet-sugar refineries of the south-western gubernias; b) to the southern mining area; c) to jobs at the docks (Odessa, Rostov-on-Don, Riga, etc.); d) to the peat beds in Vladimir and other gubernias; e) to the mining and metallurgical area of the Urals; f) to the fisheries (Astrakhan, the Black Sea, Azov Sea, etc.); g) to shipbuilding, sailoring, lumbering and rafting jobs, etc.; h) to jobs on the railways, etc.

These are the main movements of the workers which, according to the evidence of employers, more or less materially affect the conditions of labour hire in the various localities. To appreciate more clearly the significance of these movements, let us compare them with the data on wages in the various districts from and to which the workers migrate. Confining ourselves to 28 gubernias in European Russia, we divide these into 6 groups according to the character of the movement of workers, and get the following data:*

* The other gubernias are omitted in order not to complicate our exposition with data that contribute nothing new to the subject under examination; furthermore, the other gubernias are either untouched by the main, mass, movements of workers (Urals, the North) or have their specific ethnographical, administrative and juridical features (the Baltic gubernias, the gubernias in the Jewish Pale of

Groups of gubernia according to character of movement of workers	Average wages for 10 years (1881-1891)					Extent of movement of workers			
	of annual worker		Money wages as % of total	of seasonal (summer) worker	of day labourer in summer, own board	Agricultural		Non-agricultural	
	Without keep	Including keep				Influx	Departure		Influx
	Rubles			Rubles	Kopeks				
1. Huge agricultural influx	93.00	143.50	64.8	55.67	82	About 1 million workers	—	—	Considerable number to mining area
2. Huge agricultural influx, departure inconsiderable . .	69.80	111.40	62.6	47.30	63	About 1 million workers	Small number	—	
3. Considerable agricultural departure; influx slight	58.67	100.67	58.2	41.50	53	Small number	over 300,000 workers	Small number	Small number
4. Huge departure, mostly agricultural but also non-agricultural . . .	51.50	92.95	55.4	35.64	47	—	over 1. 5 million workers		—
5. Huge non-agricultural departure. Agricultural influx slight . . .	63.43	112.43	56.4	44.00	55	Small number	Very small number	About 1¼ million workers	—
6. Huge non-agricultural influx; fairly considerable agricultural influx . .	79.80	135.80	58.7	53.00	64	Fairly considerable number	—	(to metropolitan cities)	Huge number

This table clearly shows us the basis of the process that creates the home market for labour-power and, consequently, the home market for capitalism. Two main areas, those most developed capitalistically, attract vast numbers of workers: the area of agricultural capitalism (the southern and the eastern outer regions), and the area of industrial capitalism (the metropolitan and the industrial gubernias). Wages are lowest in the area of departure, the central agricultural gubernias, where capitalism, both in agriculture and in industry, is least developed*; in the influx areas, on the other hand, wages rise for all types of work, as does also the percentage of money wage to total wage, i.e., money economy gains ground at the expense of natural economy. The intermediary areas, those between the areas of the greatest influx (and of the highest wages) and the area of departure (and of the lowest wages) reveal the mutual replacement of workers to which reference was made above: workers leave in such numbers that in the places of departure a shortage of labour is created which attracts workers from the more "poorly paid" gubernias.

In essence, the two-sided process shown in our table—that of the diversion of population from agriculture to industry (industrialisation of the population) and of the development of commercial-industrial, capitalist agriculture (industrialisation of agriculture)—epitomises all that

Settlement, the Byelorussian gubernias, etc.). Data from the publication cited above. Wage figures are the average for the gubernias in the respective groups; the day labourer's summer wage is the average for three seasons: sowing, haymaking and harvesting. The areas (1 to 6) include the following gubernias: 1) Taurida, Bessarabia and Don; 2) Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Samara, Saratov, Orenburg; 3) Simbirsk, Voronezh, Kharkov; 4) Kazan, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel, Kursk; 5) Pskov, Novgorod, Kaluga, Kostroma, Tver, Nizhni-Novgorod; 6) St. Petersburg, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Vladimir.

* Thus, the peasants flee in mass from the localities where patriarchal economic relationships are most prevalent, where labour-service and primitive forms of industry are preserved to the greatest extent, to localities where the "pillars" are completely decayed. They flee from "people's production" and pay no heed to the chorus of voices from "society" following in their wake. In this chorus two voices can be clearly distinguished: "They have little attachment!" comes the menacing bellow of the Black-Hundred Sobakevich.[163] "They have insufficient allotment land!" is the polite correction of the Cadet Manilov.

has been said above on the formation of a home market for capitalist society. The home market for capitalism is created by the parallel development of capitalism in agriculture and in industry,* by the formation of a class of rural and industrial employers, on the one hand, and of a class of rural and industrial wage-workers, on the other. The main streams of the movement of workers show the main forms of this process, but by far not all the forms; in what has gone before we have shown that the forms of this process differ in peasant and in landlord farming, in the different areas of commercial agriculture, in the different stages of the capitalist development of industry, etc.

How far this process is distorted and confused by the representatives of Narodnik economics is seen most clearly in §VI of Part 2 of Mr. N.—on's *Sketches*, which bears the significant heading: "The Influence of the Redistribution of the Social Productive Forces upon the Economic Position of the Agricultural Population." Here is how Mr. N.—on pictures this "redistribution": ". . . In capitalist . . . society, every increase in the productive power of labour entails the 'freeing' of a corresponding number of workers, who are compelled to seek some other employment; and since this occurs in all branches of production, and this 'freeing' takes place over the whole of capitalist society, the only thing left open to them is to turn to the means of production of which they have not yet been deprived, namely, the land" (p. 126). . . . "Our peasants have not been deprived of the land, and that is why they turn their efforts towards it. When they lose their employment in the factory, or are obliged to abandon their subsidiary domestic occupations, they see no other course but to set about the increased exploitation of the soil. All Zemstvo statistical returns

* Theoretical economics established this simple truth long ago. To say nothing of Marx, who pointed directly to the development of capitalism in agriculture as a process that creates a "home market for industrial capital" (*Das Kapital*, I², S. 776, Chapter 24, Sec. 5),[164] let us refer to Adam Smith. In chapter XI of Book I and Chapter IV of Book III of *The Wealth of Nations*, he pointed to the most characteristic features of the development of capitalist agriculture and noted the parallelism of this process with the process of the growth of the towns and the development of industry.

note the fact that the area under cultivation is growing. . ." (128).

As you see, Mr. N.—on knows of quite a special sort of capitalism that has never existed anywhere and that no economist could conceive of. Mr. N.—on's capitalism does not divert the population from agriculture to industry, does not divide the agriculturists into opposite classes. Quite the contrary. Capitalism "frees" the workers from industry and there is nothing left for "them" to do but to turn to the land, for "our peasants have not been deprived of the land"!! At the bottom of this "theory," which originally "redistributes" in poetic disorder all the processes of capitalist development, lie the ingenious tricks of all Narodniks which we have examined in detail previously: they lump together the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat; they ignore the growth of commercial farming; they concoct stories about "people's" "handicraft industries" being isolated from "capitalist" "factory industry," instead of analysing the consecutive forms and diverse manifestations of capitalism in industry.

V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BORDER REGIONS. HOME OR FOREIGN MARKET?

In Chapter I we pointed to the erroneous character of the theory that links the problem of a foreign market for capitalism with that of the realisation of the product (pp. 64-65 and foll.). Capitalism's need of a foreign market is by no means to be explained by the impossibility of realising the product on the home market, but by the circumstance that capitalism is in no position to go on repeating the same processes of production on the former scale, under unchanging conditions (as was the case under pre-capitalist regimes), and that it inevitably leads to an unlimited growth of production which overflows the old, narrow limits of earlier economic units. With the unevenness of development inherent in capitalism, one branch of production outstrips the others and strives to transcend the bounds of the old field of economic relations. Let us take, for example, the textile industry at the beginning of the post-Reform period. Being fairly

well developed capitalistically (manufacture beginning to pass into factory industry), it had gained complete command of the market of Central Russia. But the big factories, growing so rapidly, could no longer be satisfied with the former dimensions of the market; they began to seek a market further afield, among the new population colonising Novorossia, the south-east Transvolga region, North Caucasus, then Siberia, etc. The efforts of the big factories to reach out beyond the old markets are undoubted. Does it mean that the areas which served as these old markets could not, in general, consume a larger quantity of the products of the textile industry? Does it mean, for example, that the industrial and central agricultural gubernias cannot, in general, absorb a larger quantity of wares? No, it does not. We know that the differentiation of the peasantry, the growth of commercial agriculture and the increase in the industrial population have also expanded, and continue to expand, the home market of this old area. But this expansion of the home market is retarded by many factors (chief among them the retention of obsolete institutions which hinder the development of agricultural capitalism); and the factory owners will not, of course, wait until the capitalist development of other branches of the national economy catches up with that of the textile industry. The mill owners need a market at once, and if the backwardness of other branches of the national economy restricts the market in the old area, they will seek for a market in another area, or in other countries, or in the colonies of the old country.

What is a colony in the politico-economic sense? It was stated above that, according to Marx, the main features of this concept are the following: 1) the existence of unoccupied, free lands, easily accessible to settlers; 2) the existence of an established world division of labour, of a world market, thanks to which the colonies can specialise in the mass production of agricultural produce, receiving in exchange finished industrial goods "which they would have to produce themselves under other circumstances" (see above, p. 258, footnote, Chapter IV, § II). Reference has been made elsewhere to the fact that the southern and the eastern border regions of European Russia, which have been settled in the post-Reform period, bear the

distinctive features mentioned and constitute, in the economic sense, colonies of Central European Russia.* The term colony is still more applicable to the other outer regions, for example, the Caucasus. Its economic "conquest" by Russia took place much later than the political conquest; and to this day this economic conquest has not been completed to the full. In the post-Reform period there has been, on the one hand, an intensive colonisation of the Caucasus,** an extensive ploughing up of the land (particularly in the North Caucasus) by colonists producing wheat, tobacco, etc., for sale, and attracting masses of rural wage-workers from Russia. On the other hand, native age-old "handicraft" industries, which are declining due to the competition of wares from Moscow, are being eliminated. There has been a decline in the ancient gunsmith's craft due to the competition of imported Tula and Belgian wares, a decline in handicraft iron-work due to the competition of the imported Russian products, as well as in the handicraft processing of copper, gold and silver, clay, fats and soda, leather, etc.*** These products are turned out more cheaply in Russian factories, which supply the Caucasus with their wares. There has been a decline in the making of drinking-horns because of the decay of the feudal system in Georgia and of the steady disappearance of her memorable feasts; there has been a decline in the headgear industry due to the replacement of Asiatic dress by European; there has been a decline in the production of wine-skins and pitchers for local wine, which for the first time is now being sold (giving rise to the barrel-making trade) and has in turn captured the Rus-

* "... It was thanks exclusively to them, thanks to these forms of people's production, and on the basis of them that the whole of South Russia was colonised and settled." (Mr. N.—on, *Sketches*, 284). How wonderfully broad and comprehensive is the term: "forms of people's production"! It covers whatever you like: patriarchal peasant farming, labour-service, primitive handicrafts, small commodity-production, and those typically capitalist relations within the peasant community that we saw above in the data on the Taurida and Samara gubernias (Chapter II), etc., etc.

** Cf. articles by Mr. P. Semyonov in *Vestnik Finansov*, 1897, No. 21, and by V. Mikhailovsky in *Novoye Slovo*, June 1897.

*** See article by K. Khatisov in Vol. II of *Reports and Investigations of Handicraft Industry*, and by P. Ostryakov in Vol. V. of *Transactions of the Handicraft Commission*.

sian market. Russian capitalism has thus been drawing the Caucasus into the sphere of world commodity circulation, obliterating its local peculiarities—the remnants of ancient patriarchal isolation—and *providing itself with a market* for its factories. A country thinly populated at the beginning of the post-Reform period, or populated by mountaineers living outside world economy and even outside history, has been turning into a land of oil industrialists, wine merchants, big wheat and tobacco growers, and Mr. Coupon[165] has been ruthlessly divesting the proud mountaineer of his picturesque national costume and dressing him in the livery of a European flunkey (Gleb Uspensky).[166] The process of rapid colonisation in the Caucasus and of the rapid growth of its agricultural population has been accompanied by a process (obscured by this growth) of the diversion of the population from agriculture to industry. The urban population of the Caucasus increased from 350,000 in 1863 to about 900,000 in 1897 (the total population increased between 1851 and 1897 by 95%). There is no need to add that the same thing has taken place and continues in both Central Asia and Siberia, etc.

Thus, the question naturally arises, where is the borderline between the home and the foreign market? To take the political boundaries of the state would be too mechanical a solution—and would it be a solution? If Central Asia is the home market and Persia the foreign market, to which category do Khiva and Bokhara belong? If Siberia is the home market and China the foreign market, to which category does Manchuria belong? Such questions are not of great importance. What is important is that capitalism cannot exist and develop without constantly expanding the sphere of its domination, without colonising new countries and drawing old non-capitalist countries into the whirlpool of world economy. And this feature of capitalism has been and continues to be manifested with tremendous force in post-Reform Russia.

Hence, the process of the formation of a market for capitalism has two aspects, namely, the development of capitalism in depth, i.e., the further growth of capitalist agriculture and industry in the given, definite and enclosed territory—and the development of capitalism in breadth,

i.e., the extension of the sphere of the capitalist domination to new territory. In accordance with the plan of the present work, we have confined ourselves almost exclusively to the first aspect of the process, and for this reason we consider it particularly necessary to stress the point here that its other aspect is of exceptionally great importance. Anything like a complete study of the process of colonisation of the border regions and of the expansion of Russian territory, from the point of view of capitalist development, would require a special work. Suffice it to mention here that Russia is in a particularly favoured position as compared with other capitalist countries, due to the abundance of free land accessible for colonisation in her border regions.* To say nothing of Asiatic Russia we have also in European Russia border regions which, because of their exceeding remoteness and bad means of communication, are still very poorly connected economically with central Russia. Let us take, for instance, the "Far North"—Archangel Gubernia; the boundless stretches of territory and their natural resources are still exploited very slightly. One of the principal local products, timber, was until recently exported mainly to England. In this respect, therefore, that part of European Russia was a foreign market for Britain without being a home market for Russia. The Russian entre-

* The circumstance indicated in the text has another aspect. The development of capitalism in depth in the old, long-inhabited territories is retarded because of the colonisation of the outer regions. The solution of the contradictions inherent in, and produced by, capitalism is temporarily postponed because of the fact that capitalism can easily develop in breadth. Thus, the simultaneous existence of the most advanced forms of industry and of semi-medieval forms of agriculture is undoubtedly a contradiction. If Russian capitalism had possessed no range for expansion beyond the bounds of the territory already occupied at the beginning of the post-Reform period, this contradiction between capitalist large-scale industry and the archaic institutions in rural life (the tying of the peasants to the land, etc.) would have had to lead quickly to the complete abolition of these institutions, to the complete clearing of the path for agricultural capitalism in Russia. But the possibility (for the mill owner) of seeking and finding a market in the outer regions in process of colonisation and the possibility (for the peasant) of moving to new territory, mitigates the acuteness of this contradiction and delays its solution. It goes without saying that *such* a deceleration of the growth of capitalism is equivalent to preparing its even greater extension in the near future.

preneurs naturally envied the British, and now, with the extension of the railway line to Archangel, they are jubilant at the prospect of "elevated moods and business activity in various branches of industry in the region."*

VI. THE "MISSION" OF CAPITALISM

We still have, in conclusion, to sum up on the question which in literature has come to be known as that of the "mission" of capitalism, i.e., of its historical role in the economic development of Russia. Recognition of the progressiveness of this role is quite compatible (as we have tried to show in detail at every stage in our exposition of the facts) with the full recognition of the negative and dark sides of capitalism, with the full recognition of the profound and all-round social contradictions which are inevitably inherent in capitalism, and which reveal the historically transient character of this economic regime. It is the Narodniks—who exert every effort to show that an admission of the historically progressive nature of capitalism means an apology for capitalism—who are at fault in underrating (and sometimes in even ignoring) the most profound contradictions of Russian capitalism, by glossing over the differentiation of the peasantry, the capitalist character of the evolution of our agriculture, and the rise of a class of rural and industrial allotment-holding wage-labourers, by glossing over the complete predominance of the lowest and worst forms of capitalism in the celebrated "handicraft" industries.

The progressive historical role of capitalism may be summed up in two brief propositions: increase in the productive forces of social labour, and the socialisation of that labour. But both these facts manifest themselves in extremely diverse processes in different branches of the national economy.

The development of the productive forces of social labour is to be observed in full relief only in the epoch of large-scale machine industry. Until that highest stage of capitalism was reached, there still remained hand production and primitive technique, which developed quite spontaneously and exceedingly slowly. The post-Reform epoch differs radi-

* *Productive Forces*, XX, 12.

cally in this respect from previous epochs in Russian history. The Russia of the wooden plough and the flail, of the water-mill and the hand-loom, began rapidly to be transformed into the Russia of the iron plough and the threshing machine, of the steam-mill and the power-loom. An equally thorough transformation of technique is seen in every branch of the national economy where capitalist production predominates. This process of transformation must, by the very nature of capitalism, take place in the midst of much that is uneven and disproportionate: periods of prosperity alternate with periods of crisis, the development of one industry leads to the decline of another, there is progress in one aspect of agriculture in one area and in another aspect in another area, the growth of trade and industry outstrips the growth of agriculture, etc. A large number of errors made by Narodnik writers spring from their efforts to prove that this disproportionate, spasmodic, feverish development is not development.*

Another feature of the development by capitalism of the social productive forces is that the growth of the means of production (productive consumption) outstrips by far the growth of personal consumption: we have indicated on more than one occasion how this is manifested in agriculture and in industry. This feature springs from the general

* "Let us see what the further development of capitalism could bring even if we succeeded in sinking Britain to the bottom of the sea and in taking her place" (Mr. N.—on, Sketches, 210). The cotton industry of Britain and America, which meets 2/3 of the world's demand, employs only a little over 600,000 people all told. "And it follows, that even if we got a considerable part of the world market ... capitalism would still be unable to exploit the whole mass of labouring people which it is now continuously depriving of employment. What, indeed, are some 600,000 British and American workers compared with millions of peasants left for months on end without employment?" (211).

"History has gone on till now, but goes on no longer." Till now every step in the development of capitalism in the textile industry has been accompanied by the differentiation of the peasantry, by the growth of commercial agriculture and agricultural capitalism, by the diversion of population from agriculture to industry, by "millions of peasants" turning to building, lumbering and all sorts of other non-agricultural work for hire, by the migration of masses of people to the outer regions and by the conversion of these regions into a market for capitalism. All this, however, has only gone on till now; nothing of the sort occurs any longer!

laws of the realisation of the product in capitalist society, and fully conforms to the antagonistic nature of this society.*

The socialisation of labour by capitalism is manifested in the following processes. Firstly, the very growth of commodity-production destroys the scattered condition of small economic units that is characteristic of natural economy and draws together the small local markets into an enormous national (and then world) market. Production for oneself is transformed into production for the whole of society; and the greater the development of capitalism, the stronger becomes the contradiction between this collective character of production and the individual character of appropriation. Secondly, capitalism replaces the former scattered production by an unprecedented concentration both in agriculture and in industry. That is the most striking and outstanding, but not the only, manifestation of the feature of capitalism under review. Thirdly, capitalism eliminates the forms of personal dependence that constituted an inalienable component of preceding systems of economy. In Russia, the progressive character of capitalism in this respect is particularly marked, since the personal dependence of the producer existed in our country (and partly continues to exist to this day), not only in agriculture, but in manufacturing industry ("factories" employing serf labour), in the mining and metallurgical industries, in the fishing industry,

* His ignoring of the significance of the means of production and his careless attitude to "statistics" have led to the following utterly untenable statement by Mr. N.—on: "... all (!) capitalist production in the sphere of manufacturing industry at most produces new values to the amount of not more than 400 to 500 million rubles" (*Sketches*, 328). Mr. N.—on bases this calculation on the returns of the three-per-cent tax and the extra profits tax, without stopping to think whether such returns can cover "all capitalist production in the sphere of manufacturing industry." Moreover, he takes returns which (on his own admission) do not cover the mining and metallurgical industries, and yet he includes in "new values" only surplus-value and variable capital. Our theoretician has forgotten that, in those branches of industry which produce goods for personal consumption, constant capital also represents new value *for society* and is exchanged for the variable capital and surplus-value of those branches of industry which produce means of production (mining and metallurgical industries, building, lumbering, railway construction, etc.). Had Mr. N.—on not confused the number of "factory" workers with the total number of workers capitalistically employed in manufacturing industry, he would easily have perceived the errors in his calculations.

etc.* Compared with the labour of the dependent or bonded peasant, the labour of the hired worker is progressive in all branches of the national economy. Fourthly, capitalism necessarily creates mobility of the population, something not required by previous systems of social economy and impossible under them on anything like a large scale. Fifthly, capitalism constantly reduces the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture (where the most backward forms of social and economic relationships always prevail), and increases the number of large industrial centres. Sixthly, capitalist society increases the population's need for association, for organisation, and lends these organisations a character distinct from those of former times. While breaking down the narrow, local, social-estate associations of medieval society and creating fierce competition, capitalism at the same time splits the whole of society into large groups of persons occupying different positions in production, and gives a tremendous impetus to organisation within each such group.** Seventhly, all the above-mentioned changes effected in the old economic system by capitalism inevitably lead also to a change in the mentality of the population. The spasmodic character of economic development, the rapid transformation of the methods of production and the enormous concentration of production, the disappearance of all forms of personal dependence and patriarchalism in relationships, the mobility of the population, the influence of the big industrial centres, etc.—all this cannot but lead to a profound change in the very character of the producers,

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* For example, in one of the principal centres of the Russian fishing industry, the Murmansk coast, the "age-old" and truly "time-hallowed" form of economic relationships was the "pokrut,"[167] which was already fully established in the 17th century and continued almost without change until recent times. "The relations between the pokrutmen and their masters are not limited to the time spent at the fisheries: on the contrary, they embrace the whole life of the pokrutmen, who are permanently dependent economically on their masters" (*Material on Artels in Russia*, Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1874, p. 33). Fortunately, in this branch of industry also, capitalism is apparently marked by a "contemptuous attitude to its own historical past." "Monopoly ... is giving way to ... the capitalist organisation of the industry with hired labourers" (*Productive Forces*, V, pp. 2-4).

** Cf. *Studies*, p. 91, footnote 85, p. 198. (See present edition, Vol. 2, "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism."—*Ed.*)

and we have had occasion to note the corresponding observations of Russian investigators.

Turning now to Narodnik economics, with whose representatives we have constantly had to polemise, we may sum up the causes of our differences with them as follows. First, we cannot but regard as absolutely wrong the Narodniks' very conception of the process of capitalist development in Russia, and their notion of the system of economic relationships that preceded capitalism in Russia; and what is particularly important, from our point of view, is their ignoring of the capitalist contradictions in the structure of peasant economy (both agricultural and industrial). Furthermore, whether the development of capitalism in Russia is slow or rapid, depends entirely on what we compare this development with. If we compare the pre-capitalist epoch in Russia with the capitalist (and that is the comparison which is needed for arriving at a correct solution of the problem), the development of social economy under capitalism must be considered as extremely rapid. If, however, we compare the present rapidity of development with that which could be achieved with the general level of technique and culture as it is today, the present rate of development of capitalism in Russia really must be considered as slow. And it cannot but be slow, for in no single capitalist country has there been such an abundant survival of ancient institutions that are incompatible with capitalism, retard its development, and immeasurably worsen the condition of the producers, who "suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development.[168] Finally, perhaps the profoundest cause of disagreement with the Narodniks is the difference in our fundamental views on social and economic processes. When studying the latter, the Narodnik usually draws conclusions that point to some moral; he does not regard the diverse groups of persons taking part in production as creators of various forms of life; he does not set out to present the sum-total of social and economic relationships as the result of the mutual relations between these groups, which have different interests and different historical roles. . . . If the writer of these lines has succeeded in providing some material for clarifying these problems, he may regard his labours as not having been fruitless.

APPENDIX I

Combined table of statistics on small

1) A dash signifies zero. Empty space signifies "no information".
2) The industries are given in the order of successive increase in the average number
3) For industries No. 31 and No. 33 the value of processed raw material is given, and
4) The average number of horses per owner, according to the data for 19 industries, is
5) The percentage of peasants who cultivate their land with hired labour, according to

No. of industry	Name of industry	Total number of establishments				Total number of workers				Aggregate output in rubles				No. of establishm employing wage-wor		
		Total	By grades			Total	By grades			Total	By grades			Total	By grade	
			I	II	III		I	II	III		I	II	III		I	II
1	Cart	76	40	25	11	127	40	50	37	30,100	9,500	10,500	10,100	4	—	1
2	Toy (turners)	47	22	17	8	83	22	34	27	13,500	2,900	5,300	5,300	7	—	4
3	Spectacle-frame	27	12	8	7	49	12	16	21	11,550	3,000	4,300	4,250	1	—	—
4	Joinering	274	196	66	12	576	277	213	86	96,800	48,650	33,850	14,300	16	—	5
5	Basket	121	35	52	34	265	35	104	126	40,860	4,100	16,250	20,510	—	—	—
6	Guitar	29	9	12	8	61	9	24	28	16,000	2,025	5,900	8,075	—	—	—
7	Toy (in Sergiyevsky Posad)	41	28	8	5	95	48	24	23	27,330	13,130	8,000	6,200	5	—	3
8	Mirror	142	99	27	16	332	134	89	109	67,350	19,170	18,180	30,000	32	3	13
9	Hot-house	74	29	36	9	188	50	100	38	54,400	11,900	30,090	12,410	34	5	21
	Total for 9 industries (Nos. 1-9)	*831*	*470*	*251*	*110*	*1,176*	*627*	*654*	*495*	*357,890*	*114,375*	*132,370*	*111,145*	*99*	*8*	*47*
10	Leather (raw hides)	10	4	3	3	27	9	9	9	29,890	2,450	6,040	21,400	8	2	3
11	Leather (large hides)	22	7	11	4	63	10	31	22	78,911	6,942	34,135	37,834	6	—	3
12	Tassel	15	8	4	3	42	16	12	14	19,700	7,000	6,600	6,100	1	—	1
13	Blacksmithery	42	9	24	9	133	18	72	43	25,700	3,100	13,900	8,700	28	3	17
14	Varnishing	40	22	9	9	130	44	25	61	37,400	7,400	5,100	24,900	13	3	1
15	Pottery	121	72	33	16	452	174	144	134	224,800	81,500	71,800	71,500	60	28	16
16	Furriery	28	14	8	6	105	37	32	36	9,167	3,261	2,821	3,085	—	—	—
17	Cap	25	8	10	7	92	13	35	44	40,450	7,500	14,750	18,200	4	—	1
18	Hook	45	22	16	7	198	54	77	67	50,250	12,150	19,200	18,900	22	6	9
	Total for 9 industries (Nos. 10-18)	*348*	*166*	*118*	*64*	*1,242*	*375*	*437*	*430*	*516,268*	*131,303*	*174,346*	*210,619*	*142*	*42*	*51*
19	Copper	139	70	58	11	716	138	348	230	441,700	44,500	219,200	178,000	86	19	56
20	Brush	150	81	59	10	835	264	426	145	233,000	62,300	122,400	48,300	94	32	52
21	Boot	64	39	14	11	362	116	99	147	291,490	87,740	82,990	120,760	41	16	14
22	Brick	233	167	43	23	1,402	486	317	609	357,000	119,800	79,000	158,500	105	43	39
23	Harness	32	17	10	5	194	49	57	88	70,300	16,200	18,600	35,500	26	11	10
24	Starch	68	15	42	11	429	75	261	93	129,808	12,636	55,890	61,282	68	15	42
25	Leather (small hides)	11	2	5	4	75	4	25	46	77,570	800	28,450	48,320	9	—	5
26	Toy (metal toys)	16	6	5	5	117	10	38	69	56,400	3,800	18,600	34,000	13	3	5
27	Hat	54	16	20	18	450	35	113	302	127,650	8,950	32,500	86,200	45	7	20
28	Art Painting	37	12	14	11	313	53	111	149	229,000	39,500	81,500	108,000	32	7	14
	Total for 10 industries (Nos. 19-28)	*804*	*425*	*270*	*109*	*4,893*	*1,220*	*1,795*	*1,878*	*2,013,918*	*395,926*	*739,130*	*878,862*	*519*	*153*	*257*
29	Sieve-plaiting	10	5	3	2	115	26	28	61	69,300	7,300	15,000	47,000	7	2	3
30	Tray	29	7	12	10	340	15	67	258	102,530	4,130	22,400	76,000	23	2	11
31	Horn (in Dmitrov Uyezd)	22	12	5	5	345	52	76	217	201,400	24,400	44,000	133,000	15	5	5
32	Pin	10	6	3	1	163	53	35	75	54,800	16,900	9,900	28,000	10	6	3
33	Horn (in Bogorodsk Uyezd)	31	9	11	11	53	80	164	309	149,900	22,100	43,100	84,700	31	9	11
	Total for 5 industries (Nos. 29-33)	*102*	*39*	*34*	*29*	*1,516*	*226*	*370*	*920*	*577,930*	*74,830*	*134,400*	*368,700*	*86*	*24*	*33*
	Total for 33 industries	*2,085*	*1,100*	*673*	*312*	*9,472*	*2,448*	*3,256*	*3,723*	*3,466,006*	*716,434*	*1,180,246*	*1,596,326*	*846*	*227*	*388*
34	Abacus	91	55	29	7	171(?)	82	42	38	46,670	13,750	16,470	16,450	?		
35	Fringe	39	13	15	8	88	16	34	38	?				14	—	8
36	Tailoring	43	18	17	8	286	62	123	101	?				34	9	17
37	Porcelain	20	6	9	5	1,861	108	621	1,132	1,399,000	69,000	435,000	895,000	20	6	9

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(*to Chap. V, p. 345*)

peasant industries of Moscow Gubernia

of workers (family and hired combined) for the whole industry, per establishment.
constitutes 50-57% of the value of the wares, i.e., of the aggregate output.
1.4 and by grades: I) 1.1; II) 1.5; III) 2.0.
the data for 16 industries, is 12% and by grades: I) 4.5%; II) 16.7%; III) 27.3%.

ents kers	No. of wage-workers				Average number of horses per owner				% of peasants who cultivate their land with hired labour				Which establishments are placed in grades			No. of industry
s	Total	By grades			Total	By grades			Total	By grades						
III		I	II	III		I	II	III		I	II	III	I	II	III	
3	7	—	1	6	1.2	0.9	1.3	1.9	1	—	—	9	with 1 worker	with 2 workers	with 3 wkrs and more	1
3	10	—	4	6	1.2	0.8	1.3	2.0	—	—	—	—		same as in No. 1		2
1	2	—	—	2										same as in No. 1		3
11	48	—	7	41									with 1-2 workers	with 3-4 workers	with 5 wkrs and more	4
—	—	—	—	—	0.9	1	0.8	1	—	—	—	—		same as in No. 1		5
—	—	—	—	—	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	—	—	—	—		same as in No. 1		6
2	9	—	4	5	0.7	0.6	0.5	1.4	—	—	—	—	with 1-2 workers	with 3 workers	with 4-5 workers	7
16	84	3	20	61	1.4	1.1	1.5	2.5	9.9	—	7.4	75		same as in No. 4		8
8	42	6	23	13	2.2	1.7	2.5	2.7					with 1-3 stoves	with 4-6 stoves	with 7-12 stoves	9
44	*202*	*9*	*59*	*134*												
3	13	2	6	5									proc. 50-150 hides	proc. 300-600 hides	processing 1000 hides	10
3	16	—	8	8									proc. 60-200 hides	proc. 250-800 hides	processing 1200-1700 hides	11
—	2	—	2	—	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.6	—	—	—	—	with 2 workers	with 3 workers	with 4-6 workers	12
8	32	3	17	12										same as in No. 12		13
9	43	3	2	38	1.2	0.8	1.0	2.3	—	—	—	—	pictorial and sawing	making wares for booths	making wares for shops	14
16	149	33	29	87									with 1-3 workers	with 4-5 workers	with 6 wkrs and more	15
—	—	—	—	—	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.6	—	—	—	—	with 2-3 workers	with 4 workers	with 5 wkrs and more	16
3	9	—	2	7									with 1-2 workers	with 3-4 workers	with 5 wkrs and more	17
7	70	7	24	39	1.1	0.9	1.0	2.1	27.9	9.1	31.2	71.4	with 2-3 workers	with 4-7 workers	with 8-12 workers	18
49	*334*	*48*	*90*	*196*												
11	428	22	204	202									with 1-3 workers	with 4-11 workers	with 12 wkrs and more	19
10	343	47	188	108	1.2	1	1.5	1.8	39	20	54	91		same as in No. 19		20
11	217	47	68	102	1.5	1.3	1.6	2.1	12	8	21	19	with 1-5 workers	with 6-10 workers	with 11 wkrs and more	21
23	835	92	186	557										same as in No. 21		22
5	135	19	36	80									with 2-4 workers	with 5-7 workers	with 13 wkrs and more	23
11	277	45	165	67	3.4	2.7	3.2	5.3					using 1-2 sieves	using 3 sieves	using 4 sieves and drum	24
4	59	—	23	46									processing 500 hides each	processing 5-10 thous. hides each	processing 18-23 thous. hides each	25
5	94	3	32	59	1.2	0.6	2	1.2	25	—	20	60	with 1-2 workers	with 6-9 workers	with 11-18 workers	26
18	372	9	83	280									with 1-3 workers	with 4-9 workers	with 10 and more	27
11	220	21	74	125									with 1-5 workers	with 6-9 workers	with 10 and more	28
109	*2,990*	*305*	*1,059*	*1,626*												
2	58	3	12	43	1.8	1	2.3	3	60	20	100	100	making plaited nets	making plaited and woven nets	same, bigger	29
10	284	2	44	238									with 1-3 workers	with 4-8 workers	with 9 and more	30
5	302	31	66	205									with 5-11 workers	with 12-19 workers	with 20 and more	31
1	134	35	26	73									with 7-10 workers	with 11-13 workers	over 13	32
11	518	66	150	302										same as in No. 31		33
29	*1,296*	*137*	*298*	*861*												
231	*4,822*	*499*	*1,506*	*2,817*												
	9				1.1	0.9	1.1	2.8	2.2	—	—	28	turners	joiners	moulders	34
6	30	—	8	22	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2					with 1 lathe	with 2-3 lathes	with 4 and more	35
8	191	20	89	82	1.3	1	1.2	2	28	5.5	29.4	75	with 2-5 workers	with 6-9 workers	with 10-16 workers	36
5	1,817	96	601	1,120									having up to 30 workers	having 31-104 workers	having 120 and more	37

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Category (rubles)	Number of establishments	(Approximately) Total income per establishment	(Approximately) Total income per establishment	Category (rubles)	Number of establishments	(Approximately) Total income per establishment	(Approximately) Total income per establishment
Up to 10	127	10	1,270	Up to 600	40	550	22,000
" " 20	139	20	2,780	" " 700	38	650	24,700
" " 50	2,110	35	73,850	" " 800	22	750	16,500
" " 100	3,494	75	262,050	" " 900	20	850	17,000
" " 200	1,414	150	212,100	" " 1,000	17	950	16,150
" " 300	602	250	150,050	1,000 and over	19	1,500	28,500
" " 400	208	350	72,800	2,000-3,000	2	2,500	5,000
" " 500	112	450	50,400				
All establishments					8,364	—	955,150

We now give a summary showing the division of the handicraftsmen according to the income of their establishments.

determine the latter, another approximate calculation had to be made. Knowing the division of families according to the number of family workers (and separately—according to the number of wage-workers employed), we assumed that the lower the income of a family, the smaller its size (i.e., the smaller the number of family workers per establishment) and the fewer the establishments employing wage-workers. On the contrary, the higher the income per family, the larger the number of establishments employing wage-workers and the larger the family, that is, the number of family workers per establishment is larger. Obviously, this assumption is the most favourable for anyone who might want to contest our conclusions. In other words, whatever other assumption was made, it would only help to reinforce our conclusions.

APPENDIX II (*to Chapter VII, p. 456*)

Table of statistics on the factory industry of European Russia

Years	Data on the different numbers of trades regarding which there has been information at various times			Data on 34 trades		
	No. of factories	Aggregate output (thousand rubles)	No. of workers	No. of factories	Aggregate output (thousand rubles)	No. of workers
1863	11,810	247,614	357,835	—	—	—
1864	11,984	274,519	353,968	5,792	201,458	272,385
1865	13,686	286,842	380,638	6,175	210,825	290,222
1866	6,891	276,211	342,473	5,775	239,453	310,918
1867	7,082	239,350	315,759	6,934	235,757	313,759
1868	7,238	253,229	331,027	7,091	249,310	329,219
1869	7,488	287,565	343,308	7,325	283,452	341,425
1870	7,853	318,525	356,184	7,691	313,517	354,063
1871	8,149	334,605	374,769	8,005	329,051	372,608
1872	8,194	357,145	402,365	8,047	352,087	400,325
1873	8,245	351,530	406,964	8,103	346,434	405,050
1874	7,612	357,699	411,057	7,465	352,036	399,376
1875	7,555	368,767	424,131	7,408	362,931	412,291
1876	7,419	361,616	412,181	7,270	354,376	400,749
1877	7,671	379,451	419,414	7,523	371,077	405,799
1878	8,261	461,558	447,858	8,122	450,520	432,728
1879	8,628	541,602	482,276	8,471	530,287	466,515
1885	17,014	864,736	615,598	6,232	479,028	436,775
1886	16,590	866,804	634,822	6,088	464,103	442,241
1887	16,723	910,472	656,932	6,103	514,498	472,575
1888	17,156	999,109	706,820	6,089	580,451	505,157
1889	17,382	1,025,056	716,396	6,148	574,471	481,527
1890	17,946	1,033,296	719,634	5,969	577,861	493,407
1891	16,770	1,108,770	738,146	—	—	—

Notes

1. Here are the data on the factory industry of European Russia in the post-Reform era that we have been able to find in official publications such as: *Statistical Chronicle of the Russian Empire*, St. Petersburg, 1866. I.—*Returns and Material of the Ministry of Finance*, 1866, No. 4, April, and 1867, No. 6, June.—*The Ministry of Finance Yearbook*, Vols. I, VIII, X and XII.—*Collection of Data on Factory Industry in Russia*, published by Department of Commerce and Manufacture for 1885-1891. All these data are drawn from one and the same source, namely, the reports supplied by owners of factories and works to the Ministry of Finance. The significance of these data and their values are dealt with in detail in the text.

2. The 34 trades for which data are given lor 1864-1879 and 1885-1890 are the following: cotton-spinning; cotton-weaving; flax-spinning; calico-printing; hemp-spinning and rope-making; wool-spinning; cloth; wool-weaving; silk-weaving and ribbon; brocade, galloon; gold-spinning and metal-beating; knitted wear; dyeing; finishing; oil-proofing and varnishing; stationery; wall-paper; rubber; chemical and dye; cosmetic; vinegar; mineral-water; match; sealing-wax and varnish; leather, suede and morocco; glue; stearin; soap and tallow-candle; wax-candle; glass, crystal and mirror; porcelain and faience; machine-building; iron-founding; copper and bronze; wire, nail, and some small metal wares.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

APPENDIX III (*to Chapter VII, p. 519*)

The chief centers of factory industry in European Russia

Gubernia	Uyezd (or town)	Settlement	1879			1890			No. of inhabitants according to 1897 census
			No. of factories	Aggregate output in thousand rubles	No. of workers	No. of factories	Aggregate output in thousand rubles	No. of workers	
Moscow	Town	Moscow	618	95,403	61,931	806	114,788	67,213	1,035,664
	Moscow	Danilov v.*	3	2,502	1,837	6	10,370	3,910	3,958
		Cherkizovo v.	1	53	125	12	449	322	?
		Izmalovo v.	—	—	—	1	1,604	1,104	3,416
		Puskino v.	2	3,060	1,281	1	620	1,076	3,151
		Balashikha t.	1	1,050	905	1	3,045	2,687	?
		Reutovo v.	1	2,900	2,235	1	2,180	2,134	3,256
	Vereya	Naro-Fominsk v.	3	2,690	1,955	3	2,445	1,133	?
	Bronnitai	Troitsk-Ramemskoye v.	1	3,573	2,893	1	4,773	5,098	6,865
	Klin	Solnechnaya Gora v.	1	60	304	2	1,384	1,073	?
		Nekrasina h.	1	1,300	538	1	3,212	2,794	?
	Kolomna	Ozery v.	4	214	1,163	5	4,950	5,574	11,166
		Sadki t.	3	1,775	1,865	1	1,598	1,850	?
		Bobrovo v.	1	4,558	2,556	1	4,608	3,396	5,116
	Town	Dmitrov and env.	2	3,600	3,462	3	4,167	3,565	
	Dmitrov	Muromtsevo v.	1	1,774	2,371	1	2,076	1,816	?
	Town	Serpukhov v.	21	18,537	9,780	23	11,265	5,885	?
	Serpukhov	Nefedova h.	—	—	—	1	2,735	2,000	?
	Town	Bogorodsk and nearby							
		Glukhovo v.	16	3,870	9,548	16	8,880	10,405	9,309
	Bogorodsk	Pavlov suburb.	15	2,623	2,751	13	1,760	2,071	9,991
		Istomkino v.	1	2,006	1,426	1	2,007	1,651	2,085
		Krestovozdvizh v.	4	740	935	5	1,415	1,670	?
		Zuyevo v.	10	3,216	2,059	9	5,876	2,054	9,908
Total for gubernia without Moscow city			92	60,101	49,989	108	81,419	63,268	—

Note. Totals "for gubernia" mean totals for enumerated centres in gubernias.

Note to 2nd edition. We add for purposes of comparison, figures of 1897 census on number of inhabitants. Unfortunately, the Central Statistical Committee publication *Towns and Centres of Habitation in Uyezds Having 2,000 and More Inhabitants* gives no detailed data.

*Here and further, v. = village; t. = township; h. = hamlet; st. = station; env. = environs; s. = settlement.—*Ed.*

Gubernia	Uyezd (or town)	Settlement	1879 No. of factories	1879 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1879 No. of workers	1890 No. of factories	1890 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1890 No. of workers	No. of inhabitants according to 1897 census
Tver	Town	Tver and evn. . . .	23	6,440	8,404	26	8,720	6,875	53,477
	Town	Vishny-Volochek and env.	1	1,780	1,221	2	3,584	2,393	16,722
	Vishny-Volochek	Zavarovo v	1	1,130	2,003	1	1,020	2,186	?
	Korchev	Kuznetsovo v	1	400	861	1	500	1,220	2,503
	Town	Rzhev	15	1,894	3,533	6	411	765	21,397
	For gubernia		41	11,644	16,022	36	14,235	13,439	—
Ryazan	Town	Yegoryevsk	20	4,126	3,532	15	5,598	5,697	19,241
Nizhni-Novgorod	Town	Arzamas	24	394	380	18	255	366	10,591
	Gorbatov	Bogorodskoye v . . .	41	315	219	58	547	392	12,342
		Pavlovo v	21	235	272	26	240	589	12,431
		Vorsma v	3	116	303	4	181	894	4,674
	Balakhna	Sormovo v	1	2,890	1,911	1	1,500	1,000	2,963
	For gubernia		149	4,924	2,311	172	8,754	3,245	—
Grodno	Town	Belostok	59	2,122	1,619	98	2,734	3,072	63,927
	Belostok	Suprasi t	7	938	854	5	447	585	2,459
Kazan	Town	Kazan	66	8,083	3,967	78	7,663	4,787	131,508
Tambov	Tambov	Rasskazovo v. . . .	19	1,067	2,128	13	940	2,058	8,283
Chernigov	Surazh	Klintsy	15	1,892	2,456	27	1,548	1,836	12,166
Smolensk	Dukhovshchina	Yarisevo v	1	2,731	2,523	1	4,000	3,106	5,761

Gubernia	Uyezd (or town)	Settlement	1879 No. of factories	1879 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1879 No. of workers	1890 No. of factories	1890 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1890 No. of workers	No. of inhabitants according to 1897 census
Kaluga	Zhizdra	Lyudinovo v	1	2,488	3,118	1	529	1,050	7,784
	Medyn	Troitskoye and Kondrovo vs	1	1,047	1,019	1	1,330	1,285	?
Orel	Bryansk	near Bezhetskaya st.	1	6,970	3,265	1	8,485	4,500	19,054
		Sergievo-Raditsk v.	1	1,000	1,012	1	257	400	2,808
Tula	Town	Tula	95	3,671	3,661	248	8,648	6,418	111,048
Vladimir	Pokrov	Nikolskoye t. near							25,233
		Orekhovo st	2	7,316	10,964	3	22,160	26,852	7,219
		Dulevo v	1	425	1,100	1	600	1,400	3,412
		Likina h	1	317	389	2	1,184	1,155	?
		Kirzhach t	11	1,025	1,437	9	628	825	?
	Town	Shuya	38	5,161	4,879*	32	6,857	5,473	4,799
	Shuya	Ivanovo-Voznesensk t.	49	20,876	9,943	52	26,403	15,387	53,949
		Teikovo v	4	5,913	3,524*	4	4,642	3,581	5,780
		Kokhma v.	9	3,232	2,413	6	2,769	1,666*	3,337
	Town	Melenki	16	1,597	2,769	15	2,509	2,498	8,904
	Melenki	Gus v	2	2,284	3,438	2	3,748	5,241	12,007
	Town	Vyazniki and nearby							
		Yartsevo h	8	2,879	3,017	6	3,012	3,331	7,398
	Vyazniki	Yuzha v.	1	—	—	1	2,390	1,961	3,378
	Alexandrov	Karabanovo v	1	5,530	4,248	1	5,000	3,879	?
		Struninp v	2	3,522	1,688	1	4,950	2,771	
	Town	Pereyaslavi	8	2,671	2,154	6	2,703	2,157	8,662
	Town	Kovrov and env.	4	1,760	1,723	5	1,940	2,062	14,570
	Kovrov	Gorki v	1	1,350	838	1	1,632	1,332	?
		Kolobovo v	1	676	575	2	895	885	?
	Vladimir	Sobino v	1	2,200	1,819	1	—	2,000	5,486
		Stavrovo v.	3	1,834	1,335	2	567	871	?
	Town	Murom	26	1,406	1,407*	27	943	1,274*	12,589
	Town	Yuryev-Polsky	12	1,062	1,138*	7	1,183	1,126*	5,637
For gubernia			201	73,027	60,780	186	96,715	87,727	—

Note. Asterisk indicates that outside workers are not included in the number of factory workers

Gubernia	Uyezd (or town)	Settlement	1879 No. of factories	1879 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1879 No. of workers	1890 No. of factories	1890 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1890 No. of workers	No. of inhabitants according to 1897 census
St. Petersburg	Town	St. Petersburg	538	117,500	48,888	490	126,645	51,760	} 1,267,023
	Suburbs	of St. Petersburg	84	40,085	24,943	51	35,927	18,939	
	Town	Narva and env.	7	12,361	6,484	6	15,288	7,566	16,577
	Tsarakoye Selo	Velikoseiskoye Kolpino s	1	3,148	1,872	1	2,906	1,930	12,241
For gubernia			630	173,094	82,187	548	180,766	80,195	—
Kiev	Town	Kiev	76	3,279	1,858	125	16,186	5,901	247,432
	Cherkassk	Smela t.	9	4,070	1,434	8	4,715	1,238	15,187
Kostroma	Town	Kostroma	32	3,899	5,181	24	5,220	4,907	41,268
	Town	Kineshma and env.	4	421	157	9	1,737	1,748	7,564
	Kineshma	Tezino v	3	768	950	3	1,866	2,420	?
		Bonyachki v	3	1,865	2,365	3	1,331	1,495	3,158
		Navoloki v	—	—	—	1	1,314	1,305	?
		Vichuga v	1	940	800	2	684	1,138	?
		N. Golchikha v	4	389	265	4	260	686*	?
	Town	Nerekhta	1	883	1,204	—	—	—	3,002
	Nerekhta	Kiselyovo v	2	1,189	1,196	3	2,855	2,368	?
		Yakovlevskoye v	5	1,041	1,095*	5	1,378	2,177*	?
		Pistsovo v	4	1,634	417	5	923	1,773	2,668
		Frolovka v	1	1,700	1,300	1	1,750	1,530	?
	Town	Yuryevets	2	383	569	1	750	830	4,778
	Yuryevets	Rodniki v	4	1,154	776	3	2,188	2,792	3,225
For gubernia			66	16,266	16,275	64	22,256	25,169	—

* Partly included here is Esthland Gubernia (Krenholm Textile Mill).

Gubernia	Uyezd (or town)	Settlement	1879 No. of factories	1879 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1879 No. of workers	1890 No. of factories	1890 Aggregate output in thousand rubles	1890 No. of workers	No. of inhabitants according to 1897 census
Liflandia	Town	Riga	151	19,094	11,962	226	36,568	16,306	256,197
Yaroslavl	Town	Yaroslavl and env. . .	49	5,245	4,206	47	12,996	1,639	70,610
	Yaroslavl	Norsky s.	1	2,500	2,304	2	1,980	9,779	2,134
		Velikoseiskoye volost	1	910	956	6	2,169	2,992	4,534
For gubernia			51	8,655	7,466	55	17,145	14,410	—
Kharkov	Town	Kharkov	102	4,225	2,171	122	5,494	3,406	174,846
Saratov	Town	Saratov	103	4,495	1,983	89	7,447	2,224	137,109
	Town	Tsaritsyn	25	272	218	57	1,086	751	55,967
	Tsaritsyn	Dubovka s	21	157	110	26	221	270	16,255
For gubernia			149	4,924	2,311	172	8,754	3,245	—
Samara	Town	Samara	(?) 1	18	10	48	4,560	1,377	91,672
Kherson	Town	Odessa	159	13,750	3,763	306	29,407	8,634	405,041
Don	Town	Nakhichevan	34	873	732	45	3,472	3,098	29,312
	Town	Novcherkassk	15	278	128	28	965	467	52,005
	Town	Rostov-on-Don	26	4,898	2,750	92	13,605	5,756	119,886
Ekaterinoslav	Town	Ekaterinoslav	33	1,003	469	63	4,841	3,628	121,216
	Bakhmut	Yuzovka t	1	2,000	1,300	3	8,988	6,332	28,076
	Ekaterinoslav	Kamenskoye v	—	—	—	1	7,200	2,400	16,878
For the two gubernia			109	9,052	5,379	232	39,071	21,681	—
Total for enumerated 103 centres			2,831	536,687	355,777	3,638	706,981	451,244	—

Gubernia	Uyezd (or town)	Settlement	1879			1890			Average annual growth to 1897 in inhabitants
			No. of factories	Average annual output in thousand rubles	No. of workers	No. of factories	Average annual output in thousand rubles	No. of workers	
Lifflandia	Town	Riga	151	19,094	11,962	226	36,568	16,306	256,197
Yaroslavl	Town	Yaroslavl and env. . .	49	5,245	4,206	47	12,996	1,639	70,610
	Yaroslavl	Norsky s.	1	2,500	2,304	2	1,980	9,779	2,194
		Velikoseiskoye volost	1	910	956	6	2,169	2,992	4,534
For gubernia			51	8,655	7,466	55	17,145	14,410	—
Kharkov	Town	Kharkov	102	4,225	2,171	122	5,494	3,406	174,846
Saratov	Town	Saratov	103	4,495	1,983	89	7,447	2,224	137,109
	Town	Tsaritsyn	25	272	218	57	1,086	761	55,967
	Tsaritsyn	Dubovka s.	21	157	110	26	221	270	16,255
For gubernia			149	4,924	2,311	172	8,754	3,246	—
Samara	Town	Samara	(?) 1	18	10	48	4,560	1,377	91,672
Kherson	Town	Odessa	159	13,750	3,763	306	29,407	8,634	405,041
Don	Town	Nakhichevan	34	873	732	45	3,472	3,098	29,312
	Town	Novcherkassk	15	278	128	28	965	467	52,005
	Town	Rostov-on-Don	26	4,898	2,750	92	13,605	5,756	119,886
Ekaterinoslav	Town	Ekaterinoslav	33	1,003	469	63	4,841	3,628	121,216
	Bakhmut	Yuzovka t.	1	2,000	1,300	3	8,988	6,332	28,076
	Ekaterinoslav	Kamenskoye v. . . .	—	—	—	1	7,200	2,400	16,878
For the two gubernia			109	9,052	5,379	232	39,071	21,681	—
Total for enumerated 103 centres			2,831	536,687	355,777	3,638	706,981	461,244	—

UNCRITICAL CRITICISM

(REGARDING MR. P. SKVORTSOV'S ARTICLE "COMMODITY FETISHISM" IN *NAUCHNOYE OBOZRENIYE*, No. 12, 1899.)

Written in January-March, 1900
Published in May and June, 1900
in the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*,
Nos. 5 and 6 [169]
Signed: Vladimir Ilyin

Published according
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Nauchnoye Obozreniye

"Jove is wrathful" . . . . This has long been known as a very amusing sort of spectacle, and actually the anger of the stern Thunderer merely calls forth laughter. Further confirmation of this old truth has been supplied by Mr. P. Skvortsov, who has let loose a host of the choicest "wrathful" remarks against my book on the process of the formation of a home market for Russian capitalism.

I

"To depict the process as a whole," Mr. Skvortsov grandly instructs me, "one must set forth one's understanding of the capitalist mode of production; to confine oneself to mere references to the theory of realisation is quite superfluous." Why references to the theory of the home market are "superfluous" in a book devoted to an analysis of data on the home market, remains the secret of our stern Jove, who by "setting forth one's understanding," "understands" . . . giving extracts from *Capital*, half of which are irrelevant. "The author may be reproached for the *dialectical* (a specimen of Mr. Skvortsov's wit!) "contradiction that, having set himself the aim of examining a problem" (of how the home market is being formed for Russian capitalism), "he comes, at the end of his *references to theory*, to the conclusion that no such problem exists at all." Mr. Skvortsov is so pleased with this remark of his that he repeats it several times, not seeing, or not wishing to see, that it is based on a gross error. At the end of the first chapter of my book I

say that "the problem of the home market *as a separate, self-sufficient problem not depending on that of the degree of capitalist development* does not exist at all" (69).[170] Well, does the critic disagree with that? No, he agrees with it, for on the preceding page he says that my remarks are "fair." That being the case, what has occasioned his clamour and attempt to divest my conclusion of its most important part? That also remains a secret. At the end of the introductory, theoretical chapter, I definitely indicate the theme of interest to me: "the question of how a home market is being formed for Russian capitalism reduces itself to the following: How and in what direction are the diverse aspects of the Russian national economy developing? What constitutes the connection between and interdependence of these diverse aspects?" (69). Does the critic consider these questions unworthy of examination? No, he prefers to avoid the issue of the theme I set myself and to point to *other themes* with which, at Jove's behest, I should have occupied myself. I should, in his opinion, have "described the reproduction and circulation both of that part of the product which is produced in agriculture and in industry capitalistically, and of that part which is produced by independent peasant producers . . . and shown the relation between them, i.e., the magnitudes of constant and variable capital and of surplus-value in each of the indicated departments of social labour" (2278). Now that is simply a high-sounding and totally meaningless phrase! Before attempting to describe the reproduction and circulation of the product which is produced in agriculture capitalistically, one must first ascertain *exactly how* and *to what extent* agriculture becomes capitalist, among peasants or among landlords, in one district or in another, etc. Unless this is done (and that is what I have done in my book), the description suggested by Mr. Skvortsov will remain a series of commonplaces. Before we can speak of the part of the product which is produced in industry capitalistically, we must first ascertain exactly which industry in Russia is becoming capitalist and to what extent it is doing so. That is precisely what I tried to do by processing the data on the handicraft industry, for example; our stern critic grandly passes all this by in silence and with a supremely serious air invites me to mark time and to

dispose of the matter with empty commonplaces about capitalist industry! The question as to exactly which peasants in Russia are "independent producers" also requires a study of the facts, and that is what I tried to undertake in my book; had Mr. Skvortsov pondered over this question, he would not have made the nonsensical assertion that the categories of constant capital, variable capital and surplus-value may, without further ado, be applied to the economy of "independent peasant producers." In a word, the elaboration of the theme proposed by Mr. Skvortsov is possible only *after* clearing up the questions I have indicated. Under the guise of amending my formulation of the problem, our stern critic beats a retreat from an analysis of concrete and historically specific reality to simply copying Marx.

Incidentally, we cannot pass by in silence the following trick by Mr. P. Skvortsov, one that splendidly characterises our critic's methods. Prof. Sombart (says Mr. P. Skvortsov) shows that German exports lag behind the development of German industry. "These data," Mr. P. Skvortsov explains, "go to confirm my conception of markets." Good, isn't it? Mr. Skvortsov's arguments illustrate the meaning of the well-known saying: there's a bush in the garden, and my uncle's in Kiev. . . . We are discussing the theory of realisation, and he tells us: capitalism, like feudalism, lives on surplus-labour! If we add to such inimitable tricks a number of stern rebukes, we shall get the sum-total of Mr. Skvortsov's "criticism."

But let the reader judge for himself: to show my "failure to understand," Mr. P. Skvortsov cites, on pages 2279 and 2280, extracts from various parts of the first chapter, picks out isolated words from isolated sentences and exclaims: "*The finding*, *the exchange*, the theory of the *home market*, *the finding of the replacing*, and finally, *the compensating*! I do not think such precision of terms can be taken as evidence that Mr. Ilyin clearly understands Marx's 'remarkable' theory of realisation!?" Now that is precisely the sort of "criticism" that was once ridiculed by Chernyshevsky; a man takes up *The Adventures of Chichikov* and begins to "criticise": "Chi-chi-kov, tchi-tchi. . . Oh how funny! The finding, the exchange. . . . I do not think that is clear. . . ."[171] Oh, what destructive criticism!

On page 52 of my book I say that it was not necessary to divide the product according to its natural form in analysing the production of individual capital, but that it was absolutely necessary in analysing the reproduction of social capital, for in the latter case (and only in the latter case) are we dealing with the replacement of the natural form of the product. Mr. Skvortsov asserts that I "failed to understand" Marx, severely reprimands me for "translating freely," considers it "necessary to quote *Capital* at length" (the passages quoted stating exactly what I said), and pounces upon the following words of mine: "Now, however, the question," i.e., in analysing the reproduction of social, and not of individual, capital, "is: where will the workers and the capitalists obtain their articles of consumption, where will the capitalists obtain their means of production, how will the finished product meet all these demands and enable production to expand?" Underlining this passage, Mr. Skvortsov goes on to say: "The passages I have underlined do indeed contain a theory of realisation, only not Marx's, but Mr. Ilyin's, a theory which has nothing in common with Marx's theory" (2282). Strongly put! But let us see what sort of proof is advanced. The proofs, of course, are quotations from Marx, including the following: "The question as it immediately forelies (sic!)* is this: How is the capital

* By the way, about translations. Quoting from my book the following passage: "... as though only the absolute consuming power of society constituted their (the productive forces') outer limit" (57), Mr. Skvortsov gives me the following strict admonition: "Mr. Ilyin ... did not notice the clumsiness of his translation, whereas the original says simply and clearly. 'als ob nur die absolute Konsumptionsfähigkeit der Gesellschaft ihre Grenze bilde'" (2286). What is wrong with this (quite correct) translation the critic does not indicate. But to show how strict he is, it will be sufficient to quote a couple of *his* translations. Page 2284: "But when the normal annual reproduction is shown on a given scale ... thereby it is also shown ..." (in the original: ist damit auch unterstellt); page 2285: "We are dealing, primarily, with simple reproduction. Further on it will be shown" (in the original: Ferner wird unterstellt) not only that products are exchanged at their value," etc. Thus, good Mr. Skvortsov is no doubt firmly convinced that "unterstellen" means "to show," and that "wird interstellt" is future tense.

I say nothing about the style of our stern critic, who treats us to such phrases as: "now the capitalist mode of production equals agricullural industry" (2293).

consumed in production replaced in value out of the annual product, and how is the movement of this replacement intertwined with the consumption of surplus-value by the capitalists, and of wages by the workers?" Conclusion: "I believe that I have shown sufficiently that the theory of realisation which Mr. Ilyin presents as Marx's has nothing in common with the analysis given by Marx," etc. All I can do is to ask once again: Good, isn't it? What the difference is between what I say and what is said in the quotations from Marx remains the secret of our stern critic. All that is clear is that my mortal sin lies in "translating freely," or perhaps in that I explain Marx in my "own words," as Mr. Skvortsov expresses it in another part of his article (2287). Just think of it! To expound Marx in one's "own words"! "Genuine" Marxism consists in learning *Capital* by heart and quoting passages from it, in season and out . . . à la Mr. Nikolai —on.

Here is an illustration confirming this last remark. In my book I say that capitalism "makes its appearance only as a result of widely developed commodity circulation," and, in another place, that "capitalism is that stage in the development of commodity-production in which labour-power, too, becomes a commodity." Midst thunder and lightning our stern Jove announces: "under what conditions capitalism makes its appearance . . . is known to every more or less educated reader" (sic!), "Mr. Ilyin's bourgeois horizon," and other pearls adorning the polemics of the wrathful Mr. Skvortsov. Then follow quotations from Marx: the first says exactly what I said (the purchase and sale of labour-power is the basic condition of capitalist production); the second says that the mode of circulation derives from the social character of production and not vice versa (*Das Kapital*, II. B., 93).[172] Mr. Skvortsov imagines he has utterly confuted his opponent with this last quotation. Actually, however, he has replaced the question I raised by another one and given proof of his ability to offer irrelevant quotations. What did I speak of in the incriminating passage? Of the fact that capitalism is the result of commodity circulation, i.e., of the historical relation between capitalist production and commodity circulation. And what is spoken of in the passage quoted from Volume II of *Capital* (the volume devoted to the circulation of capital)? The relation between capitalist

production and capitalist circulation; Marx is polemising in this passage (S. 92. II. B.)[173] against the economists who contrasted natural economy, money economy and credit economy as three characteristic economic forms of movement in social production; Marx says that that is wrong, because money and credit economy are merely modes of circulation peculiar to different stages in the development of capitalist production, and he concludes with a remark about the "bourgeois horizon" *of these economists*. Mr Skvortsov thinks that "genuine" Marxism consists in clutching at the last word of Marx and repeating it, even against an opponent who did not dream of discussing the relation between natural, money and credit economy. We leave it to the reader to determine which party displays "failure to understand," and among what sort of literature such tricks are classified. Behind the clamour of his stern rebukes Mr. Skvortsov not only resorted to the "point of replacing" but also completely evaded the problem of the relation between capitalist production and commodity circulation. That is a very important problem, to which I revert many times in my book, emphasising the historical role of merchant's capital as the predecessor of capitalist production. Mr. Skvortsov would seem to have no objection to this (judging by the fact that he says nothing about it). That being the case, what sense is there in the noise he makes about my statement that capitalism is a result of commodity circulation? Does not merchant's capital express the development of commerce, i.e., commodity circulation without capitalist production? These questions too, once again, remain the secret of the wrathful Jove.

To finish with the "criticism" Mr. Skvortsov directs against the theoretical part of my book, I have to examine a few more of the stern rebukes and gross errors which abound in the article "Commodity Fetishism."

In my book I say: "The need for a capitalist country to have a foreign market is . . . determined . . . by the fact that capitalism makes its appearance only as a result of widely developed commodity *circulation*, which transcends the limits of the state. It is therefore impossible to conceive a capitalist nation without foreign trade, nor is there any such nation. As the reader sees, this reason is of a historical order" (65). The stern Jove "criticises": "I, as a reader, do not

see that this reason is of a historical order. A totally unfounded assertion" (2284), etc. If commodity circulation is the necessary historical predecessor of capitalism, is there any need to explain in addition why "this reason is of a historical order"?

For the abstract theory of capitalism all that exists is developed and fully established capitalism, and the question of its origin is eliminated.

"Mr. Ilyin . . . for the realisation of the product in capitalist society . . . turns to the aid of the foreign market" (2286). To the reader who is familiar with my *Studies* and *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* I need scarcely explain that this, too, is a trick performed by the same method as the preceding ones. A quotation from Marx: ". . . foreign commerce only replaces home products by articles of other use or bodily form. . . ."[174] Conclusion: "Every literate person, with the exception of critically-minded individuals, will understand that Marx says the very opposite of Mr. Ilyin's theory that there is no need to go to the foreign market to find 'an equivalent for that part of the product which is being sold,' to find 'another part of the capitalist product that can replace the first"' (2284). Oh, splendid Mr. Skvortsov!

"Mr. Ilyin . . . by ignoring the essential features of capitalist society and thus converting it into planned production—proportion in the development of different trades undoubtedly means planned production—nicely realises, in the end, the same quantity of products within the country" (2286). Our "critic's" new trick consists in attributing to me the notion that capitalism ensures regular proportion. Constant, deliberately maintained proportion would, indeed, signify the existence of planning; but this is not the proportion which is "established only as the average magnitude of a number of continual fluctuations" (that is what I say in the passage quoted by Mr. Skvortsov). I definitely say that proportion (or conformity) is "*assumed*" by theory, but in fact it is "*constantly disturbed*," that to replace one distribution of capital by another and so create proportion "*there must be a crisis*" (all the words underlined are to be found on that very page 66, which is quoted by Mr. Skvortsov). The question arises, what can one

think of a critic who ascribes to his opponent the transformation of capitalism into planned production, while making reference to the very page and the very paragraph where that opponent says that for capitalism *there must be a crisis* so as to create a *constantly disturbed* proportion??

II

Let us pass to the second part of Mr. Skvortsov's article, which is devoted to a criticism of the factual data quoted and analysed in my book. Maybe here, at least, we shall find some serious criticism relating to problems of which a special study has been made by Mr. Skvortsov.

The social division of labour is the basis of commodity economy and is the basic process of the formation of a home market—says Mr. Skvortsov, quoting my words—"while plain 'division of labour'—not social, we must assume—is the basis of manufacture. . . ." In this "attempt at irony" the critic reveals his failure to understand the elementary difference between division of labour in society and division of labour in the workshop: the former creates (under commodity production—a condition which I definitely specified, so that Mr. Skvortsov's reminder about the division of labour in the Indian village community relates to that author's deplorable weakness for quoting irrelevant passages from Marx) isolated commodity-producers, who, independently and separately from one another, produce different products which enter into exchange; the latter does not alter the relation of the producers to society, but merely transforms their position in the workshop. That is the reason, so far as I can judge, why Marx sometimes speaks of "social division of labour"* and at others simply

* In chapter twelve, volume one of *Capital* [in the English edition it is Chapter XIV.—*Ed.*], which deals with manufacture, there is a special section entitled "Division of Labour in Manufacture, and Division of Labour in Society." At the beginning of this section Marx says: "We shall now lightly touch upon the relation between the division of labour in manufacture, and the social division of labour, which forms the foundation of all production of commodities" (*Das Kapital*, I^2, S. 362).[175] How truly instructive it is to contrast this to the trick of our wrathful Jove!

of division of labour. If Mr. Skvortsov thinks otherwise, he should formulate and explain his opinion instead of dealing out stern but wholly meaningless remarks.

"Division of labour is not in the least a characteristic feature of manufacture, for division of labour exists in the factory too."

Very well, Mr. Skvortsov! But have I said that this is the only feature that distingulshes manufacture from the factory? Had the critic at all seriously wanted to discover whether I correctly understand the "characteristic features of manufacture" (a very interesting and by no means as simple a problem as may appear at first sight), could he have kept silent about the fact that in the very section concerned I definitely say: "We have had occasion elsewhere to enumerate the principal features of the concept of manufacture according to Marx (*Studies*, 179*)" (385, footnote 1)? In the *Studies*, division of labour figures as only *one* of a series of features. The reader of Mr. Skvortsov's article might, therefore, get an absolutely distorted notion of my views, and no notion whatever of the critic's views.

To proceed. The attempt to present a whole number of so-called "handicraft" industries as the manufactory stage of Russian capitalism is made in my book, if I am not mistaken, *for the first time*, and I, of course, am far from imagining that this problem has been altogether settled (particularly since I have examined it from a specific point of view). I accordingly anticipated criticism of my views, and did so with all the more reason, and all the more interest, because certain Russian Marxists had expressed somewhat different views (see *The Development of Capitalism*, p. 550, footnote). But how has the problem been treated by Mr. P. Skvortsov? His "criticism" amounts in its entirety to an exhortation, magnificent for its laconic severity, not to confine myself to a "mechanical enumeration of the number of wage-workers, of aggregate output in such and such years in this or that sphere of production" (2278). If this exhortation does not refer to the section of my book which deals with the question of factory statistics (Mr. Skvortsov

* See present edition, Vol. 2, *The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia.—Ed.*

does not say a word about this), it must refer to the chapter on manufacture, the greater part of which consists of factual data. How they might have been dispensed with is a secret that our stern critic does not reveal, and I continue to hold to the opinion that it is better to incur the charge of my exposition being dry than to give the reader cause to think that my opinion is based on "quotations" from *Capital*, and not on a study of Russian data. If Mr. Skvortsov thinks my enumeration is "mechanical," are we to take it that he considers as wrong the conclusions which I have drawn from these data in the second half of Chapter VI, and repeated in Chapter VII, § XII?—Are we to take it that he does not agree that these data show a specific structure of industry characterised by aspecific system of: 1) technique, 2) economy and 3) culture? The stern Jove had not a single word to say about this in his "criticism," which, if we discount the wrathful rebukes, is left without any content whatsoever. That's rather little, most respected Mr. Skvortsov!

Let us pass to the part played by peasant taxes in developing commodity economy. I asserted that at one time poll-taxes had been an important factor in the development of exchange, but that now commodity-production had become so firmly established that the importance of taxes "is becoming altogether secondary." Against this Mr. Skvortsov launches a host of paltry and fearful words such as, "fetishism of commodities," unite everything, "omnipotence," potency of commodity-production, etc.; but alas, these potent words merely cover up the stern critic's impotence to refute the conclusion I drew. "Even Mr. Kautsky," writes Mr. Skvortsov, "to whom Mr. Ilyin bears resemblance in many respects" . . . (poor "Mr. Kautsky," who "bears resemblance" to the "commodity fetishist," completely fails to understand *Capital*, and resembles that man who is weighed down by a "bourgeois horizon," Mr. Ilyin! Will he recover from the blow struck by a "genuine" Marxist?) . . . "says that the conversion of peasant dues in kind into dues in cash increases the peasants' demand for money" (2288). Very well, stern Mr. Critic, but surely that has absolutely nothing to do with the problem of the part played by taxes in the *peasants' cash expenditure* as compared with outlays on the rest of their needs and requirements. *This* problem is

not even touched upon by Kautsky. Mr. Skvortsov over and over again reveals his remarkable talent for offering irrelevant quotations. "The main question," says Mr. Skvortsov, advancing his second objection, "which is not explained even by the budget data, is as follows: where is the horseless peasant to obtain 25 rubles to pay his taxes" (25 *per cent* of his cash espenditure, 25 rubles out of 100 rubles has been turned by Mr. Skvortsov simply into 25 rubles!) "and the horse-owning peasant 10 rubles? The question is not what part of the income (?) taxes constitute in the peasants' total cash expenditure" (2290). I advise Mr. Skvortsov to take out a patent for a remarkable invention: the very latest and very easiest method of "scientific criticism" that radically destroys an opponent. On one out of several hundred pages of his book your opponent incidentally raises the question of the share of tax expenditure in the total cash expenditure; all you have to do is to quote this passage, foist *another* question on your opponent, and you brilliantly prove that he is a "commodity fetishist," who, monster that he is, does not give a thought to where the poor horseless peasant is to get 25 rubles! And then, as to other pages in the book, which deal with the ratio of taxes to income, with the items and with the source of income, you can omit them and thus prove that your opponent has a "bourgeois horizon." Really, take out a patent, Mr. Skvortsov!

Here is another example of how Mr. Skvortsov utilises his invention. I ask the reader's attention: such gems of "scientific criticism" are the only ones of their kind.

We refer to the same page 156, which deals with the budget figures for peasant taxes. After showing the role of taxes in the peasants' total cash expenditure, I continue: "If, however, we do not take the role of taxes in the development of exchange, but take them relative to income, we shall see that it is an excessively high one. How heavily the traditions of the pre-Reform epoch weigh down upon the peasant of today is seen most strikingly in the existence of taxes which absorb one-seventh of the gross expenditure of the small farmer, or even of the allotment-holding farm labourer. Moreover, the distribution of taxes within the village community is astonishingly uneven: the better off the peasant, the smaller the part of his total

expenditure that goes in taxes. The horseless peasant pays in proportion to his income nearly three times as much as the peasant owning many horses (see above, table on distribution of expenditure). . . .” Any reader who is at all attentive in his approach to what he reads must naturally ask: Why do I speak of the distribution of taxes within the village community, when the budgets relate to the farms of peasants not only of different communities, but even of different uyezds? Perhaps the uneven distribution is here fortuitous—perhaps it depends on the different assessment of one dessiatine of allotment land in the different uyezds or in the different village communities from which the farms were taken for compiling the typical budgets? And so, in order to eliminate this inevitable objection, I immediately went on, after what I had said, to explain: “. . .*We speak of the distribution of taxes within the village community*, *because if we calculate the amount of taxes and duties per dessiatine of allotment land*, *it will be found to be nearly uniform*. . . .” Had the critic wanted to verify these words, all he needed to do was to compare the table on page 151 (amount of taxes and dues per farm) with the table on p. 157 (quantity of allotment land per household) to convince himself with ease that, judging by the budget data, although the budgeted farms belong to different communities, and even to different uyezds, the amounts of taxes and dues per dessiatine of allotment land are *nearly* uniform.

And now, observe *what methods* Mr. Critic uses to destroy his opponent! He picks out the words I underlined about the amount of taxes per dessiatine of allotment land; *fails to notice* (sic!) that these words relate *only to the budget data*; ascribes to these words the meaning that the amount of taxes per dessiatine of allotment land is nearly uniform for the whole of the Russian peasantry; triumphantly accuses me, because of this latter conclusion, of not being acquainted with Zemstvo statistical publications, and cites two tables to confirm the (generally known) fact that in different village communities, volosts and uyezds, the amounts of taxes per dessiatine of allotment land are far from being uniform. Having performed this trick, the critic goes on to add: “Indeed, within a village community where *one and the same size* of allotment is received, the

payments will be not nearly but actually uniform in size. The whole point is that Mr. Ilyin does not know which village community he is talking about. To finish with Mr. Ilyin's abuse of the Zemstvo statistics," etc. . . (2292). I would like very much to know whether another example could be found in scientific literature of this sort of criticism.

Having acquainted ourselves with the methods by which Mr. Skvortsov "has proved" the utter "worthlessness" of the budget data I have given, we may presumably ignore the potent (and impotent) terms in which the critic expresses his dissatisfaction with the very use of budget data. In demanding *mass* data on budgets, Mr. Skvortsov is evidently talking again about something that has nothing to do with the case, for descriptions of *specific* farms, such as I made use of, *never are and never can be* of a mass nature. The literature relating to the budgets of specific farms is indicated by me at the beginning of the section criticised, and I would, of course, only be grateful to the critic if he supplemented or corrected me. But Mr. Skvortsov knows how to "criticise" without touching on the substance of the point at issue! I attempted to prove that the budgets were typical by comparing the average sizes of family, crop area, land rented and number of animals per horseless and one-horse households, according to the budget data and the "mass data" (p. 158 of my book); but our stern critic simply calls this a "curiosity"—on what grounds, nobody knows. Perhaps for the same reason that a certain "critic" found the name Chichikov so funny? The budgets "are not typical . . . if only because the disposal of . . . grain . . . from the autumn onwards and its acquisition in the spring are very rarely met with in Voronezh Gubernia, whereas for the whole of Russia" such disposal has been proved to be the case, supposedly, by Mr. Nik.—on (2291). It is a true proverb which says that les beaux esprits se rencontrent*: That "genuine" Marxist, Mr. Pavel Skvortsov, coming up against a contradiction between the assertions of the "genuine" Marxist, Mr. Nikolai—on, and Zemstvo statistical data, unhesitatingly settles the problem along the lines that the data are not typical, and not that Mr. Nik.—on's statements are wrong, or too

* All great minds think alike.—*Ed.*

general. Besides, what has the question of selling grain in autumn and buying grain in spring to do with the controversy over whether or not certain budgets are typical, budgets which, in examining the problem, I do not use at all?

III

After the thankless job of explaining the things imputed to me, it is a pleasure to meet, at last, with an objection on fundamentals, even if formulated in terms of the stern rebukes ("fetishism," "utter failure to understand") which Mr. Skvortsov evidently considers very convincing, and even if the critic's own opinions have had to be surmised rather than seen plainly stated. Mr. Skvortsov is quite right when he says that my views "are the central theme of the entire book."

In order to set off our points of disagreement more sharply, I will compare two extreme formulations of our opposite views: Mr. Skvortsov probably thinks (at all events, it follows from his objections) that the less the land the peasants received when they were emancipated, and the higher the price they paid for it, the faster would have been the development of capitalism in Russia. I think the opposite: *the more the land the peasants received when they were emancipated, and the lower the price they paid for it, the faster, wider and freer would have been the development of capitalism in Russia*, the higher would have been the standard of living of the population, the wider would have been the home market, the faster would have been the introduction of machinery into production; the more, in a word, would the economic development of Russia have resembled that of America. I shall confine myself to indicating two circumstances which, in my opinion, confirm the correctness of the latter view: 1) land-poverty and the burden of taxation have led to the development over a very considerable area of Russia of the labour-service system of private-landowner farming, i.e., a direct survival of serfdom,* and not at all to the

* Incidentally, in my book I definitely advance this thesis (that labour-service is a survival of serfdom). Mr. Skvortsov says nothing about this but takes my remark that, fundamentally, labour-service has existed ever since the time of *Russkaya Pravda* and storms about it; he cites a quotation from Klyuchevsky, talks of home markets in the 12th century, and of commodity fetishism, and asserts that

development of capitalism; 2) it is in our border regions, where serfdom was either entirely unknown, or was feeblest, and where the peasants suffer least from land shortage, labour-service and the burden of taxation, that there has been the greatest development of capitalism in agriculture. This comparison is necessary precisely for an analysis of the conditions of the "transition from the one social formation to the other," which I am so fiercely and so sweepingly accused of ignoring by Mr. Skvortsov.

The extremely stereotyped nature of Mr. Skvortsov's views on the economic processes in peasant economy in this country is also revealed by his remarks on migration and on the way capitalism breaks down medieval barriers. Now, was I not right in drawing a comparison between Mr. Pavel Skvortsov and Mr. Nikolai —on? Both "solve" the problem of migration by an extremely simple and entirely negative criticism of those "who attach importance" to migration. But that conclusion is worthy only of the most primitive—to wit, "genuine"—Marxism, which contents itself with absolutely abstract . . . commonplaces. What does "attach importance" to migration mean? If we take these words in their literal sense, can there be a single economist of sound mind and good memory *who does not attach importance* to the annual migrations? If we take these words in the specific sense of *capitalism*, then, firstly, Mr. Skvortsov distorts my meaning, for I say the very opposite in the passage he quotes. Secondly, an economist who sets out to study the characteristics of the economic system and development of Russia (not only to bring lengthy, and often irrelevant, quotations from Marx) must necessarily ask: what influence is exerted by the migrations in Russia? Without making a special study of the question, I remarked in the passage indicated by Mr. Skvortsov that my conclusions on the differentiation of the peasantry fully correspond to those of Mr. Hourwich.* Moreover, I repeatedly

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I think that "commodity production is the miraculous and all-explaining starting-point in history (sic!) since the days of *Russkaya Pravda*" (sic!). This, apparently, is some more of the "tchi-tchi" type of criticism to which, as it is, I think I devoted too much time at the beginning of this article.

* A propos of Mr. Hourwich, Mr. Skvortsov, by his unwarranted

touch on the subject of migration in other parts of my book. Maybe my views on this subject are wrong, but Mr. Skvortsov does absolutely nothing to correct or to supplement them; he tota]ly obscures the issue with his stern rebukes. Further, my remarks give Mr. Skvortsov grounds for concluding that the "commodity fetishist believes in the miraculous power of his fetish now" (sic!). Now, that is truly "crushing"! But do you deny that I am right, most respected Mr. Critic? Why not share your *factual* considerations with the public and examine the data *of at least one* uyezd? That would be so natural for a person who makes a special study of Zemstvo statistics! And I take the liberty of holding this view, in spite of Mr. Skvortsov's terrible words (fetishism, miraculous power), which—does anyone doubt it?—are enough to frighten anybody.*

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and supercilious attitude towards the "conclusions" of this writer who is known in Marxist literature as the author of two books and as a contributor to magazines, only reveals his own conceit.

* My words: "Before capitalism appeared, agriculture in Russia was the business of the gentry, a lord's hobby for some, and a duty, an obligation for others" (313), in Mr. Skvortsov's opinion "indicate that a whole social formation, the feudal mode of production, was merely a lord's hobby." No, Mr. Skvortsov, they do not "indicate" this at all, for I pointed out elsewhere that "feudal economy was a definite, regular and complete system" (192), and here I merely described *one of* the features of this system. That landlord economy contained an element of the "lord's hobby" can easily be seen by anyone who remembers the "Oblomovs of the feudal or bondage-suffering countryside" (218); and it is borne out by the Zemstvo statisticians who invented the expression "lord's hobby" (213),—it is proved even by the data on a certain period in the development of the agricultural-machinery industry in Russia: the attempts of landlords simply to import both workers and machines from abroad (193), which (219) were nothing but a "lord's hobby."—"When and where the transformation by capitalism of the lord of the manor [votchinnik]" (Mr. P. S. is wrong in thinking that this category is applicable only to the period "prior to the rise of serfdom"; it is also applicable to the period of serfdom) "and of the dependent peasant into industrialists was completed Mr. Ilyin does not, unfortunately, tell us." (2293) I speak of this in chapters II and III, and particularly IV, of my book, where I deal precisely with the transformation of agriculture into *commercial and industrial* enterprise. Very possibly, what I say about this process requires supplementing and correcting, I have no doubt that any serious and well-informed critic could do this; but Mr. Skvortsov, unfortunately, has utterly obscured the issue by simply voicing stern rebukes. That's hardly enough!

Finally, the last point on which one can discuss fundamentals with Mr. Skvortsov is that of the classification of Zemstvo statistics on the peasantry. Mr. Skvortsov has made a special study of Zemstvo statistics, and, if we are not mistaken, still continues to do so. One would, therefore, be justified in expecting him to say something based on facts and explaining this controversial and extremely interesting subject. I wrote: "we reject a limine any classification according to allotment and exclusively employ classification according to economic strength (draught animals, area under crops)," and I went on to say that classification according to allotment, which is far more common in our Zemstvo statistics, is absolutely unsuitable because life disturbs the equality (within the village community) of allotment land tenure: it is sufficient to recall such universally known and unchallenged facts as the leasing of allotments, their abandonment, the purchase and the renting of land and the supplementing of agriculture with commercial and industrial enterprises and with work for hire. "Economic statistics must necessarily take the *scale and type of farm* as the basis of classification" (105). Mr. Skvortsov's "criticism" consists in the following: "Mr. Ilyin is displeased with the classification of statistics on the peasantry according to allotment. There are two (sic!) classifications of statistics. One is the historical classification, according to which village communities (!) having the same amount of allotment land per registered person are gathered into one group. The other is a factual classification, according to which peasant farms having allotments of equal size, regardless of the communities to which they belong, are gathered into one group. What makes the historical classification important is that it clearly shows what the conditions were under which the peasantry passed from feudal to capitalist society . . ." and so forth on this theme, also examined above. . . . "The classification Mr. llyin proposes . . . utterly confuses the historical conception of the conditions of our peasantry's transition from the one social formation to the other. Mr. Ilyin's proposal is more in the nature of an industrial census (sic!), such as is taken in Germany" (2289). This is a sample of Mr. Skvortsov's criticism on a subject on which he specialises, and on a question on which, with the best will in the world, it is

impossible to "quote" Marx. The question is: What is the point of this argument about the "historical" classification of *village* communities, when I am dealing with the classification of *house-to-house* data? By what miraculous means can the classification of present-day house-to-house data "utterly confuse" the long-established historical data on village communities? Mr. Skvortsov is entitled to use the word "historical" in this connection only to the extent that he turns his *back on history*: if the classification of village communities according to size of allotment per registered person relates to the history of what happened 40 years ago, then what is going on before our eyes with ever-increasing rapidity is also history. Further, it is altogether inexplicable how a man who studies Zemstvo statistics and talks of all things in nothing less than the tone of a prophet can write that "there are two classifications" (of village communities according to allotment and of households according to allotment), when everyone knows that *there are very many classifications*: according to area under crops, number of draught animals, number of working members, number of farm labourers, house ownership, and so forth? How can Mr. Skvortsov declare so categorically, and *without a shadow of proof*, that only classification according to allotment is "factual," when the point at issue is precisely: *is this classification a factual one*? I show for a number of uyezds that the distribution of allotment land among the peasant farms continues to this day to be marked by an "equality" that is relatively very great (20% of well-to-do households, 26-30% of the population, account for 29-36% of the allotment land in various uyezds or groups of uyezds), whereas the distribution of the *factual* indices of farming, draught animals, area under crops, improved implements, etc., is everywhere, without exception, *incomparably less* equal. Mr. Skvortsov contrives to criticise, and even berate, my statements, without saying a word about fundamentals.

It goes without saying that, not being a professional statistician, I laid no claims to solving the problem of classification. I think, however, that the basic problems of Zemstvo statistics (and the problem of the methods of classifying information concerning households is a basic one, as I point out in the passage quoted by Mr. Skvortsov) are things

which not merely Zemstvo statisticians, but all economists, have a right and even a duty to discuss. One cannot conceive of an economist who is studying the actual economic situation in Russia being able to dispense with Zemstvo statistics; and if the elaboration of Zemstvo statistics and the work of economists proceed independently, each in its own way, neither the one nor the other can achieve satisfactory results. That classification according to allotment is not a satisfactory factual classification has been admitted in part by the Zemstvo statisticians themselves, who have given a number of classifications according to draught animals and to area under crops of which I made use in my book. Just now, when the importance of the problem is particularly emphasised by practically all Marxists and is not denied even by economists of other trends, a re-examination of the problem should be particularly necessary. But Mr. Skvortsov, instead of offering criticism, presents us with pompous but quite vapid phrases like the following: "we need a summary of Zemstvo returns which gives a detailed account of the production and reproduction of peasant farming, so that anyone who desires may take up such an abstract and verify the 'conclusions' of Messrs. Ilyin, Postnikov and Hourwich" (2292). Yes, of course, "we need a summary"; but if these words are not to remain an empty sound, and if the summary is really to succeed in answering the main problems advanced by Russia's present economic system and by that system's evolution, what is needed is to raise and to discuss from all angles the fundamental problem of the methods to be employed in drawing up the summary, to discuss it without fail in general publications, and not merely among Zemstvo statisticians, and still less within the four walls of this or that Zemstvo statistical bureau. I raised this problem in my book and attempted to indicate its solution. It is not, of course, for me to judge whether the solution is a correct one. But I am justified in drawing the conclusion that Mr. Skvortsov, for all his sternness, has said nothing whatever about the problem, but has instead, without grounds for so doing, advocated routine methods, advocated a point of view that was already old in 1885 (see footnote on page 103 of *The Development of Capitalism*, where I quote from Mr. V. V.'s

article "A New Type of Local Statistical Publication" his admission that "the statistical data must be adapted to the groups themselves and not to such a conglomeration of the most diverse economic groups of peasants as the village or the village community," and where I raise the question as to why Mr. V. V. himself never once made use of the data on these most diverse groups).

In conclusion, a few words about "orthodoxy," which will not be superfluous, since Mr. Skvortsov's appearance in the role of "genuine" Marxist renders particularly urgent the precisest possible definition of what, if it may be so expressed, is one's position. While not in the least desiring to place Mr. B. Avilov on a par with Mr. Skvortsov, I nevertheless find it necessary to touch on a passage in the former's article in the same issue of the *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*. At the end of a postscript to this article Mr. B. Avilov says: "Mr. Ilyin stands also for orthodoxy. But I think there is still plenty of room for 'orthodoxy,' i.e., *the simple interpretation of Marx* . . ." (p. 2308). I think that the words I have italicised are probably a slip of the pen, for I said quite definitely that *by orthodoxy I do not at all mean the simple interpretation of Marx*. In the article which Mr. B. Avilov has in mind, after the words: "No, let us better remain 'under the sign of orthodoxy,'" I say: "Let us not believe that orthodoxy means taking things on trust, that orthodoxy precludes critical application and further development, that it permits historical problems to be obscured by abstract schemes. If there are orthodox disciples who are guilty of these truly grievous sins, the blame must rest entirely with those disciples and not by any means with orthodoxy, which is distinguisbed by diametrically opposite qualities" (*Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, 1899, No. 8, p. 1579).[176] Thus I definitely said that to accept anything on trust, to preclude critical application and development, is a grievous sin; and in order to apply and develop, "simple interpretation" is obviously not enough. The disagreement between those Marxists who stand for the so-called "new critical trend" and those who stand for so-called "orthodoxy" is that they want to apply and develop Marxism in *different directions*: the one group want to remain consistent Marxists, developing the basic tenets of

Marxism in accordance with the changing conditions and with the local characteristics of the different countries, and further elaborating the theory of dialectical materialism and the political-economic teachings of Marx; the other group reject certain more or less important aspects of Marx's teachings, and in philosophy, for instance, take the side, not of dialectical materialism, but of neo-Kantianism, and in political economy the side of those who label some of Marx's teachings as "tendentious," etc. The former on this account accuse the latter of eclecticism, and in my opinion have very good grounds for doing so. The latter call the former "orthodox," and it should never be forgotten that use of this term has been made by opponents in controversy, that the "orthodox" do not reject criticism in general, but only "criticism" by eclectics (who would only be entitled to call themselves advocates of "criticism" to the extent that in the history of philosophy the teachings of Kant and of his followers are called "criticism," "critical philosophy"). In the same article I named authors (p. 1569, footnote, and p. 1570, footnote*) who, in my opinion, are representatives of the consistent and integral, and not eclectic, development of Marxism, and who have done for this development—in the field of philosophy, in the field of political economy and in the field of history and politics—incomparably more than, for example, Sombart or Stammler,** the mere repetition of whose eclectic views is regarded by many today as a big step forward. It is scarcely necessary for me to add that latterly the representatives of the eclectic trend have grouped themselves around E. Bernstein. I shall limit myself to these brief remarks on the question of my "orthodoxy," both because it is not immediately relevant to the subject of my article, and because I am unable here to elaborate in detail the views of the former, and must refer those who are interested to the German literature. On this subject the Russian controversies are merely echoes of the German, and unless

* See present edition, Vol. 4, *Once More on the Theory of Realisation.—Ed.*

** Cf. against Stammler the very proper remarks made by G. Cunow, part of whose article was translated and published in the *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* in 1899; then B. Lvov's *The Social Law* (ibid.), and the translation of Mr. Sadi Gunter's article which the *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* promises to publish in 1900.

one is familiar with the latter one cannot obtain a really precise idea of the point at issue.*

* It is this eclecticism, in my opinion, which is the substance of the "new" "critical" trend that has "begun to take shape" in our literature latterly (cf. Struve's articles in *Zhizn*, 1899, No. 10, and 1900, No. 2, and Tugan-Baranovsky's in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, 1899, No. 5, and 1900, No. 3). The first-mentioned author began to "give shape" to leanings towards eclecticism over five years ago in his *Critical Remarks*, and immediately after that book appeared an attempt was made (as Struve will be good enough to recall) to "open the eyes" of the public to the mixture of Marxism and bourgeois science in his views.[177] It is strange, therefore, to hear the following from Struve: "Simply to close one's eyes to the so-called (wrongly so-called, perhaps?—V. I.) 'bourgeois' criticism of Marx's teachings and to engage in repeating and paraphrasing them, has hitherto proved not only useless but even harmful" (*Zhizn*, No. 2, 305). "Simply to close one's eyes," not only to bourgeois science, but even to the most absurd doctrines, up to and including extreme obscurantism is, of course undoubtedly harmful; that is a banal commonplace. It is one thing, however, not to close one's eyes to bourgeois science, by keeping watch on it, and using it, but being *critical* towards it, and refusing to surrender the integrity and definiteness of one's world outlook; but it is another thing to give way to bourgeois science and to repeat, for example, catchwords about Marx being "tendentious," etc., which have a very definite meaning and significance. As for "repeating and paraphrasing," does the repeating and paraphrasing of Bohm-Bawerk and Wieser, Sombart and Stammler, in itself, a priori, deserve more attention than the repeating and paraphrasing of Marx? Has Struve, who has managed to discern (in Russian literature, mind you) the "harmfulness" (sic!) of repeating Marx, failed to notice the harmfulness of uncritically repeating the fashionable corrections of fashionable bourgeois "science"? How far must one have departed from Marxism to have arrived at such an opinion, and at such an unpardonable "closing of eyes" to the present-day "vacillation of thought"! At the end of his article Struve particularly requests my views on the questions raised by the so-called "critics." I would reply to this that what specially interests me just now is the contemporary eclectic trend in philosophy and in political economy, and that I still hope at some future date to present a systematic analysis of this trend;[178] but to chase after every single "fundamental error" and "fundamental antinomy" ... of eclecticism is (I ask the pardon of the respected "critics"!) simply uninteresting. That is why I shall confine myself for the moment to putting forward a counter-suggestion. Let the new "critical trend" take the most definite shape, and not limit itself to mere hints. The sooner this happens the better, for then the less will be the confusion and the more clearly will the public appreciate the difference between Marxism and the new "trend" in the bourgeois criticism of Marx.

NOTES

[1] Lenin's book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was the result of tremendous research lasting more than three years. Lenin began intensive work on his book when in prison, soon after his arrest in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class," and finished it in the village of Shushenskoye where he lived in exile. He had, however, been gathering material for his book long before he began writing it.

In his first letter from prison, dated January 2, 1896, Lenin wrote: "I have a plan that has occupied my mind considerably ever since I was arrested, increasingly so as time passes. I have long been engaged on an economic problem (that of the marketing of the products of manufacturing industry within the country), have selected some literature, drawn up a plan for its analysis and have even done some writing with a view to having my work published in book form, should its dimensions exceed those of a magazine article. I should be very unwilling to give up the job, and am now, apparently, faced with the alternative of either writing it here or of abandoning it altogether." (See present edition Vol. 37.)

In the same letter, in addition to giving instructions about books to be obtained according to a list he had drawn up, Lenin unfolded his plan of work:

"The list of books," he wrote, "is divided into the two parts into which my book is divided. A—The general theoretical part. This requires fewer books, so that, in any case, I hope to write it, although it needs more preparatory work. B—The application of the theoretical principles to Russian facts. This part requires very many books. The chief difficulty will be: 1) Zemstvo publications. Part of them, by the way, I already have, but another part (small monographs) may be ordered, and a part may be obtained through statisticians I know; 2) Government publications—the papers of commissions, reports and minutes of congresses, etc. These are important, but they are more difficult to obtain. Some of them, even the majority, I think, are in the library of the Free Economic Society." (See present edition, Vol. 37.)

Lenin's sister, A. I. Ulyanova-Elizarova, relates in her reminiscences that while Vladimir Ilyich was working on his book in prison "he decided to use the St. Petersburg libraries in order to obtain material needed for the work he had planned and that he knew he would not be able to get in exile. And so in prison he made an intense study of a mass of source material, and copied out numerous extracts. I dragged heaps of books to him from the Free Economic Society library, from the Academy of Sciences and from other scientific book repositories."

Lenin also worked on the book while on his way to exile. In a letter dated March 15, 1897, he wrote that while on the way he had looked over some "books borrowed for a short while," and that he intended to send them back from Krasnoyarsk. During a halt at Krasnoyarsk (en route for Shushenskoye village), Lenin made a study of books and magazines that he found in the rich private library of G. V. Yudin, a merchant, and also in the local city library.

While in exile Lenin continued to work hard on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Since he did not possess the means to buy large numbers of books, he wrote to his relatives asking them to make arrangements to supply him from libraries in the capital. "... It would very likely be more profitable for me to spend money on postage and have many books than to spend much more money *on buying* a few books." (See present edition, Vol. 37.) On Lenin's instructions, his sister, M. I. Ulyanova, copied out numerous extracts from various books in the Rumyantsev Library in Moscow. Lenin received these extracts at the end of May 1897. From the autumn of the same year, he received the material he needed regularly and set to work on the new sources, particularly on the numerous statistical abstracts. In the spring of 1898, N. K. Krupskaya, who had secured a transfer from her place of exile in Ufa to Shushenskoye, brought Lenin many books.

During his three years' work on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin studied and made a critical analysis of everything that had been written on Russian economics. In this monograph mention is made of, and passages are quoted from, over 500 different books, abstracts, research papers, reviews and articles. The literature, however, actually studied and used by Lenin, but not included among the sources he mentions, was *much more extensive*. But even this list gives an idea of the colossal amount of work involved in his study of the development of Russian capitalism.

The draft of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was completed in August 1898. In a letter dated October 11, 1898 Lenin wrote: "I have finished drafting my markets, and I have begun to give them the finishing touches. The making of a fair copy will go on simultaneously, so that I have thought of sending it on in parts and of having it printed as it gets there in order to avoid delay (I expect to send off the first lot in a month's time at the very latest); if they begin printing it in December, it might

just be in time for this season." (See present edition, Vol. 37.) Much time was needed to give the manuscript the finishing touches and the job was completed at the end of January 1899.

Lenin paid careful attention to the remarks of comrades and relatives who read *The Development of Capitalism* while it was still in manuscript. Each chapter was copied into a separate little notebook, and, apart from Krupskaya, was read and discussed by other Social-Democrats who were in exile at that time in the Minusinsk area. "We were the 'first readers,' so to speak, of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*," wrote G. M. Krzhizhanovsky in his reminiscences (he lived in exile not far from Shushenskoye village). "Whatever was sent to us, we read carefully and returned it to Lenin with our comments. He took our comments very much into consideration."

The Development of Capitalism in Russia came off the press at the end of March, 1899, under the pseudonym of "Vladimir Ilyin." The issue of 2,400 copies was sold out very quickly and circulated mainly among the Social-Democratic intelligentsia, the student youth, and also through the medium of propagandists in workers' study circles.

The bourgeois press tried to pass over Lenin's monograph in silence, and the first reviews did not appear until the autumn of 1899. One of them received a crushing retort from Lenin in his article "Uncritical Criticism," which was printed in the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (*Scientific Review*) for May-June 1900 (see pp. 609-32 in this volume).

A second edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* appeared in 1908.

Since the establishment of Soviet power *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* has, according to data as of October 1, 1957, been published 75 times, in a total of 3,372,000 copies and in 20 of the languages of the Soviet peoples. In addition it has appeared in the English, French, German, Spanish, Chinese, Czech, Hungarian, Japanese, Turkish and other foreign languages.

Part of the preparatory work for *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, which shows the volume of the research done by Lenin, and the methods he employed, has been published in the *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*.

The present volume follows the second, 1908, edition, which was published after the text had been corrected and supplemented by Lenin. In addition, account has been taken of all the author's remarks concerning the first, 1899, edition. p. 21

[2] *V. V.*—pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov.

N.—on or *Nikolai—on*, pseudonym of N. F. Danielson. Vorontsov and Danielson were the most prominent ideologists of liberal Narodism in the 80s and 90s of the 19th century. p. 25

[3] In February or at the beginning of March 1899, when in exile, Lenin received a copy of *Die Agrarfrage* (*The Agrarian Question*) by Kautsky, then still a Marxist. By then, the greater

part of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* had been set up in type, and so Lenin decided to make reference to Kautsky's work in the preface. On March 17 (29), 1899, Lenin sent a postscript to the preface. "If only it is not late," he wrote, "I would very much like to have it printed.... Maybe even if the preface is already set, it will still be possible to add the postscript?" The addition to the preface got into the hands of the censor and was changed. In a letter dated April 27 (May 9), 1899, Lenin wrote of this: "Have heard that my P.S. to the preface was late, fell into the hands of the preliminary censor and 'suffered,' I think." p. 26

[4] In the second edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* the numbering of the sections was changed through Lenin's introduction of several additions. The item to which Lenin refers the reader is in Chapter II, §XII, C, p. 162 and p. 168. p. 27

[5] On February 17, 1899, in the Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Trade, a discussion took place on a paper entitled "Is It Possible to Reconcile Narodism with Marxism?" Representatives of liberal Narodism as well as "Legal Marxists" took part in the discussion. V. P. Vorontsov (V. V.) said that those who represented the "modern trend of Marxism in the West" stood closer to Russian Narodism than to the Russian Marxists. A brief report of this meeting appeared on February 19 (March 3), 1899, in the reactionary St. Petersburg paper, *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*). p. 28

[6] The second edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was published in 1908. An announcement of its publication appeared in March 1908, in *Knizhnaya Letopis* (*Book Chronicle*), Issue No. 10.

For the second edition Lenin went over the text, eliminated printer's errors made numerous additions and wrote a new preface, dated July 1907. In the second edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* Lenin replaced the expressions "disciples," and "supporters of the working people," which he had employed so as to pass the censorship, by the forthright terms Marxists, Socialists. He also replaced allusions to "the new theory" by references to Marx and Marxism.

Lenin made considerable additions, employing the very latest statistics. He introduced into the second chapter a new section (XI), devoted to an analysis of the results of the Army-Horse Censuses of 1896-1900. He cited new facts in confirmation of his previous conclusions about the development of capitalism in Russia, in particular new factory statistical material; gave an analysis of the results of the general population census of 1897, which provided a fuller picture of the class structure of Russia (see Chapter VII, §V, pp. 501-507, *Addendum to second edition*).

In the second edition the results of the struggle against the so-called "Legal Marxists" on the basic problems dealt with in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* are also summed up. The experience of the first Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 fully confirmed Lenin's description of the "Legal Marxists" as bourgeois liberals hiding behind the cloak of Marxism and attempting to use the working-class movement in the interests of the bourgeoisie.

He introduced 24 new footnotes into the second edition (pp. 27, 45, 57, 157, 159, 163, 183, 206, 221, 274, 281, 389, 449, 451, 467, 499, 509, 523, 526, 533, 535, 550, 552, 575), 2 new sections (pp. 146-148 and 501-507), a new table (p. 512), wrote 8 paragraphs of new text and 3 big additions to previous paragraphs (pp. 300-303, 223-224, 225, 293-294), and made about 75 additions and alterations.

Lenin did not cease working on his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* after the appearance of the second edition in 1908. This is shown by the additions, made by him in 1910 or 1911 to page 405 of a copy of the second edition, dealing with the division of factories and works into groups according to the number of workers employed in 1908 (see illustration on page 513 of the present volume).

In the preface to the second edition Lenin speaks of the possibility of his revising the work in the future and indicates that in that case it would have to be divided into two volumes:—volume 1 to be devoted to an analysis of Russian economy before the Revolution and volume 2 to a study of the results and achievements of the Revolution.

A number of Lenin's other works, including *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*, which was written at the end of 1907, were devoted to a study of the results and achievements of the 1905-1907 Revolution. p. 31

[7] Marx cites Heine's expression relating to "yes-men": "Ich habe Drachenzähne gesät und Flöhe geerntet" (I have sown dragon's teeth and harvested fleas) in his book *Karl Grün*, "*Die sozial Bewegung in Frankreich und Belgien*" (Darmstadt, 1845) *oder Die Geschichtschreibung des wahren Sozialismus* [*Karl Grün*, "*The Social Movement in France and Belgium*" (Darmstadt, 1845), or *The Historiography of True Socialism*] (Marx-Engles/Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteil, B. 5, S. 495). p. 32

[8] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership including representatives of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries and bourgeois intellectuals who used hypocritical phrases about "democracy" to hide their real views and to win over the peasantry. The Cadet agrarian programme envisaged the possibility of part of the landed estates being turned over to the peasants on the basis of redemption payments, but at an

exorbitant price. The Cadets favoured the retention of the monarchy and tried to persuade the tsar and the feudal landlords to share power with them; their main task, however, they considered to be the fight against the revolutionary movement. During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried to save the monarchy. The Cadets in the bourgeois Provisional Government pursued a counter-revolutionary policy, opposed to the interests of the people but favourable to the U.S., British and French imperialists. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power and participated in all the armed counter-revolutionary actions and campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards were defeated, the Cadets fled abroad, where they continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity. p. 33

[9] *The Party of Octobrists* (or *Union of October Seventeenth*) represented the interests of the big industrial capitalists and of the big landlords who farmed their land on capitalist lines. The Octobrists claimed to stand by the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, in which, scared by the revolution, he promised the people civil rights; actually, however, the Octobrists had no intention of limiting the powers of tsarism, and fully supported both the home and the foreign policies of the tsar's government. p. 33

[10] *Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadyevich*—Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1906-1911, an extreme reactionary. The suppression of the Revolution of 1905-1907 and the period of severe political reaction that followed are connected with his name.

In an effort to provide the tsarist autocracy with a firm support in the countryside in the shape of the kulaks, Stolypin secured the adoption of a new agrarian law. By an edict of November 9, 1906, each peasant became entitled to withdraw from the village community and to have his allotment made his private property, with the ensuing right to sell it, mortgage it, etc., which until then had been forbidden. It was made the duty of the community to supply the peasant leaving its ranks with land in a single tract. The kulaks made use of this legislation to buy up the lands of the economically weak peasants for next to nothing. The laws of June 14, 1910, and of May 29, 1911, provided for a compulsory arrangement of land distribution that favoured the kulaks. p. 33

[11] *June 3, 1907*, was the day on which the Second State Duma was disbanded and a new law was promulgated dealing with the elections to the Third State Duma, that ensured a majority for the landlords and capitalists in the Duma. The tsar's government treacherously violated the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, did away with constitutional rights and had the Social-

Democratic group in the Second Duma arraigned and sentenced to hard labour. The so-called coup d'état of June 3 marked a temporary victory of the counter-revolution. p. 34

[12] *Popular Socialists*—members of the Popular Socialist Party, which separated from the right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (S.R.s) in 1906. They expressed the interests of the kulaks and stood for the partial nationalisation of landed estates on a redemption basis and the distribution of the land among the peasants according to the so-called labour norm. They favoured a bloc with the Cadets. Lenin called them "Social-Cadets," "petty-bourgeois opportunists," and "S.R. Mensheviks," who vacillated between the Cadets and the S.R.s, and he emphasised that this party "differs very little from the Cadets, since it has withdrawn from its programme both the Republic and the demand for all the land." The leading figures in the party were A. V. Peshekhonov, N. F. Annensky, V. A. Myakotin, and others. Following the February (1917) bourgeois-democratic revolution the Popular Socialist Party participated in the bourgeois Provisional Government. Following the October Socialist Revolution the Popular Socialists participated in counter-revolutionary plots and armed actions against the Soviets. The party went out of existence during the Civil War.

Trudoviks (from *trud*, "labour")—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Russian State Dumas, consisting of peasants and also of Narodnik-minded intellectuals. The Trudovik Group was constituted in April 1906 from the peasant deputies to the First State Duma.

The demands of the Trudoviks included the abolition of all restrictions based on the social estates and on nationality, the democratisation of the Zemstvos and urban local government bodies, and universal suffrage in the elections to the State Duma. The Trudovik agrarian programme proceeded from the Narodnik principle of the equalitarian use of the land: the formation of a national fund made up of lands belonging to the state, the royal family, the tsar himself and the monasteries, and also of private estates where they exceeded the established labour norm, with provision for compensation in the case of confiscated private estates. In the State Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Bolsheviks, their vacillations being due to the very class nature of the peasants who are petty proprietors. In September 1906 Lenin pointed out that the Trudovik peasant "is not above trying to strike a deal with the monarchy and settling down on his patch of land within the framework of the bourgeois system. At the present time, however, his energies are mainly devoted to the struggle against the landlords for the land, to the struggle against the feudal state for democracy." (See present edition, Vol. 11, *An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties of Russia*.) Since the Trudoviks represented the peasant masses, the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Duma were to arrive at agreements with them on individual issues

with a view to waging a joint struggle against the Cadets and the tsarist autocracy.

In 1917 the "Trudovik Group" merged with the "Popular Socialist" Party. p. 34

[13] *Molchalinism*—a synonym for sycophancy, toadyism. Derived from the name Molchalin, a character in Griboyedov's play *Wit Works Woe*. p. 34

[14] In the first edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899) this chapter was entitled "References to Theory." p. 37

[15] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow, 1959, Vol. III, p. 622.

Throughout this book, references to Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* are to the following German editions: Vol. 1—2nd edition, 1872; Vol. 2—1885 edition; and Vol. 3—1894 edition. References to the "Russian translation" of *Capital* are to the one by N. F. Danielson (1896). p. 38

[16] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 622. p. 40

[17] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 745 and 747. p. 42

[18] Here and elsewhere, footnotes indicated as *Note to 2nd edition* are those written by Lenin himself when he prepared the second, 1908 edition of this work. p. 45

[19] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 470. p. 47

[20] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 373. p. 48

[21] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 590. p. 48

[22] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, Chapter XXIV, Section 2. p. 49

[23] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 199-202. p. 49

[24] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 363-64. p. 50

[25] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 394. p. 52

[26] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 351-523. p. 54

[27] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 299-300. p. 55

[28] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 438-39. p. 56

[29] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 316. p. 57

[30] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 239-40. p. 57

[31] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 245. p. 57

[32] E. Bernstein's *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (*The Premises of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy*), which revised the principles of revolutionary Marxism in the spirit of bourgeois reformism, appeared in 1899. Lenin received a copy of it when the first edition of his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* had appeared, so that it was only in the second edition that he was able to include his remarks on Bernstein's opportunist views.

Lenin calls Bernstein "famous after the fashion of Herostratos." Tradition has it that *Herostratos*, a Greek who lived in the 4th century B. C., set fire to the noted temple of Artemis in his native town of Ephesus for the sole purpose of becoming known to posterity. The name of Herostratos has become an epithet applied to individuals who are ready to commit crime for the sake of winning fame. p. 57

[33] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 472-73. p. 58

[34] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 299. p. 58

[35] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 822. Lenin's remark on errors in the translation of *Capital* refers to the translation by N.—on (Danielson), 1896. p. 60

[36] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, Preface by Frederick Engels, p. 17. p. 62

[37] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 818-819. p. 64

[38] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 821-824. p. 64

[39] *Volgin*—pseudonym of G. V. Plekhanov. The work here cited is included in Vol. IX of his Works. p. 65

[40] *Zemstvo house-to-house censuses* were investigations of peasant farms undertaken by statistical agencies of the Zemstvos or rural government bodies. These censuses, which were conducted mainly for taxation purposes, became very common in the 1880s. The household censuses provided a wealth of factual material which was published in statistical abstracts covering the different gubernias and their uyezds or subdivisions. The Zemstvo statisticians, however, many of whom were Narodniks, were very often biased in the way they processed the statistical data and classified them incorrectly, thereby robbing them of much of their value. "Here is the weakest spot in our Zemstvo statistics, splendid as they are for the care and detail with which they are compiled," wrote Lenin. (See present edition, Vol. 20.) Phenomena of the economic type were hidden under piles of figures

in the Zemstvo returns and reviews, while the essential differences between, and features of, various peasant groups that took shape as capitalism developed were lost in the columns of average figures.

Lenin made a comprehensive analysis of Zemstvo statistical data, and carefully studied and processed them. He made calculations of his own, drew up tables and statistical summaries, gave a Marxist analysis of the peasant-farm data secured, and grouped them scientifically. Lenin used the wealth of Zemstvo statistical material to expose the artificiality of Narodnik schemes and to draw a true picture of Russia's economic development. He made extensive use of Zemstvo statistical material in his writings and especially in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. p. 70

[41] *Novorossia*—the name given to the Southern steppe area of European Russia. p. 70

[42] V. Y. Postnikov's *Peasant Farming in South Russia* is examined in detail by Lenin in one of his first works, *New Economic Trends in Peasant Life*. (See present edition, Vol. 1.) p. 70

[43] *Allotment land*—land left for the use of the peasants after the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. Held by the peasant community, it was periodically redistributed among the peasants. p. 73

[44] The full title of this source is *Statistical Returns for Taurida Gubernia. Statistical Tables Concerning Economic Conditions in the Villages of Melitopol Uyezd. Appendix to Vol. I*, Simferopol, 1885. p. 74

[45] *Yoking* (*supryaga*)—cultivation of the land with draught animals belonging to different peasants yoked together in a team. p. 79

[46] *Volost*—the lowest administrative territorial unit of the uyezd in pre-revolutionary Russia. p. 81

[47] *Sarpinka*—a thin striped or check cotton cloth; originally made in Sarepta. p. 95

[48] The *registered* males were those members of the male population of feudal Russia subject to the poll-tax (the peasantry and urban middle class were chiefly affected) and to this end were recorded in special censuses (so-called "registrations"). Such "registrations" took place in Russia from 1718 onwards; the tenth and last "registration was made in 1857-1859." In a number of districts redistribution of the land within the village communities took place on the basis of those recorded in the "registration" lists. p. 102

[49] *Appropriated family land*—land in Siberia appropriated mainly by rich peasants, who did what they pleased with it, making gifts of it, selling it, or handing it down in the family. p. 125

[50] For the notes containing preliminary calculations made by Lenin in the margins of these publications, see *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*, pp. 144-150. p. 125

[51] See A. N. Engelhardt, *From the Countryside. 11 Letters*. 1872-1882, St. Petersburg, 1885. In 1937 this book was republished by the Publishing House for Social and Economic Literature, Moscow. p. 135

[52] *Army-horse censuses*—a register of the number of horses fit for army service in case of mobilisation, was, as a rule, taken in tsarist Russia every six years. The first census was taken in 1876 in 33 gubernias in the west of Russia. The second census was taken in 1882 and covered the whole of European Russia, the results being published in 1884 under the title *Horse Census of 1882*. In 1888 a census was taken in 41 gubernias, and in 1891 in the remaining 18 gubernias and in the Caucasus. The examination of the data gathered was undertaken by the Central Statistical Committee, which published them in the abstracts: *Statistics of the Russian Empire. XX. Army-Horse Census of 1888* (St. Petersburg, 1891) and *Statistics of the Russian Empire. XXXI. Army-Horse Census of 1891* (St. Petersburg, 1894). The next census was taken in the years 1893-1894 and covered 38 gubernias of European Russia, the results being published under the title *Statistics of the Russian Empire. XXXVII. Army-Horse Census of 1893 and 1894* (St. Petersburg, 1896). Data of the army-horse census for the years 1899-1901, covering 43 gubernias of European Russia, one Caucasian gubernia and the Kalmyk steppe of the Astrakhan Gubernia made up Vol. LV of the *Statistics of the Russian Empire* (St. Petersburg, 1902).

The *army-horse censuses* were investigations that covered all the peasant farms. In his book, Lenin utilised the census material when examining the process of the differentiation of the peasantry. p. 141

[53] Lenin made a detailed analysis of the material contained in Blagoveshchensky's compilation in a special notebook and in the remarks he wrote in the margins. These have been published in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*, pp. 89-99. p. 142

[54] Lenin refers here to the title of the previously mentioned essay by the Liberal Narodnik, Vorontsov (V. V.), that appeared in 1892. p. 145

[55] *The Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry in Russia* mentioned here and further on constitute a series of 16 volumes, which appeared from time to time in the years 1879 to 1887. The "Commission of Inquiry into

Handicraft Industry in Russia" (called, for short, the "Handicraft Commission") was set up in 1874 under the auspices of the Council of Trade and Manufactures, at the request of the First All-Russia Congress of Owners of Factories and Works, that took place in 1870. The Commission included representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Home Affairs, State Properties, and of the Russian Geographical Society, Free Economic Society, Moscow Agricultural Society, Russian Technical Society and Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Trade. The valuable material published by the "Handicraft Commission" in its *Transactions* were mainly the fruits of the work of local, often little-known, officials. Lenin, who made a detailed study of the Commission's *Transactions*, drew from them numerous facts and figures showing the development of capitalist relations in Russia's handicraft industry. p. 149

[56] In this column Lenin also includes incomes from fruit growing and stock raising. p. 152

[57] A paper by Prof. A. I. Chuprov on grain prices was discussed by the Free Economic Society in March 1897.

The Free Economic Society (F.E.S.) was a privileged scientific body, founded in 1765 with the aim, as its Statutes indicated of "disseminating information beneficial to agriculture and industry." Scientists, from the ranks of liberal nobles or bourgeoisie, made up the membership of the F.E.S. The Society undertook investigations by questionnaire and sent out expeditions to study various branches of the national economy and parts of the country; it periodically issued *Transactions of the F.E.S.*, containing the results of investigations conducted, and verbatim reports of papers read and of discussions held in the Society's sections. The *Transactions of the F.E.S.* are frequently mentioned by Lenin in his works. p. 155

[58] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 791. p. 156

[59] *Collective responsibility*—the peasants of each village community were collectively responsible for making timely and full payments and for the fulfilment of all sorts of services to the state and the landlords (payment of taxes and of land redemption instalments, provision of recruits for the army, etc.). This form of bondage, which was retained even after serfdom was abolished in Russia, was done away with only in 1906. p. 157

[60] Drechsler's data are analysed by Lenin in his *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* (Chapter XI, "Stock Raising on Small and Large Farms"). See present edition, Vol. 13. p. 159

[61] The expressions "quarter of a horse" and "living fraction" belong to the writer Gleb Uspensky. See his sketches Living Figures in the *Selected Works* of Uspensky, 1938 edition. p. 159

[62] See Y. E. Yanson, *Comparative Statistics of Russia and West-European Countries*. Vol. II. Industry and Trade. Section I. Agricultural Statistics. St. Petersburg, 1880, pp. 422-423, 326, etc. p. 162

[63] The famine of 1891 affected the east and south-east gubernias of European Russia with particular severity, its scale exceeding all similar calamities that had befallen the country. It ruined masses of peasants and at the same time hastened the process of the creation of a home market and the development of capitalism in Russia. This was dealt with by Engels in his article "Socialism in Germany." He also referred to it in his letters to Nikolai—on dated October 29, 1891, March 15 and June 18, 1892. p. 166

[64] Lenin's comments on F. A. Shcherbina's article are published in the *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*, pp. 70-84. p. 170

[65] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 504-505. p. 173

[66] *The Valuyev Commission*—the "Commission to Investigate the Condition of Russian Agriculture "which functioned under the chairmanship of the tsar's minister P. A. Valuyev. In the years 1872-1873 the Commission collected a large amount of material dealing with the condition of agriculture in post-Reform Russia: Governors' reports, statements and depositions of landlords, marshals of the nobility, Zemstvo administrations, volost boards, grain merchants, village priests, kulaks, statistical and agricultural societies and other bodies connected with agriculture. This material was published in *Papers of the Commission of Inquiry into the Condition of Russian Agriculture*, St. Petersburg, 1873. p. 173

[67] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 770.
Lenin's note on the wrong translation of the term "Arbeitsrente" as "trudovaya renta" refers to the translation by Nikolai—on (Danielson) of 1896. p. 174

[68] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 776. p. 175

[69] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 777-778. p. 175

[70] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 779. p. 176

[71] *Gift-land peasants*, those of the former landlords' peasants, who, at the time of the Reform of 1861, by "agreement" with their landlords received their allotments as a gift (without having.

to redeem them). The gilt-lander received a miserable strip, amounting altogether to a quarter of the so-called "top" or "statutory" allotment, i.e., of the allotment established by law for the given locality. All the rest of the lands that had constituted the peasants' allotments before the Reform were seized by the landlord, who held his "gift-landers," forcibly dispossessed of their land, in a state of economic bondage even after serfdom was abolished.

"*Three-dayers*," a category of allotment-holding agricultural wage-workers. Farming the land he held on a poverty level, the "three-dayer" was a day labourer who, in return for grain or 20 to 30 rubles in cash, had to agree to conditions of bondage, or pay off the debt by working three days a week throughout the summer on the farm of the kulak or the landlord who made the loan. This type of allotment-holding agricultural labourer was met with on a particularly extensive scale in the north-western gubernias of tsarist Russia. p. 179

[72] *Ostsee region*—the Baltic region of tsarist Russia, which included the gubernias of Esthland, Courland and Liflandia. This area is now the territory of the Latvian and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics. p. 179

[73] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 163-165. p. 183

[74] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 322-327, 580-584, 595-596. p. 184

[75] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 581. p. 184

[76] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 326. p. 184

[77] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 323. p. 184

[78] The Narodnik theory of "people's production" is criticised by Lenin in his earlier work *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*. (See present edition, Vol. 1.) p. 184

[79] The first six sections of this chapter originally appeared as an article in the journal *Nachalo* (*Beginning*), Issue No. 3, March 1899 (pp. 96-117) under the title of "The Dislodgement of Corvée by Capitalist Economy in Contemporary Russian Agriculture." The article was accompanied by the following editorial note: "This article is an extract from the author's considerable investigation of the development of capitalism in Russia." p. 191

[80] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953, p. 10. p. 192

[81] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 771. p. 193

[82] "*Cut-off-lands*" (*otrezki*)—the pasture lands woods, etc., which the landlords "cut off," i.e., of which they deprived the peasants when serfdom was abolished in Russia. p. 194

[83] *Temporarily-bound peasants*—serfs who, after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, were obliged to perform certain services for the landlords, i.e., do corvée service or pay quit-rent. The "temporarily-bound status" continued until the peasants, by agreement with the landlords, had acquired their allotments by the payment of redemption money. The landlords were obliged to accept redemption payments only after the edict of 1881, by which the "obligatory relation" between the peasants and the landlords had to cease as from January 1, 1883. p. 194

[84] The two volumes of *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices on Certain Aspects of the Russian National Economy* reached Lenin in the village of Shushenskoye in 1897. He made a careful study of them while working on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, as is proved by his numerous marginal comments in the volumes. While he exposed the method which the Narodniks were so fond of employing, the distortion of the actual situation by quoting "average" statistics which in fact obscured the differentiation of the peasantry, Lenin carefully checked and made use of the concrete material in the volumes. Thus, on page 153 of Vol. 1 Lenin drew up a table showing the distribution, in the different gubernias of Russia, of the various forms of economy (capitalist, labour-service, and mixed). This material, along with some additions from other sources, went to make up the table given in the text. p. 196

[85] *Cultivation of cycles*—an enslaving form of labour-service rendered to the landlord by the peasant as rental for land obtained from him in post-Reform Russia. The landlord lent the peasant land or made him a loan in cash or kind for which the peasant undertook to cultivate a "cycle," using his own implements and draught animals; this meant cultivating one dessiatine of spring crops and one of winter crops, occasionally supplemented by reaping a dessiatine of crops. p. 198

[86] *Skopshchina*—the name given in the southern parts of Russia to the payment of land rent in kind, on terms of bondage, the tenant paying the landowner "s kopny" (from the corn-shock) a portion of the harvest (a half, and sometimes more), and usually fulfilling miscellaneous labour services in addition. p. 201

[87] *Villeins*—feudally dependent peasants in ancient Rus (9th-13th centuries) who performed corvée service for the princes and other temporal and clerical lords and also paid rent in kind. The feudal lords seized the land of the villeins and compelled them to work on the feudal estates.

Russkaya Pravda (*Russian Law*)—the first written codification of laws and princes' decrees (11th-12th centuries). The statutes of the *Russkaya Pravda* protected the lives and property of the feudal lord and are indicative of the bitter class struggle between peasants in feudal bondage and their exploiters. p. 204

[88] The Verbatim Report of the Debates of March 1 and 2 appeared in the *Transactions of the Free Economic Society*, 1897, No. 4. p. 212

[89] *Oblomov*—a type of landlord who lacked will-power, did nothing and was extremely lazy. A character in Goncharov's novel of that name. p. 218

[90] *Pindar*—ancient Greek lyrical poet. Of his numerous works, four volumes of poems have survived in which he extols the victors at the games. Pindar's name has become an epithet used to designate those who "eulogise" beyond measure.

In speaking of the Pindar of the capitalist factory Lenin has in mind the term applied by Marx in *Capital*, Volume I, to that apologist of capitalism, Dr. Ure. p. 233

[91] *Zvegintsev Commission*—was established in 1894 under the auspices of the Zemstvo Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs to draw up measures for "introducing order into employments outside the village and regulating the movement of agricultural labourers." p. 242

[92] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 546. p. 245

[93] In the first edition (1899) of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* the table was given as follows: p. 253

50 Gubernias of

Periods	Population				Sown				Thousands Net yield			
					all crops sown, i.e., cereals plus potatoes							
	000's	in % %				in % %				in % %		
1864-66	61,400	100			72,225	100			152,851	100		
1870-79	69,853	114	100		75,620	104	100		211,325	138	100	
1883-87	81,725	132	117	100	80,293	111	106	100	255,178	166	120	100
1885-94	86,282	140	123	105	92,616	128	122	115	265,254	173	126	104

[94] Lenin's notes on this publication and his preliminary calculations are published in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*, pp. 165-175. p. 254

[95] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 738-39. p. 258

[96] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 655. p. 259

[97] *Res fungibilis*—replaceable thing—an old juridical term. "Replaceable things" are those which in contracts are indicated by simple numerical quantity or measure ("so many bushels of rye," "so many bricks"). They are distinguished from "irreplaceable things"—things that are specifically indicated ("such and such a thing," "article number so and so"). p. 270

[98] *Little Russia*, i.e., Malorossia—as the territory of the Ukraine was officially called in tsarist Russia. p. 272

[99] N. A. Blagoveshchensky's *Peasant Farming. Combined Zemstvo House-to-House Census Economic Returns*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1893. p. 275

[100] See Y. M. Dementyev's *The Factory, What It Gives and What It Takes from the Population*, Moscow, 1893, pp. 88-97. p. 296

[101] "Metropolitan gubernias" here refers to the gubernias of St. Petersburg and Moscow. p. 307

[102] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 180. p. 314

[103] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 334 (*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*). p. 315

[104] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 663. p. 320

European Russia

of Chetverts										
Sown				Potatoes	Net yield				Net per-capita yield, in chetverts of		
	in % %				in % %			cereals	potatoes	total crops
6,918	100			16,966	100			2.21	0.27	2.48
8,757	126	100		30,379	178	100		2.59	0.43	3.02
10,847	156	123	100	36,164	212	119	100	2.68	0.44	3.12
16,552	239	187	152	44,348	260	146	123	2.57	0.50	3.07

[105] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 316. p. 321

[106] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 693. p. 321

[107] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 642. p. 321

[108] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 242-243. p. 322

[109] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 241. p. 322

[110] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 603, 787. p. 323

[111] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 119. p. 325

[112] This refers to the article by Engels entitled "The Peasant Question in France and Germany," published in *Die Neue Zeit*, Issue No. 10 of the year 1894-95. (See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 420-440.) The French "disciples"—the name given, with an eye to censorship, to Marxists (in the article mentioned Engels calls them "French Socialists of the Marxist trend"). p. 326

[113] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 787. p. 327

[114] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 792-793. p. 327

[115] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 603-604. p. 327

[116] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 709. p. 328

[117] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 709-710. p. 329

[118] In the years 1894-1895 Count *Kanitz*, representative of the agrarians, introduced into the German Reichstag the proposal known as the "Antrag Kanitz" calling on the government to assume control of the purchase of grain abroad, and undertake the sale of all such imported grain at average prices. The proposal was rejected by the Reichstag. p. 329

[119] Lenin gives an appreciation of the research done by Bücher, and of the latter's classification of the stages and forms of industrial development, in Chapter VII of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, in his footnote on page 550. The most important part of Bücher's work, that devoted to the origin of the national economy, was translated into Russian by Lenin apparently when he was in exile, in the village of Shushenskoye. Lenin's translation has not been published. p. 332

[120] In the middle of the 19th century, the knitting of slippers with designs in coloured wools was widespread in Arzamas and its outskirts. In the 1860s ten thousand and more pairs of knitted

footwear were made annually in the town, the Nikolsky Convent and the village of Viyezdnaya Sloboda. The wares were sold at the Nizhni-Novgorod fair, and from there were dispatched to Siberia, the Caucasus and other parts of Russia. p. 341

[121] *Manilov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, typifying the weak-willed, hollow dreamer and inert windbag. p. 355

[122] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 322. p. 356

[123] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 323. p. 357

[124] *Metal-beaters*—workers who beat gold, silver, tin, copper and other metals into the foil or leaf formerly used for decorative purposes; icons and other church property were among the articles so decorated. p. 357

[125] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 334-335. p. 359

[126] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 263-264, 270-271, 290, 319-320, 321-322. p. 361

[127] *Industries of Vladimir Gubernia*, Vol. III, an investigation by S. Kharizomenov, Moscow, 1882, pp. 20-21. p. 374

[128] *State peasants with quarter holdings*—the name given in tsarist Russia to the category of former state peasants, descendants of lower-rank servicemen who in the 16th to 17th centuries were settled in the border lands of the state of Muscovy. For their services in guarding the state frontiers the settlers (Cossacks musketeers, soldiers) were given the use of small plots of land either temporarily or in perpetuity. The area of such a plot amounted to a so-called *quarter* [1.35 acres]. From the year 1719 such settlers were called *odnodvortsi* [i.e., those possessing only their own farmsteads and no community land]. Formerly they enjoyed various kinds of privileges and had the right to own peasants, but during the 19th century were gradually deprived of these rights and reduced to the status of ordinary peasants. By a regulation of 1866 the quarter lots were recognised as the private property of the former quarter-lot peasants and their descendants. p. 381

[129] *Free tillers*—the category of peasants freed from serf dependence by the law of February 20, 1803. This law permitted landlords themselves to decide the terms on which they freed the peasants from the land. p. 381

[130] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 329-331. p. 385

[131] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 154. p. 385

[132] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 368. p. 385

[133] *Workroom owners*, *middlemen*—owners of premises who rented them to manufacturers for the installation of hand-looms, and themselves worked there. The middleman or workroom owner, by arrangement with the employer, undertook to heat or repair the premises, deliver raw materials to the weavers, send the finished product to the employer or act as overseer. p. 386

[134] *Statistical Chronicle of the Russian Empire*, II. Vol. III. Material for the Study of Handicraft Industry and Hand Labour in Russia. Part 1. Published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of Home Affairs. St. Petersburg, 1872. p. 388

[135] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 342-350. p. 396

[136] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 342-350. p. 398

[137] *Cadastre*—a public record of the extent, value and ownership of land, etc., for purposes of taxation. The cadastral surveys gave particulars of land held, incomes of inhabitants and descriptions of streets, monasteries, fortifications, etc. The oldest cadastre now extant dates back to the 15th century, but most of those that have been preserved relate to the 17th century. Surveys for the cadastre were made by special commissions appointed by the central government authorities. p. 415

[138] *The Law of June 2, 1897* established a working day of 11½ hours for industrial enterprises and railway workshops. Prior to the adoption of this law the working day in Russia was unlimited and lasted as long as 14 and 15 hours and even more. The tsar's government was forced to adopt this law due to the pressure of the working-class movement, which was led by the "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class" headed by Lenin. A detailed analysis and criticism of the law is given by Lenin in his pamphlet: *The New Factory Law*. (See present edition, Vol. 2.) p. 418

[139] The table that follows is based on a similar but more detailed table published in the *Vestnik Finansov*, Issue No. 42, 1898. p. 423

[140] Prior to 1864 the gunsmiths of Tula were serfs of the state and lived in special suburbs (slobodas). (The state blacksmiths' sloboda, etc.) They were divided into guilds: barrel, gun-stock, lock, instrumental, etc. For the carrying out of auxiliary work serf-peasants from a number of villages were attached to the Tula arms factories, their task being to prepare charcoal for the gun-smiths, guard the forests allocated to the factories, and do jobs in the factory yards.

In Tula at the time of their liberation from feudal dependence there were nearly 4,000 gunsmiths, of whom 1,276 were employed in factories and 2,362 worked at home. In all, the gunsmiths and their families numbered over 20,000. p. 424

[141] Lenin refers here to the factory owned by the St. Petersburg Footwear Manufacturing Company, established in 1878. In 1894-95 the factory employed 845 workers and the value of its output was 1,287,912 rubles (figures taken from the *List of Factories and Works*, St. Petersburg, 1897, Issue No. 13450, pp. 548-549). p. 430

[142] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 747-749. p. 434

[143] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 323. p. 440

[144] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 342-343. p. 442

[145] The reference here is to M. K. Gorbunova's *Women's Industries in Moscow Gubernia*, Part IV (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*. Section covering economic statistics, Vol. VII, Part II, Moscow, 1882). Introduction, p. IX. p. 444

[146] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 478, etc., pp. 643, etc.; Chapter XXV, Section 4 particularly. p. 447

[147] Lenin refers to Y. N. Andreyev's *Handicraft Industry in Russia According to the Investigations of the "Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry in Russia" and Other Sources,* St. Petersburg, 1885 (the estimate of the number of persons engaged in "subsidiary trades" as 7½ millions is given on p. 69 of the book). Lenin also refers to the pamphlet by the same author entitled *Handicraft Industry in Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1882, p. 12. p. 451

[148] To characterise the development of large-scale industry in tsarist Russia in the post-Reform period Lenin examined the material contained in numerous factory statistical sources of that period (statistical returns, monographs and works of research, official reference books, magazine and newspaper reports, papers, etc.). Lenin's work of checking, processing, combining and scientifically grouping statistical data is shown in the notes he made in various books and from other material published in section 2 of *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*. For Lenin's estimation of the main sources of factory statistics see also his article "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics." (See present edition, Vol. 4.) p. 454

[149] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 474. p. 454

[150] The "*landlord establishment of a manorial-possessional character*" was a feudal manorial manufactory belonging to a landlord and

employing his serf-peasants. By a decree of Peter I issued in 1721, merchant factory owners were permitted to purchase peasants for work in their factories. The feudal workers attached to such enterprises were called "possessional peasants." p. 470

[151] Lenin refers to *Material for the Statistics of Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia*, Vol. V, Pt. 1 (Zavodsky district), Kazan, 1894, on p. 65 of which there is a table headed "Information on a team of workers bound by debt to their jobs in the shops of the Arta works in 1892." p. 486

[152] Lenin quotes here *The Mining and Metallurgical Industry of Russia*. Published by the Department of Mines. International Columbia Exhibition, 1893, in Chicago, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 52. p. 488

[153] In the first edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* the table contained the figures for the years 1890 and 1896. In the second edition these figures were omitted. Furthermore, the figures for 1897 differed somewhat from those for the same year cited in the second edition. The corresponding part of the table as it appeared in the first edition was as follows:

1890	56,560	100	28,174	49.7	13,418	23.7	367.2
1896	98,414	100	35,457	36.6	39,169	39.7	547.2
1897	113,982	100	40,850	35.8	46,350	40.6	—

The figures for 1897 given in the first edition had a footnote, also omitted in the second edition, stating:—"In 1898 the pig-iron output in the Empire is estimated at 133 million poods, of which 60 million poods were produced in the South and 43 million poods in the Urals (*Russkiye Vedomosti* [*Russian Gazette*], 1899, No. 1)." p. 489

[154] Lenin supplemented this table later with the corresponding figures for 1908 (see illustration on p. 513). The data entered by Lenin were taken from *Collection of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1908* (no. 50-51), published in 1910. Consequently. Lenin's entries were made either in 1910 or in 1911. p. 512

[155] *Boatmen*—workers who towed river craft by rope, or rowed them. p. 528

[156] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 642. p. 529

[157] While in exile in the village of Shushenskoye, Lenin, assisted by Krupskaya, translated volume one and edited the translation of volume two of *The History of Trade Unionism*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Volume one of the Webbs' book "translated from the English by Vladimir Ilyin" (i.e., Lenin) was published in St. Petersburg in 1900 by O. N. Popova. Volume two appeared in 1901. p. 531

[158] The "Khludov Factory," the property of the brothers A. and G. Khludov was situated in the town of Yegoryevsk Ryazan Gubernia. The firm's full title was: "Yegoryevsk Cotton-Spinning Factory Co., A. and G. Khludov." The bracketed data (showing the number of workers and the value of output) given in Lenin's footnote were taken from the *List of Factories*, St. Petersburg, 1897, Issue No. 763. p. 534

[159] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 747-749. p. 536

[160] *Last*—a term used on Russian merchant ships: equalled two tons. p. 554

[161] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 622. p. 562

[162] In the 1890s *Russkaya Mysl* was a liberal publication and *Russky Vestnik*, a magazine expressing the reactionary view. p. 580

[163] *Sobakevich*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, the personification of the bullying, tight-fisted landlord. p. 589

[164] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, Chapter 30 (p. 745). p. 590

[165] *Mr. Coupon*—a term adopted in the 1880s and 1890s to indicate capital and capitalists. The expression "Mr. Coupon" was put in circulation by the writer Gleb Uspensky in his articles "Grave Sins." p. 594

[166] See Gleb Uspensky's article "In the Caucasus." *Works*, Vol. II, 1918. p. 594

[167] *Pokrut*—the form of economic relations that existed among members of artels engaged in hunting sea animals or fishing in the north of Russia; the means of production in the artel belonged to an employer to whom the workers were in bondage. The employer usually received two-thirds of the catch, and the workers only one-third. The workers were compelled to sell part of their catch to the employer at a low price, payment being made in goods, which was very much to the disadvantage of the workers. p. 599

[168] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 9. p. 600

[169] Lenin's article "Uncritical Criticism" is an answer to a hostile review of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* by P. N. Skvortsov, a "Legal Marxist." Lenin began working on the article in January 1900, during his last weeks of exile at Shushenskoye. This information is contained in a letter written by N. K. Krupskaya to Lenin's mother, M. A. Ulyanova, dated January 19, 1910. The article was finished in March 1900, after Lenin's return from

exile, and appeared in the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (*Scientific Review*) in May and June, 1900. This was the last of Lenin's articles to appear in the Russian legal press before he went abroad. p. 609

[170] In his references to *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* Lenin gives the page numbers of the 1899 edition. These have been changed to correspond to the pages of the present edition. p. 612

[171] The words in inverted commas "Chi-chi-kov ... etc.," are a paraphrase of the following extract from Chernyshevsky's *Essays on the Gogol Period in Russian Literature*. "... A witty examination of *Dead Souls* might be written as follows: After giving the book's title: The Adventures [pokhozhdeniya] of Chichikov, or Dead Souls, begin directly in the following way: 'The cooling down [prokhlazhdeniya] of Tchi! tchi! kov—don't think reader, that I have sneezed ... etc., etc.' Some twenty years ago there were readers who thought that witty" (see N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Essays on the Gogol Period in Russian Literature*, St. Petersburg, 1892, p. 64). p. 613

[172] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 116-17. p. 615

[173] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 115. p. 616

[174] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 470. p. 617

[175] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 350-351. p. 618

[176] Lenin's article "Once More on the Theory of Realisation," signed V. Ilyin, appeared in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, Issue No. 8, August 1899. (See present edition, Vol. 4.) p. 630

[177] "An attempt to 'open the eyes' of the public to the mixture of Marxism and bourgeois science" is a reference to Lenin's criticism of Struveism, "Legal Marxism," in his essay *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book*. This essay, contained in Volume 1 of the present edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*, exposed the real nature of the "Legal Marxists," and showed that they were bourgeois liberals who were attempting to use the Marxist banner and the working-class movement in the interests of the bourgeoisie. p. 632

[178] "*A systematic analysis of this trend*" was made by Lenin in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. This supremely important philosophical work was written in 1908 and appeared in book form in Moscow in 1909. (See present edition, Vol. 14.) p. 632

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ

ТОМ 3

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

4

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PREFACE

Volume Four of the *Collected Works* contains Lenin's writings for the period February 1898-February 1901. These writings are devoted to the struggle for the victory of revolutiollary Marxism in the working-class movement and to the exposure of the anti-revolutionary views of the Narodniks, "legal Marxists," and "economists."

"A Note on the Question of the Market Theory (Apropos of the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)," "Once More on the Theory of Realisation," and "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" were directed against the "legal Marxists," who sought to subordinate and adapt the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

This volume contains Lenin's first writings against "economism": "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats," articles for the third issue of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy," and "Apropos of the *Profession de foi*," in which he laid bare the opportunism of the "economists" and showed "economism" to be a variety of international opportunism ("Bernsteinism on Russian soil"). Against the anti-Marxist positions adopted by the "economists," Lenin contraposed the plan of the unity of socialism with the working-class movement.

Several of the articles in this volume are models of the journalism of social and political exposure to which Lenin attached great significance in the struggle against the lawlessness of the tsarist officials, the struggle to awaken the consciousness of the broad masses of the people. These articles are: "Beat—but Not to Death!", "Why Accelerate the Vicissitude of the Times?" and "Objective Statistics," published under the general heading of "Casual Notes": "The Drafting of 183 Studeuts into the Army," the preface to

the pamphlet on the famous Kharkov May Day celebration, 1900, *May Days in Kharkov*, and the article, "Factory Courts," written in connection with the granting of police functions to the Factory Inspectorate.

The volume also contains writings relating to the organisation of the all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper *Iskra*: "Draft of a Declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*," "How the 'Spark' Was Nearly Extinguished," and "Declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra*."

These documents, as well as the articles, "Our Programme," "A Draft Programme of Our Party," "The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement," and "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry," define the tasks confronting the Marxist organisations and the working-class movement of Russia at the moment when Lenin set about the actual formation of a party to fight under the unitary banner of revolutionary Marxism against opportunism, amateurishness in work, ideological disunity, and vacillation.

The present volume also contains the "Draft Agreement" with the Plekhanovist Emancipation of Labour group on the publication of the newspaper *Iskra* and the magazine *Zarya*, which appears for the first time in a collected edition of Lenin's writings. *Iskra* was launched on the basis of the "Draft Agreement."



V. I. LENIN

1897

ON THE QUESTION OF OUR FACTORY STATISTICS

(PROFESSOR KARYSHEV'S NEW STATISTICAL EXPLOITS)[1]

The Russian reading public displays a lively interest in the question of our factory statistics and in the chief conclusions to be drawn from them. This interest is quite understandable, for the question is connected with the more extensive one of the "destiny of capitalism in Russia." Unfortunately, however, the state of our factory statistics does not correspond to the general interest in their data. This branch of economic statistics in Russia is in a truly sad state, and still sadder, perhaps, is the fact that the people who write about statistics often display an astounding lack of understanding of the nature of the figures they are analysing, their authenticity and their suitability for drawing certain conclusions. Such precisely is the estimate that must be made of Mr. Karyshev's latest work, first published in *Izvestia Moskovskovo Selskokhozyaistvennovo Instituta* (4th year, Book 1) and then as a separate booklet with the high-sounding title *Material on the Russian National Economy. I. Our Factory Industry in the Middle Nineties* (Moscow, 1898). Mr. Karyshev tries, in this essay, to draw conclusions from the latest publication of the Department of Commerce and Manufactures on our factory industry.* We shall make a detailed analysis of Mr. Karyshev's conclusions and, especially, of his methods. We think that an analysis of this sort will have significance, not only in determining the way in which the material is treated by Pro-

* Ministry of Finance. Department of Commerce and Manufactures. The Factory Industry of Russia. *List of Factories and Works*, St. Petersburg, 1897, pp. 63 + vi + 1047.

fessor So-and-So (for this a review of a few lines would suffice), but also in determining the degree of reliability of our factory statistics, for which deductions they are suitable and for which they are unsuitable, what the most important requirements of our factory statistics are and the tasks of those who study them.

As its name implies, the source used by Mr. Karyshev contains a list of factories in the Empire for the year 1894-95. The publication of a full list of all factories (i.e., of *relatively* large industrial establishments, with varying conceptions of what is to be considered large) is not new to our literature. Since 1881 Messrs. Orlov and Budagov have compiled a *Directory of Factories and Works* the last (third) edition of which was issued in 1894. Much earlier, in 1869, a list of factories was printed in the notes accompanying the statistical tables on industry in the first issue of the *Ministry of Finance Yearbook*. The reports which factory owners are by law obliged to submit annually to the Ministry provided the material for all these publications. The new publication of the Department of Commerce and Manufactures differs from former publications of this type in its somewhat more extensive information, but at the same time it has tremendous shortcomings from which the earlier ones did not suffer and which greatly complicate its utilisation as material on factory statistics. In the introduction to the *List* there is a reference to the unsatisfactory condition of these statistics in the past which thereby defines the purpose of the publication to serve precisely as material for statistics and not merely as a reference book. But the *List*, as a statistical publication, amazes one by the complete absence of any sort of summarised totals. It is to be hoped that a publication of this sort, the first of its kind, will also be the last statistical publication without summaries. The huge mass of raw material in the form of piles of figures is useless ballast in a reference book. The introduction to the *List* sharply criticises the reports previously submitted to the Ministry by factory owners on the grounds that they "consisted of confusing information, always one and the same, which was repeated from year to year and did not allow even the quantity of goods produced to be accurately determined, whereas production figures as complete and reliable as possible are an urgent

necessity" (p. 1). We shall certainly not say a word in defence of the absolutely outmoded system of our former factory statistics that were purely pre-Reform,* both as to organisation and as to quality. But, unfortunately, there is *scarcely any noticeable* improvement in their present condition. The gigantic *List* just published still does not give us the right to speak of any serious changes in the old system admitted by all to be useless. The reports "did not allow even the quantity of goods produced to be accurately determined."... Indeed, in the latest *List* there is no information whatsoever on the quantity of goods, although Mr. Orlov's *Directory*, for example, gave this information for a very large number of factories, and in some branches of industry for almost all factories, so that in the summarised table there is information on the quantity of the product (for the leather, distilling, brick, cereals, flour milling, wax, lard, flax-scutching, and brewery industries). And it was from the old reports that the *Directory* material was compiled. The *List* does not give any information on machinery employed, although the *Directory* gave this information for some branches of industry. The introduction describes the changes that have occurred in our factory statistics in this way: formerly, factory owners supplied information through the police according to "a brief and insufficiently clear programme" and no one checked the information. "Material was obtained from which no more or less precise conclusions could be drawn" (p. 1). Now a new and much more detailed programme has been compiled and the gathering and checking of factory statistical information have been entrusted to the factory inspectors. At first glance one might think that we now have the right to expect really acceptable data, since a correct programme and provision for checking the data are two very important conditions for successful statistics. In actual fact, however, these two features are still in their former primitively chaotic state. The detailed programme with an explanation is not published in the introduction to the *List* although statistical methodology requires the publication of the programme according to which the data were gathered. We

* The Reform of 1861 which abolished serfdom in Russia.—*Ed.*

shall see from the following analysis of the *List* material that the basic questions of programme for factory statistics still remain entirely unclarified. With regard to checking the data, here is a statement by a person engaged in the practical side of this process—Mr. Mikulin, Senior Factory Inspector of Kherson Gubernia,* who has published a book containing an analysis of statistical data gathered according to the new system in Kherson Gubernia.

"It proved impossible to make a factual check of all the figures in the reports submitted by owners of industrial establishments and they were, therefore, returned for correction only in those cases when comparison with the data of similar establishments or with information obtained during an inspection of the establishments showed obvious inconsistencies in the answers. *In any case, responsibility for the correctness of the figures for each establishment contained in the lists rests with those who submitted them*" (*Factory and Artisan Industry in Kherson Gubernia*, Odessa, 1897, preface. Our italics). And so, responsibility for the accuracy of the figures, as before, still rests with the factory owners. Representatives of the Factory Inspectorate were not only unable to check all the figures, but, as we shall see below, were even unable to ensure that they were uniform and could be compared.

Later, we shall give full details of the shortcomings of the *List* and the material it uses. Its chief shortcoming, as we have noted, is the complete absence of summaries (private persons who compiled the *Directory* drew up summaries and expanded them with each edition). Mr. Karyshev, availing himself of the collaboration of two other people, conceived the happy idea of filling this gap, at least in part, and of compiling summaries on our factory industry according to the *List*. This was a very useful undertaking, and every one would have been grateful for its achievement, if ... if Mr. Karyshev, firstly, had published even a few of

* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country 1929-30.—*Ed.*

the obtained results in their entirety and if, secondly, he had not displayed, in his treatment of the material, a lack of criticism bordering on high-handedness. Mr. Karyshev was in a hurry to draw conclusions before he had studied the material attentively and before his statistical processing was anything like "thorough,"* so that naturally he made a whole series of the most curious errors.

Let us begin with the first, basic question in industrial statistics: what establishments should come under the heading of "factories"? Mr. Karyshev does not even pose this question; he seems to assume that a "factory" is something quite definite. As far as the *List* is concerned, he asserts, with a boldness worthy of better employment, that in contrast to former publications this one registers not only *large* establishments but *all* factories. This assertion, which the author repeats twice (pp. 23 and 34), *is altogether untrue*. Actually the reverse is the case; the *List* merely registers *larger* establishments as compared with former publications on factory statistics. We shall now explain how it is that Mr. Karyshev could "fail to notice" such a "trifle"; but first let us resort to historical reference. Prior to the middle eighties our factory statistics did not include *any* definitions or rules that limited the concept of factory to the larger industrial establishments. Every type of industrial (and artisan) establishment found its way into "factory" statistics; this, it goes without saying, led to terrific chaos in the data, since the full registration of all such establishments, by the employment of existing forces and means (i.e., without a correct industrial census), is absolutely out of the question. In some gubernias or in some branches of industry hundreds and thousands of the tiniest establishments were included, while in others only the larger "factories" were listed. It was, therefore, natural that the people who first tried to make a scientific analysis of the data contained in our factory statistics (in the sixties) turned all their attention to this question and directed all their efforts to separating the

* Contrary to the opinion of the reviewer in *Russkiye Vedomosti*[2] (1898, No. 144), who, apparently, was as little capable of a critical attitude to Mr. Karyshev's conclusions as was Mr. Karyshev of a critical attitude to the *List*'s figures.

branches for which there were more or less reliable data from those for which the data were absolutely unreliable, to separating establishments large enough to enable the obtainment of satisfactory data from those too small to yield satisfactory data. Bushen,* Bok,** and Timiryazev*** provided such valuable criteria on all these questions that, had they been carefully observed and developed by the compilers of our factory statistics, we should now have, in all probability, some very acceptable data. But in actual fact all these criteria remained, as usual, a voice crying in the wilderness, and our factory statistics have remained in their former chaotic state. From 1889 the Department of Commerce and Manufactures began its publication of the *Collection of Data on Factory Industry in Russia* (for 1885 and the following years). A slight step forward was made in this publication: the small establishments, i.e., those with an output valued at less than 1,000 rubles, were excluded. It goes without saying that this standard was too low and too indefinite; it is ridiculous even to think of the *full* registration of *all* industrial establishments with an output valued at more than that amount as long as the information is collected by the police. As before, some gubernias and some branches of industry included a mass of small establishments with outputs ranging in value from 2,000 to 5,000 rubles, while other gubernias and other branches of industry omitted them. We shall see instances of this further on. Finally, our latest factory statistical system has introduced a completely different formula for defining the concept "factory." It has been recognised that "all industrial establishments" (of those "*under the jurisdiction*" *of the Factory Inspectorate*) are subject to registration "if they employ no fewer than 15 workers, as are also those employing fewer than 15 workers, if they have a steam-boiler, a steam-engine, *or other mechanical motive power and*

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* *Ministry of Finance Yearbook*. First issue. St. Petersburg, 1869.

** *Statistical Chronicle of the Russian Empire*. Series II, Issue 6, St. Petersburg, 1872. Material for the factory statistics of European Russia, elaborated under the editorship of I. Bok.

*** *Statistical Atlas of Main Branches of Factory Industry of European Russia, with List of Factories and Works*. Three issues St. Petersburg, 1869, 1870, and 1873.

machines or factory installations."* We must examine this definition in detail (the points we have stressed are particularly unclear), but let us first say that this concept of "factory" is something quite new in our factory statistics; until now no attempt has been made to limit the concept "factory" to establishments with a definite number of workers, with a steam-engine, etc. In general, the strict limitation of the concept "factory" is undoubtedly necessary, but the definition we have cited suffers, unfortunately, from its extreme lack of precision, from its unclarity and diffusion. It provides the following definitions of establishments subject to registration as "factories" in the statistics: 1) The establishment must come within the jurisdiction of the Factory Inspectorate. This, apparently, excludes establishments belonging to the state, etc., metallurgical plants and others. In the *List*, however, there are many state and government factories (see Alphabetical List, pp. 1-2), and we do not know whether they were registered in all gubernias or whether the data pertaining to them were subject to checking by the Factory Inspectorate, etc. It must be said, in general, that as long as our factory statistics are not freed from the web of various "departments" to which the different industrial establishments belong, they *cannot be* satisfactory; the areas of departmental jurisdiction frequently overlap and are subject to changes; even the implementation of similar programmes by different departments will never be identical. The rational organisation of statistics demands that complete information on all industrial establishments be concentrated in one purely statistical institution to ensure careful observation of identical methods of gathering and analysing data. So long as this is not done, the greatest caution must he exercised in dealing with factory statistics that now include and now exclude (at different times and in different gubernias) establishments belonging to "another department." Metallurgical plants, for instance, have long been excluded from our factory statistics; but Orlov, nevertheless, included in

* Circular of June 7, 1895, in Kobelyatsky (*Handbook for Members of the Factory Inspectorate, etc.*, 4th edition. St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 35. Our italics). This circular is not reprinted in the introduction to the *List*, and Mr. Karyshev, in analysing the *List* material, did not go to the trouble of discovering what the *List* meant by "factories"!!

the last edition of his *Directory* quite a number of metallurgical plants (almost all rail production, the Izhevsk and Votkinsk factories in Vyatka Gubernia, and others) that are not included in the *List*, although the latter records metallurgical plants in other gubernias that were previously not included in "factory" statistics (e.g., the Siemens copper-smelting plant in Elisavetpol Gubernia, p. 330). In Section VIII of the introduction to the *List*, iron-working, iron-smelting, iron and copper-founding and other establishments are mentioned (p. iii), but no indication at all is given of the way in which metallurgical plants are separated from those "subordinated" to the Department of Commerce and Manufactures. 2) Only *industrial* establishments are subject to registration. This definition is not as clear as it seems to be at first glance; the separation of artisan and agricultural establishments requires detailed and clearly defined rules applicable to each branch of industry. Below we shall see confusion in abundance arising out of the absence of these rules. 3) The number of workers in an establishment must be no less than 15. It is not clear whether only workers actually employed in the establishment are counted or whether those working outside are included; it has not been explained how the former are to be distinguished from the latter (this is also a difficult question), whether auxiliary workers should be counted, etc. In the above-mentioned book Mr. Mikulin quotes instances of the confusion arising out of this unclarity. The *List* enumerates many establishments that employ *only* outside workers. It stands to reason that an attempt to list *all* establishments of this type (i.e., all shops giving out work, all people in the so-called handicraft industries who give out work, etc.) can only raise a smile under the present system, of gathering information, while fragmentary data for some gubernias and some branches of industry are of no significance and merely add to the confusion. 4) All establishments possessing a steam-boiler or a steam-engine are called "factories." This definition is the most accurate and most happily chosen, because the employment of steam is really typical for the development of large-scale machine industry. 5) Establishments possessing "other" (non-steam) "mechanical motive power" are regarded as factories. This definition is very inaccurate and exceedingly broad; by this definition, estab-

lishments employing water, horse, and wind power, even treadmills, may be called factories. Since the registration of all such establishments is not even feasible, there must be confusion, examples of which we shall soon see. 6) Under the heading "factories" are included establishments having "factory installations." This most indefinite and hazy definition negates the significance of all definitions given previously and makes the data chaotic and impossible to compare. This definition will inevitably be understood differently in different gubernias, and what sort of definition is it in reality? A factory is an establishment having factory installations.... Such is the last word of our newest system of factory statistics. No wonder these statistics are so unsatisfactory. We shall give examples from *all* sections of the *List* in order to show that in some gubernias and in some branches of industry the tiniest establishments are registered, which introduces confusion into factory statistics, since there can be no question of recording all such establishments. Let us take Section I: "cotton processing." On pp. 10-11 we come across five "factories" in the villages of Vladimir Gubernia which, for payment, dye yarn and linen belonging to others (*sic*!). In place of the value of the output the sum paid for dyeing is given as from 10 rubles (?) to 600 rubles, with the number of workers from zero (whether this means that there is no information on the number of workers or that there are no *hired* workers, is not known) to three. There is no mechanical motive power. These are peasant dye-houses, i.e., the most primitive artisan establishments that have been registered by chance in one gubernia and, it goes without saying, omitted in others. In Section II (wool processing), in the same Vladimir Gubernia, we find hand "factories" that card wool belonging to others for the payment of 12-48 rubles a year and employ 0 or 1 worker. There is a hand silk factory (Section III, No. 2517) in a village; it employs three workers and has an output valued at 660 rubles. Then more village dye-houses in the same Vladimir Gubernia, employing 0-3 workers for hand work and receiving 150-550 rubles for the treatment of linen (Section IV, treatment of flax, p. 141). There is a bast-mat "factory" in Perm Gubernia, on a hand-work level, employing six workers (Section V), with an output valued at 921 rubles (No. 3936). It goes without saying that there

are more than a few such establishments in other gubernias (Kostroma, for instance), but they were not counted as factories. There is a printing-works (Section VI) with one worker and an output value of 300 rubles (No. 4167): in other gubernias only the big printing-works were included, and in still others, none at all. There is a "sawmill" with three workers sawing barrel staves for the payment of 100 rubles (Section VII, No. 6274), and a metal-working hand establishment employing three workers with an output valued at 575 rubles (No. 8962). In Section IX (processing of mineral products) there are very many of the tiniest establishments, brickworks especially, with, for example, only one worker and an output valued at 48-50 rubles, and so on. In Section X (processing of livestock products) there are petty candle, sheepskin processing, leather and other establishments employing hand labour, 0-1-2 workers, with an output valued at a few hundred rubles (pp. 489, 507, et al.). More than anywhere else there are numerous establishments of a purely artisan type in Section XI (processing of foodstuffs), in the oil-pressing and, especially, the flour-milling branches. In the latter industry the strict division of "factories" from petty establishments is most essential; but so far this has not been done and utter chaos reigns in all our factory statistical publications. An attempt to introduce order into the statistics on the factory-type flour-milling establishments was made by the first congress of gubernia statistical committee secretaries (in May 1870),* but it was in vain, and up to the present day the compilers of our factory statistics do not seem to be concerned about the utter uselessness of the figures they print. The *List*, for example, included among the factories windmills employing one worker and realising from 0 to 52 rubles, etc. (pp. 587, 589, *et passim*); water-mills with one wheel, employing one worker and earning 34-80 rubles, etc. (p. 589, *et passim*); and so on. It goes without saying that such "statistics" are simply ridiculous, because another and even several other volumes could be filled with such mills without giving

* According to the draft rules drawn up by the congress on the gathering of industrial data, all mills equipped with less than 10 pairs of millstones, but not roller mills, were excluded from the list of factories. *Statistical Chronicle*, Series II, Issue 6, Introduction, p. xiii.

a complete list. Even in the section dealing with the chemical industry (XII) there are tiny establishments such as village pitch works employing from one to three workers, with an output valued at 15-300 rubles (p. 995, et al.). Such methods can go so far as to produce "statistics" similar to those published in the sixties in the well-known *Military Statistical Abstract* that for European Russia listed 3,086 pitch and tar "factories," of which 1,450 were in Archangel Gubernia (employing 4,202 workers, with a total output valued at 156,274 rubles, i.e., an average of fewer than three workers and a little more than 100 rubles per "factory"). Archangel Gubernia seems to have been deliberately left out of this section of the *List* altogether, as though the peasants there do not distil pitch and make tar! We must point out that all the instances cited concern registered establishments that do not come under the definitions given in the circular of June 7, 1895. Their registration, therefore, is *purely fortuitous*; they were included in some gubernias (perhaps, even, in some uyezds*), but in the majority they were omitted. Such establishments were omitted in former statistics (from 1885 onwards) as having an output valued at less than 1,000 rubles.

Mr. Karyshev did not properly understand this basic problem of factory statistics; yet he did not hesitate to make "deductions" from the figures he obtained by his calculations. The first of these deductions is that the number of factories in Russia is decreasing (p. 4, et al.). Mr. Karyshev arrived at this conclusion in a very simple way: he took the number of factories for 1885 from the data of the Department of Commerce and Manufactures (17,014) and deducted from it the number of factories in European Russia given in the *List* (14,578). This gives a reduction of 14.3%—the professor even calculates the percentage and is not bothered by the fact that the 1885 data did not include the excise-paying factories; he confines himself to the remark that the addition of excise-paying establishments would give a greater "reduction" in the number of factories. And the author undertakes to discover in which part of Russia this "process of diminution in the number of establishments" (p. 5) is evolving "most rapidly." In actual fact *there is no process of diminution*, *the number of*

* See footnote on p. 15.—*Ed.*

factories in Russia is increasing and not decreasing, and the figment of Mr. Karyshev's imagination came from the learned professor's having compared data that are not at all comparable.* The incomparability is by no means due to the absence of data on excise-paying factories for 1885. Mr. Karyshev could have taken figures that included such factories (from Orlov's cited *Directory* that was compiled from the same Department of Commerce and Manufactures lists), and in this way could have fixed the number of "factories" in European Russia at *27,986* for 1879, *27,235* for 1884, *21,124* for 1890, and the "reduction" by 1894-95 (14,578) would have been incomparably greater. The only trouble is that all these figures are quite unsuitable for comparison, because, frst, there is no uniform conception of "factory" in old and present-day factory statistical publications, and, secondly, very small establishments are included in the number of "factories" fortuitously and indiscriminately (for certain gubernias, for certain years), and, with the means at the disposal of our statistics, it would be ridiculous even to assume that they could be registered in full. Had Mr. Karyshev taken the trouble to study the definition of "factory" in the *List*, he would have seen that in order to compare the number of factories in that publication with the number of factories in others it would be *necessary to take only establishments employing 15 or more workers*, *because it is only this type* of establishment that the *List* registered *in toto* and without any limitations for all gubernias and all branches of industry. Since such establishments are among the relatively large ones, their registration in previous publications was also more satisfactory. Having thus assured the uniformity of data to be compared, let us compute the number of factories in European Russia employing sixteen** or

* In 1889 Mr. Karyshev took data for 1885 (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*,[3] No. 9) drawn from the most loyal reports of the governors, data that included the very smallest flour-mills, oil-presses, brickyards, potteries, leather, sheepskin, and other handicraft establishments, and fixed the number of "factories" in European Russia at *62,801*! We are amazed that he did not calculate the percentage of "reduction" in the number of factories today in relation to this figure.

** We are taking 16 and not 15 workers, partly because the computation of factories with 16 and more workers has already been made

more workers, taking them from the *Directory* for 1879 and from the *List* for 1894-95. We get the following instructive figures:

Source	Year	Number of Factories in European Russia: Total	Employing 16 or more workers	Employing fewer than 16 workers
Directory, 1st edition	1879	27,986*	4,551	23,435
Directory, 3rd edition	1890	21,124	6,013	15,111
List	1894-95	14,578	6,659 (without print-shops 6,372)	7,919

Therefore, the comparison of those figures which alone can be considered relatively uniform, comparable, and complete shows that *the number of factories in Russia is increasing*, and at a fairly rapid rate: in fifteen or sixteen years (from 1879 to 1894-95) it has increased from 4,500 to 6,400, i.e., by 40 per cent (in 1879 and 1890 print-shops were not included in the number of factories). As far as the number of establishments employing fewer than 16 workers is concerned, it would be *absurd* to compare them for these years, since different definitions of "factory" and different methods of excluding small establishments were employed in all these publications. In 1879 *no* small establishments were excluded; *on account of this*, the very smallest establishments in branches closely connected with agriculture and peasant industries (flour milling, oil pressing, brickmaking, leather, potteries, and others) were included, but they were omitted in later publications. By 1890 some small establishments (those with an output valued at less than 1,000 rubles) were omitted; this left fewer small "factories." And lastly, in 1894-95, the mass of establishments employing fewer than 15 workers was omitted, which resulted in the immediate reduction in the number of small "factories" to about a half of the 1890 figure. The number of factories for 1879 and 1890 can be made comparable in another way—by selecting the establishments

in the *Directory* for 1890 (3rd edition, p. x), and partly because the explanations of the Ministry of Finance sometimes adopt this standard (see Kobelyatsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 14).

* Some gaps in the information have been filled in approximately: see *Directory*, p. 695.

with an output valued at no less than 2,000 rubles. This is possible because the totals from the *Directory*, as quoted above, refer to all registered establishments, whereas the *Directory* entered in its *name index* of factories only those with an output valued at no less than 2,000 rubles. The number of establishments of this type may be considered approximately comparable (although there can never be a complete list of these establishments as long as our statistics are in their present state), with the exception, however, of the flour-milling industry. Registration in this branch is of a completely fortuitous character in different gubernias and for different years both in the *Directory* and in the *Collection* of the Department of Commerce and Manufactures. In some gubernias only steam-mills are counted as "factories," in others big water-mills are added, in the third case hundreds of windmills, and in the fourth even horse-mills and treadmills are included, etc. Limitation on the basis of the value of output does not clear up the chaos in statistics on factory-type mills, because, instead of that value the quantity of flour milled is taken, and this, even in very small mills, frequently amounts to more than 2,000 poods a year. The number of mills included in factory statistics, therefore, makes unbelievable leaps from year to year on account of the lack of uniformity in registration methods. The *Collection*, for example, listed 5,073, 5,605 and 5,201 mills in European Russia for the years 1889, 1890, and 1891 respectively. In Voronezh Gubernia the number of mills, 87 in 1889, suddenly increased to 285 in 1890 and 483 in 1892 as a result of the accidental inclusion of windmills. In the Don region the number of mills increased from 59 in 1887 to 545 in 1888 and 976 in 1890, then dropping to 685 in 1892 (at times windmills were included, while at others they were not), etc., etc. The employment of such data is clearly impermissible. We, therefore, take only steam-mills and add to them establishments in other branches of industry with an output value of no less than 2,000 rubles, and the number of factories we get for European Russia in 1879 is about 11,500 and in 1890 about 15,500.* From this, again, it follows that there is *an increase*

* It is impossible to obtain the required figure from the data in the *List*, first, because it omits a mass of establishments with an output valued at 2,000 rubles and more owing to their employing fewer than

in the number of factories and not the decrease invented by Mr. Karyshev. Mr. Karyshev's theory of the "process of diminution in the number of establishments" in the factory industry of Russia is a pure fable, based on a worse than insufficient acquaintance with the material he undertook to analyse. Mr. Karyshev, as long ago as 1889 (*Yuridiehesky Vestnik*, No. 9), spoke of the number of factories in Russia, comparing absolutely unsuitable figures taken from the loyal reports of the governors and published in the *Returns for Russia for 1884-85* (St. Petersburg, 1887, Table XXXIX) with the strange figures of the *Military Statistical Abstract* (Issue IV. St. Petersburg, 1871), which included among the "factories" thousands of tiny artisan and handicraft establishments, thousands of tobacco plantations (*sic*! see pp. 345 and 414 of the *Military Statistical Abstract* on tobacco "factories" in Bessarabia Gubernia), thousands of rural flour-mills and oil-presses, etc., etc. Small wonder that in this way the *Military Statistical Abstract* recorded over 70,000 "factories" in European Russia in 1866. The wonder is that a man was found who was so inattentive and uncritical with regard to every printed figure as to take it as a basis for his calculations.*

Here a slight diversion is necessary. From his theory of the diminution of the number of factories Mr. Karyshev deduces the existence of a process of the concentration of industry. It goes without saying that, in rejecting his theory, we do not by any means reject the conclusion, since it is only Mr. Karyshev's way of arriving at it that is wrong. To demonstrate this process, we must isolate the biggest establishments. Let us take, for example, establishments employing 100 or more workers. Comparing the number of such establishments, the number of workers they employ, and the total value of their output with data on all establishments, we get this table:

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15 workers. Secondly, because the *List* counted the total value of the output without excise (in which it differed from former statistics). Thirdly, because the *List*, in some cases, registered, not the total value of the output, but payment for the processing of raw material.

* Dealing with the question of the number of factory workers, Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky has shown the utter uselessness of the *Military Statistical Abstract* data (see his book, *The Factory*, *etc.*, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 336, et seq., and *Mir Bozhy*,[4] 1898, No. 4), and Messrs. N. —on and Karyshev have responded with silence to his direct challenge. They really cannot do anything else but remain silent.

See footnote*	1879			1890			1894-95		
	Number of		Value of output (thous. rubles)	Number of		Value of output (thous. rubles)	Number of		Value of output (thous. rubles)
	Factories	Workers		Factories	Workers		Factories	Workers	
All "factories"	27,986	763,152	1,148,134	21,124	875,764	1,500,871	14,578	885,555	1,345,346
Establishments with 100 or more workers	21,238	509,643	629,926	1,431	623,146	858,588	1,468	655,670	955,233
Percentage of total	—	66.8	54.8	—	71.1	57.2	—	74	70.8

* The same sources. Some data for 1879, as already mentioned, have been added approximately. The general data of the *Directory* and the *List* are incomparable with each other, but here we compare *only percentages* of the total number of workers and of the total value of output, and these data in their totals are much more reliable (as we shall show later) than the data on the total number of factories. The estimate of large establishments is taken from *Capitalism in Russia*, which the present writer is preparing for print.[5]

It can be seen from this table that the number of very large establishments is increasing, as well as the number of workers employed and the value of the output, which constitute an ever greater proportion of the total number of workers and the total value of the output of officially registered "factories." The objection may be raised that if a concentration of industry is taking place, it means that big establishments are squeezing out the smaller, whose number and, consequently, the total number of establishments, is decreasing. But, firstly, this last deduction is not made in respect of "factories" but refers to *all industrial establishments*, and of these we have no right to speak because we have no statistics on industrial establishments that are in the least reliable and complete. Secondly, and from a purely theoretical standpoint, it cannot be said *a priori* that the number of industrial establishments in a developing capitalist society must inevitably and always diminish, since, simultaneous with the process of the concentration of industry, there is the process of the population's withdrawal from farming, the process of growth in the number of small industrial establishments in the backward parts of the country as a result of the break-up of the semi-natural peasant economy, etc.*

Let us return to Mr. Karyshev. He pays almost the greatest attention of all to those data that are the least reliable (i.e., the data on the number of "factories"). He divides up the gubernias into groups according to the number of "factories," he designs a cartogram on which these groups are plotted, he compiles a special table of gubernias having the greatest number of "factories" in each branch of industry (pp. 16-17); he presents a mass of calculations in which the number of factories in each gubernia is shown as a percentage of the total (pp. 12-15). In doing this Mr. Karyshev overlooked a mere bagatelle: he forgot to ask himself *whether the numbers of factories in different gubernias are comparable*. This is a question that must be answered in the negative and, consequently, the greater part of Mr. Karyshev's calculations,

* The handicraft census for 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia showed, for example, that with every decade of the post-Reform period more and more small industrial establishments are being opened in the villages. See *Survey of Perm Territory. A Sketch of the State of Handicraft Industry in Perm Gubernia*. Perm, 1896.

comparisons, and arguments must he relegated to the sphere of innocent statistical exercises. If the professor had acquainted himself with the definition of "factory" given in the circular of June 7, 1895, he would easily have concluded that such a vague definition *cannot* be applied uniformly in different gubernias, and a more attentive study of the *List* itself could have led him to the same conclusion. Let us cite some examples. Mr. Karyshev selects Voronezh, Vyatka, and Vladimir gubernias (p. 12) for the number of establishments in Section XI (processing of food products; this group contains the greatest number of factories). But the abundance of "factories" in these gubernias is to be explained primarily by the *purely fortuitous* registration, specifically in these gubernias, of small establishments such as were not included in other gubernias. In Voronezh Gubernia, for instance, there are many "factories" simply because small flour-mills were included (of 124 mills only 27 are steam-mills; many of them are water-mills with 1-2-3 wheels; such mills were not included in other gubernias, and, indeed, they could not be listed in full), as well as small oil-presses (mostly horse-driven), which were not included in other gubernias. In Vyatka Gubernia only 3 out of 116 mills are steam-driven, in Vladimir Gubernia a dozen windmills and 168 oil-presses were included, of which the majority were wind- or horse-driven or were worked by hand. The fact that there were fewer establishments in other gubernias, does not, of course, mean that these gubernias were devoid of windmills, small water-mills, etc. They were simply not included. In a large number of gubernias steam-mills were included almost exclusively (Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Kherson, et al.), and the flour-milling industry accounted for 2,308 "factories" out of 1,233 in European Russia, according to Section XI. It was absurd to speak of the distribution of factories by gubernias without investigating the *dissimilarity* of the data. Let us take Section IX, the processing of minerals. In Vladimir Gubernia, for example, there are 96 brickworks and in the Don region, 31, i.e., less than a third of the number. The *Directory* (for 1890) showed the opposite: 16 in Vladimir and 61 in the Don region. It now turns out that, according to the *List*, out of the 96 brickworks in Vladimir Gubernia only 5 employ 16 or more workers, while the analogous figures for the Don region

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are 26 out of 31. The obvious explanation of this is that in the Don region small brickworks were not so generously classified as "factories" as in Vladimir Gubernia, and that is all (the small brickworks in Vladimir Gubernia are all run on hand labour). Mr. Karyshev does not see any of this (p. 14). In respect of Section X (processing of livestock products) Mr. Karyshev says that the number of establishments is small in almost all gubernias but that "an outstanding exception is Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia with its 252 factories" (p. 14). This is primarily due to the fact that very many small hand establishments (sometimes horse- or wind-driven) were included in this gubernia and not in the others. Thus, for Mogilev Gubernia the *List* includes only two factories in this section; each of them employs more than 15 workers. Dozens of small factories processing livestock products could have been listed in Mogilev Gubernia, in the same way as they were included in the *Directory* for 1890, which showed 99 factories processing livestock products. The question then arises: What sense is there in Mr. Karyshev's calculations of the distribution by percentages of "factories" so differently understood?

In order to show more clearly the different conceptions of the term "factory" in different gubernias, we shall take two neighbouring gubernias: Vladimir and Kostroma. According to the *List*, there are 993 "factories" in the former and 165 in the latter. In all branches of industry (sections) in the former there are tiny establishments that swamp the large ones by their great number (only 324 establishments employ 16 or more workers). In the latter there are very few small establishments (112 factories out of 165 employ 16 or more workers), although everybody realises that more than a few windmills, oil-presses, small starch, brick, and pitch works, etc., etc., could be counted in this gubernia.*

* We have here another instance of the arbitrary determination of the number of "factories" in our "newest" system of factory statistics. The *List* for 1894-95 records 471 factories for Kherson Gubernia (Mr. Karyshev, op. cit., p. 5), but for 1896 Mr. Mikulin suddenly lists as many as 1,249 "factory establishments" (op. cit., p. xiii), among them 773 with mechanical motive power and 109 without, employing more than 15 workers. With this unclarity in the definition of "factory" such leaps are inevitable.

Mr. Karyshev's light-minded attitude towards the authenticity of the figures he uses reaches its peak when he compares the number of "factories" per gubernia for 1894-95 (according to the *List*) with that for 1885 (according to the *Collection*). There is a serious dissertation on the increased number of factories in Vyatka Gubernia, on the "considerably decreased" number in Perm Gubernia, and on the substantially increased number in Vladimir Gubernia, and so on (pp. 6-7). "In this we may see," concludes our author profoundly, "that the above-mentioned process of diminution in the number of factories affects places with a more developed and older industry less than those where industry is younger" (p. 7). Such a deduction sounds very "scientific"; the greater the pity that it is merely nonsensical. The figures used by Mr. Karyshev are quite fortuitous. For example, according to the *Collection*, for 1885-90 the number of "factories" in Perm Gubernia was 1,001, 895, 951, 846, 917, and 1,002 respectively, following which, in 1891, the figure suddenly dropped to 585. One of the reasons for these leaps was the inclusion of 469 mills as "factories" in 1890 and 229 in 1891. If the *List* gives only 362 factories for that gubernia, it must be borne in mind that it now includes only 66 mills as "factories." If the number of "factories" has increased in Vladimir Gubernia, the *List*'s registration of small establishments in that gubernia must be remembered. In Vyatka Gubernia, the *Collection* recorded 1-2-2-30-28-25 mills from 1887 to 1892 and the *List*, 116. In short, the comparison undertaken by Mr. Karyshev demonstrates over and over again that he is quite incapable of analysing figures from different sources.

In giving the numbers of factories in different sections (groups of industrial branches) and in computing their ratio to the total number, Mr. Karyshev once again fails to notice that there is no uniformity in the number of small establishments included in the various sections (there are, for example, fewer in the textile and metallurgical industries than elsewhere, about one-third of the total number for European Russia, whereas in the industries processing livestock and food products they constitute about two-thirds of the total number). It stands to reason that in this way he is comparing non-comparable magnitudes, with the result that his percentages (p. 8) are devoid of all meaning. In short, on the entire

question of the number of "factories" and their distribution Mr. Karyshev has displayed a complete lack of understanding of the nature of the data he has employed and their degree of reliability.

As we go over from the number of factories to the number of workers, we must say, in the first place, that the figures for the total number of workers recorded in our factory statistics are much more reliable than those given for the factories. Of course, there is no little confusion here, too, and no lack of omissions and reductions of the actual number. But in this respect we do not find such great divergence in the type of data used, and the excessive variations in the number of small establishments, which are at times included in the number of factories and at others not, have very little effect on the total number of workers, for the simple reason that even a very large percentage of the smallest establishments gives a very small percentage of the total number of workers. We have seen above that for the year 1894-95, 74 per cent of the workers were concentrated in 1,468 factories (10 per cent of the total number). The number of small factories (employing fewer than 16 workers) was 7,919 out of 14,578, i.e., more than a half, and the number of workers in them was (even allowing an average of 8 workers per establishment) something like 7 per cent of the total. This gives rise to the following phenomenon: while there is a tremendous difference in the number of factories in 1890 (in the *Directory*) and in 1894-95, the difference in the number of workers is insignificant: in 1890 the figure was 875,764 workers for fifty gubernias of European Russia, and in 1894-95 it was 885,555 (counting only workers employed inside the establishments). If we deduct from the first figure the number of workers employed in the rail manufacturing (24,445) and salt-refining (3,704) industries, not included in the *List*, and from the second figure the number of workers in printshops (16,521), not included in the *Directory*, we get 847,615 workers for 1890 and 869,034 workers for 1894-95, i.e., 2.5 per cent more. It goes without saying that this percentage cannot express the actual increase, since many small establishments were not included in 1894-95, but, in general, the closeness of these figures shows the relative suitability of the over-all data on the total number of workers and their

relative reliability. Mr. Karyshev, from whom we have taken the total number of workers, does not make an accurate analysis of precisely which branches of industry were included in 1894-95 as compared with former publications, nor does he point out that the *List* omits many establishments that were formerly included in the number of factories. For his comparison with former statistics he takes the same absurd data of the *Military Statistical Abstract* and repeats the same nonsense about the alleged reduction in the number of workers relative to the population which has already been refuted by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky (see above). Since the data on the number of workers are more authentic, they are deserving of a more thorough analysis than the data on the number of factories, but Mr. Karyshev has done just the opposite. He does not even group factories together according to the number of workers employed, which is what he should have done in the first place, in view of the fact that the *List* regards the number of workers as an important distinguishing feature of the factory. It can be seen from the data cited above that the concentration of workers is very great.

Instead of grouping factories according to the number of workers employed in them, Mr. Karyshev undertook a much simpler calculation, aimed at determining the average number of workers per factory. Since the data on the number of factories are, as we have seen, particularly unreliable, fortuitous, and dissimilar, the calculations are full of errors. Mr. Karyshev compares the average number of workers per factory in 1886 with the figure for 1894-95 and from this deduces that "the average type of factory is growing larger" (pp. 23 and 32-33), not realising that in 1894-95 only the larger establishments were listed, so that the comparison is incorrect. There is a very strange comparison of the number of workers per factory in the different gubernias (p. 26); Mr. Karyshev obtains the result, for instance, that "Kostroma Gubernia turns out to have a bigger average type of industry than all other gubernias"—242 workers per factory as compared with, for example, 125 in Vladimir Gubernia. It does not enter the learned professor's head that this is due merely to different methods of registration, as we have explained above. Having allowed the difference between the number of large and small establishments in different gubernias to pass

unnoticed, Mr. Karyshev invented a very simple way of *evading* the difficulties encountered in this question. Precisely put, he multiplied the average number of workers *per factory for the whole of European Russia* (and then for Poland and the Caucasus) by the number of factories in each gubernia and indicated the groups he thus obtained on a special cartogram (No. 3). This, indeed, is really so simple! Why group factories according to the number of workers they employ, why examine the relative number of large and small establishments in different gubernias, when we can so easily *artificially level out* the "average" size of the factories in various gubernias according to one standard? Why try to find out whether there are many or few small and petty establishments included in the number of factories in Vladimir or Kostroma Gubernia, when we can "simply" take the average number of workers per factory *throughout* European Russia and multiply it by the number of factories in *each* gubernia? What matters it if such a method equates hundreds of fortuitously registered windmills and oil-presses with big factories? The reader, of course, will not notice it, and who knows—he may even believe the "statistics" invented by Professor Karyshev!

In addition to workers employed in the establishment, the *List* has a special category of workers "outside the establishment." This includes not only those working at home to the orders of the factory (Karyshev, p. 20), but also auxiliary workers, and so on. The number of these workers given in the *List* (66,460 in the Empire) must not be regarded as "an indication of how far advanced in Russia is the development of the so-called outside department of the factory" (Karyshev, p. 20), since there can be no question of anything like a complete registration of such workers under the present system of factory statistics. Mr. Karyshev says very thoughtlessly: "66,500 for the whole of Russia with her millions of handicraftsmen and artisans is but a few" (*ibid.*). Before writing this he had to forget that, if not the greater part, at least a very large part of these "millions of handicraftsmen," as is confirmed by all sources, work for jobbers, i.e., are the selfsame "outside workers." One has only to glance at those pages of the *List* devoted to districts known for their handicraft industries to be convinced of the thoroughly fortuitous and fragmentary nature of the registration of

"outside workers." Section II (wool processing) of the *List*, for example, for Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia counts only 28 outside workers in the town of Arzamas and in the suburban Viyezdnaya Sloboda (p. 89), whereas we know from the *Transactions of the Commission of Inquiry into Handicraft Industry in Russia* (Issues V and VI) that many hundreds (up to a thousand) "handicraftsmen" work there for masters. The *List* does not record any outside workers at all in Semyonov Uyezd, whereas we know from the Zemstvo[6] statistics that over 3,000 "handicraftsmen" work there for masters in the felt boot and insole branches. The *List* records only one "factory" employing 17 outside workers in the accordion industry of Tula Gubernia (p. 395), whereas the cited *Transactions of the Commission*, etc., as early as 1882, listed between 2,000 and 3,000 handicraftsmen working for accordion factory owners (Issue IX). It is, therefore, obvious that to regard the figure of 66,500 outside workers as being in any way authentic and to discuss their distribution by gubernias and branches of industry, as Mr. Karyshev does, and even to compile a cartogram, is simply ridiculous. The real significance of these figures lies not at all in the determination of the extent to which capitalist work is done in the home (which is determinable only from a complete industrial census that includes all shops and other establishments, as well as individuals giving out work to be done at home), but in the separation of the workers in the establishments, i.e., factory workers in the strict sense from outside workers. Hitherto these two types of workers have often been confounded; frequent instances of such confusion are to be found even in the *Directory* for 1890. The *List* is now making the first attempt to put an end to this state of affairs.

The *List*'s figures relating to the annual output of the factories have been analysed by Mr. Karyshev most satisfactorily of all, mainly because that author at last introduced the grouping of factories by the magnitude of their output and not by the usual "averages." It is true that the author still cannot rid himself of these "averages" (the magnitude of output per factory) and even compares the averages for 1894-95 with those for 1885, a method that, as we have repeatedly said, is absolutely incorrect. We would note that the total figures for the annual output of factories are much more

authentic than the total figures for the number of factories, for the reason, already mentioned, of the minor role of the small establishments. According to the *List*, there are, for example, only 245 factories in European Russia with an output valued at more than one million rubles, i.e., only 1.9 per cent, but they account for 45.6 per cent of the total annual output of all factories in European Russia (Karyshev, p. 38), while factories with an output valued at less than 5,000 rubles constitute 30.8 per cent of the total number, but account for only 0.6 per cent of the total output, i.e., a most insignificant fraction. We must here note that in these calculations Mr. Karyshev ignores the difference between the value of the total output (=value of the product) and payment for the processing of raw material. This very important distinction is made for the first time in our factory statistics by the *List*.* It goes without saying that these two magnitudes are absolutely incomparable with each other and that they should have been separated. Mr. Karyshev does not do this, and it is to be supposed that the low percentage of annual output of the small establishments is partly due to the inclusion of establishments that showed only the cost of processing the product and not its value. Below we shall give an example of the error into which Mr. Karyshev falls through ignoring this circumstance. The fact that the *List* differentiates between payment for processing and the value of the product and that it does not include the sum of the excise in the price of production makes it impossible to compare these figures with those of previous publications. According to the *List*, the output of all the factories of European Russia amounts to 1,345 million rubles, while according to the *Directory* for 1890 it amounted to 1,501 million. But if we subtract the sum of the excise from the second figure (250 million rubles in the distilling industry alone), then the first figure will be considerably greater.

* The only thing is that, unfortunately, we have no guarantee that the *List* made this distinction strictly and consistently, i.e., that the value of the product is shown *only* for those factories that actually sell their product, and payment for processing raw material only for those that process material belonging to others. It is possible, for example, that in the flour-milling industry (where the above-mentioned distinction is most frequently met with) the mill owners should have shown either of the figures indiscriminately. This is a problem that requires special analysis.

In the *Directory* (2nd and 3rd editions) factories were distributed in groups according to the amount of annual output (without any indication of the share of each group in the total output), but this distribution cannot he compared with the data in the *List* because of the differences in registration methods mentioned above and in the determining of the magnitude of annual output.

We have yet another fallacious argument of Mr. Karyshev to examine. Here, too, in quoting data on the total annual output of factories in each gubernia, he could not refrain from making comparisons with the data for the years 1885 to 1891, i.e., with the data of the *Collection*. Those data contain no information on productions subject to excise, and for that reason Mr. Karyshev looks only for gubernias in which the total output for 1894-95 is *less* than in previous years. Such gubernias are to be found to the number of eight (pp. 39-40), and apropos of this Mr. Karyshev argues about "the retrograde movement in industry" in the "less industrial" gubernias and says that this "may serve as an indication of the difficult position of the small establishments in their competition with big establishments," and so on. All these arguments would probably be very profound if—if they were not all completely fallacious. And here, too, Mr. Karyshev did not notice that he was comparing absolutely noncomparable and dissimilar data. Let us demonstrate this incomparability by data on each of the gubernias indicated by Mr. Karyshev.* In Perm Gubernia the total output in 1890 was 20.3 million rubles (Directory), while in 1894-95 it was 13.1 million rubles; this includes the flour-milling industry, 12.7 million (at 469 mills!) in 1890, and 4.9 million (at 66 mills) in 1894-95. The seeming "reduction," therefore, is simply a matter of the fortuitous registration of different numbers of mills. The number of steam-mills, for example, increased from 4 in 1890 and 1891 to 6 in 1894-95. The "reduction" of

* In this case we do not take the data of the *Collection* but those of the *Directory* for 1890, *deducting industries subject to excise*. With the exception of these industries, the *Directory* data do not differ from those of the *Collection*, since they are based on the same reports of the Department of Commerce and Manufactures. In order to expose Mr. Karyshev's error we need detailed data for individual factories and not only for individual industries.

output in Simbirsk Gubernia is to be explained in the same way (1890: 230 mills with an output of 4.8 million rubles; 1894-95: 27 mills with an output of 1.7 million rubles. Steam-mills, 10 and 13 respectively). In Vyatka Gubernia the total output was 8.4 million rubles in 1890 and 6.7 million in 1894-95, a reduction of 1.7 million rubles. Here, in 1890, two metallurgical works, the Votkinsk and the Izhevsk, were included, with a combined output valued at precisely 1.7 million rubles; in 1894-95 they were not included because they were "subordinated" to the Department of Mines and Metallurgy. Astrakhan Gubernia: 2.5 million rubles in 1890 and 2.1 million in 1894-95. But in 1890 the salt-refining industry (346,000 rubles) was included, while in 1894-95 it was not, because it belongs to the "mining" industries. Pskov Gubernia: 2.7 million rubles in 1890 and 2.3 million in 1894-95; but 45 flax-scutching establishments with a total output of 1.2 million rubles were counted in 1890, and in 1894-95 only four *flax-spinning* establishments with an output valued at 248,000 rubles. It stands to reason that the flax-scutching establishments in Pskov Gubernia have not disappeared but were simply not included in the list (perhaps because the majority of them are hand-worked and employ less than 15 workers). In Bessarabia Gubernia the output of the flour-mills was registered in different ways, although a similar number of mills was recorded both in 1890 and in 1894-95 (97 in each case); in 1890 the quantity of flour milled was computed—4.3 million poods valued at 4.3 million rubles, while in 1894-95 the majority of the mills recorded *only payment for milling*, so that their total output (1.8 million rubles) cannot be compared with the figure for 1890. The following instances will illustrate the difference. Levenson's two mills recorded an output of 335,000 rubles in 1890 (*Directory*, p. 424), and in 1894-95 recorded only 69,000 rubles *payment for milling* (*List*, No. 14231-2). Schwartzberg's mill, on the contrary, showed the value of the product in 1890 as 125,000 rubles (*Directory*, p. 425), and in 1894-95 as 175,000 rubles (*List*, No. 14214); out of the total sum for the flour-milling industry in 1894-95, 1,400,000 rubles are accounted for by the value of the product and 0.4 million rubles as payment for milling. The same is true of Vitebsk Gubernia: in 1890—241 mills with a total output figure of 3.6 million rubles, and in 1894-95—82

mills with a total output figure of 120,000 rubles, the majority of the mills showing only payment for milling (the number of steam-mills in 1890 was 37, in 1891, 51, and in 1894-95, 64), so that *more than a half* of this sum of 120,000 rubles does not represent the value of the product but payment for milling. And, finally, in the last gubernia, Archangel, the "retrograde movement in industry" discovered by Mr. Karyshev is explained simply by a strange error in his calculations: in actual fact the total value of the output of the Archangel factories, according to the *List*, is not the 1.3 million rubles twice quoted by Mr. Karyshev (pp. 40 and 39, as compared with 3.2 million rubles in 1885-91), but *6.9 million rubles*, of which 6.5 million rubles was accounted for by 18 sawmills (*List*, p. 247).

Summarising what has been said above, we come to the conclusion that Mr. Karyshev's approach to the material he was analysing was astonishingly inattentive and devoid of criticism, so that he committed a whole series of the crudest errors. With regard to the calculations based on the *List* figures that he made together with his colleagues, it must be said that they lose much in statistical value from the fact that Mr. Karyshev did not publish full totals, i.e., total numbers of factories, workers, value of output for all gubernias and all branches of industry (although he apparently made these calculations, which, had he published them in full, would, on the one hand, have made verification possible and, on the other, have proved of great benefit to those who use the *List*). The purely statistical analysis of the material, therefore, proved extremely fragmentary, incomplete, and unsystematic, and Mr. Karyshev's deductions, made in too great a hurry, serve, for the most part, as an example of how not to work with figures.

Returning to the question raised above on the present state of our factory statistics, we must say, first of all, that if "complete and reliable production figures" are an "urgent necessity" (as the introduction to the *List* says, with which one cannot but agree), then, to obtain them, a correctly organised industrial census is essential, one that will register each and every industrial establishment, enterprise, and kind of work, and that will be taken regularly at definite intervals of time. If the data on occupations in the first

census[7] of the population, taken on January 28, 1897, prove satisfactory and if they are analysed in detail, they will greatly facilitate the taking of an industrial census. As long as there are no such censuses it can only be a question of registering some of the big industrial establishments. It must be conceded that the present system of collecting and processing statistical information on such big establishments ("factories and workers" in the prevailing terminology) is unsatisfactory in the highest degree. Its first shortcoming is the division of factory statistics among various "departments" and the absence of a special, purely statistical institution that centralises the collecting, checking, and classifying of all information on all types of factories. When you analyse the data of our present-day factory statistics you find yourself on territory that is intersected in all directions by the boundaries of various "departments" (which employ special ways and means of registration, and so on). It sometimes happens that these boundaries pass through a certain factory, so that one section of a factory (the iron foundry, for example) comes under the Department of Mines and Metallurgy, while another section (the manufacture of ironware, for example) comes under the Department of Commerce and Manufactures. It can be understood how this makes the use of the data difficult and into what errors those investigators risk falling (and fall) who do not pay sufficient attention to this complicated question. With regard to the checking of the information, it must be said in particular that the Factory Inspectorate will, naturally, never be in a position to check the extent to which all information supplied by all factory owners corresponds to reality. Under a system of the present-day type (i.e., under which the information is not gathered by means of a census conducted by a special staff of agents but by means of questionnaires circulated among factory owners), the chief attention should be paid to ensuring that the central statistical institution have *direct* contact with all factory owners, systematically control the *uniformity* of the returns, and see to their completeness and to the dispatch of questionnaires to *all* industrial centres of any importance—that it thus prevent the fortuitous inclusion of dissimilar data, or different applications and interpretations of the programme. The second basic shortcoming of present-day statistics

lies in the fact that the programme for the gathering of information has not been elaborated. If this programme is prepared in offices and is not submitted to the criticism of specialists and (what is particularly important) to an all-round discussion in the press, the information *never can be* in any way complete and uniform. We have seen, for example, how unsatisfactorily even the basic programmatic question—what is a "factory"?—is being solved. Since there is no industrial census, and the system employed is that of gathering information from the industrialists themselves (through the police, the Factory Inspectorate, etc.), the concept "factory" should most certainly be defined with complete accuracy and limited to big establishments of such size as to warrant our expectation that they will be registered *everywhere and in their entirety without omissions*. It appears that the fundamental elements of the definition of a "factory establishment" as at present accepted have been quite well chosen: 1) the number of workers employed *in the establishment* to be no fewer than 15 (the question of separating auxiliary workers from factory workers in the true sense of the word, of determining the average number of workers for the year, etc., to be elaborated); and 2) the presence of a steam-engine (even when the number of workers is smaller). Although extreme caution should be exercised in extending this definition, it is an unfortunate fact that to these distinguishing characteristics have been added other, quite indeterminate ones. If, for instance, the bigger establishments employing water power must not be omitted, it should be shown with absolute accuracy what establishments of this type are subject to registration (using motive power of not less than so many units, or employing not less than a certain number of workers and so on). If it is considered essential to include smaller establishments in some branches, these branches must be listed very precisely and other definite features of the concept "factory establishments" must be given. Those branches in which "factory" establishments merge with "handicraft" or "agricultural" establishments (felt, brick, leather, flour milling, oil pressing, and many others) should be given special attention. We believe that the two characteristics we have given of the concept "factory" should in no case be extended, because even such relatively big

establishments can scarcely be registered without omissions under the existing system of gathering information. A reform of the system may be expressed either in partial and insignificant changes or in the introduction of full industrial censuses. As far as the extent of the information is concerned, i.e., the number of questions asked the industrialists, here, too, a radical distinction has to be made between an industrial census and statistics of the present-day type. It is only possible and necessary to strive for complete information in the first case (questions on the history of the establishment, its relations to neighbouring establishments and the neighbourhood population, the commercial side of affairs, raw and auxiliary materials, quantity and type of the product, wages, the length of the working day, shifts, nightwork and overtime, and so on and so forth). In the second case great caution must be exercised: it is better to obtain relatively little reliable, complete, and uniform information than a lot of fragmentary, doubtful information that cannot be used for comparisons. The only addition undoubtedly necessary is that of questions on machinery in use and on the amount of output.

In saying that our factory statistics are unsatisfactory in the highest degree, we do not by any means wish to imply that their data are not deserving of attention and analysis. Quite the contrary. We have examined in detail the shortcomings of the existing system in order to stress the necessity for a particularly thorough analysis of the data. The chief and basic purpose of this analysis should be the separation of the wheat from the chaff, the separation of the relatively useful material from the useless. As we have seen, the chief mistake made by Mr. Karyshev (and many others) consists precisely in the failure to make such a separation. The figures on "factories" are the least reliable, and under no circumstances can they be used without a thorough preliminary analysis (the separate listing of the bigger establishments, etc.). The number of workers and the output values are much more reliable in the grand totals (it is, however, still necessary to make a strict analysis of which productions were included and in which way, how the output value was computed, etc.). If the more detailed totals are taken, it is possible that the data will prove unsuited for comparison and their use condu-

cive to error. The fables of the reduction of the number of factories in Russia and of the number of factory workers (relative to the population)—fables that have been so zealously disseminated by the Narodniks[8]—can only be explained as due to the ignoring of all these circumstances.

As far as the analysis of the material itself is concerned, it must undoubtedly be based on information on each separate factory, i.e., card-index information. The cards must, first and foremost, be grouped by territorial units. The gubernia is too big a unit. The question of the distribution of industry is so important that the classification must be for individual cities, suburbs, villages, and groups of villages that form industrial centres or districts. Further, grouping by branches of industry is essential. In this respect our latest factory statistical system has, in our opinion, introduced an undesirable change, causing a radical rupture with the old subdivision into branches of industry that has predominated right from the sixties (and earlier). The *List* made a new grouping of industries in twelve sections: if the data are taken by sections only, we get an excessively broad framework embracing branches of production of the most diverse character and throwing them together (felt cloth and rough felt, sawmills and furniture manufacture, notepaper and printing, iron-founding and jewellery, bricks and porcelain, leather and wax, oil-pressing and sugar-refining, beer-brewing and tobacco, etc.). If these sections are subdivided in detail into separate branches we get groups that are far too detailed (see Mikulin, op. cit.), *over three hundred* of them! The old system that had ten sections and about a hundred branches of production (91 in the *Directory* for 1890) seems to us to have been much happier. Furthermore, it is essential to group the factories *according to the number of workers*, *the type of motive power*, as well as *according to the amount of output*. Such a grouping is particularly necessary from the purely theoretical standpoint for the study of the condition and development of industry and for the separation of relatively useful from useless data in the material at hand The absence of such a grouping (necessary within the territorial groups and the groups of branches of production) is the most significant shortcoming of our present publications on factory statistics, which allow only "average figures" to be determined,

quite often absolutely false and loading to serious errors. Lastly, grouping under all these headings should not be limited to a determination of the number of establishments in each group (or sub-group) but must be accompanied by a calculation of the number of workers and aggregate output in each group, in establishments employing both machine and hand labour, etc. In other words, *combined* tables are necessary as well as *group* tables.

It would be a mistake to think that such an analysis involves an inordinate amount of labour. The Zemstvo statistical bureaus with their modest budgets and small staffs carry out much more complicated work for each uyezd; they analyse 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 separate cards (and the number of relatively big, "factory" establishments throughout the whole of Russia would probably not be more than 15,000-16,000); moreover, the volume of information on each card is incomparably greater: there are several hundred columns in the Zemstvo statistical abstracts, whereas in the *List* there are less than twenty. Notwithstanding this, the best Zemstvo statistical abstracts not only provide group tables under various headings, but also combined tables, i.e., those showing a combination of various features.

Such an analysis of the data would, firstly, provide the requisite material for economic science. Secondly, it would fully decide the question of separating relatively useful from useless data. Such an analysis would immediately disclose the fortuitous character of data on some branches of industry, some gubernias, some points of the programme, etc. An opportunity would be provided to extract relatively full, reliable, and uniform material. Valuable indications would be obtained of the way in which these qualities can be assured in the future.

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REVIEW

A. Bogdanov. ***A Short Course of Economic Science****. Moscow, 1897. Publ. A. Murinova's Bookshop. 290 pp. Price 2 rubles.*

Mr. Bogdanov's book is a remarkable manifestation in our economic literature; not only is it "no superfluous" guide among a number of others (as the author "hopes" in his preface), it is by far the best of them. In this note, therefore, we intend to call the reader's attention to the outstanding merits of the book and to indicate a few minor points which could, in our opinion, be improved upon in future editions; in view of the lively interest displayed by our reading public in economic questions, it is to be expected that further editions of this useful book will soon be forthcoming.

The chief merit of Mr. Bogdanov's *Course* is the strict adherence to a definite line from the first page to the last, in a book that treats of many and very extensive problems. From the outset the author gives a clear-cut and precise definition of political economy as "the science that studies the social relations of production and distribution in their development" (3), and he never deviates from this point of view, one that is often but poorly understood by learned professors of political economy who lapse from "the social relations of production" to production in general and fill their ponderous courses with a pile of empty banalities and examples that have nothing to do with social science. Alien to the author is the scholasticism that often impels compilers of textbooks to indulge in "definitions" and in an analysis of every aspect of each definition; the clarity of

his exposition, actually gains, rather than loses, by this, and the reader gets a clear conception, for example, of such a category as *capital*, both in the social and in the historical sense. In his *Course*, Mr. Bogdanov bases the sequence of his exposition on the view that political economy is the science of the historically developing systems of social production. He begins his *Course* with a brief exposition of "general concepts" (pp. 1-19) of the science and ends with a brief "history of economic views" (pp. 235-90), outlining the subject of the science in Section C: "The Process of Economic Development"; he does not give his outline dogmatically (as is the case with the majority of textbooks), but by means of a characteristic of the periods of economic development in their proper sequence: the periods of primitive clan communism, slavery, feudalism and guilds, and, finally, capitalism. This is precisely what an exposition of political economy should be. The objection may be raised that under these circumstances the author is inevitably compelled to break up one and the same theoretical division (e.g., money) between different periods and thereby repeat himself. But this purely formal shortcoming is more than compensated by the fundamental merits of the historical exposition. And is it really a shortcoming? The repetitions are quite insignificant and are of benefit to the beginner because he is better able to grasp the more important postulates. The treatment of the various functions of money in the various periods of economic development, for example, shows the student clearly that the theoretical analysis of these functions is not based on abstract speculation but on a precise study of what actually happened in the course of the historical development of mankind. It provides a more complete conception of the particular, historically determined, systems of social economy. The whole task of a handbook of political economy is, of course, to give the student of that science the fundamental concepts of the different systems of social economy and of the basic features of each system; the whole task is one of placing in the hands of the student who has mastered the elementary handbook a reliable guide to the further study of the subject, so that, having understood that the most important problems of contemporary social

life are intimately bound up with problems of economic science, he may acquire an interest in this study. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred this is precisely what is lacking in handbooks of political economy. Their shortcoming is due not so much to the fact that they are usually limited to one system of social economy (i.e., the capitalist system) as to their inability to focus the reader's attention on the basic features of that system; they are unable to give a clear definition of its historical significance and to show the process (and the conditions) of its emergence, on the one hand, and the tendencies of its further development, on the other; they are unable to represent the different aspects and different manifestations of contemporary economic life as component parts of a definite system of social economy, as manifestations of the basic features of that system; they are unable to give the reader reliable guidance, because they do not usually adhere to one particular line with complete consistency; and, lastly, they are unable to interest the student, because they have an extremely narrow and incoherent conception of the significance of economic questions and present economic, political, moral, and other "factors" in "poetic disorder." Only the *materialist conception of history* can bring light into this chaos and open up the possibility for a broad, coherent, and intelligent view of a specific system of social economy as the foundation of a specific system of man's entire social life.

The outstanding merit of Mr. Bogdanov's *Course* is that the author adheres consistently to historical materialism. In outlining a definite period of economic development in his "exposition" he usually gives a sketch of the political institutions, the family relations, and the main currents of social thought *in connection* with the basic features of the economic system under discussion. The author explains how the particular economic system gave rise to a certain division of society into classes and shows how *these classes* manifested themselves in the political, family, and intellectual life of that historical period, and how the interests of these classes were reflected in certain schools of economic thought, for example, how the interests of developing capitalism were expressed by the school of free competition and how, at a later period, the interests of the same

class were expressed by the school of vulgar economists (284), the apologist school. The author rightly points out the connection between the position of definite classes and the historical school (284), as well as the school of *Katheder*-reformers[9] (the "realistic" or "historico ethical" school), which, with its empty and false conception of the "non-class" origin and significance of juridico-political institutions (288), etc., must be characterised as the school of "compromise" (287). The author connects the theories of Sismondi and Proudhon with the development of capitalism and with good reason relegates them to the category of petty-bourgeois economists; he shows the roots of their ideas in the interests of a specific class in capitalist society, the class that occupies the "middle, transitional place" (279), and recognises without circumlocution the reactionary import of such ideas (280-81). Thanks to the consistency of his views and his ability to examine the different aspects of economic life in their relation to the fundamental features of the economic system under discussion, the author has given a correct assessment of such phenomena as the participation of the workers in the profits of an enterprise (one of the "forms of wages" that "can very rarely prove profitable for the employer" [pp. 132-33]) or the production associations which, "being organised within capitalist relations," "in reality serve only to increase the petty bourgeoisie" (187).

We know that it is precisely these features of Mr. Bogdanov's *Course* that will give rise to more than a few reproaches. It stands to reason that representatives and supporters of the "ethico-sociological" school in Russia[10] will be dissatisfied. Among the dissatisfied there will also be those who assume that "the question of the economic conception of history is purely academic,"* and many others.... But apart from this, one might say partisan, dissatisfaction, the objection will be raised that the posing of questions so extensively has led to the extraordinarily condensed exposition of the *Short Course* which, in the brief

* This is the opinion of the *Russkaya Mysl*[11] reviewer (1897; November, bibliographical section, p. 517). And to think that there are such comedians in the world!

space of 290 pages, deals with all periods of economic development, from the clan community and savagery to capitalist cartels and trusts, as well as the political and family life of the world of antiquity and the Middle Ages, and with the history of economic views. Mr. A. Bogdanov's exposition really is condensed to the highest degree, as he himself states in his preface, wherein he says plainly that his book is a "conspectus." There is no doubt that some of the author's terse notes, dealing mostly with facts of a historical character, but sometimes with more detailed problems of theoretical economics, will not be understood by the beginner who wishes to learn something of political economy. We, however, do not think that the author should be blamed for this. We would even say, without fear of being accused of paradoxes, that such notes should be regarded as a merit and not a shortcoming of the book under review. For, indeed, were the author to think of giving a detailed exposition, explanation and basis for every such note, his book would have attained immeasurable dimensions quite out of keeping with the purposes of a short guide. And it would be impossible to outline, in any course, no matter how extensive, all the data of modern science on all periods of economic development and on the history of economic views from Aristotle to Wagner. Had he discarded all such notes, his book would positively have been worsened by the reduction of the scope and significance of political economy. In their present form these terse notes will, we think, be of great benefit both to teachers and students who use the book. Concerning the former this is more than true. The latter will see from the sum total of these notes that political economy cannot be studied carelessly, *mir nichts dir nichts*,* without any previous knowledge, and without making the acquaintance of very many and very important problems in history, statistics, etc. Students will see that they cannot become acquainted with problems of social economy in its development and its influence on social life from one or even from several textbooks or courses that are often distinguished by their "facility of exposi-

* As Kautsky aptly remarked in the preface to his well-known book, *Marx's Oekonomische Lehren*. (*Marx's Economic Teachings.—Ed.*)

tion" as well as by their amazing emptiness, their meaningless phrase-mongering; that the most vitally important questions of history and present-day reality are indissolubly bound up with economic questions and that the roots of the latter are to be found in the social relations of production. Such, indeed, is the chief purpose of any guidebook—to give the basic concepts of the subject under discussion and to show in what direction it is to be studied in greater detail and why such a study is important.

Let us now turn to the second part of our remarks and point out those places in Mr. Bogdanov's book that, in our opinion, stand in need of correction or expansion. We hope the respected author will not demur at the trivial and even hole-picking nature of these remarks: in a conspectus individual phrases and even individual words have incomparably greater significance than in an extensive and detailed exposition.

Mr. Bogdanov, in general, uses only the terminology of the school of economics to which he adheres. But when he speaks of the form of value he replaces that term by the expression "formula of exchange" (p. 39, et seq.). This seems to us to be an unfortunate expression; the term "form of value" is really inconvenient in a brief handbook, and it would probably be better to say instead: form of exchange or stage of development of exchange, since, otherwise, we get such expressions as "predominance of the second formula of exchange" (43) (?). In speaking of capital, the author was mistaken in omitting the general formula of capital which would have helped the student to master the fact that trading and industrial capital are of the same kind.

In describing capitalism, the author omitted the question of the growth of the commercial-industrial population at the expense of the agricultural population and that of the concentration of the population in the big cities; this gap is felt all the more because the author, in speaking of the Middle Ages, dealt in detail with the relations between countryside and town (63-66), while in respect of the modern town he said only a couple of words about the countryside being subordinated to it (174).

In discussing the history of industry, the author determinedly placed the "domestic system of capitalist produc-

tion"* "mid-way between artisan production and manufacture" (p. 156, *Thesis* 6). This simplification does not seem to us, in the present case, to be very convenient. The author of *Capital* described capitalist domestic industry in the section on machine industry and attributed it directly to the transforming effect which the latter exerts on old forms of labour. Actually those forms of domestic labour that prevail, both in Europe and in Russia, in the dressmaking industry, for example, cannot by any means be placed "mid-way between artisan production and manufacture." They come *later* than manufacture in the historical development of capitalism and it would have been worth while, we think, to say a few words about this.

In the chapter on the machine period of capitalism,** a noticeable gap is the absence of a paragraph on the reserve army and capitalist over-population, engendered by machine industry, on its significance in the cyclical development of industry, and on its chief forms. The very scanty mention the author makes of these phenomena on pages 205 and 270 are clearly insufficient.

The author's statement that "during the past fifty years" "profit has been increasing more rapidly than rent" (179) is too bold an assertion. Not only Ricardo (against whom Mr. Bogdanov mentions the point), but Marx as well affirms the general tendency of rent to increase with particular rapidity under all and any circumstances (rent may even increase when the price of grain is decreasing). That reduction in grain prices (and in rent under certain circumstances), brought about recently by the competition of the virgin fields of America, Australia, etc., became acute only in the seventies, and Engels' note to the section on rent (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 259-60[12]), devoted to the present-day agrarian crisis, is formulated with much greater caution. Engels here postulates the "law" of the growth of rent in civi-

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* Pp. 93, 95, 147, 156. It seems to us that this term is a successful substitution for the expression "domestic system of large-scale production" that was introduced into our literature by Korsak.

** The strict division of capitalism into a period of manufacture and a period of machine industry is one of the most valuable features of Mr. Bogdanov's *Course*.

lised countries, which explains the "amazing vitality of the class of big landlords," and further says only that this vitality "is gradually being exhausted" (*allmählig sich erschöpft*).

The paragraphs devoted to farming are also marked by excessive brevity. The paragraph on (capitalist) rent shows only in the barest outline that it is conditioned by capitalist farming ("In the period of capitalism land remains private property and takes on the role of capital," 127—and that is all!). In order to avoid all sorts of misunderstandings, a few words, in greater detail, should have been said about the emergence of the rural bourgeoisie, the condition of the farm labourers, and the difference in their condition and that of the factory workers (a lower standard of living and requirements, remnants of their attachment to the land or of various *Gesindeordnungen*,* etc.). It is also a pity that the author did not touch on the genesis of capitalist rent. After the mention he made of the *coloni*[13] and dependent peasants and, further, of the rent paid by our peasants, he should have given a brief characteristic of the course taken by the development of rent from labour rent (*Arbeitsrente*) to rent in kind (*Produktenrente*), then to money rent (*Geldrente*), and finally to capitalist rent (cf. *Das Kapital*, III, 2, *Kap*. 47[14]).

In treating of the supplanting of subsidiary industries by capitalism and the resultant loss of stability experienced by peasant economy, the author expresses himself as follows: "In general the peasant economy becomes poorer—the sum total of values produced decreases" (148). This is most inexact. The process of the ruination of the peasantry by capitalism consists in its dispossession by the rural bourgeoisie, which derives from that same peasantry. Mr. Bogdanov could hardly, for example, describe the decline of peasant farming in Germany without mentioning the *Vollbauer*.** In the place mentioned the author speaks of the peasantry in general, and follows this up immediately with an example from Russian reality; well, to speak of the

* Legal injunctions fixing the relations between landowners and serfs.—*Ed.*

** A peasant who is in possession of a full (undivided) plot of land.—*Ed.*

Russian peasantry "in general" is a more than risky business. On the same page the author says: "The peasant either engages in farming alone or he goes to the manufactory," that is, we add on our own part, be becomes either a rural bourgeois or a proletarian (with a tiny piece of land). Mention should have been made of this two-sided process.

Lastly, we must mention the absence of examples from Russian life as a general drawback of the book. On very many questions (for instance, on the organisation of production in the Middle Ages, the development of machine industry and railways, the growth of the urban population, crises and syndicates, the difference between manufactories and factories, etc.) such examples taken from our economic literature would have been of great importance, since the absence of examples with which he is familiar makes it much more difficult for the beginner to master the subject. It seems to us that the filling of these gaps would not greatly increase the size of the book and would not increase the difficulty of distributing it widely, which is very desirable in all respects.

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A NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF THE MARKET THEORY

(APROPOS OF THE POLEMIC of Messrs. TUGAN-BARANOVSKY AND BULGAKOV)

The question of markets in capitalist society, it will be remembered, occupied a highly important place in the theory of the Narodnik economists headed by Messrs. V. V. and N.—on. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that economists who adopt a negative attitude towards the Narodnik theories should deem it essential to call attention to this problem and to explain, first and foremost, the basic, abstract-theoretical points of the "market theory." An attempt to offer such an explanation was undertaken by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky in 1894 in his book, *Industrial Crises in Modern England*, Chapter 1, Part 2, "The Market Theory"; last year, Mr. Bulgakov devoted his book, *Markets under Capitalist Production* (Moscow, 1897), to the same problem. The two authors are in agreement in their basic views; the central feature of both is an exposition of the noteworthy analysis, "the circulation and reproduction of the aggregate social capital," an analysis made by Marx in the third section of Volume II of *Capital*. The two authors agree that the theories propounded by Messrs. V. V. and N.—on on the market (especially the internal market) in capitalist society are completely erroneous and are due either to an ignoring or a misunderstanding of Marx's analysis. Both authors recognise the fact that developing capitalist production creates its own market mainly for *means of production and not for articles of consumption*; that the realisation of the product in general and of surplus-value in particular is fully explicable without the introduction of a foreign market; that the necessity of a foreign market for a capitalist country is not due to

the conditions of realisation (as Messrs. V. V. and N.—on assumed), but to historical conditions, and so on. It would seem that Messrs. Bulgakov and Tugan-Baranovsky, being in such complete accord, would have nothing to argue about and that they could direct their joint efforts to a further and more detailed criticism of Narodnik economics. But in actual fact a polemic arose between these two writers (Bulgakov, op. cit., pages 246-57, *et passim*; Tugan-Baranovsky in *Mir Bozhy*, 1898, No. 6, "Capitalism and the Market," apropos of S. Bulgakov's book). In our opinion both Mr. Bulgakov and Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky have gone a bit too far in their polemic and have given their remarks too personal a character. Let us try and discover whether there is any real difference between them and, if there is, which of them has the greater right on his side.

To begin with, Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky charges Mr. Bulgakov with possessing "little originality" and with liking too much *jurare in verba magistri** (*Mir Bozhy*, 123). "The solution I set forth as regards the question of the role of the foreign market for a capitalist country," says Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky, "adopted *in toto* by Mr. Bulgakov, is not taken from Marx at all." We believe this statement to be untrue, for it was *precisely from Marx* that Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky took his solution to the question; Mr. Bulgakov no doubt also took it from the same source, so that the argument should not be about "originality" but about the understanding of a certain postulate of Marx, about the need to expound Marx in one way or in another. Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky says that Marx "does not touch at all on the question of the foreign market in the second volume" (*loc. cit.*). This is not true. In that same (third) section of the second volume, wherein he analyses the realisation of the product, Marx very definitely explains the relationship of foreign trade and, consequently, of the foreign market, to this question. He says the following:

"Capitalist production does not exist at all without foreign commerce. But when one assumes normal annual reproduction on a given scale one also assumes that foreign commerce *only replaces home products* [*Artikel*—

* To swear by the words of the master.—*Ed.*

goods]* *by articles of other use- or bodily form*, without affecting value-relations, hence without affecting either the value-relations in which the two categories 'means of production' and 'articles of consumption' mutually exchange, or the relations between constant capital, variable capital, and surplus-value, into which the value of the product of each of these categories may be divided. The involvement of foreign commerce in analysing the annually reproduced value of products can therefore only confuse without contributing any new element of the problem, or of its solution. For this reason it must be entirely discarded" (*Das Kapital*, II[1], 469.[15] Our italics). Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's "solution of the question," namely, "...in any country importing goods from abroad there may be a surplus of capital; a foreign market is absolutely essential to such a country" (*Industrial Crises*, p. 429. Quoted in *Mir Bozhy*, *loc. cit.*, 121)—is merely a paraphrase of Marx's postulate. Marx says that in analysing realisation foreign trade must not be taken into consideration, since it only replaces one article by another. In analysing the question of realisation (Chapter I of the second part of *Industrial Crises*), Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky says, that a country importing goods must export them, that is, must have a foreign market. One may ask, can it be said after this that Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's "solution of the question" is "not taken from Marx at all"? Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky says further that "Volumes II and III of *Capital* constitute a far from finished rough draft" and that "for this reason we do not find in Volume III conclusions drawn from the splendid analysis given in Volume II" (op. cit., 123). This statement too is inaccurate. In addition to individual analyses of social reproduction (*Das Kapital*, III, 1, 289),[16] there is an explanation of how and to what extent the realisation of constant capital is "independent" of individual consumption and "we find in Volume III" a special chapter (the 49th, "Concerning the Analysis of the Process of Production") devoted to conclusions drawn from the splendid analysis given in Volume II, a chapter in which the results of the analysis

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

are applied to the solution of the exceedingly important question of the forms of social revenue in capitalist society. Lastly, we must point out the equal inaccuracy of Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's assertion that "Marx, in Volume III of *Capital* speaks in a quite different manner on the given question," and that in Volume III we "can even find statements that are decisively refuted by that analysis" (op. cit., 123). On page 122 of his article Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky quotes two such passages from Marx that allegedly contradict the basic doctrine. Let us examine them closely. In Volume III Marx says: "The conditions of direct exploitation, and those of realising it, are not identical. They diverge not only in place and time, but also logically. The first are only limited by the productive power of society, the latter by the proportional relation of the various branches of production and the consumer power of society.... The more productiveness develops, the more it finds itself at variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of consumption rest" (III, 1, 226. Russian translation, p. 189).[17] Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky interprets these words as follows: "The mere proportional distribution of national production does not guarantee the possibility of marketing the products. The products may not find a market even if the distribution of production is proportional—this is apparently the meaning of the above-quoted words of Marx." No, this is not the meaning of those words. There are no grounds for seeing in them some sort of a *correction* to the theory of realisation expounded in Volume II. Marx is here merely substantiating that contradiction of capitalism which he indicated in other places in *Capital*, that is, the contradiction between the tendency toward the *unlimited* expansion of production and the inevitability of *limited* consumption (as a consequence of the proletarian condition of the mass of the people). Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky will, of course, not dispute the fact that this contradiction is *inherent* in capitalism; and since Marx points to this in the passage quoted, we have no right to look for some other meaning in his words. "The consumer power of society" and the "proportional relation of the various branches of production"—these are not conditions that are isolated, independent of, and unconnected with, each other. On the contrary, a definite condition of consump-

tion is one of the elements of proportionality. In actual fact, the analysis of realisation showed that the formation of a home market for capitalism owes less to articles of consumption than to means of production. From this it follows that Department I of social production (the production of means of production) can and must develop more rapidly than Department II (the production of articles of consumption). Obviously, it does not follow from this that the production of means of production can develop *in complete independence* of the production of articles of consumption and *outside of all connection with it*. In respect of this, Marx says: "As we have seen [Book II, Part III], continuous circulation takes place between constant capital and constant capital.... It is at first independent of individual consumption because it never enters the latter. But this consumption definitely (*definitiv*) limits it nevertheless, since constant capital is never produced for its own sake but solely because more of it is needed in spheres of production whose products go into individual consumption"- (III, 1, 289. Russian translation, 242).[18] In the final analysis, therefore, productive consumption (the consumption of means of production) is always bound up with individual consumption and is always dependent on it. Inherent in capitalism, on the one hand, is the tendency toward the limitless expansion of productive consumption, toward the limitless expansion of accumulation and production, and, on the other, the proletarisation of the masses of the people that sets quite narrow limits for the expansion of individual consumption. It is obvious that we have here a contradiction in capitalist production, and in the above-quoted passage Marx simply reaffirms this contradiction.*

* The other passage quoted by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky has precisely the same meaning (III, 1, 231, cf. *S.* [*Seite*—German for page.—*Ed.*] 232 to the end of the paragraph),[19] as well as the following passage on crises: "The ultimate cause of all real crises always remains the poverty and limited consumption of the masses as opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop the productive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of society constituted their limit" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 21. Russian translation, p. 395).[20] The following observation by Marx expresses the same idea: "Contradiction in the capitalist mode of production: the labourers as buyers of commodities are important for the market. But as sellers of their own commodity—

The analysis of realisation in Volume II does not in any way refute this contradiction (Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's opinion notwithstanding); it shows, on the contrary, the connection between productive and personal consumption. It stands to reason that it would be a serious error to conclude from this contradiction of capitalism (or from its other contradictions) that capitalism is impossible or unprogressive as compared with former economic regimes (in the way our Narodniks like doing). Capitalism cannot develop except in a whole series of contradictions, and the indication of these contradictions merely explains to us the historically transitory nature of capitalism, explains the conditions and causes of its tendency to go forward to a higher form.

Summarising all that has been said above, we arrive at the following conclusion: the solution of the question of the role of the foreign market as expounded by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky was taken precisely from Marx; there is no contradiction whatsoever on the question of realisation (or on the theory of markets) between Volumes II and III of *Capital*.

Let us proceed. Mr. Bulgakov accuses Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky of an incorrect assessment of the market theories of pre-Marxian economists. Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky accuses Mr. Bulgakov of uprooting Marx's ideas from the scientific soil in which they grew and of picturing matters as though "Marx's views had no connection with those of his predecessors." This last reproach is absolutely groundless, for Mr. Bulgakov not only did not express such an absurd opinion but, on the contrary, cited the views of representatives of various pre-Marxian schools. In our opinion, both Mr. Bulgakov and Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky, in outlining the history of the question, were wrong in paying too little attention to Adam Smith, who absolutely should have been treated in the greatest detail in a *special* exposition of the "market

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labour-power—capitalist society tends to keep them down to the minimum price (*Das Kapital*, II, 303).[21] We have already spoken of Mr. N.—on's incorrect interpretation of this passage in *Novoye Slovo*,[22] 1897, May. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*, pp. 168-69.—*Ed.*) There is no contradiction whatsoever between all these passages and the analysis of realisation in Section III of Volume II.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

theory"; "absolutely" because it was precisely Adam Smith who was the founder of that fallacious doctrine of the division of the social product into variable capital and surplus-value (wages, profit and rent, in Adam Smith's terminology), which persisted until Marx and which, not only prevented the solution of the question of realisation, but did not even pose it correctly. Mr. Bulgakov says in all justice that "with incorrect premises and a false formulation of the problem itself, these disputes [on the market theory, that arose in economic literature] could only lead to empty, scholastic discussions" (op. cit., p. 21, note). The author, incidentally, devoted only one page to Adam Smith, omitting the brilliant, detailed analysis of Adam Smith's theory given by Marx in the 19th chapter of Volume II of *Capital* (§ II, *S.* 353-83),[23] and instead dwelt on the theories of the secondary and unoriginal theoreticians, J. S. Mill and von Kirchmann. As far as Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky is concerned, he *ignored Adam Smith altogether* and, as a result, in his outline of the views of later economists *omitted their fundamental error* (that of repeating Adam Smith's above-mentioned error). It goes without saying that under these circumstances the exposition could must be satisfactory. We shall confine ourselves to two examples. Having outlined his Scheme No. 1 that explains simple reproduction, Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky says: "But the case of simple reproduction assumed by us does not, of course, give rise to any doubts; the capitalists, according to our assumption, consume all their profits, so it is obvious that the supply of commodities will not exceed the demand" (*Industrial Crises*, p. 409). This is wrong. It was not at all "obvious" to former economists, for they could not explain even the simple reproduction of social capital, and, indeed, it cannot be explained unless it is understood that the value of the social product is divided into *constant capital* + variable capital + surplus-value, and in its material form into two great departments—means of production and articles of consumption. For this reason even this case gave Adam Smith cause for "doubts," in which, as Marx showed, he got tangled up. If the later economists repeated Smith's *error* without sharing his *doubts*, this only shows that they had taken a step backwards in theory as far as the present ques-

tion is concerned. It is likewise incorrect for Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky to state: "The Say-Ricardo doctrine is correct theoretically; if its opponents had taken the trouble to make numerical computations of the way commodities are distributed in capitalist economy, they would easily have understood that their refutation of this theory contains a logical contradiction" (*loc. cit.*, 427). No. The Say-Ricardo doctrine is incorrect theoretically—Ricardo repeated Smith's error (see his *Works*, translated by Sieber, St. Petersburg, 1882, p. 221), and Say put the finishing touches to it by maintaining that the difference between the gross and the net product of society is fully subjective. And however hard Say-Ricardo and their opponents had applied themselves to "numerical computations," they would never have reached a solution, because this is not merely a matter of figures, as Bulgakov has rightly remarked in respect of another passage in Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's book (Bulgakov, *loc. cit.*, p. 21, note).

We now come to another subject for dispute between Messrs. Bulgakov and Tugan-Baranovsky—the question of numerical schemes and their significance. Mr. Bulgakov maintains that Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's Schemes, "owing to their departure from the model [i.e., from Marx's Schemes, to a great extent lose their power of conviction and do not explain the process of social reproduction" (*loc. cit.*, 248); and Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky says that "Mr. Bulgakov does not properly understand what such schemes are intended for" (*Mir Bozhy*, No. 6 for 1898, p. 125). In our opinion the truth in this case is entirely on Mr. Bulgakov's side. It is more likely that Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky "does not properly understand what the schemes are intended for" when he assumes that they "prove the deduction," (*ibid.*). Schemes alone cannot prove anything: they can only *illustrate* a process, *if its separate elements have been theoretically explained*. Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky compiled his own Schemes which differed from Marx's (and which were incomparably less clear than Marx's), at the same time omitting a theoretical explanation of those elements of the process that they were supposed to illustrate. The basic postulate of Marx's theory, that the social product does not consist of only variable capitall + surplus-value (as Adam Smith, Ricardo, Proudhon, Rodbertus, and others thought), but of

constant capital+the above two parts—this postulate is not explained at all by Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky, although he adopted it in his Schemes. The reader of Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's book is *unable to understand* this basic thesis of the new theory. Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky did not in any way show why it is essential to divide social production into two departments (I: means of production and II: articles of consumption), although, as Mr. Bulgakov justly remarked, "in this one division there is greater theoretical meaning than in all former arguments about the market theory" (*loc. cit.*, p. 27). This is why Mr. Bulgakov's exposition of the Marxian theory is much clearer and more correct than Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky's.

In conclusion, examining Mr. Bulgakov's book in greater detail, we must note the following. About a third of the book is devoted to questions of the "differences in the turnover of capital" and of the "wages fund." The sections under these headings seem to us to be the least successful. In the first of these the author tries to add to Marx's analysis (see p. 63, note) and delves into very intricate computations and schemata to illustrate how the process of realisation takes place with differences in the turnover of capital. It seems to us that Mr. Bulgakov's final conclusion (that, in order to explain realisation with differences in the turnover of capital, it is necessary to assume that the capitalists in both departments have reserves, cf. p. 85) follows naturally from the general laws of the production and circulation of capital, so that there was no need to assume different cases of relations of the turnover of capital in Departments I and II and to draw up a whole series of diagrams. The same must be said of the second of the abovementioned sections. Mr. Bulgakov correctly points out Mr. Herzenstein's error in asserting that he had found a contradiction in Marx's theory on this question. The author rightly says that "if the turnover period of all individual capitals is made to equal one year, at the beginning of the given year the capitalists will be the owners both of the entire product of the preceding year and of a sum of money equal to its value" (pp. 142-43). But Mr. Bulgakov was entirely wrong to take (p. 92, et seq.) the purely scholastic presentation of the problem by earlier economists (whether wages are derived

from current production or from the production of the preceding working period); he created additional difficulties for himself in "dismissing" the statement by Marx, who "seems to contradict his basic point of view," "arguing as though" "wages are not derived from capital but from current production" (p. 135). But Marx did not pose the question in this way at all. Mr. Bulgakov found it necessary to "dismiss" Marx's statement because he tried to apply to Marx's theory a completely alien formulation of the question. Once it has been established how the entire process of social production takes place in connection with the consumption of the product by different classes of society, how the capitalists contribute the money necessary for the circulation of the product—once all this has been explained, the question of whether wages are derived from current or preceding production loses all serious significance. Engels, publisher of the last volumes of *Capital*, therefore, said in the preface to Volume II that arguments like that of Rodbertus, for example, as to "whether wages are derived from capital or income, belong to the domain of scholasticism and are definitely settled in Part III of the second book of *Capital*" (*Das Kapital*, II, *Vorwort*, *S.* xxi).[24]

Written at the end 1898

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Signed: *Vladimir Ilyin*

Published according to the text in the magazine

REVIEW

Parvus. ***The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis.*** *Economic essays. Translated from the German by L. Y. St. Petersburg, 1898. Publ O. N. Popova (Educational Library, Series 2, No. 2). 142 pp. Price 40 kopeks.*

This book, by the gifted German journalist who writes under the pseudonym of Parvus, consists of a number of essays describing some of the phenomena of modern world economy, with the greatest attention paid to Germany. Parvus' central theme is the development of the world market and he describes mainly the recent stages of this development in the period of the decline of England's industrial hegemony. Of the greatest interest are his remarks on the role being played by the old industrial countries that serve as a market for the younger capitalist countries: England, for example, swallows up an ever-growing amount of German manufactured goods and at the present time takes from one-fifth to a quarter of the total German export. Parvus employs the data of commercial and industrial statistics to describe the peculiar division of labour between the various capitalist countries, some of whom produce mainly for the colonial market and others for the European market. In the chapter headed "Towns and Railways" the author makes an extremely interesting attempt to describe the most important "forms of capitalist towns" and their significance in the general system of capitalist economy. The remaining and greater part of the book (pp. 33-142) is devoted to questions concerning the contradictions in present-day capitalist agriculture and the agrarian crisis. Parvus first explains the influence of industrial development on grain prices, on ground rent, etc. He then outlines the theory of ground rent developed by Marx in Volume III of *Capital* and explains

the basic cause of capitalist agrarian crises from the standpoint of this theory. Parvus adds data on Germany to the purely theoretical analysis of this question and comes to the conclusion that "the last and basic cause of the agrarian crisis is increased ground rent due exclusively to capitalist development and the consequent increased price of land." "Eliminate these prices," says Parvus, "and European agriculture will again be able to compete with the Russian and American." "Its [private property's] only weapon against the agrarian crisis is, with the exception of fortuitous favourable combinations on the world market, the auctioning of all capitalist landed properties" (141). The conclusion drawn by Parvus, therefore, coincides, by and large, with Engels' opinion; in Volume III of *Capital* Engels pointed to the fact that the present-day agricultural crisis makes the ground rents formerly obtained by European landowners impossible.[26] We strongly recommend to all readers who are interested in the questions mentioned above to acquaint themselves with Parvus' book. It is an excellent reply to the current Narodnik arguments on the present agricultural crisis which are constantly to be met with in the Narodnik press and which suffer from a most essential shortcoming: the fact of the crisis is examined in disconnection from the general development of world capitalism; it is examined, not from the standpoint of definite social classes, but solely for the purpose of deducing the petty-bourgeois moral on the viability of small peasant farming.

The translation of Parvus' book, can, on the whole, be considered satisfactory, although in places awkward and heavy turns of speech are to be met with.

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REVIEW

R. Gvozdev. ***Kulak Usury, Its Social and Economic Significance.*** *St. Petersburg, 1899. Publ. N. Garin.*

Mr. Gvozdev's book sums up data gathered by our economic literature on the interesting question of kulak usurers. The author mentions a number of indications of the development of commodity circulation and production in the pre-Reform period that brought about the emergence of trading and usurer's capital. He then reviews the material on usury in grain production, on kulakism, in connection with migration, handicraft industries, and peasants' auxiliary employments, as well as in connection with taxation and credit. Mr. Gvozdev rightly points out that representatives of Narodnik economics have held a wrong view of kulakism, regarding it as some sort of an "excrescence" on the organism of "people's production" and not as one of the forms of capitalism, closely and indivisibly bound up with the entire Russian social economy. The Narodniks ignored the connection between kulakism and the differentiation of the peasantry, the closeness of the village usurer "bloodsuckers" and others to the "enterprising muzhiks," those representatives of the rural petty bourgeoisie in Russia. The survivals of medieval institutions that still weigh down on our countryside (social-estate seclusion of the village commune,[28] the tying of the peasant to his allotment,[29] collective liability,[30] the social-estate inequality of taxation) create tremendous barriers against the investment of small amounts of capital in production, against their employment in agriculture

and industry. The natural result of all this is the tremendous prevalence of *the lowest and worst forms of capital*, viz., trading and usurer's capital. In the midst of a mass of "economically weak" peasants dragging out an existence of semi-starvation on their small allotments, the small group of prosperous peasants inevitably turns into exploiters of the worst type, enslaving the poor by money loans, winter hiring,[31] etc., etc. Outdated institutions hindering the growth of capitalism both in agriculture and in industry thereby reduce the demand for labour-power but, at the same time, do not protect the peasant from the most shameless and uncurbed exploitation or even from starving to death. A rough estimate of the sums paid by indigent peasants to the kulaks and usurers, quoted by Mr. Gvozdev in his book, shows clearly the groundlessness of the usual comparison made between the Russian allotment-holding peasantry and the West-European proletariat. In actual fact the masses of that peasantry are in a far worse condition than is the rural proletariat in the West; in actual fact our indigent peasants are paupers and the years in which it is necessary to take extraordinary measures of help for millions of starving peasants occur with over-growing frequency. If the fiscal institutions did not artificially lump together the prosperous and poor peasantry, the latter would undoubtedly have to be officially regarded as paupers, which would more accurately and more truthfully define the attitude of modern society to those strata of the population. Mr. Gvozdev's book is valuable because it gives a summary of data on the process of "non-proletarian impoverishment"* and very justly describes this process as the lowest and worst form of the differentiation of the peasantry. Mr. Gvozdev is apparently well acquainted with Russian economic literature, but his book would have gained had he given less space to quotations from various magazines and allowed more space for an independent study of the material. The Narodnik analysis of the available material usually leaves untouched the aspects of the given question that are most important from the theoretical point of view. Furthermore, Mr. Gvozdev's

* Parvus, *The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis*. St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 8, footnote.

own arguments are frequently too sweeping and general. This must be said, in particular, of the chapter on handicraft industries. The style of the book suffers, at times, from mannerisms and haziness.

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REVIEW

Commercial and Industrial Russia. *Handbook for Merchants and Factory Owners. Compiled under the editorship of A. A. Blau, Head of the Statistical Division of the Department of Commerce and Manufactures. St. Petersburg, 1899. Price 10 rubles.*

The publishers of this gigantic tome set themselves the aim of "filling a gap in our economic literature" (p. i), that is, to give at one and the same time the addresses of commercial and industrial establishments throughout Russia and information on the "condition of the various branches of industry." No objection could be made to such a combination of reference and scientific-statistical material, were both the one and the other sufficiently complete. In the book named above, unfortunately, the directory completely overwhelms the statistical material, the latter being incomplete and insufficiently analysed. First of all, this publication compares unfavourably with previous publications of the same nature, since it does not give statistical data for *each individual* establishment or enterprise included in its lists. As a result, the lists of establishments and enterprises, occupying 2,703 huge columns of small print, lose all their scientific significance. In view of the chaotic state of our commercial and industrial statistics it is extremely important to have data precisely on each individual establishment or enterprise, since our official statistical institutions never make anything like a tolerable analysis of these data but confine themselves to announcing totals in which relatively reliable material is mixed up with absolutely unreliable material. We shall now show that this last remark applies equally to

the book under review; but first let us mention the following original method employed by the compilers. Printing the addresses of establishments and enterprises in each branch of production, they gave the number of establishments and the sum of their turnover for the whole of Russia only; they calculated the average turnover for one establishment in each branch and indicated with a special symbol those having a turnover greater or less than the average. It would have been much more to the purpose (if it was impossible to print information on each individual establishment) to fix a number of categories of establishments and enterprises that are similar for each branch of commerce and industry (according to the amount of turnover, the number of workers, the nature of the motive power, etc.) and to distribute all establishments according to these categories. It would then at least have been possible to judge the completeness and comparability of the material for different gubernias and different branches of production. As far as factory statistics, for example, are concerned, it is enough to read the phenomenally vague definition of this concept on page 1 (footnote) of the publication under review and then glance over the lists of factory owners in some branches to become convinced of the heterogeneity of the statistical material published in the book. It is, therefore, necessary to exercise great caution in dealing with the summarised factory statistics in Section I, Part I of *Commercial and Industrial Russia* (Historical-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry and Trade). We read here that in 1896 (partly also in 1895) there were, throughout the Russian Empire, 38,401 factories with an aggregate output of 2,745 million rubles, employing 1,742,181 workers; these data include excise-paying and non-excise-paying industries and mining and metallurgical enterprises. We are of the opinion that this figure cannot, without substantial verification, be compared with the figures of our factory statistics for previous years. In 1896 a number of branches of production were registered that formerly (until 1894-95) had not come under the heading of "factories": bakeries, fisheries, abattoirs, print-shops, lithograph shops, etc., etc. The value of the total output of all mining and metallurgical establishments in the Empire was fixed at 614 million rubles by original methods about which we are told only

that the value of pig-iron is, apparently, repeated in the value of iron and steel. The total number of workers in the mining and metallurgical industries is, on the contrary, apparently underestimated: the figure for 1895-96 was given as 505,000. Either this is an error or many branches have been omitted. From the figures scattered throughout the book it can be seen that for only a few branches in this department the number of workers is 474,000, not including those engaged in coal-mining (about 53,000), salt-mining (about 20,000), stone-quarrying (about 10,000), and in other mining industries (about 20,000). There were more than 505,000 workers in all the mining and metallurgical industries of the Empire in 1890, and precisely these branches of production have developed particularly since that time. For example: in five branches of this division for which historical-statistical data are given in the text of the book (iron founding, wire drawing, machine building, gold- and copper-ware manufacturing) there were, in 1890, 908 establishments, with a total output valued at 77 million rubles and employing 69,000 workers, while in 1896 the figures were—1,444 establishments, with a total output valued at 221.5 million rubles, employing 147,000 workers. By assembling the historical-statistical data scattered throughout the book, which, unfortunately, do not cover all branches of production but only a certain number (cotton processing, chemical production, and more than 45 other branches), we can obtain the following information for the Empire as a whole. In 1890 there were 19,639 factories, with a total output valued at 929 million rubles, employing 721,000 workers, and in 1896 there were 19,162 factories, with a total output valued at 1,708 million rubles, employing 985,000 workers. If we add two branches subject to excise—beet-sugar and distilling—(1890-91—116,000 workers and 1895-96—123,000 workers), we get the number of workers as 837,000 and 1,108,000 respectively, *an increase of nearly one-third in a period of six years*. Note that the decrease in the number of factories is due to the differences in the registration of flour-mills: in 1890, among the factories, 7,003 mills were included (156 million rubles, 29,638 workers), while in 1896 only 4,379 mills (272 million rubles, 37,954 workers) were included.

Such are the data that can be extracted from the publication under review and which allow us to get some conception of the industrial boom in Russia in the nineties. It will be possible to deal with this question in greater detail when the full statistical data for 1896 have been published.

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ONCE MORE 0N THE THEORY OF REALISATION

My "Note on the Question of the Market Theory (Concerning the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)" was published in the number of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* for January of the present year (1899) and was followed by P. B. Struve's article, "Markets under Capitalist Production (Apropos of Bulgakov's Book and Ilyin's Article)." Struve "rejects, to a considerable extent, the theory proposed by Tugan-Baranovsky, Bulgakov, and Ilyin" (p. 63 of his article) and expounds his own conception of Marx's theory of realisation.

In my opinion, Struve's polemic against the above-mentioned writers is due not so much to an essential difference of views as to his mistaken conception of the content of the theory he defends. In the first place, Struve confuses the market theory of bourgeois economists who taught that products are exchanged for products and that production, therefore, should correspond to consumption, with Marx's theory of realisation which showed by analysis *how* the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital, i.e., the realisation of the product in capitalist society, takes place.* Neither Marx nor those writers who have expounded his theory and with whom Struve has entered into a polemic deduced the harmony of production and consumption from this analysis, but, on the contrary, stressed forcefully the contradictions that are inherent in capitalism and that are bound to make their appearance in the course of capitalist

* See my *Studies*, p. 17, et al. (See present edition, Vol. 2, *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*, p. 151, et al.—*Ed.*)

realisation.* Secondly, Struve confuses the abstract theory of realisation (with which his opponents dealt exclusively) with concrete historical conditions governing the realisation of the capitalist product in some one country and some one epoch. This is just the same as confusing the abstract theory of ground rent with the concrete conditions of the development of capitalism in agriculture in some one country. These two basic delusions of Struve engendered a whole series of misunderstandings which can only be cleared up by an analysis of the individual propositions of his article.

1. Struve does not agree with me when I say that in expounding the theory of realisation we must give Adam Smith special emphasis. "If it is a matter of going back to Adam," he writes, "then we should not stop at Smith but at the physiocrats."[32] But this is not so. It was precisely Adam Smith who did not confine himself to admitting the truth (known also to the physiocrats) that products are exchanged for products but raised the question of how the different component parts of social *capital* and the product are replaced (realised) according to their value.** For this reason Marx, who fully recognised that in the theory of the physiocrats, i.e., in Quesnay's *Tableau économique*, some postulates were, "for their time, brilliant"***; who recognised that in the analysis of the process of reproduction Adam Smith had, in some respects, taken a step backwards as compared with the physiocrats (*Das Kapital*, I 2, 612, Anm. 32[34]), nevertheless devoted only about a page and a half to the physiocrats in his review of the history of the question of realisation (*Das Kapital*, II 1, S. 350-51[35]), whereas he devoted

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 27, 24, et al. (See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 155, 163-64, 160-61.—*Ed.*)

** Incidentally, in my article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* the term "stoimost" (value) was everywhere changed to "tsennost." This was not my doing, but the editor's. I do not regard the use of any one term as being of particularly great importance, but I deem it necessary to state that I used and always use the word "stoimost."

*** Frederick Engels, *Herrn E. Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft, Dritte Auflage* (Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* [*Anti-Dühring*], third ed.—*Ed.*), p. 270,[33] from the chapter written by Marx.

over thirty pages to Adam Smith (*ibid.*, 351-83[36]) and analysed in detail Smith's basic error which was inherited by the entire subsequent political economy. It is, therefore, necessary to pay greater attention to Adam Smith in order to explain the bourgeois economists' theory of realisation, since they all repeated Smith's mistake.

2. Mr. Bulgakov quite correctly says in his book that bourgeois economists confuse simple commodity circulation with capitalist commodity circulation, whereas Marx established the difference between them. Struve believes that Mr. Bulgakov's assertion is based on a misunderstanding. In my opinion it is just the opposite, the misunderstanding is not Mr. Bulgakov's but Struve's. And how, indeed, has Struve refuted Mr. Bulgakov? In a manner most strange: he refutes his postulate by repeating it. Struve says: Marx cannot be regarded as a champion of that theory of realisation according: to which the product can be realised inside the given community, because Marx "made a sharp distinction between simple commodity circulation and capitalist circulation" (!! p. 48). But that is precisely what Mr. Bulgakov said! This is precisely why Marx's Theory is not confined to a repetition of the axiom that products are exchanged for products. That is why Mr. Bulgakov is correct in regarding the disputes between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists on the possibility of over-production to be "empty and scholastic discussions": the two disputants confused commodity and capitalist circulation; both of them repeated Adam Smith's error.

3. Struve is wrong in giving the theory of realisation the name of the theory of proportional distribution. It is inaccurate and must inevitably lead to misunderstandings. The theory of realisation is an abstract* theory that shows how the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital takes place. The essential premises of this abstract theory are, firstly, the exclusion of foreign trade, of the foreign markets. But, by excluding foreign trade, the theory of realisation does not, by any means, postulate that a capitalist society has ever existed or could ever

* See my article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, p. 37. (See p. 55 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

exist without foreign trade.* Secondly, the abstract theory of realisation assumes and must assume the proportional distribution of the product between the various branches of capitalist production. But, in assuming this, the theory of realisation does not, by any means, assert that in a capitalist society products are always distributed or could be distributed proportionally.** Mr. Bulgakov rightly compares the theory of realisation with the theory of value. The theory of value presupposes and must presuppose the equality of supply and demand, but it does not by any means assert that this equality is always observed or could be observed in capitalist society. The law of realisation, like every other law of capitalism, is "implemented only by not being implemented" (Bulgakov, quoted in Struve's article, p. 56). The theory of the average and equal rate of profit assumes, in essence, the same proportional distribution of production between its various branches. But surely Struve will not call it a theory of proportional distribution on these grounds.

4. Struve challenges my opinion that Marx justly accused Ricardo of repeating Adam Smith's error. "Marx was wrong," writes Struve. Marx, however, quotes directly a passage from Ricardo's work (II[1], 383).[37] Struve ignores this passage. On the next page Marx quotes the opinion of

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* *Ibid.*, p. 38. (See p. 56 of this volume.—*Ed.*) Cf. *Studies*, p. 25 (see present edition, Vol. 2, p. 162.—*Ed.*): "Do we deny that capitalism needs a foreign market? Of course not. But the question of a foreign market has absolutely nothing to do with the question of realisation.

** "Not only the products ... which replace surplus-value, but also those which replace variable ... and constant capital ... all these products are realised in the same way, in the midst of 'difficulties,' in the midst of continuous fluctuations, which become increasingly violent as capitalism grows" [*Studies*, p. 27 (see present edition, Vol. 2, p. 164.—*Ed.*)]. Perhaps Struve will say that this passage is contradicted by other passages, e.g., that on p. 31 (see present edition, Vol. 2, p. 169.—*Ed.*): "... the capitalists can realise surplus-value"? This is only a seeming contradiction. Since we take an abstract theory of realisation (and the Narodniks put forward precisely an abstract theory of the impossibility of realising surplus-value), the deduction that realisation is possible becomes inevitable. But while expounding the abstract theory, it is necessary to indicate the contradictions that are inherent in the actual process of realisation. This was done in my article.

Ramsay, who had also noted Ricardo's error. I also indicated another passage from Ricardo's work where he says forthrightly: "The whole produce of the land and labour of every country is divided into three portions: of these, one portion is devoted to wages, another to profits, and the other to rent" (here constant capital is erroneously omitted. See Ricardo's Works, translated by Sieber, p. 221). Struve also passes over this passage in silence. He quotes only one of Ricardo's comments which points out the absurdity of Say's argument on the difference between gross and net revenue. In Chapter 49, Volume III of *Capital*, where deductions from the theory of realisation are expounded, Marx quotes precisely this comment of Ricardo, saying the following about it: "By the way, we shall see later"—apparently, this refers to the still unpublished Volume IV of *Capital*[38]—"that Ricardo nowhere refuted Smith's false analysis of commodity-price, its reduction to the sum of the values of the revenues (*Revenuen*). He does not bother with it, and accepts its correctness so far in his analysis that he 'abstracts' from the constant portion of the value of commodities. He also falls back into the same way of looking at things from time to time" (i.e., into Smith's way of looking at things. *Das Kapital*, III, 2, 377. Russian translation, 696).[39] We shall leave the reader to judge who is right: Marx, who says that Ricardo repeats Smith's error,* or Struve, who says that Ricardo "knew perfectly well [?] that the whole social product is not exhausted by wages, profit, and rent," and that Ricardo "unconsciously [!] wandered away from the parts of the social product that constitute production costs." Is it possible to know *perfectly well* and at the same time *unconsciously* wander away?

5. Struve not only did not refute Marx's statement that Ricardo had adopted Smith's error, but repeated that very error in his own article. "It is strange ... to think,"

* The correctness of Marx's assessment is also seen with particular clarity from the fact that Ricardo shared Smith's fallacious views on the accumulation of an individual capital. Ricardo thought that the accumulated part of the surplus-value is expended entirely on wages, whereas it is expended as: 1) constant capital and 2) wages. See *Das Kapital*, I², 611-13, Chapter 22, §2.[40] Cf. *Studies*, p. 29, footnote. (See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 167.—*Ed.*)

he writes, "that any one division of the social product into categories could have substantial importance for the general comprehension of realisation, especially since all portions of the product that is being realised actually take on the form of revenue (gross) in the process of realisation and the classics regarded them as revenues" (p. 48). That is precisely the point—*not* all the portions of the product in realisation take on the form of revenue (gross); it was precisely this mistake of Smith that Marx explained when he showed that a part of the product being realised does not and cannot ever take on the form of revenue. That is the part of the social product which replaces the constant capital that serves for the production of means of production (the constant capital in Department I, to use Marx's terminology). Seed grain in agriculture, for instance, never takes on the form of revenue; coal used for the extraction of more coal never takes on the form of revenue, etc., etc. The process of the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital cannot be understood unless that part of the gross product which can serve only as capital, the part that can never take on the form of revenue, is separated from it.* In a developing capitalist society this part of the social product must necessarily grow more rapidly than all the other parts of the product. Only this law will explain one of the most profound contradictions of capitalism: the growth of the national wealth proceeds with tremendous rapidity, while the growth of national consumption proceeds (if at all) very slowly.

6. Struve "cannot at all understand" why Marx's differentiation between constant and variable capital "is essential to the theory of realisation" and why I "particularly insist" on it.

Struve's lack of comprehension is, on the one hand, the result of a simple misunderstanding. In the first place, Struve himself admits one point of merit in this differentiation—that it includes not only revenues, but the whole product. Another point of merit is that it links up the analysis of the process of realisation logically with the

* Cf. *Das Kapital*, III, 2, 375-76 (Russian translation, 696),[41] on distinguishing the gross product from gross revenue.

analysis of the process of production of an individual capital. What is the aim of the theory of realisation? It is to show *how* the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital takes place. Is it not obvious from the first glance that the role of variable capital must be radically different from that of constant capital? Products that replace variable capital must be exchanged, in the final analysis, for *articles of consumption* for the workers and meet their usual requirements. The products that replace constant capital must, in the final analysis, be exchanged for *means of production* and must be employed as capital for fresh production. For this reason the differentiation between constant and variable capital is absolutely essential for the theory of realisation. Secondly, Struve's misunderstanding is due to his having, here also, arbitrarily and erroneously understood the theory of realisation as showing that the products are distributed proportionally (see, especially, pp. 50-51). We have said above and say again that such a conception of the content of the theory of realisation is fallacious.

Struve's failure to understand is, on the other hand, due to the fact that he deems it necessary to make a distinction between "sociological" and "economic" categories in Marx's theory and makes a number of general remarks against that theory. I must say, first, that none of this has anything whatsoever to do with the theory of realisation, and, secondly, that I consider Struve's distinction to be vague and that I see no real use for it. Thirdly, that I consider not only debatable, but even directly incorrect, Struve's assertions that "it is indisputable that the relation of the sociological principles" of his theory to the analysis of market phenomena "was not clear to Marx himself," that "the theory of value, as expounded in Volumes I and III of *Capital*, undoubtedly suffers from contradiction."* All these statements of Struve

* In opposition to this last statement of Struve let me quote the latest exposition of the theory of value made by K. Kautsky, who states and proves that the law of the average rate of profit "does not abolish the law of value but merely modifies it" (*Die Agrarfrage*, *S.* 67-68). (*The Agrarian Question*, pp. 67-68.—*Ed.*) We would point out, incidentally, the following interesting statement made by Kautsky in the introduction to his excellent book: "If I have succeeded in developing new and fruitful ideas in this work I am grateful, first and

are mere empty words. They are not arguments but decrees. They are the anticipated results of the criticism of Marx which the Neo-Kantians[42] intend to undertake.* If we live long enough we shall see what the criticism brings. In the meantime we assert that this criticism has provided nothing on the theory of realisation.

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foremost, to my two great teachers for this; I stress this the more readily since there have been, for some time, voices heard even in our circles that declare the viewpoint of Marx and Engels to be obsolete.... In my opinion this scepticism depends more on the personal peculiarities of the sceptics than on the qualities of the disputed theory. I draw this conclusion, not only from the results obtained by analysing the sceptics' objections, but also on the basis of my own personal experience. At the beginning of my ... activities I did not sympathise with Marxism at all. I approached it quite as critically and with as much mistrust as any of those who now look down with an air of superiority on my dogmatic fanaticism. I became a Marxist only after a certain amount of resistance. But then, and later, whenever I had doubts regarding any question of principle, I always came to the ultimate conclusion that it was I who was wrong and not my teachers. A more profound study of the subject compelled me to admit the correctness of their viewpoint. Every new study of the subject, therefore, every attempt to re-examine my views served to strengthen my conviction, to strengthen in me my recognition of the theory, the dissemination and application of which I have made the aim of my life."

* Incidentally, a few words about this (future) "criticism," on which Struve is so keen. Of course, no right-minded person will, in general, object to criticism. But Struve, apparently is repeating his favourite idea of fructifying Marxism with "critical philosophy." It goes without saving that I have neither the desire nor the opportunity to deal here at length with the philosophical content of Marxism and therefore confine myself to the following remark. Those disciples of Marx who call, "Back to Kant," have so far produced exactly nothing to show the necessity for such a turn or to show convincingly that Marx's theory gains anything from its impregnation with Neo-Kantianism. They have not even fulfilled the obligation that should be a priority with them—to analyse in detail and refute the negative criticism of Neo-Kantianism made by Engels. On the contrary, those disciples who have gone back to pre-Marxian materialist philosophy and not to Kant, on the one hand, and to dialectical idealism, on the other, have produced a well-ordered and valuable exposition of dialectical materialism, have shown that it constitutes a legitimate and inevitable product of the entire latest development of philosophy and social science. It is enough for me to cite the well-known work by Mr. Beltov in Russian literature and *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus* (Stuttgart, 1896)[43] [*Essays on the History of Materialism* (Stuttgart, 1896).—*Ed.*] in German literature.

7. On the question of the significance of Marx's Schemes In the third section of *Capital* II, Struve maintains that the abstract theory of realisation can be well explained by the most varied methods of dividing the social product. This amazing assertion is to be fully explained by Struve's basic misunderstanding—that the theory of realisation "is completely exhausted" (??!) by the banality that products are exchanged for products. Only this misunderstanding could have led Struve to write such a sentence: "The role played by these masses of commodities [those being realised] in production, distribution, etc., whether they represent capital (*sic*!!) and what sort of capital, constant or variable, is of absolutely no significance to the essence of the theory under discussion" (51). It is of no significance to Marx's theory of realisation, a theory that consists in the analysis of the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social *capital*, whether or not commodities constitute capital!! This amounts to saying that as far as the essence of the theory of ground rent is concerned, there is no significance in whether or not the rural population is divided into landowners, capitalists, and labourers, since the theory is reduced, as it were, to an indication of the differing fertility of the different plots of land.

Only because of the same misunderstanding could Struve have asserted that the "natural relations between the elements of social consumption—social *metabolism*—can best be shown," not by the Marxian division of the product, but by the following division: means of production+articles of consumption+surplus-value (p. 50).

What is this social metabolism? Primarily it is the exchange of means of production for articles of consumption. How can this exchange be shown if surplus-value is especially *separated from* means of production and *from* articles of consumption? After all, surplus-value is embodied either in means of production or in articles of consumption! Is it not obvious that such a division, which is logically groundless (in that it confuses division according to the natural form of the product with division by elements of value), *obscures* the process of social metabolism?*

* Let us remind the reader that Marx divides the aggregate social product into two departments according to the natural form of the

8. Struve says that I ascribed to Marx the bourgeois-apologetic theory of Say-Ricardo (52), the theory of harmony between production and consumption (51), a theory that is in howling contradiction to Marx's theory of the evolution and eventual disappearance of capitalism (51-52); that, therefore, my "perfectly correct argument" that Marx, in both the second and third volumes, stressed the contradiction, inherent in capitalism, between the unlimited expansion of production and the limited consumption on the part of the masses of the people, "jettisons that theory of realisation ... whose defender" I am "in other cases."

This statement of Struve is likewise untrue and derives likewise from the above-mentioned misunderstanding to which he has become subject.

Whence comes Struve's assumption that I do not understand the theory of realisation as an analysis of the process of reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital, but as a theory which says only that products are exchanged for products, a theory which preaches the harmony of production and consumption? Struve could not have shown by an analysis of my articles that I understand the theory of realisation in the second way, for I have stated definitely and directly, that I understand it in the first way. In the article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism," in the section devoted to an explanation of Smith's and Sismondi's error, I say: "The whole question is *how* realisation takes place—*that is*, the replacement of all parts of the social product. Hence, the point of departure in discussing social capital and revenue—or, what is the same thing, the realisation of the product in capitalist society—must be the distinction between ... *means of production* and *articles of consumption*" (*Studies*, 17).* "The problem of realisation consists in analysing the *replacement* of all parts of the social product in terms of value and in terms of material form" (*ibid.*, 26).** Is not Struve repeating this when he

product: I—means of production and II—articles of consumption. In each of these departments the product is divided into three parts according to elements of value: 1) constant capital, 2) variable capital, and 3) surplus-value.

* See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 152.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 162.—*Ed.*

says—supposedly against me—that the theory which interests us "shows the mechanism of realisation ... insofar as that realisation is effected" *(Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, 62)? Am I contradicting *that* theory of realisation which I defend when I say that realisation is effected "in the midst of difficulties, in the midst of continuous fluctuations, which become increasingly violent as capitalism grows, in the midst of fierce competition, etc."? (*Studies*, 27)*; when I say that the Narodnik theory "not only reveals a failure to understand this realisation, but, in addition, reveals *an extremely superficial understanding of the contradictions inherent in this realisation*" (26-27)**; when I say that the realisation of the product, effected not so much on account of articles of consumption as on account of means of production, "is, of course, a contradiction, but the sort of contradiction that exists in reality, that springs from the very nature of capitalism" (24),*** a contradiction that "fully corresponds to the historical mission of capitalism and to its specific social structure: the former" (the mission) "is to develop the productive forces of society (production for production); the latter" (the social structure of capitalism) "precludes their utilisation by the mass of the population" (20)****?

9. Apparently there are no differences of opinion between Struve and me on the question of the relations between production and consumption in capitalist society. But if Struve says that Marx's postulate (which asserts that consumption is not the aim of capitalist production) "bears the obvious stamp of the polemical nature of Marx's whole system in general," that "it is tendentious" (53), then I most decidedly challenge the appropriateness and justification of such expressions. It is a fact that consumption is not the aim of capitalist production. The contradiction between this fact and the fact that, in the final analysis, production is bound up with consumption, that it is also dependent on consumption in capitalist society—this contradiction does not spring from a doctrine but from reality. Marx's theory of realisation

* See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 164.—*Ed.*
** *Ibid.*, p. 163.—*Ed.*
*** *Ibid.*, p. 160.—*Ed.*
*** *Ibid.*, p. 156.—*Ed.*

has, incidentally, tremendous scientific value, precisely because it shows how this contradiction occurs, and because it puts this contradiction in the foreground. "Marx's system" is of a "polemical nature," not because it is "tendentious,"* but because it provides an exact picture, in theory, of all the contradictions that are present in reality. For this reason, incidentally, all attempts to master "Marx's system" without mastering its "polemical nature" are and will continue to be unsuccessful: the "polemical nature" of the system is nothing more than a true reflection of the "polemical nature" of capitalism itself.

10. "What is the real significance of the theory of realisation?" asks Mr. Struve and answers by quoting the opinion of Mr. Bulgakov, who says that the possible expansion of capitalist production is actually effected even if only by a series of crises. "Capitalist production is increasing throughout the world," says Mr. Bulgakov. "This argument," objects Struve, "is quite groundless. The fact is that the real 'expansion of capitalist production' is not by any means effected in that ideal and isolated capitalist state which Bulgakov presupposes and which, by his assumption, is sufficient unto itself, but in the arena of world economy where the most differing levels of economic development and differing forms of economic existence come into collision" (57).

Thus, Struve's objection may be summed up as follows: In actual fact realisation does not take place in an isolated, self-sufficing, capitalist state, but "in the arena of world economy," i.e., by the marketing of products in other countries. It is easy to see that this objection is based on an error. Does the problem of realisation change to any extent if we do not confine ourselves to the home market ("self-sufficing" capitalism) but make reference to the foreign market, if we take several countries instead of only one? If we do not think that the capitalists throw their goods into the sea or give them away gratis to foreigners—if we do not take individual, exceptional cases or periods, it is obvious that we must accept a certain equilibrium of export and import.

* The classical example of gentlemen *à la* A. Skvortsov who sees tendentiousness in Marx's theory of the average rate of profit could serve as a warning against the use of such expressions.

If a country exports certain products, realising them "in the arena of world economy," it imports other products in their place. From the standpoint of the theory of realisation it must necessarily be accepted that "foreign commerce only replaces home products [*Artikel*—goods] by articles of other use- or bodily form" (*Das Kapital*, II, 469.[44] Quoted by me in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, p. 38*). Whether we take one country or a group of countries, the essence of the process of realisation does not change in the slightest. In his objection to Mr. Bulgakov, therefore, Struve repeats the old error of the Narodniks, who connected the problem of realisation with that of the foreign market.**

In actual fact these two questions have nothing in common. The problem of realisation is an abstract problem that is related to the general theory of capitalism. Whether we take one country or the whole world, the basic laws of realisation, revealed by Marx, remain the same.

The problem of foreign trade or of the foreign market is an historical problem, a problem of the concrete conditions of the development of capitalism in some one country and in some one epoch.***

11. Let us dwell for a while on the problem that has "long interested" Struve: what is the real scientific value of the theory of realisation?

It has exactly the same value as have all the other postulates of Marx's abstract theory. If Struve is bothered by the circumstance that "perfect realisation is the ideal of capitalist production, but by no means its reality," we must remind him that all other laws of capitalism, revealed by Marx, also depict only the ideal of capitalism and not its reality. "We need present," wrote Marx, "only the inner organisation of the capitalist mode of production, in its ideal average (*in ihrem idealen Durchschnitt*), as it were" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 367; Russian translation, p. 688).[45] The theory of capital assumes that the worker receives the full value of his labour-power. This is the ideal of capitalism,

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* See present volume, pp. 56-57.—*Ed.*

** I analysed this error of the Narodniks in my *Studies*, pp. 25-29. (See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 161-66.—*Ed.*)

*** Ibid., cf. *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, No. 1, p. 37 (see present volume, p. 55.—*Ed.*)

but by no means its reality. The theory of rent presupposes that the entire agrarian population has been completely divided into landowners, capitalists, and hired labourers. This is the ideal of capitalism, but by no means its reality. The theory of realisation presupposes the proportional distribution of production. This is the ideal of capitalism, but by no means its reality.

The scientific value of Marx's theory is its explanation of the process of the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital. Further, Marx's theory showed how the contradiction, inherent in capitalism, comes about, how the tremendous growth of production is definitely not accompanied by a corresponding growth in people's consumption. Marx's theory, therefore, not only does not restore the apologetic bourgeois theory (as Struve fancies), but, on the contrary, *provides a most powerful weapon against apologetics*. It follows from the theory that, *even* with an ideally smooth and proportional reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital, the contradiction between the growth of production and the narrow limits of consumption is inevitable. But in reality, *apart from this*, realisation does not proceed in ideally smooth proportions, but only amidst "difficulties," "fluctuations," "crises," etc.

Further, Marx's theory of realisation provides a most powerful weapon against the petty-bourgeois reactionary criticism of capitalism, as well as against apologetics. It was precisely this sort of criticism against capitalism that our Narodniks tried to substantiate with their fallacious theory of realisation. Marx's conception of realisation inevitably leads to the recognition of the historical progressiveness of capitalism (the development of the means of production and, consequently, of the productive forces of society) and, thereby, it not only does not obscure the historically transitory nature of capitalism, but, on the contrary, explains it.

12. "In relation to an ideal or isolated, self-sufficing capitalist society," asserts Struve, extended reproduction would be impossible, "since the necessary additional workers can nowhere be obtained."

I certainly cannot agree with Struve's assertion. Struve has not proved, and it cannot be proved, that it is impossible

to obtain additional workers from the reserve army. Against the fact that additional workers can be obtained from the natural growth of the population, Struve makes the unsubstantiated statement that "extended reproduction, based on the natural increase in the population, may not be arithmetically identical with simple reproduction, but from the practical capitalist standpoint, i.e., economically, may fully coincide with it." Realising that the impossibility of obtaining additional workers cannot be proved theoretically, Struve evades the question by references to historical and practical conditions. "I do not think that Marx could solve the historical [?!] question on the basis of this absolutely abstract construction." ... "Self-sufficing capitalism is the historically [!] inconceivable limit." ... "The intensification of the labour that can be forced on a worker is extremely limited, not only in actual fact, but also logically." ... "The constant raising of labour productivity cannot but weaken the very compulsion to work." ...

The illogicality of these statements is as clear as daylight! None of Struve's opponents has ever or anywhere given voice to the absurdity that an historical question can be solved with the aid of abstract constructions. In the present instance Struve himself did not propound an historical question, but one that is an absolute abstraction, a purely theoretical question, "in relation to an ideal capitalist society" (57). Is it not obvious that he is simply evading the question? I, of course, would not dream of denying that there exist numerous historical and practical conditions (to say nothing of the immanent contradictions of capitalism) that are leading and will lead to the destruction of capitalism rather than to the conversion of present-day capitalism into an ideal capitalism. But on the purely theoretical question "in relation to an ideal capitalist society" I still retain my former opinion that there are no theoretical grounds for denying the possibility of extended reproduction in such a society.

13. "Messrs. V. V. and N.—on have pointed out the contradictions and stumbling-blocks in the capitalist development of Russia, but they are shown Marx's Schemes and told that capital is always exchanged for capital..." (Struve, op. cit., 62).

This is sarcasm in the highest degree. The pity is that matters are depicted in an absolutely false light. Anyone who reads Mr. V. V.'s *Essays on Theoretical Economics* and Section XV of the second part of Mr. N.—on's *Sketches* will see that both these writers raised precisely the abstract-theoretical question of realisation—the realisation of the product in capitalist society in general. This is a fact. There is another circumstance which is also a fact; other writers, those who opposed them, "deemed it essential to explain, *first and foremost*, the basic, *abstract-theoretical* points of the market theory" (as is stated in the opening lines of my article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*). Tugan-Baranovsky wrote on the theory of realisation in the chapter of his book on crises, which bears the subtitle, "The Market Theory." Bulgakov gave his book the subtitle, "A Theoretical Study." It is therefore a question of who confuses abstract-theoretical and concrete-historical questions, Struve's opponents or Struve himself?

On the same page of his article Struve quotes my statement to the effect that the necessity for a foreign market is not due to the conditions of realisation but to historical conditions. "But," Struve objects (a very typical "but"!), "Tugan-Baranovsky, Bulgakov, and Ilyin have examined only the abstract conditions of realisation and have not examined the historical conditions" (p. 62).

The writers mentioned did not explain historical conditions for the precise reason that they took it upon themselves to speak of abstract-theoretical and not concrete-historical questions. In my book, *On the Question of the Development of Capitalism in Russia* ("The Home Market for Large-Scale Industry and the Process of Its Formation in Russia"),* the printing of which has now (March 1899) been completed, I did not raise the question of the market theory but of a home market for Russian capitalism. In this case, therefore, the abstract truths of theory play only the role of guiding principles, a means of analysing concrete data.

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* The reference is to *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see present edition, Vol. 3).—*Ed.*

14. Struve "wholly supports" his "point of view" on the theory of "third persons" which he postulated in his *Critical Remarks*. I, in turn, wholly support what I said in this connection at the time *Critical Remarks* appeared.[46]

In his *Critical Remarks* (p. 251) Struve says that Mr. V. V.'s argument "is based on a complete theory, an original one, of markets in a developed capitalist society." "This theory," says Struve, "is correct insofar as it confirms the fact that surplus-value cannot be realised by consumption, either by the capitalists or the workers, and presupposes consumption by third persons." By these third persons "in Russia" Struve "presumes the Russian agricultural peasantry" (p. 61 of the article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*).

And so, Mr. V. V. propounds a complete and original theory of markets in a developed capitalist society, and the Russian agricultural peasantry is pointed out to him! Is this not confusing the abstract-theoretical question of realisation with the concrete-historical question of capitalism in Russia? Further, if Struve acknowledges Mr. V. V.'s theory to be even partly correct, he must have overlooked Mr. V. V.'s basic theoretical errors on the question of realisation, he must have overlooked the incorrect view that the "difficulties" of capitalist realisation are confined to surplus-value or are specially bound up with that part of the value of the product—he must have overlooked the incorrect view that connects the question of the foreign market with the question of realisation.

Struve's statement that the Russian agricultural peasantry, by the differentiation within it, creates a market for our capitalism is perfectly correct (in the above-mentioned book I demonstrated this thesis in detail by an analysis of Zemstvo statistical data). The theoretical substantiation of this thesis, however, relates in no way to the theory of the realisation of the product in capitalist society, but to the theory of the formation of capitalist society. We must also note that calling the peasants "third persons" is not very fortunate and is likely to cause a misunderstanding. If the peasants are "third persons" for capitalist industry, then the industrial producers, large and small, the factory owners and work-

ers, are "third persons" for capitalist farming. On the other hand, the peasant farmers ("third persons") create a market for capitalism only to the extent that they are differentiated into the classes of capitalist society (rural bourgeoisie and rural proletariat), i.e., only insofar as they cease to be "*third*" persons and become *active* persons in the capitalist system.

15. Struve says: "Bulgakov makes the very subtle remark that no difference in principle can be discerned between the home and the foreign market for capitalist production." I fully agree with this remark: in actual fact a tariff or political frontier is very often quite unsuitable as aline drawn between the "home" and "foreign" markets. But for reasons just indicated I cannot agree with Struve that "the theory asserting the necessity for third persons ... arises out of this." One demand does arise directly out of this: do not stop at the traditional separation of the home and foreign markets when analysing the question of capitalism. This distinction, groundless from a strictly theoretical point of view, is of particularly little use for such countries as Russia. It could be replaced by another division which distinguishes, for instance, the following aspects of capitalist development: 1) the formation and development of capitalist relations within the bounds of a certain fully populated and occupied territory; 2) the expansion of capitalism to other territories (in part completely unoccupied and being colonised by emigrants from the old country, and in part occupied by tribes that remain outside the world market and world capitalism). The first side of the process might be called the development of capitalism in depth and the second its development in breadth.* Such a division would include the whole process of the historical development of capitalism: on the one hand, its development in the old countries, where for centuries the forms of capitalist relations up to and including large-scale machine industry have

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* It goes without saying that the two sides of the process are actually closely united, and that their separation is a mere abstraction, merely a method of investigating a complicated process. My book mentioned above is devoted entirely to the first side of the process. See Chapter VIII, Section V.

been built up; on the other hand, the mighty drive of developed capitalism to expand to other territories! to populate and plough up new parts of the world, to set up colonies and to draw savage tribes into the whirlpool of world capitalism. In Russia this last-mentioned capitalist tendency has been and continues to be seen most clearly in our outlying districts whose colonisation has been given such tremendous impetus in the post-Reform, capitalist period of Russian history. The south and south-east of European Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia serve as something like colonies for Russian capitalism and ensure its tremendous development, not only in depth but also in breadth.

Finally, the division proposed is convenient because it clearly determines the range of questions which precisely is embraced by the theory of realisation. It is clear that the theory applies only to the first side of the process, only to the development of capitalism in depth. The theory of realisation (i.e., the theory which examines the process of the reproduction and circulation of the aggregate social capital) must necessarily take an isolated capitalist society for its constructions, i.e., must ignore the process of capitalist expansion to other countries, the process of commodity exchange between countries, because this process does not provide anything for the solution of the question of realisation and only transfers the question from one country to several countries. It is also obvious that the abstract theory of realisation must take as a prerequisite an ideally developed capitalist society.

In regard to the literature of Marxism, Struve makes the following general remark: "The orthodox chorus still continues to dominate, but it cannot stifle the new stream of criticism because true strength in scientific questions is always on the side of criticism and not of faith." As can be seen from the foregoing exposition, we have satisfied ourselves that the "new stream of criticism" is not a guarantee against the repetition of old errors. No, let us better remain "under the sign of orthodoxy"! Let us not believe that orthodoxy means taking things on trust, that orthodoxy precludes critical application and further development, that it permits historical problems to be obscured by abstract schemes. If there

are orthodox disciples who are guilty of these truly grievous sins, the blame must rest entirely with those disciples and not by any means with orthodoxy, which is distinguished by diametrically opposite qualities.

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REVIEW

Karl Kautsky. ***Die Agrarfrage.*** *Eine Uebersicht über die Tendenzen der modfernen Landwirtschaft und die Agrarpolitik u.s.w.** *Stuttgart, Dietz, 1899.*

Kautsky's book is the most important event in present-day economic literature since the third volume of *Capital*. Until now Marxism has lacked a systematic study of capitalism in agriculture. Kautsky has filled this gap with "The Development of Agriculture in Capitalist Society," the first part (pp. 1-300) of his voluminous (450-page) book. He justly remarks in his preface that an "overwhelming" mass of statistical and descriptive economic material on the question of agricultural capitalism has been accumulated and that there is an urgent need to reveal the "basic tendencies" of economic evolution in this branch of the economy in order to demonstrate the varied phenomena of agricultulal capitalism as "partial manifestations of one common [integral] process" (*eines Gesammtprozesses*). It is true that agricultural forms and the relations among the agricultural population in contemporary society are marked by such tremendous variety that there is nothing easier than to seize upon a whole mass of facts and pointers taken from any inquiry that will "confirm" the views of the given writer. This is precisely the method used in a large number of arguments by our Narodnik press which tries to prove the viability of petty peasant economy or even its superiority over large-scale production.

* Karl Kautsky. *The Agrarian Question*. A Review of the Tendencies in Modern Agriculture and Agrarian Policy, etc.—*Ed.*

in agriculture. A distinguishing feature of all these arguments is that they isolate individual phenomena, cite individual cases, and do not even make an attempt to connect them with the general picture of the whole agrarian structure of capitalist countries in general and with the basic tendencies of the entire present-day evolution of capitalist farming. Kautsky does not make this usual mistake. He has been studying the problem of capitalism in agriculture for over twenty years and is in possession of very extensive material; in particular, Kautsky bases his inquiry on the data of the latest agricultural censuses and questionnaires in England, America, France (1892), and Germany (1895). He never loses his way amidst piles of facts and never loses sight of the connection between the tiniest phenomenon and the general structure of capitalist farming and the general evolution of capitalism.

Kautsky does not confine himself to any one particular question, e.g., the relations between large-scale and small-scale production in agriculture, but deals with tha general question of whether or not capital is bringing agriculture under its domination, whether it is changing forms of production and forms of ownership in agriculture and how this process is taking place. Kautsky gives every recognition to the important rola played by pre-capitalist and non-capitalist forms of agriculture in modern society and to the necessity of examining ths relationship of these forms to the purely capitalist forms; he begins his investigation with an extremely brilliant and precise characterisation of the patriarchal peasant economy and of agriculture in the feudal epoch. Having thus established the starting-points for the development of capitalism in agriculture, he proceeds to characterise "modern agriculture." The description is given first of all from the technical standpoint (the crop rotation system, division of labour, machinery, fertilisers, bacteriology), and the reader is given a splendid picture of the great revolution capitalism has wrought in the course of a few decades by making agriculture a *science* instead of a routine craft. Further comes the investigation of "the capitalist character of modern agriculture"—a brief and popularly written, but extremely precise and talented, exposition of Marx's theory of profit and rent. Kautsky shows that the tenant farmer system

and the mortgage system are merely two sides of one and the same process, noted by Marx, of separating the agricultural producers from the landowners. The relations between large-scale and small-scale production are then examined and it is shown that the technical superiority of the former over the latter is beyond doubt. Kautsky effectively demonstrates this thesis and explains in detail how the stability of petty production in agriculture does not depend in any way on its technical rationality but on the fact that the small peasants work far harder than hired labourers and reduce their vital necessities to a level lower than that of the latter. The supporting data which Kautsky cites are in the highest degree interesting and clear-cut. An analysis of the question of associations in agriculture leads Kautsky to the conclusion that associations are undoubtedly indicative of progress but that they are a transition to capitalism and not to communal production; associations do not decrease but increase the superiority of large-scale over small-scale agricultural production. It is absurd to think that the peasant in modern society can go over to communal production. Reference is usually made to statistical data which do not show that the small producer is ousted by the big producer, but which merely serve to show that the development of capitalism in agriculture is much more complicated than in industry. In industry, too, such manifestations as the spread of capitalist work in the home, etc., are not infrequently interconnected with the basic tendency development. But in agriculture the ousting of the small producer is hampered, primarily, by the limited size of the land area; the buying-up of small holdings to form a big holding is a very difficult matter; with intensified farming an increase in the quantity of products obtained is sometimes compatible with a reduction in the area of the land (for which reason statistics operating exclusively with data on the size of the farm have little evidential significance). The concentration of production takes place through the buying-up of many holdings by one proprietor; the latifundia thus formed serve as a basis for one of the higher forms of large-scale capitalist farming. Lastly, it would not even be advantageous for the big landowners to force out the small proprietors completely: the latter provide them with hand[s]! For this reason the landown-

ers and capitalists frequently pass laws that artificially maintain the small peasantry. Petty farming becomes stable when it ceases to compete with large-scale farming, when it is turned into a supplier of labour-power for the latter. The relations between large and small landowners come still closer to those of capitalists and proletarians. Kautsky devotes a special chapter to the "proletarisation of the peasantry," one that is rich in data, especially on the question of the "auxiliary employments" of the peasants, i.e., the various forms of hired labour.

After elucidating the basic features of the development of capitalism in agriculture, Kautsky proceeds to denuonstrate the historically transitory character of this system of social economy. The more capitalism develops, the greater the difficulties that commercial (commodity) farming encounters. The monopoly in land ownership (ground rent), the right of inheritance, and entailed estates[47] hamper the rationalisation of farming. The towns exploit the countryside to an ever greater extent, taking the best labour forces away from the farmers and absorbing an ever greater portion of the wealth produced by the rural population, whereby the rural population is no longer able to return to the soil that which is taken from it. Kautsky deals in particularly great detail with the depopulating of the countryside and acknowledges to the full that it is the middle stratum of farmers which suffers least of all from a shortage of labour-power, and he adds that "good citlzens" (we may also add: and the Russian Narodniks) are mistaken in rejoicing at this fact, in thinking that they can see in it the beginnings of a rebirth of the peasantry which refutes the applicability of Marx's theory to agriculture. The peasantry may suffer less than other agricultural classes from a shortage of hired labour, but it suffers much more from usury, tax oppression, the irrationality of its economy, soil exhaustion, excessive toil, and underconsumption. The fact that not only agricultural labourers, but even the children of the peasants, flee to the towns is a clear refutation of the views of optimistically-minded petty-bourgeois economists! But the biggest changes in the condition of European agriculture have been brought about by the competition of cheap grain imported from America, the Argentine, India, Russia, and other countries. Kautsky made

a detailed study of the significance of this fact that arose out of the development of industry in quest for markets. He describes the decline in European grain production under the impact of this competition, as well as the lowering of rent, and makes a particularly detailed study of the "industrialisation of agriculture" which is manifested, on the one hand, in the industrial wage-labour of the small peasants and, on the other, in the development of agricultural technical production (distilling, sugar refining, etc.), and even in the elimination of some branches of agriculture by manufacturing industries. Optimistic economists, says Kautsky, are mistaken in believing that such changes in European agriculture can save it from crisis; the crisis is spreading and can only end in a general crisis of capitalism as a whole. This, of course, does not give one the least right to speak of the ruin of agriculture, but its conservative character is gone for ever; it has entered a state of uninterrupted transformation, a state that is typical of the capitalist mode of production in general. "A large area of land under large-scale agricultural production, the capitalist nature of which is becoming more and more pronounced; the growth of leasing and mortgaging, the industrialisation of agriculture—these are the elements that are preparing the ground for the socialisation of agricultural production...." It would be absurd to think, says Kautsky in conclusion, that one part of society develops in one direction and another in the opposite direction. In actual fact "social development in agriculture is taking the same direction as in industry."

Applying the results of his theoretical analysis to questions of agrarian policy, Kautsky naturally opposes all attempts to support or "save" peasant economy. There is no reason even to think that the village commune, says Kautsky, could go over to large-scale communal farming (p. 338, section, "*Der Dorfkommunismus*"*; cf. p. 339). "The protection of the peasantry (*der Bauernschutz*) does not mean protection of the *person* of the peasant (no one, of course, would object to such protection), but protection of the peasant's *property*. Incidentally, it is precisely the peasant's property that is the main cause of his impoverishment and

* Village communism.—*Ed.*

his degradation. Hired agricultural labourers are now quite frequently in a better position than the small peasants. The protection of the peasantry is not protection from poverty but the protection of the fetters that chain the peasant to his poverty" (p. 320). The radical transformation of agriculture by capitalism is a process that is only just beginning, but it is one that is advancing rapidly, bringing about the transformation of the peasant into a hired labourer and increasing the flight of the population from the countryside. Attempts to check this process would be reactionary and harmful: no matter how burdensome the consequences of this process may be in present-day society, the consequences of checking the process would be still worse and would place the working population in a still more helpless and hopeless position. Progressive action in present-day society can only strive to lessen the harmful effects which capitalist advance exerts on the population, to increase the consciousness of the people and their capacity for collective self-defence. Kautsky, therefore, insists on the guarantee of freedom of movement, etc., on the abolition of all the remnants of feudalism in agriculture (e.g., *die Gesindeordnungen*,* which place farm workers in a personally dependent, semi-serf position), on the prohibition of child labour under the age of fourteen, the establishment of an eight-hour working day, strict sanitary police to exercise supervision over workers' dwellings, etc., etc.

It is to be hoped that Kautsky's book will appear in a Russian translation.[48]

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* Legislation defining relations between landowners and serfs.—*Ed.*

REVIEW

J. A. Hobson. ***The Evolution of Modern Capitalism.*** *Translated from the English. St. Petersburg, 1898. Publ. O. N. Popova. Price 1 rb. 50 kop.*

Hobson's book is, strictly speaking, not a study of the evolution of modern capitalism, but a series of sketches, based mainly on English data, dealing with the most recent industrial development. Hence, the title of the book is somewhat broad: the author does not touch upon agriculture at all and his examination of industrial economics is far from complete. Like the well-known writers Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Hobson is a representative of one of the advanced trends of English social thought. His attitude towards "modern capitalism" is critical; he fully admits the necessity of replacing it by a higher form of social economy and treats the problem of its replacement with typically English reformist practicality. His conviction of the need for reform is, in the main, arrived at empirically, under the influence of the recent history of English factory legislation, of the English labour movement, of the activities of the English municipalities, etc. Hobson lacks well-knit and integral theoretical views that could serve as a basis for his reformist programme and elucidate specific problems of reform. He is, therefore, at his best when he deals with the grouping and description of the latest statistical and economic data. When, on the other hand, he deals with the general theoretical problems of political economy, he proves to be very weak. The Russian reader will even find it strange to see a writer with such extensive

knowledge and practical aspirations deserving of full sympathy helplessly labouring over questions like, what is "capital," what is the role of "savings," etc. This weak side of Hobson is fully explained by the fact that he regards John Stuart Mill as a greater authority on political economy than Marx, whom he quotes once or twice but whom he evidently does not understand at all or does not know. One cannot but regret the vast amount of unproductive labour wasted by Hobson in an attempt to get clear on the contradictions of bourgeois and professorial political economy. At best he comes close to the solutions given by Marx long ago; at worst he borrows erroneous views that are in sharp contradiction to his attitude towards "modern capitalism." The most unfortunate chapter in his book is the seventh: "Machinery and Industrial Depression." In this chapter Hobson tried to analyse the theoretical problems of crises, of social capital and revenue in capitalist society, and of capitalist accumulation. Correct ideas on the disproportionateness of production and consumption in capitalist society and on the anarchic character of capitalist economy are submerged in a heap of scholastic arguments about "saving" (Hobson confuses accumulation with "saving"), amidst all sorts of Crusoeisms (suppose "a man working with primitive tools, discovers an implement ... saving food,"etc.), and the like. Hobson is very fond of diagrams, and in most cases he uses them very ably for graphic illustration of his exposition. But the idea of the "mechanism of production" given in his diagram on page 207 (Chap. VII) can only elicit a smile from the reader who is at all acquainted with the real "mechanism" of *capitalist* "production." Hobson here confuses production with the social system of production and evinces an extremely vague understanding of what capital is, what its component parts are, and into what classes capitalist society is necessarily divided. In Chapter VIII he cites interesting data on the composition of the population according to occupation, and on the changes in this composition in the course of time, but the great flaw in his theoretical arguments on "machinery and the demand for labour" is that he ignores the theory of "capitalist overpopulation" or the reserve army. Among the more happily written chapters of Hobson's book are those in which he examines modern towns and the position of women in modern

industry. Citing statistics on the growth of female labour and describing the extremely bad conditions under which this labour is performed, Hobson justly points out that the only hope of improving these conditions lies in the supplanting of domestic labour by factory labour, which leads to "closer social intercourse" and to "organisation." Similarly, on the question of the significance of towns, Hobson comes close to Marx's general views when he admits that the antithesis between town and country contradicts the system of collectivist society. Hobson's conclusions would have been much more convincing had he not ignored Marx's teaching on this question too. Hobson would then, probably, have emphasised more clearly the historically progressive role of the cities and the necessity of combining agriculture with industry under the collectivist organisation of economy. The last chapter of Hobson's book, "Civilisation and Industrial Development," is perhaps the best. In this chapter the author proves by a number of very apt arguments the need to reform the modern industrial system along the line of expanding "public control" and the "socialisation of industry." In evaluating Hobson's somewhat optimistic views regarding the methods by which these "reforms" can be brought about, the special features of English history and of English life must be borne in mind: the high development of democracy, the absence of militarism, the enormous strength of the organised trade unions, the growing investment of English capital outside of England, which weakens the antagonism between the English employers and workers, etc.

In his well-known book on the social movement in the nineteenth century, Prof. W. Sombart notes among other things a "tendency towards unity" (title of Chapter VI), i.e., a tendency of the social movement of the various countries, in its various forms and shades, towards uniformity and along with it a tendency towards the spread of the ideas of Marxism. In regard to England Sombart sees this tendency in the fact that the English trade unions are increasingly abandoning "the purely Manchester standpoint." In regard to Hobson's book we can say that under pressure of the demands of life, which is increasingly corroborating Marx's "prognosis," progressive English writers are beginning to

realise the unsoundness of traditional bourgeois political economy and, freeing themselves from its prejudices, are involuntarily approaching Marxism.

The translation of Hobson's book has substantial shortcomings.

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CAPITALISM IN AGRICULTURE

(KAUTSKY'S BOOK AND MR. BULGAKOV'S ARTICLE)

Written in April-May 1899

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Cover of the magazine *Zhizn* in which Lenin's "Capitalism in Agriculture" was published in 1900

Reduced

FIRST ARTICLE

Nachalo, No. 1-2 (Section II, pp. 1-21), contains an article by Mr. S. Bulgakov entitled: "A Contribution to the Question of the Capitalist Evolution of Agriculture," which is a criticism of Kautsky's work on the agrarian question. Mr. Bulgakov rightly says that "Kautsky's book represents a whole world outlook," that it is of great theoretical and practical importance. It is, perhaps, the first systematic and scientific investigation of a question that has stimulated a heated controversy in all countries, and still continues to do so, even among writers who are agreed on general views and who regard themselves as Marxists. Mr. Bulgakov "confines himself to negative criticism," to criticism of "individual postulates in Kautsky's book" (which he "briefly"—too briefly and very inexactly, as we shall see—reviews for the readers of *Nachalo*). "Later on," Mr. Bulgakov hopes "to give a systematic exposition of the question of the capitalist evolution of agriculture" and thus "also present a whole world outlook" in opposition to Kautsky's.

We have no doubt that Kautsky's book will give rise to no little controversy among Marxists in Russia, and that in Russia, too, some will oppose Kautsky, while others will support him. At all events, the writer of these lines disagrees most emphatically with Mr. Bulgakov's opinion, with his appraisal of Kautsky's book. Notwithstanding Mr. Bulgakov's admission that *Die Agrarfrage** is "a remarkable work," his appraisal is astonishingly sharp, and is written in a tone unusual in a controversy between authors of

* *The Agrarian Question.—Ed.*

related tendencies. Here are samples of the expressions Mr. Bulgakov uses: "extremely superficial" ... "equally little of both real agronomics and real economics" ... "Kautsky employs *empty phrases* to evade serious scientific problems" (Mr. Bulgakov's italics!!), etc., etc. We shall therefore carefully examine the expressions used by the stern critic and at the same time introduce the reader to Kautsky's book.

I

Even before Mr. Bulgakov gets to Kautsky, he, in passing, takes a shot at Marx. It goes without saying that Mr. Bulgakov emphasises the enormous services rendered by the great economist, but observes that in Marx's works one "sometimes" comes across even "erroneous views ... which have been sufficiently refuted by history." "Among such views is, for example, the one that in agriculture variable capital diminishes in relation to constant capital just as it does in manufacturing industry, so that the organic composition of agricultural capital continuously rises." Who is mistaken here, Marx or Mr. Bulgakov? Mr. Bulgakov has in mind the fact that in agriculture the progress of technique and the growing intensity of farming often lead *to an increase* in the amount of labour necessary to cultivate a given plot of land. This is indisputable; but it is very far from being a refutation of the theory of the diminution of variable capital *relatively* to constant capital, *in proportion* to constant capital. Marx's theory merely asserts that the ratio $\frac{v}{c}$ (v = variable capital, c = constant capital) in general has a tendency to diminish, even when v increases per unit of area. Is Marx's theory refuted if, simultaneously, c increases still more rapidly? Agriculture in capitalist countries, taken by and large, shows a diminution of v and an increase of c. The rural population and the number of workers employed in agriculture are diminishing in Germany, in France, and in England, whereas the number of machines employed in agriculture is increasing. In Germany, for example, from 1882 to 1895, the rural population diminished from 19,200,000 to 18,500,000 (the number of wage-workers in agriculture diminished from 5,900,000 to 5,600,000), whereas the number of machines

employed in agriculture increased from 458,369 to 913,391*; the number of steam-driven machines employed in agriculture increased from 2,731 (in 1879) to 12,856 (in 1897), while the total horse power of the steam-driven machinery employed increased still more. The number of cattle increased from 15,800,000 to 17,500,000 and the number of pigs from 9,200,000 to 12,200,000 (in 1883 and 1892 respectively). In France, the rural population diminished from 6,900,000 ("independent") in 1882 to 6,600,000 in 1892; and the number of agricultural machines increased as follows: 1862—132,784; 1882—278,896; 1892—355,795. The number of cattle was as follows: 12,000,000; 13,000,000; 13,700,000 respectively; the number of horses: 2,910,000; 2,840,000; 2,790,000 respectively (the reduction in the number of horses in the period 1882-92 was less significant than the reduction in the rural population). Thus, by and large, the history of modern capitalist countries has certainly not refuted, but has *confirmed* the applicability of Marx's law to agriculture. The mistake Mr. Bulgakov made was that he too hastily raised certain facts in agronomics, without examining their significance, to the level of *general* economic laws. We emphasise "general," because neither Marx nor his disciples ever regarded this law otherwise than as the law of the general tendencies of capitalism, and not as a law for all individual cases. Even in regard to industry Marx himself pointed out that periods of technical change (when the ratio $\frac{v}{c}$ diminishes) are followed by periods of progress on the given technical basis (when the ratio $\frac{v}{c}$ remains constant, and in certain cases may even increase). We know of cases in the industrial history of capitalist countries in which this law is contravened by entire branches of industry, as when large capitalist workshops (incorrectly termed factories) are broken up and supplanted by capitalist domestic industry. There cannot be any doubt that in agriculture the process of development of capitalism is immeasurably more complex and assumes incomparably more diverse forms.

* Machines of various types are combined. Unless otherwise stated, all figures are taken from Kautsky's book.

Let us now pass to Kautsky. The outline of agriculture in the feudal epoch with which Kautsky begins is said to be "very superficially compiled and superfluous." It is difficult to understand the motive for such a verdict. We are sure that if Mr. Bulgakov succeeds in realising his plan to give a systematic exposition of the capitalist evolution of agriculture, he will have to outline the main features of the *pre-capitalist* economics of agriculture. Without this the character of *capitalist* economics and the transitional forms which connect it with feudal economics cannot be understood. Mr. Bulgakov himself admits the enormous importance of "the form which agriculture assumed *at the beginning* [Mr. Bulgakov's italics] of its capitalist course." It is precisely with "the beginning of the capitalist course" of European agriculture that Kautsky begins. In our opinion, Kautsky's outline of feudal agriculture is excellent; it reveals that remarkable distinctness and ability to select what is most important and essential without becoming submerged in details of secondary importance which, in general, are characteristic of this author. In his introduction Kautsky first of all gives an extremely precise and correct presentation of the question. In most emphatic terms he declares: "There is not the slightest doubt—we are prepared to accept this *a priori* (*von vornherein*)—that agriculture does not develop according to the same pattern as industry: it is subject to special laws" (*S*. 5-6). The task is "to investigate whether capital is bringing agriculture under its domination and how it is dominating it, how it transforms it, how it invalidates old forms of production and forms of property and creates the need for new forms" (*S*. 6). Such, and only such, a presentation of the question can result in a satisfactory explanation of "the development of agriculture in capitalist society" (the title of the first, theoretical, part of Kautsky's book).

At the beginning of the "capitalist course," agriculture was in the hands of the *peasantry*, which, as a general rule, was subordinated to the feudal regime of social economy. Kautsky first of all characterises the *system* of peasant farming, the combining of agriculture with domestic industry, and further the elements of decay in this paradise of petty-bourgeois and conservative writers (*à la* Sismondi), the significance of usury and the gradual "penetration into the coun-

tryside, deep into the peasant household itself, of the class antagonism which destroys the ancient harmony and community of interests" (*S.* 13). This process, which began as far back as the Middle Ages, has not completely come to an end to this day. We emphasise this statement because it shows immediately the utter incorrectness of Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that Kautsky did not even raise the question of who was the carrier of technical progress in agriculture. Kautsky raised and answered that question quite definitely; anyone who reads his book carefully will grasp the truth (often forgotten by the Narodniks, agronomists, and many others) that the carrier of technical progress in modern agriculture is the *rural bourgeoisie*, both petty and big; and (as Kautsky has shown) the big bourgeoisie plays a more important role in this respect than the petty bourgeoisie.

II

After describing (in Chapter III) the main features of feudal agriculture: the predominance of the three-field system, the most conservative system in agriculture; the oppression and expropriation of the peasantry by the big landed aristocracy; the organisation of feudal-capitalist farming by the latter; the transformation of the peasantry into starving paupers (*Hungerleider*) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the development of bourgeois peasants (*Grossbauern*, who cannot manage without regular farm labourers and day labourers), for whom the old forms of rural relations and land tenure were unsuitable; the abolition of these forms and the paving of the way for "capitalist, intensive farming" (*S.* 26) by the forces of the bourgeois class which had developed in the womb of industry and the towns—after describing all this, Kautsky goes on to characterise "modern agriculture" (Chapter IV).

This chapter contains a remarkably exact, concise, and lucid outline of the gigantic revolution which capitalism brought about in agriculture by transforming the routine craft of peasants crushed by poverty and ignorance into the scientific application of agronomics, by disturbing the age-long stagnation of agriculture, and by giving (and continuing

to give) an impetus to the rapid development of the productive forces of social labour. The three-field system gave way to the crop rotation system, the maintenance of cattle and the cultivation of the soil were improved, the yield increased and specialisation in agriculture and the division of labour among individual farms greatly developed. Pre-capitalist uniformity was replaced by increasing diversity, accompanied by technical progress in all branches of agriculture. Both the use of machinery in agriculture and the application of steam power were introduced and underwent rapid development; the employment of electric power, which, as specialists point out, is destined to play an even greater role in this branch of production than steam power, has begun. The use of access roads, land improvement schemes, and the application of artificial fertilisers adapted to the physiology of plants have been developed; the application of bacteriology to agriculture has begun. Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that "Kautsky's data"* are not accompanied by an *economic* analysis" is completely groundless. Kautsky shows precisely the connection between this revolution and the growth of the *market* (especially the growth of the towns), and the subordination of agriculture to *competition* which *forced* the changes and specialisation. "This revolution, which has its origin in urban capital, increases the dependence of the farmer on the market and, moreover, constantly changes market conditions of importance to him. A branch of production that was profitable while the local market's only connection with the world market was a high road becomes unprofitable and must necessarily be superseded by another branch of production when a railway is run through the locality. If, for example, the railway brings cheaper grain, grain production

* "All these data," thinks Mr. Bulgakov; "can be obtained from any (*sic*!) handbook of the economics of agriculture." We do not share Mr. Bulgakov's roseate views on "handbooks." Let us take from "any" of the Russian books those of Messrs. Skvortsov (*Steam Transport*) and N. Kablukov (*Lectures*, half of them reprinted in a "new" book *The Conditions of Development of Peasant Economy in Russia*). Neither from the one nor from the other would the reader be able to obtain a picture of that transformation which was brought about by *capitalism* in agriculture, because neither even sets out to give a general picture of the transition from feudal to capitalist economy.

becomes unprofitable; but at the same time a market for milk is created. The growth of commodity circulation makes it possible to introduce new, improved varieties of crops into the country," etc. (*S*. 37-38). "In the feudal epoch," says Kautsky, "the only agriculture was small-scale agriculture, for the landlord cultivated his fields with the peasant's implements. Capitalism first created the possibility for large-scale production in agriculture, which is technically more rational than small-scale production." In discussing agricultural machinery, Kautsky (who, it should be said in passing, points precisely to the specific features of agriculture in this respect) explains the *capitalist* nature of its employment; he explains the influence of agricultural machinery upon the workers, the significance of machinery as a factor of progress, and the "reactionary utopianism" of schemes for restricting the employment of agricultural machinery. "Agricultural machines will continue their transformative activity: they will drive the rural workers into the towns and in this way serve as a powerful instrument for raising wages in the rural districts, on the one hand, and for the further development of the employment of machinery in agriculture, on the other" (*S*. 41). Let it be added that in special chapters Kautsky explains in detail the capitalist character of modern agriculture, the relation between large- and small-scale production, and the proletarisation of the peasantry. As we see, Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that Kautsky "does not raise the question of knowing why all these wonder-working changes were necessary" is entirely untrue.

In Chapter V ("The Capitalist Character of Modern Agriculture") Kautsky expounds Marx's theory of value, profit, and rent. "Without money, modern agricultural production is impossible," says Kautsky, "or, what is the same thing, it is impossible *without capital*. Indeed, under the present mode of production any sum of money which does not serve the purpose of individual consumption can be transformed into capital, i.e., into a value begetting surplus-value and, as a general rule, actually is transformed into capital. Hence, modern agricultural production is capitalist production" (*S*. 56). This passage, incidentally, enables us to appraise the following statement made by Mr. Bulgakov: "I employ this term (capitalist agriculture) in the ordinary sense

(Kautsky also employs it in the same sense), i.e., in the sense of large-scale production in agriculture. Actually, however (*sic*!), when the *whole* of the national economy is organised on capitalist lines, there is no *non*-capitalist agriculture, the *whole* of it being determined by the general conditions of the organisation of production, and only within these limits should the distinction be made between large-scale, entrepreneur farming and small-scale farming. For the sake of clarity a new term is required here also." And so it seems, Mr. Bulgakov *is correcting* Kautsky.... "Actually, however," as the reader sees, Kautsky *does not employ* the term "capitalist agriculture" in the "ordinary," inexact sense in which Mr. Bulgakov employs it. Kautsky understands perfectly well, and says so very precisely and clearly, that under the capitalist mode of production all agricultural production is "as a general rule" capitalist production. In support of this opinion he adduces the simple fact that in order to carry on modern agriculture money is needed, and that in modern society money which does not serve the purpose of individual consumption becomes capital. It seems to us that this is somewhat clearer than Mr. Bulgakov's "correction," and that Kautsky has fully proved that it is possible to dispense with a "new term."

In Chapter V of his book Kautsky asserts, *inter alia*, that both the tenant farmer system, which has developed so fully in England, and the mortgage system, which is developing with astonishing rapidity in continental Europe, express, in essence, one and the same process, viz., *the separation of the land from the farmer*.* Under the capitalist tenant farmer system this separation is as clear as daylight. Under the mortgage system it is "less clear, and things are not so simple; but in essence it amounts to the same thing" (*S*. 86). Indeed, it is obvious that the mortgaging of land is the mortgage, or sale, of ground rent. Consequently, under the mortgage system, as well as under the tenant farmer system, the recipients of rent (=the landowners) are separated from the

* Marx pointed to this process in Volume III of *Capital* (without examining its various *forms* in different countries) and observed that this separation of "land as an instrument of production from landed property and landowner" is "one of the major results of the capitalist mode of production" (III, 2, *S*. 156-57; Russian translation, 509-10).[50]

recipients of the profit of enterprise (= farmers, rural entrepreneurs). "In general, the significance of this assertion of Kautsky is unclear" to Mr. Bulgakov. "It can hardly be considered as proved that the mortgage system expresses the separation of the land from the farmer." "Firstly, it cannot be proved that debt absorbs the *whole* rent; this is possible only by way of exception...." To this we reply: There is no need to prove that interest on mortgage debts absorbs the *whole* rent, just as there is no need to prove that the *actual amount* paid for land leased coincides with rent. It is sufficient to prove that mortgage debts are growing with enormous rapidity; that the landowners strive to mortgage all their land, to sell the whole of the rent. The existence of this tendency—a theoretical economic analysis can, in general, deal only with tendencies—cannot be doubted. Consequently, there can be no doubt about the process of separation of the land from the farmer. The combination of the recipient of rent and the recipient of the profit of enterprise in one person is, "from the historical point of view, an exception" (*ist historisch eine Ausnahme*, *S*. 91).... "Secondly, the causes and sources of the debt must be analysed in each separate case for its significance to be understood." Probably this is either a misprint or a slip. Mr. Bulgakov cannot demand that an economist (who, moreover, is dealing with the "development of agriculture in capitalist society" *in general*) should investigate the causes of the debt "*in each separate case*" or even expect that he would be able to do so. If Mr. Bulgakov wanted to say that it is necessary to analyse the causes of debt in different countries at different periods, we cannot agree with him. Kautsky is perfectly right in saying that too many monographs on the agrarian question have accumulated, and that the urgent task of modern theory is not to add new monographs but to "investigate the main trends of the capitalist evolution of agriculture as a whole" (*Vorrede*, *S*. vi*). Among these main trends is undoubtedly the separation of the land from the farmer in the form of an increase in mortgage debts. Kautsky precisely and clearly defined the real significance of mortgages, their progressive historical character (the separation of the land from the farmer being one of the condi-

* Foreword, p. vi.—*Ed*.

tions for the socialisation of agriculture, *S*. 88), and the essential role they play in the capitalist evolution of agriculture.* All Kautsky's arguments on this question are extremely valuable theoretically and provide a powerful weapon against the widespread bourgeois talk (particularly in "any handbook of the economics of agriculture") about the "misfortune" of debts and about "measures of assistance." ... "Thirdly," concludes Mr. Bulgakov, "land leased out may, in its turn, be mortgaged; and in this sense it may assume the same position as land not leased out." A strange argument! Let Mr. Bulgakov point to at least one economic phenomenon, to at least one economic category, that is not interwoven with others. The fact that there are cases of combined leasing and mortgaging does not refute, does not even weaken, the theoretical proposition that the separation of the land from the farmer is expressed in two forms: in the tenant farmer system and in mortgage debts.

Mr. Bulgakov also declares that Kautsky's statement that "countries in which the tenant farmer system is developed are also countries in which large land ownership predominates" (*S*. 88) is "still more unexpected" and "altogether untrue." Kautsky speaks here of the concentration of land ownership (under the tenant farmer system) and the concentration of mortgages (under the system in which the landowners manage their own farms) as conditions that facilitate the abolition of the private ownership of land. On the question of concentration of land ownership, continues Kautsky, there are no statistics "which would enable one to trace the amalgamation of several properties in single hands"; but "in general it may be taken" that the increase in the number of leases and in the area of the leased land proceeds side by side with concentration of land ownership. "Countries in which the tenant farmer system is developed are also countries in which large land ownership predominates."

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* The increase in mortgage debts does not always imply that agriculture is in a depressed state.... The progress and prosperity of agriculture (as well as its decline) "should find expression in an increase in mortgage debts—firstly, because of the growing need of capital on the part of progressing agriculture, and, secondly, because of the increase in ground rent, which facilitates the expansion of agricultural credit" (*S*. 87).

It is clear that Kautsky's entire argument applies only to countries in which the tenant farmer system is developed; but Mr. Bulgakov refers to East Prussia, where he "hopes to show" an increase in the number of leases side by side with the break-up of large landed properties—and he thinks that by means of this single example he is refuting Kautsky! It is a pity, however, that Mr. Bulgakov forgets to inform his readers that Kautsky himself points to the break-up of large estates and the growth of peasant tenant farming in the East Elbe province and, in doing so, explains, as we shall see later, the real significance of these processes.

Kautsky points to the concentration of mortgage institutions as proof that the concentration of land ownership is taking place in countries in which mortgage debts exist. Mr. Bulgakov thinks that this is no proof. In his opinion, "It might easily be the case that the deconcentration of capital (by the issue of shares) is proceeding side by side with the concentration of credit institutions." Well, we shall not argue with Mr. Bulgakov on this point.

III

After examining the main features of feudal and capitalist agriculture, Kautsky passes on to the question of "large- and small-scale production" in agriculture (Chapter VI). This chapter is one of the best in Kautsky's book. In it he first examines the "technical superiority of large-scale production." In deciding the question in favour of large-scale production, Kautsky does not give an abstract formula that ignores the enormous variety of agricultural relations (as Mr. Bulgakov, altogether groundlessly, supposes); on the contrary, he clearly and precisely points to the necessity of taking this variety into account in the practical applications of the theoretical law. In the first place, "*it goes without saying*" that the superiority of large-scale over small-scale production in agriculture is inevitable only when "*all other conditions are equal*" (*S*. 100. My italics). In industry, also, the law of the superiority of large-scale production is not as absolute and as simple as is sometimes thought; there, too, it is the equality of "*other conditions*" (not always existing in reality) that ensures the full applicability of the law. In

agriculture, however, which is distinguished for the incomparably greater complexity and variety of its relations, the full applicability of the law of the superiority of large-scale production is hampered by considerably stricter conditions. For instance, Kautsky very aptly observes that on the borderline between the peasant and the small landlord estates "quantity is transformed into quality": the big peasant farm may be "economically, if not technically, superior" to the small landlord farm. The employment of a scientifically educated manager (one of the important advantages of large-scale production) is too costly for a small estate; and the management by the owner himself, is very often merely "Junker," and by no means scientific, management. Secondly, large-scale production in agriculture is superior to small production only up to a certain limit. Kautsky closely investigates this limit further on. It also goes without saying that this limit differs in different branches of agriculture and under different social-economic conditions. Thirdly, Kautsky does not in the least ignore the fact that "*so far*," there are branches of agriculture in which, as experts admit, small-scale production can compete with large-scale production; for example, vegetable gardening, grape growing, industrial crops, etc. (*S.* 115). But these branches occupy a position quite subordinate to the decisive (*entscheidenden*) branches of agriculture, viz., the production of grain and animal husbandry. Moreover, "even in vegetable gardening and grape growing there are already fairly successful large-scale enterprises" (*S.* 115). Hence, "taking agriculture as a whole (*in Allgemeinen*), those branches in which small-scale production is superior to large-scale production need not be taken into account, and it is quite permissible to say that large-scale production is decidedly superior to small-scale production" (*S.* 116).

After demonstrating the technical superiority of large-scale production in agriculture (we shall present Kautsky's arguments in greater detail later on in examining Mr. Bulgakov's objections), Kautsky asks: "What can small production offer against the advantages of large-scale production?" And he replies: "The greater diligence and greater care of the worker, who, unlike the hired labourer, works for himself, and the low level of requirements of the small independent

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farmer, which is even lower than that of the agricultural labourer" (*S*. 106); and, by adducing a number of striking facts concerning the position of the peasants in France, England, and Germany, Kautsky leaves no doubt whatever about "overwork and under-consumption in small-scale production." Finally, he points out that the superiority of large-scale production also finds expression in the striving of farmers to form *associations*: "Associated production is large-scale production." The fuss made by the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and the Russian Narodniks in particular (e.g., the above-mentioned book by Mr. Kablukov), over the small farmers' associations is well known. The more significant, therefore, is Kautsky's excellent analysis of the role of these associations. Of course, the small farmers' associations are a link in economic progress; but they express *a transition to capitalism* (*Fortschritt zum Kapitalismus*) *and not toward collectivism*, as is often thought and asserted (*S*. 118). Associations do not diminish but enhance the superiority (*Vorsprung*) of large-scale over small-scale production in agriculture, because the big farmers enjoy greater opportunities of forming associations and take greater advantage of these opportunities. It goes without saying that Kautsky very emphatically maintains that communal, collective large-scale production is superior to capitalist large-scale production. He deals with the experiments in collective farming made in England by the followers of Robert Owen* and with analogous communes in the United States of North America. All these experiments, says Kautsky, *irrefutably prove* that it is quite possible for workers to carry on large-scale modern farming collectively, but that for this possibility to become a reality "a number of definite economic, political, and intellectual conditions" are necessary. The transition of the small producer (both artisan and peasant) to collective production is hindered by the extremely low development of solidarity and discipline, the isolation, and the "property-owner fanaticism," noted not only among West-European peasants, but, let us add,

* On pages 124-26 Kautsky describes the agricultural commune in Ralahine, of which, incidentally, Mr. Dioneo tells his Russian readers in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*,[51] No. 2, for this year.

also among the Russian "commune" peasants (recall A. N. Engelhardt and G. Uspensky). Kautsky categorically declares that "it is absurd to expect that the peasant in *modern society* will go over to communal production" (*S.* 129).

Such is the extremely rich content of Chapter VI of Kautsky's book. Mr. Bulgakov is particularly displeased with this chapter. Kautsky, we are told, is guilty of the "fundamental sin" of confusing various concepts; "technical advantages are confused with economic advantages." Kautsky "proceeds from the false assumption that the *technically* more perfect mode of production is also *economically* more perfect, i.e., more viable." Mr. Bulgakov's emphatic statement is altogether groundless, of which, we hope, the reader has been convinced by our exposition of Kautsky's line of argument. Without in the least confusing technique with economics,* Kautsky rightly investigates the question of the relation of large-scale to small-scale production in agriculture, *other conditions being equal*, under the capitalist system of production. *In the opening sentence of the first section of Chapter VI Kautsky points precisely to this con-*

* The only thing Mr. Bulgakov could quote in support of his claim is the *title* Kautsky gave to the first section of his Chapter VI: "(a) The *Technical* Superiority of Large-Scale Production," although this section deals with both the technical and the economic advantages of large-scale production. But does this prove that Kautsky *confuses* technique with economics? And, strictly speaking, it is still an open question as to whether Kautsky's title is inexact. The point is that Kautsky's object was to contrast the content of the first and second sections of Chapter VI: in the first section (a) he deals with the technical superiority of large-scale production in capitalist agriculture, and here, in addition to machinery, etc., he mentions, for instance, credit. "A peculiar sort of technical superiority," says Mr. Bulgakov ironically. But *Rira bien qui rira le dernier*! (He laughs best who laughs last.—*Ed.*) Glance into Kautsky's book and you will see that he has in mind, principally, the progress made in the *technique* of credit business (and further on in the technique of trading), which is accessible *only* to the big farmer. On the other hand, in the second section of this chapter (b) he compares the quantity of labour expended and the rate of consumption by the workers in large-scale production with those in small-scale production. Consequently, in this part Kautsky examines *the purely economic difference* between small- and large-scale production. The *economics* of credit and commerce is the same for both; but the *technique* is different.

nection between the level of development of capitalism and the degree of the general applicability of the law of the superiority of large-scale agriculture: "The more capitalist agriculture becomes, the more it develops the qualitative difference between the techniques of small- and large-scale production" (*S.* 92). This qualitative difference did not exist in pre-capitalist agriculture. What then can be said of this stern admonition to which Mr. Bulgakov treats Kautsky: "In point of fact, the question should have been put as follows: what significance in the competition between large- and small-scale production can any of the specific features of either of these forms of production have *under the present social-economic conditions*?" This "correction" bears the same character as the one we examined above.

Let us see now how Mr. Bulgakov refutes Kautsky's arguments in favour of the technical superiority of large-scale production in agriculture. Kautsky says: "One of the most important features distinguishing agriculture from industry is that in agriculture production in the proper sense of the word [*Wirtschaftsbetrieb*, an economic enterprise] is usually connected with the household (*Haushalt*), which is not the case in industry." That the larger household has the advantage over the small household in the saving of labour and materials hardly needs proof.... The former purchases (note this! *V. I.*) "kerosene, chicory, and margarine wholesale; the latter purchases these articles retail, etc." (*S.* 93). Mr. Bulgakov "corrects": "Kautsky did not mean to say that this was technically more advantageous, but that it cost less"!... Is it not clear that in this case (as in all the others) Mr. Bulgakov's attempt to "correct" Kautsky was more than unfortunate? "This argument," continues the stern critic, "is also very questionable in itself, because under certain conditions the value of the product may not include the value of the scattered huts, whereas the value of a common house is included, even with the interest added. This, too, depends upon social-economic conditions, which—and not the alleged technical advantages of large-scale over small-scale production—should have been investigated."... In the first place, Mr. Bulgakov forgets the trifle that Kautsky, after comparing the significance of large-scale production with that of small-scale production, *all other conditions being equal*,

proceeds to examine these conditions in detail. Consequently, Mr. Bulgakov wants to throw different questions together. Secondly, how is it that the value of the peasants' huts does not enter into the value of the product? Only because the peasant "does not count" the value of the timber he uses or the labour he expends in building and repairing his hut. Insofar as the peasant still conducts a natural economy, he, of course, may "not count" his labour; there is no justification for Mr. Bulgakov's not telling his readers that *Kautsky very clearly and precisely points this out on pp. 165-67 of his book* (Chapter VII, "The Proletarisation of the Peasant"). But we are now discussing the "social-economic condition" of capitalism and not of natural economy or of simple commodity production. Under capitalist social conditions "not to count" one's labour means to work for nothing (for the merchant or another capitalist); it means to work for incomplete remuneration for the labour power expended; it means to lower the level of consumption below the standard. As we have seen, Kautsky fully recognised and correctly appraised *this* distinguishing feature of small production. In his objection to Kautsky, Mr. Bulgakov repeats the usual trick and the usual mistake of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists. These economists have deafened us with their praises of the "viability" of the small peasant, who, they say, need not count his own labour, or chase after profit and rent, etc. These good people merely forget that such arguments confuse the "social-economic conditions" of natural economy, simple commodity production, and capitalism. Kautsky excellently explains all these mistakes and *draws a strict distinction* between the various systems of social-economic relations. He says: "If the agricultural production of the small peasant is not drawn into the sphere of commodity production, if it is merely a part of household economy, it also remains outside the sphere of the centralising tendencies of the modern mode of production. However irrational his parcellised economy may be, no matter what waste of effort it may lead to, he clings to it tightly, just as his wife clings to her wretched household economy, which likewise produces infinitely miserable results with an enormous expenditure of labour-power, but which represents the only sphere in which she is not subject to another's rule and is

free from exploitation" (*S*. 165). The situation changes when natural economy is supplanted by commodity economy. The peasant then has to sell his produce, purchase implements, and *purchase land*. As long as the peasant remains *a simple commodity producer*, he can be satisfied with the standard of living of the wage-worker; he needs neither profit nor rent; he can pay a higher price for land than the capitalist entrepreneur (*S*. 166). But simple commodity production is supplanted by *capitalist production*. If, for instance, the peasant has mortgaged his land, he must also obtain the rent which he has sold to the creditor. At this stage of development the peasant can only formally be regarded as a simple commodity producer. *De facto*, he usually has to deal with the *capitalist*—the creditor, the merchant, the industrial entrepreneur—from whom he must seek "auxiliary employment," i.e., to whom he must sell his labour-power. At this stage—and Kautsky, we repeat, compares large-scale with small-scale farming in capitalist society—the possibility for the peasant "not to count his labour" means only one thing to him, namely, to work himself to death and continually to cut down his consumption.

Equally unsound are the other objections raised by Mr. Bulgakov. Small-scale production permits of the employment of machinery within narrower limits; the small proprietor finds credit more difficult to obtain and more expensive, says Kautsky. Mr. Bulgakov considers these arguments false and refers to—peasant associations! He completely ignores the evidence brought forward by Kautsky, whose appraisal of these associations and their significance we quoted above. On the question of machinery, Mr. Bulgakov again reproaches Kautsky for not raising the "more general economic question: What, upon the whole, is the economic role of machinery in agriculture [Mr. Bulgakov has forgotten Chapter IV of Kautsky's book!] and is it as inevitable an instrument in agriculture as in manufacturing industry?" Kautsky clearly pointed to the capitalist nature of the use of machinery in modern agriculture (*S*. 39, 40, et seq.); noted the specific features of agriculture which create "technical and economic difficulties" for the employment of machinery in agriculture (*S*. 38, et seq.); and adduced data on the growing employment of machinery (*S*. 40), on its technical

significance (42, et seq.), and on the role of steam and electricity. Kautsky indicated the size of farm necessary, according to agronomic data, for making the fullest use of various machines (94), and pointed out that according to the German census of 1895 the employment of machinery steadily and rapidly increases from the small farms to the big ones (2 per cent in farms up to two hectares, 13.8 per cent in farms of 2 to 5 hectares, 45.8 per cent in farms of 5 to 20 hectares, 78.8 per cent in farms of 20 to 100 hectares, and 94.2 per cent in farms of 100 and more hectares). Instead of these figures, Mr. Bulgakov would have preferred "general" arguments about the "invincibility" or non-invincibility of machines!...

"The argument that a larger number of draught animals per hectare is employed in small-scale production is unconvincing ... because the relative intensity of animal maintenance per farm ... is not investigated"—says; Mr. Bulgakov. We open Kautsky's book at the page that contains this argument and read the following: "The large number of cows in small-scale farming [per 1,000 hectares] is to no small extent are determined by the fact that the peasant engages more in animal husbandry and less in the production of grain than the big farmer; but this does not explain the difference in the number of horses maintained" (page 96, on which are quoted figures for Saxony for 1860, for the whole of Germany for 1883, and for England for 1880). We remind the reader of the fact that in Russia the Zemstvo statistics reveal the same law expressing the superiority of large-scale over small-scale farming: the big peasant farms manage with a smaller number of cattle and implements per unit of land.*

Mr. Bulgakov gives a far from complete exposition of Kautsky's arguments on the superiority of large-scale over small-scale production in capitalist agriculture. The superiority of large-scale farming does not only lie in the fact that there is less waste of cultivated area, a saving in livestock and implements, fuller utilisation of implements,

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* See V. Y. Postnikov, *Peasant Farming in South Russia*. Cf. V. Ilyin, *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapter II, Section I. (See present edition, Vol. 3.—*Ed.*)

wider possibilities of employing machinery, and more opportunities for obtaining credit; it also lies in the commercial superiority of large-scale production, the employment in the latter of scientifically trained managers (Kautsky, *S.* 104). Large-scale farming utilises the co-operation of workers and division of labour to a larger extent. Kautsky attaches particular importance to the scientific, agronomic education of the farmer. "A scientifically well-educated farmer can be employed only by a farm sufficiently large for the work of management and supervision to engage fully the person's labour-power" (*S.* 98: "The size of such farms varies, according to the type of production," from three hectares of vineyards to 500 hectares of extensive farming). In this connection Kautsky mentions the interesting and extremely characteristic fact that the establishment of primary and secondary agricultural school benefits the big farmer and not the peasant by providing the former with employees (the same thing is observed in Russia). "The higher education that is required for fully rationalised production is hardly compatible with the peasants' present conditions of existence. This, of course, is a condemnation, not of higher education, but of the peasants' conditions of life. It merely means that peasant production is able to exist side by side with large-scale production, not because of its higher productivity, but because of its lower requirements" (*S.* 99). Large-scale production must employ, not only peasant labourers, but also urban workers, whose requirements are on an incomparably higher level.

Mr. Bulgakov calls the highly interesting and important data which Kautsky adduces to prove "overwork and underconsumption in small-scale production" "a few[!] casual[??] quotations." Mr. Bulgakov "undertakes" to cite as many "quotations of an opposite character." He merely forgets to say whether he also undertakes to make *an opposite assertion* which he would prove by "quotations of an opposite character." This is the whole point! Does Mr. Bulgakov undertake to assert that large-scale production in capitalist society differs from peasant production in the prevalence of overwork and the lower consumption of its workers? Mr. Bulgakov is too cautious to make such a ludicrous assertion. He considers it possible to avoid the fact of the peasants'

overwork and lower consumption by remarking that "in some places peasants are prosperous and in other places they are poor"!! What would be said of an economist who, instead of generalising the data on the position of small- and large-scale production, began to investigate the difference in the "prosperity" of the population of various "places"? What would be said of an economist who evaded the overwork and lower consumption of handicraftsmen, as compared with factory workers, with the remark that "in some places handicraftsmen are prosperous and in other places they are poor"? Incidentally, a word about handicraftsmen. Mr. Bulgakov writes: "Apparently Kautsky was mentally drawing a parallel with *Hausindustrie*,* where there are no technical limits to overwork [as in agriculture], but this parallel is unsuitable here." Apparently, we say in reply, Mr. Bulgakov was astonishingly inattentive to the book he was criticising, for Kautsky did not "mentally draw a parallel" with *Hausindustrie*, but *pointed to it directly and precisely on the very first page of that part of the chapter* which deals with the question of overwork (Chapter VI, b, *S*. 106): "As in domestic industry (*Hausindustrie*), the work of the children of the family in small peasant farming is even more harmful than wage-labour for others." However emphatically Mr. Bulgakov decrees that this parallel is unsuitable here, his opinion is nevertheless entirely erroneous. In industry, overwork has no technical limits; but for the peasantry it is "limited by the technical conditions of agriculture," argues Mr. Bulgakov. The question arises: who, indeed, confuses technique with economics, Kautsky or Mr. Bulgakov? What has the technique of agriculture, or of domestic industry, to do with the case when facts prove that the small producer in agriculture and in industry drives his children to work at an earlier age, works more hours per day, lives "more frugally," and cuts down his requirements to such a level that he stands out in a civilised country as a real "barbarian" (Marx's expression)? Can the economic similarity of such phenomena in agriculture and in industry be denied on the grounds that agriculture has a large number of specific features (which Kautsky does not forget in the least)? "The

* Domestic industry.—*Ed*.

small peasant could not put in more work than his field requires even if he wanted to," says Mr. Bulgakov. But the small peasant can and does work fourteen, and not twelve, hours a day; he can and does work with that super-normal intensity which wears out his nerves and muscles much more quickly than the normal intensity. Moreover, what an incorrect and extreme abstraction it is to reduce all the peasant's work to field work! You will find nothing of the kind in Kautsky's book. Kautsky knows perfectly well that the peasant also works in the household, works on building and repairing his hut, his cowshed, his implements, etc., "*not counting*" all this additional work, for which a wage-worker on a big farm would demand payment at the usual rate. Is it not clear to every unprejudiced person that overwork has *incomparably wider limits* for the peasant—for the small farmer—than for the small industrial producer if he is *only* such? The overwork of the small farmer is strikingly demonstrated as a universal phenomenon by the fact that all bourgeois writers unanimously testify to the "diligence" and "frugality" of the peasant and accuse the workers of "indolence" and "extravagance."

The small peasants, says an investigator of the life of the rural population in Westphalia quoted by Kautsky, overwork their children to such an extent that their physical development is retarded; working for wages has not such bad sides. A small Lincolnshire farmer stated the following to the parliamentary commission which investigated agrarian conditions in England (1897): "I have brought up a family and nearly worked them to death." Another said: "I and my children have been working eighteen hours a day for several days and average ten to twelve during the year." A third: "We work much harder than labourers, in fact, like slaves." Mr. Read described to the same commission the conditions of the small farmer, in the districts where agriculture in the strict sense of the word predominates, in the following manner: "The only way in which he can possibly succeed is this, in doing the work of two agricultural labourers and living at the expense of one ... as regards his family, they are worse educated and harder worked than the children of the agricultural labourers" (Royal Commission on Agriculture, Final Report, pp. 34, 358. Quoted by Kautsky,

S. 109). Will Mr. Bulgakov assert that not less frequently a day labourer does the work of two peasants? Particularly characteristic is the following fact cited by Kautsky showing that "the peasant art of starvation (*Hungerkunst*) may lead to the economic superiority of small production": a comparison of the profitableness of two peasant farms in Baden shows a deficit of 933 marks in one, *the large one*, and a surplus of 191 marks in the other, which was *only half the size* of the first. But the first farm, which was conducted exclusively with the aid of hired labourers, had to feed the latter properly, at a cost of nearly one mark (about 45 kopeks) per person per day; whereas the smaller farm was conducted exclusively with the aid of the members of the family (the wife and six grown-up children), whose maintenance *cost only half the amount* spent on the day labourers: 48 pfennigs per person per day. If the family of the small peasant had been fed as well as the labourers hired by the big farmer, the small farmer would have suffered a deficit of 1,250 marks! "His surplus came, not from his full corn bins, but from his empty stomach." What a huge number of similar examples would be discovered, were the comparison of the "profitableness" of large and small farms accompanied by calculation of the consumption and work of peasants and of wage-workers.* Here is another calculation of the higher profit of a small farm (4.6 hectares) as compared with a big farm (26.5 hectares), a calculation made in one of the special magazines. But how is this higher profit obtained?—asks Kautsky. It turns out that the small farmer is assisted by his children, assisted from the time they begin to walk; whereas the big farmer has to spend money on his children (school, *gymnasium*). In the small farm even the old people, over 70 years of age, "take the place of a full worker." "An ordinary day labourer, particularly on a big farm, goes about his work and thinks to himself: 'I wish it was knocking-off time.' The small peasant, however, at all events in all the busy seasons, thinks to himself: 'Oh, if only the day were an hour or two longer.'" The small producers, the author of this article in the agricultural magazine says didactically, make

* Cf. V. Ilyin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, pp. 112, 175, 201. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 168-70, 244-46, 273-75.—*Ed*.)

better use of their time in the busy seasons: "They rise earlier, retire later and work more quickly, whereas the labourers employed by the big farmer do not want to get up earlier, go to bed later or work harder than at other times." The peasant is able to obtain a net income thanks to the "simple" life he leads: he lives in a mud hut built mainly by the labour of his family; his wife has been married for 17 years and has worn out only one pair of shoes; usually she goes barefoot, or in wooden sabots; and she makes all the clothes for her family. Their food consists of potatoes, milk, and on rare occasions, herring. Only on Sundays does the husband smoke a pipe of tobacco. "These people did not realise that they were leading a particularly simple life and did not express dissatisfaction with their position.... Following this simple way of life, they obtained nearly every year a small surplus from their farm."

IV

After completing his analysis of the interrelations between large- and small-scale production in capitalist agriculture, Kautsky proceeds to make a special investigation of the "limits of capitalist agriculture" (Chapter VII). Kautsky says that objection to the theory that large-scale farming is superior to small-scale is raised mainly by the "friends of humanity" (we almost said, friends of the people...) among the bourgeoisie, the pure Free Traders, and the agrarians. Many economists have recently been advocating small-scale farming. The statistics usually cited are those showing that big farms are not eliminating small farms. And Kautsky quotes these statistics: in Germany, from 1882 to 1895, it was the area of the medium-sized farms that increased most; in France, from 1882 to 1892, it was the area of the smallest and biggest farms that increased most; the area of the medium-sized farms diminished. In England, from 1885 to 1895, the area of the smallest and the biggest farms diminished; it was the area of the farms ranging from 40 to 120 hectares (100 to 300 acres), i.e., farms that cannot be put in the category of small farms, which increased most. In America, the average area of farms is diminishing: in 1850 it was 203 acres; in 1860—199 acres; in 1870—153 acres; in 1880—134

acres; and in 1890—137 acres. Kautsky makes a closer examination of the American statistics and, Mr. Bulgakov's opinion notwithstanding, his analysis is extremely important from the standpoint of *principle*. The main reason for the diminution in the average farm area is the break-up of the large plantations in the South after the emancipation of the Negroes; in the Southern States the average farm area diminished by more than one-half. "Not a single person who understands the subject will regard these figures as evidence of the victory of small-scale over *modern* [=capitalist] large-scale production." In general, an analysis of American statistics *by regions* shows a large variety of relations. In the principal "wheat states," in the northern part of the Middle West, the average farm area *increased* from 122 to 133 acres. "Small-scale production becomes predominant only in those places where agriculture is in a state of decline, or where pre-capitalist, large-scale production enters into competition with peasant production" (135). This conclusion of Kautsky is very important, for it shows that if certain conditions are not adhered to, the handling of statistics may become merely *mishandling*: a distinction must be drawn between capitalist and pre-capitalist large-scale production. A *detailed* analysis must be made for separate districts that differ materially from one another in the forms of farming and in the historical conditions of its development. It is said, "Figures prove!" But one must analyse the figures to see what they prove. They only prove *what they directly say*. The figures do not speak directly of the scale on which production is carried on, but of the *area* of the farms. It is possible, and in fact it so happens, that "with intensive farming, production can be carried on upon a larger scale on a small estate than on a large estate extensively farmed." "Statistics that tell us only about the area of farms tell us nothing as to whether the diminution of their area is due to the actual diminution of the scale of farming, or to its intensification" (146). Forestry and pastoral farming, these first forms of capitalist large-scale farming, permit of the largest area of estates. Field cultivation requires a smaller area. But the various systems of field cultivation differ from one another in this respect: the exhaustive, extensive system of farming (which has prevailed in America up to

now) permits of huge farms (up to 10,000 hectares, such as the *bonanza farms** of Dalrymple, Glenn, and others. In our steppes, too, peasant farms, and particularly merchants' farms, attain such dimensions). The introduction of fertilisers, etc., necessarily leads to a diminution in the area of farms, which in Europe, for instance, are smaller than in America. The transition from field farming to animal husbandry again causes a diminution in the area of farms: in England, in 1880, the average size of livestock farms was 52.3 acres, whereas that of field farms was 74.2 acres. That is why the transition from field farming to animal husbandry which is taking place in England *must* give rise to a tendency for the area of farms to diminish. "But it would be judging very superficially if the conclusion were drawn from this that there has been a decline in production" (149). In East Elbe (by the investigation of which Mr. Bulgakov hopes some time to refute Kautsky), it is precisely the introduction of intensive farming that is taking place: the big farmers, says Sering, whom Kautsky quotes, are increasing the productivity of their soil and are selling or leasing to peasants the remote parts of their estates, since with intensive farming it is difficult to utilise these remote parts. "Thus, large estates in East Elbe are being reduced in size and in their vicinity small peasant farms are being established; this, however, is not because small-scale production is superior to large-scale, but because the former dimensions of the estates were adapted to the needs of extensive farming" (150). The diminution in farm area in all these cases usually leads to an increase in the quantity of products (per unit of land) and frequently to an increase in the number of workers employed, i.e., to an actual *increase* in the scale of production.

From this it is clear how little is proved by general agricultural statistics on the *area* of farms, and how cautiously one must handle them. In industrial statistics we have *direct* indices of the scale of production (quantity of goods, total value of the output, and the number of workers employed), and, besides, it is easy to distinguish the different branches. Agricultural statistics hardly ever satisfy these necessary conditions of evidence.

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* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

Furthermore, the monopoly in landed property limits agricultural capitalism: in industry, capital grows as a result of *accumulation*, as a result of the conversion of surplus-value into capital; *centralisation*, i.e., the amalgamation of several small units of capital into a large unit, plays a lesser role. In agriculture, the situation is different. The whole of the land is occupied (in civilised countries), and it is possible to enlarge the area of a farm only by *centralising* several lots; this must be done in such a way as to form *one continuous area*. Clearly, enlarging an estate by purchasing the surrounding lots is a very difficult matter, particularly in view of the fact that the small lots are partly occupied by agricultural labourers (whom the big farmer needs), and partly by small peasants who are masters of the art of maintaining their hold by reducing consumption to an unbelievable minimum. For some reason or other the statement of this simple and very clear fact, which indicates the limits of agricultural capitalism, seemed to Mr. Bulgakov to be a mere "phrase" (??!!) and provided a pretext for the most groundless rejoicing: "And so [!], the superiority of large-scale production comes to grief [!] at the very first obstacle." First, Mr. Bulgakov misunderstands the law of the superiority of large-scale production, ascribing to it excessive abstractness, from which Kautsky is very remote, and then turns his misunderstanding into an argument against Kautsky! Truly strange is Mr. Bulgakov's belief that he can refute Kautsky by referring to Ireland (large landed property, but without large-scale production). The fact that large landed property is one of the conditions of large-scale production does not in the least signify that it is a sufficient condition. Of course, Kautsky could not examine the historical and other causes of the specific features of Ireland, or of any other country, in a general work on capitalism in agriculture. It would not occur to anyone to demand that Marx, in analysing the general laws of capitalism in industry, should have explained why small industry continued longer in France, why industry was developing slowly in Italy, etc. Equally groundless is Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that concentration "could" proceed gradually: it is not as easy to enlarge estates by purchasing neighbouring lots as it is to add new premises to a factory for an additional number of machines, etc.

In referring to this purely fictitious possibility of the gradual concentration, or renting, of land for the purpose of forming large farms, Mr. Bulgakov paid little attention to the really specific feature of agriculture in the process of concentration—a feature which Kautsky indicated. This is the latifundia, the concentration of several estates in the hands of a single owner. Statistics usually register the number of individual estates and tell us nothing about the process of concentration of various estates in the hands of big landowners. Kautsky cites very striking instances, in Germany and Austria, of such concentration which leads to a special and higher form of large-scale capitalist farming in which several large estates are combined to form a single economic unit managed by a single central body. Such gigantic agricultural enterprises make possible the combination of the most varied branches of agriculture and the most extensive use of the advantages of large-scale production.

The reader will see how remote Kautsky is from abstractness and from a stereotyped understanding of "Marx's theory," to which he remains true. Kautsky warned against this stereotyped understanding, even inserting a special section on the doom of small-scale production in industry in the chapter under discussion. He rightly points out that even in industry the victory of large-scale production is not so easy of achievement, and is not so uniform, as those who talk about Marx's theory being inapplicable to agriculture are in the habit of thinking. It is sufficient to point to capitalist domestic industry; it is sufficient to recall the remark Marx made about the extreme variety of transitional and mixed forms which obscure the victory of the factory system. How much more complicated this is in agriculture! The increase in wealth and luxury leads, for example, to millionaires purchasing huge estates which they turn into forests for their pleasures. In Salzburg, in Austria, the number of cattle has been declining since 1869. The reason is the sale of the Alps to rich lovers of the hunt. Kautsky says very aptly that if agricultural statistics are taken in general, and uncritically, it is quite easy to discover in the capitalist mode of production a tendency to transform modern nations into hunting tribes!

Finally, among the conditions setting the limits to capitalist agriculture, Kautsky also points to the fact that the shortage of workers—due to the migration of the rural population—compels the big landowners to allot land to labourers, to create a small peasantry to provide labour-power for the landlord. An absolutely propertyless agricultural labourer is a rarity, because in agriculture rural economy, in the strict sense, is connected with household economy. Whole categories of agricultural wage-workers own or have the use of land. When small production is eliminated too greatly, *the big landowners try to strengthen or revive it* by the sale or lease of land. Sering, whom Kautsky quotes, says: "In all European countries, a movement has recently been observed towards ... settling rural labourers by allotting plots of land to them." Thus, within the limits of the capitalist mode of production it is impossible to count on small-scale production being entirely eliminated from agriculture, for the capitalists and agrarians themselves strive to revive it when the ruination of the peasantry has gone too far. Marx pointed to this rotation of concentration and parcellisation of the land in capitalist society as far back as 1850, in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.[52]

Mr. Bulgakov is of the opinion that these arguments of Kautsky contain "an element of truth, but still more of error." Like all Mr. Bulgakov's other verdicts, this one has also extremely weak and nebulous grounds. Mr. Bulgakov thinks that Kautsky has "constructed a theory of proletarian small-scale production," and that this theory is true for a very limited region. We hold a different opinion. The agricultural wage-labour of small cultivators (or what is the same thing, the agricultural labourer and day labourer with an allotment) is *a phenomenon characteristic, more or less, of all capitalist countries*. No writer who desires to describe capitalism in agriculture can, without violating the truth, leave this phenomenon in the background.* Kautsky, in Chapter VIII of his book, viz., "The Proletarisation of the Peasant," adduces extensive evidence to prove that in Germany, in

* Cf. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Chapter II, Section XII, p. 120. (See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 178.—*Ed.*) It is estimated that in France about 75 per cent of the rural labourers own land. Other examples are also given.

particular, proletarian small-scale production is general. Mr. Bulgakov's statement that other writers, including Mr. Kablukov, have pointed to the "shortage of workers" *leaves the most important thing in the background*—the enormous difference in principle between Mr. Kablukov's theory and Kautsky's theory. Because of his characteristically *Kleinbürger** point of view, Mr. Kablukov "constructs" out of the shortage of workers the theory that large-scale production is unsound and that small-scale production is sound. Kautsky gives an accurate description of the facts and indicates their true significance in modern class society: the class interests of the landowners compel them to strive to allot land to the workers. As far as class position is concerned, the agricultural wage-workers with allotments are situated between the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but closer to the latter. In other words, Mr. Kablukov develops one side of a complicated process into a theory of the unsoundness of large-scale production, whereas Kautsky analyses the special forms of social-economic relations created by the interests of large-scale production at a certain stage of its development and under certain historical conditions.

V

We shall now pass to the next chapter of Kautsky's book, the title of which we have just quoted. In this chapter Kautsky investigates, firstly, the "tendency toward the parcellisation of landholdings," and, secondly, the "forms of peasant auxiliary employments." Thus, here are depicted those extremely important trends of capitalism in agriculture that are typical of the overwhelming majority of capitalist countries. Kautsky says that the break-up of landholdings leads to an increased demand for small plots on the part of small peasants, who pay a higher price for the land than the big farmers. Several writers have adduced this fact to prove that small-scale farming is superior to large-scale farming. Kautsky very appropriately replies to this by comparing the price of land with the price of houses: it is well known that small and cheap houses are *dearer* per unit of

* Petty-bourgeois.—*Ed.*

capacity (per cubic foot, etc.) than large and costly houses. The higher price of small plots of land is not due to the superiority of small-scale farming, but to the particularly oppressed condition of the peasant. The enormous number of dwarf farms that capitalism has called into being is seen from the following figures: in Germany (1895), out of 5,500,000 farms, 4,250,000, i.e., more than three-fourths, are of an area of less than five hectares (58 per cent are less than two hectares). In Belgium, 78 per cent (709,500 out of 909,000) are less than two hectares. In England (1895), 118,000 out of 520,000 are less than two hectares. In France (1892), 2,200,000 (out of 5,700,000) are less than one hectare; 4,000,000 are less than five hectares. Mr. Bulgakov thinks that he can refute Kautsky's argument that these dwarf farms are very irrational (insufficient cattle, implements, money, and labour-power which is diverted to auxiliary occupations) by arguing that "very often" (??) the land is spade-tilled "with an incredible degree of intensity," although ... with "an extremely irrational expenditure of labour-power." It goes without saying that this objection is totally groundless, that individual examples of excellent cultivation of the soil by small peasants are as little able to refute Kautsky's general characterisation of this type of farming as the above-quoted example of the greater profitableness of a small farm is able to refute the thesis of the superiority of large-scale production. That Kautsky is quite right in placing these farms, *taken as a whole*,* in the proletarian category is seen from the fact, revealed by the German census of 1895, that very many of the small farmers cannot dispense with subsidiary earnings. Of a total of 4,700,000 persons obtaining an independent livelihood in agriculture, 2,700,000, or *57 per cent*, have subsidiary earnings. Of 3,200,000 farms of less than two hectares each, only 400,000, or *13 per cent*, have no subsidiary incomes! In the whole of Germany, out of

* We emphasise "taken as a whole," because it cannot, of course, be denied that in certain cases even these farms having an insignificant area of land can provide a large quantity of products and a large income (vineyards, vegetable gardens, etc.). But what would we say of an economist who tried to refute the reference to the lack of horses among Russian peasants by pointing, for instance, to the vegetable growers in the suburbs of Moscow who may sometimes carry on rational and profitable farming without horses?

5,500,000 farms, *1,500,000* belong to agricultural and industrial wage-workers (+704,000 to artisans). And after this Mr. Bulgakov presumes to assert that the theory of proletarian small landholdings was "constructed" by Kautsky!* Kautsky thoroughly investigated the forms assumed by the proletarisation of the peasantry (the forms of peasant auxiliary employment) (*S*. 174-93). Unfortunately, space does not permit us to deal in detail with his description of these forms (agricultural work for wages, domestic industry—*Hausindustrie*, "the vilest system of capitalist exploitation"—work in factories and mines, etc.). Our only observation is that Kautsky makes the same appraisal of *auxiliary employment* as that made by Russian economists. Migratory workers

* In a footnote to page 15, Mr. Bulgakov says that Kautsky, believing that grain duties were not in the interest of the overwhelming majority of the rural population, repeats the mistake committed by authors of the book on grain prices.[53] We cannot agree with this opinion either. The authors of the book on grain prices made a large number of mistakes (which I indicated repeatedly in the above-mentioned book), but there is no mistake whatever in admitting that high grain prices are not in the interests of the mass of the population. What is a mistake is the *direct* deduction that the interests of the masses coincide with the interests of the whole social development. Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Struve have rightly pointed out that the *criterion* in appraising grain prices must be whether, more or less rapidly, through capitalism, they eliminate labour-service, whether they stimulate social development. This is a question of fact which I answer differently from the way Struve does. I do not at all regard it as proved that the development of capitalism in agriculture is retarded by low prices. On the contrary, the particularly rapid growth of the agricultural machinery industry and the stimulus to specialisation in agriculture which was given by the reduction of grain prices show that low prices *stimulate* the development of capitalism in Russian agriculture (cf. *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Chapter III, Section V, p. 147, footnote 2). (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 212-13.—*Ed*.) The reduction of grain prices has a profound transforming effect upon all other relations in agriculture.

Mr. Bulgakov says: "One of the important conditions for the intensification of farming is the raising of grain prices." (The same opinion is expressed by Mr. P. S. in the "Review of Home Affairs" column, p. 299 in the same issue of *Nachalo*.) This is inexact. Marx showed in Part VI of Volume III of *Capital*[54] that the productivity of additional capital invested in land may diminish, *but may also increase*; with a reduction in the price of grain, rent may fall, *but it may also rise*. Consequently, intensification may be due—in different historical periods and in different countries—to altogether different conditions, irrespective of the level of grain prices.

are less developed and have a lower level of requirements than urban workers; not infrequently, they have a harmful effect on the living conditions of the urban workers. "But for those places from which they come and to which they return they are pioneers of progress.... They acquire new wants and new ideas" (*S*. 192), they awaken among the backwoods peasants consciousness, a sense of human dignity, and confidence in their own strength.

In conclusion we shall deal with the last and particularly sharp attack Mr. Bulgakov makes upon Kautsky. Kautsky says that in Germany, from 1882 to 1895 it was the smallest (in area) and the largest farms that grew most in number (so that the parcellisation of the land proceeded at the expense of the medium farms). Indeed, the number of farms under one hectare increased by 8.8 per cent; those of 5 to 20 hectares increased by 7.8 per cent; while those of over 1,000 hectares increased by 11 per cent (the number of those in the intervening categories hardly increased at all, while the total number of farms increased by 5.3 per cent). Mr. Bulgakov is extremely indignant because the percentage is taken of the biggest farms, the number of which is insignificant (515 and 572 for the respective years). Mr. Bulgakov's indignation is quite groundless. He forgets that these farms insignificant in number, are the largest in size and that they *occupy nearly as much land as* 2,300,000 to 2,500,000 dwarf farms (up to one hectare). If I were to say that the number of very big factories in a country, those employing 1,000 and more workers, increased, say, from 51 to 57, by 11 per cent, while the total number of factories increased 5.3 per cent, would not that show an increase in large-scale production, notwithstanding the fact that the *number* of very large factories may be insignificant as compared with the total number of factories? Kautsky is fully aware of the fact that it was the peasant farms of from 5 to 20 hectares which grew most in total area (Mr. Bulgakov, p. 18), and he deals with it in the ensuing chapter.

Kautsky then takes the changes in area in the various categories in 1882 and 1895. It appears that the largest increase (+563,477 hectares) occurred among the peasant farms of from 5 to 20 hectares, and the next largest among the biggest farms, those of more than 1,000 hectares (+94,014), where

as the area of farms of from 20 to 1,000 hectares *diminished* by 86,809 hectares. Farms up to one hectare increased their area by 32,683 hectares, and those from 1 to 5 hectares, by 45,604 hectares.

And Kautsky draws the following conclusion: the diminution in the area of farms of from 20 to 1,000 hectares (more than balanced by an increase in the area of farms of 1,000 hectares and over) is due, not to the decline of large-scale production, but to its intensification. We have already seen that intensive farming is making progress in Germany and that it frequently requires a diminution in the area of farms. That there is intensification of large-scale production can be seen from the growing utilisation of steam-driven machinery, as well as from the enormous increase in the number of agricultural non-manual employees, who in Germany are employed only on large farms. The number of estate managers (inspectors), overseers, bookkeepers, etc., increased from 47,465 in 1882 to 76,978 in 1895, i.e., by 62 per cent; the percentage of women among these employees increased from 12 to 23.4.

"All this shows clearly how much more intensive and more capitalist large-scale farming has become since the beginning of the eighties. The next chapter will explain why simultaneously there has been such a big increase in the area of middle-peasant farms" (*S.* 174).

Mr. Bulgakov regards this description as being "in crying contradiction to reality," but the arguments he falls back on again fail to justify such an emphatic and bold verdict, and not by one iota do they shake Kautsky's conclusion. "In the first place, the intensification of farming, if it took place, would not in itself explain the relative and absolute diminution of the cultivated area, the diminution of the total proportion of farms in the 20- to 1,000-hectare group. The cultivated area could have increased simultaneously with the increase in the number of farms. The latter need merely (*sic*!) have increased somewhat faster, so that the area of each farm would have diminished."*

* Mr. Bulgakov adduces data, in still greater detail, but they add nothing whatever to Kautsky's data, since they show the same increase in the number of farms in one group of big proprietors and a reduction in the land area.

We have deliberately quoted in full this argument, from which Mr. Bulgakov draws the conclusion that "the diminution in the size of farms owing to the growth of intensive farming is pure fantasy" (*sic*!), because it strikingly reveals the very mistake of mishandling "statistics" against which Kautsky seriously warned. Mr. Bulgakov puts ridiculously strict demands upon the statistics of the *area* of farms and ascribes to these statistics a significance which they never can have. Why, indeed, should the cultivated area have increased "somewhat"? Why "should not" the intensification of farming (which, as we have seen, sometimes leads to the sale and renting to peasants of parts of estates remote from the centre) have shifted a certain number of farms from a higher category to a lower? Why "should it not" have diminished the cultivated area of farms of from 20 to 1,000 hectares?* In industrial statistics a reduction in the *output* of the very big factories would have indicated a decline in large-scale production. But the diminution in *area* of large estates by 1.2 per cent does not and *cannot indicate* the volume of production, which very often increases with a decrease in the area of the farm. We know that the process of livestock breeding replacing grain farming, particularly marked in England, is going on in Europe as a whole. We know that sometimes this change causes a decrease in the farm area; but would it not be strange to draw from this the conclusion that the smaller farm area implied a decline in large-scale production? That is why, incidentally, the "eloquent table" given by Mr. Bulgakov on page 20, showing the reduction in the number of large and small farms and the increase in the number of medium farms (5 to 20 hectares) possessing animals for field work, proves nothing at all. This may have been due to a change in the system of farming.

That large-scale agricultural production in Germany has become more intensive and more capitalist is evident, firstly, from the increase in the number of *steam-driven* machines employed: from 1879 to 1897 their number increased

* There was a reduction in this category from 16,986,101 hectares to 16,802,115 hectares, i.e., by a whole ... 1.2 per cent! Does not this speak in favour of the "death agony" of large-scale production seen by Mr. Bulgakov?

fivefold. It is quite useless for Mr. Bulgakov to argue in his objection that the number of *all* machines *in general* (and not steam-driven machines only) owned by small farms (up to 20 hectares) is much larger than that owned by the large farms; and also that in America machines are employed in extensive farming. We are not discussing America now, but Germany, where there are no *bonanza farms*.* The following table gives the percentage of farms in Germany (1895) employing steam ploughs and steam threshing machines:

Farms	Per cent of farms employing	
	steam ploughs	steam threshing machines
Under 2 hectares	0.00	1.08
2 to 5 "	0.00	5.20
5 to 20 "	0.01	10.95
20 to 100 "	0.10	16.60
100 hectares and over	5.29	61.22

And now, if the total number of steam-driven machines employed in agriculture in Germany has increased fivefold, does it not prove that large-scale farming has become more intensive? Only it must not be forgotten, as Mr. Bulgakov forgets on page 21, that an increase in the size of enterprises in agriculture is not always identical with an increase in the area of farms.

Secondly, the fact that large-scale production has become more capitalist is evident from the increase in the number of agricultural non-manual employees. It is useless for Bulgakov to call this argument of Kautsky a "curiosity": "an increase in the number of officers, side by side with a reduction of the army"—with a reduction in the number of agricultural wage-workers. Again we say: *Rira bien qui rira le dernier*!** Kautsky not only does not forget the reduction in the number of agricultural labourers, but shows it

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** What is indeed a curiosity is Mr. Bulgakov's remark that the increase in the number of non-manual employees testifies, perhaps, to the growth of agricultural industry, *but not*(!) to the growth of intensive large-scale farming. Until now we have thought one of the most important forms of increased intensification to be the growth of industry in agriculture (*described in detail and appraised by Kautsky in Chapter X*).

in detail in regard to a number of countries; only this fact has absolutely nothing to do with the matter in hand, because the rural population as a whole is diminishing, while the number of proletarian small farmers is increasing. Let us assume that the big farmer abandons the production of grain and takes up the production of sugar-beet and the manufacture of sugar (in Germany in 1871-72, 2,200,000 tons of beets were converted into sugar; in 1881-82, 6,300,000 tons; in 1891-92, 9,500,000 tons, and in 1896-97, 13,700,000 tons). He might even sell, or rent, the remote parts of his estate to small peasants, particularly if he needs the wives and children of the peasants as day labourers on the beet plantations. Let us assume that he introduces a steam plough which eliminates the former ploughmen (on the beet plantations in Saxony—"models of intensive farming"*—steam ploughs have now come into common use). The number of wage-workers diminishes. The number of higher grade employees (bookkeepers, managers, technicians, etc.) necessarily increases. Will Mr. Bulgakov deny that we see here an increase in intensive farming and capitalism in large-scale production? Will he assert that nothing of the kind is taking place in Germany?

To conclude the exposition of Chapter VIII of Kautsky's book, viz., on the proletarisation of the peasants, we need to quote the following passage. "What interests us here," says Kautsky, after the passage we have cited above, quoted also by Mr. Bulgakov, "is the fact that the proletarisation of the rural population is proceeding in Germany, as in other places, notwithstanding the fact that the tendency to parcellise medium estates has ceased to operate there. From 1882 to 1895 the total number of farms increased by 281,000. By far the greater part of this increase was due to the greater number of proletarian farms up to one hectare in area. The number of these farms increased by 206,000.

"As we see, the development of agriculture is quite a special one, quite different from the development of industrial and trading capital. In the preceding chapter we pointed out that in agriculture the tendency to centralise farms does not lead to the complete elimination of small-scale pro-

* Kärger, quoted by Kautsky, *S.* 45.

duction. When this tendency goes too far it gives rise to an opposite tendency, so that the tendency to centralise and the tendency to parcellise alternate with each other. Now we see that both tendencies can operate side by side. There is an increase in the number, of farms whose owners come into the commodity market as proletarians, as sellers of labour-power.... All the material interests of these small farmers as sellers of the commodity labour-power are identical with the interests of the industrial proletariat, and their land ownership does not give rise to antagonism between them and the proletariat. His land more or less emancipates the peasant small holder from the dealer in food products; but it does not emancipate him from the exploitation of the capitalist entrepreneur, whether industrial or agricultural" (*S*. 174).

In the following article we shall deal with the remaining part of Kautsky's book and give the work a general appraisal; in passing, we shall examine the objections Mr. Bulgakov raises in a later article.

SECOND ARTICLE

I

In Chapter IX of his book ("The Growing Difficulties of Commercial Agriculture") Kautsky proceeds to analyse the *contradictions* inherent in capitalist agriculture. From the objections which Mr. Bulgakov raises against this chapter, which we shall examine later, it is evident that the critic has not quite properly understood the general significance of these "difficulties." There are "difficulties" which, while being an "obstacle" to the full development of rational agriculture, at the same time *stimulate the development* of capitalist agriculture. Among the "difficulties" Kautsky points, for example, to the depopulation of the countryside. Undoubtedly, the migration from the countryside of the best and most intelligent workers is an "obstacle" to the full development of rational agriculture; but it is equally indubitable that the farmers combat this obstacle by *developing technique*, e.g., by introducing machinery.

Kautsky investigates the following "difficulties": a) ground rent; b) right of inheritance; c) limitation of right of inheritance; entailment (*fideicommissum*, *Anerbenrecht*)[55]; d) the exploitation of the countryside by the town; e) depopulation of the countryside.

Ground rent is that part of surplus-value which remains after the average profit on invested capital is deducted. The monopoly of landed property enables the landowner to appropriate this surplus, and the price of land (= capitalised rent) *keeps* rent at the level it has once reached. Clearly, rent "hinders" the complete rationalisation of agriculture: under the tenant farmer system the incentive to improve-

ments, etc., becomes weaker, and under the mortgage system the major part of the capital has to be invested, not in production, but in the purchase of land. In his objection Mr. Bulgakov points out, first, that there is "nothing terrible" in the growth of mortgage debts. He forgets, however, that Kautsky, not "in another sense," but precisely in this sense, has pointed to the necessary increase in mortgages even when agriculture is prospering (see above, First Article, II). Here, Kautsky does not raise the question as to whether an increase in mortgages is "terrible" or not, but asks what difficulties prevent capitalism from accomplishing its mission. Secondly, in Mr. Bulgakov's opinion, "it is hardly correct to regard increased rent only as an obstacle.... The rise in rent, the possibility of raising it, serves as an independent incentive to agriculture, stimulating progress of technique and every other form" of progress ("process" is obviously a misprint). Stimuli to progress in capitalist agriculture are: population growth, growth of competition, and growth of industry; rent, however, is a tribute exacted by the landowner from social development, from the growth of technique. It is, therefore, incorrect to state, that the rise in rent is an "*independent* incentive" to progress. Theoretically, it is possible for capitalist production to exist in the absence of private property in land, i.e., with the land nationalised (Kautsky, *S*. 207), when absolute rent would not exist at all, and differential rent would be appropriated by the state. This would not weaken the incentive to agronomic progress; on the contrary, it would greatly increase it.

"There can be nothing more erroneous than to think that it is in the interest of agriculture to force up (*in die Höhe treiben*) the prices of estates or artificially to keep them at a high level," says Kautsky. "This is in the interest of the present (*augenblicklichen*) landowners, of the mortgage banks and the real estate speculators, but not in the interest of agriculture, and least of all in the interest of its future, of the future generation of farmers" (*S*. 199). As to the price of land, it is capitalised rent.

The second difficulty confronting commercial agriculture is that it necessarily requires private property in land. This leads to the situation in which the land is either split up on passing to heirs (such parcellisation even

leading in *some places* to technical retrogression) or is burdened by mortgages (when the heir who receives the land pays the co-heirs money capital which he obtains by a mortgage on the land). Mr. Bulgakov reproaches Kautsky for "overlooking, in his exposition, the positive side" of the mobilisation of the land. This reproach is absolutely groundless; for in the historical part of his book (in particular Chapter III of Part I, which deals with feudal agriculture and the reasons for its supersession by capitalist agriculture), as well as in the practical part,* Kautsky clearly pointed out to his readers the positive side and the historical necessity of private property in land, of the subjection of agriculture to competition, and, consequently, of the mobilisation of the land. The other reproach that Mr. Bulgakov directs at Kautsky, namely, that he does not investigate the problem of "the different degrees of growth of the population in different places," is one that we simply cannot understand. Did Mr. Bulgakov really expect to find studies in demography in Kautsky's book?

Without dwelling on the question of entailment, which, after what has been said above, represents nothing new, we shall proceed to examine the question of the exploitation of the countryside by the town. Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that Kautsky "does not contrapose the positive to the negative sides and, primarily, the importance of the town as a market for agricultural produce," is in direct contradiction to the facts. Kautsky deals very definitely with the importance of the town as a market for agriculture *on the very first page* of the chapter which investigates "modern agriculture" (*S*. 30, et seq.). It is precisely to "urban industry" (*S*. 292) that Kautsky ascribes the principal role in the transformation of agriculture, in its rationalisation, etc.**

That is why we cannot possibly understand how Mr. Bulgakov could repeat in his article (page 32, *Nachalo*, No. 3) these very ideas *as if in opposition to Kautsky*! This is a

* Kautsky emphatically expressed his opposition to every medieval restriction upon the mobilisation of the land, to entailment (*fideicommissum*, *Anerbenrecht*), and to the preservation of the medieval peasant commune (*S*. 332), etc.

** Cf. also *S*. 214, where Kautsky discusses the role urban capital plays in the rationalisation of agriculture.

particularly striking example of this stern critic's false exposition of the book he is subjecting to criticism. "It must not be forgotten," Mr. Bulgakov says to Kautsky admonishingly, that "part of the values [which flow to the towns] returns to the countryside." Anyone would think that Kautsky forgets this elementary truth. As a matter of fact Kautsky distinguishes between the flow of values (from the countryside to the town) with or without an equivalent return much more clearly than Mr. Bulgakov attempts to do. In the first place, Kautsky examines the "flow of commodity values from the country to the town without equivalent return (*Gegenleistung*)" (*S.* 210) (rent which is spent in the towns, taxes, interest on loans obtained in city banks) and justly regards this as the economic exploitation of the countryside by the town. Kautsky further discusses the question of the efflux of values with an equivalent return, i.e., the exchange of agricultural produce for manufactured goods. He says: "From the point of view of the law of value, this efflux does not signify the exploitation of agriculture*; actually, however, in the same way as the above-mentioned factors, it leads to its agronomic (*stofflichen*) exploitation, to the impoverishment of the land in nutritive substances" (*S.* 211).

As for the agronomic exploitation of the countryside by the town, here too Kautsky adheres to one of the fundamental propositions of the theory of Marx and Engels, i.e., that the antithesis between town and country destroys the necessary correspondence and interdependence between agriculture and industry, and that with the transition of capitalism to a higher form this antithesis must disappear.**

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* Let the reader compare Kautsky's clear statement as quoted above with the following "critical" remark by Mr. Bulgakov: "If Kautsky regards the giving of grain to the non-agricultural population by direct grain producers as exploitation," etc. One cannot believe that a critic who has read Kautsky's book at all attentively could have written that "if"!

** It goes without saying that the opinion that it is necessary to abolish the antithesis between town and country in a society of associated producers does not in the least contradict the admission that the attraction of the population to industry from agriculture plays a historically progressive role. I had occasion to discuss this elsewhere (*Studies*, p. 81, footnote 69). (See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 229.—*Ed.*)

Mr. Bulgakov thinks that Kautsky's opinion on the agronomic exploitation of the country by the town is a "strange" one; that, "at all events, Kautsky has here stepped on the soil of absolute fantasy" (*sic*!!!). What surprises us is that Mr. Bulgakov ignores the fact that Kautsky's opinion, which he criticises, is identical with one of the fundamental ideas of Marx and Engels. The reader would be right in concluding that Mr. Bulgakov considers the idea of the abolition of the antithesis between town and country to be "absolute fantasy." If such indeed is the critic's opinion, then we emphatically disagree with him and go over to the side of "fantasy" (actually, not to the side of fantasy, of course, but to that of a more profound criticism of capitalism). The view that the idea of abolishing the antithesis between town and country is a fantasy is not new by any means. It is the ordinary view of the bourgeois economists. It has even been borrowed by several writers with a more profound outlook. For example, Dühring was of the opinion that antagonism between town and country "is inevitable by the very nature of things."

Further, Mr. Bulgakov is "astonished" (!) at the fact that Kautsky refers to the growing incidence of epidemics among plants and animals as one of the difficulties confronting commercial agriculture and capitalism. "What has this to do with capitalism...?" asks Mr. Bulgakov. "Could any higher social organisation abolish the necessity of improving the breeds of cattle?" We in our turn are astonished at Mr. Bulgakov's failure to understand Kautsky's perfectly clear idea. The old breeds of plants and animals created by natural selection are being superseded by "improved" breeds created by artificial selection. Plants and animals are becoming more susceptible and more demanding; with the present means of communication epidemics spread with astonishing rapidity. Meanwhile, farming remains individual, scattered, frequently small (peasant) farming, lacking knowledge and resources. Urban capitalism strives to provide all the resources of modern science for the development of the technique of agriculture, but it leaves the social position of the producers at the old miserable level; it does not systematically and methodically transplant urban culture to the rural districts. No higher social organisation will

abolish the necessity of improving the breeds of cattle (and Kautsky, of course, did not think of saying anything so absurd); but the more technique develops, the more susceptible the breeds of cattle and plants* become, the more the present capitalist social organisation suffers from lack of social control and from the degraded state of the peasants and workers.

The last "difficulty" confronting commercial agriculture that Kautsky mentions is the "depopulation of the countryside," the absorption by the towns of the best, the most energetic and most intelligent labour forces. Mr. Bulgakov is of the opinion that in its general form this proposition "is at all events incorrect," that "the present development of the urban at the expense of the rural population in no sense expresses a law of development of capitalist agriculture," but the migration of the agricultural population of industrial, exporting countries overseas, to the colonies. I think that Mr. Bulgakov is mistaken. The growth of the urban (more generally: industrial) population *at the expense of* the rural population is not only a present-day phenomenon but a general phenomenon which expresses *precisely the law* of capitalism. The theoretical grounds of this law are, as I have pointed out elsewhere,** first, that the growth of social division of labour wrests from primitive agriculture an increasing number of branches of industry,*** and,

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* That is why in the practical part of his book Kautsky recommends the sanitary inspection of cattle and of the conditions of their maintenance (*S.* 397).

** *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Chapter I, Section II, and Chapter VIII, Section II. (See present edition, Vol. 3.—*Ed.*)

*** Pointing to this circumstance, Mr. Bulgakov says that "the agricultural population may diminish *relatively* [his italics] even when agriculture is flourishing." Not only "may," but *necessarily must* in capitalist society.... "The relative diminution [of the agricultural population] merely (*sic*!) indicates here a growth of new branches of people's labour," concludes Mr. Bulgakov. That "merely" is very strange. New branches of industry do actually withdraw "the most energetic and most intelligent labour forces" from agriculture. Thus, this simple reason is sufficient to enable one to accept Kautsky's general thesis as being *fully correct*: the *relative* diminution of the rural population sufficiently confirms the correctness of the general thesis (that capitalism withdraws the most energetic and most intelligent labour forces from agriculture).

secondly, that the variable capital required to work a given plot of land, on the whole, diminishes (cf. *Das Kapital*, III, 2, *S*. 177; Russian translation, p. 526,[56] which I quote in my book, *The Development of Capitalism*, pp. 4 and 444*). We have indicated above that in certain cases and certain periods we observed an increase in the variable capital required for the cultivation of a given plot of land; hut this does not affect the correctness of the general law. Kautsky of course, would not think of denying that not in every case does the relative diminution of the agricultural population become absolute diminution; that the degree of this absolute diminution is also determined by the growth of capitalist colonies. In relevant places in his book Kautsky very clearly points to this growth of capitalist colonies which flood Europe with cheap grain. ("The flight from the land of the rural population (*Landflucht*) which leads to the depopulation of the European countryside, constantly brings, not only to the towns, but also to the colonies, fresh crowds of robust country dwellers..." *S*. 242.) The phenomenon of industry depriving agriculture of its strongest, most energetic, and most intelligent workers is general, not only in industrial, but also in agricultural, countries; not only in Western Europe, but also in America and in Russia. The contradiction between the culture of the towns and the barbarism of the countryside which capitalism creates inevitably leads to this. The "argument" that "a decrease in the agricultural population side by side with a general increase in the population is inconceivable without the importation of large quantities of grain" is, in Mr. Bulgakov's opinion, "obvious." But in my opinion this argument is not only not obvious, but wrong. A decrease in the agricultural population side by side with a general increase in the population (growth of the towns) is quite conceivable without grain imports (the productivity of agricultural labour increases and this enables a smaller number of workers to produce as much as and even more than was formerly produced). A general increase in the population parallel with a

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 40, 561.—Ed.

decrease in the agricultural population and a decrease (or a disproportionate increase) in the quantity of agricultural products is also conceivable—"conceivable" because the nourishment of the people has deteriorated under capitalism.

Mr. Bulgakov asserts that the increase of the medium-sized peasant farms in Germany in the period 1882-95, a fact established by Kautsky, which he connected with the other fact that these farms suffer least from a shortage of labour, "is capable of shaking the whole structure" of Kautsky's argument. Let us examine Kautsky's statements more closely.

According to agricultural statistics, the largest increase in area in the period 1882-95 occurred in the farms of from 5 to 20 hectares. In 1882 these farms occupied 28.8 per cent of the total area of all farms and in 1895, 29.9 per cent. This increase in the total area of medium-sized peasant farms was accompanied by a decrease in the area of big peasant farms (20 to 100 hectares; 1882—31.1 per cent, 1895—30.3 per cent). "These figures," says Kautsky, "gladden the hearts of all good citizens who regard the peasantry as the strongest bulwark of the present system. 'And so, it does not move, this agriculture,' they exclaim in triumph; 'Marx's dogma does not apply to it.'" This increase in the medium-sized peasant farms is interpreted as the beginning of a new era of prosperity for peasant farming.

"But this prosperity is rooted in a bog," Kautsky replies to these good citizens. "It arises, not out of the *well-being* of the peasantry, but out of the *depression* of agriculture as a whole" (230). Shortly before this Kautsky said that, "notwithstanding all the technical progress which has been made, *in some places* [Kautsky's italics] there is a decline in agriculture; there can be no doubt of that" (228). This decline is leading, for example, to the revival of feudalism—to attempts to tie the workers to the land and impose certain duties upon them. Is it surprising that backward forms of agriculture should revive on the soil of this "depression"? That the peasantry, which in general is distinguished from workers employed in large-scale production by its lower level of requirements, greater ability to starve, and greater exertion while at work, can hold out longer during a

crisis?* "The agrarian crisis affects all agricultural classes that produce commodities; it does not stop at the middle peasant" (*S.* 231).

One would think that all these propositions of Kautsky are so clear that it is impossible not to understand them. Nevertheless, the critic has evidently failed to understand them. Mr. Bulgakov does not come forward with an opinion: he does not tell us how he explains this increase in the medium-

* Kautsky says elsewhere: "The small farmers hold out longer in a hopeless position. We have every reason to doubt that this is an advantage of small-scale production" (*S.* 134).

In passing, let us mention data fully confirming Kautsky's view that are given by Koenig in his book, in which he describes in detail the condition of English agriculture in a number of typical counties (*Die Lage der englischen Landwirtschaft*, *etc.* [*The Condition of English Agriculture*, *etc.*], Jena, 1896, von Dr. F. Koenig). In this book we find *any amount* of evidence of overwork and under-consumption on the part of the small farmers, as compared with hired labourers, but no evidence of the opposite. We read, for instance, that the small farms pay "because of immense (*ungeheuer*) diligence and frugality" (88); the farm buildings of the small farmers are inferior (107); the small landowners (*yeoman farmers* [these words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*]) are worse off than the tenant farmers (149); "their conditions are very miserable (in Lincolnshire), their cottages being worse than those of the labourers employed on the big farms, and some are in a very bad state. The small landowners work harder and for longer hours than ordinary labourers, but they earn less. They live more poorly and eat less meat ... their sons and daughters work without pay and are badly clothed" (157). "The small farmers work like slaves; in the summer they often work from 3 a.m. to 9 p.m." (a report of the Chamber of Agriculture in Boston, *S.* 158). "Without a doubt," says a big farmer, "the small man (*der kleine Mann*), who has little capital and on whose farm all the work is done by members of his family, finds it easier to cut down housekeeping expenses, while the big farmer must feed his labourers equally well in bad years and good" (218). The small farmers (in Ayrshire) "are extraordinarily (*ungeheuer*) diligent; their wives and children do no less, and often more, work than the day labourers; it is said that two of them will do as much work in a day as three hired labourers" (231). "The life of the small tenant farmer, who must work with his whole family, is the life of a slave" (253). "Taken as a whole ... the small farmers have evidently withstood the crisis better than the big farmers, but this does not imply that the small farm is more profitable. The reason, in our opinion, is that the small man (*der kleine Mann*) utilises the unpaid assistance of his family.... Usually ... the whole family of the small farmer works on the farm.... The children are fed and clothed, and only rarely do they get a definite daily wage" (277-78), etc., etc.

sized peasant farms, but he ascribes to Kautsky the opinion that "the development of the capitalist mode of production is ruining agriculture." And Mr. Bulgakov exclaims angrily: "Kautsky's assertion that agriculture is being destroyed is wrong, arbitrary, unproved, and contradicts all the main facts of reality," etc., etc.

To this we can only say that Mr. Bulgakov *conveys Kautsky's ideas altogether incorrectly*. Kautsky does not state that the development of capitalism is ruining agriculture; he says the opposite. Only by being very inattentive in reading Kautsky's book can one deduce from his words on the depression (= crisis) in agriculture and on the technical retrogression to be observed *in some places* (*nota bene*) that he speaks of the "destruction," the "doom" of agriculture. In Chapter X, which deals especially with the question of overseas competition (i.e., the main reason for the agrarian crisis), Kautsky says: "The impending crisis, of course (*natürlich*), need not necessarily (*braucht nicht*) ruin the industry which it affects. It does so only in very rare cases. As a general rule, a crisis merely causes a change in the existing property relations in the capitalist sense" (273-74). This observation made in connection with the crisis in the agricultural industries clearly reveals Kautsky's general view of the significance of a crisis. In the same chapter Kautsky again expresses the view in relation to the whole of agriculture: "What has been said above does not give one the least right to speak about the doom of agriculture (*Man braucht deswegen noch lange nicht von einem Untergang der Landwirtschaft zu sprechen*), but where the modern mode of production has taken a firm hold its conservative character has disappeared for ever. The continuation of the old routine (*das Verharren beim Alten*) means certain ruin for the farmer; he must constantly watch the development of technique and continuously adapt his methods of production to the new conditions.... Even in the rural districts economic life, which hitherto has with strict uniformity moved in an eternal rut, has dropped into a state of constant revolutionisation, a state that is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production" (289).

Mr. Bulgakov "does not understand" how trends toward the development of productive forces in agriculture can be com-

bined with trends that increase the difficulties of commercial agriculture. What is there unintelligible in this? Capitalism in both agriculture and industry gives an enormous impetus to the development of productive forces; but it is precisely this development which, the more it proceeds, causes the contradictions of capitalism to become more acute and creates new "difficulties" for the system. Kautsky develops one of the fundamental ideas of Marx, who categorically emphasised the progressive historical role of agricultural capitalism (the rationalisation of agriculture, the separation of the land from the farmer, the emancipation of the rural population from the relations of master and slave, etc.), at the same time no less categorically pointing to the impoverishment and oppression of the direct producers and to the fact that capitalism is incompatible with the requirements of rational agriculture. It is very strange indeed that Mr. Bulgakov, who admits that his "general social-philosophic world outlook is the same as Kautsky's,"* should fail to note that Kautsky here develops a fundamental idea of Marx. The readers of *Nachalo* must inevitably remain in perplexity over Mr. Bulgakov's attitude towards these fundamental ideas and wonder how, in view of the identity of their general world outlook, he can say: "*De principiis non est disputandum*"!!?** We permit ourselves not to believe Mr. Bulgakov's statement; we consider that an argument between him and other Marxists is possible precisely because of the community of these "*principia*." In saying that capitalism rationalises agriculture and that industry provides machinery for agriculture, etc., Mr. Bulgakov merely repeats one of these "*principia*." Only he should not have said "quite the opposite" in this connection. Readers might think that Kautsky holds a different opinion, whereas he very emphatically and definitely develops these fundamental ideas of Marx in his book. He says: "It is precisely industry which has created the technical and scientific conditions for new, rational agriculture. It is precisely industry which has revolutionised agriculture by means of machines

* As for the philosophic world outlook, we do not know whether what Mr. Bulgakov says is true. Kautsky does not seem to be an adherent of the critical philosophy, as Mr. Bulgakov is.

** In matters of principle there is no disputing.—*Ed.*

and artificial fertilisers, by means of the microscope and the chemical laboratory, giving rise in this way to the technical superiority of large-scale capitalist production over small-scale, peasant production" (*S*. 292). Thus, Kautsky does not fall into the contradiction in which we find Mr. Bulgakov bogged: on the one hand, Mr. Bulgakov admits that "capitalism [i.e., production carried on with the aid of wage-labour, i.e., not peasant, but large-scale production?] rationalises agriculture," while on the other, he argues that "it is not large-scale production which is the vehicle of this technical progress"!

II

Chapter X of Kautsky's book deals with the question of overseas competition and the industrialisation of agriculture. Mr. Bulgakov treats this chapter in a very offhand manner: "Nothing particularly new or original, more or less well-known main facts," etc., he says, leaving in the background the fundamental question of the conception of the agrarian crisis, its essence and significance. And yet this question is of enormous theoretical importance.

The conception of the agrarian crisis inevitably follows from the general conception of agrarian evolution which Marx presented and on which Kautsky enlarges in detail. Kautsky sees the essence of the agrarian crisis in the fact that, owing to the competition of countries which produce very cheap grain, agriculture in Europe has lost the opportunity of shifting to the masses of consumers the burdens imposed on it by the private ownership of land and capitalist commodity production. From now on agriculture in Europe "*must itself bear them* [these burdens], *and this is what the present agrarian crisis amounts to*" (*S*. 239, Kautsky's italics). Ground rent is the main burden. In Europe, ground rent has been raised by preceding historical development to an extremely high level (both differential and *absolute* rent) and is fixed in the price of land.* On the other hand, in

* For the process of inflating and fixing rent see the apt remarks of Parvus in *The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis*. Parvus shares Kautsky's main view on the crisis and on the agrarian question generally.

the colonies (America, Argentina, and others), insofar as they remain colonies, we see *free* land occupied by new settlers, either entirely gratis or for an insignificant price; moreover, the virginal fertility of this land reduces production costs to a minimum. Up to now, capitalist agriculture in Europe has quite naturally transferred the burden of excessively high rents to the consumer (in the form of high grain prices); now, however, the burden of these rents falls upon the farmers and the landowners themselves and ruins them.* Thus, the agrarian crisis has upset, and continues to upset, the prosperity which capitalist landed property and capitalist agriculture formerly enjoyed. Hitherto capitalist landed property has exacted an ever-increasing tribute from social development; and it fixed the level of this tribute in the price of land. Now it has to forego this tribute.** Capitalist agriculture has now been reduced to the state of instability that is characteristic of capitalist industry and is compelled to adapt itself to new market conditions. Like every crisis, the agrarian crisis is ruining a large number of farmers, is bringing about important changes in the established property relations, and *in some places* is leading to technical retrogression, to the revival of medieval relations and forms of economy. Taken as a whole, however, it is *accelerating* social evolution, ejecting patriarchal stagnation from its last refuge, and making necessary the further specialisation of agriculture (a principal factor of agricultural progress in capitalist society), the further application of machinery, etc. On the whole, as Kautsky shows by data

* Parvus, op. cit. p. 141, quoted in a review of Parvus' book in *Nachalo*, No. 3, p. 117. (See present volume, p. 66.—*Ed.*) We should add that the other "difficulties" of commercial agriculture confronting Europe affect the colonies to an incomparably smaller degree.

** Absolute rent is the result of monopoly. "Fortunately, there is a limit to the raising of absolute rent.... Until recent times it rose steadily in Europe in the same way as differential rent. But overseas competition has undermined this monopoly to a very considerable extent. We have no grounds for thinking that differential rent in Europe has suffered as a result of overseas competition, except for a few counties in England.... But absolute rent has dropped, and this has benefited (*zu gute gekommen*) primarily the working classes" (*S.* 80; cf. also *S.* 328).

for several countries, in Chapter IV of his book, *even* in Western Europe, instead of the stagnation in agriculture in the period 1880-90, we see technical progress. We say *even* in Western Europe, because in America, for example, this progress is still more marked.

In short, there are no grounds for regarding the agrarian crisis as an obstacle to capitalism and capitalist development.

REPLY TO Mr. P. NEZHDANOV

In issue No. 4 of *Zhizn*, Mr. P. Nezhdanov examined articles by me and other authors on the market theory. I intend to reply to only one of Mr. Nezhdanov's assertions—that in my article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, issue No. 1 for this year, I "distorted my struggle against the theory of third persons." As far as the other questions are concerned, those raised by Mr. P. Nezhdanov in respect of the market theory and, in particular, of P. B. Struve's views, I shall confine myself to a reference to my article in reply to Struve ("Once More on the Theory of Realisation"; the delay in its publication in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* was due to circumstances over which the author had no control).

Mr. P. Nezhdanov maintains that "capitalist production does not suffer from any contradiction between production and consumption." From this he concludes that Marx, in recognising this contradiction, "suffered from a serious internal contradiction" and that I am repeating Marx's error.

I believe Mr. Nezhdanov's opinion to be a mistaken one (or one based on a misunderstanding) and cannot see any contradiction in Marx's views.

Mr. P. Nezhdanov's assertion that there is no contradiction between production and consumption in capitalism is so strange that it is only to be explained by the very *special meaning* that he attaches to the concept "contradiction." Mr. P. Nezhdanov is of the opinion that "if there really were a contradiction between production and consumption that contradiction would provide a regular surplus-product" (p. 301; the same in the final theses, p. 316). This is an utterly

arbitrary and, in my opinion, utterly incorrect interpretation. In criticising my assertions on the contradiction between production and consumption in capitalist society, Mr. P. Nezhdanov should (I think) have told the reader how I understand that contradiction and should not have limited himself to an exposition of his own views on the essence and significance of that contradiction. The whole essence of the question (which has given rise to Mr. P. Nezhdanov's polemic against me) is that I understand the contradiction under discussion quite differently from the way in which Mr. P. Nezhdanov wishes to understand it. I did not say anywhere that this contradiction should *regularly** produce a surplus-product; I do not think so and such a view cannot be deduced from Marx's words. The contradiction between production and consumption that is inherent in capitalism is due to the tremendous rate at which production is growing, to the tendency to unlimited expansion which competition gives it, while consumption (individual), if it grows at all, grows very slightly; the proletarian condition of the masses of the people makes a rapid growth of individual consumption impossible. It seems to me that any one reading carefully pages 20 and 30 of my *Studies* (the article on the Sismondists cited by Mr. P. Nezhdanov) and page 40 of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (1899, No. 1)** can convince himself that, from the outset, I gave *only this meaning* to the contradiction between production and consumption in capitalism. Indeed, no other meaning can be ascribed to this contradiction by one who adheres strictly to Marx's theory. The contradiction between production and consumption that is inherent in capitalism consists only in this, that the growth of the national wealth proceeds side by side with the growth of the people's poverty; that the productive forces of society increase without a corresponding increase in consumption by the people, without the employment of these productive forces for the benefit of the working masses. The contradiction

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* I stress *regularly* because the irregular production of a surplus-product (crises) is inevitable in capitalist society as a result of the disturbance in proportion between the various branches of industry. But a certain state of consumption is one of the elements of proportion.

** See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 155 and 167 and pp. 58-59 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

under discussion, understood in this sense, is a fact that does not admit of any doubt and that is confirmed by the daily experience of millions of people, and it is the observation of this fact that leads the working men to the views that have found a full scientific expression in Marx's theory. This contradiction does not, by any means, lead inevitably to the regular production of a surplus-product (as Mr. Nezhdanov would like to think). We can quite well imagine (if we argue from a purely theoretical standpoint about an ideal capitalist society) the realisation of the entire product in a capitalist society without any surplus-product, *but we cannot imagine capitalism* without a disparity between production and consumption. This disparity is expressed (as Marx has demonstrated clearly in his Schemes) by the fact that the production of the means of production can and must outstrip the production of articles of consumption.

Mr. Nezhdanov, therefore, was completely mistaken in his deduction that the contradiction between production and consumption must regularly provide a surplus-product, and this mistake led to his unjustly accusing Marx of inconsistency. Marx, on the contrary, remains consistent when he shows:

1) that the product *can* be realised in a capitalist society (it goes without saying that this is true if proportionality between the various branches of industry is assumed); that it would be incorrect to introduce foreign trade or "third persons" to explain this realisation;

2) that the theories of the petty-bourgeois economists (*à la* Proudhon) on the impossibility of realising *surplus-value* are based on a complete misunderstanding of the very process of realisation in general;

3) that even with fully proportional, ideally smooth realisation we cannot imagine capitalism without a contradiction between production and consumption, without the tremendous growth of production being accompanied by an extremely slow growth (or even stagnation and worsening) of consumption by the people. Realisation is due more to means of production than to articles of consumption—this is obvious from Marx's Schemes; and from this, in turn, it follows inevitably that "the more productiveness develops, the more it finds itself at variance with the narrow basis on

which the conditions of consumption rest" (Marx).[57] It is obvious from all the passages in *Capital* devoted to the contradiction between production and consumption* that it is *only in this sense* that Marx understood the contradiction between production and consumption.

Incidentally, Mr. P. Nezhdanov is of the opinion that Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky also denies the contradiction between production and consumption in a capitalist society. I do not know whether this is true. Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky himself introduced into his book a scheme showing the possibility of the growth of production accompanied by a contraction of consumption (which, of course, is possible and actual under capitalism). How can one deny that we see here a contradiction between production and consumption, although there is no surplus-product?

In charging Marx (and me) with inconsistency, Mr. P. Nezhdanov also lost sight of the fact that he should have explained, as a basis for his viewpoint, how one should understand the "independence" of the production of means of production from the production of articles of consumption. According to Marx, this "independence" is limited to the following: a certain (and constantly growing) part of the product which consists of means of production is realised by exchanges within the given department, i.e., exchanges of means of production for means of production (or the use of the product obtained, *in natura*,** for fresh production); but in *the final analysis* the manufacture of means of production is necessarily bound up with that of articles of consumption, since the former are not manufactured for their own sake, but only because more and more means of production are demanded by the branches of industry manufacturing articles of consumption.*** The views of the petty-bourgeois economists, therefore, do not differ from those of Marx because the

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* These passages are quoted in my article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, 1899, No. 1 (see present volume, p. 56, et seq.—*Ed.*) and are repeated in the first chapter of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, pp. 18-19. (See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 56-57.—*Ed.*)

** In its natural form.—*Ed.*

*** *Das Kapital*, III, 1, 289.[58] Quoted by me in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, p. 40 (see present volume, p. 59.—*Ed.*), and in *The Development of Capitalism*, 17. (See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 55.—*Ed.*)

former recognised in general the connection between production and consumption in a capitalist society while the latter denied in general that connection (which would be absurd). The difference is that the petty-bourgeois economists considered this connection between production and consumption to be *a direct one*, that they thought *production follows consumption*. Marx showed that this connection is *an indirect one*, that it only makes itself felt *in the final analysis*, because in capitalist society *consumption follows production*. But the connection nevertheless exists, even if it is indirect; consumption must, in the final analysis, follow production, and, if the productive forces are driving towards an unlimited growth of production, while consumption is restricted by the proletarian condition of the masses of the people, there is undoubtedly a contradiction present. This contradiction does not signify the impossibility of capitalism,* but it does signify that its transformation to a higher form is a necessity: the stronger this contradiction becomes, the more developed become the objective conditions for this transformation, as well as the subjective conditions, i.e., the workers' consciousness of this contradiction.

The question now arises: what position could Mr. Nezhdanov adopt on the question of the "independence" of the means of production as regards articles of consumption? One of two: either he will completely deny any dependence between them, will assert the possibility of realising means of production that are *in no way connected* with articles of consumption, that are not connected even in "the final analysis" —in which case he will inevitably descend to the absurd, or he will admit, following Marx, that in the final analysis means of production are connected with articles of consumption, in which case he must admit the correctness of my understanding of Marx's theory.

In conclusion, let me take an example to illustrate these abstract arguments with concrete data. It is known that in any capitalist society exceptionally low wages (=the low

* *Studies*, p. 20 (see present edition, Vol. 2, p. 155.—*Ed.*); *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, No. 1, p. 41 (see present volume, p. 60.—*Ed.*); *The Development of Capitalism*, pp. 19-20. (See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 58.—*Ed.*) If this contradiction were to lead to "a regular surplus-product," it would signify precisely the impossibility of capitalism.

level of consumption by the masses of the people) often hinder the employment of machinery. What is more, it even happens that machines acquired by entrepreneurs are in disuse because the price of labour drops so low that manual labour becomes more profitable to the owner!* The existence of a contradiction between consumption and production, between the drive of capitalism to develop the productive forces to an unlimited extent and the limitation of this drive by the proletarian condition, the poverty and unemployment of the people, is, in this case, as clear as daylight. But it is no less clear that it is correct to draw one single conclusion from this contradiction—that the development of the productive forces themselves must, with irresistible force, lead to the replacement of capitalism by an economy of associated producers. It would, on the other hand, be utterly incorrect to draw from this contradiction the conclusion that capitalism must *regularly* provide a surplus-product, i.e., that capitalism cannot, in general, realise the product, and can, therefore, play no progressive historical role, and so on.

Written in May 1899
Published in December 1899
in the magazine *Zhizn*
Signed: *Vladimir Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in the magazine

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* I bring an instance of this phenomenon in the sphere of Russian capitalist agriculture in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, page 165. (See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 234.—*Ed.*) Similar phenomena are not individual instances but are the usual and *inevitable* consequences of the basic features of capitalism.

A PROTEST BY RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[59]

Written at the end of August-beginning of September 1899
First published abroad in December 1899 as the separate reprints from No. 4-5 of the magazine *Rabochaya Dyelo*[60]

Published according to the text in the magazine

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТИЯ

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Оттискъ изъ № 4-5 „Рабочаго Дѣла".

ПРОТЕСТЪ

РОССІЙСКИХЪ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТОВЪ

СЪ ПОСЛѢСЛОВІЕМЪ ОТЪ РЕДАКЦІИ „РАБОЧАГО ДѢЛА

Собраніе соціальдемократовъ одной мѣстности (Россіи), въ числѣ семнадцати человѣкъ, приняло ЕДИНОГЛАСНО слѣдующую резолюцію и постановило опубликовать ее и передать на обсужденіе всѣмъ товарищамъ.

Въ послѣднее время среди русскихъ соціальдемократовъ замѣчаются отступленія отъ тѣхъ основныхъ принциповъ русской соціальдемократіи, которые были провозглашены какъ основателями и передовыми борцами—членами Группы „Освобожденія Труда", — такъ и соціальдемократическими изданіями русскихъ рабочихъ организацій 90-хъ годовъ. Ниже приводимое „credo", долженствующее выражать основные взгляды нѣкоторыхъ („молодыхъ") русскихъ соціальдемократовъ, представляетъ изъ себя попытку систематическаго и опредѣленнаго изложенія „новыхъ воззрѣній". — Вотъ это „credo" въ полномъ видѣ.

„Существованіе цехового и мануфактурнаго періода на Западѣ наложило рѣзкій слѣдъ на всю послѣдующую исторію, въ особенности на исторію соціальдемократіи. Необходимость для буржуазіи завоевать свободныя формы, стремленіе освободиться отъ сковывающихъ производство цеховыхъ регламентацій, сдѣлали ее, буржуазію, революціоннымъ элементомъ; она повсюду на Западѣ начинаетъ съ liberté, fraternité, égalité (свобода, братство и равенство).

Facsimile of the first page of the reprint of "A Protext by Russian Social-Democrats" from No. 4-5 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. 1899.

Оттискъ изъ № 4-5 „Рабочаго Дѣла".

ПРОТЕСТЪ

РОССІЙСКИХЪ СОЦІАЛЪДЕМОКРАТОВЪ

СЪ ПОСЛѢДОВІЕМЪ ОТЪ РЕДАКЦІИ „РАБОЧАГО ДѢЛА"

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Facsimile of the first page of the reprint of "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" from No. 4-5 of Рабочее Дѣло. 1899.

A MEETING OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS, SEVENTEEN IN NUMBER, HELD AT A CERTAIN PLACE (IN RUSSIA), ADOPTED *UNANIMOUSLY* THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION AND RESOLVED TO PUBLISH IT AND TO SUBMIT IT TO ALL COMRADES FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION

A tendency has been observed among Russian Social-Democrats recently to depart from the fundamental principles of Russian Social-Democracy that were proclaimed by its founders and foremost fighters, members of the Emancipation of Labour group[61] as well as by the Social-Democratic publications of the Russian workers' organisations of the nineties. The *Credo* reproduced below, which is presumed to express the fundamental views of certain ("young") Russian Social-Democrats, represents an attempt at a systematic and definite exposition of the "new views." The following is its full text:

"The guild and manufacture period in the West laid a sharp impress on all subsequent history and particularly on the history of Social-Democracy. The fact that the bourgeoisie had to fight for free forms, that it strove to release itself from the guild regulations fettering production, made the bourgeoisie a revolutionary element; everywhere in the West it began with *liberté*, *fraternité*, *égalité* (liberty, fraternity, equality), with the achievement of free political forms. By these gains, however, as Bismarck expressed it, it drew a bill on the future payable to its antipode—the working class. Hardly anywhere in the West did the working class, as a class, win the democratic institutions—it made use of them. Against this it may be argued that the working class took part in revolutions. A reference to history will refute this opinion, for, precisely in 1848, when the consolidation of Constitutions took place in the West, the working class represented the urban artisan element, the petty-bourgeois democracy; a factory proletariat hardly existed,

while the proletariat employed in large-scale industry (the German weavers depicted by Hauptmann, the weavers of Lyons) represented a wild mass capable only of rioting, but not of advancing any political demands. It can be definitely stated that the Constitutions of 1848 were won by the bourgeoisie and the small urban artisans. On the other hand, the working class (artisans, manufactory workers, printers, weavers, watchmakers, etc.) have been accustomed since the Middle Ages to membership in organisations, mutual benefit societies, religious societies, etc. This spirit of organisation is still alive among the skilled workers in the West, sharply distinguishing them from the factory proletariat, which submits to organisation badly and slowly and is capable only of *lose-organisation* (temporary organisations) and not of permanent organisations with rules and regulations. It was these manufactory skilled workers that comprised the core of the Social-Democratic parties. Thus, we get the picture: on the one hand, the relative ease of political struggle and every possibility for it, on the other hand, the possibility for the systematic organisation of this struggle with the aid of the workers trained in the manufacturing period. It was on this basis that theoretical and practical Marxism grew up in the West. The starting-point was the parliamentary political struggle with the prospect—only superficially resembling Blanquism, but of totally different origin—of capturing power, on the one hand, and of a *Zusammenbruch* (collapse), on the other. Marxism was the theoretical expression of the prevailing practice: of the political struggle predominating over the economic. In Belgium, in France, and particularly in Germany, the workers organised the political struggle with incredible ease; but it was with enormous difficulty and tremendous friction that they organised the economic struggle. Even to this day the economic organisations as compared with the political organisations (leaving aside England) are extraordinarily weak and unstable, and everywhere *laissent à désirer quelque chose* (leave something to be desired). So long as the energy in the political struggle had not been completely exhausted, *Zusammenbruch* was an essential organisational *Schlagwort* (slogan) destined to play an extremely important historical role. The fundamental law that can be discerned by studying the working-class movement is that of the line of least resistance. In the West, this line was political activity, and Marxism, as formulated in the *Communist Manifesto*, was the best possible form the movement could assume. But when all energy in political activity had been exhausted, when the political movement had reached a point of intensity difficult and almost impossible to surpass (the slow increase in votes in the recent period, the apathy of the public at meetings the note of despondency in literature), this, in conjunction with the ineffectiveness of parliamentary action and the entry into the arena of the ignorant masses, of the unorganised and almost unorganisable factory proletariat, gave rise in the West to what is now called Bernsteinism,[62] the crisis of Marxism. It is difficult to imagine a more logical course than the period of development of the labour movement from the *Communist Manifesto* to Bernsteinism, and a careful study of this whole process can determine with astronomical exactitude the outcome of this "crisis." Here, of course, the issue is not the defeat or

victory of Bernsteinism—that is of little interest; it is the radical change in practical activity that has been gradually taking place for a long time within the party.

"The change will not only be towards a more energetic prosecution of the economic struggle and consolidation of the economic organisations, but also, and most importantly, towards a change in the party's attitude to other opposition parties. Intolerant Marxism, negative Marxism, primitive Marxism (whose conception of the class division of society is too schematic) will give way to democratic Marxism, and the social position of the party within modern society must undergo a sharp change. The party *will recognise* society, its narrow corporative and, in the majority of cases, sectarian tasks will be widened to social tasks, and its striving to seize power will be transformed into a striving for change, a striving to reform present-day society on democratic lines adapted to the present state of affairs, with the object of protecting the rights (all rights) of the labouring classes in the most effective and fullest way. The concept 'politics' will be enlarged and will acquire a truly social meaning, and the practical demands of the moment will acquire greater weight and will be able to count on receiving greater attention than they have been getting up to now.

"It is not difficult to draw conclusions for Russia from this brief description of the course of development taken by the working-class movement in the West. In Russia, the line of least resistance will never tend towards political activity. The incredible political oppression will prompt much talk about it and cause attention to be concentrated precisely on this question, but it will never prompt practical action. While in the West the fact that the workers were drawn into political activity served to strengthen and crystallise their weak forces, in Russia, on the contrary, these weak forces are confronted with a wall of political oppression. Not only do they lack practical ways of struggle against this oppression, and hence, also for their own development, but they are systematically stifled and cannot give forth even weak shoots. If to this we add that the working class in our country has not inherited the spirit of organisation which distinguished the fighters in the West, we get a gloomy picture, one that is likely to drive into despondency the most optimistic Marxist who believes that an extra factory chimney stack will by the very fact of its existence bring great welfare. The economic struggle too is hard, infinitely hard, but it is possible to wage it, and it is in fact being waged by the masses themselves. By learning in this struggle to organise, and coming into constant conflict with the political regime in the course of it, the Russian worker will at last create what may be called a form of the labour movement, the organisation or organisations best conforming to Russian conditions. At the present, it can be said with certainty that the Russian working-class movement is still in the amoeba state and has not yet acquired any form. The strike movement, which goes on with any form of organisation, cannot yet be described as the crystallised form of the Russian movement, while the illegal organisations are not worth consideration even from the mere quantitative point of view (quite apart from the question of their usefulness under present conditions).

"Such is the situation. If to this we add the famine and the process of ruination of the countryside, which facilitate *Streikbrecher*-ism,* and, consequently, the even greater difficulty of raising the masses of the workers to a more tolerable cultural level, then ... well, what is there for the Russian Marxist to do?! The talk about an independent workers' political party merely results from the transplantation of alien aims and alien achievements to our soil. The Russian Marxist, so far, is a sad spectacle. His practical tasks at the present time are paltry, his theoretical knowledge, insofar as he utilises it *not as an instrument for research* but as a schema for activity, is worthless for the purpose of fulfilling even these paltry practical tasks. Moreover, these borrowed patterns are harmful from the practical point of view. Our Marxists, forgetting that the working class in the West entered political activity after that field had already been cleared, are much too contemptuous of the radical or liberal opposition activity of all other non-worker strata of society. The slightest attempt to concentrate attention on public manifestations of a liberal political character rouses the protest of the orthodox Marxists, who forget that a number of historical conditions prevent us from being Western Marxists and demand of us a different Marxism, suited to, and necessary in, Russian conditions. Obviously, the lack in every Russian citizen of political feeling and sense cannot be compensated by talk about politics or by appeals to a non-existent force. This political sense can only be acquired through education, i.e., through participation in that life (however un-Marxian it may be) which is offered by Russian conditions. 'Negation' is as harmful in Russia as it was appropriate (temporarily) in the West, because negation proceeding from something organised and possessing real power is one thing, while negation proceeding from an amorphous mass of scattered individuals is another.

"For the Russian Marxist there is only one course: participation in, i.e., assistance to, the economic struggle of the proletariat, and participation in liberal opposition activity. As a 'negator,' the Russian Marxist came on the scene very early, and this negation has weakened the share of his energy that should be turned in the direction of political radicalism. For the time being, this is not terrible; but if the class schema prevents the Russian intellectual from taking an active part in life and keeps him too far removed from opposition circles it will be a serious loss to all who are compelled to fight for legal forms separately from the working class, which has not yet put forward political aims. The political innocence concealed behind the cerebrations of the Russian Marxist intellectual on political topics may play mischief with him."

We do not know whether there are many Russian Social-Democrats who share these views. But there is no doubt that ideas of this kind have their adherents, and we there-

* Strike-breaking.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

fore feel obliged to protest categorically against such views and to warn all comrades against the menacing deflection of Russian Social-Democracy from the path it has already marked out—the formation of an independent political working-class party which is inseparable from the class struggle of the proletariat and which has for its immediate aim the winning of political freedom.

The above-quoted *Credo* represents, first, "a brief description of the course of development taken by the working-class movement in the West," and, secondly, "conclusions for Russia."

First of all, the authors of the *Credo* have an entirely false conception of the history of the West-European working-class movement. It is not true to say that the working class in the West did not take part in the struggle for political liberty and in political revolutions. The history of the Chartist movement and the revolutions of 1848 in France, (Germany, and Austria prove the opposite. It is absolutely untrue to say that "Marxism was the theoretical expression of the prevailing practice: of the political struggle predominating over the economic." On the contrary, "Marxism" appeared at a time when non-political socialism prevailed (Owenism, "Fourierism," "true socialism") and the *Communist Manifesto* took up the cudgels at once against non-political socialism. Even when Marxism came out fully armed with theory (*Capital*) and organised the celebrated International Working Men's Association,[63] the political struggle was by no means the prevailing practice (narrow trade-unionism in England, anarchism and Proudhonism in the Romance countries). In Germany the great historic service performed by Lassalle was the transformation of the working class from an appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie into an independent political party. Marxism linked up the economic and the political struggle of the working class into a single inseparable whole; and the effort of the authors of the *Credo* to separate these forms of struggle is one of their most clumsy and deplorable departures from Marxism.

Further, the authors of the *Credo* also have an entirely wrong conception of the present state of the West-European working-class movement and of the theory of Marxism, under the banner of which that movement is marching.

To talk about a "crisis of Marxism" is merely to repeat the nonsense of the bourgeois hacks who are doing all they can to exacerbate every disagreement among the socialists and turn it into a split in the socialist parties. The notorious Bernsteinism—in the sense in which it is commonly understood by the general public, and by the authors of the *Credo* in particular—is an attempt to narrow the theory of Marxism, to convert the revolutionary workers' party into a reformist party. As was to be expected, this attempt has been strongly condemned by the majority of the German Social-Democrats. Opportunist trends have repeatedly manifested themselves in the ranks of German Social-Democracy, and on every occasion they have been repudiated by the Party, which loyally guards the principles of revolutionary international Social-Democracy. We are convinced that every attempt to transplant opportunist views to Russia will encounter equally determined resistance on the part of the overwhelming majority of Russian Social-Democrats.

Similarly, there can be no suggestion of a "radical change in the practical activity" of the West-European workers' parties, in spite of what the authors of the *Credo* say: the tremendous importance of the economic struggle of the proletariat, and the necessity for such a struggle, were recognised by Marxism from the very outset. As early as the forties Marx and Engels conducted a polemic against the utopian socialists who denied the importance of this struggle.[64]

When the International Working Men's Association was formed about twenty years later, the question of the importance of trade unions and of the economic struggle was raised at its very first Congress, in Geneva, in 1866. The resolution adopted at that Congress spoke explicitly of the importance of the economic struggle and warned the socialists and the workers, on the one hand, against exaggerating its importance (which the English workers were inclined to do at that time) and, on the other, against underestimating its importance (which the French and the Germans, particularly the Lassalleans, were inclined to do). The resolution recognised that the trade unions were not only a natural, but also an essential phenomenon under capitalism and considered them an extremely important means for organising the working class in its daily struggle against capital and

for the abolition of wage-labour. The resolution declared that the trade unions must not devote attention exclusively to the "immediate struggle against capital," must not remain aloof from the general political and social movement of the working class; they must not pursue "narrow" aims, but must strive for the general emancipation of the millions of oppressed workers. Since then the workers' parties in the various countries have discussed the question many times and, of course, will discuss it again and again—whether to devote more or less attention at any given moment to the economic or to the political struggle of the proletariat; but the general question, or the question in principle, today remains as it was presented by Marxism. The conviction that the class struggle must necessarily combine the political and the economic struggle into one integral whole has entered into the flesh and blood of international Social-Democracy. The experience of history has, furthermore, incontrovertibly proved that absence of freedom, or restriction of the political rights of the proletariat, always make it necessary to put the political struggle in the forefront.

Still less can there be any suggestion of a serious change in the attitude of the workers' party towards the other opposition parties. In this respect, too, Marxism has mapped out the correct line, which is equally remote from exaggerating the importance of politics, from conspiracy (Blanquism, etc.), and from decrying politics or reducing it to opportunist, reformist social tinkering (anarchism, utopian and petty-bourgeois socialism, state socialism, professorial socialism, etc.). The proletariat must strive to form independent political workers' parties, the main aim of which must be the capture of political power by the proletariat for the purpose of organising socialist society. The proletariat must not regard the other classes and parties as "one reactionary mass"[65]; on the contrary, it must take part in all political and social life, support the progressive classes and parties against the reactionary classes and parties, support every revolutionary movement against the existing system, champion the interests of every oppressed nationality or race, of every persecuted religion, of the disfranchised sex, etc. The arguments the *Credo* authors advance on this subject merely reveal a desire to obscure the class character of the struggle

of the proletariat, weaken this struggle by a meaningless "recognition of society," and reduce revolutionary Marxism to a trivial reformist trend. We are convinced that the overwhelming majority of Russian Social-Democrats will resolutely reject this distortion of the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy. Their erroneous premises regarding the West-European working-class movement led the authors of the *Credo* to draw still more erroneous "conclusions for Russia."

The assertion that the Russian working class "has not yet put forward political aims" simply reveals ignorance of the Russian revolutionary movement. The North-Russian Workers' Union[66] formed in 1878 and the South-Russian Workers' Union[67] formed in 1875 put forward even then the demand for political liberty in their programmes. After the reaction of the eighties, the working class repeatedly put forward the same demand in the nineties. The assertion that "the talk about an independent workers' political party merely results from the transplantation of alien aims and alien achievements to our soil" reveals a complete failure to understand the historical role of the Russian working class and the most vital tasks of Russian Social-Democracy. Apparently, the programme of the authors of the *Credo* inclines to the idea that the working class, following "the line of least resistance," should confine itself to the economic struggle, while the "liberal opposition elements" fight, with the "participation" of the Marxists, for "legal forms." The application of such a programme would be tantamount to the political suicide of Russian Social-Democracy, it would greatly retard and debase the Russian working-class movement and the Russian revolutionary movement (for us the two concepts coincide). The mere fact that it was possible for a programme like this to appear shows how well grounded were the fears expressed by one of the foremost champions of Russian Social-Democracy, P. B. Axelrod, when, at the end of 1897, he wrote of the possibility of the following prospect:

"The working-class movement keeps to the narrow rut of purely economic conflicts between the workers and employers and, in itself taken as a whole, is not of a political character, while in the struggle for political freedom the advanced strata of the proletariat follow the

revolutionary circles and groups of the so-called intelligentsia" (Axelrod, *Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats*, Geneva, 1898, p. 19).

Russian Social-Democrats must declare determined war upon the whole body of ideas expressed in the *Credo*, for these ideas lead straight to the realisation of this prospect. Russian Social-Democrats must bend every effort to translate into reality another prospect, outlined by P. B. Axelrod in the following words:

"The other prospect: Social-Democracy organises the Russian proletariat into an independent political party which fights for liberty, *partly side by side and in alliance with* the bourgeois revolutionary groups (if such should exist), and partly by recruiting directly into its ranks or securing the following of the most democratic-minded and revolutionary elements from among the intelligentsia" (*ibid.*, p. 20).

At the time P. B. Axelrod wrote the above lines the declarations made by Social-Democrats in Russia showed clearly that the overwhelming majority of them adhered to the same point of view. It is true that one St. Petersburg workers' paper, *Rabochaya Mysl*,[68] seemed to incline toward the ideas of the authors of the *Credo*. In a leading article setting forth its programme (No. 1, October 1897) it expressed, regrettably, the utterly erroneous idea, an idea running counter to Social-Democracy, that the "economic basis of the movement" may be "obscured by the effort to keep the political ideal constantly in mind." At the same time, however, another St. Petersburg workers' newspaper, *S. Peterburgsky Rabochy Listok*[69] (No. 2, September 1897), emphatically expressed the opinion that "the overthrow of the autocracy ... can be achieved only by a well-organised and numerically strong working-class party" and that "organised in a strong party" the workers will "emancipate themselves, and the whole of Russia, from all political and economic oppression." A third newspaper, *Rabochaya Gazeta*,[70] in its leading article in issue No. 2 (November 1897), wrote: "The fight against the autocratic government for political liberty is the immediate task of the Russian working-class movement." "The Russian working-class movement will increase its forces tenfold if it comes out as a single harmonious whole, with a common name and a well-knit organisation...." "The

separate workers' circles should combine into one common party." "The Russian workers' party will be a Social-Democratic Party."

That precisely these views of *Rabochaya Gazeta* were fully shared by the vast majority of Russian Social-Democrats is seen, furthermore, from the fact that the Congress of Russian Social-Democrats[71] in the spring of 1898 formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published its manifesto and recognised *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official Party organ. Thus, the *Credo* authors are taking an enormous step backward from the stage of development which Russian Social-Democracy has already achieved and which it has recorded in the *Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*. Since the frenzied persecution by the Russian Government has led to the present situation in which the Party's activity has temporarily subsided and its official organ has ceased publication, it is the task of all Russian Social-Democrats to exert every effort for the utmost consolidation of the Party, to draw up a Party programme and revive its official organ. In view of the ideological vacillations evidenced by the fact that programmes like the above-examined *Credo* can appear, we think it particularly necessary to emphasise the following fundamental principles that were expounded in the *Manifesto* and that are of enormous importance to Russian Social-Democracy. First, Russian Social-Democracy "desires to be and to remain the class movement of the organised working masses." Hence it follows that the motto of Social-Democracy must be: aid to the workers, not only in their economic, but also in their political struggle; agitation, not only in connection with immediate economic needs, but also in connection with all manifestations of political oppression; propaganda, not only of the ideas of scientific socialism, but also of democratic ideas. Only the theory of revolutionary Marxism can be the banner of the class movement of the workers, and Russian Social-Democracy must concern itself with the further development and implementation of this theory and must safeguard it against the distortions and vulgarisations to which "fashionable theories" are so often subjected (and the successes of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Russia have already made Marxism a "fashionable" theory). While concentrating all their present efforts on activity among factory

and mine workers, Social-Democrats must not forget that with the expansion of the movement home workers, handicraftsmen, agricultural labourers, and the millions of ruined and starving peasants must be drawn into the ranks of the labouring masses they organise.

Secondly: "On his strong shoulders the Russian worker must and will carry to a finish the cause of winning political liberty." Since its immediate task is the overthrow of the autocracy, Social-Democracy must act as the vanguard in the fight for democracy, and consequently, if for no other reason, must give every support to all democratic elements of the population of Russia and win them as allies. Only an independent working-class party can serve as a strong bulwark in the fight against the autocracy, and only in alliance with such a party, only by supporting it, can all the other fighters for political liberty play an effective part.

Thirdly and finally: "As a socialist movement and trend, the Russian Social-Democratic Party carries on the cause and the traditions of the whole preceding revolutionary movement in Russia; considering the winning of political liberty to be the most important of the immediate tasks of the Party as a whole, Social-Democracy marches towards the goal that was already clearly indicated by the glorious representatives of the old Narodnaya Volya.[72]" The traditions of the whole preceding revolutionary movement demand that the Social-Democrats shall at the present time concentrate all their efforts on organising the Party, on strengthening its internal discipline, and on developing the technique for illegal work. If the members of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia, despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory which served as the banner of the movement, then Social-Democracy, relying on the class struggle of the proletariat, will be able to render itself invincible. "The Russian proletariat will throw off the yoke of autocracy in order to continue the struggle against capital and the bourgeoisie for the complete victory of socialism with still greater energy."

We invite all groups of Social-Democrats and all workers' circles in Russia to discuss the above-quoted *Credo*

and our resolution, and to express a definite opinion on the question raised, in order that all differences may be removed and the work of organising and strengthening the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party may be accelerated.

Groups and circles may send their resolutions to the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad which, by Point 10 of the decision of the 1898 Congress of Russian Social-Democrats, is a part of the Russian Social-Democratic Party and its representative abroad.

REVIEW

S. N. Prokopovich. ***The Working-Class Movement in the West***[73]

"...to turn to social science and to its alleged conclusion that the capitalist system of society is hastening inexorably to its doom by virtue of the contradictions developing within it. We find the relevant explanations in Kautsky's *Erfurt Programme*" (147). Before dealing with the content of the passage quoted by Mr. Prokopovich, we must take note of a peculiarity highly typical of him and similar reformers of theory. Why is it that our "critical investigator," in turning to "social science," looks for "explanations" in Kautsky's popular booklet and nowhere else? Does he really believe that the whole of "social science" is contained in that little booklet? He knows perfectly well that Kautsky is "a faithful custodian of the traditions of Marx" (I, 187) and that an exposition and a substantiation of the "conclusions" of a certain school of "social science" are to be found precisely in Marx's treatises on political economy; yet he acts as though such a thing were altogether unknown to him. What are we to think of an "investigator" who confines himself to attacks on "custodians" of a theory but who does not once, throughout his book, risk crossing swords openly and directly with the theory itself?

In the passage quoted by Mr. Prokopovich, Kautsky says that the technological revolution and the accumulation of capital are progressing with increasing rapidity, that the expansion of production is made necessary by the fundamental properties of capitalism and must be uninterrupted, while the expansion of the market "has for some time been proceed-

ing too slowly" and that "the time is apparently at hand when the market for European industry will not only cease its further expansion but will even begin to shrink. This event can only mean the bankruptcy of the entire capitalist society." Mr. Prokopovich "criticises" the "conclusions" drawn by "social science" (*i.e.*, Kautsky's citation of one of the laws of development evolved by Marx): "The basis thus given for the inevitability of the collapse of capitalist society allots the chief role to the contradiction between 'the constant drive to expand production and the ever slower expansion of the market and, finally, its shrinkage.' It is this contradiction, according to Kautsky, that must bring about the collapse of the capitalist system of society. But [listen well!] the expansion of production presumes the 'productive consumption' of part of the surplus-value—i.e., first its realisation and then its expenditure on machinery, buildings, etc., for new production. In other words, the expansion of production is most closely connected with the existence of a market for the commodities already produced; the constant expansion of production with a market that is relatively shrinking is, therefore, an impossibility" (148).. And Mr. Prokopovich is so well satisfied with his excursion into the sphere of "social science" that in the very next line he speaks with condescending disdain of a "scientific" (in inverted commas) substantiation of faith, etc. Such jockeying with criticism would be outrageous, were it not for the fact that it is, more than anything else, amusing. Our good Mr. Prokopovich has heard a knell, but knows not from what bell. Mr. Prokopovich has heard of the abstract theory of realisation that has recently been heatedly discussed in Russian literature in the course of which the role of "productive consumption" has been particularly stressed on account of errors in Narodnik economics. Mr. Prokopovich has not properly understood this theory and imagines that it *denies* (!) the existence in capitalism of those basic and elementary contradictions Kautsky speaks of. To listen to Mr. Prokopovich, we would have to believe that "productive consumption" could develop *quite independently* of individual consumption (in which consumption by the masses plays the dominant role), i.e., that capitalism does not contain within itself any contradiction between production and



Page 6 of the manuscript of Lenin's "Review of S. N. Prokopovich's Book." End of 1899

Reduced

Page 6 of the manuscript of Lenin's "Review of S. N. Prokopovich's Book." End of 1899

Reduced

consumption. This is simply absurd, and Marx and his Russian supporters* have clearly opposed such misconstructions. Not only does the bourgeois-apologetic theory into which our "critical investigator" has wandered not follow from the fact that "the expansion of production presumes productive consumption," but, on the contrary, from it follows the contradiction between the tendency towards the unlimited growth of production and limited consumption that is inherent precisely in capitalism and that must bring about its collapse.

Apropos of what has been said, it is worth while mentioning the following interesting point. Mr. Prokopovich is a fervent follower of Bernstein, whose magazine articles he quotes and translates for several pages. In his well-know book, *Die Voraussetzungen*, *etc.*,** Bernstein even recommends Mr. Prokopovich to the German public as his Russian supporter, but he makes a reservation, the substance of which is that Mr. Prokopovich is more Bernsteinian than Bernstein. And, a remarkable thing, Bernstein and his Russian yesman both distort the theory of realisation, but *in diametrically opposite directions*, so that they *cancel each other out*. Firstly, Bernstein regarded as a "contradiction" the fact that Marx turned against Rodbertus' theory of crises and at the same time declared that "the ultimate cause of all real crises is the poverty and limited consumption of the masses." Actually there is no contradiction here at all, as I have had occasion to point out in other places (*Studies*, p. 30,*** *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 19****). Secondly, Bernstein argues in precisely the same manner as does Mr. V. V. here in Russia, that the tremendous growth of the surplus-product must inevitably mean an increase in the number of well-to-do (or the greater prosperity of the workers),

* Cf. my article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* for August 1899, especially page 1572 (see pp. 74-93 of this volume, especially p. 84.—*Ed.*), and *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 16, et seq. (See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 54, et seq.—*Ed.*)

** *The Premises*, *etc.*—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 2, *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*, pp. 167-68.—*Ed.*

**** See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 58.—*Ed.*

since the capitalists themselves and their servants (*sic*!) cannot "consume" the entire surplus-product (*Die Voraussetzungen*, *etc.*, *S*. 51-52). This naïve argument completely ignores the role of productive consumption, *as Kautsky pointed out in his book against Bernstein* (Kautsky, *Gegen Bernstein*, II. *Abschnitt*,*—the paragraph on "the employment of surplus-value"). And now there appears a Russian Bernsteinian, recommended by Bernstein, who says exactly the opposite, who lectures Kautsky on the role of "productive consumption" and then reduces Marx's discovery to the absurdity that productive consumption can develop quite independently of individual consumption (!), that the realisation of surplus-value by its use for the production of means of production does away with the dependence, in the final analysis, of production on consumption and, consequently, with the contradiction between them! By this example the reader may judge whether Mr. Prokopovich's "loss of a good half of the theoretical premises" is due to the "investigations" or whether our "critical investigator" is "at a loss" due to some other cause.

A second example. Taking up three pages (25-27), our author "investigated" the question of peasant associations in Germany. He gave a list of the various kinds of associations and statistical data on their rapid growth (especially of dairy associations) and argued: "The artisan has been almost deprived of his roots in the modern economic system, whereas the peasant continues to stand firm [!] in it." How very simple, isn't it really? The undernourishment of the German peasants, their exhaustion from excessive labour, the mass flight of people from the countryside to the towns—all that must be mere invention. It suffices to point to the rapid growth of associations (especially dairy associations that result in depriving the peasants' children of milk and lead to the peasants' greater dependence on capitalists) in order to prove the "stability" of the peasantry. "The development of capitalist relations in the manufacturing industry ruins the artisan but improves the condition of the peasant. It [the condition?] hinders the penetration of capitalism into agriculture." This is new! Until now it has been

* Kautsky, *Against Bernstein*, Section II.—*Ed.*

believed that it is the development of capitalism in the manufacturing industry that is the main force which gives rise to, and develops, capitalism in agriculture. But Mr. Prokopovich, like his German prototypes, could truly say of himself: *nous avons changé tout ca*—we have changed all that! But would that be true, gentlemen? Have you really changed *anything at all*, have you shown the error in even one of the basic postulates of the theory you have "torn to pieces" and replaced it by a truer postulate? Have you not, on the contrary, returned to the old prejudices?... "On the other hand, the development of the manufacturing industry ensures subsidiary earnings for the peasant."... A return to the doctrine of Messrs. V. V. & Co. on the subsidiary earnings of the peasantry! Mr. Prokopovich does not deem it worth mentioning the fact that in a large number of cases these "earnings" express the conversion of the peasant into a wage-labourer. He prefers to conclude his "investigation" with the high-sounding sentence: "The sap of life has not yet left the peasant class." It is true that Kautsky has shown, precisely in respect of Germany, that agricultural associations are a transition stage on the way *to capitalism*—but, you see, we already know how the terrible Mr. Prokopovich has crushed Kautsky!

We see this resurrection of Narodnik views (Narodnik views of the V. V. hue) not only in the above passage but in many other places in Mr. Prokopovich's "critical investigation." The reader probably knows the fame (a sorry fame) that Mr. V. V. earned for himself by his excessive narrowing and debasing of the theory known as "economic" materialism: this theory, as "adapted" by Mr. V. V., did not postulate that in the final analysis all factors are reduced to the development of the productive forces, but postulated that many extremely important (although in the final analysis secondary) factors could be neglected. Mr. Prokopovich offers us a very similar distortion when he attempts to expose Kautsky as one who does not understand the significance of "material forces" (144), in the course of which Mr. Prokopovich himself light-mindedly confuses "economic organisation" (145) with "economic force" (on 146 and especially 149). Unfortunately we cannot dwell to the needed extent on an analysis of this error of Mr. Prokopovich, but must refer the reader to the above-mentioned book by Kautsky

against Bernstein (*Abschnitt* III, Section *a*), where the original versions of Mr. Prokopovich's rehashings are discussed at length. We also hope that the reader who peruses Mr. Prokopovich's book attentively will see quite easily that the theory torn to pieces by our "critical investigator" (Mr. Prokopovich, incidentally, here, too, maintains a modest silence about the views of the founders of the theory and refrains from examining them, preferring to confine himself to extracts from the speeches and articles of present-day adherents of this theory)—that the theory is in no way to blame for this disgraceful narrowing of "economic" materialism (cf., for example, statements by authoritative Belgian spokesmen on pp. 74, 90, 92, 100 in the second part).

As far as the extracts quoted by Mr. Prokopovich are concerned, it should be said that he often seizes on individual passages and gives the reader a distorted impression of views and arguments that have not been expounded in Russian literature. On account of this, Mr. Prokopovich's jockeying with criticism creates a most repulsive impression. In some cases it would be worth the while of those who read Mr. Prokopovich's book to refer even to a book by Professor Herkner that has recently been translated into Russian: *Wage-Labour in Western Europe* (St. Petersburg, 1899, published by the magazine *Obrazovaniye*). For instance, in a note to page 24 (Part I) Mr. Prokopovich writes that the Congress of 1892 "adopted a resolution sympathising with the organisation of producers' associations" and follows this up with a quotation which, first, does not fully support the words of the author and, secondly, *breaks off* precisely at the point where it speaks of the necessity "to conduct a particular struggle against the belief that associations are in a position to bring any influence to bear on capitalist production relations, etc." (Herkner, Notes, pp. xi-xii, Note 6 to Chapter IX).

Mr. Prokopovich is just as successful in his crushing of Kautsky on pages 56, 150, 156, 198, and in many other places as he is in the case we have examined. Mr. Prokopovich's assertions that Liebknecht, in the sixties, for a time renounced his ideals, betrayed them, etc. (111, 112), are in no sense to be taken seriously. We have had occasion to see how well-founded his judgements are, and the following

sentence (once again directed, not against the founder of the theory, but against its "custodian") will, for example, show us to what Pillars of Hercules the insolence and self-assurance of our "investigator" will take him: "We should be acting superficially, if we undertook to criticise this whole conception of the working-class movement from the standpoint of its conformity to the true course taken by the development of this movement—from the standpoint of its *scientific basis* [Mr. Prokopovich's italics]. There is not and cannot be (*sic*!) a grain of science in it" (156). This is what you call categorical criticism! All this Marxism, it isn't even worth criticising, and that's that! Obviously we have before us either a man who is destined to make a great revolution in the science "of which there cannot be even a grain" in the theory that is dominant in Germany, or ... or—how can it be put delicately?—or a man who, when "at a loss," repeats the phrases of others. Mr. Prokopovich prostrates himself with such fervour before this very latest of gods who has pronounced those words for the thousandth time that he has no pity on his own forehead. Bernstein, if you please, "has some shortcomings in his theoretical views" (198) that consist—can you imagine it?—in his belief in the necessity of a scientific theory that defines the aims of the men of action concerned. "Critical investigators" are not subject to this strange belief. "Science will become free," utters Mr. Prokopovich, "only when it is admitted that it must *serve* the aims of a party and not *define* them. It must be recognised that science cannot define the aims of a practical party" (197). Be it noted that Bernstein renounced precisely these views of his follower. "A principled programme inevitably leads to dogmatism and is only a hindrance in the way of the party's sound development.... Theoretical principles are all very well in propaganda but not in a programme" (157). "Programmes are unnecessary; they are harmful." "The individual himself may be a programme if he is sensitive to, and has a fine feeling for, the needs of the times."... The reader probably thinks that I am continuing to quote Mr. Prokopovich. But no, I am now quoting the newspaper *Novoye Vremya*,[74] which recently published articles on a programme that attracted a great deal of attention—not the programme of a party, of course, but of the new Minister for Internal Affairs....

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The relationship of the freedom of unprincipledness—excuse me, "freedom of science"—preached by Mr. Prokopovich to the views of the majority of the West-European personalities of whom our valiant critic so valiantly writes, may be seen from the following quotations drawn from that same book by Mr. Prokopovich: "Of course, without a betrayal of principles..." (159). "Not in any way violating one's independence, loyalty to principle...." "I renounce compromise only in the case ... in which it leads to a renunciation of principles or even to the ignoring of principles..." (171). "Introducing no unprincipledness...", (174). "Not, of course, selling one's soul, in the present case, one's principles..." (176). "The principles are now firmly established..." (183). "A compass [is needed] that would rid us of the need to grope our way," against "short-sighted empiricism," against "a thoughtless attitude to principles" (195). "Primary importance attaches to principles, to the theoretical part..." (103, Part II), etc.

In conclusion, two more quotations: "If German Social-Democracy were the expression of socialism and not of the proletariat that is acting in defence of its own interests in present-day society, for the first time recognising its significance, then—since not all Germans are idealists—side by side with this party that pursues idealist aims we should see another, stronger party, a working-class party that represents the practical interests of that part of the German proletariat that is not idealist."... "If socialism were not to play the role of a mere symbol in that movement, a symbol distinguishing one definite organisation, if it were the motive idea, the principle that demands of party members a certain specific service—in that ease the socialist party would separate from the general labour party, and the mass of the proletariat, which strives for better living conditions under the existing system and cares little for the ideal future, would form an independent labour party." The reader will again probably think....

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REVIEW

Karl Kautsky. ***Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Eine Antikritik****

...In the introduction Kautsky gives voice to some extremely valuable and apt ideas on the conditions that must be satisfied by serious and conscientious criticism if those undertaking it do not wish to confine themselves within the narrow bounds of soulless pedantry and scholasticism, if they do not wish to lose sight of the close and indestructible bonds that exist between the "theoretical reason" and the "practical reason"—not the practical reason of individuals, but of the masses of the population placed in specific conditions. Truth, of course, comes first, says Kautsky, and if Bernstein has become sincerely convinced of the error of his former views, it is his plain duty to give definite expression to his convictions. But the trouble with Bernstein is his lack of precisely this directness and definiteness. His pamphlet is amazingly "encyclopaedic" (as Antonio Labriola has remarked in a French magazine); it touches on a mass of problems, an agglomeration of questions, but *not on any one* of them does it provide an integral and precise exposition of the critic's new views. The critic merely expresses his doubts and abandons difficult and complicated questions without any independent analysis after having scarcely touched upon them. This brings about, Kautsky notes sarcastically, a strange phenomenon: Bernstein's followers understand his

* Karl Kautsky. *Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme. A Counter-Critique.—Ed.*

book in the most diverse ways, whereas his opponents all understand it in the same way. Bernstein's chief objection to his opponents is that they do not understand him, that they do not want to understand him. The whole series of newspaper and magazine articles that Bernstein has written in answer to his opponents has failed to explain his positive views.

Kautsky begins his Counter-Criticism with the question of method. He examines Bernstein's objections to the materialist conception of history and shows that Bernstein confuses the concept of "determinism" with that of "mechanism," that he confuses freedom of will with freedom of action, and without any grounds identifies historical necessity with the hopeless position of people under compulsion. The outworn accusation of fatalism, which Bernstein also repeats, is refuted by the very premises of Marx's theory of history. Not everything can be reduced to the development of the productive forces, says Bernstein. Other factors "must be taken into consideration."

Very well, answers Kautsky, that is something every investigator must do, irrespective of what conception of history guides him. Anyone who wants to make us reject Marx's method, the method that has so brilliantly justified itself and continues to justify itself in practice, must take one of two paths: either he must reject altogether the idea of objective laws, of the necessity of the historical process, and in so doing abandon all attempts at providing a scientific basis for sociology; or he must show how he can evolve the necessity of the historical process from other factors (ethical views, for example), he must show this by an analysis that will stand up to at least a remote comparison with Marx's analysis in *Capital*. Not only has Bernstein not made the slightest attempt to do this, but, confining himself to empty platitudes about "taking into consideration" other factors, he *has continued* to use the old materialist method in his book as though he did not declare it to be wanting! As Kautsky points out, Bernstein, at times, even applies this method with the most impermissible crudity and one-sidedness! Further on Bernstein's accusations are levelled against dialectics which, he alleges, lead to arbitrary constructions, etc., etc. Bernstein repeats these phrases (that

have already managed to disgust also the Russian readers) without making the slightest attempt to show what is incorrect in dialectics, whether Hegel or Marx and Engels are guilty of methodological errors (and precisely what errors). The only means by which Bernstein tries to motivate and fortify his opinion is a reference to the "tendentiousness" of one of the concluding sections of *Capital* (on the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation). This charge has been worn threadbare: it was made by Eugen Dühring and Julius Wolf and many others in Germany, and it was made (we add on our part) by Mr. Y. Zhukovsky in the seventies and by Mr. N. Mikhailovsky in the nineties—by the very same Mr. Mikhailovsky who had once accused Mr. Y. Zhukovsky of acrobatics for making the selfsame charge. And what *proof* does Bernstein offer in confirmation of this worn-out nonsense? Only the following: Marx began his "investigation" with ready-made conclusions, since in 1867 *Capital* drew the same conclusion that Marx had drawn as early as the forties. Such "proof" is tantamount to fraud, answers Kautsky, because Marx based his conclusions on two investigations and not on one, as he points out very definitely in the introduction to *Zur Kritik* (see Russian translation: *A Critique of Some of the Propositions of Political Economy*[75]). Marx made his first investigation in the forties, after leaving the Editorial Board of the *Rheinische Zeitung*.[76] Marx left the newspaper because he had to treat of material interests and he realised that he was not sufficiently prepared for this. From the arena of public life, wrote Marx about himself, I withdrew into the study. And so (stresses Kautsky, hinting at Bernstein), Marx had doubts regarding the correctness of his judgement of material interests, regarding the correctness of the dominant views on this subject at that time, but he did not think his doubts to be important enough to write a whole book and inform the world about them. On the contrary, Marx set out to study in order to advance from doubtings of the old views to positive new ideas. He began to study French social theories and English political economy. He came into close contact with Engels, who was at that time making a detailed study of the actual state of the economy in England. The result of this joint work, this *first* inquiry, was the

well-known conclusions which the two writers expounded very definitely towards the end of the forties.[77] Marx moved to London in 1850, and the favourable conditions there for research determined him "to begin afresh *from the very beginning* and to work through the new material critically" (*A Critique of Some of the Propositions*, 1st edition, p. xi.[78] Our italics). The fruit of this *second* inquiry, lasting many long years, were the works: *Zur Kritik* (1859) and *Das Kapital* (1867). The conclusion drawn in *Capital* coincides with the former conclusion drawn in the forties because the second inquiry confirmed the results of the first. "My views, however they may be judged ... are the result of conscientious investigation lasting many years," wrote Marx in 1859 (*ibid.*, p. xii).[79] Does this, asks Kautsky, resemble conclusions found ready-made long before the investigation?

From the question of dialectics Kautsky goes over to the question of value. Bernstein says that Marx's theory is unfinished, that it leaves many problems "that are by no means fully explained." Kautsky does not think of refuting this: Marx's theory is not the last word in science, he says. History brings new facts and new methods of investigation that require the further development of the theory. If Bernstein had made an attempt to utilise new facts and new methods of inquiry for the further development of the theory, everybody would have been grateful to him. But Bernstein does not dream of doing that; he confines himself to cheap attacks on Marx's disciples and to extremely vague, purely eclectic remarks, such as: the Gossen-Jevons-Böhm theory of marginal utility is no less just than Marx's theory of labour-value. Both theories retain their significance for different purposes, says Bernstein, because Böhm-Bawerk has as much right, *a prior*, to abstract from the property of commodities that they are produced by labour, as Marx has to abstract from the property that they are use-values. Kautsky points out that it is utterly absurd to regard two opposite, mutually exclusive theories suitable for different purposes (and, furthermore, Bernstein does not say for what purposes either of the two theories is suitable). It is by no means a question as to which property of commodities we are, *a priori* (*von Hause aus*), entitled to abstract from; the question is how to explain the principal

phenomena of present-day society, based on the *exchange* of products, how to explain the value of commodities, the function of money, etc. Even if Marx's theory may leave a number of still unexplained problems, Bernstein's theory of value is a totally unexplained problem. Bernstein further quotes Buch, who constructed the concept of the "maximum density" of labour; but Bernstein does not give a complete exposition of Buch's views or make a definite statement of his own opinion on that question. Buch, it seems, gets entangled in contradictions by making value depend on wages and wages depend on value. Bernstein senses the eclecticism of his statements on value and tries to defend eclecticism in general. He calls it "the revolt of the sober intellect against the tendency inherent in every dogma to constrict thought within narrow confines." If Bernstein were to recall the history of thought, retorts Kautsky, he would see that the great rebels against the constriction of thought within narrow confines were never eclectics, that what has always characterised them has been the striving for the unity, for the integrity of ideas. The eclectic is too timid to dare revolt. If, indeed, I click my heels politely to Marx and at the same time click my heels politely to Böhm-Bawerk, that is still a long way from revolt! Let anyone name even one eclectic in the republic of thought, says Kautsky, who has proved worthy of the name of rebel!

Passing from the method to the results of its application, Kautsky deals with the so-called *Zusammenbruchstheorie*, the theory of collapse, of the sudden crash of West-European capitalism, a crash that Marx allegedly believed to be inevitable and connected with a gigantic economic crisis. Kautsky says and proves that Marx and Engels never propounded a special *Zusammenbruchstheorie*, that they did not connect a *Zusammenbruch* necessarily with an economic crisis. This is a distortion chargeable to their opponents who expound Marx's theory one-sidedly, tearing out of context odd passages from different writings in order thus triumphantly to refute the "one-sidedness" and "crudeness" of the theory. Actually Marx and Engels considered the transformation of West-European economic relations to be dependent on the maturity and strength of the classes

brought to the fore by modern European history. Bernstein tries to assert that this is not the theory of Marx, but Kautsky's interpretation and extension of it. Kautsky, however, with precise quotations from Marx's writings of the forties and sixties, as well as by means of an analysis of the basic ideas of Marxism, has completely refuted this truly pettifogging trickery of the Bernstein who so blatantly accused Marx's disciples of "apologetics and pettifoggery." This part of Kautsky's book is particularly interesting, the more so, since some Russian writers (e.g., Mr. Bulgakov in the magazine *Nachalo*) have been in a hurry to repeat the distortion of Marx's theory which Bernstein offered in the guise of "criticism" (as does Mr. Prokopovich in his *Working-Class Movement in the West*, St. Petersburg, 1899).

Kautsky analyses the basic tendencies of contemporary economic development in particularly great detail in order to refute Bernstein's opinion that this development is not proceeding in the direction indicated by Marx. It stands to reason that we cannot present here a detailed exposition of the chapter "Large- and Small-Scale Production" and of other chapters of Kautsky's book which are devoted to a political-economic analysis and contain extensive numerical data, but shall have to confine ourselves to a brief mention of their contents. Kautsky emphasises the point that the question is one of the direction, by and large, of development and by no means of particularities and superficial manifestations, which *no* theory can take into account in all their great variety. (Marx reminds the reader of this simple but oft forgotten truth in the relevant chapters of *Capital*.) By a detailed analysis of the data provided by the German industrial censuses of 1882 and 1895 Kautsky shows that they are a brilliant confirmation of Marx's theory and have placed beyond all doubt the process of the concentration of capital and the elimination of small-scale production. In 1896 Bernstein (when he himself still belonged to the guild of apologists and pettifoggers, says Kautsky ironically) most emphatically recognised this fact, but now he is excessive in his exaggeration of the strength and importance of small-scale production. Thus, Bernstein estimates the number of enterprises employing fewer than 20 workers at several hundred thousand, "apparently adding in his pessimistic zeal an extra

nought to the figure," since there are only 49,000 such enterprises in Germany. Further, whom do the statistics not place among the petty entrepreneurs—cabmen, messengers, gravediggers, fruit hawkers, seamstresses (even though they may work at home for a capitalist), etc., etc.! Here let us note a remark of Kautsky's that is particularly important from the theoretical standpoint—that petty commercial and industrial enterprises (such as those mentioned above) in capitalist society are often merely one of the forms of relative over-population; ruined petty producers, workers unable to find employment turn (sometimes temporarily) into petty traders and hawkers, or rent out rooms or beds (also "enterprises," which are registered by statistics equally with all other types of enterprise!), etc. The fact that these employments are overcrowded does not by any means indicate the viability of petty production but rather the growth of poverty in capitalist society. Bernstein, however, emphasises and exaggerates the importance of the petty "industrial producers" when to do so seems to him to serve his advantage (on the question of large- and small-scale production), but keeps silent about them when he finds it to his disadvantage (on the question of the growth of poverty).

Bernstein repeats the argument, long known to the Russian public as well, that joint-stock companies "permit" the fragmentation of capital and "make unnecessary" its concentration, and he cites some figures (cf. *Zhizn*, No. 3 for 1899) on the number of small shares. Kautsky replies that these figures prove exactly nothing, since small shares in any companies might belong to big capitalists (as even Bernstein must admit). Bernstein does not adduce any evidence, nor can he, to prove that joint-stock companies *increase* the number of property-owners, for the joint-stock companies actually serve to expropriate the gullible men of small means for the benefit of big capitalists and speculators. The growth in the number of shares merely shows that wealth has a tendency to take on the form of shares; but this growth tells us nothing about the distribution of wealth. In general, Bernstein's attitude to the question of an increase in the number of wealthy people, the number of property-owners, is an astonishingly thoughtless one, which has not prevented his bourgeois followers

from praising precisely this part of his book and announcing that it is based on "a tremendous amount of numerical data." And Bernstein proved himself skilful enough, says Kautsky ironically, to compress this tremendous amount of data into two pages! He confuses property-owners with capitalists, although no one has denied an increase in the number of the latter. In analysing income-tax data, he ignores their fiscal character, and their confusion of income from property with income in the form of salary, etc. He compares data for different times that have been collected by different methods (on Prussia, for example) and are, therefore, not comparable. He even goes so far as to borrow data on the growth of property-owners in England (printing these figures in heavy type, as his trump card) from an article in some sensational newspaper that was singing the praises of Queen Victoria's jubilee and whose handling of statistics was the *nec plus ultra* of light-mindedness! The source of this information is unknown and, indeed, such information cannot be obtained on the basis of data on the English income tax, since these do not permit one to determine the number of tax-payers and the total income of each tax-payer. Kautsky adduces data from Kolb's book on the English income tax from 1812 to 1847 and shows that they, in exactly the same way as Bernstein's newspaper data, indicate an (apparent) increase in the number of property-owners—and that, in a period of the most terrible increase in the most horrible poverty of the people in England! A detailed analysis of Bernstein's data led Kautsky to the conclusion that Bernstein had not quoted a single figure that actually proved a growth in the number of property-owners.

Bernstein tried to give this phenomenon a theoretical grounding: the capitalists, he said, cannot themselves consume the entire surplus-value that increases to such a colossal extent; this means that the number of property-owners that consume it must grow. It is not very difficult for Kautsky to refute this grotesque argument that totally ignores Marx's theory of realisation (expounded many times in Russian literature). It is particularly interesting that for his refutation Kautsky does not employ theoretical arguments alone, but offers concrete data attesting to the growth of luxury and lavish spending in the West-European coun-

tries; to the influence of rapidly changing fashions, which greatly intensify this process; to mass unemployment; to the tremendous increase in the "productive consumption" of surplus-value, i.e., the investment of capital in new enterprises, especially the investment of European capital in the railways and other enterprises of Russia, Asia, and Africa.

Bernstein declares that everyone has abandoned Marx's "theory of misery" or "theory of impoverishment." Kautsky demonstrates that this is again a distorted exaggeration on the part of the opponents of Marx, since Marx propounded no such theory. He spoke of the growth of poverty, degradation, etc., indicating at the same time the counteracting tendency and the real social forces that alone could give rise to this tendency. Marx's words on the growth of poverty are fully justified by reality: first, we actually see that capitalism has a tendency to engender and increase poverty, which acquires tremendous proportions when the above-mentioned counteracting tendency is absent. Secondly, poverty grows, not in the physical but in the social sense, i.e., in the sense of the disparity between the increasing level of consumption by the bourgeoisie and consumption by society as a whole, and the level of the living standards of the working people. Bernstein waxes ironical over such a conception of "poverty," saying that this is a Pickwickian conception. In reply Kautsky shows that people like Lassalle, Rodbertus, and Engels have made very definite statements to the effect that poverty must be understood in its social, as well as in its physical, sense. As you see—he parries Bernstein's irony—it is not such a bad company that gathers at the "Pickwick Club"! Thirdly and lastly, the passage on increasing impoverishment remains perfectly true in respect of the "border regions" of capitalism, the border regions being understood both in the geographical sense (countries in which capitalism is only beginning to penetrate and frequently not only gives rise to physical poverty but to the outright starvation of the masses) and in the political-economic sense (handicraft industries and, in general, those branches of economy in which backward methods of production are still retained).

The chapter on the "new middle estate" is likewise extremely

interesting and, for us Russians, particularly instructive. If Bernstein had merely wanted to say that in place of the declining petty producers a new middle estate, the intelligentsia, is appearing, he would be perfectly correct, says Kautsky, pointing out that he himself noted the importance of this phenomenon several years before. In all spheres of people's labour, capitalism increases the number of *office and professional workers* with particular rapidity and makes a growing demand for intellectuals. The latter occupy a special position among the other classes, attaching themselves partly to the bourgeoisie by their connections, their outlooks, etc., and partly to the wage-workers as capitalism increasingly deprives the intellectual of his independent position, converts him into a hired worker and threatens to lower his living standard. The transitory, unstable, contradictory position of that stratum of society now under discussion is reflected in the particularly widespread diffusion in its midst of hybrid, eclectic views, a farrago of contrasting principles and ideas, an urge to rise verbally to the higher spheres and to conceal the conflicts between the historical groups of the population with phrases—all of which Marx lashed with his sarcasm half a century ago.

In the chapter on the theory of crises Kautsky shows that Marx did not at all postulate a "theory" of the ten-year cycle of industrial crises, but merely stated a fact. The change in this cycle in recent times has been noted by Engels himself. It is said that cartels of industrialists can counteract crises by limiting and regulating production. But America is a land of cartels; yet instead of a limitation we see there a tremendous growth of production. Further, the cartels limit production for the home market but expand it for the foreign market, selling their goods abroad at a loss and extracting monopoly prices from consumers in their own country. This system is inevitable under protectionism and there are no grounds for anticipating a change from protectionism to Free Trade. The cartels close small factories, concentrate and monopolise production, introduce improvements, and in this way greatly worsen the condition of the producers. Bernstein is of the opinion that the speculation which gives rise to crises weakens as the conditions on the world market change from unforeseeable to foreseeable

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and known conditions; but he forgets that it is the "unforeseeable" conditions in the new countries that give a tremendous impetus to speculation in the old countries. Using statistical data, Kautsky shows the growth of speculation in precisely the last few years, as well as the growth in the symptoms indicating a crisis in the not very distant future.

With regard to the remaining part of Kautsky's book, we must mention his analysis of the muddle people get into through confusing (as does Mr. S. Prokopovich, op. cit.) the economic strength of certain groups with their economic organisations. We must mention Kautsky's statement to the effect that Bernstein ascribes to purely temporary conditions of a given historical situation the dignity of a general law—his refutation of Bernstein's incorrect views on the essence of democracy; and his explanation of Bernstein's statistical error, in comparing the number of industrial workers in Germany with the number of voters and overlooking the mere trifle that not all the workers in Germany (but only males over the age of 25) enjoy the franchise and that not all participate in the elections. We can only strongly recommend to the reader who is interested in the question of the significance of Bernstein's book and in the polemic around it to turn to the German literature and under no circumstances to believe the biased and one-sided reviews by the proponents of eclecticism that dominate in Russian literature. We have heard that part of Kautsky's book here under-review will probably be translated into Russian. This is-very desirable, but is no substitute for an acquaintanceship-with the original.

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LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL GROUP

Dear Comrades!

In response to your request I am sending three articles for the newspaper and deem it essential to say a few words about my collaboration in general and the relations between us in particular.

From your previous communication I gathered that you wanted to found a publishing firm and give me a series of Social-Democratic pamphlets to edit.

Now I see that matters are different, that you have set up your Editorial Board, which is beginning the publication of a newspaper and invites me to collaborate.

Needless to say, I agree willingly to this proposal as well, but I must state, in doing so, that I consider successful collaboration possible *only on the following terms*: 1) *regular* relations between the editors and the collaborator, *who shall be informed* of decisions on all manuscripts (accepted, rejected, changed) and of *all publications of your firm*; 2) my articles to be signed with a special pseudonym (if the one I sent you has been lost, choose another yourselves); 3) agreement between the editors and the collaborator on fundamental views concerning theoretical questions, concerning immediate practical tasks, and concerning the desired character of the newspaper (or series of pamphlets).

I hope the editors will agree to these terms and, in order to effect the earliest possible agreement between us, I will deal in brief with the questions arising out of the third condition.

I am informed that you find that "the old current is strong" and that there is no particular need for a polemic against Bernsteinism and its Russian echoers. I consider this view to he too optimistic. Bernstein's public announcement that the majority of the Russian Social-Democrats agree with him[81]; the split between the "young" Russian Social-Democrats abroad and the Emancipation of Labour group[82] which is the founder, the representative, and the most faithful custodian of the "old current"; the vain efforts of *Rabochaya Mysl* to say some new word, to revolt against the "extensive" political tasks, to raise petty matters and amateurish work to the heights of apotheosis, to wax vulgarly ironical over "revolutionary theories" (No. 7, "In Passing"); lastly, complete disorder in the legal Marxist literature and the frantic efforts on the part of the majority of its representatives to seize upon Bernsteinism, the "criticism" *à la mode*—all this, in my opinion, serves to show clearly that the re-establishment of the "old current" and its energetic defence is a matter of real urgency.

You will see from the articles what my views on the tasks of the paper and the plan of its publication are, and I should very much like to know the extent of our solidarity on this question (unfortunately the articles have been written in somewhat of a hurry: it is very important for me to know the deadline for their delivery).

I think it is *necessary to launch a direct polemic* against *Rabochaya Mysl*, but for this purpose I should like to receive *Nos. 1-2*, *6*, *and those following 7*; also *Proletarskaya Borba*.[83] I need the last-named pamphlet also in order to review it in the paper.

As to length, you write that I am to impose no constraint on myself. I think that as long as there is a newspaper I shall give preference to newspaper articles and deal in them even with pamphlet themes, reserving for myself the right to work the articles up into pamphlets at a later date. The subjects with which I propose to deal in the immediate future are: 1) the Draft Programme (I'll send it soon)[84]; 2) questions of tactics and organisation that are to be discussed at the next congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party[85]; 3) a pamphlet on rules of conduct for workers and socialists at liberty, in prison, and in exile—modelled after

the Polish pamphlet (on "rules of conduct"—if you can, I should like you to obtain it for me); 4) strikes (I—their significance, II—laws on strikes; III—a review of some of the strikes of recent years); 5) the pamphlet, *Woman and the Working-Class Cause*, and others.

I should like to know approximately what material the Editorial Board has in hand, so as to avoid repetition and the tackling of questions that have already been "exhausted."

I shall await an answer from the Editorial Board through the same channels. (*Apart from this way I have not had nor have I any other means of communicating with your group.*)

F. P. [86]

OUR PROGRAMME

International Social-Democracy is at present in a state of ideological wavering. Hitherto the doctrines of Marx and Engels were considered to be the firm foundation of revolutionary theory, but voices are now being raised everywhere to proclaim these doctrines inadequate and obsolete. Whoever declares himself to be a Social-Democrat and intends to publish a Social-Democratic organ must define precisely his attitude to a question that is preoccupying the attention of the German Social-Democrats and not of them alone.

We take our stand entirely on the Marxist theoretical position: Marxism was the first to transform socialism from a utopia into a science, to lay a firm foundation for this science, and to indicate the path that must be followed in further developing and elaborating it in all its parts. It disclosed the nature of modern capitalist economy by explaining how the hire of the labourer, the purchase of labour-power, conceals the enslavement of millions of propertyless people by a handful of capitalists, the owners of the land, factories, mines, and so forth. It showed that all modern capitalist development displays the tendency of large-scale production to eliminate petty production and creates conditions that make a socialist system of society possible and necessary. It taught us how to discern, beneath the pall of rooted customs, political intrigues, abstruse laws, and intricate doctrines—the *class struggle*, the struggle between the propertied classes in all their variety and the propertyless mass, the *proletariat*, which is at the head of all the propertyless. It made clear the real task of

a revolutionary socialist party: not to draw up plans for refashioning society, not to preach to the capitalists and their hangers-on about improving the lot of the workers, not to hatch conspiracies, *but to organise the class struggle of the proletariat and to lead this struggle, the ultimate aim of which is the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the organisation of a socialist society.*

And we now ask: Has anything new been introduced into this theory by its loud-voiced "renovators" who are raising so much noise in our day and have grouped themselves around the German socialist Bernstein? *Absolutely nothing*. Not by a single step have they advanced the science which Marx and Engels enjoined us to develop; they have not taught the proletariat any new methods of struggle; they have only retreated, borrowing fragments of backward theories and preaching to the proletariat, not the theory of struggle, but the theory of concession—concession to the most vicious enemies of the proletariat, the governments and bourgeois parties who never tire of seeking new means of baiting the socialists. Plekhanov, one of the founders and leaders of Russian Social-Democracy, was entirely right in ruthlessly criticising Bernstein's latest "critique"[87]; the views of Bernstein have now been rejected by the representatives of the German workers as well (at the Hannover Congress).[88]

We anticipate a flood of accusations for these words; the shouts will rise that we want to convert the socialist party into an order of "true believers" that persecutes "heretics" for deviations from "dogma," for every independent opinion, and so forth. We know about all these fashionable and trenchant phrases. Only there is not a grain of truth or sense in them. There can be no strong socialist party without a revolutionary theory which unites all socialists, from which they draw all their convictions, and which they apply in their methods of struggle and means of action. To defend such a theory, which to the best of your knowledge you consider to be true, against unfounded attacks and attempts to corrupt it is not to imply that you are an enemy of *all* criticism. We do not regard Marx's theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the science which socialists *must* develop in all directions if

they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an *independent* elaboration of Marx's theory is especially essential for Russian socialists; for this theory provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently than in France, in France differently than in Germany, and in Germany differently than in Russia. We shall therefore gladly afford space in our paper for articles on theoretical questions and we invite all comrades openly to discuss controversial points.

What are the main questions that arise in the application to Russia of the programme common to all Social-Democrats? We have stated that the essence of this programme is to organise the class struggle of the proletariat, and to lead this struggle, the ultimate aim of which is the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the establishment of a socialist society. The class struggle of the proletariat comprises the economic struggle (struggle against individual capitalists or against individual groups of capitalists for the improvement of the workers' condition) and the political struggle (struggle against the government for the broadening of the people's rights, i.e., for democracy, and for the broadening of the political power of the proletariat). Some Russian Social-Democrats (among them apparently those who direct *Rabochaya Mysl* regard the economic struggle as incomparably the more important and almost go so far as to relegate the political struggle to the more or less distant future. This standpoint is utterly false. All Social-Democrats are agreed that it is necessary to organise the economic struggle of the working class, that it is necessary to carry on agitation among the workers on this basis, i.e., to help the workers in their day-to-day struggle against the employers, to draw their attention to every form and every case of oppression and in this way to make clear to them the necessity for combination. But to forget the political struggle for the economic would mean to depart from the basic principle of international Social-Democracy, it would mean to forget what the entire history of the labour movement teaches us. The confirmed adherents of the bourgeoisie and of the government which serves it have even made repeated attempts to organise purely economic unions of workers and to divert them in this way from "politics," from

socialism. It is quite possible that the Russian Government, too, may undertake something of the kind, as it has always endeavoured to throw some paltry sops or, rather, sham sops, to the people, only to turn their thoughts away from the fact that they are oppressed and without rights. No economic struggle can bring the workers any lasting improvement, or can even be conducted on a large scale, unless the workers have the right freely to organise meetings and unions, to have their own newspapers, and to send their representatives to the national assemblies, as do the workers in Germany and all other European countries (with the exception of Turkey and Russia). But in order to win these rights it is necessary to wage a *political struggle*. In Russia, not only the workers, but all citizens are deprived of political rights. Russia is an absolute and unlimited monarchy. The tsar alone promulgates laws, appoints officials and controls them. For this reason, *it seems* as though in Russia the tsar and the tsarist government are independent of all classes and accord equal treatment to all. But *in reality* all officials are chosen exclusively from the propertied class and all are subject to the influence of the big capitalists, who make the ministers dance to their tune and who achieve whatever they want. The Russian working class is burdened by a double yoke; it is robbed and plundered by the capitalists and the landlords, and to prevent it from fighting them, the police bind it hand and foot, gag it, and every attempt to defend the rights of the people is persecuted. Every strike against a capitalist results in the military and police being let loose on the workers. Every economic struggle necessarily becomes a political struggle, and Social-Democracy must indissolubly combine the one with the other into a *single class struggle of the proletariat*. The first and chief aim of such a struggle must be the conquest of political rights, *the conquest of political liberty*. If the workers of St. Petersburg alone, with a little help from the socialists, have rapidly succeeded in wringing a concession from the government—the adoption of the law on the reduction of the working day[89]—then the Russian working class as a whole, led by a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, will be able, in persistent struggle, to win incomparably more important concessions.

The Russian working class is able to wage its economic and political struggle alone, even if no other class comes to its aid. But in the political struggle the workers do not stand alone. The people's complete lack of rights and the savage lawlessness of the bashi-bazouk officials rouse the indignation of all honest educated people who cannot reconcile themselves to the persecution of free thought and free speech; they rouse the indignation of the persecuted Poles, Finns, Jews, and Russian religious sects; they rouse the indignation of the small merchants, manufacturers, and peasants, who can nowhere find protection from the persecution of officials and police. All these groups of the population are incapable, separately, of carrying on a persistent political struggle. But when the working class raises the banner of this struggle, it will receive support from all sides. Russian Social-Democracy will place itself at the head of all fighters for the rights of the people, of all fighters for democracy, and it will prove invincible!

These are our fundamental views, and we shall develop them systematically and from every aspect in our paper. We are convinced that in this way we shall tread the path which has been indicated by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in its published *Manifesto*.

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK

The Russian working-class movement is today going through a period of transition. The splendid beginning achieved by the Social-Democratic workers' organisations in the Western area, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and other cities was consummated by the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (spring 1898). Russian Social-Democracy seems to have exhausted, for the time being, all its strength in making this tremendous step forward and has gone back to the former isolated functioning of separate local organisations. The Party has not ceased to exist, it has only withdrawn into itself in order to gather strength and put the unification of all Russian Social-Democrats on a sound footing. To effect this unification, to evolve a suitable form for it and to get rid completely of narrow local isolation—such is the immediate and most urgent task of the Russian Social-Democrats.

We are all agreed that our task is that of the organisation of the proletarian class struggle. But what is this class struggle? When the workers of a single factory or of a single branch of industry engage in struggle against their employer or employers, is this class struggle? No, this is only a weak embryo of it. The struggle of the workers becomes a class struggle only when all the foremost representatives of the entire working class of the whole country are conscious of themselves as a single working class and launch a struggle that is directed, not against individual employers, but against the *entire class* of capitalists and against the government that supports that class. Only when the individual worker realises that he is a member

of the entire working class, only when he recognises the fact that his petty day-to-day struggle against individual employers and individual government officials is a struggle against the entire bourgeoisie and the entire government, does his struggle become a class struggle. "Every class struggle is a political struggle"[90]—these famous words of Marx are not to be understood to mean that any struggle of workers against employers must *always be* a political struggle. They must be understood to mean that the struggle of the workers against the capitalists inevitably *becomes* a political struggle *insofar as* it becomes a *class* struggle. It is the task of the Social-Democrats, by organising the workers, by conducting propaganda and agitation among them, to *turn* their spontaneous struggle against their oppressors into the struggle of the whole class, into the struggle of a definite political *party* for definite political and socialist ideals. This is something that cannot be achieved by local activity alone.

Local Social-Democratic activity has attained a fairly high level in our country. The seeds of Social-Democratic ideas have been broadcast throughout Russia; workers' leaflets—the earliest form of Social-Democratic literature—are known to all Russian workers from St. Petersburg to Krasnoyarsk, from the Caucasus to the Urals. All that is now lacking is the unification of all this local work into the work of a single *party*. Our chief drawback, to the overcoming of which we must devote all our energy, is the narrow "amateurish" character of local work. Because of this amateurish character many manifestations of the working-class movement in Russia remain purely local events and lose a great deal of their significance as examples for the whole of Russian Social-Democracy, as a stage of the whole Russian working-class movement. Because of this amateurishness, the consciousness of their community of interests throughout Russia is insufficiently inculcated in the workers, they do not link up their struggle sufficiently with the idea of Russian socialism and Russian democracy. Because of this amateurishness the comrades' varying views on theoretical and practical problems are not openly discussed in a central newspaper, they do not serve the purpose of elaborating a common programme and devising common tactics for the Party, they are lost in narrow study-circle life or they lead

to the inordinate exaggeration of local and chance peculiarities. Enough of our amateurishness! We have attained sufficient maturity to go over to *common action*, to the elaboration of a common Party programme, to the joint discussion of our Party tactics and organisation.

Russian Social-Democracy has done a great deal in criticising old revolutionary and socialist theories; it has not limited itself to criticism and theorising alone; it has shown that its programme is not hanging in the air but is meeting the extensive spontaneous movement among the people, that is, among the factory proletariat. It has now to make the following, very difficult, but very important, step—to elaborate an organisation of the movement adapted to our conditions. Social-Democracy is not confined to simple service to the working-class movement: it represents "*the combination of socialism and the working-class movement*" (to use Karl Kautsky's definition which repeats the basic ideas of the *Communist Manifesto*); the task of Social-Democracy is to bring definite socialist ideals to the spontaneous working-class movement, to connect this movement with socialist convictions that should attain the level of contemporary science, to connect it with the regular political struggle for democracy as a means of achieving socialism—in a word, to fuse this spontaneous movement into one indestructible whole with the activity of the *revolutionary party*. The history of socialism and democracy in Western Europe, the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, the experience of our working-class movement—such is the *material* we must master to elaborate a purposeful organisation and purposeful tactics for our Party. "The analysis" of this material must, however, be done independently, since there are no ready-made models to be found anywhere. On the one hand, the Russian working-class movement exists under conditions that are quite different from those of Western Europe. It would be most dangerous to have any illusions on this score. On the other hand, Russian Social-Democracy differs very substantially from former revolutionary parties in Russia, so that the necessity of learning revolutionary technique and secret organisation from the old Russian masters (we do not in the least hesitate to admit this necessity) does not in any way relieve

us of the duty of assessing them critically and elaborating our own organisation independently.

In the presentation of such a task there are two main questions that come to the fore with particular insistence: 1) How is the need for the complete liberty of local Social-Democratic activity to be combined with the need for establishing a single—and, consequently, a centralist—party? Social-Democracy draws its strength from the spontaneous working-class movement that manifests itself differently and at different times in the various industrial centres; the activity of the local Social-Democratic organisations is the *basis* of all Party activity. If, however, this is to be the activity of isolated "amateurs," then it cannot, strictly speaking, be called Social-Democratic, since it will not be the organisation and leadership of the *class* struggle of the proletariat. 2) How can we combine the striving of Social-Democracy to become a revolutionary party that makes the struggle for political liberty its chief purpose with the determined refusal of Social-Democracy to organise political conspiracies, its emphatic refusal to "call the workers to the barricades" (as correctly noted by P. B. Axelrod), or, in general, to impose on the workers this or that "plan" for an attack on the government, which has been thought up by a company of revolutionaries?

Russian Social-Democracy has every right to believe that it has provided the *theoretical* solution to these questions; to dwell on this would mean to repeat what has been said in the article, "Our Programme." It is now a matter of the *practical* solution to these questions. This is not a solution that can be made by a single person or a single group; it can be provided only by the organised activity of Social-Democracy as a whole. We believe that the most urgent task of the moment consists in undertaking the solution of these questions, for which purpose we must have as our immediate aim *the founding of a Party organ that will appear regularly and be closely connected with all the local groups*. We believe that *all* the activity of the Social-Democrats should be directed to this end throughout the whole of the forthcoming period. Without such an organ, local work will remain narrowly "amateurish." The formation of the Party—if the correct representation of that Party in a

certain newspaper is not organised—will to a considerable extent remain bare words. An economic struggle that is not united by a central organ cannot become the *class* struggle of the entire Russian proletariat. It is impossible to conduct a political struggle if the Party as a whole fails to make statements on all questions of policy and to give direction to the various manifestations of the struggle. The organisation and disciplining of the revolutionary forces and the development of revolutionary technique are impossible without the discussion of all these questions in a central organ, without the collective elaboration of certain *forms and rules for the conduct of affairs*, without the establishment—through the central organ—of every Party member's *responsibility* to the entire Party.

In speaking of the necessity to concentrate *all* Party forces—all literary forces, all organisational abilities, all material resources, etc.—on the foundation and correct conduct of the organ of the whole Party, we do not for a moment think of pushing other forms of activity into the background—e.g., local agitation, demonstrations, boycott, the persecution of spies, the bitter campaigns against individual representatives of the bourgeoisie and the government, protest strikes, etc., etc. On the contrary, we are convinced that all these forms of activity constitute the *basis* of the Party's activity, but, *without* their unification through an organ of the whole Party, these forms of revolutionary struggle *lose nine-tenths of their significance*; they do not lead to the creation of common Party experience, to the creation of Party traditions and continuity. The Party organ, far from competing with such activity, will exercise tremendous influence on its extension, consolidation, and systematisation.

The necessity to concentrate *all* forces on establishing a regularly appearing and regularly delivered organ arises out of the peculiar situation of Russian Social-Democracy as compared with that of Social-Democracy in other European countries and with that of the old Russian revolutionary parties. Apart from newspapers, the workers of Germany, France, etc., have numerous other means for the public manifestation of their activity, for organising the movement—parliamentary activity, election agitation, public meetings,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

participation in local public bodies (rural and urban), the open conduct of trade unions (professional, guild), etc., etc. *In place of all of that*, yes, *all* of that, we must be served—until we have won political liberty—by a revolutionary newspaper, without which *no* broad organisation of the entire working-class movement is possible. We do not believe in conspiracies, we renounce individual revolutionary ventures to destroy the government; the words of Liebknecht, veteran of German Social-Democracy, serve as the watchword of our activities: "*Studieren*, *propagandieren*, *organisieren*"—Learn, propagandise, organise—and the pivot of this activity can and must be only the *organ of the Party*.

But is the regular and more or less stable establishment of such an organ possible, and under what circumstances is it possible? We shall deal with this matter next time.

AN URGENT QUESTION

In the previous article we said that our immediate task is to establish a Party organ, one that appears and can be delivered regularly, and we raised the question of whether and under what circumstances it is possible to achieve this aim. Let us examine the more important aspects of this question.

The main objection that may be raised is that the achievement of this purpose *first* requires the development of local group activity. We consider this fairly widespread opinion to be fallacious. We can and must immediately set about founding the Party organ—and, it follows, the Party itself—and putting them on a sound footing. The conditions essential to such a step already exist: local Party work is being carried on and obviously has struck deep roots; for the destructive police attacks that are growing more frequent lead to only short interruptions; fresh forces rapidly replace those that have fallen in battle. The Party has resources, for publishing and literary forces, not only abroad, but in Russia as well. The question, therefore, is whether the work *that is already being conducted* should be continued in "amateur" fashion or whether it should be organised into the work of one party and in such a way that it is reflected in its entirety in one common organ.

Here we come to the most urgent question of our movement, to its sore point—organisation. The improvement of revolutionary organisation and discipline, the perfection of our underground technique are an absolute necessity. We must openly admit that in this respect we are lagging behind

the old Russian revolutionary parties and must bend all our efforts to overtake and surpass them. Without improved organisation there can be no progress of our working-class movement in general, and no establishment of an active party with a properly functioning organ, in particular. That is on the one hand. On the other, the existing Party organs (organs in the sense of institutions and groups, as well as newspapers) must pay greater attention to questions of organisation and exert an influence in this respect on local groups.

Local, amateurish work always leads to a great excess of personal connections, to study-circle methods, and we have grown out of the study-circle stage which has become too narrow for our present-day work and which leads to an over-expenditure of forces. Only fusion into a single party will enable us strictly to observe the principles of division of labour and economy of forces, which must be achieved in order to reduce the losses and build as reliable a bulwark as possible against the oppression of the autocratic government and against its frantic persecutions. Against us, against the tiny groups of socialists hidden in the expanses of the Russian "underground," there stands the, huge machine of a most powerful modern state that is exerting all its forces to crush socialism and democracy. We are convinced that we shall, in the end, smash that police state, because all the sound and developing sections of our society are in favour of democracy and socialism; but, in order to conduct a systematic struggle against the government, we must raise revolutionary organisation, discipline, and the technique of underground work to the highest degree of perfection. It is essential for individual Party members or separate groups of members to specialise in the different aspects of Party work—some in the duplication of literature, others in its transport across the frontier, a third category in its distribution inside Russia, a fourth in its distribution in the cities, a fifth in the arrangement of secret meeting places, a sixth in the collection of funds, a seventh in the delivery of correspondence and all information about the movement, an eighth in maintaining relations, etc., etc. We know that this sort of specialisation requires much greater self-restraint, much greater ability to concentrate on

modest, unseen, everyday work, much greater real heroism than the usual work in study circles.

The Russian socialists and the Russian working class, however, have shown their heroic qualities and, in general, it would be a sin to complain of a shortage of people. There is to be observed among the working youth an impassioned, uncontrollable enthusiasm for the ideas of democracy and socialism, and helpers for the workers still continue to arrive from among the intellectuals, despite the fact that the prisons and places of exile are overcrowded. If the idea of the necessity for a stricter organisation is made widely known among all these recruits to the revolutionary cause, the plan for the organisation of a regularly published and delivered Party newspaper will cease to be a dream. Let us take one of the conditions for the success of this plan—that the newspaper be assured a regular supply of correspondence and other material from everywhere. Has not history shown that at all times when there has been a resurgence of our revolutionary movement such a purpose has proved possible of achievement even in respect of papers published abroad? If Social-Democrats working in various localities come to regard the Party newspaper as *their own* and consider the maintenance of regular contact with it, the discussion of their problems and the reflection of the whole movement in it to be their main task, it will be quite possible to ensure the supply to the paper of full information about the movement, provided methods of maintaining secrecy, not very complicated ones, are observed. The other aspect of the question, that of delivering the newspaper regularly to all parts of Russia, is much more difficult, more difficult than the similar task under previous forms of revolutionary movement in Russia when newspapers were not, to such an extent, intended for the masses of the people. The purpose of Social-Democratic newspapers, however, facilitates their distribution. The chief places to which the newspaper must be delivered regularly and in large numbers are the industrial centres, factory villages and towns, the factory districts of big cities, etc. In such centres the population is almost entirely working class; in actual fact the worker in such places is master of the situation and has hundreds of ways of outwitting the police; relations with neighbouring factory centres are

distinguished by their extraordinary activity. At the time of the Exceptional Law against the Socialists (1878-90)[91] the German political police did not function worse, but probably better, than the Russian police; nevertheless, the German workers, thanks to their organisation and discipline, were able to ensure the regular transport across the frontiers of a weekly illegal newspaper and to deliver it to the houses of all subscribers, so that even the ministers could not refrain from admiring the Social-Democratic post ("the red mail"). We do not, of course, dream of such successes, but we can, if we bend our efforts towards it, ensure that our Party newspaper appears no less than twelve times a year and is regularly delivered in all the main centres of the movement to all groups of workers that can be reached by socialism.

To return to the question of specialisation, we must also point out that its insufficiency is due partially to the dominance of "amateur" work and partially to the fact that our Social-Democratic newspapers usually devote far too little attention to questions of organisation.

Only the establishment of a common Party organ can give the "worker in a given field" of revolutionary activity the consciousness that he is marching with the "rank' and file," the consciousness that his work is directly essential to the Party, that he is one of the links in the chain that will form a noose to strangle the most evil enemy of the Russian proletariat and of the whole Russian people—the Russian autocratic government. Only strict adherence to this type of specialisation can economise our forces; not only will every aspect of revolutionary work be carried out by a smaller number of people, but there will be an opportunity to make a number of aspects of present-day activities *legal* affairs. This *legalisation* of activity, its conduct within the framework of the law, has long been advised for Russian socialists by *Vorwärts* (*Forward*),[92] the chief organ of the German Social-Democrats. At first sight one is astonished at such advice, but in actual fact it merits careful attention. Almost everyone who has worked in a local study circle in some city will easily remember that among the numerous and diverse affairs in which the circle engaged some were, in themselves, legal (e.g., the gathering

of information on the workers' conditions; the study of legal literature on many questions; consultation and reviewing of certain types of foreign literature; maintenance of certain kinds of relations; aid to workers in obtaining a general education, in studying factory laws, etc.). Making affairs of this sort the specific function of a special contingent of people would reduce the strength of the revolutionary army "in the firing line" (without any reduction of its "fighting potential") and increase the strength of the reserve, those who replace the "killed and wounded." This will be possible only when both the active members and the reserve see their activities reflected in the common organ of the Party and sense their connection with it. Local meetings of workers and local groups will, of course, always be necessary, no matter to what extent we carry out our specialisation; but, on the one hand, the number of mass revolutionary meetings (particularly dangerous from the standpoint of police action and often having results far from commensurate with the danger involved) will become considerably less and, on the other hand, the selection of various aspects of revolutionary work as special functions will provide greater opportunities to screen such meetings behind legal forms of assembly: entertainments, meetings of societies sanctioned by law, etc. Were not the French workers under Napoleon III and the German workers at the time of the Exceptional Law against the Socialists able to devise all possible ways to cover up their political and socialist meetings? Russian workers will be able to do likewise.

Further: only by better organisation and the establishment of a common Party organ will it be possible to extend *and* deepen the very content of Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation. We stand in great need of this. Local work must almost inevitably lead to the exaggeration of local particularities, to . . . . . .* this is impossible without a central organ which will, at the same time, be an advanced democratic organ. Only then will our *urge* to convert Social-Democracy into a leading fighter for democracy become *reality*. Only then, too, shall

* Part of the manuscript is not extant.—*Ed.*

we be able to work out definite political tactics. Social-Democracy has renounced the fallacious theory of the "one reactionary mass." It regards utilisation of the support of the progressive classes against the reactionary classes to be one of the most important political tasks. As long as the organisations and publications are local in character, this task can hardly be carried out at all: matters do not go farther than relations with individual "liberals" and the extraction of various "services" from them. Only a common Party organ, consistently implementing the principles of political struggle and holding high the banner of democracy will be able to win over to its side all militant democratic elements and use all Russia's progressive forces in the struggle for political freedom. Only then shall we be able to convert the workers' smouldering hatred of the police and the authorities into conscious hatred of the autocratic government and into determination to conduct a desperate struggle for the rights of the working class and of the entire Russian people! In modern Russia, a strictly organised revolutionary party built up on this foundation will prove the greatest political force!

In subsequent issues we shall publish the draft programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and begin a more detailed discussion of the various organisational questions.

A DRAFT PROGRAMME OF OUR PARTY[93]

Written at the end 1899

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The thing to begin with, most likely, is the question of whether there is really a pressing need for a programme of the Russian Social-Democrats. From comrades active in Russia we have heard the opinion expressed that at this particular moment there is no special need to draw up a programme; that the urgent question is one of developing and strengthening local organisations, of placing agitation and the delivery of literature on a more sound footing; that it would be better to postpone the elaboration of a programme until such time as when the movement stands on firmer ground; that a programme might, at the moment, turn out to be unfounded.

We do not share this opinion. It goes without saying that "every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes,"[94] as Karl Marx said. But neither Marx nor any other theoretician or practical worker in the Social-Democratic movement has ever denied the tremendous importance of a programme for the consolidation and consistent activity of a political party. The Russian Social-Democrats have just got over the period of the most bitter polemics with socialists of other trends and with non-socialists who were unwilling to understand Russian Social-Democracy; they have also got over the initial stages of the movement during which the work was carried on piecemeal by small local organisations. The need for unity, for the establishment of common literature, for the appearance of Russian workers' newspapers arises out of the real situation, and the foundation in the spring of 1898 of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which announced its intention of elaborating a Party programme in the near future, showed clearly that the demand for a programme grew out of the needs of the

movement itself. At the present time the urgent question of our movement is no longer that of developing the former scattered "amateur" activities, but of uniting—of organisation. This is a step for which a programme is a necessity. The programme must formulate our basic views; precisely establish our immediate political tasks; point out the immediate demands that must show the area of agitational activity; give unity to the agitational work, expand and deepen it, thus raising it from fragmentary partial agitation for petty, isolated demands to the status of agitation for the sum total of Social-Democratic demands. Today, when Social-Democratic activity has aroused a fairly wide circle of socialist intellectuals and class-conscious workers, it is urgently necessary to strengthen connections between them by a programme and in this way give all of them a sound basis for further, more extensive, activity. Lastly, a programme is urgently necessary because Russian public opinion is very often most profoundly mistaken in respect of the real tasks and methods of action of the Russian Social-Democrats: these mistaken views in some cases grow naturally in the morass of political putrefaction that is our real life, in others they are artificially nurtured by the opponents of Social-Democracy. In any case, this is a fact that has to be taken into account. The working-class movement, merging with socialism and with the political struggle, must establish a party that will have to dispel all these misunderstandings, if it is to stand at the head of all the democratic elements in Russian society. The objection may be raised, further, that the present moment is inopportune for the elaboration of a programme because there are differences of opinion that give rise to polemics among the Social-Democrats themselves. I believe the contrary to be true—this is another argument *in favour* of the necessity for a programme. On the one hand, since the polemic has begun, it is to be hoped that in the discussion of the draft programme all views and all shades of views will be afforded expression, that the discussion will be comprehensive. The polemic indicates that the Russian Social-Democrats are showing a revived interest in extensive questions pertaining to the aims of our movement and to its immediate tasks and tactics; precisely such a revival is essential to a discussion of the draft pro-

gramme. On the other hand, if the polemic is not to be fruitless, if it is not to degenerate into personal rivalry, if it is not to lead to a confusion of views, to a confounding of enemies and friends, it is absolutely essential that the question of the programme be introduced into the polemic. The polemic will be of benefit only if it makes clear in what the differences actually consist, *how profound they are*, whether they are differences of substance or differences on partial questions, whether or not these differences interfere with common work in the ranks of one and the same party. *Only* the introduction of the programme question into the polemic, only a definite statement by the two polemising parties on their *programmatic* views, can provide an answer to all these questions, questions that insistently demand an answer. The elaboration of a common programme for the Party should not, of course, put an end to all polemics; it will firmly establish those basic views on the character, the aims, and the tasks of our movement which must serve as the banner of a fighting party, a party that remains consolidated and united despite partial differences of opinion among its members on partial questions.

And now, to the matter.

When a programme of the Russian Social-Democrats is spoken of, all eyes naturally turn towards the members of the Emancipation of Labour group who founded Russian Social-Democracy and have done so much for its theoretical and practical development. Our older comrades were not slow in responding to the demands of the Russian Social-Democratic movement Almost at the very same time—in the spring of 1898—when preparations were being made for the congress of Russian Social-Democrats which laid the foundations for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, P. B. Axelrod published his pamphlet, *Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats* (Geneva, 1898; the foreword being dated March 1898), and reprinted as an appendix to it "A Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democrats," published by the Emancipation of Labour group as early as 1885.

We shall begin with a discussion of this draft. Despite the fact that it was published almost 15 years ago, it is our opinion that, by and large, it adequately serves it

purpose and is on the level of present-day Social-Democratic theory. The draft designates precisely that class which alone, in Russia as in other countries, is capable of being an independent fighter for socialism—the working class, the "industrial proletariat"; it states the aim which this class must set itself—"the conversion of all means and objects of production into social property," "the abolition of commodity production" and "its replacement by a new system of social production"—"the communist revolution"; it indicates the "inevitable preliminary condition" for "the reconstruction of social relations"—"the seizure of political power by the working class"; it affirms the international solidarity of the proletariat and the necessity for an "element of variety in the programmes of the Social-Democrats of different states in accordance with the social conditions in each of them taken separately"; it points to the specific feature of Russia "where the masses of working people suffer under the double yoke of developing capitalism and moribund patriarchal economy"; it shows the connection between the Russian revolutionary movement and the process of the creation (by the forces of developing capitalism) of "a new class, the industrial proletariat—the most responsive, mobile, and developed"; it indicates the necessity for the formation of "a revolutionary working-class party" and specifies "its first political task"—"the overthrow of absolutism"; it shows the "means of political struggle" and formulates its basic demands.

All these elements are, in our opinion, absolutely essential to a programme of the Social-Democratic working-class party; they all enunciate theses that have, until now, been again and again confirmed both in the development of socialist theory and in the development of the working-class movement of all countries, specifically, in the development of Russian social thought and the Russian working-class movement. In view of this, the Russian Social-Democrats can and should, in our opinion, make the draft of the Emancipation of Labour group—a draft requiring editorial changes, corrections, and additions only in respect of details—the basis of the programme of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class party.

Let us try to note which of these changes of detail we deem advisable and in regard to which it would be desirable

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to have an exchange of opinions among all Russian Social-Democrats and class-conscious workers.

In the first place, there must, of course, be some slight changes in the structural character of the programme; in 1885 it was the programme of a group of revolutionaries abroad who had proved able to define the only path of development for the movement that offered success, but who, at that time, still did not see before them anything like an extensive and independent working-class movement in Russia. In 1900 it has become a question of a programme for a working-class party founded by a large number of Russian Social-Democratic organisations. In addition to the editorial changes that are in consequence essential (and that need not be dealt with in detail, since they are self-evident), this difference makes it necessary to bring into the foreground and emphasise more strongly the process of economic development that is engendering the material and spiritual conditions for the Social-Democratic working-class movement, and the class struggle of the proletariat which the Social-Democratic Party sets itself the aim of organising. The cardinal point of the programme should be the characterisation of the basic features of the present-day economic system of Russia and its development (cf. in the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group: "Capitalism has achieved tremendous success in Russia since the abolition of serfdom. The old system of natural economy is giving way to commodity production..."). This should be followed by an outline of the fundamental tendency of capitalism—the splitting of the people into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, the growth of "the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation."[95] These famous words of Marx are repeated in the second paragraph of the Erfurt Programme of the German Social-Democratic Party,[96] and the critics that are grouped about Bernstein have recently made particularly violent attacks precisely against this point, repeating the old objections raised by bourgeois liberals and social-politicians against the "theory of impoverishment." In our opinion the polemic that has raged round this question has demonstrated the *utter groundlessness* of such "criticism." Bernstein himself admitted that the above words of Marx were true as a characterisation of the *tendency* of

capitalism—a tendency that becomes a reality in the absence of the class struggle of the proletariat against it, in the absence of labour protection laws achieved by the working class. It is precisely in Russia today that we see the above tendency manifesting its effect with tremendous force on the peasantry and the workers. Further, Kautsky has shown that these words on the growth of "the mass of misery, etc.," are true in the sense, not only of characterising a tendency, but of indicating the growth of "social poverty," i.e., the growth of the disparity between the condition of the proletariat and the living standard of the bourgeoisie—the standard of social consumption that continues to rise parallel with the gigantic growth in the productivity of labour. Lastly, these words are true also in the sense that in "the border regions" of capitalism (i.e., those countries and those branches of the national economy in which capitalism is only just emerging and clashing with pre-capitalist conditions) the growth of poverty—not only "social," but also the most horrible physical poverty, to the extent of starvation and death from starvation—assumes a mass scale. Everybody knows that this is ten times more applicable to Russia than to any other European country. And so, the words about the growth of "the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation" must, in our opinion, imperatively be included in our programme—first, because they faithfully describe the basic and essential features of capitalism, they characterise precisely the process that unrolls before our eyes and that is one of the chief reasons for the emergence of the working-class movement and socialism in Russia; secondly, because these words provide a fund of material for agitation, because they summarise a whole series of phenomena that most oppress the masses of the workers, but, at the same time, most arouse their indignation (unemployment, low wages, undernourishment, famine, the Draconian discipline of capital, prostitution, the growth in the number of domestics, etc., etc.); and, thirdly, because by this precise characterisation of the ruinous effect of capitalism and of the necessary, inevitable indignation of the workers we draw a line between ourselves and the indecisive elements who ,"sympathise" with the proletariat and demand "reforms" for its

benefit, while trying to occupy the "golden mean" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the autocratic government and the revolutionaries. It is particularly necessary today to dissociate ourselves from such people, if we are to strive for a united and consolidated working-class party that conducts a determined and unswerving struggle for political liberty and socialism.

Here a few words are in order on our attitude to the Erfurt Programme. From what has been said above it is clear to everyone that we consider it necessary to make changes in the draft of the Emancipation of Labour group that will bring the programme of the Russian Social-Democrats closer to that of the German. We are not in the least afraid to say that we want to imitate the Erfurt Programme: there is nothing bad in imitating what is good, and precisely today, when we so often hear opportunist and equivocal criticism of that programme, we consider it our duty to speak openly in its favour. Imitating, however, must under no circumstances be simply copying. Imitation and borrowing are quite legitimate insofar as in Russia we see the same *basic* processes of the development of capitalism, the same *basic* tasks for the socialists and the working class; but they must not, under any circumstances, lead to our forgetting the *specific features* of Russia which must find *full expression* in the specific features of our programme. Running ahead somewhat, let us say here that among these specific features are, first, our political tasks and means of struggle; and, secondly, our struggle against all remnants of the patriarchal, pre-capitalist regime and the specific posing of the *peasant* question arising out of that struggle.

Having made this necessary reservation, let us continue. The statement on the growth of "the mass of misery" must be followed by a characterisation of the *class struggle* of the proletariat—a declaration of the aim of this struggle (the conversion of all means of production into social property and the replacement of capitalist production by socialist production), a declaration of the international character of the working-class movement, a declaration of the *political* character of the class struggle and its *immediate* objective (the winning of political liberty). It is particularly necessary to recognise the struggle against the autocracy for political

liberties as the first political task of the working-class party; this task should, in our opinion, be explained by an exposition of the class nature of the present-day Russian autocracy and of the need to overthrow it, not only in the interests of the working class, but also in the interests of social development as a whole. Such a description is essential both in regard to theory, because, from the standpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat—the interests of the working-class movement as a whole are higher than the interests of a separate section of the workers or of separate phases of the movement; and in regard to practice, the elucidation is essential because of the need to characterise the focal point to which all the variety of Social-Democratic activity—propaganda, agitation, and organisation—must be directed and round which it must be concentrated. *In addition*, we think a special paragraph of the programme should be devoted to the provision that the Social-Democratic working-class party set itself the *aim* of supporting every revolutionary movement against the autocracy and the struggle against all attempts on the part of the autocratic government to corrupt and befog the political consciousness of the people by means of bureaucratic guardianship and sham doles, by means of that demagogic policy which our German comrades have called the "*Peitsche und Zuckerbrot*" policy (whip and biscuit policy). The biscuit = the doles to those who, for the sake of partial and individual improvements in their material conditions, renounce their political demands and remain the humble slaves of police violence (hostels for students, etc.) and for workers—one has only to recall the proclamations of Minister of Finance Witte at the time of the St. Petersburg strikes in 1896 and 1897,[97] or the speeches in defence of the workers delivered by representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the commission on the promulgation of the law of June 2, 1897). The whip = the increased persecution of those who, despite the doles, remain fighters for political liberty (the drafting of students into the army[98]; the circular of August 12, 1897, on the transportation of workers to Siberia; increased persecution of Social-Democracy, etc.). The biscuit is to decoy the weak, to bribe and corrupt them; the whip is to overawe and "rend-

er harmless" honest and class-conscious fighters for the-working-class cause and for the cause of the people. As long as the autocracy exists (and we must now in drawing up our programme take into account the existence of the autocracy, since its collapse would inevitably call forth such huge changes in political conditions that they would compel the working-class party to make essential changes in the formulation of its immediate political tasks)—as long as the autocracy exists, we must expect a continued renewal and increase of the government's demagogic measures. Consequently, we must conduct against them a systematic struggle, exposing the falseness of the police benefactors of the people, showing the connection between government reforms and the struggle of the workers, teaching the proletariat to make use of every reform to strengthen its fighting position and extend and deepen the working-class movement. The point on the support for *all* fighters against the autocracy is necessary in the programme, because Russian Social-Democracy, indissolubly fused with the advanced elements of the Russian working class, must raise the *general-democratic* banner, in order to group about itself all sections and all elements capable of fighting for political liberty or at least of supporting that fight in some way or another.

Such is our view on the demands that must be met by the section of our programme dealing with *principles* and on the basic postulates that must be expressed in it with the maximum precision and clarity. In our opinion the following should be deleted from the draft programme of the Emancipation of Labour group (from the part dealing with principles): 1) statements on the form of peasant land tenure (we shall discuss the peasant question later); 2) statements on the causes of "instability," etc., of the intelligentsia; 3) the point on the "abolition of the present system of political representation and its replacement by direct people's legislation"; 4) the point on the "means of political struggle." True, we do not see anything obsolete or erroneous in the last point, but, on the contrary, believe that the means of struggle should be precisely those indicated by the Emancipation of Labour group (agitation, revolutionary organisation, transition at "a suitable moment" to determined attack, not rejecting, *in principle*, even ter-

ror); but we believe that the programme of *a working-class party* is no place for indications of the means of activity that were necessary in the programme of a group of revolutionaries abroad in 1885. The programme should leave the question of means open, allowing the choice of means to the militant organisations and to Party congresses that determine the *tactics* of the Party. Questions of tactics, however, can hardly be introduced into the programme (with the exception of the most important questions, questions of *principle*, such as our attitude to other fighters against the autocracy). Questions of tactics will be discussed by the Party newspaper as they arise and will be eventually decided at Party congresses. The same applies, in our opinion, to the question of terror. The Social-Democrats must imperatively undertake the discussion of this question—of course, from the standpoint of tactics and not of principle—because the growth of the movement leads of its own accord, spontaneously, to more frequent cases of the killing of spies and to greater, more impassioned indignation in the ranks of the workers and socialists who see ever greater numbers of their comrades being tortured to death in solitary confinement and at places of exile. In order to leave nothing unsaid, we will make the reservation that, in our own personal opinion, terror is *not* advisable as a means of struggle *at the present moment*, that the Party (*as a party*) must renounce it (until there occurs a change of circumstances that might lead to a change of tactics) and concentrate *all its energy* on organisation and the regular delivery of literature. This is not the place to speak in greater detail on the question.

As far as the issue of direct people's legislation is concerned, it seems to us that at the present moment it should not be included in the programme. The victory of socialism must not be connected, in principle, with the *substitution* of direct people's legislation for parliamentarism. This was proved, in our view, by the discussion on the Erfurt Programme and by Kautsky's book on people's legislation. Kautsky admits (on the basis of an historical and political analysis) that a certain benefit accrues from people's legislation under the following conditions: 1) the absence of an antithesis between town and village or the preponderance of the towns, 2) the existence of highly developed political

parties; 3) "the absence of excessively centralised state power, independently opposed to people's legislation." In Russia we see *exactly the opposite* conditions, and the danger of "people's legislation" degenerating into an imperialist "plebiscite" would be particularly great in our country. If Kautsky could say, in 1893, speaking of Germany and Austria, that "for us, East-Europeans, direct people's legislation belongs to the sphere of the 'state of the future,'" what is there to be said of Russia? We, therefore, believe that at present, when the autocracy is dominant in Russia, we should limit ourselves to the demand for a "democratic constitution" and prefer the first two points of the practical part of the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group to the first two points of the practical part of the "Erfurt Programme."

Now let us look at the practical part of the programme. This part consists, in our opinion, of three sections, in substance if not in arrangement: 1) the demands for general democratic reforms; 2) the demands for measures of protection for the workers; and 3) the demands for measures in the Interests of the peasants. There is hardly any need to make substantial changes in the "draft programme" of the Emancipation of Labour group as regards the first section, which demands: 1) universal franchise; 2) salaries for deputies; 3) general, secular, free, and compulsory education, etc.; 4) inviolability of the person and domicile of citizens; 5) uncurtailed freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, etc. (here it should perhaps be added specifically: the right to strike); 6) freedom of movement and occupation (here it would probably be correct to add: "freedom of migration" and "the complete abolition of passports"); 7) full equality of all citizens, etc.; 8) replacement of the permanent army by the general arming of the people; 9) "the revision of our entire civil and criminal legislation, the abolition of social-estate divisions and of punishments incompatible with the dignity of man." Here it would be well to add: "complete equality of rights for men and women." To this section should be added the demand for fiscal reforms formulated in the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group as one of the demands to "be put forward by the working-class party, basing itself on these fundamental political rights"—"the

abolition of the present system of taxation and the institution of a progressive income tax." Lastly, there should also be here a demand for "the election of civil servants by the people; for every citizen to be granted the right to prosecute in court any government official without first having to make a complaint to superiors."

In the second section of the practical demands we find in the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group a general demand for "the legislative regulation of relations between workers (urban and rural) and employers, and the organisation of a relevant inspectorate with workers' representation." We think that the *working-class party* should define the demands made on this point more thoroughly and in greater detail; the party should demand: 1) an eight-hour working day; 2) prohibition of night-work and prohibition of the employment of children under 14 years of age; 3) uninterrupted rest periods, for every worker, of no less than 36 hours a week; 4) extension of factory legislation and the Factory Inspectorate to all branches of industry and agriculture, to government factories, to artisan establishments, and to handicraftsmen working at home; election, by the workers, of assistant inspectors having the same rights as the inspectors; 5) establishment of factory and rural courts for all branches of industry and agriculture, with judges elected from the employers and-the workers in equal numbers; 6) unconditional prohibition everywhere of payment in kind; 7) legislation fixing the responsibility of factory owners for all accidents and maiming of workers, both industrial and agricultural; 8) legislation fixing payment of wages at least once a week in all cases of the hire of workers of all kinds; 9) repeal of all laws violating the equality of employers and employees (for example, the laws making factory and farm workers criminally responsible for leaving their work, the laws giving employers greater freedom to cancel hiring agreements than their employees, etc.). (It goes without saying that we are only outlining desirable demands without giving them the final formulation required for the draft.) This section of the programme must (in conjunction with the preceding section) provide the basic, guiding principles for agitation, without in any way, of course, hindering agitators in this or that locality, branch

Проф. уполномоченный нотр.

Конечно 1877, нотабль, Берлин, Шлиссельбург неприятные отношения с уполномоченными [illegible]. Нам оставалось [illegible] 20-ть минут в Ваше Величество [illegible], [illegible] уполномоченные [illegible] минут [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

First page
of the manuscript
of Lenin's
"Draft Programme
of Our Party." 1899
Reduced

of production, factory, etc., from putting forward demands in a somewhat modified form, demands that are more concrete or more specific. In drawing up this section of the programme, we should strive, therefore, to avoid two extremes—on the one hand, we must not omit any one of the main, basic demands that hold great significance for the *entire* working class; on the other, we must not go into minute particulars with which it would hardly be rational to load the programme.

The demand for "state assistance for producers' associations" in the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group should, in our opinion, be completely eliminated. The experience of other countries, as well as theoretical considerations, and the specific features of Russian life (the tendency of the bourgeois liberals and the police government to flirt with "artels" and with "the patronage ... of people's industry," etc.)—all this should counsel against our putting forward this demand. (Fifteen years ago, of course, matters were quite different in many respects; *then* it was quite natural for Social-Democrats to include such a demand in their programme.)

There remains the third and last section of the practical part of the programme—the demands related to the peasant question. In the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group we find only one demand pertaining to this question—the demand for a "radical revision of our agrarian relations, i.e., a revision of the conditions of land redemption and the allotment of the land to the village communes; the granting of the right to refuse an allotment and to leave the village commune to those peasants who find it convenient to do so, etc."

It seems to me that the basic idea here expressed is perfectly correct and that the Social-Democratic working-class party should, in point of fact, include a relevant demand in its programme (I say "a relevant demand" because I think certain amendments are desirable).

I understand this problem in the following way. The peasant question in Russia differs substantially from the peasant question in the West, the *sole* difference being that in the West the question is almost exclusively one of a peasant in a capitalist, bourgeois society, whereas in Russia

it is one of a peasant who suffers no less (if not more) from *pre-capitalist* institutions and relations, from the *survivals of serfdom*. The role of the peasantry as a class that provides fighters against the autocracy and against the survivals of serfdom is by now played out in the West, but not yet in Russia. In the West the industrial proletariat has long since become completely alienated from the countryside; this alienation has been made final by relevant legal institutions. In Russia "the industrial proletariat, both by its composition and by the conditions of its existence, is to a very great extent still connected with the countryside" (P. B. Axelrod, op. cit., p. 11). True enough, the differentiation of the peasantry into a petty bourgeoisie and into wage-workers is proceeding with great power and astounding rapidity in Russia, but it is a process that has not yet come to an end, and what is most important—this process is still evolving within the framework of the old institutions of serfdom that fetter all the peasants with the heavy chains of collective liability and the tax-assessed community. The Russian Social-Democrat, therefore, even if he (like the writer of these lines) belongs to the determined opponents of the protection or support of small proprietorship or small agricultural economy in capitalist society, i.e., even if, on the agrarian question, he (like the writer of these lines) is on the side of those Marxists whom the bourgeois and opportunists of all stripes love to deride as "dogmatists" and "orthodox"—the Russian Social-Democrat can and must, without betraying his convictions in the slightest, but, rather, because of those convictions, insist that the working-class party should inscribe on its banner *support* for the peasantry (*not by any means* as a class of small proprietors or small farmers), *insofar as the peasantry is capable of a revolutionary struggle against the survivals of serfdom in general and against the autocracy in particular*. Do not all of us Social-Democrats declare that we are ready to support even the big bourgeoisie *insofar as it is capable* of a *revolutionary* struggle against the above manifestations—how then can we refuse to support the petty-bourgeois class, many millions strong, that is gradually, step by step, merging with the proletariat? If support for the liberal demands of the big bourgeoisie does not mean support of the big bourgeoisie, then support for the democratic

demands of the petty bourgeoisie certainly does not mean support of the petty bourgeoisie; on the contrary, it is precisely this development which political liberty will make possible in Russia that will, with particular force, lead to the destruction of small economy under the blows of capital. I do not think there will be any arguments among the Social-Democrats on this point. The question, therefore, is: 1) how to elaborate demands in such a way that they *do not degenerate* into support of small property-owners in a capitalist society? and 2) is our peasantry capable, at least in part, of a *revolutionary* struggle against the remnants of serfdom and against absolutism?

Let us begin with the second question. It is doubtful whether anyone will deny the existence of revolutionary elements among the Russian peasantry. In the post-Reform period, too, we know, there have been peasant revolts against the landlords, their stewards, and the government officials who support them. Well known are the agrarian killings, revolts, etc. Well known is the growing indignation of the peasantry (in whom even pitiful fragments of education have already begun to arouse a sense of human dignity) against the savage lawlessness of the gang of aristocratic wastrels that has been let loose against the peasantry under the title of Rural Superintendents.[99] Well known is the fact that famines of growing frequency involve millions of people who cannot remain passive spectators of such "food difficulties." Well known is the fact of the growth of religious sects and rationalism among the peasantry; political protests in religious guise are common to all nations at a certain stage of their development, and not to Russia alone. The existence of revolutionary elements among the peasantry, therefore, is not open to the slightest doubt. We do not in the least exaggerate the strength of these elements; we do not forget the political backwardness and ignorance of the peasants, nor in the least wipe out the difference between "the Russian revolt, senseless and ruthless," and the revolutionary struggle; we do not in the least forget the endless means which the government has at its disposal for the political deception and demoralisation of the peasantry. But from all this there follows only one thing, that it would be senseless to make the peasantry the *vehicle* of the revolutionary movement, that

a party would be insane to *condition* the revolutionary character of its movement upon the revolutionary mood of the peasantry. There can be no thought of proposing anything of the sort to the Russian Social-Democrats. We say only that a working-class party cannot, without violating the basic tenets of Marxism and without committing a tremendous political mistake, *overlook* the revolutionary elements that exist among the peasantry and not afford those elements support. Whether or not the revolutionary elements among the Russian peasantry will be able to behave at least in the way the West-European peasants behaved at the time of the overthrow of the autocracy is a question to which history has not yet provided an answer. If they prove themselves incapable, the Social-Democrats will have lost nothing as far as their good name or their movement is concerned, since it will not be their fault if the peasantry does not respond (may not have the strength to respond) to their revolutionary appeal. The working-class movement is going its own way and will continue to do so, despite all the betrayals of the big bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie. If the peasantry should prove itself capable—then that Social-Democracy which did not afford it support under these circumstances would for ever lose its good name and the right to be regarded as the leading fighter for democracy.

Returning to the first question presented above, we must say that the demand for a "radical revision of agrarian relations" seems unclear to us: it may have been sufficient fifteen years ago, but we can hardly be satisfied with it today when we must provide guidance for agitation and, at the same time, guard ourselves against the defenders of small economy, all too numerous in present-day Russian society, who have such "influential" supporters as Messrs. Pobedonostsev, Witte, and very many officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We take the liberty of offering our comrades for discussion the following approximate formulation of the third section of the practical part of our programme:

"The Russian Social-Democratic working-class party, giving its support to every revolutionary movement against

the present state and social system, declares that it will support the peasantry, insofar as it is capable of revolutionary struggle against the autocracy, as the class that suffers most from the Russian people's lack of rights and from the survivals of serfdom in Russian society.

"Proceeding from this principle, the Russian Social-Democratic working-class party demands:

"1) The abrogation of land redemption[100] and quit-rent payments and of all duties at present obligatory for the peasantry as a tax-paying social-estate.

"2) The return to the people of the sums of which the government and the landed proprietors have robbed the peasants in the form of redemption payments.

"3) The abolition of collective liability and of all laws that hamper the peasant in disposing of his land.

"4) The abolition of all remnants of the peasant's feudal dependence on the landlord, whether they are due to special laws and institutions (e.g., the position of the peasants and workers in the iron-foundry districts of the Urals) or to the fact that the land of the peasants and the landlords has not yet been demarcated (e.g., survivals of the law of easement in the Western territory),[101] or to the fact that the cutting-off of the peasant land by the landlords has left the peasants in what is in actual fact the hopeless position of former corvée peasants.

"5) That peasants be granted the right to demand, in court, the reduction of excessively high rents and to prosecute for usury landlords and, in general, all persons who take advantage of the necessitous condition of the peasants to conclude with them shackling agreements."

We shall have to deal in particular detail with the motives for such a proposal—not because this is the most important part of the programme, but because it is the most disputed and has a more remote connection with the generally established truths that are accepted by all Social-Democrats. The introductory proposition on (conditional) "support" for the peasantry seems to us to be necessary, because the proletariat cannot and must not, in general, take upon itself the defence of the interests of a class of small property-owners; it can support it only *to the extent to which* that class is revolutionary. And since it is

the autocracy that is today the embodiment of all that is backward in Russia, all the survivals of serfdom, lack of rights, and "patriarchal" oppression, it is essential to point out that the working-class party supports the peasantry only to the extent that the latter is capable of revolutionary struggle against the *autocracy*. Such a proposition is apparently excluded by the following proposition in the draft of the Emancipation of Labour group: "The main bulwark of the autocracy resides precisely in the political apathy and intellectual backwardness of the peasantry." But this is not a contradiction of theory alone; it is a contradiction of reality, because the peasantry (like the class of small property-owners in general) is distinguished by the duality of its character. We do not wish to repeat well-known political-economic arguments showing the internal contradictions of the condition of the peasantry, but we shall call to mind the following characterisation by Marx of the French peasantry of the early fifties:

"The Bonaparte dynasty represents not the revolutionary, but the conservative peasant; not the peasant that strikes out beyond the condition of his social existence, the small holding, but rather the peasant who wants to consolidate this holding, not the country folk who, linked up with the towns, want to overthrow the old order through their own energies, but on the contrary those who, in stupefied seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves and their small holdings saved and favoured by the ghost of the Empire. It represents not the enlightenment, but the superstition of the peasant; not his judgement, but his prejudice; not his future, but his past; not his modern Cevennes, but his modern Vendée" (*Der 18. Brumaire. S.* 99[102]). The working-class party needs precisely to support the peasantry which is striving to overthrow "the old order," i.e., in Russia, first and foremost the autocracy. The Russian Social-Democrats have always recognised the necessity to extract and absorb the revolutionary side of the Narodnik doctrine and trend. In the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group this is expressed not only in the above-quoted demand for "a radical revision," etc., but also in the following words: "It goes without saying, incidentally, that even today, people

who are in direct contact with the peasantry could, by their activities among them, render important service to the socialist movement in Russia. Far from repelling such people, the Social-Democrats will make every effort to come to an agreement with them on the basic principles and methods of their work." Fifteen years ago, when the traditions of revolutionary Narodism were still alive, such a declaration was sufficient; but today we must ourselves begin to discuss "basic principles of work" among the peasantry if we want the Social-Democratic working-class party to become a vanguard fighter for democracy.

But do not the demands we propose lead to the support, not of the peasants themselves, but of their property, to the consolidation of small economy, and do they correspond to the entire course of capitalist development? Let us examine these questions that are of the highest importance to the Marxist.

There can scarcely be any differences of opinion among Social-Democrats with regard to *the substance* of the first and third demands. The second demand, by its essence, will probably give rise to differences of opinion. The following considerations, to our view, speak in its favour: 1) it is a fact that the redemption payments represented direct plunder of the peasants on the part of the landlords, that the payments were not only for peasant land but for serf-holding rights, and that the government gathered *more* from the peasants than it paid to the landlords; 2) we have no grounds for regarding this fact as something ended and filed away in the archives of history, for the aristocratic exploiters themselves do not so regard the peasant Reform when they lament over the "sacrifices" they made at the time; 3) precisely today, when the starvation of millions of peasants is becoming chronic, when the government that wastes millions on gifts to the landlords and capitalists, and on an adventurist foreign policy, is haggling for pennies off the grants to the starving—precisely today it is appropriate and essential to recall what the rule of the autocratic government that serves the interests of the privileged classes has cost the people; 4) the Social-Democrats cannot remain indifferent spectators of peasant

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NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

hunger and the death of peasants from starvation; there have never been two opinions among Russian Social-Democrats as to the need for the most extensive help to the starving, and hardly anyone will claim that serious help is possible without revolutionary measures; 5) the expropriation of the royal demesne[103] and greater mobilisation of lands belonging to the aristocracy, i.e., that which would result from the implementation of the proposed demand, would bring only benefit to the entire social development of Russia. *Against* the proposed demand we shall probably be told, mostly, that it is "impracticable." If such an objection is supported only by phrases against "revolutionism" and "utopianism," we can say in advance that such *opportunist phrases* do not frighten us in the least and that we do not attach any significance to them. If, however, the objection is supported by an analysis of the economic and political conditions of our movement, we fully admit the necessity for a more detailed discussion of the question and the benefit accruing from a polemic in regard to it. We would only mention that this demand does not stand alone but forms part of the demand to support the peasantry *to the extent* that the latter is revolutionary. History will decide precisely how and with what strength these elements in the peasantry will manifest themselves. If we understand by the "practicability" of a demand its general correspondence, not to the interests of social development, but to a specific state of economic and political conditions, it will be a totally fallacious criterion, as Kautsky showed convincingly in his polemic with Rosa Luxemburg when the latter spoke of the "impracticability" (for the Polish working-class party) of the demand for Polish independence. Kautsky, at that time, pointed out as an example (if our memory serves us) the demand made by the Erfurt Programme on the election of civil servants by the people. The "practicability" of this demand is more than doubtful in present-day Germany, but none of the Social-Democrats proposed limiting the demands to the narrow bounds of what is possible at a given moment or under given conditions.

Further, as far as the fourth point is concerned, probably no one will object, in principle, to the necessity for

Social-Democrats to advance the demand for the abolition of all remnants of feudal dependence. What will need clarification will probably be only the formulation of that demand, as well as its extent, i.e., whether it should include, for example, measures for abolishing the *factual* corvée dependence of the peasants that was created by the cutting-off of peasant lands in 1861.[104] In our opinion this question should be decided in the affirmative. The tremendous significance of the actual survival of corvée (labour-service) economy has been fully established in literature, as has also the tremendous retardation of social development (and the development of capitalism) caused by this survival. The development of capitalism, of course, is leading up to, and will in the end result in, the elimination of these survivals "of their own accord, in a natural way." But, first, these survivals are extraordinarily tenacious, so that their rapid elimination is not to be expected; secondly—and mainly—the "natural way" means nothing other than the dying-out of the peasants who, *in point of fact* (due to labour-service, etc.), are tied to the soil and enslaved by the landlords. It stands to reason that under these circumstances the Social-Democrats cannot allow their programme to be silent on this question. It may be asked: How could this demand be implemented? We think it unnecessary to deal with this in the programme. The implementation of this demand (as of almost all others in this section, depending on the strength of the revolutionary elements among the peasantry) will, of course, necessitate a detailed examination of local conditions by local, elective, peasant committees as a counterweight to the Committees of Nobles[105] that accomplished their "legal" plunder in the sixties; the democratic demands of the programme adequately define the democratic institutions required for this purpose. This would be precisely the "radical revision of agrarian relations" of which the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group speaks. As we said above, we agree in principle with this point of the Emancipation of Labour group's draft and would only: 1) specify the conditions under which the proletariat can struggle for the class interests of the peasantry; 2) define the *character* of the revision—the aboli-

tion of the remnants of feudal dependence; 3) express the demands more precisely.

We foresee another objection: a re-examination of the question of cut-off lands, etc., should lead to the return of those lands to the peasantry. This is obvious. But will this not strengthen small property, small holdings. Can the Social-Democrats desire the replacement of the big capitalist economy, which is perhaps being conducted on the lands plundered from the peasantry, by small economy? This would, indeed, be a *reactionary* measure!

We answer: undoubtedly the substitution of small-scale for large-scale economy is reactionary, and we must not favour it. But the demand we are discussing is *conditioned* by the aim of "abolishing the remnants of feudal dependence"; consequently, it cannot lead to the fragmentation of big holdings; it applies only to old holdings that are, in essence, based purely on the corvée system; *in relation to them* a peasant holding, free of all medieval impediments (cf. point 3) *is progressive*, *not reactionary*. It is, of course, not easy to draw a line of demarcation here, but we do not believe that any one demand in our programme can be "easily" realised. Our role is to outline the basic principles and basic tasks; those who will be called upon to decide these problems in practice will know how to consider the details.

The purpose of last point is identical with that of the preceding: the struggle against all remnants of the *pre-capitalist mode of production* (so abundant in the Russian countryside). It will be remembered that the renting of land by peasants in Russia very often serves to conceal survivals of corvée relations. The idea for this last point was borrowed from Kautsky, who pointed out that, in relation to Ireland, even Gladstone's liberal administration had enacted a law in 1881 granting the courts the right to reduce excessively high rents, and included in the number of desirable demands: "The reduction of exorbitant rents by courts especially set up for this purpose" (*Reduzierung übermässiger Pachtzinsen durch dazu eingesetzte Gerichtshöfe*). This would be particularly useful in Russia (given the condition, of course, of the courts being democratically organised) in the sense that it would eliminate corvée relations. We think that to this we could also add the

demand for the extension of the laws on usury to cover enslaving agreements; in the Russian village, bondage is so widespread, so heavily oppressive to the peasant in his *capacity as a worker*, so exceedingly obstructive to social progress, that the struggle against it is particularly necessary. And it would not be more difficult for a court to establish the enslaving, usurious character of an agreement, than to establish the excessive nature of rent.

In general, the demands we propose reduce themselves, in our opinion, to two main objectives: 1) to abolish all *pre-capitalist*, feudal institutions and relations in the countryside (the complement to these demands being contained in the first section of the practical part of the programme); 2) to give the class struggle in the countryside a more open and conscious character. We believe that precisely these principles should serve as a guide for the Social-Democratic "agrarian programme" in Russia. It is necessary to dissociate ourselves resolutely from the attempts, so numerous in Russia, to *smooth down* the class struggle in the countryside. The dominant liberal-Narodnik tendency is distinguished precisely by this feature, but, in resolutely rejecting it (as was done in the "Appendix to the Report of the Russian Social-Democrats at the International Congress in London"), we should not forget that we must take particular note of the revolutionary content of Narodism. "To the extent that Narodism was revolutionary, i.e., came out against the social-estate, bureaucratic rule and against the barbarous forms of exploitation and oppression of the people which the state supported, to that extent Narodism had to be included, with relevant amendments, as a component part of the programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (Axelrod, *Present Tasks and Tactics*, p. 7). Two basic forms of the class struggle are today intertwined in the Russian countryside: 1) the struggle of the peasantry against the privileged landed proprietors and against the remnants of serfdom; 2) the struggle of the emergent rural proletariat against the rural bourgeoisie. For Social-Democrats the second struggle, of course, is of greater importance; but they must also indispensably support the first struggle *to the extent that it does not contradict* the interests of social development.

It is no accident that the peasant question has always occupied and continues to occupy such a prominent place in Russian society and in the Russian revolutionary movement: this fact is a reflection of the great significance still retained by the first of the two forms of struggle.

In conclusion, there is one possible misunderstanding against which we should be on guard. We spoke of Social-Democracy's "revolutionary appeal" to the peasants. Does this not mean diffusion, is it not harmful to the essential concentration of forces for work among the industrial proletariat? Not in the least; the necessity for such a concentration is recognised by *all* Russian Social-Democrats; it figures in the draft of the Emancipation of Labour group (1885) and again in the pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (1898). Consequently, there are absolutely no grounds at all to fear that the Social-Democrats will split their forces. A programme is not an instruction; a programme must embrace the *whole* movement, and in practice, of course, first one and then another aspect of the movement has to be brought into the foreground. No one will dispute the necessity to speak in the programme of rural, as well as industrial, workers, although in the present situation there is not a single Russian Social-Democrat who would think of calling upon the comrades to go to the village. The working-class movement, however, even apart from our efforts, will inevitably lead to the spread of democratic ideas in the countryside. "Agitation based on economic interests will inevitably lead Social-Democratic circles directly up against facts that show clearly the closest solidarity of interests between our industrial proletariat and the peasant masses" (Axelrod, *ibid.*, p. 13). For this reason an "*Agrarprogramm*" (*in the sense indicated*; strictly speaking, of course, it is not an "agrarian programme" at all) is an absolute necessity for Russian Social-Democrats. In our propaganda and agitation we constantly come upon peasant-workers, that is, factory-workers who retain their connections with the village, who have relatives or a family in the village and who travel back and forth. Questions of land redemption payments, collective liability, and rent are of vital interest even to large numbers of metropolitan

workers (to say nothing of the workers in the Urals, for example, amongst whom Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation has begun to find its way). We should be remiss in performing our duty, if we did not take care to give precise guidance to Social-Democrats and class-conscious workers who go to the village. Nor should we forget the rural intelligentsia, elementary school teachers, for instance. The latter are so humiliated, materially and spiritually, they observe so closely and know from their own experience the lack of rights and the oppression of the people, that there can be no doubt at all of the sympathetic reception among them of Social-Democratic ideas (given the further growth of the movement).

These then, in our opinion, should be the component parts of a programme of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class party: 1) a statement on the basic character of the economic development of Russia; 2) a statement on the inevitable result of capitalism: the growth of poverty and the increasing indignation of the workers; 3) a statement on the class struggle of the proletariat as the basis of our movement; 4) a statement on the final aims of the Social-Democratic working-class movement—on its striving to win political power for the accomplishment of these aims—and on the international character of the movement; 5) a statement on the essentially political nature of the class struggle; 6) a statement to the effect that the Russian absolutism, which conditions the lack of rights and the oppression of the people and patronises the exploiters, is the chief hindrance to the working-class movement, and that the winning of political liberty, essential in the interests of the entire social development, is, therefore, the most urgent political task of the Party; 7) a statement to the effect that the Party will support all parties and sections of the population that struggle against the autocracy and will combat the demagogic intrigues of our government; 8) the enumeration of the basic democratic demands; then, 9) demands for the benefit of the working class; and 10) demands for the benefit of the peasantry, with an explanation of the general character of these demands.

We are fully conscious of the difficulty of providing a completely satisfactory formulation of the programme

without a number of conferences with comrades; but we consider it essential to set about this task, believing (for the reasons indicated above) that postponement is impermissible. We hope to receive the aid of all the theoreticians of the Party (headed by the members of the Emancipation of Labour group), as well as of all socialists doing practical work in Russia (not only of Social-Democrats: it would be very desirable to hear the opinion of socialists of other groups and we would not refuse to publish their opinion), and the aid of all class-conscious workers.

A RETROGRADE TREND IN RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

The Editorial Board of *Rabochaya Mysl* has published a *Separate Supplement to "Rabochaya Mysl"* (September 1899), for the purpose of "dispelling the mass of misunderstanding and indefiniteness that exists with regard to the trend of *Rabochaya Mysl* (such as our 'renunciation of politics')." (From the Editorial Board.) We are very glad that *Rabochaya Mysl* is at last raising programmatic questions which, until now, it sought to ignore, but we emphatically protest against the statement that the "trend of *Rabochaya Mysl* is that of progressive Russian workers" (as the Editorial Board declares in the cited text). In fact, if the Editorial Board of *Rabochaya Mysl* wants to follow the path indicated (so far only *indicated*) in that publication, this means that it has falsely understood the programme elaborated by the founders of Russian Social-Democracy, a programme that has to-date had the adherence of all Russian Social-Democrats working in Russia; it means that it is taking a *step backwards* with respect to the level of theoretical and practical development already attained by Russian Social-Democracy.

The *Rabochaya Mysl* trend is expounded in the leading article of the *Separate Supplement* entitled "Our Reality" (signed: *R. M.*), which article we must now analyse in the greatest detail.

From the very beginning of the article we see that *R. M.* gives a *false* description of "our reality" in general, and of our working-class movement in particular, that he reveals an extremely narrow conception of the working-class

movement and a desire to close his eyes to the higher forms of that movement which have evolved under the leadership of the Russian Social-Democrats. "Our working-class movement," says *R. M.*, indeed, at the outset of the article, "contains the germs of the most diverse forms of organisation" ranging from strike associations to legal societies (permitted by law).

"And is that all?" asks the reader, in perplexity. Surely *R. M.* must have noticed some *higher*, more advanced forms of organisation in the working-class movement in Russia! Apparently he is unwilling to notice them because, on the next page, he repeats his assertion in a still more emphatic manner: "The tasks of the movement at the present moment, the real working-class cause of the Russian workers," he says, "reduce themselves to the workers' amelioration of their condition *by all possible means*," and yet the *only* means enumerated are strike organisations and legal societies! Thus, the Russian working-class movement *reduces itself*, it would seem, to strikes and legal societies! But this is an absolute *untruth*! As far back as twenty years ago, the Russian working-class movement founded a much broader organisation put forward much more extensive aims (of which in detail below). The Russian working-class movement founded such organisations as the St. Petersburg[106] and Kiev[107] Leagues of Struggle, the Jewish Workers' League,[108] and others. *R. M.* does indeed say that the Jewish working-class movement has a "specific political character" and is an exception. But this, again, is an untruth; for if the Jewish Workers' League were something "specific," it *would not have amalgamated* with a number of Russian organisations to form the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The foundation of this Party is the biggest step taken by the Russian working-class movement *in its fusion* with the Russian revolutionary movement. This step shows clearly that the Russian working-class movement *does not reduce itself* to strikes and legal societies. How could it have happened that the Russian socialists writing in *Rabochaya Mysl* are unwilling to recognise this step and to grasp its significance?

It happened because *R. M.* does not understand the relation of the Russian working-class movement to social-

ism and to the revolutionary movement in Russia, because he does not understand the political aims of the Russian working class. "The most characteristic index of the trend of our movement," writes *R. M.*, "is, of course, the demands put forward by the workers." We ask: why are the demands of the *Social-Democrats* and Social-Democratic organisations not included among the indices of *our movement*? On what grounds does *R. M.* separate the demands of the workers from the demands of the Russian Social-Democrats? *R. M.* makes this division throughout his article in the same way as the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* make it, in general, in every issue of their paper. In order to explain this error of *Rabochaya Mysl* we must clarify the general question of the relation of *socialism* to *the working-class movement*. At first socialism and the working-class movement existed separately in all the European countries. The workers struggled against the capitalists, they organised strikes and unions, while the socialists stood aside from the working-class movement, formulated doctrines criticising the contemporary capitalist, bourgeois system of society and demanding its replacement by another system, the higher, socialist system. The separation of the working-class movement and socialism gave rise to weakness and underdevelopment in each: the theories of the socialists, unfused with the workers' struggle, remained nothing more than utopias, good wishes that had no effect on real life; the working-class movement remained petty, fragmented, and did not acquire political significance, was not enlightened by the advanced science of its time. For this reason we see in all European countries a constantly growing urge to *fuse* socialism with the working-class movement in a single *Social-Democratic* movement. When this fusion takes place the class struggle of the workers becomes *the conscious struggle of the proletariat* to emancipate itself from exploitation by the propertied classes, it is evolved into a higher form of the socialist workers' movement—*the independent working-class Social-Democratic party*. By directing socialism towards a fusion with the working-class movement, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels did their greatest service: they created a revolutionary theory that explained the necessity for this fusion and gave socialists

the task of organising the class struggle of the proletariat.

Precisely this is what happened in Russia. In Russia, too, socialism has been in existence for a long time, for many decades, *standing aside* from the struggle of the workers against the capitalists, aside from the workers' strikes, etc. On the one hand, the socialists did not understand Marx's theory, they thought it inapplicable to Russia; on the other, the Russian working-class movement remained in a purely embryonic form. When the South-Russian Workers' Union was founded in 1875 and the North-Russian Workers' Union in 1878, those workers' organisations did not take the road chosen by the Russian socialists; they demanded political rights for the people, they wanted to wage a struggle for those rights, but at that time the Russian socialists mistakenly considered the political struggle a deviation from socialism. However, the Russian socialists did not hold to their undeveloped, fallacious theory. They went forward, accepted Marx's teaching, and evolved a theory of workers' socialism applicable to Russia—the theory of the Russian Social-Democrats. The foundation of Russian Social-Democracy was the great service rendered by the Emancipation of Labour group, Plekhanov, Axelrod, and their friends.* Since the foundation of Russian Social-Democracy (1883) the Russian working-class movement—in each of its broader manifestations—has been drawing closer to the Russian Social-Democrats in an effort to merge with them. The founding of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (in the spring of 1898) marked the biggest step forward towards this fusion. At the present time the *principal* task for all Russian socialists and all class-conscious Russian workers is to strengthen this fusion, consolidate and organise the Social-Democratic Labour Party. He who does not wish to recognise this fusion, he who tries to draw some sort of artificial line of demarcation between the working-class movement and Social-Democracy in Russia renders no service

* The fusion of Russian socialism with the Russian working-class movement has been analysed historically in a pamphlet by one of our comrades, *The Red Flag in Russia, A Brief History of the Russian Working-Class Movement*. The pamphlet will shortly be off the press.[109]

but does *harm* to workers' socialism and the working-class movement in Russia.

To continue. "As far as extensive demands, political demands, are concerned," writes *R. M.*, "it is only in those of the St. Petersburg weavers ... in 1897 that we see the first and still weakly conscious case of our workers putting forward such broad political demands." We must again say that this is *beyond all doubt untrue*. In publishing such utterances, Editorial Board of *Rabochaya Mysl* displays, first, a forgetfulness of the history of the Russian revolutionary and working-class movement that is unpardonable in a Social-Democrat, and, secondly, an unpardonably narrow conception of the workers' cause. The Russian workers put forward extensive political demands in the May, 1898, leaflet of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle and in the newspapers *S. Peterburgsky Rabochy Listok* and *Rabochaya Gazeta*, the latter having been recognised, in 1898, by leading Russian Social-Democratic organisations as the official organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. *Rabochaya Mysl*, by ignoring these facts, is moving backwards and fully justifies the opinion that it is not representative of advanced workers, but of the lower, undeveloped strata of the proletariat (*R. M.* himself says in his article that this has already been pointed out to *Rabochaya Mysl*). The lower strata of the proletariat do not know the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, nor does *R. M.* know it. The lower strata of the proletariat do not understand the relationship between the working-class movement and Social-Democracy, nor does *R. M.* understand that relationship. Why was it that in the nineties the Russian workers did not form their special organisations separate and apart from the socialists as they had done in the seventies? Why did they not put forward their own political demands separate and apart from the socialists? *R. M.* apparently understands this to mean that "the Russian workers are still little prepared for this" (p. 5 of his article), but this explanation is only further proof that he has the right to speak only on behalf of the lower strata of the proletariat. The lower strata of the workers, during the movement of the nineties, were not conscious of its political character. Nevertheless,

everyone knows (and *R. M.* himself speaks of it) that the working-class movement of the nineties acquired an extensive political significance. This was due to the fact that the advanced workers, as always and everywhere, determined the character of the movement, and they were followed by the working masses because they showed their readiness and their ability to serve the cause of the working class, because they proved able to win the full confidence of the masses. Those advanced workers were Social-Democrats; many of them even took a personal part in the disputes between the Narodnaya Volya adherents and the Social-Democrats that typified the transition of the Russian revolutionary movement from peasant and conspiratorial socialism to working-class socialism. It can, therefore, be understood why these advanced workers have not alienated themselves from the socialists and revolutionaries in a separate organisation. Such an alienation had a meaning and was necessary at the time when socialism alienated itself from the working-class movement. Such alienation would have been impossible and meaningless once the advanced workers had seen before them working-class socialism and the *Social-Democratic* organisations. The *fusion* of the advanced workers and the Social-Democratic organisations was altogether natural and inevitable. It was the result of the great historical fact that in the nineties two profound social movements converged in Russia: one, a spontaneous movement, a popular movement within the working class, the other, the movement of social thought in the direction of the theory of Marx and Engels, towards the theory of Social-Democracy.

From the following it can be seen how extremely narrow is *Rabochaya Mysl*'s conception of the political struggle. Speaking of the breadth of political demands, *R. M.* states: "For the workers to conduct such a political struggle consciously and independently, it is essential that it be waged by the working-class organisations themselves, that the workers' political demands should find support in the workers' consciousness of their common political requirements and the interests of the moment [note well!], that they should be the demands of the workers' [craft] organisations themselves, that they should really be drawn up by them

jointly and also put forward jointly by those working-class organisations on their own initiative....” It is further explained that the immediate common political demands of the workers are, for the time being (!!), still the ten-hour working day and the restoration of holidays abolished by the law of June 2, 1897.

And after this the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* are still surprised that they are accused of renouncing politics! Indeed, is not this reduction of politics to the struggle of craft unions for individual reforms the renunciation of politics? Is this not the rejection of the basic tenet of world Social-Democracy that the Social-Democrats must strive to organise the class struggle of the proletariat into independent political working-class parties that fight for democracy *as a means* for the proletariat to win political power and organise a socialist society? With a strangely unbounded thoughtlessness our latest distorters of Social-Democracy cast overboard everything dear to the Social-Democrats, everything that gives us the right to regard the working-class movement as a world-historical movement. It matters little to them that the long experience of European socialism and European democracy teaches the lesson that it is essential to strive for the formation of independent working-class political parties. It matters little to them that in the course of a long and arduous historical path the Russian revolutionary movement has evolved the union of socialism and the working-class movement, the union of the great social and political ideals and the class struggle of the proletariat. It matters little to them that the advanced Russian workers have laid the foundation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Down with all that! Let us liberate ourselves from a too extensive ideological equipment and from a too difficult and exacting historical experience—and let “there remain for the time being” only craft unions (the possibility of organising which in Russia has not yet been proved at all, if we leave legal societies out of the reckoning), let these craft unions, “on their own initiative,” elaborate demands, the demands of the “moment,” demands for tiny, petty reforms!! What is this, if not the preachment of a retrograde trend? What, indeed, if not propaganda for the destruction of socialism!

And please note that *Rabochaya Mysl* does not merely outline the idea that local organisations should elaborate their own local forms of struggle and specific motives for agitation, methods of agitation, etc.—nobody would object to this idea. Russian Social-Democrats have never laid claim to anything hampering the independence of the workers in this respect. But *Rabochaya Mysl* wants *to push aside* the great political aims of the Russian proletariat altogether and "for the time being" confine itself "exclusively" to "the interests of the moment." Until now the Russian Social-Democrats have always wanted to make use of every demand of the moment and, by agitating for that demand, to organise the proletariat for the struggle against the autocracy as the immediate objective. Now *Rabochaya Mysl* wants *to limit* the struggle of the proletariat to a petty struggle for petty demands. *R. M.*, knowing very well that he is retreating from the views of the entire Russian Social-Democracy, makes the following reply to those who accuse *Rabochaya Mysl*: It is said that the overthrow of tsarism is the immediate objective of the Russian working-class movement. But of which working-class movement, asks *R. M.*, "*the strike movement? the mutual benefit societies? the workers' circles?*" (page 5 of the article). To this we reply: Speak for yourself alone, for your group, for the lower strata of the proletariat of a given locality which it represents, but do not presume to speak on behalf of the advanced Russian workers! The representatives of the lower strata of the proletariat often do not realise that the struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy can only be conducted by a revolutionary party. Nor does *R. M.* know this. The advanced workers, however, do. The less advanced representatives of the proletariat often do not know that the Russian working-class movement is not limited to the strike struggle, to mutual benefit societies and workers' circles; that the Russian working-class movement has long been striving to organise itself into a revolutionary party and has demonstrated this striving by action. *R. M.* does not know this, either. But the advanced Russian workers know it.

R. M. tries to represent his complete misunderstanding of Social-Democracy as a sort of specific understanding

of "our reality." Let us look more closely at his ideas on this subject.

"As far as the concept of the autocracy itself is concerned," writes *R. M.*, "...we shall not deal with that at length, assuming that all to whom we speak have the most precise and clear conception of such things." We shall soon see that *R. M.* himself has an extremely imprecise and unclear conception of such things; but first let us mention one other circumstance. Are there workers among those to whom *R. M.* is speaking? Of course, there are. And if so, where are they to get a precise and clear conception of the autocracy? Obviously this requires the broadest and most systematic propaganda of the ideas of political liberty in general; agitation is required to connect every individual manifestation of police violence and of oppression by officialdom with a "precise conception" (in the minds of the workers) of the autocracy. This, it would seem, is elementary. But if it is, then can purely local propaganda and agitation against the autocracy be successful? Is it not absolutely essential to *organise* such propaganda and agitation throughout Russia into a single planned activity, i.e., into the activity of a single party? Why then does *R. M.* not indicate that the task of organising systematic propaganda and agitation against the autocracy is one of the immediate objectives of the Russian working-class movement? Only because he has the most *im*precise and *un*clear conception of the tasks of the Russian working-class movement and of Russian Social-Democracy.

R. M. proceeds to explain that the autocracy is a tremendous "personal power" (a bureaucracy drilled like soldiers) and a tremendous "economic power" (financial resources). We shall not dwell on the "*im*precise" aspects of his explanation (and there is much that is "*im*precise" here), but shall pass over directly to the main point:

"And so," *R. M.* asks of Russian Social-Democracy, "is it not the overthrow of this personal power and the seizure of this economic power that the Russian workers are at this very moment advised to project as the first and immediate task of their present (embryonic) organisations? (we shall not even mention the revolutionaries, who say that

this task must be undertaken by the circles of advanced workers)."

In amazement we rub our eyes and read this monstrous passage over two or three times. Surely we must be mistaken! But no, we are not. *R. M. actually does not know what is meant by the overthrow of the autocracy*. Hard to believe as this is, it is a fact. But after the confusion of ideas that *R. M.* has displayed, is it hard to believe after all?

R. M. confuses the seizure of power by revolutionaries with the overthrow of the autocracy by revolutionaries.

Old Russian revolutionaries (of the Narodnaya Volya) strove for the seizure of power by a revolutionary party. They thought that by the seizure of power the "party would overthrow the personal power" of the autocracy, i.e., appoint its agents in place of the government officials, "seize economic power," i.e., all the financial means of the state and carry out the social revolution. The Narodnaya Volya members (the old ones) actually did strive to "overthrow the personal power and seize the economic power" of the autocracy, to employ *R. M.*'s clumsy expression. The Russian Social-Democrats have decidedly set themselves against this revolutionary theory. Plekhanov subjected it to trenchant criticism in his essays, *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883) and *Our Differences* (1885), pointing out the task of the Russian revolutionaries—the foundation of a revolutionary working-class party whose immediate aim should be the overthrow of the autocracy. What is meant by the overthrow of the autocracy? To explain this to *R. M.* we must answer the question: what is the autocracy? The autocracy (absolutism, unlimited monarchy) is a form of rule under which all supreme power is wielded wholly and indivisibly by an absolute monarch, the tsar. The tsar issues laws, appoints officials, collects and disburses the national revenues *without any participation by the people in legislation or in control over the administration*. The autocracy, therefore, means the absolute power of government officials and the police and the absence of rights for the people. The entire people suffers from this absence of rights, but the propertied classes (especially the rich landed proprietors and capitalists) exercise a powerful

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influence over the bureaucracy. The working class suffers doubly: both from the lack of rights to which the entire Russian people is subjected and from the oppression of the workers by the capitalists, who compel the government to serve their interests.

What is meant by the overthrow of the autocracy? It implies the tsar's renunciation of absolute power; the granting to the people of the right to elect their own representatives for legislation, for supervision over the actions of the government officials, for supervision over the collection and disbursement of state revenues. This type of government in which the people participate in legislation and administration is called the *constitutional* form of government (constitution = law on the participation of people's representatives in legislation and the administration of the state). Thus, the overthrow of the autocracy means the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the constitutional form of government. For the overthrow of the autocracy, therefore, no "overthrow of personal power or seizure of economic power" is necessary, but it is necessary to compel the tsarist government to renounce its unlimited power and convene a Zemsky Sobor* of representatives of the people for the elaboration of a constitution ("to win a democratic constitution" [people's constitution, drawn up in the interests of the people], as it is put in the draft programme of the Russian Social-Democrats published in 1885 by the Emancipation of Labour group).

Why must the overthrow of the autocracy be the first task of the Russian working class? Because under the autocracy the working class is not able to develop its struggle extensively, to gain for itself any stable positions in either the economic or political fields, to establish sound mass organisations and unfurl the banner of the social revolution before the masses of the working people and teach them to struggle for it. The decisive struggle of the entire working classs against the bourgeois class is possible only under conditions of political liberty, and the final aim of that struggle is for the proletariat to win political power and organise a socialist society. The conquest of

* A central representative assembly.—*Ed.*

political power by an organised proletariat that has gone through a lengthy schooling in struggle will really be "the overthrow of the personal power and the seizure of the economic power" of the bourgeois government; but the Russian Social-Democrats have never put forward *this* seizure of power as the immediate task of the Russian workers. Russian Social-Democrats have always maintained that only under conditions of political liberty, when there is an extensive mass struggle, can the Russian working class develop organisations for the final victory of socialism.

But how can the Russian working class overthrow the autocracy? The editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* make mock even of the Emancipation of Labour group which founded Russian Social-Democracy and stated in its programme that "the struggle against the autocracy is obligatory even for those workers' circles that now constitute the germs of the future Russian working-class party." It seems ridiculous to *Rabochaya Mysl* (see No. 7 and the article under review): the overthrow of the autocracy—by workers' circles! In reply, we say to the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl*: Whom are you mocking? It is yourselves you are mocking! The editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* complain that the Russian Social-Democrats *are not comradely* in their polemic with them. Let the readers judge on whose side the polemic is uncomradely: on the side of the old Russian Social-Democrats who have set forth their views clearly and who say outright which views of the "young" they consider mistaken and why; or on the side of the "young" who *do not name* their opponents but jab from behind cover, first at "the author of a German book on Chernyshevsky" (Plekhanov, whom, moreover, they groundlessly confuse with certain legal writers), then at the Emancipation of Labour group, citing *with distortions* passages from its programme without putting forward anything like a definite programme of their own. Yes, we recognise the duty of comradeship, the duty to support all comrades, the duty to tolerate the opinions of comrades *but as far as we are concerned*, *the duty of comradeship derives from our duty to Russian and international Social-Democracy*, *and not vice versa*. We recognise our comradely obligations to *Rabochaya Mysl*, not because its editors are our comrades; we consider the editors of *Rabo-*

chaya Mysl our comrades only because and to the extent that they work in the ranks of Russian (and, consequently, of international) Social-Democracy. Therefore, if we are certain that the "comrades" are moving backwards, away from the Social-Democratic programme, that the "comrades" are hemming in and distorting the aims of the working-class movement, we consider it our *duty* to give expression to our convictions with a complete certainty that leaves nothing unsaid!

We have just stated that the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* distort the views of the Emancipation of Labour group. Let the reader judge for himself. "We are prepared not to understand those of our comrades," writes *R. M.*, "who consider their programme for 'the emancipation of labour' a simple answer to the question: 'Where are we to get the forces for the struggle against the autocracy?'" (elsewhere: "Our revolutionaries regard the workers' movement as the best means of overthrowing the autocracy"). Open the draft programme of the Russian Social-Democrats published by the Emancipation of Labour group in 1885 and reprinted by P. B. Axelrod in his booklet, *Present Tasks and Tactics of Russian Social Democracy* (Geneva, 1898), and you will see that the programme *is based on* the emancipation of labour from the oppression of capital, the transfer of all means of production to social ownership, the seizure of political power by the working class, and the founding of a revolutionary *working-class* party. It is clear that *R. M.* distorts that programme and is *unwilling* to understand it. He has seized upon P. B. Axelrod's words at the beginning of his booklet wherein it is stated that the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group "was an answer" to the question: Where are we to get the forces for the struggle against absolutism? It is, however, *an historical fact* that the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group was the answer to the question posed by the Russian revolutionaries and by the Russian revolutionary movement as a whole. However, because the programme answered that question, does it mean that the working-class movement was only the means to an end for the Emancipation of Labour group? Such a "*misunderstanding*" on the part of *R. M.* merely shows that he is unacquainted with the

generally-known facts of the activities of the Emancipation of Labour group.

To continue. How can the "overthrow of the autocracy" be a task for workers' circles? *R. M.* does not understand. Open the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group: "Russian Social-Democrats consider that for the workers' circles the chief means of political struggle against the autocracy," we read, "is agitation amongst the working class and the further spreading of socialist ideas and revolutionary organisations amongst the workers. These organisations, closely bound together in an integral whole and not content with individual clashes with the government, will lose no time in going over, at a suitable moment, to a general, decisive offensive against the government." These were precisely the tactics followed by the Russian organisations that established the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the spring of 1898. And they proved that such organisations are a powerful political force in Russia. If these organisations form one single party and carry on widespread agitation against the autocratic government, using for this purpose all elements of the liberal opposition, the objective of winning political liberty will undoubtedly be one that can be attained by such a party. If the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* are "prepared not to understand" this, we are "prepared" to advise them: learn, gentlemen, for these things are not in themselves very difficult to understand.

Let us, however, get back to *R. M.*, whom we left arguing about the struggle against the autocracy. *R. M.*'s own views on this subject illustrate still more clearly the new, retrograde, trend of *Rabochaya Mysl*.

"The end of the autocracy is clear," writes *R. M.* "...The struggle against the autocracy is one of the conditions for the sound development of all vital social elements." From this the reader will probably think that the struggle against the autocracy is essential to the working class. But wait. *R. M.* has his own logic and his own terminology. By the word "struggle," through the addition of the word "social" (struggle), he understands something very specific. *R. M.* describes the *legal opposition* of many sections of the Russian population to the government, and he draws the conclusion: "Indeed, the struggles for Zemstvo and urban

public self-government, for public schools, and for public aid to the starving population, etc., constitute a struggle against the autocracy." "The necessity to wage a social struggle against the bureaucratic autocracy is obvious to all class-conscious, progressive sections and groups of the population. More than this. This social struggle, which through some strange misunderstanding has not attracted the favourable attention of many Russian revolutionary writers, is, as we have seen, being conducted by Russian society; nor did it begin yesterday." "The real question is how these separate social strata ... are to conduct this [note this!] struggle against the autocracy with the maximum success. ... The main question for us is to know how our workers should conduct this social [!] struggle against the autocracy."...

These arguments of *R. M.* are again cluttered with an unbelievable amount of confusion and errors.

First, *R. M.* confuses *legal opposition* with the struggle against the autocracy, with the struggle to overthrow the autocracy. This confusion, unpardonable in a socialist, results from his employing the expression "struggle against the autocracy" without an explanation: this expression may mean (with a reservation) struggle *against* the autocracy, but also struggle against individual measures of the autocracy within the framework of that same autocratic system.

Secondly, by regarding legal opposition as the social struggle against the autocracy and affirming that our workers should wage "this social struggle," *R. M.* virtually says that our workers should carry on legal opposition, not a revolutionary struggle, against the autocracy; in other words, he sinks into a hideous debasement of Social-Democracy, which he confuses with the most commonplace and beggarly Russian liberalism.

Thirdly, *R. M.* declares a *flagrant untruth* regarding Russian Social-Democratic writers (true, he prefers making his reproaches in "all comradeship," without naming names; but if it is not Social-Democrats whom he has in mind, his words have no sense), when he states that they do not pay attention to legal opposition. On the contrary, the Emancipation of Labour group, and P. B. Axelrod in particular, as well as the *Manifesto of the Russian Social-*

Democratic Labour Party and the pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (published by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and designated by Axelrod as a *commentary* to the *Manifesto*)—all, not only paid attention to legal opposition, but even elucidated with precision its relation to Social-Democracy.

Let us clarify the issue. What sort of "struggle against the autocracy" is being conducted by our Zemstvos, by our liberal societies in general, and by the liberal press? Are they carrying on a struggle against the autocracy, for the overthrow of the autocracy? *No*, *they never have engaged and still do not engage in such a struggle*. This is a struggle that is waged only by the revolutionaries, who frequently come from the liberal society and rely on its sympathy. But waging a revolutionary struggle is in no sense the same thing as sympathising with the revolutionaries and supporting them; the struggle against the autocracy is in no sense the same thing as legal opposition to the autocracy. The Russian liberals express their dissatisfaction with the autocracy only in the form *sanctioned* by the autocracy itself, i.e., the form that the autocracy does not consider dangerous to the autocracy. The grandest showing of liberal opposition has been nothing more than the *petitions* of the liberals to the tsarist government to draw the people into the administration. And each time the liberals patiently accepted the brutal police rejections of their petitions; they put up with the lawless and savage repressions with which the government of gendarmes repaid even legal attempts to make known their opinion. Simply to present the liberal opposition as a social struggle against the autocracy is a pure *distortion* of the issue, because the Russian liberals have *never* organised a revolutionary party to struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy, although they could have found and can still find for this purpose both the material means and representatives of Russian liberalism abroad. *R. M.* not only distorts the issue, but he drags in the name of the great Russian socialist N. G. Chernyshevsky. "The workers' allies in this struggle," says *R. M.*, "are all the advanced strata of Russian society, who are defending their social interests and institutions, who have a clear conception of the common good, who 'never forget' [*R. M.* quotes

Chernyshevsky] that there is 'a great difference as to whether changes are brought about by an independent decision of the government or *by the formal demand of society*.'" If this comment is applied to all representatives of the "social struggle" in the way *R. M.* understands it, i.e., to all Russian liberals, then it is a *falsification pure and simple*. The Russian liberals have never presented any formal demands to the government, and precisely for this reason the Russian liberals have never played and now certainly cannot play an *independent* revolutionary role. Not "all the advanced strata of society" can be allies of the working class and Social-Democracy, but only revolutionary parties founded by members of that society. In general, the liberals can and should serve merely *as one of the sources* of additional forces and means for the revolutionary working-class party (as P. B. Axelrod so clearly stated in the above-mentioned pamphlet). N. G. Chernyshevsky ridiculed "the progressive strata of Russian society" for the very fact that they did not understand the necessity for formal demands to the government and indifferently watched revolutionaries from their own midst perish under the blows of the autocratic government. In this case *R. M.*'s quotations from Chernyshevsky are as senseless as his quotations from the same author, torn piecemeal out of context, in the second article of the *Separate Supplement*, which are meant to show that Chernyshevsky was not a utopian and that Russian Social-Democrats do not appreciate the full significance of the "great Russian socialist." In his book on Chernyshevsky (articles in the collection *Sotsial-Demokrat*,[110] issued as a separate volume in German) Plekhanov fully appreciated the significance of Chernyshevsky and explained his attitude to the theory of Marx and Engels. The editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* have merely revealed their own inability to give anything like a connected and comprehensive assessment of Chernyshevsky, of his strong and weak sides.

"The real question" for Russian Social-Democracy is by no means that of determining how the liberals are to conduct the "social struggle" (by "social struggle" *R. M.*, as we have seen, means legal opposition), but how to organise a revolutionary working-class party devoted to the struggle for the

overthrow of the autocracy, a party that could gain the backing of *all* opposition elements in Russia, a party that could *utilise* all manifestations of opposition in its revolutionary struggle. It is precisely a revolutionary working-class party that is needed for this purpose, because in Russia only the working class can be a determined and consistent fighter for democracy, because without the vigorous influence of such a party the liberal elements "could remain a sluggish, inactive, dormant force" (P. B. Axelrod, op. cit., p. 23). In saying that our "more advanced strata" are conducting "a real [!!] social struggle against the autocracy" (p. 12 of *R. M.*'s article), that "the main question for us is how our workers should conduct *this social struggle* against the autocracy"—in saying such things, *R. M.* is, in fact, retreating completely from Social-Democracy. We can only offer serious advice to the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* to ponder well the question of where they want to go and where their real place is: among the revolutionaries, who carry the banner of the social revolution to the working classes and want to organise them into a political revolutionary party, or among the liberals, who are conducting their own "social struggle" (i.e., the legal opposition)? There is nothing at all socialist in the theory of the "independent social activity" of the workers; in the theory of "social mutual aid" and of the craft unions that "so far" confine themselves to the 10-hour working day; in the theory of the "social struggle" of the Zemstvos, liberal societies, and others against the autocracy—there is nothing in this theory that the liberals would not accept! Indeed, the entire programme of *Rabochaya Mysl* (to the extent that one can call it a programme) tends, in essence, to leave the Russian workers undeveloped and split, and to make them the *tail-end of the liberals*!

Some of *R. M.*'s phrases are particularly strange. "The whole trouble is merely that our revolutionary intelligentsia," he proclaims, "mercilessly persecuted by the political police, mistake the struggle against the political police for the political struggle against the autocracy." What sense can there be in such a statement? The political police are called political because they persecute enemies of the autocracy and those who struggle against the autocracy. For

this reason, *Rabochaya Mysl*, so long as its metamorphosis into a liberal is not completed, fights against the political police as do all Russian revolutionaries and socialists and all class-conscious workers. From the fact that the political police mercilessly persecute socialists and workers, that the autocracy maintains a "well-ordered organisation," "competent and resourceful statesmen" (p. 7 of *R. M.*'s article), only two conclusions are to be drawn: the cowardly and wretched liberal will pass judgement that our people in general and our workers in particular are still ill-prepared for the struggle and that all hopes must be placed in the "struggle" of the Zemstvos, the liberal press, etc., since this is the "real struggle against the autocracy" and not only a struggle against the political police. The socialist and every class-conscious worker will conclude that the working-class party must bend all its efforts to the formation of a "well-ordered organisation," to the training of "competent and resourceful revolutionaries" from among the advanced workers and socialists, people who will raise the working-class party to the high level of the loading fighter for democracy and who will be able to win over to its side all opposition elements.

The editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* do not realise that they are standing on an inclined plane down which they will roll to the first of these two conclusions!

Or, again: "What amazes us further in these programmes [i.e., in the programmes of the Social-Democrats]," writes *R. M.*, "is that they incessantly give first place to the advantages of workers' activities in a parliament [non-existent in Russia], while completely ignoring ... the importance of workers' participation" in the employers' legislative assemblies, on factory boards, and in municipal self-government (p. .15). If the advantages of parliament are not brought into the forefront, how will the workers learn about political rights and political liberty? If we keep silent on these questions—as does *Rabochaya Mysl*—does this not mean perpetuating the political ignorance of the lower strata of the workers? As to workers' participation in municipal self-government, no Social-Democrat has ever denied anywhere the advantages and the importance of the activities of *socialist* workers in municipal self-government;

but it is ridiculous to speak of this in Russia, where no open manifestation of socialism is possible and where firing the workers with enthusiasm for municipal self-government (even were this possible) would actually mean distracting advanced workers from the socialist working-class cause towards liberalism.

"The attitude of the advanced strata of the workers towards this [autocratic] government," says *R. M.*, "is as understandable as their attitude towards the factory owners." The common-sense view of this, therefore, is that the advanced strata of the workers are no less class-conscious Social-Democrats than the socialists from among the intelligentsia, so that *Rabochaya Mysl*'s attempt to separate the one from the other is absurd and harmful. The Russian working class, accordingly, has produced the elements necessary for the formation of an independent working-class political party. But the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* draw from the fact of the political consciousness of the advanced strata of the workers the conclusion ... that it is necessary to hold these advanced elements back, so as to keep them marking time! "Which struggle is it most desirable for the workers to wage?" asks *R. M.*, and he answers: Desirable is the struggle that is possible, and possible is the struggle which the workers are "waging at the given moment"!!! It would be difficult to express more glaringly the senseless and unprincipled opportunism with which the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl*, allured by fashionable "Bernsteinism," have become infected! What is possible is desirable, and what we have at the given moment is possible! It is as though a man setting out on a long and difficult road on which numerous obstacles and numerous enemies await him were told in answer to his question "Where shall I go?": "It is desirable to go where it is possible to go, and it is possible to go where you are going at the given moment"! This is the sheerest nihilism, not revolutionary, however, but opportunist nihilism, manifested either by anarchists or bourgeois liberals! By "calling upon" the Russian workers to engage in a "partial" and "political" struggle (with political struggle understood, not as the struggle against the autocracy, but only as "the struggle to improve the condition of all workers"), *R. M.* is actually calling upon the Russian

working-class movement and Russian Social-Democracy to take *a step backward*, he is actually calling upon the workers to separate from the Social-Democrats and thus throw overboard everything that has been acquired by European and Russian experience! The workers have no need for socialists in their struggle to improve their condition, if that is their only struggle. In all countries there are workers who wage the struggle for the improvement of their condition, but know nothing of socialism or are even hostile to it.

"In conclusion," writes *R. M.*, "a few words on our conception of working-class socialism." After what has been said above the reader will have no difficulty in imagining the sort of "conception" it is. It is simply a copy of Bernstein's "fashionable" book. Our "young" Social-Democrats substitute the "independent social and political activity of the workers" for the class struggle of the proletariat. If we recall how *R. M.* understands *social* "struggle" and "politics," it will be clear that this is a direct return to the "formula" of certain Russian legal writers. Instead of indicating precisely the aim (and essence) of socialism—the transfer of the land, factories, etc., in general, of all the means of production, to the ownership of the whole of society and the replacement of the capitalist mode of production by production according to a common plan in the interests of all members of society—instead of all this, *R. M.* indicates first of all the development of craft unions and consumers' co-operatives, and says only in passing that socialism leads to the complete socialisation of all the means of production. On the other hand, he prints in the heaviest type: "Socialism is merely a further and higher development of the modern community"—a phrase borrowed from Bernstein, which not only does not explain but even obscures the significance and substance of socialism. All the liberals and the entire bourgeoisie undoubtedly favour the "development of the modern community," so that they will all rejoice at *R. M.*'s declaration. Nevertheless, the bourgeois are the *enemies* of socialism. The point is that "the modern community" has many varied aspects, and of those who employ this general expression, some have one aspect in view, others another. And so, instead of

explaining the concept of the class struggle and socialism to the workers, *R. M.* offers them only nebulous and misleading phrases. Lastly, instead of indicating the means modern socialism advances for the achievement of socialism—the winning of political power by the organised proletariat—instead of this, *R. M.* speaks only of placing production under their (the workers') social management or under the management of democratised social power, democratised "by their [the workers'] active participation on boards examining all kinds of factory affairs, in courts of arbitration, in all possible assemblies, commissions, and conferences for the elaboration of labour laws; by the workers' participation in public self-government, and, lastly, in the country's general representative institution." In this way the editors of *Rabochaya Mysl* include in working-class socialism only that which is to be obtained along the *peaceful* path and exclude the revolutionary path. This narrowing-down of socialism and its reduction to common bourgeois liberalism represents again a tremendous step backwards as compared with the views of all Russian Social-Democrats and of the overwhelming majority of European Social-Democrats. The working class would, of course, prefer to take power *peacefully* (we have already stated that this seizure of power can be carried out only by the organised working class which has passed through the school of the class struggle), but to *renounce* the revolutionary seizure of power would be *madness* on the part of the proletariat, both from the theoretical and the practical-political points of view; it would mean nothing but a disgraceful retreat in face of the bourgeoisie and all other propertied classes. It is very probable—even most probable—that the bourgeoisie will not make peaceful concessions to the proletariat and at the decisive moment will resort to violence for the defence of its privileges. In that case, no other way will be left to the proletariat for the achievement of its aim but that of revolution. This is the reason the programme of "working-class socialism" speaks of the winning of political power in general *without defining* the method, for the choice of method depends on a future which we cannot precisely determine. But, we repeat, to limit the activities of the proletariat under any circumstances to peaceful

"democratisation" alone is arbitrarily to narrow and vulgarise the concept of working-class socialism.

We shall not analyse the other articles in the *Separate Supplement* in such great detail. We have spoken of the article on the tenth anniversary of Chernyshevsky's death. As to the pro-Bernsteinian propaganda of the *Rabochaya Mysl* Editorial Board, which the enemies of socialism throughout the world, especially the bourgeois liberals, have seized on, and against which the vast majority of the German Social-Democrats and class-conscious German workers spoke out so decisively (at their Hannover Congress)—as to Bernsteinism, this is not the place to speak of it in detail. We are interested in our *Russian* Bernsteinism, and we have shown the limitless confusion of ideas, the absence of anything like independent views, the tremendous step backwards as compared with the views of Russian Social-Democracy which "our" Bernsteinism represents. As far as German Bernsteinism is concerned, we would rather leave it to the Germans themselves to handle. We would remark only that Russian Bernsteinism is infinitely lower than the German. Bernstein, despite his errors, despite his obvious striving to retrogress both theoretically and politically, still has sufficient intelligence and sufficient conscientiousness *not to propose changes* in the programme of German Social-Democracy without himself having arrived at any new theory or programme; in the final and decisive moment, he declared his acceptance of Bebel's resolution, a resolution that announced solemnly to the world that German Social-Democracy would stand by its old programme and its old tactics. And our Russian Bernsteinians? Without having done a hundredth of what Bernstein has done, they even go so far as to refuse to recognise the fact that all Russian Social-Democratic organisations laid the foundations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1898, published its *Manifesto*, and announced *Rabochaya Gazeta* to be its official organ, and that these publications stand by the "old" programme of the Russian Social-Democrats in its entirety. Our Bernsteinians do not seem to be aware of the fact that, if they have rejected the old views and adopted new ones it is their moral duty—to Russian Social-Democracy and

to the Russian socialists and workers who devoted all their efforts to the preparations for, and the founding of, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and who in their majority now all Russian prisons—that it is the duty of those who profess the new views, not to confine themselves to jabbing from holes and corners at "our revolutionaries" in general, but to announce directly and publicly with whom and with what they are in disagreement, what new views and what new programme they advance in place of the old.

There is still one other question left for us to examine, probably the most important one, namely, how such a retrograde trend in Russian Social-Democracy is *to be explained*. In our opinion it is not to be explained solely by the personal qualities of the *Rabochaya Mysl* editors or by the influence of the fashionable Bernsteinism alone. We hold that it is to be explained mainly by the peculiarities in the historical development of Russian Social-Democracy, which gave rise to—and *had temporarily* to give rise to—a narrow understanding of working-class socialism.

In the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties, when Social-Democrats initiated their practical work in Russia, they were confronted firstly with-the Narodnaya Volya, which charged them with departing from the political struggle that had been inherited from the Russian revolutionary movement, and with which the Social-Democrats carried on a persistent polemic. Secondly, they were confronted with the Russian liberal circles, which were also dissatisfied with the turn taken by the revolutionary movement—from the Narodnaya Volya trend to Social-Democracy. The twofold polemic centred round the question of politics. In their struggle against the narrow conceptions of the Narodnaya Volya adherents, who reduced politics to conspiracy-making, the Social-Democrats could be led to, and did at times, declare themselves against politics in general (in view of the then prevailing narrow conception of politics). On the other hand, the Social-Democrats often heard, in the liberal and radical *salons* of bourgeois "society," regrets that the revolutionaries had abandoned terror; people who were mortally afraid for their own skins and at a decisive moment failed to give support to the heroes who struck blows at the autocracy, these people hypocritically accused

the Social-Democrats of political indifferentism and yearned for the rebirth of a party that would pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them. Naturally, the Social-Democrats conceived a hatred for such people and their phrases, and they turned to the more mundane but more serious work of propaganda among the factory proletariat. At first it was inevitable that this work should have a narrow character and should be embodied in the narrow declarations of some Social-Democrats. This narrowness, however, did not frighten those Social-Democrats who had not in the least forgotten the broad historical aims of the Russian working-class movement. What matters it if the *words* of the Social-Democrats sometimes have a narrow meaning when *their deeds* cover a broad field. They do not give themselves up to useless conspiracies, they do not hob-nob with the Balalaikins[111] of bourgeois liberalism, but they go to that class which alone is the real revolutionary class and assist in the development of its forces! They believed that this narrowness would disappear of its own accord with each step that broadened Social-Democratic propaganda. And this, to a considerable degree, is what has happened. From propaganda they began to go over to widespread agitation. Widespread agitation, naturally, brought to the forefront a growing number of class-conscious advanced workers; revolutionary organisations began to take form (the St. Petersburg, Kiev, and other Leagues of Struggle, the Jewish Workers' Union). These organisations naturally tended to merge and, eventually, they succeeded: they united and laid the foundations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It would seem that the old narrowness would then have been left without any basis and that it would be completely cast aside. But things turned out differently: the spread of their agitation brought the Social-Democrats into contact with the lower, less developed strata of the proletariat; to attract these strata it was necessary for the agitator to be able to adapt himself to the lowest level of understanding, he was taught to put the "demands and interests of the given moment" in the foreground and to push back the broad ideals of socialism and the political struggle. The fragmentary, amateur nature of Social-Democratic work, the extremely weak connections between the study circles in

the different cities, between the Russian Social-Democrats and their comrades abroad who possessed a profounder knowledge and a richer revolutionary experience, as well as a wider political horizon, naturally led to a gross exaggeration of this (*absolutely essential*) aspect of Social-Democratic activity, which could bring some individuals to lose sight of the other aspects, especially since with every reverse the most developed workers and intellectuals were wrenched from the ranks of the struggling army, so that sound revolutionary traditions and continuity could not as yet be evolved. It is in this extreme exaggeration of one aspect of Social-Democratic work that we see the chief cause of the sad retreat from the ideals of Russian Social-Democracy. Add to this enthusiasm over a fashionable book, ignorance of the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, and a childish claim to originality, and you have all the elements that go to make up "the retrograde trend in Russian Social-Democracy."

We shall, therefore, have to deal in greater detail with the question of the relation of the advanced strata of the proletariat to the less advanced, and the significance of Social-Democratic work among these two sections.

The history of the working-class movement in all countries shows that the better-situated strata of the working class respond to the ideas of socialism more rapidly and more easily. From among these come, in the main, the advanced workers that every working-class movement brings to the fore, those who can win the confidence of the labouring masses, who devote themselves entirely to the education and organisation of the proletariat, who accept socialism consciously, and who even elaborate independent socialist theories. Every viable working-class movement has brought to the fore such working-class leaders, its own Proudhons, Vaillants, Weitlings, and Bebels. And our Russian working-class movement promises not to lag behind the European movement in this respect. At a time when educated society is losing interest in honest, illegal literature, an impassioned desire for knowledge and for socialism is growing among the workers, real heroes are coming to the fore from amongst the workers, who, despite their wretched living conditions, despite the stultifying penal

servitude of factory labour, possess so much character and will-power that they study, study, study, and turn themselves into conscious Social-Democrats—"the working-class intelligentsia." This "working-class intelligentsia" already exists in Russia, and we must make every effort to ensure that its ranks are regularly reinforced, that its lofty mental requirements are met and that leaders of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party come from its ranks. The newspaper that wants to become the organ of all Russian Social-Democrats must, therefore, be at the level of the advanced workers; not only must it not lower its level artificially, but, on the contrary, it must raise it constantly, it must follow up all the tactical, political, and theoretical problems of world Social-Democracy. Only then will the demands of the working-class intelligentsia be met, and it itself will take the cause of the Russian workers and, *consequently*, the cause of the Russian revolution, into its own hands.

After the numerically small stratum of advanced workers comes the broad stratum of average workers. These workers, too, strive ardently for socialism, participate in workers' study circles, read socialist newspapers and books, participate in agitation, and differ from the preceding stratum only in that they cannot become fully independent leaders of the Social-Democratic working-class movement. The average worker will not understand some of the articles in a newspaper that aims to be the organ of the Party, he will not be able to get a full grasp of an intricate theoretical or practical problem. This does not at all mean that the newspaper must lower itself to the level of the mass of its readers. The newspaper, on the contrary, must raise their level and help promote advanced workers from the middle stratum of workers. Such workers, absorbed by *local* practical work and interested mainly in the events of the working-class movement and the immediate problems of agitation, should connect their every act with thoughts of the entire Russian working-class movement, its historical task, and the ultimate goal of socialism, so that the newspaper, the mass of whose readers are average workers, must connect socialism and the political struggle with every local and narrow question.

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Lastly, behind the stratum of average workers comes the mass that constitutes the lower strata of the proletariat. It is quite possible that a socialist newspaper will be completely or well-nigh incomprehensible to them (even in Western Europe the number of Social-Democratic voters is much larger than the number of readers of Social-Democratic newspapers), but it would be absurd to conclude from this that the newspaper of the Social-Democrats should adapt itself to the lowest possible level of the workers. The only thing that follows from this is that different forms of agitation and propaganda must be brought to bear on these strata—pamphlets written in more popular language, oral agitation, and chiefly—leaflets on local events. The Social-Democrats should not confine themselves even to this; it is quite possible that the first steps towards arousing the consciousness of the lower strata of the workers will have to take the form of legal educational activities. It is very important for the *Party* to make use of this activity, guide it in the direction in which it is most needed, send out legal workers to plough up virgin fields that can later be planted by Social-Democratic agitators. Agitation among the lower strata of the workers should, of course, provide the widest field for the personal qualities of the agitator and the peculiarities of the locality, the trade concerned, etc. "Tactics and agitation must not be confused," says Kautsky in his book against Bernstein. "Agitational methods must be adapted to individual and local conditions. Every agitator must be allowed to select those methods of agitation that he has at his disposal. One agitator may create the greatest impression by his enthusiasm, another by his biting sarcasm, a third by his ability to adduce a large number of instances, etc. While being adapted to the agitator, agitation must also be adapted to the public. The agitator must speak so that he will be understood; he must take as a starting-point something well known to his listeners. All this is self-evident and is not merely applicable to agitation conducted among the peasantry. One has to talk to cabmen differently than to sailors, and to sailors differently than to printers. *Agitation* must be *individualised*, but our *tactics*, our political *activity* must be *uniform*" (*S*. 2-3). These words from a leading representative of

Social-Democratic theory contain a superb assessment of agitation as part of the general activity of the party. These words show how unfounded are the fears of those who think that the formation of a revolutionary party conducting a political struggle will interfere with agitation, will push it into the background and curtail the freedom of the agitators. On the contrary, only an organised party can carry out widespread agitation, provide the necessary guidance (and material) for agitators on all economic and political questions, make use of every local agitational success for the instruction of all Russian workers, and send agitators to those places and into that *milieu* where they can work with the greatest success. It is only in an organised party that people possessing the capacities for work as agitators will be able to dedicate themselves wholly to this task—to the advantage both of agitation and of the other aspects of Social-Democratic work. From this it can be seen that whoever forgets political agitation and propaganda on account of the economic struggle, whoever forgets the necessity of organising the working-class movement into the struggle of a political party, will, aside from everything else, deprive himself of even an opportunity of successfully and steadily attracting the lower strata of the proletariat to the working-class cause.

However, such an exaggeration of one side of our activities to the detriment of the others, even the urge to throw overboard the other aspects, is fraught with still graver consequences for the Russian working-class movement. The lower strata of the proletariat may even become demoralised by such calumnies as that the founders of Russian Social-Democracy only want to use the workers to overthrow the autocracy, by invitations to confine themselves to the restoration of holidays and to craft unions, with no concern for the final aims of socialism and the immediate tasks of the political struggle. Such workers may (and will) always be ensnared by the bait of any sops offered by the government or the bourgeoisie. The lower strata of the proletariat, the very undeveloped workers, might, under the influence of the preaching of *Rabochaya Mysl*, fall victim to the bourgeois and profoundly reactionary idea that the worker cannot and should not interest himself in anything but increased

wages and the restoration of holidays ("the interests of the moment"); that the working people can and should conduct the workers' struggle by their own efforts alone, by their own "private initiative," and not attempt to combine it with socialism; that they should not strive to turn the working-class movement into the essential, advanced cause of all mankind. We repeat, the most undeveloped workers might be demoralised by such an idea, but we are confident that the advanced Russian workers, those who guide the workers' study circles and all Social-Democratic activity, those who today fill our prisons and places of exile—from Archangel Gubernia to Eastern Siberia—that those workers will reject such a theory with indignation. To reduce the entire movement to the interests of the moment means to speculate on the backward condition of the workers, means to cater to their worst inclinations. It means artificially to break the link between the working-class movement and socialism, between the fully defined political strivings of the advanced workers and the spontaneous manifestations of protest on the part of the masses. Hence, the attempt of *Rabochaya Mysl* to introduce a special trend merits particular attention and calls for a vigorous protest. As long as *Rabochaya Mysl*, adapting itself, apparently, to the lower strata of the proletariat, assiduously avoided the question of the ultimate goal of socialism and the political struggle, with no declaration of its special trend, many Social-Democrats only shook their heads, hoping that with the development and extension of their work the members of the *Rabochaya Mysl* group would come to rid themselves of their narrowness. However, when people who, until now, have performed the useful work of a preparatory class clutch at fashionable opportunist theories and begin to deafen the ears of Europe with announcements about intending to put the whole of Russian Social-Democracy into the preparatory class for many years (if not for ever), when, in other words, people who have, until now, been labouring usefully over a barrel of honey begin "in full view of the public" to pour ladles of tar into it, then it is time for us to set ourselves decisively against this retrograde trend!

Russian Social-Democracy, both through its founders, the members of the Emancipation of Labour group, and

through the Russian Social-Democratic organisations that founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has always recognised the following two principles: 1) The essence of Social-Democracy is the organisation of the class struggle of the proletariat for the purpose of winning political power, of transferring all means of production to society as a whole, and of replacing capitalist by socialist economy; 2) the task of Russian Social-Democracy is to organise the Russian revolutionary working-class party which has as its immediate aim the overthrow of the autocracy and the winning of political liberty. Whoever departs from these basic principles (formulated precisely in the programme of the Emancipation of Labour group and expressed in the *Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*) departs from Social-Democracy.

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APROPOS OF THE *PROFESSION DE FOI**

Although the *Profession de foi*, composed by the Kiev Committee, is only a rough draft, for the elaboration and polishing of which, according to the Committee, there was an insufficiency of time, it nevertheless allows one to obtain quite a clear idea of the views of the Kiev Committee. These views must certainly call forth an emphatic protest from those Russian Social-Democrats who abide by the viewpoint of the old principles of Social-Democracy proclaimed in Russia by the Emancipation of Labour group, enunciated repeatedly in the publications of the R.S.D.L.P. and reaffirmed in its manifesto. There is no doubt that the views of the Kiev Committee *reflect* the very considerable influence of the new trend of the "young Russian Social-Democrats," which, when developed to the extreme, has merged with Bernsteinism and yielded such products as the famous *Separate Supplement to "Rabochaya Mysl"* (September 1899) and the no less famous *Credo*.

It cannot be said that the *Profession de foi* has gone all the way towards this opportunist and reactionary trend, but it has taken such serious steps in that direction and denotes such confusion in the basic ideas of Social-Democracy, such a vacillation in revolutionary thinking, that we consider it our duty to give warning to the comrades in Kiev and to analyse in detail their deviation from principles long established both in international and in Russian Social-Democracy.

* Profession of faith, a programme, the exposition of a world outlook.—*Ed.*

The very first sentence of the *Profession de foi* gives rise to the most serious bewilderment: "While admitting that the struggle for the political rights of the proletariat is the immediate general task of the working-class movement in Russia, the Kiev Committee nevertheless does not believe it possible at the present time to turn to the mass of the workers and call on them to take political action, in other words, it does not believe it possible to carry on *political* agitation, because the Russian workers have not, in the mass, attained the maturity for political struggle." We shall not discuss the formulation of this passage; of importance to us only are the ideas contained in it and reiterated (note this) in many other places in the *Profession de foi*, ideas of such a nature that they simply leave us wondering: Can those who wrote this really be Social-Democrats?

"The Russian workers have not, in the mass, attained the maturity for political struggle"! If this is true, it is tantamount to a death sentence for Social-Democracy as a whole; for it means that the Russian workers have not, in the mass, reached the maturity necessary for Social-Democracy. In actual fact, there is not and never has been a Social-Democracy anywhere in the world that is not inseparably and indivisibly bound up with the political struggle. Social-Democracy without the political struggle is a river without water, it is a howling contradiction, it is either something in the nature of a return to the utopian socialism of our forefathers who despised "politics," or to anarchism, or to trade-unionism.

The first *profession de foi* of world socialism, the *Communist Manifesto*, established a truth that has since become an elementary verity—that every class struggle is a political struggle, that the working-class movement only then grows out of its embryonic state, its infancy, and becomes a *class* movement when it makes the transition to the political struggle. The first *profession de foi* of Russian socialism, Plekhanov's booklet, *Socialism and the Political Struggle*, which appeared in 1883, reaffirmed this elementary truth in its application to Russia and showed precisely how and why the Russian revolutionary movement must bring about a fusion of socialism and the political struggle, a fusion of the spontaneous movement of the masses of

workers and the revolutionary movement, a fusion of the class struggle and the political struggle. By adopting the standpoint of socialism and the class struggle and simultaneously rejecting the possibility of "calling at the present moment on the masses to take political action," the Kiev Committee is, in essence, departing completely from the principles of Social-Democracy, and the desire to remain true to these principles has led the Committee into a number of glaring contradictions.

Indeed, how can one speak of the "political education" of the workers, if one does not recognise the possibility of conducting political agitation and political struggle? Surely there is no need to prove to Social-Democrats that there can be no political education except through political struggle and political action. Surely it cannot be imagined that any sort of study circles or books, etc., can politically educate the masses of workers if they are kept away from political activity and political struggle. Surely Russian Social-Democracy does not have to go back to the viewpoint of the serf-owners who declared that it was first necessary to educate the peasants and then to emancipate them, or to the viewpoint of those ink-slingers who grovel before the government and say that the people must first be educated and then granted political rights. How can one undertake to bring the workers to recognition of the need to struggle for political rights and at the same time not believe in the possibility of calling on them to take political action, in the possibility of conducting political agitation? Arouse the consciousness of the need for political struggle and at the same time not call for political struggle?! What falderal is this? What does it mean? This kind of tangle is not the result of something left unsaid or of the unfinished nature of a rough draft; it is the natural, inevitable result of the dualism and equivocation that permeate all the views of the Kiev Committee. The Committee wants, on the one hand, to remain true to the basic principles long established in international and Russian Social-Democracy and, on the other, is infatuated with the fashionable Bernsteinian catchwords, "necessity," "gradualness" (end of Section I of the Kiev Committee's *Profession de foi*), "the directly economic character of the

movement," the impossibility of political agitation and struggle, the necessity of adhering to the solid ground of real demands and needs (as though the struggle for political liberty is not called forth by the most real demand and need!); in a word, it is infatuated with the fashionable catchwords out of which such writings *à la mode* as the *Credo* and the *Separate Supplement to "Rabochaya Mysl"* are spun. Let us examine in its essence the thesis in which all the weak aspects of the *Profession de foi* now under discussion are focused, the thesis that it is "impossible at the present time to turn to the mass of the workers with the call to take political action"; that it is impossible, in other words, to conduct political agitation, because the Russian workers have not yet attained the maturity for political struggle. This last assertion is, fortunately, untrue (we say "fortunately," for were it true, it would inevitably lead Russian Marxists and Russian Social-Democrats into the quagmire of trade-unionist and bourgeois-liberal vulgarisation into which the authors of *Credo*, *Rabochaya Mysl*, and their numerous hangers-on in our legal literature are trying to push them). The Russian workers have, in the mass, not only attained maturity for political struggle, but they have on many occasions demonstrated it by engaging in acts of political struggle, often even spontaneously.

Is not the mass distribution of manifestos in which the government is condemned and castigated really an act of political struggle? Have not the Russian workers in the mass "used their own means" to deal with the police and the soldiery when these became excessively arrogant; have they not liberated arrested comrades by force? Have they not in many places fought in real street battles against troops and police? Have not the Russian workers in the mass, for more than twenty years, sent the best, most developed, most honest, and most courageous of their comrades into the revolutionary circles and organisations? But for the sake of a fashionable doctrine of bourgeois vulgarisation we, representatives of the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, are supposed to forget all that and admit the impossibility of calling on the working masses to take political action! The objection will probably be raised that the

cited instances are more often spontaneous outbursts rather than political struggles. To which we answer: Were not our strikes mere spontaneous outbursts until the revolutionary circles of socialists undertook extensive agitation and summoned the working masses to the class struggle, to the conscious struggle against their oppressors? Call one find in history a single case of a popular movement, of a class movement, that did not begin with spontaneous, unorganised outbursts, that would have assumed an organised form and created political parties without the conscious intervention of enlightened representatives of the given class? If the working-class urge, spontaneous and indomitable, to engage in political struggle has so far taken mainly the form of unorganised outbursts, only *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[112] and *Grazhdanin*[113] can draw from this the conclusion that the Russian workers have not yet, in the mass, attained the maturity for political agitation. A socialist, on the contrary, will draw from it the conclusion that the time has long been ripe for political agitation, for the broadest possible appeal to the working masses to engage in political action and political struggle. If we do not make this appeal, we fail in our duty and, in actual fact, cease to be Social-Democrats, since economic and trade-union organisations without political struggle have always and everywhere been advocated by zealous champions of the bourgeoisie. For this reason the persistent ignoring of the political struggle and the political tasks of the Russian working class, such as we see, for instance, in *Rabochaya Mysl*, cannot be called anything but criminal and disgraceful. This hushing-up is tantamount to demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, who see and feel political oppression, who revolt spontaneously against it, but who meet with indifference on the part of their socialist leaders or even with polemics against the ideas of political struggle. When we are told that the ideas of political liberty must be brought "gradually" to the masses, what can we call this but indifference and extreme narrowness? One might think that hitherto we have been too hasty in bringing these ideas to the masses, so that we need to curb and moderate ourselves!!! Or, when we are told that "a political clarification of the condition of the working class" is necessary only "to the

extent that there is reason for it in each individual case," as though "reasons" for political agitation are not furnished by a multitude of the most widespread, day-to-day facts of working-class life!

The effort to limit political agitation to the existence of reasons in each individual case is either senseless or it reflects a desire to take a step backwards in the direction of *Credo* and *Rabochaya Mysl*, a desire to narrow the scope of our already far-too-narrow propaganda and agitation. The objection will also probably be raised that the working-class *masses* are not yet able to understand the idea of the political struggle, an idea that is comprehensible only to certain, more developed workers. To this objection, which we hear so frequently from "young" Russian Social-Democrats, our answer is that, firstly, Social-Democracy has everywhere and always been, and *cannot but be* the representative of the class-conscious, and not of the non-class-conscious, workers and that there cannot be anything more dangerous and more criminal than the demagogic speculation on the underdevelopment of the workers. If the criterion of activity were that which is immediately, directly, and to the greatest degree accessible to the broadest masses, we should have to preach anti-Semitism or to agitate, let us say, on the basis of an appeal to Father Johann of Kronstadt.[114]

It is the task of Social-Democracy to develop the political consciousness of the masses and not to drag along at the tail-end of the masses that have no political rights; secondly, and this is most important, it is untrue that the masses will not understand the idea of political struggle. Even the most backward worker will understand the idea, provided, of course, the agitator or propagandist is able to approach him in such a way as to communicate the idea to him, to explain it in understandable language on the basis of facts the worker knows from everyday experience. But this condition is just as indispensable for clarifying the economic struggle: in this field, too, the backward worker from the lower or middle strata of the masses will not be able to assimilate the general idea of economic struggle; it is an idea that can be absorbed by a few educated workers whom the masses will follow,

guided by their instincts and their direct, immediate interests.

This is likewise true of the political sphere; of course, only the developed worker will comprehend the general idea of the political struggle, and the masses will follow him because they have a very good sense of their lack of political rights (as the Kiev Committee's *Profession de foi* admits in one place), and because their most immediate, everyday interests regularly bring them into contact with every kind of manifestation of political oppression. In no political or social movement, in no country has there ever been, or could there ever have been, any other relation between the mass of the given class or people and its numerically few educated representatives than the following: everywhere and at all times the leaders of a certain class have always been its advanced, most cultivated representatives. Nor can there be any other situation in the Russian working-class movement. The ignoring of the interests and requirements of this advanced section of the workers, and the desire *to descend* to the level of understanding of the lower strata (instead of constantly *raising* the level of the workers' class-consciousness) must, therefore, necessarily have a profoundly harmful effect and prepare the ground for the infiltration of all sorts of non-socialist and non-revolutionary ideas into the workers' midst.

To conclude the analysis of the Kiev Committee's views on the political struggle [I add the following]. The Committee, in a manner that is highly strange and, at the same time, highly typical of the entire *Profession de foi*, not considering it possible at the present time to call on the masses of the workers to take political action, recognises the desirability of organising *partial* demonstrations for purely agitational purposes (and not for the purpose of bringing pressure upon the government) on issues that are comprehensible to the broad masses Socialists calling on the workers *not* to bring pressure to bear on the government!!! That is about the limit. ...Only it is beyond our ken how demonstrations that do *not* bring pressure to bear on the government are possible. Should we perhaps recommend to the workers that they demonstrate within the four walls of their hovels and lock the doors before they begin? Or per-

haps they should demonstrate by making the gesture of the fig with their hands in their pockets? That would probably not bring such harmful and ruinous "pressure upon the government"! And we also despair of understanding what is meant by a "partial demonstration." Does it, perhaps, mean of one trade, on issues of that trade alone (again: what has this to do with socialism?), or, perhaps, on partial political issues and not against the entire political system, the autocracy in its entirety? But if this is so, are these not purely and simply the ideas of *Credo* and of the sheerest opportunism, ideas that extremely lower and obscure the political consciousness and the political tasks of the working class? If this is so, hadn't we better repeat the "winged phrase" of a "young" metropolitan Social-Democrat: "It is premature to discredit the autocracy among the workers"?...

The *Profession de foi* displays an extreme narrowness of views not only in regard to the question of "politics." "At the present time," we read, "agitational influence brought to bear on the masses can only take the form of, firstly, assistance in the economic struggle of the proletariat. The Committee, therefore, takes advantage of every clash between the workers and the employers, or every important fact of abuse on the part of the employers, to address a manifesto to the workers explaining to them their situation and calling on them to protest; it takes a leading part in strikes, formulates the workers' demands, shows the best way to win the demands, and by all these means develops class-consciousness in the workers." That is all; nothing more is told us on the economic struggle. And this is a *profession de foi*! Read these passages over again carefully: Again we have here the language of the *Credo* and the ideas of the *Credo* (which illustrates once more the abysmal blundering of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* editors who stubbornly desire to conceal the views of the "young economists" and to see in them nothing but the deviations of individuals).

For the socialist, the economic struggle serves as a basis for the organisation of the workers into a revolutionary party, for the strengthening and development of their class struggle against the whole capitalist system. If the economic struggle is taken as something complete in itself there will be nothing socialist in it; the experience of all European

countries shows us many examples, not only of socialist, but also of anti-socialist trade unions.

It is the task of the bourgeois politician "to assist the economic struggle of the proletariat"; the task of the socialist is to bring the economic struggle to further the socialist movement and the successes of the revolutionary working-class party. The task of the socialist is to further the indissoluble fusion of the economic and the political struggle into the single class struggle of the socialist working-class masses. The diffuse expressions of the Kiev Committee's *Profession de foi*, therefore, open wide the doors to Bernsteinian ideas and legalise an impermissibly narrow attitude to the economic struggle.

Agitational activity among the masses must be of the broadest nature, both economic and political, on all possible issues and in regard to all manifestations of oppression whatever their form. We must utilise this agitation to attract growing numbers of workers into the ranks of the revolutionary Social-Democratic party, to encourage the political struggle in all conceivable manifestations, to organise this struggle and transform it from its spontaneous forms into the struggle of a single political party. Agitation, therefore, must serve as *a means* of widely expanding the political protest and the more organised forms of political struggle. Today our agitation is too hemmed in; the range of questions it touches upon is too limited. It is our duty therefore not to legitimise this narrowness but to try to liberate ourselves from it, to deepen and expand our agitational work.

In the *Profession de foi* now under discussion this narrowness leads, not only to the theoretical errors above analysed, but to the narrowing of the practical tasks. This narrowing can be seen in the desire "to make the investigation of the workers' conditions at local factories and works, through questionnaires and other means, the immediate pressing task." We, of course, can have nothing against questionnaires in general, Since they constitute an essential accessory to agitation, but to occupy ourselves with investigations means to expend unproductively revolutionary forces that are sparse enough as it is.

In fact, much can be gathered from our legal inquiries. We must make it our immediate and urgent task to

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extend agitation and propaganda (especially on the political level), all the more so, since the very good habit, now becoming widespread among our workers, of sending reports of their own to the socialist newspapers guarantees an abundance of material.

A still greater narrowing is to be seen in the fact that on the question of funds only "trade-union strike" funds are recognised as desirable, while not a word is said to the effect that these funds must become integrated in the Social-Democratic Party to be used for the political struggle.

To limit our secret funds to purely economic activity is a desire natural to the authors of the *Credo*; but it is incomprehensible in the *Profession de foi* of a committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

On the question of legal societies the *Profession de foi* is no less narrow, displaying the same effort to make concessions to the notorious Bernsteinism. For a committee of the Social-Democratic Party to assist in the founding of funds means again to scatter forces and to wipe out the distinction between purely cultural activity and revolutionary work; a revolutionary party can and must make use of legal societies for the strengthening and consolidation of *its own* work, as centres of agitation, as a convenient cover for establishing connections, etc., etc.—but only for this. To expend socialist forces on rendering assistance to the founding of societies is in the highest degree irrational; it is incorrect to accord these societies an independent significance and it is simply ridiculous to believe that legal societies can be "fully independent of the participation and pressure of the employers."

Lastly, the narrowness and specific character of the Kiev Committee's views are reflected in its organisational plans. It is true we agree fully with the Kiev Committee that this is not the time to announce the re-establishment of the Party and to elect a new Central Committee; but we view as utterly erroneous the opinion concerning the "directly economic character of the movement," the opinion that the Russian proletariat "is not prepared for political agitation." It would also be an error to wait until "local groups grow stronger, increase their membership, and strengthen

their connections with the working-class *milieu*"—such reinforcement often leads to immediate collapse.

On the contrary, we must immediately set about the work of unification and begin it with literary unity, with the establishment of a common Russian newspaper that must make an effort to prepare for the re-establishment of the Party by serving as an organ for the whole of Russia; by gathering correspondence and news items from the circles in all localities; by providing space for the discussion of disputed questions; by extending the scope of our agitation and propaganda; by devoting special attention to organisational questions, to tactical and technical methods of conducting the work; by satisfying all the demands of the most developed workers, and by constantly raising the level of the lower strata of the proletariat (attracted by workers' correspondence, etc.) to an ever greater conscious participation in the socialist movement and in the political struggle.

Only in this way, we are convinced, can real conditions be provided for the unification and re-establishment of the Party, and only a direct and frank polemic against narrow "economism" and the growing spread of Bernsteinian ideas can ensure the correct development of the Russian working-class movement and Russian Social-Democracy.

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FACTORY COURTS

Factory courts is the name given to courts consisting of elected representatives of workers and employers (factory owners in the case of industry) that examine cases and disputes arising in connection with the terms of hire, with the fixing of rates of pay for ordinary work and overtime, with the discharge of workers in violation of rules, with payments for damage to material, with unfair imposition of fines, etc., etc. Courts of this kind exist in the majority of the West-European countries, but not in Russia, and we propose to examine what advantages they bring the workers and why the institution of factory courts is desirable in addition to the ordinary courts, where cases are heard by a sole judge appointed by the government or elected by the propertied classes, with no elected representatives of the employers and the workers.

The first advantage of the factory court is that it is much more accessible to the workers. To present a petition to an ordinary court, one has to submit it in writing (which often requires the employment of a solicitor); stamp duty has to be paid; there are long waiting periods; the plaintiff has to appear in court, which takes him and the witnesses away from their work; then comes a further period of waiting until the case goes to a higher court to be retried after an appeal by dissatisfied litigants. Is it any wonder that workers do not willingly resort to the ordinary courts? Factory courts, on the contrary, consist of employers and workers elected as judges. It is not at all difficult for a worker to make a verbal complaint to one of his fellow workers whom he has himself elected. Sessions of factory courts are usually

held on holidays or, in general, at times when the workers are free and do not have to interrupt their work. Cases are handled much more expeditiously by factory courts.

The second advantage that the workers gain from factory courts is that the judges have a far better understanding of factory affairs and, furthermore, are not outside officials but local people who have a knowledge of the workers' living conditions and local industrial conditions; half of them are workers, who will always be just to a worker and will not regard him as a drunkard, an insolent and ignorant fellow (as he is regarded by the majority of official judges, who come from the bourgeois class, the class of property owners, and who almost always retain their connections with bourgeois society, with the factory owners, directors, and engineers, but are separated from the workers as by a Chinese Wall). Official judges are mostly concerned that matters should go smoothly on paper; as long as things look all right on paper, the government official does not worry about anything else—he is merely concerned with receiving his salary and pleasing those in higher authority. This accounts for the disgusting amount of red tape, protracted litigation, and pettifoggery—something has been incorrectly recorded, something did not get properly entered in the court record, and the case is lost, however just it may have been. When the judges are elected from among the employers and from among the workers, they have no need to pile up red tape, because they are not working for a salary and are not dependent on parasitic government officials. They are not concerned with getting a still better post, but with settling disputes that prevent the factory owners from continuing production uninterruptedly and workers from continuing their work in peace and with less fear of chicaneries and unjust vexations on the part of the employers. Furthermore, one has to know factory life well and from personal experience in order to be able to settle disputes between employers and workers. The official judge glances at the worker's pay-book, reads the rules, and refuses to listen to anything else—you have broken the rules, he says, so you bear the responsibility, and the rest does not concern me. But judges elected from among the employers and from among the workers do not merely look at pa-

pers but at what happens in real life. It sometimes happens that a rule remains unchanged on paper, while in practice things proceed differently. Very often the official judge, even if he wants to, even if he examines cases with the greatest attention, cannot understand the point at issue, because he does not know the customs, he does not know the methods of fixing rates, he does not know the methods by which a master often cheats the worker without infringing the rules and the rates (as by transferring the worker to another job, by giving him different material, etc.). Elected judges who themselves work or who manage factory affairs have an immediate understanding of such issues, they can easily understand what exactly the worker wants, they are not concerned merely with observing the rules but with ensuring that the worker cannot be cheated by the bypassing of the rules, with ensuring that there can be no pretexts for deception and arbitrariness. There was a recent report in the newspapers that hat-makers had almost been convicted of theft, on a complaint from the employers, for making use of the waste trimmings from hats. Fortunately honest barristers were found who gathered information to prove that this was the custom in the industry and that the workers, far from being thieves, had not violated a single regulation. The ordinary, simple worker who earns very small wages can hardly ever get to a good barrister, and for this reason, as every worker knows, official judges often pass cruel, senselessly cruel, sentences in cases affecting workers. Absolute justice is never to be expected from official judges: we have said above that these judges belong to the bourgeois class and are prejudiced in advance to give credence to whatever the factory owner says and to disbelieve the words of the worker. The judge consults the law: a master and servant contract (one man hires himself out for wages to do something for another or to serve him). As far as he is concerned, it is all the same whether an engineer, a doctor, a factory director, or an unskilled labourer hires himself out to the factory owner; the judge thinks (by the dictates of his bureaucratic soul and his bourgeois stupidity) that the unskilled labourer should know his rights and be able, as well as a director, engineer, or doctor, to make stipulations in his contract for everything needed.

But the judges in a factory court (half of the panel) are elected from among the workers, who know very well that a new worker, or a young worker, often feels in the factory or in the office as though he were in a dark forest and has not even the ghost of an idea that he is concluding a "free contract" and that he can "foresee" terms in that contract that are to his advantage. Let us take the following instance: a worker wants to register a complaint against unjust rejection of work or against fines. It is useless for him even to think of complaining to a judge or to a factory inspector, both of whom are government officials. An official will keep insisting on one thing: the *law* gives the factory owner the right to fine workers and to reject bad work, so that it is for the factory owner to decide whether the work is bad and whether blame rests with the worker. That is why workers so rarely seek recourse to the courts: they put up with abuses, put up with them until finally they strike when their cup of patience runs over. With judges elected from their midst, the workers would find it incomparably easier to secure equity and protection in such cases and in regard to all petty factory disputes and insults. The wealthy official judge does not regard such petty matters as worthy of his attention (like having hot water for tea, or an extra cleaning of a machine, or similar items); but to the worker these things are by no means petty. Only the workers themselves can judge what a huge amount of gross ill-treatment, of insults, and of humiliation can be caused by what at first sight appear trifling, innocuous, inoffensive rules and regulations in the factory.

The third advantage workers stand to gain from factory courts is that in and through them workers learn to know the laws. As a rule the workers (in their mass) do not know and cannot get to know the laws, although government officials and official judges often punish them for not knowing the laws. When an official confronts a worker with the law and the worker pleads ignorance of its very existence, the official (or the judge) either laughs at him or rebukes him with the statement: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse," as basic Russian legislation puts it. Any official and judge, therefore, *assumes* that every worker knows the laws. But this assumption is a bourgeois lie, a lie invented by proper-

tied people and by capitalists against the propertyless, the same sort of lie as the assumption that a worker concludes a "free contract" with the master. In actual fact, the worker who starts in at the factory at a tender age, when he has learned no more than to read and write (and very, very many have not even been able to learn to read and write!), has never had time to learn anything about laws, has had nobody to learn from, and, no doubt, has had no reason to learn—because if bourgeois officials apply the laws without asking him, the laws will not be of much benefit to the worker! The bourgeois classes that accuse the workers of ignorance of the laws have done absolutely nothing to help them acquire the knowledge, so that it is not so much the workers themselves who are to blame for their ignorance of the law as their exploiters (=those who plunder them), who own all the property, live by the labour of others and want to be the only ones to take advantage of education and knowledge. There is no school and there are no books that will give the workers a knowledge of the laws, because only very few workers can read books—very, very few among the millions of working people oppressed by capital. For the same reason there are very few who attend school, and even those who have had some schooling can, in most cases, only read, write, and count; this is too little for the understanding of a branch of knowledge as complicated and difficult as are the Russian laws. The workers will gain a knowledge of the laws only when they have to apply them themselves and hear and see justice done according to those laws. Workers could learn to know the laws better if, for instance, they were appointed to juries (with the factory owners required to pay them their regular wages for the days spent in court); but bourgeois society is so constructed that only people from the propertied classes may serve as jurymen (and also peasants who have been schooled in "social service," i.e., in the lower ranks of the police); the propertyless, the proletarians, must submit to a court that is not theirs, while they themselves have no right to judge! When factory courts are set up, the workers elect their own comrades as judges and the elections take place at regular intervals; in this way those elected from among the workers acquaint themselves with the laws by applying them in practice,

that is, they not only read the laws as they are written in a book (for that does not by any means ensure a knowledge of the laws), but see for themselves in practice what particular laws are applicable to what cases and what their effect on the workers is. It is much easier for other workers, apart from the elected judges, to acquaint themselves with the laws through factory courts, because it is easy for a worker to speak to a judge elected from among his mates and obtain from him any necessary information. Workers will visit a factory court more often than a court conducted by civil servants, because it is more accessible; they will listen to cases in which their relatives and friends are participating and in this way acquaint themselves with the laws. For a working man to understand in whose interests the laws are drawn up and in whose interests those who apply them act, it is important that he should become acquainted with the laws in practice and not merely from books. Once the worker is acquainted with the laws he will see quite clearly that the interests are those of the propertied class, the men of property, the capitalists, the bourgeoisie and that the working class will never win a sound and radical improvement in its conditions, so long as it does not win the right to elect its representatives to participate in the formulation of laws and in supervision over their fulfilment.

Furthermore (fourthly), a good aspect of factory courts is that they teach the workers to take an independent part in public, state affairs (because the court is a state institution and the activity of the court is a part of state activity), they teach the workers to elect the most intelligent and honest of their comrades, those who firmly support the workers' cause, to post where their activities can be seen by the whole working class, where workers' representatives can declare the needs and demands of all the workers. It is to the interest of the capitalist class, of the entire bourgeoisie, to keep the workers ignorant and isolated, to remove as quickly as possible those among them who are more intelligent and who make use of their intellect and knowledge, not to become traitors to their class and to fawn on the foremen, masters, and police, but to help other workers acquire greater knowledge and to learn to stand up jointly for the working-class cause. But in order that such advanced representatives,

of whom that cause has great need, should come to be known by all workers and win their trust, it is important that all should witness their activities, that all should know whether they are capable of expressing and upholding the real needs and desires of the workers. If the workers could elect such people as judges, the best of them would be known to all, they would gain wider trust, and the proletarian cause would win by it greatly. If we look at our landowners, industrialists, and merchants, we see that they are not content with the fact that each of them is able to go to a governor or to a minister and present his requests; they also make sure of having their representatives in the courts (the courts with representatives from the social-estates) and that these participate directly in the administration (e.g., Marshals of the Nobility,[115] school inspectors, etc., are elected by the nobility; members of factory affairs boards,[116] of stock-exchange and fair committees are elected by the merchants, etc.). The working class in Russia is without any rights at all; workers are regarded as draught animals that have to toil for others and hold their tongues, that never dare to state their needs and desires. If the workers were to elect their comrades to factory courts constantly, they would have at least some possibility of participating in public affairs and of stating, not only the opinions of individual workers—of Pyotr, Sidor, or Ivan—but also of stating the opinions and demands of all the workers. In that case the workers would not be so mistrustful of the courts as they are of those conducted by government officials; they would see their comrades there, those who would intercede for them.

Further (fifthly), the factory courts are of benefit to the workers because they would give greater publicity to factory affairs and to all incidents in factory life. We see today that the factory owners and the government are doing everything in their power to conceal what is happening in the factory world from the general public; it is forbidden to publish anything about strikes, the reports of factory inspectors on the condition of the workers are no longer being printed, an effort is being made to have all abuses passed in silence and get matters settled as quickly as possible "in camera," by government officials, and all workers'

meetings are prohibited. It is not surprising that the mass of the workers frequently has very little knowledge of what is going on in other factories or even in other departments of the same factory. Factory courts, to which workers could frequently appeal, which would be held in public, i.e., in the presence of a working-class public, in non-working hours, would benefit the workers by helping to make known all abuses and would thus facilitate their struggle against various factory outrages and accustom them to think, not only of the regime at their own factory, but of the regime at all factories, of the conditions of all workers.*

Finally, there is one other benefit accruing from factory courts that must be mentioned: they get factory owners, directors, and foremen into the habit of treating workers decently, of treating them as equal citizens and not as slaves. Every worker knows that factory owners and foremen all too often permit themselves to treat workers in a disgracefully insulting manner, to rail at them, etc. It is difficult for a worker to complain against this attitude; it can be rebuffed only when the workers are sufficiently developed and are able to give support to their comrade. The factory owners and foremen say that our workers are very ignorant and coarse, for which reason they have to be treated roughly. There are still many survivals, actually, of serfdom among our workers, there is little education and much uncouthness—this cannot be denied. But who is mostly to blame for this? It is precisely the factory owners, foremen, and government officials who are to blame, they, whose attitude to the workers is that of feudal lords towards serfs,

* It must, of course, be remembered that factory courts can be only one of the ways and means of publicity, and not even the chief means. The life in factories, the conditions of the workers and their struggle can be brought to public knowledge in a real and comprehensive manner only by a free working-class press and by free meetings of the people to discuss all state affairs. Similarly, workers' representation at factory courts is only one of the means of representation and is far from being the chief means. The real representation of the workers' needs and interests is possible only through a national representative assembly (a parliament) that would promulgate laws and supervise their execution. Below we shall deal with the question as to whether factory courts are possible under the conditions now obtaining in Russia.

they, who do not want to consider the worker as an equal. If workers make a request or ask a question civilly, they are everywhere met with rudeness, with oaths and threats. Is it not obvious that when factory owners blame the workers for their rudeness under these circumstances they are placing the blame on the wrong shoulders? Factory courts would speedily wean our exploiters of their insulting manner: there would be worker judges in the court side by side with the factory owners, and they would discuss cases and vote together. The factory-owner judges would have to regard the worker judges as their equals and not as their hired servants. The contestants and witnesses in court would come from the factory owners and the workers, and the former would get their training in addressing workers civilly. This is very important to the workers, in view of the fact that at present discussions of this sort are extremely rare: the factory owner refuses to recognise delegates elected by the workers, so that the latter have only one way open to them—to strike, a difficult and often a very burdensome way. Further, if there were also workers among the judges, workers would be able to appeal freely to the court against rough treatment. Worker judges would always be on their side, and if a factory owner or a master ware summoned to court for insulting behaviour, he would lose all desire to display his arrogance and insolence.

Factory courts consisting of representatives of masters and workers in equal numbers, therefore, would have great significance for the workers and would bring them many benefits. They would be more accessible to the workers than the ordinary courts, there would be less pettifoggery and red tape, the judges would have a better knowledge of the factory conditions, and would judge more fairly; they would acquaint the workers with the laws, they would teach the workers to elect their representatives and to participate in state affairs, they would give greater publicity to factory life and to the working-class movement, and they would accustom the factory owners to treat the workers decently, to have polite dealings with them as equals with equals. It is no matter for wonder, therefore, that the workers in all European countries demand the establishment of factory courts, that they demand that these courts should be

set up, not only for factory workers (which the Germans and the French already have), but also for workers engaged in home-work for capitalists (for handicraftsmen), as well as for agricultural labourers. No officials appointed by the government (*no judges and no factory inspectors*) can *ever* replace institutions in which the *workers themselves participate*: after what has been said above, this requires no further explanation. Every worker, furthermore, knows from his own experience what he has to expect from government officials; if he is told that government officials can be concerned with the workers' welfare equally with people elected from among the workers themselves, he knows it to be a lie and a deception. Deception of this sort is of great advantage to the government that wants the workers to remain the ignorant, rightless, and inarticulate slaves of the capitalists, and for this reason one often hears these lying assertions from government officials or from writers who defend the interests of the factory owners and the government.

The need for factory courts and the benefits they could bring the workers are so obvious that they were long ago recognised *even by Russian government officials*. True, it was so long ago that many have forgotten it! It was at the time when our peasants were liberated from serf dependence (in 1861, over 38 years ago). About that time the Russian Government decided also to replace the laws governing artisans and factory workers with new ones; it was all too obvious then that the old laws for workers could not remain when the peasants had been liberated, since many of the workers had been serfs when the old laws were drawn up. And so the government appointed a commission of several officials to study the factory laws of France and Germany (and of other countries) and to draft a bill to change the Russian laws for artisans and factory workers. The commission included some very important people. Nevertheless, they got down to the task and printed five tomes in which they outlined foreign laws and proposed a new law for Russia. This new law, proposed by the commission, *was to institute factory courts with the judges elected from among the factory owners and the workers in equal numbers*. The draft was printed in 1865, that is, thirty-four years ago. But what, the

worker will ask, happened to this draft law? Why did not the government, which had itself instructed the officials to draft a law on the necessary changes, introduce factory courts in Russia?

Our government dealt with the commission's draft in the same manner in which it deals with any draft laws that are in any way of benefit to the people and to the workers. The officials were rewarded for their labours for the good of the tsar and the fatherland; they were given decorations to hang from ribbons round their necks and accorded higher ranks and more lucrative posts. And the draft law they had prepared was quietly "pigeon-holed," as they say in offices. And so this draft law is still stacked away in its pigeon-hole. The government has even stopped thinking of according the workers the right to elect comrades from their midst to factory courts.

It cannot, however, be said that the government has not once thought about the workers since that time. True, it has not thought of them of its own free will, but only when forced to do so by menacing workers' unrest and strikes; nevertheless, it has thought of them. It has published laws prohibiting child labour in factories, prohibiting night-work for women in certain industries, reducing the working day, and appointing factory inspectors. Despite all the pettifoggery employed in drafting them, despite the numerous loopholes left open for the factory owners to violate and get round them, these laws have still been of some benefit. Why, then, does the government prefer introducing new laws and new officials—factory inspectors—instead of introducing factory courts, provided for by a law that has been fully elaborated? The reason for this is very obvious and the workers must fully understand it, for this example will make clear the entire policy of the Russian Government with respect to the working class.

The government has appointed new officials instead of factory courts, because factory courts would raise the level of the workers' class-consciousness; make them more conscious of their rights, of their human and civic dignity; teach them to think independently about state affairs and about the interests of the entire working class; teach them to elect their more developed comrades to represent them,

and in this way undermine, if only in part, the undivided authority assumed by government officials. This is what the government fears more than anything else. It is even prepared to dispense a few hand-outs to the workers (only mites, of course, and only with one hand that does the giving ceremonially in full view of the public, so that it may pose as a benefactor, while taking them away slyly and gradually with the other hand! The workers now know this trick, having had a sample of it in the factory law of June 2, 1897!)—it is prepared to dole out crumbs as long as the autocratic power of the bureaucracy is left untouched and there is no awakening of the workers' class-consciousness, no development of their independence. The government can easily avoid this terrible danger by appointing new officials, since officials are the humble servants of the government. It is no trouble to forbid officials (factory inspectors, for instance) to publish their reports, it is no trouble to forbid them to talk to the workers regarding their rights and regarding the abuses of the masters, it is no trouble to turn them into factory police sergeants and to order them to report to the police all dissatisfaction and unrest on the part of the workers.

Therefore, so long as the present political system remains in Russia—i.e., denial of rights to the people, lawless actions on the part of government officials and the police, who are not answerable to the people—the workers cannot expect the introduction of factory courts which can be of benefit to them. The government understands full well that factory courts would very speedily cause the workers to go over to more radical demands. Having elected their representatives to the factory courts, the workers would soon realise the insufficiency of this step, because the factory owners and landlords who exploit them send their representatives to very many state institutions at a much higher level; the workers would certainly demand a general all-people's representation. Having once secured court publicity for factory affairs and the workers' needs, they would soon see that this is not enough, because in our day real publicity can be obtained only through newspapers and popular meetings, so that the workers would demand freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.

This is why the government has buried the draft law to introduce factory courts in Russia!

On the other hand, let us assume for a moment that the government were deliberately, with deception of the workers in mind, to introduce factory courts today and to retain the present political system intact. Would this be of any benefit to the workers? It would bring them no benefits at all: the workers would not even elect to these courts the most class-conscious and most loyal of their comrades, those who are most devoted to the cause of the working class, knowing that in Russia for every straightforward and honest word a man may be seized simply by order of the police and thrown into prison or transported to Siberia without trial!

It follows, therefore, that the demand for factory courts with judges elected from among the workers is only one small part of a wider and more radical demand: the demand for political rights for the people, i.e., the right to participate in the administration of the state and the right to make known the needs of the people openly, not only in the press, but also at popular meetings.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ON STRIKES[117]

In recent years, workers' strikes have become extremely frequent in Russia. There is no longer a single industrial gubernia in which there have not occurred several strikes. And in the big cities strikes never cease. It is understandable, therefore, that class-conscious workers and socialists should more and more frequently concern themselves with the question of the significance of strikes, of methods of conducting them, and of the tasks of socialists participating in them.

We wish to attempt to outline some of our ideas on these questions. In our first article we plan to deal generally with the significance of strikes in the working-class movement; in the second we shall deal with anti-strike laws in Russia; and in the third, with the way strikes were and are conducted in Russia and with the attitude that class-conscious workers should adopt to them.

I

In the first place we must seek an explanation for the outbreak and spread of strikes. Everyone who calls to mind strikes from personal experience, from reports of others, or from the newspapers will see immediately that strikes break out and spread wherever big factories arise and grow in number. It would scarcely be possible to find a single one among the bigger factories employing hundreds (at times even thousands) of workers in which strikes have not occurred. When there were only a few big factories in Russia there were few strikes; but ever since big factories have been

multiplying rapidly in both the old industrial districts and in new towns and villages, strikes have become more frequent.

Why is it that large-scale factory production always leads to strikes? It is because capitalism must necessarily lead to a struggle of the workers against the employers, and when production is on a large scale the struggle of necessity takes on the form of strikes.

Let us explain this.

Capitalism is the name given to that social system under which the land, factories, implements, etc., belong to a small number of landed proprietors and capitalists, while the mass of the people possesses no property, or very little property, and is compelled to hire itself out as workers. The landowners and factory owners hire workers and make them produce wares of this or that kind which they sell on the market. The factory owners, furthermore, pay the workers only such a wage as provides a bare subsistence for them and their families, while everything the worker produces over and above this amount goes into the factory owner's pocket, as his profit. Under capitalist economy, therefore, the people in their mass are the hired workers of others, they do not work for themselves but work for employers for wages. It is understandable that the employers always try to reduce wages; the less they give the workers, the greater their profit. The workers try to get the highest possible wage in order to provide their families with sufficient and wholesome food, to live in good homes, and to dress as other people do and not like beggars. A constant struggle is, therefore, going on between employers and workers over wages; the employer is free to hire whatever worker he thinks fit and, therefore, seeks the cheapest. The worker is free to hire himself out to an employer of his choice, so that he seeks the dearest, the one that will pay him the most. Whether the worker works in the country or in town, whether he hires himself out to a landlord, a rich peasant, a contractor, or a factory owner, he always bargains with the employer, fights with him over the wages.

But is it possible for a single worker to wage a struggle by himself? The number of working people is increasing: peasants are being ruined and flee from the countryside to the town or the factory. The landlords and factory owners

are introducing machines that rob the workers of their jobs. In the cities there are increasing numbers of unemployed and in the villages there are more and more beggars; those who are hungry drive wages down lower and lower. It becomes impossible for the worker to fight against the employer by himself. If the worker demands good wages or tries not to consent to a wage cut, the employer tells him to get out, that there are plenty of hungry people at the gates who would be glad to work for low wages.

When the people are ruined to such an extent that there is always a large number of unemployed in the towns and villages, when the factory owners amass huge fortunes and the small proprietors are squeezed out by the millionaires, the individual worker becomes *absolutely powerless* in face of the capitalist. It then becomes possible for the capitalist to crush the worker completely, to drive him to his death at slave labour and, indeed, not him alone, but his wife and children with him. If we take, for instance, those occupations in which the workers have not yet been able to win the protection of the law and in which they cannot offer resistance to the capitalists, we see an inordinately long working day, sometimes as long as 17-19 hours; we see children of 5 or 6 years of age overstraining themselves at work; we see a generation of permanently hungry workers who are gradually dying from starvation. Example: the workers who toil in their own homes for capitalists; besides, any worker can bring to mind a host of other examples! Even under slavery or serfdom there was never any oppression of the working people as terrible as that under capitalism when the workers cannot put up a resistance or cannot win the protection of laws that restrict the arbitrary actions of the employers.

And so, in order to stave off their reduction to such extremities, the workers begin a desperate struggle. As they see that each of them, individually, is completely powerless and that the oppression of capital threatens to crush him, the workers begin to revolt jointly against their employers. Workers' strikes begin. At first the workers often fail to realise what they are trying to achieve, lacking consciousness of the *wherefore* of their action; they simply smash the machines and destroy the factories. They merely want to display their wrath to the factory owners; they are trying

out their joint strength in order to get out of an unbearable situation, without yet understanding why their position is so hopeless and what they should strive for.

In all countries the wrath of the workers first took the form of isolated revolts—the police and factory owners in Russia call them "mutinies." In all countries these isolated revolts gave rise to more or less peaceful strikes, on the one hand, and to the all-sided struggle of the working class for its emancipation, on the other.

What significance have strikes (or stoppages) for the struggle of the working class? To answer this question, we must first have a fuller view of strikes. The wages of a worker are determined, as we have seen, by an agreement between the employer and the worker, and if, under these circumstances, the individual worker is completely powerless, it is obvious that workers must fight jointly for their demands, they are compelled to organise strikes either to prevent the employers from reducing wages or to obtain higher wages. It is a fact that in every country with a capitalist system there are strikes of workers. Everywhere, in all the European countries and in America, the workers feel themselves powerless when they are disunited; they can only offer resistance to the employers jointly, either by striking or threatening to strike. As capitalism develops, as big factories are more rapidly opened, as the petty capitalists are more and more ousted by the big capitalists, the more urgent becomes the need for the joint resistance of the workers, because unemployment increases, competition sharpens between the capitalists who strive to produce their wares at the cheapest (to do which they have to pay the workers as little as possible), and the fluctuations of industry become more accentuated and crises* more acute. When industry prospers, the factory owners make big profits but do not think of sharing them with the

* We shall deal elsewhere in greater detail with crises in industry and their significance to the workers. Here we shall merely note that during recent years in Russia industrial affairs have been going well, industry has been "prospering," but that now (at the end of 1899) there are already clear signs that this "prosperity" will end in a crisis: difficulties in marketing goods, bankruptcies of factory owners, the ruin of petty proprietors, and terrible calamities for the workers (unemployment, reduced wages, etc.).

workers; but when a crisis breaks out, the factory owners try to push the losses on to the workers. The necessity for strikes in capitalist society has been recognised to such an extent by everybody in the European countries that the law in those countries does not forbid the organisation of strikes; only in Russia barbarous laws against strikes still remain in force (we shall speak on another occasion of these laws and their application).

However, strikes, which arise out of the very nature of capitalist society, signify the beginning of the working-class struggle against that system of society. When the rich capitalists are confronted by individual, propertyless workers, this signifies the utter enslavement of the workers. But when those propertyless workers unite, the situation changes. There is no wealth that can be of benefit to the capitalists if they cannot find workers willing to apply their labour-power to the instruments and materials belonging to the capitalists and produce new wealth. As long as workers have to deal with capitalists on an individual basis they remain veritable slaves who must work continuously to profit another in order to obtain a crust of bread, who must for ever remain docile and inarticulate hired servants. But when the workers state their demands jointly and refuse to submit to the money-bags, they cease to be slaves, they become human beings, they begin to demand that their labour should not only serve to enrich a handful of idlers, but should also enable those who work to live like human beings. The slaves begin to put forward the demand to become masters, not to work and live as the landlords and capitalists want them to, but as the working people themselves want to. Strikes, therefore, always instil fear into the capitalists, because they begin to undermine their supremacy. "All wheels stand still, if your mighty arm wills it," a German workers' song says of the working class. And so it is in reality: the factories, the landlords' land, the machines, the railways, etc., etc., are all like wheels in a giant machine—the machine that extracts various products, processes them, and delivers them to their destination. The whole of this machine is set in motion by *the worker* who tills the soil, extracts ores, makes commodities in the factories, builds houses, workshops, and railways. When the workers refuse to work, the

entire machine threatens to stop. Every strike reminds the capitalists that it is the workers and not they who are the real masters—the workers who are more and more loudly proclaiming their rights. Every strike reminds the workers that their position is not hopeless, that they are not alone. See what a tremendous effect strikes have both on the strikers themselves and on the workers at neighbouring or nearby factories or at factories in the same industry. In normal, peaceful times the worker does his job without a murmur, does not contradict the employer, and does not discuss his condition. In times of strikes he states his demands in a loud voice, he reminds the employers of all their abuses, he claims his rights, he does not think of himself and his wages alone, he thinks of all his workmates who have downed tools together with him and who stand up for the workers' cause, fearing no privations. Every strike means many privations for the working people, terrible privations that can be compared only to the calamities of war—hungry families, loss of wages, often arrests, banishment from the towns where they have their homes and their employment. Despite all these sufferings, the workers despise those who desert their fellow workers and make deals with the employers. Despite all these sufferings, brought on by strikes, the workers of neighbouring factories gain renewed courage when they see that their comrades have engaged themselves in struggle. "People who endure so much to bend one single bourgeois will be able to break the power of the whole bourgeoisie,"[118] said one great teacher of socialism, Engels, speaking of the strikes of the English workers. It is often enough for one factory to strike, for strikes to begin immediately in a large number of factories. What a great moral influence strikes have, how they affect workers who see that their comrades have ceased to be slaves and, if only for the time being, have become people on an equal footing with the rich! Every strike brings thoughts of socialism very forcibly to the worker's mind, thoughts of the struggle of the entire working class for emancipation from the oppression of capital. It has often happened that before a big strike the workers of a certain factory or a certain branch of industry or of a certain town knew hardly anything and scarcely ever thought about socialism, but after the strike, study circles and

associations become much more widespread among them and more and more workers become socialists.

A strike teaches workers to understand what the strength of the employers and what the strength of the workers consists in; it teaches them not to think of their own employer alone and not of their own immediate workmates alone but of all the employers, the whole class of capitalists and the whole class of workers. When a factory owner who has amassed millions from the toil of several generations of workers refuses to grant a modest increase in wages or even tries to reduce wages to a still lower level and, if the workers offer resistance, throws thousands of hungry families out into the street, it becomes quite clear to the workers that the capitalist class as a whole is the enemy of the whole working class and that the workers can depend only on themselves and their united action. It often happens that a factory owner does his best to deceive the workers, to pose as a benefactor, and conceal his exploitation of the workers by some petty sops or lying promises. A strike always demolishes this deception at one blow by showing the workers that their "benefactor" is a wolf in sheep's clothing.

A strike, moreover, opens the eyes of the workers to the nature, not only of the capitalists, but of the government and the laws as well. Just as the factory owners try to pose as benefactors of the workers, the government officials and their lackeys try to assure the workers that the tsar and the tsarist government are equally solicitous of both the factory owners and the workers, as justice requires. The worker does not know the laws, he has no contact with government officials, especially with those in the higher posts, and, as a consequence, often believes all this. Then comes a strike. The public prosecutor, the factory inspector, the police, and frequently troops, appear at the factory. The workers learn that they have violated the law: the employers are permitted by law to assemble and openly discuss ways of reducing workers' wages, but workers are declared criminals if they come to a joint agreement! Workers are driven out of their homes; the police close the shops from which the workers might obtain food on credit, an effort is made to incite the soldiers against the workers even when the workers conduct themselves quietly and peacefully. Soldiers are even ordered to fire

on the workers and when they kill unarmed workers by shooting the fleeing crowd in the back, the tsar himself sends the troops an expression of his gratitude (in this way the tsar thanked the troops who had killed striking workers in Yaroslavl in 1895). It becomes clear to every worker that the tsarist government is his worst enemy, since it defends the capitalists and binds the workers hand and foot. The workers begin to understand that laws are made in the interests of the rich alone; that government officials protect those interests; that the working people are gagged and not allowed to make known their needs; that the working class must win for itself the right to strike, the right to publish workers' newspapers, the right to participate in a national assembly that enacts laws and supervises their fulfilment. The government itself knows full well that strikes open the eyes of the workers and for this reason it has such a fear of strikes and does everything to stop them as quickly as possible. One German Minister of the Interior, one who was notorious for the persistent persecution of socialists and class-conscious workers, not without reason, stated before the people's representatives: "Behind every strike lurks the hydra [monster] of revolution."[119] Every strike strengthens and develops in the workers the understanding that the government is their enemy and that the working class must prepare itself to struggle against the government for the people's rights.

Strikes, therefore, teach the workers to unite; they show them that they can struggle against the capitalists only when they are united; strikes teach the workers to think of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of factory owners and against the arbitrary, police government. This is the reason that socialists call strikes "a school of war," a school in which the workers learn to make war on their enemies for the liberation of the whole people, of all who labour, from the yoke of government officials and from the yoke of capital.

"A school of war" is, however, not war itself. When strikes are widespread among the workers, some of the workers (including some socialists) begin to believe that the working class can confine itself to strikes, strike funds, or strike associations alone; that by strikes alone the working class can achieve a considerable improvement in its condi-

tions or even its emancipation. When they see what power there is in a united working class and even in small strikes, some think that the working class has only to organise a general strike throughout the whole country for the workers to get everything they want from the capitalists and the government. This idea was also expressed by the workers of other countries when the working-class movement was in its early stages and the workers were still very inexperienced. *It is a mistaken idea.* Strikes are *one* of the ways in which the working class struggles for its emancipation, but they are not the only way; and if the workers do not turn their attention to other means of conducting the struggle, they will slow down the growth and the successes of the working class. It is true that funds are needed to maintain the workers during strikes, if strikes are to be successful. Such workers' funds (usually funds of workers in separate branches of industry, separate trades or workshops) are maintained in all countries; but here in Russia this is especially difficult, because the police keep track of them, seize the money, and arrest the workers. The workers, of course, are able to hide from the police; naturally, the organisation of such funds is valuable, and we do not want to advise workers against setting them up. But it must not be supposed that workers' funds, when prohibited by law, will attract large numbers of contributors, and so long as the membership in such organisations is small, workers' funds will not prove of great use. Furthermore, even in those countries where workers' unions exist openly and have huge funds at their disposal, the working class can still not confine itself to strikes as a means of struggle. All that is necessary is a hitch in the affairs of industry (a crisis; such as the one that is approaching in Russia today) and the factory owners will even deliberately cause strikes, because it is to their advantage to cease work for a time and to deplete the workers' funds. The workers, therefore, cannot, under any circumstances, confine themselves to strike actions and strike associations. Secondly, strikes can only be successful where workers are sufficiently class-conscious, where they are able to select an opportune moment for striking, where they know how to put forward their demands, and where they have connections with socialists and are able to procure

leaflets and pamphlets through them. There are still very few such workers in Russia, and every effort must be exerted to increase their number in order to make the working-class cause known to the masses of workers and to acquaint them with socialism and the working-class struggle. This is a task that the socialists and class-conscious workers must undertake jointly by organising a socialist working-class party for this purpose. Thirdly, strikes, as we have seen, show the workers that the government is their enemy and that a struggle against the government must be carried on. Actually, it is strikes that have gradually taught the working class of all countries to struggle against the governments for workers' rights and for the rights of the people as a whole. As we have said, only a socialist workers' party can carry on this struggle by spreading among the workers a true conception of the government and of the working-class cause. On another occasion we shall discuss specifically how strikes are conducted in Russia and how class-conscious workers should avail themselves of them. Here we must point out that strikes are, as we said above, "a school of war" and not the war itself, that strikes are only one means of struggle, only one aspect of the working-class movement. From individual strikes the workers can and must go over, as indeed they are actually doing in all countries, to a struggle of the entire working class for the emancipation of all who labour. When all class-conscious workers become socialists, i.e., when they strive for this emancipation, when they unite throughout the whole country in order to spread socialism among the workers, in order to teach the workers all the means of struggle against their enemies, when they build up a socialist workers' party that struggles for the emancipation of the people as a whole from government oppression and for the emancipation of all working people from the yoke of capital—only then will the working class become an integral part of that great movement of the workers of all countries that unites all workers and raises the red banner inscribed with the words: "Workers of all countries, unite!"

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DRAFT OF A DECLARATION OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ISKRA*[120] AND *ZARYA*[121]

In undertaking the publication of two Social-Democratic organs—a scientific and political magazine and an all-Russian working-class newspaper—we consider it necessary to say a few words concerning our programme, the objects for which we are striving, and the understanding we have of our tasks.

We are passing through an extremely important period in the history of the Russian working-class movement and Russian Social-Democracy. All evidence goes to show that our movement has reached a critical stage. It has spread so widely and has brought forth so many strong shoots in the most diverse parts of Russia that it is now striving with unrestrained vigour to consolidate itself, assume a higher form, and develop a definite shape and organisation. Indeed, the past few years have been marked by an astonishingly rapid spread of Social-Democratic ideas among our intelligentsia; and meeting this trend in social ideas is the spontaneous, completely independent movement of the industrial proletariat, which is beginning to unite and struggle against its oppressors and is manifesting an eager striving for socialism. Study circles of workers and Social-Democratic intellectuals are springing up everywhere, local agitation leaflets are beginning to appear, the demand for Social-Democratic literature is increasing and is far outstripping the supply, and intensified government persecution is powerless to restrain the movement.

The prisons and places of exile are filled to overflowing. Hardly a month goes by without our hearing of socialists

"caught in dragnets" in all parts of Russia, of the capture of underground couriers, of the arrest of agitators, and the confiscation of literature and printing-presses; but the movement goes on and is growing, it is spreading to ever wider regions, it is penetrating more and more deeply into the working class and is attracting public attention to an ever-increasing degree. The entire economic development of Russia and the history of social thought and of the revolutionary movement in Russia serve as a guarantee that the Social-Democratic working-class movement will grow and surmount all the obstacles that confront it.

The principal feature of our movement, which has become particularly marked in recent times, is its state of disunity and its amateur character, if one may so express it. Local study circles spring up and function in almost complete isolation from circles in other districts and—what is particularly important—from circles that have functioned and now function simultaneously in the same districts. Traditions are not established and continuity is not maintained; local publications fully reflect this disunity and the lack of contact with what Russian Social-Democracy has already achieved. The present period, therefore, seems to us to be critical precisely for the reason that the movement is outgrowing this amateur stage and this disunity, is insistently demanding a transition to a higher, more united, better and more organised form, which we consider it our duty to promote. It goes without saying that at a certain stage of the movement, at its inception, this disunity is entirely inevitable; the absence of continuity is natural in view of the astonishingly rapid and universal growth of the movement after a long period of revolutionary calm. Undoubtedly, too, there will always be diversity in local conditions; there will always be differences in the conditions of the working class in one district as compared with those in another; and, lastly, there will always be the particular aspect in the points of view among the active local workers; this very diversity is evidence of the virility of the movement and of its sound growth. All this is true; yet disunity and lack of organisation are not a necessary consequence of this diversity. The maintenance of continuity and the unity of the movement do not by any means exclude diversity, but,

on the contrary, create for it a much broader arena and a freer field of action. In the present period of the movement, however, disunity is beginning to show a definitely harmful effects and is threatening to divert the movement to a false path: narrow practicalism, detached from the theoretical clarification of the movement as a whole, may destroy the contact between socialism and the revolutionary movement in Russia, on the one hand, and the spontaneous working-class movement, on the other. That this danger is not merely imaginary is proved by such literary productions as the *Credo*—which has already called forth legitimate protest and condemnation—and the *Separate Supplement to "Rabochaya Mysl"* (September 1899). That supplement has brought out most markedly the trend that permeates the whole of *Rabochaya Mysl*; in it a particular trend in Russian Social-Democracy has begun to manifest itself, a trend that may cause real harm and that must be combated. And the Russian legal publications, with their parody of Marxism capable only of corrupting public consciousness, still further intensify the confusion and anarchy which have enabled the celebrated Bernstein (celebrated for his bankruptcy) to publish before the whole world the untruth that the majority of the Social-Democrats active in Russia support him.

It is still premature to judge how deep the cleavage is, and how far the formation of a special trend is probable (at the moment we are not in the least inclined to answer these questions in the affirmative and we have not yet lost hope of our being able to work *together*), but it would be more harmful to close our eyes to the gravity of the situation than to exaggerate the cleavage, and we heartily welcome the resumption of literary activity on the part of the Emancipation of Labour group, and the struggle it has begun against the attempts to distort and vulgarise Social-Democracy.[122]

The following practical conclusion is to be drawn from the foregoing: we Russian Social-Democrats must unite and direct all our efforts towards the formation of a single, strong party, which must struggle under the banner of a revolutionary Social-Democratic programme, which must maintain the continuity of the movement and systematically support its organisation. This conclusion is not

a new one. The Russian Social-Democrats reached it two years ago when the representatives of the largest Social-Democratic organisations in Russia gathered at a congress in the spring of 1898, formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published the *Manifesto* of the Party, and recognised *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official Party organ. Regarding ourselves as members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, we agree entirely with the fundamental ideas contained in the *Manifesto* and attach extreme importance to it as the open and public declaration of the aims towards which our Party should strive. Consequently, we, as members of the Party, present the question of our immediate and direct tasks as follows: What plan of activity must we adopt to revive the Party on the firmest possible basis? Some comrades (even some groups and organisations) are of the opinion that in order to achieve this we must resume the practice of electing the central Party body and instruct it to resume the publication of the Party organ.[123] We consider such a plan to be a false one or, at all events, a hazardous one. To establish and consolidate the Party means to establish and consolidate unity among all Russian Social-Democrats; such unity cannot be decreed, it cannot be brought about by a decision, say, of a meeting of representatives; it must be worked for. In the first place, it is necessary to develop a common Party literature—common, not only in the sense that it must serve the whole of the Russian movement rather than separate districts, that it must discuss the questions of the movement as a whole and assist the class-conscious proletarians in their struggle instead of dealing merely with local questions, but common also in the sense that it must unite all the available literary forces, that it must express all shades of opinion and views prevailing among Russian Social-Democrats, not as isolated workers, but as comrades united in the ranks of a single organisation by a common programme and a common struggle. Secondly, we must work to achieve an organisation especially for the purpose of establishing and maintaining contact among all the centres of the movement, of supplying complete and timely information about the movement, and of delivering our newspapers and periodicals regularly to all parts of Russia. Only when such an organisation has been founded,

only when a Russian socialist post has been established, will the Party possess a sound foundation, only then will it become a real fact and, therefore, a mighty political force. We intend to devote our efforts to the first half of this task, i.e., to creating a common literature, since we regard this as the pressing demand of the movement today, and a necessary preliminary measure towards the resumption of Party activity.

The character of our task naturally determines the programme for conducting our publications. They must devote considerable space to theoretical questions, i.e., to the general theory of Social-Democracy and its application to Russian conditions. The urgent need to promote a wide discussion of these questions at the present time in particular is beyond all doubt and requires no further explanation after what has been said above. It goes without saying that questions of general theory are inseparably connected with the need to supply information about the history and the present state of the working-class movement in the West. Furthermore, we propose systematically to discuss all political questions—the Social-Democratic Labour Party must respond to all questions that arise in all spheres of our daily life, to all questions of home and foreign politics, and we must see to it that every Social-Democrat and every class-conscious worker has definite views on all important questions. Unless this condition is fulfilled, it will be impossible to carry on wide and systematic propaganda and agitation. The discussion of questions of theory and policy will be connected with the drafting of a Party programme, the necessity for which was recognised at the congress in 1898. In the near future we intend to publish a draft programme; a comprehensive discussion of it should provide sufficient material for the forthcoming congress that will have to adopt a programme.[124] A further vital task, in our opinion, is the discussion of questions of organisation and practical methods of conducting our work. The lack of continuity and the disunity, to which reference has been made above, have a particularly harmful effect upon the present state of Party discipline, organisation, and the technique of secrecy. It must be publicly and frankly owned that in this respect we Social-Demo-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

crats lag behind the old workers in the Russian revolutionary movement and behind other organisations functioning in Russia, and we must exert all our efforts to come abreast of the tasks. The attraction of large numbers of working-class and intellectual young people to the movement, the increasing failures and the cunningness of governmental persecution make the propaganda of the principles and methods of Party organisation, discipline, and the technique of secrecy an urgent necessity.

Such propaganda, if supported by all the various groups and by all the more experienced comrades, can and must result in the training of young socialists and workers as able leaders of the revolutionary movement, capable of overcoming all obstacles placed in the way of our work by the tyranny of the autocratic police state and capable of serving all the requirements of the working masses, who are spontaneously striving towards socialism and political struggle. Finally, one of the principal tasks arising out of the above-mentioned issues must be the analysis of this spontaneous movement (among the working masses, as well as among our intelligentsia). We must try to understand the social movement of the intelligentsia which marked the late nineties in Russia and combined various, and sometimes conflicting, tendencies. We must carefully study the conditions of the working class in all spheres of economic life, study the forms and conditions of the workers' awakening, and of the struggles now setting in, in order that we may unite the Russian working-class movement and Marxist socialism, which has already begun to take root in Russian soil, into one integral whole, in order that we may combine the Russian revolutionary movement with the spontaneous upsurge of the masses of the people. Only when this contact has been established can a Social-Democratic working-class party be formed in Russia; for Social-Democracy does not exist merely to serve the spontaneous working-class movement (as some of our present-day "practical-workers" are sometimes inclined to think), but to combine socialism with the working-class movement. And it is only this combination that will enable the Russian proletariat to fulfil its immediate political task—to liberate Russia from the tyranny of the autocracy.

The distribution of these themes and questions between the magazine and the newspaper will be determined exclusively by differences in the size and character of the two publications—the magazine should serve mainly for propaganda, the newspaper mainly for agitation. But all aspects of the movement should be reflected in both the magazine and the newspaper, and we wish particularly to emphasise our opposition to the view that a workers' newspaper should devote its pages exclusively to matters that immediately and directly concern the spontaneous working-class movement, and leave everything pertaining to the theory of socialism, science, politics, questions of Party organisation, etc., to a periodical for the intelligentsia. On the contrary, it is necessary to combine all the concrete facts and manifestations of the working-class movement with the indicated questions; the light of theory must be cast upon every separate fact; propaganda on questions of politics and Party organisation must be carried on among the broad masses of the working class; and these questions must be dealt with in the work of agitation. The type of agitation which has hitherto prevailed almost without exception—agitation by means of locally published leaflets—is now inadequate; it is narrow, it deals only with local and mainly economic questions. We must try to create a higher form of agitation by means of the newspaper, which must contain a regular record of workers' grievances, workers' strikes, and other forms of proletarian struggle, as well as all manifestations of political tyranny in the whole of Russia; which must draw definite conclusions from each of these manifestations in accordance with the ultimate aim of socialism and the political tasks of the Russian proletariat. "Extend the bounds and broaden the content of our propagandist, agitational, and organisational activity"—this statement by P. B. Axelrod must serve as a slogan defining the activities of Russian Social-Democrats in the immediate future, and we adopt this slogan in the programme of our publications.

Here the question naturally arises: if the proposed publications are to serve the purpose of uniting all Russian Social-Democrats and mustering them into a single party, they must reflect all shades of opinion, all local specific features, and all the various practical methods. How can

we combine the varying points of view with the maintenance of a uniform editorial policy for these publications? Should these publications be merely a jumble of various views, or should they have an independent and quite definite tendency?

We hold to the second view and hope that an organ having a definite tendency will prove quite suitable (as we shall show below), both for the purpose of expressing various viewpoints, and for comradely polemics between contributors. Our views are in complete accord with the fundamental ideas of Marxism (as expressed in the *Communist Manifesto*, and in the programmes of Social-Democrats in Western Europe); we stand for the consistent development of these ideas in the spirit of Marx and Engels and emphatically reject the equivocating and opportunist corrections *à la* Bernstein which have now become so fashionable. As we see it, the task of Social-Democracy is to organise the class struggle of the proletariat, to promote that struggle, to point out its essential ultimate aim, and to analyse the conditions that determine the methods by which this struggle should be conducted. "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves.[125] But while we do not separate Social-Democracy from the working-class movement, we must not forget that the task of the former is to represent the interests of this movement in all countries as a whole, that it must not blindly worship any particular phase of the movement at any particular time or place. We think that it is the duty of Social-Democracy to support every revolutionary movement against the existing political and social system, and we regard its aim to be the conquest of political power by the working class, the expropriation of the expropriators, and the establishment of a socialist society. We strongly repudiate every attempt to weaken or tone down the revolutionary character of Social-Democracy, which is the party of social revolution, ruthlessly hostile to all classes standing for the present social system. We believe the historical task of Russian Social-Democracy is, in particular, to overthrow the autocracy: Russian Social-Democracy is destined to become the vanguard fighter in the ranks of Russian democracy; it is destined to achieve the aim which the whole social development

of Russia sets before it and which it has inherited from the glorious fighters in the Russian revolutionary movement. Only by inseparably connecting the economic and political struggles, only by spreading political propaganda and agitation among wider and wider strata of the working class, can Social-Democracy fulfil its mission.

From this point of view (outlined here only in its general features, since it has been dealt with in greater detail and more thoroughly substantiated on many occasions by the Emancipation of Labour group, in the *Manifesto* of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and in the "commentary" to the latter—the pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats**—and in *The Working-Class Cause in Russia* [a basis of the programme of Russian Social-Democracy]), we shall deal with all theoretical and practical questions; and we shall try to connect all manifestations of the working-class movement and of democratic protest in Russia with these ideas.

Although we carry out our literary work from the standpoint of a definite tendency, we do not in the least intend to present all our views on partial questions as those of all Russian Social-Democrats; we do not deny that differences exist, nor shall we attempt to conceal or obliterate them. On the contrary, we desire our publications to become organs for the *discussion* of all questions by all Russian Social-Democrats of the most diverse shades of opinion. We do not reject polemics between comrades, but, on the contrary, are prepared to give them considerable space in our columns. Open polemics, conducted in full view of all Russian Social-Democrats and class-conscious workers, are necessary and desirable in order to clarify the depth of existing differences, in order to afford discussion of disputed questions from all angles, in order to combat the extremes into which representatives of various views, various localities, or various "specialities" of the revolutionary movement inevitably fall. Indeed, we regard one of the drawbacks of the present-day movement to be the absence of open polemics between avowedly differing views, the effort to conceal differences on fundamental questions.

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* See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 323.—*Ed.*

Moreover, while recognising the Russian working class and Russian Social-Democracy as the vanguard in the struggle for democracy and for political liberty, we think it necessary to strive to make our publications *general-democratic* organs, not in the sense that we would for a single moment agree to forget the class antagonism between the proletariat and other classes, nor in the sense that we would consent to the slightest toning-down of the class struggle, but in the sense that we would bring forward and discuss *all* democratic questions, not confining ourselves merely to narrowly proletarian questions; in the sense that we would bring forward and discuss all instances and manifestations of political oppression, show the connection between the working-class movement and the political struggle in all its forms, attract all honest fighters against the autocracy, regardless of their views or the class they belong to, and induce them to support the working class as the only revolutionary force irrevocably hostile to absolutism. Consequently, although we appeal primarily to the Russian socialists and class-conscious workers, we do not appeal to them alone. We also call upon all who are oppressed by the present political system in Russia, on all who strive for the emancipation of the Russian people from their political slavery to support the publications which will be devoted to organising the working-class movement into a revolutionary political party; we place the columns of our publications at their disposal in order that they may expose all the abominations and crimes of the Russian autocracy. We make this appeal in the conviction that the banner of the political struggle raised by Russian Social-Democracy can and will become the banner of the whole people.

The tasks we set ourselves are extremely broad and all-embracing, and we would not have dared to take them up, were we not absolutely convinced from the whole of our past experience that these are the most urgent tasks of the whole movement, were we not assured of the sympathy and of promises of generous and constant support on the part of: 1. several organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of separate groups of Russian Social-Democrats working in various towns; 2. the Emancipation of Labour group, which founded Russian Social-Democracy

and has always been in the lead of its theoreticians and literary representatives; 3. a number of persons who are unaffiliated with any organisation, but who sympathise with the Social-Democratic working-class movement, and have proved of no little service to it. We will exert every effort to carry out properly the part of the general revolutionary work which we have selected, and will do our best to bring every Russian comrade to regard our publications as his own, to which all groups would communicate every kind of information concerning the movement, in which they would express their views, indicate their needs for political literature, relate their experiences, and voice their opinions concerning Social-Democratic editions; in a word, the medium through which they would thereby share whatever contribution they make to the movement and whatever they draw from it. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a genuinely all-Russian Social-Democratic organ. Russian Social-Democracy is already finding itself constricted in the underground conditions in which the various groups and isolated study circles carry on their work. It is time to come out on the road of open advocacy of socialism, on the road of open political struggle. The establishment of an all-Russian organ of Social-Democracy must be *the first step* on *this road*.

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

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "How the 'Spark' Was Nearly Extinguished." 1900

Reduced

HOW THE "SPARK" WAS NEARLY EXTINGUISHED*

I first went to Zurich. I arrived alone without having seen Arsenyev (Potresov). P. B. Axelrod met me in Zurich with open arms and I spent two days in a heart-to-heart talk with him. The conversation was as between friends who had not seen each other for a long time; we spoke about anything and everything, in no particular order, and not at all in the manner of a business discussion. Indeed, in regard to practical matters, there is not much that Axelrod *mitsprechen kann*,** but it was quite evident that he gravitated towards G. V. Plekhanov, from the manner in which he insisted on setting up the printing-press for the magazine in Geneva. Generally speaking, Axelrod was very "flattering" (excuse the expression), he said that our enterprise meant *everything* to them, that it meant their revival, that "we" would now be able to counteract Plekhanov's extremism. I took particular note of the last remark, and the entire subsequent "history" has proved that those were words of especial significance.

I went to Geneva. Arsenyev warned me to be particularly cautious with Plekhanov, who was terribly wrought up over the split[126] and very suspicious. My conversation with him did indeed show that he really was suspicious, distrustful, and *rechthaberisch* to the *nec plus ultra*.*** I tried to observe caution and avoided all "sore" points, but the constant restraint that I had to place on myself could not but greatly

* A play of words on the title of the newspaper *Iskra* meaning "spark."—*Ed.*

** Can contribute.—*Ed.*

*** Holding himself to be right to the nth degree.—*Ed.*

affect my mood. From time to time little "frictions" arose in the form of sharp retorts on the part of Plekhanov to any remark that might even in the least degree cool down or soothe the passions that had been aroused (by the split). There was also "friction" over questions concerning the tactics of the magazine, Plekhanov throughout displaying complete intolerance, an inability or an unwillingness to understand other people's arguments, and, to employ the correct term, insincerity. We declared that we must make *every possible* allowance for Struve, that *we ourselves* bore some guilt for his development, since we, *including Plekhanov*, had failed to protest when protest was necessary (1895, 1897). Plekhanov absolutely refused to admit even the slightest guilt, employing transparently worthless arguments by which he *dodged* the issue without clarifying it. This diplomacy in the course of comradely conversations between future co-editors was extremely unpleasant. Why the self-deception with the pretence that he, Plekhanov, had in 1895 been "ordered [??] not to shoot" (at Struve) and that he was accustomed to doing as he was ordered (really!)?[127] Why the self-deception with the assertion that in 1897 (when Struve wrote in *Novoye Slovo* that his object was to refute one of the fundamental theses of Marxism) he had not opposed it, because he never could (and never would) conceive of polemics between collaborators[128] in one and the same magazine? This insincerity was extremely irritating, the more so by the fact that in the discussion Plekhanov sought to make it appear that we did not desire to carry on a ruthless fight against Struve, that we desired to "reconcile everything," etc. A heated discussion arose over the question of polemics in general in columns of the magazine. Plekhanov was opposed and refused to listen to our arguments. He displayed a hatred towards "the Union-Abroad people" that bordered on the indecent (suspecting them of espionage, accusing them of being swindlers and rogues, and asserting that he would not hesitate to "shoot" such "traitors," etc.). The remotest suggestion that he went to extremes (for example, my allusion to the publication of private letters[129] and to the imprudence of such a procedure) roused him to a high pitch of excitement and manifest irritability. It became evident that he and we were becoming increasingly disgruntled.

But with him it expressed itself, among other things, in the following: We had a draft prepared of an editorial declaration ("In the Name of the Editorial Board"),* in which we explained the aims and the programme of the publications. This was written in an "opportunist" spirit (from Plekhanov's point of view)—polemics between members of the staff were to be permitted, the tone was modest, allowance was made for the possibility of a peaceful ending of the controversy with the "economists," etc. The declaration laid stress on our belonging to the Party and on our desire to work for its unification. Plekhanov had read this declaration together with Arsenyev and Zasulich before my arrival; he had read it and raised no objection to the content. He had merely expressed a desire to improve the style, to elevate the tone, without changing the trend of the ideas. A. N. Potresov had left the declaration with him for this purpose. When I arrived, Plekhanov did not say a word to me about the matter, but when I visited him a few days later, he returned the declaration to me with an air of—Here you are, in the presence of witnesses, I return it to you intact; you see I have not lost it. I inquired why he had not made the suggested changes. He replied evasively that it could be done later, that it would not take long and was not worth doing at the time. I took the declaration, made the changes myself (it was a rough draft outlined when I was still in Russia), and read it a second time to Plekhanov (in the presence of Vera Zasulich), this time asking him *point-blank* to take the thing and correct it. Again he resorted to evasions and turned the job over to Vera Zasulich who was sitting beside him (an altogether strange suggestion, since we had never requested her to work on the statement, besides which, she could not have made the corrections, i.e., have "elevated" the tone and given the declaration the character of a manifesto).

Thus matters went on until the conference (the conference of the entire Emancipation of Labour group: Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Zasulich, and we two, our third man being absent[130]). Finally Axelrod arrived and the conference began. On the question of our attitude towards the Jewish Union (the Bund), Plekhanov displayed extreme intolerance and

* See p. 320 of this volume—*Ed.*

openly declared it to be an organisation of exploiters who exploit the Russians and not a Social-Democratic organisation. He said that our aim was to eject this Bund from the Party, that the Jews are all chauvinists and nationalists, that a Russian party should be Russian and should not render itself into "captivity" to the "brood of vipers," etc. None of our objections to these indecent speeches had any result and Plekhanov stuck to his ideas to the full, saying that we simply did not know enough about the Jews, that we had no real experience in dealing with Jews. No resolution on this question was adopted. We read the "declaration" together at the conference. Plekhanov's behaviour was very odd. He remained silent, he suggested no changes, he did not take a stand against the idea in the declaration that polemics be permitted, and in general seemed to withdraw, precisely to withdraw. He did not wish to participate, and only casually threw in a venomous, malicious remark to the effect that he (meaning they, i.e., the Emancipation of Labour group of which he is dictator), of course, would have written a different sort of declaration. This remark, uttered in passing, after a sentence in connection with a different matter, struck me as being particularly repellent; a conference of co-editors is in session and one of them (who has been *twice* asked to submit his own draft or to suggest changes to ours) suggests no emendations, but sarcastically observes that he, of course, would not have written so (in so timid, modest, and opportunistic a manner, he wished to say). This showed clearly enough that normal relations did not exist between him and us. Subsequently—let me pass over the less important issues of the conference—the question of our attitude towards Bobo[131] and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky came up. We were in favour of a *conditional* invitation (we were inevitably driven to this by the bitterness Plekhanov displayed; we wanted him to see that we desired a different attitude. His incredible bitterness drove one instinctively, as it were, to protest and to defend his opponents. Zasulich aptly remarked that Plekhanov always argued in a manner that aroused his readers' sympathy for his opponent). Very coldly and drily Plekhanov declared that he completely disagreed, and he demonstratively remained silent throughout the whole of our fairly protracted conversation with Axelrod and Zasulich.

who were not disinclined to agree with us. The whole morning passed in what might be called a very tense atmosphere. It became clear beyond doubt that Plekhanov was presenting an ultimatum to us—to choose between him and those "rogues." Seeing that things were coming to such a pass, Arsenyev and I agreed to give way and at the very opening of the evening session declared that "on the insistence of Plekhanov" we had withdrawn our proposal. This declaration met with silence (as if it were a matter of course that we could do nothing else but give way!). This "ultimatum atmosphere" (as Arsenyev later described it) greatly irritated us—Plekhanov's desire to have unlimited power was obvious. A little before that, in a private conversation about Bobo (when Plekhanov, Arsenyev, Zasulich, and I were taking an evening walk in the woods), Plekhanov, after a heated discussion, said, laying his hand on my shoulders, "But, gentlemen, I am not putting any conditions; we shall discuss all this together at the conference and together we will decide." I was touched by this at the time. But at the conference the very opposite happened; Plekhanov stood aside from the comradely discussion, maintained an angry silence, and by his silence obviously "*put conditions*." To me it seemed to be a sharp display of insincerity (although I did not at the moment formulate my impressions so clearly), while Arsenyev declared outright: "I will never forgive him this concession!" Saturday came. I do not remember exactly what we spoke about that day; but in the evening, when we were all walking together, a fresh conflict flared up. Plekhanov proposed that a certain person (as yet unpublished in our literature, but in whom he claims to see philosophical talent; the person is unknown to me, except for a blind worship of Plekhanov) be assigned the writing of an article on a philosophical subject. Plekhanov went on to say: "I shall advise the person to begin the article with a remark against Kautsky somewhat as follows—a fine fellow, indeed! has already become a 'critic' and publishes philosophic articles by 'critics' in *Neue Zeit*,[132] but does not give full scope to 'Marxists' [read: Plekhanov]." Arsenyev, on hearing the proposal for a sharp attack upon Kautsky (who had been invited to contribute to the magazine), became indignant and heatedly opposed it on the grounds that it was uncalled for. Plekhanov became puffed up and irate, I

seconded Arsenyev, Axelrod and Zasulich remained silent. Half an hour later, Plekhanov departed (we had accompanied him to the steamer), in the final moments he had sat in silence, his brow black as a cloud. As soon as he left us, we felt as though a weight had been lifted from us all, and the discussion proceeded in a "friendly spirit." The next day, Sunday (today is September 2, Sunday. It happened *only* a week ago!!! But to me it seems like a year! How remote the thing has become!), we arranged to meet, not in our cottage, but at Plekhanov's. We came to the place, Arsenyev arriving first, I later. Plekhanov had sent Axelrod and Zasulich to inform Arsenyev that he declined to be co-editor, desiring to be just a contributor. Axelrod left, and Zasulich, quite put out and confused, murmured to Arsenyev: "Georg is displeased, he declines...." I entered. The door was opened for me by Plekhanov, who offered me his hand with a rather queer smile and then walked out. I stepped into the room and found Zasulich and Arsenyev sitting there, their faces wearing a strange expression. "Well, ladies and gentlemen," said I, "how goes it?" Plekhanov entered and invited us into his room. There he stated that it would be better if he were a contributor, an ordinary contributor, for otherwise there would be continual friction, that evidently his views on things differed from ours, that he understood and respected our, Party, point of view, but could not share it. Better, therefore, that we be the editors and he a contributor. We were amazed to hear this, positively amazed, and began to argue against the idea. Thereupon Plekhanov said: "Well, if we are to be together, how shall we vote; how many votes are there?" "Six." "Six is not a practical number." "Well, let Georg have two votes," suggested Zasulich, "otherwise he will always be alone—two votes on questions of tactics." We agreed to that. Upon that Plekhanov took the reins of management in his hands and with the air of editor-in-chief began apportioning departments among those present and assigning articles to this one and that in a tone that brooked no objection. We sat there as if we had been ducked; mechanically we agreed to everything, unable as yet to comprehend what had taken place. We realised that we had been made fools of; that our remarks were becoming more and more halting; that Plekhanov "waved them aside" (not refuting

them but waving them aside) more and more easily and carelessly; that "the new system" was *de facto* tantamount to his complete domination; and that Plekhanov understood this perfectly, not hesitating to domineer over us without ceremony. We realised that we had been fooled and utterly defeated, but were as yet unable to get a full grasp of our position. Yet no sooner did we find ourselves alone, no sooner had we left the steamer and were on our way to the cottage, than the lid flew off and we broke out in a wild and furious tirade against Plekhanov.

But before relating the substance of this tirade and what it led to, I shall go back a bit. Why did the idea of Plekhanov's complete domination (quite apart from the *form* it assumed) rouse us to such indignation? Previously we had thought that we would be the editors, and they—close collaborators. I had proposed (back in Russia) that the matter be formally submitted in this manner, but Arsenyev had objected to a formal proposition and suggested that we go about it "in a friendly way" (which would achieve the same result), to which I agreed. But both of us were in accord on the point that we were to be the editors, because the "old ones" were extremely intolerant, in addition to the fact that they would not be able to perform painstakingly the drudgery of editorial work. These were the only considerations that guided us, for we were quite ready to accept their ideological guidance. The conversations I had had in Geneva with those of Plekhanov's younger comrades and adherents closest to him (members of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group,[133] long-standing adherents of Plekhanov, active Party workers, not working men, but simple, industrious people entirely devoted to Plekhanov)—these conversations strengthened my conviction (and Arsenyev's) that this was exactly how we should arrange the matter. Those adherents had told us without equivocation that it was desirable to have the editorial office in Germany, *where we would be more independent of Plekhanov*, and that to allow the old ones to have practical control of the editorial work would bring about terrible delays, if not the collapse of the entire enterprise. For the very same reasons, Arsenyev was *unconditionally* in favour of Germany.

I broke off my description of how the "Spark" was nearly extinguished at the point where we were returning home on

the evening of Sunday, August 26 (New Style). As soon as we found ourselves alone, after leaving the steamer, we broke out into a flood of angry expressions. Our pent-up feelings got the better of us; the charged atmosphere burst into a storm. Up and down our little village we paced far into the night; it was quite dark, there was a rumbling of thunder, and constant flashes of lightning rent the air. We walked along, bursting with indignation. I remember that Arsenyev began by declaring that as far as he was concerned his personal relations with Plekhanov were broken off once and for all, never to be restored. He would maintain business relations with him, but as for personal relations—*fertig*.* Plekhanov's behaviour had been insulting to such a degree that one could not help suspecting him of harbouring "unclean" thoughts about us (i.e., that he regarded us as *Streber***). He trampled us underfoot, etc. I fully supported these charges. My "infatuation" with Plekhanov disappeared as if by magic, and I felt offended and embittered to an unbelievable degree. Never, never in my life, had I regarded any other man with such sincere respect and veneration, never had I stood before any man so "humbly" and never before had I been so brutally "kicked." That's what it was, we had actually been kicked. We had been scared like little children, scared by the grown-ups threatening to leave us to ourselves, and when we funked (the shame of it!) we were brushed aside with an incredible unceremoniousness. We now realised very clearly that Plekhanov had simply laid a trap for us that morning when he declined to act as a co-editor; it had been a deliberate chess move, a snare for guileless "pigeons." There could be no doubt whatever about that, for, had Plekhanov sincerely feared to act as a co-editor because he would be a stumbling-block and might rouse useless friction between us, he would not a moment later have revealed (and brutally revealed) the fact that his *co*-editorship was absolutely the equivalent of his *sole* editorship. And since a man with whom we desired to co-operate closely and establish most intimate relations, resorted to chess moves in dealing with comrades, there could be no doubt that this man

* Finished.—*Ed*.
** Careerists.—*Ed*.

was bad, yes, bad, inspired by petty motives of personal vanity and conceit—an insincere man. This discovery—and it was indeed a discovery—struck us like a thunderbolt; for up to that moment both of us had stood in admiration of Plekhanov, and, as we do with a loved one, we had forgiven him everything; we had closed our eyes to all his shortcomings; we had tried hard to persuade ourselves that those shortcomings were really non-existent, that they were petty things that bothered only people who had no proper regard for principles. Yet we ourselves had been taught practically that those "petty" shortcomings were capable of repelling the most devoted friends, that no appreciation of his theoretical correctness could make us forget his *repelling* traits. Our indignation knew no bounds. Our ideal had been destroyed; gloatingly we trampled it underfoot like a dethroned god. There was no end to the charges we hurled against him. It cannot go on like this, we decided. We do not wish, we will not, we *cannot* work together with him under such conditions. Good-bye, magazine! We will throw every thing up and return to Russia, where we will start all over again, right from the very beginning, and confine ourselves to the newspaper. We refuse to be pawns in the hands of that man; he does not understand, and cannot maintain comradely relations. We did not dare undertake the editorship *ourselves*; besides, it would be positively repulsive to do so now, for it would appear as though we really coveted the editor's post, that we really were *Streber*, careerists, and that we, too, were inspired by motives of vanity, though in a smaller way.... It is difficult to describe adequately what our feelings were that night—such mixed, heavy, confused feelings. It was a real drama; the complete abandonment of the thing which for years we had tended like a favourite child, and with which we had inseparably linked the whole of our life's work. And all because we had formerly been infatuated with Plekhanov. Had we not been so infatuated, had we regarded him more dispassionately, more level-headedly, had we studied him more objectively, our conduct towards him would have been different and we would not have suffered such disaster in the literal sense of the word, we would not have received such a "moral ducking," as Arsenyev correctly expressed it. We had received the most bitter lesson of our lives, a

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painfully bitter, painfully brutal lesson. Young comrades "court" an elder comrade out of the great love they bear for him—and suddenly he injects into this love an atmosphere of intrigue, compelling them to feel, not as younger brothers, but as fools to be led by the nose, as pawns to be moved about at will, and, still worse, as clumsy *Streber* who must be thoroughly frightened and quashed! An enamoured youth receives from the object of his love a bitter lesson—to regard all persons "without sentiment," to keep a stone in one's sling. Many more words of an equally bitter nature did we utter that night. The suddenness of the disaster naturally caused us to magnify it, but, in the main, the bitter words we uttered were true. Blinded by our love, we had actually behaved like *slaves*, and it is humiliating to be a slave. Our sense of having been wronged was magnified a hundredfold by the fact that "he" himself had opened our eyes to our humiliation....

Finally, we returned to our respective rooms to go to bed, firmly determined to express our indignation to Plekhanov on the following day, to give up the magazine and go away, retain only the newspaper, and publish the material for the magazine in pamphlet form. The cause would not suffer by this, we thought, and we would avoid having intimate dealings with "that man."

Next morning I woke up earlier than usual. I was awakened by footsteps on the stairs and the voice of Axelrod who was knocking at Arsenyev's door. I heard Arsenyev call out in reply and open the door—I heard all this and wondered whether he would have pluck enough to come out with everything immediately. Better to speak out at once, indeed better, than to drag the thing out! I washed and dressed and went to Arsenyev's room, where I found him at his toilet. Axelrod was sitting in the armchair, his face wearing a somewhat strained expression. "Listen, Comrade X," said Arsenyev turning to me, "I have told Axelrod of our decision to go back to Russia, and of our conviction that things cannot be run like this." I fully concurred with this, of course, and supported Arsenyev's statement. We related everything to Axelrod, quite frankly, so much so that Arsenyev even spoke of our suspicion that Plekhanov regarded us as *Streber*. Axelrod half-sympathised with us generally, shook his head

sadly, and appeared to be greatly perturbed, confused, put out. But hearing this last remark, he began to protest and to shout that our accusation was unfounded; that Plekhanov had many shortcomings, but not this one; that in this matter it was not he who was unjust to us, but we who were unjust to him; that until then he had been prepared to say to Plekhanov, "See what a mess you have made, now clear it up yourself, I wash my hands of the matter," but he could no longer say this, seeing that we were also unjust. His assurances made little impression upon us, as may be imagined, and poor Axelrod looked pitiful when he finally realised that we were firm in our decision.

We went out together to warn Vera Zasulich. It was to be expected that she would take the news of the "break" (for it did certainly look like a break) very badly. "I fear," Arsenyev had said to me the previous evening, "I do seriously fear that she will commit suicide...."

I shall never forget the mood in which we three went out that morning "It's like going to a funeral," I thought to myself. And indeed we walked as in a funeral procession—silent, with downcast eyes, oppressed to the extreme by the absurdness, the preposterousness, and the senselessness of our loss. As though a curse had descended upon us! Everything had been proceeding smoothly after so many misfortunes and failures, when suddenly, a whirlwind—and the end, the whole thing shattered again. I could hardly bring myself to believe it (as one cannot bring oneself to believe the death of a near one)—could it be I, the fervent worshipper of Plekhanov, who was now filled with bitter thoughts about him, who was walking along with clenched teeth and a devilish chill at the heart, intending to hurl cold and bitter words at him and almost to announce the "breaking-off of our relations"? Was this but a hideous dream, or was it reality?

The impression clung to us even during our conversation with Zasulich; She did not display any strong emotion, but she was obviously deeply depressed and she asked us, almost implored us, could we not go back on our decision, could we not try—perhaps it was not so terrible, after all, and it would be possible to set things to rights once we were at work; during the work the repellent features of his character

would not be so apparent.... It was extremely painful to listen to the sincere pleadings of this woman, weak before Plekhanov, but absolutely sincere and passionately loyal to the cause, who bore the yoke of Plekhanovism with the "heroism of a slave" (Arsenyev's expression). It was, indeed, so painful that at times I thought I would burst into tears.... Words of pity, despair, etc., easily move one to tears at a funeral....

We left Axelrod and Zasulich. We lunched, dispatched letters to Germany saying that we were coming and that they were *to stop the machine* we had even sent a telegram about the matter (*prior* to our conversation with Plekhanov!!), and neither of us doubted for a moment that we had done right.

After lunch, at the appointed hour, we again went to the house of Axelrod and Zasulich, where Plekhanov was due to be by now. As we approached, the three of them came out to meet us. We greeted each other in silence. Plekhanov tried to start an extraneous conversation (we had asked Axelrod and Zasulich to warn him of our intention, so that he would know all about it), we returned to the room and sat down. Arsenyev began to speak—drily, briefly, and with restraint. He said that we despaired of the possibility of carrying on with relations *such* as they had developed on the previous evening; that we had decided to return to Russia to consult the comrades there, since we no longer dared to decide the matter ourselves, and that for the time being we would have to abandon the idea of publishing the magazine. Plekhanov was very calm and restrained, and apparently had complete command of himself; he did not show a trace of the nervousness betrayed by Axelrod and Zasulich (he had been in bigger battles than this! we thought to ourselves, gazing at him in fury). He inquired what it was all about. "We are in an atmosphere of ultimatums," replied Arsenyev, and he expounded the idea at greater length. "Were you afraid that after the first issue I would go on strike before we got out the second?" asked Plekhanov aggressively. He thought we would not dare to say a thing like that. But I too was calm and cool, as I replied: "Is that very much different from what Arsenyev said? Isn't that what he said?" Plekhanov seemed to bristle under the words. He had not expected such a dry tone and direct accusation.

"Well, if you have decided to leave, what is there to discuss?" he said. "I have nothing to say, my position is a very curious one. All you do is talk of impressions and nothing else. You have the impression that I am a bad man. I cannot help that."

"We may be to blame," I said, desiring to turn the conversation away from this "impossible" subject, "for having rushed across in this headlong manner without first sounding the ford."

"Not at all," replied Plekhanov. "To speak quite frankly, you are to blame (perhaps Arsenyev's state of nervousness may have had something to do with it) for attaching too much importance to impressions to which no importance whatever should have been attached." After a moment's silence we said that we could confine ourselves to publishing pamphlets for the time being. Plekhanov angrily retorted: "I haven't thought about pamphlets and am not thinking of them. *Don't count on me*. I shall not sit idle with my arms folded if you go away. I may take up some other enterprise before you return."

Nothing so much lowered Plekhanov in my eyes as this statement when later I recalled it and turned it over in my mind. This was such a crude threat and such a badly calculated attempt to intimidate us, that it simply "finished" Plekhanov as far as we were concerned and exposed his "policy" towards us: give them a good scare and that will suffice....

But we did not pay *the slighest attention* to his threat. I simply pressed my lips tight in silence: very well, if this is how you would have it, then *à la guerre comme à la guerre**; but you must be a fool if you cannot see that we have changed, that we have undergone a transformation overnight.

Perceiving that his threats were ineffective, Plekhanov tried another manoeuvre—for what else can it be called, when a few moments later he stated that the break with us would spell for him complete abandonment of political activity, that he would give up political work and devote himself to science, to purely scientific literature, for if he could not

* If it's war, then the way of war!—*Ed*.

work with us, it meant that he would not be able to work with anybody.... Having found threats to be unavailing, he tried flattery! But coming as that did *after* threats, it could only produce a feeling of revulsion.... The conversation was very brief and nothing came of it. Seeing this, Plekhanov switched the conversation to Russian atrocities in China, but he was almost the only one who spoke and very soon we parted company.

Our conversation with Axelrod and Zasulich after Plekhanov's departure was neither interesting nor important; Axelrod wriggled and tried to prove that Plekhanov was also crushed and that the sin would be on our heads if we left in this manner, etc., etc. In a tête-*à*-tête with Arsenyev, Zasulich confessed that "Georg" was always like that. She confessed to her "slavish heroism," but admitted that it would "teach him a lesson" if we went away.

We spent the rest of the evening in a state of idleness and depression.

On the next day, Tuesday, August 28 (New Style), we were due to leave for Geneva, and from there to proceed to Germany. Early in the morning, I was awakened by Arsenyev (a late riser usually). I was surprised. He said that he had slept badly and that he had thought of a last possible scheme by which the matter could somehow be adjusted so that a serious *Party* enterprise might not be ruined by spoiled *personal* relations. We would publish a *collection*, since we had the material ready and had established contact with the printing-house. We would publish this collection under the present undefined editorial relations and see what happened; from this it would be just as easy to pass on to the publication of a magazine as to the publication of pamphlets. If Plekhanov remained stubborn, then, to the devil with him, we would know that we had done all we could.... And thus it was decided.

We went out to inform Axelrod and Zasulich and met them on the way; they were coming to see us. They, of course, readily agreed and Axelrod undertook the task of negotiating with Plekhanov and of obtaining his consent.

We arrived at Geneva and had our *last interview* with Plekhanov. He adopted a tone which might have suggested that all that had happened was a sad misunderstanding due to

nervousness. He inquired sympathetically after Arsenyev's health, and nearly embraced him—the latter almost gave a jump. Plekhanov agreed to the publication of a collection. We said that in regard to the editorial arrangements, three variations were possible: 1) we to be the editors, and he a contributor; 2) all of us to be the editors; 3) he to be the editor, and we contributors; that we would discuss all three alternatives in Russia, draw up a plan, and bring it back with us. Plekhanov declared that he absolutely rejected the third variant, that he insisted emphatically that *this* arrangement be definitely excluded, and that he *agreed* to the *first two*. We therefore decided that for the time being, *until we submitted* our proposal for the new editorial regime, the old system was to remain in force (the six of us to act as co-editors, with Plekhanov apportioned two votes).

Plekhanov then expressed the desire to know precisely what it was that we were dissatisfied with. I remarked that perhaps it would be better to pay more attention to the future rather than to the past. But he insisted that the question be gone into and clarified. A conversation started in which only Plekhanov and I took part, Arsenyev and Axelrod remaining silent. The conversation was carried on rather calmly, even very calmly. Plekhanov said he had noticed that Arsenyev was irritated by his refusal concerning Struve; I remarked that he, on the contrary, had laid down conditions to us, notwithstanding his statement, previously made during our conversation in the woods, that he would impose no conditions. Plekhanov defended himself, saying that he had been silent, not because he was laying down conditions, but because the question was clear as far as he was concerned. I urged the necessity for permitting polemics and the necessity for voting among ourselves. Plekhanov agreed to the latter, but added that voting, of course, was permissible on partial questions, but impossible on fundamental questions. I objected by saying that it would not always be easy to distinguish between fundamental and partial questions, and that it was precisely in drawing such distinctions that the co-editors would have to take a vote. Plekhanov was stubborn. He said that this was a matter of conscience, that the distinction between fundamental and partial questions was perfectly clear, and that there would

be no occasion for taking a vote. And so we got stuck in this dispute as to whether voting should be permitted among the editors on the question of defining what were fundamental and what were partial questions, and we could make no progress. Plekhanov displayed all his dexterity, the brilliance of his examples, smiles, jests, and citations, which compelled us to laugh in spite of ourselves; but he evaded the question without definitely saying "no." I became convinced that he positively could not concede the point; that he could not abandon his "individualism" and his "ultimatums," since he would never agree to take a vote on such questions but would present ultimatums.

That evening I departed without again meeting any of the members of the Emancipation of Labour group. We had agreed among ourselves not to relate what had passed to any one except our most intimate friends. We decided to keep up appearances and not give our opponents cause for triumph. Outwardly it was as though nothing had happened; the apparatus must continue to work as it had worked till then, but within a chord had broken, and instead of splendid personal relations, dry, business-like relations prevailed, with a constant reckoning according to the principle: *si vis pacem, para bellum.**

It will be of interest, however, to mention a conversation I had that same evening with an intimate friend and adherent of Plekhanov, a member of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group. I mentioned no word to him about what had occurred; I told him that we had arranged to publish a magazine, that the articles had been decided on—it was time to set to work. I discussed with him the practical ways of arranging the work. He gave stress to the opinion that the old ones were absolutely incapable of doing editorial work. I discussed with him the "three variations" and asked him directly which in his opinion was the best. Without hesitation, he answered—the first (we to be the editors, they the contributors), but in all probability, he thought, the magazine would be Plekhanov's and the newspaper ours.

As the affair became more and more remote, we began to think of it more calmly, and became convinced that it was

* If you desire peace, prepare for war.—*Ed.*

entirely unreasonable to give up the enterprise, that we had for the time being no ground for fearing to undertake the editorship (of the *collection*), but that indeed it was necessary for us to undertake it, for there was absolutely no other way of making the apparatus work properly, and of preventing the project from being ruined by the disruptive "propensities" of Plekhanov.

By the time we arrived at N.,[134] on September 4 or 5, we had drawn up the plan of the *formal* relations between us (I had begun to write it *en route*, on the train). That plan made us the editors and them the contributors, with the right to vote on all editorial questions. It was decided to discuss this plan with Yegor (Martov), and then to submit it to them.

Hopes were *beginning to rise* that the "Spark" would be rekindled.

Written at the beginning of September 1900

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT AGREEMENT

1. In view of the solidarity in fundamental conceptions and the identity of practical aims of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group abroad and the Russian group that publishes the collection *Zarya* and the newspaper *Iskra*, these two organisations conclude an alliance.
2. The two groups will afford each other all-round support: firstly, in regard to literature. The Emancipation of Labour group will collaborate closely in editing the collection *Zarya* and the newspaper *Iskra**; secondly, in delivering and distributing literature, in expanding and consolidating revolutionary connections, and in obtaining material resources.
3. The *Sotsial-Demokrat* group and special *Iskra* agents will be the foreign representatives of the *Iskra* group.
4. Letters and packages from abroad addressed to the *Iskra* group will be forwarded to the address of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group. In the event of any member of the *Iskra* group being abroad, all correspondence will be transmitted to him. If at any given moment there is no member of the *Iskra* group abroad, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group and *Iskra* agents will take the duties upon themselves.

Written early in September 1900

Published according to the manuscript

First published in 1940 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 3

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* The terms of this collaboration are laid down in a special agreement.[135]

DECLARATION OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ISKRA*

IN THE NAME OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

In undertaking the publication of a political newspaper, *Iskra*, we consider it necessary to say a few words concerning the objects for which we are striving and the understanding we have of our tasks.

We are passing through an extremely important period in the history of the Russian working-class movement and Russian Social-Democracy. The past few years have been marked by an astonishingly rapid spread of Social-Democratic ideas among our intelligentsia, and meeting this trend in social ideas is an independent movement of the industrial proletariat, which is beginning to unite and struggle against its oppressors, and to strive eagerly towards socialism. Study circles of workers and Social-Democratic intellectuals are springing up everywhere, local agitation leaflets are being widely distributed, the demand for Social-Democratic literature is increasing and is far outstripping the supply, and intensified government persecution is powerless to restrain the movement. The prisons and places of exile are filled to overflowing. Hardly a month goes by without our hearing of socialists "caught in dragnets" in all parts of Russia, of the capture of underground couriers, of the confiscation of literature and printing-presses. But the movement is growing, it is spreading to ever wider regions, it is penetrating more and more deeply into the working class and is attracting public attention to an ever-increasing degree. The entire economic development of Russia and the history of social thought and of the revolutionary movement in Russia serve

as a guarantee that the Social-Democratic working-class movement will grow and will, in the end, surmount all the obstacles that confront it.

On the other hand, the principal feature of our movement, which has become particularly marked in recent times, is its state of disunity and its amateur character, if one may so express it. Local study circles spring up and function independently of one another and—what is particularly important—of circles that have functioned and still function in the same districts. Traditions are not established and continuity is not maintained; local publications fully reflect this disunity and the lack of contact with what Russian Social-Democracy has already achieved.

Such a state of disunity is not in keeping with the demands posed by the movement in its present strength and breadth, and creates, in our opinion, a critical moment in its development. The need for consolidation and for a definite form and organisation is felt with irresistible force in the movement itself; yet among Social-Democrats active in the practical field this need for a transition to a higher form of the movement is not everywhere realised. On the contrary, among wide circles an ideological wavering is to be seen, an infatuation with the fashionable "criticism of Marxism" and with "Bernsteinism," the spread of the views of the so-called "economist" trend, and what is inseparably connected with it—an effort to keep the movement at its lower level, to push into the background the task of forming a revolutionary party that heads the struggle of the entire people. *It is a fact* that such an ideological wavering is to be observed among Russian Social-Democrats; that narrow practicalism, detached from the theoretical clarification of the movement as a whole, threatens to divert the movement to a false path. No one who has direct knowledge of the state of affairs in the majority of our organisations has any doubt whatever on that score. Moreover, literary productions exist which confirm this. It is sufficient to mention the *Credo*, which has already called forth legitimate protest; the *Separate Supplement to "Rabochaya Mysl"* (September 1899), which brought out so markedly the trend that permeates the *whole* of *Rabochaya Mysl*; and, finally, the manifesto of the St. Petersburg Self-Emancipation of

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First page of the separate leaflet
"Declaraction of the Editorial Board
of *Iskra*." 1900
Reduced

Россійская
Соціалдемократическая
Рабочая Партія

ИС

ОТЪ РЕДАКЦІИ.

Предпринимая изданіе политической газеты — „Искра", мы считаемъ необходимымъ сказать нѣсколько словъ о томъ, къ чему мы стремимся и какъ понимаемъ свои задачи.

Мы переживаемъ крайне важный моментъ въ исторіи русскаго рабочаго движенія и русской соціалдемократіи. Послѣдніе годы характеризуются поразительно быстрымъ распространеніемъ соціалдемократическихъ идей среди нашей интеллигенціи, а на встрѣчу этому теченію общественной мысли идетъ самостоятельно возникшее движеніе промышленнаго пролетаріата, который начинаетъ объединяться и бороться противъ своихъ угнетателей, начинаетъ съ жадностью стремиться къ соціализму. Кружки рабочихъ и соціалдемократовъ интеллигентовъ появляются повсюду, распространяются мѣстные агитаціонные листки, растетъ спросъ на соціалдемократическую литературу, далеко обгоняя предложеніе, а усиленныя правительственныя преслѣдованія не въ силахъ удержать этого движенія. Битковъ набиты тюрьмы, переполнены мѣста ссылки, чуть не каждый мѣсяцъ слышно о „провалахъ" во всѣхъ концахъ Россіи, о поимкѣ транспортовъ, о конфискаціи литературы и типографій, но движеніе все растетъ, захватываетъ все большій районъ, все глубже проникаетъ въ рабочій классъ, все больше привлекаетъ общественное вниманіе. И все экономическое развитіе Россіи, вся исторія русской общественной мысли и русскаго революціоннаго движенія ручаются за то, что соціалдемократическое рабочее движеніе будетъ расти несмотря на всѣ препятствія и въ концѣ концовъ — преодолѣетъ ихъ.

Но, съ другой стороны, главная черта нашего движенія, которая особенно бросается въ глаза въ послѣднее время, — его раздробленность, его, такъ сказать, кустарный характеръ: мѣстные кружки возникаютъ и дѣйствуютъ независимо другъ отъ друга и даже (что особенно важно) независимо отъ кружковъ, дѣйствовавшихъ и дѣйствующихъ въ тѣхъ же центрахъ; не устанавливается традиціи, нѣтъ преемственности, и мѣстная литература всецѣло отражаетъ раздробленность и отсутствіе связи съ тѣмъ, что уже создано русской соціалдемократіей.

Несоотвѣтствіе этой раздробленности съ запросами, вызываемыми силою и широтой движенія, создаетъ, по нашему мнѣнію, критическій моментъ въ его развитіи. Въ самомъ движеніи съ неудержимой силой сказывается потребность упрочиться, выработать опредѣленную физіономію и организацію, а между тѣмъ въ средѣ практически дѣйствующихъ соціалдемократовъ необходимость такого перехода къ высшей формѣ движенія сознается далеко не вездѣ. Въ довольно широкихъ кругахъ наблюдается, наоборотъ, шатанье мысли, увлеченіе модной „критикой марксизма" и „бернштеніадой", распространеніе взглядовъ такъ называемаго „экономическаго" направленія и въ неразрывной связи съ этимъ — стремленіе задержать движеніе на его низшей стадіи, стремленіе отодвинуть на второй планъ задачу образованія революціонной партіи, ведущей борьбу во главѣ всего народа. Что подобнаго рода шатанье мысли наблюдается

КРА

„Изъ искры возгорится пламя“
Отвѣтъ декабристовъ Пушкину.

среди русскихъ соціалдемократовъ, что узкій практицизмъ, оторванный отъ теоретическаго освѣщенія движенія въ его цѣломъ, грозитъ совратить движеніе на ложную дорогу, это фактъ; въ этомъ не могутъ усомниться люди, непосредственно знакомые съ положеніемъ дѣлъ въ большинствѣ нашихъ организацій. Да есть и литературныя произведенія, подтверждающія это: стоитъ назвать хотя бы „Credo“, вызвавшее уже вполнѣ законный протестъ, „Отдѣльное приложеніе къ Рабочей Мысли (сент. 1899)“, столь рельефно выразившее тенденцію, проникающую всю газету „Рабочая Мысль“, или наконецъ — воззваніе петербургской „Группы Самоосвобожденія Рабочаго Класса“, составленное въ духѣ того же „экономизма“. И совершенно невѣрно утвержденіе „Рабочаго Дѣла“, что „Credo“ представляетъ собою не больше какъ мнѣніе единичныхъ лицъ, что направленіе „Рабочей Мысли“ выражаетъ лишь сумбурность и безтактность ея редакціи, а не особое направленіе въ самомъ ходѣ русскаго рабочаго движенія.

А рядомъ съ этимъ въ произведеніяхъ писателей, которыхъ читающая публика, съ большимъ или меньшимъ основаніемъ, считала до сихъ поръ видными представителями „легальнаго“ марксизма, все болѣе и болѣе обнаруживается поворотъ къ воззрѣніямъ, сближающимся съ буржуазной апологетикой. Результатомъ всего этого и является тотъ разбродъ и та анархія, благодаря которымъ эксъ-марксистъ или вѣрнѣе эксъ-соціалистъ Бернштейнъ, перечисляя свои успѣхи, могъ печатно заявить, не встрѣчая возраженій, будто большинство дѣйствующихъ въ Россіи соціалдемократовъ состоитъ изъ его послѣдователей.

Мы не хотимъ преувеличивать опасность положенія, но закрывать на нее глаза было бы неизмѣримо вреднѣе; вотъ почему мы отъ всей души привѣтствуемъ рѣшеніе „Группы Освобожденія Труда“ возобновить ея литературную дѣятельность и начать систематическую борьбу противъ попытокъ извращенія и опошленія соціалдемократизма.

Практическій выводъ изъ всего этого такой: мы, русскіе соціалдемократы, должны сплотиться и направить всѣ усилія на образованіе крѣпкой партіи, борющейся подъ единымъ знаменемъ революціонной соціалдемократіи. Именно эта задача была намѣчена уже Съѣздомъ 1898 года, образовавшимъ Россійскую Соціалдемократическую Рабочую Партію и опубликовавшимъ ея Манифестъ.

Мы признаемъ себя членами этой партіи, вполнѣ раздѣляемъ основныя идеи „Манифеста“ и придаемъ ему важное значеніе, какъ открытому заявленію ея цѣлей. Поэтому для насъ, какъ членовъ партіи, вопросъ о ближайшей и непосредственной нашей задачѣ ставится такимъ образомъ: какой планъ дѣятельности должны мы принять, что бы достигнуть возможно болѣе прочнаго возобновленія партіи?

Обычный отвѣтъ на этотъ вопросъ состоитъ въ томъ, что необходимо снова выбрать центральное учрежденіе и поручить ему возобновить органъ партіи. Но въ переживаемый нами періодъ разброда такой простой путь едва-ли былъ бы цѣлесообразенъ.

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the Working Class group,[136] also drawn up in the spirit of "economism." And *completely untrue* are the assertions of *Rabocheye Dyelo* to the effect that the *Credo* merely represents the opinions of individuals, that the trend represented by *Rabochaya Mysl* expresses merely the confusion of mind and the tactlessness of its editors, and not a special tendency in the progress of the Russian working-class movement.

Simultaneously with this, the works of authors whom the reading public has hitherto, with more or less reason, regarded as prominent representatives of "legal" Marxism are increasingly revealing a change of views in a direction approximating that of bourgeois apologetics. As a result of all this, we have the confusion and anarchy which has enabled the ex-Marxist, or, more precisely, the ex-socialist, Bernstein, in recounting his successes, to declare, unchallenged, in the press that the majority of Social-Democrats active in Russia are his followers.

We do not desire to exaggerate the gravity of the situation, but it would be immeasurably more harmful to close our eyes to it. For this reason we heartily welcome the decision of the Emancipation of Labour group to resume its literary activity and begin a systematic struggle against the attempts to distort and vulgarise Social-Democracy.

The following practical conclusion is to be drawn from the foregoing: we Russian Social-Democrats must unite and direct all our efforts towards the formation of a strong party which must struggle under the single banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy. This is precisely the task laid down by the congress in 1898 at which the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was formed, and which published its *Manifesto*.

We regard ourselves as members of this Party; we agree entirely with the fundamental ideas contained in the *Manifesto* and attach extreme importance to it as a public declaration of its aims. Consequently, we, as members of the Party, present the question of our immediate and direct tasks as follows: What plan of activity must we adopt to revive the Party on the firmest possible basis?

The reply usually made to this question is that it is necessary to elect anew a central Party body and instruct it to

resume the publication of the Party organ. But, in the period of confusion through which we are now passing, such a simple method is hardly expedient.

To establish and consolidate the Party means to establish and consolidate unity among all Russian Social-Democrats, and, for the reasons indicated above, such unity cannot be decreed, it cannot be brought about by a decision, say, of a meeting of representatives; it must be worked for. In the first place, it is necessary to work for solid ideological unity which should eliminate discordance and confusion that—let us be frank!—reign among Russian Social-Democrats at the present time. This ideological unity must be consolidated by a Party programme. Secondly, we must work to achieve an organisation especially for the purpose of establishing and maintaining contact among all the centres of the movement, of supplying complete and timely information about the movement, and of delivering our newspapers and periodicals regularly to all parts of Russia. Only when such an organisation has been founded, only when a Russian socialist post has been established, will the Party possess a sound foundation and become a real fact, and, therefore, a mighty political force. We intend to devote our efforts to the first half of this task, i.e., to creating a common literature, consistent in principle and capable of ideologically uniting revolutionary Social-Democracy, since we regard this as the pressing demand of the movement today and a necessary preliminary measure towards the resumption of Party activity.

As we have said, the ideological unity of Russian Social-Democrats has still to be created, and to this end it is, in our opinion, necessary to have an open and all-embracing discussion of the fundamental questions of principle and tactics raised by the present-day "economists," Bernsteinians, and "critics." Before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation. Otherwise, our unity will be purely fictitious, it will conceal the prevailing confusion and hinder its radical elimination. It is understandable, therefore, that we do not intend to make our publication a mere storehouse of various views. On the contrary, we shall conduct it in the spirit of a strictly defined tendency. This tendency can

be expressed by the word Marxism, and there is hardly need to add that we stand for the consistent development of the ideas of Marx and Engels and emphatically reject the equivocating, vague, and opportunist "corrections" for which Eduard Bernstein, P. Struve, and many others have set the fashion. But although we shall discuss all questions from our own definite point of view, we shall give space in our columns to polemics between comrades. Open polemics, conducted in full view of all Russian Social-Democrats and class-conscious workers, are necessary and desirable in order to clarify the depth of existing differences, in order to afford discussion of disputed questions from all angles, in order to combat the extremes into which representatives, not only of various views, but even of various localities, or various "specialities" of the revolutionary movement, inevitably fall. Indeed, as noted above, we regard one of the drawbacks of the present-day movement to be the absence of open polemics between avowedly differing views, the effort to conceal differences on fundamental questions.

We shall not enumerate in detail all questions and points of subject-matter included in the programme of our publication, for this programme derives automatically from the general conception of what a political newspaper, published under present conditions, should be.

We will exert our efforts to bring every Russian comrade to regard our publication as his own, to which all groups would communicate every kind of information concerning the movement, in which they would relate their experiences, express their views, indicate their needs for political literature, and voice their opinions concerning Social-Democratic editions: in a word, they would thereby share whatever contribution they make to the movement and whatever they draw from it. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a genuinely all-Russian Social-Democratic organ. Only such a publication will be capable of leading the movement on to the high road of political struggle. "Extend the bounds and broaden the content of our propagandist, agitational, and organisational activity"—these words of P. B. Axelrod must serve as a slogan defining the activities of Russian Social-Democrats in the immediate future, and we adopt this slogan in the programme of our publication.

We appeal not only to socialists and class-conscious workers, we also call upon all who are oppressed by the present political system; we place the columns of our publications at their disposal in order that they may expose all the abominations of the Russian autocracy.

Those who regard Social-Democracy as an organisation serving exclusively the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat may be content with merely local agitation and working-class literature "pure and simple." We do not understand Social-Democracy in this way; we regard it as a revolutionary party, inseparably connected with the working-class movement and directed against absolutism. Only when organised in such a party will the proletariat—the most revolutionary class in Russia today—be in a position to fulfil the historical task that confronts it—to unite under its banner all the democratic elements in the country and to crown the tenacious struggle in which so many generations have fallen with the final triumph over the hated regime.

* * *

The size of the newspaper will range from one to two printed signatures.

In view of the conditions under which the Russian underground press has to work, there will be no regular date of publication.

We have been promised contributions by a number of prominent representatives of international Social-Democracy, the close co-operation of the Emancipation of Labour group (G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, and V. I. Zasulich), and the support of several organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as well as of separate groups of Russian Social-Democrats.

Written in September 1900
Published in 1900 by *Iskra* as a separate leaflet

Published according to the text of the leaflet, 1900

MEMORIA TOMIO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET, *MAY DAYS IN KHARKOV*

The present pamphlet contains a description of the celebrated May Day demonstrations in Kharkov in 1900; it was drawn up by the Kharkov Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the basis of descriptions sent in by the workers themselves. It was sent to us as a newspaper report, but we consider it necessary to publish it as a separate pamphlet because of its size, as well as because in this way it will be possible to secure wider distribution. In another six months, the Russian workers will celebrate the First of May of the first year of the new century, and it is time we set to work organising the celebrations in as large a number of centres as possible, and on a scale as imposing as possible. They must be imposing, not only in the numbers of participants, but in the organised character and the class-consciousness the participants will display, in their determination to launch a resolute struggle for the political liberation of the Russian people and, consequently, for a free opportunity for the class development of the proletariat and its open struggle for socialism. It is time to prepare for the forthcoming May Day celebrations, and one of the most important preparation measures must consist in learning what the Social-Democratic movement in Russia has already achieved, in examining the shortcomings of our movement in general and of the May Day movement in particular, in devising means to eliminate these shortcomings and achieve better results.

May Day in Kharkov showed what a great political demonstration a working-class festival can become and

what we lack to make these celebrations a really great all-Russian manifestation of the class-conscious proletariat. What made the May Day celebrations in Kharkov an event of outstanding importance? The large-scale participation of the workers in the strike, the huge mass meetings in the streets, the unfurling of red flags, the presentation of demands put forth in proclamations and the revolutionary character of these demands: the eight-hour day and political liberty. The legend that the Russian workers have not yet matured for the political struggle, that their principal concern should be the purely economic struggle, which they should only little by little and very slowly supplement with partial political agitation for partial political reforms and not for the struggle against the entire political system of Russia—that legend has been totally refuted by the Kharkov May Day celebrations. But here we want to draw attention to another aspect of the matter. Although the May Day celebrations in Kharkov have once more demonstrated the political capacities of the Russian workers, they have, at the same time, revealed what we lack for the full development of these capacities.

The Kharkov Social-Democrats tried to prepare for the May Day celebrations by distributing pamphlets and leaflets in advance, and the workers drew up a plan for the general demonstration and for the speeches to be delivered in Konnaya Square. Why did the plan not succeed? The Kharkov comrades say because the "general staff" of the class-conscious socialist workers did not distribute its forces evenly, there having been many in one factory, and in another few; and, further, because the workers' plan "was known to the authorities," who, of course, took all steps to split the workers. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: we lack *organisation*. The masses of the workers were roused and ready to follow the socialist leaders; but the "general staff" failed to organise a strong nucleus able to distribute properly all the available forces of class-conscious workers and so ensure the necessary secrecy that the drawn-up plans of action should remain unknown, not only to the authorities, but to all individuals outside the organisation. This organisation must be a *revolutionary* organisation. It must be composed of men and women who clearly understand the tasks of the Social-



Российская Социалдемократическая Рабочая Партия

МАЙСКІЕ ДНИ ВЪ ХАРЬКОВѢ

Изданіе „ИСКРЫ"

Типография „Искры". Январь 1901.

Facsimile of the cover of the pamphlet,
May Days in Kharkov. 1901

Facsimile of the cover of the pamphlet,
May Day in Alarcón, 1901

Democratic working-class movement and who have resolved to engage in a determined struggle against the present political system. It must combine within itself the socialist knowledge and revolutionary experience acquired from many decades of activity by the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia with the knowledge of working-class life and conditions and the ability to agitate among the masses and lead them which is characteristic of the advanced workers. It should be our primary concern not to set up an artificial partition between the intellectual and the worker, not to form a "purely workers'" organisation, but to strive, above all, to achieve the above-stated combination. We permit ourselves in this connection to quote the following words of G. Plekhanov:

"A necessary condition for this activity [agitation] is the consolidation of the already existing revolutionary forces. Propaganda in the study circles can be conducted by men and women who have no mutual contact whatever with one another and who do not even suspect one another's existence; it goes without saying that the lack of organisation always affects propaganda, too, but it does not make it impossible. However, in a period of great social turmoil, when the political atmosphere is charged with electricity, when now here and now there, from the most varied and unforeseen causes, outbreaks occur with increasing frequency, heralding the approaching revolutionary storm—in a word, when it is necessary either to agitate or remain in the rear, at such a time *only organised* revolutionary forces can seriously influence the progress of events. The individual then becomes powerless; the revolutionary cause can then be carried forward only on the shoulders of units of a higher order—by *revolutionary organisations*" (G. Plekhanov, *The Tasks of the Socialists in the Fight Against the Famine*, p. 83).

Precisely such a period is approaching in the history of the Russian working-class movement, a period of turmoil and of outbreaks precipitated by the most varied causes, and if we do not wish to remain "in the rear," we must direct all our efforts towards establishing an all-Russian organisation capable of guiding all the separate outbreaks and ensuring in this way that the approaching storm (to which the Kharkov worker also refers at the end of the pamphlet) is not an elemental outburst, but a conscious movement of the prole-

tariat standing at the head of the entire people in revolt against the autocratic government.

In addition to manifesting the insufficient unity and preparedness of our revolutionary organisations, the Kharkov May Day celebrations also furnish another and no less important practical indication. "The May Day festival and demonstration," we read in the pamphlet, "were unexpectedly interconnected with various practical demands presented without relevant preparation and, consequently, in general doomed to failure." Let us take, for example, the demands put forward by the railway-workshop employees. Of the fourteen demands, eleven have to do with minor improvements, which can quite easily be achieved even under the present political system—wage increases, reduction of hours, removal of abuses. Included among these demands, as though identical with them, are the following three: 4) introduction of an eight-hour day, 7) guarantee against victimisation of workers after the May First events, and 10) establishment of a joint committee of workers and employers for settling disputes between the two parties. The first of these demands (point 4) is a general demand advanced by the world proletariat; the fact that this demand was put forward seems to indicate that the advanced workers of Kharkov realise their solidarity with the world socialist working-class movement. But precisely for this reason it should not have been included among minor demands like better treatment by foremen, or a ten per cent increase in wages. Demands for wage increases and better treatment can (and should) be presented by the workers to their employers in each separate trade; these are trade demands, put forward by separate categories of workers. The demand for an eight-hour day, however, is the demand of the whole proletariat, presented, not to individual employers, but to the state authorities as the representative of the entire present-day social and political system, to the capitalist class as a whole, the owners of all the means of production. The demand for an eight-hour day has assumed special significance. It is a declaration of solidarity with the international socialist movement. We need to make the workers understand this difference, so that they do not reduce the demand for the eight-hour day to the level of demands like free railway tickets, or the dismissal of a

watchman. Throughout the year the workers, first in one place and then in another, continuously present a variety of partial demands to their employers and fight for their achievement. In assisting the workers in this struggle, socialists must always explain its connection with the proletarian struggle for emancipation in all countries. And the First of May must be the day on which the workers solemnly declare that they realise this connection and resolutely join in the struggle.

Let us take the tenth demand which calls for the establishment of a committee for the settlement of disputes. Such a committee composed of representatives of the workers and the employers could, of course, be very useful, but only if the elections were absolutely free and the elected representatives enjoyed complete independence. What purpose would such a committee serve, if the workers, who wage a struggle against the election of creatures of the management or who strongly attack the management and expose its tyranny, end by being discharged? Such workers would not only be discharged, they would be arrested. Consequently, for such a committee to be of service to the workers, the delegates must, first, be absolutely independent of the factory management; this can be achieved only when there are free labour unions embracing many factories, unions that have their own resources and are prepared to protect their delegates. Such a committee can be useful only if many factories, if possible all the factories in the given trade, are organised. Secondly, it is necessary to secure guarantees of the inviolability of the person of the workers, i.e., that they will not be arrested arbitrarily by the police or the gendarmerie. This demand to guarantee the workers against victimisation was put forward (point 7). But from whom can the workers demand guarantees of the inviolability of the person and freedom of association (which, as we have seen, is a necessary condition for the success of the committees)? Only from the state authorities, because the absence of a guarantee of inviolability of the person and freedom of association is due to the fundamental laws of the Russian state. More than that, it is due to the very form of government in Russia. The form of government in Russia is that of an absolute monarchy. The tsar is an autocrat, he alone decrees the laws and appoints all the higher

officials without any participation of the people, without participation of the people's representatives. Under such a state system there can be no inviolability of the person; citizens' associations, and particularly working-class associations, cannot be free. For that reason, it is senseless to demand guarantees of the inviolability of the person (and freedom of association) from an autocratic government; for such a demand is synonymous with demanding political rights for the people, and an autocratic government is termed autocratic precisely because it implies negation of political rights for the people. It will be possible to obtain a guarantee of the inviolability of the person (and freedom of association) only when *representatives of the people* take part in legislation and in the entire administration of the state. So long as a body of people's representatives does not exist, the autocratic government, upon making certain petty concessions to the workers, will always take away with one hand what it gives with the other. The May Day celebrations in Kharkov were another vivid proof that this is so—the governor conceded to the demands of the working masses and released those who had been arrested, but within a day or two, on orders from St. Petersburg, scores of workers were again rounded up. The gubernia and factory officials' "guarantee" immunity to delegates, while the gendarmes seize them and fling them into prison in solitary confinement or banish them from the city! Of what use are such guarantees to the people?

Hence, the workers must demand from the tsar the convocation of an assembly of the representatives of the people, the convocation of a Zemsky Sobor. The manifesto distributed in Kharkov on the eve of the First of May this year raised this demand, and we have seen that a section of the advanced workers fully appreciated its significance. We must make sure that *all* advanced workers understand clearly the necessity for this demand and spread it, not only among the masses of the workers, but among all strata of the people who come into contact with the workers and who eagerly desire to know what the socialists and the "urban" workers are fighting for. This year when a factory inspector asked a group of workers precisely what they wanted, only one voice shouted, "A constitution!"; and this voice sounded so isolat-

ed that the correspondent reported somewhat mockingly: "One proletarian *blurted out*...." Another correspondent put it, "Under the circumstances," this reply was "semi-comical" (see *Labour Movement in Kharkov*, Report of the Kharkov Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, Geneva, September 1900, p. 14). As a matter of fact, there was nothing comical in the reply at all. What may have seemed comical was the incongruity between the demand of this lone voice for a change in the whole state system and the demands for a half-hour reduction in the working day and for payment of wages during working hours. There is, however, an indubitable connection between these demands and the demand for a constitution; and if we can get the masses to understand this connection (and we undoubtedly will), then the cry "A constitution!" will not be an isolated one, but will come from the throats of thousands and hundreds of thousands, when it will no longer be comical, but menacing. It is related that a certain person driving through the streets of Kharkov during the May Day celebrations asked the cabby what the workers wanted, and he replied: "They want an eight-hour day and their own newspaper." That cabby understood that the workers were no longer satisfied with mere doles, but that they wanted to be free men, that they wanted to be able to express their needs freely and openly and to fight for them. But that reply did not yet reveal the consciousness that the workers are fighting for the liberty of the whole people and for their right to take part in the administration of the state. When the demand that the tsar convene an assembly of people's representatives is repeated with full consciousness and indomitable determination by the working masses in all industrial cities and factory districts in Russia; when the workers have reached the stage at which the entire urban population, and all the rural people who come into the towns, understand what the socialists want and what the workers are fighting for, then the great day of the people's liberation from police tyranny will not be far off!

Written early in November 1900
Published in January 1901
in a pamphlet issued by *Iskra*

Published according to
the text of the pamphlet

THE URGENT TASKS OF OUR MOVEMENT

Russian Social-Democracy has repeatedly declared the immediate political task of a Russian working-class party to be the overthrow of the autocracy, the achievement of political liberty. This was enunciated over fifteen years ago by the representatives of Russian Social-Democracy—the members of the Emancipation of Labour group. It was affirmed two and a half years ago by the representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic organisations that, in the spring of 1898, founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Despite these repeated declarations, however, the question of the political tasks of Social-Democracy in Russia is prominent again today. Many representatives of our movement express doubt as to the correctness of the above-mentioned solution of the question. It is claimed that the economic struggle is of predominant importance; the political tasks of the proletariat are pushed into the background, narrowed down, and restricted, and it is even said that to speak of forming an independent working-class party in Russia is merely to repeat somebody else's words, that the workers should carry on only the economic struggle and leave politics to the intelligentsia in alliance with the liberals. The latest profession of the new faith (the notorious *Credo*) amounts to a declaration that the Russian proletariat has not yet come of age and to a complete rejection of the Social-Democratic programme. *Rabochaya Mysl* (particularly in its *Separate Supplement*) takes practically the same attitude. Russian Social-Democracy is passing through a period of vacillation and doubt border-

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Facsimile of page 1 of the first issue
of the newspaper *Iskra*. December 1900

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛЬ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ

ИСК

№ 1. ДЕКАБРЬ

НАСУЩНЫЯ ЗАДАЧИ НАШЕГО ДВИЖЕНІЯ.

Русская соціалдемократія не разъ уже заявляла, что ближайшей политической задачей русской рабочей партіи должно быть ниспроверженіе самодержавія, завоеваніе политической свободы. Это заявляли больше 15 лѣтъ тому назадъ представители русской соціалдемократіи, члены группы „Осв. Труда", это заявили два съ половиной года тому назадъ и представители русскихъ соціалдемократическихъ организацій, образовавшіе весной 1898 года Россійскую Соціалдемократическую Рабочую Партію. Но не смотря на эти неоднократныя заявленія, вопросъ о политическихъ задачахъ соціалдемократіи въ Россіи снова выступаетъ на очередь въ настоящее время. Многіе представители нашего движенія выражаютъ сомнѣніе въ правильности указаннаго рѣшенія вопроса. Говорятъ, что преобладающее значеніе имѣетъ экономическая борьба, отодвигаютъ на второй планъ политическія задачи пролетаріата, съуживаютъ и ограничиваютъ эти задачи, заявляютъ даже, что разговоры объ образованіи самостоятельной рабочей партіи въ Россіи просто повтореніе чужихъ словъ, что рабочимъ надо вести одну экономическую борьбу, предоставивъ политику интеллигентамъ въ союзѣ съ либералами. Это послѣднее заявленіе новаго символа вѣры (пресловутое credo) сводится уже прямо къ признанію русскаго пролетаріата несовершеннолѣтнимъ и къ полному отрицанію соціалдемократической программы. А „Рабочая Мысль" (особенно въ отдѣльномъ Приложеніи) высказалась въ сущности въ томъ же смыслѣ. Русская соціалдемократія переживаетъ періодъ колебаній, періодъ сомнѣній, доходящихъ до самоотрицанія. Съ одной стороны, рабочее движеніе отрывается отъ соціализма; рабочимъ помогаютъ вести экономическую борьбу, но имъ вовсе не разъясняютъ при этомъ или недостаточно разъясняютъ соціалистическихъ цѣлей и политическихъ задачъ всего движенія въ цѣломъ. Съ другой стороны, соціализмъ отрывается отъ рабочаго движенія: русскіе соціалисты опять начинаютъ все больше и больше говорить о томъ, что борьбу съ правительствомъ должна вести одними своими силами интеллигенція, ибо рабочіе ограничиваются лишь экономической борьбой

Троякаго рода обстоятельства подготовили, по нашему мнѣнію, почву для этихъ печальныхъ явленій. Во-первыхъ, въ началѣ своей дѣятельности русскіе соціалдемократы ограничились одной кружковой пропагандистской работой. Перейдя къ агитаціи въ массахъ, мы не всегда могли удер-

ческой мысли отъ передовы
классовъ гораздо больше, чѣ
при такой оторванности ру
осуждено на безсиліе. Отс
задача, которую призвана ос
кратія: внѣдрить соціалист
самосознаніе въ массу проле
ціонную партію, неразрывно
бочимъ движеніемъ. Много
шеніи русской соціалдемокра
сдѣлать. Съ ростомъ движе
соціалдемократіи становится
стороннѣе, все большее чис
точиваетъ свои силы на ос
ныхъ задачъ, которыя выдви
пропаганды и агитаціи. Это
и неизбѣжное, но оно заста
ніе на то, чтобы частныя за
пріемы борьбы не возводил
чтобы подготовительная раб
главной и единственной рабо
Содѣйствовать политическо
организаціи рабочаго класса
задача. Всякій, кто отодви
планъ, кто не подчиняетъ ей
дѣльныхъ пріемовъ борьбы,
путь и наноситъ серьезный
Отодвигаютъ эту задачу, в
содержаніе и размахъ полити
организаціи, кто считаетъ воз
рабочихъ „политикой" толь
ихъ жизни, только въ торже
комъ заботливо размѣниваетъ
самодержавія на требованіе
державія и недостаточно заб
ванія отдѣльныхъ уступокъ
безповоротную борьбу рево
тивъ самодержавія.
„Организуйтесь!", повторя
газета „Рабочая Мысль", пов
номическаго" направленія.
соединяемся къ этому кличу
къ нему: организуйтесь не то
стачечныя кассы и рабочіе к
въ политическую партію, ор

ЖРА

„Изъ искры возгорится пламя!"...
Отвѣтъ декабристовъ Пушкину.

1900 ГОДА

№ 1.

гъ представителей трудящихся
мъ въ другихъ странахъ, и что
ческое революціонное движеніе
ода сама собою вытекаетъ та
уществить русская соціалдемо-
ческія идеи и политическое
таріата и организовать револю-
связанную съ стихійнымъ ра-
уже сдѣлано въ этомъ отно-
тіей; но еще больше остается
нія поприще дѣятельности для
все шире, работа все разно-
ю дѣятелей движенія сосредо-
уществленіи различныхъ част-
гаются повседневными нуждами
явленіе совершенно законное
ляетъ обращать особое внима-
ачи дѣятельности и отдѣльные
ись въ нѣчто самодовлѣющее.
ота не возводилась на степень
ты.

ому развитію и политической
— наша главная и основная
гаетъ эту задачу на второй
всѣхъ частныхъ задачъ и от-
тотъ становится на ложный
редъ движенію.

о-вторыхъ, тѣ, кто съуживаетъ
ческой пропаганды, агитаціи и
можнымъ и умѣстнымъ угощать
о въ исключительные моменты
ственныхъ случаяхъ, кто слиш-
политическую борьбу противъ
тдѣльныхъ уступокъ отъ само-
отится о томъ, чтобы эти требо-
возвести въ систематическую и
юціонной рабочей партіи про-

етъ рабочимъ на разные лады
торяютъ всѣ сторонники „эко-
1 мы, конечно, всецѣло при-
, но мы непремѣнно добавимъ
лько въ общества взаимопомощи,
ружки, организуйтесь также и
ганизуйтесь для рѣшительной

есть въ Россіи живого и честнаго. И только тогда исполнится великое пророчество русскаго рабочаго-революціонера, Петра Алексѣева: „подымется мускулистая рука милліоновъ рабочаго люда, и ярмо деспотизма, огражденное солдатскими штыками, разлетится въ прахъ!"

ВИЛЬГЕЛЬМЪ ЛИБКНЕХТЪ

(РОДИЛСЯ 29-го МАРТА 1826 г., УМЕРЪ 7-го АВГУСТА 1900 г.)

Со смертью старѣйшаго вождя германской соціалдемократіи революціонный пролетаріатъ всего міра лишился одного изъ своихъ наиболѣе замѣчательныхъ и неутомимыхъ борцовъ и руководителей. Не даромъ вѣсть объ его внезапной кончинѣ, какъ громомъ поразила передовыхъ рабочихъ всѣхъ цивилизованныхъ странъ. Не только изъ всѣхъ концовъ Германіи, но и изъ другихъ странъ Европы, да не одной лишь Европы, а и Америки, Австраліи, и даже изъ южной Африки, Японіи посланы были сочувственныя телеграммы, съ выраженіемъ глубокой скорби о незамѣнимой утратѣ, понесенной международной соціалдемократіей. Похороны Либкнехта приняли характеръ и размѣры величественной манифестаціи, въ которой приняли участіе сотни тысячъ, быть можетъ, около милліона нѣмецкихъ рабочихъ и представителей рабочихъ партій Англіи, Франціи, Австріи, Венгріи, Бельгіи, Даніи и разныхъ другихъ странъ. По единодушнымъ заявленіямъ всѣхъ добросовѣстныхъ газетныхъ корреспондентовъ, видѣвшихъ эту манифестацію, такихъ грандіозныхъ похоронъ не удостаивался еще ни одинъ король, ни одинъ императоръ.

Всеобщія глубокія симпатіи борющагося пролетаріата всего міра къ Либкнехту, съ такой силой и искренностью выразившіяся по случаю его кончины, пріобрѣтены были имъ многолѣтней службой дѣлу освобожденія рабочаго класса, неутомимыми усиліями его на пользу умственнаго и политическаго возвышенія эксплуатируемыхъ и угнетенныхъ рабочихъ массъ. Представить полную и разностороннюю оцѣнку его заслугъ передъ международнымъ пролетаріатомъ, — значитъ дать подробное описаніе его жизни и дѣятельности, по меньшей мѣрѣ, начиная съ шестидесятыхъ годовъ, т. е. приблизительно за сорокъ лѣтъ. Но начало его общественной дѣятельности относится къ революціи 1848 г. а выработка его убѣжденій и идеаловъ, на служеніе которымъ онъ отдалъ свои способности, началась еще раньше, въ тѣ *времена, когда въ Германіи, какъ теперь въ Россіи, не*

лось очень часто отстаивать свое право на существованіе въ борьбѣ съ народовольцами, которые понимали подъ „политикой" дѣятельность, оторванную отъ рабочаго движенія, которые съуживали политику до одной только заговорщицкой борьбы. Отвергая такую политику, соціалдемократы впадали въ крайность, отодвигая на второй планъ политику вообще. Въ-третьихъ, разрозненно дѣйствуя въ мѣстныхъ мелкихъ рабочихъ кружкахъ, соціалдемократы недостаточно обращали вниманіе на необходимость организаціи революціонной партіи, объединяющей всю дѣятельность мѣстныхъ группъ и дающей возможность правильно поставить революціонную работу. А преобладаніе разрозненной работы естественно связано съ преобладаніемъ экономической борьбы.

Всѣ указанныя обстоятельства породили увлеченіе одной стороной движенія. „Экономическое" направленіе, (поскольку тутъ можно говорить о „направленіи") создало попытки возвести эту узость въ особую теорію, попытки воспользоваться для этой цѣли модной бернштейніадой, модной „критикой марксизма", проводящей старыя буржуазныя идеи подъ новымъ флагомъ. Лишь эти попытки породили опасность ослабленія связи между русскимъ рабочимъ движеніемъ и русской соціалдемократіей, какъ передовымъ борцомъ за политическую свободу. И самая насущная задача нашего движенія состоитъ въ укрѣпленіи этой связи.

Соціалдемократія есть соединеніе рабочаго движенія съ соціализмомъ, ея задача — не пассивное служеніе рабочему движенію на каждой его отдѣльной стадіи, а представительство интересовъ всего движенія въ цѣломъ, указаніе этому движенію его конечной цѣли, его политическихъ задачъ, охрана его политической и идейной самостоятельности. Оторванное отъ соціалдемократіи, рабочее движеніе мельчаетъ и необходимо впадаетъ въ буржуазность: ведя одну экономическую борьбу, рабочій классъ теряетъ свою политическую самостоятельность, становится хвостомъ другихъ партій, измѣняетъ великому завѣту: „освобожденіе рабочихъ должно быть дѣломъ самихъ рабочихъ". Во всѣхъ странахъ былъ такой періодъ, когда рабочее движеніе и соціализмъ существовалъ отдѣльно другъ отъ друга и шли особой дорогой, — и во всѣхъ странахъ такая оторванность приводила къ слабости соціализма и рабочаго движенія; во всѣхъ странахъ только соединеніе соціализма съ рабочимъ движеніемъ создавало прочную основу и для того и для другого. Но въ каждой странѣ это соединеніе соціализма съ рабочимъ движеніемъ вырабатывалось исторически, вырабатывалось особымъ путемъ, въ зависимости отъ условій мѣста и времени. Въ Россіи необходимость соединенія соціализма и рабочаго движенія теоретически провозглашена уже давно, — но практически это соединеніе вырабатывается лишь въ настоящее время. Процессъ этой выработки есть очень трудный процессъ, и нѣтъ ничего особенно удивительнаго въ томъ, что онъ сопровождается разными колебаніями и сомнѣніями

Какой-же урокъ вытекаетъ для насъ изъ прошлаго?

Исторія всего русскаго соціализма привела къ тому, что самой его насущной задачей оказалась борьба противъ самодержавнаго правительства, завоеваніе политической свободы: наше соціалистическое движеніе концентрировалось, такъ сказать, на борьбѣ съ самодержавіемъ. Съ другой стороны, исторія показала, что въ Россіи оторванность соціалисти-

пролетаріатъ не способенъ по
совой борьбы, безъ такой
осуждено на безсиліе, и одн
и обществами взаимопомощи
удастся исполнить лежащую
задачу освободить себя и
политическаго и экономическ
въ исторіи не достигалъ госп
своихъ политическихъ вожде
вителей, способныхъ органи
имъ. И русскій рабочій клас
собенъ выдвигать такихъ люд
русскихъ рабочихъ за 5-6 по
масса революціонныхъ силъ т
самыя отчаянныя правительст
шаютъ, а увеличиваютъ чис
ціализму, къ политическому
борьбѣ. Съѣздъ нашихъ то
ставилъ задачу, а не повтор
одно только увлеченіе „инте
рѣшительно взяться за выпо
на очередь вопросъ о прог
партіи. Какъ мы смотримъ
программы, мы уже сказали,
ложенія, здѣсь, конечно, не
ціоннымъ мы намѣрены посв
шихъ номерахъ. Это одни
вопросовъ. Мы сильно отст
старыхъ дѣятелей русскаго р
прямо признать этотъ недоч
выработку болѣе конспиратив
матическую пропаганду прав
дуванія жандармовъ и обход
товлять людей, посвящающи
свободные вечера, а всю св
организацію, настолько круп
провести строгое раздѣленіе
дами нашей работы. Что кас
тактики, то мы ограничимся
демократія не связываетъ се
дѣятельности однимъ какимъ
планомъ или пріемомъ полит
етъ всѣ средства борьбы, ли
личнымъ силамъ партіи и
наибольшихъ результатовъ, д
віяхъ. При крѣпкой организо
можетъ превратиться въ по
политическую побѣду надъ п
организованной партіи возст
можетъ разростись въ побѣд
жны помнить, что борьба съ
требованія, отвоеваніе отдѣль
мелкія стычки съ непріятеле
на форпостахъ, а рѣшительн
редъ нами стоитъ во всей с
пость, изъ которой осыпаю
уносящіе лучшихъ борцовъ.
пость, и мы возьмемъ ее, есл
пролетаріата соединимъ со в
ціонеровъ въ одну партію,

дняться до сознательной клас-
рганизаціи рабочее движеніе
ьми только кассами, кружками
рабочему классу никогда не
на немъ великую историческую
весь русскій народъ отъ его
аго рабства. Ни одинъ классъ
одства, если онъ не выдвигалъ
й, своихъ передовыхъ предста-
ювать движеніе и руководить
съ показалъ уже, что онъ спо-
ей: широко разлившаяся борьба
слѣднихъ лѣтъ показала, какая
ится въ рабочемъ классѣ, какъ
венныя преслѣдованія не умень-
ло рабочихъ, рвущихся къ со-
сознанію и къ политической
варищей въ 1898 г. вѣрно по-
лъ чужія слова, не выразилъ
ллигентовъ"... И мы должны
іненіе этихъ задачъ, поставивъ
раммѣ, организаціи и тактикѣ
на основныя положенія нашей
а подробно развивать эти по-
мѣсто. Вопросамъ организа-
ятить рядъ статей въ ближай-
изъ самыхъ больныхъ нашихъ
али въ этомъ отношеніи отъ
еволюціоннаго движенія; надо
етъ и направить свои силы на
ной постановки дѣла, на систе-
лъ веденія дѣла, пріемовъ на-
а сѣтей полиціи. Надо подго-
къ революціи не одни только
ю жизнь, надо подготовлять
ую, чтобы въ ней можно было
труда между различными ви-
ается, наконецъ, до вопросовъ
здѣсь слѣдующимъ: соціал-
ѣ рукъ, не съуживаетъ своей
нибудь заранѣе придуманнымъ
ческой борьбы, — она призна-
ь бы они соотвѣтствовали на-
давали возможность достигать
остижимыхъ при данныхъ усло-
анной партіи отдѣльная стачка
литическую демонстрацію, въ
равительствомъ. При крѣпкой
аніе въ отдѣльной мѣстности
оносную революцію. Мы дол-
правительствомъ за отдѣльныя
ныхъ уступокъ, это — только
мъ, это — небольшія схватки
ая схватка еще впереди. Пе-
воей силѣ непріятельская крѣ-
гъ насъ тучи ядеръ и пуль.
Мы должны взять эту крѣ-
и всѣ силы пробуждающагося
ѣми силами русскихъ револю-
къ которой потянется все, что

произвола и устарѣлыхъ государственныхъ и общественныхъ порядковъ. Исторія жизни и дѣятельности Либкнехта тѣснѣйшимъ образомъ связана, поэтому, съ исторіей Германіи, а косвенно съ важнѣйшими моментами и событіями въ исторіи Европы, за періодъ болѣе продолжительный, чѣмъ полстолѣтіе. Для того, чтобы представить біографію Либкнехта въ такихъ широкихъ рамкахъ, надобно написать объемистую книгу. Здѣсь же мы ограничимся только сообщеніемъ нѣсколькихъ фактовъ изъ его, полной неутомимой дѣятельности и борьбы жизни, и, главнымъ образомъ, изъ того періода ея, въ теченіе котораго онъ воспитался и подготовился къ роли вождя германскихъ рабочихъ.

* * *

По своему рожденію и воспитанію, Либкнехтъ принадлежитъ къ буржуазіи и именно къ тѣмъ ея слоямъ, которые у насъ извѣстны подъ названіемъ „интеллигенція". Какъ я уже сказалъ, во времена его дѣтства и юности, въ Германіи господствовало монархическое и полицейское самовластіе, отъ котораго больше всего страдали, конечно, низшіе городскіе классы да деревенскія массы, находившіяся сверхъ того, подъ гнетомъ помѣщиковъ; но терпѣли также и буржуазные классы, — торговцы, фабриканты, а въ особенности образованные ихъ слои, врачи, адвокаты, учителя, профессора и учащаяся, по преимуществу, университетская молодежь. Вслѣдствіе этого, буржуазія вообще, а интеллигенція въ особенности, проникнута была духомъ недовольства и оппозиціи. Наиболѣе благородныя натуры и горячія головы изъ интеллигенціи проникнуты были сочувствіемъ къ народнымъ страданіямъ, мечтали о такихъ общественныхъ порядкахъ, при которыхъ не было бы мѣста неравенству и несправедливости и старались даже распространять свои революціонныя и соціалистическія идеи среди рабочихъ. Внутри самой Германіи пропаганда эта велась, конечно, тайно, подъ страхомъ строжайшихъ наказаній. Но нѣмецкіе рабочіе, главнымъ образомъ, молодые подмастерья, имѣли тогда обыкновеніе перекочевывать изъ одного города въ другой и даже изъ одной страны въ другую. Благодаря этому обстоятельству, нѣмецкихъ рабочихъ въ 40-хъ и 50-хъ годахъ можно было встрѣтить сотнями не только въ Швейцаріи, Франціи, Бельгіи, сосѣднихъ съ Германіей странахъ, но даже и въ Англіи. Во всѣхъ этихъ государствахъ уже до революціи 1848 г. были конституціонные порядки, дававшіе рабочимъ большій или меньшій просторъ для саморазвитія и самодѣятельности. Туда направили свои главныя усилія тѣ изъ нѣмецкихъ соціалистовъ и революціонеровъ, которые стремились вызвать среди рабочихъ сознательное недовольство существующими порядками. Свободныя политическія учрежденія и антиправительственная и соціалистическая агитація туземныхъ оппозиціонныхъ партій и рабочихъ союзовъ въ названныхъ странахъ, конечно, въ свою очередь, сильно способствовали умственному и политическому пробужденію нѣмецкихъ пролетаріевъ, на время или на долго водворившихся тамъ. Результатомъ этого двойного воздѣйствія на нихъ было то, что Швейцарія, напр., уже въ 40-хъ годахъ покрылась сѣтью нѣмецкихъ рабочихъ обществъ. Союзъ коммунистовъ, образовавшійся въ Лондонѣ и издавшій, какъ извѣстно, знаменитый „Манифестъ Коммунистической Партіи", написанный Марксомъ и Энгельсомъ, также состоялъ, главнымъ образомъ, изъ нѣмецкихъ рабочихъ.

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ing on self-negation. On the one hand, the working-class movement is being sundered from socialism, the workers are being helped to carry on the economic struggle, but nothing, or next to nothing, is done to explain to them the socialist aims and the political tasks of the movement as a whole. On the other hand, socialism is being sundered from the labour movement; Russian socialists are again beginning to talk more and more about the struggle against the government having to be carried on entirely by the intelligentsia because the workers confine themselves to the economic struggle.

In our opinion the ground has been prepared for this sad state of affairs by three circumstances. First, in their early activity, Russian Social-Democrats restricted themselves merely to work in propaganda circles. When we took up agitation among the masses we were not always able to restrain ourselves from going to the other extreme. Secondly, in our early activity we often had to struggle for our right to existence against the Narodnaya Volya adherents, who understood by "politics" an activity isolated from the working-class movement and who reduced politics purely to conspiratorial struggle. In rejecting this sort of politics, the Social-Democrats went to the extreme of pushing politics entirely into the background. Thirdly, working in the isolation of small local workers' circles, the Social-Democrats did not devote sufficient attention to the necessity of organising a revolutionary party which would combine all the activities of the local groups and make it possible to organise the revolutionary work on correct lines. The predominance of isolated work is naturally connected with the predominance of the economic struggle.

These circumstances resulted in concentration on one side of the movement only. The "economist" trend (that is, if we can speak of it as a "trend") has attempted to elevate this narrowness to the rank of a special theory and has tried to utilise for this purpose the fashionable Bernsteinism and the fashionable "criticism of Marxism," which peddles old bourgeois ideas under a new label. These attempts alone have given rise to the danger of a weakening of connection between the Russian working-class movement and Russian Social-Democracy, the vanguard in the struggle for

political liberty. The most urgent task of our movement is to strengthen this connection.

Social-Democracy is the combination of the working-class movement and socialism. Its task is not to serve the working-class movement passively at each of its separate stages, but to represent the interests of the movement as a whole, to point out to this movement its ultimate aim and its political tasks, and to safeguard its political and ideological independence. Isolated from Social-Democracy, the working-class movement becomes petty and inevitably becomes bourgeois. In waging only the economic struggle, the working class loses its political independence; it becomes the tail of other parties and betrays the great principle: "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by, the working classes themselves."[137] In every country there has been a period in which the working-class movement existed apart from socialism, each going its own way; and in every country this isolation has weakened both socialism and the working-class movement. Only the fusion of socialism with the working-class movement has in all countries created a durable basis for both. But in every country this combination of socialism and the working-class movement was evolved historically, in unique ways, in accordance with the prevailing conditions of time and place. In Russia, the necessity for combining socialism and the working-class movement was in theory long ago proclaimed, but it is only now being carried into practice. It is a very difficult process and there is, therefore, nothing surprising in the fact that it is accompanied by vacillations and doubts.

What lesson can be learned from the past?

The entire history of Russian socialism has led to the condition in which the most urgent task is the struggle against the autocratic government and the achievement of political liberty. Our socialist movement concentrated itself, so to speak, upon the struggle against the autocracy. On the other hand, history has shown that the isolation of socialist thought from the vanguard of the working classes is greater in Russia than in other countries, and that if this state of affairs continues, the revolutionary movement in Russia is doomed to impotence. From this condition emerges the task which the Russian Social-Democracy is

called upon to fulfil—to imbue the masses of the proletariat with the ideas of socialism and political consciousness, and to organise a revolutionary party inseparably connected with the spontaneous working-class movement. Russian Social-Democracy has done much in this direction, but much more still remains to be done. With the growth of the movement, the field of activity for Social-Democrats becomes wider; the work becomes more varied, and an increasing number of activists in the movement will concentrate their efforts upon the fulfilment of various special tasks which the daily needs of propaganda and agitation bring to the fore. This phenomenon is quite natural and is inevitable, but it causes us to be particularly concerned with preventing these special activities and methods of struggle from becoming ends in themselves and with preventing preparatory work from being regarded as the main and sole activity.

Our principal and fundamental task is to facilitate the political development and the political organisation of the working class. Those who push this task into the background, who refuse to subordinate to it all the special tasks and particular methods of struggle, are following a false path and causing serious harm to the movement. And it is being pushed into the background, firstly, by those who call upon revolutionaries to employ only the forces of isolated conspiratorial circles cut off from the working-class movement in the struggle against the government. It is being pushed into the background, secondly, by those who restrict the content and scope of political propaganda, agitation, and organisation; who think it fit and proper to treat the workers to "politics" only at exceptional moments in their lives, only on festive occasions; who too solicitously substitute demands for partial concessions from the autocracy for the political struggle against the autocracy; and who do not go to sufficient lengths to ensure that these demands for partial concessions are raised to the status of a systematic, implacable struggle of a revolutionary, working-class party against the autocracy.

"Organise!" *Rabochaya Mysl* keeps repeating to the workers in all keys, and all the adherents of the "economist" trend echo the cry. We, of course, wholly endorse this

appeal, but we will not fail to add: organise, but not only in mutual benefit societies, strike funds, and workers' circles; organise also in a political party; organise for the determined struggle against the autocratic government and against the whole of capitalist society. Without such organisation the proletariat will never rise to the class-conscious struggle; without such organisation the working-class movement is doomed to impotency. With the aid of nothing but funds and study circles and mutual benefit societies the working class will never be able to fulfil its great historical mission—to emancipate itself and the whole of the Russian people from political and economic slavery. Not a single class in history has achieved power without producing its political leaders, its prominent representatives able to organise a movement and lead it. And the Russian working class has already shown that it can produce such men and women. The struggle which has developed so widely during the past five or six years has revealed the great potential revolutionary power of the working class; it has shown that the most ruthless government persecution does not diminish, but, on the contrary, increases the number of workers who strive towards socialism, towards political consciousness, and towards the political struggle. The congress which our comrades held in 1898 correctly defined our tasks and did not merely repeat other people's words, did not merely express the enthusiasm of "intellectuals."... We must set to work resolutely to fulfil these tasks, placing the question of the Party's programme, organisation, and tactics on the order of the day. We have already set forth our views on the fundamental postulates of our programme, and, of course, this is not the place to develop them in detail. We propose to devote a series of articles in forthcoming issues to questions of organisation, which are among the most burning problems confronting us. In this respect we lag considerably behind the old workers in the Russian revolutionary movement. We must frankly admit this defect and exert all our efforts to devise methods of greater secrecy in our work, to propagate systematically the proper methods of work, the proper methods of deluding the gendarmes and of evading the snares of the police. We must train people who will devote the whole of

their lives, not only their spare evenings, to the revolution; we must build up an organisation large enough to permit the introduction of a strict division of labour in the various forms of our work. Finally, with regard to questions of tactics, we shall confine ourselves to the following: Social-Democracy does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some one preconceived plan or method of political struggle; it recognises all methods of struggle, provided they correspond to the forces at the disposal of the Party and facilitate the achievement of the best results possible under the given conditions. If we have a strongly organised party, a single strike may turn into a political demonstration, into a political victory over the government. If we have a strongly organised party, a revolt in a single locality may grow into a victorious revolution. We must bear in mind that the struggles with the government for partial demands and the gain of certain concessions are merely light skirmishes with the enemy, encounters between outposts, whereas the decisive battle is still to come. Before us, in all its strength, towers the enemy fortress which is raining shot and shell upon us, mowing down our best fighters. We must capture this fortress, and we will capture it, if we unite all the forces of the awakening proletariat with all the forces of the Russian revolutionaries into one party which will attract all that is vital and honest in Russia. Only then will the great prophecy of the Russian worker-revolutionary, Pyotr Alexeyev, be fulfilled: "The muscular arm of the working millions will be lifted, and the yoke of despotism, guarded by the soldiers' bayonets, will be smashed to atoms!"[138]

MEMARE LOMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Written in early November 1900
Published in December 1900
in *Iskra*, No. 1

Published according to
the *Iskra* text

THE WAR IN CHINA

Russia is bringing her war with China to a close: a number of military districts have been mobilised, hundreds of millions of rubles have been spent, tens of thousands of troops have been dispatched to China, a number of battles have been fought and a number of victories won—true, not so much over regular enemy troops, as over Chinese insurgents and, particularly, over the unarmed Chinese populace, who were drowned or killed, with no holding back from the slaughter of women and children, not to speak of the looting of palaces, homes, and shops. The Russian Government, together with the press that kowtows to it, is celebrating a victory and rejoicing over the fresh exploits of the gallant soldiery, rejoicing at the victory of European culture over Chinese barbarism and over the fresh successes of Russia's "civilising mission" in the Far East.

But the voices of the class-conscious workers, of the advanced representatives of the many millions of the working people, are not heard amid this rejoicing. And yet, it is the working people who bear the brunt of the victorious new campaigns, it is working people who are sent to the other end of the world, from whom increased taxes are extorted to cover the millions expended. Let us, therefore, see: What attitude should the socialists adopt towards this war? In whose interests is it being fought? What is the real nature of the policy now being pursued by the Russian Government?

Our government asserts first of all that it is not waging war against China; that it is merely suppressing a

rebellion, pacifying rebels; that it is helping the lawful government of China to re-establish law and order. True, war has not been declared, but this does not change the situation a bit, because war is being waged nonetheless. What made the Chinese attack Europeans, what caused the rebellion which the British, French, Germans, Russians, Japanese, etc., are so zealously crushing? "The hostility of the yellow race towards the white race," "the Chinese hatred for European culture and civilisation"—answer the supporters of the war. Yes! It is true the Chinese hate the Europeans, but which Europeans do they hate, and why? The Chinese do not hate the European peoples, they have never had any quarrel with them—they hate the European capitalists and the European governments obedient to them. How can the Chinese not hate those who have come to China solely for the sake of gain; who have utilised their vaunted civilisation solely for the purpose of deception, plunder, and violence; who have waged wars against China in order to win the right to trade in opium with which to drug the people (the war of England and France with China in 1856); and who hypocritically carried their policy of plunder under the guise of spreading Christianity? The bourgeois governments of Europe have long been conducting this policy of plunder with respect to China, and now they have been joined by the autocratic Russian Government. This policy of plunder is usually called a colonial policy. Every country in which capitalist industry develops rapidly has very soon to seek colonies, i.e., countries in which industry is weakly developed, in which a more or less patriarchal way of life still prevails, and which can serve as a market for manufactured goods and a source of high profits. For the sake of the profit of a handful of capitalists, the bourgeois governments have waged endless wars, have sent regiments to die in unhealthy tropical countries, have squandered millions of money extracted from the people, and have driven the peoples in the colonies to desperate revolts or to death from starvation. We need only recall the rebellion of the native peoples against the British in India[139] and the famine that prevailed there, or think of the war the English are now waging against the Boers.

And now the European capitalists have placed their rapacious paws upon China, and almost the first to do so was the Russian Government, which now so loudly proclaims its "disinterestedness." It "disinterestedly" took Port Arthur away from China and began to build a railway to Manchuria under the protection of Russian troops. One after another the European governments began feverishly to loot, or, as they put it, to "rent," Chinese territory, giving good grounds for the talk of the partition of China. If we are to call things by their right names, we must say that the European governments (the Russian Government among the very first) have already started to partition China. However, they have not begun this partitioning openly, but stealthily, like thieves. They began to rob China as ghouls rob corpses, and when the seeming corpse attempted to resist, they flung themselves upon it like savage beasts, burning down whole villages, shooting, bayonetting, and drowning in the Amur River unarmed inhabitants, their wives, and their children. And all these Christian exploits are accompanied by howls against the Chinese barbarians who dared to raise their hands against the civilised Europeans. The occupation of Niuchuang and the moving of Russian troops into Manchuria are temporary measures, declares the autocratic Russian Government in its circular note of August 12, 1900 addressed to the Powers; these measures "are called forth exclusively by the necessity to repel the aggressive operations of Chinese rebels"; they "cannot in the least be regarded as evidence of any selfish plans, which are totally alien to the policy of the Imperial Government."

Poor Imperial Government! So Christianly unselfish, and yet so unjustly maligned! Several years ago it unselfishly seized Port Arthur, and now it is unselfishly seizing Manchuria; it has unselfishly flooded the frontier provinces of China with hordes of contractors, engineers, and officers, who, by their conduct, have roused to indignation even the Chinese, known for their docility. The Chinese workers employed in the construction of the Chinese railway had to exist on a wage of ten kopeks a day—is this not unselfish on Russia's part?

How is our government's senseless policy in China to be explained? Who benefits by it? The benefit goes to a handful of capitalist magnates who carry on trade with China, to a handful of factory owners who manufacture goods for the Asian market, to a handful of contractors who are now piling up huge profits on urgent war orders (factories producing war equipment, supplies for the troops, etc., are now operating at full capacity and are engaging hundreds of new workers). This policy is of benefit to a handful of nobles who occupy high posts in the civil and military services. They need adventurous policies, for these provide them with opportunities for promotion, for making a career and gaining fame by their "exploits." In the interests of this handful of capitalists and bureaucratic scoundrels, our government unhesitatingly sacrifices the interests of the entire people. And in this case, as always, the autocratic tsarist government has proved itself to be a government of irresponsible bureaucrats servilely cringing before the capitalist magnates and nobles.

What benefits do the Russian working class and the labouring people generally obtain from the conquests in China? Thousands of ruined families, whose breadwinners have been sent to the war; an enormous increase in the national debt and the national expenditure; mounting taxation; greater power for the capitalists, the exploiters of the workers; worse conditions for the workers; still greater mortality among the peasantry; famine in Siberia—this is what the Chinese war promises and is already bringing. The entire Russian press, all the newspapers and periodicals are kept in a state of bondage; they dare not print anything without permission of the government officials. This is the reason for the lack of precise information as to what the Chinese war is costing the people; but there is no doubt that it requires the expenditure of *many hundreds of millions of rubles*. It has come to our knowledge that the government, by an unpublished decree, handed out the tidy sum of a hundred and fifty million rubles for the purpose of waging the war. In addition to this, current expenditures on the war absorb *one million rubles* every three or four days, and these terrific sums are

being squandered by a government which, haggling over every kopek, has steadily cut down grants to the famine-stricken peasantry; which can find no money for the people's education; which, like any kulak, sweats the workers in the government factories, sweats the lower employees in the post offices, etc.!

Minister of Finance Witte declared that on January 1, 1900, there were two hundred and fifty million rubles available in the treasury. Now this money is gone, it has been spent on the war. The government is seeking loans, is increasing taxation, is refusing necessary expenditures because of the lack of money, and is putting a stop to the building of railways. The tsarist government is threatened with bankruptcy, and yet it is plunging into a policy of conquest—a policy which not only demands the expenditure of enormous sums of money, but threatens to plunge us into still more dangerous wars. The European states that have flung themselves upon China are already beginning to quarrel over the division of the booty, and no one can say how this quarrel will end.

But the policy of the tsarist government in China is not only a mockery of the interests of the people—its aim is to corrupt the political consciousness of the masses. Governments that maintain themselves in power only by means of the bayonet, that have constantly to restrain or suppress the indignation of the people, have long realised the truism that popular discontent can never be removed and that it is necessary to divert the discontent from the government to some other object. For example, hostility is being stirred up against the Jews; the gutter press carries on Jew-baiting campaigns, as if the Jewish workers do not suffer in exactly the same way as the Russian workers from the oppression of capital and the police government. At the present time, the press is conducting a campaign against the Chinese; it is howling about the savage yellow race and its hostility towards civilisation, about Russia's tasks of enlightenment, about the enthusiasm with which the Russian soldiers go into battle, etc., etc. Journalists who crawl on their bellies before the government and the money-bags are straining every nerve to rouse the hatred of the people against China. But the

Chinese people have at no time and in no way oppressed the Russian people. The Chinese people suffer from the same evils as those from which the Russian people suffer—they suffer from an Asiatic government that squeezes taxes from the starving peasantry and that suppresses every aspiration towards liberty by military force; they suffer from the oppression of capital, which has penetrated into the Middle Kingdom.

The Russian working class is beginning to move out of the state of political oppression and ignorance in which the masses of the people are still submerged. Hence, the duty of all class-conscious workers is to rise with all their might against those who are stirring up national hatred and diverting the attention of the working people from their real enemies. The policy of the tsarist government in China is a criminal policy which is impoverishing, corrupting, and oppressing the people more than ever. The tsarist government not only keeps our people in slavery but sends them to pacify other peoples who rebel against their slavery (as was the case in 1849 when Russian troops suppressed the revolution in Hungary). It not only helps the Russian capitalists to exploit the Russian workers, whose hands it ties to hold them back from combining and defending themselves, but it also sends soldiers to plunder other peoples in the interests of a handful of rich men and nobles. There is only one way in which the new burden the war is thrusting upon the working people can be removed, and that is the convening of an assembly of representatives of the people, which would put an end to the autocracy of the government and compel it to have regard for interests other than those solely of a gang of courtiers.

Iskra, No. 1, December 1900

Published according to the *Iskra* text

THE SPLIT IN THE UNION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ABROAD

In the spring of this year, there took place in Switzerland a conference of the members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad which resulted in a split. The minority, led by the Emancipation of Labour Group, which had founded the Union Abroad and which until the autumn of 1898 had edited the Union publications, formed a separate organisation under the name of the Russian Revolutionary Organisation *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The majority, including the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, continues to call itself the Union. The congress of Russian Social-Democrats in the spring of 1898, which formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, recognised the Union as the representative of our Party abroad. How must we regard the question of representation now that the Union has split? We shall not go into detail concerning the causes of the split; we shall observe merely that the widespread and serious accusation that Plekhanov has seized the Union's printing-press is not true. In reality, the manager of the printing-press had refused to turn it over entirely to only one part of the split Union, and the two parties soon divided the printing establishment between them. The most important thing, from our point of view, is the fact that *Rabocheye Dyelo* was in the wrong in this controversy; it erroneously denied the existence of an "economist" trend; it advocated the wrong tactics of ignoring the extremism of this trend and of refraining from combating it openly.

For this reason, while not denying the service which *Rabocheye Dyelo* has rendered in publishing literature and

organising its distribution, we refuse to recognise either section of the split organisation as the representative of our Party abroad. This question must remain open until our next Party congress. The official representatives of Russian Social-Democracy abroad at the present time are the Russian members of the permanent international Committee set up in Paris by the International Socialist Congress in the autumn of this year.[140] Russia has two representatives on this Committee: G. V. Plekhanov and B. Krichevsky (one of the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*). Until the two groups of Russian Social-Democracy become reconciled or come to an agreement, we intend to conduct all our business pertaining to the representation of Russia with G. V. Plekhanov. Finally, we must express our opinion on the question of whom we desire to see as the Russian secretary of the permanent international Committee. At the present time, when under the cloak of the "criticism of Marxism," attempts are being made to corrupt Social-Democracy by bourgeois ideology and by a meek and mild policy towards an enemy armed to the teeth (the bourgeois governments), it is especially necessary to have at this responsible post a man able to stand against the tide and to speak with influence against ideological wavering. For this reason, as well as for those stated above, we cast our vote for G. V. Plekhanov.

Written not later than December 8, 1900
Published in December 1900 in *Iskra*, No. 1

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NOTE OF DECEMBER 29, 1900

29. XII. 1900. Sunday, 2 a. m.

I should like to set down my impressions of today's talks with the "twin." It was a remarkable meeting, "historic" in a way (Arsenyev, Velika, the twin+wife[141]+myself)—at least it was historic as far as my life is concerned; it summed up, if not a whole epoch, at least a page in a life history, and it determined my conduct and my life's path for a long time to come.

As the case was first stated by Arsenyev, I understood that the twin was coming over to us and wished to take the first steps, but the very opposite turned out to be the case. In all probability this strange error originated from the fact that Arsenyev keenly desired what the twin was "tempting" us with, viz., political material, correspondence, etc. "The wish is father to the thought," and Arsenyev believed in the possibility of what the twin was tempting him with; he wished to believe in the sincerity of the twin and in the possibility of a decent *modus vivendi* with him.

This very meeting utterly and irrevocably destroyed such a belief. The twin revealed himself in a totally new light, as a "politician" of the purest water, a politician in the worst sense of the word, an old fox, and a brazen huckster. He arrived *completely convinced of our impotence*, as Arsenyev himself described the results of our negotiations, and this formulation was entirely correct. Convinced of our impotence, the twin arrived for the purpose of laying down conditions of *surrender*, which he did in an exceedingly clever manner, without uttering a single impolite word,

yet without being able to conceal the coarse haggling nature of the common liberal that lay hidden beneath the dapper, cultured exterior of this latest "critic."

In reply to my question (with which the business part of the evening began) as to why he did not agree to work simply as a contributor, the twin stated firmly that it was psychologically impossible for him to work for a magazine in which he would be "taken to task" (his precise words), and that surely we did not think that we could abuse him and he would "write political articles" (his very words!) for us; that he could co-operate only on terms of complete equality (i.e., evidently, equality between the critics and the orthodox); that since the Declaration,* his comrade and friend[142] has refused even to meet Arsenyev; that his, the twin's, attitude was determined not so much by the Declaration, in fact not at all by the Declaration, as by the fact that at first he had desired to confine himself to the role of "benevolent helpmate," but that now he did not intend so to limit himself but wanted also to be an editor (he said it almost in these words!!). The twin did not blurt this out all in one breath, the negotiations concerning his collaboration dragged on for quite a long time (too long in the opinion of Arsenyev and Velika), but the negotiations made it quite clear to me that no business could be done with this gentleman.

He then began to insist on his proposal: Why not establish a third political periodical on an equal basis with the others? This would be to our and his advantage (the newspaper would get material, we would "make" something out of the resources provided for it). He proposed that on the cover we should have nothing Social-Democratic, nothing to indicate our firm, and that we were obliged (not formally but morally) to contribute to this organ all our material of a general political nature.

Everything became clear, and I said openly that the publication of a third periodical was out of the question, and that the whole matter reduced itself to the question as to whether Social-Democracy must carry on the political struggle or whether the liberals should carry it on as an

* See p. 351 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

independent and self-contained movement (I expressed myself more clearly and definitely, more precisely). The twin understood and angrily retorted that after I had expressed myself with *anerkennenswerter Klarheit** (literally!) there was nothing more to be said and all that we might discuss was the placing of orders—orders for the collections, but that would be a sort of third magazine (I put in). "Well, then place an order for just the one *available* pamphlet," replied the twin. "Which one?" I asked. "Why do you want to know?" retorted the wife insolently. "If you agree in principle, we shall decide, but if not, why do you want to know?" I inquired about the conditions of the printing. "Published by X, and nothing more; there must be no mention of your firm, nothing except the *Verlag*.** There must be no connection with your firm"—declared the twin. I argued also against that, demanding that mention be made of our firm. Arsenyev began to argue against me, and the conversation was cut off.

Finally, we decided to postpone the decision. Arsenyev and Velika had another heated discussion with the twin, demanded an explanation *from him*, argued with him. I remained silent for the most part and laughed (so that the twin could see it quite clearly) and the conversation soon came to an end.

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in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Published according to
the manuscript

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* Commendable clarity.—*Ed.*
** Publishers.—*Ed.*

CASUAL NOTES

Written in January 1901
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Signed: *T. K.*

Published according to
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1901-го г.

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April 1901

ЗАРЯ

Соціаль-демократическій
научно-политическій журналъ.
Издается при ближайшемъ
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Засуличъ и П. Б. Аксельрода.

Цѣна 2 руб.

Stuttgart
J. H. W. Dietz Nachf. (G. m. b. H.)
1901

Facsimile of the cover of the first issue
of the magazine *Zarya*,
April 1901

I. BEAT—BUT NOT TO DEATH!

On January 23, in Nizhni-Novgorod, the Moscow High Court of Justice, in a special session, *with the participation of representatives of the social-estates*, tried the case of the murder of the peasant Timofei Vasilyevich Vozdukhov, who had been taken to the police-station "to sober up" and there beaten up by four policemen, Shelemetyev, Shulpin, Shibayev, and Olkhovin, and by acting Station Sergeant Panov, so that he died in the hospital the next day.

Such is the simple tale of this case, which throws a glaring light upon what usually and always goes on in our police-stations.

As far as can be gathered from the extremely brief newspaper reports, what appears to have happened is the following. On April 20, Vozdukhov drove up to the Governor's house in a cab. The superintendent of the Governor's house came out to him; in giving evidence at the trial the superintendent stated that Vozdukhov, hatless, had been drinking but was not drunk, and that he, Vozdukhov, complained to him about a certain steamboat booking office having refused to sell him a ticket (?). The superintendent ordered Shelemetyev, the policeman on duty, to take him to the police-station. Vozdukhov was sufficiently sober to be able to speak quietly with Shelemetyev and on arriving at the police-station quite distinctly told Sergeant Panov his name and occupation. Notwithstanding all this, Shelemetyev, no doubt with the knowledge of Panov, who had just questioned Vozdukhov, "*pushed*" the latter, not into the common cell, in which there were a number of other drunkards, but into the adjoining

"*soldiers' lock-up.*" As he pushed him, his sword got caught on the latch of the door and it cut his hand slightly; imagining that Vozdukhov was holding the sword, he rushed at him to strike him, shouting that his hand had been cut. He struck Vozdukhov with all his might in the face, in the chest, in the side; he struck him so hard that Vozdukhov fell, striking his forehead on the door and begging for mercy. "Why are you beating me?" he implored, according to the statement of a witness, Semakhin, who was in the neighbouring cell at the time. "It was not my fault. Forgive me, for Christ's sake!" According to the evidence of this witness, it was not Vozdukhov who was drunk, but sooner Shelemetyev. Shelemetyev's colleagues, Shulpin and Shibayev, who had been continuously drinking in the police-station since the first day of Easter week (April 20 was Tuesday, the third day of Easter week), learned that Shelemetyev was "teaching" (the expression used in the indictment!) Vozdukhov a lesson. They went into the soldiers' lock-up accompanied by Olkhovin, who was on a visit from another station, and attacked Vozdukhov with their fists and feet. Police Sergeant Panov came on the scene and struck Vozdukhov on the head with a book, and then with his fists. "Oh! they beat and beat him so hard that my belly ached for pity," said a woman witness, who was under arrest there at the time. When the "lesson" was over, the sergeant very coolly ordered Shibayev to wipe the blood from the victim's face—it would not look so bad then; the chief might see it—and then to fling him into the common cell. "Brothers!" cried Vozdukhov to the other detainees, "see how the police have beaten me. Be my witnesses, I'll lodge a complaint." But he never lived to lodge the complaint. The following morning, he was found in a state of unconsciousness and sent to the hospital where he died within eight hours without coming to himself again. A post-mortem revealed ten broken ribs, bruises all over his body, and haemorrhage of the brain.

The court sentenced Shelemetyev, Shulpin, and Shibayev to four years' penal servitude, and Olkhovin and Panov *to one month's detention*, finding them guilty only of "insulting behaviour."...

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

With this sentence we shall commence our examination of the case. Those sentenced to penal servitude were charged according to Articles 346 and 1490, Part II, of the Penal Code. The first of these articles provides that an official inflicting wounds or injuries in the exercise of his duties is liable to the maximum penalty reserved "for the perpetration of such a crime." Article 1490, Part II, provides for a penalty of from eight to ten years' penal servitude for inflicting torture resulting in death. Instead of inflicting the *maximum penalty*, the court, consisting of representatives of the social-estates and crown judges, *reduced* the sentence *by two degrees* (sixth degree, eight to ten years of penal servitude; seventh degree, four to six years, i.e., it made the maximum reduction of sentence permitted by the law in cases of extenuating circumstances, and, moreover, imposed the *minimum* penalty of that low degree. In a word, the court did all it could to let the culprits off as lightly as possible; in fact, it did more than it could, because it evaded the law concerning the "maximum penalty." Of course, we do not wish to assert that "supreme justice" demanded precisely ten and not four years' penal servitude; the essential point is that the murderers were declared to be murderers and that they were sentenced to penal servitude. But we cannot refrain from noting a tendency characteristic of the court of crown judges and representatives of the estates; when they try a police official, they are ready to display the greatest clemency, but when they sit in judgement over an act committed against the police, as is well known, they display inexorable severity.*

* In passing, we shall adduce another fact indicating the punishments imposed by our courts for various crimes. A few days after the Vozdukhov murder trial, the Moscow District Military Tribunal tried a private in the local artillery brigade for stealing fifty pairs of trousers and a few pairs of boots, while on guard duty in the storeroom. The sentence was four years' *penal servitude*. A human life entrusted to the police is equal in value to fifty pairs of trousers and a few pairs of boots entrusted to a sentry. In this peculiar "equation" the whole of our police state system is reflected as the sun is reflected in a drop of water. The individual against state power is nothing. Discipline within the state power is everything ... pardon me, "everything" only for the small fry. A petty thief is sentenced to penal servitude, but the big thieves, the magnates, cabinet ministers, bank directors, build-

With a police sergeant before it, how could the court refuse him clemency? He had met Vozdukhov as he was brought in and apparently had ordered him to be placed, not in a common cell, but first, in order to teach him a lesson, in the soldiers' lock-up. He took part in the assault, using his fists and a book (no doubt a copy of the Penal Laws); he gave orders to have all traces of the crime removed (to wipe away the blood). On the night of April 20 he reported to the inspector, Mukhanov, upon his return, "everything in order at the station in his charge" (his exact words!)—but he had nothing to do with the murderers, he was only guilty of an insulting act, just insulting behaviour, punishable by detention. Quite naturally, this gentleman, Mr. Panov, innocent of murder, is still in the police service occupying the post of a village police sergeant. Mr. Panov has merely transferred his useful directing activities in "teaching lessons" to the common people from the town to the country. Now, reader, tell us in all conscience, can Sergeant Panov understand the sentence of the court to mean anything else than advice in the future to remove the traces of a crime more thoroughly, to "teach" in such a manner as to leave no trace? You did right in ordering the blood to be wiped from the face of the dying man, but you allowed him to die. That, pal, was careless. In the future be more careful and never forget the first and last commandment of the Russian Derzhimorda[143]: "Beat—but not to death!"

From the ordinary human point of view, the sentence Panov drew was a mockery of justice. It reveals a cringing, servile spirit, an attempt to throw the whole blame upon the minor police officers and to shield their immediate chief with whose knowledge, approval, and participation this brutal crime was committed. From the juridical point of view, the sentence is an example of the casuistry resorted to by bureaucratic judges who are themselves not far re-

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ers of railways, engineers, contractors, etc., who plunder the Treasury of property valued at tens and hundreds of thousands of rubles are punished only on very rare occasions, and at the worst are banished to remote provinces where they may live at ease on their loot (the bank thieves in Western Siberia), and from where it is easy to escape across the frontier (Colonel of Gendarmes Méranville de Saint-Clair).

moved from police sergeants. Speech was given to man to conceal his thoughts, say the diplomats. Our jurists may say that the law is given to distort the concepts of guilt and responsibility. Indeed, what refined juridical art is required to be able to reduce complicity in torture to simple insulting behaviour! Panov was guilty of an offence equal in gravity to that perhaps committed by a factory hand who possibly on the morning of April 20 mischievously struck Vozdukhov's cap off his head! In fact, milder than that: it was not an offence but merely an "infringement." Even participation in a brawl (let alone the brutal assault upon a helpless man), if it results in a fatality, is liable to a severer punishment than that meted out to the police sergeant. Legal chicanery took advantage of the fact that the law provides for various degrees of punishment for inflicting injuries in the exercise of official duties and allows the court the discretion to pronounce sentences ranging from two months' imprisonment to permanent banishment to Siberia, according to the circumstances of the case. Of course, it is quite a rational rule not to bind a judge to strictly formal definitions, but to allow him certain latitude. Our professors of criminal law have often praised Russian legislation for this and have emphasised its liberal character. However, in praising our law, they lose sight of one trifle, namely, that, for rational laws to be applied, it is necessary to have judges who are not reduced to the role of mere officials, that it is necessary to have representatives of the public in the court, and for public opinion to play its part in the examination of cases. Secondly, the assistant public prosecutor came to the aid of the court by *withdrawing* the charge against Panov (and Olkhovin) of torture and cruelty and pleading only for a sentence for insulting behaviour. In his plea, the assistant prosecutor called expert evidence to prove that the blows inflicted by Panov were neither numerous nor painful. As you see, the juridical sophistry is not very ingenious: since Panov did less beating than the others, it *may* be argued that his punches were not *very* painful, and since they were not very painful, it *may* be argued that his offence was not "torture and cruelty"; and since it was not torture and cruelty, then it was merely insulting behaviour. All this works out to

everybody's satisfaction, and Mr. Panov remains in the ranks of the guardians of law and order....*

We have just referred to the participation of representatives of the public in court trials, and to the part that should be played by public opinion. The case in point is an excellent illustration. In the first place, why was this case tried, not by a jury, but by a court of crown judges and representatives of the estates? Because the government of Alexander III, having declared ruthless war upon every public aspiration towards liberty and independence, very soon found that trial by jury was dangerous. The reactionary press declared trial by jury to be "trial by the street," and launched against it a campaign which, be it said in passing, continues to this day. The government adopted a reactionary programme. Having crushed the revolutionary movement of the seventies, it insolently declared to the representatives of the people that it regarded them as the "street," the mob, which must not interfere in the

* In Russia, instead of exposing the outrage in all its horror before the court and the public, they prefer to hush up the case in court and do nothing more than send out circular letters and orders full of pompous but meaningless phrases. For instance, a few days ago the Orel Chief of Police issued an order which, confirming previous orders, instructs the local police inspectors to impress upon subordinates, personally and through their assistants, that they must refrain from roughness and violence in handling drunkards in the streets and when taking them to the police-station to sober up. The order further specifies that police officers must explain to their subordinates that it is the duty of the police to protect drunkards who cannot be left alone without obvious danger to themselves; that subordinate police officers, whom the law has placed in the position of first protectors and guardians of citizens, must, therefore, in taking drunkards into custody, not only refrain from treating them roughly and inhumanly, but must do all they can to protect them until they have become sober. The order warns subordinate police officials that only by such conscientious and lawful exercise of their duties will they earn the confidence and respect of the population, and that if, on the contrary, police officials treat drunkards harshly and cruelly, or resort to violent conduct incompatible with the duty of a police officer, who should serve as a model of respectability and good morals, they will be punished with all the vigour of the law and any subordinate police officer guilty of such conduct will be rigorously prosecuted. A capital idea for a cartoon in a satirical journal—a police sergeant, acquitted of the charge of murder, reading an order that he must serve as a model of respectability and good morals!

work of legislation, let alone interfere in the administration of the state, and which must be driven from the sanctuary where Russian citizens are tried and punished according to the Panov method. In 1887 a law was passed removing crimes committed by and against officials from the jurisdiction of courts sitting with a jury and transferring them to courts of crown judges and representatives of the estates. It is well known that these representatives of the estates, merged into a single collegium with the bureaucratic judges, are mute super-numeraries playing the miserable role of witnesses ready to say yes to everything the officials of the Department of Justice decide. This is one of a long series of laws adopted during the latest reactionary period of Russian history and having one single tendency in common: to re-establish a "sound authority." Under the pressure of circumstances, the government in the latter half of the nineteenth century was compelled to come into contact with the "street"; but the character of the street changed with astonishing rapidity and the ignorant inhabitants gave place to citizens who were beginning to understand their rights and who were capable even of producing the champions of their rights. Realising this, the government drew back in horror, and is now making convulsive efforts to surround itself by a Chinese Wall, to immure itself in a fortress into which no manifestations of independent public action can penetrate.... But I have strayed somewhat from my subject.

Thanks to the reactionary law, the street was deprived of the right to try representatives of the government. Officials have been tried by officials. This has affected, not only the sentence passed by the court, but also the character of the preliminary investigation and the trial. Trial by the street is valuable because it breathes a living spirit into the bureaucratic formalism which pervades our government institutions. The street is interested, not only, and not so much, in the definition of the given offence (insulting behaviour, assault, torture), or in the category of punishment to be imposed; it is interested in exposing thoroughly and bringing to public light the significance and all the social and political threads of the crime, in order to draw lessons in public morals and practical

politics from the trial. The street does not want to see in the court "an official institution," in which functionaries apply to given cases the corresponding articles of the Penal Code, but a public institution which exposes the ulcers of the present system, which provides material for criticising it and, consequently, for improving it. Impelled by its practical knowledge of public affairs and by the growth of political consciousness, the street is discovering the truth for which our official, professorial jurisprudence, weighed down by its scholastic shackles, is groping with such difficulty and timidity—namely, that in the fight against crime the reform of social and political institutions is much more important than the imposition of punishment. For this reason the reactionary publicists and the reactionary government hate, and cannot help hating, trial by the street. For this reason the curtailments put on the competency of jury courts and the restrictions on publicity run like a scarlet thread throughout the whole of the post-Reform history of Russia; indeed, the reactionary character of the "post-Reform" epoch was exposed *immediately* after the law of 1864, reforming our "judicature," came into force.* The absence of "trial by the street" was markedly felt in this particular case. Who in the court that tried this case could have been interested in its social aspect, and who would have sought to bring it out prominently? The public prosecutor? The official who is closely connected with the police, who shares responsibility for the detention of prisoners and the manner in which they are treated, who, in certain cases, is actually the chief of police? We have seen that the assistant prosecutor even withdrew the charge of torture against Panov. The civil plaintiff—in the event that Vozdukhova, the widow of the murdered man and a witness

* In their polemics in the legal press against the reactionaries, the liberal advocates of trial by jury often categorically deny its political significance and endeavour to show that they favour participation of public representatives in the courts for reasons other than political. This may partly be explained by the lack of ability on the part of our jurists to think politically to a logical conclusion, notwithstanding their specialisation in "political" science. But, chiefly, it is to be explained by the necessity to speak in Aesopean language, by the impossibility openly to declare their sympathies for a constitution.

at the trial, had put in a civil claim against the murderers? But how was this simple woman to know that it was permissible to bring a civil claim for damages before a criminal court? But even had she known it, would she have been able to retain a lawyer? And even had she been able to do so, could a lawyer have been found who was willing to call public attention to the state of affairs brought to light by this murder? And even if such a lawyer had been found, would his "civic zeal" have been supported by such "delegates" of the public as the representatives of the social-estates? Picture to yourself a rural district elder—I have in mind a provincial court—embarrassed in his rustic clothes, not knowing what to do with his rough, peasant hands, awkwardly trying to conceal his feet encased in greased top-boots, gazing with awe upon His Excellency, the president of the court, who is seated on the same bench with him. Or imagine a city mayor, a fat merchant, breathing heavily in his unaccustomed livery, with his chain of office round his neck, trying to ape his neighbour, a Marshal of the Nobility, a gentleman in a nobleman's uniform, who looks sleek and well tended, with aristocratic manners. By his side are judges, men who have gone through the hard grind of the school of bureaucracy, genuine functionaries who have grown grey in the service and are filled with a consciousness of the importance of the duty they have to fulfil—to try representatives of the authorities whom the street is not worthy to try. Would not this scene dampen the ardour of the most eloquent lawyer? Would it not remind him of the ancient aphorism: "neither cast ye your pearls before..."?

And so it happened that the case was rushed through at express speed, as if all concerned were eager to get it off their hands as quickly as possible,* as if they feared to rake too thoroughly in the muck; one may get accustomed to living near a cesspool and not notice the foul odours emanating from it, but as soon as an attempt is made to cleanse it,

* No one, however, thought of bringing the case to trial quickly. Despite the fact that the case was remarkably clear and simple, it was not tried until January 23, 1901, although the crime had been committed on April 20, 1899. A *speedy*, just, and merciful trial!

the stench assails the nostrils, not only of the inhabitants of the particular street, but also of those of the neighbouring streets.

Just think of the number of questions that naturally arise and that no one has taken the trouble to clear up! Why did Vozdukhov go to the Governor? The indictment—the document which embodied the effort of the prosecuting authorities to disclose the crime—not only failed to reply to this question, but deliberately obscured it with the statement that Vozdukhov "was detained in a state of intoxication in the courtyard of the Governor's house by policeman Shelemetyev." It even gives ground for the assumption that Vozdukhov was brawling—and where do you think? In the courtyard of the Governor's house! In actuality, Vozdukhov *drove up to the Governor's house in a cab in order to lodge a complaint*—this fact was established. What did he go to complain about? Ptitsyn, the superintendent of the Governor's house, stated that Vozdukhov had complained about the refusal of a steamship booking office to sell him a ticket (?). The witness Mukhanov, formerly inspector of the station in which Vozdukhov was assaulted (and now governor of the provincial prison in Vladimir), stated that he had heard from Vozdukhov's wife that she and her husband had been drinking and that *in Nizhni they had been beaten up in the river police-station and in the Rozhdestvensky police-station*, *and that Vozdukhov had gone to the Governor to complain about this*. Notwithstanding the fact that the witnesses obviously contradicted each other, the court did not make the slightest attempt to clear up the matter. On the contrary, one has every reason to conclude that the court *did not wish* to clear up the matter. Vozdukhov's wife gave evidence at the trial, but no one took the trouble to ask her whether she and her husband had really been assaulted in several Nizhni police-stations, under what circumstances they had been arrested, in what premises they had been assaulted, and by whom, whether her husband had really wished to complain to the Governor, and whether he had mentioned his intention to any one else. Most likely the witness Ptitsyn, an official in the Governor's office, was not inclined to accept complaints from Vozdukhov—who was not drunk? but whom, nevertheless, it was necessary to make

sober!—against the police and ordered the *intoxicated* policeman Shelemetyev to take the complainant to the police-station to be sobered up. But this interesting witness was not cross-examined. The cabby, Krainov, who had driven Vozdukhov to the Governor's house and subsequently to the police-station, was not questioned as to whether Vozdukhov had told him why he was going to the Governor, as to what he had said to Ptitsyn, and whether anybody else had heard the conversation. The court was satisfied merely to hear the brief written affidavit of Krainov (who did not appear in court) which testified that Vozdukhov had not been drunk, but only slightly intoxicated, and the assistant prosecutor had not even taken the trouble to subpoena this important witness. If we bear in mind that Vozdukhov, a sergeant in the army reserve and consequently a man of experience who must have known something about law and order, had said even after the last fatal blows, "I am going to lodge a complaint," it appears more than likely that he went to the Governor to lodge a complaint against the police, that Ptitsyn lied to shield the police and that the servile judges and the servile prosecutor did not wish to bring this delicate story to light.

Further, why was Vozdukhov beaten? Again the indictment presents the case in a manner *most* favourable ... to the accused. The "motive for the torture," it is alleged, was the cutting of Shelemetyev's hand when he pushed Vozdukhov into the soldiers' lock-up. The question arises, why was Vozdukhov, who spoke calmly both with Shelemetyev and with Panov, pushed (assuming that it was really necessary to *push* him!), not into the common cell, but first into the soldiers' lock-up? He had been brought to the station to be sobered up—there were already a number of drunkards in the common cell, and later on Vozdukhov was put into the common cell; why, then, did Shelemetyev, after "introducing" him to Panov, push him into the *soldiers' lock-up*? Evidently for the purpose of beating him. In the common cell there were a number of people, whereas in the soldiers' lock-up Vozdukhov would be alone, and Shelemetyev could call to his aid his comrades and Mr. Panov, who was "in charge" of Police-Station No. 1 at the time. Consequently, the torture was inflicted, not for some chance reason, but

deliberately and with forethought. We can assume one of two things—either that all who are taken to the police-station for sobering up (even when they behave themselves decently and quietly) are first put into the soldiers' lock-up to be "taught a lesson," or that Vozdukhov was put in there *precisely for the reason that he had gone to the Governor to lodge a complaint against the police*. The newspaper reports of the trial are so brief that one hesitates to express oneself categorically in favour of the second hypothesis (which is not at all improbable); but the preliminary investigation and the court examination could have cleared this point up beyond any doubt. It stands to reason that the court did not pay any attention whatever to this. I say "it stands to reason," because the indifference of the court reflects not only bureaucratic formalism, but the simple point of view of the Russian man in the street. "What is there to make a fuss about? A drunken muzhik was killed in a police-station! Worse things than that happen!" And the man in the street begins to relate scores of incomparably more revolting cases, in which the culprits have gone scot-free. The remarks of the man in the street are absolutely just; nevertheless, his attitude is absolutely wrong and by his arguments he merely reveals his extreme, philistine short-sightedness. Are not incomparably more revolting cases of police tyranny possible in our country only because this tyranny is the common, everyday practice in every police-station? And is not our indignation impotent against these exceptional cases because we, with customary indifference, tolerate the "normal" cases; because our indifference remains unperturbed, even when a customary practice like an assault upon a drunken (or allegedly drunken) "muzhik" in a police-station rouses the protest of this very muzhik (who ought to be accustomed to this sort of thing), of this very muzhik, who paid with his life for his most impertinent attempt to submit a humble petition to the Governor?

There is another reason why we must not ignore this all too common case. It has long been held that the preventive significance of punishment is not in its severity, but in its inevitableness. What is important is not that a crime shall be severely punished, but that *not a single*

crime shall pass undiscovered. From this aspect, too, the present case is of interest. Illegal and savage assault is committed in police-stations in the Russian Empire—it may be said without exaggeration—daily and hourly,* and only rare and very exceptional cases are brought up in court. This is not in the least surprising, since the criminals are the very police who in Russia are charged with the duty of disclosing crime. These circumstances compel us to devote all the greater, if unusual, attention to those cases in which the courts are constrained to raise the curtain that conceals such habitual facts.

Note, for example, how the police perpetrate their assault. Five or six of them together set upon their victim with brutal cruelty, many of them are drunk, all are armed with swords. But not one of them ever strikes the victim with his sword. They are men of experience and they know how to beat a man up. A sword blow leaves a mark of guilt, but try and prove that bruises made by fists were in-

* These lines were already written when the press brought another confirmation of the correctness of this assertion. At the other end of Russia, in Odessa—a city enjoying the status of a capital—a magistrate acquitted a certain M. Klinkov who had been charged by Station Sergeant Sadukov with disorderly conduct while under arrest in the police-station. At the trial, the accused and his four witnesses testified to the following: Sadukov arrested M. Klinkov, who was in a state of drunkenness, and took him to the police-station. When he became sober, Klinkov demanded to be released, upon which a policeman grabbed him by the collar and began to punch him. Three other policemen arrived on the scene, and the four of them fell upon him, striking him in the face, on the head, the chest and the sides. Under the rain of blows and covered with blood, Klinkov fell to the floor, whereupon the policemen assaulted him with even greater fury. According to the evidence of Klinkov and his witnesses, this torture was inflicted at the instigation and with the encouragement of Sadukov. As a result of the blows he received, Klinkov lost consciousness. On reviving, he was released from the police-station. Immediately on his release he went to be examined by a physician. The magistrate advised Klinkov to lodge a complaint with the prosecutor against Sadukov and the policemen, to which Klinkov replied that he had already done so and that he would bring twenty witnesses.

One need not be a prophet to foretell that M. Klinkov will fail to get the policemen brought to trial and punished for torture. They did not actually beat him to death; but if, contrary to expectation, they are prosecuted, they are sure to get off lightly.

flicted by the police! "Arrested during a brawl in which he was beaten up,"—and your case isn't worth a straw. Even in the present instance, when the man, as it happened, was beaten to death ("the devil tempted him to die, a hefty muzhik like that! Who would have thought it!"), the prosecution was obliged to bring witnesses to testify that "Vozdukhov was absolutely sound in health before he was taken to the police-station." Apparently, the murderers, who maintained throughout the trial that they had not beaten the man, stated that they had brought him to the station in a battered condition. It is an extremely difficult matter to get witnesses to give evidence in a case like this. By a happy chance, the window between the common cell and the soldiers' lock-up was not completely curtained off. True, instead of glass the panes consisted of sheets of tin with holes punched through, and on the side of the soldiers' lock-up these holes were covered up by a leather curtain. By poking a finger through a hole, one could raise the curtain and see what was going on in the soldiers' lock-up. Only through this circumstance was it possible at the trial to obtain a picture of the scene of the "lesson." But such negligence as improperly curtained windows could exist only in the past century. In the twentieth century, the little window between the common cell and soldiers' lock-up in the Kremlin district Police-Station No. 1 in Nizhni-Novgorod is no doubt blocked up.... And since there are no witnesses, woe betide the poor fellow who finds himself in the soldiers' lock-up!

In no country in the world is there such a multitude of laws as in Russia. We have laws for everything. There are special regulations governing detention in custody, which specifically state that detention is legally permissible only in special premises, subject to special supervision. As you see, the law is observed. In the police-station, there is a special "common cell." But *before* a man is put into the common cell, it is "customary" to "shove" him into the soldiers' lock-up. Although the role of the soldiers' lock-up as a real torture chamber was perfectly clear throughout the trial, the judicial authorities did not even think of paying the matter the slightest attention. Surely, the prosecuting attorney cannot be expected to expose

the excesses of our brutal police and to take measures against them!

We have referred to the question of witnesses in a case of this kind. At best, such witnesses can only be persons in the hands of the police. Only under the most exceptional circumstances would it be possible for an outsider to witness a police "lesson" given in a police-station. But it is possible for the police to influence the witnesses that are in their hands. And this is what happened in the present case. The witness Frolov, who at the time of the murder was in the common cell, stated during the preliminary investigation that Vozdukhov had been assaulted by the policemen and the sergeant; later he withdrew his testimony against Sergeant Panov; at the trial, however, he stated that none of the policemen had struck Vozdukhov, that he had been persuaded to give evidence against the police by Semakhin and Barinov (two other men in the common cell who were the principal witnesses for the prosecution), and that the police had not persuaded or prompted him to say this. The witnesses Fadeyev and Antonova stated that no one had laid a finger on Vozdukhov in the soldiers' lock-up, that everything had been quiet there and no quarrelling had taken place.

As is to be seen, quite the usual thing happened. And the judicial authorities behaved with customary indifference. There is a law that provides severe penalties for perjury. A prosecution instituted against the two perjurers would throw further light on the outrages the police perpetrate against those who have the misfortune to fall into their hands and are almost completely defenceless (hundreds of thousands of the "common" people meet with such misfortune every day). But all that the court is concerned about is applying this or that article of the Penal Code; it is not in the least concerned about that defencelessness. This detail in the trial, like all the others, showed clearly how strong and all-entangling is the net, how persistent the canker, which can only be removed by abolishing the whole system of police tyranny and denial of the people's rights.

About thirty-five years ago, F. M. Reshetnikov, a well-known Russian writer, met with an unpleasant adventure.

One evening he went to the Assembly of Nobles in St. Petersburg under the mistaken impression that a concert was to be given there. The policeman at the door barred his way and shouted at him: "What's the shoving? Who are you?" "A factory hand," roughly replied Reshetnikov, stung to anger by this affront. What followed this reply, as related by Gleb Uspensky, was that Reshetnikov spent the night in the police-station, from which he emerged bruised and battered, bereft of his money and his ring. "I report this matter to Your Excellency," wrote Reshetnikov in a petition to the St. Petersburg Chief of Police. "I seek no compensation. May I only humbly trouble you with the request that the police officers and their subordinates *shall not beat the people*.... As it is, the people have only sufferings in store for them."[144]

The modest request which a Russian writer was bold enough to make to the chief of police of the capital so long ago has not yet been fulfilled and it *cannot be fulfilled* so long as the present political system lasts. At the present time, however, every honest man who is tormented by the contemplation of this brutality and violence turns toward the great new movement among the people that is mustering its forces in order to wipe all brutality from the face of the land of Russia and to achieve mankind's finest ideals. During recent decades, hatred for the police has grown immensely and has become deep-rooted in the hearts of the masses of the common people. The development of urban life, the growth of industry, the spread of literacy, have all served to imbue even the uneducated masses with aspirations for a better life and a consciousness of their human dignity; the police, however, have remained as tyrannical and brutal as ever. To their bestiality we now see added a greater subtlety in the detection and persecution of the new, most dangerous enemy, i.e., everything that brings to the masses of the people a ray of consciousness of their rights and confidence in their strength. Fertilised by this consciousness and this confidence, popular hatred will find vent, not in savage vengeance, but in the struggle for liberty.

II. WHY ACCELERATE THE VICISSITUDE OF THE TIMES?

The Assembly of Nobles of Orel Gubernia has adopted an interesting project, but more interesting is the debate which it occasioned.

The issue is the following. The gubernia Marshal of the Nobility, M. A. Stakhovich, proposed in his report the conclusion of a contract with the Finance Department, under which the Orel nobles would be appointed to the posts of excise-collectors. With the introduction of the liquor monopoly forty collectors are to be appointed to gather the moneys from the government liquor shops. Their remuneration will amount to 2,180 rubles per annum (900 rubles salary, 600 rubles travelling expenses, and 680 rubles for hiring a guard). The nobles thought it would be a good thing to get these posts, and for this purpose it was suggested that they form a guild and enter into a contract with the Treasury. Instead of the required deposit (from 3,000 to 5,000 rubles), they suggested that at first 300 rubles per annum be deducted from the pay of each collector, which sums could serve to establish a nobles' guaranty fund to be deposited with the liquor department.

The proposal—certainly a practical one—proves that our higher estate possesses a highly developed flair for grabbing slices of the state pie wherever possible. But it is precisely this business acumen that seemed to many of the high-born landlords to be excessive, disreputable, and unworthy of nobility. A heated discussion flared up on the question, in the course of which three distinct points of view came to light.

The first is the practical point of view. A man must live, the nobility is in straitened circumstances ... here is an opportunity to earn money ... surely they cannot refuse to help the poor nobles. Besides, the collectors could help to encourage sobriety among the people. The second is the point of view of the romantics. To trade in liquor, to be in a position only slightly above that of a bartender, subordinate to common store managers, "very often persons of the lower orders"!?... and there followed a hot stream of words about the high calling of the nobility. We intend to deal with these speeches, but first let us men-

tion the third point of view—that of the statesmen. On the one hand, there is no denying that the thing seems somewhat discreditable, but, on the other, it must be admitted that it is lucrative. But we can make money and at the same time preserve our virtue. The chief excise officer may even hand out appointments without deposits, and all the forty nobles may obtain posts at the request of the gubernia Marshal of the Nobility without forming a guild or entering into contracts, otherwise "the Minister of Internal Affairs may refuse to endorse the decision in order to safeguard the proper functioning of the existing state system." In all probability, this wise opinion would have prevailed, had not the Marshal of the Nobility made two important statements: first, that the contract had already been submitted to the Council of the Ministry of Finance, which had recognised its feasibility and approved it in principle; and, secondly, that "it was impossible to obtain such posts merely at the request of the gubernia Marshal of the Nobility." The report was approved.

Poor romantics! They suffered defeat. But how eloquently they had pleaded!

"Hitherto the nobility has provided people for leading positions only. The report suggests the formation of some sort of guild. Is this compatible with the past, the present, and the future of the nobility? According to the law, if a bartender embezzles funds, the nobleman will have to step behind the bar. Death is preferable to such a position!"

Good Lord! How noble man is! Death is preferable to selling vodka! To trade in corn is quite a noble occupation, particularly in years of bad harvest, when high profits can be made out of the starvation of the people. A still more noble occupation is usury in grain, the lending of grain to the starving peasants in the winter with the stipulation that they will work in the summer at one-third of the usual wage-rate. In the central black earth zone, in which Orel Gubernia is situated, the landlords have always engaged in this noble form of usury with particular zeal. And in order to draw a distinction between noble and ignoble usury, it is necessary, of course, to proclaim as loudly as possible that the position of a bartender is a degrading occupation for a nobleman.

"We must carefully cherish our calling which is expressed in the celebrated imperial manifesto by the words, unselfishly to serve the people. To serve for selfish motives would contradict this.... A social-estate that has to its credit such services as the valiant martial deeds of its ancestors and that had to bear the brunt of the great reforms of Emperor Alexander II still possesses opportunities for the future fulfilment of its duties to the state."

Yes, unselfish service! The distribution of lands, the granting of inhabited estates, i.e., gifts of thousands of dessiatines of land, together with thousands of serfs; the establishment of a class of big landowners possessing hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of dessiatines and by exploitation reducing millions of peasants to poverty—these are the manifestations of this unselfishness. The reference to the "great" reforms of Alexander II is particularly charming. Take, for example, the emancipation of the peasants. How unselfishly our noble aristocracy fleeced these peasants; compelling them to pay for their own land, at a price three times its real value; robbing them by cutting off various parts of their land; exchanging their own sandy wastes, gullies, and uncultivable land for the peasants' good land;—and now they have the insolence to boast of these exploits!

"There is nothing patriotic in the liquor trade.... Our traditions are not based on rubles, but on service to the state. The nobility must not become stockbrokers."

Sour grapes! The nobility "must not" become stockbrokers because large capital is required on the Stock Exchange, and our quondam slaveowners have squandered their fortunes. In the eyes of the broad masses they have long ago become, not stockbrokers, but the slaves of the Stock Exchange, the slaves of the ruble. And in their pursuit of the ruble, the "highest social-estate" has long been engaged in such highly patriotic occupations as the manufacture of raw brandy, the installation of sugar-refineries and other enterprises, participation in sundry dubious commercial and industrial undertakings, begging at the doors of high Court circles, grand dukes, cabinet ministers, etc., etc., in order to obtain concessions and government guarantees for such enterprises, in order to entreat for doles in the form

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

of privileges for the Nobles' Bank, sugar-export bonuses, slices (thousands of dessiatines in extent!) of Bashkirian or other land, soft, lucrative jobs, etc.

"The ethics of the nobility bear the traces of history, of social position..."—as well as traces of the stable in which the nobles were trained to practise violence and indignities on the muzhiks. The age-long habit of command has bred in the nobles something even more subtle: the ability to clothe their exploiting interests in pompous phrases, calculated to deceive the ignorant "common people." Listen further:

"Why accelerate the vicissitude of the times? It may be a prejudice, but old traditions forbid us to help bring these things upon ourselves...."

These words, uttered by Mr. Naryshkin (one of the members of the council that advocated the state point of view), express a true class sense. Of course, to hesitate to accept the position of a collector (or even of a bartender) is, in these times, mere prejudice. But does not the unparalleled and shameless exploitation of the peasantry by the landlords in our rural districts rest on the prejudices of the benighted masses of the peasantry? Prejudices are dying out anyhow; why then hasten their death by openly bringing together the noble and the bartender, and in this way help the peasant to understand (which he is beginning to do, anyway) the simple truth that the noble landlord is a usurer and robber, a beast of prey, like any village bloodsucker, only immeasurably more powerful because of the lands he owns, his ancient privileges and his close relations with the tsarist government, his habit to command, and his ability to conceal his Judas[145] nature under a doctrine of romanticism and magnanimity?

Yes, Mr. Naryshkin is certainly a counsellor from whose lips political wisdom drops. I am not surprised that the Marshal of the Orel Nobility replied to him in terms so refined that they would do honour to an English lord. He said:

"It would be mere boldness on my part to object to the authorities whom we have heard here, were I not convinced that in arguing against their opinions, I am not arguing against their convictions."

Now, this is true, and, moreover, in a much wider sense than Mr. Stakhovich, who indeed accidentally let the truth

slip, imagined. All the nobles, from the most practical to the most romantic, share the same convictions. All are fully convinced of their "sacred right" to possess the hundreds and thousands of dessiatines of land their ancestors grabbed or had granted to them by land-grabbers, the right to exploit the peasants and play the dominant role in the state, the right to enjoy the biggest (and if the worst comes to the worst, even smaller) slices of the state pie, i.e., the people's money. Their opinions differ only in regard to the expediency of undertaking this or that enterprise, and their discussions of these divergent opinions are as instructive for the proletariat as are all other domestic quarrels in the camp of the exploiters. Such disputes bring out the differences between the common interests of the capitalist or landlord class as a whole, and the interests of individual persons or separate groups. Not infrequently in the course of such disputes, one blabs what one has sought ever so carefully to conceal.

Besides this, however, the Orel episode throws some light upon the character of the notorious liquor monopoly. What benefits our official and semi-official press expected from it! Increased revenues, improved quality, and less drunkenness! But instead of increased revenues, all we actually have so far is an increase in the price of spirits, confusion in the budget, and the impossibility of determining the exact financial results of the whole operation. Instead of improvement in quality, we have deterioration; and the government is hardly likely to impress the public with its reports, displayed in the entire press, of the successful results of the "degustation" of the new "government vodka." Instead of less drunkenness, we have more illicit trading in spirits, augmented police incomes from this trading, the opening of liquor shops over the protests of the population, which is petitioning against their being opened,* and increased drunkenness in the streets.** But

* For example, it was recently reported in the newspapers that as far back as 1899 a number of villages in Archangel Gubernia adopted resolutions against the opening of liquor shops in their localities. The government, which at this very moment is introducing the liquor monopoly into that district, *of course* answered with a refusal, no doubt out of regard for the sobriety of the people!

** This is quite apart from the enormous amount of money the peasant communes have lost as a result of the liquor monopoly. Hith-

above all, what a new and gigantic field is opened for official arbitrariness, tyranny, favour-currying and embezzlement by the creation of this new state enterprise, with a turnover of many millions of rubles, and the creation of a whole army of new officials! It is the invasion of a locust-swarm of officials, boot-licking, intriguing, plundering, wasting seas of ink and reams upon reams of paper. The Orel project is nothing but an attempt to cloak in legal forms the striving to grab the fattest possible slices of the state pie, a desire which is so prevalent in our provinces, and which, in view of the unrestrained power of the officials and the gagging of the people, threatens to intensify the reign of tyranny and plunder. A simple illustration: last autumn the newspapers reported "a building incident in connection with the liquor monopoly." In Moscow, three warehouses are being built for storing vodka to supply the whole of Moscow Gubernia. The government appropriated a sum of 1,637,000 rubles for this purpose. It now appears that "it has been found necessary to make a supplementary appropriation of *two-and-a-half millions*."* Apparently the officials who had charge of this state property pinched a little more than fifty pairs of trousers and a few pairs of boots!

III. OBJECTIVE STATISTICS

Our government is in the habit of accusing its opponents, not only revolutionaries, but also liberals, of being tendentious. Have you ever read the comments of the official press on the liberal (legal, of course) publications? *Vest-*

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erto they obtained a revenue from liquor shops. The Treasury has deprived them of this source of revenue without a kopek compensation! In his interesting book, *Das hungernde Russland* (*Reiseelndrücke, Beobachtungen und Untersuchungen* [*Starving Russia* (Travel Impressions, Observations, and Inquiries).—*Ed.*] by C. Lebmann and Parvus, Stuttgart, Dietz Verlag, 1900), Parvus justly describes this as *robbing the rural commune funds*. He states that according to the calculations of the Samara Gubernia Zemstvo, the losses incurred by the peasant communes in the three years 1895-97 as a result of the introduction of the liquor monopoly amounted to *3,150,000 rubles*!

* Author's italics, see *S. Peterburgskiye Vedomosti* (*St. Petersburg Recorder*), No. 239, September 1, 1900.

nik Finansov,[146] the organ of the Ministry of Finance, would at times publish reviews of the press, and each time the official in charge of this column referred to the comments of the (big) liberal magazines on the budget, on the famine, or on some government measure, he always spoke with indignation of their "tendentiousness" and, by way of contrast, pointed, "objectively," not only to "the seamy side," but to the "gratifying features." This, of course, is only a minor example, but it illustrates the habitual attitude of the government, its habitual tendency to brag of its "objectivity."

We shall endeavour to bring some satisfaction to these strict and impartial judges. We shall endeavour to do this in dealing with statistics. Naturally, we shall not take statistics on this or that set of facts of public life: it is well known that the facts are recorded by biased people and generalised by institutions which are sometimes decidedly "tendentious," like the Zemstvos. No, we shall deal with statistics on ... laws. The most ardent supporter of the government, we imagine, would hardly dare to assert that there is anything more objective and impartial than statistics on laws—a simple calculation of the decisions made by the government, quite apart from any consideration of the divergence between word and deed, between promulgation and execution, etc.

And now, to the matter.

The State Senate publishes, as is known, a *Compendium of the Laws and Edicts of the Government,* a periodical that announces the measures adopted by the government. We shall examine these facts, and note *what* the laws and edicts are about. Precisely: what they are about. We dare not criticise the official edicts; we shall merely compute the number issued in this or that sphere. The January newspapers reprinted from this government publication the content of Nos. 2905 to 2929 of last year and Nos. 1 to 66 of the current year. Thus, in the period from December 29, 1900, to January 12, 1901, the very threshold of the new century, ninety-one laws and edicts were promulgated. The character of these ninety-one laws renders them very convenient for "statistical" analysis. None of them is outstanding; there is nothing that puts everything else in

the shade and lays a special impress upon the present period of domestic administration. All of them are relatively petty and answer to current requirements continuously and regularly arising. We thus see the government in its everyday garb, and this serves as a further guarantee of the objectivity of the "statistics."

Of the ninety-one laws, thirty-four, i.e., more than a third, deal with one and the same subject: extension of the call dates for payment of capital on shares or of payment of purchases of stock in various commercial and industrial joint-stock companies. These laws can be recommended to newspaper readers as a means of refreshing their memory in regard to the list of our industrial enterprises and the names of various firms. The second group of laws is entirely analogous to the first in content. It deals with changes in the articles of association of commercial and industrial companies. These include fifteen acts revising the articles of association of K. and S. Popov Bros., tea dealers; A. Nauman & Co., cardboard and tar-paper manufacturers; I. A. Osipov & Co., tanners, and leather, canvas and linen merchants; etc., etc. To these must be added eleven more acts, of which six were passed to meet certain requirements of trade and industry (the establishment of a public bank and a mutual credit society; the fixing of prices of securities to be taken as deposit for state contracts; rules for the movement of privately-owned cars on the railways; regulations governing brokers on the Borisoglebsk Corn Exchange), while five deal with the appointment of six additional policemen and two mounted police sergeants to four factories and one mine.

Thus, sixty out of ninety-one of the laws, i.e., two-thirds, directly serve the various practical needs of our capitalists and (partly) protect them from the discontent of the workers. The impartial language of figures tells us that our government, judging by the very nature of most of its everyday laws and edicts, is a loyal servant of the capitalists and that, in relation to the capitalist class as a whole, it functions in exactly the same way as, say, the head office of an iron trust, or as does the office of a sugar-refining syndicate in relation to the capitalists in the individual branches of industry. Of course, the fact

that special laws have to be passed in order to introduce some trifling alteration in the articles of association of a company or to extend the call dates for payments on shares simply shows the unwieldiness of our state machinery; only a slight "improvement in the machinery" is necessary for all this to come under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. On the other hand, the unwieldiness of the machine, the excessive centralisation, the necessity for the government itself to poke its nose into everything—this is a feature of the whole of our public life, not merely of the sphere of commerce and industry. Hence, the examination of the number of enacted laws of this or that kind gives us a pretty fair insight into what the government interests itself in, into what it thinks and does.

But the government displays considerably less interest in private associations that do not pursue aims so honourable from the moral point of view, and safe from the political point of view, as profit-making (except that it displays interest in order to hamper, prohibit, suppress, etc.). In the period "under review"—the writer of these lines is in the civil service, and he hopes, therefore, that the reader will forgive his employment of bureaucratic terms—the articles of association of two societies were sanctioned (those of the Society for the Aid to Needy Students in the Vladikavkaz Boys' Gymnasium, and of the Vladikavkaz Society for Educational Excursions and Tours); by imperial grace permission to change the statutes was authorised for three others (the Saving and Mutual Aid Societies of the office employees and workers of the Lyudinovo and Sukreml Works and of the Maltsov Railway, the First Hop-Cultivation Society, and the Philanthropic Society for the Encouragement of Female Labour); fifty-five laws were passed pertaining to commercial and industrial companies; and five, in relation to various other societies. In the sphere of commercial and industrial interests, "we" exert our best efforts for the task and strive to do everything possible to facilitate association between merchants and manufacturers (strive, but do nothing, for the unwieldiness of the machine and the endless red tape considerably restrict the "possibilities" in the police state). In the sphere of non-commercial associations, we stand in principle for homeopathy. Now, hop-growing

societies and societies for the encouragement of female labour are not so bad, but educational excursions.... God knows what may be discussed on these excursions! And will not the constant surveillance of the inspectors be made difficult? Now, you know, one must be careful in handling fire.

Schools. As many as three new schools have been established. And what schools! An elementary school for farmyard workers in the village of Blagodatnoye on the estate of His Imperial Highness, the Grand Duke Pyotr Nikolayevich. That the villages belonging to the Grand Dukes are all paradises* I have long ceased to doubt. But neither do I now doubt that even the highest personages may sincerely and whole-heartedly interest themselves in the education of the "younger brother." Moreover, the rules of the Dergachi Rural Handicraft School, and of the Asanovo Elementary Agricultural School have been confirmed. I regret that I have not a reference book at hand to inform me whether or not some highly-placed personage owns these village paradises, in which popular education—and landlord farming are being cultivated with such zeal. But I console myself with the thought that such inquiries do not enter into the duties of a statistician.

This, then, is the sum total of the laws that express "the government's solicitude for the people." As the reader will observe, I have made the greatest possible allowances in grouping these laws. Why, for example, is the Hop-Cultivation Society not a commercial enterprise? Perhaps because commerce is not the only thing that is discussed at its meetings. Or take the school for farmyard workers. Who can tell whether it is a school or an improved stockyard?

We have still to deal with the last group of laws that shows the government's solicitude for itself. This group consists of three times as many laws as we assigned to the last two categories, twenty-two laws, dealing with administrative reforms, each one more radical than the other—changing the name of the village Platonovskoye to Nikolayevskoye; modifying the articles of association, staffs, rules,

* A play on the name of the village Blagodatnoye which implies an earthly paradise.—*Ed.*

lists, hours for sessions (of certain uyezd conferences), etc.; increasing the salary of midwives attached to army units in the Caucasus military area; determining the sums for shoeing and veterinary treatment of Cossack mounts; changing the by-laws of a private commercial school in Moscow; defining the rules of the scholarship grants endowed by Privy Councillor Daniil Samuilovich Polyakov at the Kozlov Commercial School. I am not sure whether I have classified these laws correctly. Do they really express the government's solicitude for itself, or for commercial and industrial interests? If I have classified them wrongly, I beg the reader's indulgence, since this is the first attempt that has been made to compile statistics on laws. Hitherto no one has attempted to raise this sphere of knowledge to the level of a strict science, not even the professors of Russian state law.

Finally, one legislative act must be treated as a special, independent group, both because of its content and because of its being the first governmental measure in the new century. This is the law concerning the "increase in the area of forests to be devoted to the development and improvement of His Imperial Majesty's hunting." A grand *début* worthy of a great power!

Now, to strike a balance. Statistics would be incomplete without it.

Fifty laws and edicts devoted to various commercial and industrial companies and enterprises; a score of administrative name-changes and reforms; two creations and three reorganisations of private societies; three schools for the training of landlords' employees; six policemen and two mounted sergeants appointed to factories. Can there be any doubt whatever that such richly varied legislative and administrative activity will guarantee our country rapid and undeviating progress in the twentieth century?

THE DRAFTING OF 183 STUDENTS INTO THE ARMY*

The newspapers of January 11 published the official announcement of the Ministry of Education on the drafting into the army of 183 students of Kiev University as a punishment for "riotous assembly." The Provisional Regulations of July 29, 1899—this menace to the student world and to society—are being put into execution less than eighteen months after their promulgation, and the government seems to hasten to justify itself for applying a measure of unexampled severity by publishing a ponderous indictment in which the misdeeds of the students are painted in the blackest possible colours.

Each misdeed is more ghastly than the preceding one! In the summer a general students' congress was convened in Odessa to discuss a plan to organise all Russian students for the purpose of giving expression to protests against various aspects of academic, public, and political life. As a punishment for these criminal political designs all the student delegates were arrested and deprived of their documents. But the unrest does not subside—it grows and persists in breaking out in *many* higher educational institutions. The students desire to discuss and conduct their common affairs freely and independently. Their authorities—with the soulless formalism for which Russian officials have always been noted—retaliate with petty vexations, rouse the discontent of the students to the highest

* We were going to press when the official announcement was published.

pitch, and automatically stimulate the thoughts of the youths who have not yet become submerged in the morass of bourgeois stagnation to protest against the whole system of police and official tyranny.

The Kiev students demand the dismissal of a professor who took the place of a colleague that had left. The administration resists, provokes students to "assemblies and demonstrations" and—yields. The students call a meeting to discuss what could make possible so horrendous a case—two "white linings"[147] (according to reports) raped a young girl. The administration sentences the "ringleaders" to solitary confinement in the students' detention cell. These refuse to submit. They are expelled. A crowd of students demonstratively accompany the expelled students to the railway station. A new meeting is called; the students remain until evening and refuse to disperse so long as the rector does not show up. The Vice-Governor and Chief of Gendarmerie arrive on the scene at the head of a detachment of troops, who surround the University and occupy the main hall. The rector is called. The students demand—a constitution, perhaps? No. They demand that the punishment of solitary confinement should not be carried out and that the expelled students should be reinstated. The participants at the meeting have their names taken and are allowed to go home.

Ponder over this astonishing lack of proportion between the modesty and innocuousness of the demands put forward by the students and the panicky dismay of the government, which behaves as if the axe were already being laid to the props of its power. Nothing gives our "omnipotent" government away so much as this display of consternation. By this it proves more convincingly than does any "criminal manifesto" to all who have eyes to see and ears to hear that it realises the complete instability of its position, and that it relies only on the bayonet and the knout to save it from the indignation of the people. Decades of experience have taught the government that it is surrounded by inflammable material and that a mere spark, a mere protest against the students' detention cell, may start a conflagration. This being the case, it is clear that the punishment had to be an exemplary one: Draft hundreds of students into the army! "Put

the drill sergeant in place of Voltaire!"[148]—the formula has not become obsolete; on the contrary, the twentieth century is destined to see its real application.

This new punitive measure, new in its attempt to revive that which has long gone out of fashion, provokes many thoughts and comparisons. Some three generations ago, in the reign of Nicholas I, drafting into the army was a natural punishment entirely in keeping with the whole system of Russian serf-owning society. Young nobles were sent to the army and compelled to serve as private soldiers, losing the privileges of their estate until they earned officer's rank. Peasants were also drafted into the army, and it meant a long term of penal servitude, where "Green Street"[149] with its inhuman torment awaited them. It is now more than a quarter of a century since "universal" military service was introduced, which at the time was acclaimed as a great democratic reform. Real universal military service that is not merely on paper is undoubtedly a democratic reform; by abolishing the social-estate system it would make all citizens equal. But if such were the case, could drafting into the army be employed as a punishment? When the government converts military service into a form of punishment, does it not thereby prove that we are much nearer to the old recruiting system than to *universal* military service? The Provisional Regulations of 1899 tear off the pharisaical mask and expose the real Asiatic nature even of those of our institutions which most resemble European institutions. In reality, we have not and never had universal military service, because the privileges enjoyed by birth and wealth create innumerable exceptions. In reality, we have not and never had anything resembling equality of citizens in military service. On the contrary, the barracks are completely saturated with the spirit of most revolting absence of rights. The soldier from the working class or the peasantry is completely defenceless; his human dignity is trodden underfoot, he is robbed, he is beaten, beaten, and again beaten—such is his constant fare. Those with influential connections and money enjoy privileges and exemptions. It is not surprising, therefore, that drafting into this school of tyranny and violence can be a punishment, even a very severe punishment, amounting almost to deprivation of rights.

The government thinks it will teach the "rebels" discipline in this school. But is it not mistaken in its calculations? Will not this school of Russian military service become the military school of the revolution? Not all the students, of course, possess the stamina to go through the whole course of training in this school. Some will break down under the heavy burden, fall in combat with the military authorities; others—the feeble and flabby—will be cowed into submission by the barracks. But there will be those whom it will harden, whose outlook will be broadened, who will be compelled to ponder and profoundly sense their aspirations towards liberty. They will experience the whole weight of tyranny and oppression on their own backs when their human dignity will be at the mercy of a drill sergeant who very frequently takes deliberate delight in tormenting the "educated." They will see with their own eyes what the position of the common people is, their hearts will be rent by the scenes of tyranny and violence they will be compelled to witness every day, and they will understand that the injustices and petty tyrannies from which the students suffer are mere drops in the ocean of oppression the people are forced to suffer. Those who will understand this will, on leaving military service, take a Hannibal's vow[150] to fight with the vanguard of the people for the emancipation of the entire people from despotism.

The humiliating character of this new punishment is no less outrageous than its cruelty. In declaring the students who protested against lawlessness to be mere rowdies—even as it declared the exiled striking workers to be persons of depraved demeanour—the government has thrown down a challenge to all who still possess a sense of decency. Read the government communication. It bristles with such words as disorder, brawling, outrage, shamelessness, licence. On the one hand, it speaks of criminal political aims and the desire for political protest; and on the other, it slanders the students as mere rowdies who must be disciplined. This is a slap in the face of Russian public opinion, whose sympathy for the students is very well known to the government. The only appropriate reply the students can make is to carry out the threat of the Kiev students, to organise a determined general student strike in all higher educational

institutions in support of the demand for the repeal of the Provisional Regulations of July 29, 1899.

But it is not the students alone who must reply to the government. Through the government's own conduct the incident has become something much greater than a mere student affair. The government turns to public opinion as though to boast of the severity of the punishment it inflicts, as though to mock at all aspirations towards liberty. All conscious elements among all strata of the people must take up this challenge, if they do not desire to fall to the level of dumb slaves bearing their insults in silence. At the head of these conscious elements stand the advanced workers and the Social-Democratic organisations inseparably linked with them. The working class constantly suffers immeasurably greater injuries and insults from the police lawlessness with which the students have now come into such sharp conflict. The working class has already begun the struggle for its emancipation. It must remember that this great struggle imposes great obligations upon it, that it cannot emancipate itself without emancipating the whole people from despotism, that it is its duty first and foremost to respond to every political protest and render every support to that protest. The best representatives of our educated classes have proved—and sealed the proof with the blood of thousands of revolutionaries tortured to death by the government—their ability and readiness to shake from their feet the dust of bourgeois society and join the ranks of the socialists. The worker who can look on indifferently while the government sends troops against the student youth is unworthy of the name of socialist. The students came to the assistance of the workers—the workers must come to the aid of the students. The government wishes to deceive the people when it declares that an attempt at political protest is mere brawling. The workers must publicly declare and explain to the broad masses that this is a lie; that the real hotbed of violence, outrage, and licence is the autocratic Russian Government, the tyranny of the police and the officials.

The manner in which this protest is to be organised must be decided by the local Social-Democratic organisations and workers' groups. The most practical forms of protest

are the distribution, scattering, and posting up of leaflets, and the organisation of meetings to which as far as possible all classes of society should be invited. It would be desirable, however, where strong and well-established organisations exist, to attempt a broader and more open protest by means of a public demonstration. The demonstration organised last December 1, outside the premises of the newspaper *Yuzhny Krai*[151] in Kharkov, may serve as a good example of such a protest. The jubilee of that filthy sheet, which baits everything that aspires to light and freedom and glorifies every bestiality of our government, was being celebrated at the time. The large crowd assembled in front of *Yuzhny Krai*, solemnly tore up copies of the paper, tied them to the tails of horses, wrapped them round dogs, threw stones and stink-bombs containing sulphuretted hydrogen at the windows, and shouted: "Down with the corrupt press!" Such celebrations are well deserved, not only by the corrupt newspapers, but by all our government offices. If they but rarely celebrate anniversaries of official benevolence, they constantly deserve the celebration of the people's retribution. Every manifestation of governmental tyranny and violence is a legitimate motive for such a demonstration. The people must not let the government's announcement of its punishment of the students go unanswered!

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THE WORKERS' PARTY AND THE PEASANTRY[152]

Forty years have passed since the peasants were emancipated. It is quite natural that the public should celebrate with particular enthusiasm February 19, the anniversary of the fall of old feudal Russia and the beginning of an epoch which promised the people liberty and prosperity. But we must not forget that besides genuine loathing of serfdom and all its manifestations, there is also much unctuousness in the laudatory orations delivered on the occasion. The now fashionable estimation of the "great" Reform as "the emancipation of the peasantry accompanied by a grant of land *with the aid* of state compensation" is utterly hypocritical and false. Actually, the peasants were emancipated *from* the land, inasmuch as the plots they had tilled for centuries were ruthlessly cut down and hundreds of thousands of peasants were deprived of all their land and settled on a quarter or beggar's allotment.[153] In point of fact, the peasants were doubly robbed: not only were their plots of land cut down, but they had to pay "redemption money" for the land left to them, and which had always been in their possession; the redemption price, moreover, was far above the actual value of the land. Ten years after the emancipation of the peasantry the landlords themselves admitted to government officials investigating the state of agriculture that the peasants had been made to pay, not only for their land, but for their personal liberty. Yet, although the peasants had to pay redemption money for their liberation, they were not granted real freedom; for twenty years they remained "temporarily bound"[154]; they were left—and have remained to this day—the lowest social-estate, subject to flogging;

liable to special taxes; bereft of the right freely to leave the semi-feudal commune, freely to dispose of their own land, or freely to settle in any part of the country. Our peasant Reform, far from manifesting magnanimity of the government, on the contrary, serves as a great historical example of the extent to which the autocratic government befouls everything it touches. Under pressure of military defeat, appalling financial difficulties, and menacing discontent among the peasantry, the government was actually *compelled* to liberate the peasants. The tsar himself admitted that the peasants had to be emancipated from above, lest they emancipate themselves from below. But in embarking on emancipation, the government did everything possible and impossible to satisfy the greed of the "injured" serf-owners; it did not even stop at the base device of reshuffling the men who were to carry out the Reform, although the men selected had come from among the nobility itself! The first body of mediators was dissolved and replaced by men incapable of refusing to help the serf-owners cheat the peasantry in the very process of demarcating the land. Nor could the great Reform be carried out without resort to military punitive action and the shooting-down of peasants who refused to accept the title-deeds to the land.[155] It is not surprising, therefore, that the best men of the time, muzzled by the censors, met this great Reform with the silence of condemnation.

The peasant, "emancipated" from corvée service, emerged from the hands of the reformers crushed, plundered, degraded, tied to his allotment, so much so that he had no alternative but "voluntarily" to accept corvée services. And so he began to cultivate the land of his former master, "renting" from him the very land that had been cut off from his own allotment, hiring himself out in the winter for summer work in return for the corn he had to borrow from the landlord to feed his hungry family. The "free labour," for which the manifesto drawn up by a jesuitical priest called upon the peasantry to ask the "blessing of God," turned out to be nothing more nor less than labour-service and bondage.

To oppression by the landlords, which was preserved thanks to the magnanimity of the officials who introduced

and carried out the Reform, was added oppression by capital. The power of money, which crushed even the French peasant, emancipated from the power of the feudal landlords, not by a miserable, half-hearted reform, but by a mighty popular revolution—this power of money bore down with all its weight upon our semi-serf muzhik. He had to obtain money at all costs—in order to pay the taxes which had increased as a result of the beneficent Reform, to rent land, to buy the few miserable articles of factory-made goods which began to squeeze out the home manufactures of the peasant, to buy corn, etc. The power of money not only crushed the peasantry, but split it up. An enormous number of peasants were steadily ruined and turned into proletarians; from the minority arose a small group of grasping kulaks and enterprising muzhiks who laid hands upon the peasant farms and the peasants' lands, and who formed the kernel of the rising rural bourgeoisie. The forty years since the Reform have been marked by this constant process of "de-peasantising" the peasants, a process of slow and painful extinction. The peasant was reduced to beggary. He lived together with his cattle, was clothed in rags, and fared on weeds; he fled from his allotment, if he had anywhere to go, and even *paid* to be relieved of it, if he could induce anyone to take over a plot of land, the payments on which exceeded the income it yielded. The peasants were in a state of chronic starvation, and they died by the tens of thousands from famine and epidemics in bad harvest years, which recurred with increasing frequency.

This is the state of our countryside even at the present time. One might ask: What is the way out, by what means can the lot of the peasantry be improved? The small peasantry can free itself from the yoke of capital only by associating itself with the working-class movement, by helping the workers in their struggle for the socialist system, for transforming the land, as well as the other means of production (factories, works, machines, etc.), into social property. Trying to save the peasantry by protecting small-scale farming and small holdings from the onslaught of capitalism would be a useless retarding of social development; it would mean deceiving the peasantry with illusions of the possibility of prosperity even under capitalism,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

it would mean disuniting the labouring classes and creating a privileged position for the minority at the expense of the majority. That is why Social-Democrats will always struggle against senseless and vicious institutions such as that which forbids the peasant to dispose of his land, such as collective liability, or the system of prohibiting the peasants from freely leaving the village commune or freely accepting into it persons belonging to any social-estate. But, as we have seen, our peasants are suffering not only and not so much from oppression by capital as from oppression by the landlords and the survivals of serfdom. Ruthless struggle against these shackles, which immeasurably worsen the condition of the peasantry and tie it hand and foot, is not only possible but even necessary in the interest of the country's social development in general; for the hopeless poverty, ignorance, lack of rights, and degradation, from which the peasants suffer, lay an imprint of Asiatic backwardness upon the entire social system of our country. Social-Democracy would not be doing its duty if it did not render every assistance to this struggle. This assistance should take the form, briefly put, of *carrying the class struggle into the countryside*.

We have seen that in the modern Russian village two kinds of class antagonism exist side by side: first, the antagonism between the agricultural workers and the proprietors, and, secondly, the antagonism between the peasantry as a whole and the landlord class as a whole. The first antagonism is developing and becoming more acute, the second is gradually diminishing. The first is still wholly in the future; the second to a considerable degree already belongs to the past. And yet, despite this, it is the second antagonism that has the most vital and most practical significance for Russian Social-Democrats at the present time. It goes without saying it is an axiom for every Social-Democrat, that we must utilise all the opportunities presenting themselves to us to develop the class-consciousness of the agricultural wage-workers, that we must pay attention to the migration of urban workers to the countryside (e.g., mechanics employed on steam threshing-machines, etc.) and to the markets where agricultural labourers are hired.

But our rural labourers are still too closely connected with the peasantry, they are still too heavily burdened with the misfortunes of the peasantry as a whole to enable the movement of the rural workers to assume national significance, either now or in the immediate future. On the other hand, the question of sweeping away the survivals of serfdom, of driving the spirit of social-estate inequality and degradation of tens of millions of the "common people" out of the whole of the Russian state system is already a matter of national significance, and the Party which claims to be the vanguard in the fight for freedom cannot ignore it.

The deplorable condition of the peasantry has now become (in a more or less general form) almost universally recognised. The phrase about "the defects" of the Reform of 1861 and the need for state aid has become a current truism. It is our duty to point out that peasant distress arises precisely from the class oppression of the peasantry; that the government is the loyal champion of the oppressing classes; and that those who sincerely and seriously desire a radical improvement in the condition of the peasantry must seek, not aid from the government, but deliverance from its oppression and the achievement of political liberty. There is talk of the redemption payments being excessively high, and of benevolent measures on the part of the government to reduce them and extend the dates of payment. Our reply to this is: all payment of redemption money is nothing more nor less, than robbery of the peasantry by the landlords and the government, screened by legal forms and bureaucratic phrases; it is nothing more nor less than tribute paid to the serf-owners for emancipating their slaves. We will put forward the demand for the immediate and complete abolition of redemption payments and quit-rents, and the demand for the return to the people of the hundreds of millions which the tsarist government has extorted from them in the course of the years to satisfy the greed of the slaveowners. There is talk of the peasants not having sufficient land, of the need for state aid to provide them with more land. Our reply to this is: it is precisely *because of* state aid (aid to the landlords, of course) that the peasants in such an enormous number of cases were deprived of land they vitally needed. We put forward the demand for restitution to the

peasants of the land of which they have been deprived, a condition that still binds them to forced labour, to the rendering of corvée service, i.e., that virtually keeps them in a state of serfdom. We will put forward the demand for the establishment of peasant committees to remove the crying injustices perpetrated against the emancipated slaves by the Committees of Nobles set up by the tsarist government. We will demand the establishment of courts empowered to reduce the excessively high payment for land extorted from the peasants by the landlords who take advantage of their hopeless position, courts in which the peasants could prosecute for usury all who take advantage of their extreme need to impose shackling agreements upon them. We will utilise every opportunity to explain to the peasants that the people who talk to them about the tutelage or aid of the present state are either fools or charlatans, and are their worst enemies; that what the peasants stand most in need of is relief from the monstrous oppression of the bureaucratic power, recognition of their complete and absolute equality in all respects with all other social-estates, complete freedom of movement from place to place, freedom to dispose of their lands, and freedom to manage their own communal affairs and dispose of the communal revenues. The most common facts in the life of any Russian village provide a thousand issues for agitation in behalf of the above demands. This agitation must be based upon the local, concrete, and most pressing needs of the peasantry; yet it must not be confined to these needs, but must be steadily directed towards widening the outlook of the peasants, towards developing their political consciousness. The peasants must be brought to understand the special positions occupied in the state by the landlords and the peasants respectively, and they must be taught that the only way to free the countryside from tyrannical oppression is to convene an assembly of representatives of the people and to overthrow the arbitrary rule of the officials. It is absurd to assert that the demand for political liberty would not be understood by the workers: not only the workers who have engaged the factory owners and the police in direct battle for years and who constantly see their best fighters subjected to arbitrary arrests and persecution—

not only these workers, who are already imbued with socialism, but every sensible peasant who thinks at all about the things he sees going on around him will understand what the workers are fighting for, will understand the significance of a Zemsky Sobor which will emancipate the whole country from the unlimited power of the hated officials. Agitation on the basis of the direct and most urgent needs of the peasants will fulfil its purpose—i.e., carry the class struggle into the countryside—only when it succeeds in combining every exposure of some "economic" evil with definite political demands.

But the question arises whether the Social-Democratic Labour Party can include in its programme demands like those referred to above. Can it undertake to carry on agitation among the peasantry? Will it not lead to the scattering and diversion of our revolutionary forces, not very numerous as it is, from the principal and only reliable channel of the movement?

Such objections are based on a misunderstanding. We must definitely include in our programme demands for the emancipation of our countryside from all the survivals of slavery, demands capable of rousing the best section of the peasantry, if not to engage in independent political action, then at all events consciously to support the working-class struggle for emancipation. We should be making a mistake if we defended measures that would have the effect of retarding social development or of artificially shielding the small peasantry against the growth of capitalism, against the development of large-scale production; but we should be committing a much more disastrous mistake if we failed to utilise the working-class movement for the purpose of spreading among the peasantry the democratic demands of which the Reform of February 19, 1861, fell short because of its distortion by the landlords and the officials. Our Party must include such demands in its programme if it is to take the lead of the whole people in the struggle against the autocracy.*

* We have drafted a Social-Democratic programme which includes the above-mentioned demands. We hope—after this draft has been discussed and amended with the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group—to publish it as the draft programme of our Party in one of our forthcoming issues.

But the inclusion of these points does not mean that we would call active revolutionary forces from the towns to the villages. Such a thing is out of the question. There can be no doubt that all the militant elements of the Party must concentrate on work in the towns and industrial centres; that only the industrial proletariat is capable of conducting a steadfast and mass struggle against the autocracy, of employing such methods of struggle as organising public demonstrations, or of issuing a *popular* political newspaper regularly and circulating it widely. We must include peasant demands in our programme, not in order to call convinced Social-Democrats from the towns to the countryside, not in order to chain them to the village, but to guide the activities of those forces that *cannot* find an outlet anywhere except in the rural localities and to utilise for the cause of democracy, for the political struggle for freedom, the ties which, owing to the force of circumstances, a good many faithful Social-Democratic intellectuals and workers have with the countryside—ties that are necessarily increasing and growing stronger with the growth of the movement. We have long passed the stage when we were a small detachment of volunteers, when the reserves of Social-Democratic forces were limited to circles of young people who all "went to the workers." Our movement now has a whole army at its command, an army of workers, engaged in the struggle for socialism and freedom—an army of intellectuals who have been taking part in the movement and who can now be found over the whole length and breadth of Russia—an army of sympathisers whose eyes are turned with faith and hope towards the working-class movement and who are prepared to render it a thousand services. We are confronted with the great task of organising all these armies in such a manner as will enable us, not only to organise transient outbreaks, not only to strike casual and sporadic (and therefore not dangerous) blows at the enemy, but to pursue the enemy steadily and persistently, in a determined struggle all along the line, to harass the autocratic government wherever it sows oppression and gathers a harvest of hatred. Can this aim be achieved without sowing the seeds of the class struggle and political consciousness among the many millions of the peasantry? Let no one say it is impossible

to sow these seeds! It is not only possible, it is already being done in a thousand ways that escape our attention and influence. This process will evolve much more widely and rapidly when we issue a slogan that will bring our influence to bear and when we unfurl the banner of the emancipation of the Russian peasantry from all the survivals of shameful serfdom. Country people coming to the towns even today regard with curiosity and interest the workers' struggle, incomprehensible to them, and carry news of it to the remotest parts of the land. We can and must bring about a situation in which the curiosity of the bystanders is replaced, if not by full understanding, then at least by a vague consciousness that the workers are struggling for the interests of the whole people, by a growing sympathy for their struggle. And when that has been done, the day of the victory of the revolutionary workers' party over the police government will come with a rapidity exceeding our own anticipation.

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NOTES

[1] The article, "*On the Question of Our Factory Statistics* (*Professor Karyshev's New Statistical Exploits*)," was written in August 1898 and published in the collection *Economic Studies and Essays* that appeared early in October 1898. Lenin made extensive use of the material and the conclusions of this article for his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Chapter V, "The First Stages of Capitalism in Industry"; Chapter VI, "Capitalist Manufacture and Capitalist Domestic Industry"; and Chapter VII, "The Development of Large-Scale Machine Industry," Section II, "Our Factory Statistics"). p. 13

[2] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards, it expressed the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia. Among its contributors in the 1880s and 1890s were the democratic writers V. G. Korolenko, M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin, and G. I. Uspensky. It also published items written by liberal Narodniks. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party. Lenin said that *Russkiye Vedomosti* was a peculiar combination of "Right-wing Cadetism and a strain of Narodism" (see present edition, Vol. 19, "Frank Speeches of a Liberal"). In 1918 the publication was closed down together with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 17

[3] *Yuridichesky Vestnik* (*The Legal Messenger*)—a monthly magazine, bourgeois-liberal in trend, published in Moscow from 1867 to 1892. p. 24

[4] *Mir Bozhy* (*The Wide World*; literally, *God's World*)—a monthly literary and popular-scientific magazine, liberal in trend, it was published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1906. In 1898 the magazine carried Lenin's review of A. Bogdanov's *A Short Course of Economic Science* (see p. 46 of this volume). From 1906 to 1918 the magazine appeared under the title *Sovremenny Mir* (*Contemporary World*). p. 27

[5] The reference is to Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see present edition, Vol. 3). p. 28

[6] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864.

The powers of the Zemstvos were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the provincial governors and by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which could overrule any decisions disapproved by the government. p. 36

[7] The results of the first general census of the population of the Russian Empire, taken on January 28 (February 9), 1897, were published as a series between 1897 and 1905; in the second edition of his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* Lenin made use of them, correcting the data on the population of a number of places. p. 41

[8] *Narodism*—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement; it began to manifest itself in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century and comprised mainly progressive intellectuals from the lower estates. With the objective of rousing the peasantry to struggle against absolutism, the revolutionary youth "went among the people," to the village, gaining there, however, no support. The Narodniks held to the view that capitalism in Russia was a fortuitous phenomenon with no prospect of development, and that for this reason there would be no growth and development of a Russian proletariat. The Narodniks considered the peasantry to be the main revolutionary force and regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. The Narodniks proceeded from an erroneous view of the role of the class struggle in historical development, maintaining that history is made by heroes, by outstanding personalities, who are followed passively by the popular masses. p. 44

[9] *Katheder-reformers* or *Katheder-Socialists*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois political economy in the 1870s and 1880s who under the guise of socialism, advocated bourgeois-liberal reformism from university chairs (*Katheder* in German). The fear aroused among the exploiting classes by the spread of Marxism and the growth of the working-class movement, as well as the efforts of bourgeois ideologists to find fresh means of keeping the working people in subjugation, brought *Katheder*-Socialism into being.

The *Katheder*-Socialists, among whom were Adolf Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, Lorenz Brentano, and Werner Sombart, asserted that the bourgeois state is above classes, that it can reconcile mutually hostile classes, and that it can gradually introduce "socialism" without affecting the interests of the capitalists, while giving every possible consideration to the demands of the working people. They suggested the legalisation of police-regulated wage-labour and the revival of the medieval guilds. Marx and Engels exposed *Katheder*-Socialism, showing how essentially reactionary it was. Lenin called the *Katheder*-Socialists the bed bugs of "police-bourgeois university science" who hated Marx's revolution-

ary teachings. In Russia the views of the *Katheder*-Socialists were disseminated by the "legal Marxists." p. 49

[10] Lenin refers to the liberal Narodniks headed by N. M. Mikhailovsky; he criticised the views of the "school" in his *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (see present edition, Vol. 1). p. 49

[11] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly literary and political magazine published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918; until 1905 it was liberal Narodnik in its views, the editor from 1880 to 1885 was V. M. Lavrov. During the struggle between the Marxists and the liberal Narodniks in the nineties the magazine occasionally carried articles by Marxists. In this period *Russkaya Mysl* published the democratic writers D. N. Mamin-Sibiryak, G. I. Uspensky, V. G. Korolenko, A. M. Gorky, A. P. Chekhov, and others. After the Revolution of 1905 it became the organ of the counter-revolutionary liberals and was edited by P. B. Struve. It was an advocate of nationalism, reaction, and clericalism, and it defended landlordism. Lenin termed the journal "Black-Hundred Thought" (see present edition, Vol. 13, "Police-Patriotic Demonstration to Order"). p. 49

[12] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 709-10. p. 52

[13] *Coloni*—tenant farmers renting small parcels of land from big landowners in the Roman Empire. The *coloni* paid in cash or kind for the right to use the land. The *coloni* later became bound serfs by virtue of their indebtedness to the landowners. p. 53

[14] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 763-93. p. 53

[15] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 470 p. 57

[16] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 299-300. p. 57

[17] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 239-40. p. 58

[18] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 299-300. p. 59

[19] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 244. p. 59

[20] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 472-73. p. 59

[21] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 316. p. 60

[22] *Novoye Slovo* (*New Word*)—a monthly scientific, literary, and political magazine, published in St. Petersburg from 1894 by liberal Narodniks. Early in 1897 it was taken over by the "legal Marxists" (P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, and others). *Novoye Slovo* published two of Lenin's articles when he was in exile in Siberia—"A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" and "About a Certain Newspaper Article." The magazine also

presented writings by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, L. Martov, A. M. Gorky, and others. It was closed down by the tsarist authorities in December 1897. p. 60

[23] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 362-89. p. 61

[24] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 17. p. 64

[25] *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (*Science Review*)—a scientific magazine issued in St. Petersburg from 1894 to 1903 (when it became a literary magazine). It published Lenin's three articles: "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory" and "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" (see present volume, pp. 55-64, 74-93); and "Uncritical Criticism" (see present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 609-32). p. 64

[26] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 708-10. p. 66

[27] *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*)—a monthly literary and political magazine that was published in St. Petersburg during the first months of 1899 by "legal Marxists"; its editors were P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, and others. It published articles by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, and others. The magazine was closed down by the tsarist authorities in June 1899. p. 66

[28] *The village* (*land*) *commune* (Russ. *obshchina* or *mir*) was the communal form of peasant use of land characterised by compulsory crop rotation and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective liability, the periodical redistribution of the land without the right to refuse the allotment, and prohibition of purchase or sale of the allotted land.

The Russian village commune dates back to ancient times and in the course of its historical development it gradually became one of the mainstays of feudalism in Russia. The landlords and the tsarist government used the village commune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze land redemption payments and taxes out of the people. Lenin pointed out that the village commune "does not save the peasant from turning into a proletarian; actually it serves as a medieval barrier dividing the peasants who are as if chained to small associations and- to categories that have lost all "reason for existence" (see "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century," present edition, Vol. 15).

The problem of the village commune aroused heated debates and brought an extensive economic literature into existence. Particularly great interest in the village commune was displayed by the Narodniks, who saw in it the guarantee of Russia's evolution to socialism by a special path. By tendentiously gathering their material, falsifying facts, and employing so-called "average figures," the Narodniks sought to prove that the commune peasantry in Russia possessed a special sort of "steadfastness," that the village commune protected the peasants against the penetration of capitalist relations into their lives and "saved" them from ruin and class differentiation. As early as the 1880s, G. V. Plekhanov showed

that the Narodnik illusions about "commune socialism" were unfounded and in the 1890s Lenin completely refuted the Narodnik theories. Lenin made use of a tremendous amount of statistical material and countless facts to show how capitalist relations were developing in the Russian village and how capital, by penetrating into the patriarchal village commune, was splitting the peasantry into two antagonistic classes, the kulaks and the poor peasants.

In 1906 the tsarist minister Stolypin issued a law favouring the kulaks which allowed peasants to leave the commune and sell their allotments. This law marked the beginning of the official abolition of the village commune system and intensified the differentiation of the peasantry. In the nine years following the adoption of the law, over two million peasant families withdrew from the communes. p. 67

[29] *Allotment land*—land left for the use of the peasants after the abolition of serfdom in 1861. The allotted land was not permitted to be sold by the peasants. It was held by the village commune and was periodically redistributed among the peasants. p. 67

[30] *Collective liability* was a compulsory measure making the peasants of each village commune collectively liable for timely and full payments and for the fulfilment of all sorts of services to the state and the landlords (payment of taxes and land redemption instalments, provision of recruits for the army, etc.). This form of bondage was retained after serfdom had been abolished and remained in force until 1906. p. 67

[31] *Winter hiring*—the hiring of peasants for summer work by landlords and kulaks in the winter, when the peasants were particularly in need of cash and were willing to agree to extortionate terms. p. 68

[32] *Physiocrats*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois classical political economy in the fifties and sixties of the eighteenth century when the French Revolution was being prepared ideologically. The school was founded by F. Quesnay. The physiocrats formula for economic policy was "*laissez faire*, *laissez passer*," which aimed at providing the most favourable conditions for developing bourgeois relations. The physiocrats proclaimed the principle of the unlimited rule of private property; they rejected protectionism, struggled against the limitations of the guilds, and demanded free trade and free competition.

The physiocrats transferred the investigation of the sources of wealth and the surplus-product from the sphere of circulation to that of production, but confined it to agricultural production. They were the first to attempt a study of the laws of the reproduction and distribution of the aggregate social product. Quesnay's *Tableau économique* was an attempt to depict the capitalist production process as a whole. The physiocrats, however, did not understand the nature of value and did not realise that surplus-

value is congealed surplus-labour but regarded it as a peculiar gift of nature ("the net product"). p. 75

[33] Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*. Lenin refers to the chapter "From the *Critical History*" (Part II, Chapter X). p. 75

[34] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 591. p. 75

[35] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 359-60. p. 75

[36] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 360-89. p. 76

[37] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 389. p. 77

[38] *Volume IV of Capital*—the designation given by Lenin, in accordance with the view expressed by Engels, to Marx's *Theories of Surplus-Value*, written in the years 1862-63. In the preface to Volume II of *Capital*, Engels wrote: "After eliminating the numerous passages covered by Books II and III, I intend to publish the critical part of this manuscript as Book IV of *Capital*" (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II p. 2). Death prevented Engels from preparing Volume IV for the press; it was first published in German, after being edited by Karl Kautsky, in 1905-10. In this edition basic principles governing the scientific publication of a text were violated and there were distortions of a number of the tenets of Marxism.

The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. is issuing a new (Russian) edition of *Theories of Surplus-Value* (Volume IV of *Capital*) in three parts, according to the manuscript of 1862-63. Part I appeared in 1955 and Part II in 1957. p. 78

[39] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 820. p. 78

[40] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 589-91. p. 78

[41] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 819. p. 78

[42] *Neo-Kantians*—adherents of Neo-Kantianism, a trend in bourgeois philosophy that arose in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century; it was a resuscitation of the more reactionary, idealist concepts of Kant's philosophy. Neo-Kantianism opposed dialectical and historical materialism with the slogan of "Back to Kant!" In his book, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Engels called the Neo-Kantians "theoretical reactionaries" and "cobweb-spinning eclectic flea-crackers." The Neo-Kantians among the German Social-Democrats (Eduard Bernstein, Karl Schmidt, and others) subjected to revision the Marxist philosophy, Marx's economic theory, and the Marxist theory of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Russian supporters of Neo-Kantianism included the "legal Marxists," Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Mensheviks. Lenin subjected the

reactionary philosophy of the Neo-Kantians to a comprehensive criticism in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see present edition, Vol. 14). p. 81

[43] Lenin refers to G. V. Plekhanov's *Development of the Monist View of History*, published legally in St. Petersburg in 1895 under the pen-name of N. Beltov, and to his *Essays on the History of Materialism* published in German. p. 81

[44] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 470. p. 86

[45] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 810. p. 86

[46] Lenin refers to his work, "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book" (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507). p. 90

[47] *Entailed estates*—a system of inheritance that has been preserved in some capitalist countries from feudal times. Under this system estates are inherited undivided by the eldest in the family or by the eldest son of the holder. p. 97

[48] A translation of one of the chapters of Karl Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question* was published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, No. 8, for 1899, under the title "Modern Agriculture." p. 99

[49] Lenin's study "*Capitalism in Agriculture* (*Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article*)," was intended for publication in *Nachalo* but upon the closing-down of that magazine it was published in *Zhizn*.

Zhizn (*Life*)—a literary, scientific, and political magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901; in 1902 it was published abroad. From 1899 onwards the magazine was in the hands of the "legal Marxists." p. 105

[50] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 603. p. 116

[51] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early 1890s it became the organ of the liberal Narodniks and was edited by S. N. Krivenko and N. K. Mikhailovsky. The magazine advocated conciliation of the tsarist government and waged a bitter struggle against Marxism and the Russian Marxists. In 1906 it became the organ of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist" Party. p. 121

[52] The reference is to Marx's article criticising an essay by E. de Girardin, "*Le Socialisme et l'impôt*" ("Socialism and Taxes").

The article was published in issue No. 4 of the journal *Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politisch-ökonomische Revue* (*New Rhenish Gazette, Political-Economic Review*), issued in May 1850. The journal was published by Marx in Hamburg in 1850 and was a continuation of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. p. 136

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[53] This is a reference to *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices on Certain Aspects of Russian Economy*, in two volumes, compiled by a group of authors of the liberal-bourgeois and Narodnik trend and edited by Professor A. I. Chuprov and A. S. Posnikov (1897). Lenin read this book when he was in exile and criticised it in his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. p. 139

[54] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 600-793. p. 139

[55] *Fideicommissum*—entailment of an estate. Under this system a landed estate passed to the eldest son of the testator and could not be mortgaged, divided, or sold *in parte* or *in toto*.

Anerbenrecht—a peasant variant of *fideicommissum* which gave the landed proprietor a somewhat greater right in respect of the inherited estate but which forbade the division of the inheritance. p. 146

[56] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 622. p. 152

[57] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 240. p. 163

[58] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 299. p. 163

[59] "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" was written by Lenin in August 1899 when he was in exile and when he received the manifesto of the "economists—which A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova sent him from St. Petersburg and which she called the *Credo* of the "Young." The author of the *Credo* was Y. D. Kuskova, at the time a member of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. The manifesto of the group of "economists" was not intended for the press; as Lenin said, it was published "irrespective of, and perhaps even against, the wishes of its authors," because the "economists" feared public criticism of their opportunist views.

The draft of the "Protest" which Lenin prepared to oppose the manifesto of the Russian Bernsteinians was discussed at a meeting of seventeen Marxists in exile in Minusinsk Region at the village of Yermakovskoye. The "Protest" was adopted unanimously. A colony of exiles in Turukhansk also subscribed to the "Protest." Another colony of 11 exiled Social-Democrats in the town of Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia, also came out against the *Credo* of the "economists."

The "Protest" was sent abroad and immediately upon its receipt G. V. Plekhanov sent it to the press for inclusion in the current number of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. The "young" members of the Union Abroad, engaged in editing *Rabocheye Dyelo*, however, published the "Protest" as a separate leaflet in December 1899 without Plekhanov's knowledge. The "Protest" was followed by a postscript stating that the *Credo* represented the opinion of individuals whose position did not constitute a danger to the Russian working-class movement and denying that "economism" was current among members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. Early in 1900 Plekhanov reprinted the "Protest" in the *Vademecum*,

a collection of essays against the "economists." Plekhanov welcomed the appearance of the "Protest" as evidence that the Russian Social-Democrats had recognised the serious danger of "economism" and had emphatically declared war on it. p. 167

[60] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*)—the magazine of the "economists" which appeared irregularly in Geneva between April 1899 and February 1902 as an organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. For a criticism of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group see Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 167

[61] *The Emancipation of Labour* was the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov in 1883 and included P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. I. Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov among its members.

The group did much to spread Marxism in Russia. It translated such Marxist works as *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels, *Wage-Labour and Capital* by Marx, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* by Engels, etc., published them abroad and organised their distribution in Russia. Plekhanov and his group seriously undermined Narodism. In 1883 and in 1885 Plekhanov wrote two draft programmes of the Russian Social-Democrats; these were published by the Emancipation of Labour group and marked an important step towards the establishment of a Social-Democratic party in Russia. Plekhanov's *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885), and *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) played a considerable part in disseminating Marxist ideas. The group, however, made some serious mistakes. It clung to remnants of Narodnik views, underestimated the revolutionary role of the peasantry, and overestimated the part played by the liberal bourgeoisie. These errors were the germs of the future Menshevik ideas espoused by Plekhanov and other members of the group. The group had no practical ties with the working-class movement. Lenin pointed out that the Emancipation of Labour group "only theoretically founded the Social-Democratic Party and took the first step in the direction of the working-class movement" (see present edition, Vol. 20, "Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement").

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held in August 1903, the Emancipation of Labour group announced its dissolution. p. 171

[62] *Bernsteinism*—a trend hostile to Marxism in international Social-Democracy. It emerged in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century and became connected in name with the Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein who attempted to revise Marx's revolutionary theory in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism. The Russian Bernsteinians were the "legal Marxists," the "economists," the Bundists, and the Mensheviks. p. 172

[63] *The International Working Men's Association* (First International)—the First international organisation of the proletariat, founded

by Karl Marx in 1864 at an international workers' meeting convened in London by English and French workers. The foundation of the first International was the result of many years of persistent struggle waged by Marx and Engels to establish a revolutionary party of the working class. Lenin said that the First International "laid the foundation of an international organisation of the workers for the preparation of their revolutionary assault on capital," "laid the foundation for the proletarian, international struggle for socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 29, "*The Third International and Its Place in History*").

The central, leading body of the International Working Men's Association was the General Council, of which Marx was a permanent member. In the course of the struggle against the petty-bourgeois influences and sectarian tendencies then prevalent in the working-class movement (narrow trade-unionism in England, Proudhonism and anarchism in the Romance countries), Marx rallied around himself the most class-conscious members of the General Council (Friedrich Lessner, Eugène Dupont, Hermann Jung, and others). The First International directed the economic and political struggle of the workers of different countries and strengthened their international solidarity. The First International played a tremendous part in disseminating Marxism, in connecting socialism with the working-class movement.

Following the defeat of the Paris Commune, the working class faced the task of creating mass national parties based on the principles advanced by the First International. "As I view European conditions," wrote Marx in 1873, "it is quite useful to let the formal organisation of the International recede into the background for the time being" (Marx to Sorge, London, September 27, 1873). In 1876 the First International was officially disbanded at a convention in Philadelphia. p. 175

[64] Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 187-97. p. 176

[65] Lenin criticises the well-known Lassallean thesis that all other classes constitute a reactionary mass with respect to the working class. This thesis was included in the programme of the German Social-Democrats that was adopted at the Gotha Congress in 1875, the Congress which united the two hitherto separately existing German socialist parties, the Eisenachers and the Lassalleans.

Marx exposed the anti-revolutionary nature of this thesis in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 25-26). p. 177

[66] *The North-Russian Workers' Union*, organised in 1878 in St. Petersburg, was one of the early revolutionary political organisations of the Russian working class. The leaders of the Union were Stepan Khalturin, a joiner, and Victor Obnorsky, a mechanic. The Union organised strikes and issued a number of proclamations. It had a membership of over 200. In 1879 the Union was suppressed

by the tsarist government. In February 1880 the members of the Union who remained at liberty published one issue of *Rabochaya Zarya* (*Workers' Dawn*), the first working-class newspaper in Russia. p. 178

[67] *The South-Russian Workers' Union*, founded in 1875 in Odessa by Y. O. Zaslavsky, was the first workers' revolutionary political organisation in Russia. The Union was suppressed by the tsarist government after having been in existence for eight or nine months. p. 178

[68] *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*)—the newspaper of the "economists," published from October 1897 to December 1902; altogether 16 issues appeared (under the editorship of K. M. Takhtarev and others).

Lenin criticised the views of *Rabochaya Mysl* in his "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy" (see pp. 255-85 of this volume), in articles published in *Iskra*, and in his work *What Is to Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 179

[69] *S. Peterburgsky Rabochy Listok* (*St. Petersburg Workers' Paper*)—an illegal newspaper, organ of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Two numbers appeared: No. 1 in February (dated January) 1897, which was mimeographed in Russia, some 300-400 copies having been run off; No. 2 in September 1897, in Geneva (printed).

The paper advanced the aim of combining the economic struggle of the working class with extensive political demands and stressed the necessity for the foundation of a working-class party. p. 179

[70] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*)—the illegal organ of the Kiev group of Social-Democrats. Two issues appeared—No. 1 in August 1897 and No. 2 in December (dated November) of the same year. The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the Party's official organ. The newspaper did not appear after the Congress, the print-shop having been destroyed by the police and the members of the Central Committee arrested. Concerning the attempts to resume its publication made in 1899 see present volume, pp. 207-09. p. 179

[71] The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was held in March 1898 in Minsk. The Congress was attended by nine delegates from six organisations—the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinolsav, and Kiev Leagues for the Emancipation of the Working Class, the *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Kiev) editorial group, and the Bund.

The Congress elected a Central Committee, adopted *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official organ of the Party, published a *Manifesto*, and declared the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad to be the Party's representative abroad. Soon after the Congress the Central Committee was arrested.

The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was important for its decisions and its *Manifesto* which proclaimed the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. p. 180

[72] *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*)—a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists that came into being in August 1879 as a result of a split in the ranks of the Narodnik organisation *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Liberty). The Narodnaya Volya was headed by an Executive Committee whose membership included A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya, and A. A. Kvyatkovsky. The Narodnaya Volya clung to the utopian socialism of the Narodniks, but took the path of political struggle, considering its most important task to be the overthrow of the autocracy and the winning of political liberty. Its programme envisaged the organisation of a "permanent popular assembly" elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of the land to the people, and the elaboration of measures for the transfer of the factories to the workers. "The Narodovoltsi (members and followers of the Narodnaya Volya)," wrote Lenin, "made a step forward in their transition to the political struggle, but they did not succeed in connecting it with socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 8, "Working-Class and Bourgeois Democracy").

The Narodovoltsi carried on a heroic struggle against the autocracy. They based their activities on the fallacious theory of active "heroes" and the passive "mass" and expected to recast society without the participation of the people, employing only their own forces and attempting to overawe and disorganise the government by means of individual terror. After the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the government undertook brutal repressions and by executions and provocations broke up the Narodnaya Volya organisation. Many attempts were made to reconstitute the Narodnaya Volya throughout the eighties, but all were unsuccessful. In 1886, for instance, a group that followed the traditions of the Narodnaya Volya was organised under the leadership of A. I. Ulyanov (Lenin's brother) and P. Y. Shevyrev. After an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Alexander III in 1887, the group was exposed and its active members were executed.

Although Lenin criticised the fallacious, utopian programme of the Narodnaya Volya, he had a great respect for the selfless struggle of its members against tsarism and placed a high value on their secrecy technique and their strictly centralised organisation. p. 181

[73] Lenin's review of Prokopovich's *Working-Class Movement in the West. An Experiment in Critical Investigation. Vol. I. Germany. Belgium* (St. Petersburg, 1899) was written at the end of 1899. The first three pages and the end of the manuscript have been lost; apparently the manuscript was prepared for the press, for it contains some slight corrections made by Martov. The present translation has been made from Lenin's original text without the

corrections. Lenin's review was not published at the time, in view of the fact that Prokopovich's book was held up by the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee on May 22, 1899, and did not appear until the end of January 1900. p. 183

[74] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917; at first it was moderately liberal, but from 1876 onwards it became an organ of the reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. The newspaper opposed not only the revolutionary, but the bourgeois-liberal movement. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Black Hundreds. p. 191

[75] *Zur Kritik*—Marx's *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*). Lenin's references are to the Russian edition of the book published in 1896. p. 195

[76] *Rheinische Zeitung für Politik, Handel und Gewerb* (*Rhenish Gazette for Politics, Trade, and Manufacture*)—a daily newspaper that appeared in Cologne from January 1, 1842, to March 31, 1843. The paper was founded by representatives of Rhineland bourgeois who were opposed to Prussian absolutism. Certain Left Hegelians were invited to contribute to the paper. Marx became a collaborator in April 1842 and was one of the paper's editors from October of that year. The *Rheinische Zeitung* also published a series of articles by Frederick Engels. Under Marx the paper began to take on a more definite revolutionary-democratic character. The course taken by the *Rheinische Zeitung*, and the great popularity it achieved in Germany, caused alarm and discontent in government circles and led to the vicious persecution of the paper by the reactionary press. On January 19, 1843, the Prussian Government issued an order to close down the *Rheinische Zeitung* from April 1, 1843, and to establish a particularly strict, double censorship for the remaining period of its existence. p. 195

[77] Lenin refers to the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. p. 196

[78] Karl Marx, "Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 365). p. 196

[79] See Note 78. p. 196

[80] Lenin wrote "*Our Programme*," "*Our Immediate Task*," and "*An Urgent Question*" during his exile. He intended the articles for *Rabochaya Gazeta*, which had been adopted as official organ of the Party at the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. An attempt to renew the publication of the newspaper was made in 1899 and the editorial group proposed to Lenin that he assume the editorship; later it invited him to collaborate. Lenin sent the articles with the letter to the editorial group. The attempt to renew publication was unsuccessful and the articles were never printed. p. 205

[81] Russian opportunists, the "economists" and the Bundists, were in agreement with Bernstein's views. In his *Premises of Socialism*, Bernstein represented their agreement with his views as being that of the majority of the Russian Social-Democrats. p. 208

[82] This is a reference to the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad at its first conference held in Zurich in November 1898. p. 208

[83] The collection, *Proletarskaya Borba* (*Proletarian Struggle*), No. 1, published by the Social-Democratic group of the Urals, was printed in the winter of 1898-99 at the group's own press. The writers who prepared the collection adopted an "economist" position, denied the necessity for an independent working-class political party and believed that the political revolution could be effected by a general strike. Lenin characterised the views of the authors of this collection in an assessment in Chapter IV of *What Is to Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 208

[84] The reference is to "A Draft Programme of Our Party" (see pp. 227-54 of this volume). p. 208

[85] This refers to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was to have been convened in the spring of 1900. For Lenin's attitude to the convening of a congress at this time see pp. 323 and 353 of this volume. p. 208

[86] *F. P.*—one of Lenin's pen-names. p. 209

[87] The reference is to Plekhanov's article, "Bernstein and Materialism," published in issue No. 44 of *Neue Zeit* (*New Times*), organ of the German Social-Democrats, in July 1898. p. 211

[88] The *Hannover Congress* of the German Social-Democrats was held in 1899 from September 27 to October 2 (October 9-14). In the discussion of the chief point on the agenda, "The Attack on the Fundamental Views and Tactics of the Party," the Congress voted against Bernstein's revisionist views, without, however, subjecting them to an extensive criticism. p. 211

[89] The law of June 2 (14), 1897, establishing an eleven-and-a-half-hour day for industrial enterprises and railway workshops. Prior to this the working day in Russia had not been regulated and was as long as fourteen or fifteen hours. The tsarist government was forced to issue the June 2 law because of pressure on the part of the working-class movement headed by the Leninist "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class." Lenin made a detailed analysis and criticism of the law in a pamphlet entitled *The New Factory Law* (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 267-315). p. 213

[90] Marx and Engels, *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* (*Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 42-43). p. 216

[91] *The Exceptional Law Against the Socialists* was promulgated in Germany in 1878. The law suppressed all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, mass working-class organisations, and the labour press; socialist literature was confiscated and the banishing of socialists began. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. 224

[92] *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—the central organ of German Social-Democracy; it was first published in 1876 and was edited by Wilhelm Liebknecht and others. Engels made use of its columns for the struggle against all manifestations of opportunism. From the middle nineties, however, after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* began regularly to print articles of the opportunists, who predominated in German Social-Democracy and in the Second International. p. 224

[93] Lenin wrote "*A Draft Programme of Our Party*" when he was still in exile, as can be seen from the date "1899" which he inscribed on the manuscript and from the letter to the editorial group of *Rabochaya Gazeta* (see p. 207 of this volume. The mention of the year 1900 in the text is evidently due to the fact that the issue of *Rabochaya Gazeta* for which it was intended was to have appeared that year.

"A Draft Programme of Our Party" represented a continuation of Lenin s work on programmatic questions which he had begun in prison in 1895-96 (see present edition, Vol. 2, "Draft and Explanation of a Programme of the Social-Democratic Party," pp. 93-121). p. 229

[94] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 16). p. 229

[95] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 763. p. 233

[96] *The Erfurt Programme* of German Social-Democracy was adopted in October 1891 at a congress in Erfurt in place of the Gotha Programme of 1875; the errors in the latter were exposed by Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. p. 233

[97] Lenin refers to the leaflets distributed by the government during the strikes of 1896 and 1897. In the leaflet issued on June 15, 1896, S. Y. Witte, Minister of Finance, appealed to the workers not to listen to "agitators" (socialists) and to await better living conditions and improved working conditions from the government to whom "the affairs of the factory owners and the workers are alike dear." Witte threatened to punish the workers for the unauthorised cessation of work as "an illegal act." p. 236

[98] Lenin refers to the "Provisional Regulations Governing the Military Service of Students of Higher Educational Institutions Expelled from Those Institutions for the Joint Organisation of Disorders." Under these regulations, approved on July 29 (August 10), 1899, students who participated in actions directed against the police

regime obtaining in institutions of higher learning would be expelled from universities and drafted into the tsarist army as privates for a term ranging from one to three years. The students of all higher educational institutions demanded the repeal of the "Provisional Regulations" ("The Drafting of 183 Students into the Army" in the present volume, pp. 414-19). p. 236

[99] *Rural Superintendent* (*Zemsky Nachalnik in Russian*)—an administrative post instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to strengthen the authority of the landlords over the peasants. The Rural Superintendents were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were granted very great powers, not merely administrative, but also judicial, which included the right to arrest peasants and administer corporal punishment. p. 243

[100] Land redemption payments were established by the "Regulation Governing Redemption by Peasant Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence..." adopted on February 19, 1861. The tsarist government compelled the peasants, in return for the allotments assigned to them, to pay redemption to the landlords amounting to several times the real price of the land. When the deal was concluded, the government paid the landlord the purchase price, which was considered a debt owed by the peasant to be repaid over a period of 49 years. The instalments to be paid annually by the peasants were called land redemption payments. These were an intolerable burden on the peasants and caused their impoverishment and ruin. The peasants formerly belonging to landlords alone paid nearly 2,000 million rubles to the tsarist government, whereas the market price of the land that the peasants received did not exceed 544 million rubles. In view of the fact that the adoption of the redemption scheme by the peasants did not take place at once, but dragged on until 1883, the redemption payments were not to have ended before 1932. The peasant movement during the first Russian revolution (1905-07), however, compelled the tsarist government to abolish the redemption payments as from January 1907. p. 245

[101] *Law of easement*—the right to make use of the property of others. In the present case Lenin refers to survivals of feudal relations in the Western Territory. After the Reform of 1861 the peasants were compelled to render supplementary services for the benefit of the landlords for the right to use common roads, meadows, pastures, water, etc. p. 245

[102] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 335). p. 246

[103] *Royal demesne*—lands belonging to members of the tsar's family. p. 248

[104] *Cut-off lands* (*otrezki*)—the pasture lands, woods, etc., which the landlords "cut off," i.e., of which they deprived the peasants when serfdom was abolished in Russia. p. 249

[105] *Gubernia Committees of Nobles* were set up by the tsarist authorities in 1857-58 to draw up plans for the "Peasant Reform," for the "emancipation" of the peasants.

The plans put forward by the Committees of Nobles envisaged an "emancipation" that would benefit only the landlords; the committees effected the "legal" plunder of the peasants in the sixties. p. 249

[106] *The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class*, organised by Lenin in the autumn of 1895, united about twenty Marxist workers' circles in St. Petersburg. The work of the League was based on the principles of centralism and strict discipline. The League was headed by a central group consisting of V. I. Lenin, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. K. Krupskaya, L. Martov (Y. O. Zederbaum), M. A. Silvin, V. V. Starkov, and others. The entire work of the League, however, was under the direct leadership of five members of the group headed by Lenin. The League was divided into several district organisations. Such leading class-conscious workers as I. V. Babushkin and V. A. Shelgunov connected the groups with the factories where there were organisers in charge of gathering information and distributing literature. Workers' circles were established in the big factories.

For the first time in Russia the League set about introducing socialism into the working-class movement, effecting a transition from the propagation of Marxism among small numbers of advanced workers attending circles to political agitation among broad masses of the proletariat. It directed the working-class movement and connected the workers' struggle for economic demands with the political struggle against tsarism. It organised a strike in November 1895 at the Thornton Woollen Mill. In the summer of 1896 the famous St. Petersburg textile workers' strike, involving over 30,000 workers, took place under the leadership of the League. The League issued leaflets and pamphlets for the workers and prepared the ground for the issuance of the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo*. Its publications were edited by Lenin.

The League's influence spread far beyond St. Petersburg, and workers' circles in Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, and other cities, and other parts of Russia followed its example and united to form Leagues of Struggle.

Late in the night of December 8 (20), 1895, the tsarist government dealt the League a severe blow by arresting a large number of its leading members, including Lenin. An issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* ready for the press was seized. The League replied to the arrest of Lenin and the other members by issuing a leaflet containing political demands in which reference was made, for the first time to the existence of the League of Struggle.

While in prison, Lenin continued to guide the League, helped it with his advice, smuggled coded letters and leaflets out of prison, and wrote the pamphlet, *On Strikes* (the original of which has

not yet been found), and the "Draft and Explanation of a Programme of the Social-Democratic Party."

The League was significant, as Lenin put it, because it was the first real beginning of a revolutionary party based on the working-class movement to guide the class struggle of the proletariat. p. 256

[107] *The Kiev League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class* was formed in March 1897, under the influence of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, by a resolution adopted at the Kiev conference which proposed that all Russian Social-Democratic organisations call themselves Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, following the example of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation. The League united Russian and Polish Social-Democratic groups and a group of the Polish Socialist Party, altogether more than 30 members. The Kiev League of Struggle maintained connections with the St. Petersburg League (through personal contacts and through acquaintance with the St. Petersburg proclamations and Lenin's writings on programmatic questions: Lenin's "Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" was sent to Kiev in manuscript and was known to the leaders of Kiev Social-Democratic organisations).

The activities of the Kiev League of Struggle began with the May Day proclamation of 1897 which was widely distributed in the southern cities of Russia. In that year the Kiev League distributed 6,500 copies of proclamations at more than 25 Kiev factories. That same year a special group of the League published two issues of *Rabochaya Gazeta* as an all-Russian Social-Democratic newspaper. The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., in March 1898, adopted *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the Party's official organ. The League's illegal literature was distributed mainly in the South-Russian towns. In addition to its agitational work the League carried on propaganda in workers' circles and at factory meetings.

The Kiev League of Struggle carried on active preparations for the convening of the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Shortly after the Congress the League was suppressed by the police (the *Rabochaya Gazeta* printing-press that had been transferred from Kiev to Ekaterinoslav and a large quantity of illegal literature was seized). Arrests were carried out in Kiev and in many big Russian cities.

The Kiev League of Struggle played an important role in the development and organisation of the working class in Russia for the formation of a Marxist revolutionary party. The members of the Social-Democratic groups that remained at liberty soon re-established the underground organisation which took the name of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 256

[108] *The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia* (*The Bund*) was formed by a founding congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilno in 1897; it was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the Western

regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (1898) "as an autonomous organisation, independent only as far as questions affecting the Jewish proletariat are concerned."

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the working-class movement of Russia. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected its demand that it be recognised as the only representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party. In 1906 the Bund again entered the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of a resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists persistently supported the opportunist wing of the Party (the "economists," the Mensheviks, the liquidators) and struggled against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. The Bund countered the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy. During the period of the Stolypin reaction, it adopted a liquidationist position and was active in forming the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) it adopted the position of the social-chauvinists. In 1917 it supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Bund leadership joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time, a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with Soviet power. In 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself and part of its membership entered the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the basis of the rules of admission. p. 256

[109] The pamphlet referred to is L. Martov's *Red Flag in Russia*, published abroad in October 1900. p. 258

[110] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—a literary and political review, published by the Emancipation of Labour group in London and Geneva between 1890 and 1892. Four issues appeared. *Sotsial-Demokrat* played an important part in spreading Marxist ideas in Russia. G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, and V. I. Zasulich were the chief figures associated with its publication. p. 271

[111] *Balalaikin*—a character from M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *Modern Idyll*; a liberal windbag, adventurer, and liar. p. 279

[112] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—one of the oldest Russian newspapers, originally issued (in 1756) as a small sheet by Moscow University. In 1863 it was taken over by M. N. Katkov and became a monarchist-nationalist organ, reflecting the views of the most reactionary sections of the landlords and the clergy. In 1905 it became one of the leading organs of the Black Hundreds and continued to appear until the October Revolution in 1917. p. 290

[113] *Grazhdanin* (*The Citizen*)—a reactionary magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1872 to 1914. From the eighties of the last

century it was the organ of the extreme monarchists and was edited by Prince Meshchersky and financed by the government. It had a small circulation, but it was influential in bureaucratic circles. p. 290

[114] *Johann of Kronstadt* (I. I. Sergeyev)—the priest of Kronstadt Cathedral, an obscurantist notorious for his pogrom incitements directed against non-Russian nationalities. p. 291

[115] *Marshal of the Nobility*—in tsarist Russia, the elected representative of the nobility of a gubernia or uyezd. The Marshal of the Nobility was in charge of all the affairs of the nobility; he occupied an influential position in the administration and took the chair at meetings of the Zemstvo. p. 303

[116] *Factory affairs boards*—bodies supervising factory affairs in tsarist Russia. As a rule, the boards consisted of the provincial governor, the public prosecutor, the chief of the police administration, the factory inspector, and two factory owners. p. 303

[117] Lenin wrote "*On Strikes*" for *Rabochaya Gazeta* when he was in exile (see the "Letter to the Editorial Group," p. 207 of this volume). Only the first part of the article is in the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism; it is not known whether the other parts were written. p. 310

[118] Frederick Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p 260). p. 315

[119] Lenin quotes a statement made by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, von Puttkamer. p. 317

[120] *Iskra* (*The Spark*) was the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper; it was founded by Lenin in 1900 and it played an important role in building the Marxist revolutionary party of the working class in Russia.

It was impossible to publish the revolutionary newspaper in Russia on account of police persecution, and, while still in exile in Siberia, Lenin evolved a plan for its publication abroad. When his exile ended (January 1900) Lenin immediately set about putting his plan into effect. In February, in St. Petersburg, he negotiated with Vera Zasulich (who had come from abroad illegally) on the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group in the publication of the newspaper. At the end of March and the beginning of April a conference was held—known as the Pskov Conference—with V. I. Lenin, L. Martov (Y. O. Zederbaum), A. N. Potresov, S. I. Radchenko, and the "legal Marxists" P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky participating, which discussed the draft declaration, drawn up by Lenin, of the Editorial Board of the all-Russian newspaper (*Iskra*) and the scientific and political

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magazine (*Zarya*) on the programme and the aims of these publications. During the first half of 1900 Lenin travelled in a number of Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga, Smolensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, Samara, Syzran) and established contact with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats, obtaining their support for *Iskra*. In August 1900, when Lenin arrived in Switzerland, he and Potresov conferred with the Emancipation of Labour group on the programme and the aims of the newspaper and the magazine, on possible contributors, and on the editorial board and its location. The conference almost ended in failure (see pp. 333-49 of this volume), but an agreement was finally reached on all disputed questions.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900; the ensuing issues were published in Munich; from July 1902 the paper was published in London, and from the spring of 1903 in Geneva. Considerable help in getting the newspaper going (the organisation of secret printing-presses, the acquisition of Russian type, etc.) was afforded by the German Social-Democrats Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun, and others; by Julian Marchlewski, a Polish revolutionary residing in Munich at that time, and by Harry Quelch, one of the leaders of the English Social-Democratic Federation.

The Editorial Board of *Iskra* consisted of: V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov, and V. I. Zasulich. The first secretary of the board was I. G. Smidovich-Leman; the post was then taken over, from the spring of 1901, by N. K. Krupskaya, who also conducted the correspondence between *Iskra* and the Russian Social-Democratic organisations. Lenin was in actuality editor-in-chief and the leading figure in *Iskrai*, in which he published his articles on all basic questions of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia, as well as on the most important events in world affairs.

Iskra became the centre for the unification of Party forces for the gathering and training of Party workers. In a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara, and others) groups and committees of the R.S.D.L.P. were organised on Leninist *Iskra* lines and a conference of *Iskra* supporters held in Samara in January 1902 founded the Russian *Iskra* organisation. *Iskra* organisations grew up and worked under the direct leadership of Lenin's disciples and comrades-in-arms: N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, P. A. Krasikov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky, I. I. Radchenko, and others.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin, the *Iskra* Editorial Board drew up a draft programme of the Party (published in No. 21 of *Iskra*) and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held in July and August 1903. By the time the Congress was convened the majority of the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had adopted the *Iskra* position, approved its programme, organisational plan, and tactical line, and recognised the newspaper as their leading organ. A special

resolution of the Congress noted *Iskra*'s exceptional role in the struggle to build the Party and adopted the newspaper as the central organ of the R.S.D.L.P. The Congress approved an editorial board consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov, and Martov. Despite the Congress decision, Martov refused to participate, and Nos. 46-51 of *Iskra* were edited by Lenin and Plekhanov. Later Plekhanov went over to the Menshevik position and demanded that all the old Menshevik editors be included in the Editorial Board of *Iskra*, although they had been rejected by the Congress. Lenin could not agree to this and on October 19 (November 1), 1903, he resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board. He was co-opted to the Central Committee, from where he conducted a struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. Issue No. 52 of *Iskra* was edited by Plekhanov alone. On November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, on his own initiative and in violation of the will of the Congress, co-opted all the old Menshevik editors to the Editorial Board. Beginning with issue No. 52, the Mensheviks turned *Iskra* into their own organ. p. 320

[121] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political magazine published legally in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* Editorial Board. Altogether four numbers (in three issues) appeared: No. 1—April 1901 (it actually appeared on March 23, New Style); No. 2-3—December 1901; and No. 4—August 1902. p. 320

[122] Lenin refers to the "Announcement on the Renewal of Publications of the Emancipation of Labour Group" published at the beginning of 1900 in Geneva, after the appearance of Lenin's "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats." In their "Announcement" the Emancipation of Labour group supported Lenin's appeal in the "Protest" for decisive struggle against opportunism in the ranks of Russian and international Social-Democracy. p. 322

[123] By *groups and organisations* Lenin means the Social-Democrats grouped round the newspaper *Yuzhny Rabochy* (*Southern Worker*), the Bund, and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, the leadership of which had been transferred from the Emancipation of Labour group to the "young" supporters of "economism." These organisations planned to call the Second Congress of the Party in Smolensk in the spring of 1900. The circumstances surrounding the preparation for the Congress are discussed in Chapter 5 of Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 323

[124] Lenin refers to "A Draft Programme of Our Party" which he wrote at the end of 1899 for No. 3 of *Rabochaya Gazeta* that never came to be published (see present volume, pp. 227-54). A draft programme of the Party was elaborated for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., on Lenin's suggestion, by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* and was printed in *Iskra*, No 21, on June 1, 1902; it was adopted by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1903. p. 324

[125] Lenin quotes the basic postulate of the "General Rules of the International Working Men's Association" (First International) drawn up by Karl Marx (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, p. 386). p. 327

[126] The split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, referred to in this passage, occurred at the Second Congress of the Union in April 1900. At the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Union was recognised as the representative of the Party abroad; the majority of its members, however, adopted the "economist" position, on account of which the Emancipation of Labour group and their supporters left the Congress, broke off relations with the Union, and formed an independent organisation of Russian Social-Democrats abroad under the name of Russian Revolutionary Organisation *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 333

[127] By saying that he had been "ordered" not "to shoot" at P. B. Struve in 1895 (in this case he is hinting at A. N. Potresov), G. V. Plekhanov was trying to justify his conciliatory attitude towards the revisionist position of the "legal Marxists." Lenin considered Plekhanov's behaviour to be incorrect, because he not only failed to criticise the bourgeois-liberal views of Struve but took the latter under his protection. p. 334

[128] Lenin is apparently referring to Struve's article, "Again on Free Will and Necessity," published in 1897 in issue No. 8 of the magazine *Novoye Slovo* (*New Word*). In this article Struve declared himself openly against the Marxist theory of the proletarian revolution. On June 27 (July 9), 1899, Lenin wrote to Potresov: "One thing I do not understand—how could Kamensky (Plekhanov.—*Ed.*) leave unanswered the articles by Struve and Bulgakov against Engels in *Novoye Slovo*! Can you explain this to me?" p. 334

[129] This passage refers to *Vademecum*, a collection of articles and documents for the *Rabocheye Dyelo* Editorial Board (1900) in which Plekhanov published, among other documents, three private letters from Z. M. Kopelson of the Bund and from an "economist" leader, Y. D. Kuskova. p. 334

[130] "*Our third man*" was L. Martov (Y. O. Zederbaum) who was in the South of Russia at the time Lenin and Potresov conducted their negotiations with the Emancipation of Labour group and who did not go abroad until March 1901. p. 335

[131] *Bobo*—P. B. Struve. p. 336

[132] *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—theoretical publication of German Social-Democracy. Appeared in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Several articles by Frederick Engels appeared in its columns between 1885 and 1895. Engels frequently offered points of advice to the

editors of *Die Neue Zeit* and severely criticised them for departing from Marxism. In the late 1890s, after Engels' death, the journal, which expounded Kautskian views, made a practice of publishing articles by revisionists. During the First World War (1914-18) the publication adopted a Centrist position and actually supported the social-chauvinists. p. 337

[133] These were former members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad who, after the split at the Second Congress of the Union, in April 1900, broke with the opportunist majority and united with the Emancipation of Labour group to form the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group. p. 339

[134] *N.*—the city of Nuremberg which Lenin visited on his way from Geneva to Munich after the conference between the *Iskra* and the Emancipation of Labour groups. p. 349

[135] This "*special agreement*" was apparently written later. The following document is now in the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.; it is in an envelope bearing the inscription by N. K. Krupskaya: "Documents relating to the earliest period. Agreement on the publication of *Zarya* and *Iskra*:

"1. The collection *Zarya* and the newspaper *Iskra* are published and edited by a group of Russian Social-Democrats, the Emancipation of Labour group participating in the editorial work.

"2. All articles on matters of principle and those of special significance will be communicated to all members of the Emancipation of Labour group, if that is not made impossible by editorial and technical circumstances.

"3. The members of the Emancipation of Labour group will vote on all editorial questions—personally, if they are present in the place where the editorial office is located, and by mail when articles are communicated to them.

"4. In the event of differences of opinion between the editors and the Emancipation of Labour group, the editors undertake to publish in full the special opinion of the group or of each of its members individually.

"5. Only point 1 of this agreement is to be published.

October 6, 1900."

The document is typewritten, has no heading, and is unsigned. p. 350

[136] *The Self-Emancipation of the Working Class group* was a small circle of "economists" that came into being in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1898 and existed for a few months only. The group issued a manifesto announcing its aims (printed in the magazine *Nakanune* [*On the Eve*], published in London), its rules, and several proclamations addressed to workers.

Lenin criticised the views of this group in Chapter 2 of his book, *What Is to Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 353

[137] See Note 125. p. 368

[138] *Pyotr Alexeyev*—a worker-revolutionary in the seventies of the last century whose speech, made before a tsarist court on March 10 (22), 1877, in St. Petersburg, was first printed in London in the irregularly appearing collection *Vperyod!* (*Forward!*). The speech was afterwards repeatedly published illegally and was very popular among Russian workers. p. 371

[139] The reference is to the uprising for national liberation that began in India in 1857. The insurrection was suppressed by British troops in 1859. p. 373

[140] *The Fifth International Socialist Congress of the Second International* was held from September 10 to September 14 (23-27, New Style), 1900, in Paris. The Russian delegation consisted of 23 members. Among its other decisions the Congress acted to establish a standing International Socialist Bureau composed of representatives of the socialist parties of all countries, its secretariat to be in Brussels. p. 379

[141] *Arsenyev*—A. N. Potresov; *Velika*—V. I. Zasulich; "*the twin*"—P. B. Struve; "*the wife*"—N. A. Struve, wife of P. B. Struve. p. 380

[142] *The comrade and friend of P. B. Struve*—M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky. p. 381

[143] *Derzhimorda*—the name of a policeman in N. V. Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*; a boorish, insolent oppressor, a man of violence. p. 390

[144] Lenin quotes from Gleb Uspensky's "Fyodor Mikhailovich Reshetnikov." p. 402

[145] Lenin refers to Porphyry (nicknamed Judas) Golovlyov, a sanctimonious, hypocritical landlord serf-owner described in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 406

[146] *Vestnik Finansov, Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* (*Finance, Industry and Trade Messenger*)—a weekly journal published by the Ministry of Finance in St. Petersburg from November 1883 to 1917 (until January 1885 it was called *Ukazatel Pravitelstvennykh Rasporyazheny po Ministerstvu Finansov—Record of Government Instructions, Ministry of Finance*). It carried government regulations, economic articles, and reviews. p. 409

[147] "*White linings*"—the name given in tsarist Russia to monarchist-minded students from aristocratic and bourgeois circles who conducted a struggle against the democratic section of the students, supporters of the revolutionary movement. The name derived from white silk linings of their uniforms. p. 415

[148] The words of Colonel Skalozub, a character in A. S. Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 416

[149] "*Green Street*"—a form of corporal punishment employed in the army of feudal Russia. The condemned man was tied to a rifle and made to run the gauntlet between two ranks of soldiers who beat him with sticks or green switches. This form of punishment was particularly widespread under Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55). p. 416

[150] *Hannibal's vow*—unwavering determination to fight to the end. The Carthagenian general, Hannibal, made a vow not to cease the struggle against Rome until his dying day. p. 417

[151] *Yuzhny Krai* (*Southern Region*)—a daily newspaper dealing with social, literary, and political problems founded in Kharkov in 1880. The paper, published and edited by A. A. Yuzefovich, an extreme reactionary, upheld conservative, royalist views. p. 419

[152] The article, "*The Workers' Party and the Peasantry*," was written in connection with the elaboration of the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., published in the name of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* in the summer of 1902 and adopted by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. p. 420

[153] *A quarter or beggar's allotment*—a quarter of the so-called "maximum" or "decree" allotment, the amount established by law for a given district at the time of the Reform of 1861. Some of the peasants received these tiny parcels of land from the landlords without payment of redemption money. Such allotments were, therefore, also called "gift allotments" and the peasants who received them were called "gift peasants." p. 420

[154] *Temporarily bound peasants*—peasants who were still compelled to carry out certain duties (payment of quit-rent or performance of corvée service) for the use of their land even after the Reform and until they started paying redemption money to the landlord for their allotment.

From the moment the redemption contract was concluded, the peasants ceased to be "temporarily bound" and joined the category of "peasant property-owners." p. 420

[155] These *title-deeds* were documents defining the land-owning relations of temporarily bound peasants and landlords upon the abolition of serfdom in 1861. The title-deed indicated the amount of land used by the peasant before the Reform and the land and other properties that remained in his hands after "emancipation"; the deed also listed the duties the peasant had to perform for the landlord. The amount of redemption money to be paid by the peasant was determined on the basis of this title-deed. p. 421

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(1898-April 1901)

1898

Prior to January 24 (prior to February 5)	Lenin writes two letters to N. Y. Fedoseyev in Verkholensk (Siberia), the organiser and leader of the first Marxist circles in Kazan.
Between February 7 and February 17 (19-26)	Lenin writes his review of A. Bogdanov's *A Short Course of Economic Science*.
End of February (beginning of March) to August	Lenin translates Volume I of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's *Industrial Democracy*.
End of May (beginning of June)	Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya leave the village of Shushenskoye for Minusinsk. They take part in a meeting of exiles.
July 10 (22)	V. I. Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya are married.
August 9 (21)	Lenin completes the draft of his work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.
Prior to August 26 (prior to September 7)	Lenin writes his article, "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics (Professor Karyshev's New Statistical Exploits)."
September 11-25 (September 23-October 7)	Lenin goes to Krasnoyarsk, works in a library, and meets local political exiles.
October 9-15 (21-27)	The first collection of Lenin's writings, *Economic Studies and Essays*, published in Russia, under the signature of Vladimir Ilyin.

Autumn	Lenin's pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Demokrats*, published in Geneva.
December 24, 1898-January 2, 1899 (January 5)	Lenin and Krupskaya go to Minusinsk. Lenin attends a meeting of exiled Marxists from different parts of the Minusinsk area.

1899

January 30 (February 11)	Lenin completes the preparation for the press of his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.
January	Lenin's "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory (Apropos of the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)" is published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, No. 1.
February	Lenin reviews R. Gvozdev's book, *Kulak Usury, Its Social and Economic Significance*, Parvus' *The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis*, and the handbook, *Commercial and Industrial Russia*.
First half of March	Lenin writes "Once More on the Theory of Realisation," an article against Struve.
Prior to March 21 (prior to April 2)	Lenin writes a review of Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question*.
March 24-31 (April 6-12)	Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* is published, under the signature of Vladimir Ilyin.
April 4 (16)-May 9 (21)	Lenin writes two articles under the common heading, "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)."
May 2 (14)	Lenin's house in the village of Shushenskoye is searched and Lenin is interrogated when the police establish the fact of his correspondence with exiled Social-Democrats.
May	Lenin's review of Hobson's work, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, is published in *Nachalo*, No. 5.
Prior to May 29 (prior to June 10)	Lenin writes his "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov," an article against revisionism.

Prior to August 22 (prior to September 3)	Lenin writes "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo*, the manifesto of the "economists."
	In the village of Yermakovskoye Lenin organises a conference of 17 Marxist political exiles which approves his "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats."
September 9-15 (21-27)	Lenin's translation of Volume I of the Webbs' *Industrial Democracy* is published, under the signature of Vladimir Ilyin.
September 10 (22)	Lenin attends the funeral in Yermakovskoye of A. A. Vaneyev, an exiled member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, and speaks at the graveside.
Beginning of September 1899-January 19 (31), 1900	Lenin and Krupskaya edit the Russian translation of Volume II of the Webbs' *Industrial Democracy* sent them from St. Petersburg.
Not earlier than October	Lenin accepts the proposal to edit Rabochaya Gazeta, which was recognised at the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. as the official organ of the Party, and, somewhat later, a further proposal to contribute to the newspaper. Lenin writes three articles for *Rabochaya Gazeta* and a "Letter to the Editorial Group."
End of the year	Lenin writes a review of S. N. Prokopovich's book, *The Working-Class Movement in the West*.
	Lenin writes a review of Kautsky's book, *Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme. A Counter-Critique.*
	Lenin and Krupskaya translate Kautsky's book, Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme. A Counter-Critique. Lenin's "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" is published in Geneva as a reprint from *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 4-5.
	Lenin writes the articles: "A Draft Programme of Our Party"; "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy"; "Apropos of the *Profession de foi*"; "Factory Courts"; "On Strikes."
1898-99	Lenin corresponds with F. V. Lengnik, who was in exile (the correspondence is devoted mostly to a discussion of philosophical questions).

1900

January 29	Lenin's term of exile ends.
(February 10)	Lenin and Krupskaya leave Shushenskoye for European Russia. Forbidden to live in the metropolitan cities, university towns, and big industrial centres, Lenin chooses the town of Pskov as being most convenient for contact with St. Petersburg.
First half of February	On his way from Siberia, Lenin stops at Ufa, where Krupskaya remained until the end of her term of exile. Lenin meets Social-Democrats in exile at Ufa (A. D. Tsyurupa and others).
Middle of February	Lenin visits Moscow illegally and stays with his relatives.
	From I. K. Lalayants, a representative of the Ekaterinoslav Committee, Lenin learns of the preparations for the convocation of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and receives a proposal to participate in it as well as to undertake the editing of *Rabochaya Gazeta*.
Prior to February 26 (prior to March 10)	Lenin comes illegally to St. Petersburg, where he meets V. I. Zasulich, who has come from abroad, and conducts with her negotiations on the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group in the publication of an all-Russian Marxist newspaper and magazine abroad.
February 26 (March 10)	Lenin arrives in Pskov, where he is kept under the secret surveillance of the police.
Spring	Lenin establishes contact with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats in various Russian towns and conducts negotiations for their support for the future *Iskra*.
	Lenin goes illegally to Riga to establish contact with local Social-Democrats. In Pskov Lenin takes part in a meeting of the local revolutionary and oppositional intellectuals; he speaks in criticism of revisionism.
End of March-beginning of April, prior to 4th (17)	Lenin draws up the draft declaration of the Editorial Board on the programme and the objectives of the all-Russian political newspaper (*Iskra*) and the scientific and political magazine (*Zarya*).

	Lenin conducts a conference between revolutionary Marxists and "legal Marxists" (P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky) on the question of support for the publication of *Iskra* and *Zarya* (the Pskov Conference).
April-May	Lenin writes a report for the contemplated Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and receives a mandate from the Emancipation of Labour group to attend the Congress.
May 6 (18)	Lenin obtains a passport to go to Germany.
May 20 (June 2)	Lenin goes illegally to St. Petersburg to establish contact with local Social-Democrats.
May 21 (June 3)	Lenin is arrested and interrogated in St. Petersburg,
May 31 (June 13)	Lenin is released from custody.
June 1-7 (14-20)	Lenin lives with relatives at Podolsk, near Moscow. On Lenin's invitation a number of Social-Democrats (P. N. Lepeshinsky, S. P. and S. P. Shesternin, and others) come to Podolsk and Lenin comes to an agreement with them on their support for the future *Iskra*.
June 7 (20)	Lenin goes to N. K. Krupskaya in Ufa via Nizhni-Novgorod (now Gorky).
June 8 or 9 (21 or 22)	Lenin comes to an agreement with the Nizhni-Novgorod Social-Democrats on their support for *Iskra*.
Second half of June	In Ufa Lenin comes to an agreement with the local Social-Democrats in exile on their support for *Iskra*.
Later than July 2 (15)	Lenin leaves Ufa for Podolsk.
Between July 2 and 10 (15 and 23)	Lenin stays in Samara (now Kuibyshev), where he comes to an agreement with the local Social-Democrats on their support for *Iskra*.
July 10 (23)	Lenin returns to Podolsk.
July 16 (29)	Lenin leaves for abroad.

Beginning of August	Lenin stays in Zurich for two days and discusses with P. B. Axelrod the publication of *Iskra* and *Zarya*.
	Lenin has talks with G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva on the publication of *Iskra* and *Zarya*; differences of opinion with Plekhanov in connection with Lenin's draft statement "In the Name of the Editorial Board."
	At Bellerive (near Geneva) Lenin has talks with N. E. Bauman and other Social-Democrats on their participation in the work of *Iskra*.
August 11-15 (24-28)	Lenin takes part in a conference with the Emancipation of Labour group at Corsier (near Geneva) on the question of the publication and joint editing of *Iskra* and *Zarya*..
August 20 (September 2) and later	Lenin records the circumstances connected with his talks with Plekhanov ("How the 'Spark' Was Nearly Extinguished").
August 22 or 23 (September 4 or 5)	Lenin draws up a draft agreement between the *Iskra* group and the Emancipation of Labour group on the question of the publication of *Iskra* and *Zarya* and on the relation of the groups on the Editorial Board of the publications.
Between August 23 and September 2 (between September 5 and 15)	In his correspondence with an unknown Russian Social-Democrat Lenin emphatically rejects any agreement with the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, an organisation of "economists."
August 24 (September 6)	Lenin travels from Nuremberg to Munich.
Between September 27 and October 5 (between October 10 and 18)	The "Declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra*," composed by Lenin, is published as a separate leaflet. The statement is sent to Russia for distribution among Social-Democratic organisations and workers.
October 13 (26)	In a letter to A. A. Yakubova, Lenin, in the name of the *Iskra* group, emphatically refuses to accept the invitation to collaborate with *Rabochaya Mysl*, organ of the "economists."
Beginning of November	Lenin writes the preface to the pamphlet, *May Days in Kharkov*.

November	Lenin edits the first issue of *Iskra* and prepares it for the press.
End of November (first half of December)	Lenin organises the preparation and the publication of the first number of *Zarya* in Stuttgart.
Between December 1 and 10 (between December 19 and 23)	Lenin goes from Munich to Leipzig to prepare the first issue of *Iskra* for the press.
December 11 (24)	The first issue of *Iskra* appears carrying Lenin's articles: "The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement" (leading article); "The War in China"; "The Split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad."
Between December 16 (29), 1900, and mid-February 1901	Lenin takes part in the negotiations between the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* and P. B. Struve, on the latter's arrival in Munich, on the conditions for Struve's collaboration with those publications. Lenin is emphatically against an agreement with Struve.

1901

January-March	The work of the "groups supporting *Iskra*" and its agents in Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Pskov, Poltava, Samara, South Russia, etc.) develops under Lenin's guidance.
First half of February	The second issue of *Iskra* appears, carrying Lenin's article, "The Drafting of 183 Students into the Army."
Mid-February	Lenin goes to Prague and Vienna to arrange for N. K. Krupskaya to go abroad.
End of February-first half of March (March)	Lenin conducts negotiations for the establishment of an illegal printing-press for *Iskra* in Russia (in Kishinev).
March 10 (23)	The first issue of *Zarya* appears carrying three of Lenin's articles under the heading, *Casual Notes*.
April 12 (25)	Lenin places before the Emancipation of Labour group a plan for the unification of Russian revolutionary Social-Democratic organisations abroad, grouped round *Iskra*, into a League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy.

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April 19 (May 2)	The third issue of *Iskra* appears, carrying Lenin's article "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry."
Between April 24 and May 1 (between May 7 and 14)	The Conference in Munich of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* discusses Lenin's plan for the formation of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, as well as provisional rules for the League.

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

5

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.S.R.

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

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PREFACE

Volume Five contains Lenin's works written between May 1901 and February 1902. These include articles and notes published in *Iskra*: "Where To Begin", "Another Massacre", "A Valuable Admission", "The Lessons of the Crisis", "The Serf-Owners at Work", "Fighting the Famine-Stricken", "Party Affairs Abroad", "A Talk with Defenders of Economism", "Demonstrations Have Begun", "Political Agitation and 'The Class Point of View'", and others. In these articles Lenin deals with the most important events in Russian domestic affairs and throws light on the concrete tasks of building the Party and of the class struggle of the proletariat.

In the article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", published in *Zarya* in December 1901, Lenin elaborates the tactics of the Marxist party of the proletariat in relation to the liberal bourgeoisie.

"The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" expounds and develops the Marxist theory of the agrarian question and is a critique of the Russian and international revisionists.

This volume also contains Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* the theoretical premises of which laid the foundations of the ideology of the Bolshevik Party.

Seven of the works of Lenin to be found in this volume are included in the *Collected Works* for the first time. Of these, three are notes published in *Iskra*: "A Zemstvo Congress", "On a Letter from 'Southern Workers'", and "Reply to 'A Reader'". The other four documents are: "Speech Delivered on September 21 (October 4, new style)" [Lenin's

speech at the "Unity" Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad on September 21 (October 4), 1901], "The Journal *Svoboda*", "On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Revolutionary Activity of G. V. Plekhanov", and "Anarchism and Socialism". These four items appeared in print only after the October Revolution.

WHERE TO BEGIN[1]

Written in May 1901
Published in *Iskra,*
No. 4, May 1901

Published according to
the *Iskra* text

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ

ИСКРА

„Искра разгорится пламя"...
Отвѣтъ декабристовъ Пушкину

№ 4. МАЙ 1901 ГОДА № 4.

СЪ ЧЕГО НАЧАТЬ

САНОДЕРЖАВІЕ И ФИНАНСЫ

First page of *Iskra*, No. 4, carrying Lenin's article "Where To Begin". 1901

Reduced

First page of Iskra, No. 4, carrying Lenin's article "When To Begin", 1901

Enlarged

In recent years the question of "what is to be done" has confronted Russian Social-Democrats with particular insistence. It is not a question of what path we must choose (as was the case in the late eighties and early nineties), but of what practical steps we must take upon the known path and how they shall be taken. It is a question of a system and plan of practical work. And it must be admitted that we have not yet solved this question of the character and the methods of struggle, fundamental for a party of practical activity, that it still gives rise to serious differences of opinion which reveal a deplorable ideological instability and vacillation. On the one hand, the "Economist" trend, far from being dead, is endeavouring to clip and narrow the work of political organisation and agitation. On the other, unprincipled eclecticism is again rearing its head, aping every new "trend", and is incapable of distinguishing immediate demands from the main tasks and permanent needs of the movement as a whole. This trend, as we know, has ensconced itself in *Rabocheye Dyelo*.[2] This journal's latest statement of "programme", a bombastic article under the bombastic title "A Historic Turn" ("*Listok*" *Rabochevo Dyela*, No. 6[3]), bears out with special emphasis the characterisation we have given. Only yesterday there was a flirtation with "Economism", a fury over the resolute condemnation of *Rabochaya Mysl*,[4] and Plekhanov's presentation of the question of the struggle against autocracy was being toned down. But today Liebknecht's words are being quoted: "If the circumstances change within twenty-four hours, then tactics must be changed within twenty-four hours." There is talk of a "strong fighting organisation" for direct attack, for storming the autocracy; of "broad revolutionary political agitation among the masses" (how energetic we are now—both revolutionary and

political!); of "ceaseless calls for street protest,"; of "street demonstrations of a pronounced [*sic*!] political character"; and so on, and so forth.

We might perhaps declare ourselves happy at *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s quick grasp of the programme we put forward in the first issue of *Iskra*,[5] calling for the formation of a strong well-organised party, whose aim is not only to win isolated concessions but to storm the fortress of the autocracy itself; but the lack of any set point of view in these individuals can only dampen our happiness.

Rabocheye Dyelo, of course, mentions Liebknecht's name in vain. The tactics of agitation in relation to some special question, or the tactics with regard to some detail of party organisation may be changed in twenty-four hours; but only people devoid of all principle are capable of changing, in twenty-four hours, or, for that matter, in twenty-four months, their view on the necessity—in general, constantly, and absolutely—of an organisation of struggle and of political agitation among the masses. It is ridiculous to plead different circumstances and a change of periods: the building of a fighting organisation and the conduct of political agitation are essential under any "drab, peaceful" circumstances, in any period, no matter how marked by a "declining revolutionary spirit"; moreover, it is precisely in such periods and under such circumstances that work of this kind is particularly necessary, since it is too late to form the organisation in times of explosion and outbursts; the party must be in a state of readiness to launch activity at a moment's notice. "Change the tactics within twenty-four hours"! But in order to change tactics it is first necessary to have tactics; without a strong organisation skilled in waging political struggle under all circumstances and at all times, there can be no question of that systematic plan of action, illumined by firm principles and steadfastly carried out, which alone is worthy of the name of tactics. Let us, indeed, consider the matter; we are now being told that the "historic moment" has presented our Party with a "completely new" question—the question of terror. Yesterday the "completely new" question was political organisation and agitation; today it is terror. Is it not strange to hear people who have so grossly forgotten their principles holding forth on a radical change in tactics?

Fortunately, *Rabocheye Dyelo* is in error. The question of terror is not a new question at all; it will suffice to recall briefly the established views of Russian Social-Democracy on the subject.

In principle we have never rejected, and cannot reject, terror. Terror is one of the forms of military action that may be perfectly suitable and even essential at a definite juncture in the battle, given a definite state of the troops and the existence of definite conditions. But the important point is that terror, at the present time, is by no means suggested as an operation for the army in the field, an operation closely connected with and integrated into the entire system of struggle, but as an independent form of occasional attack unrelated to any army. Without a central body and with the weakness of local revolutionary organisations, this, in fact, is all that terror can be. We, therefore, declare emphatically that under the present conditions such a means of struggle is inopportune and unsuitable; that it diverts the most active fighters from their real task, the task which is most important from the standpoint of the interests of the movement as a whole; and that it disorganises the forces, not of the government, but of the revolution. We need but recall the recent events. With our own eyes we saw that the mass of workers and "common people" of the towns pressed forward in struggle, while the revolutionaries lacked a staff of leaders and organisers. Under such conditions, is there not the danger that, as the most energetic revolutionaries go over to terror, the fighting contingents, in whom alone it is possible to place serious reliance, will be weakened? Is there not the danger of rupturing the contact between the revolutionary organisations and the disunited masses of the discontented, the protesting, and the disposed to struggle, who are weak precisely because they are disunited? Yet it is this contact that is the sole guarantee of our success. Far be it from us to deny the significance of heroic individual blows, but it is our duty to sound a vigorous warning against becoming infatuated with terror, against taking it to be the chief and basic means of struggle, as so many people strongly incline to do at present. Terror can never be a regular military operation; at best it can only serve as one of the methods employed in a decisive assault. But can we *issue the call* for such

a decisive assault at the present moment? *Rabocheye Dyelo* apparently thinks we can. At any rate, it exclaims: "Form assault columns!" But this, again, is more zeal than reason. The main body of our military forces consists of volunteers and insurgents. We possess only a few small units of regular troops, and these are not even mobilised; they are not connected with one another, nor have they been trained to form columns of any sort, let alone assault columns. In view of all this, it must be clear to anyone who is capable of appreciating the general conditions of our struggle and who is mindful of them at every "turn" in the historical course of events that at the present moment our slogan cannot be "To the assault", but has to be, "Lay siege to the enemy fortress". In other words, the immediate task of our Party is not to summon all available forces for the attack right now, but to call for the formation of a revolutionary organisation capable of uniting all forces and guiding the movement in actual practice and not in name alone, that is, an organisation ready at any time to support every protest and every outbreak and use it to build up and consolidate the fighting forces suitable for the decisive struggle.

The lesson of the February and March events[6] has been so impressive that no disagreement in principle with this conclusion is now likely to be encountered. What we need at the present moment, however, is not a solution of the problem in principle but a practical solution. We should not only be clear on the nature of the organisation that is needed and its precise purpose, but we must elaborate a definite *plan* for an organisation, so that its formation may be undertaken from all aspects. In view of the pressing importance of the question, we, on our part, take the liberty of submitting to the comrades a skeleton plan to be developed in greater detail in a pamphlet now in preparation for print.[7]

In our opinion, the starting-point of our activities, the first step towards creating the desired organisation, or, let us say, the main thread which, if followed, would enable us steadily to develop, deepen, and extend that organisation, should be the founding of an All-Russian political newspaper. A newspaper is what we most of all need; without it we cannot conduct that systematic, all-round propaganda and agitation, consistent in principle, which is the chief

and permanent task of Social-Democracy in general and, in particular, the pressing task of the moment, when interest in politics and in questions of socialism has been aroused among the broadest strata of the population. Never has the need been felt so acutely as today for reinforcing dispersed agitation in the form of individual action, local leaflets, pamphlets, etc., by means of generalised and systematic agitation that can only be conducted with the aid of the periodical press. It may be said without exaggeration that the frequency and regularity with which a newspaper is printed (and distributed) can serve as a precise criterion of how well this cardinal and most essential sector of our militant activities is built up. Furthermore, our newspaper must be All-Russian. If we fail, and as long as we fail, to combine our efforts to influence the people and the government by means of the printed word, it will be utopian to think of combining other means, more complex, more difficult, but also more decisive, for exerting influence. Our movement suffers in the first place, ideologically, as well as in practical and organisational respects, from its state of fragmentation, from the almost complete immersion of the overwhelming majority of Social-Democrats in local work, which narrows their outlook, the scope of their activities, and their skill in the maintenance of secrecy and their preparedness. It is precisely in this state of fragmentation that one must look for the deepest roots of the instability and the waverings noted above. The *first* step towards eliminating this shortcoming, towards transforming divers local movements into a single, All-Russian movement, must be the founding of an All-Russian newspaper. Lastly, what we need is definitely a *political* newspaper. Without a political organ, a political movement deserving that name is inconceivable in the Europe of today. Without such a newspaper we cannot possibly fulfil our task—that of concentrating all the elements of political discontent and protest, of vitalising thereby the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. We have taken the first step, we have aroused in the working class a passion for "economic", factory exposures; we must now take the next step, that of arousing in every section of the population that is at all politically conscious a passion for *political* exposure. We must not be discouraged by the fact that the voice of

political exposure is today so feeble, timid, and infrequent. This is not because of a wholesale submission to police despotism, but because those who are able and ready to make exposures have no tribune from which to speak, no eager and encouraging audience, they do not see anywhere among the people that force to which it would be worth while directing their complaint against the "omnipotent" Russian Government. But today all this is rapidly changing. There is such a force—it is the revolutionary proletariat, which has demonstrated its readiness, not only to listen to and support the summons to political struggle, but boldly to engage in battle. We are now in a position to provide a tribune for the nationwide exposure of the tsarist government, and it is our duty to do this. That tribune must be a Social-Democratic newspaper. The Russian working class, as distinct from the other classes and strata of Russian society, displays a constant interest in political knowledge and manifests a constant and extensive demand (not only in periods of intensive unrest) for illegal literature. When such a mass demand is evident, when the training of experienced revolutionary leaders has already begun, and when the concentration of the working class makes it virtual master in the working-class districts of the big cities and in the factory settlements and communities, it is quite feasible for the proletariat to found a political newspaper. Through the proletariat the newspaper will reach the urban petty bourgeoisie, the rural handicraftsmen, and the peasants, thereby becoming a real people's political newspaper.

The role of a newspaper, however, is not limited solely to the dissemination of ideas, to political education, and to the enlistment of political allies. A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser. In this last respect it may be likened to the scaffolding round a building under construction, which marks the contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the builders, enabling them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organised labour. With the aid of the newspaper, and through it, a permanent organisation will naturally take shape that will engage, not only in local activities, but in regular general work, and will train its members to fol-

low political events carefully, appraise their significance and their effect on the various strata of the population, and develop effective means for the revolutionary party to influence those events. The mere technical task of regularly supplying the newspaper with copy and of promoting regular distribution will necessitate a network of local agents of the united party, who will maintain constant contact with one another, know the general state of affairs, get accustomed to performing regularly their detailed functions in the All-Russian work, and test their strength in the organisation of various revolutionary actions. This network of agents* will form the skeleton of precisely the kind of organisation we need—one that is sufficiently large to embrace the whole country; sufficiently broad and many-sided to effect a strict and detailed division of labour; sufficiently well tempered to be able to conduct steadily *its own* work under any circumstances, at all "sudden turns", and in face of all contingencies; sufficiently flexible to be able, on the one hand, to avoid an open battle against an overwhelming enemy, when the enemy has concentrated all his forces at one spot, and yet, on the other, to take advantage of his unwieldiness and to attack him when and where he least expects it. Today we are faced with the relatively easy task of supporting student demonstrations in the streets of big cities; tomorrow we may, perhaps, have the more difficult task of supporting, for example, the unemployed movement in some particular area, and the day after to be at our posts in order to play a revolutionary part in a peasant uprising. Today we must take advantage of the tense political situation arising out of the government's campaign against the Zemstvo; tomorrow we may have to support popular indignation against some tsarist bashi-bazouk on the rampage and help, by means of boycott, indictment demonstrations, etc., to make things so hot for him as to

* It will be understood of course, that these agents could work successfully only in the closest contact with the local committees (groups, study circles) of our Party. In general, the entire plan we project can, of course, be implemented only with the most active support of the committees which have on repeated occasions attempted to unite the Party and which, we are sure, will achieve this unification—if not today, then tomorrow, if not in one way, then in another.

force him into open retreat. Such a degree of combat readiness can be developed only through the constant activity of regular troops. If we join forces to produce a common newspaper, this work will train and bring into the foreground, not only the most skilful propagandists, but the most capable organisers, the most talented political party leaders capable, at the right moment, of releasing the slogan for the decisive struggle and of taking the lead in that struggle.

In conclusion, a few words to avoid possible misunderstanding. We have spoken continuously of systematic, planned preparation, yet it is by no means our intention to imply that the autocracy can be overthrown only by a regular siege or by organised assault. Such a view would be absurd and doctrinaire. On the contrary, it is quite possible, and historically much more probable, that the autocracy will collapse under the impact of one of the spontaneous outbursts or unforeseen political complications which constantly threaten it from all sides. But no political party that wishes to avoid adventurous gambles can base its activities on the anticipation of such outbursts and complications. We must go our own way, and we must steadfastly carry on our regular work, and the less our reliance on the unexpected, the less the chance of our being caught unawares by any "historic turns".

ANOTHER MASSACRE

It seems that we are now passing through a period in which our working-class movement is once more about to engage with irresistible force in the sharp conflicts that terrify the government and the propertied classes and bring joy and encouragement to socialists. Yes, we rejoice in these conflicts and are encouraged by them, notwithstanding the tremendous number of victims claimed by military reprisals, because the working class is proving by its resistance that it is not reconciled to its position, that it refuses to remain in slavery or to submit meekly to violence and tyranny. Even with the most peaceful course of events, the present system always and inevitably exacts countless sacrifices from the working class. Thousands and tens of thousands of men and women, who toil all their lives to create wealth for others, perish from starvation and constant malnutrition, die prematurely from diseases caused by horrible working conditions, by wretched housing and overwork. He is a hundred times a hero who prefers to die fighting in open struggle against the defenders and protectors of this infamous system rather than die the lingering death of a crushed, broken-down, and submissive nag. We do not by any means want to imply that scuffling with the police is the best form of struggle. On the contrary, we have always told the workers that it is in their interests to carry on the struggle in a more calm and restrained manner, and to try to make use of all discontent for support to the organised struggle of the revolutionary party. But the principal source that sustains revolutionary Social-Democracy is the spirit of protest among the working class which, in view of the violence and oppression surrounding the workers, is bound to manifest itself from time to time in the form

of desperate outbursts. These outbursts arouse to conscious life the widest sections of the workers, oppressed by poverty and ignorance, and stimulate in them a noble hatred for the oppressors and enemies of liberty. That is why the news of massacres such as that which took place at the Obukhov Works on May 7, makes us exclaim: "The workers' revolt has been suppressed; long live the revolt of the workers!"

There was a time, and not very long ago at that, when workers' revolts were a rare exception, called forth only by some special circumstances. Now things have changed. A few years ago industry was flourishing, trade was brisk, and the demand for workers was great. Nevertheless, the workers organised a number of strikes to improve their working conditions; they realised that they must not let the moment slip by, that they must take advantage of the time when the employers were making particularly high profits and it would be easier to win concessions from them. The boom, however, has given way to a crisis. The manufacturers cannot sell their goods, profits have declined, bankruptcies have increased, factories are cutting production, and workers are being discharged and turned into the streets in masses without a crust of bread. The workers now have to fight desperately, not to improve their conditions, but to maintain the old standards and to reduce the losses the employers impose on them. And so the working-class movement develops in depth and extent: at first, struggle in exceptional and isolated cases; then, unceasing and stubborn battles during industrial prosperity and the trade boom; finally, similar unceasing and stubborn struggle in the period of crisis. We may now say that the working-class movement has become a permanent feature of our life and that it will grow whatever the conditions.

The change-over from boom to crisis will not only teach our workers that united struggle is a permanent necessity, it will also destroy the harmful illusions that began to take shape at the time of industrial prosperity. By means of strikes, the workers were able in some places to force concessions from the employers with comparative ease, and this "economic" struggle assumed an exaggerated significance; it was forgotten that trade unions and strikes can, at best, only win slightly better terms for the sale of labour-power as a commodity. Trade unions and strikes cannot help in

times of crisis when there is no demand for this "commodity", they cannot change the conditions which convert labour-power into a commodity and which doom the masses of working people to dire need and unemployment. To change these conditions, a revolutionary struggle against the whole existing social and political system is necessary; the industrial crisis will convince very many workers of the justice of this statement.

Let us return to the massacre of May 7. We give below available information on the May strikes and manifestations of unrest among the St. Petersburg workers.[8] We shall also examine the police report of the massacre. Lately we have learned to understand the significance of government (and police) reports of strikes, demonstrations, and clashes with the troops; we have gathered sufficient material to judge the reliability of these reports—the smoke of police falsehoods may sometimes give a clue to the fire of popular indignation.

"On May 7," says the official report, "about two hundred workers employed in various departments of the Obukhov Steel Works in the village of Alexandrovskoye on the Schlüsselburg Highway stopped work after the dinner break, and in the course of their interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, assistant to the director of the works, put forward a number of groundless demands."

If the workers stopped work without giving two weeks' notice (assuming the stoppage was not due to lawless acts all too frequently committed by the employers), even according to Russian law (which of late has been systematically enlarged and sharpened against the workers), they have merely committed a common offence for which they are liable to prosecution in a magistrate's court. But the Russian Government is making itself more and more ridiculous by its severity. On the one hand, laws are passed designating new crimes (e.g., wilful refusal to work or participation in a mob that damages property or resists armed force), penalties for striking are increased, etc., while on the other, the physical and political possibility of applying these laws and imposing corresponding penalties is disappearing. It is physically impossible to prosecute thousands and tens of thousands of men for refusing to work, for striking, or for

"mobs". It is politically impossible to try each case of this sort, for no matter how the judges are selected and no matter how publicity is emasculated, there still remains at least the shadow of a trial, naturally a "trial" of the government and not of the workers. Thus, criminal laws passed for the definite purpose of facilitating the government's *political* struggle against the proletariat (and at the same time of concealing the political character of the struggle by "state" arguments about "public order", etc.) are steadily forced into the background by *direct* political struggle and open street clashes. "Justice" throws off the mask of majesty and impartiality, and takes to flight, leaving the field to the police, the gendarmes, and the Cossacks, who are greeted with stones.

Let us take the government's reference to the "demands" of the workers. From a legal standpoint stoppage of work is a misdemeanour, irrespective of the workers' demands. But the government has lost its chance of basing itself on the law it recently issued, and it tries to justify its reprisals carried out with "the means at its disposal" by declaring the workers' demands to be without basis. Who were the judges in this affair? Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanov, assistant to the director of the works, the very authority against whom the workers were complaining! It is not surprising, therefore, that the workers reply to such explanations by the powers that be with a hail of stones.

And so, when the workers poured into the street and held up horse trams a real battle began. Apparently the workers fought with all their might, for, although armed only with stones, they managed *twice* to beat off the attacks by police, gendarmes, mounted guards, and the armed factory guard.* It is true, if police reports are to be believed, "several shots" were fired from the crowd, but no one was injured by them. Stones, however, fell "*like hail*", and the workers not only

* Note this! The government communication states that "the armed factory guard" "were already standing by in the factory yard", whereas the gendarmes, mounted guards, and the city police were called out later. Since when, and why, was an *armed* guard maintained *in readiness* in the factory yard? Since the First of May? Did they expect a workers' demonstration? That we do not know; but it is clear that the government is deliberately concealing facts that would explain the mounting discontent and indignation of the workers.

put up a stubborn resistance, they displayed resourcefulness and ability in adapting themselves immediately to the situation and in selecting the best form of struggle. They occupied the neighbouring courtyards and *from over the fences* poured a hail of stones on-the tsar's bashi-bazouks, so that even *after* three volleys had been fired, killing one man (only one?) and wounding eight (?) (one of whom died the following day), even after this, although the crowd had fled, the fight still continued and some companies of the Omsk Infantry Regiment had to be called out to "clear the workers out of the neighbouring courtyards".

The government emerged victorious, but such victories will bring nearer its ultimate defeat. Every clash with the people will increase the number of indignant workers who are ready to fight, and will bring into the foreground more experienced, better armed, and bolder leaders. We have already discussed the plan of action these leaders should follow. We have repeatedly pointed to the imperative necessity for a sound revolutionary organisation. But in connection with the events of May 7, we must not lose sight of the following:

Much has been said recently about the impossibility and the hopelessness of street fighting against modern troops. Particularly insistent on this have been the wise "Critics" who have dragged out the old lumber of bourgeois science in the guise of new, impartial, scientific conclusions, and have distorted Engels' words that refer, with reservations, only to a temporary tactic of the German Social-Democrats.[9] But we see from the example of even this one clash how absurd these arguments are. Street fighting is possible; it is not the position of the fighters, but the position of the government that is hopeless if it has to deal with larger numbers than those employed in a single factory. In the May 7 fighting the workers had nothing but stones, and, of course, the mere prohibition of the city mayor will not prevent them from securing other weapons next time. The workers were unprepared and numbered only three and a half thousand; nevertheless, they repelled the attack of several hundred mounted guards, gendarmes, city police, and infantry. Did the police find it easy to storm the *one* house, No. 63, Schlüsselburg Highway?[10] Ask yourselves—will it be easy to

"*clear the workers*" out of whole blocks, not merely out of one or two courtyards, in the St. Petersburg working-class districts? When the time of decisive battle comes, will it not be necessary to "*clear*" the houses and courtyards of the capital, not only of workers, but of all who have not forgotten the infamous massacre of March 4,[11] who have not become reconciled to the police government, but are only terrified by it and not yet confident of their own strength?

Comrades! Do your best to collect the names of those killed and wounded on May 7. Let all workers in the capital honour their memory and prepare for a new and decisive struggle against the police government for the people's liberty!

Iskra, No. 5, June 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

THE PERSECUTORS OF THE ZEMSTVO AND THE HANNIBALS OF LIBERALISM[12]

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Facsimile of the cover of the magazine *Zarya*, No. 2-3, 1901, which published the following of Lenin's writings: "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (under the heading "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), and "Review of Home Affairs"

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It has been said of the Russian peasant that he is poorest of all in the consciousness of his poverty; of the ordinary Russian subject, it may be said that, while he is poor in civil rights, he is poorest of all in the consciousness of his lack of rights. Just as the peasant has grown accustomed to his wretched poverty, to living his life without pondering over the causes of his wretchedness, or the possibility of removing it, so the plain Russian subject has become accustomed to the omnipotence of the government, to living on without a thought as to whether the government can retain its arbitrary power any longer and whether, side by side with it, there are not forces undermining the outmoded political system. A particularly good "antidote" to this political apathy and somnolence is usually contained in the "secret documents"* which reveal that, not only desperate cutthroats and confirmed enemies of the government, but also members of the government itself, including ministers, and even the tsar, realise the tottering state of the autocracy and seek ways and means to improve their position, which they consider totally unsatisfactory. One such document is the Memorandum drawn up by Witte, who, having quarrelled with the Minister of the Interior, Goremykin, over the question of introducing Zemstvo institutions in the outlying regions, decided to display his perspicacity and his loyalty to the autocracy by drawing up an indictment against the Zemstvo.**

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* I refer, of course, only to that "antidote"—by no means the sole or even the most "powerful" one—which is represented by the press.

** *The Autocracy and the Zemstvo*. A Confidential Memorandum by the Minister of Finance, S. Y. Witte, with a preface and annotations by R. N. S. Published by *Zarya*,[13] Stuttgart, Verlag von J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1901, pp. xliv and 212.

The charge is levelled against the Zemstvo that it is incompatible with autocracy, that by its very nature it is constitutional, that its existence inevitably gives rise to friction and conflict between the representatives of the public and the government. The indictment is drawn up on the basis of vast (relatively) and fairly well prepared material, and since it is an indictment concerning a political affair (a rather peculiar one at that), we may be sure that it will be read with no less interest and will prove no less useful, than were the indictments in political trials once published in our newspapers.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

I

Let us endeavour to determine whether the assertion that our Zemstvo is constitutional is borne out by the facts, and if so, to what extent, and in what precise sense.

In this matter, the epoch in which the Zemstvo was introduced is of particular importance. The fall of serfdom was a historical event of such magnitude that it inevitably made a rent in the police veil concealing class antagonisms. The most solidified and best educated class, and the one most accustomed to political power—the nobility—displayed a very definite desire to restrict the power of the autocracy by means of representative institutions. The reference to this fact in Witte's Memorandum is extremely instructive. He says: "Declarations concerning the necessity of 'representation for the nobility' and concerning 'the right of the Russian nation to elect its representatives to advise the supreme authority' were made at assemblies of nobles as far back as 1859-60." "Even the word 'constitution' was uttered."* "Several Gubernia** Committees

* Dragomanov, "Zemstvo Liberalism in Russia", p. 4. Witte very often fails to mention that he has quoted from Dragomanov (cf., for example, pp. 36-37 of the Memorandum and pp. 55-56 of the above-mentioned article), although he refers to him in some other passages.

** *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Tr.*

for the Peasant Question and individual members of committees called before the drafting commissions urged the necessity of drawing the public into participation in the administration. 'Deputies are openly striving for a constitution,' wrote Nikitenko in his diary in 1859."

"When, after the promulgation of the Regulations of February 19, 1861,[14] the hopes entertained in the autocracy were far from realised, and, moreover, when the 'redder' elements in the administration (like N. Milyutin) were alienated from the implementation of the Regulations, the movement in favour of 'representation' became more nearly unanimous. It found expression in resolutions moved in many assemblies of nobles in 1862, and in petitions drawn up by the assemblies in Novgorod, Tula, Smolensk, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Tver. The most remarkable of these was the Moscow petition, which pleaded for local self-government, public trials, obligatory redemption of peasant lands, publication of budgets, freedom of the press, and the convening in Moscow of a National Duma representing all classes for the purpose of drawing up a complete system of reforms. Sharpest were the decisions adopted and the petition drawn up by the nobility of Tver on February 2, urging the necessity of introducing a number of civil and economic reforms (e.g., equality of rights for all social-estates, obligatory redemption of peasant lands) and 'the convocation of elected representatives of the whole Russian nation as the only means for satisfactorily settling the questions raised, but not settled, in the Regulations of February 19'.*

"Despite the administrative and judicial penalties inflicted on the initiators of the Tver petition**—continues Dragomanov—(not for

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* Dragomanov, op. cit., p. 5. Cited in an abridged form in the Memorandum, p. 64, with a reference, not to Dragomanov, but to *Kolokol*, No. 126 and to *Revue des deux Mondes*, June 15, 1862.[15]

** Incidentally, one of the initiators of this petition, Nikolai Alexandrovich Bakunin, a younger brother of the famed M. A. Bakunin, passed away recently (April 19, this year, i.e., 1901) at his estate in Tver Gubernia. Nikolai Alexandrovich signed the petition of 1862, together with his younger brother Alexei and other mediators. This petition, relates the author of an item on N. A. Bakunin, published in one of our newspapers, called down punishment upon its signatories. After a year's confinement in the Fortress of Peter and Paul the signatories were released, but Nikolai Alexandrovich and his brother Alexei were not pardoned (they had not signed the petition for pardon) and as a consequence, were prohibited from holding public office. After that, N. A. Bakunin never made a public appearance, nor could he speak publicly again.... In this manner our government retaliated against the lawful actions of the landed nobility at the time of "the great reforms"! And this was in 1862, prior to the Polish rebellion, at a time when even Katkov[16] proposed the convocation of a Zemsky Sobor. [*Zemsky Sobor* (National Assembly) and

the petition directly, but for the sharp motivation attached to the collective resignation of the civil mediators[17]), declarations in the same spirit were made at various assemblies of nobles in 1862 and early in 1863, at which projects for local self-government were also drawn up.

"At this time, a constitutional movement was in progress also among the *raznochintsi*,[18] finding expression there in more or less revolutionary secret societies and proclamations: *Velikoruss* (between August and November 1861, officers like Obruchev and others took part in its publication), *Zemskaya Duma* (1862), *Zemlya i Volya* (1862-63).... *Velikoruss* published a draft petition which, as many said, was to have been submitted to the tsar during the Thousand Years of Russia celebrations in August 1862." The draft petition stated *inter alia*: "May it please Your Majesty to convene in one of the capitals of our Russian fatherland, in Moscow or in St. Petersburg, the representatives of the Russian nation in order that they may draw up a constitution for Russia...."*

If we recall also the proclamation *To Young Russia*,[19] the numerous arrests and the Draconic punishments inflicted upon the "political" criminals (Obruchev, Mikhailov, and others), culminating in the frame-up of Chernyshevsky[20] and his being sentenced illegally to penal servitude, we shall have a complete picture of the social situation that gave rise to the Zemstvo reform. Witte states only *half* the truth in his Memorandum when he says that "the idea underlying the establishment of Zemstvo institutions was undoubtedly a political one", that governing circles "undoubtedly took into consideration" the liberal and constitutionalist aspirations of the people. The hidebound official view on social phenomena, which the author of the Memorandum reveals throughout, is here demonstrated by his ignoring the *revolutionary* movement and by his concealing the Draconic measures of repression with which the government *protected* itself against the onset of the revolutionary "party". True, from our modern viewpoint, it seems strange to speak of a revolutionary "party" and of its onset at the beginning of the sixties. Forty years of historical experience have made us more exacting with regard to what may be called revolutionary movements and revolutionary onsets. But it must not be forgotten that at that time, after thirty years of the rule

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National Duma were current in Russian literature of the sixties of the past century as terms denoting national representative assembly.—*Tr.*]

* Cf. V. Burtsev, *One Hundred Years*, p. 39.

of Nicholas I, no one could have foreseen the course of events, no one could have estimated the government's real strength of resistance or the real strength of the people's indignation. Even the most cautious and sober politician could not but acknowledge the possibility of a revolutionary outbreak and the serious danger of a peasant revolt—in the obtaining conditions of the revival of the democratic movement in Europe; the ferment in Poland; the discontent in Finland; the demands for political reforms made by the entire press and by all the nobility; the widespread distribution of *Kolokol* throughout Russia; the powerful appeals of Chernyshevsky, who was able, by means even of censored articles, to educate genuine *revolutionaries*; the appearance of proclamations; the ferment among the peasants, who were "very often"* *compelled* by armed force and bloodshed to accept the Regulations that

* L. Panteleyev, "Reminiscences of the Sixties", in the collection of essays, *At the Glorious Post* (p. 315).[21] This minor piece contains a number of very interesting facts on the revolutionary unrest in 1861-62 and on the police reaction.... "Early in 1862 the social atmosphere was extremely tense; the slightest incident could have given a strong impetus to the course of events in either direction. The impetus was given by the great conflagrations that occurred in St. Petersburg in May of that year." These fires first broke out on May 16 and raged with particular fierceness on May 22 and 23—on the latter date there were five conflagrations. On May 28, the Apraksin Place [a market-place in St. Petersburg named after its owner, Count Apraksin.—*Tr.*] caught fire and a wide area surrounding it was laid waste. The populace attributed these fires to the students, and the rumours were taken up by the newspapers. The manifesto *To Young Russia*, proclaiming a bloody war against the whole existing system and justifying every means to this end, was taken to confirm the rumours of incendiarism. "After May 28, something in the nature of martial law was proclaimed in St. Petersburg." A special committee was established with powers to take *extraordinary* measures for the protection of the capital. The city was divided into three zones, each under the control of a military governor. A field court martial was set up to try those accused of incendiarism. *Sovremennik*[22] and *Russkoye Slovo*[23] were suspended for eight months; *Dyen*,[24] published by Aksakov, was suppressed. Stringent temporary press regulations (sanctioned on May 12, *i.e.*, *before the fires broke out*; consequently, "*the progress of events*" was towards reaction and was unrelated to the fires, the opinion of Mr. Panteleyev notwithstanding) and regulations for the surveillance of printing locations were resorted to. Numerous political arrests were made (Chernyshevsky and N. Serno-Solovyevich, Rymarenko, and others); Sunday schools and public reading-rooms were closed; permits for public lectures in St. Petersburg

stripped them of everything; the refusal of whole groups of civil mediators from among the nobility to apply *such* Regulations, and, finally, the student disorders. Under such circumstances, the autocratic government, which held it to be its lofty mission to protect, at all costs, the omnipotence and irresponsibility of the court camarilla and the army of official leeches, on the one hand, and to support the worst representatives of the exploiting classes, on the other—such a government *had no other recourse* than ruthlessly to exterminate individuals, the conscious and indomitable enemies of tyranny and exploitation (i.e., "the ringleaders" of "the revolutionary party"), terrify the masses of discontented people, and bribe them with small concessions. This meant penal servitude for those who preferred to remain silent rather than pour forth stupid or hypocritical phrases about the "great emancipation"; reforms (*innocuous for the autocracy and the exploiting classes*) for those who waxed enthusiastic over the liberalism of the government and the era of progress.

We do not wish to suggest that these calculated reactionary police tactics were clearly conceived and systematically pursued by all, or even by a few, of the members of the ruling clique. Some of them, on account of their narrow-mindedness, may not have pondered on the significance of these tactics as a whole and may have been childishly enthusiastic about "liberalism", failing to observe its police mantling. In general, however, there is no doubt that the collective experience and collective reasoning of the rulers compelled them to pursue these tactics unswervingly. Not in vain did most of the grandees and notables undergo a prolonged training in bureaucratic and police methods in the service

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became more difficult to obtain; and the second department of the Literary Fund[25] and even the Chess Club[26] were closed down.

The Committee of Inquiry failed to establish any connection between the fires and politics. One of its members, Stolbovsky, told Mr. Panteleyev that in the Committee "he succeeded in exposing the principal false witnesses who, it seems, were the cat's-paw of police agents" (325-26). Thus, there are weighty grounds for believing that the rumours about *student incendiarism were circulated by the police*. The despicable exploitation of the ignorance of the people for the purpose of slandering revolutionaries and protesters was, therefore, in full swing at the height of the "epoch of great reforms".

of Nicholas I, and were, so to speak, case-hardened by fire and water. They remembered how sovereigns had at one time flirted with liberalism, and at another acted as the executioners of the Radishchevs[27] and "let loose" the Arakcheyevs[28] at their loyal subjects; they remembered December 14, 1820,[29] and they played the role of gendarme of Europe the Russian Government had played in 1848-49.[30] The historical experience of autocracy not only compelled the government to pursue tactics of intimidation and corruption, but also compelled many independent liberals to recommend these tactics to the government. In proof of this, we shall quote the opinions of Koshelev and Kavelin. In his pamphlet, *Constitution, Autocracy, and the National Duma* (Leipzig, 1862), A. Koshelev expresses *opposition* to a constitution, advocates the convening of a National Advisory Duma, and anticipates the following objection:

"To convene a National Duma means to lead Russia towards revolution, i.e., to repeat, in Russia, the *États généraux*,[31] which were subsequently transformed into the Convention and which came to an end with the events of 1792, the proscriptions, the guillotine, the *noyades*,* etc." "No, gentlemen," replied Koshelev, "it will not be the convocation of a National Duma that will prepare the ground for revolution, as you understand it. Revolution will come much more surely and rapidly as a result of the hesitant and contradictory actions of the government, one step forward—one step backward, edicts and laws impossible of execution, the restraints placed upon thought and speech; as a result of the police (open, and what is worse, secret) surveillance over the actions of the social-estates and of private persons, the petty persecution of certain individuals, the plunder of the Treasury, the squandering of public funds and the lavish granting of rewards, the incapacity of statesmen and their alienation from Russia, etc., etc. A country just awakening from centuries of oppression can be more surely driven to revolution (again as you understand it) by military executions, solitary confinement, and banishment; for rankling wounds are incomparably more sensitive and painful than fresh wounds. But have no fear, the revolution, which, as you suppose, was brought about in France by journalists and other writers, will not break out in Russia. Let us also hope that no society of desperate hotheads, who choose assassination as a means of attaining their ends, will be formed in Russia (although it is more difficult to vouch for that). What is more probable and dangerous is that, influenced by the split and unobserved by the rural, urban, and secret police, an alliance will be established between the peasants and the petty-bourgeois townspeople,

* Mass executions, by drowning.—*Ed.*

which will be joined by young and old, writers and adherents of *Velikoruss*, *Young Russia*, etc. Such an all-destructive alliance, advocating equality, not before, but despite, the law (What matchless liberalism! We, of course, are in favour of equality, but not of equality *despite* the law—the law which destroys equality!), not the popular, historical village commune, but its morbid progeny, and not the rule of reason, which certain office-holders fear so much, but the rule of brute force, which these office-holders so readily employ—such an alliance, I say, is far more probable in Russia and may be far more powerful than the moderate, well-meaning, and independent opposition to the government which our bureaucrats abhor so much and which they try so hard to restrict and suppress. Do not imagine that the party or the inner, secret, and anonymous press is small and weak, do not imagine that you have plucked it out root and branch. No! By preventing the youth from completing their education, by treating youthful pranks as if they were political crimes, by petty persecution and police surveillance you have increased the strength of that party tenfold, and have multiplied it and spread it throughout the Empire. What will our statesmen resort to in the face of an outbreak resulting from such an alliance? Armed force? But will that be absolutely reliable?" (pp. 49-51).

Do not the pompous phrases of this tirade obviously suggest the tactics: destroy the "hotheads" and the adherents of the "alliance between the peasants and the petty-bourgeois townspeople"; satisfy and disunite the "well-meaning and moderate opposition" through concessions? But the government proved to be cleverer and more agile than the Koshelevs imagined; it conceded much less than a National "Advisory" Duma.

And the following from a private letter written by K. D. Kavelin to Herzen,[32] dated August 6, 1862: "... The news from Russia is not so bad, in my opinion. It was not Nicholas Solovyevich that was arrested, but Alexander. The arrests do not surprise me and, I confess, do not seem to me outrageous. A revolutionary party considers every means to overthrow the government justified, while the government defends itself by every means at its disposal. Arrests and banishment under the reign of the despicable Nicholas were quite another thing. People then died for their ideas, their convictions, their faith, and their utterances. I would like to see you in the government's boots and see what you would do against a party that is secretly and openly working against you. I like Chernyshevsky very, very much, but never in my life have I seen such a *brouillon* [an irascible, unso-

ciable bully, a sower of discord],* such a tactless and cocksure fellow! To perish in vain, for absolutely no reason at all! There cannot be the least doubt now that the conflagrations have a connection with the leaflets."** What an example of servile-professorial profundity! It is the revolutionaries who are to blame for everything; it is they who are conceited enough to hiss at phrase-mongering liberals, they who are so impudent as to work secretly and openly against the government and so tactless as to get themselves incarcerated in the Fortress of Peter and Paul. He, too, the liberal professor, would punish people like these "with all the means at his disposal", were he in power.

II

Thus, the Zemstvo reform was one of the concessions forced from the autocratic government by public ferment and revolutionary pressure. We have dealt with the character of this pressure in detail in order to supplement and correct the picture outlined in the Memorandum by its bureaucratic author, who obscured the struggle that had given rise to this concession. Nevertheless, the half-hearted and pusillanimous character of this concession is quite clearly described in the Memorandum:

"At first, when the Zemstvo reform was just being undertaken, it was no doubt intended as a first step toward the introduction of representative institutions***, but later, when Count Lanskoi and N. A. Milyutin were replaced by Count Valuyev, there was an obvious desire, as even the ex-Minister of the Interior admits, to act in a spirit of 'conciliation', 'softly and evasively'. 'The government has no clear

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Tr.*

** We quote from the German translation of Dragomanov's edition of the correspondence of K. D. Kavelin and I. S. Turgenev with A. I. Herzen: *Bibliothek russischer Denkwürdigkeiten*, herausgegeben von Th. Schiemann, Stuttgart, 1894, Bd. 4, *S.* 65-66.

*** There is "no doubt" that the author of the Memorandum, in employing the language of Leroy-Beaulieu, commits the usual bureaucratic exaggeration. There is "no doubt" that neither Lanskoi nor Milyutin had anything very definite in mind, and it is ridiculous to regard the evasive phrases of Milyutin ("in principle in favour of the Constitution, but regards its introduction as premature") as a "first step".

idea of its aims,' he said at the time. In short, an attempt was made—unfortunately made so often by statesmen and always with bad results for everyone—to act evasively between two opposite opinions, to satisfy liberal aspirations and preserve the existing system."

The pharisaical word "unfortunately" is highly amusing. A minister of the police government describes as casual the tactics which the government *could not but pursue* and did pursue in adopting the factory inspection laws, as well as the law on the reduction of the working day (June 2, 1897), and which it is now (1901) pursuing in General Vannovsky's flirtation with the "public".[33]

"On the one hand, it was stated in the explanatory Memorandum attached to the regulations governing Zemstvo institutions that the purpose of the proposed law was to develop as completely and as consistently as possible the principle of local self-government, and that 'the Zemstvo administration is merely a special organ of one and the same state authority'.... *Severnaya Pochta*, then the organ of the Ministry of the Interior, hinted broadly that the institutions to be established were to serve as schools for representative bodies.

"On the other hand, ... the Zemstvo institutions are described in the explanatory Memorandum as private and as public institutions, subject to the general laws in the same way as individual societies and private persons are subject....

"Both the provisions in the Regulations of 1864 and, in particular, all the subsequent measures adopted by the Ministry of the Interior in relation to the Zemstvo institutions clearly indicate that the 'independence' of the Zemstvo institutions was seen as a great danger, and that the government was afraid to permit the proper development of these institutions, being *fully aware of what that would lead to*. [Our italics throughout.] ... There is no doubt that those who had to carry out the Zemstvo reform did so *merely as a concession to public opinion*, in order as the explanatory Memorandum stated, 'to limit the *unrealisable expectations and radical aspirations* which have been aroused *among the various social-estates* in connection with the establishment of the Zemstvo institutions'; at the same time, these people fully understood it [the reform?] *and strove to prevent the proper development of the Zemstvo*, to give it a private character, restrict its powers, etc. While pacifying the liberals with the promise that the first step would not be the last and declaring, or, to be more precise, echoing the adherents of the liberal trend, that it was necessary to grant the Zemstvo institutions real and independent powers, Count Valuyev, *in the very act of drafting the Regulations of 1864, strove in every way to restrict the powers of those institutions and place them under strict administrative guardianship*....

"Bereft of a single guiding idea, representing a compromise between two opposite trends, the Zemstvo institutions, in the form in which they were established by the Regulations of 1864, proved in practice

to be out of accord with the fundamental idea of local self-government on which they were based, as well as with the administrative system into which they were mechanically inserted and which, moreover, had neither been reformed nor adapted to the new conditions of life. The Regulations of 1864 sought to reconcile the irreconcilable and in that way to satisfy both the advocates and opponents of Zemstvo self-government. *The former were offered superficialities and hopes for the future, while in order to satisfy the latter the powers of the Zemstvo institutions were given an extremely elastic definition.*"

What pointed words our ministers sometimes accidentally let drop when they desire to put a spoke in the wheel of one of their colleagues and to display their profundity, and how useful it would be for every one of our self-complacent Russians and all admirers of the "great" reforms to hang on their walls in golden frames the wise police maxims: "Pacify the liberals with the promise that the first step will not be the last", "offer" them "superficialities and hopes for the future"! It would be particularly useful at the present time to refer to these precepts when reading in articles or other items in newspapers about General Vannovsky's "heartfelt solicitude".

Thus, from the very beginning, the Zemstvo was doomed to serve as a fifth wheel to the wagon of Russian state administration, a wheel *tolerated* by the bureaucracy only insofar as it would not disturb its absolute authority, while the role of the representatives of the population was restricted to the simple technical fulfilment of the functions outlined by this very bureaucracy. The Zemstvos had no executive organs of their own, they had to act through the police, they had no contact with one another, and they were immediately placed under the control of the administration. Having made such a harmless concession, the government, on the very day after the establishment of the Zemstvos, began systematically to impose restrictions upon them; the almighty bureaucratic clique *could not* reconcile itself to the elected representation of the social-estates and began to persecute it in every possible way. A very interesting part of the Memorandum is the summary of facts on this persecution, notwithstanding its obvious incompleteness.

We have seen how pusillanimous and irrational was the attitude of the liberals towards the revolutionary movement at the beginning of the sixties. Instead of supporting the

"alliance of the petty-bourgeois townspeople and the peasants with the adherents of *Velikoruss*", they feared this "alliance" and held it up as a bogy with which to scare the government. Instead of rising to the defence of the leaders of the democratic movement, persecuted by the government, they pharisaically washed their hands of them and justified the action of the government. This treacherous policy of grandiloquence and shameful flabbiness met with poetic justice. Having dealt with those who proved themselves capable, not merely of jabbering about liberty, but of *fighting* for it, the government felt sufficiently strong to squeeze the liberals out of even the minor and inferior positions which they had occupied "with the permission of the authorities". So long as the "alliance of the petty-bourgeois townspeople and the peasants" with the revolutionaries represented a serious menace, the Ministry of the Interior itself mumbled words about a "school of representative institutions", but when the "tactless and cock-sure" hecklers and hotheads had been removed, the "scholars" were treated with an iron hand. Then a tragicomical epic began. The Zemstvo appealed for an extension of its rights, but was *deprived* of one right after another and given "fatherly" homilies in answer to its petitions. But let the historical dates, even those presented in the Memorandum, speak for themselves.

On October 12, 1866, the Ministry of the Interior issued a circular subordinating the Zemstvo employees completely to government institutions. On November 21 a law was passed restricting the right of the Zemstvo in taxing commercial and industrial establishments. The St. Petersburg Zemstvo Assembly, in 1867, sharply criticised this law, and (on the proposal of Count A. P. Shuvalov) adopted a decision to petition the government to arrange for the questions touched upon by this law to be discussed by "the combined forces and with the simultaneous efforts of the central administration and the Zemstvo". The government's answer to this petition was to close down the St. Petersburg Zemstvo institutions and to resort to reprisals: the chairman of the St. Petersburg Zemstvo Board, Kruse, was banished to Orenburg; Count Shuvalov—to Paris; and Senator Luboshchinsky was ordered to resign. *Severnaya Pochta*, organ of the Ministry of the Interior, published an article in which "these

stern measures of punishment were explained by the fact that the Zemstvo Assemblies, too, from the very opening of their sessions, had acted contrary to the law [to what law? and why were the law-breakers not brought *to trial*, when only shortly before a speedy, just, and merciful court procedure had been introduced?]; that instead of supporting the Zemstvo Assemblies of other gubernias, utilising for that purpose the rights which His Majesty has graciously granted them for exercising proper care over the local economic interests of the Zemstvo in their charge [i.e., instead of being humbly submissive and following the "intentions" of the officialdom], they strove continuously, by falsely explaining the case and misinterpreting the laws, *to rouse sentiments of mistrust and lack of respect for the government*". After such an admonition, it is not surprising that "the other Zemstvos failed to support the St. Petersburg Zemstvo, although the law of November 21, 1866, had everywhere given rise to deep-going discontent, so that at meetings many people declared it to be tantamount to destroying the Zemstvos".

On December 16, 1866, the Senate issued a "clarification" granting the governors of the gubernias the right to refuse endorsement to any person elected by a Zemstvo Assembly whom the respective governor deemed politically unreliable. On May 4, 1867, there followed another Senate interpretation to the effect that communication of Zemstvo proposals to other gubernias was contrary to law, since Zemstvo institutions must concern themselves only with local affairs. On June 13 the Council of State issued a ruling, with Imperial sanction, prohibiting publication of decisions, minutes, reports of discussions, etc., of the meetings of Zemstvo, urban, and social-estate assemblies without the consent of the gubernia authorities. Further, that law extended the powers of chairmen of Zemstvo Assemblies; it granted them the right to close meetings at their discretion and imposed upon them the obligation, *under threat of punishment*, to close any meeting at which questions not in consonance with the law were presented for discussion. The public greeted this measure with hostility, regarding it as a serious restriction of Zemstvo activity. "Every one knows," Nikitenko entered in his diary, "that the Zemstvos are tied hand and foot by the new regulations which give the chairmen of

Assemblies and the governors of gubernias almost unlimited powers over them." The circular of October 8, 1868 makes it obligatory to obtain the consent of the governor for the publication even of the reports of the Zemstvo Boards and restricts inter-communication between Zemstvos. In 1869 the office of inspector of elementary schools was established for the purpose of taking the effective management of elementary education out of the hands of the Zemstvos. A regulation issued by the Committee of Ministers on September 19, 1869, which received Imperial sanction, declares that "neither in their composition nor in their fundamental principles are Zemstvo institutions governmental authorities". The law of July 4 and the circular of October 22, 1870 confirm and increase the subordination of Zemstvo employees to the governors of the gubernias. In 1871 instructions were issued to the inspectors of elementary schools empowering them to dismiss teachers who were deemed politically unreliable and to suspend all decisions of the school councils and submit them to the school guardians for their sanction. On December 25, 1873, Alexander II, in a rescript addressed to the Minister of Education, expressed the fear that *unless proper guardianship and control are exercised over them*, the elementary schools may be converted "*into an instrument for the moral corruption of the people*, *some attempts at which have already been disclosed*," and he ordered the marshals of the nobility, by their close co-operation, to preserve the moral influence of the schools. In 1874 a new regulation concerning the elementary schools was issued, which placed the management of the schools entirely in the hands of the head masters. The Zemstvo "protested"—if a petition pleading that the law be revised and that the representatives of the Zemstvo take part in this revision (the petition of the Kazan Zemstvo in 1874) can, without irony, be described as a protest. Of course, the petition was rejected. Etc., etc.

III

Such was the first course of lessons given to Russian citizens in the "school of representative institutions" opened by the Ministry of the Interior. Fortunately, in addition to the political scholars who, in connection with the constitu-

tional declarations of the sixties, wrote that "it is time to give up all nonsense and get down to business, and business is now in the Zemstvo institutions and nowhere else",* there were in Russia also "hotheads", who were not satisfied with such "tact" and went with revolutionary propaganda among the people. Although they adhered to a theory which in essence was not revolutionary, their propaganda roused a spirit of discontent and protest among broad strata of the educated youth. Despite their utopian theory, which rejected political struggle, the movement led to a desperate grapple between the government and a handful of heroes, to a struggle for political freedom. Thanks to this struggle, and to it alone, the situation again changed; the government was once more compelled to make concessions, and the liberals once again revealed their political immaturity, their inability to support the fighters and bring real pressure to bear upon the government. The constitutional aspirations of the Zemstvo became very marked, but these proved to be but a feeble "impulse", despite the fact that Zemstvo liberalism in itself had made decided political progress. Particularly noteworthy was its attempt to establish an illegal party and to set up its own political organ. In his Memorandum, Witte summarises some of these illegal writings (of Cannan, Dragomanov, Tikhomirov), in order to demonstrate the "slippery path" (p. 98) upon which the Zemstvo had entered. In the late seventies, several congresses of Zemstvo liberals were held. The liberals decided "to take measures to bring about at least a temporary cessation of the destructive activities of the extreme revolutionary party, for they were convinced that nothing could be achieved by peaceful means if the terrorists continued to irritate and alarm the government by threats and acts of violence" (p. 99). Thus, instead of making an effort to extend the struggle, to secure considerable public support for individual revolutionaries, to organise some sort of public pressure (in the form of demonstrations, of refusal by the Zemstvo to carry out compulsory expenditures, etc.), the liberals again appealed for "tact"—"not to irritate"

* A letter written by Kavelin to relatives in 1865, in which he refers to the petition of the Moscow nobility for "the convocation of a general assembly of representatives of the land of Russia to discuss needs common to the whole state".

the government!—to employ the "peaceful means" that had so brilliantly proved their futility in the sixties!* Of course, the revolutionaries refused to agree to any cessation or suspension of fighting actions. The Zemstvo supporters then formed the League of Oppositional Elements, which was later transformed into the Zemstvo Union and Self-Government Society, or Zemstvo Union. The programme of the Zemstvo Union contained the following demands: (1) freedom of speech and the press, (2) inviolability of the person, and (3) the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. An attempt to publish illegal pamphlets in Galicia failed (the Austrian police seized the manuscripts and the persons who intended to print them), and in August 1881 *Volnoye Slovo*,[34] edited in Geneva by Dragomanov (ex-professor of Kiev University), became the official organ of the Zemstvo Union. "In the final analysis," wrote Dragomanov in 1888, "the attempt to publish *Volnoye Slovo* as a Zemstvo organ cannot be regarded as successful, if only for the reason that Zemstvo material did not begin to reach the editorial office regularly until late in 1882 and publication ceased in May 1883" (op. cit., p. 40). The failure of the liberal organ was a natural effect of the weakness of the liberal movement. On November 20, 1878, Alexander II delivered a speech at a meeting of representatives of the social-estates in Moscow, in which he expressed the hope that "he would obtain their co-operation in checking the erring younger generation which was pursuing the fatal path whither suspect persons were striving to lead it." Later, an appeal for public co-operation appeared in *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*[35] (No. 186, 1878). In reply, five Zemstvo Assemblies (Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Samara, and Tver) issued declarations urging the need to convene a National Assembly. "We may believe also," says Witte in his Memorandum, after summarising in detail the contents

* Dragomanov said in all justice: "As a matter of fact, liberalism in Russia cannot employ absolutely 'peaceful means', because every declaration in favour of changing the higher administration is prohibited by law. The Zemstvo liberals should have stepped resolutely over the bounds of this prohibition, and in this way at least have demonstrated their strength to both the government and the terrorists. As the Zemstvo liberals did not demonstrate this strength, they lived to see the day when the government revealed its intention to destroy the already truncated Zemstvo institutions" (ibid., pp. 41-42).

of these petitions, of which only three appeared in the press in full, "that the Zemstvo declarations on the convocation of a National Assembly would have been far more numerous, had not the Ministry of the Interior taken timely steps to prevent such declarations; the marshals of the nobility, as chairmen of gubernia Zemstvo Assemblies, received circular letters instructing them to prevent even the reading of such petitions at meetings of the assemblies. In some places, arrests were made and councillors banished. In Chernigov the meeting hall was invaded and forcibly cleared by gendarmes" (p. 104).

The liberal magazines and newspapers supported the movement. A petition signed by "twenty-five prominent Moscow citizens" addressed to Loris-Melikov asked for the convocation of an independent assembly of representatives of the Zemstvos which should be given the right to participate in the government of the nation. In appointing Loris-Melikov Minister of the Interior, the government was *apparently* making a concession. But only *apparently*; for not only were no decisive steps taken, there were not even any declarations that might be called positive and incapable of misinterpretation. Loris-Melikov called together the editors of St. Petersburg periodicals and explained to them "the programme": to learn the wishes, needs, etc., of the population, to enable the Zemstvos, etc., to enjoy their legal rights (the liberal programme guarantees the Zemstvos those "rights" of which the law systematically deprives them!), etc. The author of the Memorandum states:

"Through the medium of these interlocutors the Minister's programme was circulated throughout Russia—for which purpose they had been called together. In point of fact, the programme did not promise anything definite. One could read into it anything one desired, i.e., everything or nothing. A leaflet secretly distributed at the time was right in its way [only in "its" way, not absolutely in "every" way!] when it stated that the programme simultaneously wagged a 'fox tail' and gnashed 'wolf's fangs'. This attack on the programme and its author is the more understandable, because, in communicating the programme to the representatives of the press, the Count strongly urged them 'not to confuse and not to excite the public mind needlessly with their

visionary illusions'." But the liberal Zemstvo supporters refused to listen to the *truth* contained in the secret leaflet and accepted the wagging of the "fox tail" as a "new policy" worthy of confidence. "The Zemstvos believed and sympathised with the government," says the Memorandum, quoting an illegally published pamphlet, *The Opinions of the Zemstvo Assemblies on the Present State of Russia*, "and they seemed afraid of running too far ahead and of pestering the government with excessive requests." A characteristic admission on the part of the Zemstvo adherents, who enjoyed freedom of expression! The Zemstvo Union at its congress in 1880 had only just decided "to strive to secure central popular representation, of which an absolute condition would be a single chamber and universal suffrage", when this decision to *strive to secure* was carried out by the tactic of refraining from "*running too far ahead*" and "*believing and sympathising with*" ambiguous declarations that bind no one to anything! With unpardonable naïveté, the Zemstvo adherents imagined that presenting petitions meant "striving to secure"—and petitions "poured in from the Zemstvos in abundance". On January 28, 1881, Loris-Melikov submitted a most humble Memorial to the tsar proposing the establishment of a commission of Zemstvo representatives with advisory powers only, for the purpose of drafting the laws His Majesty would be pleased to indicate. The Special Council set up by Alexander II approved of this measure; the findings of the Council of February 17, 1881, were confirmed by the Tsar, who also approved the text of the government announcement submitted by Loris-Melikov.

"Undoubtedly," writes Witte, "the establishment of such a purely advisory commission did not yet establish a constitution," but, he continues, it can hardly be denied that it represented a step forward (following the reforms of the sixties) towards a constitution and towards nothing else. The author then repeats a statement contained in the foreign press to the effect that upon reading Loris-Melikov's Memorial, Alexander II exclaimed: "Why, this is the *États généraux*.... What is proposed to us is neither more nor less than the Assembly of Notables of Louis XVI."[36]

We would observe, on our part, that under certain circumstances the application of Loris-Melikov's proposal

might have been a step towards a constitution, but it might also not have been; everything depended on which prevailed —the pressure of the revolutionary party and the liberal public, or the counter-pressure of the very powerful, compact party of persisting supporters of the autocracy that were unscrupulous in the methods they employed. If, however, we speak, not of what might have happened, but of what actually did happen, then we must admit the indubitable fact that the government was *wavering*. Some members of the government were in favour of strenuously resisting the liberals, while others were in favour of making concessions. But—and this is particularly important—even the latter wavered, having no very definite programme and never rising above the level of scheming bureaucrats.

In his Memorandum, Witte writes:

> "Count Loris-Melikov appeared to be afraid to look the affair straight in the face and to define his programme with precision; he continued the evasive policy—in another direction, it is true—that had been adopted by Count Valuyev towards the Zemstvo institutions.
>
> "As even the legal press rightly pointed out at the time, the programme announced by Loris-Melikov was distinguished by its extreme vagueness. This vagueness is observed in all the Count's subsequent actions and pronouncements. On the one hand, he declared that the autocracy was 'separated from the people', that 'he looks to public support as the principal force...', and that he regarded the proposed reform 'not as something final, but merely as a first step', etc. On the other hand, the Count declared at the same time to the press representatives that 'the hopes aroused among the people are nothing but a visionary illusion...', and in his most humble Memorial to the Tsar, he stated categorically that a National Assembly would be 'a dangerous experiment of reverting to the past...', that the measure he proposed would not in any way restrict the powers of the autocracy, since it had nothing in common with Western constitutional forms. Generally speaking, as L. Tikhomirov has fitly remarked, the Memorial itself is distinguished by its wonderfully confused wording" (p. 117).

In his attitude towards the freedom *fighters* Loris-Melikov, that notorious hero of the "dictatorship of the heart",[37] displayed "a cruelty unparalleled, before or since, in ordering the execution of a seventeen year-old youth for a printed leaflet found in his possession. Loris-Melikov did not forget the most remote parts of Siberia, and he did everything to worsen the conditions of the exiles suffering for their propaganda" (V. Zasulich in *Sotsial-*

Demokrat,[38] No. 1, p. 84). In view of the government's wavering, only a force capable of earnest struggle could have secured a constitution; but such a force was lacking—the revolutionaries had exhausted themselves by their effort of March 1[39]; there was neither a broad movement nor a strong organisation of the working class, and the liberal public on this occasion again proved to be so politically immature that even after the assassination of Alexander II it restricted itself to the mere presentation of petitions. The Zemstvos, the municipalities, and the liberal press (*Poryadok*, *Strana*, *Golos**), all presented petitions. Particularly loyal, artful, and nebulous were the petitions of the liberal authors of memoranda, such as the Marquis of Velepolski, Professor Chicherin, and Professor Gradovsky. Witte's Memorandum reproduces their content from a pamphlet published in London,** *The Constitution of Count Loris-Melikov* (Free Russian Press Fund, London, 1893). Those authors invented ingenious devices for bringing the monarch to cross the Rubicon without his being aware of it". It stands to reason that all these cautious petitions and artful devices proved utterly useless without a revolutionary force, and the autocratic party triumphed—triumphed despite the fact that on March 8, 1881, a majority of the Council of Ministers (seven against five) had voted *in favour* of Loris-Melikov's proposal. (So the pamphlet has it; but Witte, who assiduously cites its authors, for some reason or other declares in his Memorandum: "It is not authentically known what happened at this meeting of March 8 and what it resulted in; it would be rash to rely upon the rumours that have reached the foreign press," p. 124). On April 29, 1881, the Manifesto on the reaffirmation and preservation of autocracy, described by Katkov as "manna from heaven", was promulgated.

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* *Poryadok* (Order); *Strana* (The Country); *Golos* (The Voice).—*Ed.*

** As we have seen, the author of the Memorandum most carefully copies from illegal pamphlets and admits that "the underground press and the literary works published abroad quite correctly judged the position on this question from their point of view" (p. 91). The only thing original produced by this learned Russian "political-scientist" is a certain amount of raw material; he has had to borrow all the fundamental points of view regarding political questions in Russia from underground literature.

For the second time since the emancipation of the peasants the revolutionary tide was swept back, and following it and as a consequence of it, the liberal movement for a second time gave way to *reaction*, over which Russian progressive society, of course, raised bitter lamentations. We are past masters of the art of lamentation; we lament the tactlessness and self-assurance of revolutionaries in harassing the government; we lament the government's indecisiveness when, finding that it is not confronted by a real force, it makes pseudo-concessions and takes back with one hand what it has given with the other; we lament "the age without ideas and ideals", when the government, having settled scores with revolutionaries whom the people failed to support, hastens to make up for lost time and fortifies itself for a fresh onslaught.

IV

The epoch of the "dictatorship of the heart", as Loris-Melikov's ministry has been described, proved to our liberals that even the "constitutionalism" of one of the ministers, even of the Prime Minister, with the government wavering and the Council of Ministers approving "the first step towards reform" by a majority, still guarantees precisely nothing, if there is no serious social force capable of compelling the government to surrender. It is interesting to note also that the government of Alexander III did not show its fangs immediately upon the promulgation of the Manifesto reaffirming the autocracy, but found it necessary for a time to fool the "public". In employing the term "fool" the public, we do not suggest that the government adopted the Machiavellian scheme of some minister, notable, or other. It cannot be over-emphasised that the system of pseudo-concessions and of seemingly important steps "to meet" public opinion has become an integral part of the policy of every modern government, including the Russian, for the Russian Government has for many generations recognised the necessity of reckoning with public opinion in one way or another, and in the course of many generations has trained statesmen in the shrewd art of domestic diplomacy. Such a diplomat was Count Ignatyev, whose appointment to the Ministry of the Interior in place of Loris-Melikov was intended to cover the

government's retreat towards out and out reaction. More than once Ignatyev proved himself a demagogue and deceiver of the worst type, so much so that Witte reveals in his Memorandum not a little "police complacency" when he describes the period of his office as an "unsuccessful attempt to create a country with local self-government and with an autocratic tsar at its head". True, this is precisely the "formula" advanced at the time by I. S. Aksakov; it was utilised by the government for its manoeuvres and was assailed by Katkov, who proved conclusively that there is a necessary connection between local self-government and a constitution. But it would be short-sighted to attempt *to explain* the well-known tactics of the police government (tactics deriving from its very nature) by the prevalence of this or that political view at the given moment.

Ignatyev issued a circular, in which he promised that the government would "take urgent measures to introduce proper methods to secure, with the maximum of success, the active participation of local public figures in the execution of His Majesty's designs". The Zemstvos responded to this "call" by petitions pleading for the convocation of an assembly "of the elected representatives of the people" (from the memorandum of a member of the Cherepovets Zemstvo; the governor did not even permit the opinion of a member of the Kirillov Zemstvo to be published). The government instructed the governors to "take no further action" with regard to these petitions; "at the same time, measures were apparently taken to prevent other assemblies from submitting similar petitions". The notorious attempt was made to call a conference of "qualified people" hand-picked by the ministers (for the purpose of discussing questions of reducing land redemption payments,[40] regulating migration, reforming local government, etc.). "The work of the committees of experts evoked no sympathy among the public and, *notwithstanding all the precautionary measures*, even aroused a direct protest from the Zemstvos. Twelve Zemstvo Assemblies petitioned that Zemstvo representatives be invited to participate in legislative activity, not only on special occasions and by appointment from the government, but permanently and by election from the Zemstvos." An attempt by the Samara Zemstvo to adopt a similar motion was pre-

vented by the chairman, "after which the Assembly broke up in protest" (Dragomanov, op. cit., p. 29; Memorandum, p. 131). That Count Ignatyev *duped* the Zemstvos is apparent from the following fact: "Mr. Ustimovich, Marshal of the Poltava Nobility and author of the draft Constitutional Petition of 1879, openly declared in the Gubernia Assembly of Nobles that he had received *positive assurances* [*sic*!] from Count Ignatyev that the government would call upon the representatives of the country to take part in legislative activity" (Dragomanov, ibid.).

These frauds of Ignatyev crowned the work of covering up the government's transition to a decisively new policy, and not without good reason did D. A. Tolstoi, who on May 30, 1882, was appointed Minister of the Interior, earn the nickname "Minister of Struggle". Petitions from the Zemstvos even for the convening of some sort of private conferences were unceremoniously rejected. There was even a case of a government commission replacing a Zemstvo Board and banishing its members, on a complaint lodged by a governor against "the systematic opposition" of the Zemstvo (of Cherepovets). D. A. Tolstoi, a faithful disciple and follower of Katkov, went further and decided to "reform" the Zemstvo institutions. The idea underlying the reform (which, as we have seen, was confirmed by history) was that "the opposition to the government has strongly entrenched itself in the Zemstvos" (p. 139 of the Memorandum, dealing with the original plan for Zemstvo reform). D. A. Tolstoi planned to replace the Zemstvo Boards with bureaus subordinated to the governor and to make all decisions of the Zemstvo Assemblies subject to the governor's sanction. This would have been a truly "radical" reform; but it is extremely interesting to note that even this disciple of Katkov, this "Minister of Struggle", in the words of the Memorandum, "did not abandon the usual policy of the Ministry of the Interior towards the Zemstvo institutions. In the draft of his project, Tolstoi did not openly express his idea, actually to abolish the Zemstvos; on the pretext of correctly developing the principle of local self-government, he sought to preserve their external form, but, at the same time, deprive them of all internal substance". This cunning policy of "the fox tail" was still further supplemented and developed in the

Council of State, with the result that the Zemstvo Regulations of 1890 "proved to be another half-measure in the history of Zemstvo institutions. They did not abolish the Zemstvos, but rendered them featureless and colourless; they did not destroy their character as being representative of all social-estates, but they gave them a social-estate tinge; ... they did not convert the Zemstvo institutions into regular organs of the state, ... but increased the power of the governors over them ... and increased the governor's power of veto". "The Regulations of July 12, 1890, were, in keeping with their author's design, a step in the direction of abolishing the Zemstvo institutions, not a radical reform of Zemstvo local self-government."

The Memorandum goes on to state that this new "half-measure" did not remove the opposition to the government (it was, of course, impossible to remove the opposition to a reactionary government by intensifying that reaction), but merely drove *certain* of its manifestations below the surface. The opposition manifested itself, first, in the fact that certain anti-Zemstvo laws—if one may so term them—met with resistance and were not carried out *de facto*; it manifested itself, again, in constitutional (or, at all events, constitution-flavoured) petitions. Thus, the law of June 10, 1893, which tied up the Zemstvo medical service in a tangle of detailed regulations, met with the first-mentioned type of opposition. "The Zemstvo institutions put up a strenuous resistance to the Ministry of the Interior, which had to make a retreat. The Ministry was compelled to suspend the introduction of new regulations, already drafted, to reserve them for a complete collection of the laws, and to draft a fresh proposal on altogether different principles [i.e., principles more acceptable to the Zemstvos]." The Assessment of Real Estate Act of June 8, 1893, which similarly introduced the principle of regulation and restricted the rights of the Zemstvos in the assessment of rates, likewise gave rise to dissatisfaction, and in many cases "is not being applied in practice". The medical and statistical institutions established by the Zemstvos, which have brought considerable benefit to the population (as compared with the bureaucracy, of course), proved themselves of sufficient strength to paralyse the regulations drawn up in the chancelleries of St. Petersburg.

The second form of opposition also found expression in the new Zemstvo, in 1894, when the Zemstvo petitions to Nicholas II renewed very definitely their demand for the extension of local self-government and gave rise to the "celebrated" words about senseless dreaming.

To the horror of the ministers, the "political tendencies" of the Zemstvos did not disappear. The author of the Memorandum cites the bitter complaints of the Governor of Tver (from his report of 1898) over the "closely knit group of people of liberal views" which had concentrated the affairs of the gubernia Zemstvo entirely in its own hands. "From the same governor's report for 1895, it is apparent that the struggle against the Zemstvo opposition presents a difficult task for the local administration and that the marshals of the nobility, who officiate as chairmen at Zemstvo meetings, are sometimes called upon to display 'civic courage' [*sic*!] in carrying out the instructions contained in the confidential circulars of the Ministry of the Interior on matters in which the Zemstvo institutions must not interfere." It is further related how, at one of the meetings of the assembly, the gubernia Marshal of the Nobility turned over his post as chairman to the uyezd* Marshal (Tver), how the Tver Marshal in his turn passed it on to the Novy Torzhok Marshal, and how the Novy Torzhok Marshal also fell ill and handed over the post to the Staritsa Marshal. And so, even the marshals of the nobility flinch from carrying out police functions! "The law of 1890 [laments the author of the Memorandum] gave the Zemstvo a social-estate tinge, strengthened the government element in the assemblies, and appointed all the uyezd marshals of the nobility and rural superintendents[41] to the gubernia Zemstvo Assemblies, and the fact that these featureless, social-estate, bureaucratic Zemstvos continue nevertheless to betray political tendencies, is a matter that should be pondered.... Resistance has not been overcome; deep discontent and silent opposition undoubtedly exist, and will continue to exist until the Zemstvo representing all estates dies." Such is the last word in bureaucratic wisdom. If curtailed representation gives rise to discontent, then the abolition of every kind of representation

* See footnote to p. 36.—*Tr.*

will, by simple human logic, strengthen this discontent and opposition. Mr. Witte imagines, however, that if one of the institutions that bring at least a particle of discontent to the surface is closed down, the discontent will disappear. Perhaps you think that Witte proposes something as resolute as the abolition of the Zemstvo? Nothing of the kind. Although, for the sake of fine words, he condemns the policy of evasion, Witte himself has nothing else but this policy to propose; nor can he have, without shedding the skin of minister of the autocratic government. Witte mumbles arrant nonsense about a "third way"—neither bureaucratic domination nor local self-government, but an administrative reform which should "properly organise" the "participation of public elements in government institutions". It is easy to emit nonsense of this kind, but after all the experiments with "qualified people" no one will be deceived by it; it is only too obvious that *without a constitution* any "participation of public elements" will be a fiction, will mean the subordination of the public (or those "called" from the public) to the bureaucracy. While criticising a particular measure of the Ministry of the Interior (the establishment of Zemstvos in the outlying regions), Witte cannot suggest anything new on the general question he himself raises, but merely warms up the old methods—half-measures, pseudo-concessions, and promises of numerous benefits, none of which are fulfilled. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that on the general question of "the direction of domestic policy", Witte and Goremykin are at one, and that the controversy between them is merely a family quarrel, a feud within the clan. On the one hand, Witte hastens to declare, "I have never proposed nor do I now propose the abolition of Zemstvo institutions or any radical change in the present system ... under present conditions there can hardly be any talk of abolishing them [the existing Zemstvos]". Witte, "on his part, thinks that with the establishment of strong governmental authority in the localities, it will be possible to place greater confidence in the Zemstvos", etc. After establishing a strong local bureaucracy to counterbalance local self-government (i.e., rendering local self-government impotent), one can place greater "confidence" in it. The same old song! Mr. Witte fears only "institutions representing all

the social-estates"; he "did not have in mind the various corporations, societies, unions of the social-estates or trade unions and did not consider their activities to be dangerous to the autocracy". For example, in regard to the "village communes", Mr. Witte does not doubt in the least that in view of their "inertness" they are harmless to the autocracy. "The predominance of landownership relations and the interests connected with them develop spiritual peculiarities in the rural population which render it indifferent to anything outside the politics of the village pump.... Our peasants at village meetings concern themselves with the apportioning of taxes, ... the distribution of allotments, etc. Moreover, they are illiterate or semi-literate—*what sort of politics then can they concern themselves with*?" Mr. Witte is extremely sober-minded, as you see. In regard to the unions of social-estates he declares that from the point of view of the danger they represent to the central government "their diversity of interests is of great importance. The government, by taking advantage of this diversity of interests, can always find support in one social-estate and play it off against the political claims of the others". Witte's programme of "properly organised participation of public elements in government institutions" is nothing but another of the innumerable attempts of the police state to "split" the population.

On the other hand, Mr. Goremykin, with whom Mr. Witte enters into such heated controversy, himself carries out this very systematic policy of disunity and persecution. He argues (in his Memorandum, to which Witte rejoins) that it is necessary to institute new offices to supervise the Zemstvo; he is opposed to permitting even simple local congresses of Zemstvo civil servants; he stands whole-heartedly for the Regulations of 1890—that step towards the abolition of the Zemstvos; he fears the effort of the Zemstvos to include "tendentious questions" in their programme of assessment work; he fears Zemstvo statistics generally; he is in favour of taking the elementary schools out of the hands of the Zemstvos and placing them under the control of government institutions; he argues that the Zemstvos are incapable of handling the questions connected with the food supply (Zemstvo workers, don't you see, encourage "exaggerated notions of the extent of the disaster and the needs of the

famine-stricken population"!!); and he defends the fixing of limits to Zemstvo taxation, "in order to protect landed property from excessive increases in Zemstvo taxes". Witte is entirely right, therefore, when he says: "The entire policy of the Ministry of the Interior towards the Zemstvos consists in slowly but steadily undermining their organs, weakening their significance, and concentrating their functions in the hands of government institutions. It may be said without the slightest exaggeration that when the 'recently adopted measures' referred to in the Memorandum [Goremykin's] 'regulating the various branches of Zemstvo work and administration' are brought to a successful conclusion, we shall have no local self-government whatever. All that will be left of the Zemstvo institutions will be a mere idea and a shell without any real content." Consequently, the policy of Goremykin (and more so the policy of Sipyagin) and of Witte lead to the same goal, and the controversy over the question of the Zemstvo and constitutionalism is, we repeat, nothing more than a family quarrel. Lovers' tiffs are easily made up again. The "fight" between Mr. Witte and Mr. Goremykin is nothing more serious than that. As for our own views on the general question of the autocracy and the Zemstvos, it will be more convenient to present them in the process of analysing the preface written by R. N. S.*

V

Mr. R. N. S.'s preface represents much that is of interest. It touches upon the broadest questions of political reforms in Russia, the various methods by which these reforms can be effected, and the significance of the various forces leading to these reforms. On the other hand, Mr. R. N. S., who apparently has close relations with liberal circles generally, and Zemstvo liberal circles in particular, undoubtedly sounds a new note in the chorus of our "underground" literature. Therefore, in order to clear up the question of the political significance of the Zemstvos in principle and to acquaint ourselves with the tendencies and, I shall not say directions,

* A *nom de plume* used by Mr. Struve. (Author's comment to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

but moods, in the circles close to the liberals, it will be well worth our while to deal in detail with this preface and determine whether that which is new in it is positive or negative, and to what extent it is positive and to what extent negative and why.

The fundamental feature of R. N. S.'s views is the following. As can be seen from numerous passages of his essay, quoted below, he favours peaceful, gradual, and strictly legal development. On the other hand, he rebels with all his being against the autocracy and yearns for political freedom. But the autocracy is an autocracy precisely because it prohibits and persecutes *all* "development" towards freedom. This contradiction permeates the whole of R. N. S.'s essay and renders his argumentation extremely illogical, hesitant, and unsound. Constitutionalism can be combined with solicitude for the strictly legal development of autocratic Russia only on the premise or, at least, on the assumption that the autocratic government *itself* will understand, grow weary, yield, etc. And Mr. R. N. S. does, indeed, at times fall from the height of his civic indignation to the vulgar viewpoint of the most immature liberalism. Thus, he says of himself: "... we who regard the struggle for civil liberties waged by politically conscious people in Russia today to be their vow of Hannibal, a vow as sacred as that taken by the men and women who fought for the emancipation of the peasants in the forties" ... and, again, "however trying it is to those of us who have taken the 'vow of Hannibal' to fight against the autocracy", etc. Well said, powerfully said! Powerful words like these would have been an embellishment to the article, if the same spirit of indomitable and irreconcilable struggle ("the vow of Hannibal") had pervaded it throughout. But these powerful words, precisely because they are so powerful, sound discordant when accompanied by a note of artificial conciliation and pacification, by an attempt to introduce, even with the aid of far-fetched interpretations, the conception of peaceful, strictly legal development. Mr. R. N. S., unfortunately, evinces more than enough such notes and such attempts. He devotes a page and a half, for instance, to a detailed "argumentation" of the idea that "the policy of the state during the reign of Nicholas II deserves *even severer* [our italics] condemnation from

the moral and political points of view than the wicked revision of the reforms of Alexander II carried out during the reign of Alexander III". Why *severer* condemnation? It appears that this is because Alexander III fought against revolution, while Nicholas II fought against "the legal aspirations of Russian society"; the former fought against politically conscious forces, the latter against "quite peaceful social forces often acting without any clear political idea" ("hardly even realising that their purposive cultural work was undermining the state system"). To a considerable degree this is untrue in point of fact, as we shall show further on. But apart from this, one cannot help noting the author's peculiar line of reasoning. He condemns autocracy, but condemns one autocrat *more* than another, not because of policy, for that has remained unchanged, but because he (allegedly) has no "hotheads" to contend with, such as "naturally" call forth sharp resistance, and, consequently, he has no occasion for persecutions. Is not such an argument an obvious concession to the loyal and humble contention that Our Father the Tsar need not fear to call together his beloved people because they have never dreamed of anything beyond the bounds of peaceful strivings and strict legality? We are not surprised to find such a "train of thought" (or train of lies) in the works of Mr. Witte, who writes in his Memorandum: "One would suppose, when there are no political parties and there is no revolution, and when the rights of the supreme authority are not being challenged, that the administration should not be contraposed to the people or society...",* etc. We are not surprised to meet with such arguments in the writings of Mr. Chicherin, who, in the Memorandum presented to Count Milyutin after March 1, 1881, declared that "the authorities must first of all display their energy and show that they have not lowered their nag in the face of danger", that "the monarchical system is compatible with free institutions only when the latter are the fruit of peaceful development and the calm initiative of the supreme authority itself", and who recommended the

* P. 205. "This is even silly," observes R. N. S. in a footnote to this passage. Quite so. But is not R. N. S.'s reasoning on pp. xi-xii of his preface, cited above, moulded from the same clay?

establishment of a "strong and liberal" government functioning with the aid of a "legislative organ strengthened and renovated by the elective element".* Now, it would be quite natural for such a Mr. Chicherin to acknowledge that the policy of Nicholas II deserves greater condemnation, *because* under his rule peaceful development and the calm initiative of the supreme authority itself *could have led* to free institutions. But is it natural and decent to hear such reasoning from a man who took the vow of Hannibal to struggle?

Mr. R. N. S. is wrong in point of fact. "Now," he says, comparing the present reign with the preceding one, "no one thinks seriously of the violent overthrow wishfully imagined by the adherents of Narodnaya Volya." *Parlez pour vous, monsieur!* Speak only for yourself. We know quite definitely that the revolutionary movement in Russia, far from having died out or subsided in the present as compared with the previous reign, has, on the contrary, revived and become many times stronger. What kind of "revolutionary" movement would it be, if none of the participants thought seriously of a violent change? The objection may be raised that in the quoted lines Mr. R. N. S. has in mind, not violent revolution in general, but a specific "Narodnaya Volya" revolution, i.e., a revolution that will be both political and social at the same time, a revolution that will lead, not only to the overthrow of the autocracy, but to the seizure of power. Such an objection, however, would be groundless, first, because to the autocracy as such (i.e., to the autocratic government and not to the "bourgeoisie" or "society") it is not important *for what reason* people want to overthrow it; important is *the fact* that they want to overthrow it. Secondly, at the beginning of the reign of Alexander III, the Narodnaya Volya adherents "presented" to the government the very alternative that Social-Democracy now presents to Nicholas II—either revolutionary struggle or the renunciation of autocratic power. (See the Letter of the Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volya to Alexander III, dated March 10, 1881, which put forward two conditions: (1) a general amnesty for all political offenders, and (2) the

* Witte's Memorandum, pp. 122-23. *The Constitution of Count Loris-Melikov*, p. 24.

convening of an assembly of representatives of the entire Russian people on the basis of universal suffrage, freedom of the press, speech, and assembly.) Mr. R. N. S. himself knows perfectly well that many people, not only among the intelligentsia, but also among the working class, "think seriously" about a violent revolution; see page xxxix et seq. of his essay, where reference is made to "revolutionary Social-Democracy", which possesses a "mass basis and intellectual forces", which is advancing towards "the decisive political struggle", towards the "sanguinary struggle of revolutionary Russia against the absolutist-bureaucratic regime" (p. xli). There is not the slightest doubt, therefore, that Mr. R. N. S.'s "loyal speeches" constitute a special method, an attempt to influence the government (or "public opinion") by demonstrating his (or other people's) modesty.

Mr. R. N. S., by the way, thinks that the term "struggle" may be given a very wide interpretation. "The abolition of the Zemstvo," he writes, "will place a trump card in the hands of revolutionary propagandists—we say this quite objectively [*sic*!], without, on the one hand, experiencing repulsion against what is usually termed revolutionary action, or, on the other, being carried away with infatuation or admiration for this form [*sic*!] of struggle for political and social progress." This is a most remarkable tirade. If we remove the quasi-scientific formula, this inappropriate parading of "objectivity" (since the author himself mentions his preference for one or another form of activity or of struggle, the protestation of his objectivity rates in value with the statement, two and two equal one stearin candle), we shall find the hoary argument: Gentlemen of the government, you may believe me when I begin to scare you with revolution, because my heart is not in it. His reference to objectivity is nothing more nor less than a fig-leaf intended to conceal subjective antipathy to revolution and revolutionary activity. And Mr. R. N. S. stands in need of a fig-leaf, because such antipathy is totally incompatible with the vow of Hannibal.

By the way, are we not making a mistake about this Hannibal? Did he really take a vow to struggle against the Romans, or only to fight for the progress of Carthage, which progress, of course, in the final analysis, would be to the in-

jury of Rome? Can the term "struggle" be understood otherwise than in its "narrow" meaning? Mr. R. N. S. thinks it can. A comparison of the vow of Hannibal with the above-mentioned tirade yields the conclusion that struggle against the autocracy manifests itself in various "forms": one form is the revolutionary, illegal struggle; another form is "struggle for political and social progress" in general, in other words peaceful legal activity, which disseminates culture within the limits permitted by the autocracy. We do not doubt in the least that it is possible even under the autocracy to carry on legal activity which promotes Russian progress, in some cases fairly rapid technological progress, in a few cases insignificant social progress, and, in exceptional cases, political progress to a very slight extent. We may argue about the magnitude of this slight progress and the extent to which it is possible, the extent to which isolated cases of such progress are capable of paralysing the mass political demoralisation which the autocracy is constantly sowing among the population everywhere. But to include, even indirectly, peaceful legal activity in the conception of struggle against the autocracy means to facilitate this work of demoralisation and to weaken the as it is infinitely weak consciousness of the Russian man in the street of his responsibility as citizen for *everything* the government does.

Unfortunately, Mr. R. N. S. is not alone among the illegal writers who seek to obliterate the difference between revolutionary struggle and peaceful uplift activities. He has a predecessor in the person of R. M., author of the article "Our Reality", published in the celebrated "*Separate Supplement*" *to Rabochaya Mysl*[42] (September 1899). In his controversy with the Social-Democratic revolutionaries, Mr. R. M. wrote: "The struggle for the Zemstvo and for municipal seIf-government, the struggle for public schools, the struggle for public courts, the struggle for public aid to the famine-stricken population, etc., all represent the struggle against the autocracy.... This social struggle, which for some unexplained reason fails to attract the favourable interest of many Russian revolutionary writers, is, as we have seen, being waged by Russian society, and not only since yesterday.... The question now is how these separate social strata ... can wage the struggle against the autocracy most effectively....

The principal question for us is how this social struggle against the autocracy should be waged by our workers, whose movement our revolutionaries regard as the best means of overthrowing the autocracy" (pp. 8-9). As can be seen, Mr. R. M. does not bother to conceal his antipathy towards the revolutionaries; he openly characterises legal opposition and peaceful activity as struggle against the autocracy, and the most important question for him is how the workers should conduct *this* struggle. Mr. R. N. S. is not nearly so crude and open, but the kinship between the political trends of this liberal and of the ardent worshipper of the labour movement pure and simple, is very definitely apparent.*

With respect to Mr. R. N. S.'s "objectivity", we must say that he sometimes simply casts it aside. He is "objective" when he speaks of the working-class movement, of its organic growth, of the future inevitable struggles between revolutionary Social-Democracy and the autocracy, and when he states that the abolition of the Zemstvos will inevitably force the liberals to organise an illegal party. All this is set forth in a very business-like and sober manner, so sober indeed that one can only rejoice that the working-class movement in Russia is so well understood in liberal circles. But when, instead of fighting the enemy, Mr. R. N. S. begins to talk about the possibility of "submission" on the part of the enemy, he forfeits his "objectivity", gives expression to his real sentiments, and even passes from the indicative mood to the imperative.

"Only in the event of people being found among those in power courageous enough to submit to history and to compel the autocrat to

* "The economic organisations of the workers," says Mr. R. N. S. in another passage, "will serve as a school for the real political education of the working masses." We would advise our author to be more careful in employing the term "real", which has been worn thin by the knights of opportunism. It cannot be denied that under certain conditions their economic organisations may help the workers very considerably in their political training (no more than it can be denied that under other circumstances they may help in their political demoralisation). But the masses of the workers can obtain *real* political training only by their participation in all aspects of the revolutionary movement, including open street fighting and civil war against the defenders of political and economic slavery.

submit to it will the final and bloody struggle between revolutionary Russia and the autocratic-bureaucratic regime be avoided.... No doubt there are men among the higher bureaucracy who do not sympathise with the reactionary policy.... These men, the only persons having access to the throne, never dare to express their convictions openly.... Perhaps the enormous shadow of the inevitable, historic day of retribution, the shadow of great events, will cause the government circles to waver and will destroy the iron system of reactionary policy while there is yet time. Comparatively little is required for this now.... Perhaps it [the government] will realise, before it is too late, the fatal danger of protecting the autocratic regime at all costs. Perhaps even before it has to face revolution, it will grow weary of its struggle against the natural and historically necessary development of freedom, and will waver in its 'irreconcilable' policy. If it ceases to be consistent in its struggle against freedom, it will be obliged to open the door wider and wider for it. It maybe ... no, not only may be, but *so shall it be*!" (Author's italics).

Amen! is all that we need add to this well-intentioned and lofty monologue. Our Hannibal makes such rapid progress that he now appears before us in a third form. The first was the struggle against the autocracy, the second—the spreading of culture, the third—appeals to the enemy to submit and attempts to frighten him with a "shadow". How frightful! We quite agree with our respected Mr. R. N. S. that the sanctimonious hypocrites of the Russian Government are sooner frightened by "shadows" than by anything else on earth. Immediately prior to conjuring up shadows, our author, in referring to the growth of the revolutionary forces and to the impending revolutionary outbreak, exclaimed: "We foresee with profound sorrow the horrible price in people and in cultural forces that will have to be paid for this madly aggressive, conservative policy which has neither political sense nor a shadow of moral justification." What a bottomless pit of doctrinairism and unction is revealed by this conclusion to an argument about the revolutionary outbreak! The author fails completely to understand the enormous historical significance it would have, if, for once at least, the people of Russia taught the government a good lesson. Instead of showing the "horrible price" the people have paid and are still paying to absolutism, in order to arouse their hatred and indignation and instil in them a readiness and a passion for struggle, you talk about *future* sacrifices in order to frighten people away

from the struggle. My good gentlemen! It would be far better for you to refrain altogether from talking about the "revolutionary outbreak" than to ruin your reasoning with such a finale. Apparently, you do not wish *to create* "great events", you merely want to talk about "the shadow of great events", and then only with "persons having access to the throne".

Our legal press, as we know, is chock-full of such talk with shadows and about shadows; and in order to give substance to the shadows, it has become fashionable to refer to the "great reforms" and to sing to them hallelujahs full of conventional lies. An author writing under the surveillance of the censor may sometimes be forgiven such lies, since otherwise he would never be able to express his striving for political reforms. But no censorship hovered over Mr. R. N. S. He writes, "The great reforms were not devised for the greater triumph of the bureaucracy." How evasive this apologetic phrase is. *By whom* "devised"? By Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Unkovsky, and those who marched with them? But these people demanded ever so much more than was effected by the "reforms", and because of this they were persecuted by the government that introduced the "great" reforms. By the government and by those who followed it blindly singing its praises and snarling at the "hotheads"? But the government strove by every means in its power to concede as little as possible, and to curtail the democratic demands *precisely* for the "greater triumph of the bureaucracy". Mr. R. N. S. is well aware of these historical facts, and he obscures them only for the reason that they entirely refute his smug theory of the possible "submission" of the autocrat. There is no place for submissiveness in politics, and the time-honoured police method of *divide et impera*, divide and rule, yield the unimportant in order to preserve the essential, give with one hand and take back with the other, can be mistaken for submission only out of unbounded simplicity (both sacred and sly simplicity). "... When the government of Alexander II devised and introduced the 'great reforms', it did not at the same time deliberately set itself the aim of cutting off imperatively all the Russian people's legal roads to political liberty, it did not weigh its every step and every paragraph of the

law with this end in view." This is *untrue*! The government of Alexander II, both in "devising" the reforms and in introducing them, set out from the very beginning to reject the demands for political freedom then put forward. From the beginning to the end it cut off every legal road to liberty; for it answered even simple appeals with repressions, it never even permitted liberty to be discussed freely. Suffice it to recall the facts mentioned in Witte's Memorandum, quoted above, to refute Mr. R. N. S.'s paeans of praise. Concerning the persons in the government of Alexander II, Witte expresses himself, for example, as follows: "It must be observed that the prominent statesmen of the sixties, whose celebrated names will be preserved by a grateful posterity, in their time did more that is great than anything their successors may have done; they toiled at the renovation of our state and social system from sincere conviction, not to frustrate the strivings of their ruler, but out of unbounded loyalty to him" (p. 67 of the Memorandum). What is true is true—from sincere conviction, out of unbounded loyalty to the ruler at the head of the police gang....

After this we are not surprised that Mr. R. N. S. says very little about the most important question of the role of the Zemstvos in the struggle for political liberty. Apart from the usual references to the "practical" and "cultural" work of the Zemstvo, he mentions in passing its "educational-political significance"; he says that the "Zemstvo has political significance", that the Zemstvo, as Mr. Witte clearly sees, "is dangerous [to the present system] only by virtue of the historical tendency of its development—as the embryo of a constitution". And, concluding these seemingly casual remarks, comes the following attack upon revolutionaries: "We value Mr. Witte's work, not only for the truth it tells about the autocracy, but also as a valuable political testimonial to the Zemstvo granted by the bureaucracy itself. This testimonial is an excellent reply to all those who, being devoid of political education or carried away by revolutionary phrases [*sic*!], have refused to see the enormous political significance of the Russian Zemstvos and their legal cultural activity." Who has revealed a lack of education? Who is carried away? Where and when? With whom does Mr. R. N. S. disagree? And why? To these ques-

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tions no reply is forthcoming, and our author's attack is nothing but an expression of his antipathy towards revolutionaries, which we know from other passages in his essay. Matters are not clarified by the still stranger comment: "By these words we do not desire [?!] to offend revolutionaries whose moral courage in the struggle against tyranny cannot be too highly estimated." Wherefore this remark? What connection is there between moral courage and inability to appreciate the Zemstvos? Mr. R. N. S. has indeed fallen out of the frying-pan into the fire. First he "offended" the revolutionaries by making an unsupported and "anonymous" (i.e., not known against whom levelled) charge of ignorance and phrase-mongering, and now he commits a fresh "offence" against them by assuming that they can be induced to swallow the charge of ignorance if the pill is sweetened by recognition of their moral courage. To complete the confusion, Mr. R. N. S. contradicts himself by declaring, in chorus, as it were, with those who are "carried away by revolutionary phrases", that "the modern Russian Zemstvo ... is not a political magnitude that could impress or overawe anyone by its own direct power.... It can barely maintain its own position".... "Only in the remote future and only as a result of the cultural development of the whole country could such institutions [as the Zemstvo] ... become a menace to this [absolutist] system."

VI

Let us, however, try to analyse the issue on which Mr. R. N. S. speaks so angrily and emptily. The facts we have cited above show that the "political significance" of the Zemstvos., i.e., their significance as a factor in the struggle for political freedom, lies principally in the following: first, these bodies of representatives of our propertied classes (particularly the landed aristocracy) forever contrapose elected institutions to the bureaucracy, give rise to constant conflicts between them, expose at every step the reactionary character of the irresponsible tsarist officialdom, and foster discontent and opposition to the autocratic govern-

ment.* Secondly, the Zemstvos, attached to the bureaucratic chariot like a superfluous fifth wheel, strive to consolidate their position, to increase their significance, and to obtain a constitution by petitioning—"unconsciously march towards it", as Witte himself puts the matter. For that reason they are unsuitable as allies of the government in its fight against the revolutionaries; they maintain a benevolent neutrality towards the latter and render them undoubted, if indirect, service by causing the government to waver in its measures of repression at critical moments. Of course, institutions, which hitherto have proved that they are, at best, capable of making only liberal petitions and maintaining benevolent neutrality, cannot be regarded as an "important", or to any degree an independent, factor in the political struggle; but it cannot be denied that the Zemstvos represent one of the *auxiliary* factors in the struggle. In this sense we are even prepared, if you will, to regard the Zemstvo as a piece of constitution. Perhaps the reader will say, "Then you agree with Mr. R. N. S., who does not claim any more for them?" Not at all. It is only here that our difference with him begins.

Let us admit for the sake of argument that the Zemstvo is a piece of constitution. But it is precisely such a piece that was used *to decoy* Russian "society" away from a constitution. It is precisely such a relatively unimportant position that the autocracy has yielded to growing democracy in order to retain its hold on its principal positions, in order to divide and disunite those who demanded political reforms. We have seen how this policy of disuniting on the basis of "confidence" in the Zemstvo ("the embryo of a constitution") succeeded in the sixties and in the years 1880-81. The question of the relation of the Zemstvos to political freedom is a particular case of the general question of the relation of reforms to revolution. This particular case serves to illustrate the narrow-mindedness and stupidity of the fashionable theory of Bernstein,[43] which substitutes reforms for revolutionary struggle and declares (e.g.,

* See the extremely detailed treatment of this aspect of the question in the pamphlet by P. B. Axelrod, *The Historical Position and the Mutual Relations between Liberal and Socialist Democracy in Russia*, Geneva, 1898. See particularly pp. 5, 8, 11-12, 17-19.

through the mouth of Mr. Berdyaev) that the "principle of progress is that the better things are, the better". This principle in its general form is as untrue as its reverse that the worse things are, the better. Revolutionaries, of course, will never reject the struggle for reforms, the struggle to capture even minor and unimportant enemy positions, *if* these will serve to strengthen the attack and help to achieve full victory. But they will never forget that sometimes the enemy himself surrenders a certain position in order to disunite the attacking party and thus to defeat it more easily. They will never forget that only by constantly having the "ultimate aim" in view, only by appraising every step of the "movement" and every reform from the point of view of the general revolutionary struggle, is it possible to guard the movement against false steps and shameful mistakes.

It is this aspect of the question—the significance of the Zemstvo as an instrument for *strengthening* the autocracy through half-concessions, as a means of bringing over a certain section of the liberals to the side of the autocracy—that Mr. R. N. S. has completely failed to understand. He has preferred to invent for his own use a doctrinaire scheme by which the Zemstvos and the constitution are connected by the straight-line "formula", the better things are, the better. "If you first abolish the Zemstvos in Russia," he says, addressing himself to Witte, "and then increase the rights of the individual, you will lose the good opportunity of giving the country a moderate constitution growing historically out of local self-government with a social-estate appearance. At all events you will render the cause of conservatism a distinct disservice." What a beautiful and harmonious conception! Local self-government with a social-estate tinge—a wise conservative, having access to the throne—a moderate constitution. The unfortunate thing about it is that in actual practice, the wise conservatives have on more than one occasion, thanks to the Zemstvos, found "good opportunities" *to withhold* the constitution from the country.

Mr. R. N. S.'s peaceful "conception" had its effect also on the slogan with which he concludes his essay and which is printed in the manner of a slogan, as a separate line and

in heavy type: "Rights, and an Authoritative All-Russian Zemstvo!" It must be frankly acknowledged that this is the same sort of indecent flirting with the political prejudices of the broad masses of Russian liberals as *Rabochaya Mysl*'s flirting with the political prejudices of the broad masses of the workers. We are duty-bound to raise a protest in the first as in the second case against such flirting. It is prejudice to believe that the government of Alexander II did not cut off the legal road to liberty, that the Zemstvos provide a good opportunity for granting a moderate constitution to the country, and that the slogan, "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo" can serve as the banner of, we shall not say the revolutionary, but even the constitutional, movement. This is not a banner that can serve to distinguish enemies from allies, or help to direct and guide the movement; it is but a rag that can only help the most unreliable characters to creep into the movement, and assist the government to make still another attempt to come off with high-sounding promises and indesisive reforms. One need not be a prophet to be able to prophesy this. Our revolutionary movement will reach its apogee, the liberal ferment in society will increase tenfold, and other Loris-Melikovs and Ignatyevs will appear in the government and inscribe on their banner: "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo". But if it came to pass, it would be the most unfavourable outcome for Russia and the most favourable for the government. If any considerable section of the liberals put their faith in that banner, and, allowing themselves to be carried away by it, attack the revolutionary "hotheads" in the rear, the latter may find themselves cut off, and the government will try to restrict itself to a minimum of concessions limited to something in the nature of an advisory and aristocratic constitution. Whether this attempt will be successful or not, depends upon the outcome of the decisive struggle between the revolutionary proletariat and the government; but of one thing we may be certain—the liberals will be betrayed. With the aid of slogans like those advanced by Mr. R. N. S. ("Authoritative Zemstvo", etc.), the government will decoy them like puppies away from the revolutionaries, only to take them by the scruff of the neck and thrash them with the whip

of reaction. And when that happens, gentlemen, we will not forget to say, *Serves you right*!

Why, instead of a demand for the abolition of absolutism, is such a moderate and chastened wish put forward as ultimate slogan? First, for the sake of the philistine doctrinairism that desires to render a "service to conservatism" and believes that the government will be softened by such moderation and be rendered "submissive" by it. Secondly, in order to "unite the liberals". Indeed, the slogan "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo" can perhaps serve to unite *all* liberals in the same way as (in the opinion of the "Economists") the slogan "add a kopek to each ruble"* will unite *all* the workers. But will not *such* unity be a loss rather than a gain? Unity is an advantage when it raises those who are united to the level of the class-conscious and decisive programme of the unifying force. Unity is a disadvantage when it lowers the unifying force to the level of the prejudices of the masses. Among Russian liberals there is undoubtedly a widespread prejudice that the Zemstvo is indeed the "embryo of a constitution",** the "natural", peaceful, and gradual growth of which is accidentally retarded

* I.e., a one per cent wage increase.—*Tr.*

** As to what may be expected from the Zemstvo, it may not be without interest to quote the following opinion expressed by Prince P. V. Dolgorukov in his *Listok*[44] published in the sixties (Burtsev, op. cit., pp. 64-67): "In examining the main regulations governing the Zemstvo institutions, we again come across the selfsame secret thought of the government, which continually breaks out into the light, viz., to overwhelm with generosity, to proclaim loudly, 'See how much I am giving you!'— yet to give as little as possible, and even to impose restrictions upon the enjoyment of the little that is given.... Under the present autocratic system, the Zemstvo institutions do not and cannot bring any benefits, and will not and cannot have any significance, but they are rich in the seeds of fruitful development in the future.... New Zemstvo institutions may well be destined to serve as the basis for the future constitutional order in Russia.... But as long as Russia lacks a constitutional system of government, as long as the autocracy exists, and as long as freedom of the press is denied, the Zemstvo institutions will be doomed to remain political phantoms, *mute* assemblies of those who should voice the interests of the people." Thus, even in the sixties, Dolgorukov was not very optimistic. The forty years that have passed since then have taught us much and have demonstrated that the Zemstvos were destined by "fate" (and partly by the government) to serve as the basis for a series of measures *to overwhelm* the constitutionalists.

by the intrigues of certain immoral time-servers, that only a few petitions are necessary in order to bring the autocrat to "submission", that legal cultural work generally and Zemstvo work in particular have "considerable political significance", relieving those who mouth verbal hostility to the autocracy of the obligation actively to support the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy in one way or another, and so forth, and so on. Undoubtedly, it would be very useful and desirable to unite the liberals; but the unity must be one whose purpose is to combat outworn prejudices and not to play up to them, to raise the general level of our political development (or rather underdevelopment), and not to sanction it—in a word, it must be a unity for the purpose of supporting the illegal struggle and not for the purpose of opportunistic phrase-mongering about the great political significance of legal activity. If there can be no justification for issuing to the workers the political slogan "Freedom to Strike", etc., then, by the same token, there can be no justification for issuing to the liberals the slogan "An Authoritative Zemstvo". *Under the autocracy* every kind of Zemstvo, however "authoritative" it may be, will inevitably be a deformity, incapable of development, while *under a constitution* the Zemstvo will immediately lose its present-day "political" significance.

The unification of liberals is possible in two ways: by forming an independent liberal party (illegal, of course), or by organising liberal aid for revolutionaries. Mr. R. N. S. himself points to the first form, but ... if what he says in this connection is to be taken as a genuine expression of the views and prospects of liberalism, then it does not give grounds for very great optimism. He writes: "Without a Zemstvo, the Zemstvo liberals will have to form a liberal party or abandon the historical stage as an organised force. We are convinced that the organisation of liberals in an illegal party, even if its programme and its methods are very moderate, will be the inevitable result of the abolition of the Zemstvo." If that is the case, we shall have to wait a long time, for even Witte does not wish to abolish the Zemstvos, and as for the Russian Government it is very much concerned with preserving their outward form, even if their content is completely eliminated. That a liberal

party will be a very moderate one is quite natural, and it is useless to expect that the movement among the bourgeoisie (for only on that movement can a liberal party be based) will give rise to any other. But what should be the activities and the "methods" of such a party? Mr. R. N. S. does not explain. He says: "An illegal liberal party, being an organisation consisting of the most moderate and least mobile of the opposition elements, cannot by itself develop a particularly extensive, or particularly intensive, activity...." We think, however, that in a certain sphere, although limited by local and above all by Zemstvo interests, the liberal party could very well develop an extensive and intensive activity, such as the organisation of political exposures.... "But with such activity on the part of other parties, especially the Social-Democratic or working-class party, the liberal party, even without entering into any direct agreement with the Social-Democrats, can become a highly important factor...." Very true; and the reader will naturally expect that the author would, at least in general outline, describe the work of this "factor". But instead of doing so, Mr. R. N. S. describes the growth of revolutionary Social-Democracy and concludes: "With the existence of a pronounced political movement ... a liberal opposition, if it is in the least organised, can play an important political role; with proper tactics, a moderate party always stands to gain from an accentuated struggle between extreme social elements...." That is all! The "role" of the "factor" (which has already managed to convert itself from a party into an "opposition") is to "take advantage" of the growing acuteness of the struggle. Mention is made of what the liberals stand to gain, but not a word is said about the liberals taking part in the struggle. The slip of the tongue, one may say, is providential....

The Russian Social-Democrats never closed their eyes to the fact that the political liberties for which they are first and foremost fighting will benefit *primarily* the bourgeoisie. Only a socialist steeped in the worst prejudices of utopianism, or reactionary Narodism, would for that reason object to carrying on the struggle against the autocracy. The bourgeoisie will benefit by these liberties and rest on its laurels—the proletariat, however, must have freedom

in order to develop the struggle for socialism to the utmost. And Social-Democracy will persistently carry on the struggle for liberation, regardless of the attitude of the various strata of the bourgeoisie towards it. In the interests of the political struggle, we must support every opposition to the oppressive autocracy, no matter on what grounds and in what social stratum it manifests itself. For that reason, we are by no means indifferent to the opposition expressed by our liberal bourgeoisie in general, and by our Zemstvo liberals in particular. If the liberals succeed in organising themselves in an illegal party, so much the better. We shall welcome the growth of political consciousness among the propertied classes; we will support their demands, we will endeavour to work so that the activities of the liberals and the Social-Democrats mutually supplement each other.* But even if they fail to do so (which is more probable), we shall not give them up as lost, we will endeavour to strengthen contacts with individual liberals, acquaint them with our movement, support them by exposing in the labour press all the despicable acts of the government and the local authorities, and try to induce them to support the revolutionaries. Such an exchange of services between liberals and Social-Democrats is already proceeding; it must be extended and made permanent. But while always ready to carry on this exchange of services, we will never, under any circumstances, cease to carry on a determined struggle against the illusions that are so widespread in the politically undeveloped Russian society generally and among Russian liberals in particular. Paraphrasing the celebrated statement of Marx in regard to the Revolution of 1848, we may say of the Russian revolutionary movement that its progress lies, not so much in the achievement of any positive gains, as in emancipation from harmful illusions.[46]

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* The present writer had occasion to point out the utility of a liberal party four years ago, in commenting upon the Narodnoye Pravo Party.[45] See *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (Geneva, 1898, p. 26): "... If, however, the party [Narodnoye Pravo] also contains not masquerade, but real non-socialist politicians, non-socialist democrats, then this party can do no little good by striving to draw closer to the political opposition among our bourgeoisie...." (See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 345.—*Ed.*)

We have emancipated ourselves from the illusions of anarchism and Narodnik socialism, from contempt for politics, from the belief in the exceptionalist development of Russia, from the conviction that the people are ready for revolution, and from the theory of the seizure of power and the duel-like combat between the autocracy and the heroic intelligentsia.

It is time our liberals emancipated themselves from the illusion, theoretically untenable, one might assume, yet very tenacious in practice, that it is still possible to hold parley with the Russian autocracy, that some kind of Zemstvo is the embryo of a constitution, and that the sincere adherents of the constitution can fulfil their vow of Hannibal by patient legal activity and by patient appeals to the enemy to turn submissive.

A VALUABLE ADMISSION

Labour unrest has once again been the subject of intense and widespread comment. The governing circles are alarmed, in all earnestness alarmed. This is evident from the fact that it was deemed necessary to "punish", by suspension for a week, even *Novoye Vremya*,[47] that arch-loyal newspaper ever fawning on the authorities, for an article published in issue No. 9051 of May 11, entitled "Apropos of the Labour Unrest". Of course, the penalty was not inflicted because of the contents of the article, which was replete with the warmest appreciation of the government and the sincerest concern for its interests. What was considered dangerous was the very discussion of events that were "disturbing society", the mere reference to their extensiveness and their importance. Below we give extracts from the secret circular (also dated May 11)[48] directing that press articles dealing with the disorders in the factories and with the workers' attitude towards the employers be published *only by permission of the Department of Police*, which proves better than all arguments that the government itself is inclined to regard the labour unrest as a matter of state importance. The article in *Novoye Vremya* is of particular interest precisely for the reason that it outlines a complete state programme, which in effect amounts to allaying the discontent by a few petty and in part fictitious doles to which are attached pompous signboards about protective policy, cordiality, etc., and which provide pretexts for increasing surveillance by government officials. But this programme, which is not a new one, embodies, one may say, the "acme" of wisdom of modern statesmen, not only in Russia, but also in the West. In a

society based on private property and the enslavement of millions of propertyless toilers by a handful of rich people, the government cannot be anything but the loyal friend and ally of the exploiters and the most reliable guardian of their power. In our times, guns, bayonets, and whips are not a sufficiently reliable guardian; it is necessary to convince the exploited that the government stands above classes, that it does not serve the interests of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, but those of justice, that it is concerned with protecting the weak and the poor against the rich and the powerful, etc. Napoleon III in France and Bismarck and Wilhelm II in Germany exerted no little effort to play up to the workers in this way. But in Europe, where there is a more or less free press, a representative government, electoral campaigns, and well-established political parties, all these hypocritical tricks were quickly exposed. In Asia, however, which includes Russia, where the masses of the people are so wretched and ignorant, and where there are such strong prejudices fostering faith in Our Father the Tsar, tricks of this kind are quite successful. One of the very characteristic signs that the European spirit is beginning to penetrate into Russia is the *failure* with which this policy has met in the last ten or twenty years. Over and over again it was tried, but each time, within a few years after the enactment of some "protective" (allegedly protective) labour law, there was a reversion to the old state of affairs—the number of discontented workers increased, ferment grew, unrest gained in scope—again the "protective" policy was announced with a blare of trumpets, again pompous phrases could be heard about heartfelt solicitude for the workers; another law was passed providing a penny's worth of benefit and a pound's worth of empty and lying words for the workers, and in a few years' time the whole business was repeated. The government was as frantic as a squirrel in a cage, and went to any lengths, in one form or another, to stop up the gaps with sops and shreds; but the discontent broke out in ever newer places with increasing vigour.

Let us recall the outstanding points in the history of "labour legislation" in Russia. Towards the end of the seventies there were big strikes in St. Petersburg, and the socialists tried to take advantage of the situation to inten-

sify their agitation. Alexander III included factory legislation in his so-called "popular" (but in fact aristocratic-police) policy. In 1882 the Factory Inspectorate was introduced and at first its reports were even published. The government, of course, was not pleased with these reports and *ceased their publication*. The factory inspection laws proved to be merely a stopgap. Then came the years 1884-85; the industrial crisis gave rise to a powerful movement among the workers, and there were a number of turbulent strikes in the central district (the Morozov cotton-mill strike[49] being particularly noteworthy). Again the "protective" policy was brought to the fore, this time advocated with particular zeal by Katkov in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*.[50] Katkov fumed and raged over the fact that the Morozov strikers were tried by a jury, and he described the hundred and one questions submitted by the court for the jury's decision as "a hundred-and-one gun salute in honour of the appearance of the labour question in Russia"; but, at the same time, he demanded that the "state" come to the defence of the workers and prohibit the monstrous system of fines that had ultimately aroused the Morozov cotton weavers to revolt. The law of 1886 was passed; it greatly widened the powers of the Factory Inspectorate and prohibited the imposition of arbitrary fines to benefit the employers. Ten years passed, and again there was an outbreak of labour unrest. The strikes of 1895, particularly the great strike of 1896,[51] caused the government to tremble with fear (especially on account of the fact that the Social-Democrats were by then regularly marching shoulder to shoulder with the workers); with unprecedented celerity, it passed the "protective" law (June 2, 1897) for a shorter working day. During the discussion of the projected law in committee the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, including the director of the Department of Police, declared loudly that the factory workers must come to regard the government as their constant protector and their just and merciful patron (see the pamphlet *The Secret Documents on the Law of June 2, 1897*[52]). Although passed, the protective law is being curtailed and rendered ineffective on the sly through circulars issued by the selfsame government. Another industrial crisis sets in. The workers for the hundredth time are

convinced that the "protection" of the police government cannot substantially alleviate their conditions, or give them liberty to look after themselves; again unrest and street fighting, again the government is anxious, again we hear police speeches about "state protection", this time proclaimed in *Novoye Vremya*. Gentlemen! Will you never tire of scooping up water with a sieve?

No, the government, of course, will never tire of repeating its attempts to intimidate the irreconcilable workers and decoy the weaker, the more foolish, and more cowardly, by means of a dole. Nor will we ever tire of exposing the real meaning of these attempts and of exposing "statesmen" who but yesterday ordered soldiers to shoot down the workers and today are shouting about protection; who but yesterday talked about their justice and their patronage of the workers and today are seizing the best of the workers and intellectuals, one after another, and leaving them to the mercy of the police without trial. Therefore we consider it necessary to dwell on the "state programme" of *Novoye Vremya* in good time before some new "protective" law is promulgated. Moreover, the admissions made in this connection by a publication so "authoritative" in the sphere of home politics as *Novoye Vremya* are worthy of attention.

Novoye Vremya is compelled to admit that the "regrettable manifestations in the sphere of the labour question" are not accidental. Of course, the socialists, too, are responsible (the newspaper avoids mentioning the awful word "socialist", preferring such vague terms as "pernicious pseudo-doctrines" and the "propaganda of anti-state and anti-social ideas"); but ... but why are the socialists so successful among the workers? *Novoye Vremya*, of course, does not miss an opportunity to hurl abuse at the workers: they are so "undeveloped and ignorant" that they willingly listen to the pernicious propaganda of the socialists, so harmful to the welfare of the police. Consequently, the socialists and the workers are to blame, and the gendarmes have long been waging a desperate war against the guilty, filling the prisons and places of exile. But to no avail. Apparently, there is *something in the conditions of the factory workers* which "engenders and fosters discontent with their present conditions" and thus "favours the success" of socialism.

"The severe toil of the factory workers in extremely unfavourable conditions of life provides them with a bare subsistence for as long as they are able to work, and in every emergency when they are without work for any length of time, they find themselves in desperate straits, as, for example, the workers in the Baku oilfields described recently in the newspapers." Government supporters, thus, are compelled to admit that the success of socialism is due to the really bad conditions of the workers. But the admission is made in such a vague and evasive form, and with such reservations, that it is clear that people of this sort cannot possibly have the slightest intention of touching the "sacred property" of the capitalists which oppresses the workers. "Unfortunately," writes *Novoye Vremya*, "we know too little about the actual state of affairs in regard to the labour question in Russia." Yes, unfortunately indeed! And "we" know little, precisely because we permit the police government to keep the whole press in slavery, to gag every one who honestly attempts to expose the scandalous state of affairs in our country. But "we" do try to turn the working man's hatred not against the Asiatic government but against the non-Russians. *Novoye Vremya* broadly hints at the "non-Russian factory managers", and calls them "coarse and greedy". Such a bait is likely to trap only the most ignorant and undeveloped workers, those who believe that all their misfortunes come from the "Germans" or the "Jews" and who do not know that the German and the Jewish workers unite to fight their German and Jewish exploiters. But even the workers who do not know this have learned from thousands of examples that the Russian capitalists are the "greediest" and most unceremonious of all capitalists, and that the Russian police and the Russian Government are the "coarsest" of all.

Of interest, too, are *Novoye Vremya*'s regrets that the workers are no longer so ignorant and submissive as is the peasantry. The paper bewails the fact that the workers "are abandoning their rural nests", that the "factory districts become the gathering centres of mixed masses", that the "villagers are abandoning their villages with their modest [that is the heart of the matter], but independent, social and economic interests and relationships". Indeed, they

have something to bewail. "The villagers" are tied to their nests, and out of fear of losing them, dare not submit demands to their landlord, to threaten him with strikes, etc. The villagers do not know conditions in other places and are interested only in the affairs of their own hamlet (the supporters of the government call this the "independent interests" of the villager; knowing his place, not poking his nose into politics—what can please the authorities more?); but in this hamlet, the local leech, the landlord or the kulak, knows every single individual; the peasants have all inherited from their fathers and grandfathers the servile lesson of submission, and there is no one there to awaken consciousness in them. In the factory, however, the people are "mixed", are not tied to their nests (it is all the same to them where they work), they have seen and learned things, and are bold and full of interest in everything that is going on in the world.

Notwithstanding this deplorable transformation of the humble muzhik into a class-conscious worker, our police wiseacres still hope to delude the working masses with phrases about "the state's protection of the workers' welfare". *Novoye Vremya* fortifies this hope with the following outworn argument: "Capitalism, proud and all-powerful in the West, is still an infant in our country, it can walk only in leading strings, and these are provided by the government."... Now, only a humble peasant will believe this old song about the omnipotence of the authorities! The worker, however, sees all too often that the capitalists keep the police, the church, and the military and civil officials in "leading strings". And so, continues *Novoye Vremya*, the government "*must insist*" upon an improvement in the workers' conditions, i.e., it must demand this improvement of the employers. Simple, is it not? Issue an order, and, presto, the thing is done. But it is easy to talk; in point of fact, the orders of the authorities, even the most "modest", such as the establishment of hospitals at the factories, have been ignored by the capitalists for whole decades. Moreover, the government would not dare to order the capitalists to do anything that would seriously affect the "sacred" right of private property. Furthermore, the government wants no serious improvement in the conditions of the workers, because in

thousands of instances it is an employer itself and underpays and oppresses the workers in the Obukhov Works and in hundreds of other places, as well as tens of thousands of postal and railway employees, etc., etc. *Novoye Vremya*, realising that no one would take the orders of our government seriously, tries to bolster up its position with lofty historical examples. This should be done, it says in regard to the improvement in the conditions of the workers, "in the same way as half a century ago, when the government took the peasant question in hand, when it was guided by the wise conviction that it would be better, through reforms from above, to avert the presentation of demands for such reforms from below and not to wait for such an eventuation".

Now, this is really a valuable admission. Before the emancipation of the peasants, the tsar indicated to the nobility the possibility of a popular rebellion, saying that it would be better to emancipate from above than to wait until they began to emancipate themselves from below. And now this cringing newspaper admits that the mood of the workers fills it with a fear no less than did the mood of the peasants "on the eve of freedom". "Better from above than from below"! The autocracy's newspaper lackeys are profoundly mistaken if they think there is a "similarity" between the demands for reforms today and those of that time. The peasants demanded the abolition of serfdom, having nothing against the tsar's rule and believing in the tsar. The workers today are revolting first and foremost against the government; they realise that their lack of rights under the police autocracy binds them hand and foot in their struggle against the capitalists and for that reason they demand liberation from governmental tyranny and governmental outrage. The workers are also in a state of unrest "on the eve of freedom", but this will be the liberation of the whole people, which is wresting political freedom from the despots.

* * *

Do you know what great reform is proposed in order to hush the discontent of the workers and to demonstrate to them the "state's protection"? If persistent rumour is to be believed, a struggle is going on between the Ministry of

Finance and the Ministry of the Interior. The latter demands that the Factory Inspectorate be placed under its control; for then, it argues, the factory inspectors will be less likely to indulge the capitalists and will show more regard for the interests of the workers and in this way avert unrest. Let the workers prepare for this new act of the tsar's grace; the factory inspectors will don different uniforms and they will be placed on the staff of another ministry (in all probability with a rise in salary), the very ministry, indeed (especially the Department of Police), which for such a long time past has been demonstrating its love and solicitude for the workers.

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THE LESSONS OF THE CRISIS

The commercial and industrial crisis has already dragged on for almost two years. Apparently it is still growing, spreading to new branches of industry and to new districts, and is becoming more acute as a result of the failure of more banks. Every issue of our newspaper since last December has in one form or another shown the development of the crisis and its disastrous effects. The time has come to raise the general question of the causes and the significance of this phenomenon. For Russia, it is a comparatively new phenomenon, as new as Russian capitalism. In the old capitalist countries—i.e., in the countries where the greatest part of the goods is produced for sale, and where the majority of the workers own neither land nor tools, but sell their labour-power to employers, to the owners of property, to those to whom the land, the factories, the machinery, etc., belong—in the capitalist countries, crises are an old phenomenon, recurring from time to time, like attacks of a chronic disease. Hence, crises may be predicted, and when capitalism began to develop with particular rapidity in Russia, the present crisis was predicted in Social-Democratic literature. The pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, written at the end of 1897, stated: "We are apparently now passing through the period in the capitalist cycle [a rotation, in which the same events repeat themselves like summer and winter] when industry is 'prospering', when business is brisk, when the factories are working at full capacity, and when countless new factories, new enterprises, joint-stock companies, railway enterprises, etc., etc., are springing up like mushrooms. One need not be a prophet to foretell the inevitable and fairly sharp crash

that is bound to succeed this period of industrial 'prosperity'. This crash will ruin masses of small owners, will throw masses of workers into the ranks of the unemployed...."* And the crash came with a severity unparalleled in Russia. What is the cause of this horrible, chronic disease of capitalist society, which recurs so regularly that its coming can be forecast?

Capitalist production cannot develop otherwise than by leaps and bounds—two steps forward and one step (and sometimes two) back. As we have said, capitalist production is production for sale, the production of commodities for the market. Production is conducted by individual capitalists, each producing on his own and none of them able to say exactly what kind and what amount of commodities will be required on the market. Production is carried on haphazardly; each producer is concerned only in excelling the others. Quite naturally, therefore, the quantity of commodities produced may not correspond to the market demand. This probability becomes particularly great when the enormous market is suddenly extended to new huge, unexplored territories. This was precisely the situation at the beginning of the industrial "boom" we experienced not so long ago. The capitalists of all Europe stretched out their paws towards that part of the globe inhabited by hundreds of millions of people, towards Asia, of which until recently only India and a small section of the coastal regions had been closely connected with the world market. The Transcaspian Railway began to "open up" Central Asia for the capitalists; the "Great Siberian Railway" (great, not only because of its length, but because of the unrestricted plunder of the Treasury by the contractors and the unrestricted exploitation of the workers who built it) opened up Siberia. Japan began to develop into an industrial nation and strove to make a breach in the Chinese Wall, opening the way to a choice morsel into which the capitalists of England, Germany, France, Russia, and even Italy immediately plunged their teeth. The construction of gigantic railways, the expansion of the world market, and the growth of commerce, all stimulated an unexpected revival of industry, an increase of new

* See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 346.—*Ed.*

enterprises, a wild hunt for commodity markets, a hunt for profits, the floating of new companies, and the attraction to industry of masses of fresh capital, which consisted partly of the small savings of small capitalists. It is not surprising that this wild world-hunt for new and unknown markets led to a terrific crash.

To obtain a clear idea of the nature of this hunt for markets and profits, we must remember what giants took part in it. When we speak of "separate enterprises" and "individual capitalists", we sometimes forget that, strictly speaking, these terms are inexact. In reality, only the appropriation of profit has remained individual but production itself has become social. Gigantic crashes have become possible and inevitable, only because powerful *social* productive forces have become subordinated to a gang of rich men, whose only concern is to make profits. We shall illustrate this by an example from Russian industry. Recently the crisis has spread to the oil industry, in which such enterprises as the Nobel Brothers Oil Company are engaged. In 1899 the company sold 163,000,000 poods of oil products to the value of 53,500,000 rubles, while in 1900 it sold 192,000,000 poods to the value of 72,000,000 rubles. In one year, a single enterprise increased the value of its output by 18,500,000 rubles! This "single enterprise" is maintained by the combined labour of tens and hundreds of thousands of workers engaged in extracting oil and refining it; in delivering it by pipeline, railways, seas, and rivers; and in making the necessary machinery, warehouses, materials, lighters, steamers, etc. These tens of thousands of workers work for the whole of society, but their labour is controlled by a handful of millionaires, who appropriate the entire profit earned by the organised labour of this mass of workers. (In 1899 the Nobel Company made a net profit of 4,000,000 rubles, and in 1900 the figure was 6,000,000 rubles, of which the shareholders received 1,300 rubles per 5,000-ruble-share, with five members of the board of directors receiving *bonuses* to the amount of 528,000 rubles!) When several such enterprises fling themselves into the wild chase for a place in an unknown market, is it surprising that a crisis sets in?

Furthermore, for an enterprise to make profit, its goods must be sold, purchasers must be found. The purchasers

of these goods must comprise the entire population, because these colossal enterprises produce whole mountains of goods. But nine-tenths of the population of all capitalist countries are poor; they are workers who receive extremely miserable wages and peasants who, in the main, live even worse than the workers. Now, when, in the period of a boom, the large industrial enterprises set out to produce as vast a quantity of goods as possible, they flood the market with such a huge quantity of goods that the majority of the population, being poor, cannot pay for them. The number of machines, tools, warehouses, railroads, etc., continues to grow. From time to time, however, this process of growth is interrupted because the masses of the people for whom, in the last analysis, these improved instruments of production are intended, remain in a state of poverty that verges on beggary. The crisis shows that modern society could produce immeasurably more goods for the improvement of the living conditions of the entire working people, if the land, factories, machines, etc., had not been seized by a handful of private owners, who extract millions of profits out of the poverty of the people. The crisis shows that the workers should not confine themselves to the struggle for individual concessions from the capitalists. While industry is in upswing, such concessions may be won (the Russian workers on more than one occasion between 1894 and 1898 won concessions by energetic struggle); but when the crash comes, the capitalists not only withdraw the concessions they made, but take advantage of the helpless position of the workers to force wages down still lower. And so things will inevitably continue until the army of the socialist proletariat overthrows the domination of capital and private property. The crisis shows how near-sighted were those socialists (who call themselves "Critics", probably because they borrow uncritically the doctrines of the bourgeois economists) who two years ago loudly proclaimed that crashes were becoming less and less probable.

The lessons of the crisis, which has exposed the absurdity of subordinating social production to private property, are so instructive that even the bourgeois press is now demanding stricter supervision—e.g., over the banks. But no supervision will prevent the capitalists from setting up

enterprises in times of boom which must inevitably become bankrupt later on. Alchevsky, the founder of a land and a commercial bank in Kharkov, both now bankrupt, acquired millions of rubles by fair means or foul for the purpose of establishing and maintaining mining and metallurgical enterprises that promised wealth beyond the dreams of avarice. A hitch in industry wrecked these banks and mining and metallurgical enterprises (the Donets-Yuryev Company). But what does the "crash" of enterprises mean in capitalist society? It means that the smaller capitalists, capitalists of the "second magnitude", are eliminated by the big millionaires. The place of Alchevsky, the Kharkov millionaire, is taken by the Moscow millionaire, Ryabushinsky, who, being a richer capitalist, will bring greater pressure to bear on the workers. The supplanting of smaller capitalists by big capitalists, the increased power of capital, ruination of masses of small property-owners (e.g., small investors, who lose all their property in a bank crash), the frightful impoverishment of the workers—all this is brought about by the crisis. We recall also cases described in *Iskra* of capitalists lengthening the working day and discharging class-conscious workers in an effort to replace them by more submissive people from the villages.

The effect of the crisis in Russia is, in general, ever so much greater than in any other country. Stagnation in industry is accompanied by famine among the peasantry. Unemployed workers are being sent out of the towns to the villages, but where can the unemployed peasants be sent? By sending the workers to the villages, the authorities desire to clear the cities of the discontented people; but perhaps those sent out will be able to rouse at least part of the peasantry from its age-long submission and induce it, not only to request, but *to demand*. The workers and peasants are being drawn closer to each other, not only by unemployment and hunger, but also by police tyranny, which deprives the workers of the possibility of uniting to defend their own interests and prevents even the aid of well-disposed people from reaching the peasantry. The heavy paw of the police is becoming a hundred times heavier for the millions of people who have lost all means of livelihood. The gendarmes and the police in the towns, the rural superin-

tendents and the village policemen in the rural districts, see clearly that hatred against them is growing, and they are beginning to fear, not only the food-kitchens, set up in the villages, but even advertisements in the newspapers appealing for funds. Afraid of voluntary contributions! In truth, the thief fears his own shadow. When the thief sees a passer-by offering alms to the man he has robbed, he begins to think that the two are shaking hands in a pledge to settle accounts with him.

Iskra, No. 7, August 1901

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THE SERF-OWNERS AT WORK

On June 8, 1901, a law was adopted governing the grants of state lands in Siberia to private persons. How this new law will be applied, the future will show; but its character is so instructive, it so strikingly demonstrates the undisguised nature and the real strivings of the tsarist government, that it should be analysed thoroughly and made known as widely as possible among the working class and the peasantry.

Our government has long been granting doles to the noble, aristocratic landlords. It established for them the Nobles' Bank, it granted them all sorts of privileges in obtaining loans and relief in the payment of arrears, it helped them to arrange a strike of the millionaire sugar-refiners in order to raise prices and increase their profits; it took care to provide the ruined sons of the aristocracy with soft jobs as rural superintendents, and it is now arranging for the government purchase of vodka on very favourable terms for the noble distillers. However, in making grants of state lands, it not only makes gifts to the richest and most aristocratic exploiters, but creates a *new* class of exploiters and dooms millions of peasants and workers to permanent bondage to new landlords.

Let us examine the principal features of the new law. It must be observed, first of all, that before its introduction in the Council of State by the Minister of Agriculture and State Property, the law was discussed *at a special conference on the affairs of the nobility*. It is generally known that in Russia today it is not the workers and peasants, but the noble landlords who suffer most from poverty, and so this "special conference" hastened to devise measures by which

their poverty might be relieved. State lands in Siberia will be sold and leased to "private persons" for the purpose of "private enterprise"; but foreigners and non-Russian subjects of the tsar (the Jews included among the latter) are prohibited *for ever* from acquiring these lands in any way. The lands may be leased (and we shall see that this is the most advantageous transaction for the future landlords) only to nobles, "who", as the law states, "owing to their economic reliability, are the most desirable landowners to have in Siberia from the standpoint of the government". Thus, the standpoint of the government is that the labouring population must be enslaved to the big landed aristocracy. How big can be seen from the fact that salable allotments may not exceed *three thousand dessiatines*, while no limit at all is placed on the amount of land leased, and the term of the leases may be for a period *up to ninety-nine years*! According to the government's calculations, a poor landlord needs *two hundred times* as much land as a peasant, who is given fifteen dessiatines of land in Siberia for himself and his family.

The easy terms and the exceptions to the rule which the law provides for the landlords are truly astounding. The lessee pays nothing for the first five years. If he purchases the land he has leased (which *right* the new law gives him), payment is spread over a period of thirty-seven years. With special permission, an area of land exceeding 3,000 dessiatines may be set aside for sale, land may be sold at agreed prices and not by auction, while arrears may be postponed for one or even three years. It must not be forgotten that generally only the higher dignitaries and persons with court connections, etc., will take advantage of the new law—and such people will obtain these easy terms and the exemptions quite casually, in the course of a drawing-room conversation with a governor or a minister.

But there's the rub! Of what use are these bits of land, three thousand dessiatines in area, to the landowning generals if there is no "muzhik" forced to work for these generals? However rapidly poverty is increasing among the people in Siberia, the local peasant is nevertheless much more independent than the "Russian" peasant and he has not been trained to work under the bludgeon. The new law is intended

to train him. "The lands appointed for private enterprises *shall*, *as far as possible*, *be divided into lots alternating with areas* held by the peasant allotment holders", says Article 4 of the new law. The tsarist government displays its solicitude for the poor peasants and tries to provide "means of livelihood" for them. Ten years ago, the same Mr. Yermolov who now, as Minister of Agriculture and State Property, has introduced into the Council of State the new Siberian land law providing for the disposal of state lands to private persons, wrote a book (anonymously) entitled *The Crop Failure and the Distress of the People*. In that work he openly declared that there was no reason for permitting peasants who could obtain "a livelihood" from their local landlords to migrate to Siberia. Russian statesmen do not hesitate to express purely feudal views; peasants were created to work for the landlords, and peasants, therefore, must not be "permitted" to migrate to a place of their choice, if thereby the landlords will be deprived of cheap labour. And when, despite all the difficulties, the red tape, and even the downright prohibition, the peasants still continued to migrate to Siberia in hundreds of thousands, the tsarist government, acting like the steward of an old-time manorial lord, hastened after them to work them to exhaustion in their new habitations. If, however, "alternating" with the puny peasant allotments* and peasant lands (the best of which are already occupied), there will be lots of three thousand dessiatines belonging to the noble landlords, then all temptation to migrate to Siberia will disappear very soon. The more cramped the conditions of the surrounding peasants become, the more the new landlords' land will increase in value; the peasants will be obliged to hire themselves out cheaply, or lease land from the landlords at exorbitant rates—just as in "Russia". The new law sets out precisely to create as quickly as possible a new paradise for the landlords and a new hell for the peasants; there is a special clause on the leasing of land for a *single* season. While special permission is required to sublease state lands, it is permitted quite

* By the terms of the 1861 reform, peasant allotments, unlike peasant lands, could not be sold.—*Tr.*

freely for one season. All that the landlord need trouble about is to engage a steward, who will sublease land by the dessiatine to the peasants living on the allotments "alternating" with the landlord's land, and send his master the net profit.

Probably many nobles will not care to carry on even such an "enterprise". In that case, they can make a nice little pile at one stroke by reselling the state land to real farmers. It is no accident that the new law has been timed with the construction of a railroad in Siberia, when banishment to Siberia has been abolished, and when migration to Siberia has increased to an enormous extent; all this will inevitably lead (and is already leading) to a rise in land values. Hence, the granting of state lands to private persons at the present time is nothing more nor less than plunder of the Treasury by the nobles. The state lands are rising in value, but they are being leased or sold on highly advantageous terms to generals and people of that stripe, who will benefit by the rising prices. In Ufa Gubernia, for instance, in one uyezd alone, the nobles and officials made the following transaction in land sold to them (on the basis of a similar law): they paid the government 60,000 rubles for the land and within two years sold it for 580,000 rubles, obtaining for the mere resale *more than hall a million rubles*! From this instance we can imagine the millions of rubles that will pass into the pockets of the poverty-stricken landlords thanks to the land grants throughout Siberia.

With all sorts of lofty arguments the government and its adherents seek to cover up this naked robbery. They talk about the development of culture in Siberia, and of the enormous importance of model farms. As a matter of fact, the large estates, which place the neighbouring peasants in a hopeless position, can at the present time serve only to develop the most uncultured methods of exploitation. Model farms are not established by robbing the Treasury, and the grant of lands will lead simply to land speculation among the nobles and officials, or to farming methods in which bondage and usury will flourish. The noble aristocrats, in alliance with the government, have prohibited Jews and other non-Russians (whom they try to present to the ignorant people as particularly outrageous exploiters) from acquiring state lands in Siberia, in order

that they may *themselves* engage in the worst type of exploitation without hindrance.

There is talk also of the political significance of having the social-estate of landed nobility in Siberia; among the intelligentsia, it is said, there is a very large number of former exiles, of unreliable people there, who need to be counterbalanced by the establishment of a reliable support of the state, a reliable "local" element. This talk contains a greater and profounder truth than *Grazhdanin*[53] and *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* imagine. The police state is arousing so much hostility against itself among the masses that it finds it necessary artificially to create groups that can serve as pillars of the fatherland. It is essential for the government to create a class of big exploiters, who would be under obligation to it for everything and dependent upon its grace, who would make enormous profits by the most despicable methods (speculation and kulak exploitation), and, consequently, could always be relied upon to support every tyranny and oppression. The Asiatic government must find support in Asiatic large landownership, in a feudal system of "granting lands". And if it is not possible at present to grant "populated estates", it is possible at all events to grant estates *alternating* with the lands of peasants who are becoming more and more destitute. If it is not convenient simply to grant thousands of dessiatines of land gratis to the Court lickspittles, it is possible to cover up this wholesale bestowal of lands by their sale or "leasing" (for 99 years) that is attended by thousands of privileges. When we compare this land policy with that of modern progressive countries like America, for example, can we call it anything else but feudal? In America, no one would *dare* talk about permitting or not permitting migration; for in that country, every citizen has the right to go where he pleases. In that country every one who desires to engage in farming has the right *by law* to occupy vacant land in the outlying parts of the country. In America, they are not creating a class of Asiatic satraps, but a class of energetic farmers who have developed the productive forces of the country. Thanks to the abundant free land there, the working class in America enjoys the highest standard of living in the world.

And what a period our government has chosen for passing this serf-owners' law! It is a period of the most acute industrial crisis, when tens and hundreds of thousands are unemployed, when millions of peasants are again suffering from famine. The government has exerted all its efforts to prevent the disaster from being given "publicity". That is why it has sent the unemployed workers back to their village homes; that is why it has transferred food distribution from the Zemstvos to the police officials; that is why it has prohibited private persons from organising food-kitchens for the famine-stricken; and that is why it has gagged the press. But when the famine "publicity", so unpleasant to the ears of the well-fed, died down, Our Father the Tsar set to work to assist the poverty-stricken landlords and poor unfortunate courtier generals. We repeat, our task at the present time is simply to bring the contents of this new law to the knowledge of all. As they become acquainted with it, the most undeveloped sections of the workers, and the most backward and downtrodden peasants, will understand whom the present government serves and what kind of government the people must have.

Iskra, No. 8, September 10, 1901

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PROMARX
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A ZEMSTVO CONGRESS

The wave of excitement among the general public that spread over the country after the events of this spring is not receding. It makes itself felt in one form or another among all sections of Russian society, a society that as recently as January of this year seemed to be deaf and alien to the purposive work of Russian Social-Democracy. The government is bending its every effort to calm the troubled public conscience as quickly as possible with the usual soap bubbles such as the Manifesto of March 25 on "heart-felt protection", such as the so-called Vannovsky Reforms or the Sipyagin and Shakhovskoi[54] solemn buffoon tours of Russia.... Some of the more naïve among the general public will actually be calmed by such measures, but by far not all. Even the present-day Zemstvo people, about fifty per cent of whom are scared civil servants, seem to be coming out of the state of chronic trepidation to which they were reduced in the now historical stagnant epoch of the "Peacemaker-Tsar".

His Majesty the Bureaucracy, having now shed its crude covering of modesty, is arousing feelings of discontent and disgust even among the Zemstvos, among those timid people in whom civic courage and civic morality are almost completely atrophied.

We have been informed that in the city of X (for precaution, to remain unnamed) a congress of Zemstvo members was called at the end of June. It is said to have been attended by 40 or 50 Zemstvo people from several gubernias.

These people did not, of course, assemble to discuss political questions, but to solve peaceable, purely Zemstvo problems; they gathered "without infringing the bounds of

the department and the extent of their authority", as it is picturesquely expressed in the Zemstvo Instructions (Article 87). The meeting, however, was called without the permission and knowledge of the administration and, consequently, was held "in contravention of the Instructions for the activities of Zemstvo institutions", to quote the Instructions, and the assembled Zemstvo men gradually went over from the discussion of peaceable, innocent questions to a discussion of the general state of affairs. Such is the logic of life: conscientious Zemstvo men, howsoever they at times denounce radicalism and illegal work, are, by the force of events, faced with the necessity of illegal organisation and a more determined form of activity. Far be it from us to condemn this natural and perfectly correct path. It is time, at long last, for Zemstvo members to give an energetic and organised rebuff to a government that has taken the bit between its teeth, has killed rural self-government, has mutilated both urban and Zemstvo self-government, and with asinine obstinacy lays the axe to the last remnants of the Zemstvo institutions. It is said that one of the elderly and respected men of the Zemstvo, during the discussion at the congress on the question of how to combat the law setting limits to taxation by the Zemstvos, exclaimed: "Zemstvo members must, at last, say their word; for if they don't, they'll never be able to!" We are in complete agreement with the outcry of this liberal who is prepared to challenge the bureaucratic autocracy to open struggle. The Zemstvos are on the eve of internal bankruptcy. If the best Zemstvo men do not today take energetic measures, if they do not get rid of their usual Manilov[55] attitude, their trivial questions of secondary importance—"tinkering", as one venerable Zemstvo man put it—the Zemstvos will lose their adherents and turn into the usual "government offices". Such an inglorious death is inevitable; for one cannot with impunity for whole decades do nothing but show cowardice, offer thanks, and humbly petition; one must threaten, demand, stop wasting time on trifles, and settle down to the real work.

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE "CRITICS OF MARX"[56]

Written in June-September 1901

Chapters I to IV were first published in *Zarya,* No. 2-3, December 1901, signed *N. Lenin*; Chapters V to IX were published in *Obrazovanije*,[57] No. 2, February 1906, signed *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Zarya* and *Obrazovaniye* texts, checked with the text of the collection *The Agrarian Question*, by Vl. Ilyin, 1908

XV. 1906.

ОБРАЗОВАНІЕ.

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и

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№ 2.

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ
Типо-литографія Б. М. Вольфа. Разъѣзжая, 15.
1906.

Facsimile of the title-page of the magazine *Obrazovaniye*, No. 2, for 1906 which carried chapters V-IX of Lenin's "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'".

Facsimile of the title-page of the magazine Obrazovanie, No. 2,
for 1906 which carried chapters V-IX of Lenin's
"The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'"

"... To argue ... that dogmatic Marxism has been jolted from its positions in the sphere of agrarian questions would be like forcing an open door...." So spoke *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[58] last year through the mouth of Victor Chernov (1900, No. 8, p. 204). What a peculiar quality this "dogmatic Marxism" possesses! For many years now scientists and very learned people in Europe have been gravely declaring (and newspaper scribes and journalists have been repeating it over and over again) that Marxism has been jolted from its positions by "criticism", and yet every new critic starts from the beginning, all over again, to bombard these allegedly destroyed positions. Mr. Chernov, for example, in the periodical *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, as well as in the collection, *At the Glorious Post*, in a *two-hundred-and-forty-page-long* "discussion" of Hertz' work* with his reader, "forces an open door". Hertz' work, which has been given such a lengthy exposition, is itself a review of Kautsky's book, and has been translated into Russian. Mr. Bulgakov, in keeping with his promise to refute this very same Kautsky, has published a whole two-volume study. Now, surely, no one will ever be able to find the remnants of "dogmatic Marxism", which lies crushed to death beneath this mountain of critical printed matter.

I

THE "LAW" OF DIMINISHING RETURNS

Let us first of all examine the general theoretical physiognomy of the Critics. Mr. Bulgakov published an article in the periodical *Nachalo*[59] criticising Kautsky's *Agrarian*

* See present volume, footnote to p. 130—*Tr.*

Question in which he at once exposed his stock of "critical" methods. He charged down on Kautsky with the dash and abandon of a veritable cavalier and "scattered" him to the winds. He put into Kautsky's mouth what he had not said, he accused him of ignoring the very circumstances and arguments which he, Kautsky, had expounded with precision, and he presented to the reader as *his own* the critical conclusions drawn by Kautsky. With the air of an expert, Mr. Bulgakov accused Kautsky of confounding technology with economics, and in doing so betrayed, not only incredible confusion, but also a disinclination to read to the end the page he quotes from his opponent's book. Needless to say, this article from the pen of the future professor is replete with outworn gibes against socialists, against the "theory of collapse", against utopianism, against belief in miracles, etc.* Now, in his doctoral thesis (*Capitalism and Agriculture*, St. Petersburg, 1900), Mr. Bulgakov settled all his accounts with Marxism and brought his "critical" evolution to its logical conclusion.

Mr. Bulgakov makes the "law of diminishing returns" the corner-stone of his "theory of agrarian development". We are treated to quotations from the works of the classics who established this "law" (according to which each additional investment of labour and capital in land produces, not a corresponding, but a diminishing quantity of products). We are given a list of the English economists who recognise this law. We are assured that it "has universal significance", that it is "an evident and absolutely undeniable truth", "which needs only to be stated clearly", etc., etc. The more emphatically Mr. Bulgakov expresses himself, the clearer it becomes that he is *retreating* to bourgeois political economy, which obscures social relationships by imaginary "eternal laws". Indeed, what does the "evidentness" of the notorious "law of diminishing returns" amount to? If each successive investment of labour and capital in land produced, not a diminishing, but an equal quantity of products,

* I replied immediately to Mr. Bulgakov's article in *Nachalo* by an article entitled "Capitalism in Agriculture". Following the suppression of *Nachalo*, my article was published in *Zhizn*,[60] 1900, Nos. 1 and 2. (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*) (See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 105-59.—*Ed.*)

there would be no sense in extending the area of land under cultivation; additional quantities of grain would be produced on the same plot of land, however small, and "it would be possible to carry on the agriculture of the whole globe upon one dessiatine of land". This is the customary (*and the only*) argument advanced in favour of this "universal" law. A little thought, however, will prove to anyone that this argument is an empty abstraction, which ignores the most important thing—the level of technological development, the state of the productive forces. Indeed, the very term "additional (or successive) investments of labour and capital" *presupposes* changes in the methods of production, reforms in technique. In order to increase the quantity of capital invested in land to any considerable degree, new machinery must be *invented*, and there must be new methods of land cultivation, stock breeding, transport of products, and so on and so forth. Of course, "additional investments of labour and capital" may and do take place on a relatively small scale even when the technique of production has remained at the same level. In such cases, the "law of diminishing returns" is applicable *to a certain degree*, i.e., in the sense that the unchanged technique of production imposes relatively very narrow limits upon the investment of additional labour and capital. Consequently, instead of a universal law, we have an extremely relative "law"—so relative, indeed, that it cannot be called a "law", or even a cardinal specific feature of agriculture. Let us take for granted: the three-field system, cultivation of traditional grain crops, maintenance of cattle to obtain manure, lack of improved grassland and improved implements. Obviously, assuming that these conditions remain unchanged, the possibilities of investing additional labour and capital in the land are extremely limited. But even within the narrow limits in which some investment of additional labour and capital is still possible, a decrease in the productivity of each such additional investment will *not always and not necessarily* be observed. Let us take industry—flour-milling or ironworking, for example, in the period preceding world trade and the invention of the steam-engine. At that level of technical development, the limits to which additional labour and capital could be invested in a blacksmith's forge,

or in a wind- or water-mill, were very restricted; the inevitable thing that happened was that small smithies and flour-mills continued to multiply and increase in number until the radical changes in the methods of production created a basis for new forms of industry.

Thus, the "law of diminishing returns" does not at all apply to cases in which technology is progressing and methods of production are changing; it has only an extremely relative and restricted application to conditions in which technology remains unchanged. That is why neither Marx nor the Marxists speak of this "law", and only representatives of bourgeois science like Brentano make so much noise about it, since they are unable to abandon the prejudices of the old political economy, with its abstract, eternal, and natural laws.

Mr. Bulgakov defends the "universal law" by arguments deserving only of ridicule.

"What was formerly a free gift of Nature must now be produced by man: the wind and the rain broke up the soil, which was full of nutritive elements, and only a little effort on the part of man was required to produce what was needed. In the course of time, a larger and larger share of the productive work fell to man. As is the case everywhere, artificial processes more and more take the place of natural processes. But while in industry this expresses man's victory over Nature, in agriculture it indicates the increasing difficulties of an existence for which Nature is diminishing her gifts.

"In the present case it is immaterial whether the increasing difficulty of producing food is expressed in an increase in human labour or in an increase of its products, such as instruments of production, fertilisers [Mr. Bulgakov wishes to say that it is immaterial whether the increasing difficulty of producing food finds expression in an increased expenditure of human labour or in an increase in the products of human labour]; what is important is that food becomes more and more costly to man. This substitution of human labour for the forces of Nature and of artificial factors of production for natural factors is the law of diminishing returns" (16).

Evidently, Mr. Bulgakov is envious of the laurels of

Messrs. Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky, who arrived at the conclusion that it is not man who works with the help of machines, but machines that work with the help of man. And like those critics, he sinks to the level of vulgar political economy by talking about the forces of Nature being *superseded* by human labour, and so forth. Speaking generally, it is as impossible for human labour to supersede the forces of Nature as it is to substitute pounds for yards. Both in industry and in agriculture, man can only utilise the forces of Nature when he has learned how they operate, and he can *facilitate* this utilisation by means of machinery, tools, etc. That primitive man obtained all he required as a free gift of Nature is a silly fable for which Mr. Bulgakov would be howled down even by first-term students. Our age was not preceded by a Golden Age; and primitive man was absolutely crushed by the burden of existence, by the difficulties of the struggle against Nature. The introduction of machinery and of improved methods of production immeasurably eased man's struggle against Nature generally, and the production of food in particular. It has not become more difficult to produce food; it has become more difficult for the workers to obtain it because capitalist development has inflated ground-rent and the price of land, has concentrated agriculture in the hands of large and small capitalists, and, to a still larger extent, has concentrated machinery, implements, and money, without which successful production is impossible. To explain the aggravation of the workers' condition by the argument that Nature is reducing her gifts can mean only that one has become a bourgeois apologist.

"In accepting this law," continues Mr. Bulgakov, "we do not in the least assert that there is a continuously increasing difficulty in food production; nor do we deny progress in agriculture. To assert the first, and to deny the second, would be contrary to obvious facts. This difficulty does not grow uninterruptedly, of course; development proceeds in zigzag fashion. Discoveries in agronomics and technical improvements convert barren into fertile land and temporarily remove the tendency indicated by the law of diminishing returns" (ibid.).

Profound, is it not?

Technical progress is a "temporary" tendency, while the law of diminishing returns, i.e., diminishing productivity (and that not always) of additional investments of capital on the basis of an unchanging technique, "has universal significance"! This is equal to saying that the stopping of trains at stations represents the universal law of steam transport, while the motion of trains between stations is a temporary tendency paralysing the operation of the universal law of immobility.

Finally, extensive data clearly refute the universality of the law of diminishing returns—data on the agricultural as well as the non-agricultural population. Mr. Bulgakov himself admits that "if each country were restricted to its own natural resources, the procuring of food would call for an uninterrupted relative increase [note this!] in the quantity of labour and, consequently, in the agricultural population" (19). The diminution in the agricultural population of Western Europe, accordingly, is explained by the fact that the operation of the law of diminishing returns has been counteracted by the importation of grain.

An excellent explanation, indeed! Our pundit has forgotten a detail, namely, that a relative diminution in the agricultural population is common to all capitalist countries, both agricultural and grain-importing. The agricultural population is relatively diminishing in America and in Russia. It has been diminishing in France since the end of the eighteenth century (see figures in the same work of Mr. Bulgakov, II, p. 168). Moreover, the relative diminution of the agricultural population sometimes becomes an absolute diminution, whereas the excess of grain imports over exports was still quite insignificant in the thirties and forties, and *only after 1878* do we cease to find years in which grain exports exceed grain imports.* In Prussia there was a relative diminution in the agricultural population from 73.5 per cent in 1816 to 71.7 per cent in 1849, and to 67.5 per cent in 1871, whereas the importation of rye began only in the early sixties, and the importation of wheat in the early seventies (ibid., Part II, pp. 70 and 88). Finally, if

* *Statistique agricole de la France. Enquête de 1892*, Paris, 1897, p. 113. (*Agricultural Statistics of France. Survey of 1892.—Ed.*)

we take the European grain-importing countries, e.g., France and Germany during the last decade, we shall find that there has been *undoubted progress* in agriculture side by side with *an absolute diminution* in the number of workers engaged in farming. In France this number dropped from 6,913,504 in 1882 to 6,663,135 in 1892 (*Statistique agricole*, Part II, pp. 248-51), and in Germany from 8,064,000 in 1882 to 8,045,000 in 1895.* Thus, it may be said that the *entire* history of the nineteenth century, by a multitude of data on countries of the most varied character, proves irrefutably that the "universal" law of diminishing returns is *absolutely paralysed* by the "temporary" tendency of technological advance which enables a relatively (and sometimes absolutely) diminishing rural population to produce an increasing quantity of agricultural products for an increasing mass of population.

Incidentally, this mass of statistical data also refutes the two following main points of Mr. Bulgakov's "theory": first, his assertion that the theory that constant capital (implements and materials of production) grows more rapidly than variable capital (labour-power) "is absolutely inapplicable to agriculture". With an air of importance Mr. Bulgakov declares that this theory is wrong, and in proof of his opinion refers to: (a) "Professor A. Skvortsov" (celebrated mostly for having ascribed Marx's theory of the average

* *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Neue Folge, Bd. 112: *Die Landwirtschaft im Deutschen Reich* (*Statistics of the German Empire*, New Series, Vol. 112: *Agriculture in the German Empire.—Ed.*), Berlin, 1898, *S.* 6 ★. This evidence of technological advance accompanied by a diminution in the agricultural population is of course not at all pleasing to Mr. Bulgakov, for it utterly destroys his Malthusianism. Our "strict scientist", therefore, resorts to the following trick: instead of taking agriculture in the strict sense of the term (land cultivation, livestock breeding, etc.), he (after adducing statistics on the increase in the quantity of *agricultural* produce obtained per hectare!) takes "agriculture in the broad sense", in which German statistics include hothouse cultivation, market gardening, *and forestry and fishing*! In this way, we get an increase in the sum-total of persons actually engaged in "agriculture"!! (Bulgakov, II, p. 133.) The figures quoted above apply to persons for whom agriculture is the *principal* occupation. The number of persons engaged in agriculture as a subsidiary occupation increased from 3,144,000 to 3,578,000. To add these to the previous figures is not entirely correct; but even if we do this, the increase is very small: from 11,208,000 to 11,623,000.

rate of profit to ill-intentioned propaganda); and (b) the fact that under intensive farming the number of workers employed per unit of land increases. This is an example of the deliberate refusal to understand Marx which fashionable Critics constantly display. Think of it: the theory of the more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital is refuted by the increase of *variable capital* per unit of land! And Mr. Bulgakov *fails to notice* that the very statistics he himself offers in such abundance confirm Marx's theory. In German agriculture as a whole the number of workers employed diminished from 8,064,000 in 1882 to 8,045,000 in 1895 (and if the number of persons engaged in agriculture as a subsidiary occupation is added, it increased from 11,208,000 to 11,623,000, i.e., only by 3.7 per cent). In the same period, livestock increased from 23,000,000 to 25,400,000 (all livestock expressed in terms of cattle), i.e., by more than 10 per cent; the number of cases in which the five most important agricultural machines were employed increased from 458,000 to 922,000, i.e., more than doubled; the quantity of fertilisers imported increased from 636,000 tons (1883) to 1,961,000 tons (1892), and the quantity of potassium salts from 304,000 double centners to 2,400,000.* Is it not clear from this that constant capital has increased in relation to variable capital? This, quite apart from the fact that these summary figures to a great extent conceal the progress of large-scale production. We shall deal with this point later.

Secondly, the progress of agriculture simultaneously with a diminution, or a negligible absolute increase, in the agricultural population completely refutes Mr. Bulgakov's absurd attempt to revive Malthusianism. The first of the Russian "ex-Marxists" to make this attempt was probably Mr. Struve, in his *Critical Remarks*; but he, as always, never went beyond hesitant, half-expressed, and ambiguous remarks, which he did not carry to their logical conclusion or round off into a complete system of views. Mr. Bulgakov, however, is bolder and more consistent; he unhesitatingly converts the "law of diminishing returns" into "one of the

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* *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Bd. 112, *S.* 36★; Bulgakov, II, 135.

most important laws of the history of civilisation" (*sic*! p. 18). "The entire history of the nineteenth century ... with its problems of riches and poverty would be unintelligible without this law." "I have not the least doubt that the social question as it is posed today is materially linked with this law." (Our strict scientist hastens to make this declaration on page 18 of his "Inquiry"!)... "There is no doubt," he declares at the end of his work, "that where over-population exists, a certain part of the poverty that prevails must be put under the heading of *absolute poverty*, the poverty of production and not of distribution" (II, 221). "The population problem, in the special form in which it presents itself to us as a result of the conditions of agricultural production, is, in my opinion, the principal obstacle—at the present time at any rate—in the way of any extensive application of the principles of collectivism or co-operation in agricultural enterprise" (II, 265). "The past leaves to the future a heritage in the shape of a grain problem more terrible and more difficult than the social problem—the problem of production and not of distribution" (II, 455), and so on and so forth. There is no need for us to discuss the scientific significance of this "theory", which is inseparably connected with the universal law of diminishing returns, since we have already examined this law. The fact that critical flirtation with Malthusianism in its logical development has inevitably resulted in a descent to the most vulgar bourgeois apologetics is proved by the above-quoted arguments, which Mr. Bulgakov has presented with a frankness that leaves nothing to be desired.

In a further essay we shall examine data from several new sources cited by our Critics (who constantly din into our ears that orthodox Marxists fear specification) and show that Mr. Bulgakov generally stereotypes the word "over-population", the use of which relieves him of the necessity of making any kind of analysis, particularly of analysing the class antagonisms among the "peasantry". Here we shall confine ourselves to the general theoretical aspect of the agrarian question and touch on the theory of rent. "As for Marx," writes Mr. Bulgakov, "we must say that in Volume III of *Capital*, in the form in which we have it now, he adds nothing worthy of attention to Ricardo's theory of differ-

ential rent" (87). Let us bear this "nothing worthy of attention" in mind and compare the Critic's verdict with the following statement made by him previously: "Notwithstanding his obvious opposition to this law [the law of diminishing returns], Marx appropriates, in its fundamental principles, Ricardo's theory of rent, which is based on this law" (13). Thus, according to Mr. Bulgakov, Marx failed to see the connection between Ricardo's theory of rent and the law of diminishing returns, and therefore he never carried his argument to its logical conclusion! In regard to such a statement we can say but one thing—that no one distorts Marx to the degree that the ex-Marxists do and no one is so incredibly un... un... unabashed in ascribing to the writer he is criticising a thousand and one mortal sins.

Mr. Bulgakov's assertion is a glaring distortion of the truth. Actually, Marx not only saw the connection between Ricardo's theory of rent and his erroneous doctrine of diminishing returns, but quite definitely exposed Ricardo's error. Anyone who has read Volume III of *Capital* with even a grain of "attention" could not but have observed the fact, very much "worthy of attention", that it was precisely Marx who *freed* the theory of differential rent from *all connection* with the notorious "law of diminishing returns". Marx demonstrated that the unequal productivity of different investments of capital in land was all that was necessary for the formation of differential rent. The question as to whether the transition is from better land to worse land or vice versa, as to whether the productivity of the additional investments of capital in land diminishes or increases, is absolutely immaterial. In actual practice, all sorts of combinations of these varying cases take place; and it is utterly impossible to subject these combinations to a single general rule. For example, Marx first of all describes the first form of differential rent, which arises from the unequal productivity of capital invested in unequal plots of land, and he explains his case by tables (concerning which Mr. Bulgakov severely rebukes Marx for his "excessive predilection for clothing what are often very simple thoughts in a complicated mathematical garb". This complicated mathematical garb is simply the four rules of arithmetic, and the very simple ideas, as we see, were completely mis-

understood by our learned professor). After analysing these tables, Marx draws the conclusion: "This takes care of the first false assumption regarding differential rent—still found among West, Malthus, and Ricardo—namely, that it necessarily presupposes a movement toward worse and worse soil, or an ever-decreasing fertility of the soil. It can be formed, as we have seen, with a movement toward better and better soil; it can be formed when a better soil takes the lowest position that was formerly occupied by the worst soil; it can be connected with a progressive improvement in agriculture. The precondition is merely the inequality of different kinds of soil." (Marx does not speak here of the unequal productivity of successive investments of capital in land, because this gives rise to the *second* form of differential rent; in this chapter he speaks only of the *first* form of differential rent.) "So far as the increase in productivity is concerned, it [differential rent—*Ed.*] assumes that the increase in absolute fertility of the total area does not eliminate this inequality, but either increases it, leaves it unchanged, or merely reduces it" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, *S.* 199).[61] Mr. Bulgakov *failed to see* the radical difference between Marx's theory of differential rent and Ricardo's theory of rent. He preferred to rummage in Volume III of *Capital* for "a fragment which would rather suggest the idea that Marx was by no means opposed to the law of diminishing returns" (p. 13, footnote). We apologise to the reader for having to devote so much space to a passage that is quite immaterial to the question that concerns us and Mr. Bulgakov. But what can one do when the heroes of modern criticism (who have the insolence to charge orthodox Marxists with resorting to rabulous disputation) distort the absolutely clear meaning of a doctrine to which they are opposed by quoting passages out of context and in faulty translations? Mr. Bulgakov quotes the passage that he found as follows: "From the standpoint of the capitalist mode of production, a relative increase in the price of (*agricultural*) products always takes place, *since* [we ask the reader to pay particular attention to the words *we* have italicised] these products cannot be secured unless an expenditure is incurred, a payment made, which was not previously made." Marx goes on to say that elements of Nature entering as

agents into production, costing nothing, represent a free gift of Nature's productive power of labour; but if for the production of an additional product it is necessary to work without the help of this natural power, a new capital outlay is required, which leads to an increase in the cost of production.

Concerning this mode of "quoting" we have three remarks to make. First, *Mr. Bulgakov himself introduced* the word "since", which gives his tirade the definite sense of establishing some kind of "law". *In the original* (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, *S.* 277-78)[62] *Marx does not say "since" but "when"*. When something is paid for which formerly did not have to be paid for, there is a relative increase in the price of the product. Is *that* proposition anything like a recognition of the "law" of diminishing returns? Secondly, Mr. Bulgakov inserts in parentheses the word "agricultural". *In the original text the word does not appear at all*. In all probability, with the frivolousness characteristic of the Critics, Mr. Bulgakov decided that in this passage Marx could be speaking only of agricultural products, and therefore hastened to give his readers an "explanation" that is a complete misrepresentation. In point of fact, Marx in this passage speaks of products generally; in the original, the passage quoted by Mr. Bulgakov is preceded by the words: "But, in general, the following is to be noted." Freely bestowed natural forces may also enter into industrial production—in the same section on rent Marx gives the example of a waterfall which for a certain factory takes the place of steam power—and if it is necessary to manufacture an additional quantity of products without the aid of these freely bestowed natural forces, there will *always* be a relative increase in the price of the products. Thirdly, we must examine the context in which this passage occurs. Marx discusses in this chapter differential rent obtained from the worst cultivated soil, and he examines *as always* two absolutely equivalent, *two absolutely equally possible* cases: the first case—increasing productivity of successive investments of capital (*S.* 274-76),[63] and the second case—decreasing productivity of such investments (*S.* 276-78).[64] In regard to the second of the possible cases, Marx says: "Concerning decreasing productiveness of the soil with successive investments of

capital, see Liebig.... *But, in general*, the following is to be noted" (our italics). There follows the passage "translated" by Mr. Bulgakov, stating that when what was formerly obtained gratis has now to be paid for, there is *always* a relative increase in the price of the product.

We shall leave it to the reader to judge the scientific conscientiousness of the Critic who turned Marx's remark about one of the possible cases into a recognition of this case by Marx as some sort of general "law".

And the following is the conclusion at which Mr. Bulgakov arrives concerning the passage he has discovered: "This passage, of course, is vague...." Of course! By substituting one word for another, Mr. Bulgakov has rendered it utterly meaningless! "... but it cannot be understood otherwise than as an indirect or even direct recognition [listen well!] of the law of diminishing returns. I am unaware that Marx has expressed himself openly on the latter in any other place" (I, 14). As an ex-Marxist, Mr. Bulgakov is "unaware" that Marx openly declared the assumptions of West, Malthus, and Ricardo—that differential rent presupposes a transition to worse land or diminishing returns—to be utterly false.* He is "unaware" that in the course of his voluminous analysis of rent Marx points out *scores of times* that he regards diminishing and increasing productivity of additional investments of capital as equally possible cases!

II

THE THEORY OF RENT

Mr. Bulgakov has completely failed to understand Marx's theory of rent. He is convinced that he has shattered this theory by the two following arguments: (1) According to Marx, agricultural capital enters into the equalisation of

* This false assumption of classical political economy, refuted by Marx, was adopted by the "Critic" Mr. Bulgakov, following on the heels of his teacher, Brentano, uncritically, of course. "The condition for the appearance of rent," Mr. Bulgakov writes, "is the law of diminishing returns" (I, 90). "... English rent ... as a matter of fact distinguishes successive investments of capital of varying and, as a rule, diminishing productivity" (I, 130).

the rate of profit, so that rent is created by a surplus profit that exceeds the average rate of profit. Mr. Bulgakov considers this to be false because the monopoly of land ownership eliminates free competition, which is necessary for the process of equalising the rate of profit. Agricultural capital does not enter into the process of equalising the rate of profit. (2) Absolute rent is merely a special case of differential rent, and it is erroneous to distinguish the one from the other. The distinction is based upon a completely arbitrary twofold interpretation of one and the same fact, namely, the monopoly ownership of one of the factors of production. Mr. Bulgakov is so convinced of the crushing effect of his arguments that he cannot refrain from pouring forth a stream of vehement words against Marx, such as *petitio principii*,* non-Marxism, logical fetishism, Marx's loss of capacity for mental flights, and so forth. And yet both those arguments are based on a rather crude error. The same one-sided vulgarisation of the subject which induced Mr. Bulgakov to raise one of the possible cases (diminishing productivity of additional investments of capital) to the level of the universal law of diminishing returns brings him in the present instance to employ the concept "monopoly" uncritically and to convert it into something universal. In doing so, he confuses the results which accrue under the capitalist organisation of agriculture from *the limitedness of land*, on the one hand, and from *private property in land*, on the other. These are two different things, as we shall explain.

"The *condition*, although not the source, of the appearance of ground-rent," writes Mr. Bulgakov, "is the same as that which gave rise to the possibility of the monopolisation of land—the fact that the productivity of the land is limited, while man's growing need for it is limitless" (I, 90). Instead of "the productivity of the land is limited", he should have said, "*land is limited*". (As we have shown, limitedness of the productivity of the land implies "limitedness" of the given technical level, the given state of the productive forces.) Under the capitalist system of society,

* An argument based on the conclusion from a proposition that has still to be proved.—*Ed.*

the limitedness of land does indeed presuppose monopolisation of land, *but of land as an object of economy and not as an object of property rights*. The assumption of the capitalist organisation of agriculture necessarily includes the assumption that all the land is occupied by separate private enterprises; *but it in no way includes the assumption* that the whole of the land is the private property of those farmers, or of other persons, or that it is, in general, private property. The monopoly of landownership based on property rights and the monopoly of the land economy are two entirely different things, not only logically, but historically. Logically, we can quite easily imagine a purely capitalist organisation of agriculture in which private property in land is entirely absent, in which the land is the property of the state, or of a village commune, etc. In actual practice we see that in all developed capitalist countries the whole of the land is occupied by separate, private enterprises; but these enterprises exploit not only their own lands, but also those rented from other landowners, from the state, or from village communes (e.g., in Russia, where, as is well known, the private enterprises established on peasant communal lands are principally capitalist peasant enterprises). Not without reason did Marx, at the very beginning of his analysis of rent, observe that the capitalist mode of production meets in its first stages (and subordinates to itself) the most varied forms of landed property: from clan property[65] and feudal landed property down to the property of the peasant commune.

Thus, the limitedness of land necessarily presupposes only the monopolisation of the economy of the land (under the domination of capitalism). The question arises: what are the necessary consequences of *this* monopolisation in relation to the problem of rent? The limitedness of land results in the price of grain being determined by the conditions of production, not on the average land, but on the worst land under cultivation. This price of grain enables the farmer (=the capitalist entrepreneur in agriculture) to cover his cost of production and gives him the average rate of profit on his capital. The farmer on the better land obtains an additional profit, which forms *differential rent*. The question as to whether private property in land exists

has nothing whatever to do with the question of the formation of differential rent, which is inevitable in capitalist agriculture even on communal, state, or non-private lands. The only consequence of the limitedness of land under capitalism is the formation of differential rent arising out of the difference in the productivity of various investments of capital. Mr. Bulgakov sees a second consequence in the elimination of free competition in agriculture when he says that the absence of this free competition prevents agricultural capital from participating in the formation of average profit. Obviously, he confuses the question of land cultivation with the right of property in land. The only thing that logically follows from the limitedness of land (irrespective of private property in land) is that the land will be entirely occupied by capitalist farmers; but it by no means follows that free competition among those farmers will necessarily be restricted in any way. Limitedness of land is a general phenomenon which inevitably leaves its impress upon the whole of capitalist agriculture. The logical unsoundness of confusing these different things is clearly confirmed by history. We shall not speak of England, where the separation of landownership from land cultivation is obvious, where free competition among farmers is almost limitless, where capital obtained from commerce and industry was and is invested in agriculture on the widest scale. But in all other capitalist countries (notwithstanding the opinion of Mr. Bulgakov, who, following Mr. Struve, vainly strives to place "English" rent in a special category) *the same process* of the separation of landownership from land cultivation is actual, although in extremely varied forms (leases, mortgages). In failing to see this process (strongly emphasised by Marx), Mr. Bulgakov has failed to see the main thing. In all European countries, after the fall of serfdom, we see the decay of landownership based on social-estates, the mobilisation of landed property, the investment of merchant and industrial capital in agriculture, an increase in tenant farming and an increase in the mortgaging of land. In Russia also, despite the most pronounced survivals of serfdom, we see after the Reform*

* The Reform of 1861 which abolished serfdom in Russia.—*Tr.*

increased purchasing of land by peasants, commoners, and merchants, and increased leasing of privately-owned, state, and *village communal* lands, etc., etc. What do all these phenomena prove? They prove that free competition has entered *agriculture—despite* the monopoly *of landed property* and regardless of the infinite variety of its forms. In all capitalist countries at the present time, every owner of capital can invest his money in agriculture (by purchasing or leasing land) as easily, or almost as easily, as he can invest in any branch of commerce or industry.

In arguing against Marx's theory of differential rent, Mr. Bulgakov says that "all these differences [differences in the conditions of the production of agricultural products] are contradictory and *may* [our italics] mutually eliminate one another; as Rodbertus pointed out, distance may be counteracted by fertility, different degrees of fertility may be equalised by more intensive cultivation of the more fertile plots" (I, 81). A pity, indeed, that our strict scientist should have forgotten that Marx noted this fact and was able to appraise it not so one-sidedly. Marx wrote: "... It is evident that these two different causes of differential rent—fertility and location [of plots of land]—may work in opposite directions. A certain plot of land may be very favourably located and yet be very poor in fertility, and vice versa. This circumstance is important, for it explains how it is possible that bringing into cultivation the land of a certain country may equally well proceed from the better to the worse land as vice versa. Finally, it is clear that the progress of social production in general has, on the one hand, the effect of evening out differences arising from location [of plots of land] as a cause of ground-rent, by creating local markets and improving locations by establishing communication and transportation facilities; on the other hand, it increases the differences in individual locations of plots of land by separating agriculture from manufacturing and forming large centres of production, on the one hand, while relatively isolating agricultural districts [*relative Vereinsamung des Landes*] on the other" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, *S*. 190).[66] Thus, while Mr. Bulgakov triumphantly repeats the long known references to the *possibility* of the

mutual elimination of the differences, Marx presents the *further* problem of the transformation of this possibility into reality and shows that, simultaneously with equalising influences, there are to be observed differentiating influences. The final result of these mutually contradictory influences is, as everyone knows, that in all countries plots of land *differ* considerably both in fertility and in location. Mr. Bulgakov's objection merely reveals that he has not given any thought whatsoever to his observations.

Continuing his argument, Mr. Bulgakov says that the conception of the last and least productive investment of labour and capital is "employed uncritically by both Ricardo and Marx. It is not difficult to see what an arbitrary element is introduced by this conception: let the amount of capital invested in land be equal to $10a$, and let each successive a represent a diminishing productivity; the total product of the soil will be A. Obviously, the average productivity of each a will be equal to $A/10$; and if the total capital is regarded as a single whole, then the price will be determined precisely by this average productivity" (I, 82). Obviously, we say in reply to this, behind his florid phrases about the "limited productivity of the land" Mr. Bulgakov failed to see *a trifle*: the limitedness of land. This limitedness, irrespective of the form of *property* in land, creates a certain kind of monopoly, i.e., since all the land is occupied by farmers, and since there is a demand for the whole of the grain produced on the whole of the land, including the worst land and the remotest from the market, it is clear that the price of grain is determined by the price of production on the worst land (or the price of production connected with the last and least productive investment of capital). Mr. Bulgakov's "average productivity" is a futile exercise in arithmetic, for the limitedness of land prevents the actual formation of this average. For this "average productivity" to form and to determine the prices, every capitalist must, in general, not only be able to invest capital in agriculture (to the extent that free competition, as we have said, exists in agriculture), but he must be able at all times to establish *new* agricultural enterprises in addition to those already existing. If this were possible, there would be no difference whatever between agriculture and industry, and rent could

not come into existence. But precisely because of the limitedness of land, this is not the case.

To proceed. Until now we have pursued our argument without taking into account the question of property in land; we have seen that this method was necessary for logical considerations, as well as for the reason that historical data show that capitalist agriculture emerged and developed under various forms of landownership. Let us now introduce this new condition. Let us assume that all land is privately owned. How will this affect rent? Differential rent will be collected by the landowner from the farmer on the basis of his right of ownership. Since differential rent is the surplus profit over and above the normal, average profit on capital, and since free competition in the sense of the free investment of capital in agriculture exists (is being created by capitalist development), the landowner will always find a farmer who will be satisfied with the average profit and who will give him the surplus profit. Private property in land does not create differential rent; it merely transfers it from the hands of the farmer to the hands of the landowner. Is the influence of private landownership restricted to that? Can we assume that the landowner will permit the farmer to exploit *gratis* the worst and most inconveniently located land, which only produces the average profit on capital? Naturally, not. Landownership is a monopoly, and on the basis of this monopoly the landowner demands payment from the farmer for this land also. That payment will be *absolute rent*, which has no connection whatever with the difference in productivity of various investments of capital, and which *has its genesis in the private ownership of land*. In accusing Marx of making an arbitrary, twofold interpretation of the same monopoly, Mr. Bulgakov did not take the trouble to consider that we are actually dealing with a twofold monopoly. In the first place, we have the monopoly (capitalist) of land economy. This monopoly originates in the limitedness of land, and is therefore inevitable in any capitalist society. *This* monopoly leads to the determination of the price of grain by the conditions of production on the worst land; the surplus profit obtained by the investment of capital on better land, or by a more productive investment of capital, forms differential rent.

This rent comes into being quite independently of private property in land, which simply enables the landowner to take it from the farmer. In the second place, we have the monopoly of private property in land. Neither logically nor historically is this monopoly inseverably linked with the previous monopoly.* There is nothing in this monopoly that is *essential* to capitalist society and to the capitalist organisation of agriculture. On the one hand, we can quite easily conceive of capitalist agriculture without private property in land; indeed, many consistent bourgeois economists have demanded the nationalisation of land. On the other hand, even in practice we meet with the capitalist organisation of agriculture without private ownership of land, e.g., on state and village-commune lands. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between these two kinds of monopolies, as well as to recognise that absolute rent, which is *engendered* by private property in land, exists side by side with differential rent.**

* It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that we are dealing here with the general theory of rent and the capitalist organisation of agriculture; we do not, therefore, concern ourselves with facts like the antiquity and widespread character of private property in land, or the undermining of the last-mentioned form of monopoly, and partly of both its forms, by overseas competition, and so forth.

** In the second part of Volume II of *Theories of Surplus-Value* (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, II. Theil), published in 1905, Marx gives an explanation of absolute rent which confirms the correctness of my interpretation (particularly in regard to the two forms of monopoly). The following passages from Marx pertain to this interpretation: "If land were an unlimited element, not only in relation to capital and to population, but in actual fact, i.e., if it were as 'unlimited' as 'air and water', if it 'existed in unlimited quantities' [quotations from Ricardo], then the appropriation of land by one person could not in practice in any way exclude the appropriation of land by another person. In that case, private (as also 'public' and state) property in land could not exist. If, in addition, the land everywhere were of the same quality, no rent could be obtained for it.... The crux of the matter is—if land in relation to capital existed as a natural element, then capital in the sphere of agriculture would operate in the same way as it does in every other sphere of industry. There would then be no property in land and no rent.... On the other hand, if land is: (1) limited; and (2) appropriated—if property in land is a condition for the emergence of capital—and that is precisely the case in countries where capitalist production is developing; and in countries where this condition did not formerly exist (as in old Eu-

Marx explains the possibility of the formation of absolute rent from the surplus-value of agricultural capital by the fact that in agriculture the share of variable capital in the total composition of capital is above the average (a quite natural assumption in view of the undoubted backwardness of agricultural as compared with industrial technique). This being the case, it follows that the value of agricultural products, generally speaking, is higher than the cost of their production, and that surplus-value is higher than profit. The monopoly of private property in land, however, prevents this surplus from passing wholly into the process of equalising profits, and absolute rent is taken from this surplus.*

Mr. Bulgakov is greatly dissatisfied with this explanation and he exclaims: "What kind of thing is this surplus-value, which, like cloth or cotton, or some other commodity, can suffice or not suffice to cover a possible demand? In the first place, it is not a material thing, it is a concept, which serves to express a definite social relationship of production"

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rope), capitalist production itself creates it, as in the United States—then land does not represent a field of activity accessible to capital in an elementary way. That is why absolute rent exists, apart from differential rent" (pp. 80-81).[67] Marx definitely draws a distinction here between the limitedness of land and the fact that land is private property. (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

* We desire to say in passing that we have considered it necessary to deal in particular detail with Marx's theory of rent because we find that the interpretation Mr. P. Maslov gives of it is also incorrect ("The Agrarian Question", in *Zhizn*, Nos. 3 and 4, 1901). In that article, he regards the diminishing productivity of successive investments of capital, if not as a law, then at all events as the "usual" and as it were normal phenomenon, which he links with differential rent, and he rejects the theory of absolute rent. Mr. P. Maslov's interesting article contains many true remarks concerning the Critics, but it suffers greatly from the author's erroneous theory just referred to (while defending Marxism, he has not taken the trouble to define clearly the difference between "his own" theory and that of Marx), as well as from a number of careless and utterly unjust assertions, as for example, that Mr. Berdyaev "is completely liberating himself from the influence of bourgeois authors" and is distinguished for his "consistent class point of view, maintained without sacrificing objectivity"; that "in many respects Kautsky's analysis is in places ... tendentious"; that Kautsky "has completely failed to indicate in what direction the development of the productive forces in agriculture is proceeding"; and so forth.

(I, 105). This contrasting of a "material thing" to a "concept" is a striking example of the scholasticism which is now so freely offered in the guise of "criticism". What would be the use of a "concept" of the share of the social product if there were not definite "material things" corresponding to that concept? Surplus-value is the money equivalent of the surplus product, which consists of a definite share of cloth, cotton, grain, and of all other commodities (the word "definite" must not, of course, be understood in the sense that science can concretely define that share, but in the sense that the conditions which, in general outline, define the dimensions of this share are known). In agriculture, the surplus product is larger (in proportion to the capital) than in other branches of industry, and this surplus (which does not enter into the equalisation of profit owing to the monopoly of private property in land) may, naturally, "suffice or not suffice to cover the demand" of the monopolist landowner.

We shall not burden the reader with a detailed exposition of the theory of rent which Mr. Bulgakov has created, as he modestly remarks, "by his own efforts", "pursuing his own path" (I, 111). A few remarks will suffice to characterise this product of the "last and least productive investment" of professorial "effort". The "new" theory of rent is brewed according to the ancient recipe: "What is worth doing at all is worth doing thoroughly". Since free competition exists, then without any restrictions (although absolutely free competition has nowhere and at no time existed). Since monopoly exists, there is nothing more to be said. Consequently, rent is not taken from surplus-value, and not even from the agricultural product; it is taken from the product of non-agricultural labour; it is simply a tribute, a tax, a deduction from the total social product, a promissory note in favour of the landlord. "Agricultural capital, with its profit, and agricultural labour, agriculture in general as a sphere of investment for capital and labour, are therefore a *status in statu** in the kingdom of capitalism.... All [*sic*!] definitions of capital, surplus-value, wages, and value generally are imaginary quantities when applied to agriculture" (I, 99).

* A state within a state.—*Ed.*

So, now everything is clear: both capitalists and wage-workers in agriculture are imaginary quantities. But if Mr. Bulgakov at times wanders into the clouds, he, at others, argues not altogether irrationally. Fourteen pages farther on we read: "The production of agricultural products costs society a certain quantity of labour; that is the value of these products." Excellent. Consequently, at least the "definition" of value is not altogether an imaginary quantity. Farther we read: "Since production is organised on a capitalist basis, and since capital stands at the head of production, the price of grain will be determined by the price of production, that is, the productivity of the given labour and capital invested will be calculated according to average social productivity." Fine! Consequently, the "definitions" of capital, surplus-value, and wages are not altogether imaginary quantities. Consequently, free competition (although not absolutely free) exists; for unless capital could flow from agriculture into industry and vice versa, "the calculation of productivity according to average social productivity" would be impossible. Again: "The monopoly in land causes price to rise above value to the limits permitted by market conditions." Excellent! But where has Mr. Bulgakov seen that tribute, taxes, promissory notes, etc., are dependent upon market conditions? If the monopoly causes price to rise to the limits permitted by market conditions, then the only difference between the "new" theory of rent and the "old" is this: the author, pursuing "his own path", failed to understand the difference between the influence of the limitedness of land and the influence of private property in land, on the one hand, and the connection between the concept "monopoly" and the concept "the last and least productive investment of labour and capital", on the other. Is it surprising, therefore, that seven pages farther on (I, 120) Mr. Bulgakov should completely lose sight of "his own" theory and argue about the "method of distributing this [agricultural] product among the landowner, the capitalist farmer, and the agricultural labourers"? A brilliant finale to a brilliant criticism! A remarkable outcome of the new *Bulgakov theory of rent*, which, henceforth, will enrich the science of political economy!

III

MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE

Let us now pass to what Mr. Bulgakov regards as the "remarkable" work of Hertz (*Die agrarischen Fragen im Verhältniss zum Sozialismus*, Wien, 1899.* Russian translation by A. Ilyinsky, St. Petersburg, 1900). We shall need, however, to spend a little time in simultaneously examining similar arguments by both authors.

The question of machinery in agriculture and the closely connected question of large- and small-scale production in agriculture most frequently provide the "Critics" with the occasion to "refute" Marxism. We shall later analyse some of the detailed data they present; for the present let us examine their general arguments. The Critics devote entire pages to arguing in detail that the use of machinery encounters greater difficulties in agriculture than in industry and for that reason machines are used to a smaller extent and have less significance. This is indisputable, and it was definitely shown, for example, by the same Kautsky whose name is enough to arouse Messrs. Bulgakov, Hertz, and Chernov to a state bordering on frenzy. But this indisputable fact does not in the least controvert the other fact that the use of machinery is developing rapidly in agriculture also, and that it has a powerful transforming effect upon it. All that the Critics can do is to "evade" this inevitable conclusion by such profound arguments as, "Agriculture is characterised by the domination of Nature in the process of production and by the lack of human free will" (Bulgakov, I, 43). "... instead of the uncertain and imprecise work of man, it [machinery in industry] performs micrometric as well as colossal work with mathematical precision. The machine cannot do the like [?] in the production of agricultural products because, to this day, this working instrument is not in the hands of man, but in the hands of Mother Nature. This is no metaphor" (ibid.). Indeed it is no metaphor; it is merely an empty phrase; for everyone knows that the steam plough, the seed-drill, the threshing-machine, etc., *make* work *more* "certain

* Friedrich Otto Hertz, *The Agrarian Question in Relation to Socialism*, Vienna, 1899.—*Ed.*

and precise"; consequently, to say, "cannot do the like", is simply to talk nonsense! Similarly, how can it be said that machinery in agriculture "cannot to any extent [*sic*!] revolutionise *production*" (Bulgakov, I, 43-44, where he quotes the opinion of agricultural machinery experts, who, however, merely refer to the relative difference between agricultural and industrial machinery), or that "not only cannot machinery convert the worker into its adjunct [?], but that the worker still retains his previous control of the process" (44)—as feeder of the threshing-machine, perhaps?

Mr. Bulgakov tries to belittle the superiority of the steam plough by references to Stumpfe and Kutzleb (who wrote of the ability of small-scale farming to compete with large-scale farming), as against the opinions of experts in agricultural machinery and agricultural economics (Fühling, Perels). He advances arguments to the effect that steam ploughing requires a special soil* and "extremely extensive estates" (in Mr. Bulgakov's opinion this is not an argument against small-scale farming, but against the steam plough!), and that with *12-inch* furrows the work of animals is *cheaper* than steam power, and so forth. One could fill tomes with such arguments, without, however, in the least refuting the fact that the steam plough has made extremely deep ploughing possible (furrows deeper than 12 inches), or the fact that its use has rapidly developed: in England, in 1867, only 135 estates were using steam ploughs, whereas in 1871 over 2,000 steam ploughs had come in to use (Kautsky); in Germany the number of farms using steam ploughs increased from 836 in 1882 to 1,696 in 1895.

On the question of agricultural machinery Mr. Bulgakov frequently cites Franz Bensing, whom he recommends as "the author of a special monograph on agricultural machinery" (I, 44). It would be most unfair if we did not in the present case show *how* Mr. Bulgakov quotes his authors, and *how* the very witnesses he calls testify against him.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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* Hertz, with a particularly "triumphant" air, insists upon this, contending that the "absolute" judgement (*S.* 65, Russian translation, p. 156) that the steam plough is superior to the horse plough "under all circumstances" is false. This is precisely what is called forcing an open door!

In arguing that Marx's "construction" on the more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital is inapplicable to agriculture, Mr. Bulgakov points to the need of a larger expenditure of labour-power in proportion to the increase in the productivity of agriculture, and, among others, quotes the calculations made by Bensing: "The general amount of human labour required by the various systems of economy is expressed as follows: the three-field system—712 man-days; the Norfolk crop rotation system—1,615 man-days; crop rotation with a considerable production of sugar-beet—3,179 man-days per 60 hectares" (Franz Bensing, *Der Einfluss der landwirtschaftlichen Maschinen auf Volks- und Privatwirtschaft*,* Breslau, 1897, *S.* 42. Quoted by Bulgakov, I, 32). The unfortunate thing, however, is that by this calculation Bensing desired to prove that the role of machinery is growing. Applying these figures to German agriculture as a whole, Bensing calculates that the available agricultural workers would be sufficient to cultivate the land only on the three-field system, and that, consequently, the introduction of a crop rotation system would have been altogether *impossible* without machines. It is well known that when the old three-field system prevailed machinery was hardly utilised at all; consequently, Bensing's calculation proves the *opposite* of what Mr. Bulgakov tries to prove; this calculation shows that the growth of productivity of agriculture was necessarily accompanied by a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital.

Elsewhere Mr. Bulgakov, after asserting that "a radical [*sic*!] difference exists between the role of machinery in the manufacturing industry and in agriculture", quotes the words of Bensing: "Agricultural machinery cannot effect an unlimited increase in production in the way machines in industry do..." (I, 44). Mr. Bulgakov is unlucky again. Bensing points to this by no means "radical" difference between agricultural and industrial machinery in the beginning of Chapter VI of his book, which is entitled: "The Influence of Agricultural Machinery on Gross Income". After making a de-

* *The Influence of Agricultural Machinery on National and Private Economy.—Ed.*

tailed analysis of the data relating to each special type of machine as published in agricultural literature and of his own findings obtained in a special inquiry, Bensing arrives at the following general conclusion: the increase in gross income obtained by the use of a steam plough is ten per cent, of a seed-drill ten per cent, and of a threshing-machine fifteen per cent; moreover, the seed-drill causes a saving of twenty per cent in seed; only the use of potato-digging machines shows a decline of five per cent in gross income. Mr. Bulgakov's assertion that "at all events, the steam plough is the only agricultural machine about which anything favourable can be said from the technical point of view" (I, 47-48) is *at all events* refuted by the very Bensing to whom incautious Mr. Bulgakov here refers.

In order to present the significance of machinery in agriculture as precisely and completely as possible, Bensing makes a number of detailed calculations of the results of farming carried on without machinery, with one machine, with two machines, and so forth, and, finally, with the use of all the important machines, including the steam plough and light railways (*Feldbahnen*). He found that in farming without the aid of machinery gross income amounted to 69,040 marks—expenditure, 68,615 marks, net income, 425 marks, or 1.37 marks per hectare. In farming that made use of all the important machines gross income amounted to 81,078 marks—expenditure, 62,551.5 marks, net income, 18,526.5 marks, or 59.76 marks per hectare, i.e., *more than forty times as much as in the first case.* That is the effect of machinery alone, for the system of cultivation is assumed to have remained unchanged. It goes without saying that the use of machinery is accompanied, as Bensing's calculations show, by an enormous increase in constant capital and a *diminution* in variable capital (i.e., in the capital expended on labour-power and in the number of workers employed). In short, Bensing's work entirely refutes Mr. Bulgakov and proves the superiority of large-scale production in agriculture, as well as the fact that the law of the growth of constant capital at the expense of variable capital is applicable to agriculture.

Only one thing makes Mr. Bulgakov akin to Bensing, and that is that the latter adopts the purely bourgeois point of

view, completely fails to understand the contradictions inherent in capitalism, and smugly pretends not to see that machines oust the worker, etc. This moderate and methodical pupil of the German professors speaks of Marx with a hatred to match Mr. Bulgakov's, except that Bensing is more consistent—he calls Marx "an opponent of machinery" in general, in both agriculture and industry, because, says he, Marx "distorts the facts" when he talks of the harmful effect machines have on the workers and attributes all sorts of misfortunes to machines (Bensing, *loc. cit.*, *S*. 4, 5, and 11). Mr. Bulgakov's attitude toward Bensing reveals to us again and again what the "Critics" take from the bourgeois scientists and what they pretend not to see.

The nature of Hertz' "criticism" is sufficiently revealed by the following example. On page 149 of his book (Russian translation) he charges Kautsky with employing "*feuilleton* methods", and on page 150 he "refutes" the assertion that large-scale production is superior to small-scale production in regard to the use of machinery, by the following arguments: (1) Machinery *is accessible* also to small farmers through the medium of co-operative societies. That, if you please, is supposed to refute the *fact* that machinery is used on a larger scale on big farms! On the question as to who has greater *access* to the benefits of co-operative organisation, we shall have a separate talk with Hertz in our second essay. (2) David has shown in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*[68] (Vol. V, No. 2) that the use of machinery on small farms "is extensive and is rapidly increasing ... that seed-drills are frequently [*sic*!] to be found even on very small farms. The same applies to mowers and other machines" (*S*. 63, Russian translation, p. 151). But if the reader turns to David's article,* he will see that the author takes the *absolute figures* of the number of farms using machinery, and not the percentage of those farms in relation to the total number of farms in the given category (as Kautsky does, of course).

Let us compare those figures, which are for the whole of Germany for 1895: **

* This faulty method is repeated in David's work *Socialism and Agriculture*, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 179. (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—*Ed*.)

** *Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, 112. Bd., *S*. 36 ★.

Groups of farms	Total number of farms	Farms using machinery					
		Seeding-machines	Per cent	Seed-drills	Per cent	Mowers and reapers	Per cent
Under 2 hectares	3,236,367	214	0.01	14,735	0.46	245	0.01
2 to 5 "	1,016,318	551	0.05	13,088	1.29	600	0.06
5 to 20 "	998,804	3,252	0.33	48,751	4.88	6,746	0.68
20 to 100 "	281,767	12,091	4.29	49,852	17.69	19,535	6.93
100 and over "	25,061	12,565	50.14	14,366	57.32	7,958	31.75
Totals	5,558,317	28,673	0.52	140,792	2.54	35,084	0.63

Confirmation indeed of the statement of David and Hertz that seeding-machines and mowers are "frequently" found "even on very small farms"! And if Hertz draws the "conclusion" that, "judged by statistics, Kautsky's assertion will not stand criticism", who is it that really employs *feuilleton* methods?

It should be pointed out as a curiosity that whereas the "Critics" deny the superiority of large-scale farming in regard to the use of machinery and deny the overwork and underconsumption caused by this fact in small farming, they outrageously contradict themselves when compelled to deal with the actual facts of the situation (and when they forget their "principal task"—to refute "orthodox" Marxism). Thus, in Volume II of his book (p. 115) Mr. Bulgakov says: "Large-scale farming always works with greater capital intensity than small-scale farming, and therefore, naturally, gives preference to the mechanical factors of production over live labour-power." That Mr. Bulgakov as a "Critic" should follow Messrs. Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky in their inclination towards vulgar political economy by contrasting mechanical "*factors* of production" to live factors is indeed quite "natural". But is it natural that he should so incautiously deny the superiority of large-scale farming?

On concentration in agricultural production Mr. Bulgakov can find no other words with which to express himself than "the mystical law of concentration", and so forth. But he comes up against the figures for England, and they show that a tendency towards the concentration of farms was

observed from the fifties to the end of the seventies. "Small subsistence farms combined into larger farms," writes Mr. Bulgakov. "*This* consolidation of land was by no means the result of the conflict between large-scale and small-scale production [?] but of a conscious [?!] striving on the part of the landlords to increase their rents by combining several small farms which provided them with very low rents into large farms capable of paying them larger rents" (I, 239). We are to understand from this: **Not** conflict between large-scale and small-scale farming, **but** the elimination of the latter, because it is less remunerative. "Since farming is established on a capitalist basis, it is indisputable that within certain limits large-scale capitalist farming possesses undoubted advantages over small-scale capitalist farming" (I, 239-40). If this is indisputable, why the clamour? Why did Mr. Bulgakov cry murder (in *Nachalo*) against Kautsky, who *begins* his chapter on large-scale and small-scale production (in his *Agrarian Question*) with the statement: "The more capitalistic agriculture becomes, the more qualitative becomes the difference in technique between large-scale and small-scale production"?

But not only the period of prosperity of English agriculture—also the period of crisis leads to conclusions unfavourable to small-scale farming. The reports of commissions published during recent years "with astonishing persistence assert that the crisis has most severely affected the small farmers" (I, 311). One report dealing with small owners says: "Their homes are worse than the average labourers' cottages.... All of them work astonishingly hard and for many more hours than the labourers, and many of them say that their material conditions are not so good as those of the latter, that they do not live as well and rarely eat fresh meat.... The yeomen, burdened with mortgages, were the first to go under..." (I, 316). "They stint themselves in all things as only few labourers do.... The small farmers keep going as long as they are able to avail themselves of the unpaid labour of the members of their families.... It is hardly necessary to add that the living conditions of the small farmers are far worse than those of the labourers" (I, 320-21). We have quoted these passages so that the reader may judge the correctness of the following conclusion drawn by Mr.

Bulgakov: "The severe ruination of the farms which had survived until the epoch of the agrarian crisis indicates merely [!!] that in such circumstances small producers succumb more quickly than large producers—and nothing more [*sic*!!]. It is utterly impossible to draw from this any general conclusion concerning the economic viability of small farms, for in that epoch the whole of English agriculture was insolvent" (I, 333). Isn't this priceless? And in the chapter dealing with the general conditions of development of peasant farming, Mr. Bulgakov even generalises this remarkable method of reasoning in the following manner: "A sudden drop in prices has a serious effect on all forms of production; but peasant production, having least capital at its disposal, is naturally less stable than large-scale production (which does not in the slightest affect the question of its general viability)" (II, 247). Thus, in capitalist society, enterprises having less capital at their disposal are less stable; but that does not affect their "general" viability!

Hertz is not more consistent in his reasoning. He "refutes" Kautsky (in the manner described above); but in discussing America he admits the superiority of large-scale farming in that country, which permits "the employment of machinery on a far larger scale than our parcellised farming permits" (*S*. 36, Russian translation, p. 93). He admits that "the European peasant, employing antiquated, routine methods of production, frequently toils [*robotend*] for a crust of bread like a labourer, without striving for anything better" (ibid.). Hertz admits generally that "small-scale production employs a relatively larger amount of labour than large-scale production" (*S*. 74, Russian translation, p. 177); he could well communicate to Mr. Bulgakov the data on the increase in yield resulting from the introduction of the steam plough (*S*. 67-68, Russian translation, pp. 162-63), etc.

The natural concomitant of our Critics' faulty theoretical reasoning on the significance of agricultural machinery is their helpless repetition of the views of downright reactionary agrarians who are opposed to machinery. Hertz, it is true, still hesitates on this delicate point; in speaking of the "difficulties" in the way of introducing machinery in agriculture, he observes: "The opinion is expressed that so much free time is left in the winter that hand threshing is

more profitable" (*S*. 65, Russian translation, pp. 156-57). Apparently, Hertz, with the logic peculiar to him, is inclined to draw the conclusion that this is an argument, not against small production, not against the capitalist obstacles to the introduction of machinery, but against machinery! It is not surprising that Mr. Bulgakov chides Hertz for being "too closely tied to the opinion of his party" (II, 287). The Russian professor, of course, is above such degrading "ties" and proudly declares: "I am sufficiently free from the prejudice so widespread—particularly in Marxist literature—according to which every machine must be regarded as progress" (I, 48). Unfortunately, the flight of imagination revealed in this magnificent piece of reasoning finds no correspondence in concrete conclusions. "The steam threshing-machine," writes Mr. Bulgakov, "which deprives very many workers of winter occupation, spelt for the labourers an undoubtedly serious evil uncompensated by technical advantages.* Goltz, incidentally, points this out and even gives expression to a utopian desire" (II, 103), i.e., the desire *to restric*t the use of threshing-machines, particularly steam threshers, "in order", adds he, "to improve the conditions of the agricultural labourers, as well as to reduce emigration and migration" (by migration Goltz, in all probability, means movement to the towns).

We shall remind the reader that this Goltzian idea was also noted by Kautsky in his *Agrarian Question*. It will not be without interest, therefore, to compare the attitude of the narrow orthodox Marxist, steeped in Marxist prejudices, with that of the latter-day Critic who has excellently assimilated the whole spirit of "criticism" towards a concrete question of economics (the significance of machines) and politics (not to be restricted?).

Kautsky says (*Agrarfrage*, *S*. 41) that Goltz ascribes a particularly "harmful influence" to the threshing-machine: it deprives the agricultural labourers of their principal

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* Cf. Vol. 1, p. 51: "... the steam thresher ... performs the bulk of the work in winter when there is a scarcity of work as it is (consequently, the usefulness of the machine for agriculture as a whole [*sic*!!] is more than doubtful; we shall come across this fact again later on)."

winter occupation, drives them into the towns, and intensifies the depopulation of the countryside. Goltz proposes to restrict the use of the threshing-machine, and, Kautsky adds, proposes this "ostensibly in the interests of agricultural labourers, but in fact in the interests of the landlords, for whom," as Goltz himself says, "the loss resulting from such restriction will be amply compensated—if not immediately, then in the future—by the larger number of workers they will be able to obtain in the summer-time". "Fortunately," continues Kautsky, "this conservative friendship for the labourers is nothing more nor less than reactionary utopianism. The threshing-machine is of too great an 'immediate' advantage for the landlord to be induced to abandon its use for the sake of profits 'in the future'. And so, the thresher will continue to perform its revolutionary work; it will continue to drive the agricultural labourers into the towns, and as a result will become a powerful instrument for the raising of wages in the rural districts, on the one hand, and for the further development of the agricultural machine industry, on the other."

Mr. Bulgakov's attitude towards the problem as presented by a Social-Democrat and by an agrarian is very characteristic; it is an example in miniature of the position all the contemporary "Critics" occupy midway between the party of the proletariat and the party of the bourgeoisie. The Critic, of course, is not so narrow-minded and not so banal as to adopt the point of view of the class struggle and the revolutionising of all social relationships by capitalism. On the other hand, however, although our Critic "has grown wiser", the recollection of the time when he was "young and foolish", and shared the prejudices of Marxism, prevents him from adopting in its entirety the programme of his new comrade, the agrarian, who quite reasonably and consistently passes from the conclusion that machinery is harmful "for the *whole* of agriculture" to the desire to prohibit its use. And our good Critic finds himself in the position of Buridan's ass, between two bundles of hay. On the one hand, he has lost all understanding of the class struggle and is now capable of saying that machinery is harmful for "the *whole* of agriculture", forgetting that the *whole* of modern agriculture is conducted mainly by entrepreneurs, who are concerned only

about their profit; he has so far forgotten "the years of his youth", when he was a Marxist, that he now raises the extremely absurd question as to whether the technical advantages of machinery will "compensate" for its harmful effects upon the labourers (produced, not by the steam thresher alone, but by the steam plough, the mower, seed-sifter, etc.). He even fails to see that, in fact, the agrarian wants to enslave the labourer further both in winter and in summer. On the other hand, he vaguely recalls the obsolete, "dogmatic" prejudice that prohibiting machinery is utopian. Poor Mr. Bulgakov! Will he manage to extricate himself from this unpleasant situation?

It is interesting to note that in trying in every way to belittle the significance of agricultural machinery, and even making use of the "law of diminishing returns", our Critics have forgotten to mention (or have deliberately refrained from mentioning) the new technological revolution which electrical engineering is preparing in agriculture. But Kautsky, who, according to the extremely unfair judgement of Mr. P. Maslov, "committed a serious mistake in completely failing to indicate the course taken by the development of the productive forces in agriculture" (*Zhizn*, 1901, No. 3, p. 171), pointed to the significance of electricity in agriculture as far back as 1899 (in *Die Agrarfrage*). Today, the symptoms of the approaching technological revolution are much more distinct. Attempts are being made to elucidate theoretically the significance of electricity in agriculture (see Dr. Otto Pringsheim, *Landwirtschaftliche Manufaktur und elektrische Landwirtschaft*,* Brauns Archiv, XV, 1900, *S*. 406-18; and Kautsky's article in *Neue Zeit*,[69] XIX, 1, 1900-01, No. 18, "*Die Elektrizität in der Landwirtschaft*"**). Practical landlord farmers are describing their experiments in the application of electricity (Pringsheim cites a work by Adolf Seufferheld, who describes the experiments on his own farm). These landlords see in electricity a means of making agriculture once more remunerative. They call upon the government and the landlords to estab-

* *Agricultural Manufacture and Electrified Agriculture.—Ed.*
** "Electricity in Agriculture."—*Ed.*

lish central power stations and to organise the mass production of electricity for farmers. (Last year a work was published in Königsberg, written by P. Mack, an East-Prussian landlord, entitled *Der Aufschwung unseres Landwirtschaftsbetriebes durch Verbilligung der Produktionskosten. Eine Untersuchung über den Dienst, den Maschinentechnik und Elektrizität der Landwirtschaft bieten.**)

Pringsheim makes what in our opinion is a very true observation: that, in its general technological, and perhaps even economic, level, modern agriculture is at a stage of development which more than anything resembles the stage of industry Marx described as "manufacture". The predominance of hand labour and simple co-operation, the sporadic employment of machines, the relatively small extent of production (if we consider, for example, the total annual volume of products sold by a single enterprise), the relatively limited market for the most part, the connection between large- and small-scale production (the latter, like the handicraftsman in his relation to the big master-manufacturer, supplies the former with labour-power—or else the former buys up the "semi-finished articles" from the latter; thus, the big farmer buys beets, cattle, etc., from the small farmers)—all these are symptoms of the fact that agriculture has not yet reached the stage of real "large-scale machine industry" in the Marxian sense. In agriculture there is no "system of machines" as yet linked into one productive mechanism.

Of course, this comparison must not be carried too far. On the one hand, agriculture possesses certain peculiar features that cannot possibly be removed (if we leave aside the extremely remote and problematic possibility of producing protein and foods in laboratories). Owing to these peculiarities, large-scale machine production will never manifest in agriculture *all* the features it possesses in industry. On the other hand, even in the manufacture stage of development large-scale production in industry reached predominance and considerable technical superiority over small-scale produc-

* *The Rise in Our Agriculture Through Reduced Cost of Production. An Inquiry into the Services Offered to Agriculture by Mechanical Engineering and Electricity.—Ed.*

tion. For a long time the small producer tried to counteract this superiority by the lengthened working day and curtailed consumption which are so characteristic of the handicraftsman and of the modern small peasant. The predominance of hand labour in the manufacture stage enabled the small producer to hold his own for a time by "heroic" measures such as these. But those who were deceived by this and talked about the viability of the handicraftsman (even as our contemporary Critics talk of the viability of the peasant) very soon found themselves refuted by the "temporary tendency" which paralysed the "universal law" of technological stagnation. Let us recall, for instance, the Russian investigators into the handicraft weaving industry in Moscow Gubernia in the seventies. As far as cotton weaving was concerned, they said, the hand weaver was doomed; the machine had triumphed. The handicraft silk weaver, however, may still hold his own for a time, the machinery being still far from perfect. Two decades have passed, and machinery has driven the small producer from still another of his last refuges, as if telling those who have ears to hear and eyes to see that the economist must always look forward, towards technological progress, or else be left behind at once; for he who will not look ahead turns his back on history; there is not and there cannot be any middle path.

"Writers who, like Hertz, in treating of competition between small- and large-scale production in agriculture ignored electrical engineering, must start their investigation all over again," aptly remarked Pringsheim, which remark applies with still greater force to Mr. Bulgakov's two-volume work.

Electricity is cheaper than steam power. It is more easily divisible into small units, it can be more easily transmitted over very long distances; machinery powered by electricity runs more smoothly and precisely, and for that reason it is more convenient to use it in threshing, ploughing, milking, cutting fodder,* etc. Kautsky describes one of the Hungar-

* This is for the information of our bold Mr. Bulgakov, who boldly and groundlessly speaks of "branches of agricultural production in which machinery cannot be used at all, as, for example, livestock farming" (I, 49).

ian latifundia* in which electricity is transmitted from a central station in all directions to the remote parts of the estate and is used for running agricultural machinery, for chopping mangels, for raising water, for lighting, etc., etc. "In order to pump 300 hectolitres a day from a well 29 metres deep into a reservoir 10 metres high, and in order to prepare fodder for 240 cows, 200 calves, and 60 oxen and horses, i.e., for chopping mangels, etc., two pairs of horses were required in the winter and one pair in the summer, at a cost of 1,500 gulden. Now, the horses have been replaced by a three and a five h.p. motor costing altogether 700 gulden to maintain, which represents a saving of 800 gulden" (Kautsky, loc. cit.). Mack calculates the cost of a horse-workday at 3 marks; but if the horse is replaced by electricity the cost is 40 to 75 pfennigs, i.e., four to seven times cheaper. If in 50 years or more from now, he says, 1,750,000 of the horses used in German agriculture were supplanted by electricity (in 1895, 2,600,000 horses, 1,000,000 oxen, and 2,300,000 cows were used for field work in German agriculture, of which 1,400,000 horses and 400,000 oxen were used on farms exceeding 20 hectares in area), expenses would be reduced from 1,003,000,000 marks to 261,000,000 marks, i.e., by 742,000,000 marks. An enormous area of land now utilised for raising cattle feed could then be turned to the production of food—for the improvement of the food of the workers, whom Mr. Bulgakov tries so much to scare with the prospect of the "diminution of the gifts of Nature", "the grain problem", and so forth. Mack strongly recommends the uniting of agriculture with industry for the permanent exploitation of electricity; he recommends the cutting of a Mazurian canal to provide power for five power stations which would distribute electricity to farmers within a radius of 20-25 kilometres. He recommends the use of peat for the same purpose, and demands the association of farmers: "Only in co-operative association with industry and big capital is it possible to make our branch of industry profitable once again" (Mack, *S.* 48). Of course, the employment of new methods of production will encounter many difficulties; it will

* Again for the information of Mr. Bulgakov, who talks of "the latifundian degeneration of large-scale farming"!

not proceed in a straight line, but in zigzag fashion; however, that the employment of new methods will take place, that the revolution in agriculture is inevitable, can hardly be doubted. "The substitution of electric motors for the majority of draught animals," rightly says Pringsheim, "means opening up the possibility of the machine system in agriculture.... What could not be achieved by steam power will certainly be achieved by electrical engineering, namely, the advancement of agriculture from the old manufacture stage to modern large-scale production" (loc. cit., p. 414.)

We shall not dilate upon the enormous victory the introduction of electrical engineering in agriculture will represent (and partly already represents) for large-scale production; it is too obvious to require emphasis. It will be better to see which modern farms contain the rudiments of this "machine system" that will be set in motion by a central power station. Before the machine system can be introduced, it is first of all necessary to test various kinds of machines, to conduct experiments with many combinations of machines. The information we require can be found in the returns of the German agricultural census of June 14, 1895. We have figures showing the number of farms in each category that used their own or hired machines. (Mr. Bulgakov, when citing some of these figures on page 114, Vol. II, erroneously takes them to apply to the number of *machines* used. In passing, it may be said that the statistics on the number of farms using machines, their own or hired, naturally bring out the superiority of large-scale farming to a smaller extent than is really the case. Big farmers have their own machines more often than small farmers, who are obliged to pay exorbitant prices for the hire of machines.) The data relate to the use either of machines in general, or of a certain kind of machine, so that we are not able to determine *whole* machines the farms in each group use. But if for each group we compute the number of farms using each separate kind of machine, we shall obtain *the number of cases* in which agricultural machines of all kinds are *used*. The following table presents the data drawn up in this manner and shows how the ground is being prepared for the "machine system" in agriculture.

Size of farms	Per hundred farms	
	Number of farms that used agricultural machines generally (1895)	Number of instances in which some kind of agricultural machine was used (1895)
Under 2 hectares . . .	2.03	2.30
2 to 5 " . . .	13.81	15.46
5 to 20 " . . .	45.80	56.04
20 to 100 " . . .	78.79	128.46
100 and over " . . .	94.16	352.34
Average . . .	16.36	22.36

Thus, in small farms under five hectares (these comprise more than three-fourths of the total in this group, viz., 4,100,000 out of 5,500,000, or 75.5 per cent; but they account for only 5,000,000 hectares out of a total of 32,500,000 hectares, or 15.6 per cent), the number of *cases* in which agricultural machines of any type are used (we have included dairy machinery) is quite insignificant. Of the medium farms (from 5 to 20 hectares) fewer than half use machines generally, while the number of instances showing use of agricultural machines represents only 56 per hundred farms. Only under large-scale capitalist production* do we see the *majority* of farms (from three-quarters to nine-tenths) using machinery and *the beginning of the establishment of a machine system*: on every farm there is more than one case of use of machinery. This means that several machines are used on a single farm: for example, farms of over 100 hectares use *about four machines* each (352 per cent as compared with 94 per cent using machines generally). Of 572 latifundia (farms of 1,000 hectares and over), 555 use machines; and the number of cases in which machines were used is 2,800, i.e., each farm used *five machines*. It is clear from this which farms are preparing the ground for the "electrical" revolution and which will mostly take advantage of it.

* Over 20 hectares only 300,000 farms out of 5 500,000, i.e., only 5.5 per cent of the total, but they occupy 17,700,000 hectares of land out of 32,500,000, or 54.4 per cent of the total farmland.

IV

THE ABOLITION OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY. PARTICULAR QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE "CRITICS"

From Hertz let us pass to Mr. Chernov. As the latter merely "talks with his readers" about the former, we shall confine ourselves here to a brief description of Hertz' method of argument (and Mr. Chernov's method of paraphrasing him), and (in the next essay) take up certain new facts advanced by the "Critics".

It will suffice to cite but a *single* example to show the sort of theoretician Hertz is. At the very beginning of his book we find a paragraph under the pretentious heading, "The Concept of National Capitalism". Hertz wants nothing more nor less than to present a definition of capitalism. He writes: "We can, of course, characterise it as a system of national economy which rests *juridically* on the completely applied principles of freedom of the person and of property, *technically* on production on a wide [large?] scale,* *socially* on the alienation of the means of production from the direct producers, *politically* on the possession by the capitalists of the central political power [the concentrated political power of the state?] ... solely on the economic basis of the distribution of property" (Russian translation, p. 37). These definitions are incomplete, and certain reservations must be made, says Hertz; for example, domestic industry and small tenant farming still persist everywhere side by side with large-scale production. "The *realistic* [*sic*!] definition of capitalism as a system under which production is under the control [domination and control] of capitalists [owners of capital] is likewise not quite suitable." A fine "realistic" definition of capitalism as the domination of capitalists! How characteristic it is—this now fashionable, quasi-realistic, but in fact eclectic quest for an exhaustive enumeration of all the separate symptoms and separate "factors". The result, of

* Mr. V. Chernov translates it (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 4, p. 132): "on production which has achieved a high state of development". That is how he contrived to "understand" the German expression "*auf grosser Stufenleiter*"!!

course, is that this meaningless attempt to include into a general concept all the partial symptoms of single phenomena, or, conversely, to "avoid conflict with extremely varied phenomena"—an attempt that merely reveals an elementary failure to understand what science is—leads the "theoretician" to a point where he cannot see the wood for the trees. Thus, Hertz lost sight of such a detail as commodity production and the transformation of labour-power into a commodity! Instead, he invented the following *genetic* definition, which—as punishment for the inventor—ought to be quoted in full: Capitalism is "that state of national economy in which the realisation of the principles of free exchange and freedom of the person and of property has reached its (relative) high point which is determined by the economic development and the empirical conditions of each separate national economy" (*S*. 10, Russian translation, pp. 38-39, not quite exact). Filled with awe and admiration, Mr. Chernov, of course, transcribes and describes this twaddle, and, moreover, treats the readers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for the space of thirty pages to an "analysis" of the types of national capitalism. From this highly instructive analysis we can extract a number of extremely valuable and by no means stereotyped references, for example, to the "independent, proud, and energetic character of the Briton"; to the "substantial" English bourgeoisie and the "unattractiveness" of their foreign policy; to the "passionate and impulsive temperament of the Latin race" and to the "methodicalness of the Germans" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 4, p. 152). "Dogmatic" Marxism, of course, is utterly annihilated by this analysis.

No less annihilating is Hertz' analysis of mortgage statistics. At all events, Mr. Chernov goes into ecstasies over it. "The fact is," he writes, "...Hertz' figures have not yet been refuted by anyone. Kautsky, in his reply to Hertz, dwelt at extreme length upon certain details [such as his proof of Hertz' *distortions*—a fine 'detail'!], but to Hertz' argument on the question of mortgages *he made no reply whatever*" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, p. 217, Mr. Chernov's italics). As can be seen from the reference on page 238 in the cited issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, Mr. Chernov is aware of the article Kautsky wrote in reply ("*Zwei Kritiker meiner*

Agrarfrage",* in *Neue Zeit*, 18, 1, 1899-1900). Mr. Chernov could not but know, too, that the periodical in which the article appeared is prohibited in Russia by the censor. The more noteworthy, therefore, as characterising the features of the modern "Critics", is the fact that the very words which Chernov himself underlines contain *a flagrant untruth*; for on the question of mortgages Kautsky *replied* to "Hertz, David, Bernstein, Schippel, Bulgakov, *e tutti quanti*",** on pp. 472-77, *in the selfsame article to which Mr. Chernov refers*. To rectify distorted truth is a tedious duty; but since we have to deal with the Messrs. Chernov, it is a duty not to be neglected.

Kautsky, of course, replied to Hertz with ridicule; for in regard to this question too Hertz revealed his inability, or unwillingness, to understand what is what and an inclination to repeat the threadbare arguments of bourgeois economists. Kautsky in his *Agrarfrage* (*S*. 88-89) dealt with the concentration of mortgages. "Numerous petty village usurers," wrote Kautsky, "are being forced more and more into the background, forced to yield to big centralised capitalist or public institutions which monopolise mortgage credit." Kautsky enumerates certain capitalist and public institutions of this type; he speaks of mutual land credit societies (*genossenschaftliche Bodenkreditinstitute*) and points to the fact that *savings-banks*, insurance companies, and many corporations (*S*. 89) invest their funds in mortgages, etc. Thus, until 1887, seventeen mutual credit societies in Prussia had issued mortgage bonds to the amount of 1,650,000,000 marks. "These figures show how enormously ground-rent is concentrated in the hands of *a few central institutions* [our italics]; but this concentration is rapidly increasing. In 1875 German mortgage banks issued mortgage bonds to the amount of 900,000,000 marks and in 1888 to the amount of 2,500,000,000 marks, while in 1892 the amount reached a total of 3,400,000,000 marks, concentrated in 31 banks (as against 27 in 1875)" (*S*. 89). This concentration of ground-rent is a clear indication of the concentration of *landed property*.

* "Two Critics of My *Agrarian Question*."—*Ed*.

** Kautsky's expression, p. 472 of *Neue Zeit*. (*E tutti quanti*—and all others of their stripe.—*Ed*.)

"No!" retort Hertz, Bulgakov, Chernov & Co. "We find a very decided tendency towards decentralisation and the break-up of property" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, p. 216); for "more than a fourth of the mortgage credits are concentrated in the hands of democratic [*sic*!] credit institutions with a vast number of small depositors" (ibid.). Presenting a series of tables, Hertz attempts with extraordinary zeal to prove that the bulk of the depositors in savings-banks, etc., are *small depositors*. The only question is—what is the purpose of this argument? Kautsky himself referred to the mutual credit societies and savings-banks (while not, of course, imagining, as does Mr. Chernov, that they are particularly "democratic" institutions). Kautsky speaks of the centralisation of rent in the hands of a few central institutions, and he is met with the argument about the large number of small depositors in savings-banks!! And this they call "the break-up of property"! What has the number of depositors in mortgage banks to do with agriculture (the subject under discussion being the concentration of rent)? Does a big factory cease to signify the centralisation of production because its shares are distributed among a large number of small capitalists? "Until Hertz and David informed me," wrote Kautsky in his reply to the former, "I had not the slightest idea where the savings-banks obtained their money. I thought they operated with the savings of the Rothschilds and the Vanderbilts."

In regard to transferring mortgages to the state, Hertz says: "This would be the poorest way of fighting big capital, but, of course, the best means of arousing the large and constantly increasing army of the smallest property-owners, particularly the agricultural labourers, against the proponents of such a reform" (*S*. 29, Russian translation, p. 78. Mr. Chernov smugly repeats this on pp. 217-18 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*).

These then are the "property-owners" over whose increase Bernstein & Co. get so wrought up!—retorts Kautsky. Servant girls with twenty marks in the savings-bank! And again we have the threadbare argument employed against the socialists that by "expropriation" they will rob a large army of working people. None other than Eugen Richter zealously advanced this argument in the pamphlet he published after the repeal of the Exceptional Law Against the

Socialists[70] (and which employers bought up by the thousands to distribute gratis among their workers). In that pamphlet Richter introduces his celebrated "thrifty Agnes", a poor seamstress who had a score or so of marks in the savings-bank and was robbed by the wicked socialists when they seized political power and nationalised the banks. That is the source from which the Bulgakovs,* Hertzes, and Chernovs draw their "critical" arguments.

"At that time," says Kautsky, concerning Eugen Richter's "celebrated" pamphlet, "Eugen Richter was unanimously ridiculed by all Social-Democrats. Now we find people among the latter who, in our central organ [this, I think, refers to David's articles in *Vorwärts*],[71] sing a hymn of praise to a work in which these very ideas are reproduced. Hertz, we extol thy deeds!

"For poor Eugen, in the decline of his years, this is indeed a triumph, and I cannot refrain from quoting for his pleasure the following passage from that very page in Hertz' book: 'We see that the small peasants, the urban house-owners, and especially the big farmers, are expropriated by the lower and middle classes the bulk of which undoubtedly consists of the rural population'" (Hertz, *S*. 29, Russian translation, p. 77. Retold with rapture in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, pp. 216-17). "David's theory of 'hollowing out' [*Aushöhlung*] capitalism by collective wage agreements [*Tarifgemeinschaften*] and consumers' co-operative societies is now excelled. It pales into insignificance before Hertz' expropriation of the expropriators by means of savings-banks. Thrifty Agnes, whom everybody considered dead, has come to life again" (Kautsky, loc. cit., *S*. 475), and the Russian "Critics", together with the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, hasten to transplant this resurrected "thrifty Agnes" to Russian soil in order to discredit "orthodox" Social-Democracy.

And this very Mr. V. Chernov, spluttering with enthusiasm over Hertz' repetition of Eugen Richter's arguments, "annihilates" Kautsky in the pages of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and in the symposium. *At the Glorious Post*, compiled in honour of Mr. N. Mikhailovsky. It would be unfair not to present some

* Mr. Bulgakov resorted to this argument against Kautsky with regard to the question of mortgages, in *Nachalo*, and in German, in Braun's *Archiv*.

of the gems of this tirade. "Kautsky, again following Marx," writes Mr. Chernov in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 229, "admits that the progress of capitalist agriculture leads to the reduction of nutritive matter in the soil: in the form of various products, something is continuously being taken from the land, sent to the towns, and never restored to the land.... As you see, on the question of the laws of the fertility of the soil, Kautsky helplessly [*sic*!] repeats the words of Marx, who bases himself upon the theory of Liebig. But when Marx wrote his first volume, Liebig's 'law of restoration' was the last word in agronomics. More than half a century has elapsed since that discovery. A complete revolution has taken place in our knowledge of the laws governing soil fertility. And what do we see? The whole post-Liebig period, all the subsequent discoveries of Pasteur and Ville, Solari's experiments with nitrates, the discoveries of Berthelot, Hellriegel, Wilfahrt, and Vinogradsky in the sphere of the bacteriology of the soil—all this is beyond Kautsky's ken...." Dear Mr. Chernov! How wonderfully he resembles Turgenev's Voroshilov: you remember him in *Smoke*, the young Russian *Privatdocent* who went on a tour abroad. This Voroshilov was a very taciturn young man; but now and again he would break his silence and pour forth scores and hundreds of the most learned of names, the rarest of the rare. Our learned Mr. Chernov, who has utterly annihilated that ignoramus Kautsky, behaves in exactly the same manner. Only ... only had we not better consult Kautsky's book—glance at least at its chapter headings? We come to Chapter IV: "Modern Agriculture", section *d*, "Fertilisers, *Bacteria*". We turn to section *d* and read:

"Towards the end of the last decade the discovery was made that leguminous plants ... unlike other cultivated plants, obtain nearly the whole of their nitrogen supply, not from the soil, but from the air, and that far from robbing the soil of nitrogen they enrich it. But they possess this property only when the soil contains certain micro-organisms which adhere to their roots. Where these micro-organisms do not exist, it is possible by means of certain inoculations to give these leguminous plants the property of converting soil poor in nitrogen into nitrogen-rich soil, and in this way to fertilise this soil to a certain extent for other crops. As a general

rule, by inoculating bacteria into these plants and by using a suitable mineral fertiliser (phosphoric acid salts and potash fertilisers), it is possible to obtain the highest steady yields from the soil even without stable manure. Only thanks to this discovery has 'free farming' acquired a really firm basis" (Kautsky, pp. 51-52). Who, however, gave a scientific basis to the remarkable discovery of nitrogen-gathering bacteria?—Hellriegel....

Kautsky's fault is his bad habit (possessed by many of the narrow orthodox) of never forgetting that members of a militant socialist party must, even in their scientific works, keep the working-class reader in mind, that they must strive to write *simply*, without employing unnecessary clever turns of phrase and those outer symptoms of "learning" which so captivate decadents and the titled representatives of official science. In this work, too, Kautsky preferred to relate in a clear and simple manner the latest discoveries in agronomics and to omit scientific names that mean nothing to nine-tenths of the readers. The Voroshilovs, however, act in precisely the opposite manner; they prefer to effuse a veritable stream of scientific names in the domains of agronomics, political economy, critical philosophy, etc., and thus bury essentials under this scientific lumber.

Thus, Voroshilov-Chernov, by his slanderous accusation that Kautsky is not acquainted with scientific names and scientific discoveries, blocked from view an extremely interesting and instructive episode in fashionable criticism, namely, the attack of bourgeois economics upon the socialist idea of abolishing the antithesis between town and country. Prof. Lujo Brentano, for instance, asserts that migration from the country to the towns is caused, not by given social conditions, but by *natural necessity*, by the law of diminishing returns.* Mr. Bulgakov, following in the foot-

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* See Kautsky's article "Tolstoi und Brentano" in *Neue Zeit*, XIX, 2, 1900-01, No. 27. Kautsky compares modern scientific socialism with the doctrines of Lev Tolstoi, who has always been a profound observer and critic of the bourgeois system, notwithstanding the reactionary naïveté of his theory, and bourgeois economics whose "star" Brentano (the teacher, as we know, of Messrs. Struve, Bulgakov, Hertz, *e tutti quanti*), betrays the most incredible muddle-headedness in confounding natural with social phenomena, in confounding the concept of productivity with that of profitability, the concept

steps of his teacher, stated in *Nachalo* (March 1899, p. 29) that the idea of abolishing the antithesis between town and country was "an absolute fantasy", which would "cause an agronomist to smile". Hertz writes in his book: "The abolition of the distinction between town and country is, it is true, the principal striving of the old utopians [and even of the *Manifesto*]. Nevertheless, we do not believe that a social system containing all the conditions necessary for directing human culture to the highest aims achievable would really abolish such great centres of energy and culture as the big cities and, to soothe offended aesthetic sentiments, abandon these abundant depositories of science and art, without which progress is impossible" (*S*. 76. The Russian translator, on p. 182, rendered the word "*potenziert*"* as "potential". These Russian translations are an awful nuisance! On page 270, the same translator translates the sentence, "*Wer isst zuletzt das Schwein*?"** as "Who, in the end, is the pig?"). As can be seen, Hertz defends the bourgeois system from socialist "fantasies" with phrases that convey the "struggle for idealism" no less than do the writings of Messrs. Struve and Berdyaev. But his defence is not in the least strengthened by this bombastic, idealistic phrase-mongering.

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of value with that of price, etc. "This is not so characteristic of Brentano personally," Kautsky says justly (p. 25), "as of the *school* to which he belongs. The *historical school* of bourgeois economics, in its modern form, regards the striving towards an integral conception of the social mechanism as being a superseded standpoint [*überwundener Standpunkt*]. According to this view, economic science must not investigate social laws and combine them into an integral system, but must confine itself to the formal description of separate social facts of the past and the present. Thus, it accustoms one to swim merely on the surface of things; and when a representative of this school, nevertheless, succumbs to the temptation to get to the bottom of things, he finds himself out of his depth and flounders helplessly round and round. In our party, too, there has been observed for some time a tendency to substitute for the Marxist theory, not some other theory, but that absence of all theory [*Theorielosigkeit*] which distinguishes the historical school—a tendency to degrade the theoretician to the position of a mere reporter. To those who desire, not simply an aimless skipping [*Fortwurschteln*] from instance to instance, but an integral, energetic movement forward towards a great goal, the Brentano confusion which we have exposed must serve as a warning against the present methods of the historical school."

* Raised to a higher power, abundant.—*Ed*.

** Who, in the end, eats the pig?—*Ed*.

The Social-Democrats have proved that they know how to appreciate the historic services of the great centres of energy and culture by their relentless struggle against all that encroaches on the freedom of movement of the population generally and of the peasants and agricultural labourers in particular. That is why no agrarian can trap them, as he can the Critics, with the bait of providing the "muzhik" with winter "employment". The fact that we definitely recognise the progressive character of big cities in capitalist society, however, does not in the least prevent us from including in our ideal (and in our programme of action, for we leave unattainable ideals to Messrs. Struve and Berdyaev) the abolition of the antithesis between town and country. It is not true to say that this is tantamount to abandoning the treasures of science and art. Quite the contrary: this is necessary in order to bring these treasures *within the reach of the entire people*, in order to abolish the alienation from culture of millions of the rural population, which Marx aptly described as "the idiocy of rural life".[72] And at the present time, when it is possible to transmit electric power over long distances, when the technique of transport has been so greatly improved that it is possible at less cost (than at present) to carry passengers at a speed of more than 200 versts an hour,* there are absolutely no technical obstacles to the enjoyment of the treasures of science and art, which for centuries have been concentrated in a few centres, by the whole of the population spread more or less evenly over the entire country.

And if there is nothing to prevent the abolition of the antithesis between town and country (not be imagined, of course, as a single act but as a series of measures), it is not an "aesthetic sentiment" alone that demands it. In the big cities people suffocate with the fumes of their own excrement, to use Engels' expression, and periodically all who can, flee from the cities in search of fresh air and pure water.[73] Industry is also spreading over the countryside; for it, too, requires pure water. The exploitation of waterfalls, canals,

* The proposal to construct such a road between Manchester and Liverpool was rejected by Parliament only because of the selfish opposition of the big railway magnates, who feared that the old companies would be ruined.

and rivers to obtain electric power will give a fresh impetus to this "spreading out of industry". Finally—*last, but not least**—the rational utilisation of city refuse in general, and human excrement in particular, so essential for agriculture, also calls for the abolition of the antithesis between town and country. It is against this point in the theory of Marx and Engels that the Critics decided to direct their agronomical arguments (the Critics preferred to refrain from fully analysing the theory, which is dealt with in great detail in Engels' *Anti-Dühring*,[74] and, as usual, limited themselves simply to paraphrasing fragments of the thoughts of a Brentano). Their line of reasoning is as follows: Liebig proved that it is necessary to restore to the soil as much as is taken from it. He was therefore of the opinion that throwing city refuse into the seas and rivers was a stupid and barbarous waste of materials essential for agriculture. Kautsky agrees with Liebig's theory. *But* modern agronomics has proved that it is quite possible to restore the productive forces of the soil without the use of stable manure, namely, by means of artificial fertilisers, by the inoculation of certain bacteria into leguminous plants which collect nitrates, etc. *Consequently*, Kautsky, and all those "orthodox" people, are simply behind the times.

Consequently—we reply—here, too, the Critics commit one of their innumerable and endless *distortions*. After explaining Liebig's theory, Kautsky *immediately* showed that modern agronomics has proved that it is quite possible "to dispense altogether with stable manure" (*Agrarfrage*, *S.* 50; see passage quoted above), but added that this was merely a *palliative* compared with the waste of human excrement entailed by the present system of city sewage disposal. Now, if the Critics were at all capable of discussing the essential points of the question, this is the point they should have disproved; they should have shown that it is not a palliative. But they did not even think of doing so. Needless to say, the possibility of substituting artificial for natural manures and the fact that this is already being done (*partly*) do not in the least refute the irrationality of wasting natural fertilisers and thereby polluting the rivers and the air

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

in suburban and factory districts. Even at the present time there are sewage farms in the vicinity of large cities which utilise city refuse with enormous benefit to agriculture; but by this system only an infinitesimal part of the refuse is utilised. To the objection that modern agronomics has refuted the argument that the cities agronomically exploit the countryside, with which the Critics present Kautsky as something new, he replies, on page 211 of his book, that artificial fertilisers "render it possible to avoid the diminution of soil fertility, but the necessity to employ them to an increasing extent merely indicates still another of the numerous burdens agriculture has to bear, which *are by no means a natural necessity*, *but a product of existing social relations*".*

The words we have emphasised contain the "pivot" of the question which the Critics so zealously confuse. Writers like Mr. Bulgakov try to scare the proletariat with the bogy that the "grain question" is more terrible and important than the social question; they are enthusiastic over birth control and argue that "control of the increase of the population" is becoming "the fundamental [*sic*!] economic condition" for the prosperity of the peasantry (II, 261), that this control is worthy of "respect", and that "much hypocritical indignation [only hypocritical, not legitimate, indignation against the present social system?] is roused among sentimental [?!] moralists by the increase in births among the peasant population, as if unrestrained lust [*sic*!] were in itself a virtue" (ibid.). Such writers must naturally and inevitably strive to keep in the background the *capitalist* obstacles to agricultural progress, to throw the entire blame for everything upon the natural "law of diminishing returns", and to present the idea of abolishing the antithesis between town and country as "pure fantasy". But what utter irresponsibility the Chernovs betray when they repeat such arguments and at the same time reproach the Critics of Marxism for "lacking principles and for being eclectics and opportunists" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 11, p. 246)?! What spectacle could be more comical

* "It goes without saying," continues Kautsky, "that artificial fertilisers will not disappear with the fall of capitalism; but they will enrich the soil with special materials and not fulfil the *whole* task of restoring its fertility."

than that of Mr. Chernov reproving others for lack of principles and for opportunism.

All the other critical exploits of our Voroshilov are identical to what we have just examined.

Voroshilov assures us that Kautsky fails to understand the difference between capitalist credit and usury; that he betrays utter failure, or unwillingness, to understand Marx, in maintaining that the peasant fulfils the functions of entrepreneur and, as such, stands in the same relation to the proletariat as the factory owner. Beating his breast, Voroshilov cries out: "I say this boldly because I feel [*sic*!] the ground firmly under my feet" (*At the Glorious Post*, p. 169). In all this, rest assured, Voroshilov is again hopelessly confusing things and boasting as usual. He "failed to see" the passages in Kautsky's book that deal with usury as such (*Agrarfrage*, *S*. 11, 102-04, especially 118, 290-92), and with all his might forces an open door, shouting as usual about Kautsky's "doctrinaire formalism", "moral hard-heartedness", "mockery at human sufferings", and so forth. In regard to the peasant fulfilling the functions of entrepreneur, apparently this astonishingly complicated idea is beyond the scope of Voroshilov's comprehension. In the next essay, however, we shall try to clarify this for him with very concrete examples.

When Voroshilov seeks to prove that he is a real representative of the "interests of labour" and abuses Kautsky for "driving from the ranks of the proletariat numerous genuine working people" (op. cit., p. 167), such as the *Lumpenproletariat*, domestic servants, handicraftsmen, etc., then the reader can be assured that Voroshilov is again muddling things together. Kautsky examines the distinguishing characteristics of the "modern proletariat" which created the modern "Social-Democratic proletarian movement" (*Agrarfrage*, *S*. 306); but to date the Voroshilovs have produced nothing to show that tramps, handicraftsmen, and domestic servants have created a Social-Democratic movement. The charge directed at Kautsky that he is capable of "driving" domestic servants (who in Germany are now beginning to join the movement), handicraftsmen, etc., from the ranks of the proletariat merely exposes to the full the impudence of the Voroshilovs; their display of friendship for the "genuine working people" increases as such phrases decrease in prac-

tical significance, and they can attack with greater impunity the *second part* of the *Agrarian Question*, which has been suppressed by the Russian censor. Speaking, incidentally, of impudence, there are some other gems. In praising Messrs. N.—on[75] and Kablukov, while completely ignoring the Marxist criticism directed against them, Mr. Chernov, with affected naïveté, asks: To whom do the German Social-Democrats refer when they speak of their Russian "comrades"? Let him who finds it hard to believe that such questions are asked in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, turn to No. 7, p. 166.

When Voroshilov asserts that Engels' "prediction" that the Belgian labour movement will prove barren owing to the influence of Proudhonism[76] "has been proved false", then the reader may well know that Voroshilov, self-assured in his, shall we say, "irresponsibility", is again distorting the facts. He writes: "It is not surprising that Belgium has never been orthodox Marxist, and it is not surprising that Engels, being displeased with her for that reason, predicted that the Belgian movement, owing to the influence of 'Proudhonist principles', would pass '*von nichts durch nichts zu nichts*'.* Alas, this prediction has fallen through, and the breadth and many-sidedness of the Belgian movement enable it to serve today as a model from which many 'orthodox' countries are learning a great deal" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 10, p. 234). The facts are as follows: In 1872 (seventy-two!), Engels was engaged in a polemic in the columns of the Social-Democratic paper *Volksstaat*[77] with the German Proudhonist Mülberger to deflate the exaggerated importance attached to Proudhonism, he wrote: "The only country where the working-class movement is directly under the influence of Proudhonist 'principles' is Belgium, and precisely as a result of this the Belgian movement comes, as Hegel would say, 'from nothing through nothing to nothing'."**

Thus, it is *positively untrue* to say that Engels "predicted" or "prophesied" anything. He merely spoke of *the facts as they were*, i.e., the situation that existed in 1872. And it is an

* "From nothing through nothing to nothing."—*Ed.*

** See the pamphlet *Zur Wohnungsfrage*, Zürich, 1887, in which Engels' articles against Mülberger, written in 1872, are reproduced together with his introduction dated January 10, 1887. The passage quoted will be found on p. 56.[78]

undoubted historical fact that *at that time* the Belgian movement was marking time precisely because of the predominance of Proudhonism, whose leaders were opposed to collectivism and repudiated independent proletarian political action. Only in 1879 was a "Belgian Socialist Party" formed; and only from that time onwards was the campaign for universal suffrage conducted, marking the victory of Marxism over Proudhonism (the recognition of the political struggle of the proletariat organised in an independent class party) and the beginning of the pronounced successes of the movement. In its present programme the "Belgian Labour Party" has adopted *all* the fundamental ideas of Marxism (apart from certain minor points). In 1887, in a preface to the second edition of his articles on the housing question, Engels laid special emphasis on the "gigantic progress the international working-class movement has made during the past fourteen years". This progress, he writes, is largely due to the elimination of Proudhonism, which predominated *at that time* and which *now* has been almost forgotten. "In Belgium," Engels observes, "the Flemings have ousted the Walloons from the leadership of the movement, deposed [*abgesetzt*] Proudhonism, and greatly raised the level of the movement" (preface, p. 4. of the same pamphlet).[79] *Russkoye Bogatstvo*'s description of the facts is a veritable paragon of fidelity!

When Voroshilov ... but enough! Of course, we cannot hope to keep up with this legally published magazine, which is able with impunity, month after month, to give vent to a flood of falsehood about "orthodox" Marxism.

V

"THE PROSPERITY OF ADVANCED, MODERN SMALL FARMS". THE BADEN EXAMPLE*

Details, details! cries Mr. Bulgakov in *Nachalo* (No. 1, pp. 7 and 13); and this slogan is repeated a hundred times in a hundred different sharps and flats by all the "Critics".

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* Chapters V-IX were published in the magazine *Obrazovaniye* with the following note by the author: "These essays were written in 1901. The first part was published in pamphlet form last year in Odessa [by Burevestnik (Storm Petrel) Publishers]. The second

Very well, gentlemen, let us examine the details.

It was utterly absurd of you to direct this slogan at Kautsky, since the principal task of a scientific study of the agrarian question, which is encumbered with a countless number of disconnected details, was to present a general picture of the whole of the modern agrarian system in its development. Your slogan merely concealed your lack of scientific principle and your opportunistic dread of any integral and well thought-out philosophy. Had you not read Kautsky's book in the manner of a Voroshilov, you would have been able to derive from it a great deal of information on handling and assimilating detailed statistics. And that you are unable to operate with detailed statistics we shall now demonstrate by a number of examples *chosen by yourselves*.

In his article entitled "Peasant Barbarians", directed against Kautsky and published in the magazine of the Voroshilovs, *Sozialistische* (??) *Monatshefte* (III. Jahrg., 1899, Heft 2), Eduard David triumphantly refers to "one of *the most thorough and interesting monographs*" on peasant farming that have appeared recently, namely, that of Moritz Hecht, entitled *Drei Dörfer der badischen Hard** (Leipzig, 1895). Hertz clutched at this reference and, following David, cited some figures from this "excellent work" (*S*. 68, Russian translation, p. 164) and "strongly recommended" (*S*. 79, Russian translation, p. 188) the reading of the original or of the passage given by David. Mr. Chernov, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, hastened to repeat both David and Hertz, and contrasted to Kautsky's statements Hecht's "striking pictures of the prosperity of advanced, modern small farms" (No. 8, pp. 206-09).

Let us then turn to Hecht.

Hecht describes three Baden villages located at distances ranging from four to fourteen kilometres from Karlsruhe: Hagsfeld, Blankenloch, and Friedrichsthal. Although the farms are small, from one to three hectares, the peasants lead a prosperous and cultured life and gather an exception ally large yield from their land. David (followed by Chernov)

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part appears in print for the first time. Each essay is a more or less independent whole. Their common theme is the analysis of the criticism of Marxism in Russian literature."—*Ed.*

* *Three Villages in the Hard of Baden.—Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

compares this yield with the average yield for the whole of Germany (in double centners per hectare: potatoes, 150-160 and 87.8; rye and wheat, 20-23 and 10-13; hay, 50-60 and 28.6) and exclaims: What do you think of that as an example of "backward small peasants"! In the first place, we reply, insofar as no comparison is made between small-and large-scale farming conducted under the same conditions, it is absurd to view this as an argument against Kautsky. Mr. Chernov appears even more absurd when he asserts, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8, p. 229, that "Kautsky's rudimentary view [regarding the agronomic exploitation of the village by the town] even exaggerates the shady aspects of capitalism", and when he cites, on page 209 of the same issue, as an argument *against* Kautsky, an instance in which this capitalist obstacle to the progress of agriculture *is eliminated* by the fact that the villages he selects are situated in proximity to towns. While the overwhelming majority of the agricultural population lose an enormous quantity of natural fertilisers as a result of the depopulation of the rural districts by capitalism and the concentration of the population in the cities, an insignificant minority of suburban peasants obtain special benefits from their situation and become rich at the expense of the impoverishment of the masses. It is not surprising that the yield in the villages described is so high, considering that they spend the sum of 41,000 marks annually on manure from the army stables in the three neighbouring garrison towns (Karlsruhe, Bruchsal, and Durlach) and on liquid refuse from the urban drainage systems (Hecht, *S.* 65); artificial fertilisers are purchased only to the amount of 7,000 marks annually.* To attempt to refute the technical superiority of large-scale over small-scale farming by adducing instances of small farms

* Incidentally, Mr. Chernov assures the readers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* that there is "hardly any noticeable difference" *in the size of the farms* in those villages. But if the demand for details is not an empty phrase on his lips, he cannot forget that for these suburban peasants the amount of land is of much less importance than the amount of fertilisers used; and in this respect the difference is extremely marked. The yields are highest and the peasants most prosperous in the village of Friedrichsthal, although the land area in that village is the smallest. This village, farming 258 hectares of land, spends 28,000 out of the total of 48,000

operating under such conditions means merely to expose one's impotence. Secondly, to what extent do these instances really represent "genuine small peasants", *echte und rechte Kleinbauern*, as David says, and as Hertz and Chernov repeat after him? They mention only the area of the farms, and in this way prove *only* their inability to handle detailed statistics. As everyone knows, a hectare of land is to a suburban peasant what ten hectares are to a peasant living in a remote district; moreover, the very *type* of farms undergoes radical change because of the proximity of towns. Thus, the price of land in Friedrichsthal, the village which has the least land, but which is the most prosperous of the suburban villages, ranges from 9,000 to 10,000 marks, *five times* the average price of land in Baden (1,938 marks), *and about twenty times* the price in remote districts in East Prussia. Consequently, judged by the size of output (the only exact index of the size of a farm), these are by no means "small" peasants. In regard to the *type* of farming, we see here a remarkably high stage of development of *money* economy and the *specialisation* of agriculture, which is particularly emphasised by Hecht. They cultivate tobacco (45 per cent of the area under cultivation in Friedrichsthal) and high grades of potatoes (used partly for seed and partly for the table of the "gentry"—Hecht, S. 17—in Karlsruhe); they sell milk, butter, sucking-pigs, and grown pigs to the capital, and themselves buy grain and hay. Agriculture here has assumed a completely commercial character, and the peasant who conducts his farm in the neighbourhood of the capital is the purest type of *petty-bourgeois*; so that, had Mr. Chernov really familiarised himself with the details he borrows from others, he might have acquired some understanding of this category of "petty-bourgeois" peasant which is to him so mysterious (see *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 7, p. 163). It is most curious that both Hertz and Mr. Chernov, while declaring that they are totally unable to understand how the peasant fulfils the functions of an entrepreneur, how he is able to figure as a

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marks spent on fertilisers, which amounts to 108 marks per hectare. Hagsfeld spends only 30 marks per hectare (12,000 marks for 397 hectares), while Blankenloch spends only 11 marks per hectare (8,000 marks for 736 hectares).

worker at one moment and as an entrepreneur at another, refer to the detailed investigation of an author who says bluntly: "The peasant of the eighteenth century, with his eight-to-ten hectares of land, was a peasant ["*was* a peasant", Mr. Chernov!] and a manual labourer; the dwarf peasant of the nineteenth century, with his one or two hectares of land, is a brainworker, an entrepreneur and a merchant" (Hecht, *S*. 69; cf. *S*. 12: "The farmer has become a *merchant* and an *entrepreneur*." Hecht's italics). Well, have not Hertz and Mr. Chernov "annihilated" Kautsky in the Voroshilov manner for confusing the peasant with the entrepreneur?

The clearest indication of the "entrepreneur" is his employment of wage-labour. It is highly characteristic that not one of the quasi-socialists who referred to Hecht's work *uttered a single word* about that fact. Hecht, a most typical *Kleinbürger* of the ultra-loyal type, who waxes enthusiastic over the piety of the peasants and the "paternal solicitude" shown them by the Grand Duchy officials in general, and over their adoption of such an "important" measure as, in particular, the establishment of cookery schools, naturally tries to obscure those facts and to show that no "social gulf" separates the rich from the poor, the peasant from the agricultural labourer, or the peasant from the factory worker. "No agricultural *day-labourer* category exists," writes Hecht. "The majority of the peasants are able to cultivate their land themselves, with the help of their families; only a few in those three villages experience the need for outside help during the harvest or at threshing time; such families 'request' ['*bitten*'], to employ the local expression, certain men or women, who would never dream of calling themselves 'day-labourers', 'to help them'" (*S*. 31). There is nothing surprising in the fact that only a few farmers in the three villages mentioned hire day-labourers, because many "farmers", as we shall see, are factory workers. What proportion of pure farmers employ hired labour Hecht does not say; he prefers to pack his candidate's thesis (the Germans call it doctoral dissertation), which is devoted only to three villages (of one of which he is a native), not with exact statistics concerning the various categories of peasants, but with reflections on the high moral significance of diligence and thrift. (Notwithstanding this, or perhaps because of it, Hertz and David extol Hecht's

work to the skies.) All we learn is that the wages of day-labourers are lowest in the most prosperous and purely agricultural village, Friedrichsthal, which is farthest away from Karlsruhe (14 kilometres). In Friedrichsthal, a day-labourer gets two marks a day, paying for his own keep, while in Hagsfeld (4 kilometres from Karlsruhe and inhabited by factory workers) the wages of a day-labourer are three marks a day. Such is one of the conditions of the "prosperity" of the "real small peasants" so much admired by the Critics. "In those three villages," Hecht informs us, "purely patriarchal relations still exist between the masters and their *servants* [*Gesinde* in German means both domestic servants and farm labourers]. The 'master', i.e., the peasant with three to four hectares of land, addresses his men and women labourers as 'thou' and calls them by their forenames; they call the peasant 'uncle' [*Vetter*] and the peasant's wife 'auntie' [*Base*], and address them as 'you'.... The labourers eat at the family table and are regarded as members of the family" (*S*. 93). Our "most thorough" Hecht says nothing about the extent to which hired labour is employed in tobacco growing, which is so widely developed in that district and which requires a particularly large number of labourers; but since he has said at least something about wage-labour, even this very loyal little bourgeois must be regarded as being much better able to handle the "details" of a research than the Voroshilovs of "critical" socialism.

Thirdly, Hecht's research was used to refute the fact that the peasantry suffers from overwork and undernourishment. But here it turns out that the Critics preferred *to ignore* facts of the kind *mentioned* by Hecht. They cleverly utilised that conception of the "middle" peasant by means of which both the Russian Narodniks and the West-European bourgeois economists so extensively idealise the "peasantry". Speaking "generally", the peasants in the three villages mentioned are very prosperous; but even from Hecht's far from thorough monograph it is apparent that in this respect the peasants must be divided into three large groups. About one-fourth (or 30 per cent) of the farmers (the majority in Friedrichsthal and a few in Blankenloch) are prosperous petty bourgeois, who have grown rich as a result of living in the vicinity of the capital. They engage in remunerative dairy farming (selling

10-20 litres of milk a day) and tobacco growing (one example: gross income of 1,825 marks from 1.05 hectares of land under tobacco), fatten pigs for sale (in Friedrichsthal, 497 out of 1,140 inhabitants keep pigs; in Blankenloch, 445 out of 1,684; and in Hagsfeld, 220 out of 1,273 inhabitants), etc. This minority (who alone possess all the features of "prosperity" so much admired by the Critics) are without doubt quite frequent employers of hired labour. In the next group, to which the majority of farmers in Blankenloch belong, standards are very much lower, less fertilisers is used, the yield is lower, there is less livestock (in Friedrichsthal, the number of livestock, expressed in terms of cattle, is 599 head on 258 hectares; in Blankenloch, 842 head on 736 hectares; and in Hagsfeld, 324 head on 397 hectares); "parlours" are more rarely seen in the houses, meat is far from being a daily fare, and many families practise (what is so familiar to us Russians) the selling of grain in the autumn—when they are hard pressed for money—and the re-purchasing of grain in the spring.* In this group, the centre of gravity is constantly shifting *from agriculture to industry*, and 103 Blankenloch peasants are already employed as factory workers in Karlsruhe. These, together with almost the entire population of Hagsfeld, form the third category (40-50 per cent of the total number of farms). In this category, agriculture is a side line in which mostly women are engaged. The standard of living is higher than in Blankenloch (the result of the influence of the capital city), but poverty is strongly felt. The peasants sell their milk and for themselves sometimes purchase "cheaper margarine" (*S*. 24). The number of goats kept is rapidly increasing: from nine in 1855 to ninety-three in 1893. "This increase," writes Hecht, "can be explained only by the disappearance of farms that are strictly speaking peasant farms, and the break-up [*Auflösung*] of the peasant

* Incidentally, Hecht explains the economic backwardness of Blankenloch by the predominance of natural economy and the *existence of common lands* which guarantees to every person on reaching the age of 32 a strip of land (*Allmendgut*) of 36 *ares* (1 *are* = 0.01 hectare.—*Ed*.), irrespective of whether he is "lazy or diligent, thrifty or otherwise" (*S*. 30). Hecht, for all that, is opposed to dividing up the common lands. This, he says, is a sort of public charity institution (*Altersversorgung*) for aged factory workers, whose numbers are increasing in Blankenloch.

class into a class of rural factory workers possessing extremely small plots of land" (*S*. 27). Parenthetically, it should be said that between 1882 and 1895 the number of goats in Germany increased enormously: from 2,400,000 to 3,100,000, which clearly reveals the reverse of the progress of the "sturdy peasantry" which the Bulgakovs and the petty-bourgeois socialist "Critics" laud to the skies. The majority of the workers walk three and a half kilometres every day to their factory in the town, because they cannot afford to spend even one mark (48 kopeks) a week on railway fares. Nearly 150 workers out of the 300 in Hagsfeld find it beyond their means to pay even 40 or 50 pfennigs for dinner in the "public dining-room" and have their dinners brought to them from home. "Punctually at eleven o'clock," writes Hecht, "the poor womenfolk put the dinners in their pots and carry them to the factory" (*S*. 79). As for the working women, they, too, work at the factory ten hours a day, and all they receive for their toil is from 1.10 to 1.50 marks (the men receive 2.50 to 2.70 marks); at piece-work they earn from 1.70 to 2.00 marks. "Some of the working women try to supplement their meagre wages by some auxiliary employment. In Blankenloch four girls work at the paper mill in Karlsruhe, and they take home paper to make bags at night. Working from eight p. m. to eleven p. m. [*sic*!], they can make 300 bags, for which they receive 45-50 pfennigs; this supplement to their small daily earnings goes to pay their railway fares to and from work. In Hagsfeld, several women who worked in factories as girls earn a little extra money polishing silverware on winter evenings" (*S*. 36). "The Hagsfeld worker," says Hecht, moved, "has a permanent residence not by imperial order, but as a result of his own efforts; he has a little house which he is not compelled to share with others, and a small plot of land. But more important than these real possessions is the consciousness that they have been acquired by his own diligence. The Hagsfeld worker is both a factory worker and a peasant. Those with no land of their own rent at least a few strips to supplement their income by *working in their spare time*. In the summer, when work in the factory starts only ["only"!] at seven o'clock, the worker rises at four in order to hoe potatoes in his field, or to carry fodder to the cattle. Or when he returns from work at seven in the evening, what is

there for him to do, especially in the summer? Well, he puts in an hour or an hour and a half in his field; he does not want a high rent from his land—he merely wants to make full use [*sic*!] of his labour-power...." Hecht goes on at great length in this unctuous strain and concludes his book with the words: "The dwarf peasant and the factory worker have both [*sic*!] raised themselves to the position of the middle class, not as a result of artificial and coercive measures, but as a result of their own diligence, their own energy, and the higher morality they have reached."*

"The three villages of the Baden Hard now represent *one great and broad middle class*" (Hecht's italics).

There is nothing astonishing in the fact that Hecht writes in this vein, for he is a bourgeois apologist of the common or garden variety. But what name do those people deserve who, to deceive others, call themselves socialists, who paint reality in still brighter colours than does Hecht, point to the prosperity of the bourgeois minority as general progress, and conceal the proletarisation of the majority with the stale shibboleth "unification of agriculture and industry"?

VI

THE PRODUCTIVITY OF A SMALL AND A BIG FARM. AN EXAMPLE FROM EAST PRUSSIA

For a change let us go from distant South Germany to East Prussia, nearer to Russia. We have before us a highly instructive and *detailed* investigation of which Mr. Bulgakov, who clamours so loudly for details, has been totally unable to make use. "A comparison of the data on the real

* Hecht says very much more about this "higher morality", and no less than Mr. Bulgakov waxes enthusiastic over the "sober marital policy", the "iron diligence", the "thrift", and the "temperance" he even quotes a "well-known peasant proverb": *Man sieht nicht auf die Goschen* (*d. h. Mund*), *sondern auf die Groschen*, which freely translated means: We work, not so much for our mouths as for our pockets. We suggest that our readers compare this proverb with the "doctrine" of the Kiev professor, Bulgakov: that peasant farming (since it seeks neither lent nor profit) is "the most advantageous form of organisation of agriculture that society [*sic*!] can have" (Bulgakov, I, 154).

productivity of large and small farms," writes Mr. Bulgakov, "cannot provide an answer to the question of their technical advantages, since the farms compared may be operating under different economic conditions. The most that can be obtained from such data is the factual confirmation of the negative conclusion that large-scale production possesses no technical advantages over small-scale production, not only theoretically, but, under certain conditions, also practically. Quite a few comparisons of this kind have been made in economic literature, at all events sufficient to undermine the belief of the unbiased and unprejudiced reader in the advantages of large-scale production generally" (I, 57-58). In a footnote the author cites two instances. The first is Auhagen's work, quoted by Kautsky in his *Agrarfrage* (*S*. 111), as well as by Hertz (*S*. 69, Russian translation, p. 166), in which a comparison is made only between two farms in Hanover, one of 4.6 hectares and one of 26.5 hectares. In this example, the small farm has a higher yield per hectare than the large one, and Auhagen determined the income of the small farm to be higher than that of the large farm. Kautsky, however, has shown that this higher income is the result of *under-consumption*. Hertz attempted to refute this evidence, but with his usual success. Since Hertz' work has now been translated into Russian, while Kautsky's reply to Hertz is unknown in Russia, we shall, very briefly, give the substance of this reply (in the cited article in *Neue Zeit*). Hertz, as usual, distorted Kautsky's arguments and alleged that he referred only to the fact that the owner of the big farm is able to send his son to the Gymnasium. In actuality, Kautsky mentioned this merely to illustrate the standard of living, and had Hertz quoted *in full the budgets* of the two families in question (each consisting of five persons), he would have obtained the following figures: 1,158.40 marks for the small farm and 2,739.25 marks for the large farm. If the family of the small farm lived on the *same* standard as that of the large farm, the small farm would prove *less* profitable than the large one. Auhagen estimates the income of the small farm at 1,806 marks, i.e., 5.45 per cent of the capital invested (33,651 marks), and that of the large farm at 2,720 marks, or 1.82 per cent of the capital invested (149,559 marks). If we make allowance for the under-consumption of the small

farmer, we shall find that his income is equal to *258 marks*, or *0.80 per cent*! And this, when the amount of labour involved is disproportionately high: on the small farm there are three workers to 4.6 hectares, that is, one worker to 1.5 hectares, while on the large farm there are eleven (see Hertz, *S.* 75, Russian translation, p. 179) to 26.5 hectares, that is one worker to 2.4 hectares. Furthermore, we shall not dwell on the circumstance, justly ridiculed by Kautsky, that the alleged socialist Hertz compares the labour of the children of modern peasants to Ruth's[80] gleaning! Mr. Bulgakov confines himself merely to presenting the figures of the yield per hectare, but *says not a word* about the respective standards of living of the small and big farmers.

"We find another example," continues our advocate of details, "in the latest researches of Karl Klawki (*Ueber Konkurrenzfähigkeit des landwirtschaftlichen Kleinbetriebs. Thiel's Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*, 1899, Heft 3-4).* His examples are taken from East Prussia. The author compares large, medium, and small farms by taking four of each kind. The specific feature of his comparisons is, first, the fact that expenditure and income are expressed in money, and, secondly, the fact that the author translates the cost of labour-power on the small farms, where it is not purchased, into money and places it to the expenditure account; such a method is hardly correct for our purpose [*sic*! Mr. Bulgakov forgets to add that Klawki translates the cost of labour on *all* the farms into money and from the outset values the labour on the small farms at a lower rate!]. Nevertheless, we have...." There follows a table which for the moment we shall merely summarise: the average net profit per morgen (= ¼ hectare) on the large farm is ten marks, on the medium farm, eighteen marks, on the small farm, twelve marks. And Mr. Bulgakov concludes: "The highest profits are obtained on the medium farms; then come the small farms, while the large farms lag behind the others."

We have seen fit to quote the *entire* passage in which Mr. Bulgakov compares the large and small farms. Now let us consider what is evidenced by Klawki's interesting work,

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* *The Competitive Capacity of Small-Scale Production in Agriculture—Thiel's Agricultural Yearbooks*, 1899, Issue 3-4.—*Ed.*

120 pages of which are devoted to a description of twelve typical farms existing under equal conditions. In the first place, we shall cite the statistics pertaining to these farms, and in the interest of space and clarity we shall confine ourselves to the *average* figures for the large, medium, and small farms (the average size of the farms in each category being 358, 50, and 5 hectares respectively).

Category of farms	Income and expenditure per morgen in marks (1 morgen = 1/4 hectare)												Expenditure per 100 marks of products*		Per 100 morgen	
	Total Income			Income from the sale of produce			Consumption of own produce			Total						
	Agriculture	Stock farming	Total	Agriculture	Stock farming	Total	Agriculture	Stock farming	Total	Income	Expenses	Net profit	Marks a	Marks b	Hired workdays	Total workdays
Large	17	16	33	11	14	25	6	2	8	33	23	10	65	70	887	887
Medium	18	27	45	12	17	29	6	10	16	45	27	18	35	60	744	924
Small	23	41	64	9	27	36	14	14	28	64	52	12	8	80	—	—

It would appear, therefore, that *all* Mr. Bulgakov's conclusions are fully confirmed by Klawki's work: the smaller the farm, the higher the gross income and the higher even the income from sales per morgen! We think that with the methods employed by Klawki—widely employed methods, in their main features common to all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists—the superiority of small-scale farming in all or nearly all cases is proved. Consequently, *the essential thing* in this matter, which the Voroshilovs completely fail to see, is *to analyse those methods*, and it is for this reason that Klawki's partial researches are of such enormous general interest.

Let us start with the yields. It turns out that the yield of the great majority of cereals regularly and very considerably

* a = where the value of the labour-power of the farmer and his family is not expressed in terms of money; b = if it is so expressed.

diminishes with the diminution of the area of the farms. The yield (in centners per morgen) on the large, medium, and small farms respectively is: wheat 8.7, 7.3, 6.4; rye 9.9, 8.7, 7.7; barley 9.4, 7.1, 6.5; oats 8.5, 8.7, 8.0; peas 8.0, 7.7, 9.2;* potatoes 63, 55, 42; mangels 190, 156, 117. Only of flax, not grown on the large farms, do the small farms (3 out of 4) gather a bigger yield than the medium farms (2 out of 4), namely, 6.2 *Stein* (=18.5 pounds) as against 5.5.

To what is the higher yield on the large farms due? Klawki ascribes decisive importance to the following four causes: (1) Drainage is almost entirely absent on the small farms, and even where it exists the drain pipes are laid by the farmer himself and laid badly. (2) The small farmers do not plough their land deep enough, their horses being weak. (3) Most often the small farmers are unable to give their cattle sufficient fodder. (4) The small farmers have inferior manure, their straw is shorter, it is largely used as fodder (which also means that the feed is inferior), and less straw is used for bedding.

Thus, the small farmers' cattle is weaker and inferior, and is kept in a worse condition. This circumstance explains the strange and glaring phenomenon that, notwithstanding the higher yield per morgen on the large farms, income from agriculture per morgen, according to Klawki's computations, is less on the large than on the medium and small farms. The reason for this is that Klawki *does not include fodder*, either in disbursement or in income. In this way, things that in reality make for an essential difference between the large and small farms, a difference unfavourable to the latter, are artificially and falsely equated. By this method of computation large-scale farming appears to be less remunerative than small-scale farming, *because* a larger portion of the land of the large farms is devoted to the cultivation of fodder (although the large farms keep a much smaller number of cattle per unit of land), whereas the small farmers "make shift" with straw for fodder. Consequently, the "superiority" of small-scale farming lies in its *wasteful exploitation* of the land (by inferior fertilisation) and of the *cattle* (by inferior fodder).

* These are grown only on two out of the four farms in this category; in the large and medium categories, three out of four grow peas.

Needless to say, such a comparison of the profitableness of different farms lacks all scientific value.*

Another reason for the higher yield on large farms is that a larger number of the big farmers (and apparently, even, almost they alone) marl the soil, utilise larger quantities of artificial fertilisers (the expenditure per morgen being 0.81 marks, 0.38 marks, and 0.43 marks respectively) and *Kraftfuttermittel*** (in large farms two marks per morgen, and in the others nil). "Our peasant farms," says Klawki, who includes the medium farms in the category of large peasant farms, "spend nothing on *Kraftfuttermittel*. They are very slow to adopt progressive methods and are particularly chary of spending cash" (Klawki, op. cit., 461). The large farms are superior also in the method of cultivating the soil: we observe improved crop rotation on all four of the large farms, on three of the medium farms (on one the old three-field system is used), and only on one of the small farms (on the other three the three-field system is used). Finally, the big farmers use machinery to a far greater extent. True, Klawki himself is of the opinion that machinery is of no great consequence, but we shall not be satisfied with that "opinion"; we shall examine the statistics. The following eight kinds of machines—steam threshers, horse threshers, grain-sorting machines, sifters, seed-drills, manure spreaders, horse-drawn rakes, and rollers—are distributed among the farms described, as follows: on the four large farms, twenty-nine (including one steam thresher); on the four medium farms, eleven (not a single steam-driven machine); and on the four small farms, one machine (a horse-driven thresher).

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* It should be noted that a similarly false equation of obviously unequal quantities in small- and large-scale farming is to be found, not only in separate monographs but in the great bulk of contemporary agrarian statistics. Both French and German statistics deal with "average" live weight and "average" price per head of cattle in all categories of farms. German statistics go so far in this method as to define the gross value of the whole of the cattle in various categories of farms (classified according to area). At the same time, however the reservation is made that the presumed equal value per head of cattle in different categories of farms "does not correspond to the reality" (*S.* 35).

** Concentrated feed.—*Ed.*

Of course, no "opinion" of any admirer of peasant farming can make us believe that grain-sorting machines, seed-drills, rollers, etc., do not affect the size of the crop. Incidentally, we have here data on machines belonging to certain definite owners, unlike the general run of German statistics, which register only cases of the use of machines, whether owned or hired. Obviously, such a registration will also have the effect of minimising the superiority of large-scale farming and of obscuring forms of "borrowing" machines, like the following described by Klawki: "The big farmer willingly lends the small farmer his roller, horse rake, and grain-sorting machine, if the latter promises to supply a man to do the mowing for him in the busy season" (443). Consequently, a certain number of the cases in which machines are employed on small farms, which, as we have shown, are rare, represent a transmuted form of acquiring labour-power.

To continue. Another case of erroneous comparison of obviously unequal quantities is Klawki's method of computing the price of the product on the market as being equal for all categories of farms. Instead of taking actual transactions, the author takes as a basis an assumption that he himself points to as incorrect. The peasants sell most of their grain in their own locality, and merchants in small towns force down prices very considerably. "The large estates are better off in this respect, for they can send grain to the principal city in the province in considerable quantities. In doing so, they usually receive from 20 to 30 pfennigs more per centner than they could get in the small town" (373). The big farmers are better able to assess the value of their grain (451), and they sell it, not by measure, as the peasants do to their disadvantage, but by weight. Similarly, the big farmers sell their cattle by weight, whereas the price of the peasants' cattle is fixed simply on the basis of outer appearance. The big farmers can also make better arrangements for selling their dairy products, for they can send their milk to the towns and obtain a higher price than the middle farmers, who convert their milk into butter and sell it to merchants. Moreover, the butter produced on the medium farms is superior to that produced on the small farms (use of separators, daily churning, and so forth), and the latter get from five to ten pfennigs per pound less. The small farmers have to

sell their fat stock sooner (i.e., less matured) than the middle farmers, because they have a smaller supply of fodder (444). Klawki, in his monograph, leaves out of his calculations all these advantages—in their totality by no means unimportant—which the large farms possess as sellers, just as the theoreticians who admire small-scale farming leave out this *fact* and refer to the *possibility* of improving matters by means of co-operation. We do not wish to confound the realities of capitalism with the possibilities of a petty-bourgeois co-operative paradise. Below we shall bring forward *facts* showing who really derives the most advantage out of co-operatives.

Let us note that Klawki "is not concerned with" the labour of the small and middle farmers themselves in draining the soil and in all kinds of repair work ("the peasants do the work themselves"), and so forth. The socialist calls this "advantage" enjoyed by the small farmer *Ueberarbeit*, overwork, and the bourgeois economist refers to it as one of the advantageous aspects ("for *society*"!) of peasant farming. Let us note that, as Klawki points out, the hired labourers get better pay and food on the medium farms than on the large farms, but they work harder: the "example" set by the farmer stimulates "greater diligence and thoroughness" (465). Which of these two capitalist masters—the landlord or his "own kind", the peasant—squeezes more work out of the labourer for the given wages, Klawki does not attempt to determine. We shall therefore confine ourselves to stating that the expenditure of the big farmers on accident and old-age insurance for their labourers amounts to 0.29 marks per morgen and that of the middle farmer to 0.13 marks (the small farmer here, too, enjoys an advantage in that he does not insure himself at all; needless to say, to the "great advantage of the society" of capitalists and landlords). We shall also bring an example from Russian agricultural capitalism. The reader who is familiar with Shakhovskoi's work *Outside Agricultural Employment* will probably remember the following characteristic observation: The Russian homestead farmers and the German colonists (in the south) "pick" their labourers, pay them from 15 to 20 per cent more than do the big employers and squeeze 50 per cent more work out of them. This was reported by Shakhovskoi in 1896; this year we read

in *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta*,* for instance, the following communication from Kakhovka: "... The peasants and homestead farmers, as is the custom, paid higher wages (than those paid on the big estates), for they demand better workers and those possessing the greatest endurance" (No. 109, May 16, 1901). There are hardly grounds for assuming that this condition is characteristic of Russia alone.

In the table given above the reader saw two methods of computation—one that takes into account the money value of the farmer's labour-power, and one that does not. Mr. Bulgakov considers that to include this money value "is hardly correct". Of course, a precise budget of the farmers' and labourers' expenditure, in money and in kind, would be far more correct; but since we lack these data, we are obliged to make an *approximate* estimate of the family's money expenditure. The *manner* in which Klawki makes this approximation is extremely interesting. The big estate-owners do not work themselves, of course; they even have special salaried managers who carry out all the work of direction and supervision (of four estates, three are supervised by managers and one is not; Klawki would consider it more correct to classify this last estate, consisting of 125 hectares, as a large peasant estate). Klawki "assigns" to the owners of two large estates 2,000 marks per annum each "for their labour" (which on the first estate, for instance, consists of leaving the principal estate once a month for a few days' check-up on the manager's work). To the account of the farmer of 125 hectares (the first-mentioned estate consisted of 513 hectares) he "assigns" only 1,900 marks for the work of the farmer himself and of his three sons. Is it not "natural" that a farmer with a smaller amount of land should "make shift" with a smaller budget? Klawki allows the middle farmers from 1,200 to 1,716 marks for the labour of the husband and wife, and in three cases also of the children. To the small farmers he allows from 800 to 1,000 marks for the work of four to five (*sic*!) persons, i.e., a little more (if more at all) than a labourer, an *Instmann*, gets, who with his family earns only from 800 to 900 marks. Thus, we observe here another big step forward: first, a comparison is made between figures that are obvi-

* *Commercial and Industrial Gazette.—Tr.*

ously uncomparable; now it is declared that the standard of living *must* decline with the diminution in the size of the farm. But that means the *a priori* recognition of the fact that capitalism degrades the small peasants, a fact ostensibly to have been refuted by the computations of the "net profit"!

And if, by the author's *assumption*, the money income diminishes with the diminution in the size of the farm, the drop in consumption is evident by direct data. Consumption of agricultural products on the farms amounts to the following per person (counting two children as one adult): large farm, 227 marks (average of two figures); medium farm, 218 marks (average of four figures); small farm, 135 (*sic*!) marks (average of four figures). And the larger the farm, the larger is the quantity of additional food products purchased (*S*. 453). Klawki himself observes that here it is necessary to raise the question of *Unterkonsumption* (under-consumption), which Mr. Bulgakov denied, and which here he preferred *to ignore*, thus proving to be even more of an apologist than Klawki. Klawki seeks to minimise the significance of this fact. "Whether there is any under-consumption among the small farmers or not, we cannot say," he states, "but we think it is probable in the case of small farm IV [97 marks per head]. The fact is that the small peasants live very frugally [!] and sell much of what they, so to speak, save out of their mouths" (*sich sozusagen vom Munde absparen*).* He attempts to prove that this fact does not refute the higher "productivity" of small-scale farming. If consumption were increased to 170 marks, which is quite adequate (for the "younger broth-

* It is interesting to note, for example, that the income from the sale of milk and butter on the large farms amounts to seven marks per morgen, on the medium farms three marks, and *on the small farms* seven marks. The point is, however, that the small peasants consume "very little butter and whole milk ... while the inhabitants of small farm IV [on which the consumption of products produced on the farm amounts to only 97 marks per head] do not consume these items at all" (450). Let the reader compare this fact (which, by the way, has long been known to all except the "Critics") with Hertz' grand reasoning (*S*. 113, Russian translation, p. 270): "But does the peasant get nothing for his milk?" Who, in the end, eats the [milk-fed] pig? Not the peasant?" These utterances should be recalled more often as an unexcelled example of the most vulgar embellishment of poverty.

er",[81] but not for the capitalist farmer, as we see), the figure for consumption per morgen would have to be increased and the income from sales reduced by six or seven marks. If this amount is subtracted (see table above), we get from 29 to 30 marks, i.e., a sum still larger than that obtained on the large farms (*S*. 453). But if we increase consumption, not to this haphazardly-taken figure (and a low one at that, because "he'll manage somehow"), but to 218 marks (equal to the actual figure on the medium farms), the income from the sale of products will drop on the small farms to *20 marks* per morgen, as against 29 marks on the medium farms, and 25 marks on the large farms. That is to say, the correction of *this one* error (of the numerous errors indicated above) in Klawki's computations destroys *all* the "advantages" of the small peasant.

But Klawki is untiring in his quest of advantages. The small peasants "combine agriculture with industrial occupations": three small peasants (out of four) "diligently work as day-labourers and receive board in addition to their pay" (435). But the advantages of small-scale farming are particularly marked during periods of crisis (as Russian readers have long known from the numerous exercises on this theme on the part of the Narodniks, now rehashed by the Chernovs): "During agricultural crises, as well as at other times, it is the small farms that possess the greatest stability, they are able to sell a relatively larger quantity of products than the other categories of farms by severely curtailing domestic expenses, which, it is true, must lead to a certain amount of under-consumption" (479—Klawki's last conclusions; cf. *S*. 464). "Unfortunately, many small farms are reduced to this by the high rates of interest on loans. But in this way, although with great effort, they are able to keep on their feet and eke out a livelihood. Probably, it is the great diminution in consumption that chiefly explains the increase in the number of small peasant farms in our locality indicated in the statistics of the Empire." And Klawki adduces figures for the Königsberg *Regierungsbezirk*,* where in the period between 1882 and 1895 the number of farms under two hectares increased

* Königsberg Administrative Area.—*Ed*.

from 56,000 to 79,000, those from two to five hectares from 12,000 to 14,000, and those from five to twenty hectares from 16,000 to 19,000. This is in East Prussia, the very place in which the Bulgakovs claim to see the "elimination" of large-scale by small-scale production. And yet the gentlemen who give the bare statistics of the area of farms in this Suzdal[82] fashion clamour for "details"! Naturally, Klawki considers that "the most important task of modern agrarian policy for the solution of the agricultural labourer problem in the East is to encourage the most efficient labourers to settle down by affording them the opportunity of acquiring a piece of land as their own property, if not in the first, then at least in the second [*sic*!] generation" (476). It doesn't matter that the *Instleute* who purchase a plot of land out of their savings "in the majority of cases prove to be worse off financially; they are fully aware of this themselves, but they are tempted by the greater freedom", and the main task of bourgeois political economy (now, apparently, of the "Critics" also) is to foster this illusion among the most backward section of the proletariat.

Thus, on every point Klawki's inquiry refutes Mr. Bulgakov, who referred to Klawki. This inquiry demonstrates the technical superiority of large-scale production in agriculture, the overwork and under-consumption of the small peasant and his transformation into a regular or day-labourer for the landlord; it proves that there is a connection between the increase in the number of small peasant farms and the growth of poverty and proletarisation. Two conclusions that follow from this inquiry are of exceptional significance from the point of view of principle. First, we see clearly the obstacle to the introduction of machinery in agriculture: the abysmal degradation of the small farmer, who is ready to "leave out of account" his own toil and who makes manual labour cheaper for the capitalist than machinery. Mr. Bulgakov's assertions notwithstanding, the facts prove incontestably that under the capitalist system the position of the small peasant in agriculture is *in every way analogous* to that of the handicraftsman in industry. Mr. Bulgakov's assertions notwithstanding, we see in agriculture a still further diminution in consumption and a still further intensification of labour employed as methods of competing with large-scale

production. Secondly, in regard to every manner of comparison between the remunerativeness of small and large farms, we must once and for all declare as absolutely useless and vulgarly apologetic any conclusion that leaves out of account the following three circumstances: (1) How does the *farmer* eat, live, and work? (2) How are the *cattle* kept and worked? (3) How is the *land* fertilised, and is it exploited in a rational manner? Small-scale farming manages to exist by methods of sheer waste—waste of the farmer's labour and vital energy, waste of strength and quality of the cattle, and waste of the productive capacities of the land. Consequently, any inquiry that fails to examine these circumstances thoroughly is nothing more nor less than bourgeois sophistry.*

It is not surprising, therefore, that the "theory" of the overwork and under-consumption of the small peasants in modern society has been so severely attacked by Messrs. the Critics. In *Nachalo* (No. 1, p. 10) Mr. Bulgakov "undertook" to give any number of "citations" disproving Kautsky's asser-

* Leo Huschke, in his work, *Landwirtschaftliche Reinertrags-Berechnungen bei Klein-, Mittel- und Grossbetrieb dargelegt an typischen Beispielen Mittelthüringens* [*Assessment of Net Incomes of Small, Medium, and Large Farms, Based on Typical Examples from Middle Thuringia.—Ed.*] (Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1902), justly points out that "it is possible by merely reducing the assessment" of the small farmer's labour-power to obtain a computation that will prove his superiority over the middle and the big farmer, and his ability to compete with them (*S.* 126). Unfortunately, the author did not carry his idea to its logical conclusion, and therefore did not present systematic data showing the manner in which the cattle were kept, the method of fertilising the soil, and the cost of maintaining the farmer's household in the various categories of farms. We hope to return to Herr Huschke's interesting work. For the moment we shall merely note his reference to the fact that small-scale farming fetches lower prices for its products than large-scale farming (*S.* 146, 155) and his conclusion that: "The small and medium farms strove to overcome the crisis which set in after 1892 (the fall in the prices of agricultural produce) by cutting down cash expenditure as much as possible, while the large farms met the crisis through increasing their yields by means of increased expenditure on their farms" (*S.* 144). Expenditure on seeds fodder and fertilisers in the period from 1887-91 to 1893-97 was reduced on the small and medium farms and increased on the large farms. On the small farms this expenditure amounted to seventeen marks per hectare and on the large farms to forty-four marks. (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

tions. From the studies of the League for Social and Political Questions,[83] *Bäuerliche Zustände* (*Conditions of the Peasantry*), repeats Mr. Bulgakov, "Kautsky, in his attempt to galvanise the corpse [*sic*!] of the obsolete dogma back to life, selected certain facts showing the depressed condition of peasant farming, which is quite understandable at the present time. Let the reader look for himself; he will find evidence there of a somewhat different character" (II, 282). Let us "look" for ourselves and verify the quotations given by this strict scientist, who, in part, merely repeats Hertz' quotations (*S*. 77, Russian translation, p. 183).

"From Eisenach comes evidence of improvements in stock-breeding, in soil fertilisation, evidence of the use of machinery, and in general of progress in agricultural production...." We turn to the article on Eisenach (*Bäuerliche Zustände*, I. Band). The condition of the owners of less than five hectares (of which there are 887 out of the 1,116 farms in this district) "is, in general, not very favourable" (66). "Insofar as they can work for the big farmers as reapers, day-labourers, etc., their condition is relatively good..." (67). Generally speaking, important technological progress has been made in the past twenty years, but "much is left to be desired, particularly in regard to the smaller farms..." (72). "... the smaller farmers sometimes employ weak cows for field work...." Subsidiary earnings derive from tree felling and carting firewood; the latter "takes the farmers away from agriculture" and leads to "worsened conditions..." (69). "Nor does tree felling provide adequate earnings. In some districts the small landowners [*Grundstücksbesitzer*] engage in weaving, which is miserably [*leidlich*] paid. In isolated cases work is obtained at cigar-making at home. Generally speaking, there is a shortage of subsidiary earnings..." (73). And the author, Ökonomie-Commissar Dittenberger, concludes with the remark that, in view of their "simple lives" and their "modest requirements", the peasants are strong and healthy, which "is astonishing, considering the low nutritive value of the food consumed by the poorest class, among whom potatoes are the principal item of fare..." (74).

That is how the "learned" Voroshilovs refute the "obsolete Marxist prejudice that peasant farming is incapable of technological progress"!

"...In regard to the Kingdom of Saxony, General Secretary Langsdorff says that in whole districts, particularly in the more fertile localities, there is now hardly any difference in intensiveness of cultivation between the large and the small estates". That is how Kautsky is refuted by the Austrian Voroshilov (Hertz, *S*. 77, Russian translation, pp. 182-83), followed by the Russian Voroshilov (Bulgakov, II, 282, referring to *Bäuerliche Zustände*, II, 222). We turn to page 222 of the book from which the Critics cite, and following the words quoted by Hertz we read: "The difference is more marked in the hilly districts, where the bigger estates operate with a relatively large working capital. But here, too, very frequently, the peasant farms realise a no lesser net profit than do the large farms, since the smaller income is compensated by greater frugality, which at the prevailing very low level of requirements [*bei der vorhandenen grossen Bedürfnisslosigkeit*] is carried to such lengths that the condition of the peasant is very often worse than that of the industrial worker, who has become accustomed to greater requirements" (*Bäuerliche Zustände*, II, 222). We read further that the prevailing system of land cultivation is crop rotation, which has become the predominant system among the middle farmers, while "the three-field system is met with almost exclusively among the small peasant-owned estates". In regard to stock-breeding, progress is also observed everywhere. "Only in regard to the raising of horned cattle and the utilisation of dairy products does the peasant usually lag behind the big landlord" (223).

"Professor Ranke," continues Mr. Bulgakov, "testifies to the technological advance in peasant farming in the environs of Munich, which, he says, is typical for the whole of Upper Bavaria." We turn to Ranke's article: Three *Grossbauer* communities farming with the aid of hired labourers—69 peasants out of 119 hold more than 20 hectares each, comprising three-fourths of the land. Moreover, 38 of these "peasants" hold more than 40 hectares each, with an average of 59 hectares each; between them they hold nearly 60 per cent of the entire land....

We think this should suffice to reveal the manner in which Messrs. Bulgakov and Hertz "quote".

VII

THE INQUIRY INTO PEASANT FARMING IN BADEN

"Due to lack of space," writes Hertz, "we cannot render the detailed and interesting judgements of the Inquiry into 37 communities in Baden. In the majority of cases they are analogous to those presented above: side by side with favourable, we find unfavourable and indifferent judgements; *but nowhere in these entire three volumes of the Inquiry do the detailed budgets of expenditure give any grounds for the conclusion that 'under-consumption'* (*Unterkonsumption*), 'sordid and degrading poverty', etc., are prevalent" (*S*. 79, Russian translation, p. 188). The words we have emphasised represent, as usual, a *direct untruth*. The very Baden Inquiry to which Hertz refers contains documentary evidence *attesting* to "under-consumption" precisely among the *small peasantry*. Hertz' distortion of the facts closely resembles the method that was especially cultivated by the Russian Narodniks and is now practised by all the "Critics" on the agrarian question, viz., sweeping statements about "the peasantry". Since the term "peasantry" is still more vague in the West than it is in Russia (in the West this social-estate is not sharply defined), and since "average" facts and conclusions conceal the relative "prosperity" (or at all events, the absence of starvation) among the minority and the privation suffered by the majority, apologists of all sorts have an unlimited field of activity. In actual fact, the Baden Inquiry enables us to distinguish various groups of peasants, which Hertz, although an advocate of "details", preferred not to see. Out of 37 typical communities, a selection was made of typical farms of big peasants (*Grossbauer*), middle peasants, and small peasants, as well as of day-labourers, making a total of 70 peasants' (31 big, 21 middle, and 18 small) and 17 day-labourers' households; and the budgets of these households were subjected to a very detailed examination. We have not been able to analyse *all* the data; but the *principal results* cited below will suffice to enable us to draw very definite conclusions.

Let us first present the data on the general economic type of (a) large, (b) middle, and (c) small peasant farms (Anlage VI: "*Uebersichtliche Darstellung der Ergebnisse*

der in den Erhebungsgemeinden angestellten Ertragsberechnungen."* We have divided this table into groups for the *Grossbauer*, *Mittelbauer*, and *Kleinbauer* respectively). Size of holdings—average in each group: (a) 33.34 hectares, (b) 13.5 hectares, and (c) 6.96 hectares—which is relatively high for a country of small land-holdings like Baden. But if we exclude the ten farms in communities Nos. 20, 22, and 30, where exceptionally large holdings are the rule (up to 43 hectares among the *Kleinbauer* and up to 170 hectares among the *Grossbauer*!), we shall obtain the following figures, more normal for Baden: (a) 17.8 hectares, (b) 10.0 hectares, and (c) 4.25 hectares. Size of families: (a) 6.4 persons, (b) 5.8, and (c) 5.9. (Unless otherwise stated, these and subsequent figures apply to all the 70 farms.) Consequently, the families of the big peasants are considerably larger; nevertheless, they employ hired labour to a far greater extent than the others. Of the 70 peasants, 54, i.e., more than three-fourths of the total, employ hired labour, namely: 29 big peasants (out of 31), 15 middle (out of 21), and 10 small (out of 18). Thus, of the big peasants, 93 per cent cannot manage without hired labour, while the figure for the small peasants is 55 per cent. These figures are very useful as a test of the current opinion (accepted uncritically by the "Critics") that the employment of hired labour is negligible in present-day peasant farming. Among the big peasants (whose farms of 18 hectares are included in the category of 5-20 hectares, in wholesale descriptions reckoned as real peasant farms), we see pure capitalist farming: 24 farms employ 71 labourers—almost 3 labourers per farm, and 27 farmers employ day-labourers for a total of 4,347 days (161 man-days per farmer). Compare this with the size of the holdings of the big peasants in the environs of Munich, whose "progress" served our bold Mr. Bulgakov as a refutation of the "Marxist prejudice" regarding the degradation of the peasants by capitalism!

For the middle peasants we have the following figures: 8 employ 12 labourers, and 14 employ day-labourers for a total of 956 man-days. For the small peasants: 2 employ

* Appendix VI: "Brief Review of the Results of the Assessment of Incomes in Communities Investigated."—*Ed.*

2 labourers, and 9 employ day-labourers for a total of 543 man-days. One-half the number of *small* peasants employ hired labour for 2 months (543:9=60 days), i.e., in the most important season for the farmers (notwithstanding the fact that their farms are larger, the production of these small peasants is very much lower than that of the Friedrichsthal peasants, of whom Messrs. Chernov, David, and Hertz are so enamoured).

The results of this farming are as follows: 31 big peasants made a net profit of 21,329 marks and suffered a loss of 2,113 marks, i.e., a total profit for this category of 19,216 marks, or 619.9 marks per farm (523.5 marks if 5 farms in communities Nos. 20, 22, and 30 are excluded). For the medium farms the corresponding amount will be 243.3 marks (272.2 marks, if the 3 communities are excluded), and for the small farms, 35.3 marks (37.1 marks, if the 3 communities are excluded). Consequently, the small peasant, literally speaking, *can barely make ends meet and only just manages to do so by cutting down consumption*. The Inquiry (*Ergebnisse*, *etc.*, in Vol. IV of *Erhebungen*,[84] *S.* 138) contains figures showing the consumption of the most important food items on each farm. Below we quote these data as averages for each category of peasants:

Category of peasants	Consumption per person per day				Expenditure per person	
	Bread and fruit	Potatoes	Meat	Milk	Groceries, heating, lighting, etc., per day	Clothing per
	Pounds		Grammes	Litres	Pfennings	Marks
Big peasants	1.84	1.82	138	1.05	72	66
Middle "	1.59	1.90	111	0.95	62	47
Small "	1.49	1.94	72	1.11	57	38
Day-labourers	1.69	2.14	56	0.85	51	32

These are the data in which our bold Hertz "failed to perceive" either under-consumption or poverty! We see that the small peasant, as compared with those of the higher groups, reduces his consumption very considerably, and

that his food and clothing are little better than those of the day-labourer. For example, he consumes about two-thirds of the amount of meat consumed by the middle peasant, and about half the amount consumed by the big peasant. These figures prove once again the uselessness of sweeping conclusions and the erroneousness of all assessments of income that ignore differences in living standards. If, for instance, we take *only* the two last columns of our table (to avoid complicated calculations in translating food products into money terms), we shall see that the "net profit", not only of the small peasant, but also of the middle peasant, is a *pure fiction*, which only pure bourgeois like Hecht and Klawki, or pure Voroshilovs like our Critics, can take seriously. Indeed, if we assume that the small peasant spends as much money on food as the middle peasant does, his expenditure would be increased by *one hundred marks*, and we would get an enormous *deficit*. If the middle peasant spent as much as the big peasant, his expenditure would be increased by 220 marks, and unless he "stinted himself" in food he, too, would sustain a deficit.* Does not the reduced consumption of the small peasant, following self-evidently from the inferior feeding of his cattle and the inadequate restoration (often the complete exhaustion) of the productivity of the soil, entirely confirm the truth of Marx's words, at which the modern Critics merely shrug their shoulders in lofty contempt: "An infinite fragmentation

* Mr. Chernov "objects": Does not the big farmer stint his day-labourer still more in food and other expenses? (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1900, No. 8, p. 212). This objection repeats the old Krivenko-Vorontsovtrick, if one may use such an expression, of *foisting* liberal-bourgeois arguments upon Marxists. The objection would be valid against those who say that large-scale production is superior, not only technically, but because it improves (or at least makes tolerable) the condition of the labourers. Marxists do not say that. They merely expose the false trick of *painting* the condition of the small farmer *in roseate hues*, either by sweeping statements about prosperity (Mr. Chernov on Hecht), or by estimates of "income" that *leave out of account* reduced consumption. The bourgeoisie must needs paint things in roseate hues, must needs foster the illusion among the labourers that they can become "masters" and that small "masters" can obtain high incomes. It is the business of socialists to expose these falsehoods and to explain to the small peasants that for them too there is no salvation outside of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

of means of production, and isolation of the producers themselves. Monstrous waste of human energy. Progressive deterioration of conditions of production and increased prices of means of production—an inevitable law of proprietorship of parcels" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, *S*. 342).[85]

In regard to the Baden Inquiry we must note still another distortion by Mr. Bulgakov (the Critics mutually supplement each other; while one distorts one aspect of the information adduced from a given source, a second distorts the other). Mr. Bulgakov frequently quotes from the Baden Inquiry. It would *appear*, therefore, that he is acquainted with it. Yet we find him writing the following: "The exceptional and apparently fatal indebtedness of the peasant"—so states the Overture, II, 271—"represents one of the most immutable dogmas in the mythology created in literature in relation to peasant farming.... Surveys at our disposal reveal considerable indebtedness only among the smallest, not yet firmly established holdings [*Tagelöhnerstellen*]. Thus, Sprenger expresses the general impression obtained from the results of the extensive investigation conducted in Baden [to which reference is made in a footnote] in the following manner: '...Only the plots of the day-labourers and small peasant farmers are relatively speaking heavily mortgaged in a large number of the districts investigated; but even among these, in the majority of cases, the indebtedness is not so great as to cause alarm...'" (272). A strange thing. On the one hand, *there is reference to the Inquiry itself*, *and on the other*, there is merely the quoted "general impression" of a certain Sprenger who has written about this Inquiry. But as ill-luck would have it, Sprenger's writing falls short of the truth (at least in the passage quoted by Mr. Bulgakov; we have not read Sprenger's book). First, the authors of the Inquiry assert that, in the majority of cases, it is precisely the indebtedness of the small peasant holdings which *reaches* alarming dimensions. Secondly, they assert that the position of the small peasants in this respect is not only worse than that of the middle and big peasants (which Sprenger noted) *but also worse than that of the day-labourers*.

It must be observed in general that the authors of the Baden Inquiry established the extremely important fact that

on the large farms *the limits of permissible indebtedness* (i.e., the limits to which the farmer may go without risking bankruptcy) *are higher than on the small farms*. After the data we have presented above on the farming results obtained by the big, middle, and small peasants respectively, this fact requires no further explanation. The authors of the Inquiry estimate the indebtedness permissible and safe (*unbedenklich*) for the large and medium farms at 40-70 per cent of the land value, or an average of 55 per cent. In regard to the small farms (which they set as between four and seven hectares for crop cultivation, and between two and four hectares for viticulture and commercial crops), they consider that "the limits of indebtedness ... must not exceed 30 per cent of the value of the holding, if the *regular* payment of interest and of instalments on the principal is to be *fully* secured" (*S*. 66, B. IV). In the surveyed communities (with the exception of those where *Anerbenrecht** prevails, e.g., Unadingen and Neukirch), the percentage of indebtedness (in proportion to the value of the estate) steadily diminishes as we pass from the small to the large farms. In the community of Dittwar, for instance, the indebtedness of farms up to one-fourth of a hectare equals 180.65 per cent; from one to two hectares, 73.07 per cent; from two to five hectares, 45.73 per cent; from five to ten hectares, 25.34 per cent; and from ten to twenty hectares, 3.02 per cent (ibid., *S*. 89-90). But the percentage of indebtedness does not tell us everything, and the authors of the Inquiry draw the following conclusion:

"The above-given statistics, consequently, confirm the widespread opinion that those owners of peasant holdings who are on the border-line [in the middle] between the day-labourers and the middle peasants [in the rural districts the farmers of this category are usually called the "middle estate"—*Mittelstand*] are frequently in a worse position than those in the groups above or below [*sic*!] in the size of their holdings; for, although they are able to cope with *moderate* indebtedness, if it is kept at a certain and not very high level, they find it difficult to meet their obligations, being

* Right of inheritance, by which the property of a peasant household passes undivided to a single heir.—*Ed*.

unable to obtain *regular* collateral employment (as day-labourers, etc.), by which means to increase their income....” Day-labourers, “insofar as they have some regular collateral employment, are frequently in a much better position materially than those belonging to the ‘middle estate’, for, as computations in numerous cases have shown, collateral employment produces at times such a high net (i.e., money) income as to enable them to repay even *large* debts” (loc. cit., 67).* Finally, the authors reiterate that the indebtedness of the small peasant farms in relation to the permissible level is “sometimes unsafe”; hence, “in purchasing land, particular business-like caution must be exercised ... primarily by the *small* peasant population and by the day-labourers, closely related to it” (98).

This, then, is the bourgeois counsellor to the small peasant! On the one hand, he fosters in the proletarians and semi-proletarians the hope that they will be able to purchase land, “if not in the first, then in the second generation”, and by diligence and abstemiousness obtain from it an enormous percentage of “net income”; on the other hand, he advises especially the poor peasants to exercise “particular caution” in purchasing land if they have no “regular employment”, that is to say, when the capitalists have no need for settled workers. And yet there are “critical” simpletons who accept these selfish lies and threadbare banalities as the findings of the most up-to-date science!

One would think that the detailed data we have presented on the big, middle, and small peasants would suffice to make even Mr. V. Chernov understand the meaning of the term “petty bourgeois” as applied to the peasant, a term that seems to inspire him with such horror. Capitalist evolution has not only introduced similarity in the *general* economic system of West-European countries, but it has brought Russia also closer to the West, so that *the main features* of peasant farming in Germany are similar to those

* The authors of the Inquiry rightly say: The small peasant sells relatively little for cash, but he stands particularly in need of money, and because of his lack of capital, every cattle disease, every hailstorm, etc., hits him particularly hard.

in Russia. However, in Russia the process of differentiation among the peasantry, abundantly confirmed in Russian Marxist literature, is in an initial stage; it has not yet assumed anything like a finished form, it has not yet given rise, for example, to the immediately noticeable, distinctive type of big peasant (*Grossbauer*). In Russia the mass expropriation and extinction of an enormous section of the peasantry still greatly overshadow the "first steps" of our peasant bourgeoisie. In the West, however, this process, which started even before the abolition of serfdom (cf. Kautsky, *Agrarfrage*, *S*. 27), long ago caused the obliteration of the social-estate distinction between peasant and "privately-owned" (as we call it) farming, on the one hand, and the formation of a class of agricultural wage-workers, which has already acquired fairly definite features, on the other.* It would be a grave error to assume, however, that this process came to a stop after more or less definite new types of rural population had emerged. On the contrary, it goes on continuously, now rapidly, now slowly, of course, depending on the numerous and varying circumstances, and assumes most diverse forms according to the varying agronomic conditions, etc. The proletarisation of the peasantry continues, as we shall prove below by the mass of German statistics; besides which, it is evident from the cited data on the small peasantry. The increasing flight, not only of agricultural labourers, but of peasants, from the country to the towns is in itself striking evidence of this growing proletarisation. But the peasant's flight to the town is necessarily preceded by his ruin; and the ruin is preceded by a desperate struggle for economic independence. The data on the extent of the employment of hired labour, the amount of "net income", and the level of consumption of the various types of peasantry, bring out this struggle in striking relief. The principal weapon in this fight is "iron diligence" and frugality—frugality according to the motto "We work, not so much for our mouths as for our pockets". The inevitable result of the

* "The peasantry," writes Mr. Bulgakov, with reference to France in the nineteenth century, "split up into two sections, each sharply distinguished from the other, namely, the proletariat and the small proprietors" (II, 176). The author is mistaken, however, in believing that the "splitting up" ended with this—it is a ceaseless process.

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struggle is the rise of a minority of wealthy, prosperous farmers (an insignificant minority in most cases—and in every case when particularly favourable conditions are absent, such as proximity to the capital, the construction of a railway, or the opening up of some new, remunerative branch of commercial agriculture, etc.) and the continuously increasing impoverishment of the majority, which steadily saps the strength of the peasants by chronic starvation and exhausting toil, and causes the quality of the land and cattle to deteriorate. The inevitable result of the struggle is the rise of a minority of *capitalist* farms based on wage-labour, and the increasing necessity for the majority to work at "side lines", i.e., their conversion into industrial and agricultural wage-workers. The data on wage-labour very clearly reveal the immanent tendency, inevitable under the present system of society, for all small producers to become small capitalists.

We quite understand why bourgeois economists, on the one hand, and opportunists of various shades, on the other, shun this aspect of the matter and why they cannot help doing so. The differentiation of the peasantry reveals to us the *profoundest* contradictions of capitalism in the very process of their *inception* and their further development. A complete evaluation of these contradictions inevitably leads to the recognition of the small peasantry's blind-alley and hopeless position (hopeless, outside the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the entire capitalist system). It is not surprising that these most profound and most undeveloped contradictions are not mentioned; there is an attempt to evade the fact of the overwork and under-consumption of the small peasants, which can be denied only by unconscionable or ignorant people. The question of the hired labour employed by the peasant bourgeoisie and of wage-work of the rural poor is left in the shade. Thus, Mr. Bulgakov submitted an "essay on the theory of agrarian development", passing over both these questions in eloquent silence!*

* Or contains no less eloquent evasions, such as: "...the numerous cases of combining industry with agriculture, when industrial wage-workers own small plots of land..." are "no more than a detail [?!] in the economic system. There are as yet [?] no grounds for regarding this as a new manifestation of the industrialisation of agricul-

"Peasant farming," he says, "may be defined as that form of farming in which the labour of the peasant's own family is exclusively, or almost exclusively employed. Very rarely do even peasant farms dispense altogether with outside labour,—the help of neighbours or casual hired labour—but this does not change [naturally!] the economic features of peasant farming" (I, 141). Hertz is somewhat more naïve, and at the very beginning of his book he makes the following reservation: "Hereinafter, by small or peasant farms I shall always assume a form of farming in which the farmer, the members of his family, and not more than one or two workers are employed" (*S*. 6, Russian translation, p. 29). When they discuss the hiring of a "hand" our *Kleinbürger* soon forget the very "peculiarities" of agriculture which they constantly make so much of with no regard for relevance. In agriculture, one or two labourers is by no means a small number, even if they work only in the summer. But the main thing is not whether this is a small or a large number; the main thing is that hired labourers are employed by the

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ture, or its loss of independent development; this phenomenon is much too insignificant in extent (in Germany, for instance, only 4.09 per cent of agricultural land is held by industrial wage-workers)" (*sic*!—II, pp. 254-55). In the first place, the fact that an insignificant *share* of the land is held by hundreds of thousands of workers does not prove that this "phenomenon is insignificant in extent", it proves rather that capitalism degrades and proletarises the small farmer. Thus, the total number of farmers holding less than two hectares (although their number is enormous: 3,200,000 out of 5,500,000, or 58.2 per cent, almost *three-fifths*) own "only" 5.6 per cent of the total area of agricultural land. Will our clever Mr. Bulgakov draw the inference from this that the entire "phenomenon" of small landownership and small farming is a mere "detail" and "is much too insignificant in extent"?? Of the 5,500,000 farmers in Germany, 791,000, or 14.4 per cent, are industrial wage-workers; and the overwhelming majority of these own less than two hectares of land each, namely, 743,000, which represents 22.9 per cent of the total number of farmers owning less than two hectares. Secondly, true to his usual practice, Mr. Bulgakov *distorted the statistics he adduced*. By an oversight he took from the page of the German Inquiry he quoted (*Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, B. 112, *S*. 49 ★) the figure of the area of land owned by *independent* trading farmers. The non-independent trading farmers (i.e., industrial wage-workers) hold *only* 1.84 per cent of the total area of agricultural land. 791,000 wage-workers own 1.84 per cent of the total area of land, while 25,000 landlords own 24 per cent. Truly a most insignificant "detail"!

wealthier, more prosperous peasants, whose "progress" and "prosperity" our knights of philistinism are so fond of presenting as the prosperity of the mass of the population. And in order to put a better complexion on this distortion, these knights majestically declare: "The peasant is a working man no less than the proletarian" (Bulgakov, II, 288). And the author expresses satisfaction at the fact that "workers' parties are more and more losing the anti-peasant tinge characteristic of them hitherto" (characteristic of them hitherto!) (289). "Hitherto", you see, they "left out of account the fact that peasant property is not an instrument of exploitation, but a condition for the application of labour". That is how history is written! Frankly, we cannot refrain from saying: Distort, gentlemen, but have a sense of measure! And the same Mr. Bulgakov has written a two-volume "study" of 800 pages chock-full of "quotations" (how correct they are we have repeatedly shown) from all sorts of inquiries, descriptions, monographs, etc. But not once, *literally not once*, has he attempted even to examine the relations between the peasants whose property is an instrument of exploitation and those peasants whose property is "simply" a condition for the application of labour. *Not once* has he presented systematic statistics (which, as we have shown, were contained in the sources he cited) concerning the types of farms, the standard of living, etc., of the peasants who hire labour, of the peasants who neither hire labour nor hire themselves out as labourers, and of the peasants who hire themselves out as labourers. More than that. We have seen that to prove the "progress of peasant farming" (peasant farming *in general*!) he has given data on the *Grossbauer* and opinions that confirm the progress of some and the impoverishment and proletarisation of others. He even sees a general "social regeneration" (*sic*!) in the rise of "well-to-do peasant farms" (II, 138; for general conclusion, cf. p. 456), as if well-to-do peasant farm were not synonymous with bourgeois, entrepreneur-peasant farm. His one attempt to extricate himself from this tangle of contradictions is the following still more entangled argument: "The peasantry, of course, does not constitute a homogeneous mass; this has been shown above [probably in his argument about such a petty detail as the industrial wage-labour performed by farmers?]; a constant struggle is here in proc-

ess between a differentiating trend and a levelling trend. But are these differences and even the antagonism of individual interests greater than those between the various strata of the working class, between urban and rural workers, between skilled and unskilled labour, between trade unionists and non-trade unionists? It is only by completely ignoring these differences within the worker estate (which cause certain investigators to see the existence of a fifth estate in addition to the fourth) that a distinction can be drawn between the allegedly homogeneous working class and the heterogeneous peasantry" (288). What a remarkably profound analysis! Confounding trade differences with class differences; confounding differences in the way of life with the different positions of the various classes in the system of social production—what better illustration is needed of the complete absence of scientific principles in the fashionable "criticism"* and of its practical tendency to obliterate, the very concept "class" and to eliminate the very idea of the class struggle. The agricultural labourer earns fifty kopeks a day; the enterprising peasant who employs day-labourers earns a ruble a day; the factory worker in the capital earns two rubles a day; the small provincial master earns one and a half rubles a day. Any more or less politically conscious worker would be able to say without difficulty to which class the representatives of these various "strata" belong, and in what direction the social activities of these various "strata"

* Let us recall the fact that reference to the *alleged* homogeneity of the working class was a favourite argument of Ed. Bernstein and of all his adherents. And as regards "differentiation", it was Mr. Struve who, in his *Critical Remarks*, profoundly observed: There is differentiation, but there is also levelling; for the objective student both these processes are of equal importance (in the same way as it made no difference to Shchedrin's objective historian whether Izyaslav defeated Yaroslav or vice versa).[86] There is a development of the money economy, but there are also reversions to natural economy. There is a development of large-scale factory production, but there is also a development of capitalist domestic industry (Bulgakov, II, 88: "*Hausindustrie* is nowhere near extinction in Germany"). An "objective" scientist must carefully gather facts and note things, "on the one hand" and "on the other", and (like Goethe's Wagner) "pass from book to book, from folio to folio" without making the least attempt to obtain a consistent view and build up a general idea of the process as a whole.

will tend. But for the representative of university science, or for the modern "Critic", this is such a profound wisdom that it is totally beyond assimilation,

VIII

GENERAL STATISTICS OF GERMAN AGRICULTURE FOR 1882 AND 1895. THE QUESTION OF THE MEDIUM FARMS

Having examined the detailed statistics of peasant farming, which are particularly important for us, because peasant farming is the centre of gravity of the modern agrarian question, let us now pass to the general statistics of German agriculture and verify the conclusions drawn from them by the "Critics". Below, in brief, are the principal returns of the censuses of 1882 and of 1895:

Groups of farms	No. of farms (thousands)		Cultivated area (1,000 hectares)		Relative numbers				Absolute increase or decrease	
					Farms		Area			
	1882	1895	1882	1895	1882	1895	1882	1895	Farms	Area
Under 2 hectares . . .	3,062	3,236	1,826	1,808	58.0	58.2	5.7	5.6	+174	− 18
2-5 hectares	981	1,016	3,190	3,286	18.6	18.3	10.0	10.1	+ 35	+ 96
5-20 "	927	999	9,158	9,722	17.6	18.0	28.7	29.9	+ 72	+564
20-100 "	281	282	9,908	9,870	5.3	5.1	31.1	30.3	+ 1	− 38
100 and over	25	25	7,787	7,832	0.5	0.4	24.5	24.1	± 0	+ 45
Totals . . .	5,276	5,558	31,869	32,518	100	100	100	100	+282	+649

Three circumstances must be examined in connection with this picture of change interpreted differently by Marxists and by the "Critics": the increase in the number of the smallest farms; the increase in latifundia, i.e., farms of one thousand hectares and over, in our table placed in the row of over one hundred hectares; and, lastly, the increase in the number of middle-peasant farms (5-20 hectares), which is the most striking fact, and the one giving rise to the most heated controversy.

The increase in the number of the smallest farms indicates an enormous increase in poverty and proletarisation; for the overwhelming majority of the owners of less than two hectares cannot obtain a livelihood from agriculture alone but must seek auxiliary employment, i.e., work for wages. Of course, there are exceptions: the cultivation of special crops, viticulture, market gardening, industrial crop cultivation, suburban farming generally, etc., render possible the existence of independent (at times even not small) farmers even on one and a half hectares. But out of a total of three million *farms*, these exceptions are quite insignificant. The fact that the mass of these small "farmers" (representing three-fifths of the total number) *are wage-labourers* is strikingly proved by the German statistics concerning the principal occupations of the farmers in the various categories. The following is a brief summary of those statistics:

Groups of farmers	Farms according to *principal* occupation (per cent)					Per cent of independent farmers with auxiliary occupations
	Independent		Non-independent labour	Other occupations	Total	
	Agriculture	Trade, etc.				
Under 2 hectares	17.4	22.5	50.3	9.8	100	26.1
2 to 5 "	72.2	16.3	8.6	2.9	100	25.5
5 to 20 "	90.8	7.0	1.1	1.1	100	15.5
20 to 100 "	96.2	2.5	0.2	1.1	100	8.8
100 and over "	93.6	1.5	0.4	4.2	100	23.5
Average	45.0	17.5	31.1	6.4	100	20.1

We see, thus, that out of the total number of German farmers only 45%, i.e., *fewer than half*, are independent with farming as their *main* occupation. And even of these independent farmers *one-fifth* (20.1 %) have auxiliary occupations. The principal occupation of 17.5% of the farmers is trading, industry, market gardening, and so forth (in these occupations they are "independent", i.e., occupy the position of masters and not of hired workers). *Almost one-third* (31.1 %) are hired workers ("not independent", employed in various branches of agriculture and industry). The principal

occupation of 6.4% of the farmers is office employment (in military service, civil service, etc.), the liberal professions, etc. Of the farmers with farms under two hectares, *one half* are hired workers; the "independent" farmers among these 3,200,000 "owners" represent a small minority, only 17.4% of the total. Of this number, 17%, *one-fourth* (26.1 %), are engaged in *auxiliary* occupations, i.e., are hired workers, not in their principal occupations (like the abovementioned 50.3%), but in their side-line occupations. Even among the farmers owning from 2-5 hectares, only a little more than half (546,000 out of 1,016,000) are independent farmers without auxiliary occupations.

We see from this how amazingly untrue is the picture presented by Mr. Bulgakov when, asserting (erroneously, as we have shown) that the total number of persons actually engaged in agriculture has grown, he explains this by the "increase in the number of independent farms—as we already know, mainly middle-peasant farms, at the expense of the big farms" (II, 133). The fact that the number of middle-peasant farms has expanded most in proportion to the total number of farms (from 17.6% to 18%, i.e., a rise of 0.4%) does not in the least prove that the increase in the agricultural population is due principally to the growth in the number of middle-peasant farms. On the question as to which category has contributed most to the general increase in the number of farms, we have direct data that leave no room for two opinions: the total number of farms has risen by 282,000, of which the number of farms under two hectares increased by 174,000. Consequently, the larger agricultural population (if and insofar as it is larger at all) is to be explained precisely by the increase in the number of non-independent farms (the bulk of the farmers with farms under two hectares not being independent). The rise is greatest in the small allotment farms, which indicates growing *proletarisation*. Even the increase (by 35,000) in the number of farms of 2-5 hectares cannot be wholly attributed to the expanded number of *independent* farms, for of those farmers only 546,000 out of the total of 1,016,000 are independent, drawing no subsidiary earnings.

Coming now to the large farms, we must note, first of all, the following characteristic fact (of utmost importance for

the refutation of all apologists): the combination of agriculture with other occupations has diverse and opposite significance for the various categories of farmers. Among the small farmers it signifies proletarisation and curtailed independence; for in this category agriculture is combined with occupations like those of hired labourers, small handicraftsmen, small traders, and so forth. Among the big farmers, it signifies either a rise in the political significance of landed proprietorship through the medium of government service, military service, etc., or the combination of agriculture with forestry and agricultural industries. As we know, the latter phenomenon is one of the most characteristic symptoms of *capitalist* advance in agriculture. That is why the percentage of farmers who regard "independent" farming as their principal occupation (who are engaged in farming as masters and not as labourers) sharply increases with the increase in the size of the farms (17-72-90-96%), but drops to 93% in the category of farms of 100 hectares and over. In this group 4.2% of the farmers regard office employment (under the heading of "other occupations") as their principal occupation; 0.4% of the farmers regard "non-independent" work as their principal occupations (what is here discussed is not hired labourers but managers, inspectors, etc., cf. *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, B. 112, *S.* 49 ★). Similarly, we see that the percentage of independent farmers who engage in auxiliary occupations sharply diminishes with the increase in the size of the farms (26-25-15-9%), but greatly increases among the farmers possessing 100 hectares and over (23%).

In regard to the number of large farms (100 hectares and over) and the area of land they occupy, the statistics given above indicate a *diminution* in their share in the total number of farms and the total area. The question arises: Does this imply that large-scale farming is being crowded out by small and middle-peasant farming, as Mr. Bulgakov hastens to assume? We think not; and by his angry thrusts at Kautsky on this point Mr. Bulgakov merely exposes his inability to refute Kautsky's opinion on the subject. In the first place, the diminution in the proportion of the large farms is extremely small (from 0.47% to 0.45%, i.e., two-hundredths of one per cent of the total number of farms,

and from 24.43% to 24.088%, i.e., 35-hundredths of one per cent of the total area). It is a generally known fact that with the intensification of farming *it is* sometimes *necessary* to make a slight reduction in the area of the farm, and that the big farmers lease small lots of land remote from the centre of the estate in order to secure labourers. We have shown above that the author of the detailed description of the large- and small-scale farms in East Prussia openly admits the auxiliary role played by small in relation to big landownership, and that he strongly advises the settlement of labourers. Secondly, there can be no talk of the elimination of large-scale by small-scale farming, for the reason that data on the *size* of farms are not yet adequate for judging the *scale of production*. The fact that in this respect large-scale farming has made considerable progress is irrefutably proved by statistics on the use of machinery (see above), and on agricultural industries (to be examined in greater detail below, since Mr. Bulgakov gives an astonishingly incorrect interpretation of the German statistics on this subject). Thirdly, in the group of farms of 100 hectares and over a prominent place is occupied by *latifundia*, i.e., farms of 1,000 hectares and over. The number of these farms has increased proportionately more than the number of middle-peasant farms, namely, from 515 to 572, or by 11%, whereas the number of middle-peasant farms has increased from 926,000 to 998,000, or by 7.8%. The area of latifundia *has increased* from 708,000 hectares to 802,000 hectares, or by 94,000 hectares. In 1882 latifundia occupied 2.22% of the total land under cultivation; by 1895 they occupied 2.46%. On this point Mr. Bulgakov, in his work, supplements the groundless objections to Kautsky he made in *Nachalo* with the following even more groundless generalisation: "An index of the decline of large-scale farming," he writes, "is ... the increase of latifundia, although the progress of agriculture and the growth of intensive farming should be accompanied by the splitting-up of farms" (II, 126). Mr. Bulgakov unconcernedly goes on to talk about the "latifundia [!] degeneration" of large-scale farming (II, 190, 363). With what remarkable logic our "scholar" reasons: *since* the diminution in the size of farms *at times*, with the intensification of farming, implies an increase in production,

therefore an increase in the number and in the area of latifundia should, *in general*, signify a decline! But since logic is so bad, why not turn for help to statistics? The source from which Mr. Bulgakov draws his information contains a mass of data on latifundia farming. We present here some of the figures: in 1895, 572 of the largest agricultural enterprises occupied an area of 1,159,674 hectares, of which 802,000 hectares were given over to agriculture and 298,000 were covered by forests (a part of these latifundia proprietors were primarily timber merchants and not farmers). Livestock of all kinds is kept by 97.9% of these farmers, and draught animals by 97.7 % . Machines are used by 555 in this group, and, as we have seen, it is in this group that the *maximum number* of cases of the use of machines of various types occurs; steam ploughs are used by 81 farms, or 14% of the total number of latifundia farms; livestock is kept as follows: 148,678 head of cattle, 55,591 horses, 703,813 sheep, and 53,543 pigs. Sixteen of these farms are combined with sugar refineries, 228 with distilleries, 6 with breweries, 16 with starch factories, and 64 with flour-mills. Intensification may be judged from the fact that 211 of these farms cultivate sugar-beet (26,000 hectares are devoted to this crop) and 302, potatoes for industrial purposes; 21 (with 1,822 cows, or 87 cows per farm) sell milk to the cities, and 204 belong to dairy co-operative societies (18,273 cows, or 89 per farm). A very strange "latifundia degeneration" indeed!

We now pass to the middle-peasant farms (5-20 hectares). The proportion they represent of the total number of farms has increased from 17.6% to 18.0% (+0.4%), and of the total area, from 28.7% to 29.9% (+1.2%). Quite naturally, every "annihilator of Marxism" regards these figures as his trump card. Mr. Bulgakov draws from them the conclusion that "large-scale farming is being crowded out by small-scale farming", that there is a "tendency towards decentralisation", and so on and so forth. We have pointed out above that precisely with respect to the "peasantry" unclassified statistics are particularly unsuitable and can more than ever lead to error; it is precisely in this sphere that the processes of the formation of small enterprises and the "progress" of the peasant bourgeoisie are most likely to

conceal the proletarisation and impoverishment of the majority. In German agriculture as a whole we see an undoubted development of large-scale capitalist farming (the growth of latifundia, the increase in the use of machinery, and the development of agricultural industries), on the one hand; on the other, there is a still more undoubted growth of proletarisation and impoverishment (flight to the cities, expanded parcellisation of the land, growth in the number of small allotment holdings, increase in auxiliary hired labour, decline in the food consumption of the small peasants, etc.). Hence, it would be clearly improbable and impossible that these processes should not be current among the "peasantry". Moreover, the detailed statistics definitely indicate these processes and confirm the opinion that data on the size of farms alone are totally inadequate in this case. Hence, Kautsky rightly pointed out, on the basis of the general state of the capitalist development of German agriculture, the incorrectness of drawing from those statistics the conclusion that small-scale production was gaining over large-scale production.

We have, however, direct data abundantly proving that the increase in the number of "middle-peasant farms" indicates an *increase in poverty* and not in wealth and prosperity. We refer to the very data on draught animals which Mr. Bulgakov utilised so clumsily both in *Nachalo* and in his book. "If this required further proof," wrote Mr. Bulgakov with reference to his assertion that medium farming was progressing and large-scale farming declining, "then to the indices of the amount of labour-power we could add the indices of the number of draught animals. Here is an eloquent table."*

	Number of farms using animals for field work		Difference
	1882	*1895*	
Under 2 hectares	325,005	306,340	—18,665
2 to 5 " . . .	733,957	725,584	— 8,383
5 to 20 " . . .	894,696	925,103	+30,407
20 to 100 " . . .	279,284	275,220	— 4,064
100 and over " . . .	24,845	24,485	— 360
Totals . . .	2,257,797	2,256,732	— 1,065

* We reproduce the table as given by Mr. Bulgakov, merely adding the totals.

"The number of farms with draught animals declined among the large as well as the small farms, and increased only among the medium farms" (*Nachalo*, No. 1, p. 20).

Mr. Bulgakov could be pardoned for having, in a hurriedly written magazine article, erred in arriving at a conclusion *diametrically opposed* to the one the statistics on draught animals logically lead to. But our "strict scientist" repeated this error in his "investigation" (Vol. II, p. 127, where, moreover, he used the figures +30,407 and —360 as applying to the number of animals, whereas they apply to the number of farms using draught animals. But that, of course, is a minor point).

We ask our "strict scientist", who talks so boldly of the "decline of large-scale farming" (II, 127): What is the significance of the increase of 30,000 in the number of middle-peasant farms with draught animals when *the total number* of middle-peasant farms increased by 72,000 (II, 124)? Is it not clear from this that the *percentage* of middle-peasant farms with draught animals is *declining*? This being the case, should not Mr. Bulgakov have ascertained *what percentage* of farms in the various categories kept draught animals in 1882 and in 1895, the more so, since the data are given on the very page, and in the very table from which he took his absolute figures (*Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, B. 112, *S.* 31★)?

The data are here given:

	Percentage of farms using draught animals		Difference
	1882	*1895*	
Under 2 hectares	10.61	9.46	— 1.15
2-5 "	74.79	71.39	— 3.40
5-20 "	96.56	92.62	— 3.94
20-100 "	99.21	97.68	— 1.53
100 and over "	99.42	97.70	— 1.72
Average	42.79	40.60	— 2.19

Thus, the farms with draught animals diminished *on the average* by over 2 per cent; but the reduction was *above the average* among the small- and middle-peasant farms, and *below the average* among the large farms.* Moreover, it

* The smallest reduction is observed among the smallest farms, only a relatively insignificant proportion of which keeps draught

must not be forgotten that "it is precisely on the large farms that animal power is frequently displaced by mechanical power in the form of machines of various kinds, including steam-driven machines (steam ploughs, etc.)" (*Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, B. 112, *S.* 32★). Therefore, if in the group of large farms (of 100 hectares and over) the number with draught animals diminished by 360, and if at the same time the number with steam ploughs *increased by 615* (710 in 1882 and 1,325 in 1895), it is clear that, taken as a whole, large-scale farming has not lost, but has benefited thereby. Consequently, we come to the conclusion that the only group of German farmers who have undoubtedly *improved* their conditions of farming (with respect to the use of animals for field work, or the substitution of steam power for animals) are the *big* farmers, with farms of 100 hectares and over. In all the remaining groups the conditions of farming have deteriorated; and *they have deteriorated most in the group of middle-peasant farms*, in which the percentage of farms using draught animals has diminished most. The difference in the percentage of large farms (of 100 hectares and over) and medium farms (of 5-20 hectares) with draught animals was formerly less than 3% (99.42 and 96.56); the difference is now more than 5% (97.70 and 92.62).

This conclusion is still more strongly confirmed by the data on the types of draught animals used. The smaller the farm, the weaker the types: a relatively smaller number of oxen and horses and a larger number of cows, which are much weaker, are used for field work. The following data show the situation in this respect for the years 1882 and 1895:

For one hundred farms using draught animals the data are:

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animal. We shall see further that it was precisely among those farms (and *only* among them) that the composition of the draught animals improved, i.e., a larger number of horses and oxen and a relatively smaller number of cows were being kept. As the authors of the German Inquiry (*S.* 32★) have rightly remarked, the farmers on the smallest allotments keep draught animals, not only for tilling the land, but also for "auxiliary work for wages". Consequently, in discussing the question of draught animals it would be erroneous to take these small allotments into account, since they are placed under altogether exceptional conditions.

	Cows only			Cows, along with horses or oxen		
	1882	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*	
Under 2 hectares . . .	83.74	82.10	— 1.64	85.21	83.95	— 1.26
2-5 " . . .	68.29	82.69	+ 1.13	72.95	74.93	+ 1.98
5-20 " . . .	18.49	20.30	+ 1.81	29.71	34.75	+ 5.04
20-100 " . . .	0.25	0.28	+ 0.03	3.42	6.02	+ 2.60
100 and over " . . .	0.00	0.03	+ 0.03	0.25	1.40	+ 1.15
Average	41.61	41.82	+ 0.21	48.18	50.48	+ 2.30

We see a general deterioration in the kind of draught animals used (for the reason indicated, the small allotment farms are not taken into account), the *greatest deterioration* occurring *in the group of middle-peasant farms*. In that group, of the total number of farms possessing draught animals, the percentage of those compelled to use *cows* as well as other animals, and of those compelled to use *cows only*, increased *most of all*. At the present time, more than one-third of the middle-peasant farms with draught animals have to use cows for field work (which, of course, leads to poorer tilling and, consequently, to a drop in the crop yield, as well as to a lower milk yield), while more than one-fifth use only cows for field work.

If we take the number of animals used for field work, we shall find in all groups (except the small allotment farms) an increase in the number of cows. The number of horses and oxen has changed as follows:

Number of Horses and Oxen Used for Field Work (Thousands)

	1882	*1895*	Difference
Under 2 hectares	62.9	69.4	+ 6.5
2-5 "	308.3	302.3	— 6.0
5-20 "	1,437.4	1,430.5	— 6.9
20-100 "	1,168.5	1,155.4	— 13.1
100 and over "	650.5	695.2	+44.7
Totals.	3,627.6	3,652.8	+25.2

With the exception of the small allotment farms, an increase in the number of draught animals proper is seen *only* among the big farmers.

Consequently, the general conclusion to be drawn from the changes in farming conditions with regard to animal and mechanical power employed for field work, is as

follows: *improvement* only among the big farmers; deterioration among the rest; the *greatest* deterioration *among the middle-peasant farms*.

The statistics for 1895 enable us to divide the middle-peasant farm group into two subgroups: with 5 to 10 hectares and with 10 to 20 hectares respectively. As was to be expected, in the first subgroup (which has by far the greater number of farms), farming conditions insofar as they affect the use of draught animals are incomparably worse than in the second. Of the total of 606,000 owners of 5-10 hectares, 90.5% possess draught animals (of the 393,000 with 10-20 hectares—95.8%), and of this number, 46.3% use cows for field work (17.9% in the 10-20 hectare group); the number using only cows amounts to 41.3% (4.2% in the 10-20 hectare group). It turns out that precisely the 5-10 hectare group, the one most poorly equipped with draught animals, shows the *greatest increase* from 1882 to 1895 both in the number of farms and in area. The relevant figures follow:

	Percentage of Total								
	Farms			Total area			Cultivated area		
	1882	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*	
5-10 hectares	10.50	10.90	+ 0.40	11.90	12.37	+ 0.47	12.26	13.02	+ 0.76
10-20 hectares	7.06	7.07	+ 0.01	16.70	16.59	— 0.11	16.48	16.88	+ 0.40

In the 10-20 hectare group the increase in the number of farms is quite insignificant. The proportion of the total area even diminished, while the proportion of the cultivated area increased to a much lesser extent than that of the farms in the 5-10 hectare group. Consequently, the increase in the middle-peasant farm group is accounted for mainly (and partly even exclusively) by the 5-10 hectare group, i.e., the very group in which farming conditions with regard to the use of draught animals are particularly bad.

Thus, we see that the statistics irrefutably reveal the true significance of the notorious increase in the number of middle-peasant farms: it is not an increase in prosperity, but *an increase in poverty*; not the progress of small farming, but *its degradation*. If the conditions of farming have deteriorated *most* among the middle-peasant farms, and if

these farms have been obliged to resort most extensively to the use of cows for field work, then, on the basis of this aspect of farming alone (one of the most important aspects of farming as a whole), it is not only our right but our duty to draw the conclusions regarding all the other aspects of farming. If the number of horseless farms (to use a term familiar to the Russian reader, and one quite applicable to the present case) has increased, if there is deterioration in the type of draught animals used, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the general maintenance of the animals and the treatment of the soil, as well as the food and the living conditions of the farmers, have likewise deteriorated; for in peasant farming, as all know, the harder the animals are worked and the worse they are fed, the harder the peasant works and the worse he is fed, and vice versa. The conclusions we drew above from Klawki's detailed study are fully confirmed by the mass data on all the small peasant farms in Germany.

IX

DAIRY FARMING AND AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES IN GERMANY. THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION IN GERMANY DIVIDED ACCORDING TO ITS POSITION IN THE ECONOMY

We have dealt in such detail with the data on draught animals because these are the only data (apart from those dealing with machinery, which we have earlier examined) that enable us to obtain an inside view, as it were, of agriculture, of its equipment and organisation. All the other data—on the amount of land (which we have cited), and the number of livestock (to be cited below)—merely describe the external aspects of agriculture, equating things that are obviously unequal, since treatment of the soil and, consequently, its yield, and the quality and productivity of livestock are different in the different categories of farms. Although these differences are well known, they are usually forgotten in statistical compilations; the data on machines and draught animals alone enable us, at least to some extent, to form a judgement of these differences and to decide

who gains (on the whole) from them. If the large farms use, to a larger extent than the rest, particularly complex and costly machines, which alone are taken into account by statistics, then it is obvious that the other types of agricultural implements, which statistics ignore (ploughs, harrows, waggons, etc.), are of a better quality, are used in larger numbers, and (because the farms are bigger) are more fully utilised on the large farms. The same applies to livestock. The small farmer must inevitably make up for the lack of these advantages by greater industry and frugality (he has no other weapons in his struggle for existence), and for this reason those qualities are not merely casual but always and inevitably distinguish the small farmer in capitalist society. The bourgeois economist (and the modern "Critic", who on this question, as on all others, drags along at the tail of the bourgeois economist) calls this the virtue of thrift, perseverance, etc. (cf. Hecht and Bulgakov), ascribing it to the peasant as a merit. The socialist calls it overwork (*Ueberarbeit*) and under-consumption (*Unterkonsumption*) and holds capitalism responsible for it; he tries to open the eyes of the peasant to the deception practised by those who deliver Manilov orations, picturing social degradation as a virtue and thereby striving to perpetuate it.

We shall now deal with the data on the distribution of livestock among the various groups of German farmers in 1882 and 1895. The following are the main summaries (in percentages of total):

	Livestock								
	(In value)			Cattle			Pigs		
	1882	*1895*	±	*1882*	*1895*	±	*1882*	*1895*	±
Under 2 hectares	9.3	9.4	+ 0.1	10.5	8.3	— 2.2	24.7	25.6	+ 0.9
2-5 "	13.1	13.5	+ 0.4	16.9	16.4	— 0.5	17.6	17.2	— 0.4
5-20 "	33.3	34.2	+ 0.9	35.7	36.5	+ 0.8	31.4	31.1	— 0.3
20-100 "	29.5	28.8	— 0.7	27.0	27.3	+ 0.3	20.6	19.6	— 1.0
100 and over "	14.8	14.1	— 0.7	9.9	11.5	+ 1.6	5.7	6.5	+ 0.8
Totals	100	100	—	100	100	—	100	100	—

Thus, the share of the total livestock owned by the large farms has diminished, whereas that of the middle-peasant farms has increased most. We speak of the total livestock, notwithstanding the fact that the statistics refer only to value, because the statisticians' assumption that the value of each animal is equal for all groups is obviously wrong.

The data on value, which make it possible to add different kinds of livestock (the result could have been obtained by expressing all the livestock in terms of cattle; but this would have entailed fresh calculations, without however, altering the conclusions materially), actually show the distribution of all livestock according to number and not according to real value. Since the livestock belonging to the big farmers is of a better quality and probably improves to a greater extent than that of the small farmers (to judge by the improvement in the implements), the figures considerably minimise the real superiority of large-scale farming.

With regard to certain types of livestock, it must be said that the diminution of the share of the large farms is entirely due to the decline in commercial sheep farming: from 1882 to 1895 the number of sheep diminished from 21,100,000 to 12,600,000, i.e., by 8,500,000; of this total diminution, farms of 20 hectares and over accounted for 7,000,000. As is known, stock raising for the dairy-product and meat markets is one of the developing branches of commercial livestock farming in Germany. For this reason we took the data on cattle and pigs, finding that the *greatest* progress in these two branches of livestock farming has been made on the large farms (of 100 hectares and over): share in the total number of cattle and pigs has increased most. This fact stands out the more for the reason that the area of livestock farms is usually smaller than that of agricultural farms and one would thus expect a more rapid development, not of large, but of middle, capitalist farms. The general conclusion to be drawn (in regard to the number, not the quality, of cattle) should be the following: the big farmers have lost most as a result of the sharp decline in commercial sheep farming, and this loss has not entirely, but only partly, been compensated by a greater increase (as compared with the small and medium farms) in the raising of cattle and pigs.

In speaking of dairy farming, we cannot ignore the extremely instructive and, as far as we know, unutilised material on this question furnished by German statistics. But this concerns the general question of combining agriculture with agricultural industries, and we are obliged to deal with it because of the amazing distortion of the facts of which Mr. Bulgakov is again guilty. As is known, the com-

bination of agriculture with the industrial processing of farm produce is one of the most outstanding characteristics of the specifically capitalist progress in agriculture. Some time back, in *Nachalo* (No. 3, p. 32), Mr. Bulgakov declared: "In my opinion, Kautsky vastly exaggerates the significance of this combination. If we take the statistics, we shall find that the amount of land connected with industry in this way is quite negligible." The argument is an extremely weak one; for Mr. Bulgakov does not dare to deny the technically progressive character of this combination. And as for the most important question, as to whether large-scale or small-scale production is the vehicle of this progress, he simply evades it. Since, however, the statistics provide a very definite reply to this question, Mr. Bulgakov resorts in his book to—*sit venia verbo*!*—cunning. He cites the percentage of farms (of all farms in general and not according to groups!) that are combined with agricultural industry in one form or another, and remarks: "It must not be supposed that they are combined principally with large farms" (II, 116). The very opposite is the case, most worthy professor: that is precisely what must be supposed; and the table you give (which does *not* show the percentage of farms combined with agricultural industries in relation to the total number of farms in *each* group) merely deceives the uninformed or inattentive reader. Below we give the combined data (to avoid filling our pages with figures) on the number of farms connected with sugar refining, distilling, starch making, brewing, and flour milling (consequently, the totals will show the number of *cases* in which agriculture is combined with agricultural industries), and we get the following picture:

	Total number of farms	Number of cases of combination with agricultural industries	
			Per cent
Under 2 hectares	3,236,367	11,364	0.01
2 to 5 "	1,016,318	13,542	1.09
5 to 20 "	998,804	25,879	2.03
20 to 100 "	281,787	8,273	2.52
100 and over "	25,061	4,006	15.72
Totals	5,558,317	63,064	1.14
Farms with 1000 hectares and over	572	330	57.69

* Save the mark!—*Ed.*

Thus, the percentage of farms in combination with agricultural industries is negligible in small-scale farming and reaches marked dimensions only in large-scale farming (and enormous dimensions on the latifundia, of which *more than half* enjoy the benefits of this combination). If this fact is compared with the above-cited data on the use of machines and draught animals, the reader will understand the pretentious nonsense of Mr. Bulgakov's aphorisms on the "illusion fostered by conservative" Marxists "that large-scale farming is the vehicle of economic progress and that small-scale farming is the vehicle of retrogression" (II, 260).

"The great bulk (of sugar-beet and potatoes for distilling alcohol!) was produced on the small farms," continues Mr. Bulgakov.

But the very opposite is the case: *it was precisely on the large farms*:

	Number of farms cultivating sugar-beets	Percentage of total number of farms in category	Area under beet (in hectares)	Per cent	Number of farms cultivating potatos for industrial purposes	Percentage of total number of farms in category
Under 2 hectares . . .	10,781	0.33	3,781	1.0	565	0.01
2-5 " . . .	21,413	2.10	12,693	3.2	947	0.09
5-20 " . . .	47,145	4.72	48,213	12.1	3,023	0.30
20-100 " . . .	26,643	9.45	97,782	24.7	4,293	1.52
100 and over " . . .	7,262	28.98	233,820	59.0	5,195	20.72
Totals	113,244	2.03	396,289	100.0	14,023	0.25
1000 hectares and over	211	36.88	26,127	—	302	52.79

Thus, we see again that the percentage of farms cultivating sugar-beet and potatoes for industrial purposes is negligible in the small-farm group, considerable in the large-farm group, and very high on the latifundia. The great bulk of the beets (83.7 per cent, judging by the area under beet) is produced on the large farms.*

* Mr. Bulgakov's sheer ... bad luck in his assertions on the processing of industrial crops is so strange that we involuntarily ask ourselves whether it may not be due to the fact that in citing the tables from the German Inquiry he *failed to see* that they do not show the

Similarly, Mr. Bulgakov failed to ascertain the "share of large-scale farming" in dairy farming (II, 117); yet this branch of commercial livestock farming is one of those that are developing with particular rapidity over the whole of Europe, as well as being one of the characteristics of the progress of agriculture. The following figures show the number of farms selling milk and dairy products to the towns:

	Number of farms	Percentage of total*	Percentage of total number of farms in group	Number of cows	Percentage of total	Number of cows per farms
Under 2 hectares	8,998	21.46	0.3	25,028	11.59	2.8
2-5 "	11,049	26.35	1.1	30,275	14.03	2.7
5-20 "	15,344	36.59	1.5	70,916	32.85	4.6
20-100 "	5,676	13.54	2.0	58,439	27.07	10.3
100 and over "	863	2.06	3.4	31,213	14.46	36.1
Totals	41,930	100.0	0.8	215,871	100.0	5.1
1000 hectares and over	21	—	3.7	1,822	—	87.0

Thus, here too, large-scale farming is in advance: the percentage of farmers engaged in the milk trade increases proportionately with the increase in the size of the farms, and it is highest on the latifundia ("latifundia degeneration"). For instance, the percentage of large farms (100 hectares and over) selling milk to the towns is more than twice that of the middle-peasant (5-20 hectare) farms (3.4 and 1.5 per cent).

The fact that the large farms (large in area) also engage in large-scale dairy farming is confirmed by the data on the number of cows per farm, viz., 36 per farm of 100 hectares

percentage of farms combined with agricultural industries *in relation to the total number of farms in the given group*. On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine that a "study" by a strict scientist could contain such a string of errors (accompanied by a string of smug conclusions). On the other hand, the identity of Mr. Bulgakov's tables with those in the German Inquiry (*S.* 40★ and 41★) is beyond doubt.... Oh those "strict scientists"!

* We have included this column so that the reader may form a clear idea of the methods employed by Mr. Bulgakov, who, for confirmation of his conclusions, refers only to this one column (taken from the above Inquiry).

and over, and even 87 on the latifundia. Generally speaking, the obviously capitalist farms (20 hectares and over) own 41.5% of the total number of cows, whose milk is sold to the towns, although these proprietors represent an insignificant percentage of the total number of farmers (5.52%), and a very small percentage of the number of farmers selling milk to the towns (15.6%). The progress of capitalist farming and the capitalist concentration of this branch of commercial livestock farming are therefore an indubitable fact.

But the concentration of dairy farming is by no means fully brought out by data on farms grouped according to area. It is clear *a priori* that there can and must be farms equal in area but unequal in regard to livestock in general, and to dairy cattle in particular. Let us, first, compare the distribution of the *total number* of cattle among the various groups of farms with the distribution of the total number of cows whose milk is sold to the towns.

	Percentage of		
	all cattle	cows whose milk is sold to towns	Difference
Under 2 hectares	8.3	11.6	+ 3.3
2 to 5 "	16.4	14.0	— 2.4
5 to 20 "	36.5	32.8	— 3.7
20 to 100 "	27.3	27.1	— 0.2
100 and over "	11.5	14.5	+ 3.0
Totals	100.0	100.0	

Thus, we see again that it is the *middle-peasant* farms which are *the worst off*; this group utilises the smallest share of its cattle for the urban milk trade (the most profitable branch of dairy farming). On the other hand, the large farms occupy a very favourable position and utilise a relatively large proportion of their cattle for the urban milk trade.* But the position of the smallest farms is most favourable of all, for they utilise the *largest* proportion of their cattle for the urban milk trade. Consequently, in this

* This difference is not to be explained by the fact that the proportion of oxen to the total number of cattle is unequal, for the percentage of oxen (at all events those used for field work) is higher on the large than on the middle-peasant farms.

group, special "milk" farms are developing on which agriculture is forced into the background, or even abandoned altogether (out of 8,998 farms in this group which sell milk to the towns, 471 have no arable land, and the farmers possess a total of 5,344 cows, or 11.3 cows per farm). We obtain an interesting picture of the concentration of dairy farming within one and the same group according to area of tilled land if, with the aid of the German statistics, we single out the farms with one and with two cows each:

Farms Selling Dairy Products to the Towns

	Number of farms	Farms with one cow	Farms with two cows	Farms with three cows or more			Total number of cows
				Number of farms	Number of cows	Cows per farm	
Under 50 *ares*	1,944	722	372	850	9,787	11.5	11,255
50 *ares* to 2 hectares . .	7,054	3,302	2,552	1,200	5,367	4.5	13,773
0 to 2 hectares.	8,998	4,024	2,924	2,050	15,156	7.4	25,028
2 to 5 "	11,049	1,862	4,497	4,690	19,419	4.3	30,275

Among the farms with a negligible amount of agricultural land (0-0.5 hectares) we see an enormous concentration of dairy farming: fewer than one half of these farmers (850 out of 1,944) concentrate in their hands almost nine-tenths of the total number of cows in this group (9,789 out of 11,255), with an average of 11.5 cows per farm. These are by no means "small" farmers; they are farmers having a turnover in all probability (especially those adjacent to big cities) of several thousand marks per annum, and it is doubtful whether they can manage without hired labour. The rapid growth of the towns causes a steady increase in the number of such "dairy farmers", and, of course, there will always be the Hechts, Davids, Hertzes, and Chernovs to console the mass of the small peasants crushed by poverty with the example of isolated cases of their fellow-farmers who have "got on in the world" by means of dairy farming, tobacco cultivation, and so forth.

In the 0.5-2 hectare group of farms we see that fewer than one-fifth of the total number of farmers (1,200 out of 7,054) concentrate in their hands over two-fifths of the total number of cows (5,367 out of 13,773); in the 2-5 hectare

group, fewer than one half of the farmers (4,690 out of 11,049) concentrate in their hands more than three-fifths of the total number of cows (19,419 out of 30,275), and so on. Unfortunately, the German statistics do not enable us to classify the groups with a larger number of cows.* But even the data presented fully confirm the general conclusion that *the concentration of capitalist agriculture is in reality much greater* than the data on area alone would lead us to suppose. The latter combine in one group farms small in area and producing small quantities of grain with farms producing dairy products, meat, grapes, tobacco, vegetables, etc., on a large scale. Of course, all these branches occupy a far inferior place as compared with the production of grain, and certain *general* conclusions hold good also in regard to statistics relating to area. But, in the first place, certain special branches of commercial agriculture are growing with

* To be more exact, the manner in which the German data *are grouped* does not enable us to do this; for the authors of the Inquiry had the data for each farm separately (on the basis of the replies listed in the questionnaires sent out to the farmers). In passing, we would state that this practice of gathering information from each farm separately adopted by German agricultural statistics is superior to the French method and apparently also to the English and other methods. Such a system enables us to classify the various types of farms not only according to area but also according to scale of farming (dairy farming, for example), according to the extent of use of machinery, degree of development of agricultural industries, and so forth. But this system requires a more thorough classification of the statistical data. First, the farms must be classified, not only according to one single feature (extent of area), but according to several features (number of machines, livestock, area of land under special crops, and so forth). Secondly, combined classifications must be made, i.e., the division of each group, classified according to area, into subgroups according to numbers of livestock, etc. Russian Zemstvo statistics on peasant farming can and should serve as a model in this respect. While German government statistics are superior to Russian *government* statistics in their fullness and comprehensiveness, in their uniformity and exactness, and in the rapidity of their preparation and publication, our *Zemstvo* statistics are superior to the European partial inquiries and investigations because of the remarkable fullness and detailed analysis of certain particular data. Russian Zemstvo statistics have for a long time included surveys of individual farms and presented various group tables and the combined tables we have mentioned. A close study of Russian Zemstvo statistics by Europeans would no doubt give a strong impetus to the progress of social statistics generally.

particular rapidity in Europe, constituting a distinguishing feature of its *capitalist* evolution. Secondly, the circumstance referred to is frequently forgotten with reference to certain examples, or to certain districts, and this opens a wide field for petty-bourgeois apologetics, samples of which were presented by Hecht, David, Hertz, and Chernov. They referred to tobacco growers, who, judged by the size of their farms, are *echte und rechte Kleinbauern*,* but, if judged by the extent of their tobacco plantations, are by no means "small" farmers. Moreover, if we examine the data on tobacco growing separately, we shall find capitalist concentration in this area also. For instance, the total number of tobacco growers in Germany in 1898 was estimated at 139,000, with a cultivation of 17,600 hectares of tobacco land. But of these 139,000, some 88,000, or 63 per cent, together owned not more than 3,300 hectares, i.e., only one-fifth of the total area of land under tobacco. The other four-fifths were in the hands of 37% of the tobacco growers.**

The same applies to grape growing. As a general rule, the area of the "average" vineyard, in Germany, for example, is very small: 0.36 hectares (344,850 growers and 126,109 hectares of vineyards). But the vineyards are distributed as follows: 49% of the growers (with 20 or fewer *ares* of vineyards) have only 13% of the total area of vineyards; the "middle" growers (20-50 *ares*), representing 30% of the total, hold 26% of the total area of vineyards, whereas the big

* Genuine small peasants.—*Ed.*

** *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse des 19. Jrhd.* (*German National Economy at the End of the Nineteenth Century.—Ed.*), Berlin, 1900, *S.* 60. This is a very rough computation based on the fiscal returns. For Russia, we have the following data on the distribution of tobacco growing in three uyezds of Poltava Gubernia: of the total of 25,089 peasant farms growing tobacco, 3,015 farms (less than one-eighth) have 74,565 dessiatines under grain out of a total of 146,774 dessiatines, or more than one half, and 3,239 dessiatines under tobacco out of a total of 6,844 dessiatines, or nearly one half. By grouping these farms according to the tobacco area we get the following: 324 farms (out of 25,089) have two or more dessiatines, comprising a total of 2,360 out of 6,844 dessiatines. These belong to the big capitalist tobacco planters, notorious for their outrageous exploitation of the workers. Only 2,773 farms (a little more than one-tenth) had over half a dessiatine each under tobacco, comprising altogether 4,145 out of 6,844 dessiatines under tobacco. See *A Review of Tobacco Growing in Russia*, Issues II and III, St. Petersburg, 1894.

growers (half a hectare and over), representing 20% of the total, hold 61 % of the total area of vineyards, or more than three-fifths.* Still more concentrated is market gardening (*Kunst- und Handelsgärtnerei*), which is rapidly developing in all capitalist countries in direct dependence on the growth of large cities, big railroad stations, industrial settlements, etc. The number of market gardening enterprises in Germany in 1895 is estimated at 32,540, with an area of 23,570 hectares, or an average of less than one hectare each. But more than half of this area (51.39%) is concentrated in the hands of 1,932 proprietors, or 5.94% of all the market gardeners. The size of the market gardens and the area of the rest of the land the big farmers utilise for agriculture can be judged from the following figures: 1,441 market gardeners have vegetable gardens ranging from two to five hectares, making an average of 2.76 hectares per vegetable farm, and total land amounting to an average of 109.6 hectares per farm; 491 farmers have vegetable gardens of five hectares and over, making an average of 16.54 hectares per farm, and total land amounting to an average of 134.7 hectares per farm.

Let us return to dairy farming, the data on which help us to judge the significance of co-operative societies, which Hertz regards as a panacea for the evils of capitalism. Hertz is of the opinion that "the principal task of socialism" is to support these co-operative societies (op. cit., *S*. 21, Russian translation, p. 62; *S*. 89, Russian translation, p. 214), and Mr. Chernov, who, as might be expected, bruises his forehead in the act of ardent prostration before the new gods, has invented a theory of the "non-capitalist evolution of agriculture" with the aid of co-operative societies. We shall have a word or two to say on the theoretical significance of this sort of remarkable discovery. For the moment, we shall note that the worshippers of co-operative societies

* It is of interest to note that in France, where vine growing is incomparably more developed than in Germany (1,800,500 hectares), the concentration of vineyards is also more considerable. However, we have only the general statistics on area to enable us to form a judgement; for in France data are not gathered on individual farms, and the actual number of growers is unknown. In Germany 12.83% of the total vineyards belong to growers owning ten or more hectares of land. In France, however, 57.02% of the vineyards belong to this category of growers.

are always eager to talk of what it is "possible" to achieve by co-operative societies (cf. the instance given above). We, however, prefer to show what is actually achieved by the aid of co-operative societies under the present capitalist system. On the occasion of the census of enterprises and occupations in Germany in 1895 a register was made of all farms participating in co-operatives for the sale of dairy products (*Molkereigenossenschaften und Sammelmolkereien*), as well as of the number of cows from which each farmer obtained milk and milk products for sale. As far as we know, those are perhaps the only *mass* data that determine with precision, not only the extent to which farmers of various categories participate in co-operative societies, but, what is particularly important, the economic, so to speak, extent of this participation, viz., the size of the particular branch of each farm in the co-operative society (the number of cows providing products for sale organised by co-operative societies). We cite the figures, divided into the five principal groups according to area of farms:

Farms Participating in Co-operative Societies for the Sale of Dairy Products

	Number of such farms	Percentage of farms in given category	Percentage of farms in all categories*	Number of cows on such farms	Percentage of total number of cows		Average number of cows per farm
Under 2 hectares . .	10,300	0.3	6.95	18,556	1.71		1.8
2-5 " . .	31,819	3.1	21.49	73,156	6.76		2.3
5-20 " . .	53,597	5.4	36.19	211,236	19.51		3.9
20-100 " . .	43,561	15.4	29.42	418,563	38.65	72.02	9.6
100 and over " . .	8,805	35.1	5.95	361,435	33.37		41.0
Totals . . .	148,082	2.7	100	1,082,946	100		7.3
1000 hectares and over	204	35.6	—	18.273	—		89.0

Thus, only an insignificant minority (3-5%) of the small farmers participate in co-operative societies—in all probability an even smaller percentage than that of capitalist farms in the lower groups. On the other hand, the percentage

* Mr. Bulgakov stated: "The share of large-scale farming will be seen from the following figures" (II, 117) and he cited *only* these figures, which do not reveal "the share of large-scale farming, but (unless compared with other data) rather serve *to obscure* it.

of the large, obviously capitalist, farms which participate in co-operative societies is from three to seven times greater than that of even the middle-peasant farms. The percentage of the latifundia participating in co-operatives is largest of all. We can now form an idea of the boundless naïveté of the Austrian Voroshilov, Hertz, who, in retorting to Kautsky, states that the "German Agricultural Co-operative Wholesale Society [*Bezugsvereinigung*], with which the largest co-operative societies are affiliated, represents *1,050,000 farmers*" (*S*. 112, Russian translation, p. 267, Hertz' italics) from which he concludes that *this means* that not only big farmers (holding more than 20 hectares, who number 306,000) participate in these co-operatives, but peasants too! Hertz had only to ponder a little over his own assumption (that *all* the large farms participate in co-operatives), in order to realise that if all big farmers are members of co-operative societies, this *implies* that of the rest a *smaller percentage* participate in them, which means that Kautsky's conclusion concerning *the superiority of large-scale over small-scale farming even with respect to co-operative organisation* is fully confirmed.

But still more interesting are the data on the number of cows furnishing the products, the sale of which is organised by the co-operatives. The *overwhelming majority* of these cows, *almost three-fourths* (72%), belong to big farmers engaged in *capitalist dairy farming* and owning ten, forty, and (on the latifundia) even eighty cows per farm. And now let us listen to Hertz. "We assert that *co-operative societies bring most benefit to the small and smallest farmers...*" (op. cit., *S*. 112, Russian translation, p. 269, Hertz' italics). The Voroshilovs are alike everywhere: be it in Russia or in Austria. When the Voroshilovs beat their breasts and exclaim vehemently, "We assert", we can be quite sure that they are asserting that which is not.

To conclude our review of German agrarian statistics, let us examine briefly the general situation in regard to the distribution of the agricultural population according to its position in the economy. Of course, we take agriculture proper (A 1, and not A 1 to 6, according to the German nomenclature, i.e., we do not include among the agriculturists fishermen, lumbermen, and hunters); we then take the

data on persons for whom agriculture is the *principal occupation*. German statistics divide this population into three main groups: (a) independent (viz., farmer owners, tenant farmers, etc.), (b) non-manual employees (managers, foremen, supervisors, office clerks, etc.), and (c) labourers. The last-named group is split up into the following four subgroups: (c^1) "members of families employed on a farm belonging to the head of the family—father, brother, etc.," in other words, labourers that are members of the family, as distinct from hired labourers, to which category all the other subgroups of group c belong. Clearly, therefore, in order to study the social composition of the population (and its capitalist evolution), the labourers that are members of the family must not be grouped with the hired labourers, as is usually done, but with the farmers in group *a*; for they are in fact the farmers' partners, enjoying right of inheritance, etc. Other subgroups are: (c^2) agricultural labourers, men and women (*Knechte und Mägde*), and (c^3) "agricultural day-labourers and other labourers (shepherds, herdsmen) owning or renting land". Consequently, the last-named subgroup consists of persons who are at the same time farmers and wage-labourers, i.e., an intermediate and transitional group which should be placed in a special category. Finally, there is the subgroup (c^4) "ditto—neither owning nor renting land". In this way, we obtain three main groups: I. Farmers—owners of land and the members of their families. II. Farmers—owners of land and at the same time wage-labourers. III. Wage-workers not owning land (non-manual employees, labourers, and day-labourers). The following table illustrates the manner in which the rural population* of Ger-

* We speak only of the "active" population (as the French term it; in German, *erwerbsthätige*), i.e., those actually engaged in agriculture, not including domestic servants and those members of families who are not regularly and permanently engaged in agricultural work. Russian social statistics are so undeveloped that we still find lacking a special term like "*active*", "*erwerbsthätig*", "*occupied*". Yanson, in his analysis of the data on the occupations of the population of St. Petersburg (*St. Petersburg According to the Census of 1890*), employs the term "independent"; but this is not a suitable term, for it usually implies masters, and, consequently, division according to participation or non-participation in industrial activity (in the broad sense of the term) is confused with division according to the position occupied in industry (individual self-employed workman).

many was distributed among these groups in the years 1882 and 1895:

	Active (self-employed) population engaged in agriculture as the main occupation (thousands)			
	1882	*1895*		
(a) Farm owners	2,253	2,522	+ 269	
(c^1) Members of farmers' families	1,935	1,899	— 36	
I.	4,188	4,421	+ 233	+5.6%
(c^2) Labourers with allotments (II)	866	383	— 483	—55.8%
I + II	5,004	4,804	— 250	
(b) Non-manual employees	47	77	+ 30	
(c^3) Labourers	1,589	1,719	+ 130	
(c^4) Labourers without allotments .	1,374	1,445	+ 71	
III	3,010	3,241	+ 231	+ 7.7%
Totals . . .	8,064	8,045	— 19	— 0.2%

Thus, the active population has diminished, although only slightly. Among this population we see a diminution in the landowning section (I+II) and an increase in the landless section (III). This clearly shows that *the expropriation of the rural population is progressing*, and that it is precisely the small landowners who are being expropriated; for we know by now that the wage-labourers with small plots of land belong to the group of smallest farmers. Furthermore, of the persons owning land, the number of farmer-labourers is diminishing, while the number of farmers is increasing. We see, therefore, *the disappearance of middle groups and the growth of the extreme groups*: the intermediary group is disappearing; *capitalist contradictions* are becoming *more acute*. Of the wage-labourers there is an increase in the number of those entirely expropriated, while the number owning land is diminishing. Of the farmers there is an increase in the number directly owning enterprises, while

The term "productive population" could be used, but even that would be inexact, for the military, rentier, and similar classes are not at all "productive". Perhaps the most suitable term would be "self-employed" population, viz., those engaged in some "trade" or other occupation (= producing an income) as distinct from those who live at the expense of those "self-employed".

the number employed in the enterprises of heads of families is diminishing. (In all probability the latter circumstance is due to the fact that in the majority of cases working members of peasant families receive no pay whatever from the head of the family and for that reason are particularly prone to migrate to the cities.)

If we take the data on the population for whom agriculture is an *auxiliary* occupation, we shall see that this (active or self-employed) population increased from 3,144,000 to 3,578,000, i.e., by 434,000. This increase is almost entirely due to the growth in the number of working members of farmers' families, which expanded by 397,000 (from 664,000 to 1,061,000). The number of farmers increased by 40,000 (from 2,120,000 to 2,160,000); the number of labourers owning land increased by 51,000 (from 9,000 to 60,000); while the number of landless labourers diminished by 54,000 (from 351,000 to 297,000). This enormous increase from 664,000 to 1,061,000, or 59.8% in the course of 13 years, is further evidence of the growth of proletarisation—the growth of the number of *peasant*s, members of peasants' families, who have come to regard agriculture merely as an *auxiliary* occupation. We know that in those cases the principal occupation is working for wages (next in importance being petty trading, handicraft, etc.). If we combine the numbers of all working members of peasant families—those for whom agriculture is the principal occupation and those for whom it is merely an auxiliary occupation—we shall get the following: 1882—2,559,000; 1895—2,960,000. This increase may easily provide occasion for erroneous interpretations and apologetic conclusions, especially if it is compared with the number of wage-labourers, which, on the whole, is diminishing. Actually, the general increase is obtained by the *diminution* in the number of working members of peasant families for whom agriculture is the principal occupation and by the *increase* in the number for whom it is an auxiliary occupation; the latter amounted in 1882 to only 21.7% of the total number of working members of peasant families, whereas in 1895 they amounted to 35.8%. Thus, the statistics covering the *entire* agricultural population distinctly reveal to us the two processes of proletarisation to which orthodox Marxism has always pointed, and

which opportunist critics have always tried to obscure by stereotyped phrases. These processes are: on the one hand, the growing separation of the peasantry from the land, the expropriation of the rural population, which either moves to the towns or is turned from landowning labourers into landless labourers; on the other hand, the development of "auxiliary employment" among the peasantry, i.e., the combination of agriculture with industry, which marks the first stage of proletarisation and always leads to increased poverty (longer working day, malnutrition, etc.). Regarded only from the external aspect, these two processes, to a certain extent, even tend in opposite directions: an increase in the number of landless labourers and an increase in the number of working members of peasant landowning families. For this reason, to confound the two processes, or to ignore either of them, may easily lead to the crudest blunders, numerous examples of which are scattered through Bulgakov's work.[87] Finally, the occupational statistics reveal to us a remarkable increase in the number of non-manual employees,* from 47,000 to 77,000, or 63.8%. Simultaneously with the growth of proletarisation, there is a growth of large-scale capitalist production, which requires non-manual employees to a degree rising in proportion to the increase in the use of machinery and the development of agricultural industries.

Thus, notwithstanding his vaunted "details", Mr. Bulgakov proved unable to grasp the German data. In the occupational statistics he merely saw an increase in the number of landless labourers and a diminution in the number of landowning labourers, which he took to be an index of the "changes that have taken place in the organisation of agricultural labour" (II, 106). But these changes in the organisation of labour in German agriculture as a whole have remained for him a fortuitous and inexplicable fact, in no way connected with the general structure and evolution of agricultural capitalism. In reality, it is only one of the aspects of the process of capitalist development. Mr. Bulgakov's

* In regard to this fact Mr. Bulgakov delivered himself in *Nachalo* of the banal joke, "The increase in the number of officers in a dwindling army". A vulgarised view of the organisation of labour in large-scale production!

opinion notwithstanding, the technical progress of German agriculture is first and foremost the progress of large-scale production, as has been irrefutably proved by statistics relating to the use of machinery, the percentage of enterprises using draught animals and the type used, the development of industries connected with agriculture, the growth of dairy farming, and so forth. Inseverably connected with the progress of large-scale production are the growth of the proletarisation and expropriation of the rural population; the expanding number of small allotment farms and of peasants whose principal source of livelihood is auxiliary occupations; the increased poverty among the middle-peasant population, whose farming conditions have deteriorated most (the largest increase in the percentage of horseless farms and in the percentage of farms using cows for field work), and, consequently, whose general living conditions and quality of land cultivation have undergone greatest deterioration.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE "UNITY" CONFERENCE OF R.S.D.L.P. ORGANISATIONS ABROAD

SEPTEMBER 21-22 (OCTOBER 4-5), 1901 [88]

1

SPEECH DELIVERED ON SEPTEMBER 21 (OCTOBER 4)

(NOTE FROM THE MINUTES)

Comrades!

Let us begin with the point on which the success of the conference depends.

As a representative of *Iskra* I consider it necessary to touch on the history of our attitude to the other organisations. *Iskra* has been completely independent from its very inception, recognising only ideological connections with Russian Social-Democracy and functioning on instructions from many comrades in Russia. In its first issue *Iskra* declared that it would not deal with the organisational differences that had arisen in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad[89] and attached the greatest importance to its position on matters of principle.*

Some members of the Union Abroad proposed that we hold a conference to come to an agreement with the organisations abroad. We understood the proposal to mean that a group in the Union was in agreement with our principles, which made it possible that the Union would also accept them. The revolutionary organisation *Sotsial-Demokrat*,[90] voiced agreement, notwithstanding considerable organisational differences, as well as differences on principle. The Union, unfortunately, refused to negotiate. When a new group of initiators[91] appeared, the Union consented to the negotiations. Since the Union had no distinct physiognomy and since a new trend towards revolutionary Marxism had manifested itself within it it was to be hoped that an agreement

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 378-79.—*Ed.*

on principle would be possible. *Iskra* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* again consented, and the Geneva Conference was held. At the beginning of our session Comrade Kruglov read the conference resolution without any comments. No one from the Union took the floor in opposition.

We affirm that in its tenth issue, *Rabocheye Dyelo* made a decisive break with the traditions of revolutionary Marxism and opposed the agreement on principles elaborated at the Geneva Conference, with whose tendencies the Union is apparently in agreement.

In view of this, my criticism will be directed against the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, and not against the entire Union.

Let us compare the Geneva resolution with the articles in issue No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

The Geneva resolution astonishes one by its amazing detail and its stressing of points that are considered generally known.

Point 1 of the agreement on principles reads: "Accepting the basic principles of scientific socialism and acting in solidarity with international revolutionary Social-Democracy, we reject all attempts to introduce opportunism into the class struggle of the proletariat—attempts that find expression in so-called Economism, Bernsteinism, Millerandism,[92] etc." Here there is an obvious allusion to something; obviously a struggle was taking place between opportunism and revolutionary Marxism. Whatever the contents of issue No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* may be, it cannot, in any event, destroy the historical fact that the Geneva Conference took place and that the resolution it adopted can serve as a basis for unification. In its third point, for instance, the Geneva resolution recognises that Social-Democracy should assume leadership in the struggle for democracy. Apparently there were previous differences of opinion on this point, too. In its effort to keep well away from opportunism, the resolution descends almost to the ridiculous. (See Point "e", in Paragraph 5.) It follows, therefore, that there were differences even on such elementary questions. Now let us compare that resolution with the articles in *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10). Unfortunately I have had the articles at my disposal for three days only, not more than enough for a cursory examination.

These articles give a detailed explanation of the difference in our views; there are some just remarks addressed to *Zarya* and *Iskra* which we shall turn to account. But that is not what concerns us at the moment; we are concerned with the principles underlying the articles. The position on principle adopted by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10) contradicts the position adopted by the Union delegates at the Geneva Conference. It is impossible to reconcile these two positions. It is necessary to reveal the differences contained in them in order to know on what basis the Union takes its stand, in order to know whether it is possible to effect ideological unity, without which organisational unity would be meaningless; we have not sought and could not seek such unity. On pages 32 and 33 of issue No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* the author of the article demurs at the contraposing of Mountain and Gironde in international Social-Democracy.[93] Look but at the Geneva Conference—does it not represent a clash between the Mountain and the Gironde? Does not *Iskra* represent the Mountain? Did not *Iskra* in its very first editorial declare itself against organisational unity prior to the demarcation of ideological boundaries? In *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, it is stated that even the most rabid Bernsteinians take a stand on the basis of class interests. The resolution makes special mention of Bernsteinism, to refute which the delegates at the conference devoted considerable effort; and now, in the articles of *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10), the same old fare is rehashed. What is this, a challenge or a sneer? To what end the effort we put forth? People are simply laughing at our pains to elaborate a theoretical basis. We must not forget that without a common ideological basis there can be no question of unity. In the same article, moreover, we get the prospect of a widened scope of our differences. On page 33, for example, the author writes: "Perhaps our differences arise out of different interpretations of Marxism?" Again, I ask, to what end the effort we put forth?

Point "c" of Paragraph 4 of the Geneva resolution speaks of the necessity to struggle against all opponents of revolutionary Marxism; however, we are told that perhaps, in general, we understand Marxism differently.

I must also mention that all this is accompanied by arguments on the harmfulness of fettering thought, etc., which

is precisely what all the Bernsteinians are saying. This was stated at the Lübeck *Parteitag*,[94] and it is also repeated by the followers of Jaurès,[95] while the points of the agreement say nothing about this, since the agreement was made expressly on the basis of revolutionary Marxism. Even faint manifestations of criticism would have led to a complete breach. We have met to discuss the content of the opinions and not the freedom of opinion. References to French and German models are most unfortunate. The Germans have already achieved what we are still struggling for. They have a united Social-Democracy which exercises leadership in the political struggle. Our Social-Democracy is not yet the leader of the revolutionary groups; on the contrary, there are signs of the revival of other revolutionary tendencies. In the articles in *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10), not only are there no signs of a complete break in principle with opportunism, there is even something worse—there is praise of the predominance of the spontaneous movement. I am not cavilling at words. All of us, the comrades from *Iskra*, the comrades from *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and I, are calling attention only to the basic tendencies of the articles; but those words, as the Germans say, *ins Gesicht schlagen*.* Particularly as regards these points the Geneva resolution could not be clearer. The recently emerged Workers' Party for the Political Liberation of Russia[96] chants in harmony with these publications.

Consider in the article the famous distinction between tactics-as-plan and tactics-as-process. The author says that tactics-as-plan is in contradiction to the fundamental principle of revolutionary Marxism, and he thinks that one may speak of tactics-as-"process", taken to mean the growth of the Party's tasks, which increase as the Party grows. In my opinion this is simply unwillingness to discuss. We have expended so much time and effort on the formulation of definite political tasks, and at the Geneva Conference so much was said about them; and now we are suddenly being talked to about "tactics-as-plan" and "tactics-as-process". To me this represents a return to the specific, narrow Bernsteinian product of *Rabochaya Mysl* which asserted that only that

* Offend the nostrils.—*Ed.*

struggle should be conducted which is possible, and that the possible struggle is that which is going on. We on our part maintain that only the distortion of Marxism is growing. The Geneva resolution says that no stages are necessary for the transition to political agitation, and then an article suddenly appears in which "the literature of exposure" is contraposed to the "proletarian struggle". Martynov writes about students and liberals, holding that they can worry about democratic demands themselves. We, however, think that the entire peculiarity of Russian Social-Democracy consists in the fact that the liberal democracy has not taken the initiative in the political struggle. If the liberals know better what they have to do and can do it themselves, there is nothing for us to do. The author of the article goes as far as to assume that the government will adopt concrete, administrative measures of its own accord.

As we all know, there were differences of opinion on the question of terror at the Geneva Conference. After the Conference, a part of the Union Abroad, the Bund,[97] at its conference, came out decisively against terror. On page 23, however, the author writes that we "do not wish to set ourselves against the terrorist moods". This is the sheerest opportunism.*

Published for the first time

Published according to the text of the minutes

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* The minutes break off at this point.—*Ed.*

2

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE UNION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ABROAD AT THE "UNITY" CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 21 (OCTOBER 4), 1901

1. Do all the three organisations accept, in principle, the resolution of the June Conference?

2. Is the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad willing and able so to organise publication activity as to render impossible unprincipled and opportunist deviations from revolutionary Marxism—deviations that create confusion of mind so dangerous for our movement—and to eliminate all flirting with tacit and avowed Bernsteinism, as well as servile acceptance of the elementary forms and spontaneity of the movement, which must inevitably lead to the conversion of the labour movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy?

First published in December 1901, in the pamphlet, *Documents of the "Unity" Conference*

Published according to the text in the pamphlet

FIGHTING THE FAMINE-STRICKEN

What astonishing solicitude for the famine-stricken our government is displaying! What an amazingly long circular (of August 17) the Minister of the Interior has issued to the governors of the affected gubernias! A veritable literary work, more than sixteen pages long, written by Mr. Sipyagin to explain the government's food policy in its entirety. The document was apparently published to impress the "public", as if to say: See how solicitous we are, how prompt we are with relief measures, how providential we are in organising in advance food-kitchens and all forms and phases of their activity! It must be admitted that the circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior certainly does create an impression, both by its bulk and (if one has the patience to read it through) by its contents. A frank exposition of the government's policy is always the best means for agitation against the tsarist government and, while expressing our profound gratitude to Mr. Sipyagin, we make bold to suggest that the other ministers speak more frequently of their programme in circulars published for general information.

If one has the patience to read through Mr. Sipyagin's circular to the end, we said. A great deal of patience will be required, for three-fourths, nay, nine-tenths of the circular consists of the usual official banalities. It is a rehash of things known for years and repeated a hundred times even in the "Code of Laws".[98] It is a mass of circumlocution, a detailed description of the ceremonial in the relations between Chinese mandarins; it is in the grand style of the chancelleries, with periods thirty-six lines long, in a "jargon" that makes the heart bleed for our native Russian

language. As you read deeply into this effusion, you feel as though you were in a Russian police-station with its musty walls and its all-pervading specific stench, in which the officials personify in their appearance and bearing the most case-hardened bureaucracy, while in the courtyard, visible through the window, gloomy buildings loom reminiscent of the torture chamber.

Three main points in the government's new programme attract particular attention: first, greater power is vested in the individual officials and care is taken that the bureaucratic spirit and service discipline should be strengthened and protected from any breath of fresh air; secondly, a scale of relief is fixed for the famine-stricken, viz., regulations on the rationing of bread to be given to a "needy" family; and, thirdly, despairing horror is expressed at the fact that "disloyal" persons, capable of arousing the people against the government, are rushing in to help the famine-stricken, and timely measures against such "agitation" are provided for. We shall deal with each of these points in detail.

Only a year has elapsed since the government deprived the Zemstvos of the right to manage food affairs and transferred that administration to the rural superintendents and uyezd congresses (law of June 12, 1900). Now before the law has come into force, it has been repealed by a mere circular. The reports of a number of provincial governors sufficed to convince the government that the law had become unsuitable! This makes plainly evident the worthlessness of laws that are turned out like pancakes by the St. Petersburg government departments without prior discussion on a serious level by people really informed and capable of expressing an independent opinion, and without serious intention to create a more satisfactory state of affairs, laws that are dictated by the ambition of some cunning minister eager to further his career and display his loyalty. The Zemstvo is not loyal—take the food administration out of its hands! But before this could be done it was discovered that the rural superintendents and even the uyezd congresses, consisting exclusively of government officials, were inclined to discuss matters too much. Apparently there were rural superintendents stupid enough to call famine famine and simple enough to think it necessary

to fight against the famine, and not against those who really want to help the famine-stricken; and in all probability there were officials in the uyezd congresses who were not subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and who also failed to understand the real tasks of "home politics". And so, by the mere circular of a minister a new "Central Uyezd" —no, this is not a printer's error—a "Central Uyezd Food Board" is set up, the whole purpose of which is to prevent the infiltration of disloyal persons and disloyal ideas and the commission of imprudent acts in the administration of food distribution. Thus, the Minister considers as imprudent and prohibits the "premature" compilation (i.e., not immediately before the bread distribution) of lists of the needy. It arouses, he says, "exaggerated hopes" among the people! The Central Uyezd Food Board is concentrated in the hands of *a single person*, and the Ministry recommends *the uyezd marshal of the nobility* for the post. Indeed, that official is so closely connected with the governor and performs so many police functions that he will doubtless be able to understand the true spirit of the food policy. Moreover, he is a big local landed proprietor, respected and trusted by all the landlords. A man of that type will certainly understand, as no one else will, the Minister's profound idea on the "demoralising" effects of relief given to persons "able to dispense with it". As for the gubernatorial powers, the Minister refers to this subject at the very beginning of the circular and repeats over and over again that the governor is responsible for everything, that all must obey the governor, that the governor must be able to take "special" measures, etc. To this day the governor in a Russian province has always been a real satrap upon whose pleasure the existence of any and every institution, and even of every individual, in the province "in his charge" depends; but now a real "state of war" has been established. Severity increased to an inordinate degree—in connection with famine relief! This is so truly Russian!

But greater stringency, intensified surveillance—all this demands increased expenditure on the bureaucratic machine, a fact of which the Minister has not lost sight; the uyezd marshals of the nobility, or other persons directing the Central Uyezd Food Board, will be granted "a special

sum" to cover their expenses, "concerning the approximate amount whereof Your Excellency will tender the appropriate application to me", adds the circular in its "special" jargon. In addition, further sums will be granted as follows: 1,000 rubles in a lump sum for uyezd council "office expenses"; from 1,000 to 1,500 rubles for expenses of the gubernia governor's offices. It is the offices that will have to carry on most of the activity, since famine relief will consist almost entirely of office work—how can the offices be left without the necessary funds? The offices come first, and what is left can go to the famine-stricken.

Mr. Sipyagin displays remarkable persistence and resourcefulness in devising measures for *reducing* famine relief. In the first place, he calls upon all governors to discuss which uyezds "have been affected by the harvest failure" (the final determination on this matter rests with the Ministry itself, since even governors cannot be trusted to avoid "exaggeration"!). Then follow the instructions indicating when uyezds *are not to be* regarded as affected areas: (1) if not more than one-third of its volosts* are affected; (2) if a grain shortage is usual in the uyezd and additional grain is purchased annually with subsidiary earnings; (3) if local resources are insufficient to grant relief. Here we have an example in miniature of the bureaucratic solution of the food problem—one measuring rod for all! What is the size of the population of one-third of the volosts? how seriously are they affected? have not the usual "earnings" been reduced this year by the serious industrial crisis?—all these are idle questions after the categorical "directions" of the Ministry. But the worst is still to come. The point at issue is—who is to be regarded as needy and how much relief is to be granted? Mr. Sipyagin recommends the following "approximate" computation which "has rarely been found to be greatly exaggerated". (What we fear most of all is exaggeration; we fear exaggerated hopes, we fear exaggerated loans! Famine, unemployment—all these are merely "exaggerations". Such is the idea that clearly emerges from all the ministerial reasoning.) In the first place, a test threshing is to be made to determine the "*average* yield per dessiatine in each village",

* See footnote to p. 36—*Tr.*

after which the area sown by each farmer is to be estimated. Why not also determine the size of the crop harvested by farmers of different means? The harvest of a poor peasant is smaller, and the term "average" is disadvantageous precisely to those in distress. Secondly, those who gather not less than forty-eight poods of grain per family per annum (counting twelve poods for three adults and six poods for two children) are not regarded as being in distress. This is the sort of calculation a tight-fisted kulak could be expected to make. In an ordinary year even the poorest peasant family of five or six persons consumes eighty, not forty-eight, poods of grain, whereas the middle (average) peasant family of five consumes 110 poods, as is known from surveys of peasant farming. Consequently, the tsarist government is cutting down *by one half* the amount of grain actually needed for food. Thirdly, says the circular, "this quantity [viz., forty-eight poods per family] is to be reduced by one half, in view of the fact that the worker element represents about fifty per cent of the population". The government stubbornly insists upon its standing rule that the working population must not be given relief because, as it argues, they can earn money. But the Minister has already ordered that the uyezds in which the population is normally engaged in auxiliary occupations shall not come under the heading of affected areas. Why, then, should he deprive the working population of relief for *a second time*? Everyone knows that, not only are there no opportunities for earning extra money this year, but that even the usual subsidiary earnings have declined owing to the crisis. The government itself has banished many thousands of unemployed workers from the cities to the rural areas. The experience of previous famines has shown that exclusion of the adult working population from relief leads only to the division of the existing inadequate relief between children and adults. No, the saying that "you cannot skin one ox twice" would be far too flattering for a Ministry of the Interior that in a twofold way excludes from the relief lists all who are able to work. Fourthly, this relief, totally inadequate and reduced by one half, is still further *cut down* by one-third, one-fifth, or one-tenth, "in proportion to the approximate number of well-to-do farmers having stocks left over from last year, or any other ma-

terial resources"! This is the third hide flayed from the same ox. What kind of "stock" can a peasant have if he has harvested not more than forty-eight poods of grain for his whole family? All other earnings have been taken into account twice; moreover, even the Russian peasant, with all the poverty to which government policy and exploitation by capitalists and landlords have reduced him, cannot live by bread alone. In addition to bread, he must spend money on fuel, clothes, and other food, as well as on repairs to his house. In ordinary years, as scientific inquiries into peasant farming inform us, even the poorest peasant spends *more than half* his income on requirements other than bread. If all these things are taken into account, it will be found that the Minister calculates the relief to be granted at *one-fourth or one-fifth* of what is actually needed. This is not fighting famine, it is fighting those who really want to help the famine-stricken.

The circular concludes with a regular crusade against private philanthropists. It has not infrequently been revealed, thunders Mr. Sipyagin, that certain philanthropists strive to arouse among the population "discontent with the present system and encourage the people to make totally unjustified demands on the government", that they conduct "anti-government agitation", etc. These accusations are absolutely *false*. It is well known that in 1891 leaflets were distributed by "peasant well-wishers"[99] in which the people were rightly told who their real enemy was; probably other attempts at agitation were made in connection with the famine. But there was not a single case of revolutionaries carrying on propaganda under cover of philanthropy. The vast majority of the philanthropists—this is an undoubted fact—were just philanthropists *and nothing more*. When, therefore, Mr. Sipyagin states that many of them were "persons whose political past is not irreproachable", we ask him, who among us now has an "irreproachable past"? Even "highly-placed persons" often paid tribute to the general democratic movement in their youth. Of course, we do not wish to say that to carry on agitation against the government in connection with the famine is impermissible or even undesirable. On the contrary, such agitation is always necessary, particularly in times of famine. We

merely wish to point out that Mr. Sipyagin is *straying into the realm of fiction* in trying to make it appear that his fears and anxieties are based on past experience. We wish to say that Mr. Sipyagin's statement is further proof of an old truism: the police government is afraid of even the slightest contact between the people and intellectuals that are in the least independent and honest, it fears every true and bold utterance addressed directly to the people, it suspects—and rightly so—that mere solicitude for the genuine (not imaginary) satisfaction of the people's needs is tantamount to agitation against the government; for the people see that private philanthropists sincerely desire to help them, while the tsarist government officials hamper and reduce relief, minimise the extent of the distress, impede the opening of food-kitchens, etc. Now the new circular demands that all contributions and appeals for contributions, as well as the opening of food-kitchens, "be under the control of the authorities"; it demands that all relief workers arriving in the affected areas "present themselves" to the governor, that they may choose assistants only with his consent, and that they submit to him a report of their activities! Those who desire to help the famine-stricken must submit to police officials and to the police system of curtailing relief and shamefully reducing relief rates. Whoever refuses to submit to this despicable procedure must not be allowed to carry on relief work—such is the essence of government policy. Mr. Sipyagin howls that "politically unreliable persons are eagerly taking advantage of the famine to pursue their criminal aims on the pretence of helping their neighbours", and this cry is taken up by the entire reactionary press (e.g., *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*). How horrible! To exploit the sufferings of the people for political purposes! In point of fact, what is horrible is precisely the fact that in Russia every kind of activity, *even* philanthropic work most remote from politics, inevitably brings people capable of independent thought into conflict with police tyranny and with measures of "suppression", "prohibition", "restriction", etc., etc. It is horrible that the government, under the cloak of high political considerations, pursues its Judas policy[100] of taking bread from the starving, cutting down relief to one-fifth, prohibiting everyone except police of-

ficials from approaching the starving! We repeat the call issued in *Iskra*: Organise a campaign of exposure against the police government's food policy; expose in the uncensored free press the outrages committed by local satraps, the whole avaricious tactic of curtailing relief, the miserliness and inadequacy of the relief, the despicable attempt to minimise the extent of the famine, and the shameful struggle against those who desire to help the famine-stricken! We advise all who have a grain of sincere sympathy for the people in their dire distress to take measures to bring to their knowledge the true sense and significance of the ministerial circular. It is only because of the unbounded ignorance of the people that *such* circulars do not immediately call forth an outburst of general indignation. Let the class-conscious workers who stand closest to the peasantry and to the less enlightened urban masses take the initiative in this work of exposing the government!

A REPLY TO THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE

Rabochaya Mysl, the organ of the St. Petersburg Committee (League of Struggle[101]), in its issue No. 12, published an article replying to a note in the first issue of *Iskra* on the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. Unfortunately, the reply assiduously *evades* the very essence of the controversy; such methods of discussion will never make the case clear. We have maintained and continue to maintain that *a split* has taken place in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, that the Union *broke up* into two sections after the withdrawal from the conference in 1900 of a substantial minority, including the Emancipation of Labour group,[102] which had established the Union and formerly edited all its publications. Now that the split has occurred, neither of the two sections can occupy the place formerly occupied by the old Union as a whole. The St. Petersburg Committee *does not attempt* to refute this opinion when (for some unknown reason) it speaks only of Plekhanov and not of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation and when it lets its readers know only indirectly that the St. Petersburg League of Struggle apparently denies *the fact of the split* and continues to regard one of the sections of the late Union Abroad as the whole Union.

To what end engage in a polemic if there is no desire to examine the essence of the opponent's opinion and frankly to express one's own?

To continue. We have maintained and hold to our view that the principal cause (not pretext, but cause) of the split was a difference of opinion on principles, namely, a difference between revolutionary and opportunist Social-Democracy. For this reason alone, what has happened in

the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad cannot be regarded as anything but a split in the old Union Abroad. The question arises—how does the St. Petersburg Committee regard the matter? Will it dare to deny the existence of profound differences in principle between the two sections of the late Union Abroad? We do not know, because the St. Petersburg Committee contrived to write a "reply" which does not contain *a single word* about the main question. We again ask the St. Petersburg comrades—and not only the St. Petersburg comrades—does not a polemic that evades the heart of the matter threaten to degenerate into an unpleasant wrangle? Is it, in fact, worth while engaging in a polemic if there is no desire to examine the essentials of the question and to express one's opinion definitely and without reservations, or if it is regarded as premature to do so?

Iskra, No. 9, October 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

PARTY AFFAIRS ABROAD

The foreign branch of the *Iskra* organisation has united with the *Sotsial-Demokrat* revolutionary organisation abroad, and has formed with it a single organisation under the name of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad.[103] As will be seen from its published declaration, the new organisation proposes to issue a number of propaganda and agitational pamphlets. The League is the representative of *Iskra* abroad. Thus, the organisation of revolutionary Social-Democrats abroad, led by the Emancipation of Labour group, has finally merged with the organisation grouped round our paper. As before, the Emancipation of Labour group will participate directly in editing and managing our publications.

The unification of the Russian revolutionary Social-Democratic organisations abroad was accomplished 'after their attempt to combine with the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (which issues *Rabocheye Dyelo*) had failed. Early in summer, a conference of representatives of the three organisations drafted an agreement. The basis of the agreement was provided by a number of resolutions on matters of principle, according to which the Union Abroad would put an end to all flirting with Economism and Bernsteinism, and recognise the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. There was reason to hope that unity would be accomplished; for until then the only obstacle to a *rapprochement* was the vacillation of the Union Abroad and of its organ, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, with regard to questions of principle. These hopes were not justified, since the recently published No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* contained editorial articles openly directed against the

resolutions that had been drawn up at the conference with the participation of the delegation of the Union Abroad. Apparently, the Union Abroad again swerved towards the Right Wing of our movement. In fact, at the conference of the three organisations, the Union Abroad proposed "amendments" to the above-mentioned resolutions, which clearly showed that it was reverting to its previous deviations. The other organisations felt obliged to leave the conference, and in fact did so. Apparently, our comrades of the Union Abroad are not yet sufficiently aware of the danger of the intermediary position their organisation occupies between revolutionary socialism and the opportunism that plays into the hands of the liberals. We hope that time and bitter experience will convince them of the error of their tactics. The effort observed throughout the Party, not only to work for the expansion of our movement, but also to raise its qualitative level, is the best guarantee that the much-desired unification of all our forces will be accomplished under the banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy, which our paper serves.

Iskra, No. 9, October 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

PENAL SERVITUDE REGULATIONS AND PENAL SERVITUDE SENTENCES

Once again "provisional regulations"!

This time, however, it is not disobedient students that are affected, but peasants who are guilty of starving.

On September 15, the "Provisional Regulations Governing the Participation of the Population in the Famine-Affected Areas in the Works Undertaken by Order of the Departments of Railways, Agriculture, and State Property" received the Imperial sanction and were immediately promulgated. When the Russian peasant becomes acquainted with these regulations (not from the newspapers, of course, but from personal experience), he will obtain further confirmation of the truth knocked into him during centuries of enslavement to the landlords and the officials: when the officials solemnly declare that the peasant "is to be allowed to participate" in any large or small affair, either in paying redemption money for the landlords' land, or in public works organised in connection with the famine, some new Egyptian plague must be expected.

In actuality, the entire contents of the Provisional Regulations of September 15 give the impression of being a new penal law, a supplementary regulation to the Penal Code. In the first place, the very organisation and management of the works are hemmed in with as much profound "caution" and as many bureaucratic complications as if rebels or convicts, rather than famine-stricken peasants, were being dealt with. One would imagine that the organisation of public works was the simplest thing in the world: all that is required is that the Zemstvos and other institutions be provided with funds and employ workers to

build roads, clear forests, etc. Under ordinary circumstances, this is how such works are carried out. Now, however, a new system is introduced. The rural superintendent suggests what kind of work is to be done, the governor gives his opinion, which is transmitted to the special "Conference on Food Affairs" in St. Petersburg, composed of representatives of various government departments, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of the Interior. Moreover, the general management of this work is vested in the Minister, who may appoint special representatives to act on his behalf. The St. Petersburg Committee will even fix the maximum pay for the workers, which, no doubt, means that it will see to it that the peasant is not "corrupted" by excessive pay! Apparently, the object of the Provisional Regulations of September 15 is *to hinder* public works on a large scale, precisely as the Sipyagin circular of August 17 *hindered* relief to the famine-stricken.

But still more important and more vicious are the special regulations governing the engagement of peasants for public works.

If the work is carried on "away from their place of residence" (which naturally affects the overwhelming majority of cases), the workmen must form special artels *under the surveillance of the rural superintendent*, who is to approve the overseer responsible for maintaining order. Starving peasants must not dare to elect their overseer themselves, as workmen usually do. They are placed under the command of the rural superintendent armed with the birch! The names of the members of artels are to be entered in a special list, which *takes the place of* the legal *residence permit*.... Instead of individual passports, therefore, there will be lists of artel members. The purpose of the change? *To restrict* the peasant; for, with his own passport, he could make better arrangements for himself in the new place, or leave the work more easily upon being dissatisfied.

Further, "the maintenance of order *en route* and the delivery of consignments of workmen to the work managers are entrusted to officials specially appointed by the Ministry of the Interior". Free workmen are given travelling allowances; serfs are "shipped" in listed *consignments* and "delivered" to special officials. Are not the peasants right

in regarding "public" and state work as a new form of serfdom?

Indeed, the law of September 15 reduces the starving peasants to a position close to that of serfs, not only because it deprives them of the freedom of movement. The law gives the officials the right *to deduct part of their wages* to be sent to the workmen's families "if the gubernia authorities in the district where their families reside" consider it necessary. The money the workmen earn is to be disposed of without their consent. The peasant is stupid; he cannot look after his family himself. The authorities can do that far better. Who indeed has not heard how well they cared for the peasant families in the military settlements[104]?

One thing stands in the way, however. The peasants are no longer so submissive as they were at the time of the military settlements. They may demand ordinary passports and protest against deductions from their wages without their consent! Hence, it is necessary to resort to greater stringency, and so a special clause provides that "the preservation of order among the workers in the places of work is entrusted by the order of the Ministry of the Interior, to the local rural superintendents, the officers of the special corps of gendarmerie, police officials, or persons specially appointed for the purpose". Apparently, the government *a priori* regards the starving peasants as "rebels", and, in addition to the general surveillance conducted by the entire Russian police force, to which all Russian workers are subjected, it establishes an especially strict surveillance. It is decided *beforehand* to treat the peasants with an iron hand for having dared to "exaggerate" the famine and for putting forward (as Sipyagin expressed himself in his circular) "totally unjustified demands on the government".

To avoid having dealings with the courts in the event of any expression of discontent by the workmen, the Provisional Regulations empower the officials to place workmen under arrest *for a period not exceeding three days without trial* for disturbing the peace, for failing to work conscientiously, and for failing to obey orders. A free workman must be brought before a magistrate before whom he may defend himself, and against whose sentence he may appeal; but a starving peasant may be imprisoned without trial! The only

penalty that can be inflicted upon a free working man for refusing to work is dismissal, but according to the new law, "for persistent refusal to work" the peasant *may be sent back to his home under escort*, together with thieves and bandits!

The new Provisional Regulations are in fact penal servitude regulations for the famine-stricken, regulations that sentence them to hard labour and deprivation of rights for having dared to importune the officials with requests for aid. The government has not been satisfied with depriving the Zemstvos of jurisdiction over food distribution, with prohibiting private persons from organising food-kitchens without the permission of the police, and with ordering real needs to be reduced to one-fifth; it also declares the peasant to be without rights and orders him to be punished without trial. To the constant penal servitude of a starving existence and overwork is now added the threat of penal servitude on public works.

These are the measures taken by the government with respect to the peasants. As for the workers, the punishment meted out to them is more strikingly described in the "Indictment", which appeared in our last issue, in connection with the unrest at the Obukhov Works in May. *Iskra* dealt with these events in its June and July issues. The legal press was silent about the trial, probably remembering how even the most loyal *Novoye Vremya* "suffered" for attempting to write on this subject. A few lines appeared in the press to the effect that the trial had taken place at the end of September; subsequently one of the southern newspapers casually reported the verdict: two were sentenced *to penal servitude*, eight were acquitted, the rest were sentenced to imprisonment and detention in houses of correction for terms ranging from two to three and a half years.

Thus, in the article, "Another Massacre" (*Iskra*, No. 5),* we underestimated the vindictiveness of the Russian Government. We believed that in the struggle it had recourse to military reprisals as a last resort, fearing to appeal to the courts. It turns out, however, that it managed to combine one with the other: after assaulting the crowd and killing

* See present volume, pp. 25-30.—*Ed.*

three workers, thirty-seven men out of several thousand were seized and sentenced to Draconic punishments.

From the indictment we are able to judge to some extent the manner in which they were seized and tried. Anton Ivanovich Yermakov, Yephraim Stepanovich Dakhin, and Anton Ivanovich Gavrilov are charged with being the ringleaders. The indictment states that Yermakov had leaflets at his house (according to the evidence of Mikhailova, an assistant in a government liquor shop, *who*, *however*, *was not called upon to testify at the trial*), that he talked about the struggle for political liberty, and that on April 22 he went to Nevsky Prospekt with a red flag. Further it is stressed that Gavrilov, too, possessed and distributed leaflets calling for a demonstration on April 22. In regard to the accused Yakovleva, the charge is likewise that she participated in certain secret gatherings. It is clear, therefore, that the prosecutor sought to single out as ringleaders those whom the secret police suspected of being politically active workers. The political character of the case is apparent also from the fact that the crowd shouted, "We want liberty!" and from the connection with the First of May. It should be said in passing that it was the dismissal of twenty-six men for "losing time" on the First of May that set off the conflagration; but the prosecutor, of course, said not a word about the *illegality* of the dismissals!

The case is clear. Those suspected of being political enemies were made to stand trial. The secret police submitted the list. And the police "confirmed", of course, that these persons had been in the crowd, thrown stones, and stood out among the rest.

The trial was used as a shameful cloak for the second act of political vengeance (following the massacre). Politics were mentioned in order to make the case appear more serious, but no explanation of the political circumstances connected with the case was allowed. The men were tried as criminals, according to Article 263 of the Criminal Code, viz., on the charge of "overt rebellion against the authorities appointed by the government", rebellion, moreover, by armed persons (?). The charge was *a frame-up*. The police had instructed the judges to examine only one side of the case.

We wish to point out that according to Articles 263-265 of the Code, a sentence of penal servitude may be imposed for participation in a demonstration of *any* kind: for "overt rebellion for the purpose of preventing the execution of the orders and measures prescribed by the government", even if the "rebels" were not armed, and even if they did not commit any overt act of violence! Russian laws mete out sentences of penal servitude with a free hand. It is time we saw to it that every such trial *is converted* into a political trial by the accused themselves, so that the government shall not dare in the future to conceal its political vindictiveness by the farce of a criminal trial!

Yet what "progress", indeed, is to be observed in the administration of justice as compared, for example, with 1885! Then the weavers in the Morozov mills[105] were tried before a judge and a jury, full reports of the trial appeared in the press, and at the trial workers came forward as witnesses and exposed the outrageous conduct of the employer. But now—a court consisting of officials sitting with representatives of the social-estates without an opinion of their own, a trial behind closed doors, dumb silence on the part of the press, hand-picked witnesses: factory officials; watchmen; policemen, who have beaten the people; soldiers, who have shot down the workers. What a despicable farce!

If we compare the "progress" made in the reprisals against the workers between the years 1885 and 1901 with the "progress" made in the struggle against the famine-stricken between the years 1891 and 1901, we obtain some idea of the rapid spread of popular indignation in extent and in depth, and of the rising fury of the government, which is "clamping down" on both private philanthropists and the peasants, and is terrorising the workers with penal servitude. But threats of penal servitude will not terrify workers whose leaders showed no fear of death in open street battles with the myrmidons of the tsar. The memory of our heroic comrades murdered and tortured to death in prison will increase tenfold the strength of the new fighters and will rouse thousands to rally to their aid, and like the eighteen-year-old Marfa Yakovleva, they will openly say: "We stand by our brothers!" In addition to reprisals by the police and the military against participants in demonstra-

tions, the government intends to prosecute them for rebellion; we will retaliate by uniting our revolutionary forces and winning over to our side all who are oppressed by the tyranny of tsarism, and by systematically preparing for the uprising of the whole people!

Iskra, No. 10, November 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

REVIEW OF HOME AFFAIRS

Written in October 1901

First published in December 1901, in *Zarya*, No. 2-3
Signed: *T. Kh.*

Published according to the *Zarya* text

I. FAMINE[106]

Again famine! The last ten years have been marked, not only by the ruin of the peasantry, but by its veritable extinction, which has proceeded with such an astonishing rapidity that no war, however prolonged and bitter, has claimed such a host of victims. The most powerful forces of modern times are massed against the peasant: world capitalism, which is developing at an ever increasing rate, has created transoceanic competition, and has provided the small minority of farmers able to hold out in the desperate struggle for survival with the most improved methods and implements of production; and the militarist state, whose adventurous policy in its colonial possessions in the Far East and Central Asia involves enormous costs heavily burdening the masses of working people, the state which, in addition, is organising at the people's expense ever newer "suppression" and "restraints" to counteract the growing discontent and indignation of the masses.

Since famine has become a usual phenomenon in our country, it would be natural to expect that the government would try to fix and strengthen its usual food distribution policy. While in 1891-92 the government was caught unawares and was at first thrown into consternation, now, however, it is rich in experience and knows precisely where (and how) to proceed. In its July issue (No. 6), *Iskra* wrote: "At this moment a black cloud of people's distress is threatening our country and the government is once again making preparations for the exercise of its disgraceful function of brute violence to deprive the starving people of bread and punish everyone who, contrary to government policy, renders aid to the hungry."

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The government's preparations were swift and determined. The spirit in which they were made is illustrated by the Elizavetgrad affair. Prince Obolensky, Governor of Kherson Gubernia, immediately declared war upon all who dared to write or speak about the famine in Elizavetgrad, appeal for public aid for the famine-stricken, form private groups, and invite private persons to organise this aid. The Zemstvo doctors wrote to the newspapers stating that famine was raging in the uyezd, that the people were disease-stricken and were dying, and that the "bread" they were eating was something unbelievable, not deserving to be called bread. The governor launched a polemic against the doctors and published official denials. Anyone at all acquainted with the general conditions under which our press has to work, anyone who will take the trouble to recall the severe persecution to which even moderate organs and incomparably more moderate authors have been subjected recently, will understand the significance of this "polemic" between the head of a gubernia and mere Zemstvo doctors who are not even in government service. It was simply an act of gagging them, an outright declaration without any ceremony that the government would not tolerate the truth about the famine. But what is a mere declaration? Whatever may be said of others, the Russian Government certainly cannot be reproached with restricting itself to mere declarations when the opportunity exists to "apply power". And Prince Obolensky hastened to apply power; he appeared personally on the scene of war—war upon the famine-stricken and upon those who, though not on the pay roll of any department, desired to render *real* aid to the famine-stricken; and he *prohibited* a number of private persons (including Madame Uspenskaya), who had come to the famine-stricken area, *from opening food-kitchens*. Like Julius Caesar, Prince Obolensky came, saw, and conquered; and the telegraph promptly informed the entire Russian reading public of his victory. One thing is perplexing—that this victory, this brazen challenge to all Russians who have retained at least a shred of decency, a grain of civic courage, met with no opposition whatever from those who, one may say, were most interested in the matter. Very many persons in Kherson Gubernia doubtless knew—and know now—the reason for the silence about the famine and

the fight against famine relief; but no one has published a single statement on this instructive case, or the relevant documents, or even a simple appeal to protest against the monstrous prohibition of food-kitchens. When the government carries out its threat to dismiss all who "lost time" on the First of May, the workers declare a strike; but the intelligentsia keeps silent when intellectuals are prohibited ... from rendering aid to the famine-stricken.

Encouraged, as it were, by success in the first skirmish with the "sowers of discord" who dare to aid the famine-stricken, the government soon launched an attack all along the line. Prince Obolensky's valiant exploit was elevated to a guiding principle, into a law, which would henceforth regulate the relations between all administrators and all persons accessory to the distribution of food (the word "accessory", strictly speaking, is a term in criminal law peculiar to the Penal Code; but as we have seen and shall see below, at the present time rendering aid to the famine-stricken without authority is regarded as a crime). Such a law was soon enacted—this time in the simplified form of "a circular from the Minister of the Interior to all governors of gubernias affected by the harvest failure of 1901" (August 17, 1901, No. 20).

It may be assumed that this circular will serve for many years to come as a souvenir of the monumental heights to which police fear rises in the face of the people's distress, a fear of closer ties between the famine-stricken people and the "intellectuals" who desire to help them; at the same time, it is a fear that reveals a firm intention to suppress all "clamour" about the famine and to restrict relief to the most insignificant scope. One can only regret that the immoderate length of the circular and the ponderous official style in which it is written will hinder the public at large from becoming acquainted with its contents.

It will be remembered that the law of June 12, 1900, took the management of food affairs out of the hands of the Zemstvos and transferred it to the rural superintendents and uyezd congresses. What, it seemed, could be more reliable? The elective principle was eliminated; persons in any way independent of the authorities would have no jurisdiction and consequently would make no more noise. But after Prince Obolensky's campaign, all this appeared to be

inadequate. The whole business must be more strictly subordinated to the Ministry and to the officials directly carrying out its orders; the slightest possibility of exaggeration must be definitely removed. For that reason, the question as to which uyezds are "affected by the harvest failure" is from now on *to be decided* exclusively by the Ministry,* which apparently is to serve as the headquarters for the general staff for conducting military operations against the famine-stricken. Through the medium of the governors, these headquarters will direct the activities of the individuals (principally the uyezd marshals of the nobility) in whose hands the Central Uyezd Food Board is concentrated. The initiator of military operations against the famine-stricken, Prince Obolensky, was obliged to travel personally to the district in order to prohibit, restrain, and curtail. Now, everything is "regulated", and all that is necessary is an exchange of telegrams (possible, thanks to the grant of a thousand rubles per uyezd for office expenses) between the Central Uyezd Board and the St. Petersburg Central Board for the necessary "orders" to be given. Turgenev's civilised landlord not only kept away from the stables, but even gave orders in subdued tones to a liveried footman in white gloves: "See that Fyodor gets it...."[107] So it will be here now; "orders" will be given, "without clamour", nicely and quietly, to restrain the immoderate appetites of the starving population.

The fact that Mr. Sipyagin is convinced that the appetite of the starving peasant is immoderate becomes evident,

* The manner in which the Ministry decides this question can be judged from the example of Perm Gubernia. According to the latest press reports, this gubernia is still regarded as having "a good harvest", notwithstanding the fact that (according to the report of the extraordinary gubernia Zemstvo congress held on October 10) the harvest this year *is even worse* than the extremely poor harvest of 1898. The yield this year represents only 58 per cent of the average, and in the Shadrinsk and Irbit uyezds is only 36 per cent and 34 per cent respectively. In 1898 the government granted the gubernia (in addition to local grants) 1,500,000 poods of grain and over 250,000 rubles in money. Now, however, the Zemstvos have no funds, they are restricted in their powers, the harvest is far worse than that of 1898, the price of grain began to rise *as from July 1*, the peasants *have begun selling their cattle*—and the government persists in declaring that the gubernia has "a good harvest"!!

not only from the persistent warnings in the circular against "exaggeration", but from the new regulations it lays down which remove all possibility of exaggeration. Do not be in a hurry to draw up the lists of the distressed, for this will arouse among the population "exaggerated hopes", the Minister states explicitly, and orders that the lists be drawn up only immediately before grain is to be distributed. Furthermore, the circular regards it as superfluous to determine when an uyezd *should be* considered a distressed area; but it distinctly states when an uyezd *should not be* considered a distressed area (e.g., when not more than one-third of the volosts are affected, when usual auxiliary employment is available, etc.). Finally, in regard to the rate of relief to be granted to the famine-stricken, the Minister introduces regulations which show with extreme clarity that the government desires *at all costs* to cut down these grants to the very minimum, to mere doles that do nothing to secure the population against starvation. In point of fact, the quota is forty-eight poods of grain per family (calculated on the average yield of the harvest in each village), and those who possess that amount or more are not in need. How this figure was arrived at, no one knows. All that is known is that in *non*-famine years even the poorest peasant consumes twice as much grain (cf. Zemstvo Statistical Investigation of Peasants' Budgets). Consequently, undernourishment is considered a normal state according to the Minister's prescript. But even this quota is reduced, first by half, in order to prevent the working elements, which represent about fifty per cent of the population, from obtaining loans, *and then* by one-third, one-fifth, and one-tenth, "in proportion to the approximate number of well-to-do farmers having stocks left over from last year, or any other [literally so: "or any other"!] material resources". One can judge from this what an insignificant fraction of the amount of grain actually required by the population will be represented by the loan the government intends to grant. And, as if rejoicing in his insolence, Mr. Sipyagin, in explaining this incredible system of curtailing relief, declares that such an approximate computation "has rarely been found to be greatly exaggerated". Comment is superfluous.

Whenever official declarations of the Russian Government contain something more than bare instructions and make at least some attempt to explain them, they almost invariably—it is a kind of law more stable than the majority of our laws—advance two principal motives or rather two principal types of motives. On the one hand, we invariably find a number of general phrases, written in pompous style, about official solicitude and a desire to meet the requirements of the time and the wishes of public opinion. Thus, reference is made to the "important task of averting a food shortage among the rural population", to the "moral responsibility for the welfare of the local population", etc. It goes without saying that these commonplaces signify nothing and impose no definite obligation; but they are as alike as two peas to the immortal sermons delivered by the immortal Judas Golovlyov to the peasants he had robbed. Parenthetically it should be said, these commonplaces are constantly exploited (sometimes out of simple-mindedness and sometimes as a "duty") by the censored liberal press whereby to demonstrate that the government shares its point of view.

But if the other, less general and less obviously hollow motives of the government's orders are examined more closly, concrete statements will always be found *which repeat in toto* the established arguments of the most reactionary organs of our press (e.g., *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*). We are of the opinion that it would be well worth while (and quite possible even for those who work legally) to follow up and record every case of this solidarity between the government and *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. In the circular under discussion, for example, we find a repetition of the vile accusations levelled by the terribly "wild landlords" to the effect that the premature compilation of lists of the distressed stimulates "efforts among certain well-to-do householders to give their farms an appearance of poverty by selling their supplies, reserves, and implements". The Minister states that this "has been proved by experience in the course of previous food campaigns". Consequently? Consequently, the Minister acquires his political experience from the lessons taught him by the most hidebound serf-owners, who raised such a clamour in previous famine years, who are clamouring now

about the deceit of the peasants, and who are so indignant over the "noise" that is being raised about the epidemic of famine typhus.

It was from these serf-owners also that Mr. Sipyagin learned to talk about demoralisation. "It is extremely important," he writes, "for ... the local institutions ... to help economise the allocated funds and, above all [*sic*!!], prevent the unjustified grants of government relief to persons who are materially secure, because of the harmful and demoralising effect of such grants." This shameless instruction to help economise the funds is sealed by the following advice based on a point of principle: "... wide distribution of food grants to families that can dispense with them [that can subsist on twenty-four poods of grain a year per family?], apart from being an unproductive [!] expenditure of state funds, will be no less harmful from the standpoint of the benefits and requirements of the state than if those really in distress were left without proper aid." In bygone times, monarchs would in their sentimental moments say. "It is better to acquit ten criminals than to convict one innocent man"; but nowadays the right arm of the tsar declares: It is as harmful to give relief to families that can manage on twenty-four poods of grain a year as to leave families "really" in need without relief. What a pity that this magnificently candid "point of view" regarding "the benefits and requirements of the state" is obscured from the eyes of the general public by a lengthy and dull circular! One hope is left: perhaps the Social-Democratic press and Social-Democratic oral agitation will enable the people to become more closely acquainted with the contents of the ministerial circular.

* * *

But the circular directs an especially vigorous "attack" upon private philanthropists. Everything indicates that the administrators, who are waging war against the famine-stricken, consider the most important "enemy" position to be private relief circles, private food-kitchens, etc. With laudable frankness Mr. Sipyagin explains why private philanthropy has for a long time now given the Ministry of the Interior sleepless nights. "Beginning with the poor harvest

of 1891 and 1892, and during all subsequent calamities of a similar kind," says the circular, "it has not infrequently been found that certain philanthropists, while rendering material aid to the inhabitants of the affected districts, strive to rouse among them discontent with the present system and encourage the people to make totally unjustified demands on the government. At the same time, the failure to meet the distress to the full, and the inevitable ailments and economic disorders that arise therefrom, create an extremely favourable soil for anti-government agitation; politically unreliable persons freely take advantage of this and pursue their criminal aims under the cloak of helping their neighbour. Usually, as soon as the first news of a serious harvest failure is received, persons with a political past that is not irreproachable pour into the affected districts from all directions, strive to make contact with representatives of charitable organisations and institutions from the capital, who, through ignorance, engage those persons as local helpers and in this way create serious difficulties inimical to the interests of good order and administration."

However, the Russian Government is becoming hard pressed in the land of Russia. Time was when only the student youth was considered as a stratum calling for special security measures. The students were subjected to the strictest surveillance, contact with them on the part of persons whose political past is not irreproachable was regarded as a great offence, every study circle and society, even if it pursued purely philanthropic aims, was suspected of anti-government aims, etc. In those times—not far in the past—there was no other *stratum*, to say nothing of a social class, that in the eyes of the government, represented "an extremely favourable soil for anti-government agitation". But since the middle nineties, one meets in official government communications mention of another, immeasurably more numerous, social class that calls for special security meaures—the factory workers. The growth of the labour movement compelled the government to establish a full-fledged system of institutions to maintain surveillance over this new stormy element. Among the districts prohibited as places of residence for politically doubtful persons were included factory centres and settlements, uyezds and whole

gubernias, in addition to the capitals and university cities.* Two-thirds of European Russia came under special protection against unreliable elements, while the remaining third is becoming so crowded with "persons whose political past is not irreproachable" that even the remotest province is becoming restless.** It now appears that according to the authoritative judgement of so competent a person as the Minister of the Interior even the remotest *village* represents "favourable soil" for anti-government agitation, insofar as there occur in it cases of not fully relieved distress, of sickness, and of economic disorder. And are there many Russian villages in which such "cases" are not constant? And should not we Russian Social-Democrats immediately take advantage of Mr. Sipyagin's instructive reference to "favourable" soil? On the one hand, precisely at this moment, the rural districts are displaying interest in the rumours which at times have managed to penetrate to them in one way or another about the skirmishes that occurred between the government's gendarmes and the urban proletariat and the young intelligentsia in February and March. On the other hand, do not phrases like the peasant's "totally unjustified demands", etc., provide a sufficiently wide programme for the most extensive, all-round agitation?

We must take advantage of Mr. Sipyagin's useful information and laugh at his simplicity. It is indeed the sheerest naïveté to imagine that by placing private charity under the supervision and control of the governor he can hinder the spread of the influence of "unreliable" persons in the rural districts. Genuine philanthropists have never pursued political aims, so that the new measures of prohibition and restriction will mostly affect the very persons who are least dangerous to the government. Those, however, who desire to

* See, for instance, the secret circular published in *Iskra*, No. 6, on the people banished from St. Petersburg, mostly writers, many of whom had never been involved in political affairs of any kind, let alone "labour" affairs. Nevertheless, they have been denied domicile, not only in university cities, but also in "factory localities", while for some the prohibition relates *only* to factory localities.

** See, for example, the correspondence in *Iskra*, Nos. 6 and 7, in which it is reported that public unrest and aid to the peasants in despite of the government had penetrated even into such God-guarded cities as Penza, Simferopol, Kursk, etc.

open the eyes of the peasants to the real significance of these measures, and to the government's attitude towards the famine, will not consider it necessary to establish contact with representatives of the Red Cross or present themselves to the governors. Thus, when it was found that the factory environment represented "favourable soil", those who desired to establish contact with that environment did not visit the factory managers for information about factory conditions or present themselves to the factory inspectors for permission to organise meetings with the workers. We are fully aware, of course, that it is extremely difficult to carry on political agitation among the peasantry, the more so since it is impossible and irrational to withdraw revolutionary forces from the cities for that purpose. Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that the government's heroic deeds, such as restricting private charity, remove a good half of these difficulties and do half our work for us.

* * *

We shall not dwell on the same Minister's circular calling for stricter surveillance over charitable concerts, theatrical performances, etc.; for that is a "mere bagatelle", as compared with the circular we have just examined (cf. article "Fresh Obstacles", *Iskra*, No. 9).

We will endeavour to establish the relation that exists now between the government relief for the population, fixed and distributed according to the new regulations, and the actual extent of the distress. True, our information on this point is exceedingly scanty. The press now is thoroughly muzzled, the voices of private organisers of food-kitchens have been silenced simultaneously with the "prohibition" of their activities, and the only sources of information available to the Russian public, now struck dumb by the new stringent measures, are the official police reports on the favourable progress of the food campaign, the articles written in the same spirit in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, sometimes the interviews of an idle reporter with this or that Jack-in-office pompously expatiating on "His Excellency's singleness of mind and His Excellency's singleness of authority, etc.".[108] Thus, *Novoye Vremya*, No. 9195,

reports that the Governor of Saratov, A. P. Engelhardt (formerly Governor of Archangel), gave an interview to a representative of a local newspaper, in the course of which he said that he had personally convened in that locality a conference of marshals of the nobility, of representatives of the Zemstvo Boards, of the rural superintendents, and of representatives of the Red Cross, at which he had "distributed tasks".

"Scurvy, in the form I have seen it in Archangel Gubernia, is not to be found here [said A. P. Engelhardt]. In Archangel, one cannot approach within five paces of a patient; there the disease is really a form of 'rot'. Here we see mostly the effects of severe anaemia, which results from the awful conditions of domestic life. Almost the only symptoms of scurvy observed here are white lips and white gums.... With proper nutrition such patients recover within a week. Food is now being distributed. About one thousand rations are being distributed daily, although not more than four hundred cases of acute distress have been registered.

"Besides scurvy, only three cases of typhus have been reported in the whole district. We may hope that things will not get worse, for everywhere public works have been organised and the population is assured of employment."

What prosperity! In the whole of Khvalynsk Uyezd (to which the Jack-in-office refers) there are only four hundred persons in acute distress (in all probability the rest, in Mr. Sipyagin's and Mr. Engelhardt's opinion, "can manage well" on twenty-four poods of grain per family per annum!), the population is provided for, and the sick recover within a week. After this, how can we not believe *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* when, in a special leading article (in No. 258), it informs us that "according to the latest reports, in twelve gubernias affected by the harvest failure *the administration is very actively organising relief*. Many uyezds have already been investigated for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a shortage of food; *uyezd managers* of food-affairs *have been appointed*, etc. Apparently, official representatives of the government are doing everything possible to render timely and adequate aid."

"... very actively organising", and ... "not more than four hundred cases of acute distress have been registered"....

In Khvalynsk Uyezd there are 165,000 rural inhabitants, and one thousand rations are being distributed. The yield of rye in the whole of the south-eastern area (including Saratov Gubernia) this year was 34 per cent below average. Of the total area of peasant lands planted to crops in Saratov Gubernia (1,500,000 dessiatines), 15 per cent suffered a complete failure of the harvest (according to the report of the gubernia Zemstvo Board) and 75 per cent suffered a poor harvest, while Khvalynsk and Kamyshin uyezds are the two worst affected uyezds in the gubernia. Consequently, the total amount of grain gathered in by the peasants in Khvalynsk Uyezd is at least 30 per cent below average. Let us assume that half of this shortage affects the well-to-do peasantry, which is not yet reduced thereby to starvation (a very risky assumption, since the well-to-do peasant possesses better land and cultivates it better, so that he always suffers less from a bad harvest than do the poor peasants). But even on this assumption, the number of the starving must be something like 15 per cent, or about 25,000. Yet we are offered the consolation that scurvy in Khvalynsk is not nearly so bad as it is in Archangel, that there were only three cases of typhus (if only they would lie more cleverly!), and that one thousand rations are being distributed (the size of which is in all probability determined by Sipyagin's system of combating exaggerations).

With respect to the "subsidiary earnings", which, to avoid exaggeration, Mr. Sipyagin *thrice* takes into account in his circular (once, when he orders that uyezds in which subsidiary earnings are usual shall not be regarded as affected areas; a second time when he orders that the forty-eight poods scale be reduced by half because 50 per cent of the working population "must" be earning wages; and a third time when he orders this scale to be further reduced by amounts ranging from one-third to one-tenth according to local conditions)—with respect to these subsidiary earnings, not only agricultural but even non-agricultural earnings have diminished in Saratov Gubernia. "The harvest failure," we read in the above-mentioned Zemstvo Board report, "has also affected the handicraftsmen, due to the drop in the sales of their manufactures. Owing to these circumstances, *a crisis is observed* in the uyezds in which handicrafts are most highly

developed." Among these is Kamyshin Uyezd, which has suffered most, and in which many thousands of poor people are engaged in weaving the celebrated local striped calico (*sarpinka*). Even in normal years conditions in the handicraft industry of this remote rural district were woeful; six- and seven-year-old children, for example, were employed at a wage of seven or eight kopeks a day. We can picture to ourselves what conditions are like there in a year of severe harvest failure and acute crisis in the handicraft industry.

In Saratov Gubernia (and in all affected gubernias, of course), the poor grain harvest is accompanied also by a shortage of fodder. The past few months (i.e., in the second half of the summer!) have seen the spread of various cattle diseases and an increase in cattle mortality. "According to a report of the veterinary surgeon in Khvalynsk Uyezd [we quote from the newspaper that contained the above-mentioned Zemstvo Board report], an examination of the contents of the stomachs of the dead cattle revealed nothing but earth."

The "Report of the Zemstvo Department of the Ministry of the Interior" on the progress of the food campaign contained, incidentally, the statement that of the uyezds recognised as affected areas "in Khvalynsk alone a number of cases of epidemic scurvy have been discovered in two villages since July. The local medical staff is exerting all its efforts to stop the epidemic and two Red Cross detachments have been sent to the district to assist the local forces. According to the report of the governor [the very A. P. Engelhardt, whose acquaintance we have made], their efforts are meeting with considerable success; according to reports received by the Ministry up to September 12, in none of the other affected uyezds were there any cases of acute distress left without relief, and no development of disease as a consequence of inadequate nutrition is observed."

To show what confidence may be placed in the statement that no cases of *acute* distress were left unrelieved (were there cases of *chronic* distress?) and that the development of disease is not observed, we shall confine ourselves to comparing data on two other gubernias.

In Ufa Gubernia, Menzelinsk and Belebeyev uyezds were declared to be affected areas, and the Zemstvo Depart-

ment of the Ministry of the Interior reports that "according to the governor's statement" the amount of the government grant required "specifically for food" is 800,000 poods. However, a special meeting of the Ufa Gubernia Zemstvo Assembly held on August 27 to discuss the question of rendering relief to the famine-stricken estimated food requirements of those uyezds at 2,200,000 poods of grain, 1,000,000 poods for the other uyezds, not including grants of seed-grain (3,200,000 poods for the entire gubernia) and cattle fodder (600,000 poods). Consequently, the Ministry fixed the grant at *one-fourth* the amount fixed by the Zemstvo.

Another instance. In Vyatka Gubernia none of the uyezds was declared affected areas at the time when the Zemstvo department issued its report; nevertheless, the food grant was fixed by that body at 782,000 poods. This is the figure which, by press reports, was fixed by the Vyatka Gubernia Food Department at its meeting of August 28 (in accordance with the decisions of the Uyezd Assemblies held between August 18 and 25). *Approximately on August 12, these very* Assemblies had fixed a different amount for the grant, viz., 1,100,000 poods for food and 1,400,000 poods for seed. Why this difference? What happened between August 12 and 28? The answer is, Sipyagin's circular of August 17 on fighting the famine-stricken had been published. Consequently, the circular had an immediate effect, and the trifling amount of 230,000 poods of grain was struck out of the estimate, drawn up, mark you, by the Uyezd Assemblies, i.e., by the very institutions which, by the law of June 12, 1900, were established in place of the unreliable Zemstvos, institutions composed of officials generally and of rural superintendents in particular.... Shall we really live to see the day when even the rural superintendents will be accused of liberalism? Perhaps we shall. Recently we read in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* the following reprimand inflicted on a certain Mr. Om., who, in *Priazovsky Krai*[109] had dared to propose that the newspapers publish the minutes of the meetings of the Gubernia Boards for Urban Affairs (since press representatives were not permitted to attend them):

"The purpose is all too transparent: *the Russian civil servant frequently suffers from a fear of appearing illiberal*, and publicity may compel him, at times even against his

own conscience, to support some fantastically liberal scheme proposed by the city or the Zemstvo. By no means an altogether false calculation."

Should not the Vyatka rural superintendents, who (apparently out of fear of appearing illiberal) have revealed such unpardonable frivolity in "exaggerating" the food crisis, be placed under special surveillance?*

Incidentally, if the wise Russian Government had not withdrawn from it jurisdiction over food affairs, the "fantastically liberal" Vyatka Zemstvo would have gone even further in its estimate of the distress. At all events, the Special Gubernia Conference, held from August 30 to September 2, declared the amount of grain harvested to be 17 per cent, and the amount of cattle fodder 15 per cent, below

* Another instance of the manner in which the Governor of Vyatka combats exaggerations:

"In an 'announcement' sent out to the Volost Boards the Governor of Vyatka records a very cautious attitude on the part of the peasants towards food grants from the government and the Zemstvo. 'During my tour of the gubernia,' writes Mr. Klingenberg, 'I saw for myself with what deliberation and caution the peasants act in the present circumstances. They hesitate to contract debts except under pressure of extreme necessity and are firmly resolved to wait patiently for God's help in the year to come, striving by their own efforts to extricate themselves from their difficult condition.' Hence, the Governor of Vyatka expresses the conviction that 'the peaceful and sensible inhabitants of Vyatka Gubernia will not allow themselves to be disturbed by rumours about free government and Zemstvo aid and about the annulment of debts and arrears, or by exaggerated reports of the failure of the harvest'. The Governor deems it his duty to warn the peasants that 'if a check of the grants shows that householders, even with no reserve stocks, have gathered in sufficient corn this year to feed themselves and their families and to sow their fields, but have sold their corn and utilised the proceeds for other purposes, such householders must not count on obtaining a loan. According to the new law, the loans granted will be recoverable, not on the basis of collective liability,[110] but in accordance with the regulations governing the collection of taxes. Consequently, every householder who applies for and receives a loan must bear in mind that he and he alone will be responsible for repayment, that no one will help him, that repayment will be strictly enforced, and that if he falls into arrears all his movable property may be sold and his real estate confiscated.'"

We can well imagine how the local volost authorities treat starving peasants who have fallen into arrears and demand a loan after such a statement by the Governor!

subsistence needs. The amount absolutely essential is 105,000,000 poods (the amount harvested in an ordinary year being 134,000,000; in this year, 84,000,000 poods). There is, therefore, a shortage of *21 million poods*. "The total number of volosts in the gubernia suffering from a shortage of grain this year is 158 out of 310. The population of these volosts numbers 1,566,000 persons of both sexes." Yes, undoubtedly, "the administration is very actively organising"—minimising the real extent of the distress and reducing the work of relieving the starving to a kind of acrobatics of cheese-paring philanthropy.

In fact, the term "acrobats of philanthropy" would be too flattering a name for the administrators who have rallied under the banner of the Sipyagin circular. What they have in common with acrobats of philanthropy is the paltry nature of the relief they render and their attempts to blow it up into something bigger than it is. But the acrobats of philanthropy at worst regard the people upon whom they bestow their charity as playthings that pleasantly tickle their vanity, whereas the Sipyagin administrators regard their beneficiaries as enemies, as people that make illegal demands ("totally unjustified demands on the government") and that must therefore be held in restraint. This point of view was expressed most strikingly in the remarkable Provisional Regulations, which were accorded royal sanction on September 15, 1901.

These regulations represent in the full sense a law, which consists of twenty articles and contains so much that is remarkable that we would not hesitate to designate it as one of the most important legislative acts of the early twentieth century. To begin with the title: "Provisional Regulations Governing the *Participation* of the Population in the Famine-Affected Areas in the Works Undertaken by Order of the Departments of Railways, Agriculture, and State Property." Evidently these works are so chock-full of benefits that to be allowed to "participate" in them must be regarded as a special act of grace, otherwise the first clause of the new law would not state: "Rural inhabitants of localities affected by the famine *shall be allowed to participate* in the carrying out of the works projects", etc.

But the law provides for these "privileges" only in its second half, while in the first it deals with the *organisation* of the whole business. The competent authorities "determine the most suitable works projects to be undertaken" (Article 2), which "shall be carried out in conformity with the provision in the law" (Article 3, which, like the chapter headings in some Dickensian novel, may be entitled: "The clause of the new law, which tells of the necessity of acting in accordance with the old law"). The public works are to be launched on budget estimates, or on special credits, and the general supervision of the organisation of these works is vested in the Minister of the Interior, who may appoint officials with special powers and who arranges a special "Conference on Food Affairs" with representatives of various ministries participating under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister. The functions of this body include: (a) granting permission for departures from the existing regulations; (b) discussing proposals for the allocation of funds; (c) "fixing the maximum remuneration to be paid to workmen, as well as establishing the other conditions under which the population may be permitted to participate in the aforesaid works; (d) distributing the work crews to the locations of the projects; and, (e) organising the transport of the crews to the works locations". The decisions of the Conference must be sanctioned by the Minister of the Interior, as well as, "in corresponding cases", by the ministers of other departments. The function of determining the works projects, and of ascertaining the number of residents in need of work, is vested in the rural superintendents, who must report the information to the governors, who, in turn, communicate the information with their opinions to the Ministry of the Interior and "on its instructions arrange, through the rural superintendents, for the dispatch of workers to the works locations...."

Ugh! At last we have mastered the "organisation" of this new business! The question now arises how much lubrication will be required to set all the wheels of this ponderous, purely Russian administrative monster in motion. Try to imagine this thing concretely. Only the rural superintendent comes in direct contact with the famine-stricken. He therefore must take the initiative. He sends a communi-

ation—to whom? To the governor, says an article of the Provisional Regulations of September 15. But in accordance with the circular of August 17, a special Central Uyezd Food Board has been established, whose function is "to concentrate the management of *all* food affairs in the uyezd in the hands of a single official" (under the circular of August 17 the uyezd marshal of the nobility should preferably be appointed to that post). A "dispute" arises, which, of course, is quickly settled on the basis of the remarkably clear and simple "principles" outlined in the six points of Article 175 of the General Gubernia Regulations which prescribes "the order for settling disputes ... between public departments and officials". In the end the document finds its way somehow into the office of the governor, where someone undertakes to draft an "opinion". Following which, everything goes to St. Petersburg, there to be examined by the special Conference. But the representative of the Ministry of Railways to the Conference is unable to decide on the expediency of such a public works project as road repairs in Buguruslan Uyezd, and so another document travels from St. Petersburg to the gubernia and back again. When, finally, the expediency of the works, etc., etc., is decided on in principle, the Conference in St. Petersburg will then set about "distributing the work crews" between Buzuluk and Buguruslan uyezds.

How shall this unwieldy machine be explained? By the novelty of the thing? Not at all. Before the Provisional Regulations of September 15 were introduced, public works could be organised ever so much more simply "on the basis of the existing laws", and the circular of August 17, which refers to the public works organised by the Zemstvos, the Guardians of the poor, and the gubernia authorities, makes no reference to the necessity for any kind of special organisation. You see, therefore, that the government's "food campaign" consists in the fact that the St. Petersburg departments spend a whole month (from August 17 to September 15) thinking and thinking, and finally produce a hopelessly tangled skein of red tape. We may be sure, however, that the St. Petersburg Conference stands in no danger of making exaggerations, as do the local bureaucrats who "fear to appear illiberal"....

But the prize exhibit of the new Provisional Regulations is the prescript concerning the "rural inhabitants" hired for the works projects. When work is to be carried out "away from their place of residence", the workers must first of all form themselves into a special artel, "under the supervision of the rural superintendent", who endorses the appointment of the artel overseer responsible for maintaining order; secondly, the names of the workmen joining such an artel must be entered in a special list which "is to serve as a *substitute* for the ordinary legally established residence permits of the workmen thereon listed during their transfer to, and stay at, their place of work, and which must remain in the possession of the official accompanying the workmen on their journey, or, in his absence, in the possession of the artel overseer, and on arrival at the destination must be placed in charge of the works manager".

Why is it necessary to substitute a special list for the ordinary passports, which every peasant who desires to travel has a right to receive gratis? This is clearly a restriction imposed upon the workmen, since, if they remained in possession of their passports, they would have more freedom in selecting a room, in spending their free time, or in changing one job for another, if they found it more remunerative or convenient to do so. We shall see below that this was done deliberately, not only out of love for red tape, but specifically in order to impose restrictions upon the workmen and make their conditions approximate those of gangs of transported serfs accompanied by an "inventory" of a kind.[111] It appears that the function of "maintaining order on the journey, and the delivery [sic!] of the work crew to the public works manager is vested in an official commissioned for the purpose by the Ministry of the Interior". The farther into it we get, the more complicated it becomes. The substitution of lists for passports leads to the substitution of freedom of movement by—"consignment of work crews". What have we here? Gangs of convicts being transported to penal servitude? Have all the laws permitting the peasant in possession of a passport to travel wherever and however he pleases been repealed—perhaps as a punishment for "exaggerating" the famine? Is conveyance at government expense a sufficient reason for depriving a citizen of his rights?

To continue. It appears that the persons in charge of distributing the workmen and of paying their wages, as well as the other officials of the department supervising the execution of the works projects, "on the instructions of the gubernia authorities in the district where the families of the workmen reside, dock the wages earned, wherever possible, and send the deducted amount to their home locations for the maintenance of the workmen's families". A further deprivation of rights. How dare the officials deduct part of the wages earned by the workers? How dare they interfere in the workmen's family affairs and decide for them, as if they were serfs, whom they are to maintain and how much they are to contribute to that end? Would workmen permit their wages to be docked without their consent? Apparently, this question entered the heads of those who drafted the new "penal servitude regulations", because the clause immediately following the one quoted above says: "The preservation of order among the workmen in the works locations is entrusted, by decision of the Minister of the Interior, to the local rural superintendents, to the officers of the special corps of gendarmerie, to the police officials, or to persons specially appointed for that purpose." It is clear that the peasants are *to be punished* by deprivation of their rights for "exaggerating" the famine and for their "totally unjustified demands on the government"! It is not enough that the ordinary police, the factory police, and the secret police keep the Russian workers in general under surveillance; these regulations prescribe the establishment of a *special* surveillance. One might think the government has completely lost its head out of fear of these work crews of hungry peasants, freighted, transported, and delivered with a thousand precautions.

We read further: "Workers guilty of disturbing the public peace and quiet, deliberately shirking their work, or refusing to carry out the lawful demands of the works managers or those appointed for the purpose of preserving order, are liable, on the order of the officials mentioned in Article 16 [referred to above] to be placed under arrest *for three days without trial*; for persistent refusal to work they may, on the orders of the said officials, be *transported under escort* to their permanent place of residence."

After this, can the Provisional Regulations of September 15 be called anything but provisional penal servitude regulations? Punishment without trial, deportation under escort.... The ignorance and wretchedness of the Russian peasant is very great indeed, but there is a limit to everything. For this constant starvation and the steady banishment of workers from the towns to the country cannot but have their effect. And our government, which is so fond of governing by means of provisional regulations* will one day receive a very severe shock.

The Provisional Regulations of September 15 must serve us as a means for wide agitation in workers' study circles and among the peasantry; *we must distribute* copies of these regulations with leaflets explaining them; we must call meetings and read this law to the audience, explain its meaning in connection with the government's "food" policy as a whole. We must see to it that every worker, who is in the least class-conscious and who goes to the village, shall thoroughly understand the meaning of the "provisional penal servitude regulations" and be able to explain to all whom he meets what the regulations are about and what must be done to gain deliverance from the penal servitude of starvation, tyranny, and lack of rights.

Let these provisional regulations governing *workers' artels* serve as a standing reproach and a serious warning to the soulful Russian intellectuals who advocate the establishment of various kinds of artels and similar legal societies permitted or encouraged by the government—a reproach for that naïveté with which they believed in the sincerity of the government's permission or encouragement, without perceiving the base serf character that was concealed behind the signboard of "the furtherance of people's labour", etc. A warning—when they speak in the future of artels and other societies permitted by the Sipyagins, never to forget to tell the whole truth about the workers' artels established

* It is an old adage that any fool can govern under a state of siege. In Europe, it may be necessary to declare a state of siege from time to time, but in Russia a state of siege is always in force, supplemented, now here, now there, by provisional regulations. Are not all political affairs in Russia conducted according to provisional regulations?

in accordance with the provisional regulations of September 15, and if they dare not talk about *such* artels, to remain entirely silent.

II. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CRISIS AND THE FAMINE

While we are faced with a fresh outbreak of famine, the old and protracted commercial and industrial crisis, which still drags on, has thrown on to the streets tens of thousands of workers unable to find employment. Distress is very great among these workers, and all the more revealing is the fact that both the government and educated "society" adopt an attitude towards the distress of the workers that is entirely different from their attitude towards the distress of the peasants. The public institutions and the press make no effort to determine the number of workers in distress, or the degree of that distress, even to the extent to which this is done in the case of the peasants. No systematic measures are adopted to organise aid for the starving workers.

Why this difference? It is, in our opinion, least of all because the distress among the workers is less apparent, or reveals itself in less acute forms. True, the city dwellers who do not belong to the working class know very little about the conditions of the factory workers, that they live now even more congested in cellars, attics, and hovels, that they are more undernourished than ever before and are pawning their last sticks and rags. True, the increasing number of tramps and beggars, who frequent doss-houses and fill the prisons and hospitals, do not attract any particular attention, because, well, "everyone" is accustomed to the idea that doss-houses and dens of hopeless wretchedness are always packed in large cities. True, unlike the peasants, unemployed workers are not tied down to a single place, and either of their own accord roam the country in quest of employment or are banished to "their native places" by authorities afraid of concentrations of large numbers of unemployed workers. Nevertheless, anyone who has any contact at all with industrial life knows from experience, and anyone who interests himself in public affairs knows from the newspapers, that unemployment is steadily increasing.

No, the reasons for this difference in attitude lie much deeper; they are to be sought in the fact that famine in the rural districts and unemployment in the towns belong to two altogether different types of economic life and are due to altogether different relations between the exploiting and the exploited classes. In the rural districts, the relations between these two classes are extremely confused and complicated by a multiplicity of transitional forms, as, for example, when farming is combined with usury, or with the exploitation of hired labour, etc., etc. It is not the agricultural hired labourer—the antagonism of whose interests to the interests of the landlord and wealthy peasant is clearly apparent and is largely understood by the labourer himself—who is starving, but the small peasant, who is usually regarded (and regards himself) as an independent farmer, who only now and again falls accidentally into some "temporary" dependence. The immediate cause of the famine—the failure of the harvest—is spontaneous in the eyes of the masses, it is the will of God. And as poor harvests accompanied by famine have occurred from time immemorial, legislation has long been compelled to reckon with them. For years codes upon codes of laws have existed (principally on paper) providing for the distribution of food among the people and prescribing an involved system of "measures". Although these measures, borrowed largely from the period of serfdom and the period of prevailing patriarchal, self-sufficing economy, correspond very little to the requirements of modern times, every famine sets in motion the whole government and Zemstvo administrative machine. And, however greatly the powers that be may desire it, this machine finds it difficult, almost impossible, to avoid resorting to all manner of aid from the hated "third persons", the intellectuals, who are striving to "raise a clamour". On the other hand, the connection of the famine with the poor harvest, together with the wretched state of the peasants, who do not understand (or but vaguely understand) that it is the increasing exploitation of capital in conjunction with the predatory policy of the government and of the landlords which has reduced them to this ruinous condition, has caused the famine-stricken to feel so absolutely helpless that, far from putting for-

ward exacting demands, they put forward no "demands" at all.

The less conscious the oppressed class is of its oppression and the less exacting it is in its demands upon its oppressors, the larger the number of individuals among the propertied classes who will be inclined towards philanthropy, and the less, relatively, will resistance be offered to this philanthropy by the local landlords, who are directly interested in keeping the peasants in a state of poverty. If this indisputable fact is borne in mind, it will be clear that the increased opposition of the landlords, the loud cries raised about the "demoralisation" of the peasants, and, finally, the purely military measures against the famine-stricken and against the benefactors, adopted by a government actuated by such a spirit, are symptoms of the complete decline and decay of that ancient, supposedly immutable and time-hallowed, patriarchal rural life over which the ardent Slavophils, the reactionaries most conscious of their aim, and the most naïve of the old-fashioned Narodniks, wax so enthusiastic. The Narodniks have always accused us Social-Democrats of artificially applying the concept of the class struggle to conditions which do not admit of its application, while the reactionaries have always accused us of sowing class hatred and of inciting "one section of the population against another". Without reiterating the answer to these charges, which has been given time and time again, we shall state merely that the Russian Government *excels us all* in the judgement of the profundity of the class struggle, and in the energetic force of the measures that must logically follow from such a judgement. Every one who has in one way or another come in contact with people who in famine years have gone to the village to "feed" the peasants—and who has not come in contact with them?—knows that they were prompted by pure sentiments of pity and humane sympathy, and that "political" plans of any kind were totally alien to them; that the propaganda of the ideas of the class struggle left such people cold, and that the arguments of the Marxists in heated battles against the views of the Narodniks on the village left them unconvinced. What has the class

struggle to do with it? they said; the peasants are starving and we must help them—that is all.

But those who could not be convinced by the arguments of the Marxists may perhaps be convinced by the "arguments" of the Minister of the Interior. No, it is not simply that "the peasants are starving", he warns the philanthropists, and they must not "simply" go to help the peasants without the permission of the authorities, for that spreads demoralisation and stimulates unjustifiable demands. To interfere in the food campaign means to interfere in the plans of God and the police to provide the landlords with workmen willing to work for next to nothing, and the Treasury with taxes collected by force. He who ponders over Sipyagin's circular must say to himself—Yes, social war is going on in our countryside, and, as in all wars, the belligerents cannot be denied their right to inspect the cargoes of vessels sailing to enemy ports, even if the vessels sail under neutral flags. The only difference between this and other wars is that in this case one side, obliged perpetually to work and perpetually to starve, is not even fighting, it is only being fought—for the present.

In factory industry, however, it has long been evident that this war is being carried on, and there is no need for government circulars to explain to the "neutral" philanthropists that it is unwise to ford the river without first sounding its depth (that is, without first obtaining the permission of the authorities and the factory owners). As early as 1885, when there was as yet no noticeable socialist agitation amongst the workers, even in the central gubernias, where the workers are closer to the peasantry than are the workers in the capital, the industrial crisis caused the factory atmosphere to become so electrically charged that storms broke out continuously, now in one place and now in another. Under such circumstances, philanthropy is doomed to impotence from the outset and for that reason remains a casual and purely individual affair, without acquiring even a shadow of social significance.

We shall note yet one other peculiar feature in the attitude of the public towards famines. It may be said without exaggeration that until very recently the opinion prevailed that the whole of the Russian economic, and even

political, system rested upon the *mass* of independent landowning peasant farmers. The extent to which this opinion had penetrated the minds of even the most advanced thinking people, least susceptible to the wiles of official flattery, was strikingly illustrated by Nikolai—on in his work published after the famine of 1891-92[112]. The ruin of an enormous number of peasant farms seemed to every one to be so absurd, to be such an impossible leap into the void, that the necessity to extend the widest possible aid that would effectively "heal the wounds" was almost generally recognised. And again it was none other than Mr. Sipyagin who undertook the task of dispelling the last shreds of illusion. What does "Russia" rest upon, what do the landowners and the commercial and industrial classes live on, if not on the ruination and impoverishment of the people? To attempt to heal *this* "wound" otherwise than on paper—why, that would be a political crime!

Mr. Sipyagin will, without doubt, contribute to the dissemination and the confirmation of the truth that there neither is nor can be any other means of combating unemployment and crises, as well as the Asiatic-barbarian and cruel forms the expropriation of the small producers has assumed in Russia, than the class struggle of the revolutionary proletariat against the entire capitalist system. The rulers of the capitalist state are no more concerned about the vast numbers of famine and crisis victims than a locomotive is concerned about those whom it crushes in its path. Dead bodies stop the wheels, the locomotive halts, it may (with a too energetic driver) jump the rails, but, in any case, after a delay, long or short, it will continue on its way. We hear of death from starvation, and of the ruin of tens and hundreds of thousands of small farmers, but, at the same time, we hear accounts of the progress of agriculture in our country, of the acquisition of foreign markets by the Russian landlords, who have sent an expedition of Russian farmers to England; we hear of increased sales of improved implements and of the extension of cultivated grassland, etc. For the masters of Russian agriculture (as well as for all capitalist masters), intensified ruination and starvation are nothing more than a slight and temporary hitch, to which they pay almost no attention whatever, unless

compelled by the famine-stricken. Everything goes on as usual—even speculation in the sale of lands belonging to the section of the *proprietors* which consists of the well-to-do peasantry.

Thus, Buguruslan Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, has been declared an "affected area". This means that famine and the ruination of the *mass* of the peasantry have reached the highest point. But the misfortune of the masses does not hinder, but on the contrary appears to facilitate, the consolidation of the economic position of the bourgeois minority of the peasantry. In the September correspondence of *Russkiye Vedomosti*[113] (No. 244) we read the following concerning the uyezd referred to:

"Buguruslan Uyezd, Samara Gubernia. The most important subject of discussion in this uyezd is the rapid rise in the price of land everywhere and the enormous speculation in land as a result. Only some fifteen or twenty years ago, excellent valley land could be bought at *from ten to fifteen rubles* per dessiatine. There were districts remote from the railway where, only three years ago, thirty-five rubles per dessiatine was regarded as a high price, and only on one occasion was as much as sixty rubles per dessiatine paid for first-rate land, with an excellent farm-house, situated near a market. Now, however, *from fifty to sixty rubles* per dessiatine is paid for the poorest land, while the price of good land has risen as high as eighty and even one hundred rubles per dessiatine. The speculation caused by this rise in land prices assumes two forms: First, the purchase of land for the purpose of immediate resale (there have been instances in which land was bought at forty rubles per dessiatine and resold within a year to the local *peasants at fifty-five rubles*). In such cases usually the landlords, not having either the time or the desire to bother with all the red tape and the formalities of selling the land to the peasants through the Peasant Bank, sell to the capitalist land speculators, who in *their turn resell to the selfsame local peasants*. In the second form, numerous land agents are engaged in foisting upon peasants from remote provinces (mostly from the Ukraine) all kinds of worthless land for which they obtain handsome *commissions* from the owners (*from one to two rubles* per dessiatine),

From what has been said, it should be clear that the main victim of this land speculation is *the peasant*, whose land hunger serves as the basis for this unimaginable and, by economic causes unexplainable, jump in the price of land. Of course, the building of railways has had something to do with this, but not a great deal, for the principal buyer of land in our country remains the peasant, who by no means regards the railway as a factor of prime importance."

These tenacious "enterprising muzhiks", who so greedily invest their "savings" (and their plunder) in the purchase of land, will inevitably cause the ruin of even those poor peasants who have still managed to survive the present famine.

While bourgeois society resorts to land-purchasing schemes for the well-to-do peasant as a means of counteracting the ruination and starvation of the poor peasants, the search for new markets is resorted to as a means of counteracting crises and the glutting of the markets with the products of industry. The servile press (*Novoye Vremya*, No. 9188) waxes enthusiastic over the successes of the new trade with Persia and discusses glowingly the prospects of commerce with Central Asia and, particularly, with Manchuria. The iron magnates and other industrial leaders rub their hands in glee when they hear of proposals for further railway expansion. It has been decided to build the following major lines: St. Petersburg-Vyatka, Bologoye-Sedlets, Orenburg-Tashkent; the government has guaranteed a railway loan of 37,000,000 rubles (to the Moscow-Kazan, Lodz, and South-Eastern Railway companies); and other lines are planned: Moscow-Kyshtym, Kamyshin-Astrakhan and Black Sea lines. The starving peasants and unemployed workers may console themselves with the thought that the state money (if the state can raise it) will not, of course, be spent "unproductively" on famine relief (see Sipyagin's circular), but will be poured into the pockets of engineers and contractors, like those virtuosi in the art of embezzlement who year by year stole large sums during the construction of the Sormovo Dam, and who were only recently convicted (by way of exception) by the Moscow Assizes[114] in Nizhni-Novgorod.*

* Unfortunately, lack of space prevents us from dealing in detail with this trial, which has demonstrated once again how the con-

III. THE THIRD ELEMENT

The term "third element" or "third persons" was employed, if we are not mistaken, by the Vice-Governor of Samara, Mr. Kondoidi, in his speech at the opening of the Samara Gubernia Zemstvo Assembly in 1900, to designate persons "belonging neither to the administration nor to the representatives of the social-estates". The increase in the numbers and in the influence of such persons serving in the Zemstvo as doctors, technicians, statisticians, agronomists, teachers, etc., has long since attracted the attention of our reactionaries, who have also described these hated "third persons" as the "Zemstvo bureaucracy".

Generally speaking, it must be said that our reactionaries (including, of course, the entire top bureaucracy) reveal a fine political instinct. They are so well-experienced in combating oppositions, popular "revolts", religious sects, rebellions, and revolutionaries, that they are always on the *qui vive* and understand far better than naïve simpletons and "honest fogies" that the autocracy can never reconcile itself to self-reliance, honesty, independent convictions, and pride in real knowledge of *any kind whatsoever*. So thoroughly imbued are they with the spirit of subservience and red tape

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tractors and engineers run the show. For us Russians this is an old story that is perennially new. Engineer Alexandrov, in company with Shnakenburg, head of the Nizhni-Novgorod branch of the Kazan region of the Ministry of Railways, and the six contractors who were brought to trial, *during a period of three years* (1893-95), had "built" for themselves and others thousands of rubles by presenting to the Treasury accounts, certificates, vouchers, etc., etc., for work never done and for supplies never delivered. Not only the jobs, but even the contractors, were fictitious; an ordinary clerk signed as a contractor! The amounts this fraternity pocketed can be seen from the following: Engineer Alexandrov submitted bills (from the "contractors" who found themselves in the dock) for a sum of *over 200,000* rubles; in these accounts, for example, the sum of 4,400 rubles appeared instead of the actually expended sum of 400 rubles. According to the evidence of one of the witnesses, Engineer Alexandrov squandered large sums of money either on women or on his immediate superiors, the railway engineers, spending as much as from fifty to eighty rubles for a single dinner.

Most interesting of all, however, is the manner in which this case was handled and how it ended. The chief of police, to whom a detective reported the matter, "refused to take it up" (!). "This is not

that prevails in the hierarchy of Russian officialdom that they have contempt for any one who is unlike Gogol's Akaky Akakiyevich,[115] or, to use a more contemporary simile, the Man in a Case[116].

Indeed, if men in public office are to be judged, not by the positions they hold, but by their knowledge and their merits, will it not logically and inevitably lead to the creation of freedom of public opinion and public control to judge such knowledge and such merits? Will it not undermine the privileges of estate and rank upon which alone the Russian autocracy rests? Let us but listen to the arguments Kondoidi advances to justify his displeasure:

"Representatives of the social-estates, sometimes without adequately proven grounds, give ear to the words of intellectuals, even if the latter are nothing more than salaried civil servants, merely because they talk about science or quote something they have learned from newspaper or magazine writers". Well, well! Mere "salaried civil servants" daring to teach "representatives of the social-estates"! In

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our affair," he said, "it is the business of the Ministry of Railways," and the detective had to appeal to the public prosecutor. In the end the whole thing came to light because the thieves fell out: Alexandrov "refused to split" with one of the clerk-contractors. The case dragged on *for six years*. Some of the witnesses died in the meantime and many of them managed to forget the most important points in the case. A material witness like Lokhtin, ex-chief of the Kazan region of the Ministry of Railways, *could not be found* (*sic*!): according to one version he was in Kazan, according to another in Yeniseisk on business! This is not a joke, reader—it is taken from the trial record.

The fact that others were implicated, in addition to those brought to trial, is apparent from the following: First, the commendable detective who brought the case to light is no longer in the service; he has purchased a tenement house, and is now living on the income from it. Secondly, Engineer Makarov, *chief of the Kazan Region of the Ministry of Railways* (who during the construction of the Sormovo Dam acted as assistant chief), tried his utmost at the trial to shield Alexandrov. He even declared—literally!—that "*it was perfectly in order*" for the dam to have been washed away in the spring of 1894. When he examined Alexandrov's books, he found everything in perfect order: Alexandrov was distinguished for his experience, zeal, and accuracy!

The result: Alexandrov—one year's confinement in a fortress; Shnakenburg—a severe reprimand (from which he was absolved by the Manifesto of 1896!). The rest were acquitted. The Treasury's claim was disallowed. One can imagine how pleased the unlocated Lokhtins and the Makarovs still in the service must be.

passing, it should be said that the Zemstvo councillors, to whom the Vice-Governor referred, are members of a non-estate institution; but since every institution in our country is thoroughly saturated with the social-estate spirit, and since the Zemstvos, too, have lost the greater part of their non-estate character in consequence of the new regulations, it can be said, for the sake of brevity, that in Russia there are two governing "classes": (1) the administration, and (2) the representatives of the social-estates. There is no room for a third element in a monarchy resting on the social-estates. And if unsubmissive economic development persistently undermines the foundations of the estates by the very growth of capitalism and gives rise to the need for "intellectuals", who are becoming increasingly numerous, then it must be expected that the third element will strive to break out of its narrow confines.

"The dreams of those belonging neither to the administration nor to the representatives of the social-estates in the Zemstvo," said Mr. Kondoidi, "are pure fantasy, but if these dreams have as their basis political tendencies, they may be harmful."

To admit the possibility of "political tendencies" is merely a diplomatic way of admitting their existence. The "dreams" referred to here are, if you will, all assumptions that for the doctor stem from the interests of the medical profession and for the statistician, from the interests of statistics, and that do not take into consideration the interests of the governing estates. In themselves, these dreams are fantasy, but, if you please, they foster political discontent.

We shall now relate the attempt of another administrator, the head of one of the central gubernias, to advance a different argument for displeasure with the third element. According to this official, the activities of the Zemstvo in the gubernia *in his charge* "are year by year departing from the principles upon which the Ordinance on Zemstvo Institutions[117] is based". According to these regulations, the local inhabitants are empowered to manage affairs dealing with local needs and requirements. Owing to the indifference which the majority of landowners display towards the right granted them, "the Zemstvo Assemblies have become a *mere formality* and affairs are conducted by the Zemstvo Boards,

the character of which leaves much to be desired". This "has led to a big increase in the staffs of many Boards and to the practice of enlisting in the Zemstvo the services of *experts*—statisticians, agronomists, teachers, sanitary inspectors, etc., who, conscious of their *educational*, and sometimes *intellectual*, *superiority* over the members of the Zemstvo, have begun to display *increasing independence*, which, in particular, is achieved by convening all kinds of *congresses* in the gubernia and by setting up all kinds of councils in the Boards. As a result, the whole of the Zemstvo administration has fallen into the hands of persons *who have nothing in common with the local population*." Although "there are among these persons many who are well-intentioned and are worthy of the utmost respect, they cannot regard their services as anything else than a means of livelihood, and they are interested in local needs and requirements only to the extent that their personal welfare depends upon these".

In the opinion of the governor, "in Zemstvo affairs, *the hired man cannot take the place of the property-owner*". This argument may be described as more cunning or more candid than the one mentioned above, depending on how one looks at it. It is more cunning because it makes no mention of political tendencies, but tries to base its reasoning exclusively on the interests of local needs and requirements. It is more candid because it openly contrasts the "hired man" to the *property-owner*. This is the time-honoured point of view of the Russian Kit Kitych,[118] who, in hiring a "mere teacher", is guided principally by the market price of this particular form of professional service. The real master of everything is the property-owner, proclaims the representative of the camp from which praises are constantly heard of Russia and its strong and absolutely independent authority which is above all the classes and which, thank God, is free from the domination of selfish interests over public life that prevails in Western countries corrupted by parliamentarianism. And since the property-owner is the master, he must be master also of medical, statistical, and educational "affairs"; our Jack-in-office does not hesitate to draw this conclusion, which is the open recognition of the political leadership of the propertied classes. What is more curious, he does not hesitate to admit that these "experts" are conscious of their

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

educational, and sometimes intellectual, superiority over the members of the Zemstvo. Of course, what other measures can be taken against intellectual superiority than measures of severity?...

Recently, our reactionary press was presented with an excellent opportunity to repeat the demand for these measures of severity. The refusal of the intellectuals to be treated as ordinary hired men, as sellers of labour-power (rather than as citizens fulfilling definite public functions), has led from time to time to conflicts between the bigwigs of the Zemstvo Boards and the doctors who would resign in a body, or to conflicts with the technicians, etc. Recently the struggles between the Boards and the statisticians have assumed an outright epidemic character.

In the May issue of *Iskra* (No. 4), it was reported that the local authorities in Yaroslavl had long been dissatisfied with their statisticians and, after the events in St. Petersburg in March, made a thorough "cleansing" of the statistical bureau, with instructions to the manager "in the future to engage students with extreme caution and with an assurance of their reliability beyond the shadow of a doubt". An article, entitled "Sedition in Vladimir-on-Klyazma" (*Iskra* for June, No. 5), described the general condition of the suspected statisticians, and the reasons for the dislike exhibited towards them by the Governor, the manufacturers, and the landlords. The dismissal of the Vladimir statisticians for having telegraphed a message of sympathy to Annensky (who had been assaulted on Kazan Square on March 4) led practically to the closing-down of the statistical bureau, and as statisticians from other towns refused to serve in a Zemstvo that was unable to protect the interests of its employees, the local gendarmerie was obliged to act as mediator between the dismissed statisticians and the governor. "A gendarme visited several of the statisticians at their homes and suggested to them that they submit a request for reinstatement"; but his mission was a complete failure. Finally, the August issue of *Iskra* (No. 7) reported an "incident in the Yekaterinoslav Zemstvo" in which "pasha" Rodzyanko (chairman of the Gubernia Zemstvo Board) had dismissed statisticians for failing to carry out the "order" to keep a diary, which action led to the resignation of all the other members of the bureau,

as well as to letters of protest from the Kharkov statisticians (published in the came issue of *Iskra*). Complications then began to set in. The Kharkov pasha, Mr. Gordeyenko (also chairman of the gubernia Zemstvo Board), intervened and declared to the statisticians of "his" Zemstvo that he "will not tolerate within the walls of the Board any meetings of employees called to discuss questions that do not concern their duties". The Kharkov statisticians had barely carried out their intention of demanding the dismissal of the spy in their midst (Antonovich), when the administration dismissed the manager of the statistical bureau, which again led to the resignation of all the statisticians.

The excitement caused by these events among the mass of Zemstvo statistical department employees can be judged by the letter written by the Vyatka statisticians, who sought to give a detailed reason for refusing to join the movement, for which they were justly described in *Iskra* (No. 9) as the "Vyatka strike-breakers".

Iskra, of course, reported only some of the conflicts, by far not all, that took place; the legal press reported such conflicts also in the gubernias of St. Petersburg, Olonets, Nizhni-Novgorod, Taurida, and Samara (we include in the category of conflicts cases in which a number of statisticians are dismissed simultaneously, since such cases roused considerable discontent and ferment). The lengths to which the suspicious and shameless provincial authorities went can be judged from the following:

"*S. M. Bleklov*, *manager of the Taurida Bureau*, in his 'Report on the Investigation of Dnieper Uyezd During May and June 1901', which he submitted to the Board, relates that work in the uyezd was carried on under hitherto unprecedented conditions. Although the statisticians had the governor's consent to the undertaking of their duties, were furnished with the necessary documents, and in accordance with the orders of the gubernia officials were entitled to the assistance of the local authorities, they *were nonetheless surrounded with extreme suspicion* on the part of the uyezd police, who *dogged their steps* and expressed their distrust of them *in the rudest manner*, so much so that, as one peasant related, a policeman rode behind the statisticians and questioned the peasants as to whether 'the statisticians were not

carrying on the propaganda of harmful ideas against the state and the fatherland'. According to Mr. Bleklov, the statisticians 'encountered various obstacles and difficulties which not only hindered their work, but deeply outraged *their sense of personal dignity*.... Frequently, the statisticians found themselves in the position of *persons charged with a crime*, concerning whom secret investigations were being made, which were known, by the by, to everybody—persons against whom it was considered necessary to warn all and sundry. The unbearable moral depression which they frequently suffered can therefore be well understood.'"

Not a bad illustration for the record of the Zemstvo-*versus*-statistician conflicts and for the description of the surveillance over the "third element" in general!

Small wonder that the reactionary press rushed in to attack the new "rebels". *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* published a thunderous leading article, entitled "The Strike of the Zemstvo Statisticians" (September 24, No. 263), and a special article by N. A. Znamensky, entitled "The Third Element" (October 10, No. 279). "The third element is rearing its head too high," writes the paper; it is resorting to "systematic opposition and strikes", in order to resist the attempts to introduce "necessary discipline in the service". The blame for all this rests upon the Zemstvo liberals, who have demoralised the employees.

"There is not the slightest doubt that measures have been taken to introduce a degree of order in statistics and in the work of assessing by the more sober and sensible of the Zemstvo leaders, who refused to permit *the Boards* in their charge *to be demoralised by anyone*, *even under the flag of liberal* opposition. The opposition and *the strikes* should at last open their eyes to the character of the people they have to deal with in the persons of the *intellectual proletarians*, *roaming as they did from one gubernia to another*, engaging, who knows, in statistical investigations, *or in educating the local adolescents in the Social-Democratic spirit*.

"At all events, the 'Zemstvo-*versus*-statistician conflicts' will bring home a useful lesson to the more sensible section of the Zemstvo people. We think they will now see clearly that in the person of the '*third element*' they

have nurtured a viper in the bosom of the Zemstvo institutions."*

We, too, have no doubt that the howling and whining of the faithful watchdog of the autocracy (the appellation, as is known, which Katkov, who for so long succeeded in keeping *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* charged with his spirit, assumed for himself) will "open the eyes" of many who do not yet fully understand how irreconcilable autocracy is to the interests of social development, to the interests of the intelligentsia generally, and to the interests of every genuine public cause which does not stand for embezzling state funds and for treachery.

This little picture of the anti-"third element" crusade and the "Zemstvo-*versus*-statistician conflicts" should teach us Social-Democrats an important lesson. It must strengthen our faith in the might of the labour movement we lead; for we see that unrest in the foremost revolutionary class is spreading to other classes and other strata of society, that it has already led, not only to the rousing of the revolutionary spirit among the students to a degree hitherto unparalleled,** but to the beginning of the awakening of the countryside, to greater self-confidence and readiness to struggle on the part of social groups that have until now (as groups) not been very responsive.

Public unrest is growing among the entire people in Russia, among all classes, and it is our duty as revolutionary Social-Democrats to exert every effort to take advantage of this development, in order to explain to the progressive working-class intellectuals what an ally they have in the peasants, in the students, and in the intellectuals generally, and to teach them how to take advantage of the flashes of social protest that break out, now in one place, now in another. We shall be able to assume our role of front-rank fighters

* *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, No. 263.

** As these lines are written, news comes of fresh and greater unrest among the students, of meetings in Kiev, St. Petersburg, and other cities, of the formation of revolutionary students' groups in Odessa, etc. Perhaps history will impose upon the students the role of initiators in the decisive struggle. Be that as it may, if victory is to be achieved in this struggle, the masses of the proletariat must be roused and we must accelerate our efforts to make them class-conscious, to inspire and organise them.

for freedom only when the working class, led by a militant revolutionary party, while never for a moment forgetting its special condition in modern society and its specific historic task of liberating humanity from economic enslavement, will raise the banner in the struggle for *freedom* for the whole people and will rally to this banner all those of the most varied social strata whom the Sipyagins, Kondoidis, and the rest of the gang are so wilfully forcing into the ranks of the discontented.

What is necessary now in order to achieve this is that we infuse into our movement, not only the consistent revolutionary theory elaborated in the course of a century-long development of European thought, but also the revolutionary energy and revolutionary experience bequeathed to us by our West-European and Russian precursors, and that we do not fall into slavish adoption of the opportunism in its various forms from which our Western comrades—who have not been affected by it to such an extent—are turning away, but which is such a strong hindrance to us in our march to victory.

The Russian proletariat, at the present time, is confronted by the most difficult, but extremely gratifying, task: to crush the enemy, whom the long-suffering Russian intelligentsia has been unable to overcome, and to assume its place in the ranks of the international army of socialism.

IV. TWO SPEECHES BY MARSHALS OF THE NOBILITY

"It is a sadly significant fact, entirely without precedent; and many unexampled misfortunes are held in store for Russia by such facts, which are possible only because of our far-advanced social demoralisation...." Thus wrote *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, in the leading article of No. 268 (September 29), commenting on a speech delivered by M. A. Stakhovich, Marshal of the Nobility of Orel Gubernia, at a missionary congress held in that gubernia (the congress closed on September 24).... Well, if "social demoralisation" has affected the marshals of the nobility, the foremost men in the uyezd and the second in importance in the gubernia, where indeed must we seek for the end of this "pestilential, spiritual canker that has seized upon Russia"?

What is the issue? The issue is that this Mr. Stakhovich (the very gentleman who wished to find posts for the Orel nobility as liquor excise collectors; see "Casual Notes", *Zarya*, No. 1*) delivered a fiery speech in defence of freedom of conscience and was "tactless, not to say cynical, enough to suggest the following":**

"*It is the duty of the missionary congress more than of any other body in Russia to proclaim the necessity of freedom of conscience*, the necessity to abolish all penalties for seceding from the Orthodox Church and accepting another faith. *And I would suggest that the Orel missionary congress openly express itself in this sense and present such a petition in suitable manner....*"

Of course, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* was naïve enough to picture Mr. Stakhovich as a Robespierre ("that oh, so gay M. A. Stakhovich, whom I have long known, a Robespierre!" wrote Mr. Suvorin in *Novoye Vremya*, and it was difficult to read his speech "for the defence" without smiling), as it was naïve of Mr. Stakhovich to suggest to the priests that they petition "in suitable manner" for freedom of conscience. It was like suggesting to a congress of police officers that they petition for political freedom!

There is hardly need to add that "the convocation of the clergy, presided over by the highest priest", rejected

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 383-413.—*Ed.*

** *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, September 29, No. 268. I apologise to the reader for betraying such a predilection for *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. But what can one do? In my opinion, it is the most interesting, the most consistent, *and the most serviceable* political newspaper in Russia. One can hardly term "political" literature, in the proper sense of the word, that which at best simply makes a selection of some interesting, though raw, facts and then offers sighs instead of "wisdom": I do not say that such writing cannot be very useful, but it is not politics. Nor can the *Novoye Vremya* type of literature be described as political literature in the real sense of the word, notwithstanding (or rather because of) the fact that it is excessively political. It has no definite political programme and no convictions, it merely possesses the ability to adapt its tone to the moods of the moment, to cringe before the powers that be and carry out their every order, and to flirt with an illusion of public opinion. *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, however, has its own line and does not fear (it has nothing to fear) to march ahead of the government, and to touch upon, at times very frankly, the most delicate subjects. It is a useful newspaper, and indispensable helpmate in revolutionary agitation!

Mr. Stakhovich's suggestion "both on account of the contents of the speech and of its non-accordance with the tasks of the local missionary congress", after hearing the "weighty objections" of His Grace, the Bishop Nikanor of Orel; of N. I. Ivanovsky, Professor of the Kazan Academy of Divinity; of V. M. Skvortsov, editor and publisher of the periodical *Missionerskoye Obozreniye*[119]; of V. A. Ternavtsev and M. A. Novosyolov, members of the university staff; and of several missionary priests. One might say: An alliance of "science" and the church!

Of course, Mr. Stakhovich interests us, not as a model of clear and consistent political thinking, but as a model of the most "oh, so gay" Russian nobleman, who is always ready to grab a slice of the state pie. And one can imagine to what extent "demoralisation" has penetrated Russian life generally and the life of our rural districts in particular as a result of police tyranny and the inquisitorial persecution of religious sects, if the very stones cry out, if even marshals of the nobility have begun to talk strongly about freedom of conscience.

The following instances from Mr. Stakhovich's speech give a striking picture of the outrageous state of affairs that rouses even the most "oh, so gay" to indignation:

"Go to the library of the missionary brotherhood, and take down the handbook of laws. There you will read in Article 783, Volume II, Part I, that it is the duty of the rural chief of police, in addition to preventing duelling, lampooning, drunkenness, hunting in the close season, and men and women washing together in public baths, to keep observation over the arguments directed against the dogmas of the Orthodox Church and to prevent the seduction of the orthodox to other faiths and schisms!" Yes! There is actually such an article in the Act, and it imposes many more such functions upon the rural police chief besides those enumerated by the speaker. The majority of city dwellers would look upon this article as a curiosity, as, indeed, Mr. Stakhovich designated it; but for the peasant this curiosity conceals a *bitterer Ernst*, the bitter truth about the outrages committed by the lower ranks of the police, who are only too firmly convinced that God is very high up and the tsar very far off.

And now some concrete instances that we shall cite together with the official denial made by the President of the Council of the Orel Orthodox Brotherhood of Peter and Paul and of the Orel Diocesan Missionary Congress, Archpriest Peter Rozhdestvensky (*Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, No. 269, reprinted from *Orlovsky Vestnik*,[120] No. 257):

"(a) In the speech [by Mr. Stakhovich] reference is made to a village in Trubchevsk Uyezd:

"'*With the knowledge and consent of the priest and of the officials*, *the suspected Stundists*[121] *were locked in the church*, a table was brought, a white cloth was spread over it, an icon was upon it, and each was led separately to the table and commanded to kiss the icon.

"'"I refuse to kiss idols."

"'"So! *Flog him on the spot*!"

"'The weaker ones returned to the orthodox faith after the first flogging. But there were some who were *flogged four times*.'

"According to the official data presented in the report of the Orel Orthodox Brotherhood of Peter and Paul, published as far back as 1896, and according to the verbal information given at the congress by Father D. Pereverzev, the described acts of violence inflicted by the orthodox population upon the sectarians of the village of Lyubets in Trubchevsk Uyezd took place *following a decision adopted at the village meeting and somewhere in the village*, *but certainly not with the consent of the local priest and on no account in the church*; this regrettable incident took place *eighteen or nineteen years ago*, long before the Orel Diocesan Mission was even thought of."

Commenting on the above, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* states that Mr. Stakhovich cited *only two facts* in his speech. Perhaps so. But what facts they were! The refutation based on "official data" (of the rural police) and on the report of the Orthodox Brotherhood *but emphasises* the shocking character of the outrages which roused the indignation of even an "oh, so gay" nobleman. Whether the flogging took place "somewhere in the village" or in the church, six months or eighteen years ago, does not alter the case in the least (except perhaps in the one respect that, by general knowledge, the persecution of sects has become even more brutal of late and that the establishment of missions is directly

related to this fact). As to the local priest's *having had nothing to do with the inquisitors in rustic garb**—better had you kept quiet about it in the press, Reverend Father; you will only be a laughing-stock. Of course, the "local priest" did not give his "consent" to torture, a punishable act under the Criminal Code, any more than the Holy Inquisition punished its victims with its own hands. It handed them over to the secular authorities; nor did it ever shed blood, it only had its victims burned.

The second fact:

"(b) It was stated in the speech:

"'In that case the priest will never again be able to give the answer we heard him give here: "*You say*, *Father*, *there were forty families and now there are only four*. What has become of the rest?"

"'"By the grace of God *they have been banished to Transcaucasia and to Siberia*."'

"Actually, in the village of Glybochka, Trubchevsk Uyezd, which is the village concerned in this case, there were *in 1898*, according to the report of the Brotherhood, not *forty* Stundist *families*, *but forty persons* of both sexes, including twenty-one children. In that year only seven persons were banished to Transcaucasia by order of the regional court as a penalty for proselytising to the Stundist faith. As for the expression of the local priest, '*banished by the grace of God*', *it was a casual remark dropped at a closed session of the congress during a free exchange of opinion among the delegates*, the more so, since the priest in question was previously known to every one, and at the congress proved himself to be *a most worthy* missionary priest."

Such a refutation is truly priceless! Casually dropped during a free exchange of opinion! This is precisely what makes it interesting, for we know only too well the real value of the official utterances of official persons. And if the priest,

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* In his rejoinder to the official denial, Mr. Stakhovich wrote: "I do not know what the official report of the Brotherhood contains, but Father Pereverzev related the details of this incident at the congress and stated that the civil authorities knew of the decision of the village meeting [*sic*!!]. ... I asked him personally whether the priest knew and he answered, "Yes, he knew too." Comment is superfluous.

who uttered these words "straight from the heart", is "a most worthy missionary priest", the more significant are these words for that very reason. "By the grace of God, banished to Transcaucasia and to Siberia." These magnificent words should become no less famous than Metropolitan Philaret's defence of serfdom with the help of Holy Writ.

Since we have mentioned Philaret, it would be unfair not to mention the letter addressed by a "learned liberal" to His Grace Ambrosius, Archbishop of Kharkov, and published in the magazine *Vera i Razum*[122] for 1901.* The author of the letter signed himself: Jeronim Preobrazhensky, honorary citizen, formerly a member of the clergy. It was the editor who described him as the "learned [!] liberal", no doubt because he was overawed by his "well of wisdom". We shall cite only a few passages from the letter, which again reveals the fact that political thought and political protest penetrate by unseen ways into wider circles than we sometimes imagine.

"I am already an old man, nearly sixty. During my lifetime I have observed not a few departures from the fulfilment of church duties, and I must say conscientiously that in every case the clergy was to blame. As for '*the latest events*', I think we should fervently thank the clergy of our day for opening the eyes of many. Now not only volost clerks but young and old, educated and uneducated and even those barely able to read will strive to read the writings of the great Russian author. People pay high prices to get his books (published abroad by Svobodnoye Slovo,[123] and freely obtainable in all countries of the world except Russia); they read them, discuss them, and finally come to conclusions that are, of course, not favourable to the clergy. The people are now beginning to understand where truth and where falsehood lies; they see that the clergy say one thing and do another, and that often even their words are contradictory. Much that is true might be said, but unfortunately one cannot speak frankly with the clergy; they would immediately report to the authorities and demand punishment and execution.... But Christ did not attract converts by force and by executions, but by justice and love....

"... In concluding your speech, you write: 'We possess a great force for the struggle—that is the autocratic power of our most devout sovereigns.' Again a subterfuge, and again we refuse to believe you. Although you, the *enlightened* clergy, strive to assure us that you

* We take this opportunity to thank the correspondent who sent us the reprints from the magazine. Our ruling classes very often are not ashamed to expose themselves *au naturel* in prison, church, and similar special publications. It is high time we revolutionaries systematically utilised this "rich treasure-house" of political enlightenment.

'imbibed loyalty to the autocrat with your mother's milk' (from the speech of the present vicar, delivered at the time of his consecration as bishop), we, the *unenlightened*, refuse to believe that a year-old infant (even a future bishop) could reason about the form of government and give preference to autocracy. After the abortive attempt of Patriarch Nikon to play in Russia the role of the Popes of Rome, who in Western countries combined within themselves spiritual and temporal power, our church, through its highest representatives, the metropolitans, has wholly and for ever subjected itself to the power of the sovereigns, who sometimes, as was the case with Peter the Great, despotically imposed their will upon the church. (The pressure Peter the Great brought to bear upon the clergy in the condemnation of Tsarevich Alexei.) In the nineteenth century, we see complete harmony between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities in Russia. In the stern epoch of Nicholas I, when, influenced by the great social movements in the West, social consciousness began to awaken in Russia and here, too, individual champions arose to fight against the outrageous enslavement of the common people, our church remained completely indifferent to the popular sufferings, and despite Christ's great commandment of human brotherhood and brotherly love, not a single voice was raised among the clergy in defence of the dispossessed people, against the cruel tyranny of the landlords; and the only reason for this was that the government did not yet dare to lay its hand upon serfdom, the existence of which Philaret of Moscow openly sought to justify with biblical texts from the Old Testament. Then came the storm: Russia was defeated and politically degraded at Sevastopol. The defeat clearly exposed all the defects of our pre-Reform* system, and before all else our young, humane sovereign (who owes the education of his mind and spirit to the poet Zhukovsky) broke the ancient chains of slavery; but, by the irony of fate, the test of the great act of February 19 was submitted for revision from the Christian point of view to the selfsame Philaret, who apparently hastened to change his views regarding serfdom to suit the spirit of our times. The epoch of the great reforms left its mark also upon our clergy, which, under Makarius (afterwards Metropolitan) carried on the fruitful work of reorganising our ecclesiastical institutions in which they hacked a window (even if a small one) into the world of light and publicity. The period of reaction, which set in after March 1, 1881, enabled an element of leadership corresponding to the manner of Pobedonostsev and Katkov to penetrate into the clergy; and while the progressive people of the country in the Zemstvos and in society are presenting petitions for the abolition of the survivals of corporal punishment, the church remains silent and utters not a word in condemnation of those who defend the rod—that atrocious instrument for the degradation of human beings created in the image of God. After all this, would it be unjust to suppose *in the event of changes in the régime from above* that our clergy, through its representatives, would praise a constitutional monarch just as it now lauds the autocratic monarch? Why then the hypocrisy? Strength lies, not in the autocracy, but in

* Prior to the Peasant Reform of 1861.—*Tr.*

the monarch. Peter I was also a heaven-sent autocrat, but the church to this day does not favour him, and Peter III was a similar autocrat who wanted to shear and educate our clergy—what a pity he was not allowed to reign for two or three years! And if the present reigning autocrat, Nicholas II, decided to express his kindly feelings for the famous Lev Nikolayevich,* where would you then run to hide with your snares, your fears, and your threats?

"In vain you quote texts of the prayers which the clergy sends up for the tsar; this jumble of words in an incomprehensible jargon convinces no one. We live under an autocracy: if ordered to do so, you will write prayers thrice as long and even more expressive".

* * *

The second marshal's speech, as far as we know, was not published in our press. A hectographed copy, sent to us by an unknown correspondent last August, bore the following pencilled inscription: "Speech delivered by an uyezd marshal of the nobility at a private meeting of marshals called to discuss student affairs." We give the speech in full:

"For lack of time I shall express my views on this meeting of marshals of the nobility in the form of theses:

"The cause of the present disorders is known approximately: They are called forth, first, by the disordered state of our entire governmental system, by the oligarchic régime of the bureaucratic corporate body, i.e., by the dictatorship of the bureaucrats.

"This state of disorder in the bureaucratic governmental dictatorship reveals itself throughout the whole of Russian society, from top to bottom, in the form of general discontent that finds its outward expression in the general politicalism, a politicalism that is not temporary or superficial, but profound and chronic.

"This politicalism, the common disease of the whole of society, permeates all its manifestations, its functions and institutions, and for that reason necessarily the educational institutions, with their younger, more impressionable public, which is oppressed by the same régime of the bureaucratic dictatorship.

"It is recognised that the root evil of student disorders lies in the general disorganisation of the state and in the general disease resulting from this condition; however, in view of the spontaneous sentiments and of the necessity for checking the development of the local evil, the disorders cannot be ignored and efforts must be made at least from this side to diminish the frightfully destructive manifestations of the general evil in the same way as, when the whole organism is diseased and is in need of prolonged and radical treatment, it is necessary to take urgent measures to suppress local, acute, and destructive complications of the disease.

* Lev Tolstoi.—*Tr.*

"In the secondary and higher educational establishments, the evil of the bureaucratic régime finds expression principally in the substitution of human (youthful) development and education by bureaucratic training, which is combined with the systematic suppression of human individuality and dignity.

"The distrust, indignation, and anger against the officials and the teachers roused among the youth by all these manifestations are being transferred from the high schools to the universities, where, unfortunately, the universities being what they are at present, the youth encounters the same evils and the same suppression of human individuality and dignity.

"In a word, for the youth, the universities are not temples of learning, but factories for converting the impersonal student masses into the bureaucratic commodity required by the state.

"This suppression of human individuality (in the process of converting the students into an impersonal, pliable mass), which reveals itself in the form of a systematic and chronic suppression and persecution of all personality and dignity, frequently in the form of brutal violence, lies at the base of all student disorders that have erupted for several decades and threaten to continue with greater intensity in the future, carrying off the best of Russia's youth.

"All this we know—but what are we to do in the present situation? How can we help the present acute situation with all its bitterness, with all its misery and sorrow? Give up all efforts? Abandon our youth to the mercy of fate, to the bureaucrats, and to the police, without attempting to help them—wash our hands of the whole thing and walk off? This, to my mind, is the main issue, namely, what can we do to assuage the acute manifestation of this disease, now that we recognise its general character?

"Our meeting reminds me of a crowd of well-intentioned people who have entered a wild forest for the purpose of clearing it, and who stand in utter amazement at the enormity of the general task, instead of concentrating on any one special point.

"Professor K. T. has presented to us a striking general picture of the true state of affairs today in the universities and among the students, pointing out the various harmful influences from the outside, not only political, but even police influences, upon the unstable students; but we knew all this before, more or less, albeit not so clearly as we know now.

"He suggested a radical change in the whole of the educational system and its substitution by a better system as the only possible measure to adopt, but the professor remarked that this would probably require considerable time; and if we bear in mind that every particular system in the Russian state, as in every other state, forms an organic part of the system as a whole, then perhaps the end of that time is not foreseeable.

"But what must we do now in order at least to assuage the unbearable pain caused by the disease at the present time? What palliative can we adopt? Even palliatives that temporarily soothe the patient are frequently recognised as necessary. This is a question we have not answered. Instead of a reply, we have heard vague, wavering opinions

as regards the student youth in general, which, I might say, obscure the question even more. It is even difficult to recall those judgements, but I will endeavour to do so.

"Something was said about girl students: We gave them courses and lectures, and see how they thank us—by taking part in student disorders!

"Now, had we presented bouquets or costly ornaments to the fair sex, such a reproach would be conceivable; to organise lecture courses for women, however, is not a favour, but the satisfaction of a social need. Women's lecture courses are not a caprice, but as much a socially necessary educational institution as are the universities for the higher development of the youth of both sexes. That is why full social and comradely solidarity exists between the male and female educational institutions.

"This solidarity, to my view, likewise fully explains the fact that the unrest among the student youth has also spread among the students in women's educational institutions. All the students are in a state of unrest, irrespective of attire, male or female.

"Someone else then spoke about the student unrest, saying that we must not be indulgent with the students, that their outrages must be halted by force. To this, in my opinion, the rational objection was made that even if the conduct of the students can be set down as outrageous, these are not fortuitous, but are chronic and deep-rooted and that therefore the resort to mere punitive measures, as past experience has shown, will prove unavailing. Personally, as I view the matter, it is highly questionable as to which side is responsible for the greatest outrage of all the outrageous disorders that excite our educational institutions and are bringing them to their doom; I do not believe the government's reports.

"This is the very point, that the other side is not listened to and cannot be listened to; it is gagged (the justice of my words, that in its reports the administration lies and that by its atrocious conduct it is chiefly responsible for the outrages, has not been fully confirmed).

"Reference was made to the outside influences of various revolutionary forces upon the student youth.

"Yes, those influences exist, but too much significance is attached to them. Thus, the factory owners, in whose factories these influences are mainly felt, also throw the blame for everything upon them, arguing that, were it not for those influences, there would be quiet and contentment and the peace of God in their factories; they forget or ignore all the legal and illegal exploitation of the workers, which brings about their impoverishment and rouses amongst them discontent and finally leads to disorders. Were it not for this exploitation, the revolutionary elements working from the outside would be deprived of the many grounds and causes that enable them to penetrate so easily into factory affairs. All this, in my opinion, may also be said with respect to our educational institutions, which have been transformed from temples of learning into factories for the manufacture of bureaucratic material.

"The power of the small but purposive handful of young men and women, of whom the professor spoke, to hypnotise and incite crowds

of young men and women, apparently not in the least so predisposed, to strikes and to disorders lies in the general, instinctive consciousness of the oppression weighing over the whole of our student youth, and in the generally unhealthy state of mind that is created by this oppression among student youth at all levels. This is what happens in all factories.

"I recall also that something was said about not flattering the students, about not showing them sympathy during disorders, since expressions of sympathy merely incite them to fresh outbreaks, to illustrate which argument a number of varying instances were cited. On this point I would say, first of all, that in view of the manifold confusion and the diversity of occurrences during disorders, it is impossible to point to single cases as illustrative of all, since, for every such case, numerous others of a directly contradictory character can be found. One can only dwell on the general indications, which I shall here briefly undertake to do.

"As we all know, the students are far from being coddled, not only have they not been scented with incense (I do not speak of the forties), but they have never enjoyed any particular public sympathy. At the time of the disorders, the public was either indifferent to the students or even more than negative towards them, throwing the blame entirely upon them, without knowing (or desiring to know) the causes of the disorders (credence was given, without the slightest doubt as to their veracity, to the government reports, which were hostile to the students, apparently for the first time the public has begun to doubt them). To speak, therefore, of flattering the students is quite beside the mark.

"Failing to find support among the intelligentsia in general or among the professors and the university officials, the students finally began to seek sympathy among the various popular elements, and we know that they succeeded more or less in finding it, they have begun gradually to gain the sympathy of the popular crowds.

"To be convinced of this, one need only note the difference between the present attitude of the crowd and that displayed towards the students at the time of the Okhotny Ryad[124] assaults. Herein lies the great evil: the evil is not that sympathy is expressed, but that this sympathy is one-sided, that it is assuming a demagogic tinge.

"The absence of sympathy and support of any kind on the part of the settled intelligentsia, and the distrust this gives rise to, throws our youth inevitably into the arms of demagogues and revolutionists; it becomes their tools and, again inevitably, demagogic elements begin more and more to develop among the student youth, drawing it away from peaceful, cultural development and from the existing order (if it can be called order) and driving it into the enemy camp.

"We ourselves are to blame if our youth has ceased to have confidence in us; we have done nothing to deserve its confidence.

"These, I think, are the main ideas that were expressed at this meeting; the others (considerable in number, too) are hardly worth recalling.

"I come now to the conclusion. In gathering here, our intention was to do something to calm the passions of the present day, to lighten

the heavy burden of our youth today, not some time in the future, and we were defeated. Again the youth will be justified in saying and will say that today as in the past the peaceful, settled Russian intelligentsia neither can nor wishes to render it any assistance, to come to its defence, to understand it and to ease its bitter lot. The gulf between ourselves and the youth will become wider, and the youth will increasingly join up with the various demagogues whose hand is outstretched towards it.

"We were not defeated by the fact that the measure we proposed, a petition to the tsar, was not accepted; perhaps that measure was not a practical one (although in my opinion no attention was paid to it); we were defeated by the fact that we ourselves destroyed all possibility of applying any measure whatsoever to help our suffering youth; we have confessed our impotence, and once again we grope as before, in darkness.

"What remains for us to do?

"Wash our hands of the affair?

"This darkness constitutes the terrible and gloomy tragedy of Russian life."

This speech requires no lengthy comment. It too, apparently, belongs to a still sufficiently "oh, so gay" Russian noble who, either for doctrinaire or for selfish motives, expresses reverence for "peaceful, cultural development" of the "existing order" and waxes indignant with "revolutionists", whom he confounds with "demagogues". But this indignation, if examined closely, borders on the grumbling of an old man (old, not in age but in views) who perhaps is ready to recognise something good in the thing he is grumbling about. In speaking of the "existing order" he cannot refrain from remarking, "if it can be called order". He smoulders with resentment against the disorder caused by the "dictatorship of the bureaucrats", the "systematic and chronic persecution of all personality and dignity"; he cannot close his eyes to the fact that all the outrages are committed chiefly by the administration. He is sufficiently straightforward to confess his impotence and to recognise the indecency of "washing one's hands" of the entire country's misery. True, he is still frightened by the "one-sided" sympathy of the "crowd" towards the students. His aristocratically effeminated mind is haunted by the menace of "demagogy", and perhaps even by the menace of socialism (let us repay candour with candour). But it would be absurd to attempt to test the views and sentiments of a marshal of the nobility who is fed up with the disgusting Russian bureaucracy by the

touchstone of socialism. We have no need to be diplomatic either in regard to him or to anyone else; when we hear a Russian landlord, for example, storming against the illegal exploitation and the impoverishment of *factory* workers, we will not fail, incidentally, to say to him, Cast out the beam out of thine own eye, friend! We shall not for a moment conceal from him that we stand and will continue to stand for the irreconcilable class struggle against the "masters" of modern society. But a political alignment is determined, not only by ultimate aims, but also by immediate aims, not only by general views, but also by the pressure of direct practical necessity. Whoever clearly sees the contradiction between the "cultural development" of the country and the "oppressive régime of the bureaucratic dictatorship" must, sooner or later, be compelled by the very facts of life to come to the conclusion that this contradiction cannot be removed unless the autocracy is removed. Having come to this conclusion, he will unfailingly assist—grumble, but assist—the party that can rouse a menacing force against the autocracy—a force that will be menacing, not only in the eyes of the autocracy, but in the eyes of all. In order to become such a party, we repeat, Social-Democracy must purge itself of all opportunistic pollution, and under the banner of revolutionary theory, basing itself on the most revolutionary class, it must carry its agitation and organising activity among all classes of the population.

Taking our leave of the marshals of the nobility, we say, *Au revoir*, gentlemen, our allies of tomorrow!

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *DOCUMENTS OF THE "UNITY" CONFERENCE*

In *Iskra*, No. 9 (October 1901),* we told of the unsuccessful attempt to unite the section of the *Zarya-Iskra* organisation abroad, the revolutionary organisation *Sotsial-Demokrat* and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. We have decided to publish the proceedings of the "Unity" Conference, so that all Russian Social-Democrats may independently draw their own conclusions as to the reasons for the failure of the attempt at unity made by the organisations abroad. Unfortunately, the secretary of the Conference, elected by the Union Abroad, refused to assist in drawing up the minutes of the proceedings (as will be seen from his letter, quoted on pages 10 and 11 of this pamphlet, in reply to the invitation to him by the secretaries of the two other organisations).

This refusal is all the more strange for the reason that the Union Abroad has published its own account of the "Unity" Conference (*Two Conferences*, Geneva, 1901). It would appear, therefore, that although the Union Abroad desired to inform the Russian comrades of the results of the Conference, *it did not wish* to acquaint them with the debates.** We leave

* See present volume, pp. 241-42.—*Ed.*

** According to the Conference standing orders, the minutes should have been approved by the Conference itself, each day's proceedings commencing with the reading and approval of the minutes of the previous day's proceedings. But on the second day, when the chairman, in opening the session, called for the minutes of the first day's two sessions, the three secretaries in one voice declared that they could not present them. Owing to the absence of a stenographer, the records were in a most unsatisfactory state. It is quite understandable, therefore, that if the secretaries could not prepare the minutes on the night after the first day of the Conference, it was useless to ex-

it to the reader to draw his own conclusions as to the possible and probable reasons for this unwillingness.

After the Union Abroad had rejected our proposal, we on our part did not think it desirable to publish a summary of the discussion that had not been drawn up jointly by all three secretaries; for this reason we are obliged to confine ourselves to the publication of *all* documents and declarations *submitted to the bureau* of the Conference. The bureau consisted of the chairmen and secretaries of all three organisations, and all declarations were submitted to the bureau exclusively in writing; thus there can be no doubt about the objectivity of a description of the Conference which is based on the documents and declarations.

On the other hand, the publication of *all* the documents and declarations presented to the bureau is all the more necessary at the present time, since the Union Abroad has crowned its strange refusal to participate in drawing up the minutes of the Conference with a still stranger method of drawing up the Conference report. Thus, the Union Abroad *has not reproduced* in full the interpellations* submitted *to the bureau* of the Conference by the representative of *Iskra* (Frey[125]) in the name of the *Iskra* section abroad, and of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation; but it did reproduce the reply (to the interpellations) "drawn up" by the Union Abroad but not submitted to the bureau and not even read at the Conference (*Two Conferences*, p. 26). The Union Abroad is mistaken in stating that the "interpellation" was withdrawn. The interpellation consisted of the two questions submitted to the Union by Frey in the name of the two organisations (see p. 6 of this pamphlet). *Neither* of these questions *was withdrawn*; only the form was changed

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pect that the minutes would be ready on the evening of the second day when we left the Conference. Everyone knew perfectly well that the minutes were not ready. Hence, the indignation of the Union Abroad over the "desertion" of our chairman, who "did not wait until the minutes of the Conference were approved" (*Two Conferences*, p. 29), is nothing but a subterfuge. Since there was no verbatim report, there was nothing else to do except for the three secretaries to get together and draw up at least a brief summary of the discussions. This, in fact, was our proposal, but the Union Abroad rejected it. Clearly, the responsibility for the absence of a summarised, if not a full, report of the Conference, rests upon the Union Abroad.

* See present volume, p. 230.—*Ed.*

to turn the questions into a resolution which might have been submitted to a vote (the words "Does the Union Abroad recognise in principle the resolution of the June Conference?" were altered to read: "The three organisations accept in principle the resolution of the June Conference", etc.). Furthermore, the Union Abroad has not published the declaration of the Borba group *which was presented to the bureau* (see pp. 6-7 of this pamphlet).

Not only has the Union Abroad failed to publish the contents of the speech delivered by a member of the Borba group after the Union had submitted amendments to the June resolutions, but it makes no reference whatever to the speech.* In that speech, a member of the Borba group, who had taken part in the June Conference, spoke against the amendments of the Union Abroad. The Union published the "arguments" in favour of the amendments, contained in a speech delivered at the Conference by B. Krichevsky, without, however, having presented them to the bureau. In a word, having rejected our proposal for the joint drafting of a summary of the entire discussion, the Union preferred to publish only what it thought of advantage to itself and to ignore even some of the things that were presented to the bureau.

We do not propose to follow that example. We have confined ourselves to the publication of all the declarations and documents presented to the bureau, with the bare statement as to the opinions expressed by the spokesmen of *all* the organisations represented at the Conference. Let the reader judge as to whether the articles in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, and the *amendments* of the Union Abroad have violated the principle that was the basis of the agreement drawn up at the June Conference. Of course, we shall also leave unanswered the angry words that so profusely decorate the pages of the pamphlet of the Union Abroad, including the charges of "slander", or of our having "broken up" the Conference by leaving it. Such accusations can only raise a smile. Three organisations gathered to discuss the question of unity. Two agreed that they could not unite with the third. Naturally, there was nothing left for the two organisations but to

* See pamphlet *Two Conference*, p. 28.

explain their position and depart. Only those who are angry because they are wrong can characterise this step as "breaking up" the Conference, or designate as "slander" the assertion that the Union Abroad wavers in questions of principle.

As for our view of the controversial questions of Russian Social-Democracy, we prefer not to confuse the issue with an objective report of the Conference proceedings. In addition to the articles that have already appeared, and will appear, in *Iskra* and *Zarya*, we are preparing a special pamphlet on the urgent questions of our movement, to be published in the near future.

Written in November 1901

First published in December 1901 in a pamphlet issued by the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad

Published according to the text in the pamphlet

THE PROTEST OF THE FINNISH PEOPLE

We publish below the full text of another mass petition by means of which the Finnish people express their strong protest against the policy of the government, which has violated, and continues to violate, the constitution of Finland, thus breaking the *oath* solemnly taken by all the tsars, from Alexander I to Nicholas II.

The petition was presented to the Finnish Senate on September 17 (30), 1901, for submission to the tsar. It is signed by 473,363 Finnish men and women of all strata of society, i.e., by nearly *half a million* citizens. The total population of Finland is 2,500,000, so that this petition veritably expresses *the voice of the entire people*.

The text reads in full:

"*Most puissant*, *most gracious Sovereign*, *Emperor and Grand Duke!* Your Imperial Majesty's change of the law On military service in Finland has aroused general alarm and profound sorrow throughout the territory.

The orders, the Manifesto and the law on military service, confirmed by Your Imperial Majesty on July 12 (June 29) this year are to complete violation of the fundamental laws of the Grand Duchy and of the precious rights belonging to the Finnish people and to all the citizens of the country by virtue of its laws.

"In accordance with the fundamental laws, regulations governing citizens' duties to defend the region may be issued only with the consent of the Diet. This was the procedure by which the Military Service Act of 1878 was passed, in accordance with a joint decision of the Emperor Alexander II and the Diet. During the reign of Emperor Alexander III, numerous specific changes were made in this Law, but none without the consent of the Diet. Despite this, the Law of 1878 is declared annulled, without the consent of the Diet, and the new orders issued in place of the old Law are at complete variance with the decision of the deputies to the Extraordinary Diet of 1899.

"One of the most important rights vested in every Finnish citizen is the right to live and act under the protection of the Finnish laws.

Today, thousands and thousands of Finnish citizens are deprived of this right, for the new Military Service Act compels them to serve in Russian units and converts military service into suffering for those sons of our country who will be forcibly drafted into these units, alien to them in language, religion, manners, and customs.

"The new regulations abolish every legally fixed limitation of the annual contingent. Moreover, they contain no recognition of the right granted by the fundamental laws for the Diet to participate in drafting the military budget.

"In violation of the fundamental principle of the Law of 1878, even the militia has been made entirely dependent upon the discretion of the Minister of War.

"The impression created by such regulations is not modified by the measures of relief referred to in the Manifesto, which are to operate for a transitional period as yet undefined, because the temporary reduction in the number of recruits will be immediately followed by unlimited drafts for service with Russian units.

"The Finnish people have not asked for any relief of the military burden they have carried. The Diet, which expresses the opinion of the people, has proved Finland's readiness to increase its share in the defence of the state as far as it is in its power, on the condition that the juridical position of the Finnish troops as a Finnish institution is preserved.

"Contrary to this, the new regulations state that the majority of the Finnish units are to be abolished and Russian officers permitted to enter the service of the few remaining units; that even the non-commissioned officers of these units must know the Russian language which means that Finnish-born citizens mainly of peasant strata will be prevented from filling these posts; that these troops are to come under Russian administration and that they may, even in peace-time, be stationed outside of Finland.

"These orders which do not constitute a reform but merely pursue the aim of abolishing the national troops of Finland, are a sign of distrust which the Finnish people throughout almost a century of union with Russia have done nothing to deserve.

"The new military service regulations also contain expressions, the implication of which is that the Finnish people have no fatherland of their own and that the rights of Finnish citizenship to those born in the country are denied. These expressions betray aims that are incompatible with the inalienable right of the Finnish people to preserve, in their union with Russia, the political position firmly guaranteed to Finland in 1809.

"A grave misfortune has beset our region during the recent years. Time and again it has been demonstrated that the established fundamental laws of the region are ignored, partly in legislative measures and partly in the assignment of Russians to important posts. The region has been administered in a manner to suggest that the aim was to disturb peace and order, to hinder useful pursuits, and to cause friction between Russians and Finns.

"The greatest misfortune that has befallen the country, however, is the introduction of the new military service regulations.

In its humble response of May 27, 1899, the Diet described in detail the order which, according to the fundamental laws of Finland must be observed in the promulgation of a law on military service. It was pointed out that if a new law on military service is passed in any other way, that law, even if put into operation by force, cannot be recognised as a legal measure, and in the eyes of the Finnish people will be nothing more than an act of violence.

"Everything the Diet indicated continues to be the Finnish people's unchanging sense of justice, which cannot be changed by violence.

"Serious consequences are to be feared from regulations not in accord with the laws of the country. The conscience of officials in government institutions will come into grave conflict with their sense of duty for conscience will urge them to refuse to be guided by such regulations. The number of able-bodied emigrants compelled to leave the country from fear of the threatening changes will increase still more if the regulations announced will be put into effect.

"The new military service regulations, like every other measure directed against the rights of the Finnish people to a separate political and national existence, must inevitably sow distrust between the monarch and the people, as well as give rise to growing discontent, to a sense of general oppression, to uncertainty, and to enormous difficulties for society and its members in the work for the welfare of the region. These evils cannot be avoided except by the substitution of the aforesaid regulations by a military service law passed jointly with the Diet, and in general by the strict observance of the fundamental laws on the part of the government authorities of the region.

"The Finnish people cannot cease to be a separate people. United by a common historical fate, by juridical conceptions and cultural work, our people will remain true to its love of the Finnish fatherland and to its traditional liberty. The people will not deviate from its aspirations to occupy worthily the modest place fate has destined for it among the nations.

"Firm in the conviction of our rights and in the respect for our laws which are our mainstay in our social life, we are no less firmly convinced that the unity of mighty Russia will suffer no damage if Finland continues in the future to be administered in accordance with the fundamental principles laid down in 1809, and in this way to feel happy and peaceful in its union with Russia.

"The sense of duty to their country compels the inhabitants of all communities and social strata to submit to Your Imperial Majesty a true and unembellished record of the state of affairs. We pointed out above that the recently promulgated military service regulations, contradicting as they do the solemnly guaranteed fundamental laws of the Grand Duchy, cannot be regarded as a legal act. We consider it our duty to add that the military burden in itself is not nearly so important to the Finnish people as the loss of firmly established rights and of legally founded tranquillity on this most important question. We therefore humbly pray Your Imperial Majesty graciously to give the matters referred to in this petition the attention their seriousness calls for. We are, etc."

We have little to add to the above petition, which represents a people's indictment of the gang of Russian official law-breakers.

We shall enumerate the principal facts of the "Finnish question".

Finland was annexed to Russia in 1809, during the war with Sweden. Desiring to win over the Finns who were formerly subjects of the Swedish King, Alexander I decided to recognise and confirm the old Finnish constitution. According to this constitution, no fundamental law can be made, amended, interpreted, or repealed *without the consent of the Diet*, *i.e.*, *the assembly of representatives of all social-estates*. Alexander I, in a number of manifestos, "solemnly" confirmed "*the promise sacredly to preserve the separate constitution of the country*".

This sacred promise was subsequently confirmed by all succeeding Russian monarchs, including Nicholas II, who, in the Manifesto of October 25 (November 6), 1894, "promised to preserve them [the fundamental laws] in their inviolable and immutable force and operation".

Within five years the Tsar of Russia *had broken his solemn oath*. Preceded by a campaign of vilification, conducted by the venal and servile press, the Manifesto of February 3 (15), 1899 was promulgated, introducing new regulations, according to which laws might be passed *without the consent of the Diet* "if these laws concern the requirements of the Empire as a whole or are part of imperial legislation".

This was a glaring violation of the constitution, a veritable *coup d'état*, because every law can be said to concern the requirements of the Empire as a whole!

This coup d'etat was brought about *by violence*: Governor General Bobrikov threatened to call troops into Finland if the Senate refused to publish the Manifesto. According to the statements made by Russian officers, ball cartridges were distributed to the Russian troops stationed in Finland, and horses were saddled, etc.

The first act of violence was followed by innumerable others. Finnish newspapers were suppressed one after another, the right of assembly was annulled, Finland was flooded with swarms of Russian spies and despicable provocateurs, who incited the people to rebellion etc., etc. Finally, the

Military Service Act of June 29 (July 12) was passed, *without the consent of the Diet*. This law has been dealt with sufficiently in the petition.

Both the Manifesto of February 3, 1899 and the Act of June 29, 1901 are *illegal*. This is the violence of a perjurer acting with a horde of bashi-bazouks called the tsarist government. It would be futile, of course, for 2,500,000 Finns to think of an uprising; but we, all Russian citizens, should ponder over the disgrace that puts us to shame. We are still slaves to such an extent that we are employed to reduce other peoples to slavery. We still tolerate a government that suppresses every aspiration towards liberty in Russia with the ferocity of an executioner, and that furthermore employs Russian troops for the purpose of violently infringing on the liberties of others!

Iskra, No. 10, November 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

THE JOURNAL *SVOBODA*[126]

Svoboda is a worthless little rag. Its author—indeed, this is precisely the impression it creates, that one person has written it all, from beginning to end—claims to write popularly "for the workers". But what we have here is not popularisation, but talking down in the worst sense of the term. There is not one simple word, everything is twisted.... The author cannot write a single phrase without embellishments, without "popular" similes and "popular" catchwords such as "theirn". Outworn socialist ideas are chewed over in this ugly language without any new data, any new examples, any new analysis, and the whole thing is deliberately vulgarised. Popularisation, we should like to inform the author, is a long way from vulgarisation, from talking down. The popular writer leads his reader towards profound thoughts, towards profound study, proceeding from simple and generally known facts; with the aid of simple arguments or striking examples he shows the main *conclusions* to be drawn from those facts and arouses in the mind of the thinking reader ever newer questions. The popular writer does not presuppose a reader that does not think, that cannot or does not wish to think; on the contrary, he assumes in the undeveloped reader a serious intention to use his head and *aids* him in his serious and difficult work, leads him, helps him over his first steps, and *teaches* him to go forward independently. The vulgar writer assumes that his reader does not think and is incapable of thinking; he does

not lead him in his first steps towards serious knowledge, but in a distortedly simplified form, interlarded with jokes and facetiousness, hands out "ready-made" *all* the conclusions of a known theory, so that the reader does not even have to chew but merely to swallow what he is given.

Written in the autumn of 1901
First published in the magazine *Bolshevik*, No. 2, 1936

Published according to the manuscript



First page of the manuscript of Lenin's
"The Journal *Svoboda*". 1901
Reduced

A TALK WITH DEFENDERS OF ECONOMISM

Below we publish in full, as received from one of our representatives,

"*A Letter to the Russian Social-Democratic Press.*

"In response to the suggestion made by our comrades in exile that we express our views on *Iskra*, we have resolved to state the reasons for our disagreement with that organ.

"While recognising that the appearance of a special Social-Democratic organ specially devoted to questions of the political struggle is entirely opportune, we do not think that *Iskra*, which has undertaken this task, has performed it satisfactorily. The principal drawback of the paper, which runs like a scarlet thread through its columns, and which is the cause of all its other defects, large and small, is the exaggerated importance it attaches to the influence which the ideologists of the movement exert upon its various tendencies. At the same time, *Iskra* gives too little consideration to the material elements and the material environment of the movement, whose interaction creates a definite type of labour movement and determines its path, the path from which the ideologists, despite all their efforts, are incapable of diverting it, even if they are inspired by the finest theories and programmes.

"This defect becomes most marked when *Iskra* is compared with *Yuzhny Rabochy*[127] which, like *Iskra*, raises the banner of political struggle but connects it with the preceding phase of the South-Russian working-class movement. Such a presentation of the question is alien to *Iskra*. It has set itself the task of fanning 'the spark into a great conflagration',* but it forgets that necessary inflammable material and favourable environmental conditions are required for such a task. In dissociating itself completely from the 'Economists', *Iskra* loses sight of the fact that their activity prepared the ground for the workers' participation in the February and March events, upon which *Iskra* lays so much stress and, to all appearances, greatly exaggerates. While criticising adversely the activity of the Social-Democrats of the late nineties, *Iskra* ignores the fact that at that time the conditions were

* A play on the word *Iskra*, which means "spark".—*Tr.*

lacking for any work other than the struggle for minor demands, and ignores also the enormous educational significance of that struggle. *Iskra* is entirely wrong and unhistorical in its appraisement of that period and of the direction of the activities of the Russian Social-Democrats at the time, in identifying their tactics with those of Zubatov,[128] in failing to differentiate between the 'struggle for minor demands', which widens and deepens the labour movement, and 'minor concessions', whose purpose was to paralyse every struggle and every movement.

"Thoroughly imbued with the sectarian intolerance so characteristic of ideologists in the infantile period of social movements, *Iskra* is ready to brand every disagreement with it, not only as a departure from Social-Democratic principles, but as desertion to the camp of the enemy. Of such a nature is its extremely indecent and most reprehensible attack upon *Rabochaya Mysl*, contained in the article on Zubatov, in which the latter's success among a certain section of the working class was attributed to that publication. Negatively disposed to the other Social-Democratic organisations, which differ from it in their views on the progress and the tasks of the Russian labour movement, *Iskra*, in the heat of controversy, at times forgets the truth and, picking on isolated unfortunate expressions, attributes to its opponents views they do not hold, emphasises points of disagreement that are frequently of little material importance, and obstinately ignores the numerous points of contact in views. We have in mind *Iskra*'s attitude towards *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

"*Iskra*'s excessive predilection for controversy is due primarily to its exaggerating the role of 'ideology' (programmes, theories...) in the movement, and is partly an echo of the internecine squabbles that have flared up among Russian political exiles in Western Europe, of which they have hastened to inform the world in a number of polemical pamphlets and articles. In our opinion, these disagreements exercise almost no influence upon the actual course of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, except perhaps to damage it by bringing an undesirable schism into the midst of the comrades working in Russia. For this reason, we cannot but express our disapproval of *Iskra*'s fervent polemics, particularly when it oversteps the bounds of decency.

"This basic drawback of *Iskra* is also the cause of its inconsistency on the question of the attitude of Social-Democracy to the various social classes and tendencies. By theoretical reasoning, *Iskra* solved the problem of the immediate transition to the struggle against absolutism. In all probability it senses the difficulty of such a task for the workers under the present state of affairs but lacking the patience to wait until the workers will have gathered sufficient forces for this struggle, *Iskra* begins to seek allies in the ranks of the liberals and intellectuals. In this quest, it not infrequently departs from the class point of view, obscures class antagonisms, and puts into the forefront the common nature of the discontent with the government, although the causes and the degree of the discontent vary considerably among the 'allies'. Such, for example, is *Iskra*'s attitude towards the Zemstvo. It tries to fan into flames of political struggle the Zemstvo's Frondian demonstrations, which are frequently called forth by the fact that the govern-

ment pays more attention to the protection of industry than to the agrarian aspirations of the Zemstvo gentry*, and it promises the nobles that are dissatisfied with the government's sops the assistance of the working class, but it does not say a word about the class antagonism that exists between these social strata. It may be conceded that it is admissible to say that the Zemstvo is being roused and that it is an element fighting the government, but this must be stated so clearly and distinctly that no doubt will be left as to the character of a possible agreement with such elements. *Iskra*, however, approaches the question of our attitude towards the Zemstvo in a way that to our mind can only dim class-consciousness, for in this matter, like the advocates of liberalism and of the various cultural endeavours, *Iskra* goes against the fundamental task of Social-Democratic literature, which is, not to obscure class antagonism, but to criticise the bourgeois system and explain the class interests that divide it. Such, too, is *Iskra*'s attitude towards the student movement. And yet in other articles *Iskra* sharply condemns all 'compromise' and defends, for instance, the intolerant conduct of the Guesdists.

"We shall refrain from dwelling upon *Iskra*'s minor defects and blunders, but in conclusion we think it our duty to observe that we do not in the least desire by our criticism to belittle the significance which *Iskra* can acquire, nor do we close our eyes to its merits. We welcome it as a political, Social-Democratic newspaper in Russia. We regard one of its greatest merits to be its able explanation of the question of terror to which it devoted a number of timely articles. Finally, we cannot refrain from noting the exemplary, literary style in which *Iskra* is written, a thing so rare in illegal publications, its regular appearance, and the abundance of fresh and interesting material which it publishes.

"*A group of comrades*"

September 1901."

In the first place, we should like to say that we cordially welcome the straightforwardness and frankness of the authors of this letter. It is high time to stop playing at hide-and-seek, concealing one's Economist "*credo*" (as is done by a section of the Odessa Committee from which the "politicians" broke away), or declaring, as if in mockery of the truth, that at the present time "not a single Social-Democratic organisation is guilty of the sin of Economism" (*Two Conferences*, p. 32, published by *Rabocheye Dyelo*). And now to the matter.

The authors of the letter fall into the very same fundamental error as that made by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (see particularly issue No. 10). They are muddled over the question

* Lenin's reference is to the liberal landlords, members of the Zemstvo Boards.—*Tr.*

of the relations between the "material" (spontaneous, as *Rabocheye Dyelo* puts it) elements of the movement and the ideological (conscious, operating "according to plan"). They fail to understand that the "ideologist" is worthy of the name only when he *precedes* the spontaneous movement, points out the road, and is able ahead of all others to solve all the theoretical, political, tactical, and organisational questions which the "material elements" of the movement spontaneously encounter. In order truly to give "consideration to the material elements of the movement", one must view them critically, one must be able to point out the dangers and defects of spontaneity and *to elevate* it to the level of consciousness. To say, however, that ideologists (i.e., politically conscious leaders) cannot divert the movement from the path determined by the interaction of environment and elements is to ignore the simple truth that the conscious element *participates* in this interaction and in the determination of the path. Catholic and monarchist labour unions in Europe are also an inevitable result of the interaction of environment and elements, but it was the consciousness of priests and Zubatovs and not that of socialists that participated in this interaction. The theoretical views of the authors of this letter (like those of *Rabocheye Dyelo*) do not represent Marxism, but that parody of it which is nursed by our "Critics" and Bernsteinians who are unable to connect spontaneous evolution with conscious revolutionary activity.

In the prevailing circumstances of today this profound theoretical error inevitably leads to a great tactical error, which has brought incalculable damage to Russian Social-Democracy. It is a fact that the spontaneous awakening of the masses of the workers and (due to their influence) of other social strata has been taking place with astonishing rapidity during the past few years. The "material elements" of the movement have grown enormously even as compared with 1898, but *the conscious leaders* (the Social-Democrats) *lag behind this growth*. This is the main cause of the crisis which Russian Social-Democracy is now experiencing. The mass (spontaneous) movement lacks "ideologists" sufficiently trained theoretically to be proof against all vacillations; it lacks leaders with such a broad political outlook, such

revolutionary energy, and such organisational talent as to create a militant political party on the basis of the new movement.

All this in itself would, however, be but half the evil. Theoretical knowledge, political experience, and organising ability are things that can be acquired. If only the desire exists to study and acquire these qualities. But since the end of 1897, particularly since the autumn of 1898, there have come forward in the Russian Social-Democratic movement individuals and periodicals that not only close their eyes to this drawback, but that have declared it to be a special virtue, that have elevated the worship of, and servility towards, spontaneity to the dignity of a theory and are preaching that Social-Democrats must not march ahead of the movement, but should drag along *at the tail-end*. (These periodicals include not only *Rabochaya Mysl*, but *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which began with the "stages theory" and ended with the defence, as a matter of principle, of spontaneity, of the "full rights of the movement of the moment", of "tactics-as-process", etc.)

This was, indeed, a sad situation. It meant the emergence of a *separate trend*, which is usually designated as Economism (in the broad sense of the word), the principal feature of which is its incomprehension, even *defence*, *of lagging*, i.e., as we have explained, the lagging of the conscious leaders behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses. The characteristic features of this trend express themselves in the following: with respect to principles, in a vulgarisation of Marxism and in helplessness in the face of modern "criticism", that up-to-date species of opportunism; with respect to politics, in the striving to restrict political agitation and political struggle or to reduce them to petty activities, in the failure to understand that unless Social-Democrats take the leadership of the general democratic movement in *their own* hands, they will never be able to overthrow the autocracy; with respect to tactics, in utter instability (last spring *Rabocheye Dyelo* stood in amazement before the "new" question of terror, and only six months later, after considerable wavering and, as always, dragging along at the tail-end of the movement, did it express itself against terror, in a very ambiguous resolution); and with respect to

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

organisation, in the failure to understand that the mass character of the movement does not diminish, but increases, our obligation to establish a strong and centralised organisation of revolutionaries capable of leading the preparatory struggle, every unexpected outbreak, and, finally, the decisive assault.

Against this trend we have conducted and will continue to conduct an irreconcilable struggle. The authors of the letter apparently belong to this trend. They tell us that the economic struggle prepared the ground for the workers' participation in the demonstrations. True enough; but we appreciated sooner and more profoundly than all others the importance of this preparation, when, as early as December 1900, in our first issue, we opposed the stages theory,* and when, in February, in our second issue, immediately after the drafting of the students into the army, and prior to the demonstrations, we called upon the workers to come to the aid of the students.** The February and March events did not "refute the fears and alarms of *Iskra*" (as Martynov, who thereby displays his utter failure to understand the question, thinks—*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 53), but wholly confirmed them, for the leaders lagged behind the spontaneous rise of the masses and proved to be unprepared for the fulfilment of their duties as leaders. Even at the present time the preparations are far from adequate, and for that reason all talk about "exaggerating the role of ideology" or the role of the conscious element as compared with the spontaneous element, etc., continues to exercise a most baneful influence upon our Party.

No less harmful is the influence exerted by the talk, allegedly in defence of the class point of view, about the need to lay less stress on the general character of discontent manifested by the various strata of the population against the government. On the contrary, we are proud of the fact that *Iskra* rouses political discontent among *all* strata of the population, and the only thing we regret is that we are unable to do this in a much wider scale. It is not true to say that in doing so, we obscure the class point of view; the authors of the letter

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* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 366-71.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*

have not pointed to a single concrete instance in evidence of this, nor can they do so. Social-Democracy, as the vanguard in the struggle for democracy, must (notwithstanding the opinion expressed in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 41) lead the activities of the various oppositional strata, explain to them the general political significance of their partial and professional conflicts with the government, rally them to the support of the revolutionary party, and train from its own ranks leaders capable of exercising political influence upon all oppositional strata. Any renunciation of this function, however florid the phrases about close, organic contact with the proletarian struggle, etc., with which it may deck itself, is tantamount to a fresh "defence of lagging", the defence of lagging behind the nation-wide democratic movement on the part of Social-Democrats; it is tantamount to a surrender of the leadership to bourgeois democracy. Let the authors of the letter ponder over the question as to why the events of last spring served so strongly to stimulate *non*-Social-Democratic revolutionary tendencies, instead of raising the authority and prestige of Social-Democracy.

Nor can we refrain from protesting against the astonishing short-sightedness displayed by the authors of the letter in regard to the controversies and internecine squabbles among the political exiles. They repeat the stale nonsense about the "indecency" of devoting to *Rabochaya Mysl* an article on Zubatov. Do they wish to deny that the spreading of Economism facilitates the tasks of the Zubatovs? In asserting this, however, we do not in the slightest "identify" the tactics of the Economists with those of Zubatov. As for the "political exiles" (if the authors of the letter were not so unpardonably careless concerning the continuity of ideas in the Russian Social-Democratic movement, they would have known that the warning about Economism sounded by the "political exiles", to be precise, by the Emancipation of Labour group, has been strikingly confirmed!), note the manner in which Lassalle, who was active among the Rhine workers in 1852, judged the controversies of the exiles in London. Writing to Marx, he said:

"... The publication of your work against the 'big men', Kinkel, Ruge, etc., should hardly meet with any difficulties on the part of the police.... For, in my opinion, the govern-

ment is not averse to the publication of such works, because it thinks that 'the revolutionaries will cut one another's throats'. Their bureaucratic logic neither suspects nor fears the fact that it is precisely internal Party struggles that lend a party strength and vitality; that the greatest proof of a party's weakness is its diffuseness and the blurring of clear demarcations; and that a party becomes stronger by purging itself" (letter from Lassalle to Marx, June 24, 1852).

Let the numerous complacent opponents of severity, irreconcilability, and fervent polemics, etc., take note!

In conclusion, we shall observe that in these remarks we have been able to deal only briefly with the questions in dispute. We intend to devote a special pamphlet to the analysis of these questions, which we hope will appear in the course of six weeks.

Iskra, No. 12, December 6, 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY OF G. V. PLEKHANOV

The Editorial Board of *Iskra* joins whole-heartedly in celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the revolutionary activity of G. V. Plekhanov. May this celebration serve to strengthen the positions of revolutionary Marxism, which alone can guide the world struggle of the proletariat for emancipation and resist the attacks of eternally old opportunism that is recurrently making its noisy appearance in new guises. May this celebration serve to strengthen the bonds between the thousands of young Russian Social-Democrats who are devoting all their efforts to difficult practical work and the Emancipation of Labour group, which is providing the movement with what it stands so much in need of—a tremendous reserve of theoretical knowledge, wide political horizons, and rich revolutionary experience.

Long live Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy! Long live international Social-Democracy!

Written in December 1901

First published in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, No. 7, (30)

Published according to the manuscript

DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEGUN

A fortnight ago we observed the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first social-revolutionary demonstration in Russia, which took place on December 6, 1876, on Kazan Square in St. Petersburg,[129] and we pointed to the enormous upswing in the number and magnitude of the demonstrations at the beginning of the current year. We urged that the demonstrators should advance a political slogan more clearly defined than "Land and Freedom"[130] (1876), and a more far-reaching demand than "Repeal the Provisional Regulations" (1901). Such a slogan must be: *political freedom*; and the demand to be put forward by the entire people has to be *the demand for the convocation of the people's representatives*.

We see now that demonstrations are being revived on the most varied grounds in Nizhni-Novgorod, in Moscow, and in Kharkov. Public unrest is growing everywhere, and more and more imperative becomes the necessity to unify it into one single current directed *against the autocracy*, which everywhere sows tyranny, oppression, and violence. On November 7, a small but successful demonstration was held in Nizhni-Novgorod, which arose out of a farewell gathering in honour of Maxim Gorky. An author of European fame, whose only weapon was free speech (as a speaker at the Nizhni-Novgorod demonstration aptly put it), was being banished by the autocratic government from his home town without trial or investigation. The bashi-bazouks accuse him of exercising a harmful influence on us, said the speaker in the name of all Russians in whom but a spark of striving towards light and liberty is alive, but we declare that his influence has been a good one. The myrmi-

dons of the tsar perpetrate their outrages in secret, and we will expose their outrages publicly and openly. In Russia, workers are assaulted for demanding their right to a better life; students are assaulted for protesting against tyranny. Every honest and bold utterance is suppressed! The demonstration, in which workers took part, was concluded by a student reciting: "Tyranny shall fall, and the people shall rise—mighty, free, and strong!"

In Moscow, hundreds of students waited at the station to greet Gorky. Meanwhile, the police, scared out of their wits, *arrested* him on the train *en route* and (despite the special permission previously granted him) prohibited his entering Moscow, forcing him to change directly from the Nizhni-Novgorod to the Kursk line. The demonstration against Gorky's banishment failed; but on the eighteenth of November, without any preparation, a small demonstration of students and "strangers" (as our Ministers put it) took place in front of the Governor General's house against the prohibition of a social evening arranged for the previous day to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the death of N. A. Dobrolyubov.[131] The representative of the autocracy in Moscow was howled down by people who, in unison with all educated and thinking people in Russia, held dear the memory of a writer who had passionately hated tyranny and passionately looked forward to a people's uprising against the "Turks at home", i.e., against the autocratic government. The Executive Committee of the Moscow Students' Organisations rightly pointed out in its bulletin of November 23 that the unprepared demonstration served as a striking indication of the prevailing discontent and protest.

In Kharkov, a demonstration called in connection with student affairs developed into a regular street battle, in which the students were not the only participants. Last year's experience taught the students a lesson. They realised that only the support of the people, especially of the workers, could guarantee them success, and that in order to obtain that support, they must not restrict themselves to struggling merely for academic (student) freedom, but for *the freedom of the entire people*, for *political freedom*. The Kharkov Joint Council of Students' Organisations

definitely expressed this idea in its October manifesto and, judging from their leaflets and manifestos, the students of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Riga, and Odessa are beginning to understand the "senselessness of the dream" of academic freedom amidst the gloom of enslavement enshrouding the people. The infamous speech delivered by General Vannovsky in Moscow, in which he denied the "rumours" that he had at one time promised something, the unparalleled insolence of the St. Petersburg detective (who seized a student in the Institute of Electrical Engineering in order to take from him a letter he had received by messenger), the savage assault upon Yaroslavl students by the police in the streets and in the police station—these and a thousand other facts sound their cry for struggle, struggle, struggle against the whole of the autocratic system. Patience became exhausted in the case of the Kharkov veterinaries. The first-year students submitted a petition for the dismissal of Professor Lagermark, on account of his bureaucratic attitude towards their studies and his intolerable rudeness in which he went so far as to fling copies of the syllabus in the faces of the students! Without investigating the case, the government responded by expelling the entire first-year student body from the Institute, and in addition slandered the students by declaring in its report that they demanded the right to appoint the professors. This roused the entire Kharkov student body to action, and it was resolved to organise a strike and a demonstration. Between November 28 and December 2, Kharkov was for the second time in the same year transformed into a field of battle between the "Turks at home" and the people, which protested against autocratic tyranny. On the one side, shouts of, "Down with the autocracy!", "Long live liberty!"—on the other, sabres, knouts, and horses trampling upon the people. The police and Cossacks, mercilessly assaulting all and sundry, irrespective of age and sex, gained a victory over an unarmed crowd and are now triumphant....

Shall we allow them to triumph?

Workers! You know only too well the evil force that is tormenting the Russian people. This evil force binds you hand and foot in your everyday struggles against the employers for a better life and for human dignity. This evil force

snatches hundreds and thousands of your best comrades from your midst, flings them into jail, sends them into banishment, and, as if in mockery, declares them to be "persons of evil conduct". This evil force on May 7 fired on the workers of the Obukhov Works in St. Petersburg, when they rose up with the cry, "We want liberty!"—and then staged a farce of a trial, in order to send to penal servitude those heroes who escaped the bullets. This evil force is assaulting students today, and tomorrow it will fling itself with greater ferocity upon you. Lose no time! Remember that you must support every protest and every struggle against the bashi-bazouks of the autocratic government! Exert every effort to come to an agreement with the demonstrating students, organise circles for the rapid transmission of information and for the distribution of leaflets, explain to all that you are struggling for the freedom of the entire people.

When the flames of popular indignation and open struggle flare up, first in one place and then in another, it is more than ever necessary to direct upon them a powerful current of fresh air, to fan them into a great conflagration!

Iskra, No. 13, December 20, 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

ON A LETTER FROM "SOUTHERN WORKERS"

We have received a letter from "Southern Workers" welcoming the strengthening of the revolutionary current in Russian Social-Democracy and asking us to convey their greetings to the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. Unfortunately we cannot print the letter in full, due to lack of space. We are in complete accord with the authors of the letter that "the methods adopted in Russia for bringing revolutionary ideas to the masses through proclamations are not adequate for educating the masses to political consciousness", that "it is essential to establish a special literature for the political education of the Russian proletariat". But their proposal to issue, for that purpose, popular pamphlets of three or four pages to be distributed "simultaneously throughout Russia" is hardly feasible. We hold that the Russian proletariat is now mature enough for the type of publication that is serviceable to all other classes—viz., newspapers. Only a political newspaper can really educate the masses to become politically conscious and, in the words of the letter, throw light on "the whole of our social life, from the fourth estate to the big bourgeoisie". Only an All-Russian newspaper, if actively supported by all committees and local study circles, can achieve distribution more or less "simultaneously throughout Russia" and be published frequently enough to deserve the name of newspaper. Only the firm establishment of a revolutionary organ of this type can mark the transition of our movement from "strikes and the economic struggle to the broad revolutionary struggle against the Russian autocratic government".

Iskra, No. 13, December 20, 1901

Published according to the *Iskra* text

ANARCHISM AND SOCIALISM

Theses:

1. Anarchism, in the course of the 35 to 40 years (Bakunin and the *International*, 1866—) of its existence (and with Stirner included, in the course of many more years) has produced nothing but general platitudes against *exploitation*.

These phrases have been current for more than 2,000 years. What is missing is (α) an understanding of the *causes* of exploitation; (β) an understanding of the *development* of society, which leads to socialism; (γ) an understanding of the *class struggle* as the creative force for the realisation of socialism.

2. An understanding of the *causes* of exploitation. *Private* property as the basis of *commodity* economy. Social property in the means of production. In anarchism—nil.

Anarchism is bourgeois *individualism* in reverse. Individualism as the basis of the entire anarchist world outlook.

{ Defence of petty property and *petty economy* on the land. *Keine Majorität*.*
Negation of the unifying and organising power of authority. }

3. Failure to understand the development of society—the role of large-scale production—the development of capitalism into socialism.

(Anarchism is a product of *despair*. The psychology of the unsettled intellectual or the vagabond and not of the proletarian.)

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* No majority (i.e., the anarchists' non-acceptance of the submission by the minority to the majority).—*Ed*.

4. Failure to understand the *class* struggle of the proletariat.

Absurd negation of politics in bourgeois society.

Failure to understand the role of the organisation and the education of the workers.

Panaceas consisting of one-sided, disconnected means.

5. What has anarchism, at one time dominant in the Romance countries, contributed in recent European history?

— No doctrine, revolutionary teaching, or theory.

— Fragmentation of the working-class movement.

— Complete fiasco in the experiments of the revolutionary movement (Proudhonism, 1871; Bakuninism, 1873).

— Subordination of the working class to *bourgeois* politics in the guise of negation of politics.

Written in 1901

First published in 1936 in the magazine *Proletarskaya*, *Revolutsia*, No. 7

Published according to the manuscript



First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Anarchism and Socialism". 1901

Reduced

CONCERNING THE STATE BUDGET

Our newspapers, as usual, have published the most respectful report of the Minister of Finance on the budget—the state revenues and disbursements for 1902. As usual, everything, according to the Minister's assurance, is going well: "the finances are in a most satisfactory state", "equilibrium has been firmly maintained in the budget", "the railway system continues its successful development", and there is even "a steady improvement in the people's welfare"! Small wonder that so little interest is shown in questions of the state economy, despite their importance; interest is blunted by the obligatory, standard eulogies; for everyone knows that paper will put up with anything, that "anyway" the public "isn't allowed to peep" behind the scenes of official financial juggling.

On this occasion, however, the following circumstance stands out particularly. With his usual legerdemain the conjurer shows the public his empty hands, makes passes, and produces one gold coin after another. The public applauds. Nevertheless, the conjurer begins to make the most frantic efforts to defend himself and is almost in tears when he assures us that he is not deceiving us, that there is no deficit, and that his liabilities are less than his assets. Russians have been so well schooled in respectable behaviour in official places that even as onlookers they feel uncomfortable, and only a few mutter the French saying under their breath: "He who excuses himself accuses himself."

Let us see how our Witte "excuses" himself. The gigantic expenditure, amounting to almost 2,000 million rubles (1,946 million), has been fully covered only because of

the 144 million taken from the famous "free cash in hand" at the State Treasury, which free cash in hand was made up by last year's 4 per cent loan of 127 million rubles (floated at 148 million rubles, of which 21 million have still not been taken up). In other words, a deficit covered by the loan? Nothing of the sort, says our magician, "the loan was certainly not floated because of the need to cover expenditures unforeseen in the estimate", since 114 million rubles remained "completely free" after the coverage; the loan was raised because it was desired to build new railways.

Well said, Mr. Witte! But, first, what you say does not refute the fact of the deficit, since 114 million rubles, even if "completely free", cannot cover an expenditure of 144 million rubles. Secondly, the free cash in hand (114 million rubles) included 63 million received in excess of the usual revenue for 1901, as compared with the budget estimate, and our press has long since revealed the fact that you *artificially reduce* the estimate for the budget revenue in order to effect a fictitious increase in the "free cash in hand" and steadily increase taxation. Last year, for instance, stamp duties were raised (the new stamp duty regulations), the price of government-distilled vodka rose from 7 rubles to 7 rubles 60 kopeks a *vedro*,* customs duties continued to increase (increases were introduced "temporarily" in 1900 on account of the war in China), and so on. Thirdly, while you laud the "cultural role" of the railways, you modestly refrain from mentioning the purely Russian and very uncultured custom of *plundering the Treasury* when railways are built (to say nothing of the shameful exploitation of the workers and the starving peasants by railway contractors!). Thus, a Russian newspaper recently reported that the cost of building the Siberian railway was initially estimated at 350 million rubles, but that in actuality 780 million have been expended and that in the end the total cost will probably exceed *1,000 million* (*Iskra* has had something to say about the plunder on the Siberian railway: see issue No. 2). You compute the revenues with precision, Mr. Witte, omitting nothing, but how about rendering an account of *the actual extent of the expenditure*?

* 1 *vedro*—about 12.3 litres (21.7 pints).—*Tr.*

Another matter not to be forgotten is the fact that the building of railways in 1902 was undertaken partly because of the military purposes of our "peace-loving" government (the vast Bologoye-Sedlets line, more than 1,000 versts long) and partly because of the absolute necessity to afford at least some "help" to oppressed industry, in whose affairs the State Bank is directly interested. The State Bank has not only granted loans with a liberal hand to tottering enterprises, but has practically taken many of them under its full control. The bankruptcy of industrial enterprises threatened to lead to the bankruptcy of the state! Lastly, let us not forget, either, that it is under the administration of the "genius" Witte that the sum of the loans and the size of the taxes are constantly increasing, despite the fact that the capital of the savings-banks is applied exclusively to support state credits. This capital has already exceeded 800 million rubles. Taking all this into consideration, we realise that Witte's economy is wasteful, that the autocracy is heading slowly but surely for bankruptcy, since taxation cannot be raised indefinitely and the French bourgeoisie will not always come to the aid of the Russian Tsar.

Against the charge of having increased the national debt Witte defends himself with arguments that are sheerly ludicrous. He compares liabilities with "assets", he compares the sum of the state loans for 1892 and 1902 with the costs of the state railways for the same years and produces a reduction in the "net" debt. But we have still further assets: "Fortresses and warships" (I swear, the report had it so!), harbours and government factories, quit-rent, and forests.

Magnificent, Mr. Witte! But have you not noticed that you are like the merchant summoned to court as a bankrupt who tried to justify himself before the bailiffs who were about to make an inventory of his property? As long as an enterprise is unshakably solvent no one would dream of asking that loans be specially guaranteed. No one doubts that the Russian people have plenty of "assets"; but the greater these assets, the greater the guilt of those who, despite the abundance, conduct the economy by increasing loans and taxation. You are merely demonstrating to the people that they should get rid of those who squander their

assets, and do so as quickly as possible. In actual fact, of all the European countries, Turkey alone has so far put forward special state assets as a guarantee of state loans. This action has naturally led to *the assumption of control by foreign creditors* over the assets that were to guarantee them the return of the loans they had advanced. The economy of the "great Russian state" administered by representatives of Rothschild and of Bleichröder—what glittering prospects you open up before us, Mr. Witte!*

This is quite apart from the fact that there is no banker who will accept fortresses and warships as collateral, that these represent a minus, not a plus, in our economy. Even railways can serve as a guarantee only when they are run at a profit. However, from Mr. Witte's report we learn that up to the present all Russian railways have, in general, been run at a loss. Only in 1900 was the deficit on the Siberian railways covered and a "small net profit" obtained—so small that Mr. Witte remains modestly silent as to its amount. He also remains silent in regard to the fact that in the first eight months of 1901 the takings of the railways in European Russia dropped as a result of the crisis. We can well imagine the balance of our railway economy if the actual sums of money plundered during construction, as well as the official sums allotted for the job, were taken into consideration. Is it not high time to place these valuable assets in more reliable hands?

Needless to say, Witte speaks in the most soothing tones of the industrial crisis: "The hitch ... without doubt does not affect general industrial prosperity and, after a certain interval of time, we shall probably [!] see a fresh period of industrial revival." Fine comfort for the millions of the working class, who suffer from unemployment and reduced wages! You may search in vain in the list of state expenditures for the slightest hint of the millions and

* Witte himself was aware of the clumsiness of his arguments in regard to "assets" and therefore, elsewhere in his report, he tried to improve the impression by saying that the growing value of state assets "has no particular significance with respect to the commitments of the Russian Treasury, since Russia's credit does not stand in need of special guarantees". Of course not! But a detailed account with a list of these special guarantees was left ... just in case!

tens of millions that the Treasury has wasted on direct and indirect support of the industrial enterprises "suffering" from the crisis. What gigantic sums are involved in such support may be seen from press reports to the effect that the total sum of the loans granted by the State Bank between January 1, 1899 and January 1, 1901 increased from 250 million to 449 million rubles, and that industrial loans increased from 8,700,000 to 38,800,000 rubles. Even the loss of four million rubles from industrial loans did not cause the Treasury any difficulty. And as for the workers who have sacrificed on the altar of "industrial success", not the contents of their purse, but their lives and the lives of the millions dependent on them, the Treasury helped these workers by sending thousands of them from the industrial towns to the starving villages "free of charge"!

Witte avoids the word "famine" altogether, assuring us in his report that the "detrimental effects of the poor harvest ... will be mitigated by generous help to the needy". This generous help, according to him, amounts to 20 million rubles, while the deficit in the harvest is estimated at 250 million rubles (if one takes as the base the very low price of 50 kopeks a pood, compared, however, with the years of favourable harvests). Indeed, how very "generous"! Even if we assume that only a half of the losses is borne by the poor peasantry, it will still become evident that we underestimated the greed of the Russian Government, when we wrote (in re Sipyagin's circular; see *Iskra*, No. 9)* that the government was cutting relief loans down to *one-fifth*. The Russian Tsar is generous, not in his aid to the peasant, but in his police measures directed against those who really wanted to help the famine-stricken. He is also generous in squandering millions in order to grab an appetising slice in China. In two years, Witte informs us, *80 million rubles* went in extraordinary expenditure on the war in China and "*in addition* very substantial sums were expended *from the ordinary budget*". This means that anything up to *100 million rubles* was expended, if not more! The unemployed worker and the starving peasant

* See present volume, pp. 231-38.—*Ed.*

may take comfort from the fact that Manchuria is almost sure to be ours....

Lack of space keeps us from dealing at length with the remaining parts of the report. Witte also defends himself against the charge of scantiness in the disbursements on public education: to the 36 million rubles of the estimate of the Ministry of Public Education he adds the disbursements of other ministries on education and "cooks up" the figure of 75 million rubles. But even this figure (of doubtful veracity) is extremely miserable for the whole of Russia, representing less than five per cent of the total budget.

The fact that "our state budget is organised mainly on the basis of a system of indirect taxation" is considered by Witte to be an advantage, and he repeats the stale bourgeois arguments on the possibility of "adjusting the consumption of taxed articles to accord with the degree of prosperity". In actual fact, however, it is notorious that indirect taxation affecting articles of mass consumption is distinguished by its extreme injustice. The entire burden is placed on the shoulders of the poor, while it creates a privilege for the rich. The poorer a man is, the greater the share of his income that goes to the state in the form of indirect taxes. The masses who own little or nothing constitute nine-tenths of the population, consume nine-tenths of the taxed items, and pay nine-tenths of the total of all indirect taxes, while they receive no more than two- or three-tenths of the national income.

In conclusion, an interesting "trifle". On which items were expenditures most of all increased from 1901 to 1902? The total expenditures increased from 1,788 million to 1,946 million rubles, that is, by less than one-tenth. Nevertheless, expenditures on *two* items increased by *nearly a quarter*: from 9,800,000 to 12,800,000 rubles "for the maintenance of members of the royal family" and ... "for the maintenance of the special corps of gendarmes" from 3,960,000 to 4,940,000 rubles. We have here the answer to the question: What are "the most urgent needs of the Russian people"? And what touching "unity" between the tsar and the gendarmes!

Iskra, No. 15, January 15, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

POLITICAL AGITATION AND "THE CLASS POINT OF VIEW"

Let us begin with an illustration.

The reader will remember the sensation that was created by the speech delivered by M. A. Stakhovich, Marshal of the Nobility of Orel Gubernia, at a missionary congress, in the course of which he urged that *freedom of conscience* be recognised by law. The conservative press, led by *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, is conducting a furious campaign against Mr. Stakhovich. It cannot find names vile enough with which to call him and almost goes so far as to accuse the entire Orel nobility of high treason for having re-elected Mr. Stakhovich as Marshal. Now, this re-election is indeed very significant and to a certain degree it bears the character of a demonstration of the nobility against police tyranny and outrage.

Stakhovich, says *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, "is not so much Marshal of the Nobility, as the oh, so gay Misha Stakhovich, the life and soul of the party, the clever conversationalist..." (No. 348, 1901). So much the worse for you, gentlemen, defenders of the bludgeon. If even our jovial landlords begin to talk about freedom of conscience, then the infamies of the priests and the police must verily be without number....

"What does our 'intellectual', frivolous crowd that instigates and applauds the Stakhoviches care for the affairs of our sacred orthodox faith and our time-honoured attitude towards it?"... Once again, so much the worse for you, gentlemen, champions of the autocracy, the orthodox faith, and the national essence. A fine system indeed our police-ridden autocracy must be, if it has permeated even reli-

gion with the spirit of the prison-cell, so that the "Stakhoviches" (who have no firm convictions in matters of religion, but who are interested, as we shall see, in preserving a stable religion) become utterly indifferent (if not actually hostile) to this notorious "national" faith. "... They call our faith a delusion!! They mock at us because, thanks to this 'delusion', we fear and try to avoid sin and we carry out our obligations uncomplainingly, no matter how severe they may be; because we find the strength and courage to bear sorrow and privations and forbear pride in times of success and good fortune...." So! The orthodox faith is dear to them because it teaches people to bear misery "uncomplainingly". What a profitable faith it is indeed for the governing classes! In a society so organised that an insignificant minority enjoys wealth and power, while the masses constantly suffer "privations" and bear "severe obligations", it is quite natural for the exploiters to sympathise with a religion that teaches people to bear "uncomplainingly" the hell on earth for the sake of an alleged celestial paradise. But in its zeal *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* became too garrulous. So garrulous, in fact, that *unwittingly it spoke the truth*. We read on: "... They do not suspect that if they, the Stakhoviches, eat well, sleep peacefully, and live merrily, it is thanks to this 'delusion'."

The sacred truth! This is precisely the case. It is because religious "delusions" are so widespread among the masses that the Stakhoviches and the Oblomovs,[132] and all our capitalists who live by the labour of the masses, and even *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* itself, "sleep peacefully". And the more education spreads among the people, the more will religious prejudices give way to socialist consciousness, the nearer will be the day of victory for the proletariat—the victory that will emancipate all oppressed classes from the slavery they endure in modern society.

But having blurted out the truth on one point, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* disposed, far too easily, of another interesting point. It is obviously mistaken in believing that the Stakhoviches "do not realise" the significance of religion, and that they demand liberal forms out of sheer "thoughtlessness". Such an interpretation of a hostile political trend is too childishly naïve. The fact that in this

instance Mr. Stakhovich came forward as advocate of the entire liberal trend was proved best of all by *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* itself; otherwise, what need was there for waging such a campaign against a single speech? What need was there for speaking, not about Stakhovich, but about the Stakhoviches, about the "intellectual crowd"?

Moskovskiye Vedomosti's error was, of course, deliberate. That paper is more unwilling than it is unable to analyse the liberalism it hates from the class point of view. That it does not desire to do so goes without saying; but its inability to do so interests us very much more, because this is a complaint that even very many revolutionaries and socialists suffer from. Thus, the authors of the letter published in No. 12 of *Iskra*, who accuse us of departing from the "class point of view" for striving in our newspaper to follow all manifestations of liberal discontent and protest, suffer from this complaint, as do also the authors of *Proletarskaya Borba*[133] and of several pamphlets in "The Social-Democratic Library",[134] who imagine that our autocracy represents the absolutist rule of the bourgeoisie; likewise the Martynovs, who seek to persuade us to abandon the many-sided campaign of exposure (i.e., the widest possible political agitation) against the autocracy and to concentrate our efforts mainly upon the struggle for economic reforms (to give something "positive" to the working class, to put forward in its name "concrete demands" for legislative and administrative measures "which promise certain palpable results"); likewise, too, the Nadezhdins, who, on reading the correspondence in our paper on the statistical conflicts, ask in astonishment: "Good Lord, what is this—a Zemstvo paper?"

All these socialists forget that the interests of the autocracy coincide only with certain interests of the propertied classes, and only under certain circumstances; frequently it happens that its interests do not coincide with the interests of these classes as a whole, but only with those of certain of their strata. The interests of other bourgeois strata and the more widely understood interests of the *entire* bourgeoisie, of the development of capitalism as a whole, necessarily give rise to a liberal opposition to the autocracy. For instance, the autocracy guarantees the

bourgeoisie opportunities to employ the crudest forms of exploitation, but, on the other hand, places a thousand obstacles in the way of the extensive development of the productive forces and the spread of education; in this way it arouses against itself, not only the petty bourgeoisie, but at times even the big bourgeoisie. The autocracy guarantees (?) the bourgeoisie protection against socialism, but since the people are deprived of rights, this protection is necessarily transformed into a system of police outrages that rouse the indignation of the entire people. What the result of these antagonistic tendencies is, what relative strength of conservative and liberal views, or trends, among the bourgeoisie obtains at the present moment, cannot be learned from a couple of general theses, for this depends on all the special features of the social and political situation at a given moment. To determine this, one must study the situation in detail and carefully watch all the conflicts with the government, no matter by what social stratum they are initiated. It is precisely the "class point of view" that makes it *impermissible* for a Social-Democrat to remain indifferent to the discontent and the protests of the "Stakhoviches".

The reasoning and activity of the above-mentioned socialists show that they are indifferent to liberalism and thus reveal their incomprehension of the basic theses of the *Communist Manifesto*, the "Gospel" of international Social-Democracy. Let us recall, for instance, the words that the bourgeoisie itself provides material for the political education of the proletariat by its struggle for power, by the conflicts of various strata and groups within it, etc.[135] Only in politically free countries has the proletariat easy access to this material (and then only to part of it). In enslaved Russia, however, we Social-Democrats must work hard to obtain this "material" for the working class, i.e., we must *ourselves undertake* the task of conducting general political agitation, of carrying on a public exposure campaign against the autocracy. This task is particularly imperative in periods of political ferment. We must bear in mind that in one year of intensified political life the proletariat can obtain more revolutionary training than in several years of political calm. For this reason the tendency of the above-mentioned socialists consciously or

unconsciously *to restrict* the scope and content of political agitation is particularly harmful.

Let us recall also the words that the Communists support *every* revolutionary movement against the existing system. Those words are often interpreted too narrowly, and are not taken to imply support for the liberal opposition. It must not be forgotten, however, that there are periods when every conflict with the government arising out of progressive social interests, however small, may under certain conditions (*of which our support is one*) flare up into a general conflagration. Suffice it to recall the great social movement which developed in Russia out of the struggle between the students and the government over academic demands,[136] or the conflict that arose in France between all the progressive elements and the militarists over a trial in which the verdict had been rendered on the basis of forged evidence.[137] Hence, it is our bounden duty to explain to the proletariat every liberal and democratic protest, to widen and support it, with the active participation of the workers, be it a conflict between the Zemstvo and the Ministry of the Interior, between the nobility and the police regime of the Orthodox Church, between statisticians and the bureaucrats, between peasants and the "Zemstvo" officials, between religious sects and the rural police, etc., etc. Those who contemptuously turn up their noses at the slight importance of some of these conflicts, or at the "hopelessness" of the attempts to fan them into a general conflagration, do not realise that all-sided political agitation is a focus in which the vital interests of political education of the proletariat coincide with the vital interests of social development as a whole, of the entire people, that is, of all its democratic elements. It is our direct duty to concern ourselves with every liberal question, to determine our Social-Democratic attitude towards it, to help the proletariat to take an active part in its solution and to accomplish the solution in its own, proletarian way. Those who refrain from concerning themselves in this way (whatever their intentions) in actuality leave the liberals in command, place in their hands the political education of the workers, and concede the hegemony in the political struggle to elements which, in the final analysis, are leaders of bourgeois democracy.

The class character of the Social-Democratic movement must not be expressed in the restriction of our tasks to the direct and immediate needs of the "labour movement pure and simple". It must be expressed in our leadership of every aspect and every manifestation of the great struggle for liberation that is being waged by the proletariat, the only truly revolutionary class in modern society. Social-Democracy must constantly and unswervingly spread the influence of the labour movement to all spheres of the social and political life of contemporary society. It must lead, not only the economic, but also the political, struggle of the proletariat. It must never for a moment lose sight of our ultimate goal, but always carry on propaganda for the proletarian ideology—the theory of scientific socialism, viz., Marxism—guard it against distortion, and develop it further. We must untiringly combat any and every bourgeois ideology, regardless of the fashionable and striking garb in which it may drape itself. The socialists we have mentioned above depart from the "class" point of view also because, and to the extent that, they remain indifferent to the task of combating the "criticism of Marxism". Only the blind fail to see that this "criticism" has taken root more rapidly in Russia than in any other country, and has been more enthusiastically taken up by Russian liberal propaganda than by any other, precisely for the reason that it is one of the elements of the bourgeois (now consciously bourgeois) democracy now in formation in Russia.

It is particularly in regard to the political struggle that the "class point of view" demands that the proletariat *give an impetus* to every democratic movement. The political demands of working-class democracy do not differ in principle from those of bourgeois democracy, they differ only in degree. In the struggle for economic emancipation, for the socialist revolution, the proletariat stands on a basis different in principle and it stands alone (the small producer will come to its aid only to the extent that he enters, or is preparing to enter, its ranks). In the struggle for political liberation, however, we have many allies, towards whom we must not remain indifferent. But while our allies in the bourgeois-democratic camp, in struggling for liberal reforms, will always glance back and seek to adjust matters

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

so that they will be able, as before, "to eat well, sleep peacefully, and live merrily" at other people's expense, the proletariat will march forward to the end, without looking back. While the confreres of R. N. S. (author of the preface to Witte's Memorandum) haggle with the government over the rights of the authoritative Zemstvo, or over a constitution, we will struggle for the democratic republic. We will not forget, however, that if we want to push someone forward, we must continuously keep our hands on that someone's shoulders. The party of the proletariat must learn to catch every liberal just at the moment when he is prepared to move forward an inch, and make him move forward a yard. If he is obdurate, we will go forward without him and over him.

Iskra, No. 16, February 1, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

REPLY TO "A READER"

The following letter has been received by the Editorial Board:

"In dealing with the question of agitation (if I am not mistaken, in No. 13) *Iskra* opposes agitational leaflets (pamphlets of two or three pages) on political subjects. In the opinion of the editors, newspapers can successfully replace such literature. Newspapers are, of course, a fine thing. Nobody would dream of disputing that. But can they replace leaflets that are specially intended for widespread distribution among the masses? The editors have received a letter from Russia in which a group of workers-agitators gave their opinion on this subject. *Iskra*'s reply is obviously due to a misunderstanding. The question of agitation is as important today as the question of demonstrations. It is, therefore, to be desired that the editors raise this question once again and on this occasion devote to it greater attention.

"*A Reader*"

Anyone who takes the trouble to read our reply to the letter from "Southern Workers" in No. 13 of *Iskra** together with this letter will easily convince himself that it is precisely the author of the letter who labours under an obvious misunderstanding. There was no question of *Iskra*'s "opposing agitational leaflets"; it never entered anyone's head that a newspaper could "replace leaflets". Our correspondent did not notice that leaflets are in fact proclamations. Such literature as proclamations *cannot be replaced by anything* and will always be *absolutely essential*—on this point the "Southern Workers" and *Iskra* are in full accord. But they are also agreed that this type of literature *is not sufficient*. If we speak of good housing for the workers and at the same time say that good food is not enough

* See present volume, p. 326.—*Ed.*

for them, that would hardly be taken to mean that we are "against" good food. The question is—which is the highest form of *agitational* literature? The "Southern Workers" *did not say a word* about the newspaper when they raised this question. Their silence could, of course, have been due to local circumstances, but we, although we did not in the least wish to enter into "disputes" with our correspondents, naturally could not refrain from reminding them that the proletariat should also organise its own newspaper just as the other classes of the population have done, that fragmentary work alone is not enough, and that the regular, active, and general work of all localities for a revolutionary organ is essential.

As far as the three- or four-page pamphlets are concerned, *we did not speak* "against" them *in the least*, but merely doubted the practicability of a plan to develop them into *regular* literature distributed "simultaneously throughout Russia". If they consist of three or four pages, they will be, essentially, only proclamations. In all parts of Russia we have many very good proclamations that are not in the least heavy reading, both student and workers' proclamations, that sometimes run to six or eight small pages. A really *popular* pamphlet, capable of *explaining* even one single question to a completely unprepared worker, would probably be much bigger in size and there would be no need and no possibility of distributing it "simultaneously throughout Russia" (since it is not only of topical significance). Fully recognising, as we do, every variety of political literature, old and new, so long as it is really good political literature, we would advise working, not upon an invention of a midway type of agitational medium—something between leaflet and popular pamphlet, but for a revolutionary organ that *really* deserves the name of periodical (appearing, not once, but at least two or four times, a month) and which is an *All*-Russian organ.

Iskra, No. 16, February 1, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT[138]

"...Party struggles lend a party strength and vitality; the greatest proof of a party's weakness is its diffuseness and the blurring of clear demarcations; a party becomes stronger by purging itself...."

(From a letter of Lassalle to Marx, of June 24, 1852)

Written between the autumn of 1901 and February 1902
First published as a separate work in March 1902

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Что дѣлать?

Наболѣвшіе вопросы нашего движенія

Н. ЛЕНИНА.

. . . „Партійная борьба придаетъ партіи силу и жизненность, величайшимъ доказательствомъ слабости партіи является ея расплывчатость и притупленіе рѣзко обозначенныхъ границъ, партія укрѣпляется тѣмъ, что очищаетъ себя“ . . . (Изъ письма Лассаля къ Марксу отъ 24 іюня 1852 г.).

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PREFACE

According to the author's original plan, the present pamphlet was to have been devoted to a detailed development of the ideas expressed in the article "Where To Begin" (*Iskra*, No. 4, May 1901).* We must first apologise to the reader for the delay in fulfilling the promise made in that article (and repeated in response to many private inquiries and letters). One of the reasons for this delay was the attempt, undertaken in June of the past year (1901), to unite all the Social-Democratic organisations abroad. It was natural to wait for the results of this attempt, for, had the effort proved successful, it would perhaps have been necessary to expound *Iskra*'s conceptions of organisation from a somewhat different approach; in any case, such a success promised to put an end very quickly to the existence of the two trends in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. As the reader knows, the attempt failed, and, as we propose to show, was bound to fail after the new swing of *Rabochaya Dyelo*, in its issue No. 10, towards Economism. It was found to be absolutely essential to begin a determined struggle against this trend, diffuse and ill-defined, but for that reason the more persistent, the more capable of reasserting itself in diverse forms. Accordingly, the original plan of the pamphlet was altered and considerably enlarged.

Its main theme was to have been the three questions raised in the article "Where To Begin"—the character and main content of our political agitation; our organisational tasks; and the plan for building, simultaneously and from various sides, a militant, All-Russian organisation. These questions have long engaged the mind of the author, who

* See present volume, pp. 13-24.—*Ed.*

tried to raise them in *Rabochaya Gazeta*[139] during one of the unsuccessful attempts to revive that paper (see Chapter V). But the original plan to confine the pamphlet to an analysis of only these three questions and to set forth our views as far as possible in a positive form, without, or almost without, entering into polemics, proved wholly impracticable, for two reasons. On the one hand, Economism proved to be much more tenacious than we had supposed [we employ the term Economism in the broad sense, as explained in *Iskra*, No. 12 (December 1901), in the article entitled "A Talk With Defenders of Economism", which was a synopsis, so to speak, of the present pamphlet*]. It became clear beyond doubt that the differences regarding the solution of the three questions mentioned were explainable to a far greater degree by the basic antithesis between the two trends in the Russian Social-Democratic movement than by differences over details. On the other hand, the perplexity of the Economists over the practical application of our views in *Iskra* clearly revealed that we often speak literally in different tongues and therefore *cannot* arrive at an understanding without beginning *ab ovo*, and that an attempt must be made, in the simplest possible style, illustrated by numerous and concrete examples, *systematically to "clarify" all* our basic points of difference with all the Economists. I resolved to make such an attempt at "clarification", fully realising that it would greatly increase the size of the pamphlet and delay its publication; I saw *no other way* of meeting my pledge I had made in the article "Where To Begin". Thus, to the apologies for the delay, I must add others for the serious literary shortcomings of the pamphlet. I had to work *in great haste*, with frequent interruptions by a variety of other tasks.

The examination of the above three questions still constitutes the main theme of this pamphlet, but I found it necessary to begin with two questions of a more general nature—why such an "innocent" and "natural" slogan as "freedom of criticism" should be for us a veritable war-cry, and why we cannot come to an understanding even on the fundamental question of the role of Social-Democrats in

* See present volume, pp. 313-20.—*Ed.*

relation to the spontaneous mass movement. Further, the exposition of our views on the character and substance of political agitation developed into an explanation of the difference between trade-unionist politics and Social-Democratic politics, while the exposition of our views on organisational tasks developed into an explanation of the difference between the amateurish methods which satisfy the Economists, and the organisation of revolutionaries which we hold to be indispensable. Further, I advance the "plan" for an All-Russian political newspaper with all the more insistence because the objections raised against it are untenable, and because no real answer has been given to the question I raised in the article "'Where To Begin" as to how we can set to work from all sides simultaneously to create the organisation we need. Finally, in the concluding part, I hope to show that we did all we could to prevent a decisive break with the Economists, a break which nevertheless proved inevitable; that *Rabochaya Dyelo* acquired a special significance, a "historical" significance, if you will, because it expressed fully and strikingly, not consistent Economism, but the confusion and vacillation which constitute the distinguishing feature of *an entire period* in the history of Russian Social-Democracy; and that therefore the polemic with *Rabochaya Dyelo*, which may upon first view seem excessively detailed, also acquires significance, for we can make no progress until we have completely put an end to this period.

N. Lenin

February 1902

I

DOGMATISM AND "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM"

A. WHAT DOES "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM" MEAN?

"Freedom of criticism" is undoubtedly the most fashionable slogan at the present time, and the one most frequently employed in the controversies between socialists and democrats in all countries. At first sight, nothing would appear to be more strange than the solemn appeals to freedom of criticism made by one of the parties to the dispute. Have voices been raised in the advanced parties against the constitutional law of the majority of European countries which guarantees freedom to science and scientific investigation? "Something must be wrong here," will be the comment of the onlooker who has heard this fashionable slogan repeated at every turn but has not yet penetrated the essence of the disagreement among the disputants; "evidently this slogan is one of the conventional phrases which, like nicknames, become legitimised by use, and become almost generic terms."

In fact, it is no secret for anyone that two trends have taken form in present-day international* Social-Democ-

* Incidentally, in the history of modern socialism this is a phenomenon, perhaps unique and in its way very consoling, namely, that the strife of the various trends within the socialist movement has from national become international. Formerly, the disputes between Lassalleans and Eisenachers,[140] between Guesdists and Possibilists,[141] between Fabians and Social-Democrats, and between Narodnaya Volya adherents and Social-Democrats, remained confined within purely national frameworks, reflecting purely national features, and proceeding, as it were, on different planes. At the present time (as is now evident), the English Fabians, the French Ministerialists, the

racy. The conflict between these trends now flares up in a bright flame and now dies down and smoulders under the ashes of imposing "truce resolutions". The essence of the "new" trend, which adopts a "critical" attitude towards "obsolete dogmatic" Marxism, has been clearly enough *presented* by Bernstein and *demonstrated* by Millerand.

Social-Democracy must change from a party of social revolution into a democratic party of social reforms. Bernstein has surrounded this political demand with a whole battery of well-attuned "new" arguments and reasonings. Denied was the possibility of putting socialism on a scientific basis and of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history. Denied was the fact of growing impoverishment, the process of proletarisation, and the intensification of capitalist contradictions; the very concept, "*ultimate aim*", was declared to be unsound, and the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was completely rejected. Denied was the antithesis in principle between liberalism and socialism. Denied was *the theory of the class struggle*, on the alleged grounds that it could not be applied to a strictly democratic society governed according to the will of the majority, etc.

Thus, the demand for a decisive turn from revolutionary Social-Democracy to bourgeois social-reformism was accompanied by a no less decisive turn towards bourgeois criticism of all the fundamental ideas of Marxism. In view of the fact that this criticism of Marxism has long been directed from the political platform, from university chairs, in numerous pamphlets and in a series of learned treatises, in view of the fact that the entire younger generation of the educated classes has been systematically reared for decades on this criticism, it is not surprising that the "new critical" trend in Social-Democracy should spring up, all

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German Bernsteinians, and the Russian Critics—all belong to the same family, all extol each other, learn from each other, and together take up arms against "dogmatic" Marxism. In this first really international battle with socialist opportunism, international revolutionary Social-Democracy will perhaps become sufficiently strengthened to put an end to the political reaction that has long reigned in Europe?

complete, like Minerva from the head of Jove. The content of this new trend did not have to grow and take shape, it was transferred bodily from bourgeois to socialist literature.

To proceed. If Bernstein's theoretical criticism and political yearnings were still unclear to anyone, the French took the trouble strikingly to demonstrate the "new method". In this instance, too, France has justified its old reputation of being "the land where, more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were each time fought out to a decision..." (Engels, Introduction to Marx's *Der 18 Brumaire*).[142] The French socialists have begun, not to theorise, but to act. The democratically more highly developed political conditions in France have permitted them to put "Bernsteinism into practice" immediately, with all its consequences. Millerand has furnished an excellent example of practical Bernsteinism; not without reason did Bernstein and Vollmar rush so zealously to defend and laud him. Indeed, if Social-Democracy, in essence, is merely a party of reform and must be bold enough to admit this openly, then not only has a socialist the right to join a bourgeois cabinet, but he must always strive to do so. If democracy, in essence, means the abolition of class domination, then why should not a socialist minister charm the whole bourgeois world by orations on class collaboration? Why should he not remain in the cabinet even after the shooting-down of workers by gendarmes has exposed, for the hundredth and thousandth time, the real nature of the democratic collaboration of classes? Why should he not personally take part in greeting the tsar, for whom the French socialists now have no other name than hero of the gallows, knout, and exile (*knouteur, pendeur et déportateur*)? And the reward for this utter humiliation and self-degradation of socialism in the face of the whole world, for the corruption of the socialist consciousness of the working masses—the only basis that can guarantee our victory—the reward for this is pompous *projects* for miserable reforms, so miserable in fact that much more has been obtained from bourgeois governments!

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new "critical" trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of *opportunism*. And if we judge people, not by the glittering uniforms they don or

by the high-sounding appellations they give themselves, but by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that "freedom of criticism" means freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.

"Freedom" is a grand word, but under the banner of freedom for industry the most predatory wars were waged, under the banner of freedom of labour, the working people were robbed. The modern use of the term "freedom of criticism" contains the same inherent falsehood. Those who are really convinced that they have made progress in science would not demand freedom for the new views to continue side by side with the old, but the substitution of the new views for the old. The cry heard today, "Long live freedom of criticism", is too strongly reminiscent of the fable of the empty barrel.

We are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, firmly holding each other by the hand. We are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and we have to advance almost constantly under their fire. We have combined, by a freely adopted decision, for the purpose of fighting the enemy, and not of retreating into the neighbouring marsh, the inhabitants of which, from the very outset, have reproached us with having separated ourselves into an exclusive group and with having chosen the path of struggle instead of the path of conciliation. And now some among us begin to cry out: Let us go into the marsh! And when we begin to shame them, they retort: What backward people you are! Are you not ashamed to deny us the liberty to invite you to take a better road! Oh, yes, gentlemen! You are free not only to invite us, but to go yourselves wherever you will, even into the marsh. In fact, we think that the marsh is your proper place, and we are prepared to render *you* every assistance to get there. Only let go of our hands, don't clutch at us and don't besmirch the grand word freedom, for we too are "free" to go where we please, free to fight not only against the marsh, but also against those who are turning towards the marsh!

B. THE NEW ADVOCATES OF "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM"

Now, this slogan ("freedom of criticism") has in recent times been solemnly advanced by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10), organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, not as a theoretical postulate, but as a political demand, as a reply to the question, "Is it possible to unite the Social-Democratic organisations operating abroad?": "For a durable unity, there must be freedom of criticism" (p. 36).

From this statement two definite conclusions follow: (1) that *Rabocheye Dyelo* has taken under its wing the opportunist trend in international Social-Democracy in general, and (2) that *Rabocheye Dyelo* demands freedom for opportunism in Russian Social-Democracy. Let us examine these conclusions.

Rabocheye Dyelo is "particularly" displeased with the "inclination of *Iskra* and *Zarya* to predict a rupture between the *Mountain* and the *Gironde* in international Social-Democracy".*

"Generally speaking," writes B. Krichevsky, editor of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, "this talk of the *Mountain* and the *Gironde* heard in the ranks of Social-Democracy represents a shallow historical analogy, a strange thing to come from the pen of a Marxist. The Mountain and the Gironde did not represent different temperaments, or intellectual trends, as the historians of social thought may think, but different classes or strata—the middle bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, on the other. In the modern socialist movement, however, there is no conflict of class interests; the socialist movement in its entirety, in *all* of its diverse forms (Krichevsky's italics), including the most pronounced Bernsteinians, stands on the basis of the class interests of the proletariat and its class struggle for political and economic emancipation" (pp. 32-33).

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* A comparison of the two trends within the revolutionary proletariat (the revolutionary and the opportunist), and the two trends within the revolutionary bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century (the Jacobin, known as the Mountain, and the Girondist) was made in the leading article in No. 2 of *Iskra* (February 1901). The article was written by Plekhanov. The Cadets,[143] the Bezzaglavtsi,[144] and the Mensheviks to this day love to refer to Jacobinism in Russian Social-Democracy. But how Plekhanov came to apply this concept for the first time against the Right wing of Social-Democracy—about this they prefer to keep silent or to forget. (Author's note to the 1907 edition—*Ed.*)

A bold assertion! Has not Krichevsky heard of the fact, long ago noted, that it is precisely the extensive participation of an "academic" *stratum* in the socialist movement in recent years that has promoted such a rapid spread of Bernsteinism? And what is most important—on what does our author found his opinion that even "the most pronounced Bernsteinians" stand on the basis of the class struggle for the political and economic emancipation of the proletariat? No one knows. This determined defence of the most pronounced Bernsteinians is not supported by any argument or reasoning whatever. Apparently, the author believes that if he repeats what the most pronounced Bernsteinians say about themselves his assertion requires no proof. But can anything more "shallow" be imagined than this judgement of an entire trend based on nothing more than what the representatives of that trend say about themselves? Can anything more shallow be imagined than the subsequent "homily" on the two different and even diametrically opposite types, or paths, of party development? (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, pp. 34-35.) The German Social-Democrats, in other words, recognise complete freedom of criticism, but the French do not, and it is precisely their example that demonstrates the "bane of intolerance".

To this we can only say that the very example B. Krichevsky affords us attests to the fact that the name Marxists is at times assumed by people who conceive history literally in the "Ilovaisky manner".[145] To explain the unity of the German Socialist Party and the disunity of the French Socialist Party, there is no need whatever to go into the special features in the history of these countries, to contrast the conditions of military semi-absolutism in the one with republican parliamentarism in the other, to analyse the effects of the Paris Commune and the effects of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists, to compare the economic life and economic development of the two countries, or to recall that "the unexampled growth of German Social-Democracy" was accompanied by a strenuous struggle, unique in the history of socialism, not only against erroneous theories (Mühlberger, Dühring,* the *Katheder*-Socialists[146]),

* At the time Engels dealt his blows at Dühring, many representatives of German Social-Democracy inclined towards the latter's

but also against erroneous tactics (Lassalle), etc., etc. All that is superfluous! The French quarrel among themselves because they are intolerant; the Germans are united because they are good boys.

And observe, this piece of matchless profundity is designed to "refute" the fact that puts to rout the defence of the Bernsteinians. The question whether or not the Bernsteinians *stand* on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat is one that can be completely and irrevocably answered only by historical experience. Consequently, the example of France holds greatest significance in this respect, because France is the only country in which the Bernsteinians attempted *to stand* independently, on their own feet, with the warm approval of their German colleagues (and partly also of the Russian opportunists; cf. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 2-3, pp. 83-84). The reference to the "intolerance" of the French, apart from its "historical" significance (in the Nozdryov[147] sense), turns out to be merely an attempt to hush up very unpleasant facts with angry invectives.

Nor are we inclined to make a present of the Germans to Krichevsky and the numerous other champions of "freedom of criticism". If the "most pronounced Bernsteinians" are still tolerated in the ranks of the German party, it is only to the extent that they *submit* to the Hanover resolution,[148] which emphatically rejected Bernstein's "amendments", and to the Lübeck resolution, which (notwithstanding the diplomatic terms in which it is couched) contains a direct warning to Bernstein. It is debatable, from the

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views, and accusations of acerbity, intolerance, uncomradely polemics, etc., were hurled at Engels even publicly at a Party Congress. At the Congress of 1877, Most, and his supporters, introduced a resolution to prohibit the publication of Engels's articles in *Vorwärts* because "they do not interest the overwhelming majority of the readers", and Vahlteich declared that their publication had caused great damage to the Party, that Dühring too had rendered services to Social-Democracy: "We must utilise everyone in the interests of the Party; let the professors engage in polemics if they care to do so, but *Vorwärts* is not the place in which to conduct them" (*Vorwärts*, No. 65, June 6, 1877). Here we have another example of the defence of "freedom of criticism", and our legal critics and illegal opportunists, who love so much to cite the example of the Germans, would do well to ponder it!

standpoint of the interests of the German party, whether diplomacy was appropriate and whether, in this case, a bad peace is better than a good quarrel; in short, opinions may differ as to the expediency of any one of the *methods* employed to reject Bernsteinism, but that the German party *did reject* Bernsteinism on two occasions, is a fact no one can fail to see. Therefore, to think that the German example confirms the thesis that "the most pronounced Bernsteinians stand on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat, for political and economic emancipation", means to fail completely to understand what is going on under our very eyes.*

Nor is that all. As we have seen, *Rabocheye Dyelo* demands "freedom of criticism" and defends Bernsteinism before *Russian* Social-Democracy. Apparently it convinced itself that we were unfair to our "Critics" and Bernsteinians. But to which ones? who? where? when? What did the unfairness represent? About this, not a word. *Rabocheye Dyelo* does not name a single Russian Critic or Bernsteinian! We are left with but one of two possible suppositions. *Either* the unfairly treated party is none other than *Rabocheye Dyelo* itself (this is confirmed by the fact that in the two articles in No. 10 reference is made only to the wrongs suffered by *Rabocheye Dyelo* at the hands of *Zarya* and *Iskra*). If that

* It should be observed that *Rabocheye Dyelo* has always confined itself to a bare statement of facts concerning Bernsteinism in the German party and completely "refrained" from expressing its own opinion. See, for instance, the reports of the Stuttgart Congress[149] in No. 2-3 (p. 66), in which all the disagreements are reduced to "tactics" and the statement is merely made that the overwhelming majority remain true to the previous revolutionary tactics. Or, No. 4-5 (p. 25, et seq.), in which we have nothing but a paraphrasing of the speeches delivered at the Hanover Congress, with a reprint of Bebel's resolution. An exposition and a criticism of Bernstein's views are again put off (as was the case in No. 2-3) to be dealt with in a "special article". Curiously enough, in No. 4-5 (p. 33), we read the following: "... the views expounded by Bebel have the support of the vast majority of the Congress," and a few lines thereafter: "... David defended Bernstein's views.... First of all, he tried to show that ... Bernstein and his friends, after all is said and done [*sic*!], stand on the basis of the class struggle..." This was written in December 1899, and in September 1901 *Rabocheye Dyelo*, apparently no longer believing that Bebel was right, repeats David's views as, its own!

is the case, how is the strange fact to be explained that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which always vehemently dissociated itself from all solidarity with Bernsteinism, could not defend itself without putting in a word in defence of the "most pronounced Bernsteinians" and of freedom of criticism? *Or* some third persons have been treated unfairly. If this is the case, then what reasons may there be for not naming them?

We see, therefore, that *Rabocheye Dyelo* is continuing to play the game of hide-and-seek it has played (as we shall show below) ever since its founding. And let us note further this *first* practical application of the vaunted "freedom of criticism". In actual fact, not only was it forthwith reduced to abstention from all criticism, but also to abstention from expressing independent views altogether. The very *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which avoids mentioning Russian Bernsteinism as if it were a shameful disease (to use Starover's[150] apt expression), proposes, for the treatment of this disease, *to copy word for word* the latest German prescription for the German variety of the malady! Instead of freedom of criticism—slavish (worse: apish) imitation! The very same social and political content of modern international opportunism reveals itself in a variety of ways according to national peculiarities. In one country the opportunists have long ago come out under a separate flag; in another, they have ignored theory and in fact pursued the policy of the Radicals-Socialists; in a third, some members of the revolutionary party have deserted to the camp of opportunism and strive to achieve their aims, not in open struggle for principles and for new tactics, but by gradual, imperceptible, and, if one may so put it, unpunishable corruption of their party; in a fourth country, similar deserters employ the same methods in the gloom of political slavery, and with a completely original combination of "legal" and "illegal" activity, etc. To talk of freedom of criticism and of Bernsteinism as a condition for uniting the *Russian* Social-Democrats and not to explain how *Russian* Bernsteinism has manifested itself and what particular fruits it has borne, amounts to talking with the aim of saying nothing.

Let us ourselves try, if only in a few words, to say what *Rabocheye Dyelo* did not want to say (or which was, perhaps, beyond its comprehension).

C. CRITICISM IN RUSSIA

The chief distinguishing feature of Russia in regard to the point we are examining is that *the very beginning* of the spontaneous working-class movement, on the one hand, and of the turn of progressive public opinion towards Marxism, on the other, was marked by the combination of manifestly heterogeneous elements under a common flag to fight the common enemy (the obsolete social and political world outlook). We refer to the heyday of "legal Marxism". Speaking generally, this was an altogether curious phenomenon that no one in the eighties or the beginning of the nineties would have believed possible. In a country ruled by an autocracy, with a completely enslaved press, in a period of desperate political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is persecuted, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the *censored* literature and, though expounded in Aesopian language, is understood by all the "interested". The government had accustomed itself to regarding only the theory of the (revolutionary) Narodnaya Volya as dangerous, without, as is usual, observing its internal evolution, and rejoicing at *any* criticism levelled against it. Quite a considerable time elapsed (by our Russian standards) before the government realised what had happened and the unwieldy army of censors and gendarmes discovered the new enemy and flung itself upon him. Meanwhile, Marxist books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist, Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature. It was quite natural, therefore, that among the Marxian neophytes who were caught up in this atmosphere, there should be more than one "author who got a swelled head..."[151].

We can now speak calmly of this period as of an event of the past. It is no secret that the brief period in which Marxism blossomed on the surface of our literature was called forth by an alliance between people of extreme and of very moderate views. In point of fact, the latter were bourgeois democrats; this conclusion (so markedly confirmed by their

subsequent "critical" development) suggested itself to some even when the "alliance" was still intact.*

That being the case, are not the revolutionary Social-Democrats who entered into the alliance with the future "Critics" mainly responsible for the subsequent "confusion"? This question, together with a reply in the affirmative, is sometimes heard from people with too rigid a view. But such people are entirely in the wrong. Only those who are not sure of themselves can fear to enter into temporary alliances even with unreliable people; not a single political party could exist without such alliances. The combination with the legal Marxists was in its way the first really political alliance entered into by Russian Social-Democrats. Thanks to this alliance, an astonishingly rapid victory was obtained over Narodism, and Marxist ideas (even though in a vulgarised form) became very widespread. Moreover, the alliance was not concluded altogether without "conditions". Evidence of this is the burning by the censor, in 1895, of the Marxist collection *Material on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*.[152] If the literary agreement with the legal Marxists can be compared with a political alliance, then that book can be compared with a political treaty.

The rupture, of course, did not occur because the "allies" proved to be bourgeois democrats. On the contrary, the representatives of the latter trend are natural and desirable allies of Social-Democracy insofar as its democratic tasks, brought to the fore by the prevailing situation in Russia, are concerned. But an essential condition for such an alliance must be the full opportunity for the socialists to reveal to the working class that its interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, the Bernsteinian and "critical" trend, to which the majority of the legal Marxists turned, deprived the socialists of this opportunity and demoralised the socialist consciousness by vulgarising Marxism, by advocating the theory of the blunting of social contradictions, by declaring the idea of the

* The reference is to an article by K. Tulin directed against Struve. (See present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.—*Ed.*) The article was based on an essay entitled "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

social revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat to be absurd, by reducing the working-class movement and the class struggle to narrow trade-unionism and to a "realistic" struggle for petty, gradual reforms. This was synonymous with bourgeois democracy's denial of socialism's right to independence and, consequently, of its right to existence; in practice it meant a striving to convert the nascent working-class movement into an appendage of the liberals.

Naturally, under such circumstances the rupture was necessary. But the "peculiar" feature of Russia manifested itself in the fact that this rupture simply meant the elimination of the Social-Democrats from the most accessible and widespread "legal" literature. The "ex-Marxists", who took up the flag of "criticism" and who obtained almost a monopoly to "demolish" Marxism, entrenched themselves in this literature. Catchwords like "Against orthodoxy" and "Long live freedom of criticism" (now repeated by *Rabocheye Dyelo*) forthwith became the vogue, and the fact that neither the censor nor the gendarmes could resist this vogue is apparent from the publication of *three* Russian editions of the work of the celebrated Bernstein (celebrated in the Herostratean sense) and from the fact that the works of Bernstein, Mr. Prokopovich, and others were recommended by Zubatov (*Iskra*, No. 10). A task now devolved upon the Social-Democrats that was difficult in itself and was made incredibly more difficult by purely external obstacles—the task of combating the new trend. This trend did not confine itself to the sphere of literature. The turn towards "criticism" was accompanied by an infatuation for "Economism" among Social-Democratic practical workers.

The manner in which the connection between, and interdependence of, legal criticism and illegal Economism arose and grew is in itself an interesting subject, one that could serve as the theme of a special article. We need only note here that this connection undoubtedly existed. The notoriety deservedly acquired by the *Credo* was due precisely to the frankness with which it formulated this connection and blurted out the fundamental political tendency of "Economism"—let the workers carry on the economic struggle (it would be more correct to say the trade-unionist struggle,

because the latter also embraces specifically working-class politics) and let the Marxist intelligentsia merge with the liberals for the political "struggle". Thus, trade-unionist work "among the people" meant fulfilling the first part of this task, while legal criticism meant fulfilling the second. This statement was such an excellent weapon against Economism that, had there been no *Credo*, it would have been worth inventing one.

The *Credo* was not invented, but it was published without the consent and perhaps even against the will of its authors. At all events, the present writer, who took part in dragging this new "programme" into the light of day,* has heard complaints and reproaches to the effect that copies of the résumé of the speakers' views were distributed, dubbed the *Credo*, and even published in the press together with the protest! We refer to this episode because it reveals a very peculiar feature of our Economism—fear of publicity. This is a feature of Economism generally, and not of the authors of the *Credo* alone. It was revealed by that most outspoken and honest advocate of Economism, *Rabochaya Mysl*, and by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (which was indignant over the publication of "Economist" documents in the *Vademecum*[155]), as well as by the Kiev Committee, which two years ago refused to permit the publication of its *profession de foi*,** together with a repudiation of it,*** and by many other individual representatives of Economism.

This fear of criticism displayed by the advocates of freedom of criticism cannot be attributed solely to craftiness (although, on occasion, no doubt craftiness is brought into play: it would be improvident to expose the young and as

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* The reference is to the *Protest of the Seventeen* against the *Credo*. The present writer took part in drawing up this protest (the end of 1899).[153] The protest and the *Credo* were published abroad in the spring of 1900. (See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82.—*Ed.*) It is now known from the article written by Madame Kuskova (I think in *Byloye*[154]) that she was the author of the *Credo* and that Mr. Prokopovich was very prominent among the "Economists" abroad at the time. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

** Confession of faith.[156]

*** As far as our information goes, the composition of the Kiev Committee has changed since then.

yet frail shoots of the new trend to attacks by opponents). No, the majority of the Economists look with sincere resentment (as by the very nature of Economism they must) upon all theoretical controversies, factional disagreements, broad political questions, plans for organising revolutionaries, etc. "Leave all that to the people abroad!" said a fairly consistent Economist to me one day, thereby expressing a very widespread (and again purely trade-unionist) view; our concern is the working-class movement, the workers, organisations here, in our localities; all the rest is merely the invention of doctrinaires, "the overrating of ideology", as the authors of the letter, published in *Iskra*, No. 12, expressed it, in unison with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10.

The question now arises: such being the peculiar features of Russian "criticism" and Russian Bernsteinism, what should have been the task of those who sought to oppose opportunism in deeds and not merely in words? First, they should have made efforts to resume the theoretical work that had barely begun in the period of legal Marxism and that fell anew on the shoulders of the comrades working underground. Without such work the successful growth of the movement was impossible. Secondly, they should have actively combated the legal "criticism" that was perverting people's minds on a considerable scale. Thirdly, they should have actively opposed confusion and vacillation in the practical movement, exposing and repudiating every conscious or unconscious attempt to degrade our programme and our tactics.

That *Rabocheye Dyelo* did none of these things is well known; we shall have occasion below to deal with this well-known fact in detail and from various aspects. At the moment, however, we desire merely to show the glaring contradiction that exists between the demand for "freedom of criticism" and the specific features of our native criticism and Russian Economism. It suffices but to glance at the text of the resolution in which the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad endorsed the point of view of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

"In the interests of the further ideological development of Social-Democracy, we recognise the freedom of criticism of Social-Democratic theory in Party literature to be absolutely necessary insofar as the criticism does not run counter to the class and revolutionary character of this theory" (*Two Conferences*, p. 10).

And the motivation? The resolution "in its first part coincides with the resolution of the Lübeck Party Congress on Bernstein".... In the simplicity of their souls the "Unionists" failed to observe what a *testimonium paupertatis* (attestation of poverty) they betray with this copying.... "But ... in its second part, it restricts freedom of criticism much more than did the Lübeck Party Congress."

The resolution of the Union Abroad, then, is directed against the Russian Bernsteinians? If it is not, then the reference to Lübeck would be utterly absurd. But it is not true to say that it "restricts freedom of criticism". In adopting their Hanover resolution, the Germans, point by point, rejected *precisely* the amendments proposed by Bernstein, while in their Lübeck resolution they cautioned *Bernstein personally*, by naming him. Our "free" imitators, however, make *not a single allusion* to *a single* manifestation of specifically Russian "criticism" and Russian Economism. In view of this omission, the bare reference to the class and revolutionary character of the theory leaves far wider scope for misinterpretation, particularly when the Union Abroad refuses to identify "so-called Economism" with opportunism (*Two Conferences*, p. 8, Paragraph 1). But all this, in passing. The main thing to note is that the positions of the opportunists in relation to the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Russia are diametrically opposed to those in Germany. In that country, as we know, the revolutionary Social-Democrats are in favour of preserving that which exists—the old programme and the tactics, which are universally known and have been elucidated in all their details by many decades of experience. But the "Critics" desire to introduce changes, and since these Critics represent an insignificant minority, and since they are very timid in their revisionist efforts, one can understand the motives of the majority in confining themselves to the dry rejection of "innovations". In Russia, however, it is the Critics and the Economists who are in favour of preserving that which exists: the "Critics" want us to go on regarding them as Marxists and to guarantee them the "freedom of criticism" they enjoyed to the full (for, in fact, they never recognised any kind of *party* ties,* and, more-

* The fact alone of the absence of public party ties and party traditions, representing as it does a cardinal difference between Rus-

over, we never had a generally recognised party body that could "restrict" freedom of criticism, if only by counsel); the Economists want the revolutionaries to recognise the sovereign character of the present movement" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 25), i.e., to recognise the "legitimacy" of that which exists; they want the "ideologists" not to try to "divert" the movement from the path that "is determined by the interaction of material elements and material environment" ("Letter" in *Iskra*, No. 12); they want to have that struggle recognised as desirable "which it is possible for the workers to wage under the present conditions", and as the only possible struggle, that "which they are actually waging at the present time" ("*Separate Supplement" to Rabochaya Mysl*, p. 14). We revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, are dissatisfied with this worship of spontaneity, i.e., of that which exists "at the present moment". We demand that the tactics that have prevailed in recent years be changed; we declare that "before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation" (see announcement of the publication of *Iskra*).* In a word, the Germans stand for that which exists and reject changes; we demand a change of that which exists, and reject subservience thereto and reconciliation to it.

This "slight" difference our "free" copyists of German resolutions failed to notice.

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sia and Germany, should have warned all sensible socialists against blind imitation. But here is an instance of the lengths to which "freedom of criticism" goes in Russia. Mr. Bulgakov, the Russian Critic, utters the following reprimand to the Austrian Critic, Hertz: "Notwithstanding the independence of his conclusions, Hertz on this point [on the question of co-operative societies] apparently remains excessively bound by the opinions of his party, and although he disagrees with it in details, he dare not reject the common principle" (*Capitalism and Agriculture*, Vol. II, p. 287). The subject of a politically enslaved state, in which nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of the population are corrupted to the marrow by political subservience and completely lack the conception of party honour and party ties, superciliously reproves a citizen of a constitutional state for being excessively "bound by the opinions of his party"! Our illegal organisations have nothing else to do, of course, but draw up resolutions on freedom of criticism....

* See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 354.—*Ed.*

D. ENGELS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THEORETICAL STRUGGLE

"Dogmatism, doctrinairism", "ossification of the party—the inevitable retribution that follows the violent strait-lacing of thought"—these are the enemies against which the knightly champions of "freedom of criticism" in *Rabocheye Dyelo* rise up in arms. We are very glad that this question has been placed on the order of the day and we would only propose to add to it one other:

And who are the judges?

We have before us two publishers' announcements. One, "The Programme of the Periodical Organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—*Rabocheye Dyelo*" (reprint from No. 1 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*), and the other, the "Announcement of the Resumption of the Publications of the Emancipation of Labour Group". Both are dated 1899, when the "crisis of Marxism" had long been under discussion. And what do we find? We would seek in vain in the first announcement for any reference to this phenomenon, or a definite statement of the position the new organ intends to adopt on this question. Not a word is said about theoretical work and the urgent tasks that now confront it, either in this programme or in the supplements to it that were adopted by the Third Congress of the Union Abroad in 1901 (*Two Conferences*, pp. 5-18). During this entire time the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* ignored theoretical questions, in spite of the fact that these were questions that disturbed the minds of all Social-Democrats the world over.

The other announcement, on the contrary, points first of all to the declining interest in theory in recent years, imperatively demands "vigilant attention to the theoretical aspect of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat", and calls for "ruthless criticism of the Bernsteinian and other anti-revolutionary tendencies" in our movement. The issues of *Zarya* to date show how this programme has been carried out.

Thus, we see that high-sounding phrases against the ossification of thought, etc., conceal unconcern and helplessness with regard to the development of theoretical thought. The case of the Russian Social-Democrats manifestly illus-

trates the general European phenomenon (long ago noted also by the German Marxists) that the much vaunted freedom of criticism does not imply substitution of one theory for another, but freedom from all integral and pondered theory; it implies eclecticism and lack of principle. Those who have the slightest acquaintance with the actual state of our movement cannot but see that the wide spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain lowering of the theoretical level. Quite a number of people with very little, and even a total lack of theoretical training joined the movement because of its practical significance and its practical successes. We can judge from that how tactless *Rabocheye Dyelo* is when, with an air of triumph, it quotes Marx's statement: "Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes."[157] To repeat these words in a period of theoretical disorder is like wishing mourners at a funeral many happy returns of the day. Moreover, these words of Marx are taken from his letter on the Gotha Programme,[158] in which he *sharply condemns* eclecticism in the formulation of principles. If you must unite, Marx wrote to the party leaders, then enter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not allow any bargaining over principles, do not make theoretical "concessions". This was Marx's idea, and yet there are people among us who seek—in his name—to belittle the significance of theory!

Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. This idea cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity. Yet, for Russian Social-Democrats the importance of theory is enhanced by three other circumstances, which are often forgotten: first, by the fact that our Party is only in process of formation, its features are only just becoming defined, and it has as yet far from settled accounts with the other trends of revolutionary thought that threaten to divert the movement from the correct path. On the contrary, precisely the very recent past was marked by a revival of non-Social-Democratic revolutionary trends (an eventuation regarding which Axelrod long ago warned the Economists). Under these circumstances, what at first sight appears to be an "unimportant" error may lead to

most deplorable consequences, and only short-sighted people can consider factional disputes and a strict differentiation between shades of opinion inopportune or superfluous. The fate of Russian Social-Democracy for very many years to come may depend on the strengthening of one or the other "shade".

Secondly, the Social-Democratic movement is in its very essence an international movement. This means, not only that we must combat national chauvinism, but that an incipient movement in a young country can be successful only if it makes use of the experiences of other countries. In order to make use of these experiences it is not enough merely to be acquainted with them, or simply to copy out the latest resolutions. What is required is the ability to treat these experiences critically and to test them independently. He who realises how enormously the modern working-class movement has grown and branched out will understand what a reserve of theoretical forces and political (as well as revolutionary) experience is required to carry out this task.

Thirdly, the national tasks of Russian Social-Democracy are such as have never confronted any other socialist party in the world. We shall have occasion further on to deal with the political and organisational duties which the task of emancipating the whole people from the yoke of autocracy imposes upon us. At this point, we wish to state only that the *role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*. To have a concrete understanding of what this means, let the reader recall such predecessors of Russian Social-Democracy as Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and the brilliant galaxy of revolutionaries of the seventies; let him ponder over the world significance which Russian literature is now acquiring; let him ... but be that enough!

Let us quote what Engels said in 1874 concerning the significance of theory in the Social-Democratic movement. Engels recognises, *not two* forms of the great struggle of Social-Democracy (political and economic), as is the fashion among us, *but three*, *placing the theoretical struggle on a par with the first two*. His recommendations to the German working-class movement, which had become strong, practically and politically, are so instructive from the standpoint

of present-day problems and controversies, that we hope the reader will not be vexed with us for quoting a long passage from his prefatory note to *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*,* which has long become a great bibliographical rarity:

"The German workers have two important advantages over those of the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; and they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called 'educated' classes of Germany have almost completely lost. Without German philosophy, which preceded it, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific socialism—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed—would never have come into being. Without a sense of theory among the workers, this scientific socialism would never have entered their flesh and blood as much as is the case. What an immeasurable advantage this is may be seen, on the one hand, from the indifference towards all theory, which is one of the main reasons why the English working-class movement crawls along so slowly in spite of the splendid organisation of the individual unions; on the other hand, from the mischief and confusion wrought by Proudhonism, in its original form, among the French and Belgians, and, in the form further caricatured by Bakunin, among the Spaniards and Italians.

"The second advantage is that, chronologically speaking, the Germans were about the last to come into the workers' movement. Just as German theoretical socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen—three men who, in spite of all their fantastic notions and all their utopianism, have their place among the most eminent thinkers of all times, and whose genius anticipated innumerable things, the correctness of which is now being scientifically proved by us—so the practical workers' movement in Germany ought never to forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it was able simply to utilise their dearly bought experience, and could now avoid their mistakes, which in their time were mostly unavoidable. Without the precedent of the English trade unions and French workers'

* Dritter Abdruck, Leipzig, 1875. Verlag der Genossenschaftsbuchdruckerei. (*The Peasant War in Germany*. Third impression. Co-operative Publishers, Leipzig, 1875.—*Ed.*)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

political struggles, without the gigantic impulse given especially by the Paris Commune, where would we be now?

"It must be said to the credit of the German workers that they have exploited the advantages of their situation with rare understanding. For the first time since a workers' movement has existed, the struggle is being conducted pursuant to its three sides—the theoretical, the political, and the practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists)—in harmony and in its interconnections, and in a systematic way. It is precisely in this, as it were, concentric attack, that the strength and invincibility of the German movement lies.

"Due to this advantageous situation, on the one hand, and to the insular peculiarities of the English and the forcible suppression of the French movement, on the other, the German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foretold. But let us hope that as long as they occupy it, they will fill it fittingly. This demands redoubled efforts in every field of struggle and agitation. In particular, it will be the duty of the leaders to gain an ever clearer insight into all theoretical questions, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old world outlook, and constantly to keep in mind that socialism, since it has become a science, demands that it be pursued as a science, i.e., that it be studied. The task will be to spread with increased zeal among the masses of the workers the ever more clarified understanding thus acquired, to knit together ever more firmly the organisation both of the party and of the trade unions....

"If the German workers progress in this way, they will not be marching exactly at the head of the movement—it is not at all in the interest of this movement that the workers of any particular country should march at its head—but they will occupy an honourable place in the battle line; and they will stand armed for battle when either unexpectedly grave trials or momentous events demand of them increased courage, increased determination and energy."[159]

Engels's words proved prophetic. Within a few years the German workers were subjected to unexpectedly grave trials in the form of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists.

And they met those trials armed for battle and succeeded in emerging from them victorious.

The Russian proletariat will have to undergo trials immeasurably graver; it will have to fight a monster compared with which an anti-socialist law in a constitutional country seems but a dwarf. History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks confronting the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. And we have the right to count upon acquiring this honourable title, already earned by our predecessors, the revolutionaries of the seventies, if we succeed in inspiring our movement, which is a thousand times broader and deeper, with the same devoted determination and vigour.

II

THE SPONTANEITY OF THE MASSES AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

We have said that our movement, much more extensive and deep than the movement of the seventies, must be inspired with the same devoted determination and energy that inspired the movement at that time. Indeed, no one, we think, has until now doubted that the strength of the present-day movement lies in the awakening of the masses (principally, the industrial proletariat) and that its weakness lies in the lack of consciousness and initiative among the revolutionary leaders.

However, of late a staggering discovery has been made, which threatens to disestablish all hitherto prevailing views on this question. This discovery was made by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which in its polemic with *Iskra* and *Zarya* did not confine itself to making objections on separate points, but tried to ascribe "general disagreements" to a more profound cause—to the "different appraisals of the *relative* importance of the spontaneous and consciously 'methodical' ele-

ment". *Rabocheye Dyelo* formulated its indictment as a "*belittling of the significance of the objective or the spontaneous element of development*".* To this we say: Had the polemics with *Iskra* and *Zarya* resulted in nothing more than causing *Rabocheye Dyelo* to hit upon these "general disagreements", that alone would give us considerable satisfaction, so significant is this thesis and so clear is the light it sheds on the quintessence of the present-day theoretical and political differences that exist among Russian Social-Democrats.

For this reason the question of the relation between consciousness and spontaneity is of such enormous general interest, and for this reason the question must be dealt with in great detail.

A. THE BEGINNING OF THE SPONTANEOUS UPSURGE

In the previous chapter we pointed out how *universally* absorbed the educated youth of Russia was in the theories of Marxism in the middle of the nineties. In the same period the strikes that followed the famous St. Petersburg industrial war of 1896 assumed a similar general character. Their spread over the whole of Russia clearly showed the depth of the newly awakening popular movement, and if we are to speak of the "spontaneous element" then, of course, it is this strike movement which, first and foremost, must be regarded as spontaneous. But there is spontaneity and spontaneity. Strikes occurred in Russia in the seventies and sixties (and even in the first half of the nineteenth century), and they were accompanied by the "spontaneous" destruction of machinery, etc. Compared with these "revolts", the strikes of the nineties might even be described as "conscious", to such an extent do they mark the progress which the working-class movement made in that period. This shows that the "spontaneous element", in essence, represents nothing more nor less than consciousness in an *embryonic form*. Even the primitive revolts expressed the awakening of consciousness to a certain extent. The workers were losing their age-long faith in the permanence of the system which oppressed them and began... I shall not say to understand, but to sense

* *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, September 1901, pp. 17-18. *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s italics.

the necessity for collective resistance, definitely abandoning their slavish submission to the authorities. But this was, nevertheless, more in the nature of outbursts of desperation and vengeance than of *struggle*. The strikes of the nineties revealed far greater flashes of consciousness; definite demands were advanced, the strike was carefully timed, known cases and instances in other places were discussed, etc. The revolts were simply the resistance of the oppressed, whereas the systematic strikes represented the class struggle in embryo, but only in embryo. Taken by themselves, these strikes were simply trade union struggles, not yet Social-Democratic struggles. They marked the awakening antagonisms between workers and employers; but the workers, were not, and could not be, conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the whole of the modern political and social system, i.e., theirs was not yet Social-Democratic consciousness. In this sense, the strikes of the nineties, despite the enormous progress they represented as compared with the "revolts", remained a purely spontaneous movement.

We have said that *there could not have been* Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.* The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of

* Trade-unionism does not exclude "politics" altogether, as some imagine. Trade unions have always conducted some political (but not Social-Democratic) agitation and struggle. We shall deal with the difference between trade-union politics and Social-Democratic politics in the next chapter.

thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. In the period under discussion, the middle nineties, this doctrine not only represented the completely formulated programme of the Emancipation of Labour group, but had already won over to its side the majority of the revolutionary youth in Russia.

Hence, we had both the spontaneous awakening of the working masses, their awakening to conscious life and conscious struggle, and a revolutionary youth, armed with Social-Democratic theory and straining towards the workers. In this connection it is particularly important to state the oft-forgotten (and comparatively little-known) fact that, although the *early* Social-Democrats of that period *zealously carried on economic agitation* (being guided in this activity by the truly useful indications contained in the pamphlet *On Agitation*,[160] then still in manuscript), they did not regard this as their sole task. On the contrary, *from the very beginning* they set for Russian Social-Democracy the most far-reaching historical tasks, in general, and the task of overthrowing the autocracy, in particular. Thus, towards the end of 1895, the St. Petersburg group of Social-Democrats, which founded the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, prepared the first issue of a newspaper called *Rabocheye Dyelo*. This issue was ready to go to press when it was seized by the gendarmes, on the night of December 8, 1895, in a raid on the house of one of the members of the group, Anatoly Alexeyevich Vaneyey,* so that the first edition of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was not destined to see the light of day. The leading article in this issue (which perhaps thirty years hence some *Russkaya Starina*[161] will unearth in the archives of the Department of Police) outlined the historical tasks of the working class in Russia and placed the achievement of political liberty at their head. The issue also contained an article entitled "What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?"** which dealt with the crushing of the

* A. A. Vaneyev died in Eastern Siberia in 1899 from consumption, which he contracted during solitary confinement in prison prior to his banishment. That is why we considered it possible to publish the above information, the authenticity of which we guarantee, for it comes from persons who were closely and directly acquainted with A. A. Vaneyev.

** See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 87-92.—*Ed.*

elementary education committees by the police. In addition, there was some correspondence from St. Petersburg, and from other parts of Russia (e.g., a letter on the massacre of the workers in Yaroslavl Gubernia). This, "first effort", if we are not mistaken, of the Russian Social-Democrats of the nineties was not a purely local, or less still, "Economic", newspaper, but one that aimed to unite the strike movement with the revolutionary movement against the autocracy, and to win over to the side of Social-Democracy all who were oppressed by the policy of reactionary obscurantism. No one in the slightest degree acquainted with the state of the movement at that period could doubt that such a paper would have met with warm response among the workers of the capital and the revolutionary intelligentsia and would have had a wide circulation. The failure of the enterprise merely showed that the Social-Democrats of that period were unable to meet the immediate requirements of the time owing to their lack of revolutionary experience and practical training. This must be said, too, with regard to the *S. Peterburgsky Rabochy Listok*[162] and particularly with regard to *Rabochaya Gazeta* and the *Manifesto* of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, founded in the spring of 1898. Of course, we would not dream of blaming the Social-Democrats of that time for this unpreparedness. But in order to profit from the experience of that movement, and to draw practical lessons from it, we must thoroughly understand the causes and significance of this or that shortcoming. It is therefore highly important to establish the fact that a part (perhaps even a majority) of the Social-Democrats, active in the period of 1895-98, justly considered it possible even then, at the very beginning of the "spontaneous" movement, to come forward with a most extensive programme and a militant tactical line.* Lack of training of the majority of the revolu-

* "In adopting a hostile attitude towards the activities of the Social-Democrats of the late nineties, *Iskra* ignores the absence at that time of conditions for any work other than the struggle for petty demands," declare the Economists in their "Letter to Russian Social-Democratic Organs" (*Iskra*, No. 12). The facts given above show that the assertion about "absence of conditions" *is diametrically opposed to the truth*. Not only at the end, but even in the mid-nineties, all the conditions existed for *other* work, besides the struggle for petty demands—all the conditions except adequate training of leaders. Instead

tionaries, an entirely natural phenomenon, could not have roused any particular fears. Once the tasks were correctly defined, once the energy existed for repeated attempts to fulfil them, temporary failures represented only part misfortune. Revolutionary experience and organisational skill are things that can be acquired, provided the desire is there to acquire them, provided the shortcomings are recognised, which in revolutionary activity is more than half-way towards their removal.

But what was only part misfortune became full misfortune when this consciousness began to grow dim (it was very much alive among the members of the groups mentioned), when there appeared people—and even Social -Democratic organs—that were prepared to regard shortcomings as virtues, that even tried to invent a *theoretical* basis for their *slavish cringing before spontaneity*. It is time to draw conclusions from this trend, the content of which is incorrectly and too narrowly characterised as "Economism".

B. BOWING TO SPONTANEITY. *RABOCHAYA MYSL*

Before dealing with the literary manifestation of this subservience to spontaneity, we should like to note the following characteristic fact (communicated to us from the above-mentioned source), which throws light on the conditions in which the two future conflicting trends in Russian Social-Democracy arose and grew among the comrades working in St. Petersburg. In the beginning of 1897, just prior to their banishment, A. A. Vaneyev and several of his comrades attended a private meeting[163] at which "old" and "young" members of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class gathered. The conversation centred chiefly about the question of organisation, particularly about the "rules for the workers' mutual benefit fund", which, in

of frankly admitting that we, the ideologists, the leaders, lacked sufficient training—the "Economists" seek to shift the blame entirely upon the "absence of conditions", upon the effect of material environment that determines the road from which no ideologist will be able to divert the movement. What is this but slavish cringing before spontaneity, what but the infatuation of the "ideologists" with their own shortcomings?

their final form, were published in "*Listok*" *Rabotnika*,[164] No. 9-10, p. 46. Sharp differences immediately showed themselves between the "old" members ("Decembrists", as the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats jestingly called them) and several of the "young" members (who subsequently took an active part in the work of *Rabochaya Mysl*), with a heated discussion ensuing. The "young" members defended the main principles of the rules in the form in which they were published. The "old" members contended that the prime necessity was not this, but the consolidation of the League of Struggle into an organisation of revolutionaries to which all the various workers' mutual benefit funds, students' propaganda circles, etc., should be subordinated. It goes without saying that the disputing sides far from realised at the time that these disagreements were the beginning of a cleavage; on the contrary, they regarded them as something isolated and casual. But this fact shows that in Russia, too, "Economism" did not arise and spread without a struggle against the "old" Social-Democrats (which the Economists of today are apt to forget). And if, in the main, this struggle has not left "documentary" traces behind it, it is *solely* because the membership of the circles then functioning underwent such constant change that no continuity was established and, consequently, differences in point of view were not recorded in any documents.

The founding of *Rabochaya Mysl* brought Economism to the light of day, but not at one stroke. We must picture to ourselves concretely the conditions for activity and the short-lived character of the majority of the Russian study circles (a thing that is possible only for those who have themselves experienced it) in order to understand how much there was of the fortuitous in the successes and failures of the new trend in various towns, and the length of time during which neither the advocates nor the opponents of the "new" could make up their minds—and literally had no opportunity of so doing—as to whether this really expressed a distinct trend or merely the lack of training of certain individuals. For example, the first mimeographed copies of *Rabochaya Mysl* never reached the great majority of Social-Democrats, and if we are able to refer to the leading article in the first number, it is only because it was reproduced in an

article by V. I.[165] ("*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10, p. 47, et seq.), who, of course, did not fail to extol with more zeal than reason the new paper, which was so different from the papers and projects for papers mentioned above.* It is well worth dwelling on this leading article because it brings out in bold relief *the entire spirit of Rabochaya Mysl* and Economism generally.

After stating that the arm of the "blue-coats"** could never halt the progress of the working-class movement, the leading article goes on to say: "... The virility of the working-class movement is due to the fact that the workers themselves are at last taking their fate into their own hands, and out of the hands of the leaders"; this fundamental thesis is then developed in greater detail. Actually, the leaders (i.e., the Social-Democrats, the organisers of the League of Struggle) were, one might say, torn out of the hands of the workers*** by the police; yet it is made to appear that the workers were fighting against the leaders and liberated themselves from their yoke! Instead of sounding the call to go forward towards the consolidation of the revolutionary organisation and the expansion of political activity, the call was issued for a *retreat* to the purely trade-union struggle. It was announced that "the economic basis of the movement is eclipsed by the effort never to forget the political ideal", and that the watchword for the working-class movement was "Struggle for economic conditions" (!) or, better still, "The workers for the workers". It was declared that strike funds "are more valuable to the movement than a hundred other organisations" (compare this statement made in October 1897, with the

* It should be stated in passing that the praise of *Rabochaya Mysl* in November 1898, when Economism had become fully defined, especially abroad, emanated from the selfsame V. I, who very soon after became one of the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. And yet *Rabocheye Dyelo* denied that there were two trends in Russian Social-Democracy, and continues to deny it to this day!

** The tsarist gendarmes wore blue uniforms.—*Tr.*

*** That this simile is a correct one is shown by the following characteristic fact. When, after the arrest of the "Decembrists", the news spread among the workers of the Schlüsselburg Highway that the discovery and arrest were facilitated by an *agent-provocateur*, N. N. Mikhailov, a dentist, who had been in contact with a group associated with the "Decembrists", the workers were so enraged that they decided to kill him.

polemic between the "Decembrists" and the young members in the beginning of 1897), etc. Catchwords like "We must concentrate, not on the 'cream' of the workers, but on the 'average', mass worker"; "Politics always obediently follows economics",* etc., etc., became the fashion, exercising an irresistible influence upon the masses of the youth who were attracted to the movement but who, in the majority of cases, were acquainted only with such fragments of Marxism as were expounded in legally appearing publications.

Political consciousness was completely overwhelmed by spontaneity—the spontaneity of the "Social-Democrats" who repeated Mr. V. V.'s "ideas", the spontaneity of those workers who were carried away by the arguments that a kopek added to a ruble was worth more than any socialism or politics, and that they must "fight, knowing that they are fighting, not for the sake of some future generation, but for themselves and their children" (leader in *Rabochaya Mysl*, No. 1). Phrases like these have always been a favourite weapon of the West-European bourgeois, who, in their hatred for socialism, strove (like the German "*Sozial-Politiker*" Hirsch) to transplant English trade-unionism to their native soil and to preach to the workers that by engaging in the purely trade-union struggle** they would be fighting for themselves and for their children, and not for some future generations with some future socialism. And now the "V. V.'s of Russian Social-Democracy" have set about repeating these bourgeois phrases. It is important at this point to note three circumstances that will be useful to our further analysis of *contemporary* differences.***

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* These quotations are taken from the same leading article in the first number of *Rabochaya Mysl*. One can judge from this the degree of theoretical training possessed by these "V. V.'s of Russian Social-Democracy",[166] who kept repeating the crude vulgarisation of "economic materialism" at a time when the Marxists were carrying on a literary war against the real Mr. V. V., who had long ago been dubbed "a past master of reactionary deeds" for holding *similar* views on the relations between politics and economics!

** The Germans even have a special expression, *Nur-Gewerkschaftler*, which means an advocate of the "pure trade-union" struggle.

*** We emphasise the word *contemporary* for the benefit of those who may pharisaically shrug their shoulders and say: It is easy enough to attack *Rabochaya Mysl* now, but is not all this ancient history? *Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur* (change the name and the tale is

In the first place, the overwhelming of political consciousness by spontaneity, to which we referred above, also took place *spontaneously*. This may sound like a pun, but, alas, it is the bitter truth. It did not take place as a result of an open struggle between two diametrically opposed points of view, in which one triumphed over the other; it occurred because of the fact that an increasing number of "old" revolutionaries were "torn away" by the gendarmes and increasing numbers of "young" "V. V.'s of Russian Social- Democracy" appeared on the scene. Everyone, who has, I shall not say participated in, but at least breathed the atmosphere of, the *present-day* Russian movement, knows perfectly well that this is precisely the case. And if, nevertheless, we insist strongly that the reader be fully clear on this generally known fact, if we cite, for explicitness, as it were, the facts of the first edition of *Rabocheye Dyelo* and of the polemic between the "old" and the "young" at the beginning of 1897, we do this because the people who vaunt their "democracy" speculate on the ignorance of these facts on the part of the broad public (or of the very young generation). We shall return to this point further on.

Secondly, in the very first literary expression of Economism we observe the exceedingly curious phenomenon—highly characteristic for an understanding of all the differences prevailing among present-day Social-Democrats—that the adherents of the "labour movement pure and simple", worshippers of the closest "organic" contacts (*Rabocheye Dyelo*'s term) with the proletarian struggle, opponents of any non-worker intelligentsia (even a socialist intelligentsia), are compelled, in order to defend their positions, to resort to the arguments of the *bourgeois* "pure trade-unionists". This shows that from the very outset *Rabochaya Mysl* began—unconsciously—to implement the programme of the *Credo*. This shows (something *Rabocheye Dyelo* cannot grasp) that *all* worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of "the conscious element", of the role of Social-Democracy, *means*, *quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not*, *a strength-*

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about you.—*Ed.*) is our answer to such contemporary Pharisees, whose complete subjection to the ideas of *Rabochaya Mysl* will be *proved* further on.

ening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers. All those who talk about "overrating the importance of ideology",* about exaggerating the role of the conscious element,** etc., imagine that the labour movement pure and simple can elaborate, and will elaborate, an independent ideology for itself, if only the workers "wrest their fate from the hands of the leaders". But this is a profound mistake. To supplement what has been said above, we shall quote the following profoundly true and important words of Karl Kautsky on the new draft programme of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party:***

"Many of our revisionist critics believe that Marx asserted that economic development and the class struggle create, not only the conditions for socialist production, but also, and directly, the *consciousness* [K. K.'s italics] of its necessity. And these critics assert that England, the country most highly developed capitalistically, is more remote than any other from this consciousness. Judging by the draft, one might assume that this allegedly orthodox-Marxist view, which is thus refuted, was shared by the committee that drafted the Austrian programme. In the draft programme it is stated: 'The more capitalist development increases the numbers of the proletariat, the more the proletariat is compelled and becomes fit to fight against capitalism. The proletariat becomes conscious' of the possibility and of the necessity for socialism.' In this connection socialist consciousness appears to be a necessary and direct result of the proletarian class struggle. But this is absolutely untrue. Of course, socialism, as a doctrine, has its roots in modern economic relationships just as the class struggle of the proletariat has, and, like the latter, emerges from the struggle against the capitalist-created poverty and misery of the masses. But socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other; each arises under different conditions. Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist production as, say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other, no matter how much it may desire to do so; both arise out of the modern social process. The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, but the *bourgeois intelligentsia* [K. K.'s italics]: it was in the minds of individual members of this stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed proletarians who, in their turn, introduce it into the proletarian class

* Letter of the "Economists", in *Iskra*, No. 12.

** *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10.

*** *Neue Zeit*, 1901-02, XX, I, No. 3, p. 79. The committee's draft to which Kautsky refers was adopted by the Vienna Congress (at the end of last year) in a slightly amended form.

struggle where conditions allow that to be done. Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without [*von Aussen Hineingetragenes*] and not something that arose within it spontaneously [*urwüchsig*]. Accordingly, the old Hainfeld programme quite rightly stated that the task of Social-Democracy is to imbue the proletariat [literally: saturate the proletariat] with the *consciousness* of its position and the consciousness of its task. There would be no need for this if consciousness arose of itself from the class struggle. The new draft copied this proposition from the old programme, and attached it to the proposition mentioned above. But this completely broke the line of thought...."

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement,* the *only* choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology *in any way*, *to turn aside from it in the slightest degree* means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. There is much talk of spontaneity. But the *spontaneous* development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology, *to its development along the lines of the Credo programme*; for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade-unionism, is *Nur-Gewerkschaftlerei*, and trade-unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie. Hence, our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is *to combat spontaneity*, *to divert* the working-class movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to

* This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no part in creating such an ideology. They take part, however, not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians, as Proudhons and Weitlings; in other words, they take part only when they are able, and to the extent that they are able, more or less, to acquire the knowledge of their age and develop that knowledge. But in order that working men *may succeed in this more often*, every effort must be made to raise the level of the consciousness of the workers in general; it is necessary that the workers do not confine themselves to the artificially restricted limits of "*literature for workers*" but that they learn to an increasing degree to master *general literature*. It would be even truer to say "are not confined", instead of "do not confine themselves", because the workers themselves wish to read and do read all that is written for the intelligentsia, and only a few (bad) intellectuals believe that it is enough "for workers" to be told a few things about factory conditions and to have repeated to them over and over again what has long been known.

come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy. The sentence employed by the authors of the "Economist" letter published in *Iskra*, No. 12, that the efforts of the most inspired ideologists fail to divert the working-class movement from the path that is determined by the interaction of the material elements and the material environment is therefore *tantamount to renouncing socialism*. If these authors were capable of fearlessly, consistently, and thoroughly considering what they say, as everyone who enters the arena of literary and public activity should be, there would be nothing left for them but to "fold their useless arms over their empty breasts" and surrender the field of action to the Struves and Prokopoviches, who are dragging the working-class movement "along the line of least resistance", i.e., along the line of bourgeois trade-unionism, or to the Zubatovs, who are dragging it along the line of clerical and gendarme "ideology".

Let us recall the example of Germany. What was the historic service Lassalle rendered to the German working-class movement? It was that he *diverted* that movement from the path of progressionist trade-unionism and co-operativism towards which it had been spontaneously moving (*with the benign assistance of Schulze-Delitzsch and his like*). To fulfil such a task it was necessary to do something quite different from talking of underrating the spontaneous element, of tactics-as-process, of the interaction between elements and environment, etc. *A fierce struggle against spontaneity* was necessary, and only after such a struggle, extending over many years, was it possible, for instance, to convert the working population of Berlin from a bulwark of the progressionist party into one of the finest strongholds of Social-Democracy. This struggle is by no means over even today (as might seem to those who learn the history of the German movement from Prokopovich, and its philosophy from Struve). Even now the German working class is, so to speak, split up among a number of ideologies. A section of the workers is organised in Catholic and monarchist trade unions; another section is organised in the Hirsch-Duncker unions,[167] founded by the bourgeois worshippers of English trade-unionism; the third is organised in Social-Democratic trade unions. The last-named group is immeasurably more numerous than the rest,

but the Social-Democratic ideology was able to achieve this superiority, and will be able to maintain it, only in an unswerving struggle against all other ideologies.

But why, the reader will ask, does the spontaneous movement, the movement along the line of least resistance, lead to the domination of bourgeois ideology? For the simple reason that bourgeois ideology is far older in origin than socialist ideology, that it is more fully developed, and that it has at its disposal *immeasurably* more means of dissemination.* And the younger the socialist movement in any given country, the more vigorously it must struggle against all attempts to entrench non-socialist ideology, and the more resolutely the workers must be warned against the bad counsellors who shout against "overrating the conscious element", etc. The authors of the Economist letter, in unison with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, inveigh against the intolerance that is characteristic of the infancy of the movement. To this we reply: Yes, our movement is indeed in its infancy, and in order that it may grow up faster, it must become imbued with intolerance against those who retard its growth by their subservience to spontaneity. Nothing is so ridiculous and harmful as pretending that we are "old hands" who have long ago experienced all the decisive stages of the struggle.

Thirdly, the first issue of *Rabochaya Mysl* shows that the term "Economism" (which, of course, we do not propose to abandon, since, in one way or another, this designation has already established itself) does not adequately convey the real character of the new trend. *Rabochaya Mysl* does not altogether repudiate the political struggle; the rules for a workers' mutual benefit fund published in its first issue con-

* It is often said that the working class *spontaneously* gravitates towards socialism. This is perfectly true in the sense that socialist theory reveals the causes of the misery of the working class more profoundly and more correctly than any other theory, and for that reason the workers are able to assimilate it so easily, *provided*, however, this theory does not itself yield to spontaneity, *provided* it subordinates spontaneity to itself. Usually this is taken for granted, but it is precisely this which *Rabocheye Dyelo* forgets or distorts. The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism; nevertheless, most widespread (and continuously and diversely revived) bourgeois ideology spontaneously imposes itself upon the working class to a still greater degree.

tain a reference to combating the government. *Rabochaya Mysl* believes, however, that "politics always obediently follows economics" (*Rabocheye Dyelo* varies this thesis when it asserts in its programme that "in Russia more than in any other country, the economic struggle is inseparable from the political struggle"). *If by politics is meant Social-Democratic politics*, then the theses of *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo* are utterly incorrect. The economic struggle of the workers is very often connected (although not inseparably) with bourgeois politics, clerical politics, etc., as we have seen. *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s theses are correct, if by politics is meant trade-union politics, viz., the common striving of all workers to secure from the government measures for alleviating the distress to which their condition gives rise, but which do not abolish that condition, i.e., which do not remove the subjection of labour to capital. That striving indeed is common to the English trade-unionists, who are hostile to socialism, to the Catholic workers, to the "Zubatov" workers, etc. There is politics and politics. Thus, we see that *Rabochaya Mysl* does not so much deny the political struggle, as it bows to its *spontaneity*, to its unconsciousness. While fully recognising the political struggle (better: the political desires and demands of the workers), which arises spontaneously from the working-class movement itself, it absolutely refuses *independently to work out* a specifically *Social-Democratic politics* corresponding to the general tasks of socialism and to present-day conditions in Russia. Further on we shall show that *Rabocheye Dyelo* commits the same error.

C. THE SELF-EMANCIPATION GROUP[168] AND *RABOCHEYE DYELO*

We have dealt at such length with the little-known and now almost forgotten leading article in the first issue of *Rabochaya Mysl* because it was the first and most striking expression of that general stream of thought which afterwards emerged into the light of day in innumerable streamlets. V. I. was perfectly right when, in praising the first issue and the leading article of *Rabochaya Mysl*, he said that the article had been written in a "sharp and fervent" manner ("*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10, p. 49). Every man with convictions

who thinks he has something new to say writes "fervently" and in such a way as to make his views stand out in bold relief. Only those who are accustomed to sitting between two stools lack "fervour"; only such people are able to praise the fervour of *Rabochaya Mysl* one day and attack the "fervent polemics" of its opponents the next.

We shall not dwell on the "*Separate Supplement*" *to Rabochaya Mysl* (below we shall have occasion, on various points, to refer to this work, which expresses the ideas of the Economists more consistently than any other) but shall briefly mention the "Appeal of the Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group" (March 1899, reprinted in the London *Nakanune*,[169] No. 7, July 1899). The authors of the "Appeal" rightly say that "the workers of Russia are *only just awakening*, are just beginning to look about them, and are *instinctively clutching at the first available* means of struggle". Yet they draw from this the same false conclusion as that drawn by *Rabochaya Mysl*, forgetting that the instinctive is the unconscious (the spontaneous) to the aid of which socialists must come; that the "first available means of struggle" will always be, in modern society, the trade-union means of struggle, and the "first available" ideology the bourgeois (trade-union) ideology. Similarly, these authors do not "repudiate" politics, they merely (merely!) echo Mr. V. V. that politics is the superstructure, and therefore, "political agitation must be the superstructure to the agitation carried on in favour of the economic struggle; it must arise on the basis of this struggle and follow in its wake."

As for *Rabocheye Dyelo*, it began its activity with the "defence" of the Economists. It stated a *downright untruth* in its opening issue (No. 1, pp. 141-42) in claiming that it "does not know to which young comrades Axelrod referred" when he warned the Economists in his well-known pamphlet.* In the polemic that flared up with Axelrod and Plekhanov over this untruth, *Rabocheye Dyelo* had to admit that "in form of perplexity, it sought *to defend* all the younger Social-Democrats abroad from this unjust accusation" (the charge of narrowness levelled by Axelrod at the Economists). In re-

* *Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democracy*, Geneva, 1898. Two letters to *Rabochaya Gazeta*, written in 1897.

ality this accusation was completely justified, and *Rabocheye Dyelo* knew perfectly well that, among others, it applied also to V. I., a member of its Editorial Board. Let me note in passing that in this polemic Axelrod was entirely right and *Rabocheye Dyelo* entirely wrong in their respective interpretations of my pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*.* The pamphlet was written in 1897, before the appearance of *Rabochaya Mysl*, when I thought, rightly, that the *original* tendency of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, which I characterised above, was dominant. And this tendency was dominant at least until the middle of 1898. Consequently, *Rabocheye Dyelo* had no right whatever, in its attempt to deny the existence and danger of Economism, to refer to a pamphlet that expressed views *forced out* by "Economist" views in St. Petersburg in 1897-98.**

But *Rabocheye Dyelo* not only "defended" the Economists, it itself constantly fell into their fundamental errors. The source of this confusion is to be found in the ambiguity of the interpretation given to the following thesis of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* programme: "We consider that the most important phenomenon of Russian life, the one that will mainly *determine the tasks* [our italics] and the character of the publication activity of the Union, is the *mass working-class movement* [*Rabocheye Dyelo*'s italics] which has arisen in recent years." That the mass movement is a most important phenomenon is a fact not to be disputed. But the crux of the matter is, how is one to understand the statement that the mass working-class movement will "determine the tasks"? It may

* See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323—51.—*Ed.*

** In defending its first untruth ("we do not know to which young comrades Axelrod referred"), *Rabocheye Dyelo* added a second, when it wrote in its *Reply*: "Since the review of *The Tasks* was published, tendencies have arisen, or become more or less clearly defined, among certain Russian Social-Democrats, towards economic one-sidedness, which represent a step backwards from the state of our movement as described in *The Tasks*" (p. 9). This, in the *Reply*, published *in 1900*. But the first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* (containing the review) appeared *in April 1899*. Did Economism really arise only in 1899? No. The year 1899 saw the first protest of the *Russian* Social-Democrats against Economism (the protest against the *Credo*). Economism arose in 1897, as *Rabocheye Dyelo* very well knows, for already *in November 1898*, *V. I.* was praising *Rabochaya Mysl* (see "*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10).

be interpreted in one of two ways. *Either* it means bowing to the spontaneity of this movement, i.e., reducing the role of Social-Democracy to mere subservience to the working-class movement as such (the interpretation of *Rabochaya Mysl*, the Self-Emancipation Group, and other Economists), or it means that the mass movement places before us new theoretical, political, and organisational tasks, far more complicated than those that might have satisfied us in the period before the rise of the mass movement. *Rabocheye Dyelo* inclined and still inclines towards the first interpretation, for it has said nothing definite about any new tasks, but has argued constantly as though the "mass movement" *relieves* us of the necessity of clearly understanding and fulfilling the tasks it sets before us. We need only point out that *Rabocheye Dyelo* considered that it was impossible to set the overthrow of the autocracy as the *first* task of the mass working-class movement, and that it degraded this task (in the name of the mass movement) to that of a struggle for immediate political demands (*Reply*, p. 25).

We shall pass over the article by B. Krichevsky, editor of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, entitled "The Economic and the Political Struggle in the Russian Movement", published in No. 7 of that paper, in which these very mistakes* are repeated, and

* The "stages theory", or the theory of "timid zigzags", in the political struggle is expressed, for example, in this article, in the following way: "Political demands, which in their character are common to the whole of Russia, should, however, at first (this was written in August 1900!) correspond to the experience gained by the given stratum [*sic*!] of workers in the economic struggle. Only [!] on the basis of this experience can and should political agitation be taken up," etc. (p. 11). On page 4, the author, protesting against what he regards as the absolutely unfounded charge of Economist heresy, pathetically exclaims: "What Social-Democrat does not know that according to the theories of Marx and Engels the economic interests of certain classes play a decisive role in history, and, *consequently*, that particularly the proletariat's struggle for its economic interests must be of paramount importance in its class development and struggle for emancipation?" (Our italics.) The word "consequently" is completely irrelevant. The fact that economic interests play a decisive role *does not in the least imply* that the economic (i.e., trade-union) struggle is of prime importance; for the most essential, the "decisive" interests of classes can be satisfied *only* by radical *political* changes in general. In particular the fundamental economic interests of the proletariat can be satisfied only by a political revolution that will replace the dic-

proceed directly to *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. We shall not, of course, enter in detail into the various objections raised by Krichevsky and Martynov against *Zarya* and *Iskra*. We are here interested solely in the basis of principles on which *Rabocheye Dyelo*, in its tenth issue, took its stand. Thus, we shall not examine the strange fact that *Rabocheye Dyelo* saw a "diametrical contradiction" between the proposition:

> "Social-Democracy does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some one preconceived plan or method of political struggle; it recognises all means of struggle as long as they correspond to the forces at the disposal of the Party," etc. (*Iskra*, No. 1)*.

and the proposition:

> "Without a strong organisation skilled in waging political struggle under all circumstances and at all times, there can be no question of that systematic plan of action, illumined by firm principles and steadfastly carried out, which alone is worthy of the name of tactics" (*Iskra*, No. 4).**

To confound recognition, *in principle*, of all means of struggle, of all plans and methods, provided they are expedient, with the demand *at a given political moment* to be guided by a strictly observed plan is tantamount, if we are to talk of tactics, to confounding the recognition by medical science of various methods of treating diseases with the necessity for adopting a certain definite method of treatment for a given disease. The point is, however, that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, itself the victim of a disease which we have called bowing to spontaneity, refuses to recognise any "method of treatment" for *that* disease. Hence, it has made the remarkable discovery that "tactics-as-plan contradicts the fundamental spirit of Marxism" (No. 10, p. 18), that tactics are "*a process of growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party*" (p. 11, *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s italics). This remark

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tatorship of the bourgeoisie by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Krichevsky repeats the arguments of the "V. V.'s of Russian Social-Democracy" (viz., that politics follows economics, etc.) and of the Bernsteinians of German Social-Democracy (e.g., by similar arguments Woltmann sought to prove that the workers must first of all acquire "economic power" before they can think about political revolution).

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 370-71.—*Ed.*

** See present volume, p. 18.—*Ed.*

has every chance of becoming a celebrated maxim, a permanent monument to the *Rabocheye Dyelo* "trend". To the question, *whither*? the leading organ replies: Movement is a process of changing the distance between the starting-point and subsequent points of the movement. This matchless example of profundity is not merely a curiosity (were it that, it would not be worth dealing with at length), but *the programme of a whole trend*, the very programme which R. M. (in the "*Separate Supplement*" *to Rabochaya Mysl*) expressed in the words: That struggle is desirable which is possible, and the struggle which is possible is that which is going on at the given moment. This is precisely the trend of unbounded opportunism, which passively adapts itself to spontaneity.

"Tactics-as-plan contradicts the essence of Marxism!" But this is a slander of Marxism; it means turning Marxism into the caricature held up by the Narodniks in their struggle against us. It means belittling the initiative and energy of class-conscious fighters, whereas Marxism, on the contrary, gives a gigantic impetus to the initiative and energy of the Social-Democrat, opens up for him the widest perspectives, and (if one may so express it) places at his disposal the mighty force of many millions of workers "spontaneously" rising for the struggle. The entire history of international Social-Democracy teems with plans advanced now by one, now by another, political leader, some confirming the far-sightedness and the correct political and organisational views of their authors and others revealing their short-sightedness and their political errors. At the time when Germany was at one of the crucial turning-points in its history—the formation of the Empire, the opening of the Reichstag, and the granting of universal suffrage—Liebknecht had one plan for Social-Democratic politics and work in general, and Schweitzer had another. When the anti-socialist law came down on the heads of the German socialists, Most and Hasselmann had one plan—they were prepared then and there to call for violence and terror; Höchberg, Schramm, and (partly) Bernstein had another—they began to preach to the Social-Democrats that they themselves had provoked the enactment of the law by being unreasonably bitter and revolutionary, and must now earn forgiveness by their exemplary conduct. There was

yet a third plan proposed by those who prepared and carried out the publication of an illegal organ. It is easy, of course, with hindsight, many years after the struggle over the selection of the path to be followed, and after history has pronounced its verdict as to the expediency of the path selected, to utter profound maxims about the growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party. But at a time of confusion,* when the Russian "Critics" and Economists are degrading Social-Democracy to the level of trade-unionism, and when the terrorists are strongly advocating the adoption of "tactics-as-plan" that repeats the old mistakes, at such a time, to confine oneself to profundities of this kind, means simply to issue to oneself a "certificate of poverty". At a time when many Russian Social-Democrats suffer from a lack of initiative and energy, from an inadequate "scope of political propaganda, agitation, and organisation,"** from a lack of "plans" for a broader organisation of revolutionary work, at such a time, to declare that "tactics-as-plan" contradicts the essence of Marxism means not only to vulgarise Marxism in the realm of theory, but *to drag the Party backward* in practice.

Rabocheye Dyelo goes on to sermonise:

> "The task of the revolutionary Social-Democrat is only to accelerate objective development by his conscious work, not to obviate it or substitute his own subjective plans for this development. *Iskra* knows all this in theory; but the enormous importance which Marxism justly attaches to conscious revolutionary work causes it in practice, owing to its doctrinaire view of tactics, *to belittle the significance of the objective or the spontaneous element of development*" (p. 18).

Another example of the extraordinary theoretical confusion worthy of Mr. V. V. and his fraternity. We would ask our philosopher: how may a designer of subjective plans "belittle" objective development? Obviously by losing sight of the fact that this objective development creates or strength-

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* "*Ein Jahr der Verwirrung*" ("A Year of Confusion") is the title Mehring gave to the chapter of his *History of German Social-Democracy* in which he describes the hesitancy and lack of determination displayed at first by the socialists in selecting the "tactics-as-plan" for the new situation.

** Leading article in *Iskra*, No. 1. (See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 369.—*Ed.*)

ens, destroys or weakens certain classes, strata, or groups, certain nations or groups of nations, etc., and in this way serves to determine a given international political alignment of forces, or the position adopted by revolutionary parties, etc. If the designer of plans did that, his guilt would not be that he belittled the spontaneous element, but, on the contrary, that he belittled the *conscious* element, for he would then show that he lacked the "consciousness" properly to understand objective development. Hence, the very talk of "estimating the *relative* significance" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*'s italics) of spontaneity and consciousness itself reveals a complete lack of "consciousness". If certain "spontaneous elements of development" can be grasped at all by human understanding, then an incorrect estimation of them will be tantamount to "belittling the conscious element". But if they cannot be grasped, then we do not know them, and therefore cannot speak of them. What then is Krichevsky discussing? If he thinks that *Iskra*'s "subjective plans" are erroneous (as he in fact declares them to be), he should have shown what objective facts they ignore, and only then charged *Iskra* with *lacking political consciousness* for ignoring them, with "belittling the conscious element", to use his own words. If, however, displeased with subjective plans, he can bring forward no argument other than that of "belittling the spontaneous element" (!), he merely shows: (1) that, theoretically, he understands Marxism *à la* Kareyev and Mikhailovsky, who have been sufficiently ridiculed by Beltov;[170] and (2) that, practically, he is quite satisfied with the "spontaneous elements of development" that have drawn our legal Marxists towards Bernsteinism and our Social-Democrats towards Economism, and that he is "full of wrath" against those who have determined at all costs *to divert* Russian Social-Democracy from the path of "spontaneous" development.

Further, there follow things that are positively droll. "Just as human beings will reproduce in the old-fashioned way despite all the discoveries of natural science, so the birth of a new social order will come about, in the future too, *mainly* as a result of elemental outbursts, despite all the discoveries of social science and the increase in the number of conscious fighters" (p. 19). Just as our grandfathers in

their old-fashioned wisdom used to say, Anyone can bring children into the world, so today the "modern socialists" (*à la* Nartsis Tuporylov)[171] say in their wisdom, Anyone can participate in the spontaneous birth of a new social order. We too hold that anyone can. All that is required for participation of that kind is *to yield* to Economism when Economism reigns and to terrorism when terrorism arises. Thus, in the spring of this year, when it was so important to utter a note of warning against infatuation with terrorism, *Rabocheye Dyelo* stood in amazement, confronted by a problem that was "new" to it. And now, six months after, when the problem has become less topical, it presents us at one and the same time with the declaration: "We think that it is not and should not be the task of Social-Democracy to counteract the rise of terroristic sentiments" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 23), and with the Conference resolution: "The Conference regards systematic and aggressive terror as being inopportune" (*Two Conferences*, p. 18). How beautifully clear and coherent this is! Not to counteract, but to declare inopportune, and to declare it in such a way that unsystematic and defensive terror does not come within the scope of the "resolution". It must be admitted that such a resolution is extremely safe and is fully insured against error, just as a man who talks, but says nothing, insures himself against error. All that is needed to frame such a resolution is an ability to keep *at the tail-end* of the movement. When *Iskra* ridiculed *Rabocheye Dyelo* for declaring the question of terror to be new,* the latter angrily accused *Iskra* of "having the incredible effrontery to impose upon the Party organisation solutions of tactical questions proposed by a group of emigrant writers more than fifteen years ago" (p. 24). Effrontery indeed, and what an overestimation of the conscious element—first to resolve questions theoretically beforehand, and then to try to convince the organisation, the Party, and the masses of the correctness of this solution!** How much better it would be to repeat the elements and, without "imposing" anything upon anybody, swing with every

* See present volume, p. 18-20.—*Ed.*

** Nor must it be forgotten that in solving "theoretically" the problem of terror, the Emancipation of Labour group *generalised* the experience of the antecedent revolutionary movement.

"turn"—whether in the direction of Economism or in the direction of terrorism. *Rabocheye Dyelo* even generalises this great precept of worldly wisdom and accuses *Iskra* and *Zarya* of "setting up their programme against the movement, like a spirit hovering over the formless chaos" (p. 29). But what else is the function of Social-Democracy if not to be a "spirit" that not only hovers over the spontaneous movement, but also *raises* this movement *to the level of* "*its programme*"? Surely, it is not its function to drag at the *tail* of the movement. At best, this would be of no service to the movement; at worst, it would be exceedingly harmful. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, however, not only follows this "tactics-as-process", but elevates it to a principle, so that it would be more correct to describe its tendency not as opportunism, but as *tail-ism* (from the word *tail*). And it must be admitted that those who are determined always to follow behind the movement and be its tail are absolutely and forever guaranteed against "belittling the spontaneous element of development".

* * *

And so, we have become convinced that the fundamental error committed by the "new trend" in Russian Social-Democracy is its bowing to spontaneity and its failure to understand that the spontaneity of the masses demands a high degree of consciousness from us Social-Democrats. The greater the spontaneous upsurge of the masses and the more widespread the movement, the more rapid, incomparably so, the demand for greater consciousness in the theoretical, political and organisational work of Social-Democracy.

The spontaneous upsurge of the masses in Russia proceeded (and continues) with such rapidity that the young Social-Democrats proved unprepared to meet these gigantic tasks. This unpreparedness is our common misfortune, the misfortune of *all* Russian Social-Democrats. The upsurge of the masses proceeded and spread with uninterrupted continuity; it not only continued in the places where it began, but spread to new localities and to new strata of the population (under the influence of the working-class movement, there was a renewed ferment among the student youth, among the intellectuals generally, and even among the peasantry).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Revolutionaries, however, *lagged behind* this upsurge, both in their "theories" and in their activity; they failed to establish a constant and continuous organisation capable of *leading* the whole movement.

In Chapter I, we established that *Rabocheye Dyelo* belittled our theoretical tasks and that it "spontaneously" repeated the fashionable catchword "freedom of criticism"; those who repeated this catchword lacked the "consciousness" to understand that the positions of the opportunist "Critics" and those of the revolutionaries in Germany and in Russia are diametrically opposed.

In the following chapters, we shall show how this bowing to spontaneity found expression in the sphere of the political tasks and in the organisational work of Social-Democracy.

III

TRADE-UNIONIST POLITICS AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

We shall again begin by praising *Rabocheye Dyelo*. "Literature of Exposure and the Proletarian Struggle" is the title Martynov gave the article on his differences with *Iskra* published in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. He formulated the substance of the differences as follows: "We cannot confine ourselves solely to exposing the system that stands in its [the working-class party's] path of development. We must also react to the immediate and current interests of the proletariat. ... *Iskra* ... is in fact an organ of revolutionary opposition that exposes the state of affairs in our country, particularly the political state of affairs.... We, however, work and shall continue to work for the cause of the working class in close organic contact with the proletarian struggle" (p. 63). One cannot help being grateful to Martynov for this formula. It is of outstanding general interest, because substantially it embraces not only our disagreements with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, but the general disagreement between ourselves and the "Economists" on the political struggle. We have shown that the "Economists" do not altogether repudiate "politics", but that they are constantly straying from the Social-Democratic to the trade-unionist conception of politics. Martynov

strays in precisely this way, and we shall therefore take his views as a *model* of Economist error on this question. As we shall endeavour to prove, neither the authors of the "*Separate Supplement*" *to Rabochaya Mysl* nor the authors of the manifesto issued by the Self-Emancipation Group, nor the authors of the Economist letter published in *Iskra*, No. 12, will have any right to complain against this choice.

A. POLITICAL AGITATION AND ITS RESTRICTION BY THE ECONOMISTS

Everyone knows that the economic* struggle of the Russian workers underwent widespread development and consolidation simultaneously with the production of "literature" exposing economic (factory and occupational) conditions. The "leaflets" were devoted mainly to the exposure of the factory system, and very soon a veritable passion for exposures was roused among the workers. As soon as the workers realised that the Social-Democratic study circles desired to, and could, supply them with a new kind of leaflet that told the whole truth about their miserable existence, about their unbearably hard toil, and their lack of rights, they began to send in, actually flood us with, correspondence from the factories and workshops. This "exposure literature" created a tremendous sensation, not only in the particular factory exposed in the given leaflet, but in all the factories to which news of the revealed facts spread. And since the poverty and want among the workers in the various enterprises and in the various trades are much the same, the "truth about the life of the workers" stirred *everyone*. Even among the most backward workers, a veritable passion arose to "get into print"—a noble passion for this rudimentary form of war against the whole of the present social system which is based upon robbery and oppression. And in the overwhelming majority of cases these "leaflets" were in truth a declaration of

* To avoid misunderstanding, we must point out that here, and throughout this pamphlet, by economic struggle, we imply (in keeping with the accepted usage among us) the "practical economic struggle", which Engels, in the passage quoted above, described as "resistance to the capitalists", and which in free countries is known as the organised-labour syndical, or trade-union struggle.

war, because the exposures served greatly to agitate the workers; they evoked among them common demands for the removal of the most glaring outrages and roused in them a readiness to support the demands with strikes. Finally, the employers themselves were compelled to recognise the significance of these leaflets as a declaration of war, so much so that in a large number of cases they did not even wait for the outbreak of hostilities. As is always the case, the mere publication of these exposures made them effective, and they acquired the significance of a strong moral influence. On more than one occasion, the mere appearance of a leaflet proved sufficient to secure the satisfaction of all or part of the demands put forward. In a word, economic (factory) exposures were and remain an important lever in the economic struggle. And they will continue to retain this significance as long as there is capitalism, which makes it necessary for the workers to defend themselves. Even in the most advanced countries of Europe it can still be seen that the exposure of abuses in some backward trade, or in some forgotten branch of domestic industry, serves as a starting-point for the awakening of class-consciousness, for the beginning of a trade-union struggle, and for the spread of socialism.*

The overwhelming majority of Russian Social-Democrats have of late been almost entirely absorbed by this work of organising the exposure of factory conditions. Suffice it to recall *Rabochaya Mysl* to see the extent to which they have been absorbed by it—so much so, indeed, that they have

* In the present chapter we deal only with the *political* struggle, in its broader or narrower meaning. Therefore, we note only in passing, merely as a curiosity, *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s charge that *Iskra* is "too restrained" in regard to the economic struggle (*Two Conferences*, p. 27, rehashed by Martynov in his pamphlet, *Social-Democracy and the Working Class*). If the accusers computed by the hundredweights or reams (as they are so fond of doing) any given year's discussion of the economic struggle in the industrial section of *Iskra*, in comparison with the corresponding sections of *Rabocheye Dyelo* and *Rabochaya Mysl* combined, they would easily see that the latter lag behind even in this respect. Apparently, the realisation of this simple truth compels them to resort to arguments that clearly reveal their confusion. "*Iskra*," they write, "willy-nilly [!] is compelled [!] to reckon with the imperative demands of life and to publish at least [!!] correspondence about the working-class movement" (*Two Conferences*, p. 27). Now this is really a crushing argument!

lost sight of the fact that this, *taken by itself*, is in essence still not Social-Democratic work, but merely trade-union work. As a matter of fact, the exposures merely dealt with the relations between the workers *in a given trade* and their employers, and all they achieved was that the sellers of labour-power learned to sell their "commodity" on better terms and to fight the purchasers over a purely commercial deal. These exposures could have served (if properly utilised by an organisation of revolutionaries) as a beginning and a component part of Social-Democratic activity; but they could also have led (and, given a worshipful attitude towards spontaneity, were bound to lead) to a "purely trade-union" struggle and to a non-Social-Democratic working-class movement. Social-Democracy leads the struggle of the working class, not only for better terms for the sale of labour-power, but for the abolition of the social system that compels the propertyless to sell themselves to the rich. Social-Democracy represents the working class, not in its relation to a given group of employers alone, but in its relation to all classes of modern society and to the state as an organised political force. Hence, it follows that not only must Social-Democrats not confine themselves exclusively to the economic struggle, but that they must not allow the organisation of economic exposures to become the predominant part of their activities. We must take up actively the political education of the working class and the development of its political consciousness. *Now* that *Zarya* and *Iskra* have made the first attack upon Economism, "all are agreed" on this (although some agree only in words, as we shall soon see).

The question arises, what should political education consist in? Can it be confined to the propaganda of working-class hostility to the autocracy? Of course not. It is not enough *to explain* to the workers that they are politically oppressed (any more than it is *to explain* to them that their interests are antagonistic to the interests of the employers). Agitation must be conducted with regard to every concrete example of this oppression (as we have begun to carry on agitation round concrete examples of economic oppression). Inasmuch as *this* oppression affects the most diverse classes of society, inasmuch as it manifests itself in the most varied spheres of life and activity—vocational, civic, personal, family,

religious, scientific, etc., etc.—is it not evident that *we shall not be fulfilling our task* of developing the political consciousness of the workers if we do not *undertake* the organisation of the *political exposure* of the autocracy *in all its aspects*? In order to carry on agitation round concrete instances of oppression, these instances must be exposed (as it is necessary to expose factory abuses in order to carry on economic agitation).

One might think this to be clear enough. It turns out, however, that it is only in words that "all" are agreed on the need to develop political consciousness, *in all its aspects*. It turns out that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, for example, far from tackling the task of organising (or making a start in organising) comprehensive political exposure, is even trying *to drag Iskra*, which has undertaken this task, *away from it*. Listen to the following: "The political struggle of the working class is merely [it is certainly not "merely"] the most developed, wide, and effective form of economic struggle" (programme of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, published in issue No. 1, p. 3). "The Social-Democrats are now confronted with the task of lending the economic struggle itself, as far as possible, a political character" (Martynov, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 42). "The economic struggle is the most widely applicable means of drawing the masses into active political struggle" (resolution adopted by the Conference of the Union Abroad and "amendments" thereto, *Two Conferences*, pp. 11 and 17). As the reader will observe, all these theses permeate *Rabocheye Dyelo* from its very first number to the latest "Instructions to the Editors", and all of them evidently express a single view regarding political agitation and struggle. Let us examine this view from the standpoint of the opinion prevailing among all Economists, that political agitation must *follow* economic agitation. Is it true that, in general,* the economic struggle "is the most widely appli-

* We say "in general", because *Rabocheye Dyelo* speaks of general principles and of the general tasks of the Party as a whole. Undoubtedly, cases occur in practice when politics really *must* follow economics, but only Economists can speak of this in a resolution intended to apply to the whole of Russia. Cases do occur when *it is possible* "right from the beginning" to carry on political agitation "exclusively on an economic basis"; yet *Rabocheye Dyelo* came in the end to

cable means" of drawing the masses into the political struggle? It is entirely untrue. *Any and every* manifestation of police tyranny and autocratic outrage, not only in connection with the economic struggle, is not one whit less "widely applicable" as a means of "drawing in" the masses. The rural superintendents and the flogging of peasants, the corruption of the officials and the police treatment of the "common people" in the cities, the fight against the famine-stricken and the suppression of the popular striving towards enlightenment and knowledge, the extortion of taxes and the persecution of the religious sects, the humiliating treatment of soldiers and the barrack methods in the treatment of the students and liberal intellectuals—do all these and a thousand other similar manifestations of tyranny, though not directly connected with the "economic" struggle, represent, in general, *less* "widely applicable" means and occasions for political agitation and for drawing the masses into the political struggle? The very opposite is true. Of the sum-total of cases in which the workers suffer (either on their own account or on account of those closely connected with them) from tyranny, violence, and the lack of rights, undoubtedly only a small minority represent cases of police tyranny in the trade-union struggle as such. Why then should we, beforehand, *restrict* the scope of political agitation by declaring only *one* of the means to be "the most widely applicable", when Social-Democrats must have, in addition, other, generally speaking, no less "widely applicable" means?

In the dim and distant past (a full year ago!...) *Rabocheye Dyelo* wrote: "The masses begin to understand immediate political demands after one strike, or at all events, after several", "as soon as the government sets the police and gendarmerie against them" [*August* (No. 7) 1900, p. 15]. This opportunist theory of stages has now been rejected by the Union Abroad, which makes a concession to us by declaring: "There is no need whatever to conduct political agitation

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the conclusion that "there is no need for this whatever" (*Two Conferences*, p. 11). In the following chapter, we shall show that the tactics of the "politicians" and revolutionaries not only do not ignore the trade-union tasks of Social-Democracy, but that, on the contrary, they alone *can secure* their consistent fulfilment.

right from the beginning, exclusively on an economic basis" (*Two Conferences*, p. 11). The Union's repudiation of part of its former errors will show the future historian of Russian Social-Democracy better than any number of lengthy arguments the depths to which our Economists have degraded socialism! But the Union Abroad must be very naïve indeed to imagine that the abandonment of one form of restricting politics will induce us to agree to another form. Would it not be more logical to say, in this case too, that the economic struggle should be conducted on the widest possible basis, that it should always be utilised for political agitation, but that "there is no need whatever" to regard the economic struggle as the *most* widely applicable means of drawing the masses into active political struggle?

The Union Abroad attaches significance to the fact that it has substituted the phrase "most widely applicable means" for the phrase "the best means" contained in one of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the Jewish Workers' Union (Bund). We confess that we find it difficult to say which of these resolutions is the better one. In our opinion they are *both worse*. Both the Union Abroad and the Bund fall into the error (partly, perhaps unconsciously, under the influence of tradition) of giving an Economist, trade-unionist interpretation to politics. Whether this is done by employing the word "best" or the words "most widely applicable" makes no essential difference whatever. Had the Union Abroad said that "political agitation on an economic basis" is the most widely applied (not "applicable") means, it would have been right in regard to a certain period in the development of our Social-Democratic movement. It would have been right in regard to the *Economists* and to many (if not the majority) of the practical workers of 1898-1901; for these practical Economists *applied* political agitation (to the extent that they applied it at all) *almost exclusively on an economic basis*. Political agitation on *such* lines was recognised and, as we have seen, even recommended by *Rabochaya Mysl* and the Self-Emancipation Group. *Rabocheye Dyelo* should have *strongly condemned* the fact that the useful work of economic agitation was accompanied by the harmful restriction of the political struggle; instead, it declares the means most widely *applied* (*by the Economists*) to be the most

widely *applicable*! It is not surprising that when we call these people Economists, they can do nothing but pour every manner of abuse upon us; call us "mystifiers", "disrupters", "papal nuncios", and "slanderers"*; go complaining to the whole world that we have mortally offended them; and declare almost on oath that "not a single Social-Democratic organisation is now tinged with Economism".** Oh, those evil, slanderous politicians! They must have deliberately invented this Economism, out of sheer hatred of mankind, in order mortally to offend other people.

What concrete, real meaning attaches to Martynov's words when he sets before Social-Democracy the task of "lending the economic struggle itself a political character"? The economic struggle is the collective struggle of the workers against their employers for better terms *in the sale of their labour-power*, for better living and working conditions. This struggle is necessarily a trade-union struggle, because working conditions differ greatly in different trades, and, consequently, the struggle *to improve* them can only be conducted on the basis of trade organisations (in the Western countries, through trade unions; in Russia, through temporary trade associations and through leaflets, etc.). Lending "the economic struggle itself a political character" means, therefore, striving to secure satisfaction of these trade demands, the improvement of working conditions in each separate trade by means of "legislative and administrative measures" (as Martynov puts it on the ensuing page of his article, p. 43). This is precisely what all workers' trade unions do and always have done. Read the works of the soundly scientific (and "soundly" opportunist) Mr. and Mrs. Webb and you will see that the British trade unions long ago recognised, and have long been carrying out, the task of "lending the economic struggle itself a political character"; they have long been fighting for the right to strike, for the removal of all legal hindrances to the co-operative and trade-union movements, for laws to protect women and children, for the improvement of labour conditions by means of health and factory legislation, etc.

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* These are the precise expressions used in *Two Conferences*, pp. 31, 32, 28 and 80.

** *Two Conferences*, p. 32.

Thus, the pompous phrase about "lending the economic struggle *itself* a political character", which sounds so "terrifically" profound and revolutionary, serves as a screen to conceal what is in fact the traditional striving *to degrade* Social-Democratic politics to the level of trade-union politics. Under the guise of rectifying the one-sidedness of *Iskra*, which, it is alleged, places "the revolutionising of dogma higher than the revolutionising of life",* we are presented with the *struggle for economic reforms* as if it were something entirely new. In point of fact, the phrase "lending the economic struggle itself a political character" means nothing more than the struggle for economic reforms. Martynov himself might have come to this simple conclusion, had he pondered over the significance of his own words. "Our Party," he says, training his heaviest guns on *Iskra*, "could and should have presented concrete demands to the government for legislative and administrative measures against economic exploitation, unemployment, famine, etc." (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, pp. 42-43). Concrete demands for measures—does not this mean demands for social reforms? Again we ask the impartial reader: Are we slandering the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ites (may I be forgiven for this awkward, currently used designation!) by calling them concealed Bernsteinians when, as their point of *disagreement* with *Iskra*, they advance their thesis on the necessity of struggling for economic reforms?

Revolutionary Social-Democracy has always included the struggle for reforms as part of its activities. But it utilises "economic" agitation for the purpose of presenting to the government, not only demands for all sorts of measures, but also (and primarily) the demand that it cease to be an autocratic government. Moreover, it considers it its duty to present this demand to the government on the basis, not of the economic struggle *alone*, but of all manifestations in general of public and political life. In a word,

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* *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 60. This is the Martynov variation of the application, which we have characterised above, of the thesis "every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes" to the present chaotic state of our movement. In fact, this is merely a translation into Russian of the notorious Bernsteinian sentence: "The movement is everything, the final aim is nothing."

it subordinates the struggle for reforms, as the part to the whole, to the revolutionary struggle for freedom and for socialism. Martynov, however, resuscitates the theory of stages in a new form and strives to prescribe, as it were, an exclusively economic path of development for the political struggle. By advancing at this moment, when the revolutionary movement is on the upgrade, an alleged special "task" of struggling for reforms, he is dragging the Party backwards and is playing into the hands of both "Economist" and liberal opportunism.

To proceed. Shamefacedly hiding the struggle for reforms behind the pompous thesis of "lending the economic struggle itself a political character", Martynov advanced, as if it were a special point, *exclusively economic* (indeed, exclusively factory) *reforms*. As to the reason for his doing that, we do not know it. Carelessness, perhaps? Yet if he had in mind something else besides "factory" reforms, then the whole of his thesis, which we have cited, loses all sense. Perhaps he did it because he considers it possible and probable that the government will make "concessions" only in the economic sphere?* If so, then it is a strange delusion. Concessions are also possible and are made in the sphere of legislation concerning flogging, passports, land redemption payments, religious sects, the censorship, etc., etc. "Economic" concessions (or pseudo-concessions) are, of course, the cheapest and most advantageous from the government's point of view, because by these means it hopes to win the confidence of the working masses. For this very reason, we Social-Democrats *must not* under any circumstances or in any way whatever create grounds for the belief (or the misunderstanding) that we attach greater value to economic reforms, or that we regard them as being particularly important, etc. "Such demands," writes Martynov, speaking of the concrete demands for legislative and administrative measures referred to above, "would not be merely a hollow sound, because, promising certain palpable results, they might be actively supported by the working masses...." We are not Economists,

* P. 43. "Of course, when we advise the workers to present certain economic demands to the government, we do so because in the economic sphere the autocratic government is, of necessity, prepared to make certain concessions!"

oh no! We only cringe as slavishly before the "palpableness" of concrete results as do the Bernsteins, the Prokopoviches, the Struves, the R. M.'s, and *tutti quanti*! We only wish to make it understood (together with Nartsis Tuporylov) that all which "does not promise palpable results" is merely a "hollow sound"! We are only trying to argue as if the working masses were incapable (and had not already proved their capabilities, notwithstanding those who ascribe their own philistinism to them) of actively supporting every protest against the autocracy, even if it *promises absolutely no palpable results whatever*!

Let us take, for example, the very "measures" for the relief of unemployment and the famine that Martynov himself advances. *Rabocheye Dyelo* is engaged, judging by what it has promised, in drawing up and elaborating a programme of "concrete [in the form of bills?] demands for legislative and administrative measures", "promising palpable results", while *Iskra*, which "constantly places the revolutionising of dogma higher than the revolutionising of life", has tried to explain the inseparable connection between unemployment and the whole capitalist system, has given warning that "famine is coming", has exposed the police "fight against the famine-stricken", and the outrageous "provisional penal servitude regulations"; and *Zarya* has published a special reprint, in the form of an agitational pamphlet, of a section of its "Review of Home Affairs", dealing with the famine.* But good God! How "one-sided" were these incorrigibly narrow and orthodox doctrinaires, how deaf to the calls of "life itself"! Their articles contained—oh horror!—*not a single*, can you imagine it? not a single "concrete demand" "promising palpable results"! Poor doctrinaires! They ought to be sent to Krichevsky and Martynov to be taught that tactics are a process of growth, of that which grows, etc., and that the economic struggle *itself* should be given a political character!

"In addition to its immediate revolutionary significance, the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government ["*economic* struggle against the government"!] has also this significance: it constantly brings home

* See present volume, pp. 253-74.—*Ed.*

to the workers the fact that they have no political rights" (Martynov, p. 44). We quote this passage, not in order to repeat for the hundredth and thousandth time what has been said above, but in order to express particular thanks to Martynov for this excellent new formula: "the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government". What a gem! With what inimitable skill and mastery in eliminating all partial disagreements and shades of differences among Economists this clear and concise proposition expresses the *quintessence* of Economism, from summoning the workers "to the political struggle, which they carry on in the general interest, for the improvement of the conditions of all the workers",* continuing through the theory of stages, and ending in the resolution of the Conference on the "most widely applicable", etc. "Economic struggle against the government" is precisely trade-unionist politics, which is still very far from being Social-Democratic politics.

B. HOW MARTYNOV RENDERED PLEKHANOV MORE PROFOUND

"What a large number of Social-Democratic Lomonosovs have appeared among us lately!" observed a comrade one day, having in mind the astonishing propensity of many who are inclined toward Economism to, arrive, "necessarily, by their own under standing", at great truths (e.g., that the economic struggle stimulates the workers to ponder over their lack of rights) and in doing so to ignore, with the supreme contempt of born geniuses, all that has been produced by the antecedent development of revolutionary thought and of the revolutionary movement. Lomonosov-Martynov is precisely such a born genius. We need but glance at his article "Urgent Questions" to see how by "his own understanding" he *arrives at* what was long ago said by Axelrod (of whom our Lomonosov, naturally, says not a word); how, for instance, he *is beginning* to understand that we cannot ignore the opposition of such or such strata of the bourgeoisie (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 9, pp. 61, 62, 71; compare this with *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s *Reply* to Axelrod, pp. 22, 23-24),

* *Rabochaya Mysl*, "*Separate Supplement*", p. 14.

etc. But alas, he is only "arriving" and is only "beginning", not more than that, for so little has he understood Axelrod's ideas, that he talks about "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". For three years (1898-1901) *Rabocheye Dyelo* has tried hard to understand Axelrod, but has so far not understood him! Can one of the reasons be that Social-Democracy, "like mankind", always sets itself only tasks that can be achieved?

But the Lomonosovs are distinguished not only by their ignorance of many things (that would be but half misfortune!), but also by their unawareness of their own ignorance. Now this is a real misfortune; and it is this misfortune that prompts them without further ado to attempt to render Plekhanov "more profound".

"Much water," Lomonosov-Martynov says, "has flowed under the bridge since Plekhanov wrote his book [*Tasks of the Socialists in the Fight Against the Famine in Russia*]. The Social-Democrats who for a decade led the economic struggle of the working class ... have failed as yet to lay down a broad theoretical basis for Party tactics. This question has now come to a head, and if we should wish to lay down such a theoretical basis, we should certainly have to deepen considerably the principles of tactics developed at one time by Plekhanov.... Our present definition of the distinction between propaganda and agitation would have to be different from Plekhanov's [Martynov has just quoted Plekhanov's words: "A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a mass of people."] By propaganda we would understand the revolutionary explanation of the present social system, entire or in its partial manifestations, whether that be done in a form intelligible to individuals or to broad masses. By agitation, in the strict sense of the word [*sic*!], we would understand the call upon the masses to undertake definite, concrete actions and the promotion of the direct revolutionary intervention of the proletariat in social life."

We congratulate Russian—and international—Social-Democracy on having found, thanks to Martynov, a new terminology, more strict and more profound. Hitherto we thought (with Plekhanov, and with all the leaders of the international working-class movement) that the propagandist, dealing with, say, the question of unemployment, must explain the capitalistic nature of crises, the cause of their inevitability in modern society, the necessity for the transformation of this society into a socialist society, etc. In a word, he must present "many ideas", so many, indeed, that

they will be understood as an integral whole only by a (comparatively) few persons. The agitator, however, speaking on the same subject, will take as an illustration a fact that is most glaring and most widely known to his audience, say, the death of an unemployed worker's family from starvation, the growing impoverishment, etc., and, utilising this fact, known to all, will direct his efforts to presenting *a single idea* to the "masses", e.g., the senselessness of the contradiction between the increase of wealth and the increase of poverty; he will strive *to rouse* discontent and indignation among the masses against this crying injustice, leaving a more complete explanation of this contradiction to the propagandist. Consequently, the propagandist operates chiefly by means of the *printed* word; the agitator by means of the *spoken* word. The propagandist requires qualities different from those of the agitator. Kautsky and Lafargue, for example, we term propagandists; Bebel and Guesde we term agitators. To single out a third sphere, or third function, of practical activity, and to include in this function "the call upon the masses to undertake definite concrete actions", is sheer nonsense, because the "call", as a single act, either naturally and inevitably supplements the theoretical treatise, propagandist pamphlet, and agitational speech, or represents a purely executive function. Let us take, for example, the struggle the German Social-Democrats are now waging against the corn duties. The theoreticians write research works on tariff policy, with the "call", say, to struggle for commercial treaties and for Free Trade. The propagandist does the same thing in the periodical press, and the agitator in public speeches. At the present time, the "concrete action" of the masses takes the form of signing petitions to the Reichstag against raising the corn duties. The call for this action comes indirectly from the theoreticians, the propagandists, and the agitators, and, directly, from the workers who take the petition lists to the factories and to private homes for the gathering of signatures. According to the "Martynov terminology", Kautsky and Bebel are both propagandists, while those who solicit the signatures are agitators. Isn't it clear?

The German example recalled to my mind the German word "Verballhornung", which, literally translated, means

"Ballhorning". Johann Ballhorn, a Leipzig publisher of the sixteenth century, published a child's reader in which, as was the custom, he introduced a drawing of a cock, but a cock without spurs and with a couple of eggs lying near it. On the cover he printed the legend, "*Revised* edition by Johann Ballhorn". Ever since then, the Germans describe any "revision" that is really a worsening as "ballhorning". And one cannot help recalling Ballhorn upon seeing how the Martynovs try to render Plekhanov "more profound".

Why did our Lomonosov "invent" this confusion? In order to illustrate how *Iskra* "devotes attention only to one side of the case, just as Plekhanov did a decade and a half ago" (39). "With *Iskra*, propagandist tasks force agitational tasks into the background, at least for the present" (52). If we translate this last proposition from the language of Martynov into ordinary human language (because mankind has not yet managed to learn the newly-invented terminology), we shall get the following: with *Iskra*, the tasks of political propaganda and political agitation force into the background the task of "presenting to the government concrete demands for legislative and administrative measures" that "promise certain palpable results" (or demands for social reforms, that is, if we are permitted once again to employ the old terminology of the old mankind not yet grown to Martynov's level). We suggest that the reader compare this thesis with the following tirade:

> "What also astonishes us in these programmes [the programmes advanced by revolutionary Social-Democrats] is their constant stress upon the benefits of workers' activity in parliament [non-existent in Russia], though they completely ignore [thanks to their revolutionary nihilism] the importance of workers' participation in the legislative manufacturers' assemblies on factory affairs [which do exist in Russia] ... or at least the importance of workers' participation in municipal bodies...."

The author of this tirade expresses in a somewhat more forthright and clearer manner the very idea which Lomonosov-Martynov discovered by his own understanding. The author is R. M., in the "*Separate Supplement*" *to Rabochaya Mysl* (p. 15).

C. POLITICAL EXPOSURES AND "TRAINING IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY"

In advancing against *Iskra* his theory of "raising the activity of the working masses", Martynov actually betrayed an urge *to belittle* that activity, for he declared the very economic struggle before which all economists grovel to be the preferable, particularly important, and "most widely applicable" means of rousing this activity and its broadest field. This error is characteristic, precisely in that it is by no means peculiar to Martynov. In reality, it is possible to "raise the activity of the working masses" *only* when this activity *is not restricted* to "political agitation on an economic basis". A basic condition for the necessary expansion of political agitation is the organisation of *comprehensive* political exposure. *In no way* except by means of such exposures can the masses be trained in political consciousness and revolutionary activity. Hence, activity of this kind is one of the most important functions of international Social-Democracy as a whole, for even political freedom does not in any way eliminate exposures; it merely shifts somewhat their sphere of direction. Thus, the German party is especially strengthening its positions and spreading its influence, thanks particularly to the untiring energy with which it is conducting its campaign of political exposure. Working-class consciousness cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to *all* cases of tyranny, oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter *what class* is affected—unless they are trained, moreover, to respond from a Social-Democratic point of view and no other. The consciousness of the working masses cannot be genuine class-consciousness, unless the workers learn, from concrete, and above all from topical, political facts and events to observe *every* other social class in *all* the manifestations of its intellectual, ethical, and political life; unless they learn to apply in practice the materialist analysis and the materialist estimate of *all* aspects of the life and activity of *all* classes, strata, and groups of the population. Those who concentrate the attention, observation, and consciousness of the working class exclusively, or even mainly, upon itself alone are not Social-Democrats; for the self-knowledge of the working class is indissolubly bound up, not solely with a fully clear theo-

retical understanding—or rather, not so much with the theoretical, as with the practical, understanding—of the relationships between *all* the various classes of modern society, acquired through the experience of political life. For this reason the conception of the economic struggle as the most widely applicable means of drawing the masses into the political movement, which our Economists preach, is so extremely harmful and reactionary in its practical significance. In order to become a Social-Democrat, the worker must have a clear picture in his mind of the economic nature and the social and political features of the landlord and the priest, the high state official and the peasant, the student and the vagabond; he must know their strong and weak points; he must grasp the meaning of all the catchwords and sophisms by which each class and each stratum *camouflages* its selfish strivings and its real "inner workings"; he must understand what interests are reflected by certain institutions and certain laws and how they are reflected. But this "clear picture" cannot be obtained from any book. It can be obtained only from living examples and from exposures that follow close upon what is going on about us at a given moment; upon what is being discussed, in whispers perhaps, by each one in his own way; upon what finds expression in such and such events, in such and such statistics, in such and such court sentences, etc., etc. These comprehensive political exposures are an essential and *fundamental* condition for training the masses in revolutionary activity.

Why do the Russian workers still manifest little revolutionary activity in response to the brutal treatment of the people by the police, the persecution of religious sects, the flogging of peasants, the outrageous censorship, the torture of soldiers, the persecution of the most innocent cultural undertakings, etc.? Is it because the "economic struggle" does not "stimulate" them to this, because such activity does not "promise palpable results", because it produces little that is "positive"? To adopt such an opinion, we repeat, is merely to direct the charge where it does not belong, to blame the working masses for one's own philistinism (or Bernsteinism). We must blame ourselves, our lagging behind the mass movement, for still being unable to organise

sufficiently wide, striking, and rapid exposures of all the shameful outrages. When we do that (and we must and can do it), the most backward worker will understand, *or will feel*, that the students and religious sects, the peasants and the authors are being abused and outraged by those same dark forces that are oppressing and crushing him at every step of his life. Feeling that, he himself will be filled with an irresistible desire to react, and he will know how to hoot the censors one day, on another day to demonstrate outside the house of a governor who has brutally suppressed a peasant uprising, on still another day to teach a lesson to the gendarmes in surplices who are doing the work of the Holy Inquisition, etc. As yet we have done very little, almost nothing, *to bring* before the working masses prompt exposures on all possible issues. Many of us as yet do not recognise this as our *bounden duty* but trail spontaneously in the wake of the "drab everyday struggle", in the narrow confines of factory life. Under such circumstances to say that "*Iskra* displays a tendency to minimise the significance of the forward march of the drab everyday struggle in comparison with the propaganda of brilliant and complete ideas" (Martynov, op. cit., p. 61), means to drag the Party back, to defend and glorify our unpreparedness and backwardness.

As for calling the masses to action, that will come of itself as soon as energetic political agitation, live and striking exposures come into play. To catch some criminal red-handed and immediately to brand him publicly in all places is of itself far more effective than any number of "calls"; the effect very often is such as will make it impossible to tell exactly who it was that "called" upon the masses and who suggested this or that plan of demonstration, etc. Calls for action, not in the general, but in the concrete, sense of the term can be made only at the place of action; only those who themselves go into action, and do so immediately, can sound such calls. Our business as Social-Democratic publicists is to deepen, expand, and intensify political exposures and political agitation.

A word in passing about "calls to action". *The only newspaper* which *prior to* the spring events *called upon* the workers to intervene actively in a matter that certainly did not *promise* any *palpable results* whatever for the workers, i.e.,

the drafting of the students into the army, *was Iskra*. Immediately after the publication of the order of January 11, on "drafting the 183 students into the army", *Iskra* published an article on the matter (in its February issue, No. 2),* and, *before* any demonstration was begun, forthwith *called upon* "the workers to go to the aid of the students", called upon the "people" openly to take up the government's arrogant challenge. We ask: how is the remarkable fact to be explained that although Martynov talks so much about "calls to action", and even suggests "calls to action" as a special form of activity, he said not a word about *this* call? After this, was it not sheer philistinism on Martynov's part to allege that *Iskra* was *one-sided* because it did not issue sufficient "calls" to struggle for demands "promising palpable results"?

Our Economists, including *Rabocheye Dyelo*, were successful because they adapted themselves to the backward workers. But the Social-Democratic worker, the revolutionary worker (and the number of such workers is growing) will indignantly reject all this talk about struggle for demands "promising palpable results", etc., because he will understand that this is only a variation of the old song about adding a kopek to the ruble. Such a worker will say to his counsellors from *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*: you are busying yourselves in vain, gentlemen, and shirking your proper duties, by meddling with such excessive zeal in a job that we can very well manage ourselves. There is nothing clever in your assertion that the Social-Democrats' task is to lend the economic struggle itself a political character; that is only the beginning, it is not the main task of the Social-Democrats. For all over the world, including Russia, *the police themselves often take the initiative in lending* the economic struggle a political character, and the workers themselves learn to understand whom the government supports.** The "economic struggle of the workers

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*

** The demand "to lend the economic struggle itself a political character" most strikingly expresses *subservience to spontaneity* in the sphere of political activity. Very often the economic struggle *spontaneously* assumes a political character, that is to say, without the intervention of the "revolutionary bacilli—the intelligentsia", without the

against the employers and the government", about which you make as much fuss as if you had discovered a new America, is being waged in all parts of Russia, even the most remote, by the workers themselves who have heard about strikes, but who have heard almost nothing about socialism. The "activity" you want to stimulate among us workers, by advancing concrete demands that promise palpable results, we are already displaying and in our everyday, limited trade-union work we put forward these concrete demands, very often without any assistance whatever from the intellectuals. But *such* activity is not enough for us; we are not children to be fed on the thin gruel of "economic" politics alone; we want to know everything that others know, we want to learn the details of *all* aspects of political life and to take part *actively* in every single political event. In order that we may do this, the intellectuals must talk to us less of what we already know.* and tell us more about what we do not yet know

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intervention of the class-conscious Social-Democrats. The economic struggle of the English workers, for instance, also assumed a political character without any intervention on the part of the socialists. The task of the Social-Democrats, however, is not exhausted by political agitation on an economic basis; their task is *to convert* trade-unionist politics into Social-Democratic political struggle, *to utilise* the sparks of political consciousness which the economic struggle generates among the workers, for the purpose of *raising* the workers to the level of *Social-Democratic* political consciousness. The Martynovs, however, instead of raising and stimulating the spontaneously awakening political consciousness of the workers, *bow to spontaneity* and repeat over and over *ad nauseam*, that the economic struggle "impels" the workers to realise their own lack of political rights. It is unfortunate, gentlemen, that the spontaneously awakening trade-unionist political consciousness does not "*impel*" you to an understanding of your Social-Democratic tasks.

* To prove that this imaginary speech of a worker to an Economist is based on fact, we shall refer to two witnesses who undoubtedly have direct knowledge of the working-class movement and who are least of all inclined to be partial towards us "doctrinaires"; for one witness is an Economist (who regards even *Rabocheye Dyelo* as a political organ!), and the other is a terrorist. The first witness is the author of a remarkably truthful and vivid article entitled "The St. Petersburg Working-Class Movement and the Practical Tasks of Social-Democracy", published in *Rabocheye Dyelo* No. 6. He divides the workers into the following categories: (1) class-conscious revolutionaries; (2) intermediate stratum; (3) the remaining masses. The intermediate stratum, he says, "is often more interested in questions of political life than in its own immediate economic interests, the connection

and what we can never learn from our factory and "economic" experience, namely, political knowledge. You intellectuals can acquire this knowledge, and it is your *duty* to bring it to us in a hundred- and a thousand-fold greater measure than you have done up to now; and you must bring it to us, not only in the form of discussions, pamphlets, and articles (which very often—pardon our frankness—are rather dull), but precisely in the form of vivid *exposures* of what our government and our governing classes are doing at this very moment in all spheres of life. Devote more zeal to carrying out this duty and *talk less about "raising the activity of the working masses"*. We are far more active than you think, and we are quite able to support, by open street fighting, even demands that do not promise any "palpable results" whatever. It is not for you to "raise" our activity, because *activity is precisely the thing you yourselves lack*. Bow less in subservience to spontaneity, and think more about raising *your own* activity, gentlemen!

D. WHAT IS THERE IN COMMON BETWEEN ECONOMISM AND TERRORISM?

In the last footnote we cited the opinion of an Economist and of a non-Social-Democratic terrorist, who showed themselves to be accidentally in agreement. Speaking generally, however, there is not an accidental, but a necessary, inherent connection between the two, of which we shall have need to speak later, and which must be mentioned here in

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between which and the general social conditions it has long understood".... *Rabochaya Mysl* "is sharply criticised": "It keeps on repeating the same thing over and over again, things we have long known, read long ago." "Again nothing in the political review!" (pp. 30-31). But even the third stratum, "the younger and more sensitive section of the workers, less corrupted by the tavern and the church, who hardly ever have the opportunity of getting hold of political literature, discuss political events in a rambling way and ponder over the fragmentary news they get about student riots", etc. The terrorist writes as follows: "... They read over once or twice the petty details of factory life in other towns, not their own, and then they read no more ... dull, they find it.... To say nothing in a workers' paper about the government ... is to regard the workers as being little children.... The workers are not little children" (*Svoboda*, published by the Revolutionary-Socialist Group, pp. 69-70).

connection with the question of education for revolutionary activity. The Economists and the present-day terrorists have one common root, namely, *subservience to spontaneity*, with which we dealt in the preceding chapter as a general phenomenon and which we shall now examine in relation to its effect upon political activity and the political struggle. At first sight, our assertion may appear paradoxical, so great is the difference between those who stress the "drab everyday struggle" and those who call for the most self-sacrificing struggle of individuals. But this is no paradox. The Economists and the terrorists merely bow to different poles of spontaneity; the Economists bow to the spontaneity of "the labour movement pure and simple", while the terrorists bow to the spontaneity of the passionate indignation of intellectuals, who lack the ability or opportunity to connect the revolutionary struggle and the working-class movement into an integral whole. It is difficult indeed for those who have lost their belief, or who have never believed, that this is possible, to find some outlet for their indignation and revolutionary energy other than terror. Thus, both forms of subservience to spontaneity we have mentioned are nothing but *the beginning of the implementation* of the notorious *Credo* programme: Let the workers wage their "economic struggle against the employers and the government" (we apologise to the author of the *Credo* for expressing her views in Martynov's words. We think we have a right to do so since the *Credo*, too, says that in the economic struggle the workers "come up against the political régime"), and let the intellectuals conduct the political struggle by their own efforts—with the aid of terror, of course! This is an absolutely logical and inevitable *conclusion* which must be insisted on—*even though those* who are beginning to carry out this programme *do not themselves realise* that it is inevitable. Political activity has its logic quite apart from the consciousness of those who, with the best intentions, call either for terror or for lending the economic struggle itself a political character. The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and, in this case, good intentions cannot save one from being spontaneously drawn "along the line of least resistance", along the line of the *purely bourgeois Credo* programme. Surely it is no accident either that many Rus-

sian liberals—avowed liberals and liberals that wear the mask of Marxism—whole-heartedly sympathise with terror and try to foster the terrorist moods that have surged up in the present time.

The formation of the Revolutionary-Socialist *Svoboda* Group—which set itself the aim of helping the working-class movement in every possible way, but which included in its *programme* terror, and emancipation, so to speak, from Social-Democracy—once again confirmed the remarkable perspicacity of P. B. Axelrod, who *literally foretold* these results of Social-Democratic waverings *as far back as the end of 1897* (*Present Tasks and Tactics*), when he outlined his famous "two perspectives". All the subsequent disputes and disagreements among Russian Social-Democrats are contained, like a plant in the seed, in these two perspectives.*

From this point of view it also becomes clear why *Rabocheye Dyelo*, unable to withstand the spontaneity of Economism, has likewise been unable to withstand the spontaneity of terrorism. It is highly interesting to note here the specific arguments that *Svoboda* has advanced in defence of terrorism. It "completely denies" the deterrent role of terrorism (*The Regeneration of Revolutionism*, p. 64), but instead stresses its "excitative significance". This is characteristic, first, as representing one of the stages of the break-up and decline of the traditional (pre-Social-Democratic) cycle of ideas which insisted upon terrorism. The admission

* Martynov "conceives of another, more realistic [?] dilemma" (*Social-Democracy and the Working Class*, p. 19): "Either Social-Democracy takes over the direct leadership of the economic struggle of the proletariat and by that [!] transforms it into a revolutionary class struggle...." "By that", i.e., apparently by the direct leadership of the economic struggle. Can Martynov cite an instance in which leading the trade-union struggle *alone* has succeeded in transforming a trade-unionist movement into a revolutionary class movement? Can he not understand that in order to bring about this "transformation" we must actively take up the "direct leadership" of *all-sided* political agitation?... "Or the other perspective: Social-Democracy refrains from assuming the leadership of the economic struggle of the workers and so ... clips its own wings..." In *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s opinion, quoted above, it is *Iskra* that "refrains". We have seen, however, that the latter *does far more than Rabocheye Dyelo* to lead the economic struggle, but that, moreover, it does not confine itself thereto and *does not narrow down* its political tasks for its sake.

that the government cannot now be "terrified", and hence disrupted, by terror, is tantamount to a complete condemnation of terror as a system of struggle, as a sphere of activity sanctioned by the programme. Secondly, it is still more characteristic as an example of the failure to understand our immediate tasks in regard to "education for revolutionary activity". *Svoboda* advocates terror as a means of "exciting" the working-class movement and of giving it a "strong impetus". It is difficult to imagine an argument that more thoroughly disproves itself. Are there not enough outrages committed in Russian life without special "excitants" having to be invented? On the other hand, is it not obvious that those who are not, and cannot be, roused to excitement even by Russian tyranny will stand by "twiddling their thumbs" and watch a handful of terrorists engaged in single combat with the government? The fact is that the working masses are roused to a high pitch of excitement by the social evils in Russian life, but we are unable to gather, if one may so put it, and concentrate all these drops and streamlets of popular resentment that are brought forth to a far larger extent than we imagine by the conditions of Russian life, and that must be combined into a *single* gigantic torrent. That this can be accomplished is irrefutably proved by the enormous growth of the working-class movement and the eagerness, noted above, with which the workers clamour for political literature. On the other hand, calls for terror and calls to lend the economic struggle itself a political character are merely two different forms of *evading* the most pressing duty now resting upon Russian revolutionaries, namely, the organisation of comprehensive political agitation. *Svoboda* desires *to substitute* terror for agitation, openly admitting that "as soon as intensified and strenuous agitation is begun among the masses the excitative function of terror will be ended" (*The Regeneration of Revolutionism*, p. 68). This proves precisely that both the terrorists and the Economists *underestimate* the revolutionary activity of the masses, despite the striking evidence of the events that took place in the spring,* and whereas the one group goes out in

* The big street demonstrations which began in the spring of *1901*. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

search of artificial "excitants", the other talks about "concrete demands". But both fail to devote sufficient attention to the development of *their own activity* in political agitation and in the organisation of political exposures. And no other work can serve as a *substitute* for this task either at the present time or at any other.

E. THE WORKING CLASS AS VANGUARD FIGHTER FOR DEMOCRACY

We have seen that the conduct of the broadest political agitation and, consequently, of all-sided political exposures is an absolutely necessary and a *paramount* task of our activity, if this activity is to be truly Social-Democratic. However, we arrived at this conclusion *solely* on the grounds of the pressing needs of the working class for political knowledge and political training. But such a presentation of the question is too narrow, for it ignores the general democratic tasks of Social-Democracy, in particular of present-day Russian Social-Democracy. In order to explain the point more concretely we shall approach the subject from an aspect that is "nearest" to the Economist, namely, from the practical aspect. "Everyone agrees" that it is necessary to develop the political consciousness of the working class. The question is, *how* that is to be done and what is required to do it. The economic struggle merely "impels" the workers to realise the government's attitude towards the working class. Consequently, *however much we may try* to "lend the economic, struggle itself a political character", we *shall never be able* to develop the political consciousness of the workers (to the level of Social-Democratic political consciousness) by keeping within the framework of the economic struggle, for *that framework is too narrow*. The Martynov formula has some value for us, not because it illustrates Martynov's aptitude for confusing things, but because it pointedly expresses the basic error that all the Economists commit, namely, their conviction that it is possible to develop the class political consciousness of the workers *from within*, so to speak, from their economic struggle, i.e., by making this struggle the exclusive (or, at least, the main) starting-point, by making it the exclusive (or, at least,

the main) basis. Such a view is radically wrong. Piqued by our polemics against them, the Economists refuse to ponder deeply over the origins of these disagreements, with the result that we simply cannot understand one another. It is as if we spoke in different tongues.

Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers *only from without*, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this knowledge is the sphere of relationships of *all* classes and strata to the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between *all* classes. For that reason, the reply to the question as to what must be done to bring political knowledge to the workers cannot be merely the answer with which, in the majority of cases, the practical workers, especially those inclined towards Economism, mostly content themselves, namely: "To go among the workers." To bring political knowledge to the *workers* the Social-Democrats must *go among all classes of the population*; they must dispatch units of their army *in all directions*.

We deliberately select this blunt formula, we deliberately express ourselves in this sharply simplified manner, not because we desire to indulge in paradoxes, but in order to "impel" the Economists to a realisation of their tasks which they unpardonably ignore, to suggest to them strongly the difference between trade-unionist and Social-Democratic politics, which they refuse to understand. We therefore beg the reader not to get wrought up, but to hear us patiently to the end.

Let us take the type of Social-Democratic study circle that has become most widespread in the past few years and examine its work. It has "contacts with the workers" and rests content with this, issuing leaflets in which abuses in the factories, the government's partiality towards the capitalists, and the tyranny of the police are strongly condemned. At workers' meetings the discussions never, or rarely ever, go beyond the limits of these subjects. Extremely rare are the lectures and discussions held on the history of the revolutionary movement, on questions of the government's home and foreign policy, on questions of the economic evo-

lution of Russia and of Europe, on the position of the various classes in modern society, etc. As to systematically acquiring and extending contact with other classes of society, no one even dreams of that. In fact, the ideal leader, as the majority of the members of such circles picture him, is something far more in the nature of a trade-union secretary than a socialist political leader. For the secretary of any, say English, trade union always helps the workers to carry on the economic struggle, he helps them to expose factory abuses, explains the injustice of the laws and of measures that hamper the freedom to strike and to picket (i.e., to warn all and sundry that a strike is proceeding at a certain factory), explains the partiality of arbitration court judges who belong to the bourgeois classes, etc., etc. In a word, every trade-union secretary conducts and helps to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". It cannot be too strongly maintained that *this is still not* Social-Democracy, that the Social-Democrat's ideal should not be the trade-union secretary, but *the tribune of the people*, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects; who is able to generalise all these manifestations and produce a single picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation; who is able to take advantage of every event, however small, in order to set forth *before all* his socialist convictions and his democratic demands, in order to clarify for *all* and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat. Compare, for example, a leader like Robert Knight (the well-known secretary and leader of the Boiler-Makers' Society, one of the most powerful trade unions in England), with Wilhelm Liebknecht, and try to apply to them the contrasts that Martynov draws in his controversy with *Iskra*. You will see—I am running through Martynov's article—that Robert Knight engaged more in "calling the masses to certain concrete actions" (Martynov, op. cit., p. 39), while Wilhelm Liebknecht engaged more in "the revolutionary elucidation of the whole of the present system or partial manifestations of it" (38-39); that Robert Knight "formulated the immediate demands of the proletariat and indicated the means

by which they can be achieved" (41), whereas Wilhelm Liebknecht, while doing this, did not hold back from "simultaneously guiding the activities of various opposition strata", "dictating a positive programme of action for them"* (41); that Robert Knight strove "as far as possible to lend the economic struggle itself a political character" (42) and was excellently able "to submit to the government concrete demands promising certain palpable results" (43), whereas Liebknecht engaged to a much greater degree in "one-sided" "exposures" (40); that Robert Knight attached more significance to the "forward march of the drab everyday struggle" (61), whereas Liebknecht attached more significance to the "propaganda of brilliant and completed ideas" (61); that Liebknecht converted the paper he was directing into "an organ of revolutionary opposition that exposed the state of affairs in our country, particularly the political state of affairs, insofar as it affected the interests of the most varied strata of the population" (63), whereas Robert Knight "worked for the cause of the working class in close organic connection with the proletarian struggle" (63)—if by "close and organic connection" is meant the subservience to spontaneity which we examined above, by taking the examples of Krichevsky and Martynov—and "restricted the sphere of his influence", convinced, of course, as is Martynov, that "by doing so he deepened that influence" (63). In a word, you will see that *de facto* Martynov reduces Social-Democracy to the level of trade-unionism, though he does so, of course, not because he does not desire the good of Social-Democracy, but simply because he is a little too much in a hurry to render Plekhanov more profound, instead of taking the trouble to understand him.

Let us return, however, to our theses. We said that a Social-Democrat, if he really believes it necessary to develop comprehensively the political consciousness of the proletariat, must "go among all classes of the population". This gives rise to the questions: how is this to be done? have we enough forces to do this? is there a basis for such work among all the other classes? will this not mean a re-

* For example, during the Franco-Prussian War, Liebknecht dictated a programme of action *for the whole of democracy*; to an even greater extent Marx and Engels did this in 1848.

treat, or lead to a retreat, from the class point of view? Let us deal with these questions.

We must "go among all classes of the population" as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organisers. No one doubts that the theoretical work of Social-Democrats should aim at studying all the specific features of the social and political condition of the various classes. But extremely little is done in this direction as compared with the work that is done in studying the specific features of factory life. In the committees and study circles, one can meet people who are immersed in the study even of some special branch of the metal industry; but one can hardly ever find members of organisations (obliged, as often happens, for some reason or other to give up practical work) who are especially engaged in gathering material on some pressing question of social and political life in our country which could serve as a means for conducting Social-Democratic work among other strata of the population. In dwelling upon the fact that the majority of the present-day leaders of the working-class movement lack training, we cannot refrain from mentioning training in this respect also, for it too is bound up with the "Economist" conception of "close organic connection with the proletarian struggle". The principal thing, of course, is *propaganda* and *agitation* among all strata of the people. The work of the West European Social-Democrat is in this respect facilitated by the public meetings and rallies which *all* are free to attend, and by the fact that in parliament he addresses the representatives of *all* classes. We have neither a parliament nor freedom of assembly; nevertheless, we are able to arrange meetings of workers who desire to listen to *a Social-Democrat*. We must also find ways and means of calling meetings of representatives of all social classes that desire to listen to *a democrat*; for he is no Social-Democrat who forgets in practice that "the Communists support every revolutionary movement", that we are obliged for that reason to expound and emphasise *general democratic tasks before the whole people*, without for a moment concealing our socialist convictions. He is no Social-Democrat who forgets in practice his obligation to be *ahead of all* in raising, accentuating, and solving every general democratic question.

"But everyone agrees with this!" the impatient reader will exclaim, and the new instructions adopted by the last conference of the Union Abroad for the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* definitely say: "All events of social and political life that affect the proletariat either directly as a special class or as *the vanguard of all the revolutionary forces in the struggle for freedom* should serve as subjects for political propaganda and agitation" (*Two Conferences*, p. 17, our italics). Yes, these are very true and very good words, and we would be fully satisfied if *Rabocheye Dyelo understood* them *and if it refrained from saying in the next breath things that contradict them*. For it is not enough to call ourselves the "vanguard", the advanced contingent; we must act in such a way that *all* the other contingents recognise and are obliged to admit that we are marching in the vanguard. And we ask the reader: Are the representatives of the other "contingents" such fools as to take our word for it when we say that we are the "vanguard"? Just picture to yourselves the following: a Social-Democrat comes to the "contingent" of Russian educated radicals, or liberal constitutionalists, and says, We are the vanguard; "the task confronting us now is, as far as possible, to lend the economic struggle itself a political character". The radical, or constitutionalist, if he is at all intelligent (and there are many intelligent men among Russian radicals and constitutionalists), would only smile at such a speech and would say (to himself, of course, for in the majority of cases he is an experienced diplomat): "Your 'vanguard' must be made up of simpletons. They do not even understand that it is our task, the task of the progressive representatives of bourgeois democracy to lend the workers' economic struggle *itself* a political character. Why, we too, like the West-European bourgeois, want to draw the workers into politics, *but only into trade-unionist*, *not into Social-Democratic politics*. Trade-unionist politics of the working class is precisely *bourgeois politics* of the working class, and this 'vanguard's' formulation of its task is the formulation of trade-unionist politics! Let them call themselves Social-Democrats to their heart's content, I am not a child to get excited over a label. But they must not fall under the influence of those pernicious orthodox doctrinaires, let them allow 'freedom of

criticism' to those who unconsciously are driving Social-Democracy into trade-unionist channels."

And the faint smile of our constitutionalist will turn into Homeric laughter when he learns that the Social-Democrats who talk of Social-Democracy as the vanguard, today, when spontaneity almost completely dominates our movement, fear nothing so much as "belittling the spontaneous element", as "underestimating the significance of the forward movement of the drab everyday struggle, as compared with the propaganda of brilliant and completed ideas", etc., etc.! A "vanguard" which fears that consciousness will outstrip spontaneity, which fears to put forward a bold "plan" that would compel general recognition even among those who differ with us. Are they not confusing "vanguard" with "rearguard"?

Indeed, let us examine the following piece of reasoning by Martynov. On page 40 he says that *Iskra* is one-sided in its tactics of exposing abuses, that "however much we may spread distrust and hatred of the government, we shall not achieve our aim until we have succeeded in developing sufficient active social energy for its overthrow". This, it may be said parenthetically, is the familiar solicitude for the activation of the masses, with a simultaneous striving to restrict one's own activity. But that is not the main point at the moment. Martynov speaks here, accordingly, of *revolutionary* energy ("for overthrowing"). And what conclusion does he arrive at? Since in ordinary times various social strata inevitably march separately, "it is, therefore, clear that we Social-Democrats cannot simultaneously guide the activities of various opposition strata, we cannot dictate to them a positive programme of action, we cannot point out to them in what manner they should wage a day-to-day struggle for their interests.... The liberal strata will themselves take care of the active struggle for their immediate interests, the struggle that will bring them face to face with our political régime" (p. 41). Thus, having begun with talk about revolutionary energy, about the active struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy, Martynov immediately turns toward trade-union energy and active struggle for immediate interests! It goes without saying that we cannot guide the struggle of the students, liberals, etc., for their

"immediate interests"; but this was not the point at issue, most worthy Economist! The point we were discussing was the possible and necessary participation of various social strata in the overthrow of the autocracy; and not only are we *able*, but it is our bounden duty, to guide *these* "activities of the various opposition strata", if we desire to be the "vanguard". Not only will our students and liberals, etc., themselves take care of "the struggle that brings them face to face with our political régime"; the police and the officials of the autocratic government will see to this first and foremost. But if "we" desire to be front-rank democrats, we must make it our concern *to direct* the thoughts of those who are dissatisfied only with conditions at the university, or in the Zemstvo, etc., to the idea that the entire political system is worthless. *We* must take upon ourselves the task of organising an all-round political struggle under the leadership of *our* Party in such a manner as to make it possible for all oppositional strata to render their fullest support to the struggle and to our Party. *We* must train our Social-Democratic practical workers to become political leaders, able to guide all the manifestations of this all-round struggle, able at the right time to "dictate a positive programme of action" for the aroused students, the discontented Zemstvo people, the incensed religious sects, the offended elementary schoolteachers, etc., etc. For that reason, Martynov's assertion that "with regard to these, we can function *merely in the negative* role of exposers of abuses ... we can *only* dissipate their hopes in various government commissions" *is completely false* (our italics). By saying this, Martynov shows that he *absolutely fails to understand* the role that the revolutionary "vanguard" must really play. If the reader bears this in mind, he will be clear as to *the real meaning* of Martynov's concluding remarks: "*Iskra* is the organ of the revolutionary opposition which exposes the state of affairs in our country, particularly the political state of affairs, insofar as it affects the interests of the most varied strata of the population. We, however, work and will continue to work for the cause of the working class in close organic contact with the proletarian struggle. By restricting the sphere of our active influence we deepen that influence" (63). The true sense of this conclusion is as follows: *Iskra* desires *to elevate* the

trade-unionist politics of the working class (to which, through misconception, through lack of training, or through conviction, our practical workers frequently confine themselves) to the level of Social-Democratic politics. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, however, desires *to degrade* Social-Democratic politics to trade-unionist politics. Moreover, it assures the world that the two positions are "entirely compatible within the common cause" (63). *O, sancta simplicitas!*

To proceed. Have we sufficient forces to direct our propaganda and agitation among *all* social classes? Most certainly. Our Economists, who are frequently inclined to deny this, lose sight of the gigantic progress our movement has made from (approximately) 1894 to 1901. Like real "tail-enders" they often go on living in the bygone stages of the movement's inception. In the earlier period, indeed, we had astonishingly few forces, and it was perfectly natural and legitimate then to devote ourselves exclusively to activities among the workers and to condemn severely any deviation from this course. The entire task then was to consolidate our position in the working class. At the present time, however, gigantic forces have been attracted to the movement. The best representatives of the younger generation of the educated classes are coming over to us. Everywhere in the provinces there are people, resident there by dint of circumstance, who have taken part in the movement in the past or who desire to do so now and who, are gravitating towards Social-Democracy (whereas in 1894 one could count the Social-Democrats on the fingers of one's hand). A basic political and organisational shortcoming of our movement is our *inability* to utilise all these forces and give them appropriate work (we shall deal with this more fully in the next chapter). The overwhelming majority of these forces entirely lack the opportunity of "going among the workers", so that there are no grounds for fearing that we shall divert forces from our main work. In order to be able to provide the workers with real, comprehensive, and live political knowledge, we must have "our own people", Social-Democrats, everywhere, among all social strata, and in all positions from which we can learn the inner springs of our state mechanism. Such people are required, not only for propaganda and agitation, but in a still larger measure for organisation.

Is there a basis for activity among all classes of the population? Whoever doubts this lags in his consciousness behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses. The working-class movement has aroused and is continuing to arouse discontent in some, hopes of support for the opposition in others, and in still others the realisation that the autocracy is unbearable and must inevitably fall. We would be "politicians" and Social-Democrats in name only (as all too often happens in reality), if we failed to realise that our task is to utilise every manifestation of discontent, and to gather and turn to the best account every protest, however small. This is quite apart from the fact that the millions of the labouring peasantry, handicraftsmen, petty artisans, etc., would always listen eagerly to the speech of any Social-Democrat who is at all qualified. Indeed, is there a single social class in which there are no individuals, groups, or circles that are discontented with the lack of rights and with tyranny and, therefore, accessible to the propaganda of Social-Democrats as the spokesmen of the most pressing general democratic needs? To those who desire to have a clear idea of what the political agitation of a Social-Democrat among *all* classes and strata of the population should be like, we would point to *political exposures* in the broad sense of the word as the principal (but, of course, not the sole) form of this agitation.

"We must arouse in every section of the population that is at all politically conscious a passion for *political* exposure," I wrote in my article "Where To Begin" [*Iskra*, May (No. 4), 1901], with which I shall deal in greater detail later. "We must not be discouraged by the fact that the voice of political exposure is today so feeble, timid, and infrequent. This is not because of a wholesale submission to police despotism, but because those who are able and ready to make exposures have no tribune from which to speak, no eager and encouraging audience, they do not see anywhere among the people that force to which it would be worth while directing their complaint against the 'omnipotent' Russian Government.... We are now in a position to provide a tribune for the nation-wide exposure of the tsarist government, and it is our duty to do this. That tribune must be a Social-Democratic newspaper."*

The ideal audience for political exposure is the working class, which is first and foremost in need of all-round and

* See present volume, pp. 21-22.—*Ed.*

live political knowledge, and is most capable of converting this knowledge into active struggle, even when that struggle does not promise "palpable results". A tribune for *nation-wide* exposures can be only an All-Russian newspaper. "Without a political organ, a political movement deserving that name is inconceivable in the Europe of today"; in this respect Russia must undoubtedly be included in present-day Europe. The press long ago became a power in our country, otherwise the government would not spend tens of thousands of rubles to bribe it and to subsidise the Katkovs and Meshcherskys. And it is no novelty in autocratic Russia for the underground press to break through the wall of censorship and *compel* the legal and conservative press to speak openly of it. This was the case in the seventies and even in the fifties. How much broader and deeper are now the sections of the people willing to read the illegal underground press, and to learn from it "how to live and how to die", to use the expression of a worker who sent a letter to *Iskra* (No. 7).[172] Political exposures are as much a declaration of war against the *government* as economic exposures are a declaration of war against the factory owners. The moral significance of this declaration of war will be all the greater, the wider and more powerful the campaign of exposure will be and the more numerous and determined the social *class* that has *declared war in order to begin the war*. Hence, political exposures in themselves serve as a powerful instrument for *disintegrating* the system we oppose, as a means for diverting from the enemy his casual or temporary allies, as a means for spreading hostility and distrust among the permanent partners of the autocracy.

In our time only a party that will *organise* really *nation-wide* exposures can become the vanguard of the revolutionary forces. The word "nation-wide" has a very profound meaning. The overwhelming majority of the non-working-class exposers (be it remembered that in order to become the vanguard, we must attract other classes) are sober politicians and level-headed men of affairs. They know perfectly well how dangerous it is to "complain" even against a minor official, let alone against the "omnipotent" Russian Government. And they will come *to us* with their complaints only when they see that these complaints can really have effect, and that

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we represent *a political force*. In order to become such a force in the eyes of outsiders, much persistent and stubborn work is required *to raise* our own consciousness, initiative, and energy. To accomplish this it is not enough to attach a "vanguard" label to rearguard theory and practice.

But if we have to undertake the organisation of a really nation-wide exposure of the government, in what way will then the class character of our movement be expressed?—the overzealous advocate of "close organic contact with the proletarian struggle" will ask us, as indeed he does. The reply is manifold: we Social-Democrats will organise these nation-wide exposures; all questions raised by the agitation will he explained in a consistently Social-Democratic spirit, without any concessions to deliberate or undeliberate distortions of Marxism; the all-round political agitation will be conducted by a party which unites into one inseparable whole the assault on the government in the name of the entire people, the revolutionary training of the proletariat, and the safeguarding of its political independence, the guidance of the economic struggle of the working class, and the utilisation of all its spontaneous conflicts with its exploiters which rouse and bring into our camp increasing numbers of the proletariat.

But a most characteristic feature of Economism is its failure to understand this connection, more, this identity of the most pressing need of the proletariat (a comprehensive political education through the medium of political agitation and political exposures) with the need of the general democratic movement. This lack of understanding is expressed, not only in "Martynovite" phrases, but in the references to a supposedly class point of view identical in meaning with these phrases. Thus, the authors of the "Economist" letter in *Iskra*, No. 12, state*: "This basic drawback

* Lack of space has prevented us from replying in detail, in *Iskra*, to this letter, which is highly characteristic of the Economists. We were very glad at its appearance, for the allegations that *Iskra* did not maintain a consistent class point of view had reached us long before that from various sources, and we were waiting for an appropriate occasion, or for a formulated expression of this fashionable charge, to give our reply. Moreover, it is our habit to reply to attacks, not by defence, but by counter-attack.

of *Iskra* [overestimation of ideology] is also the cause of its inconsistency on the question of the attitude of Social-Democracy to the various social classes and tendencies. By theoretical reasoning [not by "the growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party"], *Iskra* solved the problem of the immediate transition to the struggle against absolutism. In all probability it senses the difficulty of such a task for the workers under the present state of affairs [not only senses, but knows full well that this task appears less difficult to the workers than to the "Economist" intellectuals with their nursemaid concern, for the workers are prepared to fight even for demands which, to use the language of the never-to-be-forgotten Martynov, do not "promise palpable results"] but lacking the patience to wait until the workers will have gathered sufficient forces for this struggle, *Iskra* begins to seek allies in the ranks of the liberals and intellectuals"....

Yes, we have indeed lost all "patience" "waiting" for the blessed time, long promised us by diverse "conciliators", when the Economists will have stopped charging the workers with *their own* backwardness and justifying their own lack of energy with allegations that the workers lack strength. We ask our Economists: What do they mean by "the gathering of working-class strength for the struggle"? Is it not evident that this means the political training of the workers, so that *all* the aspects of our vile autocracy are revealed to them? And is it not clear that *precisely for this work* we need "allies in the ranks of the liberals and intellectuals", who are prepared to join us in the exposure of the political attack on the Zemstvos, on the teachers, on the statisticians, on the students, etc.? Is this surprisingly "intricate mechanism" really so difficult to understand? Has not P. B. Axelrod constantly repeated since 1897 that "the task before the Russian Social-Democrats of acquiring adherents and direct and indirect allies among the non-proletarian classes will be solved principally and primarily by the character of the propagandist activities conducted among the proletariat itself"? But the Martynovs and the other Economists continue to imagine that "by economic struggle against the employers and the government" the workers must *first* gather strength (for trade-unionist politics) and *then*

"go over"—we presume from trade-unionist "training for activity"—to Social-Democratic activity!

"...In this quest," continue the Economists, "*Iskra* not infrequently departs from the class point of view, obscures class antagonisms, and puts into the forefront the common nature of the discontent with the government, although the causes and the degree of the discontent vary considerably among the 'allies'. Such, for example, is *Iskra*'s attitude towards the Zemstvo...." *Iskra*, it is alleged, "promises the nobles that are dissatisfied with the government's sops the assistance of the working class, but it does not say a word about the class antagonism that exists between these social strata." If the reader will turn to the article "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo" (*Iskra*, Nos. 2 and 4), to which, *in all probability*, the authors of the letter refer, he will find that they* deal with the attitude of the *government* towards the "mild agitation of the bureaucratic Zemstvo, which is based on the social-estates", and towards the "independent activity of even the propertied classes". The article states that the workers cannot look on indifferently while the government is waging a struggle against the Zemstvo, and the Zemstvos are called upon to stop making mild speeches and to speak firmly and resolutely when revolutionary Social-Democracy confronts the government in all its strength. What the authors of the letter do not agree with here is not clear. Do they think that the workers will "not understand" the phrases "propertied classes" and "bureaucratic Zemstvo based on the social-estates"? Do they think that *urging* the Zemstvo to abandon mild speeches and to speak firmly is "overestimating ideology"? Do they imagine the workers can "gather strength" for the struggle against the autocracy if they know nothing about the attitude of the autocracy towards the Zemstvo *as well*? All this too remains unknown. One thing alone is clear and that is that the authors of the letter have a very vague idea of what the political tasks of Social-Democracy are. This is revealed still more clearly by their remark: "Such, too, is *Iskra*'s attitude towards the student movement" (i.e., it also "obscures the class antag-

* In the interval *between* these articles there was one (*Iskra*, No. 3), which dealt especially with class antagonisms in the countryside. (See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*)

onisms"). Instead of calling on the workers to declare by means of public demonstrations that the real breeding-place of unbridled violence, disorder, and outrage is not the university youth but the Russian Government (*Iskra*, No. 2*), we ought probably to have inserted arguments in the spirit of *Rabochaya Mysl*! Such ideas were expressed by Social-Democrats in the autumn of 1901, after the events of February and March, on the eve of a fresh upsurge of the student movement, which reveals that even in this sphere the "spontaneous" protest against the autocracy is *outstripping* the conscious Social-Democratic leadership of the movement. The spontaneous striving of the workers to defend the students who are being assaulted by the police and the Cossacks surpasses the conscious activity of the Social-Democratic organisation!

"And yet in other articles," continue the authors of the letter, "*Iskra* sharply condemns all compromise and defends, for instance, the intolerant conduct of the Guesdists." We would advise those who are wont so conceitedly and frivolously to declare that the present disagreements among the Social-Democrats are unessential and do not justify a split, to ponder these words. Is it possible for people to work together in the same organisation, when some among them contend that we have done extremely little to explain the hostility of the autocracy to the various classes and to inform the workers of the opposition displayed by the various social strata to the autocracy, while others among them see in this clarification a "compromise"—evidently a compromise with the theory of "economic struggle against the employers and the government"?

We urged the necessity of carrying the class struggle into the rural districts in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the emancipation of the peasantry (issue No. 3** and spoke of the irreconcilability of the local government bodies and the autocracy in relation to Witte's secret Memorandum (No. 4). In connection with the new law we attacked the feudal landlords and the government which serves them (No. 8***) and we welcomed the illegal Zemstvo

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*
*** See present volume, pp. 95-100.—*Ed.*

congress. We urged the Zemstvo to pass over from abject petitions (No. 8*) to struggle. We encouraged the students, who had begun to understand the need for the political struggle, and to undertake this struggle (No. 3), while, at the same time, we lashed out at the "outrageous incomprehension" revealed by the adherents of the "purely student" movement, who called upon the students to abstain from participating in the street demonstrations (No. 3, in connection with the manifesto issued by the Executive Committee of the Moscow students on February 25). We exposed the "senseless dreams" and the "lying hypocrisy" of the cunning liberals of *Rossiya*[173] (No. 5), while pointing to the violent fury with which the government-gaoler persecuted "peaceful writers, aged professors, scientists, and well-known liberal Zemstvo members" (No. 5, "Police Raid on Literature"). We exposed the real significance of the programme of "state protection for the welfare of the workers" and welcomed the "valuable admission" that "it is better, by granting reforms from above, to forestall the demand for such reforms from below than to wait for those demands to be put forward" (No. 6**). We encouraged the protesting statisticians (No. 7) and censured the strike-breaking statisticians (No. 9). He who sees in these tactics an obscuring of the class-consciousness of the proletariat and *a compromise with liberalism* reveals his utter failure to understand the true significance of the programme of the *Credo* and *carries out that programme de facto*, however much he may repudiate it. For by *such an approach* he drags Social-Democracy towards the "economic struggle against the employers and the government" and *yields to liberalism*, abandons the task of actively intervening in *every* "liberal" issue and of determining *his own*, Social-Democratic, attitude towards this question.

F. ONCE MORE "SLANDERERS", ONCE MORE "MYSTIFIERS"

These polite expressions, as the reader will recall, belong to *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which in this way answers our charge that it "is indirectly preparing the ground for convert-

* See present volume, pp. 101-02.—*Ed.*
** See present volume, pp. 87-88.—*Ed.*

ing the working-class movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy". In its simplicity of heart *Rabocheye Dyelo* decided that this accusation was nothing more than a polemical sally: these malicious doctrinaires are bent on saying all sorts of unpleasant things about us, and, what can be more unpleasant than being an instrument of bourgeois democracy? And so they print in bold type a "refutation": "Nothing but downright slander", "mystification", "mummery" (*Two Conferences*, pp. 30, 31, 33). Like Jove, *Rabocheye Dyelo* (although bearing little resemblance to that deity) is wrathful because it is wrong, and proves by its hasty abuse that it is incapable of understanding its opponents' mode of reasoning. And yet, with only a little reflection it would have understood why *any* subservience to the spontaneity of the mass movement and *any* degrading of Social-Democratic politics to the level of trade-unionist politics mean preparing the ground for converting the working-class movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy. The spontaneous working-class movement is by itself able to create (and inevitably does create) only trade-unionism, and working-class trade-unionist politics is precisely working-class bourgeois politics. The fact that the working class participates in the political struggle, and even in the political revolution, does not in itself make its politics Social-Democratic politics. Will *Rabocheye Dyelo* make bold to deny this? Will it, at long last, publicly, plainly, and without equivocation explain how it understands the urgent questions of international and of Russian Social-Democracy? Hardly. It will never do anything of the kind, because it holds fast to the trick, which might be described as the "not here" method—"It's not me, it's not my horse, I'm not the driver. We are not Economists; *Rabochaya Mysl* does not stand for Economism; there is no Economism at all in Russia." This is a remarkably adroit and "political" trick, which suffers from the slight defect, however, that the publications practising it are usually nicknamed, "At your service, sir".

Rabocheye Dyelo imagines that bourgeois democracy in Russia is, in general, merely a "phantom" (*Two Conferences*, p. 32).* Happy people! Ostrich-like, they bury their heads

* There follows a reference to the "concrete Russian conditions which fatalistically impel the working-class movement on to the revo-

in the sand and imagine that everything around has disappeared. Liberal publicists who month after month proclaim to the world their triumph over the collapse and even the disappearance of Marxism; liberal newspapers (*S. Peterburgskiye Vedomosti*,[174] *Russkiye Vedomosti*, and many others) which encourage the liberals who bring to the workers the Brentano[175] conception of the class struggle and the trade-unionist conception of politics; the galaxy of critics of Marxism, whose real tendencies were so very well disclosed by the *Credo* and whose literary products alone circulate in Russia without let or hindrance; the revival of revolutionary *non*-Social-Democratic tendencies, particularly after the February and March events—all these, apparently, are just phantoms! All these have nothing at all to do with bourgeois democracy!

Rabocheye Dyelo and the authors of the Economist letter published in *Iskra*, No. 12, should "ponder over the reason why the events of the spring brought about such a revival of revolutionary non-Social-Democratic tendencies instead of increasing the authority and the prestige of Social-Democracy".

The reason lies in the fact that we failed to cope with our tasks. The masses of the workers proved to be more active than we. We lacked adequately trained revolutionary leaders and organisers possessed of a thorough knowledge of the mood prevailing among all the opposition strata and able to head the movement, to turn a spontaneous demonstration into a political one, broaden its political character, etc. Under such circumstances, our backwardness will inevitably be utilised by the more mobile and more energetic non-Social-Democratic revolutionaries, and the workers, however energetically and self-sacrificingly they may fight the police and the troops, however revolutionary their actions may be, will prove to be merely a force support-

lutionary path". But these people refuse to understand that the revolutionary path of the working-class movement might not be a Social-Democratic path. When absolutism reigned, the entire West-European bourgeoisie "impelled", deliberately impelled, the workers on to the path of revolution. We Social-Democrats, however, cannot be satisfied with that. And if we, by any means whatever, degrade Social-Democratic politics to the level of spontaneous trade-unionist politics, we thereby play into the hands of bourgeois democracy.

ing those revolutionaries, the rearguard of bourgeois democracy, and not the Social-Democratic vanguard. Let us take, for example, the German Social-Democrats, whose weak aspects alone our Economists desire to emulate. Why is there *not a single* political event in Germany that does not add to the authority and prestige of Social-Democracy? Because Social-Democracy is always found to be in advance of all others in furnishing the most revolutionary appraisal of every given event and in championing every protest against tyranny. It does not lull itself with arguments that the economic struggle brings the workers to realise that they have no political rights and that the concrete conditions unavoidably impel the working-class movement on to the path of revolution. It intervenes in every sphere and in every question of social and political life; in the matter of Wilhelm's refusal to endorse a bourgeois progressist as city mayor (our Economists have not yet managed to educate the Germans to the understanding that such an act is, in fact, a compromise with liberalism!); in the matter of the law against "obscene" publications and pictures; in the matter of governmental influence on the election of professors, etc., etc. Everywhere the Social-Democrats are found in the forefront, rousing political discontent among all classes, rousing the sluggards, stimulating the laggards, and providing a wealth of material for the development of the political consciousness and the political activity of the proletariat. As a result, even the avowed enemies of socialism are filled with respect for this advanced political fighter, and not infrequently an important document from bourgeois, and even from bureaucratic and Court circles, makes its way by some miraculous means into the editorial office of *Vorwärts*.

This, then, is the resolution of the seeming "contradiction" that surpasses *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s powers of understanding to such an extent that it can only throw up its hands and cry, "Mummery!" Indeed, just think of it: We, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, regard the *mass* working-class movement as the *corner-stone* (and say so in bold type!); we warn all and sundry against belittling the significance of the element of spontaneity; we desire to lend the economic struggle itself—*itself*—a political character; we desire to maintain close and organic contact

with the proletarian struggle. And yet we are told that we are preparing the ground for the conversion of the working-class movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy! And who are they that presume to say this? People who "compromise" with liberalism by intervening in every "liberal" issue (what a gross misunderstanding of "organic contact with the proletarian struggle"!), by devoting so much attention to the students and even (oh horror!) to the Zemstvos! People who in general wish to devote a greater percentage (compared with the Economists) of their efforts to activity among non-proletarian classes of the population! What is this but "mummery"?

Poor *Rabocheye Dyelo*! Will it ever find the solution to this perplexing puzzle?

IV

THE PRIMITIVENESS OF THE ECONOMISTS AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES

Rabocheye Dyelo's assertions, which we have analysed, that the economic struggle is the most widely applicable means of political agitation and that our task now is to lend the economic struggle itself a political character, etc., express a narrow view, not only of our political, but also of our *organisational* tasks. The "economic struggle against the employers and the government" does not at all require an All-Russian centralised organisation, and hence this struggle can never give rise to such an organisation as will combine, in one general assault, all the manifestations of political opposition, protest, and indignation, an organisation that will consist of professional revolutionaries and be led by the real political leaders of the entire people. This stands to reason. The character of any organisation is naturally and inevitably determined by the content of its activity. Consequently, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, by the assertions analysed above, sanctifies and legitimises not only narrowness of political activity, but also of organisational work. In this case, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, as always, proves itself an organ whose consciousness yields to spontaneity. Yet subservience to spontaneously developing forms of organisation,

failure to realise the narrowness and primitiveness of our organisational work, of our "handicraft" methods in this most important sphere, failure to realise this, I say, is a veritable ailment from which our movement suffers. It is not an ailment that comes with decline, but one, of course, that comes with growth. It is however at the present time, when the wave of spontaneous indignation, as it were, is sweeping over us, leaders and organisers of the movement, that an irreconcilable struggle must be waged against all defence of backwardness, against any legitimation of narrowness in this matter. It is particularly necessary to arouse in all who participate in practical work, or are preparing to take up that work, discontent with the *amateurism* prevailing among us and an unshakable determination to rid ourselves of it.

A. WHAT IS PRIMITIVENESS?

We shall try to answer this question by giving a brief description of the activity of a typical Social-Democratic study circle of the period 1894-1901. We have noted that the entire student youth of the period was absorbed in Marxism. Of course, these students were not only, or even not so much, interested in Marxism as a theory; they were interested in it as an answer to the question, "What is to be done?", as a call to take the field against the enemy. These new warriors marched to battle with astonishingly primitive equipment and training. In a vast number of cases they had almost no equipment and absolutely no training. They marched to war like peasants from the plough, armed only with clubs. A students' circle establishes contacts with workers and sets to work, without any connection with the old members of the movement, without any connection with study circles in other districts, or even in other parts of the same city (or in other educational institutions), without any organisation of the various divisions of revolutionary work, without any systematic plan of activity covering any length of time. The circle gradually expands its propaganda and agitation; by its activities it wins the sympathies of fairly large sections of workers and of a certain section of the educated strata, which provide it with money and from among

whom the "committee" recruits new groups of young people. The attractive power of the committee (or League of Struggle) grows, its sphere of activity becomes wider, and the committee expands this activity quite spontaneously; the very people who a year or a few months previously spoke at the students' circle gatherings and discussed the question, "Whither?", who established and maintained contacts with the workers and wrote and published leaflets, now, establish contacts with other groups of revolutionaries, procure literature, set to work to publish a local newspaper, begin to talk of organising a demonstration, and finally turn to open warfare (which may, according to circumstances, take the form of issuing the first agitational leaflet or the first issue of a newspaper, or of organising the first demonstration). Usually the initiation of such actions ends in an immediate and complete fiasco. Immediate and complete, because this open warfare was not the result of a systematic and carefully thought-out and gradually prepared plan for a prolonged and stubborn struggle, but simply the result of the spontaneous growth of traditional study circle work; because, naturally, the police, in almost every case, knew the principal leaders of the local movement, since they had already "gained a reputation" for themselves in their student days, and the police waited only for the right moment to make their raid. They deliberately allowed the study circle sufficient time to develop its work so that they might, obtain a palpable *corpus delicti*, and they always permitted several of the persons known to them to remain at liberty "for breeding" (which, as far as I know, is the technical term used both by our people and by the gendarmes). One cannot help comparing this kind of warfare with that conducted by a mass of peasants, armed with clubs, against modern troops. And one can only wonder at the vitality of the movement which expanded, grew, and scored victories despite the total lack of training on the part of the fighters. True, from the historical point of view, the primitiveness of equipment was not only inevitable at first, but *even legitimate* as one of the conditions for the wide recruiting of fighters, but as soon as serious war operations began (and they began in fact with the strikes in the summer of 1896), the defects in our fighting organisations made themselves felt to an ever-increasing

degree. The government, at first thrown into confusion and committing a number of blunders (e.g., its appeal to the public describing the misdeeds of the socialists, or the banishment of workers from the capitals to provincial industrial centres), very soon adapted itself to the new conditions of the struggle and managed to deploy well its perfectly equipped detachments of *agents provocateurs*, spies, and gendarmes. Raids became so frequent, affected such a vast number of people, and cleared out the local study circles so thoroughly that the masses of the workers lost literally all their leaders, the movement assumed an amazingly sporadic character, and it became utterly impossible to establish continuity and coherence in the work. The terrible dispersion of the local leaders; the fortuitous character of the study circle memberships; the lack of training in, and the narrow outlook on, theoretical, political, and organisational questions were all the inevitable result of the conditions described above. Things have reached such a pass that in several places the workers, because of our lack of self-restraint and the inability to maintain secrecy, begin to lose faith in the intellectuals and to avoid them; the intellectuals, they say, are much too careless and cause police raids!

Anyone who has the slightest knowledge of the movement is aware that all thinking Social-Democrats have at last begun to regard these amateurish methods as a disease. In order that the reader who is not acquainted with the movement may have no grounds for thinking that we are "inventing" a special stage or special disease of the movement, we shall refer once again to the witness we have quoted. We trust we shall be forgiven for the length of the passage:

"While the gradual transition to more extensive practical activity," writes B—v in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 6, "a transition that is directly dependent on the general transitional period through which the Russian working-class movement is now passing, is a characteristic feature, ... there is, however, another, no less interesting feature in the general mechanism of the Russian workers' revolution. We refer to *the general lack of revolutionary forces fit for action*,* which is felt not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Russia. With the general revival of the working-class movement, with the general development of the working masses, with the growing frequency of strikes, with the increasingly open mass struggle of the workers,

* All italics ours.

and with the intensified government persecution, arrests, deportation, and exile, this *lack of highly skilled revolutionary forces is becoming more and more marked* and, without a doubt, *cannot but affect the depth and the general character of the movement*. Many strikes take place without any strong and direct influence upon them by the revolutionary organisations.... A shortage of agitational leaflets and illegal literature is felt.... The workers' study circles are left without agitators.... In addition, there is a constant dearth of funds. In a word, *the growth of the working-class movement is outstripping the growth and development of the revolutionary organisations*. The numerical strength of the active revolutionaries is too small to enable them to concentrate in their own hands the influence exercised upon the whole mass of discontented workers, or to give this discontent even a shadow of coherence and organisation.... The separate study circles, the separate revolutionaries, scattered, uncombined, do not represent a single, strong, and disciplined organisation with proportionately developed parts...." Admitting that the immediate organisation of fresh study circles to replace those that have been broken up "merely proves the vitality of the movement ... but does not prove the existence of an adequate number of adequately prepared revolutionary workers", the author concludes: "The lack of practical training among the St. Petersburg revolutionaries is seen in the results of their work. The recent trials, especially that of the Self-Emancipation Group and the Labour-against-Capital group,[176] clearly showed that the young agitator, lacking a detailed knowledge of working class conditions and, consequently, of the conditions under which agitation can be carried on in a given factory, ignorant of the principles of secrecy, and understanding only the general principles of Social-Democracy [if he does] is able to carry on his work for perhaps four, five, or six months. Then come arrests, which frequently lead to the break-up of the entire organisation, or at all events, of part of it. The question arises, therefore, can the group conduct successful activity if its existence is measured by months?... Obviously, the defects of the existing organisations cannot be wholly ascribed to the transitional period.... Obviously, the numerical, and above all the qualitative, make-up of the functioning organisations is no small factor, and the first task our Social-Democrats must undertake ... is that of *effectively combining the organisations and making a strict selection of their membership*."

B. PRIMITIVENESS AND ECONOMISM

We must now deal with a question that has undoubtedly come to the mind of every reader. Can a connection be established between primitiveness as growing pains that affect the *whole* movement, and Economism, which is *one* of the currents in Russian Social-Democracy? We think that it can. Lack of practical training, of ability to carry on organisational work is certainly common *to us all*, includ-

ing those who have from the very outset unswervingly stood for revolutionary Marxism. Of course, were it only lack of practical training, no one could blame the practical workers. But the term "primitiveness" embraces something more than lack of training; it denotes a narrow scope of revolutionary work generally, failure to understand that a good organisation of revolutionaries cannot be built on the basis of such narrow activity, and lastly—and this is the main thing—attempts to justify this narrowness and to elevate it to a special "theory", i.e., subservience to spontaneity on this question too. Once such attempts were revealed, it became clear that primitiveness is connected with Economism and that we shall never rid ourselves of this narrowness of our organisational activity until we rid ourselves of Economism generally (i.e., the narrow conception of Marxist theory, as well as of the role of Social-Democracy and of its political tasks). These attempts manifested themselves in a twofold direction. Some began to say that the working masses themselves have not yet advanced the broad and militant political tasks which the revolutionaries are attempting to "impose" on them; that they must continue to struggle for *immediate* political demands, to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers and the government"* (and, naturally, corresponding to this struggle which is "accessible" to the mass movement there must be an organisation that will be "accessible" to the most untrained youth). Others, far removed from any theory of "gradualness", said that it is possible and necessary to "bring about a political revolution", but that this does not require building a strong organisation of revolutionaries to train the proletariat in steadfast and stubborn struggle. All we need do is to snatch up our old friend, the "accessible" cudgel. To drop metaphor, it means that we must organise a general strike,** or that we must stimulate the "spiritless" progress of the working-class movement by means of "excitative terror"***

* *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, especially the *Reply* to Plekhanov.

** See "Who Will Bring About the Political Revolution?" in the collection published in Russia, entitled *The Proletarian Struggle*. Re-issued by the Kiev Committee.

*** *Regeneration of Revolutionism* and the journal *Svoboda*.

Both these trends, the opportunists and the "revolutionists", bow to the prevailing amateurism; neither believes that it can be eliminated, neither understands our primary and imperative practical task to establish *an organisation of revolutionaries* capable of lending energy, stability, and continuity to the political struggle.

We have quoted the words of B—v: "The growth of the working-class movement is outstripping the growth and development of the revolutionary organisations." This "valuable remark of a close observer" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*'s comment on B—v's article) has a twofold value for us. It shows that we were right in our opinion that the principal cause of the present crisis in Russian Social-Democracy is *the lag of the leaders* ("ideologists", revolutionaries, Social-Democrats) behind *the spontaneous upsurge of the masses*. It shows that all the arguments advanced by the authors of the Economist letter (in *Iskra*, No. 12), by Krichevsky and by Martynov, as to the danger of belittling the significance of the spontaneous element, of the drab everyday struggle, as to tactics-as-process, etc., are nothing more than a glorification and a defence of primitiveness. These people who cannot pronounce the word "theoretician" without a sneer, who describe their genuflections to common lack of training and backwardness as a "sense for the realities of life", reveal in practice a failure to understand our most imperative *practical* tasks. To laggards they shout: Keep in step! Don't run ahead! To people suffering from a lack of energy and initiative in organisational work, from a lack of "plans" for wide and bold activity, they prate about "tactics-as-process"! The worst sin we commit is that we *degrade* our political *and organisational* tasks to the level of the immediate, "palpable", "concrete" interests of the everyday economic struggle; yet they keep singing to us the same refrain: Lend the economic struggle itself a political character! We repeat: this kind of thing displays as much "sense for the realities of life" as was displayed by the hero in the popular fable who cried out to a passing funeral procession, "Many happy returns of the day!"

Recall the matchless, truly "Nartsis-like" superciliousness with which these wiseacres lectured Plekhanov on the "workers' *circles* generally" (*sic*!) being "unable to cope

with political tasks in the real and *practical* sense of the word, i.e., in the sense of the expedient and successful *practical* struggle for political demands" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*'s *Reply*, p. 24). There are circles and circles, gentlemen! Circles of "amateurs" are not, of course, capable of coping with political tasks so long as they have not become aware of their amateurism and do not abandon it. If, besides this, these amateurs are enamoured of their primitive methods, and insist on writing the word "practical" in italics, and imagine that being practical demands that one's tasks be reduced to the level of understanding of the most backward strata of the masses, then they are hopeless amateurs and, of course, certainly cannot *in general cope with any political tasks*. But a circle of leaders, of the type of Alexeyev and Myshkin, of Khalturin and Zhelyabov, is capable of coping with political tasks in the genuine and most practical sense of the term, for the reason and to the extent that their impassioned propaganda meets with response among the spontaneously awakening masses, and their sparkling energy is answered and supported by the energy of the revolutionary class. Plekhanov was profoundly right, not only in pointing to this revolutionary class and proving that its spontaneous awakening was inevitable, but in setting even the "workers' circles" a great and lofty political task. But you refer to the mass movement that has sprung up since that time in order *to degrade* this task, *to curtail* the energy and scope of activity of the "workers' circles". If you are not amateurs enamoured of your primitive methods, what are you then? You boast that you are practical, but you fail to see what every Russian practical worker knows, namely, the miracles that the energy, not only of a circle, but even of an individual person is able to perform in the revolutionary cause. Or do you think that our movement cannot produce leaders like those of the seventies? If so, why do you think so? Because we lack training? But we are training ourselves, we will go on training ourselves, and we will be trained! Unfortunately it is true that the surface of the stagnant waters of the "economic struggle against the employers and the government" is overgrown with fungus; people have appeared among us who kneel in prayer to spontaneity, gazing with awe (to take an expression from

Plekhanov) upon the "posterior" of the Russian proletariat. But we will get rid of this fungus. The time has come when Russian revolutionaries, guided by a genuinely revolutionary theory, relying upon the genuinely revolutionary and spontaneously awakening class, can at last—at long last!—rise to full stature in all their giant strength. All that is required is for the masses of our practical workers, and the still larger masses of those who dreamed of practical work when they were still at school, to pour scorn and ridicule upon any suggestion that may be made to degrade our political tasks and to restrict the scope of our organisational work. And we will achieve that, rest assured, gentlemen!

In the article "Where To Begin", I wrote in opposition to *Rabocheye Dyelo*: "The tactics of agitation in relation to some special question, or the tactics with regard to some detail of party organisation may be changed in twenty-four hours; but only people devoid of all principle are capable of changing, in twenty-four hours, or, for that matter, in twenty-four months, their view on the necessity—in general, constantly, and absolutely—of an organisation of struggle and of political agitation among the masses."* To this *Rabocheye Dyelo* replied: "This, the only one of *Iskra*'s charges that makes a pretence of being based on facts, is totally without foundation. Readers of *Rabocheye Dyelo* know very well that from the outset we not only called for political agitation, without waiting for the appearance of *Iskra* ... [saying at the same time that not only the workers' study circles, "but also the mass working-class movement could not regard as its first political task the overthrow of absolutism", but only the struggle for immediate political demands, and that "the masses begin to understand immediate political demands after one, or at all events, after several strikes"],... but that with our publications which we furnished from abroad for the comrades working in Russia, we provided the *only* Social-Democratic political and agitational material ... [and in this sole material you not only based the widest political agitation exclusively on the economic struggle, but you even went to the extent of claiming that this restricted agitation was the "most widely

* See present volume, p. 18.—*Ed.*

applicable". And do you not observe, gentlemen, that your own argument—that this was the *only* material provided—proves the necessity for *Iskra*'s appearance, and its struggle against *Rabocheye Dyelo*?]. ... On the other hand, our publishing activity actually prepared the ground for the tactical unity of the Party ... [unity in the conviction that tactics is a process of growth of Party tasks that grow together with the Party? A precious unity indeed!] ... and by that rendered possible the creation of a 'militant organisation' for which the Union Abroad did all that an organisation abroad could do" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 15). A vain attempt at evasion! I would never dream of denying that you did all you possibly could. I have asserted and assert now that the *limits* of what is "possible" for you to do are restricted by the narrowness of your outlook. It is ridiculous to talk of a "militant organisation" to fight for "immediate political demands", or to conduct the economic struggle against the employers and the government".

But if the reader wishes to see the pearls of "Economist" infatuation with amateurism, he must, of course, turn from the eclectic and vacillating *Rabocheye Dyelo* to the consistent and determined *Rabochaya Mysl*. In its *Separate Supplement*, p. 13, R. M. wrote: "Now two words about the so-called revolutionary intelligentsia proper. True, on more than one occasion it has proved itself prepared 'to enter into determined battle with tsarism'. The unfortunate thing, however, is that our revolutionary intelligentsia, ruthlessly persecuted by the political police, imagined the struggle against the political police to be the political struggle against the autocracy. That is why, to this day, it cannot understand 'where the forces for the struggle against the autocracy are to be obtained'."

Truly matchless is the lofty contempt for the struggle against the police displayed by this worshipper (in the worst sense of the word) of the *spontaneous* movement! He is prepared *to justify* our inability to organise secret activity by the argument that with the spontaneous mass movement it is not at all important for us to struggle against the political police! Very few people indeed would subscribe to this appalling conclusion; to such an extent have our deficiencies in revolutionary organisations become a matter of acute

importance. But if Martynov, for example, refuses to subscribe to this, it will only be because he is unable, or lacks the courage, to think out his ideas to their logical conclusion. Indeed, does the "task" of advancing concrete demands by the masses, demands that promise palpable results, call for special efforts to create a stable, centralised, militant organisation of revolutionaries? Cannot such a "task" be carried out even by masses that do not "struggle against the political police" at all? Could this task, moreover, be fulfilled if, in addition to the few leaders, it were not undertaken by such workers (the overwhelming majority) as are quite *incapable* of "struggling against the political police"? Such workers, average people of the masses, are capable of displaying enormous energy and self-sacrifice in strikes and in street battles with the police and the troops, and are capable (in fact, are alone capable) of *determining* the outcome of our entire movement—but the struggle against the *political* police requires special qualities; it requires *professional* revolutionaries. And we must see to it, not only that the masses "advance" concrete demands, but that the masses of the workers "advance" an increasing number of such professional revolutionaries. Thus, we have reached the question of the relation between an organisation of professional revolutionaries and the labour movement pure and simple. Although this question has found little reflection in literature, it has greatly engaged us "politicians" in conversations and polemics with comrades who gravitate more or less towards Economism. It is a question meriting special treatment. But before taking it up, let us offer one further quotation by way of illustrating our thesis on the connection between primitiveness and Economism.

In his *Reply*, Mr. N. N.[177] wrote: "The Emancipation of Labour group demands direct struggle against the government without first considering where the material forces for this struggle are to be obtained, and without indicating *the path of the struggle*." Emphasising the last words, the author adds the following footnote to the word "path": "This cannot be explained by purposes of secrecy, because the programme does not refer to a plot but to *a mass movement*. And the masses cannot proceed by secret paths. Can we conceive of a secret strike? Can we conceive of secret

demonstrations and petitions?" (*Vademecum*, p. 59.) Thus, the author comes quite close to the question of the "material forces" (organisers of strikes and demonstrations) and to the "paths" of the struggle, but, nevertheless, is still in a state of consternation, because he "worships" the mass movement, i.e., he regards it as something that *relieves* us of the necessity of conducting revolutionary activity and not as something that should encourage us and stimulate our revolutionary activity. It is impossible for a strike to remain a secret to those participating in it and to those immediately associated with it, but it may (and in the majority of cases does) remain a "secret" to the masses of the Russian workers, because the government takes care to cut all communication with the strikers, to prevent all news of strikes from spreading. Here indeed is where a special "struggle against the political police" is required, a struggle that can never be conducted actively by such large masses as take part in strikes. This struggle must be organised, according to "all the rules of the art", by people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity. The fact that the masses are spontaneously being drawn into the movement does not make the organisation of this struggle *less necessary*. On the contrary, it makes it *more necessary*; for we socialists would be failing in our direct duty to the masses if we did not prevent the police from making a secret of every strike and every demonstration (and if we did not ourselves from time to time secretly prepare strikes and demonstrations). And we *will succeed in doing this*, because the spontaneously awakening masses will *also produce* increasing, numbers of "professional revolutionaries" *from their own ranks* (that is, if we do not take it into our heads to advise the workers to keep on marking time).

C. ORGANISATION OF WORKERS AND ORGANISATION OF REVOLUTIONARIES

It is only natural to expect that for a Social-Democrat whose conception of the political struggle coincides with the conception of the "economic struggle against the employers and the government", the "organisation of revolutionaries" will more or less coincide with the "organisation of

workers". This, in fact, is what actually happens; so that when we speak of organisation, we literally speak in different tongues. I vividly recall, for example, a conversation I once had with a fairly consistent Economist, with whom I had not been previously acquainted. We were discussing the pamphlet, *Who Will Bring About the Political Revolution?* and were soon of a mind that its principal defect was its ignoring of the question of organisation. We had begun to assume full agreement between us; but, as the conversation proceeded, it became evident that we were talking of different things. My interlocutor accused the author of ignoring strike funds, mutual benefit societies, etc., whereas I had in mind an organisation of revolutionaries as an essential factor in "bringing about" the political revolution. As soon as the disagreement became clear, there was hardly, as I remember, a single question of principle upon which I was in agreement with the Economist!

What was the source of our disagreement? It was the fact that on questions both of organisation and of politics the Economists are forever lapsing from Social-Democracy into trade-unionism. The political struggle of Social-Democracy is far more extensive and complex than the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government. Similarly (indeed for that reason), the organisation of the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party must inevitably be of *a kind different* from the organisation of the workers designed for this struggle. The workers' organisation must in the first place be a trade-union organisation; secondly, it must be as broad as possible; and thirdly, it must be as public as conditions will allow (here, and further on, of course, I refer only to absolutist Russia). On the other hand, the organisation of the revolutionaries must consist first and foremost of people who make revolutionary activity their profession (for which reason I speak of the organisation of *revolutionaries*, meaning revolutionary Social-Democrats). In view of this common characteristic of the members of such an organisation, *all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals*, not to speak of distinctions of trade and profession, in both categories, *must be effaced*. Such an organisation must perforce not be very extensive

and must be as secret as possible. Let us examine this threefold distinction.

In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade-union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers' associations, since *all* workers' associations and *all* study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers' economic struggle—the strike—is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence. Conditions in our country, therefore, on the one hand, strongly "impel" the workers engaged in economic struggle to concern themselves with political questions, and, on the other, they "impel" Social-Democrats to confound trade-unionism with Social-Democracy (and our Krichevskys, Martynovs, and Co., while diligently discussing the first kind of "impulsion", fail to notice the second). Indeed, picture to yourselves people who are immersed ninety-nine per cent in "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". Some of them will never, during the *entire* course of their activity (from four to six months), be impelled to think of the need for a more complex organisation of revolutionaries. Others, perhaps, will come across the fairly widely distributed Bernsteinian literature, from which they will become convinced of the profound importance of the forward movement of "the drab everyday struggle". Still others will be carried away, perhaps, by the seductive idea of showing the world a new example of "close and organic contact with the proletarian struggle"—contact between the trade-union and the Social-Democratic movements. Such people may argue that the later a country enters the arena of capitalism and, consequently, of the

working-class movement, the more the socialists in that country may take part in, and support, the trade-union movement, and the less the reason for the existence of non-Social-Democratic trade unions. So far the argument is fully correct; unfortunately, however, some go beyond that and dream of a complete fusion of Social-Democracy with trade-unionism. We shall soon see, from the example of the Rules of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, what a harmful effect such dreams have upon our plans of organisation.

The workers' organisations for the economic struggle should be trade-union organisations. Every Social-Democratic worker should as far as possible assist and actively work in these organisations. But, while this is true, it is certainly not in our interest to demand that only Social-Democrats should be eligible for membership in the "trade" unions, since that would only narrow the scope of our influence upon the masses. Let every worker who understands the need to unite for the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions. The very aim of the trade unions would be impossible of achievement, if they did not unite all who have attained at least this elementary degree of understanding, if they were not very *broad* organisations. The broader these organisations, the broader will be our influence over them—an influence due, not only to the "spontaneous" development of the economic struggle, but to the direct and conscious effort of the socialist trade-union members to influence their comrades. But a broad organisation cannot apply methods of strict secrecy (since this demands far greater training than is required for the economic struggle). How is the contradiction between the need for a large membership and the need for strictly secret methods to be reconciled? How are we to make the trade unions as public as possible? Generally speaking, there can be only two ways to this end: either the trade unions become legalised (in some countries this preceded the legalisation of the socialist and political unions), or the organisation is kept secret, but so "free" and amorphous, *lose** as the Germans say, that the need for secret methods becomes almost negligible as far as the bulk of the members is concerned.

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* *Lose* (German)—"loose".—*Ed.*

The legalisation of non-socialist and non-political labour unions in Russia has begun, and there is no doubt that every advance made by our rapidly growing Social-Democratic working-class movement will multiply and encourage attempts at legalisation—attempts proceeding for the most part from supporters of the existing order, but partly also from the workers themselves and from liberal intellectuals. The banner of legality has already been hoisted by the Vasilyevs and the Zubatovs. Support has been promised and rendered by the Ozerovs and the Wormses,[178] and followers of the new tendency are now to be found among the workers. Henceforth, we cannot but reckon with this tendency. How we are to reckon with it, on this there can be no two opinions among Social-Democrats. We must steadfastly expose any part played in this movement by the Zubatovs and the Vasilyeys, the gendarmes and the priests, and explain their real intentions to the workers. We must also expose all the conciliatory, "harmonious" notes that will be heard in the speeches of liberal politicians at legal meetings of the workers, irrespective of whether the speeches are motivated by an earnest conviction of the desirability of peaceful class collaboration, by a desire to curry favour with the powers that be, or whether they are simply the result of clumsiness. Lastly, we must warn the workers against the traps often set by the police, who at such open meetings and permitted societies spy out the "fiery ones" and try to make use of legal organisations to plant their *agents provocateurs* in the illegal organisations.

Doing all this does not at all mean forgetting that *in the long run* the legalisation of the working-class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs. On the contrary, it is precisely our campaign of exposure that will help us to separate the tares from the wheat. What the tares are, we have already indicated. By the wheat we mean attracting the attention of ever larger numbers, including the most backward sections, of the workers to social and political questions, and freeing ourselves, the revolutionaries, from functions that are essentially legal (the distribution of legal books, mutual aid, etc.), the development of which will inevitably provide us with an increasing quantity of material for agitation. In this sense, we may, and should,

say to the Zubatovs and the Ozerovs: Keep at it, gentlemen, do your best! Whenever you place a trap in the path of the workers (either by way of direct provocation, or by the "honest" demoralisation of the workers with the aid of "Struve-ism") we will see to it that you are exposed. But whenever you take a real step forward, though it be the most "timid zigzag", we will say: Please continue! And the only step that can be a real step forward is a real, if small, extension of the workers' field of action. Every such extension will be to our advantage and will help to hasten the advent of legal societies of the kind in which it will not be *agents provocateurs* who are detecting socialists, but socialists who are gaining adherents. In a word, our task is to fight the tares. It is not our business to grow wheat in flower-pots. By pulling up the tares, we clear the soil for the wheat. And while the Afanasy Ivanoviches and Pulkheria Ivanovnas[179] are tending their flower-pot crops, we must prepare the reapers, not only to cut down the tares of today, but to reap the wheat of tomorrow.*

Thus, *we* cannot by means of legalisation *solve* the problem of creating a trade-union organisation that will be as little secret and as extensive as possible (but we should be extremely glad if the Zubatovs and the Ozerovs disclosed to us even a partial opportunity for such a solution—to this end, however, we must strenuously combat them). There remain secret trade-union organisations, and *we must* give all possible assistance to the workers who (as we definitely know) are adopting this course. Trade-union organisations, not only can be of tremendous value in developing and consolidating the economic struggle, but can also become

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* *Iskra*'s campaign against the tares evoked the following angry outburst from *Rabocheye Dyelo*: "For *Iskra*, the signs of the times lie not so much in great events [of the spring], as in the miserable attempts of the agents of Zubatov to 'legalise' the working-class movement. It fails to see that these facts tell against it; for they testify that the working-class movement has assumed menacing proportions in the eyes of the government" (*Two Conferences*, p. 27). For all this we have to blame the "dogmatism" of the orthodox who "turn a deaf ear to the imperative demands of life". They obstinately refuse to see the yard-high wheat and are combating inch-high tares! Does this not reveal a "distorted sense of perspective in regard to the Russian working-class movement" (ibid., p. 27)?

a very important auxiliary to political agitation and revolutionary organisation. In order to achieve this purpose, and in order to guide the nascent trade-union movement in the channels desired by Social-Democracy, we must first understand clearly the absurdity of the plan of organisation the St. Petersburg Economists have been nursing for nearly five years. That plan is set forth in the "Rules for a Workers' Mutual Benefit Fund" of July 1897 ("*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10, p. 46, taken from *Rabochaya Mysl*, No. 1), as well as in the "Rules for a Trade-Union Workers' Organisation" of October 1900 (special leaflet printed in St. Petersburg and referred to in *Iskra*, No. 1). Both these sets of rules have one main shortcoming: they set up the broad workers' organisation in a rigidly specified structure and confound it with the organisation of revolutionaries. Let us take the last-mentioned set of rules, since it is drawn up in greater detail. The body consists of *fifty-two* paragraphs. Twenty-three deal with the structure, the method of functioning, and the competence of the "workers' circles", which are to be organised in every factory ("a maximum of ten persons") and which elect "central (factory) groups". "The central group," says paragraph 2, "observes all that goes on in its factory or workshop and keeps a record of events." "The central group presents to subscribers a monthly financial account" (par. 17), etc. Ten paragraphs are devoted to the "district organisation", and nineteen to the highly complex interconnection between the Committee of the Workers' Organisation and the Committee of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle (elected representatives of each district and of the "executive groups"—"groups of propagandists, groups for maintaining contact with the provinces, and with the organisation abroad, groups for managing stores, publications, and funds").

Social-Democracy = "executive groups" in relation to the economic struggle of the workers! It would be difficult to show more glaringly how the Economists' ideas deviate from Social-Democracy to trade-unionism, and how alien to them is any idea that a Social-Democrat must concern himself first and foremost with an organisation of revolutionaries capable of guiding the *entire* proletarian struggle for emancipation. To talk of "the political emancipation of the

working class" and of the struggle against "tsarist despotism", and at the same time to draft rules like these, means to have no idea whatsoever of the real political tasks of Social-Democracy. Not one of the fifty or so paragraphs reveals even a glimmer of understanding that it is necessary to conduct the widest possible political agitation among the masses, an agitation highlighting every aspect of Russian absolutism and the specific features of the various social classes in Russia. Rules like these are of no use even for the achievement of trade-union, let alone political, aims, since trade unions are organised by *trades*, of which no mention is made.

But most characteristic, perhaps, is the amazing top-heaviness of the whole "system", which attempts to bind each single factory and its "committee" by a permanent string of uniform and ludicrously petty rules and a three-stage system of election. Hemmed in by the narrow outlook of Economism, the mind is lost in details that positively reek of red tape and bureaucracy. In practice, of course, three-fourths of the clauses are never applied; on the other hand, a "secret" organisation of this kind, with its central group in each factory, makes it very easy for the gendarmes to carry out raids on a vast scale. The Polish comrades have passed through a similar phase in their movement, with everybody enthusiastic about the extensive organisation of workers' benefit funds; but they very quickly abandoned this idea when they saw that such organisations only provided rich harvests for the gendarmes. If we have in mind broad workers' organisations, and not widespread arrests, if we do not want to provide satisfaction to the gendarmes, we must see to it that these organisations remain without any rigid formal structure. But will they be able to function in that case?

Let us see what the functions are: "... To observe all that goes on in the factory and keep a record of events" (par. 2 of the Rules). Do we really require a formally established group for this purpose? Could not the purpose be better served by correspondence conducted in the illegal papers without the setting up of special groups? "... To lead the struggles of the workers for the improvement of their workshop conditions" (par. 3). This, too, requires no set organisational

form. Any sensible agitator can in the course of ordinary conversation gather what the demands of the workers are and transmit them to a narrow—not a broad—organisation of revolutionaries for expression in a leaflet. "...To organise a fund ... to which subscriptions of two kopeks per ruble* should be made" (par. 9)—and then to present to subscribers a monthly financial account (par. 17), to expel members who fail to pay their contributions (par. 10), and so forth. Why, this is a very paradise for the police; for nothing would be easier for them than to penetrate into such a secrecy of a "central factory fund", confiscate the money, and arrest the best people. Would it not be simpler to issue one-kopek or two-kopek coupons bearing the official stamp of a well-known (very narrow and very secret) organisation, or to make collections without coupons of any kind and to print reports in a certain agreed code in an illegal paper? The object would thereby be attained, but it would be a hundred times more difficult for the gendarmes to pick up clues.

I could go on analysing the Rules, but I think that what has been said will suffice. A small, compact core of the most reliable, experienced, and hardened workers, with responsible representatives in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organisation of revolutionaries, can, with the widest support of the masses and without any formal organisation, perform *all* the functions of a trade-union organisation, in a manner, moreover, desirable to Social-Democracy. Only in this way can we secure the *consolidation* and development of a *Social-Democratic* trade-union movement, despite all the gendarmes.

It may be objected that an organisation which is so *lose* that it is not even definitely formed, and which has not even an enrolled and registered membership, cannot be called an organisation at all. Perhaps so. Not the name is important. What is important is that this "organisation without members" shall do everything that is required, and from the very outset ensure a solid connection between our future trade unions and socialism. Only an incorrigible utopian would have a *broad* organisation of workers, with elections, reports, universal suffrage, etc., under the autocracy.

* Of wages earned.—*Tr.*

The moral to be drawn from this is simple. If we begin with the solid foundation of a strong organisation of revolutionaries, we can ensure the stability of the movement as a whole and carry out the aims both of Social-Democracy and of trade unions proper. If, however, we begin with a broad workers' organisation, which is supposedly most "accessible" to the masses (but which is actually most accessible to the gendarmes and makes revolutionaries most accessible to the police), we shall achieve neither the one aim nor the other; we shall not eliminate our rule-of-thumb methods, and, because we remain scattered and our forces are constantly broken up by the police, we shall only make trade unions of the Zubatov and Ozerov type the more accessible to the masses.

What, properly speaking, should be the functions of the organisation of revolutionaries? We shall deal with this question in detail. First, however, let us examine a very typical argument advanced by our terrorist, who (sad fate!) in this matter also is a next-door neighbour to the Economist. *Svoboda*, a journal published for workers, contains in its first issue an article entitled "Organisation", the author of which tries to defend his friends, the Economist workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. He writes:

> "It is bad when the masses are mute and unenlightened, when the movement does not come from the rank and file. For instance, the students of a university town leave for their homes during the summer and other holidays, and immediately the workers' movement comes to a standstill. Can a workers' movement which has to be pushed on from outside be a real force? No, indeed.... It has not yet learned to walk, it is still in leading-strings. So it is in all matters. The students go off, and everything comes to a standstill. The most capable are seized; the cream is skimmed and the milk turns sour. If the 'committee' is arrested, everything comes to a standstill until a new one can be formed. And one never knows what sort of committee will be set up next—it may be nothing like the former. The first said one thing, the second may say the very opposite. Continuity between yesterday and tomorrow is broken, the experience of the past does not serve as a guide for the future. And all because no roots have been struck in depth, in the masses; the work is carried on not by a hundred fools, but by a dozen wise men. A dozen wise men can be wiped out at a snap, but when the organisation embraces masses, everything proceeds from them, and nobody, however he tries, can wreck the cause" (p. 63).

The facts are described correctly. The picture of our amateurism is well drawn. But the conclusions are worthy

of *Rabochaya Mysl*, both as regards their stupidity and their lack of political tact. They represent the height of stupidity, because the author confuses the philosophical and social-historical question of the "depth" of the "roots" of the movement with the technical and organisational question of the best method in combating the gendarmes. They represent the height of political tactlessness, because, instead of appealing from bad leaders to good leaders, the author appeals from the leaders in general to the "masses" . This is as much an attempt to drag us back organisationally as the idea of substituting excitative terrorism for political agitation drags us back politically. Indeed, I am experiencing a veritable *embarras de richesses*, and hardly know where to begin to disentangle the jumble offered up by *Svoboda*. For clarity, let me begin by citing an example. Take the Germans. It will not be denied, I hope, that theirs is a mass organisation, that in Germany everything proceeds from the masses, that the working-class movement there has learned to walk. Yet observe how these millions value their "dozen" tried political leaders, how firmly they cling to them. Members of the hostile parties in parliament have often taunted the socialists by exclaiming: "Fine democrats you are indeed! Yours is a working-class movement only in name; in actual fact the same clique of leaders is always in evidence, the same Bebel and the same Liebknecht, year in and year out, and that goes on for decades. Your supposedly elected workers' deputies are more permanent than the officials appointed by the Emperor!" But the Germans only smile with contempt at these demagogic attempts to set the "masses" against the "leaders", to arouse bad and ambitious instincts in the former, and to rob the movement of its solidity and stability by undermining the confidence of the masses in their "dozen wise men". Political thinking is sufficiently developed among the Germans, and they have accumulated sufficient political experience to understand that without the "dozen" tried and talented leaders (and talented men are not born by the hundreds), professionally trained, schooled by long experience, and working in perfect harmony, no class in modern society can wage a determined struggle. The Germans too have had demagogues in their ranks who have flattered the "hundred fools", exalted them above the "dozen

wise men", extolled the "horny hand" of the masses, and (like Most and Hasselmann) have spurred them on to reckless "revolutionary" action and sown distrust towards the firm and steadfast leaders. It was only by stubbornly and relentlessly combating all demagogic elements within the socialist movement that German socialism has managed to grow and become as strong as it is. Our wiseacres, however, at a time when Russian Social-Democracy is passing through a crisis entirely due to the lack of sufficiently trained, developed, and experienced leaders to guide the spontaneously awakening masses, cry out with the profundity of fools: "It is a bad business when the movement does not proceed from the rank and file."

"A committee of students is of no use; it is not stable." Quite true. But the conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must have a committee of professional *revolutionaries*, and it is immaterial whether a student or a worker is capable of becoming a professional revolutionary. The conclusion you draw, however, is that the working-class movement must not be pushed on from outside! In your political innocence you fail to notice that you are playing into the hands of our Economists and fostering our amateurism. Wherein, may I ask, did our students "push on" our workers? *In the sense* that the student brought to the worker the fragments of political knowledge he himself possesses, the crumbs of socialist ideas he has managed to acquire (for the principal intellectual diet of the present-day student, legal Marxism, could furnish only the rudiments, only scraps of knowledge). There has never been too much of *such* "pushing on from outside"; on the contrary, there has so far been all too little of it in our movement, for we have been stewing too assiduously in our own juice; we have bowed far too slavishly to the elementary "economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government". We professional revolutionaries must and will make it our business to engage in *this kind* of "pushing on" a hundred times more forcibly than we have done hitherto. But the very fact that you select so hideous a phrase as "pushing on from outside"—a phrase which cannot but rouse in the workers (at least in the workers who are as unenlightened as you yourselves) a sense of distrust towards *all* who bring

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them political knowledge and revolutionary experience from outside, which cannot but rouse in them an instinctive desire to resist *all* such people—proves you to be *demagogues*, and demagogues are the worst enemies of the working class.

And, please—don't hasten howling about my "uncomradely methods" of debating. I have not the least desire to doubt the purity of your intentions. As I have said, one may become a demagogue out of sheer political innocence. But I have shown that you have descended to demagogy, and I will never tire of repeating that demagogues are the worst enemies of the working class. The worst enemies, because they arouse base instincts in the masses, because the unenlightened worker is unable to recognise his enemies in men who represent themselves, and sometimes sincerely so, as his friends. The worst enemies, because in the period of disunity and vacillation, when our movement is just beginning to take shape, nothing is easier than to employ demagogic methods to mislead the masses, who can realise their error only later by bitter experience. That is why the slogan of the day for the Russian Social-Democrat must be—resolute struggle against *Svoboda* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, both of which have sunk to the level of demagogy. We shall deal with this further in greater detail.*

"A dozen wise men can be more easily wiped out than a hundred fools." This wonderful truth (for which the hundred fools will always applaud you) appears obvious only because in the very midst of the argument you have skipped from one question to another. You began by talking and continued to talk of the unearthing of a "committee", of the unearthing of an "organisation", and now you skip to the question of unearthing the movement's "roots" in their "depths". The fact is, of course, that our movement cannot be unearthed, for the very reason that it has countless thousands of roots deep down among the masses; but that is not the point at issue. As far as "deep roots" are concerned,

* For the moment let us observe merely that our remarks on "pushing on from outside" and *Svoboda*'s other disquisitions on organisation apply *in their entirety* to *all* the Economists, including the adherents of *Rabocheye Dyelo*; for some of them have actively preached and defended such views on organisation, while others among them have drifted into them.

we cannot be "unearthed" even now, despite all our amateurism, and yet we all complain, and cannot but complain, that the "*organisations*" are being unearthed and as a result it is impossible to maintain continuity in the movement. But since you raise the question of *organisations* being unearthed and persist in your opinion, I assert that it is far more difficult to unearth a dozen wise men than a hundred fools. This position I will defend, no matter how much you instigate the masses against me for my "anti-democratic" views, etc. As I have stated repeatedly, by "wise men", in connection with organisation, I mean *professional revolutionaries*, irrespective of whether they have developed from among students or working men. I assert: (1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organisation of leaders maintaining continuity; (2) that the broader the popular mass drawn spontaneously into the struggle, which forms the basis of the movement and participates in it, the more urgent the need for such an organisation, and the more solid this organisation must be (for it is much easier for all sorts of demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); (3) that such an organisation must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that in an autocratic state, the more we *confine* the membership of such an organisation to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to unearth the organisation; and (5) the *greater* will be the number of people from the working class and from the other social classes who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it.

I invite our Economists, terrorists, and "Economists-terrorists"* to confute these propositions. At the moment,

* This term is perhaps more applicable to *Svoboda* than the former, for in an article entitled "The Regeneration of Revolutionism" the publication defends terrorism, while in the article at present under review it defends Economism. One might say of *Svoboda* that "it would if it could, but it can't". Its wishes and intentions are of the very best—but the result is utter confusion; this is chiefly due to the fact that, while *Svoboda* advocates continuity of organisation, it refuses to recognise continuity of revolutionary thought and Social-Democratic theory. It wants to revive the professional revolutionary ("The

I shall deal only with the last two points. The question as to whether it is easier to wipe out "a dozen wise men" or "a hundred fools" reduces itself to the question, above considered, whether it is possible to have a mass *organisation* when the maintenance of strict secrecy is essential. We can never give a mass organisation that degree of secrecy without which there can be no question of persistent and continuous struggle against the government. To concentrate all secret functions in the hands of as small a number of professional revolutionaries as possible does not mean that the latter will "do the thinking for all" and that the rank and file will not take an active part in the *movement*. On the contrary, the membership will promote increasing numbers of the professional revolutionaries from its ranks; for it will know that it is not enough for a few students and for a few working men waging the economic struggle to gather in order to form a "committee", but that it takes years to train oneself to be a professional revolutionary; and the rank and file will "think", not only of amateurish methods, but of such training. Centralisation of the secret functions of the *organisation* by no means implies centralisation of all the functions of the *movement*. Active participation of the widest masses in the illegal press will not diminish because a "dozen" professional revolutionaries centralise the secret functions connected with this work; on the contrary, it will *increase* tenfold. In this way, and in this way alone, shall we ensure that reading the illegal press, writing for it, and to some extent even distributing it, will *almost cease to be secret work*, for the police will soon come to realise the folly and impossibility of judicial and administrative red-tape procedure over every copy of a publication that is being distributed in the thousands. This holds not only for the press, but for every function of the movement, even for demonstrations. The active and widespread participation of the masses will not suffer; on the contrary, it will benefit by the fact that a "dozen" experienced revolution-

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Regeneration of Revolutionism"), and to that end proposes, first, excitative terrorism, and, secondly, "an organisation of average workers" (*Svoboda*, No. 1, p. 66, et seq.), as less likely to be "pushed on from outside". In other words, it proposes to pull the house down to use the timber for heating it.

aries, trained professionally no less than the police, will centralise all the secret aspects of the work—the drawing up of leaflets, the working out of approximate plans; and the appointing of bodies of leaders for each urban district, for each factory district, and for each educational institution, etc. (I know that exception will be taken to my "undemocratic" views, but I shall reply below fully to this anything but intelligent objection.) Centralisation of the most secret functions in an organisation of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and enhance the quality of the activity of a large number of other organisations, that are intended for a broad public and are therefore as loose and as non-secret as possible, such as workers' trade unions; workers' self-education circles and circles for reading illegal literature; and socialist, as well as democratic, circles among *all* other sections of the population; etc., etc. We must have such circles, trade unions, and organisations everywhere in *as large a number as possible* and with the widest variety of functions; but it would be absurd and harmful *to confound* them with the organisation of *revolutionaries*, to efface the border-line between them, to make still more hazy the all too faint recognition of the fact that in order to "serve" the mass movement we must have people who will devote themselves exclusively to Social-Democratic activities, and that such people must *train* themselves patiently and steadfastly to be professional revolutionaries.

Yes, this recognition is incredibly dim. Our worst sin with regard to organisation consists in the fact that *by our primitiveness we have lowered the prestige of revolutionaries in Russia*. A person who is flabby and shaky on questions of theory, who has a narrow outlook, who pleads the spontaneity of the masses as an excuse for his own sluggishness, who resembles a trade-union secretary more than a spokesman of the people, who is unable to conceive of a broad and bold plan that would command the respect even of opponents, and who is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art—the art of combating the political police—such a man is not a revolutionary, but a wretched amateur!

Let no active worker take offence at these frank remarks, for as far as insufficient training is concerned, I apply them first and foremost to myself. I used to work in a study circle[180]

that set itself very broad, all-embracing tasks; and all of us, members of that circle, suffered painfully and acutely from the realisation that we were acting as amateurs at a moment in history when we might have been able to say, varying a well-known statement: "Give us an organisation of revolutionaries, and we will overturn Russia" The more I recall the burning sense of shame I then experienced, the bitterer become my feelings towards those pseudo-Social-Democrats whose preachings "bring disgrace on the calling of a revolutionary", who fail to understand that our task is not to champion the degrading of the revolutionary to the level of an amateur, but *to raise* the amateurs to the level of revolutionaries.

D. THE SCOPE OF ORGANISATIONAL WORK

We have heard B—v tell us about "the lack of revolutionary forces fit for action which is felt not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Russia". Hardly anyone will dispute this fact. But the question is, how is it to be explained? B—v writes:

> "We shall not go into an explanation of the historical causes of this phenomenon; we shall merely state that a society, demoralised by prolonged political reaction and split by past and present economic changes, promotes from its own ranks *an extremely small number of persons fit for revolutionary work*; that the working class does produce revolutionary workers who to some extent reinforce the ranks of the illegal organisations, but that the number of such revolutionaries is inadequate to meet the requirements of the times. This is all the more so because the worker who spends eleven and a half hours a day in the factory is in such a position that he can, in the main, perform only the functions of an agitator; but propaganda and organisation, the delivery and reproduction of illegal literature, the issuance of leaflets, etc., are duties which must necessarily fall mainly upon the shoulders of an extremely small force of intellectuals" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 6, pp. 38-39).

On many points we disagree with B—v, particularly with those we have emphasised, which most saliently reveal that, although weary of our amateurism (as is every thinking practical worker), B—v cannot find the way out of this intolerable situation because he is weighted down by Economism. The fact is that society produces very *many* persons fit for

"the cause", but we are unable to make use of them all. The critical, transitional state of our movement in this respect may be formulated as follows: *There are no people—yet there is a mass of people*. There is a mass of people, because the working class and increasingly varied social strata, year after year, produce from their ranks an increasing number of discontented people who desire to protest, who are ready to render all the assistance they can in the struggle against absolutism, the intolerableness of which, though not yet recognised by all, is more and more acutely sensed by increasing masses of the people. At the same time, we have no people, because we have no leaders, no political leaders, no talented organisers capable of arranging extensive and at the same time uniform and harmonious work that would employ all forces, even the most inconsiderable. "The growth and development of the revolutionary organisations" lag, not only behind the growth of the working-class movement, which even B—v admits, but behind that of the general democratic movement among all strata of the people. (In passing, probably B—v would now regard this as supplementing his conclusion.) The scope of revolutionary work is too narrow, as compared with the breadth of the spontaneous basis of the movement. It is too hemmed in by the wretched theory of "economic struggle against the employers and the government". Yet, at the present time, not only Social-Democratic political agitators, but Social-Democratic organisers must "go among all classes of the population".* There is hardly a single practical worker who will doubt that the Social-Democrats could distribute the thousand and one minute functions of their organisational work among individual representatives of the most varied classes. Lack of specialisation is one of the most serious defects of our technique, about which B—v justly and bitterly complains. The smaller each separate "operation" in our common cause the more people

* Thus, an undoubted revival of the democratic spirit has recently been observed among persons in military service, partly as a consequence of the more frequent street battles with "enemies" like workers and students. As soon as our available forces permit, we must without fail devote the most serious attention to propaganda and agitation among soldiers and officers, and to the creation of "military organisations" affiliated to our Party.

we can find capable of carrying out such operations (people who, in the majority of cases, are completely incapable of becoming professional revolutionaries); more difficult will it be for the police to "net" all these "detail workers", and the more difficult will it be for them to frame up, out of an arrest for some petty affair, a "case" that would justify the government's expenditure on "security". As for the number of people ready to help us, we referred in the preceding chapter to the gigantic change that has taken place in this respect in the last five years or so. On the other hand, in order to unite all these tiny fractions into one whole, in order not to break up the movement while breaking up its functions, and in order to imbue the people who carry out the minute functions with the conviction that their work is necessary and important, without which conviction they will never do the work,* it is necessary to have a strong organisation of tried revolutionaries. The more secret such an organisation is, the stronger and more widespread will be the confidence in the Party. As we know, in time of war, it is not only of the utmost importance to imbue one's own army with confidence in its strength, but it is important also to convince the enemy and all *neutral* elements of this strength;

* I recall that once a comrade told me of a factory inspector who wanted to help the Social-Democrats, and actually did, but complained bitterly that he did not know whether his "information" reached the proper revolutionary centre, how much his help was really required, and what possibilities there were for utilising his small and petty services. Every practical worker can, of course, cite many similar instances in which our primitiveness deprived us of allies. These services, each "small" in itself, but invaluable when taken in the mass, could and would be rendered to us by office employees and officials, not only in factories, but in the postal service, on the railways, in the Customs, among the nobility, among the clergy, and in *every* other walk of life, including even the police and the Court! Had we a real party, a real militant organisation of revolutionaries, we would not make undue demands on every one of these "aides", we would not hasten always and invariably to bring them right into the very heart of our "illegality", but, on the contrary, we would husband them most carefully and would even train people especially for such functions, bearing in mind that many students could be of much greater service to the Party as "aides" holding some official post than as "short-term" revolutionaries. But, I repeat, only an organisation that is firmly established and has no lack of active forces would have the right to apply such tactics.

friendly neutrality may sometimes decide the issue. If such an organisation existed, one built up on a firm theoretical foundation and possessing a Social-Democratic organ, we should have no reason to fear that the movement might be diverted from its path by the numerous "outside" elements that are attracted to it. (On the contrary, it is precisely at the present time, with amateurism prevalent, that we see many Social-Democrats leaning towards the *Credo* and only imagining that they are Social-Democrats.) In a word, specialisation necessarily presupposes centralisation, and in turn imperatively calls for it.

But B—v himself, who has so excellently described the necessity for specialisation, underestimates its importance, in our opinion, in the second part of the argument we have quoted. The number of working-class revolutionaries is inadequate, he says. This is perfectly true, and once again we stress that the "valuable communication of a close observer" fully confirms our view of the causes of the present crisis in Social-Democracy, and, consequently, of the means required to overcome it. Not only are revolutionaries in general lagging behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses, but even worker-revolutionaries are lagging behind the spontaneous awakening of the working-class masses. This *fact* confirms with clear evidence, from the "practical" point of view, too, not only the absurdity but even the *politically reactionary nature* of the "pedagogics" to which we are so often treated in the discussion of our duties to the workers. This fact proves that our very first and most pressing duty is to help to train working-class revolutionaries who will be on the same level *in regard to Party activity* as the revolutionaries from amongst the intellectuals (we emphasise the words "in regard to Party activity", for, although necessary, it is neither so easy nor so pressingly necessary to bring the workers up to the level of intellectuals in other respects). Attention, therefore, must be devoted *principally* to *raising* the workers to the level of revolutionaries; it is not at all our task *to descend* to the level of the "working masses" as the Economists wish to do, or to the level of the "average worker" as *Svoboda* desires to do (and by this ascends to the second grade of Economist "pedagogics"). I am far from denying the necessity

for popular literature for the workers, and especially popular (of course, not vulgar) literature for the especially backward workers. But what annoys me is this constant confusion of pedagogics with questions of politics and organisation. You, gentlemen, who are so much concerned about the "average worker", as a matter of fact, rather insult the workers by your desire *to talk down* to them when discussing working-class politics and working-class organisation. Talk about serious things in a serious manner; leave pedagogics to the pedagogues, and not to politicians and organisers! Are there not advanced people, "average people", and "masses" among the intelligentsia too? Does not everyone recognise that popular literature is also required for the intelligentsia, and is not such literature written? Imagine someone, in an article on organising college or high-school students, repeating over and over again, as if he had made a new discovery, that first of all we must have an organisation of "average students". The author of such an article would be ridiculed, and rightly so. Give us your ideas on organisation, if you have any, he would be told, and we ourselves will decide who is "average", who above average, and who below. But if you have no organisational ideas *of your own*, then all your exertions in behalf of the "masses" and "average people" will be simply boring. You must realise that these questions of "politics" and "organisation" are so serious in themselves that they cannot be dealt with in any other but a serious way. We can and must *educate* workers (and university and Gymnasium students) so that we *may be able to discuss* these questions with them. But once you do bring up these questions, you must give real replies to them; do not fall back on the "average", or on the "masses"; do not try to dispose of the matter with facetious remarks and mere phrases.*

* *Svoboda*, No. 1, p. 66, in the article "Organisation": "The heavy tread of the army of workers will reinforce all the demands that will be advanced in behalf of Russian Labour"—Labour with a capital L, of course. And the author exclaims: "I am not in the least hostile towards the intelligentsia, but [*but*—the word that Shchedrin translated as meaning: The ears never grow higher than the forehead!]—but I always get frightfully annoyed when a man comes to me uttering beautiful and charming words and demands that they be accepted for their [his?] beauty and other virtues" (p. 62). Yes, I "always get frightfully annoyed", too.

To be fully prepared for his task, the worker-revolutionary must likewise become a professional revolutionary. Hence B—v is wrong in saying that since the worker spends eleven and a half hours in the factory, the brunt of all other revolutionary functions (apart from agitation) "*must necessarily* fall mainly upon the shoulders of an extremely small force of intellectuals". But this condition does not obtain out of sheer "necessity". It obtains because we are backward, because we do not recognise our duty to assist every capable worker to become a *professional* agitator, organiser, propagandist, literature distributor, etc., etc. In this respect, we waste our strength in a positively shameful manner; we lack the ability to husband that which should be tended and reared with special care. Look at the Germans: their forces are a hundredfold greater than ours. But they understand perfectly well that really capable agitators, etc., are not often promoted from the ranks of the "average". For this reason they immediately try to place every capable working man in conditions that will enable him to develop and apply his abilities to the fullest: he is made a professional agitator, he is encouraged to widen the field of his activity, to spread it from one factory to the whole of the industry, from a single locality to the whole country. He acquires experience and dexterity in his profession; he broadens his outlook and increases his knowledge; he observes at close quarters the prominent political leaders from other localities and of other parties; he strives to rise to their level and combine in himself the knowledge of the working-class environment and the freshness of socialist convictions with professional skill, without which the proletariat *cannot* wage a stubborn struggle against its excellently trained enemies. In this way alone do the working masses produce men of the stamp of Bebel and Auer. But what is to a great extent automatic in a politically free country must in Russia be done deliberately and systematically by our organisations. A worker-agitator who is at all gifted and "promising" *must not be left* to work eleven hours a day in a factory. We must arrange that he be maintained by the Party; that he may go underground in good time; that he change the place of his activity, if he is to enlarge his experience, widen his outlook, and be

able to hold out for at least a few years in the struggle against the gendarmes. As the spontaneous rise of their movement becomes broader and deeper, the working-class masses promote from their ranks not only an increasing number of talented agitators, but also talented organisers, propagandists, and "practical workers" in the best sense of the term (of whom there are so few among our intellectuals who, for the most part, in the Russian manner, are somewhat careless and sluggish in their habits). When we have forces of specially trained worker-revolutionaries who have gone through extensive preparation (and, of course, revolutionaries "of all arms of the service"), no political police in the world will then be able to contend with them, for these forces, boundlessly devoted to the revolution, will enjoy the boundless confidence of the widest masses of the workers. We are directly *to blame* for doing too little to "stimulate" the workers to take this path, common to them and to the "intellectuals", of professional revolutionary training, and for all too often dragging them back by our silly speeches about what is "accessible" to the masses of the workers, to the "average workers", etc.

In this, as in other respects, the narrow scope of our organisational work is without a doubt due directly to the fact (although the overwhelming majority of the "Economists" and the novices in practical work do not perceive it) that we restrict our theories and our political tasks to a narrow field. Subservience to spontaneity seems to inspire a fear of taking even one step away from what is "accessible" to the masses, a fear of rising too high above mere attendance on the immediate and direct requirements of the masses. Have no fear, gentlemen! Remember that we stand so low on the plane of organisation that the very idea that we *could* rise *too* high is absurd!

E. "CONSPIRATORIAL" ORGANISATION AND "DEMOCRATISM"

Yet there are many people among us who are so sensitive to the "voice of life" that they fear it more than anything in the world and charge the adherents of the views here expounded with following a Narodnaya Volya line,

with failing to understand "democratism", etc. These accusations, which, of course, have been echoed by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, need to be dealt with.

The writer of these lines knows very well that the St. Petersburg Economists levelled the charge of Narodnaya Volya tendencies also against *Rabochaya Gazeta* (which is quite understandable when one compares it with *Rabochaya Mysl*). We were not in the least surprised, therefore, when, soon after the appearance of *Iskra*, a comrade informed us that the Social-Democrats in the town of X describe *Iskra* as a Narodnaya Volya organ. We, of course, were flattered by this accusation; for what decent Social-Democrat has not been accused by the Economists of being a Narodnaya Volya sympathiser?

These accusations are the result of a twofold misunderstanding. First, the history of the revolutionary movement is so little known among us that the name "Narodnaya Volya" is used to denote any idea of a militant centralised organisation which declares determined war upon tsarism. But the magnificent organisation that the revolutionaries had in the seventies, and that should serve us as a model, was not established by the Narodnaya Volya, but by the *Zemlya i Volya*, which split up into the Chorny Peredel and the Narodnaya Volya. Consequently, to regard a militant revolutionary organisation as something specifically Narodnaya Volya in character is absurd both historically and logically; for *no* revolutionary trend, if it seriously thinks of struggle, can dispense with such an organisation. The mistake the Narodnaya Volya committed was not in striving to enlist *all* the discontented in the organisation and to direct this organisation to resolute struggle against the autocracy; on the contrary, that was its great historical merit. The mistake was in relying on a theory which in substance was not a revolutionary theory at all, and the Narodnaya Volya members either did not know how, or were unable, to link their movement inseparably with the class struggle in the developing capitalist society. Only a gross failure to understand Marxism (or an "understanding" of it in the spirit of "Struve-ism") could prompt the opinion that the rise of a mass, spontaneous working-class movement *relieves* us of the duty of creating as good an organisation of revolutionaries as the

Zemlya i Volya had, or, indeed, an incomparably better one. On the contrary, this movement *imposes* the duty upon us; for the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become its genuine "class struggle" until this struggle is led by a strong organisation of revolutionaries.

Secondly, many people, including apparently B. Krichevsky (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 18), misunderstand the polemics that Social-Democrats have always waged against the "conspiratorial" view of the political struggle. We have always protested, and will, of course, continue to protest against *confining* the political struggle to conspiracy.* But this does not, of course, mean that we deny the need for a strong revolutionary organisation. Thus, in the pamphlet mentioned in the preceding footnote, after the polemics against reducing the political struggle to a conspiracy, a description is given (as a Social-Democratic ideal) of an organisation so strong as to be able to "resort to ... rebellion" and to every other form of attack, in order to "deliver a smashing blow against absolutism".** In *form* such a strong revolutionary organisation in an autocratic country may also be described as a "conspiratorial" organisation, because the French word "conspiration" is the equivalent of the Russian word "*zagovar*" ("conspiracy"), and such an organisation must have the utmost secrecy. Secrecy is such a necessary condition for this kind of organisation that all the other conditions (number and selection of members, functions,

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* Cf. *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, p. 21, polemics against P. L. Lavrov. (See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 340-41.—*Ed.*)

** *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, p. 23. (See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 342.—*Ed.*) Apropos, we shall give another illustration of the fact that *Rabocheye Dyelo* either does not understand what it is talking about or changes its views "with the wind". In No. 1 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, we find the following passage in italics: "*The substance set forth in the pamphlet accords entirely with the editorial programme of Rabocheye Dyelo*" (p. 142). Really? Does the view that the overthrow of the autocracy must not be set as the first task of the mass movement accord with the views expressed in *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*? Do the theory of "the economic struggle against the employers and the government" and the stages theory accord with the views expressed in that pamphlet? We leave it to the reader to judge whether a periodical that understands the meaning of "accordance in opinion" in this peculiar manner can have firm principles.

etc.) must be made to conform to it. It would be extremely naïve indeed, therefore, to fear the charge that we Social-Democrats desire to create a conspiratorial organisation. Such a charge should be as flattering to every opponent of Economism as the charge of following a Narodnaya Volya line.

The objection may be raised that such a powerful and strictly secret organisation, which concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret activities, an organisation which of necessity is centralised, may too easily rush into a premature attack, may thoughtlessly intensify the movement before the growth of political discontent, the intensity of the ferment and anger of the working class, etc., have made such an attack possible and necessary. Our reply to this is: Speaking abstractly, it cannot be denied, of course, that a militant organisation *may* thoughtlessly engage in battle, which *may* end in a defeat entirely avoidable under other conditions. But we cannot confine ourselves to abstract reasoning on such a question, because every battle bears within itself the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no way of *reducing* this possibility except by organised preparation for battle. If, however, we proceed from the concrete conditions at present obtaining in Russia, we must come to the positive conclusion that a strong revolutionary organisation is absolutely necessary precisely for the purpose of giving stability to the movement and of *safeguarding* it against the possibility of making thoughtless attacks. Precisely at the present time, when no such organisation yet exists, and when the revolutionary movement is rapidly and spontaneously growing, we *already observe* two opposite extremes (which, as is to be expected, "meet"). These are: the utterly unsound Economism and the preaching of moderation, and the equally unsound "excitative terror", which strives "artificially to call forth symptoms of the end of the movement, which is developing and strengthening itself, when this movement is as yet nearer to the start than to the end" (V. Zasulich, in *Zarya*, No. 2-3, p. 353). And the instance of *Rabocheye Dyelo* shows that *there exist* Social-Democrats who give way to both these extremes. This is not surprising, for, apart from other reasons, the "economic struggle against the employers and the government"

can *never* satisfy revolutionaries, and opposite extremes will therefore always appear here and there. Only a centralised, militant organisation that consistently carries out a Social-Democratic policy, that satisfies, so to speak, all revolutionary instincts and strivings, can safeguard the movement against making thoughtless attacks and prepare attacks that hold out the promise of success.

A further objection may be raised, that the views on organisation here expounded contradict the "democratic principle". Now, while the earlier accusation was specifically Russian in origin, this one is *specifically foreign* in character. And only an organisation abroad (the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad) was capable of giving its Editorial Board instructions like the following:

> "*Organisational Principle.* In order to secure the successful development and unification of Social-Democracy, the broad democratic principle of Party organisation must be emphasised, developed, and fought for; this is particularly necessary in view of the anti-democratic tendencies that have revealed themselves in the ranks of our Party" (*Two Conferences*, p. 18).

We shall see in the next chapter how *Rabocheye Dyelo* combats *Iskra*'s "anti-democratic tendencies". For the present, we shall examine more closely the "principle" that the Economists advance. Everyone will probably agree that "the broad democratic principle" presupposes the two following conditions: first, full publicity, and secondly, election to all offices. It would be absurd to speak of democracy without publicity, moreover, without a publicity that is not limited to the membership of the organisation. We call the German Socialist Party a democratic organisation because all its activities are carried out publicly; even its party congresses are held in public. But no one would call an organisation democratic that is hidden from every one but its members by a veil of secrecy. What is the use, then, of advancing "the *broad* democratic principle" when the fundamental condition for this principle *cannot be fulfilled* by a secret organisation? "The broad principle" proves itself simply to be a resounding but hollow phrase. Moreover, it reveals a total lack of understanding of the urgent tasks of the moment in regard to organisation. Everyone knows how great the lack of secrecy is among the "broad" masses

of our revolutionaries. We have heard the bitter complaints of B—v on this score and his absolutely just demand for a "strict selection of members" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 6, p. 42). Yet, persons who boast a keen "sense of realities" *urge*, in a situation like this, not the strictest secrecy and the strictest (consequently, more restricted) selection, of members, but "the *broad* democratic principle"! This is what you call being wide of the mark.

Nor is the situation any better with regard to the second attribute of democracy, the principle of election. In politically free countries, this condition is taken for granted. "They are members of the Party who accept the principles of the Party programme and render the Party all possible support," reads Clause 1 of the Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party. Since the entire political arena is as open to the public view as is a theatre stage to the audience, this acceptance or non-acceptance, support or opposition, is known to all from the press and from public meetings. Everyone knows that a certain political figure began in such and such a way, passed through such and such an evolution, behaved in a trying moment in such and such a manner, and possesses such and such qualities; consequently, *all* party members, knowing all the facts, can elect or refuse to elect this person to a particular party office. The general control (in the literal sense of the term) exercised over every act of a party man in the political field brings into existence an automatically operating mechanism which produces what in biology is called the "survival of the fittest". "Natural selection" by full publicity, election, and general control provides the assurance that, in the last analysis, every political figure will be "in his proper place", do the work for which he is best fitted by his powers and abilities, feel the effects of his mistakes on himself, and prove before all the world his ability to recognise mistakes and to avoid them.

Try to fit this picture into the frame of our autocracy! Is it conceivable in Russia for all who accept the principles of the Party programme and render the Party all possible support to control every action of the revolutionary working in secret? Is it possible for all to elect one of these revolutionaries to any particular office, when, in the very interests of the work, the revolutionary *must* conceal his iden-

tity from nine out of ten of these "all"? Reflect somewhat over the real meaning of the high-sounding phrases to which *Rabocheye Dyelo* gives utterance, and you will realise that "broad democracy" in Party organisation, amidst the gloom of the autocracy and the domination of gendarmerie, is nothing more than a *useless and harmful toy*. It is a useless toy because, in point of fact, no revolutionary organisation has ever practiced, or could practice, broad democracy, however much it may have desired to do so. It is a harmful toy because any attempt to practise "the broad democratic principle" will simply facilitate the work of the police in carrying out large-scale raids, will perpetuate the prevailing primitiveness, and will divert the thoughts of the practical workers from the serious and pressing task of training themselves to become professional revolutionaries to that of drawing up detailed "paper" rules for election systems. Only abroad, where very often people with no opportunity for conducting really active work gather, could this "playing at democracy" develop here and there, especially in small groups.

To show the unseemliness of *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s favourite trick of advancing the plausible "principle" of democracy in revolutionary affairs, we shall again summon a witness. This witness, Y. Serebryakov, editor of the London magazine, *Nakanune*, has a soft spot for *Rabocheye Dyelo* and is filled with a great hatred for Plekhanov and the "Plekhanovites". In its articles on the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, *Nakanune* definitely sided with *Rabocheye Dyelo* and poured a stream of petty abuse upon Plekhanov. All the more valuable, therefore, is this witness in the question at issue. In *Nakanune* for July (No. 7) 1899, an article entitled "Concerning the Manifesto of the Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group", Serebryakov argued that it was "indecent" to talk about such things as "self-deception, leadership, and the so-called Areopagus in a serious revolutionary movement" and, *inter alia*, wrote:

"Myshkin, Rogachov, Zhelyabov, Mikhailov, Perovskaya, Figner, and others never regarded themselves as leaders, and no one ever elected or appointed them as such, although in actuality, they were leaders, because, in the propaganda period, as well as in the period of the struggle against the government, they took the brunt of the work upon themselves, they went into the most dangerous places, and their

activities were the most fruitful. They became leaders, not because they wished it, but because the comrades surrounding them had confidence in their wisdom, in their energy, in their loyalty. To be afraid of some kind of Areopagus (if it is not feared, why write about it?) that would arbitrarily govern the movement is far too naïve. Who would pay heed to it?"

We ask the reader, in what way does the "Areopagus" differ from "anti-democratic tendencies"? And is it not evident that *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s "plausible" organisational principle is equally naïve and indecent; naïve, because no one would pay heed to the "Areopagus", or people with "anti- democratic tendencies", if "the comrades surrounding them had" no "confidence in their wisdom, energy, and loyalty"; indecent, because it is a demagogic sally calculated to play on the conceit of some, on the ignorance of others regarding the actual state of our movement, and on the lack of training and the ignorance of the history of the revolutionary movement on the part of still others. The only serious organisational principle for the active workers of our movement should be the strictest secrecy, the strictest selection of members, and the training of professional revolutionaries. Given these qualities, something even more than "democratism" would be guaranteed to us, namely, complete, comradely, mutual confidence among revolutionaries. This is absolutely essential for us, because there can be no question of replacing it by general democratic control in Russia. It would be a great mistake to believe that the impossibility of establishing real "democratic" control renders the members of the revolutionary organisation beyond control altogether. They have not the time to think about toy forms of democratism (democratism within a close and compact body of comrades in which complete, mutual confidence prevails), but they have a lively sense of their *responsibility*, knowing as they do from experience that an organisation of real revolutionaries will stop at nothing to rid itself of an unworthy member. Moreover, there is a fairly well-developed public opinion in Russian (and international) revolutionary circles which has a long history behind it, and which sternly and ruthlessly punishes every departure from the duties of comradeship (and "democratism", real and not toy democratism, certainly forms a component part of the conception of

comradeship). Take all this into consideration and you will realise that this talk and these resolutions about "anti-democratic tendencies" have the musty odour of the playing at generals which is indulged in abroad.

It must be observed also that the other source of this talk, viz., naïveté, is likewise fostered by the confusion of ideas concerning the meaning of democracy. In Mr. and Mrs. Webb's book on the English trade unions there is an interesting chapter entitled "Primitive Democracy". In it the authors relate how the English workers, in the first period of existence of their unions, considered it an indispensable sign of democracy for all the members to do all the work of managing the unions; not only were all questions decided by the vote of all the members, but all official duties were fulfilled by all the members in turn. A long period of historical experience was required for workers to realise the absurdity of such a conception of democracy and to make them understand the necessity for representative institutions, on the one hand, and for full-time officials, on the other. Only after a number of cases of financial bankruptcy of trade-union treasuries had occurred did the workers realise that the rates of contributions and benefits cannot be decided merely by a democratic vote, but that this requires also the advice of insurance experts. Let us take also Kautsky's book on parliamentarism and legislation by the people. There we find that the conclusions drawn by the Marxist theoretician coincide with the lessons learned from many years of practical experience by the workers who organised "spontaneously". Kautsky strongly protests against Rittinghausen's primitive conception of democracy; he ridicules those who in the name of democracy demand that "popular newspapers shall be edited directly by the people"; he shows the need for *professional* journalists, parliamentarians, etc., for the Social-Democratic leadership of the proletarian class struggle; he attacks the socialism of anarchists and *littérateurs* who in their "striving for effect" extol direct legislation by the whole people, completely failing to understand that this idea can be applied only relatively in modern society.

Those who have performed practical work in our movement know how widespread the "primitive" conception of democ-

racy is among the masses of the students and workers. It is not surprising that this conception penetrates also into rules of organisations and into literature. The Economists of the Bernsteinian persuasion included in their rules the following: "§ 10. All affairs affecting the interests of the whole of the union organisation shall be decided by a majority vote of all its members." The Economists of the terrorist persuasion repeat after them. "The decisions of the committee shall become effective only after they have been referred to all the circles" (*Svoboda*, No. 1, p. 67). Observe that this proposal for a widely applied referendum is advanced *in addition* to the demand that *the whole of* the organisation be built on an elective basis! We would not, of course, on this account condemn practical workers who have had too few opportunities for studying the theory and practice of real democratic organisations. But when *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which lays claim to leadership, confines itself, under such conditions, to a resolution on broad democratic principles, can this be described as anything but a mere "striving for effect"?

F. LOCAL AND ALL-RUSSIA WORK

The objections raised against the plan of organisation here outlined on the grounds that it is undemocratic and conspiratorial are totally unsound. Nevertheless, there remains a question which is frequently put and which deserves detailed examination. This is the question of the relations between local work and All-Russian work. Fears are expressed that the formation of a centralised organisation may shift the centre of gravity from the former to the latter, damage the movement through weakening our contacts with the working masses and the continuity of local agitation generally. To these fears we reply that our movement in the past few years has suffered precisely from the fact that local workers have been too absorbed in local work; that therefore it is absolutely necessary to shift the centre of gravity somewhat to national work; and that, far from weakening this would strengthen our ties and the continuity of our local agitation. Let us take the question of central and local newspapers. I would ask the reader not to forget that we cite the publication of newspapers only as *an example* illustrat-

ing an immeasurably broader and more varied revolutionary activity in general.

In the first period of the mass movement (1896-98), an attempt was made by local revolutionary workers to publish an All-Russian paper—*Rabochaya Gazeta*. In the next period (1898-1900), the movement made an enormous stride forward, but the attention of the leaders was wholly absorbed by local publications. If we compute the total number of the local papers that were published, we shall find that on the average one issue per month was published.* Does this not clearly illustrate our amateurism? Does this not clearly show that our revolutionary organisation lags behind the spontaneous growth of the movement? If *the same number* of issues had been published, not by scattered local groups, but by a single organisation, we would not only have saved an enormous amount of effort, but we would have secured immeasurably greater stability and continuity in our work. This simple point is frequently lost sight of by those practical workers who work *actively* and almost exclusively on local publications (unfortunately this is true even now in the overwhelming majority of cases), as well as by the publicists who display an astonishing quixotism on this question. The practical workers usually rest content with the argument that "it is difficult"** for local workers to engage in the organisation of an All-Russian newspaper, and that local newspapers are better than no newspapers at all. This argument is, of course, perfectly just, and we, no less than any practical worker, appreciate the enormous importance and usefulness of local newspapers *in general*. But not this is the point. The point is, can we not overcome the fragmentation and primitiveness that are so glaringly expressed in the thirty issues of local newspapers that have been published throughout Russia in the course of two and a half years? Do not restrict yourselves to the indisputable, but too

* See *Report to the Paris Congress*,[181] p. 14. "From that time (1897) to the spring of 1900, thirty issues of various papers were published in various places.... On an average, over one issue per month was published".

** This difficulty is more apparent than real. In fact, *there is not* a single local study circle that lacks the opportunity of taking up some function or other in connection with All-Russian work. "Don't say, I can't; say, I won't."

general, statement about the usefulness of local newspapers generally; have the courage frankly to admit their negative aspects revealed by the experience of two and a half years. This experience has shown that under the conditions in which we work, these local newspapers prove, in the majority of cases, to be unstable in their principles, devoid of political significance, extremely costly in regard to expenditure of revolutionary forces, and totally unsatisfactory from a technical point of view (I have in mind, of course, not the technique of printing, but the frequency and regularity of publication). These defects are not accidental; they are the inevitable outcome of the fragmentation which, on the one hand, explains the predominance of local newspapers in the period under review, and, on the other, is *fostered by* this predominance. It is positively *beyond the strength* of a separate local organisation to raise its newspaper to the level of a political organ maintaining stability of principles; it is *beyond its strength* to collect and utilise sufficient material to shed light on the whole of our political life. The argument usually advanced to support the need for numerous local newspapers in free countries that the cost of printing by local workers is low and that the people can be kept more fully and quickly informed—this *argument* as experience has shown, speaks *against* local newspapers in Russia. They turn out to be excessively costly in regard to the expenditure of revolutionary forces, and appear *very* rarely, for the simple reason that the publication of an *illegal* newspaper, however small its size, requires an extensive secret apparatus, such as is possible with large-scale factory production; for this apparatus cannot be created in a small, handicraft workshop. Very frequently, the primitiveness of the secret apparatus (every practical worker can cite numerous cases) enables the police to take advantage of the publication and distribution of one or two issues to make *mass* arrests, which result in such a clean sweep that it becomes necessary to start all over again. A well-organised secret apparatus requires professionally well-trained revolutionaries and a division of labour applied with the greatest consistency, but both these requirements are beyond the strength of a separate local organisation, however strong it may be at any given moment.

Not only the general interests of our movement as a whole (training of the workers in consistent socialist and political principles) but also specifically local interests are *better served by non-local newspapers*. This may seem paradoxical at first sight, but it has been proved to the hilt by the two and a half years of experience referred to. Everyone will agree that had all the local forces that were engaged in the publication of the thirty issues of newspapers worked on a single newspaper, sixty, if not a hundred, issues could easily have been published, with a fuller expression, in consequence, of all the specifically local features of the movement. True, it is no easy matter to attain such a degree of organisation, but we must realise the need for it. Every local study circle must think about it and *work actively* to achieve it, without waiting for an impetus from outside, without being tempted by the popularity and closer proximity of a local newspaper which, as our revolutionary experience has shown, proves to a large extent to be illusory.

And it is a bad service indeed those publicists render to the practical work who, thinking themselves particularly close to the practical workers, fail to see this illusoriness, and make shift with the astoundingly hollow and cheap argument that we must have local newspapers, we must have district newspapers, and we must have All-Russian newspapers. Generally speaking, of course, all these are necessary, but once the solution of a concrete organisational problem is undertaken, surely time and circumstances must be taken into consideration. Is it not quixotic for *Svoboda* (No. 1, p. 68) to write in a special article "dealing with *the question of a newspaper*": "It seems to us that every locality, with any appreciable number of workers, should have its own workers' newspaper; not a newspaper imported from somewhere, but its very own." If the publicist who wrote these words refuses to think of their meaning, then at least the reader may do it for him. How many scores, if not hundreds, of "localities" with any appreciable number of workers there are in Russia, and what a perpetuation of our amateurish methods this would mean if indeed every local organisation set about publishing its own newspaper! How this diffusion would facilitate the gendarmerie's task of netting—and without "any appreciable" effort—the local

revolutionary workers at the very outset of their activity and of preventing them from developing into real revolutionaries. A reader of an All-Russian newspaper, continues the author, would find little interest in the descriptions of the malpractices of the factory owners and the "details of factory life in various towns not his own". But "an inhabitant of Orel would not find Orel affairs dull reading. In every issue he would learn who had been 'picked for a lambasting' and who had been 'flayed', and he would be in high spirits" (p. 69). Certainly, the Orel reader is in high spirits, but our publicist's flights of imagination are also high—too high. He should have asked himself whether such concern with trivialities is tactically in order. We are second to none in appreciating the importance and necessity of factory exposures, but it must be borne in mind that we have reached a stage when St. Petersburg folk find it dull reading the St. Petersburg correspondence of the St. Petersburg *Rabochaya Mysl*. Leaflets are the medium through which local factory exposures have always been *and must continue* to be made, but we must raise the level of the *newspaper*, not lower it to the level of a factory leaflet. What we ask of a newspaper is not so much "petty" exposures, as exposures of the major, typical evils of factory life, exposures based on especially striking facts and capable, therefore, of arousing the interest of *all* workers and all leaders of the movement, of really enriching their knowledge, broadening their outlook, and serving as a starting-point for awakening new districts and workers from ever-newer trade areas.

"Moreover, in a local newspaper, all the malpractices of the factory administration and other authorities may be denounced then and there. In the case of a general, distant newspaper, however, by the time the news reaches it the facts will have been forgotten in the source localities. The reader, on getting the paper, will exclaim: 'When was that—who remembers it?'" (ibid.). Precisely—who remembers it! From the same source we learn that the 30 issues of newspapers which appeared in the course of two and a half years were published in six cities. This averages *one issue per city per half-year*! And even if our frivolous publicist *trebled* his estimate of the productivity of local work (which would be wrong in the case of an average town, since it is

impossible to increase productivity to any considerable extent by our rule-of-thumb methods), we would still get only one issue every two months, i.e., nothing at all like "denouncing then and there". It would suffice, however, for ten local organisations to combine and send their delegates to take an active part in organising a general newspaper, to enable us every fortnight to "denounce", *over the whole of Russia*, not petty, but really outstanding and typical evils. No one who knows the state of affairs in our organisations can have the slightest doubt on that score. As for catching the enemy red-handed—if we mean it seriously and not merely as a pretty phrase—that is quite beyond the ability of an illegal paper generally. It can be done only by a leaflet, because the time limit for exposures of that nature can be a day or two at the most (e.g., the usual brief strikes, violent factory clashes, demonstrations, etc.).

"The workers live not only at the factory, but also in the city," continues our author, rising from the particular to the general, with a strict consistency that would have done honour to Boris Krichevsky himself; and he refers to matters like municipal councils, municipal hospitals, municipal schools, and demands that workers' newspapers should not ignore municipal affairs in general.

This demand—excellent in itself—serves as a particularly vivid illustration of the empty abstraction to which discussions of local newspapers are all too frequently limited. In the first place, if indeed newspapers appeared "in every locality with any appreciable number of workers" with such detailed information on municipal affairs as *Svoboda* desires, this would, under our Russian conditions, inevitably degenerate into actual concern with trivialities, lead to a weakening of the consciousness of the importance of an All-Russian revolutionary assault upon the tsarist autocracy, and strengthen the extremely virile shoots—not uprooted but rather hidden or temporarily suppressed—of the tendency that has become noted as a result of the famous remark about revolutionaries who talk a great deal about non-existent parliaments and too little about existent municipal councils. We say "inevitably", in order to emphasise that *Svoboda* obviously does not desire this, but the contrary, to come about. But good intentions are not enough. For municipal affairs

to be dealt with in their proper perspective, in relation to our entire work, this perspective must *first* be clearly conceived, firmly established, not only by argument, but by numerous examples, so that it may acquire the stability of a *tradition*. This is still far from being the case with us. Yet this must be done *first*, before we can allow ourselves to think and talk about an extensive local press.

Secondly, to write really well and interestingly about municipal affairs, one must have first-hand knowledge, not book knowledge, of the issues. But there are hardly any Social-Democrats *anywhere in Russia* who possess such knowledge. To be able to write in newspapers (not in popular pamphlets) about municipal and state affairs, one must have fresh and varied material gathered and written up by able people. And in order to be able to gather and write up such material, we must have something more than the "primitive democracy" of a primitive circle, in which everybody does everything and all entertain themselves by playing at referendums. It is necessary to have a staff of expert writers and correspondents, an army of Social-Democratic reporters who establish contacts far and wide, who are able to fathom all sorts of "state secrets" (the knowledge of which makes the Russian government official so puffed up, but the blabbing of which is such an easy matter to him), who are able to penetrate "behind the scenes"—an army of people who must, as their "official duty", be ubiquitous and omniscient. And we, the Party that fights against *all* economic, political, social, and national oppression, can and must find, gather, train, mobilise, and set into motion such an army of omniscient people—all of which requires still to be done. Not only has not a single step in this direction been taken in the overwhelming majority of localities, but even the *recognition* of its necessity is very often lacking. One will search in vain in our Social-Democratic press for lively and interesting articles, correspondence, and exposures dealing with our big and little affairs—diplomatic, military, ecclesiastical, municipal, financial, etc., etc. There is *almost nothing*, or very little, about these matters.* That is why

* That is why even examples of exceptionally good local newspapers fully confirm our point of view. For example, *Yuzhny Rabochy*[182] is an excellent newspaper, entirely free of instability of prin-

"it always annoys me frightfully when a man comes to me, utters beautiful and charming words" about the need for newspapers in "every locality with any appreciable number of workers" that will expose factory, municipal, and government evils.

The predominance of the local papers over a central press may be a sign of either poverty or luxury. Of poverty, when the movement has not yet developed the forces for large-scale production, continues to flounder in amateurism, and is all but swamped with "the petty details of factory life". Of luxury, when the movement *has fully mastered* the task of comprehensive exposure and comprehensive agitation, and it becomes necessary to publish numerous local newspapers in addition to the central organ. Let each decide for himself what the predominance of local newspapers implies in present-day Russia. I shall limit myself to a precise formulation of my own conclusion, to leave no grounds for misunderstanding. Hitherto, the majority of our local organisations have thought almost exclusively in terms of local newspapers, and have devoted almost all their activities to this work. This is abnormal; the very opposite should have been the case. The majority of the local organisations should think principally of the publication of an All-Russian newspaper and devote their activities chiefly to it. Until this is done, we shall *not* be able to establish a *single* newspaper capable, to any degree, of serving the movement with *comprehensive* press agitation. When this is done, however, normal relations between the necessary central newspaper and the necessary local newspapers will be established automatically.

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ciple. But it has been unable to provide what it desired for the local movement, owing to the infrequency of its publication and to extensive police raids. Principled presentation of the fundamental questions of the movement and wide political agitation, which our Party most urgently requires at the present time, has proved too big a job for the local newspaper. The material of particular value it has published, like the articles on the mine owners' convention and on unemployment, was not strictly local material, *it was required for the whole of Russia*, not for the South alone. No such articles have appeared in any of our Social-Democratic newspapers.

* * *

It would seem at first glance that the conclusion on the necessity for shifting the centre of gravity from local to All-Russian work does not apply to the sphere of the specifically economic struggle. In this struggle, the immediate enemies of the workers are the individual employers or groups of employers, who are not bound by any organisation having even the remotest resemblance to the purely military, strictly centralised organisation of the Russian Government—our immediate enemy in the political struggle—which is led in all its minutest details by a single will.

But that is not the case. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the economic struggle is a trade struggle, and for that reason it requires that the workers be organised according to trades, not only according to place of employment. Organisation by trades becomes all the more urgently necessary, the more rapidly our employers organise in all sorts of companies and syndicates. Our fragmentation and our amateurism are an outright hindrance to this work of organisation which requires the existence of a single, All-Russian body of revolutionaries capable of giving leadership to the All-Russian trade unions. We have described above the type of organisation that is needed for this purpose; we shall now add but a few words on the question of our press in this connection.

Hardly anyone will doubt the necessity for every Social-Democratic newspaper to have *a special department* devoted to the trade-union (economic) struggle. But the growth of the trade-union movement compels us to think about the creation of a trade-union press. It seems to us, however, that with rare exceptions, there can be no question of trade-union newspapers in Russia at the present time; they would be a luxury, and many a time we lack even our daily bread. The form of trade-union press that would suit the conditions of our illegal work and is already required at the present time is *trade-union pamphlets*. In these pamphlets, *legal** and illegal material should be

* Legal material is particularly important in this connection, and we are particularly behind in our ability to gather and utilise it systematically. It would not be an exaggeration to say that one could

gathered and grouped systematically, on the working conditions in a given trade, on the differences in this respect in the various parts of Russia; on the main demands advanced by the workers in the given trade; on the inadequacies of legislation affecting that trade; on outstanding instances of economic struggle by the workers in the trade; on the beginnings, the present state, and the requirements of their trade-union organisation, etc. Such pamphlets would, in the first place, relieve our Social-Democratic press of a mass of trade details that are of interest only to workers in the given trade. Secondly, they would record the results of our experience in the trade-union struggle, they would preserve the gathered material, which now literally gets lost in a mass of leaflets and fragmentary correspondence; and they would summarise this material. Thirdly, they could serve as guides for agitators, because working conditions change relatively slowly and the main demands of the workers in a given trade are extremely stable (cf., for example, the demands advanced by the weavers in the Moscow district in 1885 and in the St. Petersburg district in 1896). A compilation of such demands and needs might serve for years as an excel-

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somehow compile a trade-union pamphlet on the basis solely of legal material, but it could not be done on the basis of illegal material alone. In gathering illegal material from workers on questions like those dealt with in the publications of *Rabochaya Mysl*, we waste a great deal of the efforts of revolutionaries (whose place in this work could very easily be taken by legal workers), and yet we never obtain good material. The reason is that a worker who very often knows only a single department of a large factory and almost always the economic results, but not the general conditions and standards of his work, cannot acquire the knowledge which is possessed by the office staff of a factory, by inspectors, doctors, etc., and which is scattered in petty newspaper reports and in special industrial, medical, Zemstvo, and other publications.

I vividly recall my "first experiment", which I would never like to repeat. I spent many weeks "examining" a worker, who would often visit me, regarding every aspect of the conditions prevailing in the enormous factory at which he was employed. True, after great effort, I managed to obtain material for a description (of the one single factory!), but at the end of the interview the worker would wipe the sweat from his brow, and say to me smilingly: 'I find it easier to work overtime than to answer your questions."

The more energetically we carry on our revolutionary struggle, the more the government will be compelled to legalise part of the "trade-union" work, thereby relieving us of part of our burden.

lent handbook for agitators on economic questions in backward localities or among the backward strata of the workers. Examples of successful strikes in a given region, information on higher living standards, on improved working conditions, in one locality, would encourage the workers in other localities to take up the fight again and again. Fourthly, having made a start in generalising the trade-union struggle and in this way strengthening the link between the Russian trade-union movement and socialism, the Social-Democrats would at the same time see to it that our trade-union work occupied neither too small nor too large a place in our Social-Democratic work as a whole. A local organisation that is cut off from organisations in other towns finds it very difficult, sometimes almost impossible, to maintain a correct sense of proportion (the example of *Rabochaya Mysl* shows what a monstrous exaggeration can be made in the direction of trade-unionism) But an All-Russian organisation of revolutionaries that stands undeviatingly on the basis of Marxism, that leads the entire political struggle and possesses a staff of professional agitators, will never find it difficult to determine the proper proportion.

V

THE "PLAN" FOR AN ALL-RUSSIA POLITICAL NEWSPAPER

"The most serious blunder *Iskra* committed in this connection" writes B. Krichevsky (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 30), charging us with a tendency to "convert theory into a lifeless doctrine by isolating it from practice", "was its 'plan' for a general party organisation" (viz., the article entitled "Where To Begin"*). Martynov echoes this idea in declaring that "*Iskra*'s tendency to belittle the significance of the forward march of the drab everyday struggle in comparison with the propaganda of brilliant and completed ideas ... was crowned with the plan for the organisation of a party which it sets forth in the article entitled 'Where To Begin' in issue No. 4" (ibid., p. 61). Finally, L. Nadezhdin

* See present volume, pp. 13-24.—*Ed.*

has of late joined in the chorus of indignation against this "plan" (the quotation marks were meant to express sarcasm). In his pamphlet, which we have just received, entitled *The Eve of the Revolution* (published by the "Revolutionary-Socialist Group" *Svoboda*, whose acquaintance we have made), he declares (p. 126): "To speak now of an organisation held together by an All-Russian newspaper means propagating armchair ideas and armchair work" and represents a manifestation of "bookishness", etc.

That our terrorist turns out to be in agreement with the champions of the "forward march of the drab everyday struggle" is not surprising, since we have traced the roots of this intimacy between them in the chapters on politics and organisation. But we must draw attention here to the fact that Nadezhdin is the only one who has conscientiously tried to grasp the train of thought in an article he disliked and has made an attempt to reply to the point, whereas *Rabocheye Dyelo*, has said nothing that is material to the subject, but has tried merely to confuse the question by a series of unseemly, demagogic sallies. Unpleasant though the task may be, we must first spend some time in cleansing this Augean stable.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A. WHO WAS OFFENDED BY THE ARTICLE "WHERE TO BEGIN"

Let us present a small selection of the expletives and exclamations that *Rabocheye Dyelo* hurled at us. "It is not a newspaper that can create a party organisation, but vice versa...." A newspaper, standing *above* the party, *outside of its control*, and independent of it, thanks to its having its own staff of agents...." "By what miracle has *Iskra* forgotten about the actually existing Social-Democratic organisations of the party to which it belongs?..." "Those who possess firm principles and a corresponding plan are the supreme regulators of the real struggle of the party and dictate to it their plan...." "The plan drives our active and virile organisations into the kingdom of shadows and desires to call into being a fantastic network of agents...." "Were *Iskra*'s plan carried into effect, every trace of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which is taking shape, would be

obliterated...." "A propagandist organ becomes an uncontrolled autocratic law-maker for the entire practical revolutionary struggle...." "How should our Party react to the suggestion that it be *completely* subordinated to an autonomous editorial board?", etc., etc.

As the reader can see from the contents and the tone of these above quotations, *Rabocheye Dyelo has taken offence*. Offence, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the organisations and committees of our Party which it alleges *Iskra* desires to drive into the kingdom of shadows and whose very traces it would obliterate. How terrible! But a curious thing should be noted. The article "Where To Begin" appeared in May 1901. The articles in *Rabocheye Dyelo* appeared in September 1901. Now we are in mid-January 1902. During these five months (prior to and after September), *not a single* committee and *not a single* organisation of the Party protested formally against this monster that seeks to drive them into the kingdom of shadows; and yet scores and hundreds of communications from all parts of Russia have appeared during this period in *Iskra*, as well as in numerous local and non-local publications. How could it happen that those who would be driven into the realm of shadows are not aware of it and have not taken offence, though a third party has?

The explanation is that the committees and other organisations are engaged in real work and are not playing at "democracy". The committees read the article "Where To Begin", saw that it represented an attempt "to elaborate a definite plan for an organisation, *so that its formation may be undertaken from all aspects*"; and since they knew and saw very well that *not one* of these "sides" would dream of "setting about to build it" until it was convinced of its necessity, and of the correctness of the architectural plan, it has naturally never occurred to them to take offence at the boldness of the people who said in *Iskra*: "In view of the pressing importance of the question we, on our part, take the liberty of submitting to the comrades a skeleton plan to be developed in greater detail in a pamphlet now in preparation for the print." With a conscientious approach to the work, was it possible to view things otherwise than that if the comrades *accepted* the plan submitted to them, they would carry it

out, not because they are "subordinate", but because they would be convinced of its necessity for our common cause, and that if they *did not accept it*, then the "skeleton" (a pretentious word, is it not?) would remain merely a skeleton? Is it not demagogy to fight against the skeleton of a plan, not only by "picking it to pieces" and advising comrades to reject it, but by *inciting* people inexperienced in revolutionary matters against its authors *merely on the grounds* that they *dare* to "legislate" and come out as the "supreme regulators", i.e., because they dare *to propose* an outline of a plan? Can our Party develop and make progress if an attempt to *raise* local functionaries to broader views, tasks, plans, etc., is objected to, not only with the claim that these views are erroneous, but on the grounds that the very "desire" to "*raise*" us gives "offence"? Nadezhdin, too, "picked" our plan "to pieces", but he did not sink to such demagogy as cannot be explained solely by naïveté or by primitiveness of political views. From the outset, he emphatically rejected the charge that we intended to establish an "inspectorship over the Party". That is why Nadezhdin's criticism of the plan can and should be answered on its merits, while *Rabocheye Dyelo* deserves only to be treated with contempt.

But contempt for a writer who sinks so low as to shout about autocracy and "subordination" does not relieve us of the duty of disentangling the confusion that such people create in the minds of their readers. Here we can clearly demonstrate to the world the nature of catchwords like "broad democracy". We are accused of forgetting the committees, of desiring or attempting to drive them into the kingdom of shadows, etc. How can we reply to these charges when, out of considerations of secrecy, we *can give* the reader *almost no facts* regarding our real relationships with the committees? Persons hurling vehement accusations calculated to provoke the crowd prove to be ahead of us because of their brazenness and their disregard of the duty of a revolutionary to conceal carefully from the eyes of the world the relationships and contacts which he maintains, which he is establishing or trying to establish. Naturally, we refuse once and for all to compete with such people in the field of "democratism". As to the reader who is not initiated in all Party affairs, the only way in which we can discharge our duty to him is to

acquaint him, not with what is and what is *im Werden* but with *a particle* of what has taken place and what may be told as a thing of the past.

The Bund hints that we are "impostors"*; the Union Abroad accuses us of attempting to obliterate all traces of the Party. Gentlemen, you will get complete satisfaction when we relate to the public *four facts* concerning the past.

First fact.** The members of one of the Leagues of Struggle, who took a direct part in founding our Party and in sending a delegate to the Inaugural Party Congress, reached agreement with a member of the *Iskra* group regarding the publication of a series of books for workers that were to serve the entire movement. The attempt to publish the series failed and the pamphlets written for it, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* and *The New Factory Law*,*** by a circuitous course and through the medium of third parties, found their way abroad, where they were published.[184]

Second fact. Members of the Central Committee of the Bund approached a member of the *Iskra* group with the proposal to organise what the Bund then described as a "literary laboratory". In making the proposal, they stated that unless this was done, the movement would greatly retrogress. The result of these negotiations was the appearance of the pamphlet *The Working-Class Cause in Russia*.****

Third fact. The Central Committee of the Bund, via a provincial town, approached a member of the *Iskra* group with the proposal that he undertake the editing of the revived *Rabochaya Gazeta* and, of course, obtained his consent. The offer was later modified: the comrade in question was invited to act as a contributor, in view of a new plan for the

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* *Iskra*, No. 8. The reply of the Central Committee of the General Jewish Union of Russia and Poland to our article on the national question.

** We deliberately refrain from relating these facts[183] in the sequence of their occurrence.

*** See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51 and 267-315.—*Ed.*

**** The author requests me to state that, like his previous pamphlets, this one was sent to the Union Abroad on the assumption that its publications were edited by the Emancipation of Labour group (owing to certain circumstances, he could not then—February 1899—know of the change in editorship). The pamphlet will be republished by the League[185] at an early date.

composition of the Editorial Board. Also this proposal, of course, obtained his consent.[186] Articles were sent (which we managed to preserve): "Our Programme" which was a direct protest against Bernsteinism, against the change in the line of the legal literature and of *Rabochaya Mysl*; "Our Immediate Task" ("to publish a Party organ that shall appear regularly and have close contacts with all the local groups", the drawbacks of the prevailing "amateurism"); "An Urgent Question" (an examination of the objection that it is necessary *first* to develop the activities of local groups before undertaking the publication of a common organ; an insistence on the paramount importance of a "revolutionary organisation" and on the necessity of "developing organisation, discipline, and the technique of secrecy to the highest degree of perfection").* The proposal to resume publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta* was not carried out, and the articles were not published.

Fourth fact. A member of the committee that was organising the second regular congress of our Party communicated to a member of the *Iskra* group the programme of the congress and proposed that group as editorial board of the revived *Rabochaya Gazeta*. This preliminary step, as it were, was later sanctioned by the committee to which this member belonged, and by the Central Committee of the Bund.[187] The *Iskra* group was notified of the place and time of the congress and (uncertain of being able, for certain reasons, to send a delegate) drew up a written report for the congress. In the report, the idea was suggested that the mere election of a Central Committee would not only fail to solve the question of unification at a time of such complete disorder as the present, but would even compromise the grand idea of establishing a party, in the event of an early, swift, and thorough police round-up, which was more than likely in view of the prevailing lack of secrecy; that therefore, a beginning should be made by inviting all committees and all other organisations to support the revived common organ, which would establish *real* contacts between all the committees and *really* train a group of leaders for the entire movement; and that the committees and the Party would very easily

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 210-14, 215-20, 221-26.—*Ed.*

be able to transform such a group into a Central Committee as soon as the group had grown and become strong. In consequence of a number of police raids and arrests, however, the congress could not take place. For security reasons the report was destroyed, having been read only by a few comrades, including the representatives of one committee.

Let the reader now judge for himself the character of the methods employed by the Bund in hinting that we were impostors, or by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which accuses us of trying to relegate the committees to the kingdom of shadows and to "substitute" for the organisation of a party an organisation disseminating the ideas advocated by a single newspaper. It was to the committees, *on their repeated invitation*, that we reported on the necessity for adopting a definite plan of concerted activities. It was precisely for the Party organisation that we elaborated this plan, in articles sent to *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and in the report to the Party congress, again on the invitation of those who held such an influential position in the Party that they took the initiative in its (actual) restoration. Only after the *twice* repeated attempts of the Party organisation, *in conjunction with ourselves*, *officially* to revive the central organ of the Party had failed, did we consider it our bounden duty to publish an *unofficial* organ, in order that with the *third* attempt the comrades might have before them the results of *experience* and not merely conjectural proposals. Now certain results of this experience are present for all to see, and all comrades may now judge whether we properly understood our duties and what should be thought of people that strive to mislead those unacquainted with the immediate past, simply because they are piqued at our having pointed out to some their inconsistency on the "national" question, and to others the inadmissibility of their vacillation in matters of principle.

B. CAN A NEWSPAPER BE A COLLECTIVE ORGANISER?

The quintessence of the article "Where To Begin" consists in the fact that it discusses *precisely* this question and gives an affirmative reply to it. As far as we know, the only attempt to examine this question on its merits and to prove that it

must be answered in the negative was made by L. Nadezhdin, whose argument we reproduce in full:

"... It pleased us greatly to see *Iskra* (No. 4) present the question of the need for an All-Russian newspaper; but we cannot agree that this presentation bears relevance to the title 'Where To Begin'. Undoubtedly this is an extremely important matter, but neither a newspaper, nor a series of popular leaflets, nor a mountain of manifestoes, can serve as the basis for a militant organisation in revolutionary times. We must set to work to build strong political organisations in the localities. We lack such organisations; we have been carrying on our work mainly among enlightened workers, while the masses have been engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle. *If strong political organisations are not trained locally, what significance will even an excellently organised All-Russian newspaper have?* It will be a burning bush, burning without being consumed, but firing no one! *Iskra* thinks that around it and in the activities in its behalf people will gather and organise. *But they will find it far easier to gather and organise around activities that are more concrete.* This something more concrete must and should be the extensive organisation of local newspapers, the immediate preparation of the workers' forces for demonstrations, the constant activity of local organisations among the unemployed (indefatigable distribution of pamphlets and leaflets, convening of meetings, appeals to actions of protest against the government, etc.). We must begin live political work in the localities, and when the time comes to unite on this real basis, it will not be an artificial, paper unity; not by means of newspapers can such a unification of local work into an All-Russian cause be achieved!" (*The Eve of the Revolution*, p. 54.)

We have emphasised the passages in this eloquent tirade that most clearly show the author's incorrect judgement of our plan, as well as the incorrectness of his point of view in general, which is here contraposed to that of *Iskra*. Unless we train strong political organisations in the localities, even an excellently organised All-Russian newspaper will be of no avail. This is incontrovertible. But the whole point is that *there is no other way* of *training* strong political organisations except through the medium of an All-Russian newspaper. The author missed the most important statement *Iskra* made *before it proceeded* to set forth its "plan": that it was necessary "to call for the formation of a revolutionary organisation, capable of uniting all forces and guiding the movement in actual practice and *not in name alone*, that is, *an organisation ready at any time to support every protest and every outbreak* and use it to build up and consolidate the fighting forces suitable for the decisive struggle". But

now after the February and March events, everyone will agree with this in principle, continues *Iskra*. Yet what we need is not a solution of the question in principle, but its *practical solution*; we must immediately advance a definite constructive plan through which all may immediately set to work to build *from every side*. Now we are again being dragged away from the practical solution towards something which in principle is correct, indisputable, and great, but which is entirely inadequate and incomprehensible to the broad masses of workers, namely, "to rear strong political organisations"! This is not the point at issue, most worthy author. The point is *how* to go about the rearing and how to accomplish it.

It is not true to say that "we have been carrying on our work mainly among enlightened workers, while the masses have been engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle". Presented in such a form, the thesis reduces itself to *Svoboda*'s usual but fundamentally false contraposition of the enlightened workers to the "masses". In recent years, even the enlightened workers have been "engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle". That is the first point. On the other hand, the masses will never learn to conduct the political struggle until we help *to train* leaders for this struggle, both from among the enlightened workers and from among the intellectuals. Such leaders can acquire training *solely* by systematically evaluating *all* the everyday aspects of our political life, *all attempts* at protest and struggle on the part of the various classes and on various grounds. Therefore, to talk of "rearing political organisations" and at the same time *to contrast* the "paper work" of a political newspaper to "live political work in the localities" is plainly ridiculous. *Iskra* has adapted its "plan" for a newspaper to the "plan" for creating a "militant preparedness" to support the unemployed movement, peasant revolts, discontent among the Zemstvo people, "popular indignation against some tsarist bashi-bazouk on the rampage", etc. Anyone who is at all acquainted with the movement knows full well that the vast majority of local organisations have *never even dreamed* of these things; that many of the prospects of "live political work" here indicated *have never* been realised by a single organisation; that the attempt, for example, to call

attention to the growth of discontent and protest among the Zemstvo intelligentsia rouses feelings of consternation and perplexity in Nadezhdin ("Good Lord, is this newspaper intended for Zemstvo people?"—*The Eve*, p. 129), among the Economists (Letter to *Iskra*, No. 12), and among many practical workers. Under these circumstances, it is possible to "begin" *only* by inducing people *to think* about all these things, to summarise and generalise all the diverse signs of ferment and active struggle. In our time, when Social-Democratic tasks are being degraded, *the only way* "live political work" can be *begun* is with live political agitation, which is impossible unless we have an All-Russian newspaper, frequently issued and regularly distributed.

Those who regard the *Iskra* "plan" as a manifestation of "bookishness" have totally failed to understand its substance and take for the goal that which is suggested as the most suitable means for the present time. These people have not taken the trouble to study the two comparisons that were drawn to present a clear illustration of the plan. *Iskra* wrote: The publication of an All-Russian political newspaper must be *the main line* by which we may unswervingly develop, deepen, and expand the organisation (viz., the revolutionary organisation that is ever ready to support every protest and every outbreak). Pray tell me, when bricklayers lay bricks in various parts of an enormous, unprecedentedly large structure, is it "paper" work to use a line to help them find the correct place for the bricklaying; to indicate to them the ultimate goal of the common work; to enable them to use, not only every brick, but even every piece of brick which, cemented to the bricks laid before and after it, forms a finished, continuous line? And are we not now passing through precisely such a period in our Party life when we have bricks and bricklayers, but lack the guide line for all to see and follow? Let them shout that in stretching out the line, we want to command. Had we desired to command, gentlemen, we would have written on the title page, not "*Iskra*, No. 1", but "*Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 3", as we were invited to do by certain comrades, and *as we would have had a perfect right to do* after the events described above. But we did not do that. We wished to have our hands free to wage an irreconcilable struggle against all pseudo-Social-Democrats; we wanted our

line, if properly laid, to be respected because it was correct, and not because it had been laid by an official organ.

"The question of uniting local activity in central bodies runs in a vicious circle," Nadezhdin lectures us; "unification requires homogeneity of the elements, and the homogeneity can be created only by something that unites; but the unifying element may be the product of strong local organisations which at the present time are by no means distinguished for their homogeneity." This truth is as revered and as irrefutable as that we must train strong political organisations. And it is equally barren. *Every* question "runs in a vicious circle" because political life as a whole is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole art of politics lies in finding and taking as firm a grip as we can of the link that is least likely to be struck from our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that most of all guarantees its possessor the possession of the whole chain.* If we had a crew of experienced bricklayers who had learned to work so well together that they could lay their bricks exactly as required without a guide line (which, speaking abstractly, is by no means impossible), then perhaps we might take hold of some other link. But it is unfortunate that as yet we have no experienced bricklayers trained for teamwork, that bricks are often laid where they are not needed at all, that they are not laid according to the general line, but are so scattered that the enemy can shatter the structure as if it were made of sand and not of bricks.

Another comparison: "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser. In this respect *it may be compared to the scaffolding* erected round a building under construction; it marks the contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the builders, permitting them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their

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* Comrade Krichevsky and Comrade Martynov! I call your attention to this outrageous manifestation of "autocracy", "uncontrolled authority", "supreme regulating", etc. Just think of it: a desire *to possess* the whole chain!! Send in a complaint at once. Here you have a ready-made topic for two leading articles for No. 12 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*!

organised labour."* Does this sound anything like the attempt of an armchair author to exaggerate his role? The scaffolding is not required at all for the dwelling; it is made of cheaper material, is put up only temporarily, and is scrapped for firewood as soon as the shell of the structure is completed. As for the building of revolutionary organisations, experience shows that sometimes they may be built without scaffolding, as the seventies showed. But at the present time we cannot even imagine the possibility of erecting the building we require without scaffolding.

Nadezhdin disagrees with this, saying: "*Iskra* thinks that around it and in the activities in its behalf people will gather and organise. *But they will find it far easier* to gather and organise around *activities that are more concrete*!" Indeed, "far easier around activities that are more concrete". A Russian proverb holds: "Don't spit into a well, you may want to drink from it." But there are people who do not object to drinking from a well that has been spat into. What despicable things our magnificent, legal "Critics of Marxism" and illegal admirers of *Rabochaya Mysl* have said in the name of this something more concrete! How restricted our movement is by our own narrowness, lack of initiative, and hesitation, which are justified with the traditional argument about finding it "far easier to gather around something more concrete"! And Nadezhdin—who regards himself as possessing a particularly keen sense of the "realities of life", who so severely condemns "armchair" authors and (with pretensions to wit) accuses *Iskra* of a weakness for seeing Economism everywhere, and who sees himself standing far above the division between the orthodox and the Critics—fails to see that with his arguments he contributes to the narrowness that arouses his indignation and that he is drinking from the most spat-in well! The sincerest indignation against narrowness, the most passionate desire to raise its worshippers from their knees, will not suffice if the indignant one is swept along without sail or rudder and, as "spontaneously" as the revolutionaries of the seventies, clutches at such things as "excitative

* Martynov, in quoting the first sentence of this passage in *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10, p. 62), omitted the second, as if desiring to emphasise either his unwillingness to discuss the essentials of the question or his inability to understand them.

terror", "agrarian terror", "sounding the tocsin", etc. Let us take a glance at these "more concrete" activities around which he thinks it will be "far easier" to gather and organise: (1) local newspapers; (2) preparations for demonstrations; (3) work among the unemployed. It is immediately apparent that all these things have been seized upon at random as a pretext for saying something; for, however we may regard them, it would be absurd to see in them anything especially suitable for "gathering and organising". The selfsame Nadezhdin says a few pages further: "It is time we simply stated the fact that activity of a very pitiable kind is being carried on in the localities, the committees are not doing a tenth of what they could do ... the coordinating centres we have at present are the purest fiction, representing a sort of revolutionary bureaucracy, whose members mutually grant generalships to one another; and so it will continue until strong local organisations grow up." These remarks, though exaggerating the position somewhat, no doubt contain many a bitter truth; but can it be said that Nadezhdin does not perceive the connection between the pitiable activity in the localities and the narrow mental outlook of the functionaries, the narrow scope of their activities, inevitable in the circumstances of the lack of training of Party workers confined to local organisations? Has he, like the author of the article on organisation, published in *Svoboda*, forgotten how the transition to a broad local press (from 1898) was accompanied by a strong intensification of Economism and "primitiveness"? Even if a "broad local press" could be established at all satisfactorily (and we have shown this to be impossible, save in very, exceptional cases)—even then the local organs could not "gather and organise" *all* the revolutionary forces for a *general* attack upon the autocracy and for leadership of the *united* struggle. Let us not forget that we are here discussing *only* the "rallying", organising significance of the newspaper, and we could put to Nadezhdin, who defends fragmentation, the question he himself has ironically put: "Have we been left a legacy of 200,000 revolutionary organisers?" Furthermore, "preparations for demonstrations" cannot be *contraposed* to *Iskra*'s plan, for the very reason that this plan includes the organisation of the broadest possible demonstrations *as one of its aims*; the point under discussion is

the selection of the practical *means*. On this point also Nadezhdin is confused, for he has lost sight of the fact that only forces that are "gathered and organised" can "prepare for" demonstrations (which hitherto, in the overwhelming majority of cases, have taken place spontaneously) and that we *lack* precisely *the ability* to rally and organise. "Work among the unemployed." Again the same confusion; for this too represents one of the field operations of the mobilised forces and not a plan for mobilising the forces. The extent to which Nadezhdin here too underestimates the harm caused by our fragmentation, by our lack of "200,000 organisers", can be seen from the fact that: many people (including Nadezhdin) have reproached *Iskra* for the paucity of the news it gives on unemployment and for the casual nature of the correspondence it publishes about the most common affairs of rural life. The reproach is justified; but *Iskra* is "guilty without sin". We strive "to stretch a line" through the countryside too, where there are hardly any bricklayers anywhere, and we are *obliged* to encourage *everyone* who informs us even as regards the most common facts, in the hope that this will increase the number of our contributors in the given field and will ultimately *train us all* to select facts that are really the most outstanding. But the material on which we can train is so scanty that, unless we generalise it for the whole of Russia, we shall have very little to train on at all. No doubt, one with at least as much ability as an agitator and as much knowledge of the life of the vagrant as Nadezhdin manifests could render priceless service to the movement by carrying on agitation among the unemployed; but such a person would be simply hiding his light under a bushel if he failed to inform *all* comrades in Russia as regards every step he took in his work, so that others, who, in the mass, still lack the ability to undertake new kinds of work, might learn from his example.

All without exception now talk of the importance of unity, of the necessity for "gathering and organising"; but in the majority of cases what is lacking is a definite idea of where to begin and how to bring about this unity. Probably all will agree that if we "unite", say, the district circles in a given town, it will be necessary to have for this purpose *common institutions*, i.e., not merely the common title of

"League", but genuinely *common* work, exchange of material, experience, and forces, distribution of functions, not only by districts, but through specialisation on a town-wide scale. All will agree that a big secret apparatus will not pay its way (to use a commercial expression) "with the resources" (in both money and manpower, of course) of a single district, and that this narrow field will not provide sufficient scope for a specialist to develop his talents. But the same thing applies to the co-ordination of activities of a number of towns, since even a specific locality *will be* and, in the history of our Social-Democratic movement, has proved to be, far too narrow a field; we have demonstrated this above in detail with regard to political agitation and organisational work. What we require foremost and imperatively is to broaden the field, establish *real* contacts between the towns on the basis of *regular*, *common* work; for fragmentation weighs down on the people and they are "stuck in a hole" (to use the expression employed by a correspondent to *Iskra*), not knowing what is happening in the world, from whom to learn, or how to acquire experience and satisfy their desire to engage in broad activities. I continue to insist that we can *start* establishing *real* contacts only with the aid of a common newspaper, as the only regular, All-Russian enterprise, one which will summarise the results of the most diverse forms of activity and thereby *stimulate* people to march forward untiringly along *all* the innumerable paths leading to revolution, in the same way as all roads lead to Rome. If we do not want unity in name only, we must arrange for all local study circles *immediately to assign*, say, a fourth of their forces to *active* work for the *common* cause, and the newspaper will immediately convey to them* the general design, scope, and character of the cause; it will give them a precise indication of the most keenly felt shortcomings in the All-Russian activity, where agitation is lacking and contacts are weak, and it will point out which little wheels in the vast general mechanism

* *A reservation*: that is, if a given study circle sympathises with the policy of the newspaper and considers it useful to become a collaborator, meaning by that, not only for literary collaboration, but for revolutionary collaboration generally. *Note for Rabocheye Dyelo*: Among revolutionaries who attach value to the cause and not to playing at democracy, who do not separate "sympathy" from the most active and lively participation, this reservation is taken for granted.

a given study circle might repair or replace with better ones. A study circle that has not yet begun to work, but which is only just seeking activity, could then start, not like a craftsman in an isolated little workshop unaware of the earlier development in "industry" or of the general level of production methods prevailing in industry, but as a participant in an extensive enterprise that *reflects* the whole general revolutionary attack on the autocracy. The more perfect the finish of each little wheel and the larger the number of detail workers engaged in the common cause, the closer will our network become and the less will be the disorder in the ranks consequent on inevitable police raids.

The mere function of distributing a newspaper would help to establish *actual* contacts (if it is a newspaper worthy of the name, i.e., if it is issued regularly, not once a month like a magazine, but at least four times a month). At the present time, communication between towns on revolutionary business is an extreme rarity, and, at all events, is the exception rather than the rule. If we had a newspaper, however, such communication would become the rule and would secure, not only the distribution of the newspaper, of course, but (what is more important) an exchange of experience, of material, of forces, and of resources. Organisational work would immediately acquire much greater scope, and the success of one locality would serve as a standing encouragement to further perfection; it would arouse the desire to utilise the experience gained by comrades working in other parts of the country. Local work would become far richer and more varied than it is at present. Political and economic exposures gathered from all over Russia would provide mental food for workers of all trades and *all stages of development*; they would provide material and occasion for talks and readings on the most diverse subjects, which would, in addition, be suggested by hints in the legal press, by talk among the people, and by "shamefaced" government statements. Every outbreak, every demonstration, would be weighed and discussed in its every aspect in all parts of Russia and would thus stimulate a desire to keep up with, and even surpass, the others (we socialists do not by any means flatly reject all emulation or all "competition"!) and consciously prepare that which at first, as it were, sprang up spontaneously,

a desire to take advantage of the favourable conditions in a given district or at a given moment for modifying the plan of attack, etc. At the same time, this revival of local work would obviate that desperate, "convulsive" exertion of *all* efforts and risking of *all* forces which every single demonstration or the publication of every single issue of a local newspaper now frequently entails. On the one hand, the police would find it much more difficult to get at the "roots", if they did not know in what district to dig down for them. On the other hand, regular common work would train our people to adjust the force of a *given* attack to the strength of the given contingent of the common army (at the present time hardly anyone ever thinks of doing that, because in nine cases out of ten these attacks occur spontaneously); such regular common work would facilitate the "transportation" from one place to another, not only of literature, but also of revolutionary forces.

In a great many cases these forces are now being bled white on restricted local work, but under the circumstances we are discussing it would be possible to transfer a capable agitator or organiser from one end of the country to the other, and the occasion for doing this would constantly arise. Beginning with short journeys on Party business at the Party's expense, the comrades would become accustomed to being maintained by the Party, to becoming professional revolutionaries, and to training themselves as real political leaders.

And if indeed we succeeded in reaching the point when all, or at least a considerable majority, of the local committees, local groups, and study circles took up active work for the common cause, we could, in the not distant future, establish a weekly newspaper for regular distribution in tens of thousands of copies throughout Russia. This newspaper would become part of an enormous pair of smith's bellows that would fan every spark of the class struggle and of popular indignation into a general conflagration. Around what is in itself still a very innocuous and very small, but regular and *common*, effort, in the full sense of the word, a regular army of tried fighters would systematically gather and receive their training. On the ladders and scaffolding of this general organisational structure there would soon develop and come

to the fore Social-Democratic Zhelyabovs from among our revolutionaries and Russian Bebels from among our workers, who would take their place at the head of the mobilised army and rouse the whole people to settle accounts with the shame and the curse of Russia.

That is what we should dream of!

* * *

"We should dream!" I wrote these words and became alarmed. I imagined myself sitting at a "unity conference" and opposite me were the *Rabocheye Dyelo* editors and contributors. Comrade Martynov rises and, turning to me, says sternly: "Permit me to ask you, has an autonomous editorial board the right to dream without first soliciting the opinion of the Party committees?" He is followed by Comrade Krichevsky, who (philosophically deepening Comrade Martynov, who long ago rendered Comrade Plekhanov more profound) continues even more sternly: "I go further. I ask, has a Marxist any right at all to dream, knowing that according to Marx, mankind always sets itself the tasks it can solve and that tactics is a process of the growth of Party tasks which grow together with the Party?"

The very thought of these stern questions sends a cold shiver down my spine and makes me wish for nothing but a place to hide in. I shall try to hide behind the back of Pisarev.

"There are rifts and rifts," wrote Pisarev of the rift between dreams and reality. "My dream may run ahead of the natural march of events or may fly off at a tangent in a direction in which no natural march of events will ever proceed. In the first case my dream will not cause any harm; it may even support and augment the energy of the working men.... There is nothing in such dreams that would distort or paralyse labour-power. On the contrary, if man were completely deprived of the ability to dream in this way, if he could not from time to time run ahead and mentally conceive, in an entire and completed picture, the product to which his hands are only just beginning to lend shape, then I cannot at all imagine what stimulus there would be to induce man to undertake and complete extensive and strenuous work in the

sphere of art, science, and practical endeavour.... The rift between dreams and reality causes no harm if only the person dreaming believes seriously in his dream, if he attentively observes life, compares his observations with his castles in the air, and if, generally speaking, he works conscientiously for the achievement of his fantasies. If there is some connection between dreams and life then all is well."[188]

Of this kind of dreaming there is unfortunately too little in our movement. And the people most responsible for this are those who boast of their sober views, their "closeness" to the "concrete", the representatives of legal criticism and of illegal "tail-ism".

C. WHAT TYPE OF ORGANISATION DO WE REQUIRE?

From what has been said the reader will see that our "tactics-as-plan" consists in rejecting an immediate *call* for assault; in demanding "to lay effective siege to the enemy fortress"; or, in other words, in demanding that all efforts be directed towards gathering, organising, and *mobilising* a permanent army. When we ridiculed *Rabocheye Dyelo* for its leap from Economism to shouting for an assault (for which it clamoured in *April* 1901, in "*Listok*" *Rabochevo Dyela*, No. 6), it of course came down on us with accusations of being "doctrinaire", of failing to understand our revolutionary duty, of calling for caution, etc. Of course, we were not in the least surprised to hear these accusations from those who totally lack principles and who evade all arguments by references to a profound "tactics-as-process", any more than we were surprised by the fact that these charges were repeated by Nadezhdin, who in general has a supreme contempt for durable programmes and the fundamentals of tactics.

It is said that history does not repeat itself. But Nadezhdin exerts every effort to cause it to repeat itself and he zealously imitates Tkachov[189] in strongly condemning "revolutionary culturism", in shouting about "sounding the tocsin" and about a special "eve-of-the-revolution point of view", etc. Apparently, he has forgotten the well-known maxim that while an original historical event represents a tragedy, its replica is merely a farce.[190] The attempt to seize power, which was prepared by the preaching of Tkachov and carried

out by means of the "terrifying" terror that did really terrify, had grandeur, but the "excitative" terror of a Tkachov the Little is simply ludicrous, particularly so when it is supplemented with the idea of an organisation of average people.

"If *Iskra* would only emerge from its sphere of bookishness," wrote Nadezhdin, "it would realise that these [instances like the worker's letter to *Iskra*, No. 7, etc.] are symptoms of the fact that soon, very soon, the 'assault' will begin, and to speak now [*sic*!] of an organisation linked with an All-Russian newspaper means to propagate armchair ideas and armchair activity." What an unimaginable muddle—on the one hand, excitative terror and an "organisation of average people", along with the opinion that it is far "easier" to gather around something "more concrete", like a local newspaper, and, on the other, the view that to talk "now" about an All-Russian organisation means to propagate armchair thoughts, or, bluntly put, "now" it is already too late! But what of the "extensive organisation of local newspapers"—is it not too late for that, my dear L. Nadezhdin? And compare with this *Iskra*'s point of view and tactical line: excitative terror is nonsense; to talk of an organisation of average people and of the *extensive* publication of local newspapers means to fling the door wide open to Economism. We must speak of a single All-Russian organisation of revolutionaries, and it will never be too late to talk of that until the real, not a paper, assault begins.

"Yes, as far as organisation is concerned the situation is anything but brilliant," continues Nadezhdin. "Yes, *Iskra* is entirely right in saying that the mass of our fighting forces consists of volunteers and insurgents.... You do well to give such a sober picture of the state of our forces. But why, at the same time, do you forget that *the masses are not ours at all*, and consequently, *will not ask us* when to begin military operations; they will simply go and 'rebel'.... When the crowd itself breaks out with its elemental destructive force it *may* overwhelm and sweep aside the 'regular troops' among whom we prepared all the time to introduce extremely systematic organisation, but never *managed* to do so." (Our italics.)

Astounding logic! *For the very reason* that the "masses are not ours" it is stupid and unseemly to shout about an immediate "assault", for assault means attack by regular troops and not a spontaneous mass upsurge. For the very reason that the masses *may* overwhelm and sweep aside the regular

troops we must without fail "manage to keep up" with the spontaneous upsurge by our work of "introducing extremely systematic organisation" in the regular troops, for the more we "manage" to introduce such organisation the more probably will the regular troops not be overwhelmed by the masses, but will take their place at their head. Nadezhdin is confused because he imagines that troops in the course of systematic organisation are engaged in something that isolates them from the masses, when in actuality they are engaged exclusively in all-sided and all-embracing political agitation, i.e., precisely in work that *brings closer and merges into a single whole* the elemental destructive force of the masses and the conscious destructive force of the organisation of revolutionaries. You, gentlemen, wish to lay the blame where it does not belong. For it is precisely the *Svoboda* group that, by including terror *in its programme*, calls for an organisation of terrorists, and such an organisation would indeed prevent our troops from establishing closer contacts with the masses, which, unfortunately, are still not ours, and which, unfortunately, do not yet ask us, or rarely ask us, when and how to launch their military operations.

"We shall miss the revolution itself," continues Nadezhdin in his attempt to scare *Iskra*, "in the same way as we missed the recent events, which came upon us like a bolt from the blue." This sentence, taken in connection with what has been quoted above, clearly demonstrates the absurdity of the "eve-of-the-revolution point of view" invented by *Svoboda*.* Plainly put, this special "point of view" boils down to this that it is too late "now" to discuss and prepare. If that is the case, most worthy opponent of "bookishness", what was the use of writing a pamphlet of 132 pages on questions of theory**

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* *The Eve of the Revolution*, p. 62.

** In his *Review of Questions of Theory*, Nadezhdin, by the way, made almost no contribution whatever to the discussion of questions of theory, apart, perhaps, from the following passage, a most peculiar one from the "eve-of-the-revolution point of view": "Bernsteinism, on the whole, is losing its acuteness for us at the present moment, as is the question whether Mr. Adamovich will prove that Mr. Struve has already earned a lacing, or, on the contrary, whether Mr. Struve will refute Mr. Adamovich and will refuse to resign—it really makes no difference, because the hour of revolution has struck" (p. 110). One can hardly imagine a more glaring illustration of Nadezhdin's

and tactics"? Don't you think it would have been more becoming for the "eve-of-the-revolution point of view" to have issued 132,000 leaflets containing the summary call, "Bang them—knock'em down!"?

Those who make nation-wide political agitation the cornerstone of their programme, *their tactics*, *and their organisational work*, as *Iskra* does, stand the least risk of missing the revolution. The people who are now engaged throughout Russia in weaving the network of connections that spread from the All-Russian newspaper not only did not miss the spring events, but, on the contrary, gave us an opportunity to foretell them. Nor did they miss the demonstrations that were described in *Iskra*, Nos. 13 and 14; on the contrary, they took part in them, clearly realising that it was their duty to come to the aid of the spontaneously rising masses and, at the same time, through the medium of the newspaper, help all the comrades in Russia to inform themselves of the demonstrations and to make use of their gathered experience. And if they live they will not miss the revolution, which, first and foremost, will demand of us experience in agitation, ability to support (in a Social-Democratic manner) every protest, as well as direct the spontaneous movement, while safeguarding it from the mistakes of friends and the traps of enemies.

We have thus come to the last reason that compels us so strongly to insist on the plan of an organisation centred round an All-Russian newspaper, through the common work for the common newspaper. Only such organisation will ensure the *flexibility* required of a militant Social-Democratic organisation, viz., the ability to adapt itself immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle, the ability, "on the one hand, to avoid an open battle against an overwhelming enemy, when the enemy has concentrated all his forces at one spot and yet, on the other, to

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infinite disregard for theory. We have proclaimed "the eve of the revolution", *therefore* "it really makes no difference" whether or not the orthodox will succeed in finally driving the Critics from their positions! Our wiseacre fails to see that it is precisely during the revolution that we shall stand in need of the results of our theoretical battles with the Critics in order to be able resolutely to combat their *practical* positions!

take advantage of his unwieldiness and to attack him when and where he least expects it".* It would be a grievous error indeed to build the Party organisation in anticipation only of outbreaks and street fighting, or only upon the "forward march of the drab everyday struggle". We must *always* conduct our everyday work and always be prepared for every situation, because very frequently it is almost impossible to foresee when a period of outbreak will give way to a period of calm. In the instances, however, when it is possible to do so, we could not turn this foresight to account for the purpose of reconstructing our organisation; for in an autocratic country these changes take place with astonishing rapidity, being sometimes connected with a single night raid by the tsarist janizaries.[191] And the revolution itself must not by any means be regarded as a single act (as the Nadezhdins apparently imagine), but as a series of more or less powerful outbreaks rapidly alternating with periods of more or less complete calm. For that reason, the principal content of the activity of our Party organisation, the focus of this activity, should be work that is both possible and essential in the period of a most powerful outbreak as well as in the period of complete calm, namely, work of political agitation, connected throughout Russia, illuminating all aspects of life, and conducted among the broadest possible strata of the masses. But this work is *unthinkable* in present-day Russia without an All-Russian newspaper, issued very frequently. The organisation, which will form round this newspaper, the organisation of its *collaborators* (in the broad sense of the word, i.e., all those working for it), will be ready *for*

* *Iskra*, No. 4, "Where To Begin". "Revolutionary culturists, who do not accept the eve-of-the-revolution point of view, are not in the least perturbed by the prospect of working for a long period of time," writes Nadezhdin (p. 62). This brings us to observe: Unless we are able to devise political tactics and an organisational plan for *work over a very long period*, while ensuring, in *the very process of this work*, our Party's readiness to be at its post and fulfil its duty in every contingency whenever the march of events is accelerated—unless we succeed in doing this, we shall prove to be but miserable political adventurers. Only Nadezhdin, who began but yesterday to describe himself as a Social-Democrat, can forget that the aim of Social-Democracy is to transform radically the conditions of life of the whole of mankind and that for this reason it is not permissible for a Social-Democrat to be "perturbed" by the question of the duration of the work.

everything, from upholding the honour, the prestige, and the continuity of the Party in periods of acute revolutionary "depression" to preparing for, appointing the time for, and carrying out the *nation-wide armed uprising*.

Indeed, picture to yourselves a very ordinary occurrence in Russia—the total round-up of our comrades in one or several localities. In the absence of a *single*, common, regular activity that combines *all* the local organisations, such round-ups frequently result in the interruption of the work for many months. If, however, all the local organisations had one common activity, then, even in the event of a very serious round-up, two or three energetic persons could in the course of a few weeks establish contact between the common centre and new youth circles, which, as we know, spring up very quickly even now. And when the common activity, hampered by the arrests, is apparent to all, new circles will be able to come into being and make connections with the centre even more rapidly.

On the other hand, picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this and prepare for it. But *how*? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the purpose of preparing the uprising. Even if we had a Central Committee, it could achieve absolutely nothing by such appointments under present-day Russian conditions. But a network of agents* that would form in the course of establishing and distributing the common newspaper would not have to "sit about and wait" for the call for an uprising, but could carry on the regular activity that would guarantee the highest

* Alas, alas! Again I have let slip that awful word "agents", which jars so much on the democratic cars of the Martynovs! I wonder why this word did not offend the heroes of the seventies and yet offends the amateurs of the nineties? I like the word, because it clearly and trenchantly indicates *the common cause* to which all the agents bend their thoughts and actions, and if I had to replace this word by another, the only word I might select would be the word "collaborator", if it did not suggest a certain bookishness and vagueness. The thing we need is a military organisation of agents. However, the numerous Martynovs (particularly abroad), whose favourite pastime is "mutual grants of generalships to one another", may instead of saying "passport agent" prefer to say, "Chief of the Special Department for Supplying Revolutionaries with Passports". etc.

probability of success in the event of an uprising. Such activity would strengthen our contacts with the broadest strata of the working masses and with all social strata that are discontented with the autocracy, which is of such importance for an uprising. Precisely such activity would serve to cultivate the ability to estimate correctly the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to select the proper moment for an uprising. Precisely such activity would train *all* local organisations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate the whole of Russia and to react to such "incidents" in the most vigorous, uniform, and expedient manner possible; for an uprising is in essence the most vigorous, most uniform, and most expedient "answer" of the entire people to the government. Lastly, it is precisely such activity that would train all revolutionary organisations throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most secret, contacts with one another, thus creating *real* Party unity; for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss' the plan for the uprising and to take the necessary preparatory measures on the eve, measures that must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

In a word, the "plan for an All-Russian political newspaper", far from representing the fruits of the labour of armchair workers, infected with dogmatism and bookishness (as it seemed to those who gave but little thought to it), is the most practical plan for immediate and all-round preparation of the uprising, with, at the same time, no loss of sight for a moment of the pressing day-to-day work.

CONCLUSION

The history of Russian Social-Democracy can be distinctly divided into three periods:

The first period embraces about ten years, approximately from 1884 to 1894. This was the period of the rise and consolidation of the theory and programme of Social-Democracy. The adherents of the new trend in Russia were very few in number. Social-Democracy existed without a working-class movement, and as a political party it was at the embryonic stage of development.

The second period embraces three or four years—1894-98. In this period Social-Democracy appeared on the scene as a social movement, as the upsurge of the masses of the people, as a political party. This is the period of its childhood and adolescence. The intelligentsia was fired with a vast and general zeal for struggle against Narodism and for going among the workers; the workers displayed a general enthusiasm for strike action. The movement made enormous strides. The majority of the leaders were young people who had not reached "the age of thirty-five" which to Mr. N. Mikhailovsky appeared to be a sort of natural border-line. Owing to their youth, they proved to be untrained for practical work and they left the scene with astonishing rapidity. But in the majority of cases the scope of their activity was very wide. Many of them had begun their revolutionary thinking as adherents of Narodnaya Volya. Nearly all had in their early youth enthusiastically worshipped the terrorist heroes. It required a struggle to abandon the captivating impressions of those heroic traditions, and the struggle was accompanied by the breaking off of personal relations with people who were deter-

mined to remain loyal to the Narodnaya Volya and for whom the young Social-Democrats had profound respect. The struggle compelled the youthful leaders to educate themselves to read illegal literature of every trend, and to study closely the questions of legal Narodism. Trained in this struggle, Social-Democrats went into the working-class movement without "for a moment" forgetting either the theory of Marxism, which brightly illumined their path, or the task of overthrowing the autocracy. The formation of the Party in the spring of 1898 was the most striking and at the same time the *last* act of the Social-Democrats of this period.

The third period, as we have seen, was prepared in 1897 and it definitely cut off the second period in 1898 (1898-?). This was a period of disunity, dissolution, and vacillation. During adolescence a youth's voice breaks. And so, in this period, the voice of Russian Social-Democracy began to break, to strike a false note—on the one hand, in the writings of Messrs. Struve and Prokopovich, of Bulgakov and Berdyaev, and on the other, in those of V. I—n and R. M., of B. Krichevsky and Martynov. But it was only the leaders who wandered about separately and drew back; the movement itself continued to grow, and it advanced with enormous strides. The proletarian struggle spread to new strata of the workers and extended to the whole of Russia, at the same time indirectly stimulating the revival of the democratic spirit among the students and among other sections of the population. The political consciousness of the leaders, however, capitulated before the breadth and power of the spontaneous upsurge; among the Social-Democrats, another type had become dominant—the type of functionaries, trained almost exclusively on "legal Marxist" literature, which proved to be all the more inadequate the more the spontaneity of the masses demanded political consciousness on the part of the leaders. The leaders not only lagged behind in regard to theory ("freedom of criticism") and practice ("primitiveness"), but they sought to justify their backwardness by all manner of high-flown arguments. Social-Democracy was degraded to the level of trade-unionism by the Brentano adherents in legal literature, and by the tail-enders in illegal literature. The *Credo* programme began to be put into operation, espe-

cially when the "primitive methods" of the Social-Democrats caused a revival of revolutionary non-Social-Democratic tendencies.

If the reader should feel critical that I have dealt at too great length with a certain *Rabocheye Dyelo*, I can say only that *Rabocheye Dyelo* acquired "historical" significance because it most notably reflected the "spirit" of this third period.* It was not the consistent R. M., but the weathercock Krichevskys and Martynovs who were able properly to express the disunity and vacillation, the readiness to make concessions to "criticism" to "Economism", and to terrorism. Not the lofty contempt for practical work displayed by some worshipper of the "absolute" is characteristic of this period, but the combination of pettifogging practice and utter disregard for theory. It was not so much in the direct rejection of "grandiose phrases" that the heroes of this period engaged as in their vulgarisation. Scientific socialism ceased to be an integral revolutionary theory and became a hodgepodge "freely" diluted with the content of every new German textbook that appeared; the slogan "class struggle" did not impel to broader and more energetic activity but served as a balm, since "the economic struggle is inseparably linked with the political struggle"; the idea of a party did not serve as a call for the creation of a militant organisation of revolutionaries, but was used to justify some sort of "revolutionary bureaucracy" and infantile playing at "democratic" forms.

When the third period will come to an end and the fourth (now heralded by many portents) will begin we do not know. We are passing from the sphere of history to the sphere of the present and, partly, of the future. But we firmly believe that the fourth period will lead to the consolidation of militant Marxism, that Russian Social-Democracy will emerge from the crisis in the full flower of manhood, that the oppor-

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* I could also reply with the German proverb: *Den Sack schlägt man, den Esel meint man* (you beat the sack, but you mean the donkey). Not *Rabocheye Dyelo* alone, but also *the broad mass* of practical workers *and theoreticians* was carried away by the "criticism" *à la mode*, becoming confused in regard to the question of spontaneity and lapsing from the Social-Democratic to the trade-unionist conception of our political and organisational tasks.

tunist rearguard will be "replaced" by the genuine vanguard of the most revolutionary class.

In the sense of calling for such a "replacement" and by way of summing up what has been expounded above, we may meet the question, What is to be done? with the brief reply:

Put an End to the Third Period.

FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

Appendix[192]

THE ATTEMPT TO UNITE *ISKRA* WITH *RABOCHEYE DYELO*

It remains for us to describe the tactics adopted and consistently pursued by *Iskra* in its organisational relations with *Rabocheye Dyelo*. These tactics were fully expressed in *Iskra*, No. 1, in the article entitled "The Split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad".* From the outset we adopted the point of view that the real Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, which at the First Congress of our Party was recognised as its representative abroad, had split into two organisations; that the question of the Party's representation remained an open one, having been settled only temporarily and conditionally by the election, at the International Congress in Paris, of two members to represent Russia on the International Socialist Bureau,[193] one from each of the two sections of the divided Union Abroad. We declared that fundamentally *Rabocheye Dyelo* was wrong; in principle we emphatically took the side of the Emancipation of Labour group, at the same time refusing to enter into the details of the split and noting the services rendered by the Union Abroad in the sphere of purely practical work.**

Consequently, ours was, to a certain extent, a waiting policy. We made a concession to the opinions prevailing among the majority of the Russian Social-Democrats that the most determined opponents of Economism could work

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* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 378-79.—*Ed.*

** Our judgement of the split was based, not only upon a study of the literature on the subject, but also on information gathered abroad by several members of our organisation.

hand in hand with the Union Abroad because it had repeatedly declared its agreement in principle with the Emancipation of Labour group, without, allegedly, taking an independent position on fundamental questions of theory and tactics. The correctness of our position was indirectly proved by the fact that almost simultaneously with the appearance of the first issue of *Iskra* (December 1900) three members separated from the Union, formed the so-called "Initiators' Group", and offered their services: (1) to the foreign section of the *Iskra* organisation, (2) to the revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, and (3) to the Union Abroad, as mediators in negotiations for reconciliation. The first two organisations at once announced their agreement; *the third turned down* the offer. True, when a speaker related these facts at the "Unity" Conference last year, a member of the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad declared the rejection of the offer to have been due *entirely* to the fact that the Union Abroad was dissatisfied with the composition of the Initiators' Group. While I consider it my duty to cite this explanation, I cannot, however, refrain from observing that it is an unsatisfactory one; for, knowing that two organisations had agreed to enter into negotiations, the Union Abroad could have approached them through another intermediary or directly.

In the spring of 1901 both *Zarya* (No. 1, April) and *Iskra* (No. 4, May)* entered into open polemics with *Rabocheye Dyelo*. *Iskra* particularly attacked the article "A Historic Turn" in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which, in its *April* supplement, that is, after the spring events, revealed instability on the question of terror and the calls for "blood", with which many had been carried away at the time. Notwithstanding the polemics, the Union Abroad agreed to resume negotiations for reconciliation through the instrumentality of a new group of "conciliators". A preliminary conference of representatives of the three cited organisations, held in June, framed a draft agreement on the basis of a very detailed "accord on principles", which the Union Abroad published in the pamphlet *Two Conferences*, and the League Abroad in the pamphlet *Documents of the "Unity" Conference*.

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* See present volume, pp. 13-24.—*Ed.*

The contents of this accord on principles (more frequently named the Resolutions of the June Conference) make it perfectly clear that we put forward as an absolute condition for unity *the most emphatic* repudiation of any and every manifestation of opportunism generally, and of Russian opportunism in particular. Paragraph 1 reads: "We repudiate all attempts to introduce opportunism into the proletarian class struggle—attempts that have found expression in the so-called Economism, Bernsteinism, Millerandism, etc." "The sphere of Social-Democratic activities includes ... ideological struggle against all opponents of revolutionary Marxism" (4, c); "In every sphere of organisational and agitational activity Social-Democracy must never for a moment forget that the immediate task of the Russian proletariat is the overthrow of the autocracy" (5, a); "... agitation, not only on the basis of the everyday struggle between wage-labour and capital" (5, b); "... we do not recognise ... a stage of purely economic struggle and of struggle for partial political demands" (5, c); "... we consider it important for the movement to criticise tendencies that make a principle of the elementariness and narrowness of the lower forms of the movement" (5, d). Even a complete outsider, having read these resolutions at all attentively, will have realised from their very formulations that they are directed against people who were opportunists and Economists, who, even for a moment, forgot the task of overthrowing the autocracy, who recognised the theory of stages, who elevated narrowness to a principle, etc. Anyone who has the least acquaintance with the polemics conducted by the Emancipation of Labour group, *Zarya*, and *Iskra* against *Rabocheye Dyelo* cannot doubt for a single moment that these resolutions repudiate, point by point, the very errors into which *Rabocheye Dyelo* strayed. Hence, when a member of the Union Abroad declared at the "Unity" Conference that the articles in No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* had been prompted, not by a new "historic turn" on the part of the Union Abroad, but by the excessive "abstractness" of the resolution,* the assertion was justly ridiculed by one of the speakers. Far from being abstract, he said, the resolutions were incredibly concrete: one could see at a glance that they were "trying to catch somebody".

* This assertion is repeated in *Two Conferences*, p. 25.

This remark occasioned a characteristic incident at the Conference. On the one hand, Krichevsky, seizing upon the word "catch" in the belief that this was a slip of the tongue which betrayed our evil intentions ("to set a trap"), pathetically exclaimed: "Whom are they out to catch?" "Whom indeed?" rejoined Plekhanov sarcastically. "Let me come to the aid of Comrade Plekhanov's lack of perspicacity," replied Krichevsky. "Let me explain to him that the trap was set *for the Editorial Board of Rabocheye Dyelo* [general laughter] but we have not allowed ourselves to be caught!" (A remark from the left: "All the worse for you!") On the other hand, a member of the Borba group (a group of conciliators), opposing the amendments of the Union Abroad to the resolutions and desiring to defend our speaker, declared that obviously the word "catch" was dropped by chance in the heat of polemics.

For my part, I think the speaker responsible for uttering the word will hardly be pleased with this "defence". I think the words "trying to catch somebody" were "true words spoken in jest"; we have always accused *Rabocheye Dyelo* of instability and vacillation, and, naturally, we *had* to try *to catch* it in order to put a stop to the vacillation. There is not the slightest suggestion of evil intent in this, for we were discussing instability of principles And we succeeded in "catching" the Union Abroad in such comradely manner* that Krichevsky himself and one other member of the Administrative Committee of the Union signed the June resolutions.

The articles in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10 (our comrades saw the issue for the first time when they arrived at the Confer-

* Precisely: In the introduction to the June resolutions we said that Russian Social-Democracy as a whole always stood by the principles of the Emancipation of Labour group and that the particular service of the Union Abroad was its publishing and organising activity. In other words, we expressed our complete readiness to forget, the past and to recognise the usefulness (for the cause) of the work of our comrades of the Union Abroad *provided* it completely ceased the vacillation we tried to "catch". Any impartial person reading the June resolutions will only thus interpret them. If the Union Abroad, after having *caused* a split by its new turn towards Economism (in its articles in No. 10 and in the amendments), now solemnly charges us with *untruth* (*Two Conferences*, p. 30), because of what we said about its services, then, of course, such an accusation can only evoke a smile.

ence, a few days before the meetings started) clearly showed that a new turn had taken place in the Union Abroad in the period between the summer and the autumn: the Economists had once more gained the upper hand, and the Editorial Board, which veered with every "wind", again set out to defend "the most pronounced Bernsteinians" and "freedom of criticism", to defend "spontaneity", and through the lips of Martynov to preach the "theory of restricting" the sphere of our political influence (for the alleged purpose of rendering this influence more complex). Once again Parvus' apt observation that it is difficult to catch an opportunist with a formula has been proved correct. An opportunist will readily put his name to *any* formula and as readily abandon it, because opportunism means precisely a lack of definite and firm principles. Today, the opportunists have repudiated *all* attempts to introduce opportunism, repudiated *all* narrowness, solemnly promised "never for a moment to forget about the task of overthrowing the autocracy" and to carry on "agitation not only on the basis of the everyday struggle between wage-labour and capital", etc., etc. But tomorrow they will change their form of expression and revert to their old tricks on the pretext of defending spontaneity and the forward march of the drab everyday struggle, of extolling demands promising palpable results, etc. By continuing to assert that in the articles in No. 10 "the Union Abroad did not and does not now see any heretical departure from the general principles of the draft adopted at the conference" (*Two Conferences*, p. 26), the Union Abroad merely reveals a complete lack of ability, or of desire, to understand the essential points of the disagreements.

After the tenth issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, we could make one effort: open a general discussion in order to ascertain whether all the members of the Union Abroad agreed with the articles and with the Editorial Board. The Union Abroad is particularly displeased with us because of this and accuses us of trying to sow discord in its ranks, of interfering in other people's business, etc. These accusations are obviously unfounded, since with an elected editorial board that "veers" with every wind, however light, everything depends upon the direction of the wind, and we defined the direction at private meetings at which no one was present, except mem-

bers of the organisations intending to unite. The amendments to the June resolutions submitted in the name of the Union Abroad have removed the last shadow of hope of arriving at agreement. The amendments are documentary evidence of the new turn towards Economism and of the fact that the majority of the Union members are in agreement with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. It was moved to delete the words "so-called Economism" from the reference to manifestations of opportunism (on the plea that "the meaning" of these words "was vague"; but if that were so, all that was required was a more precise definition of the nature of the widespread error), and to delete "Millerandism" (although Krichevsky had defended it in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 2-3, pp. 83-84, and still more openly in *Vorwärts**). Notwithstanding the fact that the June resolutions definitely indicated that the task of Social-Democracy is "to guide *every* manifestation of the proletarian struggle against *all* forms of political, *economic*, and social oppression", thereby calling for the introduction of system and unity in all these manifestations of the struggle, the Union Abroad added the wholly superfluous words that "the economic struggle is a powerful stimulus to the mass movement" (taken by itself, this assertion cannot be disputed, but with the existence of narrow Economism it could not but give occasion for false interpretations). Moreover, even the direct *constriction* of "politics" was suggested for the June resolutions, both by the deletion of the words "not for a moment" (to forget the aim of overthrowing the autocracy) and by the addition of the words "the economic struggle is the *most widely* applicable means of drawing the masses into active political struggle". Naturally, upon the submission of such amendments, the speakers on our side refused, one after another, to take the floor, considering it hopeless to continue negotiations with people who were again turning towards Economism and were striving to secure for themselves freedom to vacillate.

"It was precisely the preservation of the independent features and the autonomy of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, considered by the Union to be the *sine qua non* of the durability of

* A polemic on the subject started in *Vorwärts* between its present editor, Kautsky, and the Editorial Board of *Zarya*. We shall not fail to acquaint the Russian reader with this controversy.[194]

our future agreement, that *Iskra* regarded as the stumbling-block to agreement" (*Two Conferences*, p. 25). This is most inexact. We never had any designs against *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s autonomy.* We did indeed *absolutely refuse to recognise* the independence of its features, if by "independent features" is meant independence on questions of principle in theory and tactics. The June resolutions contain an utter repudiation of *such* independence of features, because, in practice, such "independence of features" has always meant, as we have pointed out, all manner of vacillations fostering the disunity which prevails among us and which is intolerable from the Party point of view. *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s articles in its tenth issue, together with its "amendments" clearly revealed its desire to preserve this kind of independence of features, and such a desire naturally and inevitably led to a rupture and a declaration of war. But all of us were ready to recognise *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s "independence of features" in the sense that it should concentrate on definite literary functions. A proper distribution of these functions naturally called for: (1) a theoretical magazine, (2) a political newspaper, and (3) popular collections of articles and popular pamphlets. Only by agreeing to such a distribution of functions would *Rabocheye Dyelo* have proved that it *sincerely* desired to abandon once and for all its errors, against which the June resolutions were directed. Only such a distribution of functions would have removed all possibility of friction, effectively guaranteed a durable agreement, and, at the same time, served as a basis for a revival and for new successes of our movement.

At present not a single Russian Social-Democrat can have any doubts that the final rupture between the revolutionary and the opportunist tendencies was caused, not by any "organisational" circumstances, but by the desire of the opportunists to consolidate the independent features of opportunism and to continue to cause confusion of mind by the disquisitions of the Krichevskys and Martynovs.

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* That is, if the editorial consultations in connection with the establishment of a joint supreme council of the combined organisations are not to be regarded as a restriction of autonomy. But in June *Rabocheye Dyelo* agreed to this.

CORRECTION TO *WHAT IS TO BE DONE?*

The Initiators' Group of whom I speak in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 141,* have asked me to make the following correction to my description of the part they played in the attempt to reconcile the Social-Democratic organisations abroad: "Of the three members of this group, only one left the Union Abroad at the end of 1900; the others left in 1901, only after becoming convinced that it was impossible to obtain the Union's consent to a conference with the *Iskra* organisation abroad and the revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, which the Initiators' Group had proposed. The Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad at first rejected this proposal, contending that the persons comprising the Initiators' Group were 'not competent' to act as mediators, and it expressed the desire to enter into direct contact with the *Iskra* organisation abroad. Soon thereafter, however, the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad informed the Initiators' Group that following the appearance of the first number of *Iskra* containing the report of the split in the Union, it had altered its decision and no longer desired to maintain relations with *Iskra*. After this, how can one explain the statement made by a member of the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad that the latter's rejection of a conference was called forth *entirely* by its dissatisfaction with the composition of the Initiators' Group? It is true that it is equally difficult to explain why the

* See present volume, p. 521-22.—*Ed.*

Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad agreed to a conference in June of last year, for the article in the first issue of *Iskra* still remained in force and *Iskra*'s 'negative' attitude to the Union Abroad was still more strongly expressed in the first issue of *Zarya*, and in No. 4 of *Iskra*, both of which appeared prior to the June Conference."

N. Lenin

Iskra, No. 19, April 1, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

NOTES

[1] "*Where To Begin*" was published in *Iskra* and reissued by local Social-Democratic organisations as a separate pamphlet. The Siberian Social-Democratic League printed 5,000 copies of the pamphlet and distributed it throughout Siberia. The pamphlet was also distributed in Samara, Tambov, Nizhni-Novgorod, and other Russian cities. p. 13

[2] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*)—a journal with "Economist" views, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It appeared irregularly and was published in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902 under the editorship of B. N. Krichevsky, A. S. Martynov, and V. P. Ivanshin. Altogether 12 numbers appeared in nine issues.

Lenin criticised the views of the Rabocheye Dyelo group in his *What Is To Be Done?* (see present volume, pp. 347-529). p. 17

[3] "*Listok*" *Rabochevo Dyela* (*Rabocheye Dyelo Supplement*)—of which eight numbers were issued in Geneva, at irregular intervals, between June 1900 and July 1901. p. 17

[4] *Rabochaya Mysl (Workers' Thought)*—an "Economist" newspaper, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, published from October 1897 to December 1902. Altogether 16 issues appeared: numbers 3 to 11 and number 16 were published in Berlin, the remaining numbers in St. Petersburg. It was edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others.

Lenin characterised the paper's views as a Russian variety of international opportunism and criticised them in a number of his articles published in *Iskra* and in other works including *What Is To Be Done?* p. 17

[5] The reference is to the article "The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement", which was published as the leading article in *Iskra*, No. 1, December 1900 (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 366-71).

Iskra (*The Spark*)—the first All-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900. The foundation of a militant organ of revolutionary Marxism was the main task confronting Russian Social-Democrats at the time.

Since the publication of a revolutionary newspaper in Russia was impossible, owing to police persecution, Lenin, while still in exile in Siberia, worked out all the details of a plan to publish

the paper abroad. When his term of exile ended in January 1900, he immediately began to put his plan into effect. In February he conducted negotiations with Vera Zasulich, who had come illegally to St. Petersburg from abroad, on the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group in the publication of an All-Russian Marxist newspaper. The so-called Pskov Conference was held in April, with V. I. Lenin, L. Martov (Y. O. Tsederbaum), A. N. Potresov, S. I. Radchenko, and the "legal Marxists" (P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky) participating. The conference heard and discussed Lenin's draft editorial declaration on the programme and the aims of the All-Russian newspaper (*Iskra*) and the scientific and political magazine (*Zarya*). Lenin visited a number of Russian cities—St. Petersburg, Riga, Pskov, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, and Samara—establishing contact with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats and obtaining their support for *Iskra*. In August, when Lenin arrived in Switzerland, he and Potresov held a conference with the Emancipation of Labour group on the programme and the aims of the newspaper and the magazine on possible contributors, on the composition of Editorial Board, and on the problem of residence. For an account of the founding of *Iskra* see the article "How the 'Spark' was Nearly Extinguished" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 333-49).

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900; the ensuing issues were published in Munich; from July 1902 it was published in London; and from the spring of 1903 in Geneva.

The Editorial Board consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov, and V. I. Zasulich. The first secretary of the Editorial Board was I. G. Smidovich-Leman. From the spring of 1901 the post was taken over by N. K. Krupskaya, who was also in charge of all correspondence between *Iskra* and Russian Social-Democratic organisations. Lenin was actually Editor-in-Chief and the leading figure in *Iskra*. He published his articles on all important questions of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia and dealt with the most important events in world affairs.

Iskra became, as Lenin had planned, a rallying centre for the Party forces, a centre for the training of leading Party workers. In a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow Samara, and others) groups and committees of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (R.S.D.L.P.) were organised along Lenin's *Iskra* line. *Iskra* organisations sprang up and worked under the direct leadership of Lenin's disciples and comrades-in-arms: N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, and others. The newspaper played a decisive role in the struggle for the Marxist Party, in the defeat of the "Economists", and in the unification of the dispersed Social-Democratic study circles.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin, the Editorial Board drew up a draft programme of the Party

(published in *Iskra*, No. 21) and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in July and August 1903. By the time the Congress was convened the majority of the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had joined forces with *Iskra*, approved its programme, organisational plan, and tactical line, and accepted it as their leading organ. By a special resolution, which noted the exceptional role played by *Iskra* in the struggle to build the Party, the Congress adopted the newspaper as the central organ of the R.S.D.L.P. and approved an editorial board consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov, and Martov. Despite the decision of the Congress, Martov refused to participate, and Nos. 46 to 51 were edited by Lenin and Plekhanov. Later Plekhanov went over to the Menshevik position and demanded that all the old Menshevik editors, notwithstanding their rejection by the Congress, be placed on the Editorial Board. Lenin could not agree to this, and on October 19 (November 1, new style), 1903, he left the *Iskra* Editorial Board to strengthen his position in the Central Committee and from there to conduct a struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. Issue No. 52 of *Iskra* was edited by Plekhanov alone. On November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, on his own initiative and in violation of the will of the Congress, co-opted all the old Menshevik editors on to the Editorial Board. Beginning with issue No. 52, the Mensheviks turned *Iskra* into their own, opportunist, organ. p. 18

[6] This passage refers to the mass revolutionary actions of students and workers—political demonstrations, meetings, strikes—that took place in February and March 1901, in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Kazan, Yaroslavl, Warsaw, Belostok, Tomsk, Odessa, and other cities in Russia.

The student movement of 1900-01, which began with academic demands, acquired the character of revolutionary action against the reactionary policy of the autocracy; it was supported by the advanced workers and it met with a response among all strata of Russian society. The direct cause of the demonstrations and strikes in February and March 1901, was the drafting of 183 Kiev University students into the army as a punitive act for their participation in a students' meeting (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19). The government launched a furious attack on participants in the revolutionary actions; the police and the Cossacks dispersed demonstrations and assaulted the participants; hundreds of students were arrested and expelled from colleges and universities. On March 4 (17), 1901, the demonstration in the square in front of the Kazan Cathedral, in St. Petersburg, was dispersed with particular brutality. The February-March events were evidence of the revolutionary upsurge in Russia; the participation of workers in the movement under political slogans was of tremendous importance. p. 20

[7] The reference is to Lenin's work *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (see present volume, pp. 347-529). p. 20

[8] Lenin refers to a contribution to *Iskra*, No. 5 (June 1901), entitled "The First of May in Russia", which was published in the section "Chronicle of the Working-Class Movement and Letters from Factories". p. 27

[9] Lenin refers to Frederick Engels' Introduction to Karl Marx's work *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*; the 1895 edition of the Introduction was distorted by the German Social-Democrats and construed by them to mean a rejection of armed uprising and barricade fighting.

The full text of the Introduction was first published according to Engels' manuscript in the U.S.S.R. (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38). p. 29

[10] Lenin refers here to the clash between the police and the striking workers of the Maxwell factory in St. Petersburg in December 1898. For several hours the police (200 on foot and 100 mounted police), who had arrived to arrest the "ringleaders" of the strike, could not penetrate into the workers' barracks. The workers, who had barricaded themselves, fought against the police with logs, with bottles, and with boiling water which they poured on the police. p. 29

[11] Lenin refers here to the brutality of the tsarist police and Cossacks in dispersing a demonstration in Kazan Square, St. Petersburg, on March 4 (17), 1901. Thousands of students and workers took part in this protest demonstration against the drafting of students into the army. The tsarist government used armed force to disperse the demonstration. The demonstrators were brutally beaten, several were killed and many crippled. A detailed report of the event was given in *Iskra*, No. 3, in April 1901. p. 30

[12] "*The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism*" is a criticism of the confidential Memorandum, "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo", written by the tsarist minister S. Y. Witte and published abroad illegally, and of the preface to it written by the liberal P. B. Struve.

Lenin's article occasioned serious disagreement among the editors of *Iskra*, Plekhanov and several other members of the Editorial Board expressing themselves against it.

The polemic over the article which the Board members conducted in their correspondence lasted about a month. Lenin accepted some suggestions to alter certain particular formulations but emphatically refused to modify the sharp tone of exposure and the direction of the article. p. 31

[13] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political magazine published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* Editorial Board.

The following articles of Lenin were published in *Zarya*: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Ques-

tion and the 'Critics of Marx'" (published under the title "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), "Review of Home Affairs", "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". Altogether four numbers (in three issues) appeared: No. 1—April 1901 (actually on March 23, new style), Nos. 2-3—December 1901, and No. 4—August 1902. p. 35

[14] *The "Regulations Governing Redemption by Peasants Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence"* signed by Alexander II on February 19, 1861, together with the Manifesto announcing the abolition of serfdom. p. 37

[15] *Kolokol* (*The Bell*)—a revolutionary periodical published under the motto of *Vivos voco!* (I call on the living!) by A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogaryov from July 1, 1857 to April 1865, in London and from 1865 to December 1868, in Geneva. In 1868 the periodical was published in French with a supplement in Russian. *Kolokol* was published in an edition of 2,500 copies and spread throughout Russia. It exposed the tyranny of the autocracy, the plunder and embezzlement of the civil servants, and the ruthless exploitation of the peasants by the landlords.

Kolokol was the leading organ of the revolutionary uncensored press and the precursor of the working-class press in Russia; it played an important role in the development of the general-democratic and revolutionary movement, in the struggle against the autocracy and against serfdom.

La Revue des deux mondes (*Review of the Two Worlds*)—a French bourgeois-liberal monthly published in Paris from 1829 to 1940. It began as a literary and art journal, but subsequently began to devote considerable space to philosophy and politics. Some of the most eminent writers contributed to the review—among them Victor Hugo, George Sand, Honoré de Balzac, and Alexandre Dumas. Since 1948 it has been published under the title *La Revue. Literature, histoire, arts et sciences des deux mondes* (*The Review. The literature, history, arts and sciences of the two worlds*). p. 37

[16] *Katkov, M. N.*—reactionary journalist. From 1851 he edited *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*). He was a rabid opponent, not only of the revolutionary movement, but of all social progress. p. 37

[17] *Civil Mediator*—an administrative office instituted by the tsarist government at the time of the implementation of the "Peasant Reform" of 1861. The civil mediators, appointed by the governor from among the local nobility, where empowered to investigate and render decisions on conflicts between peasants and landlords that occurred during the implementation of the "Regulations" on the emancipation of the peasants; they were actually intended to be protectors of the interests of the ruling classes. The chief function of the civil mediators was to draw up "title

deeds" which gave the precise dimensions of the peasants' allotments and their location, as well as details of the obligations of the peasants; the mediators were also charged with the supervision of peasant local self-government bodies. The mediators approved the elected officials of the peasant administration, had the right to impose penalties upon them, to arrest or fine them, and to annul the decisions of village meetings.

In this passage Lenin refers to the liberal-minded civil mediators in Tver Gubernia, who refused to implement the "Regulations" and who decided to be guided in their work by the decisions of the Assembly of the Nobility in their gubernia; this Assembly, in February 1862, had formally recognised the unsatisfactory nature of the "Regulations" and the necessity for the immediate redemption of peasant lands with state aid, as well as the introduction of a number of democratic institutions. The Tver civil mediators were arrested by the tsarist government and each was sentenced to over two years' imprisonment. p. 38

[18] *Raznochintsi* (i.e., "men of different estates")—the Russian commoner-intellectuals, drawn from the small townsfolk, the clergy, the merchant classes, the peasantry, as distinct from those drawn from the nobility. p. 38

[19] *To Young Russia*—a proclamation issued by P. G. Zaichnevsky's revolutionary group in May 1862. The proclamation called for revolutionary action against the autocracy and advanced the slogan for "a social and democratic Russian republic" in the form of a federation of the regions. p. 38

[20] *Chernyshevsky, N. G.* (1828-1889)—the great Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, scholar, critic, and author; the leader of the revolutionary movement in the sixties of the past century. In 1862 Chernyshevsky was arrested and sentenced to 14 years' penal servitude and exile for life in Siberia, he was allowed to return only in 1883. Chernyshevsky had a tremendous influence on the development of Russian progressive social thought. p. 38

[21] *At the Glorious Post*—a collection published by the Narodniks to commemorate forty years of literary and social activity (1860-1900) of the Narodnik ideologist N. K. Mikhailovsky. p. 39

[22] *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*)—a monthly scientific, political, and literary journal founded by Alexander Pushkin; published in St. Petersburg from 1836 to 1866. From 1847 it was published by N. A. Nekrasov and I. I. Panayev. Among the contributors were V. G. Belinsky, N. G. Chernyshevsky, N. A. Dobrolyubov, N. V. Shelgunov, M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin, and M. A. Antonovich. *Sovremennik* was the most progressive journal of its day; it voiced the aspirations of revolutionary democracy. It was closed down by the tsarist government in 1866. p. 39

[23] *Russkoye Slovo* (*Russian Word*)—a prominently progressive literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1859 to 1866, among its contributors were D. I. Pisarev and N. V. Shelgunov. The journal had considerable influence among the youth of the sixties. It was closed down by the tsarist government in 1866. p. 39

[24] *Dyen* (*The Day*)—a weekly newspaper published in Moscow from 1861 to 1865 by I. S. Aksakov. p. 39

[25] *Literary Fund* (The Literary Fund Society for Aid to Indigent Writers and Scientists and Their Families)—a legal benevolent society founded in St. Petersburg in 1859 with the participation of N. G. Chernyshevsky. Under the pretext of helping indigent writers and scientists, the organisers made an attempt to muster the progressive, revolutionary-minded section of the intelligentsia. In April 1862 an attempt was made by progressives to establish a legal student society through the founding of a "Department for Aid to Poor Students". The Department was headed by a student committee. A considerable section of the committee was connected with the illegal revolutionary organisation Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom). In June 1862 the Department was closed by the tsarist government. p. 40

[26] *The Chess Club* was founded on the initiative of N. G. Chernyshevsky and his closest associates in St. Petersburg in January 1862. Among the leading members of the Club were N. A. Nekrasov, the brothers A. A. and N. A. Serno-Solovyevich, the brothers V. S. and N. S. Kurochkin, P. L. Lavrov, G. Y. Blagosvetlov, G. Z. Yeliseyev, and N. G. Pomyalovsky. Members of the illegal Zemlya i Volya organisation also belonged to the Club. The Chess Club was actually a literary club, the centre of the St. Petersburg revolutionary-minded intelligentsia. In June 1862 the Club was closed by the Tsarist government. p. 40

[27] *Radishchev, A. N.* (1749-1802)—Russian writer and revolutionary. In his famous work *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*, he made the first open attack on serfdom in Russia. By order of Catherine II he was sentenced to death for the book, but the sentence was commuted to 10 years' exile in Siberia. He returned from exile under amnesty, but when the tsarist government threatened him with new persecutions he committed suicide. Lenin considered Radishchev to have been one of the most outstanding champions of progress among the Russian people. p. 41

[28] *Arakcheyev, A. A.*—reactionary tsarist statesman at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth centuries; he greatly influenced home and foreign policies during the reigns of Paul I and Alexander I. An epoch of unlimited police despotism and the outrages of the controlling military is associated with his name ("Arakcheyevshchina"). p. 41

[29] *The Decembrist Revolt*—led by a group of revolutionaries from the nobility who opposed the autocracy and serfdom. p. 41

[30] Lenin refers to the participation of the troops of Tsar Nicholas I in the suppression of the revolutionary movement in Europe in 1848-49, particularly the revolution in Hungary in 1849. p. 41

[31] *États généraux* (*The States General*)—a representative body of the social-estates of France from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, consisting of deputies from the nobility, the clergy, and the Third Estate, it was convened by the king for the settlement of administrative and financial questions. The States General were not convened for 175 years—from 1614 to 1789. When they were convened in 1789 by Louis XVI for the purpose of settling the financial crisis, the body was proclaimed as the National Assembly by a decision of the deputies representing the Third Estate. p. 41

[32] *Herzen, A. I.* (1812-1870)—prominent Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, publicist, and author. p. 42

[33] *General Vannovsky*, appointed Minister of Education in 1901, made use of liberal phrases such as "love" and "heartfelt solicitude" for the student youth, with the aim of quietening the student disturbances. After introducing a number of insignificant reforms in the sphere of education, he resorted to renewed repressive measures against the revolutionary students—arrests, banishment, expulsions from universities, etc. p. 44

[34] *Volnoye Slovo* (*Free Word*)—a weekly, and from No. 37 a fortnightly, periodical published in Geneva from 1881 to 1883; altogether 62 issues appeared. *Volnoye Slovo* claimed to have as its purpose the unification of opposition elements and propagated liberal ideas on the need to reform the Russian social system on "principles of freedom and self-government". Actually it was founded with the knowledge of the secret police by members of the Holy Guard (a secret organisation promoted by the biggest landed nobility and high government officials, headed by Prince A. P. Shuvalov and others) for purposes of political provocation. *Volnoye Slovo* was edited by the police agent A. P. Malshinsky.

At the end of 1882 the Holy Guard collapsed and *Volnoye Slovo*, beginning with No. 52 (January 8, 1883), was edited by M. P. Dragomanov; it claimed to be the organ of the Zemstvo League, which did not exist as a permanent and properly-constituted organisation. p. 50

[35] *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* (*Government Herald*)—official government newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1869 to 1917. p. 50

[36] *The Assembly of Notables of Louis XVI*—an assembly of the highest representatives of the privileged social-estates of France convened by King Louis XVI in 1787 and 1788 to settle the country's financial

crisis. The Assembly refused to pass an ordinance taxing the privileged social-estates and Louis XVI was forced to convene the States General. p. 52

[37] *Dictatorship of the heart*—the name given ironically to the short-lived policy of flirting with the liberals, pursued by the tsarist official Loris-Melikov, who, in 1880, was appointed chief of the Supreme Administrative Commission to combat "sedition" and, later, Minister of the Interior. p. 53

[38] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—a literary-political review published abroad by the Emancipation of Labour group in the period 1890-92. Altogether four issues appeared.

Lenin quotes an article by Vera Zasulich entitled "Revolutionaries from the Bourgeois Milieu", published in No. 1 for 1890. p. 54

[39] *Narodnaya Volya* (*The People's Will*)—a secret Narodnik terrorist organisation, whose members carried out the assassination of Alexander II, on March 1, 1881; it came into being in August 1879, following the split in the secret society Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom). The Narodnaya Volya was headed by an Executive Committee which included A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya, and A. A. Kvyatkovsky. The immediate aim of the Narodnaya Volya was the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy, while its programme provided for the establishment of a "permanent popular representative body" elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of land to the people, and the elaboration of measures for the factories to pass into the hands of the workers. The Narodnaya Volya, however, was unable to find the road to the masses of the people and took to political conspiracy and individual terror. The terrorist struggle of the Narodnaya Volya was not supported by a mass revolutionary movement; this enabled the government to crush the organisation by fierce persecution, death sentences, and provocation.

After 1881 the Narodnaya Volya ceased to exist as an organisation. Repeated attempts to revive it, made during the 1880s ended in failure. An instance was the terrorist group that was formed in 1886, headed by A. I. Ulyanov (Lenin's brother) and P. Y. Shevyrev; after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III the group was exposed and its active members were executed.

Although he criticised the erroneous, utopian programme of the Narodnaya Volya, Lenin showed great respect for the selfless struggle waged by its members against tsarism. In 1899, in "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats", Lenin stated that "the members of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia, despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory which served as the banner of the movement" (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 181). p. 54

[40] *Land redemption payments* were fixed by the "Regulations Governing Redemption by Peasants Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence", approved on February 19, 1861. The tsarist government compelled peasants to pay redemption money for the land allotted to them at a rate several times higher than the actual value of the land. Upon the conclusion of the redemption deal, the government paid a sum of money to the landlord as redemption money, which sum was regarded as a debt to be repaid by the peasant in annual instalments over a period of 49 years. The "land redemption payments" were unbearably burdensome for the peasants and led to mass ruin and pauperisation. Peasants who had formerly been landlord's serfs alone paid a sum of about 2,000 million rubles to the tsarist government, while the land they received was not worth more than 544 million rubles. Since the deals did not take effect immediately, but at various times up to 1883, the payments were to have continued until 1932. The peasant movement at the time of the First Russian Revolution (1905-07), however, compelled the tsarist government to cancel the land redemption payments as from January 1907. p. 56

[41] *Rural superintendent*—an office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to increase the power of the landlords over the peasantry. The rural superintendents, appointed from among the local landed nobility, were granted tremendous powers, not only administrative, but juridical, which included the right to arrest peasants and order corporal punishment. p. 59

[42] "*Separate Supplement*" *to Rabochaya Mysl*—a pamphlet published by the editors of the "Economist" newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* in September 1899. The pamphlet, especially the included article "Our Reality", signed R. M., was a candid expose of the opportunist views of the "Economists". Lenin criticised the pamphlet in his article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85), and in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present volume, pp. 361-67, 397, 407-08). p. 67

[43] *Bernsteinism*—an anti-Marxist trend in international Social-Democracy which arose in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century and derived its name from the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein. Bernstein set out to revise the revolutionary teachings of Marx in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism.

In Russia Bernsteinism had its adherents in the "legal Marxists" the "Economists", the Bundists, and the Mensheviks. p. 73

[44] *Listok* (*Small Paper*)—a monthly newspaper of constitutional liberal views published illegally abroad by Prince P. V. Dolgorukov. Altogether twenty-two numbers were issued between November 1862 and July 1864. The first five numbers were issued in Brussels, the others in London. p. 76

[45] *Narodnoye Pravo* (*People's Right*) *Party*—an underground organisation of the democratic intelligentsia formed in 1893, with the

assistance of ex-members of the *Narodnaya Volya* (M. A. Natanson and others), and crushed by the tsarist government in the spring of 1894. The Narodnoye Pravo issued two programmatic documents "An Urgent Question" and "Manifesto". Most of the Narodnoye Pravo members subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 79

[46] Lenin refers here to a thesis in Marx's *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1858, p. 139). p. 79

[47] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a St. Petersburg newspaper published from 1868 to October 1917. At first moderately liberal, it became after 1876 the organ of the most reactionary circles of the nobility and the state bureaucracy. The paper conducted a struggle, not only against the revolutionary, but also against the bourgeois-liberal, movement. From 1905 onwards it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. p. 81

[48] The circular referred to was sent out by the Central Press Board to all newspaper and magazine editors after *Novoye Vremya* published the article "Apropos of the Labour Unrest". The circular was reproduced in *Iskra*, No. 6 (July 1901) in the article "St. Petersburg" (section "From Our Social Life"). p. 81

[49] The strike movement of 1885 involved many textile enterprises in Vladimir, Moscow, Tver, and other gubernias of the industrial centre of Russia. The January strike of the workers at the Nikolskoye Mill, near Orekhovo-Zuyevo, belonging to Morozov, was the biggest and had the greatest significance. The principal demands of the strikers were the reduction of fines, the introduction of a regular hiring system, etc. The strike was led by the advanced workers P. Moiseyenko, L. Ivanov, and V. Volkov. The Morozov strike, in which over 8,000 workers took part, was crushed by tsarist troops and over 600 workers were arrested. Under pressure of the strike movement of 1885-86, the tsarist government was forced to issue a law on fines (the Law of June 3, 1886), according to which fine-moneys were to be used for the needs of the workers and were not to go into the employer's pocket. p. 83

[50] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a newspaper founded in 1756; beginning with the 1860s, it expressed the views of the most reactionary monarchist elements among the landlords and the clergy; from 1905 onwards, it was one of the chief organs of the Black Hundreds. It continued publication until the October Revolution of 1917. p. 83

[51] Lenin refers to mass strikes of St. Petersburg workers, mainly in the textile industry, in 1895 and, particularly, 1896. The 1896 strike began on the Kalinkin Cotton-Spinning Mill on May 23. The immediate cause of the strike was the employers' refusal to pay the

workers in full for holidays on the occasion of the coronation of Nicholas II. The strike spread rapidly to all the main cotton-spinning and weaving mills of St. Petersburg, and then to large machine-building plants, a rubber factory, a paper factory, and a sugar refinery. For the first time the proletariat of the capital launched a struggle against its exploiters on a broad front. Over 30,000 workers went on strike. The strike was conducted under the leadership of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, which issued leaflets and manifestos calling on the workers to stand solid and steadfast in defence of their rights; the League published and distributed the strikers' main demands, which included the ten-and-a-half-hour working day, increased rates of pay, and payment of wages on time.

The report of the strike produced a tremendous impression abroad. The Berlin *Vorwärts* (*Forward*) and the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* (*Workers' Gazette*) carried accounts of the strike. An address from English workers, signed by the leaders of all socialist and trade-union organisations, was translated into Russian and distributed by the League of Struggle among the St. Petersburg workers. At a meeting of London trade unions a report on the strike by Vera Zasulich and a speech by Eleanor Marx-Aveling were greeted with great enthusiasm and the audience took up a collection to aid the strikers; similar collections were taken up in other trade unions. Collections for the St. Petersburg strikers were organised in Germany, Austria, and Poland. The London Congress of the Second International, which took place in July 1896, cheered Plekhanov's report of the 1896 strike and adopted a special resolution greeting the Russian workers who were "struggling against one of the last bastions of European reaction".

The St. Petersburg strikes gave an impetus to the working-class movement in Moscow and other Russian cities, they forced the government to speed up the review of the factory laws and to issue the Law of June 2 (14), 1897 limiting the working day at all factories and mills to eleven and a half hours. The strikes, as Lenin subsequently wrote, "ushered in an era of steady advance in the working-class movement, that most powerful factor in the whole of our revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 13, "Preface to the Collection *Twelve Years*"). p. 83

[52] The pamphlet *The Secret Documents on the Law of June 2, 1897* was published in Geneva in 1898 by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 83

[53] *Grazhdanin* (*The Citizen*)—a reactionary newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1872 to 1914. From the 1880s on, it spoke for the extreme monarchists. The newspaper existed mainly on subsidies from the tsarist government. p. 99

[54] *Sipyagin, D. S.*—reactionary statesman in tsarist Russia; Minister of the Interior from 1899 to 1902.

Shakhovskoi, D. I.—prince, Zemstvo leading figure. p. 101

[55] *Manilov*—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls* whose name has become a synonym for complacency, sentimentality, and futile day-dreaming. p. 102

[56] "*The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'*" was written between June and September 1901. The first four chapters were published in the journal *Zarya*, Nos. 2-3, in December 1901, under the title "the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question. First Essay"; the contribution bore the signature of *N. Lenin*. The chapters were later published legally in Odessa (with the inscription "Permitted by the Censor". Odessa July 23, 1905) by the Burevestnik Publishers as a separate pamphlet *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*, by N. Lenin. The title was retained by the author for further publications of the essay in whole or in part.

Chapter V-IX were first published in the legal magazine *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*), No. 2, February 1906. They had subtitles; chapters I-IV, published in *Zarya* and in the 1905 pamphlet had none.

The nine chapters with two additional ones (X and XI) were first published together in 1908 in St. Petersburg in *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, by *V. I. Ilyin* (V. I. Lenin), chapters I-IV had subtitles; some editorial changes were made in the text and some notes added.

Chapter XII (the last) was, first printed in the collection *Current Life* in 1908.

The first nine chapters are included in the present volume; chapters X, XI, and XII, written in 1907, will appear in Volume 13 of the present edition of the *Collected Works* of V. I. Lenin. p. 103

[57] *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*)—a literary, popular-scientific, social and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1909. There were Marxists among its contributors from 1902 to 1908. p. 103

[58] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early 1890s it became an organ of the liberal Narodniks and was edited by S. N. Krivenko and N. K. Mikhailovsky. It preached conciliation with the tsarist government and abandonment of all revolutionary struggle against it. The magazine was bitterly hostile to Marxism and the Russian Marxists. p. 107

[59] *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*)—a literary, scientific, and political monthly published by the "legal Marxists"; it appeared in St. Petersburg in the first half of 1899, with P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky among its editors. Besides the "legal Marxists", the contributors included G. V. Plekhanov and V. I. Zasulich. The tsarist government suppressed the journal in June 1899.

Lenin published in *Nachalo* several reviews (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 65-73 and pp. 94-103) and part of the third chapter of his *Development of Capitalism in Russia*, entitled "The Land-

owners' Transition from Corvée to Capitalist Economy" (see present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 191-219).

Lenin refers to Bulgakov's article "A Contribution to the Question of the Capitalist Evolution of Agriculture" published in Nos. 1-2 and 3 of the journal for January-February and March 1899. p. 107

[60] *Zhizn* (*Life*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901; in 1902 it was published abroad. Beginning with 1899 the magazine was an organ of the "legal Marxists".

In the December 1899 issue (No. 12) Lenin published "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov" and in the issues of January and February 1900 (Nos. 1 and 2), two articles under the heading "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 160-65 and pp. 105-59). p. 108

[61] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 644. p. 117

[62] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 728. p. 118

[63] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 724-27. p. 118

[64] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 727-28. p. 118

[65] *Clan property*—the land owned by the clan. p. 121

[66] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 635-36. p. 123

[67] See Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II, S. 80-81, Berlin, 1923. p. 127

[68] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist Monthly*)—the principal organ of the opportunists in German Social-Democracy and one of the organs of international opportunism. During the imperialist world war (1914-18) the magazine adopted a social-chauvinist position. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. p. 134

[69] *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—a German Social-Democratic magazine published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Between 1885 and 1895 the magazine published some of Engels' articles. Engels often gave pointers to the editors of *Die Neue Zeit* and sharply criticised their deviations from Marxism. Beginning with the middle nineties, after Engels' death, the magazine propagated Karl Kautsky's views and regularly published articles by revisionists. During the imperialist world war (1914-18) the magazine occupied a Centrist position and in actuality supported the social-chauvinists. p. 140

[70] *The Exceptional Law Against the Socialists* was promulgated in Germany in 1878. Under this law all organisations of the Social-

Democratic Party, all workers' mass organisations, and the working-class press were prohibited, socialist literature was confiscated, and the banishment of Social-Democrats was begun. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. 150

[71] *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—the central organ of German Social-Democracy. It began publication in 1876, with Wilhelm Liebknecht as one of its editors. Frederick Engels conducted a struggle against all manifestations of opportunism in its columns. In the late nineties, after Engels' death, *Vorwärts* regularly published articles by the opportunists who dominated German Social-Democracy and the Second International. p. 150

[72] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party", Moscow, 1958, p. 38. p. 154

[73] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 627. p. 154

[74] See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 394-411. p. 155

[75] *N.—on*, *Nikolai—on*—pseudonyms of N. F. Danielson, one of the ideologists of the liberal Narodniks in the eighties and nineties of the last century. p. 158

[76] *Proudhonism*—an unscientific trend in petty-bourgeois socialism, hostile to Marxism, so called after its ideologist, the French anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon criticised big capitalist property from the petty-bourgeois position and dreamed of perpetuating petty property ownership; he proposed the foundation of "people s" and "exchange" banks, with the aid of which the workers would be able to acquire the means of production, become handicraftsmen, and ensure the "just" marketing of their wares. Proudhon did not understand the role and significance of the proletariat and displayed a negative attitude towards the class struggle, the proletarian revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat; as an anarchist he denied the necessity for the state. Marx and Engels struggled persistently against Proudhon's efforts to impose his views on the First International. Proudhonism was subjected to a ruthless criticism in Marx's *Poverty of Philosophy*. The determined struggle waged by Marx, Engels, and their supporters ended in the complete victory of Marxism over Proudhonism in the First International.

Lenin called Proudhonism the "dull thinking of a petty-bourgeois and a philistine" incapable of comprehending the viewpoint of the working class. The ideas of Proudhonism are widely utilised by bourgeois "theoreticians" in their class-collaboration propaganda. p. 158

[77] *Der Volksstaat* (*The People's State*)—the central newspaper of the German Social-Democratic (Eisenacher) Party; published in

Leipzig from 1869 to 1876 under the editorship of Wilhelm Liebknecht. Marx and Engels contributed to the paper. p. 158

[78] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 613. p. 158

[79] Lenin quotes here Frederick Engels' Preface to the second edition of his *The Housing Question* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 548). p. 159

[80] *Ruth*—in the biblical legend Ruth gleaned ears of corn in an alien field. The expression "*Ruth's gleaning*" is here used in the sense of easy, carefree labour. p. 169

[81] *The younger brother*, i .e., the people—a patronising expression used in liberal literature in tsarist times. p. 177

[82] *In this Suzdal fashion*—in a primitive superficial fashion. The expression originates from the fact that before the Revolution, crude, gaudily painted, and cheap icons were made in Suzdal Uyezd. p. 178

[83] *The League for Social and Political Questions* (*Verein für Sozialpolitik*)—an association of German bourgeois economists, founded in 1872. The purpose of the association was to counteract the influence of Social-Democracy among the working class and to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. p. 180

[84] *Erhebungen über die Lage der Landwirtschaft in Grossherzogthum Baden, 1883. Veranstaltet durch das grossherzogliche Ministerium des Innern. Bd. IV.* (An Inquiry into the State of Agriculture in the Grand Duchy of Baden, 1883. Undertaken by the Ministry of the Interior of the Grand Duchy. Vol. IV.). p. 184

[85] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 787. p. 186

[86] From M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *Modern Idyll*. p. 193

[87] It may be seen from the text of Chapters VII and IX, first published in the magazine *Obrazovaniye*, that Lenin intended to examine French agricultural statistics in this essay and to analyse the "critical" views of the French economist Maurice. This plan was not put into effect, and in the 1908 edition Lenin changed the passages showing his original design. Thus he omitted two words "and French" from the sentence: "The proletarisation of the peasantry continues, as we shall prove below by the mass of German and French statistics...." In the phrase: "The rapid growth of the towns causes a steady increase in the number of such 'dairy farmers', and, of course, there will always be the Hechts, Davids, Hertzes, and Chernovs (and, not to offend France, the Maurices as well, whom we'll mention later)...", the words in parenthesis were omitted.

The end of the sentence, "For this reason, to confound the two processes, or to ignore either of them, may easily lead to the crudest blunders, an example of which we shall see later, when studying Bulgakov's analysis of the French data", was changed to: "numerous examples of which are scattered through Bulgakov's book". p. 221

[88] *The "Unity" Conference*, held in Zurich on September 21-22 (October 4-5), 1901, was an attempt to unite the Russian Social-Democratic organisations abroad on a platform of Marxist principles. The Conference was attended by representatives of the foreign department of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation (which included the Emancipation of Labour group), the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, the Bund, and the Borba (Struggle) group.

The Conference was preceded by a preliminary conference of representatives of these organisations in Geneva (June 1901). The Geneva Conference adopted a resolution containing fundamental principles for agreement and joint action.

This apparent initial *rapprochement* was to have been officially constituted at the "Unity" Conference; but articles by the leaders of the Union Abroad, published in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10 (September 1901), as well as amendments and addenda to the resolution of the Geneva Conference, submitted by the Union Abroad during the "Unity" Conference, showed that the Union Abroad still adhered to its opportunist position. The representatives of *Iskra* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* read a declaration and withdrew from the Conference.

Lenin took part in the "Unity" Conference under the name of Frey and spoke under that name. This was his first public appearance among the Russian Social-Democrats abroad. p. 223

[89] *The Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was founded in Geneva in 1894 on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group, which at first supervised its activities and edited its publications. Opportunist elements (the "young" Social-Democrats the "Economists") later gained the upper hand in the Union. At the Union's first conference, in November 1898, the Emancipation of Labour group refused to bear further responsibility for the editorship of its publications. The final break with the Union and the withdrawal of the Emancipation of Labour group took place in April 1900, at the Union's second conference, when the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters left the Conference and founded the autonomous organisation *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 225

[90] The *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation was founded by the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters after the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (May 1900). In a leaflet-manifesto the organisation declared its purposes to be "the promotion of the socialist movement among the Russian proletariat" and the struggle against every opportunist attempt to distort Marx-

ism. The organisation published a Russian translation of *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, a number of works by Marx and Engels, and several pamphlets by Plekhanov, Kautsky, and others. In October 1901, on Lenin's initiative, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation joined forces with the *Iskra-Zarya* organisation abroad and formed the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 225

[91] This group, consisting of D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov (Nevzorov, E. L. Gurevich (V. Danevich, Y. Smirnov), which was formed in Paris in 1900, adopted, in May 1901, the name of "Borba" (struggle). In an attempt to reconcile the revolutionary and opportunist trends in Russian Social-Democracy, the Borba group proposed the unification of the Social-Democratic organisations abroad and for this purpose entered into negotiations with the *Iskra-Zarya* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations and with the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad; the group also took part in the Geneva Conference (June 1901) and in the "Unity" Conference (October 1901). In the autumn of 1901 the Borba group took shape as an independent literary group and announced its publications. In these publications ("Material for a Party Programme", Issues I-III; "Leaflet" No. 1, 1902, etc.) the group distorted the revolutionary theory of Marxism and displayed hostility to the Leninist principles of organisation and the tactical line of Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy. On account of its deviation from Social-Democratic views and tactics, its disorganising activities and its lack of contact with Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the Borba group was not allowed to participate in the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. By decision of the Second Congress, the Borba group was dissolved. p. 225

[92] *Millerandism*—an opportunist trend called after the French social-reformist Millerand, who, in 1899, entered the reactionary bourgeois government of General Galiffet, the butcher of the Paris Commune. p. 226

[93] *Mountain and Gironde*—the two political groups of the bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. *La Montagne* (Mountain) was the name given to the Jacobins, the most consistent representatives of the revolutionary class of the period—bourgeoisie; they advocated the abolition of absolutism and the feudal system. The Girondists, as distinct from them, vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution, and chose the way of compromise with the royalists.

Lenin applied the term "Socialist Gironde" to the opportunist tendency in Social-Democracy and the term "Mountain" or proletarian Jacobins, to the revolutionary Social-Democrats. After the R.S.D.L.P. had split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin, on many occasions, stressed the point that the Mensheviks were the Girondist tendency in the working-class movement. p. 227

[94] *The Lübeck Parteitag* of the German Social-Democratic Party was held between September 9 and 15 (22-28), 1901. The central issue at the Congress was the struggle against revisionism, which had by that time taken form as the Right Wing of the Party, with its own programme and periodical press (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*). Bernstein, the leader of the revisionists, had long been advocating the revision of scientific socialism; at the Congress he demanded "freedom to criticise" Marxism. The Congress rejected the resolution introduced by Bernstein's supporters and adopted a resolution that gave a direct warning to Bernstein, though without laying down the principle that Bernsteinian views were incompatible with membership of the working-class party. p. 228

[95] *Jaurèists*—followers of the French socialist J. J. Jaurès, who headed the Right reformist Wing of the French Socialist Party. Under the pretext of defending "freedom of criticism", they sought to revise the Marxist principles and preached the class collaboration of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In 1902 they formed the French Socialist Party, which adhered to reformist principles. p. 228

[96] *The Workers' Party for the Political Liberation of Russia*—a small Narodnik-type organisation; existed in Minsk, Belostok and several other cities from 1899 to 1902. In 1902 the members of the party joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party. p. 228

[97] *The Bund*—the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia; founded in 1897, it embraced mainly the Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at its First Congress in March 1898. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Bund delegates insisted on the recognition of their organisation as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in Russia. The Congress rejected this organisational nationalism, whereupon the Bund withdrew from the Party.

In 1906, following the Fourth ("Unity") Congress, the Bund reaffiliated with the R.S.D.L.P. The Bundists constantly supported the Mensheviks and waged an incessant struggle against the Bolsheviks. Despite its formal affiliation with the R.S.D.L.P., the Bund remained an organisation of a bourgeois-nationalist character. As opposed to the Bolshevik programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination, the Bund put forward the demand for cultural-national autonomy. During the First World War of 1914-18 the Bund took the stand of social-chauvinism. In 1917 the Bund supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. During the Civil War, prominent Bundists joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time, a turn began among the rank and file in favour of support to the Soviet Government. When the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention became apparent, the Bund declared its abandonment of the strug-

FROM MARX TO LENIN NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE BY BUDDY

gle against the Soviet system In March 1921, the Bund dissolved itself and part of the membership joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as new members. p. 229

[98] *Code of Laws of the Russian Empire*—a collected edition of the laws operative in the Russian Empire, published in fifteen volumes in 1833 and effective from 1835; a sixteenth volume was published in 1892. p. 231

[99] The reference is to the proclamation entitled "*A First Letter to the Famine-Stricken Peasants*", which appeared in 1892 over the signature "Peasant Well-Wishers". About 1,800 copies of the proclamation were printed at the illegal Lakhta Press belonging to the Narodnaya Volya Group in St. Petersburg. p. 236

[100] Lenin refers to Judas Golovlyov—a sanctimonious, hypocritical landlord serf-owner described in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 237

[101] The committee here referred to is the St. Petersburg Committee of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class which functioned in the period following the arrest of Lenin and the majority of the League leaders in December 1895; the leadership of the League fell into the hands of the "young" Social-Democrats, who supported the "Economist" position.

The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, founded by Lenin in the autumn of 1895 united all the Marxist workers' study circles in St. Petersburg. It was headed by a Central Group (S. I. Radchenko, A. A. Vaneyev, A. A. Yakubova, N. K. Krupskaya, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Starkov, and others) under Lenin's direction.

The League of Struggle headed by Lenin led the revolutionary working-class movement, linking the workers' struggle in support of economic demands with the political struggle against tsarism. It was the first organisation in Russia to *combine socialism with the working-class movement* and to go over from the propaganda of Marxism among a restricted range of advanced workers to political agitation among the working-class masses on an extended scale. The League issued leaflets and pamphlets for the workers and directed their strike struggles. It was the embryo of the revolutionary working-class Marxist Party. The influence of the League was felt far beyond St. Petersburg, and similar Leagues of Struggle, patterned upon it, were formed in other cities. p. 239

[102] *The Emancipation of Labour group* was the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov in 1883; the group included P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. I. Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov.

The group did much to spread Marxism in Russia. It translated such Marxist works as *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels; *Wage-Labour and Capital* by Marx; *Socialism:*

Utopian and Scientific by Engels; it published them abroad and organised their distribution in Russia. Plekhanov and his group dealt a serious blow at Narodism. In 1883 Plekhanov drafted a programme for the Russian Social-Democrats and in 1885 drew up another. The two drafts were published by the Emancipation of Labour group and marked an important step towards the establishment of a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. Plekhanov's *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885), and *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) played an important role in disseminating Marxist views. The group, however, made some serious mistakes; it clung to remnants of Narodnik views, overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie, while underestimating the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry. These errors were the first projections of the future Menshevik views held by Plekhanov and other members of the group. The group had no practical ties with the working-class movement. Lenin pointed out that the Emancipation of Labour group "only theoretically founded the Social-Democracy and took the first step in the direction of the working-class movement" (see present edition, Vol. 20, "The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement"). At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., in August 1903, the Emancipation of Labour group announced its dissolution. p. 239

[103] *The League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was founded on Lenin's initiative in October 1901. The *Iskra-Zarya* organisation abroad and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation (which included the Emancipation of Labour group) entered the League. The task of the League was to disseminate the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy and promote the foundation of a militant Social-Democratic organisation. Actually, the League was the representative of *Iskra* abroad. It recruited supporters for *Iskra* from among Social-Democrats living abroad, gave it material support, organised its delivery to Russia, and published popular Marxist literature. The League issued several *Bulletins* and pamphlets. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. approved the League as the sole Party organisation abroad, accorded it the full rights of a committee working under the leadership and control of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

After the Second Congress the Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the League and launched their struggle against Lenin and the Bolsheviks. At the Second Congress of the League in October 1903, the Mensheviks libelled the Bolsheviks, following which Lenin and his supporters walked out. The Mensheviks adopted new Rules for the League that contradicted the Rules of the Party adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. From that time onwards the League became a bulwark of Menshevism; it continued its existence until 1905. p. 241

[104] *Military settlements*—a special organisation of the Russian army introduced under Tsar Alexander I. By organising these settlements the tsarist government expected to curtail expenditure on the main-

tenance of the army, ensure a source of trained reserves, and obtain a reliable force for use against the growing revolutionary movement. The arch-reactionary A. A. Arakcheyev, Minister for War, was appointed head of the military settlements (hence the name—Arakcheyev settlements).

All peasants living on the territory allotted to the settlements were made soldiers for life. Army units were made up of settlers between the ages of 18 and 45 years ("farmers") and all other peasants fit for military service became "assistant farmers". Every farmer-settler had to feed three of the soldiers quartered on the settlement. All the settlers had to wear army uniform and undergo constant army training. Their whole lives were subordinated to a severe regime, everything, even family relations, coming under the strict regulations. Army drill and compulsory army work did not leave the peasants sufficient time for work on their farms which gradually fell into ruin

The unbearable, prison-like conditions of life and work in the military settlements led to a number of large-scale revolts, which were suppressed with incredible cruelty.

Military settlements were abolished in 1857. p. 245

[105] See Note 49. p. 248

[106] The first chapter of Lenin's *Review of Home Affairs* was published as a separate pamphlet in two editions under the title of "Fighting the Famine-Stricken". The first edition appeared as a separate reprint from *Zarya*, No. 2-3; the second edition of 3,000 copies was printed at the *Iskra* illegal press in Kishinev. p. 253

[107] The reference is to Arkady Pavlych Penochkin, a character in I. Turgenev's story "The Village Elder". p. 256

[108] Lenin quotes from M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The History of a Town*. p. 262

[109] *Priazovsky Krai* (*Azov Region*)—a daily newspaper published in Rostov-on-Don from 1891 to 1916; it was a continuation of the newspaper *Donskoye Polye* (*The Don Field*) published from 1889 to 1891. p. 266

[110] *Collective liability*—the compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants of each village commune for the making of timely and full payments and for the fulfilment of all sorts of services to the state and to the landlords (payment of poll-taxes and of redemption instalments, provision of recruits for the army, etc.). This form of bondage, which was retained even after serfdom had been abolished, remained in force until 1906. p. 267

[111] "*Inventory*"—a criminal list maintained by the gubernia authorities; it contained detailed information on convicts banished to Siberia. p. 271

[112] The book referred to is Nik.–on's (N. F. Danielson's) *Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*, St. Petersburg, 1893. p. 278

[113] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards by liberal professors of Moscow University and Zemstvo personalities; it expressed the views of the liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Right Cadets; it was banned after the October Revolution together with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 279

[114] *Assizes*—an institution of the tsarist courts of justice established by the judicial reform of 1864; it examined special civil and criminal cases and was a court of appeal for cases tried by the gubernia courts. Each assizes was established for several gubernias. p. 280

[115] The character referred to is Akaky Akakiyevich Bashmachkin, the hero of Gogol's story "The Greatcoat". p. 282

[116] *The Man in a Case*—the central character in Chekhov's story of that name. p. 282

[117] The reference is to the "Ordinance on Gubernia and Uyezd Zemstvo Institutions", approved by Alexander II on January 1, 1864. p. 283

[118] *Kit Kitych*—the nickname given to Tit Titych (Kit is Russian for "whale" and Tit is the Russian form of Titus) in A. N. Ostrovsky's comedy *Shouldering Another's Troubles*. p. 284

[119] *Missionerskoye Obozreniye* (*Missionary Review*)—a monthly theological journal published from 1896 to 1898 in Kiev and from 1899 to 1916 in St. Petersburg. The journal fought against all non-Orthodox Christians and was supported by the most reactionary clergy, notorious for their obscurantism and operating in close contact with the police. p. 291

[120] *Orlovsky Vestnik* (*Orel Herald*)—a daily newspaper, moderately liberal, with a social, political, and literary content, it was published in Orel from 1876 to 1918. p. 292

[121] *Stundists*—one of the religious sects persecuted in tsarist Russia. p. 292

[122] *Vera i Razum* (*Faith and Reason*)—a fortnightly theological and philosophical journal published by the Kharkov Theological Seminary from 1884 to 1916. The journal maintained an extreme reactionary position and made violent attacks on the democratic movement and on progressive ideas. p. 294

[123] *Svobodnoye Slovo* (*Free Word*)—a publishing house that issued abroad (in England and Switzerland) the works of Lev Tolstoi banned by the Russian censor and pamphlets against the oppression of non-Orthodox Christians by the tsarist government. From 1899 to 1901 the house published the journal *Svobodnaya Mysl* (*Free Thought*) and from 1901 to 1905 the journal *Svobodnoye Slovo* (*Free Word*). p. 294

[124] *Okhotny Ryad*—a street market in pre-revolutionary Moscow where mainly poultry and cooked foods were sold; the Okhotny Ryad traders were active participants in raids organised by the police, especially in breaking up student meetings and demonstrations. p. 299

[125] *Frey*—one of Lenin's pseudonyms. p. 303

[126] *Svoboda* (*Freedom*)—a journal published in Switzerland in 1901-02 by the Svoboda group that was formed in May 1901 and that referred to itself as "a revolutionary socialist group". Two issues appeared—No. 1 in 1901 and No. 2 in 1902. The Svoboda group also issued *The Eve of the Revolution: A Non-Periodical Review of Questions of Theory and of Tactics*, No. 1; the publication *Otkliki* (*Responses*), No. 1; the pamphlet *The Renaissance of Revolutionism in Russia*, by L. Nadezhdin and others

The Svoboda group was devoid of "serious, lasting ideas, of programme tactics, organisation, or roots in the masses" (see present edition Vol. 20, "On Adventurism"). Its publications advocated the ideas of "Economism" and of terrorism and supported the anti-*Iskra* groups in Russia. The Svoboda group ceased to exist in 1903. p. 311

[127] *Yuzhny Rabochy* (*Southern Worker*)—a Social-Democratic newspaper published illegally by a group of the same name from January 1900 to April 1903; altogether 12 issues appeared. The newspaper circulated chiefly among Social-Democratic organisations in the south of Russia.

Lenin said of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group that it was one of those organisations "which in words accepted *Iskra* as the guiding organ but in deeds followed their own particular plans and were distinguished for their instability on questions of principle". The group existed until the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Subsequently the majority of the leading members of the group became Mensheviks. p. 313

[128] *Zubatov*—Colonel of the Gendarmes, tried to introduce "police socialism". He set up fake workers' organisations under the protection of the gendarmerie and the police in an effort to divert the workers from the revolutionary movement. p. 314

[129] The demonstration on December 6(18) 1876 was organised by workers and students as a protest against the tyrannical actions of the autocracy. Plekhanov, who took part in the demonstration, delivered a revolutionary speech. The demonstration was broken up by the police, and many participants were arrested and sentenced to banishment or penal servitude. p. 322

[130] The slogan "*Land and Freedom*" was released at that time by an illegal organisation of the same name (Zemlya i Volya), founded by the Narodniks in Russia in 1876. Among the leading members were G. V. Plekhanov, A. D. Mikhailov, O. V. Aptekman, A. A. Kvyatkovsky, S. M. Kravchinsky (Stepnyak), S. L. Perovskaya, N. A. Morozov, and V. N. Figner.

The Zemlya i Volya organisation viewed the peasantry as the chief revolutionary force in Russia and sought to bring about an uprising of the peasantry against tsarism. It conducted revolutionary activity in a number of Russian gubernias—Tambov, Voronezh, and others. In 1879 a terrorist grouping was formed in Zemlya i Volya which regarded individual terror to be the chief means of fighting against tsarism. At a congress held in Voronezh that year Zemlya i Volya split into two groups: Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will) and Chorny Peredel (General Redistribution). p. 322

[131] *N. A. Dobrolyubov* (1836-1861)—Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher and literary critic. p. 323

[132] *Oblomov*—the central character in the novel of that name by I. Goncharov. Oblomov was the personification of routine, stagnation, and inertia. p. 338

[133] The collection *Proletarskaya Borba* (*Proletarian Struggle*), No. 1, was published by the Ural Social-Democratic Group in 1899. The authors, who espoused "Economist" views, denied the necessity of establishing an independent working-class political party and believed that a political revolution could be accomplished by means of a general strike, without the preliminary organisation and preparation of the masses and without an armed uprising. p. 339

[134] "*The Social-Democratic Workers' Library*"—a series of pamphlets published illegally in Vilno and St. Petersburg in 1900-01. p. 339

[135] See *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx and Engels *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, pp. 21-65. p. 340

[136] The reference is to the general strike of students organised in the winter of 1901-02. Some 30,000 students took part in the strike. p. 341

[137] Lenin refers to the case of Dreyfus, a French General Staff officer, a Jew, who, in 1894, was court-martialled and sentenced to life imprisonment on an obviously trumped-up charge of espionage and high treason. That provocative trial was organised by French reactionary circles. The general movement for the defence of Dreyfus that developed in France exposed the corruption of the court and sharpened the struggle between republicans and royalists. In 1899 Dreyfus was pardoned and released. It was not until 1906, after a fresh examination of the case, that Dreyfus was rehabilitated. p. 341

[138] Lenin's work *What Is To Be Done?* was written at the end of 1901 and early in 1902. In "Where To Begin", published in *Iskra*, No. 4 (May 1901), Lenin said that the article represented "a skeleton plan to be developed in greater detail in a pamphlet now in preparation for print".

Lenin began the actual writing of the book in the autumn of 1901. In his "Preface to the Pamphlet *Documents of the 'Unity' Conference*", written in November 1901, Lenin said that the book was in preparation "to be published in the near future". In December Lenin published (in *Iskra*, No. 12) his article "A Talk with Defenders of Economism", which he later called a conspectus of *What Is To Be Done?* He wrote the Preface to the book in February 1902 and early in March the book was published by Dietz in Stuttgart. An announcement of its publication was printed in *Iskra*, No. 18, March 10, 1902.

In republishing the book in 1907 as part of the collection *Twelve Years*, Lenin omitted Section A of Chapter V, "Who Was Offended by the Article 'Where To Begin'", stating in the Preface that the book was being published with slight abridgements representing the omission solely of details of the organisational relationships and minor polemical remarks. Lenin added five footnotes to the new edition.

The text of this volume is that of the 1902 edition, verified with the 1907 edition. p. 347

[139] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*)—an illegal newspaper issued by the Kiev group of Social-Democrats. Two issues appeared—No. 1 in August and No. 2 in December (dated November) 1897. The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official organ of the Party, but the newspaper discontinued publication shortly after the Congress, as a result of a police raid on the printing-press and the arrest of the Central Committee. p. 350

[140] *Lassalleans and Eisenachers*—two parties in the German working-class movement in the sixties and early seventies of the nineteenth century.

Lassalleans—supporters of Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) and adherents of his theories; Lassalle was a German petty-bour-

geois socialist who played an active part in organising (in 1863) the General Association of German Workers, a political organisation that existed up to 1875. The programmatic demands of the Association were formulated by Lassalle in a number of articles and speeches. Lassalle regarded the state as a supra-class organisation and, in conformity with that philosophically idealist view, believed that the Prussian state could bo utilised to solve the social problem through the setting up of producers' co-operatives with its aid. Marx said that Lassalle advocated a "Royal-Prussian state socialism". Lassalle directed the workers towards peaceful, parliamentary forms of struggle, believing that the introduction of universal suffrage would make Prussia a "free people's state". To obtain universal suffrage he promised Bismarck the support of his Association against the liberal opposition and also in the implementation of Bismarck's plan to reunite Germany "from above" under the hegemony of Prussia. Lassalle repudiated the revolutionary class struggle, denied the importance of trade unions and of strike action, ignored the international tasks of the working class, and infected the German workers with nationalist ideas. His contemptuous attitude towards the peasantry, which he regarded as a reactionary force, did much damage to the German working-class movement. Marx and Engels fought his harmful utopian dogmatism and his reformist views. Their criticism helped free the German workers from the influence of Lassallean opportunism.

Eisenachers—members of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, founded in 1869 at the Eisenach Congress. The leaders of the Eisenachers were August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, who were under the ideological influence of Marx and Engels. The Eisenach programme stated that the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany considered itself "a section of the International Working Men's Association and shared its aspirations". Thanks to the regular advice and criticism of Marx and Engels, the Eisenachers pursued a more consistent revolutionary policy than did Lassalle's General Association of German Workers; in particular, on the question of German reunification, they followed "the democratic and proletarian road, struggling against the slightest concession to Prussianism, Bismarckism, and nationalism" (see present edition, Vol. 19, "August Bebel"). Under the influence of the growing working-class movement and of increased government repressions, the two parties united at the Gotha Congress in 1875 to form the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany, of which the Lassalleans formed the opportunist wing. p. 352

[141] *Guesdists and Possibilists*—two trends in the French socialist movement arising out of the split in the French Workers' Party in 1882.

Guesdists—followers of Jules Guesde, constituted the Marxist wing of the movement and advocated an independent revolutionary policy of the proletariat. In 1901 they formed the Socialist Party of France.

Possibilists—a petty-bourgeois reformist trend that sought to divert the proletariat from revolutionary methods of struggle. The Possibilists advocated the restriction of working-class activity to what is "possible" under capitalism. In 1902, in conjunction with other reformist groups, the Possibilists organised the French Socialist Party.

In 1905 the Socialist Party of France and the French Socialist Party united to form a single party. During the imperialist war of 1914-18, Jules Guesde, together with the entire leadership of the French Socialist Party, went over to the camp of social-chauvinism. p. 352

[142] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 245. p. 354

[143] *Cadets*—the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the principal bourgeois party in Russia, representing the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. It was formed in October 1905. Parading as democrats and calling themselves the party of "people's freedom", the Cadets tried to win the following of the peasantry. Their aim was to preserve tsarism in the form of a constitutional monarchy. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Cadets organised counter-revolutionary conspiracies and revolts against the Soviet Republic. p. 356

[144] *Bezzaglavtsi*—from the title of the journal *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*)—were organisers of, and contributors to, the journal published in St. Petersburg in 1906 by S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, and others. The journal openly advocated revisionism, supported the Mensheviks and liberals and opposed an independent proletarian policy. Lenin called the group "pro-Menshevik Cadets or pro-Cadet Mensheviks". p. 356

[145] *Ilovaisky, D. I.* (1832-1920)—historian; author of numerous official textbooks of history that were extensively used in primary and secondary schools in pre-revolutionary Russia. In Ilovaisky's texts history was reduced mainly to acts of kings and generals; the historical process was explained through secondary and fortuitous circumstances. p. 357

[146] *Katheder-Socialism*—a trend in bourgeois political economy that emerged in Germany in the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century. Under the guise of socialism the *Katheder*-Socialists preached bourgeois-liberal reformism from university chairs (*Katheder*). They maintained that the bourgeois state was above classes, that it was capable of reconciling hostile classes and gradually introducing "socialism", without affecting the interests of the capitalists, while, at the same time, taking the demands of the workers as far as possible into consideration. In Russia the

views of the *Katheder*-Socialists were disseminated by the "legal Marxists". p. 357

147 *Nozdryov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls* whom the author called "an historical personage" for the reason that wherever he went he left behind him a scandalous "history". p. 358

148 *The Hanover resolution*—resolution on "Attacks on the Fundamental Views and Tactics of the Party", adopted by the German Social-Democratic Party Congress at Hanover, September 27-October 2 (October 9-14), 1899. A discussion of this question at the Congress and the adoption of a special resolution were necessitated by the fact that the opportunists, led by Bernstein, launched a revisionist attack on Marxist theory and demanded a reconsideration of Social-Democratic revolutionary policy and tactics. The resolution adopted by the Congress rejected the demands of the revisionists, but failed to criticise and expose Bernsteinism. Bernstein's supporters also voted for the resolution. p. 358

149 *The Stuttgart Congress* of the German Social-Democratic Party held on September 21-26 (October 3-8), 1898, was the first congress to discuss the question of revisionism in the German Social-Democratic Party. A statement from Bernstein (who did not attend) was read to the Congress; it amplified and defended the opportunist views he had previously set forth in a number of articles. There was, however, no unity among his opponents at the Congress. Some (Bebel, Kautsky, and others) called for an ideological struggle and a criticism of Bernstein's errors, but opposed the adoption of organisational measures toward him. The others, led by Rosa Luxemburg—the minority—urged a more vigorous struggle against Bernsteinism. p. 359

150 *Starover* (Old Believer)—the pseudonym of A. N. Potresov, a member of the *Iskra* Editorial Board, he subsequently became a Menshevik. p. 360

151 "*The Author Who Got a Swelled Head*"—the title of one of Maxim Gorky's early stories. p. 361

152 The reference is to the collection *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development*, printed legally in an edition of 2,000 copies in April 1895. The collection included Lenin's article (signed *K. Tulin*) "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book (*The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature*)", directed against the "legal Marxists" (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507). p. 362

153 "*A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats*" was written by Lenin in 1899, in exile. It was a reply to the *Credo* of a group of "Econo-

mists" (S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, and others, who subsequently became Cadets). On receiving a copy of the *Credo* from his sister, A. I. Yelizarova, Lenin wrote a sharp protest in which he exposed the real nature of the declaration.

The Protest was discussed and unanimously endorsed by a meeting of 17 exiled Marxists convened by Lenin in the village of Yermakovskoye, Minusinsk District (Siberia). Exiles in Turukhansk District (Siberia) and Orlovo (Vyatka Gubernia) subsequently associated themselves with the Protest.

Lenin forwarded a copy of the Protest abroad to the Emancipation of Labour group; Plekhanov published it in his *Vademecum* (*Handbook—Ed.*) *for the Editors of Rabocheye Dyelo*. p. 364

[154] *Byloye* (*The Past*)—a monthly journal on historical problems published in St. Petersburg in 1906-07; in 1908 it changed its name to *Minuvshiye Gody* (*Years Past*). It was banned by the tsarist government in 1908, but resumed publication in Petrograd in July 1917 and continued in existence until 1926. p. 364

[155] *Vademecum for the Editors of Rabocheye Dyelo*—a collection of articles and documents compiled and prefaced by G. V. Plekhanov and published by the Emancipation of Labour Group in Geneva in 1900; it exposed the opportunist views of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and of the Editorial Board of its periodical, *Rabocheye Dyelo*. p. 364

[156] *Profession de foi*—a manifesto setting forth the opportunist views of the Kiev Committee, issued at the end of 1899. It was identical with the "Economist" *Credo* on many points. Lenin criticised the document in his article "Apropos of the *Profession de foi*" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 286-96). p. 364

[157] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 16. p. 369

[158] *The Gotha Programme*—the programme adopted by the German Social-Democratic Party at the Gotha Congress in 1875 when the Eisenachers and Lassalleans united. The programme suffered from eclecticism and opportunism, since the Eisenachers made concessions to the Lassalleans on the most important points and accepted their formulations. Marx and Engels subjected the Gotha Programme to scathing criticism and characterised it as a retrograde step as compared with the Eisenach Programme of 1869 (See Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 13-48). p. 369

[159] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 652-54. p. 372

[160] The pamphlet *On Agitation* was written by A. Kremer (later an organiser of the Bund) and edited by Y. O. Tsederbaum (Martov) in Vilno in 1894; it was at first circulated in handwritten and hectographed copies, but at the end of 1897 it was printed in Geneva and supplied with a preface and a concluding piece by P. B. Axelrod. The pamphlet summarised the experiences gained in Social-Democratic work in Vilno and exerted a great influence on Russian Social-Democrats, since it called on them to reject narrow study-circle propaganda and to go over to mass agitation among the workers on issues of their everyday needs and demands. It exaggerated the role of the purely economic struggle, however, to the detriment of political agitation on issues of general democratic demands, and was the embryo of the future "Economism". P. B. Axelrod noted the one-sidedness of the "Vilno Economism" in his concluding piece to the Geneva edition, G. V. Plekhanov made a critical analysis of the pamphlet *On Agitation* in his *Once More on Socialism and the Political Struggle*. p. 376

[161] *Russkaya Starina* (*The Russian Antiquary*)—a monthly magazine dealing with historical problems published in St. Petersburg from 1870 to 1918. p. 376

[162] *S. Peterburgsky Rabochy Listok* (*St. Petersburg Workers' Paper*)—an illegal newspaper, organ of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Two issues appeared: No. 1 in February 1897 (dated January and mimeographed in Russia in an edition of 300-400 copies) and No. 2 in September 1897 in Geneva. p. 377

[163] *A private meeting* referred to here was held in St. Petersburg between February 14 and 17 (February 26 and March 1), 1897. It was attended by V. I. Lenin, A. A. Vaneyev, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, and other members of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, that is, by the "veterans" who had been released from prison for three days before being sent into exile to Siberia, as well as by the "young" leaders of the League of Struggle who had taken over the leadership of the League after Lenin's arrest in December 1895. p. 378

[164] "*Listok*" *Rabotnika* (*The Workingman's Paper*)—published in Geneva by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad from 1896 to 1899; altogether there appeared 10 issues. Issues 1-8 were edited by the Emancipation of Labour group. But after the majority of the Union Abroad went over to "Economism", the Emancipation of Labour group refused to continue editing the paper. Nos. 9 and 10 were issued by a new editorial board set up by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 379

[165] The "*article by V. I.*"—an article by V. P. Ivanshin. p. 380

[166] *V. V.*— pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov, an ideologist of liberal Narodism in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. By the "*V. V.'s of Russian Social-Democracy*" Lenin understands the "Economists" who represented the opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. p. 381

[167] *The Hirsch-Duncker Unions* were established in Germany in 1868 by Hirsch and Duncker, two bourgeois liberals. They preached the "harmony of class interests", drew the workers away from the revolutionary class struggle against the bourgeoisie, and restricted the role of the trade unions to that of mutual benefit societies and educational bodies. p. 385

[168] *The Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group*—a small group of "Economists" formed in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1898; it existed for only a few months and published a manifesto setting forth its aims [published in *Nakanune* (*On the Eve*) in London], a set of rules and several leaflets addressed to the workers. p. 387

[169] *Nakanune* (*On the Eve*)—a journal expressing Narodnik views. It was published in Russian in London from January 1899 to February 1902—altogether 37 issues. The journal was a rallying point for representatives of various petty-bourgeois parties. p. 388

[170] G. V. Plekhanov published his well-known work *The Development of the Monist View of History* legally in St. Petersburg in 1895 under the pseudonym of *N. Beltov*. p. 394

[171] *Nartsis Tuporylov* (*Narcissus Blunt-Snout*) was the pseudonym under which Y. O. Martov published his satirical poem "Hymn of the Contemporary Russian Socialist" in *Zarya*, No. I, April 1901. The "Hymn" ridiculed the "Economists" and their adaptations to spontaneous events. p. 395

[172] The letter in *Iskra*, No. 7 (August 1901), was from a weaver. It was published in the section "Workers' Movement and Letters from the Factories". The letter testified to the great influence of Lenin's *Iskra* among the advanced workers.

The letter reads in part:

"... I showed *Iskra* to many fellow-workers and the copy was read to tatters; but we treasure it.... *Iskra* writes about our cause, about the All-Russian cause which cannot be evaluated in kopeks or measured in hours, when you read the paper you understand why the gendarmes and the police are afraid of us workers and of the intellectuals whom we follow. It is a fact that they are a threat, not only to the bosses' pockets, but to the tsar, the employers, and all the rest.... It will not take much now to set the working people aflame. All that is wanted is a spark, and the fire will break out. How true are the words 'The Spark will kindle a flame!' (The motto of *Iskra*.—*Ed*.) In the past every strike was an important

event, but today everyone sees that strikes alone are not enough and that we must now fight for freedom, gain it through struggle. Today everyone, old and young, is eager to read but the sad thing is that there are no books. Last Sunday I gathered eleven people and read to them 'Where To Begin'. We discussed it until late in the evening. How well it expressed everything, how it gets to the very heart of things.... And we would like to write a letter to your *Iskra* and ask you to teach us, not only how to begin, but how to live and how to die." p. 431

[173] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a moderate liberal newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1899 to 1902. p. 436

[174] *S. Peterburgskiye Vedomosti* (*St. Petersburg Recorder*)—a newspaper that began publication in St. Petersburg in 1728 as a continuation of the first Russian newspaper *Vedomosti*, founded in 1703. From 1728 to 1874 the *S. Peterburgskiye Vedomosti* was published by the Academy of Sciences and from 1875 onwards by the Ministry of Education; it continued publication until the end of 1917. p. 438

[175] *L. Brentano*—a German bourgeois economist, a champion of so-called "state socialism", who tried to prove the possibility of achieving social equality within the framework of capitalism by reforms and through the reconciliation of the interests of the capitalists and of the workers. Using Marxist phraseology as a cover, Brentano and his followers tried to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. p. 438

[176] The full name of this small organisation was *Workers' Group for the Struggle Against Capital*, its views were close to those of the "Economists". The group was formed in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1899, it prepared a mimeographed leaflet, "Our Programme", which was never circulated, owing to the arrest of the group. p. 444

[177] *N. N.*—pseudonym of S. N. Prokopovich, an active "Economist" who later became a Cadet. p. 450

[178] *Vasilyev, N. V.*—Colonel of the Gendarmes, supporter of the Zubatov "police socialism". (See Note 128.)

Ozerou, I. Kh. and Worms, A. E.—professors at Moscow University, spokesmen for the "police socialism" of Zubatov. p. 455

[179] *Afanasy Ivanovich and Pulkheria Ivanovna*—a patriarchal family of petty provincial landlords in Gogol's *Old-Time Landowners*. p. 456

[180] Lenin refers here to his own revolutionary activity in St. Petersburg in 1893-95. p. 466

[181] The reference is to the pamphlet *Report on the Russian Social-Democratic Movement to the International Socialist Congress in Paris, 1900*. The Report was submitted to the Congress by the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* on behalf of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and was published as a separate pamphlet in Geneva in 1901; the pamphlet also contained the report of the Bund ("The History of the Jewish Working-Class Movement in Russia and Poland"). p. 483

[182] *Yuzhny Rabochy* (*The Southern Worker*)—a Social-Democratic newspaper, illegally published from January 1900 to April 1903 by a group of that name; twelve issues appeared. p. 488

[183] Lenin added this footnote for purposes of secrecy. The facts are enumerated in the order in which they actually took place. p. 496

[184] The reference is to the negotiations between the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and Lenin who, in the second half of 1897, wrote the two pamphlets mentioned. p. 496

[185] The reference is to the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. (See Note 103.) p. 496

[186] The reference is to the negotiations between Lenin and the Central Committee of the Bund. p. 497

[187] *The "fourth fact"* of which Lenin speaks was the attempt of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the Bund to convene the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in the spring of 1900. The "*member of the committee*" referred to was I. H. Lalayants (a member of the Ekaterinoslav Social-Democratic Committee) who came to Moscow in February 1900 for talks with Lenin. p. 497

[188] Lenin cites the article by D. I. Pisarev "Blunders of Immature Thinking". p. 510

[189] *Tkachov, P. N.* (1844-1885)—one of the ideologists of revolutionary Narodism, a follower of the Auguste Blanqui. p. 510

[190] Lenin refers to the following passage from Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 247). p. 510

[191] *Janizaries*—privileged Turkish infantry, abolished in 1826. The janizaries plundered the population and were known for their unusual brutality. Lenin called the tsarist police "janizaries". p. 514

[192] Lenin omitted this appendix when *What Is To Be Done?* was republished in the collection *Twelve Years* in 1907 p. 521

[193] *The International Socialist Bureau*—the executive body of the Second International established by decision of the Paris Congress in 1900. From 1905 onwards Lenin was a member of the Bureau as a representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. p. 521

[194] *Iskra*, No. 18 (March 10, 1902) published in the section "From the Party" an item entitled "*Zarya*'s Polemic with *Vorwärts*", summing up the controversy. p. 526

THE LIFE AND WORK OF V. I. LENIN

Chronology

(May 1901-February 1902)

1901

May, prior to 13 (26)	Lenin begins work on his book *What Is To Be Done?*
May 13-15 (20-28)	Lenin's "Where To Begin" is published in *Iskra*, No. 4; in this article Lenin outlined a concrete plan for the building of a revolutionary party of the working class, which was later developed in *What Is To Be Done?*
May-June	Lenin guides the organising of the transport of *Iskra* to Russia. Lenin conducts negotiations with the *Iskra* group in Baku for reprinting *Iskra* in the local underground print-shop organised by V. Z. Ketskhoveli. In letters to *Iskra* agents Lenin gives instructions on the reprinting of material published in the newspaper at the *Iskra* underground press in Kishinev.
June, prior to 24 (beginning of July)	Lenin writes his "Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism".
June 24 and 26 (July 7 and 9)	Lenin poses to the *Iskra* editors the question of drafting a Party programme.
June 24-July 17 (July 7-30)	The discussion on Lenin's article "Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" by the *Iskra* editors reveals differences between Lenin and Plekhanov on the question of the attitude to the liberals. Lenin refuses to change the general tone of the article or to revise his position of principle on the question of the attitude to the liberals.
June	Lenin's article "Another Massacre", on the workers' defence at the Obukhov Works, published in *Iskra*, No. 5.

June-September	Lenin writes "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", directed against the revisionist "Critics" of the Marxist theory of the agrarian question.
July	In a letter to an *Iskra* adherent Lenin protests emphatically against the publication, in St. Petersburg, of a local periodical of the Russian *Iskra* organisation, believing that plan to be a return to amateur methods of work. Lenin's article "A Valuable Admission" published in *Iskra*, No. 6 .
July 31-August 12 (August 13-25)	Lenin receives from Russia N. K. Krupskaya's first pamphlet, The Woman Worker, printed in the *Iskra* underground press at Kishinev.
August	Lenin's article "The Lessons of the Crisis" published in *Iskra*, No. 7.
	Lenin sends to *Iskra* agents in Russia the plan he has elaborated for an All-Russian *Iskra* organisation.
September 10 (23)	Lenin's article "The Serf-Owners at Work" published in *Iskra*, No. 8.
September 20 (October 3)	Lenin participates in a conference of representatives of *Iskra* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations abroad held in Zurich. The conference instructs Lenin to speak at the "Unity" Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad.
September 21 (October 4)	Lenin speaks at the "Unity" Conference of *Iskra* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, the Bund, and the Borba group, and exposes the opportunism of the leaders of the Union Abroad.
September 22 (October 5)	After reading a declaration on the final rupture with the Union Abroad, Lenin and the representatives of *Iskra* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations abroad leave the "Unity" Conference.
Late September-early October (October)	Lenin negotiates with an *Iskra* agent from Russia and gives instructions on the formation of an All-Russian *Iskra* organisation.
	Lenin participates in the organisation—undertaken on his initiative—of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, which united the adherents of *Iskra* and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation.

October	Lenin's articles "Fighting the Famine-Stricken" "A Reply to the St. Petersburg Committee", and "Party Affairs Abroad" published in *Iskra*, No. 9.
November, prior to 20 (December, prior to 3)	Lenin's article "Penal Servitude Regulations and Penal Servitude Sentences" published in *Iskra*, No. 10.
November 20 (December 3)	Lenin's article "The Protest of the Finnish People" published in *Iskra*, No. 11.
December, prior to 5 (18)	In a letter to the *Iskra* organisations in Russia Lenin presents the information that *What Is To Be Done?* will shortly be published.
December 5 (18)	In a letter to an *Iskra* agent Lenin objects strongly to the use of the *Iskra* press at Kishinev for printing writings of an "Economist" tendency.
December, prior to 6 (19)	In the name of the *Iskra* Editorial Board Lenin writes a letter of congratulation to G. V. Plekhanov on the anniversary of his twenty-five years of revolutionary activity.
December 6 (19)	Lenin's article "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" published in *Iskra*, No. 12.
December, between 6 and 10 (19 and 23)	*Zarya*, No. 2-3 publishes Lenin's "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" under the title "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question" (the first article signed *N. Lenin*), and "Review of Home Affairs".
December 20 (January 2, 1902)	Lenin's article "Demonstrations Have Begun" published in *Iskra*, No. 13.
December 21 (January 3 1902)	Lenin receives the first copy of *Iskra*, No. 10, printed at the *Iskra* underground press in Kishinev.

1902

Early January (mid-January)	Lenin writes critical notes to the first draft programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, composed by Plekhanov.
January 8 (21)	Lenin, in a speech at a conference of the *Iskra* Editorial Board in Munich criticises the first draft programme composed by Plekhanov and introduces his corrections and proposals.

January (between 8 and 25) (between January 21 and February 7)	Lenin composes a new draft programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.
January 15 (28)	Lenin's article "Concerning the State Budget" published in *Iskra*, No. 15.
End of January (first half of February)	Following Lenin's instructions, the All-Russian *Iskra* organisation is founded at a conference of *Iskra* adherents in Samara.
February 1 (14)	Lenin's article "Political Agitation and 'The Class Point of View'" published in *Iskra*, No. 16.
February	Lenin writes the Preface to his *What Is To Be Done?*
End of February to mid-March (March)	Lenin writes the critical notes to the second draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. composed by Plekhanov.
March 5 (18)	Lenin writes for the Belostok Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the "Report of the *Iskra* Editorial Board to the Meeting of R.S.D.L.P. Committees" and a draft resolution; he takes part in the conference of the *Iskra* Editorial Board and gives instructions to the *Iskra* delegate to the Belostok Conference.
Beginning of March (mid-March)	The book *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* is published in Stuttgart; in this work Lenin elaborated the ideological foundations of the Marxist Party.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 5

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

6

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.S.R.

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Издание четвертое

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ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume Six contains works by V. I. Lenin written between January 1902 and August 1903.

The volume includes *Material for the Preparation of the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.*, which reflects the struggle waged by Lenin in the Editorial Board of *Iskra* for the working out of a revolutionary programme for the party of the working class.

A considerable part of the volume consists of works dealing with the question of agrarian relations and the peasantry, the theory of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry: "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social Democracy", the pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*, and other works.

The national question and the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalism are dealt with in the articles, "The National Question in Our Programme", "Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an 'Independent Political Party'?", and other writings.

The present volume contains the following works directed against the Socialist-Revolutionaries: "Revolutionary Adventurism", "The Basic Thesis Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries", "Why the Social-Democrats Must Declare a Determined and Relentless War on the Socialist-Revolutionaries", and others.

Lenin's struggle against bourgeois liberalism is reflected in the articles, "The Autocracy is Wavering...", "Mr. Struve Exposed by His Colleague", and "Political Struggle and Political Chicanery".

"A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks", and "Draft Rules of the R.S.D.L.P." are devoted to an elaboration of the organisational principles of a Marxist party.

The volume includes "On the Subject of Reports by Committees and Groups of the R.S.D.L.P. to the General Party Congress", as well as draft resolutions and speeches at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which give an idea of Lenin's work in preparation for and during the Party Congress.

The present volume includes the following works by V. I. Lenin published for the first time in his *Collected Works*: "Concerning Demonstrations", "On the Tasks of the Social Democratic Movement", "The Basic Thesis Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries", "To Secondary School Students", "Extract from an Article Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries", "Draft Appeal of the Russian Organising Committee to the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, and the Foreign Committee of the Bund", "Marxist Views on the Agrarian Question in Europe and in Russia", "Outline of an Article Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries", "First Speech in the Discussion on the Party Rules", "Speech on the Attitude Towards the Student Youth", and "The Latest Word in Bundist Nationalism".

MATERIAL FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[1]

Written in January-April 1902

First published in 1924, in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Published according to the manuscript



First page of Lenin's manuscript, "Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party", 1902

Reduced

NOTES ON PLEKHANOV'S FIRST DRAFT PROGRAMME

PLEKHANOV'S TEXT	LENIN'S NOTES
I. The principal economic feature of present day society is the domination of capitalist production relations in it,	Page 1. No. 1—Capitalism is not a "feature" of present-day society, but its economic *system* or *mode*, etc.
i.e., ownership of the means of production and of commodity circulation by the numerically very small class of capitalists,	No. 2—The means of production belong not only to the capitalists, but to the landowners and small producers as well.
while the majority of the population consists of proletarians,	No. 3—The proletariat is not the majority of the population in many countries.
who have no other possession but their labour-power, and cannot subsist except by selling it.	No. 4—The proletariat possesses certain articles of consumption (and partly means of production too).
In consequence of this, the majorjority of the population is reduced to the dependent position of wage-workers, whose labour creates the income of the capitalists.	Page 2. No. 5 + of the landowners.
II. The sphere of domination of capitalist production relations is constantly expanding, as continuous technical progress	To page 2. Not technical progress but private ownership expropriates and *verelendet** the small producer.

* Impoverishes.—*Ed.*

increases the economic importance of the big enterprises and thereby

No. 6—"and thereby"?? Of itself technical progress cannot *increase* the economic importance of the big enterprises. As the result of technical progress (+ a number of economic changes, such as in market conditions, etc.) small-scale production is being ousted by large-scale production.

decreases the number of independent small producers, reduces their role in the economic life of society,

No. 6-7. Capitalism does not always "*decrease the n u m b e r* of small producers" (relatively, and not necessarily absolutely, particularly in Russia).

[Capitalism expropriates and leads him—the small producer—to degradation and impoverishment....]

Page 2. No. 7. Reduces the role of the small = increases the economic importance of the big (one and the same thing).

and at places turns them directly into vassals and tributaries of the big manufacturers.

No. 8—Directly—delete. The process of the separation of the producer from the means of production is not indicated.

III. Capitalist production relations weigh more and more heavily on the working class, as technical progress, by increasing the productivity of labour, not only makes it materially possible for the capitalists to intensify the exploitation of the workers, but converts this possibility into reality, occasioning a relative reduction in the demand for

Page 3 of the original draft.

No. 9. + and on the small producers

[the peasants in general should be specially mentioned].

No. 10—giving rise to, or engendering.

labour-power simultaneously with a relative and absolute increase in its supply.

Page 3—expressed in an extremely unpopular, abstract way. Far better in the Erfurt Programme[2] "...the army of surplus-workers is growing", "insecurity of existence is increasing.

IV. The development of labour productivity does not raise the price of labour-power, but, on the contrary, is very often the direct cause of its reduction. Thus, technical progress, which signifies an increase in social wealth causes greater social inequality in capitalist society, widens the distance between the propertied and the propertyless, and increases the workers' economic dependence on the capitalists.

Page 4—"the price of labour-power" is very often <* (also expressed in a very abstract way; = the growth of exploitation, oppression, poverty, degradation).

"Thus" causes greater inequality. It would appear from this that greater inequality is engendered *only* by the increase (intensification) in the *exploitation* of the wage-worker, whereas it is engendered:

1) by the expropriation of the small producer + 2) by the impoverishment of the small producer + 3) by the increase in exploitation + 4) by the growth of the reserve army.

V. With such a state of affairs in capitalist society and with the constantly growing mutual rivalry among the capitalist countries on the world market, the sale of commodities necessarily lags behind their production, and this periodically causes more or less severe industrial crises attended by more or less lengthy periods of industrial stagnation, leading to a further

Page 5.

Is it necessary to indicate the *causes* of crises in the programme?

If so, the shortcoming is that two causes are indicated: 1) greater social inequality ("with such a state of affairs", p. 4) + 2) the growth of rivalry.

* Reduced.—*Ed.*

The basic cause of crises = *Planlosigkeit*,* private appropriation under social production, is not indicated.

reduction in the number and economic importance of the small producers,

Pages 5-6: reduction of the "*e c o n o m i c i m p o r t a n c e*" of the small producers is too abstract a term.

{ Expropriates (= reduces the number?) and *verelendet*.

to a still greater dependence of wage-labour upon capital,

Page 6—of wage-"*labour*"? Isn't it better to say of the *workers*?

and to a still more rapid relative and at places even absolute, deterioration of the conditions of the proletariat and the small producers.

Page 6—consequences of a crisis—*relative and absolute deterioration of the conditions*. Isn't it better to say plainly: unemployment, poverty of the workers and the small producers.

VI. But as these inevitable contradictions of capitalism grow and develop, the discontent of the working class with the existing order of things also grows, its struggle against the capitalist class becomes sharper, and in its midst the realisation spreads ever more widely and rapidly

Page 7—instead of discontent—*indignation*.

Page 7—the spreading of a realisation (—γ) is placed *on a par* with the growth of indignation (—α) and the aggravation of the struggle (—β). But

α and β are spontaneous, whereas

γ should be introduced by *us*.

* Painlessness.—Ed.

that the yoke of economic dependence, which lies on its shoulders, can be thrown off only through its own efforts, and that to throw off this yoke a social revolution is necessary, i.e., the destruction of capitalists production relations and the conversion of the means of production and of the circulation of products into public property.

Page 7—"only through its own efforts".

This should be expressed in a more general way: *can be the act only of the working class*, etc.

Pages 7-8.

1) destruction of capitalist production relations? -- Socialist production* *taking the place*** of commodity production,

2) the expropriation of the exploiters,

3) the conversion of the means of production into *public property*

the conversion of private into public property.

VII. This revolution of the proletariat will emancipate the whole off mankind, now oppressed and suffering, since it will put an end to all forms of oppression and exploitation of man by man.

VIII. In order to replace capitalist commodity production by the socialist organisation of the production of articles to satisfy the needs of society and ensure the well-being of all its members, in order to effect its revolution,

Page 9—unclear***: "to satisfy the needs of society and ensure the well-being of all its members."

This is insufficient: (cf. the Erfurt Programme: "the greatest well-being and all-round harmonious perfection").

---

* It is necessary to explain what this socialist production is.

** As is stated on pages 8-9.

*** In Lenin's manuscript the word "unclear" is written above the words "to satisfy the needs".—*Ed*.

the proletariat must have command of political power, which will make it master of the situation and enable it ruthlessly to smash all the obstacles it will come up against on the road to its great goal. In this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is an essential political condition of the social revolution.

Page 9. "Master of the situation", "ruthlessly to smash", "dictatorship"??? (The social revolution is enough for us.)

IX. But the development of international exchange and the world market has established such close ties among all nations of the civilised world, that this great goal can be attained only through the united efforts of the proletarians of all countries. Hence the present-day working-class movement had to become, and has long become, an international movement.

Page 10—*nil*.

X. Russian Social-Democracy regards itself as one of the detachments of the world army of the proletariat, as part of international Social-Democracy.

XI. It pursues the same ultimate aim as the Social-Democrats of all other countries set themselves.

Page 11.—"the same *Endziel**". Why the repetition?

It discloses to the workers the irreconcilable antagonism between their interests and those of the capitalists, explains to them the historical significance, nature, and prerequisites of the social revolution which the proletariat is to carry out, and organises their forces for an unremitting struggle against their exploiters.

Page 11.—"the same *Endziel*"—and right alongside the *task* (might there not be confusion?) of the Social-Democratic Party:

1) To disclose *to* (?) the workers the irreconcilable antagonism between their interests and those of the capitalists.

2) To explain to them the significance, nature, and prerequisites of the social revo-

* Ultimate aim.—*Ed*.

lution [+the necessity of revolution?].

The Germans put this more forcibly: *weisen naturnotwendiges Ziel*.*

3) To organise their forces for an unremitting struggle against *their exploiters* (*N. B.? + against the government?*) + *? to direct* the struggle of the proletariat.

1) is included in 2).

1)—too limited.

It should be:

α to indicate the ultimate aim,

β to create an organisation of revolutionaries to *direct* the struggle of the proletariat.

XII. But its immediate aims are considerably modified by the fact that in our country numerous remnants of the pre-capitalist—serf-owning—social system are an oppressive burden on the entire working population and are the most difficult of all the obstacles hindering the progress of the Russian working-class movement.

Page 12. "Remnants of the serf-owning system ... are an oppressive burden on the entire working population"

+the retardation of the development of productive forces

+the deterioration of living conditions

+keeping the whole people in a state of ignorance and subjection)—the most difficult obstacle (=remnants)?

(What are these remnants? The autocracy + all the rest? This is said *below*.)

* To indicate the naturally necessary aim.—*Ed.*

The Russian Social-Democrats still have to work for the establishment of those juridical institutions which, constituting a natural legal complement to capitalist production relations, already exist in the advanced capitalist countries

12-13: necessary to work for the establishment of *those* (?) *juridical* institutions which *already* (?) *exist* in the advanced countries.

[These should be named more concretely. Unpopular.]

and are necessary for the complete and comprehensive development of the class struggle of wage-labour against capital.

Page 13—of wage-labour? —of the workers, of the struggle of the working class against the capitalist class for its complete emancipation.

And since the tsarist autocracy, which is the most outstanding remnant of the old serf-owning system and the most harmful in respect of further social development, is wholly incompatible with these juridical institutions, and since by its very nature it cannot but be the bitterest and most dangerous enemy of the proletarian emancipation movement, the Russian Social-Democrats advance as their immediate political task the overthrow of the monarchy.

Page 13. The autocracy is incompatible with these juridical institutions

(with political liberty??).

Page 14. Since the *autocracy* is incompatible—the overthrow of the *monarchy* ((inconsistent)).

Written not later than January 8 (21), 1902

DRAFT PROGRAMME OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY*

[A]

I. Commodity production is ever more rapidly developing in Russia, the capitalist mode of production becoming increasingly dominant in it.

II. As the result of continuous technical progress, small-scale production is being ousted to an ever greater degree by large-scale production. The most important part of the means of production (of the land and factories, tools and machinery, railways and other means of communication) is becoming concentrated in the hands of a relatively insignificant number of capitalists and big landowners as their private property. The independent small producers (peasants, handicraftsmen, and artisans) are being ruined in growing numbers, losing their means of production and thus turning into proletarians, or else becoming servants and tributaries of capital. Increasing numbers of working people are compelled to sell their labour-power and become wage-workers, who are dependent on the property-owners and by their labour create the wealth of the latter.

III. The greater the degree of technical progress, the more the growth of the demand for labour-power lags behind the growth of its supply, and the greater are the opportunities for the capitalists to intensify exploitation of the workers. Insecurity of existence and unemployment, the yoke of

* The theoretical part of this programme constitutes the draft proposed by one of the editors, Frey[3] (and drawn up by him on the basis of G. V. Plekhanov's original draft). The practical part of the programme (from the point indicated below to the end) is proposed by the whole committee, i.e., by the five editors.

exploitation, and humiliation of every kind are becoming the lot of ever wider sections of the working population.

IV. This process is being still more aggravated by industrial crises, which are the inevitable outcome of the basic contradictions of capitalism. Poverty and destitution among the masses exist side by side with wastage of social wealth in consequence of the impossibility of finding markets for commodities produced.

V. Thus, the gigantic development of the productive forces of social labour, which is constantly becoming more socialised labour, is attended by monopolisation of all the principal advantages of this development by a negligible minority of the population. The growth of social wealth proceeds side by side with the growth of social inequality; the gulf between the class of property-owners (the bourgeoisie) and the class of the proletariat is growing.

[B]

VI. But as all these inevitable contradictions of capitalism increase and develop, the number and the solidarity of the proletarians, their discontent and indignation also grow, the struggle between the working class and the capitalist class becomes sharper, and the urge to throw off the intolerable yoke of capitalism mounts.

VII. The emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself. All the other classes of present-day society stand for the preservation of the foundations of the existing economic system. The real emancipation of the working class requires a social revolution—which is being prepared by the entire development of capitalism—i.e., the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, their conversion into public property, and the replacement of capitalist production of commodities by the socialist organisation of the production of articles by society as a whole, with the object of ensuring full well-being and free, all-round development for all its members.

VIII. This proletarian revolution will completely abolish the division of society into classes and, consequently, all social and political inequality arising from that division.

IX. To effect this social revolution the proletariat must win political power, which will make it master of the situa-

tion and enable it to remove all obstacles along the road to its great goal. In this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is an essential political condition of the social revolution.

X. Russian Social-Democracy undertakes the task of disclosing to the workers the irreconcilable antagonism between their interests and those of the capitalists, of explaining to the proletariat the historical significance, nature, and prerequisites of the social revolution it will have to carry out, and of organising a revolutionary class party capable of directing the struggle of the proletariat in all its forms.

XI. But the development of international exchange and of production for the world market has established such close ties among all nations of the civilised world, that the present-day working-class movement had to become, and has long become, an international movement. That is why Russian Social-Democracy regards itself as one of the detachments of the world army of the proletariat, as part of international Social-Democracy.

XII. The immediate aims of Russian Social-Democracy are, however, considerably modified by the fact that in our country numerous remnants of the pre-capitalist, serf-owning social system, retard the development of the productive forces in the highest degree, render impossible the complete and all-round development of the proletariat's class struggle, and lower the working population's standard of living; they are responsible for the Asiatically barbarous way in which the many-million-strong peasantry is dying out, and keep the entire people in a state of ignorance and subjection, denying them all rights.

XIII. The tsarist autocracy is the most outstanding of these remnants of the serf-owning system and the most formidable bulwark of all this barbarism. It is the bitterest and most dangerous enemy of the proletarian emancipation movement and the cultural development of the entire people.

[C]

For these reasons* the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party advances as its immediate political task the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a

* Here begins the text adopted by the committee as a whole.

republic based on a democratic constitution that would ensure:

1) the people's sovereignty, i.e., concentration of supreme state power in the hands of a legislative assembly consisting of representatives of the people;

2) universal, equal, and direct suffrage, both in elections to the legislative assembly and in elections to all local organs of self-government, for every citizen who has reached the age of twenty-one; the secret ballot at all elections; the right of every voter to be elected to any of the representative assemblies; remuneration for representatives of the people;

3) inviolability of the person and domicile of citizens;

4) unrestricted freedom of conscience, speech, the press and of assembly, the right to strike and to organise unions;

5) freedom of movement and occupation;

6) abolition of social-estates; full equality for all citizens, irrespective of sex, religion or race;

7) recognition of the right to self-determination for all nations forming part of the state;

8) the right of every citizen to prosecute any official, without previously complaining to the latter's superiors;

9) general arming of the people instead of maintaining a standing army;

10) separation of the church from the state and of the school from the church;

11) universal, free, and compulsory education up to the age of sixteen; state provision of food, clothing, and school supplies to needy children.

[D]

To protect the working class and to raise its fighting capacity,* the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party demands:

1) that the working day be limited to eight hours for all wage-workers;

---

* Frey moved that the beginning of this paragraph be altered to read as follows:

"To safeguard the working class from physical and moral degeneration, and also to raise its fighting capacity in the struggle for its emancipation...."

2) that a weekly rest period of not less than thirty-six consecutive hours for wage-workers of both sexes employed in all branches of the national economy be established by law;

3) that all overtime be prohibited;

4) that night-work (from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m.) in all branches of the national economy be prohibited, with the exception of those branches in which it is essential for technical reasons;

5) that employers be forbidden to employ children under the age of fifteen;

6) that female labour be forbidden in industries specifically injurious to the health of women;

7) that the law establish employers' civil liability for workers' complete or partial disability caused by accidents or by harmful working conditions; that the worker should not be required to prove his employer's responsibility for disability;

8) that payment of wages in kind be prohibited*;

9) that state pensions be paid to aged workers, who have become incapacitated;

10) that the number of factory inspectors be increased; that female inspectors be appointed in industries in which female labour predominates; that observance of the factory laws be supervised by representatives elected by the workers and paid by the state; piece rates and rejection of work done should also be supervised by elected representatives of the workers;

11) that local self-government bodies, in co-operation with elected representatives of the workers, supervise sanitary conditions in living quarters provided for workers by employers, and also see to the observance of rules operating in such living quarters and the terms on which they are leased, with the object of protecting the wage-workers from employers' interference in their lives and activities as private persons and citizens;

12) that a properly organised and comprehensive system of health inspection be instituted to supervise working conditions at all enterprises employing wage-labour;

* Frey moved that the following be inserted here (in the same clause): "that the law should establish weekly payment for all workers employed on a contract basis."

13) that the Factory Inspectorate's activities be extended to artisan, home, and handicraft industries, and to state-owned enterprises;

14) that any breach of the labour protection laws be punishable by law;

15) that employers be forbidden to make any deductions from wages, on any grounds or for any purpose whatsoever (fines, rejections, etc.);

16) that factory courts be set up in all branches of the national economy, with equal representation of workers and employers.

[E]

Besides, with the object of democratising Russia's state economy, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party demands that all indirect taxation be abolished and progressive income-tax be introduced.

With a view to eradicating the remnants of the old serf-owning system, the Party will work for*:

1) abolition of land redemption and quit-rent payments, as well as of all services now imposed on the peasantry as a taxable social-estate;

2) annulment of collective liability[4] and of all laws restricting the peasant in the free disposal of his land;

3) restitution to the people of all sums taken from them in the form of land redemption and quit-rent payments; confiscation for this purpose of monasterial property and of the royal demesnes, and imposition of a special land-tax on members of the big landed nobility who received land redemption loans, the revenue thus obtained to be credited to a special public fund for the cultural and charitable needs of the village communes;

4) establishment of peasant committees

a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation, or, when the land has changed hands, by

* Frey moved that the following words be inserted here: "and for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside," so that the whole paragraph would read as follows: "With a view to eradicating the remnants of the old serf-owning system and for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will work for."

redemption, etc.) of the land cut off from the peasants when serfdom was abolished and now used by the landlords as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage;

b) for the eradication of the remnants of the serf-owning system which still exist in the Urals, the Altai, the Western territory, and other regions of the country;

5) empowerment of courts to reduce exorbitant rents and declare null and void all contracts entailing bondage.

[F]

Working for the achievement of its immediate political and economic aims,* the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party supports every oppositional and revolutionary movement directed against the existing social and political order in Russia, but emphatically rejects all those reformist plans which depict every extension of police tutelage over the working masses as a step towards the solution of the social problem.**

For its part, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is firmly convinced that the complete, consistent, and lasting implementation of the indicated political and social changes can be achieved only by overthrowing the autocracy and convoking a Constituent Assembly, freely elected by the whole people.

Written in late January-
early February 1902

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* Frey moved that the beginning of the paragraph be altered to read as follows:
"Fighting for these demands, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," etc.

** Frey moved that the end of this paragraph be altered to read as follows: "... plans connected with any extension or consolidation of tutelage of the working masses by the police and officials."

THREE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

No. 1. In Paragraph (A) II, instead of: "As the result of continuous technical progress, small-scale production is being ousted to an ever greater degree by large-scale production"

insert the following:

"Technical progress is making constant headway, large-scale production is developing to an ever-increasing extent, small-scale production is being ousted more and more or is declining."

No. 2. In Paragraph (B) VII, after: "All the other classes of present-day society stand for the preservation of the foundations of the existing economic system"

insert:

"and the small producer, who is being ruined under the yoke of capitalism, becomes truly revolutionary only to the extent that he realises the hopelessness of his position and places himself at the standpoint of the proletariat"—

and further begin with a new paragraph.

No. 3. In Paragraph (B) XII, instead of: "are responsible for the Asiatically barbarous way in which the many-million-strong peasantry is dying out"

insert:

"are responsible for the Asiatically barbarous forms of exploitation and the agonising extinction of the many-million-strong peasantry".

Written in the second
half of February 1902



Замѣчанія на проектъ программы.

Самое общее и основное недостатокъ, который долженъ быть прежде всего устраненъ, есть смѣшеніе всѣхъ этихъ программъ, именно: эта не программа партіи борющейся партіи, а Programmschrift, это скорѣе программа для учащихся (особенно въ самомъ началѣ недѣлъ, посвященныхъ характеристикѣ капитализма) и программа учащихся первого курса, но кстати говоря, о капитализмѣ вообще, а еще не о русскомъ капитализмѣ. Этотъ основной недостатокъ вызываетъ такое число поправокъ, прочтенныхъ программы сообразуясь съ капитализмомъ. Поэтому долженъ я разбирать пункта и пункты только общій итогъ.

„Развитіе производ. орудія и т. д. до сло

First page of Lenin's manuscript,
"Notes on Plekhanov's Second Draft Programme", 1902
Reduced

First page of Lenin's manuscript,
"Notes on Plekhanov's Second Draft Programme", 1902
Reduced

NOTES ON PLEKHANOV'S SECOND DRAFT PROGRAMME

The *entire character* of the programme is, in my opinion, the most general and basic defect of this draft, one that makes it unacceptable. Specifically, it is not the programme of a party engaged in a practical struggle, but a *Prinzipienerklärung**; it is rather a programme *for students* (especially its most important section, which is devoted to a definition of capitalism), moreover for first-year students, who are acquainted with capitalism in general, but not yet with Russian capitalism. This basic defect leads also to a great deal of repetition, and the *programme* tends to become a *commentary*. I shall endeavour to prove this by analysing the draft point by point, and shall then draw the general conclusions.

"The development of international exchange", etc., to the words "has long become an international movement" (§ I—for convenience in quoting I shall number each paragraph in consecutive order).

In essence there is nothing to which objection can be taken here. Only the words: "the great emancipation movement of our times" are superfluous, for the emancipatory nature of the working-class movement is dealt with below at length and concretely.

Further, in my opinion, this paragraph is not in its proper place. The programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Party should begin with a definition (and indictment) of Russian capitalism—and only then stress the international character of the movement, which in form—to use the words of the *Communist Manifesto*—is of necessity at first a national struggle.[5]

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* A declaration of principles.—*Ed.*

§ II. "*Like the Social-Democrats of all other countries, the Russian Social-Democrats take an international stand.* They regard their Party as one of the detachments of the world army of the proletariat, as part of international Social-Democracy".

The words I have underlined are superfluous, since they add absolutely nothing to what has been said prior to and after this. These superfluous words merely weaken the wholly adequate and graphic expression of thought contained in the words "detachment" and "part".

§ III. "They pursue the same ultimate aim as the Social-Democrats of all other countries."

These too are superfluous words, repeated *t w i c e* below in §§ XIII ("the ultimate aim of all the efforts of international Social-Democracy", etc.) and XVII ("the identity of the common ultimate aim"). A "detachment" of an army is a detachment for the very reason that it pursues the same aim.

§ IV. "This ultimate aim, which is common to the Social-Democrats of all countries" (again superfluous repetition), "is determined by bourgeois society's nature and course of development."

Also superfluous words, precisely because it is shown further *how* bourgeois society's nature and course of development "determine" this ultimate aim. This paragraph is something in the nature of a heading or section title. But headings, which are necessary in textbooks or articles, are quite unnecessary in a programme. *Alles, was im Programm überflüssig, schwächt es** (Engels in his notes on the draft of the Erfurt Programme).[6]

§§ V and VI (as well as the beginning of VII) evoke, in addition to formal remarks, one general and fundamental objection to the whole character of the programme as outlined in the draft.

I shall first state this general objection (for which purpose it will be necessary in part to defend the counterdraft), and then I shall proceed to the formal remarks.

§ V gives an academic definition of "developed" capitalism in general; § VI speaks of the "expansion" of capitalist production relations together with technical progress and the

* All that is superfluous in a programme weakens it.—*Ed.*

growth of big enterprises to the detriment of small enterprises (or at the expense of the latter), i.e., as small-scale production is being ousted by large-scale production.

This method of exposition is illogical and incorrect.

It is incorrect because the fighting proletariat learns what capitalism is, not from academic definitions (as one learns from textbooks), but from practical acquaintance with the *contradictions* of capitalism, with the *development* of society and its consequences. And in our programme we must *define* this development, and state—as briefly and graphically as possible—that *matters are proceeding in a certain way*. We should leave to commentaries all explanations of why things are proceeding in just this way and no other, and all details of the forms in which the basic tendencies find expression. As to what capitalism is—that will of itself follow from our definition of exactly how matters stand (*resp.** are proceeding).

It is illogical because the process of the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production (§ VI) and that of the division of society into property-owners and proletarians (§ V) *are one and the same process*. And this is not expressed by the formulation given in the draft. According to the draft we have the following: *First proposition*. Developed capitalism consists in a considerable section of independent small-scale production having been ousted by large-scale production employing wage-workers. *Second proposition*. The domination of capitalism spreads in the degree that large-scale production ousts small-scale production....

In my opinion, these two paragraphs should be combined in one, for the reason indicated, and the process should be expressed as follows: technical progress—the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production—the concentration of the means of production in the hands of the capitalists and the landowners—the ruin of the independent small producers: their conversion into proletarians or into dependents of capital.

The following objections are raised to this formulation (which the counterdraft has attempted to give):

(1) It alleges that the ruin of the Russian peasantry (*resp.*

* *Respective* (Lat.).—*Ed.*

the formation of large-scale landownership in Russia, etc.) depends *solely* on the growth of capitalism.

This objection is, I believe, groundless. It is stated quite clearly in the appropriate place (viz., at the end of the programme) that there exists in our country a host of remnants of the serf-owning system, and that these remnants "barbarise" the process of development. But once we consider the process of the development of capitalism the *basic* process in Russia's social and economic evolution, we must begin precisely by describing *this* process, as well as *its* contradictions and consequences. Only in this way can we give graphic expression to our thought that the process of the development of capitalism, the ousting of small-scale production, the concentration of property, etc., is proceeding and will continue, *despite* all the remnants of the serf-owning system, and *through* all these remnants.

(2) It is said that the proposition "small-scale production is being ousted to an ever greater degree by large-scale production" is "too categorical", "stereotyped", etc.

I must, therefore, explain the reasons which lead me to consider this formulation *no less correct* and *far more apt* than the formulation given in the draft under discussion: "an increase in the economic importance of the big enterprises, a decrease in the relative number of the small enterprises, reduction of their role in the social and economic life of the country."

From the purely theoretical aspect, both these formulations are *absolutely identical in meaning*, and all attempts to establish a *difference in substance* between them are wholly arbitrary.* "An increase in the importance of the big and the reduction of the role of the small"—is equivalent to *ousting*. Ousting can consist in nothing else. The complexity and confusion in the question of small-scale production being ousted by large-scale production do *not at all* depend on anyone being unable (in good faith) to understand that ousting means "an increase in the importance of the big and

* We would challenge anyone who does not agree with this to cite or even imagine a single example of *any* "increase in the economic importance of the big enterprises and reduction of the role of the small enterprises" that *would not* make it obvious that the latter are being *ousted* by the former.

reduction of the role of the small"—but depend *wholly and exclusively* on the difficulty of agreement on *a choice of the indices and symptoms* of the ousting, *resp.* of the increase in the importance of the one, *resp.* the reduction of the role of the other.

In its most general form, the process of the development of capitalism in this respect may be expressed as follows:

Initial period:

Total production = *100*.

Large-scale = a. Small-scale = $100 - a$.

Subsequent period.

Total production = *200*.

Large-scale = $\mathbf{2a} + \mathbf{b}$. Small-scale = $200 - \mathbf{2a} - \mathbf{b}$.

It can be said with confidence that all and every kind of data on the proportional relation between large-scale and small-scale production will fit into this formula. Nobody out to understand the process can doubt that this is indeed *ousting*. Whether $200 - 2a - b$ will be greater in size than $100 - a$ (relative ousting) or smaller (absolute ousting)—this is *ousting in any case*. Only a "critic" who does not wish to understand this will be "unable to understand"—and such people are very hard to please. Moreover, the commentary will give the proper rebuff to such people.

The difficulty of the question does not at all lie in understanding that the indicated modification is equivalent to "ousting", but in *the exact* definition of the magnitudes *100*, a, etc. This is a concrete question, a question of fact, and the formulation: "an increase in the importance and the reduction of the role" does not bring us a hair's breadth closer to its solution.

For example, *in the overwhelming majority of cases*, all European industrial statistics determine this "importance" and this "role" *by the number* of workers (and agrarian statistics do so *by the amount of land*). And no one has yet ventured to doubt that a *decrease in the proportionate number* of workers (*resp.* the amount of land) means precisely *ousting*. The trouble, however, is that *very often* such indices as the number of workers (*resp.* the amount of land) are *insufficient*. Small enterprises may be *ousted*, while the number of workers there (the amount of land) *increases*—if, for instance, these workers are handling *outside* materials, or if this land

is cultivated by inferior draught animals, or by workers in inferior conditions, or is cultivated and fertilised in a worse way, and so on, and so forth. It is common knowledge that the "critical" arguments against "Marxist dogma" teem with just *such* "misunderstandings", *and these "misunderstandings" are not eliminated one iota* by saying "an increase in the importance and the reduction of the role" instead of "ousting", since it is "generally accepted" that the "importance" and "role" are expressed quite simply by the number of workers and the amount of land.

No one will doubt that such processes as the differentiation of the peasantry, increasing use of machinery especially by big proprietors, improvements in the stock of draught animals used by the big proprietors and deterioration of that used by smallholders (the substitution of cows for horses, etc.), growing "importunities" of the hired worker at the big enterprises and the longer working hours there, *resp.* the small peasant's diminishing consumption, improved cultivation and fertilisation of the big proprietor's land, and poorer cultivation and fertilisation of the smallholder's land, the big proprietor's advantage over the latter in the field of credits and association, and so on and so forth—all these are precisely an *ousting* of small-scale production by large-scale production (in agriculture). It is not at all difficult (or even necessary) to prove that all these processes amount to "ousting"—it is difficult to prove that it is *precisely* to these processes that attention should be paid, that these processes are actually *taking place*. This difficulty is not made easier in the least by the words: "an increase in the importance and the reduction of the role"; it can be made easier *only* by a commentary, *only* by examples of how people *are unable to define* (do not want to define) the true expression of the process of ousting (=an increase in the importance and the reduction of the role).

It is a sheer illusion to imagine that the words "an increase in the importance and the reduction of the role" are deeper, more meaningful, and broader than the "narrow" and "stereotyped" word "ousting". These words do not contribute in the least towards a more profound understanding of the process—they merely express this process *more hazily and more vaguely*. And the reason I am contesting these words so vigorously is not because they are theoretically incorrect,

but just because they lend an appearance of profundity to *sheer haziness*.

A person who has "attended a seminary" and nothing more and is aware that a proportionate decrease (and not necessarily an absolute decrease) is tantamount to ousting will see in this haziness a desire to cover up the nakedness of the "Marxist dogma", which has been compromised by the critics.* A person who has not attended a seminary will only sigh over such masterly and "fathomless wisdom"—whereas the word "ousting" will remind every worker and every peasant of scores and hundreds of familiar instances. It is no harm if he does not immediately grasp the full import of this expression: *selbst wenn einmal ein Fremdwort oder ein nicht auf den ersten Blick in seiner ganzen Tragweite zu erfassender Satz vorkommt, schadet das nichts. Der mündliche Vortrag in den Versammlungen, die schriftliche Erklärung in der Presse tut da alles Nötige, und der kurze, prägnante Satz befestigt sich dann, einmal verstanden, im Gedächtniss, wird Schlagwort, und das passiert der breiteren Auseinandersetzung nie.*** (Engels in his criticism of the Erfurt Draft.)

From the standpoint of style, too, the words "an increase in the importance and the reduction of the role" instead of "ousting" are undesirable. This is not the language of a revolutionary party, but the language of *Russkiye Vedomosti*.[7] This is the terminology not of socialist propaganda, but of a statistical abstract. These words seem, as it were, deliberately chosen with a view to giving the reader the impression that the process described is a mild one, culminating in nothing definite, a painless process. Since in real-

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* Such an *interpretation* of haziness is all the more inevitable the more widely such a definite formulation as, for instance, in the Erfurt Programme, becomes known: "*...geht die Verdrängung der zersplitterten Kleinbetriebe durch kolossale Grossbetriebe....*" ("...the scattered small enterprises are being ousted by colossal large-scale enterprises..."—*Ed.*)

** There is no harm in one's occasionally coming across a foreign word or a sentence whose full import one cannot grasp at first glance. Oral reports at meetings and written statements in the press do all that is necessary, and a brief but pithy sentence, once understood, will impress itself on the mind and become a slogan, which is never the case with a broader exposition.—*Ed.*

ity the reverse is true, these words are *to that extent* quite wrong. We cannot and should not choose the *most abstract* formulations, for what we are writing is not an article directed against the critics, but the programme of a militant party, which makes its appeal to the masses of handicraftsmen and peasants. In this appeal, we must say *klipp und klar** that capital "makes servants and tributaries of them", "ruins" them and "ousts" them, driving them into the ranks of the proletariat. This is the only formulation that would be a true expression of what every handicraftsman and every peasant knows from thousands of instances. And only this formulation will inevitably suggest the conclusion: your only salvation lies in joining the party of the proletariat.

In passing to the formal remarks against § V and § VI, I shall note the following.

§ V speaks of bourgeois society "in developed form", and at the same time states that both a "section of the artisans" and "the small peasantry" have survived in this society. What follows is an inaccuracy. If one is to understand the words "developed form" in a strictly theoretical sense, then there will be neither artisans nor small peasants in such a society. And even if these words are taken in their usual sense to mean the *most* developed countries—even then we will find that in Britain, for example, "the small peasantry" as a separate section of society has in essence practically ceased to exist.

"The domination of commodity production on the basis of capitalist production relations." That is rather incongruous. Of course, *fully* developed commodity production is possible only in capitalist society, but "commodity production" in general is both logically and historically *prius* to capitalism.

The term "capitalist production relations" is not used consistently in the draft. It is occasionally replaced by the term "the capitalist mode of production" (§ XI). To lessen the difficulty of understanding the programme, one term should, in my opinion, be used throughout, namely, the latter, since the former is more theoretical, and without the

* Clearly and distinctly.—*Ed.*

addition of the word "system", etc. (of relations), does not indicate anything complete or integral.

"The feudal-handicraft period...." Here, an expression seems to have been chosen, as though deliberately, which is least applicable to Russia, for it is questionable whether the term "feudalism" is applicable to our Middle Ages. And yet, the description given of "developed" bourgeois society is *in substance* applicable to Russia as well (independent small producers and the small peasants "have survived", they sell "their labour-power periodically or constantly", etc.). Hence, by its own formulation the draft refutes the opinion that no definition of the development of capitalism can be written, which will clearly and directly have Russia in view.

"The small producers, artisan-producers, who work to order...." To order from consumers or from the merchants who give out work? Probably the former. But precisely in Russia most small producers in industry work for the market and not to order.

"... The major part of the articles of consumption"... (why not also "of the means of production"?)... "is produced for sale *on the home or world market*...." The words underlined are unnecessary repetition, since the increase in international exchange is dealt with in § 1.

"...The means of production *and of circulation*" of commodities. I believe that the words underlined should be transferred from the programme to the commentary, since one can *infer* that the capitalists own the *means of circulation* from the fact that they own the means of production in a society with a commodity economy.

"... Of persons who possess no means of production and of circulation *except their labour-power*...." That is not the way to put it.

The reference to "constant or periodical" sale of labour-power—"for a whole year or several months"—is a superfluous detail, which should be transferred to the commentary.

(§ VI) "...An increase in the economic importance of the big *industrial* enterprises"—and below: the reduction of the role of independent small producers in general. Is the omission of big *agricultural* enterprises accidental? Or was it intended to say that the economic importance of big enterprises increases *only* in industry, whereas the role

of small enterprises is diminishing *both* in industry and in agriculture? If the latter is the case—then that would be *absolutely wrong*. The "economic importance of the big enterprises" is increasing in agriculture too (it will suffice to mention machinery as one example—and other examples are given above). Naturally, the process here is *immeasurably more complex*, but this will have to be said (and said with concrete explanations) in the commentary.

...Dependent "more or less completely, more or less obviously, more or less onerously..."—these are words which, in my opinion, are redundant and weaken the meaning. The phrasing in the original draft—"servants and tributaries"—is stronger and more graphic.

§ VII begins with superfluous reiteration, again referring to the "conversion of the small producers into proletarians", although this has already been noted in §§ V and VI.

§ VII gives an elaborate explanation of the fact that the growth of the demand for labour-power lags behind the growth of its supply. The exposition, in this case, can hardly benefit from such "elaborateness". In any case, no full *explanation of the process* is, of course, given (e.g., mention is made of the growing employment of female and child labour, but no mention is made of the growing intensification of labour, etc.). It would therefore be more correct to refer *all* explanations (with concrete examples) to the commentary, and to formulate in the programme only *what* the contradiction of capitalism consists in and *what* its tendency is.

The objection is raised that, by saying that "the greater the degree of technical progress, the more the growth of the demand for labour-power lags behind the growth of its supply", the question is presented in an incorrect light, since the "growth of supply" is far from being dependent on "technical progress" alone. But this objection is not sound, for the words "the greater—the more" are by no means equivalent to the words "since—consequently". The preceding paragraph explains *what* causes the "growth of supply" ("ruin", "ousting", etc.), and this will be explained more concretely in the commentary.

"...The share of the working class in the sum-total of the material wealth created by its labour is constantly diminishing...." These words appear in the paragraph dealing with

the intensification of exploitation (compare the quotation with the text directly preceding it). One might think therefore that what is meant by "share" is the relation of v to $v+m$. But in that event this is superfluous and does not correspond to the words "sum-total of wealth".

If, however, the sum-total $= c+v+m$, then, first, it is not quite proper to term $c+m$ (as against v) the "share", for by "share" is meant what is shared, i.e., articles of consumption. Further, in that case this proposition belongs in substance to the next paragraph, which deals with the increase in social wealth (c+v+m) and social inequality. In view of this, it would be better to omit the words quoted as superfluous repetition.

Moreover, these words, as formulated, presuppose a society that is so *developed* as to consist *only* of wage-workers and capitalists [for the share of the small producers also decreases], and this does not accord with § V, which keeps small producers in a "developed" society too.

§ VIII should come after §§ IX and X: these latter deal with crises, i.e., with *one* of the contradictions of capitalism, whereas § VIII sums up *all* the contradictions of capitalism and all tendencies in its development.

To the words "increase in the productivity of labour" should be added: "of social labour, which is constantly becoming more socialised labour". The draft speaks in the wrong place of the process of the socialisation of labour (§ XI) and in too narrow a form ("the process of technical progress combines the workers' labour more and more"). Capitalism's socialisation of labour does not consist solely in the "combination of the labour of the workers".

The words: "A widening of the distance between the propertied and the propertyless" following the words "an increase in social inequality" are a superfluous repetition. On the other hand, reference to the "growing gulf" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie must of necessity be added so as to define the chief social consequence of all the indicated contradictions of capitalism and pass over to the class struggle.

Incidentally, with regard to a definition of the social consequences of capitalism, it must be stated that here particularly the draft suffers from *abstractness*, limiting itself as it does to the utterly inadequate proposition: "multiplication

of the difficulties in the struggle for existence and of all the privations and sufferings attendant on this struggle". In my opinion it is absolutely essential to indicate *more definitely* those social consequences which weigh most heavily both upon the working class and the small producers.

An objection raised against the formulation of these consequences in the counterdraft, is, for instance, that the words "humiliation of every kind" are not true. I believe they are true, embracing as they do such phenomena as *prostitution*, the conversion of the "intelligentsia" into mere hirelings, the conversion of the worker into a seller of his wife and children, submission to the iron discipline of capital, the use of economic power for political oppression, for pressure on the freedom of opinion, and so on and so forth. In exactly the same way it seems to me absolutely essential to point to the "poverty and destitution of the masses" under capitalism. I am not proposing to speak of the absolute growth of poverty and destitution, but I fully share Kautsky's opinion that "*ein ausführliches s.-d. Programm, welches nicht erkennen lässt, dass der Kapitalismus naturnotwendig Massenarmut und Massenelend erzeugt, das nicht als den Inhalt des Strebens der Sd-tie den Kampf gegen diese Armut und dieses Elend bezeichnet, verschweigt die entscheidende Seite unserer Bewegung und enthält also eine empfindliche Lücke*"* (against the Austrian draft).

It is just as essential, as I see it, to point out that "all the principal" (hence, not absolutely all) "advantages of the process of development of the productive forces are monopolised by a negligible minority of the population".

§§ IX and X deal with crises. In view of the changed formulation, there is nothing in substance here to which exception could be taken. In form, however, these paragraphs suffer from repetitions (again "world market", again "capitalist production relations"). It would be far better to completely delete from the programme an attempt to *explain* crises,

* "... a detailed Social-Democratic programme which does not make it clear that capitalism must naturally lead to mass poverty and mass destitution, and does not regard the struggle against this poverty and this destitution as the content of Social-Democracy's aspirations, ignores the decisive aspect of our movement and thus has a conspicuous deficiency".—*Ed.*

limiting it to *noting* that they are inevitable, and leaving explanation and elaboration to the commentary. As it is, reference is made, for example, to crises and to "periods of stagnation", but on the whole the entire cycle of capitalist industry is not encompassed in any way.

The social consequences of crises are indicated, but again with repetitions (it is enough to mention the "aggravation" of the process, etc.) and again too vaguely: crises not only render the position of the small producers difficult, not only lead to the relative and absolute deterioration of their conditions, but actually ruin them and drive them into the ranks of the proletariat.

Against §§ XI and XII I have an extremely important objection in principle: these paragraphs present the relation of the proletariat to the small producers *in an altogether one-sided and incorrect way* (for "the working and exploited masses" consist of precisely the proletariat and the small producers). The two paragraphs are directly at variance with the fundamental theses of the *Communist Manifesto*, the General Rules of the International[8], and the majority of present-day Social-Democratic programmes; they leave the way open to Narodnik, "critical", and all sorts of petty-bourgeois misapprehensions.

"...The discontent of the working and exploited masses is growing"—that is true, but it is absolutely incorrect to identify the proletariat's discontent with that of the small producer, and merge the two as has been done here. The small producers' discontent very often engenders (and inevitably must engender in them or among a considerable section of them) an urge *to defend their existence as small proprietors*, i.e., to defend the foundations of the present-day order, and even to turn it back.

"...Their struggle and, above all, the struggle of their foremost representative, the proletariat, is becoming sharper...." The struggle is growing sharper among the small producers too, of course. But their "struggle" is *very often* directed *against* the proletariat, for in many respects the very position of the small producers *sharply contraposes* their interests to those of the proletariat. Generally speaking, the proletariat is *not at all* the petty bourgeoisie's "foremost representative". If that does occur, it is only when the small

producers realise that their doom is inevitable, when they "*desert* their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat". It happens very often, on the other hand, that the anti-Semite and the big landowner, the nationalist and the Narodnik, the social-reformer and the "critic of Marxism" are the foremost representatives of the *present-day* small producer who has not yet deserted "his own standpoint". It is least of all appropriate to lump together each and every kind of sharpening, particularly at the present time, when the "sharpening of the struggle" of the small producers is accompanied by "sharpening of the struggle" of the "socialist Gironde" against the "Mountain".[9]

"...International Social-Democracy stands at the head of the emancipation movement of *the working and exploited masses*...." Not at all. It stands at the head of the *working class alone*, of the *working-class movement* alone, and if other elements join this class these are only elements and not classes. And they come over completely and absolutely *only* when they "desert their own standpoint".

"...It organises *their* fighting forces...." Wrong again. Nowhere does Social-Democracy organise the "fighting forces" of the small producers. It organises the fighting forces of the working class alone. The formulation chosen in the draft is all the less appropriate *the less* it applies to Russia, the more *restricted the exposition* (cf. § V) is to "*developed*" bourgeois society.

Summa summarum. The draft speaks in *positive* form of the revolutionary spirit of the petty bourgeoisie (if it "supports" the proletariat, does this not signify that it is revolutionary?) without a single word about its conservatism (and even reactionary spirit). This is entirely one-sided and incorrect.

We can (and must) point in positive form to the conservatism of the petty bourgeoisie. And *only in conditional form* should we point *to its revolutionary spirit*. Only such a formulation will coincide in full with the entire spirit of Marx's teachings. For example, the *Communist Manifesto* declares outright that "of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie ... the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class.... The small manufacturer ... the artisan, the peasant ... *are not revolutionary*,

but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary.... If by chance they are revolutionary, ["if"]* they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat ... they *d e s e r t* their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat".[10]

Let it not be said that matters have changed substantially in the half century since the *Communist Manifesto*. It is precisely in this respect that nothing has changed: and theoreticians have always and constantly recognised this proposition (for instance, Engels in 1894 refuted the French agrarian programme from this very standpoint.[11] He stated outright that *until* the small peasant *deserts* his standpoint, he is not with us; his place is with the anti-Semites; let them put him through the mill, and the more the bourgeois parties dupe him, the more surely he will come over to us)—moreover, history furnishes a wealth of factual confirmation of this theory, right down to the most recent times, right down to *nos chers amis*, Messrs. the "Critics".

Besides, reference to the *dictatorship of the proletariat* contained in the original draft is missing here. Even if this were done accidentally, through an oversight, it is still indubitable that the concept of "dictatorship" is incompatible with *positive* recognition of outside support for the proletariat. If we really knew *positively* that the petty bourgeoisie will support the proletariat in the accomplishment of its, the proletariat's, revolution it would be pointless to speak of a "dictatorship", for we would then be fully guaranteed so overwhelming a majority that we could get on very well without a dictatorship (as the "critics" would have us believe). The recognition of the necessity for the *dictatorship* of the proletariat is *most closely and inseparably* bound up with the thesis of the *Communist Manifesto* that the proletariat *alone* is a really revolutionary class.

(Parenthetically—just how "jealous" Engels was about this part is evident from the following *passus* from his criticism of the Erfurt Draft. "*Der Ruin welter Volksschichten*,"** Engels cites from the draft, and remarks; "*statt*

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

** The ruin of the broad masses of the people."—*Ed.*

dieser deklamatorischen Phrase, die aussieht als täte uns der Ruin von Bourgeois und Kleinbürgern noch leid [!!], *würde ich die einfache Tatsache erzählen: die durch den Ruin der städtischen und ländlichen Mittelstände, der Kleinbürger und Kleinbauern, den Abgrund zwischen Besitzenden und Besitzlosen erweitern oder vertiefen.*"*)

I may be told that the counterdraft gives positive expression to the small producer's conservatism ("all the other classes of present-day society stand for the preservation of the foundations of the existing economic system"), whereas revolutionariness *is not expressed even conditionally*.

This objection is entirely unfounded. The small producer's conditional revolutionariness is expressed in the counterdraft in the only way it can be expressed, i.e., *in the wording of the indictment against capitalism*. The conditional revolutionariness of the small producer is expressed:

(1)—in the words about his *ousting and ruin* by capitalism. We, the proletariat, accuse capitalism of bringing about

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* ("in place of this declamatory phrase, which sounds as if we were in fact distressed by the ruin of the bourgeois and the petty bourgeois [!!], I would state the simple fact: through the ruin of the urban and rural middle estates—the petty bourgeois and the small peasants—the gulf between the propertied and the propertyless grows.—*Ed.*)[12]

The Erfurt draft programme contained the following *passus*: "*In diesem Befreiungskampf verficht die Sozialdemokratie als die Verfechterin* (or *Vertreterin—Neue Zeit*,[13] IX, 2, 789) *nicht bloss der Lohnarbeiter, sondern der Ausgebeuteten und Unterdrückten insgesamt, alle Forderungen, Massregeln und Einrichtungen, welche die Lage des Volkes vm allgemetnen und der Arbeiterklasse im besondern zu verbessern geeignet sind.*" ["In this struggle for emancipation, Social-Democracy fights as the champion (or representative) not only of the wage-workers, but of all the exploited and oppressed, for all demands, measures, and institutions that could improve the position of the people in general, and of the working class in particular."—*Ed.*] And Engels *positively* advised that this entire *passus* be *deleted*, asking sarcastically: "*des Volkes im allgemeinen* (*wer ist das*?)" ["The people in general (what does that mean?)."—*Ed.*] And, in accordance with Engels' advice, this *passus* was *completely scrapped*; the paragraph stating that "the emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself, since *all the other* classes stand for private ownership of the means of production and have the common aim of preserving the foundations of present-day society—*under the direct influence of Engels* this paragraph was adopted in a *sharper form* than in the original draft.

large-scale production through the *ruin* of the peasant. Hence, the direct conclusion that *if* the peasant grasps the inevitability of this process, he will "desert his own standpoint and place himself at ours".

(2)—in the words: "Insecurity of existence and unemployment, the yoke of exploitation, and humiliation of every kind and becoming the lot" (not only of the proletariat, but) "of ever wider sections of the working population." This very formulation expresses the fact that the proletariat provides *representation* of the entire working population, and moreover a representation under which we urge (and *compel*) all to desert *their* own standpoint and place themselves at ours, and not *vice versa*—we do not desert our own standpoint, and we do not merge our class struggle with the struggle of all sorts of weathercocks.

And the idea of representation is expressed in exactly the same way

(3)—in the words about the poverty and destitution of the masses (the masses in general, and not the workers alone).

It is *only in such form* that the party of the revolutionary class can express the conditional revolutionariness of the other classes, in order to lay before them *its* understanding of their destitution and the way to remedy that destitution, and, in *its* declaration of war on capitalism, to speak not only in its own name, but in the name of all the "poverty-stricken and destitute" masses. Hence it follows that whoever accepts this doctrine must join us. It would be simply ridiculous for us to make a special point of this in the programme and declare that *if* certain unreliable elements adopt our standpoint they too will be revolutionary! That would be the best way to destroy faith in us precisely among those half-hearted and flabby allies who, as it is, lack faith in us.*

* The more "indulgence" we show, in the practical part of our programme, towards the small producer (e.g., to the peasant), the "more strictly" must we treat these unreliable and double-faced social elements in the *theoretical* part of the programme, without sacrificing one iota of *our* standpoint. Now then, we say, if you adopt this, our, standpoint, you can count on "indulgence" of every kind, but if you don't, well then, don't get angry with us! Under the "dictatorship" we shall say about you: there is no point in wasting words where the use of power is required....

In addition to this objection to §§ XI and XII in principle, I also have a minor formal remark to make against § XI. This is not the proper place to speak about the "*material* possibility of doing away with capitalism"; what this paragraph deals with is *not* the material *but* the ideological prerequisites for capitalism to be done away with. If the material prerequisites are mentioned, then reference should also be made to the ideological (moral, etc.) prerequisites. It would, however, be far more correct to transfer this "material possibility" to the paragraph that deals with capitalism's evolution and tendencies, and not with the class struggle.

It is illogical to speak in § XII of the forthcoming social revolution—and only in § XV of this revolution itself and the necessity for it. The order should be reversed.

In § XIII, the substitution of the expression "expropriation of the exploiters" for the words "abolition (or elimination) of private ownership" is, in my opinion, not a happy one. It is less clear and precise. Nor is the end of the paragraph properly expressed: "the planned organisation of the social process of production so as to satisfy the needs of society as a whole, as well as its individual members". That is not enough. Organisation of that kind will, perhaps, be provided even by the trusts. It would be more definite to say "by society *as a whole*" (for this covers planning and indicates who is responsible for that planning), and not merely to satisfy the needs of its members, but with the object of ensuring *full* well-being and free, *all-round* development for *all* the members of society.

§ XIV is, in my opinion, indefinite (I do not yet know whether we shall emancipate "all" oppressed "humanity": as, for instance, the oppression of people of weak character by those of very strong character). If would be better to use the formulation given by Marx in his criticism of the Gotha Programme: the abolition of division into classes and of the inequality arising therefrom.[14] Engels too, in his criticism of the Erfurt Programme, insisted that *die Abschaflung der Klassen ist unsere Grundforderung*,* and that only by *a precise and outright reference* to this "fundamental demand"

* The abolition of classes is our fundamental demand.[15]—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

shall we impart an *absolutely definite* (and not exaggerated) meaning to our promises to emancipate all and to rid all of all evils.

§ XV—I have already dealt above with "support of the proletariat by other sections of the population" and with the omission of the "dictatorship of the proletariat".

§ XVI is altogether strange and out of place. "The political education" of the proletariat consists in our enlightening it, organising it and directing its struggle—and that has already been dealt with in § XII (to which only "leadership of its struggle" should be added).

§ XVII also seems to me superfluous verbosity. What is the point of speaking generally about the dependence of our immediate tasks on various social and political situations? Let this be dealt with in treatises, whereas we should say plainly that certain definite peculiarities (remnants of serf-ownership, the autocracy, etc.) modify our immediate task in a certain definite way.

§ XVIII: "In Russia capitalism is more and more becoming the predominant mode of production...." That is unquestionably insufficient. It has already become predominant (if I say that 60 has already become predominant over 40, it does not at all mean that 40 does not exist or that it has been reduced to insignificance). We still have so many Narodniks, pro-Narodnik liberals, and "critics" rapidly reverting to Narodnik ideas that it is impermissible to leave room for the slightest vagueness on this point. And if capitalism has not yet even become "predominant", then it would be better perhaps to wait awhile with Social-Democracy as well.

"... advancing Social-Democracy *to the very first place*...." Capitalism *is* only just *becoming* predominant, but we are already in the "very first" place.... In my opinion, we should not talk at all about the very first place: that is self-evident from the entire programme. Let us leave it to history to say this about us, rather than say it ourselves.

The draft evidently rejects the expression: the old, *serf-owning* social system, considering the expression "serf-ownership" applicable only to the *legal* structure. I believe that this distinction is groundless: "serf-ownership" was, of course, a juridical institution, but it also corresponded to a specific

system of landlord (and peasant) *economy*, and, besides, it manifested itself in numerous day-by-day relationships that were not provided for "by law". For this reason it is scarcely advisable to avoid the expression: "the pre-capitalist, serf-owning social system".

The "description" of serfdom (that the masses were, so to speak, baptised chattels) is utterly out of place and superfluous in our programme.

On the other hand, it is insufficient to say about the influence of the remnants of the serf-owning system that they weigh heavily upon the mass of working people. We must also indicate the retardation in the development of the country's productive forces, and other social consequences of serfdom.*

§ XIX. In my opinion, it is quite superfluous to state that to us democracy (*resp.* political liberty) is a "transitional stage" (transitional to what? After all, we openly say below that a republic is our *immediate* practical demand)—and that a constitution is "the natural legal complement ["property" of—obviously a mistake in copying] to capitalist production relations". This is absolutely out of place in the programme. It would be wholly sufficient for us to say that the autocracy retards or restricts "*a l l* social development": hence, the development of capitalism is also incompatible with it. Details on this score should be relegated to the commentary, for in the programme they even weaken our declaration of war on the autocracy, imparting a bookish and abstract air to the programme.

Moreover, what is the point of these general passages about legal complements to capitalism and about a "legal structure" (§ XX), when later we speak much more directly and definitely about a republic? (Besides, § XX contains the expression "the old serf-owning system", i.e., here the draft itself attributes to the word "serf-ownership" a broader meaning than the purely juridical.)

Nor is there any point in speaking about the autocracy being incompatible with a legal structure, since the demand for the former's overthrow and replacement by a

* Incidentally. The expression in the counterdraft: "the Asiatically barbarous *way in which* the peasantry *is dying out*" is a poor one. Way of disappearance, or something like that, could be said.

republic follows immediately. It would be better to express ourselves more definitely about the people's "lack of rights" under the autocracy, etc.

"... The autocracy is the bitterest enemy of the aspirations of the working class towards emancipation...." To this should be added: "and of the cultural development of the whole people," or words to that effect. In this way (and not by talking about "representation") we shall indicate that Social-Democracy represents the interests not only of the working class, but of *all* social progress.

Summing up all the above notes, I find four basic shortcomings in the draft, which, in my opinion, render it unacceptable:

1) extreme *abstractness* of many of the formulations, so that they might seem intended for a series of lectures rather than for a militant party;

2) evasion and obscuring of the question of specifically *Russian capitalism* are a particularly serious shortcoming, since the programme should provide a compendium and guide for agitation against Russian capitalism. We must come out with a direct appraisal of Russian capitalism and with an open declaration of war against it specifically;

3) the altogether one-sided and incorrect presentation of the *relation of the proletariat to the small producers*, which cuts the ground from under our feet in the war against the "critics" and many others;

4) the constant endeavour in the programme to give *explanations* of the process. The explanations fail in their purpose anyway, and the exposition becomes prolix, numerous repetitions occur, and the programme constantly lapses into a commentary.

Written in late February-
early March 1902

OPINION ON PLEKHANOV'S SECOND DRAFT

Four basic shortcomings pervade the whole draft and, in my opinion, make it entirely unacceptable:

1) In the manner of formulation of the most important section, which contains a definition of capitalism, this draft is a programme of an economic *textbook* on capitalism in general rather than a programme for the proletariat, which is *fighting* against very real manifestations of a very definite capitalism.

2) The programme is particularly unsuitable for the party of the *Russian* proletariat, because the evolution of Russian capitalism and the antagonisms and social evils engendered by Russian capitalism are almost entirely evaded and obscured by the selfsame system of defining capitalism in general. In its programme the party of the Russian proletariat should formulate in the most unambiguous manner its arraignment of Russian capitalism, its declaration of war on Russian capitalism. This is all the more necessary inasmuch as the Russian programme cannot be identical in this respect with the European programmes: the latter speak of capitalism and of bourgeois society without indicating that these concepts are equally applicable to Austria, Germany, and so on, because that goes without saying. In relation to Russia this cannot be taken for granted.

To dispense with the question by saying that capitalism "in its developed form" is distinguished *in general* by such and such features—and in Russia capitalism "is becoming predominant"—is to *evade* making the concrete arraignment and declaration of war that is most important for a party engaged in a practical struggle.

That is why the draft fails to achieve one of the principal aims of a programme: to provide the Party with a directive for its day-by-day propaganda and agitation concerning all the various manifestations of Russian capitalism.

3) Some of the most important paragraphs are formulated in the draft with an inaccuracy which will inevitably engender most dangerous misinterpretations and hamper our theoretical struggle and propaganda. Thus, for example, the growth of large-scale production is limited to "industrial" enterprises. The evolution of agrarian capitalism is disregarded or even evaded. Further, instead of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" there is "the revolution which the proletariat will have to effect with the support of other sections of the population which are suffering from capitalist exploitation", and even the class struggle of the proletariat has been replaced by "the struggle of the working and exploited masses". This formulation contradicts the basic principle of the International: "The emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself." Besides the proletariat, the other part of the "working and exploited masses" (i.e., mainly the small producers) is *only partially* revolutionary in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. It is revolutionary only when, "with a view to joining the proletariat", it "*places itself at the standpoint of the proletariat*" (*The Communist Manifesto*). As for the reactionary nature of the small producers, that is not brought out in the draft, so that *on the whole* the relation of the proletariat to the "working and exploited masses" is presented *incorrectly*. (For example, the draft reads: "their struggle [the struggle of the working and exploited masses] and, above all, the struggle of their foremost representative, the proletariat, is becoming sharper." "The sharpening of the struggle" of the small producers is expressed in anti-Semitism, in Caesarism, in peasant unions against the farm labourers, and even in the struggle of the socialist Gironde against the Mountain. Representation of all the working and exploited masses by the proletariat should be expressed in the programme in our *arraignment* of capitalism for the poverty of the *m a s s e s* (and not only for the poverty of the working class), for unemployment among "ever wider sections of the working population" [and not of the working class].)

4) The draft constantly slips away from a programme in the strict sense of the word towards a *commentary*. A programme should give *concise statements*, without a single superfluous word, and leave all *explanations* to commentaries, pamphlets, agitation, etc. Engels was therefore fully justified when he accused the Erfurt Programme of being too long, abounding in too much detail and repetition, so as to tend towards becoming a commentary.

In the draft this shortcoming is still more manifest; there is a dreadful amount of repetition; in any case, the attempts made to introduce explanations of the process into the programme (instead of merely giving a definition of the process) fail to achieve their purpose and render the programme impossibly prolix.

Written in late February-
early March 1902

REMARKS ON THE COMMITTEE'S DRAFT PROGRAMME[16]

TEXT OF THE COMMITTEE'S DRAFT	LENIN'S REMARKS
	A question mark indicates a desire to improve the style.
1. The development of international exchange has established such close ties among all nations of the civilised world, that the great emancipation movement of the proletariat had to become, and has long become, an international movement.	
2. For this reason the Russian Social-Democrats regard their Party as one of the detachments of the world army of the proletariat, as part of international Social-Democracy, and pursue the same ultimate aim as the Social-Democrats of all other countries.	The style needs brushing up. This "as" is not good Russian. Clumsy style. "They pursue the same ultimate aim as the Social-Democrats of all other countries have set themselves", or something to that effect.
3. This ultimate aim is determined by bourgeois society's nature and course of development.	I would recommend that "nature and" be deleted as superfluous words. The *ultimate aim* is determined by the *course* and not by the modifications of

this general "course" that are explained by the concept of "nature of development". Hence, these superfluous words are also not quite accurate.

This society is characterised by the domination of commodity production under capitalist production relations, i.e., by the fact that the most important and most considerable part of the articles of consumption is produced

Why only "articles of consumption"? What about means of production? "Products", etc., would be better.

for sale on the home or world market, and the most important and most considerable part of the means

These words should, in my opinion, be deleted. Unnecessary repetition.

of production and of circulation of these articles of consumption—commodities—

These words should be deleted. Commodities are not limited to articles of consumption.

belongs to a relatively small

(Instead of "relatively small", *perhaps negligible*, since the words: "*most* important and most considerable part" are sufficiently restrictive. But this is not important.)

class of persons, ∨ whereas the overwhelming majority of the population consists partly of persons who possess no means of production

∨ The words "to the capitalists and landowners" should be added. Otherwise the result is an *abstract concept* which is particularly *out of place* in conjunction with the subsequent "peasants and handicraftsmen".

and of circulation whatever (proletarians)

"And of circulation" should be deleted. Proletarians of the purest water can have and do have "means of circulation" which are exchanged for *articles of consumption.*

and partly of those who have at their disposal only very insignificant means of production, which do not ensure their existence (certain sections of small producers, as, for instance, small peasants and handicraftsmen). All these persons are forced by their economic position to sell their labour-power *constantly* or *periodically* i.e., to hire themselves to the owners of the means of production and of circulation of commodities, and by their labour create the latter's income.

The style requires brushing up!
? "Means of production" *ensure* (?) existence.

4. The domination of capitalist production relations grows more and more as constant technical progress, by increasing the economic importance of the big enterprises, ousts the independent small producers, that is, causes a relative decline in their number by converting part of them into proletarians, diminishes the role of the others in social and economic life, and at places makes them more or less completely, more or less obviously, more or less onerously, dependent upon the big manufacturers.

"Upon capital"—not only upon big capital.

5. By converting part of the independent small producers into proletarians, this technical progress leads to a still greater

?

increase in the supply of labour-power, making it possible for the manufacturers to employ female and child labour to an ever greater extent in the process of commodity production and circulation. And since, on the other hand, this same process of technical (machine) progress leads to a relative decrease in the manufacturers' need of the workers' physical labour, the demand for labour-power necessarily lags behind its supply, as a consequence of which the dependence of wage-labour on capital increases and the exploitation of the former by capital is intensified. The share of the working class in the sum-total of the social income created by its labour is constantly diminishing.

?

These words should be deleted as a needless repetition of the idea already expressed in the preceding proposition.

In general, § 5 brings out in particular relief the general defect of the draft: *long periods* and an undesirable *prolixity* of exposition. Incidentally: this results in what Engels in his criticism of the Erfurt Draft called "*schiefe Nebenbedeutung*".* For instance, it appears as if the increase in the employment of female and child labour is due *solely* to the "conversion" of the independent small producers into proletarians, whereas this is not so; it also takes place *prior to* such "*c o n v e r s i o n*". The beginning of § 5 is a superfluous repetition.

* "The possibility of misinterpretation".—*Ed.*

6. This state of affairs within bourgeois so-

Over-production, which causes more or less severe industrial crises, followed by more or less lengthy periods of industrial stagnation, is an inevitable result of the growth of the productive forces, in the absence of planning, which is characteristic of commodity production, and under the capitalist production relations inherent in present-day society. In their turn crises and periods of industrial stagnation render the position of the independent small producers still more difficult and lead still more rapidly to the relative and, in some places, even the absolute deterioration in the proletarians' conditions.

Omission.

Repetition again!!

This is insufficient. Not only do they "render their position difficult", but *ruin* them outright on a mass scale.

The first part of §6 would gain a great deal if it were made shorter.

7. Thus, technical progress, which implies an increase in labour productivity and the growth of social wealth, entails, in bourgeois society, an increase in social inequality, a widening of the distance between the propertied and the propertyless, a growth of insecurity of existence, unemployment and poverty of every description.

"*Growth* of poverty of every description"—this borrowing from my draft is not a very apt one. I did not speak about the *growth* of poverty. "Of every description" includes "*absolute*" too. The reference to the *poverty of the masses* should therefore be worded somewhat differently.

8. But, as all these contradictions, inherent in the capitalist mode of production, grow and develop, the working and exploited masses' discontent with the existing order of things also grows, and the struggle of their foremost representative—the proletariat—against the champions of this order becomes sharper.

§8 shows the committee's *stubborn disinclination* to observe the precise and unambiguous *c o n d i t i o n* it was set at its very "birth". *On the basis of this condition* an insertion should have been made (which the committee has done in §10), and, *m o r e o v e r*, before the insertion the text should deal only with the class struggle of the proletariat *a l o n e*. This latter demand, clearly expressed in the conciliation agreement, was *not carried out* by the committee, and I consider that I am within my rights in insisting that it be carried out.

Prior to what is stated at the end of §10, it is *i n c o r r e c t* to speak of the discontent of all the working masses in general and to call the proletariat their "foremost representative", since this is true *o n l y u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n* expressed at the end of §10. The committee presents the conditional as something unconditional. The half-heartedness of the small producer and his *s e m i - r e a c t i o n a r y s p i r i t have not been in any way expressed* by the committee: this is quite impermissible. The result is that

the *possibility* of finding this small producer (or a *part* of this section) among the *principled* "champions of this order" (the same phrase in § 8!!) has been entirely *forgotten!!* And yet this possibility *very* often becomes a reality before our very eyes.

In order to have the right to speak of the movement of the proletariat, its class struggle and even the *class dictatorship*, it is necessary *first to single out* this *one* class, and then only to add something about its role as a representative. Otherwise the result is a lack of coherence in the draft; § 8 *is not connected* in strict logic either *with the continuation* (why not a "dictatorship of the working masses"??), *or with the beginning* (if all the social antagonisms are aggravated, that *means* that the struggle of the *two classes* grows ever sharper, and this is something the committee has forgotten to point out!!). It does not hang together.

At the same time, technical progress, by socialising the process of labour within the workshop and concentrating production,

The socialisation of labour is far from being limited to what takes place within the workshop: this passage must be corrected.

more and more rapidly creates the possibility of the social revolution, which constitutes the ultimate aim of the entire activity of international Social-Democracy, as the conscious spokesman of the class movement of the proletariat.

+ "and *the necessity*" (for the social revolution).

Compare. N.B.

9. This social revolution will consist in the removal of capitalist production relations and their substitution by socialist production relations, i.e., it will consist in the expropriation of the exploiters for the purpose of converting the means of production and of circulation of products into public property, and in the planned organisation of the social production process so as to satisfy the needs of both society as a whole and its individual members.

?

Not accurate. *Such* "satisfaction" is "given" by capitalism as well, but *not to all* members of society and *not in equal degree.*

The achievement of this aim will emancipate all of oppressed humanity, since it will put an end to all forms of the exploitation of one part of society by another.

—My objections have already been set forth—N.B.*

10. To effect its social revolution, the proletariat must win political power (*the class dictatorship*), which will make it master of the situation and enable it to surmount all obstacles. Organising for this purpose into an independent political party, which is opposed to all bourgeois parties,

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"Opposed to *a l l* bourgeois parties" means to the *petty-bourgeois* parties as well, does it not?? But the *majority* of the petty bourgeois are "working and exploited". That does not hang together.

* See pp. 26, 52 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the proletariat calls upon all other sections of the population which are suffering from capitalist exploitation to join its ranks,

Social-Democracy organises and calls *upon*. "The proletariat ... calls into its (!) sections"—*ganz unmöglich!**

counting on their support, inasmuch as they are conscious of the hopelessness of their position in present-day society and place themselves at the standpoint of the proletariat.

The words "counting on their support" should be deleted. They are *redundant* (if it calls upon, that means it counts on) and have *schiefe Nebenbedeutung*. It calls upon those who are conscious, inasmuch as they are conscious, *das genügt.***

11. The Social-Democratic Party, the party of the fighting proletariat directs all manifestations of its class struggle, discloses to the whole of the working and exploited masses the irreconcilable antagonism between the interests of the exploiters and the interests of the exploited, and explains to them the historical significance and the indispensable prerequisites for the future social revolution.

"Irreconcilability of their (the masses) interests with the very existence of capitalism", or a similar correction. Not all the working people find themselves in a position wherein their interests" are "irreconcilably" opposed to the interests of the exploiters. The working peasant has *something*, somewhat, $\frac{a}{n}$, **in common** with the big landowner. We need more *general* and broader statements, lest the result

* Quite impossible!—The reference is to an infelicity in the Russian style.—*Ed.*

** That is enough.—*Ed.*

12. But despite the identity of their common ultimate aim, an identity conditioned by the dominance of the same mode of production throughout the civilised world, the Social-Democrats of different countries do not set themselves the same *immediate* tasks, both because this mode is not everywhere developed in equal degree and also because its development in different countries takes place under varying social and political conditions.

be an inaccuracy and amount to *phrase-mongering*.

? Style!!

§12—the end. An attempt should be made to shorten this. It would by very useful for this paragraph to shrink. Would it not be possible to condense ten words into two by saying "national features", or a similar expression?

13. In Russia, side by side with capitalism, which is rapidly extending the sphere of its domination and more and more becoming the predominant mode of production, we still meet at every step remnants of our old, pre-capitalist social order, which was based on bondage of the masses of working people to the landlords, to the state, or to the head of the state. These remnants retard the development of the productive forces in the highest degree, hamper the all-round development of the proletariat's class struggle, lower the working population's standard of living, are responsible for the Asiatically barbarous way in which the many-million-strong peasantry is being ruined and

§13—the beginning. My most humble thanks for the tiny step in my direction. But "becoming the predominant...."*

N.B.

? Style!

* At this point Lenin expresses his opinion of a piece of infelicitous phrasing in the draft.—*Ed.*

reduced to degradation, and keep entire people in a state of ignorance total absence of rights, and subjection.

§ 13—the end. Correction desirable: I have already suggested *how* (my amendments to my draft*), or you get "... barbarous way in which ... is being ruined and reduced to degradation..."?

14. As the most outstanding of all survivals of our serf-owning system and the most formidable bulwark of all this barbarism, the tsarist autocracy is wholly incompatible with political and civil liberties, which have long been in existence in the advanced countries of capitalist production, as the natural legal complement to that production.

? Style.

"*Natural* legal complement"—a correct thought very badly expressed. For capitalism the "naturalness" of liberty is complicated by 1,001 social and historical factors, which the word "natural" does not bring out. Moreover, it smacks, reeks, of a sort of liberalism. Something should be said to the effect that the "autocracy is *inevitably* doomed to death by the *entire* development of capitalism, which imperatively requires civil and political liberties for the expression of its increasingly complex interests", or something like that, in short, the idea of *inevitability* should be expressed, without giving rise to misunder-

* See p. 32 of this volume.—*Ed.*

standings by attributing this inevitability to "natural" developments.

By its very nature it must crush every social movement and is bound to be the bitterest enemy of all the proletariat's emancipatory aspirations.

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This won't do. *Not* every: bimetallism (and pre-Raphaelitism) are also "social movements". This must be amended.

For these reasons, Russian Social-Democracy advances as its immediate political task the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a republic based on a democratic constitution that would ensure, etc.

On the whole, the more one reads the Committee's draft, the more one is convinced of the fact that it is, so to say, *semi-digested*. I take it upon myself to predict that this quality in the draft will bring down upon us a great deal of justified reproaches, if we publish it in *such* a form. *Everyone* will see that it is just "pasted together".

If the Lord God has chosen to punish us for our sins by obliging us to come out with a "mongrel" draft, we should at least do *everything* in our power to *reduce* the unhappy consequences. Therefore, those who are *above all* guided by a desire to "get through with it as quickly as possible" are quite wrong. It may be taken for granted that *now*, given such a constellation, nothing but evil will come of haste, and our editorial draft will be unsatisfactory. It is not absolutely necessary to publish it in No. 4 of *Zarya*[17]: we can publish it in No. 5 and in a special impression *before* No. 5 appears. If we do this, a delay of a month or so will do no harm at all to the Party. And, indeed, it would be better if the illustrious committee goes over it again thoroughly, thinks it over, digests it, and gives us a draft *of its own*, an integral draft, rather than one that has been pasted together. Let me repeat: if this task is unrealisable, it would be far better to revert to the plan of two drafts (and we

shall be fully able to carry out this plan without *any* "awkwardness": Plekhanov publishes his draft over his signature in *Zarya*, and I publish mine "on the side", in Geneva, as X, Y or Z). I hereby most respectfully request the august Board to give its *close* consideration to "all the circumstances of the case".

12.IV.1902—I am writing in the train: I apologise for the scribble. If I have time, I shall write again and more clearly.

Written on March 30 (April 12), 1902

ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON THE COMMITTEE'S DRAFT PROGRAMME

Besides my remarks written on the draft itself, I should like to note the following:

§ 3. "Society (bourgeois) is characterised by the domination of commodity production *under* capitalist production relations, *i.e.*" ... then follows a description of the basic features of capitalism. The result is an incongruity: the "*i.e.*" connects dissimilar, unequal concepts, namely, 1) the *modification* of commodity production in a form conditioned by the domination of capitalist production relations, and 2) the sale of products on the market and the sale of their labour-power by the masses of the population.

This incongruity, this equating of the *b a s i c* and most general features of commodity production in general and of capitalism in general—and the modifications of commodity production on the basis of capitalist production relations (then commodities are no longer exchanged *simply* according to value)—clearly shows how poor G. V. Plekhanov's formulation is (and yet the committee adopted this formulation, merely rephrasing it). In a programme that presents only the most general and basic features of capitalism *and does not set forth even the theory of surplus-value*, we suddenly "nod" to Böhm-Bawerk by calling to mind that "commodity production on the basis of capitalism" is not quite the same as simple commodity production! If so, then why not add to the programme special references to Mikhailovsky, Berdayev, and the like? On the one hand, only one very general socialist expression is used to cover even all of Marx's teachings about the exploitation of labour by capital: "create by their labour the latter's income" (end of § 3)—and

on the other hand, note is made of the specific transformation of surplus-value into profit under "commodity production on the basis of capitalist production relations".

G. V. Plekhanov is quite right when he states that the words "commodity production on the basis of capitalist production relations" express the fundamental idea of Volume III.[18] But that is all. There is no point in including this idea in the programme—just as there is no point in describing in the programme the mechanism of realisation, which is the fundamental idea of Volume II, or in describing the conversion of excess profit into ground rent. In the programme it is sufficient to *note* the exploitation of labour by capital = the creation of surplus-value, whereas to speak of every kind of *transformation* and modification of the forms of this surplus-value is out of place (and impossible in a few short propositions).

ADDITION CONCERNING THE CLASS STRUGGLE

I fully share V. Zasulich's opinion that in our country it is possible to attract a much larger proportion of small producers into the ranks of Social-Democracy and much more rapidly (than in the West), that to achieve this we must do *all* in our power, and that this "wish" should be expressed in the programme "against" the Martynovs and Co. I am in full agreement with all this. *I welcome* the addition that has been made at the end of § 10—I emphasise this to avoid any misunderstanding.

However, there is no need to go to the other extreme, as V. Zasulich does! A "wish" should not be confused with *reality*, and with immanently necessary reality at that, to which alone our *Prinzipienerklärung** is devoted. It would be desirable to attract *all* the small producers—naturally. But we know that they constitute a special class, even if bound to the proletariat by a thousand ties and intermediate grades, but nevertheless a special class.

In the first place it is essential *to draw a line of demarcation* between ourselves and all others, to single out the proletariat *alone and exclusively*, and only *then* declare

* A declaration of principles.—*Ed.*

that the proletariat will emancipate all, that it calls on all, invites all.

I agree to this "then", but I demand that this "in the first place" should come first!

Here in Russia the monstrous sufferings of the "working and exploited masses" did not rouse any *popular* movement until a "handful" of factory workers began the struggle, the class struggle. And *only* this "handful" guarantees the conduct, continuation, and *extension* of this struggle. It is in Russia, where the critics (Bulgakov) accuse the Social-Democrats of "peasantophobia", and the Socialist-Revolutionaries[19] shout of the need for *replacing* the concept of the class struggle by the concept of "the struggle of *all* the working and exploited" (*Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*, No. 2[20])—it is in Russia that we must, *in the first place*, *draw a line of demarcation* between ourselves and all this riffraff, by means of the most clear-cut definition of the class struggle alone of the proletariat *alone*—and only then declare that we *call on all*, that we shall undertake everything, take everything, extend to include everything. But the committee "extends", while forgetting to draw a line of demarcation!! And I am accused of being narrow-minded because I demand that this extension be *preceded* by "demarcation"?! But that is trickery, gentlemen!!

The struggle inevitably facing us tomorrow against the combined forces of the critics + the more Leftist gentlemen of *Russkiye Vedomosti* and *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[21] + the Socialist-Revolutionaries will most imperatively demand of us that very *demarcation* between the *class struggle* of the proletariat and the "struggle" (is it a struggle?) "of the working and exploited masses". Phrase-mongering about these masses is a trump card in the hands of all the *unsicheren Kantonisten*,* and the committee is playing into their hands and depriving us of a weapon for the struggle against half-heartedness, in order to emphasise one half! But do not forget the other half!

Written in April 1902

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* Unreliable cantonists. In this context—"unreliable allies".—*Ed.*

AN AMENDMENT TO THE AGRARIAN SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME[22]

I propose the following amendment to Clause 4 of our agrarian programme: instead of "Establishment of peasant committees (a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation, *or*, *when the land has changed hands*, *by redemption*, *etc.*) of the land", etc., to state: "Establishment of peasant committees (a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation) of the land which..." etc.,

i.e., to scrap the italicised words.

It seems to me that this amendment should be made for the following considerations:

1. In the agrarian programme we present our "maximum", our "socio-revolutionary demands" (see my commentary[23]). Allowing land redemption, however, runs counter to the socio-revolutionary nature of the entire demand.

2. Both the historical tradition of "redemption" (that of 1861)[24] and its very content (cf. the well-known phrase: "redemption is nothing but purchase")[25] give it the specific flavour of a mawkishly well-intentioned and bourgeois measure. Our allowing land redemption makes it not impossible for the entire essence of our demand to be discredited (and there will be more than enough vilifiers prepared to do this.)*

3. The fear that an "injustice" would be committed by taking away the cut-off lands from people who have paid money for them is groundless. We have in any case set two restrictive conditions for this measure of restituting the

* By allowing land redemption, we are *degrading* the restitution of the cut-off lands from an extraordinary, revolutionary measure to the most petty "reform".

cut-off lands: [(1)—"the lands cut off in 1861", and (2)—"*now* used as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage".] It is absolutely right to confiscate property serving the purposes of *feudal* exploitation, and to do so without compensation. (Let the purchaser of the cut-off lands then sue the seller—that is no affair of ours.)

4. By allowing "redemption", we are placing the onus of *monetary* payment on the peasants, who by reason of labour rent were most deeply involved in natural economy: the abruptness of the transition to *monetary payments* may ruin the peasants *in an especially rapid way*, and this would run counter to the entire spirit of our programme.

5. Even if a purchaser of cut-off lands is to be "compensated" *by way of exception*, this should by no means be done at the expense of the peasants, who have the moral and historical right to these cut-off lands. "Compensation" can be made by giving a corresponding plot somewhere in the border regions, etc.; but that does not concern us.

I ask everyone to vote: *For* = discarding the words about redemption, deleting the words I have indicated.

Against = endorsing of the old text.

1) G. V.—
2) P. B.—
3) V. I.—
4) Berg—
5) A. N.—
6) Frey—for.

Written in April 1902

SIGNS OF BANKRUPTCY

Only a year has elapsed since Bogolepov[26] was struck by Karpovich's bullet, which cleared the way for a "new course" in the government's policy towards the universities. During this year we have observed successively an unusual surge of social indignation, an unusually gentle note in speeches by our rulers, a regretfully all-too-usual infatuation of society with these new speeches, an infatuation which has extended to a certain section of the students as well, and, lastly, following on the fulfilment of Vannovsky's florid promises, a new outburst of students' protests. To those who last spring expected a "new era" and seriously believed that the tsarist drill sergeant would fulfil but a modicum of the hopes harboured by students and society—in short, to the Russian liberals, it should now be clear how mistaken they were in once again giving credence to the government, how little justification there was for halting the movement for reform which in the spring had begun to assume impressive forms, and for allowing themselves to be lulled by the sweet strains coming from the government sirens. After the promise to reinstate at the universities all last year's victims had been broken, after a series of new reactionary measures had flung a challenge to all those who demanded a real reform of the educational system, after a series of fresh and violent reprisals against demonstrators who demanded that the fraudulent bankrupt should make good his promises—after all this the government of "cordial concern" has published "provisional regulations"[27] for student organisations as means of "pacification", and ... instead of "pacification" is confronted with a general conflagrations of "disorders" again involving all educational institutions.

We, revolutionaries, have never for a moment believed that Vannovsky's promised reforms were meant in earnest. We kept on telling the liberals that the circulars of this "cordial" general and the rescripts of Nicholas Obmanov[28] were just another manifestation of the liberal policy the autocracy has become so adept in during forty years of struggle against the "internal enemy", i.e., against all progressive elements in Russia. We warned the liberals against the "pipe dreams" they began to indulge in following the government's very first steps in the spirit of the "new course". We exposed the deliberate falsity of the government's promises, and warned society: "If your opponent has been stunned by the first serious assault, keep on showering fresh blows at him, redoubling their strength and frequency...." That travesty of the right to organise which the "provisional regulations" are now offering the students was predicted by the revolutionaries from the very beginning of the talk about this new gift from the government. We knew what could and should have been expected of the autocracy and its miserable attempt at reform. We knew that Vannovsky would "pacify" nobody and nothing, that he would not fulfil any progressive hopes, and that the "disorders" would inevitably recur in one form or another.

A year has passed, but society is still marking time. The higher educational institutions that are supposed to exist in any well-ordered state have again stopped functioning. Tens of thousands of young people have again had the tenor of their life upset, and society is again faced with the old question: "What next?"

A considerable majority of the students have refused to recognise the "provisional regulations" and the organisations allowed by them. With greater determination than they usually show, the professors are expressing obvious dissatisfaction with this gift of the government. And, indeed, one does not have to be a revolutionary, one does not have to be a radical, to recognise that this so-called "reform" not only fails to give the students anything resembling freedom, but is also worthless as a means of bringing any tranquillity into university life. Is it not immediately obvious that these "provisional regulations" create in advance a series of causes for conflict between the students and the author-

ities? Is it not obvious that the introduction of these regulations threatens to turn any students' meeting, lawfully called for the most peaceful purpose, into a starting-point for fresh "disorders"? Can it be doubted, for example, that by presiding at such meetings the inspectors, who exercise police functions, will constantly annoy some, evoke protest in others, and intimidate and gag yet others? And is it not clear that Russian students will not allow the character of the discussions at such meetings to be forcibly determined at the "discretion" of the authorities?

Yet the "right" of assembly and organisation granted by the government in the absurd form established by the "provisional regulations" is the *maximum* that the autocracy can give the students, if it is to remain an autocracy. Any further step in this direction would amount to a suicidal disturbance of the equilibrium on which the government's relations with its "subjects" rest. Reconciling themselves to this maximum that the government can offer, or intensifying the *political*, *revolutionary* character of their protest—such is the dilemma the students are facing. The majority are adopting the latter alternative. More clearly than ever before, a revolutionary note rings in the students' appeals and resolutions. The policy of alternating brutal repression with Judas kisses is doing its work and revolutionising the mass of students.

Yes, in one way or another, the students have settled the question confronting them and have declared that they are again prepared to take up the weapon they laid aside (under the influence of the lullabies). But what does society, which seems to have dozed off to these treacherous lullabies, intend to do? Why does it persist in maintaining silence and in "sympathising on the quiet"? Why is nothing heard of *society's* protests, *its* active support for the renewed unrest? Is it really prepared to wait "calmly" for the inevitable tragic events by which every student movement has been attended hitherto? Does it really intend to confine itself to the wretched role of teller of the number of victims in the struggle and passive observer of its shocking scenes? Why do we not hear the voice of the "fathers", when the "children" have unequivocally declared their intention to offer up new sacrifices on the altar of

Russian freedom? Why does our society not support the students at least in the way the workers have already supported them? After all, the higher educational institutions are attended not by the proletarians' sons and brothers, and yet the workers in Kiev, Kharkov, and Ekaterinoslav have already openly declared their sympathy with the protesters, despite a number of "precautionary measures" taken by the police authorities and despite their threats to use armed force against demonstrators. Is it possible that this manifestation of the revolutionary idealism of the Russian proletariat will not influence the behaviour of society, which is vitally and directly interested in the fate of the students, and will not urge it to energetic protest?

The student "disorders" this year are beginning under fairly favourable portents. They are assured the sympathy of the "crowd", "the street". It would be a criminal mistake on the part of liberal society not to make every effort to completely demoralise the government by giving *timely* support to the students, and to wrest real concessions from it.

The immediate future will show how far our liberal society is capable of such a role. The outcome of the present student movement largely depends on the answer to this question. But whatever that outcome may be, one thing is certain: the recurrence of general student disorders after so brief a lull is a sign of the political bankruptcy of the present system. For three years the universities have been unable to settle down to normal life, studies are conducted by fits and starts, one of the cogs of the state machine is ceasing to function and, after turning uselessly for a time, is again coming to a standstill for a long while. There can be no doubt that under the present political regime there is no radical cure for this disease. The late Bogolepov sought to save the fatherland by a "heroic" method borrowed from the outmoded medicine prescribed by Nicholas I. We know what that led to. It is obvious that there can be no further progress in *this* direction. The policy of flirting with the students has now suffered a fiasco. But there is no other way besides violence and flirtation, and each new manifestation of this unquestionable bankruptcy of the existing regime will undermine its

foundations more and more, depriving the government of all prestige in the eyes of the indifferent philistines, and increasing the number of people who realise the need to struggle against it.

Yes, the bankruptcy of the autocracy is beyond doubt, and it is hurrying to announce the fact to the world at large. Is it not a declaration of bankruptcy that "a state of emergency" has been proclaimed in a good third of the Empire, and local authorities in all parts of Russia have come out simultaneously with "compulsory decrees" forbidding, under pain of severe penalties, acts that Russian laws do not allow as it is? By their very nature, all emergency regulations, which suspend the operation of ordinary laws, are meant to operate for only a limited time and in a limited area. The assumption is that extra-ordinary circumstances demand the temporary application of emergency measures in definite localities for the purpose of restoring the equilibrium necessary for the unimpeded operation of ordinary laws. That is the argument used by representatives of the existing regime. Twenty odd years have elapsed since the introduction of the emergency law. Twenty years of its operation in the principal centres of the Empire have not brought about the "pacification" of the country, or restored public order. After this powerful remedy has been in use for twenty years, it appears that the disease of "unreliability", which it was devised to combat, has become so widespread and struck such deep roots as to make it necessary to extend it to all towns and factory centres of any importance! Is this not bankruptcy, openly declared by the bankrupt himself? Confirmed adherents of the present order (undoubtedly such do exist) must be horrified by the fact that the population is gradually becoming inured to this potent medicine, and is ceasing to react to fresh injections of it.

The bankruptcy of the government's *economic* policy is also coming to light, this time against its will. The autocracy's rapacious methods of running the economy have rested on the monstrous exploitation of the peasantry. These methods have taken for granted, as an inevitable consequence, recurrent famines among the peasants in one locality or another. At such times the predatory state has attempted

to parade before the population in the noble role of considerate provider for the very people it has robbed. Beginning with 1891, famines have taken an enormous toll of victims, and from 1897 they have followed one another almost without interruption. In 1892 Tolstoi bitterly derided the fact that "the parasite is preparing to feed the plant upon whose juices it thrives".[29] It was, indeed, an absurd idea. Times have changed, and with famine having turned into a normal state of affairs in the countryside, our parasite is not so much taken up with the Utopian idea of feeding the plundered peasantry, as with declaring that very same idea an offence against the state. The aim has been achieved—the huge famine of today is taking place in an atmosphere of dead silence that is unusual even in our country. The groans of the starving peasants are not heard; there is no attempt on the part of the public to take the initiative in combating the famine; the newspapers say nothing about the situation in the villages. An enviable silence, but do not Messrs. the Sipyagins feel that this quiet is highly reminiscent of the calm before a storm?

The state system, which for ages has rested on the passive support of millions of peasants, has reduced the latter to a state in which year in year out they are unable to provide food for themselves. This *social* bankruptcy of the monarchy of Messrs. the Obmanovs is no less instructive than its *political* bankruptcy.

When will the affairs of our fraudulent bankrupt be wound up? Will he manage to carry on much longer, living from day to day, and patching up the holes in his political and financial budget with skin taken from the living body of the national organism? The greater or lesser period of grace that history will allow our bankrupt will depend on many factors; but one of the most important will be the degree of revolutionary activity displayed by those who have become aware of the existing regime's complete bankruptcy. Its decay is in an advanced stage, and is far ahead of the *political mobilisation* of the social elements destined to be its grave-diggers. This political mobilisation will be carried out most effectively by revolutionary Social-Democracy, which alone will be capable of dealing a mortal blow at the autocracy. The new clash between the

students and the government enables and obliges us all to accelerate this mobilisation of all social forces hostile to the autocracy. Months of hostilities in political life are accounted by history as the equivalent of years. The times we live in are indeed times of hostilities.

Iskra, No. 17, February 15, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

FROM THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF RUSSIA

Under this general heading we intend to publish from time to time, as the material accumulates, articles and commentaries in which all aspects of Russia's economic life and economic development will be described from the Marxist point of view. Now that *Iskra*[30] has begun to appear fortnightly, the absence of such a section is most keenly felt. However, we must call the most earnest attention of all comrades and sympathisers of our publications to the fact that to conduct this section (at all properly) we need an abundance of material and in this respect our editors find themselves in an exceptionally unfavourable position. The contributor to the legal press cannot even imagine the most elementary obstacles that sometimes frustrate the intentions and endeavours of the "underground" writer. Do not forget, gentlemen, that we cannot use the Imperial National Library, where tens and hundreds of special publications and local newspapers are at the service of the journalist. Material for an economics section at all befitting a "newspaper", i.e., material that is at all brisk, topical, and interesting to both reader and writer, is scattered in small local newspapers and in special publications which are mostly either too expensive or are not at all on sale (government, Zemstvo,[31] medical publications, etc.). That is why it will be possible to run an economics section tolerably well *only* if *all readers* of the illegal newspaper act in accordance with the proverb: "Many a little makes a mickle." Putting aside all false modesty, the Editorial Board of *Iskra* must admit that in this respect they are very poorly supplied. We are sure that most of our readers are able to read the most various special and local publications, and actually do

read them "for themselves". Only when every such reader asks himself *each time* he comes across some interesting item: "Is this material available to the editors of our paper? What have I done to acquaint them with this material?"—only then shall we succeed in having all the outstanding developments in Russia's economic life appraised, not only from the standpoint of the official, *Novoye Vremya*,[32] Witte panegyrics, not only for the sake of the traditional liberal-Narodnik plaints, but also from the standpoint of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

And now, after this non-liberal plaint, let us get down to the subject.

1. THE SAVINGS-BANKS

Of late the savings-banks have become one of the most favoured subjects of panegyrics, not only from Witte, but from the "critics" as well. The Davids and Hertzes, the Chernovs and Bulgakovs, the Prokopoviches and Totomiantses, in a word, all adherents of the fashionable "criticism of Marxism" (to say nothing of respectable professors, like the Kablukovs and Karyshevs) chant in various tones and voices: "Those orthodox devotees talk about the concentration of capital!—Why, the savings-banks alone show us the decentralisation of capital. They talk of mounting poverty! In actual fact, we see an increase in small savings among the people."

Let us take the official statistics on the Russian savings-banks for 1899,[33] which someone was kind enough to send us, and examine them more closely. In 1899 there was a total of 4,781 state savings-banks in Russia, of which 3,718 were located at post- and telegraph-offices and 84 at factories. In five years (from 1895 to 1899) the number of savings-banks increased by 1,189, i.e., by one-third. During the same period the number of depositors increased from 1,664,000 to 3,145,000, i.e., by almost one and a half million (by 89 per cent), and the total deposits increased from 330,000,000 rubles to 608,000,000 rubles, i.e., by 278,000,000 rubles, or by 84 per cent. And so there has apparently been an enormous increase in "the people's savings"?

But what strikes the eye in this connection is the following circumstance. From literature about the savings-banks it is known that in the eighties and early nineties the total deposits increased *most rapidly in the famine years*, 1891 and 1892. That is on the one hand. On the other, we know that during this period in general, during the eighties and nineties taken together, the increase in "the people's savings" was accompanied by an astonishingly rapid and drastic process of impoverishment, ruin, and starvation among the peasantry. To understand how these conflicting phenomena could go together one need only recall that the *growth of money economy* was the principal feature in Russia's economic life during the period mentioned. The increase in savings-bank deposits is by itself not at all indicative of a growth in "the people's" savings in general, but only of a growth in *monetary* "savings" (and sometimes even only of their concentration in central institutions). Among the peasantry, for example, it is quite possible that, with the transition from natural economy to money economy, there should be an *increase* in monetary savings *with a decrease* in the sum-total of "the people's" savings. The peasant of the old type kept his savings in a stocking when these savings were in cash, but most often these savings were made up of grain, fodder, coarse linen, firewood, and like articles "in kind". The peasant who has been or is being ruined now has savings neither in kind nor in cash, while a negligible minority of peasants who are growing rich are accumulating monetary savings which are beginning to find their way into state savings-banks. Hence, the increase in deposits parallel with the spread of famine is quite understandable; what it denotes is not an advancement in the people's welfare, but the elimination of the old-type, independent, peasant by the new rural bourgeoisie, i.e., the wealthy peasants, who are unable to run their farms without permanent farm labourers and day labourers.

The statistics classifying depositors according to occupation provide interesting oblique confirmation of what has been said above. These data cover nearly three million (2,942,000) accounts, with deposits totalling 545,000,000 rubles. The average deposit is shown to be 185 rubles—a

sum, as you see, that clearly points to the predominance, among depositors, of "fortunates" who constitute a negligible minority of the Russian people and who have inherited or acquired property. The biggest depositors are the *clergy*: 46,000,000 rubles spread over 137,000 accounts, i.e., an average of 333 rubles per account. It seems that being responsible for saving the souls of their flock is not an unprofitable business.... Next in line are the *landowners*: 9,000,000 rubles on 36,000 accounts, i.e., average of 268 rubles; further—*merchants*: 59,000,000 rubles on 268,000 accounts, i.e., an average of 222 rubles; then come officers—with an average of 219 rubles per account, civil servants—averaging 202 rubles. "Agricultural and other rural occupations" hold only sixth place: 640,000 accounts totalling 126,000,000 rubles, i.e., the average account is 197 rubles; then come "employees in private businesses"—with an average of 196 rubles; "miscellaneous occupations"—186 rubles; urban trades—159 rubles; "domestic servants"—143 rubles; *factory workers*—136 rubles, and last come "private soldiers"—86 rubles.

Thus, factory workers practically come *last* among depositors (exclusive of private soldiers, who are maintained by the state)! Even domestic servants have higher average savings (143 rubles per account, as against 136 rubles) and possess a much larger number of accounts. To be precise: domestic servants have 333,000 accounts with deposits totalling 48,000,000 rubles, while factory workers have 157,000 accounts with deposits totalling 21,000,000 rubles. The proletariat, which creates all the wealth of our aristocracy and our magnates, is in a worse condition than servants of the latter! Of the total number of Russian factory workers (not less than two million people) only approximately *one-sixth* are able to make even the most modest deposits in the savings-banks[34]—and this despite the fact that workers' entire income comes exclusively in money, and they often have to support families living in the villages, so that for the most part their deposits are not "savings" at all in the real sense of the word, but simply sums *put aside* for the next remittance to their families, etc. Moreover, we say nothing of the fact that the group listed under the heading "factory workers" probably

includes office clerks, foremen, superintendents, in a word, persons who are not actually factory workers.

As to the peasants—if one considers that they are mostly entered under the heading of "agricultural and other rural occupations",—well, their average savings account is, as we have seen, higher than even that of employees in private businesses, and considerably exceeds the average savings of those coming under the heading of "urban trades" (i.e., presumably, shopkeepers, artisans, janitors, etc.). Obviously, these 640,000 peasants (out of approximately 10,000,000 households, or families) with 126,000,000 rubles in savings-banks belong exclusively to the *peasant bourgeoisie*. It is only to these peasants, and perhaps to those most closely associated with them, that the data on progress in agriculture, the spread of machinery, improvements in land cultivation, and higher living standards, etc., apply—data brought forward against the socialists by Messrs. the Wittes so as to show an "advancement in the people's welfare", and by Messrs. the Liberals (and the "Critics") so as to refute the "Marxist dogma" about the decline and ruin of small-scale farming. These gentlemen do not notice (or pretend not to notice) that the decline of small-scale production is expressed precisely in the fact that a negligible number of people who grow rich through the ruin of the masses come from the ranks of the small producers.

Of still greater interest are data classifying the total number of depositors according to the size of their deposits. In round figures, this classification is as follows: of three million depositors, one million possess accounts *not exceeding* 25 *rubles*. Their deposits total 7,000,000 rubles (out of 545,000,000 rubles, i.e., only 12 kopeks of every 10 rubles of the aggregate deposits!). The average account is *7 rubles*. That is to say, the really small depositors, who constitute *one-third* of the total number, possess only 1/83 of the aggregate sum. Further, depositors with accounts of between 25 and 100 rubles constitute one-fifth of the total number (600,000) and own a total of 36,000,000 rubles, the average account being *55* rubles. If we combine these two groups, we see that *over* 50 *per cent* of all depositors (1,600,000 out of 3,000,000) own only 42,000,000 rubles, or 1/12, of the grand total of 545,000,000 rubles. Of the remaining

well-to-do depositors one million have accounts ranging from 100 to 500 rubles, with deposits totalling 209,000,000 rubles, the average account being 223 rubles. Four hundred thousand depositors have accounts exceeding 500 rubles each, with deposits totalling 293,000,000 rubles, an average of 762 rubles. Consequently, these evidently well-to-do people, who form *less* than 1/7 of the total number of depositors, possess *more than half* (54 per cent) of the total capital.

Hence, the *concentration of capital* in present-day society, the dispossession of the masses, makes itself felt with great force even in an institution especially intended for the "younger brother", the poorer section of the population, since deposits are limited by law to 1,000 rubles. And let us note that this concentration of property, which is typical of any capitalist society, is still higher in the advanced countries, despite the greater "democratisation" of their savings-banks. In France, for instance, as of December 31, 1899, there were 10,500,000 savings-bank accounts with deposits totalling 4,337,000,000 francs (a franc is slightly less than 40 kopeks). That makes an average of 412 francs per account, or about 160 rubles, i.e., *less* than the average deposit in Russian savings-banks. The number of small depositors in France is also comparatively larger than in Russia: approximately one-third of depositors (3 1/3 million) have accounts ranging up to 20 francs (8 rubles), the average deposit being 13 francs (5 rubles). Altogether these depositors possess only 35,000,000 francs out of a total of 4,337,000,000, i.e., 1/125. Depositors with accounts of up to 100 francs constitute a little over 50 per cent of the total number (5,300,000), but possess a total of only 143,000,000 francs, i.e., 1/33 of the aggregate deposits. On the other hand, depositors with accounts of 1,000 francs and over (400 rubles and over), while constituting *less than one-fifth* (18.5 per cent) of the total number of depositors, have concentrated in their hands *over two-thirds* (68.7 per cent) of all deposits, viz., 2,979,000,000 francs out of a total of 4,337,000,000 francs.

Thus, the reader now has before him a certain amount of information for an appraisal of our "critics'" arguments. One and the same fact—the enormous increase

in savings-bank deposits, and in particular the increase in the number of small depositors—is interpreted in different ways. The "critics of Marxism" say: the people's welfare is growing and decentralisation of capital is increasing. The socialists say: what is taking place is the conversion of savings "in kind" into monetary savings, and the number of well-to-do peasants, who are turning bourgeois and converting their savings into capital, is increasing. An incomparably more rapid growth is to be seen in the number of peasants being driven into the ranks of the proletariat, which lives by the sale of its labour-power and puts (at least temporarily) part of its meagre income into the savings-banks. The large number of small depositors merely goes to show how numerous are the poor in capitalist society, since the share of these small depositors in the aggregate deposits is negligible.

The question arises: in what way do the "critics" differ from the most ordinary bourgeois?

Let us go further, and see how the capital of the savings-banks is used and for what purposes. In Russia this capital serves primarily to strengthen the might of the militarist and bourgeois-police state. The tsarist government (as we have already pointed out in a leading article in No. 15 of *Iskra**) disposes of this capital just as arbitrarily as it does of all other public property it lays hands on. It quite calmly "borrows" hundreds of millions of this capital for financing its Chinese expeditions, for hand-outs to capitalists and landowners, for re-equipping the army, enlarging the navy, etc. Thus, in 1899, for example, 613,000,000 rubles out of aggregate savings-bank deposits of 679,000,000 rubles were invested in securities, viz., 230,000,000 rubles in *state loans*, 215,000,000 rubles in mortgages held by the Land Banks, and 168,000,000 rubles in railway loans.

The Treasury is doing some very profitable "business": first, it covers all expenses incurred by the savings-banks and gets a net profit (hitherto credited to the reserve fund of the savings-banks); secondly, it *compels* the depositors to cover the deficits in our state economy (compels them to

* See present edition, Vol. 5, "The Budget".—*Ed.*

loan money to the Treasury). From 1894 to 1899, deposits in savings-banks totalled an average of 250,000,000 rubles per annum, while withdrawals amounted to 200,000,000 rubles. Consequently, that leaves *fifty million* rubles annually that can be used for loans to patch up holes in the Treasury's money-bags, into which thieving fingers are dipped by all but the laziest. Why fear deficits due to squandering money on wars and on hand-outs to hangers-on at Court, to landlords and manufacturers when it is always possible to obtain sizable sums from the "people's savings"!

We shall add parenthetically that one of the reasons the Treasury is conducting such profitable business is because it is steadily lowering the rate of interest paid on monetary deposits, which is lower than the interest on securities. For example, in 1894 the interest paid on monetary deposits was 4.12 per cent, and on securities—4.34 per cent; in 1899 it was 3.92 per cent and 4.02 per cent, respectively. As is well known, reduction of interest is a feature common to all capitalist countries and it brings out most clearly and graphically the growth of big capital and *large-scale production at the expense of small-scale production*, because in the final analysis the rate of interest is determined by the ratio between aggregate profits and the aggregate capital invested in production. Nor can we ignore the fact that the Treasury is constantly intensifying its exploitation of postal and telegraph employees: at first they had only the mails to look after; then the telegraph was added; now they have been burdened also with the job of receiving and paying out savings deposits (it should be remembered that 3,718 out of the 4,781 savings-banks are at post- and telegraph-offices). A terrific increase in the intensity of labour and a longer working day—that is what this means to the mass of postal and telegraph employees. As to their salaries, the Treasury scrimps on them like the most close-fisted kulak: the lowest grade of employees, those who have just entered service, are paid literally *starvation* rates; then comes an endlessly graded succession of twenty-five-kopek and fifty-kopek rises, and the prospect of a niggardly pension after forty to fifty years of drudgery is intended to increase even more the bondage of this veritable "proletariat of officialdom".

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

But let us return to the way savings-bank capital is used. We have seen that (by order of the Russian Government) the banks invest 215,000,000 rubles in mortgages held by the Land Banks and 168,000,000 rubles in railway loans. This fact has provided food for still another and of late extremely widespread display of bourgeois ... I meant to say "critical" wisdom. In essence, the Bernsteins, the Hertzes, the Chernovs, the Bulgakovs, and their like tell us, this fact means that the small depositors in the savings-banks are becoming *railway owners* and land *mortgage holders*. It is a fact, they argue, that even such purely capitalist and colossal enterprises as the railways and banks are becoming more and more decentralised, are being divided up, and are passing into the hands of petty proprietors, who acquire them by purchasing shares, bonds, mortgages, etc.; it is a fact that the wealthy, the owners of property are growing in number—yet those narrow-minded Marxists are fussing about with the antiquated theory of concentration and the theory of impoverishment. If, for instance, the Russian factory workers have 157,000 accounts at savings-banks with aggregate deposits amounting to 21,000,000 rubles, about 5,000,000 rubles of this sum is invested in railway loans, and about 8,000,000 rubles in Land Bank mortgages. That means that Russian factory workers own 5,000,000 rubles' worth of railways and are landowners worth 8,000,000 rubles. Now go and talk of a proletariat! Hence, the workers are exploiting the landowners, since, in the form of interest on mortgages, they receive a modicum of rent, i.e., a small portion of the surplus-value.

Yes, this precisely is the line of reasoning adopted by the latest critics of Marxism.... And—here is something that will surprise you—I am prepared to agree with the widespread opinion that we should welcome this "criticism", since it has brought a stir into a theory which was alleged to be stagnant; I am prepared to agree to that on the following condition. There was a time when the French socialists whetted their skill as propagandists and agitators by analysing the sophisms of Bastiat, while the German socialists followed suit by unravelling the sophisms of Schulze-Delitzsch[35]; as for us, Russians, it has *thus far* fallen to

our lot to deal only with the company of "critics". And so, I am prepared to shout, "Long live criticism!"—*on condition* that, in our propaganda and *agitation among the masses,* we, socialists, engage *as widely as possible* in an analysis of all the bourgeois sophisms of fashionable "criticism". If you agree to this condition we can call it a bargain! Incidentally, our bourgeoisie are more and more maintaining a discreet silence; for they prefer the protection of the tsarist archangels* to that of the bourgeois theoreticians, and it will be very convenient for us to accept the "critics" as the "devil's advocates".

Through the savings-banks ever larger numbers of workers and small producers are taking a share in big enterprises. This is undoubtedly a fact. What this fact shows, however, is not an increase in the number of property-owners, but 1) the growing socialisation of labour in capitalist society, and 2) the growing subordination of small-scale production to large-scale production. Take the small Russian depositor. Over 50 per cent of such depositors, as we have seen, have accounts of up to 100 rubles, to wit 1,618,000 depositors with savings totalling 42,000,000 rubles, i.e., an average of 26 rubles per depositor. Thus, this depositor "owns" about 6 rubles' worth of railways and about 9 rubles' worth of "landed property". Does this make him wealthy or a "proprietor"? No, he remains a proletarian, who is forced to sell his labour-power, i.e., to become a slave of those who own the means of production. As for his "share" in "railway and banking" business, it merely shows that capitalism is increasingly linking together individual members of society and individual classes. The interdependence of individual producers was infinitesimal in patriarchal economy; it is now constantly increasing. Labour is becoming more and more social, and enterprises less and less "private", although they still remain *almost entirely* in private hands.

His participation in a big enterprise undoubtedly *weaves* the small depositor *into the pattern* of that enterprise. Who benefits from this link? Big capital does, which extends its transactions by paying the small depositor no

* An appellation given in tsarist Russia to members of the secret police.—*Ed.*

more (and often less) than it pays any other lender, and by being *the more independent* of the small depositors, the *smaller* and the more scattered the latter are. We have seen that the share of the small depositors is extremely small even in the savings-bank capital. How insignificant, then, must it be in the capital of the railway and banking magnates. By giving his mite to these magnates, the small depositor enters into a *new dependence* on big capital. He cannot even think of having any say in the use of this big capital; his "profit" is ridiculously small (26 rubles at 4 per cent= 1 ruble a year!). Yet in the event of a failure he loses even his miserable mite. What the abundance of these small depositors signifies is not the decentralisation of big capital but the *strengthening of the power* of big capital, which is able to dispose of even the smallest mites in the "people's" savings. His share in big enterprises does not make the small depositor more independent; on the contrary, he becomes *more dependent* on the big proprietor.

What follows from the increase in the number of small depositors is not the reassuring philistine deduction about an increase in the number of wealthy people, but the revolutionary conclusion of the growing dependence of the small depositors on the big, of the mounting contradiction between the increasingly socialised nature of the enterprises and the preservation of private ownership of the means of production. The more the savings-banks develop, the more interested do the small depositors become in the socialist victory of the proletariat, which alone will make them real, and not fictitious, "sharers" in and administrators of social wealth.

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REPORT OF THE *ISKRA* EDITORIAL BOARD TO THE MEETING (CONFERENCE) OF R.S.D.L.P. COMMITTEES[36]

March 5, 1902.

Comrades! Only the day before yesterday we received notice of the meeting to be called for March 21, together with the entirely unexpected information that the original plan to hold a conference had been superseded by a plan to convene a Party congress. We do not know who is responsible for this sudden and unmotivated change. On our part, we consider it most unfortunate. We protest against such rapid changes in decisions on highly complex and important Party measures, and strongly recommend a return to the original plan for a conference.

To be convinced of the necessity for this, it is enough, in our opinion, to give more careful consideration to the agenda (*Tagesordnung*) of the congress, which was likewise communicated to us only the day before yesterday; moreover, we do not know whether this is only a draft *Tagesordnung*, and whether this agenda has been proposed by one or by several organisations. The agenda provides for nine questions to be discussed by the congress in the following order (I am giving a brief summary of the points): A) the economic struggle; B) the political struggle; C) political agitation; D) May Day; E) the attitude towards opposition elements; F) the attitude towards revolutionary groups unaffiliated to the Party; G) organisation of the Party; H) the Central Organ, and I) representatives and Party organisations abroad.

First, in its architecture and in the wording of the individual questions this agenda produces an irresistible

impression of "economism".[37] We do not of course think that the organisation proposing this agenda would entertain "economist" views to this day (although *to some extent* this is not altogether impossible), but we ask the comrades to remember that it is also necessary to take into account both the opinion held by international revolutionary Social-Democracy, and those survivals of "economism" which are still widespread in our country. Just imagine: the advanced party of political struggle calls a congress at a time when all revolutionary and opposition forces in the country, which have begun a direct attack on the autocracy, are straining every effort—and all of a sudden we lay chief stress on the "economic struggle", with "politics" *following* only in the wake!! Is this not a copy of the traditional error of our "economists", who claim that political agitation (*resp.* struggle) should come after the economic? Is it possible to imagine that it would occur to any European Social-Democratic Party, during a revolutionary period, to place the question of the trade-union movement before all other questions? Or take this separation of the question of political agitation from the question of the political struggle! Does it not smack of the usual fallacy which contraposes the political struggle to political agitation as something fundamentally different, something belonging to a different stage? Or, lastly, how is one to explain the fact that demonstrations figure in the agenda *primarily* as *a means of the economic struggle!??* After all, we must not forget that at the present time *a number* of elements hostile to Social-Democracy are levelling against all Social-Democracy the accusation of "economism": these accusations are being made by *Nakanune*,[38] by *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*, by *Svoboda*,*[39] and even (even!) by *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. We must not forget that whatever resolutions the conference may adopt, the agenda itself will remain a historical document by which the level of our entire Party's political development will be judged.

Secondly, it is astonishing that the agenda raises (a few days before the congress 1) questions that should be

* See pp. 283-84 of this volume.—*Ed.*

discussed only after thorough preparations, only when it is possible to adopt really definite and comprehensible decisions on them—otherwise it is better not to discuss them at all for the time being. For example, points E and F: the attitude towards opposition and other revolutionary trends. These questions must be discussed in advance, from all angles, reports drawn up on them, and differences in existing shades made clear—only then can we adopt decisions that would actually offer something new, that would serve as a real *guide* for the whole Party, and not merely repeat some traditional "generalisation". In point of fact, just consider: can we in a few days prepare a comprehensive and well-grounded decision that would take into consideration all the practical requirements of the movement on the questions of the attitude towards the "revolutionary-socialist *Svoboda* group" or towards the new-born "Socialist-Revolutionary Party"? This apart from the strange impression, to say the least, that will be produced on everyone by the fact that revolutionary groups unaffiliated to the Party are mentioned, while nothing is said on so important a question as the attitude towards the Bund,[40] or a revision of the clauses dealing with the latter, in the resolutions of the First Congress of the Party.

Thirdly—and most important—there is an unpardonable omission in the agenda: not a word is said of the *stand* taken by present-day Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy *on matters of principle*, or of its *Party programme*. At a time when the whole world is clamouring about the "crisis of Marxism", and all Russian liberal publicists are clamouring even about its collapse *and disappearance*, when the question of the "two trends in Russian Social-Democracy" has not only been placed on the order of the day, but has even found its way into various lecture programmes, into the programmes for propagandists' talks and self-education groups—at a time like this it is quite impossible to pass over these questions in silence. We, comrades, are being ridiculed by our opponents, who already say even *in print* (see Nadezhdin, "The Eve of the Revolution") that we have grown accustomed to "reporting that all's well"!...

In our opinion, all the above-mentioned shortcomings in the agenda prove convincingly how irrational is the

plan to convert into a congress a conference that has already been summoned. We understand, of course, how keenly everyone feels the fact that there has been no Party congress since 1898, how tempting the idea is of using the efforts spent in organising the conference so as to put an end to this existence of a "party without party institutions". But it would be a very great mistake to let these practical considerations make us forget that from a congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party everyone now expects decisions which would be on a level with *all* the revolutionary tasks of the present time; that if we fail to rise to the occasion *now*, at this truly critical moment, we may bury all Social-Democracy's hopes to gain the hegemony in the political struggle; that it is better not to begrudge an expense of a few thousand rubles and several months of preparatory organisational work, and to use the present conference so as to prepare for the summer a congress that will really be a *general Party* congress capable of finally settling all immediate problems both in the sphere of theory (the theoretical programme) and in the sphere of the political struggle.

Look at the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are more and more skilfully taking advantage of our shortcomings and gaining ground to the detriment of Social-Democracy. They have only just formed a "party", founded a *theoretical* organ, and decided to launch a political *monthly* newspaper. What will be said of the Social-Democrats if *after* this event they fail to achieve at their congress results *at least such as these*? Are we not running the risk of creating the impression that when it comes to a clear-cut programme and revolutionary organisation the Social-Democrats are not ahead of this "party", which is known to be gathering around itself all sorts of indeterminate, undetermined, and even undeterminable elements?

In view of all this we believe that the present congress of committee representatives should not be declared the Second regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, but an *unofficial conference*. This conference's *main and immediate task* should be to organise and prepare for next summer a real *general Party congress* capable of endorsing the Party programme, making final

arrangements for publication of a political weekly organ of the Party, and in general bringing about the complete and actual unification of all committees and even of all groups (in print-shops,[41] etc.) of Social-Democrats on the basis of steadfastness of principle, loyalty to the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy, and genuinely militant preparedness for *offensive* political action.

Proceeding from this basic idea, we take the liberty of submitting to the comrades for their consideration the following *Tagesordnung* for our conference:

1. *Statement of principles*. In the resolution on this question an emphatic stand should be taken against those deplorable attempts to restrict our theory and our tasks, which were but recently quite widespread. By vigorously rejecting any such restrictions the Party conference will make an important contribution to the unification of all Social-Democrats on matters of principle and will re-establish the shaken prestige of revolutionary Marxism. Some comrades may perhaps express fear that discussion on the statement of principles will take up a great deal of time and divert attention from practical questions. We do not in the least share these apprehensions, for we believe that the extensive debates in the illegal press have cleared up the question so well that we shall reach an agreement on the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy with great speed and ease. On the other hand, it is utterly impossible to do without a statement of principles.

Moreover, the removal of this question from the conference's *Tagesordnung* would in any case fail in its purpose since the very same question would inevitably come up, only in more disjointed form, in the discussion of the resolutions on the economic struggle, the political struggle, etc. For this reason it would be far more expedient to first finish with this matter, refrain from splitting up our resolutions on political agitation, strikes, and so on, and give one connected exposition of the view on our main tasks.

On our part, we will endeavour to prepare a draft of this resolution and append it to this report (if time permits).

2. *The Second regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*. Here we have in view the preliminary (and, of course, to a certain extent tentative)

decision on the question of the date of the congress (summer, or not later than autumn, since it is desirable to end it before the next "season"), the place (in connection with which the conditions of secrecy must be carefully considered), the funds required for its arrangement (*Iskra*, on its part, would be prepared to immediately contribute 500 rubles for this purpose, from a certain special donation it has received; we would possibly be able soon to find another such sum or even more. We should discuss how many thousand rubles it will approximately cost, and practical ways of raising the rest); lastly, the general principles of representation and the fullest possible representation (i.e., so as to ensure representation of definite pre-selected committees and certain groups, and possibly also of study circles of Russian Social-Democrats, to say nothing of the comparatively easy task of securing representatives from the two Social-Democratic organisations abroad; a procedure should also be adopted for discussing the question of inviting to the congress such organisations that may be founded in the interim between conference and congress, etc., etc.).

3. *Election of an Organising Committee*. Generally speaking, the task of this O.C. should be to implement conference decisions, make preparations for and arrange the congress, set a final date and place for the latter, attend to its practical organisation, arrange such matters as the transport of literature, and establish Party print-shops in Russia (with the aid of *Iskra*, two local print-shop groups sympathising with our publications have been formed in Russia; they have succeeded in publishing in their two print-shops Nos. 10 and 11 of *Iskra*, the pamphlets. *What Next?*, *The Tenth Anniversary of the Morozov Strike*, *The Speech by Pyotr Alexelyev*, *The Indictment in the Obukhov Case*, and many others, as well as a number of leaflets. We hope that representatives from these local groups will be able to participate in the work of the conference and that they will assist in every way in the accomplishment of the general Party tasks); further, it should give assistance to various local organisations, labour unions, students' organisations, and so on and so forth. With the support of all organisations, this O. C. could, in the space of three or four months, fully prepare the ground for the

formation of a real Central Committee, capable *de facto* of directing the entire political struggle of our Party.

In view of the complexity and variety of the O.C.'s tasks, it should, in our opinion, consist of a fairly large number of members (5-7), who should be directed to elect a bureau, distribute functions among themselves, and hold several meetings prior to the congress.

4. *Election of a committee for preparing a draft Party programme*. As the editors of *Iskra* (including the Emancipation of Labour group[42]) have already been working on this difficult job for a long time, we venture to propose the following plan to the comrades. We have already completed the entire draft of the practical section of the programme, including the draft agrarian programme, and, besides, *two* variants for the theoretical part of the programme have been prepared. Our representative will acquaint the conference with these drafts, should this be found necessary and if nothing comes up to prevent him from doing so. From these two variants, we are at present drawing up a single general draft, but of course we should not like to make it public in its rough form, i.e., before the work is completed. Should the conference elect several persons to collaborate with our Editorial Board in the preparation of the programme, that might perhaps be the most practical solution of the question.

For our part, we can in any case give the comrades an immediate formal undertaking to submit within a few weeks the final draft of the Party programme, which we intended to publish in advance in *Iskra*, so as to enable *all* comrades to get acquainted with it, and to obtain their comments.

5. *The Central Organ*. In view of the tremendous difficulties involved in launching a periodical which would appear regularly and be adequately provided with literary and technical facilities, the conference will most likely follow the example of the First Congress of the Party and choose an existing publication. Whether the question is settled in this way, or whether it is decided to launch an entirely new periodical, it will in any case be necessary to instruct a special committee, or better still the same Organising Committee, to undertake the preparatory work

and to discuss the matter from all angles together with the existing or newly-elected editorial board.

It would be essential, in our opinion, to draw the Emancipation of Labour group into this discussion, for without its co-operation and guidance we cannot imagine the proper organisation of a political organ that would be consistent in principle and would in general meet all the requirements of the movement.

Inasmuch as attempts to establish a fortnightly periodical have already been made before the conference, the Party should make it its immediate task to establish *a weekly newspaper*: this would be fully possible given really *joint* work on such a paper by *all* Russian Social-Democrats.

6. *Preparation of the agenda for the Party congress and reports on that agenda*. The conference should draw up part of this agenda itself, and entrust part of it to the Organising Committee; it should *without fail* appoint (*resp.* find) reporters on each question. Only by appointing reporters in advance is it possible to ensure a truly comprehensive discussion of the various questions and correct decisions on them at the congress (some of the reports could be printed beforehand in full or in part, and discussed in the press; for instance, we hope to publish soon an almost completed treatise on the agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy, etc., written by a member of the Editorial Board,* etc.).

7. *Current practical questions of the movement*—for example, a) discussion and endorsement of a May Day leaflet (*resp.* discussion of drafts submitted by *Iskra* and other organisations).

b) The May Day demonstration—the time and methods of its organisation.

c) Instructions to the Organising Committee to assist in organising boycotts, demonstrations, etc., and at the same time gradually to prepare the minds of Party members, and likewise the forces and means of the Party, for a general uprising of the people.

d) Various financial questions relating to the maintenance of the Organising Committee, *etc.*

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* See pp. 105-48 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Concluding our report on the tasks and *Tagesordnung* of our congress, we shall only remark that it is absolutely impossible for us to draw up a detailed report on the work of *Iskra* because we are extremely pressed for time. We are therefore compelled to limit ourselves to the following brief outline.

(N.B.) ROUGH OUTLINE OF RESOLUTION

1. The conference categorically rejects each and every attempt to inject opportunism into the revolutionary class movement of the proletariat—attempts which have found expression in the so-called "criticism of Marxism", Bernsteinism,[43] and "economism". At a time when the bourgeoisie of all countries is rejoicing over the so widely publicised "crisis in socialism", the conference declares, in the name of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, its solidarity with the revolutionary international Social-Democratic movement, and expresses its firm conviction that Social-Democracy will emerge from this crisis stronger than ever and prepared for a relentless struggle for the achievement of its great ideals.

2. The conference declares its solidarity with the Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party[44] and confirms that it considers the overthrow of the autocracy the immediate political task of the Party. The conference declares that in its work for the accomplishment of this immediate task as well as of its ultimate aim Social-Democracy lays chief stress on all-round and nationwide political agitation which calls on the proletariat to fight against all manifestations of economic, political, national, and social oppression, whatever section of the population this oppression is directed against. The conference declares that the Party will support every revolutionary and progressive opposition movement directed against the existing political and social system. The conference particularly recommends, as practical methods of struggle, the organisation of boycotts, manifestations at theatres, etc., as well as organised mass demonstrations. The conference advises all Party committees and groups to devote

due attention to the need for preparatory measures for a nation-wide armed uprising against the tsarist autocracy.

3. The conference declares that Russian Social-Democracy will continue as heretofore to guide the economic struggle of the proletariat, will strive to extend and deepen it, to strengthen its ideological and organisational bonds with the Social-Democratic labour movement, and will endeavour to take advantage of every manifestation of this struggle so as to develop the political consciousness of the proletariat and draw the latter into the political struggle. The conference declares that there is no need whatever to conduct agitation from the very outset on an economic basis alone, or to consider economic agitation in general to be the most widely applicable means of drawing the masses into the political struggle.

[N. B.: It is very important here too to *expose Rabocheye Dyelo*[45] once again!!]

4. (About the peasantry—should this be done perhaps in the spirit of our agrarian programme?

I shall try to prepare and forward it at once.)

First published in 1923, in Vol. V of the *Collected Works* of N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov)

Published according to the manuscript

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY[46]

Written in February-
first half of March 1902

First published in August 1902
in the magazine *Zarya*, No. 4.
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the manuscript

I

There is hardly any need to prove at length that an "agrarian programme" is essential to the Russian Social-Democratic Party. By an agrarian programme we mean a definition of the guiding principles of Social-Democratic policy on the agrarian question, i.e., policy in relation to agriculture and the various classes, sections, and groups of the rural population. Naturally, in a "peasant" country like Russia the agrarian programme of the socialists is chiefly, if not exclusively, a "peasant programme", a programme defining their attitude towards the peasant question. Big landowners, agricultural wage-workers, and "peasants"—these are the three main components of the rural population in any capitalist country, Russia included. In the same measure as the attitude of the Social-Democrats to the first two of these three components (the landowners and the labourers) is definite and self-evident, even the very concept of the "peasantry" is indefinite, and all the more indefinite is our policy with regard to the fundamental problems of its life and evolution. If in the West the crux of the Social-Democrats' agrarian programme is precisely the "peasant question", how much more so must that be the case in Russia. It is all the more necessary for us, Russian Social-Democrats, to have the most unambiguous definition of our policy in the peasant question because in Russia our movement is still quite new and because the whole of old Russian socialism was, in the final analysis, a "peasant" socialism. True, the mass of Russian "radicals", who imagine themselves the custodian of the heritage left by our Narodnik socialists of all shades, have practically nothing socialistic left in them. But all of them are all the more eager to bring into the forefront their differences with

us on the "peasant" question, the more it pleases them to tone down the fact that the "labour" question has come into the foreground of the social and political life of Russia, and the fact that they have no stable principles whatever in this question, while in essence nine-tenths of them are the most ordinary bourgeois social-reformers in this matter. Lastly, the numerous "critics of Marxism", who in the latter respect have almost entirely merged with the Russian radicals (or liberals?), are also endeavouring to lay specific emphasis on the peasant question, on which "orthodox Marxism" is allegedly most completely put to shame by the "latest works" of the Bernsteins, Bulgakovs, Davids, Hertzes and even ... the Chernovs!

Further, in addition to the theoretical uncertainties and the war of "progressive" trends, the purely practical requirements of the movement itself have of late lent special urgency to the task of propaganda and agitation in the countryside. However, this work cannot be conducted at all seriously and on a large scale without a programme consistent in principle and politically expedient. Since the very day of their appearance as an independent trend, Russian Social-Democrats have realised the full importance of the "peasant question". Let us recall that the draft programme of the Russian Social-Democrats prepared by the Emancipation of Labour group and published in 1885 contains a demand for a "radical revision of agrarian relationships (the terms of redemption and allotment of land to the peasants)".* In the pamphlet entitled *The Tasks of the Socialists in the Fight Against the Famine in Russia* (1892), G. V. Plekhanov also spoke of the Social-Democratic policy on the peasant question.

It is therefore quite natural that in one of its first issues (April 1901, No. 3) *Iskra* also published a rough outline of an agrarian programme, defining its attitude towards the principles of the Russian Social-Democrats' agrarian policy, in an article entitled "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry".** A great many Russian Social-Democrats were perplexed by this article, in connection with which we,

* See appendix to P. B. Axelrod's pamphlet, *Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats*, Geneva, 1898.

** See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*



First page of Lenin's manuscript, "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", 1902

Reduced

the editors, have received a number of comments and letters. The clause on the restitution of the cut-off lands evoked most objections, and we were planning to launch a discussion on the matter in the columns of *Zarya*, when No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* appeared with an article by Martynov which, among other things, dealt with the *Iskra* agrarian programme. Since *Rabocheye Dyelo* has voiced many of the current objections, we hope that our correspondents will not resent our confining ourselves *for the time being* to a reply to Martynov alone.

I stress *for the time being* because of the following circumstances. The *Iskra* article was written by one of the editors, and although the other members of the Editorial Board agreed with the author on the general presentation of the question, there could, of course, have been differences of opinion on particulars and specific points. In the meantime, our entire Editorial Board (i.e., including the Emancipation of Labour group) was occupied with the preparation of a collective draft programme for our Party. This work was protracted (partly as a result of various Party affairs and certain circumstances of our illegal work, and partly because of the necessity for a special congress to discuss the programme from all angles), and was completed only quite recently. As long as the clause on the restitution of the cut-off lands remained my personal opinion, I made no haste to defend it, since the general presentation of the question of our agrarian policy was far more important to me than this particular clause, which could still be rejected or substantially modified in our general draft. I shall now be defending this general draft. As to the "friendly reader" who took the trouble of communicating to us his criticism of our agrarian programme, we ask him now to undertake the criticism of our general draft.

II

We shall quote the "agrarian" section of this draft programme in full.

"With a view to eradicating the remnants of the old serf-owning system and for the purpose of facilitating the

free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will work for:

"1) abolition of land redemption and quit-rent payments, as well as of all services now imposed on the peasantry as a taxable social-estate;

"2) annulment of collective liability and of all laws restricting the peasant in the free disposal of his land;

"3) restitution to the people of all sums taken from them in the form of land redemption and quit-rent payments; confiscation for this purpose of monasterial property and of the royal demesnes, and imposition of a special land tax on members of the big landed nobility who received land redemption loans, the revenue thus obtained to be credited to a special public fund for the cultural and charitable needs of the village communes;

"4) establishment of peasant committees

"a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation, or, when the land has changed hands, by redemption, etc.) of the land cut off from the peasants when serfdom was abolished and now used by the landlords as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage;

"b) for the eradication of the remnants of the serf-owning system which still exist in the Urals, the Altai, the Western territory, and other regions of the country;

"5) empowerment of courts to reduce exorbitant rents and to declare null and void all contracts entailing bondage."

The reader may perhaps wonder at the fact that the "agrarian programme" contains no demands whatever in favour of the agricultural wage-workers. On this score let us note that such demands have been included in the preceding section of the programme which contains the demands presented by our Party "to safeguard the *working class* from physical and moral degeneration, and also to raise its fighting capacity in the struggle for its emancipation". The words we have underlined apply to *all* wage-workers, including those in agriculture, and *all the 16 clauses of* this section of the programme apply *to the agricultural workers as well.*

True, this combination of industrial and agricultural workers in one section, with the "agrarian" part of the programme limited to "peasant" demands, has the drawback that the demands in favour of the agricultural workers do not strike the eye, are not discernible at first glance. A superficial acquaintance with the programme may even create the entirely wrong impression that we have deliberately toned down the demands in favour of the agricultural wage-workers. Needless to say, this impression would be quite false, for the drawback in question is at bottom of a purely external character. It can be easily obviated by closer acquaintance with the programme itself and the commentaries on it (and it goes without saying that our Party programme will "go to the people" only together with printed commentaries, and, what is far more important, with spoken commentaries as well). Should some group wish to make a special appeal to the agricultural workers, it need only select from all the demands in favour of the workers those particular demands that are most important to farm labourers, hands hired by the day, etc., and set them out in a separate pamphlet, leaflet, or in speeches.

From the standpoint of principle, the *only correct* way to edit the programme sections under analysis is one that will unite all demands in favour of the wage-workers *in all branches* of the national economy and will distinctly place in a special section demands in favour of the "peasants", because the fundamental criterion of what we can and must demand in the former and latter cases is *absolutely different*. In the draft, the fundamental difference between the two sections of the programme under review is expressed in the preamble to each section.

For wage-workers we demand such *reforms* as would "safeguard them from physical and moral degeneration and raise their fighting capacity"; for the peasants, however, we seek only such *changes* as would help "to eradicate the remnants of the old serf-owning system and facilitate the free development of the class struggle in the countryside". Hence it follows that our demands in favour of the peasants are far more restricted, that their terms are much more moderate and presented in a smaller frame-

work. With regard to the wage-workers, we undertake to defend their interests *as a class in present-day society*; we do this because we consider their class movement the only *truly* revolutionary movement (cf. the words in the theoretical part of the programme on the relation of the working class to other classes) and strive to organise this particular movement, to direct it, and bring the light of socialist consciousness into it. As regards the peasantry, however, *we do not by any means undertake* to defend its interests *as a class of small landowners and farmers in present-day society*. Nothing of the kind. The emancipation of the workers must be the act of the working class itself", and for this reason Social-Democracy represents—*directly* and *wholly*—the interests of the proletariat alone, and seeks indissoluble organic unity with its class movement alone. All the other classes of present-day society stand for the preservation of the foundations of the existing economic system, and that is why Social-Democracy can undertake to defend the interests of those classes only under certain circumstances and on concrete and strictly defined conditions. For instance, in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, the class of small producers, including the small farmers, is a *reactionary* class, and therefore "trying to save the peasantry by protecting small-scale farming and small holdings from the onslaught of capitalism would be a useless retarding of social development; it would mean deceiving the peasantry with illusions of the possibility of prosperity even under capitalism; it would mean disuniting the labouring classes and creating a privileged position for the minority at the expense of the majority" (*Iskra*, No. 3).* That is why in our draft programme the inclusion of the "peasant" demands hinges on *two highly circumscribed conditions*. We make the legitimacy of "peasant demands" in a Social-Democratic programme dependent, firstly, on the condition that they lead to the eradication of remnants of the serf-owning system, and, secondly, that they facilitate the free development of the class struggle in the countryside.

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* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 422-23.—*Ed.*

Let us dwell in greater detail on each of these conditions, which have already been briefly outlined in No. 3 of *Iskra*.

The "remnants of the old serf-owning system" are still extremely numerous in our countryside. This is a generally known fact. Labour-rent and bondage, the peasants' inequality as a social-estate and as citizens, their subjection to the privileged landowners, who still have the right to flog them, and their degrading living conditions, which virtually turn the peasants into barbarians—all this is not an exception, but the rule in the Russian countryside, and in the final analysis this is all a direct survival of the serf-owning system. In those instances and relationships where this system still prevails, and insofar as it still prevails, its enemy is the *peasantry as a whole*. As opposed to serf-ownership, to the feudal-minded landlords, and the state that serves them, the peasantry still stands as a *class*, a class not of capitalist but of serf-owning society, i.e., as an estate-class.* Inasmuch as this class antagonism between the "peasantry" and the privileged landowners, so characteristic of serf-owning society, still survives in our countryside, *insomuch* a working-class party must undoubtedly be on the side of the "peasantry", support its struggle and *urge it on to fight* against all remnants of serf-ownership.

We put the word "peasantry" in quotation marks in order to emphasise the existence in this case of an absolutely indubitable contradiction: in present-day society the peasantry of course no longer constitutes an integral class. But whoever is perplexed by this contradiction forgets that this is not a contradiction in exposition, in a doctrine, but a

* We know that in slave and feudal societies, class divisions were also expressed in the division of the population into *social-estates*, each class with specific *legal* status in the state. That is why classes in a society based on slavery and feudalism (and on serf-ownership) were also separate social-estates. On the other hand, in capitalist, bourgeois society, all citizens are equal in law, division into social-estates has been abolished (at least in principle), and that is why classes have ceased to be social-estates. The division of society into classes is a common feature to slave, feudal, and bourgeois societies, but in the two former estate-classes existed, whereas in the latter the classes are not estates.

contradiction in life itself. This is not an invented, but a living and dialectical contradiction. *Inasmuch as* in our countryside serf-owning society is being eliminated by "present-day" (bourgeois) society, *insomuch* the peasantry ceases to be a class and becomes divided into the rural proletariat and the rural bourgeoisie (big, middle, petty, and very small). *Inasmuch* as serf-owning relationships still exist, *insomuch* the "peasantry" still continues to be a class, i.e., we repeat, a class of serf-owning society rather than of bourgeois society. This "inasmuch—insomuch" exists in real life in the form of an *extremely complex* web of serf-owning and bourgeois relationships in the Russian countryside today. To use Marx's terminology, labour rent, rent in kind, money rent, and capitalist rent are all most fantastically interlinked in our country. We lay special emphasis on this fact, which has been established by all economic investigations in Russia, because it necessarily and inevitably constitutes a source of that complexity, confusion, or, if you will, artificialness, of some of our "agrarian" demands, which at first glance so greatly puzzles many people. Whoever limits his objections to *general* dissatisfaction with the complexity and "artfulness" of the proposed solutions forgets that *there can be no* simple solution of such tangled problems. It is our duty to fight against all remnants of serf-owning relationships—that is beyond doubt to a Social-Democrat—and since these relationships are most intricately interwoven with bourgeois relationships, we are *obliged* to penetrate into the very core, so to say, of this confusion, undeterred by the complexity of the task. There could be only one "simple" solution of this task: to keep aloof, pass it by, and leave it to the "spontaneous element" to clear up this mess. But this "simplicity", favoured by all and sundry bourgeois and "economist" admirers of spontaneity, is unworthy of a Social-Democrat. The party of the proletariat must not only support but must also urge on the peasantry in its struggle against all the remnants of the serf-owning system. To urge the peasantry on, it must not confine itself to wishful thinking; it must lay down a definite revolutionary directive, and be able to *help in finding the bearings* in the maze of agrarian relationships.

III

For the reader to get a clearer idea of the inevitability of a complex solution of the agrarian question, we would ask him to compare in this respect the workers' and the peasants' sections of the programme. In the former, all the solutions are extremely simple and comprehensible even to the most uninitiated and least imaginative person; they are "natural", tangible, and easily achievable. In the latter, on the contrary, most of the solutions are extremely complex, "incomprehensible" at first glance, artificial, improbable, and difficult to bring about. How can this difference be explained? Can it be that, in the first case, the compilers of the programme gave it sober and business-like consideration, whereas in the second case they were lost and confused, lapsing into romanticism and phrase-mongering? Such an explanation, it must in truth be said, would be extremely "simple", childishly simple, and we are not at all surprised at Martynov having grasped at it. It did not enter his mind that economic development itself had facilitated and simplified to the utmost the practical solution of the workers' minor problems. Social and economic relationships in the sphere of large-scale capitalist production have become (and are increasingly becoming) so transparent, clear, and simplified that the next steps forward suggest themselves automatically, immediately, and at first glance. On the other hand, capitalism's elimination of serf-ownership in the countryside has so confused and complicated social and economic relationships as to make it necessary to ponder deeply over the solution (in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy) of the immediate practical questions, and it may be said in advance and with full certainty that a "simple" solution cannot be invented.

Incidentally, once we have begun to compare the workers' and the peasants' sections of the programme, let us note still another difference in principle between them. This difference may be briefly formulated as follows: in the workers' section we have no right to go beyond the bounds of demands for social reform; in the peasants' section however, we must not stop at social-revolutionary demands. In other words: in the workers' section we are definitely

limited by the minimum programme; in the peasants' section we can and must produce a maximum programme.* Let us explain.

What we set forth in both sections is not our ultimate aim, but our immediate demands. In both we should therefore remain on the basis of present-day (=bourgeois) society. Therein lies the similarity between the two sections. However, their fundamental difference consists in the fact that the workers' section contains demands directed against the *bourgeoisie*, whereas the peasants' section contains demands directed against the would-be *serf-owning landlords* (against the feudal lords, I would say, if the applicability of this term to our landed nobility were not so disputable**). In the workers' section we must confine ourselves to *partial* improvements in the existing, bourgeois, order. In the peasants' section we must strive to *completely* eradicate all the remnants of the serf-owning system from this existing order. In the workers' section we cannot bring forward demands whose significance would be tantamount to a final smashing of bourgeois rule: when we achieve this ultimate aim of ours, which has been adequately stressed elsewhere in the programme and which we "never for a moment" lose sight of in the struggle for the immediate demands, then we, the Party of the proletariat, shall no longer confine ourselves to questions of this or that responsibility of the employers, or to some factory housing, but shall take into our own hands the *entire* management and disposal of the whole of social production, and consequently, of distribution as well. On the contrary, in the peasants' section we can and must bring

* The objection that the demand for the restitution of the cut off lands is far from being the maximum of our immediate demands in favour of the peasantry (or of our agrarian demands in general) and that it is therefore not consistent will be dealt with later, when we speak of the concrete clauses of the programme we are defending. We maintain, and shall endeavour to prove, that the demand for the "restitution of the cut-off lands" is the maximum that we can at present advance in our agrarian programme.

** Personally, I am inclined to decide this question in the affirmative, but in the given instance, it is of course neither the place nor time for substantiating or even for proposing this solution, since what we are concerned with now is the defence of the draft agrarian programme prepared collectively by the entire Editorial Board.

forward demands whose significance would be tantamount to the final smashing of the rule of the feudal-minded landlords and to the complete eradication of all traces of serf-ownership from our countryside. We cannot present social-revolutionary demands among the immediate demands in the workers' section, since the social revolution which overthrows the rule of the bourgeoisie is the proletarian revolution which achieves our *ultimate* aim. In the peasants' section, we present social-revolutionary demands as well, since the social revolution which overthrows the rule of the serf-owning landlords (i.e., a social revolution of the bourgeoisie, like the Great French Revolution) is also possible on the basis of the existing, bourgeois, order. In the workers' section, we keep to our stand (conditionally, for the time being, with our own independent intentions and aims, but we nevertheless keep to our stand) in favour of social reforms, for what we are demanding here is only what the bourgeoisie can (in principle) concede to us without as yet losing its domination (and what Messrs. the Sombarts, Bulgakovs, Struves, Prokopoviches and Co. therefore in advance advise the bourgeoisie to concede in all wisdom and good faith). In the peasants' section, however, we must, *unlike the social-reformers*, also demand what the feudal-minded landlords will not and cannot give us (or the peasants)—we must also demand what the revolutionary movement of the peasantry can take only by force.

IV

That is why the "simple" criterion of "feasibility", with the aid of which Martynov so "easily" pulled our agrarian programme to pieces, is inadequate and worthless. This criterion of direct and immediate "feasibility" is applicable in general only to the avowedly reformative sections and clauses of our programme, and by no means to the programme of a revolutionary party in general. In other words, this criterion is applicable to our programme only by way of exception, and by no means as a general rule. Our programme must be feasible only in the broad and philosophical sense of the word, so that not a single letter in it will contradict the direction of all social and economic evolution. And since we

have correctly determined this direction (in general and in particular), we must—in the name of our revolutionary principles and our revolutionary duty—fight *with all our might*, always and absolutely, for the *maximum* of our demands. However, to try to determine in advance, before the final outcome of the struggle, in the course of that struggle, that we shall perhaps fail to achieve the *entire* maximum means lapsing into sheer philistinism. Considerations of this kind always lead to opportunism, even if the authors of such considerations may harbour no such intentions.

Indeed, is it not philistinism on Martynov's part to discern "romanticism" in the *Iskra* agrarian programme "because *it is highly problematic whether the peasant masses can be brought into our movement* under the present conditions" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 58. Italics mine)? This is a good example of those very "plausible" and very cheap arguments by means of which Russian Social-Democratism was simplified to "economism". A closer look at this "plausible" argument will show that it is a soap-bubble. "Our movement" is the Social-Democratic labour movement. The *peasant masses* cannot just be "brought" *into it*: that is not problematic but *impossible*, and there was never any question of it. However, the peasant masses *cannot but be brought* into the "movement" against all the remnants of the serf-owning system (including the autocracy). Martynov confused matters by using the expression "our movement", without giving thought to the fundamental difference between the character of the movement against the bourgeoisie and against the serf-owning system.*

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* How little thought Martynov has given to the question he has undertaken to write on is most vividly seen from the following statement in his article: "In view of the fact that the agrarian section of our programme *will still be of comparatively little practical significance for a very long time to come*, it affords a wide field for revolutionary phrase-mongering." The underlined words contain the very confusion indicated in the text. Martynov has heard that in the West agrarian programmes are put forward only when there is a highly developed working-class movement. In our country this movement is just beginning. Hence, our publicist hastens to conclude—"for a very long time to come"! He has overlooked a trifle: in the West agrarian programmes are written for the purpose of drawing those who are *half-peasants*,

It is not the bringing of the peasant masses into the movement against remnants of serf-ownership that can be called problematic, but perhaps only the *degree* to which they are so brought: serf-owning relationships in the countryside are closely interwoven with bourgeois relationships, and as a class of bourgeois society the peasants (the small farmers) are far more a conservative than a revolutionary element (particularly since in our country the bourgeois evolution of agricultural relationships is only just beginning). That is why, in a period of political reforms, it will be far easier for the government to split the peasants (than, for instance, the workers), far easier for it to weaken (or even, at the worst, to paralyse) their revolutionary spirit by means of minor and insignificant concessions to a comparatively small number of petty proprietors.

All this is true. But what follows from it? The easier it is for the government to come to terms with the conservative elements of the peasantry, the greater must be our efforts, and the sooner we must exert them, to reach agreement with its revolutionary elements. It is our duty to determine with the greatest possible scientific precision the *direction* along which we must support these elements, and then to urge them to wage a resolute and unconditional struggle

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half-workers into the *Social*-Democratic movement against the *bourgeoisie*; while in our country such programmes are meant to draw the peasant *masses* into the *democratic* movement against the *remnants of the serf-owning system*. That is why in the West the significance of the agrarian programme will become all the *greater*, the more agricultural capitalism develops. The practical significance of our agrarian programme will *decrease*, as far as most of its demands are concerned, the *more* agricultural capitalism develops, since the remnants of serf-ownership this programme is directed against are dying out both of themselves and as the result of the government's policy. Our agrarian programme is, therefore, calculated in practice mainly for the immediate future, for the period *preceding* the downfall of the autocracy. A political revolution in Russia will at all events lead inevitably to such fundamental changes in our most backward agrarian system that we shall unfailingly have to revise our agrarian programme. But Martynov is quite sure of only one thing: that Kautsky's book[47] is good (this is warranted), and that it is sufficient to repeat and transcribe Kautsky without bearing in mind how radically different Russia is with regard to the agrarian programme (this is not at all wise).

against all remnants of the serf-owning system, to urge them on at all times and under all circumstances, by all available means. And is it not philistinism to attempt to "prescribe" in advance the *degree of success* that will attend our urging? That will be decided by life and recorded by history; our present job, in any case, is to fight on, and fight to the end. Does a soldier who has already gone into the attack dare argue that we perhaps will wipe out not an entire enemy army corps, but only three-fifths of it? Is not such a demand as, for instance, the demand for a *republic* also "problematic" in the Martynov sense? It will surely be easier for the government to make partial payment on *this* bill than to meet the bill of the peasant demands for the eradication of all traces of the serf-owning system. But what is that to us? We shall, of course, pocket this partial payment, without however calling off our desperate struggle for *full* payment. We must spread the idea far and wide that only in a republic can the decisive battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie take place; we must *create** and consolidate republican traditions among all the Russian revolutionaries and among the broadest possible masses of Russian workers; we should express through this "republic" slogan that we will carry to the end the struggle to democratise the state system, without looking back—and the struggle will itself determine what share of that payment, when and how, we shall succeed in winning. It would be stupid to try to calculate that share before we make the enemy feel the full force of our blows and without ourselves feeling the full force of his blows. Similarly, with regard to the peasant demands, our job is to determine, on the basis of scientific data, the *maximum* of these demands and to help the comrades to fight for this max-

* We say "create", because the old Russian revolutionaries never paid serious attention to the question of a republic, never considering it a "practical" issue—the Narodniks, the rebels, etc., because of their contemptuous anarchist attitude towards politics, those in the Narodnaya Volya[48] because they wanted to leap straight from the autocracy into the socialist revolution. It has fallen to our lot (if we leave out of account the long forgotten republican ideas of the Decembrists) to the lot of the Social-Democrats, to popularise the demand for a republic among the masses and to create republican traditions among the Russian revolutionaries.

imum—and then let the sober legal critics and the illegal "tail-enders", the latter so enamoured of tangible results, laugh at its "problematic" character!*

V

We shall now proceed to the second general proposition, which defines the nature of all our peasant demands and is expressed in the following words: "*...for the purpose of*

* It would perhaps be useful, in discussing the "feasibility" of the demands in the Social-Democratic programme, to recall Karl Kautsky's polemic against Rosa Luxemburg in 1896. Rosa Luxemburg wrote that the demand for Poland's restoration was inappropriate in the Polish Social-Democrats' practical programme, since this demand could not be realised in present-day society. Karl Kautsky took exception to this, saying that this argument was "based on a strange misconception of the essence of a socialist programme. Whether they find direct expression in the programme or are tacitly accepted 'postulates,' our practical demands should be conformed (*werden ... darnach bemessen*), not with their being *achievable* under the given alignment of forces, but with their *compatibility* with the existing social system, and with the consideration whether they can facilitate and further (*fördern*) the proletariat's class struggle, and pave (*ebnen*) for it the way to the political rule of the proletariat. In this, we take no account of the current alignment of forces. The Social-Democratic programme is not written for the given ("*den*") moment—as far as possible, it should cover (*ausreichen*) all eventualities in present-day society. It should serve not only for practical action (*der Action*), but for propaganda as well, in the form of concrete demands, it should indicate, more vividly than abstract arguments can do, the direction in which we intend to advance. The more distant practical aims we can set ourselves without straying into Utopian speculations, the better the direction in which we are advancing will be all the clearer to the masses—even to those who are unable to grasp (*erfassen*) our theoretical premises. The programme should show what we *demand* of existing society or of the existing state, and not what we *expect* of it. As an example, let us take the programme of German Social-Democracy. It demands that officials should be elected by the people. Measured by Miss Luxemburg's standards, this demand is just as Utopian as the demand for the establishment of a Polish national state. No one will be deluded into believing that it is possible to ensure that, under the political conditions obtaining in the German Reich, government officials are elected by the people. With just as good reason as one can assume that a Polish national state is achievable only when the proletariat wins political power, one can assert this concerning the above demand. But is that sufficient ground for not including it in our practical programme?" (*Neue Zeit*, XIV. 2, S. 513 u. 514. All italics are Karl Kautsky's.)

facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside...."

These words are of the utmost importance both for the principled presentation of the agrarian question in general, and for an appraisal of individual agrarian demands in particular. The demand for the eradication of the remnants of the serf-owning system is common to us and to all the consistent liberals, Narodniks, social-reformers, critics of Marxism on the agrarian question, etc., etc. In advancing this demand, we differ from all these gentlemen, not in principle, but only in degree: in this point too they will inevitably remain at all times within the limits of reforms; we, however, will not stop (in the sense indicated above) even at social-revolutionary demands. On the contrary, by demanding that the "free development of the class struggle in the countryside" be ensured, we place ourselves in opposition to all these gentlemen in *principle*, *and even* to all revolutionaries and socialists who are *not* Social-Democrats. These latter will also not stop at social-revolutionary demands in the agrarian question, but they will not wish to subordinate these demands precisely to such a condition as the free development of the class struggle in the countryside. This condition is the fundamental and focal point in the theory of revolutionary Marxism in the sphere of the agrarian question.* To acknowledge this condition means recognising that, despite all its confusion and complexity, despite all the diversity of its forms, the evolution of agriculture is also capitalist evolution, that (like the evolution of industry) it also engenders the proletariat's class struggle against the bourgeoisie, that precisely *this* class struggle must be our prime and fundamental concern, the touchstone for both questions of principle and political tasks, as well as methods of propaganda, agitation, and organisation. To acknowledge this condition means undertaking to abide un-

* In essence all the delusions and fallacies of the "critics" of Marxism on the agrarian question boil down to a failure to understand this very point, and the boldest and most consistent (and to that extent the most honest) of them, Mr. Bulgakov, openly declares in his "survey" that the "doctrine" of the class struggle is quite inapplicable to agricultural relationships. (*Capitalism and Agriculture*, Vol. II, p. 289.)

swervingly by the class viewpoint also in the very painful question of the participation of the small peasants in the Social-Democratic movement, means sacrificing nothing of the proletariat's standpoint in favour of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, but, on the contrary, demanding that the small peasant, who is being oppressed and ruined by all modern capitalism, should desert *his* own class standpoint and place himself at the standpoint of the proletariat.

By setting this condition, we shall resolutely and irrevocably put ourselves apart, not only from *our enemies* (i.e., the direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious supporters of the bourgeoisie, who are our temporary and partial allies in the struggle against the remnants of the serf-owning system), but also from those *unreliable friends* who, because of their mid-course presentation of the agrarian question, can cause (and actually do cause) much harm to the proletariat's revolutionary movement.

By setting this condition, we are providing a guiding principle that will enable any Social-Democrat, even if he finds himself in some out-of-the-way village, even if he is faced with the most tangled web of agrarian relationships which bring *general* democratic tasks into the foreground, to apply and stress his proletarian standpoint when he is tackling those tasks—just as we remain Social-Democrats when we tackle *general*-democratic, political problems.

By setting this condition, we are replying to the objection that many people bring forward after a cursory acquaintance with the concrete demands in our agrarian programme.... "Redemption payments and cut-off lands shall be restituted to the *village communes*"!?—But, then, where is our specifically proletarian complexion and our proletarian independence? Is this not in effect a gift to the rural bourgeoisie??

Of course it is—but only in the sense that the fall of the serf-owning system was itself a "gift to the bourgeoisie", i.e., since it relieved bourgeois, and not some other development, from the fetters and restrictions of the serf-owning system. The proletariat is distinguished from all the other classes oppressed by and opposed to the bourgeoisie for the very reason that it rests its hopes, not on a retardation of bourgeois development, or on any abatement or slackening of the class struggle, but, on the contrary, on the fullest and

freest development of the class struggle, on the acceleration of bourgeois progress.* In a developing capitalist society *it is impossible* to eradicate the remnants of the serf-owning system which hamper its development, in such a way as not to strengthen and fortify the bourgeoisie. To be "baffled" by this is equivalent to repeating the mistake of those socialists who said that we have no need of political liberty since it might strengthen and fortify the rule of the bourgeoisie.

VI

Having examined the "general section" of our agrarian programme, we shall now proceed to analyse its specific demands. We shall take the liberty of beginning not with the first but with the fourth clause (on the cut-off lands), since this is the most important and the central clause, the one that lends a special character to the agrarian programme and is at the same time its most vulnerable point (at any rate, in the view of most of those who voiced their opinions on the article in No. 3 of *Iskra*).

Let us recall that this clause is made up of the following components: 1. It demands the establishment of peasant committees with authority to reorganise agrarian relationships that are direct survivals of the serf-owning system. The expression "peasant committees" has been chosen to make it quite clear that, as distinct from the "Reform" of 1861 with its committees of nobles,[49] the reorganisation of these relationships must rest with the peasants, and not with the landowners. In other words: the final abolition of relationships stemming from the serf-owning system is left, not to the oppressors, but to the section of the population which is oppressed by these relationships; not to the minority, but to the majority of those concerned. In essence, this is nothing but *a democratic revision of the peasant reform* (i.e., the very thing demanded by the first draft programme prepared by

* It stands to reason that the proletariat does not support all measures accelerating bourgeois progress, but only those that tend *directly* to strengthen the capacity of the working class to struggle for its emancipation. And "labour rent" and bondage weigh upon the poor section of the peasantry, which is close to the proletariat, much more heavily than upon the well-to-do section of the peasantry.

the Emancipation of Labour group). And the only reason we have not chosen this latter expression is because it indicates the true nature and concrete substance of this revision less definitely and less expressively. Therefore, if Martynov, for instance, really had some contribution to make on the agrarian question, he should have stated definitely whether he rejects the very idea of a democratic revision of the peasant reform, and if not, then he should have stated just how *he* pictures it.*

Further, 2. The peasant committees are given the right to expropriate and redeem landlords' land, to effect exchanges of land, and so on (Clause 4,b); moreover, this right is limited to cases where there is a direct survival of serf-owning relationships. Specifically (3), the right to expropriate and redeem is granted only with regard to land which, first, was "cut off from the peasants when serfdom was abolished" (since time immemorial this land had been an essential appurtenance of the peasant farm, part and parcel of that farm, and was artificially severed from it by the legalised robbery known as the great Peasant Reform)—and, secondly, is "used by the landlords as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage".

This second condition still more limits the right of redemption and expropriation, extending it, not to all "cut-off lands",

* We note the inconsistency (or is it reservation?) of Nadezhdin, who has apparently adopted *Iskra*'s idea of peasant committees in his outline of the agrarian programme, but formulates this idea most lamely when he says: "The institution of a special court of people's representatives to examine peasant *complaints* and statements with regard to all the transactions attending the 'Emancipation'." (*The Eve of the Revolution*, p. 65. Italics mine.) One can *complain* only about a *breach* of the law. The "Emancipation" of February 19, with all its "transactions", itself constitutes a *law*. The establishment of special courts to examine complaints about the injustice of a given law is senseless until that law is repealed, or new legislative standards have been set up to replace this law (or to annul it in part). The "court" should be invested not only with the right to receive "complaints" about lands cut off from pastures but also the right to return (*resp.* redeem, etc.) that pasture land—but in that case, first, a "court" authorised to make laws would no longer be a court; secondly, it is necessary to indicate definitely just what rights of expropriation, redemption, etc., this "court" would have. But however inapt Nadezhdin's formulation may be, he has grasped the need for a democratic revision of the Peasant Reform much better than Martynov has.

but only to such that to this day remain instruments of bondage and "by means of which", as *Iskra* has formulated it, "forced labour, bondage, the corvée system, i.e., in actual fact the very same serf labour, *is still maintained*". In other words, wherever the half-hearted nature of our Peasant Reform has led to serf-owning forms of farming surviving to this day, with the aid of land cut off from the peasants' lands, the peasants are given the right to do away with these survivals once and for all, even by means of expropriation, the right to the "*restitution of the cut-off lands*".

We can therefore reassure our kind-hearted Martynov, who has asked with such alarm: "What should be done about those cut-off lands in the possession of the nobility or purchasers of non-noble origin, which are now being cultivated along model, capitalist lines?" It is not a question of these particular cut-off lands, my worthy friend, but rather of those typical (and extremely numerous) cut-off lands which to this very day serve as a basis for still existing remnants of the serf-owning system.

Finally, 4. Clause 4, b, empowers the peasant committees to eradicate remnants of serf-owning system which still survive in certain parts of the country (servitude, uncompleted allotment of land, its demarcation, and so forth and so on).

Hence, for the sake of simplicity, the entire content of Clause 4 may be briefly expressed as "restitution of the cut-off lands". The question arises: how did the idea of this demand originate? It arose as the direct outcome of the general and fundamental proposition that we must assist the peasants and urge them to destroy all remnants of the serf-owning system as completely as possible. This meets with "general approval", doesn't it? Well then, if you do agree to follow this road, make an effort to proceed along it independently; don't make it necessary to drag you; don't let the "unusual" appearance of this road frighten you, don't be put out by the fact that in many places you will find no beaten track at all, and that you will have to crawl along the edge of precipices, break your way through thickets, and leap across chasms. Don't complain of the poor road: these complaints will be futile whining, for you should have known in advance that you would be moving, not along a highway

that has been graded and levelled by all the forces of social progress, but along paths through out-of-the-way places and back-alleys which do have a way out, but from which you, we or anyone else will never find a direct, simple, and easy way out—"never", i.e., whilst these disappearing, but so slowly disappearing, out-of-the-way places and back-alleys continue to exist.

But if you do not want to stray into these back-alleys, then say so frankly and don't try to get away by phrase-mongering.*

You agree to fight for the abolition of the remnants of the serf-owning system? Very well. Remember, however, that *there does not exist* a single juridical institution to express or stipulate these remnants—I am of course speaking of those remnants exclusively in the sphere of the agrarian relationships that we are discussing now, and not in the sphere of legislation relating to the social-estates, financial affairs, etc. Direct survivals of the corvée system, recorded times without number in all the economic surveys of Russia, are maintained, not by any special law which protects them, but by the actually existing land relationships. This is so to such an extent that witnesses testifying before the well-known Valuyev Commission[50] openly stated that serf-ownership would undoubtedly have been revived had it not been

* For instance, Martynov levels a charge of "phrase-mongering" against *Iskra*, which has given him both the general principles of its agrarian policy ("the introduction of the class struggle into the countryside") and a practical answer to the question of concrete programme demands. Without replacing these general principles with any others, without giving even the slightest thought to these principles, or making any attempt to draw up a definite programme, Martynov dismisses the whole matter with the following grandiloquent words: "...We must demand their [the peasants' as petty proprietors] protection ... against various obsolete forms of economic bondage...." Isn't that getting off rather cheaply? Couldn't you try to point out to us *at least one* protective measure *against at least one* (let alone "various"!) obsolete form of bondage? (Evidently there are also "forms of bondage" that are not obsolete!!) After all, the small credit associations, the amalgamated dairies, the mutual aid societies, the associations of small farmers the peasant banks, and the Zemstvo agronomists are likewise all "protective measures against various obsolete forms of economic bondage". Does it follow that you propose that "we must demand" all this?? You had better do some thinking first, my good friend, and then speak of programmes!

directly prohibited by law. Hence, one of two things: either you refrain altogether from touching upon the land relationships between the peasants and the landlords—in which case all the remaining questions are solved very "simply", but then you will also be ignoring the main source of all the survivals of serf-owning economy in the countryside, and will "simply" be avoiding a burning question bearing on the most vital interests of the feudal landlords and the enslaved peasantry, a question which tomorrow or the day after may easily become one of the most pressing social and political issues in Russia. Or else you want also to touch upon the source of the "obsolete forms of economic bondage" represented by the land relationships—in which case you must reckon with the fact that these relationships are so complex and entangled that they do not actually permit of any easy or simple solution. Then, if you are not satisfied with the concrete solutions we have proposed for this complex question, you no longer *have the right* to get away with a general "complaint" about its complexity, but *must* attempt to cope with it independently, and propose some other concrete solution.

The importance of the cut-off lands in present-day peasant farming is a question of reality. And it is noteworthy that deep as the gulf is between Narodism (in the broad sense of the word) and Marxism in the appraisal of the economic system and the economic evolution of Russia, the two doctrines have no divergence on *this* question. Representatives of both trends are agreed that the Russian countryside is teeming with remnants of serf-ownership and (*nota bene*) that the predominant mode of private farming in the central gubernias of Russia (the "labour-rent system of farming") is a direct survival of the serf-owning system. They are agreed furthermore that the cutting-off of peasant land in favour of the landlords—i.e., both the cutting-off in the downright literal sense and the depriving of the peasants of the right to use common lands as pasturage, the right to use woodlands, watering places, grazing grounds, and so forth—constitutes one of the mainstays (*if not the mainstay*) of the labour-rent system. It will suffice to recall that, according to the most recent data, the labour-rent system of landlord farming *predominates in no less than 17 gubernias of European Russia*. Let those who regard the clause on the cut-off

lands as a purely artificial, "laboured" and wily invention try to dispute this fact!

Here is what the labour-rent system of farming means. In actual fact, i.e., not according to ownership but according to economic utilisation, the landlords' and the peasants' lands have not been divided up completely, but remain merged; part of the peasants' land, for example, feeds cattle required for the cultivation not of the peasants' land but of the landlords' land; part of the landlords' land is absolutely indispensable to the neighbouring peasant farm as it is run at present (watering places, grazing grounds, etc.). This actual interlinking of land tenures *inevitably* engenders the same (or, more precisely, preserves the thousand-year-old) relationships between muzhik and landlord that existed under the serf-owning system. The muzhik remains a serf *de facto*, working with the same antiquated implements, on the basis of the old three-field system, for the same old "lord of the manor". What else do you want, if the peasants themselves everywhere bluntly call this labour rent "*panshchina*" and "*barshchina*",* if the landlords themselves say when they describe their farms: my land is worked by "my former..." (that is, not only former, but present as well!) "...peasants" with their own implements in exchange for the use of my pasture land?

Whenever it becomes necessary to solve any complex and entangled social and economic problem, it is an elementary rule that one should take the most typical case to begin with, the case that is freest of all extraneous complicating influences and circumstances, and use the solution reached in this case as a premise for further procedure, while taking stock of these extraneous and complicating circumstances, one by one. Take a case that is most "typical" in this respect: the children of the former serfs are working for the sons of the former serf-owners to pay for the use of the latter's pasture lands. Labour rent makes for stagnation in cultivation techniques and for stagnation in *all* social and economic relationships in the countryside, since this labour rent hampers the development of money economy and the

* *Panshchina* and *barshchina* are two equivalent terms, with roughly the meaning of the corvée system.—*Ed.*

differentiation of the peasantry, disembarrasses the landlord (comparatively) of the stimulus of competition (instead of raising the technical level, he reduces the share of the sharecropper; incidentally, this reduction has been recorded in a number of localities for many years of the post-Reform period), ties the peasant to the land, thereby checking the progress of migration, outside employment, etc.

The question arises whether any Social-Democrat will doubt that in this "pure" case the expropriation of the corresponding part of the landlords' land in favour of the peasants is wholly natural, desirable, and achievable. This expropriation will rouse Oblomov[51] from his slumber and force him to introduce more advanced methods of farming on his smaller estate; this expropriation will undermine (I will not say destroy, but precisely undermine) the labour-rent system, encourage the spirit of independence and democracy among the peasantry, raise their standard of living, and give a powerful impulse to the further development of money economy and capitalist progress in agriculture.

And in general: once it is generally acknowledged that the cut-off lands are one of the principal roots of the labour-rent system—and this system is a direct survival of serf-ownership which retards the development of capitalism—how can one doubt that the restitution of the cut-off lands will undermine the labour-rent system and accelerate social and economic progress?

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VII

There are nevertheless very many who have doubted this, and we shall now proceed to consider the arguments advanced by the doubters. All these arguments may be classified in the following groups: a) Is the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands consistent with the basic theoretical principles of Marxism and with the principles of the Social-Democratic programme? b) Is it wise, from the viewpoint of political expedience, to advance the demand for redressing a historical injustice, the significance of which is diminishing with every step in economic development? c) Can this demand be realised in practice? d) Admitting that we

can and must advance such a demand and include in our agrarian programme not the minimum but the maximum, is the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands consistent from this point of view? Is such a demand actually a maximum?

As far as I can judge, *all* objections "against the cut-off lands" fit into one or another of these four groups; moreover, most of the objectors (including Martynov) have answered all four questions in the negative, considering the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands wrong in principle, politically inexpedient, practically unattainable, and logically inconsistent.

Let us consider all these questions in their order of importance.

a) The demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands is considered wrong in principle for two reasons. In the first place, we are told that it will "affect" capitalist agriculture, i.e., hold up or delay the development of capitalism; in the second place, we are told that it will not only fortify but actually multiply small property. The first of these arguments (particularly emphasised by Martynov) is absolutely untenable, because, on the contrary, typical cut-off lands retard the development of capitalism, and their restitution will stimulate this development; as for non-typical cases (quite apart from the fact that exceptions are always and everywhere possible and only go to prove the rule), a reservation was made both in *Iskra* and in the programme ("...the land cut off ... and now used as a means of bondage..."). This objection is due simply to ignorance of the real importance of the cut-off lands and labour rent in the economy of the Russian countryside.

The second argument (which was developed in particular detail in several private letters) is much more serious and is in general the strongest argument against the programme we are defending. Generally speaking, it is not at all the task of the Social-Democrats to develop, support, consolidate, let alone, multiply, small-scale farming and small property. That is quite true. But the point is that what confronts us here is not a "general" but an *exceptional* case of small-scale farming, and this exceptional character *is clearly expressed* in the preamble to our agrarian programme: "the destruc-

tion of the remnants of the serf-owning system and the free development of the class struggle in the countryside." *Generally* speaking, it is reactionary to support small property *because* such support is directed against large-scale *capitalist* economy and, consequently, retards social development, and obscures and glosses over the class struggle. In this case, however, we want to support small property not against capitalism but against serf-ownership; in this case, by supporting the small peasantry, we give a powerful impulse to the development of the class struggle. Indeed, on the one hand, we are thus making a *last* attempt to fan the embers of the peasants' class (social-estate) enmity for the feudal-minded landlords. On the other hand, we are clearing the way for the development of the bourgeois class antagonism in the countryside, because that antagonism is at present *masked* by what is supposedly the common and equal oppression of all the peasants by the remnants of the serf-owning system.

There are two sides to all things in the world. In the West, the peasant proprietor has already played his part in the democratic movement, and is now defending his position of privilege as compared with the proletariat. In Russia, the peasant proprietor is as yet on the eve of a decisive and nation-wide democratic movement with which he cannot but sympathise. He still looks ahead more than he looks back. He is still more of a fighter against the privileges of the former serf-owners as a social-estate, privileges which are still so strong in Russia, than a defender of his own privileged position. In a historic moment *like the present*, it is our direct duty to support the peasants and to try to direct their as yet vague and blind discontent against their real enemy. And we shall not be in the least contradicting ourselves if we delete from our programme the struggle against the remnants of the serf-owning system in the subsequent historical period when the special features of the present social and political "juncture" will have disappeared, when the peasants, let us suppose, will have been satisfied by insignificant concessions made to an insignificant number of property-owners and begin definitely to "snarl" at the proletariat. Then, we shall probably also have to delete from our programme the struggle against the autocracy, for it is quite inconceivable that the peasants will succeed in ridding them-

selves of the most repulsive and grievous form of feudal oppression *before* political liberty has been attained.

Under the capitalist system of economy, small property retards the development of the productive forces by tying the worker to a small plot of land, by legalising old-fashioned techniques, and by making it difficult to bring land into the trade turnover. Where the labour-rent system predominates, small landed property, by ridding itself of labour rent, stimulates the development of the productive forces, releases the peasant from the bondage that tied him down to one particular place, relieves the landlord of "gratuitous" servants, makes it impossible for him to prefer unlimited intensification of "patriarchal" exploitation to technical improvements, and facilitates land being brought into the trade turnover. In a word, the contradictory position of the small peasant on the boundary between serf economy and capitalist economy fully justifies this exceptional and temporary support of small property by the Social-Democrats. We repeat: this is not a contradiction in the wording or in the formulation of our programme, but a contradiction in real life.

It may be argued: "However slowly the labour-rent farming may be yielding to the pressure of capitalism, still it is yielding; it is, moreover, doomed to disappear completely; large-scale labour-rent farming is giving way to, and will be directly replaced by, large-scale capitalist farming. What you want is to accelerate the elimination of serf-owning by a measure which in essence amounts to the splitting-up (partial, but nevertheless splitting-up) of large-scale farms. Are you not thereby sacrificing the interests of the future for the interests of the present? For the sake of the problematic possibility of a peasant revolt against serf-owning in the immediate future, you are placing obstacles in the way of a revolt of the agricultural proletariat against capitalism in the more or less distant future!"

This argument, however convincing it may seem at first glance, is very one-sided: in the first place, the small peasantry is also yielding—slowly no doubt, but nevertheless yielding—to the pressure of capitalism, and is likewise ultimately doomed to inevitable elimination; in the second place, large-scale labour-rent farming too is not always "directly" replaced by large-scale capitalist farming; it quite often gives

rise to a section of semi-dependent peasants—semi-farm labourers, semi-proprietors. And yet, such a revolutionary measure as the restitution of the cut-off lands would render a tremendous service precisely by substituting, at least once, the "method" of open revolutionary transformation for the "method" of gradual and imperceptible transformation of serf dependence into bourgeois dependence: this *could not fail to exert the profoundest influence* on the spirit of protest and the independent struggle of the entire rural working population. In the third place, we, Russian Social-Democrats, will also try to make use of the experience of Europe, and begin to attract the "country folk" to the socialist working-class movement at a much earlier stage and much more zealously than was done by our Western comrades, who after the conquest of political liberty, continued for a long time to "grope" for the road the industrial workers' movement should follow: in this sphere we shall take much that is ready-made "from the Germans", but in the agrarian sphere we may perhaps evolve something new. And in order to facilitate for our farm labourers and semi-farm labourers the subsequent transition to socialism, it is highly important that the socialist party begin to "stand up" *at once* for the small peasants, and do "everything possible" for them, never refusing a hand in solving the urgent and complex "alien" (non-proletarian) problems, and helping the working and exploited masses to regard the socialist party as their leader and representative.

To proceed. b) The demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands is considered politically inexpedient, since, it is argued, it is imprudent to switch the attention of the Party from the fundamental and imminent issue of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie over to the redressing of all sorts of historical injustices, which are already beginning to lose immediate significance. As Martynov sarcastically puts it, this amounts to "re-emancipating the peasants forty years too late".

This argument too appears plausible, but only at first glance. Historical injustices are of different kinds. There are such which, as it were, keep aloof from the mainstream of history, do not check that stream or hinder its course, and do not prevent the proletarian class struggle from extending and

from striking deeper roots. It would certainly be unwise to try to redress historical injustices of this kind. As an example, we shall mention the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. No Social-Democratic party would think of including in its programme the redress of a wrong of *this* kind, although, on the other hand, not one would shirk its duty of protesting against this injustice and of condemning all the ruling classes for having perpetrated it. If we had motivated our demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands only on the ground that an injustice had been committed and should be redressed, that would have been no more than a hollow democratic phrase. However, we do not make any plaint over a historical injustice the motivation of our demand, but rather the need to abolish the remnants of the serf-owning system and to clear the road for the class struggle in the countryside, i.e., a very "practical" and very pressing need for the proletariat.

We have here an example of a *different* kind of historical injustice, one which still *directly retards* social development and the class struggle. A refusal to attempt to redress historical injustices of *this* kind would mean "defending the knout on the ground that it is a historical knout". The problem of freeing our countryside from the burden of the remnants of the "old regime" is one of the most urgent questions of the day, one that is put forward by all trends and parties (except that of the former serf-owners), so that the reference to our being late is pointless in general and simply ludicrous when voiced by Martynov. It is the Russian bourgeoisie who were "late" with what is really *their* task of sweeping away all the remnants of the old regime, and we must and shall rectify this omission until it has been rectified, until we have won political liberty, as long as the position of the peasants continues to foster dissatisfaction among practically the whole of educated bourgeois society (as is the case in Russia), instead of fostering a feeling of conservative self-satisfaction among it on account of the "indestructibility" of what is supposed to be the strongest bulwark against socialism (as is the case in the West where this self-satisfaction is displayed by all the parties of Order, ranging from the Agrarians and Conservatives *pur sang*, through the liberal and free-thinking bourgeois, to even as far—without offence to Messrs. the Chernovs and the *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*!—to

even as far as the fashionable "critics of Marxism" in the agrarian question). Then, of course, those Russian Social-Democrats who trail along in the rear of the movement as a matter of principle, and who are concerned only with questions "promising palpable results", were also "late", and, because they were late in giving definite directives on the agrarian question as well, these "tail-enders" have succeeded only in providing the non-Social-Democratic revolutionary trends with a highly potent and reliable weapon.

As for c) the practical "infeasibility" of the demand that the cut-off lands should be restituted, this objection (which has been particularly stressed by Martynov) is of the feeblest. In conditions of political liberty, the question of determining in which concrete cases expropriation, redemption, exchange, demarcation, etc., should be carried out and exactly how this should be done would be solved by the peasant committees ten times more easily than by the committees of nobles, which consisted of representatives of a minority and acted in the interests of that minority. Only those who are used to underestimating the revolutionary activity of the masses can attach any importance to this objection.

At this point the fourth and last objection is raised. If we are to count on the revolutionary activity of the peasants and offer them a maximum and not a minimum programme, we must be consistent and demand either a peasant "General Redistribution"[52] or bourgeois nationalisation of the land! "If," writes Martynov, "we wanted to find a genuine (*sic!*) class slogan for the mass of the small peasantry, we should have to go further and advance the demand for a 'General Redistribution', but then we should have to part with the Social-Democratic programme."

This reasoning betrays the "economist" most strikingly, and reminds us of the saying about those who, if they are compelled to pray, do it with such zeal that they bang their foreheads against the ground.

You have pronounced yourselves in favour of *one* of the demands which satisfy *certain* interests of a certain section of the small producers: *hence it follows* that you must desert your own standpoint and adopt the standpoint of that section!! Nothing of the sort follows; only "tail-enders", who confuse the drawing-up of a programme conforming

to a class's broadly conceived interests with subservience to that class, can reason in this way. Although we represent the proletariat, we will nevertheless condemn outright the prejudiced idea of backward proletarians that one must fight only for demands "promising palpable results". While supporting the progressive interests and demands of the peasants, we will decisively reject their reactionary demands. The "General Redistribution", one of the most outstanding slogans of the old Narodniks, represents a combination of just such revolutionary and reactionary features. The Social-Democrats have stated dozens of times that they do not at all discard the whole of Narodism, with the forthrightness of a certain foolish bird, but select and take for their own its revolutionary and general democratic elements. The demand for "General Redistribution" contains the reactionary Utopian idea of generalising and perpetuating small-scale peasant production, but it also contains (in addition to the Utopian idea that the "peasantry" can serve as the vehicle of the *socialist* revolution) a revolutionary element, namely, the desire to sweep away by means of a peasant revolt all the remnants of the serf-owning system. In our opinion, the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands singles out from all the peasant's two-way and contradictory demands precisely that which can have a revolutionary effect only in the direction along which society's entire development is proceeding, and consequently deserves the proletariat's support. In actual fact, Martynov's invitation to "go further" only lands us in the absurd position of having to define the "*genuine*" class slogan of the peasantry from the standpoint of the *existing* prejudices of the peasantry, and not from that of the *properly understood* interests of the proletariat.

Nationalisation of the land is a different matter. This demand (if it is interpreted in the bourgeois sense, and not in the socialist) does actually "go further" than the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands, and in principle we fully endorse it. It goes without saying that, when the revolutionary moment comes, we shall not fail to advance it. But our present programme is being drawn up, not only for the period of revolutionary insurrection, not even so much for that period, as for the period of political slavery, for the

period that precedes political liberty. However, in this period the demand for the nationalisation of the land is *much less* expressive of the immediate tasks of the democratic movement in the meaning of a struggle against the serf-owning system. The demand for the establishment of peasant committees and for the restitution of the cut-off lands kindles this class struggle in the countryside directly and, consequently, cannot give occasion for any experiments in state socialism. The demand for the nationalisation of the land, on the other hand, to a certain extent diverts attention from the most striking manifestations and most outstanding survivals of serf-ownership. That is why our agrarian programme can and must be advanced at once as a means of stimulating the democratic movement among the peasants. However, to advance the demand for nationalisation of the land under the autocracy or even under a semi-constitutional monarchy would be quite wrong. For, while we lack firmly established and deep-rooted democratic political institutions, this demand will be much more likely to distract our minds towards absurd experiments in state socialism than to provide a stimulus "for the free development of the class struggle in the countryside".*

That is why we think that, on the basis of the present social system, the maximum demand in our agrarian programme should not go beyond the democratic revision of the Peasant Reform. The demand for nationalisation of the land, while quite valid in principle and quite suitable at certain moments, is politically inexpedient at the present moment.

It is interesting to note that, in his desire to reach just such a maximum as nationalisation of the land, Nadezhdin has gone astray (partly owing to his decision to confine himself in the programme "to demands which the muzhik understands and needs"). Nadezhdin formulates the demand for nationalisation of the land as follows: "the conversion of

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* Kautsky very rightly remarked in one of his articles against Vollmar: "In Britain the advanced workers may demand nationalisation of the land. But what would be the outcome if, in a militarist and police state like Germany, all the land became state property (*eine Domäne*)? This sort of state socialism has been realised, at least, to a considerable degree, in Mecklenburg." ("*Vollmar und der Staatssozialismus*", *Neue Zeit*, 1891-92, X. 2, S. 710.)

state, royal, church, and landlords' lands into public property, into a national fund to be allocated to the working peasantry on long-term leases and on the most advantageous terms." The "muzhik" will, no doubt, understand this demand, but the Social-Democrat will probably not. The demand for nationalisation of the land is a demand of the Social-Democrat programme which is valid in principle only as a bourgeois and not as a socialist measure, for, as socialists, we demand the nationalisation of *all* the means of production. So long as we remain on the basis of bourgeois society we can demand only the transfer of ground rent to the state—a transfer which in itself far from retarding would accelerate the capitalist evolution of agriculture. It follows that, in the first place, a Social-Democrat, while supporting bourgeois nationalisation of the land, must by no means exclude the peasants' land, as Nadezhdin has done. If we preserve a *private* system of economy on the land, merely abolishing private ownership of land, it would be utterly reactionary to exclude the small proprietor *in this connection*. In the second place, if *such* nationalisation took place, a Social-Democrat would resolutely oppose the leasing of national land "to the working peasantry" in preference to the agrarian capitalists. This preference would also be reactionary, given domination or preservation of the capitalist mode of production. If a democratic country undertook to carry out bourgeois nationalisation of the land, it would be the duty of that country's proletariat to show no preference either for small or big leaseholders, but to demand unconditionally that *every* leaseholder observe the labour protection laws (on the maximum working day, health regulations, etc., etc.) and the laws governing rational cultivation of the land and care of livestock. In practice, the proletariat's adoption of such a policy in the event of bourgeois nationalisation would of course be tantamount to hastening the victory of large-scale production over small-scale (in the same way as factory legislation speeds up that victory in industry).

The desire to be "understood by the muzhik" at all costs has driven Nadezhdin into the jungle of a reactionary petty-bourgeois Utopia.*

* As for Nadezhdin, he has in our opinion acted very inconsistently by demanding, in his outline of an agrarian programme, the conver-

Thus, an analysis of objections to the demand for restitution of the cut-off lands convinces us that these objections are groundless. We must put forward the demand for the democratic revision of the Peasant Reform, or, to be precise, for the revision of the agrarian reforms contained in it. To determine the precise character, limits, and manner of carrying out this revision, we must demand the establishment of peasant committees which shall have the right to expropriate, redeem, exchange, etc., those cut-off lands in which survivals of the serf-owning system of economy are rooted.

VIII

The fifth clause in our draft agrarian programme is closely bound up with the fourth. Clause 5 demands "empowerment of courts to reduce exorbitant rents and declare null and void all contracts entailing bondage". Like Clause 4, it is directed against bondage; unlike Clause 4 it demands, not a single act of revision and reform of the agrarian system, but constant revision of civic rights. *This* is entrusted to the "courts", meaning, of course, not those miserable parodies of courts which form the "institute" of rural superintendents[54] (or even the Justices of the Peace, who are elected by the propertied classes from among property holders), but those courts referred to in § 16 of the preceding section of our draft programme. This § 16 demands that "industrial courts be set up in all branches of the national economy..." (hence in agriculture as well) "...with equal representation of workers and employers". Such composition of the courts would be a guarantee both of their democratic nature and free expression of the different class interests of the various sections of the rural population. Class antagonism would not be covered up with the fig-

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sion into "public property" of all kinds of land, *except peasants' land*, and allocations from a "national (land) fund" for "long-term leases *to the working peasantry*". In the first place, a Social-Democrat could not exclude peasant holdings from the general nationalisation of the land. Secondly, he would advocate nationalisation of the land only as a transition to large-scale communist, and not small individual, farming. Nadezhdin's mistake is probably due to his decision to limit the programme to "demands which the muzhik *understands* (italics mine) and needs".[53]

leaf of rotten bureaucratism—that whited sepulchre for the remains of popular liberties—but would stand out openly and clearly to the general view, thereby rousing the country folk from their patriarchal slumber. The election of judges from among the local inhabitants would guarantee their being familiar with agrarian life in general and its local features in particular. For the masses of the peasants, who could not come under the heading of "workers" or "employers", special rules would naturally be established to ensure equal representation of all elements of the rural population. Moreover, we, Social-Democrats, would categorically insist under all circumstances, first, on *separate* representation for the agricultural wage-workers, however few they may be, and, secondly, that economically weak peasants and prosperous peasants should if possible be represented separately (for confusion of these two categories, not only results in false statistics, but leads to the oppression and constraint of the former by the latter in all fields of life).

The competence of these courts would be twofold: firstly, they would be empowered to *reduce* rents where they are "exorbitant". This very wording in the programme recognises in oblique fashion how widespread this phenomenon is. The fact that the question of the level of rent would be examined by courts in open session and with both parties represented would be of enormous benefit, irrespective of what the court might decide. Reductions of rent (even though these reductions might be infrequent) would play their part in removing the remnants of serf-ownership: it is well known that in our countryside rent is more often of a serf-owning than a bourgeois nature; it is much more "money" rent (i.e., a modified form of feudal rent) than capitalist rent (i.e., the surplus over and above the profit of the employer). Reductions of rent would therefore directly help to replace serf-owning forms of farming by capitalist forms.

Secondly, the courts would be empowered "to declare null and void all contracts entailing bondage". The meaning of "bondage" is not defined here, since it would be wholly undesirable to hamper the elected judges in the application of this clause. The Russian muzhik knows only too well what bondage is! From the scientific standpoint this concept covers all contracts which entail elements of *usury* (winter

hiring, etc.) or *serfdom* (labour rent for damage done by straying cattle, etc.).

Clause 3, on the restitution of redemption payments to the people, is of a somewhat different nature. Here the doubts that Clause 4 evokes on the score of small property do not arise. On the other hand, the objectors point to both the practical infeasibility of this demand and the absence of a logical connection between this clause and the general section of our agrarian programme (="the eradication of the remnants of the serf-owning system and the free development of the class struggle in the countryside"). Nevertheless, no one will deny that it is precisely the remnants of the serf-owning system that in their aggregate are the cause of the constant famines which affect millions of peasants and at once set Russia apart from all civilised nations. Even the autocracy has therefore been obliged more and more frequently to institute a special fund (utterly trifling, of course, and going more to line the pockets of embezzlers of state property and bureaucrats than for the relief of the famine-stricken) "for the cultural and charitable needs of the village communes". We, too, cannot but demand, among other democratic reforms, that such a fund be established. That can scarcely be disputed.

The question now arises, from what source should the sum required for this fund be obtained? So far as we can judge, a progressive income-tax might be suggested to us: the rates of taxation on the incomes of the rich should be raised for the purpose, and the sums obtained thereby used for this fund. It would be only fair for the country's wealthiest citizens to contribute most for the maintenance of the famine-stricken and for expenditures on the greatest possible alleviation of calamities caused by famines. We would have nothing against such a measure either, which need not be specially mentioned in the programme since it is fully covered by the demand for a progressive income-tax, which is a separate item in the programme. But why confine oneself to this source? Why not try, in addition, to return to the people at least part of the tribute which yesterday's slave-owners extracted, and are still extracting, from the peasants with the assistance of the police state? Is not this tribute most closely bound up with the *present-day* famines? And would not the demand to return this tribute render us the

greatest service in spreading and intensifying the revolutionary indignation of the peasants against all feudal landlords and against bondage of every kind?

But, then—the objection is raised—this tribute *cannot* be returned in full. Quite so (just as the cut-off lands cannot be restituted in full). But if one cannot get the whole debt back, why not take part of it? What objection can there be to a special land-tax on the big landed nobility who received land redemption loans? The number of such owners of latifundia (which occasionally even become entailed estates) is quite considerable in Russia, and it would be only fair to make them bear a special responsibility for famines among the peasantry. It will be even fairer to confiscate in full monasterial property and royal demesnes, as property most thoroughly steeped in traditions of serf-ownership and serving to enrich the most reactionary and socially most harmful drones, and at the same time to withdraw no small amount of land from civil and commercial circulation. Confiscation of such estates would therefore be wholly in the interests of all social development*; it would be precisely the sort of partial bourgeois nationalisation of the land that could under no circumstances lead to the hocus-pocus of "state socialism". It would be of direct and enormous political importance in strengthening the democratic institutions of the *new* Russia; and at the same time it would also provide additional funds for famine relief.

IX

Finally, as to the first two clauses of our agrarian programme, there is no need to dwell on them at length. "Abolition of land redemption and quit-rent payments, as well as of all services now imposed on the peasantry as a taxable social-estate" (Clause 1) is something that is self-evident to every Social-Democrat. Moreover, no doubts arise as to the practical feasibility of this measure, so far as we can judge. The second clause demands "annulment of collective liability and

* With regard to the leasing of these confiscated estates, the Social-Democrats should by no means pursue a specifically peasant policy, but should at once pursue the policy outlined by us above in our objections to Nadezhdin.

of all laws restricting the peasant...” (note: “peasant” and not “peasants”) “...in the free disposal of his land”. Here we must say a few words about the much-vaunted and memorable “*village commune*”. Actually, of course, the annulment of collective liability (Mr. Witte may manage to put this particular reform through before the revolution), the abolition of division into social-estates, freedom of movement, and the right for each individual peasant freely to dispose of his land will rapidly and inevitably bring about the removal of the burden of taxation and serf-bondage that the land commune to a three-fourths extent constitutes at the present time. But this result will only prove the correctness of our views on the village commune, prove how incompatible it is with the entire social and economic development of capitalism. The result will by no means follow from any particular measure recommended by us “against the village commune”, for we never have supported and never shall support *a single measure* aimed directly against this or that system of peasant land tenure. Moreover, we shall unreservedly defend the village commune as a democratic organisation of local government, as a co-operative or a neighbours’ association, against all encroachments on the part of the bureaucrats—encroachments which find such favour with opponents of the village commune in the camp of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*.[55] We shall never help any one to “destroy the village commune”, but we shall strive absolutely for the abolition of all institutions that run counter to democracy, *irrespective of the effect of this abolition on the basic or partial reallotment of the land*, *etc.*; that is where we differ fundamentally from the Narodniks—overt and covert, consistent and inconsistent, timid and bold—who, on the one hand, are “of course” democrats, and on the other, fear to resolutely and unequivocally define their attitude towards such elementary democratic demands as full freedom of movement, *complete* abolition of the social-estate nature of the peasant commune, and, *consequently*, utter annulment of collective liability, and abolition of all laws restricting the peasant in the free disposal of his land.*

* This is the touchstone we should apply to the numerous radicals in Russia (and even revolutionaries, of *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*) who in this question are inclined to sit between two stools.

The objection may be raised that, by sanctifying the individual will of each particular peasant, the latter measure will destroy the village commune, not only as a system of land reallotment, etc., but outright, even as a co-operative neighbours' association. Each individual peasant will have the right to demand, despite the will of the majority, that his land be allotted to him as a separate plot. Does this not run counter to the general tendency of all socialists to further the extension rather than the restriction of the right of the collective body over the individual?

To this we reply that it does not at all follow from our formulation that every peasant must necessarily demand that a separate plot of land be allotted to him. What does follow is only liberty to sell the land; moreover, the preferential right of the commune members to purchase land that is being sold does not run counter to this liberty. The annulment of collective liability would turn all members of the peasant commune into free co-owners of a certain plot of land; as to what else they will then make of this plot, that is their business and will depend on common civil law and on whatever special agreements they enter into among themselves. With regard to extending the right of the collective body over the individual, such extension is upheld by the socialists only when it is in the interests of technical and social progress.* In this form, naturally, we too would uphold any appropriate law if only it referred not just to the small property-owners alone, or just to the peasants alone, but in general to *all* those who own land.

X

In conclusion, let us sum up the fundamental principles on which our agrarian programme is based. Anyone who has had occasion to engage in drawing up programmes or enter

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* Kautsky, for instance, considers it correct to demand "the restriction of the rights of private property in land in the interests of 1) demarcation of land holdings, abolishing strip-farming, 2) raising standards of agriculture, 3) preventing epidemics" (*Die Agrarfrage*, S. 437). Demands of this sort, which are fully justified, are not and should not be connected in any way with the peasant commune.

into the details of their drafting in other countries knows that one and the same thought can be formulated in the most diverse ways. What we hold important is that all the comrades to whom we are now submitting our draft for consideration should reach common ground, first and foremost, on the fundamental principles. Then this or that specific feature in the formulation will not be of decisive importance.

We hold that the class struggle is the main factor also in the sphere of agrarian relationships in Russia. We base our entire agrarian policy (and, consequently, our agrarian programme as well) on unswerving recognition of this fact along with all consequences resulting from it. Our principal immediate aim is to clear the way for the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the class struggle of the proletariat, which is directed towards attainment of the ultimate aim of the international Social-Democratic movement, the conquest of political power by the proletariat, and the laying of the foundations of a socialist society. By declaring the class struggle our guiding line in all "agrarian questions", we resolutely and for all time dissociate ourselves from adherents, so numerous in Russia, of half-hearted and nebulous theories, such as "Narodnik", "ethico-sociological", "critical", social-reformist, and whatever else they may be called!

To clear the way for the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, it is necessary to remove all remnants of serfdom, which now *overlie* the beginnings of capitalist antagonisms among the rural population, and keep them from developing. And we are making a *final* attempt to help the peasantry sweep away all these remnants at a single decisive blow—"final" because developing Russian capitalism is itself spontaneously doing the very same work, is making for the very same goal, but making for it along its own peculiar road of violence and oppression, ruin and starvation. The transition from exploitation by the serf-owners to capitalist exploitation is inevitable, and it would be a harmful and reactionary illusion to attempt to hold it back or to "get round" it. But this transition is also conceivable in the form of the forcible overthrow of those heirs of the serf-owners who, relying on the tradition of the former power of the slaveowner, rather than on the "power of money", are sucking the last

drops of blood from the patriarchal peasantry. This patriarchal peasantry, which lives under a system of natural economy by the labour of its hands, is doomed to disappear, but there is no "necessity" or any "immanent" law of social and economic evolution that dooms it to endure the torment of being "ground down by taxes", of floggings, or a long-drawn out, horribly protracted death by starvation.

And so, without harbouring any illusions about it being possible for the small producers to thrive or even to lead a tolerable existence in a capitalist society (such as Russia is becoming to a greater and greater extent), we demand the complete and unconditional revolutionary and not reformative annulment and eradication of the survivals of serf-ownership; we hold that the lands which the government of the nobility cut off from the peasantry and which to this day still serve to keep the peasants in virtual bondage are peasants' lands. Thus, we take our stand—by way of exception and by reason of the specific historical circumstances—as defenders of small property; but we defend it only in its struggle against what has come down from the "old order", and only on condition that those institutions be abolished which retard the transformation of the patriarchal Oblomov villages,[56] frozen in their immobility, backwardness, and neglect, on condition of the establishment of complete freedom of movement, freedom to dispose of land, and the complete abolition of division into social-estates. We want to supplement democratic revision of the state and civil laws of Russia with democratic, revolutionary revision of the notorious "Peasant Reform".

Guided by these principles of agrarian policy, any Russian Social-Democrat who finds himself in the countryside will be able to see his way in the intricate maze of relationships there, and will be able to "adapt" his strictly consistent revolutionary propaganda and agitation to these relationships. He will not be caught napping by a possible movement in the peasantry (which already seems to have started here and there). He will not then limit himself to those demands on behalf of wage-workers in agriculture which are set forth in detail in the section on the immediate "working-class" demands of our programme, and which, of course, he will advance everywhere and at all times. Among the peasantry too he will be

able to give an impulse to the general democratic movement which (if it is destined to pass beyond the embryonic stage in our countryside) will begin with the struggle against the former serf-owners in the countryside, and end in an uprising against that most formidable and foul remnant of the serf-owning system known as the tsarist autocracy.

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P. S. This article was written before the outbreak of the peasant uprisings in the south of Russia in the spring of this year.[57] These events have fully confirmed the principles set forth in this article. As to the tactical tasks which are now presenting themselves more forcibly than ever to our Party in its "rural" work, we hope to deal with them next time.

A LETTER TO THE ZEMSTVOISTS

We quote in full a hectographed letter addressed to Zemstvoists, which passed from hand to hand during the latest session of the Zemstvo Assemblies (it has regrettably only just come into our possession):

"Dear Sir,

"The grave situation in which Russia, the Russian people, and the Russian Zemstvo find themselves today has prompted us to address this letter to you, dear Sir, on the assumption that the ideas and intentions herein expressed will meet with your sympathy.

"The long series of sad and distressing facts of which we have in recent times been silent witnesses weighs like a dark cloud on the public conscience, and every person of education is faced squarely with the fateful question: is it possible to persist in abstaining from political action and by remaining passive contribute to the growing impoverishment and corruption of our native land?

"The chronic crop failures and the intolerable burden of taxation in the form of land redemption payments, non-assessable taxes have literally ruined the people, leading to its physical degeneration.

"The virtual denial to the peasantry of even the faintest semblance of self-government, the petty tutelage of official and self-appointed representatives of 'firm government', and the artificial state of mental starvation in which the people is kept by the uninvited guardians of 'the foundations of Russian tradition and law' are sapping its spiritual powers, its initiative and energy.

"The productive forces of the country are being brazenly plundered by men of business in this country and abroad, with the gracious connivance of adventurers who are gambling with the destinies of our country. In vain is the 'beneficent government' trying to have a series of contradictory and hastily concocted measures take the place of a spirited and systematic struggle carried on by economic groups in the country. Official 'patronage' and 'concern' are impotent in lace of the evil forerunners of Russia's economic and financial bankruptcy: agrarian, industrial, and financial crises—the brilliant results of the policy of chance and gambling. The press is stifled and deprived of any possibility to shed light on at least part of the crimes that are hourly committed by the upholders of law and order, against the freedom and

honour of Russian citizens. Despotism, senseless and cruel, alone raises its voice authoritatively and reigns over the boundless expanses of our ravaged, humiliated, and outraged native land, nowhere meeting with a fitting rebuff.

"With such a state of affairs, the government's systematic mistrust for the slightest manifestation of private or public initiative, the activities of any kind of public associations, and in particular the Zemstvo institutions—which the Russia of the sixties had hoped would prove the corner-stone of a new realm—is quite natural. The triumphant bureaucracy has condemned the Zemstvo institutions to a lingering death, and every year deals a new blow at their activities, their significance and authority in the eyes of society and the people, who scarcely distinguish between the Zemstvo and the bureaucratic administration. The Zemstvo Assemblies have been converted into bureaucratic social-estate councils, despite the clearly expressed protest of all progressive groups in the country, and have lost all connection with the mass of the Russian people. The Zemstvo Boards are becoming annexes to the gubernatorial offices, and, losing in independence, are gradually acquiring all the defects of a government office. The Zemstvo election meetings have been reduced to a veritable farce. The paucity of voters and their division into social-estate groups, while depriving such meetings of the opportunity to serve as a means for the expression, in the persons of the elected councillors, of the various public interests, turn them into a battleground of petty and personal ambitions.

"The range of Zemstvo activities is gradually but steadily being restricted. The Zemstvo has been deprived of jurisdiction in the matter of food supplies. In the matter of assessments the Zemstvo has become the executor of the orders of government officials. In the sphere of public education the role of the Zemstvo has been reduced to practically nil. The Medical Regulations drawn up by the Goremykin Ministry, while not abrogated formally, hang over the Zemstvo medical service like the Sword of Damocles. The dark shadow cast by the government's instructions to the school boards has to all appearances been dissipated. But the Zemstvo is in no way guaranteed against a reappearance of this shadow, this time, however, embodied in the form of a law which would finally destroy the Zemstvo general schools. Contacts between the Zemstvo institutions of the various gubernias, the need for which has become proverbial are confronted with new difficulties in the latest Circular of the Ministry of the Interior on this subject. Every step of the Zemstvo as a public institution comes up against an intricate cobweb of numerous circulars from the various ministers, and the Zemstvoist is obliged to spend no little time, energy and wit on the thankless task of untangling this web, if he wants to give effect to this or that measure. The notorious Article 87 of the Zemstvo Statutes, and particularly its Clause 2, places the whole of Zemstvo activities under the Governor's supervision. Gubernatorial investigations of Zemstvo Boards are becoming ever more frequent; through the permanent members of the Gubernia Board for Zemstvo Affairs, the government is unceremoniously placing the Zemstvo under open surveillance. By enacting a law limiting the right of the

Zemstvo to levy taxes, the government openly admits its extreme mistrust of the fundamental right of the Zemstvo—the right to impose local taxes. Owing to the interference of the Police Department, the best Zemstvo officials, both elected and employed, are forcibly torn away from Zemstvo activities. In the near future, the ministerial projects of control of the Zemstvo's financial operations to be exercised by officials of the State Control Board and of the regulation of the activity of the Zemstvo Advisory Commissions will probably be made law.

"Not only are Zemstvo petitions being turned down, but they are not even given consideration in accordance with the procedure established for such cases and are casually rejected by the ministers on their own authority. Under such conditions, it has become impossible to work in the Zemstvo with an earnest belief in the fruitfulness of that work. And we are now witnessing a process of constantly increasing impoverishment of the Zemstvo forces and in particular of the Zemstvo executive bodies—the Boards. People who are ardently devoted to the Zemstvo cause are leaving the Zemstvo, having lost faith in the efficacy of the work under the present conditions. And their places are being taken by Zemstvoists of a new type, by opportunists who tremble in cowardly fashion for the good name, the outward form of the Zemstvo institutions, and who disgrace the latter by crawling and grovelling to the administration. The result is an internal corruption of the Zemstvo that is far worse than a formal abolition of self-government. The government's open campaign against the Zemstvo idea itself might lead to widespread public indignation, which the bureaucrats fear so greatly. But before our very eyes a camouflaged destruction of the principle of self-government is taking place and, unfortunately, is not meeting with organised resistance.

"With such a state of affairs, the comparative insignificance of the material results of Zemstvo activities is by no means compensated by its educational significance, and the almost forty years of work on the part of the Zemstvo institutions directed towards developing civic spirit, social consciousness, and initiative may be lost without a trace for the immediate future. From this standpoint, the meek and humble marking of time by the opportunist Zemstvoists only facilitates the inglorious and futile death of the great idea of the Zemstvo institutions. The only possible way to lead the Zemstvos out of the impasse into which they have been led by the system of tutelage is to fight energetically against the absurd idea that a consideration of questions going beyond the bounds of the minor details of local life is fraught with national disaster. This bugbear, which, of course, threatens no danger to the people or the security of the state, this idea, the absurdity of which is cynically acknowledged by its supporters (see Witte's confidential memorandum, 'The Autocracy and the Zemstvo'), must be combated by the Zemstvo through open and bold consideration in the Zemstvo Assemblies of questions of national importance which are closely bound up with the needs and interests of the local population. And the more comprehensively, the more fully and energetically the Zemstvo Assemblies consider questions of this kind, the more clearly will it be disclosed that public consideration of evils affecting the people does not threaten the people with disaster, but on the

contrary, averts it, that the muzzle which has at present been placed on the press is of benefit only to the enemies of the people, that police rule over word and thought cannot create honest citizens, and that law and freedom are not incompatible with each other. Public discussion of all such questions in several Gubernia Zemstvo Assemblies simultaneously will undoubtedly meet with the greatest sympathy on the part of all sections of the people and rouse the public conscience to energetic activity. If, however, the Zemstvo fails to react in any way to the present critical condition of Russia, then of course Messrs. the Sipyagins and Wittes, after having deprived the Zemstvo of its role of representative of the interests of labour, will not hesitate to bring it into final 'conformity' with the general structure of the institutions of the Empire. What forms this 'conformity' will take, we, who know the shrewdness and resourcefulness of the country's present rulers, are decidedly at a loss to imagine. After all, the Minister of the Interior had sufficient effrontery, and displayed amazing contempt for the 'pre-eminent' social-estate of the Empire in investing its chosen representatives—the Marshals of the Nobility—with the despicable role of spies, whose duty was to keep the lecturers and the content of popular lectures under surveillance.

"For the reasons outlined above, we are of the opinion that our inactivity and further meek resignation to all the experiments to which the bureaucracy is subjecting the Zemstvo and all Russia constitute, not only a form of suicide, but a grave crime against our native land. How groundless, how insensate are the tactics of opportunism—the sale of one's 'birthright' for a 'mess of pottage'—has been shown us sufficiently clearly by life: the autocratic bureaucracy, having first appropriated our birthright, has now also taken away from us the 'mess of pottage'. Step by step we have been deprived of almost all our civic rights; the forty years that have elapsed since the inception of the 'great reforms' have brought us back to the same point from which we departed forty years ago when we embarked on those reforms. Have we much to lose now? how can we justify continued silence on our part? how can it be explained except by shameful cowardice and an utter lack of all sense of civic duty?

"As Russian citizens, and moreover Russian citizens in 'high positions', we are in duty bound to defend the rights of the Russian people, in duty bound to give a fitting reply to the autocratic bureaucracy which is striving to crush the slightest manifestation of liberty and independence in public life and to make abject slaves of the whole Russian people. As Zemstvoists, we are especially obliged to uphold the rights of the Zemstvo institutions, defend them against the arbitrariness and despotism of the bureaucracy, and uphold their right to independence and the satisfaction in the broadest way of the needs of all sections of the people.

"Let us then cease to be silent in the manner of school children guilty of some misdemeanour; let us at last show that we are adult citizens and let us demand what is our due—the claim to our 'birthright', our civic rights.

"The autocratic bureaucracy never grants anything voluntarily but only what it is compelled to grant, although it then tries to make

a show of ceding its 'rights' solely out of magnanimity. If it happens to grant more than it was compelled to, it immediately withdraws all superfluous concessions, as was the case with our 'great reforms'. The government showed no concern for the workers until it was faced with a serious 'labour movement' in the form of demonstrations of many thousands of workers; it thereupon hastened to enact 'labour legislation', which, although sufficiently hypocritical, was nevertheless designed to meet at least some of the demands of the workers and to pacify these formidable masses. For decades the government crippled our students, our sisters, brothers and children, by forbidding the slightest criticism of the 'educational system' it had devised, and savagely suppressing student 'disorders'.

"But no sooner had these 'disorders' turned into a mass strike, than the academic machine came to a standstill, and the bureaucracy was suddenly imbued with an ardent feeling of 'cordial concern' for the student youth; and those very demands to which only yesterday the sole reply was the crack of Cossack whips are today proclaimed a government programme for the 'reform of education'.

"Of course, there is no small dose of hypocrisy in this metamorphosis too, and yet.... Yet there can be no doubt of the fact that the 'bureaucracy' has been compelled openly to recognise and make a fairly substantial concession to public opinion. And we, like the whole of Russian society, like the whole of the Russian people, can count on the recognition and realisation of our rights only if we boldly, openly, concertedly, and persistently demand these rights.

"In view of all these considerations, we have decided to address the present letter to you, dear Sir, and to many other members of the gubernia Zemstvos, with the appeal to help the present session of Gubernia Zemstvo Assemblies raise, discuss, and adopt corresponding decisions on the following questions:

"1. Reconsideration of the Statutes on Zemstvo Institutions and their amendment along the following lines:

"a) the granting of equal suffrage to all groups of the population, without distinction of social-estates, and with a considerable lowering of the property qualification; b) the removal from the Zemstvo of members representing social-estates as such; c) the Zemstvo to be freed in all its activities from the tutelage of the administration, and to be granted complete independence in all local affairs, on condition that it submits to the laws of the country on the same basis as all other persons and institutions; d) the jurisdiction of the Zemstvo to be extended by granting it complete independence in attending to all local interests and requirements insofar as they do not infringe on general state interests; e) the repeal of the law limiting the right of the Zemstvo to levy taxes; f) the Zemstvo to be granted the broadest rights in the matter of spreading public education in every possible way; moreover, the Zemstvo to be granted the right to supervise and improve the educational as well as the economic aspect of this matter; g) the abrogation of the above-mentioned Medical Regulations, which threaten the Zemstvo medical service; h) food supply matters to be

put back into the hands of the Zemstvo, the latter also to be granted complete independence in the organisation and conduct of its statistical and assessment work; i) all Zemstvo business to be conducted exclusively by elected Zemstvo people, who shall not be subject to endorsement by the administration, still less be appointed against the will of the Zemstvo Assemblies; j) the Zemstvo to be granted the right to employ people exclusively at their own discretion without endorsement by the administration; k) the Zemstvo to be granted the right freely to discuss all questions affecting the state as a whole if they bear on local interests and requirements, in addition to which all petitions of the Zemstvo shall be considered without fail by higher government institutions within a definitely designated period of time; l) all Zemstvos to be granted the right to communicate with one another as well as to arrange congresses of Zemstvo representatives to consider questions concerning all or several Zemstvos.

"II. Reconsideration and amendment of the Statutes on the Peasantry with a view to granting them complete equality of rights with the other social-estates.

"III. Revision of the taxation system with a view to equalising the burden of taxation through progressive taxes on income derived from property, and provided that certain minimum incomes be exempted from taxation.

"It is likewise highly desirable that the following points be raised and considered in the Zemstvo Assemblies:

"IV. The re-establishment everywhere of courts conducted by Justices of the Peace, as well as the repeal of all laws restricting the competence of trial by jury.

"V. The granting of greater freedom of the press; the necessity of abolishing preliminary censorship; the revision of the censorship regulations so as to indicate definitely and explicitly what may and what may not be published; the prohibition of arbitrary action by the administrative authorities in censorship matters, and the trying of all cases of press law violations exclusively in open session of the general courts.

"VI. Revision of existing laws and ministerial edicts concerning measures to protect the security of the state; the elimination, in this sphere, of secret 'judgement' by the administrative authorities, and open trial of all cases of this kind by general court procedure.

"Trusting that you will not refuse to assist in raising in your Gubernia Zemstvo Assembly the general questions herein indicated, we have the honour to request you to inform all Zemstvos as far as possible, through councillors whom you know personally or who are known to you, of any eventual decision of the Zemstvo Assembly. We likewise hope that in most Zemstvos there will be a sufficient number of bold and enterprising people who will succeed in getting the Zemstvo Assemblies to adopt these demands. If we all present our just demands concertedly, openly, and unequivocally, the bureaucracy will be compelled to yield, as it always does when it encounters a rallied and enlightened force.

"*Old Zemstvoists*."

This is a very instructive letter, which shows how life itself is forcing even people who are little capable of struggle and who are most of all absorbed in practical routine to act *against* the autocratic government. And if this letter is compared, for instance, with such writings as Mr. R.N.S.'s foreword to the Witte Memorandum,[58] the former, in my opinion, makes the better impression.

True, there are no "broad" political generalisations in the letter—but then its authors are not making "programmatic" declarations, but giving modest advice as to how to begin agitation *in practice*. They have not indulged in "flights of fancy" to the extent of speaking directly about political liberty, but then neither have they indulged in phrase-mongering about persons close to the throne who could possibly influence the tsar. Nor do they falsely extol the "acts" of Alexander II, but, on the contrary, there is derision of the "great reforms" (in quotation marks). They find in themselves the frankness and courage to rise resolutely against the "Zemstvo opportunists", without fear of declaring war on the "shameful cowardice", and without currying favour with the particularly backward liberals.

We do not yet know what success has attended the appeal of the old Zemstvoists, but at any rate we think that their initiative deserves full support. The recent revival of the Zemstvo movement is in general an extremely interesting phenomenon. The authors of the letter themselves mention how the movement has spread: started by the workers, it has extended to the students and is now being taken up by Zemstvoists. All these three social elements are thus arranging themselves in proper succession in accordance with the diminishing order of their numerical strength, public alertness, social and political radicalism, and revolutionary determination.

So much the worse for our enemy. The less revolutionary the elements that rise up against him, the better it is for us, unreserved opponents of the autocracy and of the existing economic system as a whole.

Let us convey our greetings to the new protesters and, consequently, to our new allies. Let us help them.

You can see that they are poor; they can only put out a small leaflet, issued in a worse form than the leaflets

of the workers and students. We are rich. We shall publish it in printed form. We shall give publicity to this new slap in the face to the Obmanov tsars. This slap in the face is all the more remarkable, the more "respectable" the people are who deal it.

You can see that they are weak; they have so little contact with the people that their letter passes from hand to hand as if it were actually a copy of a private letter. We are strong. We can and must circulate this letter "among the people", and primarily among the proletariat, which is prepared for and has already commenced the struggle for the freedom of the whole people.

You can see that they are timid; they are only just beginning to extend the scope of their pure Zemstvo agitation. We are bolder than they are; our workers have already gone through the "stage" (a stage that was forced on them) of economic agitation alone. Let us set them an example of how to fight. For if the workers fought for a demand like the annulment of the "Provisional Rules", in order to voice a protest against the autocracy, then the violation by the administration of even the faintest trace of what is nonetheless "*self-government*" may constitute no less important ground!

But here we are stopped short by all sorts of supporters of "economism", overt and covert, conscious and unconscious. Who needs this support of the Zemstvoists by the workers? they ask us. Is it not the Zemstvoists alone? Is it not people who are perhaps dissatisfied only because the government favours the industrial capitalists more than the agricultural? Is it not the bourgeoisie alone, whose desires go no further than "the spirited struggle of the economic groups of the country"?

Who needs it? Well, first of all, and more than all, the *working class itself*. This "only really revolutionary class" of present-day society would not be a revolutionary class indeed, if it did not take advantage of *every* occasion for dealing a new blow at its bitterest enemy. And the words about political agitation and political struggle in our statements and programmes would be hollow sounds if we let slip the favourable opportunities for struggle that present themselves when even former allies of this enemy (the men

of the sixties) and in part also his present allies (the opportunist Zemstvoists and feudal-minded landlords) are beginning to quarrel with him.

Let us then carefully follow Zemstvo developments, the rise and spread (or fall and ebb) of the new wave of protests. Let us try to acquaint the working class more fully with the history of the Zemstvo, with the government's concessions to society in the sixties, with the lying speeches of the tsars and their tactics: first to grant a "mess of pottage" instead of the "birthright"—and then (on the basis of this retention of the "birthright") to take away the mess of pottage itself. Let the workers learn to see through these old police tactics in all their manifestations. Such discernment is also indispensable in our struggle for our "birthright", for the freedom of the proletariat to wage a struggle against *all* economic and social oppression. Let us tell the workers in the study circles about the Zemstvo and its attitude to the government; let us issue leaflets on the Zemstvo protests; let us work in such a way that to every insult the tsarist government offers to any Zemstvo that is at all honest the proletariat will be able to reply with demonstrations against the high-handed governors, the bashi-bazouk gendarmes, and the Jesuit censors. The party of the proletariat must learn to denounce and stigmatise *every* servant of the autocracy for *every* outrage and violence directed against any section of society, any nation or race.

Iskra, No. 18, March 10, 1902

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ON THE *BORBA* GROUP

K. N. You ask what the *Borba* group is. We know that several of its members have contributed to *Zarya* (two articles) and *Iskra* (3 reports, 2 articles and 1 commentary). Several articles they sent us were not published. They have now published a printed "declaration", complaining of our "undemocratic" attitude and campaigning even ... against a *Personencultus**! As a man of experience you will grasp what is at the bottom of it all from this one unparalleled and peerless word. And when *Borba* publishes its article against *Where to Begin?* about the rejection of which they also speak in the declaration—then even comrades who are absolutely inexperienced in Party affairs will understand why we did not receive these contributors with open arms.

As for "democracy", see *What Is to Be Done?*, IV, e)**: what is stated there about *Rabocheye Dyelo* applies to *Borba* as well.

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A LETTER TO THE NORTHERN LEAGUE[59]

A Letter of N.N. to the N.L.

(Comments on the Programme of the N.L.)

First of all, it is necessary to note the principal defect of the "programme" in respect of *form*, namely, that it lumps together the fundamental principles of scientific socialism with the narrow, concrete tasks, not only of a particular moment, but even of a particular locality. This defect becomes at once apparent even from a glance at the contents of the fifteen paragraphs of the programme. Let us do that.

§ 1—aim of the working-class movement in general.

§ 2—the principal condition for achieving this aim.

§ 3—immediate political task of Russian Social-Democracy.

§ 4—attitude of Russian Social-Democracy to the liberals, etc.

§ 5—ditto.

§ 6—the concepts of "class" and "party" (a particular difference of opinion with the "economists").

§ 7—practical tasks of agitation.

§ 8—significance of propaganda.

§ 9—demonstrations and manifestations.

§ 10—May Day celebrations.

§ 11—leaflets and demonstrations on February 19.[60]

§ 12—economic struggle and social reforms.

§ 13—the necessity of an offensive as well as of a defensive struggle of the working class.

§ 14—active, not merely passive, role in strikes.

§ 15—strikes as the best means of struggle.

It will easily be seen that these paragraphs, which deal with such varied matters, should have been divided up

into separate sections (otherwise it may give rise to considerable misunderstandings among people unable to distinguish between fundamental principles and the practical tasks of the moment). It is not only inept but even utterly incorrect and ambiguous to place side by side a statement of the ultimate aim of socialism and a discussion with the "economists", or a definition of the importance of strikes. What the Northern League should have done was first to make a clear statement of principle with regard to its convictions in general, then to define the political tasks of the Party as the Northern League understands them, and, thirdly, to separate from these strictly programmatic theses the *resolutions* of the organisation (the Northern League) on the problems of the practical movement (§§ 7-11 and 13-15). A separate point should have been made of § 6, which defines the attitude of the Northern League to the differences of opinion among Russian Social-Democrats, while § 12 should have been included in the statement of principle (since the relation of the current struggle for petty improvements and reforms to the struggle for the ultimate aim is a general and not a specifically Russian question).

After this general remark, I shall now proceed to analyse the individual paragraphs:

§ 1 outlines the general aims of Social-Democracy as a whole. These aims are stated extremely briefly and disjointedly. True, the programme of a local organisation ought not to go into details, which are *indispensable* for the programme of a party. Fully realising this and considering that it was a very useful and important decision on the part of the Northern League not to keep silent about the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy even in a programme of a local organisation, I would in that case deem it necessary only to add a statement outlining the fundamental principles in greater detail. In other words, it should have been indicated, for instance, that the Northern League bases itself on *international* scientific socialism (the international character of the movement is not indicated anywhere in the programme), and subscribes to the theory of "revolutionary Marxism". In addition to this *general* statement of its principles, it would be possible to add a proposition like § 1, but by itself it (§ 1) is not sufficient.

As an organisation affiliated to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Northern League should have declared its solidarity with the "Manifesto" of this Party; moreover, it would have been also useful to point to the solidarity of the Northern League at least with the draft programme of the Russian Social-Democrats prepared in the eighties by the Emancipation of Labour group. Such a statement, while leaving open the question of the modifications this draft requires, would more accurately define the Northern League's stand in matters of principle. Here is the alternative: *either* you must yourselves draw up a *complete* account of all the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy (i.e., draw up the theoretical section of the Social-Democratic programme yourselves), or you must declare quite definitely that the Northern League *subscribes* to more or less well-known and established principles. The third way, the one chosen by the programme—to indicate the ultimate aim in an utterly disjointed manner—will not do.

§ 2 begins with an extremely inaccurate, ambiguous, and dangerous statement: "considering socialism to be the class interest of the proletariat". These words identify, as it were, socialism with the "class interest of the proletariat". And this identification is *absolutely incorrect*. Precisely at the present time, when an *exceedingly narrow* conception of the "class interests of the proletariat" has become extremely widespread, it is quite impermissible to present a formulation which, if it can be somehow acceptable, will be accepted only if the expression "class interest" is understood in an *extremely broad* sense. "Class interest" impels the proletarians to unite, to fight against the capitalists, to think about the prerequisites of their emancipation. "Class interest" makes them receptive to socialism. But socialism, as the ideology of the class struggle of the proletariat, is subject to the general conditions governing the inception, development, and consolidation of an ideology; in other words, it is founded on the sum-total of human knowledge, presupposes a high level of scientific development, demands scientific work, etc., etc. Socialism is *introduced* by the ideologists into the proletarian class struggle, which develops spontaneously on the basis of capitalist relationships. The formulation of § 2,

however, throws an altogether false light on the real relation of socialism to the class struggle. Moreover, § 2 does not speak of the class struggle. That is its second defect.

§ 3 defines absolutism inadequately (for example, it does not point to its connection with remnants of the serf-owning system), in places bombastically ("boundless") and vaguely ("ignoring" the *individual*). Further, the conquest of political liberty (it should have been noted that the Northern League sets this task to the *whole Party*) is essential, *not only* for the full development of the workers' class struggle; in one way or another it should have been pointed out that it is also essential in the interests of all social development.

"The autocracy represents the interests of the ruling classes exclusively." This is inaccurate, or wrong. The autocracy satisfies *certain* interests of the ruling classes, maintaining itself partly by the inertness of the mass of the peasantry and the small producers in general, partly by balancing between conflicting interests, and constituting, to a certain extent, an independent organised political force. The wording of § 3 is especially impermissible in view of the fact that the absurd identification of the Russian autocracy with the rule of the bourgeoisie is extremely widespread in our country.

"Incompatible with the principle of democracy." What is the point of this when nothing has as yet been said about democracy? And does not the demand for the overthrow of the autocracy and the winning of political liberty express precisely the "principle" of democracy? This phrase will not do. Instead it should have been pointed out more precisely how consistent and *determined* we are (in comparison with the bourgeois democrats) in our understanding of the "principle of democracy"—for example, by describing in one way or another the idea *and content* of a "democratic constitution" or proclaiming our demand for a *democratic republic* as a matter of "principle".

§ 4 is especially unsatisfactory. Instead of speaking about the "full" utilisation of "broad" liberty (as a matter of fact, this is just vague phrase-mongering, which could very well be replaced, and should be, by definite reference to a democratic republic and a democratic constitution,

for "full" utilisation means consistent democracy)—instead of this, it was *imperative* to state that it is *not only* the working class that is interested in political liberty. Silence on this score is tantamount to opening the door wide to the worst forms of "economism", and to forgetting our general *democratic* tasks.

It is *absolutely wrong* to say that the realisation (?? attainment, conquest) of political liberty is "just as" necessary to the proletariat as higher wages and a shorter working day. This is just what it is *n o t*, for *this* is a necessity of a *different* and *f a r m o r e c o m p l e x* order than the necessity for wage increases, etc. The difference between the two "necessities" may also be clearly seen from the fact, for instance, that the autocracy is prepared to grant (*and actually does occasionally grant*) improved conditions to individual sections or groups of the working class *if only* these sections will make their peace with absolutism. The sentence under analysis is absolutely impermissible, reflecting as it does an incredible vulgarisation of "economic" materialism, and debasement of Social-Democratic understanding to the level of sheer trade-unionism.

Further. "In view of this" ... should be deleted *in view of* what has been stated above ... "in the impending struggle" ... (i.e., evidently the struggle against tsarism?) ... "the Social-Democrats should come forward with a definite class programme and demands...." The *class* nature of our *political* programme and *political* demands is expressed precisely in the fact that they stand for complete and consistent democracy. If, however, one speaks about our entire programme in general, and not only about political demands, then its class nature should follow of itself from the very content of our programme. There is no point in speaking of a "*definite*" class programme; you yourselves must *define*, expound, express and formulate this class programme explicitly and with precision.

"...Without subordination to the liberal programme...." This is simply ludicrous. We come forward as the foremost democratic party, and suddenly make the reservation that we do "not subordinate"!! Like children who have just been freed from "subordination"!

Our "insubordination" to the liberals should be expressed, not in phrases about insubordination, but in the whole nature of our programme (*and*, *of course*, *of our activity*). It is precisely that conception of political tasks which identifies (or at least equates) the necessity for liberty with the necessity for wage increases, that *expresses subordination of Social-Democracy to the liberals.*

The end of § 4 will not do either; it is criticised in all that has been said above.

§ 5 reduces our general attitude towards all democracy in general to mere collaboration with other parties in practical matters. That is too narrow. If such parties exist, they should have been named concretely (not in the programme, but in a special resolution of the congress), and the attitude towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the *Svoboda* group, etc., should have been explicitly defined. If, however, it is a question, not of definite parties, but of the attitude towards other revolutionary (*and opposition*) trends in general, then the wording should have been expanded, in one way or another repeating the thesis of the *Communist Manifesto* about our support of every revolutionary movement against the existing system.[61]

§ 6 is out of place in the programme. It should have been transferred to a separate resolution and should have stated *openly* that it deals with the differences of opinion (or two trends) within the Russian Social-Democratic movement. This is more than "numerous misunderstandings". The formulation of the differences of opinion is too narrow, for they *are far from being limited* to the confusion of class with party. There should have been a corresponding statement coming out resolutely and definitely against the "critics of Marxism", "economism", and limitation of our political tasks.

As to the second part of § 6, since it is *elucidated* in other paragraphs (7, 14, and others), a criticism of it is given in the comments on these paragraphs.

§ 7, like all that follows (with the exception of § 12), should go into a separate resolution, but should not be a direct part of the *programme.*

§ 7 formulates the "task" of the League's activity in a limited way. We must not only "develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat", but also *organise* the latter into

a political party—and then *direct* its struggle (both economic and political).

The statement that the proletariat finds itself in "definite, concrete conditions" is superfluous. It should either be omitted or these conditions should be *defined* (but this should be done elsewhere in the programme).

It is wrong to say that agitation is the "only" means of achieving our tasks. It is far from being the only means.

It is inadequate to define agitation as "influence over broad sections of the workers". The nature of this influence should be indicated. It is necessary to speak about *political* agitation more directly, resolutely, definitely and in greater detail: otherwise, by keeping silent about political agitation as such and devoting two whole paragraphs (14 and 15) to economic agitation, the programme strays (unintentionally) into "economism". Special emphasis should have been placed on the necessity for agitation about *all* manifestations of political and economic, social and national oppression, *irrespective of the class or section of the population affected by that oppression*—the necessity (for Social-Democrats) to be in the forefront in all clashes with the government, and so on—and only then should the means of agitation (oral agitation, newspapers, leaflets, manifestations, etc., etc.) have been indicated.

§ 8 begins with superfluous repetition.

"Recognises propaganda *only* to the extent", etc. This is incorrect. Propaganda does not only have this significance; it is not only a means of "training agitators", but also a means of spreading class-consciousness in general. The programme goes to the other extreme. If it was necessary to come out against propaganda which some people divorce too much from the tasks of agitation, it would have been better to say: "in propaganda it is *particularly* necessary not to lose sight of the task of training agitators", or something to that effect. But *all* propaganda should not be reduced to the training of "experienced and capable agitators", and the "training of only individual class-conscious workers" should not be simply "rejected". We consider this inadequate, but we do not "reject" it. And the latter part of § 8 (from: "our attitude being one of rejection") should therefore be deleted altogether.

§ 9. I fully agree with this paragraph in essence. Perhaps "in connection with the *most* varied events in public life and government measures..." should have been added.

Instead of "the best means", it would be more accurate to say: "one of the best means".

Only the end of this paragraph is unsatisfactory. Demonstrations and manifestations unite, and should unite, *not only* the workers (moreover, to say "unites" through manifestations is *in*sufficient, since we also want to unite organisationally, directly and for all time, and not only for one particular occasion). "... *Thereby* developing in them...." This is either inaccurate—class-consciousness cannot be developed by manifestations *alone*—or superfluous (it has already been said that it is one of the best means).

It would be useful to add something about the need to *organise* manifestations, about their preparation, conduct, etc.

In general, the absence in the programme of any reference to the necessity of devoting great attention to the matter of *revolutionary organisation*, in particular to setting up an all-Russia, militant organisation, is a *great deficiency*. Once reference is made to agitation, propaganda, strikes, and the like, it is quite inexcusable to say nothing *about revolutionary organisation.*

§ 10. It should have been added that in our country May Day must also become a demonstration *against the autocracy*, a demand for political liberty. Pointing to the international significance of the holiday is not enough. It must also be linked up with the struggle for the most vital *national* political demands.

§ 11. A very good idea, but expressed too restrictedly. Perhaps the words "among other things" should have been inserted, since demonstrations should be organised on the anniversary of the Commune as well, and on many other occasions; or "in particular" should have been inserted or else the impression may be created that demonstrations on other occasions are not necessary.

Further. It is wrong to appeal on February 19 (in leaflets) *only* to the workers. Apart from the fact that in general we always appeal to the entire people and even to the whole world in our demonstrations an in the leaflets issued

in connection with them, on February 19 in particular appeals should be addressed also to the *peasantry*. And if we are to appeal to the peasantry, that means we must draw up a Social-Democratic policy on the agrarian question. The programme does not touch on this question, and we quite understand that a local organisation may perhaps lack the time or the forces to deal with this. Nevertheless, it should certainly have at least been mentioned, in one way or another, in connection with one attempt or another to tackle it in Social-Democratic literature and in the practical activities of our movement.*

The end of § 11 will not do ("only *class* force"—which class? The working class alone?). Should have been deleted.

§ 12. We neither can nor will help "in every way" to improve the conditions of the workers under the present circumstances. For instance, we cannot help in the Zubatov[62] fashion, and even if Zubatov corruption is involved we shall not do that. We fight only for such improvement of the workers' conditions as will *raise* their capacity to wage the class struggle, i.e., when the improvement of conditions is *not bound up* with corruption of political consciousness, with police tutelage, with being tied down to a given locality, with subjugation to a "benefactor", with a lowering of human dignity, etc., etc. Precisely in Russia, where the autocracy is so much inclined (and is becoming more and more inclined) to *buy itself off* from revolution with various hand-outs and sham reforms, it is our duty to draw a clear line of demarcation between ourselves and all sorts of "reformers". We also fight for reforms, but by no means "in every way"; we fight for reforms *only* in Social-Democratic fashion, only in a revolutionary way.

§ 13 is omitted by decision of the congress. And it should have been omitted.

§ 14 formulates the content and the tasks of economic agitation in too narrow a way. The latter is not confined to strikes alone. We need "better conditions", not only for the cultural development of the proletariat, but particularly for its revolutionary development. The "active

* For instance, the attempts of the workers to stage demonstrations in connection with floggings of the peasants, etc.

role" of Social-Democrats in strikes does not end with encouraging the struggle *for improvements in economic conditions*. Strikes (like economic agitation in general) should *always* be used to encourage the *revolutionary* struggle for freedom and for socialism as well. Strikes should be used for *political* agitation also.

§ 15 is also most unsatisfactory. Strikes are not the "best" means of struggle, but only *one* of the means, and not always necessarily one of the best means. We must recognise the importance of strikes, make use of them and lead them at all times—but it would be all the more dangerous to exaggerate their importance, the more this has been done by the "economists".

What is said further about strikes is redundant: it has already been stated in § 14. A reference to leadership of the economic struggle in general would have been sufficient. This leadership may sometimes consist in deterring from strike action. The programme expresses itself in too absolute a fashion, and for this very reason too restrictedly. The programme should have spoken about the task in general, that of leading the economic struggle of the proletariat, of making it more organised and conscious, of organising workers' trade unions and endeavouring to develop them into all-Russia organisations, of utilising every strike, every manifestation of economic oppression, etc., for the most widespread socialist and revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

The end of § 15 *limits* the tasks of this agitation, making the use of political agitation depend, as it were, on action by the police, etc. Actually, however, we must try to use political agitation (and this is quite possible if the leaders are at all capable) *before* action by these "archangels", and *irrespective* of that action. It should have been formulated more generally: "to take advantage of all and every opportunity for political agitation", etc.

The end of § 15 is also incorrect. It is the less fitting for us to speak of "general strikes", the less opportunity we in Russia have of *preparing* them. And, in general, there is no reason for speaking *specially* about "general" strikes in programmes (remember the absurd "general strike" in the pamphlet *Who Will Carry Out the Political Revolution?*[63] After all, such misunderstandings are also possible). To

declare that strikes are "the best means of developing *class-consciousness*" is also absolutely incorrect.

As a whole, a serious revision of the programme would be highly desirable. In general it would also be desirable for the Northern League to take an active part both in the unification of *revolutionary* Social-Democracy in a *party* and in the preparation of the Party programme. For their part, the editors of *Zarya* and *Iskra* hope soon to acquaint the Northern League with their draft (most of which is already completed), and trust that the Northern League will co-operate in amending and circulating this draft and in preparing it for adoption by the entire Party.

N. N.

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WHY THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS MUST DECLARE A DETERMINED AND RELENTLESS WAR ON THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

1) Because that trend in our social thought which goes by the name of "Socialist-Revolutionary" is in fact moving away, and has indeed moved away, from the only international theory of revolutionary socialism existing today, i.e., from Marxism. In the great split of international Social-Democracy into an opportunist wing (or, "Bernsteinian") and a revolutionary wing, this trend has taken up an entirely indefinite and impermissibly irresolute position between two stools. Basing itself solely on the bourgeois and opportunist criticism of Marxism, it has pronounced the latter to have been "shaken" (*Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*, No. 2, p. 62), and promised, on its part, to "revise" Marxism anew, in its own way, but has done nothing whatever to fulfil this ominous promise.

2) Because the Socialist-Revolutionary trend helplessly yields to the dominant tendency in Russian social and political thought which should be termed liberal Narodism. Repeating the error of the Narodnaya Volya and of old Russian socialism in general, the Socialist-Revolutionaries fail to see the sheer flabbiness and internal contradictions of this tendency; their independent creative contribution to Russian revolutionary thought is restricted to tacking revolutionary phrases on to the old testament of liberal Narodnik wisdom. Russian Marxism was the first to undermine the theoretical foundations of liberal Narodism, to lay bare its bourgeois and petty-bourgeois class content, and to have waged and continue to wage war against it, undeterred by the desertion of a swarm of critical (=opportunist) Marxists to the enemy camp. But the stand the Socialist-Revolutionaries have been holding in this war is (*at best*) one of hostile neutrality; here again they

have seated themselves between two stools, between Russian Marxism (from which they have borrowed only a few paltry shreds) and quasi-socialist liberal Narodism.

3) Because the Socialist-Revolutionaries, owing to their above-mentioned complete lack of principle in questions of international and Russian socialism, do not understand or do not recognise the only really revolutionary principle, that of the *class struggle*. They do not understand that only a party which *fuses* socialism with the *Russian working-class movement* being engendered with increasing force and of an increasing scale by the growth of Russian capitalism can be really revolutionary and truly socialist in Russia today. The attitude of the Socialist-Revolutionaries towards the Russian working-class movement has always been that of dilettante spectators, and when, for instance, that movement contracted the illness of "economism" (as a consequence of its amazingly rapid growth) the Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the one hand, gloated over the mistakes made by people who were working at the new and difficult task of rousing the masses of the workers, and, on the other hand, put a spoke in the wheel of revolutionary Marxism when it launched and victoriously carried through the struggle against this "economism". A half-hearted attitude towards the working-class movement inevitably leads in fact to aloofness from it, and owing to this aloofness the Socialist-Revolutionary Party has no social basis whatever. It does not rely upon any social class, for the term class cannot be applied to a group of unstable intellectuals who qualify their vagueness and lack of principle as "broadness".

4) Because by assuming a disdainful attitude towards socialist ideology and seeking to rely simultaneously and in an equal degree upon the intelligentsia, the proletariat, and the peasantry, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party thereby inevitably (whether it wants to or not) leads to the political and ideological enslavement of the Russian proletariat by Russian bourgeois democracy. A disdainful attitude towards theory, evasiveness, and shilly-shallying with regard to socialist ideology inevitably play into the hands of bourgeois ideology. As social strata *comparable* with the proletariat, the Russian intelligentsia and

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the Russian peasantry can serve as the mainstay only of a *bourgeois-democratic* movement. This is not only a consideration that stems necessarily from our teachings as a whole (which regard the small producer, for instance, as revolutionary only to the extent that he makes a clean break with the society of commodity economy and capitalism and places himself at the standpoint of the proletariat)—no, it is also an absolute fact which is already beginning to make itself felt. At the moment of the political revolution and on the day after this-revolution, this fact will inevitably make itself felt with still greater force. Socialist-Revolutionarism is one of the manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideological instability and petty-bourgeois vulgarisation of socialism, against which Social-Democracy must and will always wage determined war.

5) Because the practical demands of the programme which the Socialist-Revolutionaries have—I won't say brought forward, but at least—outlined have already quite clearly revealed the enormous harm caused in practice by the unprincipled character of this trend. For example, their agrarian minimum programme as outlined in No. 8 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[64] (perhaps it would be more correct to say: scattered among the time-worn premises of our Narodism?) in the first place misleads both the peasantry by promising it a "minimum"—socialisation of the land—and the working class by giving it an entirely wrong impression of the true nature of the peasant movement. Such frivolous promises only compromise a revolutionary party in general; in particular they compromise the teaching of scientific socialism concerning the socialisation of all means of production as our ultimate aim. Secondly, by including the support and development of co-operatives in their minimum programme, the Socialist-Revolutionaries completely abandon the ground of revolutionary struggle and degrade their so-called socialism to the level of the most banal petty-bourgeois reformism. Thirdly, by opposing the demand of the Social-Democrats for the abolition of all the medieval fetters that bind our village commune, tie the muzhik to his allotment, deny him freedom of movement, and unavoidably entail his humiliation as member of his social-estate, the Socialist-Revolutionaries have shown

that they have not been able even to safeguard themselves against the *reactionary* doctrines of Russian Narodism.

6) Because the Socialist-Revolutionaries, by including terrorism in their programme and advocating it in its present-day form as a means of political struggle, are thereby doing the most serious harm to the movement, destroying the indissoluble ties between socialist work and the mass of the revolutionary class. No verbal assurances and vows can disprove the unquestionable fact that present-day terrorism, as practised and advocated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, is *not connected in any way* with work among the masses, for the masses, or together with the masses; that the organisation of terroristic acts by the Party distracts our very scanty organisational forces from their difficult and by no means completed task of organising a revolutionary workers' party; that *in practice* the terrorism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is nothing else than *single combat*, a method that has been wholly condemned by the experience of history. Even foreign socialists are beginning to become embarrassed by the noisy advocacy of terrorism advanced today by our Socialist-Revolutionaries. Among the masses of the Russian workers this advocacy simply sows harmful illusions, such as the idea that terrorism "compels people to think politically, even against their will" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 7, p. 4), or that "more effectively than months of verbal propaganda it is capable of changing the views... of thousands of people with regard to the revolutionaries and the meaning [!!] of their activity", or that it is capable of "infusing new strength into the waverers, those discouraged and shocked by the sad outcome of many demonstrations" (*ibid.*), and so on. These harmful illusions can only bring about early disappointment and weaken the work of preparing the masses for the onslaught upon the autocracy.

Written in June-July 1902

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Published according to the manuscript

TWO LETTERS TO I. I. RADCHENKO

I

Dear Friend,

First of all, my heartiest congratulations to you (and your friends) on a tremendous success: the beginning of the reorganisation of the Local Committee.[65] This may become a turning-point for our *whole* movement, and it is therefore of the utmost importance and urgency to carry through this reorganisation *to the end*. Take particular care of yourself, so that you should manage to complete it.

Let me get down to business now. You ask me to help you "with a concrete outline of a plan for local work in connection with all-Russia activities". In order to meet your request immediately, I am for the time being writing to express my personal opinion (so as not to delay matters by having to contact the other members of the Editorial Board, who are at present scattered in different places; they will possibly also send you a few words themselves later). I am not quite sure whether I understand your request correctly. My sources now are: your letter of June 21 and the letter of 2a 3b[66] about the two meetings (you, 2a 3b, and Krasikov) with Vanya (the St. Petersburg League[67]). Judging from these sources (especially the latter), Vanya "now shares our views and frankly acknowledges the demerits of his former stand". Proceeding from this, I shall continue to write, addressing myself both to you and to Vanya, and I leave it entirely to you to decide whether to transmit my letter to Vanya (*and Manya*=the Workers' Organisation[68]) immediately or later, whether to give it in full or with certain amendments, which in case of necessity I

likewise authorise you to make (informing us of all such amendments as far as possible, of course).

Strictly speaking, I am of course unable to give you just now a "concrete outline of a plan for Local work in connection with all-Russia activities": it is impossible for me to do this without a *number of detailed* conferences both with Vanya and with Manya. All that I can offer is an outline of the practical steps that Vanya should take immediately and before all else, once he has become a new Vanya or wants to become so *de facto*. It seems to me that the steps planned by all of you at the second meeting with Vanya (and described in the letter of 2a 3b) are wholly correct. I fully agree that "the first thing to do is openly to declare oneself an adherent of certain views". This is the very thing that must come first, and it can be done only by an *open* declaration.[69] I am fully aware of the fact that most or many of Vanya's comrades (i.e., the committees and their members) are strongly prejudiced against such open declarations or at least are unaccustomed to them. This trait is quite comprehensible from the angle of the stage of the movement that has already been passed and of the mistakes that have already been rejected. But just because Vanya holds such an important position, just because in the past he openly declared his old views, which were decidedly at variance with the *Iskra* views, just because of all this I would particularly earnestly advise the comrades (=Vanya) to overcome this feeling of estrangement and this prejudice. Hitherto our local work has suffered mostly from narrowness and isolation, from the reluctance of the local leaders to tackle *actively* and resolutely the job of working out general Party questions. Then let Vanya, as he comes over to the adherents of revolutionary Social-Democracy, break with this tradition at once and declare *for all to hear* that *these* are his fundamental *theoretical views* and *organisational ideas* and that he himself is now going to fight for the realisation of these ideas, urging all other committees to follow suit. This declaration will be of enormous importance both to Vanya and to the whole of Russia; it will be a big *event* in itself. We need not be afraid of offending Vanya's old friends, who held different views; every shadow of offence will be removed by the very fact

that Vanya *himself* will openly and frankly admit that circumstances and experience have convinced him of the, erroneousness of the former theoretical views, tactical principles, and organisational plans, in one way or another bound up with "economism". There will not be even the semblance of an attack on these old views here, but merely an avowal of *his own* evolution. The frank straightforwardness of this avowal will exert an influence on the *actual* unification of all Russian Social-Democrats and on the full cessation of the "polemics" between them, which will be ten times as great as a hundred protests against the "polemics".

And so, first and foremost, an open and printed declaration (in a local bulletin or in *Iskra*, preferably in both). This step should absolutely not be delayed even for a single week, for *without it* all other steps *may easily* prove futile (arrests, etc.), while *with it* the new road would be established at once.

What should this declaration contain? If Vanya were to ask my comradely advice on this point (*but not before he asked me*, *of course*) I would reply: 1) an express repudiation of his old views (theoretical, tactical, and organisational) with a most general description of these views (in one or two words, if possible). 2) A declaration that he is joining the *Iskra* supporters, subscribes to its theoretical, tactical, and organisational views, and recognises it as the *leading* organ (N.B., the word "leading" does not at all mean that one necessarily has to agree with it in everything. It merely implies solidarity with the *guiding* principles of a certain organ. This declaration is *fully compatible* both with a reference to particular differences, should any exist, and with an intimation that I want the following changes and that I, now an *Iskra* supporter, will strive to *effect* them, and try to get these changes made in *Iskra*). 3) Special emphasis on the demand for the unification or, more accurately, the actual *restoration* of a united all-Russia Social-Democratic Labour Party, *by means of* joint work, which should begin with a rallying about *Iskra* so as to convert it into an instrument of genuinely nation-wide agitation and which (the work) should lead to the creation of a militant all-Russia organisation, capable

of launching a determined onslaught on the autocracy. 4) An acknowledgement (already made, but not yet published by Vanya) of the need to reorganise the structure and functioning of Vanya and Manya (their relationships, etc.), an announcement (so to speak) of a revision of their structure. 5) An acknowledgement of the need for closer links *and fusion* with the Russian *Iskra* organisation[70] so as to accomplish the tasks Vanya and this organisation will henceforth share. 6) The assignment of one or several members (perhaps from Vanya and from Manya, etc.) of the St. Petersburg Committee for the matter of immediately beginning the practical realisation of the above-mentioned task, i.e., *fusion* with *Iskra* and *unification* of the Party.*

Of these six points, the sixth, of course, can by no means be made public, which may likewise be the case with some of the other points as well. The declaration could conclude with an ellipsis, and make the frank reservation that such and such (or "subsequent") points cannot be made public for reasons of secrecy. But I repeat: if Vanya has really come over to our side he should not postpone this declaration for *even a single week.*

It is at such a meeting of delegates from the St. Petersburg Committee with Sonya (the Russian *Iskra* organisation) and with the *Iskra* Editorial Board (abroad) that a really concrete plan will be prepared, not only for the reorganisation of work in St. Petersburg, but also for the actual unification of the Party, the constitution of an Organising Committee to prepare the Second Party Congress, etc., etc., etc.

Further, at your second meeting it was proposed that "before proceeding to carry out the above-mentioned plan [to send delegates abroad in July] a preliminary examination be made of the state of affairs in various areas of our vast fatherland so as to have a basis for discussion at the congress". I consider this decision (I say so quite frankly) a mistake, and I would advise you to abandon it. It means delaying matters and dispersing your forces. Let us first achieve a single objective: let us (we and Vanya) reach

* This (§ 6) has also already been settled de facto at your second meeting: sending comrades abroad for the purpose of coming to a final understanding.

an understanding among ourselves. *This will already be equivalent* to complete solidarity between Vanya and Sonya. And given this solidarity, the *next* practical task (a tour of Russia) will be accomplished by Vanya∓Sonya (+or=?) quite easily. But there is no sense in dispersing our efforts now: first (1) let us finally *convince* Vanya and Manya, then (2) publicly *announce* our standpoint, further (3) come to an immediate understanding with *Iskra* (abroad, where *Iskra* already has a whole file of material on the state of affairs in the various localities of our vast fatherland; don't disdain this file, comrades!) and (4) with Sonya, and only then (5) tour Russia with the express practical aim of the *actual* unification of the work (and the convocation of a general Party congress).

There, if you please, is a "concrete outline of a plan" of immediate practical tasks. If § 2 presents difficulties, § 3 can be moved to first place (this, of course, will entail some delay, but under certain circumstances an unavoidable delay). But both 2 and 3 must be insisted on at all costs. Moreover, it is of the utmost importance that the members of Vanya who are coming here should be invested with the fullest possible powers and that if possible there be two of them rather than one (although this really depends entirely on the local conditions, and of those you are in a better position to judge).

I believe I can conclude with this. Please let me know your opinion as soon as possible: have I understood your request correctly? is my "concrete plan" feasible? etc. I am afraid that things are not yet so good and that Vanya is not yet a full adherent. What is particularly suspicious is that Manya has not yet been given *What Is to Be Done?** It would be a good thing if you could meet with Vanya again *in pleno* (i.e., at a *full* session of the St. Petersburg Committee): this would be of the utmost importance in *accurately establishing* whether there are any opponents, just who they are, and what main points they advance. It would be of equal importance that you meet with Manya directly. You must hasten Vanya's trip here (and it would be good for Manya to come too!) *a s m u c h*

* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

as possible and at all costs (have them come *straight* to London; give them the *London* address *without fail* and also Meshcheryakov's Belgian address for all eventualities). If you succeed in doing this, it will already be a great achievement guaranteeing that your work will bear fruit even if you are all arrested now. And don't forget a contingency like that is quite possible, and that it is therefore imperative to accomplish the first real step (declaration, trip) as quickly as possible and without the slightest delay.

If *in fact* Vanya unreservedly becomes *one of us*, then we shall hold the Second Party Congress within a few months and make *Iskra* a fortnightly or even a weekly organ of the Party. Try to convince Vanya that we haven't the slightest intention of distracting him from *local* work, that St. Petersburg is a "locality" which is of *direct* importance to the whole of Russia as well, that the merger of Vanya with Sonya will greatly intensify local work, and will at the same time immediately lift the whole Party out of its semi-spectral state and raise it to the stage not only of reality, but also of a power of prime importance.

Warmly shaking your hand,
Yours,
Lenin

Written before July 3 (16), 1902

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II

Dear Friend,

The news you sent us recently about the release of Vanya's friends—the "allies" (=supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo*)—again gives rise to some doubts in our mind. Will Vanya hold out now? At all events, put the question to him squarely, get a direct reply, and if it is in the negative make him feel ashamed of himself, using no uncertain language; in any case, let us know immediately how matters stand. If Vanya has again got (or even is about to get) out of our hands, it is all the more imperative that you devote trebled efforts to Manya, if possible to her directly; if not, through your new friends, the conversation with whom you have described to us in such detail and so interestingly.

You should make it your business (if Vanya shows even the *slightest* signs of unreliability or evasiveness) to prepare the St. Petersburg *Iskra*-ists for war on the remnants of "economism". Naturally, there is no need to say anything to them about this war, but all efforts must be put into preparing for it, and as far as possible on both flanks. That is, firstly, try to maintain your established personal relations with our friends in the intellectual half of Vanya, try to see them, influence them, make them feel ashamed, meet the young people among them, and prepare the *Iskra*-ists to break with the waverers. The second flank—the workers—is far more important. Your study circle is excellent vantage-ground, and you must above all see to it that this circle develops, becomes conscious of and gives expression to its hostility towards Vanya. Try to supply this circle with *What Is to Be Done?* and to achieve (judging by your letter, this is not at all difficult) *complete* unanimity; moreover, you must particularly and emphatically stress the

fact that *What Is to Be Done?* is levelled precisely and mainly against just this "St. Petersburg" type of people. Dot your i's in your discussions with them, constantly referring to Vanya as a bad example, an example of what should not be done. I am more than ready to help you in any way I can—for instance, through a series of letters to the circle. First, let this circle become *Iskra*-ist consciously and in full, become consciously and *unreservedly* hostile to all of the old "St. Petersburg truck", to *Rabochaya Mysl*, to *Rabocheye Delo*, and to all shilly-shallying. *Then* (*and only then*) we shall do the following: the declaration you advised Vanya to make and I wrote to you about in detail will be made, in somewhat altered form of course, by the circle, which will raise the "banner of insurrection" against Vanya's "economists", and announce a direct campaign for the purpose of winning all of Manya over to its side.

I do not doubt for a moment that this campaign will end in complete and rapid victory, and I consider that it is not this campaign which constitutes the main difficulty, but the matter of getting people to the point of embarking on an open campaign, of not slipping into compromises with Vanya once more, into making concessions to him, into procrastination, etc. *Absolutely* no compromises whatever, and *ruthless* war against the slightest remnants of "economism" and amateurishness—that, in my opinion, is the task you should set yourself in the circle. Better lose three months, half a year, or even more on preparations, and create a *militant Iskra*-ist circle rather than unite unprepared people with Vanya's diplomats and cunctators.

Make use of the fact that you have a free hand in the circle and pursue your policy resolutely, keeping people who are not entirely with you well at a distance.

If you manage matters in this way, you will be independent of Vanya's waverings and vacillations; you will have *y o u r o w n* foothold. And if you occasionally have to manoeuvre in your dealings with Vanya, you must not resort to the slightest attempt at manoeuvring in the circle, but at all times maintain an attitude of *irreconcilability* towards Vanya there. Your tactics will then be quite simple: if Vanya comes closer to you, pat him on the head, but keep tight hold of the stick in your other

hand, i.e., don't conceal from him the fact that this is not enough, that it is necessary to come over the whole way and come in, and that a little will not satisfy you. If Vanya drifts away, don't let him get away with a single mistake, with a single misstep. It should be one of your main tasks to *fasten* on to each of Vanya's blunders, and make it a subject of merciless exposure and condemnation in the circle (and as far as possible in *Iskra* too from time to time).

In a word, in your relations with Vanya hold steadfastly to the principle: I want peace with you and to that end I am preparing thoroughly for war against you.

A piece of practical advice in conclusion. By nature Vanya is a diplomat and a pedant. He has now raised the question of alterations in the hovel and it is most likely that on the plausible pretext of this "revision of structure" he will drag things out, invent thousands of compromises, etc. Don't fall for this bait. Mercilessly deride love of compiling rules. It is not a matter of rules, and whoever thinks it possible to draw up model rules on the basis of certain tactical and organisational ideas understands absolutely nothing at all and must be thoroughly *hounded* for this lack of understanding. If Vanya imagines that they will discuss the new rules from all angles, rewrite forty paragraphs out of the fifty, and then "to a good feast and the wedding", i.e., that the new work will then begin in accordance with the new rules—if he (as is obvious from everything) imagines this, then it means that he has discarded his old prejudices only in word and that actually he still retains hundreds of stupid ideas against which we must fight and fight again. Castigate pedantry and formalism, and point out that it is not a matter of rules but of 1) coming to an agreement on views, *thinking* them *over thoroughly*, and 2) of *reaching mutual understanding* in the practical work *itself*.

With this as our standpoint, we snap our fingers at your (Vanya's) game of rules and state flatly—who we are, what we want and how we work is something you know, and should know, not only from our publications, but also from personal meetings in Russia and abroad (such meetings are unavoidable in the revolutionary movement). If you do not care to go hand in hand with us, say so outright, don't

hedge, and bear in mind that we will wage a real war against all hedging. Don't imagine that you will be able to conceal your hedging from us behind revisions of rules, and the like. But if you want to go hand in hand with us, get down to work *at once*, and then you will see that this work in connection with an all-Russia newspaper, on the paper and with it as a basis, will itself show what new forms are required, and will probably (and even undoubtedly) show that, given a genuine and live movement, these forms will take shape of themselves, without any rules. And when we are strong, we shall organise meetings and conferences four times a year in Russia and twice abroad (or *vice versa*, depending on circumstances), and all rules will be determined at these conferences (to put it more plainly—we shall send all rules to the devil).

I warmly shake your hand, and I am waiting impatiently for your reply. Do my letters hit the nail on the head, i.e., do they give you what you want?

Yours,
Lenin

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REVOLUTIONARY ADVENTURISM

I

We are living in stormy times, when Russia's history is marching on with seven-league strides, and every year sometimes signifies more than decades of tranquillity. Results of the half-century of the post-Reform period are being summed up, and the corner-stone is being laid for social and political edifices which will determine the fate of the entire country for many, many years to come. The revolutionary movement continues to grow with amazing rapidity—and "our trends" are ripening (and withering) uncommonly fast. Trends firmly rooted in the class system of such a rapidly developing capitalist country as Russia almost immediately reach their own level and feel their way to the classes they are related to. An example is the evolution of Mr. Struve, from whom the revolutionary workers proposed to "tear the mask" of a Marxist only one and a half years ago and who has now himself come forward without this mask as the leader (or servant?) of the liberal landlords, people who take pride in their earthiness and their sober judgement. On the other hand, trends expressing only the traditional instability of views held by the intermediate and indefinite sections of the intelligentsia try to substitute noisy declarations for *rapprochement* with definite classes, declarations which are all the noisier, the louder the thunder of events. "At least we make an infernal noise"[71]—such is the slogan of many revolutionarily minded individuals who have been caught up in the maelstrom of events and who have neither theoretical principles nor social roots.

It is to these "noisy" trends that the "Socialist-Revolutionaries", whose physiognomy is emerging more and more clearly, also belong. And it is high time for the proletariat to have a better look at this physiognomy, and form a clear idea of the real nature of these people, who seek the proletariat's friendship all the more persistently, the more palpable it becomes to them that they cannot exist as a separate trend without close ties with the truly revolutionary class of society.

Three circumstances have served most to disclose the true face of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. These are, first, the split between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists, who are raising their heads under the banner of the "criticism of Marxism". Secondly, Balmashov's assassination of Sipyagin and the new swing towards terrorism in the sentiments of some revolutionaries. Thirdly and mainly, the latest movement among the peasantry, which has compelled such that are accustomed to sit between two stools and have no programme whatever to come out *post factum* with some semblance of a programme. We shall proceed to examine these three circumstances, with the reservation that in a newspaper article it is possible to give only a brief outline of the main points in the argument and that we shall in all likelihood return to the subject and expound it in greater detail in a magazine article, or in a pamphlet.[72]

It was only in No. 2 of *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* that the Socialist-Revolutionaries finally decided to come out with a theoretical statement of principle, in an unsigned editorial headed "The World Progress and Crisis of Socialism". We strongly recommend this article to all who want to get a clear idea of utter unprincipledness and vacillation in matters of theory (as well as of the art of concealing this behind a spate of rhetoric). The entire content of this highly noteworthy article may be expressed in a few words. Socialism has grown into a world force, socialism (= Marxism) is now splitting as a result of the war of the revolutionaries (the "orthodox") against the opportunists (the "critics"). We, Socialist-Revolutionaries, "of course" have never sympathised with opportunism, but we are overjoyed because of the "criticism" which has freed us from

a dogma; we too are working for a revision of this dogma—and although we have as yet nothing at all to show by way of criticism (except bourgeois-opportunist criticism), although we have as yet revised absolutely nothing, it is nevertheless that freedom from theory which redounds to our credit. That redounds to our credit all the more because, as people free of theory, we stand firmly for general unity and vehemently condemn all theoretical disputes over principles. "A serious revolutionary organisation", *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (No. 2, p. 127) assures us in all seriousness, "would give up trying to settle disputed questions of social theory, which always lead to disunity, although this of course should not hinder theoreticians from seeking their solution"—or, more outspokenly: let the writers do the writing and the readers do the reading[73] and in the meantime, while they are busying themselves, we will rejoice at the blank left behind.

There is no need, of course, to engage in a serious analysis of this theory of deviation from socialism (in the event of disputes proper). In our opinion, the crisis of socialism makes it incumbent upon any in the least serious socialists to devote redoubled attention to theory—to adopt more resolutely a strictly definite stand, to draw a sharper line of demarcation between themselves and wavering and unreliable elements. In the opinion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, if such things as confusion and splits are possible "even among Germans", then it is God's will that we, Russians, should pride ourselves on our ignorance of whither we are drifting. In our opinion, the absence of theory deprives a revolutionary trend of the right to existence and inevitably condemns it, sooner or later, to political bankruptcy. In the opinion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, the absence of theory is a most excellent thing, most favourable "for unity". As you see, we cannot reach agreement with them, for the fact of the matter is that we even speak different languages. There is one hope: perhaps they will be made to see reason by Mr. Struve, who also (only more seriously) speaks about the elimination of dogma and says that "our" business (as is the business of any bourgeoisie that appeals to the proletariat) is not to disunite, but to unite. Will not the Socialist-Revolutionaries ever see, with the help of

Mr. Struve, what is *really signified* by their stand of liberation from socialism for the purpose of unity, and unity on the occasion of liberation from socialism?

Let us go over to the second point, the question of terrorism.

In their defence of terrorism, which the experience of the Russian revolutionary movement has so clearly proved to be ineffective, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are talking themselves blue in the face in asseverating that they recognise terrorism only in conjunction with work among the masses, and that therefore the arguments used by the Russian Social-Democrats to refute the efficacy of this method of struggle (and which have indeed been refuted for a long time to come) do not apply to them. Here something very similar to their attitude towards "criticism" is repeating itself. We are not opportunists, cry the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and at the same time they are shelving the dogma of proletarian socialism, for reason of sheer opportunist criticism and no other. We are not repeating the terrorists' mistakes and are not diverting attention from work among the masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries assure us, and at the same time enthusiastically recommend to the Party acts such as Balmashov's assassination of Sipyagin, although everyone knows and sees perfectly well that this act was in no way connected with the masses and, moreover, could not have been by reason of the very way in which it was carried out—that the persons who committed this terrorist act neither counted on nor hoped for any definite action or support on the part of the masses. In their naïveté, the Socialist-Revolutionaries do not realise that their predilection for terrorism is causally most intimately linked with the fact that, from the very outset, they have always kept, and still keep, aloof from the working-class movement, without even attempting to become a party of the revolutionary class which is waging its class struggle. Over-ardent protestations very often lead one to doubt and suspect the worth of whatever it is that requires such strong seasoning. Do not these protestations weary them?—I often think of these words, when I read assurances by the Socialist-Revolutionaries: "by terrorism we are not relegating work among the masses into the background". After all, these assurances come from the very people who have al-

ready drifted away from the Social-Democratic labour movement, which really rouses the masses; they come from people who are continuing to drift away from this movement, clutching at fragments of any kind of theory.

The leaflet issued by the "Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries" on April 3, 1902, may serve as a splendid illustration of what has been stated above. It is a most realistic source, one that is very close to the immediate leaders, a most authentic source. The "presentation of the question of terrorist struggle" in this leaflet "coincides in full" also "with the Party views", according to the valuable testimony of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (No. 7, p. 24).*

The April 3 leaflet follows the pattern of the terrorists' "latest" arguments with remarkable accuracy. The first thing that strikes the eye is the words: "we advocate terrorism, not in place of work among the masses, but precisely for and simultaneously with that work". They strike the eye particularly because these words are printed in letters three times as large as the rest of the text (a device that is of course repeated by *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*). It is all really so simple! One has only to set "not in place of, but together with" in bold type—and all the arguments of the Social-Democrats, all that history has taught, will fall to the ground. But just read the whole leaflet and you will see that the protestation in bold type takes the name of the masses in vain. The day "when the working people will emerge from the shadows" and "the mighty popular wave will shatter the iron gates to smithereens"—"alas!" (literally, "alas!") "is still a long way off, and it is fright-

* True, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* does some juggling with this point also. On the one hand—"coincides in full", on the other—a hint about "exaggerations". On the one hand, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* declares that this leaflet comes from only "one group" of Socialist-Revolutionaries. On the other hand, it is a fact that the leaflet bears the imprint "Published by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party." Moreover, it carries the motto of this same *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* ("By struggle you will achieve your rights"). We appreciate that *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* finds it disagreeable to touch on this ticklish point but we believe that it is simply unseemly to play at hide-and-seek in such cases. The existence of "economism" was just as disagreeable to revolutionary Social-Democracy, but the latter exposed it openly, without ever making the slightest attempt to mislead anyone.

ful to think of the future toll of victims!" Do not these words "alas, still a long way off" reflect an utter failure to understand the mass movement and a lack of faith in it? Is not this argument meant as a deliberate sneer at the fact that the working people are already beginning to rise? And, finally, even if this trite argument were just as well-founded as it is actually stuff and nonsense, what would emerge from it in particularly bold relief would be the inefficacy of terrorism, for *without* the working people all bombs are powerless, patently powerless.

Just listen to what follows: "Every terrorist blow, as it were, takes away part of the strength of the autocracy and transfers [!] all this strength [!] to the side of the fighters for freedom." "And if terrorism is practised systematically [!l, it is obvious that the scales of the balance will finally weigh down on our side." Yes, indeed, it is obvious to all that we have here in its grossest form one of the greatest prejudices of the terrorists: political assassination of itself "transfers strength"! Thus, on the one hand you have the theory of the transference of strength, and on the other—"not in place of, but together with".... Do not these protestations weary them?

But this is just the beginning. The real thing is yet to come. "Whom are we to strike down?" asks the party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and replies: the ministers, and not the tsar, for "the tsar will not allow matters to go to extremes" (!!How did they find that out??), and besides "it is also easier" (this is literally what they say!): "No minister can ensconce himself in a palace as in a fortress." And this argument concludes with the following piece of reasoning, which deserves to be immortalised as a model of the "theory" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. "Against the crowd the autocracy has its soldiers; against the revolutionary organisations its secret and uniformed police; but what will save it..." (what kind of "it" is this? The autocracy? The author has unwittingly identified the autocracy with a target in the person of a minister whom it is easier to strike down!) "...from individuals or small groups that are ceaselessly, and even in ignorance of one another [!!], preparing for attack, and are attacking? No force will be of avail against elusiveness. Hence, our task is clear: to remove every

one of the autocracy's brutal oppressors by the only means that has been left [!] us by the autocracy—death." No matter how many reams of paper the Socialist-Revolutionaries may fill with assurances that they are not relegating work among the masses into the background or disorganising it by their advocacy of terrorism—their spate of words cannot disprove the fact that the actual psychology of the modern terrorist is faithfully conveyed in the leaflet we have quoted. The theory of the transference of strength finds its natural complement in the theory of elusiveness, a theory which turns upside down, not only all past experience, but all common sense as well. That the only "hope" of the revolution is the "crowd"; that only a revolutionary organisation which leads this crowd (in deed and not in word) can fight against the police—all this is ABC. It is shameful to have to prove this. And only people who have forgotten everything and learned absolutely nothing could have decided "the other way about", arriving at the fabulous, howling stupidity that the autocracy can be "saved" from the crowd by soldiers, and from the revolutionary organisations by the police, but that there is no salvation from individuals who hunt down ministers!!

This fabulous argument, which we are convinced is destined to become notorious, is by no means simply a curiosity. No, it is instructive because, through a sweeping reduction to an absurdity, it reveals the principal mistake of the terrorists, which they share with the "economists" (perhaps one might already say, with the former representatives of deceased "economism"?) This mistake, as we have already pointed out on numerous occasions, consists in the *failure to understand* the basic defect of our movement. Because of the extremely rapid growth of the movement, the leaders lagged behind the masses, the revolutionary organisations did not come up to the level of the revolutionary activity of the proletariat, were incapable of marching on in front and leading the masses. That a discrepancy of this sort exists cannot be doubted by any conscientious person who has even the slightest acquaintance with the movement. And if that is so, it is evident that the present-day terrorists are really "economists" turned inside out, going to the equally foolish but opposite extreme. At a time when the revolutionaries *are short of* the forces and means to lead the masses,

who are already rising, an appeal to resort to such terrorist acts as the organisation of attempts on the lives of ministers by individuals and groups that are not known to one another means, not only *thereby* breaking off work among the masses, but also introducing downright disorganisation into that work.

We, revolutionaries, "are accustomed to huddling together in timid knots," we read in the April 3 leaflet, "and even [N.B.] the new, bold spirit that has appeared during the last two or three years has so far done more to raise the sentiments of the crowd than of individuals." These words unintentionally express much that is true. And it is this very truth that deals a smashing rebuff to the propagandists of terrorism. From this truth every thinking socialist draws the conclusion that it is necessary to use group action more energetically, boldly, and harmoniously. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, conclude: "Shoot, elusive individual, for the knot of people, alas, is still a long way off, and besides there are soldiers against the knot." This really defies all reason, gentlemen!

Nor does the leaflet eschew the theory of excitative terrorism. "Each time a hero engages in single combat, this arouses in us all a spirit of struggle and courage," we are told. But we know from the past and see in the present that *only* new forms of the mass movement or the awakening of new sections of the masses to independent struggle really rouses a spirit of struggle and courage *in all*. Single combat however, inasmuch as it remains *single combat* waged by the Balmashovs, has the immediate effect of simply creating a short-lived sensation, while indirectly it even leads to apathy and passive waiting for the next *bout*. We are further assured that "every flash of terrorism lights up the mind", which, unfortunately, we have not noticed to be the case with the terrorism-preaching party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. We are presented with the theory of big work and petty work. "Let not those who have greater strength, greater opportunities and resolution rest content with petty [!] work; let them find and devote themselves to a big cause—the propaganda of terrorism among the masses [!], the preparation of the intricate ... [the theory of elusiveness is already forgotten!] ... terror

ist ventures." How amazingly clever this is in all truth: to sacrifice the life of a revolutionary for the sake of wreaking vengeance on the scoundrel Sipyagin, who is then replaced by the scoundrel Plehve—that is big work. But to prepare, *for instance*, the masses for an armed demonstration—that is petty work. This very point is explained in No. 8 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, which declares that "it is easy to write and speak" of armed demonstrations "as a matter of the vague and distant future", "but up till now all this talk has been merely of a theoretical nature". How well we know this language of people who are free of the constraint of firm socialist convictions, of the burdensome experience of each and every kind of popular movement! They confuse immediately tangible and sensational results with practicalness. To them the demand to adhere steadfastly to the class standpoint and to maintain the mass nature of the movement is "vague" "theorising". In their eyes definitiveness is slavish compliance with every turn of sentiment and ... and, by reason of this compliance, inevitable helplessness at each turn demonstrations begin—and bloodthirsty words, talk about the beginning of the end, flow from the lips of such people. The demonstrations halt—their hands drop helplessly, and before they have had time to wear out a pair of boots they are already shouting: "The people, alas, are still a long way off...." Some new outrage is perpetrated by the tsar's henchmen—and they demand to be shown a "definite" measure that would serve as an exhaustive *reply* to that particular outrage, a measure that would bring about an immediate "transference of strength", and they proudly promise this transference! These people do not understand that this very promise to "transfer" strength constitutes political adventurism, and that their adventurism stems from their lack of principle.

The Social-Democrats will always warn against adventurism and ruthlessly expose illusions which inevitably end in complete disappointment. We must bear in mind that a revolutionary party is worthy of its name only when it guides *in deed* the movement of a revolutionary class. We must bear in mind that any popular movement assumes an infinite variety of forms, is constantly developing new forms and discarding the old, and effecting modifications or new

combinations of old and new forms. It is our duty to participate actively in this process of working out means and methods of struggle. When the students' movement became sharper, we began to call on the workers to come to the aid of the students (*Iskra*, No. 2*) without taking it upon ourselves to forecast the forms of the demonstrations, without promising that they would result in an immediate transference of strength, in lighting up the mind, or a special elusiveness. When the demonstrations became consolidated, we began to call for their organisation and for the arming of the masses, and put forward the task of preparing a popular uprising. Without in the least denying violence and terrorism in principle, we demanded work for the preparation of such forms of violence as were calculated to bring about the direct participation of the masses and which guaranteed that participation. We do not close our eyes to the difficulties of this task, but will work at it steadfastly and persistently, undeterred by the objections that this is a matter of the "vague and distant future". Yes, gentlemen, we stand for future and not only past forms of the movement. We give preference to long and arduous work on what promises a future rather than to an "easy" repetition of what has been condemned by the past. We shall always expose people who in word war against hackneyed dogmas and in practice hold exclusively to such moth-eaten and harmful commonplaces as the theory of the transference of strength, the difference between big work and petty work and, of course, the theory of single combat. "Just as in the days of yore the peoples' battles were fought out by their leaders in single combat, so now the terrorists will win Russia's freedom in single combat with the autocracy," the April 3 leaflet concludes. The mere reprinting of *such* sentences provides their refutation.

Anyone who really carries on his revolutionary work in conjunction with the class struggle of the proletariat very well knows, sees and feels what vast numbers of immediate and direct demands of the proletariat (and of the sections of the people capable of supporting the latter) remain unsatisfied. He knows that in very many places, throughout vast areas, the working people are literally

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*

straining to go into action, and that their ardour runs to waste because of the scarcity of literature and leadership, the lack of forces and means in the revolutionary organisations. And we find ourselves—we see that we find ourselves—in the same old vicious circle that has so long hemmed in the Russian revolution like an omen of evil. On the one hand, the revolutionary ardour of the insufficiently enlightened and unorganised crowd runs to waste. On the other hand, shots fired by the "elusive individuals" who are losing faith in the possibility of marching in formation and working hand in hand with the masses also end in smoke.

But things can still be put to rights, comrades! Loss of faith in a real cause is the rare exception rather than the rule. The urge to commit terrorist acts is a passing mood. Then let the Social-Democrats close their ranks, and we shall fuse the militant organisation of revolutionaries and the mass heroism of the Russian proletariat into a single whole!

In the next article we shall deal with the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

II

The Socialist-Revolutionaries' attitude to the peasant movement is of particular interest. It is precisely in the agrarian question that representatives of the old Russian socialism, their liberal-Narodnik descendants, and also adherents of opportunist criticism who are so numerous in Russia and so vociferously pass assurances that on this score Marxism has already been conclusively disproved by the "critics", have always considered themselves especially strong. Our Socialist-Revolutionaries too are tearing Marxism to shreds, so to speak: "dogmatic prejudices ... outlived dogmas long since refuted by life ... the revolutionary intelligentsia has shut its eyes to the countryside, revolutionary work among the peasantry was forbidden by orthodoxy", and much else in this vein. It is the current fashion to kick out at orthodoxy. But to what subspecies must one relegate those of the kickers who *did not* even *manage* to draw up an outline for an agrarian programme of their own *before*

the commencement of the peasant movement? When *Iskra* sketched its agrarian programme as early as in No. 3,* *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* could only mutter: "Given such a presentation of the question, still another of our differences is fading away"—what happened here is that the editors of *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* had the mishap of utterly failing to understand *Iskra* 's presentation of the question (the "introduction of the class struggle into the countryside"). *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* now belatedly refers to the pamphlet entitled *The Next Question*, although it contains no programme whatever, but only panegyrics on such "celebrated" opportunists as Hertz.

And now these same people—who before the commencement of the movement were in agreement both with *Iskra* and with Hertz—come out, on the day following the peasant uprising, with a manifesto "from the peasant league [!] of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party", a manifesto in which you will not find a single syllable really emanating from the peasantry, but only a literal repetition of what you have read hundreds of times in the writings of the Narodniks, the liberals, and the "critics". ... It is said that courage can move mountains. That is so, Messrs. the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but it is not to such courage that your garish advertisement testifies.

We have seen that the Socialist-Revolutionaries' greatest "advantage" lies in their freedom from theory; their greatest skill consists in their ability to speak without saying anything. But in order to present a programme, one must nevertheless say something. It is necessary, for instance, to throw overboard the "dogma of the Russian Social-Democrats of the late eighties and early nineties to the effect that there is no revolutionary force save the urban proletariat". What a handy little word "dogma" is! One need only slightly twist an opposing theory, cover up this twist with the bogy of "dogma"—and there you are!

Beginning with the *Communist Manifesto*, all modern socialism rests on the indisputable truth that the proletariat alone is a *really* revolutionary class in capitalist society. The other classes may and do become revolutionary only in

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

part and only under certain conditions. What, then, must one think of people who have "transformed" this truth into a dogma of the Russian Social-Democrats of a definite period and who try to convince the naïve reader that this dogma was "based entirely on the belief that open political struggle lay far in the future"?

To counter Marx's doctrine that there is only one really revolutionary class in modern society, the Socialist-Revolutionaries advance the trinity: "the intelligentsia, the proletariat, and the peasantry", thereby revealing a hopeless confusion of concepts. If one sets the intelligentsia against the proletariat and the peasantry it means that one considers the former a definite social stratum, a group of persons occupying just as definite a social position as is occupied by the wage-workers and the peasants. But as such a stratum the Russian intelligentsia is precisely a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. With regard to this stratum, Mr. Struve is quite right in calling his paper the mouthpiece of the Russian intelligentsia. However, if one is referring to those intellectuals who have *not yet taken* any definite social stand, or *have already been thrown off* their normal stand by the facts of life, and are passing over to the side of the proletariat, then it is altogether absurd to contrapose this intelligentsia to the proletariat. Like any other class in modern society, the proletariat is not only advancing intellectuals from its own midst, but also accepts into its ranks supporters from the midst of all and sundry educated people. The campaign of the Socialist-Revolutionaries against the basic "dogma" of Marxism is merely additional proof that the entire strength of this party is represented by the handful of Russian intellectuals who have broken away from the old, but have not yet adhered to the new.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries' views on the peasantry are even more muddled. To take just the posing of the question: "What social classes in general [!] always [!!] cling to the existing ... [the autocratic only? or bourgeois in general?] ... order, guard it and do not yield to revolutionisation?" As a matter of fact, this question can be answered only by another question: what elements of the intelligentsia in general always cling to the existing chaos of ideas,

guard it and do not yield to a definite socialist world outlook? But the Socialist-Revolutionaries want to give a serious answer to an insignificant question. To "these" classes they refer, first, the bourgeoisie, since its "interests have been satisfied". This old prejudice that the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie have already been satisfied to such a degree that we neither have nor can have bourgeois democracy in our country (cf. *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*, No. 2, pp. 132-33) is now shared by the "economists" and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Again, won't Mr. Struve teach them some common sense?

Secondly, the Socialist-Revolutionaries include among these classes the "petty-bourgeois strata" "whose interests are individualistic, undefined as class interests, and do not lend themselves to formulation in a reformative or revolutionary socio-political programme". Whence this has come, the Lord alone knows. It is common knowledge that the petty bourgeoisie does not always and in general guard the existing order, but on the contrary often takes revolutionary action even against the bourgeoisie (specifically, when it joins the proletariat) and very often against absolutism, and that it almost always formulates programmes of social reform. Our author has simply come out with a "noisier" declaration against the petty bourgeoisie, in accordance with the "practical rule", which Turgenev expressed through an "old fox" in one of his "Poems in Prose": "Cry out most loudly against those vices you yourself feel guilty of."[74] And so, *since* the Socialist-Revolutionaries feel that the only social basis of their position between two stools can be perhaps provided only by certain petty-bourgeois sections of the intelligentsia, they *therefore* write about the petty bourgeoisie as if this term does not signify a social category, but is simply a polemical turn of speech. They likewise want to evade the unpleasant fact of their failure to understand that the peasantry of today belongs, as a whole, to the "petty-bourgeois strata". Won't you try to give us an answer on this score, Messrs. the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Won't you tell us why it is that, while repeating snatches of the theory of Russian Marxism (for example, about the progressive significance of peasant outside employment and tramping), you turn a blind eye to the fact that this same Marxism has

revealed the petty-bourgeois make-up of Russian peasant economy? Won't you explain to us how it is possible in contemporary society for "proprietors or semi-proprietors" not to belong to the petty-bourgeois strata?

No, harbour no hopes! The Socialist-Revolutionaries will not reply; they will not say or explain anything bearing upon the matter, for they (again like the "economists") have thoroughly learned the tactic of pleading ignorance when it comes to theory. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* looks meaningly towards *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*—that is their job, they say (cf. No. 4, reply to *Zarya*), while *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* informs its readers of the exploits of the opportunist critics and keeps on threatening to make its criticism ever sharper. That is hardly enough, gentlemen!

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have kept themselves pure of the baneful influence of modern socialist doctrines. They have fully preserved the good old methods of vulgar socialism. We are confronted by a new historical fact, a new movement among a certain section of the people. They do not examine the condition of this section or set themselves the aim of explaining its movement by the nature of that section and its relation to the developing economic structure of society as a whole. To them, all this is an empty dogma, outlived orthodoxy. They do things more simply: what is it that the representatives of the rising section themselves are speaking about? Land, additional allotments, redistribution of the land. There it is in a nutshell. You have a "semi-socialist programme", "a thoroughly correct principle", "a bright idea", "an ideal which already lives in the peasant's mind in embryo form", etc. All that is necessary is to "brush up and elaborate this ideal", bring out the "pure idea of socialism". You find this hard to believe, reader? It seems incredible to you that this Narodnik junk should again be dragged into the light of day by people who so glibly repeat whatever the latest book may tell them? And yet this is a fact, and all the words we have quoted are in the declaration "from the peasant league" published in No. 8 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries accuse *Iskra* of having prematurely tolled the knell of the peasant movement by describing it as the last peasant revolt. The peasantry,

they inform us, can participate in the socialist movement of the proletariat as well. This accusation testifies to the confusion of thought among the Socialist-Revolutionaries. They have not even grasped that the democratic movement against the remnants of serf-ownership is one thing, and the socialist movement against the bourgeoisie is quite another. Since they have failed to understand the peasant movement itself, they have likewise been unable to understand that the words in *Iskra*, which frightened them so, refer only to the former movement. Not only has *Iskra* stated in its programme that the small producers (including the peasants), who are being ruined, can and should participate in the socialist movement of the proletariat, but it has also defined the exact conditions for this participation. The peasant movement of today, however, is not at all a socialist movement directed against the bourgeoisie and capitalism. On the contrary, it unites the bourgeois and the proletarian elements in the peasantry, which are really one in the struggle against the remnants of the serf-owning system. The peasant movement of today is leading—and will lead—to the establishment, not of a socialist or a semi-socialist way of life in the countryside, but of a bourgeois way of life, and will clear away the feudal debris cluttering up the bourgeois foundations that have already arisen in our countryside.

But all this is a sealed book to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. They even assure *Iskra* in all seriousness that to clear the way for the development of capitalism is an empty dogma, since the "reforms" (of the sixties) "did clear [!] full [!!] space for the development of capitalism". That is what can be written by a glib person who lets a facile pen run away with him and who imagines that the "peasant league" can get away with anything: the peasant won't see through it! But kindly reflect for a moment, my dear author: have you never heard that remnants of the serf-owning system retard the development of capitalism? Don't you think that this is even all but tautological? And haven't you read somewhere about the remnants of serf-ownership in the present-day Russian countryside?

Iskra says that the impending revolution will be a bourgeois revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionaries ob-

ject: it will be "primarily a political revolution and to a certain extent a democratic revolution". Won't the authors of this pretty objection try to explain this to us—does history know of any bourgeois revolution, or is such a bourgeois revolution conceivable, that is not "to a certain extent a democratic revolution"? Why, even the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves (equalitarian tenure of land that has become social property) does not go beyond the limits of a bourgeois programme, since the preservation of commodity production and toleration of private farming, even if it is conducted on common land, in no way eliminates capitalist relationships in agriculture.

The greater the levity with which the Socialist-Revolutionaries approach the most elementary truths of modern socialism, the more easily do they invent "most elementary deductions", even taking pride in the fact that their "programme reduces itself" to such. Let us then examine all three of their deductions, which most probably will long remain a monument to the keen wit and profound socialist convictions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Deduction No. 1: "A large portion of the territory of Russia now already belongs to the state—what we need is that all the territory should belong to the people." Our teeth are "now already" on edge from the touching references to state ownership of land in Russia contained in the writings of the police Narodniks (*à la* Sazonov, etc.) and the various *Katheder*-reformers.[75] "What we need" is that people who style themselves socialists and even revolutionaries should trail in the rear of these gentlemen. "What we need" is that socialists should lay stress on the alleged omnipotence of the "state" (forgetting even that a large share of the state land is concentrated in the uninhabited marginal regions of the country), and not on the class antagonism between the semi-serf peasantry and the privileged handful of big landowners, who own most of the best cultivated land and with whom the "state" has always been on the best of terms. Our Socialist-Revolutionaries, who imagine that they are deducing a pure idea of socialism, are in actual fact sullying this idea by their uncritical attitude towards the old Narodism.

Deduction No. 2: "The land is now already passing from capital to labour—what we need is that this process be completed by the state." The deeper you go into the forest, the thicker the trees.* Let us take another step towards police Narodism; let us call on the (class!) "state" to extend peasant landownership in general. This is remarkably socialistic and amazingly revolutionary. But what can one expect of people who call the purchase and lease of land by the peasants a transfer "from capital to labour" and not transfer of land from the feudal-minded landlords to the rural bourgeoisie. Let us remind these people at least of the statistics on the actual distribution of the land that is "passing to labour": between six- and nine-tenths of all peasant-purchased land, and from five- to eight-tenths of all leased land are concentrated in the hands of *one-fifth of the peasant households*, i.e., in the hands of a small minority of well-to-do peasants. From this one can judge whether there is much truth in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' words when they assert "we do not at all count" on the well-to-do peasants but only on the "labouring sections exclusively".

Deduction No. 3: "The peasant already has land, and in most cases on the basis of equalitarian land distribution—what we need is that this labour tenure should be carried through to the end ... and culminate in collective agricultural production through the development of co-operatives of every kind." Scratch a Socialist-Revolutionary and you find Mr. V. V.![76] When it came to action, all the old prejudices of Narodism, which had safely preserved themselves behind shifty phrasing, crept to the surface at once. State ownership of the land—the completion by the state of the transference of the land to the peasantry—the village commune—co-operatives—collectivism—in this magnificent scheme of Messrs. Sazonov, Yuzov, N.—on,[77] the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Hofstetter, Totomiants, and so on, and so forth—in this scheme a mere trifle is lacking. It takes account neither of developing capitalism, nor of the class struggle. But then how could this trifle enter the minds of people whose entire ideological luggage consists of Narodnik rags and smart patches of fashionable

* A Russian saying.—*Ed.*

criticism? Did not Mr. Bulgakov *himself* say that there is no place for the class struggle in the countryside? Will the replacement of the class struggle by "co-operatives of every kind" fail to satisfy both the liberals and the "critics", and in general all those to whom socialism is no more than a traditional label? And is it not possible to try to soothe naïve people with the assurance: "Of course, any idealisation of the village commune is alien to us", although right next to this assurance you read some colossal bombast about the "colossal organisation of the *mir* peasants", then bombast that "in certain respects no other class in Russia is so impelled towards a purely [!] political struggle as the peasantry", that peasant self-determination (!) is far broader in scope and in competence than that of the Zemstvo, that this combination of "broad" ... (up to the very boundary of the village?) ... "independent activity" with an absence of the "most elementary civic rights" "seems to have been deliberately designed for the purpose of ... rousing and exercising [!] political instincts and habits of social struggle". If you don't like all this, you don't have to listen, but....

"One has to be blind not to see how much easier it is to pass to the idea of socialising the land from the traditions of communal land tenure." Is it not the other way round, gentlemen? Are not those people hopelessly deaf and blind who to this very day do not know that it is precisely the medieval seclusion of the semi-serf commune, which splits the peasantry into tiny unions and binds the rural proletariat hand and foot, that maintains the traditions of stagnation, oppression, and barbarism? Are you not defeating your own purpose by recognising the usefulness of outside employment, which has already destroyed by three-quarters the much-vaunted traditions of equalitarian land tenure in the commune, and reduced these traditions to meddling by the police?

The minimum programme of the Socialist Revolutionaries, based as it is on the theory we have just analysed, is a real curiosity. This "programme" includes two items: 1) "socialisation of the land, i.e., its conversion into the property of the whole of society, to be used by the working people"; 2) "the development among the peasantry of all possible types of public associations and economic co-

operatives ... [for a "purely" political struggle?] ... for the gradual emancipation of the peasantry from the sway of money capital ... [and subjugation to industrial?] ... and for the preparation of collective agricultural production of the future." Just as the sun is reflected in a drop of water, so is the entire spirit of the present-day "Social-Revolutionarism" reflected in these two items. In theory, revolutionary phrase-mongering instead of a considered and integral system of views; in practice—helpless snatching at this or that modish petty expedient instead of participation in the class struggle—that is all they have to show. We must admit that it has required rare civic courage to place socialisation of the land *alongside* of co-operation in a *minimum* programme. Their minimum programme: Babeuf, on the one hand, and Mr. Levitsky, on the other.[78] This is inimitable.

If it were possible to take this programme seriously, we should have to say that, in deceiving themselves with grandiloquent words, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are also deceiving the peasants. It is deception to assert that "co-operatives of every kind" play a revolutionary role in present-day society and prepare the way for collectivism rather than strengthen the rural bourgeoisie. It is deception to assert that socialisation of the land can be placed before the "*peasantry*" as a "minimum", as something just as close at hand as the establishment of co-operatives. Any socialist could explain to our Socialist-Revolutionaries that today the abolition of private ownership of land can only be the immediate prelude to its abolition in general; that the mere transfer of the land "to be used by the working people" would still not satisfy the proletariat, since millions and tens of millions of ruined peasants are no longer able to work the land, even if they had it. And to supply these ruined millions with implements, cattle, etc., would amount to the socialisation of all the means of production and would require a socialist revolution of the proletariat and not a peasant movement against the remnants of the serf-owning system. The Socialist-Revolutionaries are confusing socialisation of the land with bourgeois nationalisation of the land. Speaking in the abstract, the latter is conceivable on the basis of capitalism too, without abolishing wage-labour. But the very example of these same Socialist-Revo-

lutionaries is vivid confirmation of the truth that to advance the demand for nationalisation of the land in a police state is tantamount to obscuring the only revolutionary principle, that of the class struggle, and bringing grist to the mill of every kind of bureaucracy.

Not only that. The Socialist-Revolutionaries descend to outright reaction when they rise up against the demand of our draft programme for the "annulment of all laws restricting the peasant in the free disposal of his land". For the sake of the Narodnik prejudice about the "commune principle" and the "equalitarian principle" they deny to the peasant such a "most elementary civic right" as the right freely to dispose of his land; they complacently shut their eyes to the fact that the village commune of today is hemmed in by its social-estate reality; they become champions of the police interdictions established and supported by the "state" ... of the rural superintendents! We believe that not only Mr. Levitsky but Mr. Pobedonostsev[79] too will not be very much alarmed over the demand for socialisation of the land for the purpose of establishing equalitarian land tenure, once this demand is put forth as a minimum demand alongside of which such things figure as co-operatives and the defence of the police system of keeping the muzhik tied down to the official allotment which supports him.

Let the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries serve as a lesson and a warning to all socialists, a glaring example of what results from an absence of ideology and principles, which some unthinking people call freedom from dogma. When it came to action, the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not reveal even a single of the three conditions essential for the elaboration of a consistent socialist programme: a clear idea of the ultimate aim; a correct understanding of the path leading to that aim; an accurate conception of the true state of affairs at the given moment or of the immediate tasks of that moment. They simply obscured the ultimate aim of socialism by confusing socialisation of the land with bourgeois nationalisation and by confusing the primitive peasant idea about small-scale equalitarian land tenure with the doctrine of modern socialism on the conversion of all means of production

into public property and the organisation of socialist production. Their conception of the path leading to socialism is peerlessly characterised by their substitution of the development of co-operatives for the class struggle. In their estimation of the present stage in the agrarian evolution of Russia, they have forgotten a trifle: the remnants of serf-ownership, which weigh so heavily on our countryside. The famous trinity which reflects their theoretical views—the intelligentsia, the proletariat, and the peasantry—has its complement in the no less famous three-point "programme"—socialisation of the land, co-operatives, and attachment to the allotment.

Compare this with *Iskra*'s programme, which indicates to the entire militant proletariat one ultimate aim, without reducing it to a "minimum", without debasing it so as to adapt it to the ideas of certain backward sections of the proletariat or of the small producers. The road leading to this aim is the same in town and countryside—the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. But besides this class struggle, another struggle is going on in our countryside: the struggle of the entire peasantry against the remnants of serf-ownership. And in *this* struggle the party of the proletariat promises its support to the *entire* peasantry and strives to provide its revolutionary ardour with a real objective, and guide its uprising against its real enemy, considering it dishonest and unworthy to treat the muzhik as though he were under tutelage or to conceal from him the fact that at present and immediately he can achieve only the complete eradication of all traces and remnants of the serf-owning system, and only clear the way for the broader and more difficult struggle of the entire proletariat against the whole of bourgeois society.

Iskra, No. 23, August 1,
and No. 24, September 1, 1902

Published according
to the *Iskra* text

A LETTER TO THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE

Dear Comrades,

We have received your letter expressing your gratitude to the author of *What Is to Be Done?* and informing us of the decision to allocate 20 per cent* to *Iskra*. I thank you heartily for this expression of sympathy and solidarity. It is all the more valuable for an author of illegal publications because of the fact that in his work he is completely cut off from his readers. Each exchange of ideas, each report of the impression any article or pamphlet produces on the various groups of readers is of particular importance to us, and we shall be very grateful, not only for letters dealing with the work in the strict sense of the word, not only for contributions to the press, but also for letters which make the author feel that he is not cut off from the reader.

We published your decision to credit 20 per cent to *Iskra* in No. 22 of *Iskra*. However, we did not venture to publish your thanks to Lenin, since for one thing you mentioned that separately, without saying that you would like to see it in print. And for another, the wording of your message of thanks did not seem suitable for the press. But please do not think we attach no importance to publication of the committees' declarations on their solidarity with certain views. On the contrary, *this is of special importance*, particularly now when all of us are thinking of the unification of revolutionary Social-Democracy. It would be highly desirable for the Moscow Committee to express its solidarity with my book in the form of a *statement*, which

* I.e., of the Moscow Party Committee's fund.—*Ed.*

would immediately appear in *Iskra*. It is high time that the committees came out with an open announcement of their Party stand, breaking with those tactics of tacit agreement which prevailed in the "third period". This is the general argument in favour of an open declaration. In particular, I, for example, *have been accused in the press* (by the *Borba* group, in its *Listok**) of wanting to turn the Editorial Board of *Iskra* into the Russian Central Committee, of wanting to "order" "agents" about, etc. This is downright distortion of what is said in *What Is to Be Done?*, but I have no desire to keep on reiterating in the press: "you are distorting". Those who should begin to speak up are, I think, the functionaries in Russia, who *know very well* that the "orders" of *Iskra* go no further than advice and an expression of opinion, and who see that the *organisational* ideas propounded in *What Is to Be Done?* reflect the vitally urgent and burning question of the *actual* movement. I think that these functionaries should themselves demand to be heard and loudly declare how *they* regard this question, how their experience in work leads them to agree with our views on the organisational tasks.

We understand, and naturally could understand, your expression of gratitude for *What Is to Be Done?* only in the sense that this book has provided you with answers to *your own questions*, that through *first-hand* acquaintance with the movement you have *yourselves* arrived at the conviction that bolder, more widespread, more *unified*, and more centralised work is needed, more closely consolidated about a single, central newspaper—a conviction which is also set forth in this book. And this being so, once you have really become convinced of this, it is desirable that the committee should say so openly and emphatically, urging the other committees to work together with it in the same direction, following the same "line", setting itself the same immediate tasks with regard to Party organisation.

We hope, comrades, that you will find it possible to read this letter to a general meeting of the whole committee, and will inform us of your decision on the questions indicated. (In parenthesis, let me add that the St. Peters-

* Literally, a one-sheet newspaper.—*Ed.*

burg Committee has also sent us an expression of solidarity, and is now considering a similar statement.)

Did you have enough copies of *What Is to Be Done?*? Have the workers read it and what is their reaction?

I warmly shake the hands of all the comrades, and wish them full success.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on August 11 (24), 1902

First published in 1922
in P. N. Lepeshinsky's book
At the Turning-Point

Published according
to the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF THE PAMPHLET, *THE TASKS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS*

Exactly five years have passed since the writing of the present pamphlet, which is now appearing in its second edition to meet our agitational requirements. In this brief period such tremendous progress has been made by our young working-class movement and such profound changes have taken place in the position of Russian Social-Democracy and in its strength that it may perhaps appear strange that the need should arise for an old pamphlet simply to be republished. Can it be that in 1902 the "tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" have not changed in the least as compared with 1897? Has, then, the author himself, who at that time summed up what was still the "first experience" of his Party activity, gone no step further in his views on this score?

These (or similar) questions will probably arise in the mind of many a reader, and to answer them we must refer to the pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?*, and supplement some of the remarks made there. This reference is necessary so as to show how the author presented his views on Social-Democracy's present-day tasks, and supplement what is said there (pp. 31-32, 121, 138*) about conditions obtaining when the pamphlet, which is now republished, was being written, and about its relation to that particular "period"

* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

in the development of Russian Social-Democracy. In all, I named four such periods in the above-mentioned pamphlet (*What Is to Be Done?*), the last of which referred "to the sphere of the present and, partly, of the future"; the third period was termed that of the domination (or, at least, the widespread) of the "economist" trend, beginning with 1897-98; the second period was the name given to the years 1894-98, and the first to the years 1884-94. In the second period, in contrast to the third, we see no disagreements among the Social-Democrats themselves. At that time Social-Democracy was ideologically united, and it was then that an attempt was made to achieve the same unity in practice, in organisation (the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party). At that time the main attention of the Social-Democrats was centred not on clearing up and deciding various internal Party questions (as was the case in the third period), but on the ideological struggle against the opponents of Social-Democracy, on the one hand, and on the develop ment of practical Party work, on the other.

There was no such antagonism between the theory and the practice of the Social-Democrats as existed in the period of "economism".

The pamphlet in question reflects the specific features of the then situation and "tasks" of Social-Democracy. It calls for deeper and more widespread practical work, seeing no "obstacles" whatever to this in lack of clarity on any of the general views, principles, or theories, seeing no difficulty (at that time there was none) in combining the political struggle with the economic. It addresses its explanations of principles to adherents of the Narodnaya Volya and the Narodnoye Pravo,[80] who are opposed to Social-Democracy, in an endeavour to dispel the misunderstandings and prejudices which keep them away from the new movement.

So, at the present time, when the "economist" period is evidently coming to an end, the Social-Democrats' stand is again the same as it was five years ago. Of course, the tasks now confronting us are incomparably more complicated, as a result of the immense growth of the movement during this time, but the principal features of the present reproduce, on a broader base and on a larger scale, the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

specific features of the "second" period. The variance between our theory, programme, tactical tasks, and practical activities is disappearing in proportion to the disappearance of "economism". We can and must boldly call again for deeper and more widespread practical work, since the theoretical premises for this work have already been created to a large extent. We must again devote particular attention to non-Social-Democratic illegal trends in Russia, and here we are again confronted with trends which in essence are the very same as those of the first half of the 1890s—only much more developed, organised, and "mature".

While discarding their old vestments, the adherents of the Narodnaya Volya have transformed themselves into "Socialist-Revolutionaries", indicating, as it were, by this very name that they have stopped in mid-stream. They have broken away from the old ("Russian" socialism), but have not yet adhered to the new (Social-Democracy). The only theory of revolutionary socialism known to contemporary mankind, i.e., Marxism, has been relegated by them to the archives on the basis of bourgeois ("Socialists"!) and opportunist ("Revolutionaries"!) criticism. In practice an absence of ideology and principles leads them to "revolutionary adventurism", which finds expression in a number of ways; their endeavours to place on a par such social sections and classes as the intelligentsia, the proletariat, and the peasantry; their noisy advocacy of "systematic" terrorism; their remarkable agrarian minimum programme (socialisation of the land, co-operatives, and attachment to the allotment. See *Iskra*, Nos. 23 and 24*); their attitude towards the liberals (see *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 9, and Mr. Zhitlovsky's review of *Osvobozhdeniye*[81] in No. 9 of *Sozialistische Monatshefte*[82]), and much else with which we shall most probably have to deal more than once. In Russia there are still so many social elements and conditions fostering the instability of the intellectuals, evoking in radically-minded individuals a desire to combine the outmoded and outworn with the lifeless vogue of the day, and hindering their making common cause with the proletariat and its class struggle, that the Russian Social-Democrats will have yet to reckon

* See pp. 184-205 of this volume.—*Ed.*

with a trend or trends similar to that of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" until the time comes when capitalist evolution and the sharpening of class contradictions will cut the ground from under their feet.

The Narodnoye Pravo followers, who in 1897 were at least just as vague (see below, pp. 20-22*) as the present-day Socialist-Revolutionaries, very quickly disappeared from the scene as a consequence of this. But their "sober" idea—that of completely separating from socialism the demand for political liberty—has not died, and could not have died, for in Russia liberal democratic trends are very strong and are constantly becoming stronger among the most diverse sections of the big and petty bourgeoisie. For this reason the liberal *Osvobozhdeniye*, which wants to group around itself the representatives of the bourgeois opposition in Russia, has become the legitimate heir of the Narodnoye Pravo, and its definite, consistent, and mature continuator. And just as the withering and decay of the old, pre-Reform Russia, the patriarchal peasantry, and the old type of intelligentsia, who can be equally enthusiastic over the village commune, agricultural co-operatives, and "elusive" terrorism, are inevitable, so too is it inevitable for the propertied classes of capitalist Russia, the bourgeoisie, and the petty bourgeoisie, to grow and mature, with their sober liberalism, which is beginning to realise that it does not pay to maintain a dull-witted, barbarian, and costly autocratic government that offers no defence against socialism—with their demand for European forms of class struggle and class domination, with their innate (in the period of the awakening and growth of the proletariat) ambition to conceal their bourgeois class interests by denying the class struggle in general.

We thus have reason to be grateful to the liberal landowning gentry who are endeavouring to found a "Zemstvo constitutional party". Let us first begin with the least important thing: we are grateful to them for removing Mr. Struve from Russian Social-Democracy, completing his metamorphosis from a quasi-Marxist into a liberal, helping us by a living example to demonstrate to one and all the real

* See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 344-45.—*Ed.*

meaning of Bernsteinism in general and of Russian Bernsteinism in particular. Secondly, by striving to turn diverse sections of the Russian bourgeoisie into conscious liberals, *Osvobozhdeniye* will help us to hasten the conversion of more and more masses of workers into conscious socialists. There has been so much rambling, liberal-Narodnik quasi-socialism in our country that the new liberal trend is clearly a step forward in comparison. It will now be a simple matter to give the workers a vivid demonstration of the Russian liberal and democratic bourgeoisie, to show the need for an independent political party of the working class that would be part of international Social-Democracy; it will now be a simple matter to call on the intellectuals to make their stand absolutely clear: liberalism *or* Social-Democracy; half-way theories and trends will very quickly be ground down between the millstones of these two growing and mounting "opposites". Thirdly, and this of course is most important, we shall be grateful to the liberals *if* through their opposition they will undermine the alliance between the autocracy and certain sections of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. We say "if" because by flirting with the autocracy, extolling peaceful cultural work, and by their war against "tendentious" revolutionaries, etc., the liberals are undermining not so much the autocracy, as the struggle against the autocracy. By steadily and uncompromisingly exposing all the half-heartedness of the liberals, all their attempts to flirt with the government, we shall be nullifying the effects of this treacherous aspect of the liberal-bourgeois gentlemen's political activity and paralysing their left hands while ensuring the greatest results from the work of their right hands.

Thus, both the Narodnaya Volya and the Narodnoye Pravo have made great strides in developing, defining, and giving shape to their actual aspirations and their actual nature. The struggle which in the first half of the 1890s took place among narrow circles of revolutionary youth is now reviving as a decisive struggle of mature political trends and real political parties.

In view of this, the new edition of the *Tasks* may perhaps prove useful also because it will remind the Party's

young members of its recent past, will show how the Social-Democrats came to occupy that position among the other trends which has only now become fully defined, and will help give a clearer and more distinct picture of the essentially identical but more complex "tasks" of the present.

The Social-Democrats are now faced with the urgent task of putting an end to all dissension and wavering in their midst, of closing their ranks, and merging organisationally under the banner of revolutionary Marxism, of concentrating all their efforts so as to unite all Social-Democrats engaged in practical work, extend and deepen their activity, while at the same time devoting serious attention to explaining to the broadest possible masses of intellectuals and workers the real significance of the two above-mentioned trends, with which Social-Democracy has long had to reckon.

August 1902.

First published in December 1902 in the pamphlet issued by the League of Russian Social-Democracy Abroad

Published according to the text in the pamphlet

THE DRAFT OF A NEW LAW ON STRIKES

We have come into possession of a new confidential document—the memorandum of the Ministry of Finance "On a revision of articles in the law which make strikes and breaches of contract of hire punishable, and on the desirability of instituting workers' organisations for purposes of mutual aid". In view of the length of this memorandum and the need to acquaint the broadest possible sections of the working class with it, we are publishing it as a separate pamphlet.[83] At present, however, we shall give a brief review of the contents of this interesting document and point out its importance.

The memorandum begins with a short survey of the history of our factory legislation, mentioning the Laws of June 3, 1886 and June 2, 1897,[84] and then proceeds to the question of the abolition of criminal liability for leaving employment and for striking. The Ministry of Finance is of the opinion that the threat of arrest or imprisonment for a worker's leaving work without permission or for a number of workers downing tools by agreement among themselves, fails in its purpose. Experience has shown that this does not ensure the maintenance of public order; this threat merely embitters the workers, convincing them of the injustice of the law. The enforcement of these laws is very difficult "in view of the extreme burdensomeness of instituting hundreds and sometimes thousands of proceedings" if every worker who leaves his job is to be tried, and also in view of the fact that it is unprofitable for the factory owner to lose workers if the latter are imprisoned for going on strike. Making strikes a criminal offence leads to inordinately

zealous interference by the police, which does more harm than good, bringing the employers more difficulties and trouble than relief. The memorandum proposes the complete abolition of the individual worker's liability for leaving a factory of his own accord, or for participating in peaceable strikes (unattended by violence or breaches of public law and order, etc.). Following the example of legislation abroad, penalties should be imposed only for "violence, threats, or *defamation* [!] practised by any employer or worker against the person or property of a third person with the object of compelling the latter, despite his free and lawful intentions, to work or to abstain from working" on certain terms. In other words, instead of criminal liability for participation in strikes the proposal is to make it a crime to interfere with "persons desiring to work".

As to the mutual aid societies, the Ministry of Finance complains of arbitrariness on the part of the administrative authorities (which, it claims, is particularly noticeable in Moscow where the Society of Mechanics[85] even claimed the right to "mediate" between workers and management), and demands legislative enactment of proper regulations for such societies and assistance in their organisation.

Thus, the general spirit of the new memorandum of the Ministry of Finance is undoubtedly liberal, and its main point is the proposal to abolish criminal liability for participation in strikes. We shall not analyse the contents of the entire "Bill" in detail here (it will be more convenient to do so after the memorandum has been published in full), but shall merely call the reader's attention to the nature and significance of this liberalism. The proposal to give the workers a certain right to strike and to organise is nothing new, not only in our liberal publicist writings but even in projects coming from official government commissions. In the early sixties, the Stackelberg Commission, which revised factory and artisan regulations, proposed that factory courts elected from among the workers and the employers be set up and that some freedom of organisation be granted the workers. In the eighties the commission charged with drafting a new criminal code proposed the abolition of criminal liability for participation in strikes. However, the present draft of the Ministry of

Finance differs substantially from the earlier projects, and this difference will remain an extremely important sign of the times even if the proposed new draft is pigeon-holed like all others before it. This essential difference consists in the fact that the new draft rests on an incomparably sounder foundation; in it you sense, not only the voice of a few progressive theorists and ideologists of the bourgeoisie, but the voice of an entire section of practical industrialists. This is no longer the liberalism of "humane" government officials and professors alone; it is the home-bred, native liberalism of the Moscow merchants and manufacturers. Let me say frankly that this fact fills my heart with a lofty patriotic pride: the twopenny-halfpenny liberalism of the merchant means much more than the shilling liberalism of the government official. And what is most interesting in the memorandum is not the nauseating talk about freedom of contract and the interests of the state, but the practical considerations of the manufacturers, which break right through the traditional juridical arguments.

This is intolerable! We're fed up! Keep out of it!— is what the Russian manufacturer is saying to the Russian police through the medium of the author of the ministerial memorandum. Just listen indeed to the following line of reasoning:

"To the police authorities, who find support in the vagueness and ambiguity of the existing law, every strike comes not as a natural economic phenomenon, but invariably as a breach of public law and order. If, however, a calmer attitude existed with regard to stoppages of work at factories, and strikes were not made synonymous with breaches of public order, it would be much easier to ascertain the true causes of such, to separate lawful and justifiable grounds from those that are unlawful and untenable and to take the necessary steps towards peaceful agreement between the two parties. Given a more normal state of affairs such as this, restrictive and repressive measures would be resorted to only when disorder was patently in evidence." The police do not go into the reasons for a strike; they are concerned *solely* with cutting it short, to which end they resort to one of two methods: either they force the workers (by arrests, deportation, and other measures "up to and in-

cluding the use of armed force") to return to work, or they prompt the employers to make concessions. "It cannot be said that either of these methods suits" Messrs. the Manufacturers: the former "embitters the workers", the latter "confirms the workers in the extremely harmful belief that a strike is the surest way of getting what they want in every case". "The history of strikes during the last decade affords many illustrations of the harm resulting from the efforts to suppress the resulting complications rapidly and at any cost. Hurriedly made arrests have at times so incensed workers who were completely calm until then that Cossacks had to be brought into action, and after that of course any satisfaction even of the legitimate demands of the strikers was out of the question. On the other hand, cases of prompt satisfaction of the workers' unlawful demands by means of pressure upon the manufacturers did not fail to evoke similar strikes in other industrial enterprises where it became necessary to resort to military force rather than to a system of concessions, which is sometimes entirely incomprehensible to the workers and strengthens their conviction that the authorities are unjust and despotic towards them...." That the police should ever satisfy even unlawful demands of the workers by means of pressure upon the manufacturers—that of course is a fancy of the Messrs. the Capitalists, who want to say that in some cases they themselves, after some bargaining with the strikers, would concede less than they have to concede under the pressure of the grim prospect of "breaches of state law and order". The memorandum has a dig at the Ministry of the Interior, which in its circular letter of August 12, 1897, "issued without agreement with the Ministry of Finance" (that is where the crux of the matter lies!), prescribes both arrest and deportation in every strike and demands that every case connected with strikes be dealt with as required by the emergency regulations. "The higher administrative authorities," continues the memorandum, setting forth the complaints of the manufacturers, "go still further [than the law] and flatly regard *all* [italics in the original] cases of strikes as matters of state importance.... Actually, however, every strike (of course if not accompanied by violence) is a purely economic phenomenon, which is quite natural and in no way jeopard-

dises public law and order. In these cases law and order should be maintained in the same way as during popular festivities, celebrations, performances, and like occasions."

This is the language of genuine Manchester Liberals, who proclaim that the struggle between capital and labour is a purely natural phenomenon, who with remarkable frankness put on a par "trade in commodities" and "trade in labour" (elsewhere in the memorandum), demand non-interference by the state, and assign to this state the role of night (and day) watchman. And, what is of particular importance, the Russian manufacturers have been compelled to adopt this liberal standpoint by none other than our workers. The working-class movement has spread so greatly that strikes have really become "natural economic phenomena". The workers' struggle has assumed such stubborn forms that interference by the police state, which prohibits all manifestations of this struggle, has really begun to prove harmful, not only to the workers (to whom it has, of course, never brought anything but harm), but even to the manufacturers themselves, on whose behalf this interference was practised. The workers actually deprived the police prohibitions of all force, but the police continued (and in an autocratic state could not but continue) to interfere and, feeling their impotence, kept going from side to side: from armed force to concessions, from savage reprisals to blandishments. The less effective police intervention proved, the more keenly did the manufacturers feel the *arbitrariness* of the police, the more inclined they were to believe that it *did not pay* them to support this arbitrariness. The conflict between a certain section of the big industrialists and the all-powerfull police became more and more intense, assuming particularly acute forms in Moscow, where the system of flirting with the workers had flourished most luxuriantly. The memorandum openly complains of the Moscow authorities, who were carrying on a dangerous game with workers' conferences and the workers' mutual aid society in the engineering industry. In order to decoy the workers it became necessary to grant the council of this society a certain right of mediation—and the manufacturers immediately began to kick. "At first this council," the memorandum says at

their dictation, "applied to the Factory Inspectorate, but, seeing that the latter did not recognise its right to act as mediator, a role which it had assumed on its own, it began to turn to the Chief of Police, who not only accepts the tendered statements, but acts on them in due course, thus sanctioning the rights which the council has arrogated to itself." The manufacturers are protesting against particular administrative decrees and demand the legislative enactment of a new system.

True, the manufacturers' liberalism has not ventured so far beyond the extremely narrow limits of their specific interests; their hostility to police arbitrariness is limited to individual cases of police excesses which are not to their advantage, and is not levelled against the mainstays of bureaucratic despotism. But, by aggravating the class antagonisms in the capitalist countries, the economic development of Russia and of the whole world will foster the growth of this hostility, provide greater grounds for it, and intensify it. The proletariat's strength lies precisely in the growth of its numbers and its solidarity as a result of the very process of economic development, while the interests of the big and petty bourgeoisie become more and more scattered and divided. To take into account this "natural" advantage of the proletariat, the Social-Democrats must closely watch all clashes of interests among the ruling classes, using these clashes, not only in order to gain practical advantages for one section or another of the working class, but also for the purpose of enlightening the entire working class, for the purpose of deriving a useful lesson from each new social and political incident.

The practical advantage which the workers stand to gain from the revision of the law proposed by the liberal manufacturers is too obvious to be dwelt on at length. It is an undoubted concession to a growing force, an abandonment by the enemy of one of his positions, which the revolutionary proletariat has practically captured already and which the more far-seeing leaders of the hostile army no longer care to defend. Of course, this is no big concession: first of all, it is ridiculous even to think that *real* freedom, the right to strike, is possible without political liberty. The police still retain the right to make arrests

and to deport without trial, and will retain that right so long as the autocracy continues to exist. And the retention of this right means preservation of nine-tenths of the police interference, the outrages, and the high-handedness, which are beginning to disgust even the manufacturers. Secondly, even in the narrow sphere of factory legislation itself, the Ministry of Finance is taking a very timid step forward, copying the German Bill which the German workers have dubbed the "Hard Labour" Bill,[86] and preserving *special* penalties "for violence, threats, or defamation" in connection with the contract of hire, as if *general* penal laws covering these offences did not exist! But the Russian workers will know how to utilise even this small concession so as to strengthen their positions, to intensify and extend their great struggle for the emancipation of working humanity from wage slavery.

As to the useful lesson taught us by the new memorandum, we must note primarily that the protest of the manufacturers against the medieval strike law affords us a small and particular example of the general incompatibility of interests between the developing bourgeoisie and moribund absolutism. This should give food for thought to those people who (like the Socialist-Revolutionaries) have hitherto timidly shut their eyes to the elements of *bourgeois* opposition in Russia and who continue to reiterate as of old that the "interests" (in general!) of the Russian bourgeoisie are satisfied. It turns out that police arbitrariness clashes now with some, now with other interests of even those sections of the bourgeoisie that are most directly *protected* by the tsarist police and are *threatened directly* with material loss by any loosening of the fetters placed on the proletariat.

It turns out that a real revolutionary movement disorganises the government, not only directly by the fact that it enlightens, rouses, and unites the exploited masses, but also indirectly by the fact that it cuts the ground from under antiquated laws, destroys the faith in the autocracy even of those who would seem to be its confederates, increases "family squabbles" among these confederates, and replaces firmness and unity in the camp of the enemy by dissension and wavering. But in order to achieve such results one condition is required, which our Socialist-Revolutionaries have

never been able to grasp: it is necessary that the movement should be truly revolutionary, i.e., that it should rouse to a new life ever broader sections of the really revolutionary class, that it should actually refashion the spiritual and political make-up of this class, and through it, of all those who come in contact with it. If the Socialist-Revolutionaries grasped this truth, they would understand what practical harm is wrought by their ideological poverty and the unprincipledness of their approach to the fundamental problems of socialism; they would understand that it is not the forces of the government but those of the revolution that are disorganised by people who preach that against the crowd the autocracy has its soldiers and against organisations—the police, whereas individual terrorists who remove ministers and governors are truly elusive.

The new "step" by the executive board of the manufacturers' henchmen affords us still another useful lesson. This lesson is that we must be able to make practical use of any liberalism, even of the twopenny-halfpenny variety, and that at the same time we must be on our guard lest this liberalism corrupt the masses with its false presentation of questions. An example is Mr. Struve, an interview with whom we could put under the heading: "How the liberals want to teach the workers and how the workers should teach the liberals." In No. 4 of *Osvobozhdeniye*, which has begun publication of the memorandum under analysis, Mr. Struve tells us, among other things, that the new draft is an expression of "statesmanship", which, he says, will scarcely succeed in breaking through the wall of arbitrariness and senselessness. No, Mr. Struve. It was not "statesmanship" that advanced the new strike Bill, but the manufacturers. This Bill has appeared, not because the state "recognised" the basic principles of civil law (the bourgeois "liberty and equality" of employers and workers), but because the abolition of criminal liability for participation in strikes has become *advantageous to the manufacturers*. The juridical formulations and wholly conclusive reasons now assigned by the Ministry of Finance "itself" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 4, p. 50) existed long ago in Russian publications and even in the reports of government commissions, but it all remained buried in oblivion until the *captains of industry* raised their voices,

after the workers had *shown them in practice* how absurd the old laws were. We stress the decisive importance of the manufacturers' advantages and interests not because we believe that this diminishes the importance of the government schemes—on the contrary, we have already stated that this raises their importance in our eyes. But the proletariat must learn above all to look at things squarely and soberly in its struggle against the whole of the present-day system, to lay bare the real causes behind "lofty acts of state", and to expose unremittingly the false and high-sounding bombast about "statesmanship", etc., to which the sly police officials give utterance deliberately, and the learned liberals short-sightedly.

Further, Mr. Struve advises the workers to be "restrained" in their agitation for the abolition of criminal liability for participation in strikes. "The more restrained it [this agitation] will be in form," Mr. Struve preaches, "the greater its significance will be." The workers should cordially thank this former socialist for such advice. This is the traditional Molchalin[87] wisdom of the liberals—to preach restraint at the very time when the government has just begun to waver (on some particular question). More restraint is needed so as not to hinder implementation of the incipient reform, so as not to raise apprehensions, and to make use of the propitious moment when the first step has already been taken (a memorandum has been drawn up!) and when some government department's recognition of the necessity for reforms gives "irrefutable [?] proof both to the government and to society [!] of the justice and timeliness" (?) of these reforms. This is how Mr. Struve reasons with regard to the draft under discussion, and this is how the Russian liberals have always reasoned. However this is not how the Social-Democrats reason. Just look, they say, even some manufacturers have already begun to understand that the European forms of the class struggle are better than Asiatic police tyranny. Our stubborn fight has forced even the manufacturers to doubt the omnipotence of the myrmidons of the autocracy. Forward, then, more boldly! Spread more widely the glad tidings of irresolution in the enemy camp; take advantage of the slightest sign of wavering on the part of the enemy so as to increase your demands rather than "restrain" them in

the Molchalin manner. Against the debt the government owes to the people, they want to pay you one kopek in every hundred rubles. One payment of this kopek in order to demand in louder and louder terms the whole sum, to completely discredit the government and prepare our forces to deliver a decisive blow at it.

Iskra, No. 24, September 1, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

A LETTER TO THE EDITORS OF *YUZHNY RABOCHY*[88]

Dear Comrades,

Your detailed letter has greatly gladdened us all. Please send us the promised supplement as soon as possible, and write oftener. We hope soon to send one of the comrades to you for more detailed and final talks; meanwhile we shall confine ourselves to the most important points.

You are right a thousand times over when you say that we must unite as soon as possible, indeed immediately, in a single all-Russian organisation, whose aim would be to prepare the ground for ideological unity among the committees and for the practical, organisational unity of the Party. We, for our part, have already taken a number of fairly important steps in this direction, thanks to the fact that the St. Petersburg Committee has come over fully to the *Iskra* point of view, published a statement to this effect, and *de facto* (this, of course, is strictly *entre nous**) merged with the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, and given its members very influential places in the committee's central group. If we succeed in getting the same complete solidarity and complete fusion with the South, the actual unification of the Party will be three-quarters on the way to accomplishment. This must be pushed ahead as fast as possible. We are taking steps immediately, first, to see to it that members of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia visit you for the purpose of coming to an agreement; second, to establish connections here with Chernyshov. For your part, hurry up the release (or publication in *Iskra*) of your statement of

* Between us.—*Ed.*

principles, fully defining your position in the Party, and take all steps towards actual fusion with the *Iskra* organisation in Russia.

In conclusion, a few words on the questions you have raised. Regarding the peasantry and the agrarian programme, we are not clear on precisely what you find unsatisfactory in our draft agrarian programme and what changes you would like. Let us know this more concretely. Have you seen No. 4 of *Zarya* with the article on the agrarian programme?* In general, your remarks about the mistakes made by *Iskra* show how important it is for us to communicate more frequently and regularly so as to achieve complete harmony. We have so devilishly few forces that only the closest unity of all Social-Democrats can ensure us success in the struggle against both the "adventurers" and the government. And yet we hitherto knew almost nothing about your standpoint, for instance, or about your practical work—is that normal? Besides, is it normal that you, for instance, are now taking steps on your own to establish permanent transport connections, while we are doing it likewise on our own? (Let us know in greater detail what steps you are taking, how and where, what are the means you have, etc.) This same circumstance, i.e., the shortage of forces, should be taken into account in considering the question of a special press organ, of continuing the publication of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, of changing it to *Russky Rabochy*. We must weigh all aspects of the matter with the utmost care. Just consider where we are to get the forces for two papers, when we know very well that we have not enough even for one. Won't you be giving St. Petersburg (the non-*Iskra*-ist elements in St. Petersburg) a stimulus to publish *Rabochaya Mysl* also as an "explanatory", popular, etc., paper? And this at a time when St. Petersburg is preparing to discontinue *Rabochaya Mysl* and at last get down to real work on *Iskra*. Won't your efforts to arrange regular contributions to *Iskra* from Russia suffer as a result of your plans—and you know that without this collaboration *Iskra* cannot become a genuine Party organ; don't forget either that, except for you, we have practically no one in view for this work. And if the *Iskra*-ists

* See pp. 105-48 of this volume.—*Ed.*

don't take this in hand, who will do so, and when? Finally, thrash out more thoroughly the question of whether the purposes of explanatory, propagandist, popular literature meant for the "average worker" (as you put it) are compatible with the purposes of a newspaper. That there must be literature specially designed for the average worker and the masses is indisputable; but this can be only in the form of leaflets and pamphlets, since it is *impossible* for a newspaper properly to *explain every* question to the average worker. For this we must begin from the *beginning*, with the ABC, and go straight through to the end, carefully and thoroughly examining all aspects of a question. A newspaper would scarcely be in a position to do this even if it were assured of ideal conditions with regard to literary forces. Don't forget, lastly, that what you do, whether you desire it or not, will be of all-Russian importance, and that all talk, notions, and theories about *special* papers "for the intelligentsia" and "for the workers" may play a most pernicious part, not only irrespectively of your desires, but even despite anything you may do to counteract it personally. After all, there is only a handful like you among the Russian Social-Democrats, while among the mass of the Russian Social-Democrats there is still a very great deal of narrow-mindedness of all kinds. We do not, of course, intend to limit ourselves to these cursory remarks on a question of such importance, but we only ask you not to unduly hasten your decision, and to discuss the matter from all angles. We consider it even *desirable* to preserve a separate group (the Editorial Board of *Yuzhny Rabochy*) at least until the Party congress, but this group should not be in a hurry with its paper.

Written on September 3 (16), 1902

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Published according to the manuscript

A LETTER TO A COMRADE ON OUR ORGANISATIONAL TASKS[89]

Written in September 1902

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1904

Россійская Соціальдемократическая Рабочая Партія.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Письмо къ товарищу

о нашихъ организаціонныхъ задачахъ

Н. Ленина

Изданіе Центральнаго Комитета Р. С.-Д. Р. Партіи.

Женева
Типографія Партіи, Rue de la Coulouvrenière, 27.
1904

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet, *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*. 1904

Reduced

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet, A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks, 1904
Reduced

Dear Comrade,

It is with pleasure that I accede to your request for a criticism of your draft for the "Organisation of the St. Petersburg Revolutionary Party". (Most likely you meant the organisation of the work of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in St. Petersburg.) The question you have raised is so important that all members of the St. Petersburg Committee, and even all Russian Social-Democrats in general, should take part in its discussion.

First of all, let me express my complete agreement with your explanation of the unsuitableness of the former ("league type", as you term it) organisation of the "League". You refer to the lack of serious training and revolutionary education among the progressive workers, to the so-called elective system, which *Rabocheye Dyelo* supporters are championing so proudly and stubbornly on the grounds of "democratic" principles, and to the workers' alienation from active work.

That precisely is the case: 1) the lack of serious training and revolutionary education (not only among the workers, but among the intellectuals as well), 2) the misplaced and immoderate application of the elective principle, and 3) the workers' alienation from active revolutionary work—that is where the main shortcoming of the St. Petersburg organisation and of many other local organisations of our Party really lies.

I fully share your basic view on the organisational tasks, and also subscribe to your organisational plan, so far as I understand its general outlines from your letter.

Specifically, I wholly agree with you that special stress should be laid on the tasks connected with the work on an all-Russian scale and with the work of the Party as a whole;

in your draft this is expressed in Clause One, which reads: "The newspaper *Iskra*, which has permanent correspondents among the workers and close contact with the work within the organisation, is the leading centre of the *Party* (and not only of a committee or a district)." I should merely like to remark that the newspaper can and should be the *ideological* leader of the Party, evolving theoretical truths, tactical principles, general organisational ideas, and the general tasks of the whole Party at any given moment. But only a special central group (let us call it the Central Committee, say) can be the direct *practical* leader of the movement, maintaining *personal* connections with all the committees, embracing all the best revolutionary forces among the Russian Social-Democrats, and *managing* all the general affairs of the Party, such as the distribution of literature, the issuing of leaflets, the allocation of forces, the appointment of individuals and groups to take charge of special undertakings, the preparation of demonstrations and an uprising on an all-Russian scale, etc. Since the strictest secrecy of organisation and preservation of continuity of the movement is essential, our Party can and should have *two* leading centres: a C.O. (Central Organ) and a C. C. (Central Committee). The former should be responsible for ideological leadership, and the latter for direct and practical leadership. Unity of action and the necessary solidarity between these groups should be ensured, not only by a single Party programme, but also by the *composition of the two groups* (both groups, the C.O. and the C.C., should be made up of people who are in complete harmony with one another), and by the institution of regular and systematic joint conferences. Only then will the C.O., on the one hand, be placed beyond the reach of the Russian gendarmes and assured of consistency and continuity, while, on the other hand, the C.C. will always be at one with the C.O. on all essential matters and have sufficient freedom to *take* direct *charge* of all the practical aspects of the movement.

For this reason it would be desirable that Clause One of the Rules (according to your draft) should not only indicate which Party organ is recognised as the leading organ (that, of course, is necessary), but should also state that the given local organisation sets itself the task of working ac-

tively for the *creation*, support, and consolidation of those central institutions without which our Party cannot exist as a party.

Further, in Clause Two, you say that the committee should "direct the local organisation" (perhaps it would be better to say: "all local work and all the local organisations of the Party"; but I shall not dwell on details of formulation), and that it should consist of both workers and intellectuals, for to divide them into two committees is harmful. This is absolutely and indubitably correct. There should be only one committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and it should consist of fully convinced Social-Democrats who devote themselves entirely to Social-Democratic activities. We should particularly see to it that as many workers as possible become fully class-conscious and professional revolutionaries and members of the committee.* Once there is a *single* and not a dual committee, the matter of the committee members *personally* knowing many workers is of particular importance. In order to take the lead in whatever goes on in the workers' midst, it is necessary to be able to have access to all quarters, to know very many workers, to have all sorts of channels, etc., etc. The committee should, therefore, include, as far as possible, all the principal *leaders* of the working-class movement from among the workers themselves; it should direct *all* aspects of the local movement and take charge of *all* local institutions, forces and means of the Party. You do not say how the committee should be set up—most likely, here too we shall agree with you that it is scarcely necessary to have special regulations about this; how to set up the committee is a matter for the Social-Democrats on the spot to decide. However, it should perhaps be pointed out that new members should be added to the committee by decision of a majority (or two-thirds, etc.) of its members, and that the committee should see to it that its list of contacts is placed in hands that are reliable (from the revolutionary standpoint) and safe (in the political sense), and that it prepares candi-

* We must try to get on the committee revolutionary workers who have the greatest contacts and the best "reputation" among the mass of the workers.

date-members in advance. When we have the C.O. and the C.C., new committees should be set up only with their co-operation and their consent. As far as possible, the committees should not have very many members (so that they consist of well-educated people, each well versed in the technique of his particular branch of revolutionary activity), but at the same time they should include a sufficient number to take charge of *all* aspects of the work, and to ensure full representation and binding decisions. Should it happen that the number of members is fairly large and that it is hazardous for them to meet frequently, it might then be necessary to select from the committee a special and very small *executive* group (consisting of, say, five, or even fewer persons), which should without fail include the secretary and those most capable of giving practical guidance to the work as a whole. It is *particularly important* that candidate-members be provided for this group so that the work should not have to stop in case of arrests. The activities of the executive group, its membership, etc., should be subject to approval by a general meeting of the committee.

Further, *after* the committee, you propose the following institutions under it: 1) discussion meetings (conferences of the "best" revolutionaries), 2) district circles with 3) a propagandists' circle attached to each of these, 4) factory circles, and 5) "meetings of representatives" of delegates from the factory circles of a given district. I fully agree with you that *all* further institutions (and of these there should be very many and extremely diversified ones, besides those mentioned by you) should be subordinated to the committee, and that it is necessary to have district groups (for the very big cities) and factory groups (always and everywhere). But I do not quite agree with you, it seems, on several details. For instance, with regard to "discussion meetings" I think that these are *wholly unnecessary*. The "best revolutionaries" should all be on the committee, or engaged in special work (printing, transport, agitational tours, the organisation, say, of a passport bureau, or of combat squads to deal with spies and *agents provocateurs*, or of groups in the army, etc.).

"Conferences" will be held in the committee and in each district, in each factory, propagandist, trade (weavers, me-

chanics, tanners, etc.), student, literary, etc., circle. Why should conferences be made a special institution?

Further. You quite justifiably demand that the opportunity to write to *Iskra* directly should be given to "everyone who wants it". Only "directly" should not be understood to mean that "everyone who wants it" should be given access to the editorial office or its address, but that it should be obligatory to hand over (or forward) to the editors letters from *all who so desire*. The addresses should, of course, be made known to a *fairly wide circle*; however, they should not be given to everyone who wants them, but only to revolutionaries who are reliable and known for their ability to observe the conditions of secrecy—perhaps even not to one person in each district, as you suggest, but to several. It is also necessary that all who take part in our work, each and every circle, *should have the right* to bring their decisions, desires and requests to the attention of the *committee*, *as well as* of the C.O. and C.C. If we ensure this, then *all conferences of Party functionaries* will have the benefit of *full information*, without instituting anything so cumbersome and contrary to the rules of secrecy as "discussion meetings". Of course, we should also endeavour to arrange *personal conferences* of the greatest possible number of all and sundry functionaries—but then here everything hinges on the observance of secrecy. General meetings and gatherings are possible in Russia only rarely and by way of exception, and it is necessary to be doubly wary about allowing the "best revolutionaries" to attend these meetings, since it is easier in general for *agents provocateurs* to get into them and for spies to trail some participant of the meeting. I think that perhaps it would be better to do as follows: when it is possible to organise a big (say, 30 to 100 people) general meeting (for instance, in the summer-time in the woods, or in a secret apartment that has been specially secured for this purpose), the committee should send one or two of the "best revolutionaries" and *make sure* that the meeting is attended by the proper people, i.e., for example, that invitations should be extended to as many as possible of the reliable members of the factory circles, etc. But these meetings should not officially go on record; they should not be put in the Rules, or held regularly; matters should not be arranged in

such a way that everyone who attends the meeting knows everyone else there, i.e., knows that everyone is a "representative" of a circle, etc.; that is why I am opposed, not only to "discussion meetings" but also to "meetings of representatives". In place of these two institutions I would propose a rule to the following effect. The committee must see to the organisation of big meetings of as many people as possible who are practical participants in the movement, and of the workers in general. The time, place, and occasion for the meeting and its composition are to be determined by the committee, which is responsible for the secret arrangement of such affairs. It is self-evident that the organisation of workers' gatherings of a less formal character at outings, in the woods, etc., is in no way restricted by this. Perhaps it would be even better not to say anything about this in the Rules.

Further, as regards the district groups, I fully agree with you that it is one of their most important tasks to organise the *distribution* of literature properly. I think the district groups should for the main part act as *intermediaries* between the committees and the factories, intermediaries and even mostly *couriers*. Their chief task should be the proper distribution of the literature received from the committee in accordance with the rules of secrecy. This is an extremely important task, for if we secure regular contact between a special district group of distributors *and all the factories* in that district, as well as the largest possible number of *workers' homes* in that district, it will be of enormous value, both for demonstrations and for an uprising. Arranging for and organising the speedy and proper delivery of literature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., training a network of agents for this purpose, means performing the *greater* part of the work of preparing for future demonstrations or an uprising. It is too late to start organising the distribution of literature at a time of unrest, a strike, or turmoil; this work can be built up only gradually, by making distributions *obligatory* twice or three times a month. If no newspapers are available, leaflets may and should be distributed, but the distributive machine must in no case be allowed to remain idle. This machine should be brought to such a degree of perfection as to make it possible to inform and mobilise, so to speak,

the whole working-class population of St. Petersburg overnight. Nor is this by any means a Utopian aim, provided there is a systematic transmission of leaflets from the centre to the narrower intermediary circles and from them to the distributors. In my opinion, the functions of the district groups should not be extended beyond the bounds of purely intermediary and transmission work, or, to put it more accurately, they should be extended only with the utmost caution—otherwise this can only increase the risk of discovery and be injurious to the integrity of the work. Of course, conferences to discuss all Party questions will take place in the district circles as well, but *decisions* on all general questions of the local movement should be made only by the committee. The district groups should be permitted to act independently only on questions concerning the technical aspect of transmission and distribution. The composition of the district groups should be determined by the committee, i.e., the committee *appoints* one or two of its members (or even comrades who are not on the committee) as delegates to this or that district and instructs them to *establish a district group*, all the members of which are likewise installed in office, so to speak, by the committee. The district group is a branch of the committee, deriving its powers only from the latter.

I now pass on to the question of propagandists' circles. It is hardly possible to organise such circles separately in every district owing to the scarcity of our propagandist forces, and it is hardly desirable. Propaganda must be carried on in one and the same spirit by the whole committee, and it should be strictly centralised. My idea of the matter is therefore as follows: the committee instructs several of its members to organise a group of propagandists (which will be a branch of the committee or *one of the institutions of the committee*). This group, using for the sake of secrecy the *services* of the district groups, should conduct propaganda *throughout the town*, and in all localities "within the jurisdiction" of the committee. If necessary, this group may set up subgroups, and, so to say, entrust certain of its functions to the latter, but all this can be done only with the sanction of the committee, which must always and unconditionally possess the right of detailing its delegate to any

group, subgroup, or circle which has any connection at all with the movement.

The same pattern of organisation, the same type of branches of the committee or its institutions, should be adopted for all the various groups serving the movement—students' groups in the higher and secondary schools; groups, let us say, of supporters among government officials; transport, printing, and passport groups; groups for arranging secret meeting places; groups whose job it is to track down spies; groups among the military; groups for supplying arms; groups for the organisation of "financially profitable enterprises," for example, etc. The whole art of running a secret organisation should consist in making use of *everything possible*, in "giving everyone something to do", at the same time retaining *leadership* of the whole movement, not by virtue of having the power, of course, but by virtue of authority, energy, greater experience, greater versatility, and greater talent. This remark is made to meet the possible and usual objection that strict centralisation may all too easily ruin the movement if the centre *happens* to include an *incapable* person invested with tremendous power. This is, of course, possible, but it cannot be obviated by the elective principle and decentralisation, the application of which is absolutely impermissible to any wide degree and even altogether detrimental to revolutionary work carried on under an autocracy. Nor can any rules provide means against this; such means can be provided only by measures of "comradely influence", beginning with the resolutions of each and every subgroup, followed up by their appeals to the C.O. and the C.C., and ending (if the worst comes to the worst) with the *removal* of the persons in authority who are absolutely incapable. The committee should endeavour to achieve the greatest possible division of labour, bearing in mind that the various aspects of revolutionary work require various abilities, and that sometimes a person who is absolutely useless as an organiser may be invaluable as an agitator, or that a person who is not good at strictly secret work may be an excellent propagandist, etc.

Incidentally, while on the subject of propagandists, I should like to say a few words in criticism of the usual practice of *overloading* this profession with incapable people

and thus lowering the level of propaganda. It is sometimes the habit among us to regard every student as a propagandist without discrimination, and every *youngster* demands that he should "be given a circle", etc. This must be countered because it does a great deal of harm. There are *very few* propagandists whose principles are invariably consistent and who are really capable (and to become such one must put in a lot of study and amass experience); such people should therefore be specialised, put wholly on this kind of work, and be given the utmost care. Such persons should deliver several lectures a week and be sent to other towns when necessary, and, in general, capable propagandists should make tours of various towns and cities. But the mass of young beginners should be given mainly practical assignments, which are somewhat neglected in comparison with the students' conduct of circles, which is optimistically called "propaganda". Of course, thorough training is also required for serious practical enterprises; nevertheless, work in this sphere can more easily be found for "beginners" too.

Now about the factory circles. These are particularly important to us: the main strength of the movement lies in the organisation of the workers at the *large* factories, for the large factories (and mills) contain not only the predominant part of the working class, as regards numbers, but even more as regards influence, development, and fighting capacity. Every factory must be our fortress. For that every "factory" workers' organisation should be as secret internally as "ramified" externally, i.e., in its outward relationships, it should stretch its feelers as far and in as many directions as any revolutionary organisation. I emphasise that here, too, a group of revolutionary workers should necessarily be the core, the leader, the "master". We must break completely with the traditional type of purely labour or purely trade-union Social-Democratic organisation, *including* the "factory" circles. The factory group, or the factory (mill) committee (to distinguish it from other groups of which there should be a great number) should consist of a very small number of *revolutionaries*, who take their instructions and receive their authority to carry on all Social-Democratic work in the factory *directly from the committee*. Every member of the factory committee should regard himself as an

agent of the committee, obliged to submit to all its orders and to observe all the "laws and customs" of the "army in the field" which he has joined and from which in time of war he has no right to absent himself without official leave. The composition of the factory committee is therefore a matter of very great importance, and one of the chief duties of the committee should be to see to the proper organisation of these subcommittees. This is how I picture it: the committee instructs certain of its members (plus, let us say, certain workers who for some reason or other have not been included in the committee, but who can be very useful by reason of their experience, knowledge of people, intelligence, and connections) to organise factory subcommittees everywhere. This group consults with the district representatives, arranges for a number of meetings, thoroughly checks candidate-members of the factory subcommittees, subjects them to close cross-examination, where necessary puts them to the test, endeavouring personally to examine and verify the *largest possible* number of candidate-members of the subcommittee of the factory in question, and, finally, submits a list of members for each factory circle to the committee for approval, or proposes that authority be given to some designated worker to set up, nominate or select a complete subcommittee. In this way, the committee will also determine which of these agents is to maintain contact with it *and how* the contact is to be maintained (as a general rule, through the district representatives, but this rule may be supplemented and modified). In view of the importance of these factory subcommittees, we must see to it as far as possible that *every* subcommittee is in possession of an address to which it can direct its communication to the C.O. and of a *repository* for its list of contacts in some safe place (i.e., that the information required for the immediate re-establishment of the subcommittee in the event of arrests is transmitted as regularly and as fully as possible to the Party centre, for safekeeping in a place where the Russian gendarmes are unable to get at it). It is a matter of course that the transmission of addresses must be determined by the committee at its own discretion and on the basis of the facts at its disposal, and not on the basis of some non-existent right to a "democratic" allocation of these addresses.

Finally, it is perhaps not superfluous to mention that it may sometimes be necessary, or *more convenient*, to confine ourselves to the appointment of one agent from the committee (and an alternate for him) instead of a factory subcommittee consisting of several members. As soon as the factory subcommittee has been formed it should proceed to organise a number of factory groups and circles with diverse tasks and varying degrees of secrecy and organisational form, as, for instance, circles for delivering and distributing literature (this is one of the most important functions, which must be organised so as to provide us with a real postal service of our own, so as to possess tried and tested methods, not only for distributing literature, but also for delivering it to the homes, and so as to provide a definite knowledge of all the workers' addresses and ways of reaching them); circles for reading illegal literature; groups for tracking down spies*; circles for giving special guidance to the trade-union movement and the economic struggle; circles of agitators and propagandists who know how to initiate and to carry on long talks in an *absolutely legal* way (on machinery, inspectors, etc.) and so be able to speak safely and publicly, to get to know people and see how the land lies, etc.** The factory subcommittee should endeavour to embrace the whole factory, the largest possible number of the workers, with a network of all kinds of circles (or agents). The success of the subcommittee's activities should be measured by the abundance of such circles, by their accessibility to touring propagandists and, above all, by the correctness of the regular work done in the *distribution of literature* and the collection of information and correspondence.

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* We must get the workers to understand that while the killing of spies, *agents provocateurs*, and traitors may sometimes, of course, be absolutely unavoidable, it is highly undesirable and mistaken to make a system of it, and that we must strive to create an organisation which will be able to render spies *innocuous* by exposing them and tracking them down. It is impossible to do away with all spies, but to create an organisation which will ferret them out and *educate* the working-class masses is *both possible and necessary*.

** We also need combat groups, in which workers who have had military training or who are particularly strong and agile should be enrolled, to act in the event of demonstrations, in arranging escapes from prison, etc.

To sum up, the general type of organisation, in my opinion, should be as follows: a committee should be at the head of the entire local movement, of all the local Social-Democratic activities. From it should stem the institutions and branches subordinate to it, such as, first, *the network of executive agents* embracing (as far as possible) the whole working-class mass and organised in the form of *district* groups and factory (mill) subcommittees. In times of peace this network will be engaged in distributing literature, leaflets, proclamations and the secret communications from the committee; in times of war it will organise demonstrations and similar collective activities. Secondly, the committee will also branch out into circles and groups of all kinds serving the whole movement (propaganda, transport, all kinds of underground activities, etc.). All groups, circles, subcommittees, etc., should enjoy the status of committee institutions or branches of a committee. Some of them will openly declare their wish to join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and, if endorsed by the committee, will join the Party, and will assume definite functions (on the instructions of, or in agreement with, the committee), will undertake to obey the orders of the Party organs, receive the same rights as all Party members, and be regarded as immediate candidates for membership of the committee, etc. Others will not join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and will have the status of circles formed by Party members, or associated with one Party group or another, etc.

In all *internal* matters, members of *all* these circles are of course on an equal footing, as are all members of a committee. The only exception will be that the right of *personal* contact with the local committee (as well as with the C.C. and the C.O.) will be reserved solely to the person (or persons) appointed for that purpose by the committee. In all other respects, this person will be on an equal footing with the rest, who will also have the right to present statements (but not in person) to the local committee and to the C.C. and C.O. It follows that the exception indicated will not at all be an infraction of the principle of equality, but merely a necessary concession to the absolute demands of secrecy. A member of a committee who fails to transmit

a communication of his "own" group to the committee, the C.C. or the C.O., will be guilty of a direct breach of Party duty. Further, the degree of secrecy and the organisational form of the various circles will depend upon the nature of the functions: accordingly, the organisations will be most varied (ranging from the "strictest", narrowest, and most restricted type of organisation to the "freest", broadest, most loosely constituted, and open type). For instance, strictest secrecy and military discipline must be maintained in the distributing groups. The propagandists' groups must also maintain secrecy, but be under far less military discipline. Workers' groups for reading legal literature, or for organising discussions on trade-union needs and demands call for still less secrecy, and so on. The distributing groups should belong to the R.S.D.L.P. and know a certain number of its members and functionaries. The groups for studying labour conditions and drawing up trade-union demands need not necessarily belong to the R.S.D.L.P. Groups of students, officers, or office employees engaged in self-education *in conjunction with* one or two Party members should in some cases not even be aware that these belong to the Party, etc. But in one respect we must *absolutely* demand the *maximum degree of organisation* in all these branch groups, namely, that every Party member belonging to such a group is formally responsible for the conduct of work in the group and is obliged to take *every* measure in order that the composition of each of these groups, the whole *mechanism* of its work, and the content of that work should be *known as fully as possible* to the C.C. and the C.O. That is necessary in order that the centre may have a *complete* picture of the whole movement, that the selection for various Party posts may be made from the widest possible circle of people; that all groups of a similar nature throughout Russia may learn from one another (through the medium of the centre), and that warning may be given in the event of the appearance of *agents provocateurs* or suspicious characters—in a word, that is absolutely and vitally necessary in all cases.

How is it to be done? By submitting regular reports to the committee, by transmitting to the C.O. as much of the contents as possible of as large a number of reports as possible, by arranging that members of the C.C. and the local

committee visit the various circles, and, finally, by making it *obligatory* to hand over the list of contacts with these circles, i.e., the names and addresses of several members of each circle, for safekeeping (and to the Party bureau of the C.O. and the C.C.). Only when reports are submitted and contacts transmitted will it be possible to say of a Party member belonging to a given circle that he has done his duty; only then will the Party as a whole be in a position *to learn* from every circle that is carrying on practical work; only then will arrests and dragnets lose their terror for us, for if contacts are maintained with the various circles it will always be easy for a delegate of our C.C. to find substitutes *immediately* and have the work resumed. The arrest of a committee will then not destroy the whole machine, but only remove the leaders, who will always have candidates ready. And let it not be said that the transmission of reports and contacts is impossible because of the need to maintain secrecy: once there is the desire to do so, it is always, and *will always*, be possible to hand over (or forward) reports and contacts, so long as we have committees, a C.C. or a C.O.

This brings us to a highly important principle of all Party organisation and all Party activity: while *the greatest possible centralisation* is necessary with regard to the ideological and practical *leadership* of the movement and the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, *the greatest possible decentralisation* is necessary with regard to keeping the Party centre (and therefore the Party as a whole) *informed* about the movement, and with regard to *responsibility* to the Party. The leadership of the movement should be entrusted to the smallest possible number of the most homogeneous possible groups of professional revolutionaries with great practical experience. Participation in the movement should extend to the greatest possible number of the most diverse and heterogeneous groups of the most varied sections of the proletariat (and other classes of the people). The Party centre should always have before it, not only exact information regarding the activities of each of these groups, but also the *fullest possible information regarding their composition*. We must centralise the leadership of the movement. We must also (and *for that very reason*, since without information centralisation is impossible) as far as possible

decentralise responsibility to the Party on the part of its individual members, of every participant in its work, and of every circle belonging to or associated with the Party. This decentralisation is an essential prerequisite of revolutionary centralisation and an *essential corrective to it*. Only when centralisation has been carried through to the end and when we have a C.O. and a C.C., will it be possible for every group, however small, to communicate with them—and not only communicate with them, but to do so *regularly* as a result of a system established by years of experience—only then will the possibility of grievous consequences resulting from an accidentally unfortunate composition of a local committee be eliminated. Now that we are coming close to actual unity in the Party and to the creation of a real leading centre, we must well remember that *this centre will be powerless* if we do not at the same time introduce the *maximum of decentralisation* both with regard to responsibility to the centre and with regard to keeping it informed of all the cogs and wheels of the Party machine. This decentralisation is nothing but the reverse side of the *division of labour* which is generally recognised to be one of the most urgent practical needs of our movement. No official recognition of a given organisation as the leading body, no setting-up of a formal C.C. will make our movement really united, or create an enduring militant Party, if the Party centre continues to be *cut off* from direct practical work by the local committees of the old type, i.e., by committees such as are, on the one hand, made up of a regular jumble of persons, each of whom carries on all and every kind of work, without devoting himself to some definite type of revolutionary work, without assuming responsibility for some special duty, without carrying through a piece of work to the end, once it has been undertaken, thoroughly considered and prepared, wasting an enormous amount of time and energy in radicalist noise-making, while, on the other hand, there is a great mass of students' and workers' circles, half of which are altogether unknown to the committee, while the other half are just as cumbersome, just as lacking in specialisation, just as little given to acquiring the experience of professional revolutionaries or to benefiting from the experience of others, just as taken

up with endless conferences "about everything", with elections and with drafting rules, as the committee itself. For the centre to be able to work properly, the local committees *must reorganise themselves*; they must become specialised and more "business-like" organisations, achieving real "perfection" in one or another practical sphere. For the centre not only to advise, persuade, and argue (as has been the case hitherto), but really conduct the orchestra, it is necessary to know exactly who is playing which fiddle, and where and how; where and how instruction has been or is being received in playing each instrument; who is playing out of tune (when the music begins to jar on the ear), and where and why; and who should be transferred, and how and where to, so that the discord may be remedied, etc. At the present time—this must be said openly—we either know nothing about the *real internal* work of a committee, except from its proclamations and general correspondence, or we know about it from friends or good acquaintances. But it is ridiculous to think that a huge Party, which is capable of leading the Russian working-class movement and which is preparing a general onslaught upon the autocracy, can limit itself to this. The number of committee members should be cut down; each of them, wherever possible, should be entrusted with a definite, special and important function, for which he will be held to account; a special, very small, directing centre must be set up; a network of executive agents must be developed, linking the committee with every large factory, carrying on the regular distribution of literature and giving the centre an exact picture of this distribution and of the entire mechanism of the work; lastly, numerous groups and circles must be formed, which will undertake various functions or unite persons who are close to the Social-Democrats, who help them and are preparing to become Social-Democrats, so that the committee and the centre may be constantly informed of the activities (and the composition) of these circles—these are the lines along which the St. Petersburg, and all the other committees of the Party, should be reorganised; and this is why the question of Rules is of so little importance.

I have begun with an analysis of the draft Rules in order to bring out the drift of my proposals more clearly. And as

a result it will, I hope, have become clear to the reader that in fact it would perhaps be possible to get along *without Rules*, substituting for them regular reports about each circle and every aspect of the work. What can one put in the Rules? The committee guides the work of everyone (this is clear as it is). The committee elects an executive group (this is not always necessary, and when it is necessary it is not a matter of Rules but of *informing* the centre of the composition of this group and of the candidate-members to it). The committee distributes the various fields of work among its members, charging every member to make regular reports to the committee and to keep the C.O. and C.C. informed about the progress of the work (here, too, it is more important to inform the centre of whatever assignments have been made than to include in the Rules a regulation which *more frequently than not* will go by the board because of scarcity of our forces). The committee must specify exactly who its members are. New members are added to the committee by co-optation. The committee appoints the district groups, factory subcommittees and certain groups (if you wish to enumerate them you will never be done, and there is no point approximately in enumerating them in the Rules; it is sufficient to inform the centre about their organisation). The district groups and subcommittees organise the following circles.... It would be all the less useful to draw up such Rules at present since we have practically no general Party experience (and in many places none whatever) with regard to the activities of the various groups and subgroups of this sort, and in order to acquire such experience what is needed is not Rules but the organisation of Party information, if I may put it in this way. Each of our local organisations now spends at least a few evenings on discussing Rules. If instead, each member would devote this time to making a detailed and well-prepared report *to the entire Party* on his particular function, the work would gain a hundredfold.

And it is not merely because revolutionary work does not always lend itself to definite organisational form that Rules are useless. No, definite organisational form is necessary, and we must endeavour to *give such form* to all our work as far as possible. That is permissible to a much greater

extent than is generally thought, and achievable not through Rules but solely and exclusively (we must keep on reiterating this) through transmitting exact information to the Party centre; it is only then that we shall have real organisational form connected with real responsibility and (inner-Party) publicity. For who of us does not know that *serious* conflicts and differences of opinion among us are actually decided not by vote "in accordance with the Rules", but by struggle and threats to "resign"? During the last three or four years of Party life the history of *most* of our committees has been replete with such internal strife. It is a great pity that this strife has not assumed definite form: it would then have been much more instructive for the Party and would have contributed much more to the experience of our successors. But no Rules can create *such* useful and essential definiteness of organisational form; this can be done solely through *inner-Party publicity*. Under the autocracy we can have no other means or weapon of inner-Party publicity than keeping the Party centre regularly informed of Party events.

And only after we have learned to apply this inner-Party publicity on a wide scale shall we actually be able to amass experience in the functioning of the various organisations; only on the basis of such extensive experience over a period of many years shall we be able to draw up Rules that will *not be mere paper Rules*.

POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND POLITICAL CHICANERY

At present it seems that the home policy of the Russian Government can least of all be accused of insufficient resoluteness and clarity. The fight against the enemy at home is in full swing. Hardly ever has there been a time when fortresses, prisons, police stations, and even private homes and apartments temporarily converted into lock-ups have been so crammed with persons under arrest. There is no room for all those who have been seized; it is impossible to send all the exiles to Siberia by the usual "means of transportation", without equipping extraordinary "expeditions"; there are neither the forces nor the means for instituting a uniform regime for all prisoners, and the wholly arbitrary behaviour of the distraught and tyrannical local authorities especially rouses the indignation of the prisoners and drives them to protest, struggle, and hunger-strikes. The higher authorities, however, while leaving it to the small fry to deal with the internal enemies already in custody, are zealously continuing their labours to "improve" and reorganise the police with a view to striking further against the very roots and branches. It is war pure and simple, and it is not only becoming apparent to ever greater masses of the Russian population, but is actually being more or less directly felt by them. The vanguard of police and gendarmerie flying squads are slowly but surely followed by the heavy artillery of the law. Take the laws of the preceding month, and the first things to strike you are the new ukases which destroy the last vestiges of Finland's liberties, and in addition, perhaps, the extensive law on mutual aid societies for the nobility. The first of these measures completely undermines the independence of the Finnish courts and Senate,

making it possible for the Governor-General to know everything, to control everything, i.e., actually converting Finland into one of those numerous Russian provinces which enjoy no rights and are abased. From now on, remarks *Finlandskaya Gazeta*, the police-controlled government newspaper, there is hope for the "harmonious" activity of all local institutions.... I am at a loss to say whether this is a malicious sneer at an unarmed foe who has been dealt a most foul and deliberate blow, or unctuous twaddle in the spirit of "Judas" Golovlyov.[90]

The second of the laws mentioned above is the latest offspring of the same Select Committee for Affairs of the Nobility, which has already blessed the fatherland with the looting of Siberian lands ("the imposition of landed proprietorship in Siberia").[91] At a time of severe commercial and industrial crisis and complete impoverishment in the countryside, when millions of workers and peasants are prey to hunger, malnutrition, and distress, it is of course impossible even to imagine a better way of using the people's money than for hand-outs to the unfortunate landed gentry. First, the government will grant to each mutual aid society for the nobility a certain lump sum ("at the discretion of His Majesty the Emperor"!), and, secondly, over a period of ten years it will grant them as much again as members of the local nobility will themselves contribute. The societies will assist those who have difficulty in paying interest on loans. The gentlemen of the nobility need have no compunction about accepting loans when they have been shown such an easy way of getting money for payments from the pockets of the people.

And as if deliberately to sum up this policy of persecution, violence, and plunder, to generalise and consecrate it, there came the tsar's addresses to the nobility, Zemstvoists, peasants, and workers (in Kursk and St. Petersburg). The tsar thanked the nobility for the service it had rendered him, service "dictated by conscience rather than by fear", and promised to display ceaseless concern in the promotion of landed proprietorship, "which constitutes the age-old pillar of law and order and of the moral strength of Russia". To the Zemstvoists the tsar said nothing at all either about a pillar, or about the moral strength of

Russia, or about service dictated by conscience rather than by fear. He told them briefly and plainly that their "mission is to organise local efforts in the sphere of economic requirements", and that only if they bore this in mind, only if they discharged this mission successfully, could they be assured of his graciousness. This was an absolutely definite answer to the constitutional yearnings of the Zemstvoists, a direct warning (or, to be more exact, challenge) to them, a threat to withhold his "graciousness" in the event of the slightest transgression on their part beyond the bounds of "local efforts in the sphere of economic requirements".

Further, to the peasants the tsar openly expressed censure for the "disturbances" and the "plunder of estates", describing as "merited punishment" the brutal beating and torture of the muzhiks who had risen in hunger and desperation, and recalling the words of Alexander III, who had enjoined them to "obey the Marshals of the Nobility". Lastly, to the workers the tsar spoke neither more nor less than "about enemies", *his* enemies, who should also be the enemies of the workers.

And so, the noblemen are the faithful servants and the age-old pillar of law and order. The Zemstvoists (or Zemstvo noblemen?) get a warning. The peasants too are censured and are commanded to obey the noblemen. The workers are faced squarely with the question of *enemies*. Instructive speeches. It is instructive to compare them, and it would be most desirable to acquaint as many people as possible both with the exact text and the real meaning of these speeches, through the medium of proclamations, leaflets, and talks in study circles and at meetings. Simple explanatory notes to the text of these speeches would serve as splendid material for agitation among the most unenlightened part of the most backward sections of the working class, the small traders and manufacturers, and the peasantry. And not only the "ignorant", but also many an enlightened and educated Russian citizen would also benefit by careful pondering over the tsar's speeches—especially from among the liberals in general and among the Zemstvoists in particular. It is not often that one hears from the lips of royalty such an explicit avowal, confirmation, and declaration of war at home: war

of the various classes of the population, war against domestic enemies. And an open avowal of war is an excellent remedy against all and sundry forms of political chicanery, i.e., attempts to gloss over, evade and hush up the war, or attempts to constrict and dwarf its nature.

The political chicanery to which we refer is exhibited both by the government and the peaceful opposition, and occasionally even by the revolutionaries (although it is true that in the case of the latter it assumes a special form which does not resemble the former). On the part of the government it is deliberate enticement, bribery, and corruption, in short, a system that has come to be known as "Zubatovism". Promises of more or less extensive reforms, actual readiness to carry out the tiniest fraction of what has been promised, and the demand to refrain from political struggle in return for this—such is the essence of Zubatovism. Now even some of the Zemstvoists already see that the parleys between Mr. Plehve, Minister of the Interior, and Mr. D. N. Shipov (Chairman of the Moscow Zemstvo Board) constitute the beginning of "Zemstvo Zubatovism". Plehve promises to deal "more favourably" with the Zemstvo (cf. *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 7), promises to convene a conference of chairmen of Zemstvo Boards early next year for "settling all questions concerning the functioning of Zemstvo institutions", demanding in return that the Zemstvoists "say nothing about representation in the higher government bodies". It would appear that the matter is as clear as can be: the promise is most indefinite, while the demand is such that, if it is complied with, the Zemstvoists' yearnings cannot be realised. Against this political deceit, trickery, and corruption there is only one remedy: merciless exposure of the tricksters, and a resolute political (i.e., in Russian conditions, *revolutionary*) struggle against the police autocracy. Judging by *Osvobozhdeniye*, our Zemstvoists, however, are not yet equal to this task. They reply to political chicanery in kind, and their mouthpiece betrays utter instability. In No. 7 of *Osvobozhdeniye* this instability is particularly glaring owing to the fact that opinions on the question at issue are voiced not only by the editors but also by several contributors with whom the editors more or less disagree. In the editorial, the view

that Plehve's promises are a trap and an expression of Zubatovism is given only as the opinion of a few Zemstvoists, and right next to this we are given the opinion of other Zemstvoists who "are inclined to follow the minister's instructions" (!!). The editors are far from the idea of launching a campaign against Zemstvo Zubatovism. They have cautioned the Zemstvoists against "concessions" to the government (in Nos. 5 and 6), but they do not come out with a resolute condemnation of Mr. Shipov and Co., who have heeded the advice of the old police fox and deleted from the agenda of the spring congress of the Zemstvo Point 4 (which dealt with the necessity of supplementing the Select Committee on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry with elected Zemstvo representatives). The conclusion drawn by the editors in their leading article is not that the Zemstvo is degraded because part of the Zemstvoists have fallen for the police's vile bait, but because the very fact of negotiations between the government and the Zemstvo "proves that the Zemstvo is now already a 'representative body'" (!!) and that the "congress" promised by Mr. Plehve (it seems to me Mr. Plehve spoke only about a "conference"?) "is desirable in any case", since it "cannot but clear up the relations between the Zemstvo and the government". The editors are "firmly convinced that the Zemstvoists will behave at the congress as befits them—as representatives of the people, and not as assistants to the ministers in the economic sphere". If one judges solely by this leading article, one must, on the contrary, be firmly convinced that the Zemstvoists will again act as "assistants" of the police authorities, as Messrs. Shipov and Co. have done (until another Zemstvo trend thrusts them aside, or refashions them).

A welcome relief from the political chicanery in this leading article is offered by further articles from contributors: Mr. Anton Staritsky's and even more so the article of the Zemstvo Councillor Mr. T. The former calls the action of Mr. Shipov and Co. a "false step", advises the Zemstvoists "not to be hasty in thinking that some sort of congress arranged by Mr. Plehve will confirm them in their birthright", advises them not to fall for the bait, and refrain from political chicanery. The editors comment: "On

the whole we agree with the author of this article", evidently in the opinion that, in particular, political chicanery should not be condemned so one-sidedly.*

The second contributor, however, openly rebels against the entire stand of *Osvobozhdeniye*, attacking its incompleteness and irresolution, condemning such false language as, for instance, references to "the people's anarchy", and declaring that "it is impossible to rest content with half-measures, that it is necessary to decide to go on to the very end", that "it is necessary to have done with the servile half-measures of the legal opposition..." "stopping at no sacrifice", that "unless we become revolutionaries, we [Zemstvoists] will be unable to contribute anything substantial to the cause of the political emancipation of Russia". From the bottom of our hearts we welcome these honest and firm statements by the Zemstvo councillor and earnestly advise everyone who takes an interest in the problem under examination to make a study of them. He *fully* confirms the appraisal of the *Osvobozhdeniye* programme given by us in *Iskra*. More than that: his article shows not only the correctness of our point of view, but also the expediency of our sharp exposure of the half-heartedness of liberalism. It appears that among the Zemstvoists themselves there are people who are repelled by shilly-shallying of any sort and whom we must make special efforts to support by ruthlessly criticising such shilly-shallying from our standpoint.

The editor of *Osvobozhdeniye*, of course, does not agree with Zemstvo Councillor T. and—respectfully but firmly—declares: "We see many things in a different light...." To say the least! And what then are the objections of the editors? They boil down to two main points: firstly, Mr. Struve prefers peaceful paths "on principle", in contrast, as he believes, to some revolutionaries; secondly, he accuses the latter of insufficient tolerance. Let us examine these objections.

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* In No. 8 of *Osvobozhdeniye*, which we have just received, we already have a more resolute condemnation of political chicanery and Mr. Shipov's false step. Good! Perhaps the incident with this respected personage will induce the editors to look for the roots of "political chicanery" in their fundamental views about the relations between liberalism and the revolutionary trends?

In an article headed "Apropos of a Reproach" Mr. Struve (the article is over his signature.—*Ed.*) quotes my article in No. 2-3 of *Zarya* ("The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism"). What displeased him particularly, of course, were the words: "if, for once at least, the people taught the government a good lesson" it would be of "enormous historical significance".* You see, Mr. Struve decidedly and categorically disagrees that violent revolution is preferable to peaceful reform. The most resolute Russian revolutionaries, he says, preferred the peaceful path on principle, and no doctrines whatever can stifle this glorious tradition.

It is difficult to conceive of anything more fallacious and laboured than this argument. Does Mr. Struve really fail to understand that a slave who has risen in revolt is morally entitled to speak about the preferability of peace with the slaveowner, whereas a slave who renounces rebellion sinks into shameful hypocrisy when he repeats the very same words? "The elements of revolution in Russia are, unfortunately *or fortunately*, not yet ripe", says Mr. Struve, and this word "fortunately" shows him up completely.

As for the glorious traditions of revolutionary thought, Mr. Struve would be well advised to keep silent on this score. We need only refer to the famous closing words of the *Communist Manifesto*.[92] We need only recollect that thirty years after the publication of the *Manifesto*, when the German workers were deprived of a portion of the rights which the Russian people have never had, Engels retorted to Dühring in the following words:

"To Herr Dühring force is the absolute evil; the first act of force is to him the original sin; his whole exposition is a jeremiad on the contamination of all subsequent history consummated by this original sin; a jeremiad on the shameful perversion of all natural and social laws by this diabolical power, force. That force, however, plays also another role in history, a revolutionary role; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one, that it is the instrument with the aid

* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

of which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilised political forms—of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of the economic system of exploitation—unfortunately, because all use of force, forsooth, demoralises the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has been given by every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision—which indeed may be forced on the people—would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness as a result of the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War. And this parsons' mode of thought—lifeless, insipid and impotent—claims the right to impose itself on the most revolutionary party that history has known!"[93]

Let us proceed to the second point, dealing with tolerance. What we need is "mutual understanding", "complete frankness", and "great tolerance" in relations between the various trends, we are unctuously instructed by Mr. Struve (like many Socialist-Revolutionaries and exponents of public opinion). Well, and what should we do, we ask him, if our complete frankness will seem to you to be lack of tolerance? If we, for example, find that *Osvobozhdeniye* has a right hand and a left hand, a pernicious and treacherous left hand, does not complete frankness make it incumbent upon us to wage ruthless battle against this left hand? Does not such frankness oblige us to fight against the adventurism (and political chicanery) of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, when they display it both in questions of the theory of socialism and in the attitude they have towards the class struggle in all their tactics? Is there even the slightest trace of political sense in the demand to water down this struggle and to render it innocuous for the sake of that which the very people this struggle is directed against are pleased to term tolerance?

It is high time to dispense with your tawdry show of naïveté, gentlemen! High time to understand the simple truth that it is not political chicanery, not what the late Stepnyak[94] once called self-restriction and self-concealment, not the conventional lie of diplomatic mutual recognition

that ensure a genuine (and not merely an alleged) joint struggle against the common enemy, but actual participation in the struggle, actual unity in struggle. When the struggle of the German Social-Democrats against the military-police and feudal-clerical reaction really became one with the struggle of any genuine party which relied for support upon a definite class of the people (for instance, the liberal bourgeoisie), then joint action was instituted without any phrase-mongering about mutual recognition. One does not talk about recognising a fact that is obvious to everyone and felt by everyone (we, for instance, do not ask anyone to recognise the working-class movement!). Only people who confuse politics with political chicanery can think that the "tone" of polemics can interfere with a genuine political alliance. But so long as we have evasive talk instead of genuine participation in our struggle, so long as we have only adventurist tactics instead of a genuine advance towards our struggle on the part of some other social stratum or class, no spate of threatening or miserable words will bring "mutual recognition" one iota nearer.

Iskra, No. 26, October 15, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

CONCERNING DEMONSTRATIONS[95]

It seems to us that the writer of the letter raises the question rather too bluntly and underestimates the significance of organised demonstrations. We have as yet done little in this important matter, and our efforts must be concentrated mainly and primarily on organisation. As long as we lack solidly united revolutionary organisations capable of mustering several detachments of picked people to direct all aspects of a demonstration, so long will failures be inevitable. Once an organisation like that takes shape and gains strength in the process of work, through a number of experiences, then it (and it alone) will be able to decide the question as to when and how it is necessary to arm, and when and how arms should be used. This organisation will also have to give serious attention to the question of raising "the speed of mobilisation" (a very important circumstance quite rightfully emphasised by the writer of the letter), of increasing the number of active demonstrators, training marshals for demonstrations, extending agitation among the masses, drawing "the crowd of onlookers" "into the work", and of "corrupting" the troops. Precisely because a step like the transition to armed street fighting is a "tough" one and because it is "inevitable, sooner or later", it can and should be taken only by a strong revolutionary organisation which *directly* leads the movement.

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Published according
to the manuscript

VULGAR SOCIALISM AND NARODISM AS RESURRECTED BY THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

Ridicule has its good effects. In the articles entitled "Revolutionary Adventurism",* we expressed the firm conviction that our Socialist-Revolutionaries would never agree to state their theoretical position in unambiguous and precise terms. To refute so malignant and unjust a suggestion a series of articles has been started in No. 11 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* under the title "Questions of Programme". Good! Better late than never. We welcome in advance all articles in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* on "questions of programme" and we promise close attention directed towards ascertaining whether it will actually be possible to extract any *programme* from them.

With this end in view, let us examine the first article, "The Class Struggle in the Countryside", but we shall first remark that when our opponents say (No. 11, p. 6) "our programme has been set out", they are once more being unduly ... "carried away". You must admit, gentlemen, that this is not true! You have not yet set out any programme, i.e., you have not only failed to produce a complete exposition of your views as officially endorsed by the Party (a programme in the narrow sense of the word, or at least a draft programme), but you have not even defined in the least your attitude towards such fundamental "questions of programme" as the question of Marxism and opportunist criticism of it, or the question of Russian capitalism, and of the position, significance, and tasks of the proletariat which

* See pp. 184-205 of this volume.—*Ed.*

that capitalism has called into being, and so on. All we know of "your programme" is that you occupy an altogether indefinite position *between* revolutionary Social-Democracy and the opportunist trend on the one hand, and *between* Russian Marxism and Russian liberal Narodism on the other.

We shall now show you, using the issue you have taken up, the kind of inextricable contradictions you are entangled in, as a result of this laboured attempt to sit between two stools. "It is not that we fail to understand, but we deny that the present-day peasantry as a whole belongs to the petty-bourgeois strata," writes *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (No. 11). "We regard the peasantry as being sharply divided into two fundamentally different categories: 1) the working peasantry which lives by the exploitation of its own labour-power [!??] and 2) the rural bourgeoisie—middle and petty—which to a greater or lesser extent lives by the exploitation of the labour-power of others." The Socialist-Revolutionary theoreticians, who consider that the "essential distinguishing feature" of the bourgeois class is its "source of income" (use of the unpaid labour of others), discover "tremendous similarity in principles" between the rural proletariat and the "independent farmers" who live by applying their own labour to the means of production. "Labour, as a definite category of political economy, is the basis of the existence of both groups. This is one point. Another is that under present conditions both are *mercilessly exploited*." Consequently, they must be put into a *single* category of the working peasantry.

We have deliberately presented the arguments of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* in such detail in order to enable the reader to ponder over them and to appraise their theoretical premises. That these premises are without foundation is patent. To look for the fundamental distinguishing feature of the various classes of society in their sources of income is to give precedence to relations of distribution, which in reality are only a consequence of relations of production. This error was long ago pointed out by Marx, who described as vulgar socialists those who failed to see it. The fundamental criterion by which classes are distinguished is the place they occupy in social production, and, consequently,

the relation in which they stand to the means of production. Appropriation of one part or another of the social means of production and its application to private enterprise, to undertakings organised for the sale of the product, is the fundamental distinction of one class in present-day society (the bourgeoisie) from the proletariat, which is deprived of the means of production and sells its labour-power.

To proceed: "*Labour*, as a definite category of political economy, is the basis of the existence of both groups." It is not labour that is a definite category of political economy, but only the social form of labour, the social organisation of labour, or, in other words, the mutual relations of people arising out of the part they play in social labour. The same mistake in vulgar socialism, which we have analysed above, is repeated here in another form. When the Socialist-Revolutionaries say: "In essence, the relations between farmer and farm-labourer, on the one hand, and between independent peasants and the money-lenders, the kulaks, on the other, are exactly the same," they are reproducing in its entirety the mistake of, say, German vulgar socialism, which, in the person of Mühlberger, for example, stated that in essence the relations between employer and worker are the same as those between house owner and tenant. Our Mühlbergers are equally incapable of distinguishing between the basic and the derivative forms of exploitation, and confine themselves to declamations on the subject of "exploitation" in general. Our Mühlbergers are equally incapable of understanding that it is precisely the exploitation of wage-labour that forms the basis of the whole predatory system of today, that it is the exploitation of wage-labour that leads to the division of society into irreconcilably opposed classes, and that only from the point of view of *this* class struggle can all other manifestations of exploitation be consistently gauged, without lapsing into vagueness and abandoning all principles. Our Mühlbergers must therefore meet from those Russian socialists who value the integrity of their movement and the "good name" of their revolutionary banner a rebuff just as decisive and merciless as that which the German Mühlberger met.

To give a clearer idea of how muddled our Socialist-Revolutionaries' "theory" is, we shall approach the ques-

tion under discussion from its practical aspect and try to illustrate it by concrete examples. In the first place, the vast majority of the petty bourgeoisie is everywhere and always *working* and being exploited. Otherwise, why should it be classed among transitional and intermediate strata? In the second place, small artisans and tradesmen are *working* and being exploited in a commodity-producing society in exactly the same way as the peasants are. Perhaps our Socialist-Revolutionaries would like to create also a "category" of "working" trade-and-industrial population instead of the "narrow" category of the proletariat? Thirdly, in order that the Socialist-Revolutionaries may appreciate the importance of the "dogma" they so dislike, let them try to visualise a peasant living near some town, who, without hiring any hands, lives by his own labour and by the sale of all kinds of agricultural produce. We make bold to hope that even the most ardent Narodniks will not venture to deny that *this* sort of peasant belongs to the petty bourgeoisie and that it is impossible to "unite" him in the same *class* (mark you, we are talking of a class, not of a party) with the wage-workers. But is there any difference in principle between the position of this kind of commercial farmer and that of any small farmer in a society of a developing commodity economy?

The question now arises how can we account for the fact that Messrs. the Socialist-Revolutionaries are (to put it mildly) drawing closer to vulgar socialism? May it not be a chance peculiarity in this particular writer? To refute this supposition it will suffice to quote the following passage from No. 11 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, where the writer exclaims: "As if it were all a matter of the size of one and the same economic category" (the big and petty bourgeois) "and not of a difference in principle" (just listen to that!) "between two categories, viz., labour economy and bourgeois capitalist economy!" It would be difficult for us even to imagine a more complete and obvious confirmation of what we said in our article, "Revolutionary Adventurism": scratch a Socialist-Revolutionary and you find Mr. V. V. This sentence alone is enough to explain the Socialist-Revolutionaries' position to anyone at all familiar with the evolution of Russian social and political thought. It

is a known fact that at the bottom of the pale-pink quasi-socialism which used to embellish (and still embellishes) liberal Narodism, the trend prevalent in our educated society, lay the idea that peasant "labour economy" and bourgeois economy are diametrically opposed. This idea, various shades of which have been elaborated in detail by Messrs. Mikhailovsky, V. V., Nik.—on, and others, was one of the strongholds that Russian Marxism directed its criticism against. If, we said, you want to help the peasantry, which is being ruined and oppressed, you must be able to abandon illusions and squarely face the reality that is destroying the nebulous dreams about labour economy (or "people's production"?) and revealing to us the *petty-bourgeois character* of peasant economy. In Russia, as everywhere else, small-scale labour economy can be developed and consolidated only by turning into petty-bourgeois economy. This transformation is actually in progress, and the working peasant's *true* and real tendency towards small enterprise has been irrefutably confirmed by the facts of life. As commodity economy develops, our peasants, like all small producers and by the very fact that they are such, come under the category of petty bourgeois: they break up into a minority of entrepreneurs and a mass of proletarians; the latter are connected with the "petty proprietors" by a series of transitional stages of being half-workers and half-proprietors (such transitional forms exist in all capitalist countries and in all branches of industry).

What then has been the attitude of the Socialist-Revolutionaries towards the supplanting of one trend of socialist thought by another, towards the struggle between the old Russian socialism and Marxism? They simply tried to evade making a thorough analysis of the question as long as they could. And when such evasion was no longer possible, when those who wanted to form a separate "party" were asked to give a clear explanation, when they were forced to reply, forced by derision and by a direct accusation of a lack of principle, only then did these people take to reiterating the old Narodnik theory of "labour economy" and the old errors of vulgar socialism. We repeat: we could not have wished for better confirmation of the charge we brought against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, viz., of utterly

lacking principle, than this article in No. 11, which attempts to "unite" the theory of "labour economy" with the theory of the class struggle.

* * *

As a curiosity, we will add that in No. 11 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* attempts are made to give a "plausible" explanation of the decision to avoid all polemics on matters of principle. We are told that *Iskra* misquotes in its article, "Revolutionary Adventurism". An example? It omits, for example, the words "in certain places" (in certain places the land is passing from capital to labour). How dreadful! An irrelevant phrase has been omitted! Or, perhaps, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* will dare assert that the words "in certain places" have a relation, *even the slightest*, to the question of *appraising* the process of the passing of land *in general* (whether or not it is a bourgeois process)? Let it try.

Further. *Iskra* cut the quotation short at the words "by the state", although this is followed by "of course, not by the present state". *Iskra* (we will add) was even more malicious: it had the impudence to term this state a *class* state. Will our opponents who "have been stung to the quick" assert that the state spoken of in the "minimum programme" under examination is not a class state?

Lastly, *Iskra* quoted the leaflet of April 3, in which even *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya itself* found the appraisal of terrorism exaggerated. Yes, we *did* quote the reservation made by *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, but we added that we regarded all this as mere "juggling" and vague hints. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* was greatly displeased by this, and has set out to explain and give details (thereby confirming *in fact* that there was an obscurity which required explanations). What are its explanations? At the demand of the Party, you see, *amendments* were made in the leaflet of April 3. These amendments, however, "were considered inadequate", and for that reason the words "in the name of the Party" were deleted from the leaflet. But the words "published by the Party" remained, and the second (the "real") leaflet, which was brought out on the same date,

April 3, did not say a word about differences or exaggerations. Having given these explanations and realising that they only confirm the legitimacy of *Iskra* 's demand for an explanation (in the words "juggling and hints"), *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* asks itself the question: how could the Party have issued from its own press a leaflet with which is was not in agreement? The answer given by *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* is as follows: "Why, in exactly the same way as *Rabocheye Dyelo*, *Iskra*, *Rabochaya Mysl*,[96] and *Borba*[97] all appear with the imprint of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party." Very well. But, in the first place, we have publications of different kinds, and they are printed not at the "Party" print-shop, but at the print-shops of the various groups. In the second place, when *Rabochaya Mysl*, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, and *Iskra* all appeared at the same time we ourselves said that this was *confusion*. What follows from that? It follows that the Social-Democrats themselves lay bare and brand confusion *in their own ranks* and try to get rid of it through serious work on theory, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionaries begin to admit that there is confusion in their ranks only *after* they have been exposed, and take the opportunity once again to boast of their broad-mindedness, which permits them to issue, on the same day and on the occasion of the same political event, two leaflets in which they give two diametrically opposite interpretations of the political significance of this event (a new terroristic act). Knowing as they do that no good can come of ideological confusion, the Social-Democrats preferred "first to draw a line of demarcation and then to unite",* thereby ensuring both durability and fruitfulness of the future unity. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries, while interpreting their "programme" in different ways, each at his own sweet will,**

* See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 354.—*Ed.*

** You have only to compare *Our Tasks*, published by the former League of Socialist-Revolutionaries, with the Manifesto of the former Socialist-Revolutionary Party (see No. 5 of *Iskra*) then with the editorial statement in No. 1 of *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*, the programme articles in Nos. 7-11 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and the pamphlet *Freedom*, published by the so-called Workers' Party for the Political Liberation of Russia, whose fusion with the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was recently announced in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*.

maintain the fiction of "practical" unity and superciliously say to us: it is only among you, Social-Democrats, that various "groups" exist; we have—a party! Quite true, gentlemen, but history teaches us that sometimes the relations between "groups" and parties are like the relations between Pharaoh's lean kine and fat kine. All sorts of "parties" exist. For example there was a Workers' Party for the Political Liberation of Russia and yet its two years of existence passed as tracelessly as its disappearance did.

Iskra, No. 27, November 1, 1902

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ON THE TASKS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT[98]

When hypocritical flirting with both the working class and the "legal" opposition goes hand in hand with action on the part of a horde of infuriated scoundrels of the type of Val or Obolensky,[99] it means that the government wants to corrupt and split up those masses and sections of the people which it is powerless to break, and in order to facilitate its task it wants to divert the revolutionary forces, small as their number is, to hunt down each of these scoundrels. It does not matter whether one representative or another of the government is aware of this in general, or how well he is aware of it. What matters is that the tactics to which the government is impelled by all its immense political experience and police instinct, *really* has this significance. When the revolutionary movement permeates the truly revolutionary classes of the people, moreover, when it grows in depth and extent, holding out the promise of developing soon into an invincible force, then the government finds it advantageous to provoke the best revolutionary forces to hunt after mediocre leaders of most outrageous violence. But we must not allow ourselves to be provoked. We must not lose our heads at the very first peals of really revolutionary thunder coming from the people, cast all caution to the winds, and, to ease mind and conscience, eschew all the experience of Europe and the experience of Russia, all more or less definite socialist convictions, all claims to fundamentally consistent, and not adventurist, tactics. In short, we must not allow realisation of an attempt to restore the Narodnaya Volya movement and to repeat all its theoretical and practical

mistakes that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have undertaken and persist in furthering more and more. Our answer to efforts made to corrupt the masses and provoke the revolutionaries must not be given in a "programme" which would open the door wide to the most harmful old mistakes and to new ideological waverings, or in tactics that would tend to deepen the isolation of the revolutionaries from the masses, which is the main source of our weakness and of our incapacity to start a determined struggle at once. We must answer by strengthening the contact between the revolutionaries and the people, and this contact can be established in our time only by developing and strengthening the Social-Democratic labour movement. Only the working-class movement rouses that truly revolutionary and advanced class which has nothing to lose from the collapse of the existing political and social order, the class which is the final and inevitable product of that order, the class which alone is the unquestionable and uncompromising enemy of that order. Only by relying upon the theory of revolutionary Marxism, upon the experience of international Social-Democracy, can we bring about the fusion of our revolutionary movement with the labour movement and create an invincible Social-Democratic movement. Only in the name of a real workers' party can we, without losing faith in our convictions, call on all the progressive elements in the country to join in revolutionary work, call on all working, all suffering and oppressed people to support socialism.

Written in November 1902

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THE BASIC THESIS AGAINST THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

The basic thesis I am advancing against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and for an appraisal of *all* aspects of the activities (and of the whole essence) of this trend is as follows: *the entire trend of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and their party as a whole, is nothing but an attempt by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia at escamotage of our working-class movement, and, consequently, the whole of the socialist and the whole of the revolutionary movement in Russia.*

Let me explain at once why, in this thesis which is so important to me, I could not avoid employing a rare foreign word no doubt incomprehensible to most readers. Escamotage means deception, fraudulent appropriation of the results of the labour of others and thus rendering this labour useless, trickery, swindling, etc. It is not difficult to see why I had to reject these Russian words and choose a foreign word instead. The words "to trick, fool, deceive" are invariably associated in our minds with the idea of a deliberate, conscious lie—that in the first place, and in the second, with the idea of self-seeking, dishonest motives on the part of those who resort to this lie. Yet I am far from the idea of accusing the Socialist-Revolutionaries of anything resembling a conscious lie or dishonest motives. Nothing of the kind. I have no doubt that as a trend, as a "party", the Socialist-Revolutionaries could have originated (or could have survived since the days of the Narodnaya Volya), that they could have grown and gained some strength of late, thanks *entirely* to the fact that they attracted people

doubtlessly revolutionary-minded and even quite prepared for heroic self-sacrifice, people in all sincerity willing to lay down their lives in the interests of freedom and the interests of the people. But the fact that people adhere sincerely and by conviction to a certain social and political stand does not in any way predetermine whether this stand is not absolutely false and internally contradictory. Would not the results of the best-intended activity based on this stand prove to be (even though unconsciously and against the will of those who conduct it) "escamotage" of the working-class movement, diverting it from the correct course, decoying it into an impasse, etc.?

I shall try to illustrate my idea by an example. Imagine that we are in a huge, dark, humid, and dense semi-virgin forest. Imagine that only by burning down this forest is it possible to prepare the way for the cultivation of the entire area covered by the forest or surrounded by it, and that it is extremely difficult to procure fire and to sustain it in this forest. It is necessary to dry the timber which is available everywhere in abundance but which catches fire with difficulty, the fire dying easily again and again in the oppressively humid atmosphere. It is necessary to get together the material to be set alight. It is necessary to maintain the fire (combustion), to protect it, to nurture every flash of fire, to let the flame grow, preparing systematically and stubbornly the general conflagration without which the damp and dark forest will not cease to be a forest. This work, however, is very difficult, not only because of the external, atmospheric, conditions, but also because of the great scarcity of the only suitable material which can burn, which cannot cease burning under any circumstances, which has really caught fire and is burning continuously, with a steady flame unlike the numerous flickering lights which lack intrinsic power and which in the past so often flashed into being only to die out after burning for a short time. And now, when this basic inflammable material has begun to burn so well as to cause a general rise in the temperature, thereby lending strength and brightness to a mass of other, flickering little flames, people suddenly appear and declare with an overweening air: how narrow-minded one

must be to believe in the antiquated dogma about the only basic, the only unquestionably reliable inflammable material! How stereotyped it is to consider all the other little flares merely as by-products, as auxiliary elements, and to think it absolutely necessary to cling first of all and most of all to this *one* material, at any cost! How one-sided it is to keep on endlessly preparing, preparing and preparing the real general conflagration and to allow those outrageous scoundrels, the tree-tops, to shelter and maintain the dampness and gloom. What should be done is to fire flares which will knock down the tree-tops, singe them, frighten all the dark forces and produce such a sensation, such a stir, encouragement and excitation. And these people get to work briskly. With a sigh of relief they heave overboard the antiquated prejudices about some kind of basic inflammable material. With a calm conscience they accept into their ranks all and sundry, without inquiring into their views and opinions, convictions and aspirations: we are a party of action, and it does not matter to us even if some of us have adopted arguments which tend to extinguish the fire. They call boldly for an undiscriminating attitude towards all kinds of little flames and towards the firing of flares, brushing aside with contempt the lessons of the past; now, they say, there is a great deal more inflammable material, and there fore sheer light-mindedness is permissible!... And so, despite the harm people of this kind are causing to the movement, can it be thought that they are ordinary deceivers? Nothing of the kind! They are not deceivers at all, but simply pyrotechnists!

That, incidentally, is my answer to those Socialist-Revolutionaries who have simply interpreted the term "adventurer" as "swindler" (Mr. Rafailov in Geneva) or "rogue" (Mr. Zhitlovsky in Berne). Gentlemen, I told them, you should not necessarily interpret everything in terms of the criminal code. The adventurism of a revolutionary trend, an internally contradictory, unprincipled, unstable trend which conceals emptiness behind high-sounding promises and is therefore inevitably doomed to bankruptcy, should not be confused with the adventurism of rogues who know very well that they are committing punishable offences and that they are in danger of being exposed for swindling. We

have accused you of adventurism, stating plainly and concretely (see Nos. 23 and 24 of *Iskra**) that it stems from your utter lack of principle in all the basic questions of international socialism, from the incredible muddle of views in your hastily concocted agrarian programme served out to the "consumer" under a savoury dressing, from the shakiness and groundlessness of your terrorist tactics. And you reply: look here, we are called adventurers, rogues, swindlers; we are offended, insulted! But these cries, esteemed gentlemen, seem very much to imply that in essence you have nothing to object to.

It may now be asked: where is the proof of the correctness of my thesis? What distinguishing, characteristic features of the entire Socialist-Revolutionary trend should I demonstrate in order to justify the appraisal of the entire trend given in this thesis? If this appraisal is correct, then (it is to be hoped) there is no socialist in the least conscientious and serious who would deny the need for a determined and merciless war against this trend, for its harmfulness to be completely exposed to the widest possible sections of the people. And so, to be able to dig down to the essence of this question and analyse it from every aspect, I suggest that attention be directed mainly and primarily to what should constitute the *answers* to this question. Let those who wish to disprove the correctness of the appraisal not confine themselves to "complaints" or "amendments", but answer just as plainly: what are the points which *they* think require proof in order to corroborate the correctness of the thesis I advanced?

The central point of this thesis (escamotage of the working-class movement by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia) is the fact of escamotage, or, in other words, the fundamental contradiction between the principles, the programme of the "party", and its actual attitude towards the process of revolutionising present-day society. The contradiction lies in the fact that in reality the party of "Socialist-Revolutionaries" does not at all adhere to the standpoint of scientific revolutionary socialism (= Marxism) in questions relating to either the international or the Russian work-

* See pp. 184-205 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ing-class movement. In actual fact, the characteristic feature of this "party" is utter lack of principle in all most important fundamental questions of modern socialism.*

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

NEW EVENTS AND OLD QUESTIONS

To all appearances the brief "lull" which has marked our revolutionary movement for the past six to nine months, as distinguished from its previous rapid and stormy development, is drawing to a close. However brief this "lull" may have been, however obvious it has been to every careful and informed observer that the absence (for so short a time) of open manifestations of mass indignation among the workers by no means signifies a stop in the growth of this indignation both in depth and in extent, numerous voices have nevertheless been raised among our intelligentsia—who are revolutionary in spirit but frequently have neither firm ties with the working class nor a sound foundation of definite socialist convictions—expressing despondency and a lack of faith in the mass working-class movement, on the one hand, and, on the other, calling for a repetition of the old tactics of individual political assassinations as a necessary and obligatory method of political struggle at the present time. During the few months that have elapsed since the demonstrations of the previous season, a "party" of "Socialist-Revolutionaries" has had time to arise in our country, and has begun to declaim loudly that demonstrations have a discouraging effect, that "the people, alas, are still a long way off", and that it is easy, *of course*, to speak and write of arming the masses, but that now it is necessary to get down to "individual resistance" without trying to wriggle out of the urgent necessity of individual terror by obsolete references to one and the same old task (so dull and "uninteresting" to the intellectual who is free from "dogmatic" faith in the working-class movement!) of carrying on agitation among the proletarian masses and organising a mass onslaught.

But what at first sight seemed a most ordinary and "common place" strike suddenly broke out in Rostov-on-Don and

led to events which manifestly demonstrated the utter stupidity and harmfulness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' attempt to restore the Narodnaya Volya movement with all its theoretical and tactical mistakes. The strike, which involved many thousands of workers and began with demands of a purely economic nature, rapidly developed into a political event, despite the extreme dearth of organised revolutionary forces participating in it. Crowds of people which, according to some participants, numbered between twenty and thirty thousand, held astonishingly serious and well-organised political meetings where Social-Democratic leaflets were read and eagerly discussed, political speeches were delivered, the most casual and untrained representatives of the working people were told the elementary truths of socialism and the political struggle, and practical and "object" lessons were given on how to deal with the soldiers and how to appeal to them. The authorities and the police lost their heads (perhaps partly because the soldiers could not be relied on?) and for several days proved unable to interfere with the organising of open-air political mass gatherings, the like of which had never before been seen in Russia. When armed force was finally brought in, the crowd offered desperate resistance, and the murder of a comrade served as the occasion for a political demonstration at his funeral the following day.... The Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, most likely see the thing in a different light; from their standpoint it would perhaps have been "more expedient" if the six comrades murdered in Rostov had given their lives in an attempt on the lives of individual police tyrants.

We, however, are of the opinion that it is only such mass movements, in which mounting political consciousness and revolutionary activity are openly manifested to all by the working class, that deserve to be called *genuinely revlutionary* acts and are capable of really encouraging everyone who is fighting for the Russian revolution. What we see here is not the much-vaunted "individual resistance", whose only connection with the masses consists of verbal declarations, publication of sentences passed, etc. What we see is genuine resistance on the part of the crowd; and the lack of organisation, unpreparedness and spontaneity

of this resistance remind us how unwise it is to exaggerate our revolutionary forces and how criminal it is to neglect the task of steadily improving the organisation and preparedness of this crowd, which is waging an actual struggle before our very eyes. The only task worthy of a revolutionary is to learn to elaborate, utilise and make our own the material which Russian life furnishes in only too great sufficiency, rather than fire a few shots in order to create pretexts for stimulating the masses, and material for agitation and for political reflection. The Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot find enough praise of the great "agitational" effect of political assassinations, about which there is so much whispering both in the drawing-rooms of the liberals and in the taverns of the common people. It is nothing to them (since they are free of all narrow dogmas on anything even approximating a definite socialist theory!) to stage a political *sensation* as a substitute (or, at least, as a supplement) for the political education of the proletariat. We, however, consider that the *only* events that can have a real and serious "agitational" (stimulating), and not only stimulating but also (and this is far more important) educational, effect are events in which the masses themselves are the actors, events which are born of the sentiments of the masses and not staged "for a special purpose" by one organisation or another. We believe that even a hundred regicides can never produce so stimulating and educational an effect as this participation of tens of thousands of working people in meetings where their vital interests and the links between politics and these interests are discussed, and as this participation in a struggle, which really *rouses* ever new and "untapped" sections of the proletariat to greater political consciousness, to a broader revolutionary struggle. We are told of the disorganisation of the government (which has been obliged to replace Messrs. the Sipyagins by Messrs. the Plehves and to "select" the vilest scoundrels to serve it), but we are convinced that to *sacrifice* one revolutionary, even in exchange for ten scoundrels, means only disorganising our own ranks, which are thin as it is, so thin that they cannot keep up with all that is "demanded" of them by the workers. We believe that the government is truly disorganised when, and only when, the broad masses, genuinely

organised by the struggle itself, plunge the government into a state of confusion; when the legitimacy of the demands of the progressive elements of the working class becomes apparent to the crowd in the street and begins to be clear even to part of the troops called out for the purpose of "pacification"; when military action against tens of thousands of the people is preceded by wavering among the authorities, who have no way of really knowing what this military action will lead to; when the crowd see and feel that those who have fallen on the field of civil war are their comrades, a part of themselves, and are filled with new wrath and a desire to grapple more decisively with the enemy. Here it is no longer some scoundrel, but the existing system as a whole that comes out as the enemy of the people, against whom are arrayed the local and the St. Petersburg authorities, the police, the Cossacks, and the troops, to say nothing of the gendarmes and the courts which, as ever, supplement and complete the picture in every popular uprising.

Yes, uprising. However far the beginning of what seemed to be a strike movement in a remote provincial town was from a "genuine" uprising, its continuation and its finale nevertheless evoke involuntary thoughts of an uprising. The prosaic motive for the strike and the minor nature of the demands presented by the workers throw into particularly bold relief, not only the mighty power of the solidarity of the proletariat, which at once saw that the railway workers' struggle was the common cause of the proletarians, but also its receptiveness of political ideas and political propaganda, and its readiness to defend with might and main, in open battle with the troops, those rights to a free life and free development which all thinking workers have already come to consider common and elementary. And the Don Committee was a thousand times right when it declared in its proclamation, "To All Citizens", which we print in full elsewhere in this issue, that the Rostov strike was one of the steps towards a general upsurge among the Russian workers with the demand for political liberty.[100] In events of this sort we really see with our own eyes how an armed uprising of the whole people against the autocratic government is maturing, not only as an idea in the minds and programmes of the revolutionaries, but also as the inevitable, natural

and practical *next* step of the movement itself, as the result of the growing indignation, growing experience, and growing boldness of the masses, who are being given such valuable lessons, such a splendid education by the realities of Russian life.

An inevitable and natural step, I have said—and I hasten to make the reservation: *if only* we do not permit ourselves to depart by a single step from the impending and pressing task of assisting these masses, who have already begun to rise, to act more boldly and concertedly; of giving them not a couple but dozens of open-air speakers and leaders; of creating a real, militant organisation capable of guiding the masses, and not a so-called "combat organisation" that guides elusive individuals (if it does guide them at all). That this is a difficult task goes without saying, but we can quite justifiably adapt Marx's words which have so frequently and so ineptly been quoted of late, and say: "Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen" individual attempts and cases of resistance, more important than a hundred organisations and "parties" belonging only to the intelligentsia.[101]

Besides the Rostov fighting, the penal sentences passed on demonstrators are outstanding among recent political events. The government has decided to use every possible method of intimidation, from floggings to penal servitude. And what a splendid reply it received from the workers, whose speeches in court we give below[102]; how instructive this reply is to all those who were especially loud in their outcries about the discouraging effect of demonstrations, not because they wanted to encourage further work in this direction, but because they wanted to preach much-vaunted individual resistance! These speeches, coming as they do from the very thick of the proletariat, are excellent commentaries on events like those in Rostov, and, at the same time, they are remarkable statements ("public manifestations", I would say if this were not so specifically police terminology), imbuing with boundless vigour the long and difficult work for the "real" steps of the movement. What is remarkable in these speeches is the simple, authentically precise description of how the most everyday facts, occurring in *scores and hundreds of millions*, of the "misery,

oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation" of the workers in present-day society lead to the awakening of their consciousness, to their growing "revolt", to a revolutionary expression of this revolt (I have put in quotation marks the words I *had* to use in describing the speeches of the Nizhni-Novgorod workers, for they are the famous words which Marx uses in the last pages of the first volume of *Capital*, and which evoked such clamorous and unsuccessful attempts on the part of the "critics", opportunists, revisionists, etc., to refute the Social-Democrats and accuse them of not telling the truth).

For the very reason that these speeches came from ordinary workers by no means advanced in their development, workers who did not even speak as members of any particular organisation, but simply as men in the crowd, for the very reason that they stressed not their personal convictions but facts from the life of every proletarian or semi-proletarian in Russia, for that very reason their conclusions are so inspiring: "that is why we consciously went to the demonstration against the autocratic government." The ordinariness and "mass character" of the facts from which they drew their conclusions are a guarantee that thousands, tens and hundreds of thousands, can and inevitably will come to the same conclusion, provided we prove capable of continuing, extending, and strengthening systematic, theoretically consistent, and all-round revolutionary (Social-Democratic) influence over them. We are ready to be condemned to penal servitude for fighting against political and economic slavery now that we have felt the breath of liberty, said four workers from Nizhni-Novgorod. And thousands of workers in Rostov, who for several days won for themselves the right to hold political gatherings, fighting off a series of attacks on the part of the soldiers against the unarmed crowd, repeated after them as it were: we are ready to face death.

By this sign shall ye conquer, is all that remains for us to say to those who have eyes to see and ears to hear.

Iskra, No. 29, December 1, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

TO SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS[103]

Welcoming whole-heartedly the energetic initiative of the students, we on our part give them the following comradely advice. Try to concentrate your efforts on self-education as the main purpose of your organisation, in order to develop into convinced, steadfast, and consistent Social-Democrats. Draw the strictest possible line of demarcation between this extremely important and essential preparatory work and direct practical activity. On joining (and *before* joining) the ranks of the army in the field try to establish closest (and most secret) contacts with the local or all-Russian Social-Democratic organisations, so as not to be alone when you begin your work, so as to be able to continue what has already been done before, rather than begin all over again, to take your place at once in the ranks, to advance the movement and raise it to a higher stage.

Iskra, No. 29, December 1, 1902

Published according to the *Iskra* text

ON THE *SVOBODA* GROUP

The attitude of Messrs. the "Revolutionary-Socialists" towards any analysis of differences in principle is evident from the following. In the pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?*, Lenin directly challenged *Svoboda* to refute the proposition that an "organisation of revolutionaries" is necessary for extending and intensifying work among the masses. In the same pamphlet Mr. Nadezhdin was given a detailed explanation of all the harm and unseemliness of a light-minded attitude towards theory, of inconsistency in matters of programme (a "revolutionary-socialist" and at the same time practically a Social-Democrat!), of vacillation between revolutionary tactics and the tactics of "economism", and between terrorism and the class struggle of the proletariat. In this pamphlet it was plainly pointed out and proved that *Svoboda* is sinking to the level of demagogy.* Mr. Nadezhdin preferred to decline the direct challenge. Instead of open battle with visor raised, this noble swashbuckler chose to act on the sly under a cover of a dispute on matters of organisation. In their "magazine for workers" (??) the *Svoboda* group merely hisses and snarls, without explaining its views, inciting the "masses" against an "organisation of revolutionaries" and assuring them that *Iskra* is chopping down the "sound trunk" of "economism". Disputes over principle, it assures us, are nothing but a pastime for intellectuals. For the "masses" it is sufficient to raise a howl against "domineering" and to indulge in quips about "an empty stomach and the Holy Ghost", about the "danger of hobnailed jackboots", about "swine and blockheads",

* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

about "weakened grey matter" and "pig snouts", about the "collaring and jaw-breaking department", etc. (see *Otkliki*, pp. 30-55). Our revolutionary-socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries persist in debasing "mass" literature to the level of cheap broadsheets, and for this service of theirs they claim the right to introduce confusion and corruption into all serious Party questions. A programme consisting of double book-keeping, tactics consisting of double book-keeping, practical activities consisting of demagogy—there you have a portrait of the "revolutionary-socialist" *Svoboda* group.

Iskra, No. 30, December 15, 1902

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EXTRACT FROM AN ARTICLE AGAINST THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

The fusion of socialism with the working-class movement (this *sole* guarantee of a strong and truly revolutionary movement) is no easy matter, and it is not surprising that it is attended by vacillation of every kind. That is what we wrote exactly two years ago in the first article published in the first issue of *Iskra*.* And if a struggle was necessary against a tendency (trend) that had chosen the correct path but had wrongly defined its tasks along that path, it is far more necessary to struggle against a trend that does not even think of any fusion of any more or less integral and well-substantiated socialism with the working-class movement. Lacking a social basis and any links with a definite social class, it is endeavouring to cover up its inner impotence by the sweep of its emotion, the "breadth" of its programme, *i.e.* (read), by an unprincipled combination of the most diverse and opposing programmes which are equally applicable, precisely because of this quality of theirs, to the intelligentsia, to the proletariat, and to the peasantry. Behind the intelligentsia *en masse*, just as behind the liberal opposition, it may not be possible to discern any social class (since the liberal-Narodist trend, towards which the old Russian socialism was incapable of adopting a critical attitude, as are the Socialist-Revolutionaries today, declares that it is above classes). The peasantry may be approached without any solution of "accursed" problems relating to the foundations of its life, or its place in the social and economic evolution of Russia and of the whole world; it

* See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 368.—*Ed.*

may be approached with such general revolutionary and socialist phrases (socialist, at first glance) which as far as possible would not be contradictory to any of the accepted and declared solutions of the peasant question. The stormy period we are experiencing, with the struggle flaring up now here, now there, makes it possible, under cover of this struggle, to evade all and sundry questions of principle, limiting oneself to sympathetic support of all its manifestations and to the invention of "individual resistance" during a comparative lull. And the result is a trend which is very revolutionary in words, but not in the least revolutionary as far as its real views and contacts with the revolutionary class are concerned, revolutionary in its sharp attacks on the government and at the same time entirely incapable of correctly appraising the general tactics of this government and of giving a correct answer to such tactics. And truly, it is not difficult to see that notwithstanding all the jumps and waverings, notwithstanding all the confusion of the government in particular instances, its tactics as a whole betray clearly its two principal lines of self-defence.

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DRAFT APPEAL OF THE RUSSIAN ORGANISING COMMITTEE TO THE LEAGUE OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY, THE UNION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ABROAD, AND THE FOREIGN COMMITTEE OF THE BUND

In fulfilment of the decision passed by a conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the spring of 1902, the *Organising Committee* proposes to the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad,[104] and the Foreign Committee of the Bund the formation of a foreign division of the Organising Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The functions of this foreign division of the Russian Organising Committee should be as follows:

1) elaboration of the question as to how Social-Democratic organisations abroad should be represented at the congress. The final decision of this question depends upon the Russian Organising Committee and then upon the congress itself; 2) assistance from abroad in the arrangement of the congress (for example, finances, passports, etc.), and 3) preparation for the unification of the Social-Democratic organisations abroad, which is so vitally necessary in the interests of the Party and of the Social-Democratic labour movement in Russia in general.

Written in December 1902-January 1903

Published for the first time

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ON THE SUBJECT OF REPORTS BY COMMITTEES AND GROUPS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TO THE GENERAL PARTY CONGRESS[105]

One of the members of the Organising Committee has asked me to send a list of questions to which it would be desirable to have replies given in the reports of the committees and groups of our Party at its Second Congress. I enclose herewith an approximate list of such questions, but first I should like to say a few words about the length of this list. Naturally, it would be *desirable* to have reports on *all* branches of Social-Democratic work, and the ideal report would therefore embrace an all but endless number of questions. Of course, we cannot even dream of it being possible to present such full reports. Nevertheless, I consider it very important and essential for the Organising Committee to endeavour to acquaint each committee or group with *the complete range* of questions of interest to (and needed by) the congress. Our Second Congress will have an even more *constituent* character than the First, and we must therefore bend every effort towards making the reports as complete and substantial as possible. The *closer* each group's report approximates to the ideal, the more completely and exactly will the movement as a whole be represented at our congress, and the more enduring the results of the congress.

The preparation of the reports, their discussions both in the committees and groups, etc., should begin as much as possible prior to the congress. In this connection it would be extremely important for the committees and groups, first, to divide among many of their members the work of drawing up the report; secondly, as soon as *each* section



First page of Lenin's manuscript, "On the subject of Reports by Committees and Groups of the R.S.D.L.P. to the General Party Congress." December 1902-January 1903

Reduced

of the report is ready the committees and groups should *immediately* forward a copy of it abroad, i.e., to a safe place (without waiting for the *complete* report); thirdly, they should make a point of drawing into this work not only actual but also former members, and not only the active but also absent members, in other words, those in exile or abroad. These persons could be instructed to prepare reports covering either a definite group of questions or a definite period when they worked in the committee or group. Such reports, or sections of reports, could greatly facilitate the task of the delegates at the congress. It stands to reason, furthermore, that the delegates should also make use of Party literature which contains numerous answers to questions in any report, i.e., they should try to gather all this literature, make a digest of all that is essential in it, correct any mistakes occurring in it, supplement it, adding whatever could not be printed for reasons of secrecy, etc. (it is also of the utmost importance to enlist for this work the co-operation of former members of committees and groups who are temporarily abroad). Incidentally, with regard to secrecy it should be added that there are certain questions to which written answers cannot and should not be given, for that would be disclosing secrets; nevertheless, the answers to these questions must positively be considered, prepared, and discussed by the committees and groups, for at the Party congress it will be *obligatory* to report on these questions (if not *in pleno*, then to a special commission, to the C.C., etc.).

With a view to drawing as many people as possible into the work of drafting the reports, it would be desirable to circulate the *list* of questions *itself* (together with the amendments recommended by specific committees, groups or individual comrades) *as widely as possible*; moreover, only the fact that these questions and reports are intended for the Second Party Congress should be kept secret from the broad circles of Social-Democrats.

Finally, there arises the question of the period to be covered by the reports. Formally speaking, it should be the period between the First and Second Congresses, i.e., from 1898 to 1903. However, since the First Congress was not fully representative, lasted too short a time, and was held under extremely unfavourable circumstances, it would be desirable

that the reports should also cover the period preceding 1898.

It would perhaps not be superfluous to make the reservation that this extremely detailed list of questions for the report should by no means be interpreted to imply that the person who is best acquainted with the history of the movement, or, in general, who is best able to answer all these questions, will make the best delegate to the congress, The congress should be of practical value in uniting the movement and giving it a powerful impulse, and those comrades who, even if they are new, are the most energetic, influential, and devoted to revolutionary work will make the best delegates. The reports, however, can be compiled from the contributions of many people and, in addition, in some cases it will perhaps be possible to delegate more than one person; it would be particularly desirable to give *a large number of worker* delegates the opportunity of attending the congress.

I shall now proceed to give the list of questions, which are divided up into eight sections or groups (the division of specific questions and even of groups of questions is often artificial and has been made only for convenience in reviewing them, as all questions are most closely interconnected).

I. THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT, ITS HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE

1) A brief description of the conditions and state of industry. Number, composition, distribution, and other specific features of the local proletariat (industrial, commercial, handicraft, etc., possibly agricultural also).

2) To what extent are the workers affected by socialist agitation? In what districts? Factories? Domestic industry, etc. Describe in as great detail as possible the growth of this group of workers from the very outset of the movement.

3) As complete a list as possible of strikes and a detailed account of each more or less big strike. Aggregate figures are desirable.

4) Have there been any outstanding instances of boycotts or other collective action,* besides strikes, on the part of the workers? Give details.

5) What workers' circles have existed and still exist? Mutual aid societies? Self-education societies? Working-class organisations? Trade unions? Fullest possible description of all such associations, their organisation, predominant composition, membership, period of existence, nature of activities, results of experience in this respect, etc.

6) Have any attempts been made to organise legal workers' societies? Detailed information about each such attempt, its results, effect, fate, present condition, and importance. The same with regard to Zubatov societies. Have any attempts been made to utilise legal societies for Social-Democratic purposes?

7) Effect of the present crisis? Description of it, primarily on the basis of information given by workers. The unemployed, their mood, agitation among them, etc.

II. HISTORY OF THE LOCAL SOCIALIST CIRCLES, APPEARANCE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS, STRUGGLE OF TRENDS WITHIN THEM

8) Were there any traces of the old socialist organisations when Social-Democracy appeared? What did they consist of and how did they make themselves felt? When did propaganda and agitation begin among the working class, and who started it? The followers of the Narodnaya Volya? What was their attitude towards Social-Democracy?

9) When and under what circumstances did individual Social-Democrats or Social-Democratic circles make their appearance? Give, in as much detail as possible, a description of *each* circle (in accordance with its programme), its importance and influence on subsequent circles.

10) How did Social-Democratic views take shape and develop in the local circles? What was the influence of other (towns) places? Of literature from abroad? Of legally published Marxist literature (and the literature of the "critics

* Collective statements? Public meetings? Participation in public manifestations? etc.

of Marxism")? Describe the influence of the first, second and third factors as fully as possible.

11) Differences within the Social-Democratic movement. Did they exist before the appearance of the Manifesto of 1898? How did they express themselves? Have any documents remained? How was the Manifesto received? What protests or dissatisfaction did it arouse and from whom? How did the so-called "economist" views arise? How did they develop and spread? It is very important to describe this most accurately, using all available documentary material, with regard to every "economist" "phase" in the local movement. How did differences in the appraisal of the various Party papers and in the struggle among their adherents express themselves? Of *Rabochaya Gazeta*[106] (1897), *Rabotnik*,[107] published abroad, and its Listok, of *Rabochaya Mysl*, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, *Iskra*, *Zarya*, *Borba*, *Zhizn*,[108] etc.? etc.?

11 *bis*) Have there been any splits and conflicts between workers and the "intelligentsia" among Social-Democrats? It is very important to ascertain the causes and influence of such.

12) How has the struggle of trends been waged in the local circles? Only among the Social-Democratic intellectuals? Or among the workers too? Among the adherent student groups? Has it found expression in splits? In the organisation of separate groups? Has it flared up over general questions of principle? Over the contents of the leaflets? Over the question of demonstrations? Over the attitude towards the student movement? Over the question of the May Day demands?

Describe in detail the course and consequences of the struggle among the trends, and the present state of affairs in this respect.

III. ORGANISATION OF THE LOCAL COMMITTEE, LOCAL GROUPS AND CIRCLES

13) Predominant composition of the committee (*resp*. of the group, circle, and, if there are many, of each specific one)? Students? Workers? Are members added by election (and how is this done?), or otherwise? Are there separate

intellectuals' and workers' committees? Special technical, propagandist, agitational groups? Literary, central, district, local, executive groups? Their relationships according to the "Rules" (if such exist) and in actual practice? General meetings, their functions, frequency, and size? Organisation of contacts with other towns and abroad (i.e., special people, groups or persons outside the groups, etc.)? How is the distribution of literature organised? Organisation of tours?

What are the conclusions to be drawn from experience in organisational matters, and the prevailing views on organisational principles in the committees, among the intellectuals and the workers?

It is particularly important to give a detailed explanation of the causes and *effects* of the formation of separate intellectuals' and workers' (factory, artisan, etc.) committees.

14) Extension of work to nearby and other localities? What form has this taken: organised or sporadic? Have attempts been made to form *district* organisations or to participate in them?

Character of contacts with other localities.

History of the origin and work of district organisations. Composition of central district committee? Attitude towards local committees? Collection of funds? District treasuries? Repositories for literature? Effect of the district organisations upon the scope of the work, its stability, contact with the local committees, etc.

15) Finances of the committee? Statement of aggregate income and expenditure (based on reports, if any) for the entire period of existence? Ordinary and average budget, nature of its sources, collections raised among workers, levies on members, payment for literature, socials, donations, etc. (influence of *Osvobozhdeniye* and Socialist-Revolutionaries in this respect).

Amount and character of expenditure: technical aspects? maintenance of people? travelling expenses? etc.

IV. CHARACTER, CONTENT, AND SCOPE OF LOCAL WORK

16) Propaganda. Composition (of the circles) of propagandists? Their number, method of action? Do they include workers? Do students predominate? Do more experienced

comrades examine and direct their activities? Usual programmes of lectures, and how these are modified in the course of time? Workers' response and requests for definite subjects? Is it a practice to send speakers with good lectures to various towns, districts, etc.? Composition and size, frequency and circumstances of lecture meetings?

17) Economic agitation. When did issue of leaflets begin? Is it possible to give the total number of leaflets issued and in how many copies? (Approximately?) What districts, factories, and trades has this agitation involved? The procedure adopted in drawing up and approving leaflets? Participation of workers in this? Technique of publication and *d i s t r i b u t i o n*? Do workers act as distributors? To what extent is the demand for leaflets met?

18) Political agitation. Transition from economic agitation? When did it begin? Has it evoked any protests? When were the first political leaflets issued? Was there a time when only economic leaflets were issued? How is political agitation carried out and on what pretexts? Describe as fully as possible its expansion both as to the nature of the leaflets and as to the sphere of distribution. Documentary material is desirable, since it is important to know *all instances* of political agitation and all its spheres. Has it been conducted only among workers or among other classes as well (cf. below)? Methods and procedure in drawing up leaflets, demand for them, and extent to which this demand is met? Which are more needed, local or general leaflets?

19) Literature. What illegal publications are distributed? Enumerate them, stating how widely they are distributed, the attitude of the committee and the workers (*resp*. of the public in general) towards *each* publication (pamphlets, etc.). Time of distribution, demand, among which sections, chiefly for what literature?

Distributed or scattered? Collective reading in circles? What items have required explanation by intellectuals? Is interpretative reading widely practised? Of what works specifically?

20) Local and general Party press. History of the local paper. How frequently issued? Number of copies? How has the literary end been organised? Collection and safekeeping (loss?) of material? Organisation of contributions to

the local and general Party organs? Are there special literary groups? Reporters? Contacts with literary people? How are contributions forwarded? Through the committee? Through private persons and to what extent? Attempts to utilise students? Exiles?

Conclusions and inquiries about the papers.

21) May Day rallies. Account of each May Day rally and lessons for the future.

22) Demonstrations. Summary information on each demonstration. Attempts to organise in general? To offer resistance in particular? To arm? Views of workers and of "practicians" in general on this question?

Supplementing and checking of Party literature on demonstrations.

Present attitude towards this question.

V. ATTITUDE TOWARDS REVOLUTIONARY (ESPECIALLY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC) GROUPS OF OTHER RACES AND NATIONALITIES

23) Are there any workers of other nationalities and races? Work among these? Organised or sporadic? In what languages? Attitude towards Social-Democratic groups working in the same locality and using some other language? A precise and detailed account of these relations is desirable. Are there differences of opinion? On question of principle as to the national programme? On tactics? On organisation? Relations desirable for joint work. Possibility of a *single* Party organ? Is federation desirable, and of what type?

VI. PRINT-SHOPS, TRANSPORT? AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECRET WORK

24) Print-shops. Experience in establishing them. Expenditure of money and forces. Productivity. Need for local print-shops (for leaflets?) and general print-shops for many towns? Technical, organisational, financial, and secrecy arrangements for this work.

25) Transport. Have there been contacts in this field? Transport groups? History of each and detailed information

on arrangements, functioning, results, and prospects. Desirable form of organisation.

26) Arrangements for secret work. Secret quarters. Signals? Underground quarters? Procurement of passports~ Experience in this respect? Are there necessary contacts for this?

Arrangement of rendezvous?

Shadowing of spies? The struggle against spies and *agents provocateurs*? Its forms, previous and desirable?

Codes, correspondence between towns, within the town, with abroad?

Lectures on: "How to behave at police interrogations? Need for pamphlets on this and other subjects?

Committee records? Have there been such and have they been kept in the past? At present?

VII. CONTACTS AND ACTIVITY AMONG SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OUTSIDE THE WORKING CLASS

27) Work among the peasantry? Are there individual contacts? Detailed information about such? How are contacts made and maintained, and with what peasants? With agricultural workers? Role of factory workers who go to the villages?

Attempts at propaganda? Distribution of pamphlets? Leaflets? What kind? How successful?

Existing situation and prospects.

28) Students. Is influence sporadic and personal, or organised? Have many Social-Democrats come from the midst of the students? Are there any contacts with students' circles, fraternities, union councils? How are these contacts maintained? Lectures? Distribution of literature? Prevalent mood among students and the history of changes in various moods.

Attitude towards student disturbances?

Students' participation in demonstrations.? Attempts to reach preliminary agreement in this respect?

Students as propagandists, their training for this work?

29) Secondary schools, Gymnasia, theological seminaries, etc., commercial and business schools? Nature of contacts with pupils? Attitude towards new phase of upsurge in move-

ment among them? Attempts to organise circles and study courses? Have recruits to the Social-Democratic movement been made (and how often) among recent Gymnasium graduates (or pupils)? Circles, lectures? Distribution of literature?

30) Contacts with "society"? In the past and today, and among what sections? Based on money collections? Distribution of literature? For organisation of legal libraries? To collect information and correspondence? Changes in the attitude of "society" towards Social-Democrats. Demand for Social-Democratic literature? Contacts among civil servants? Among postal, telegraph, and railway employees? Among factory inspectors? Among police employees? Among the clergy? Etc.?

It is likewise desirable to have an account of the experience of individual committee members in establishing personal contacts among various sections.

31) Contacts with the military? Part played by Social-Democratic intellectuals and workers who have completed military service? Contacts among commissioned and non-commissioned officers? How are these contacts maintained and utilised? Importance of these contacts in agitation, propaganda, organisation, etc.

It is desirable that particularly detailed information be given on this question and the preceding, since the problem is a new one and numerous isolated measures have to be summed up and collated.

VIII. STATE OF THE NON-SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY AND OPPOSITION TRENDS AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM

32) Liberal trends. Liberal-Narodnik. Among the public? Among the students? *Osvobozhdeniye*, its circulation (among students? among workers?) and its influence? Are there any *Osvobozhdeniye* circles? Their attitude towards the Social-Democrats?

Interest in *Osvobozhdeniye* among Social-Democratic circles and attitude towards this publication. Is it utilised for propaganda and agitation?

General meetings with debates?

33) Socialist-Revolutionaries. Detailed account of their appearance in the given locality? When? From the Narodnaya Volya people? Their change into the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Influence of "economism"? Character and composition of their contacts and circles? Veterans? Students? Workers? The struggle against the Social-Democrats, its course, and how conducted?

United groups of Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Their detailed history, data on their work, *leaflets*, resolutions of groups, and so on.

Special features of weakness or strength of the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Inclination towards terrorism? Among students? Among workers?

Work of the Socialist-Revolutionaries among the peasantry? Character of their contacts and activities there? Influence of their "agrarian programme"?

34) Other groups and trends. The *Svoboda* group, Workers' Party for the Political Liberation of Russia, Makhayevists,[109] *Rabocheye Znamya*-ists, etc. An account of their views, attitude towards Social-Democracy, information about their contacts and work.

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MOSCOW ZUBATOVISTS IN ST. PETERSBURG

Moskovskiye Vedomosti (No. 345, Dec. 15, 1902) carries a "Letter to the Publisher", written by a worker named F. A. Slepov, which we reproduce *in full* below. First of all, we would like to lend encouragement to our esteemed "fellow-journalist", Mr. Gringmut, editor of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, for publishing a document of such great interest. And Mr. Gringmut undoubtedly stands in need of encouragement, for of late his extremely useful activity in obtaining (and featuring) material for revolutionary agitation has somehow fallen off, faded ... lost some of its fervour. You must try harder, colleague! Secondly, it is of the utmost importance at the present time that the St. Petersburg workers should watch every step of Zubatovism, should collect information more regularly about workers who have linked up with spies and are conferring with former, present and future generals, society ladies, and "true Russian" intellectuals, and should spread this information as widely as possible, explaining it in detail to one and all.

Here is the letter, which we have supplemented with a few comments of our own in brackets:

"Dear Sir,

"Could you find it possible to publish the following in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, which is held in such esteem by all true Russian people:

"On the 10th of this month, a meeting of the Board of the Russkoye Sobraniye[110] was held in the premises of the Sobraniye in St. Petersburg and was devoted exclusively to questions concerning the life of Russian factory workers.

"Among the most prominent members of St. Petersburg society present at the meeting were: General K. V. Komarov,

former Assistant Governor General of Warsaw; Auditor General A. V. Vasilyev; Colonel A. P. Veretennikov; Count Apraxin; Count A. P. Ignatyev, ex-Governor General of Kiev; Count P. A. Golenishchev-Kutuzov; General Zabudsky; Admiral Nazimov; Nikolai Vyacheslavovich von Plehve; I. P. Khrushchov, member of the Board of the Ministry of Public Education; Professor Zolotaryov of the General Staff; V. S. Krivenko; Count N. F. Heyden; General Demyanenkov; Archpriest Ornatsky and other church dignitaries. Also present were ladies from the upper circles of St. Petersburg society, as well as Mayor Lelyanov and Councillor Dekhterev of the City Council. The press was represented by V. V. Komarov, editor of *Svyet*; V. L. Velichko, editor of *Russky Vestnik*; Syromyatnikov, of the staff of *Novoye Vremya*; K. K. Sluchevsky, former editor of *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*; Leikin, editor and publisher of the *Oskolki* magazine; the painter Karazin, and others.

"The meeting opened with a report on the condition of workers in the manufacturing industries delivered by I. S. Sokolov, a worker" (concerning Sokolov see No. 30 of *Iskra*, which gives a fuller list, based on information taken from *Svyet*, of St. Petersburg worker-Zubatovists.—*Ed.*). "In the main, the speaker explained the present condition of the working class in the industrial cities, their material and spiritual needs, their efforts to acquire knowledge, etc." (It is a pity that Mr. Sokolov's report has not been published! It would be interesting to see how he managed to "explain" the workers' efforts to acquire knowledge but made no mention of police persecution of such efforts.—*Ed.*) "Then representatives of the Moscow workers" (would it not be more correct to say: representatives of the Moscow secret police? Was it not on money supplied by the police that you and your friends travelled to St. Petersburg, Mr. Slepov?—*Ed.*), "among whom I was, also had the honour of attending the meeting of the Russkoye Sobraniye and reporting to that illustrious gathering on the state of affairs in the working-class world of Moscow. In our report we first of all expressed, on behalf of Russian workers, our profound gratitude to the members of the Russkoye Sobraniye for giving their representatives the opportunity to explain the present condition of the Russian working class. Further we requested the representatives of

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Russian higher society to devote serious attention to the education of the Russian workers" (quite naturally! It is precisely from the upper classes that the worker should expect an education—by means of the whip probably!—*Ed.*), "which is in a far from satisfactory state, a fact that is being successfully used for socialist propaganda by persons with malicious intent" (if the lack of education is advantageous to the *socialists*, why, then, is the *government* closing schools for workers and reading-rooms? It doesn't make sense, Mr. Slepov!—*Ed.*), "thereby causing harm not only to the workers, but to the entire Russian state. Then we endeavoured to call the attention of the illustrious assembly to the lack of sympathy among Moscow factory-owners for the Moscow workers' idea of uniting in a close family for the purpose of founding their own mutual aid societies, which are so important for delivering the workers from crushing want. In this connection we asked members of the illustrious assembly to raise in government circles the question of loans to the workers' mutual aid societies" (see the speech of the Nizhni-Novgorod worker, Samylin, before the court, in No. 29 of *Iskra*, in which he tells how he was arrested for taking part in a workers' circle studying economics. There is education for you; there you have mutual aid societies!—*Ed.*). "Undoubtedly, support of the workers in their material needs would constitute the best refutation of malicious propaganda among them" (can it really be that Mr. Slepov—and what an appropriate name he has!*—seriously believes that for the sake of some miserable hand-out a class-conscious worker would cease striving for liberty? As to "supporting the non-class-conscious, ignorant *mass* "in their material needs, this is beyond the power of even the most highly placed patrons of the Zubatovists, since in order to provide such support it is first necessary to change the whole social system, which rests on destitution of the masses.—*Ed.*). "These false '*well-wishers*' of the workers usually say that the workers can improve their life only by means of riots, disturbances, resistance to the authorities, etc. Unfortunately such incitement sometimes meets with success, as every-

* Slepov, from *slepoi*—the Russian for "blind".—*Ed.*

one knows. Peaceful improvement of the workers' living conditions is the best way to refute these agitators. Then we had the honour to report to the illustrious assembly that in Moscow, despite most widespread unemployment, socialist propaganda had lost all its appeal of late" (but only quite recently we heard of an enormous number of arrests. in Moscow! What would be the point of the arrests and who would there have been to arrest if this propaganda had lost its appeal??—*Ed.*), "precisely because the workers are already beginning to organise and have a Mutual Aid Society and a Consumers' Society, and because the sympathetic attention of the authorities has already been given to the needs of the workers, making it possible to arrange for them lectures on general education, etc. Besides what has been said above, we also reported to the Sobraniye about cases in Moscow in which we had figured in the capacity of mediators and conciliators between workers and manufacturers, not only putting an end to disorders but even averting them, as, for instance, at the Hakental factory, the Bromley Bros. factory and the Dobrov-Nabholtz factory. We also mentioned the strike of workers of the Goujon metallurgical plant, where the workers of the rolling and nail shops did stop work, but thanks to our intervention did not go so far as to cause disturbances, and returned to work as a result of our comradely advice" (the workers get plenty of such "comradely" advice during each strike both from the police and from the factory inspectors, who are always asking them to "return to work." This is not comradely, but police advice.—*Ed.*).

"The members of the Russkoye Sobraniye listened to our reports sympathetically" (how else but sympathetically would they listen to workers who are helping the police in its business!—*Ed.*) "and many voiced the opinion that serious thought should be given to the question of the workers and that they should be afforded the opportunity and the means of ridding themselves of the influence of the socialist doctrine" (an interesting scene: generals and priests, Zubatov spies and writers loyal to the police spirit intend to "help" the workers rid themselves of the influence of the socialist doctrine!—and incidentally, at the same time to help hook unwary workers who will swallow the bait.—

Ed.), "allowing them independent activity, under control of government statutes and under the guidance of that section of the intelligentsia which truly loves its native land and is striving for its welfare and prosperity" (fine independent activity indeed under police control! No, the workers are already demanding independent activity untrammelled by the police, with the right to choose as leaders those of the intellectuals whom they, the workers, trust.—*Ed.*). "V. V. Komarov, A. V. Vasilyev, Colonel Veretennikov, Mr. Dekhterev, the painter Karazin, Prince D. P. Golitsyn, and many others reacted most warmly to the question of the workers. The idea was expressed that it was necessary to set up special workers' councils, headed by a central council, which would be a beneficial factor in averting misunderstandings between workers and manufacturers. As Mr. Dekhterev put it, this should be allowed because a crowd can never act intelligently and that influence over a crowd of workers could be exerted best of all by the workers themselves; as an example, he cited a similar type of institution in France which was coping with the above-mentioned task successfully." (Yes, Workers' Councils are meeting with success in France and throughout Europe. That is true. But they are meeting with success because there the workers enjoy political liberty, have their own unions, their own newspapers, their elected representatives in parliament. Does Mr. Dekhterev really think that the St. Petersburg workers are all so naïve as not to know this?—*Ed.*). "The question of government loans to the workers' mutual aid societies also met with sympathy by members of the Russkoye Sobraniye. The meeting closed with a decision to elect a special commission to consider the steps to be taken in the matter. We trust that you, Mr. Editor, as a true Russian, will accord us, workers, the same sympathy, and that you will find it possible to publish the above in your paper, so that our best people may all unite for a joint struggle against the enemies of our native land, who are stirring up sedition among the mass of the people, sowing the seeds of internecine strife and undermining loyalty to the time-honoured traditions, and respect and reverence for the supreme authority. We are firmly convinced that there are also people in Russia who are ready to give their all to the

service of their fatherland, to offer up their forces and abilities on its altar and, in close communion, to erect an insurmountable barrier to falsehood and malice in Russia.

"F. A. Slepov, worker."

And at the close Mr. Slepov could not but let his tongue run away with him! All support for the workers' needs, all sympathy on the part of the government boiled down to one thing: to form groups from among the workers themselves to combat socialism. This is the truth of it. And it will be most interesting for the workers to learn that in addition to the knout and imprisonment, exile and prisons, the Zubatov workers will also try to inculcate in them "respect and reverence for the supreme authority". No sensible worker will say at a public meeting what he really thinks—that would be delivering himself directly into the hands of the police. But through *our own* papers, *our own* leaflets and *our own* meetings we can and must see to it that the new Zubatov campaign is turned entirely to the good of socialism.

Iskra, No. 31, January 1, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FORMATION OF AN ORGANISING COMMITTEE[111]

Four years ago several Russian Social-Democratic organisations united in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and worked out a certain plan of organisation and general principles of activity, which were set forth in the "Manifesto" published by the Party.[112] Unfortunately, this first attempt was not crowned with success: the elements necessary for building up a united and strong Social-Democratic Party, which would wage an unremitting struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat from all forms of oppression and exploitation, did not as yet exist. On the one hand, the very forms of the practical activity of the Russian Social-Democrats were only just beginning to take shape. The Social-Democrats, who had but recently entered on the path of struggle, were still seeking the best ways of putting their theoretical views into practice and were still advancing with timid and uncertain steps. The working-class movement, on which they based their activities and which was finding expression in tremendous strikes, had only just burst forth in a brilliant flash that dazzled the eyes of many, obscuring from their vision the tasks and aims, so clear and definite, of revolutionary Social-Democracy, and inducing an enthusiasm for a narrow trade-union struggle. On the other hand, the constant repressions practised by the government against the Social-Democratic organisations, which had not yet become strong or firmly rooted, destroyed all continuity and cut short any tradition in their activities.

However, this unsuccessful attempt did not pass without a trace. From that time on, the very idea of an organised political party of the proletariat, which guided our forerunners, became the lodestar and goal of all class-conscious Social-Democrats. In the course of these four years, repeated attempts have been made to give effect to this idea, which has been handed down to us by the first Social-Democratic leaders. But to this day we are faced with the very same disorganisation that existed four years ago.

At the same time, life makes greater and greater demands on us. Whereas the first leaders of the Party made it their task to rouse the dormant revolutionary forces of the mass of the workers, we are faced with the much more complex task of guiding the awakening forces in the right direction, of taking our place at the head of these forces

and of leading them. We must be prepared at any moment to hear the call: "Lead us whither you have called us!" It will be a fearful thing if that moment takes us unawares, just as divided and unprepared as we are at present. Let it not be said to us that we are exaggerating the gravity of the moment. Anyone capable of seeing beyond ripples on the surface, anyone capable of discerning a process that is going on in the depths, will never suspect us of exaggeration.

But the gravity of the situation is enhanced by still other circumstances. We are passing through a momentous period in history. The awakening of the working class in connection with the general course of Russian life has roused various sections of society to activity. More or less consciously they are striving to organise for the purpose of joining, in one way or another, the struggle against an obsolete regime. We wish them every success! Social-Democrats can only welcome all who join such a struggle. But they must vigilantly watch lest such allies make Social-Democracy a tool in their hands, lest they divert it from the main field of activity, lest they deprive it of the leading role in the struggle against the autocracy and, what is most important, lest they hinder the progress of the revolutionary struggle by diverting it from the correct path. That this danger is no figment of the imagination is clear to everyone who has carefully followed the development of the revolutionary struggle in recent years.

Thus, Russian Social-Democracy is now faced with a gigantic task, one that is beyond the power of any local committee or even district organisation. No matter how perfect the local organisations may be, they will not be able to cope with this task, for it has already grown beyond local bounds. It can be accomplished only by the collective forces of all Social-Democrats in Russia, welded into a single, centralised, disciplined army. But, then, who is to assume the initiative for this unification?

This question was discussed last year at a conference of representatives of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, the Central Committee of the United Committees and Organisations of the South, the *Iskra* organisation, the Central Committees of the Bund (in Russia and abroad), the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, and some other organisations. The conference instructed representatives of certain organisations to form an Organising Committee, which would assume the task of actually re-establishing the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

In fulfilment of this decision, representatives of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, the *Iskra* organisation, and *Yuzhny Rabochy* group* have formed an Organising Committee, which sets itself the first and foremost task of *preparing the conditions for the convocation of a Party congress*.

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* The Bund was also invited to send its representative to the Organising Committee, but for reasons unknown to us, the Bund did not respond to this invitation. We hope that these reasons were purely accidental, and that the Bund will not delay in sending its representative.

However, since the convocation of a congress is a highly complex matter and requires considerable time, the Organising Committee assumes, until the re-establishment of the central Party body, certain general functions (the issuing of leaflets intended for the whole of Russia, general transport arrangements and methods of underground work, the establishment of contacts between the committees, etc.).

It is self-evident that the Organising Committee, which has arisen on the initiative of several organisations, will be bound by obligatory relations only with those organisations that have already authorised it or that will authorise it to act for them. Its relation to all other committees and groups is that of a separate organisation, which offers its services to them.

The task which the Organising Committee has decided to undertake is a great and responsible one, and, if it has nevertheless made so bold as to do so, that is only because the need for unity is so pressing, because disunity is making itself felt all too keenly, and because continued disorganisation constitutes so great a threat to the common cause. In setting to work, the Organising Committee believes that the success of its activity will depend to a considerable extent on the attitude adopted towards it by the Social-Democratic committees and organisations, and this attitude itself will be regarded by the committee as a criterion of the correctness with which it has gauged the present situation.

The Organising Committee

December 1902

* * *

This statement by the newly-formed Organising Committee of our Party speaks eloquently enough for itself, and there is no need for us to devote many words to explaining the great significance of the step that has been taken. Unification, the re-establishment of a united Party, is the most pressing task of the Russian Social-Democrats, a task that urgently requires immediate accomplishment. This task is a very difficult one, for it is not unity of a few handfuls of revolutionarily minded intellectuals that we need, but unity of all leaders of the working-class movement, which has roused the whole of a large class of the population to independent life and struggle. We need unification based on a strict singleness of principle which must be consciously and firmly arrived at by all or by the vast majority of committees, organisations, and groups, of intellectuals and workers, who act in varying circumstances and under varying conditions and have sometimes achieved their Social-Democratic convictions along the most diverse paths. Such unification

cannot be decreed; neither can it be established immediately, by mere resolutions adopted by assembled delegates. It must be prepared and developed systematically and gradually, so that the general Party congress can consolidate and improve what has already been accomplished, continue what has been started, and complete and formally endorse the firm foundation for further, more widespread and intense work. And that is why we particularly welcome the wisely cautious and modest way in which the Organising Committee has entered upon its duties. Without insisting on any kind of obligatory relations with the mass of Russian Social-Democrats, the Organising Committee confines itself to *offering its services* to all of them. And so let all Russian Social-Democrats without exception—committees and circles, organisations and groups, those on active service and those temporarily on the retired list (exiles, etc.)—make haste to respond to this call; let them strive to establish direct and active contacts with the O.C.; let them give their most active support to the great work of unification. We must see to it that *not a single* group of Russian Social-Democrats fails to establish contacts with the O.C., or work in comradely harmony with it. Further, while regarding the preparation and convocation of a general Party congress as its primary task, the O.C. also assumes certain general functions *in the service of the movement*. We are confident, that no Social-Democrat will fail to recognise the pressing need for this extension of functions on the part of the O.C., for this is merely an extended *offer of its services*—an offer that goes to meet demands expressed thousands and thousands of times—an offer that does not entail the forfeiture of any "rights", but rather the practical abandonment of isolation as speedily as possible, and the tackling in common of a number of joint undertakings. Finally, we also consider absolutely correct and in place the resolute statement of the O.C. that the convocation of a congress is a highly complex matter and requires considerable time. This, of course, does not at all mean that the convocation of the congress should be put off. Nothing of the sort. If we take into account the urgency of the congress, then we would have to admit that even one month is too "considerable" a period for its convocation. But if we bear in mind our conditions of

work and the necessity for adequate representation of the entire movement at the congress, then five or even ten times as long a period will not cause a single Party worker who is at all experienced to lose heart.

Let us then wish every success to the work for the speediest possible unification and re-establishment of the Party and let us show our sympathy with this work not only in words but in immediate action on the part of every one of us. Long live Russian and international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Iskra, No. 32, January 15, 1903

Published according to the Iskra text

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE LETTER FROM "7 Ts. 6 F."[113]

I am writing under the fresh impression of your letter, which I have just read. Its senseless twaddle is so exasperating that I am unable to suppress the desire to state my opinion frankly. Please send my letter on to the author and tell him that he need not take offence at the severe tone. After all, it is not meant for publication.

The letter deserves a reply, in my opinion, because it shows up in particularly bold relief a characteristic trait in the mood of many present-day revolutionaries: waiting for instructions; demanding *everything* from above, from others, from outside; looking lost when faced by failures caused by local inactivity; piling up complaint after complaint, and inventing recipes for a cheap and simple cure of the evil.

You will not invent anything, gentlemen! If *you yourselves* are inactive, if you permit splits to take place under your very noses and then heave sighs and make complaint—*no recipes will help you*. And it is utterly absurd to shower us with complaints on this score. Don't imagine that you offend us by your accusations and attacks: you see, we have become inured, so devilishly inured to them that they do not provoke us!

"Mass" literature "by the hundredweight"—this battle-cry of yours is nothing but an *imaginary recipe* for someone else to cure you of your own inactivity. Believe me, no such recipes will *ever* work! If you yourselves are not energetic and alert, no one will help you in any way. It is highly unreasonable to wail, "*g i v e* us this or that, *d e l i v e r* something or other", when *you yourselves should do the getting and delivering*. It is useless to write about it to us, for we cannot do it from here, whereas you can and should

do it by yourselves: I am referring to the delivery of literature we are publishing and have on hand.

Some local "activists" (so called because they are inactive), who have seen no more than a few issues of *Iskra* and who do not work actively to get and distribute it in *mass* quantities, invent the flimsy excuse: "That is not what we want. Give us *mass* literature, for the masses! Masticate it for us, put it into our mouths, and perhaps we'll manage to do the swallowing ourselves.

How phenomenally absurd these plaints appear to those who know and see that they, these local "activists", are unable to organise the distribution of even what is available. Is it not ridiculous to read: give us hundredweights, when you *are unable* to take and transport even a *few pounds*? Do that first, worthy "dreamers for an hour" (for the first mishap makes you abandon everything, even all your convictions!). Do that, and then, when you have done it not once, but dozens of times, the publication, too, *will grow* with the demand.

I say it will grow, for your plaints about mass literature (which you have uncritically and senselessly copied from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *Svoboda* people, and all sorts of confused "inactivists") are caused by forgetfulness of a small ... a very small trifle, namely, forgetfulness of the fact that you are unable to take and distribute *even a hundredth part* of the mass literature we are publishing now. I shall take one of the recent lists of one of our few (miserably, pitifully, shamefully few) consignments. *The Nizhni-Novgorod speeches*, *the Rostov struggle*, *the pamphlet on strikes*, *the Dikstein pamphlet**[114]—I shall limit myself to these. Four, only four small items! So little!!

* "This is old stuff!" you wail. Yes. All parties that have good popular literature have been distributing *old stuff*: Guesde and Lafargue, Bebel, Bracke, Liebknecht, etc., *for decades*. Do you hear: for decades! And the *only* popular literature that is *good*, the *only* popular literature that is *suitable* is that which can serve *for decades*. For popular literature is a series of *textbooks for the people* and textbooks teach the ABC, which remains unchanged for *fifty years* at a time. The "popular" literature which "captivates" you and which the *Svoboda* group and Socialist-Revolutionaries publish by the hundredweight every month is *waste paper* and *charlatanism*. Charlatans always bustle and make the greatest noise, and some naïve people mistake that for energy.

Yes, it is very little! Yes, we need four hundred, not four.

But, permit me to ask you, have you been able to distribute *at least these four things by the ten thousand*? No, you have not been able to do this. You have not been able to distribute them by the hundred even. *That is why* you shout: *give* us hundredweights! (No one will ever *give* you anything if you are unable to *take* it: bear that in mind).

Have you been able to make use of the *hundreds* of copies which have been *delivered* to you, *brought* to you, *and placed into your mouths*?? No, you have not been able to do that. Even in this trifle you have not been able to link up the masses with Social-Democracy. Every month we get tens and hundreds of leaflets, reports, news items, and letters from all parts of Russia, but we have had *not a single* (give good thought to the exact meaning of the words, "not a single"!) report about the distribution of these hundreds of copies among the *masses*, about the impression they made on the *masses*, about the reaction of the *masses*, about discussions among the *masses* on t h e s e things! You are placing us in a position wherein the writer does the writing and the reader (the intellectual) does the reading—after which this same slothful reader fulminates against the writer because he (the writer!!!) does not furnish literature "by the hundredweight" everywhere. The person whose sole business it is to *l i n k u p* the writer with the masses sits like a ruffled turkey and gobbles away: give us mass literature, while *at the same* time *he is unable* to make use of even a *h u n d r e d t h p a r t* of what is available.

You will of course say that it is *impossible*, impossible in general, to get, for instance, *Iskra*, our main product, *linked up* with the masses. I know you will say that. I have heard it hundreds of times and have always replied that this is untrue, that it is a subterfuge, shirking, inability, and indolence, the desire to have roast duck fly straight into your mouths.

I know from the facts that enterprising people *have been able* to "link up" *Iskra* (this super-intellectual *Iskra*, as the sorry little intellectuals consider it) with the *masses* of even such backward and uneducated workers as those in the industrial gubernias around Moscow. I have known *workers* who have themselves distributed *Iskra* among the masses (there)

and who merely remarked that there were too few copies. Quite recently I heard a "soldier from the field of battle" tell of how in one such out-of-the-way factory area in central Russia *Iskra* is read at one and the same time in numerous circles, at gatherings numbering from ten to fifteen people, the committee and subcommittees *themselves* reading over every issue in advance, *planning* jointly just how to use each article in agitation talks. And they were able to make use of even those paltry five to eight (maximum: *eight*!!) copies which were all that they got owing to the helpless inactivity of the activists stationed near the border (who are never even able to make arrangements for reception of literature consignments and hope that the writer will give birth not only to articles but to people to do the work for them!).

Come now, tell us with your hand over your heart: have many of you made *such* use of *every* copy of *Iskra* you received (delivered to you, brought *to* you)? You are silent! Well then, let me tell you: one *out of a hundred* copies that get to Russia (by the will of the fates and due to the inactivity of the "readers") is being used *in this way*, with discussions on the agitation value of every item, with readings of every item in workers' study circles, in *all* circles of *all* workers who are accustomed to foregather in a particular town. And yet people who are unable to *assimilate* even a hundredth part of the material that gets to them wail: give us hundredweights!! Shchedrin's formula (the writer does the writing) still regards the "reader" far, far too optimistically!!

The present-day reader (from among the Social-Democratic intellectuals) has gone so far as to complain about the *writers* because the local intellectuals are lazy and "order" the workers about, without doing anything for them. The complaint is justified, a thousand times justified, only ... is it directed to the proper quarter? Won't you permit us to *return this complaint to the sender*, with a double charge as punishment?? What about yourselves, my worthy complainants? If your friends are *unable* to make use of *Iskra* for readings in workers' study circles, if they are *unable* to assign people for the delivery and distribution of literature, if they are *unable* to assist the workers to set up circles for this purpose, why *don't you throw* such helpless friends *overboard*?? Just think, in what sort of pretty

situation do you find yourselves when you complain to *us* about *your own* helplessness?

It is a *fact* that the "practicians" do not make use of even a hundredth part of all they *could* **take**. And it is a no less indubitable fact that the special varieties of "mass" literature which these people have thought up are only pretexts and dodges. In the letter of "7 Ts. 6 F.", for instance, three varieties are recommended to "us" (it would be to us, of course):

1) A popular newspaper. Chew over every fact so as to make its assimilation possible without digestion, so that *we*, "activists", should need no stomachs at all.

It does not matter that the world has never yet seen such a "popular" "newspaper", since a newspaper *gives answers* to *everything*, while popular literature *gives instruction* on *a few things*. It does not matter that *all* our examples of such literature, beginning with *Rabochaya Mysl*, on through *Vperyods*,[115] *Rabocheye Dyelos*, *Krasnoye Znamyas*,[116] and the like, have unavoidably and necessarily proved mongrels, being neither popular nor newspapers. It does not matter that *all* efforts of the "workers'" newspapers have merely nurtured, and always will nurture, the absurd division into an intellectual movement **and** a working-class movement (a division caused by the dull-wittedness and bungling of the intellectuals, who go so far as to send complaints about their own bungling from the *seat of the trouble* to the ends of the earth!). It does not matter that *all* the efforts of the "workers'" newspapers so far have been breeding, and will always breed among us, amateurishness and special, profound, Kazan and Kharkov theories. All this does not matter. Look at the *captivating Svoboda* group and the *captivating* ("breath-taking") Socialist-Revolutionaries; what a mass (ugh, what a mass!) of popular newspapers and periodicals they are publishing!! *Narodnoye Dyelo*, *Krasnoye Znamya*, *Svoboda*—a magazine for workers, *Otkliki*—a newspaper and magazine for workers, *Luchina*—for peasants, *Rabochaya Mysl*—the Geneva newspaper of the St. Petersburg workers!! It does not matter that all this is trash, but it is *mass* trash for all that.

And all you have is just one *Iskra*; after all, it gets monotonous! Thirty-one issues and all *Iskra*, while with the

captivating people every two issues of one title (of trash) are immediately followed by three issues of another title (of trash). Now, this is energy, this is jolly, this is new! But our Social-Democrats....

2) And "they" are always having new pamphlets. Each reprint is considered a pamphlet and all this is meretriciously trumpeted forth, and the printed sheets are added up (a **million** printed sheets: see No. 16 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*. They have broken all records! Champions!).

But in our case! Reprints are not counted as pamphlets—that is highbrowism, bookishness!! The ancient Dikstein pamphlets are being republished, when every girl in Paris and in Chernigov knows that *ten* new pamphlets (trash) are worth a hundred times more than one old pamphlet, even a good one.

It is only the Germans who do things in such a way that, for example, in 1903 Bebel's *Our Aims*, written **thirty-four** years ago, is being republished for the *eleventh* time!! That is so boring. Our "captivating" Socialist-Revolutionaries are pouring out stuff. But our local "activists" are able to use neither the *o l d* Plekhanov pamphlets (twenty years old: ancient stuff! To the archives with them!), nor "some" one (one!) pamphlet on strikes[117] and on the Witte memorandum!

This quite apart from the fact that the local "activist" does not lift a finger to squeeze *g o o d* pamphlets out of authors now in exile—and to *get local writers to contribute to* "*Iskra*". Why do that? It is much easier to complain than to undertake such a troublesome business! And the present-day reader unblushingly calls himself an *Iskra*-ist on the grounds that he writes complaints to *Iskra*. Nor does it trouble his conscience in the slightest that 99 per cent of the articles are written by the one and the same three and a half writers. Nor does he find it necessary even to think about the fact that *Iskra* must not be allowed to stop publication and that the fortnightly issue of one and a half to two signatures calls for a lot of work. Still, he continues to shout with simply unparalleled fatuity: thirty-one issues, and there are still many fools in the localities and much helpless wailing!! A truly crushing argument.... Only whom and what does it crush?

3) Leaflets.

G i v e us leaflets! The committees cannot do it!! Write, deliver, bring (and distribute?) leaflets!

Well, now, this is indeed consistent. I open my mouth and you shovel it in: here we have the new formula for the relations between the "writer" and the *Iskra* practician! To go so far as to state that the local organisations (consisting of slothful "activists"?) cannot manage to issue local leaflets, that these leaflets should be delivered from abroad, that is the *limit*. This is such a splendid (in my opinion) crowning touch to the whole letter of "7 Ts. 6 F." that it only remains for me to conclude with this "crown". Any further remarks or comments will only dim its shining lustre.

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CONCERNING THE STATEMENT OF THE BUND

We have just received No. 106 of the Bund's *Posledniye Izvestia* (dated February 3 (January 21*)), which reports an exceptionally important, drastic and highly lamentable step taken by the Bund. It appears that in Russia there has come out a statement of the Central Committee of the Bund on the announcement of the Organising Committee. As a matter of fact, it would be more correct to say: a statement on the *footnote* in the announcement of the Organising Committee, for it is *mainly* this single footnote that the Bund deals with in its statement.

This is what it is all about. As our readers know, the Organising Committee stated in this terrible "footnote", which (ostensibly!) was the spark that set the forest on fire, literally the following:

"The Bund was also invited to send its representative to the Organising Committee, but for reasons unknown to us, the Bund did not respond to this invitation. We hope that these reasons were purely accidental, and that the Bund will not delay in sending its representative."**

What, we ask, could be more natural and innocent than this footnote? How else could the O.C. have acted? To avoid mentioning the Bund would have been wrong, since the O.C. did not and could not ignore it so long as the Bund, on the basis of the decision of the Party Congress in 1898, was affiliated to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. And once we did mention it, we had to state that we had invited it. Clear enough, one would think? And it is even clearer that if the O.C. did not know the reasons for

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* Second date Old Style.—*Ed.*

** See p. 306 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the Bund's silence, this is exactly what *should have been* stated: "for reasons unknown to us." By adding the words: we hope that these reasons were *purely accidental* and that the Bund will not delay in sending its representative—the O.C. openly and straightforwardly expressed its desire to work *together with the Bund* for the organisation of the congress and the re-establishment of the Party.

Obviously, if the Bund also shared this desire, it would only have to send its representative, who was *invited* both through secret channels and in the press announcement. Instead, the Bund *enters into polemics* with a footnote (!!), and in a printed statement gives a *separate* and *particular* exposition of its opinions and views on the tasks of the O.C. and the conditions for convoking a congress. Prior to examining the Bund's "polemic" and analysing its views, we must *protest* most emphatically against the Bund coming out with a separate statement in the press, since such action is an infringement of the most elementary rules governing the *joint* conduct of revolutionary activities and especially organisational activities. One of two things, gentlemen. Either you *do not want* to work in *one common* O.C., in which case no one, of course, will complain of your acting separately, or you want to work jointly, in which case you are *in duty bound* to state your views, not in separate statements to the public, but to the comrades on the O.C., which comes out publicly only as an integral body.

The Bund itself is, of course, fully aware that its action flies in the face of all rules of comradely conduct of *common* affairs, and it attempts to take refuge in the following feeble justification: "Since we have had no possibility to express our views on the tasks of the forthcoming congress either through personal attendance at the conference or through participation in drawing up the 'Announcement', we are obliged to make up for this omission, at least to some extent, by the present statement." The question arises: does the Bund really intend in all seriousness to assure us that it had "no possibility" to send a letter to the O.C.? Or to send a letter to the St. Petersburg Committee? Or to the *Iskra* organisation, or *Yuzhny Rabochy*? And besides was there no possibility for the Bund to send its delegate to one of these organisations? Did the Bund try to take at least one

of these "impossibly" difficult steps, which very likely were especially difficult for an organisation so weak, inexperienced and lacking in all links as the Bund?

Stop this game of hide-and-seek, gentlemen! It is both stupid and unbefitting. You acted separately because you *wanted* to act separately. And you wanted to act separately in order to indicate and immediately carry out your *decision* to place your relations with the Russian comrades on a *new* footing: not to *affiliate* to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the basis of the Rules of 1898, but to enter into a *federative* alliance with it. Instead of *discussing* this question in detail and comprehensively before the entire congress, as we wanted to do, when *for a very long time we refrained from continuing the polemic we started* on the question of federation and nationality[118]—instead of doing this, as all or the vast majority of the Russian comrades undoubtedly wanted to do, you *wrecked* joint discussion. You did not act as a fellow comrade of St. Petersburg, the South, and *Iskra*, one who desired to discuss together with them the best form of relations (both *prior to the congress* and *at the congress*); you acted as a *contracting party*, apart from all the members of the R.S.D.L.P. presenting *your own terms* to the whole of this Party.

Love cannot be forced, says the Russian proverb. If the Bund does not want to remain in the closest alliance with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which was properly recommended by the Congress of 1898, then of course it will cease to maintain the old relations. We do not deny the "right" of the Bund to express its opinion and its desire (in general, we do not indulge in talk about "rights" in the cause of revolution except in cases of dire necessity). But we do very much regret the fact that the Bund has shown so little tact as to give expression to its opinion in a separate public statement when it was invited to enter a common organisation (the O.C.) *which had not expressed in advance any hard and fast opinion on the given question* and was calling a congress for the express purpose of discussing each and every opinion.

The Bund wanted to *provoke* an immediate declaration of opinions on the part of all those who entertain different views on this question. Very well! We, of course, shall not

refuse to do so. We shall tell the Russian proletariat, and shall specially repeat to the Jewish proletariat, that the present Bund leaders are committing a grave political error, which will undoubtedly be corrected by time, experience, and the growth of the movement. At one time the Bund supported "economism", helped to bring about the split abroad, and adopted resolutions stating that the economic struggle is the *best* means of political agitation. We rose up against this and fought it. And the fight helped to rectify the old mistakes, of which very likely not even a trace has remained. We fought against the urge towards terrorism, which to all appearances vanished even more rapidly. We are convinced that nationalist passion too will vanish. In the end the Jewish proletariat will understand that its most vital interests demand the *closest* unity with the Russian proletariat in one party, that it is the height of folly to decide in advance whether the evolution of the Jewish people in free Russia will differ from its evolution in free Europe, that the Bund ought not to go beyond the demand (in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) for the complete autonomy in matters concerning the Jewish proletariat, which was fully recognised by the 1898 Congress and which has never been denied by anyone.

But let us return to the Bund's statement. It terms the footnote to the "Announcement" of the O.C. "ambiguous". This is an untruth that borders on malicious slander. A few lines later, the Bund's Central Committee itself admits that the "reasons for our representative's absence from the conference were purely accidental." And what did the O.C. say? It expressed the hope that it was only for accidental reasons that the representative of the Bund did not attend. You yourselves confirm this assumption and then grow angry over it. Why is that? Further. No one can know of accidental occurrences in advance. Hence, the assertion of the Bund's Foreign Committee that the O.C. *knew* the reasons that prevented the representative from appearing is absolutely unfounded. The Bund's Foreign Committee is in general playing a very unseemly part in this affair: the Bund's Foreign Committee supplements the statement of the Bund's Central Committee with its own inventions, which flatly contradict the words of even the C.C. itself! How could the

Bund's Foreign Committee ascertain that the O.C. *knew* the reasons for the Bund's absence, when it was the C.C. (and not the Foreign Committee) of the Bund that was invited, and when the C.C. itself says that the reasons for this absence were purely accidental??

"We are convinced," says the Bund's C.C., "that had the initiators of the conference taken a little more trouble, these accidental reasons could not have kept us from responding...." We would ask any impartial person: if two comrades who are preparing to get together in the O.C. admit in a single voice that the reasons which prevented the meeting were "purely accidental", is it not out of place and unseemly to *start a public polemic* on who is more to blame for the non-appearance? On our part, let us remark that we long ago expressed our regret (of course, not in the press, but in a letter) over the absence of the Bund, and we were informed that the Bund had been invited *twice*: first, by letter, and then by word of mouth through the X. Committee of the Bund.

The delegate arrived *almost a month after* the conference, the Bund complains. Yes, this is a terrible crime, and, of course, it deserves public exposure, since it lends particular conspicuousness to the punctuality of the Bund, which has not got round to sending a delegate even after two months have passed!

The delegate "did not keep his promise" to send the "Announcement" of the O.C. either in manuscript or in printed form, but *without fail* prior to its distribution.... We advise our Russian comrades not to talk to certain people without making a record of the conversation. We too were promised by the *Iskra* organisation that we would be sent both the manuscript and a printed copy of the "Announcement", but nevertheless we did not receive the manuscript at all, and saw the printed copy *much later* than members of organisations which have no contacts with the *Iskra* organisation. Let the Bundists decide the question of whether it would be seemly on our part if we began to publish accusations against the *Iskra* organisation of having broken its promise. The delegate of the O.C. promised the Bund's C.C. to write at once to the comrade charged with the printing of the "Announcement" about holding up the printing: this was *actually* promised (so far as we can judge from information at our disposal).

This promise was kept, but it was too late to stop the printing, since there was no time to get in touch with the printshop.

To sum up: the O.C. initiators wrote letters, made a personal announcement through the X. Committee, and sent a delegate to the Bund's Central Committee, while for months the Bund did not send *a single letter*, let alone a delegate! And yet the Bund comes out in the press with accusations! And strangely enough the Bund's Foreign Committee affirms that the initiators of the conference behaved "strangely", that their activities are decidedly at variance with their aim, that they displayed "haste" (the Bund's C.C., on the contrary, accuses them of slowness!), that they merely want to "create the impression" that the Bund "was indifferent"!!

We have still to say a few words about the charge against the O.C. that it has not drawn "the only correct conclusion", namely: "Since actually there is no party, the forthcoming congress should be in the nature of a constituent congress, and, therefore, the right to participate in it should be accorded to all Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, both Russian and those of all other nationalities." The Bund is trying to get round the unpleasant fact that, since it does not have a single centre, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party consists of a number of committees and organs, and possesses a "Manifesto" and resolutions of the First Congress, at which, incidentally, the Jewish proletariat was also represented by people who had not yet made their mark in "economist," terrorist, and nationalist waverings. By formally advancing the "right" of "all" nationalities to found the long-ago-founded Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Bund manifestly confirms that it is precisely over the question of the notorious "federation" that it has raised the whole issue. But the Bund should be the last to raise this question, and it is not about "rights" that the issue should be raised among serious revolutionaries. Everyone knows that the question of cementing and uniting a basic nucleus of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is on the order of the day. We cannot but favour representation of "all" nationalities at the congress, but at the same time we must remember that we can think of *expanding* the nucleus or allying it with other organisations *only*

after the formation of this nucleus has been completed (or, at the very least, after there is no doubt about its stability) Until we have ourselves become united organisationally and have firmly set out along the correct path, amalgamation with us will not give anything to "all other" nationalities! And the answer to the question of the *possibility* (and not of the "right", gentlemen!) of "all other" nationalities being represented at our congress depends on a number of tactical and organisational steps by the O.C. and the Russian committees, depends, in short, on how successful the activity of the O.C. will be. It is a historical fact that from the very outset the Bund has tried to put a spoke in the wheel of the O.C.

Iskra, No. 33, February 1, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

ON THE MANIFESTO OF THE LEAGUE OF THE ARMENIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

A new Social-Democratic organisation has made its appearance in the Caucasus: *The League of Armenian Social-Democrats*. This League, as we know, began its practical activities over half a year ago and already has its own paper, published in Armenian. We have received the first issue of this paper, which is called *Proletariat* and next to its title carries the inscription "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party". It contains a number of articles, commentaries, and reports dealing with the social and political conditions which have called into existence the League of Armenian Social-Democrats, and giving a general outline of the programme of its activities.

The leading article, "Manifesto of the Armenian Social-Democrats", states: "In its activities, the League of Armenian Social-Democrats, as one of the branches of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party which extends the network of its organisations far and wide over the entire expanse of Russia, is in complete accord with the R.S.D.L.P., and will fight together with it for the interests of the Russian proletariat in general, and of the Armenian proletariat in particular." Further, after referring to the rapid development of capitalism in the Caucasus and the monstrously powerful and manifold results of this process, the authors go on to speak of the present state of the working-class movement in the Caucasus. In the industrial centres of the Caucasus, such as Baku, Tiflis, and Batum, with their big capitalist establishments and numerous industrial proletariat, this movement has already struck deep roots. However, because of the extremely low cultural level of the Caucasian workers,

their struggle against the employers has naturally been of a more or less instinctive, spontaneous nature till now. A force was necessary which could unite the workers' scattered forces, give their demands articulate form and develop class-consciousness among them. That force is socialism.

Then, after briefly setting forth the main theses of scientific socialism, the League explains its stand in relation to the present-day trends in international, and, in particular, Russian, Social-Democracy. "The attainment of the socialist ideal," says the Manifesto, "is, in our opinion, conceivable neither through the working class' efforts in the economic sphere nor through partial political and social reforms; it is possible only by completely smashing the entire existing system, by means of a social revolution, to which the political dictatorship of the proletariat must be the necessary prologue." Then, pointing out that the existing political system in Russia is hostile to every social movement, especially to that of the working class, the League declares that it sets itself the immediate task of politically educating the Armenian proletariat and drawing it into the struggle of the entire Russian proletariat for the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy. Without at all denying the need for the partial economic struggle of the workers against the employers, the League, however, does not consider it of importance in itself. The League recognises this struggle insofar as it improves the material condition of the workers and helps develop political consciousness and class solidarity among them.

Of particular interest to us is the League's attitude towards the national question. "Taking into consideration," says the Manifesto, "that the Russian state is made up of many different nationalities at varying levels of cultural development, and believing that only the extensive development of local self-government can safeguard the interests of these heterogeneous elements, we deem essential the establishment of a *federative* [italics ours] republic in the future free Russia. As to the Caucasus, in view of the extremely diverse national composition of its population, we shall strive to unite all the local socialist elements and all the workers of the various nationalities; we shall strive to create a united and strong Social-Democratic organisation,

for a more successful struggle against the autocracy. In the future Russia we shall recognise the right of all nations to free self-determination, since we regard national freedom as being only one of the aspects of civil liberties in general. Proceeding from this proposition, and taking into account the above-mentioned diverse national composition of the Caucasus and the absence of geographical boundaries between the various nationalities, we do not find it possible to include in our programme the demand for political autonomy for the Caucasian peoples; we demand only autonomy in matters pertaining to cultural life, i.e., freedom of language, schools, education, etc."

We whole-heartedly welcome the Manifesto of the League of Armenian Social-Democrats and especially its splendid attempt to give a correct presentation of the national question. It is highly desirable that this attempt be carried through to the end. Two fundamental principles by which all Social-Democrats in Russia should be guided in the national question *have been* quite correctly *outlined* by the League. These are, firstly, the demand for political and civil liberties and complete equality, rather than for national autonomy; and, secondly, the demand for the right to self-determination for every nationality forming part of the state. But neither of these principles is as yet quite consistently brought out by the League of Armenian Social-Democrats. As a matter of fact, is it possible *from the Armenian Social-Democrats' point of view* to speak of the demand for a *federative* republic? Federation *presupposes* autonomous national political units, whereas the League rejects the demand for national autonomy. To be fully consistent, the League should delete the demand for a *federative* republic from its programme, confining itself to the demand for a democratic republic in general. It is not the business of the proletariat to *preach* federalism and national autonomy; it is not the business of the proletariat to advance such demands, which inevitably amount to a demand for the establishment of an autonomous *class* state. It is the business of the proletariat to rally the greatest possible *masses* of workers of each and every nationality *more closely*, to rally them for struggle *in the broadest possible arena* for a democratic republic and for socialism. And since the state arena in which we are work-

ing today was created and is being maintained and extended by means of a series of outrageous acts of violence, then, to make the struggle against all forms of exploitation and oppression successful, we must not disperse but unite the forces of the *working class*, which is the most oppressed and the most capable of fighting. The demand for recognition of every nationality's right to self-determination simply implies that we, the party of the proletariat, must always and unconditionally *oppose any attempt* to influence national *self*-determination from without *by violence or injustice*. While at all times performing this negative duty of ours (to fight and protest against violence), we on our part concern ourselves with the self-determination of the *proletariat* in each nationality rather than with self-determination of peoples or nations. Thus, the general, basic and ever-binding programme of Russian Social-Democracy must consist only in the demand for equal rights for all citizens (irrespective of sex, language, creed, race, nationality, etc.) and for their right to free democratic *self*-determination. As to *support* of the demand for *national* autonomy, it is by no means a permanent and binding part of the programme of the proletariat. This support may become necessary for it only in isolated and exceptional cases. With regard to Armenian Social-Democracy, the League of Armenian Social-Democrats has itself recognised the absence of such exceptional circumstances.

We hope to return to the question of federalism and nationality.* For the time being we shall conclude by once again welcoming a new member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—the League of Armenian Social-Democrats.

Iskra, No. 33, February 1, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

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* See pp. 452-461 of this volume.—*Ed.*

DOES THE JEWISH PROLETARIAT NEED AN "INDEPENDENT POLITICAL PARTY"?

No. 105 of *Posledniye Izvestia* (January 28/15, 1903), published by the Foreign Committee of the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, carries a brief article entitled "Concerning a Certain Manifesto" (viz., the manifesto issued by the Ekaterinoslav Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) containing the following statement, which is as extraordinary as it is significant and indeed "fraught with consequences": "The Jewish proletariat has formed itself (*sic*!) into an independent (*sic*!) political party, the Bund."

We did not know this before. This is something new.

Hitherto the Bund has been a constituent part of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and in No. 106 of *Posledniye Izvestia* we still (still!) find a statement of the Central Committee of the Bund, bearing the heading "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party." It is true that at its latest congress, the Fourth, the Bund decided to change its name (without stipulating that it would like to hear the Russian comrades' opinion on the name a section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should bear) and to "introduce" new *federal* relations into the Rules of the Russian Party. The Bund's Foreign Committee has even "introduced" these relations, if that word can be used to describe the fact that it has withdrawn from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and has concluded a federal agreement with the latter.

On the other hand, when *Iskra* polemised with the decisions of the Bund's Fourth Congress, the Bund itself stated very definitely that it only wanted to *secure the acceptance*

of its wishes and *decisions* by the R.S.D.L.P.; in other words, it flatly and categorically acknowledged that until the R.S.D.L.P. adopted new Rules and settled new forms of its attitude towards the Bund, the latter would remain a section of the R.S.D.L.P.

But now, suddenly, we are told that the Jewish proletariat has already *formed itself* into an *independent* political party! We repeat—this is something new.

Equally new is the furious and foolish onslaught of the Bund's Foreign Committee upon the Ekaterinoslav Committee. We have at last (*though unfortunately after much delay*) received a copy of this manifesto, and we do not hesitate to say that in attacking a manifesto *like this* the Bund has *undoubtedly* taken a serious political step.* This step fully accords with the Bund's proclamation as an independent political party and throws much light on the physiognomy and behaviour of this new party.

We regret that lack of space prevents us from reprinting the Ekaterinoslav manifesto in full (it would take up about two columns in *Iskra***), and shall confine ourselves to remarking that this admirable manifesto excellently explains to the Jewish workers of the *city of Ekaterinoslav* (we shall presently explain why we have emphasised these words) the Social-Democratic attitude towards Zionism and anti-Semitism. Moreover, the manifesto treats the sentiments, moods, and desires of the Jewish workers so considerately, with such comradely consideration, that it specially refers to and emphasises the necessity of fighting under the banner of the R.S.D.L.P. "*even for the preservation and further development of your* [the manifesto addresses the Jewish workers] *national culture*", "*even from the standpoint of purely national interests*" (underlined and italicised in the manifesto itself).

Nevertheless, the Bund's Foreign Committee (we almost said the new party's Central Committee) has fallen upon the

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* That is, of course, if the Bund's Foreign Committee expresses the views of the Bund as a whole on this question.

** We intend to reprint in full the manifesto and the attack of the Bund's Foreign Committee in a pamphlet which we are preparing for the press.

manifesto for *making no mention of the Bund*. That is the manifesto's only crime, but one that is terrible and unpardonable. It is for this that the Ekaterinoslav Committee is accused of lacking in "political sense". The Ekaterinoslav comrades are chastised for not "yet having digested the idea of the necessity for a separate organisation [a profound and significant idea!] of the forces [!!l of the Jewish proletariat", for "still harbouring the absurd hope of somehow getting rid of it" (the Bund), for spreading the "no less dangerous fable" (no less dangerous than the Zionist fable) that anti-Semitism is connected with the bourgeois strata and with their interests, and not with those of the working class. That is why the Ekaterinoslav Committee is advised to "abandon the harmful habit of keeping silent about the independent Jewish working-class movement" and to "reconcile itself to the fact that the Bund exists".

Now, let us consider whether the Ekaterinoslav Committee is actually guilty of a crime, and whether it really should have mentioned the Bund without fail. Both questions can be answered only in the negative, for the simple reason that the manifesto is not addressed to the "Jewish workers" in general (as the Bund's Foreign Committee quite wrongly stated), but to "the Jewish workers of *the city of Ekaterinoslav*" (the Bund's Foreign Committee forgot to quote these last words!). *The Bund has no organisation* in Ekaterinoslav. (And, in general, regarding the south of Russia the Fourth Congress of the Bund passed a resolution *not to organise separate committees of the Bund* in cities where the Jewish organisations are included in the Party committees and where their needs can be fully satisfied without separation from the committees.) Since the Jewish workers in Ekaterinoslav are not organised in a separate committee, it follows that their movement (inseparably from the entire working-class movement in that area) is wholly guided by the Ekaterinoslav Committee, which subordinates them *directly* to the R.S.D.L.P., which *must* call upon them to work *for the whole Party*, and not for its individual sections. It is clear that under these circumstances the Ekaterinoslav Committee was not obliged to mention the Bund; on the contrary, if it had presumed to advocate "the necessity for a separate organisation of the forces [it would rather and more probably have been

an organisation of *impotence**] of the Jewish proletariat (which is what the Bundists want), it would have made a very grave error and committed a direct breach, not only of the Party Rules, but of the unity of the proletarian class struggle.

Further, the Ekaterinoslav Committee is accused of lack of "orientation" in the question of anti-Semitism. The Bund's Foreign Committee betrays truly infantile views on important social movements. The Ekaterinoslav Committee speaks of the *international* anti-Semitic movement of the *last decades* and remarks that "from Germany this movement spread to other countries and everywhere found adherents among the bourgeois, and not among the working-class sections of the population". "This is a no less dangerous fable" (than the Zionist fables), cries the thoroughly aroused Bund's Foreign Committee. Anti-Semitism "has struck roots in the mass of the workers", and to prove this the "well-oriented" Bund cites two facts: 1) workers' participation in a pogrom in Częstochowa and 2) the behaviour of 12 (*twelve*!) Christian workers in Zhitomir, who scabbed on the strikers and threatened to "kill off all the Yids". Very weighty proofs indeed, especially the latter! The editors of *Posledniye Izvestia* are so accustomed to dealing with big strikes involving five or ten workers that the behaviour of twelve ignorant Zhitomir workers is dragged out as evidence of the link between international anti-Semitism and one "section" or another "of the population". This is, indeed, magnificent! If, instead of flying into a foolish and comical rage at the Ekaterinoslav Committee, the Bundists had pondered a bit over this question and had consulted, let us say, Kautsky's pamphlet on the social revolution,[119] a Yiddish edition of which they themselves published-recently, they would have understood the link that *undoubtedly* exists

* It is this task of "organising impotence" that the Bund serves when, for example, it uses such a phrase as "our comrades of the 'Christian working-class organisation'". The phrase is as preposterous as is the whole attack on the Ekaterinoslav Committee. We have no knowledge of any "Christian" working-class organisations. Organisations belonging to the R.S.D.L.P. have never distinguished their members according to religion, never asked them about their religion and never *will*—even when the Bund will *in actual fact* "have formed itself into an independent political party".

between anti-Semitism and the interests of the bourgeois, and not of the working-class sections of the population. If they had given it a little more thought they might have realised that the social character of anti-Semitism today is not changed by the fact that dozens or even hundreds of unorganised workers, nine-tenths of whom are still quite ignorant, take part in a pogrom.

The Ekaterinoslav Committee has risen up (and rightly so) against the Zionist fable about anti-Semitism being eternal; by making its angry comment the Bund has only confused the issue and planted in the minds of the Jewish workers ideas which tend to *blunt* their class-consciousness.

From the viewpoint of the struggle for political liberty and for socialism being waged by the whole working class of Russia, the Bund's attack on the Ekaterinoslav Committee is the height of folly. From the viewpoint of the Bund as "an independent political party", this attack becomes understandable: don't dare anywhere organise "Jewish" workers together with, and inseparably from, "Christian" workers! If you would address the Jewish workers in the name of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party or its committees, don't dare do so directly, over our heads, ignoring the Bund or making no mention of it!

And this profoundly regrettable fact is not accidental. Having once demanded "federation" instead of autonomy in matters concerning the Jewish proletariat, you were *compelled* to proclaim the Bund an "independent political party" in order to carry out this principle of federation *at all costs*. However, your declaring the Bund an independent political party is just that reduction to an absurdity of your fundamental error in the national question which will inescapably and inevitably be the starting-point of a change in the views of the Jewish proletariat and of the Jewish Social-Democrats in general. "Autonomy" under the Rules adopted in 1898 provides the Jewish working-class movement with all it needs: propaganda and agitation in Yiddish, its own literature and congresses, the right to advance separate demands to supplement a single general Social-Democratic programme and to satisfy local needs and requirements arising out of the special features of Jewish life. In everything else there must be complete fusion with the Russian proletariat, in the inter-

ests of the struggle waged by the entire proletariat of Russia. As for the fear of being "steam-rollered" in the event of such fusion, the very nature of the case makes it groundless, since it is autonomy that is a guarantee against all steam-rollering" in matters pertaining specifically to the *Jewish* movement, while in matters pertaining to the struggle against the autocracy, the struggle against the bourgeoisie of Russia as a whole, we must act as a single and centralised militant organisation, have behind us the whole of the proletariat, without distinction of language or nationality, a proletariat whose unity is cemented by the continual joint solution of problems of theory and practice, of tactics and organisation; and we must not set up organisations that would march separately, each along its own track; we must not weaken the force of our offensive by breaking up into numerous independent political parties; we must not introduce estrangement and isolation and then have to heal an artificially implanted disease with the aid of these notorious "federation" plasters.

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MARXIST VIEWS ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN EUROPE AND IN RUSSIA[120]

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

Марксизм взгляды на аграрный вопрос в Европе и в России.

Лекция I. Общая теория аграрного вопроса. Образование капиталистических отношений. Различные формы докапиталистических отношений и образование класса с.-х. наемных рабочих. Теория ренты Маркса. Буржуазная фальсификация ученых т.-наз. классических школ (т. Булгаков, Горн, Девид, Чернов, отчасти Маслов и пр.), пытающаяся объяснить существованием законами (в роде закона убывающего плодородия почв) существование дани, взимаемой с общества землевладельцами. Противоречия капитализма в земледелии.

First page of Lenin's manuscript,
"Marxist Views on the Agrarian Question in Europe
and in Russia". 1903

Reduced

First page of Lenin's manuscript,
"Marxist Views on the Agrarian Question in Europe
and in Russia". 1903

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PROGRAMME OF LECTURES

Lecture I. *General Theory of the Agrarian Question*. Development of capitalist agriculture. Different forms of development of commercial agriculture and the formation of the class of agricultural wage-workers. Marx's theory of rent. Bourgeois character of the teachings of the so-called critical school (Messrs. Bulgakov, Hertz, David, Chernov, and in part Maslov, and others), which tries to explain by natural laws (such as the notorious law of diminishing returns) the existence of the tribute levied on society by the landed proprietors. Contradictions of capitalism in agriculture.

Lecture II. *Small- and Large-Scale Production in Agriculture*.

Efforts of the so-called critical school to obscure the slavery of the small producer in present-day society. An analysis of the monographic investigations completely misinterpreted by this school (M. Hecht, K. Klawki, Auhagen).

Lecture III. *Continuation*. The Baden questionnaire. Complete confirmation of Marxist views by its returns. General data of German agrarian statistics. Fable about the latifundian degeneration of big capital. Machinery in agriculture. Greatest deterioration of draught cattle in middle-peasant households. Co-operatives in agriculture; German general statistics of 1895 on dairy co-operatives. Difference in form between co-operatives in agriculture and trusts in industry, which prevented the so-called critical school from understanding the complete identity of both in their social and economic content.

Lecture IV. *Presentation of the Agrarian Question in Russia*. Foundations of the Narodnik world outlook and its historical significance as a primitive form of agrarian

democracy. Central significance of the question of the peasantry (the village commune and people's production). Disintegration of the peasantry into the rural bourgeoisie and rural proletariat. Methods of studying this process and its significance. Replacement of the corvée system by the capitalist system of economy. Reactionary character of Narodnik views. Requirements of the current historical moment: elimination of the remnants of the serf-owning system and free development of the class struggle in the countryside.

OUTLINE OF LECTURE ONE

GENERAL THEORY

Marx's theory of the development of the capitalist mode of production applies to agriculture just as it does to industry. Capitalism's basic features and its different forms in agriculture and industry should not be confused.

Let us examine the characteristic basic features and the specific forms of the process which creates the capitalist system in agriculture. The cause of the appearance of this process is a double one: 1) commodity production and 2) the fact that labour-power, not the product, is a commodity. When this labour-power is drawn into exchange, all production becomes capitalistic, and a special class, the proletariat, is created. The growth of commodity production and the development of wage-labour in agriculture take place in a different form than in industry, and the application of Marx's theory here may therefore seem incorrect; it is, however, necessary to know the form in which agriculture becomes capitalistic. To this end it is essential in the first place to establish two facts:

I. How does commercial agriculture grow? and

II. How does the formation of the working class manifest itself?

I. The basic feature of this process is the rapid growth of the industrial population and the sale of products on the market. Hence, extensive growth of the non-agricultural population is necessary for the extensive development of commodity agriculture. This process assumes different

forms and is to be observed in countries which import and export grain. On its part, the rapid growth of the industrial population creates a shortage of grain in the industrial countries, i.e., makes it impossible to do without imported grain if the technological system remains unchanged. The growing demand for grain under private ownership of the land leads to the formation of monopoly prices.

That is important for the explanation of rent.

The very process of the formation of commercial agriculture does not take place in exactly the same way as in factory industry: in industry it takes place in a simple and direct form, whereas in agriculture we see something different: the prevalence of a mixture of commercial and non-commercial agriculture. Here we have a combination of different forms. In the main, in a given locality *one* definite product is taken to the market. On the one hand, production on the landlord's estate, and particularly on the peasant's land, is commodity production, while on the other hand it retains its consumer character.

The necessity to obtain money brings about the transition from natural to commercial economy. The power of money weighs upon the peasants, not only in Western Europe, but in Russia too. Zemstvo statistics show that the peasants' subordination to the market attains colossal proportions even in places where the survivals of patriarchal economy are still very strong.

II. The process by which the class of wage-workers is formed consists in the disintegration of the peasantry into two strata: 1) farmers who regard agriculture as an industry, and 2) wage-workers. This process is often described as the differentiation of the peasantry. In Russia in particular this process has been very conspicuous. It was observed by "economists" as far back as the times of the feudal system.

Specific features of formation.

This process takes place unevenly. Alongside of the emergence of a class of wage-workers we see the existence of the patriarchal system and the formation of the new, capitalist system. The wage-workers' class is connected with the land in one way or another: the forms of this process will consequently be very varied.

DOMINATION OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE

Rent

The population in a capitalist country is divided into three classes: 1) wage-workers, 2) owners of land, and 3) capitalists. In studying the system it will be necessary to ignore specific local features where this distinct division may not yet exist.

According to Marx, a product is basically divided into necessary and surplus-product. A certain part of this surplus-product constitutes ground rent, viz., that part which remains after the deduction of average profit on capital. In a developed capitalist society, average profit is formed under the influence of competition, which distributes the surplus-product among the capitalists, not in proportion to the number of workers, but in proportion to the total amount of capital invested in a given enterprise.

The process of the formation of average profit is analysed by Marx in Volume III of *Capital*. Capital will yield different profits on plots of land with varying fertility, the poorer land yielding less profit, and the better land—more, additional profit. (The theory of rent was founded before Marx by Ricardo.) Owing to monopoly prices on the grain market and the general shortage of grain, the price is determined by the poorest plot of land. The extra profit derived from the better land, or from the land situated close to the market, as compared with the poorer and more remotely situated plot, is called *differential* rent, according to Marx.

Rent is extracted from the farmers by the owners of land.

The varying amounts of surplus-profit may be of two kinds: 1) profit due to varying fertility, and 2) profit due to different application of capital. Further. In addition to the monopoly of private cultivation of the land, there is the monopoly of private ownership of the land: the owner of land may not give the land to the farmer until the price of grain rises, and then he takes *absolute* rent, which is an elementary monopoly. It may be: 1) a pure monopoly (in that case, strictly speaking, it should not be called rent). Secondly, absolute rent may be taken from surplus-profit on agrarian capital owing to the following circumstance. In

view of the fact that in agriculture the technical equipment is poorer, the share of variable capital (=which creates profit) is higher than in industry. The share of profit should therefore also be higher in agriculture than in industry. However, the monopoly of landownership prevents the levelling of high profit in agriculture and low profit in industry. And absolute rent in the strict sense of the term is taken from the higher agricultural profit which has not been levelled out. It has its source in higher grain prices. Differential rent, on the other hand, is taken from the product. Recent years, characterised by new countries being drawn into trade, have led to a crisis.

The price of land is calculated, anticipated rent. It is therefore treated as income from a certain capital. The capital to be spent on the purchase of land may yield an average rent income. Consequently, the rapid development of industry has greatly inflated and stabilised rent in Europe.

A large section of Maslov's book, recently published under the title *Conditions of the Development of Agriculture in Russia*, deals with the theory of rent, and in this question Maslov adheres to an entirely erroneous viewpoint, repeating the arguments of the bourgeois so-called "critics" of Marx, such as Mr. Bulgakov and others. Marx showed that the old English political economy took too simple a view of this question; it was treated not as a process creating special historical conditions, but as one creating natural conditions, and it reasoned therefore: rent is formed owing to the necessity of transition from the better to the poorer plots of land. But changes in the reverse direction also take place, inasmuch as improvements are effected. The critics have retreated from Marx towards bourgeois economy.

Another narrow concept of the theory of rent is one that combines the law governing the formation of differential rent with the law of diminishing returns, which alleges that profits diminish on one and the same plot of land. Ricardo explains the transition from the better plots to the poorer ones by the *impossibility* of applying increasing amounts of capital. All the Russian "critics" have taken up the defence of the theory of diminishing returns, as has

Maslov, who in all other questions wants to remain a Marxist. But the arguments in defence of this theory have not gone beyond quips, as, for example, the one which claims that if this theory is not recognised then it must be admitted that the returns of one plot of land should be enough to feed a whole state.

Marx fought against this theory. It adopts an arithmetical approach to the expenditure of capital and falls into error by ignoring general economic conditions. If we assume that the application of ever greater amounts of capital is always possible, then it would have been correct, but that presupposes the transformation of systems; however, systems in agriculture persist for ages, which has placed the application of capital within definite limits. If techniques do not change, then further application of capital is impossible, or possible within narrow limits. Marx pointed out that in industry too production cannot be developed infinitely on a given plot of land: if a definite territory is occupied by an enterprise, it has to be expanded if it is to be developed. *If*, on the other hand, land is rationally cultivated, that can only improve production; therefore Marx deduces that, far from being a disadvantage, such use of the land is, on the contrary, profitable. Precisely this "*if*" was ignored by the opponents of Marx's theory. Consequently, Maslov, as an alleged Marxist, can mislead many people by his views in this question. His book is one of the countless examples of a tendency to be seen in our time: going back instead of forward.

There is an absolute decline in the agricultural population, but agricultural production is making progress. In the nineteenth century this progress was closely connected with the growth of commodity agriculture. It brings out one of the main features of the capitalist system today, which is expressed in the development of competition in agriculture, in the creation of a market for it, and in the differentiation of the population. This progress has given a strong stimulus to the development of agriculture, but every step in this progress has been attended by a rise of contradictions which make it impossible to use all the productive forces of the new, scientific agriculture. Capitalism creates large-scale production and competition,

which are attended by rapacious use of the productive forces of the soil. Concentration of the population in the cities creates depopulated territories and an abnormal metabolism! Cultivation of the land is not improved, or not improved as it should be.

Socialist critics directed attention to this fact a long time ago (Marx). Mr. Hertz, and, later, Messrs. Bulgakov, Chernov, and Struve here in Russia maintained that the theory of Marx, who relied upon Liebig, had become antiquated. This opinion of the "critics" is quite fallacious. There is no doubt that capitalism has upset the equilibrium between the exploitation of the land and fertilisation of the land (the role of the separation of the town from the countryside). With many writers who sympathise with the "criticism" of the Marxist theory rather than with this theory itself, their own data speak against them. An example is Nossig. According to his data, it would appear that the productive forces of the soil are not replenished, that the land does not get back what is taken from it. Both manure and artificial fertilisers are required. One-third of an average of 60,000 kilograms of fertilisers used per hectare of land should be made up of manure, but that cannot be provided under the existing system of agriculture.

Thus, the influence of capitalism in agriculture is expressed in the following:

It demands freedom for the wage-worker and ousts all forms of the old bondage. But the agricultural wage-workers remain oppressed. Their oppression has become greater, which has created the need for greater struggle.

Capitalism has increased to a tremendous degree the tribute exacted by the owner of land, the magnitude of differential and absolute rent. The further development of agriculture is hampered by inflated rent.

THE AUTOCRACY IS WAVERING....

The autocracy is wavering. The autocrat himself publicly admits this to the people. That is the enormous significance of the tsar's Manifesto of February 26, and no amount of conventional phrases, none of the reservations or subterfuges the Manifesto abounds in, can alter the historic importance of the step that has been taken.

The tsar begins in the old way—*as yet* in the old way: "by the grace of God" ... and concludes with a half-cowardly, half-hypocritical appeal for help addressed to people invested with *public confidence*. The tsar himself already feels that the days when government in Russia could maintain itself by the grace of God are passing never to return and that henceforth the only stable government Russia can have is government *by the will of the people*.

The tsar reaffirms his sacred vow to safeguard the age-old pillars of the Russian Empire. Translated into Russian from the language of officialdom, this means: to safeguard the autocracy. Alexander III once declared that openly and without circumlocution (in the Manifesto of April 29, 1881), when the revolutionary movement was receding and dwindling. Today, when the battle-cry "Down with the autocracy" is resounding ever more loudly and impressively, Nicholas II prefers to cover his declaration with a small fig-leaf and to make a modest reference to his unforgettable progenitor. A senseless and contemptible stratagem! The question of whether or not the autocracy is to be has been raised point-blank and carried into the streets. And every promise of "reforms"—if they may be called "reforms"!—that begins with a promise to preserve the autocracy is

a glaring lie, a mockery of the Russian people. But there is nothing that could serve to expose the government in the eyes of the whole people better than this governmental appeal to the people with hypocritical and false promises.

The tsar speaks (again using a fig-leaf) about the revolutionary movement, complaining that "sedition" interferes with the work of improving public welfare, agitates minds, tears the people away from productive labour, ruins forces dear to the heart of the tsar, ruins the youthful forces indispensable to the fatherland. And so, *since* the ruined participants in the revolutionary movement are dear to the tsar's heart, *therefore* he at once promises to ruthlessly suppress every deviation from the normal course of social life, i.e., to brutally persecute free speech, workers' strikes, and popular demonstrations.

That is enough, more than enough. This Jesuitical speech speaks for itself. We merely make so bold as to express the conviction that by being spread throughout the length and breadth of Russia this "tsarist pledge" will act as most splendid propaganda in favour of revolutionary demands. There is only one answer that this pledge of the tsar's can evoke from anyone who has the least spark of honour left in him: the *demand* for the immediate and unconditional release of *all* persons who have been imprisoned, exiled or arrested—with or without trial, before or after sentence has been passed—for political or religious considerations, or because of strike activities or resistance to the authorities.

We have seen the hypocrisy of the tsar's speech. Let us now see *what* he speaks about.

He speaks mainly about three things. First, about tolerance. Our fundamental laws which guarantee freedom of worship for all faiths are to be confirmed and upheld. But the Russian Orthodox Church shall remain dominant. Secondly, the tsar speaks about a revision of legislation relating to rural affairs, about people who enjoy public confidence taking part in this revision, and about joint efforts on the part of all his subjects to raise moral standards in the family, the school, and public life. Thirdly, about

making it easier for the peasants to leave their village communes, about releasing the peasants from the restrictions of collective liability.

In answer to Nicholas II's three declarations, promises, and proposals, Russian Social-Democracy replies with three demands which it long ago raised, and has always defended and popularised to the best of its ability, and which we must now reaffirm most emphatically in connection with the tsar's Manifesto and in answer to it.

First, we demand the immediate and unconditional recognition by law of the freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, and an amnesty for all "political prisoners" and members of religious sects. Until that is done, all talk about tolerance and freedom of worship will remain a miserable pretence and a discreditable lie. Until freedom of assembly, speech, and the press is proclaimed, there will be no end to the shameful Russian inquisition, which hounds the profession of officially unsanctioned faiths, opinions, and doctrines. Down with the censorship! Down with police and gendarme protection of the "established" church! For these demands the class-conscious proletariat of Russia will fight to the last drop of blood.

Secondly, we demand the convocation of a national Constituent Assembly which will be elected by all citizens without exception and will establish an elective form of government in Russia. Enough of this game of conferences of local people, of landlords' parliaments under the governors, of representative government by the Marshals (and perhaps by the delegates as well?) of the Nobility! Enough of this cat-and-mouse game which the all-powerful officialdom has been playing with all kinds of Zemstvos, now letting them go, now stroking them with its velvet paws! Until a national assembly of deputies is called, all talk of public confidence and moral standards in public life will be a pack of lies. Until then the Russian working class will not abate its revolutionary struggle against the Russian autocracy.

Thirdly, we demand the immediate and unconditional recognition by law of the full equality of the peasants with all other social-estates, and the convocation of *peasant committees* for the abolition of all remnants of serfdom in

the countryside and the adoption of serious measures to improve the conditions of the peasantry.

The absence of rights for the peasantry, which constitutes nine-tenths of the population of Russia, cannot be tolerated a day longer. The entire working class and the entire country are suffering from this absence of rights; it is on this that all the Asiatic backwardness in Russian life rests; it is owing to this absence of rights that all the various conferences and commissions produce no results (*or are injurious to the peasants*). Now, too, the tsar wants to escape by invoking the former "conferences" of bureaucrats and noblemen; he even speaks of "strong government" to guide the efforts of the local forces. The peasants know full well from the example of the rural superintendents what this "strong government" means. Not in vain have the peasants endured forty years of poverty, want and constant starvation after the benefactions bestowed on them by the committees of nobles. Now the peasants will understand that all "reforms" and improvements will remain a sham if they are not put into effect *by the peasants themselves*. The peasants will understand—and we shall help them to understand—that only *peasant committees* are capable of really abolishing not only collective liability but all survivals of the corvée system and serfdom, which are still oppressing tens of millions of people right into the twentieth century. Freedom of assembly and freedom of the press are quite enough for the urban workers: we shall be able to make good use of these liberties!! But for the peasants, scattered in out-of-the-way places, and cowed and reduced to a state of barbarism, this is not enough—and the workers must help them, must explain to them that they will unavoidably and inescapably remain miserable slaves until they take their destiny into their own hands, until they take their first and most important step and achieve the establishment of *peasant committees* for real and not sham emancipation of the peasantry.

Intelligent and experienced people have long observed that there is no more precarious moment for a government in a revolutionary period than the beginning of concessions, the beginning of waverings. Russian political life of the last few years has brilliantly confirmed this. The govern-

ment began to waver on the question of the working-class movement, giving a free hand to Zubatovism—and made a laughing-stock of itself, playing splendidly into the hands of revolutionary agitation. The government wanted to make concessions on the student question—and made a laughing-stock of itself, advancing the revolutionisation of the students by seven-league strides. The government is now repeating on a large scale the very same method with regard to all questions of home policy—and it will inevitably make a laughing-stock of itself, inevitably facilitate, strengthen and add impetus to the revolutionary onslaught on the autocracy!

* * *

There is still another question we must deal with, and that is the practical question of how to use the tsar's Manifesto of February 26 for purposes of agitation. The Russian Social-Democrats long ago answered the question as to the means of struggle by saying: organisation and agitation; neither were they put out by the jeers of naïve people who considered this "indefinite", and held that the only "definite" means were pistol shots. And now, at a moment like the present, when such a welcome cue for conducting agitation on a nation-wide scale unexpectedly presents itself, one which so urgently demands the exertion of our every effort—at such a moment, a deficiency, the old selfsame deficiency in organisation, in ability rapidly to set our agitation going, makes itself felt more keenly than ever.

But we shall yet make up for lost time, make up for it many times over!

First of all, we must reply to the Manifesto of February 26 with leaflets published by central and local Party organisations. Whereas hitherto leaflets were issued in tens of thousands for all Russia, they should now be distributed in millions, so that the whole people may learn of the answer of the class-conscious Russian proletariat to the tsar's appeal to the people, so that all may see our definite, practical demands in juxtaposition with the speech of the tsar *on the same subject*.

Further. We must not allow reverential raptures of legal meetings of well-intentioned Zemstvoists and noblemen,

merchants and professors, etc., etc., to be the only reply to the Manifesto of February 26. Nor will the replies that Social-Democratic organisations will give in their leaflets prove sufficient. Let *every study circle*, *every meeting of workers* draw up its own answer and ratify formally and solemnly the demands of Social-Democracy. Let the decisions of these workers' meetings (and, if possible, also of peasants' meetings) be published in local leaflets and reported in our press. Let all know that we consider answers from the workers and peasants themselves the only answer from the people. And let all study circles begin to prepare immediately to back up our fundamental demands *with force*.

Moreover, we must not allow messages of gratitude to the tsar to be drawn up at all sorts of meetings, without counteraction. Our liberals have falsified Russian public opinion long enough! Long enough have they lied, saying not what they themselves think, or what the entire reasoning and militant section of the people thinks! We must endeavour to get into their meetings, declare our opinion there, too, as widely, publicly and openly as possible, voice our protest against servile gratitude, give our *real* answer to the tsar, and declare it by distributing leaflets as well as by speaking publicly, whenever possible, at all such meetings (even though the chairmen will try to stop such speeches).

Finally, we must try to bring the answer of the workers out on to the street, to broadcast our demands through demonstrations, and to show publicly the numbers and strength of the workers, their class-consciousness and determination. Let the coming May Day celebration be not only a general declaration of our proletarian demands, but also a special and definite answer to the Manifesto of February 26!

Iskra, No. 35, March 1, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

MR. STRUVE EXPOSED BY HIS COLLEAGUE

No. 17 of *Osvobozhdeniye* produced much that is gratifying to *Iskra* in general, and to the author of these lines in particular. To *Iskra* because it was gratifying for it to see that its endeavours to push Mr. Struve to the Left had yielded some result; it was gratifying to see Mr. S. S. indulging in sharp criticism of half-heartedness, gratifying to read about the intention of the *Osvobozhdeniye* people to create "openly and definitely a constitutional party" with a programme demanding universal suffrage. To the author of these lines because Mr. S. S.—"who took a prominent part" in drawing up the declaration "of the Russian constitutionalists" in No. 1 of *Osvobozhdeniye*, and hence is no mere collaborator, but to some extent the *master* of Mr. Struve—has unexpectedly rendered us a great service in our polemic *against Mr. Struve*. I shall take the liberty of beginning with this second point. No. 2-3 of *Zarya* carried an article of mine entitled "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism",* in which I polemised against Mr. R. N. S., who had written a preface to the well-known Witte memorandum. In this article I revealed the ambiguity of the entire stand taken by Mr. R. N. S., when he spoke of his Hannibal vow to fight against the autocracy and at the same time addressed unctuous speeches to the powers that be, to the sage conservatives, at the same time advancing the "formula" of "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo", etc., etc. Now that the second edition of the "Memorandum" has appeared, the public has learned that this Mr. R. N. S. is—Mr. Struve. Mr. Struve was highly displeased with my criticism, and he came down heavily on me with his extremely lengthy and extremely irate "Note to a Note".

Let us examine Mr. Struve's arguments.

The first example of the "groundlessness and injustice"

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* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

of my "polemical masterpiece" is that I spoke about Mr. Struve's antipathy against revolutionaries, despite his "alleged absolutely clear statement". Let me cite this statement in full. "The testimonial presented to the Zemstvo by the bureaucracy itself," Mr. Struve wrote, "is an excellent reply to all those who, because of an inadequate political education or because they are carried away by revolutionary phrases, refused and persist in refusing to see the great political importance of the Russian Zemstvos and their legal cultural activity." In a note to this tirade, Mr. Struve made the reservation: "By these words we do not intend in the least to give offence to the revolutionaries, to whom credit must be accorded above all for their moral courage in the struggle against despotism."

These are the "documents in the case" of groundless and unjust criticism. We leave it to the reader to judge who is right: the person who found this statement absolutely clear, or the person who has found that Mr. Struve has only made matters worse by "giving offence" to revolutionaries (*without naming them concretely*), not only with the "anonymous" charge of ignorance (it is not known against whom it is levelled), but also with the assumption that they can be made to swallow the pill of an accusation of ignorance if only it is gilded with recognition of their "moral courage".

For my part, I shall merely remark that tastes differ. Many liberals consider it the height of tact and wisdom to present the revolutionaries with testimonials to their courage, at the same time treating their programme as mere phrase-mongering, as a sign of an inadequate education, *without even analysing the substance* of their views. To our way of thinking, this is neither tact nor wisdom, but a piece of discreditable evasion. It is a matter of taste. The Russian Thiers, of course, appreciate the genteel drawing room parlance, the irreproachably parliamentarian *opportunist phrase-mongering* of the real Thiers.

To proceed. I, if you please, "pretended not to understand that the formula 'an Authoritative all-Russian Zemstvo' signifies the demand for a constitution", and my arguments on this score "confirm once more [so Mr. Struve thinks] the widespread occurrence of real revolutionary phrase-mongering, and malevolently biased phrase-mongering at

that, in our literature issued abroad [this disgusting literary style is particularly rife in the columns of *Iskra* and *Zarya*]", p. xii of the second edition of the "Memorandum". Well, as to being malevolently biased, it is difficult for us to dispute this point with Mr. Struve: what to him is a reproach we consider a compliment. What the liberals and many radicals call bias is actually unshakable firmness of conviction, while sharp criticism of erroneous views is termed "malevolent" by them. There is nothing to be done about it. *Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!* I have been and shall continue to be "malevolently biased" against Messrs. the Struves. Then there is the other charge—on a matter of fact. Did I pretend not to understand or did I actually fail to understand, and was it impossible to understand? That is the question.

I maintained that the formula "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo" means unseemly playing up to the political prejudices of the broad mass of Russian liberals, that this is "*not a banner that can serve to distinguish enemies from allies*" (take note of this!), but "a rag which can only help to attract the most unreliable characters to the movement" (p. 95 in No. 2-3 of *Zarya*).* Let me ask all and sundry: where is there any "pretence" on my part here?? I frankly state my opinion that this is not a banner but a rag, and I get the answer: you are pretending not to understand! This is indeed nothing but a new attempt to avoid an analysis of the question *in essence*, the question whether the "formula" is best fit to be a banner or a rag!

Nor is that all. Thanks to the kind assistance of Mr. S. S., I am now able to *adduce facts to prove* something much more important. I can prove that there was "unseemly playing up" on the part of Mr. Struve, not only in the sense of philistine doctrinairism intended to move the government with its modesty, not only in the sense of an irrational desire to unite the "liberals" around a minimum, but also in the sense of open and *direct "playing up" to supporters of the autocracy who are well known at such to Mr. Struve*. Mr. S. S. exposes Mr. Struve mercilessly and irretrievably by saying that the "obscure and ambiguous

* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

[mark that!] Slavophil slogan of the 'Zemsky Sobor'"[121] is being advanced to suit the purposes of the "unnatural alliance" between the liberal constitutionalists and the liberal advocates of an ideal autocracy. Mr. S. S. says that this is no more and no less than "political juggling"!! And Mr. Struve acknowledges receipt ... by terming the slogan of a Zemsky Sobor "vague and *valuable by very reason of its vagueness* [italics ours!] and at the same time dangerous."

Pretty good, isn't it? When a Social-Democrat called an *even more ambiguous* slogan (an Authoritative Zemstvo) unseemly playing up, Mr. Struve donned the mantle of injured innocence and spoke in mincing accents about a pretended failure to understand. But when a liberal, Mr. S. S., *repeated the very same thing*, Mr. Struve made grateful obeisance and acknowledged receipt! By reason of its very vagueness, a vague slogan was of *value* to Mr. Struve, who is not embarrassed in the least to admit that he is prepared to launch dangerous slogans as well, *depending on the way the wind blows*. If Mr. Shipov appears to be strong and influential, then the editor of this liberal newspaper will speak about an Authoritative Zemstvo. If Mr. S. S. appears to be strong and influential, then the editor of this liberal newspaper will speak about a constitution and universal suffrage! Not a bad picture of the political practices and political ethics in the liberal camp.... Mr. Struve forgets only to consider what value his statements will have after this magnificent metamorphosis: in January 1901 Mr. Struve demanded "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo"; in December 1902 Mr. Struve declared that it was a "pretence" not to understand that this was a demand for a constitution; in February 1903 Mr. Struve stated that in essence he had never questioned the justice of universal suffrage and that the vague slogan of a Zemsky Sobor was valuable just because it was vague. The question arises: *what right* now has any person active in politics, any Russian citizen, to assert that *tomorrow Mr. Struve will not launch a new slogan "valuable by very reason of its vagueness"*??

Let us pass to the last point of Mr. Struve's reply. "Is it not revolutionary phrase-mongering," he asks, "or absolutely lifeless doctrinairism for Mr. T. P.[122] to argue that the Zemstvo is an instrument for strengthening the

autocracy?" Mr. Struve sees in this an assimilation of the ideas of the Slavophils, agreement with Goremykin,[123] and the Herculean pillars of a lifeless doctrine. Mr. Struve is absolutely incapable of understanding the *revolutionary* attitude towards half-hearted reforms undertaken for the purpose of *avoiding a revolution*. To Mr. Struve every reference to the double game played by the reformers from above appears to be Slavophilism and reaction, just as all the European Yves Guyots declare the socialist criticism of private property to be reactionary! It is, of course, not surprising that once Mr. Struve *has become* a reformer, he has lost the ability to understand the dual nature of reforms and their significance as an instrument to strengthen the domination of the rulers, strengthen it at the price of granting reforms. But ... there was a time when Mr. Struve understood this amazingly cunning manoeuvre. That was long ago, when he was "a bit of a Marxist", and when we fought together against the Narodniks in the columns of the now defunct *Novoye Slovo*.[124] In the July 1897 issue of this periodical, Mr. Struve wrote about N. V. Vodovozov: "I remember a conversation we had in the street in 1890—I had just returned from a summer trip through Germany, full of new and strong impressions—a conversation on Wilhelm II's social policy and plans of reform. Vodovozov attached importance to them and did not agree with me, to whom the question of the significance of the fact and idea of the so-called 'social monarchy' was at that time (and so much the more so at present) decided once and for all in the negative. Vodovozov viewed the *idea* of social reform in the abstract, divorced from the real social forces that create it. That is why he considered Catholic socialism in the main a peculiar ideological movement in favour of social reform and not a specific form of preventative reaction to the growing working-class movement on the part of the European bourgeoisie, and partly also of the remnants of European feudalism...." So you see: in the distant past, at the time of his youthful infatuations, Mr. Struve understood that reforms may be a preventative reaction, i.e., a measure to prevent the ruling classes from falling, and directed against the revolutionary class, even though it does improve the condition of this

class. I put it to the reader: who, then, is right? Was it "revolutionary phrase-mongering" I indulged in when I exposed the reformist one-sidedness of Mr. Struve's attitude towards a reform such as the Zemstvo, or has Mr. Struve *become wiser* and abandoned "once and for all" the position of a revolutionary which he at one time defended (allegedly once and for all)? Have I become a champion of the Slavophils and Goremykin, or did the "strong impressions" of his trip through socialist Germany last Mr. Struve only a few years??

Yes, indeed, there are different conceptions of *the strength* of impressions, of the force of convictions, of the significance of convictions, of the compatibility of political ethics and political conviction with the launching of slogans which are valuable by reason of their vagueness....

In conclusion I cannot but remark on several statements of Mr. Struve's that considerably "mar" the pleasant impression produced by his turn to the Left. Although he has advanced only one democratic demand (universal suffrage) Mr. Struve is already making haste to speak of a "liberal *democratic* party". Is this not somewhat premature? Would it not be better *first* to definitely indicate all the *democratic* transformations which the Party demands *unconditionally* not only in the agrarian and workers programme but in the *political* programme as well, and only then to paste on a label, only then claim promotion from the "rank" of liberal to the rank of liberal democrat? After all, universal suffrage is a *minimum* of democracy that has been recognised even by some conservatives who (in Europe) have become reconciled to elections in general. But for some reason or other, Mr. Struve does not go beyond this minimum either in No. 17 or in No. 18. Further, we shall note, in passing, Mr. Struve's curious remark that the problem of socialism must be put entirely aside by the liberal democratic party "primarily because socialism is actually only a problem so far". Is it not, most esteemed Mr. Struve, because the "liberal democratic" elements of Russian society express the interests of the classes that *oppose* the socialist demands of the proletariat? I repeat, this is said merely in passing, in order to note the new *methods* used by the liberals to "negate" socialism. Actually, of course,

Mr. Struve is right when he says that the liberal "democratic" party is not a socialist party and that it would not be fitting for it to pose as such.

As to the tactics of the new party, Mr. Struve could not have expressed himself more vaguely. That is very regrettable. And it is even more regrettable that he repeats again and again, and stresses the necessity of "two-in-one" tactics in the sense of a "skilful, flexible and indissoluble combination" of legal and illegal methods of action. At best, this is an evasion of the urgent questions connected with the methods of *illegal* activities. And this is a pressing question because it is only systematic illegal activity that actually determines the physiognomy of the *party*. At worst, this is a repetition of the wriggling used by Mr. Struve when he wrote about "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo", and not about an openly and definitely constitutional and "democratic" party. Every illegal party "combines" illegal with legal activities *in the sense* that it relies on the masses, who do not participate directly in illegal activities, that it supports legal protests, utilises legal opportunities for propaganda, organisation, etc. This is generally known, and it is not this that is meant when the tactics of an *illegal party* are discussed. The point in question is the irrevocable recognition of *struggle* by this party, elaboration of methods of struggle, the *duty* of party members not to *limit themselves* to legal protests, but to subordinate *everything without exception* to the interests and demands of the *revolutionary struggle*. If there is no systematic illegal activity and revolutionary struggle, then there is no *party* that can really be *constitutional* (let alone democratic). And no greater harm can be done to the cause of the struggle than by *confusing* revolutionary work, which is based on the broad masses, makes use of mass organisations, and facilitates the political training of legal party functionaries, with work *restricted* within legal bounds.

Iskra, No. 37, April 1, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

TO THE RURAL POOR

An Explanation for the Peasants of What the Social-Democrats Want[125]

Written in March 1903

First published as a separate pamphlet in May 1903, in Geneva, by the League of Russian Social-Democracy Abroad

Published according to the text of the pamphlet

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РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ

Къ деревенской бѣднотѣ.

Объясненіе для крестьянъ, чего хотятъ соціальдемократы.

Съ приложеніемъ
Проекта программы Россійской Соціальдемократической Рабочей Партіи.

Изданіе Загран. Лиги Русск. Революціонной Соціальдемократіи.

ЖЕНЕВА
Типографія Лиги, Route Caroline, 27.
1903

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
To the Rural Poor, 1903

Reduced

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
To the Rural Poor, 1903

Reduced

1. THE STRUGGLE OF THE URBAN WORKERS

Many peasants have probably already heard about the labour unrest in the towns. Some of them have themselves been in the capitals and in the factories, and have seen the riots, as the police call them. Others know workers who were involved in the unrest and were deported to their villages by the authorities. Others again must have seen the leaflets issued by the workers, or pamphlets about the workers' struggle. Still others have only heard stories about what is going on in the towns from people with first-hand experience.

Formerly, only students rebelled, but now thousands and tens of thousands of workers have risen in all the big towns. In most cases they fight against their employers, against the factory owners, against the capitalists. The workers declare strikes, all of them stop work at a factory at the same time and demand higher wages, demand that they should be made to work not eleven or ten hours a day, but only eight hours. The workers also demand other things that would make the working man's life easier. They want the workshops to be in better condition and the machines to be protected by special devices so as to prevent them from maiming the workers; they want their children to be able to go to school and the sick to be given proper aid in the hospitals; they want the workers' homes to be like human dwellings instead of being like pigsties.

The police intervene in the workers' struggle. The police seize workers, throw them into prison, deport them without trial to their villages, or even to Siberia. The government has passed laws banning strikes and workers' meetings. But the workers wage their fight against the police and against the government. The workers say: We,

millions of working people, have bent our backs long enough! We have worked for the rich and remained paupers long enough! We have allowed them to rob us long enough! We want to unite in unions, to unite all the workers in one big workers' union (a workers' *party*) and to strive jointly for a better life. We want to achieve a new and better order of society: in this new and better society there must be neither rich nor poor; all will have to work. Not a handful of rich people, but all the working people must enjoy the fruits of their common labour. Machines and other improvements must serve to ease the work of all and not to enable a few to grow rich at the expense of millions and tens of millions of people. This new and better society is called *socialist society*. The teachings about this society are called *socialism*. The workers' unions which fight for this better order of society are called *Social-Democratic* parties. Such parties exist openly in nearly all countries (except Russia and Turkey), and our workers, together with socialists from among the educated people, have also formed such a party: the *Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*.

The government persecutes that Party, but it exists in secret, despite all prohibitions; it publishes its newspapers and pamphlets and organises secret unions. The workers not only meet in secret but come out into the streets in crowds and unfurl their banners bearing the inscriptions: "Long live the eight-hour day! Long live freedom! Long live socialism!" The government savagely persecutes the workers for this. It even sends troops to shoot down the workers. Russian soldiers have killed Russian workers in Yaroslavl, St. Petersburg, Riga, Rostov-on-Don, and Zlatoust.

But the workers do not yield. They continue the fight. They say: neither persecution, prison, deportation, penal servitude, nor death can frighten us. Our cause is a just one. We are fighting for the freedom and the happiness of all who work. We are fighting to free tens and hundreds of millions of people from abuse of power, oppression and poverty. The workers are becoming more and more class-conscious. The number of Social-Democrats is growing fast in all countries. We shall win despite all persecution.

The rural poor must clearly understand who these Social-Democrats are, what they want, and what must be done in the countryside to help the Social-Democrats to win happiness for the people.

2. WHAT DO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS WANT?

The Russian Social-Democrats are first and foremost striving to win *political liberty*. They need political liberty in order to unite all the Russian workers extensively and openly in the struggle for a new and better socialist order of society.

What is political liberty?

To understand this the peasant should first compare his present state of freedom with serfdom. Under the serf-owning system the peasant could not marry without the landlord's permission. Today the peasant is free to marry without anyone's permission. Under the serf-owning system the peasant had unfailingly to work for his landlord on days fixed by the latter's bailiff. Today the peasant is free to decide which employer to work for, on which days, and for what pay. Under the serf-owning system the peasant could not leave his village without the landlord's permission. Today the peasant is free to go wherever he pleases —if the *mir* allows him to go, if he is not in arrears with his taxes, if he can get a passport, and if the governor or the police chief does not forbid his changing residence. Thus, even today the peasant is not quite free to go where he pleases; he does not enjoy complete freedom of movement; the peasant is still a semi-serf. Later on we shall explain in detail why the Russian peasant is still a semi-serf and what he must do to escape from this condition.

Under the serf-owning system the peasant had no right to acquire property without the landlord's permission; he could not buy land. Today the peasant is free to acquire any kind of property (but even today he is not quite free to leave the *mir*; he is not quite free to dispose of his land as he pleases). Under the serf-owning system the peasant could be flogged by order of the landlord. Today the peasant cannot be flogged by order of the landlord, although he is still liable to corporal punishment.

This freedom is called *civil* liberty—freedom in family matters, in private matters, in matters concerning property. The peasant and the worker are free (although not quite) to arrange their family life and their private affairs, to dispose of their labour (choose their employer) and their property.

But neither the Russian workers nor the Russian people as a whole are yet free to arrange their *public* affairs. The people as a whole are the serfs of the government officials, just as the peasants were the serfs of the landlords. The Russian people have no right to choose their officials, no right to elect representatives to legislate for the whole country. The Russian people have not even the right to arrange meetings for the discussion of *state* affairs. We dare not even print newspapers or books, and dare not even speak to all and for all on matters concerning the whole state without permission from officials who have been put in authority over us without our consent, just as the landlord used to appoint his bailiff without the consent of the peasants!

Just as the peasants were the slaves of the landlords, so the Russian people are still the slaves of the officials. Just as the peasants lacked civil freedom under the serf-owning system, so the Russian people still lack *political* liberty. Political liberty means the freedom of the people to arrange their public, state affairs. Political liberty means the right of the people to elect their representatives (deputies) to a State Duma (parliament). All laws should be discussed and passed, all taxes should be fixed only by such a State Duma (parliament) elected by the people themselves. Political liberty means the right of the people themselves to choose all their officials, arrange all kinds of meetings for the discussion of all state affairs, and publish whatever papers and books they please, without having to ask for permission.

All the other European peoples won political liberty for themselves long ago. Only in Turkey and in Russia are the people still politically enslaved by the sultan's government and by the tsarist autocratic government. Tsarist autocracy means the unlimited power of the tsar. The people have no voice in determining the structure of the state or in running it. All laws are made and all officials are appointed

by the tsar alone, by his personal, unlimited, autocratic authority. But, of course, the tsar *cannot even know* all Russian laws and all Russian officials. The tsar cannot even know all that goes on in the country. The tsar simply endorses the will of a few score of the richest and most high-born officials. However much he may desire to, one man cannot govern a vast country like Russia. It is not the tsar who governs Russia—it is only a manner of speech to talk about autocratic, one-man rule! Russia is governed by a handful of the richest and most high-born officials. The tsar learns only what this handful are pleased to tell him. The tsar cannot in any way go against the will of this handful of high-ranking nobles: the tsar himself is a landlord and a member of the nobility; since his earliest childhood he has lived only among these high-born people; it was they who brought him up and educated him; he knows about the Russian people as a whole only that which is known to these noble gentry, these rich landlords, and the few very rich merchants who are received at the tsar's Court.

In every volost administration office you will find the same picture hanging on the wall; it depicts the tsar (Alexander III, the father of the present tsar) speaking to the volost headmen who have come to his coronation. "*Obey your Marshals of the Nobility!*" the tsar is ordering them. And the present tsar, Nicholas II, has repeated those words. Thus, the tsars themselves admit that they can govern the country only with the aid of the nobility and through the nobility. We must well remember those words of the tsar's about the peasants having to obey the nobility. We must clearly understand what a lie is being told the people by those who try to make out that tsarist government is the best form of government. In other countries—those people say—the government is elected; but it is the rich who are elected, and they govern unjustly and oppress the poor. In Russia the government is not elected; an autocratic tsar governs the whole country. The tsar stands above everyone, rich and poor. The tsar, they tell us, is just to everyone, to the poor and to the rich alike.

Such talk is sheer hypocrisy. Every Russian knows the kind of justice that is dispensed by our government. Everybody knows whether a plain worker or a farm labourer

in our country can become a member of the State Council. In all other European countries, however, factory workers and farm-hands have been elected to the State Duma (parliament); they have been able to speak freely to all the people about the miserable condition of the workers, and call upon the workers to unite and fight for a better life. And no one has dared to stop these speeches of the people's representatives; no policeman has dared to lay a finger on them.

In Russia there is no elective government, and she is governed not merely by the rich and the high-born, but by the worst of these. She is governed by the most skilful intriguers at the tsar's Court, by the most artful tricksters, by those who carry lies and slanders to the tsar, and flatter and toady to him. They govern in secret; the people do not and cannot know what new laws are being drafted, what wars are being hatched, what new taxes are being introduced, which officials are being rewarded and for what services, and which are being dismissed. In no country is there such a multitude of officials as in Russia. These officials tower above the voiceless people like a dark forest—a mere worker can never make his way through this forest, can never obtain justice. Not a single complaint against bribery, robbery or abuse of power on the part of the officials is ever brought to light; every complaint is smothered in official red tape. The voice of the individual never reaches the whole people, but is lost in this dark jungle, stifled in the police torture chamber. An army of officials, who were never elected by the people and who are not responsible to the people, has woven a thick web, and men and women are struggling in this web like flies.

Tsarist autocracy is an autocracy of officials. Tsarist autocracy means the feudal dependence of the people upon the officials and especially upon the police. Tsarist autocracy is police autocracy.

That is why the workers come out into the streets with banners bearing the inscriptions: "Down with the autocracy!", "Long live political liberty!" That is why the tens of millions of the rural poor must also support and take up this battle-cry of the urban workers. Like them, undaunted by persecution, fearless of the enemy's threats and

violence, and undeterred by the first reverses, the agricultural labourers and the poor peasants must come forward for a decisive struggle for the freedom of the whole of the Russian people and demand first of all the *convocation of the representatives of the people*. Let the people themselves all over Russia elect their representatives (deputies). Let those representatives form a supreme assembly, which will introduce elective government in Russia, free the people from feudal dependence upon the officials and the police, and secure for the people the right to meet freely, speak freely, and have a free press!

That is what the Social-Democrats want first and foremost. That is the meaning of their first demand: the *demand for political liberty*.

We know that political liberty, free elections to the State Duma (parliament), freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, will not at once deliver the working people from poverty and oppression. There is no means of immediately delivering the poor of town and country from the burden of working for the rich. The working people have no one to place their hopes in and no one to rely upon *but themselves*. Nobody will free the working man from poverty *if he does not free himself*. And to free themselves the workers of the whole country, the whole of Russia, must unite in one union, in one party. But millions of workers cannot unite if the autocratic police government bans all meetings, all workers' newspapers, and the election of workers' deputies. To unite they must have the right to form unions of every kind, must have freedom to unite; they must enjoy political liberty.

Political liberty will not at once deliver the working people from poverty, *but it will give the workers a weapon with which to fight poverty*. There is no other means and there can be no other means of fighting poverty except the *unity of the workers themselves*. But millions of people cannot unite unless there is *political liberty*.

In all European countries where the people have won political liberty, the workers began to unite long ago. Throughout the whole of Europe, workers who own no land and no workshops, and work for other people for wages all their lives are called *proletarians*. Over fifty years ago

the call was sounded for the working people to unite. "Workers of all countries, unite!"— during the past fifty years these words have circled the whole globe, are repeated at tens and hundreds of thousands of workers' meetings, and can be read in millions of Social-Democratic pamphlets and newspapers in every language.

Of course, to unite millions of workers in one union, in one party, is an extremely difficult task; it requires time, persistence, perseverance, and courage. The workers are ground down by poverty and want, benumbed by ceaseless toil for the capitalists and landlords; often they have not even the time to think of why they remain perpetual paupers, or how to be delivered from this. Everything is done to prevent the workers from uniting: either by means of direct and brutal violence, as in countries like Russia where there is no political liberty, or by refusing to employ workers who preach the doctrines of socialism, or, lastly, by means of deceit and bribery. But no violence or persecution can stop the proletarian workers from fighting for the great cause of the emancipation of all working people from poverty and oppression. The number of Social-Democratic workers is constantly growing. Take our neighbouring country, Germany; there they have elective government. Formerly, in Germany, too, there was an unlimited, autocratic, monarchist government. But long ago, over fifty years ago, the German people destroyed the autocracy and won political liberty by force. In Germany laws are not made by a handful of officials, as in Russia, but by an *assembly of people's representatives*, by a parliament, by the *Reichstag*, as the Germans call it. All adult males take part in electing deputies to this assembly. This makes it possible to count how many votes were cast for the Social-Democrats. In 1887 *one-tenth* of all votes were cast for the Social-Democrats. In 1898 (when the most recent elections to the Reichstag took place) the Social-Democratic vote increased nearly threefold. This time *more than one-fourth* of all the votes were cast for the Social-Democrats. *Over two million* adult males voted for *Social-Democratic candidates* to parliament. Among the farm labourers of Germany socialism is not yet widespread but it is now making very rapid progress among them. And when the masses

of farm-hands, day labourers and poor, pauperised peasants unite with their brothers in the towns, the German workers will win and establish an order under which the working people will suffer neither poverty nor oppression.

By what means do the Social-Democratic workers want to deliver the people from poverty?

To know this, one must clearly understand the cause of the poverty of the vast masses of the people under the present social order. Rich cities are growing, magnificent shops and houses are being built, railways are being constructed, all kinds of machines and improvements are being introduced in industry and agriculture, but millions of people remain in poverty, and continue to work all their lives to provide a bare subsistence for their families. That is not all: more and more people are becoming unemployed. Both in town and country there are more and more people who can find no work at all. In the villages they starve, while in the towns they swell the ranks of the "tramps" and "down-and-outs", find refuge like beasts in dug-outs on the outskirts of towns, or in dreadful slums and cellars, such as those in the Khitrov Market in Moscow.

Why is this? Wealth and luxury are increasing, and yet the millions and millions who by their labour create all this wealth remain in poverty and want! Peasants are dying of starvation, workers wander about without employment, and yet merchants export millions of poods of grain from Russia to foreign countries, factories are standing idle because the goods cannot be sold, for there is no market for them!

The cause of all this is, first of all, that most of the land, and also the factories, workshops, machines, buildings, ships, etc., belong to a small number of rich people. Tens of millions of people work on this land and at these factories and workshops, but they are all owned by a few thousand or tens of thousands of rich people, landlords, merchants, and factory owners. The people work for those rich men for hire, for wages, for a crust of bread. All that is produced over and above what is required to provide a bare subsistence for the workers goes to the rich; this is their profit, their "income". All the benefits arising from the use of machines and from improvements in methods

of production go to the landowners and capitalists: they accumulate wealth untold, while the workers get only a miserable pittance. The workers are brought together for work; on large estates and at big factories several hundred and sometimes even several thousand workers are employed. When labour is united in this way, and when the most diverse kinds of machines are employed, work becomes more productive: one worker produces much more than scores of workers did working separately and without the aid of machines. But the benefits of this more productive labour go not to all the working people, but to an insignificant number of big landowners, merchants, and factory owners.

One often hears it said that the landlords and merchants "*provide* work" for the people, that they "provide" the poor with earnings. It is said, for instance, that a neighbouring factory or a neighbouring landlord "*maintains*" the local peasants. Actually, however, the workers by their labour *maintain* themselves and also all those who do not work themselves. *But for permission* to work on the landlord's land, at a factory, or on a railway, the worker *gives* the owner *gratis* all he produces, while the worker himself gets only enough for a bare subsistence. Actually, therefore, it is not the landlords and the merchants who give the workers employment, but the workers who by their labour maintain everybody, surrendering *gratis* the greater part of their labour.

Further. In all present-day states the people's poverty is due to the fact that the workers produce all sorts of articles for sale, for the market. The factory owner and the artisan, the landlord and the well-to-do peasant produce various goods, raise cattle, sow and harvest grain *for sale*, in order to obtain *money*. Money has everywhere become the ruling power. All the goods produced by human labour are exchanged for money. With money you can buy anything. With money you can even buy a man, that is to say, force a man who owns nothing to work for another who has money. Formerly, land used to be the ruling power—that was the case under the serf-owning system: whoever possessed land possessed power and authority. Today, however, money, capital, has become the ruling power. With money you can buy as much land as you like. Without money you will

not be able to do much even if you have land: you must have money to buy a plough or other implements, to buy livestock, to buy clothes and other town-made goods, not to speak of paying taxes. For the sake of money nearly all the landlords have mortgaged their estates to the banks. To get money the government borrows from rich people and bankers all over the world, and pays hundreds of millions of rubles yearly in interest on these loans.

For the sake of money everyone today is waging a fierce war against everyone else. Each tries to buy cheap and to sell dear, each tries to get ahead of the other, to sell as many goods as possible, to undercut the other, to conceal from him a profitable market or a profitable contract. In this general scramble for money the little man, the petty artisan or the small peasant, fares worse than all: he is always left behind by the rich merchant or the rich peasant. The little man never has any reserves; he lives from hand to mouth; each difficulty or accident compels him to pawn his last belongings or to sell his livestock at a trifling price. Once he has fallen into the clutches of a kulak or of a usurer he very rarely succeeds in escaping from the net, and in most cases he is utterly ruined. Every year tens and hundreds of thousands of small peasants and artisans lock up their cottages, surrender their holdings to the commune *gratis* and become wage-workers, farm-hands, unskilled workers, proletarians. But the rich grow richer and richer in this struggle for money. They pile up millions and hundreds of millions of rubles in the banks and make profit not only with their own money, but also with the money deposited in the banks by others. The little man who deposits a few score or a few hundred rubles in a bank or a savings-bank receives interest at the rate of three or four kopeks to the ruble; but the rich make millions out of these scores and use these millions to increase their turnover and make ten and twenty kopeks to the ruble.

That is why the Social-Democratic workers say that the only way to put an end to the poverty of the people is to change the existing order from top to bottom, throughout the country, and to establish a socialist order, in other words, to take the estates from the big landowners, the

factories from the factory owners, and money capital from the bankers, to abolish their *private property* and turn it over to the whole working people throughout the country. When that is done the workers' labour will be made use of not by rich people living on the labour of others, but by the workers themselves and by those elected by them. The fruits of common labour and the advantages from all improvements and machinery will then benefit all the working people, all the workers. Wealth will then grow at a still faster rate because the workers will work better for themselves than they did for the capitalists; the working day will be shorter; the workers' standard of living will be higher; all their conditions of life will be completely changed.

But it is not an easy matter to change the existing order throughout the country. That requires a great deal of effort, a long and stubborn struggle. All the rich, all the property-owners, all the *bourgeoisie** will defend their riches with all their might. The officials and the army will rise to defend all the *rich class*, because the government itself is in the hands of the rich class. The workers must rally as one man for the struggle against all those who live on the labour of others; the workers themselves must unite and help to unite all the poor in a single *working class*, in a single *proletarian class*. The struggle will not be easy for the working class, but it will certainly end in the workers' victory because the bourgeoisie, or those who live on the labour of others, are an insignificant minority of the population, while the working class is the vast majority. The workers against the property-owners means millions against thousands.

The workers in Russia are already beginning to unite for this great struggle in a single workers' Social-Democratic Party. Difficult as it is to unite in secret, hiding from the police, nevertheless, the organisation is growing and gaining strength. When the Russian people have won

* Bourgeois means a property-owner. The bourgeoisie are all the property-owners taken together. A big bourgeois is the owner of big property. A petty bourgeois is the owner of small property. The words bourgeoisie and proletariat mean the same as property-owners and workers, the rich and the poor, or those who live on the labour of others and those who work for others for wages.

political liberty, the work of uniting the working class, the cause of socialism, will advance much more rapidly, more rapidly than it is advancing among the German workers.

3. RICHES AND POVERTY, PROPERTY-OWNERS AND WORKERS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

We know now what the Social-Democrats want. They wan to fight the whole of the rich class to free the people from poverty. In our countryside there is no less and, perhaps, even more poverty than there is in the towns. We shall not speak here about how great the poverty in the countryside is. Every worker who has been in the country and every peasant are well acquainted with want, hunger, and ruin in the countryside.

But the peasant does not know the *cause* of his distress, hunger and destitution, or *how* to rid himself of this want. To know this one must first find out what causes all want and poverty in both town and countryside. We have already dealt with this briefly, and we have seen that the poor peasants and rural workers must unite with the urban workers. But that is not enough. We must also find out what sort of people in the countryside will follow the rich, the property-owners, and what sort of people will follow the workers, the Social-Democrats. We must find out whether there are many peasants who, no less than the landlords, are able to acquire capital and live on the labour of others. Unless we get to the bottom of this matter, no amount of talking about poverty will be of any use, and the rural poor will not know *who* in the countryside must unite among themselves and with the urban workers, or *what* must be done to make it a *dependable* union and to prevent the peasant from being hoodwinked by his own kind, the rich peasant, as well as by the landlord.

To get to the bottom of this let us now see how strong the landlords are and how strong the rich peasants are in the countryside.

Let us begin with the landlords. We can judge of their strength in the first place by the amount of land they own as private property. The total amount of land in European Russia, including peasant allotment land and privately

owned land, has been calculated at about 240,000,000 dessiatines* (except the state lands, of which we shall speak separately). Out of this total of 240,000,000 dessiatines, 131,000,000 dessiatines of allotment land are held by the peasants, that is to say, by *over ten million households*; whereas 109,000,000 dessiatines are held by private owners, i.e., by *less than half a million families*. Thus, even if we take the average, every peasant family holds 13 dessiatines, while every family of private owners owns 218 dessiatines! But the distribution of the land is much more unequal, as we shall presently see.

Of the 109,000,000 dessiatines owned by private owners *seven* million are *royal demesnes*, in other words, the private property of the members of the imperial family. The tsar, with his family, is the first landlord, the biggest landowner in Russia. *One* family possesses *more* land than *half a million* peasant families! Further, the churches and monasteries own about *six* million dessiatines of land. Our priests preach frugality and abstinence to the peasants, but they themselves have, by fair means and foul, accumulated an enormous amount of land.

Further, about two million dessiatines are owned by the cities and towns, and an equal amount by various commercial and industrial companies and corporations. Ninety-two million dessiatines (the exact figure is 91,605,845, but to simplify matters we will quote round figures) belong to *less than half a million* (481,358) families of private owners. Half these families are quite small owners, owning less than ten dessiatines of land each, and all of them together own less than one million dessiatines. On the other hand, *sixteen thousand* families own *over one thousand* dessiatines each; and the total land owned by them amounts to *sixty-five million dessiatines*. What vast areas of land are concentrated in the hands of the big landowners is also to be seen in the fact that *just under one*

* These and all subsequent figures concerning the amount of land are very much out of date. They refer to the years 1877-78. But we have no more up-to-date figures. The Russian Government can only survive by keeping things in the dark, and that is why complete and truthful information about the life of the people throughout our country is so rarely collected. (A dessiatine = 2.7 acres.—*Ed.*)



Calculations of land distribution according to class groups compiled by Lenin in the prepartion of the pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*. 1903

Reduced

thousand families (924) own *more than ten thousand dessiatines* each, and all together they own *twenty-seven million dessiatines*! One thousand families own as much land as is owned by two million peasant families.

Obviously, millions and tens of millions of people are *bound* to live in poverty and starvation and *will go on* living in poverty and starvation as long as such vast areas of land are owned by a few thousand of the rich. Obviously, the state authorities, the government itself (even the tsar's government) will always dance to the tune of these big landowners. Obviously, the rural poor can expect no help from anyone, or from any quarter, until they unite, combine in a single class to wage a stubborn, desperate struggle against the landlord class.

At this point we must observe that very many people in this country (including even many people of education) have a totally wrong idea about the strength of the landlord class; they say that the "state" owns much more land. These bad counsellors of the peasant say: "A large portion of the territory [i.e., of all the land] of Russia already belongs to the state." (These words are taken from the newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 8, p. 8.) The mistake these people make arises from the following. They have heard that the state owns 150,000,000 dessiatines of land in European Russia. That is true. But they forget that these 150,000,000 dessiatines consist almost entirely of *uncultivable land and forests in the Far North*, in the Archangel, Vologda, Olonets, Vyatka, and Perm gubernias. Thus, the state has retained only that land which up to the present has been quite unfit for cultivation. The cultivable land owned by the state amounts to *less than four million dessiatines*. And these cultivable state lands (for example, in Samara Gubernia, where they are particularly extensive), are leased for very low rents, for next to nothing, to the rich. The rich lease thousands and tens of thousands of dessiatines of these lands and then sublet them to the peasants at exorbitant rents.

The people who say that the state owns a great deal of land are very bad counsellors of the peasant. The actual case is that the big private landowners (including the tsar personally) own a lot of good land, and the state itself is

in the hands of these big landowners. As long as the rural poor fail to unite, and by uniting become a formidable force, the "state" will always remain the obedient servant of the landlord class. There is another thing that must not be forgotten: formerly almost all the landlords were nobles. The nobility still owns a vast amount of land (in 1877-78, 115,000 nobles owned 73,000,000 dessiatines). But today money, capital, has become the ruling power. Merchants and well-to-do peasants have bought very large amounts of land. It is estimated that in the course of thirty years (from 1863 to 1892) the nobility lost (i.e., sold more than they bought) land to the value of over six hundred million rubles. And merchants and honorary citizens have acquired land to the value of 250,000,000 rubles. Peasants, Cossacks, and "other rural inhabitants" (as our government calls the common folk, to distinguish them from the "gentry", the "clean public") have acquired land to the value of 300,000,000 rubles. Thus, on the average, every year, the peasants in the whole of Russia acquire land as private property to the value of 10,000,000 rubles.

And so, there are different sorts of peasants: some live in poverty and starvation; others grow rich. Consequently, the number of rich peasants who incline towards the landlords and will take the side of the rich against the workers is increasing. The rural poor who want to unite with the urban workers must carefully ponder over this and find out whether there are many rich peasants of this kind, how strong they are, and what kind of a union we need to fight this force. We have just mentioned the bad counsellors of the peasant. Those bad counsellors are fond of saying that the peasants already have such a union. That union is the *mir*, the village commune. The *mir*, they say, is a great force. The *mir* unites the peasants very closely; the organisation (i.e., the association, unity) of the peasants in the *mir* is colossal (i.e., enormous, boundless).

That is wrong. It is a tale. A tale invented by kind-hearted people, but a tale nevertheless. If we listen to tales we shall only wreck our cause, the cause of uniting the rural poor with the urban workers. Let every rural inhabitant look round carefully: is the unity of the *mir*, is the peasant commune, at all like a union of the poor to fight *all*

the rich, *all* those who live on the labour of others? No, it is not, and it cannot be. In every village, in every commune, there are many farm labourers, many impoverished peasants, and there are rich peasants who employ farm labourers and buy land "in perpetuity". These rich peasants are also members of the commune, and it is they who lord it in the commune because they are a force. But do we need a union to which the rich belong, and which is lorded over by the rich? Of course not. We need a union *to fight* the rich. And so, the unity of the *mir* is no good to us at all.

What we need is a voluntary union, a union only of people who have realised that they must unite with the urban workers. The village commune, however, is not a voluntary union; it is enforced by the state. The village commune does not consist of people who work for the rich and who want to unite to fight the rich. The village commune consists of all sorts of people, not because they want to be in it, but because their parents lived on the same land and worked for the same landlord, because the authorities have registered them as members of that commune. The poor peasant are not free to leave the commune; they are not free to accept in the commune a man whom the police have registered in another volost, but whom we may need for our union in a particular village. No, we need a very different kind of union, a voluntary union consisting only of labourers and poor peasants to fight all those who live on the labour of others.

The times when the *mir* was a force have long passed, never to return. The *mir* was a force when hardly any of the peasants were farm labourers, or workers wandering over the length and breadth of Russia in search of a job, when there were hardly any rich peasants, when all were equally ground down by the feudal landlords. But now money has become the principal power. Members of the same commune will now fight one another for money like wild beasts. The moneyed peasants sometimes oppress and fleece their fellow peasants more than the landlords do. What we need today is not the unity of the *mir*, but a union against the *power of money*, against the rule of capital, a union of all the rural labourers and of all the poor peasants of different communes, a union of all the rural poor with the urban workers to fight both the landlords and the rich peasants.

We have seen how strong the landlords are. We must now see whether there are many rich peasants and how strong they are.

We estimate the strength of the landlords by the size of their estates, by the amount of land they own. The landlords are free to dispose of their land, free to buy land and to sell it. That is why it is possible to judge their strength very accurately by the amount of land they own. The peasants, however, still lack the right freely to dispose of their land; they are still semi-serfs, tied to their village commune. Hence, the strength of the rich peasants cannot be judged by the amount of allotment land they hold. The rich peasants do not grow rich on their allotments; they *buy* a considerable amount of land, buying both "in perpetuity" (i.e., as their private property) and "for a number of years" (i.e., on lease); they buy both from the landlords and from their fellow peasants, from those peasants who leave the land, or are compelled by want to let their holdings. It will therefore be more correct to divide the rich, middle, and poor peasants according to the number of horses they own. A peasant who owns many horses will nearly always be a rich peasant; if he keeps many draught animals it shows that he cultivates a lot of land, owns land besides his communal allotment, and has money saved up. Moreover, we are in a position to calculate the number of peasants owning many horses in the whole of Russia (European Russia, exclusive of Siberia and the Caucasus). Of course, it must not be forgotten that we can speak of the whole of Russia only in averages: the different uyezds and gubernias vary to a considerable degree. For instance, in the neighbourhood of cities we often find rich peasant farmers who keep very few horses. Some of them engage in market-gardening—a profitable business; others keep few horses but many cows and sell milk. In all parts of Russia there are also peasants who do not make money out of the land, but engage in trade: they run creameries, hulling-mills, and other enterprises. Everybody who lives in the country very well knows of rich peasants in his own village or district. But we want to know how many there are in the whole of Russia and how strong they are, so that the poor peasant shall not have to guess and go about blindfold, as it were, but know exactly his friends and his foes.

Well then, let us see whether there are many peasants who are rich or poor in horses. We have already said that the total number of peasant households in Russia is estimated at about *ten million*. Between them they now own, probably, about *fifteen million* horses (about fourteen years ago the number was seventeen million, but it is smaller now). Thus, on the average, every *ten* households have *fifteen* horses. But the whole point is that some of them—a few—own many horses, while others—very many—own no horses, or very few. There are *at least three million* peasants, who own no horses, and about three and a half million *own one horse each*. All these are either utterly ruined or very poor peasants. We call these the rural poor. They number *six and a half* million out of a total of ten million, that is to say, *almost two-thirds*! Next come the middle peasants who own a pair of draught animals each. These peasants number *about two* million households, owning *about four* million horses. Then come the rich peasants each of whom owns more than one pair of draught animals. Such comprise *one and a half million* households, but they own *seven and a half* million horses.* Thus, about one-sixth of the total households own half the total number of horses.

Now that we know this we are in a position to judge fairly accurately the strength of the rich peasants. In number they are very few: in the different communes and volosts they will comprise ten to twenty households in every hundred. But these few households are the richest. Taking

* We repeat that the figures quoted are average, approximate figures. The number of rich peasants may not be exactly a million and a half, but a million and a quarter, or a million and three-quarters, or even two million. That is not a big difference. The important thing here is not to count them up to the last thousand or last hundred thousand, but clearly to realise the strength and the position of the rich peasants so that we may be able to recognise our enemies and our friends, that we shall not allow ourselves to be deceived by tales or empty talk, but get to know accurately the position of the poor and especially the position of the rich.

Let every rural worker carefully study his own volost and the neighbouring volosts. He will see that we have counted correctly, and that on the average, this will be the position everywhere: out of every hundred households there will be ten at the most twenty, rich families some twenty middle peasants, and all the rest are poor.

Russia as a whole, they own almost as many horses as all the other peasants taken together. That means that their land under crops must also amount to nearly half the total area sown to crops by the peasants. Such peasants harvest much more grain than they require for their families. They sell large quantities of grain. They grow grain not merely to feed themselves, but grow it chiefly for sale, to make money. Peasants like these can save money. They deposit it in savings-banks and banks. They buy land as property. We have already said how much land the peasants all over Russia buy every year; nearly all this land goes to these few rich peasants. The rural poor have to think not of buying land, but of getting enough to eat. Often they have not enough money to buy grain, let alone land. Therefore, the banks in general and the Peasants' Bank in particular do not help all peasants to buy land (as is sometimes asserted by people who try to deceive the muzhik or by the very simple-minded), but only an insignificant number of peasants, only the rich peasants. Therefore, the peasant's evil counsellors whom we have mentioned tell an untruth when they say that the land is being bought by the peasants, that it is passing from capital to labour. The land can never pass to labour, that is, to the poor working man, because land has to be paid for with money. But the poor never have any money to spare. The land can go only to the rich, moneyed peasants, to capital, to those people against whom the rural poor must *fight* in alliance with the urban workers.

The rich peasants not only buy land in perpetuity; most often they take land for a number of years, on lease. By renting large plots they prevent the rural poor from getting land. For example, it has been calculated how much land rich peasants have rented in a single uyezd (Konstantinograd) in Poltava Gubernia. And what do we find? The number who rented thirty dessiatines or more per household is very small, only two out of every fifteen households. But these rich peasants have gained possession of *one half* of all the rented land, and each of them has on the average *seventy-five dessiatines* of the rented land! Or take Taurida Gubernia, where a calculation has been made of how much of the land rented by the peasants from the state through the mir, through the village commune, has been grabbed

by the rich. It has been found that the rich, who account for only *one-fifth* of the total number of households, have grabbed *three-fourths* of the rented land. Everywhere land goes to those who have money, and only the few rich have money.

Further, much land is now let by the peasants themselves. The peasants abandon their holdings because they have no livestock, no seed, nothing with which to run their farms. Today even land is of no use unless you have money. For instance, in Novouzensk Uyezd in Samara Gubernia, one, sometimes even two, out of every three rich peasant households *rent allotment land* in their own or in another commune. The allotments are let by those who have no horses, or only one horse. In Taurida Gubernia as much as *one-third* of all peasant households let their allotments. *One-fourth* of the peasant allotments, a quarter of a million dessiatines, are let. Of this quarter of a million dessiatines, one hundred and fifty thousand dessiatines (three-fifths) are rented by rich peasants! This, too, shows whether the unity of the *mir*, the commune, is of any use to the poor. In the village commune, he who has money has power. What we need is the unity of the poor of all communes.

Just as with land purchase, the peasants are deceived by talk about buying cheap ploughs, harvesters, and all sorts of improved implements. Zemstvo stores and artels are set up and it is said: improved implements will better the conditions of the peasantry. That is mere deception. All these improved implements always go to the rich; the poor get next to nothing. They cannot think of buying ploughs and harvesters; they have enough to do to keep body and soul together! All this sort of "helping the peasants" is nothing but helping the rich. As for the mass of the poor, who have neither land, livestock, nor reserves, they will not benefit by the fact that the better implements will be cheaper. Here is an example. In an uyezd in Samara Gubernia all the improved implements belonging to the poor and to the rich peasants have been taken stock of. It was found that *one-fifth* of all households, i.e., the most well-to-do, owned almost *three-fourths* of the improved implements, while the poor—*half* the households—had only *one-thirtieth*. Out of a total of 28,000 households, 10,000 possessed one horse

each, or none; these 10,000 had only *seven* improved implements out of a total of 5,724 improved implements owned by all the peasant households in the uyezd. Seven out of 5,724—that is the share of the rural poor in all these farm improvements, in all this increase in the number of ploughs and harvesters which are supposed to help "all the peasantry"! That is what the rural poor must expect from those who talk about "improving peasant farming"!

Finally, one of the main features of the rich peasants is that they *hire farm-hands and day labourers*. Like the landlords, the rich peasants also live on the labour of others. Like the landlords, they grow rich because the mass of the peasants are ruined and pauperised. Like the landlords, they try to squeeze as much work as they can out of their farm-hands and to pay them as little as possible. If millions of peasants were not utterly ruined and compelled to go to work for others, become hired labourers, sell their labour-power—the rich peasants could not exist, could not carry on their farms. There would be no "abandoned" allotments for them to pick up and no labourers for them to hire. The million and a half rich peasants throughout Russia certainly hire no less than a *million* farm-hands and day labourers. Obviously, in the great struggle between the propertied class and the class of the propertyless, between masters and workers, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the rich peasants will take the side of the property-owners against the working class.

We now know the position and the strength of the rich peasantry. Let us examine the conditions of the rural poor.

We have already said that the rural poor comprise the vast majority, almost two-thirds, of the peasant households throughout Russia. To begin with, the number of households without horses cannot be less than *three million*—probably more than that today, perhaps three and a half million. Every famine year, every crop failure, ruins tens of thousands of farms. The population grows, life on the land becomes more crowded, but all the best land has been grabbed by the landlords and the rich peasants. And so, every year more and more people are ruined, go to the towns and the factories, take work as farm-hands, or become unskilled labourers. A peasant who has no horse is one who has become

quite poor. He is a proletarian. He gains a living (if you can call it living; it would be truer to say that he just contrives to keep body and soul together) not from the land, not from his farm, but *by working for hire*. He is brother to the town worker. Even land is of no use to the peasant without a horse: half the households without horses *let their allotments*, while some even surrender them to the commune for nothing (and sometimes even pay the difference between the taxes and the expected income from the land!) because they are not in a position to till their land. A peasant who has no horse sows one dessiatine, or two at the most. He always has to buy additional grain (if he has the money to buy it with)—his own crop will never suffice to feed him. Peasants who own one horse each, and there are about three and a half million such households throughout Russia, are not very much better off. Of course, there are exceptions, and we have already said that, here and there, there are peasants with one horse each who are doing middling well, or are even rich. But we are not speaking of exceptions, of individual localities, but of Russia as a whole. If we take the entire mass of peasants who have one horse each, there can be no doubt that they are a mass of paupers. Even in the agricultural gubernias the peasant who has one horse sows only three or four dessiatines, rarely five; his crop does not suffice either. Even in a good year his food is no better than that of a peasant without a horse—which means that he is always underfed, always starves. His farm is in decay, his livestock is poor and short of fodder, and he is not in a position to look after his land properly. The peasant who owns one horse—in Voronezh Gubernia, for instance—can afford to spend (not counting expenditure on fodder) not more than *twenty rubles a year* on the whole of his farm! (A rich peasant spends *ten times as much*.) Twenty rubles a year for rent, to buy livestock, repair his wooden plough and other implements, pay the shepherd, and for everything else! Do you call that farming? It is sheer misery, hard labour, endless drudgery. It is natural that some of the peasants with one horse each, and not a few, should also *let their allotments*. Even land is of little use to a pauper. He has no money and his land does not even provide him with enough to eat, let alone with money. But money is needed for everything: for food,

for clothing, for the farm, and to pay taxes. In Voronezh Gubernia, a peasant who owns one horse usually has to pay *about eighteen rubles* a year in taxes alone, while he cannot make more than seventy-five rubles a year to meet *all* his expenses. Under these circumstances it is sheer mockery to talk about buying land, about improved implements, about agricultural banks: those things were not invented for the poor.

Where is the peasant to get the money from? He has to look for "earnings" on the side. A peasant who owns one horse, like the peasant who owns none, ekes out a living only with the help of "earnings". But what does "earnings" mean? It means working for others, working for hire. It means that the peasant who owns one horse has half ceased to be an independent farmer and has become a hireling, a proletarian. That is why such peasants are called *semi-proletarians*. They, too, are brothers to the town workers because they, too, are fleeced in every way by all sorts of employers. They, too, have no way out, no salvation, except by uniting with the Social-Democrats to fight all the rich, all the property-owners. Who works on the building of railways? Who is fleeced by the contractors? Who goes out lumbering and timber-floating? Who works as farm-hand? Or as day labourer? Who does the unskilled work in the towns and ports? It is always the rural poor, the peasants who have no horses or only one each. It is always the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians. And what vast numbers of these there are in Russia! It has been calculated that throughout Russia (exclusive of the Caucasus and Siberia) eight and sometimes even nine *million* passports are taken out yearly. Those are all for migratory workers. They are peasants only in name; actually, they are hirelings, wage-labourers. They must all unite in one union with the town workers—and every ray of light and knowledge that reaches the countryside will strengthen and consolidate this unity.

There is one more point about "earnings" that must not be forgotten. All kinds of officials and people who think as the officials do are fond of saying that the peasant, the muzhik, "needs" two things: land (but not very much of it—besides, he cannot get much, because the rich have grabbed

it all!) and "earnings". Therefore, they say, in order to help the people, it is necessary to introduce more trades in the rural districts, to "provide" more "earnings". Such talk is sheer hypocrisy. For the poor, "earnings" mean wage-labour. To "provide earnings" for the peasant means transforming him into a wage-labourer. Fine sort of assistance this! For the rich peasants there are other kinds of "earnings", which require capital, for instance, the building of a flour-mill or some other plant, the purchase of threshing-machines, trade, and so on. To confuse the earnings of moneyed people with the *wage-labour* of the poor means deceiving the poor. Of course, this deception is to the advantage of the rich; it is to their advantage to make it appear that all kinds of "earnings" are open to and within the reach of *all* the peasants. But he who really cares for the welfare of the poor will tell *the whole truth and nothing but the truth*.

It remains for us to consider the middle peasants. We have already seen that, on the average, taking Russia as a whole, we must regard as a middle peasant one who has a pair of draught animals, and that out of a total of ten million households there are about two million middle peasant households in the country. The middle peasant stands between the rich peasant and the proletarian, and that is why he is called a middle peasant. His standard of living, too, is middling: in a good year he makes ends meet on his farm, but poverty is always knocking at the door. He has either very few savings or none at all. That is why his farm is in a precarious position. He finds it hard to get money: only very seldom can he make as much money out of his farm as he needs, and if he does, it is just barely enough. To go out for earnings would mean neglecting the farm and everything would go to rack and ruin. Nevertheless, many of the middle peasants cannot get along without earnings: they, too, have to hire themselves to others; want compels them to go into bondage to the landlord, to fall into debt. And once in debt the middle peasant is hardly ever able to get out of it, for unlike the rich peasant he has no steady income. Therefore, once he falls into debt it is as if he had put his neck in a halter. He remains a debtor until he is utterly ruined. It is chiefly the middle peasant

who falls into bondage to the landlord, because for work paid on a job basis the landlord needs a peasant who is not ruined, one who owns a pair of horses and all implements required in farming. It is not easy for the middle peasant to go elsewhere in search of earnings, so he goes into bondage to the landlord in return for grain, permission to use pasture land, the lease of the cut-off lands, and money advances during the winter. The middle peasant is hard pressed, not only by the landlord and the kulak, but also by his rich neighbour, who is always one jump ahead when he wants to acquire more land and never misses an opportunity to squeeze him in some way or other. Such is the life of the middle peasant; he is neither fish nor fowl. He can be neither a real master nor a worker. All the middle peasants strive to become masters: they want to be property-owners, but very few succeed. There are a few, a very few, who even hire farm-hands or day labourers, try to become rich on the labour of others, to rise to wealth on the backs of others. But most middle peasants have no money to hire labourers—in fact, they have to hire themselves out.

Wherever a struggle begins between the rich and the poor, between the property-owners and the workers, the middle peasant remains in between, not knowing which side to take. The rich call him to their side: you, too, are a master, a man of property, they say to him, you have nothing to do with the penniless workers. But the workers say: the rich will cheat and fleece you, and there is no other salvation for you but to help us in our fight against all the rich. This struggle for the middle peasant is going on everywhere, in all countries, wherever the Social-Democratic workers are fighting to emancipate the working people. In Russia the struggle is just beginning. That is why we must most carefully study the matter and understand clearly the deceits the rich resort to in order to win over the middle peasant; we must learn how to expose these deceits and help the middle peasant to find his real friends. If the Russian Social-Democratic workers at once take the right road, we shall establish a firm alliance between the rural workers and the urban workers more quickly than our comrades, the German workers, and we shall speedily achieve victory over all the enemies of the working people.

FROM MARX TO MAO
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4. WHAT PATH SHOULD THE MIDDLE PEASANT TAKE? SHOULD HE TAKE THE SIDE OF THE PROPERTY-OWNERS AND THE RICH OR THE SIDE OF THE WORKERS AND THE POOR?

All property-owners, the entire bourgeoisie, try to win over the middle peasant by promising him all sorts of ways to improve his farm (cheap ploughs, agricultural banks, the introduction of grass sowing, cheap livestock and fertilisers, and so on) and also by inducing the peasant to join all sorts of agricultural societies (co-operatives, as they are called in books) which unite all kinds of farmers with the object of improving farming methods. In this way the bourgeoisie try to keep the middle and even the small peasant, even the semi-proletarian, from uniting with the workers, and try to induce them to side with the rich, with the bourgeoisie, in their fight against the workers, the proletariat.

To this the Social-Democratic workers reply: improved farming is an excellent thing. There is no harm in buying cheaper ploughs; nowadays even a merchant, if he is not a fool, tries to sell more cheaply to attract customers. But when a poor or a middle peasant is told that improved farming and cheaper ploughs will help all of them to escape from poverty and to get on their feet, without touching the rich, *this is deception*. All these improvements, lower prices, and co-operatives (societies for the sale and purchase of goods) *benefit the rich far more than anybody else*. The rich grow stronger and oppress the poor and middle peasants more and more. As long as the rich remain rich, as long as they own most of the land, livestock, implements, and money—as long as all this lasts, not only the poor but even the middle peasants will *never* be able to escape from want. One or two middle peasants may be able to climb into the ranks of the rich with the aid of all these improvements and co-operatives, but the people as a whole, and all the middle peasants, will sink deeper and deeper into poverty. For *all* middle peasants to become rich, the rich themselves must be turned out, and they can be turned out only if the urban workers and the rural poor are united.

The bourgeoisie say to the middle (and even to the small) peasant: we will sell you land at a low price, and ploughs

at a low price, but in return you must sell yourselves to us and give up fighting all the rich.

The Social-Democratic worker says: if you are really offered goods at a low price, why not buy them, if you have the money; that is sound business. But you should never sell yourselves. To give up the fight in alliance with the urban workers against the entire bourgeoisie would mean remaining in poverty and want for ever. If goods become cheaper, the rich will gain still more and become richer. But those who never have money to spare will gain nothing from cheaper goods until they take that money from the bourgeoisie.

Let us take an example. Those who support the bourgeoisie make much ado about all sorts of co-operatives (societies for buying cheap and selling profitably). There are even people who call themselves "Socialist-Revolutionaries", who, echoing the bourgeoisie, also talk loudly about the peasant needing nothing so much as co-operatives. All sorts of co-operatives are beginning to spring up in Russia, too, although there are still very few of them here, and there will not be many until we enjoy political liberty. Take Germany: there the peasants have many co-operatives of all kinds. But see who gains most from these co-operatives. In all Germany, 140,000 farmers belong to societies for the sale of milk and dairy products, and these 140,000 farmers (we again take round figures for the sake of simplicity) own 1,100,000 cows. It is calculated that there are *four million* poor peasants in Germany. Of these, only 40,000 belong to co-operatives: thus, *only one* out of every hundred poor peasants enjoys the benefits of these co-operatives. These 40,000 poor peasants own only 100,000 cows in all. Further, the middle farmers, the middle peasants, number *one million*; of these, 50,000 belong to co-operatives (that is to say, five out of every hundred) and they own a total of 200,000 cows. Finally, the rich farmers (i.e., both landlords and rich peasants) number *one-third of a million*; of these, 50,000 belong to co-operatives (that is to say, *seventeen* out of every hundred!) and they own 800,000 cows!

That is whom the co-operatives help first and foremost. That is how the peasant is deceived by those people who talk loudly about saving the middle peasant by means of

such societies for buying cheap and selling profitably. It is, indeed, at a very low price that the bourgeoisie want to "buy off" the peasant from the Social-Democrats, who call upon both the poor and the middle peasant to join them.

In our country, too, co-operative cheese dairies and amalgamated dairies are beginning to be formed. In our country, too, there are plenty of people who shout: artels, the *mir*, and co-operatives—that is what the peasant needs. But see who gains by these artels, co-operatives, and renting by the *mir*. Out of every hundred households in our country, at least twenty own no cows at all; thirty own only one cow each: these sell milk from dire need, their own children have to go without milk, starve, and die off like flies. The rich peasants, however, own three, four and more cows each, and these rich peasants own half the total number of cows owned by peasants. Who, then, gains from co-operative cheese dairies. Obviously, the landlords and the peasant bourgeoisie gain first of all. Obviously, it is *to their advantage* that the middle peasants and the poor should follow in their wake and that they should believe that the means of escaping from want is not the struggle of all the workers against the entire bourgeoisie, but the striving of individual small farmers to climb out of their present position and get into the ranks of the rich.

This striving is fostered and encouraged in every way by all the champions of the bourgeoisie, who pretend to be the champions and friends of the small peasant. And many simple-minded people fail to see the wolf in sheep's clothing, and repeat this bourgeois deception in the belief that they are helping the poor and middle peasants. For instance, they argue in books and in speeches that small-scale farming is the most profitable, most remunerative form of farming, that small-scale farming is flourishing, and that is why, they say, there are so many small producers in agriculture everywhere, and why they cling to their land (and not because all the best lands are owned by the bourgeoisie, and all the money, too, while the poor have to live in drudgery all their lives crowded on tiny patches of land!). The small peasant does not need much money, these smooth-tongued people say; the small and the middle peasants are more thrifty and more industrious than the big farmers, and

know how to live a simpler life; instead of buying hay for their cattle, they are content to feed them on straw. Instead of buying an expensive machine, they get up earlier and toil longer and do as much as a machine does; instead of paying money to strangers for doing repairs, the peasant himself takes his hatchet on a Sunday and does a bit of carpentry—and that is much cheaper than the way a big farmer goes about it; instead of feeding an expensive horse or an ox, he uses his cow for ploughing. In Germany all the poor peasants use cows to haul their ploughs, and in our country, too, the people have become so impoverished that they are beginning to use not only cows, but men and women to pull ploughs! How profitable, how cheap all this is! How praiseworthy of the middle and small peasants to be so industrious, so diligent, to live such simple lives, and not to waste their time on nonsense, not to think of socialism, but only of their farms, not to strive towards the workers who organise strikes against the bourgeoisie, but towards the rich and try to join the ranks of respectable folk! If only all were so industrious and so diligent, and lived frugally, and did not drink, and saved more money, and spent less on calico, and had fewer children—all would be happy and there would be no poverty and no want!

Such are the sweet songs the bourgeoisie sings to the middle peasant, and there are simpletons who believe these songs and repeat them!* Actually, all these honeyed words are nothing but deceit and mockery of the peasant. What these smooth-tongued people call cheap and profitable farming is the want, the dire need, which forces the middle and small peasant to work from morning till night, to begrudge himself a crust of bread, to grudge every penny he spends. Of course, what can be "cheaper" and "more profitable" than to wear

* In Russia these simpletons who wish the peasant well, but who every now and then start this sort of honeyed talk, are called "Narodniks" or the "advocates of small-scale farming". The "Socialist-Revolutionaries", for lack of understanding, follow in their footsteps. In Germany also there are many smooth-tongued people. One of them, Eduard David, has recently written a big book, in which he says that small farms are infinitely more profitable than large ones, because the small peasant does not spend money needlessly, keeps no horses for ploughing, and is content to use his cow instead, from which he also gets milk.

the same pair of trousers for three years, go about barefoot in summer, repair one's wooden plough with a piece of rope, and feed one's cow on rotten straw from the roof! Put a bourgeois or a rich peasant on such a "cheap" and "profitable" farm, and he will soon forget all this honeyed talk!

The people who extol small-scale farming sometimes want to help the peasant, but actually they only do him harm. With their honeyed words they deceive the peasant in the same way as people are deceived by a *lottery*. I shall tell you what a lottery is. Let us suppose I have a cow, worth 50 rubles. I want to sell the cow by means of a lottery, so I offer everyone tickets at a ruble each. Everyone has a chance of getting the cow for one ruble! People are tempted and the rubles pour in. When I have collected a hundred rubles I proceed to draw the lottery: the one whose ticket is drawn gets the cow for a ruble, the others get nothing. Was the cow "cheap" for the people? No, it was very dear, because the total money they paid was double the value of the cow, because two persons (the one who ran the lottery and the one who won the cow) gained without doing any work, and gained at the expense of the ninety-nine who lost their money. Thus, those who say that lotteries are advantageous to the people are simply practising deceit on the people. Those who promise to deliver the peasants from poverty and want by means of co-operatives of every kind (societies for buying cheap and selling profitably), improved farming, banks, and all that sort of thing, are deceiving them in exactly the same way. Just as in a lottery where there is one winner and all the rest are losers, so it is with these things: one middle peasant may manage to get rich, but ninety-nine of his fellow peasants bend their backs all their lives, never escape from want, and even sink more deeply into poverty. Let every villager examine his commune and the whole district a little more closely: are there many middle peasants who become rich and forget want? And how many are there who can never rid themselves of want? How many are ruined and leave their villages? As we have seen, it has been calculated that in the whole of Russia there are not more than two million middle peasant farms. Suppose there were ten times as many societies of all kinds for buying cheap and selling profitably as there are

now. What would the result be? It would be a big figure if a hundred thousand middle peasants succeeded in raising themselves to the level of the rich. What would that mean? It would mean that out of every hundred middle peasants, five would become rich. But what about the other ninety-five? They would be in the same straits as ever, and many of them would be in even greater difficulties! And the poor would only be impoverished all the more!

Of course, the bourgeoisie want nothing more than that the largest possible number of middle and small peasants should strive to get rich, *believe* in the possibility of escaping from poverty without fighting the bourgeoisie, place their hopes in diligence and frugality and in becoming rich, and not in uniting with the rural and urban workers. The bourgeoisie do all they can to foster this deceptive faith and *hope* in the peasant, and try to lull him with honeyed words.

To expose the deception practised by these smooth-tongued people it is sufficient to ask them three questions.

Question one: can the working people rid themselves of want and poverty when, in Russia, a hundred million dessiatines out of two hundred and forty million dessiatines of arable land belong to private landowners? When sixteen thousand very big landowners possess sixty-five million dessiatines?

Question two: can the working people rid themselves of want and poverty when one and a half million rich peasant households (out of a total of ten million) have concentrated in their hands half of all peasants' land under crops, half the total number of horses and livestock owned by peasants, and much more than half the total peasant stocks and savings? When this peasant bourgeoisie is growing richer and richer, oppressing the poor and middle peasants, making money out of the labour of others, of the farm-hands and day labourers? When six and a half million households consist of poor peasants, destitute, always starving, and reduced to winning a miserable crust of bread by all kinds of wage-labour?

Question three: can the working people rid themselves of want and poverty when money has become the ruling power, when everything can be bought for money—factories and land, and even men and women can be bought to serve as wage-workers, wage-slaves? When no one can live

or run a farm without money? When the small farmer, the poor peasant, has to wage a struggle against the big farmer to get money? When a few thousand landlords, merchants, factory owners, and bankers have concentrated in their hands hundreds of millions of rubles, and, moreover, control all the banks, where thousands of millions of rubles are deposited?

No honeyed words about the advantages of small-scale farming or of co-operatives will enable you to evade these questions. To these questions there can be only one answer: the real "co-operation" that can save the working people is the *union* of the rural poor with the Social-Democratic workers in the towns to fight the entire bourgeoisie. The faster this union grows and becomes strong, the sooner will the middle peasant realise that the promises of the bourgeoisie are all lies, and the sooner will the middle peasant come over to our side.

The bourgeoisie know this, and that is why, in addition to honeyed words, they spread all sorts of lies about the Social-Democrats. They say that the Social-Democrats want to deprive the middle and small peasants of their property. *That is a lie*. The Social-Democrats want to deprive of their property only the big proprietors, *only those who live on the labour of others*. The Social-Democrats *will never take away the property of the small and middle farmers who do not hire labourers*. The Social-Democrats defend and champion the interests of all the working people, not only the interests of the urban workers, who are more class-conscious and more united than the others, but also of the agricultural workers, and of those small artisans and peasants who do not hire workers, do not strive towards the rich, and do not go over to the side of the bourgeoisie. *The Social-Democrats are fighting for all improvements in the conditions of the workers and peasants* which can be introduced immediately, when we have not yet destroyed the rule of the bourgeoisie, and which will help them in the struggle against the bourgeoisie. But the Social-Democrats do not deceive the peasant; they tell him *the whole truth*, plainly tell him in advance that no improvements will rid the people of want and poverty as long as the bourgeoisie is in power. To enable *all the people* to know what the Social-Democrats are and what

they want, the Social-Democrats have drawn up a *programme*. A programme is a brief, clear, and precise statement *of all the things a party is striving and fighting for*. The Social-Democratic Party is the only party that advances a clear and precise programme for all the people to know and see, and for the party to consist only of people who really want to fight for the emancipation of all the working people from the yoke of the bourgeoisie, and who properly understand who must unite for this fight and how the fight must be conducted. Furthermore, the Social-Democrats believe that they must *explain* in their programme, in a direct, frank, and precise way, *the causes of the poverty and want among the working people*, and why the unity of the workers is becoming wider and stronger. It is not enough to say that life is hard and to call for revolt; every tub-thumper can do that, but it is of little use. The working people must clearly understand *why* they are living in such poverty and *with whom they must unite* in order to fight to liberate themselves from want.

We have already stated what the Social-Democrats want; we have explained the causes of the working people's want and poverty; we have indicated whom the rural poor must fight and with whom they must unite for this fight.

We shall now explain *what improvements* we can win *at once* by fighting for them, improvements in the lives of the workers and in the lives of the peasants.

5. WHAT IMPROVEMENTS ARE THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS STRIVING TO OBTAIN FOR THE WHOLE PEOPLE AND FOR THE WORKERS?

The Social-Democrats are fighting for the liberation of all the working people from all robbery, oppression, and injustice. To become free the working class must first of all become united. And to become united it must have freedom to unite, have the right to unite, have political liberty. We have already said that autocratic government means enslavement of the people by the officials and the police. Political liberty is therefore needed by the whole people, except a handful of courtiers and a few money-bags and high

dignitaries who are received at Court. But most of all, political liberty is needed by the workers and the peasants. The rich can escape the self-will and the tyranny of officials and the police by buying them off. The rich can make their complaints heard in the highest places. That is why the police and the officials take much fewer liberties with the rich than with the poor. The workers and the peasants have no money to buy off the police or the officials; they have no one to complain to and are not in a position to sue them in court. The workers and the peasants will never rid themselves of the extortions, tyranny, and insults of the police and the officials as long as there is no *elective government*, as long as there is no *national assembly of deputies*. Only such a national assembly of deputies can free the people from enslavement by the officials. Every intelligent peasant must support the Social-Democrats, who first and foremost demand of the tsarist government *the convocation of a national assembly of deputies*. The deputies must be elected by all, irrespective of social-estate; irrespective of wealth or poverty. The elections must be free, without any interference on the part of the officials; they must be carried out under the supervision of such that enjoy the people's confidence, and not of police officers or the rural superintendents. Under such conditions, deputies representing the entire people will be able to discuss all the needs of the people, and introduce a better state of affairs in Russia.

The Social-Democrats demand that the police be deprived of the power to imprison anyone without trial. Officials must be severely punished for arbitrarily arresting anyone. To put an end to their self-assumed power, they must be chosen by the people, and everyone must have the right to lodge a complaint against any official directly in a court. What is the use of complaining to the rural superintendent about a police officer, or to the governor about the rural superintendent? The rural superintendent will, of course, always protect the police officer and the governor will always protect the rural superintendent, while the complainant will get into trouble. He runs a fair chance of being put into prison or deported to Siberia. The officials will be curbed only when everyone in Russia (as in all other countries) has the right to complain both to the national assembly and to the

elected courts, and to speak freely of his needs, to write about them in the newspapers.

The Russian people are still in feudal dependence upon the officials. Without permission from the officials the people cannot call meetings, or get books and newspapers printed. Is that not feudal dependence? If meetings cannot be freely called, or books freely printed, how can one obtain redress against the officials, or against the rich? Of course, the officials suppress every book, every utterance that tells the truth about the people's poverty. The present pamphlet, too, has to be printed by the Social-Democratic Party secretly and circulated secretly: anyone who is found in possession of this pamphlet will make the acquaintance of courts and prisons. But the Social-Democratic workers are not afraid of this: they print more and more, and give the people more and more truthful books to read. And no prisons, no persecution can halt the fight for the people's freedom!

The Social-Democrats demand that the social-estates be abolished, and that all the citizens of the state enjoy exactly the same rights. Today the social-estates are divided into tax-paying and non-tax-paying, into privileged and non-privileged; we have blue blood and common blood; even the birch has been retained for the common people. In no other country are the workers and peasants in such a position of inferiority. In no country except Russia are there different laws for different social-estates. It is time the Russian people, too, demanded that every muzhik should possess *all the rights* possessed by the nobility. Is it not a disgrace that the birch should still be used and that a *tax-paying* social-estate should be in existence more than forty years after the abolition of serfdom?

The Social-Democrats demand that the people shall have complete freedom of movement and occupation. What does *freedom of movement* mean? It means that the peasant should be free to go wherever he pleases, to move to whatever place he wants to, to live in any village or town he chooses without having to ask for permission from anyone. It means that passports should be abolished in Russia too (in other countries passports were abolished long ago), that no local police officer or rural superintendent should dare to hinder any

peasant from settling or working wherever he pleases. The Russian peasant is still so much the serf of the officials that he is not free to move to a town, or to settle in a new district. The minister issues orders that the governors should not allow *unauthorised* settlement! A governor knows better than the peasant what place is good for the peasant! The peasant is a little child and must not move without permission of the authorities! Is that not feudal dependence? Is it not an insult to the people when any profligate nobleman is allowed to lord it over grown-up farmers?

There is a book called *Crop Failure and the Distress of the People* (famine), written by the present "Minister of Agriculture" Mr. Yermolov. This book says in so many words: the peasant must not change residence as long as their worships the landlords need hands. The minister says this quite openly, without the least embarrassment: he thinks the peasant will not hear what he is saying and will not understand. Why allow people to go away when the landlords need cheap labour? The more crowded the people are on the land the more that is to the landlords' advantage; the poorer the peasants are, the more cheaply can they be hired and the more meekly will they submit to oppression of every kind. Formerly, the bailiffs looked after the landlord's interests, now the rural superintendents and governors do that. Formerly, the bailiffs ordered the flogging of peasants in the stables; now the rural superintendent in the volost administration office orders the flogging.

The Social-Democrats demand that the standing army be abolished and that a militia be established in its stead, that all the people be armed. A standing army is an army that is divorced from the people and trained to shoot down the people. If the soldier were not locked up for years in barracks and inhumanly drilled there, would he ever agree to shoot down his brothers, the workers and the peasants? Would he go against the starving peasants? A standing army is not needed in the least to protect the country from attack by an enemy; a people's militia is sufficient. If every citizen is armed, Russia need fear no enemy. And the people would be relieved of the yoke of the military clique. The upkeep of this clique costs *hundreds of millions of rubles a year*, and all this money is collected from the people; that is why the taxes

are so heavy and why it becomes increasingly difficult to live. The military clique still further increases the power of the officials and police over the people. This clique is needed to plunder foreign peoples, for instance, to take the land from the Chinese. This does not ease but, on the contrary, increases the people's burden because of greater taxation. The substitution of the armed nation for the standing army would enormously ease the burden of all the workers and all the peasants.

Similarly, *the abolition of indirect taxation*, which the Social-Democrats demand, would be an enormous relief. Indirect taxes are such taxes that are not imposed directly on land or on a house but are paid by the people *indirectly*, in the form of higher prices for what they buy. The state imposes taxes on sugar, vodka, kerosene, matches, and all sorts of articles of consumption; these taxes are paid to the Treasury by the merchant or by the manufacturer, but, of course, he does not pay it out of his own pocket, but out of the money his customers pay him. The price of vodka, sugar, kerosene, and matches goes up, and every purchaser of a bottle of vodka or of a pound of sugar has to pay the tax in addition to the price of the goods. For instance, if, say, you pay fourteen kopeks for a pound of sugar, four kopeks (approximately) constitute the tax: the sugar-manufacturer has already paid the tax to the Treasury and is now exacting from every customer the sum he has paid. Thus, indirect taxes are taxes on articles of consumption, taxes which are paid by the purchaser in the form of higher prices for the articles he buys. It is sometimes said that indirect taxation is the fairest form of taxation: you pay according to the amount you buy. But this is not true. Indirect taxation is the most unfair form of taxation, because it is harder for the poor to pay indirect taxes than it is for the rich. The rich man's income is ten times or even a hundred times as large as that of the peasant or worker. But does the rich man need a hundred times as much sugar? Or ten times as much vodka, or matches, or kerosene? Of course not! A rich family will buy twice, at most, three times as much kerosene, vodka, or sugar as a poor family. But that means that the rich man will pay a *smaller part* of his income in taxes than the poor man. Let us suppose that the poor peasant's income is two

hundred rubles a year; let us suppose he buys sixty rubles' worth of such goods as are taxed and which are consequently dearer (the tax on sugar, matches, kerosene, is an *excise duty*, i.e., the manufacturer pays the duty before placing the goods on the market; in the case of vodka, a state monopoly, the State simply raises the price; cotton goods, iron and other goods have risen in price because cheap foreign goods are not admitted into Russia unless a heavy duty is paid on them). Of these sixty rubles *twenty rubles* will constitute the tax. Thus, out of every ruble of his income the poor peasant will pay *ten kopeks* in indirect taxes (exclusive of direct taxes, land redemption payments, quit-rent, land tax, Zemstvo, volost and *mir* taxes). The rich peasant has an income of one thousand rubles; he will buy one hundred and fifty rubles' worth of taxed goods and pay fifty rubles in taxes (included in the one hundred and *fifty rubles*). Thus, out of every ruble of his income the rich peasant will pay only *five kopeks* in indirect taxes. The richer the man, the *smaller* is the share of his income that he pays in indirect taxes. That is why indirect taxation is *the most unfair* form of taxation. Indirect taxes are taxes on the poor. The peasants and workers together form nine-tenths of the population and pay nine-tenths or eight-tenths of the total indirect taxation. And, in all probability, the income of the peasants and workers amounts to no more than four-tenths of the whole national income! And so, the Social-Democrats demand the abolition of indirect taxation and the introduction of a *progressive* tax on incomes and inheritances. That means that the higher the income the higher the tax. Those who have an income of a thousand rubles must pay one kopek in the ruble; if the income is two thousand, two kopeks in the ruble must be paid, and so on. The smallest incomes (let us say incomes of under four hundred rubles) do not pay anything at all. The richest pay the highest taxes. Such a tax, an *income*-tax, or more exactly, a *progressive income*-tax, would be much fairer than indirect taxes. And that is why the Social-Democrats are striving to secure the abolition of indirect taxation and the introduction of a progressive income-tax. Of Course, all the property-owners, all the bourgeoisie, object to this measure and resist it. Only through a firm alliance between the rural poor and

the urban workers can this improvement be *won* from the bourgeoisie.

Finally, the *free education* of children, which the Social-Democrats demand, would be a very important improvement for the whole of the people, and for the rural poor in particular. Today there are far fewer schools in the countryside than in the towns, and everywhere it is only the rich classes, only the bourgeoisie, who are in a position to give their children a good education. Only free and compulsory education for *all children* can get the people, at least to some extent, out of their present state of ignorance. The rural poor suffer most from this ignorance and stand in particular need of education. But, of course, we need real, free education, and not the sort the officials and the priests *want to give.*

The Social-Democrats further demand that everybody shall have full and unrestricted right to profess any religion he pleases. Of the European countries Russia and Turkey are the only ones which have retained shameful laws against persons belonging to any other faith than the Orthodox, laws against schismatics, sectarians, and Jews. These laws either totally ban a certain religion, or prohibit its propagation, or deprive those who belong to it of certain rights. All these laws are as unjust, as arbitrary and as disgraceful as can be. Everybody must be perfectly free, not only to profess whatever religion he pleases, *but also to spread or change his religion*. No official should have the right even to ask anyone about his religion: that is a matter for each person's conscience and no one has any right to interfere. There should be no "*established*" religion or church. All religions and all churches should have equal status in law. The clergy of the various religions should be paid salaries by those who belong to their religions, but the state should not use state money to support any religion whatever, should not grant money to maintain any clergy, Orthodox, schismatic, sectarian, or any other. That is what the Social-Democrats are fighting for, and until these measures are carried out without any reservation and without any subterfuge, the people will not be freed from the disgraceful police persecution of religion, or from the no less disgraceful police hand-outs to any one of those religions.

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We have seen what improvements the Social-Democrats are out to achieve for all the people, and especially for the poor. Now let us see what improvements they strive to achieve for the workers, not only for factory and urban workers, but for agricultural workers too. The factory workers live in more cramped conditions; they work in large workshops, so it is easier for them to avail themselves of the assistance of educated Social-Democrats. For all these reasons the urban workers started the struggle against the employers much earlier than the others and have achieved more considerable improvements; they have also obtained the passing of factory laws. But the Social-Democrats are fighting for the extension of these improvements to *all* the workers: to handicraftsmen both in town and country, who work for employers at home; to the wage-workers employed by petty masters and artisans; to workers in the building trades (carpenters, bricklayers, etc.); to lumbermen and unskilled labourers, *and also the agricultural labourers*. All over Russia, all these workers are now beginning to unite, following the example of, and aided by, the factory workers, to unite for the struggle for better conditions of life, for a shorter working day, *for higher wages*. And the Social-Democratic Party has set itself the task of supporting *all* workers in their struggle for a better life, of helping them to organise (to unite) the most resolute and reliable workers in strong unions, of helping them by circulating pamphlets and leaflets, by sending experienced workers to those new to the movement, and in general helping all the workers in every possible way. When we have won political liberty, we shall have our people in a national assembly of deputies, worker deputies, Social-Democrats, and, like their comrades in other countries, they will demand laws for the benefit of the workers.

We shall not enumerate here *all* the improvements the Social-Democratic Party is striving to obtain for the workers: they have been set out in our programme and explained in detail in the pamphlet, *The Workers' Cause in Russia*. Here it will be sufficient to mention the most important of those improvements. The working day must not be longer

than eight hours. One day a week must always be a day of rest. Overtime must be absolutely banned, and so must night-work. Children up to the age of sixteen must be given free education and, consequently, must not be allowed to work for hire until that age. Women must not work in trades injurious to their health. The employer must compensate the workers for all injury caused during work, for example, for injury caused when working on threshing-machines, winnowing-machines, and so forth. All wage-workers must always be paid *weekly*, and not once in two months or once in a quarter as is often the case with agricultural labourers. It is very important for the workers to be paid regularly every week and, moreover, to be paid in cash, and not in goods. Employers are very fond of making the workers accept all sorts of worthless goods at exorbitant prices in payment of wages; to put an end to this disgraceful practice, the payment of wages in goods must be absolutely prohibited by law. Further, aged workers must receive state pensions. By their labour the workers maintain all the rich classes, and the whole state, and that gives them as much right to pensions as government officials, who get pensions. To prevent employers from taking advantage of their position to disregard regulations introduced to protect the workers, inspectors must be appointed to supervise, not only the factories, but also the big landlord farms and, in general, all enterprises where wage-labour is employed. But those inspectors must not be government officials, or be appointed by ministers or governors, or be in the service of the police. The inspectors must *be elected by the workers*; the state must pay salaries to persons who enjoy the confidence of the workers and whom they have freely elected. These elected deputies of the workers must also see to it that the workers' dwellings are kept in proper condition, that the employers dare not compel the workers to live in what is like pigsties or in mud huts (as is often the case with agricultural labourers), that the rules concerning the workers' rest are observed, and so on. It must not be forgotten, however, that no elected workers' deputies will be of any use as long as there is no political liberty, as long as the police are all-powerful, and are not responsible to the people. Everyone knows that at present the police will arrest

without trial, not only workers' deputies but any worker who will dare speak in the name of all his fellow workers, expose breaches of the law, or call on the workers to unite. But when we have political liberty, the workers' deputies will be of very great use.

All employers (factory owners, landlords, contractors, and rich peasants) should *be absolutely forbidden* to make any arbitrary deductions from the wages of their workers, for example, deductions for defective goods, deductions in the form of fines, etc. It is unlawful and tyrannical for employers *arbitrarily* to make deductions from workers' wages. The employer must not reduce a worker's wage by means of any deductions, or in any way whatsoever. The employer should not be allowed to pass and execute judgement (a fine sort of judge, who pockets the deductions from the worker's wages!); he should appeal to a *proper court*, and this court must consist of deputies elected by the workers and the employers in equal numbers. Only such a court will be able to judge fairly all the grievances of the employers against the workers and of the workers against the employers.

Such are the improvements the Social-Democrats are striving to obtain for the whole of the working class. The workers on every landed estate, on every farm, in the employ of every contractor, must meet and discuss with trustworthy persons what improvements they must strive to obtain and what demands they should advance (for the demands of the workers will, of course, be different at different factories, on different estates, and with different contractors).

All over Russia *Social-Democratic committees* are helping the workers to formulate their demands in a clear and precise way, and are helping them to issue printed leaflets where these demands are set out, so that they may be known to all workers, and to the employers and the authorities. When the workers unite as one man in support of their demands, the employers always have to give way and agree to them. In the towns the workers have already obtained many improvements in this way, and now handicraftsmen, artisans, and agricultural labourers are also beginning to unite (to organise) and fight for their demands. As long as we have no political liberty, we carry on the fight in

secret, hiding from the police, who prohibit the publication of all leaflets and associations of workers. But when we have won political liberty, we shall carry on the fight on a wider scale and openly, so that working people all over Russia may unite and defend themselves more vigorously from oppression. The larger the number of workers who unite *in the workers' Social-Democratic Party*, the stronger will they be, the sooner will they be able to achieve the complete emancipation of the working class from all oppression, from all wage-labour, from all toil for the benefit of the bourgeoisie.

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We have already said that the Social-Democratic Labour Party is striving to obtain improvements, not only for the workers, but also for *all the peasants*. Now let us see what improvements it is striving to obtain for all the peasants.

6. WHAT IMPROVEMENTS ARE THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS STRIVING TO OBTAIN FOR ALL THE PEASANTS?

To secure the complete emancipation of all working people, the rural poor must, in alliance with the urban workers, wage a fight against the whole of the bourgeoisie, including the rich peasants. The rich peasants will strive to pay their farm labourers as little as possible and make them work as long and as hard as possible; but the workers in town and countryside will try to secure better wages, better conditions, and regular rest periods for farm labourers working for the rich peasants. That means that the rural poor must form their own unions apart from the rich peasants. We have already said this, and we shall always repeat it.

But in Russia, all peasants, rich and poor, are still serfs in many respects; they are an *inferior*, "*black*", *tax-paying social-estate*; they are all serfs of the police officers and rural superintendents; very often they have to work for the landlord in payment for the use of the cut-off lands, watering places, pastures or meadows, just as they worked for the feudal lord under the serf-owning system. *All* the peasants want to be free of this new serfdom; *all* of them want to have

full rights; *all* of them hate the landlords, who still compel them to *perform serf labour*, to pay "labour rent" for the use of the gentry's land and pastures, watering places and meadows, to work also "for damage" done by straying cattle and to send their womenfolk to reap the landlord's field merely "for the honour of it". All this labour rent for the landlord is a heavier burden for the poor peasants than for the rich peasants. The rich peasant is sometimes able to pay the landlord money in lieu of this work, but as a rule even the rich peasant is badly squeezed by the landlord. Hence, the rural poor must fight side by side with the rich peasants against their lack of rights, against every kind of serf labour, against every kind of labour rent. We shall be able to abolish *all* bondage, *all* poverty only when we defeat the bourgeoisie *as a whole* (including the rich peasants). But there are forms of bondage which we can abolish *before that time*, because even the rich peasant suffers badly from them. There are many localities and many districts in Russia where very often all the peasants are still quite like serfs. That is why all Russian workers and all the rural poor must *fight with both hands and on two sides*: with one hand—*fight against all the bourgeois*, in alliance with all the workers; and with the other hand—*fight against the rural officials, against the feudal landlords*, in alliance with all the peasants. If the rural poor do not form their own union separately from the rich peasants they will be deceived by the rich peasants, who will become landlords themselves, while the landless poor will not only remain poor and without land but will not even be granted freedom to unite. If the rural poor do not fight side by side with the rich peasants against feudal bondage, they will remain fettered and tied down to one place, neither will they gain full freedom to unite with the urban workers.

The rural poor must first strike at the landlords and throw off at least the most vicious and most pernicious forms of feudal bondage; in this fight many of the rich peasants and adherents of the bourgeoisie will also take the side of the poor, because everybody is disgusted with the arrogance of the landlords. But as soon as we have curtailed the power of the landlords, the rich peasant will at once reveal his true character and stretch out greedy hands to grab

everything; these are rapacious hands and they have already grabbed a great deal. Hence, we must be on our guard and form a strong, indestructible alliance with the urban workers. The urban workers will help to knock the old aristocratic habits out of the landlords and also tame the rich peasants a bit (as they have already somewhat tamed their own bosses, the factory owners). Without an alliance with the urban workers the rural poor will *never* rid themselves of all forms of bondage, want, and poverty; except for the urban workers, there is *no one* to help the rural poor, and they can count on no one but themselves. But there are improvements which we can obtain earlier, which we can obtain immediately, at the very outset of this great struggle. There are many forms of bondage in Russia which have long ceased to exist in other countries, and it is from this bondage imposed by the officials and landlords, this feudal bondage, that *the Russian peasantry as a whole* can free itself *immediately*.

Let us now see what improvements the workers' Social-Democratic Party is striving first of all to obtain so as to free the Russian peasantry as a whole from at least the most vicious forms of feudal bondage, and so as to untie the hands of the rural poor for their struggle against the Russian bourgeoisie as a whole.

The first demand of the workers' Social-Democratic Party is the immediate abolition of all land redemption payments, all quit-rent, and all the dues imposed upon the "tax-paying" peasantry. When the committees of nobles and the Russian tsar's government, consisting of nobles, "emancipated" the peasants from serfdom, the peasants were compelled to *buy out their own* land, to buy out the land which they had tilled for generations! That was *robbery*. The committees of nobles, assisted by the tsarist government, simply *robbed* the peasants. The tsarist government sent troops to many places to impose the title-deeds[126] upon the peasants *by force*, to take military punitive measures against the peasants, who were unwilling to accept the curtailed "pauper" allotments. Without the help of the troops, without brutality and shootings, the committees of nobles would never have been able to rob the peasants in the brazen way they did at the time of the emancipation

from serfdom. The peasants must always remember how they were cheated and robbed by those committees of landowning nobles, because even today the tsarist government always appoints committees of nobles or officials whenever it is a question of passing new laws concerning the peasants. The tsar recently issued a manifesto (February 26, 1903), in which he promises to revise and improve the laws concerning the peasants. Who will do the revising? Who will do the improving? Again the nobility, again the officials! The peasants will always be defrauded until they secure the setting up of *peasant committees* for the purpose of improving their conditions of life. It is time to put a stop to the landlords, rural superintendents, and all kinds of officials lording it over the peasants! It is time to put a stop to this feudal dependence of the peasant upon every police officer, upon every drink-sodden scion of the nobility who is called a rural superintendent, a police chief, or a governor! The peasants must demand freedom to manage their affairs *themselves*, freedom to consider, propose, and carry out new laws *themselves*. The peasants must demand the setting up of free, elected *peasant committees*, and until they obtain this they will always be defrauded and robbed by the nobility and the officials. No one will free the peasants from the official leeches, if they do not free themselves, if they do not unite and take their fate into *their own* hands.

The Social-Democrats not only demand the complete and immediate abolition of land redemption payments, quit-rent, and imposts of all kinds; they also demand that money taken from the people in the form of land redemption payments should be *restituted to the people*. Hundreds of millions of rubles have been paid up by peasants all over Russia since they were emancipated from serfdom by the committees of nobles. The peasants must demand that this money be returned to them. Let the government impose a special tax on the big landed nobility; let the land be taken from the monasteries and from the Department of Demesnes (i.e., from the tsar's family); let the national assembly of deputies use this money for the benefit of the peasants. Nowhere in the world is the peasant so downtrodden or so impoverished as is in Russia. Nowhere do millions of peasants die so horribly of starvation as they do in Russia. The

peasants in Russia have been reduced to dying of starvation because they were robbed long ago by the committees of nobles, and are being robbed to this day by being forced to pay tribute to the heirs of the feudal landlords every year in the form of redemption payments and quit-rent. The robbers must be made to answer for their crimes! Let money be taken away from the big landed nobility so as to provide effective relief for the famine-stricken. The starving peasant does not need charity, he does not need paltry doles; he must demand the return of the money he has paid for years and years to the landlords and to the state. The national assembly of deputies and the peasant committees will then be able to give real and effective assistance to the starving.

Further. The Social-Democratic Labour Party demands the immediate abolition of collective liability and of *all laws restricting the peasant in the free disposal of his land*. The tsar's Manifesto of February 26,1903, promises the abolition of collective liability. A law to this effect has already been passed. But this is not enough. *All laws* that prevent the peasant from freely disposing of his land must be abolished immediately; otherwise, even without collective liability the peasant will not *be quite free* and will remain a semi-serf. The peasant must be quite free to dispose of his land: to let or sell it to whomsoever he pleases, without having to ask for permission from anyone. That is what the tsar's ukase does not permit: the gentry, the merchants, and the townspeople are free to dispose of their land, but the peasant is not. The peasant is a little child, who must have a rural superintendent to look after him like a nurse. The peasant must not be allowed to sell his allotment, for he will squander the money! That is how the feudal die-hards argue, and there are simpletons who believe them and, wishing the peasant well, say that he must not be allowed to sell his land. Even the Narodniks (of whom we have already spoken) and the people who call themselves "Socialist-Revolutionaries" also yield to this argument and agree that it is bettor for the peasant to remain somewhat of a serf rather than be allowed to sell his land.

The Social-Democrats say: that is sheer hypocrisy, aristocratic talk, merely honeyed words! When we have attained socialism, and the working class has defeated the

bourgeoisie, the land will be owned in common and nobody will have the right to sell land. But what in the meantime? Are the nobleman and the merchant to be allowed to sell their land, while the peasant is not!? Are the nobleman and the merchant to be free while the peasant remains a semi-serf!? Is the peasant to continue to have to beg permission from the authorities!?

All this is mere deceit, though covered up with honeyed words, but it is deceit for all that.

As long as the nobleman and the merchant are allowed to sell land, the peasant must also have *full right* to sell his land and to dispose of it with *complete freedom*, in exactly the same way as the nobleman and the merchant.

When the working class has defeated the entire bourgeoisie, it will take the land away from the big proprietors and introduce *co-operative farming* on the big estates, so that the workers will farm the land together, in common, and freely elect delegates to manage the farms. They will have all kinds of labour-saving machines, and work in shifts for not more than eight (or even six) hours a day. The small peasant who prefers to carry on his farm in the old way on individual lines will not then produce for the market, to sell to the first comer, but for the workers' co-operatives; the small peasant will supply the workers' co-operatives with grain, meat, vegetables, and the workers in return will provide him free of charge with machines, livestock, fertilisers, clothes, and whatever else he needs. There will then be no struggle for money between the big and the small farmer; there will then be no working for hire for others; all workers will work for themselves, all improvements in methods of production and all machines will benefit the workers themselves and help to make their work easier, improve their standard of living.

But every sensible man understands that socialism cannot be attained at once: to attain it a fierce struggle must be waged against the entire bourgeoisie and all governments; all urban workers all over Russia must unite in a firm and unbreakable alliance with all the rural poor. That is a great cause, and to that cause it is worth devoting one's whole life. But until we have attained socialism, the big owner will always fight the small owner for money. Is the

big landowner to be free to sell his land, while the small peasant is not? We repeat: the peasants are not little children and will not allow anyone to lord it over them; the peasants must receive, without any restriction, *all the rights* enjoyed by the nobility and the merchants.

It is also said: the peasant's land is not his own, but communal land. Everyone cannot be allowed to sell communal land. This, too, is a deception. Have not the nobles and the merchants their associations too? Do not the nobles and the merchants combine to float companies for the joint purchase of land, factories, or any other thing? Why then are no restrictions invented for the associations of the nobility, while the police scoundrels zealously think up restrictions and prohibitions for the peasantry? The peasants have never received anything good from the officials, except beatings, extortions, and bullying. The peasants will never receive anything good until they take their affairs into their own hands, until they obtain complete equality of rights and complete liberty. If the peasants want their land to be communal, no one will dare to interfere with them; and they will voluntarily form an association which will include whomsoever they like, and on whatever terms they like; they will quite freely draw up a communal contract in whatever form they like. And let no official dare poke his nose into the communal affairs of the peasants. Let no one dare exercise his wits on the peasants and invent restrictions and prohibitions for them.

* * *

Lastly, there is another important improvement which the Social-Democrats are striving to obtain for the peasants. They want immediately to impose limits on the peasants' bondage to the nobility, their serf bondage. Of course bondage cannot be completely abolished as long as poverty exists, and poverty cannot be abolished as long as the land and the factories are in the hands of the bourgeoisie, as long as money is the principal power in the world, and until a *socialist society* has been established. But in the Russian countryside there is still much bondage of a particularly vicious sort which does not exist in other countries, although

socialism has not yet been established there. There is still much *serf bondage* in Russia which is profitable to all the landlords, weighs heavily on all the peasants, and can and must be abolished immediately, in the first place.

Let us explain the sort of bondage we call serf bondage.

Everyone who lives in the country knows cases like the following. The landlord's land adjoins the peasant's land. At the time of the emancipation the peasants were deprived of land that was indispensable to them: pasture, woodland, and watering places were cut off. The peasants cannot do without this cut-off land, without pastures and watering places. Whether they like it or not the peasants are forced to go to the landlord to ask him to let their cattle to go to the water, to graze on the pastures, and so forth. The landlord does not farm any land himself and, perhaps, has no money; he lives only by keeping the peasants in thrall. In return for the use of the cut-off lands the peasants work for him for nothing; they plough his land with their horses, harvest his grain and mow his hay, thresh his grain, and in some places even have to cart their manure to the landlord's fields, or bring him homespun cloth, and eggs and poultry. Just as under serfdom! Under serfdom the peasants had to work for nothing for the landlord on whose estate they lived, and today they very often have to work for nothing for the landlord in return for the very same land which the committees of nobles filched from them at the time of the emancipation. It is just the same as the corvée system. In some gubernias the peasants themselves call this system *barshchina*, or *panshchina*. Well, that is what we call serf bondage. At the time of the emancipation from serfdom the committees of landowning nobles deliberately arranged matters in such a way as to keep the peasants in bondage in the old way. They would deliberately dock the peasants' allotments; they would drive a wedge of the landlord's land in between peasants' holdings so as to make it impossible for the peasant even to let his poultry out without trespassing; they would deliberately transfer the peasants to inferior land, deliberately block the way to the watering place by a strip of landlord's land—in short, they arranged matters in such a way that the peasants should find themselves in a trap, and, just as before, could easily be taken

captive. There are still countless numbers of villages where the peasants are in captivity to nearby landlords, just as much as they were under serfdom. In villages like these, both the rich peasant and the poor peasant are bound hand and foot and at the mercy of the landlords. The poor peasant fares even worse than the rich peasant from this state of affairs. The rich peasant sometimes owns some land and sends his labourer to work for the landlord instead of going himself, but the poor peasant has no way out, and the landlord does what he likes to him. Under this bondage the poor peasant often has not even a moment's breathing-space; he cannot go to look for work elsewhere because of the work he has to do for his landlord; he cannot even think of freely uniting in one union, in one party, with all the rural poor and the urban workers.

Well then, are there no means by which it would be possible to abolish this sort of bondage at once, forthwith, immediately? The Social-Democratic Labour Party proposes to the peasants *two* means to this end. But we must repeat that only socialism can deliver all the poor from bondage of every kind, for as long as the rich have power they will always oppress the poor in one way or another. It is impossible to abolish all bondage at once, but it is possible greatly to restrict the most vicious, the most revolting form of bondage, serf bondage, which weighs heavily on the poor, on the middle and even on the rich peasants; it is possible to obtain immediate relief for the peasants.

There are two means to this end.

First means: freely elected courts consisting of delegates of the farm labourers and poor peasants, as well as of the rich peasants and landlords.

Second means: freely elected *peasant committees*. These peasant committees must have the right, not only to discuss and adopt all kinds of measures for abolishing the corvée, for abolishing the remnants of serfdom, but they must also have the right *to expropriate the cut-off lands and restore them to the peasants*.

Let us consider these two means a little more closely. The freely elected delegate courts will consider all cases arising out of complaints of peasants against bondage. Such courts will have the right to reduce rents for land if the

landlord, taking advantage of the peasants' poverty, has fixed them too high. Such courts will have the right to free the peasants from exorbitant payments; when a landlord engages a peasant in the winter for summer work at an excessively low wage, the court will judge the case and fix a fair wage. Of course, such courts must not consist of officials, but of freely elected delegates, and the agricultural labourers and the rural poor must also without fail elect their delegates, whose number must not in any case be less than those elected by the rich peasants and the landlords. Such courts will also try disputes between labourers and employers. When such courts exist it will be easier for the labourers and all the rural poor to defend their rights, to unite and to find out exactly what people can be trusted to stand up faithfully for the poor and for the labourers.

The other means is still more important: the establishment of free *peasant committees* consisting of elected delegates of the farm labourers and poor, middle and rich peasants in every uyezd (or, if the peasants think fit, they may elect several committees in each uyezd; perhaps they will even prefer to establish peasant committees in every volost and in every large village). No one knows better than the peasants themselves what bondage oppresses them. No one will be able to expose the landlords, who to this day live by keeping the peasants in thrall, better than the peasants themselves. The peasant committees will decide what cut-off lands, what meadows, pastures, and so forth, were taken from the peasants unfairly; they will decide whether those lands shall be expropriated without compensation, or whether those who bought such lands should be paid compensation at the expense of the high nobility. The peasant committees will at least release the peasants from the traps into which they were driven by very many committees of the landowning nobles. The peasant committees will rid the peasants of interference by officials; they will show that the peasants themselves want to, and can, manage their own affairs; they will help the peasants to reach agreement among themselves about their needs and to recognise those who are really able to stand up for the rural poor and for an alliance with the urban workers. The peasant committees will be the *first step* towards enabling the peasants even in

remote villages to get on to their feet and to take their fate into their own hands.

That is why the Social-Democratic workers warn the peasants:

Place no faith in any committees of nobles, or in any commissions consisting of officials.

Demand a national assembly of deputies.

Demand the establishment of peasant committees.

Demand complete freedom to publish pamphlets and newspapers of every kind.

When all have the right freely and fearlessly to express their opinions and their wishes in the national assembly of deputies, in the peasant committees, and in the newspapers, it will very soon be seen who is on the side of the working class and who is on the side of the bourgeoisie. Today, the great majority of the people do not think about these things at all; some conceal their real views, some do not yet know their own minds, and some lie deliberately. But when this right has been won, everyone will begin to think about these things; there will be no reason for concealing anything, and everything will soon become clear. We have already said that the bourgeoisie will draw the rich peasants to its side. The sooner and the more completely we succeed in abolishing serf bondage, and the more real freedom the peasants obtain for themselves, the sooner will the rural poor unite among themselves, and the sooner will the rich peasants unite with all the bourgeoisie. Let them unite: we are not afraid of that, although we know perfectly well that this will strengthen the rich peasants. But we, too, will unite, and *our union*, the union between the rural poor and the urban workers, will embrace far more people. It will be a union of tens of millions against a union of hundreds of thousands. We also know that the bourgeoisie will try (it is already trying!) to attract the middle and even the small peasants to its side; it will try to deceive them, entice them, sow dissension among them, and promise to raise each of them into the ranks of the rich. We have already seen the means and the deceit the bourgeoisie resort to in order to lure the middle peasant. We must therefore open the eyes of the rural poor beforehand, and consolidate in advance their separate union with the urban workers against the entire bourgeoisie.

Let every villager look around carefully. How often we hear the rich peasants talking against the nobility, against the landlords! How they complain of the oppression the people suffer from! Or of the landlords' land lying idle! How they love to talk (in private conversation) about what a good thing it would be if the peasants took possession of the land!

Can we believe what the rich peasants say? No. They do not want the land for the people; they want it for themselves. They have already got hold of a great deal of land, bought outright or rented, and still they are not satisfied. *Hence, the rural poor will not long have to march side by side with the rich peasants against the landlords*. Only the first step will have to be taken in their company, and after that their ways will part.

That is why we must draw a clear distinction between this first step and subsequent steps, and our final and most important step. The first step in the countryside will be the complete emancipation of the peasant, full rights for the peasant, and the establishment of peasant committees for the purpose of restoring the cut-off lands. But our final step will be the same in both town and country: *we shall take all the land and all the factories from the landlords and the bourgeoisie and set up a socialist society*. We shall have to go through a big struggle in the period between our first step and the final, *and whoever confuses the first step with the final weakens that struggle and unwittingly helps to hoodwink the rural poor*.

The rural poor will take the first step together with all the peasants: a few kulaks may fall out, perhaps one peasant in a hundred is willing to put up with any kind of bondage. But the overwhelming mass of the peasants will, as yet, advance as one whole: all the peasants want equal rights. Bondage to the landlords ties everyone hand and foot. But the final step will never be taken by all the peasants together: then, all the rich peasants will turn against the farm labourers. Then, it is a strong union of the rural poor and the *urban Social-Democratic workers* that we need. Whoever tells the peasants that they can take the first and the final step simultaneously is deceiving them. He forgets about the great struggle that is going on among the peasants them-

selves, the great struggle between the rural poor and the rich peasants.

That is why the Social-Democrats do not promise the peasants *immediately* a land flowing with milk and honey. That is why the Social-Democrats first of all demand complete freedom for the struggle, for the great, nation-wide struggle of the entire working class against the entire bourgeoisie. That is why the Social-Democrats advise a *small but sure first step*.

Some people think that our demand for the establishment of peasant committees for the purpose of restricting bondage and of restoring the cut-off lands is a sort of fence or barrier, as if we meant to say: stop, not a step farther! These people have given insufficient thought to what the Social-Democrats want. The demand for peasant committees to be set up for the purpose of restricting bondage and of restoring the cut-off lands is not a barrier. It is a *door*. We must first pass through this door *in order to go farther*, to march along the wide and open road *to the very end*, to the complete emancipation of all working people in Russia. Until the peasants pass through this door they will remain in ignorance and bondage, without full rights, without complete and real liberty; they will not even be able to decide definitely among themselves who is the friend of the working man and who his enemy. That is why the Social-Democrats point to this door and say that the entire people must all together first force this door and smash it in. But there are people who call themselves Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who also wish the peasant well, shout and make a noise, wave their arms about and want to help him, but *they do not see that door*! Those people are so blind that they even say: there is no need at all to give the peasant the right freely to dispose of his land! They wish the peasant well, but sometimes they argue exactly like the feudal die-hards! Such friends can be of little help. What is the use of wishing the peasant all the best if you don't clearly see the very first door that must be smashed? What is the use of wanting socialism if you don't see how to enter on the road of a free, people's struggle for socialism, not only in the towns, but also in the countryside, not only against the landlords, but also *against the rich peasants in the village commune*, *the* "*mir*"?

That is why the Social-Democrats point so insistently to this first and nearest door. The difficult thing at this stage is not to express a lot of good wishes, but to point to the right road, to understand clearly *how the very first step should be taken*. All friends of the peasant have been talking and writing for the past forty years about the Russian peasant being crushed by bondage and about his remaining a semi-serf. Long before there were any Social-Democrats in Russia, the friends of the peasant wrote many books describing how shamefully the landlords robbed and enslaved the peasant by means of the various cut-off lands. All honest people now realise that the peasant must be given assistance at once, immediately, that he must get at least some relief from this bondage; even officials in our police government are beginning to talk about this. The whole question is: *how to set about it*, *how* to take *the first step*, which door must be forced first?

To this question different people (among those who wish the peasant well) give two different answers. Every rural proletarian must try to understand these two answers as clearly as possible and form a definite and firm opinion about them. One answer is given by the Narodniks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The first thing to be done, they say, is to develop all sorts of societies (co-operatives) among the peasants. The unity of the *mir* must be strengthened. Every peasant should not be given the right to dispose of his land freely. Let the rights of the commune, the *mir*, be extended, and let all the land in Russia gradually become communal land. The peasants must be granted every assistance to purchase land, so that the land may more easily pass from capital to labour.

The other answer is given by the Social-Democrats. The peasant must first of all obtain for himself all the rights possessed by the nobility and the merchants, all without exception. The peasant must have full right to dispose freely of his land. In order to abolish the most revolting forms of bondage, peasant committees must be set up for the purpose of restoring the cut-off lands. We need not the unity of the *mir*, but unity of the rural poor in the different village communes all over Russia, unity of the rural proletarians with the urban proletarians. All sorts of societies

(co-operatives) and the communal purchase of land will always benefit the rich peasants most, and will always serve to hoodwink the middle peasants.

The Russian Government realises that some relief must be given to the peasants, but it wants to make shift with trifles; it wants everything to be done by the officials. The peasants must be on the alert, because commissions of officials will cheat them just as they were cheated by the committees of nobles. The peasants must demand the election of free peasant committees. The important thing is not to expect improvement from the officials, but for the peasants to take their fate into their own hands. Let us at first take only one step, at first abolish only the vicious forms of bondage—so that the peasants should become conscious of their strength, so that they should freely reach a common agreement and unite! No honest person can deny that the cut-off lands often serve as the instruments of the most outrageous serf bondage. No honest person can deny that our demand is the primary and fairest of demands: let the peasants freely elect *their own* committees, without the officials, for the purpose of abolishing all serf bondage.

In the free peasant committees (just as in the free all-Russian assembly of deputies) the Social-Democrats will at once do all in their power to consolidate a distinct union of the rural proletarians with the urban proletarians. The Social-Democrats will make a stand for all measures for the benefit of the rural proletarians and will help them to follow up the first step, as quickly as possible and as unitedly as possible, with the second and the third step, and so on to the very end, to the complete *victory of the proletariat*. But can we say today, at once, what demand will be appropriate tomorrow for the second step? No, we cannot, because we do not know what stand will be taken tomorrow by the rich peasants, and by many educated people who are concerned with all kinds of co-operatives and with the land passing from capital to labour.

Perhaps they will not yet succeed in reaching an understanding with the landlords on the morrow; perhaps they will want to put an end to landlord rule completely. Very good! The Social-Democrats would very much like this to happen, and they will advise rural and urban proletarians

to demand that all the land be taken from the landlords and transferred to the free people's state. The Social-Democrats will vigilantly see to it that the rural proletarians are not cheated in the course of this, and that they still further consolidate their forces for the final struggle for the complete emancipation of the proletariat.

But things may turn out quite differently. In fact, it is more likely that they will turn out differently. On the very day after the worst forms of bondage have been restricted and curtailed, the rich peasants and many educated people may unite with the landlords, and then the entire rural bourgeoisie will rise against the entire rural proletariat. In that event it would be ridiculous for us to fight only the landlords. We would then have to fight the entire bourgeoisie and demand first of all the greatest possible freedom and elbow-room for this fight, demand better conditions of life for the workers in order to facilitate this struggle.

In any case, whichever way things turn out, our first, our principal and indispensable task is *to strengthen the alliance of the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians with the urban proletarians*. For this alliance we need at once, immediately, *complete political liberty for the people*, *complete equality of rights for the peasants and the abolition of serf bondage*. And when that alliance is established and strengthened, we shall easily expose all the deceit the bourgeoisie resorts to in order to attract the middle peasant; we shall easily and quickly take the second, the third and the last step against the entire bourgeoisie, against all the government forces, and we shall unswervingly march to victory and rapidly achieve the *complete emancipation of all working people*.

7. THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

What is the *class struggle*? It is a struggle of one part of the people against the other; a struggle waged by the masses of those who have no rights, are oppressed and engage in toil, against the privileged, the oppressors and drones; a struggle of the wage-labourers, or proletarians, against the property-owners, or bourgeoisie. This great struggle has always gone on and is now going on in the Russian coun-

tryside too, although not everyone sees it, and although not everyone understands its significance. In the period of serfdom the entire mass of the peasants fought against their oppressors, the landlord class, which was protected, defended, and supported by the tsarist government. The peasants were then unable to unite and were utterly crushed by ignorance; they had no helpers and brothers among the urban workers; nevertheless they fought as best they could. They were not deterred by the brutal persecution of the government, were not daunted by punitive measures and bullets, and did not believe the priests, who tried with all their might to prove that serfdom was approved by Holy Scripture and sanctioned by God (that is what Metropolitan Philaret actually said!); the peasants rose in rebellion, now in one place and now in another, and at last the government yielded, fearing a general uprising of all the peasants.

Serfdom was abolished, but not altogether. The peasants remained without rights, remained an inferior, tax-paying, "black" social-estate, remained in the clutches of serf bondage. Unrest among the peasants continues; they continue to seek complete, real freedom. Meanwhile, after the abolition of serfdom, a new class struggle arose, the *struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie*. Wealth increased, railways and big factories were built, the towns grew still more populous and more luxurious, but all this wealth was appropriated by a very few, while the people became poorer all the time, became ruined, starved, and had to leave their homes to go and hire themselves out for wages. The urban workers started a great, new struggle of all the poor against all the rich. The urban workers have united in the *Social-Democratic Party* and are waging their struggle stubbornly, staunchly, and solidly, advancing step by step, preparing for the great final struggle, and demanding political liberty for all the people.

At last the peasants, too, lost patience. In the spring of last year, 1902, the peasants of Poltava, Kharkov, and other gubernias rose against the landlords, broke open their barns, shared the contents among themselves, distributed among the starving the grain that had been sown and reaped by the peasants but appropriated by the landlords, and demanded a new division of the land. The peasants could no longer

bear the endless oppression, and began to seek a better lot. The peasants decided—and quite rightly so—that it was better to die fighting the oppressors than to die of starvation without a struggle. But they did not win a better lot for themselves. The tsarist government proclaimed them common rioters and robbers (for having taken from the robber landlords grain which the peasants themselves had sown and reaped!); the tsarist government sent troops against them as against an enemy, and the peasants were defeated; peasants were shot down, many were killed; peasants were brutally flogged, many were flogged to death; they were tortured worse than the Turks torture their enemies, the Christians. The tsar's envoys, the governors, were the worst torturers, real executioners. The soldiers raped the wives and daughters of the peasants. And after all this, the peasants were tried by a court of officials, were compelled to pay the landlords 800,000 rubles, and at the trials, those infamous secret trials, trials in a torture chamber, counsels for the defence were not even allowed to tell how the peasants had been ill-treated and tortured by the tsar's envoys, Governor Obolensky, and the other servants of the tsar.

The peasants fought in a just cause. The Russian working class will always honour the memory of the martyrs who were shot down and flogged to death by the tsar's servants. Those martyrs fought for the freedom and happiness of the working people. The peasants were defeated, but they will rise again and again, and will not lose heart because of this first defeat. The class-conscious workers will do all in their power to inform the largest possible number of working people in town and country about the peasants' struggle and to help them prepare for another and more successful struggle. The class-conscious workers will do all in their power to help the peasants *clearly to understand why the first peasant uprising* (1902) *was crushed and what must be done in order to secure victory for the peasants and workers and not for the tsar's servants.*

The peasant uprising was crushed because it was an uprising of an ignorant and politically unconscious mass, an uprising without clear and definite *political* demands, i.e., without the demand for a change in the *political* order. The

peasant uprising was crushed because *no preparations had been made* for it. The peasant uprising was crushed because the rural proletarians had not yet allied themselves with the urban proletarians. Such were the three causes of the peasants' first failure. To be successful an insurrection must have a conscious political aim; preparations must be made for it in advance; it must spread throughout the whole of Russia and be in alliance with the urban workers. And every step in the struggle of the urban workers, every Social-Democratic pamphlet or newspaper, every speech made by a class-conscious worker to the rural proletarians will bring nearer the time when the insurrection will be repeated and end in victory.

The peasants rose without a conscious political aim, simply because they could not bear their sufferings any longer, because they did not want to die like dumb brutes, without resistance. The peasants had suffered so much from every manner of robbery, oppression, and torment that they could not but believe, if only for a moment, the vague rumours about the tsar's mercy; they could not but believe that every sensible man would regard it as just that grain should be distributed among starving people, among those who had worked all their lives for others, had sown and reaped, and were now dying of starvation, while the "gentry's" barns were full to bursting. The peasants seemed to have forgotten that the best land and all the factories had been seized by the rich, by the landlords and the bourgeoisie, precisely for the purpose of compelling the starving people to work for them. The peasants forgot that not only do the priests preach sermons in defence of the rich class, but the entire tsarist government, with its host of bureaucrats and soldiers, rises in its defence. The tsarist government reminded the peasants of that. With brutal cruelty, the tsarist government showed the peasants what state power is, whose servant and whose protector it is. We need only remind the peasants of this lesson more often, and they will easily understand why it is necessary to *change the political order*, and why we need *political liberty*. Peasant uprisings will have a conscious political aim when that is understood by larger and larger numbers of people, when every peasant who can read and write and who thinks for himself becomes

familiar with the *three principal demands* which must be fought for first of all. The first demand—the convocation of *a national assembly of deputies for the purpose of establishing popular elective government in Russia in place of the autocratic government*. The second demand—*freedom for all to publish all kinds of books and newspapers*. The third demand—*recognition by law of the peasants' complete equality of rights with the other social-estates, and the institution of elected peasant committees with the primary object of abolishing all forms of serf bondage*. Such are the chief and fundamental demands of the Social-Democrats, and it will now be very easy for the peasants to understand them, to understand *what to begin with* in the struggle for the people's freedom. When the peasants understand these demands, they will also understand that long, persistent and persevering *preparations* must be made in advance for the struggle, not in isolation, but together with the workers in the towns—the Social-Democrats.

Let every class-conscious worker and peasant rally around himself the most intelligent, reliable, and fearless comrades. Let him strive to explain to them what the Social-Democrats want, so that every one of them may understand the struggle that must be waged and the demands that must be advanced. Let the class-conscious Social-Democrats begin gradually, cautiously, but unswervingly, to teach the peasants the doctrine of Social-Democracy, give them Social-Democratic pamphlets to read and explain those pamphlets at small gatherings of trustworthy people.

But the doctrine of Social-Democracy must not be taught from books alone; every instance, every case of oppression and injustice we see around us must be used for this purpose. The Social-Democratic doctrine is one of struggle against all oppression, all robbery, all injustice. Only he who knows the causes of oppression and who *all his life fights every case of oppression* is a real Social-Democrat. How can this be done? When they gather in their town or village, class-conscious Social-Democrats must themselves decide how it must be done to the best advantage of the entire working class. To show how it must be done I shall cite one or two examples. Let us suppose that a Social-Democratic worker has come on a visit to his village, or that some urban Social-Democratic

worker has come to any village. The entire village is in the clutches of the neighbouring landlord, like a fly in a spider's web; it has always been in this state of bondage and cannot escape from it. The worker must at once pick out the most sensible, intelligent, and trustworthy peasants, those who are seeking justice and will not be frightened by the first police agent who comes along, and explain to them the causes of this hopeless bondage, tell them how the landlords cheated the peasants and robbed them with the aid of the committees of nobles, tell them how strong the rich are and how they are supported by the tsarist government, and also tell them about the demands of the Social-Democratic workers. When the peasants understand all these simple things they must all put their heads together and discuss whether it is possible to put up united resistance to the landlord, whether it is possible to put forward the first and principal demands (in the same way as the urban workers present their demands to the factory owners). If the landlord holds one big village, or several villages, in bondage, the best thing would be to obtain, through trustworthy people, a *leaflet* from the nearest Social-Democratic committee. In the leaflet the Social-Democratic committee will correctly describe, from the very beginning, the bondage the peasants suffer from and formulate their most immediate demands (reduction of rent paid for land, proper rates, and not half-rates, of pay for winter hire, or less persecution for damage done by straying cattle or various other demands). From such a leaflet all peasants who can read and write will get to know very well what the issue is, and those who cannot read will have it explained to them. The peasants will then clearly see that the Social-Democrats support them, that the Social-Democrats condemn all robbery. The peasants will then begin to understand what relief, if only slight, but relief for all that, can be obtained now, at once, if all stand together, and what big improvements for the whole country they must seek to obtain by a great struggle in conjunction with the Social-Democratic workers in the towns. The peasants will then prepare more and more for that great struggle; they will learn how to find trustworthy people and how to stand unitedly for their demands. Perhaps they may sometimes succeed in organising a strike, as the urban workers do.

True, this is more difficult in the countryside than in the towns, but it is sometimes possible for all that; in other countries there have been successful strikes, for instance, in the busy seasons, when the landlords and rich farmers are badly in need of hands. If the rural poor are prepared to strike, if an agreement has long been reached about the general demands, if those demands have been explained in leaflets, or properly explained at meetings, all will stand together, and the landlord will have to yield, or at least put some curb on his greed. If the strike is unanimous and is called during the busy season, the landlord, and even the authorities with their troops, will find it hard to do anything—time will be lost, the landlord will be threatened with ruin, and he will soon become more tractable. Of course, strikes are a new thing, and new things do not come off well at first. The urban workers, too, did not know how to fight unitedly at first; they did not know what demands to put forward in common; they simply went out to smash machinery and wreck a factory. But now the workers have learned to conduct a united struggle. Every new job must first be learned. The workers now understand that immediate relief can be obtained only if they stand together; meanwhile, the people are getting used to offering united resistance and are preparing more and more for the great and decisive struggle. Similarly, the peasants will learn to stand up to the worst robbers, to be united in their demands for some measure of relief and to prepare gradually, persistently, and everywhere for the great battle for freedom. The number of class-conscious workers and peasants will constantly grow, and the unions of rural Social-Democrats will become stronger and stronger; every case of bondage to the landlord, of extortion by the priest, of police brutality and bureaucratic oppression, will increasingly serve to open the eyes of the people, accustom them to putting up united resistance and to the idea that it is necessary to change the political order by force.

At the very beginning of this pamphlet we said that at the present time the urban workers come out into the streets and squares and publicly demand *freedom*, that they inscribe on their banners and cry out: "Down with the autocracy!" The day will soon come when the urban workers will rise not

merely to march shouting through the streets, but for the great and final struggle; when the workers will declare as one man: "We shall win freedom, or die in the fight!"; when the places of the hundreds who have been killed, fallen in the fight will be taken by thousands of fresh and still more resolute fighters. And the peasants, too, will then rise all over Russia and go to the aid of the urban workers, will fight to the end for the freedom of the workers and peasants. The tsar's hordes will be unable to withstand that onslaught. Victory will go to the working people, and the working class will march along the wide, spacious road to the liberation of all working people from any kind of oppression. The working class will use its freedom to fight for socialism!

THE PROGRAMME OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY PROPOSED BY THE NEWSPAPER *ISKRA* IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MAGAZINE *ZARYA*

We have already explained what a programme is, why one is needed, and why the Social-Democratic Party is the only party that comes out with a clear and definite programme. A programme can be finally adopted only by the congress of our Party, i.e., the assembly of representatives of all Party workers. Preparations for such a congress are now being made by the Organising Committee. But very many committees of our Party have already openly declared their agreement with *Iskra*, and their recognition of *Iskra* as the leading newspaper. Therefore, prior to the congress our draft (proposed) programme can fully serve as a precise indication of what the Social-Democrats want, and we consider it necessary to give that draft in full as an appendix to our pamphlet.

Of course, without an explanation not every worker will understand everything that is said in the programme. Many great socialists worked to create the doctrine of Social-Democracy, which was completed by Marx and Engels; the workers of all countries went through a great deal to acquire the experience that we want to utilise and make the basis of

our programme. Therefore the workers must learn the teachings of Social-Democracy in order to understand every word of the programme, *their* programme, *their* banner of the struggle. And the workers are learning and understanding the Social-Democratic programme with particular ease because that programme speaks of what every thinking worker has seen and experienced. Let nobody be deterred by the "difficulty" of understanding the programme all at once: the more every worker reads and thinks, the more experience he acquires in the struggle, the more fully will he understand it. But let everybody think over and discuss the *whole* programme of the Social-Democrats; let everybody constantly keep in mind *all that the Social-Democrats want, and what they think about the emancipation* of all working people. The Social-Democrats want everybody to know clearly and precisely the truth, the whole truth, about what the Social-Democratic Party is.

We cannot here explain the whole programme in detail. A separate pamphlet would be needed for that. We shall merely indicate briefly what the programme says, and advise the reader to get hold of two pamphlets to use as aids. One pamphlet is by the German Social-Democrat Karl Kautsky, and its title is *The Erfurt Programme*. It has been translated into Russian. The other pamphlet is by the Russian Social-Democrat L. Martov, and its title is *The Workers' Cause in Russia*. These pamphlets will help the reader to understand the whole of our programme.

Let us now indicate each part of our programme by a separate letter (see the programme below) and show what is spoken about in each part.

A) At the very beginning it says that the proletariat all over the world is fighting for its emancipation, and the Russian proletariat is only a detachment in the world army of the working class of all countries.

B) It then goes on to explain the bourgeois order of things in nearly all countries in the world, including Russia: how the majority of the population, working for the landowners and capitalists, live in poverty and want; how the small artisans and peasants are being ruined while the big factories grow bigger; how capital crushes the worker and also his wife and children; how the conditions of the working

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

class are growing worse and worse and unemployment and want are increasing.

C) It then speaks of the union of the workers, of their struggle, of the great aim of that struggle: to liberate all the oppressed and completely abolish all oppression of the poor by the rich. This part also explains why the working class is growing stronger and stronger, and why it will certainly defeat all its enemies, all those who defend the bourgeoisie.

D) Then it explains why Social-Democratic parties have been formed in all countries, how they help the working class to wage its struggle, unite and guide the workers, enlighten them and prepare them for the great struggle.

E) Further, it explains why the conditions of the people in Russia are even worse than in other countries, what a great evil the tsarist autocracy is, and why we must first of all overthrow that autocracy and establish popular, elective government in Russia.

F) What improvements must elective government bring the whole people? We explain that in our pamphlet, and it is also explained in the programme.

G) Then the programme indicates what improvements for the whole of the working class we must strive to immediately achieve in order to make life easier for it and enable it to fight more freely for socialism.

H) Special reference is made in the programme to those improvements which we must first of all strive to achieve for all the peasants so as to enable the rural poor to wage the class struggle more easily and freely against both the rural bourgeoisie and the entire Russian bourgeoisie.

I) Lastly, the Social-Democratic Party warns the people not to believe any police or bureaucratic promises or honeyed words, but to fight firmly for the immediate convocation of a free national assembly of deputies.

LES BEAUX ESPRITS SE RENCONTRENT

(WHICH MAY BE INTERPRETED ROUGHLY AS: BIRDS OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER)

In June 1902 the much-vaunted minimum agrarian programme of our Socialist-Revolutionaries (co-operatives and socialisation) enriched Russian socialist thought and the Russian revolutionary movement. The German book, *Socialism and Agriculture*, by Eduard David, the well-known opportunist (and Bernsteinite), appeared in February 1903. There can evidently be no question of the consequent product of opportunist thought including the original of the earlier "Socialist-Revolutionary" mental gymnastics. If that is so, how is one to explain the amazing, the striking similarity and even the identity of principles in the programme of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and that of the German opportunists? Is it not perhaps a case of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* being the "original", while David's "fundamental" (according to a review in *Russkiye Vedomosti*) work is the copy? Two basic ideas, and, correspondingly, two main points in the programme, run through the pattern of David's "work". He glorifies agricultural co-operatives, expecting all possible blessings from them, demanding that the Social-Democrats help develop them, and (just like our Socialist-Revolutionaries) failing to see the bourgeois nature of these alliances between petty proprietors and agrarian capitalists, big and small. David demands the conversion of large farms into small ones, and waxes enthusiastic over the profitableness and efficiency, the thrifty management and productivity of the farms "*des Arbeitsbauern*"—literally, "of the working peasant"—emphasising the society's supreme right to landed property

and the right of these same small "working peasants" to the use of the land. Without any doubt, this German opportunist has plagiarised from the Russian "Socialist-Revolutionaries"! Of course neither the German petty-bourgeois opportunist nor the Russian petty-bourgeois, the "Socialist-Revolutionaries", see anything at all of the petty-bourgeois nature of the "working peasant" in present-day society, his intermediate, transitional position between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, his ambition to "make his way in the world" (i.e., become a full-fledged bourgeois) through frugality, diligence, semi-starvation, and excessive labour, and his striving to exploit the labour of rural "workers".

Yes, indeed, *les beaux esprits se rencontrent*, and herein lies the key to a puzzle which at first glance seems so difficult: to determine which is the copy and which the original. Ideas expressing the needs, interests, strivings, and aspirations of a certain class are in the very air, and their identity cannot be concealed by any differences of garb, by any variations of opportunist or "Socialist-Revolutionary" phraseology. Murder will out.

In all the countries of Europe, Russia included, the petty bourgeoisie is steadily being "thrust to the wall" and falling into decline, a process which does not always express itself in the outright and direct elimination of the petty bourgeoisie, but in most cases leads to a reduction of its role in economic life, to deterioration of its living conditions, and greater insecurity. Everything militates against it: technical progress in big industrial and agricultural enterprises, the development of the big shops, the growth of manufacturers' associations, cartels and trusts, and even the growth of consumers' societies and municipal enterprises. And, while the petty bourgeoisie is being "thrust to the wall" in the sphere of agriculture and industry, a "new middle social-estate", as the Germans say, is emerging and developing, a new stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, who are also finding life in capitalist society harder and harder and for the most part regard this society from the viewpoint of the small producer. It is quite natural that this must inevitably lead to widespread dissemination and constant revival of petty-bourgeois ideas and doctrines in the most varied forms. It is quite natural that the Russian "Socialist-

Revolutionaries", who are wholly in thrall to the ideas of petty-bourgeois Narodism, inevitably turn out to be "birds of a feather" with the European reformists and opportunists, who, when they would be consistent, inevitably arrive at Proudhonism. And this was the very term that Kautsky quite justly used to describe David's programme and standpoint.

We have said, "when they would be consistent", and this brings us to an essential feature—one that distinguishes the present-day Socialist-Revolutionaries from both the old Russian Narodniks and at least some of the European opportunists—which can only be called adventurism. Adventurism is not concerned with consistency, but endeavours to grasp at the fleeting opportunity and make use of the battle of ideas in order to justify and preserve its ideological poverty. The old Russian Narodniks wanted to be consistent and they upheld, preached, and professed their own, distinct programme. David wants to be consistent and rises up resolutely against the whole "Marxist agrarian theory", emphatically preaches and professes the conversion of large farms into small farms, and, at least, has the courage of his convictions, and is not afraid to come out openly as the champion of small-scale farming. Our Socialist-Revolutionaries are, to put it as mildly as possible, far more "prudent". They never rise up resolutely against Marx—God forbid! On the contrary, they come forward with quotations plucked at random from Marx and Engels, assuring us with tears in their eyes that they agree with the latter *almost* in everything. They do not come out against Liebknecht and Kautsky—on the contrary, they are profoundly and sincerely convinced that Liebknecht was a Socialist-Revolutionary—in very truth, a Socialist-Revolutionary. They do not come forward as the champions of small-scale farming on principle—on the contrary, they are heart and soul for the "socialisation of the land", and it is only by accident that they sometimes blurt out that this all-embracing Russo-Dutch socialisation can mean anything and everything: either the transference of the land to society, to be used by the working people (exactly as David puts it!), or simply the transference of the land to the peasants, or, finally, quite "simply" the addition of plots of land gratis....

Our Socialist-Revolutionaries' "prudent" methods are so well known to us that we shall take the liberty, in conclusion, of giving them a piece of good advice.

You have obviously landed in a rather awkward situation, gentlemen. All along you have been assuring us that you have nothing in common either with the opportunism and reformism in the West, or with the petty-bourgeois sympathies for the "profitable" small-scale farming—and suddenly a book by an avowed opportunist and champion of small-scale farming appears, in which your "Socialist-Revolutionary" programme is "copied" with touching scrupulosity! An awkward situation indeed. But don't let it distress you: there is an easy way out. All you have to do is ... to quote Kautsky.

Nor should the reader think that this is a slip on our part. Nothing of the sort. Kautsky comes out against the Proudhonist David—*for this very reason* the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are in agreement with David, have to quote Kautsky just as they once quoted Engels. Take No. 14 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and there you will read on page seven that the Social-Democrats' "change of tactics" with regard to the peasantry "was legitimised" (!!) by one of the fathers of scientific socialism, by Engels—Engels, who took up arms against the French comrades that had changed their tactics! How can one prove this pettifogging statement? Quite simply. First, one must "quote" Engels' words that he is absolutely on the side of the small peasant (and say nothing about the fact that this very thought is expressed in the programme of the Russian Social-Democrats, which calls on all the working people to come over to the side of the proletariat!). Secondly, one must say with regard to the "concessions to Bernsteinism" made by the French comrades who changed their tactics: "*See Engels' superb criticism of these concessions*." It is this selfsame tried method that we advise the Socialist-Revolutionary gentlemen to use now too. David's book has legitimised the change in tactics on the agrarian question. One cannot but admit now that, with a programme of "co-operatives and socialisation", it is possible to remain in the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party; only dogmatists and the orthodox can fail to see this. But, on the other hand, it must be admit-

ted that David, unlike the noble Socialist-Revolutionaries, makes some concessions to Bernsteinism. "*See Kautsky's superb criticism of these concessions*."

Indeed, gentlemen, try it. Perhaps something will come of it once more.

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REPLY TO CRITICISM OF OUR DRAFT PROGRAMME

Comrade X[127] rejects the third and fourth points of the agrarian section of our draft and submits his own draft, in which all the points of the agrarian programme, as well as the preamble to it, are revised. We shall first examine Comrade X's objections to our draft, and then his own draft.

Against the third point, Comrade X advances the objection that the confiscation of the monasterial (and we would willingly add: church) estates and the royal demesnes as proposed by us would mean that the capitalists would grab the lands for next to nothing. It would be precisely those who plunder the peasants, he says, who would buy up these lands on the money they had plundered. To this we must remark that, in speaking about the sale of the confiscated estates, Comrade X draws an arbitrary conclusion that our programme does not contain. Confiscation means alienation of property without compensation. It is only of such alienation that our draft speaks. Our draft programme says nothing as to whether these lands are to be sold, and if so to whom and how, in what manner and on what terms. We are not binding ourselves, but reserve judgement as to the most expedient form in which to dispose of the confiscated properties when they are confiscated, when all the social and political conditions of such confiscation are clear. In this respect Comrade X's draft differs from our draft in demanding, not only confiscation, but the transference of the confiscated lands "to the democratic state for their most advantageous utilisation by the population". Thus, Comrade X excludes one of the forms of the disposal of what has been confiscated (sale) and does not suggest any definite form (since it remains unclear just what constitutes or

will constitute or should constitute the "most advantageous" utilisation, and just what classes of the "population" will receive the right to this utilisation and on what terms). Hence, Comrade X fails in any case to bring complete definiteness into the question of how the confiscated lands should be disposed of (nor can this be determined in advance), while he wrongly excludes their sale as one of the methods. It would be wrong to say that, under all circumstances and at all times, the Social-Democrats will be opposed to the sale of the land. In a police-controlled class state, even if it is a constitutional state, the class of property-owners may not infrequently be a far stauncher pillar of democracy than the class of tenant farmers dependent on that state. That is on the one hand. On the other hand, our draft makes for greater provision than Comrade X's draft does against confiscated lands being turned into "gifts to the capitalists" (insofar as any provision against this can be spoken of in general in the wording of a programme). And indeed, let us imagine the worst: let us imagine that, despite all its efforts, the workers' party will be unable to curb the capitalists' wilfulness and greed.* In that case, Comrade X's formulation affords free scope for the "most advantageous" utilisation of the confiscated lands by the capitalist class of the "population". On the contrary, our formulation, while it does not link up the basic demand with the form of its realisation, nevertheless envisages a strictly definite application of sums received from such realisation. When Comrade X says that "the Social-Democratic Party cannot undertake in advance to decide in what concrete form the popular representative body will utilise the land which it will have at its command", he is confusing two different things: the *method* of realising (in other words: "the form of utilising") this land and the *application* of the sums received from this realisation. By leaving the question of the application of these-sums absolutely indefinite and tying his hands, even in part, in the question of the method of realisation, Comrade X introduces a double impairment into our draft.

In our opinion, Comrade X is just as wrong when he presents the following objection to us: "It is likewise impos-

* And if we are able to curb them, then the sale of the land will not turn into plundering and gifts to the capitalists.

sible to recover land redemption payments from the nobles, since many of them have squandered them all." As a matter of fact, this is no objection at all, since we do not even propose that these sums should simply be "recovered", but propose a special tax. In his article Comrade X himself cites facts showing that the big landowners "cut off" a particularly large share of the peasants' land for themselves, in some cases seizing as much as *three-quarters* of the land. Hence the demand for a special tax on the big landed nobility in particular is quite natural. It is likewise quite natural to designate funds thus obtained for the special use we demand, for *in addition* to the general task of returning to the people all revenues received by the state (a task which can be fully accomplished only under socialism), liberated Russia will inescapably be faced with the special and most pressing task of raising the peasants' standard of living, rendering serious aid to the poverty-stricken and hungry masses, whose ranks are swelling so extremely rapidly under our autocratic system.

Let us pass to the fourth point, which Comrade X rejects in full, although he analyses only the first part of this point—about the cut-off lands—without any mention of the second part, envisaging eradication of the remnants of serfdom, which vary in different parts of the country. We shall begin with a formal remark by the author: he sees a contradiction in the fact that we demand abolition of the social-estates and the establishment of peasant, i.e., social-estate, committees. In fact, the contradiction is only a seeming one: the abolition of the social-estates requires a "dictatorship" of the lowest, oppressed social-estate, just as the abolition of classes in general, including the class of proletarians, requires the dictatorship of the proletariat. The object of our entire agrarian programme is the eradication of feudal and social-estate traditions in the sphere of agrarian relations, and to bring that about the only possible appeal can be to the lowest social-estate, to those who are oppressed by these remnants of the serf-owning system.

The author's principal objection boils down to the following: "it is hardly provable" that the cut-off lands are the principal basis of the labour-rent system, since the size of

these cut-off lands depended on whether the serf peasants were quit-rent peasants, and hence had much land, or corvée peasants, and hence had little land. "The size of the cut-off lands and their importance depend on a combination of historical conditions"; for instance, the percentage of cut-off lands is negligible on the small estates in Volsk Uyezd, while on the large estates it is enormous. This is how the author reasons, without noticing that he is getting away from the point. The cut-off lands were indubitably distributed most unevenly, depending on a combination of the most varied conditions (including a condition such as the existence of the corvée system or quit-rent under the serf-owning system). But what does that prove? Is not the labour-rent system also most unevenly distributed? Is not the existence of this system also determined by a combination of the most varied historical conditions? The author undertakes to disprove the *connection* between the cut-off lands and the labour-rent system, but talks only about the reasons for the cut-off lands and the differences in their size, without referring by as much as a single word to this connection. Only once does the author make an assertion which approaches immediately the substance of his thesis, and yet it is in this very assertion that he is *absolutely wrong*. "Consequently," he says, summing up his-arguments about the influence of quit-rent or the corvée system, "where the peasants were corvée peasants (*mainly in the central agricultural area*), *these cut-off lands will be negligible*, whereas in those places where they were quit-rent peasants, all of the landlords' land may consist of 'cut-off lands'." The words italicised by us contain a blunder which destroys the author's whole line of argument. It is precisely in the central agricultural area, this main centre of the labour-rent system and all sorts of remnants of serfdom, that the cut-off lands are not "negligible" but enormous, much greater than in the non-black-earth zone, where quit-rent predominates over corvée. Here are data on this question, received from a comrade who is a professional statistician. He has compared data given in the *Military-Statistical Abstract* on the holdings of landlords' peasants prior to the Reform with the figures showing land holdings in 1878, thus determining the size of the cut-off lands in each gubernia. It appeared that in nine gubernias

of the non-black-earth zone* the landlords' peasants held 10,421,000 dessiatines prior to the Reform, whereas only 9,746,000 dessiatines were left to them in 1878, i.e., 675,000 dessiatines, or 6.5 per cent of the land, were cut off, the average per gubernia being 72,800 dessiatines. On the other hand, in fourteen black-earth gubernias** the peasants held 12,795,000 dessiatines and were left with 9,996,000 dessiatines, i.e., 2,799,000 dessiatines, or 21.9 per cent, were cut off, an average of 199,100 dessiatines per gubernia. The only exception was the third area, in the steppes, where in five gubernias*** the peasants held 2,203,000 dessiatines and they were left with 1,580,000, i.e., 623,000, or 28.3 per cent, were cut off, the average per gubernia being 124,600 dessiatines.**** This area is an exception, since here the capitalist system predominates over the labour-rent system, while the percentage of cut-off lands is the highest here. But this exception only goes to prove the general rule, for here the influence of the cut-off lands has been paralysed by such important circumstances as the peasants possessing the largest allotments, despite the cut-off lands, and the greatest amount of free land available here for renting. Thus, the author's attempt to cast doubt on the existence of a connection between the cut-off lands and the labour-rent system is quite unsuccessful. *On the whole*, there is no doubt that the centre of the labour-rent system in Russia (the central black-earth

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* Pskov, Novgorod, Tver, Moscow, Vladimir, Smolensk, Kaluga, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma gubernias.

** Orel, Tula, Ryazan, Kursk, Voronezh, Tambov, Nizhni-Novgorod, Simbirsk, Kazan, Penza, Saratov, Chernigov, Kharkov, and Poltava gubernias (37 per cent of the land cut off).

*** Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Don (approximate figure), and Samara gubernias.

**** Comparing these figures on the cut-off lands in three areas with the figures on the proportion of corvée peasants to the total number of peasants (according to the data of the Drafting Commissions: see Vol. 32, p. 686 of the *Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, the article "The Peasants"), we get the following relationship. Non-black-earth area (9 gubernias): cut-off lands—6.5 per cent; corvée peasants—43.9 per cent (average for 9 gubernias). Central black-earth area (14 gubernias): cut-off lands—21.9 per cent, corvée peasants—76 per cent. Steppe area (5 gubernias): cut-off lands—28.3 per cent; corvée peasants—95.3 per cent. Hence the relationship is just the opposite to what Comrade X wants to make out.

area) is at the same time the centre of the cut-off lands. We emphasise "on the whole" in reply to the following question put by the author. Against the words in our programme about restitution of land which has been cut off and is now used as a means of bondage, the author has put in brackets the following question: "but what about that which is not used as such?" Our reply to him is that the programme is not a legislative bill on the restitution of the cut-off lands. We define and explain the general significance of the cut-off lands, but do not speak of individual cases. Is it really still possible, after all the Narodnik literature on the position of the post-Reform peasantry, to have any doubts about the fact that on the whole the cut-off lands serve as a means of serf bondage? Is it really possible, we ask further, to deny the connection between the cut-off lands and the labour-rent system, when this connection follows from the most elementary concepts on the post-Reform economy of Russia? The labour-rent system is a combination of the corvée system and capitalism, of the "old regime" and "modern" economy, of the system of exploitation through land allotment and the system of exploitation through separation from the land. What could be a more glaring example of present-day corvée than a system of farming based on labour rendered in return for the use of cut-off lands (a system described *as such*, as a special system, and not something incidental, in Narodnik literature in the good old days, when nobody had even heard of the hackneyed and narrow-minded Marxists)? Is it really possible to believe that today the peasant is tied down to the land *only* because there is no law granting freedom of movement, and not because of the existence, in addition to that (*and partly at the root of that*), of bondage service for the use of the cut-off lands?

After failing to prove in any way that there is any basis for his doubting the existence of a connection between the cut-off lands and bondage, the author continues his argument as follows: restitution of the cut-off lands is the allotting of small plots of land based not so much on the requirements of peasant farming as on historical "tradition". Like any allotment of an insufficient quantity of land (there can be no question of an adequate allotment), it will not destroy bondage but will rather create it, since it will cause renting of

land that is lacking, renting because of need, subsistence tenancy, and will consequently be a reactionary measure.

Here too the argument misses the mark, for the agrarian section of our programme does not at all "promise" to do away with all want in general (this promise is given only in the general socialist section of the programme), but promises only to eradicate (at least in part) the remnants of the serf-owning system. Our programme refers, not to allotment of all sorts of small plots of land in general, but specifically to doing away with at least one of the already existing forms of bondage. The author has departed from the trend of thought underlying our programme, and arbitrarily and incorrectly attributed another meaning to it. Indeed, just examine his line of reasoning. He rejects (and in this respect, he is of course right) the interpretation of cut-off lands as implying just strips of land belonging to different owners, and says: "If the cut-off lands are to constitute additional allotment land, it is necessary to see whether there are enough cut-off lands to remove relationships entailing bondage, since from this standpoint bondage relationships are a result of land-hunger." Absolutely nowhere in our programme is the assertion made that there are enough cut-off lands to do away with bondage. Only the socialist revolution can do away with all bondage, whereas in the agrarian programme we take our stand on the ground of bourgeois relationships and demand certain measures "with a view to eradicating" (we do not even say that this can be complete eradication) the remnants of the serf-owning system. The whole essence of our agrarian programme is that the rural proletariat must fight together with the rich peasantry for the abolition of the remnants of serfdom, for the cut-off lands. Anyone who examines this proposition closely will grasp the incorrectness, the *irrelevance* and illogicality of an objection such as: why *only* the cut-off lands, if that is not enough? Because *together with the rich peasantry* the proletariat *will be unable* to go, and *must not go*, beyond the abolition of serfdom, beyond restitution of the cut-off lands, etc. *Beyond that*, the proletariat in general and the rural proletariat in particular *will march alone*; not together with the "peasantry", not together with the rich peasant, but *against him*. The reason we do not go beyond the demand for the cut-off

lands is not because we do not wish the peasant well or because we are afraid of scaring the bourgeoisie, but because we do not want the rural proletarian to help the rich peasant *more than is necessary*, more than is essential to the proletariat. Both the proletarian and the rich peasant suffer from serf bondage; against *this* bondage they can and should go together; but against the *other* forms of bondage, the proletariat will go alone. Hence the distinction made in our programme between serf bondage and all other bondage necessarily follows from the *strict observance of the class interests of the proletariat*. We would be running counter to these interests and would be abandoning the class standpoint of the proletariat, if we allowed our programme to state that the "peasantry" (i.e., the rich plus the poor) will go together beyond eradication of the remnants of serfdom; we would thereby be *putting a brake* on this absolutely essential, and, from the standpoint of the Social-Democrat, the most important, process of the final *separation of the rural proletariat* from the land-holding peasantry, the process of the development of proletarian class-consciousness in the countryside. When the Narodniks, people of the old faith, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, people without faith or convictions of any kind, shrug their shoulders at our agrarian programme, that is because they (for instance, Mr. Rudin and Co.) have no idea of the real economic system in our countryside and its evolution, have no idea of the bourgeois relations which have been developing and have almost taken shape within the village commune, or of the strength of the bourgeois peasantry. They approach our agrarian programme with the old Narodnik prejudices, or more frequently with fragments of these prejudices, and begin to criticise individual points or their wording, without even comprehending the aim of our agrarian programme or the social and economic relations it has in view. When they are told that our agrarian programme does not refer to the struggle against the bourgeois system, but to the evolution of bourgeois relations in the countryside, they merely rub their eyes in amazement, unaware (because of their characteristic indifference to theory) that their perplexity is simply an echo of the struggle between the Narodnik and the Marxist world outlook.

To the Marxist who undertakes to draft an agrarian programme, the question of the remnants of serfdom in the bourgeois and capitalistically developing Russian countryside is one that has already been settled, and it is only owing to their utter lack of principle that the Socialist-Revolutionaries are unable to see that if they want to offer any *material* criticism they must contrapose to our solution of this question something that is at least coherent and integral. To the Marxist the problem is simply to avoid either of two extremes: on the one hand, not to fall into the error of those who say that, from the standpoint of the proletariat, we are in no way concerned with any immediate and temporary non-proletarian tasks, and on the other, not to allow the proletariat's co-operation in the attainment of the immediate democratic tasks to dim its class-consciousness and its class distinctiveness. In the sphere of agrarian relationships proper, this task reduces itself to the following: the bringing forward of a slogan of such an agrarian reform on the basis of the existing society as would most completely sweep away the remnants of serfdom and most rapidly single out the rural proletariat from the undifferentiated mass of the peasantry as a whole.

We believe that our programme has coped with this task. Moreover, we are not at all put out by Comrade X's question: what should we do if the peasant committees demand not the cut-off lands but all the land? We ourselves demand all the land, only, of course, not "with a view to eradicating the remnants of the serf-owning system" (to which end the agrarian *section* of our programme limits itself), but with a view to the socialist revolution. And it is precisely this goal that we are always and under all circumstances tirelessly pointing out to the "rural poor". There is no grosser error than to think that the Social-Democrat can go to the villages only with the agrarian section of his programme, that he can even for a moment furl his socialist banner. If the demand for all the land is a demand for the nationalisation of the land or its transference to the land-holding peasants of today, we shall appraise this demand from the standpoint of the proletariat's interests, taking all factors into consideration: we cannot, for instance, say in advance whether, when the revolution awakens them to political life, our land-holding

peasants will come out as a democratic revolutionary party or as a party of Order. We must draft our programme so as to be prepared even for the worst, and if the best combinations ensue, then that will only facilitate our work and give it a new stimulus.

It remains for us to deal with the following argument by Comrade X on the question under discussion. "To this," he writes concerning his thesis that the allotment of the cut-off lands will strengthen subsistence farming tenancy, "to this, exception might be taken on the ground that the allotment of the cut-off lands is important as a means of abolishing bondage forms of renting *these* lands, and not as a means of increasing and strengthening small subsistence farming. However, it is easy to see that there is a logical contradiction in this objection. The allotment of small plots of land is the *allotment of land in insufficient quantity* for the conduct of progressive farming but sufficient to strengthen subsistence farming. Hence, subsistence farming is strengthened by the allotment of an insufficient quantity of land. But as to whether bondage forms of renting will be abolished by this—that still remains to be proved. We have shown that they will become stronger because of the increase in the number of petty proprietors—competitors in renting the landlord's land."

We have quoted this argument of Comrade X's in full so as to make it easier for the reader to judge *where* the "logical contradiction" actually lies. As a general rule the peasants are at present using the cut-off lands on terms of serf bondage. Upon the restitution of the cut-off lands, the peasants will use them as free owners. Does it really "still remain to be proved" that this restitution *will abolish* the serf bondage resulting from these cut-off lands? It is a matter of special plots of land that have already given rise to a special form of bondage, but the author substitutes for this particular concept the general category of "an insufficient quantity of land"! This means skipping the question. It means assuming that at present the cut-off lands do not engender any special form of bondage: in which case their restitution would really be *simply* the "allotment of an insufficient quantity of land", and then we would really be unable to support this measure. But it is perfectly obvious to everyone that this is not the case.

Further. The author should not confuse serf bondage (the labour-rent *system* of farming) engendered by the cut-off lands with subsistence farming tenancy, with renting as a result of need in general. The latter form of renting exists in all European countries: under the capitalist system of farming, the competition of petty proprietors and small tenants *everywhere and always* inflates land prices and land rent to the proportions of "bondage". We cannot do away with *this kind* of bondage* until we get rid of capitalism. But can this be regarded as an objection to particular measures of struggle against particular and purely Russian forms of bondage? Comrade X reasons as though he objected to a reduction of the working day on the grounds that the intensity of labour would be increased as a result of this reduction. The reduction of the working day is a partial reform, which eradicates only one form of bondage, viz., enslavement by means of longer working hours. Other forms of bondage, as, for instance, "speeding up" the workers, are not eliminated by *this* reform, and all forms of bondage in general cannot be eradicated by any reforms on the basis of capitalism.

When the author says: "Allotment of the cut-off lands is a reactionary measure, which reinforces bondage," he is advancing a proposition which stands in such glaring contradiction to all the data on post-Reform peasant farming that he himself is unable to maintain this stand. He contradicts himself when he says somewhat earlier: "...It goes without saying that it is not the business of the Social-Democratic Party to implant capitalism. This will take place irrespective of the desire of any party, if peasant tenure extends...." But if the extension of peasant tenure in general leads to the development of capitalism, how much the *more* inevitably will this result from the extension of peasant land*ownership* to the special plots of land which engender a specifically serf form of bondage. The restitution of the cut-off lands will raise the peasants' standard of living, expand the home market, increase the demand for wage-workers in the towns, and likewise the demand for wage-labourers among the rich peasants and landlords, who lose a certain mainstay of the labour-rent system of farming. As to the "*implant-*

* This bondage may be limited, kept in check, by empowering the courts to reduce rents—a demand we advance in our programme.

ing of capitalism", that is an altogether queer objection. The restitution of the cut-off lands would signify the implanting of capitalism only were that restitution necessary and advantageous *solely* to the bourgeoisie. But that is not the case. It is no less, if not more, necessary and advantageous to the rural poor, who are suffering from bondage and the labour-rent system. The rural proletarian is oppressed *together* with the rural bourgeois by serf bondage, which is based to a considerable degree on these very cut-off lands. That is why the rural proletarian cannot emancipate himself from this bondage without *thereby* emancipating the rural bourgeois too. Only Messrs. the Rudins and similar Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have forgotten their kinship with the Narodniks, can see in this an "implanting" of capitalism.

Still less convincing are Comrade X's arguments on the question of the feasibility of restituting the cut-off lands. The Volsk Uyezd data he cites speak against him: almost one-fifth of the estates (18 out of 99) have remained in the hands of the old proprietors, i.e., the cut-off lands could be transferred to the peasants directly and without any redemption. Another third of the estates have changed hands entirely, i.e., here it would be necessary to redeem the cut-off lands at the expense of the big landed nobility. And only in 16 cases out of 99 would it be necessary to redeem land from peasants and other owners who purchased it in portions. We simply cannot understand how the restitution of the cut-off lands can be "unfeasible" under such circumstances. Let us take the data referring to the selfsame Saratov Gubernia. We have before us the latest "Materials on the Question of the Needs of the Agricultural Industries in Saratov Gubernia" (Saratov, 1903). The size of all the cut-off lands held by former landlords' peasants is given as 600,000 dessiatines, or 42.7 per cent.* If in 1896 the Zemstvo statisticians could determine the size of the cut-off lands on the basis of extracts

* These latest Zemstvo statistics, we might note, fully bear out the contention of the aforementioned statistician that the data he submitted on the cut-off lands are an *underestimation*. According to those data the cut-off lands in Saratov Gubernia amounted only to 512,000 dessiatines (=38 per cent). As a matter of fact, even 600,000 dessiatines is *below the actual size of the cut-off lands*, for in the first place, it does not include all the village communes of the former landlords' peasants, and, secondly, it covers *only cultivable lands*.

from the title-deeds and other documents, why can their size not be determined even more accurately by the peasant committees in, say, 1906? And if the figures for Volsk Uyezd are taken as a standard, then it would appear that approximately 120,000 dessiatines could be returned to the peasants at once and without any redemption, that about 200,000 dessiatines could be redeemed at once (at the expense of the noblemen's land) from estates which changed hands in their entirety, and that only with regard to the remaining land would the process of redemption (at the expense of the landed nobility), exchange, etc., be somewhat more complicated but in any case by no means "unfeasible". The significance the restitution of their 600,000 dessiatines of land would have for the peasants is, for example, evident from the fact that the total amount of privately owned land rented in Saratov Gubernia at the end of the nineties was approximately 900,000 dessiatines. Naturally, we do not intend to assert that all cut-off lands are being rented at the present time; we merely want to show graphically the proportion of the amount of land to be returned as property, to the amount of land which is now being rented *very often* on terms entailing bondage and serf bondage. This comparison testifies most eloquently to the force of the blow which the restitution of the cut-off lands would deal at relations entailing serf bondage, to the stimulus it would give to the revolutionary energy of the "peasantry" and—what is most important from the viewpoint of the Social-Democrat—to the tremendous impetus it would give to the ideological and political cleavage between the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie. For the peasant committees' work of expropriation would immediately and inevitably bring about just such a decided and irrevocable cleavage, and by no means a union of the entire "peasantry" for "semi-socialist" "equalitarian" demands for all the land, as the modern epigones of Narodism fondly imagine. The more revolutionary the action of the "peasantry" against the landlords, the more rapid and deep will this cleavage be, which will then be made manifest not by the statistical computations of Marxist research but by the political action of the peasant bourgeoisie, by the struggle of parties and classes within the peasant committees.

And note: by advancing the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands we are deliberately confining our task to the framework of the existing order; we are *obliged* to do this if we are to speak of a minimum programme and if we do not want to lapse into that kind of barefaced scheme-making, verging on charlatanry, in which "first place" is given to co-operatives, on the one hand, and to socialisation, on the other. We are replying to a question that has been raised but not by us,* to the question of the reforms of tomorrow, which are being discussed by the illegal press, "society", by the Zemstvos, and, perhaps, even by the government. We would be anarchists or simply windbags if we held ourselves aloof from this pressing, but by no means socialist, problem which has been raised by the entire post-Reform

* To what extent the question of agrarian reforms on the basis of the existing order has been raised "not by us" is evident, for example, from the following quotation which we have taken from an article by Mr. V. V., one of the *most prominent* theoreticians of Narodism, which dates back to the best period of his activity (*Otechestvenniye Zapiski*,[128] 1882, Nos. 8 and 9). "The order which we are analysing," Mr. V. V. wrote at the time about our system of agriculture, "has been inherited by us from the serf-owning system.... Serfdom has collapsed but so far only in its juridical aspect and a few others; the system of agriculture, however, has remained the same as it was prior to the Reform.... The peasants were unable to continue running their farms solely on their own curtailed allotments; they absolutely had to use the lands that had been taken from them.... In order to secure the proper running of the small farms, it is necessary to guarantee the peasant the use of at least those lands that ... in one way or another were at his disposal at the time of serfdom. This is the minimum desideratum that can be advanced on behalf of small scale farming." This is how the question was put by those who believed in Narodism and openly preached it, instead of unseemingly playing at hide-and-seek as the Socialist-Revolutionary gentlemen do. And Social-Democracy has appraised this Narodnik presentation in its essence, as it always appraises bourgeois and petty-bourgeois demands. It took over in full the positive and progressive side of the demands (the struggle against all remnants of serfdom), rejecting petty-bourgeois illusions and pointing out that the eradication of the remnants of the serf-owning system will clear the road for, and speed up, capitalist development and not any other kind. It is precisely in the interests of social development and of untying the proletarian's hands, and not "for the sake of small-scale farming" that we present our demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands, while by no means pledging ourselves to assist the "small" *peasant bourgeoisie* either against serfdom or even against the big bourgeoisie.

history of Russia. We must provide a *correct* solution, from the Social-Democratic standpoint, to this problem which has not been raised by us; we must define our position with regard to the agrarian reforms which all liberal society has already demanded and without which no reasonable person can imagine the political emancipation of Russia. And we define *our* stand on this liberal reform (liberal in the scientific, that is the Marxist, sense of the word), while remaining wholly true to our principle of support for the genuinely democratic movement, coupled with steady and persistent work to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat. We lay down a practical line of conduct with regard to this kind of reform, which the government or the liberals must very soon adopt. We advance a slogan that impels towards a revolutionary issue a reform which has actually been prompted by life itself and not concocted from the fantasy of a hazy, humanitarian *Allerwelts** socialism.

It is in this latter respect that the draft programme of Comrade X is in error. No answer whatever is given to the question of the attitude to be taken towards the forthcoming liberal reforms in agrarian relationships. Instead, we are offered (in points 5 and 7) an inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for the nationalisation of the land. Contradictory, because the abolition of rent is at one time proposed by means of a tax, at another by means of transferring the land to society; inferior, because rents cannot be abolished by taxes, and because the land should (generally speaking) preferably be transferred to a democratic state, and not to *small* public organisations (like the present or future Zemstvos). The reasons for non-inclusion in our programme of the demand for the nationalisation of the land have already been given more than once, and we shall not repeat them here.

Point 8 does not at all bear upon the practical section of the programme, while Point 6 has been formulated by Comrade X in such a way as to have nothing "agrarian" left in it. Why he deletes the point on the courts and reduction of rents remains a mystery.

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* Acceptable to all.—*Ed.*

The author formulates Point 1 less clearly than is done in our draft, while his addition: "in the interests of defending the petty proprietor (and not of developing petty proprietorship)," is once again non-"agrarian", inaccurate (we are not out to defend petty proprietors who employ wage-labour) and superfluous, for, inasmuch as we defend the person and not the property of the petty bourgeois, we do this through our demand for strictly defined social, financial, and other reforms.

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THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN OUR PROGRAMME

In our draft Party programme we have advanced the demand for a republic with a democratic constitution that would guarantee, among other things, "recognition of the right to self-determination for all nations forming part of the state". Many did not find this demand in our programme sufficiently clear, and in issue No. 33, in speaking about the Manifesto of the Armenian Social-Democrats, we explained the meaning of this point in the following way. The Social-Democrats will always combat every attempt to influence national self-determination from without by violence or by any injustice. However, our unreserved recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination does not in any way commit us to supporting every demand for national self-determination. As the party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and principal task to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather than that of peoples or nations. We must always and unreservedly work for the *very closest* unity of the proletariat of all nationalities, and it is only in isolated and exceptional cases that we can advance and actively support demands conducive to the establishment of a new class state or to the substitution of a looser federal unity, etc., for the complete political unity of a state.*

This explanation of our programme on the national question has evoked a strong protest from the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.).[129] In an article entitled "The Attitude of the Russian Social-Democrats Towards the National Ques-

* See pp. 324-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tion" (*Przedświt*,* March 1903), the P.S.P. expresses indignation at this "amazing" explanation and at the "vagueness" of this "mysterious" self-determination of ours; it accuses us both of doctrinairism and of holding the "anarchist" view that "the worker is concerned with nothing but the complete abolition of capitalism, since, we learn, language, nationality, culture, and the like are mere bourgeois inventions", and so on. It is worth considering this argument in detail, for it reveals almost all the misconceptions in the national question so common and so widespread among socialists.

What makes our explanation so "amazing"? Why is it considered a departure from the "literal" meaning? Does recognition of the *right* of nations to self-determination really imply *support* of any demand of every nation for self-determination? After all, the fact that we recognise the *right* of all citizens to form free associations does not at all commit us, Social-Democrats, to *supporting* the formation of any new association; nor does it prevent us from opposing and campaigning against the formation of a given association as an inexpedient and unwise step. We even recognise the *right* of the Jesuits to carry on agitation freely, but we fight (not by police methods, of course) against an alliance between the Jesuits and the proletarians. Consequently, when the *Przedświt* says: "If this demand for the right to free self-determination is to be taken literally [and that is how we have taken it hitherto], then it would satisfy us"—it is quite obvious that it is precisely the P.S.P. that is departing from the literal meaning of the programme. Its conclusion is certainly illogical from the formal point of view.

We do not, however, wish to confine ourselves to a formal verification of our explanation. We shall go straight to the root of the matter: is Social-Democracy in duty bound to demand national independence always and unreservedly, or only under certain circumstances; if the latter is the case then under what circumstances? To this question the P.S.P. has always replied in favour of unreserved recognition; we are not in the least surprised, therefore, at the fondness it displays towards the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, who

* Dawn.—*Ed.*

demand a federal state system and speak in favour of "complete and unreserved recognition of the right to national self-determination" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 18, the article entitled "National Enslavement and Revolutionary Socialism"). Unfortunately, this is nothing more than one of those bourgeois-democratic phrases which, for the hundredth and thousandth time, reveal the true nature of the so-called Party of so-called Socialist-Revolutionaries. By falling for the bait presented by these phrases and yielding to the allurement of this clamour, the P.S.P. in its turn proves how weak in theoretical background and political activities is its link with the class struggle of the proletariat. But it is to the interests of this struggle that we must *subordinate* the demand for national self-determination. It is this that makes all the difference between our approach to the national question and the bourgeois-democratic approach. The bourgeois democrat (and the present-day socialist opportunist who follows in his footsteps) imagines that democracy eliminates the class struggle, and that is why he presents all his political demands in an abstract way, lumped together, "without reservations", from the standpoint of the interests of the "whole people", or even from that of an eternal and absolute moral principle. Always and everywhere the Social-Democrat ruthlessly exposes this bourgeois illusion, whether it finds expression in an abstract idealist philosophy or in an absolute demand for national independence.

If there is still need to prove that a Marxist can recognise the demand for national independence only conditionally, namely, on the condition indicated above, let us quote a writer who *defended* from the Marxist viewpoint the Polish proletarians' demand for an independent Poland. In 1896 Karl Kautsky wrote in an article entitled "Finis Poloniae?"*: "Once the proletariat tackles the Polish question it cannot but take a stand in favour of Poland's independence, and, consequently, it cannot but welcome each step that can be taken in this direction at the present time, insofar as this step is at all compatible with the class interests of the international militant proletariat."

* "The End of Poland?"—*Ed.*

"This reservation," Kautsky goes on to say, "should be made in any case. *National independence is not so inseparably linked with the class interests of the militant proletariat as to make it necessary to strive for it unconditionally, under any circumstances.** Marx and Engels took a most determined stand in favour of the unification and liberation of Italy, but this did not prevent them from coming out in 1859 against an Italy allied with Napoleon." (*Neue Zeit*, XIV, 2, S. 520.)

As you see, Kautsky categorically rejects the *unconditional* demand for the independence of nations, and categorically demands that the question be placed not merely on a historical basis in general, but specifically on a class basis. And if we examine how Marx and Engels treated the Polish question, we shall see that this was precisely their approach to it from the very outset. *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[130] devoted much space to the Polish question, and emphatically demanded, not only the independence of Poland, but also that Germany go to war with Russia for Poland's freedom. At the same time Marx, however, attacked Ruge, who had spoken in favour of Poland's freedom in the Frankfort Parliament and had tried to settle the Polish question solely by means of bourgeois-democratic phrases about "shameful injustice", without making any attempt to analyse it historically. Marx was not like those pedants and philistines of the revolution who dread nothing more than "polemics" at revolutionary moments in history. Marx poured pitiless scorn on the "humane" citizen Ruge, and showed him, from the example of the oppression of the south of France by the north of France, that it is not every kind of national oppression that invariably inspires a desire for independence which is justified from the viewpoint of democracy and the proletariat. Marx referred to special social circumstances as a result of which "Poland ... became the revolutionary part of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.... Even the Polish nobility, although their foundations were still partly feudal, adhered to the democratic agrarian revolution with unparalleled selflessness. Poland was already a seat of East-European democracy at a time when Ger-

* Italics ours.

many was still groping her way through the most platitudinous constitutional and high-flown philosophical ideology.... So long as we [Germans] ... help to oppress Poland, so long as we keep part of Poland fettered to Germany, we shall remain fettered to Russia and Russian policy, we shall be unable completely to smash patriarchal feudal absolutism at home. The creation of a democratic Poland is the primary prerequisite of the creation of a democratic Germany.[131]

We have quoted these statements in such detail because they graphically show the historical background at a time when the attitude of international Social-Democracy to the Polish problem took shape in a way which held good almost throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. To ignore the changes which have taken place in that background and to continue advocating the old solutions given by Marxism, would mean being true to the letter but not to the spirit of the teaching, would mean repeating the old conclusions by rote, without being able to use the Marxist method of research to analyse the new political situation. Those times and today—the age of the last bourgeois revolutionary movements, and the age of desperate reaction, extreme tension of all forces on the eve of the proletarian revolution—differ in the most obvious way. *In those times* Poland as a whole, not only the peasantry, but even the bulk of the nobility, was revolutionary. The traditions of the struggle for national liberation were so strong and deep-rooted that, after their defeat at home, Poland's best sons went wherever they could find a revolutionary class to support; the memory of Dabrowski and of Wróblewski[132] is inseparably associated with the greatest movement of the proletariat in the nineteenth century, with the last—and let us hope the last unsuccessful—insurrection of the Paris workers. *In those times* complete victory for democracy in Europe was indeed impossible without the restoration of Poland. *In those times* Poland was indeed the bulwark of civilisation against tsarism, and the vanguard of democracy. *Today* the Polish ruling classes, the gentry in Germany and in Austria, and the industrial and financial magnates in Russia are supporting the ruling classes of the countries that oppress Poland, while the German and the Russian proletariat are fighting for freedom side by side with the Polish

proletariat, which has heroically taken over the great traditions of the old revolutionary Poland. *Today* the advanced representatives of Marxism in the neighbouring country, while attentively watching the political evolution of Europe and fully sympathising with the heroic struggle of the Poles, nevertheless frankly admit that "at present St. Petersburg has become a much more important revolutionary centre than Warsaw, and the Russian revolutionary movement is already of greater international significance than the Polish movement". This is what Kautsky wrote as early as 1896, in defending the inclusion in the Polish Social-Democrats' programme of the demand for Poland's restoration. And in 1902 Mehring, who has been studying the evolution of the Polish question since 1848, arrived at the following conclusion: "Had the Polish proletariat desired to inscribe on its banner the restoration of a Polish class state, which the ruling classes themselves do not want to hear of, it would be playing a historical farce; this may well happen to the propertied classes (as, for instance, the Polish nobility in 1791), but it should never happen to the working class. If, on the other hand, this reactionary Utopia comes out to win over to proletarian agitation those sections of the intelligentsia and of the petty bourgeoisie which still respond in some measure to national agitation, then that Utopia is doubly untenable as an outgrowth of that unworthy opportunism which sacrifices the long-term interests of the working class to the cheap and paltry successes of the moment.

"Those interests dictate categorically that, in all three states that have partitioned Poland, the Polish workers should fight unreservedly side by side with their class comrades. The times are past when a bourgeois revolution could create a free Poland: today the renascence of Poland is possible only through a social revolution, in the course of which the modern proletariat will break its chains."[133]

We fully subscribe to Mehring's conclusion. We shall only remark that this conclusion remains unassailable even if we do not go as far as Mehring in our arguments. Without any doubt the present state of the Polish question differs radically from that which obtained fifty years ago. However, the present situation cannot be regarded as permanent. Class antagonism has now undoubtedly relegated na-

tional questions far into the background, but, without the risk of lapsing into doctrinairism, it cannot be categorically asserted that some particular national question cannot appear temporarily in the foreground of the political drama. No doubt, the restoration of Poland prior to the fall of capitalism is highly improbable, but it cannot be asserted that it is absolutely impossible, or that circumstances may not arise under which the Polish bourgeoisie will take the side of independence, etc. And Russian Social-Democracy does not in the least intend to tie its own hands. In including in its programme recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, it takes into account *all* possible, and even all *conceivable*, combinations. That programme in no way precludes the adoption by the Polish proletariat of the slogan of a free and independent Polish republic, even though the probability of its becoming a reality before socialism is introduced is infinitesimal. The programme merely demands that a genuinely socialist party shall not corrupt proletarian class-consciousness, or slur over the class struggle, or lure working class with bourgeois-democratic phrases, or break the unity of the proletariat's present-day political struggle. This reservation is the crux of the matter, for only with this reservation do we recognise self-determination. It is useless for the P.S.P. to pretend that it differs from the German or Russian Social-Democrats in their rejection of the right to self-determination, the right to strive for a free and independent republic. It is not this, but the fact that it loses sight of the class point of view, obscures it by chauvinism and disrupts the unity of the present-day political struggle, that prevents us from regarding the P.S.P. as a genuine Social-Democratic workers' party. This, for instance, is how the P.S.P. usually presents the question: "... We can only weaken tsarism by wresting Poland from it; it is the task of the Russian comrades to overthrow it." Or again: "... After the overthrow of tsarism we would simply decide our fate by seceding from Russia." See to what monstrous conclusions this monstrous logic leads, even from the viewpoint of the programme demand for Poland's restoration. *Because* the restoration of Poland is one of the possible (but, whilst the bourgeoisie rules, by no means absolutely certain) consequences of democratic evolution, *therefore* the Polish

proletariat must not fight together with the Russian proletariat to overthrow tsarism, but "only" to weaken it by wresting Poland from it. *Because* Russian tsarism is concluding a closer and closer alliance with the bourgeoisie and the governments of Germany, Austria, etc., *therefore* the Polish proletariat must weaken its alliance with the proletariat of Russia, Germany, etc., together with whom it is now fighting against *one and the same* yoke. This is nothing more than sacrificing the most vital interests of the proletariat to the bourgeois-democratic conception of national independence. The disintegration of Russia which the P.S.P. desires, *as distinct from* our aim of overthrowing tsarism, is and will remain an empty phrase, as long as economic development continues to bring the different parts of a political whole more and more closely together, and as long as the bourgeoisie of all countries unite more and more closely against their common enemy, the proletariat, and in support of their common ally, the tsar. But *the division of the forces of the proletariat*, which is now suffering under the yoke of this autocracy, is the sad reality, the direct consequence of the error of the P.S.P., the direct outcome of its worship of bourgeois-democratic formulas. To turn a blind eye to this division of the proletariat, the P.S.P. has to stoop to chauvinism and present the views of the Russian Social-Democrats as follows: "We [the Poles] must wait for the social revolution, and until then we must patiently endure national oppression." This is an utter falsehood. The Russian Social-Democrats have never advised anything of the sort; on the contrary, they themselves fight, and call upon the whole Russian proletariat to fight, against all manifestations of national oppression in Russia; they include in *their* programme not only complete equality of status for all languages, nationalities, etc., but also recognition of every nation's right to determine its own destiny. Recognising this right, we *subordinate* to the interests of the proletarian struggle our support of the demand for national independence, and only a chauvinist can interpret our position as an expression of a Russian's mistrust of a non-Russian, for in reality this position necessarily follows from the class-conscious proletarian's distrust of the bourgeoisie. The P.S.P. takes the view that the national question is *exhausted* by the contrast—"we" (Poles) and "they"

(Germans, Russians, etc.). The Social-Democrat, however, gives first place to the contrast—"we", the proletarians, and "they", the bourgeoisie. "We", the proletarians, have seen dozens of times how the bourgeoisie *betrays* the interests of freedom, motherland, language, and nation, when it is confronted with the revolutionary proletariat. We witnessed the French bourgeoisie's surrender to the Prussians at the moment of the greatest humiliation and suppression of the French nation, the Government of National Defence becoming a Government of National Defection, the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation calling to its aid the troops of the oppressing nation so as to crush its proletarian fellow countrymen, who had dared to assume power. And that is why, undeterred by chauvinist and opportunist heckling, we shall always say to the Polish workers: only the most complete and intimate alliance with the Russian proletariat can meet the requirements of the present political struggle against the autocracy; only such an alliance can guarantee complete political and economic emancipation.

What we have said on the Polish question is wholly applicable to every other national question. The accursed history of autocracy has left us a legacy of tremendous *estrangement* between the working classes of the various nationalities oppressed by that autocracy. This estrangement is a very great evil, a very great obstacle in the struggle against the autocracy, and we must not legitimise this evil or sanctify this outrageous state of affairs by establishing any such "principles" as separate parties or a "federation" of parties. It is, of course, simpler and easier to follow the line of least resistance, and for everyone to make himself comfortable in his own corner following the rule, "it's none of my business", as the Bund now wants to do. The more we realise the need for unity and the more firmly we are convinced that a concerted offensive against the autocracy is impossible without complete unity, the more obvious becomes the necessity for a centralised organisation of the struggle in the conditions of our political system—the less inclined are we to be satisfied with a "simple", but specious and, at bottom, profoundly false solution of the problem. So long as the injuriousness of estrangement is not realised, and so long as there is no desire to put an end radically and at all costs to this

estrangement in the camp of the proletarian party, there is no need for the fig-leaf of "federation", and no use in undertaking to solve a problem which one of the "sides" concerned has no real desire to solve. That being the case, it is better to let the lessons of experience and of the actual movement prove that centralism is essential for success in the struggle waged by the proletarians of all nationalities oppressed by autocracy against that autocracy and against the international bourgeoisie, which is becoming more and more united.

Iskra, No. 44, July 15, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

OUTLINE OF AN ARTICLE AGAINST THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

About the Socialist-Revolutionaries (a party without a programme).

α) Lack of principle

Unprincipledness in matters of theory: Narodnik prejudices + West-European opportunist bourgeois "criticism". Absence of a credo, blurred political consciousness. Playing at hide-and-seek....

β) Petty-bourgeois ideology

Petty-bourgeois ideology: corrupts the class-consciousness of the proletariat, makes it unfit for an independent stand towards bourgeois democracy (because the Socialist-Revolutionaries are striving to fuse and confuse social and bourgeois democracy, while being in essence a branch of the latter).

ν) Phrases and bluff

Phrase-mongering in theory and in tactics: an unserious attitude towards revolutionary work, exaggeration, bluff, "fiction" ... (dishing out trivialities in "popular" literature) (war against "polemics", absence of principles).

δ) Terrorism

A tactical mistake, a very flagrant one: terrorism, advocacy of it, weakening of contact with the mass movement.

ΣΣ*: from all the bourgeois revolutions in Europe the working class emerged disap-

* *Summa summarum*—sum-total.—*Ed.*

ε) Dissemination of illusions + reactionary spirit of the Narodnik part of the programme + ideological, political and practical harm

pointed, because it entered them with bourgeois-democratic illusions. The Socialist-Revolutionaries are doing their utmost to "repeat" this history; it is our duty to wage a determined struggle against it, so that the Russian proletariat should derive from the forthcoming revolution not disappointment, but fresh faith in its strength, greater courage for the still more tremendous struggle before it, and the beginnings of a strong, purely proletarian organisation.

Written in July 1903

First published in 1939 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*

Published according to the manuscript

SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[134]

JULY 17 (30) - AUGUST 10 (23), 1903

Speeches first published in Geneva in 1904 in the *Minutes of the Second Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*

Speeches are published according to the text in the *Minutes* and the manuscripts

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON DEMONSTRATIONS

The Congress considers the organisation of public demonstrations against the autocracy a highly important means of political education of the working masses. In this connection, the Congress recommends, firstly, that special efforts should be made to utilise for demonstrations such instances and circumstances when some atrocious act by the tsarist government has aroused particularly widespread indignation among the people; secondly, that efforts should be most of all directed to securing the participation of broad *masses* of the working class in the demonstrations and the best possible *organisation* of the latter, in regard to preparation for them, their efficient handling, and guidance of demonstrators' resistance to the troops and police; thirdly, that preparations for armed demonstrations should be begun, strictly observing instructions of the Central Committee in this respect.

The Congress also recommends that all committees and other organisations of the Party should thoroughly discuss the question of preparations for an armed uprising and should make every effort to convince the working masses of the necessity and inevitability of an uprising. The practical measures which can already be taken in preparing for an uprising are entrusted by the Congress exclusively and entirely to the Central Committee.

Written in June-July 1903

First published in 1927
in *Lenin Miscellany VI*

Published according
to the manuscript

2

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PLACE OF THE BUND IN THE PARTY

Taking into consideration that the fullest and closest unity of the militant proletariat is absolutely essential both for the purpose of the earliest achievement of its ultimate aim and in the interests of an unswerving political and economic struggle in conditions of the existing society;

that, in particular, complete unity between the Jewish and non-Jewish proletariat is moreover especially necessary for a successful struggle against anti-Semitism, this despicable attempt of the government and the exploiting classes to exacerbate racial particularism and national enmity;

that the complete amalgamation of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Jewish and non-Jewish proletariat can in no respect or manner restrict the independence of our Jewish comrades in conducting propaganda and agitation in one language or another, in publishing literature adapted to the needs of a given local or national movement, or in advancing such slogans for agitation and the direct political struggle that would be an application and development of the general and fundamental principles of the Social-Democratic programme regarding full equality and full freedom of language, national culture, etc., etc.;

the Congress emphatically repudiates federation as the organisational principle of a Russian party and endorses the organisational principle adopted as the basis of the Rules of 1898, i.e., autonomy for the national Social-Democratic organisations in matters concerning....*

Written in June-July 1903

First published in 1927 in *Lenin Miscellany VI*

Published according to the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STUDENT YOUTH

The Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party welcomes the growing revolutionary initiative among the student youth and calls upon all organisations of the Party to give them every possible assistance in their efforts to organise. It recommends that all student groups and study circles should, firstly, make it the prime object of their activities to imbue their members with an integral and consistent socialist world outlook and give them a thorough acquaintance with Marxism, on the one hand, and with Russian Narodism and West-European opportunism, on the other, these being the principal currents among the conflicting advanced trends of today; secondly, that they should beware of those false friends of the youth who divert them from a thorough revolutionary training through recourse to empty revolutionary or idealistic phrase-mongering and philistine complaints about the harm and uselessness of sharp polemics between the revolutionary and the opposition movements, for as a matter of fact these false friends are only spreading an unprincipled and unserious attitude towards revolutionary work; thirdly, that they should endeavour, when undertaking practical activities, to establish prior contact with the Social-Democratic organisations, so as to have the benefit of their advice and, as far as possible, to avoid serious mistakes at the very outset of their work.

Written in June-July 1903

First published in Geneva in 1904 in the *Minutes of the Second Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*

Published according to the manuscript

4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PARTY LITERATURE

The Congress recognises the absolute and urgent necessity for a wide production of popular Social-Democratic literature for all sections of the population, and for the working-class masses in particular.

The Congress considers it necessary in the first place to compile a series of pamphlets (each ranging from one to five signatures in size) dealing with each (theoretical and practical) point of our Party programme and giving a detailed exposition and explanation of that point; and then a number of leaflets (ranging from one to eight printed pages each) on the same subjects to be scattered or distributed in town and country. The Congress instructs the editorial board of the Central Organ to immediately take all steps to fulfil this task.

As regards publication of a special popular newspaper for the people or for the broad sections of the working class, the Congress, though it does not reject this project in principle, considers it untimely at the immediate moment.

Written in June-July 1903

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Published according to the manuscript

5

DRAFTS OF MINOR RESOLUTIONS

THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE

The Congress deems it absolutely essential in all cases to support and develop in every way the economic struggle of the workers and their trade unions (principally the all-Russian unions) and from the very outset to ensure that the economic struggle and the trade-union movement in Russia have a Social-Democratic character.

MAY DAY

The Congress approves the celebration of the First of May, which has already become a tradition, and draws the attention of all Party organisations to the necessity of selecting the time and ways most suitable under existing conditions for celebrating this international holiday of the proletariat's struggle for freedom.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS

The Congress appoints Comrade Plekhanov to represent the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Secretariat of the Socialist International (in amendment of the Paris decision to appoint Plekhanov and Krichevsky joint representatives).

The Congress instructs the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee to arrange, by agreement between them (or by decision of the Party Council), for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to be represented at the International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam in 1904.

TERRORISM

The Congress decisively rejects terrorism, i.e., the system of individual political assassinations, as being a method of political struggle which is most inexpedient at the present time, diverting the best forces from the urgent and imperatively necessary work of organisation and agitation, destroying contact between the revolutionaries and the masses of the revolutionary classes of the population, and spreading both among the revolutionaries themselves and the population in general utterly destorted ideas of the aims and methods of struggle against the autocracy.

PROPAGANDA

The Congress calls the attention of all Party members to the importance of improving the theoretical knowledge of our propagandists and of forming groups of travelling lecturers so as to co-ordinate propaganda throughout the country.

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES

The Congress recommends to all comrades returning to Russia from abroad or from exile to their place of activity, especially if they do not have well-established contacts with any committee, that they should endeavour to give timely notice to the Central Committee or its agents so, as to enable the Central Committee properly and promptly to distribute revolutionary forces throughout Russia.

Written in June-July 1903

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Published according to the manuscript

6

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PUBLICATION OF A PERIODICAL FOR MEMBERS OF RELIGIOUS SECTS

Bearing in mind that in many of its aspects the sectarian movement in Russia represents one of the democratic trends in Russia, the Second Congress calls the attention of all Party members to the necessity of working among members of sects so as to bring them under Social-Democratic influence. By way of experiment, the Congress permits Comrade V. Bonch-Bruyevich to publish, under the supervision of the editorial board of the Central Organ, a popular newspaper entitled *Among Sectarians*, and instructs the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ to take the measures necessary to ensure successful publication of this newspaper and to create all the conditions for its proper functioning.

Written in August 1903

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Published according to the manuscript

7

DRAFT RULES OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[135]

1. A Party member is one who accepts the Party's programme and supports the Party both financially and by personal participation in one of its organisations.

2. The Party Congress is the supreme organ of the Party. Party congresses are summoned (if possible, not less than once in two years) by the Central Committee. The Central Committee is obliged to summon a congress at the demand of Party committees, or unions of committees, which jointly had one-third of the votes at the preceding congress, or at the demand of the Party Council. A congress is valid given representation of over one half of all (properly constituted) committees of the Party existing at the moment of the congress.

3. The following are entitled to representation at a congress: a) the Central Committee; b) the editorial board of the Central Organ; c) all local committees which do not belong to special unions; d) all unions of committees recognised by the Party; and e) the League Abroad. Each of the organisations enumerated has two deciding votes at a congress. New committees and unions of committees are entitled to be represented at a congress only if they have been endorsed not less than six months before the congress.

4. The Party Congress appoints the Central Committee, the editorial board of the Central Organ, and the Party Council.

5. The Central Committee co-ordinates and directs all the practical activities of the Party and administers the

Central Party Treasury, as well as all the general technical establishments of the Party. It examines conflicts that may arise between various organisations and institutions of the Party or within them.

6. The editorial board of the Central Organ gives ideological guidance to the Party by editing the Party's Central Organ, the scientific organ, and pamphlets.

7. The Party Council is appointed by the congress from among members of the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee, and consists of five persons. The Council settles disputes and differences arising between the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee on questions of general organisation and tactics. The Party Council appoints a new Central Committee in the event of the arrest of all the members of the old committee.

8. New committees and unions of committees are endorsed by the Central Committee. Each committee, union, organisation, or group recognised by the Party has charge of affairs relating specifically and exclusively to its particular locality, district or national movement, or to the special function assigned to it, being bound, however, to obey the decisions of the Central Committee and the Central Organ and to make contributions to the Central Party Treasury in amounts determined by the Central Committee.

9. Any Party member and any person who has any contact with the Party is entitled to demand that any statements made by him should be transmitted in the original to the Central Committee, the Central Organ, or the Party Congress.

10. It is the duty of every Party organisation to afford both the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ every opportunity of becoming acquainted with all its activities and its entire composition.

11. All Party organisations and collegiate bodies decide their affairs by a simple majority vote and have the right of co-optation. A two-thirds majority vote is required for co-optation or expulsion of members.

12. It is the purpose of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad to carry on propaganda and agitation abroad and also to assist the movement in Russia.

The League enjoys all the rights of committees, with the sole exception that it renders assistance to the movement in Russia only through persons or groups specially appointed for the purpose by the Central Committee.

Written in August 1903

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Published according to the text of the Minutes

8

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS NOT SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS

WITHDRAWAL OF THE BUND

The Congress considers the refusal of the Bund delegates to submit to the decision adopted by the majority of the Congress as the Bund's withdrawal from the R.S.D.L.P.

The Congress deeply regrets this step, which, it is convinced, is a major political mistake on the part of the present leaders of the "Jewish Workers' Union", a mistake which must inevitably injure the interests of the Jewish proletariat and working-class movement. The Congress considers that the arguments cited by the Bund delegates in justification of their step amount in practice to entirely unfounded apprehensions and suspicion that the Social-Democratic convictions of the Russian Social-Democrats are insincere and inconsistent; in respect of theory they are the result of the unfortunate penetration of nationalism into the Social-Democratic movement of the Bund.

The Congress voices its desire for, and firm conviction of, the need for complete and closest unity of the Jewish and Russian working-class movement in Russia, unity not only in principle but also in organisation, and resolves to take all measures in order to acquaint the Jewish proletariat in detail both with this resolution of the Congress and with the general attitude of the Russian Social-Democrats towards every national movement.

SEPARATE GROUPS

The Congress expresses its regret at the separate existence of such groups of Social-Democrats as the *Borba*, *Zhizn* and *Volya*. Their separateness cannot but, on the one hand, lead to disorganisation impermissible in the Party, and on the other hand, to regrettable departures from Social-Democratic views and Social-Democratic tactics towards so-called socialist-revolutionism (as exemplified by the *Volya* group and partially also by the *Borba* in its agrarian programme), or towards Christian socialism and anarchism (*Zhizn*). The Congress would like to see the above-mentioned groups, and in general all groups which identify themselves with Social-Democracy, join the ranks of united and organised Russian Social-Democracy. The Congress instructs the Central Committee to collect the necessary information and to adopt a final decision on the place of the above-mentioned and other separate groups within the Party, or on the attitude of the Party towards these groups.

THE ARMY

The Congress calls the attention of all Party organisations to the importance of Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation in the army, and recommends that all efforts should be made for the speediest strengthening and proper channelling of all the existing contacts among the officers and other ranks. The Congress considers it desirable to form special groups of Social-Democrats serving in the army, in order that these groups should occupy a definite position in the local committees (as branches of the committees), or in the central organisation (as institutions formed directly by the Central Committee and subordinated directly to it).

THE PEASANTRY

The Congress calls the special attention of all Party members to the importance of developing and strengthening work among the peasantry. It is necessary to acquaint the peasantry (and, especially, the rural proletariat) with the Social-Democratic programme in its entirety, and to explain the significance of the agrarian programme as the first and

immediate demands under the existing system. It is necessary to get class-conscious peasants and intellectuals in the countryside to form solidly united groups of Social-Democrats, which would maintain constant contact with the Party committees. It is necessary to counter the propaganda conducted among the peasantry by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, propaganda which spreads unprincipledness and reactionary Narodnik prejudices.

Written on August 5 (18)-
10 (23), 1903

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in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Published according
to the manuscript

9

FIRST SPEECH ON THE AGENDA OF THE CONGRESS

July 18 (31)

I should like to make a remark. It would be wrong, it is claimed, to make the question of the Bund the first item on the agenda, since the reports should be the first item, the programme the second, and the Bund the third. The arguments in favour of this order will not stand criticism. They amount to the presumption that the Party as a whole has not yet reached agreement on the programme, and that it is possible that precisely on this question we may part company. I am surprised at that. It is true that we have not yet adopted a programme, but the surmise that a rupture may take place over the programme is conjectural in the highest degree. No such tendencies have been discernible in the Party, at least as far as its literature is concerned, which of late has given the fullest reflection of Party opinion. There are both formal and moral reasons for making the question of the Bund the first item on the agenda. Formally, we stand by the Manifesto of 1898, but the Bund has expressed a desire for a radical change in our Party's organisation. Morally, many other organisations have expressed their disagreement with the Bund over this question; that has caused sharp differences leading even to polemics. The Congress therefore cannot begin harmonious work until these differences have been removed. As to the delegates' reports, it is possible that they may not be heard *in pleno* at all. I therefore second the agenda in the order approved by the Organising Committee.

10

SECOND SPEECH ON THE AGENDA OF THE CONGRESS

July 18 (31)

Now that the Congress has decided what shall be the first item on our agenda, the third point is the only moot point with regard to the rest of the agenda. This item reads: "Creation of the Central Organ of the Party, or endorsement of such." Some comrades consider that this item should be shifted farther down, because, firstly, one cannot speak of the Central Organ until a decision has been taken on the organisation of the Party in general and of its central body in particular, and so on; and, secondly, because many committees have already expressed their views on the substance of this question. I consider the second argument wrong, for declarations by the committees are not binding on the Congress and, formally speaking, have no deciding vote at the Congress. The other objection is wrong because, before settling details of organisation, the Party Rules, and the like, we must first definitely decide on the trend of Russian Social-Democracy. In fact, it is this question that has divided us so long, and the mere adoption of a programme cannot remove all the differences dividing us on this issue; that can be done only by deciding, immediately after the question of the programme, what kind of Central Organ of the Party we should form anew, or what old one we should endorse with certain modifications.

That is why I second the agenda in the order endorsed by the Organising Committee.

11

SPEECH ON THE ACTIONS OF THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE
July 18 (31)[136]

I cannot agree with Comrade Yegorov. It is he who has infringed the standing orders of the Congress and it is he who is against the clause on imperative mandates. I do not doubt the existence of the Organising Committee, just as I do not doubt the existence of the *Iskra* organisation, which also has its own organisation and its own Rules. But as soon as the standing orders of the Congress were announced, the *Iskra* organisation informed its delegates that they have full freedom of action at the Congress. Just imagine our position, as members of the Credentials Committee of the Congress, who yesterday heard two members of the Organising Committee, Comrades Stein and Pavlovich, and today are hearing an entirely new proposal. There are experienced comrades here who have attended many international congresses. These comrades could tell you what a storm of indignation has always been aroused when people say one thing at committees and another on the floor of the Congress.

12

SPEECH ON THE ATTENDANCE OF THE POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AT THE CONGRESS

July 18 (31)

In its report, the committee holds that the Polish comrades' presence at the Congress is desirable, but only in a deliberative capacity. In my opinion that is quite right, and it seems to me quite reasonable to begin the resolution of the committee with a statement to this effect. The presence of the Letts and the Lithuanians would also be highly desirable, but, unfortunately, that is not feasible. The Polish comrades could have announced their conditions of affiliation at any time, but they did not do so. The Organising Committee was therefore right in exercising restraint towards them. Nor is the question clarified by the letter from the Polish Social-Democrats which was read here. In view of this, I move that the Polish comrades be invited as guests.

13

SPEECH ON THE PLACE OF THE BUND IN THE R.S.D.L.P.

July 20 (August 2)

I shall first deal with Hofman's[137] speech and his expression "a compact majority". Comrade Hofman uses these words by way of reproach. In my opinion we should be proud, not ashamed, of the fact that there is a compact majority at the Congress. And we shall be prouder still if our whole Party proves to be a compact, a highly compact, 90 per cent, majority. (*Applause.*) The majority were right in making the position of the Bund in the Party the first item on the agenda, and the Bundists at once proved this by submitting their so-called Rules, but in essence proposing *federation*. Once there are members in the Party who propose federation and others who reject it, there could be no other course open but to make the question of the Bund the first item on the agenda. It is no use forcing your favours on anybody, and the internal affairs of the Party cannot be discussed until we have firmly and uncompromisingly settled whether or not we want to march together.

The crux of the issue has not always been presented quite correctly in the debate. The point of the matter is that, in the opinion of many Party members, federation is *harmful* and runs counter to the principles of Social-Democracy as applied to existing Russian conditions. Federation is harmful because it *sanctions* segregation and alienation, elevates them to a principle, to a law. Complete alienation does indeed prevail among us, and we ought not to sanction it, or cover it with a fig-leaf, but combat it and resolutely acknowledge and proclaim the necessity of firmly and unswervingly advancing towards the *closest* unity. That is why we reject

federation in principle, *in limine** (as the Latin phrase has it); that is why we reject *all* obligatory partitions that serve to divide us. As it is, there will always be different groupings in the Party, groupings of comrades who do not think quite alike on questions of programme, tactics or organisation; but let there be only *one* division into groups throughout the Party, that is, let all like-minded members join in a single group, instead of groups first being formed in *one section* of the Party, separately from the groups in another section of the Party, and then having a union not of groups holding different views or different shades of opinion, but of sections of the Party, each containing different groups. I repeat, we recognise no *obligatory* partitions, and that is why we reject federation in principle.

I shall now pass to the question of autonomy. Comrade Lieber has said that federation means centralism, while autonomy means decentralism. Can it be that Comrade Lieber takes the Congress members for six-year-old children, who may be regaled with such sophistries? Is it not clear that centralism demands the *absence* of all partitions between the central body and even the most remote and out-of-the-way sections of the Party? Our central body will be given the absolute right to communicate directly with every Party member. The Bundists would only laugh if someone would propose to them a form of "centralism" *within* the Bund, under which its Central Committee could not communicate with all the Kovno groups and comrades *otherwise than* through the Kovno Committee. Incidentally, as regards the committees: Comrade Lieber has exclaimed with feeling, "What is the good of talking about the Bund's autonomy if it is to be an organisation subordinated to one central body? After all, you would not grant autonomy to some Tula Committee!" You are mistaken, Comrade Lieber; we will certainly and most decidedly grant autonomy to "some" Tula Committee, too, autonomy in the sense of freedom from petty interference by the central body, although the duty of obeying that body will, of course, remain. I have taken the words "petty interference" from the Bund leaflet, "Autonomy or Federation?" The Bund has advanced this freedom from

* On the threshold.—*Ed.*

"petty interference" as a *condition*, as a *demand* to the Party. The mere fact that it advances such ridiculous demands shows how muddled the Bund is on the question at issue. Does the Bund really think that the Party would tolerate the existence of a central body that indulged in "*petty*" interference in the affairs of *any* Party organisation or group? Is this not, in effect, precisely that "organised distrust" which has already been mentioned at this Congress? Such distrust runs through all the proposals and arguments of the Bundists. Is it not, in fact, the *duty* of our entire Party to fight, for example, for *full* equality and even for *recognition* of the right of nations to self-determination? Consequently, if any section of our Party failed in this duty, it would unquestionably be liable to condemnation by virtue of our principles; it would unquestionably be liable to *correction* on the part of the central institutions of the Party. And if the neglect of that duty were conscious and deliberate, despite full opportunity to carry out that duty, then that would be *treachery*.

Further. Comrade Lieber has asked us in moving tones *how it can he proved* that autonomy is able to guarantee to the Jewish workers' movement that independence which is absolutely essential to it. A strange question, indeed! How can it be proved that one of the several paths suggested is the right one? The only way is to try it and see. My reply to Comrade Lieber's question is: *March with us*, and we undertake to prove to you in practice that all legitimate demands for independence are gratified in full.

When I hear disputes about the place of the Bund, I always recollect the British miners. They are excellently organised, better than any other workers. And *because of that* they want to thwart the general demand for an 8-hour day put forward by all proletarians.[138] These miners have the same narrow idea of the unity of the proletariat as our Bundists. Let the sad example of the miners serve as a warning to our comrades of the Bund.

PROLETARIAN EDITIONS NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

14

SPEECH ON THE PARTY PROGRAMME
July 22 (August 4)

First of all, I must draw attention to the highly characteristic way in which Comrade Lieber confuses a Marshal of the Nobility with a section of the toilers and the exploited. This confusion is a feature of all the debates. Isolated episodes of our controversy are being everywhere confused with the establishment of basic principles. One cannot deny, as Comrade Lieber does, the possibility of even a *section* (one or another) of the working and exploited population coming over to the side of the proletariat. You will recall that in 1852, referring to the revolt of the French peasants, Marx wrote (in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*) that the peasantry acts sometimes as a representative of the past and sometimes as a representative of the future; one can appeal not only to the peasant's prejudice, but to his judgement[139] as well. You will further recall that Marx said the Communards were quite right in declaring the cause of the Commune that of the peasantry as well.[140] I repeat, it cannot be doubted that, under certain conditions, it is by no means impossible for one section or another of the working people to come over to the side of the proletariat. The important thing is to define these conditions correctly. And the condition we are speaking of is expressed quite accurately in the words "place themselves at the standpoint of the proletariat". It is these words that draw a definite line of demarcation between us, Social-Democrats, and all pseudo-socialist trends in general, and the so-called Socialist-Revolutionaries in particular.

I shall now go over to that disputed passage in my pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?*, which gave rise to so much discussion here. After all this discussion, I think that the question has been so clarified that very little remains for me to add. It is obvious that here an episode in the struggle against "economism" has been confused with a discussion of the principles of a major theoretical question (the formation of an ideology). Moreover, this episode has been presented in an absolutely false light.

In support of this last statement, I might refer first of all to Comrades Akimov and Martynov, who spoke here. They made it quite clear that it was indeed an episode in the struggle against "economism" which was at issue here. They expressed views which have already been termed opportunism (and quite rightly so). They actually went so far as to "refute" the theory of impoverishment, to dispute the dictatorship of the proletariat, and even to advocate the "*Erfüllungstheorie*", as Comrade Akimov called it. To tell the truth, I do not quite know what that means. Perhaps Comrade Akimov meant to say "*Aushöhlungstheorie*"—the "theory of the hollowing out" of capitalism, that is, one of the most popular and current ideas of the Bernsteinian theory. In his defence of the old mainstays of "economism", Comrade Akimov even advanced such an incredibly eccentric argument as that the word proletariat does not figure in our programme even once in the nominative case. At most, Comrade Akimov exclaimed, they have the proletariat in the genitive case. And so it appears that the nominative is the most honourable case, whereas the genitive takes second place in the scale of honour. It only remains to convey this idea—through a special commission, perhaps—to Comrade Ryazanov, so as to enable him to supplement his first scientific work on the letters of the alphabet with another treatise on the cases....

As to the direct references to my pamphlet, *What Is to Be Done?*, it will be quite easy for me to show that they have been wrenched from the context. It is claimed that Lenin says nothing about any conflicting trends, but categorically affirms that the working-class movement invariably "*tends*" to succumb to bourgeois ideology. Is that so? Have I not said that the working-class movement is drawn

towards the bourgeois outlook *with the benevolent assistance* of the Schulze-Delitzsches *and others like them*?* And who is meant here by "others like them"? None other than the "economists", none other than those who, for example, used to say then that bourgeois democracy in Russia is a phantom. Today it is easy to talk so cheaply about bourgeois radicalism and liberalism, when examples of them are to be found right before us. But was that the case previously?

Lenin takes no account whatever of the fact that the workers, too, have a share in the formation of an ideology. Is that so? Have I not said time and again that the shortage of fully class-conscious workers, worker-leaders, and worker-revolutionaries is, in fact, the greatest deficiency in our movement? Have I not said there that the training of such worker-revolutionaries must be our immediate task? Is there no mention there of the importance of developing a trade-union movement and creating a special trade-union literature? Is not a desperate struggle waged there against every attempt to lower the level of the advanced workers to that of the masses, or of the average workers?**

To conclude. We all now know that the "economists" have gone to one extreme. To straighten matters out somebody had to pull in the other direction—and that is what I have done. I am convinced that Russian Social-Democracy will always vigorously straighten out whatever has been twisted by opportunism of any kind, and that therefore our line of action will always be the straightest and the fittest for action.

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* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*—*Ed.*

15

REPORT ON THE PARTY RULES

July 29 (August 11)

Lenin (the reporter) gives an explanation of the draft Rules submitted by him. The basic idea of the Rules, he says, is that of a division of *functions*. Hence, the division into two central bodies, for example, is not due to their geographical division (Russia and abroad), but is a logical consequence of a division of functions. It is the function of the Central Committee to exercise practical leadership, that of the Central Organ to exercise ideological leadership. To co-ordinate the activities of these two central bodies, to preclude disunity between them, and, in part, to settle disputes, a Council is needed, which should not at all be purely an institution of arbitration. The paragraphs in the Rules which govern the relations between the Central Committee and the local committees, and define the Central Committee's competence cannot and should not enumerate all the points within that competence. Such an enumeration is inconvenient and impossible, for it is inconceivable that all possible cases should be foreseen, and, moreover, points unprovided for might appear to be outside the competence of the Central Committee. The Central Committee itself should be allowed to determine the sphere of its competence, since any local matter may affect the interests of the Party as a whole, and the Central Committee should be in a position to intervene in local affairs, even going against local interests, should such action be in the interests of the Party as a whole.

16

FIRST SPEECH IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

July 31 (August 13)

I shall in the first place mention a detail that came up during the debate. Comrade Yegorov expressed regret that there was no report which might have considerably facilitated and directed our whole debate. Since it was I who was suggested as reporter, I shall, in a manner of speaking, have to defend myself for the absence of a report. And I shall say in my defence that I have a report: it is my reply to Comrade X,* which, in fact, replies to the most widespread of the objections and misunderstandings aroused by our agrarian programme, and has been distributed to all the Congress delegates. A report is no less a report for having been printed and distributed to the delegates instead of being delivered by word of mouth.

I shall now pass to the contents of the speeches by those who, unfortunately, have disregarded this particular report of mine. Comrade Martynov, for example, failed even to take account of the earlier literature on our agrarian programme, when he spoke again and again about redressing a historical injustice, of a needless reversion to forty years back, of the destruction of the feudalism of the sixties, rather than that of today, and so on. In replying to these arguments, I shall have to repeat what I have said before. If we acted *solely* on the principle of "redressing a historical injustice", we would be guiding ourselves by nothing but democratic phraseology. But we refer to the survivals

* See pp. 438-53 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of serf-ownership which *exist* around us, to present-day realities, to what is today hampering and retarding the proletariat's struggle for emancipation. We are accused of reverting to the hoary past. This accusation reveals only an ignorance of the most generally known facts regarding the activities of Social-Democrats in all countries. One of the aims they set themselves and work for everywhere is *to complete what the bourgeoisie has left unfinished*. That is what we are doing. And in order to do so, we have unavoidably to revert to the past; and that is what the Social-Democrats in every country are doing, always reverting to *their* 1789, or to *their* 1848. Similarly, the Russian Social-Democrats *cannot but revert to their* 1861, and must do so all the more energetically and frequently since our so-called peasant "Reform" has achieved so little in the way of democratic changes.

As to Comrade Gorin, he too is guilty of the common error of forgetting the serf bondage that actually exists. Comrade Gorin says that "hope of getting the cut-off lands perforce keeps the small peasant bound to an anti-proletarian ideology". Actually, however, it is not "hope" that he will get the cut-off lands, but the *present* cut-off lands themselves that forcibly maintain serf bondage, and there is no way out of this bondage, out of these serf forms of land leasing, except by converting the pseudo-tenants into free owners.

Lastly, Comrade Yegorov asked the authors of the programme what the programme signified. Is the programme, he asked, a conclusion drawn from our basic conceptions of the economic evolution of Russia, a scientific anticipation of the possible and inevitable result of political changes (in which case Comrade Yegorov might agree with us)? Or is our programme a practical slogan for agitation? In that case we could not beat the record of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the programme must be regarded as incorrect. I must say that I do not understand the distinction Comrade Yegorov draws. If our programme did not meet the first condition, it would be incorrect and we could not accept it. If, however, the programme is correct, it cannot but furnish a slogan of practical value for purposes of agitation. The contradiction between Comrade Yegorov's two alternatives is

only a seeming one; it cannot exist in fact, because a correct theoretical decision *guarantees* enduring success in agitation. And it is for enduring success that we are working, not in the least disconcerted by temporary reverses.

Comrade Lieber likewise repeated objections long ago refuted; he was astonished at the "meagreness" of our programme and demanded "radical reforms" in the agrarian sphere as well. Comrade Lieber has forgotten the difference between the democratic and the socialist parts of the programme: what he has taken for "meagreness" is the absence of anything socialistic in the democratic programme. He has failed to notice that the socialist part of our agrarian programme is to be found elsewhere, namely in the section on the workers, which also applies to agriculture. Only Socialist-Revolutionaries, with their characteristic lack of principle, are capable of confusing, as they constantly do, democratic and socialistic demands. But the party of the proletariat is in duty bound to separate and distinguish between them in the strictest fashion.

17

SECOND SPEECH IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

August 1 (14)

Before passing to details, I want to object to certain general statements, and in the first place to those of Comrade Martynov. Comrade Martynov says that it is not the feudalism of the past we must combat, but the feudalism that exists today. That is true, but let me remind you of my reply to X. The latter referred to Saratov Gubernia. I have consulted the data for that gubernia and found that the cut-off lands there amount to 600,000 dessiatines, i.e., two-fifths of the total land held by the peasants under serfdom, while the rented land amounts to 900,000 dessiatines. Consequently, two-thirds of the rented land consists of cut-off lands. That means that we are out to restore two-thirds of the land held in tenure. Hence it is not a ghost we are fighting, but a real evil. We would arrive at the state of affairs which exists in Ireland, where the present peasant reform was required, which is turning the tenant farmers into small owners. The analogy between Ireland and Russia was already pointed out by the Narodniks in their economic literature. Comrade Gorin says that the measure I propose is not the best; that it would be better to turn the peasants into free tenant farmers. But he is mistaken in thinking that it could be better to turn semi-free tenants into free tenants. We are not inventing a transition, but are proposing one that would bring the land tenure laws into conformity with the actually existing conditions of land tenure, thereby abolishing the bondage relations that esist today. Martynov says that it is not our demands

that are meagre, but the principle from which they are derived. But that is like the arguments the Socialist-Revolutionaries bring against us. We are pursuing two qualitatively different aims in the countryside: firstly, we want to achieve freedom for bourgeois relations; secondly, we want to conduct the proletarian struggle. Despite the Socialist-Revolutionaries' prejudices, it is our task to show the peasants where the revolutionary proletarian task of the peasant proletariat begins. Comrade Kostrov's objections are therefore groundless. We are told that the peasants will not be satisfied with our programme and will go further. But we are not afraid of that; we have our socialist programme for that eventuality, and consequently are not afraid even of a redistribution of the land, which terrifies Comrades Makhov and Kostrov[141] so much.

I conclude. Comrade Yegorov has called our reliance on the peasants chimerical. No! We are not carried away; we are sufficiently sceptical, and that is why we say to the peasant proletarian: "Now you are fighting by the side of the peasant bourgeoisie, but you must always be prepared to fight against that same bourgeoisie, and you will wage that fight together with the urban industrial proletarians."

In 1852 Marx said that the peasants had judgement as well as prejudices. And now, when we point out to the poor peasants the cause of their poverty, we may count on success. We believe that, since the Social-Democrats have now taken up the struggle for the interests of the peasants, we shall in future be reckoning with the fact that the peasant masses will get used to looking upon Social-Democracy as the defender of their interests.

18

THIRD SPEECH IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

August 1 (14)

There is nothing for Comrade Lieber to be surprised at. He demands of us a single general criterion, but there is no such criterion. Sometimes one demand has to be made, at other times another. We have no stereotyped standards. Lieber claims that our demand for the abolition of serf-ownership coincides with the liberals' demands. But the liberals do not say how this demand is to be carried out. We, for our part, say that it must be carried out not by the bureaucracy, but by the oppressed classes, and that means the way of revolution. Therein lies the fundamental difference between us and the liberals, whose talk about changes and reforms "pollutes" the minds of the people. If we were to set forth in detail all the demands for the abolition of serf-ownership, we should fill whole volumes. That is why we mention only the more important forms and varieties of serfdom, and leave it to our committees in the various localities to draw up and advance their particular demands in development of the general programme. Trotsky's remark to the effect that we cannot concern ourselves with local demands is wrong, for the question of the *khizani* and the temporarily bound peasants[142] is not only a local one. Moreover, it is known in agrarian literature.

19

FOURTH SPEECH
IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME
August 1 (14)

Comrade Lieber proposes deletion of the clause on the cut-off lands, on the sole grounds that he does not like the peasant committees. That is strange. Since we have agreed on the fundamental question—that the cut-off lands keep the peasants in bondage—the formation of committees is only a secondary matter, and to reject the whole clause on account of that would be illogical. It is strange, too, to hear the question as to how we are to influence the peasant committees. I hope that the Social-Democrats will then find it easier to arrange congresses, and will there decide how to act in each particular case.

20

FIRST SPEECH IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE PARTY RULES

August 2 (15)

Lenin delivers a brief speech in support of his formulation, emphasising in particular its stimulating effect: "Organise!" It should not be imagined that Party organisations must consist solely of professional revolutionaries. We need the most diverse organisations of all types, ranks and shades, beginning with extremely limited and secret and ending with very broad, free, *lose Organisationen*. Its endorsement by the Central Committee is an essential condition for a Party organisation.

21

SECOND SPEECH IN THE DISCUSSION ON THE PARTY RULES

August 2 (15)

I should like first of all to make two remarks on minor points. First, on the subject of Axelrod's kind proposal (I am not speaking ironically) to "strike a bargain". I would willingly respond to this appeal, for I by no means consider our difference so vital as to be a matter of life or death to the Party. We shall certainly not perish because of an unfortunate clause in the Rules! But since it has come to the point of choosing between *two* formulations, I simply cannot abandon my firm conviction that Martov's formulation is *worse* than the original draft and *may*, in certain circumstances, cause no little harm to the Party. The second remark concerns Comrade Brucker.[143] It is only natural for Comrade Brucker, who wishes to apply the elective principle everywhere, to have accepted my formulation, the only one that defines at all exactly the concept of a Party *member*. I therefore fail to understand Comrade Martov's delight at Comrade Brucker's agreement with me. Is it possible that in actual fact Comrade Martov makes a point of *guiding* himself by the opposite of what Brucker says, without examining his motives and arguments?

To come to the main subject, I must say that Comrade Trotsky has completely misunderstood Comrade Plekhanov's fundamental idea, and his arguments have therefore evaded the gist of the matter. He has spoken of intellectuals and workers, of the class point of view and of the mass movement, but he has failed to notice a basic question: does my formulation narrow or expand the concept of a Party

member? If he had asked himself that question, he would easily have seen that my formulation narrows this concept, while Martov's expands it, for (to use Martov's own correct expression) what distinguishes his concept is its "elasticity". And in the period of Party life that we are now passing through it is just this "elasticity" that undoubtedly opens the door to all elements of confusion, vacillation, and opportunism. To refute this simple and obvious conclusion it has to be proved that there are no such elements; but it has not even occurred to Comrade Trotsky to do that. Nor can that be proved, for everyone knows that such elements exist in plenty, and that they are to be found in the working class too. The need to safeguard the firmness of the Party's line and the purity of its principles has now become particularly urgent, for, with the restoration of its unity, the Party will recruit into its ranks a great many unstable elements, whose number will increase with the growth of the Party. Comrade Trotsky completely misinterpreted the main idea of my book, *What Is to Be Done?*, when he spoke about the Party not being a conspiratorial organisation (many others too raised this objection). He forgot that in my book I propose a number of various types of organisations, from the most secret and most exclusive to comparatively broad and "loose" (*lose*) organisations.* He forgot that the Party must be only the vanguard, the leader of the vast masses of the working class, the whole (or nearly the whole) of which works "under the control and direction" of the Party organisations, but the whole of which does not and should not belong to a "party". Now let us see what conclusions Comrade Trotsky arrives at in consequence of his fundamental mistake. He has told us here that if rank after rank of workers were arrested, and all the workers were to declare that they did not belong to the Party, our Party would be a strange one indeed! Is it not the other way round? Is it not Comrade Trotsky's argument that is strange? He regards as something sad that which a revolutionary with any experience at all would only rejoice at. If hundreds and thousands of workers who were arrested for taking part in strikes and demonstrations did not prove

* See present edition, Vol. 5.—*Ed.*

to be members of Party organisations, it would only show that we have good organisations, and that we are fulfilling our task of keeping a more or less limited circle of leaders secret and of drawing the broadest possible masses into the movement.

The root of the mistake made by those who stand for Martov's formulation is that they not only ignore one of the main evils of our Party life, but even sanctify it. The evil is that, at a time when political discontent is almost universal, when conditions require our work to be carried on in complete secrecy, and when most of our activities have to be confined to limited, secret circles and even to private meetings, it is extremely difficult, almost impossible in fact, for us to distinguish those who only talk from those who do the work. There is hardly another country in the world where the jumbling of these two categories is as common and as productive of such boundless confusion and harm as in Russia. We are suffering sorely from this evil not only among the intelligentsia, but also among the working class, and Comrade Martov's formulation sanctions it. This formulation necessarily tends to make Party members of *all and sundry*; Comrade Martov himself was forced to admit this, although with a reservation: "Yes, if you like," he said. But that is precisely what we do not like! And that is precisely why we are so adamant in our opposition to Martov's formulation. It would be better if ten who do work should not call themselves Party members (real workers don't hunt after titles!) than that one who only talks should have the right and opportunity to be a Party member. That is a principle which seems to me irrefutable, and which compels me to fight against Martov. The objection has been presented to me that we confer no rights on Party members, and that therefore there can be no abuses. This kind of objection is quite untenable: if we do not state what particular rights a Party member enjoys, please note that neither do we say that there is to be any restriction on the rights of Party members. That is point one. Secondly—and this is the main point—irrespective even of rights, we must not forget that every Party member is responsible for the Party, and that *the Party is responsible for every one of its members*. In view of the conditions in

which we have to carry on our political activities, in view of the present rudimentary state of real political organisation, it would be simply dangerous and harmful to grant the right of membership to people who are not members of a Party organisation and to make the Party responsible for people who do not belong to an organisation (perhaps deliberately). Comrade Martov was horrified at the idea that one who is not a member of a Party organisation will have no right to declare in court that he is a Party member, however energetically he may have done his work. That does not frighten me. On the contrary, serious harm would be done if a person who calls himself a Party member, even though he does not belong to any Party organisation, were to behave unworthily in court. It would be impossible to deny that such a person was working under the control and direction of the organisation—impossible because of the very vagueness of the term. Actually—and there can be no doubt about this—the words "under the control and direction" will mean that *there will be neither control nor direction*. The Central Committee will never be able to exercise real control over all who do the work but do not belong to organisations. It is our task to place *actual* control in the hands of the Central Committee. It is our task to safeguard the firmness, consistency, and purity of our Party. We must strive to raise the title and the significance of a Party member higher, higher and still higher—and I therefore oppose Martov's formulation.

22

SPEECH AT THE ELECTION OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ISKRA*

August 7 (20)[144]

Comrades! Martov's speech was so strange that I find myself obliged to protest emphatically against his presentation of the question. In the first place, let me remind you that Martov's protest against the editorial board election itself, his refusal, and that of his colleagues, to work on the editorial board which is to be elected, is in crying contradiction to what we all said (Martov included) when *Iskra* was recognised as the Party organ. The objection was then presented to us that such recognition was pointless because you cannot endorse a mere title without endorsing the editorial board; and Comrade Martov himself explained to the objectors that *this was not true*, that it was a definite political trend that was being endorsed, that the composition of the editorial board was *not being predetermined* in any way, and that the election of the editors would come up later under Point 24* of our *Tagesordnung*** Comrade Martov, therefore, had *no right whatever* now to speak about the recognition of *Iskra* being limited. Comrade Martov's statement that his inclusion in the trio without his old colleagues of the editorial board would cast a slur on his whole political reputation is therefore indicative only of an *astounding confusion of political ideas*. To adopt this point of view is to deny the right of the Congress to hold new

* During the Congress it was changed to Point 18 on the agenda.—*Ed*.

** Agenda.—*Ed*.

elections, make new appointments of any kind, and change the composition of its authorised boards. The Organising Committee provides an example of the confusion created by such an approach. We expressed to the Organising Committee the complete confidence and gratitude of the Congress but at the same time we ridiculed the very idea of the Congress having no right to examine the internal relations of the Organising Committee, and rejected every supposition that the old composition of the Organising Committee would be an embarrassment to an "uncomradely" change of this composition and the formation of a *new* Central Committee of any elements we pleased. I repeat: Comrade Martov's views on the permissibility of electing *part* of the old board reflect an extreme confusion of political ideas.

I now come to the question of the two trios. Comrade Martov said that this whole plan for two trios was the work of one person, of one member of the editorial board (that it was my plan, in fact), and that no one else was responsible for it. I *categorically protest* against this assertion and declare that it is *simply untrue*. Let me remind Comrade Martov that several weeks before the Congress I plainly told him and another member of the editorial board that at the Congress I would *demand* the *free election* of the editorial board. I gave up this plan only because *Comrade Martov himself* suggested to me the more convenient plan of electing *two trios*. I thereupon formulated this plan on paper and sent it *first of all* to Comrade Martov himself, who returned it to me with some corrections—here it is, I have the very copy, with Martov's corrections in red ink. Many of the comrades later saw this plan dozens of times, all the members of the editorial board saw it too, and *no one at any time* formally protested against it. I say "formally" because, if I am not mistaken, Comrade Axelrod on one occasion dropped some private remark to the effect that he did not sympathise with the plan. But it is obvious that for a protest the editorial board required something more than a private remark. It was not without reason that, even before the Congress, the editorial board adopted a formal decision to invite a definite *seventh* person, so that, should it be necessary to make a collective statement at the Congress, a firm decision could be made—which we so often

failed to reach on our board of six. And *all the members of the editorial board know* that the addition of a seventh permanent member to the board of six was a matter of constant concern to us for a very long time. And so, I repeat, the election of "two trios" was a perfectly natural solution, and one which I incorporated in my plan *with the knowledge and consent* of Comrade Martov. And on many subsequent occasions, Comrade Martov, together with Comrade Trotsky and others, at a number of private meetings of *Iskra* supporters, advocated this system of electing two trios.

However, in correcting Martov's statement about the private character of the plan for "two trios," I have no intention of denying Martov's assertion of the "political significance" of the step we took in not endorsing the old editorial board. On the contrary, I fully and unreservedly agree with Comrade Martov that this step is of great political significance—only not the significance which Martov ascribes to it. He said that it was an act in a struggle for influence on the Central Committee in Russia. I go farther than Martov. The whole activity of *Iskra* as a separate group has hitherto been a *struggle* for influence; but now it is a matter of something more, namely, the *organisational consolidation* of this influence, and not only a struggle for it. How profoundly Comrade Martov and I differ *politically* on this point is shown by the fact that he *blames* me for this wish to influence the Central Committee, whereas I count it *to my credit* that I strove and still strive to consolidate this influence by organisational means. It appears that we are even talking in different languages! What would be the point of all our work, of all our efforts, if they ended in the same old struggle for influence, and not in its complete acquisition and consolidation? Yes, Comrade Martov is absolutely right: the step we have taken is undoubtedly *a major political step* showing that one of the trends now to be observed has been chosen for the future work of our Party. And I am not at all frightened by the dreadful words a "state of siege in the Party", "emergency laws against particular individuals and groups", etc. We not only can but we must create a "state of siege" in relation to unstable and vacillating elements, and all our Party

Rules, the whole system of centralism now endorsed by the Congress are nothing but a "state of siege" in respect to the numerous sources of *political vagueness*. It is special laws, even if they are emergency laws, that are needed as measures against vagueness, and the step taken by the Congress has correctly indicated the political direction to be followed, by having created a firm basis for *such* laws and *such* measures.

23

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STUDENT YOUTH

August 10 (23)

It is not only by reactionaries that the expression "false friends" is used; we know from the example of the liberals and Socialist-Revolutionaries that such "false friends" do exist. It is these false friends that are trying to persuade the youth that they have no need to distinguish between different trends. We, on the contrary, consider it the main task to develop an integral revolutionary world outlook, and the practical task for the future is to get the youth, when they are organising themselves, to apply to our committees.

AN ERA OF REFORMS

Yes, we are undoubtedly passing through an era of reforms, strange as these words may sound when applied to present-day Russia. There is stagnation in all spheres of home policy, except where these are linked up with the fight against the internal enemy, and despite this—or, to be more exact, precisely because of this—constant and unceasing efforts are being made to institute reforms, attempts at reforms in the sphere of the most critical and most salient social and political relations. The proletariat, which is awakening to class-conscious life, came forward fairly long ago as the real, the main, as the only irreconcilable foe of our autocratic police regime. However, an enemy such as the foremost social class cannot be fought with force alone, even with the most ruthless, best organised, and most thorough-going force. Such an enemy makes itself reckoned with and compels concessions, which, though they are always insincere, always half-hearted, often spurious and illusory, and usually hedged round with more or less subtly hidden traps, are nevertheless concessions, reforms that mark a whole era. Of course, these are not the reforms that denote a down-grade in political development, when a crisis has passed, the storm has abated, and those who have been left masters of the situation proceed to give effect to their own programme, or (as also happens) the programme taken over from their opponents. No, these are the reforms of an up-grade, when ever greater masses are being drawn into struggle, when the crisis is still in the offing, when every clash, in which hundreds of victims are carried off the field of battle, produces thousands of new fighters who are even grimmer, bolder, and better trained.

Such reforms are always foretokens and precursors of revolution. The recent measures partly effected and partly only projected by the tsarist government are indubitably of this nature, viz., the Bill on workers' mutual aid societies (this Bill has not been made public by the government and is known only from reports in the liberal bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye*), the laws on compensation for injured workers and on factory stewards. It is on this latter law that we now propose to dwell in greater detail.

The gist of the new law is that, under certain circumstances, the workers may have the right to representation in their relations with the employers, the right to certain rudiments of organisation. These rights are circumscribed by an incredible number of police regulations, restrictions, and qualifications. And indeed, it is first of all necessary to take into consideration that, according to the new law, the right of the workers to representation depends on the consent and initiative of the factory management and on the permission of the Boards for Factory and Mining Affairs. The right to representation *may* be accorded the workers by the factory owners, but they are in no way bound to do so under this law, besides which the Factory Board may refuse to permit representation, even if requested by the employer, on any grounds or even on no grounds whatever. Hence, from the very outset, the right of the *workers* to representation has been completely, unconditionally, and conclusively left to the discretion of the *employers and the police*. If it appears advantageous and desirable to the employers and the police, they may set up workers' representative bodies (on a very restricted basis)—that is the substance of the reform. I would add parenthetically that the law makes no mention whatever of workers' representation at government factories: at privately owned factories the workers' representatives *may* turn out to be new agents, new factory watchmen controlled by the police; at government factories there is always a sufficient number of agents and watchmen! The police do not ask for a reform in this field—hence, reform is not necessary here.

Further, workers' representation itself has been given an ugly twist. The workers are to be disunited, divided into *categories*; the regulations governing the division into

categories are subject to approval by the *governor*, as are *all regulations in general* that have any bearing on the organisation of representative bodies under the new law. The manufacturers and the police can and of course will arrange the categories in such a way as to hinder workers' solidarity and unity in every way possible, rouse and inflame discord not only among the various crafts and shops but also among workers of different nationalities, sex, age groups, degrees of skill, wage levels, etc., etc. Workers' representation can be and is useful to the workers exclusively in their uniting in a single body, for their unity, organisation and solidarity are the only source of strength to the downtrodden, oppressed wage-slaves of our civilisation, ground down as they are by toil. The tsarist autocracy wants to give the workers representation of *such* a kind and on *such* terms as to *disunite* them in every way possible and thus make them powerless.

The police-established categories will have to elect *candidates* for the post of steward on the basis of detailed police rules, the number of candidates to be designated by the police. The factory management will endorse one of the candidates at its own discretion, while the governor always has the right to remove any steward who "does not meet the requirements of his office", as the law puts it.

This whole police scheme is not so very subtle! The "office" of a steward obviously consists in being useful to the police, in being acceptable to them. The law says nothing about this, for such conditions are not spoken of; they are *engineered*. And it is more than simple to engineer this, once the governor, who is the head of the local police, is given the unrestricted right to remove an undesirable steward. Once again: would it not be more correct to call such a factory steward a factory watchman? The police can decide on the election of a very large number of candidates, of whom only one will be endorsed; for example, each category of say 50 to 100 people will be told to vote for 5 or 10 candidates. Will it not be possible in some cases to turn the list of elected candidates into a list of people to be kept under special surveillance or even subject to arrest? Formerly such lists were drawn up only by spies; but now will they not *perhaps* sometimes be drawn up by the workers

themselves? To the police there is nothing dangerous or even inconvenient in a list of candidates, since it is always the worst of them that will be endorsed, or no one at all, and new elections will be ordered.

In its effort to have the factory stewards meet the requirements of their police "office", the new law (like the majority of the Russian laws) has even overdone things. Candidates must not be under 25 years of age. The original Bill proposed a minimum age of 21; higher government circles deemed it more cautious and statesmanlike to raise it by four years so as to eliminate in advance "the most unruly elements of the industrial population", which, "according to information in possession of the Department of Police, are within the 17-20 age group" (from the explanatory motives of the Ministry of Finance, published in abridged form in *Vestnik Finansov*, and in full in *Osvobozhdeniye*). But that is not all. The factory management and the police may, in each particular instance, i.e., for each separate establishment, demand, firstly, a higher minimum age and, secondly, a certain length of service of the particular worker in the factory. It is, for example, possible that they may demand a minimum age of 40 and a service record of not less than 15 years as a condition for the right to be elected as candidate for the post of steward! There is one thing, however, to which the authors of this law, who so zealously safeguarded the interests of the police, did not apparently give sufficient thought: under such conditions will workers be at all eager to accept this "post" of steward? After all, the steward will be placed almost as much at the arbitrary disposal of the police as a mere village constable. The steward may be turned into an ordinary messenger boy, conveying the orders and explanations of the factory management to the workers. The steward will undoubtedly be required to render sheer spying services and to give accounts of the meetings of the workers' categories which are called by him and for the orderly conduct of which he is responsible. And yet, while providing for rules about stewards being released from work to perform their duties, the law maintains a modest silence as to whether the stewards are to receive remuneration, and if so from whom. Do the authors of this law really

think that stewards who have been released from work will not demand pay from the factory for this "free" time? Would they really serve as stewards, at the will of the manufacturers and governors, out of sheer love for these true friends of the working people?

The desire to turn stewards into factory watchmen is particularly evident also in Clause 3 of the new law: stewards are recognised as being representatives empowered to speak for the workers' categories only on matters concerning *fulfilment* of the terms of hire. When it comes to changing the terms of hire the stewards *have no right even to hint* at this! Fine workers' "representatives" indeed. And how absurd this ruling is, even from the standpoint of the authors of the law, who wanted to make it easier "to ascertain the true desires and needs of the workers" "particularly at a time when discontent and unrest have already arisen". In nine cases out of ten, unrest is the result of this very demand to *change* the terms of hire, and to bar the stewards from taking a hand in this matter is tantamount to reducing their role to practically nil. The authors of the law have become entangled in one of the countless contradictions of the autocracy, for to accord the workers' representatives (their genuine representatives, and not representatives by permission of the police) the right to demand changes in the terms of hire would mean granting them freedom of speech and inviolability of the person.

In general there can be no question of regarding the factory stewards as genuine representatives of the workers. Representatives must be elected only by the workers, without any endorsement by the police. A representative must be removed as soon as the workers who elected him pass a vote of non-confidence in him. A representative must render an account to a meeting of the workers whenever they demand this of him. According to our law, however, the steward alone is *authorised* to convene the workers of the category which has elected him, and, besides, this must be done when and where the factory management wants it. In other words, the steward is not obliged to call the workers together, and the management does not have to provide the time and the place. It would perhaps be more expedient not to talk about workers' representation at all than to

annoy the workers with this mere pretence of representation.

Workers' meetings inspire the autocracy with such fear (and a justified fear) that it categorically bans joint meetings of the various categories. "For the discussion of matters concerning several categories," the new law decrees, "the stewards of these categories alone shall meet." For the capitalists, and for the police government which protects them, it would indeed be extremely advantageous to set up numerically small categories of foremen, office employees, and highly paid workers, to set up numerically large categories of unskilled workers and ordinary workers—and then to permit meetings only of the stewards of different categories. But this means reckoning *without the real master*: the class-conscious proletariat is the master of its own fate and it will spurn these miserable police partitions in which they would segregate it. The workers will meet together to discuss their own affairs and will organise secret meetings of their own, genuine, Social-Democratic stewards, despite all bans.

But if this miserable reform to such a degree infects the embryo of workers' representation with a spirit of police espionage, would it not be better for the class-conscious workers to have nothing whatever to do with the election of factory stewards or the meetings of the "categories"? We believe that it would not. Refusal to take an active part in present-day political life, however disgusting it may be, is the tactic of anarchists, not of Social-Democrats. We shall and must be able to promote a widespread struggle of the workers against every loathsome trap in the new law, against every spying manoeuvre made with the help of the new law—and this fight will rouse the most backward workers, and will develop the political consciousness of all who take part in the Russian workers-police-gendarme-spy "representation". The Zubatov meetings corrupted workers' minds far more and much more directly than their minds will be corrupted by stewards who kowtow to the authorities, and yet we sent to those meetings class-conscious, workers who themselves learned and taught others, and yet this entire Zubatov epic ended in a miserable fiasco, after working to the advantage of Social-Democracy far more

than to that of the autocracy: the Odessa events[145] have left no shadow of doubt on that score.

The autocracy is beginning to talk about workers' meetings. Let us take advantage of this for the widest propaganda and agitation in support of the Social-Democratic demands for the full freedom of meetings and assembly. The autocracy is beginning to talk of elections; let us take advantage of this to acquaint the working masses with the meaning of elections, with all systems of elections, with all the tricks of the police during elections. And let the workers know this not only from books and talks, but from practice, from the example of the Russian, police-controlled elections, and by participating in these elections,* the class-conscious workers will teach ever greater masses to carry on election agitation, conduct meetings, defend their demands both at meetings and before the stewards, and organise a constant watch over the activities of the stewards. The autocracy is talking about workers' representation. Let us take advantage of this to spread correct ideas about genuine representation. Only a free *workers' union*, with members in many factories and many cities, can represent the workers. Factory representation, bodies representing the workers at each factory separately, cannot satisfy the workers even in the West, even in the free states. The leaders of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, in Germany, for example, have frequently protested against factory representation. And this can be readily understood, for the yoke of capital is too heavy, and the right to dismiss workers—the sacred right of capitalist free contract—will *always* render the representative body of the workers in each individual factory powerless. Only a workers' union which organises the workers of many factories and many localities will do away with dependence of the workers' representatives on the individual factory owner. Only a workers' union will provide all the means of struggle that can at all possibly exist under capitalism. But free-workers' unions are out of the question unless we have *political liberty*, inviolability of the person, freedom of assembly

* Naturally, organised workers should in no case be elected to the post of steward; suitable people from among the unorganised masses should be put forward as candidates.

and meetings, and the right freely to elect deputies to a national assembly.

Without political liberty all forms of workers' representation will remain a miserable fraud, and the proletariat will remain in prison as hitherto, without light, without air, and without the elbow-room it needs for the struggle to attain its complete emancipation. In this prison the government is now cutting a tiny aperture instead of a window, and in such a manner that this aperture is of more use to the gendarmes and spies who guard the prisoners than it is to the prisoners themselves. And this is the reform that the butchers of the Russian people want to pass off as a benefaction of the tsarist government! But the Russian working class will use this aperture to build up fresh energy for battle; it will raze to the ground the walls of the accursed all-Russian prison and win for itself free class representation in a bourgeois-democratic state.

Iskra, No. 46, August 15, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

THE LATEST WORD IN BUNDIST NATIONALISM

The Foreign Committee of the Bund has just issued a bulletin containing a report on the Fifth Congress of the Bund, which took place in June (Old Style). Preponderant among its resolutions are the "draft Rules" on the position of the Bund in the Party. This draft is highly instructive, and from the angle of definiteness and "resoluteness" of content, nothing better could be desired. Strictly speaking, the first paragraph of the draft is so striking as to reduce all the others to mere explanation or even to entirely useless ballast. "The Bund," declares § 1, "is a *federative* [italics ours] section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party." Federation presupposes an *agreement* between separate, entirely independent units, which define their mutual relations only by voluntary consent of the sides concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "draft Rules" speak repeatedly of the "*contracting parties*" (§§ 3, 8, 12). It is not surprising that, on the basis of this draft, the *Party Congress* is not given the right to alter, supplement or delete *Rules* relating to a *section* of the Party. Neither is it surprising that the Bund reserves to itself "representation" in the Central Committee of the Party and permits this Central Committee of the Party to address itself to the Jewish proletariat and to communicate with individual sections of the Bund "*only with the consent of the Central Committee of the Bund*". All this logically stems from the concept of "federation", from the concept of "contracting parties", and had the Fifth Congress of the Bund simply resolved that the Bund is to be constituted as an independent Social-Democratic national (or, perhaps, nationalist Social-Democratic?) party, it would have saved itself

(and others) much time, much labour, and much paper. On the one hand, it would have been clear at once without any circumlocution that an independent, separate party could determine its relations with other parties only as a "contracting party" and only on the basis of "mutual consent". There would have been no need to enumerate every individual case when such consent will be required (and it is impossible in fact to enumerate *all* such cases, while to give an incomplete list, as the Bund does, is to open the door to a host of misunderstandings). There would have been no need to do violence to logic and conscience by calling an agreement between two independent units Rules on the position of one section of the party. This apparently seemly and suitable name ("Rules on the Position of the Bund in the Party") is all the more false in essence since the entire Party has in fact not yet restored its full organisational unity, while the Bund comes out as an already united section, which wishes to take advantage of the shortcomings in the general organisation in order to get still farther away from the whole, *in order to try and split up this whole into small parts for all time.*

On the other hand, a straightforward treatment of the matter would have relieved the authors of the notorious draft Rules of the necessity to introduce clauses providing for rights already possessed by *every* organised section of the Party, every district organisation, every committee and every group, e.g., the right to solve, in accordance with the Party programme, general problems on which Party congresses have not adopted decisions. To write Rules including clauses such as these is simply ridiculous.

Let us now appraise in essence the stand taken by the Bund. Once it has stepped on to the inclined plane of nationalism, the Bund (if it did not wish to renounce its basic mistake) was naturally and inevitably bound to arrive at the formation of a particular Jewish party. And this is precisely the direct object of § 2 of the Rules, which grants the Bund the *monopoly* of representing the Jewish proletariat. According to this paragraph, the Bund is in the Party as its (the Jewish proletariat's) *sole* (italics ours) representative. The activities of the Bund and the organisation of the Bund are not to be restricted by any territorial

limits. Consequently, complete separation and demarcation of the Jewish and non-Jewish proletariat of Russia is not only here effected *to the end* with absolute consistency, but is endorsed by what may be called a notarial agreement, by "Rules", by a "basic" law (see § 12 of the draft). Such "outrageous" facts as the audacious appeal of the Ekaterinoslav Committee of the Party to the Jewish workers directly, not through the medium of the Bund (which had no special organisation in Ekaterinoslav at the time!), should henceforth become impossible, according to the idea of the new draft. However few the number of Jewish workers may be in a given locality, however far away this locality may be from the centres of the Bundist organisation, no section of the Party, not even the Central Committee of the Party, dare address itself to the Jewish proletariat without the consent of the Central Committee of the Bund! It is hard to believe that such a proposal could have been made, so monstrous is this demand for monopoly, especially in our Russian conditions, but §§ 2 and 8 (footnote) of the draft Rules leave no doubts whatever on this score. The desire of the Bund to shift still farther away from the Russian comrades is apparent not only in each clause of the draft, but is also expressed in other resolutions of the congress. For example, the Fifth Congress has resolved to publish once a month *Posledniye Izvestia*, issued by the Foreign Committee of the Bund, "in the form of a newspaper which would explain the programmatic and tactical position of the Bund". We shall be looking forward with impatience and interest to an explanation of this position. The congress has *annulled* the resolution of the Fourth Congress on work in the south. It is known that the Fourth Congress of the Bund decided that "*separate committees of the Bund shall not be set up*" (italicised by the Bund) in the towns and cities in the south, where the Jewish organisations are included in the Party committees. The reversal of this decision is a big step towards further isolation, a direct challenge to the comrades from the south, who have been working and wanted to work among the Jewish proletariat, while remaining inseparably connected with the local proletariat *as a whole*. "He who says A must say B"; one who has adopted the standpoint of nationalism naturally arrives at the desire to erect a Chinese Wall

around his nationality, his national working-class movement; he is unembarrassed even by the fact that it would mean building separate walls in each city, in each little town and village, unembarrassed even by the fact that by his tactics of division and dismemberment *he is reducing to nil* the great call for the rallying and unity of the proletarians of all nations, all races and all languages. And what bitter mockery sounds in the resolution of the same Fifth Congress of the Bund on pogroms, which expresses the "confidence that *only the joint struggle* of the proletarians of all nationalities will abolish the conditions giving rise to events similar to those at Kishinev"[146] (italics ours). How false these words about joint struggle sound when we are treated at the very same time to "Rules" which not only keep the joint fighters *far apart*, but strengthen this separation and alienation through organisational means! I should like very much to give the Bund nationalists a piece of advice: learn from those Odessa workers who went on a joint strike and attended joint meetings and joint demonstrations, without first asking (ah, the audacity!) for the "consent" of the Central Committee of the Bund for an appeal to the Jewish nation, and who reassured the shopkeepers with the words (see *Iskra*, No. 45): "Have no fear, have no fear, this is not Kishinev for you, what we want is something else, we have neither Jews nor Russians in our midst, we are *all workers*, life is equally hard for us all." Let the comrades of the Bund ponder over these words, if it is not too late; let them think well about whither they are going!

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Published according to the *Iskra* text

MARTOV'S CONTRADICTIONS AND ZIGZAGS

1. He lashed the Organising Committee for its vacillations and abrupt changes of front, for its quasi-*Iskra*-ism, but then brought the vacillators and quasi-*Iskra*-ists into the Central Committee.

2. He always defended *Iskra*'s ideas of organisation (*What Is to Be Done?*), but secured the incorporation of a Jaurèsist first clause in the Rules.

3. He agreed to the editorial board being reorganised into a trio, but then fought at the Congress for a board of six *quand même*.*

4. He fought against so-called "democratism", but insisted on "freedom" of co-optation to the central bodies.

Written at the end of August 1903

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Published according to the manuscript

* All the same.—*Ed.*

NOTES

[1] The Party programme adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903 was drawn up by the Editorial Board of Lenin's *Iskra* at the end of 1901 and the first half of 1902. V. I. Lenin played a prominent part in drawing up the draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P.

As early as 1895-96, while in prison, Lenin wrote the "Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party" (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 93-121); at the end of 1899, while in exile in Siberia, he prepared a new draft programme (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 227-54). When he began publication of *Iskra*, Lenin considered its most important task to be the struggle to achieve and consolidate the ideological unity of Russian Social-Democracy and to embody this unity in the Party programme. "The discussion of questions of theory and policy," he wrote, "will be connected with the drafting of a Party programme..." (see present edition, Vol. 4, "Draft of a Declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*", p. 324).

The question of drawing up a draft of the Party programme became particularly acute in the summer of 1901: "They have written to us from Russia that there is increasing talk of a congress," V. I. Lenin wrote to P. B. Axelrod on July 9, 1901. "This once again impels us to think of a programme. The publication of a draft programme is *extremely* necessary and would be of tremendous importance" (see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 87-88). On Lenin's suggestion, the original draft of the theoretical part of the programme was written by G. V. Plekhanov.

At a conference of the *Iskra* Editorial Board held in Munich in January 1902, Lenin sharply criticised Plekhanov's draft; he made over 30 notes, pointing out a series of propositions in the draft that were incorrect in principle (see pp. 17-24 of this volume). Under the influence of criticism by Lenin and other members of the Editorial Board, Plekhanov rewrote the first two paragraphs of his draft, but he did not agree with most of the other notes and proposals. During discussion of Plekhanov's draft by the *Iskra* Editorial Board, big differences of opinion were revealed; one of the most serious was evoked by Lenin's proposal to begin the programme by pointing to the development of capitalism in Russia; in notes written after the conference Lenin wrote: "The question whether or not to begin by pointing to Russia has been left open (3 votes in favour and 3 against)." (*Lenin Miscellany II*, 1924, p. 15.)

Convinced that Plekhanov's draft of the theoretical part of the programme was unacceptable, Lenin set about writing his own draft. The initial version of Lenin's draft (in the correspondence of the members of the *Iskra* Editorial Board—"Frey's draft") was written by January 25 (February 7), 1902; Lenin completed work on his draft by February 18 (March 3), 1902 (see pp. 25-31 and 32 of this volume). Simultaneously Plekhanov was also working on his second draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. This too came in for serious critical analysis by Lenin (see pp. 35-55 and 56-58 of this volume). To co-ordinate Lenin's and Plekhanov's drafts of the programme and draw up a joint draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. the *Iskra* Editorial Board set up a "Co-ordinating" Committee.

In its work this Committee took Plekhanov's draft as a basis. However, as a result of Lenin's insistent demands, a number of very important propositions were included in the Committee's draft: the thesis of the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production replaced Plekhanov's indefinite and vague formulation; a definition more precise than in Plekhanov's draft was given of the purely proletarian character of the Party; the thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an essential condition of the socialist revolution became a point of the highest importance in the programme. Lenin got acquainted with the Committee's draft programme on April 12, 1902, while travelling from Munich to London, and he wrote his remarks on it during the journey (see pp. 59-70 of this volume)

At the conference of the *Iskra* Editorial Board held in Zurich on April 14, 1902, which Lenin did not attend, the general editorial draft of the programme was confirmed: its theoretical part (the Committee's) and the practical Part (already agreed to by all the members of the *Iskra* Editorial Board in early March 1902). Most of the notes, amendments, and additions proposed by Lenin were taken into account by the authors of the draft programme, when it was discussed at the Zurich conference.

The draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. drawn up by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* was published in *Iskra*, No. 21, June 1, 1902, and the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held July 17-August 10 (July 30-August 23), 1903, adopted the *Iskra* draft programme of the Party, with minor changes.

The programme of the R.S.D.L.P. existed until 1919, when a new programme was adopted at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). The theoretical part of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P., which described the general laws and tendencies of capitalist development, was included in the new programme of the R.C.P.(B.) on V. I. Lenin's proposal. p. 15

[2] *The Erfurt Programme* of the German Social-Democratic Party was adopted in October 1891 at the Congress in Erfurt. Compared with the Gotha Programme (1875), it was a step forward, being based on the Marxist doctrine that the capitalist mode of production must inevitably yield place to the socialist; it stressed the need for the working class to wage a political struggle, indi-

cating the party's role as the organiser of this struggle, etc. However, the Erfurt Programme, too, contained serious concessions to opportunism. It was extensively criticised by Frederick Engels ("Criticism of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891"), this being in essence a criticism of the opportunism of the entire Second International, for whose parties the Erfurt Programme was a kind of model. However, the leadership of German Social-Democracy concealed Engels' criticism from the party rank and file, while his most important remarks were ignored when the final text of the programme was drawn up. V. I. Lenin and G. V. Plekhanov considered that the Erfurt Programme's silence on the dictatorship of the proletariat was its chief defect and a cowardly concession to opportunism. p. 19

[3] *Frey*—V. I. Lenin's pseudonym. p. 25

[4] *Collective liability* was a compulsory measure making the peasants of each village commune collectively liable for timely and full payments and for the fulfilment of all sorts of services to the state and the landlords (payment of taxes and land redemption instalments, provision of recruits for the army, etc.). This form of bondage was retained even after serfdom had been abolished, and remained in force until 1906. p. 30

[5] This refers to the following proposition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*: "Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie." (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*—in three volumes,—Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 118.) p. 35

[6] Lenin is referring to Frederick Engels' article, "A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891". p. 36

[7] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Recorder)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards; it expressed the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia, and insisted on the need for reforms that would transform Russia into a constitutional monarchy. Among its contributors in the 1880s and 1890s were the democratic writers M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin, G. I. Uspensky, and V. G. Korolenko. It also published items written by liberal Narodniks. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the bourgeois Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party. Lenin said that *Russkiye Vedomosti* was "a unique combination of *Right* Cadetism and Narodnik overtones" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 135). In 1918 the publication was closed down together with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 41

[8] This refers to Karl Marx's *Provisional Rules of the International Working Men's Association* adopted on November 1, 1864, at

a meeting of the General Council of the First International, and the *General Rules of the International Working Men's Association* adopted in September 1871 by the London Conference of the First International, which took the *Provisional Rules* of the International as its basis (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1969, pp. 19-21). p. 47

[9] *The Mountain* (la Montagne) and the *Gironde* were the names of two political groupings of the bourgeoisie at the time of the French bourgeois revolution of the end of the eighteenth century. The Mountain—the Jacobins—was the name given to the more determined representatives of the revolutionary class of the time—the bourgeoisie—who advocated the abolition of absolutism and feudalism. Unlike the Jacobins, the Girondists wavered between revolution and counter-revolution, and entered into deals with the monarchy.

Lenin called the opportunist trend in Social-Democracy the "socialist Gironde," and the revolutionary Social-Democrats—"proletarian Jacobins," the "Mountain". After the R.S.D.L.P. split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin frequently stressed that the Mensheviks were the Girondist trend of the working-class movement. p. 48

[10] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, pp. 117-18. p. 49

[11] This refers to Frederick Engels' article, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany", in which he criticised the agrarian programme of the Workers' Party of France, adopted at the Marseilles Party Congress in 1892 and enlarged at the Nantes Party Congress in 1894 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 57-76). p. 49

[12] Frederick Engels, "A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891". p. 50

[13] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—a theoretical magazine of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Before October 1917, it was edited by Karl Kautsky, later by Heinrich Cunow. Some of the writings of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were first published in *Die Neue Zeit*: "Critique of the Gotha Programme" by Karl Marx (in No. 18, 1890-91) "A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891" by Frederick Engels (in No. 1, 1901-02) and others. Engels constantly helped the Editorial Board of the magazine with his advise, and not infrequently criticised it for allowing deviations from Marxism to appear in it. Contributors to *Die Neue Zeit* included prominent leaders of the German and international working-class movement at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, such as August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, G. V. Plekhanov, Paul Lafar-

gue, and Victor Adler. From the second half of the nineties, the periodical began systematically publishing article by revisionists, including a series of articles by Eduard Bernstein entitled "Problems of Socialism", which opened the revisionists' campaign against Marxism. During the First World War the magazine adopted a Centrist, Kautskian position, in actual fact supporting the social-chauvinists. p. 50

[14] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 24. p. 52

[15] Frederick Engels, "A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891". p. 52

[16] V. I. Lenin's remarks on the Committee's draft of the theoretical part of the programme were written in the margins and between the lines of the manuscript of the Committee's draft, and also on the backs of the manuscript pages. Particular points in the Committee's draft which Lenin singled out (by underlining, brackets, vertical lines in the margin, etc.) are underscored with fine lines. p. 59

[17] *Zarya* (Dawn)—a Marxist scientific and political magazine, was published in 1901-02 in Stuttgart by the *Iskra* Editorial Board Only four numbers (three books) of *Zarya* were issued: No. 1—in April 1901 (which actually appeared on March 23, New Style); No. 2-3—in December 1901; No. 4—in August 1902.

The tasks of *Zarya* were defined in the draft declaration of *Iskra* and *Zarya* which V. I. Lenin wrote in Russia (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 320-30). However, when the question of joint publication of these organs abroad was discussed with the Emancipation of Labour group, it was decided to publish *Zarya* legally and *Iskra* illegally; consequently there was no mention of *Zarya* in the declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra*, a declaration published in October 1900.

Zarya criticised international and Russian revisionism, and defended the theoretical principles of Marxism. It published V. I. Lenin's writings: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", "Messrs. the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question" (the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and 'the Critics of Marx'"), "Review of Internal Affairs", "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" and also G. V. Plekhanov's "Criticism of Our Critics. Part 1. Mr. Struve as Critic of Marx's Theory of Social Development", "Kant *versus* Kant, or Herr Bernstein's Spiritual Testament", and others. p. 70

[18] This refers to the third volume of Karl Marx's *Capital*. Below is a reference to the second volume of *Capital*. p. 73

[19] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 as a

result of the union of Narodnik groups and circles. The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia) (1900-05) and the magazine *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (Herald of the Russian Revolution) (1901-05) became its official organs. The views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism, they tried, as Lenin put it, to patch up "the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not see the class distinctions between proletariat and peasantry, glossed over the class differentiation and contradictions within the peasantry, and rejected the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. The tactic of individual terrorism which the Socialist-Revolutionaries advocated as a basic method of struggle against the autocracy caused great detriment to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land and its transfer to the village communes on the basis of equalitarian tenure, and also the development of all forms of co-operatives. There was nothing socialist in this programme, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to present as a programme for "socialising the land", since abolition of private ownership of the land, as Lenin pointed out, cannot of itself abolish the domination of capital and the poverty of the masses. The struggle for the abolition of landlord ownership was the real, historically progressive content of the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This demand objectively expressed the interests and aspirations of the peasantry at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the attempts of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to camouflage themselves as socialists, waged a stubborn struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries to gain influence over the peasantry, and laid bare the harmful consequences for the working-class movement of their tactic of individual terrorism. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks concluded temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against tsarism.

In the final analysis, the absence of class homogeneousness in the peasantry was responsible for the political and ideological instability and organisational confusion in the Socialist-Revolutionary party, and their constant vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There was a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party already in the years of the first Russian revolution: its Right wing formed the legal Labour Popular-Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Constitutional-Democrats (Cadets); the "Left" wing took shape as the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction, the Socialist-Revolutionary party experienced a complete ideological and organisational break-down, and the First World War saw most Socialist-Revolutionaries adopt the standpoint of social-chauvinism.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, of which leaders of the party (Kerensky, Avxentyev, Chernov) were members. Influenced by the revolutionising of the peasantry, the "Left" wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries founded an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries at the end of November 1917. Striving to maintain their influence among the peasant masses, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries formally recognised Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon began a struggle against Soviet power. During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activity, strongly supported the interventionists and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the civil war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries continued their hostile activity against the Soviet state within the country and abroad among whiteguard émigrés. p. 74

[20] *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii. Sotsialno-Politichcskoye Obozreniye* (Herald of the Russian Revolution. Socio-Political Review)—an illegal magazine published abroad (Paris-Geneva) in 1901-05; four numbers were issued. Beginning with No. 2 it became the theoretical organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Among contributors to the periodical were M. R. Gots (A. Levitsky), I. A. Rubanovich, V. M. Chernov (Y. Gardenin), Y. K. Breshko-Breshkovskaya. p. 74

[21] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918. In the early nineties it passed into the hands of the liberal Narodniks headed by N. K. Mikhailovsky, and became the chief Narodnik organ. As such, in 1893, it began a campaign against the Russian Social-Democrats. In its distortion and falsification of Marxism, Russkoye Bogatstvo relied on the West-European revisionists; grouped round it were publicists who subsequently became prominent members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the "Popular Socialists" and the Trudovik (Labour) groups in the Dumas.

From 1906 *Russkoye Bogatstvo* became the organ of the semi-Cadet party of "Popular Socialists". The magazine changed its title several times: *Sovremenniye Zapiski* (Contemporary Notes), *Sovremennost* (Modern Times), *Russkiye Zapiski* (Russian Notes); from April 1917 it again became *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. p. 74

[22] "*An Amendment to the Agrarian Section of the Programme*" was presented by Lenin for discussion by the other members of the *Iskra* Editorial Board.

To conduct a vote on this amendment, Lenin wrote at the end of the manuscript the pseudonyms or initials of the members

of the *Iskra* Editorial Board: G. V.—Plekhanov; P. B.—Axelrod; V. I.—Zasulich; Berg—pseudonym of Y. 0. Martov; A. N.—Potresov. p. 75

[23] Lenin calls his work entitled *The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy* a commentary on the agrarian section of the Party programme (see pp. 105-48 of this volume). p. 75

[24] According to the "Regulation Governing Redemption by Peasants Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence..." adopted on February 19, 1861 the peasants were obliged to pay compensation to the landlords for land allotted to them. In concluding the land redemption deal, the tsarist government paid over to the landlords the compensation money, which was regarded as a debt of the peasants payable over a period of 49 years. The instalments of this debt, which the peasants paid annually, were called land redemption payments, whose heavy and intolerable burden resulted in mass ruination and impoverishment of the peasants. The landlords' former peasants alone paid the tsarist government about 2,000 million rubles at a time when the market price of the land which had passed to the peasants did not exceed 544 million rubles. As all the peasants did not come under the land redemption scheme at once, but at various times until 1883, the land redemption payments were to be completed only by 1932. However, the peasant movement during the first Russian revolution of 1905-07 compelled the tsarist government to abolish land redemption payments as from January 1907. p. 75

[25] "*Redemption is nothing but purchase*" was said by Volgin, one of the characters in N. G. Chernyshevsky's *Prologue*, which expressed N. G. Chernyshevsky's own attitude to the "emancipation" of the peasants in 1861. p. 75

[26] This refers to the assassination of Bogolepov, Minister of Public Education, in February 1901 by a student named Karpovich. General Vannovsky, former Minister of War, was appointed Minister of Public Education in Bogolepov's place. p. 77

[27] The reference is to the "*Provivional Regulations for the Organisation of Student Bodies in Higher Educational Institutions under the Ministry of Public Education*", adopted on December 22, 1901 (January 4, 1902) by Vannovsky, Minister of Public Education. Dissatisfied with the "provisional regulations", which put their organisations under constant administrative control, the students protested against this fresh act of governmental arbitrariness and refused to recognise these "regulations". Even liberal professors protested against the "provisional regulations", which imposed on them the duty of police surveillance over the students. p. 77

[28] *Nicholas* (*Nika-Milusha*) *Obmanov*—a character in A. V. Amfiteatrov's *feuilleton*, "Messrs. the Obmanovs", published in the newspa-

per *Rossiya* (Russia) on January 13 (26), 1902. In veiled form the *feuilleton* gave a satirical character sketch of the last Romanovs: Nicholas I, Alexander II, Alexander III and his wife Maria Fyodorovna, and the then reigning Emperor Nicholas II. For publication of this *feuilleton* the newspaper was suppressed and Amfiteatrov exiled to Minusinsk. The article, "Messrs. the Obmanovs", was widely distributed throughout Russia in illegal editions and handwritten copies. p. 78

[29] V. I. Lenin is quoting Lev Tolstoi's article, "Concerning Starvation". p. 82

[30] *Iskra* (The Spark)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, which Lenin founded in 1900 and which played a decisive part in creating the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class.

Since police persecution made publication of a revolutionary newspaper impossible in Russia, Lenin, while in exile in Siberia, worked out all details of a plan for publishing one abroad. When his exile ended (January 1900), he immediately set about giving effect to this plan. In February 1900 Lenin conducted negotiations in St. Petersburg with V. I. Zasulich, who had illegally come there from abroad, on participation of the Emancipation of Labour group in publishing an all-Russian Marxist newspaper. In late March and early April 1900, the so-called "Pskov Conference" took place, at which V. I. Lenin, Y. O. Martov, A. N. Potresov and S. I. Radchenko, together with the "legal Marxists" P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, discussed Lenin's draft editorial declaration on the programme and tasks of an all-Russian newspaper (*Iskra*) and a scientific-political magazine (*Zarya*). Lenin visited a number of Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga, Smolensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, Samara, Syzran), established connections with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats and came to an agreement with them concerning support for the future *Iskra*. When Lenin arrived in Switzerland in August 1900, he and A. N. Potresov had a conference with members of the Emancipation of Labour group concerning the programme and tasks of the newspaper and the magazine, possible contributors, and the composition and location of the editorial board. These negotiations almost ended in a rupture (see present edition, Vol. 4, "How the 'Spark' Was Nearly Extinguished", pp. 333-49), but finally agreement on all the questions at issue was reached with the Emancipation of Labour group.

The first number of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900, while the following numbers came out in Munich, in London from July 1902 and in Geneva from the spring of 1903. Great assistance in organising the publication of *Iskra* was given by the German Social-Democrats Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun and others, by the Polish revolutionary Julian Marchlewski who was living in Munich at the time, and by Harry Quelch, one of the leaders of the British Social-Democratic Federation. The Editorial Board of *Iskra* consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov,

Y. O. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov, and V. I. Zasulich. I. G. Smidovich-Leman was the first secretary of the Editorial Board, to be later followed, from the spring of 1901, by N. K. Krupskaya, who also dealt with all *Iskra*'s correspondence with Russian Democratic organisations.

Iskra centred its attention on problems of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and all the working people of Russia against the tsarist autocracy, but it also paid great attention to leading international events, and chiefly to the international working-class movement. In actual fact Lenin was the editor-in-chief and leader of *Iskra*; he wrote articles on all the main questions of Party construction and the Russian proletariat's class struggle.

Iskra became the centre for the unification of the Party's forces, mobilising and training the Party's cadres. In a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara, etc.) R.S.D.L.P. groups and committees of Lenin's *Iskra* trend were established, and in January 1902 a Russian *Iskra* organisation was set up at a conference of *Iskra* supporters held in Samara. The *Iskra* organisations were created and carried out their work under the direct guidance of Lenin's pupils and comrades-in-arms: N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, P. A. Krasikov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky, I. I. Radchenko, and others.

On Lenin's initiative and with his direct participation, the *Iskra* Editorial Board drew up the draft Party programme (published in No. 21 of *Iskra*) and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which took place in July-August 1903. When the Congress met, most local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had adhered to *Iskra*, approved its tactics, programme, and organisational plan, and recognised it as their leading organ. A special decision of the Congress noted the unique role of *Iskra* in the struggle for the Party, and appointed it the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. The Second Congress ratified an editorial board consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov, and Martov. Martov, who insisted on retention of all six former editors, refused to go on the board, despite the Party Congress decision, and Nos. 46-51 of the paper appeared under the editorship of Lenin and Plekhanov. Later Plekhanov went over to the Menshevik position, and demanded that the *Iskra* Editorial Board should include all the old Menshevik editors rejected by the Congress. Lenin could not agree to this, and on October 19 (November 1), 1903, he left the *Iskra* Editorial Board. He was co-opted into the Central Committee and from there conducted a struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. No. 52 of *Iskra* appeared under the editorship of Plekhanov alone. On November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, acting alone and in defiance of the Congress, co-opted the former Menshevik editors into the *Iskra* Editorial Board. Beginning with No. 52, the Mensheviks transformed *Iskra* into their own organ. p. 84

[31] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864.

The powers of the Zemstvos were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the provincial governors and by the Ministry of the Interior, which could overrule any decisions disapproved by the government. p. 84

[32] In speaking of the "*Novoye Vremya* panegyrics" V. I. Lenin has in mind the reactionary trend of the tsarist Russian press as typified by the newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (New Times) which was published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917.

Novoye Vremya-ism was an expression used to denote reactionism, venality, and toadyism. p. 85

[33] V. I. Lenin has in view the "Report of the State Savings-Banks for 1899", published by the Board of the State Savings-Banks (year of publication not indicated). p. 85

[34] The calculation is inaccurate: 157,000 is not one-sixth, but approximately one-twelfth of the two million factory workers. p. 87

[35] *Bastiat*—French bourgeois economist of the first half of the nineteenth century. Bastiat preached civil peace, the "harmony of interests" of the various classes of bourgeois society. Karl Marx in his work, "Carey and Bastiat", written in July-December 1857, sharply criticised and ridiculed Bastiat's doctrine.

Schulze-Delitzsch—German economist and supporter of Bastiat. In an effort to divert workers and artisans, who were becoming proletarianised, from the revolutionary struggle, he advocated the establishment of co-operative societies and loan and savings-banks, which, he claimed, could improve the proletariat's condition within the framework of capitalism and save the artisan small producers from ruin. p. 92

[36] Report of the *Iskra* Editorial Board, which was written by Lenin, was intended for the conference of committees and organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. held on March 23-28 (April 5-10), 1902, in Belostok. Represented at the conference were: the St. Petersburg and Ekaterinoslav committees of the R.S.D.L.P., the League of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., the Central Committee of the Bund and its Foreign Committee, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, and the *Iskra* Editorial Board (whose representative, F. I. Dan, had a mandate from the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad). Through the fault of the conference organisers, who were "economists", the delegate of the *Iskra* Editorial Board arrived late, after the conference had begun, while F. V. Lengnik, the representative of the Russian *Iskra* organisation, did not get to the conference at all, although he arrived in Belostok in good time. The representative of the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee (*Iskra* trend), A. I. Piskunov, who arrived in Belostok before Dan, protested at the absence of representatives of organisations of the *Iskra*

trend, and soon left. The "economists" and the Bundists, who supported them, had intended to convert the conference into the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., reckoning thereby to strengthen their own position in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy and paralyse *Iskra*'s growing influence. Their attempt, however, failed, both because of the conference's comparatively limited composition (only four of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations operating in Russia were represented) and the deep disagreements on matters of principle, which were revealed at the conference; in particular, the *Iskra* delegate, who raised strong objection to the conference being converted into a Party congress, stated that the conference had not been properly prepared and authorised.

The Belostok Conference adopted a constituting resolution and a theoretical resolution, proposed by the delegate of the Bund Central Committee, with amendments made by the representative of the League of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. (the *Iskra* delegate, who had advanced his own draft of the theoretical resolution, voted against). The conference also approved the text of a May Day leaflet, which was based on a draft drawn up by the *Iskra* Editorial Board. The conference elected an Organising Committee to prepare the Second Party Congress, consisting of representatives of *Iskra* (F. I. Dan), the League of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. (O. A. Yermansky), and the Central Committee of the Bund (K. Portnoi). Soon after the conference, most of its delegates including two members of the Organising Committee, were arrested by the police. A new Organising Committee to prepare the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was formed in November 1902 in Pskov at a conference of representatives of the R.S.D.L.P.'s St. Petersburg Committee, the Russian organisation of *Iskra*, and the *Yuzhny Rabochy* (Southern Worker) group. p. 95

[37] "*Economism*"—an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, a Russian variety of international opportunism. The newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought) (1897-1902) and the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause) (1899-1902) were organs of the "economists".

In 1899 there appeared *Credo*, a manifesto of the "economists", which was drawn up by E. D. Kuskova. When Lenin, then in exile, received a copy of *Credo*, he wrote "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats", in which he sharply criticised the programme of the "economists". This protest was discussed and unanimously adopted at a conference of 17 Marxists serving terms of political exile, held in the village of Yermakovskoye, in Minusinsk Region. The "economists" limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events.

In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the "economists" belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could arise out of the spontaneous movement, denied the need to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The "economists", who opposed the need to create a centralised working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles and fostered confusion and wavering in the Social-Democratic movement. "Economism" threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

Lenin's *Iskra* played a major part in the struggle against "economism". By his book, *What Is to Be Done?*, which appeared in March 1902, V. I. Lenin brought about the final ideological rout of "economism". p. 96

[38] *Nakanune* (On the Eve)—a monthly magazine of the Narodnik trend, published in Russian in London from January 1899 to February 1902 under the editorship of W. A. Serebryakov; 37 numbers were issued. Grouped round the magazine, which advocated general democratic views, were representatives of various petty-bourgeois parties and trends; a hostile attitude to Marxism in general and to Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy in particular was characteristic of *Nakanune*. p. 96

[39] *Svoboda* (Freedom)—a magazine published in Switzerland by the "revolutionary-socialist" group *Svoboda*, founded by E. O. Zelensky (Nadezhdin) in May 1901. Only two numbers of the magazine appeared: No. 1 in 1901 and No. 2 in 1902. V. I. Lenin considered that the *Svoboda* group belonged to those groups which had "no stable or serious principles, programmes, tactics, organisation, and no roots among the masses" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 237). In its publications (besides *Svoboda*, the group published *The Eve of Revolution. An Irregular Review of Problems of Theory and Tactics*, No. 1; the newspaper-magazine *Otkliki* [Responses], No. 1; Nadezhdin's programmatic pamphlet, *The Rebirth of Revolutionism in Russia*, and others) the *Svoboda* group advocated the ideas of terrorism and "economism". In a bloc with the St. Petersburg "economists", it came out against *Iskra* and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The group ceased to exist in 1903. p. 96

[40] *The Bund*—the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia—was organised in 1897 at an inaugural congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilno; in the main, it united semi-proletarian elements of the Jewish artisans in the Western regions of Russia. At the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1898), the Bund joined the Party "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in regard to questions specially concerning the Jewish proletariat".

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the Russian working-class movement and took an opportunist stand on the most important questions of the Social-Democratic movement. In April 1901, the Bund's Fourth Congress voted for abolition of the organisational relations established by the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., stating in its resolution that it regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federative association of national organisations which the Bund should join as a federative unit.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which rejected the Bund's demand that it should be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party rejoining it in 1906, on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P., the Bundists constantly supported its opportunist wing (the "economists", Mensheviks, and liquidators), and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. To the Bolshevik programme's demand for the right of nations to self-determination the Bund opposed the demand for cultural and national autonomy. During the years of the Stolypin reaction, the Bund adopted a liquidators' stand and took an active part in forming the anti-Party August bloc. During the First World War, the Bundists took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917 the Bund supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution, its leadership joining the forces of counter-revolution during the years of foreign military intervention and civil war. At the same time a swing towards co-operation with Soviet power was to be observed among the Bund rank and file. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself, part of its members joining the R.C.P.(B.) on a general basis. p. 97

[41] The reference is to the Baku and Kishinev print-shops of *Iskra*.

The Kishinev print-shop was organised by L. I. Goldman in April 1901 and existed until March 12 (25), 1902. It printed G. V. Plekhanov's article, "What Next?" (reprinted from No. 2-3 of *Zarya*), N. K. Krupskaya's pamphlet, *The Working Woman*, *The Indictment in the Case of the May Disturbances at the Obukhov Factory* (reprinted from *Iskra*, No. 9, with V. I. Lenin's article, "The New Battle", as a supplement), V. I. Lenin's articles, "The Struggle Against Starvation" (reprinted from No. 2-3 of *Zarya*) and "The Beginning of Demonstrations" (reprinted from *Iskra*, No. 13), and also a number of manifestos and leaflets. No. 10 of *Iskra* was reprinted at this print-shop.

The Baku print-shop (called "Nina" in secret correspondence) was organised in September 1901 by a group of Baku *Iskra*-ists (V. Z. Ketskhoveli, L. B. Krasin, L. I. Galperin, N. P. Kozerenko, V. Sturua, and others) with the assistance of the Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Prior to March 1902, when the "Nina" print-shop temporarily discontinued its work, it had printed the pamphlets, *Spiders and Flies*, by W. Liebknecht, *The Ways People Live*, by S. Dikstein, *The Speech of Pyotr Alexeyev*, *The Tenth Anniversary of the Morozov Strike*, and proclamations and leaflets in Russian

and Georgian. The Baku print-shop reprinted No. 11 of *Iskra* and printed the Georgian illegal Marxist newspaper *Brdzola* (The Struggle). After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Baku print-shop became the central Party print-shop and carried out tasks set by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. In December 1905, the print-shop was closed down by decision of the Central Committee of the Party. p. 99

[42] *The Emancipation of Labour group*—the first Russian Marxist group—was founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Switzerland in 1883. Besides Plekhanov, the group included P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. I. Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov.

The Emancipation of Labour group did much to propagate Marxism in Russia. It translated into the Russian language works by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, such as *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, *Wage Labour and Capital*, *Socialism*: *Utopian and Scientific*, publishing them abroad and distributing them in Russia, and also popularised Marxism through its publications. The Emancipation of Labour group dealt a severe blow at Narodism, which was the chief ideological obstacle to the spread of Marxism and the development of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. In his works, *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885), and others, G. V. Plekhanov gave a Marxist criticism of the Narodnik theories of Russia's non-capitalist path of development, the Narodniks' subjective-idealist view of the role of the individual in history, the denial of the proletariat's leading role in the revolutionary movement, etc. Written by Plekhanov and published by the Emancipation of Labour group, the two draft programmes of the Russian Social-Democrats (1883 and 1885) were an important step in preparing for and creating the Social-Democratic Party in Russia. Of special importance in spreading Marxist views and in substantiating and defending dialectical and historical materialism was Plekhanov's (N. Beltov's) book, *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895), on "which has helped to rear a whole generation of Russian Marxists" (see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 269). The group published and distributed in Russia four issues of the magazine *Sotsial-Demokrat*, as well as a series of popular pamphlets for workers.

Engels welcomed the appearance of the Emancipation of Labour group, "which frankly and without equivocation accepted the great economic and historical theories of Marx" (see Frederick Engels' Letter to V. I. Zasulich, April 23, 1885. Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 459). G. V. Plekhanov and V. I. Zasulich were personal friends of Engels and corresponded with him for many years. The Emancipation of Labour group established contacts with the international working-class movement and, beginning with the First Congress of the Second International in 1889 (Paris) and throughout the whole of its existence represented Russian Social-Democracy at all congresses of the International. But the views of the Emancipation of Labour group also contained serious errors: over-estimation of the liberal bourgeoi-

sie's role and under-estimation of the revolutionary nature of peasantry as the reserve force of the proletarian revolution. These were the germ of the future Menshevik views held by Plekhanov and other members of the group. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the Emancipation of Labour group "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 278).

In 1894 the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was formed on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group. The members of the Emancipation of Labour group and their adherents left the Union in 1900 and founded the *Sotsial-Demokrat* revolutionary organisation. G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, and V. I. Zasulich, who were members of the group, were on the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1903, the Emancipation of Labour group announced that it had ceased to exist. p. 101

[43] *Bernsteinism*—a trend hostile to Marxism in the German and international Social-Democratic movement, which originated at the end of the nineteenth century and was named after Eduard Bernstein, the most outspoken representative of revisionism.

In 1896-98 Bernstein wrote a series of articles entitled "Problems of Socialism" for the magazine *Die Neue Zeit*, the theoretical organ of German Social-Democracy. In these articles, he tried under the guise of "freedom of criticism" to revise (hence the word "revisionism") the philosophical, economic, and political foundations of revolutionary Marxism and to substitute for them bourgeois theories of reconciliation of class contradictions, and of class collaboration. He attacked Marx's doctrine of the impoverishment of the working class, the growth of class contradictions, crises the inevitable collapse of capitalism, socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and brought forward a programme of social-reformism expressed in the formula: "the movement is everything, the final goal—nothing". In 1899 Bernstein's articles appeared in a book entitled *The Premises of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy*. The book had the support of German Social-Democracy's Right wing, and of opportunist elements in other parties of the Second International, including the Russian "economists".

Bernsteinism was condemned at the congresses of the German Social-Democratic Party in Stuttgart (October 1898), Hanover (October 1899), and Lübeck (September 1901). However, the Party leadership did not show sufficient determination in opposing Bernstein and his adherents, but adopted a conciliatory attitude. The Bernsteinites continued their open propaganda of revisionist ideas in the magazine *Socialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly) and in the Party organisations.

Headed by V. I. Lenin, the Bolshevik Party alone waged a consistent and resolute struggle against Bernsteinism and its adherents and followers in Russia. As early as 1899, Lenin came

out against the Bernsteinites in his "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" and in his article, "Our Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82 and 210-14). His writings, "Marxism and Revisionism" (see present edition, Vol. 15), "Differences in the European Labour Movement" (see present edition, Vol. 16), and others, were also devoted to an exposure of Bernsteinism. p. 103

[44] The reference is to the Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, issued in 1898 by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the instructions and in the name of the Party's First Congress. The Manifesto put forward the struggle for political liberty and the overthrow of the autocracy as the chief task of Russian Social-Democracy, and linked the political struggle with the general tasks of the working-class movement. p. 103

[45] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause)—a magazine that was the organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It was published in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902 under the editorship of B. N. Krichevsky, P. F. Teplov (Sibiryak), V. P. Ivanshin, and later also A. S. Martynov. Twelve numbers (9 books) were issued in all. The Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was the "economists'" centre abroad. The magazine supported Bernstein's slogan of "freedom of criticism" of Marxism, took an opportunist stand on questions of Russian Social-Democracy's tactics and organisational tasks, denied the revolutionary possibilities of the peasantry, and so on. Its supporters propagated opportunist ideas of subordinating the proletariat's political struggle to the economic, exalted spontaneity in the working-class movement and denied the Party's leading role. V. P. Ivanshin, one of the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, also took part in editing *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought), organ of the outspoken "economists", which *Rabocheye Dyelo* supported. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the *Rabocheye Dyelo* supporters represented the extreme Right, opportunist wing of the Party. p. 104

[46] Written in February and the first half of March 1902, the article, "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", which V. I. Lenin called a commentary to the agrarian section of the R.S.D.L.P.'s draft programme, was published in *Zarya*, No. 4, in August 1902. When the article was discussed by the *Iskra* Editorial Board, serious differences of opinion arose: G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and other members of the board opposed certain of its most important propositions (e.g., on land nationalisation, etc.). A number of passages, including those dealing with land nationalisation, were omitted when this article was published in *Zarya*.

The article in the present edition of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works* is published according to the original manuscript.

The postscript is not contained in the manuscript; it is given here from the text of the article in *Zarya*. p. 105

[47] The reference is to Karl Kautsky's book, *Die Agrarfrage. Eine Übersicht über die Tendensen der modernen Landwirtschaft und die Agrarpolitik der Sozialdemokratie*. (The Agrarian Question. A Review of the Tendencies of Modern Agriculture and the Agrarian Policy of Social-Democracy), published in Stuttgart in 1899. p. 119

[48] *Narodnaya Volya* (The People's Will)—a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists, which arose in August 1879, following a split in the secret society Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty). The Narodnaya Volya was headed by an Executive Committee which included A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya, A. A. Kvyatkovsky. While continuing to uphold Utopian Narodnik socialism, the members of the Narodnaya Volya (Narodovoltsi) at the same time put forward the task of achieving political liberty. Their programme envisaged the organisation of "permanent popular representation" created on the basis of universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of the land to the people, and the working out of measures for handing over the factories to the workers. The overthrow of the tsarist autocracy was the immediate aim of the Narodnaya Volya, but, since it had no links with the masses, the Narodovoltsi took the path of political plots and individual terrorism.

After March 1, 1881 (the assassination of Alexander II), the government smashed the Narodnaya Volya organisation by savage persecution, executions, and provocation. Repeated attempts to revive the Narodnaya Volya during the eighties proved fruitless. In 1886, for instance, a group was formed under the leadership of A. I. Ulyanov (the brother of V. I. Lenin) and P. Y. Shevyrev, which adopted the traditions of the Narodnaya Volya. After an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Alexander III in 1887, the group was uncovered and its active members executed.

While criticising the erroneous Utopian programme of the Narodovoltsi, V. I. Lenin at the same time held in high regard the self-sacrificing struggle against tsarism waged by the members of the Narodnaya Volya organisation. In 1899 he pointed out in "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" that "the members of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia, despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory which served as the banner of the movement" (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 181). p. 120

[49] Lenin has in mind the gubernia committees set up in 1857-58 in all the gubernias of European Russia (with the exception of Archangel Gubernia) to draw up drafts for the emancipation of the peasants from serfdom. The committees consisted of persons elected from among the nobility (hence the name "committees of nobles") and, in the main, they were engaged in seeking ways and means

of carrying out the "Peasant Reform" in a way to give the nobility the greatest benefit from it. p. 124

[50] *The Valuyeu Commission*—the "Commission to Investigate the Condition of Russian Agriculture", which functioned under the chairmanship of the tsar's minister P. A. Valuyev. In the years 1872-73 the commission collected a large amount of material dealing with the condition of agriculture in post-Reform Russia: governors' reports, statements and depositions of landlords, Marshals of the Nobility, Zemstvo administrations, volost boards, grain merchants, village priests, kulaks, statistical and agricultural societies and other bodies connected with agriculture. This material was published in *Papers of the Commission of Inquiry into the Condition of Russian Agriculture*, St. Petersburg, 1873. p. 127

[51] *Oblomov*—a landowner, the chief character in a novel of the same name by the Russian writer I. A. Goncharov. Oblomov was the personification of routine, stagnation, and incapacity for action. The name is used here in a generic sense to signify the Russian landowner. p. 130

[52] "*General Redistribution*"—a slogan popular among the peasants of tsarist Russia and expressing their desire for a general redistribution of the land. p. 136

[53] The criticism of Nadezhdin's opportunist views given on pages 138-39 of this volume (beginning with the words: "It is interesting to note that, in his desire to reach just such a maximum as nationalisation of the land, Nadezhdin has gone astray..." and ending with the words: "The desire to be 'understood by the muzhik' at all costs has driven Nadezhdin into the jungle of a reactionary petty-bourgeois Utopia") was omitted by the Editorial Board when the article was first published in *Zarya*, No 4. Nor did *Zarya* print the footnote which Lenin wrote to replace the omitted text.

In the present edition the text and footnote are given according to Lenin's manuscript. p. 140

[54] *Rural superintendent* (*Zemsky Nachalnik*)—an administrative post instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to strengthen the authority of the landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were granted extensive powers, not merely administrative but also judicial. p. 140

[55] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (Moscow Recorder)—one of the oldest Russian newspapers, published by Moscow University from 1756 (originally as a one-sheet paper). During 1863-87 it was published and edited by M. N. Katkov, an extreme reactionary and chauvinist, who was bitterly opposed to the least signs of progressive social thought and transformed the newspaper into a monarchist-

nationalist organ voicing the views of the most reactionary sections of the landlords and clergy. From 1905 *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* was one of the chief organs of the Black Hundreds. It was closed down at the end of 1917. p. 144

[56] *Oblomovka*—the name of a village belonging to the landlord Oblomov. (See Note 51.) Here the word "Oblomovka" is used to denote a Russian village in the days of tsarism. p. 147

[57] The reference is to the peasant movement in the Poltava and Kharkov gubernias at the end of March and beginning of April 1902—the first large-scale revolutionary action of Russian peasants at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was sparked by the desperate condition of the peasants in these gubernias, which became still worse in the spring of 1902 owing to the crop failure of 1901 and the resulting famine. The peasants demanded a redistribution of the land, but in the 1902 movement they limited themselves in the main to seizing stocks of food and fodder on the landlords' estates. In all, 56 estates in Poltava Gubernia and 24 in Kharkov Gubernia were attacked. Troops were dispatched to crush the peasants. These reprisals by the tsarist government resulted in many peasants being killed, all the inhabitants of certain villages flogged, and hundreds of peasants condemned to varying terms of imprisonment. The peasants were forced to pay an indemnity of 800,000 rubles for "losses" caused to the landlords by the peasant disorders. In his pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor* (see pp. 421-28 of this volume), V. I. Lenin gave an analysis of the aims and character of the peasant movement in the Kharkov and Poltava gubernias, and the causes of its defeat. p. 148

[58] The reference is to "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo", which P. B. Struve (under the pen-name of R. N. S.) wrote as a foreward to a "confidential memorandum" of S. Y. Witte, Minister of Finance, and which was published by *Zarya* in Stuttgart in 1901. This foreword was strongly criticised by Lenin in his work, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 155

[59] *The Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P.* or the Northern Labour League—a regional union of the Social-Democratic organisation in Vladimir, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma gubernias. It arose in 1900-01 on the initiative of O. A. Varentsova and V. A. Noskov, who were exiled from Yaroslavl and Ivanovo-Voznesensk, went to live in Voronezh and, together with other exiled Social-Democrats (A. I. Lyubimov, L. Y. Karpov, A. A. and N. N. Kardashev, D. V. Kosterkin), there formed a group of the *Iskra* trend. Among those who also took part in the organisation of the Northern League were M. A. Bagayev an Ivanovo-Voznesensk worker; N. N. Panin, a worker of the Putilov Factory, exiled to Siberia for taking part in the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class; A. P. Dolivo-Dobrovolsky, and others. In

the years 1901-05, the League guided the working-class movement in this industrial region. Its activities grew considerably after the Kineshma Conference, held in August 1901, of representatives of the Social-Democratic committees of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma. At the League's congress in Voronezh on January 1-5, 1902, it took final shape, electing a Central Committee (Bagayev, Varentsova, Panin, and others) and adopting a programme, which V. I. Lenin criticised in his letter to the Northern League.

From the outset the Northern League was linked with *Iskra* and shared the latter's political line and plan of organisation (in the *Iskra* organisation's report to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. it was pointed out that "of all the Party committees, the Northern League alone immediately entered into friendly relations with *Iskra*"). In an open letter published in No. 34 of *Iskra* on February 15, 1903, the League expressed complete solidarity with the programme of *Iskra* and *Zarya* and with Lenin's book, *What Is to Be Done?*, and recognised *Iskra* and *Zarya* as the leading organs of the R.S.D.L.P. The League was smashed by the secret police in the spring of 1902, but was quickly reformed, its representatives (V. A. Noskov, F. I. Shchekoldin, A. M. Stopani, A. I. Lyubimov) taking an active part in preparations for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The League's delegates to the Second Congress (L. M. Knipovich and A. M. Stopani) adhered to the Leninist majority.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Northern Labour League was reconstituted as the Northern Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the local committees becoming groups of the Northern Committee. At the conference of Northern organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Kostroma in July 1905, the Northern Committee was abolished and the Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma independent committees were formed. p. 159

[60] The reference is to the organisation of demonstrations on the anniversary of the 1861 Peasant Reform. Paragraph 11 of the Northern League's programme stated that leaflets issued on this occasion should "point out to the workers that they could expect nothing from the autocratic government" and should "endeavour to destroy the illusion that the emancipation was the personal act of the tsar, an act of good will on his part". p. 159

[61] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 137. p. 164

[62] *Zubatov*—colonel of gendarmerie and chief of the Moscow Secret Police, on whose initiative a policy of "police socialism" was conducted in 1901-03. This consisted in the setting up of legal workers' organisations intended to divert the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. Through these organisations Zubatov attempted to direct the working-class movement towards the achievement of purely economic aims, and it was suggested to the

workers that the tsarist government was prepared to help improve their economic conditions.

The reactionary character of Zubatovism was unmasked by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, who made use of legal working-class organisations so as to draw the working masses into the struggle against the autocracy. As Lenin was to write later: "And now the Zubatov movement is outgrowing its bounds. Initiated by the police in the interests of the police, in the interests of supporting the autocracy and demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, this movement is turning against the autocracy and is becoming an outbreak of the proletarian class struggle" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 90).

Under the impact of the revolutionary movement in 1903, the tsar's government was forced to liquidate the Zubatov organisations. p. 167

[63] The pamphlet, *Who Will Carry Out the Political Revolution?*, was written by A. A. Sanin and printed in 1899 in the symposium, *The Proletarian Struggle*, No. 1, published by the Urals Social-Democratic Group. The author of the pamphlet, who adopted the position of "economism", denied the need to create an independent political party of the working class and maintained that a political revolution could be carried out by means of a general strike, without any preliminary organisation and preparation of the masses, and without an armed uprising. p. 168

[64] *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia)—an illegal newspaper of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was published from the end of 1900 in Russia by the League of Socialist-Revolutionaries (No. 1, dated 1900, actually appeared in January 1901); from January 1902 to December 1905 it was published abroad (in Geneva) as the official organ of the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 172

[65] *The Local Committee*—the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 174

[66] *2a 3b*—the pseudonym of the Bolshevik P. N. Lepeshinsky, a member of the Organising Committee for the convocation of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 174

[67] *The St. Petersburg League*—the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, was organised by Lenin in the autumn of 1895 and united all the Marxist workers' study circles in St. Petersburg. The League of Struggle was headed by a Central Group, which was led by Lenin. The League of Struggle was the first in Russia to begin bringing about the union of socialism with the working-class movement, as well as the transition from propaganda of Marxism among a small group of advanced workers to political agitation among the broad masses of the working class.

In December 1895 the tsarist government dealt the League of Struggle a severe blow: during the night of December 8-9 (20-21), 1895, a large number of the League's leaders, with V. I. Lenin at their head, were arrested, and the first issue of the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause), which was ready for the press, was seized.

From prison V. I. Lenin continued to guide the League's activities: he helped it with advice, sent out letters and leaflets in cipher, wrote a pamphlet *On Strlkes* (which has not been discovered), and the "Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party" (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 93-121).

As Lenin put it, the League's importance lay in its being the embryo of a revolutionary party based on the working-class movement and guiding the proletariat's class struggle.

The older members of the League who had escaped arrest took part in preparing for and conducting the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and in drafting the "Manifesto" published in the name of the Congress. However, the prolonged absence of the League's founders serving terms of exile in Siberia, and, above all, of V. I. Lenin, facilitated the adoption of an opportunist policy by the "young" Social-Democrats, the "economists", who from 1897 through the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought), implanted the ideas of trade-unionism and Bernsteinism on Russian soil. From the second half of 1898 the most outspoken "economists"—the *Rabochaya Mysl* supporters—gained leadership of the League. p. 174

68 *The Workers' Organisation* (for secrecy dubbed *Manya*)—an organisation of supporters of "economism", which arose in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1900. In the autumn of the same year it merged with the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was formed, consisting of two parts: the "Committee" proper and the "Committee of the Workers' Organisation". After the *Iskra* trend triumphed in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation (1902), the group of "economist"-influenced Social-Democrats broke away from the St. Petersburg Committee and recreated an independent "Workers' Organisation", which existed until the beginning of 1904. p. 174

69 *The Declaration* of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on solidarity with *Iskra* and *Zarya* and on their recognition as the leading organs of Russian Social-Democracy was published in leaflet form in July 1902, and later printed in *Iskra*. No. 26, October 15, 1902. p. 175

70 *The Russian Iskra organisation* (called *Sonya* for secrecy) united *Iskra* supporters operating inside Russia. In the early period of its existence (February 1900-January 1902) the Russian *Iskra* organisation had not yet taken shape as an organised entity. The groups of *Iskra*'s supporters and "agents" (P. N. and 0. B. Lepe-

shinsky, P. A. Krasikov, A. M. Stopani, and others in Pskov; V. P. and M. G. Artsybushev, K. K. Gazenbush, and others in Samara; L. N. Radchenko, S. O. Tsederbaum, and others in Poltava; S. I. Radchenko in St. Petersburg; A. D. Tsyurupa in Kharkov; N. E. Bauman in Moscow, I. V. Babushkin in Orekhovo-Zuyevo, and so on) were not at first united by any kind of centre operating in Russia, and maintained direct relations with the *Iskra* Editorial Board. But as *Iskra*'s influence increased, its Russian organisation more and more became the hub of the Russian Social-Democratic movement; there was a considerable increase in the volume of practical work carried out by the *Iskra*-ists (arranging stores of Party literature and its transport and distribution among the Social-Democratic organisations, collecting money and dispatching correspondence to *Iskra*, etc.). All this urgently required the formation of an all-Russian centre of the *Iskra* supporters' activity, and the formation of a Russian *Iskra* organisation.

V. I. Lenin gives the date of the founding of the Russian *Iskra* organisation as January 1902, when a congress of *Iskra* supporters working in Russia was held in Samara, with the active participation of G. M. and Z. P. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, and others. The congress elected a Bureau and adopted the rules of the organisation, worked out tactical principles and defined the duties of the organisation's members. "Your initiative," V. I. Lenin wrote to the organisers of the congress, "has heartened us tremendously. Hurrah! That's the right way! Reach out wider! And operate more independently, with greater initiative—you are the first to have begun in such a broad way that it means that the continuation, too, will be successful" (*Lenin Miscellany VIII*, p. 221).

The Russian *Iskra* organisation played a prominent part in restoring actual unity in the R.S.D.L.P. With its members' most active participation, an Organising Committee was formed in November 1902 to prepare and convene the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The Russian *Iskra* organisation handed over its contacts and *Iskra* literature to the Organising Committee; it also placed at the Committee's disposal *Iskra* supporters sent to work in Russia. At the same time the Russian *Iskra* organisation was not merged in the Organising Committee, but was preserved until the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., chiefly for the purpose of influencing the Organising Committee, which included unstable and opportunist elements from among the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group (see Note 88) and members of the Bund. p. 177

[71] "*At least we make an infernal noise*." Words spoken by Repetilov, a character in Griboyedov's well-known comedy, *Wit Works Woe*, Act IV, Scene 4. p. 184

[72] V. I. Lenin's intention "to return in a magazine article, or in a pamphlet" to a more detailed exposition of the arguments against the programmatic views and tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries remained unfulfilled. The following is the preliminary mate-

rial for the intended pamphlet: "Extract from an Article Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries—(December 1902) (see pp. 285-86 of this volume), "Outline of a Pamphlet Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries"—(spring 1903) (see *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, 1939, No. 1, pp. 22-28), and "Outline of an Article Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries"—(first half of July 1903) (see pp. 462-63 of this volume). p. 185

[73] "*Let the writers do the writing and the reader do the reading*"—a sentence from M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *Miscellaneous Letters*, Letter One. p. 186

[74] The reference is to one of Turgenev's *Poems in Prose*—"A Rule of Life" (see I. S. Turgenev, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. 8, 1956, p. 464). p. 197

[75] *Katheder-reformers*, *Katheder-Socialists*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois political economy, which arose in Germany in the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century. Under the guise of socialism the *Katheder*-Socialists advocated from the university chairs (*Katheder* in German) bourgeois-liberal reformism. *Katheder*-Socialism was motivated by the exploiting classes' fear of the spread of Marxism and the growth of the working-class movement, and also by the efforts of bourgeois ideologists to find fresh means of keeping the working people in subjugation.

Representatives of *Katheder*-Socialism (Adolf Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, Lorenz Brentano, Werner Sombart, and others, asserted that the bourgeois state stands above classes and is capable of reconciling the hostile classes and of gradually introducing "socialism", without affecting the interests of the capitalists and, as far as possible, with due account of the working people's demands. They proposed giving police regulation of wage-labour the force of law and reviving the medieval guilds. Marx, Engels and Lenin exposed the reactionary nature of *Katheder*-Socialism, which in Russia was spread by the "legal Marxists". p. 200

[76] *V. V.* (pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov)—one of the ideologists of liberal Narodism in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 201

[77] *N.—on* or *Nikolai—on* (pseudonym of N. F. Danielson)—one of the ideologists of liberal Narodism in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 201

[78] *Babeuf* (1760-1797)—revolutionary Communist and leader of the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. He organised a secret society, which in 1796 tried to overthrow the power of the exploiting classes.

Levitsky—liberal Narodnik, founder of agricultural artels in Kherson Gubernia in the nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 203

[79] *Pobedonostsev*—reactionary tsarist statesman, Procurator-General of the Synod, actually head of the government and chief inspirer of the savage feudal reaction under Alexander III. He continued to play a prominent part under Nicholas II. p. 204

[80] *Narodnoye Pravo* (People's Right)—an illegal organisation of Russian democratic intellectuals founded in the summer of 1893, its initiators including O. V. Aptekman, A. I. Bogdanovich, A. V. Gedeonovsky, M. A. Natanson, and N. S. Tyutchev who had formerly belonged to the Narodnaya Volya. The members of the Narodnoye Pravo set themselves the aim of uniting all opposition forces to fight for political reforms. The organisation issued two programme documents, "Manifesto", and "An Urgent Question". In the spring of 1894 it was smashed by the tsarist government. Lenin's estimation of the Narodnoye Pravo as a political party is to be found in his "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats" (see present edition Vol. 1, pp. 129-332), and "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51). Most of the members of the Narodnoye Pravo subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 210

[81] *Osvobozhdeniye* (Emancipation)—a fortnightly magazine published abroad from June 18 (July 1), 1902, to October 18 (31), 1905, under the editorship of P. B. Struve. Arising out of the opposition Zemstvo movement, *Osvobozhdeniye* was in fact the illegal organ of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and consistently advocated the ideas of moderate-monarchist liberalism. In 1903 the League of Emancipation developed around the magazine (taking definite shape in January 1904), and continued to exist until October 1905. Together with the Zemstvo-constitutionalists, the *Osvobozhdeniye* group formed the nucleus of the Cadet Party—the chief bourgeois party in Russia—which was formed in October 1905. p. 211

[82] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly)—a magazine which was the chief organ of the opportunists of German Social-Democracy and one of the organs of international opportunism. During the 1914-18 imperialist world war it took the stand of social-chauvinism. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. p. 211

[83] V. I. Lenin is referring to the pamphlet, *The Autocracy and Strikes. The Memorandum of the Ministry of Finance on Permitting Strikes*, published in 1902 in Geneva by the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 215

[84] *The Law of June 3 (15), 1886* ("Regulations on Supervision of the Enterprises of the Factory Industry and on Relations Between Factory Owners and Workers") was passed under the influence of the working-class movement in the Moscow, Vladimir, and Yaroslavl gubernias and, in particular, the famous Morozov strike of 1885. The chief feature of the Law of June 3, 1886, was the

certain restriction it placed on the arbitrary right of factory owners to exact fines from the workers (hence it became known as the "Law on Fines"). Lenin gave a detailed analysis and criticism of this law in the pamphlet, *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers* (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 29-72).

The Law of June 2 (14), 1897 ("On the Duration and Distribution of Working Hours in Enterprises of the Factory Industry") introduced, for the first time in Russian history, legislative limitation of the working day for part of the workers in large-scale industry. Like the Law of June 3, 1886, it was passed under the influence of the working-class movement in the nineties of the nineteenth century, particularly the mass strikes of the St. Petersburg workers in 1895-96. V. I. Lenin's pamphlet, *The New Factory Law*, gives an analysis and criticism of the Law of June 2, 1897 (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 267-315). p. 215

[85] *The Society of Mechanics* (officially the Society for Mutual Aid of Workers Engaged in Mechanical Production) was formed in Moscow in May 1901 with the participation of the secret police. Its rules were confirmed by the Governor-General of Moscow on February 14, 1902. The formation of the Society was one of the attempts made to implant "police socialism", Zubatovism (see Note 62), in order to divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle. The demagogic flirting of the police with the workers and, in particular the attempts made by Zubatov agents, who controlled the Society of Mechanics, to assume the right to mediate in conflicts between employers and workers, evoked dissatisfaction among Moscow factory owners and protests from the Ministry of Finance, which reflected their interests. Under the impact of the growing working class movement, the role of the Society, like that of other Zubatov organisations, dwindled away after 1903. p. 216

[86] The reference is to the so-called "Hard Labour" Bill (*Zuchthausvorlage*) introduced in the German Reichstag in 1899 on the insistence of the employers and Emperor Wilhelm II. The Bill imposed from one to five years of prison or a fine of up to 1,000 marks on anyone who "by violence, threats, insults or a declaration of dishonesty" helped workers take part in unions and agreements, in cited them to strike or tried to oppose strike-breaking. Under pressure from the working-class movement, the "Hard Labour" Bill was turned down in the Reichstag on November 20, 1899, by the votes of the Left parties and the Centre party. p. 221

[87] *Molchalin*—a character in Griboyedov's play, Wit Works Woe, a careerist and lickspittle. p. 223

[88] *Yuzhny Rabochy* (Southern Worker)—a Social-Democratic newspaper, published illegally from January 1900 to April 1903 by a group of this name. Twelve numbers were issued. I. K. Lalayants, A. Vilensky ("Ilya"), O. A. Kogan (Yermansky), B. S. Tseitlin

(Batursky), E. Y. and E. S. Levin, V. N. Rozanov, and others were at various times editors and contributors.

Yuzhny Rabochy started as the "Ekaterinoslav Workers Newspaper" (the subtitle of the first two issues), and soon became an influential "organ of the working-class movement in South Russia". The location of the newspaper's print-shop was continually changed, being at different times in Ekaterinoslav, Smolensk, Kishinev, Nikolayev, and elsewhere.

Yuzhny Rabochy opposed "economism" and terrorism and upheld the need to develop a mass revolutionary movement. But, in opposition to the *Iskra* plan of creating in Russia a centralised Marxist party round an all-Russian political newspaper, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group put forward a plan for restoring the R.S.D.L.P. by creating regional Social-Democratic associations. A practical attempt to realise this plan was made through convocation of the conference of committees and organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. in South Russia in December 1901, at which the League of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. was formed, with *Yuzhny Rabochy* as its organ. The attempt proved impracticable (as was the entire organisational plan of *Yuzhny Rabochy*) and after the mass police raids in the spring of 1902, the League disintegrated. In August 1902, those members of *Yuzhny Rabochy*'s Editorial Board who were at large entered into negotiations with the *Iskra* Editorial Board on joint work to restore the unity of Russian Social-Democracy. The declaration of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group on solidarity with *Iskra* (published in *Iskra*, No. 27, November 1, 1902, and in *Yuzhny Rabochy*, No. 10, December 1902) was of great importance in consolidating the Social-Democratic forces in Russia. In November 1902, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, together with the Russian *Iskra* organisation, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P. participated in restoring the Organising Committee and in its activities in convening the Second Party Congress.

The *Yuzhny Rabochy* group conducted extensive revolutionary work in Russia, but at the same time it displayed opportunist tendencies in deciding the question of the attitude to the liberal bourgeoisie and to the peasant movement, and hatched a separatist plan to set up an all-Russia newspaper parallel to *Iskra*.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the *Yuzhny Rabochy* delegates adopted a "Centre" position (Lenin called the representatives of the Centre "opportunist middlemen"). The Second Congress decided to dissolve the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group as well as all separate Social-Democratic groups and organisations. p. 225

[89] *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks* was a reply to a letter from the St. Petersburg Social-Democrat A. A. Shneyerson (Yeryoma) criticising the way Social-Democratic work was organised in that city.

After the arrest of V. I. Lenin and his close associates in December 1895, the "economists" gradually gained control of the League

of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Unlike the revolutionary Marxists, who fought for the creation of an underground and centralised organisation of revolutionaries, the "economists" derogated the significance of political struggle and came out for creation of a broad working-class organisation based on the elective principle and pursuing the primary aim of immediate defence of the workers' economic interests, formation of mutual aid banks, and the like. The "economists'" long control of the League of Struggle left an imprint on its organisational structure too: its working-class membership (the so-called Workers' Organisation) was artificially separated from the intellectual members. The League's clumsy organisation was more adapted for a trade-union form of struggle than for leadership of the workers' mass revolutionary struggle against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie. The struggle between the *Iskra*-ists and the "economists" which developed in the St. Petersburg organisation culminated in the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. going over to the *Iskra* stand in the summer of 1902.

"Two questions were raised," it was reported in *Iskra*'s No. 30 of December 15, 1902, "at a meeting held in the outskirts of St. Petersburg in *June*, which was attended by *workers representing all five wards of the Workers'* Organisation (who comprised the highest body of the then Workers' *Organisation*). These questions were: 1) the two trends in Russian Social-Democracy: the old 'economist' trend, which hitherto obtained in St. Petersburg, and the revolutionary, as represented by *Iskra* and *Zarya*, and 2) principles of organisation (so-called 'democratism' or an 'organisation of revolutionaries'). On both issues *all the workers* came out *unanimously against* 'economism' and 'democratism' and in favour of the *Iskra trend*."

To reconstruct the St. Petersburg League of Struggle in the spirit of *Iskra* organisational principles, a committee was set up composed of representatives of the *Iskra* organisation, the Workers' Organisation, and the St. Petersburg Committee. However, the "economists", headed by Tokarev, stated that they disagreed with the St. Petersburg Committee's decision on support for the *Iskra* stand, formed the so-called Workers' Organisation's Committee, and launched a struggle against the *Iskra*-ists. The latter, with the support of the workers, were able to retain their positions and fortify their standing in the St. Petersburg organisation.

A Letter to a Comrade, in which Lenin developed and gave concrete shape to his plan for the Party's organisation, was received in St. Petersburg at the height of the struggle against the "economists". It was hectographed, copied by hand, and distributed among St. Petersburg Social-Democrats. In June 1903 it was illegally published by the Siberian Social-Democratic League under the title of *On Revolutionary Work in the Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.* (*A Letter to a Comrade*). This *Letter* was published by the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee as a separate pamphlet, with a preface and postscript by Lenin, who also prepared the pamphlet for the press. The *Letter* was widely distributed in Social-Demo-

cratic organisations, police archives for 1902-05 revealing that it was found during police raids in Moscow, Riga, Rostov-on-Don, Nakhichevan, Nikolayev, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and elsewhere.

The Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U.'s Central Committee contain only the first manuscript page of the *Letter*, with the following inscription in Lenin's hand: "To the St. Petersburg Committee in general and to Comrade Yeryoma in particular (from Lenin)." p. 229

[90] Lenin refers to Porphiry (nicknamed "Judas") Golovlyov, a sanctimonious, hypocritical landlord serf-owner described in M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 252

[91] Lenin is referring to the Law of June 8 (21), 1901, which turned government lands in Siberia over to private persons. The Law gave exceptional advantages to the landed nobility. Lenin made a detailed analysis and appraisal of this Law in his article, "Serf-Owners at Work" (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 252

[92] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 137. p. 257

[93] Lenin is quoting from Engels' *Anti-Dühring* (see Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 253-54). p. 258

[94] *Stepnyak-Kravchinsky*—the Russian Narodnaya Volya writer. p. 258

[95] "*Concerning Demonstrations*" is Lenin's reply to a letter from a St. Petersburg University student about the editorial article, "What Is to Be Done?", printed on September 15, 1902, in *Iskra*, No. 25. The manuscript has no heading. The present heading has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 260

[96] *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought)—a newspaper, the most consistent organ of the "economists", which was published from October 1897, to December 1902. Sixteen numbers were issued. The first two numbers were mimeographed in St. Petersburg; Nos. 3-11 were issued abroad, in Berlin; printing of Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 15 was effected in Warsaw; the last, No. 16, was issued abroad. The newspaper was edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others.

Lenin criticised the views of *Rabochaya Mysl* as a Russian variety of international opportunism in his article, "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85), in articles published in *Iskra*, and in the book, *What Is to Be Done?* p. 267

[97] Lenin gives a detailed assessment of the *Borba* group in his article, "On the *Borba* Group" (see p. 158 of this volume). p. 267

[98] "*On the Tasks of the Social-Democratic Movement*" is an excerpt from an article which Lenin wrote in November 1902.

The manuscript has no heading. The present heading has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 269

[99] *Val*—a tsarist general, who ordered that workers arrested for demonstrating on May 1, 1902, should be flogged.

Obolensky—a tsarist high official, who savagely crushed peasant uprisings in the south of Russia in 1902. p. 269

[100] The proclamation of the Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., "To All Citizens", dated November 6, 1902, was reprinted by *Iskra*, No. 29, December 1, 1902. p. 279

[101] Lenin is referring to the following passage from Karl Marx's letter to Wilhelm Bracke, of May 5, 1875: "Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 11). p. 280

[102] Lenin is referring to the speeches made in court on October 28-31 (November 10-13), 1902, by Nizhni-Novgorod workers on trial for taking part in demonstrations on May 1 and 5 (14 and 18), 1902. The speeches were originally published as a separate leaflet by the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.; they were later reprinted by *Iskra* (No. 29, December l, 1902) under the heading "Nizhni-Novgorod Workers in Court" and issued as a separate pamphlet. p. 280

[103] This article was written by Lenin as an afterword of the *Iskra* Editorial Board to the leaflet, "To Secondary School Students", issued by the South-Russian Secondary School Students' Group. The leaflet and the afterword were published in *Iskra*, No. 29, December 1, 1902.

The manuscript has no heading. The present heading has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 282

[104] *The League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was founded in October 1901 on Lenin's initiative. Affiliated to the League were the *Iskra* foreign organisation and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, which included the Emancipation of Labour group.

Formation of the League was preceded by an attempt to get these organisations join the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, made in June 1901 at the Geneva Conference. A resolution was worked out at this conference ("the agreement on principles"), recognising the need to rally all Social-Democratic forces of Russia, and especially to unite all Social-Democratic organisations abroad, and condemning opportunism in all its shades and manifestations. The unification was to have been given official form at the "Unity" Congress, which was held on September 21-22

(October 4-5), 1901. When it became clear at the Congress that the Union still adhered to its opportunist stand, the revolutionary section of the Congress (members of the *Iskra* organisation and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* group) announced that they did not consider union possible and walked out. Soon afterwards they formed the League Abroad, whose Rules stated that it was the foreign section of the *Iskra* organisation. The League recruited *Iskra* adherents from among Russian Social-Democrats living abroad, gave financial support to *Iskra* organised delivery of the paper to Russia and published Marxist popular literature. It also brought out several bulletins and pamphlets, including Lenin's *To the Rural Poor*.

The R.S.D.L.P.'s Second Congress endorsed the League as the only Party organisation abroad with the status of a committee, and indicated that it could give support to the Russian Social-Democratic movement only through persons and groups appointed by the Party's Central Committee.

Following the Second Congress, the Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the League and launched a struggle against Lenin and the Bolsheviks. At the League's second conference in October 1903, the Mensheviks got new Rules adopted, directed against the Party Rules approved by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. After this the League, which existed until 1905, became a stronghold of Menshevism.

The Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was founded in 1894 in Geneva, on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group, and had its own press where it printed revolutionary literature. At first the Emancipation of Labour group guided the Union and edited its publications. The Union issued the *Rabotnik* miscellanies and *Listok* "*Rabotnika*" (see Note 107), and published Lenin's *Explanation of the Law on Fines* (1897), Plekhanov's *New Drive Against Russian Social-Democracy* (1897), etc. The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held in March 1898, recognised the Union as the Party's representative abroad. As time proceeded, the opportunist elements—the "economists", or so-called "young" group—gained the upper hand in the Union. At the first conference of the Union, held in Zurich in November 1898, the Emancipation of Labour group announced their refusal to edit Union publications, with the exception of No. 5-6 of *Rabotnik* and Lenin's pamphlets, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* and *The New Factory Law*, which the group undertook to publish. From then on, the Union published *Rabocheye Dyelo*, a magazine of the "economists". The Emancipation of Labour group finally broke with the Union and left its ranks in April 1900, at the Union's second conference held in Geneva, when the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters left the conference and established an independent *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation. In 1903 the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. passed a decision to disband the Union (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 56). p. 287

[105] Lenin's work *On the Subject of Reports by Committees and Groups of the R.S.D.L.P. to the General Party Congress* was published in the preceding Russian edition of the *Collected Works* according to a copy of Lenin's Manuscript. Subsequently, Lenin's original manuscript was discovered. In the present edition of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works* this article is for the first time published according to Lenin's original manuscript. p. 288

[106] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette)—illegal organ of the Kiev Social-Democrats, was published in Kiev with the participation and under the editorship of B. L. Eidelman, P. L. Tuchapsky, N. A. Vigdorchik, and others. In all, two numbers were issued: No. 1—in August 1897, and No. 2—in December (marked as November) of that year. P. L. Tuchapsky, who went abroad on the instructions of the Editorial Board, acquainted G. V. Plekhanov and other members of the Emancipation of Labour group with No. 1 of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and secured their consent to contribute to the paper. In a letter to the members of the Editorial Board, G. V. Plekhanov gave a favourable appraisal of the paper as an all-Russian Social-Democratic organ, and pointed out that more attention should be paid to questions of the proletariat's political struggle. Following this contact with the Emancipation of Labour group, No. 2 of *Rabochaya Gazeta* was more definitely political in character. The Social-Democrats, grouped round *Rabochaya Gazeta*, worked on the preparations for the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (March 1898) recognised *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official Party organ. After the Congress, the third issue of the newspaper, which was ready for the press, did not appear owing to the arrest of members of the Central Committee and the *Rabochaya Gazeta* Editorial Board, and also to the seizure of the printing-press. In 1899 an attempt was made to resume publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*; V. I. Lenin speaks about this attempt in section "a" of the fifth chapter of *What Is to Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). p. 292

[107] *Rabotnik* (The Worker)—a non-periodical miscellany published in 1896-99 by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, on the initiative of Lenin. The first number, which carried Lenin's article, "Frederick Engels", was published not earlier than March 1896.

Six numbers of *Rabotnik* were issued in three books, and 10 numbers of *Listok "Rabotnika"* (The "Rabotnik" Bulletin). p. 292

[108] *Zhizn* (Life)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg between 1897 and 1901 and abroad in 1902. From 1899 the magazine was the organ of the "legal Marxists".

It published Lenin's article, "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov" (No. 12, December 1899) and two articles entitled "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" in Nos. 1 and 2, January and February 1900 (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 160-65 and 105-59). p. 292

[109] *Makhayevists*, *Makhayevism*—an anarchist trend hostile to Marxism and headed by the Polish socialist, V. K. Makhaysky, who wrote under the pen-name of A. Volsky. Their programme was set out in a book by Makhaysky, *The Intellectual Worker* (published in three parts: parts 1 and 2 were hectographed in 1899 and 1900 in Siberia, where the author had been exiled, while Part 3 came out in Geneva in 1904). Makhayevism was marked by hostility towards the intelligentsia, which Makhaysky considered a parasitic class, and by an attempt to foster among the working class antagonism towards the revolutionary intelligentsia. Individual Makhayevist groups lacking any organisational form or links with one another existed in Irkutsk, Odessa, Warsaw, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere. The Makhayevists' influence on the working class was negligible. p. 298

[110] *Russkoye Sobraniye* (the Russian Assembly)—a Black-Hundred monarchist organisation, which supported the policy of the Zubatovists. It was formed in the autumn of 1900. p. 299

[111] *The Organising Committee* (*O.C.*) *for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was first elected by the Belostok Conference in March (April) 1902, but soon after the conference all the Committee members but one were arrested. On Lenin's initiative a new Organising Committee was set up at the Pskov Conference of Social-Democratic committees held in November 1902. The *Iskra* supporters had an overwhelming majority in the new committee. Under Lenin's leadership, the Organising Committee carried out considerable work in preparing the Second Party Congress. In February 1903, draft rules for the convocation of the Party Congress were adopted at a plenary session held in Orel.

Following the February plenary session, members of the O.C. twice visited local committees with a view to assisting them in their work. With the participation of members of the O.C. the local Party organisations discussed the draft rules for the convocation of the Congress, after which the rules were confirmed by the O.C.

The O.C. confirmed the list of local organisations entitled to attend the Congress in accordance with the rules adopted. A detailed written report on its activities was prepared by the O.C. for presentation to the Congress. p. 305

[112] The reference is to the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in Minsk on March 1-3 (13-15), 1898. It was attended by nine delegates from six organisations—the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav and Kiev Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, the group of the Kiev *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and the Bund. The Congress elected the Central Committee of the Party, confirmed *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the Party's official organ, published a "Manifesto", and declared that the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad represented the Party abroad (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses*, *Conferences*,

and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, Part I, 1954, pp. 11-15).

The significance of the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. lay in the fact that, in its decisions and Manifesto, it proclaimed the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, thereby being an important factor of revolutionary propaganda. However, the Congress did not adopt a programme or work out the Party Rules. The Central Committee elected at the Congress was arrested and the *Rabochaya Gazeta* print-shop seized, so that the Congress did not succeed in linking together and unifying the individual Marxist study circles and organisations. There was no central leadership and no definite line in the work of the local organisations. p. 305

[113] *7 Ts. 6 F.*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik F. V. Lengnik. p. 310

[114] *The Nizhni-Novgorod speeches*—the reference is to the speeches made by Nizhni-Novgorod revolutionary workers during their trial for participation in demonstrations. These speeches were published in *Iskra* and then as a pamphlet.

The Rostov struggle—the reference is to the pamphlet, *The Struggle of the Rostov Workers*, published by *Iskra*.

The pamphlet on strikes refers to the pamphlet, *The Autocracy and Strikes*, published in Geneva by the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy.

The Dikstein pamphlet—this refers to a popular Marxist pamphlet, *The Ways People Live*, by Dikstein. p. 311

[115] *Vperyod* (Forward)—a newspaper of the "economist" trend, published in Kiev between 1896 and 1900. p. 314

[116] *Krasnoye Znamya* (Red Banner)—organ of the "economists", was published by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad from November 1902 to January 1903 to take the place of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. Three numbers were issued. p. 314

[117] Lenin is referring to the pamphlet, *The Autocracy and Strikes*. p. 315

[118] The polemic between *Iskra* and the Bund on the question of the latter's organisational relations with the R.S.D.L.P. arose out of the decision of the Bund congress (in April 1901) to insist upon the federative principle of Party structure. *Iskra* opposed this decision. In a number of articles and in his speeches at the Second Party Congress, Lenin sharply criticised the Bund's nationalism. p. 319

[119] The reference is to a Yiddish translation of Karl Kautsky's pamphlet, *Social Revolution*. p. 331

[120] This work consists of the programme of lectures on the agrarian question and an outline of the first lecture delivered by Lenin

in February 1903 at the Higher Russian School of Social Sciences in Paris. The school was founded in 1901 for Russian students living abroad, and functioned legally. The organisers of the school openly showed their dislike of the revolutionary Marxists and expressed sympathy with the representatives of the Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionary party. However, Lenin's prestige as a theoretician of the agrarian question was so high that the school's Council of Professors decided to invite "the well-known Marxist Vl. Ilyin" (V. I. Lenin.—*Ed.*), "author of the legal books, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and *Economic Studies*", to deliver a course of lectures on the agrarian question.

Lenin drafted the programme of his lectures well in advance and presented it before opening the course. The outline of the first lecture contained in this volume was taken down by one of the students of the school during the lecture and was then edited by Lenin. p. 335

[121] The *Slavophils* were a social trend in Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century, at a time when the serf-owning system was in the throes of a crisis. The Slavophils held the "theory" that Russia had her own and peculiar path of historical development, one that derived from the village commune system and Russian Orthodoxy, which, they claimed, were inherent in the Slavs. Since they held that Russia's historical development excluded possibility of revolution, the Slavophils were strongly opposed to the revolutionary movement, not only in Russia, but in the West as well. They stood for preservation of the autocracy, but thought that the monarch should give due consideration to public opinion, and proposed the calling of a Zemsky Sobor (Duma) composed of representatives of all sections of society. They were, however, against a constitution or any limiting of the autocracy. In the peasant question the Slavophils stood for emancipation of the peasants as individuals, and for the village communes being allotted land through its redemption from landlords. Among leading Slavophils were A. Khomyakov, the Kireyevsky brothers, the Aksakov brothers, and Y. Samarin. p. 355

[122] *T. P.*—the pseudonym under which Lenin published his article, "Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", in *Zarya*, No. 2-3, in 1901. (See present edition, Vol. 5.) p. 355

[123] *Goremykin*—tsarist statesman and a typical representative of the reactionary bureaucracy. A rabid monarchist, he was Minister of the Interior in 1896-99, during which period he conducted a reactionary policy and savagely persecuted the working-class movement. p. 356

[124] *Novoye Slovo* (New Word)—a monthly scientific, literary, and political magazine, published in St. Petersburg by the liberal Narodniks from 1894, and by the "legal Marxists" from the spring of 1897. Lenin published two articles in *Novoye Slovo*: "A Char-

acterisation of Economic Romanticism" and "About a Certain Newspaper Article" (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 129-265 and 316-22). In December 1897, the magazine was suppressed by the tsarist government. p. 356

[125] While preparing the pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*, Lenin drew up several variants of the plan and individual items for the first variant, as well as plans for separate chapters of the pamphlet (see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 339-56).

Regarding the aims of the pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*, Lenin informed Plekhanov in a letter of March 1903 that he was writing a popular pamphlet for peasants about the agrarian programme, in which he explained the Marxist view of the class struggle in the countryside on the basis of concrete data on the four strata of the village population (landlords, peasant bourgeoisie, middle peasants, and semi-proletarians together with proletarians).

The pamphlet was published in Geneva in May 1903 by the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad.

The text of the draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P., with an introduction written by Lenin, was appended to the pamphlet, which was very widely distributed. It was transported illegally to Russia from abroad, dispatched to various towns and from there distributed among the villages. During the period from May 1903 to December 1905 alone, the pamphlet was supplied to 75 towns and villages according to the incomplete data available. It was studied in illegal Social-Democratic and workers' circles, penetrated into the army and navy, and was read by students in secondary schools and universities. In 1904 the pamphlet was republished by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad; it was several times reprinted in Russia. p. 359

[126] *The title-deeds*—the name given to the deeds drawn up by the landlords at the time of the "emancipation" of the peasants under the 1861 Reform. The deeds recorded the amount of land in use by the peasants before the Reform, and determined the land the despoiled peasants kept after the "emancipation". The deeds also enumerated the services the serf peasants had previously performed for the landlord, and served as the basis in determining the amount of land redemption payment. p. 408

[127] *X*—pseudonym of the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 436

[128] *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes)—a magazine which began publication in 1820, and after 1839 appeared as a regular monthly. Contributors to the magazine included Belinsky, Nekrasov, Saltykov-Shchedrin, Yeliseyev, and others. The revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia were grouped round *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, which was constantly persecuted by the censorship until it was closed down by the tsarist government in 1884. p. 449

[129] *The Polish Socialist Party* (*P.S.P.*)—a petty-bourgeois nationalist party, founded in 1892. p. 452

[130] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (New Rhenish Gazette) appeared in Cologne from June 1, 1848, until May 19, 1849. Marx and Engels were managers of this newspaper, Marx being editor-in-chief. As Lenin put it, the newspaper was "the best, the unsurpassed organ of the revolutionary proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 81). It educated the masses, roused them to fight the counter-revolution, and made its influence felt throughout Germany. Because of its resolute and irreconcilable position and its militant internationalism, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was from the first months of its existence persecuted by the feudal-monarchist and liberal-bourgeois press, and also by the government. Marx's deportation by the Prussian Government and the repressive measures against its other editors led to the paper ceasing publication. About the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* see the article by Engels, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-49)" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 164-72). p. 455

[131] Lenin is quoting from the series of articles printed under the general title of "Debates on the Polish Question in Frankfort" in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in August-September 1848. See *MEGA*, Erste Abteilung, Band 7, S. 287-317. Engels was the author of these articles. p. 456

[132] *Dabrowski*, *Jaroslaw* and *Wróblewski*, *Walery*—prominent leaders of the Polish revolutionary movement in 1863-64, who emigrated to France after the suppression of the Polish uprising. In 1871 they were generals of the Paris Commune. p. 456

[133] Lenin is quoting Franz Mehring's introduction to the third volume of the *Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 1841 to 1850*, which he published in 1902. (*Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, 1841 bis 1850.* Dritter Band, Stuttgart. Verlag von J. H. W. Dietz, Nachf., 1902.) p. 457

[134] *The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held on July 17 (30) to August 10 (23), 1903. The first thirteen sessions of the Congress were held in Brussels, but owing to police persecution, the Congress sessions were transferred to London. In all, 37 sessions were held. There were 20 items on the agenda, of which the most important were: the Party programme, Party organisation (confirmation of the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P.), elections to the Central Committee and editorial board of the Party's Central Organ. Twenty-six organisations were represented at the Congress, which was attended by 43 delegates possessing 51 decisive votes (eight delegates had two votes each), and by 14 delegates with a deliberative voice.

The preparations for the Congress had been made by Lenin's *Iskra*, Lenin himself carrying out tremendous work in this respect.

Lenin drew up the outline of the report on the work of the *Iskra* organisation, and composed the draft of the Party Rules, the draft resolutions on several questions planned for discussion

at the Congress, the agenda and the standing orders of the Congress.

Lenin did much work among the delegates, ascertaining the general situation and state of organisation in various parts of the country, and discussing many of the problems confronting the Congress. At a meeting of the Congress delegates, Lenin made a report on the national question.

The composition of the Congress was not homogeneous. Attending it were not only supporters of *Iskra*, but also its opponents, as well as unstable and wavering elements. Lenin's preliminary acquaintance with the delegates made it possible for him to ascertain the political stand of each of them prior to the opening of the Congress.

Lenin was elected to the Bureau of the Congress and was a member of the main Congress committees: the programme, Rules and Credentials Committees. He delivered the report on the Party Rules and spoke on almost all the subjects on the agenda. The minutes of the Congress register more than one hundred and thirty speeches, remarks, and rejoinders made by Lenin. p. 465

[135] Draft Rules of the R.S.D.L.P. proposed by Lenin at the Second Congress of the Party have not been preserved. The present volume gives the original draft Rules included by the Protocol Committee of the Second Congress in the appendices to the *Full Text of the Minutes of the Second Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, published in Geneva in 1904. The Protocol Committee of the Second Party Congress erroneously termed Lenin's original draft Rules, which it included in appendix XI to the *Full Text of the Minutes*, the draft of the organisational rules of the R.S.D.L.P. put forward by Lenin at the Congress (see V. I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, item G, The Party Rules. Comrade Martov's Draft). p. 474

[136] Lenin's speech on the actions of the Organising Committee was evoked by the following incident. Before the Congress met, the Organizing Committee had already rejected the demand of the *Borba* group for their representative to attend the Congress with a deliberative voice. The Credentials Committee endorsed the Organising Committee's proposal. When Credentials Committee's decision had been reported to the Congress, one of the members of the Organising Committee demanded a recess so that this question might be reconsidered in the Organising Committee. During the recess, the Organising Committee met and by a majority of votes (against one) decided to invite the representative of the *Borba* group to attend the Congress with a deliberative voice.

Those mentioned in the speech were: Yegorov—the Menshevik E. Y. Levin; Stein—the Menshevik E. M. Alexandrova; Pavlovich—the Bolshevik P. A. Krasikov. p. 482

[137] *Hofman*—pseudonym of Bund member V. Kossovsky. p. 484

[138] This refers to the Northumberland and Durham miners who, in the eighties of the nineteenth century, secured a 7-hour working day for skilled underground workers—through a deal with the coal-owners—but later for a number of years opposed the legal enactment of an 8-hour working day for all workers in Britain. p. 486

[139] Lenin is referring to Karl Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Chapter VII (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, pp. 478-80). p. 487

[140] Lenin is referring to Karl Marx's *Civil War in France* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1969, p. 225). p. 487

[141] *Makhov*—pseudonym of the Menshevik D. P. Kalafati; Kostrov—pseudonym of the Menshevik N. N. Jordania. p. 495

[142] *Khizani*—the name given to the landless peasants of Georgia, who in the distant past had been settled on tie lands of the landlords on specially agreed terms. The *khizani* were not formally considered serfs, enjoyed personal liberty, but remained perpetual tenants without any rights. The 1861 Peasant Reform did not apply to the *khizani*, who continued to be completely dependent on the landlords. These began to increase the *khizani*'s services and confiscate the land they held. The *khizani* system was abolished after the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Temporarily bound peasants was the name given to those former serf peasants who were still compelled to carry out certain duties (payment of quit-rent or performance of corvée service) for the use of their land even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and until they started paying redemption money to the landlord for their allotments. From the moment the redemption contract was concluded, the peasants ceased to be "temporarily bound" and joined the category of "peasant property-owners".

On Lenin's proposal, the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. added to the agrarian section of the Party programme the demand for "transfer to the ownership of the peasants in the Caucasus of lands which they are using as temporarily bound peasants, *khizani*, and so forth". p. 496

[143] *Brucker*—pseudonym of the Menshevik Mrs. Makhnovets. p. 499

[144] At the thirty-first session of the Second Congress Lenin delivered a speech on the subject of the election of the *Iskra* editorial board. When the minutes of this session were ratified at the thirty-fifth session of the Congress, a change was made, with Lenin's consent, in the text of his speech. The beginning of the speech—from the words: "Comrades! Martov's speech was so strange that I find myself obliged to protest emphatically against his presentation of the question..." and ending with the words "...is therefore

indicative only of an *astounding confusion of political ideas*"—was deleted and replaced by the following:

"I ask the Congress to allow me to reply to Martov.

"Comrade Martov said that the vote in question cast a slur on his political reputation. The election has nothing to do with an insult to a political reputation (*Shouts*: '*Wrong! Not true!*' *Plekhanov and Lenin protest against recesses. Lenin asks the secretaries to enter in the minutes that Zasulich*, *Martov*, *and Trotsky have interrupted him*, *and he asks that the number of times they have interrupted him should be recorded*.)"

In the present volume Lenin's speech is printed in the form in which he wrote it and delivered it at the Congress. p. 503

[145] Lenin is referring to the strike of Odessa workers in July 1902. Despite the efforts of the local Zubatov organisation to deflect the workers from the revolutionary struggle, the strike assumed a markedly political character. Mass political strikes in 1903 embraced almost the whole of South Russia (Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Elizavetgrad, and other towns).

Lenin's *Iskra* gave detailed accounts of the Odessa events in No. 45, August 1, 1903. p. 514

[146] The reference is to the Jewish pogrom organised in Kishinev by the tsarist government and the Black Hundreds in April 1903. p. 519

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*January 1902-August 1903*)

1902

Beginning of January	V. I. Lenin writes his critical notes on the first draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. prepared by G. V. Plekhanov.
January 8 (21)	Lenin criticises Plekhanov's first draft programme at a meeting of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* in Munich and proposes amendments to this draft and recommendations.
Between January 8 and 25 (January 21 and February 7)	Lenin prepares a new draft programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.
February 15 (28)	*Iskra*, No. 17, publishes Lenin's articles, "Signs of Bankruptcy" and "From the Economic Life of Russia".
Not later than February 18 (March 3)	Lenin makes three amendments to his draft programme of the Party.
End of February-first half of March (March)	Lenin writes his critical notes on the second draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. prepared by Plekhanov.
February-first half of March	Lenin writes his article, "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", a commentary to the agrarian section of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P.
Beginning of March (middle of March)	Lenin's book, *What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement*, which lays the ideological foundations for a Marxist party, comes off the press in Stuttgart.
March 5 (18)	Lenin prepares the report of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and draft resolution for the Belostok Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., takes part in the meeting of the Editorial Board, and gives instructions to the *Iskra* delegate to the Belostok Conference.

March 10 (23)	Lenin's article, "A Letter to the Zemstvoists", is published in No. 18 of *Iskra*.
March 30 (April 12)	V. I. Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya leave Munich for London in view of the transfer of *Iskra*'s publication to that city. In the train to London, Lenin writes his remarks on the draft Party programme prepared by the co-ordinating committee of the *Iskra* Editorial Board.
Beginning of April	V. I. Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya arrive in London.
First half of April (second half of April)	Lenin makes arrangements for the printing of *Iskra* in London.
April	Lenin writes a letter to the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P., commenting on the draft programme of the League.
May 1 (14)	Lenin writes a letter to Plekhanov protesting against the impermissible character and tone of Plekhanov's remarks in editing the article, "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy".
June 1 (14)	*Iskra*, No. 21, publishes the draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P., prepared under Lenin's guidance by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and the magazine *Zarya*.
Between June 12-14 (25-27)	Lenin arrives in Paris.
June 14 (27)	At a meeting of Russian political emigrants in Paris Lenin reads a paper directed against the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
Second half of June-beginning of July (end of June-middle of July)	V. I. Lenin lives at Longwy (Northern coast of France) together with his mother M. A. Ulyanova and his sister A. I. Yelizarova.
End of June-beginning of July (July)	Lenin writes his article, "Why the Social-Democrats Must Declare a Determined and Relentless War on the Socialist-Revolutionaries".
July, before July 3 (16) and 9 (22)	V. I. Lenin writes two letters to I. I. Radchenko in which he outlines a plan for the work of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. in the immediate future.
July-August	Lenin writes his article, "Revolutionary Adventurism", which was published in Nos. 23 and 24 of *Iskra* and later as a separate pamphlet.

August 2 (15)	Lenin holds a conference with representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Russian organisation of *Iskra*, and the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P., and forms the *Iskra*-ist nucleus of the Organising Committee for the convocation of the Second Congress of the Party.
August 11 (24)	Lenin writes a letter to the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. concerning the committee's statement of solidarity with the views outlined in the book, *What Is to Be Done?*, and outlines a plan of action for the committee in the immediate future.
August	Lenin's article, "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", is published in No. 4 of *Zarya*. Lenin writes a preface to the second edition of the pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*.
September 1 (14)	Lenin's editorial, "The Draft of a New Law on Strikes", is published in *Iskra*, No. 24.
September 3 (16)	Lenin writes a letter to the editors of *Yuzhny Rabochy* about the need to unite the local committees in a single all-Russian organisation.
September 6 (19)	On Lenin's instructions, the Berlin group for the transport of *Iskra* sends to Russia the matrices for Nos. 22 and 23 of *Iskra* for printing at the illegal print-shop set up in Baku by V. Z. Ketskhoveli.
September	Lenin writes his pamphlet, *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*, in which he elaborates *Iskra*'s principles of organisation of a party of a new type. In conversations with I. V. Babushkin, who has arrived from Russia, Lenin outlines the immediate tasks of the *Iskra*-ist organisations in Russia.
October 15 (28)	Lenin's editorial, "Political Struggle and Political Chicanery", is published in No. 26 of *Iskra*.
October 28-November 7 (November 10-20)	At Lausanne, Geneva, Berne, and Zurich (Switzerland) Lenin reads his paper criticising the programme and tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
November 1 (14)	Lenin's article, "Vulgar Socialism and Narodism as Resurrected by the Socialist-Revolutionaries", is published in No. 27 of *Iskra*.
November 2-3 (15-16)	On Lenin's initiative, the Organising Committee (O.C.) for the convocation of the Second Congress

	of the R.S.D.L.P. is formed at the Pskov Conference.
November 16 (29)	Lenin reads in London his paper criticising the programme and tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
Late November (first half of December)	Lenin prepares a draft programme for the work of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., informs the Organising Committee of this draft, and outlines the immediate tasks of the Organising Committee.
November-December	Lenin writes "The Basic Thesis Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries" and his article, "On the Tasks of the Social-Democratic Movement".
December 1 (14)	Lenin's article, "New Events and Old Questions", is published in No. 29 of *Iskra*.
December 14 (27)	Lenin writes a letter to the *Iskra*-ist F. V. Lengnik in Kiev, suggesting that the struggle against the "economists" be intensified.
December	Lenin edits the Russian translation of Karl Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*, published in Geneva in 1903.
December 1902-January 1903	Lenin writes his work, "On the Subject of Reports by Committees and Groups of the R.S.D.L.P. to the General Party Congress".
Second half of 1902-first half of 1903	Lenin conducts classes for studying the programme of the R.S.D.L.P., in a circle for Russian worker-emigrants in London.

1903

January 1 (14)	Lenin's article, "Moscow Zubatovists in St. Petersburg", is published in No. 31 of *Iskra*.
January 15 (28)	Lenin's article, "Announcement of the Formation of an Organising Committee", is published in No. 32 of *Iskra*.
End of January (beginning of February)	Lenin writes his articles, "Concerning the Statement of the Bund" and "On the Manifesto of the Armenian Social-Democrats". Both articles are published in No. 33 of *Iskra*.
January	Lenin writes his work, "Some Reflections on the Letter from 7 Ts. 6 F." (7 Ts. 6 F.—pseudonym of F. V. Lengnik), criticising the leaders of the local Party committees for inactivity in organising political work among the masses.

February 10-13 (23-26)	In the Higher Russian School of Social Sciences in Paris Lenin delivers four lectures on the subject "Marxist Views on the Agrarian Question in Europe and in Russia".
February 15 (28)	Lenin's article, "Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an 'Independent Political Party'?" directed against the bourgeois nationalism of the Bund, is published in No. 34 of *Iskra*.
February 18-21 (March 3-6)	At a meeting of Russian political emigrants in Paris, Lenin reads a paper on the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats.
February 24 (March 9)	Lenin returns from Paris to London.
March 1 (14)	Lenin's article, "The Autocracy Is Wavering....", is published in No. 35 of *Iskra*.
March 5 (18)	Lenin delivers a speech on the Paris Commune at a workers' meeting in Whitechapel (a working-class district in London).
March	Lenin writes his pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor. An Explanation for the Peasants of What the Social-Democrats Want.*
April 1 (14)	Lenin's article, "Mr. Struve Exposed by His Colleague", is published in No. 37 of *Iskra*.
April 15 (28)	Lenin's article, "*Les Beaux Esprits Se Rencontrent*, (Which May Be Interpreted Roughly as: Birds of a Feather Flock Together)", directed against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, is published in No. 38 of *Iskra*.
End of April (beginning of May)	Lenin and Krupskaya move from London to Geneva in connection with the transfer of *Iskra*'s publication to that city.
May	Lenin's pamphlet, *To the Rural Poor*, comes off the press in Geneva.
June	At Berne Lenin delivers several lectures on the agrarian question.
June-first half of July	Lenin conducts preparations for the Second Congress of the Party.
	He drafts the standing orders and agenda of the Congress, prepares the draft Rules of the Party, and acquaints the members of the *Iskra* Editorial Board and delegates to the Congress with this draft.

	Lenin attends meetings of Congress delegates, makes the acquaintance of the delegates, and speaks on the national question at a delegates' meeting.
	Lenin writes an outline of the report to the Congress on the activities of the *Iskra* organisation.
	Lenin prepares draft resolutions for the Congress: on demonstrations, on the place of the Bund in the Party, on the attitude towards the student youth, on Party literature, and drafts of minor resolutions (on the economic struggle, on May Day, on the International Congress, on terrorism, on propaganda, and on the distribution of forces).
	Lenin writes his article, "Reply to Criticism of Our Draft Programme", substantiating the agrarian section of the Party programme. The article is published in the pamphlet, *On the Agrarian Programme of X*, distributed among the delegates to the Congress in lieu of a report on the agrarian question.
July 15 (28)	Lenin's editorial, "The National Question in Our Programme", is published in No. 44 of *Iskra*.
July 17 (30)-August 10 (23)	The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. meets in Brussels and London. Lenin takes a leading part in the work of the Congress; he keeps a diary of the Congress sessions.
July 17 (30)	At the first session of the Congress in Brussels, Lenin is elected Vice-Chairman, member of the Presidium and member of the Credentials Committee of the Congress.
July 17-18 (30-31)	Lenin works on the Credentials Committee of the Congress.
July 18 (31)	Lenin speaks twice at the second session of the Congress in support of the agenda recommended by him.
	Lenin speaks at the third session of the Congress on the incorrect actions of the Organising Committee (on the "incident with the O.C.") and on the question of the attendance of the Polish Social-Democrats at the Congress.
July 20 (August 2)	Lenin speaks at the sixth session of the Congress on the place of the Bund in the R.S.D.L.P., criticising the Bund's nationalism in questions of organisation.
July 21 (August 3)	Lenin is elected to the Programme Committee at the eighth session of the Congress.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Between July 21 and 29 (August 3 and 11)	Lenin works in the Programme Committee of the Congress.
July 22 (August 4)	Lenin speeks on the Party Programme at the ninth session of the Congress.
Between July 24 and 29 (August 6 and 11)	Lenin and the delegates of the Second Congress move from Brussels to London.
July 29 (August 11)	At the fourteenth session of the Congress Lenin delivers the report on the Party Rules.
	At the fifteenth session of the Congress, Lenin is elected to the Committee for Editing the Rules.
Between July 29 and August 2 (August 11 and 15)	Lenin works in the Committee for Editing the Rules.
July 31 (August 13)	Lenin speaks at the nineteenth session of the Congress, in the discussion on the agrarian programme of the Party.
August 1 (14)	Lenin delivers three speeches at the twentieth and twenty-first sessions of the Congress, in the discussion on the agrarian programme.
August 2 (15)	Lenin speaks at the twenty-second and twenty-third sessions of the Congress, in support of his proposed formulation of §1 of the Rules about membership in the Party.
August 2 or 3 (15 or 16)	Lenin attends the meeting of the *Iskra* organisation at which a split takes place among the *Iskra*-ists over the question of candidates for election to the Central Committee.
August 4 (17)	Lenin speaks at the twenty-fifth session of the Congress, on the composition of the Party Council.
August 4 and 5 (17 and 18)	Lenin speaks three times at the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions of the Congress, in the discussion on §12 of the Party Rules, on the question of co-optation to the Central Committee and to the editorial board of the Central Organ of the Party.
August 5 (18)	Lenin attends a private meeting of delegates of the majority, at which the question of the composition of the Central Committee is discussed.
Between August 5 and 10 (18 and 23)	Lenin prepares draft resolutions: on the withdrawal of the Bund from the R.S.D.L.P., on separate groups, on the army, and on the peasantry

	(these resolutions were not submitted to the Congress).
August 7 (20)	Lenin speaks at the thirty-first session of the Congress on the question of elections to the Editorial Board of *Iskra*, the Central Organ of the Party.
	Lenin is elected by secret ballot to the Editorial Board of *Iskra*; speaks on elections to the Central Committee.
August 9 or 10 (22 or 23)	Lenin prepares a draft resolution on the publication of a periodical for members of religious sects.
August 10 (23)	Lenin speaks at the thirty-seventh session of the Congress, against Potresov's resolution on the attitude towards the liberals, and delivers his speech on the attitude towards the student youth.
August 11 (24)	Lenin and other Bolshevik delegates of the Congress pay homage to the memory of Karl Marx at the latter's grave in Highgate Cemetery.
After August 11 (24)	After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin returns from London to Geneva.
August 15 (28)	Lenin's articles, "An Era of Reforms", concerning the law on factory stewards, and "The Latest Word in Bundist Nationalism", are published in No. 46 of *Iskra*.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 6

На английском языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

7

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.S.R.

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

This seventh volume of Lenin's works covers the period from September 1903 to December 1904.

The major item in it is his book, *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, which elaborated the organisational principles of the Bolshevik Party.

Many of the works in the present volume—the "Account of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", the article "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. Reply by N. Lenin to Rosa Luxemburg", the speeches at the Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad and the sessions of the Party Council, and the resolutions moved there, the draft appeal "To the Party", and the pamphlet "The Zemstvo Campaign and *Iskra*'s Plan"—are directed against the Mensheviks' opportunism in organisational and tactical questions and against their splitting activities.

The letters included in this volume—"Letter to the Members of the Central Committee", "To Five Members of the Central Committee", "Letter to Central Committee Agents and Committee Members of the R.S.D.L.P. Siding with the Second Party Congress Majority" and the "Letter to Glebov (V. A. Noskov)"—illustrate Lenin's fight against the conciliators.

"What We Are Working For", "To the Party", "A Letter to the Comrades", and the "Announcement of the Formation of an Organising Committee and the Convening of the Third Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" show how Lenin directed the preparations for the third Party Congress and the establishment of the Bureau

of Majority Committees and the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

The following documents published in this volume are included in the *Collected Works* for the first time: the "Statement Concerning Martov's Report", the letter "To the Editorial Board of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P." concerning Lenin's resignation from the editorial board of *Iskra*, the draft resolution moved in the Party Council on the convening of the Third Party Congress, and Lenin's fourth speech there on the publication of Party literature, and the "Announcement of the Formation of a Bureau of Majority Committees".

ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[1]

Written in the early part of September 1903

First published in 1927 in *Lenin Miscellany VI*

Published according to the manuscript



First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Account of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.". 1903
Reduced

This account is intended for personal acquaintances only, and therefore to read it without the consent of the author (*Lenin*) **is tantamount to reading other people's letters**.

In order to make what follows more intelligible, I shall first say a few words about the composition of the Congress, although it will mean anticipating somewhat. The number of votes at the Congress was fifty-one (thirty-three delegates with one vote each, and nine with two, nine "double-handers").[2] There were ten delegates, if I am not mistaken, with a deliberative voice but no vote; that is, fifty-two persons in all. The political grouping of these votes, as revealed during the *entire* course of the Congress, was as follows: five Bundists,[3] three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists[4] (two from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad[5] and one from the St. Petersburg League of Struggle[6]), four *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists (two from the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group[7] and two from the Kharkov Committee, which sided solidly with *Yuzhny Rabochy*), six indecisives or waverers (the "Marsh", as they were called by **all** the *Iskra*-ists[8]—in jest, of course), and, lastly, about thirty-three *Iskra*-ists who were more or less firm and consistent in their *Iskra*-ism. These thirty-three *Iskra*-ists, who when they stood together decided every issue at the Congress, split in their turn into two subgroups—a split that took shape finally only towards the end of the Congress: one subgroup, with approximately nine votes, consisting of *Iskra*-ists of the "soft or rather zigzag line" (or the female line, as certain wits called it, and not without reason)—*Iskra*-ists who stood (as will be seen later) for justice, for a middle course, etc.; and the other, with about twenty-four votes, consisting of *Iskra*-ists of the firm line, who upheld consistent *Iskra*-ism both as

regards tactics and as regards the personal composition of the central institutions of the Party.

I repeat that this grouping took final shape and became quite clear only *post factum*, towards the end of the Congress (which held close on forty sittings!), and I am anticipating when I outline it at the start. I must also make the reservation that this grouping only represents the *approximate* numbers of votes, for on various minor issues (and on one occasion—on the question of "equality of languages", of which I shall speak later—on a major issue too) the votes not infrequently split, some delegates abstaining, the groups intermingling, and so on.

The composition of the Congress had been preliminarily determined by the Organising Committee,[9] which, under the Regulations for the Congress, had the right to invite to it in a deliberative capacity such persons as it might think fit. The Congress itself at the very beginning elected a Credentials Committee, which thereafter took charge of all matters relating to its composition. (Let me say in parenthesis that on this committee too there was a Bundist, who tried to take all the other members of it by siege, keeping them up until three o'clock in the morning, and who, even so, entered a "dissenting opinion" *on every issue*.) The Congress was marked at the beginning by the peaceful and harmonious co-operation of all the *Iskra*-ists; there had always been different shades of opinion among them, of course, but they had never manifested themselves as political differences. Incidentally, let us state in advance that the split among the *Iskra*-ists was one of the major political results of the Congress, and anyone who wants to acquaint himself with the matter should therefore pay special attention to all episodes even remotely connected with that split.

One rather important event at the very beginning of the Congress was the election of the *Bureau*, or *Presidium*. Martov was for electing nine persons, who would select three from their number to act as the Bureau at each sitting, and he even suggested a Bundist as one of the nine. I was for electing only three persons for the whole duration of the Congress, and three, moreover, who would "keep order". The Bureau elected consisted of Plekhanov, myself and

Comrade T[10] (a firm-line *Iskra*-ist and member of the Organising Committee, of whom we shall have frequent occasion to speak later). The last-named, I might remark, was elected by only a narrow margin in preference to a *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ist (also a member of the Organising Committee). My difference with Martov over the question of the Bureau (a difference significant in the light of subsequent events) did not, however, lead to any split or conflict: the matter was somehow settled in a peaceful, natural, "homely" way, as most questions generally were settled in the *Iskra* organisation and the *Iskra* editorial board.

Also at the beginning of the Congress, there was a meeting of the *Iskra* organisation (confidential and informal, of course) on the subject of its Congress mandates. This meeting likewise settled its business in a peaceful and amicable manner. I only mention this meeting because I think it significant, firstly, that at the beginning of the Congress the *Iskra*-ists worked together harmoniously, and, secondly, that they had decided to appeal, in doubtful and debatable cases, to the authority of the *Iskra* organisation (or, rather, of the *Iskra* organisation members present at the Congress); although the decisions of these meetings-were not binding, of course, for the rule that "binding instructions are abolished" and that it was everyone's right, and indeed duty, to vote at the Congress according to his own free convictions, without owing obedience to any organisation—this rule, I say, was recognised by all the *Iskra*-ists, and was loudly proclaimed by the chairman at the beginning of practically every meeting of the *Iskra* organisation.

To proceed. The first incident at the Congress to disclose that all was not well among the *Iskra*-ists, an incident that "set the scene" for the final drama (or tragicomedy?), was the celebrated "*incident of the Organising Committee*". This must be dealt with at length. It occurred while the Congress was still engaged in constituting itself and discussing its Standing Orders (which, by the way, consumed a tremendous amount of time on account of the obstruction of the Bundists, who, deliberately or otherwise, never missed an opportunity to cause delay). The substance of the Organising Committee incident was that, on the one hand, that body had, even before the Congress opened, rejected the protest of the Borba

group,[11] which demanded representation at the Congress, and had stood by this decision in the Credentials Committee; and, on the other hand, *on the floor of the Congress* this same Organising Committee suddenly declared that it was inviting Ryazanov in a deliberative capacity. The course of events in regard to this incident was as follows.

Before the sittings of the Congress began, Martov confidentially informed me that a certain member of the *Iskra* organisation and of the Organising Committee (whom we shall call N[12]) had decided to insist in the Organising Committee that it invite to the Congress in a deliberative capacity a certain individual whom Martov himself could not describe otherwise than as a "renegade".[13] (And it was true that this individual had inclined at one time towards *Iskra* but afterwards, within a few weeks, in fact, had gone over to *Rabocheye Dyelo*, even though the latter was already in a state of complete degeneration.) Martov and I discussed the matter and we were both indignant that a member of the *Iskra* organisation should do such a thing, knowing, of course (for Martov had warned Comrade N), that it was a direct slap in the face for *Iskra*, yet not considering it necessary even to consult the organisation. N did in fact put forward his proposal in the Organising Committee, but it was rejected owing to the vigorous protest of Comrade T, who described the wholly unstable political character of the "renegade". It is worth noting that Martov, as he said, could not even speak any longer to N, although they had previously been on friendly personal terms, so shocked was he by this action. N's wish to put spokes in *Iskra*'s wheel was further revealed in his supporting a vote of censure passed by the Organising Committee on the *Iskra* editorial board; a censure which, to be sure, concerned a very minor matter, but which nevertheless aroused Martov's profound indignation. Furthermore, information from Russia, also communicated to me by Martov, indicated a tendency on N's part to circulate rumours of dissension between the *Iskra*-ists in Russia and the *Iskra*-ists abroad. All this disposed the *Iskra*-ists to be very distrustful of N; and on top of it all came the following. The Organising Committee had rejected the protest of Borba; the Organising Committee members attending the meeting of the Credentials Committee (T and N) had

both (*including* N!!!) likewise spoken in the most emphatic terms against Borba. Yet during an adjournment at one of the morning sittings of the Congress, the Organising Committee suddenly held a meeting of their own "by the window" and decided to invite Ryazanov in a deliberative capacity! *N was in favour of inviting him.* T, of course, was categorically against, declaring moreover that the Organising Committee had no right to make such a decision inasmuch as everything relating to the composition of the Congress had already been referred to the Credentials Committee specially elected by the Congress for the purpose. Of course, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* members of the Organising Committee + the Bundist + N outvoted Comrade T, and the decision went through.

T reported this decision to the *Iskra* editorial board, which (not all its members were present, but Martov and Zasulich were) unanimously decided, of course, to take the field at the Congress against the Organising Committee, for many *Iskra*-ists had already spoken publicly at the Congress against Borba and it was impossible to yield on this issue.

When the Organising Committee (after the dinner interval) informed the Congress of its decision, T, in his turn, informed it of his protest. Thereupon a *Yuzhny Rabochy* member of the Organising Committee fell upon T and accused him of violating discipline (1), on the grounds that the Organising Committee had resolved not to disclose (*sic*!) this fact to the Congress. Naturally, we (Plekhanov, *Martov* and I) came down hard on the Organising Committee at that, accusing it of reviving binding instructions, violating the sovereignty of the Congress, and so on. The Congress supported us, the Organising Committee was defeated, and a resolution was adopted depriving the Organising Committee as a body of the right to influence the composition of the Congress.

Such was the "Organising Committee incident". Firstly, it finally undermined the political confidence of many *Iskra*-ists in N (and strengthened their confidence in T); secondly, it not only proved, but palpably *demonstrated* how shaky the *Iskra* trend still was even in a central and, as it seemed, super-*Iskra*-ist institution like the Organising Committee. It became clear that, besides the Bundist,

the Organising Committee included 1) *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists with their own specific policy, and 2) "*Iskra*-ists who were ashamed of being *Iskra*-ists", and that only *some* of its members were 3) *Iskra*-ists who were not ashamed of being such. When the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists expressed a desire to discuss this deplorable incident with the *Iskra* editorial board (privately, of course)—*Comrade N, it is very important to note, expressed no desire at that time to do so*—the editorial board did discuss it with them, and I plainly told them that the Congress had definitely revealed an important political fact, namely, that there were many *Iskra*-ists in the Party who were ashamed of being *Iskra*-ists and were capable, just to spite *Iskra*, of playing such a trick as inviting Ryazanov. So angry was I at this trick on N's part, after he had spoken *against* Borba in the committee, that I publicly declared at the Congress that "comrades who have attended foreign congresses know what a storm of indignation is always aroused when people say one thing at committees and another on the floor of the Congress".* "*Iskra*-ists" who were afraid of being "reproached" by the Bundists with being "*Iskra* puppets", and who *for this reason alone* played *political tricks* on *Iskra*, naturally could not inspire any confidence.

The *Iskra*-ists' general distrust of N grew immensely when Martov's attempt to discuss the matter with him resulted in *N's announcing his resignation from the "Iskra" organisation*! Thereafter the N "affair" was taken up in the *Iskra* organisation, whose members were outraged by *such* a resignation, and the organisation held *four meetings* on the subject. These meetings, especially the last, are extremely important, for it was there that the split among the *Iskra*-ists, *chiefly* over the composition of the Central Committee, definitely took shape.

But before embarking on an account of these meetings of the *Iskra* organisation (which, I once more repeat, were private and informal), let me say something about the work of the Congress. That work proceeded harmoniously for the time being, in the sense of all the *Iskra*-ists acting together,

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* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 484.—*Ed.*

both on the first agenda item (the position of the Bund in the Party), and on the second (the programme), and on the third (endorsement of the Central Organ of the Party). The united stand of the *Iskra*-ists ensured a big and solid majority at the Congress (a compact majority, as the Bund ists ruefully called it!), although here too the "indecisives" (or "Marsh") and *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists more than once displayed, on minor issues, their utter instability. The political grouping of not fully *Iskra*-ist elements at the Congress stood out more and more clearly.

To return to the meetings of the *Iskra* organisation. At the first of them it was resolved to request N to give an explanation, leaving it to him to say before whom of the members of the *Iskra* organisation he wished to do so. I protested emphatically against this approach, demanding that the political issue (the *Iskra*-ists' lack of political confidence in N at this Congress) be separated from the personal issue (the appointment of a commission to investigate the reasons for N's strange conduct). At the second meeting it was announced that N wished to give his explanation *without T present*, although he did not intend, he intimated, to say anything about T personally. I again protested and refused to be present at an explanation at which a non-member of the organisation could demand the withdrawal, even for a moment, of a member, when it was not that member he was going to discuss. I considered this an unworthy manoeuvre and a slap in the face for the organisation on N's part: N did not even trust the organisation so far as to leave it to it to determine under what conditions the explanation should be given! At the third meeting, N gave his "explanation", which *failed to satisfy* the majority of those present. The fourth meeting was attended by all the *Iskra*-ists; but it was *p r e c e d e d* by a number of important episodes at the Congress itself.

First of all, mention should be made of the "equality of languages" episode. It concerned the adoption of the programme—the formulation of the demand for equality and equal rights in regard to language. (The programme was discussed and voted on point by point, the Bundists engaged in **desperate** obstruction, and practically two-thirds of the time of the Congress was spent on the programme!) On

this issue the Bundists succeeded in shaking the unity of the *Iskra*-ists, leading some of them to believe that *Iskra* objected to "equality of languages", when actually all the *Iskra* editorial board objected to was this illiterate, in its opinion, bizarre and superfluous formula. A desperate struggle ensued, and the Congress was split *in half*, into *two equal halves* (with a few abstentions): about twenty-three votes (perhaps 23-25, I do not remember exactly) were on the side of *Iskra* (and the *Iskra* editorial board), and as many were against. The question had to be postponed, it was referred back to the committee, which found a formula that the Congress adopted *u n a n i m o u s l y*. The equality of languages incident is important because it once more revealed the shakiness of *Iskra*-ism, plainly and definitely revealed the shakiness both of the indecisives (it was then, if I am not mistaken, that they were dubbed the *Marsh*, and by *none other than* the *Iskra*-ists of the Martov persuasion!) and of the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists, who were all against *Iskra*. Passions ran high and *innumerable cutting* remarks were flung at the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists by the *Iskra*-ists, *especially the Martovites*. One "leader" of the Martovites nearly came to blows with the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists during the interval, and I hastened to resume the sitting (at the urgent request of Plekhanov, who feared a scuffle). It is important to note that among these twenty-three staunchest of the *Iskra*-ists too, the Martovites (i.e., the *Iskra*-ists who subsequently followed Martov) constituted a *m i n o r i t y*.

Another episode was the struggle over Paragraph 1 of the "Party Rules". This was already the fifth item of the *Tagesordnung*,* towards the end of the Congress. (Under Item 1, a resolution against federalism was adopted; under Item 2, the programme; under Item 3, *Iskra* was adopted as the Central Organ of the Party;** under Item 4, the "dele-

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* Agenda.—*Ed.*

** It is highly important to note that the Congress *Tagesordnung*, adopted, on my report, *by the Organising Committee* and *endorsed by the Congress*, contained two separate items: *Item 3*: "Establishment of the Central Organ of the Party, or endorsement of such", and *Item 24*: "Election of the central institutions of the Party". When one of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists asked (in connection with Item 3) what it was

gates' reports" were heard, part of them, that is, the rest being referred to a committee, for the time at the disposal of the Congress was already too short—both funds and endurance had been exhausted.)

Paragraph 1 of the Rules defines a Party member. The definition given in my draft was: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts its programme and who supports the Party both financially and by personal *participation in one of the Party organisations*." In place of the words I have underlined, Martov proposed: "*work under the control and direction of one of the Party organisations*". My formulation was supported by Plekhanov, Martov's by the rest of the editorial board (Axelrod was their spokesman at the Congress). We argued that the concept Party member must be *narrowed* so as to separate those who worked from those who merely talked, to eliminate organisational chaos, to eliminate the monstrous and absurd possibility of there being organisations which consisted of Party members but which were not Party organisations, and so on. Martov stood for *broadening* the Party and spoke of a broad class movement needing a broad—i.e., diffuse—organisation, and so forth. It is amusing to note that in defence of their views nearly all Martov's supporters cited *What Is To Be Done?** Plekhanov hotly opposed Martov, pointing out that his Jaurèsist formulation would fling open the doors to the opportunists, who just longed for such a position of being inside the Party but outside its organisation. "Under the control and direction", I said, would in

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we were endorsing, just a name?—we didn't even know who the editors were to be!—*M a r t o v* took the floor and explained that what was being submitted for endorsement was the *Iskra t r e n d*, irrespective of persons, and that this would in no way predetermine the composition of the editorial board, for the election of the central institutions would follow under Item 24, and all binding instructions had been abolished.

These words of Martov's (on Item 3, *before the "Iskra"-ists had split*) are of the utmost importance.

The explanation Martov gave fully accorded with our *common* understanding of the meaning of Item 3 and Item 24 of the *Tagesordnung*.

After Item 3 Martov in his speeches at the Congress actually employed, time and again, the expression: the ex-members of the *Iskra* editorial board.

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.—*Ed.*

practice mean nothing more nor less than *without any control or direction*. Martov *won*: his formulation was adopted (by about twenty-eight votes to twenty-three, or something like that—I cannot recall exactly), *thanks* to the Bund, which, of course, at once sensed a loophole and brought all its *five* votes to bear to secure the adoption of "the worse alternative" (that is precisely how a *Rabocheye Dyelo* delegate explained his motive for voting for Martov!). The heated controversy and the voting on Paragraph 1 of the Rules once more revealed the political grouping at the Congress and demonstrated that the Bund + *Rabocheye Dyelo* could *decide the fate* of any issue by supporting the minority of the *Iskra*-ists against the majority.

It was *after* the debate and voting on Paragraph 1 of the Rules that the fourth (and *last*) meeting of the *Iskra* organisation took place. The disagreement among the *Iskra*-ists over the personal composition of the Central Committee had already become quite clear and had caused a split in their ranks: one section stood for an *Iskra*-ist Central Committee (in view of the dissolution of the *Iskra* organisation and the Emancipation of Labour group[14] and the need to complete *Iskra*'s work), the other—for admitting the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists too and for predominance of *Iskra*-ists of the "zigzag line". The first section was categorically against N's candidature, the other in favour of it. It was in a last attempt to reach agreement that this *meeting of the sixteen* (members of the *Iskra* organisation, including, I repeat, those present in a deliberative capacity) was called. The result of the voting was: nine against N, four in favour, the rest abstaining. The majority, anxious nonetheless to avoid war with the minority, thereupon proposed a compromise list of five, including one *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ist (acceptable to the minority) and one militant member of the minority, while the rest were consistent *Iskra*-ists (of whom—it is important to note—one joined in the fight at the Congress only towards the end and was to all intents and purposes impartial, while the other two took no part at all in the fight and were absolutely impartial as regards personalities). Ten hands were raised for this list (then one more was added, making eleven) and one against (only Martov's!), the rest abstained! Thus the compromise

list was wrecked by *Martov*. After this, two "militant" lists, one from each side, were put to the vote, but neither secured more than a minority.

And so, at the last meeting of the *Iskra* organisation the Martovites *proved in the minority on both issues*; nevertheless, when a member of the majority (the above-mentioned impartial member, or chairman) approached them after the meeting in a last attempt to reach agreement, they declared war.

The Martovites' calculation was clear and sure: the Bundists and *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists would undoubtedly have supported the list of the *zigzag line*, for during the month the Congress had been sitting all issues had become so plain and all personalities so clearly delineated that *not one* of the Congress delegates would have had any difficulty in deciding which was the better alternative, or the lesser evil. And for the Bund + *Rabocheye Dyelo*, of course, the zigzag *Iskra*-ists were the lesser evil, and always will be.

After the meeting of the sixteen, when the *Iskra*-ists had definitely divided and war had been declared among them, meetings began of the two parties into which the Congress had split, that is, private and unofficial gatherings of all who thought alike. The *Iskra*-ists of the consistent line assembled at first to the number of nine (out of sixteen), then fifteen, and finally ***twenty-four***, counting *votes*, *not persons*. This rapid increase was due to the fact that the lists of candidates (for the Central Committee) were already beginning to circulate, and the vast majority of the *Iskra*-ists were immediately and permanently repelled by the Martovite lists because of their flabbiness: Martov's candidates were people who had made a definitely bad impression on the Congress (by paltering, inconsistency, tactlessness, etc.). That in the first place; in the second place, when it was explained to the *Iskra*-ists what had taken place in the *Iskra* organisation, the bulk of them were drawn towards the majority, and Martov's inability to stick to a definite political line became apparent to all and sundry. So it was that twenty-four votes were quickly and easily mustered for the consistent *Iskra*-ist tactics, for the list of Central Committee candidates, and for electing a trio to the

editorial board (instead of endorsing the old, ineffectual and amorphous board of six).

By this time the Congress had finished discussing the Rules, and Martov and Co. had once again (and not once, in fact, but several times) *defeated* the majority of the *Iskra*-ists *with the generous assistance of the Bund* + "*Rabocheye Dyelo*"—as, for example, over the question of co-optation to the central bodies (this question was decided by the Congress *along Martov's lines*).

In spite of having been thus impaired, the Rules as a whole were endorsed by all the *Iskra*-ists and by the entire Congress. But after the general Rules, the Congress passed on to the Rules of the Bund, and by an *overwhelming* majority rejected the Bund's proposal (to recognise the Bund as the *sole* representative of the Jewish proletariat in the Party). I think on this issue the Bund stood alone against practically the whole Congress. Thereupon *the Bundists withdrew from the Congress*, *announcing their withdrawal from the Party*. The Martovites had lost five of their faithful allies! Then the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists too withdrew, after the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad[15] was recognised as the *sole* Party organisation abroad. The Martovites had lost another two of their faithful allies! The total number of votes at the Congress was now forty-four (51—7), of which the *majority* (twenty-four) were those of consistent *Iskra*-ists; the coalition of the Martovites with the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists and the "Marsh" resulted in only twenty votes.

The *Iskra*-ists of the zigzag line were faced with the prospect of submitting—just as the *Iskra*-ists of the firm line had submitted without a murmur when Martov *set out to beat* and did beat them in coalition with the Bund. But the Martovites were so unbridled that instead of submitting they set out to cause a row and a split.

It was causing a row to raise the question of endorsing the old editorial board, for the request of even one of the editors would be enough to oblige the Congress to *scrutinise* the question of the composition of the Central Organ in its entirety, instead of confining itself to mere endorsement. It was a step towards a split to *refuse* to take part in the elections to the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

First as regards the election of the editorial board. As I have already mentioned, what the *Tagesordnung* said, in Item 24, was: *election* of the central institutions of the Party. And *my* commentary on the *Tagesordnung*[16] (which commentary was known *to a l l the "Iskra"-ists long before the Congress* and *to all the delegates* at the Congress) said marginally: election of *t h r e e p e r s o n s t o t h e C e n t r a l O r g a n* and three to the Central Committee. Hence it is beyond all doubt that the demand for the election of a trio originated within the editorial board itself and none of the editors protested against it. Even Martov and another Martovite leader defended the proposal for "two trios" prior to the Congress, before *a number of delegates*.

Several weeks before the Congress, I personally informed Starover[17] and Martov that at the Congress I would demand the *election* of the editorial board; I agreed to the election of two trios, the idea being that the editorial trio would *either* co-opt seven (or even more) persons or would remain as it was (I specially stipulated this latter possibility). Starover even said outright that the trio would mean Plekhanov + Martov + Lenin, and I *agreed* with him—so clear had it been to everyone all along that these alone could be elected to the leadership. One had to be actuated by resentment and pique and lose one's head after the struggle at the Congress to proceed after the event to attack the trio as inexpedient and ineffectual. The old board of six was so ineffectual that *never once in all its three years* did it meet in full force. That may seem incredible, but it is a fact. *Not one* of the forty-five issues of *Iskra* was made up (in the editorial and technical sense) by anyone but Martov or Lenin. And *never once* was any *major* theoretical issue raised by anyone but Plekhanov. Axelrod did no work at all (he contributed literally nothing to *Zarya*[18] and only three or four articles to all the forty-five issues of *Iskra*). Zasulich and Starover only contributed and advised, they *never* did any actual editorial work. Who ought to be elected to the *political leadership*, to the *c e n t r e*, was as clear as daylight to every delegate at the Congress, after the month it had been in session.

To propose at the Congress to endorse the old editorial board was *a stupid attempt to provoke a row*.

It was stupid because it was futile. Even if the board of six had been endorsed, one member of it (myself, for example) would have demanded that it be reviewed, that the relations within it be examined, and the Congress would have been obliged to go into the matter all over again.

It was an attempt to provoke a row because *non-endorsement* was bound to be taken *as an insult*—whereas in a new election there was nothing insulting whatever. The Central Committee was being elected—why not the Central Organ too? There was no question of endorsing the Organising Committee—why should there be any of endorsing the old editorial board?

Naturally, however, by *demanding* endorsement the Martovites *provoked* a protest at the Congress, the protest was taken as an *insult*, as an affront, as an attempt to *oust* them, to shut them out ... and all the bogy-tales began to be invented on which the fancy of idle gossips is now feeding!

The editorial board left the hall while the Congress discussed the election-or-endorsement issue. After a desperately hot debate, *the Congress decided not to endorse the old editorial board.**

Only after this decision was taken did the *ex*-members of the editorial board return to the hall. Martov then got up and, in *his own name* and that of his colleagues, declined to stand for election, uttering all sorts of dreadful and wretched words about a "state of siege in the Party" (for blackballed Ministers?) and "emergency laws against particular individuals and groups" (such as those who, in the name of *Iskra*, try to palm off Ryazanov on it, and who say one thing at committees and another on the floor of the Congress?).

I replied to him by pointing to the *incredible confusion of political ideas* which had led to this protest against election, against the Congress making changes in official Party bodies.**

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* One Martovite made *such* a speech on this occasion that when he had finished a delegate called out to the secretary: "Don't put a full stop, put a tear-drop!" Particularly fervent in their championship of the old editorial board were the most inveterate "*Marsh*" men.

** See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 505-06.—*Ed.*

Plekhanov, Martov, and Lenin were elected. *Martov again declined*. Koltsov (who received three votes) likewise declined. Thereupon the Congress passed a resolution instructing the two members of the editorial board of the Central Organ to co-opt a third, *when they should find a suitable person*.

Next came the election of three members to the Central Committee—*the name of only one of whom was disclosed to the Congress* by the teller of the votes—and of the fifth member of the Party Council[19] (likewise by secret ballot).

The Martovites, followed by the whole of the "Marsh", *would not hand in their ballots* and submitted a written statement to the Bureau to that effect.

This was manifestly a step towards a split, towards *wrecking the Congress* and refusing to recognise the Party. Yet when one of the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists said in so many words that he *doubted* (*sic*!) the validity of the Congress decisions, Martov, overcome by shame, controverted him, *publicly declaring that he had no doubt as to their validity*.

Unfortunately, these well-spoken and loyal words have been contradicted by the actions and behaviour of Martov (and of the Martovites)....

The Congress then entrusted the publication of the minutes to a Minutes Committee, and adopted eleven resolutions on tactical questions, viz.:

1) On Demonstrations;
2) On the Trade Union Movement;
3) On Work Among the Sects;
4) On Work Among the Student Youth;
5) On How To Behave Under Interrogation;
6) On Shop Stewards;
7) On the 1904 International Congress in Amsterdam;
8) On the Liberals (Starover's resolution);
9) On the Liberals (Plekhanov's resolution),
10) On the Socialist-Revolutionaries[20];
11) On Party Literature.

Then, after a brief speech reminding the delegates that the decisions of the Congress were binding, the chairman closed the Congress.

Examining the behaviour of the Martovites since the Congress, their refusal to collaborate on the Central Organ (*although officially invited by the editorial board to do so*), their *refusal* to work on the Central Committee, and their propaganda of a boycott—all I can say is that this is an insensate attempt, unworthy of Party members, to disrupt the Party—and why? *Only* because they are dissatisfied with the composition of the central bodies; for, speaking *objectively*, it was *o n l y* over this that our ways parted, while their subjective verdicts (insult, affront, slurs, ousting, shutting out, etc., etc.) *are nothing but the fruits of offended vanity and a morbid imagination.*

This morbid imagination and offended vanity are leading directly to the most disgraceful *scandal-mongering*, when, *without yet knowing or seeing anything of the activities of the new central bodies*, people spread rumours about their being "ineffectual", about Ivan Ivanovich "ruling with a rod of iron" or Ivan Nikiforovich[21] with an "iron hand", and so on.

To try to prove that the central bodies are "ineffectual" *by boycotting them* is an unprecedented and unparalleled violation of *Party duty*, and no sophistry can conceal the fact: *the boycott is a step towards disrupting the Party.*

The Russian Social-Democratic movement is in the throes of the last difficult transition from the circles to a *Party*, from philistinism to a *realisation of revolutionary duty*, from acting by means of scandal-mongering and circle pressure to *discipline.*

Anyone who values Party work and *action* in the interests of the Social-Democratic labour movement will refuse to tolerate such wretched sophistries as a "legitimate" and "loyal" boycott of the central bodies; he will not allow the cause to suffer and the work to be brought to a standstill because a dozen or so individuals are displeased that they and their friends were not elected to the central bodies; he will not allow Party officials to be subjected to private and secret pressure through threats of non-collaboration, through boycotts, through cutting off of funds, through scandal-mongering and lying tales.

FOILED!

"Well, and what if your sonorous, bombastic and florid assurances should inspire distrust because of their very nature?"

"I should like to see who would dare doubt my word!"

"But still, suppose it is doubted?"

"I repeat, I will not allow anyone to doubt the word of a revolutionary, I shall stop at nothing, I shall go to any length, I shall demand either a direct expression of disbelief or a direct withdrawal, I...."

"What if your demand for a direct expression of disbelief is accepted?"

"What do you mean?"

"What if you are told plainly and bluntly that you are not believed?"

"I shall proclaim the man who dares say that a gross slanderer, I shall publicly brand his unparalleled conduct...."

"But what if in reply he begins to show point by point that your whole behaviour has long since made it impossible to trust you?"

"I shall go about everywhere collecting protests against this fratricidal controversy, I shall make emotional speeches about truth and justice, about crystal purity soiled by unclean hands, about the coarse and sordid husk of petty vanity, about the purifying flame which fills my soul with a supreme enthusiasm. I shall liken my enemies to Pontius Pilate...."

"And suppose they liken you to Tartuffe for such talk?"

"In that case I shall demand a court of arbitration!"

"You will at once be told that your challenge is gladly accepted, and asked to agree that the court examine whether

your adversary had legitimate grounds for doubting your *statements.*"

"In that case ... in that case ... I shall declare that '*after all that has happened*' it is ridiculous to talk of any '*agreement*' between the '*parties concerned*'!"

* *
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Such was what *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[22] calls "the unparalleled campaign over the affair of April 2".[23] For very understandable reasons, that worthy publication hates to admit that that is what happened. It takes refuge in a whole series of subterfuges, which we shall have to examine in detail.

Firstly, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* is surprised that, "instead of the organised Russian Social-Democratic movement", to which Balmashov's friends addressed their statement, it is the *Iskra* editorial board that replies. Balmashov's friends, we are told, "have received no answer to their quite definite offer, addressed to a quite definite quarter".

That is not so, gentlemen. Like everyone else, you know very well what the organised Russian Social-Democratic movement consists of, you know *all* the organisations we have. Unlike some other people, we do not have new organisations springing up overnight. We have our Party committees, we have *Iskra*, we have the Organising Committee, which has for some time been making preparations for the Second Congress of the Party. Just to which "definite quarter" did you address yourselves? To the Second Congress? To the Organising Committee? No, though you talk of a *definite* quarter, you said *absolutely nothing* to define that quarter. You yourselves say that *Iskra* is recognised by the majority of the committees; consequently, no one could answer you but *Iskra*. If the Second Congress of our Party adopts *Iskra* as the Party organ, then *Iskra*'s reply will be the reply of the Party. If not, you will have some other organ to deal with. That is simple enough for a child of six to understand.

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya is "surprised that, instead of a plain answer to the plain offer of Balmashov's friends" (an offer, supposedly, to give the Social-Democrats the

opportunity to acquaint themselves with the true facts of the affair of April 2), "it is proposed that they should regard themselves and *Iskra* as two parties between whom there could, after aIl that has happened, be some kind of preliminary negotiations or 'agreements' as to the presentation of the issue". And so, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* now asserts that we were not offered a court of arbitration, but only an opportunity of acquainting ourselves. That is not so. The "Statement" in No. 27 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* speaks literally of an "uninvestigated charge of slander" (against *Iskra*), of having an *investigation* of the charge, of *submitting* "the following evidence to a person on whose integrity and secrecy both we and the Central Organ [mark that!] of the Russian Social-Democratic Party could rely". "Investigation of the charge", "examination of evidence" by a person on whom both accuser and accused can rely—what is that but a court of arbitration? Is that only an offer to acquaint ourselves with the facts?? You are a comic lot, gentlemen. After calling upon us to agree about selecting a person of integrity, you now declare with the inimitable lofty air of a Nozdrev[24] caught red-handed that no agreement is possible!

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya "further asks whom *Iskra* is trying to make a fool of when it talks about an agreement as to the presentation of the issue, and in the same breath decrees its own presentation and categorically asserts that no other is possible". In court, everyone categorically asserts his own opinion and claims that it is the only correct one. Instead of in turn giving his own *definite* presentation of the issue, our haughty opponent begins to bluster and make fine speeches!

After a certain amount of bluster, however, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* condescends to make also a few remarks about our presentation of the issue. In its opinion, *Iskra* is dodging and retreating. It isn't, we are told, as if "the Combatant Organisation denied *Iskra*'s right to have its own free opinion [!], to judge political acts from its own point of view, or even [*sic*!] to have its private doubts about anything it liked". This "private doubts" is really priceless! The "Combatant Organisation" is so extraordinarily broad-minded as to be prepared (now, after a year and more of

warfare!) to permit us *even* to doubt—but only privately, that is, presumably, in such a way that no one but the doubter shall know anything about it.... Perhaps when these combatant people allow us to hold our own "free opinion" they also mean us to do so privately?

"One might think," *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* says, "that it was only *Iskra*'s refusal to accede to this demand that was the reason for accusing it of slander." Then follow quotations from the article "Tartuffes of Revolutionary Morality" and the remark that "what we have here is not modest and indefinite doubts, but very immodest and very definite charges".

We invite our readers to recall certain generally known facts. In No. 20 of *Iskra* (May 1, 1902), we give our opinion of Balmashov's act, without having the slightest idea of the existence of any combatant organisation. The latter thereupon writes us a letter demanding that we seek the motives for Balmashov's decision in its official statements. We silently drop this letter from an unknown organisation into the wastepaper basket. The letter is then published in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 7 (June 1902), the editors of which, for no other reason than our silence, begin to cry that a slur has been cast on the moral aspect, that the significance of the act is being belittled, and so on. We reply with an article entitled "An Enforced Controversy" (*Iskra*, No. 23, August 1, 1902), in which we laugh at this angry Jupiter, uphold our opinion of the act of April 2, and declare that in our view it is "more than doubtful" whether Balmashov belonged to any "combatant organisation". Thereupon Messieurs the Socialist-Revolutionaries, having extorted from us a public expression of our private doubts, raise an hysterical outcry about "unparalleled conduct" and talk about nothing less than "mud-slinging" and "insinuations" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 11, September 1902).

Such, in the briefest outline, are the main facts of our press controversy. Someone who knows very well that his opponent regards his utterances with silent distrust publicly forces him to the wall and demands an open expression of either belief or disbelief, and when he gets the latter answer, beats his breast and complains *urbi et orbi** what a

* To the world at large.—*Ed.*

noble creature he is and how shamefully he has been insulted. What is this but Nozdrev conduct? What is it but revolutionary swashbuckling? Did not such a person deserve to be called a Tartuffe?

Where does *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* get the idea that we are retreating and refuse to answer for our article and for the articles about Tartuffes? Is it from the fact that in our presentation of the issue we do not set forth the theses of these articles? But was the arbitration offer issued in connection with any particular articles—was it not rather in connection with *Iskra*'s general attitude towards the assurances of the "Socialist-Revolutionary Party"? Do not Balmashov's friends, at the very beginning of their statement in No. 27 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, cite precisely the starting-point of the whole controversy, namely, *Iskra*'s remark, in No. 23, that in its view it was more than doubtful whether Balmashov belonged to any "combatant organisation"? We make so bold as to assure *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* that we answer for *all* our articles; that we are prepared to supplement our questions for the arbitration court by references to *any* issue of *Iskra*; that we are ready to prove to anyone that we had every moral right and valid reason to describe as Tartuffes those on *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* who, on account of our presumptuous doubts as to the veracity of that paper's utterances, indulged in the expressions we have quoted.

"Dodging and retreating"—yes, but on whose part? Is it not on the part of those who are *now* magnanimously prepared to recognise our right to a free opinion and to private doubts, after indulging for *over a year* in disgusting bombast against *Iskra* for stubbornly persisting in its doubts and maintaining that every serious person was in duty bound to have doubts about revolutionary romancing? When you saw that your emotional talk about probity and honour actually moved your hearers to laughter, not tears, you decided you must have a new sensation, and came out with your demand for an arbitration court. The scandal-loving element in the colonies abroad rubbed their hands with glee and went about eagerly whispering: "They have summoned them to court ... at last! Now we shall see!" And now they have seen—have seen the last act of a vaudeville,

whose hero, with an ineffable air of injured innocence, declares that "after all that has happened" no agreements as to the presentation of the issue to the court are possible.

Just carry on in the same spirit, gentlemen! But bear in mind that no torrents of wretched words will prevent us from discharging our duty of exposing phrase-mongering and mystification wherever they may occur—whether in the "programmes" of revolutionary adventurers, or in the tinsel of their romancing, or in grandiloquent sermons about truth and justice, purifying flames, crystal purity, and all the rest.

Iskra, No. 48,
September 15, 1903

Published according
to the *Iskra* text

PLAN OF LETTERS ON TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH

Letters on *tasks of the revolutionary youth* could be arranged on the following plan:

I. What the present-day student body consists of and what the task of achieving its ideological unity involves.

II. Importance of Marxism in revolutionising the students (in the revolutionary movement).

III. Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia. Theoretical and tactical differences between them. Terrorism.

IV. Problems of student organisation from the standpoint of "revolutionising the students".

V. Students and the working class (?).

Ideological unity = a certain lack of ideological principles.
General argument—different groups among the students.
Analyse—what groups, their accidental or inevitable character.

Uplifters in different classes of society.
" as basis of liberals.

Class character of the six groups insufficiently distinct: autocracy the chief determining factor (reactionaries—uplifters—liberals). Petty bourgeoisie, workers, bourgeoisie—*c l a s s* groupings* already beginning to take shape.

Progressive significance of class (and political) differentiation. *Example. Academics and their differentiation from*

* Not "newly emerged" (the socialist intelligentsia), but going back half a century, beginning with the Petrashevsky circle,[25] approximately.

"*liberals*". This differentiation does not hinder but helps political utilisation (development, growth).

"Ideological unity". *Quid est*?* Between whom? Academics + liberals? Liberals + socialists?

Only Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats? Achieving ideological unity = propagating definite ideas, *clarifying* class differences, effecting ideological demarcation.

Achieving ideological unity = propagating ideas *that can lead forward*, the ideas of the progressive class.

Revolutionary Marxism, its emergence in Europe before 1848, its role in Western Europe and Russia.

{*i n s e r t*: about the "*superkluge*"** contention that bourgeois students cannot become imbued with socialism.}

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* What is it?—*Ed*.

** "Over-clever."—*Ed*.

THE TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH

FIRST LETTER[26]

The editorial statement of the newspaper *Student*,[27] which, if we are not mistaken, was first published in No. 4 (28) of *Osvobozhdeniye*,[28] and which was also received by *Iskra*, is indicative in our opinion of a considerable advance in the editors' views since the appearance of the first issue of *Student*. Mr. Struve was not mistaken when he hastened to express his disagreement with the views set forth in the statement: those views do indeed differ radically from the trend of opportunism so consistently and zealously maintained by the bourgeois-liberal organ. By recognising that "revolutionary sentiment *alone* cannot bring about ideological unity among the students", that "this requires a socialist ideal based upon one or another socialist world outlook" and, moreover, "a definite and integral" outlook, the editors of *Student* have broken in principle with ideological indifference and theoretical opportunism, and have put the question of the way to revolutionise the students on a proper footing.

True, from the current standpoint of vulgar "revolutionism", the achievement of ideological unity among the students does not require an integral world outlook, but rather precludes it, involving a "tolerant" attitude towards the various kinds of revolutionary ideas and abstention from positive commitment to some one definite set of ideas; in short, in the opinion of these political wiseacres, ideological unity presupposes a certain lack of ideological principles (more or less skilfully disguised, of course, by hackneyed formulas about breadth of views, the importance of unity at all costs and immediately, and so on and so forth).

A rather plausible and, at first glance, convincing argument always produced in support of this line of reasoning is to point to the generally known and incontrovertible fact that among the students there are, and are bound to be, groups differing greatly in their political and social views, and to declare that the demand for an integral and definite world outlook would therefore inevitably repel some of these groups and, consequently, hinder unity, produce dissension instead of concerted action, and hence weaken the power of the common political onslaught, and so on and so forth, without end.

Let us examine this plausible argument. Let us take, for example, the division of students into groups given in No. 1 of *Student*. In this first issue the editors did not yet advance the demand for a definite and integral world outlook, and it would therefore be difficult to suspect them of a leaning towards Social-Democratic "narrowness". The editorial in the first issue of *Student* distinguishes four major groups among the present-day students: 1) the indifferent crowd—"persons completely indifferent to the student movement"; 2) the "academics"—those who favour student movements of an exclusively academic type; 3) "opponents of student movements in general—nationalists, anti-Semites, etc."; and 4) the "politically minded"—those who believe in fighting for the overthrow of tsarist despotism. "This group, in turn, consists of two antithetical elements—those belonging to the purely bourgeois political opposition with a revolutionary tendency, and those who belong to the newly emerged [only newly emerged?—*N. Lenin*] socialistically minded revolutionary intellectual proletariat." Seeing that the latter subgroup is divided in its turn, as we all know, into Socialist-Revolutionary students and Social-Democratic students, we find that there are among the present-day students *six* political groups: reactionaries, indifferents, academics, liberals, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats.

The question arises: is this perhaps an accidental grouping, a temporary alignment of views? That question has only to be raised for anyone at all acquainted with the matter to answer it in the negative. And, indeed, there could not be any other grouping among our students, because

they are the most responsive section of the intelligentsia, and the intelligentsia are so called just because they most consciously, most resolutely and most accurately reflect and express the development of class interests and political groupings in society as a whole. The students would not be what they are if their political grouping did not correspond to the political grouping of society as a whole—"correspond" not in the sense of the student groups and the social groups being absolutely proportionate in strength and numbers, but in the sense of the necessary and inevitable existence among the students of the same groups as in society. And Russian society as a whole, with its (relatively) embryonic development of class antagonisms, its political virginity, and the crushed and downtrodden condition of the vast, overwhelming majority of the population under the rule of police despotism, is characterised by precisely these six groups, namely: reactionaries, indifferents, *uplifters*, liberals, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats. For "academics" I have here substituted "uplifters", i.e., believers in law-abiding progress without a political struggle, progress under the autocracy. Such uplifters are to be found in all sections of Russian society, and everywhere, like the student "academics", they confine themselves to the narrow range of professional interests, the improvement of their particular branches of the national economy or of state and local administration; everywhere they fearfully shun "politics", making no distinction (as the academics make none) between the "politically minded" of different trends, and implying by the term politics everything that concerns ... the form of government. The uplifters have always constituted, and still constitute, the broad foundation of our liberalism: in "peaceful" times (i.e., translated into "Russian", in times of political reaction) the concepts uplifter and liberal become practically synonymous; and even in times of war, times of rising public feeling, times of mounting onslaught on the autocracy, the distinction between them often remains vague. The Russian liberal, even when he comes out in a free foreign publication with a direct and open protest against the autocracy, never ceases to feel that he is an uplifter first and foremost, and every now and again he will start talking like a slave, or,

if you prefer, like a law-abiding, loyal and dutiful subject—*vide Osvobozhdeniye*.

The absence of a definite and clearly discernible borderline between uplifters and liberals is a general characteristic of the whole political grouping in Russian society. We might be told that the above division into six groups is incorrect because it does not correspond to the class division of Russian society. But such an objection would be unfounded. The class division is, of course, the ultimate basis of the political grouping; *in the final analysis*, of course, it always determines that grouping. But this ultimate basis becomes revealed only in the process of historical development and as the consciousness of the participants in and makers of that process grows. This "final analysis" is arrived at only by political struggle, sometimes a long, stubborn struggle lasting years and decades, at times breaking out stormily in the form of political crises, at others dying down and, as it were, coming temporarily to a standstill. Not for nothing is it that in Germany, for example, where the political struggle assumes particularly acute forms and where the progressive class—the proletariat—is particularly class-conscious, there still exist such parties (and powerful parties at that) as the Centre, whose denominational banner serves to conceal its heterogeneous (but on the whole decidedly anti-proletarian) class nature. The less reason is there to be surprised that the class origin of the present-day political groups in Russia is strongly overshadowed by the politically disfranchised condition of the people as a whole, by the domination over them of a remarkably well organised, ideologically united and traditionally exclusive bureaucracy. What is surprising, rather, is that Russia's development along European capitalist lines should already, despite her Asiatic political system, have made so strong a mark on the political grouping of society.

In our country too, the industrial proletariat, the progressive class of every capitalist country, has already entered on the path of a mass, organised movement led by Social-Democracy, under the banner of a programme which has long since become the programme of the class-conscious proletariat of the whole world. The category of people who are indifferent to politics is of course incomparably

larger in Russia than in any European country, but even in Russia one can no longer speak of the primitive and primeval virginity of this category: the indifference of the non-class-conscious workers—and partly of the peasants too—is giving place more and more often to outbursts of political unrest and active protest, which clearly demonstrate that this indifference has nothing in common with the indifference of the well-fed bourgeois and petty bourgeois. This latter class, which is particularly numerous in Russia owing to her still relatively small degree of capitalist development, is already unquestionably beginning, on the one hand, to produce some conscious and consistent reactionaries; but on the other hand, and immeasurably more often, it is still little to be distinguished from the mass of ignorant and downtrodden "toiling folk" and draws its ideologues from among the large group of *raznochintsy*[29] intellectuals, with their absolutely unsettled world outlook and unconscious jumble of democratic and primitive-socialist ideas. It is just this ideology that is characteristic of the old Russian intelligentsia, both of the Right wing of its liberal-Narodnik section and of the most Leftward wing: the "Socialist-Revolutionaries".

I said the "old" Russian intelligentsia. For a *new* intelligentsia, whose liberalism has almost entirely sloughed off primitive Narodism and vague socialism (not without the help of Russian Marxism, of course), is already making its appearance in our country. The formation of a real bourgeois-liberal intelligentsia is proceeding in Russia with giant strides, especially owing to the participation in this process of people so nimble and responsive to every opportunist vogue as Messrs. Struve, Berdyaev, Bulgakov & Co. As regards, lastly, those liberal and reactionary elements of Russian society who do not belong to the intelligentsia, their connection with the class interests of one or another group of our bourgeoisie or landowners is clear enough to anyone at all acquainted, say, with the activities of our Zemstvos,[30] Dumas, stock-exchange committees, fair committees, etc.

And so, we have arrived at the indubitable conclusion that the political grouping of our students is not accidental, but is bound to be such as we have depicted above, in concurrence with the first issue of *Student*. Having established that fact, we can easily cope with the controversial question of what, actually, should be understood by "achieving ideological unity among the students", "revolutionising" the students, and so on. It even seems very strange at first glance that so simple a question should have proved controversial. If the political grouping of the students corresponds to the political grouping of society, does it not follow of itself that "achieving ideological unity" among the students can mean only one of two things: either winning over the largest possible number of students to a quite definite set of social and political ideas, or establishing the closest possible bond between the students of a definite political group and the members of that group outside the student body. Is it not self-evident that one can speak of revolutionising the students only having in mind a perfectly definite content and character of this revolutionising process? To the Social-Democrat, for example, it means, firstly, spreading Social-Democratic ideas among the students and combating ideas which, though called "Socialist-Revolutionary", have nothing in common with revolutionary socialism; and, secondly, endeavouring to broaden every democratic student movement, the academic kind included, and make it more conscious and determined.

How so clear and simple a question was confused and rendered controversial is a very interesting and very characteristic story. A controversy arose between *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Nos. 13 and 17) and *Iskra* (Nos. 31 and 35) over the "Open Letter" of the Kiev Joint Council of United Fraternities and Student Organisations (printed in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 13, and in *Student*, No. 1). The Kiev Joint Council characterised as "narrow" the decision of the Second All-Russian Student Congress of 1902 that student organisations should maintain relations with the committees of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party; and the quite obvious fact that a certain section of the students in certain localities sympathise with the "Socialist-Revolutionary Party" was nicely covered up by the very

"impartial" and very unsound argument that "the students as such cannot associate themselves in their entirety with either the Socialist-Revolutionary Party or the Social-Democratic Party". *Iskra* pointed to the unsoundness of this argument, but *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, of course, flew to arms in its defence, calling the *Iskra*-ists "fanatics for divisions and splits" and accusing them of "tactlessness" and lack of political maturity.

After what has been said above, the absurdity of such an argument is only too apparent. The question at issue is the particular political role the students should play. And, don't you see, you must first shut your eyes to the fact that the students are not cut off from the rest of society and therefore always and inevitably reflect the political grouping of society as a whole, and then, with eyes thus shut, proceed to chatter about the students as such, or the students in general. The conclusion arrived at is ... the harmfulness of divisions and splits resulting from association with a particular political party. It is clear as daylight that in order to carry this curious argument to its conclusion, the arguer had to leap from the political plane to the occupational or educational plane. And it is just such a flying leap that *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* makes in the article "The Students and Revolution" (No. 17), talking, firstly, about general student interests and the general student struggle and, secondly, about the educational aims of the students, the task of training themselves for future social activity and developing into conscious political fighters. Both these points are very just—but they have nothing to do with the case and only confuse the issue. The question under discussion is *political* activity, which by its very nature is connected inseparably with the struggle of parties and inevitably involves the *choice* of one definite party. How, then, can one evade this choice on the grounds that *all* political activity requires very serious scientific training, the "development" of firm convictions, or that *no* political work can be confined to circles of politically minded people of a particular trend, but must be directed to ever broader sections of the population, must link up with the occupational interests of every section, must unite the occupational movement with the political movement and raise the former to the level of the

latter?? Why, the very fact that people have to resort to such devices in order to defend their position shows how sadly they themselves are wanting both in definite scientific convictions and in a firm political line! From whatever side you approach the matter, you find fresh confirmation of the old truth which the Social-Democrats have long propounded in condemning the efforts of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to balance themselves—as regards both scientific theory and practical politics—between Marxism, West-European "critical" opportunism and Russian petty-bourgeois Narodism.*

Indeed, imagine a state of things where political relations are at all developed and see how our "controversial question" looks in practice. Suppose there is a clerical party, a liberal party and a Social-Democratic party. In certain localities they function among certain sections of the students, let us say, and, perhaps, of the working class. They try to win over as many as possible of the influential representatives of both. Is it conceivable that they would object to these representatives choosing one definite party on the grounds that there are certain general educational and occupational interests common to all the students and to the entire working class? That would be like disputing the fact that parties must contend on the grounds that the art of printing is useful to all parties without distinction. There is no party in the civilised countries that does not realise the tremendous value of the widest and most firmly established educational and trade unions; but each seeks to have its own influence predominate in them. Who does not know that talk about this or that institution being non-partisan is generally nothing but the humbug of the ruling classes, who want to gloss over the fact that existing institutions are already imbued, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, with a very definite political spirit? Yet what our Socialist-Revolutionaries do is, in effect, to sing dithyrambs to "non-partisanship". Take, for example, the following moving tirade

* It need hardly be said that the thesis that the programme and tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are inconsistent and inherently contradictory requires special detailed elucidation. We hope to go into this in detail in a subsequent letter.

in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (No. 17): "What short-sighted tactics it is when a revolutionary organisation is determined to regard every other independent, non-subordinate organisation as a *competitor* that must be destroyed and into whose ranks division, disunity, and disorganisation must at all costs be introduced!" This was said in reference to the 1896 appeal of the Moscow Social-Democratic organisation, which reproached the students for having in recent years withdrawn into the narrow confines of their university interests, and which *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* admonished, saying that the existence of student organisations never prevented those who had "crystallised as revolutionaries" from devoting their energies to the workers' cause.

Just see how much confusion there is here. Competition is possible (and inevitable) only between a political organisation and another political organisation, a political tendency and another political tendency. There can be no competition between a mutual aid society and a revolutionary circle; and when *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* ascribes to the latter the determination to destroy the former, it is talking sheer nonsense. But if in this same mutual aid society there develops a certain political tendency—not to aid revolutionaries, for instance, or to exclude illegal books from the library—then every honest "politically minded" person is *in duty bound* to compete with it and combat it outright. If there are people who confine the circles to narrow university interests (and there undoubtedly are such people, and in 1896 there were far more!), then a *struggle* between them and the advocates of broadening, not narrowing, the interests is similarly imperative and obligatory. And, mind you, in the open letter of the Kiev Council, which evoked the controversy between *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and *Iskra*, the question was of a choice not between student organisations *and* revolutionary organisations, but between revolutionary organisations of different trends. Consequently, it is people already "crystallised as revolutionaries" that have begun to *choose*, while our "Socialist-Revolutionaries" are dragging them *back*, on the pretext that competition between a revolutionary organisation and a purely student organisation is short-sighted.... That is really too senseless, gentlemen!

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The *revolutionary* section of the students begin to choose between two revolutionary parties, and are treated to this lecture: "It was not by imposing a definite [indefiniteness is preferable, of course...] party label [a label to some, a banner to others], it was not by violating the intellectual conscience of their fellow-students [the entire bourgeois press of all countries always attributes the growth of Social-Democracy to ringleaders and trouble-makers violating the conscience of their peaceable fellows...] that this influence was achieved", i.e., the influence of the socialist section of the students over the rest. Assuredly, every honest-minded student will know what to think of this charge against the socialists of "imposing" labels and "violating consciences". And these spineless, flabby and unprincipled utterances are made in Russia, where ideas of party organisation, of party consistency and honour, of the party banner are still so immeasurably weak!

Our "Socialist-Revolutionaries" hold up as an example to the revolutionary students the earlier student congresses, which proclaimed their "solidarity with the general political movement, leaving quite aside the factional dissensions in the revolutionary camp". What is this "general political" movement? The socialist movement plus the liberal movement. Leaving that distinction aside means siding with the movement immediately nearest, that is, the liberal movement. And it is the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" who urge doing that! People who call themselves a *separate* party urge dissociation from party struggle! Does not this show that that party cannot convey its political wares under its own colours and is obliged to resort to contraband? Is it not clear that that party lacks any definite programmatic basis *of its own*? That we shall soon see.

The errors in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' arguments about the students and revolution cannot be attributed merely to the lack of logic that we have tried to demonstrate above. In a certain sense it is the other way round: the illogicality of their arguments follows from their basic error. As a "party" they from the first adopted so inherently contradictory, so slippery a stand that people who

were quite honest and quite capable of political thinking could not maintain it without constantly wobbling and falling. It should always be remembered that the Social-Democrats do not ascribe the harm done by the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" to the socialist cause to various mistakes on the part of individual writers or leaders. On the contrary, they regard all these mistakes as the inevitable consequence of a false programme and political position. In a matter like the student question this falsity is particularly apparent and the contradiction between a *bourgeois-democratic* viewpoint and a tinselled covering of revolutionary socialism becomes manifest. Indeed, examine the train of thought in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*'s programmatic article "The Students and Revolution". The author's main emphasis is on the "unselfishness and purity of aims", the "force of idealistic motives" of the "youth". It is here that he seeks the explanation of their "innovatory" political strivings, and not in the actual conditions of social life in Russia, which, on the one hand, produce an irreconcilable antagonism between the autocracy and very broad and very heterogeneous sections of the population and, on the other, render (soon we shall have to be saying: rendered) extremely difficult any manifestation of political discontent except through the universities.

The author then turns his guns on the attempts of the Social-Democrats to react consciously to the existence of different political groups among the students, to bring about closer unity of like political groups and to separate the politically unlike. It is not that he criticises as incorrect any of these attempts in particular—it would be absurd to maintain that all of them were always wholly successful. No, he is a stranger to the very idea that differing class interests are bound to be reflected in the political grouping too, that the students cannot be an exception to society as a whole, however unselfish, pure, idealistic, etc., they may be, and that the task of the socialist is not to gloss over this difference but, on the contrary, to explain it as widely as possible and to embody it in a political organisation. The author views things from the idealist standpoint of a bourgeois democrat, not the materialist standpoint of a Social-Democrat.

He is therefore not ashamed to issue and reiterate the appeal to the revolutionary students to adhere to the "general political movement". The main thing for him is precisely the general political, i.e., the general democratic, movement, which must be united. This unity must not be impaired by the "purely revolutionary circles", which must align themselves "parallel to the general student organisation". From the standpoint of the interests of this broad and united democratic movement, it would be criminal, of course, to "impose" party labels and to violate the intellectual conscience of your fellows. This was just the view of the bourgeois democrats in 1848, when attempts to point to the conflicting class interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat evoked "general" condemnation of the "fanatics for divisions and splits". And this too is the view of the latest variety of bourgeois democrats—the opportunists and revisionists, who yearn for a great united democratic party proceeding peaceably by way of reforms, the way of class collaboration. They have always been, and must necessarily be, opponents of "factional" dissensions and supporters of the "general political" movement.

As you see, the arguments of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, which from the standpoint of a socialist are illogical and contradictory to the point of absurdity, become quite understandable and consistent when viewed from the standpoint of the bourgeois democrat. That is because the Socialist-Revolutionary Party is, actually, nothing but a *subdivision* of the bourgeois democrats, a subdivision which in its composition is primarily intellectual, in its standpoint is primarily petty-bourgeois, and in its theoretical ideas eclectically combines latter-day opportunism with old-time Narodism.

The best refutation of the bourgeois democrat's phrases about unity is the course of political development and of the political struggle itself. And in Russia the growth of the actual movement has already led to this kind of refutation. I am referring to the emergence of the "academics" as a separate group among the students. As long as there was no real struggle, the academics did not stand out from the "general student" mass, and the "unity" of the whole "thinking section" of the students appeared inviolable. But as

soon as it came to *action*, the divergence of unlike elements became inevitable.*

The progress of the political movement and of the direct onslaught on the autocracy was immediately marked by greater definiteness of political grouping—despite all the empty talk about uniting anybody and everybody. That the separation of the academics and the politically minded is a big step forward, hardly anyone, surely, will doubt. But does this separation mean that the Social-Democratic students will "break" with the academics? *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* thinks that it does (see No. 17, p. 3).

But it thinks so only because of the confusion of ideas which we have brought out above. A complete demarcation of political trends in no wise signifies a "break-up" of the occupational and educational unions. A Social-Democrat who sets out to work among the students will *unfailingly* endeavour to penetrate, either himself or through his agents, into the largest possible number of the broadest possible "purely student" and educational circles; he will try to broaden the outlook of those who demand only academic freedom, and to propagate precisely the Social-Democratic programme among those who are still looking for a programme.

To sum up. A certain section of the students want to acquire a definite and integral socialist world outlook. The ultimate aim of this preparatory work can only be—for students who want to take practical part in the revolutionary movement—the conscious and irrevocable choice of one of the two trends that have now taken shape among the revolutionaries. Whoever protests against such a choice on the plea of effecting ideological unity among the students, of revolutionising them in general, and so forth, is obscuring socialist consciousness and is in actual fact preaching absence of ideological principles. The political grouping of the students cannot but reflect the political grouping of society as a whole, and it is the duty of every

* If certain reports are to be credited, a further divergence of the unlike elements among the students is becoming increasingly marked, namely, dissociation of the socialists from political *revolutionaries* who refuse to hear of socialism. It is said that this latter trend is very pronounced among the students exiled to Siberia. We shall see if these reports are confirmed.

socialist to strive for the most conscious and consistent demarcation of politically unlike groups. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party's appeal to the students to "proclaim their solidarity with the general political movement and leave quite aside the factional dissensions in the revolutionary camp" is, essentially, an appeal to go *back*, from the socialist to the bourgeois-democratic standpoint. This is not surprising, for the "Socialist-Revolutionary Party" is only a subdivision of the bourgeois democrats in Russia. When the Social-Democratic student breaks with the revolutionaries and politically minded people of all other trends, this by no means implies the break-up of the general student and educational organisations. On the contrary, only on the basis of a perfectly definite programme can and should one work among the widest student circles to broaden their academic outlook and to propagate scientific socialism, i.e., Marxism.

P. S. In subsequent letters I should like to discuss with the readers of *Student* the importance of Marxism in moulding an integral world outlook, the differences between the principles and tactics of the Social-Democratic Party and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the problems of student organisation, and the relation of the students to the working class generally.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Student*

SECOND PARTY CONGRESS

PLAN OF ARTICLE[31]

Long awaited.

Why slow? (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats. Really mass movement. Philistinism and politics.)

Chief task of Congress: to give formal shape.

1α Programme. Its significance. End of "nomad" period.[32] Bulwark in fight against liberals, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.

Guide in propaganda.

" " agitation.

2β Organisational Rules. Their significance. Centralism. Local autonomy. (2 central bodies.) Comradely attitude towards leaders. Personal and political relations. Working out interpretation and methods of applying the Rules.

3γ Resolutions.

liberals (two)	demonstrations
Socialist-Revolutionaries	trade union struggle

Party literature

1. liberals
2. liberals
3. Socialist-Revolutionaries
4. Party literature
5. demonstrations
6. trade union struggle

} important

7. shop stewards
8. 1904 Congress
9. Kishinev pogrom
10. sects
11. students
12. behaviour under interrogation

} not important

4 δ Withdrawal of Bund. Better openly. Tactics: explain harmfulness of isolation. (The Bundists' nationalism and organisational scurrilities.)

5 *Minutes.*

Written at the end of September-beginning of October 1903

First published in 1927 in *Lenin Miscellany VI*

Published according to the manuscript

MAXIMUM BRAZENNESS AND MINIMUM LOGIC

In our 46th issue we reprinted the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Bund on the position of the Bund in the R.S.D.L.P., and gave our opinion of it. The Foreign Committee of the Bund replies at great length and with great heat in its leaflet of September 9 (22). The most material part of this angry reply is the following phenomenal revelation: "*In addition to its maximum Rules* [*sic*!], *the Fifth Congress of the Bund also drew up minimum Rules*"; and these minimum Rules are quoted in full, it being explained in two notes, moreover, that "the rejection of autonomy" and the demand that other sections of the Party appeal to the Jewish proletariat only with the sanction of the Bund Central Committee "*must be put forward as an ultimatum*". Thus decided the Fifth Congress of the Bund.

Charming, is it not? The Bund Congress draws up two sets of Rules *simultaneously*, defining simultaneously both its maximum and minimum desires or demands. The minimum it prudently (oh, so prudently!) tucks away in its pocket. Only the maximum is published (in the leaflet of August 7 [20]), and it is *publicly* announced, clearly and explicitly, that this maximum draft is "to be submitted to the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party as the *basis* for the discussion [mark that!] of the Bund's position in the Party". The Bund's opponents, naturally, attack this maximum with the utmost vehemence, just because it is the maximum, the "last word"* of the

* By the way, it is extremely characteristic of the Bund's methods of controversy that this expression called down on our heads the particular wrath of *Posledniye Izvestia*.[33] Why the last word, it demanded, when it (the demand for federation) had been uttered over two years

trend they condemn. Thereupon, *a month later*, these people, without the slightest embarrassment, pull the "minimum" out of their pocket, and add the ominous word: "*ultimatum*"! That is a positive *last price*, not a "last word".... Only is it really your last, gentlemen? Perhaps you've got a minimal minimum in another pocket? Perhaps in another month or so we shall be seeing that?

We very much fear that the Bundists do not quite realise all the "beauty" of this maximum and minimum. Why, how else can you haggle than by asking an exorbitant price, then knocking off 75 per cent and declaring, "That's my last price"? Why, is there any difference between haggling and politics?

There is, gentlemen, we make bold to assure you. Firstly, in politics some parties adhere systematically to certain *principles*, and it is indecent to haggle over principles. Secondly, when people who claim to belong to a party regard certain of their demands as an ultimatum, that is, as the very condition of their membership in the party, political honesty requires that they should not conceal the fact, should not tuck it away "*for the time being*" in their pocket, but, on the contrary, should say so openly and definitely right from the start.

We have been preaching these simple truths to the Bundists for a long time. As early as February (in our 33rd issue) we wrote that it was stupid and unbefitting to play hide-and-seek, and that the Bund had acted separately (in issuing its statement about the Organising Committee) because it wanted to act *as a contracting party* and present *terms* to the Party as a whole.* For this opinion we were drenched with a whole bucketful of specifically Bundist (one might with equal justice say, specifically fish-market) abuse, yet *events have now shown that we were right*. It is indeed as a *contracting party* that the Bund comes forward

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ago? *Iskra* was counting on the short memory of its readers!... Calm yourselves, calm yourselves, gentlemen! The author of the article called your maximum Rules the last word because *that word* was uttered two days (approximately) before No. 46 of *Iskra*, and not two years ago.

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 319-25.—*Ed.*

in the decisions of its Fifth Congress, presenting outright ultimatums to the Party as a whole! That is just what we have been trying all along to get the Bundists to admit, by showing that it followed inevitably from the position they had taken up; they angrily protested, dodged and wriggled, but in the end were obliged after all to produce their "minimum".

That is funny; but funnier still is the fact that the Bund continues to wriggle even now, continues to talk about the "falsity" of "*Iskra*'s old, generally known fabrication to the effect that the Bund wants to form a federal alliance with the Russian Party". That is a lying fabrication, it claims, because Paragraph 1 of the Rules proposed by the Bund distinctly speaks of its desire to be a component element of the Party, not to form an alliance with it.

Very good, gentlemen! But does not this same paragraph say that the Bund is a *federated* component of the Party? Don't your maximum Rules refer throughout to contracting parties? Don't the minimum Rules speak of an *ultimatum*, and make any change in their "fundamental clauses" contingent on the mutual consent of the component elements of the Party, neither the local nor the district organisations, moreover, being recognised as such for this purpose? You yourselves say that neither local nor district organisations, but only "integral elements of the same nature as the Bund" can be contracting parties. You yourselves mention by way of example that "the Polish, Lithuanian or Lettish Social-Democrats" might be regarded as such integral elements, "*if they belonged to the Party*", as you sensibly add. But what if they do not belong to the Party? And what if the federation of national organisations which you find desirable is found undesirable and emphatically rejected by all the rest of the Party? You know very well that that is how matters stand; you yourselves expressly say you no longer demand that the whole Party be built on the basis of a federation of nationalities. *To whom*, then, are you addressing your *ultimatum*? Is it not obvious that you are addressing it to the whole Party, minus the Bund? Instead of convicting *Iskra* of a lying fabrication, you only convict yourselves of a minimum of logic in your subterfuges.

But look, the Bundists protest, in our minimum Rules we have even deleted the federation demand! This deletion of the "dreadful" word is indeed the most interesting episode in the famous transition from maximum to minimum. Nowhere else, perhaps, has the Bund's unconcern for principles betrayed itself so naïvely. You are dogmatists, hopeless dogmatists, we are told; nothing in the world will induce you to recognise the federal "principle of organisation". We, on the other hand, are not dogmatists, we "put the matter on a purely practical footing". Is it some principle you don't like? Queer fellows! Why, then we'll do without any principle at all, we'll "formulate Paragraph 1 in such a way that it shall not be a declaration of a definite principle of organisation". "The crux of the matter does not lie in the statement of principle prefacing the Rules, but in their concrete clauses, which are derived from an examination of the needs of the Jewish working-class movement, on the one hand, and of the movement as a whole, on the other" (leaflet of September 9 [22], p. 1).

The naïveté of this argument is so delightful that one just wants to hug the author. The Bundist seriously believes that it is only certain dreadful words the dogmatists fear, and so he decides that if these words are deleted, the dogmatist will see nothing objectionable in the concrete clauses themselves! And so he toils in the sweat of his brow, draws up his maximum Rules; gets in reserve his minimum Rules (against a rainy day), draws up ultimatum No. 1, ultimatum No. 2.... *Oleum et operam perdidisti*, *amice*!—you are wasting time and effort, my friend. In spite of the cunning (oh, wonderfully cunning!) removal of the label, the dogmatist detects the federal principle in the minimum's "concrete clauses" too. That principle is to be seen in the demand that a component element of the Party should not be limited by any territorial bounds, and in the claim to be the "sole"*

* "This word is of no significance," the Bund now assures us. Strange! Why should a word that has no significance have been inserted in both minimum and maximum? In the Russian language the word has a perfectly definite significance. What it signifies in the present instance is a "declaration" of both federalism and nationalism. We would advise the Bundists, who can see no connection between nationalism and federation, to ponder this point.

representative of the Jewish proletariat, and in the demand for "representation" on the Party Central Committee; in the denial to the Party Central Committee of the right to communicate with any part of the Bund without the consent of the Bund Central Committee; in the demand that fundamental clauses should not be changed without the consent of the *component elements* of the Party.

No, gentlemen, the crux of this matter of the Bund's position in the Party does lie in the declaration of a definite principle of organisation, and not at all in the concrete clauses. The crux of the matter is a *choice* of ways. Is the historically evolved isolation of the Bund to be legitimised, or is it to be rejected on principle, and the course openly, definitely, firmly and honestly adopted of ever closer and closer union and fusion with the Party as a whole? Is this isolation to be preserved, or a *turn made towards fusion*? That is the question.

The answer will depend on the free will of the Bund, for, as we already said in our 33rd issue, "love cannot be forced". If you *want* to move towards fusion, you will reject federation and accept autonomy. You will understand in that case that autonomy guarantees a process of fusion so gradual that the reorganisation would proceed with the minimum of dislocation, and in such a way, moreover, that the Jewish working-class movement would lose nothing and gain everything by this reorganisation and fusion.

If you do not want to move towards fusion, you will stand for federation (whether in its maximum or minimum form, whether with or without a declaration); you will be afraid of being "steam-rollered", you will turn the regrettable isolation of the Bund into a fetish, and will cry that the abolition of this isolation means the destruction of the Bund; you will begin to seek grounds justifying your isolation, and in this search will now grasp at the Zionist idea of a Jewish "*nation*", now resort to demagogy and scurrilities.

Federalism can be justified theoretically only on the basis of nationalist ideas, and it would be strange if we had to prove to the Bundists that it was no mere accident that the declaration of federalism was made at that very Fourth Congress which proclaimed the Jews to be a nation.

The idea of fusion can be discredited in practice only by inciting politically unenlightened and timid people against the "monstrous", "Arakcheyev"[34] organisational plan of *Iskra*, which supposedly wants to "regiment" the committees and not allow them to "take a single step without orders from above". How terrible! We have no doubt that all the committees will now hasten to revolt against the iron glove, the Arakcheyev fist, etc.... But where, gentlemen, did you get your information about this brutal organisational plan? From our literature? Then why not quote it? Or from the tales of idle Party gossips, who can tell you on the very best authority all, absolutely all the details regarding this Arakcheyevism? The latter supposition is probably the more correct, for even people with a minimum of logic could hardly confuse the very necessary demand that the Central Committee should "*be able* to communicate with every Party member"* with the patently scurrilous bugbear that the Central Committee will "do everything itself" and "lay down the law on everything". Or another thing: what is this nonsense that "between the periphery and the centre" there will be "*lose Organisationen*"?** We can guess: our worthy Bundists heard something, but did not know what it was all about. We shall have to explain it to them at length on some suitable occasion.

But, worst of all, it is not only the local committees that will have to revolt, but the Central Committee too. True, it has not been born yet,[35] but the gossips know for certain not only the birthday of the infant but its whole subsequent career. It appears it will be a Central Committee "*directed by a group of writers*". Such a tried and cheap method of warfare, this. The Bundists are not the first to employ it and most likely will not be the last. To convict this Central Committee, or the Organising Committee, of any mistake, you have to find proof. To convict people of not acting as they themselves think necessary, but of being *directed* by others, you must have the courage to bring charges openly and be ready to answer for them to the whole Party! All that is too dear, too dear in every respect. Gossips'

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 487.—*Ed.*

** Loose, broad organisations.—*Ed.*

tales, on the other hand, are cheap.... And perhaps the fish will bite. It is not pleasant, after all, to be considered a man (or institution) who is "directed", who is in leading strings, who is a pawn, a creature, a puppet of *Iskra*.... Our poor, poor future Central Committee! Where will it find a protector against the Arakcheyev yoke? Perhaps in the "independently acting" Bundists, those strangers to all "suspiciousness"?

Iskra, No. 49,
October 1, 1903

Published according
to the *Iskra* text

DRAFT OF A LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN TO THE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION

After a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach an understanding in private conversations, the Central Committee of the Party and the editorial board of the Central Organ deem it their duty to address you officially in the name of the Party which they represent. The refusal of Comrade Martov to take his seat on the editorial board or to collaborate on *Iskra*, the refusal of the ex-members of the *Iskra* editorial board to collaborate, and the hostile attitude of several comrades engaged in practical work towards the central institutions of our Party are creating an absolutely abnormal attitude on the part of this "opposition", so called, towards the Party as a whole. Their passive aloofness from Party work, their attempts to "boycott" the central Party institutions (as expressed, for example, in ceasing to contribute to *Iskra* beginning from its 46th issue and in the resignation of Comrade Blumenfeld from the printing establishment), their persistence, in conversation with a member of the Central Committee,[36] in calling themselves a "group", in defiance of the Party Rules, their violent attacks on the Congress-approved personal composition of the central bodies and their demand to have it changed as a condition for ending the boycott—all this is conduct which cannot be regarded as consistent with Party duty. Such conduct borders on a direct breach of discipline and nullifies the decision adopted by the Congress (in the Party Rules) that the

allocation of the Party's forces and resources is the function of the Central Committee.

The Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ therefore remind all members of the so-called "opposition" of their Party duty. Dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, whether due to personal resentment or to differences of opinion which particular Party members may consider serious, cannot and must not lead to disloyal actions. If, in the opinion of any person, the central bodies are committing mistakes, it is his duty as a Party member to point to these mistakes in the full view of the entire Party membership, and, above all, to point them out to the central bodies themselves. It is likewise the Party duty of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ to examine all such intimations with the utmost care, no matter from whom received. Yet neither the editorial board of the Central Organ nor the Central Committee has received from the so-called opposition any clear and definite intimations of mistakes or expressions of dissatisfaction or disagreement on any score whatever. Comrade Martov even refuses to take his seat on the editorial board of the Central Organ and on the supreme Party Council, though only in that post would he be able to lay bare before the Party all such mistakes as he may descry in the activities of the central bodies.

The Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ are firmly convinced that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will not allow the institutions it has set up to be influenced by the illegitimate, covert (in relation to the Party) and disloyal method of pressure and boycott. The Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ declare that they will remain at their posts come what may, until such time as the Party shall remove them, and that they will do their duty and spare no effort to perform the functions with which they have been charged. The attempts at "boycott" will not induce either the editorial board of the Central Organ or the Central Committee to swerve one hair's breadth from the path they are following, in pursuance of the will of the Congress; such attempts will only cause minor unpleasantnesses and

major damage to individual branches of Party work, and will convict those who persist in them of failing to understand their Party duty and of violating it.

Written in the early part of October 1903

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Published according to the manuscript

SECOND CONGRESS OF THE LEAGUE OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY ABROAD[37]

OCTOBER 13-18 (26-31), 1903

Published in January 1904
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Published according
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1

PREFATORY REMARKS TO THE REPORT ON THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P., OCTOBER 13 (26)

I

Lenin made a few prefatory remarks to his report. I propose, in the first place, he said, to keep to the pseudonyms used at the Congress, because I am accustomed to them and it will be easier for me to use them than to stop and think each time what organisation the delegate represented. Secondly, I propose to touch also on the meetings of the *Iskra* organisation which took place, privately, so to speak, in the intervals between sittings of the Congress. I think this is in order, firstly, because the League was the foreign branch of the *Iskra* organisation, secondly, because the *Iskra* organisation has now been dissolved, and, thirdly, because without these facts it will be more difficult for me to bring out the true meaning of the events at the Party Congress.

II

Comrade Martov is against any reference being made to the private meetings of the *Iskra* organisation on the grounds that no minutes were kept. But neither are the minutes of the Party Congress available yet, and I cannot cite them either. After all, Comrade Martov is present here and will be able to correct any inaccuracies that may creep in. If the private meetings of *Iskra* have a bearing on the matter, I shall bring them to the knowledge of an even wider audience—Comrade Martov will not be able to hush them up anyway. ("*Oho*!") I remember perfectly whom I kept out of these meetings, and who withdrew from them, and I shall have a lot to say on this score. Of course, mistakes may occur, and I shall not be able to reconstruct everything from memory. The important thing is the political grouping.

What it was as shown by each particular vote taken, I can, of course, recall only approximately, but in general it is perfectly clear to me. It is not in the interest of the work to conceal from the League what pertains to the *Iskra* organisation, which has now been dissolved, and what has already become the common concern of the Party. As to the pseudonyms used in the minutes, they would be better, of course, but I have not read the minutes and am therefore unacquainted with them.

III

Comrade Martov is afraid that discussing the private meetings of *Iskra* may land us in the domain of tittle-tattle. I had no intention of entering the domain of tittle-tattle, and we shall see who will be able to keep the argument on the plane of principle, and who will have to descend into that murky domain. ("*Oho*!") We shall see, we shall see! I consider myself fully at liberty to touch on the meetings of the editorial board, and will not object if Comrade Martov does likewise; nevertheless, I must point out that during the Congress there was not a single meeting of the editorial board as such.

IV

The chief purpose of my report is to show that Comrade Martov made a mistake; but in his hint regarding Comrade Plekhanov I detect something quite different. Let me remind you of what I said on one occasion at the Party Congress: "What a storm of indignation is usually aroused when people say one thing at committees and another on the floor of the Congress."* To hint at such behaviour is no longer discussing political conduct but indulging in personalities. As regards P. B. Axelrod's statement that X. went away completely uninformed, let me say that that was not so at all. He himself wrote me a letter saying that in his opinion there was a lot that was personal about this whole divergence and not much that related to principle. From that I conclude that he was already informed. And in answer to his request for my opinion regarding the Congress, I wrote to him on several occasions too.

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 484.—*Ed.*

2

REPORT ON THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P., OCTOBER 14 (27)

Before beginning his report, Lenin referred to the discussion at the previous sitting as to how far mention might be made of the private meetings held by the *Iskra*-ists during the Party Congress. He interpreted yesterday's decision of the Congress as meaning that facts not recorded in the minutes must be touched on as little as possible, and therefore intended, in referring to the meetings of the *Iskra* organisation, to deal only with the voting results.

After this introduction, he went on to speak of the period immediately preceding the Party Congress. In the Organising Committee, whose business it was to arrange the Congress, the *Iskra*-ists predominated, and its work was carried on along *Iskra*-ist lines. But even while the Congress arrangements were still in progress it became apparent that the Organising Committee was far from being completely at one. To begin with, it included a Bundist, who did everything he could to prevent the convocation of an *Iskra*-ist Congress; this member of the Organising Committee always pursued a separate line of his own. There were also two *Yuzhny Rabochy* members on it, and although they considered themselves *Iskra*-ists, and even announced their adherence to *Iskra*, on which subject there were lengthy negotiations, they could not be wholly regarded as such. Lastly, even the *Iskra*-ist members of the Organising Committee were not completely at one; they had differences among themselves. It is also important to mention the Organising Committee's decision on the subject of binding instructions. This question came up long before the Congress,

and the decision arrived at was that binding instructions be abolished. The editorial board too pronounced emphatically in favour of this. The decision applied to itself also. It was decided that at the Congress, since it was the supreme Party authority, no member of the Party, or of the editorial board, should consider himself bound by any commitments to the organisation that had delegated him. It was in view of this decision that I drafted a *Tagesordnung** for the Congress, together with a commentary, which I decided to submit to the Congress in my own name. Item 23 of this draft had the comment in the margin that three persons should be elected to the editorial board and as many to the Central Committee. There is one other point in this connection. As the editorial board consisted of six persons, it was decided by common consent that, if it were found necessary to hold a meeting of the board during the Congress and the votes divided equally, Comrade Pavlovich would be invited to the meeting with full voting rights.

The delegates began to arrive long before the opening of the Congress. The Organising Committee gave them an opportunity to get acquainted with the editors beforehand. Very naturally, the *Iskra*-ists wanted to present themselves at the Congress united and in harmony on all points, and with this in view private conversations were held with the delegates as they arrived, and meetings were arranged to work out a common viewpoint. At these meetings the political complexion of some of the delegates became pretty clear. At one such meeting, for instance, where I read a paper on the national question,[38] the delegate from the Mining Area expressed views akin to those of the Polish Socialist Party,[39] and in general betrayed extreme confusion of ideas.

Such were the circumstances that preceded the Congress.

I shall now explain how I came to be the only delegate from the League, although it had elected two. It turned out that no delegate had arrived from the *Iskra* organisation in Russia,[40] which was also to have sent two delegates. Thereupon a meeting of the *Iskra*-ists, held just before the Congress opened, decided that one of the two League dele-

* Agenda.—*Ed.*

gates should turn over his mandate to the other and himself act as the delegate of the *Iskra* organisation with its two mandates, with the provision that if an elected delegate should arrive from Russia, one of these two mandates would be turned over to him. Naturally, both Martov and I wanted to be the delegate from *Iskra*, in view of the minor role played by the League. We settled the point by drawing lots.

The first preliminary question—the election of the Congress Bureau—gave rise to something of a difference, true, a minor one, between Martov and me. He insisted on the election of nine persons, these even to include a Bundist. I, on the other hand, considered that we should elect a Bureau capable of pursuing a firm, consistent policy and, if necessary, even of applying what is called the "iron glove". The Bureau elected consisted of Plekhanov, Lenin, and Pavlovich.

In addition to five Bundists, there were at the Congress two delegates from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and a delegate from the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, who nearly always voted with them. From the very outset these persons greatly dragged out the proceedings. The discussion of the Congress Standing Orders alone took up an incredible amount of time. There were endless arguments, lasting several sittings, over the position of the Bund in the Party. Similar delays were caused by the Bundist who got on to the Credentials Committee. He practised obstruction at every turn, would not agree with the other members of the committee, of which I was one, on a single point, and invariably recorded a "dissenting opinion". When it was remarked that this sort of thing was likely to drag out the Congress, he replied? "Well, let it", and said he was ready to have the committee sit for any length of time. It was not till long after midnight that the work of verifying the credentials was finished.

Also in the opening days of the Congress we had an incident over the Organising Committee. Under the Regulations it had drawn up, only "prominent Party personalities" could be invited to the Congress in a deliberative capacity, and the Credentials Committee had rejected the request of the Borba group to be granted representation. Two members

of the Organising Committee had attended the Credentials Committee meeting, and they had categorically opposed admitting a Borba representative to the Congress. When the spokesman for the committee informed the Congress of this decision, a long debate "for" and "against" developed, in which one of the *Iskra*-ists declared that a representative of Borba should on no account be invited to the Congress, as that group did nothing but intrigue, try to insinuate itself into every chink, sow dissension everywhere, and so on. (*Trotsky*: "Why don't you give the speaker's name? It was I who said it." *P. Axelrod*: "The speaker evidently does not think it would be in his interest.") Yes, it was Comrade Trotsky who spoke so harshly of the Borba group. At the very height of this argument about whether a Borba representative should be admitted to the Congress, one of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* delegates, who had been late in arriving and had only just turned up, asked for a five-minute adjournment to allow him to acquaint himself with all the circumstances of the case. When the adjournment was granted, the members of the Organising Committee held a meeting then and there, by the window. I should mention that even before the Congress opened certain Organising Committee members had shown some dissatisfaction with the editorial board. For example, the Bundist member was highly indignant that the editorial board had sent its contribution of five hundred marks to the election fund of the German Social-Democrats in its own name and that of the Organising Committee without first obtaining the latter's sanction. This innocent action, which was quite natural considering the impossibility of communicating promptly with the comrades in Russia, was interpreted by the Bundist as meaning that the editors, living abroad, made free with the name of the Organising Committee without asking its consent. A motion was even tabled in the Organising Committee to censure the editors for this, and it was passed, because the Bundist was supported by Comrade NN, a member of the *Iskra* organisation. When I told Martov of this, he was much incensed, and said it was "infamous". (*Martov*: "I did not use the word 'infamous'.") I do not remember the exact expression he used. Martov added that he "would not let the matter rest there". I, for my part, tried to persuade him that the incident was

of no great significance, and that it would be better to say nothing and attach no importance to it. When the meeting of the Organising Committee by the window was over, Comrade Pavlovich, who was a member of it, informed the other two members of the Bureau that on the motion of the belated *Yuzhny Rabochy* delegate, who was also a member of the Organising Committee, the latter had decided by a majority of all against Pavlovich himself to invite the Borba representative Ryazanov to the Congress, in a deliberative capacity. Comrade Pavlovich had objected strongly to this decision, and, as binding instructions had been abolished, he considered himself at liberty to protest against it to the Congress. We Bureau members, and also the editors and other *Iskra*-ists, were outraged at this decision of the Organising Committee. Comrade NN, the Organising Committee member I have mentioned, had himself spoken in the Credentials Committee against admitting a Borba representative to the Congress, yet now, at this meeting of the Organising Committee, he had agreed to invite one. He was himself trying now to smuggle Ryazanov into the Congress. We had thus been caught in a trap. And we decided to fight with might and main against this disgraceful Organising Committee decision. Many delegates rose and opposed it. In my own speech on the subject I spoke of "the storm of indignation that is aroused at European congresses when people say one thing at committees and another on the floor of the congress". In saying this I had in mind NN, who was a member of the *Iskra* organisation. When Comrade Pavlovich made his protest to the Congress against this decision of the Organising Committee, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* member found this to be a breach of discipline, a disruptive move, and so on, and demanded that the Congress inflict suitable punishment on Comrade Pavlovich for his action. But we were able to smash all these arguments. The Organising Committee majority was defeated. A resolution was passed to the effect that after the Congress had appointed a Credentials Committee the Organising Committee as a body no longer had any right to influence the composition of the Congress. The motion to invite Ryazanov was rejected. But even since the Congress I have heard some *Iskra*-ists question: why not have admitted a Borba member to the Congress? (*Deutsch*:

"I said that at the Congress itself too.") Quite so, and on other questions also, as I shall have occasion to point out, Comrade Deutsch did not always vote with the rest of the *Iskra*-ists, as, for instance, on equality of languages. Some *Iskra*-ists have even been expressing the very singular view that the activities of the Central Committee should reflect all vacillations and primitive conceptions existing in the Party. And at the Congress certain irresolute, wavering *Iskra*-ists spoke in this same spirit. Thus, the idea that all who claim to be *Iskra*-ists really are *Iskra*-ists turns out to be quite mistaken. There are *Iskra*-ists who are even ashamed of the name—that is a fact. There are *Iskra*-ists who fight *Iskra*, who obstruct it in all kinds of ways and hinder its activities. *Iskra* has become popular, it has become the fashion to call oneself an *Iskra*-ist, but that does not prevent many people from remaining what they were before *Iskra* was recognised by many of the committees. These unreliable *Iskra*-ists have done it a great deal of harm. If at least they would fight it openly and squarely.... But no, they do it in a sneaking, underhand, surreptitious, secret manner.

The second item on the *Tagesordnung* of the Party Congress was the Party programme. The supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, the Bundists, and diverse delegates who during the Congress were nicknamed the "Marsh" practised incredible obstruction. The debate on the programme dragged out beyond all belief. Akimov alone moved several dozen amendments. There were arguments literally over single words, over what conjunction to use. So many amendments had to be discussed that one Bundist, a member of the Programme Committee, asked, and with reason, whose draft we were considering, the one submitted by the editors of *Iskra*, or one submitted by Akimov. The amendments were trifling, and the programme was adopted without any changes of importance whatever; nevertheless, the debates took up about twenty sittings, so unproductive was the work of the Congress owing to the opposition of various anti-*Iskra*-ist and quasi-*Iskra*-ist elements.

The next major incident to arise at the Congress after the Organising Committee incident was in connection with equality of languages, or, as it was ironically called at the Congress, "freedom of tongues". (*Martov*: "Or the 'asses'."

Laughter.) Yes, and the "asses". The point was this. The draft Party programme spoke of equal rights for all citizens irrespective of sex, nationality, religion, etc. This was not enough for the Bundists, and they wanted to write into the programme the right of every nationality to receive tuition in its own language and to use it in addressing public and state institutions. When a garrulous Bundist referred, by way of example, to state stud farms, Comrade Plekhanov remarked that stud farms had nothing to do with it, as horses do not talk—"only asses do". The Bundists took offence at this, evidently thinking the jest was meant for them.

It was over the equality of languages question that the first signs of a split appeared. In addition to the Bundists, the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, and the "Marsh", certain *Iskra*-ists too pronounced in favour of "freedom of tongues". Comrade Deutsch's votes on this issue evoked our astonishment, indignation, and disgust; in some cases he abstained, in others voted against us. In the end the question was decided amicably and unanimously.

On the whole, during the first half of the Congress all the *Iskra*-ists stood together. The Bundists claimed there was a conspiracy against them. One Bundist described the Congress as a "compact majority". In reply, I expressed the wish that our whole Party might become one compact majority.

But the second half of the Congress presented an entirely different picture. From that time began Martov's historic change of front. The disagreements that developed between us were by no means insignificant. They were due to Martov's erroneous appraisal of the present situation. Comrade Martov deviated from the line he had previously adhered to.

The fifth item on the *Tagesordnung* was the Rules. An argument between Martov and myself over Paragraph 1 of them had already arisen in the committee. We each upheld a different formulation. Whereas I proposed defining a Party member as one who accepted the Party programme, supported the Party financially and belonged to one of its organisations, Martov thought it sufficient if, in addition to the first two conditions, a person worked under the control of one of the Party organisations. I insisted on my formulation and pointed out that we could not adopt a different

definition of a Party member without departing from the principle of centralism. To recognise as a Party member one who did not belong to any Party organisation would mean being against all control by the Party. Martov was introducing here a new principle that was entirely contrary to the principles of *Iskra*. His formulation widened the boundaries of the Party. He tried to justify this by saying that our Party must be a party of the masses. What he was doing was to open the door to every kind of opportunist, to widen the boundaries of the Party until they became entirely blurred. In the conditions under which we have to work this is very dangerous, because it is very difficult to draw the line between a revolutionary and a windbag; that made it necessary to narrow the concept "Party". Martov's mistake was that he was throwing the door of the Party wide open to every adventurer, when it had become apparent that even at the Congress fully one-third of those present were given to intriguing. Martov on this occasion acted as an opportunist. His formulation introduced a false, discordant note into the Rules: every Party member should be under the control of an organisation, so that the Central Committee should be able to communicate with every single member. My formulation provided an incentive to organise. Comrade Martov was cheapening the concept "Party member", while it should, I consider, stand high, very high. Martov got the support of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, the Bund and the "Marsh", and with their aid he secured the adoption of his Paragraph 1 of the Rules.

Then Martov began to say that "defamatory rumours" were being circulated about him. But there was nothing offensive in pointing out with whom Martov found himself in alliance. I was the object of a similar reproof when I found myself in alliance with Comrade Brouckère. And I took no offence when Martov sent me a note saying: "Look who is voting with you." True, my alliance with Brouckère was a temporary and accidental one, while Martov's alliance with the Bund turned out to be lasting. I was against Marov's formulation because it meant *Versumpfung*.* I warned Martov of that, and our opponents, by following him to a man, provided eloquent illustration of his error. The most

* Sinking into the marsh.—*Ed.*

dangerous thing, however, was not that Martov had landed in the marsh, but that, having accidentally done so, he made no attempt to get out of it, but sank in deeper and deeper. The Bundists felt they were now the masters of the situation, and put their mark on the Party Rules.

During the second half of the Congress, too, a compact majority was formed, only it now consisted of a coalition of the Martovites plus the "Marsh" plus the *Rabocheye Dyelo* and Bund compact minority. And this compact majority stood against the *Iskra*-ists. One Bundist, seeing the *Iskra*-ists quarrelling among themselves, said: "It's nice to spar when the leaders are at loggerheads." I cannot understand why the Bund should have withdrawn, things being as they were. They were actually the masters of the situation, and could have had a lot their own way. Most probably, they had binding instructions.

After Paragraph 1 of the Rules had been spoilt in this way, we had to bind the broken pot as tightly as possible, with a double knot. Naturally, we began to fear that we would be intrigued against, let down. Hence it was necessary to introduce mutual co-optation to the central bodies, so that the Party might be assured of their unity of action. Over this a struggle developed too. Things had to be so arranged that in the period leading to the Third Party Congress we should not get a repetition of what had happened with the Organising Committee. A consistent, honest *Iskra*-ist cabinet had to be formed. On this point we were again defeated. The clause on mutual co-optation to the central bodies was voted down. The mistake of Martov, who was supported by the "Marsh", stood out more saliently than ever. From that moment the coalition was definitely formed and, on pain of defeat, we had to load our guns with double charges. There sat the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, their votes deciding the fate of the Congress. That caused the stubborn, bitter struggle that ensued.

I shall now pass to the private meetings of the *Iskra* organisation. At these we chiefly discussed the composition of the Central Committee. At all four meetings of the *Iskra* organisation, there were debates on the subject of Comrade NN, on whom a section of the *Iskra*-ists wanted to pass a vote of political non-confidence, though not in the

literal sense of the term, for no one imputed to NN anything that disgraced him, but in the specific sense that he was unfit to be a member of the *Iskra*-ist cabinet. This led to a desperate scrap. At the last meeting, the meeting of the sixteen, nine voted against NN, four in favour, while the rest abstained. At this meeting, too, we discussed who was now to be included in our cabinet.

Martov and I proposed different "trios"; we could not agree on them. Not wanting to split the vote at the Congress, we decided to propose a compromise list. We were prepared to make every concession: I agreed to a list that included two Martovites. The minority rejected this. Incidentally, a *Yuzhny Rabochy* delegate refused to be included in our list while consenting to be included in the Martovite list. It was *Yuzhny Rabochy*—an outside element—that was deciding the question of the Central Committee. After the *Iskra*-ists had split, we had to muster our supporters, and we started a vigorous agitation. The unexpected withdrawal of the Bund reversed the whole situation. With its withdrawal, there was again a compact majority and minority. We were now in the majority, and we secured the election to the Central Committee of the people we wanted.

Such were the circumstances that led to the split. It was exceedingly tactless of Martov to raise at the Congress the question of endorsing all the six editors of *Iskra*, when he knew that I would insist on the editors having to be elected. It meant turning the election of the editorial board into an expression of non-confidence in individual editors.

The elections ended at five o'clock on Saturday. We then proceeded to discuss the resolutions. We had only a few hours left for this. Owing to the obstruction and delays caused by the "Marsh", many important items had to be dropped from the *Tagesordnung*; not enough time was left, for instance, to discuss all the tactical questions.

Over the resolutions the Congress was so unanimous that we formed the impression that a conciliatory mood had developed; it seemed to us that Martov was not going to make the disagreements that had arisen an issue of state. He even said, when one of the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists questioned the validity of the elections, that the minority accepted all the Congress decisions. All the resolutions were passed in a peace-

ful and amicable spirit; differences arose only over Starover's resolution on the liberals. It was vague, and it, too, was marked by opportunism; we fought it and secured the adoption of an additional resolution on the same subject.

The general impression one got of the Congress was that we had to fight against intrigue. It was made impossible for us to work. The natural conclusion was: "Heaven preserve us from friends like these!"—i.e., the quasi-*Iskra*-ists. Martov completely failed to understand this situation. He elevated his mistaken position to a principle. His assertion that the majority had instituted a "state of siege" ran glaringly counter to the Party's real needs. For the work to be more effective, it was necessary to eliminate the obstructing elements and make it impossible for them to damage the Party; only if that were done could our work at the next Congress be fruitful. That is why it was necessary to establish complete unity between the central bodies of the Party.

The first half of the Congress was the complete opposite of the second. The cardinal, major points of the Congress as a whole were the following four: 1) the Organising Committee incident; 2) the debate on equality of languages; 3) the debate on Paragraph 1 of the Rules, and 4) the struggle over the elections to the Party central bodies.

During the first half of the Congress, Martov stood with us against the Organising Committee, the Bund, *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the "Marsh"; during the second half he landed accidentally in the marsh. Now, after the Congress, this accidental *Versumpfung* is turning into a real *Versumpfung*. (*Applause.*)

3

STATEMENT CONCERNING MARTOV'S REPORT
OCTOBER 15 (28)[41]

I protest most emphatically, as against a *contemptible* method of struggle, against Martov's asking who was lying or intriguing in reporting the private conversation between him, Starover and myself. I wish to point out that this conflicts glaringly with Martov's own statements of yesterday to the effect that he would disdain to raise the unanswerable question of how truthfully private conversations had been reproduced! I declare that Martov's account of the private conversation *en question* is *altogether incorrect*. I declare that I agree to any arbitration and that I challenge Martov to it if he chooses to accuse me of conduct incompatible with holding a responsible post in the Party. I declare that it is the moral duty of Martov, who is not levelling any explicit accusations but only throwing out dark hints—that it is his duty to have the courage to make his accusations openly and over his signature before the entire Party, and that I, as a member of the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ, propose to him on behalf of the whole editorial board that he immediately *publish* a pamphlet containing *all* his accusations. By failing to do this, Martov will only prove that all he wanted was a row at the League Congress, not the moral cleansing of the Party.

4

SPEECH ON THE RULES OF THE LEAGUE
OCTOBER 17 (30)

I shall dwell chiefly on one point, namely, the main speaker's idea that the League is autonomous in drawing up its Rules. That, in my opinion, is absolutely wrong, for the Central Committee, in which, under Paragraph 6 of the Party Rules, is vested the right to organise committees, is the only body that can draw up Rules for the League; for organising means first and foremost drawing up Rules. And until the Central Committee endorses the Rules of the League, the League *has no* Rules. The idea of autonomy is absolutely inapplicable here, for it runs counter to the Party Rules. I once again stress emphatically that, pending their endorsement by the Central Committee, the League has no Rules. As to the League having been endorsed by the Party Congress, that was not in recognition of its activities, but rather, I should say, in spite of all its defects—exclusively because of its consistency of principles.

AN UNSUBMITTED STATEMENT[42]

October 29, 1903

Comrades,

I withdrew from the sitting of the Congress yesterday (October 28) because I found it too disgusting to be present at that raking up of sordid tittle-tattle, rumours and private conversations which Martov undertook and performed with hysterical squealing to the delight of all scandal-lovers. It was as though in self-derision that this same Martov spoke eloquently the day before yesterday about the unseemliness of such references to private conversations, which cannot be verified and which lead one to wonder which of the parties to the conversation is *lying*. It was just such unseemly conduct that Martov indulged in yesterday when he hysterically pressed me to say *which of us was lying*, he or I, in reporting the famous private conversation on the subject of the famous trio.

This method of provoking a row by asking *who is lying* is worthy only of a swashbuckler looking for a pretext to pick a quarrel, or else of a man wound up to hysterical pitch and incapable of weighing the absurdity of his conduct. For a political leader accused of definite political errors to use such a method proves unmistakably that he has no other means of defence and that he is descending from the level of political differences to the miserable level of squabbling and scandal-mongering.

The question now arises, what means of defence can be employed against this swashbuckler's and rowdy's trick of hurling *unprovable* charges based on private conversations?

I say "unprovable" charges, because private conversations of which no record is kept preclude, by their very nature, *all* possibility of proof, and charges based on them lead merely to reiteration of the word "lie" in all its declensions. In the art of such reiteration Martov yesterday reached a pitch of real virtuosity, and I have no intention of following his example.

In my statement yesterday I already indicated *one* means of defence, and I categorically insist upon it. I challenge my adversary to publish immediately a pamphlet setting forth all his accusations against me, which in his speech were levelled in the form of endless and countless dark hints about lying, intriguing, and so on and so forth. I *demand* that my adversary bring his charges, over his signature, before the *whole* Party, because he cast a slur on my reputation as a member of the editorial board of the Party Central Organ and said that certain individuals could not be allowed to hold responsible posts in the Party. I undertake to publish *all* my adversary's accusations, for a public airing of the squabbles and scandal will—I know quite positively—be my best defence before the Party. I repeat that if my adversary evades my challenge, it will prove that his accusations are nothing but dark innuendoes, the product either of the slanderous propensities of a scoundrel, or of the hysterical irresponsibility of a politician who has blundered.

However, I have another means of defence, an indirect one. In my statement yesterday, I said that Martov's account of the private conversation *en question* was altogether incorrect. I am not going to go into that again, just because of the hopelessness and uselessness of *unprovable* assertions. But let everyone ponder over the "document" which I handed to Martov yesterday and which he read to the Congress. That document was the programme for the Congress and my commentary to it, a commentary written *after* the "private" conversation, *sent by me to Martov* and returned by him with his amendments.

This document *indisputably* represents the quintessence of our conversation, and I have only to analyse its exact text to prove that Martov's accusations are so much scandal. Here is the text in full:

"Item 23 [of the Congress *Tagesordnung*]. *Election of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ of the Party*."

My commentary: "The Congress shall elect *three* persons to the editorial board of the Central Organ and *three* to the Central Committee. These six persons *in conjunction* shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority vote additional members to the editorial board of the Central Organ and to the Central Committee and report to this effect to the Congress. After the report has been endorsed by the Congress, subsequent co-optation shall be effected by the editorial board of the Central Organ and by the Central Committee separately."

Martov has asserted that this system was adopted *solely* in order to enlarge the editorial board of six. This assertion is *directly* contradicted by the words "if necessary". Clearly, already at that time the possibility was envisaged that it might not be necessary. Furthermore, since the consent of four out of six was required for co-optation, it is obvious that the editorial board *could not be enlarged without the consent of non-editors*, without the consent of at least one member of the Central Committee. Consequently, the enlargement of the editorial board was made contingent on the consent of a person as to whose identity there could at that time (a month, if not six weeks, before the Congress) be only the vaguest conjectures. Consequently, it is obvious that *at that time* Martov too considered the editorial board of six, as then constituted, incapable of *further independent existence*, since the deciding voice in the matter of enlarging the elected trio was to belong to a *non-editor*, also to be elected. Martov too considered it impossible to convert the old editorial board of *Iskra* into the editorial board of the Party Central Organ without outside, non-editorial assistance.

To proceed. If it had been a matter *solely* of enlarging the board of six, what would have been the point of talking about a trio? It would have sufficed to substitute for unanimous co-optation, co-optation by some specified majority. In fact, there would in general have been no point in talking about the editorial board, it would have been enough to talk about co-optation to Party institutions in

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

general, or to the central Party institutions in particular. Consequently, it is clear that the idea was not simply enlargement. It is equally clear that it was *not* one member of the old editorial board, *but perhaps two*, *or even three*, who stood in the way of possible enlargement, seeing that, in order to *enlarge* the board of six, it was first considered desirable to *reduce* it to three.

Lastly, compare the procedure for introducing "additional members", i.e., for enlarging the central bodies, as now laid down in the Party Rules adopted by the Congress and as envisaged in the original plan which Martov and I together set down in the above-quoted commentary to Item 23 of the agenda. According to the original plan, the consent of *four against two* was required (for enlargement of the *editorial board of the Central Organ* or of the Central Committee), while the present Rules require, in the final analysis, the consent of *three against two*; for the final authority in deciding about co-optation to the central bodies is now the Council, and if two of the editors plus one other member of the Council want to enlarge the editorial board, they can, consequently, do it against the wishes of the third.

Hence, there cannot be the slightest doubt (from the precise meaning of a precise document) that an alteration in the composition of the editorial board was contemplated (by Martov and myself, without any protest from any of the other editors) long before the Congress, and that this alteration was to be effected irrespective of the wishes or consent of any one member, or possibly even two or three members, of the board of six. One may therefore judge how much validity now attaches to the wretched talk about unofficial binding instructions having tied the six, about moral bonds between them, about the importance of keeping the team intact, and the other such subterfuges in which Martov's speech abounded. All these subterfuges run directly counter to the explicit text of the commentary, which calls for a *reconstitution* of the editorial board, a reconstitution to be effected by a rather intricate and, consequently, carefully considered procedure.

Still more unquestionably does it follow from this commentary that alteration of the composition of the editorial board was made contingent on the *consent* of at least two

comrades from Russia, elected by the Congress to membership of the Central Committee. It is therefore indubitable that both I and Martov *hoped to persuade* these future members of the Central Committee that a definite alteration in the composition of the editorial board was necessary. Thus, we were leaving the composition of the editorial board to be decided by members of the Central Committee, without yet knowing exactly who they would be. Consequently, we entered the struggle *hoping to win these Central Committee members to our side*; and now that the majority of the influential comrades from Russia have sided at the Congress with me, and not with Martov (in regard to the differences that have arisen between us), for him to wail hysterically over his defeat and indulge in scurrilities and allegations which by their very nature do not admit of proof is a positively indecent and contemptible method of struggle.

N. Lenin (*V. I. Ulyanov*)

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Published according
to the manuscript

STATEMENT OF RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY COUNCIL AND FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN[43]

Inasmuch as I do not share the opinion of G. V. Plekhanov, member of the Party Council and of the editorial board of the Central Organ, that it will be in the interest of Party unity at the present time to make a concession to the Martovites and co-opt the board of six, I hereby resign from the Party Council and from the editorial board of the Central Organ.

N. Lenin

Geneva
November 1, 1903

P.S. At all events, I by no means refuse to support the new central Party institutions by my work, to the best of my ability.

Handed to Plekhanov November 1, 1903

Published in 1904

Published according to the manuscript

THE POSITION OF THE BUND IN THE PARTY

Under this title the Bund has published a translation of an article from No. 34 of the *Arbeiterstimme*.[44] This article, accompanying the decisions of the Fifth Bund Congress, represents as it were an official commentary on those decisions. It attempts to give a systematic exposition of all the arguments which lead to the conclusion that the Bund "must be a federated component of the Party". It will be interesting to examine these arguments.

The author begins by stating that the most burning question facing the Russian Social-Democratic movement is the question of unity. On what basis can it be effected? The Manifesto of 1898[45] took the principle of autonomy as the basis. The author examines this principle and finds it to be logically false and inherently contradictory. If by questions which specifically concern the Jewish proletariat are meant only such as relate to methods of agitation (with reference to the specific language, mentality and culture of the Jews), that will be technical (?) autonomy. But such autonomy will mean the destruction of all independence, for it is an autonomy enjoyed by every Party committee, and to put the Bund on a par with the committees will be a denial of autonomy. If, on the other hand, autonomy is understood to mean autonomy in some questions of the programme, it is unreasonable to deprive the Bund of all independence in the other questions of the programme; and independence in questions of programme necessarily involves representation of the Bund, as such, on the central bodies of the Party—that is, not autonomy, but federation. A sound basis for the position of the Bund in the Party must

be sought in the history of the Jewish revolutionary movement in Russia, and what that history shows is that all organisations active among the Jewish workers joined to form a single union—the Bund—and that its activities spread from Lithuania to Poland and then to the South of Russia. Consequently, history broke down all regional barriers and brought forward the Bund as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat. And there you have a principle which is not the fruit of an idle brain (?) but follows from the whole history of the Jewish working-class movement: the Bund is the sole representative of the interests of the Jewish proletariat. And, naturally, the organisation of the proletariat of a whole nationality can enter the Party only if the latter has a federal structure: the Jewish proletariat is not only part of the world family of proletarians, but also part of the Jewish nation, which occupies a special position among the nations. Lastly, it is federation that denotes close unity between the component elements of the Party, for its chief feature is direct participation by each of them in Party affairs, and they all feel they have equal rights. Under autonomy, on the other hand, the components of the Party have no rights, and there is indifference to its common affairs, and mutual distrust, friction and conflict.

Such is the author's line of argument, which we have presented almost entirely in his own words. It boils down to three things: considerations of a general nature as to the inherent contradictoriness of autonomy and its unsuitability from the standpoint of close unity between the components of the Party; lessons from history, which has made the Bund the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat; and, lastly, the affirmation that the Jewish proletariat is the proletariat of a whole nationality, a nationality occupying a special position. Thus the author endeavours to build his case on general principles of organisation, on the lessons of history, and on the idea of nationality. He tries—we must give him his due—to examine the matter from all angles. And for that very reason his statement of the case brings out so saliently the attitude of the Bund on this question which is of deep concern to all of us.

Under federation, we are told, the components of the Party have equal rights and share directly in its common

affairs; under autonomy they have no rights, and as such do not share in the general life of the Party. This argument belongs entirely to the realm of obvious fallacies; it is as like as two peas to those arguments which mathematicians call mathematical sophistries, and which prove—quite logically, at first glance—that twice two are five, that the part is greater than the whole, and so on. There are collections of such mathematical sophistries, and they are of some value to school children. But it is even embarrassing to have to explain to people who claim to be the sole representatives of the Jewish proletariat so elementary a sophistry as the attribution of different meanings to the term "component of the Party" in two parts of one and the same argument. When they speak of federation, they mean by a component of the Party a sum-total of organisations in different localities; but when they speak of autonomy, they mean by it each local organisation separately. Put these supposedly identical concepts side by side in the same syllogism, and you will arrive inevitably at the conclusion that twice two are five. And if the Bundists are still unclear as to the nature of their sophistry, let them consult their own maximum Rules and they will see that it is under federation that the local organisations communicate with the Party centre *in*directly, and under autonomy—directly. No, our federalists would do better not to talk about "close unity"! By trying to disprove that federation means the *isolation*, and autonomy the *fusion* of the different components of the Party, they only provoke hilarity.

Hardly more successful is the attempt to prove the "logical falsity" of autonomy by dividing the latter into programme autonomy and technical autonomy. The division itself is utterly absurd. Why should the specific methods of agitation among Jewish workers be classed under technical questions? What has technique to do with it, when it is a matter of peculiarities of language, mentality, conditions of life? How can you talk of independence in questions of programme in connection, for example, with the demand for civil equality for the Jews? The Social-Democratic programme only sets forth the basic demands, common to the entire proletariat, irrespective of occupational, local, national, or racial distinctions. The effect of these distinctions is that

one and the same demand for complete equality of citizens before the law gives rise to agitation against one form of inequality in one locality and against another form of inequality in another locality or in relation to other groups of the proletariat, and so on. One and the same point in the programme will be applied differently depending on differences in conditions of life, differences of culture, differences in the relation of social forces in different parts of the country, and so forth. Agitation on behalf of one and the same demand in the programme will be carried on in different ways and in different languages taking into account all these differences. Consequently, autonomy in questions specifically concerning the proletariat of a given race, nation, or district implies that it is left to the discretion of the organisation concerned to determine the specific demands to be advanced in pursuance of the common programme, and the methods of agitation to be employed. The Party as a whole, its central institutions, lay down the common fundamental principles of programme and tactics; as to the different methods of carrying out these principles in practice and agitating for them, they are laid down by the various Party organisations subordinate to the centre, depending on local, racial, national, cultural, and other differences.

Is there anything unclear about this conception of autonomy? And is it not the sheerest scholasticism to make a division into programme autonomy and technical autonomy?

Just see how the concept autonomy is "logically analysed" in the pamphlet we are examining. "From the total body of questions with which the Social-Democrats have to deal," the pamphlet says in connection with the autonomy principle taken as the basis in the 1898 Manifesto, "there are singled out [*sic*!!] some questions, which, it is recognised, specifically concern the Jewish proletariat.... Where the realm of general questions begins, the autonomy of the Bund ends.... This gives rise to a duality in the position of the Bund in the Party: in specific questions it acts as the Bund ... in general questions it loses its distinctive character and is put on a par with an ordinary committee of the Party...." The Social-Democratic programme demands complete equality of all citizens before the law. *In pursuance* of that programme the Jewish worker in Vilna puts

forward one specific demand, and the Bashkir worker in Ufa an entirely different specific demand. Does that mean that "from the total body of questions" "some are *singled out*"? If the general demand for equality is embodied in a number of specific demands for the abolition of specific forms of inequality, is that a *singling out* of the specific from the general questions? The specific demands are not singled out from the general demands of the programme, but are advanced *in pursuance* of them. What is singled out is what specifically concerns the Jew in Vilna as distinct from what specifically concerns the Bashkir in Ufa. The generalisation of their demands, the representation of their *common class interests* (and not of their specific occupational, racial, local, national, or other interests) is the affair of the whole Party, of the Party centre. That would surely seem clear enough! The reason the Bundists have muddled it is that, instead of logical analysis, they have again and again given us specimens of logical fallacies. They have entirely failed to grasp the relation between the Social-Democrats' general and specific demands. They imagine that "from the total body of questions with which the Social-Democrats have to deal, some questions are singled out", when actually *every* question dealt with in our programme is a generalisation of a number of specific questions and demands; *every* point in the programme is common to the *entire* proletariat, while at the same time it is subdivided into specific questions depending on the proletarians' different occupations, their different conditions of life, differences of language, and so on and so forth. The Bundists are disturbed by the contradictoriness and duality of the position of the Bund, consisting, don't you see, in the fact that in specific questions it acts as the Bund, while in general questions it loses its distinctive character. A little reflection would show them that such a "duality" exists in the position of *absolutely every* Social-Democratic worker, who in specific questions acts as a worker in a particular trade, a member of a particular nation, an inhabitant of a particular locality, while in general questions he "loses his distinctive character" and is put on a par with *every other* Social-Democrat. The autonomy of the Bund, under the Rules of 1898, is of exactly the same nature as the autonomy of the Tula Committee; only the limits of this auton-

omy are somewhat different and somewhat wider in the former case than in the latter. And there is nothing but a crying logical fallacy in the following argument, by which the Bund tries to refute this conclusion: "If the Bund is allowed independence in some questions of the *programme*, on what grounds is it deprived of *all* independence in the other questions of the programme?" This contrasting of specific and general questions as "some" and "*the others*" is an inimitable specimen of Bundist "logical analysis"! These people simply cannot understand that it is like contrasting the different colours, tastes, and fragrances of particular apples to the *number* of "other" apples. We make bold to inform you, gentlemen, that not only some, but every apple has its special taste, colour, and fragrance. Not only in "some" questions of the programme, but *in all without exception*, you are allowed independence, gentlemen, but only as far as concerns their application to the specific features of the Jewish proletariat. "*Mein teuerer Freund, ich rat' Euch drum zuerst Collegium logicum!*"*

The second argument of the Bundists is an appeal to history, which is supposed to have brought forward the Bund as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat.

In the first place, this is not true. The author of the pamphlet himself says that "the work of other organisations [besides the Bund] in this direction [i.e., among the Jewish proletariat] either yielded no results at all, or results too insignificant to merit attention". Hence, on his own admission, there was such work, and consequently the Bund *was not* the *sole* representative of the Jewish proletariat; as regards the results of this work, no one, of course, will rely on the Bund's opinion; and, lastly, it is a known fact that the Bund *interfered* with the work of other organisations among the Jewish proletariat (we have only to mention the well-known incident of its campaign against the Ekaterinoslav Party Committee for daring to issue a proclamation to the Jewish workers[47]), so that even if the results did indeed merit no attention, the Bund itself would be partly to blame.

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* "Hence, my dear friend, I would advise you to begin with college logic."[46]—*Ed.*

Further, the measure of truth contained in the Bund's historical reference does not in the least prove the soundness of its arguments. The facts which did take place and which the Bund has in mind speak against it, not for it. These facts are that the Bund existed and developed—during the five years since the First Congress—quite separately and independently from the other organisations of the Party. In general, the actual ties between all Party organisations during this period were very weak, but the ties between the Bund and the rest of the Party were not only far weaker than those between the other organisations, but they kept growing weaker all the time. That the Bund itself *weakened* these ties is directly proved by the history of our Party's organisations abroad. In 1898, the Bund members abroad belonged to the one common Party organisation; but by 1903 they had left it to form a completely separate and independent organisation. The separateness and independence of the Bund is beyond question, as is also the fact that it has steadily become more pronounced.

What follows from this unquestionable fact? What follows in the opinion of the Bundists is that one must bow to this fact, slavishly submit to it, turn it into a principle, into the sole principle providing a sound basis for the position of the Bund, and legitimise this principle in the Rules, which should recognise the Bund as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in the Party. In our opinion, on the other hand, such a conclusion is the sheerest opportunism, "tail-ism"[48] of the worst kind. The conclusion to be drawn from the five years of disunity is not that this disunity should be legitimised, but that an end should be put to it once and for all. And will anybody still venture to deny that it really was disunity? *All* component parts of the Party developed separately and independently during this period—are we perhaps to deduce from this the "principle" of federation between Siberia, the Caucasus, the Urals, the South, and the rest?? The Bundists themselves say that, as regards organisational unity of its components, the Party virtually did not exist—and how can what evolved when the Party did not exist be taken as a pattern for the *restoration* of organisational unity? No, gentlemen, your reference to the history of the disunity that gave rise to isolation proves

nothing whatever except that this isolation is abnormal. To deduce a "principle" of *organisation* from several years of *disorganisation* in the Party is to act like those representatives of the historical school who, as Marx sarcastically observed, were prepared to defend the knout on the grounds that it was historical.

Hence, neither the "logical analysis" of autonomy nor the appeals to history can provide even the shadow of a "principle" justifying the isolation of the Bund. But the Bund's third argument, which invokes the idea of a Jewish nation, is undoubtedly of the nature of a principle. Unfortunately, however, this Zionist idea is absolutely false and essentially reactionary. "The Jews have ceased to be a nation, for a nation without a territory is unthinkable," says one of the most prominent of Marxist theoreticians, Karl Kautsky (see No. 42 of *Iskra* and the separate reprint from it *The Kishinev Massacre and the Jewish Question*, p. 3). And quite recently, examining the problem of nationalities in Austria, the same writer endeavoured to give a scientific definition of the concept nationality and established two principal criteria of a nationality: language and territory (*Neue Zeit*,[49] 1903, No. 2). A French Jew, the radical Alfred Naquet, says practically the same thing, word for word, in his controversy with the anti-Semites and the Zionists.[50] "If it pleased Bernard Lazare," he writes of the well-known Zionist, "to consider himself a citizen of a separate nation, that is his affair; but I declare that, although I was born a Jew ... I do not recognise Jewish nationality.... I belong to no other nation but the French.... Are the Jews a nation? Although they were one in the remote past, my reply is a categorical *negative*. The concept nation implies certain conditions which do not exist in this case. A nation must have a territory on which to develop, and, in our time at least, until a world confederation has extended this basis, a nation must have a common language . And the Jews no longer have either a territory or a common language.... Like myself, Bernard Lazare probably did not know a word of Hebrew, and would have found it no easy matter, if Zionism had achieved its purpose, to make himself understood to his co-racials [*congénères*] from other parts of the world" (*La Petite République*, September 24, 1903). "German and French

Jews are quite unlike Polish and Russian Jews. The characteristic features of the Jews include nothing that bears the imprint [*empreinte*] of nationality. If it were permissible to recognise the Jews as a nation, as Drumont does, it would be an artificial nation. The modern Jew is a product of the unnatural selection to which his forebears were subjected for nearly eighteen centuries." All that remains for the Bundists is to develop the theory of a separate Russian-Jewish nation, whose language is Yiddish and their territory the Pale of Settlement.[51]

Absolutely untenable scientifically,* the idea that the Jews form a separate nation is reactionary politically. Irrefutable practical proof of that is furnished by generally known facts of recent history and of present-day political realities. All over Europe, the decline of medievalism and the development of political liberty went hand in hand with the political emancipation of the Jews, their abandonment of Yiddish for the language of the people among whom they lived, and, in general, their undeniable progressive assimilation with the surrounding population. Are we again to revert to the exceptionalist theories and proclaim that Russia will be the one exception, although the Jewish emancipation movement is far broader and deeper-rooted here, thanks to the awakening of a heroic class-consciousness among the Jewish proletariat? Can we possibly attribute to chance the fact that it is the reactionary forces all over Europe, and especially in Russia, who *oppose* the assimilation of the Jews and try to perpetuate their isolation?

That is precisely what the Jewish problem *amounts to*: assimilation or isolation?— and the idea of a Jewish "na-

* Not only national, but even racial peculiarities are denied to the Jew by modern scientific investigators, who give prime prominence to the peculiarities of the *history* of the Jews. "Do the peculiarities of Jewry spring from its racial character?" Karl Kautsky asks, and replies that we do not even know with precision what race means. "There is no need to bring in the concept race, which provides no real answer but only poses new problems. It is enough to trace the history of the Jews to ascertain the reasons, for their characteristics." And such an expert in this history as Renan says: "The characteristic features of the Jews and their manner of life are far more a product of the social conditions, [*nécessités sociales*] by which they have been influenced for centuries than a racial distinction [*phénomène de race*].[52]

tionality" is definitely reactionary not only when expounded by its consistent advocates (the Zionists), but likewise on the lips of those who try to combine it with the ideas of Social-Democracy (the Bundists). The idea of a Jewish nationality runs counter to the interests of the Jewish proletariat, for it fosters among them, directly or indirectly, a spirit hostile to assimilation, the spirit of the "ghetto". "When the National Assembly of 1791 decreed the emancipation of the Jews," writes Renan, "it was very little concerned with the question of race.... It is the business of the nineteenth century to abolish all 'ghettos', and I cannot compliment those who seek to restore them. The Jewish race has rendered the world the greatest services. Assimilated with the various nations, harmoniously blended with the various national units, it will render no lesser services in the future than in the past." And Karl Kautsky, in particular reference to the Russian Jews, expresses himself even more vigorously. Hostility towards non-native sections of the population can only be eliminated "when the non-native sections of the population cease to be alien and blend with the general mass of the population. *That is the only possible solution of the Jewish problem, and we should support everything that makes for the ending of Jewish isolation.*" Yet the Bund is resisting this only possible solution, for it is helping, not to end but to increase and legitimise Jewish isolation, by propagating the idea of a Jewish "nation" and a plan of federating Jewish and non-Jewish proletarians. That is the basic mistake of "Bundism", which consistent Jewish Social-Democrats must and will correct. This mistake drives the Bundists to actions unheard-of in the international Social-Democratic movement, such as stirring up distrust among Jewish towards non-Jewish proletarians, fostering suspicion of the latter and disseminating falsehoods about them. Here is proof, taken from this same pamphlet: "Such an absurdity [as that the organisation of the proletariat of a whole nationality should be denied representation on the central Party bodies] could be openly advocated only [mark that!] in regard to the Jewish proletariat, which, owing to the peculiar historical fortunes of the Jewish people, still has to fight for equality [!!] in the world family of the proletariat." We recently came across just such a trick in a Zionist

leaflet, whose authors raved and fumed against *Iskra*, purporting to detect in its struggle with the Bund a refusal to recognise the "equality" of Jew and non-Jew. And now we find the Bundists repeating the tricks of the Zionists! This is disseminating an outright falsehood, for we have "advocated" "denying representation" not "only" to the Jews, but also to the Armenians, the Georgians and so on, and in the case of the Poles, too, we called for the closest union and fusion of the entire proletariat fighting against the tsarist autocracy. It was not for nothing that the P.S.P. (Polish Socialist Party) raged and fulminated against us! To call a fight for the Zionist *idea* of a Jewish nation, for the federal *principle* of Party organisation, a "fight for the equality of the Jews *in the world family of the proletariat*" is to degrade the struggle from the plane of ideas and principles to that of suspicion, incitement and fanning of historically-evolved prejudices. It glaringly reveals a lack of real ideas and principles as weapons of struggle.

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We thus arrive at the conclusion that neither the logical, nor the historical, nor yet the nationalist arguments of the Bund will stand criticism. The period of disunity, which aggravated waverings among the Russian Social-Democrats and the isolation of the various organisations, had the same effect, to an even more marked degree, in the case of the Bundists. Instead of proclaiming war on this historically evolved isolation (further increased by the general disunity), they elevated it to a principle, seizing for this purpose on the sophistry that autonomy is inherently contradictory, and on the Zionist idea of a Jewish nation. Only if it frankly and resolutely admits its mistake and sets out to *move towards fusion* can the Bund turn away from the false path it has taken. And we are convinced that the finest adherents of Social-Democratic ideas among the Jewish proletariat will sooner or later compel the Bund to turn from the path of isolation to that of fusion.

Iskra, No. 51, October 22, 1903

Published according to the *Iskra* text

THE NARODNIK-LIKE BOURGEOISIE AND DISTRAUGHT NARODISM

Russian Marxists have long been pointing to the degeneration of the old, classical, revolutionary Russian Narodism that has been going on steadily since the eighties. Faith declined in a special system of peasant economy, in the village commune as the germ and basis of socialism, in the possibility of avoiding the path of capitalism by an immediate social revolution, for which the people were supposed to be already prepared. The demands for all kinds of measures to bolster up peasant economy and "small people's production" in general were the only ones to retain any political significance. Essentially, this was already nothing but bourgeois reformism; Narodism melted into liberalism; a liberal-Narodnik trend arose that would not or could not see that the measures envisaged (credits, co-operative societies, land improvement, enlargement of land holdings, and all the rest) did not go beyond the framework of *existing* bourgeois society. The Narodnik theories of Mr. V. V., Mr. Nikolai—on[53] and their numerous echoers only served as a quasi-scientific cloak for this unpleasant but indubitable fact. Marxist criticism tore off this cloak, and the influence of Narodnik ideas on Russian revolutionary circles began to ebb with amazing rapidity. These ideas were already becoming in fact the exclusive possession of the stratum to which they were kin in spirit—Russian liberal "society".

West-European Bernsteinism was a new current that strengthened and at the same time modified the above-mentioned trend. There is truth, it seems, in the saying that "a prophet is not without honour, save in his own country".

Bernstein had no luck in his own country, but, on the other hand, his ideas were "taken seriously" and applied in practice by certain socialists in France, Italy and Russia, who rapidly evolved into exponents of bourgeois reformism. Fructified by these ideas, our liberal-Narodnik trend acquired new followers of the ex-Marxist variety and at the same time matured inwardly, discarding certain primitive illusions and reactionary accretions. Bernsteinism served its purpose—not by transforming socialism, but by giving articulation to the new phase of bourgeois liberalism and removing the socialist mask from certain quasi-socialists.

A highly interesting and instructive example of the mingling and fusion of European opportunist and Russian Narodnik ideas is to be found in Mr. L.'s article "The Agrarian Question" in No. 9 (33) of *Osvobozhdeniye*. This is a truly programmatic article; it diligently sets forth the general *credo* of the author and systematically applies it to a definite sphere of problems. This article will become a landmark in the history of Russian liberalism, denoting a big step forward in its shaping and consolidation.

The author dresses his bourgeois liberalism in a coat cut according to the latest fashion. Repeating Bernstein almost word for word, he tries with an amusing earnestness to persuade the reader that "liberalism and socialism can by no means be separated from each other, let alone contrasted to each other: they are identical and inseparable in their fundamental ideal. Socialism offers no menace to liberalism, as many fear; it comes not to destroy, but to fulfil the commandments of liberalism." The wish, as we know, is father to the thought; and Mr. L. and his like would very much wish the Social-Democrats not to separate themselves from the liberals, and to have them understand socialism "not as ready-made dogmas and petrified doctrines claiming to take account in advance of the whole course of historical development" (and so on, quite in the spirit of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*), but "as a general ethical ideal" (which, as we know, all philistines, the liberals included, regard as unrealisable in this earthly vale and as belonging to the realm of the hereafter and of "things-in-themselves").

The liberals, naturally, want—excuse the vulgarism!—to show off their wares to the best advantage, to identify political liberalism in Russia with social-economic democracy. It is a very "well-meaning" idea, but at the same time very muddled and very artful. Well-meaning because it expresses the kind intention of a certain section of the liberals to work for broad social reforms. Muddled, because it is based on contrasting democratic to bourgeois liberalism (again quite in the spirit of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*!); the author apparently has no inkling of the fact that in any capitalist society there are bound to be some *bourgeois*-democratic elements who stand for broad democratic and social-economic reforms; like all the Russian Millerands,[54] he would like to identify *bourgeois* reformism with socialism, understood, of course, "not as ready-made dogmas", etc. Lastly, it is a very artful idea because the author assures himself and others that the sympathy with reform—"concern for the needs and interests of the people, 'Narodism' in the true and fine ethical sense of the term"—which is entertained by a certain section of the liberals a certain historical moment is, or could be, a permanent attribute of liberalism as such. That is so naïve as almost to be touching. Who does not know that every bourgeois ex-government, every "His Majesty's Opposition" always clamours about its true, fine and ethical "Narodism"—as long as it remains in opposition? The Russian bourgeoisie plays at Narodism (and sometimes sincerely) just because it is in opposition, and not yet at the helm of state. The Russian proletariat's reply to the artful blandishments of the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry will be: "*Pas si bête*, *messieurs!* We are not such fools, gentlemen, as to believe that."

From these general arguments as to the identity of liberalism and socialism, Mr. L. passes to the general theory of the agrarian question. In a matter of a dozen lines he demolishes Marxism (once again in the spirit of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*), presenting it for this purpose, as is customary, in a vulgarly simplified form and proclaiming it to be contrary to experience, scientifically unproved, and generally false! It is highly characteristic that the only confirmation he adduces is a reference to European *socialist* (his own italics) literature—Bernsteinian, evidently. A very convincing

reference. If European (*European*!) socialists are beginning to think and argue like bourgeois, why should not Russian bourgeois proclaim themselves both Narodniks and socialists? If the Marxist view of the peasant question "were incontestable and the only possible one, it would," Mr. L. assures us, "place all of Zemstvo [*sic*!] Russia in a terrible, a tragic position and doom it to inaction, in view of the demonstrated impossibility of a progressive agrarian policy and of rational and effective aid to peasant economy in general." The argument, as you see, is unanswerable: *because* Marxism demonstrates the impossibility under capitalism of any degree of lasting prosperity for at all broad sections of the peasantry, it *therefore* places "Zemstvo" (a slip of the pen for "landowning"?) Russia—the Russia, that is, that lives by ruining and proletarising the peasantry—in a terrible, a tragic position. Why, yes, that is one of the historic services of Marxism: it has once and for all placed in a terrible, a tragicomic position—the ideologists of the bourgeoisie who deck themselves in the toga of Narodism, social-economic democracy, etc.

To finish with Mr. L.'s theoretical exercises we have now only to quote the following gem. "Here" (in agriculture), we are told, "there is not and cannot be that automatic [!] progress which is to a certain extent possible in industry, depending on the objective [!] development of technology." This inimitable profundity has been borrowed in its entirety from Messieurs the Kablukovs, Bulgakovs, E. Davids and *tutti quanti*, who in their "learned" works justify the backwardness of their own ideas by the technical, economic and social backwardness of agriculture. The backwardness of agriculture is indubitable, it has long been recognised by Marxists and is fully explainable; but as for this "automatic [if only to a certain extent] progress in industry", and the objective development of technology—it is just sheer gibberish.

However, excursions into the realm of science are no more than an architectural ornament to Mr. L.'s article. True practical politician that he is, he offers us, along with sheer muddle-headedness in general reasoning, an extremely sober and business-like practical programme. True, he makes the modest reservation—in his stilted official Russian—that

he disclaims all intention of adumbrating a programme and confines himself to intimating his attitude—but that is just his modesty. Actually, we have in Mr. L.'s article a very complete and detailed agrarian programme for the Russian liberals, which only lacks stylistic editing and paragraphing by clauses. It is a programme in a consistent liberal spirit: political liberty, democratic tax reform, freedom of movement, a peasant democratic agrarian policy aiming at the democratisation of landownership. With a view to this democratisation, it demands freedom to leave the village commune, the conversion of the latter from a compulsory into a voluntary association similar to any economic association, and democratic rent laws. The "state" should facilitate "the transfer of land to the labouring masses" by means of a number of measures, namely: extension of the activities of the Peasant Bank, conversion of the royal demesne into state demesne, "the creation of small farms, individual or co-operative, not using hired labour", and, lastly, compulsory alienation or redemption of lands essential to the peasants. "Of course, this compulsory redemption must be placed on a firm basis of law and attended in each particular case by reliable guarantees", but in some cases it must be effected "almost [*sic*!] unconditionally"—for example, in relation to the "cut-off lands",[55] which create something in the nature of feudal relations. In order to abolish semi-feudal relations, the state should be given the right of compulsory alienation and compulsory demarcation of the plots in question.

Such is the agrarian programme of the liberals. A parallel between it and the Social-Democratic agrarian programme naturally suggests itself. Where they resemble each other is in the identity of the immediate tendency and the similarity of most of the demands. Where they differ is in the two following cardinally important points. Firstly, the Social-Democrats want to effect the abolition of the remnants of feudalism (which both programmes directly advance as the aim) by revolutionary means and with revolutionary determination, the liberals—by reformist means and half-heartedly. Secondly, the Social-Democrats' stress that the system to be purged of the remnants of feudalism is a bourgeois system; they already now, in advance, expose all its contra-

dictions, and strive immediately to extend and render more conscious the class struggle that is inherent in this new system and is already coming to the surface. The liberals ignore the bourgeois character of the system purged of feudalism, gloss over its contradictions and try to damp down the class struggle inherent in it.

Let us consider these differences.

The reformist and half-hearted character of the liberal agrarian programme is clearly apparent first of all from the fact that it does not go beyond "compulsory redemption", and only "almost" unconditional at that, whereas the Social-Democratic agrarian programme demands the alienation of the cut-off lands from their old owners without compensation, and countenances compensation only in special cases, and then at the expense of the land of the nobility. Nor, as is well known,* do the Social-Democrats reject expropriation of the landed estates in their entirety, but only regard it as impermissible and irresponsible to include this demand, which is not appropriate under all circumstances, in the programme. The Social-Democrats from the very start call on the proletariat to take the first revolutionary step in conjunction with the well-to-do peasants in order then at once to go farther, either in conjunction with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landlord class, or against the peasant bourgeoisie and the landlord class if they have joined forces. The liberals even at this stage, in the struggle against semi-feudal relations, shrink from class action and struggle. They want to entrust the reform to the "state" (forgetting the class character of the state) with the help of local self-government bodies and "*ad hoc*" commissions, drawing a parallel—nothing could be more characteristic—between the compulsory alienation of the cut-off lands and the compulsory alienation of land for building railways!! Our liberals could not have more clearly expressed, or rather *betrayed*, their cherished wish of surrounding the new reform with the same "conveniences" for the ruling classes as always and everywhere attend the sale of land to the railways. And this in the same breath with the fine phrases about substituting a peasant democratic

* See Plekhanov's statement in No. 4 of *Zarya* and mine in the reply to X. (See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 446-47.—*Ed.*)

agrarian policy for the agrarian policy of an aristocratic caste! In order to effect that substitution in practice, you have to appeal, not to the "public interest", but to the oppressed class—the peasantry—against the oppressing class—the nobility; you have to *rouse* the former against the latter, have to call for revolutionary action by the peasantry, not for reformist activity by the state. Further, when they talk about abolishing semi-feudal relations, the liberals refuse to see the precise nature of the relations that they propose to purge of feudalism. Mr. L., for example, repeats the catchphrases of Mr. Nikolai—on, Mr. V. V. and the rest about "the principle of recognising the tiller's right to the land he cultivates" and about the "virility" of the peasantry, but is modestly silent about the "principle" of bourgeois farming and the exploitation of wage-labour by these virile peasants. That it is the position of the petty-bourgeois members of the peasantry which would inevitably be strengthened and consolidated by the consistent application of democracy in the agrarian sphere, the bourgeois democrats do not and will not realise. In the proletarisation of the peasantry Mr. L. (again like the Narodniks and in the spirit of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*) refuses to see a "type of development", declaring it to be due to "the survivals of serfdom" and "the general pathological condition of the countryside"! Presumably after we get a constitution we shall see the end of the growth of the towns, of the flight of the poor peasants from the countryside, of the change-over of the landlords from the labour-rent system to the use of wage-labour, and so on! Depicting the beneficent effect of the French Revolution on the French peasantry, Mr. L. speaks glowingly of the disappearance of famines and the improvement and progress of agriculture; but about the fact that this was bourgeois progress, based on the formation of a "stable" class of agricultural wage-labourers and on chronic pauperism of the mass of the *lower* strata of the peasantry, this Narodnik-like bourgeois, of course, says never a word.

In short, the difference between Mr. L.'s agrarian programme and the Social-Democratic agrarian programme reproduces in miniature with remarkable fidelity all the general differences between the minimum programmes of liberal

and proletarian democracy. Whether you consider these programmes as theoretically expounded by their respective ideologists or as practically applied by their respective parties and trends, or whether you look at the history of, say, 1848, you will find just these two fundamental differences between the liberal and the Social-Democratic approach to the immediate practical aims: on the one hand, reformist half-heartedness in the struggle against the survivals of feudalism and a glossing over of the class antagonisms of "modern" society; on the other, a revolutionary struggle against the remnants of the old order with a view to extending, developing and intensifying the struggle of classes in the new society. Of course, these fundamental differences, which spring from the very nature of developing capitalist society, assume very different forms in different national states and at different times. An inability to recognise the "old" bourgeois democracy behind the new and peculiar forms is characteristic of its ideologists, consistent and inconsistent. Under the latter head we must, for example, class Mr. P. Novobrantsev (see *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, Nos. 32 and 33), that representative of "distraught Narodism" who, in reference to *Iskra*'s attacks on *Osvobozhdeniye* for being a bourgeois class publication, ironically remarks: "A fine bourgeoisie, we must say!" "Mr. Struve," *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* condescends to inform us, "is a representative of the 'intelligentsia', and not of the 'bourgeoisie as a class', for he does not set out to unite or lead any classes or social estates." That is all very well, gentlemen! But had you given a little thought to the matter you would have seen that Mr. Struve is a representative of the *bourgeois* intelligentsia. As to the bourgeoisie as a class, the Russian proletariat will see it as such on the historical scene only when there is political freedom and the government is almost directly a "committee" of one or another section of the bourgeoisie. And only "socialists by mistake" can fail to know that it is their duty to teach the working class to recognise the bourgeoisie both in its activities and in its ideas, both in its mature state and in its dreamy youth.

As for dreaminess, Mr. Novobrantsev is your man for that. But our article is already so long, and Mr. Novobrantsev's world outlook and agrarian-historical views pre-

sent so much that is interesting, especially when taken parallel with those of Mr. L., that we must postpone their discussion until another time.

Written on November 5 (18), 1903

Published in *Iskra*, No. 54, December 1, 1903
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Iskra* text

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrade,

Please insert the following announcement in *Iskra*: "As from November 1 (New Style), 1903, N. Lenin is no longer a member of the *Iskra* editorial board."

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin

Written on November 5 (18), 1903
Published in 1904

Published according to the manuscript

AN UNISSUED STATEMENT[56]

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., meeting in Geneva on November 27, 1903, unanimously adopted the following decision.

Comrade Plekhanov's co-optation of the Martovites to the editorial board constitutes outright defection on his part to the side of the Party Congress minority, a minority that Plekhanov himself more than once publicly characterised as inclining towards opportunism and anarchism. From the minutes of the Party Congress and the Congress of the League this will be seen quite clearly. This defection is a direct violation of the will of the Party Congress under the influence of the League Abroad and in defiance of the emphatically stated decision of the majority of the Party committees in Russia. The Central Committee cannot allow such a violation of the will of the Congress, particularly since in taking advantage of Comrade Lenin's resignation to commit this act, Comrade Plekhanov was guilty of a direct breach of trust; for Comrade Lenin resigned on certain conditions, in the interests of peace and good will in the Party, whereas the Martovites, by turning down the Central Committee's ultimatum of November 25,[57] rejected peace and thereby declared war.

The Central Committee therefore, by revolutionary action, takes the Party Central Organ into its own hands and declares that it will do everything in its power to secure that the will of the Party as a whole, not the will of the League Abroad or the treachery of an individual, shall determine the Party's future.

Central Committee

Written on November 14 (27), 1903

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Published according
to the manuscript

LETTER TO *ISKRA*[58]

The article "What Should Not Be Done" raises issues in our Party life that are so important, and at this particular juncture so urgent, that it is difficult to repress the desire to respond immediately to the editorial board's kind and hospitable offer to throw open the columns of their paper; and it is all the more difficult for one who has been a constant contributor to *Iskra*, especially at a time when to delay voicing one's opinion for a week may mean forfeiting the opportunity altogether.

And I would like to contribute my opinion in order to prevent certain possible, if not inevitable, misunderstandings.

Let me say, first of all, that I think the author of the article is a thousand times right when he insists that it is essential to safeguard the unity of the Party and avoid new splits—especially over differences which cannot be considered important. To appeal for peaceableness, mildness, and readiness to make concessions is highly praiseworthy in a leader at all times, and at the present moment in particular. To anathemise or expel from the Party, not only former Economists,[59] but even little groups of Social-Democrats who suffer from "a certain inconsistency" would certainly be unreasonable, so unreasonable that we quite understand the irritable tone of the author of the article towards those whom he considers arbitrary, stiff-necked and stupid Sobakeviches[60] capable of advocating expulsion. We even go further: when we have a Party programme and a Party organisation, we must not only hospitably throw open the columns of the Party organ for exchanges of opinion, but must afford those groups—or grouplets, as the author calls

them—which from inconsistency support some of the dogmas of revisionism, or for one reason or another insist upon their separate and individual existence as groups, the opportunity of systematically setting forth their differences, however slight these may be. Precisely in order to avoid being too harsh and stiff-necked *à la* Sobakevich towards "anarchistic individualism", it is necessary, in our opinion, to do the utmost—even if it involves a certain departure from tidy patterns of centralism and from absolute obedience to discipline—to enable these grouplets to speak out and give the whole Party the opportunity to weigh the importance or unimportance of these differences and determine just where, how and *on whose part inconsistency* is shown.

Indeed, it is high time to make a clean sweep of the traditions of circle sectarianism and—in a party which rests on the *masses*—resolutely advance the slogan: *More light!*—let the Party know *everything*, let it have *all*, *absolutely all the material* required for a judgement of all and sundry differences, reversions to revisionism, departures from discipline, etc. More confidence in the independent judgement of the whole body of Party workers!—they, and they alone, will be able to curb the excessive hotheadedness of grouplets inclined to splits, will be able, by their slow, imperceptible but persistent influence, to imbue them with the "good will" to observe Party discipline, will be able to cool the ardour of anarchistic individualism and, by the very fact of their indifference, document, prove and demonstrate the triviality of differences exaggerated by the elements tending towards a split.

To the question—"what should not be done?" (what should not be done in general, and what, in particular, should not be done so as to avoid a split), my reply is, first of all: do not conceal from the Party the appearance and growth of potential causes of a split, do not conceal any of the circumstances and events that constitute such causes; and, what is more, do not conceal them not only from the Party, but, as far as possible, from the outside public either. I say "as far as possible" having in mind the things that, in a secret organisation, must necessarily be concealed—but in our splits things of this kind play next to no part. Broad publicity—that is the surest, the only reliable means of avoiding

such splits as can be avoided, and of reducing to a minimum the harm of splits that are no longer avoidable.

For indeed, just reflect on the obligations devolving on the Party from the fact that it is dealing now with the *masses*, not with mere circles. To be a party of the masses not only in name, we must get ever wider masses to share In all Party affairs, steadily elevating them from political indifference to protest and struggle, from a general spirit of protest to the conscious adoption of Social-Democratic views, from the adoption of these views to support of the movement, from support to organised membership in the Party. Can we achieve this result without giving the widest publicity to matters on whose decision the nature of our influence on the masses will depend? The workers will cease to understand us and will desert us, as a general staff without an army, if splits take place in our ranks over trivial differences, says the author; and it is quite true. And in order that the workers *may not* cease to understand us, in order that their fighting experience and proletarian instinct may *teach us* "leaders" *something too*, the organised workers must learn to keep an eye on any potential causes of splits (in any mass party such causes have always arisen and will always recur), to properly evaluate these causes, to appraise what happens in some "backwater", in Russia or abroad, from the standpoint of the interests of the entire Party, of the entire movement.

The author is thrice justified when he stresses that much will be given to our central bodies and much will be asked of them. Just so. And for that very reason *the whole Party* must constantly, steadily and systematically *train* suitable persons for the central bodies, must see clearly, as in the palm of its hand, *all the activities* of every candidate for these high posts, must come to know even their personal characteristics, their strong and weak points, their victories and "defeats". The author makes some remarkably acute observations, evidently based on extensive experience, about some of the causes of such defeats. And just because these observations are so acute, it is necessary that the whole Party should benefit by them, that it should *always see* every "defeat", even if partial, of one or other of its "leaders". No political leader has a career that is without its defeats,

and if we are serious when we talk about influencing the masses, about winning their "good will", we must strive with all our might not to let these defeats be hushed up in the musty atmosphere of circles and grouplets, but to have them submitted to the judgement of all. That may appear embarrassing at first sight, it may seem "offensive" sometimes to individual leaders—but we must overcome this false feeling of embarrassment, it is our duty to the Party and to the working class. In this way, and in this way alone, shall we enable the whole body of influential Party workers (and not the chance assortment of persons in a circle or grouplet) to know their leaders and to *put each of them in his proper category*. Only broad publicity will correct all bigoted, one-sided, capricious deviations, it alone will convert the at times absurd and ridiculous "squalls" between "grouplets" into useful and essential material for the self-education of the Party.

Light, more light! We need a vast orchestra; and we must acquire experience in order correctly to distribute the parts, in order to know to whom to assign the sentimental violin, to whom the gruff double-bass, to whom the conductor's baton. Let the columns of the Party organ and of all Party publications indeed be thrown open hospitably to all opinions, in keeping with the author's admirable appeal; let all and sundry judge our "janglings and wranglings" over any "note" sounded too sharp, in the opinion of some, too flat, in the opinion of others, too raggedly, in the opinion of others still. Only through a series of such open discussions can we get a really harmonious ensemble of leaders; only given this condition will it be *impossible* for the workers to cease to understand us; only then will our "general staff" really be backed by the *good* and *conscious* will of an army that follows and at the same time directs its general staff!

Lenin

Iskra, No. 53,
November 25, 1903

Published according
to the *Iskra* text

WHY I RESIGNED FROM THE *ISKRA* EDITORIAL BOARD*

A LETTER TO THE EDITORS OF *ISKRA*[61]

This is by no means a personal question. It concerns the relations between the majority and minority of our Party Congress, and I am bound to answer it at once, and openly, not only because the majority delegates are bombarding me with questions, but because the article "Our Congress" in No. 53 of *Iskra* gives an *entirely false* picture of the not very profound but very disruptive division among the *Iskra*-ists to which the Congress led.

The account the article gives of the matter is such that even with a magnifying glass no one could discover in it *a single* really serious cause for the division, could find so much as a shadow of an explanation of such a phenomenon as the altered composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ, or a semblance of valid reasons for my resignation from the board. We parted company over the organisation of the Party's central bodies, the writer of the article says, over the relations between the Central Organ and the Central Committee, over the way to apply centralism, over the limits and nature of a possible and useful centralisation, over the harm of bureaucratic formalism.

Is that so? Did we not rather *part company* over the personal composition of the central bodies, over whether it was permissible, because one did not like the membership elected to them by the Congress, to boycott these central bodies, to disrupt the practical work, to revise the decisions of the Party Congress at the bidding of a *circle* of Social-Democrats abroad, such as the majority of the League?

* I sent this letter to *Iskra* immediately after No. 53 appeared. The editors refused to print it in No. 54, so I am compelled to publish it as a leaflet.

You know perfectly well, comrades, that this was indeed the case. But the great majority of the most influential and most active Party workers do not know it yet, and so I shall briefly outline the main facts—briefly because, judging by an announcement in No. 53 of *Iskra*, all the material relating to the history of our divergence will shortly be published.

At our Congress—as both the writer of the article we are discussing and the Bund delegation in their newly published report rightly point out—the "*Iskra*-ists" were in a considerable majority, about three-fifths, according to my calculation, even before the withdrawal of the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo* delegates. During the first half of the Congress these *Iskra*-ists stood together against all the anti-*Iskra*-ists and inconsistent *Iskra*-ists. This was very plainly revealed in connection with two incidents during the first half of the Congress which are important for an understanding of our divergence: the Organising Committee incident and the equality of languages incident (the latter was the only occasion when the *Iskra*-ist compact majority dropped—from three-fifths to one-half). During the second half of the Congress the *Iskra*-ists *began* to diverge, and by the end of the Congress the divergence was *complete*. The controversies over Paragraph 1 of the Party Rules and over the elections to the central bodies clearly reveal the nature of this divergence: a minority of the *Iskra*-ists (headed by Martov) became the rallying point for a steadily increasing number of non-*Iskra*-ists and indecisive elements, in opposition to the majority of the *Iskra*-ists (which included Plekhanov and myself). Over the question of Paragraph 1 of the Rules this grouping did not yet take final shape, but even so the Bundist votes and two of the three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ist votes gave the *Iskra*-ist minority the upper hand. In the elections to the central bodies the *Iskra*-ist majority (owing to the withdrawal from the Congress of the five Bundist and two *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ist votes) became the majority at the Party Congress. And *it was only at this point that we parted company* in the real sense of the term.

We disagreed profoundly, first of all, over the composition of the Central Committee. After the Organising Committee incident, at the very beginning of the Congress, the *Iskra*-ists

hotly discussed various members (*and non-members*) of the Organising Committee as candidates for the Central Committee, and at unofficial meetings of the *Iskra* organisation, after prolonged and heated debates, rejected one of the candidates supported by Martov by nine votes to four, with three abstentions; by ten votes to two, with four abstentions, a list of five was adopted which, *on my proposal*, included one leader of the non-*Iskra*-ist elements and one leader of the *Iskra*-ist minority. But the minority insisted on having three out of five, and as a result suffered complete defeat at the Party Congress. The great battle at the Congress over whether to endorse the old editorial board of six for the Central Organ or to elect a new trio* ended in the same way.

Only from this moment did the divergence become so complete as to suggest a split; only from this moment did the minority (now already become a real "compact" minority) take the course of abstaining from voting—a thing until then unwitnessed at the Congress. And after the Congress this divergence grew ever more acute. The discontented minority resorted to a boycott, lasting for months. It is quite obvious that the charges of bureaucratic formalism, of demanding unquestioning, automatic obedience, and suchlike nonsense, which sprang from this soil, were merely an attempt to lay the blame at the wrong door; and this is sufficiently borne out by the following typical case. The new editorial board (i.e., Plekhanov and myself) invited all the former editors to contribute, which invitation, of course, was at first made without any "formalism", by word of mouth. It met with a refusal. We then wrote an "official

* In view of the endless talk and misrepresentation that there has been regarding this celebrated "trio", let me point out at once that long before the Congress all comrades who were at all closely in touch were acquainted with my commentary to the draft *Tagesordnung* of the Congress. This commentary, which was circulated at the Congress, contained the following point: "The Congress shall elect three persons to the editorial board of the Central Organ and three to the Central Committee. These six persons *in conjunction* shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority vote additional members to the editorial board of the Central Organ and to the Central Committee and report to this effect to the Congress. After the report has been endorsed by the Congress, subsequent co-optation shall be effected by the editorial board of the Central Organ and by the Central Committee separately."

document" (what bureaucrats!), addressed "dear comrades", requesting them to contribute in general, and in particular to *set forth their differences in the columns of the publications of which we were the editors*. The reply was a "formal" statement to the effect that they did not wish to *have anything to do with "Iskra"*. And, in fact, for months on end none of the non-editors did any work for *Iskra*. Relations became exclusively formal and bureaucratic—but on whose "initiative"?

Underground literature began to be produced; people abroad were flooded with it, it was disseminated among the committees, and is now already beginning in part to return from Russia. The report of the delegate for Siberia, —n's letter on the slogans of the "opposition", and Martov's *Once More in the Minority* are all full of the most amusing charges against Lenin of being an "autocrat", of instituting a Robespierre guillotine regime (*sic*!), of having staged the political burial of old comrades (non-election to the central bodies is burial!), and the like. By the very logic of things the opposition is drawn to seeking such differences of "principle" on matters of organisation as entirely preclude collaboration. An especially loud outcry is raised over the celebrated "fifth member" of the Party Council. In all these writings, the Council is made out to be a piece of diplomacy or trickery on Lenin's part, an instrument for the suppression of the Central Committee in Russia by the Central Organ abroad—which is exactly the way the matter is depicted by the Bund delegation in their report on the Congress. It need hardly be said that this difference of principle is just as nonsensical as the famous bureaucratic formalism. The fifth member is elected by the Congress; consequently, it is all a matter of the *person* who enjoys the greatest confidence of the majority; and the will of the majority of a Party Congress will always, however the central Party bodies may be constituted, be manifested in the choice of definite persons.

How widely this kind of literature has been circulated abroad is evident from the fact that even the good Parvus has taken the war-path against the attempt to grasp all the threads in one hand and to "boss" (*sic*!) the workers from some such place as Geneva (*Aus der Weltpolitik*,[62] V. Jahrgang, No. 48, November 30, 1903). In a month or two, when

he reads the minutes of the Party Congress and the League Congress, our new enemy of autocracy will discover how easy it is to make a fool of oneself by accepting all manner of *Parteiklatsch** at its face value.

The climax of the opposition's campaign against the central bodies was the Congress of the League. From its minutes the reader will be able to see whether those who called it an arena for settling Party Congress scores were right or not, and whether or not there was anything in the onslaught of the opposition to provoke the Central Committee to altogether exceptional measures (as the Central Committee itself put it when alteration of the composition of the editorial board held out the hope of peace in the Party). The resolutions of this Congress reveal the true nature of the differences of "principle" over the question of autocratic bureaucracy.

After the League Congress a split loomed so threateningly that Plekhanov decided to co-opt the ex-editors. I foresaw that the opposition would not rest satisfied with this, and I did not think it permissible to revise a decision of the Party Congress to please a *circle*. But still less did I think it permissible to stand in the way of possible peace in the Party, and I therefore resigned from the editorial board, after the 51st issue of *Iskra*, stating at the same time that I did not refuse to continue as a contributor, and that I did not even insist, if peace and good will were established in the Party, on having my resignation made public. The opposition demanded (not transformation of the non-existent system of bureaucracy, formalism, autocracy, automatism, etc., but) reinstatement of the old editorial board, the co-optation of opposition representatives to the Central Committee, two seats on the Council, and recognition of the League Congress as lawful. The Central Committee made an offer of peace by consenting to co-opt two of them, to turn over one seat on the Council, to have the reorganisation of the League carried out gradually. These terms too the opposition rejected. The editors were co-opted, but peace remained an open question. That was the state of affairs when No. 53 of *Iskra* appeared.

* Party tittle-tattle.—*Ed.*

That the Party wants peace and positive work is hardly open to question. But articles like "Our Congress" are an obstacle to peace, an obstacle because they bring up hints and fragments of issues which are not and cannot be comprehensible unless the story of the divergence is told in full; an obstacle because they shift the blame from a foreign circle to the centre in charge of our practical work, which is engaged in the difficult and arduous task of actually uniting the Party, and which in any case has been having to wrestle with too many hindrances to the application of centralism. The committees in Russia are fighting against the disruptive activities and boycott tactics of the minority, which are obstructing the work all along the line. Resolutions to this effect have already come in from the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tver, Odessa, and Tula committees and from the Northern League.

Enough of this émigré *Literatengezänk*!* Let it now become an example to the practical workers in Russia of "*what should not be done*"! Let the editors of the Party's Central Organ call for a stop to all boycotts, no matter on whose part, and for concerted effort under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party!

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But what about the difference in shades of opinion among the *Iskra*-ists? the reader may ask. Our answer will be: in the first place, the difference is that in the opinion of the majority one can and should advocate one's views in the Party apart from any alteration in the personal composition of the central bodies. Every circle, even of *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, is entitled, on joining the Party, to demand the opportunity to express and advocate its views; but no circle, not even of generals, is entitled to demand representation on the Party's central bodies. In the second place, the difference is that in the opinion of the majority the blame for any formalism and bureaucracy falls on those who, by refusing to work under the leadership of the central bodies, made it difficult to conduct matters in a non-formalistic way. In the third place, I know of one *and only one* difference of principle

* Writers' squabbling.—*Ed.*

on matters of organisation, namely, that which found expression in the debate on Paragraph 1 of the Party Rules. We shall endeavour to return to this question when the minutes of the Congress appear. We shall then show that the fact that Martov's formulation was carried with the help of non-*Iskra*-ist and quasi-*Iskra*-ist elements was no accident, but was due to its being a step towards opportunism, and that this step is even more apparent in —n's letter and in *Once More in the Minority*.* The minutes will show that the author of "Our Congress" goes against the facts when he claims that "the controversy during the discussion of the Party Rules centred almost exclusively round the organisation of the central bodies of the Party". Quite the contrary. The only controversy that really involved principles and divided the two "sides" (i.e., the majority and minority of the *Iskra*-ists) at all definitely was over Paragraph 1 of the Party Rules. As for the controversies over the composition of the Council, co-optation to the central bodies, and so on, they were just controversies between individual delegates, between Martov and myself, etc.; they concerned what were relatively very minor details and did not give rise to any definite grouping of the *Iskra*-ists, who by their votes corrected now one, now another of us when he went too far. To make out that these controversies were the source of our disagreement on how centralism should be applied, what should be its limits, character, etc., is simply to whitewash the stand taken by the minority and the methods of the fight which they carried on to change the personal composition of the central bodies, and which alone caused us to diverge in the full sense of the term.

Written in the early part of December 1903

Published in leaflet form in December 1903
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the leaflet text

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* We shall then also ask to have explained what the author of "Our Congress" means by talking about an undeserved disregard for the non-*Iskra*-ists, and about the strict points of the Rules not corresponding to the actual relation of forces in the Party. What do these assertions refer to?

LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LEAGUE ABROAD, THE PARTY AID GROUPS, AND TO ALL PARTY MEMBERS ABROAD

Comrades,

The final unification of the Party now makes it essential and urgent to develop on a wide scale the activities conducted by the Social-Democrats abroad and firmly unite the efforts of all working in this field.

Under the Party Rules (Paragraph 13), all Party work abroad is divided into two major spheres, organised on different lines. On the one hand, propaganda and agitation activities abroad are under the direct charge of the League Abroad and are concentrated in its hands. The Central Committee will take all measures to facilitate the complete centralisation of this work in the hands of the League and to assure it autonomy in the exercise of this function. On the other hand, assistance by the League to the movement in Russia is rendered only through persons and groups specially appointed for the purpose by the Central Committee.

While calling upon all members of the League, all aid groups and all Party members abroad to give the League the utmost support in its work of propaganda and agitation, the Central Committee intends now to focus its efforts on the organisation of these intermediate groups through which assistance to the movement in Russia should be rendered.

The Central Committee considers its tasks in this field to be as follows.

Assistance to the Russian movement from abroad will chiefly take the form of 1) dispatching revolutionary workers to Russia; 2) dispatching to Russia funds collected abroad; 3) gathering abroad such Russian contacts, items of news, and information as need to be communicated speedily to Russia with a view to aiding the comrades active there, preventing discovery and arrest, etc.; 4) dispatching literature to Russia, etc.

While not claiming that this is an exhaustive list of all forms of direct assistance to the Russian movement from abroad, we think, however, that it is sufficient for the time being to outline the chief forms and adapt the organisation we are creating to these. Experience will show how far this organisation will need to be modified in the future.

To begin with the matter of dispatching people for work in Russia. It would, of course, be desirable for most comrades going there to contact directly the Central Committee's chief agency abroad—in Geneva—and secure from it addresses, passwords, funds and the necessary instructions. But many of the people going will naturally not be able to come to Geneva, and the Central Committee therefore intends to appoint its agents in all foreign centres of any importance: London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Vienna, and others. Every person intending to leave for work in Russia is invited to apply to the local agent of the Central Committee, who will take all measures to enable him to reach his destination with maximum speed and safety and to co-ordinate his first steps with the Central Committee's general plan of allocation of forces and funds, etc. The Central Committee hopes that the League Abroad will render these Central Committee agents every assistance—for example, by acquainting as many as possible of our people abroad with the functions of these agents and the conditions for contacting them, by helping to arrange for maximum secrecy of these contacts, etc.

Since the dispatch of people to Russia from large foreign centres is a very big job, and since one person may not always be able to acquaint himself adequately with those being dispatched, the Central Committee will, where required, appoint not one agent, but a group of agents, in accordance with Paragraph 13 of the Party Rules.

Further, as regards the dispatch of funds, the most desirable arrangement is for the collection of funds anywhere abroad to be completely concentrated in the hands of the League and for the Administration of the League to pass them over to the Central Committee. Only in urgent cases may we be obliged, as experience suggests, to have certain sums handed over directly by local sections of the League to local agents of the Central Committee, as when pressure of circumstances requires immediate aid in effecting an escape, in dispatching a person or literature, etc. The Central Committee hopes that the Administration of the League will give appropriate instructions to the sections and will devise the most suitable forms of accounting for sums collected and expended.

Next, it is common knowledge, of course, that persons arriving abroad from Russia very often communicate information which would be of the utmost importance to those working in Russia, as, for example, about the extent of arrests, the need to warn comrades in places remote from the scene of an arrest, the need to utilise contacts in Russia which the comrade escaping or otherwise leaving had no time or opportunity to utilise, etc. Of course, in proportion as all the Party work comes under the direction of the Central Committee, it will become increasingly possible to gather all such contacts and information in Russia itself, which is the only normal and desirable thing. But there is no doubt that for a long time yet there will be cases when comrades escaping from or legally leaving Russia will not manage, for one reason or another, to pass on their contacts in Russia, so that this will have to be done after they arrive abroad

Lastly, the Central Committee will, of course, endeavour to concentrate the transport of literature as completely as possible in the hands of a special transport group, some of whose members will be abroad all the time. Special Central Committee agents will therefore be appointed to manage the Party literature depots in various foreign centres, to maintain communication with the frontiers, etc. But however efficiently the business of transport is organised, there will always, of course, be gaps which will have to be filled by seizing such chances as may present themselves, by

(perhaps) dispatching suitcases, utilising opportunities which may be offered by commercial or shipping arrangements etc. All communications and items of information bearing on such matters should likewise be addressed to the Central Committee agents, with whom all such matters will be concentrated and who will act in accordance with the Central Committees general plan and instructions

In informing the League Administration of its plan of work, the Central Committee expresses its confidence that the League for its part will render every assistance to the Central Committee agents abroad, and in particular will take steps to enable these agents to acquaint themselves widely with the aid groups, youth circles, etc., etc.

Written in the early part of December 1903

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Published according to the manuscript

NOTE ON THE POSITION OF THE NEW *ISKRA*

What angers me most in the position taken up by the "Martovite" *Iskra* is its *intrinsic dishonesty and falsehood*, the attempt to evade the essence of the matter, the attempt to falsify Party opinion and judgement, to *misrepresent* concepts and facts. And I think that the obtuseness and indifference shown by some comrades, their insensitiveness to this falsehood, can only be due to their ignorance of the facts. Ignorance must be combated by explanation, and I shall certainly keep to my intention of explaining the whole matter in the greatest detail (if necessary, with *all* the documents) in a special pamphlet, which I shall undertake as soon as the minutes of the Party and League Congresses come out, that is to say, very soon.[63]

The chief *distortion* by which the Martovites try to *deceive* the Party (in their hysterical state very possibly, and even probably, primarily deceiving themselves) is, firstly, *misrepresentation* of the true sources and causes of the divergence among the *Iskra*-ists, and, secondly, *misrepresentation* of the concepts of circle spirit and disruption, of sectarianism and party spirit.

The first misrepresentation is that they represent as a difference of "principle" the *recriminations*—for that is what they actually were—exchanged by the two sides after the Congress, during the struggle between the central bodies and the opposition. These recriminations consisted in the opposition calling the majority autocrats, formalists, bureaucrats, etc., while the majority called the opposition *hysterical place-seekers*, a party of rejected Ministers or hysterical rowdies (*vide* the Congress of the League). And now *o n e* side of these mutual "compliments" is being held

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

up in the Central Organ as a difference of *principle*! Isn't that despicable?

In reality the cause of the divergence was the *Martovites' swing-over towards the Marsh*. That swing-over was clearly to be seen at the Congress in the matter of Paragraph 1 of the Rules and in the grouping in the elections to the central bodies. *This* difference, which in a measure certainly was one of *principle*, is evaded and hushed up.

The second misrepresentation is that, when it is they who have *for three months* been *disrupting* the whole Party and all the work in the interests of a *circle*, in order to worm themselves into the central bodies (for no one ever restricted genuine controversy or the free expression of opinion; on the contrary, the Martovites were invited and urged to write), the Martovites now, after getting into the editorial board by the back door, bring forward the ludicrous accusation that the majority is disruptively formalistic, bureaucratic, etc., *saying nothing* about their own boycott, their place-seeking, etc. Isn't that despicable? Either—or; either consign the whole "squabble" to *oblivion*, and in that case don't talk about it *at all*, do not countenance in the Central Organ any *recrudescence of the squabble*—for this outcry about bureaucracy is precisely a *recrudescence* of wretched place-seeking; or raise the question of the divergence, and in that case *disclose* **everything**.

Written December in 1903

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Published according to the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *A LETTER TO A COMRADE ON OUR ORGANISATIONAL TASKS*

A Letter to a Comrade,* here reprinted, was written over a year ago—in September 1902, if my memory does not deceive me. At first it passed from hand to hand in manuscript copies and circulated in Russia as a statement of *Iskra*'s views on organisation. Then, last June, the Siberian League printed and distributed it in quite a large number of copies. It is thus already fully a matter of public knowledge and there are no longer any grounds for withholding its publication. The reason I had for not publishing it before—its very unfinished literary form, it being only a "rough draft" in the fullest sense of the term—now lapses, for it is in this rough state that many practical workers in Russia have read it. Furthermore, an even weightier reason for reprinting it in its rough form (I have made only the most essential stylistic corrections) is that it has now acquired the significance of a "document".** As we know, the new editorial board of *Iskra* already announced in No. 53 the existence of differences over questions of *organisation*. Unfortunately, the editors are in no hurry to specify just what these differences are, confining themselves for the most part to hinting at things unknown.

Something must be done to help the new editorial board in its difficult task. Let the *old* organisational views of *Iskra* be made known in all their details, down even to

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* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 229-50.—*Ed.*

** My opponents having repeatedly expressed the wish to avail themselves of this letter as a document, I would consider it positively—how shall I put it mildly?—awkward to introduce any changes when reprinting it.

rough drafts; perhaps the new editorial board will then finally reveal its *new* organisational views to the Party under its "ideological direction". Perhaps it will then finally confide to us the *precise formulation* of the fundamental changes it would like to have made in our Party's Rules of Organisation. For, indeed, who does not understand that it is these Rules of Organisation that embody the organisational plans we have always had?

If the reader compares *What Is To Be Done?** and the *Iskra* articles on organisational matters with the *Letter to a Comrade*, and the latter with the Rules adopted at the Second Congress, he will be able to form a clear idea of how consistently we, the majority of the *Iskra*-ists and the majority at the Party Congress, have pursued our organisational "line". As to the new editorial board of *Iskra*, we shall be waiting, and with the greatest impatience, for a statement of its new organisational views; we shall be waiting for it to indicate just what it has been disillusioned in, and since when, and why it has begun to "burn the idols it worshipped".

N. Lenin

January 1904

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N. Lenin, *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*, Geneva, 1904

Published according to the pamphlet text

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-527.—*Ed.*

POSTSCRIPT TO THE PAMPHLET *A LETTER TO A COMRADE ON OUR ORGANISATIONAL TASKS*

The editors of *Iskra* state in its 55th issue that the Central Committee and the opposition "agreed to consign to oblivion" the facts mentioned in my "Letter to the Editors of *Iskra*" ("Why I Resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board").* This statement of the editors is an evasion which (to use Comrade Axelrod's admirable style) really is formalistic, official and bureaucratic. In reality there was *no* such agreement, as the Central Committee's foreign representative has plainly stated in a leaflet published immediately following the appearance of the 55th issue of *Iskra*. And there *could not have been* any such agreement, as should be clear to anyone who reads my letter attentively; for the opposition *rejected* the "peace and good will" offered by the Central Committee, one condition of which would *certainly* have been to consign to oblivion everything that deserved it. When the editors rejected the peace offer and *declared war on the famous bureaucracy in No. 53*, can they have been so naïve as to hope that the other side would keep quiet about the *real* origin of these fables about bureaucracy?

The editors were very much displeased when I described the real origin of these fables as *squabbling* (*Literatengezänk*—writers' squabbling). And no wonder! But, after all, you cannot dispose of this truly unpleasant fact by mouthing sorry phrases about it.

We will take the liberty of asking our worthy editors two questions.

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* See pp. 118-24 of this volume.—*Ed.*

First question. Why is *one person* merely *amused* by the most violent charges of being an autocrat, of instituting a Robespierre regime, of staging a coup, and so on and so forth, while *others* are mortally *offended* by a calm statement reciting the facts and telling of a demand for generals' posts that actually was put forward—so offended as to indulge in absolutely "rubbishy" talk about "personalities", "moral aspersions", and even "low" (where did they get that from??) "motives"? Why this difference, my good friends? Not because the "post" of general is "lower" than that of autocrat, surely?

Second question. Why don't the editors explain to the reader *why* (in that remote past when they belonged to the opposition and really were "in the minority") they expressed the desire to have certain facts *consigned to oblivion*? Do not the editors think that the very idea of desiring to "consign to oblivion" differences of *principle* is absurd and could not have occurred to any right-minded person?

So you see how clumsy you are, my dear "political opponents"! You wanted to annihilate me with the charge that it was I who was reducing a dispute over principles to the level of a squabble; instead, you have only *confirmed* my contention as to the real origin of some of your "differences of opinion".

Further, while admitting, out of clumsiness, that there were squabbles, the editors do not trouble to explain to the reader where, in their opinion, the difference of principle ends and the squabbling begins. They pass over the fact that in my letter I endeavour to draw a *perfectly clear* line between the two. I show there that the difference of principle (which was by no means so profound as to cause a real *divergence*) arose over Paragraph 1 of the Rules and was widened by the *Iskra*-ist minority joining forces with the non-*Iskra*-ist elements towards the end of the Congress. I further show that the talk about bureaucracy, formalism and the rest is chiefly just an *echo* of squabbles that occurred *after the Congress*.

The editors probably do not agree with *this* demarcation between what relates to "principle" and what should be "consigned to oblivion". Then why have they not troubled to give *their own* opinion as to what a "correct" demarcation

between them would be? Is it not because they have not yet drawn (and cannot draw) any line between the two things in their own minds?

From the article by our esteemed Comrade Axelrod in this same 55th issue of *Iskra* the reader may judge what this ... inability to discriminate leads to and what our Central Party Organ is turning into. Comrade Axelrod does not say *a single word* about the substance of our controversy over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, but confines himself to hints about "peripheral societies" that mean absolutely nothing to anyone who was not at the Congress. Comrade Axelrod has probably forgotten how long and closely we argued over Paragraph 1!—but, on the other hand, he has evolved a "theory" to the effect that "the majority of the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress were convinced that their main task was ... to fight the internal enemy". "In the face of this mission", our esteemed Comrade Axelrod is firmly convinced, "the immediate positive task became overshadowed" in the eyes of the majority. "The prospects of positive work were relegated to the dim remoteness of an indefinite future"; the Party was faced with the more urgent "military task of pacifying the internal enemy". And Comrade Axelrod cannot find words severe enough to brand this "bureaucratic* [or mechanical] centralism", these "Jacobin" (!!?) plans, these "disrupters" who "repress and persecute" people as "mutineers".

In order to demonstrate the true worth of this theory—or, rather, of these accusations against the Congress majority of a disruptive tendency to repress mutiny (*imaginary* mutiny, it is to be supposed) and of ignoring positive work, I have only to remind the forgetful Comrade Axelrod of one (to begin with) little fact. On October 6, 1903, after repeatedly pleading with the members of the minority on account of the stupidity and disruptiveness of their boycott, Plekhanov and I *officially* invited the "mutinous" writers (Comrade

* By the way, I should like the editors to note that my pamphlet is appearing with the "established imprint". As a convinced centralist, I obey the "principles" laid down by our Central Organ which in its 55th issue has instituted a section where Party publications are reviewed from the standpoint of their "imprints" (as a contribution to the fight against formalism).

Axelrod among them) to get down to positive work; we officially told them that it was unreasonable to withdraw from this work, whether because of personal irritation or of differences of opinion (for an exposition of which we were *throwing open* the columns of our publications).*

Comrade Axelrod has forgotten this. He has forgotten that his reply then was a flat refusal, without any reasons stated. He has forgotten that in his view at that time, in those distant days, "positive work was relegated to the dim remoteness of an indefinite future", which future became a much-desired present only on November 26, 1903.[64]

Comrade Axelrod has not only "forgotten" this, but generally would like, would he not, to have such "personalities" "consigned to oblivion".

To point out to the minority that *for months on end* they have been disrupting the Party, neglecting positive work, and taking up *an immense amount of the energies* of the Central Committee by their squabbling is to indulge in "personalities", cast moral aspersions, and reduce a struggle between trends to the level of a squabble. There is no place in the columns of the Central Organ for that.

But to accuse the Party Congress majority of having dared to waste time by pleading with the "mutineers", of having disrupted the Party by their fight against (*imaginary*) disrupters—that is a difference of principle, for which the columns of *Iskra* should be "reserved". Isn't that your view, most esteemed Comrade Axelrod?

It is possible that even today, if Comrade Axelrod looks around him, he will find plenty of examples of the minority's practical workers, too, relegating "positive work" to the dim remoteness of an also desirable but still indefinite future.

No, it would have been wiser for you not to say anything about the attitude of the majority and the minority to positive work! It would have been wiser not to bring up a subject about which, for instance, a factory worker in the town of——writes to me as follows:

Dear Comrade,

"We have been informed lately, that is, since the Second Party Congress, that the Central Committee was not elected by the Congress

* See pp. 352-53 of this volume.—*Ed.*

unanimously, that the Congress split in two over the relations between the Central Organ and the Central Committee, and that a so-called majority and minority arose. This came down on our heads as a terrible crushing blow, because this whole question of the relations between the Central Organ and the Central Committee was something absolutely new and unexpected for us: before the Congress it had never been raised, not only at any circles or meetings, but, as far as I can remember, in the literature either. This fact of nothing being said about it before the Congress is what I cannot understand. If we are to assume that the issue did not exist at all, then it has to be admitted that the comrades who worked so hard to unite the Party did not have a clear idea as to its organisation, that is, its structure. But that is quite out of the question, because the issue which has now split the Party shows clearly that opinions as to the Party structure did exist, and were not unanimous. But if that was so, why was the fact concealed? That is the first thing I want to say. The second is that when it comes to the question itself, I ask myself: what structure of the Party will ensure its trend being orthodox? And at once it strikes me that another important thing, besides the Party's structure, is the personnel of its leadership; that is, if the leaders are orthodox, then the Party trend will be orthodox, but if they are opportunists, then the Party will be opportunist too. Now, with that in mind, and knowing the personnel of the Party leadership, I am definitely in favour of the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee in the ideological direction of the Party. What makes me all the more positive about it is the conditions in Russia: however orthodox the Central Committee may be, since it functions in Russia it cannot be secure against arrests, and hence against losing its orthodoxy regardless of its own wishes, because successors don't always resemble the people they succeed. Any comrade who has worked on the committees for any time at all will know of cases when even the best committee is replaced, through one of the many possible chance circumstances, by a bad committee, and vice versa. But with the Central Organ it's quite another matter: it functions under different conditions (since it will be located abroad), which ensure it a longer existence, and hence an opportunity of preparing worthy successors. But I don't know, comrade, if this question can be decided once and for all, that is, by having the Central Organ always predominate over the Central Committee, or the Central Committee over the Central Organ. I don't think it is possible. Take a case like this: suppose the personnel of the Central Organ changes and from being orthodox becomes opportunist, as in the case of the *Vorwärts*[65] in Germany; could it be allowed to predominate in the ideological leadership? What would we who have been schooled in the orthodox spirit do if that happened, would we have to agree with it? No, it would be our duty to take away its right to predominate and give that right to a different body; and if that were not done for any reason, whether a sense of Party discipline or anything else, we would all deserve to be called traitors to the Social-Democratic workers' movement. That's how I see it, and I can't agree at all to a decision being made once and for all as some comrades do.

"Now, what I cannot understand at all is the fight that's going on now between the majority and the minority, and to a great many of us it seems wrong. Look, comrade, is it a natural state of affairs when all energies are spent on travelling around the committees for the one purpose of talking about the majority and minority? Really I don't know. Is this issue really so important that all energies should be devoted to it and because of it people should look on each other practically as enemies? For that's what it comes down to: if a committee is let's say, made up of followers of one camp, then nobody from the other camp will ever get into it, no matter how fit he may be for the work; in fact, he won't get in even if he is essential to the work and it suffers badly without him. I don't mean to say, of course, that the struggle over this issue should be given up altogether, no, only I think it should be of a different kind and should not lead us to forget our principal duty, which is to propagate Social-Democratic ideas among the masses for if we forget that we shall rob our Party of its strength. I don't know if it is fair or not, but when I see people trampling the interests of the work in the mud and completely forgetting them, I call them all political intriguers. It really hurts and fills you with alarm for the work when you see the people at the head of it spending their time on something else. When you see that, you ask yourself is our Party doomed to perpetual splits over such trifles, are we incapable of waging the internal and the external struggle at the same time? What's the use of having congresses if their decisions are ignored and everybody does just what he pleases, saying that the Congress decision is wrong, that the Central Committee is ineffectual, and so on. And this is being done by people who before the Congress were always clamouring for centralisation, Party discipline and so on, but who now want to show it seems, that discipline is only meant for ordinary mortals, and not for them at the top. They seem to forget that their example has a terrible demoralising effect on inexperienced comrades; already we hear the workers complaining again that the intellectuals are forgetting them because of their own dissensions; already the more impulsive are dropping their hands in despair, not knowing what to do. So far all this centralisation has turned out to be nothing but words. All one can hope is that the future will bring a change for the better."[66]

Written in January 1904

Published in the pamphlet:
N. Lenin, *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*, Geneva, 1904

Published according to the pamphlet text

TO THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP[67]

A circle or a party? That is the question our Central Organ has posed for discussion.

We consider discussion of this question to be exceedingly timely. We invite the editorial board of our Central Organ to begin by taking a look at itself. What is this editorial board? Is it a circle of persons who have been together for so-and-so many years and who have now forced their way on to the editorial board by means of a boycott, disruptive activities and the threat of a split, or is it a body of officials of our Party?

Do not try to evade the point by saying that you were co-opted legally, in accordance with the Rules. We do not question the legality of it; but we invite you not to confine yourselves to the formal aspect, but to answer the substance of our question. We want, not merely a juridical, but a political answer. And we want that answer from *you*, gentlemen, "editors" who were never elected by the Congress, never appointed by the Party, and not from Comrade Plekhanov, who, perhaps, had no alternative but to co-opt you in order to avoid a split.

Are you a circle or a body of Party officials?

If you are a circle, then why this hypocrisy and sham, these phrases about a party? Have you not, in reality, disrupted that Party, mocking for weeks and months at its institutions and its Rules? Have you not, in reality, repudiated the decisions of the Second Congress of that Party, have you not brought matters to the point of a split, have you not refused to submit to the Central Committee and the Council? Have you not placed yourselves outside the Party

by saying that for you Party congresses are not divine, i.e., not binding? You trample upon the institutions and laws of the Party and at the same time are pleased to use the imprint "Central Party Organ"!

But if you are Party officials, would you mind explaining to the Party why, and in the name of what, persons who were not appointed by the Congress insisted on ensconcing themselves in a central Party institution? Perhaps in the name of the "continuity" of the old family circle of editors? To think that people who at the League Congress passed resolutions about this philistine "continuity" now want to bamboozle us with talk of the Party! Why, what right have you to talk of a party?

You describe as formalists those who take their stand on the formal decisions of the Second Congress—because you must blur and gloss over the fact that you have *betrayed the trust* of your comrades, who, every one of them, pledged themselves over and over again to obey the decisions of the Congress. You do not submit to formal decisions when they are against you, but at the same time you unblushingly invoke the formal rights of the League when those rights are to your advantage, you invoke the formal decisions of the Party Council now that you have managed, against the Party's will, to insinuate yourselves into this, the supreme Party institution.

You describe as bureaucrats those who hold Party posts by the will of the Party Congress, not the caprice of an émigré circle of writers. You have to do this to cover up the disagreeable fact that it is indeed a spirit of bureaucracy, a spirit of place-hunting that obsesses those who just could not bring themselves to work in the Party except as members of its central institutions. Yes, your behaviour has indeed clearly shown us that our Party suffers from a spirit of bureaucracy that puts office above work and shuns neither boycott nor disruption in the effort to get into office.

You describe as grossly mechanical decisions passed by a majority vote at the Party Congress, but you do not consider grossly mechanical and scandalous the methods of struggle in the colonies abroad and at the League Congress which gained you your shameful victory over our Party editorial board! You do not see anything hypocritical in

protestations of recognising the Party being made by people who have fought for and obtained control of the Central Party Organ although they were a *minority* at the Party Congress!

And you call these hypocritical efforts to whitewash your indecent, anti-Party behaviour, this preaching of anarchy, this mockery of the Party Congress, this opportunist justifying of circle philistinism—you call this your new organisational standpoint!

Comrades! Those who are serious in counting themselves members of the Party must raise an emphatic voice of protest and put a stop to this shameful state of affairs! Those who are serious about *Iskra*'s three years of work and the Party Congress which it prepared, and which expressed the will of those Russian Social-Democrats who are really convinced on the basis of principle and are really working, will never allow an émigré circle to trample underfoot all that this Party Congress achieved.

Either—or.

Either we have no party and are completely in the power of an émigré writers' editorial circle that our Congress rejected—and in that case, away with this hypocritical talk of a party, away with the false imprints of "Party" publications, organs and institutions! We are not the Socialist-Revolutionaries, we have no need of painted scenery. The party of the proletariat demands the truth. The party of the proletariat demands the ruthlessly outspoken exposure of the obsolete circle spirit. We must have the courage to admit that there is no party and set to work from the beginning, from the very beginning, to create and build up a real party. We shall not be daunted by the temporary victory of the circle spirit, we believe and know that the class-conscious Russian proletariat will be able to build itself a party in fact, and not just in name, a party in the sense of genuine party institutions, not in the sense of false imprints.

Or we do have a party—and in that case, away with all circle interests, away with gatherings of émigré rowdies! In that case, let our *Party* editorial board be vacated at once by those not appointed to it by the Party Congress. In that case, let the editorial board of the Central Organ be

restored as elected by the Congress. In that case, let *our* Party organ advocate the views of the Party majority, let *our* Party organ defend Party organisation and the Party institutions instead of trampling them in the mud.

Down with the circle spirit, and, first of all, down with it on our Party editorial board!

Down with disrupters!

Long live the party of the proletariat, a party able to observe in practice the decisions of the Party Congress and to respect Party discipline and organisation!

Down with hypocritical talk and false imprints!

Written in the latter half of January 1904

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Published according to the manuscript

SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

JANUARY 15-17 (28-30), 1904[68]

Published in the pamphlet
The Fight for a Congress,
by N. Shakhov, Geneva, 1904

Speeches and draft resolutions
moved on January 17 (30), 1904;
first published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Draft resolutions
published according
to the manuscript

Speeches and the draft
resolution on convening
the Third Party Congress
published according to
the text of the Council
Minutes

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON MEASURES TO RESTORE PEACE IN THE PARTY, MOVED ON JANUARY 15 (28)

In view of the character and forms of manifestation of the divergence among the Party membership in connection with the Second Regular Congress, the Party Council deems it urgently necessary to call vigorously on all Party members to work together in harmony under the direction of both central institutions of the Party: the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

The historical juncture through which Russia is now passing—the tremendous intensification of revolutionary ferment within the country and the international complications, which may lead to war—imposes particularly serious duties on the party of the class-conscious proletarians, who are fighting in the front ranks for the emancipation of the entire people from the yoke of the autocracy. The need to work together in harmony, under the direction of both the central bodies of the Party, at strengthening our organisation and developing the class-consciousness and solidarity of the widest possible masses of the working class has never been so urgent as it is now.

Individual differences over all manner of questions have always arisen and inevitably will arise in a party which rests on a vast popular movement and sets out to be the conscious spokesman of that movement, emphatically rejecting all circle spirit and narrow sectarian views. But if our Party members are to be worthy representatives of the class-conscious militant proletariat, worthy participants in the world working-class movement, they must do their utmost to en-

sure that no individual differences over the interpretation and methods of realising the principles of our Party programme shall interfere, or be capable of interfering, with harmonious joint work under the direction of our central institutions. The deeper and broader our understanding of our programme and of the tasks of the international proletariat, the more we value positive work in developing propaganda, agitation, and organisation, and the farther removed we are from sectarianism, the petty circle spirit, and considerations of place and position, the more must we strive to have differences among Party members discussed calmly and on their merits and not to let these differences interfere with our work, disrupt our activities, impede the proper functioning of our central institutions.

The Party Council, as the supreme institution of the Party, vigorously condemns all disruptive moves, no matter on whose part, all refusals to work, all withdrawals of financial support for the central Party treasury, all boycotts, which are only calculated to lower a purely ideological struggle of opinions, views and shades to the level of methods of gross mechanical pressure, the level of an unseemly scuffle. The Party is worn out by the dissensions, which have already lasted nearly six months, and insistently demands peace. No differences among Party members, no dissatisfaction with the personal composition of one or other central body can justify boycotts or similar methods of struggle, which denote a lack of principles and ideals and show that the interests of the Party are being sacrificed to the interests of a circle, and the interests of the working-class movement to narrow considerations of place and position. Cases occur, of course, in our Party, as they always will in every big party, when some of the members are dissatisfied with some nuance in the activities of one or other of the central bodies, with some features of its line, or with its personal composition, etc. Such members can, and should, state the causes and nature of their dissatisfaction in a comradely exchange of opinions, or by a controversy in the columns of the Party press; but it would be absolutely impermissible and unworthy of revolutionaries to express their dissatisfaction by resorting to boycotts or refusing to support in every way they can all the positive work co-ordinated and

directed by both the central Party bodies. To support both central bodies and work together under their direct guidance is our common and plain duty as Party members.

Such unprincipled, grossly mechanical methods of struggle as have been mentioned above are deserving of unqualified condemnation, for they could completely wreck the whole Party, whose unity depends solely and entirely on the free will of the revolutionaries. And the Party Council reminds all Party members that that free will was quite definitely expressed in our common decision—to which no protest was raised—to regard all the decisions of the Second Congress and all its elections as binding on all Party members. Already the Organising Committee in its time, which earned a general vote of thanks for its work in arranging the Congress, adopted in Point 18 of the Regulations for the Second Congress the following decision, which was approved by all the Party committees:

"All decisions of the Congress and all the elections it carries out are decisions of the Party and binding on all Party organisations. They cannot be challenged by any one on any pretext whatever and can be rescinded or amended only by the next Party Congress."

This decision, accepted by the entire Party before the Congress and reaffirmed several times at the Congress itself, was equivalent to a word of honour freely pledged by all Social-Democrats to each other. Let them not forget this word of honour! Let them at once abandon all petty mutual grievances! Let them once and for all confine the struggle of ideas within such bounds that it does not lead to breaches of the Rules or hamper practical activities and positive work!

2

DISSENTING OPINION RECORDED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE JANUARY 17 (30)

The representatives of the Central Committee in the Party Council consider it their duty to record a dissenting opinion on Comrade Plekhanov's resolution.

The representatives of the Central Committee are profoundly convinced that, far from putting an end to the Party dissensions, which actually mean a complete split in the Party organisation, this resolution will, on the contrary, inflame and aggravate them still further, make them chronic, and further disrupt the Party's positive work.

This resolution is, essentially, nothing but an expression of the wish of the Party Congress minority to alter the personal composition of the Central Committee, ignoring the contrary wish of the Party Congress majority.

This resolution, as we are firmly convinced, is essentially a continuation within the Council of the policy pursued by the opposition ever since the Party Congress; and that policy has been one of boycott, disruption and anarchy, with the aim of altering the composition of the Party's central bodies by methods which do not conform in any degree to the standards of normal Party life, and which have now been condemned, too, by revolutionary public opinion as expressed in resolutions by the majority of the committees.

This resolution expresses the wish that the Central Committee should again enter into negotiations with the opposition. Negotiations have already been going on for over five months, causing complete demoralisation in the Party's ranks. The Central Committee has already stated that it



First page of the manuscript of the "Dissenting Opinion Recorded by the Representatives of the Central Committee in the Party Council", January 17 (30), 1904

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First page of the manuscript of the "Dissenting Opinion Recorded by the Representatives of the Central Committee in the Party Council", January 17 (30), 1904

Reduced

said its last word when it consented, as far back as November 25, 1903, to the co-optation of two in token of comradely confidence.

The negotiations have already entailed a tremendous expenditure of funds for travelling and an even more serious expenditure of the time and energy of revolutionaries, who have been diverted from their work.

The representatives of the Central Committee do not feel justified in again renewing these interminable negotiations, which produce fresh dissatisfaction on both sides and fresh contention over posts, hampering positive work in the most appalling way.

We most earnestly draw attention to the fact that such negotiations involve a complete interruption of the normal course of Party life.

We declare that the Central Committee lays the entire responsibility for these interruptions at the door of the minority.

We declare that we positively and absolutely fail to see any other honest and proper solution to the present dissensions in the Party, any other way of terminating this unpardonable struggle over the composition of the central bodies, than by the immediate convening of a Party Congress.

At the same time we feel that, now that Comrade Plekhanov's resolution has been adopted, our own earlier resolution has in effect been nullified and has become quite pointless, for which reason we withdraw it.

Council members
N. Lenin
F. Vasilyev

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONVENING THE THIRD PARTY CONGRESS JANUARY 17 (30)

Being convinced that the central Party institutions are powerless to terminate the absolutely abnormal and disorganising relations which have developed in the Party since the Second Congress and have continued for over five months, the Party Council resolves to convene the Third Party Congress.

4

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS MOVED ON JANUARY 17 (30)

I

The Party Council requests the editorial board of the Central Organ speedily to take all measures in its power to make available to the Central Committee at a very early date the 5,000-6,000 rubles about which the Central Organ and the Central Committee have been in correspondence and which the central Party treasury now urgently requires owing to the emergency created by the latest arrests in Russia.

II

The Party Council considers it improper for the editorial board of the Central Organ to dispatch representatives to the committees without the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee, for such action brings disorganisation into the Party and is a violation of the division of functions between the two central bodies as clearly laid down by the Second Congress.

III

The Party Council considers it improper for the editorial board of the Central Organ to communicate to the committees information on the composition of the Central Committee without the consent of the latter.

5

SPEECHES ON MEASURES TO RESTORE PEACE IN THE PARTY JANUARY 15 (28)

I

I have raised the question of measures to restore peace and normal relations in the Party because the amount of misunderstandings among Party workers has reached threatening proportions. I do not think fruitful Party work is possible unless there is some common basis which Party members who become involved for any reason in mutual misunderstandings could adhere to in their activities. It is nobody's secret that the relations between individual members and sections of the Party have become so abnormal that it would be difficult to speak now of a *united* Social-Democratic workers' party and mean it. I could, of course, if necessary, furnish detailed proof of this (recall, for instance, many of the episodes in the business correspondence between the Central Committee and the Central Organ); but perhaps, since everybody knows it to be so, it would be better not to resort just now to such ticklish illustrations. And so, we must try to adopt more vigorous measures to remove the basic evil. Otherwise we shall have a position where the simplest, most routine Party acts will give rise to highly undesirable exchanges with systematic indulgence in very strong language and in the choicest—how shall I put it mildly?—compliments, shall we say.... It may seem that I am disposed to encroach in some way on "freedom of speech"; but after all, the trouble is that in the sphere of action all is not well either. As members of the Council, whose chief function is to work for unity in the Party, against tendencies towards disunity, we must make

an effort to remove the friction that is hindering the Party's work; and given the desire, this would not be impossible. And so, I ask whether some sort of measures could not be adopted against certain methods of struggle within the Party which reduce the latter to the condition of a disorganised group and turn it into a sheer fiction. Perhaps the Council could, in the interests of the common work, pass a resolution which I have drafted and will read to you in a moment. I consider it important in principle to have a Council decision that would aim at eliminating and condemning impermissible forms of struggle between individuals or groups in the Party who are at variance on any point. I repeat, the position now is much too abnormal and needs to be corrected. (*Axelrod*: "We all agree on that.") I ask the secretaries to enter Comrade Axelrod's remark in the minutes.

I shall now read the draft of the resolution I am submit ing.*

That is the resolution which I am moving on behalf of the Central Committee, over the signatures of both its representatives, and which could serve, not to settle any specific issues or differences between Party members, but to create a common basis for Russian Social-Democrats, who are working in the interests of one common cause.

II

I saw with pleasure from the speeches of both representatives of the Central Organ that they agree in principle that vigorous measures ought to be taken to establish actual unity in the Party. That already creates a certain common basis between us. As regards Comrade Plekhanov's suggestion, I consider it necessary to say the following. Comrade Plekhanov suggests that I should single out from my draft resolution the most essential practical measures for removing the evils noted in Party life; the present resolution, he points out, has the character of an appeal. Yes, my proposal does have the character of an appeal—but then, that is just what it is meant to be. The idea of this "appeal" is that the Council should, in the name of both the central bodies, draw

* See pp. 145-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

a dividing line between what are permissible forms of struggle in the Party and what are not. I know that generally speaking—as such—the struggle is unavoidable; but there are different methods of struggle, after all. Some methods are absolutely abnormal and cannot be tolerated in any at all healthy party. And Comrade Martov was right in saying that besides a struggle of ideas there had also been what he called "organisational complications".

We, gathered here not to engage in strife but to remove abnormal conditions in the Party's life, can and should influence our other comrades by authoritatively indicating the bounds of struggle permissible in the Party. But I know no other ways of influencing people than by appealing to them. Singling out the practical suggestions would be pointless here. As regards the statement of the Central Organ representatives that I merely point to the abnormal state of Party life, but do not go into its causes, I must say that this approach of mine is not accidental but quite deliberate, for I fear that if we touched this very tangled skein even ever so slightly, the result, instead of untangling it, would be to tangle it up still more. You have to remember, after all, that where that skein is concerned we are two equally interested and very subjective parties, so that any attempt to untangle it would certainly not be for us to make, but only for people who had nothing to do with the tangling. If we were to attempt it, we should find ourselves raking up various documents all over again, which, with the Council constituted as it is, would only lead to more ... scuffles.

Let us take as our starting-point the position as it exists, for there is no getting away from realities, and I am quite ready to agree with Comrade Martov that all the differences and conflicts are not to be removed by some pious homily. That is so; but then, who could act as arbiter in these regrettable aspects of our Party life? Not we ourselves at any rate, I am persuaded; no, it would have to be a wide circle of people—devoted practical revolutionaries who have had no part in the scuffles. While carefully steering clear of the causes of our dissensions, I shall, however, venture to illustrate my idea with one example from our recent past. The struggle has now been going on for five months. During this time there have been, I should think, as many as fifty mediators

who tried to put an end to the dissensions in the Party, but I only know of one whose efforts in this respect produced relatively useful, if very modest, results. I am referring to Comrade Travinsky,[69] a person who, let me point out, is up to the ears, so to speak, in positive practical revolutionary work, so that his attention has been occupied almost exclusively by that work and he has had no share in the dissensions. It is only these fortunate circumstances, I would say, that account for his peace-making attempts having had some modicum of success. I think that if people like that were to take a hand in analysing the causes of the unfortunate position in the Party, it would be possible to untangle the skein which now has us perplexed. We, however, should beware of going into the causes of the dissensions, for this could lead, against our own will, to our dealing one another new wounds (to use Comrade Martov's expression) in addition to the many old ones still very far from healed. That is why I am against analysing the causes and favour looking for means that would at least keep the methods of struggle within more or less permissible bounds. There are only two alternatives: if it is possible to do something along these lines, then we must try to do it; but if not, if the contending sides are not to be influenced by authoritative suasion, the only remaining possibility is to apply to those third persons, uninvolved in the hostilities and engaged on their positive practical tasks, of whom I spoke before. I doubt whether we could ourselves convince one another of one or the other side being right. I don't think that is possible.

III

I do not quite understand Comrade Plekhanov's proposal. He says there should be some sort of practical measures; but surely, my draft already envisages such a practical measure. We have only to declare, to declare with authority, that a normal struggle, a struggle of ideas, a struggle carried on within definite bounds, is permissible, but that boycotts, refusal to work under the Central Committee's direction, refusal of financial support for the central Party treasury, and so on, are not permissible. We are told that mere words will not convince anyone. I will not be so bold either as to

assert that this will be enough to establish good will between the two sides in the Party, because the disease that has to be cured has indeed gone very far and a very solid wall, as Comrade Martov puts it, has indeed grown up between the two sides. We may not succeed in breaking down that wall, since we ourselves erected it; but that we who dealt one another the severest wounds may by an authoritative appeal in our capacity of Council members restrain comrades from unworthy forms of struggle is not at all impossible. And as regards demolishing the wall, I think time will then do its work and everything will tend to abate. As to the point that some passages in the appeal may be interpreted by each side in its own way, I think that the same thing could apply to anything that we might say. (*Axelrod*: "That is why it is necessary not just to talk, but to act.") Further, I fail to understand why Comrade Axelrod thinks that what I propose might only prove a fresh source of strife. I repeat, we may not break down the wall between the two sides in the Party, since we have ourselves done a great deal to erect it; but those of our comrades who, being engaged in practical work, have kept aloof from our dissensions could break it down. Comrade Martov, as I saw with pleasure today, agrees in principle with this idea of the useful role in settling our dissensions that might be played by other comrades, who have not been involved in the dissensions. But apart from that it seems to me that the very fact of representatives of the central bodies agreeing that such-and-such methods of struggle were allowable and such-and-such were not—that that in itself could make the initial breach in the wall dividing the two sides, after which the present abnormality of Party life could diminish.

IV

Comrade Plekhanov's proposal arouses in me very mixed feelings. By talking about the causes of the struggle, he comes straight back to the wounds which Comrade Martov has pointed out we have been dealing each other. What I try to do in my draft is draw a line between what is permissible in our struggle and what is not, no matter who makes the attacks. If we started going into who did what and when, it would be the beginning of the end, that is, of the end of our discus-

sion. For us to be our own arbiters is, just psychologically, morally, quite impossible. If we again proceed here to discuss what has produced the strained relations among the Party membership, shall we ourselves be able to rise above the level of petty squabbling? (*Axelrod*: "Yes, we shall!") I do not share Comrade Axelrod's optimism. Comrade Plekhanov in his analysis of the causes of the split in the Party gave his own interpretation of the facts, with which I do not agree. But if we start arguing, we shall have to fetch out the minutes and turn to them for information. For example, Comrade Plekhanov says that over the election of the central bodies the Congress divided into two practically equal parts, that a single delegate who crossed over from the majority to the minority thereby equalised the numbers of the two halves of the Congress, that therefore the Central Committee only represents one part of the Party, and so on. But you cannot argue like that; it just isn't possible, after all, to talk of the Central Committee only having been elected by one part of the Party. Many, perhaps, would now vote on various matters otherwise than they did at the Congress; I might vote differently on many points myself; but that is not to say that the possible changes and new combinations in this respect in any way invalidate the results of the earlier voting. When it is a question of a struggle, there is always a division of the whole into parts. Yes, the Central Committee *now*—but not at the Congress—is the representative of a part; but I know very well that in the opinion of the comrades the Central Organ too is, in the same way, the representative only of a part. From one standpoint only could I acknowledge Comrade Plekhanov's expression correct, namely, from the standpoint of the split that does in fact exist. It is not because the Congress did something wrong that one can speak of the composition of one or other of the central bodies being "abnormal", but solely because, there being such-and-such circumstances, people refuse to work together.... Thus, no sooner do we touch on the causes of the abnormality than we again get involved in unravelling a skein which we, far from being able to untangle, will only tangle the more. That many are dissatisfied with the composition of the Central Committee is true; but it is equally true that a good many

people are dissatisfied with the present composition of the Central Organ. To Comrade Martov's question of whether it is permissible to "break up" existing organisations, I would reply: "Yes, to reconstruct organisations is entirely permissible!" Is it permissible for a competent Party authority to remove a particular person from a particular kind of revolutionary work? My answer is: "Yes, it is!" But if I were to ask why and how a given "encroachment" on the integrity and inviolability of an organisation arose, why so-and-so was not assigned to such-and-such a sphere of Party work, and so forth, I should again be reaching out towards that skein which it is beyond us to untangle. Thus, the matter of whether or not it is permissible to "break up" organisations also brings us back to the disagreements. All of which goes to prove that to argue now about the causes of our dissensions would be a completely useless and even harmful waste of time. Now let me come back to the question of proportional representation. One could speak of that only by starting from recognition of an already existing split. We are here representatives of two contending sides.... (*Plekhanov*: "We have met here as members of the Council, not as contending sides.") Comrade Plekhanov's remark conflicts with his own resolution, which speaks of the dissensions in the Party having split the Party into two halves, one of the halves, according to the resolution, being completely unrepresented on such a central body as the Central Committee. Of course, officially we are not the representatives of two contending sides, but since that representation emerges from the course of our debates, I had a logical right to speak of it. (*Plekhanov*: "The expression you used was that we had met here as the representatives of two contending sides, and that is what caused my remark.") I will not deny that perhaps the expression I used was not quite accurate.... (*Plekhanov*: "It was incorrect.") Perhaps it was even incorrect, I shan't argue the point. I am only saying that Comrade Plekhanov's resolution shifts the argument to the basis of *de facto* recognition of the split. We have split, that is the fact I am noting. If it were not the case, the resolution would be out of order. The Party majority is dissatisfied, too, with the composition of the Central Organ, in which four out of the five editors belong to the minority. The Central Committee could put forward

the same claim for a change in the composition of the Central Organ as is now being made in relation to the Central Committee. Essentially, Comrade Plekhanov's resolution amounts to a statement of the terms of only one side.... (*Plekhanov*: "I do not belong to either majority or minority.") Comrade Plekhanov tells us he does not belong to either majority or minority, but no one else in the Council will say that. Looked at formally, from the standpoint of the Rules, the resolution moved by Comrade Plekhanov is out of order. But, I repeat, actually one can understand it insofar as it proceeds from the fact of the split. But if one side is stating its "terms", the other would be similarly entitled to present "terms". We do not stand above the "two sides", we are ourselves those "two sides". Consequently, if we are going to recognise that actually the Party has split, we must also recognise that there is only one radical way of resolving our disputes and "misunderstandings", namely, to apply to third persons. There are people in the Party, as I said before, who are engaged in positive work and have had no part in the struggle of "majority" and "minority". Those are the people to turn to.

V

I do not agree with either Martov or Plekhanov. They say there can be no question of such a resolution being out of order, and adduce two arguments. 1) Martov's argument is that the Council is the Party's supreme institution. But don't forget that the competence of the Council is limited by special provisions in the Rules—a thing which Comrade Martov himself went to no small pains to secure. 2) The second argument is that by this resolution the Council would only be voicing its opinion and recommendation. The Council can, of course, voice an opinion and recommendation, but without attempting to do more. (*Plekhanov*: "Of course! Of course!") The Council can only suggest co-optation to the Central Committee; but in that case the Central Committee will demand a change in the composition of the Central Organ. I am willing, under certain conditions, to agree to proportional representation. But I ask, is there proportional representation on the Central Organ? The composition of the

Central Organ is one to four, and even that one is a person who belongs to neither majority nor minority. The Central Committee on an earlier occasion made an offer of two to nine;[70] it made it at a time of total dissension, with a split impending. In a sense, all disagreement is a split, and when two halves will not work together, then it is an actual split. Only from the standpoint of a split could we acknowledge Comrade Plekhanov's resolution as making sense. It could be regarded as an *ultima ratio*;* but in that event both sides would be equally entitled to have the composition of the central bodies changed. I am firmly convinced that the Central Committee, for its part, is dissatisfied with the composition of the Central Organ. The moment we touch on the question of the past Congress, there will be a clash and we shall get nowhere. Thus, for example, Plekhanov claims that the Congress did not elect a third person to the editorial board because there was no suitable third person. I maintain that the Congress did not elect a third because it was convinced that Comrade Martov would join the board. The same can be said of the composition of the Council. Many people at the Congress thought that Comrade Martov would sit on the Council in the capacity of member of the editorial board. The majority can say, and will, that if there is to be proportional representation, then the Central Organ should be augmented with another six members, belonging to what is known as the majority. But that sort of argument will not help us towards the desired end, for which reason I believe Comrade Plekhanov's resolution is not as good as mine. My resolution about "the permissible and the impermissible" would have this significance, that we, as representatives of the contending sides, would be calling on the rest of the comrades to keep within the bounds of permissible forms of struggle.

We should not take a purely juridical view, for actually our common recognition of the fact that the relations in the Party are abnormal is equivalent to recognising that we are two contending sides, the Central Organ and the Central Committee. (*Plekhanov*: "This is a meeting of the Council, not of the editorial board.") Yes, I am not forgetting that.

* Last resort.—*Ed.*

From the juridical standpoint we cannot speak of proportional representation on the central bodies. But from the political standpoint, too, it is inadvisable to operate with this idea, for we should have to defer to the wishes of one side without hearing the wishes of the other. There is no third party between us who could settle our dispute. Yet only the opinion of such a third party could have weight, both political and moral. An actual split exists, and we are on the eve of a formal split if the minority persists, without caring what means it uses, in trying to make itself the majority.

6

SPEECHES ON MEASURES TO RESTORE PEACE IN THE PARTY JANUARY 16 (29)

VI

I think it necessary to reply mainly to the detailed objections advanced by Comrade Martov; but so as not to leave Comrade Plekhanov's objections unanswered either, I shall first touch briefly on these. My impression was that he was in principle in favour of proportional representation.... (*Plekhanov*: "No!") Perhaps I misunderstood him, but that was my impression. In our Party organisation the principle of proportional representation is not practised, and the sole criterion of the lawfulness of the composition of any body whose members were elected at a congress is the clearly expressed will of the congress majority. But we are told here that the lawful elections at the Congress have produced a "lawful" state of affairs that is worse than an unlawful one. That is true, but why is it so? Is it because the majority was a slight one, or because the minority has in effect brought about a split? When people talk about the Central Committee having been elected by only twenty-four votes, that is, by a tiny margin, and claim that that is the reason for all the unhappy complications in Party life since, I declare that that is not so. As to Comrade Plekhanov's remark about my "formalistic mentality" preventing me from going to the root of the matter, I must say I am at a loss to know what, properly speaking, this means. Perhaps the "root of the matter" lies in the Congress? In that case we are all formalists, for, casting our minds back to the Congress, we must go by its formal decisions. If,

on the other hand, the "root of the matter" lies outside the Congress, just where does it lie? Yes, the way things have gone, the state of affairs in the Party is worse than unlawful (a very serious thing to say), but the whole question is, why has this happened? Is the Congress to blame, or what occurred after the Congress? Unfortunately, Comrade Plekhanov does not put the matter like that.

I turn now to the remarks of Comrade Martov. He asserts that the minority does not and did not refuse to work together with us. That is not true. For three months—September, October and November—many representatives of the minority gave practical proof of not wanting to work together with us. In such cases the boycotted side only has one course open to it—to make an agreement, a deal with the "offended" opposition that refuses to work and is leading the Party towards a split, for this very fact of refusing to work together is nothing but a split. When people tell you point blank that they will not work with you, thus proving in practice that the "united organisation" is simply a fiction, that, actually, it has already been wrecked, they are certainly advancing a *shattering*, if not a convincing, argument.... I pass on to Comrade Martov's second objection—concerning the resignation of Comrade Ru[71] from the Council. This question involves two separate issues. In the first place, was it in order for Ru to be appointed to the Council from the editorial board when he was not himself a member of the board? I think it was in order. (*Martov*: "Of course it was!") Please enter Martov's interjection in the minutes. Secondly, are Council members subject to recall at the will of the bodies that delegated them? This is an intricate point, which can be interpreted both ways. In any case, the fact is that Plekhanov, who from November 1 onwards remained the sole member of the editorial board, *did not recall* Ru from the Council right up to November 26, when Martov and Co. were co-opted. Ru resigned of his own accord, it was a concession on his part so that no controversy should start over him. (*Plekhanov*: "It seems to me that arguments about Comrade Ru are out of place here. The question is not on our agenda and I don't see why we should waste precious time discussing what for us is an extraneous matter.") I must point out that at our last meeting Comrade Martov asked to have entered in the min-

utes his explanation on this point—an explanation with which I totally disagree—so that if the other side is not allowed to give its opinion on the subject too, the picture given here in the Council will be a one-sided, incorrect one. (*Plekhanov*: "I wish to emphasise that the question is not on the agenda and has no direct bearing on the main subject under discussion.")

Lenin, protesting against this formulation, appeals to the Council to decide as to his right to give his own account, as against Martov's, of a fact meeting here with such divergent interpretations. (*Plekhanov* again indicates that discussion of the question of Ru is out of place.)

Lenin insists on his right to appeal to the Council for permission to speak on a point that has already been brought up in the Council and has aroused argument. (*Martov*: "Since Comrade Lenin has raised the very important question of the right of the bodies represented on the Council to recall their delegates, let me state that I shall table a special motion to have this question settled once and for all. Perhaps this statement will satisfy Lenin and induce him to drop this matter of Ru from the present discussion.")

Comrade Martov has not only not disproved but has confirmed that I am right in my intention to present Comrade Ru's resignation from the Council in its proper light here and now. Please note that my explanations on this point have only been in answer to Comrade Martov's remarks concerning it. (Plekhanov informs Martov and Lenin that the question of Ru is not subject to present discussion, as not being among the problems on which the attention of the Council should at this session be centred.) I protest against Comrade Plekhanov's statement that it is out of place to discuss the question of Comrade Ru, who held that Council members were not recallable, so that his resignation from the Council must be viewed as a concession made to the opposition in the interests of peace and good will in the Party. (Plekhanov: "Since the Council apparently has nothing against an exchange of opinion on the subject of Comrade Ru, by all means let Lenin go on with it.") I have already finished. (Plekhanov: "If you have finished, I suggest that the Council should now discuss the resolutions moved yesterday by Comrade Lenin and myself.")

I agree with Comrade Martov that the Council resolutions would have, not juridical, but moral significance. Comrade Plekhanov has suggested that it would be desirable if I were to join the editorial board. (*Plekhanov*: "I did not say that.") At any rate, those were your words as I noted them down: "The best thing would be if Lenin joined the editorial board and the Central Committee co-opted three." (*Plekhanov*: "Yes, I said that under certain conditions, in order to secure peace in the Party, Comrade Lenin might be included on the editorial board and minority representatives co-opted to the Central Committee.")

Answering the question put to me as to just what change in the editorial board of the Central Organ would be considered desirable, it would be easy for me to cite the opinion of the "majority", who have indicated the desirability of Comrades Axelrod, Zasulich, and Starover leaving the board. Further, I must point out that in the activities of the Central Committee there has not been a single case of anyone being barred from Party work. Similarly, I cannot leave without protest Comrade Martov's statement that the Central Committee became an instrument of warfare of one side against the other. The Central Committee was appointed as an instrument for the performance of Party functions, not as an instrument of "warfare of one side against the other". This assertion of Comrade Martov's is completely contrary to the facts. No one can cite a single fact to show that the Central Committee started and waged "war" on the minority. On the contrary, it was the minority that, by its boycott, made war, which inevitably provoked resistance. Then, too, I protest against the assertion that the alleged lack of confidence in the Central Committee hinders peaceful positive work more than the lack of confidence in the Central Organ. As to the centre of the discord not lying abroad, but in Russia, as Comrade Martov insists is the case, I have to say that the Party documents will prove the reverse. Comrade Martov, referring to the document of November 25,[72] said that the Central Committee had itself admitted in principle that its composition was one-sided, since it had agreed to co-opt two of the minority. I protest against this interpretation of that document, for I myself had a share in drawing it up. The Central Committee's action had an entirely

different significance. It was not because it acknowledged its composition to be one-sided that the Central Committee agreed to this co-optation of two, but because we saw what was virtually a complete split in the Party. Whether the picture we formed of the situation was right or not is another matter.... Rumours reached us that preparations were going on for publishing a new organ.... (*Plekhanov*: "If we are going to bring in rumours, we shall get nowhere." *Axelrod*: "I for my part have heard that preparations for publishing a new organ are going on now....") I appeal to the Council: since Comrade Martov has interpreted the Central Committee document in a certain way, I am obliged to present my own interpretation of it.... I do not understand why my remark has occasioned so much excitement. (*Plekhanov*: "It is not a matter of excitement but of references to rumours being out of place.") I may be told that my motives were not valid. Perhaps not. But I put on record in any case that they were of the nature I have just indicated.

To resume: Comrade Martov has impugned the Central Committee's motives in agreeing to the co-optation of two. But I declare that the Central Committee was actuated by the conviction that a virtual split already existed in the Party and that we were on the eve of a complete formal split, in the sense of the publication of a separate organ, separate transport arrangements and a separate organisation in Russia. Now on a point of procedure: Comrade Martov's remark had to do with the substance of the question, not with procedure. And I want to ask the Council: was the chairman right in acting as he did in this case?

VII

Comrade Martov declares that I plunged straight off into polemic instead of calmly and peacefully discussing the general question of devising measures for peace in the Party. I cannot agree with that, because the polemic was *started* by none other than Comrade Martov himself. There is nothing polemical in my draft resolution. Not for nothing did Comrade Axelrod describe it as a "pastoral exhortation"—and pastoral exhortations, as we know, do not go in for polemic. And indeed, all I spoke of in it was the bounds within which

any internal struggle in the Party must be kept: what forms of such struggle can be accounted permissible, and what forms must be acknowledged impermissible and fraught with danger not only to the normal course of Party life, but to the Party's very existence. Moreover, I carefully tried to avoid an approach that might involve us in further fruitless controversy—in my proposal I endeavoured not to start from an appraisal of the methods of struggle that have actually marked the nearly six months' war between the two sides in the Party. Comrade Martov would not keep the matter on this plane and chose to indulge in polemic. Nevertheless, I shall be ready, should it be desired, to go back afterwards to where I started. As for the present, let me say the following. Comrade Martov quoted Travinsky as having welcomed the co-optation of the old editors to the editorial board. I think it necessary to emphasise here that private conversations or negotiations do not count. All official negotiations were conducted by Travinsky in writing. As to his private remarks, Comrade Martov apparently misunderstood them, and *some other time*, should it be necessary, I can prove it.

Further, Comrade Martov said there were all sorts of shortcomings in the activities of the Central Committee, and thereby he again entered the domain of polemic. There may indeed be shortcomings in the Central Committee's activities, but for a representative of the Central Organ to criticise those activities is nothing but polemic. I for my part find that the activities of the Central Organ have gone off the right track; but for all that I did not start out here by criticising the line the Central Organ's activities have taken, but by stating that there is *mutual* dissatisfaction between the Central Committee and the Central Organ. I also protest against the assertion that my resolution, if adopted by the Council, would turn the latter into an "instrument of warfare". My appeal speaks only of what forms of struggle are permissible and what forms are not.... Where does an "instrument of warfare" come into that? Comrade Axelrod said I had "started with a toast and ended with a requiem", and accused me of having devoted all my efforts to proving that there was a split in the Party. But surely, we started out yesterday by acknowledging that there was a split.... Further, by way of proving that the centre of the discord does not

lie abroad, Comrade Martov quoted Comrade Vasilyev's letter of December 12, which says that in Russia things are sheer hell.[73] To that let me say that it does not necessarily take strong groups to "create a hell", for it is petty and pettifogging squabbles that oftenest and easiest create big impediments to the work. I have mentioned my letter of September 13 to one of the former editors. I am going to publish that letter.[74] Comrade Plekhanov says the word "Marsh" is an insult. Let me remind you, however, that in the German socialist press and at congresses of the German Party the term *versumpft** evokes scoffing sometimes, but never cries of having been insulted. Neither Comrade Vasilyev nor I had any thought of insulting anyone in using the word. When there are two sides, each with its definite trend, irresolute waverers between the two are described by the term "Marsh", instead of which one could, I suppose, use "golden mean."

To call the Central Committee eccentric may be witty, but it also leads to polemic. After all, I could say the same of the Central Organ. I am told that my "appeal" is a homoeopathic remedy for an allopathic evil. I do not deny that the remedy I propose is only a palliative; but then, we cannot find allopathic remedies *here*. If you are going to talk of the need for "allopathic", radical remedies for this evil, then go all the way. A remedy like that does exist, and this one radical remedy is none other than a *congress*. For five months now we have been trying vainly to come to an understanding ("That's not so!") ... yes, it is so, and I shall prove it to you with documents.... We have been at it ever since September 15 and have not achieved it yet. Wouldn't it be better in that case to appeal to the body that Comrade Martov too spoke of yesterday?—and that body can only be a congress of Party workers. The Party Congress—that is the body that decides about the "conductor's baton". One of the reasons we have congresses is to "fight" over the "conductor's baton" (not in the crude sense of the word, of course). There a struggle is waged by way of ballots, by way of negotiations with comrades, and so forth, and there this struggle over the composition of the central bodies is in order, but outside

* Of the Marsh.—*Ed.*

PROMARX PROMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

congresses it should have no place in Party life.

And so, while my "pastoral message" may be a palliative, no other, more radical remedy exists except a congress, if you do not want to make the evil a chronic one. Comrade Axelrod pointed out that in Western Europe the members of the central institutions paid due regard to any opposition to their policy even in the remotest corners of the Party, and tried, by negotiating with the opposition, to smooth things out.... But then, our Central Committee is doing the same. The Central Committee sent two of its members abroad for that purpose,[75] the Central Committee has negotiated with various opposition representatives *dozens* of times, proving to them the absurdity of their arguments, the groundlessness of their fears, etc., etc. Let me say that this is an impossible waste of energy, money and time, and in that sense we really do have something to answer for before history.

Coming back again to the matter of practical suggestions, I repeat that you only have one radical means of ending this unhappy period of polemic—a congress. My resolution was intended to bring the struggle in the Party within more normal bounds.... We are told that that will not remove the splinter, that the trouble lies deeper.... In that case it is only the summoning of a congress that can extract the splinter completely.

VIII

It is absurd to describe as insulting what amounts to a demand for definiteness and precision. We have seen dozens of times (and particularly at the League Congress) what countless misunderstandings and even rows result from incorrect accounts of private conversations. That is a fact which it would be strange to deny. I say that the private remarks of Comrade Travinsky have been misunderstood both by the representative of the Central Organ and in part by Comrade Plekhanov. Here is what Comrade Travinsky writes me, among other things, in a letter of December 18: "We have just learned that the editorial board has circulated to the committees an official letter of the most *invidious* [I am toning down a stronger expression] character. In it the

editorial board openly comes out against the Central Committee and threatens that through the Council it could even now compel the co-optation of anyone it chose, but that it does not wish to resort yet to such measures and calls the attention of the committees to the narrow exclusiveness and incapacity of the Central Committee and the illegitimacy of the co-optation of Lenin.... A host of sallies of a personal nature. In a word, a disgraceful and ... [I again omit a too strong expression] breach of all the promises made to me. I am thoroughly disgusted. Is it possible that Plekhanov had a part in this? The Ekaterinoslav Committee is deeply incensed at the letter and has sent a very sharp reply.... Now the minority is recklessly severing the connecting bonds. The letter circulated to the committees is, in my opinion, the last straw and an open challenge. And I for one find that Lenin has every right to publish his letter outside *Iskra*. I am sure the other comrades too will have nothing against it."

There you have proof that the idea formed of Comrade Travinsky's opinion is mistaken. Comrade Travinsky could *expect* co-optation to take place since he hoped peace and good will would be established in the Party; but his hopes entirely failed to materialise.

What happened was that, instead of peace, the editorial board of Martov and the rest started war on the majority. Whereas Travinsky had hoped, and had had a right to hope, for peace.

What happened was that Plekhanov's attempts to restrain the "anarchistic individualists" did not succeed (in spite of his efforts). Accordingly, the hopes entertained by both Travinsky and myself—hopes of Plekhanov being able to keep the new editorial board from warring on the majority—these hopes did not materialise. Which only goes to show that hopes do not always materialise; when I resigned from the editorial board, it was also in the hope that this would make for peace, but my hopes did not materialise either. No one denies that private negotiations occurred, only you have to distinguish between expressions of the hopes and expectations of individuals and decisions of official bodies. There is nothing insulting to the members of the Council in my remark that one cannot draw conclusions here from private negotiations. I emphatically deny that Comrade Travinsky

expressly promised co-optation to the Central Committee. Undoubtedly, he departed hoping for peace, and as a result of that peace he could expect co-optation, but he could not expressly promise it.

Against my appeal Comrade Martov advances the argument that it contains the attacks made by only one side. Nothing of the kind. I can, if it comes to that, move another resolution, modifying the expressions Comrade Martov does not like, but his contention that my resolution is one-sided is nonsense. Earlier it was said of my resolution that it smacked of a pastoral message, that it was full of truisms, and so on—but no one ascribed to it a tendency to inflict new wounds. Comrade Martov charges me with evading a straight answer to Comrade Plekhanov's question of whether the Central Committee is or is not willing to co-opt representatives of the "minority". But how could we give you an answer to that question if we do not know what all the rest of the nine Central Committee members think of the matter now? (*Plekhanov*: "You misunderstood Comrade Martov.") To say that I am deliberately evading is ridiculous. I simply could not give the answer for not giving which I am being accused of evasion. I have said plainly that the dissatisfaction with the composition of the central bodies is mutual. One has to reckon with the opinion of other comrades too, after all. I am told: we must try to come to an understanding; but we have been trying to do that for the past five months. Comrade Martov's suggestion that by calling for a congress the Central Committee testifies to its own bankruptcy and impotence is therefore simply laughable. Hasn't the Central Committee already made every possible effort to resolve the conflict by domestic means? "The Central Committee will be demonstrating its inability...." Inability to do what? To wage the struggle? Or to bring about peace in the Party? Yes indeed! And the attacks to which my proposal has been subjected here abundantly prove it. What your resolution talks about is gaining ground from the adversary, so to speak; but then a demand like that gives rise to counter-demands, and I will even put the question in this way: has the Central Committee the right to start negotiating again on that basis? There are committees, after all, which *censured* the Central Committee for making concessions to the

League.[76] You want us to reckon with the minority *and not reckon* with the majority. That is funny. And avoidance of a congress would under these conditions smack of fearing a congress. That is why we admit ourselves powerless, but not in the sense Comrade Martov means. The Central Committee is indeed powerless to end the dissensions in the Party, and that is why we are proposing to the Council that a congress should be convened. Next, the purely juridical point of the Council's power to convene one. Comrade Martov's interpretation of it is totally incorrect. What the Rules say is: "The congress is convened (if possible not less than once in two years) by the Party Council." Consequently, the Council has the *power* to convene a congress *at any time*. It is *obliged* to convene a congress only in one specific case. (*Martov*: "From the Rules it directly follows that the Council is obliged to convene a congress when demanded by a specified number of competent organisations, or upon the lapse of two years after the previous congress. Thus, until the two years are up or until the specified number of organisations call for a congress, the Council cannot convene one." *Plekhanov*: "I suggest that the matter of the provisions for convening a congress is out of order, as having no bearing on the business in hand.")

It was Comrade Martov who brought the matter up, and we have not taken any decision to drop it. Martov says the Council cannot convene a congress, and I say that it can. The congress is convened by the Party Council on its own responsibility at any time—if possible not less than once in two years. Comrade Martov says that holding a congress is an *ultima ratio*. Yes, it is, and the fruitlessness of our present debates goes to confirm it.

You will recall that Comrade Martov has himself admitted in principle that a body made up of people who have not been involved in our dissensions could play a useful part in bringing peace to the Party. And since our own peacemaking attempts have produced no results and even in literature we are unlikely to keep to permissible forms of polemic, I maintain that only outside comrades can speak the decisive word. We, the representatives of the Central Committee, disclaim all responsibility in respect of further attempts at reconciliation in the Party; we see no other

honest way to end our dissensions than by appealing to the congress. Now about Comrade Plekhanov's remark as to the word "Marsh". (*Plekhanov*: "I was replying to the question of Comrade Vasilyev, who applied the term to a section of the Party; I repeat, as chairman I cannot allow such expressions in the Party Council.") I am admonished here that I say nothing about the abnormal and one-sided composition of the Central Committee; but what I am stating is the fact that there are two sides in the Party and that they are fighting with impermissible weapons. On the present basis, any positive work is quite impossible.

IX

Before speaking on the substance of the matter, let me say in passing once again that no one ever takes offence at the word *Sumpf*.*

Then as to the negotiations with Travinsky. My words have been interpreted here to mean that I deny that there were negotiations with him. Nothing of the sort. I did not deny that negotiations took place, but merely pointed to the difference between the significance private negotiations can have and that attaching to official ones. I quoted here a *letter* by Comrade Travinsky himself as proof that if formerly he viewed things as Comrade Plekhanov does, afterwards he altered his view. That being the case, I would consider it quite out of place to raise the question of whom France will believe.[77] There is no need whatever to appeal to "France".

Comrade Plekhanov declares that my peaceable "appeal" has had no effect even on myself. I repeat, all I do in that "appeal" is express the desire that certain methods of struggle should not be used. I call for peace. People reply by *attacking* the Central Committee, and then wonder that I *thereupon* attack the Central Organ. *After* the Central Committee has been attacked, I am accused of lack of peaceableness for hitting back! One has only to review our whole debate here in the Council in order to see who led off by proposing peace on the basis of the status quo and who continued with

* Marsh.—*Ed*.

war against the Central Committee. It has been claimed that Lenin did nothing but tell the opposition: "Do what you're told and don't argue!..." That is not quite so. All our September and October correspondence is evidence to the contrary. Let me remind you, for instance, that at the beginning of October, I was prepared (with Plekhanov) to co-opt two to the editorial board. Then, as regards the ultimatum, which I myself helped to draw up, I was willing at that time to cede you two seats on the Central Committee. Next, I made another concession by resigning from the editorial board, which I did so as not to stand in the way of others joining. It will thus be seen that I did not only say "Do what you're told and don't argue", but made concessions too. Now to the actual matter in hand. The attitude to my resolution strikes me as very strange. For does that resolution accuse anyone, is it in the nature of an attack upon anyone? All it speaks of is whether such-and-such forms of struggle are permissible or not. That there is a struggle is a fact, and the idea is purely and solely to draw a line between permissible and impermissible forms of it. And what I'm asking is: is that idea acceptable or not? Thus the expressions "instrument of struggle", "attack on the minority", etc., in relation to my resolution are quite out of place. Possibly its form is not very happy—I would not argue particularly about that and would be prepared to modify the wording—but its essence, which is that the contending sides in the Party must keep their struggle within definite permissible bounds—that is not open to question. The kind of attitude the resolution is encountering here seems to me one-sided, for one of the sides concerned rejects it because it purports to discern in it some danger to itself. (*Plekhanov*: "I wish to offer a reminder that I have already pointed out several times that there are no two sides in this Council.") To that I can say that I am referring to the *two sides* that exist in actual fact, not to any juridical division of the Council into two. To Comrade Plekhanov's resolution, on the substance of which nothing has been said here, the representatives of the editorial board have added nothing. Yet I was waiting all the time for the one-sided character of that resolution to be modified.

7

SPEECHES ON CONVENING THE THIRD PARTY CONGRESS JANUARY 17 (30)

I

On the question of convening a congress there is little to add. The Council debates too serve to illustrate the terribly difficult position in the Party. The point has repeatedly been made that two nearly equal halves formed at the Congress, so that when one member of the "majority" dropped out, complete equality resulted. I do not see how this equality could lead to peace without a Party congress. No one doubts that the discord is giving rise to crying abnormalities. A belligerent frame of mind exists *on both sides*; that is an indubitable fact. In the light of all this, no other honest and proper solution than convening a congress appears possible. Comrade Martov has spoken of the technical, financial, and other such difficulties of carrying out my proposal for a congress, but the present state of things is worse by far than all these difficulties.

II

I cannot agree with Martov; he gives a wrong picture of the role of a congress. He says the differences are not yet clear to all the comrades and that the convening of a congress would arrest the process of demarcation and the airing of the organisational conflict in the press. I think that precisely with a view to the free clarification of differences *of principle* it is necessary to eliminate the crisis, to clear the atmosphere of squabbles, and for that we need a congress. Not in order to cut short the struggle, but to bring it within normal

bounds, a Third Congress is required. The very suggestion that it would cut short the struggle over principles is a strange one. Let me remind you of the chairman's statement at the Second Congress, to the effect that even our programme is subject to further development and elucidation. But for the struggle over principles, the conflict of opinion, to be effective and fruitful, conditions are needed which at the moment we do not have. I protest against the historical parallels that have been drawn here and the reference to *Rabocheye Dyelo*. The difference between the position now and three years ago is that then we did not yet have a united party, and now we do. Those who talk here about a breakaway half should be the last to protest against a congress to eliminate the abnormality which by our own efforts we find ourselves unable to remove. Positive work and clarification of differences of principle will only be possible when the Third Congress removes that abnormality and brings the conflict of opinion within definite bounds.

II

Comrade Plekhanov's clearly stated argument is a "forceful" but false one. If the Third Congress were to lead to a split, it would mean that people do not want to submit to majority opinion, do not want to work together, that is, that in reality we have no party. Everyone has admitted that Comrade Travinsky's attempts to settle the conflict were not without result; and there are many comrades like Travinsky, and the congress would be a gathering and colloquy among just such comrades. A bitter struggle, a desperate struggle, even to the point of excesses, does not yet signify a split. If people really want to work together, they should also be willing to submit to the will of the majority, that is, of a congress.

8

SPEECHES ON THE PUBLICATION OF PARTY LITERATURE JANUARY 17 (30)

I

I shall begin from the end. Comrade Martov has misunderstood the Central Committee's letters, particularly on the subject of funds, and given a wrong interpretation of them. He leaves out of account that these letters were a sequel to a conversation which he, Martov, had with Travinsky. Martov himself wrote about the purport of that conversation in these terms: "To Comrade Travinsky, as to yourself, I mentioned 5,000-6,000 as the expected minimum of what could *over a year* be obtained for the Party from the two sources to which the members of the editorial board have access." I must state that Travinsky spoke of this being made available as a lump sum, not over the course of a year, so that there is some misunderstanding. The fact is that we counted on these 5,000 and apportioned funds between the Russian and the foreign treasury accordingly.

Comrade Martov said that both the financial sources (incidentally, how greatly the editorial board in its irritation misrepresents the matter is evident from the fact that in letters to the Central Committee Martov actually used the word "moneybags" in quotation marks and blamed us for this expression, when in reality it was his own expression, not ours)—I repeat, Comrade Martov said that both the financial sources were known to us. Yes, they are known, but the point is not whether they are known, but whether they are accessible. I know that one of these sources could provide up to 10,000 *a year*, the other up to 40,000, but that does

not help, for to me they are *inaccessible*. And it is their conversion from accessible into *inaccessible* sources that constitutes the cutting off of funds, which is an absolutely impermissible method of waging the struggle in the Party.

There is also the fact of the recent arrests, involving people who were due to obtain money in Russia. We have no money here, getting any from Russia will be a long business, and it will cost hundreds of rubles for the dispatch of special messengers. Some money will be coming through eventually, of course, barring further mishaps, but not soon, nor, in all likelihood, really enough.

That there were threats in the Central Committee's letter is quite untrue. There was no question of any threatening, for what the Central Committee was concerned for all along was the publication of the Central Organ. The point about addresses Comrade Vasilyev will deal with. According to our information, the editorial board is sending agents of its own to Russia. This implies a separate Central Organ treasury, which means a *de facto* split in the Party. It is contrary to the Rules, which require that the Central Committee should be kept fully informed and that all *funds* and all organisation of practical activities should be *wholly* concentrated in its hands. The Central Organ is grossly violating the Rules by setting up its own centre of travelling agents, its own centre of practical leadership and intervention in the affairs of the committees. The existence of these agents, contrary to the Party Rules, introduces direct disorganisation into the work. The Central Committee cannot and will not be answerable for order in the conduct of affairs when disorder is systematically introduced by the Central Organ itself. Here are letters from Odessa and Baku which illustrate how the matter stands. The Odessa letter, of December 24, says: "We had a visit yesterday from Zagorsky,[78] who announced that he had been delegated by the editorial board to inform the committees of the latest developments, the negotiations, the present position in the editorial board and the editors' request to send in material and contributions and to commission leaflets or suggest topics for leaflets of general interest, and also for pamphlets, to issue which a special group has been set up. He repeated all the old stuff and worked hard to prove the minority

right, nobleminded and 'loyal'. The committee heard him out, then asked some questions, one of them being whether the Central Committee was informed of his mission; whereupon, instead of giving a straight yes or no, he proceeded to exonerate himself and prove that the editorial board had every right to approach the committees without the Central Committee's knowledge. He insisted that his communication should be discussed and a resolution drawn up there and then, in his presence; to which the committee replied that it took note of the communication, but that as to discussing it and passing a resolution, it would do that when it saw fit, while now it was going on to its regular business."[79] And here is what we read in a letter of January 1 from Baku: "The Baku Committee has received a visit from Martyn,[80] who came with a communication from the Central Organ and with the undisguised object of sowing distrust in the Central Committee. When, at the end of his statement, he inquired as to the committee's opinion, the answer he got was: The Central Committee has our implicit confidence. And when he retorted that he would like to know their attitude to the Central Organ, he was told without any mincing of words that after what they had just heard (the statement of his mission) confidence in the latter 'had been shaken'."[81]

Equally improper and against the rules of secrecy is it that the Central Organ gives information on the composition of the Central Committee not only to the committees, but to private individuals (as for instance to Druyan, as the Central Committee pointed out in a letter to the Central Organ). As to "waging war", the fact is that Comrade Martov here confuses two totally different things. In the sphere of positive work and procuring funds any warfare (boycotts and the like) is most certainly impermissible, and the Central Committee has never engaged in any such thing. In the sphere of literature, however, "war" is permissible, and no one has ever restricted the Central Organ's polemics. You will recall that even at a much earlier period the Central Committee expressed complete readiness to publish both Dan's letter on the slogans of the opposition and Martov's pamphlet *Once More in the Minority*, though both contain attacks upon itself.

The Central Committee has never once caused any delay in issuing the Central Organ's publications. Nor has there been a single case of the Central Committee improperly or unfairly distributing literature, of its "discriminating" against the minority committees. On the contrary, Travinsky has here testified and proved that the minority committees were first of all generously supplied; Comrade Martov has had to admit that in this respect the Central Committee's activities are above reproach. As to refusing people Party literature, the matter stands as follows. *Every* Party member without exception (if he inspires confidence as regards secrecy precautions, etc.) is given literature *free* to transport to Russia and there hand over to the Central Committee agents for distribution. But when people have the hardihood to call themselves members of the Party and at the same time refuse to hand over literature to the Central Committee agents for general distribution, then naturally the Central Committee cannot (and has not even the right to) deal with such individuals. And if these people afterwards buy up literature for their separate parochial enterprises which disorganise the common work, so much the worse for them.

II

I cannot for the life of me understand what is insolent about the distribution secretary's first or second letter.[82] He requests information which he needs for his accounts, and the editors, instead of giving a comradely answer to the point—which he never did get—engage in purely bureaucratic quill-driving. Now here is something that really is insolent, in a letter by the editors of the Central Organ to the Central Committee: "The editorial board of the Central Organ brings to the Central Committee's attention that the presence abroad of three members of the Central Committee, which is not justified by any operational considerations and which implies the establishment of a new organisational centre not envisaged in the Party Rules, inevitably brings political intrigue and disorganisation into Party life...." This is outright *vilification* (intrigue) without a shadow of facts or evidence! The Central Committee's reply to it was: "Had the editors not been acting in a state of utmost irri-

tation, they would readily have seen the utter impropriety of their remarks about the number of Central Committee members present abroad. The only reply of the Central Committee's foreign representative to this and other unseemly sallies by the editors (such as the comical allegation about things being printed 'in secret') is to call on them to remember their duty as Party members and desist from actions which out of a controversy in literature could create occasions for a split...."[83]

That even bourgeois publishers supposedly let editors have *hundreds* of copies I must confess I have not heard. Let Comrade Martov try, if his are not just idle words, to ask Dietz whether he gives Kautsky 400 copies of the *Neue Zeit* to distribute. Or ask Singer, or Fischer, whether Gradnauer demands 200 copies of the *Vorwärts* to distribute on his own. The German Social-Democrats know the difference between anarchy and organisation.

The question of funds came up before the arrests—but then, I was only speaking of the difference the arrests had made to it.

How the editors confuse permissible controversy with impermissible boycott is especially vividly seen from the following.

In their letter of January 4, replying to our inquiry about funds, they mention, as one of the "factors which make it difficult for them to appeal to acquaintances for active support of the central treasury", that "Central Committee agents and their protégés indulge at meetings in threatening talk about the illegality of the present composition of the editorial board (and the letter by Central Committee member Lenin talks about it too...)." Just look at this astounding perversion of political values! The question of providing (or cutting off) sources of funds is *tied up* with that of controversy in speeches and pamphlets! What is that but mixing up ideological struggle with squabbling and contention over posts?! The question of Party members approving or disapproving the composition (and activities) of the editorial board is *jumbled* with that of "legality"! What is that but bureaucratic formalism?! It is natural that the Central Committee's foreign representative replied: "... As representative of the Central Committee, I think it necessary

to point out to the editorial board that there is no reason to bring up the question of *legality*, etc., because of heated utterances at forums of the membership abroad or a controversy conducted in literature.... If in the controversy the editors descry attacks on themselves, they have every opportunity, after all, to reply to them. Is it reasonable to get excited over some sharp (in the editors' view) thrust in controversy when there is no suggestion, even, of boycott or any other disloyal (in the Central Committee's view) mode of action?"[84]... To talk of "protégés" is nothing if not peculiar.... What is it supposed to mean? What sort of bureaucratic language is this? What has the Central Committee to do with what people say at forums? We have no censorship, that we should restrict freedom of speech and freedom of controversy. And does not *this* kind of struggle need to be marked off from boycotts?

Comrade Martov's story of the Odessa Committee having asked the Central Committee whether to send in letters to the Central Organ I regard as, obviously, a joke. No one could seriously speak of such a thing.

I repeat, there has never been a single case of the Central Committee barring the minority from the work. And I stress that Comrade Martov himself admits that he can cite no instances of improper, one-sided or biased distribution of literature.

III

Comrade Martov espies the danger of a coup on our part. That is comical. (*Martov*: "What about the ultimatum?") The Central Committee's "ultimatum" was a reply to Starover's ultimatum.[85] The ultimatum is our last word on conditions for peace and good will that we could accept. That is all. Only a diseased imagination could discover schemes for a coup in our reply to the minority, who have, unquestionably, brought the Party to the point of a split. The majority have no need to contemplate a coup. As regards the distribution of *Iskra*, all issues of the paper have, as far as possible, been distributed regularly, and had any committee deemed itself "forgotten" in this respect, it would only have needed to inform the Central Committee in a comradely way. We have up to the present received no such

notifications. And the editorial board's letter to the committees is not a comradely action, but an act of war.

The Central Committee is of the opinion that the work of literature distribution must be carried on from a single source and that a second distribution centre is unnecessary and harmful. Now a few words about the distribution secretary. I repeat that he became a target for attack only because he wanted to do his job conscientiously and addressed a business inquiry to the editorial board. And the editorial board's peremptory answer—"Don't dare talk!" "Send along 100 or 200 copies!", etc.—bears all the earmarks of a bureaucratic approach in its purest form.

On the subject of addresses I shall only say that everything that belongs to the editorial board has been handed over to it. Only personal and organisational correspondence has been sorted out, and all the rest turned over to the editors. I might also remind you that already in the London days the Organising Committee officially took all the organisational correspondence into its own hands.

To speak of there being a new centre because some members of the Central Committee are here abroad is a patent quibble and bureaucratic meddling in matters which are the Central Committee's independent concern.

IV

Comrade Martov entirely misinterprets the Rules. The Central Organ must have full information about everything—that is required both by the Rules and by the interests of the work. But the dispatch of representatives with organisational objects—such as sending Z[86] to the Odessa Committee without the Central Committee's knowledge—manifestly upsets the natural division of functions between the two central bodies of the Party. It is quite unnecessary for purposes of information, and only introduces the plainest disorganisation, completely disrupting unity of action. What this sort of move does is to aggravate the chaos in Party affairs, and in practice it means an outright splitting of the Party in two—instead of division of functions between the two central bodies.

TO THE PARTY

Comrades! That our Party is going through a severe crisis is known by now to all, and has in fact been directly and openly stated in our Central Organ also.

We consider it our duty to call on all members of the Party to take a conscious and active part in putting an end to the crisis as speedily and painlessly as possible.

Comrade Plekhanov, who at the Party Congress and—long after it—at the Congress of the League Abroad belonged to the Party Congress majority, now comes forward in No. 57 of *Iskra* as a champion of the demands of the minority, accusing the Central Committee of "eccentricity", of an intransigence that only benefits our enemies, of refusing to co-opt minority adherents. Such co-optation is, in Comrade Plekhanov's eyes, nothing less than "the only way to deliver our Party from its state of severe crisis, which sorely weakens our positions and strengthens those of our numerous enemies and opponents". One must be guided not only by the Rules, says Comrade Plekhanov—in reference presumably to this state of severe crisis—but also by the actual position of affairs, by the existing relation of forces in the Party. One must rise above the circle and doctrinaire standpoint which pushes to the forefront what divides the workers instead of what unites them.

These general principles are undoubtedly correct, and it only remains for every Social-Democrat to acquaint himself precisely with the facts and reflect seriously on the position in order correctly to apply them.

Yes, we must without fail, at the cost of any and every effort, undaunted by the prospect of a long and arduous job, cure our Party of the circle spirit, of faction and schism

over trifles, of unseemly and unworthy wrangling over the conductor's baton! Take a good look, then, at the events that have developed in our Party since its Second Congress. Have the courage to expose our sores, in order to diagnose them without hypocrisy or official humbug and to apply the right treatment.

The minutes of the Second Congress have now been published in their entirety; the minutes of the Congress of the League Abroad have likewise been made available to the Party membership. Party literature has already laid bare many manifestations and symptoms of our crisis, and although much still remains to be done in that respect, a certain summing up already can and should be made.

The Second Congress ended with a bitter struggle over the composition of our central bodies. By a majority of 24 to 20, a Central Organ editorial board of three was elected (Plekhanov, Martov and Lenin), and a Central Committee likewise made up of three comrades. Martov refused to fill the post he had been elected to, and he and all of the minority refused to take part in the elections to the Central Committee. From the very time of the Congress the minority started a bitter fight against the central bodies, a regular war over the conductor's baton, a regular war of the circle spirit against the party spirit, a war to get the old editorial board reinstated and a due (in the view of the minority) number of their adherents co-opted to the Central Committee. This war went on for months, and was accompanied by the minority's total withdrawal from work under the direction of the central bodies, by a boycott of them, and by purely anarchistic preachings, specimens of which the Party membership will find in profusion in the minutes of the League Congress. The struggle chiefly centred abroad, among the section furthest removed from positive work and from the participation of class-conscious proletarians. It involved the central bodies set up by the Second Congress in an appalling waste of energy on trips, meetings, and negotiations intended to obviate countless petty dissatisfactions, disputes and squabbles. That the demands of the opposition utterly disregarded the relation of forces whether at the Second Congress or in the Party as a whole may be seen, for example, from the fact that while the editors of the Central

Organ (Plekhanov and Lenin) actually agreed to the co-optation of two—that is, to equal representation of the Party Congress majority and minority—the opposition demanded a huge majority (four to two) on the editorial board. Under the threat of an inevitable and immediate split, the two central bodies finally made a number of concessions to the demands regarding the conductor's baton: the editors were co-opted, Lenin resigned from the editorial board and the Council, another majority member resigned from the Council likewise, the reorganisation of the League Abroad, whose Congress had flouted everything the Party Congress had decided, was allowed to lapse, and the opposition was offered two seats on the Central Committee.

The opposition rejected this offer. It evidently demands a larger number of seats, and for persons who would not be chosen by the Central Committee, but named by the opposition. Neither the relation of forces nor the interests of the work furnish the slightest justification for such demands: all that these ultimatums are backed by is threats of a split and acts of grossly mechanical pressure, such as boycotts and withholding of funds.

The Party has been disorganised and demoralised to the utmost by this fight for posts, which diverts its forces from positive work. This demoralisation is not lessened but, if anything, heightened by the fact that the minority's so-called differences of principle lend this fight a false colouring.

We all agreed unanimously—and said so emphatically time and again—to recognise all decisions of the Second Congress and all its elections as unconditionally binding. Now the minority has in practice repudiated the entire Rules and all the elections; now those who uphold the common decisions are found to be "formalists"—those who received their powers from the Congress are labelled "bureaucrats"—those who take their stand by the vote of the majority, which (by our common consent) expressed the relation of forces in the Party, are accused of a grossly mechanical and bureaucratic point of view. Those who at the Congress, having been charged by the membership with the duty of electing the Party's officials, transferred some editors to the status of contributors and some members of the Organising

Committee to that of ordinary Party workers, are now found guilty of converting Party members into cogs and wheels, etc., etc. The unsound and unstable position the minority already adopted at the Party Congress led inevitably to this dishonesty, which we are far from attributing to anyone's subjective will.

Is it not time to put an end to this strife and faction? Let everyone who cares about our Party's future ask himself that.

Is it not time to make a determined end of this fight for control of the central bodies, of this contention over posts, which is having such a disruptive effect on all our work? Is it fitting to embark yet again, after months and months of negotiations, upon new negotiations with the opposition, or to raise the question of the Central Committee's being one-sided or eccentric? For the raising of that question, after the co-optation of the editors had already seemed to ensure peace, inevitably calls up again the question of the one-sidedness and eccentricity—the anti-Party nature, even—of our Central Organ. How long are we going to engage in this indecent wrangling over the composition of the central bodies? And how can we settle the issue as to which side is right in its demands? By what yardstick are we to measure it? Why is it the "firm-liners" that are to be counted intransigent, when they have ceded a very great deal of what the Congress decided, and not the "soft-liners", who in practice have turned out uncommonly firm in their drive for a split and direct preparation of a split?

Let the comrades consider how this abnormal position can be ended. The Central Committee had hoped that the change of cabinet at the Central Organ would bring peace. When the dispute had already gone very far, when the fight over the conductor's baton had brought us to the very verge of a split—just one hope still remained: the achievement of some sort of disengagement, so as not to interfere with each other, so as gradually, in the process of working within one Party, to reduce the friction, so as not to touch, or to touch more seldom, on "sore" points. The division of the central bodies, one would have thought, at least partially ensured the ending of the crisis: the minority had the Central Organ to itself and could freely group around

it, freely advocate its views, freely carry on its Party work, without feeling "alien" in the Party. And with the majority also controlling one of the central bodies—the Central Committee (or out numbering the minority upon it)—the majority too could feel at least some satisfaction. The fight over the central bodies could have ended and given place to a purely ideological clearing up of disagreements and shades of opinion.

This hope is shattered by *Iskra*'s raising the question of co-optation to the Central Committee. We do not deem it possible to engage anew in this bargaining over posts, which fills us with repugnance. We should actually prefer, failing any other solution, to hand over *all* the conductor's batons to the minority, if it positively cannot bring itself to work in the Party except in the top posts. Our readiness to do so increases as this ugly new malady of our movement drags on—as these petty squabbles, the more unbearable for being petty, become chronic.

But we should first wish to know with all possible certainty the opinion of the Party, to consult revolutionary public opinion, especially within Russia. We invite comrades closely to examine and study the facts relating to our "crisis", to make a thorough appraisal of the present position in the Party, and to state their views on all the questions raised.

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CIRCUMSTANCES OF RESIGNATION FROM THE *ISKRA* EDITORIAL BOARD

Geneva, February 20, 1904

Dear Comrades,

As your pamphlet touches on the circumstances which induced me to resign from the *Iskra* editorial board, I would request you to find space in the Appendix for this reply of mine to Comrade Plekhanov's letter of January 29, 1904, to Comrade Martov, published in Martov's pamphlet on combating the "state of siege".

Comrade Plekhanov finds that the statement of the case in my letter to the editors is *inaccurate*. However, he has not made, nor could he have made, *a single correction of fact*. He has merely supplemented my account with an *inaccurate* version of private conversations I had with him.

Generally speaking, to quote private conversations is, I consider, a sure sign that serious arguments are lacking. I still hold the opinion so recently held by Comrade Plekhanov in reference to Comrade Martov's accounts of private conversations (League Minutes, p. 134), namely, that it is scarcely possible for such conversations to be "reproduced accurately", and that "controversy" regarding them "*leads nowhere*".

But since Comrade Plekhanov does cite our private conversations, I consider myself entitled to explain them and amplify, particularly as these conversations took place in the presence of third persons.

The first conversation, in which Comrade Plekhanov said that he had decided* to resign if I absolutely refused to

* In his zeal for accuracy Comrade Plekhanov overdoes it a little when he says: Plekhanov had no right to *decide* on co-optation,

agree to co-optation, took place on the evening of the day the League Congress ended and the following morning, in the presence of two members of the Party Council. The conversation revolved around concessions to the opposition. Plekhanov insisted that concessions were essential, for he felt certain that the opposition would not obey any decision of the Party Council and that a complete split of the Party might take place at any moment. I insisted that, after what had happened at the League, after the measures taken at its Congress by the representative of the Central Committee (each of which Comrade Plekhanov had taken part in discussing and had fully approved), it was impossible to yield to anarchistic individualism, and that the formation of a separate writers' group (which I had repeatedly declared in conversation with Plekhanov, and contrary to his own opinion, to be quite permissible) need not necessarily imply a split. When the upshot of the conversation was that one of us would have to resign, I at once said that I would do so, not wishing to hamper Plekhanov in his attempts to settle the conflict and avoid what he considered would be a split.

Comrade Plekhanov is so amiable towards me now as to find no other motive for my action than the most cowardly evasiveness. In order to paint this characteristic of mine in the liveliest colours, Comrade Plekhanov quotes me as saying: "Everybody will say that Lenin must be wrong if even Plekhanov disagrees with him."

That is laying the colours on thick, no doubt about it! So thick, in fact, that, all unnoticed by Comrade Plekhanov, the result is a patent absurdity. If I had been convinced that "everybody" would consider Plekhanov right (as he modestly thinks to himself), and had thought it necessary to reckon with the opinion of this everybody, then, obviously, I would never have ventured to disagree with Plekhanov, I would have followed him in this instance too. In his desire to present my conduct in the most unprepossessing light and ascribe it to the most ignominious motives, he fathers on me

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for according to the Rules co-optation has to be unanimous. This is not a correction, but a quibble, for what the Rules forbid in the absence of unanimity is definite organisational *actions*, and not *decisions*—which some people are all too prone to adopt for appearances' sake, without following them up with action.

a motive *devoid of all sense*. I am supposed to have been so afraid of disagreeing with Plekhanov in anything that—I did disagree with him. It doesn't hold water, this argument of Comrade Plekhanov's.

Actually, my idea was that it would be better for me to resign, for otherwise my dissenting opinion would hamper Plekhanov's *attempts* to secure peace. I did not want to hamper those attempts—perhaps we might in fact agree on peace terms—but I considered it impossible to assume responsibility for an editorial board on which an émigré circle imposed candidates *in this way*.

A few days later I did go with a certain Council member to see Plekhanov, and our talk took the following course:

"You know," said Plekhanov, "there are some wives who are so quarrelsome that it's best to give way to them in order to avoid hysterics and an unsavoury row in public."

"Perhaps so," I replied, "but in giving way you must take care to leave yourself strong enough to prevent an even bigger 'row'."

"Well, but by resigning you surrender everything," said Plekhanov.

"Not always," I rejoined, and cited the case of Chamberlain. My idea was one I have also expressed in print: should Plekhanov succeed in securing a peace acceptable to the majority, in whose ranks he had fought so long and so vigorously, then I would not start war either; if he should not succeed, I reserved to myself freedom of action, so as to denounce the "quarrelsome wife" if *even* Plekhanov could not calm and pacify her.

It was during this conversation that I told Plekhanov (who did not yet know the opposition's terms) of my "decision" to join the Central Committee (I could "decide" to do so, but of course all the members of the Central Committee would have to give their consent). Plekhanov was entirely sympathetic to this plan, as a last attempt to find some sort of mode of living with the "quarrelsome wife". When, in a letter to Plekhanov on November 6, 1903, I expressed the opinion that perhaps he was simply going to hand over the editorial board to the Martovites, he replied (on November 8): "... You seem to have a wrong idea of my intentions. I explained them again yesterday to Comrade Vasilyev" (the

Central Committee member who had attended the League Congress). Writing to this same Comrade Vasilyev on November 10 about whether to expedite or delay the 52nd issue of *Iskra*, containing a statement about the Congress, Plekhanov said: "...Publishing anything about the Congress means either 1) announcing that Martov and the others are not taking part in *Iskra*, or 2) refusing this request of Martov's—in which case he will announce it himself in a special leaflet. In either case it would bring the split to the knowledge of the public, *and that is exactly what we have to avoid just now*" (my italics—N. L.). On November 17, Plekhanov wrote to the same comrade: "... What would you say to the immediate co-optation of Martov and the others? I am beginning to think that this would be the way to settle the matter with the least difficulty. *I do not want to act without you...*" (Plekhanov's italics).

These quotations show clearly that Plekhanov was trying to act in agreement with the majority, and wanted to co-opt the editors solely for the sake of peace and on the condition of peace, and not for the purpose of war against the majority. If it has worked out the other way, that only goes to show that the cart of anarchistic individualism had got rolling too recklessly in the tactics of boycott and disruption; the strongest brakes could not hold it back. That is a great pity, of course, and Plekhanov, who sincerely wanted peace, has landed in an unpleasant position; but that is no reason for putting all the blame on me.

As to Plekhanov's statement that I was willing to keep quiet in return for a suitable "equivalent", and his proud declaration, "I did not see fit to purchase his silence", this polemical trick only makes a comical impression when compared with the words I have just quoted from his letter of November 10. It was Plekhanov who attached the utmost importance to silence, to keeping the split from the knowledge of the public.* What more natural than that I should

**A propos*, it was Plekhanov who was so insistent about withholding publication of the League Minutes and the *concluding part* of the Party Congress Minutes—the part where he says that he takes upon himself full moral responsibility for a direct vote against the old so-called editorial board, and expresses the hope that the Party has not grown poor in literary forces—a statement which one member of the minority called a pompous phrase in pseudo-classical style.

tell him I agreed to that too, provided there was peace? This talk about "equivalents" and "purchases" leads one to expect that next time Plekhanov will inform the public that Lenin is forging currency for transactions of this kind. That sort of thing has happened, after all, in our émigré quarrels—and the present atmosphere is conducive to it.

Comrade Plekhanov's letter involuntarily leads one to wonder whether he is not now having to *purchase* the right to be in the minority. The tactics of the minority in our so-called Party organ are already quite clear. What they are trying to do is obscure the controversial issues and the facts which really led to our divergence. They are trying to show that Martynov was far closer to *Iskra* than Lenin—just how, where and to what extent the muddled editors of the new *Iskra* will be a long time endeavouring to explain. They hypocritically condemn dragging personalities into the controversy, while actually their whole struggle is one big campaign against an individual, in which they do not even hesitate to ascribe to the "enemy" pernicious qualities of the most incompatible kind—from the crassest pig-headedness to the most cowardly evasiveness. Anything to make it good and strong. And those new allies, Comrades Plekhanov and Martov, make it so good and strong that they will soon be no whit behind the famous Bundists with their famous epithet—"scum". They are bombarding me so fiercely from their battleships that I am beginning to wonder whether this is not a conspiracy of two-thirds of the dreadful trio. Ought I not to pose as injured too? Ought I not to cry out about a "state of siege"? That is sometimes so convenient and so useful, you know....

To be sure, to become a true minority man Comrade Plekhanov has still, I would say, to take two little steps: first, to avow that the formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Rules advocated by Comrades Martov and Axelrod at the Congress (and so zealously hushed up by them now) constitutes, not a step towards opportunism, not a surrender to bourgeois individualism, but the germ of new, truly Social-Democratic, Akimov-Martov and Martynov-Axelrod organisational views; and, secondly, to avow that the struggle with the minority since the Congress has not been a struggle against gross violations of Party discipline, against methods

of agitation that only arouse disgust, not a struggle against anarchism and anarchistic phraseology (see pp. 17, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104, etc., etc., of the League Minutes), but a struggle against a "state of siege", bureaucracy, formalism, and so forth.

I shall deal at length with controversial issues of this kind in a pamphlet I am now preparing for the press. Meanwhile ... meanwhile let us scan the gallery of Gogol types opened in the columns of our leading organ, which is making a practice of presenting its readers with conundrums. Who resembles a stiff-necked Sobakevich treading on everybody's vanity—I beg pardon, their corns? Who is like an evasive Chichikov purchasing silence as well as dead souls? Who are like Nozdrev and Khlestakov, Manilov and Skvoznik-Dmukhanovsky?[87] Interesting and edifying puzzles.... "A controversy over principles...."

N. Lenin

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MAY DAY

Comrade workers! May Day is coming, the day when the workers of all lands celebrate their awakening to a class-conscious life, their solidarity in the struggle against all coercion and oppression of man by man, the struggle to free the toiling millions from hunger, poverty, and humiliation. Two worlds stand facing each other in this great struggle: the world of capital and the world of labour, the world of exploitation and slavery and the world of brotherhood and freedom.

On one side stand the handful of rich blood-suckers. They have seized the factories and mills, the tools and machinery, have turned millions of acres of land and mountains of money into their private property. They have made the government and the army their servants, faithful watchdogs of the wealth they have amassed.

On the other side stand the millions of the disinherited. They are forced to beg the moneybags for permission to work for them. By their labour they create all wealth; yet all their lives long they have to struggle for a crust of bread, beg for work as for charity, sap their strength and health by back-breaking toil, and starve in hovels in the villages or in the cellars and garrets of the big cities.

But now these disinherited toilers have declared war on the moneybags and exploiters. The workers of all lands are fighting to free labour from wage slavery, from poverty and want. They are fighting for a system of society where the wealth created by the common labour will go to benefit, not a handful of rich men, but all those who work. They want to make the land and the factories, mills, and machines the common property of all toilers. They want to do away

with the division into rich and poor, want the fruits of labour to go to the labourers themselves, and all the achievements of the human mind, all improvements in ways of working, to improve the lot of the man who works, and not serve as a means of oppressing him.

The great struggle of labour against capital has cost the workers of all countries immense sacrifices. They have shed rivers of blood in behalf of their right to a better life and real freedom. Those who fight for the workers' cause are subjected by the governments to untold persecution. But in spite of all persecution the solidarity of the workers of the world is growing and gaining in strength. The workers are uniting more and more closely in socialist parties, the supporters of those parties are mounting into millions and are advancing steadily, step by step, towards complete victory over the class of capitalist exploiters.

The Russian proletariat, too, has awakened to a new life. It too has joined this great struggle. Gone are the days when our worker slaved submissively, seeing no escape from his state of bondage, no glimmer of light in his bitter life. Socialism has shown him the way out, and thousands upon thousands of fighters have thronged to the red banner, as to a guiding star. Strikes have shown the workers the power of unity, have taught them to fight back, have shown how formidable to capital organised labour can be. The workers have seen that it is off their labour that the capitalists and the government live and get fat. The workers have been fired with the spirit of united struggle, with the aspiration for freedom and for socialism. The workers have realised what a dark and evil force the tsarist autocracy is. The workers need freedom for their struggle, but the tsarist government binds them hand and foot. The workers need freedom of assembly, freedom to organise, freedom for newspapers and books, but the tsarist government crushes, with knout, prison and bayonet, every striving for freedom. The cry "Down with the autocracy!" has swept through the length and breadth of Russia, it has been sounded more and more often in the streets, at great mass meetings of the workers. Last summer tens of thousands of workers throughout the South of Russia rose up to fight for a better life, for freedom from police tyranny. The bourgeoisie and government trem-

bled at the sight of the formidable army of workers, which at one stroke brought to a standstill the entire industrial life of huge cities. Dozens of fighters for the workers' cause fell beneath the bullets of the troops that tsarism sent against the internal enemy.

But there is no force that can vanquish this internal enemy, for the ruling classes and the government only live by its labour. There is no force on earth that could break the millions of workers, who are growing more and more class-conscious, more and more united and organised. Every defeat the workers sustain brings new fighters into the ranks, it awakens broader masses to new life and makes them prepare for fresh struggles.

And the events Russia is now passing through are such that this awakening of the worker masses is bound to be even more rapid and widespread, and we must strain every nerve to unite the ranks of the proletariat and prepare it for even more determined struggle. The war is making even the most backward sections of the proletariat take an interest in political affairs and problems. The war is showing up ever more clearly and vividly the utter rottenness of the autocratic order, the utter criminality of the police and court gang that is ruling Russia. Our people are perishing from want and starvation at home—yet they have been dragged into a ruinous and senseless war for alien territories lying thousands of miles away and inhabited by foreign races. Our people are ground down in political slavery—yet they have been dragged into a war for the enslavement of other peoples. Our people demand a change of political order at home—but it is sought to divert their attention by the thunder of guns at the other end of the world. But the tsarist government has gone too far in its gamble, in its criminal squandering of the nation's wealth and young manhood, sent to die on the shores of the Pacific. Every war puts a strain on the people, and the difficult war against cultured and free Japan is a frightful strain upon Russia. And this strain comes at a time when the structure of police despotism has already begun to totter under the blows of the awakening proletariat. The war is laying bare all the weak spots of the government, the war is tearing off all false disguises, the war is revealing all the inner rottenness; the war is making

the preposterousness of the tsarist autocracy obvious to all and is showing everyone the death-agony of the old Russia, the Russia where the people are disfranchised, ignorant and cowed, the Russia that is still in serf bondage to the police government.

The old Russia is dying. A free Russia is coming to take its place. The dark forces that guarded the tsarist autocracy are going under. But only the class-conscious and organised proletariat can deal them their death-blow. Only the class-conscious and organised proletariat can win real, not sham, freedom for the people. Only the class-conscious and organised proletariat can thwart every attempt to deceive the people, to curtail their rights, to make them a mere tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Comrade workers! Let us then prepare with redoubled energy for the decisive battle that is at hand! Let the ranks of the Social-Democrat proletarians close ever firmer! Let their word spread ever farther afield! Let campaigning for the workers' demands be carried on ever more boldly! Let the celebration of May Day win thousands of new fighters to our cause and swell our forces in the great struggle for the freedom of all the people, for the liberation of all who toil from the yoke of capital!

Long live the eight-hour day!

Long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Down with the criminal and plundering tsarist autocracy!

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Published according to the manuscript

N. LENIN. Ein Schritt vorwärts, zwei Schritt rückwärts
(Über die Krise in unserer Partei).

Россійская Соціальдемократическая Рабочая Партія

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ.

Шагъ впередъ, два шага назадъ

(Кризисъ въ нашей Партіи).

ЖЕНЕВА
Типографія Партіи. Rue de la Coulouvreniere, 27.
1904

Cover of the original edition of
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. 1904
Reduced

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

(THE CRISIS IN OUR PARTY)[88]

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PREFACE

When a prolonged, stubborn and heated struggle is in progress, there usually begin to emerge after a time the central and fundamental points at issue, upon the decision of which the ultimate outcome of the campaign depends, and in comparison with which all the minor and petty episodes of the struggle recede more and more into the background.

That, too, is how matters stand in the struggle within our Party, which for six months now has been riveting the attention of all members of the Party. And precisely because in the present outline of the whole struggle I have had to refer to many details which are of infinitesimal interest, and to many squabbles which at bottom are of no interest whatever, I should like from the very outset to draw the reader's attention to two really central and fundamental points, points which are of tremendous interest, of undoubted historical significance, and which are the most urgent political questions confronting our Party today.

The first question is that of the political significance of the division of our Party into "majority" and "minority" which took shape at the Second Party Congress and pushed all previous divisions among Russian Social-Democrats far into the background.

The second question is that of the significance in principle of the new *Iskra*'s position on organisational questions, insofar as this position is really based on principle.

The first question concerns the starting-point of the struggle in our Party, its source, its causes, and its fundamental political character. The second question concerns the ultimate outcome of the struggle, its finale, the sum-total of

principles that results from adding up all that pertains to the realm of principle and subtracting all that pertains to the realm of squabbling. The answer to the first question is obtained by analysing the struggle at the Party Congress; the answer to the second, by analysing what is new in the principles of the new *Iskra*. Both these analyses, which make up nine-tenths of my pamphlet, lead to the conclusion that the "majority" is the revolutionary, and the "minority" the opportunist wing of our Party; the disagreements that divide the two wings at the present time for the most part concern, not questions of programme or tactics, but only organisational questions; the new system of views that emerges the more clearly in the new *Iskra* the more it tries to lend profundity to its position, and the more that position becomes cleared of squabbles about co-optation, is opportunism in matters of organisation.

The principal shortcoming of the existing literature on the crisis in our Party is, as far as the study and elucidation of facts is concerned, the almost complete absence of an analysis of the minutes of the Party Congress; and as far as the elucidation of fundamental principles of organisation is concerned, the failure to analyse the connection which unquestionably exists between the basic error committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod in their formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Rules and their defence of that formulation, on the one hand, and the whole "system" (insofar as one can speak here of a system) of *Iskra*'s present principles of organisation, on the other. The present editors of *Iskra* apparently do not even notice this connection, although the importance of the controversy over Paragraph 1 has been referred to again and again in the literature of the "majority". As a matter of fact, Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martov are now only deepening, developing and extending their initial error with regard to Paragraph 1. As a matter of fact, the entire position of the opportunists in organisational questions already began to be revealed in the controversy over Paragraph 1: their advocacy of a diffuse, not strongly welded, Party organisation; their hostility to the idea (the "bureaucratic" idea) of building the Party from the top downwards, starting from the Party Congress and the bodies set up by it; their tendency to proceed from the

bottom upwards, allowing every professor, every high-school student and "every striker" to declare himself a member of the Party; their hostility to the "formalism" which demands that a Party member should belong to one of the organisations recognised by the Party; their leaning towards the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, who is only prepared to "accept organisational relations platonically"; their penchant for opportunist profundity and for anarchistic phrases; their tendency towards autonomism as against centralism—in a word, all that is now blossoming so luxuriantly in the new *Iskra*, and is helping more and more to reveal fully and graphically the initial error.

As for the minutes of the Party Congress, the truly undeserved neglect of them can only be explained by the fact that our controversies have been cluttered by squabbles, and possibly by the fact that these minutes contain too large an amount of too unpalatable truth. The minutes of the Party Congress present a picture of the actual state of affairs in our Party that is unique of its kind and unparalleled for its accuracy, completeness, comprehensiveness, richness and authenticity; a picture of views, sentiments and plans drawn by the participants in the movement themselves; a picture of the political shades existing in the Party, showing their relative strength, their mutual relations and their struggles. It is the minutes of the Party Congress, and they alone, that show us how far we have really succeeded in making a clean sweep of the survivals of the old, purely circle ties and substituting for them a single great party tie. It is the duty of every Party member who wishes to take an intelligent share in the affairs of his Party to make a careful study of our Party Congress. I say study advisedly, for merely to read the mass of raw material contained in the minutes is not enough to obtain a picture of the Congress. Only by careful and independent study can one reach (as one should) a stage where the brief digests of the speeches, the dry extracts from the debates, the petty skirmishes over minor (seemingly minor) issues will combine to form one whole, enabling the Party member to conjure up the living figure of each prominent speaker and to obtain a full idea of the political complexion of each group of delegates to the Party Congress. If the writer of these lines only succeeds in stimulat-

ing the reader to make a broad and independent study of the minutes of the Party Congress, he will feel that his work was not done in vain.

One more word to the opponents of Social-Democracy They gloat and grimace over our disputes; they will, of course, try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the failings and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pinpricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings, which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows. As for our opponents, let them try to give us a picture of the *true* state of affairs in their own "parties" even remotely approximating that given by the minutes of our Second Congress!

N. Lenin

May 1904

A. THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS

There is a saying that everyone is entitled to curse his judges for twenty-four hours. Our Party Congress, like any congress of any party, was also the judge of certain persons, who laid claim to the position of leaders but who met with discomfiture. Today these representatives of the "minority" are, with a naïveté verging on the pathetic, "cursing their judges" and doing their best to discredit the Congress, to belittle its importance and authority. This striving has been expressed most vividly, perhaps, in an article in *Iskra*, No. 57, by "Practical Worker",[89] who feels outraged at the idea of the Congress being a sovereign "divinity". This is so characteristic a trait of the new *Iskra* that it cannot be passed over in silence. The editors, the majority of whom were *rejected* by the Congress, continue, on the one hand, to call themselves a "Party" editorial board, while, on the other, they accept with open arms people who declare that the Congress was not divine. Charming, is it not? To be sure, gentlemen, the Congress was not divine; but what must we think of people who begin to "blackguard" the Congress *after* they have met with defeat at it?

For indeed, let us recall the main facts in the history of the preparations for the Congress.

Iskra declared at the very outset, in its announcement of publication in 1900, that before we could unite, lines of demarcation must be drawn. *Iskra* endeavoured to make the Conference of 1902"[90] a private meeting and not a Party Congress.* *Iskra* acted with extreme caution in the summer and autumn of 1902 when it re-established the Organising

* See Minutes of the Second Congress, p. 20.

Committee elected at that conference. At last the work of demarcation was finished—as we all acknowledged. The Organising Committee was constituted at the very end of 1902. *Iskra* welcomed its firm establishment, and in an *editorial* article in its 32nd issue declared that the convocation of a Party Congress was a *most urgent* and pressing necessity.* Thus, the last thing we can be accused of is having been hasty in convening the Second Congress. We were, in fact, guided by the maxim: measure your cloth seven times before you cut it; and we had every moral right to expect that after the cloth had been cut our comrades would not start complaining and measuring it all over again.

The Organising Committee drew up very precise (formalistic and bureaucratic, those would say who are now using these words to cover up their political spinelessness) Regulations for the Second Congress, got them passed by all the committees, and finally endorsed them, stipulating among other things, in Point 18, that "all decisions of the Congress and all the elections it carries out are decisions of the Party and binding on all Party organisations. They cannot be challenged by anyone on any pretext whatever and can be rescinded or amended only by the next Party Congress".** How innocent in themselves, are they not, are these words, accepted at the time without a murmur, as something axiomatic; yet how strange they sound today—like a verdict against the "minority"! Why was this point included? Merely as a formality? Of course not. This provision seemed necessary, and was indeed necessary, because the Party consisted of a number of isolated and independent groups, which might refuse to recognise the Congress. This provision in fact expressed the *free will* of all the revolutionaries (which is now being talked about so much, and so irrelevantly, the term "free" being euphemistically applied to what really deserves the epithet "capricious"). It was equivalent to a *word of honour* mutually pledged by all the Russian Social-Democrats. It was intended to guarantee that all the tremendous effort, danger and expense entailed by the

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 309.—*Ed.*

** See Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 22-23 and 380.

Congress should not be in vain, that the Congress should not be turned into a farce. It in advance qualified any refusal to recognise the decisions and *elections* at the Congress as a *breach of faith*.

Who is it, then, that the new *Iskra* is scoffing at when it makes the new discovery that the Congress was not divine and its decisions are not sacrosanct? Does that discovery imply "new views on organisation", or only new attempts to cover up old tracks?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS GROUPINGS AT THE CONGRESS

Thus, the Congress was called after the most careful preparation and on the basis of the fullest representation. The general recognition that its composition was correct and its decisions *absolutely* binding found expression also in the statement of the chairman (Minutes, p. 54) after the Congress had been constituted.

What was the principal task of the Congress? To create a *real* party on the basis of the principles and organisational ideas that had been advanced and elaborated by *Iskra*. That this was the direction in which the Congress had to work was predetermined by the three years' activities of *Iskra* and by the recognition of the latter by the majority of the committees. *Iskra*'s programme and trend were to become the programme and trend of the Party; *Iskra*'s organisational plans were to be embodied in the Rules of Organisation of the Party. But it goes without saying that this could not be achieved without a struggle: since the Congress was so highly representative, the participants included organisations which had vigorously fought *Iskra* (the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo*) and organisations which, while verbally recognising *Iskra* as the leading organ, actually pursued plans of their own and were unstable in matters of principle (the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group and delegates from some of the committees who were closely associated with it). Under these circumstances, the Congress could not but become an *arena of struggle for the victory of the "Iskra" trend*. That it did become such an arena will at once be apparent to all who peruse its minutes with any degree of

attention. Our task now is to trace in detail the principal groupings revealed at the Congress on various issues and to reconstruct, on the basis of the precise data of the minutes, the political complexion of each of the main groups. What precisely were these groups, trends and shades which, at the Congress, were to unite under the guidance of *Iskra* into a single party?—that is what we must show by analysing the debates and the voting. The elucidation of this is of cardinal importance both for a study of what our Social-Democrats really are and for an understanding of the causes of the divergence among them. That is why, in my speech at the League Congress and in my letter to the editors of the new *Iskra*, I gave prime place to an analysis of the various groupings. My opponents of the "minority" (headed by Martov) utterly failed to grasp the substance of the question. At the League Congress they confined themselves to corrections of detail, trying to "vindicate" themselves from the charge of having swung towards opportunism, but not even attempting to counter my picture of the groupings at the Congress by drawing *any different one*. Now Martov tries in *Iskra* (No. 56) to represent every attempt clearly to delimit the various political groups at the Congress as mere "circle politics". Strong language, Comrade Martov! But the strong language of the new *Iskra* has this peculiar quality: one has only to reproduce all the stages of our divergence, from the Congress onwards, for all this strong language to turn *completely and primarily* against the present editorial board. Take a look at yourselves, you so-called Party editors who talk about circle politics!

Martov now finds the facts of our struggle at the Congress so unpleasant that he tries to slur over them altogether. "An *Iskra*-ist," he says, "is one who, at the Party Congress and prior to it, expressed his complete solidarity with *Iskra*, advocated its programme and its views on organisation and supported its organisational policy. There were over forty such *Iskra*-ists at the Congress—that was the number of votes cast for *Iskra*'s programme and for the resolution adopting *Iskra* as the Central Organ of the Party." Open the Congress Minutes, and you will find that the programme was adopted by the votes of *all* (p. 233) except Akimov, who abstained. Thus, Comrade Martov wants to assure us that

the Bundists, and Brouckère, and Martynov *demonstrated* their "complete solidarity" with *Iskra* and *advocated* its views on organisation! This is ridiculous. The fact that *after* the Congress *all* who took part became equal members of the Party (and not even all, for the Bundists had withdrawn) is here jumbled with the question of the grouping that evoked the struggle *at* the Congress. Instead of a study of the *elements* that went to make up the "majority" and the "minority" after the Congress, we get the official phrase, "recognised the programme"!

Take the voting on the adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ. You will see that it was Martynov—whom Comrade Martov, with a courage worthy of a better cause, now credits with having advocated *Iskra*'s organisational views and organisational policy—who insisted on separating the two parts of the resolution: the bare adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ, and the recognition of its services. When the first part of the resolution (recognising the services of *Iskra*, expressing *solidarity* with it) was put to the vote, *only thirty-five votes* were cast in favour; there were two votes against (Akimov and Brouckère) and eleven abstentions (Martynov, the five Bundists and the five votes of the editorial board: the two votes each of Martov and myself and Plekhanov's one). Consequently, the anti-*Iskra* group (five Bundists and three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists) is quite apparent in this instance also, one most advantageous to Martov's present views and chosen by himself. Take the voting on the second part of the resolution—adopting *Iskra* as the Central Organ without any statement of motives or expression of solidarity (Minutes, p. 147): forty-four votes *in favour*, which the Martov of today classes as *Iskra*-ist. The total number of votes to be cast was fifty-one; subtracting the five votes of the editors, who abstained, we get forty-six; two voted *against* (Akimov and Brouckère); consequently, the remaining forty-four include *all five Bundist*. And so, the Bundists at the Congress "expressed complete solidarity with *Iskra*"—this is how official history is written by the official *Iskra*! Running ahead somewhat, we will explain to the reader the real reasons for this official truth: the present editorial board of *Iskra* could and would have been a real Party editorial board (and not a quasi-Party one, as it is today) *if the Bundists and*

ROMMARX ROMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the "Rabocheye Dyelo"-ists had not withdrawn from the Congress; that is why these trusty guardians of the present, so-called Party editorial board had to be proclaimed *Iskra*-ists. But I shall speak of this in greater detail later.

The next question is: if the Congress was a struggle between the *Iskra*-ist and the anti-*Iskra*-ist elements, were there no intermediate, unstable elements who vacillated between the two? Anyone at all familiar with our Party and with the picture generally presented by congresses of every kind will be inclined *a priori* to answer the question in the affirmative. Comrade Martov is now very reluctant to recall these unstable elements, so he represents the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group and the delegates who gravitated towards it as typical *Iskra*-ists, and our differences with them as paltry and unimportant. Fortunately, we now have before us the complete text of the minutes and are able to answer the question—a question of fact, of course—on the basis of documentary evidence. What we said above about the general grouping at the Congress does not, of course, claim to answer the question, but only to present it correctly.

Without an analysis of the political groupings, without having a picture of the Congress as a struggle between definite shades, the divergence between us cannot be understood at all. Martov's attempt to gloss over the different shades by ranking even the Bundists with the *Iskra*-ists is simply an evasion of the question. Even *a priori*, on the basis of the history of the Russian Social-Democratic movement before the Congress, three main groups are to be noted (for subsequent verification and detailed study): the *Iskra*-ists, the anti-*Iskra*-ists, and the unstable, vacillating, wavering elements.

C. BEGINNING OF THE CONGRESS. THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE INCIDENT

The most convenient way to analyse the debates and the voting is to take them in the order of the Congress sittings, so as successively to note the political shades as they became more and more apparent. Only when absolutely necessary will departures from the chronological order be made for the purpose of considering together closely allied questions

or similar groupings. For the sake of impartiality, we shall endeavour to mention *all* the more important votes, omitting, of course, the innumerable votes on minor issues, which took up an inordinate amount of time at our Congress (owing partly to our inexperience and inefficiency in dividing the material between the commissions and the plenary sittings, and partly to quibbling which bordered on obstruction).

The first question to evoke a debate which began to reveal differences of shades was whether first place should be given (on the Congress "order of business") to the item: "Position of the Bund in the Party" (Minutes, pp. 29-33). From the standpoint of the *Iskra*-ists, which was advocated by Plekhanov, Martov, Trotsky, and myself, there could be no doubt on this score. The Bund's withdrawal from the Party strikingly bore out our view: if the Bund refused to go our way and accept the principles of organisation which the majority of the Party shared with *Iskra*, it was useless and senseless to "make believe" that we were going the same way and only drag out the Congress (as the Bundists did drag it out). The matter had already been fully clarified in our literature, and it was apparent to any at all thoughtful Party member that all that remained was to put the question frankly, and bluntly and honestly make the choice: autonomy (in which case we go the same way), or federation (in which case our ways part).

Evasive in their entire policy, the Bundists wanted to be evasive here too and postpone the matter. They were joined by Comrade Akimov, who, evidently on behalf of all the followers of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, at once brought up the differences with *Iskra* over questions of organisation (Minutes, p. 31). The Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo* were supported by Comrade Makhov (representing the two votes of the Nikolayev Committee—which shortly before had expressed its solidarity with *Iskra*!). To Comrade Makhov the matter was altogether unclear, and another "sore spot", he considered, was "the question of a democratic system or, on the contrary [mark this!], centralism"—exactly like the majority of our present "Party" editorial board, who at the Congress had not yet noticed this "sore spot"!

Thus the *Iskra*-ists were opposed by the Bund, *Rabocheye Dyelo* and Comrade Makhov, who together controlled

the ten votes which were cast against us (p. 33). *Thirty votes* were cast *in favour*—this is the figure, as we shall see later, around which the votes of the *Iskra*-ists often fluctuated. Eleven abstained, apparently not taking the side of either of the contending "parties". It is interesting to note that when we took the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the Bund (it was the rejection of this Paragraph 2 that caused the Bund to withdraw from the Party), the votes in favour of it and the abstentions also amounted to ten (Minutes, p. 289), the abstainers being the three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists (Brouckère, Martynov, and Akimov) and Comrade Makhov. Clearly, the grouping in the vote on the *place* of the Bund item on the agenda was *not fortuitous*. Clearly, all these comrades differed with *Iskra* not only on the technical question of the order of discussion, but *in essence as well*. In the case of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, this difference in essence is clear to everyone, while Comrade Makhov gave an inimitable description of his attitude in the speech he made on the withdrawal of the Bund (Minutes, pp. 289-90). It is worth while dwelling on this speech. Comrade Makhov said that after the resolution rejecting federation, "the position of the Bund in the R.S.D.L.P. ceased to be for me a question of principle and became a question of practical politics in relation to an historically evolved national organisation". "Here," the speaker continued, "I could not but take into account all the consequences that might follow from our vote, and would therefore have voted for Paragraph 2 in its entirety." Comrade Makhov has admirably imbibed the spirit of "practical politics": in principle he had *already* rejected federation, and *therefore* in practice *he would have voted* for including in the Rules a point that signified federation! And this "practical" comrade explained his profound position of principle in the following words: "But [the famous Shchedrin "but"!] since my voting one way or the other would only have significance in principle [!!] and could not be of any practical importance, in view of the almost unanimous vote of all the other Congress delegates, I preferred to abstain in order to bring out in principle [God preserve us from such principles!] the difference between my position on this question and the position of the Bund delegates, who voted in favour. Conversely, I would have voted in favour if the

Bund delegates had abstained, as they had at first insisted." Can you make head or tail of it? A man of principle abstains from loudly saying "Yes" because practically it is useless when everybody else says "No".

After the vote on the place of the Bund item on the agenda, the question of the Borba group cropped up at the Congress; it too led to an extremely interesting grouping and was closely bound up with the "sorest" point at the Congress, namely, the personal composition of the central bodies. The committee appointed to determine the composition of the Congress pronounced against inviting the Borba group, in accordance with a *twice-adopted* decision of the Organising Committee (see Minutes, pp. 383 and 375) and the report of *the latter's representatives on this committee* (p. 35).

Thereupon Comrade Egorov, *a member of the Organising Committee*, declared that "the question of Borba" (mark, of Borba, not of some particular member of it) was "new to him", and demanded an adjournment. How a question on which the Organising Committee had twice taken a decision could be new to a member of the Organising Committee remains a mystery. During the adjournment the Organising Committee held a meeting (Minutes, p. 40), attended by such of its members as happened to be at the Congress (several members of the Organising Committee, old members of the *Iskra* organisation, were not at the Congress).* Then began a debate about Borba. The *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists spoke in favour (Martynov, Akimov, and Brouckère—pp. 36-38), the *Iskra*-ists (Pavlovich, Sorokin, Lange,[92] Trotsky, Martov, and others)—against. Again the Congress split up into the grouping with which we are already familiar. The struggle over Borba was a stubborn one, and Comrade Martov made a very circumstantial (p. 38) and "militant" speech, in which he rightly referred to "inequality of representation" of the groups in Russia and abroad, and said that it would hardly be "well" to allow a foreign group any "privilege" (golden words, particularly edifying today, in the light of the events since the Congress!), and that we should not

* Concerning this meeting, see the "Letter" of Pavlovich,[91] who was A member of the Organising Committee and who before the Congress was *unanimously* elected as the editorial board's trusted representative, its seventh member (League Minutes, p. 44.).

encourage "the organisational chaos in the Party that was characterised by a disunity not justified by any considerations of principle" (one right in the eye for ... the "minority" at our Party Congress!). Except for the followers of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, *nobody* came out openly and with reasoned motives in favour of Borba until the list of speakers was closed (p. 40). It should be said in fairness to Comrade Akimov and his friends that they at least did not wriggle and hide, but frankly advocated their line, frankly said what they wanted.

After the list of speakers had been closed, when it was already out of order to speak *on the issue itself*, Comrade Egorov "insistently demanded that a decision just adopted by the Organising Committee be heard". It is not surprising that the delegates were outraged at this manoeuvre, and Comrade Plekhanov, the chairman, expressed his "astonishment that Comrade Egorov should insist upon his demand". One thing or the other, one would think: either take an open and definite stand before the whole Congress on the question at issue, or say nothing at all. But to allow the list of speakers to be closed and then, under the guise of a "reply to the debate", confront the Congress with a *new* decision of the Organising Committee on the very subject that had been under discussion, was like a stab in the back!

When the sitting was resumed after dinner, the Bureau, still in perplexity, decided to waive "formalities" and resort to the last method, adopted at congresses only in extreme cases, viz., "comradely explanation". The spokesman of the Organising Committee, Popov, announced the committee's decision, which had been adopted by all its members against one, Pavlovich (p. 43), and which recommended the Congress to invite Ryazanov.

Pavlovich declared that he had challenged and continued to challenge the lawfulness of the Organising Committee meeting, and that the Committee's new decision "*contradicts its earlier decision*". This statement caused an uproar. Comrade Egorov, also an Organising Committee member and a member of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, evaded answering on the actual point in question and tried to make the central issue one of discipline. He claimed that Comrade Pavlovich had violated Party discipline (1), for, having heard his protest, the Organising Committee had decided "not to lay

Pavlovich's dissenting opinion before the Congress". The debate shifted to the question of Party discipline, and Plekhanov, amid the loud applause of the delegates, explained for the edification of Comrade Egorov that "*we have no such thing as binding instructions*" (p. 42; cf. p. 379, Regulations for the Congress, Point 7: "The powers of delegates must not be restricted by binding instructions. In the exercise of their powers, delegates are absolutely free and independent"). "The Congress is the supreme Party authority", and, consequently, he violates Party discipline and the Congress Regulations who in any way restricts any delegate in taking *directly* to the Congress *any* question of Party life whatsoever. The issue thus came down to this: circles or a party? Were the rights of delegates to be restricted at the Congress in the name of the imaginary rights or rules of the various bodies and circles, or were *all* lower bodies and old groups to be *completely*, and not nominally but actually, disbanded in face of the Congress, pending the creation of genuinely Party official institutions? The reader will already see from this how profoundly important from the standpoint of principle was this dispute at the very outset (the third sitting) of this Congress whose purpose was the actual restoration of the Party. Focused in this dispute, as it were, was the conflict between the old circles and small groups (such as *Yuzhny Rabochy*) and the renascent Party. And the anti-*Iskra* groups at once revealed themselves: the Bundist Abramson, Comrade Martynov, that ardent ally of the present *Iskra* editorial board, and our friend Comrade Makhov all sided with Egorov and the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group against Pavlovich. Comrade Martynov, who now vies with Martov and Axelrod in sporting "democracy" in organisation, even cited the example of ... the army, where an appeal to a superior authority can only be made through a lower one!! The true meaning of this "compact" anti-*Iskra* opposition was quite clear to everyone who was present at the Congress or who had carefully followed the internal history of our Party prior to the Congress. It was the purpose of the opposition (perhaps not always realised by all of its representatives, and sometimes pursued by force of inertia) to guard the independence, individualism and parochial interests of the small, petty groups from being

swallowed up in the broad Party that was being built on the *Iskra* principles.

It was precisely from this angle that the question was approached by Comrade Martov, who had not yet joined forces with Martynov. Comrade Martov vigorously took the field, and rightly so, against those whose "notion of Party discipline does not go beyond a revolutionary's duty to the particular group of a *lower* order to which he belongs". "No *compulsory* [Martov's italics] grouping can be tolerated within a united Party," he explained to the champions of the circle mentality, not foreseeing what a flail these words would be for his own political conduct at the end of the Congress and after.... A compulsory grouping cannot be tolerated in the case of the Organising Committee, but can quite well be tolerated in the case of the editorial board. Martov condemns a compulsory grouping when he looks at it from the centre, but Martov defends it the moment he finds himself dissatisfied with the composition of the centre....

It is interesting to note that in his speech Comrade Martov laid particular stress not only on Comrade Egorov's "profound error", but also on the political instability the Organising Committee had displayed. "A recommendation has been submitted on behalf of the Organising Committee," he exclaimed in just indignation, "which *runs counter* to the committee report [based, we will add, on the report of members of the Organising Committee—p. 43, Koltsov's remarks] and *to the Organising Committee's own earlier recommendations*." (My italics.) As we see, *at that time*, before his "swing-over", Martov clearly realised that substituting Ryazanov for Borba in no way removed the utter contradictoriness and inconsistency of the Organising Committee's actions (Party members may learn from the League Congress Minutes, p. 57, how Martov conceived the matter after his swing-over). Martov did not confine himself then to analysing the issue of discipline; he bluntly asked the Organising Committee: "What new circumstance has arisen to necessitate the *change*?" (My italics.) And, indeed, when the Organising Committee made its recommendation, it did not even have the courage to defend its opinion openly, as Akimov and the others did. Martov denies this (League Minutes, p. 56), but whoever reads the minutes of the Congress will

see that he is mistaken. Popov, in submitting the Organising Committee recommendation, *did not say a word* about the motives (Party Congress Minutes, p. 41). Egorov shifted the issue to one of discipline, and all he said on the question itself was: "The Organising Committee may have had new reasons [but whether it did, and what those new reasons were, is unknown]; it could have forgotten to nominate somebody, and so on. [This "and so on" was the speaker's sole refuge, for the Organising Committee could not have *forgotten* about Borba, which it had discussed twice before the Congress and once in the committee.] The Organising Committee did not adopt this decision not because it had changed its attitude towards the Borba group, but because it wants to remove unnecessary rocks in the path of the Party's future central organisation at the very outset of its activities." This is not a reason, but an evasion of a reason. Every sincere Social-Democrat (and we do not entertain the least doubt about the sincerity of any Congress delegate) is concerned to remove what *he considers* to be sunken rocks, and to remove them by *those methods* which *he considers* advisable. Giving reasons means explicitly stating and explaining one's view of things, and not making shift with truisms. And they *could not* give a reason without "changing their attitude towards Borba", because in its earlier and contrary decisions the Organising Committee had also been concerned to remove sunken rocks, but it had then regarded the very opposite as "rocks". And Comrade Martov very severely and very rightly attacked this argument, saying that it was "*petty*" and inspired by a wish to "*burke the issue*", and advising the Organising Committee "*not to be afraid of what people will say*". These words characterise perfectly the essential nature of the political shade which played so large a part at the Congress and which is distinguished precisely by its want of independence, its pettiness, its lack of a line of its own, its fear of what people will say, its constant vacillation between the two definite sides, its fear of plainly stating its *credo*—in a word, by all the features of a "Marsh".*

* There are people in our Party today who are horrified when they hear this word, and raise an outcry about uncomradely methods of controversy. A strange perversion of sensibility due to ... a misapplied sense of official form! There is scarcely a political party acquainted

A consequence of this political spinelessness of the unstable group was, incidentally, that *no one* except the Bundist Yudin (p. 53) did put before the Congress a resolution to invite one of the members of the Borba group. Yudin's resolution received five votes—all Bundists, apparently: the vacillating elements had changed sides again! How large was the vote of the middle group is shown approximately by the voting on the resolutions of Koltsov and Yudin on this question: the *Iskra*-ist received thirty-two votes (p. 47), the Bundist received sixteen, that is, in addition to the eight anti-*Iskra*-ist votes, the two votes of Comrade Makhov (cf. p. 46), the four votes of the members of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, and two others. We shall show in a moment that this alignment can by no means be regarded as accidental; but first let us briefly note Martov's *present* opinion of this Organising Committee incident. Martov maintained at the League that "Pavlovich and others fanned passions". One has only to consult the Congress Minutes to see that the longest, most heated and sharpest speeches against Borba and the Organising Committee were delivered by Martov himself. By trying to lay the "blame" on Pavlovich he only demonstrates his own instability: it was Pavlovich he helped to elect prior to the Congress as the seventh member of the editorial board; at the Congress he fully associated himself with Pavlovich (p. 44) against Egorov; but afterwards, having suffered defeat at the hands of Pavlovich, he began to accuse him of "fanning passions". This is ludicrous.

Martov waxes ironical in *Iskra* (No. 56) over the importance that was attached to whether X or Y should be invited. But again the irony turns against Martov, for it was this Organising Committee incident that started the dispute over such an "important" question as inviting X or Y on to the Central Committee or the Central Organ. It is unseemly to measure with two different yardsticks, depending on whether the matter concerns *your own* "group of a lower order"

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with internal struggles that has managed to do without this term, by which the unstable elements who vacillate between the contending sides have always been designated. Even the Germans, who know how to keep their internal struggles within very definite bounds indeed, are not offended by the word *versumpft* (sunk in the marsh—*Ed.*), are not horrified, and do not display ridiculous official prudery.

(relative to the Party) or *someone else*'s. This is precisely a philistine and circle, not a Party attitude. A simple comparison of Martov's speech at the League (p. 57) with his speech at the Congress (p. 44) sufficiently demonstrates this. "I cannot understand," Martov said, *inter alia*, at the League, "how people can insist on calling themselves *Iskra*-ists and at the same time be ashamed of being *Iskra*-ists." A strange failure to understand the difference between "calling oneself" and "being"—between word and deed. Martov himself, at the Congress, *called himself* an opponent of compulsory groupings, yet, after the Congress, came to *be* a supporter of them....

D. DISSOLUTION OF THE *YUZHNY RABOCHY* GROUP

The alignment of the delegates over the Organising Committee question may perhaps seem accidental. But such an opinion would be wrong, and in order to dispel it we shall depart from the chronological order and at once examine an incident which occurred at the end of the Congress, but which was very closely connected with the one just discussed. This incident was the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group. The organisational trend of *Iskra*—complete amalgamation of the Party forces and removal of the chaos dividing them—came into conflict here with the interests of *one* of the groups, which had done useful work when there was no real party, but which had become superfluous now that the work was being centralised. From the standpoint of circle interests, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group was entitled no less than the old *Iskra* editorial board to lay claim to "continuity" and inviolability. But in the interests of the Party, it was its duty to submit to the transfer of its forces to "the appropriate Party organisations" (p. 313, end of resolution adopted by the Congress). From the standpoint of circle interests and "philistinism", the dissolution of a useful group, which no more desired it than did the old *Iskra* editorial board, could not but seem a "ticklish matter" (the expression used by Comrade Rusov and Comrade Deutsch). But from the standpoint of the interests of the Party, its dissolution, its "assimilation" in the Party (Gusev's expression), was essential. The *Yuzhny Rabochy* group bluntly declared that it "did not deem it

necessary" to proclaim itself dissolved and demanded that "the Congress definitely pronounce its opinion", and pronounce it "immediately: yes or no". The *Yuzhny Rabochy* group openly invoked the same "continuity" as the old *Iskra* editorial board began to invoke ... after it was dissolved! "Although we are all individually members of one Party," Comrade Egorov said, "it nevertheless consists of a number of organisations, with which we have to reckon as *historical entities*.... If such an organisation *is not detrimental to the Party*, *there is no need to dissolve it*."

Thus an important question of *principle* was quite definitely raised, and all the *Iskra*-ists—inasmuch as their own circle interests had not yet come to the forefront—took a decisive stand against the unstable elements (the Bundists and two of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists had already withdrawn from the Congress; they would undoubtedly have been heart and soul in favour of "reckoning with historical entities"). The result of the vote was *thirty-one for*, five against and five abstentions (the four votes of the members of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group and one other, that of Byelov, most likely, judging by his earlier pronouncements, p. 308). A group of *ten votes* distinctly opposed to *Iskra*'s consistent organisational plan and defending the circle spirit as against the party spirit can be quite definitely discerned here. During the debate the *Iskra*-ists presented the question precisely from the standpoint of principle (see Lange's speech, p. 315), opposing parochial amateurishness and disunity, refusing to pay heed to the "sympathies" of individual organisations, and plainly declaring that "if the comrades of *Yuzhny Rabochy* had adhered more strictly to principle earlier, a year or two ago, the unity of the Party and the triumph of the programme principles we have sanctioned here would have been achieved sooner" . Orlov, Gusev, Lyadov, Muravyov, Rusov, Paylovich, Glebov, and Gorin all spoke in this strain. And far from protesting against these definite and repeated references made at the Congress to the lack of principle in the policy and "line" of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, of Makhov and of others, far from making any reservation on this score, the *Iskra*-ists of the "minority", in the person of Deutsch, vigorously associated themselves with these views, condemned "chaos", and welcomed the "blunt

way the question was put" (p. 315) by that very same Comrade Rusov who, *at this same sitting*, had the audacity—oh, horror!—to "bluntly put" the question of the old editorial board too on a purely Party basis (p. 325).

On the part of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group the proposal to dissolve it evoked violent indignation, traces of which are to be found in the minutes (it should not be forgotten that the minutes offer only a pale reflection of the debates, for they do not give the full speeches, but only very condensed summaries and extracts). Comrade Egorov even described as a "lie" the bare mention of the *Rabochaya Mysl* group[93] alongside of *Yuzhny Rabochy*—a characteristic sample of the attitude that prevailed at the Congress towards consistent Economism. Even much later, at the 37th sitting, Egorov spoke of the dissolution of *Yuzhny Rabochy* with the utmost irritation (p. 356), requesting to have it recorded in the minutes that during the discussion on *Yuzhny Rabochy* the members of the group had not been asked either about publication funds or about control by the Central Organ and the Central Committee. Comrade Popov hinted, during the debate on *Yuzhny Rabochy*, at a compact majority having predetermined the fate of the group. "*Now*," he said (p. 316), "*after the speeches of Comrades Gusev and Orlov*, *everything is clear*." The meaning of these words is unmistakable: now, after the *Iskra*-ists had stated their opinion and moved a resolution, everything was clear, i.e., it was clear that *Yuzhny Rabochy* would be dissolved, against its own wishes. Here the *Yuzhny Rabochy* spokesman himself drew a distinction between the *Iskra*-ists (and, moreover, *Iskra*-ists like Gusev and Orlov) and his own supporters, as representing different "lines" of organisational policy. And when the present-day *Iskra* represents the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group (and Makhov too, most likely?) as "typical *Iskra*-ists", it only demonstrates that the new editorial board has forgotten the most important (from this group's standpoint) events of the Congress and is anxious to cover up the evidence showing what elements went to form what is known as the "minority".

Unfortunately, the question of a popular periodical was not discussed at the Congress. It was very actively discussed by all the *Iskra*-ists both before the Congress and during

the Congress itself, outside the sittings, and they agreed that it would be highly irrational at this moment in the Party's life to launch such a publication or convert any of the existing ones for the purpose. The anti-*Iskra*-ists expressed the opposite opinion at the Congress; so did the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group in their report; and the fact that a motion to this effect, with ten signatures, was not tabled can only be attributed to chance, or to a disinclination to raise a "hopeless" issue.

E. THE EQUALITY OF LANGUAGES INCIDENT

Let us return to the chronological order of the Congress sittings.

We have now convincingly seen that even before the Congress proceeded to discuss its actual business, there was clearly revealed not only a perfectly definite group of anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight votes), but also a group of intermediate and unstable elements prepared to support the eight anti-*Iskra*-ists and increase their votes to roughly sixteen or eighteen.

The question of the position of the Bund in the Party, which was discussed at the Congress in extreme, excessive detail, reduced itself to deciding about the principle, while its practical decision was postponed until the discussion on organisation. Since the points involved had been given quite a lot of space in the press prior to the Congress, the discussion at the Congress produced relatively little that was new. It must, however, be mentioned that the supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Martynov, Akimov, and Brouckère), while agreeing with Martov's resolution, made the reservation that they found it inadequate and disagreed with the conclusions drawn from it (pp. 69, 73, 83 and 86).

After discussing the position of the Bund, the Congress passed on to the programme. This discussion centred mainly around amendments of detail which present but slight interest. The opposition of the anti-*Iskra*-ists on matters of principle found expression only in Comrade Martynov's onslaught on the famous presentation of the question of spontaneity and consciousness. Martynov was, of course, backed by the Bundists and *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists to a man. The un-

soundness of his objections was pointed out, among others, by Martov and Plekhanov. It should be noted as a curiosity that the *Iskra* editorial board (on second thoughts, apparently) have now gone over to Martynov's side and are saying the opposite of what they said at the Congress! Presumably, this is in accordance with the celebrated principle of "continuity".... It only remains for us to wait until the editorial board have thoroughly cleared up the question and explain to us just how far they agree with Martynov, on what points exactly, and since when. Meanwhile, we only ask: has anyone ever seen a *party* organ whose editorial board said after a congress the very opposite of what they had said at the congress?

Passing over the arguments about the adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ (we dealt with that above) and the beginning of the debate on the Rules (which it will be more convenient to examine in connection with the whole discussion of the Rules), let us consider the shades of principle revealed during the discussion of the programme. First of all let us note one detail of a highly characteristic nature, namely, the debate on proportional representation. Comrade Egorov of *Yuzhny Rabochy* advocated the inclusion of this point in the programme, and did so in a way that called forth the justified remark from Posadovsky (an *Iskra*-ist of the minority) that there was a "serious difference of opinion". "There can be no doubt," said Comrade Posadovsky, "that we do not agree on the following fundamental question: *should we subordinate our future policy to certain fundamental democratic principles and attribute absolute value to them*, or should all democratic principles be exclusively subordinated to the interests of our Party? I am decidedly in favour of the latter." Plekhanov "fully associated himself" with Posadovsky, objecting in even more definite and emphatic terms to "the absolute value of democratic principles" and to regarding them "abstractly". "Hypothetically," he said, "a case is conceivable where we Social-Democrats would oppose universal suffrage. There was a time when the bourgeoisie of the Italian republics deprived members of the nobility of political rights. The revolutionary proletariat may restrict the political rights of the upper classes in the same way as the upper classes used to restrict its polit-

ical rights." Plekhanov's speech was greeted with applause and *hissing*, and when Plekhanov protested against somebody's *Zwischenruf*,* "You should not hiss," and told the comrades not to restrain their demonstrations, Comrade Egorov got up and said: "Since such speeches call forth applause, I am obliged to hiss." Together with Comrade Goldblatt (a Bund delegate), Comrade Egorov challenged the views of Posadovsky and Plekhanov. Unfortunately, the debate was closed, and this question that had cropped up in it immediately vanished from the scene. But it is useless for Comrade Martov to attempt now to belittle or even altogether deny its significance by saying at the League Congress: "These words [Plekhanov's] aroused the indignation of some of the delegates; this could easily have been avoided if Comrade Plekhanov had added that it was of course impossible to imagine so tragic a situation as that the proletariat, in order to consolidate its victory, should have to trample on such political rights as freedom of the press.... (*Plekhanov*: '*Merci*.')" (League Minutes, p. 58.) This interpretation *directly* contradicts Comrade Posadovsky's categorical statement *at the Congress* about a "serious difference of opinion" and disagreement on a "fundamental question". On this fundamental question, all the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress *opposed* the spokesmen of the anti-*Iskra* "Right" (Goldblatt) and of the Congress "Centre" (Egorov). This is a fact, and one may safely assert that if the "Centre" (I hope this word will shock the "official" supporters of mildness less than any other...) had had occasion to speak "*without restraint*" (through the mouth of Comrade Egorov or Makhov) on this or on analogous questions, the serious difference of opinion would have been revealed at once.

It was revealed even more distinctly over the matter of "equality of languages" (Minutes, p. 171 et seq.). On this point it was not so much the debate that was so eloquent, but the voting: counting up the times a vote was taken, we get the incredible number of *sixteen*! Over what? Over whether it was enough to stipulate in the programme the equality of all citizens irrespective of sex, etc., *and language*, or whether it was necessary to stipulate "freedom of lan-

* Interjection from the floor.—*Ed*.

guage", or "equality of languages". Comrade Martov characterised this episode fairly accurately at the League Congress when he said that "a trifling dispute over the formulation of one point of the programme became a matter of principle because half the Congress was prepared to overthrow the Programme Committee". Precisely.* The immediate cause of the conflict was indeed trifling, yet it did become a matter of *principle* and consequently assumed terribly bitter forms, even to the point of attempts to "*overthrow*" the Programme Committee, of suspecting people of a desire to "*mislead the Congress*" (as Egorov suspected Martov!), and of personal remarks of the most ... abusive kind (p. 178). Even Comrade Popov "expressed regret that mere trifles had given rise to *such an atmosphere*" (my italics, p. 182) as prevailed during the course of three sittings (the 16th, 17th and 18th).

All these expressions very definitely and categorically point to the extremely important fact that the atmosphere of "suspicion" and of the most bitter farms of conflict ("overthrowing")—for which later, at the League Congress, the *Iskra*-ist majority were held responsible!—actually arose *long before we split into a majority and minority*. I repeat, this is a fact of enormous importance, a fundamental fact, and failure to understand it leads a great many people to very thoughtless conclusions about the majority at the end of the Congress having been artificial. From the present

* Martov added: "On this occasion much harm was done by Plekhanov's witticism about asses." (When the question of freedom of language was being discussed, a Bundist, I think it was, mentioned stud farms among other institutions, whereupon Plekhanov said in a loud undertone: "Horses don't talk, but asses sometimes do.") I cannot, of course, see anything particularly mild, accommodating, tactful or flexible about this witticism. But I find it strange that Martov, who admitted that the dispute became a *matter of principle*, made absolutely no attempt to analyse what this principle was and what shades of opinion found expression here, but confined himself to talking about the "harmfulness" of witticisms. This is indeed a bureaucratic and formalistic attitude! It is true that "much harm was done at the Congress" by cutting witticisms, levelled not only at the Bundists, but also at those whom the Bundists sometimes supported and even saved from defeat. However, once you admit that the incident involved principles, you cannot confine yourself to phrases about the "impermissibility" (League Minutes, p. 58) of certain witticisms.

point of view of Comrade Martov, who asserts that nine-tenths of the Congress delegates were *Iskra*-ists, the fact that "mere trifles", a "trivial" cause, could give rise to a conflict which became a "matter of principle" and nearly led to the overthrow of a Congress commission is absolutely inexplicable and absurd. It would be ridiculous to evade this *fact* with lamentations and regrets about "harmful" witticisms. No cutting witticisms could have made the conflict a matter of *principle*; it could become that only because of the character of the political groupings at the Congress. It was not cutting remarks and witticisms that gave rise to the conflict—they were only a *symptom* of the fact that the Congress political grouping itself harboured a "contradiction", that it harboured all the makings of a conflict, that it harboured an internal heterogeneity which burst forth with immanent force at the least cause, *even the most trifling*.

On the other hand, from the point of view from which I regard the Congress, and which I deem it my duty to uphold as a definite political interpretation of the events, even though this interpretation may seem offensive to some—from this point of view the desperately acute conflict of *principle* that arose from a "trifling" cause is quite explicable and inevitable. Since a struggle between the *Iskra*-ists and the anti-*Iskra*-ists went on *all the time* at our Congress, since between them stood unstable elements, and since the latter, together with the anti-*Iskra*-ists, controlled one-third of the votes (8 + 10 = 18, out of 51, according to my calculation, an approximate one, of course), it is perfectly clear and natural that *any falling away from the "Iskra"-ists of even a small minority* created the possibility of a victory for the anti-*Iskra* trend and therefore evoked a "frenzied" struggle. This was not the result of improper cutting remarks and attacks, but of the political combination. It was not cutting remarks that gave rise to the political conflict; it was the existence of a political conflict in the very grouping at the Congress that gave rise to cutting remarks and attacks—this contrast expresses the cardinal disagreement in principle between Martov and myself in appraising the political significance of the Congress and its results.

In all, there were during the Congress three major cases of a small number of *Iskra*-ists falling away from the major-

ity—over the equality of languages question, over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, and over the elections—and in all three cases a fierce struggle ensued, finally leading to the severe crisis we have in the Party today. For a political understanding of this crisis and this struggle, we must not confine ourselves to phrases about the impermissibility of witticisms, but must examine the political grouping of the shades that clashed at the Congress. The "equality of languages" incident is therefore doubly interesting as far as ascertaining the causes of the divergence is concerned, for here Martov was (still was!) an *Iskra*-ist and fought the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" harder perhaps than anybody else.

The war opened with an argument between Comrade Martov and Comrade Lieber, the leader of the Bundists (pp. 171-72). Martov argued that the demand for "equality of citizens" was enough. "Freedom of language" was rejected, but "equality of languages" was forthwith proposed, and Comrade Egorov joined Lieber in the fray. Martov declared that it was *fetishism* "when speakers insist that nationalities are equal and transfer inequality to the sphere of language, whereas the question should be examined from just the opposite angle: inequality of nationalities exists, and one of its expressions is that people belonging to certain nations are deprived of the right to use their mother tongue" (p. 172). There Martov was absolutely right. The totally baseless attempt of Lieber and Egorov to insist on the correctness of their formulation and make out that we were unwilling or unable to uphold the principle of equality of nationalities was indeed a sort of fetishism. Actually, they were, like "fetish-worshippers", defending the word and not the principle, acting not from fear of committing an error of principle, but from fear of what people might say. This shaky mentality (what if "others" blame us for this?)—which we already noted in connection with the Organising Committee incident—was quite clearly displayed here by our entire "Centre". Another of its spokesmen, the Mining Area delegate Lvov, who stood close to *Yuzhny Rabochy*, declared that "the question of the suppression of languages which has been raised by the border districts is a very serious one. It is important to include a point on

language in our programme and thus obviate any possibility of the Social-Democrats being suspected of Russifying tendencies." A remarkable explanation of the "seriousness" of the question. It is very serious *because* possible suspicions on the part of the border districts must be obviated! The speaker says absolutely nothing on the substance of the question, he does not rebut the charge of fetishism but entirely confirms it, for he shows a complete lack of arguments of his own and merely talks about what the border districts may say. Everything they *may* say will be *untrue* —he is told. But instead of examining whether it is true or not, he replies: "*They may suspect*."

Such a presentation of the question, coupled with the claim that it is serious and important, does indeed raise an issue of principle, but by no means the one the Liebers, Egorovs, and Lvovs would discern in it. The principle involved is: should we leave it to the organisations and members of the Party to apply the general and fundamental theses of the programme to their specific conditions, and to develop them for the purpose of such application, or are we, merely out of fear of suspicion, to fill the programme with petty details, minutiae, repetitions, and casuistry? The principle involved is: how can Social-Democrats discern ("suspect") in a fight against casuistry an attempt to restrict elementary democratic rights ana liberties? When are we going to wean ourselves at last from this fetishist worship of casuistry?—that was the thought that occurred to us when watching this struggle over "languages".

The grouping of the delegates in this struggle is made particularly clear by the abundant roll-call votes. There were as many as three. All the time the *Iskra* core was solidly opposed by the anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight votes) and, with very slight fluctuations, by the whole Centre (Makhov, Lvov, Egorov, Popov, Medvedev, Ivanov, Tsaryov, and Byelov—only the last two vacillated at first, now abstaining, now voting with us, and it was only during the third vote that their position became fully defined). Of the *Iskra*-ists, several fell away—chiefly the Caucasians (three with six votes)—and thanks to this the "fetishist" trend ultimately gained the upper hand. During the third vote, when the followers of both trends had clarified their position most fully,

the three Caucasians, with six votes, broke away from the majority *Iskra*-ists and went, over to the other side; two delegates—Posadovsky and Kostich—with two votes, fell away from the minority *Iskra*-ists. During the first two votes, the following had gone over to the other side or abstained: Lensky, Stepanov, and Gorsky of the *Iskra*-ist majority, and Deutsch of the minority. *The falling away of eight "Iskra"-ist votes* (*out of a total of thirty-three*) *gave the superiority to the coalition of the anti-"Iskra"-ists and the unstable elements*. It was just this *fundamental fact* of the Congress grouping that was repeated (only with *other Iskra*-ists falling away) during the vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules and during the elections. It is not surprising that those who were defeated in the elections now carefully close their eyes to the *political reasons* for that defeat, to the *starting-points* of that conflict of shades which progressively revealed the unstable and politically spineless elements and exposed them ever more relentlessly in the eyes of the Party. The equality of languages incident shows us this conflict all the more clearly because at that time Comrade Martov had not yet earned the praises and approval of Akimov and Makhov.

F. THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

The inconsistency of principle of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" was also clearly brought out by the debate on the agrarian programme, which took up so much time at the Congress (see Minutes, pp. 190-226) and raised quite a number of extremely interesting points. As was to be expected, the campaign against the programme was launched by Comrade Martynov (after some minor remarks by Comrades Lieber and Egorov). He brought out the old argument about redressing "this particular historical injustice", whereby, he claimed, we were indirectly "sanctifying other historical injustices", and so on. He was joined by Comrade Egorov, who even found that "the significance of this programme is unclear. Is it a programme for ourselves, that is, does it define our demands, or do we want to make it popular?" (!?!?) Comrade Lieber said he "would like to make the same points as Comrade Egorov". Comrade Makhov spoke up in

his usual positive manner and declared that "the majority [?] of the speakers positively cannot understand what the programme submitted means and what its aims are". The proposed programme, you see, "can hardly be considered a Social-Democratic agrarian programme"; it ... "smacks somewhat of a game at redressing historical injustices"; it bears "the trace of demagogy and adventurism". As a theoretical justification of this profundity came the caricature and oversimplification so customary in vulgar Marxism: the *Iskra*-ists, we were told, "want to treat the peasants as something homogeneous in composition; but as the peasantry split up into classes long ago [?], advancing a single programme must inevitably render the whole programme demagogic and make it adventurist when put into practice (p. 202). Comrade Makhov here "blurted out" the real reason why our agrarian programme meets with the disapproval of many Social-Democrats, who are prepared to "recognise" *Iskra* (as Makhov himself did) but who have absolutely failed to grasp its trend, its theoretical and tactical position. It was the vulgarisation of Marxism as applied to so complex and many-sided a phenomenon as the present-day system of Russian peasant economy, and not differences over particulars, that was and is responsible for the failure to understand this programme. And on this vulgar-Marxist standpoint the leaders of the anti-*Iskra* elements (Lieber and Martynov) and of the "Centre" (Egorov and Makhov) quickly found themselves in harmony. Comrade Egorov gave frank expression also to one of the characteristic features of *Yuzhny Rabochy* and the groups and circles gravitating towards it, namely, their failure to grasp the importance of the peasant movement, their failure to grasp that it was not overestimation, but, on the contrary, underestimation of its importance (and a lack of forces to utilise it) that was the weak side of our Social-Democrats at the time of the first famous peasant revolts. "I am far from sharing the infatuation of the editorial board for the peasant movement," said Comrade Egorov, "an infatuation to which many Social-Democrats have succumbed since the peasant disturbances." But, unfortunately, Comrade Egorov did not take the trouble to give the Congress any precise idea of what this infatuation of the *editorial board* consisted in; he did not take

the trouble to make specific reference to any of the material published by *Iskra*. Moreover, he forgot that *all* the fundamental points of our agrarian programme had already been developed by *Iskra* in its third issue,* that is, *long before* the peasant disturbances. Those whose "recognition" of *Iskra* was not merely verbal might well have given a little more attention to its theoretical and tactical principles!

"No, we cannot do much among the peasants!" Comrade Egorov exclaimed, and he went on to indicate that this exclamation was not meant as a protest against any particular "infatuation", but as a denial of our entire position: "It means that our slogan cannot compete with the slogan of the adventurists." A most characteristic formulation of an unprincipled attitude, which reduces everything to "competition" between the slogans of different parties! And this was said after the speaker had pronounced himself "satisfied" with the theoretical explanations, which pointed out that we strove for lasting success in our agitation, undismayed by temporary failures, and that lasting success (as against the resounding clamour of our "competitors"... for a short time) was impossible unless the programme had a firm theoretical basis (p. 196). What confusion is disclosed by this assurance of "satisfaction" followed by a repetition of the vulgar precepts inherited from the old Economism, for which the "competition of slogans" decided everything—not only the agrarian question, but the entire programme and tactics of the economic and political struggle! "You will not induce the agricultural labourer," Comrade Egorov said, "to fight side by side with the rich peasant for the cut-off lands, which to no small extent are already in this rich peasant's hands."

There again you have the same over-simplification, undoubtedly akin to our opportunist Economism, which insisted that it was impossible to "induce" the proletarian to fight for what was to no small extent in the hands of the bourgeoisie and would fall into its hands to an even larger extent in the future. There again you have the vulgarisation that forgets the Russian peculiarities of the general capitalist relations between the agricultural labourer and the rich peas-

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

ant. Actually, the cut-off lands today oppress the agricultural labourer *as well*, and he does not have to be "induced" to fight for emancipation from his state of servitude. It is certain intellectuals who have to be "induced"—induced to take a wider view of their tasks, induced to renounce stereotyped formulas when discussing specific questions, induced to take account of the historical situation, which complicates and modifies our aims. It is only the superstition that the muzhik is stupid—a superstition which, as Comrade Martov rightly remarked (p. 202), was to be detected in the speeches of Comrade Makhov and the other opponents of the agrarian programme—only this superstition explains why these opponents forget our agricultural labourer's actual conditions of life.

Having simplified the question into a naked contrast of worker and capitalist, the spokesmen of our "Centre" tried, as often happens, to ascribe their own narrow-mindedness to the muzhik. "It is precisely because I consider the muzhik, within the limits of his narrow class outlook, a clever fellow," Comrade Makhov remarked, "that I believe he will stand for the petty-bourgeois ideal of seizure and division." Two things are obviously confused here: the definition of the class outlook of the muzhik as that of a petty bourgeois, *and the restriction*, the reduction of *this* outlook to "narrow limits". It is in this reduction that the mistake of the Egorovs and Makhovs lies (just as the mistake of the Martynovs and Akimovs lay in reducing the outlook of the proletarian to "narrow limits"). For both logic and history teach us that the petty-bourgeois class outlook may be more or less narrow, and more or less progressive, precisely because of the dual status of the petty bourgeois. And far from dropping our hands in despair because of the narrowness ("stupidity") of the muzhik or because he is governed by "prejudice", we must work unremittingly to widen his outlook and help his reason to triumph over his prejudice.

The vulgar-"Marxist" view of the Russian agrarian question found its culmination in the concluding words of Comrade Makhov's speech, in which that faithful champion of the old *Iskra* editorial board set forth his principles. It was not for nothing that these words were greeted with applause ... true, it was ironical applause. "I do not know, of course,

what to call a misfortune", said Comrade Makhov, outraged by Plekhanov's statement that we were not at all alarmed by the movement for a General Redistribution,[94] and that we would not be the ones to hold back this progressive (bourgeois progressive) movement. "But this revolution, if it can be called such, would not be a revolutionary one. It would be truer to call it, not revolution, but reaction (*laughter*), a revolution that was more like a riot.... Such a revolution would throw us back, and it would require a certain amount of time to get back to the position we have today. Today we have far more than during the French Revolution (*ironical applause*), we have a Social-Democratic Party (*laughter*)...." Yes, a Social-Democratic Party which reasoned like Makhov, or which had central institutions of the Makhov persuasion, would indeed only deserve to be laughed at....

Thus we see that even on the purely theoretical questions raised by the agrarian programme, the already familiar grouping at once appeared. The anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight votes) rushed into the fray on behalf of vulgar Marxism, and the leaders of the "Centre", the Egorovs and Makhovs, trailed after them, constantly erring and straying into the same narrow outlook. It is quite natural, therefore, that the voting on certain points of the agrarian programme should have resulted in thirty and thirty-five votes in favour (pp. 225 and 226), that is, approximately the same figure as we observed in the dispute over the place of the Bund question on the agenda, in the Organising Committee incident, and in the question of shutting down *Yuzhny Rabochy*. An issue had only to arise which did not quite come within the already established and customary pattern, and which called for some independent application of Marx's theory to peculiar and new (new to the Germans) social and economic relations, and *Iskra*-ists who proved equal to the problems only made up three-fifths of the vote, while the whole "Centre" turned and followed the Liebers and Martynovs. Yet Comrade Martov strives to gloss over this obvious fact, fearfully avoiding all mention of votes where the shades of opinion were clearly revealed!

It is clearly evident from the debate on the agrarian programme that the *Iskra*-ists had to fight against a good two-fifths of the Congress. On this question the Caucasian

delegates took up an absolutely correct stand—due largely, in all probability, to the fact that first-hand knowledge of the forms taken by the numerous remnants of feudalism in their localities kept them from the schoolboyishly abstract and bare contrasts that satisfied the Makhovs. Martynov and Lieber, Makhov and Egorov were combated by Plekhanov, by Gusev (who declared that he had "frequently encountered such a pessimistic view of our work in the countryside" as Comrade Egorov's "among the comrades active in Russia"), by Kostrov,[95] by Karsky and by Trotsky. The latter rightly remarked that the "well-meant advice" of the critics of the agrarian programme "smacked too much of *philistinism*". It should only be said, since we are studying the political grouping at the Congress, that he was hardly correct when in this part of his speech (p. 208) he ranked Comrade Lange with Egorov and Makhov. Anyone who reads the minutes carefully will see that Lange and Gorin took quite a different stand from Egorov and Makhov. Lange and Gorin did not like the formulation of the point on the cut-off lands; they fully understood the idea of our agrarian programme, but tried to apply it *in a different way*, worked constructively to find what they considered a more irreproachable formulation, and in submitting their motions had in view either to convince the authors of the programme or else to side with them against all the non-*Iskra*-ists. For example, one has only to compare Makhov's motions to reject the whole agrarian programme (p. 212; *nine* for, thirty-eight against) or individual points in it (p. 216, etc.) with the position of Lange, who *moved* his own formulation of the point on the cut-off lands (p. 225), to become convinced of the radical difference between them.*

Referring to the arguments which smacked of "philistinism", Comrade Trotsky pointed out that "in the approaching revolutionary period we must link ourselves with the peasantry".... "In face of this task, the scepticism and political 'far-sightedness' of Makhov and Egorov are more harmful than any short-sightedness." Comrade Kostich, another minority *Iskra*-ist, very aptly pointed to Comrade Makhov's "unsureness of himself, of the stability of his princi-

* Cf. Gorin's speech, p. 213

ples"—a description that fits our "Centre" to a tittle. "In his pessimism Comrade Makhov is at one with Comrade Egorov, although they differ in shade," Comrade Kostich continued. "He forgets that the Social-Democrats are already working among the peasantry, are already directing their movement as far as possible. And this pessimism narrows the scope of our work" (p. 210).

To conclude our examination of the Congress discussion of the programme, it is worth while mentioning the brief debate on the subject of supporting oppositional trends. Our programme clearly states that the Social-Democratic Party supports "every *oppositional* and revolutionary movement *directed against the existing social and political order in Russia*". One would think that this last reservation made it quite clear *exactly which* oppositional trends we support. Nevertheless, the different shades that long ago developed in our Party at once revealed themselves *here too*, difficult as it was to suppose that any "perplexity or misunderstanding" was still possible on a question which had been chewed over so thoroughly! Evidently, it was not a matter of misunderstandings, but of *shades*. Makhov, Lieber, and Martynov at once sounded the alarm and again proved to be in so "compact" a minority that Comrade Martov would most likely have to attribute this too to intrigue, machination, diplomacy, and the other nice things (see his speech at the League Congress) to which people resort who are incapable of understanding the political reasons for the formation of "compact" groups of both minority and majority.

Makhov again began with a vulgar simplification of Marxism. "Our only revolutionary class is the proletariat," he declared, and from this correct premise he forthwith drew an incorrect conclusion: "The rest are of no account, they are mere hangers-on (*general laughter*).... Yes, they are mere hangers-on and only out to reap the benefits. I am against supporting them" (p. 226). Comrade Makhov's inimitable formulation of his position embarrassed many (of his supporters), but as a matter of fact Lieber and Martynov agreed with him when they proposed deleting the word "oppositional" or restricting it by an addition: "democratic-oppositional". Plekhanov quite rightly took the field against this. amendment of Martynov's. "We must criticise the liberals,"

he said, "expose their half-heartedness. That is true.... But while exposing the narrowness and limitations of all movements other than the Social-Democratic, it is our duty to explain to the proletariat that even a constitution which does not confer universal suffrage would he a step forward compared with absolutism, and that therefore it should not prefer the existing order to such a constitution." Comrades Martynov, Lieber, and Makhov would not agree with this and persisted in their position, which was attacked by Axelrod, Starover, and Trotsky and once more by Plekhanov. Comrade Makhov managed on this occasion to surpass himself. First he had said that the other classes (other than the proletariat) were "of no account" and that he was "against supporting them". Then he condescended to admit that "while essentially it is reactionary, the bourgeoisie is often revolutionary—for example, in the struggle against feudalism and its survivals". "But there are some groups," he continued, going from bad to worse, "which are always [?] reactionary—such are the handicraftsmen." Such were the gems of theory arrived at by those very leaders of our "Centre" who later foamed at the mouth in defence of the old editorial board! Even in Western Europe, where the guild system was so strong, it was the handicraftsmen, like the other petty bourgeois of the towns, who displayed an exceptionally revolutionary spirit in the era of the fall of absolutism. And it is particularly absurd of a Russian Social-Democrat to repeat without reflection what our Western comrades say about the handicraftsmen of today, that is, of an era separated by a century or half a century from the fall of absolutism. To speak of the handicraftsmen in Russia being politically reactionary as compared with the bourgeoisie is merely to repeat a set phrase learnt by rote.

Unfortunately, there is no record in the minutes of the number of votes cast for the rejected amendments of Martynov, Makhov, and Lieber on this question. All we can say is that, here too, the leaders of the anti-*Iskra* elements and one of the leaders of the "Centre"* joined forces in the already

* Another leader of this same group, the "Centre", Comrade Egorov, spoke on the question of supporting the oppositional trends on a different occasion, in connection with Axelrod's resolution on the

familiar grouping against the *Iskra*-ists. Summing up the *whole* discussion on the *programme*, one cannot help seeing that of the debates which were at all animated and evoked general interest there was *not one* that failed to reveal the difference of shades which Comrade Martov and the new *Iskra* editorial board now so carefully ignore.

G. THE PARTY RULES. COMRADE MARTOV'S DRAFT

From the programme, the Congress passed to the Party Rules (we leave out the question of the Central Organ, already touched on above, and the delegates' reports, which the majority of the delegates were unfortunately unable to present in a satisfactory form). Needless to say, the question of the Rules was of tremendous importance to all of us. After all, *Iskra* had acted from the very outset not only as a press organ but also as an *organisational* nucleus. In an editorial in its fourth issue ("Where To Begin") *Iskra* had put forward a whole plan of organisation,* which it pursued systematically and steadily over a period of *three years*. When the Second Party Congress adopted *Iskra* as the Central Organ, two of the three points of the preamble of the resolution on the subject (p. 147) were devoted *precisely to this organisational plan and to "Iskra's" organisational ideas*: its role in directing the *practical* work of the Party and the leading part it had

Socialist-Revolutionaries (p. 359). Comrade Egorov detected a "contradiction" between the demand in the programme for *support* of every oppositional and revolutionary movement and the *antagonistic* attitude towards both the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the liberals. In another form, and approaching the question from a somewhat different angle, Comrade Egorov here revealed the same narrow conception of Marxism, and the same unstable, semi-hostile attitude towards the position of *Iskra* (which he had "recognised"), as Comrades Makhov, Lieber, and Martynov had done.

* In his speech on the adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ, Comrade Popov said, *inter alia*: "I recall the article 'Where To Begin' in No. 3 or No. 4 of *Iskra*. Many of the comrades active in Russia found it a tactless article; others thought this plan was fantastic, and the majority [?—probably the majority around Comrade Popov] attributed it solely to ambition" (p. 140). As the reader sees, it is no new thing for me to hear my political views attributed to ambition—an explanation now being rehashed by Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martov.

played in the work of attaining unity. It is quite natural, therefore, that the work of *Iskra* and the entire work of organising the Party, the entire work of *actually* restoring the Party, *could not* be regarded as finished until definite ideas of organisation had been adopted by the whole Party and formally enacted. This task was to be performed by the Party's Rules of Organisation.

The principal ideas which *Iskra* strove to make the basis of the Party's organisation amounted essentially to the following two: first, the idea of centralism, which defined in principle the method of deciding all particular and detail questions of organisation; second, the special function of an organ, a newspaper, for ideological leadership—an idea which took into account the temporary and special requirements of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class movement in the existing conditions of political slavery, with the *initial* base of operations for the revolutionary assault being set up abroad. The first idea, as the one matter of principle, had to pervade the entire Rules; the second, being a particular idea necessitated by temporary circumstances of place and mode of action, took the form of a *seeming* departure from centralism in the proposal to set up *two centres*, *a Central Organ and a Central Committee*. Both these principal *Iskra* ideas of Party organisation had been developed by me in the *Iskra* editorial (No. 4) "Where To Begin"* and in *What Is To Be Done?*** and, finally, had been explained in detail, in a form that was practically a finished set of Rules, in *A Letter to a Comrade*.*** Actually, all that remained was the work of formulating the paragraphs of the Rules, which were to embody just those ideas if the recognition of *Iskra* was not to be merely nominal, a mere conventional phrase. In the preface to the new edition of my *Letter to a Comrade* I have already pointed out that a simple comparison of the Party Rules with that pamphlet is enough to establish the complete identity of the ideas of organisation contained in the two.****

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 13-24.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 229-50.—*Ed.*
**** See pp. 131-32 of this volume.—*Ed.*

A propos of the work of formulating *Iskra*'s ideas of organisation in the Rules, I must deal with a certain incident mentioned by Comrade Martov. "...A statement of fact," said Martov at the League Congress (p. 58), "will show you how far my lapse into opportunism on this paragraph [i.e., Paragraph 1] was unexpected by Lenin. About a month and a half or two months before the Congress I showed Lenin my draft, in which Paragraph 1 was formulated just in the way I proposed it at the Congress. Lenin objected to my draft on the ground that it was too detailed, and told me that all he liked was the idea of Paragraph 1—the definition of Party membership—which he would incorporate in his Rules with certain modifications, because he did not think my formulation was a happy one. Thus, Lenin had long been acquainted with my formulation, he knew my views on this subject. You thus see that I came to the Congress with my visor up, that I did not conceal my views. I warned him that I would oppose mutual co-optation, the principle of unanimity in cases of co-optation to the Central Committee and the Central Organ, and so on."

As regards the warning about opposing mutual co-optation, we shall see in its proper place how matters really stood. At present let us deal with this "open visor" of Martov's Rules. At the League Congress, recounting from memory this episode of his unhappy draft (which he himself withdrew at the Congress because it was an unhappy one, but after the Congress, with his characteristic consistency, again brought out into the light of day), Martov, as so often happens, forgot a good deal and therefore again got things muddled. One would have thought there had already been cases enough to warn him against quoting private conversations and relying on his memory (people involuntarily recall only what is to their advantage!)—nevertheless, for want of any other, Comrade Martov used unsound material. Today even Comrade Plekhanov is beginning to imitate him—evidently, a bad example is contagious.

I could not have "liked" the "idea" of Paragraph 1 of Martov's draft, for that draft contained *no idea* that came up at the Congress. His memory played him false. I have been fortunate enough to find Martov's draft among my papers, and

in it "*Paragraph 1 is formulated n o t in the way he proposed it at the Congress*"! So much for the "open visor"!

Paragraph 1 in Martov's draft: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who, accepting its programme, works actively to accomplish its aims under the control and direction of the organs [*sic*!] of the Party."

Paragraph 1 in my draft: "A member of the Party is one who accepts its programme and who supports the Party both financially and by personal participation in one of the Party organisations."

Paragraph 1 as formulated by Martov at the Congress and adopted by the Congress: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts its programme, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations."

It is clearly evident from this juxtaposition that there is no *idea* in Martov's draft, but only an *empty phrase*. That Party members must work under the control and direction of the *organs* of the Party goes without saying; *it cannot be otherwise*, and only those talk about it who love to talk without saying anything, who love to drown "Rules" in a flood of verbiage and bureaucratic formulas (that is, formulas useless for the work and supposed to be useful for display). The *idea* of Paragraph 1 appears only when the question is asked: can the *organs of the Party* exercise *actual* direction over Party members who *do not belong* to any of the *Party organisations*? There is not even a trace of this idea in Comrade Martov's draft. Consequently, *I could not have been acquainted* with the "views" of Comrade Martov "on this subject", for in Comrade Martov's draft there are *no views* on *this subject*. Comrade Martov's statement of fact proves to be a *muddle*.

About Comrade Martov, on the other hand, it does have to be said that from my draft "he knew my views on this subject" and did not protest against them, did not reject them, either on the editorial board, although my draft was shown to everyone two or three weeks before the Congress, or in talking to the delegates, who were acquainted *only* with my draft. More, even *at the Congress*, when I moved my

draft Rules* and defended them *before the election of the Rules Committee*, Comrade Martov distinctly stated: "I associate myself with Comrade Lenin's conclusions. *Only on two points do I disagree with him*" (my italics)—on the mode of constituting the Council and on unanimous co-optation (p. 157). *Not a word was yet said about any difference* over Paragraph 1.

In his pamphlet on the state of siege, Comrade Martov saw fit to recall his Rules once more, and in great detail. He assures us there that his Rules, to which, with the exception of certain minor particulars, he would be prepared to subscribe even now (February 1904—we cannot say how it will be three months hence), "quite clearly expressed his disapproval of hypertrophy of centralism" (p. iv). The reason he did not submit this draft to the Congress, Comrade Martov now explains, was, firstly, that "his *Iskra* training had imbued him with disdain for Rules" (when it suits Comrade Martov, the word *Iskra* means for him, not a narrow circle spirit, but the most steadfast of trends! It is a pity, however, that Comrade Martov's *Iskra* training did not imbue him in three years with disdain for the anarchistic phrases by which the unstable mentality of the intellectual is capable of justifying the violation of Rules adopted by common consent). Secondly, that, don't you see, he, Comrade Martov, wanted to avoid "introducing any dissonance into the tactics of that basic organisational nucleus which *Iskra* constituted". Wonderfully consistent, isn't it? On a question of *principle* regarding an opportunist formulation of Paragraph 1 or hypertrophy of centralism, Comrade Martov was so afraid

* Incidentally, the Minutes Committee, in Appendix XI, has published the draft Rules "*moved at the Congress by Lenin*" (p. 393). Here the Minutes Committee has also muddled things a little. It has confused my *original* draft (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 474-76.—*Ed.*), which was shown to all the delegates (and to many before the Congress), with the draft *moved at the Congress*, and *published the former* under the guise of the latter. Of course, I have no objection to my drafts being published, *even in all their stages of preparation*, but there was no need to cause confusion. And confusion has been caused, for Popov and Martov (pp. 154 and 157) criticised formulations in the draft I actually moved at the Congress *which are not in the draft* published by the Minutes Committee (cf. p. 394, paragraphs 7 and 11). With a little more care, the mistake could easily have been detected simply by comparing the pages I mention.

of any dissonance (which is terrible only from the narrowest circle point of view) that he did not set forth his disagreement even to a nucleus like the editorial board! On the *practical* question of the composition of the central bodies, Comrade Martov appealed for the assistance of the Bund and the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists against the vote of the majority of the *Iskra* organisation (that real *basic organisational nucleus*). The "dissonance" in his phrases, which smuggle in the circle spirit in defence of the quasi-editorial board only to repudiate the "circle spirit" in the appraisal of the question by those best qualified to judge—this dissonance Comrade Martov does not notice. To punish him, we shall quote his draft Rules *in full*, noting for our part what *views* and what *hypertrophy* they reveal*:

"Draft of Party Rules.—1. Party Membership.—1) A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who, accepting its programme, works actively to accomplish its aims under the control and direction of the organs of the Party.—2) Expulsion of a member from the Party for conduct incompatible with the interests of the Party shall be decided by the Central Committee. [The sentence of expulsion, giving the reasons, shall be preserved in the Party files and shall be communicated, on request, to every Party committee. The Central Committee's decision to expel a member may be appealed against to the Congress on the demand of two or more committees.]" I shall indicate by square brackets the provisions in Martov's draft which are *obviously* meaningless, failing to contain not only "ideas", but even any definite conditions or requirements—like the inimitable specification in the "Rules" as to *where exactly* a sentence of expulsion is to be preserved, or the provision that the Central Committee's decision to expel a member (and not all its decisions in general?) may be appealed against to the Congress. This, indeed, is hypertrophy of verbiage, or real bureaucratic formalism, which frames superfluous, patently useless or red-tapist, points and paragraphs. "II. Local Committees.—3) In its local work, the Party is represented by the Party committees" (how new and clever!). "4) [As Party committees are recognised all those existing at the time of the Second Congress and represented at the Congress.]—5) New Party committees, in addition to those mentioned in Paragraph 4, shall be appointed by the Central Committee [which shall either endorse as a committee the existing membership of the given local organisation, or shall set up a local committee by reforming the latter].—6) The committees may add to their membership by means of co-optation.—7) The Central

* I might mention that unfortunately I could not find the first variant of Comrade Martov's draft, which consisted of some forty-eight paragraphs and suffered even more from "hypertrophy" of worthless formalism.

Committee has the right to augment the membership of a local committee with such numbers of comrades (known to it) as shall not exceed one-third of the total membership of the committee." A perfect sample of bureaucracy. Why not exceeding one-third? What is the purpose of this? What is the sense of this restriction which restricts nothing, seeing that the *augmenting* may be repeated over and over again? "8) [In the event of a local committee falling apart or being broken up by persecution" (does this mean that not all the members have been arrested?), "the Central Committee shall re-establish it.]" (Without regard to Paragraph 7? Does not Comrade Martov perceive a similarity between Paragraph 8 and those Russian laws on orderly conduct which command citizens to work on weekdays and rest on holidays?) "9) [A regular Party Congress may instruct the Central Committee to reform the composition of any local committee if the activities of the latter are found incompatible with the interests of the Party. In that event the existing committee shall be deemed dissolved and the comrades in its area of operation exempt from subordination* to it.]" The provision contained in this paragraph is as highly useful as the provision contained to this day in the Russian law which reads: "Drunkenness is forbidden to all and sundry." "10) [The local Party committees shall direct all the propagandist, agitational, and organisational activities of the Party in their localities and shall do all in their power to assist the Central Committee and the Central Organs of the Party in carrying out the general Party tasks entrusted to them.]" Phew! What in the name of all that's holy is the purpose of this? "11) [The internal arrangements of a local organisation, the mutual relations between a committee and the groups subordinate to it" (do you hear that, Comrade Axelrod?), "and the limits of the competence and autonomy" (are not the limits of competence the same as the limits of autonomy?) "of these groups shall be determined by the committee itself and communicated to the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organs.]" (An omission: it is not stated where these communications are to be filed.) "12) [All groups subordinate to committees, and individual Party members, have the right to demand that their opinions and recommendations on any subject be communicated to the Central Committee of the Party and its Central Organs.]—13) The local Party committees shall contribute from their revenues to the funds of the Central Committee such sums as the Central Committee shall assign to their share.—III. Organisations for the Purpose of Agitation in Languages Other than Russian.—14) [For the purpose of carrying on agitation in any non-Russian language and of organising the workers among whom such agitation is carried on, separate organisations may be set up in places where such specialised agitation and the setting up of such organisations are deemed necessary.]—15) The question as to whether such a necessity exists shall be decided by the Central Committee of the Party.

* We would draw Comrade Axelrod's attention to this word. Why this is terrible! Here are the roots of that "Jacobinism" which goes to the length even ... even of altering the composition of an editorial board....

and in disputed cases by the Party Congress." The first part of this paragraph is superfluous in view of subsequent provisions in the Rules, and the second part, concerning disputed cases, is simply ludicrous. "16) [The local organisations mentioned in Paragraph 14 shall be autonomous in their special affairs but shall act under the control of the local committee and be subordinate to it, the forms of this control and the character of the organisational relations between the committee and the special organisation being determined by the local committee." (Well, thank God! It is now quite clear that this whole spate of empty words was superfluous.) "In respect of the general affairs of the Party, such organisations shall act as part of the committee organisation.]—17) [The local organisations mentioned in Paragraph 14 may form autonomous leagues for the effective performance of their special tasks. These leagues may have their own special press and administrative bodies, both being under the direct control of the Central Committee of the Party. The Rules of these leagues shall be drawn up by themselves, but shall be subject to endorsement by the Central Committee of the Party.]—18) [The autonomous leagues mentioned in Paragraph 17 may include local Party committees if, by reason of local conditions, these devote themselves mainly to agitation in the given language. *Note*. While forming part of the autonomous league such a committee does not cease to be a committee of the Party.]" (This entire paragraph is extremely useful and wonderfully clever, the note even more so.) "19) [The relations of local organisations belonging to an autonomous league with the central bodies of that league shall be controlled by the local committees.]—20) [The central press and administrative bodies of the autonomous leagues shall stand in the same relation to the Central Committee of the Party as the local Party committees.]—IV. Central Committee and Press Organs of the Party.—21) [The Party as a whole shall be represented by its Central Committee and its press organs, political and theoretical.]—22) The functions of the Central Committee shall be: to exercise general direction of all the practical activities of the Party; to ensure the proper utilisation and allocation of all its forces; to exercise control over the activities of all sections of the Party; to supply the local organisations with literature; to organise the technical apparatus of the Party; to convene Party congresses.—23) The functions of the press organs of the Party shall be: to exercise ideological direction of Party life, to conduct propaganda for the Party programme, and to carry out theoretical and popular elaboration of the world outlook of Social-Democracy.—24) All local Party committees and autonomous leagues shall maintain direct communication both with the Central Committee of the Party and with the editorial board of the Party organs and shall keep them periodically informed of the progress of the movement and of organisational work in their localities.—25) The editorial board of the Party press organs shall be appointed at Party congresses and shall function until the next congress.—26) [The editorial board shall be autonomous in its internal affairs] and may in the interval between congresses augment or alter its membership, informing the Central Committee in each case.—27) All statements issued by the Central Committee or receiving its sanction shall, on the demand of the

Central Committee, be published in the Party organ.—28) The Central Committee, by agreement with the editorial board of the Party organs, shall set up special writers' groups for various forms of literary work.—29) The Central Committee shall be appointed at Party congresses and shall function until the next congress. The Central Committee may augment its membership by means of co-optation, without restriction as to numbers, in each case informing the editorial board of the Central Organs of the Party.—V. The Party Organisation Abroad.—30) The Party organisation abroad shall carry on propaganda among Russians living abroad and organise the socialist elements among them. It shall be headed by an elected administrative body.—31) The autonomous leagues belonging to the Party may maintain branches abroad to assist in carrying out their special tasks. These branches shall constitute autonomous groups within the general organisation abroad.—VI. Party Congresses.—32) The supreme Party authority is the Congress.—33) [The Party Congress shall lay down the Programme, Rules and guiding principles of the activities of the Party; it shall control the work of all Party bodies and settle disputes arising between them.]—34) The right to be represented at congresses shall be enjoyed by: a) all local Party committees; b) the central administrative bodies of all the autonomous leagues belonging to the Party; c) the Central Committee of the Party and the editorial board of its Central Organs; d) the Party organisation abroad.—35) Mandates may be entrusted to proxies, but no delegate shall hold more than three valid mandates. A mandate may be divided between two representatives. Binding instructions are forbidden.—36) The Central Committee shall be empowered to invite to the congress in a deliberative capacity comrades whose presence may be useful.—37) Amendments to the Programme or Rules of the Party shall require a two-thirds majority; other questions shall be decided by a simple majority.—38) A Congress shall be deemed properly constituted if more than half the Party committees existing at the time of it are represented.—39) Congresses shall, as far as possible, be convened once every two years. [If for reasons beyond the control of the Central Committee a congress cannot be convened within this period, the Central Committee shall on its own responsibility postpone it.]"

Any reader who, by way of an exception, has had the patience to read these so-called Rules to the end assuredly will not expect me to give special reasons for the following conclusions. First conclusion: the Rules suffer from almost incurable dropsy. Second conclusion: it is impossible to discover in these Rules any special shade of organisational views evincing a disapproval of hypertrophy of centralism. Third conclusion: Comrade Martov acted very wisely indeed in concealing from the eyes of the world (and withholding from discussion at the Congress) more than $^{38}/_{39}$ of his Rules. Only it is rather odd that *à propos* of this concealment he should talk about an open visor.

H. DISCUSSION ON CENTRALISM *PRIOR* TO THE SPLIT AMONG THE *ISKRA*-ISTS

Before passing to the really interesting question of the formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Rules, a question which undoubtedly disclosed the existence of different shades of opinion, let us dwell a little on that brief general discussion of the Rules which occupied the 14th and part of the 15th Congress sittings. This discussion is of some significance inasmuch as it *preceded* the complete divergence within the *Iskra* organisation over the composition of the central bodies, whereas the subsequent debate on the Rules in general, and on co-optation in particular, took place *after* this divergence in the *Iskra* organisation. Naturally, *before* the divergence we were able to express our views more impartially, in the sense that they were more independent of views about the personal composition of the Central Committee, which became such a keen issue with us all. Comrade Martov, as I have already remarked, *associated himself* (p. 157) with my views on organisation, only making the reservation that he differed on two points of *detail*. Both the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre", on the contrary, at once took the field against both *fundamental* ideas of the whole *Iskra* organisational plan (and, consequently, against the Rules in their entirety): against centralism and against "two centres". Comrade Lieber referred to my Rules as "organised distrust" and discerned *decentralism* in the proposal for two centres (as did Comrades Popov and Egorov). Comrade Akimov wanted to broaden the jurisdiction of the local committees, and, in particular, to grant them themselves "the right to alter their composition". "They should be allowed greater freedom of action.... The local committees should be elected by the active workers in their localities, just as the Central Committee is elected by the representatives of all the active organisations in Russia. And if even this cannot be allowed, let the number of members that the Central Committee may appoint to local committees be limited...." (p. 158). Comrade Akimov, as you see, suggested an argument against "hypertrophy of centralism", but Comrade Martov remained deaf to these weighty arguments, not yet having been induced by his defeat over the composition of the central bodies

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to follow in Akimov's wake. He remained deaf even when Comrade Akimov suggested to him the "*idea*" *of his own Rules* (Paragraph 7—restriction of the Central Committee's right to appoint members to the committees)! At that time Comrade Martov still did not want any "dissonance" with us, and for that reason tolerated a dissonance both with Comrade Akimov and with himself.... At that time the only opponents of "monstrous centralism" were those to whom *Iskra*'s centralism was clearly *disadvantageous*: it was opposed by Akimov, Lieber, and Goldblatt, *followed*, cautiously and circumspectly (so that they could always turn back), by Egorov (see pp. 156 and 276) and such like. At that time it was still clear to the vast majority of the Party that it was the parochial, circle interests of the Bund, *Yuzhny Rabochy*, etc., that evoked the protest against centralism. For that matter, now too it is clear to the majority of the Party that it is the circle interests of the old *Iskra* editorial board that cause it to protest against centralism....

Take, for example, Comrade Goldblatt's speech (pp. 160-61). He inveighs against my "monstrous" centralism and claims that it would lead to the "destruction" of the lower organisations, that it is "permeated through and through with the desire to give the centre unrestricted powers and the unrestricted right to interfere in everything", that it allows the organisations "only one right—to submit without a murmur to orders from above", etc. "The centre proposed by the draft would find itself in a vacuum, it would have no peripheral organisations around it, but only an amorphous mass in which its executive agents would move." Why, this is exactly the kind of *false phrase-mongering* to which the Martovs and Axelrods proceeded to treat us after their defeat at the Congress. The Bund was laughed at when it fought *our* centralism while granting *its own* central body *even more definite* unrestricted rights (e.g., to appoint and expel members, and even to refuse to admit delegates to congresses). And when people sort things out, the howls of the *minority* will also be laughed at, for they cried out against centralism and against the Rules when they were in the minority, but lost no time in taking advantage of the Rules once they had managed to make themselves the majority.

Over the question of two centres, the grouping was also clearly evident: *all* the *Iskra*-ists were opposed by Lieber, by Akimov (the first to strike up the now favourite Axelrod-Martov tune about the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee on the Council), by Popov, and by Egorov. From the ideas of organisation which the *old Iskra* had always advocated (and which the Popovs and Egorovs had *verbally* approved!), the plan for two centres followed of itself. The policy of the *old Iskra* cut across the plans of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, the plans to create a parallel popular organ and to convert it virtually into the dominant organ. There lies the root of the paradox, so strange at first glance, that all the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the entire Marsh were in favour of one central body, that is, *of seemingly greater centralism*. Of course, there were some delegates (especially among the Marsh) who probably did not have a clear idea where the organisational plans of *Yuzhny Rabochy* would lead, and were bound to lead in the nature of things, but they were impelled to follow the anti-*Iskra*-ists by their very irresoluteness and unsureness of themselves.

Of the speeches by *Iskra*-ists during *this* debate on the Rules (the one preceding the split among the *Iskra*-ists), particularly noteworthy were those of Comrades Martov ("association" with my ideas of organisation) and Trotsky. Every word of the answer the latter gave Comrades Akimov and Lieber exposes the utter falsity of the "minority's" post-Congress conduct and theories. "The Rules, he [Comrade Akimov] said, do not define the jurisdiction of the Central Committee with enough precision. I cannot agree with him. On the contrary, this definition is precise and means that inasmuch as the Party is one whole, it must be ensured control over the local committees. Comrade Lieber said, borrowing my expression, that the Rules were 'organised distrust'. That is true. But I used this expression in reference to the Rules proposed by the Bund spokesmen, which represented organised distrust on the part of a section of the Party towards the whole Party. Our Rules, on the other hand" (at that time, before the defeat over the composition of the central bodies, the Rules were "ours"!), "represent the organised distrust of the Party towards all its sections, that is, control over all local, district, national, and other organi-



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sations" (p. 158). Yes, *our* Rules are *here* correctly described, and we would advise those to bear this more constantly in mind who are now assuring us with an easy conscience that it was the intriguing majority who conceived and introduced the system of "organised distrust" or, which is the same thing, the "state of siege". One has only to compare this speech with the speeches at the Congress of the League Abroad to get a specimen of political spinelessness, a specimen of how the views of Martov and Co. changed depending on whether the matter concerned their own group of a lower order or someone else's.

I. PARAGRAPH ONE OF THE RULES

We have already cited the different formulations around which an interesting debate flared up at the Congress. This debate took up nearly two sittings and ended with *two roll-call* votes (during the entire Congress there were, if I am not mistaken, only eight roll-call votes, which were resorted to only in very important cases because of the great loss of time they involved). The question at issue was undoubtedly one of principle. The interest of the Congress in the debate was tremendous. *All* the delegates voted—a rare occurrence at our Congress (as at any big congress) and one that likewise testifies to the interest displayed by the disputants.

What, then, was the substance of the matter in dispute? I already said at the Congress, and have since repeated it time and again, that "I by no means consider our difference [over Paragraph 1] so vital as to be a matter of life or death to the Party. We shall certainly not perish because of an unfortunate clause in the Rules!" (P. 250.)* Taken by itself, this difference, although it did reveal shades of principle, could never have called forth that divergence (actually, to speak unreservedly, that split) which took place after the Congress. But every *little* difference may become a *big* one if it is insisted on, if it is put into the foreground, if people *set about* searching for all the roots and branches-of the difference. Every *little* difference may assume *tremendous* importance if it serves as the starting-point for a *swing* towards definite mistaken views, and if these mistaken

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 499.—*Ed.*

views are combined, by virtue of new and additional divergences, with *anarchistic* actions which bring the Party to the point of a split.

And that is just what happened in the present case. The comparatively slight difference over Paragraph 1 has now acquired tremendous importance, because it was this that started the swing towards the opportunist profundities and anarchistic phrase-mongering of the minority (especially at the League Congress, and subsequently in the columns of the new *Iskra* as well). It was this that *marked the beginning* of the coalition of the *Iskra*-ist minority with the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the Marsh, which assumed final and definite shape by the time of the elections, and without understanding which *it is impossible to understand* the major and fundamental divergence over the composition of the central bodies. The slight mistake of Martov and Axelrod over Paragraph 1 was a slight crack in our pot (as I put it at the League Congress). The pot could be bound tight with a *hard* knot (and not a hangman's knot, as it was misunderstood by Martov, who during the League Congress was in a state bordering on hysteria); or *all* efforts could be directed towards widening the crack and breaking the pot in two. And that is what happened, thanks to the boycott and similar anarchistic moves of the zealous Martovites. The difference over Paragraph 1 played no small part in the elections to the central bodies, and Martov's defeat in the elections led him into a "struggle over principles" with the use of grossly mechanical and even brawling methods (such as his speeches at the Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad).

Now, after all these happenings, the question of Paragraph 1 has thus assumed *tremendous importance*, and we must clearly realise both the character of the Congress groupings in the voting on this paragraph and—far more important still—the real nature of those *shades of opinion* which revealed or began to reveal themselves over Paragraph 1. *Now*, after the events with which the reader is familiar, the question *stands* as follows: Did Martov's formulation, which was supported by Axelrod, reflect his (or their) instability, vacillation, and political vagueness, as I expressed it at the Party Congress (p. 333), his (or their) deviation towards

Jaurèsism and anarchism, as Plekhanov suggested at the League Congress (League Minutes, p. 102 and elsewhere),' Or did my formulation, which was supported by Plekhanov, reflect a wrong, bureaucratic, formalistic, Jack-in-office un-Social-Democratic conception of centralism? *Opportunism and anarchism, or bureaucracy and formalism*?—that is the way the question *stands now*, when the little difference has become a big one. And when discussing the pros and cons of my formulation *on their merits*, we must *bear in mind* just *this* presentation of the question, which has been forced upon us all by the events, or, I would say if it did not sound too pompous, has been evolved by history.

Let us begin the examination of these pros and cons with an analysis of the Congress debate. The first speech, that of Comrade Egorov, is interesting only for the fact that his attitude (*non liquet*, it is not yet clear to me, I do not yet know where the truth lies) was very characteristic of the attitude of many delegates, who found it difficult to grasp the rights and wrongs of this really new and fairly complex and detailed question. The next speech, that of Comrade Axelrod, at once made the issue one of principle. This was the first speech Comrade Axelrod made at the Congress on questions of principle, one might even say the first speech he made at all, and it can scarcely be claimed that his début with the celebrated "professor" was particularly fortunate. "I think," Comrade Axelrod said, "that we must draw a distinction between the concepts party and organisation. These two concepts are being confused here. And the confusion is dangerous." That was the first argument against my formulation. Examine it more closely. When I say that the Party should be the *sum* (and not the mere arithmetical sum, but a complex) of *organisations*,* does that mean that I "confuse"

* The word "organisation" is commonly employed in two senses, a broad and a narrow one. In the narrow sense it signifies an individual nucleus of a collective of people with at least a minimum degree of coherent form. In the broad sense it signifies the sum of such nuclei united into a whole. For example, the navy, the army, or the state is at one and the same time a sum of organisations (in the narrow sense of the word) and a variety of social organisation (in the broad sense of the word). The Department of Education is an organisation (in the broad sense of the word) and consists of a number of organisations (in the narrow sense of the word). Similarly, the Party is an organisa-

the concepts party and organisation? Of course not. I thereby express clearly and precisely my wish, my demand, that the Party, as the vanguard of the class, should be as *organised* as possible, that the Party should admit to its ranks only such elements *as allow of at least a minimum of organisation*. My opponent, on the contrary, *lumps together* in the Party organised and unorganised elements, those who lend themselves to direction and those who do not, the advanced and the incorrigibly backward—for the corrigibly backward can join an organisation. *This confusio*n is indeed *dangerous*. Comrade Axelrod further cited the "strictly secret and centralised organisations of the past" (Zemlya i Volya[96] and Narodnaya Volya[97]): around them, he said, "were grouped a large number of people who did not belong to the organisation but who helped it in one way or another and who were regarded as Party members.... This principle should be even more strictly observed in the Social-Democratic organisation." Here we come to one of the *key* points of the matter: is "this principle" really a Social-Democratic one—this principle which allows people who do not belong to any of the organisations of the Party, but only "help it in one way or another", to call themselves Party members? And Plekhanov gave the only possible reply to this question when he said: "Axelrod was wrong in citing the seventies. At that time there was a well-organised and splendidly disciplined centre; around it there were the organisations of various categories, which it had created; and what remained outside these organisations was chaos, anarchy. The component elements of this chaos called themselves Party members, but this harmed rather than benefited the cause. We should not imitate the anarchy of the seventies, but avoid it." Thus "this principle", which Comrade Axelrod wanted to pass off as a Social-Democratic one, is in reality an *anarchistic principle*. To

tion, *should be* an organisation (in the broad sense of the word); at the same time, the Party should consist of a whole number of diversified organisations (in the narrow sense of the word). Therefore, when he spoke of drawing a distinction between the concepts party and organisation, Comrade Axelrod, firstly, did not take account of the difference between the broad and the narrow sense of the word "organisation", and, secondly, did not observe that he was himself *confusing* organised and unorganised elements.

refute this, one would have to show that control, direction, and discipline *are possible* outside an organisation, and that conferring the title of Party members on "elements of chaos" *is necessary*. The supporters of Comrade Martov's formulation did not show, and could not show, *either* of these things. Comrade Axelrod took as an example "a professor who regards himself as a Social-Democrat and declares himself such". To complete the thought contained in this example, Comrade Axelrod should have gone on to tell us whether the organised Social-Democrats themselves regard this professor as a Social-Democrat. By failing to raise this further question, Comrade Axelrod abandoned his argument half-way. After all, one thing or the other. Either the organised Social-Democrats regard the professor in question as a Social-Democrat, in which case why should they not enrol him in one of the Social-Democratic organisations? For only if the professor is thus enrolled will his "declaration" answer to his actions, and not be empty talk (as professorial declarations all too frequently are). Or the organised Social-Democrats do *not* regard the professor as a Social-Democrat, in which case it would be absurd, senseless and *harmful* to allow him the right to bear the honourable and responsible title of Party member. The matter therefore reduces itself to the alternative: consistent application of the principle of organisation, or the sanctification of disunity and anarchy? Are we to build the Party on the basis of that already formed and welded core of *Social-Democrats* which brought about the Party Congress, for instance, and which should enlarge and multiply Party organisations of all kinds; or are we to content ourselves with the soothing *phrase* that all who help are Party members? "If we adopt Lenin's formula," Comrade Axelrod continued, "we shall be throwing overboard a section of those who, even if they cannot be directly admitted to an organisation, are nevertheless Party members." The confusion of concepts of which Comrade Axelrod wanted to accuse me stands out here quite clearly in his own case: he already takes it for granted that all who help *are* Party members, whereas that is what the whole argument is about and our opponents have still to *prove* the necessity and value of such an interpretation. What is the meaning of the phrase "throwing overboard", which at first glance seems so terri-

ble? Even if only members of organisations recognised as Party organisations are regarded as Party members, people who cannot "directly" join any Party organisation can still work in an organisation which does not belong to the Party but is associated with it. Consequently, there can be no talk of throwing anyone overboard in the sense of preventing them from working, from taking part in the movement. On the contrary, the stronger our Party organisations, consisting of *real* Social-Democrats, the less wavering and instability there is *within* the Party, the broader, more varied, richer, and more fruitful will be the Party's influence on the elements of the working-class *masses* surrounding it and guided by it. The Party, as the vanguard of the working class, must not be confused, after all, with the entire class. And Comrade Axelrod is guilty of just this confusion (which is characteristic of our opportunist Economism in general) when he says: "First and foremost we are, of course, creating an organisation of the most active elements of the Party, an organisation of revolutionaries; but since we are the Party of a class, we must take care not to leave outside the Party ranks people who consciously, though perhaps not very actively, associate themselves with that Party." Firstly, the active elements of the Social-Democratic working-class party will include not only organisations of revolutionaries, but a *whole number* of workers' organisations recognised as Party organisations. Secondly, how, by what logic, does the fact that we are the party of a class warrant the conclusion that it is unnecessary to make a distinction between those who *belong* to the Party and those who *associate* themselves with it? Just the contrary: precisely because there are differences in degree of consciousness and degree of activity, a distinction must be made in degree of proximity to the Party. We are the party of a class, and therefore *almost the entire class* (and in times of war, in a period of civil war, the entire class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism[98] and "tail-ism" to think that the entire class, or almost the entire class, can ever rise, under capitalism, to the level of consciousness and activity of its vanguard, of its Social-Democratic Party. No sensible Social-Democrat has ever doubted that under capitalism even the trade union orga-

nisations (which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped sections) are incapable of embracing the entire, or almost the entire, working class. To forget the distinction between the vanguard and the whole of the masses gravitating towards it, to forget the vanguard's constant duty of *raising* ever wider sections to its own advanced level, means simply to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks. And it is just such a shutting of one's eyes, it is just such forgetfulness, to obliterate the difference between those who associate themselves and those who belong, those who are conscious and active and those who only help.

To argue that we are the party of a class *in justification* of organisational looseness, *in justification* of confusing organisation with disorganisation, is to repeat the mistake of Nadezhdin, who confused "the philosophical and social-historical question of the 'depth' of the 'roots' of the movement with the technical and organisational question" (*What Is To Be Done?*, p. 91).* It is this confusion, wrought by the deft hand of Comrade Axelrod, that was then repeated dozens of times by the speakers who defended Comrade Martov's formulation. "The more widespread the title of Party member, the better," said Martov, without, however, explaining the benefit of a widespread *title* which did not correspond to fact. Can it be denied that control over Party members who do not belong to a Party organisation is a mere fiction? A widespread fiction is not beneficial, but harmful. "We could only rejoice if every striker, every demonstrator, answering for his actions, could proclaim himself a Party member" (p. 239). Is that so? *Every striker* should have the right *to proclaim himself a Party member*? In this statement Comrade Martov instantly carries his mistake to the point of absurdity, by *lowering* Social-Democracy to the level of mere strike-making, thereby repeating the misadventures of the Akimovs. We could only rejoice if the Social-Democrats succeeded in directing every strike, for it is their plain and unquestionable duty to direct every manifestation of the class struggle of the proletariat, and strikes are one of the most profound and most powerful manifestations of that

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 460.—*Ed.*

struggle. But we should be tail-enders if we were to *identify* this primary form of struggle, which *ipso facto* is no more than a trade unionist form, with the all-round and conscious Social-Democratic struggle. We should be opportunistically *legitimising a patent falsehood* if we were to allow every striker the right to "proclaim himself a Party member", for in *the majority of cases* such a "proclamation" would be *false*. We should be indulging in complacent daydreaming if we tried to assure ourselves and others that *every striker* can *be* a Social-Democrat and a member of the Social-Democratic Party, in face of that infinite disunity, oppression, and stultification which under capitalism is bound to weigh down upon such very wide sections of the "untrained", unskilled workers. This example of the "*striker*" brings out with particular clarity the difference between the *revolutionary striving* to direct every strike in a Social-Democratic way and the *opportunist phrase-mongering* which proclaims *every* striker a Party member. We are the Party of a class inasmuch as we *in fact* direct almost the entire, or even the entire, proletarian class in a Social-Democratic way; but only Akimovs can conclude from this that we must *in word* identify the Party and the class.

"I am not afraid of a conspiratorial organisation," said Comrade Martov in this same speech; but, he added, "for me a conspiratorial organisation has meaning only when it is enveloped by a broad Social-Democratic working-class party" (p. 239). To be exact he should have said: when it is enveloped by a broad Social-Democratic working-class *movement*. And in that form Comrade Martov's proposition would have been not only indisputable, but a plain truism. I dwell on this point only because subsequent speakers turned Comrade Martov's truism into the very *prevalent and very vulgar* argument that Lenin wants "to confine the sum-total of Party members to the sum-total of conspirators". This conclusion, which can only provoke a smile, was drawn both by Comrade Posadovsky and by Comrade Popov; and when it was taken up by Martynov and Akimov, its true character of an opportunist phrase became altogether manifest. Today Comrade Axelrod is developing this same argument in the new *Iskra* by way of acquainting the reading public with the new editorial board's new views on organi-

sation. Already at the Congress, at the very first sitting where Paragraph 1 was discussed, I noticed that our opponents wanted to avail themselves of this cheap weapon, and therefore warned in my speech (p. 240): "It should not be imagined that Party organisations must consist solely of professional revolutionaries. We need the most diverse organisations of all types, ranks, and shades, beginning with extremely limited and secret and ending with very broad, free, *lose Organisationen*." This is such an obvious and self-evident truth that I did not think it necessary to dwell on it. But today, when we have been dragged back in so many respects, one has to "repeat old lessons" on this subject too. In order to do so, I shall quote certain passages from *What Is To Be Done?* and *A Letter to a Comrade*.

"...A circle of leaders of the type of Alexeyev and Myshkin, of Khalturin and Zhelyabov, is capable of coping with political tasks in the genuine and most practical sense of the term, for the reason and to the extent that their impassioned propaganda meets with response among the spontaneously awakening masses, and their sparkling energy is answered and supported by the energy of the revolutionary class."* In order to be a Social-Democratic *party*, we must win the *support* precisely of the *class*. It is not that the Party should envelop the conspiratorial organisation, as Comrade Martov thought, but that the revolutionary class, the proletariat, should envelop the Party, the latter to include both conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial organisations.

"...The workers' organisations for the economic struggle should be trade union organisations. Every Social-Democratic worker should as far as possible assist and actively work in these organisations. But ... it is certainly not in our interest to demand that only Social-Democrats should be eligible for membership in the trade unions since that would only narrow the scope of our influence upon the masses. Let every worker who understands the need to unite for the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions. The very aim of the trade unions would be impossible of achievement if they did not unite all who have attained at least this elementary degree of understanding—if they

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 447.—*Ed.*

were not very *broad* organisations. The broader these organisations, the broader will be our influence over them—an influence due, not only to the 'spontaneous' development of the economic struggle, but to the direct and conscious effort of the socialist trade union members to influence their comrades" (p. 86).* Incidentally, the example of the trade unions is particularly significant for an assessment of the controversial question of Paragraph 1. That these unions *should* work "under the control and direction" of the Social-Democratic organisations, of that there can be no two opinions among Social-Democrats. But *on those grounds* to confer on all members of trade unions the right to "proclaim themselves" members of the Social-Democratic Party would be an obvious absurdity and would constitute a double danger: on the one hand, of *narrowing* the dimensions of the trade union movement and thus weakening the solidarity of the workers; and, on the other, of opening the door of the Social-Democratic Party to vagueness and vacillation. The German Social-Democrats had occasion to solve a similar problem in a practical instance, in the celebrated case of the Hamburg bricklayers working on piece rates.[99] The Social-Democrats did not hesitate for a moment to proclaim strike-breaking dishonourable in Social-Democratic eyes, that is, to acknowledge that to direct and support strikes was *their own* vital concern; but at the same time they just as resolutely rejected the demand for identifying the interests of the Party with the interests of the trade unions, for *making the Party responsible* for individual acts of individual trade unions. The Party should and will strive to imbue the trade unions with its spirit and bring them under its influence; but precisely in order to do so it must distinguish the fully Social-Democratic elements in these unions (the elements belonging to the Social-Democratic Party) from those which are not fully class-conscious and politically active, and not confuse the two, as Comrade Axelrod would have us do.

"...Centralisation of the most secret functions in an organisation of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and enhance the quality of the activity

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 454.—*Ed.*

of a large number of other organisations that are intended for a broad public and are therefore as loose and as non-secret as possible, such as workers' trade unions; workers' self-education circles and circles for reading illegal literature; and socialist, as well as democratic, circles among *all* other sections of the population; etc., etc. We must have such circles, trade unions, and organisations everywhere in *as large a number as possible* and with the widest variety of functions- but it would be absurd and harmful to *confound* them with the organisation of *revolutionaries*, to efface the border-line between them..." (p. 96).* This quotation shows how out of place it was for Comrade Martov to remind me that the organisation of revolutionaries should be *enveloped* by broad organisations of workers. I had already pointed this out in *What Is To Be Done?*— and in *A Letter to a Comrade* I developed this idea more concretely. Factory circles, I wrote there, "are particularly important to us: the main strength of the movement lies in the organisation of the workers at the *large* factories, for the large factories (and mills) contain not only the predominant part of the working class, as regards numbers, but even more as regards influence, development, and fighting capacity. Every factory must be our fortress.... The factory subcommittee should endeavour to embrace the whole factory, the largest possible number of the workers, with a network of all kinds of circles (or agents).... All groups, circles, subcommittees, etc., should enjoy the status of committee institutions or branches of a committee. Some of them will openly declare their wish to join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and, *if endorsed* by the committee, will join the Party, and will assume definite functions (on the instructions of, or in agreement with, the committee), will undertake to obey the orders of the Party organs, *receive the same rights as all Party members*, and be regarded as immediate candidates for membership of the committee, etc. Others *will not join* the R.S.D.L.P., and will have the status of circles formed by Party members, or associated with one Party group or another, etc." (pp. 17-18).** The words I have underlined make

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 466.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 241, 243, 244.—*Ed.*

it particularly clear that the *idea* of my formulation of Paragrah 1 was already fully expressed in *A Letter to a Comrade*. The conditions for joining the Party are directly indicated there, namely: 1) a certain degree of organisation, and 2) endorsement by a Party committee. A page later I roughly indicate also what groups and organisations should (or should not) be admitted to the Party, and for what reasons: "The distributing groups should belong to the R.S.D.L.P. and know a certain number of its members and functionaries. The groups for studying labour conditions and drawing up trade union demands need not necessarily belong to the R.S.D.L.P. Groups of students, officers, or office employees engaged in self-education *in conjunction with* one or two Party members should in some cases not even be aware that these belong to the Party, etc." (pp. 18-19).*

There you have additional material on the subject of the "open visor"! Whereas the formula of Comrade Martov's draft does not even touch on relations between the Party and the organisations, I pointed out nearly a year before the Congress that some organisations should belong to the Party, and others not. In *A Letter to a Comrade* the idea I advocated at the Congress was already clearly outlined. The matter might be put graphically in the following way. Depending on degree of organisation in general and of secrecy of organisation in particular, roughly the following categories may be distinguished: 1) organisations of revolutionaries; 2) organisations of workers, as broad and as varied as possible (I confine myself to the working class, taking it as self-evident that, under certain conditions, certain elements of other classes will also be included here). These two categories constitute the Party. Further, 3) workers' organisations associated with the Party; 4) workers' organisations not associated with the Party but actually under its control and direction; 5) unorganised elements of the working class, who in part also come under the direction of the Social-Democratic Party, at any rate during big manifestations of the class struggle. That, approximately, is how the matter presents itself to me. As Comrade Martov sees it, on the

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 245.—*Ed.*

contrary, the border-line of the Party remains absolutely vague, for "every striker" can "proclaim himself a Party member". What benefit is there in this looseness? A widespread "title". Its harm is that it introduces a *disorganising* idea, the confusing of class and party.

In illustration of the general propositions we have adduced, let us take a cursory glance at the further discussion of Paragraph 1 at the Congress. Comrade Brouckère (to the great glee of Comrade Martov) pronounced in favour of my formulation, but *his* alliance with me, unlike Comrade Akimov's with Martov, turned out to be based on a misunderstanding. Comrade Brouckère did "not agree with the Rules as a whole, with their entire spirit" (p. 239), and defended my formulation *as the basis of the democracy* which the supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo* desired. Comrade Brouckère had not yet risen to the view that in a political struggle it is sometimes necessary to choose the *lesser evil*; Comrade Brouckère did not realise that it was useless to advocate democracy at a Congress like ours. Comrade Akimov was more perspicacious. He put the question quite rightly when he stated that "Comrades Martov and Lenin are arguing as to which [formulation] will best achieve their common aim" (p. 252); "Brouckère and I," he continued, "want to choose the one *which will least achieve that aim*. From this angle I choose Martov's formulation." And Comrade Akimov frankly explained that he considered "their very aim" (that is, the aim of Plekhanov, Martov, and myself—the creation of a directing organisation of revolutionaries) to be "impracticable and harmful"; like Comrade Martynov,* he advocated the Economist idea that "an organisation of revolutionaries" was

* Comrade Martynov, it is true, wanted to be different from Comrade Akimov, he wanted to show that conspiratorial did not mean secret, that behind the two different words were two different concepts. What the difference is, neither Comrade Martynov nor Comrade Axelrod, who is now following in his footsteps, ever did explain. Comrade Martynov "acted" as if I had not—for example in *What Is To Be Done?* (as well as in the *Tasks* [see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51.—*Ed.*])—resolutely opposed "*confining* the political struggle to conspiracy". Comrade Martynov was anxious to have his hearers *forget* that the people I had been fighting *had not seen* any necessity for an *organisation of revolutionaries*, just as Comrade Akimov did not see it now.

unnecessary. He was "confident that in the end the realities of life will force their way into our Party organisation, whether you bar their path with Martov's formulation or with Lenin's". It would not be worth while dwelling on this "tailist" conception of the "realities of life" if we did not encounter it in the case of Comrade Martov too. In general, Comrade Martov's second speech (p. 245) is so interesting that it deserves to be examined in detail.

Comrade Martov's first argument: control by the Party organisations over Party members not belonging to them "is practicable, inasmuch as, having assigned a function to someone, the committee will be able to watch over it" (p. 245). This thesis is remarkably characteristic, for it "betrays", if one may so put it, *who* needs Martov's formulation and whom it will serve *in actual fact*—free-lance intellectuals or workers' groups and the worker masses. The fact is that there are two possible interpretations of Martov's formulation: 1) that anyone who renders the Party regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations is entitled to "*proclaim himself*" (Comrade Martov's own words) a Party member; 2) that a Party organisation is *entitled to regard* as a Party member anyone who renders it regular personal assistance under its direction. It is only the first interpretation that really gives "every striker" the opportunity to call himself a Party member, and accordingly *it alone* immediately won the hearts of the Liebers, Akimovs, and Martynovs. But this interpretation is manifestly no more than a phrase, because it would apply to the entire working class, and the distinction between Party and class would be obliterated; control over and direction of "every striker" can only be spoken of "symbolically". That is why, in his second speech, Comrade Martov at once slipped into the second interpretation (even though, be it said in parenthesis, *it was directly rejected by the Congress* when it turned down Kostich's resolution—p. 255), namely, that a committee would assign functions and watch over their fulfilment. Such special assignments will never, of course, be made to the *mass* of the workers, to the *thousands* of proletarians (of whom Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martynov spoke)—they will frequently be given precisely to those *professors* whom Comrade Axelrod mentioned, to those *high-school students* for

whom Comrade Lieber and Comrade Popov were so concerned (p. 241), and to the *revolutionary youth* to whom Comrade Axelrod referred in his second speech (p. 242). In a word, Comrade Martov's formula will either remain a dead letter, an empty phrase, or it will be of benefit mainly and almost exclusively to "*intellectuals who are thoroughly imbued with bourgeois individualism*" and do not wish to join an organisation. *In words*, Martov's formulation defends the interests of the broad strata of the proletariat, but *in fact* it serves the interests of the *bourgeois intellectuals*, who fight shy of proletarian discipline and organisation. No one will venture to deny that *the intelligentsia*, *as a special stratum* of modern capitalist society, is characterised, by and large, *precisely by individualism* and incapacity for discipline and organisation (cf., for example, Kautsky's well-known articles on the intelligentsia). This, incidentally is a feature which unfavourably distinguishes this social stratum from the proletariat; it is one of the reasons for the flabbiness and instability of the intellectual, which the proletariat so often feels; and this trait of the intelligentsia is intimately bound up with its customary mode of life, its mode of earning a livelihood, which in a great many respects approximates to the *petty-bourgeois mode of existence* (working in isolation or in very small groups, etc.). Nor is it fortuitous, lastly, that the defenders of Comrade Martov's formulation were the ones who had to cite the example of professors and high-school students! It was not champions of a broad proletarian struggle who, in the controversy over Paragraph 1, took the field against champions of a radically conspiratorial organisation, as Comrades Martynov and Axelrod thought, but the supporters of *bourgeois-intellectual individualism* who clashed with the supporters of *proletarian organisation and discipline*.

Comrade Popov said: "Everywhere, in St. Petersburg as in Nikolayev or Odessa, as the representatives from these towns testify, there are dozens of workers who are distributing literature and carrying on word-of-mouth agitation but who cannot be members of an organisation. They can be attached to an organisation, but not regarded as members" (p. 241). Why they cannot be members of an organisation remained Comrade Popov's secret. I have already quoted the passage from *A Letter to a Comrade* showing that the admis-

sion of all such workers (by the hundred, not the dozen) to an organisation is both possible and necessary, and, moreover, that a great many of these organisations can and should belong to the Party.

Comrade Martov's second argument: "In Lenin's opinion there should be no organisations in the Party other than Party organisations...." Quite true! "In my opinion, on the contrary, such organisations should exist. Life creates and breeds organizations faster than we can include them in the hierarchy of our militant organisation of professional revolutionaries...." That is untrue in two respects: 1) the number of effective organisations of revolutionaries that "life" breeds is far less than we need, than the working-class movement requires; 2) our Party should be a hierarchy not only of organisations of revolutionaries, but of a mass of workers' organisations as well.... "Lenin thinks that the Central Committee will confer the title of Party organisations only on such as are fully reliable in the matter of principles. But Comrade Brouckère understands very well that life [*sic*!] will assert itself and that the Central Committee, in order not to leave a multitude of organisations outside the Party, will have to legitimise them despite their not quite reliable character; that is why Comrade Brouckère associates himself with Lenin...." What a truly tail-ist conception of "life"! Of course, if the Central Committee had *necessarily* to consist of people who were not guided by their own opinions, but by what others might say (*vide* the Organising Committee incident), then "life" would "assert itself" in the sense that the most backward elements in the Party would gain the upper hand (*as has in fact happened now when the backward elements have taken shape as the Party* "*minority*".). But no *intelligent* reason can be given which would induce a *sensible* Central Committee to admit "unreliable" elements to the Party. By this reference to "life", which "breeds" unreliable elements, Comrade Martov patently revealed the opportunist character of his plan of organisation!... "I for my part think," he continued, "that if such an organisation [one that is not quite reliable] is prepared to accept the Party programme and Party control, we may admit it to the Party, without thereby making it a Party organisation. I would consider it a great triumph for our Party if, for example some union of

'independents' were to declare that they accepted the views of Social-Democracy and its programme and were joining the Party; which does not, however, mean that we would include the union in the Party organisation...." Such is the muddle Martov's formulation leads to: non-Party organisations belonging to the Party! Just imagine *his* scheme: the Party= 1) organisations of revolutionaries, +2) workers' organisations recognised as Party organisations, +3) workers' organisations not recognised as Party organisations (consisting principally of "independents"), +4) individuals performing various functions—professors, high-school students, etc., +5) "every striker". Alongside of this remarkable plan one can only put the words of Comrade Lieber: "Our task is not only to organise an organisation [!!]; we can and should organise a party" (p. 241). Yes, of course, we can and should do that, but what it requires is not meaningless words about "organising organisations", but the *unequivocal demand* that Party members should work to create an *organisation* in fact. He who talks about "organising a party" and yet defends using the word party to cover disorganisation and disunity of every kind is just indulging in empty words.

"Our formulation," Comrade Martov said, "expresses the desire to have a series of organisations between the organisation of revolutionaries and the masses." It does not. This truly essential desire is just what Martov's formulation *does not express*, for it *does not offer an incentive to organise*, does not contain a demand for organisation, does not separate organised from unorganised. All it offers is a *title*,* and in this

* At the League Congress, Comrade Martov adduced one more argument in support of his formulation, an argument that deserves to be laughed at. "We might point out," he said, "that, taken literally, Lenin's formulation excludes the *agents of the Central Committee* from the Party, for they do not constitute an organisation" (p. 59). Even at the League Congress this argument was greeted with *laughter*, as the minutes record. Comrade Martov supposes that the "difficulty" he mentions can only be solved by including the Central Committee agents in "the organisation of the Central Committee". But that is not the point. The point is that Comrade Martov's example saliently demonstrates that *he completely fails to understand the idea of Paragraph 1*; it was a sheer specimen of pedantic criticism that did indeed deserve to be laughed at. *Formally speaking*, all that would be required would be to form an "organisation of Central Committee agents", pass a *resolution* to include it in the Party, and the "difficulty" which

connection we cannot but recall Comrade Axelrod's words: "No decree can forbid them [circles of revolutionary youth and the like] or individuals to call themselves Social-Democrats [true enough!] and even to regard themselves as part of the Party"—now that is *not true at all*! It is impossible and *pointless* to forbid anyone to call himself a Social-Democrat, for in its *direct* sense this word only signifies a system of convictions, and not definite organisational relations. But as to forbidding various circles and persons to "regard themselves as part of the Party", that can and should be done if these circles and persons injure the Party, corrupt or disorganise it. It would be absurd to speak of the *Party* as of a whole, as of a political entity, if it could not "by decree forbid" a circle to "regard itself as part" of the whole! What in that case would be the point of defining the procedure and conditions of expulsion from the Party? Comrade Axelrod reduced Comrade Martov's fundamental mistake to an obvious absurdity; he even elevated this mistake to an *opportunist theory* when he added: "As formulated by Lenin, Paragraph 1 directly conflicts in principle with the very nature [!!] and aims of the Social-Democratic Party of the proletariat" (p. 243). This means nothing less than that making higher demands of the Party than of the class conflicts in principle with the very nature of the aims of the proletariat. It is not surprising that Akimov was heart and soul in favour of such a *theory*.

It should be said in fairness that Comrade Axelrod—who now wants to convert this mistaken formulation, one obvious-

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caused Comrade Martov so much brain-racking would immediately vanish. The *idea* of Paragraph 1 as formulated by me consists in the *incentive* to organise; it consists in *guaranteeing actual* control and direction. *Essentially*, the very question whether the Central Committee agents will belong to the Party is ridiculous, for *actual* control over them is fully and absolutely guaranteed *by the very fact that they have been appointed agents* and that they are kept on as agents. Consequently, here there can be no question of any confusion of organised and unorganised (which is the root mistake in Comrade Martov's formulation). Why Comrade Martov's formulation is no good is that it allows anyone, any opportunist, any windbag, any "professor", and any "high-school student" to *proclaim himself* a Party member. It is in vain for Comrade Martov to try to *talk away this Achilles heel* of his formulation by examples in which there can be no question of people arbitrarily styling or proclaiming themselves members.

ly tending towards opportunism, into the germ of new views —at the Congress, on the contrary, expressed a readiness to "bargain", saying: "But I observe that I am knocking at an open door" (I observe this in the new *Iskra* too), "because Comrade Lenin, with his peripheral circles which are to be regarded as part of the Party organisation, goes out to meet my demand." (And not only with the peripheral circles, but with every kind of workers' union: cf. p. 242 of the Minutes, the speech of Comrade Strakhov, and the passages from *What Is To Be Done?* and *A Letter to a Comrade* quoted above.) "There still remain the individuals, but here, too, we could bargain." I replied to Comrade Axelrod that, generally speaking, I was not averse to bargaining, and I must now explain in what sense this was meant. As regards the individuals—all those professors, high-school students, etc.—I would least of all have agreed to make concessions; but if doubts had been aroused as to the workers' organisations, I would have agreed (despite the utter groundlessness of such doubts, as I have proved above) to add to my Paragraph 1 a note to the following effect: "Workers' organisations which accept the Programme and Rules of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should be included in the largest possible numbers among the Party organisations." Strictly speaking, of course, the place for such a recommendation is not in the Rules, which should be confined to statutory definitions, but in explanatory commentaries and pamphlets (and I have already pointed out that I gave such explanations in my pamphlets long before the Rules were drawn up); but at least such a note would not contain even a shadow of *wrong* ideas capable of leading to disorganisation, not a shadow of the *opportunist* arguments* and "*anarchistic conceptions*" that are undoubtedly inherent in Comrade Martov's formulation.

* To this category of arguments, which inevitably crop up when attempts are made to justify Martov's formulation, belongs, in particular, Comrade Trotsky's statement (pp. 248 and 346) that "opportunism is produced by more complex [or: is determined by deeper] causes than one or another clause in the Rules; it is brought about by the relative level of development of bourgeois democracy and the proletariat...." The point is not that clauses in the Rules may produce opportunism, but that with their help a more or a less trenchant weapon against opportunism can be forged. The deeper its causes, the more trenchant should this weapon be. Therefore, to *justify* a for-

This last expression, given by me in quotation marks, is that of Comrade Pavlovich, who quite justly characterised as *anarchism* the recognition of "*irresponsible* and *self-enrolled* Party members". "Translated into simple terms," said Comrade Pavlovich, explaining my formulation to Comrade Lieber, "it means: 'if you want to be a Party member, your acceptance of organisational relations too must be not merely platonic'." Simple as this "translation" was, it seems

mulation which opens the door to opportunism on the grounds that opportunism has deep causes" is tail-ism of the first water. When Comrade Trotsky was opposed to Comrade Lieber, he understood that the Rules constitute the organised distrust" of the whole towards the part, of the vanguard towards the backward contingent; but when Comrade Trotsky came to be on Comrade Lieber's side, he forgot this and even began to justify the *weakness* and instability of *our* organisation of this distrust (distrust of opportunism) by talking about "complex causes", the "level of development of the proletariat", etc. Here is another of Comrade Trotsky's arguments: "It is much easier for the intellectual youth, organised in one way or another, to *enter themselves* [my italics] on the rolls of the Party." Just so. That is why it is the formulation by which even unorganised elements may *proclaim themselves* Party members that suffers from intellectualist vagueness, and not my formulation, which *obviates* the right to "enter *oneself*" on the rolls. Comrade Trotsky said that if the Central Committee "refused to recognise" an organisation of opportunists, it would only be because of the character of certain individuals, and that since these individuals would be known, as political personalities, they would not be dangerous and could be removed by a general Party boycott. This is only true of cases when people have to be *removed from the Party* (and only half true at that, because an organised party *removes* members by a vote and not by a boycott). It is absolutely untrue of the far more frequent cases when *removal* would be absurd, and when all that is required is *control*. For purposes of control, the Central Committee might, on certain conditions, *deliberately* admit to the Party an organisation which was not quite reliable but which was capable of working; it might do so with the object of testing it, of trying to *direct it on to the right path*, of correcting its partial aberrations by guidance, etc. This would not be dangerous *if* in general "*self-entering*" on the Party rolls were not allowed. It would often be useful for an open and *responsible*, controlled expression (and discussion) of mistaken views and mistaken tactics. "But if statutory definitions are to correspond to actual relations, Comrade Lenin's formulation must be rejected," said Comrade Trotsky, and again he spoke like an opportunist. Actual relations are not a dead thing, they live and develop. Statutory definitions may correspond to the progressive development of those relations, but they may also (if the definitions are bad ones) "correspond" to retrogression or stagnation. The latter case is the "case" of Comrade Martov.

it was not superfluous (as events since the Congress have shown) not only for various dubious professors and high-school students, but for honest-to-goodness Party members, for people at the top.... With no less justice, Comrade Pavlovich pointed to the contradiction between Comrade Martov's formulation and the indisputable precept of scientific socialism which Comrade Martov quoted so unhappily: "Our Party is the conscious spokesman of an unconscious process." Exactly. And for that very reason it is wrong to want "every striker" to have the right to call himself a Party member, for if "every strike" were not only a spontaneous expression of the powerful class instinct and of the class struggle which is leading inevitably to the social revolution, but a *conscious expression* of that process, then ... then the general strike would not be an anarchist phrase, then our Party would forthwith and at once *embrace* the whole working class, and, consequently, would at once put an end to *bourgeois society as a whole*. If it is to be a conscious spokesman *in fact*, the Party must be able to work out organisational relations that will *ensure a definite level* of consciousness and systematically raise this level. "If we are to go the way of Martov," Comrade Pavlovich said, "we should first of all delete the clause on accepting the *programme*, for before a programme can be accepted it must be mastered and understood.... Acceptance of the programme presupposes a fairly high level of political consciousness." We shall never allow *support* of Social-Democracy, *participation* in the struggle it directs, to be artificially *restricted* by any requirements (mastery, understanding, etc.), for this *participation* itself, the very fact of it, *promotes* both consciousness and the instinct for organisation; but since we have *joined together in a party* to carry on systematic work, we must see to it that it is systematic.

That Comrade Pavlovich's warning regarding the programme was not superfluous became apparent *at once*, during *that very same* sitting. Comrades Akimov and Lieber, who secured the adoption of Comrade Martov's formulation,* *at once*

* The vote was twenty-eight for and twenty-two against. Of the eight anti-*Iskra*-ists, seven were for Martov and one for me. Without the aid of the opportunists, Comrade Martov would not have secured

betrayed their true nature by demanding (pp. 254-55) that in the case of the programme too only platonic acceptance, acceptance only of its "basic principles", should be required (for "membership" in the Party). "Comrade Akimov's proposal is quite logical from Comrade Martov's standpoint," Comrade Pavlovich remarked. Unfortunately, we cannot see from the minutes *how many* votes this proposal of Akimov's secured—in all probability, not less than seven (five Bundists, Akimov, and Brouckère). And it was the withdrawal of *seven* delegates from the Congress that converted the "compact majority" (anti-*Iskra*-ists, "Centre", and Martovites) which began to form over Paragraph 1 of the Rules into a compact minority! It was the withdrawal of *seven* delegates that resulted in the defeat of the motion to endorse the old editorial board—that supposed howling violation of "continuity" in the *Iskra* editorship! A curious *seven* it was that constituted the sole salvation and guarantee of *Iskra* "continuity": the Bundists, Akimov and Brouckère, that is, the very delegates who voted against the *motives* for adopting *Iskra* as the Central Organ, the very delegates whose opportunism was acknowledged dozens of times by the Congress, and acknowledged in particular by Martov and Plekhanov in the matter of *toning down* Paragraph 1 in reference to the programme. The "continuity" of *Iskra* guarded by the anti-*Iskra*-ists!—this brings us to the *starting-point* of the post-Congress tragicomedy.

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The grouping of votes over Paragraph 1 of the Rules revealed a phenomenon of exactly the same type as the equality of languages incident: the falling away of one-quarter (approximately) of the *Iskra* majority made possible the victory of the anti-*Iskra*-ists, who were backed by the

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adoption of his opportunist formulation. (At the League Congress Comrade Martov tried very unsuccessfully to refute this undoubted fact, for some reason mentioning only the votes of the Bundists and forgetting about Comrade Akimov and his friends—or rather remembering them *only* when it could serve against me: Comrade Brouckère's agreement with me.)

"Centre". Of course, here too there were individual votes which disturbed the full symmetry of the picture—in so large an assembly as our Congress there are bound to be some "strays" who shift quite fortuitously from one side to the other, especially on a question like Paragraph 1, where the true character of the divergence was only beginning to emerge and many delegates had simply *not yet found their bearings* (considering that the question had not been discussed beforehand in the press). Five votes fell away from the majority *Iskra*-ists (Rusov and Karsky with two votes each, and Lensky with one); on the other hand, they were joined by one anti-*Iskra*-ist (Brouckère) and by three from the Centre (Medvedev, Egorov and Tsaryov); the result was a total of twenty-three votes (24—5+4), one vote less than in the final grouping in the elections. *It was the anti-"Iskra"-ists who gave Martov his majority*, seven of them voting for him and one for me (of the "Centre" too, seven voted for Martov, and three for me). That coalition of the minority *Iskra*-ists with the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" which formed a compact minority at the end of the Congress and after the Congress *was beginning to take shape*. The political error of Martov and Axelrod, who *undoubtedly took a step towards opportunism and anarchistic individualism* in their formulation of Paragraph 1, and especially in their defence of that formulation, was revealed at once and very clearly thanks to the free and open arena offered by the Congress; it was revealed in the fact that the least stable elements, the least steadfast in principle, at once employed all their forces to widen the fissure, the breach, that appeared in the views of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. Working together at the Congress were people who in matters of organisation frankly pursued *different aims* (see Akimov's speech)—a circumstance which at once induced those who were *in principle* opposed to our organisational plan and our Rules to support the error of Comrades Martov and Axelrod. The *Iskra*-ists who on this question too remained faithful to the views of revolutionary Social-Democracy found themselves *in the minority*. This is a point of *the utmost importance*, for unless it is grasped it is absolutely impossible to understand either the struggle over the details of the Rules or the struggle over the personal composition of the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

J. INNOCENT VICTIMS OF A FALSE ACCUSATION OF OPPORTUNISM

Before passing onto the subsequent discussion of the Rules, it is necessary, in order to elucidate our difference over the personal composition of the central institutions, to touch on the *private* meetings of the *Iskra* organisation during the Congress. The last and most important of these four meetings was held *just after* the vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules—and thus the split in the *Iskra* organisation which took place at this meeting was in point of both time and logic a prelude to the subsequent struggle.

The *Iskra* organisation began to hold private meetings* soon after the Organising Committee incident, which gave rise to a discussion of possible candidates for the Central Committee. It stands to reason that, since binding instructions had been abolished, these meetings were purely in the nature of consultations and their decisions were not binding on anyone; but their importance was nevertheless immense. The selection of candidates for the Central Committee was a matter of considerable difficulty to delegates who were acquainted neither with the secret names nor with the inner work of the *Iskra* organisation, the organisation that had brought about actual Party unity and whose leadership of the practical movement was one of the motives for the official adoption of *Iskra*. We have already seen that, united, the *Iskra*-ists were fully assured a big majority at the Congress, as much as three-fifths, and all the delegates realised this very well. All the *Iskra*-ists, in fact, expected the "*Iskra*" *organisation* to make definite recommendations as to the personal composition of the Central Committee, and not one member of that organisation raised any objection to a preliminary discussion of the Central Committee's composition within it; not one of them so much as hinted at endorsing the entire membership of the Organising Committee, that is, converting that body into the Central

* I have already tried at the League Congress to give an account of what took place at the private meetings, keeping to the barest essentials in order to avoid hopeless arguments. The principal facts are also set out in my *Letter to the Editors of* "*Iskra*" (p. 4). Comrade Martov did not challenge them in his *Reply*.

Committee, or *even at conferring* with the Organising Committee as a whole regarding candidates for the Central Committee. This circumstance is also highly significant, and it is extremely important to bear it in mind, for *now*, *after the event*, the Martovites are zealously defending the Organising Committee, thereby only proving their political spinelessness for the hundredth and thousandth time.* Until the split over the composition of the central bodies led Martov to join forces with the Akimovs, everyone at the Congress clearly realised what any impartial person may easily ascertain from the Congress minutes and from the entire history of *Iskra*, namely, that the Organising Committee was *mainly* a commission set up to convene the Congress, a commission deliberately composed of representatives of different shades, including even the Bundists; while the real work of *creating* the organised unity of the Party was done entirely by the *Iskra* organisation. (It should be remembered also that quite by chance *several Iskra*-ists on the Organising Committee were absent from the Congress, either because they had been arrested or for other reasons "beyond their control".) The members of the *Iskra* organisation present at the Congress have already been enumerated in Comrade Pavlovich's pamphlet (see his *Letter on the Second Congress*, p. 13).[100]

The ultimate result of the heated debates in the *Iskra* organisation was the two votes I have already mentioned in my *Letter to the Editors*. The first vote: "by nine votes to four, with three abstentions, one of the candidates supported by Martov was rejected." What could be simpler and more natural, one would think, than such a fact: by the common consent of all the sixteen *Iskra* organisation members at the Congress, the possible candidates are discussed, and one of Comrade Martov's candidates is rejected by the majority

* Just reflect on this "picture of morals": the *delegate* from the *Iskra* organisation confers *at the Congress* with it *alone* and *does not hint*, even, at conferring with the organising Committee. But after he is defeated both in this organisation and at the Congress, he begins to *regret* that the Organising Committee was not endorsed, to extol it retrospectively, and loftily to ignore the organisation that gave him his mandate! It may safely be vouched that no analogous instance will be found in the history of any really Social-Democratic and really working-class party.

(it was Comrade Stein, as Comrade Martov himself has now blurted out—*State of Siege*, p. 69). After all, one of the reasons why we assembled at the Party Congress was to discuss and decide to whom to entrust the "conductor's baton"—and it was the common duty of us all as Party members to give this item on the agenda the most serious attention, to decide this question from the standpoint of the *interests of the work*, and not of "philistine sentimentality", as Comrade Rusov quite rightly expressed it later. Of course, in discussing candidates *at the Congress*, we were bound to touch upon certain personal qualities, were bound to express our approval or disapproval,* especially at an unofficial and intimate meeting. *And I have already pointed out at the League Congress* that it is absurd to think that a candidate is "disgraced" when he is not approved (League Minutes, p. 49), absurd to make a "scene" and go into hysterics over what forms part of a Party member's direct duty to select officials conscientiously and judiciously. And yet this was what put the fat in the fire as far as our minority are concerned, and they began *after the Congress* to clamour about "destroying reputations" (League Minutes, p. 70) and to assure *the broad public in print* that Comrade Stein had been the "chief figure" on the former Organising Committee and that he had been groundlessly accused of "diabolical schemes" (*State of Siege*, p. 69). Is it not hysterics to shout about "destroying reputations" in connection with the approval or disapproval of candidates? Is it not squabbling when people who have been defeated both at a private meeting of the

* Comrade Martov bitterly complained at the League of the vehemence of my disapproval, failing to see that his complaint turned into an argument against himself. Lenin behaved—to use his own expression—frenziedly (League Minutes, p. 63). That is so. He banged the door. True. His conduct (at the second or third meeting of the *Iskra* organisation) aroused the indignation of the members who remained at the meeting. It did. But what follows? Only that my arguments on the substance of the questions in dispute were convincing and were borne out by the course of the Congress. For if, in fact, nine of the sixteen members of the *Iskra* organisation in the end sided with me, clearly this was so *notwithstanding* and *in spite of* my reprehensible vehemence. Hence, had it not been for this "vehemence", perhaps even more than nine would have sided with me. The more "indignation" my arguments and facts had to overcome, the more convincing they must have been.

Iskra organisation and at the official supreme assembly of the Party, the Congress, begin to complain to all and sundry and recommend rejected candidates to the worthy public as "chief figures", and when they then try to force their candidates upon the Party by causing a split and demanding *co-optation*? In our musty émigré atmosphere political concepts have become so confused that Comrade Martov is no longer able to distinguish Party duty from personal and circle allegiance! It is bureaucracy and formalism, we are to believe, to think it proper to discuss and decide upon candidates *only* at congresses, where delegates assemble primarily for the discussion of important questions of principle, where representatives of the movement assemble who are able to treat the question of personalities impartially, and who are able (and in duty bound) to *demand* and gather all necessary information about the candidates before casting their decisive votes, and where the assignment of a certain place to arguments over the conductor's baton is natural and essential. Instead of this bureaucratic and formal view, new usages and customs have now become the thing: we are, after congresses, to talk right and left about the political burial of Ivan Ivanovich or the destroyed reputation of Ivan Nikiforovich; writers are to recommend candidates in pamphlets, the while beating their breasts and hypocritically asserting: "This is not a circle, it is a party...." Those of the reading public who have a taste for scandal will eagerly savour the sensational news that, on the assurance of Martov himself,* so-and-so was the chief figure on the Organising Committee. This reading public is far more competent to discuss and decide the question than formalistic institutions like congresses, with their grossly mechanical decisions by majority vote.... Yes, there are still veritable Augean stables of émigré squabbling for our real Party workers to clean up!

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* I, too, like Martov, tried in the *Iskra* organisation to get acertain candidate nominated to the Central Committee and failed, a candidate of whose splendid reputation before and at the beginning of the Congress, as borne out by outstanding facts, I too could speak. But it has never entered my head. This comrade *has sufficient self-respect not to allow* anybody, after the Congress, to nominate him in print or to complain about political burials, destroyed reputations, etc.

Second vote of the *Iskra* organisation: "by ten votes to two, with four abstentions, a list of five [candidates for the Central Committee] was adopted which, on my proposal, included one leader of the non-*Iskra*-ist elements and one leader of the *Iskra*-ist minority."* This vote is of the utmost importance, for it clearly and irrefutably proves the utter falsity of the fables which were built up later, in the atmosphere of squabbling, to the effect that we wanted to eject the non-*Iskra*-ists from the Party or set them aside, that what the majority did was to pick candidates from only one half of the Congress and have them elected by that half, etc. All this is sheer falsehood. The vote I have cited shows that we did not exclude the non-*Iskra*-ists even from the Central Committee, let alone the Party, and that we allowed our opponents a very substantial *minority*. The whole point is that they *wanted to have a majority*, and when this modest wish was not gratified, they started a *row* and refused to be represented on the central bodies at all. That such was the case, Comrade Martov's assertions at the League notwithstanding, is shown by the following *letter* which the minority of the *Iskra* organisation addressed to us, the majority of the *Iskra*-ists (and the majority at the Congress after the withdrawal of the seven), shortly after the Congress adopted Paragraph 1 of the Rules (it should be noted that the *Iskra* organisation meeting I have been speaking of was the *last*: after it, the organisation *actually* broke up and each side tried to convince the other Congress delegates that it was in the right).

Here is the text of the letter:

"Having heard the explanation of delegates Sorokin and Sablina[101] regarding the wish of the majority of the editorial board and the Emancipation of Labour group to attend the meeting [on such and such a date],** and having with the help of these delegates established

* See p. 120 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** According to my reckoning, the date mentioned in the letter was a Tuesday. The meeting took place on Tuesday evening, that is, *after* the 28th sitting of the Congress. This chronological point is very important. It is a *documentary refutation* of Comrade Martov's opinion that we parted company over the organisation of the central bodies, and not over their personal composition. It is *documentary proof* of the correctness of my statement of the case at the League Congress and in the *Letter to the Editors*. *After the 28th* sitting of the Con-

that at the previous meeting a list of Central Committee candidates was read which was supposed to have come from us, and which was used to misrepresent our whole *political* position; and bearing in mind also that, firstly, this list was attributed to us without any attempt to ascertain its real origin; that, secondly, this circumstance is undoubtedly connected with the accusation of opportunism openly circulated against the majority of the *Iskra* editorial board and of the Emancipation of Labour group; and that thirdly this accusation is, as is perfectly clear to us, connected with a quite definite plan to *change the composition of the 'Iskra' editorial board*—we consider that the explanation given us of the reasons for excluding us from the meeting is unsatisfactory, and that the refusal to admit us to the meeting is proof of not wanting to give us the opportunity to refute the above-mentioned false accusations.

"As to the possibility of our reaching agreement on a joint list of candidates for the Central Committee, we declare that the only list we can accept as the basis for agreement is: Popov, Trotsky, and Glebov. Furthermore, we emphasise that this is a *compromise* list, since the inclusion of Comrade Glebov is to be viewed only as a concession to the wishes of the majority- for now that the role he has played at the Congress is clear to us, *we do not consider Comrade Glebov* a person satisfying the requirements that should be made of a candidate for the Central Committee.

"At the same time, we stress that our entering into negotiations regarding the candidates for the Central Committee has no bearing whatever on the question of the composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ, as on this question (the composition of the editorial board) we are not prepared to enter into any negotiations.

"On behalf of the comrades
"Martov and Starover"

This letter, which accurately reproduces the frame of mind of the disputing sides and the state of the dispute, takes us at once to the "heart" of the incipient split and reveals its real causes. The minority of the *Iskra* organisation, having refused to agree with the majority and preferred freedom of agitation at the Congress (to which they were, of course, fully entitled), nevertheless tried to induce the "delegates" of the majority to admit them to their private meeting! Naturally, this amusing demand only met with a smile and a shrug at our meeting (where the letter was of

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gress, Comrades Martov and Starover had a great deal to say about a false accusation of opportunism, but *did not say a word* about the differences over the composition of the Council or over co-optation to the central bodies (which we argued about at the 25th, 26th, and 27th sittings).

course read), and the outcry, bordering on hysterics, about "false accusations of opportunism" evoked outright laughter. But let us first examine Martov's and Starover's bitter complaints point by point.

The list had been wrongly attributed to them; their political position was being misrepresented.—But, as Martov himself has admitted (League Minutes, p. 64), it never occurred to me to doubt the truth of his statement that he was not the author of the list. In general, the authorship of the list has nothing to do with the case, and whether the list was drawn up by some *Iskra*-ist or by some representative of the "Centre", etc., is of absolutely no importance. The important thing is that this list, which consisted entirely of members of the present minority, circulated at the Congress, if only as a mere guess or conjecture. Lastly, *the most important thing of all* is that at the Congress Comrade Martov *was obliged* to dissociate himself with the utmost vehemence from *such* a list, a list which he now *would be bound* to greet with delight. Nothing could more saliently exemplify instability in the evaluation of people and shades than this right-about-face in the course of a couple of months from howling about "defamatory rumours" to forcing on the Party central body the very candidates who figure in this supposedly defamatory list!*

This list, Comrade Martov said at the League Congress, "politically implied a coalition between us and *Yuzhny Rabochy*, on the one hand, and the Bund, on the other, a coalition in the sense of a *direct agreement*" (p. 64). That is not true, for, firstly, the Bund would never have entered into an "agreement" about a list which did not include a single Bundist; and, secondly, there was *and could have been no question* of a direct agreement (which was what Martov thought disgraceful) even with the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, let alone the Bund. It was not an agreement but a coalition that was in question; not that Comrade Martov had made a deal, but that he *was bound to have the support* of those very anti-*Iskra*-ists and unstable elements whom he had fought

* These lines were already set up when we received news of the incident of Comrade Gusev and Comrade Deutsch. We shall examine this incident separately in an *appendix*. (See pp. 416-25 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

during the first half of the Congress and who had seized upon his error over Paragraph 1 of the Rules. The letter I have quoted proves incontrovertibly that the *root* of the "grievance" lay in the *open*, *and moreover false*, *accusation of opportunism*. This "accusation" which put the fat in the fire, and which Comrade Martov *now* so carefully steers clear of, in spite of my reminder in the *Letter to the Editors*, was twofold. Firstly, during the discussion of Paragraph 1 of the Rules Plekhanov bluntly declared that Paragraph 1 was a question of "keeping away" from us "every kind of representative of opportunism", and that my draft, as a bulwark against their invading the Party, "should, if only for that reason, receive the votes of all enemies of opportunism" (Congress Minutes, p. 246). These vigorous words, even though I softened them down a little (p. 250),* caused a sensation, which was clearly expressed in the speeches of Comrades Rusov (p. 247), Trotsky (p. 248), and Akimov (p. 253). In the "lobby" of our "parliament", Plekhanov's thesis was keenly commented on and varied in a thousand ways in endless arguments over Paragraph 1. But instead of defending their case on its merits, our dear comrades assumed a ludicrous air of injury and even went to the length of complaining in writing about a "false accusation of opportunism"!

Their narrow circle mentality and astonishing immaturity as Party members, which cannot stand the fresh breeze of open controversy in the presence of all, is here clearly revealed. It is mentality so familiar to the Russian, as expressed in the old saying: either coats off, or let's have your hand! These people are so accustomed to the bell-jar seclusion of an intimate and snug little circle that they almost fainted as soon as a person spoke up in a free and open arena on his own responsibility. Accusations of opportunism!—against whom? Against the Emancipation of Labour group, and its majority at that—can you imagine anything more terrible? Either split the Party on account of this ineffaceable insult, or hush up this "domestic unpleasantness" by restoring the "continuity" of the bell-jar—this alternative is already pretty clearly indicated in the letter we are

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 499-500.—*Ed.*

examining. Intellectualist individualism and the circle mentality had come into conflict with the requirement of open speaking before the Party. Can you imagine such an absurdity, such a squabble, such a complaint about "false accusations of opportunism" in the German party? There, proletarian organisation and discipline weaned them from such intellectualist flabbiness long ago. Nobody has anything but the profoundest respect for Liebknecht, let us say; but how they would have laughed over there at *complaints* that he (together with Bebel) was "openly accused of opportunism" at the 1895 Congress, when, on the agrarian question, he found himself in the bad company of the notorious opportunist Vollmar and his friends. Liebknecht's name is inseparably bound up with the history of the German working-class movement not, of course, because he happened to stray into opportunism on such a comparatively minor and specific question, but in spite of it. And similarly, in spite of all the acrimony of the struggle, the name of Comrade Axelrod, say, inspires respect in every Russian Social-Democrat, and always will; but not because Comrade Axelrod happened to defend an opportunist idea at the Second Congress of our Party, happened to dig out old anarchistic rubbish at the Second Congress of the League, but in spite of it. Only the most hidebound circle mentality, with its logic of "either coats off, or let's have your hand", could give rise to hysterics, squabbles, and a Party split because of a "false accusation of opportunism against the majority of the Emancipation of Labour group".

The other element of this terrible accusation is intimately connected with the preceding (Comrade Martov tried in vain at the League Congress [p. 63] to evade and hush up *one* side of this incident). It relates in fact to that *coalition* of the anti-*Iskra*-ist and wavering elements with Comrade Martov which *began to emerge* in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Rules. Naturally, there was no agreement, direct or indirect, between Comrade Martov and the anti-*Iskra*-ists, nor could there have been, and nobody suspected him of it: it only seemed so to him in his fright. But *politically* his error was revealed in the fact that people who undoubtedly gravitated towards opportunism began to form around him an ever more solid and "compact" majority (which has

now become a minority *only* because of the "accidental" withdrawal of seven delegates). We pointed to this "coalition", also *openly*, of course, immediately after the matter of Paragraph 1—both at the Congress (see Comrade Pavlovich's remark already quoted: Congress Minutes, p. 255) and in the *Iskra* organisation (Plekhanov, as I recall, pointed to it in particular). It is literally the same point and the same jibe as was addressed by Clara Zetkin to Bebel and Liebknecht in 1895, when she said: "*Es tut mir in der Seele weh, dass ich dich in der Gesellschaft seh*'" ("It cuts me to the quick to see you [i.e., Bebel] in such company [i.e., of Vollmar and Co.]"). It is strange, to be sure, that Bebel and Liebknecht did not send a hysterical message to Kautsky and Zetkin complaining of a false accusation of opportunism....

As to the list of candidates for the Central Committee, this letter shows that Comrade Martov was mistaken in declaring at the League that the refusal to come to an agreement with us was not yet final—another example of how unwise it is in a political struggle to attempt to reproduce the *spoken word* from memory, instead of relying on documents. Actually, the "minority" were so modest as to present the "majority" with an ultimatum: take two from the "minority" and one (by way of compromise and *only* as a concession, properly speaking!) from the "majority". This is monstrous, but it is a fact. And this fact clearly shows how absurd are the fables now being spread to the effect that the "majority" picked representatives of only one half of the Congress and got them elected by that one half. *Just the opposite*: the Martovites offered us one out of three only as a concession, consequently, in the event of our not agreeing to this unique "concession", they wanted to get *all* the seats filled by their own candidates! At our private meeting we had a good laugh at the Martovites' modesty and drew up a list of our own: Glebov-Travinsky (subsequently elected to the Central Committee)-*Popov*. For the latter we then substituted (also at a private meeting of the twenty-four) Comrade Vasilyev (subsequently elected to the Central Committee) *only because* Comrade Popov refused, first in private conversation and then openly at the Congress (p. 338), to be included in our list.

That is how matters really stood.

The modest "minority" modestly wished to be in the majority. When this modest wish was not met, the "minority" were pleased to decline altogether and to start a row. Yet there are people who now talk pontifically about the "intransigence" of the "majority"!

Entering the fray in the arena of free agitation at the Congress, the "minority" presented the "majority" with amusing ultimatums. Having suffered defeat, *our heroes burst into tears and began to cry out about a state of siege. Voilà tout.*

The terrible accusation that we intended to change the composition of the editorial board was also greeted with a smile (at our private meeting of the twenty-four): from the very beginning of the Congress, and even before the Congress, everybody had known perfectly well of the plan to *reconstitute* the editorial board by electing an initial trio (I shall speak of this in greater detail when I come to the election of the editorial board at the Congress). That the "minority" took fright at this plan *after* they saw its correctness splendidly confirmed by their coalition with the anti-*Iskra*-ists did not surprise us—it was quite natural. Of course, we could not take seriously the proposal that we should of our own free will, without a fight at the Congress, convert ourselves into a minority; nor could we take seriously this whole letter, the authors of which had reached such an incredible state of exasperation as to speak of "false accusations of opportunism". We confidently hoped that their sense of Party duty would very soon get the better of the natural desire to "vent their spleen".

K. CONTINUATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE RULES COMPOSITION OF THE COUNCIL

The succeeding clauses of the Rules aroused far more controversy over details than over principles of organisation. The 24th sitting of the Congress was entirely devoted to the question of representation at Party congresses, and again a decided and definite struggle against the common plans of all the *Iskra*-ists was waged only by the Bundists (Goldblatt and Lieber, pp. 258-59) and Comrade Akimov,

who with praiseworthy frankness admitted his role at the Congress: "Every time I speak, I do so fully realising that my arguments will not influence the comrades, but will on the contrary damage the point I am trying to defend" (p. 261). Coming just after Paragraph 1 of the Rules, this apt remark was particularly appropriate; only the words "on the contrary" were not quite in order here, for Comrade Akimov was able not only to damage various points, but at the same time, and by so doing, to "influence the comrades" ... those very inconsistent *Iskra*-ists who inclined towards opportunist phrase-mongering.

Well, in the upshot Paragraph 3 of the Rules, which defines the conditions of representation at congresses, was adopted by a majority with seven abstentions (p. 263)—anti-*Iskra*-ists, evidently.

The arguments over the composition of the Council, which took up the greater part of the 25th Congress sitting, revealed an extraordinary number of groupings around a multitude of proposals. Abramson and Tsaryov rejected the plan for a Council altogether. Panin insisted on making the Council a court of arbitration exclusively, and therefore quite consistently moved to delete the definition that the Council is the supreme institution and that it may be summoned by any two of its members.* Hertz[102] and Rusov advocated differing methods of constituting the Council, in addition to the *three* methods proposed by the *five* members of the Rules Committee.

The questions in dispute reduced themselves primarily to definition of the Council's functions: whether it was to be a court of arbitration or the supreme institution of the Party. Comrade Panin, as I have said, was consistently in favour of the former. But he stood alone. Comrade Martov vigorously opposed this: "I propose that the motion to delete the words, 'the Council is the supreme institution',

* Apparently, Comrade Starover also inclined to the view of Comrade Panin, only with the difference that the latter knew what he wanted and quite consistently moved resolutions aimed at converting the Council into a pure arbitration or conciliation body, whereas Comrade Starover did not know what he wanted when he said that according to the draft the Council could meet "only on the wish of the parties" (p. 266). That was quite incorrect.

be rejected. Our formulation [i.e., the formulation of the Council's functions that we had agreed on in the Rules Committee] deliberately leaves open the possibility of the Council developing into the supreme Party institution. For us, the Council is not merely a conciliation board." Yet the composition of the Council as proposed by Comrade Martov was solely and exclusively that of a "conciliation board" or court of arbitration: two members from each of the central bodies and a fifth to be invited by these four. Not only such a composition of the Council, but even that adopted by the Congress on the motion of Comrades Rusov and Hertz (the fifth member to be appointed by the Congress), answers the sole purpose of conciliation or mediation. Between such a composition of the Council and its mission of becoming the supreme Party institution there is an irreconcilable contradiction. The composition of the supreme Party institution should be constant, and not dependent on chance changes (sometimes owing to arrests) in the composition of the central bodies. The supreme institution should stand in direct relation to the Party Congress, receiving its powers from the latter, and not from two other Party institutions subordinate to the Congress The supreme institution should consist of persons known to the Party Congress. Lastly, the *supreme* institution should not be *organised* in a way that makes *its very existence* dependent on chance—the two bodies fail to agree on the selection of the fifth member, and the Party is left without a supreme institution! To this it was objected: 1) that if one of the five were to abstain and the remaining four were to divide equally, the position might also prove a hopeless one (Egorov) . This objection is unfounded, for the impossibility of *adopting a decision* is something that is inevitable at times in the case of *any* body, but that is quite different from the impossibility of *forming* the body. Second objection: "if an institution like the Council proves incapable of selecting the fifth member, it will mean that it is ineffectual in general" (Zasulich). But the point here is not that it will be ineffectual, but that there will be no *supreme* institution at all: without the fifth member, *there will be no* Council, there will be *no* "*institution*", and the question of whether it is effectual or not will not even arise. Lastly, if the trouble were that it might not be possible to

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form some Party body over which stood another, higher, body, that would be remediable, for in urgent cases the higher body could fill the gap in one way or another. But there is *no* body above the Council except the Congress, and therefore to frame the Rules in such a way that it *might not even be possible to form* the Council would obviously be illogical.

Both my brief speeches at the Congress on this question were devoted to an examination (pp. 267 and 269) *only of these two* wrong objections which Martov and other comrades adduced in defence of his proposal. As to the question of the Central Organ or; the Central Committee predominating on the Council, *I did not even touch on it*. This question was brought up, as early as the 14th sitting of the Congress (p. 157), by *Comrade Akimov*, he being the *first* to talk of the danger of the Central Organ predominating; and Comrades Martov, Axelrod, and others, *after the Congress*, were only following in *Akimov*'s footsteps when they invented the absurd and demagogic story that the "majority" wanted to convert the Central Committee into a tool of the editorial board. When he dealt with this question in his *State of Siege*, Comrade Martov modestly avoided mentioning its real initiator!

Anybody who cares to acquaint himself with the *entire* treatment at the Party Congress of the question of the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee, and is not content with isolated quotations torn from their context, will easily perceive how Comrade Martov has distorted the matter. *It was none other than Comrade Popov* who, as early as the 14th sitting, started a polemic *against the views of Comrade Akimov*, who wanted "the 'strictest centralisation' at the top of the Party *in order to weaken the influence of the Central Organ*" (p. 154; my italics), which in fact is the whole meaning of this [Akimov's] system". "Far from defending such centralisation", Comrade Popov added, "I am prepared to combat it with every means in my power, because it is *the banner of opportunism*." There you have the *root* of the famous question of the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee, and it is not surprising that Comrade Martov is now *obliged* to pass over the true origin of the question in silence. *Even* Comrade

Popov could not fail to discern the *opportunist* character of Akimov's talk about the predominance of the Central Organ,* and in order thoroughly to dissociate himself from Comrade Akimov, Comrade Popov *categorically* declared: "Let there be three members from the editorial board on this central body [the Council] and two from the Central Committee. *That is a secondary question*. [My italics.] The important thing is that the leadership, the supreme leadership of the Party, should proceed from one source (p. 155). Comrade Akimov objected: "Under the draft, the Central Organ is ensured predominance on the Council if only because the composition of the editorial board is constant whereas that of the Central Committee is changeable" (p. 157)—an argument which only relates to "constancy" of leadership in matters of *principle* (which is a normal and desirable thing), and certainly not to "predominance" in the sense of interference or encroachment on independence. And Comrade Popov, who at that time did not yet belong to a "minority" which masks its dissatisfaction with the composition of the central bodies by spreading tales of the Central Committee's lack of independence, told Comrade Akimov quite logically: "I propose that it [the Council] be regarded as the directing centre of the Party, in which case *it will be entirely unimportant whether there are more representatives on the Council from the Central Organ or from the Central Committee*" (pp. 157-58; my italics).

When the discussion of the composition of the Council was resumed at the 25th sitting, Comrade Pavlovich, continuing the old debate, pronounced in favour of the predom-

* Neither Comrade Popov nor Comrade Martov hesitated to call Comrade Akimov an opportunist; they only began to take exception and grow indignant when this appellation was applied *to them*, and applied justly, is connection with "equality of languages" or Paragraph 1. Comrade Akimov, in whose footsteps Comrade Martov has followed, was however able to conduct himself with greater dignity and manhood at the Party Congress than Comrade Martov and Co. at the League Congress. "I have been called an opportunist here," said Comrade Akimov at the Party Congress. "I personally consider this an abusive and offensive term and believe that I have done nothing to deserve it. However, I am not protesting" (p. 296). Can it be that Comrades Martov and Starover invited Comrade Akimov to subscribe to their protest against the false accusation of opportunism, but that Comrade Akimov declined?

inance of the Central Organ over the Central Committee "in view of the former's stability" (p. 264). It was stability in matters of *principle* that he had in mind, and that was how he was understood by Comrade Martov, who, speaking immediately after Comrade Pavlovich, considered it unnecessary to "fix the preponderance of one institution over the other" and pointed to the possibility of one of the Central Committee members residing abroad, "whereby the stability of the Central Committee in matters of principle would to some extent be preserved" (p. 264). Here there is not yet even a trace of the demagogic *confusion* of stability in matters of *principle*, and its preservation, with the preservation of the independence and initiative of the Central Committee. *At the Congress* this confusion, which *since the Congress* has practically become Comrade Martov's trump card, was furthered *only by Comrade Akimov*, who *already at that time* spoke of the "Arakcheyev[103] spirit of the Rules" (p. 268), and said that "*if three members of the Party Council were to be from the Central Organ, the Central Committee would be converted into a mere tool of the editorial board.* [My italics.] Three persons residing abroad would obtain the unrestricted [!!] right to order the work of the entire [!!] Party. Their security would be guaranteed, and their power would therefore be lifelong" (p. 268). It was with this absolutely absurd and demagogic talk, in which *ideological leadership is called interference in the work of the entire Party* (and which after the Congress provided a cheap slogan for Comrade Axelrod with his talk about "theocracy")—it was *with this* that Comrade Pavlovich again took issue when he stressed that he stood "for the stability and purity of the principles represented by *Iskra*. By giving preponderance to the editorial board of the Central Organ I want to fortify these principles (p. 268).

That is how the celebrated question of the predominance of the Central Organ over the Central Committee really stands. This famous "difference of principle" on the part of Comrades Axelrod and Martov is nothing but *a repetition of the opportunist and demagogic talk of Comrade Akimov*, the true character of which was clearly detected even by Comrade Popov, in the days when he had not yet suffered defeat over the composition of the central bodies!

* * *

To sum up the question of the composition of the Council: despite Comrade Martov's attempts in his *State of Siege* to prove that my statement of the case in the *Letter to the Editors* is contradictory and incorrect, the minutes of the Congress clearly show that, *in comparison* with Paragraph 1, this question was indeed only a *detail*, and that the assertion in the article "Our Congress" (*Iskra*, No. 53) that we argued "almost exclusively" about the organisation of the Party's central institutions is a *complete distortion*. It is a distortion all the more outrageous since the author of the article *entirely ignores the controversy over Paragraph 1*. Further, that there was no definite grouping of the *Iskra*-ists over the composition of the Council is also borne out by the minutes: there were no roll-call votes; Martov differed with Panin; I found common ground with Popov; Egorov and Gusev took up a separate stand, and so on. Finally, my last statement (at the Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad), to the effect that the Martovites' coalition with the anti-*Iskra*-ists grew steadily stronger, *is also borne out* by Comrade Martov's and Comrade Axelrod's swing towards Comrade Akimov—now apparent to everyone—on this question as well.

L. CONCLUSION OF THE DEBATE ON THE RULES. CO-OPTATION TO THE CENTRAL BODIES. WITHDRAWAL OF THE *RABOCHEYE DYELO* DELEGATES

Of the subsequent debate on the Rules (26th sitting of the Congress), only the question of restricting the powers of the Central Committee is worth mentioning, for it throws light on the character of the attacks the Martovites are *now* making on hypercentralism. Comrades Egorov and Popov strove for the restriction of centralism with rather more conviction, irrespective of their own candidature or that of those they supported. When the question was still in the Rules Commission, they moved that the right of the Central Committee to dissolve local committees be made contingent on the consent of the Council and, in addition, be limited to cases specially enumerated (p. 272, note 1). This was opposed by three members of the Rules Commis-

sion (Glebov, Martov, and myself), and at the Congress Comrade Martov upheld our view (p. 273) and answered Egorov and Popov by saying that "the Central Committee would in any case deliberate before deciding on so serious a step as the dissolution of an organisation". As you see, *at that time* Comrade Martov still turned a deaf ear to *every* anti-centralist scheme, and the Congress rejected the proposal of Egorov and Popov—only unfortunately the minutes do not tell us by how many votes.

At the Party Congress, Comrade Martov was also "against substituting the word 'endorses' for the word 'organises' [the Central Committee organises committees, etc.—Paragraph 6 of the Party Rules]. It must be given the right to organise as well." That is what Comrade Martov said *then* not having yet hit on the wonderful idea that the concept "organise" does not include endorsement, which he discovered only at the League Congress.

Apart from these two points, the debate over Paragraphs 5-11 of the Rules (Minutes, pp. 273-76) is hardly of any interest, being confined to quite minor arguments over details. Then came Paragraph 12—the question of co-optation to all Party bodies in general and to the central bodies in particular. The commission proposed raising the majority required for co-optation from two-thirds to four-fifths. Glebov, who presented its report, moved that decisions to co-opt to the Central Committee must be *unanimous*. Comrade Egorov, while acknowledging *dissonances* undesirable, stood for a simple majority in the absence of a reasoned veto. Comrade Popov agreed neither with the commission nor with Comrade Egorov and demanded either a simple majority (without the right of veto) or unanimity. Comrade Martov agreed neither with the commission, nor with Glebov, nor with Egorov, nor with Popov, declaring against unanimity, against four-fifths (in favour of two-thirds), and *against* "*mutual co-optation*", *that is*, *the right of the editorial board of the Central Organ to protest a co-optation to the Central Committee and vice versa* ("the right of mutual control over co-optation").

As the reader sees, the groupings were highly variegated and the differences so numerous as almost to lend "uniqueness" to the views of each delegate!

Comrade Martov said: "I admit the psychological impossibility of working with unpleasant persons. But it is also important for our organisation to be virile and effectual.... The right of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ to mutual control in cases of co-optation is unnecessary. It is not because I think that one is not competent in the sphere of the other that I am against it. No! The editorial board of the Central Organ, for instance, might give the Central Committee sound advice as to whether Mr. Nadezhdin, say, should be admitted to the Central Committee. I object because I do not want to create mutually exasperating red tape."

I objected: "There are two questions here. The first is that of the required majority, and I am against lowering it from four-fifths to two-thirds. The stipulation for a reasoned protest is not expedient, and I am against it. Incomparably more important is the second question, the right of the Central Committee and the Central Organ to mutual control over co-optation. The mutual consent of the two central bodies is an essential condition for harmony. What is involved here is a possible rupture between the two central bodies. Whoever does not want a split should be concerned to safeguard harmony. We know from the history of the Party that there have been people who caused splits. It is a question of principle, a very important question, one on which the whole future of the Party may depend" (pp. 276-77). That is the full text of the summary of my speech as recorded at the Congress, a speech to which Comrade Martov attaches particularly serious importance. Unfortunately, although attaching serious importance to it, he did not take the trouble to consider it in connection with the whole debate and the whole political situation at the Congress at the moment it was made.

The first question that arises is why, in my original draft (see p. 394, Paragraph 11),* I stipulated a majority of only two-thirds and did not demand mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies. Comrade Trotsky, who spoke after me (p. 277), did in fact at once raise this question.

The answer to it is given in my speech at the League

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 475.—*Ed.*

Congress and in Comrade Pavlovich's letter on the Second Congress. Paragraph 1 of the Rules "broke the pot" and it had to be bound tight with a "double knot"—I said at the League Congress. That meant, firstly, that on a purely theoretical question Martov had proved to be an opportunist, and his mistake had been *upheld* by Lieber and Akimov. It meant, secondly, that the coalition of the Martovites (that is, an insignificant minority of the *Iskra*-ists) with the anti-*Iskra*-ists ensured them *a majority at the Congress* in the voting on the personal composition of the central bodies. And it was about the *personal composition* of the central bodies that I was speaking here, emphasising the need for harmony and *warning against* "*people who cause splits*". This warning was indeed of important significance in principle, for the *Iskra* organisation (which was undoubtedly best qualified to judge about the personal composition of the central bodies, having as it did the closest practical acquaintance with all affairs and with all the candidates) had already made its recommendations on this subject and had taken the decision we know regarding the candidates who aroused its misgivings. Both morally and on its merits (that is, its competence to judge), the *Iskra* organisation should have had the decisive say in this delicate matter. But *formally speaking*, of course, Comrade Martov had every right to appeal to the Liebers and Akimovs *against* the majority of the *Iskra* organisation. And in his brilliant speech on Paragraph 1, Comrade Akimov had said with remarkable explicitness and sagacity that whenever he perceived a difference among the *Iskra*-ists over the methods of achieving their common *Iskra* aim, he consciously and deliberately *voted for the worse method*, because his, Akimov's, aims were diametrically opposed to those of the *Iskra*-ists. There could not be the *slightest doubt* therefore that, quite irrespective of the wishes and intentions of Comrade Martov, *it was the worse composition of the central bodies* that would obtain the support of the Liebers and Akimovs. They *could vote*, they were bound to vote (judging by their *deeds*, by their vote on Paragraph 1, and not by their words) precisely for that list which would promise the presence of "people who cause splits", and would do so *in order to* "cause splits". Is it surprising, in view of this situation, that I

said that it was an important question of principle (harmony between the two central bodies), one on which the whole future of the Party might depend?

No Social-Democrat at all acquainted with the *Iskra* ideas and plans and with the history of the movement, and at all earnest in sharing those ideas, could doubt for a moment that while formally it was quite right and proper for the dispute within the *Iskra* organisation over the composition of the central bodies to be decided by the Liebers and Akimovs, this would ensure the *worst* possible results. It was imperative to *fight to avert* these worst possible results.

How were we to fight them? We did not fight by hysterics and rows, of course, but by methods which were *quite loyal and quite legitimate*: perceiving that we were in the minority (as on the question of Paragraph 1), *we appealed to the Congress to protect the rights of the minority*. Greater strictness as regards the majority required for adoption of members (four-fifths instead of two-thirds), the requirement of unanimity for co-optation, mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies—all this we began to advocate *when we found ourselves in the minority on the question of the personal composition of the central bodies*. This fact is constantly ignored by the Ivans and Peters who are so ready to give opinions on the Congress lightly, after a couple of chats with friends, without seriously studying *all* the minutes and all the "testimony" of the persons concerned. Yet anybody who cares to make a conscientious study of these minutes and this testimony will inevitably encounter the fact I have mentioned, namely, that the *root* of the dispute *at that moment of the Congress* was the *personal composition of the central bodies*, and that we strove for stricter conditions of control just because we were in the minority and wanted "a double knot to bind tight the pot" broken by Martov amid the jubilation and with the jubilant assistance of the Liebers and the Akimovs.

"If it were not so," Comrade Pavlovich says, speaking of this moment of the Congress, "one would have to assume that in moving the point about unanimity in cases of co-optation, we were concerned for the interests of our adversaries; for to the side which predominates in any insti-

tution unanimity is unnecessary and even disadvantageous." (*Letter on the Second Congress*, p. 14). But today the chronological aspect of the events is all too often forgotten; it is forgotten that there was *a whole period at the Congress* when the present minority was the majority (thanks to the participation of the Liebers and Akimovs), and that it was precisely at this period that the controversy over co-optation to the central bodies took place, the underlying reason for which was the difference within the *Iskra* organisation over the personal composition of the central bodies. Whoever grasps this fact will understand the passion that marked our debates and will not be surprised by the *seeming* paradox that petty differences over details gave rise to really important issues of principle.

Comrade Deutsch, speaking at this same sitting (p. 277), was in many respects right when he said: "This motion is undoubtedly designed for the *given moment*." Yes, indeed, it is only when we have understood the given moment, in all its complexity, that we can understand the true meaning of the controversy. And it is highly important to bear in mind that when *we* were in the minority, we defended the rights of the minority by *such methods* as will be acknowledged legitimate and permissible by any European Social-Democrat, namely, by appealing to the Congress for stricter control over the personal composition of the central bodies. Similarly, Comrade Egorov was in many respects right when he said at the Congress, but at a different sitting: "I am exceedingly surprised to hear reference to principles again being made in the debate. [This was said in reference to the elections to the Central Committee, at the 31st sitting of the Congress, that is, if I am not mistaken, on Thursday morning, whereas the 26th sitting, of which we are now speaking, was held on Monday evening.] I think it is clear to everyone that during the last few days the debate has not revolved around any question of principle, but exclusively around securing or preventing the inclusion of one or another person in the central institutions. Let us acknowledge that principles have been lost at this Congress long since, and call a spade a spade. (*General laughter*. *Muravyov*: 'I request to have it recorded in the minutes that Comrade Martov smiled')" (p. 337). It is not surprising that Comrade

Martov, like the rest of us, laughed at Comrade Egorov's complaints, which were indeed ludicrous. Yes, "*during the last few days*" a very great deal did *revolve* around the personal composition of the central bodies. That is true. That was indeed *clear to everyone* at the Congress (and it is only *now* that the minority is trying to *obscure* this clear fact). And it is true, lastly, that a spade should be called a spade. But, for God's sake, where is the "loss of principles" *here*? After all, we assembled at the Congress *in order*, *in the first days* (see p. 10, the Congress agenda), to discuss the programme, tactics, and Rules and to decide the questions relating to them, and *in the last days* (Items 18 and 19 of the agenda) to discuss the personal composition of the central bodies and to decide *those* questions. When the *last days* of congresses are devoted to a struggle over the conductor's baton, that is natural and absolutely legitimate. (But when a fight over the conductor's baton is waged *after congresses*, that is squabbling.) If someone suffers defeat *at the congress* over the personal composition of the central bodies (as Comrade Egorov did), it is *simply ludicrous* of him, *after that*, to speak of "loss of principles". It is therefore understandable why everybody laughed at Comrade Egorov. And it is also understandable why Comrade Muravyov requested to have it recorded in the minutes that Comrade Martov shared in the laughter: *in laughing at Comrade Egorov*, *Comrade Martov was laughing at himself....*

In addition to Comrade Muravyov's irony, it will not be superfluous, perhaps, to mention the following fact. As we know, *after the Congress* Comrade Martov asserted right and left that it was the question of co-optation to the central bodies that played the cardinal role in our divergence, and that "the majority of the old editorial board" was emphatically opposed to mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies. *Before the Congress*, when accepting my plan to elect two trios, with mutual co-optation by a two-thirds majority, Comrade Martov *wrote to me on the subject*: "*In adopting this form of mutual co-optation*, it should be stressed that after the Congress additions to each body will be effected on somewhat different lines. (I *would advise the following*: each body co-opts new members, informing the other body of its intention; *the latter may enter a pro-*

test, in which case the dispute shall be settled by the Council. To avoid delays, this procedure should be followed in relation *to candidates nominated in advance—at least in the case of the Central Committee*—from whose number the additions may then be made more expeditiously.) In order to stress that subsequent co-optation will be effected in the manner provided by the Party Rules, the following words should be added to Item 22*: '...by which the decisions taken must be endorsed'." (My italics.)

Comment is superfluous.

Having explained the significance of the moment when the controversy over co-optation to the central bodies took place, we must dwell a little on the *votings* on the subject—it is unnecessary to dwell on the *discussion*, as the speeches of Comrade Martov and myself, already quoted, were followed only by brief interchanges in which very few of the delegates took part (see Minutes, pp. 277-80). In relation to the voting, Comrade Martov asserted at the League Congress that in my account of the matter I was guilty of "the greatest distortion" (League Minutes, p. 60) "in representing the struggle around the Rules [Comrade Martov unwittingly uttered a profound truth: after Paragraph 1, the heated disputes were indeed *around* the Rules] as a struggle of *Iskra* against the Martovites joined in coalition with the Bund."

Let us examine this interesting "greatest distortion". Comrade Martov added together the votings on the composition of the Council and the votings on co-optation and listed *eight* in all: 1) election to the Council of two members each from the Central Organ and the Central Committee—27 for

* The reference is to my original draft of the *Tagesordnung* (agenda—*Ed.*) of the Congress and my commentary to it, with which all the delegates were familiar. Item 22 of this draft provided for the election of two trios—to the Central Organ and to the Central Committee—"mutual co-optation" by these six by a two-thirds majority, the endorsement of this mutual co-optation by the Congress, and subsequent co-optation by the Central Organ and the Central Committee separately.

(M), 16 against (L), 7 abstentions.* (Let me say parenthetically that the number of abstentions is shown in the Minutes—p. 270—as 8, but that is a detail.) 2) election of the fifth Council member by the Congress—23 for (L), 18 against (M), 7 abstentions. 3) replacement of lapsed Council members by the Council itself—23 against (M), 16 for (L), 12 abstentions. 4) unanimity for co-optation to the Central Committee—25 for (L), 19 against (M), 7 abstentions. 5) the stipulation for *one* reasoned protest for non-co-optation—21 for (L), 19 against (M), 11 abstentions. 6) unanimity for co-optation to the Central Organ—23 for (L), 21 against (M), 7 abstentions. 7) votability of a motion giving the Council the right to annul a Central Organ or Central Committee decision not to co-opt a new member—25 for (M), 19 against (L), 7 abstentions. 8) this motion itself—24 for (M), 23 against (L), 4 abstentions. "*Here*, *evidently*," Comrade Martov concluded (League Minutes, p. 61), "*one Bund delegate voted for the motion while the rest abstained*." (My italics.)

Why, may one ask, did Comrade Martov consider it *evident* that the Bundist had voted *for him*, *Martov*, when there were no roll-call votes?

Because he counted the *number of votes cast*, and when it indicated that the Bund *had taken part* in the voting, he, Comrade Martov, did not doubt that it had been on *his*, Martov's, side.

Where, then, is the "greatest distortion" on my part?

The total votes were 51, without the Bundists 46, without the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists 43. In *seven* of the eight votings mentioned by Comrade Martov, 43, 41, 39, 44, 40, 44, and 44 delegates took part; in *one*, 47 delegates (or rather votes), and here Comrade Martov himself admitted that he was supported by a Bundist. We thus find that the picture sketched by Martov (and sketched incompletely, as we shall soon see) *only confirms and strengthens my account of the struggle*! We find that in a great many cases the number of abstentions was *very high*: this points to the slight—*relatively* slight interest shown by the Congress as a whole in certain *minor points*, and to the absence of any definite grouping of the

* The letters M and L in parentheses indicate which side I (L) and which side Martov (M) was on.

Iskra-ists on these questions. Martov's statement that the Bundists "manifestly helped Lenin by abstaining" (League Minutes, p. 62) *in fact speaks against Martov*: it means that it was *only* when the Bundists were absent or abstained that I could sometimes count upon victory. But whenever the Bundists *thought it worth while* to intervene in the struggle, they supported Comrade Martov; and the above-mentioned case when 37 delegates voted was *not the only time* they intervened. Whoever cares to refer to the Congress Minutes will notice *a very strange incompleteness* in Comrade Martov's picture. Comrade Martov *simply omitted three cases* when the Bund *did take part* in the voting, and *it goes without saying* that *in all these cases* Comrade Martov was the victor. Here are the three cases: 1) adoption of Comrade Fomin's amendment to lower the required majority from four-fifths to two-thirds—27 for, 21 against (p. 278), that is, 48 votes. 2) adoption of Comrade Martov's motion to delete mutual co-optation—26 for, 24 against (p. 279), that is, 50 votes. Lastly, 3) rejection of my motion to permit co-optation to the Central Organ or the Central Committee only with the consent of all members of the Council (p. 280)—27 against, 22 for (there was even a roll-call vote, of which, unfortunately, there is no record in the minutes), that is, 49 votes.

To sum up: on the question of co-optation to the central bodies the Bundists took part *in only four votings* (the *three* I have just mentioned, with 48, 50, and 49 votes, and the *one* mentioned by Comrade Martov, with 47 votes). *In all these votings* Comrade Martov was the victor. *My statement of the case proves to be right in every particular*: in declaring that there was a coalition with the Bund, in noting the relatively minor character of the questions (a large number of abstentions in very many cases), and in pointing to the absence of any definite grouping of the *Iskra*-ists (no roll-call votes; very few speakers in the debates).

Comrade Martov's attempt to detect a contradiction in my statement of the case turns out to have been made with unsound means, for he tore isolated words from their context and did not trouble to reconstruct the complete picture.

The last paragraph of the Rules, dealing with the organisation abroad, again gave rise to debates and votings which were highly significant from the point of view of the groupings at the Congress. The question at issue was recognition of the League as the Party organisation abroad. Comrade Akimov, of course, at once rose up in arms, reminding the Congress of the Union Abroad, which had been endorsed by the First Congress, and pointing out that the question was one of principle. "Let me first make the reservation," he said, "that I do not attach any particular practical significance to which way the question is decided. The ideological struggle which has been going on in our Party is undoubtedly not over yet; but it will be continued on a different plane and with a different alignment of forces.... Paragraph 13 of the Rules once more reflects, and in a very marked way, the tendency to convert our Congress from a Party congress into a factional congress. Instead of causing all Social-Democrats in Russia to defer to the decisions of the Party Congress in the name of Party unity, by uniting all Party organisations, it is proposed that the Congress should destroy the organisation of the minority and make the minority disappear from the scene" (p. 281). As the reader sees, the "continuity" which became so dear to Comrade Martov after his defeat over the composition of the central bodies was no less dear to Comrade Akimov. But at the Congress these people who apply different standards to themselves and to others rose up in heated protest against Comrade Akimov. Although the programme had been adopted, *Iskra* endorsed, and nearly the entire Rules passed, that "principle" which "in principle" distinguished the League from the Union was brought to the fore. "If Comrade Akimov is anxious to make the issue one of principle," exclaimed Comrade Martov, "we have nothing against it; especially since Comrade Akimov has spoken of possible combinations in a struggle with two trends. *The victory of one trend must be sanctioned* [this, mark, was said at the *27th* sitting of the Congress!] not in the sense that we make another bow to *Iskra*, but in the sense that we *bow a last farewell to all the possible combinations Comrade Akimov spoke of*" (p. 282; my italics).

What a picture! When all the Congress arguments regarding the programme *were already over*, Comrade Martov con-

tinued to *bow a last farewell* to all possible combinations... until he suffered defeat over the composition of the central bodies! Comrade Martov "bowed a last farewell" at the Congress to that *possible* "combination" which he cheerfully brought to fruition *on the very morrow of the Congress*. But Comrade Akimov proved *even then* to be much more far-sighted than Comrade Martov; Comrade Akimov referred to the five years' work of "an old Party organisation which, by the will of the First Congress, bears the name of a committee", and concluded with a most venomous and *prescient* stab: "As to Comrade Martov's opinion that my hopes of a new trend appearing in our Party are in vain, let me say that *even he himself inspires me with such hopes*" (p. 283; my italics).

Yes, it must be confessed, Comrade Martov has fully justified Comrade Akimov's hopes!

Comrade Martov became convinced that Comrade Akimov was right, and joined him, after the "continuity" had been broken of an old Party body deemed to have been working for three years. Comrade Akimov's victory did not cost him much effort.

But at the Congress Comrade Akimov was backed—and backed consistently—only by Comrades Martynov and Brouckère and the Bundists (eight votes). Comrade Egorov, like the real leader of the "Centre" that he is, adhered to the golden mean: he agreed with the *Iskra*-ists, you see, he "sympathised" with them (p. 282), and *proved* his sympathy by the proposal (p. 283) to avoid the question of principle altogether and *say nothing* about either the League or the Union. The proposal was rejected by twenty-seven votes to fifteen. Apparently, in addition to the anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight), nearly the entire "Centre" (ten) voted with Comrade Egorov (the total vote was forty-two, so that a large number abstained or *were absent*, as often happened during votes which were uninteresting or whose result was a *foregone conclusion*). *Whenever the question arose* of carrying out the "*Iskra*" *principles in practice*, it turned out that the "sympathy" of the "Centre" was purely *verbal*, and we secured only thirty votes or a little over. This was to be seen even more graphically in the debate and votes on Rusov's motion (to recognise the League as the *sole* organisation abroad). Here

the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Marsh" took up an outright position of *principle*, and its champions, Comrades Lieber and Egorov, declared Comrade Rusov's motion unvotable, impermissible: "It slaughters all the other organisations abroad" (Egorov). And, not desiring to have any part in "slaughtering organisations", the speaker not only refused to vote, but even left the hall. But the leader of the "Centre" must be given his due: he displayed ten times more political manhood and strength of conviction (in his mistaken principles) than did Comrade Martov and Co., for he stood up for an organisation being "slaughtered" *not only when that organisation was his own circle*, defeated in open combat.

Comrade Rusov's motion was deemed votable by twenty-seven votes to fifteen, and was then adopted by twenty-five votes to seventeen. If we add to these seventeen the absent Comrade Egorov, we get *the full complement* (*eighteen*) *of the anti-"Iskra"-ists and the "Centre"*.

As a whole Paragraph 13 of the Rules, dealing with the organisation abroad, was adopted by only *thirty-one votes* to twelve, with six abstentions. This figure, thirty-one—showing the approximate number of *Iskra*-ists at the Congress, that is, of people who consistently advocated *Iskra*'s views and applied them *in practice*—we are now encountering for no less than the *sixth time* in our analysis of the voting at the Congress (place of the Bund question on the agenda, the Organising Committee incident, the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, and two votes on the agrarian programme). Yet Comrade Martov seriously wants to assure us that there are no grounds for picking out such a "narrow" group of *Iskra*-ists!

Nor can we omit to mention that the adoption of Paragraph 13 of the Rules evoked an extremely characteristic discussion in connection with a statement by Comrades Akimov and Martynov that they "refused to take part in the voting" (p. 288). The Bureau of the Congress discussed this statement and found—with every reason—that not even the direct closing down of the Union would entitle its delegates to refuse to take part in the Congress proceedings. Refusal to vote is absolutely abnormal and impermissible—such was the view of the Bureau, which was shared by the whole Congress, including the *Iskra*-ists of the minority, who

at the 28th sitting *hotly condemned what they themselves were guilty of at the 31st*! When Comrade Martynov proceeded to defend his statement (p. 291), he was opposed alike by Pavlovich, by Trotsky, by Karsky, and by Martov. Comrade Martov was particularly clear on the duties of a dissatisfied minority (until he found himself in the minority!) and held forth on the subject in a very didactic manner. "Either you are delegates to the Congress," he told Comrades Akimov and Martynov, "in which case you *must* take part in *all* its proceedings [my italics; Comrade Martov did not yet perceive any formalism and bureaucracy in subordination of the minority to the majority!]; or you are not delegates, in which case you cannot remain at the sitting.... The statement of the Union delegates compels me to ask two questions: are they members of the Party, and are they delegates to the Congress?" (P. 292).

Comrade Martov instructing Comrade Akimov in the duties of a Party member! But it was not without reason that Comrade Akimov had said that he had some hopes in Comrade Martov.... These hopes were to come true, however, only *after* Martov was defeated in the elections. When the matter did not concern himself, but others, Comrade Martov was deaf even to the terrible catchword "emergency law", *first launched* (if I am not mistaken) by *Comrade Martynov*. "The explanation given us," Comrade Martynov replied to those who urged him to withdraw his statement, "has not made it clear whether the decision was one of principle or an *emergency measure* against the Union. If the latter, we consider that the Union has been insulted. Comrade Egorov got the same impression as we did, namely, that it was an *emergency law* [my italics] against the Union, and therefore even left the hall" (p. 295). Both Comrade Martov and Comrade Trotsky protested vigorously, along with Plekhanov, against the absurd, *truly absurd*, idea of regarding a vote of the Congress as an *insult*; and Comrade Trotsky, defending a resolution adopted by the Congress on his motion (that Comrades Akimov and Martynov could consider that full satisfaction had been given them), declared that "the resolution is one of principle, not a philistine one, and *it is no business of ours if anybody takes offence at it*" (p. 296). But it very soon became apparent that the circle mentality

and the philistine outlook are still all too strong in our Party, and the proud words I have italicised proved to be merely a high-sounding phrase.

Comrades Akimov and Martynov refused to withdraw their statement, and walked out of the Congress, amidst the delegates' general cry: "Absolutely unwarranted!"

M. THE ELECTIONS. END OF THE CONGRESS

After adopting the Rules, the Congress passed a resolution on district organisations and a number of resolutions on particular Party organisations, and, following the extremely instructive debate on the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group which I have analysed above, proceeded to discuss the election of the Party's central institutions.

We already know that the *Iskra* organisation, from which the entire Congress had expected an authoritative recommendation, had split over this question, for the *minority* of the organisation wanted to test in free and open combat whether it could not win a *majority* at the Congress. We also know that a plan was known long before the Congress—and to all the delegates at the Congress itself—for *reconstituting* the editorial board by the election of two trios, one to the Central Organ and one to the Central Committee. Let us dwell on this plan in greater detail in order to throw light on the Congress debate.

Here is the exact text of my commentary to the draft *Tagesordnung* of the Congress where this plan was set forth:* "The Congress shall elect three persons to the editorial board of the Central Organ and three to the Central Committee. These six persons *in conjunction* shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority vote additional members to the editorial board of the Central Organ and to the Central Committee and report to this effect to the Congress. After the report has been endorsed by the Congress, subsequent co-optation shall be effected by the editorial board of the Central Organ and by the Central Committee separately."

The plan stands out in this text quite definitely and

* See my *Letter to the Editors of "Iskra"*, p. 5, and the League Minutes, p. 53.

unambiguously: it implies a *reconstitution* of the editorial board, effected *with the participation* of the most influential leaders of the practical work. Both the features of this plan which I have emphasised are apparent at once to anyone who takes the trouble to read the text at all attentively. But nowadays one has to stop and explain the most elementary things. It was precisely a *reconstitution* of the editorial board that the plan implied—not necessarily an enlargement and not necessarily a reduction of its membership, but its reconstitution; for the question of a possible enlargement or reduction was left *open*: co-optation was provided for only *if necessary*. Among the suggestions for such reconstitution made by various people, some provided for a possible reduction of the number of editors, and some for increasing it to seven (I personally had always regarded seven as far preferable to six), and even to eleven (I considered this possible in the event of peaceful union with all Social-Democratic organisations in general and with the Bund and the Polish Social-Democrats in particular). But what is most important, and this is usually overlooked by people talking about the "trio", is that *the matter of further co-optation to the Central Organ was to be decided with the participation of the members of the Central Committee*. Not one comrade of all the "minority" members of the organisation or Congress delegates, who knew of this plan and approved it (either explicitly or tacitly), has taken the trouble to explain the meaning of this point. Firstly, why was a trio, and only a trio, taken as the starting-point for reconstituting the editorial board? Obviously, this would have been *absolutely senseless* if the *sole*, or at least the main, purpose had been to *enlarge* the board, and if that board had really been considered a "harmonious" one. If the purpose is to enlarge a "harmonious" body, it would be strange to *start*, not with the whole body, but with only *a part*. Obviously, *not all* members of the board were considered quite suitable for discussing and *deciding* the matter of reconstituting it, of converting the old editorial circle into a *Party institution*. Obviously, even those who personally desired the reconstitution to be an enlargement recognised that the old composition of the hoard was not harmonious and did not answer to the ideal of a Party institution, for otherwise there would

be no reason *first* to reduce the six to *three* in order to enlarge it. I repeat, this is self-evident, and only the temporary confusion of the issue by "personalities" could have caused it to be forgotten.

Secondly, it will be seen from the above-quoted text that even *the agreement of all three members of the Central Organ* would not by itself be enough for the enlargement of the trio. This, too, is always lost sight of. Two-thirds of *six*, that is, *four* votes, were to be required for co-optation; hence it would only be necessary for the three members elected to the Central Committee to exercise their veto, and *no enlargement of the trio would be possible*. Conversely, even if two of the three members of the editorial board of the Central Organ were opposed to further co-optation, it would nevertheless be possible if all three members of the Central Committee were in favour of it. It is thus obvious that the intention was, in converting the old circle into a Party institution, to grant the *deciding* voice to the Congress-elected leaders of the practical work. Which comrades we roughly had in mind may be seen from the fact that prior to the Congress the editorial board unanimously elected Comrade Pavlovich a seventh member of their body, in case it should be necessary to make a statement at the Congress on behalf of the board; in addition to Comrade Pavlovich, a certain old member of the *Iskra* organisation and member of the Organising Committee, *who was subsequently elected to the Central Committee*, was proposed for the seventh place.

Thus the plan for the election of two trios was obviously designed: 1) to reconstitute the editorial board; 2) to rid it of certain elements of the old circle spirit, which is out of place in a Party institution (if there had been nothing to get rid of there would have been no point in the idea of an initial trio!); and, lastly, 3) to get rid of the "theocratic" features of a body of writers (getting rid of them by enlisting the services of prominent practical workers *in deciding* the question of enlarging the trio). This plan, with which all the editors were acquainted, was, clearly, based on *three years' experience* of work and *fully* accorded with the principles of revolutionary organisation that we were consistently introducing. In the period of *disunity* in which *Iskra* entered the arena, groups were often formed haphazardly and

spontaneously, and inevitably suffered from certain pernicious manifestations of the circle spirit. The creation of a Party presupposed and demanded the elimination of these features; the participation of prominent practical workers in this elimination was *essential*, for certain members of the editorial board had *always* dealt with organisational affairs, and the body to enter the system of Party institutions was to be a body not merely of writers, but of political leaders. It was likewise natural, from the standpoint of the policy *Iskra* had always pursued, to leave the selection of the initial trio to the Congress we had observed the greatest *caution* in preparing for the Congress, waiting until all controversial questions of principle relating to programme, tactics, and organisation had been *fully* clarified; we had *no doubt* that the Congress would be an "*Iskra*"*-ist one* in the sense that its overwhelming majority would be solid on these fundamental questions (this was also indicated in part by the resolutions recognising *Iskra* as the leading organ), we *were bound* therefore to leave it to the comrades who had borne the whole brunt of the work of disseminating *Iskra*'s ideas and preparing for its conversion into a party to decide *for themselves* who were the most suitable candidates for the new Party institution. It is *only* by the fact that this plan for "two trios" was a natural one, *only* by the fact that it *fully accorded* with *Iskra*'s whole policy and with everything known about *Iskra* to people at all closely acquainted with the work, that the general approval of this plan and the absence of any rival plan *is to be explained*.

And so, at the Congress, Comrade Rusov first of all moved the election of *two trios. It never even occurred* to the followers of Martov, who *had informed us in writing that this plan was connected with the false accusation of opportunism*, to reduce the dispute over a board of six or three to the question whether this accusation was right or wrong. *Not one of them even hinted at it! None of them ventured to say a single word* about the differing shades of principle involved in the dispute over six or three. They preferred a commoner and cheaper method, namely, to evoke *pity*, to speak of *possible injured feelings*, to pretend that *the question of the editorial board had already been settled* by appointing *Iskra* the Central Organ. This last argument, adduced by Comrade

Koltsov against Comrade Rusov, was a piece of *downright falsity*. Two separate items were included—not fortuitously, of course—in the Congress agenda (see Minutes, p. 10): Item 4—"Central Organ of the Party", and Item 18—"Election of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ". That in the first place. In the second place, when the Central Organ was being appointed, *all* the delegates categorically declared that this did *not* mean the endorsement of the editorial board, but only of the trend,* and *not a single protest* was raised against these declarations.

Thus the statement that by endorsing a definite organ the Congress had in effect endorsed the editorial board—a statement many times reiterated by the adherents of the minority (by Koltsov, p. 321, by Posadovsky, p. 321, by Popov, p. 322, and by many others)—was *simply untrue in fact*. It was a perfectly obvious *manoeuvre* to cover a *retreat* from the position held at the time when the question of the composition of the central bodies could still be regarded *in a really dispassionate light by all*. The retreat could not be justified either by motives of principle (for to raise the question of the "false accusation of opportunism" *at the Congress* was too much to the *disadvantage* of the minority, and they *did not even hint* at it), or by a reference to the *factual* data showing which was actually more effectual—six or three (for the mere mention of these facts would have produced a heap of arguments against the minority). They had to try to burke the issue by *talk* about a "symmetrical

* See Minutes, p. 140, *Akimov*'s speech: "...I am told that we shall discuss the election of the Central Organ at the end"; *Muravyov*'s speech against Akimov, "who takes the question of the future editorial board of the Central Organ very much to heart" (p. 141), *Pavlovich*'s speech to the effect that, having appointed the organ, we had obtained "the concrete material on which to perform the operations Comrade Akimov is 90 much concerned about", and that there could not be a shadow of doubt about *Iskra*'s "submitting" to "the decisions, of the Party" (p. 142); *Trotsky*'s speech: "Since we are not endorsing the editorial board, what is it that we are endorsing in *Iskra*?... Not the name, but the trend... not the name, but the banner" (p. 142); *Martynov*'s speech: "...Like many other comrades, I consider that while discussing the adoption of *Iskra*, as a newspaper of a definite trend, as our Central Organ, we should not at this juncture discuss the method of electing or endorsing its editorial board, we shall discuss that later in its proper order on the agenda..." (p. 143).

whole", about a "harmonious team", about a "symmetrical and crystal-integral entity", and so on. It is not surprising that these arguments were immediately called by their true name: "*wretched words*" (p. 328). The very plan for a trio clearly testified to a lack of "harmony", and the impressions obtained by the delegates during a month and more of working together obviously afforded a mass of material to enable them to judge *for themselves*. When Comrade Posadovsky hinted at this material incautiously and injudiciously from his own standpoint: see pp. 321 and 325 regarding the "qualified sense" in which he had used the word "dissonances"), Comrade Muravyov bluntly declared: "In my opinion it is now quite clear to the majority of the Congress that such* dissonances undoubtedly do exist" (p. 321). The minority chose to construe the word "dissonances" (which was given currency by Posadovsky, not Muravyov) in a purely personal sense, not daring to take up the gauntlet flung down by Comrade Muravyov, not daring to bring forward in defence of the board of six a *single* argument *on the actual merits of the case*. The result was a dispute which for its sterility was more than comic: the majority (through the mouth of Comrade Muravyov) declared that the true significance of the six-or-three issue was quite clear to them, but the minority persistently refused to listen and affirmed that "we are *not in a position* to examine it". The majority not only considered themselves in a position to examine it, but had "examined it" already and announced that the results of the examination were *quite clear* to them, but the minority apparently *feared an examination* and took cover behind mere "wretched words". The majority urged us to "bear in mind that our Central Organ is something more than a literary group"; the majority "wanted the Central Organ to be headed by *quite definite persons, persons known to the Congress, persons meeting the requirements* I have mentioned" (that is, not only literary

* What "dissonances" exactly Comrade Posadovsky had in mind the Congress never did learn. Comrade Muravyov, for his part, stated at this same sitting (p. 322) that his meaning had been misrepresented, and when the minutes were being endorsed he plainly declared that he "was referring to the dissonances which had been revealed in the Congress debates on various points, dissonances over principle, whose existence is now unfortunately a fact that nobody will deny" (p. 353).

requirements; Comrade Lange's speech, p. 327). Again the minority did not dare to take up the gauntlet and did not say a word as to who, in their opinion, was suitable for what was more than a literary body, as to who was a figure of a "quite definite" magnitude "known to the Congress". The minority continued to take shelter behind their celebrated "harmony". Nor was this all. The minority even introduced into the debate arguments which were absolutely false in principle and which therefore quite rightly evoked a sharp rebuff. "The Congress," don't you see, "has neither the moral nor the political right to refashion the editorial board" (Trotsky, p. 326); "it is too delicate [*sic*!] a question" (Trotsky again); "*how will the editors who are not reelected feel about the fact that the Congress does not want to see them on the board any more*?" (Tsaryov, p. 324.)*

Such arguments simply put the whole question on the plane of *pity and injured feelings*, and were a direct admission of bankruptcy as regards real arguments of principle, real political arguments. And the majority immediately gave this attitude its *true* name: *philistinism* (Comrade Rusov). "We are hearing strange speeches from the lips of revolutionaries," Comrade Rusov justly remarked, "speeches that are in marked disharmony with the concepts Party work, Party ethics. The principal argument on which the opponents of electing trios take their stand amounts to a *purely philistine view of Party affairs* [my italics throughout].... If we adopt this standpoint, which is a *philistine* and not a Party standpoint, we shall at every election have to consider: will not Petrov be offended if Ivanov is elected and not he, will not some member of the Organising Committee be offended if another member, and not he, is elected to the Central Committee? Where is this going to land us, comrades? If we have gathered here for the purpose of creating a Party, and *not of indulging in mutual compliments and philistine sentimentality*, then we can never agree to such a view. We are about to *elect officials*, and there can be no talk of lack of confidence in any person not elected; *our*

* Cf. Comrade Posadovsky's speech: "...By electing three of the six members of the old editorial board, you pronounce the other three to be unnecessary and superfluous. And you have neither any right nor any grounds to do that."

only consideration should be the interests of the work and a person's suitability for the post to which he is being elected" (p. 325).

We would advise all who want to make an independent examination of the reasons for the Party split and to dig down to the *roots* of it at the Congress to read this speech of Comrade Rusov's *over and over again*; his arguments were not even contested by the minority, let alone refuted. And indeed there is no contesting such elementary, rudimentary truths, which were forgotten only because of "*nervous excitement*", as Comrade Rusov himself rightly explained. And this is really the explanation least discreditable to the minority of how they could desert the Party standpoint for a philistine and circle standpoint.*

* In his *State of Siege*, Comrade Martov treats this question just as he does all the others he touches upon. He does not trouble to give a complete picture of the controversy. He very modestly evades the only real issue of *principle* that arose in this controversy: philistine sentimentality, or the election of officials; the Party standpoint, or the injured feelings of the Ivan Ivanoviches? Here, too, Comrade Martov confines himself to plucking out isolated bits and pieces of what happened and adding all sorts of abusive remarks at my expense. That's not quite enough. Comrade Martov!

Comrade Martov particularly pesters *me* with the question *why* Comrades Axelrod, Zasulich, and Starover were not elected at the Congress. The philistine attitude he has adopted prevents him from seeing how *unseemly* these questions are (why doesn't he ask his colleague on the editorial board, Comrade Plekhanov?). He detects a contradiction in the fact that I regard the behaviour of the minority at the Congress on the question of the six as "tactless", yet at the same time demand Party publicity. There is no contradiction here, as Martov himself could easily have seen if he had taken the trouble to give a connected account of the *whole* matter, and not merely fragments of it. It was tactless to treat the question from a philistine standpoint and appeal to pity and consideration for injured feelings; the interests of Party publicity demanded that an estimation be given *in point of fact* of the advantages of six as compared with three, an estimation of the candidates for the posts, an estimation of the different shades-*the minority gave not a hint of any of this at the Congress.*

By carefully studying the minutes, Comrade Martov would have found in the delegates' speeches a *whole series* of arguments against the board of six. Here is a selection from these speeches: firstly, that dissonances, in the sense of different shades of principle, were clearly apparent in the old six; secondly, that a technical simplification of the editorial work was desirable; thirdly, that the interests of the work came before philistine sentimentality, and only election could ensure that the persons chosen were suited for their posts; fourthly,

But the minority were so totally unable to find sensible and business-like arguments against election that, in addition to introducing philistinism into Party affairs, they resorted to downright *scandalous practices*. Indeed, what other name can we give to the action of Comrade Popov when he advised Comrade Muravyov "not to undertake delicate *commissions*" (p. 322)? What is this but "getting personal", as Comrade Sorokin rightly put it (p. 328)? What is it but speculating on "*personalities*", in the absence of *political* arguments? Was Comrade Sorokin right or wrong when he said that "we have always protested against such practices"? "*Was it permissible for Comrade Deutsch* to try demonstratively to pillory comrades who did not agree with him?"* (P. 328.)

Let us sum up the debate on the editorial board. The minority did not refute (nor even try to refute) the majority's numerous statements that the plan for a trio was known to the *delegates* at the very beginning of the Congress *and*

that the right of the Congress to choose must not be restricted; fifthly, that the Party now needed something more than a literary group on the Central Organ, that the Central Organ needed not only writers, but administrators as well; sixthly, that the Central Organ must consist of quite definite persons, persons known to the *Congress*; seventhly, that a board of six was often ineffectual and the board's work had been accomplished *not thanks to* its abnormal constitution, *but in spite of it*; eighthly, that the conduct of a newspaper was a party (not a circle) affair, etc. Let Comrade Martov, if he is so interested in the reasons for the non-election of these persons, *penetrate* into the meaning of each of these considerations and refute *a single one* of them.

* That is the way Comrade Sorokin, *at this same sitting* understood Comrade Deutsch's words (cf. p. 324—"sharp interchange with Orlov"). Comrade Deutsch explained (p. 351) that he had "said nothing like it", but *in the same breath* admitted that he had said something *very*, *very much* "like it". "I did not say 'who dares'," Comrade Deutsch explained; "what I said was: 'I would be interested to see the people who would dare [*sic*!—Comrade Deutsch fell out of the frying pan into the fire!] to support such a criminal [sic!] proposal as the election of a board of three'" (p. 351). Comrade Deutsch did not refute *but confirmed* Comrade Sorokin's words. Comrade Deutsch only confirmed the truth of Comrade Sorokin's reproach that "all concepts are here muddled" (in the minority's arguments in favour of six). Comrade Deutsch only confirmed the pertinence of Comrade Sorokin's reminder of the *elementary* truth that "we are Party members and should be guided exclusively by political considerations". To cry that election was *criminal* was to sink not only to philistinism, but to practices that were downright *scandalous*!

prior to the Congress, and that, consequently, this plan was based on *considerations and facts which had no relation to the events and disputes at the Congress*. In defending the board of six, the minority took up a position which was *wrong and impermissible in principle*, one based on *philistine* considerations. The minority displayed an utter forgetfulness of the *Party* attitude towards the election of *officials*, not even attempting to give an *estimation* of each candidate for a post and of his suitability or unsuitability for the functions it involved. The minority *evaded* a discussion of the question on its merits and talked instead of their celebrated harmony, "shedding tears" and "indulging in pathos" (Lange's speech, p. 327), as though "somebody was being murdered". In their state of "*nervous excitement*" (p. 325) the minority even went to the length of "*getting personal*", of howling that election was "criminal", and similar *impermissible* practices.

The battle over six or three at the 30th sitting of our Congress was a battle between *philistinism* and the *party spirit*, between "*personalities*" of the worst kind and *political considerations*, between *wretched words* and the most elementary conception of *revolutionary duty*.

And at the 31st sitting, when the Congress, by a majority of nineteen to seventeen with three abstentions, had *rejected* the motion to endorse the old editorial board as a whole (see p. 330 and the *errata*), and when the *former editors* had returned to the hall, Comrade Martov in his "statement on behalf of the majority of the former editorial board" (pp. 330-31) displayed this same shakiness and instability of political position and *political concepts* to an even greater degree. Let us examine in detail each point of this collective *statement* and my reply (pp. 332-33).

"From now on," Comrade Martov said when the old editorial board was not endorsed, "the old *Iskra* does not exist, and it would be more consistent to change its name. At any rate, we see in the new resolution of the Congress a substantial limitation of the vote of confidence in *Iskra* which was passed at one of the first Congress sittings."

Comrade Martov and his colleagues raised a truly interesting and in many respects instructive question of *political consistency*. I have already replied to this by referring

to what *everyone* said when *Iskra* was being endorsed (Minutes, p. 349, cf. above, p. 82).* What we have here is unquestionably a crying instance of political inconsistency, but whether on the part of the majority of the Congress or of the majority of the old editorial board we shall leave the reader to judge. And there are two other questions very pertinently raised by Comrade Martov and his colleagues which we shall likewise leave the reader to decide: 1) Did the desire to detect a "limitation of the vote of confidence in *Iskra*" in the *Congress* decision to *elect officials to the editorial board of the Central Organ* betray a *philistine* or a *Party* attitude? 2) *When did the old "Iskra" really cease to exist*—starting from No. 46, when the two of us, Plekhanov and I, began to conduct it, or from No. 53, when the majority of the old editorial board took it over? If the first question is a most interesting *question of principle*, the second is a most interesting *question of fact*.

"Since it has now been decided," Comrade Martov continued, "to elect an editorial board of three, I must declare on my own behalf and that of the three other comrades that none of us will sit on this new editorial board. For myself, I must add that if it be true that certain comrades wanted to include my name in the list of candidates for this 'trio', I must regard it as an insult which I have done nothing to deserve [*sic*!]. I say this in view of the circumstances under which it has been decided to change the editorial board. This decision was taken on the grounds of some kind of 'friction',** of the former editorial board having been in-

* See pp. 308-10 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Comrade Martov was probably referring to Comrade Posadovsky's expression "dissonances". I repeat that Comrade Posadovsky never did explain to the Congress what *he* meant, while Comrade Muravyov, who had likewise used the expression, explained that he meant dissonances over *principle*, as *revealed in the Congress debates*. The reader will recall that the *sole* real debate over *principles* in which four of the editors (Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod, and I) took part was in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Rules, and that Comrades Martov and Starover complained *in writing* of a "false accusation of opportunism" as being one of the arguments for "changing" the editorial board. *In this letter*, Comrade Martov had detected a *clear* connection between "opportunism" and the plan to change the editorial board, but *at the Congress* he confined himself to hinting hazily at "*some kind of friction*". The "false accusation of opportunism" had already been forgotten!

effectual; moreover, the Congress decided the matter along definite lines without questioning the editorial board about this friction or even appointing a commission to report whether it had been ineffectual. [Strange that it never occurred to any member of the minority to propose to the Congress to "question the editorial board" or appoint a commission! Was it not because it would have been useless after the split in the *Iskra* organisation and the failure of the negotiations Comrades Martov and Starover wrote about?] Under the circumstances, I must regard the assumption of certain comrades that I would agree to sit on an editorial board reformed in this manner as a slur on my political reputation...."*

I have purposely quoted this argument in full to acquaint the reader with a specimen and with the beginning of what has blossomed out so profusely *since the Congress* and which cannot be called by any other name than *squabbling*. I have already employed this expression in my *Letter to the Editors of "Iskra"*, and in spite of the editors' annoyance I am obliged to repeat it, for its correctness is beyond dispute. It is a mistake to think that squabbling presupposes "sordid motives" (as the editors of the new *Iskra* conclude): any revolutionary at all acquainted with our colonies of exiles and political émigrés will have witnessed dozens of cases of squabbling in which the most absurd accusations, suspi-

* Comrade Martov further added: "Ryazanov might agree to such a role, but not the Martov whom, I think, you know by his work." Inasmuch as this was a *personal* attack on Ryazanov, Comrade Martov withdrew the remark. But it was not because of Ryazanov's personal qualities (to refer to them would have been out of place) that his name figured at the Congress as a byword; it was because of the *political complexion* of the Borba group—its *political mistakes*. Comrade Martov does well to withdraw real or assumed personal insults, but this should not lead us to forget *political mistakes*, which should serve as a *lesson to the Party*. The Borba group was accused at our Congress of causing "organisational chaos" and "disunity not justified by any considerations of principle" (Comrade Martov's speech, p. 38). *Such* political conduct does indeed deserve censure, and not only when seen in a small group prior to the Party Congress, during the period of *general* chaos, but also when we see it *after* the Party Congress, in the period when the chaos has been abolished, even if indulged in by "the majority of the *Iskra* editorial board and the majority of the Emancipation of Labour group".

cions, self-accusations, "personalities", etc., were levelled and harped upon owing to "nervous excitement" and abnormal, stagnant conditions of life. No sensible person will necessarily seek for sordid *motives* in these squabbles, *however sordid their manifestations may be*. And it is only to "nervous excitement" that we can attribute that tangled skein of absurdities, personalities, fantastic horrors, and imaginary insults and slurs which is contained in the above-quoted passage from Comrade Martov's speech. Stagnant conditions of life breed such squabbles among us by the hundred, and a political party would be unworthy of respect if it did not have the courage to designate its malady by its true name, to make a ruthless diagnosis and search for a cure.

Insofar as anything relating to principles can be extracted at all from this tangled skein, one is led *inevitably* to the conclusion that "elections have nothing to do with any slurs on political reputations", that "to deny the right of the Congress to hold new elections, make new appointments of any kind, and change the composition of its authorised boards" is to *confuse* the issue, and that "Comrade Martov's views on the permissibility of electing part of the old board reflect an *extreme confusion of political ideas*" (as I expressed it at the Congress, p. 332).*

I shall omit Comrade Martov's "personal" remark as to who initiated the plan for the trio, and shall pass to his "political" characterisation of the significance attaching to the non-endorsement of the old editorial board: "...What has now taken place is the last act of the struggle which has raged during the second half of the Congress. [Quite right! And this second half of the Congress began when Martov fell into the tight clutches of Comrade Akimov over Paragraph 1 of the Rules.] It is an open secret that in this reform it is not a question of being 'effectual', but of a struggle for influence on the Central Committee. [Firstly, it is an open secret that it *was* a question of being effectual, *as well as* of a divergence over the *composition* of the Central Committee, for the plan of the "reform" was proposed at a time when that divergence *was nowhere in sight* and when Comrade Martov

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 503-04.—*Ed.*

joined us in electing Comrade Pavlovich a seventh member of the editorial board! Secondly, we have already shown by *documentary* proofs that it was a question of the *personal composition* of the Central Committee, that *à la fin des fins* the matter came down to a difference of lists: Glebov-Travinsky-Popov or Glebov-Trotsky-Popov.] The majority of the editorial board showed that they did not want the Central Committee to be converted into a tool of the editorial board. [That is Akimov's refrain: the question of the influence for which every majority fights at any and every party congress so as then to *consolidate* it with the help of a *majority* on the central institutions is transferred to the plane of *opportunist slanders* about a "tool" of the *editorial board*, about a "mere *appendage*" of the editorial board, as Comrade Martov himself put it somewhat later, p. 334.] That is why it was found necessary to reduce the number of members of the editorial board [!!]. And that is why I cannot join such an editorial board. [Just examine this "that is why" a little more carefully. How *might* the editorial board have converted the Central Committee into an appendage or tool? *Only* if it had had three votes on the Council and had *abused* its superiority. Is that not clear? And is it not likewise clear that, having been elected the third member, Comrade Martov could always have prevented such an abuse and *by his vote alone* have destroyed all superiority of the editorial board on the Council? Consequently, the whole matter boils down to the personal composition of the Central Committee, and it is at once clear that the talk about a tool and an appendage is *slander*.] Together with the majority of the old editorial board, I thought that the Congress would put an end to the 'state of siege' in the Party and would establish a normal state of affairs. But as a matter of fact the state of siege, with its emergency laws against particular groups, still continues, and has even become more acute. Only if the old editorial board remains in its entirety can we guarantee that the rights conferred on the editorial board by the Rules will not be used to the detriment of the Party...."

There you have the whole passage from Comrade Martov's speech in which *he first advanced the notorious war-cry of a "state of siege"*. And now look at my reply to him:

"...However, in correcting Martov's statement about the private character of the plan for two trios, I have no intention of denying Martov's assertion of the 'political significance' of the step we took in not endorsing the old editorial board. On the contrary, I fully and unreservedly agree with Comrade Martov that this step is of great political significance—only not the significance which Martov ascribes to it. He said that it was an act in a struggle for influence on the Central Committee in Russia. I go farther than Martov. The whole activity of *Iskra* as a separate group has hitherto been a struggle for influence; but now it is a matter of something more, namely, the organisational consolidation of this influence, and not only a struggle for it. How profoundly Comrade Martov and I differ politically on this point is shown by the fact that he blames me for this wish to influence the Central Committee, whereas I count it to my credit that I strove and still strive to consolidate this influence by organisational means. It appears that we are even talking in different languages! What would be the point of all our work, of all our efforts, if they ended in the same old struggle for influence, and not in its complete acquisition and consolidation? Yes, Comrade Martov is absolutely right: the step we have taken is undoubtedly a major political step showing that one of the trends now to be observed has been chosen for the future work of our Party. *And I am not at all frightened by the dreadful words 'a state of siege in the Party', 'emergency laws against particular individuals and groups', etc.* We not only can but we must create a 'state of siege' in relation to unstable and vacillating elements, and all our Party Rules, the whole system of centralism now endorsed by the Congress are nothing but a 'state of siege' in respect to the numerous sources of political vagueness. It is special laws, even if they are emergency laws, that are needed as measures against vagueness, and the step taken by the Congress has correctly indicated the political direction to be followed, by having created a firm basis for such laws and such measures."*

I have italicised in this summary of my speech at the Congress *the sentence which Comrade Martov preferred to*

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 507-08.—*Ed.*

omit in his "*State of Siege*" (p. 16). It is not surprising that he did not like this sentence and did not choose to understand its obvious meaning.

What does the expression "dreadful words" imply, Comrade Martov?

It implies *mockery*, mockery of those who give big names to little things, who confuse a simple question by pretentious phrase-mongering.

The little and simple fact which *alone* could have given, and actually did give, Comrade Martov cause for "nervous excitement" was *nothing but* his *defeat at the Congress* over the *personal composition of the central bodies*. The political significance of this simple fact was that, having won, the majority of the Party Congress consolidated their influence by establishing their majority in the Party leadership as well, by creating an organisational basis for a struggle, with the help of the Rules, against what this majority considered to be vacillation, instability, and vagueness.* To make this an occasion for talking of a "struggle for influence" with horror in one's eyes and complaining of a "state of siege" was nothing but *pretentious phrase-mongering*, dreadful words.

Comrade Martov does not agree with this? Then perhaps he will try to prove to us that a party congress has ever existed, or is in general conceivable, where the majority would not proceed to consolidate the influence they had gained: 1) by securing a majority on the central bodies, and 2) by endowing it with powers to counteract vacillation, instability, and vagueness.

Before the elections, our Congress had to decide whether to give *one-third* of the votes on the Central Organ and on the Central Committee to the Party majority or the Party minority. The board of six and Comrade Martov's list meant giving one-third to us and two-thirds to his followers.

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* How was the instability, vacillation, and vagueness of the *Iskra*-ist minority manifested at the Congress? Firstly, by their opportunist phrase-mongering over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, secondly, by their coalition with Comrades Akimov and Lieber, which during the second half of the Congress rapidly grew more pronounced; thirdly, by their readiness to degrade the question of electing officials to the Central Organ to the level of philistinism, of wretched words, and even of getting personal. After the Congress all these lovely attributes developed from mere buds into blossoms and fruit.

A trio on the Central Organ and our list meant two-thirds for us and one-third for Comrade Martov's followers. Comrade Martov refused to make terms with us or yield, and challenged us *in writing* to a battle at the Congress. Having suffered defeat at the Congress, he began to weep and to complain of a "state of siege"! Well, isn't that squabbling? Isn't it a new manifestation of the wishy-washiness of the intellectual?

One cannot help recalling in this connection the brilliant social and psychological characterisation of this latter quality recently given by Karl Kautsky. The Social-Democratic parties of different countries suffer not infrequently nowadays from similar maladies, and it would be very, very useful for us to learn from more experienced comrades the correct diagnosis and the correct cure. Karl Kautsky's characterisation of certain intellectuals will therefore be only a seeming digression from our theme.

"The problem ... that again interests us so keenly today is the *antagonism between the intelligentsia* and the proletariat*. My colleagues [Kautsky is himself an intellectual, a writer and editor] will mostly be indignant that I admit this antagonism. But it actually exists, and, as in other cases, it would be the most inexpedient tactics to try to overcome the fact by denying it. This antagonism is a social one, it relates to classes, not to individuals. The individual intellectual, like the individual capitalist, may identify himself with the proletariat in its class struggle. When he does, he changes his character too. It is not *this type* of intellectual, who is still an exception among his class, that we shall mainly speak of in what follows. Unless otherwise stated, *I shall use the word intellectual to mean only the common run of intellectual who takes the stand of bourgeois society*, and who is characteristic of the intelligentsia as a *class*. This *class* stands in a certain *antagonism* to the proletariat.

"This antagonism differs, however, from the antagonism between labour and capital. The intellectual is not a capitalist. True, his standard of life is bourgeois, and he must maintain it if he is not to become a pauper; but at the same time he is compelled to sell the product of his labour, and often his labour-power, and is himself often enough exploited and humiliated by the capitalist. Hence the intellectual does not stand in any economic antagonism to the proletariat. But his status of life and his conditions of labour are not proletarian, and this gives rise to a certain antagonism in sentiments and ideas.

* I use the words intellectual and intelligentsia to translate the German *Literat* and *Literatentum*, which include not only writers but in general all educated people, the members of the liberal professions, the brain workers, as the English call them, as distinct from manual workers.

"As an isolated individual, the proletarian is nothing. His whole strength, his whole progress, all his hopes and expectations are derived from *organisation*, from systematic action in conjunction with his fellows. He feels big and strong when he forms part of a big and strong organism. This organism is the main thing for him; the individual in comparison means very little. The proletarian fights with the utmost devotion as part of the anonymous mass, without prospect of personal advantage or personal glory, doing his duty in any post he is assigned to with a voluntary discipline which pervades all his feelings and thoughts.

"Quite different is the case of the intellectual. He does not fight by means of power, but by argument. His weapons are his personal knowledge, his personal ability, his personal convictions. He can attain to any position at all only through his personal qualities. Hence the freest play for his individuality seems to him the prime condition for successful activity. It is only with difficulty that he submits to being a part subordinate to a whole, and then only from necessity, not from inclination. He recognises the need of discipline only for the mass, not for the elect minds. And of course he counts himself among the latter....

"Nietzsche's philosophy, with its cult of the superman, for whom the fulfilment of his own individuality is everything and any subordination of that individuality to a great social aim is vulgar and despicable, is the real philosophy of the intellectual; and it renders him totally unfit to take part in the class struggle of the proletariat.

"Next to Nietzsche, the most outstanding exponent of a philosophy answering to the sentiments of the intelligentsia is probably Ibsen. His Doctor Stockmann (in *An Enemy of the People*) is not a socialist, as many have thought, but the type of the intellectual, who is bound to come into conflict with the proletarian movement, and with any movement of the people generally, as soon as he attempts to work within it. For the basis of the proletarian movement, as of every democratic* movement, is respect for the majority of one's fellows. The typical intellectual *à la* Stockmann regards a 'compact majority' as a monster that must be overthrown....

"An ideal example of an intellectual who had become thoroughly imbued with the sentiments of the proletariat, and who, although he was a brilliant writer, had quite lost the specific mentality of the intellectual, marched cheerfully with the rank and file, worked in any post he was assigned to, subordinated himself whole-heartedly to our great cause, and despised the feeble whining [*weichliches Gewinsel*] about the suppression of his individuality which the intellectual trained on Ibsen and Nietzsche is prone to indulge in when he happens to be in the minority—an ideal example of the kind of intellectual

* It is extremely characteristic of the confusion brought by our Martovites into all questions of organisation that, though they have swung towards Akimov and a *misplaced* democracy, they are at the same time *incensed at the democratic election of the editorial board*, its election at *the Congress*, as planned in advance by everybody! Perhaps that is your *principle*, gentlemen?

the socialist movement needs was Liebknecht. We may also mention Marx, who never forced himself to the forefront and whose party discipline in the International, where he often found himself in the minority, was exemplary."*

Just such feeble whining of intellectuals who happened to find themselves in the minority, and nothing more, was the refusal of Martov and his friends to be named for office merely because the old circle had not been endorsed, as were their complaints of a state of siege and emergency laws "against particular groups", which Martov cared nothing about when *Yuzhny Rabochy* and *Rabocheye Dyelo* were dissolved, but only came to care about when *his* group was dissolved.

Just such feeble whining of intellectuals who happened to find themselves in the minority was that endless torrent of complaints, reproaches, hints, accusations, slanders, and insinuations regarding the "compact majority" which was started by Martov and which poured out in such a flood at our Party Congress** (and even more so after).

The minority bitterly complained that the compact majority held private meetings. Well, the minority had to do something to conceal the unpleasant fact that the delegates it invited to its own private meetings refused to attend, while those who would willingly have attended (the Egorovs, Makhovs, and Brouckères) the minority could not invite after all the fighting it had done with them at the Congress.

The minority bitterly complained of the "false accusation of opportunism". Well, it had to do something to conceal the unpleasant fact that it was *opportunists*, who in most cases had followed the anti-*Iskra*-ists—and partly these anti-*Iskra*-ists themselves—that made up the compact minority, seizing with both hands on the championship of the circle spirit in Party institutions, opportunism in arguments, philistinism in Party affairs, and the instability and wishy-washiness of the intellectual.

We shall show in the next section what is the explanation of the highly interesting *political fact* that a "compact

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* Karl Kautsky, "Franz Mehring", *Neue Zeit*, XXII, I, S. 101-03, 1903, No. 4.

** See pp. 337, 338, 340, 352, etc., of the Congress Minutes.

majority" was formed towards the end of the Congress, and why, in spite of every challenge, the minority so very, very warily *evades* the *reasons* for its formation and its *history*. But let us first finish our analysis of the Congress debates.

During the elections to the Central Committee, Comrade Martov moved a highly characteristic resolution (p. 336), the three main features of which I have on occasion referred to as "mate in three moves". Here they are: 1) to ballot *lists* of candidates for the Central Committee, and not the candidates individually; 2) after the lists had been announced, to allow two sittings to elapse (for discussion, evidently); 3) in the absence of an absolute majority, a second ballot to be regarded as final. This resolution was a most carefully conceived stratagem (we must give the adversary his due!), with which Comrade Egorov did not agree (p. 337), but which would *most certainly* have assured a complete victory for Martov *if the seven Bundists and "Rabocheye Dyelo"-ists had not quit the Congress*. The reason for this stratagem was that the *Iskra*-ist minority *did not have, and could not have had*, a "direct agreement" (such as there was among the *Iskra*-ist majority) *even with the Egorovs and Makhovs*, let alone the Bund and Brouckère.

Remember that at the League Congress Comrade Martov complained that the "false accusation of opportunism" presumed a direct agreement between him and the Bund. I repeat, this only seemed so to Comrade Martov in his fright, and *this very refusal of Comrade Egorov to agree to the balloting of lists* (Comrade Egorov "had not yet lost his principles"—presumably the principles that made him join forces with Goldblatt in appraising the absolute importance of democratic guarantees) *graphically* demonstrates the highly important fact that *there could be no question of a "direct agreement" even with Egorov*. But a *coalition* there could be, and was, both with Egorov and with Brouckère, a coalition in the sense that the Martovites *were sure* of their support every time they, the Martovites, came into serious conflict with us and Akimov and his friends had to choose the *lesser evil*. There was not and is not the slightest doubt that *Comrades Akimov and Lieber would certainly have voted both for the board of six on the Central Organ and for Martov's list for the Central Committee*, as being *the lesser evil*, as being *what*

would least achieve the "Iskra" aims (see Akimov's speech on Paragraph 1 and the "hopes" he placed in Martov). Balloting of lists, allowing two sittings to elapse, and a re-ballot were designed to achieve this very result with almost mechanical certainty without a direct agreement.

But since our compact majority remained a compact majority, Comrade Martov's flank movement would only have meant delay, and we were bound to reject it. The minority poured forth their complaints on this score in a written statement (p. 341) and, *following the example of Martynov and Akimov*, *refused to vote* in the elections to the Central Committee, "in view of the conditions in which they were held". Since the Congress, such complaints of abnormal conditions at the elections (see *State of Siege*, p. 31) have been poured right and left into the ears of hundreds of Party gossips. But in what did this *abnormality* consist? In the secret ballot—which had been stipulated beforehand in the Standing Orders of the Congress (Point 6, Minutes, p. 11), and in which it was absurd to detect any "hypocrisy" or "injustice"? In the formation of a compact majority—that "monster" in the eyes of wishy-washy intellectuals? Or in the *abnormal* desire of these worthy intellectuals to *violate the pledge* they had given before the Congress that they would recognise all its elections (p. 380, Point 18 of the Congress Regulations)?

Comrade Popov *subtly* hinted at this desire when he asked outright at the Congress on the day of the elections: "Is the Bureau certain that the decision of the Congress is valid and in order when half the delegates refused to vote?"* The Bureau of course replied that it was certain, and recalled the incident of Comrades Akimov and Martynov. Comrade Martov agreed with the Bureau and explicitly declared that Comrade Popov was mistaken and that "*the decisions of the Congress are valid*" (p. 343). Now let the reader form his own opinion of the political consistency—highly normal, we must suppose—revealed by a comparison of *this declaration made by him in the hearing of the Party* with his

* P. 342. This refers to the election of the fifth member of the Council. Twenty-four ballots (out of a total of forty-four votes) were cast, two of which were blank.

behaviour after the Congress and with the phrase in his *State of Siege* about "*the revolt of half the Party which already began at the Congress*" (p. 20). The hopes which Comrade Akimov had placed in Comrade Martov outweighed the ephemeral good intentions of Martov himself.

"*You have conquered*", Comrade Akimov!

* * *

Certain features, seemingly petty but actually very important, of the *end* of the Congress, the part of it *after* the elections, may serve to show how pure and simple a "dreadful word" was the famous phrase about a "state of siege", which has now for ever acquired a tragicomical meaning. Comrade Martov is now making great play with this tragicomical "state of siege", seriously assuring both himself and his readers that this bogey of his own invention implied some sort of abnormal persecution, hounding, bullying of the "minority" by the "majority". We shall presently show how matters stood *after* the Congress. But take even the end of the Congress, and you will find that *after the elections*, far from persecuting the unhappy Martovites, who are supposed to have been bullied, ill-treated, and led to the slaughter, the "compact majority" *itself offered* them (through Lyadov) *two seats out of three* on the Minutes Committee (p. 354). Take the resolutions on tactical and other questions (p. 355 et seq.), and you will find that they were discussed on their merits in a purely business-like way, and that the signatories to many of the resolutions included both representatives of the monstrous compact "majority" and followers of the "humiliated and insulted" "minority" (Minutes, pp. 355, 357, 363, 365 and 367). This looks like "shutting out from work" and "bullying" in general, does it not?

The only interesting—but, unfortunately, all too brief—controversy on the substance of a question arose in connection with Starover's resolution on the liberals. As one can see from the signatures to it (pp. 357 and 358), it was adopted by the Congress because three of the supporters of the "majority" (Braun, Orlov, and Osipov[104]) voted both *for it* and for Plekhanov's resolution, not perceiving the irreconcilable contradiction between the two. No irreconcilable contra-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

diction is apparent at first glance, because Plekhanov's resolution lays down a general principle, outlines a definite attitude, as regards principles and tactics, towards *bourgeois liberalism in Russia*, whereas Starover's attempts to define the *concrete conditions in which "temporary agreements" would be permissible* with "liberal or liberal-democratic trends". The subjects of the two resolutions are different. But Starover's suffers from *political vagueness*, and is consequently petty and shallow. It *does not define the class content of Russian liberalism*, does not indicate the *definite* political trends in which this is expressed, does not explain to the proletariat the *principal* tasks of propaganda and agitation in relation to these definite trends; it confuses (owing to its vagueness) such different things as the student movement and *Osvobozhdeniye*, it too pettily and casuistically prescribes *three* concrete conditions under which "temporary agreements" would be permissible. Here too, as in many other cases, political vagueness leads to casuistry. The absence of any general principle and the attempt to enumerate "conditions" result in a petty and, strictly speaking, *incorrect* specification of these conditions. Just examine Starover's three conditions: 1) the "liberal or liberal-democratic trends" shall "clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocratic government they will resolutely side with the Russian Social-Democrats". What is the difference between the liberal and liberal-democratic trends? The resolution furnishes no material for a reply to this question. Is it not that the liberal trends speak for the politically least progressive sections of the bourgeoisie, and the liberal-democratic—for the more progressive sections of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie? If that is so, can Comrade Starover possibly think that the sections of the bourgeoisie which are least progressive (but progressive nevertheless, for otherwise there could be no talk of liberalism) can "resolutely side with the Social-Democrats"?? That is absurd, and even if the spokesmen of such a trend were to "*declare it clearly and unambiguously*" (an absolutely impossible assumption), we, the party of the proletariat, *would be obliged not to believe* their declarations. To be a liberal and resolutely side with the Social-Democrats—the one excludes the other.

Further, let us assume a case where "liberal or liberal-democratic trends" clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocracy they will resolutely side with the *Socialist-Revolutionaries*. Such an assumption is far less unlikely than Comrade Starover's (owing to the bourgeois-democratic nature of the Socialist-Revolutionary trend). From his resolution, because of its vagueness and casuistry, it would appear that *in a case like this temporary agreements* with such liberals would be *impermissible*. But this conclusion, which follows inevitably from Comrade Starover's resolution, is an *absolutely false* one. Temporary agreements are permissible with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (see the Congress resolution on the latter), and, *consequently*, with liberals who side with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Second condition: these trends "shall not include in their programmes any demands running counter to the interests of the working class or the democracy generally, or obscuring their political consciousness". Here we have the same mistake again: there never have been, nor can there be, liberal-democratic trends which did not include in their programmes demands running counter to the interests of the working class and obscuring its (the proletariat's) political consciousness. Even one of the most democratic sections of our liberal-democratic trend, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, put forward in their programme—a muddled one, like all liberal programmes—demands that run counter to the interests of the working class and obscure its political consciousness. The conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that it is *essential* to "expose the limitations and inadequacy of the bourgeois emancipation movement", but not that temporary agreements are impermissible.

Lastly, in the general form in which it is presented, Comrade Starover's third "condition" (that the liberal-democrats should make universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage the slogan of their struggle) is likewise *incorrect*: it *would be unwise* to declare impermissible in all cases temporary and partial agreements with liberal-democratic trends whose slogan was a constitution with a qualified suffrage, or a "curtailed" constitution generally. As a matter of fact, the *Osvobozhdeniye* "trend" would fit into just this category,

but it would be political short-sightedness incompatible with the principles of Marxism to tie one's hands by forbidding in advance "temporary agreements" with even the most timorous liberals.

To sum up: Comrade Starover's resolution, which was signed also by Comrades Martov and Axelrod, is a *mistake*, and the Third Congress would be wise to rescind it. It suffers from *political vagueness* in its theoretical and tactical position, from casuistry in the practical "conditions" it stipulates. It *confuses two questions*: 1) the exposure of the "anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian" features of *all* liberal-democratic trends, and the need to *combat* these features, and 2) the *conditions* for temporary and partial *agreements* with any of these trends. It does not give what it should (an analysis of the class content of liberalism), and gives what it should not (prescription of "conditions"). It is absurd in general to draw up detailed "conditions" for temporary agreements at a party congress, when there is not even a definite partner to such possible agreements in view; and even if there were such a definite partner in view, it would be a hundred times more rational to leave the definition of the "conditions" for a temporary agreement to the Party's central institutions, as the Congress did in relation to the Socialist-Revolutionary "trend" (see Plekhanov's modification of the end of Comrade Axelrod's resolution—Minutes, pp. 362 and 15).

As to the objections of the "minority" to Plekhanov's resolution, Comrade Martov's only argument was: Plekhanov's resolution "ends with the paltry conclusion that a particular writer should be exposed. Would this not be 'using a sledge-hammer to kill a fly'?" (P. 358). This argument, whose emptiness is concealed by a smart phrase—"paltry conclusion"—provides a new specimen of pompous phrase-mongering. Firstly, Plekhanov's resolution speaks of "exposing in the eyes of the proletariat the limitations and inadequacy of the bourgeois emancipation movement wherever these limitations and inadequacy manifest themselves". Hence Comrade Martov's assertion (at the League Congress: Minutes, p. 88) that "all attention is to be directed only to Struve, only to one liberal" is the sheerest nonsense. Secondly, to compare Mr. Struve to a "fly" when the possibility of tem-

porary agreements with the Russian liberals is in question, is to sacrifice an elementary and manifest political fact for a smart phrase. No, Mr. Struve is not a fly, but a political magnitude, and not because he personally is such a big figure, but because of his position as the sole representative of Russian liberalism—of at all effectual and organised liberalism—in the illegal world. Therefore, to talk of the Russian liberals, and of what our Party's attitude towards them should be, without having precisely Mr. Struve and *Osvobozhdeniye* in mind is to talk without saying anything. Or perhaps Comrade Martov will show us *even one single* "liberal or liberal-democratic trend" in Russia which could compare even remotely today with the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend? It would be interesting to see him try!*

"Struve's name means nothing to the workers," said Comrade Kostrov, supporting Comrade Martov. I hope Comrade Kostrov and Comrade Martov will not be offended—but that argument is fully in the Akimov style. It is like the argument about the proletariat in the genitive case.[105]

Who are the workers to whom Struve's name (and the name of *Osvobozhdeniye*, mentioned in Comrade Plekhanov's resolution alongside of Mr. Struve) "means nothing"? Those who know very little, or nothing at all, of the "liberal and liberal-democratic trends" in Russia. One asks, what should

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* At the League Congress Comrade Martov also adduced the following argument against Comrade Plekhanov's resolution: "The chief objection to it, the chief defect of this resolution, is that it totally ignores the fact that it is our duty, in the struggle against the autocracy, not to shun alliance with liberal-democratic elements. Comrade Lenin would call this a Martynov tendency. This tendency is already being manifested in the new *Iskra*" (p. 88).

For the wealth of "gems" it contains this passage is indeed rare. 1) The phrase about *alliance* with the liberals is a sheer muddle. Nobody mentioned alliance, Comrade Martov, but only temporary or partial agreements. That is an entirely different thing. 2) If Plekhanov's resolution ignores an incredible "alliance" and speaks only of "support" in general, that is one of its merits, not a defect. 3) Perhaps Comrade Martov will take the trouble to explain what in general characterises "Martynov tendencies"? Perhaps he will tell us what is the relation between these tendencies and opportunism? Perhaps he will trace the relation of these tendencies to Paragraph 1 of the Rules? 4) I am just burning with impatience to hear from Comrade Martov how "Martynov tendencies" were manifested in the "new" *Iskra*. Please, Comrade Martov, relieve me of the torments of suspense!

be the attitude of our Party Congress to such workers: should it instruct Party members to acquaint these workers with the only definite liberal trend in Russia; or should it *refrain from mentioning* a name with which the workers are little acquainted because of their little acquaintance with politics? If Comrade Kostrov, having taken one step in the wake of Comrade Akimov, does not want to take another, he will answer this question in the former sense. And having answered it in the former sense, he will see how groundless his argument was. *At any rate*, the words "Struve" and "*Osvobozhdeniye*" in Plekhanov's resolution *are likely to be of much more value* to the workers than the words "liberal and liberal-democratic trend" in Starover's resolution.

Except through *Osvobozhdeniye*, the Russian worker cannot at the present time acquaint himself in practice with anything like a frank expression of the political tendencies of our liberalism. The legal liberal literature is unsuitable for this purpose because it is so nebulous. And we must as assiduously as possible (and among the broadest possible masses of workers) direct the weapon of our criticism against the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, so that when the future revolution breaks out, the Russian proletariat may, with the real criticism of weapons,[106] paralyse the inevitable attempts of the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry to curtail the democratic character of the revolution.

Apart from Comrade Egorov's "perplexity", mentioned above, over the question of our "supporting" the oppositional and revolutionary movement, the debate on the resolutions offered little of interest; in fact, there was hardly any debate at all.

The Congress ended with a brief reminder from the chairman that its decisions were binding on all Party members.

N. GENERAL PICTURE OF THE STRUGGLE AT THE CONGRESS. THE REVOLUTIONARY AND OPPORTUNIST WINGS OF THE PARTY

Having finished our analysis of the Congress debates and voting, we must now sum up, so that we may, on the basis of the *entire* Congress material, answer the question: what

elements, groups, and shades went to make up the final majority and minority which we saw in the elections and which were destined for a time to become the main division in our Party? A summary must be made of all the material relating to shades of principle, theoretical and tactical, which the minutes of the Congress provide in such abundance. Without a general "resumé", without a general picture of the Congress as a whole, and of all the principal groupings during the voting, this material is too disjointed, too disconnected, so that at first sight the individual groupings seem accidental, especially to one who does not take the trouble to make an independent and comprehensive *study* of the Congress Minutes (and how many readers have taken that trouble?).

In English parliamentary reports we often meet the characteristic word "division". The House "divided" into such and such a majority and minority, it is said when an issue is voted. The "division" of our Social-Democratic House on the various issues discussed at the Congress presents a picture of the struggle within the Party, of its shades of opinion and groups, that is *unique of its kind and unparalleled for its completeness and accuracy*. To make the picture a graphic one, to obtain a real *picture* instead of a heap of disconnected, disjointed, and isolated facts and incidents, to put a stop to the endless and senseless arguments over particular votings (who voted for whom and who supported whom?), I have decided to try to depict *all the basic* types of "divisions" at our Congress in the form of a *diagram*. This will probably seem strange to a great many people, but I doubt whether any other method can be found that would really generalise and summarise the results in the most complete and accurate manner possible. Which way a particular delegate voted can be ascertained with absolute accuracy in cases when a roll-call vote was taken; and in certain important cases when no roll-call vote was taken it can be determined from the minutes with a very high degree of probability, with a sufficient degree of approximation to the truth. And if we take into account *all* the roll-call votes and all the other votes on issues of any importance (as judged, for example, by the thoroughness and warmth of the debates), we shall obtain the most objective picture

of our inner Party struggle that the material at our disposal permits. In doing so, instead of giving a photograph, i.e., an image of each voting separately, we shall try to give a picture, i.e., to present all the main *types* of voting, ignoring relatively unimportant exceptions and variations which would only confuse matters. In any case, anybody will be able with the aid of the minutes to check every detail of our picture, to amplify it with any particular voting he likes, in short, to criticise it not only by arguing, expressing doubts, and making references to isolated incidents, but by drawing a *different picture* on the basis of the same material.

In marking on the diagram each delegate who took part in the voting, we shall indicate by special shading the four main groups which we have traced in detail through the whole of the Congress debates, viz., 1) the *Iskra*-ists of the majority; 2) the *Iskra*-ists of the minority; 3) the "Centre", and 4) the anti-*Iskra*-ists. We have seen the difference in shades of principle between these groups in a *host of instances*, and if anyone does not like the *names* of the groups, which remind lovers of zigzags too much of the *Iskra* organisation and the *Iskra* trend, we can tell them that it is not the name that matters. Now that we have traced the shades through *all* the debates at the Congress, it is easy to substitute for the already established and familiar Party appellations (which jar on the ears of some) a characterisation of the *essence of the shades between the groups*. Were this substitution made, we would obtain the following names for these same four groups: 1) consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats; 2) minor opportunists; 3) middling opportunists; and 4) major opportunists (major by our Russian standards). Let us hope that these names will be less shocking to those who have latterly taken to assuring themselves and others that *Iskra*-ist is a name which only denotes a "circle", and not a *trend*.

Let us now explain in detail the types of voting "snapped" on this diagram (see diagram: General Picture of the Struggle at the Congress—p. 339).

The first type of voting (A) covers the cases when the "Centre" joined with the *Iskra*-ists against the anti-*Iskra*-ists or a part of them. It includes the vote on the programme as a whole (Comrade Akimov alone abstained, all the others

voted for); the vote on the resolution condemning federation in principle (all voted for except the five Bundists); the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Bund Rules (the five Bundists voted against us; five abstained, viz.: Martynov, Akimov, Brouckère, and Makhov with his two votes; the rest were with us); *it is this vote that is represented in diagram A*. Further, the *three* votes on the question of endorsing *Iskra* as the Party's Central Organ were also of this type: the editors (five votes) abstained; in all three cases there were two votes against (Akimov and Brouckère), and, in addition, when the vote on the *motives* for endorsing *Iskra* was taken, the five Bundists and Comrade Martynov abstained.*

This type of voting provides the answer to a very interesting and important question, namely, when did the Congress "Centre" vote with the *Iskra*-ists? It was either when *the anti-*"Iskra"*-ists*, *too*, *were with us*, with a few exceptions (adoption of the programme, or endorsement of *Iskra* without motives stated), or else when it was a question of the sort of *statement* which was not in itself a direct committal to a definite political position (recognition of *Iskra*'s organising work was not in itself a committal to carry out its organisational policy in relation to particular groups; rejection of the principle of federation did not preclude abstention from voting on a specific scheme of federation, as we have seen in the case of Comrade Makhov). We have already seen, when speaking of the significance of the groupings at the Congress in general, how falsely this matter is put in the official account of the official *Iskra*, which (through the mouth of Comrade Martov) *slurs and glosses over* the difference between the *Iskra*-ists and the "Centre", between consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats and opportunists, by citing *cases when the anti-*"*Iskra*"*-ists*, *too*, *voted with us*! Even the most "Right-wing" of the opportunists in the German

* Why was the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Bund Rules taken for depiction in the diagram? Because the votes on endorsing *Iskra* were not as full, while the votes on the programme and on the question of federation referred to political decisions of a less definite and specific character. Speaking generally, the choice of one or another of a number of votes *of the same type* will not in the least affect the main features of the picture, as anyone may easily see by making the corresponding changes.

and French Social-Democratic parties never vote against such points as *the adoption of the programme as a whole.*

The second type of voting (B) covers the cases when the *Iskra*-ists, consistent and inconsistent, voted together against all the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the entire "Centre". These were mostly cases that involved giving effect to definite and specific plans of the *Iskra* policy, that is, endorsing *Iskra in fact and not only in word*. They include the *Organising Committee incident**; the question of making the position of the Bund in the Party the first item on the agenda; the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group; two votes on the agrarian programme, and, sixthly and lastly, the vote *against* the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (*Rabocheye Dyelo*), that is, the recognition of the League as the only Party organisation abroad. The old, pre-Party, circle spirit, the interests of opportunist organisations or groups, the narrow conception of Marxism were fighting here against the strictly consistent and principled policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy; the *Iskra*-ists of the minority still sided with us in quite a number of cases, in a number of exceedingly important votes (important from the standpoint of the Organising Committee, *Yuzhny Rabochy*, and *Rabocheye Dyelo*) ... until *their own* circle spirit and their own inconsistency came into question. The "divisions" of this type bring out with graphic clarity that on a number of issues involving the practical application of our principles, *the Centre joined forces with the anti-"Iskra"-ists*, displaying a much greater kinship with them than with us, a much greater leaning *in practice*

* It is this vote that is depicted in Diagram B, the *Iskra*-ists secured thirty-two votes, the Bundist resolution sixteen. It should be pointed out that of the votes of this type *not one was by roll-call*. The way the individual delegates voted can only be established—but with a very high degree of probability—by two sets of evidence: 1) in the debate the speakers of both groups of *Iskra*-ists spoke in favour, those of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" against; 2) the number of votes cast *in favour* was always very close to thirty-three. Nor should it be forgotten that when analysing the Congress debates we pointed out, quite apart from the voting, *a number* of cases when the "Centre" sided with the anti-*Iskra*-ists (the opportunists) against us. Some of these issues were: the absolute value of democratic demands, whether we should support the oppositional elements, restriction of centralism, etc.

GENERAL PICTURE OF THE STRUGGLE AT THE CONGRESS



The plus and minus signs indicate the total number of votes cast *for* and *against* on a particular issue. The figures below the stripes indicate the number of votes cast by each of the four groups. The character of the votings covered by each of the types A to E is explained in the text.



The plus and minus signs indicate the total number of votes cast for and against on a particular issue. The figures below the strips indicate the number of votes cast by each of the four groups. The character of the voting covered by each of the types A to E is explained in the text.

towards the *opportunist* than towards the *revolutionary* wing of Social-Democracy. Those who were *Iskra*-ists *in name* but were ashamed *to be Iskra*-ists revealed their true nature, and the struggle that inevitably ensued caused no little acrimony, which obscured from the less thoughtful and more impressionable the significance of the shades of principle disclosed in that struggle. But now that the ardour of battle has somewhat abated and the minutes remain as a dispassionate extract of a series of heated encounters, only those who wilfully close their eyes can fail to perceive that the alliance of the Makhovs and Egorovs with the Akimovs and Liebers was not, and could not be, fortuitous. The only thing Martov and Axelrod can do is keep well away from a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the minutes, or try at this late date to *undo* their behaviour at the Congress by all sorts of expressions of *regret*. As if regrets can remove differences of views and differences of policy! As if the present alliance of Martov and Axelrod with Akimov, Brouckère, and Martynov can cause our Party, restored at the Second Congress, to forget the struggle which the *Iskra*-ists waged with the anti-*Iskra*-ists almost throughout the Congress!

The distinguishing feature of the third type of voting at the Congress, represented by the three remaining parts of the diagram (C, D, and E), is that a *small section of the "Iskra"-ists broke away and went over to the anti-"Iskra"-ists*, who accordingly gained the victory (as long as they remained at the Congress). In order to trace with complete accuracy the development of this celebrated *coalition* of the *Iskra*-ist minority with the anti-*Iskra*-ists, the mere mention of which drove Martov to write hysterical epistles at the Congress, we have reproduced all the three main kinds of *roll-call* votes of this type. C is the vote on equality of languages (the last of the three roll-call votes on this question is given, it being the fullest). All the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the whole Centre stand solid against us; from the *Iskra*-ists a part of the majority and a part of the minority break away. *It is not yet clear which of the "Iskra"-ists are capable of forming a definite and lasting coalition with the opportunist "Right wing" of the Congress*. Next comes type D—the vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules (of the two votes, we have

taken the one which was more clear-cut, that is, in which there were no abstentions). *The coalition stands out more saliently and assumes firmer shape**: *all* the *Iskra*-ists of the minority are now on the side of Akimov and Lieber, but only a very small number of *Iskra*-ists of the majority, these counterbalancing three of the "Centre" and one anti-*Iskra*-ist who have come over to our side. A mere glance at the diagram suffices to show which elements shifted from side to side casually and temporarily and which *were drawn with irresistible force* towards *a lasting coalition with the Akimovs*. The last vote (E—elections to the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the Party Council), *which in fact represents the final division into majority and minority*, clearly reveals the complete fusion of the *Iskra*-ist minority with the *entire* "Centre" and the *remnants* of the anti-*Iskra*-ists. By this time, of the eight anti-*Iskra*-ists, *only* Comrade Brouckère remained at the Congress (Comrade Akimov had already explained his mistake to him and he had taken his proper place in the ranks of the *Martovites*). The withdrawal of the seven *most* "*Right-wing*" *of the opportunists* decided the issue of the elections against Martov.**

And now, with the aid of the objective evidence of votes of *every type*, let us sum up the results of the Congress.

There has been much talk to the effect that the majority at our Congress was "*accidental*". This, in fact, was Comrade Martov's sole consolation in his *Once More in the Minority*.

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* *Judging by all indications*, *four other votes on the Rules* were of the same type: p. 278—27 for Fomin, as against 21 for us; p. 279—26 for Martov, as against 24 for us; p. 280—27 against me, 22 for; and, on the same page, 24 for Martov, as against 23 for us. These are the votes on the question of co-optation to the central bodies, which I have already dealt with. No roll-call votes are available (there was one, but the record of it has been lost). The Bundists (all or part) evidently *saved* Martov. Martov's erroneous statements (at the League) concerning these votes have been corrected above.

** The seven opportunists who withdrew from the Second Congress were the five Bundists (the Bund withdrew from the Party after the Second Congress rejected the principle of federation) and two *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, Comrade Martynov and Comrade Akimov. These latter left the Congress after the *Iskra*-ist League was recognised as the *only* Party organisation abroad, i.e., after the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ist Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was dissolved. (Author's footnote to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

The diagram clearly shows that in *one sense*, but in only one, the majority could be called accidental, viz., in the sense that the withdrawal of the seven most opportunist delegates of the "*Right*" was—supposedly—a matter of *accident*. *To the extent* that this withdrawal was an accident (and no more), our majority was accidental. A mere glance at the diagram will show better than any long arguments on whose side these seven would have been, *were bound to have been*.* But the question is: how far was the withdrawal of the seven really an accident? That is a question which those who talk so freely about the "accidental" character of the majority do not like to ask themselves. It is an unpleasant question for them. Was it an accident that the most extreme representatives of the *Right* and not of the *Left* wing of our Party were the ones to withdraw? Was it an accident that it was *opportunist*s who withdrew, and not consistent *revolutionary Social-Democrats*? Is there no connection between this "accidental" withdrawal and the struggle against the opportunist wing which was waged throughout the Congress and which stands out so graphically in our diagram?

One has only to ask these questions, which are so unpleasant to the minority, to realise what fact all this talk about the accidental character of the majority is intended to *conceal*. It is the unquestionable and incontrovertible fact that *the minority was formed of those in our Party who gravitate most towards opportunism*. The minority was formed of those elements in the Party *who are least stable* in theory, *least steadfast in matters of principle*. It was from the *Right* wing of the Party that the minority was formed. The division into majority and minority is a direct and inevitable continuation of that division of the Social-Democrats into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, into a Mountain and a Gironde,[107] which did not appear only yesterday, nor in the Russian workers' party alone, and which no doubt will not disappear tomorrow.

This fact is of cardinal importance for elucidating the causes and the various stages of our disagreements. Who-

* We shall see later that *after* the Congress both Comrade Akimov and the Voronezh Committee, which has the closest *kinship* with Comrade Akimov, explicitly expressed their sympathy with the "*minority*".

ever tries to *evade* the fact by denying or glossing over the struggle at the Congress and the shades of principle that it revealed, simply testifies to his own intellectual and political poverty. And in order to *disprove* the fact, it would have to be shown, *in the first place*, that the general picture of the voting and "divisions" at our Party Congress was different from the one I have drawn; and, *in the second place*, that it was the most consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats, those who in Russia have adopted the name of *Iskra*-ists,* who *were in the wrong on the substance* of all those issues over which the Congress "divided". Well, just try to show that, gentlemen!

Incidentally, the fact that the minority was formed of the most opportunist, the least stable and consistent elements of the Party provides an answer to those numerous objections and expressions of doubt which are addressed to the majority by people who are imperfectly acquainted with the matter, or have not given it sufficient thought. Is it not petty, we are told, to account for the *divergence* by a minor mistake of Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod? Yes, gentlemen, Comrade Martov's mistake was a minor one (and I said so even at the Congress, in the heat of the struggle); but this minor mistake *could* (*and did*) cause a lot of harm because Comrade Martov was pulled over to the side of delegates who had made a *whole series of mistakes*, had manifested an inclination towards opportunism and inconsistency of principle on a whole series of

* Note for Comrade Martov's benefit. If Comrade Martov has now forgotten that the term "*Iskra*"-ist implies *the follower of a trend* and not *a member of a circle*, we would advise him to read in the Congress Minutes the explanation Comrade Trotsky gave Comrade Akimov on this point. There were three *Iskra*-ist *circles* (in relation to the Party) at the Congress: the Emancipation of Labour group, the *Iskra* editorial board, and the *Iskra* organisation. Two of these three circles had the good sense to dissolve themselves; the third did not display enough Party spirit to do so, and was dissolved by the Congress. The broadest of the *Iskra*-ist circles, the *Iskra* organisation (which included the editorial board and the Emancipation of Labour group), had sixteen members present at the Congress in all, of whom *only eleven* were entitled to vote. *Iskra*-ists *by trend*, on the other hand, not by membership in any *Iskra*-ist "circle", numbered, by my calculation, *twenty-seven*, *with thirty-three votes*. Hence, *less than half* of the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress belonged to *Iskra*-ist *circles*.

questions. That Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod should have displayed instability was an unimportant fact concerning individuals; it was not an individual fact, however, but a *Party* fact, and a *not altogether unimportant one*, that a very considerable minority should have been formed of *all* the least stable elements, of *all* who either rejected *Iskra*'s trend altogether and openly opposed it, or paid lip service to it but actually sided time and again with the anti-*Iskra*-ists.

Is it not absurd to *account for* the divergence by the prevalence of an inveterate circle spirit and revolutionary philistinism in the small circle comprised by the old *Iskra* editorial board? No, it is not absurd, because *all those in our Party* who all through the Congress had fought *for every kind of circle*, all those *who were generally incapable of rising* above revolutionary philistinism, all those who talked about the "historical" character of the philistine and circle spirit in order to justify and preserve that evil, *rose up* in support of *this particular* circle. The fact that narrow circle interests prevailed over the Party interest in the one little circle of the *Iskra* editorial board might, perhaps, be regarded as an accident; but it was no accident that in staunch support of this circle rose up the Akimovs and Brouckères, who attached no less (if not more) value to the "historical continuity" of the celebrated Voronezh Committee and the notorious St. Petersburg "Workers' Organisation"[108]; the Egorovs, who lamented the "murder" of *Rabocheye Dyelo* as bitterly as the "murder" of the old editorial board (if not more so); the Makhovs, etc., etc. You can tell a man by his friends—the proverb says. And you can tell a man's *political complexion* by his political allies, by the people who vote for him.

The minor mistake committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod was, and might have remained, a *minor* one until it became the starting-point for a *durable alliance* between them and the whole opportunist wing of our Party, until it led, as a result of that alliance, to a *recrudescence* of opportunism, to the exaction of *revenge* by all whom *Iskra* had fought and who were now overjoyed at a chance of *venting their spleen* on the consistent adherents of revolutionary Social-Democracy. And as a result of the post-Congress

events, what we are witnessing in the new *Iskra* is precisely a recrudescence of opportunism, the revenge of the Akimovs and Brouckères (see the leaflet issued by the Voronezh Committee*), and the glee of the Martynovs, who have at last (at last!) been allowed, in the detested *Iskra*, to have a kick at the detested "enemy" for each and every former grievance. This makes it particularly clear how essential it was to "restore *Iskra*'s old editorial board" (we are quoting from Comrade Starover's ultimatum of November 3, 1903) in order to preserve *Iskra* "continuity"....

Taken by itself, there was nothing dreadful, nor critical, nor even anything abnormal in the fact that the Congress (and the Party) divided into a Left and a Right, a revolutionary and an opportunist wing. On the contrary, the whole past decade in the history of the Russian (and not only the Russian) Social-Democratic movement had been leading inevitably and inexorably to such a division. The fact that the division took place over a number of very *minor* mistakes of the Right wing, of (relatively) very unimportant differences (a fact which seems shocking to the superficial observer and to the philistine mind), marked *a big step forward for our Party as a whole*. Formerly we used to differ over major issues, such as might in some cases even justify a split; now we have reached agreement on all major and important points, and are only divided by *shades*, about which we may *and should* argue, but over which it would be absurd and childish to part company (as Comrade Plekhanov has quite rightly said in his interesting article "What Should Not Be Done", to which we shall revert). *Now*, when the *anarchistic behaviour* of the minority *since the Congress* has almost brought the Party to a split, one may often hear wiseacres saying: Was it worth while fighting at the Congress over such trifles as the Organising Committee incident, the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group or *Rabocheye Dyelo*, or Paragraph 1, or the dissolution of the old editorial board, etc.? Those who argue in this way**

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* See pp. 406-07 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** I cannot help recalling in this connection a conversation I happened to have at the Congress with one of the "Centre" delegates. "How oppressive the atmosphere is at our Congress!" he complained. "This bitter fighting, this agitation of one against the other, this biting

are in fact introducing the circle standpoint into Party affairs: a struggle of *shades* in the Party is *inevitable and essential*, as long as it does not lead to anarchy and splits, as long as it is confined *within bounds* approved by the common consent of all comrades and Party members. And *our struggle* against the Right wing of the Party *at the Congress*, against Akimov and Axelrod, Martynov and Martov, *in no way exceeded those bounds*. One need only recall two facts which incontrovertibly prove this: 1) when Comrades Martynov and Akimov were about to quit the Congress, *we were all prepared* to do everything to obliterate the idea of an "insult"; *we all adopted* (by thirty-two votes) Comrade Trotsky's motion inviting these comrades to regard the explanations as satisfactory and withdraw their statement; 2) when it came to the election of the central bodies, we were prepared to allow the minority (or the opportunist wing) of the Congress *a minority on both central bodies*: Martov on the Central Organ and Popov on the Central Committee. We *could not* act otherwise from the Party standpoint, since even before the Congress we had decided to elect two trios. *If the difference of shades revealed at the Congress was not great*, neither was the *practical* conclusion we drew from the struggle between these shades: the conclusion amounted *solely* to this, that *two-thirds* of the seats on both bodies of three ought to be given to the *majority* at the Party Congress.

It was only the *refusa*l of the minority at the Party Congress to be a *minority on the central bodies* that led first to the "feeble whining" of defeated intellectuals, and then to *anarchistic talk* and anarchistic actions.

In conclusion, let us take one more glance at the diagram from the standpoint of the composition of the central bodies. Quite naturally, *in addition* to the question of shades,

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controversy, this uncomradely attitude!..." "What a splendid thing our Congress is!" I replied. "A free and open struggle. Opinions have been stated. The shades have been revealed. The groups have taken shape. Hands have been raised. A decision has been taken. A stage has been passed. Forward! That's the stuff for me! That's life! That's not like the endless, tedious word-chopping of your intellectuals, which stops not because the question has been settled, but because they are too tired to talk any more...."

The comrade of the "Centre" stared at me in perplexity and shrugged his shoulders. We were talking different languages.

the delegates were faced during the elections with the question of the *suitability*, efficiency, etc., of one or another *person*. The minority are now very prone to confuse these two questions. Yet that they are different questions is self-evident, and this can be seen from the simple fact, for instance, that the election of an *initial* trio for the Central Organ had been planned even *before the Congress*, at a time when no one could have foreseen the alliance of Martov and Axelrod with Martynov and Akimov. Different questions have to be answered in different ways: the answer to the question of shades must be sought for in the *minutes of the Congress*, in the *open* discussions and voting on each and every issue. As to the question of the suitability of *persons*, everybody at the Congress had decided that it should be settled by *secret ballot*. Why did *the whole Congress unanimously* take that decision? The question is so elementary that it would be odd to dwell on it. But (since their defeat at the ballot-box) the minority have begun to forget even elementary things. We have heard torrents of ardent, passionate speeches, heated almost to the point of irresponsibility, in defence of the old editorial board, but we have heard *absolutely nothing* about the shades *at the Congress* that were involved in the struggle over a board of six or three. We hear talk and gossip on all sides about the ineffectualness, the unsuitability, the evil designs, etc., of the persons elected to the Central Committee, but we hear *absolutely nothing* about the shades *at the Congress* that fought for predominance on the Central Committee. To me it seems indecent and discreditable to go about talking and gossiping *outside the Congress* about the qualities and actions of individuals (for in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred these actions are an organisational secret, which can only be divulged to the supreme authority of the Party). To fight *outside the Congress* by means of *such gossip* would, in my opinion, be *scandal-mongering*. And the only public reply I could make to all this talk would be to point to the struggle at the Congress: You say that the Central Committee was elected by a narrow majority. That is true. But this narrow majority consisted of all who had most consistently fought, not in words but in actual fact, for the realisation of the *Iskra* plans. Consequently, the *moral* prestige of this majority

should be even higher—incomparably so—than its *formal* prestige—higher in the eyes of all who value the continuity of the *Iskra trend* above the continuity of a particular *Iskra circle*. Who was *more competent to judge* the suitability of particular persons to carry out the *Iskra* policy—those who fought for that policy at the Congress, or those who in no few cases fought against that policy and defended everything retrograde, every kind of old rubbish, every kind of circle mentality?

O. AFTER THE CONGRESS. TWO METHODS OF STRUGGLE

The analysis of the debates and voting at the Congress, which we have now concluded, actually explains *in nuce* (in embryo) *everything that has happened since the Congress*, and we can be brief in outlining the subsequent stages of our Party crisis.

The refusal of Martov and Popov to stand for election immediately introduced an atmosphere of *squabbling* into a Party struggle between Party shades. On the very next day after the Congress, Comrade Glebov, thinking it incredible that the unelected editors could seriously have decided to *swing towards* Akimov and Martynov, and attributing the whole thing primarily to irritation, suggested to Plekhanov and me that the matter should be ended peaceably and that all four should be "co-opted" on condition that proper representation of the editorial board on the Council was guaranteed (i.e., that of the two representatives, one was definitely drawn from the *Party* majority). This condition seemed sound to Plekhanov and me, for its acceptance would imply *a tacit admission of the mistake at the Congress*, a desire for peace instead of war, a desire to be closer to Plekhanov and me than to Akimov and Martynov, Egorov and Makhov. The concession as regards "co-optation" thus became a *personal* one, and it was not worth while refusing to make a personal concession which should clear away the irritation and restore peace. Plekhanov and I therefore consented. But the editorial majority rejected the condition. *Glebov left*. We began to wait and see what would happen next: whether Martov would adhere to the

loyal stand he had taken up at the Congress (*against* Comrade Popov, the representative of the Centre), or whether the unstable elements who inclined towards a split, and in whose wake he had followed, would gain the upper hand.

We were faced with the question: would Comrade Martov choose to regard his Congress "coalition" as an isolated political fact (just as, *si licet parva componere magnis*,* Bebel's coalition with Vollmar in 1895 was an isolated case), or would he want to *consolidate* this coalition, exert himself to prove that it was *Plekhanov and I* who were mistaken at the Congress, and become the actual leader of the opportunist wing of our Party? This question might be formulated otherwise as follows: a squabble or a political Party struggle? Of the three of us who on the day after the Congress were the sole available members of the central institutions, Glebov inclined most to the former answer and made the most efforts to reconcile the children who had fallen out. Comrade Plekhanov inclined most to the latter answer and was, as the saying goes, neither to hold nor to bind. I on this occasion acted the part of "Centre", or "Marsh", and endeavoured to employ persuasion. To try at this date to recall the spoken attempts at persuasion would be a hopelessly muddled business, and I shall not follow the bad example of Comrade Martov and Comrade Plekhanov. But I do consider it necessary to reproduce certain passages from one written attempt at persuasion which I addressed to one of the "minority" *Iskra*-ists:

"...The refusal of Martov to serve on the editorial board, his refusal and that of other Party writers to collaborate, the refusal of a number of persons to work on the Central Committee, and the propaganda of a boycott or passive resistance are bound to lead, even if against the wishes of Martov and his friends, to a split in the Party. Even if Martov adheres to a loyal stand (which he took up so resolutely at the Congress), others will not, and the outcome I have mentioned will be inevitable....

"And so I ask myself: over what, in point of fact, would we be parting company?... I go over all the events and impressions of the Congress; I realise that I often behaved

* If little things may be compared to big.—*Ed.*

and acted in a state of frightful irritation, 'frenziedly'; I am quite willing to admit this fault of mine to anyone, if that can be called a fault which was a natural product of the atmosphere, the reactions, the interjections, the struggle, etc. But examining now, quite unfrenziedly, the results attained, the outcome achieved by frenzied struggle, I can detect nothing, absolutely nothing in these results that is injurious to the Party, and absolutely nothing that is an affront or insult to the minority.

"Of course, the very fact of finding oneself in the minority could not but be vexatious, but I categorically protest against the idea that we 'cast slurs' on anybody, that we *wanted* to insult or humiliate anybody. Nothing of the kind. And one should not allow political differences to lead to an interpretation of events based on accusing the other side of unscrupulousness, chicanery, intrigue, and the other nice things we are hearing mentioned more and more often in this atmosphere of an impending split. This should not be allowed, for it is, to say the least, the *nec plus ultra* of irrationality.

"Martov and I have had a political (and organisational) difference, as we had dozens of times before. Defeated over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, I could not but strive with all my might for *revanche* in what remained to me (and to the Congress). I could not but strive, on the one hand, for a strictly *Iskra*-ist Central Committee, and, on the other, for a trio on the editorial board.... I consider this trio the *only* one capable of being an official institution, instead of a body based on indulgence and slackness, the only one to be a real centre, each member of which would always state and defend his Party viewpoint, not one grain more, and irrespective of all personal considerations and all fear of giving offence, of resignations, and so on.

"This trio, after what had occurred at the Congress, undoubtedly meant legitimising a political and organisational line in one respect directed against Martov. Undoubtedly. Cause a rupture on that account? Break up the Party because of it?? Did not Martov and Plekhanov oppose me over the question of demonstrations? And did not Martov and I oppose Plekhanov over the question of the programme? Is not one side of every trio always up against the other

two? If the majority of the *Iskra*-ists, both in the *Iskra* organisation and at the Congress, found this particular shade of Martov's line organisationally and politically mistaken, is it not really senseless to attempt to attribute this to 'intrigue', 'incitement', and so forth? Would it not be senseless to try to talk away this fact by *abusing* the majority and calling them 'riffraff'?

"I repeat that, like the majority of the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress, I am profoundly convinced that the line Martov adopted was wrong, and that he had to be corrected. To take offence at this correction, to regard it as an insult, etc., is unreasonable. We have not cast, and are not casting, any 'slurs' on anyone, nor are we excluding anyone *from work*. And to cause a split because someone has been excluded *from a central body* seems to me a piece of inconceivable folly."*

I have thought it necessary to recall these written statements of mine now, because they *conclusively* prove that the majority wanted to draw a definite line *at once* between possible (and in a heated struggle inevitable) personal grievances and personal irritations caused by biting and "frenzied" attacks, etc., on the one hand, and a definite political mistake, a definite political line (coalition with the Right wing), on the other.

These statements prove that the *passive resistance* of the minority *began immediately after the Congress* and-at once evoked from us the warning that it was a *step towards splitting the Party*; the warning that it ran directly counter to their *declarations of loyalty at the Congress*; that the split would be solely over the *fact of exclusion from the central institutions* (that is, non-election to them), for nobody ever thought of excluding any Party member *from work*; and that our political difference (an inevitable difference, inasmuch as it had not yet been elucidated and settled which line at

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* This letter (to A. N. Potresov, of August 31 [September 13], 1903—*Ed.*) was written in *September* (New Style). I have only omitted what seemed to me irrelevant to the matter in hand. If the addressee considers what I have omitted important, he can easily repair the omission. Incidentally, let me take this opportunity to say that any of my opponents may publish any of my private letters should they think a useful purpose will be served by it.

the Congress was mistaken, Martov's or ours) was being *perverted more and more into a squabble*, accompanied by abuse, suspicions, and so on and so forth.

But the warnings were in vain. The behaviour of the minority showed that the least stable elements among them, those who *least valued the Party*, were gaining the upper hand. This compelled Plekhanov and me to withdraw the consent we had given to Glebov's proposal. For if the minority were demonstrating by their *deeds* their political instability not only as regards principles, but even as regards *elementary Party loyalty*, what value could be attached to their *talk* about this celebrated "continuity"? Nobody scoffed more wittily than Plekhanov at the utter absurdity of demanding the "co-optation" to the Party editorial board of a majority consisting of people who frankly proclaimed their new and growing differences of opinion! Has there ever been a case in the world of a party majority on the central institutions converting itself into a minority of its own accord, *prior to the airing* of *new* differences in the press, in full view of the Party? Let the differences first be stated, let the Party judge how profound and important they were, let the Party itself correct the mistake it had made at the Second Congress, should it be shown that it had made a mistake! The very fact that such a demand was made *on the plea* of differences still unknown demonstrated the utter instability of those who made it, the complete submersion of political differences by squabbling, and their entire disrespect both for the Party as a whole and for their own convictions. Never have there been, nor will there be, persons of *convinced principle* who refuse to try to *convince* before they secure (*privately*) a majority in the institution they want to bring round to their standpoint.

Finally, on October 4, Comrade Plekhanov announced that he would make a *last* attempt to put an end to this absurd state of affairs A meeting was called of all the six members of the old editorial board, attended by a new member of the Central Committee.* Comrade Plekhanov

* This Central Committee member[109] arranged, in addition, a number of private and collective talks with the minority, in which he refuted the preposterous tales that were being spread and appealed to their sense of Party duty.

spent three whole hours proving how unreasonable it was to demand "co-optation" of four of the "minority" to two of the "majority". He proposed *co-opting two of them*, so as, on the one hand, to remove all fears that we wanted to "bully", suppress, besiege, behead or bury anyone, and, on the other, to safeguard the rights and position of the Party "majority". *The co-optation of two was likewise rejected.*

On October 6, Plekhanov and I wrote the following official letter to all the old editors of *Iskra* and to Comrade Trotsky, one of its contributors:

"Dear Comrades,

"The editorial board of the Central Organ considers it its duty officially to express its regret at your withdrawal from participation in *Iskra* and *Zarya*. In spite of the repeated invitations to collaborate which we made to you immediately following the Second Party Congress and several times after, we have not received a single contribution from you. The editors of the Central Organ declare that your withdrawal from participation is not justified by anything they have done. No personal irritation should serve, of course, as an obstacle to your working on the Central Organ of the Party. If, on the other hand, your withdrawal is due to any differences of opinion with us, we would consider it of the greatest benefit to the Party if you were to set forth these differences at length. More, we would consider it highly desirable for the nature and depth of these differences to be explained to the whole Party as early as possible in the columns of the publications of which we are the editors."*

As the reader sees, it was still quite unclear to us whether the actions of the "minority" were principally governed by personal irritation or by a desire to steer the organ (and the Party) along a *new course*, and if so, what course exactly. I think that if we were even now to set seventy wise men

* The letter to Comrade Martov contained in addition a reference to a certain pamphlet and the following sentence: "Lastly, we once more inform you, in the interests of the work, that we are still prepared to co-opt you to the editorial board of the Central Organ, in order to give you every opportunity officially to state and defend your views in the supreme institution of the Party."

to elucidate this question with the help of any literature or any testimony you like, they too could make nothing of this tangle. I doubt whether a squabble can ever be disentangled: you have either to cut it, or set it aside.*

Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Trotsky, and Koltsov sent a couple of lines in reply to this letter of October 6, to the effect that the undersigned were taking no part in *Iskra* since its passage into the hands of the new editorial board. Comrade Martov was more communicative and honoured us with the following reply:

"To the Editorial Board of the, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

"Dear Comrades,

"In reply to your letter of October 6 I wish to state the following: I consider all our discussions on the subject of working together on one organ at an end after the conference which took place in the presence of a Central Committee member on October 4, and at which you refused to state the reasons that induced you to withdraw your proposal to us that Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, and I should join the editorial board on condition that we undertook to elect Comrade Lenin our 'representative' on the Council. After you repeatedly evaded at this conference formulating the statements you had yourselves made in the presence of witnesses, I do not think it necessary to explain in a letter to you my motives for refusing to work on *Iskra* under present conditions. Should the need arise, I shall explain them in detail to the whole Party, which will already be able to learn from the minutes of the Second Congress why I rejected the proposal, which you now repeat, that I accept a seat on the editorial board and on the Council....**

"*L. Martov*"

This letter, in conjunction with the previous documents, clarifies beyond any possible dispute that question of boycott, disorganisation, anarchy, and preparations for a split which Comrade Martov (with the help of exclamation marks and rows of dots) so assiduously evades in his *State of Siege*—the question of loyal and disloyal methods of struggle.

Comrade Martov and the others are *invited* to set forth their differences, they are *asked* to tell us plainly what the trouble is all about and what their intentions are, they are *exhorted* to stop sulking and to analyse calmly the mis-

* Comrade Plekhanov would probably add: "or satisfy *each and every claim* of the initiators of the squabble". We shall see why this was impossible.

** I omit what Martov replied in reference to his pamphlet, then being republished.

take made over Paragraph 1 (which is intimately connected with their mistake in swinging to the Right)—but Comrade Martov and Co. *refuse to talk*, and cry: "We are being besieged! We are being bullied!" The jibe about "dreadful words" has not cooled the ardour of these comical outcries.

How is it possible to *besiege* someone who r*efuses to work together with you*?—we asked Comrade Martov. How is it possible to ill-treat, "bully", and oppress a minority which *refuses to be a minority*? Being in the minority necessarily and inevitably involves certain disadvantages. These disadvantages are that you either have to join a body which will outvote you on certain questions, or you stay outside that body and attack it, and consequently come under the fire of well-mounted batteries.

Did Comrade Martov's cries about a "state of siege" mean that those in the minority were being fought or governed unfairly and unloyally? *Only* such an assertion could have contained even a grain of sense (in Martov's eyes), for, I repeat, being in the minority necessarily and inevitably involves certain disadvantages. But the whole comedy of the matter is that Comrade Martov *could not be fought at all* as long as he refused to talk! The minority *could not be governed at all* as long as they refused to be a minority!

Comrade Martov could not cite *a single fact* to show that the editorial board of the Central Organ had exceeded or abused its powers while Plekhanov and I were on it. Nor could the practical workers of the minority cite *a single fact* of a like kind with regard to the Central Committee. However Comrade Martov may now twist and turn in his *State of Siege*, it remains absolutely incontrovertible that *the outcries about a state of siege were nothing but "feeble whining"*.

How utterly Comrade Martov and Co. lacked *sensible* arguments against the editorial board appointed by the Congress is best of all shown by their own catchword: "We are not serfs!" (*State of Siege*, p. 34.) The mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, who counts himself among the "elect minds" standing above mass organisation and mass discipline, is expressed here with remarkable clarity. To *explain* their refusal to work in the Party by saying that they "are not serfs" is *to give themselves away completely*,

to confess to a total lack of arguments, an utter inability to furnish any motives, any sensible reasons for dissatisfaction. Plekhanov and I declare that their refusal is not justified by anything we have done; we request them to set forth their differences; and all they reply is: "We are not serfs" (adding that no bargain has yet been reached on the subject of co-optation).

To the individualism of the intellectual, which already manifested itself in the controversy over Paragraph 1, revealing its tendency to opportunist argument and anarchistic phrase-mongering; *all* proletarian organisation and discipline seems to be *serfdom*. The reading public will soon learn that in the eyes of these "Party members" and Party "officials" even a new *Party Congress* is a serf institution that is terrible and abhorrent to the "elect minds".... This "institution" is indeed terrible to people who are not averse to making use of the Party title but are conscious that this title of theirs *does not accord* with the interests and will of the Party.

The committee resolutions enumerated in my letter to the editors of the new *Iskra*, and published by Comrade Martov in his *State of Siege*, show with facts that the behaviour of the minority amounted all along to sheer *disobedience* of the decisions of the Congress and *disorganisation* of positive practical work. Consisting of opportunists and people who detested *Iskra*, the minority strove to *rend the Party* and damaged and disorganised its work, thirsting to avenge their defeat at the Congress and sensing that by *honest and loyal* means (by explaining their case in the press or at a congress) they would *never* succeed in refuting the accusation of opportunism and intellectualist instability which at the Second Congress had been levelled against them. Realising that they could not *convince* the Party, they tried to gain their ends by *disorganising* the Party and *hampering all its work*. They were reproached with having (by their mistakes at the Congress) caused a crack in our pot; they replied to the reproach by trying *with all their might* to *smash* the pot *altogether*.

So distorted had their ideas become that boycott and refusal to work were proclaimed to be "*honest** methods"

* Mining Area resolution (*State of Siege*, p. 38).

of struggle. Comrade Martov is now wriggling all around this delicate point. Comrade Martov is such a "man of principle" that he defends boycott ... when practised by the minority, but condemns boycott when, his side happening to have become the majority, it threatens Martov himself!

We need not, I think, go into the question whether this is a squabble or a "difference of principle" as to what are honest methods of struggle in a Social-Democratic workers' party.

After the unsuccessful attempts (of October 4 and 6) to obtain an explanation from the comrades who had started the "co-optation" row, nothing remained for the central institutions but to wait and see what would come of their verbal assurances that they would adhere to loyal methods of struggle. On October 10, the Central Committee addressed a circular letter to the League (see League Minutes, pp. 3-5), announcing that it was engaged in drafting Rules for the League and inviting the League members to assist. The Administration of the League had at that time decided against a congress of that body (by two votes to one; *ibid.*, p. 20). The replies received from minority supporters to this circular showed at once that the celebrated promise to be loyal and abide by the decisions of the Congress was just talk, and that, as a matter of fact, the minority had positively decided *not to obey* the central institutions of the Party, replying to their appeals to collaborate with *evasive excuses* full of sophistry and *anarchistic* phrase-mongering. In reply to the famous open letter of Deutsch, a member of the Administration (p. 10), Plekhanov, myself, and other supporters of the majority expressed our vigorous "protest against the gross violations of Party discipline by which an official of the League permits himself to hamper the organisational activities of a Party institution and calls upon other comrades likewise to violate discipline and the Rules. Remarks such as, 'I do not consider myself at liberty to take part in such work on the invitation of the Central Committee', or, 'Comrades, we must on no account allow it [The Central Committee] to draw up new Rules for the League', etc., are agitational methods of a kind that can

only arouse disgust in anyone who has the slightest conception of the meaning of the words party, organisation, and party discipline. Such methods are all the more disgraceful for the fact that they are being used against a newly created Party institution and are therefore an undoubted attempt to undermine confidence in it among Party comrades, and that, moreover, they are being employed under the cachet of a member of the League Administration and behind the back of the Central Committee." (P. 17.)

Under such conditions, the League Congress promised to be nothing but a brawl.

From the outset, Comrade Martov continued his Congress tactics of "getting personal", this time with Comrade Plekhanov, by distorting private conversations. Comrade Plekhanov protested, and Comrade Martov was obliged to withdraw his accusations (League Minutes, pp. 39 and 134), which were a product of either irresponsibility or resentment.

The time for the report arrived. I had been the League's delegate at the Party Congress. A mere reference to the summary of my report (p. 43 et seq.)* will show the reader that I gave a rough outline of that analysis of the voting at the Congress which, in greater detail, forms the contents of the present pamphlet. The central feature of the report was precisely the proof that, owing to their mistakes, Martov and Co. had landed in the opportunist wing of our Party. Although this report was made to an audience whose majority consisted of violent opponents, they could discover absolutely nothing in it which departed from loyal methods of Party struggle and controversy.

Martov's report, on the contrary, apart from minor 'corrections' to particular points of my account (the incorrectness of these corrections we have shown above), was nothing but—a product of disordered nerves.

No wonder that the majority refused to carry on the fight in this atmosphere. Comrade Plekhanov entered a protest against the "*scene*" (p. 68)—it was indeed a regular "scene"!—and withdrew from the Congress without stating the objections he had already prepared on the substance of the report. Nearly all the other supporters of the majority

* See pp. 73-83 of this volume.—*Ed.*

also withdrew from the Congress, after filing a written protest against the "unworthy behaviour" of Comrade Martov (League Minutes, p. 75).

The methods of struggle employed by the minority became perfectly clear to all. We had accused the minority of committing a political mistake at the Congress, of having swung towards opportunism, of having formed a coalition with the Bundists, the Akimovs, the Brouckères, the Egorovs, and the Makhovs. The minority had been defeated at the Congress and they had now "worked out" *two* methods of struggle, embracing all their endless variety of sorties, assaults, attacks, etc.

First method—disorganising all the activity of the Party, damaging the work, hampering all and everything "without statement of reasons".

Second method—making "scenes", and so on and so forth.*

This "second method of struggle" is also apparent in the League's famous resolutions of "principle", in the discussion of which the "majority", of course, took no part. Let us examine these resolutions, which Comrade Martov has reproduced in his *State of Siege*.

The first resolution, signed by Comrades Trotsky, Fomin, Deutsch, and others, contains two theses directed against the "majority" of the Party Congress: 1) "The League expresses its profound regret that, owing to the manifestation at the Congress of tendencies which essentially run counter to the earlier policy of *Iskra*, due care was not given in drafting the Party Rules to providing sufficient safeguards of the independence and authority of the Central Committee." (League Minutes, p. 83.)

As we have already seen, this thesis of "principle" amounts to nothing but *Akimov* phrase-mongering, the *opportunist* character of which was exposed at the Party Congress *even* by Comrade Popov! In point of fact, the claim that the

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* I have already pointed out that it would be unwise to attribute to sordid motives even the most sordid manifestations of the squabbling that is so habitual in the atmosphere of émigré and exile colonies. It is a sort of epidemic disease engendered by abnormal conditions of life, disordered nerves, and so on. I *had* to give a true picture of this system of struggle here, because Comrade Martov has *again resorted to it in its full scope in his "State of Siege"*.

"majority" did not mean to safeguard the independence and authority of the Central Committee was never anything but gossip. It need only be mentioned that when Plekhanov and I were on the editorial board, *there was on the Council no predominance* of the Central Organ over the Central Committee, but when the Martovites joined the editorial board, the Central Organ *secure*d predominance over the Central Committee on the Council! When we were on the editorial board, *practical workers in Russia predominated* on the Council over writers residing abroad; since the Martovites took over, the contrary has been the case. When we were on the editorial board, the Council *never once* attempted to interfere in any *practical* matter; since the unanimous co-optation *such interference has begun*, as the reading public will learn in detail in the near future.

Next thesis of the resolution we are examining: "...when constituting the official central bodies of the Party, the Congress ignored the need for maintaining continuity with the actually existing central bodies...."

This thesis boils down to nothing but the question of the *personal* composition of the central bodies. The "minority" preferred to evade the fact that at the Congress the old central bodies had proved their unfitness and committed a number of mistakes. But most comical of all is the reference to "continuity" with respect to the Organising Committee. At the Congress, as we have seen, nobody even hinted that the entire membership of the Organising Committee should be endorsed. At the Congress, Martov actually cried in a frenzy that a list containing three members of the Organising Committee was defamatory to him. At the Congress, the *final* list proposed by the "minority" contained *one* member of the Organising Committee (*Popov*, Glebov or Fomin, and Trotsky), whereas the list the "majority" put through contained *two* members of the Organising Committee out of three (*Travinsky*, *Vasilyev*, and Glebov). We ask, can this reference to "continuity" really be considered a "difference of principle"?

Let us pass to the other resolution, which was signed by four members of the old editorial board, headed by Comrade Axelrod. Here we find all those major accusations against the "majority" which have subsequently been re-

peated many times in the press. They can most conveniently be examined as formulated by the members of the editorial circle. The accusations are levelled against "the system of autocratic and bureaucratic government of the Party", against "bureaucratic centralism", which, as distinct from "genuinely Social-Democratic centralism", is defined a~ follows: it "places in the forefront, not internal union, but external, formal unity, achieved and maintained by purely mechanical means, by the systematic suppression of individual initiative an independent social activity"; it is therefore "by its very nature incapable of organically uniting the component elements of society".

What "society" Comrade Axelrod and Co. are here referring to, heaven alone knows. Apparently, Comrade Axelrod was not quite clear himself whether he was penning a Zemstvo address on the subject of desirable government reforms, or pouring forth the complaints of the "minority". What *is the implication* of "autocracy" in the Party, about which the dissatisfied "editors" clamour? Autocracy means the supreme, uncontrolled, non-accountable, non-elective rule of one individual. We know very well from the literature of the "minority" that by autocrat they mean *me*, and no one else. When the resolution in question was being drafted and adopted, I was on the Central Organ together with Plekhanov. Consequently, Comrade Axelrod and Co. were expressing the conviction that Plekhanov and all the members of the Central Committee "governed the Party", not in accordance with their own views of what the interests of the work required, but in accordance with the *will* of the autocrat Lenin. This accusation of autocratic government necessarily and inevitably implies pronouncing all members of the governing body except the autocrat to be mere tools in the hands of another, mere pawns and agents of another's will. And once again we ask, is this really a "difference of principle" on the part of the highly respected Comrade Axelrod?

Further, what external, formal unity are they here talking about, our "Party members" just returned from a Party Congress whose decisions they have solemnly acknowledged valid? Do they know of any other method of achieving unity in a party organised on any at all durable basis, except

a party Congress? If they do, why have they not the courage to declare frankly that they no longer regard the Second Congress as valid? Why do they not try to tell us their new ideas and new methods of achieving unity in a supposedly organised party?

Further, what "suppression of individual initiative" are they talking about, our individualist intellectuals whom the Central Organ of the Party has just been *exhorting* to set forth their differences, but who *instead* have engaged in bargaining about "co-optation"? And, in general, how could Plekhanov and I, or the Central Committee, have suppressed the initiative and independent activity of people who refused to engage in *any* "activity" in conjunction with us? How can anyone be "suppressed" in an institution or body in which he *refuses to have any part*? How could the unelected editors complain of a "system of government" when they refused to "*be governed*"? We *could not* have committed *any* errors in directing our comrades for the simple reason that they never worked under our direction at all.

It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a fig-leaf to cover up the violation of a pledge solemnly given at the Congress. You are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the Congress not in accordance with my wishes, but against them; you are a formalist because you take your stand on the formal decisions of the Congress, and not on my consent; you are acting in a grossly mechanical way because you cite the "mechanical" majority at the Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the old snug little band who insist on their circle "continuity" all the more because they do not like the explicit disapproval of this circle spirit by the Congress.

These cries about bureaucracy have never had any *real* meaning except the one I have indicated.* And this method of struggle only proves once again the intellectualist instability of the minority. They wanted to convince the Party that

* It is enough to point out that Comrade Plekhanov ceased to be a supporter of "bureaucratic centralism" in the eyes of the minority once he put through the beneficent co-optation.

the selection of the central bodies was unfortunate. And how did they go about it? By criticism of *Iskra* as conducted by Plekhanov and me? No, that they were unable to offer. The method they used consisted in the refusal of a section of the Party to work under the direction of the hated central bodies. But no central institution of any party in the world can ever prove its ability to direct people who refuse to accept its direction. Refusal to accept the direction of the central bodies is tantamount to refusing to remain in the Party, it is tantamount to disrupting the Party; it is a method of *destroying*, not of convincing. And these efforts to destroy instead of convince show their lack of consistent principles, lack of faith in their own ideas.

They talk of bureaucracy. The word bureaucracy might be translated into Russian as concentration on place and position. Bureaucracy means subordinating the interests of the *work* to the interests of one's own *career*; it means focusing attention on *places* and ignoring the work itself; it means wrangling over *co-optation* instead of fighting for *ideas*. That bureaucracy of this kind is undesirable and detrimental to the Party is unquestionably true, and I can safely leave it to the reader to judge which of the two sides now contending in our Party is guilty of such bureaucracy.... They talk about grossly mechanical methods of achieving unity. Unquestionably, grossly mechanical methods are detrimental; but I again leave it to the reader to judge whether a grosser and more mechanical method of struggle of a new trend against an old one can be imagined than installing people in Party institutions before the Party has been convinced of the correctness of their new views, and before these views have even been set forth to the Party.

But perhaps the catchwords of the minority do mean something in principle, perhaps they do express some special group of ideas, irrespective of the petty and particular cause which undoubtedly started the "swing" in the present case? Perhaps if we were to set aside the wrangling over "co-optation", these catchwords might turn out to be an expression of a different system of views?

Let us examine the matter from this angle. Before doing so, we must place on record that the first to attempt such an examination was Comrade Plekhanov at the League,

who pointed out the minority's swing towards *anarchism* and *opportunism*, and that Comrade Martov (who is now highly offended because not everyone is ready to admit that his position is one of principle*) preferred *completely to ignore* this incident in his *State of Siege*.

At the League Congress the general question was raised as to whether Rules that the League or a committee may draw up for itself are valid without the Central Committee's endorsement, and even if the Central Committee refuses to endorse them. Nothing could be clearer, one would think: Rules are a formal expression of organisation, and, according to Paragraph 6 of our Party Rules, the right to organise committees is explicitly vested in the Central Committee; Rules define the limits of a committee's autonomy, and the decisive voice in defining those limits belongs to the central and not to a local institution of the Party. *That is elementary*, and it was sheer childishness to argue with such an air of profundity that "organising" does not always imply "endorsing Rules" (as if the League itself had not of its own accord expressed the wish to be organised on the basis of formal Rules). But Comrade Martov has forgotten (temporarily, let us hope) even the ABC of Social-Democracy. In his opinion, the demand that Rules should be endorsed only indicated that "the earlier, revolutionary *Iskra* centralism is being replaced by bureaucratic centralism" (League Minutes, p. 95), and there, in fact—Comrade Martov declared in the same speech—lay the "principle" at issue

* Nothing could be more comical than the new *Iskra*'s *grievance* that Lenin refuses to see any differences of principle, or denies them. If your attitude had been based more on principle, you would the sooner have examined my repeated statements that you have swung towards opportunism. If your position had been based more on principle, you could not well have degraded an ideological struggle to a squabble over places. You have only yourselves to blame, for you have yourselves done everything to make it impossible to regard you as men of principle. Take Comrade Martov, for example: when speaking, in his *State of Siege*, of the League Congress, he says nothing about the dispute with Plekhanov over anarchism, but instead informs us that Lenin is a super-centre, that Lenin has only to wink his eye to have the centre issue orders, that the Central Committee rode roughshod over the League, etc. I have no doubt that by picking his topic in this way, Comrade Martov displayed the profundity of his ideals and principles.

(p. 96)—a principle which he preferred to ignore in his *State of Siege*!

Comrade Plekhanov answered Martov at once, requesting that expressions like bureaucracy, Jack-in-office, etc., be refrained from as "detracting from the dignity of the Congress" (p. 96). There followed an interchange with Comrade Martov, who regarded these expressions as "a characterisation of a certain trend from the standpoint of principle". *At that time*, Comrade Plekhanov, like all the other supporters of the majority, took these expressions at their real value, clearly realising that they related exclusively to the realm, if we may so put it, of "co-optation", and not of principle. However, he deferred to the insistence of the Martovs and Deutsches (pp. 96-97) and proceeded to examine their supposed principles *from the standpoint of principle*. "If that were so," said he (that is, if the committees were autonomous in shaping their organisation, in drawing up their Rules), "they would be autonomous in relation to the whole, to the Party. That is not even a Bundist view, it is a downright anarchistic view. That is just how the anarchists argue: the rights of individuals are unlimited; they may conflict; every individual determines the limits of his rights for himself. The limits of autonomy should be determined not by the group itself, but by the whole of which it forms a part. The Bund was a striking instance of the violation of this principle. Hence, the limits of autonomy are determined by the Congress, or by the highest body set up by the Congress. The authority of the central institution should rest on moral and intellectual prestige. There I, of course, agree. Every representative of the organisation must be concerned for the moral prestige of its institution. But it does not follow that, while prestige is necessary, authority is not.... To counteroppose the power of authority to the power of ideas is anarchistic talk, which should have no place here" (p. 98). These propositions are as elementary as can be, they are in fact axioms, which it was strange even to put to the vote (p. 102) and which were called in question only because "concepts have now been confused" (loc. cit). But the minority's intellectualist individualism had, inevitably, driven them to the point of wanting to sabotage the Congress, to refuse to submit to the majority; and that wish could not be justi-

fied except by *anarchistic talk*. It is very amusing to note that the minority had nothing to offer in reply to Plekhanov but *complaints* of his use of excessively strong words, like opportunism, anarchism, and so forth. Plekhanov quite rightly poked fun at these complaints by asking why "the words Jaurèsism and anarchism are not permissible, and the words *lèse-majesté* and Jack-in-office are". No answer was given. This quaint sort of *quid pro quo* is always happening to Comrades Martov, Axelrod, and Co.: their new catchwords clearly bear the stamp of vexation; any reference to the fact offends them—they are, you see, men of principle; but, they are told, if you deny *on principle* that the part should submit to the whole, you are anarchists, and again they are offended!—the expression is too strong! In other words, they want to give battle to Plekhanov, but only on condition that he does not hit back in earnest!

How many times Comrade Martov and various other "Mensheviks"* have convicted me, no less childishly, of the following "contradiction". They quote a passage from *What Is To Be Done?* or *A Letter to a Comrade* which speaks of ideological influence, a struggle for influence, etc., and contrast it to the "bureaucratic" method of influencing by means of the Rules, to the "autocratic" tendency to rely on authority, and the like. How naïve they are! They have already forgotten that *previously* our Party was not a formally organised whole, but merely a sum of separate groups, and therefore no other relations except those of ideological influence were possible between these groups. *Now* we have become an organised Party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher ones. Why, it positively makes one uncomfortable to have to chew over such elementary things for the benefit of old associates, especially when one feels that at the bottom of it all is simply the minority's refusal to submit to the majority in the matter of the elections! But *from the standpoint of principle* these endless exposures of my contradictions boil down to *nothing but* anarchistic phrase-mongering. The

* From the Russian *menshinstvo*—"minority", as "Bolshevik" comes from *bolshinstvo*—"majority".—*Trans.*

new *Iskra* is not averse to enjoying the title and rights of a Party institution, but it does not want to submit to the majority of the Party.

If the talk about bureaucracy contains any principle at all, if it is not just an anarchistic denial of the duty of the part to submit to the whole, then what we have here is the *principle of opportunism*, which seeks to lessen the responsibility of individual intellectuals to the party of the proletariat, to lessen the influence of the central institutions, to enlarge the autonomy of the least steadfast elements in the Party, to reduce organisational relations to a purely platonic and verbal acceptance of them. We saw this at the Party Congress, where the Akimovs and Liebers made exactly the same sort of speeches about "monstrous" centralism as poured from the lips of Martov and Co. at the League Congress. That opportunism leads to the Martov and Axelrod "views" on organisation by its very nature, and not by chance, and not in Russia alone but the world over, we shall see later, when examining Comrade Axelrod's article in the new *Iskra*.

P. LITTLE ANNOYANCES SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A BIG PLEASURE

The League's rejection of the resolution declaring that its Rules must be endorsed by the Central Committee (League Minutes, p. 105) was, as the Party Congress majority at once unanimously noted, a "*crying violation of the Party Rules*". Regarded as the act of men of principle, this violation was sheer anarchism; while in the atmosphere of the post-Congress struggle, it inevitably created the impression that the Party minority were trying to "settle scores" with the Party majority (League Minutes, p. 112); it meant that they did not wish to obey the Party or to remain within the Party. And when the League refused to adopt a resolution on the Central Committee statement calling for changes in its Rules (pp. 124-25), it inevitably followed that this assembly, which wanted to *be counted* an assembly of a Party organisation but at the same time not to obey the Party's central institution, had to be pronounced *unlawful*. Accordingly, the followers of the Party majority at once

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

withdrew from this quasi-Party assembly, so as not to have any share in an indecent farce.

The individualism of the intellectual, with its platonic acceptance of organisational relations, which was revealed in the lack of steadfastness over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, thus in practice reached the logical end I had predicted even in September, that is, a month and a half before, namely, the point of *disrupting* the Party organisation. And at that moment, on the evening of the day the League Congress ended, Comrade Plekhanov announced to his colleagues on both the Party's central institutions that he could not bear to "fire on his comrades", that "rather than have a split, it is better to put a bullet in one's brain", and that, to avert a greater evil, it was necessary to make the maximum personal concessions, over which, in point of fact (much more than over the principles to be discerned-in the incorrect position on Paragraph 1), this destructive struggle was being waged. In order to give a more accurate characterisation of Comrade Plekhanov's right-about-face, which has acquired a certain general Party significance, I consider it advisable to rely not on private conversations, nor on private letters (that last resort in extremity), but on Plekhanov's own statement of the case to the whole Party, namely, his article "What Should Not Be Done" in No. 52 of *Iskra*, which was written just after the League Congress, after I had resigned from the editorial board of the Central Organ (November 1, 1903), and before the co-optation of the Martovites (November 26, 1903).

The fundamental idea of "What Should Not Be Done" is that in politics one must not be too stiff-necked, too harsh and unyielding; that it is sometimes necessary, to avoid a split, to yield even to revisionists (among those moving towards us or among the inconsistents) and to anarchistic individualists. It was only natural that these abstract generalities should arouse universal perplexity among *Iskra* readers. One cannot help laughing when reading the proud and majestic statements of Comrade Plekhanov (in subsequent articles) that he had not been understood because of the novelty of his ideas and because people lacked a knowledge of dialectics. In reality, "What Should Not Be Done" could only be understood, at the time it was written, by some

dozen people living in two Geneva suburbs whose names both begin with the same letter.[110] Comrade Plekhanov's misfortune was that he put into circulation among some ten thousand readers an agglomeration of hints, reproaches, algebraical symbols, and riddles which were intended only for these dozen or so people who had taken part in all the developments of the post-Congress struggle with the minority. This misfortune befell Comrade Plekhanov because he violated a basic principle of that dialectics to which he so unluckily referred, namely, that there is no abstract truth, that truth is always concrete. That is why it was out of place to lend an abstract form to the perfectly concrete idea of yielding to the Martovites after the League Congress.

Yielding—which Comrade Plekhanov advocated as a new war-cry—is legitimate and essential in two cases: when the yielder is convinced that those who are striving to make him yield are in the right (in which case honest political leaders frankly and openly admit their mistake), or when an irrational and harmful demand is yielded to in order to avert a greater evil. It is perfectly clear from the article in question that it is the latter case the author has in mind: he speaks plainly of yielding to revisionists and anarchistic individualists (that is, to the Martovites, as every Party member now knows from the League Minutes), and says that it is essential in order to avert a split. As we see, Comrade Plekhanov's supposedly novel idea amounts to no more than the not very novel piece of commonplace wisdom that little annoyances should not be allowed to stand in the way of a big pleasure, that a little opportunist folly and a little anarchistic talk is better than a big Party split. When Comrade Plekhanov wrote this article he clearly realised that the minority represented the opportunist wing of our Party and that they were fighting with anarchistic weapons. Comrade Plekhanov came forward with the plan to combat this minority by means of personal concessions, just as (again *si licet parva componere magnis*) the German Social-Democrats combated Bernstein. Bebel publicly declared at congresses of his Party that he did not know anyone who was so susceptible to the influence of environment as Comrade Bernstein (not Mr. Bernstein, as Comrade Plekhanov was once so fond of calling him, but Comrade Bernstein): let us

take him into our environment, let us make him a member of the Reichstag, let us combat revisionism, not by inappropriate harshness (*à la* Sobakevich-Parvus) towards the revisionist, but by "killing him with kindness"—as Comrade M. Beer, I recall, put it at a meeting of English Social-Democrats when defending German conciliatoriness, peaceableness, mildness, flexibility, and caution against the attack of the English Sobakevich—Hyndman. And in just the same way, Comrade Plekhanov wanted to "kill with kindness" the little anarchism and the little opportunism of Comrades Axelrod and Martov. True, while hinting quite plainly at the "anarchistic individualists", Comrade Plekhanov expressed himself in a deliberately vague way about the revisionists; he did so in a manner to create the impression that he was referring to the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, who were swinging from opportunism towards orthodoxy, and not to Axelrod and Martov, who had begun to swing *from orthodoxy towards revisionism*. But this was only an innocent military ruse,* a feeble bulwark that was incapable of withstanding the artillery fire of Party publicity.

And anyone who acquaints himself with the actual state of affairs at the political juncture we are describing, anyone who gains an insight into Comrade Plekhanov's mentality, will realise that I could not have acted in this instance otherwise than I did. I say this for the benefit of those supporters of the majority who have reproached me for surrendering

* There was never any question after the Party Congress of making concessions to Comrades Martynov, Akimov, and Brouckère. I am not aware that they too demanded "co-optation". I even doubt whether Comrade Starover or Comrade Martov consulted Comrade Brouckère when they sent us their epistles and "notes" in the name of "half the Party".... At the League Congress Comrade Martov rejected, with the profound indignation of an unbending political stalwart, the very idea of a "union with Ryazanov or Martynov", of the possibility of a "deal" with them, or even of joint "service to the Party" (as an editor; League Minutes, D. 53). At the League Congress Comrade Martov sternly condemned "Martynov tendencies" (p. 88), and when Comrade Orthodox[111] subtly hinted that Axelrod and Martov no doubt "consider that Comrades Akimov, Martynov, and others also have the right to get together, draw up Rules for themselves, and act in accordance with them as they see fit" (p. 99), the Martovites denied it, as Peter denied Christ (p. 100: "Comrade Orthodox's fears" "regarding the Akimovs, Martynovs, etc.", "have no foundation").

the editorial board. When Comrade Plekhanov swung round after the League Congress and from being a supporter of the majority became a supporter of reconciliation at all costs, I was obliged to put the very best interpretation on it. Perhaps Comrade Plekhanov wanted in his article to put forward a programme for an amicable and honest peace? Any such programme boils down to a sincere admission of mistakes by both sides. What was the mistake Comrade Plekhanov laid at the door of the majority? An inappropriate, Sobakevich-like, harshness towards the revisionists. We do not know what Comrade Plekhanov had in mind by that: his witticism about the asses, or his extremely incautious—in Axelrod's presence—reference to anarchism and opportunism. Comrade Plekhanov preferred to express himself "abstractly", and, moreover, with a hint at the other fellow. That is a matter of taste, of course. But, after all, I had admitted my personal harshness openly both in the letter to the *Iskra*-ist and at the League Congress. How then could I refuse to admit that the majority were guilty of such a "mistake"? As to the minority, Comrade Plekhanov pointed to their mistake quite clearly, namely, revisionism (cf. his remarks about opportunism at the Party Congress and about Jaurèsism at the League Congress) and anarchism which had led to the verge of a split. Could I obstruct an attempt to secure an acknowledgement of these mistakes and undo their harm by means of personal concessions and "kindness" in general? Could I obstruct such an attempt when Comrade Plekhanov in "What Should Not Be Done" directly appealed to us to "*spare the adversaries*" among the revisionists who were revisionists "only because of a certain inconsistency"? And if I did not believe in this attempt, could I do otherwise than make a personal concession regarding the Central Organ and move over to the Central Committee in order to defend the position of the majority?* I could not absolutely deny

* Comrade Martov put it very aptly when he said that I had moved over *avec armes et bagages*. Comrade Martov is very fond of military metaphors: campaign against the League, engagement, incurable wounds, etc., etc. To tell the truth, I too have a great weakness for military metaphors, especially just now, when one follows the news from the Pacific with such eager interest. But, Comrade Martov, if we are to use military language, the story goes like this. We capture two forts at the Party Congress. You attack them at the League Congress.

the feasibility of such attempts and take upon myself the full onus for the threatening split, if only because I had myself been inclined, in the letter of October 6, to attribute the wrangle to "personal irritation". But I did consider, and still consider, it my political duty to defend the position of the majority. To rely in this on Comrade Plekhanov would have been difficult and risky, for everything went to show that he was prepared to interpret his dictum that "a leader of the proletariat has no right to give rein to his warlike inclinations when they run counter to political good sense" —to interpret it in a dialectical way to mean that if you had to fire, then it was better sense (considering the state of the weather in Geneva in November) to fire at the majority.... To defend the majority's position was essential, because, when dealing with the question of the free (?) will of a revolutionary, Comrade Plekhanov—in defiance of dialectics, which demands a concrete and comprehensive examination—modestly evaded the question of *confidence in a revolutionary*, of confidence in a "leader of the proletariat" who was leading a definite wing of the Party. When speaking of anarchistic individualism and advising us to close our eyes "at times" to violations of discipline and to yield "sometimes" to intellectualist license, which "is rooted in a sentiment that has nothing to do with devotion to the revolutionary idea", Comrade Plekhanov apparently forgot that we must also reckon with the free will of the majority of the Party, and that it must be left *to the practical workers* to determine the *extent* of the concessions to be made to the anarchistic individualists. Easy as it is to fight childish anarchistic nonsense on the literary plane, it is very difficult to carry on practical work in the same organisation with an anarchistic individualist. A writer who took it upon himself to determine the extent of the concessions that might be made to anarchism

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After the first brief interchange of shots, my colleague, the commandant of one of the forts, opens the gates to the enemy. Naturally, I gather together the little artillery I have and move into the other fort, which is practically unfortified, in order to "stand siege" against the enemy's overwhelming numbers. I even make an offer of peace, for what chance do I stand against two powers? But in reply to my offer, the new allies bombard my last fort. I return the fire. Whereupon my former colleague—the commandant—exclaims in magnificent indignation: "Just look, good people, how bellicose this Chamberlain is!"

in practice would only be betraying his inordinate and truly doctrinaire literary conceit. Comrade Plekhanov majestically remarked (for the sake of importance, as Bazarov[112] used to say) that if a new split were to occur the workers would cease to understand us; yet at the same time he initiated an endless stream of articles in the new *Iskra* whose real and concrete meaning was bound to be incomprehensible not only to the workers, but to the world at large. It is not surprising that when a member of the Central Committee read the proofs of "What Should Not Be Done" he warned Comrade Plekhanov that his plan to somewhat curtail the size of a certain publication (the minutes of the Party Congress and the League Congress) would be defeated by this very article, which would excite curiosity, offer for the judgement of the man in the street something that was piquant and at the same time quite incomprehensible to him,* and inevitably cause people to ask in perplexity: "What has happened?" It is not surprising that owing to the abstractness of its arguments and the vagueness of its hints, this article of Comrade Plekhanov's caused jubilation in the ranks of the enemies of Social-Democracy—the dancing of the *cancan* in the columns of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and ecstatic praises from the consistent revisionists in *Osvobozhdeniye*. The source of all these comical and sad misunderstandings, from which Comrade Plekhanov later tried so comically and so sadly to extricate himself, lay precisely in the violation of that basic principle of dialectics: concrete questions should be examined in all their concreteness. The delight of Mr. Struve, in particular, was quite natural: he was not in the least interested in the "good" aims (killing with kindness)

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* We are having a heated and passionate argument in private. Suddenly one of us jumps up, flings open the window, and begins to clamour against Sobakeviches, anarchistic individualists, revisionists, etc. Naturally, a crowd of curious idlers gathers in the street and our enemies rub their hands in glee. Other of the disputants go to the window too and want to give a coherent account of the whole matter, without hinting at things nobody knows anything about. Thereupon the window is banged to on the plea that it is not worth while discussing *squabbles* (*Iskra*, No. 53, p. 8, col. 2, line 24 up). It was not worth while *beginning in* "*Iskra*" on a discussion of "squabbles", Comrade Plekhanov[113]—that would be nearer the truth!

which Comrade Plekhanov pursued (but might not achieve); Mr. Struve welcomed, and could not but welcome, that *swing towards the opportunist wing of our Party* which had begun in the new *Iskra*, as everybody can now plainly see. The Russian bourgeois democrats are not the only ones to welcome every swing-towards opportunism, even the slightest and most temporary, in any Social-Democratic party. The estimate of a shrewd enemy is very rarely based on sheer misunderstanding: you can tell a man's mistakes by the people who praise him. And it is in vain that Comrade Plekhanov hopes the reader will be inattentive and tries to make out that the majority unconditionally objected to a personal concession in the matter of co-optation, and not to a desertion from the Left wing of the Party to the Right. The point is not that Comrade Plekhanov made a personal concession in order to avert a split (that was very praiseworthy), but that, though fully realising the need to *join issue* with the inconsistent revisionists and anarchistic individualists, he chose instead to join issue with the majority, with whom he parted company *over the extent* of the possible practical concessions to anarchism. The point is not that Comrade Plekhanov changed the personal composition of the editorial board, but that he betrayed his position of opposing revisionism and anarchism and ceased to defend that position in the Central Organ of the Party.

As to the Central Committee, which *at this time* was the sole organised representative of the majority, Comrade Plekhanov parted company with it then *exclusively over the possible extent of practical concessions to anarchism*. Nearly a month had elapsed since November 1, when my resignation had given a free hand to the policy of killing with kindness. Comrade Plekhanov had had every opportunity, through all sorts of contacts, to test the expedience of this policy. Comrade Plekhanov had in this period published his article "What Should Not Be Done", which was—*and remains*—the Martovites' sole ticket of admittance, so to speak, to the editorial board. The watchwords—revisionism (which we should contend with, but sparing the adversary) and anarchistic individualism (which should be courted and killed with kindness)—were printed on this ticket in imposing italics. Do come in, gentlemen, please, I will kill you

with kindness—is what Comrade Plekhanov said by this invitation card to his new colleagues on the editorial board. Naturally, all that remained to the Central Committee was to say its last word (that is what ultimatum means—a last word as to a possible peace) about what, in its opinion, was the permissible extent of practical concessions to anarchistic individualism. Either you want peace—in which case here are a certain number of seats to prove our kindness, peaceableness, readiness to make concessions, etc. (we cannot allow you any more if peace is to be guaranteed in the Party, peace not in the sense of an absence of controversy, but in the sense that the Party will not be destroyed by anarchistic individualism); take these seats and swing back again little by little from Akimov to Plekhanov. Or else you want to maintain and develop your point of view, to swing over altogether to Akimov (if only in the realm of organisational questions), and to convince the Party that you, not Plekhanov, are right—in which case form a writers' group of your own, secure representation at the next Congress, and set about winning a majority by an honest struggle, by open controversy. This alternative, which was quite explicitly submitted to the Martovites in the Central Committee ultimatum of November 25, 1903 (see *State of Siege* and *Commentary on the League Minutes**), was in full harmony with

* I shall not, of course, go into the tangle Martov created over this Central Committee ultimatum in his State of Siege by quoting private conversations and so on. This is the "second method of struggle" I described in the previous section, which only a specialist in nervous disorders could hope to disentangle. It is enough to say that Comrade Martov insists that there was an agreement with the Central Committee not to publish the negotiations, which agreement has not been discovered to this day in spite of a most assiduous search. Comrade Travinsky who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Central Committee, informed me in writing that he considered me entitled to publish my letter to the editors outside of *Iskra*.

But there was one phrase of Comrade Martov's that I particularly liked. That was the phrase "Bonapartism of the worst type." I find that Comrade Martov has brought in this category very appropriately. Let us examine dispassionately what the concept implies., In 'my opinion, it implies acquiring power by *formally* legal means, but *actually* in defiance of the will of the people (or of a party).' Is that not so, Comrade Martov? And if it is then I may safely leave it to the public to judge who has been guilty of this "Bonapartism of the

the letter Plekhanov and I had sent to the former editors on October 6, 1903: either it is a matter of personal irritation (in which case, *if the worst comes to the worst*, we might even "co-opt"), or it is a matter of a difference of principle (in which case you must *first* convince the Party, and only then talk about changing the personal composition of the central bodies). The Central Committee could the more readily leave it to the Martovites to make this delicate choice for themselves since *at this very time* Comrade Martov in his *profession de foi* (*Once More in the Minority*) wrote the following:

"*The minority lay claim to only one honour*, namely, to be the first in the history of our Party to show that one can be 'defeated' *and yet not form a new party*. This position of the minority follows from all their views on the organisational development of the Party; it follows from the consciousness of their strong ties with the Party's earlier work. The minority do not believe in the mystic power of 'paper revolutions', and see in the *deep roots* which their endeavours have *in life* a guarantee that *by purely ideological propaganda within the Party they will secure the triumph of their principles of organisation.*" (My italics.)

What proud and magnificent words! And how bitter it was to be taught by events that' they were—*merely words*.... I hope you will forgive me, Comrade Martov, but now *I claim on behalf of the majority* this "honour" which *you have not deserved*. The honour will indeed be a great one, one worth fighting for, for the circles have left us the tradition of an extraordinarily light-hearted attitude towards splits and an extraordinarily zealous application of the maxim: "either coats off, or let's have your hand!"

The big pleasure (of having a united Party) was bound to outweigh, and did outweigh, the little annoyances (in

worst type" Lenin and Comrade Y,[114] who might have availed themselves of their *formal* right not to admit the Martovites, but *did not avail themselves* of it, though in doing so they would have been backed by the will of the Second Congress—or those who occupied the editorial board by *formally legitimate means* ("unanimous co-optation"), but who knew that *actually this was not in accordance with the will of the Second Congress* and who are afraid to have this will tested at the Third Congress.

the shape of the squabbling over co-optation). I resigned from the Central Organ, and Comrade Y (who had been delegated by Plekhanov and myself to the Party Council on behalf of the editorial board of the Central Organ) resigned from the Council. The Martovites replied to the Central Committee's last word as to peace with a letter (see publications mentioned) which was tantamount to a declaration of war. Then, and only then, did I write my letter to the editorial board (*Iskra*, No. 53) on the subject of publicity.* If it comes to talking about revisionism and discussing inconsistency, anarchistic individualism, and the defeat of various leaders, then, gentlemen, let us tell all that occurred, without reservation—that was the gist of this letter about publicity. The editorial board replied with angry abuse and the lordly admonition: do not dare to stir up "*the pettiness and squabbling of circle life*" (*Iskra*, No. 53). Is that so, I thought to myself: "the pettiness and squabbling of circle life"?... Well, *es ist mir recht*, gentlemen, there I agree with you. Why, that means that you directly class all this fuss over "co-optation" as *circle squabbling*. That is true. But what discord is this?—in the editorial of this same issue, No. 53, this same editorial board (we must suppose) talks about bureaucracy, formalism, and the rest.** Do not dare to raise the question of the fight for co-optation to the Central Organ, for that would be squabbling. But we will raise the question of co-optation to the Central Committee, and will not call it squabbling, but a difference of principle on the subject of "formalism". No, dear comrades, I said to myself, permit me not to permit you that. You want to fire at my fort, and yet demand that I surrender my artillery. What jokers you are! And so I wrote and published outside of *Iskra* my *Letter to the Editors* (*Why I Resigned from the "Iskra" Editorial Board*),*** briefly relating what had really occurred, and asking yet again whether

* See pp. 114-17 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** As it subsequently turned out, the "discord" was explained very simply—it was a discord among the editors of the Central Organ. It was Plekhanov who wrote about "squabbling" (see his admission in "A Sad Misunderstanding", No. 57), while the editorial, "Our Congress", was written by Martov (*State of Siege*, p. 84). They were tugging in different directions.

*** See pp. 118-24 of this volume.—*Ed.*

peace was not possible on the basis of the following division: you take the Central Organ, we take the Central Committee. Neither side will then feel "alien" in the Party, and we will argue about the swing towards opportunism, first in the press, and then, perhaps, at the Third Party Congress.

In reply to this mention of peace the enemy opened fire with all his-batteries, including even the Council. ShelIs rained on my head. Autocrat, Schweitzer,[115] bureaucrat, formalist, supercentre, one-sided, stiff-necked, obstinate, narrow-minded, suspicious, quarrelsome.... Very well, my friends! Have you finished? You have nothing more in reserve? Poor ammunition, I must say....

Now comes my turn. Let us examine the *content* of the new *Iskra*'s new views on organisation and the relation of these views to that division of our Party into "majority" and "minority" the true character of which we have shown by our analysis of the debates and voting at the Second Congress.

Q. THE NEW *ISKRA*. OPPORTUNISM IN QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATION

As the basis for an analysis of the principles of the new *Iskra* we should unquestionably take the two articles of Comrade Axelrod.* The concrete meaning of some of his favourite catchwords has already been shown at length. Now we must try to leave their concrete meaning on one side and delve down to the line of thought that caused the "minority" to arrive (in connection with this or that minor and petty matter) at these particular slogans rather than any others, must examine the principles behind these slogans, irrespective of their origin, irrespective of the question of "co-optation". Concessions are all the fashion nowadays, so let us make a concession to Comrade Axelrod and take his "theory" "seriously".

Comrade Axelrod's basic thesis (*Iskra*, No. 57) is that "from the very outset our movement harboured two opposite trends, whose mutual antagonism could not fail to develop

* These articles were included in the collection "*Iskra*" *over Two Years*, Part II, p. 122 et seq. (St. Petersburg, 1906). (Author's note to 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

and to affect the movement parallel with its own development". To be specific: "In principle, the proletarian aim of the movement [in Russia] is the same as that of western Social-Democracy." But in our country the masses of the workers are influenced "by a social element alien to them", namely, the radical intelligentsia. And so, Comrade Axelrod establishes the existence of an antagonism between the proletarian and the radical-intellectual trend in our Party.

In this Comrade Axelrod is undoubtedly right. The existence of such an antagonism (and not in the Russian Social-Democratic Party alone) is beyond question. What is more, everyone knows that it is this antagonism that largely accounts for the division of present-day Social-Democracy into revolutionary (also known as orthodox) and opportunist (revisionist, ministerialist, reformist) Social-Democracy, which during the past ten years of our movement has become fully apparent in Russia too. Everyone also knows that the proletarian trend of the movement is expressed by orthodox Social-Democracy, while the trend of the democratic intelligentsia is expressed by opportunist Social-Democracy.

But, after so closely approaching this piece of common knowledge, Comrade Axelrod begins timidly to back away from it. He does not make *the slightest attempt* to analyse how this division manifested itself in the history of Russian Social-Democracy in general, and at our Party Congress in particular, although it is about the Congress that he is writing! Like all the other editors of the new *Iskra*, Comrade Axelrod displays a *mortal fear* of the minutes of this Congress. This should not surprise us after all that has been said above, but in a "theoretician" who claims to be investigating the different trends in our movement it is certainly a queer case of *truth-phobia*. Backing away, because of this malady, from the latest and most accurate material on the trends in our movement, Comrade Axelrod seeks salvation in the sphere of pleasant daydreaming. He writes: "Has not legal Marxism, or semi-Marxism, provided our liberals with a literary leader? Why should not prankish history provide revolutionary bourgeois democracy with a leader from the school of orthodox, revolutionary Marxism?" All we can say about this daydream which Comrade Axelrod

finds so pleasant is that if history does sometimes play pranks, that is no excuse for *pranks of thought* on the part of people who undertake to analyse history. When the liberal peeped out from under the cloak of the leader of semi-Marxism, those who wished (*and were able*) to trace his "trend" did not allude to possible pranks of history, but pointed to tens and hundreds of instances of that leader's mentality and logic, to alI those characteristics of his literary make-up which betrayed the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature.[116] And if Comrade Axelrod, setting out to analyse "the general-revolutionary and the proletarian trend in our movement", could produce *nothing*, *absolutely nothing*, in proof or evidence that certain representatives of that orthodox wing of the Party which he so detests showed such and such a trend, he thereby issued *a formal certificate of his own poverty*. Comrade Axelrod's case must be weak indeed if all he can do is allude to possible pranks of history!

Comrade Axelrod's other allusion—to the "Jacobins"—is still more revealing. Comrade Axelrod is probably aware that the division of present-day Social-Democracy into revolutionary and opportunist has long since given rise—and not only in Russia—to "historical parallels with the era of the great French Revolution". Comrade Axelrod is probably aware that the *Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy* everywhere and always resort to the terms "Jacobinism", "Blanquism", and so on to describe their opponents. Let us then not imitate Comrade Axelrod's truth-phobia, let us consult the minutes of our Congress and see whether they offer any material for an analysis and examination of the trends we are considering and the parallels we are discussing.

First example: the Party Congress debate on the programme. Comrade Akimov ("fully agreeing" with Comrade Martynov) says: "The clause on the capture of political power [the dictatorship of the proletariat] has been formulated in such a way—as compared with the programmes of all other Social-Democratic parties—that it may be interpreted, and actually has been interpreted by Plekhanov, to mean that the role of the leading organisation will relegate to-the background the class it is leading and separate the former from the latter. Consequently, the formulation of our polit-

ical tasks is exactly the same as in the case of Narodnaya Volya." (Minutes, p. 124.) Comrade Plekhanov and other *Iskra*-ists take issue with Comrade Akimov and accuse him of opportunism. Does not Comrade Axelrod find that this dispute shows us (in actual fact, and not-in the imaginary pranks of history) the antagonism between the *present-day Jacobins* and the present-day *Girondists* of Social-Democracy? And was it not because he found himself in the company of the *Girondists* of Social-Democracy (owing to the mistakes he committed) that Comrade Axelrod began talking about Jacobins?

Second example: Comrade Posadovsky declares that there is a "serious difference of opinion" over the "fundamental question" of "the absolute value of democratic principles" (p. 169). Together with Plekhanov, he denies their absolute value. The leaders of the "Centre" or Marsh (Egorov) and of the anti-*Iskra*-ists (Goldblatt) vehemently oppose this view and accuse Plekhanov of "imitating bourgeois tactics" (p. 170). *This is exactly Comrade Axelrod's idea of a connection between orthodoxy and the bourgeois trend*, the only difference being that in Axelrod's case it is vague and general, whereas Goldblatt linked it up with specific issues. Again we ask: does not Comrade Axelrod find that this dispute, too, shows us *palpably*, at our Party Congress, the antagonism between the Jacobins and the Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy? Is it not because he finds himself in the company of the Girondists that Comrade Axelrod raises this outcry against the Jacobins?

Third example: the debate on Paragraph 1 of the Rules. Who is it that defends "*the proletarian trend in our movement*"? Who is it that insists that the worker is not afraid of organisation, that the proletarian has no sympathy for anarchy, that he values the incentive to organise? Who is it that warns us against the bourgeois intelligentsia, permeated through and through with opportunism? *The Jacobins of Social-Democracy*. And who is it that tries to smuggle radical intellectuals in the Party? Who is it that is concerned about professors, high-school students, free lances, the radical youth? *The Girondist Axelrod together with the Girondist Lieber*.

How clumsily Comrade Axelrod defends himself against the "false accusation of opportunism" that at our Party Congress was openly levelled at the majority of the Emancipation of Labour group! By taking up the hackneyed Bernsteinian refrain about Jacobinism, Blanquism, and so on, he defends himself in a manner that only bears out the accusation! He shouts about the menace of the radical intellectuals in order to drown out his own speeches at the Party Congress, which were full of concern for these intellectuals.

These "dreadful words"—Jacobinism and the rest—are expressive of *opportunism* and nothing else. A Jacobin who wholly identities himself with the *organisation* of the proletariat—a proletariat *conscious* of its class interests—is a *revolutionary Social-Democrat*. A Girondist who sighs after professors and high-school students, who is afraid of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and who yearns for the absolute value of democratic demands is an *opportunist*. It is only opportunists who can still detect a danger in conspiratorial organisations today, when the idea of confining the political struggle to conspiracy has been refuted thousands of times in the press and has long been refuted and swept aside by the realities of life, and when the cardinal importance of mass political agitation has been elucidated and reiterated to the point of nausea. The real basis of this fear of conspiracy, of Blanquism, is not any feature to be found in the practical movement (as Bernstein and Co. have long, and vainly, been trying to make out), but the Girondist timidity of the bourgeois intellectual, whose mentality so often shows itself among the Social-Democrats of today. Nothing could be more comical than these laborious efforts of the new *Iskra* to utter a *new word* of warning (uttered hundreds of times before) against the tactics of the French conspirator revolutionaries of the forties and sixties (No. 62, editorial).[117] In the next issue of *Iskra*, the Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy will no doubt show us a group of French conspirators of the forties for whom the importance of political agitation among the working masses, the importance of the labour press as the principal means by which the party influences the class, was an elementary truth they had learned and assimilated long ago.

However, the tendency of the new *Iskra* to repeat the elements and go back to the ABC while pretending to be uttering something new is not fortuitous; it is an inevitable consequence of the situation Axelrod and Martov find themselves in, now that they have landed in the opportunist wing of our Party. There is nothing for it. They have to repeat the opportunist phrases, they have to *go back*, in order to try to find in the *remote past* some sort of justification for their position, which is indefensible from the point of view of the struggle at the Congress and of the shades and divisions in the Party that took shape there. To the Akimovite profundities about Jacobinism and Blanquism, Comrade Axelrod adds Akimovite lamentations to the effect that not only the "Economists", but the "politicians" as well, were "one-sided", excessively "infatuated", and so on and so forth. Reading the high-flown disquisitions on this subject in the new *Iskra*, which conceitedly claims to be above all this one-sidedness and infatuation, one asks in perplexity: whose portrait is it they are painting? where is it that they hear such talk?[118] Who does not know that the division of the Russian Social-Democrats into Economists and politicians has long been obsolete? Go through the files of *Iskra* for the last year or two before the Party Congress, and you will find that the fight against "Economism" subsided and came to an end altogether as far back as 1902; you will find, for example, that in July 1903 (No. 43), "the times of Economism" are spoken of as being "definitely over", Economism is considered "dead and buried", and any infatuations of the politicians are regarded as obvious atavism. Why, then, do the new editors, of *Iskra* revert to this dead and buried division? Did we fight the Akimovs at the Congress on account of the mistakes they made in *Rabocheye Dyelo* two years ago? If we had, we should have been sheer idiots. But everyone knows that we did not, that it was not for their old, dead and buried mistakes in *Rabocheye Dyelo* that we fought the Akimovs at the Congress, but for the *new mistakes* they committed in their arguments and their voting at the Congress. It was not by their stand in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, but by their stand at the Congress, that we judged which mistakes were really a thing of the past and which still lived and called for controversy. By the time of the Congress the

old division into Economists and politicians no longer existed; but various opportunist trends continued to exist. They found expression in the debates and voting on a number of issues, and finally led to a new division of the Party into "majority?" and "minority". The whole point is that the new editors of *Iskra* are, for obvious reasons, trying to gloss over the connection between this new division and *contemporary* opportunism in our Party, and are, in consequence, compelled to go back from the new division to the old one. Their inability to explain the political origin of the new division (or their desire, in order to prove how accommodating they are, to cast a veil* over its origin) compels them to keep harping on a division that has long been obsolete. Everyone knows that the new division is based on a difference over questions of *organisation*, which began with the controversy over principles of organisation (Paragraph 1 of the Rules) and ended up with a "practice" worthy of anarchists. The old division into Economists and politicians was based mainly on a difference over questions of *tactics*.

In its efforts to justify this retreat from the more complex, truly topical and burning issues of Party life to issues that have long been settled and have now been dug up artificially, the new *Iskra* resorts to an amusing display of profundity for which there can be no other name than tail-ism. Started by Comrade Axelrod, there runs like a a crimson thread through all the writing of the new *Iskra* the profound "idea" that content is more important than

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* See Plekhanov's article on "Economism" in No. 53 of *Iskra*. The subtitle of the article appears to contain a slight misprint. Instead of "Reflections on the Second Party Congress", it should apparently read, "on the *League* Congress", or even "on *Co-optation*". However appropriate concessions to personal claims may be under certain circumstances, it is quite inadmissible (from the Party, not the philistine standpoint) to confuse the issues that are agitating the Party and to substitute for the new mistake of Martov and Axelrod, who have begun to swing from orthodoxy towards opportunism, the old mistake (never recalled today by anyone except the new *Iskra*) of the Martynovs and Akimovs, who perhaps may now be prepared to swing from opportunism towards orthodoxy on many questions of programme and tactics.

form, that programme and tactics are more important than organisation, that "the vitality of an organisation is in direct proportion to the volume and value of the content it puts into the movement", that centralism is not an "end in itself", not an "all-saving talisman", etc., etc. Great and profound truths! The programme is indeed more important than tactics, and tactics more important than organisation. The alphabet is more important than etymology, and etymology more important than syntax—but what would we say of people who, after failing in an examination in syntax, went about pluming and priding themselves on being left in a lower class for another year? Comrade Axelrod argued about principles of organisation like an opportunist (Paragraph 1), and behaved inside the organisation like an anarchist (League Congress)—and now he is trying to render Social-Democracy more profound. Sour grapes! What is organisation, properly speaking? Why, it is only a form. What is centralism? After all, it is not a talisman. What is syntax? Why, it is less important than etymology; it is only the form of combining the elements of etymology.... "Will not Comrade Alexandrov agree with us," the new editors of *Iskra* triumphantly ask, "when we say that the Congress did much more for the centralisation of Party work by drawing up a Party programme than by adopting Rules, however perfect the latter may seem?" (No. 56, Supplement.) It is to be hoped that this classical utterance will acquire a historic fame no less wide and no less lasting than Comrade Krichevsky's celebrated remark that Social-Democracy, like mankind, always sets itself only such tasks as it can perform. For the new *Iskra*'s piece of profundity is of exactly the same stamp. Why was Comrade Krichevsky's phrase held up to derision? Because he tried to justify the mistake of a section of the Social-Democrats in matters of tactics—their inability to set correct political tasks—by a commonplace which he wanted to palm off as philosophy. In exactly the same way the new *Iskra* tries to justify the mistake of a section of the Social-Democrats in matters of organisation—the intellectualist instability of certain comrades, which has led them to the point of anarchistic phrase-mongering—by the commonplace that the programme is more important than the Rules, that questions of programme

are more important than questions of organisation! What is this but tail-ism? What is it but pluming oneself on having been left in a lower class for another year?

The adoption of a programme contributes more to the centralisation of the work than the adoption of Rules. How this commonplace, palmed off as philosophy, reeks of the mentality of the radical intellectual, who has much more in common with bourgeois decadence than with Social-Democracy! Why, the word centralisation is used in this famous phrase in a sense that is nothing but *symbolical*. If the authors of the phrase are unable or disinclined to think, they might at least have recalled the simple fact that the adoption of a programme together with the Bundists, far from leading to the centralisation of our common work, did not even save us from a split. Unity on questions of programme and tactics is an essential but by no means a sufficient condition for Party unity, for the centralisation of Party work (good God, what elementary things one has to spell out nowadays, when all concepts have been confused!). The latter requires, in addition, unity of organisation, which, in a party that has grown to be anything more than a mere family circle, is inconceivable without formal Rules, without the subordination of the minority to the majority and of the part to the whole. As long as we had no unity on the fundamental questions of programme and tactics, we bluntly admitted that we were living in a period of disunity and separate circles, we bluntly declared that before we could unite, lines of demarcation must be drawn; we did not even talk of the forms of a joint organisation, but exclusively discussed the new (at that time they really were new) problems of fighting opportunism on programme and tactics. At present, as we all agree, this fight has already produced a sufficient degree of unity, as formulated in the Party programme and the Party resolutions on tactics; we had to take the next step, and, by common consent, we did take it, working out the *forms* of a united organisation that would merge all the circles together. But now these forms have been half destroyed and we have been dragged back, dragged back to anarchistic conduct, to anarchistic phrases, to the revival of a circle in place of a Party editorial board. And this step back is being justified on the plea that the

alphabet is more helpful to literate speech than a knowledge of syntax!

The philosophy of tail-ism, which flourished three years ago in questions of tactics, is being resurrected today in relation to questions of organisation. Take the following argument of the new editors. "The militant Social-Democratic trend in the Party," says Comrade Alexandrov, "should be maintained not only by an ideological struggle, but by definite forms of organisation." Whereupon the editors edifyingly remark: "Not bad, this juxtaposition of ideological struggle and forms of organisation. The ideological struggle is a process, whereas the forms of organisation are only ... forms [believe it or not, that is what they say—No. 56, Supplement, p. 4, bottom of col. 1!] designed to clothe a fluid and developing content—the developing practical work of the Party." That is positively in the style of the joke about a cannon-ball being a cannon-ball and a bomb a bomb! The ideological struggle is a process, whereas the forms of organisation are only forms clothing the content! The point at issue is whether our ideological struggle is to have forms *of a higher type* to clothe it, the forms of a party organisation, binding on all, or the forms of the old disunity and the old circles. We have been dragged back from higher to more primitive forms, and this is being justified on the plea that the ideological struggle is a process, whereas forms—are only forms. That is just how Comrade Krichevsky in bygone days tried to drag us back from tactics-as-a-plan to tactics-as-a-process.

Take the new *Iskra*'s pompous talk about the "self-training of the proletariat", directed against those who are supposed to be in danger of missing the content because of the form (No. 58, editorial). Is this not Akimovism No. 2? Akimovism No. 1 justified the backwardness of a section of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia in formulating tactical tasks by talking about the more "profound" content of "the proletarian struggle" and the self-training of the proletariat. Akimovism No. 2 justifies the backwardness of a section of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia in the theory and practice of organisation by equally profound talk about organisation being merely a form and the self-training of the proletariat the important thing. Let me tell you gentlemen who are

so solicitous about the younger brother that the proletariat is not afraid of organisation and discipline! The proletariat will do nothing to have the worthy professors and high-school students who do not want to join an organisation recognised as Party members merely because they work under the control of an organisation. The proletariat is trained for organisation by its whole life, far more radically than many an intellectual prig. Having gained some understanding of our programme and our tactics, the proletariat will not start justifying backwardness in organisation by arguing that the form is less important than the content. It is not the proletariat, but *certain intellectuals* in our Party who lack *self-training* in the spirit of organisation and discipline, in the spirit of hostility and contempt for anarchistic talk. When they say that it is not ripe for organisation, the Akimovs No. 2 libel the proletariat just as the Akimovs No. 1 libelled it when they said that it was not ripe for the political struggle. The proletarian who has become a conscious Social-Democrat and feels himself a member of the Party will reject tail-ism in matters of organisation with the same contempt as he rejected tail-ism in matters of tactics.

Finally, consider the profound wisdom of the new *Iskra*'s "Practical Worker". "Properly understood," he says, "the idea of a 'militant' centralist organisation uniting and centralising the revolutionaries' *activities* [the italics are to make it look more profound] can only materialise naturally if such activities *exist* [both new and clever!]; organisation itself, being a form [mark that!], can only grow *simultaneously* [the italics are the author's, as throughout this quotation] with the growth of the revolutionary work which is its content." (No. 57.) Does not this remind you very much of the character in the folk tale who, on seeing a funeral, cried: "Many happy returns of the day"? I am sure there is not a practical worker (in the genuine sense of the term) in our Party who does not understand that it is precisely the form of our activities (i.e., our organisation) that has long been lagging, and lagging desperately, behind their content, and that only the Simple Simons in the Party could shout to people who are lagging: "Keep in line; don't run ahead!" Compare our Party, let us say, with the Bund. There

can be no question but that the *content** of the work of our Party is immeasurably richer, more varied, broader, and deeper than is the case with the Bund. The scope of our theoretical views is wider, our programme more developed, our influence among the mass of the workers (and not merely among the organised artisans) broader and deeper, our propaganda and agitation more varied; the pulse of the political work of both leaders and rank and file is more lively, the *popular* movements during demonstrations and general strikes more impressive, and our work among the non-proletarian strata more energetic. But the "form"? Compared with the Bund's, the "form" of our work is lagging unpardonably, lagging so that it is an eyesore and brings a blush of shame to the cheeks of anyone who does not merely "pick his teeth" when contemplating the affairs of his Party. The fact that the organisation of our work lags behind its content is our weak point, and it was our weak point long before the Congress, long before the Organising Committee was formed. The lame and undeveloped character of the form makes any serious step in the further development of the content impossible; it causes a shameful stagnation, leads to a waste of energy, to a discrepancy between word and deed. We have all been suffering wretchedly from this discrepancy, yet along come the Axelrods and "Practical Workers" of the new *Iskra* with their profound precept: the form must grow naturally, only simultaneously with the content!

That is where a small mistake on the question of organisation (Paragraph 1) will lead you if you try to *lend profundity* to nonsense and to find philosophical justification for opportunist talk. Marching slowly, in timid zigzags![119] we have heard this refrain in relation to questions of tactics; we are hearing it again in relation to questions of organisation. *Tail-ism in questions of organisation* is a natural and

* I leave quite aside the fact that the *content* of our Party work was mapped out at the Congress (in the programme, etc.) in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy only *at the cost of a struggle*, a struggle against those very anti-*Iskra*-ists and that very Marsh whose representatives numerically predominate in our "minority". On this question of "content" it would he interesting also to compare, let us say, six issues of the old *Iskra* (Nos. 46-51) with twelve issues of the new *Iskra* (Nos. 52-63). But that will have to wait for some other time.

inevitable product of the mentality of the *anarchistic individualist* when he starts to elevate his anarchistic deviations (which at the outset may have been accidental) to a *system of views*, to special *differences of principle*. At the League Congress we witnessed the beginnings of this anarchism; in the new *Iskra* we are witnessing attempts to elevate it to a system of views. These attempts strikingly confirm what was already said at the Party Congress about the difference between the points of view of the bourgeois intellectual who attaches himself to the Social-Democratic movement and the proletarian who has become conscious of his class interests. For instance, this same "Practical Worker" of the new *Iskra* with whose profundity we are already familiar denounces me for visualising the Party "as an immense factory" headed by a director in the shape of the Central Committee (No. 57, Supplement). "Practical Worker" never guesses that this dreadful word of his immediately betrays the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual unfamiliar with either the practice or the theory of proletarian organisation. For the factory, which seems only a bogey to some, represents that highest form of capitalist co-operation which has united and disciplined the proletariat, taught it to organise, and placed it at the head of all the other sections of the toiling and exploited population. And Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat trained by capitalism, has been and is teaching unstable intellectuals to distinguish between the factory as a means of exploitation (discipline based on fear of starvation) and the factory as a means of organisation (discipline based on collective work united by the conditions of a technically highly developed form of production). The discipline and organisation which come so hard to the bourgeois intellectual are very easily acquired by the proletariat just because of this factory "schooling". Mortal fear of this school and utter failure to understand its importance as an organising factor are characteristic of the ways of thinking which reflect the petty-bourgeois mode of life and which give rise to the species of anarchism that the German Social-Democrats call *Edelanarchismus*, that is, the anarchism of the "noble" gentleman, or aristocratic anarchism, as I would call it. This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party

organisation as a monstrous "factory"; he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as "serfdom" (see Axelrod's articles); division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragicomical outcry against transforming people into "cogs and wheels" (to turn editors into contributors being considered a particularly atrocious species of such transformation); mention of the organisational Rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful remark (intended for the "formalists") that one could very well dispense with Rules altogether.

Incredible as it may seem, it was a didactic remark of just this sort that Comrade Martov addressed to me in *Iskra*, No. 58, quoting, for greater weight, my own words in *A Letter to a Comrade*. Well, what is it if not "aristocratic anarchism" and tail-ism to cite examples from the era of disunity, the era of the circles, to *justify* the preservation and glorification of the circle spirit and anarchy in the era of the Party?

Why did we not need Rules before? Because the Party consisted of separate circles without any organisational tie between them. Any individual could pass from one circle to another at his own "sweet will", for he was not faced with any formulated expression of the will of the whole. Disputes within the circles were not settled according to Rules, "*but by struggle and threats to resign*", as I put it in *A Letter to a Comrade*,* summarising the experience of a number of circles in general and of our own editorial circle of six in particular. In the era of the circles, this was natural and inevitable, but it never occurred to anybody to extol it, to regard it as ideal; everyone complained of the disunity, everyone was distressed by it and eager to see the isolated circles fused into a formally constituted party organisation. And now that this fusion has taken place, we are being dragged back and, under the guise of higher organisational views, treated to anarchistic phrase-mongering! To people accustomed to the loose dressing-gown and slippers of the Oblomov[120] circle domesticity, formal Rules seem narrow, restrictive, irksome, mean, and bureaucratic, a bond of

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 229-50.—*Ed.*

serfdom and a fetter on the free "process" of the ideological struggle. Aristocratic anarchism cannot understand that formal Rules are needed precisely in order to replace the narrow circle ties by the broad Party tie. It was unnecessary and impossible to give formal shape to the internal ties of a circle or the ties between circles, for these ties rested on personal friendship or on an instinctive "confidence" for which no reason was given. The Party tie cannot and must not rest on either of these; it must be founded on *formal*, "bureaucratically" worded Rules (bureaucratic from the standpoint of the undisciplined intellectual), strict adherence to which can alone safeguard us from the wilfulness and caprices characteristic of the circles, from the circle wrangling that goes by the name of the free "process" of the ideological struggle.

The editors of the new *Iskra* try to trump Alexandrov with the didactic remark that "confidence is a delicate thing and cannot be hammered into people's hearts and minds" (No. 56, Supplement). The editors do not realise that by this talk about confidence, *naked* confidence, they are once more betraying their aristocratic anarchism and organisational tail-ism. When I was a member of a circle only—whether it was the circle of the six editors or the *Iskra* organisation—I was entitled to justify my refusal, say, to work with X merely on the grounds of lack of confidence, without stating reason or motive. But now that I have become a member of a party, *I have no right* to plead lack of confidence in general, for that would throw open the doors to all the freaks and whims of the old circles; I am *obliged* to give formal reasons for my "confidence" or "lack of confidence", that is, to cite a formally established principle of our programme, tactics or Rules; I must not just declare my "confidence" or "lack of confidence" without giving reasons, but must acknowledge that my decisions—and generally all decisions of any section of the Party—*have to be accounted for* to the whole Party; I am obliged to adhere to a *formally prescribed* procedure when giving expression to my "lack of confidence" or trying to secure the acceptance of the views and wishes that follow from this lack of confidence. From the *circle* view that "confidence" does not have to be accounted for, we have already risen to the *Party* view which demands

adherence to a formally prescribed procedure of expressing, accounting for, and *testing* our confidence; but the editors try to drag us back, and call their tail-ism new views on organisation!

Listen to the way our so-called Party editors talk about writers' groups that might demand representation on the editorial board. "We shall not get indignant and begin to shout about discipline", we are admonished by these aristocratic anarchists who have always and everywhere looked down on such a thing as discipline. We shall either "arrange the matter" (*sic*!) with the group, if it is sensible, or just laugh at its demands.

Dear me, what a lofty and noble rebuff to vulgar "factory" formalism! But in reality it is the old circle phraseology furbished up a little and served up to the Party by an editorial board which feels that it is not a Party institution, but the survival of an old circle. The intrinsic falsity of this position inevitably leads to the *anarchistic* profundity of elevating the disunity they hypocritically proclaim to be past and gone to a *principle* of Social-Democratic organisation. There is no need for any hierarchy of higher and lower Party bodies and authorities—aristocratic anarchism regards such a hierarchy as the bureaucratic invention of ministries, departments, etc. (see Axelrod's article); there is no need for the part to submit to the whole; there is no need for any "formal bureaucratic" definition of *Party* methods of "arranging matters" or of delimiting differences. Let the old circle wrangling be sanctified by pompous talk about "genuinely Social-Democratic" methods of organisation.

This is, where the proletarian who has been through the school of the "factory" can and should teach a lesson to anarchistic individualism. The class-conscious worker has long since emerged from the state of infancy when he used to fight shy of the intellectual as such. The class-conscious worker appreciates the richer store of knowledge and the wider political outlook which he finds among Social-Democratic intellectuals. But as we proceed with the building of a *real* party, the class-conscious worker must learn to distinguish the mentality of the soldier of the proletarian army from the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual who parades anarchistic phrases; he must learn to *insist* that the duties

of a Party member be fulfilled not only by the rank and file, but by the "people at the top" as well; he must learn to treat tail-ism in matters of organisation with the same contempt as he used, in days gone by, to treat tail-ism in matters of tactics!

Inseparably connected with Girondism and aristocratic anarchism is the last characteristic feature of the new *Iskra*'s attitude towards matters of organisation, namely, its defence of *autonomism* as against centralism. This is the meaning in principle (if it has any such meaning*) of its outcry against bureaucracy and autocracy, of its regrets about "an undeserved disregard for the non-*Iskra*-ists" (who defended autonomism at the Congress), of its comical howls about a demand for "unquestioning obedience", of its bitter complaints of "Jack-in-office rule", etc., etc. The opportunist wing of any party always defends and justifies all backwardness, whether in programme, tactics, or organisation. The new *Iskra*'s defence of backwardness in organisation (its tail-ism) is closely connected with the defence of *autonomism*. True, autonomism has, generally speaking, been so discredited already by the three years' propaganda work of the old *Iskra* that the new *Iskra* is ashamed, *as yet*, to advocate it-openly; it still assures us of its sympathy for centralism, but shows it only by printing the word centralism in italics. Actually, it is enough to apply the slightest touch of criticism to the "principles" of the "genuinely Social-Democratic" (not anarchistic?) quasi-centralism of the new *Iskra* for the autonomist standpoint to be detected at every step. Is it not now clear to all and sundry that on the subject of organisation Axelrod and Martov have swung over to Akimov? Have they not solemnly admitted it themselves in the significant words, "undeserved disregard for the non-*Iskra*-ists"? And what was it but autonomism that Akimov and his friends defended at our Party Congress?

It was autonomism (if not anarchism) that Martov and Axelrod defended at the League Congress when, with amusing zeal, they tried to prove that the part need not submit to the whole, that the part is autonomous in defining its

* I leave aside here, as in this section generally, the "co-optational" meaning of this outcry.

relation to the whole, that the Rules of the League, in which that relation is formulated, are valid in defiance of the will of the Party majority, in defiance of the will of the Party centre. And it is autonomism that Comrade Martov is now openly defending in the columns of the new *Iskra* (No. 60) in the matter of the right of the Central Committee to appoint members to the local committees. I shall not speak of the puerile sophistries which Comrade Martov used to defend autonomism at the League Congress, and is still using in the new *Iskra**—the important thing here is to note the undoubted tendency to *defend autonomism against centralism*, which is a fundamental characteristic of opportunism in matters of organisation.

Perhaps the only attempt to *analyse* the concept bureaucracy is the distinction drawn in the new *Iskra* (No. 53) between the "formal *democratic* principle" (author's italics) and the "formal *bureaucratic* principle". This distinction (which, unfortunately, was no more developed or explained than the reference to the non-*Iskra*-ists) contains a grain of truth. Bureaucracy *versus* democracy is in fact centralism *versus* autonomism; it is the organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to the organisational principle of opportunist Social-Democracy. The latter strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and, therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds autonomism and "democracy", carried (by the overzealous) to the point of anarchism. The former strives to proceed from the top downward, and upholds an extension of the rights and powers of the centre in relation to the parts. In the period of disunity and separate circles, this top from which revolutionary Social-Democracy strove to proceed organisationally was inevitably one of the circles, the one enjoying most influence by virtue of its activity and its revolutionary consistency (in our case, the *Iskra* organisation). In the period of the restoration of actual Party unity and dis-

* In enumerating various paragraphs of the Rules, Comrade Martov *omitted* the one which deals with the relation of the whole to the part: the Central Committee "allocates the Party forces" (Paragraph 6). Can one allocate forces without transferring people from one committee to another? It is positively awkward to have to dwell on such elementary things.

solution of the obsolete circles in this unity, this top is inevitably the *Party Congress*, as the supreme organ of the Party; the Congress as far as possible includes representatives of all the active organisations, and, by appointing the central institutions (often with a membership which satisfies the advanced elements of the Party more than the backward and is more to the taste of its revolutionary than its opportunist wing), makes them the top until the next Congress. Such, at any rate, is the case among the Social-Democratic Europeans, although little by little this custom, so abhorrent in principle to anarchists, is beginning to spread—not without difficulty and not without conflicts and squabbles—to the Social-Democratic Asiatics.

It is highly interesting to note that these fundamental characteristics of opportunism in matters of organisation (autonomism, aristocratic or intellectualist anarchism, tailism, and Girondism) are, *mutatis mutandis* with appropriate modifications), to be observed in all the Social-Democratic parties in the world, wherever there is a division into a a revolutionary and an opportunist wing (and where is there not?). Only quite recently this was very strikingly revealed in the German Social-Democratic Party, when its defeat at the elections in the 20th electoral division of Saxony (known as the Göhre incident*) brought the question of the *principles* of party organisation to the fore. That this incident should have become an issue of principle was largely due to the zeal of the German opportunists. Göhre (an ex-parson, author of the fairly well-known book *Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter*,** and one of the "heroes" of the Dresden Congress) is himself an extreme opportunist and the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist Monthly*),[122] the organ of the consistent German opportunists, at once "took up the cudgels" on his behalf.

* Göhre was returned to the Reichstag on June 16, 1903, from the 15th division of Saxony, but after the Dresden Congress[121] he resigned his seat. The electorate of the 20th division, which had fallen vacant on the death of Rosenow, wanted to put forward Göhre as candidate. The Central Party Executive and the Regional Party Executive for Saxony opposed this, and while they had no formal right to forbid Göhre's nomination, they succeeded in getting him to decline. The Social-Democrats were defeated at the polls.

** *Three Months as a Factory Worker.—Ed.*

Opportunism in programme is naturally connected with opportunism in tactics and opportunism in organisation. The exposition of the "new" point of view was undertaken by Comrade Wolfgang Heine. To give the reader some idea of the political complexion of this typical intellectual, who on joining the Social-Democratic movement brought with him opportunist habits of thought, it is enough to say that Comrade Wolfgang Heine is something less than a German Comrade Akimov and something more than a German Comrade Egorov.

Comrade Wolfgang Heine took the field in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* with no less pomp than Comrade Axelrod in the new *Iskra*. The very title of his article is priceless: "Democratic Observations on the Göhre Incident" (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*, No. 4, April). The contents are no less thunderous. Comrade W. Heine rises up in arms against "encroachments on the autonomy of the constituency", champions "the democratic principle", and protests against the interference of an "appointed authority" (i.e., the Central Party Executive) in the free election of deputies by the people. The point at issue, Comrade W. Heine admonishes us, is not a random incident, but a general "*tendency towards bureaucracy and centralism in the Party*", a tendency, he says, which was to be observed before, but which is now becoming particularly dangerous. It must be "recognised as a principle that the local institutions of the Party are the vehicles of Party life" (a plagiarism on Comrade Martov's pamphlet *Once More in the Minority*). We must not "accustom ourselves to having all important political decisions come from one centre", and must warn the Party against "a doctrinaire policy which loses contact with life" (borrowed from Comrade Martov's speech at the Party Congress to the effect that "life will assert itself"). Rendering his argument more profound, Comrade W. Heine says: "...If we go down to the roots of the matter and leave aside personal conflicts, which here, as everywhere, have played no small part, this bitterness against the *revisionists* [the italics are the author's and evidently hint at a distinction between fighting revisionism and fighting revisionists] will be found to be mainly expressive of the distrust of the Party officialdom for '*outsiders*' [W. Heine had apparently not yet read the pamphlet

about combating the state of siege, and therefore resorted to an Anglicism—*Outsidertum*], the distrust of tradition for the unusual, of the impersonal institution for everything individual [see Axelrod's resolution at the League Congress on the suppression of individual initiative]—in short, of that tendency which we have defined above as a tendency towards bureaucracy and centralism in the Party."

The idea of "discipline" inspires Comrade W. Heine with a no less noble disgust than Comrade Axelrod.... "The revisionists," he writes, "have been accused of lack of discipline for having written for the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, an organ whose Social-Democratic character has even been denied because it is not *controlled by the Party*. This very attempt to narrow down the concept 'Social-Democratic', this insistence on *discipline* in the sphere of ideological production, where absolute freedom should prevail [remember: the ideological struggle is a process whereas the forms of organisation are only forms], demonstrates the tendency towards bureaucracy and the suppression of individuality". And W. Heine goes on and on, fulminating against this detestable tendency to create "*one* big all-embracing organisation, as centralised as possible, *one* set of tactics, and *one* theory", against the demand for "implicit obedience", "blind submission", against "oversimplified centralism", etc., etc., literally "*à la* Axelrod".

The controversy started by W. Heine spread, and as there were no squabbles about co-optation in the German Party to obscure the issue, and as the German Akimovs display their complexion not only at congresses, but all the time, in a periodical of their own, the argument soon boiled down to an analysis of the principles of the orthodox and revisionist trends on the question of organisation. Karl Kautsky came forward (in the *Neue Zeit*, 1904, No. 28, in the article "*Wahlkreis und Partei*"—"Constituency and Party") as one of the spokesmen of the revolutionary trend (which, exactly as in our Party, was of course accused of "dictatorship", "inquisitorial" tendencies, and other dreadful things). W. Heine's article, he says, "expresses the line of thought of the whole revisionist trend". Not only in Germany, but in France and Italy as well, the opportunists are all staunch supporters of autonomism, of a slackening of Party disci-

pline, of reducing it to naught; everywhere their tendencies lead to *disorganisation* and to perverting "the democratic principle" into *anarchism*. "Democracy does not mean absence of authority," Karl Kautsky informs the opportunists on the subject of organisation, "democracy does not mean anarchy; it means the rule of the masses over their representatives, in distinction to other forms of rule, where the supposed servants of the people are in reality their masters." Kautsky traces at length the disruptive role played by opportunist autonomism in various countries; he shows that it is precisely the influx of "*a great number of bourgeois elements*"* into the Social-Democratic movement that is strengthening opportunism, autonomism, and the tendency to violate discipline; and once more he reminds us that "organisation is the weapon that will emancipate the proletariat", that "organisation is the characteristic weapon of the proletariat in the class struggle".

In Germany, where opportunism is weaker than in France or Italy, "autonomist tendencies have so far led only to more or less passionate declamations against dictators and grand inquisitors, against excommunication** and heresy-hunting, and to endless cavilling and squabbling, which would only result in endless strife if replied to by the other side".

It is not surprising that in Russia, where opportunism in the Party is even weaker than in Germany, autonomist tendencies should have produced fewer ideas and more "passionate declamations" and squabbling.

It is not surprising that Kautsky arrives at the following conclusion: "There is perhaps no other question on which revisionism in all countries, despite its multiplicity of form and hue, is so alike as on the question of organisation." Kautsky, too, defines the basic tendencies of orthodoxy and revisionism in this sphere with the help of the "dreadful word": bureaucracy *versus* democracy. We are told, he says, that to give the Party leadership the right to influence the

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* Kautsky mentions *Jaurès* as an example. The more these people deviated towards opportunism, the more "they were bound to consider Party discipline an impermissible constraint on their free personality".

** *Bannstrahl*: excommunication. This is the German equivalent of the Russian "state of siege" and "emergency laws". It is the "dreadful word" of the German opportunists.

selection of candidates (for parliament) by the constituencies is "a shameful encroachment on the democratic principle, which demands that all political activity proceed from the bottom upward, by the independent activity of the masses, and not from the top downward, in a bureaucratic way.... But if there is any democratic principle, it is that the majority must have predominance over the minority, and not the other way round...." The election of a member of parliament by any constituency is an important matter for the Party as a whole, which should influence the nomination of candidates, if only through its representatives (*Vertrauensmänner*). "Whoever considers this too bureaucratic or centralistic let him suggest that candidates be nominated by the direct vote of the Party membership at large [*sämtliche Parteigenossen*]. If he thinks this is not practicable, he must not complain of a lack of democracy when this function, like many others that concern the Party as a whole, is exercised by one or several Party bodies." It has long been "common law" in the German Party for constituencies to "come to a friendly understanding" with the Party leadership about the choice of candidates. "But the Party has grown too big for this tacit common law to suffice any longer. Common law ceases to be law when it ceases to be accepted as a matter of course, when its stipulations, and even its very existence, are called in question. Then it becomes necessary to formulate the law specifically, to codify it" ... to go over to more "precise statutory definition* [*statutarische Festlegung*] and, accordingly, greater strictness [*grössere Straffheit*] of organisation".

Thus you have, in a different environment, the same struggle between the opportunist and the revolutionary wing of the Party on the question of organisation, the same conflict between autonomism and centralism, between democracy and "bureaucracy", between the tendency to relax

* It is highly instructive to compare these remarks of Kautsky's about the replacement of a tacitly recognised common law by a formally defined statutory law with that whole "change-over" which our Party in general, and the editorial board in particular, have been undergoing since the Party Congress. Cf. the speech of V. I. Zasulich (at the League Congress, p. 66 et seq.), who does not seem to realise the full significance of this change-over.

and the tendency to tighten organisation and discipline, between the mentality of the unstable intellectual and that of the staunch proletarian, between intellectualist individualism and proletarian solidarity. What, one asks, was the attitude to this conflict of *bourgeois democracy*—not the bourgeois democracy which prankish history has only promised in private to show to Comrade Axelrod some day, but the real and actual bourgeois democracy which in Germany has spokesmen no less shrewd and observant than our own gentlemen of *Osvobozhdeniye*? German bourgeois democracy at once reacted to the new controversy, and—like Russian bourgeois democracy, like bourgeois democracy everywhere and always—sided solidly with the opportunist wing of the Social-Democratic Party. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, leading organ of the German stock exchange, published a thunderous editorial (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 7, 1904, No. 97, evening edition) which shows that shameless plagiarising of Axelrod is becoming a veritable disease with the German press. The stern democrats of the Frankfort stock exchange lash out furiously at the "absolutism" in the Social-Democratic Party, at the "party dictatorship", at the "autocratic rule of the Party authorities", at the "interdicts" which are intended "concurrently to chastise revisionism as a whole" (recall the "false accusation of opportunism"), at the insistence on "blind obedience", "deadening discipline", "servile subordination", and the transforming of Party members into "political corpses" (that is a good bit stronger than cogs and wheels!). "All distinctiveness of personality", the knights of the stock exchange indignantly exclaim at the sight of the undemocratic regime among the Social-Democrats, "all individuality is to be held in opprobrium, because it is feared that they might lead to the French order of things, to Jaurèsism and Millerandism, as was stated in so many words by Sindermann, who made the report on the subject" at the Party Congress of the Saxon Social-Democrats .

And so, insofar as the new catchwords of the new *Iskra* on organisation contain any principles at all, there can be no doubt that they are opportunist principles. This conclu-

sion is confirmed both by the whole analysis of our Party Congress, which divided into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, and by the example of *all* European Social-Democratic parties, where opportunism in organisation finds expression in the same tendencies, in the same accusations, and very often in the same catchwords. Of course, the national peculiarities of the various parties and the different political conditions in different countries leave their impress and make German opportunism quite dissimilar from French, French opportunism from Italian, and Italian opportunism from Russian. But the similarity of the fundamental division of all these parties into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, the similarity of the line of thought and the tendencies of opportunism in organisation stand out clearly in spite of all this difference of conditions.* With large numbers of radical intellectuals in the ranks of our Marxists and our Social-Democrats, the opportunism which their mentality produces has been, and is, bound to exist, in the most varied spheres and in the most varied forms. We fought opportunism on the fundamental problems of our world conception, on the questions of our programme, and the complete divergence of aims inevitably led to an irrevocable break between the Social-Democrats and the liberals who had corrupted our legal Marxism. We fought opportunism on tactical issues, and our divergence with Comrades Krichevsky and Akimov on these less important issues was naturally only temporary, and was not accompanied by the formation of different parties. We must now vanquish the opportunism of Martov and Axelrod on

* No one will doubt today that the old division of the Russian Social-Democrats into Economists and politicians on questions of tactics was similar to the division of the whole international Social-Democratic movement into opportunists and revolutionaries, although the difference between Comrades Martynov and Akimov, on the one hand, and Comrades von Vollmar and von Elm or Jaurès and Millerand, on the other, is very great. Nor can there be any doubt about the similarity of the main divisions on questions of organisation, in spite of the enormous difference between the conditions of politically unenfranchised and politically free countries. It is extremely characteristic that the highly principled editors of the new *Iskra*, while briefly touching on the controversy between Kautsky and Heine (No. 64), timidly *evaded* discussing the trends of *principle* manifested on questions of organisation by opportunism and orthodoxy *generally*.

questions of organisation, which are, of course, less fundamental than questions of tactics, let alone of programme, but which have now come to the forefront in our Party life.

When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never forget a characteristic feature of present-day opportunism in every sphere, namely, its vagueness, amorphousness, elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, will always evade taking a clear and decisive stand, he will always seek a middle course, he will always wriggle like a snake between two mutually exclusive points of view and try to "agree" with both and reduce his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, innocent and pious suggestions, and so on and so forth. Comrade Eduard Bernstein, an opportunist in questions of programme, "agrees" with the revolutionary programme of his party, and although he would no doubt like to have it "radically revised", he considers this untimely, inexpedient, not so important as the elucidation of "general principles" of "criticism" (which mainly consist in uncritically borrowing principles and catchwords from bourgeois democracy). Comrade von Vollmar, an opportunist in questions of tactics, also agrees with the old tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy and also coniines himself mostly to declamations, petty amendments, and sneers rather than openly advocates any definite "ministerial" tactics.[123] Comrades Martov and Axelrod, opportunists in questions of organisation, have also failed so far to produce, though directly challenged to do so, any definite statement of principles that could be "fixed by statute"; they too would like, they most certainly would like, a "radical revision" of our Rules of Organisation (*Iskra* No. 58, p. 2, col. 3), but they would prefer to devote themselves first to "general problems of organisation" (for a really radical revision of our Rules, which, in spite of Paragraph 1, are centralist Rules, would inevitably lead, if carried out in the spirit of the new *Iskra*, to autonomism; and Comrade Martov, of course, does not like to admit even to himself that he tends *in principle* towards autonomism). Their "principles" of organisation therefore display all the colours of the rainbow. The predominant item consists of innocent passionate declamations against autocracy and bureaucracy,

against blind obedience and cogs and wheels—declamations so innocent that it is still very difficult to discern in them what is really concerned with principle and what is really concerned with co-optation. But as it goes on, the thing gets worse: attempts to analyse and precisely define this detestable "bureaucracy" inevitably lead to autonomism; attempts to "lend profundity" to their stand and vindicate it inevitably lead to justifying backwardness, to tail-ism, to Girondist phrase-mongering. At last there emerges the principle of *anarchism*, as the sole really definite principle, which for that reason stands out in practice in particular relief (practice is always in advance of theory). Sneering at discipline—autonomism—anarchism—there you have the ladder which our opportunism in matters of organisation now climbs and now descends, skipping from rung to rung and skilfully dodging any definite statement of its principles.* Exactly the same stages are displayed by oppor-

* Those who recall the debate on Paragraph 1 will now clearly see that the mistake committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod over Paragraph 1 had *inevitably* to lead, when developed and deepened, to opportunism in matters of organisation. Comrade Martov's fundamental idea—self-enrolment in the Party—was this same false "democracy", the idea of building the Party from the bottom upward. My idea, on the other hand, was "bureaucratic" in the sense that the Party was to be built from the top downward, from the Party Congress to the individual Party organisations. The mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, anarchistic phrase-mongering, and opportunist, tail-ist profundity were all already displayed in the debate on Paragraph 1. Comrade Martov says in his *State of Siege* (p. 20) that "new ideas are beginning to be worked out" by the new *Iskra*. That is true in the sense that he and Axelrod are really pushing ideas in a new direction, beginning with Paragraph 1. The only trouble is that this direction is an opportunist one. The more they "work" in *this* direction, and the more this work is cleared of squabbling over co-optation, the deeper will they sink in the mire. Comrade Plekhanov already perceived this clearly at the Party Congress, and in his article "What Should Not Be Done" warned them once again: I am prepared, he as much as said, even to co-opt you, only don't continue along this road which can only lead to opportunism and anarchism. Martov and Axelrod would not follow this good advice: What? Not continue along this road? Agree with Lenin that the co-optation clamour is nothing but squabbling? Never! We'll show him that we are men of principle!—And they have. They have clearly shown everyone that if they have any new principles at all, they are opportunist principles.

tunism in matters of programme and tactics: sneering at "orthodoxy", narrowness, and immobility—revisionist "criticism" and ministerialism—bourgeois democracy.

There is a close psychological connection between this hatred of discipline and that incessant nagging note of *injury* which is to be detected in all the writings of all opportunists today in general, and of our minority in particular. They are being persecuted, hounded, ejected, besieged, and bullied. There is far more psychological and political truth in these catchwords than was probably suspected even by the author of the pleasant and witty joke about bullies and bullied. For you have only to take the minutes of our Party Congress to see that the minority are all those who suffer from a sense of injury, all those who at one time or another and for one reason or another were offended by the revolutionary Social-Democrats. There are the Bundists and the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, whom we "offended" so badly that they withdrew from the Congress: there are the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists, who were mortally offended by the slaughter of organisations in general and of their own in particular; there is Comrade Makhov, who had to put up with offence every time he took the floor (for every time he did, he invariably made a fool of himself); and lastly, there are Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod, who were offended by the "false accusation of opportunism" in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Rules and by their defeat in the elections. All these mortal offences were not the accidental outcome of impermissible witticisms, rude behaviour, frenzied controversy, slamming of doors, and shaking of fists, as so many philistines imagine to this day, but the inevitable political outcome of the whole three years' ideological work of *Iskra*. If in the course of these three years we were not just wagging our tongues, but giving expression to convictions which were to be translated into deeds, we could not but fight the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Marsh" at the Congress. And when, together with Comrade Martov, who had fought in the front line with visor up, we had offended such heaps of people, we had only to offend Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martov ever such a little bit for the cup to overflow. Quantity was transformed into quality. The negation was negated. All the offended forgot their mutual scores, fell

weeping into each other's arms, and raised the banner of "revolt against Leninism".*

A revolt is a splendid thing when it is the advanced elements who revolt against the reactionary elements. When the revolutionary wing revolts against the opportunist wing, it is a good thing. When the opportunist wing revolts against the revolutionary wing, it is a bad business.

Comrade Plekhanov is compelled to take part in this bad business in the capacity of a prisoner of war, so to speak. He tries to "vent his spleen" by fishing out isolated awkward phrases by the author of some resolution in favour of the "majority", and exclaiming: "Poor Comrade Lenin! A fine lot his orthodox supporters are!" (*Iskra*, No. 63, Supplements.)

Well, Comrade Plekhanov, all I can say is that if I am poor, the editors of the new *Iskra* are downright paupers. However poor I may be, I have not yet reached such utter destitution as to have to shut my eyes to the Party Congress and hunt for material for the exercise of my wit in the resolutions of committeemen. However poor I may be, I am a thousand times better off than those whose supporters do not utter an awkward phrase inadvertently, but on every issue—whether of organisation, tactics, or programme—adhere stubbornly and persistently to principles which are the very opposite of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. However poor I may be, I have not yet reached the stage of having to *conceal from the public* the praises lavished on me by such supporters. And that is what the editors of the new *Iskra* have to do.

Reader, do you know what the Voronezh Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party stands for? If not, read the minutes of the Party Congress. You will learn from them that the line of that committee is wholly expressed by Comrade Akimov and Comrade Brouckère, who at the Congress fought the revolutionary wing of the Party all along the line, and who scores of times were ranked as oppor-

* This amazing expression is Comrade Martov's (*State of Siege*, p. 68). Comrade Martov waited until he was five to one before raising the "revolt" against me alone. Comrade Martov argues very unskilfully: he wants to destroy his opponent by paying him the highest compliments.

tunists by everybody, from Comrade Plekhanov to Comrade Popov. Well, this Voronezh Committee, in its January leaflet (No. 12, January 1904), makes the following statement:

"A great and important event in the life of our steadily growing Party took place last year: the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., a congress of the representatives of its organisations. Convening a Party congress is a very complicated matter, and, under the prevailing monarchical regime, a very dangerous and difficult one. It is therefore not surprising that it was carried out *in a far from perfect way*, and that the Congress itself, although it passed off without mishap, did not live up to all the Party's expectations. The comrades whom the Conference of 1902 commissioned to convene the Congress were arrested, and *the Congress was arranged by persons who represented only one of the trends in Russian Social-Democracy*, *viz.*, *the 'Iskra'-ists. Many* organisations of Social-Democrats who did not happen to be *Iskra*-ists were not invited to take part in the work of the Congress, *partly for this reason* the task of drawing up *a programme and Rules* for the Party was carried out by the Congress in an *extremely imperfect manner*; the delegates themselves admit that there are important flaws in the Rules 'which may lead to dangerous misunderstandings'. The *Iskra*-ists themselves split at the Congress, and many prominent members of our R.S.D.L.P. who formerly appeared to be in full agreement with the *Iskra* programme of action have come to see that many of its views, advocated *mainly by Lenin and Plekhanov*, are impracticable. Although these last gained the upper hand at the Congress, the pulse of real life and the requirements of the practical work, in which all the non-*Iskra*-ists are taking part, are quickly correcting the mistakes of the theoreticians and have, since the Congress, already introduced important modifications. '*Iskra*' *has changed greatly and promises* to pay careful heed to the demands of all workers in the Social-Democratic movement generally. Thus, although *the results of the Congress will have to be revised* at the next Congress, and, as is obvious to the delegates themselves, are unsatisfactory *and therefore cannot be accepted by the Party as unimpeachable decisions*, the Congress clarified the situation in the Party, provided much material for the further theoretical and organising activity of the Party, and was an experience of immense instructive value for the work of the Party as a whole. The decisions of the Congress and the Rules it drew up will be *taken into account* by all the organisations, but many will *refrain from being guided by them exclusively*, *in view of* their manifest imperfections.

"Fully realising the importance of the work of the Party as a whole, the Voronezh Committee actively *responded* in all matters concerning the organisation of the Congress. It fully appreciates the importance of what took place at the Congress and *welcomes the change undergone by* '*Iskra*', which has become the Central Organ (chief organ).

Although the state of affairs in the Party and the Central Committee does not satisfy us *as yet*, we are confident that

by joint efforts the difficult work of organising the Party will be perfected. In view of false rumours, the Voronezh Committee informs the comrades that there is no question of the Voronezh Committee leaving the Party. The Voronezh Committee perfectly realises what a dangerous precedent would be created by the withdrawal of a workers' organisation like the Voronezh Committee from the R.S.D.L.P., *what a reproach this would be to the Party*, and how disadvantageous it would be to workers' organisations which might follow this example. We must not cause new splits, but persistently strive to unite all class-conscious workers and socialists in one party. Besides, the Second Congress was not a constituent congress, but only a regular one. Expulsion from the Party can only be by decision of a Party court, and no organisation, not even the Central Committee, has the right to expel any Social-Democratic organisation from the Party. Furthermore, under Paragraph 8 of the Rules adopted by the Second Congress every organisation is autonomous in its local affairs, and *the Voronezh Committee is accordingly fully entitled to put its views on organisation into practice and to advocate them in the Party*."

The editors of the new *Iskra*, in quoting this leaflet in No. 61, reprinted the second half of this tirade, which we give here in large type; as for the first half, here printed in small type, the editors *preferred to omit it*.

They were ashamed.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

R. A FEW WORDS ON DIALECTICS. TWO REVOLUTIONS

A general glance at the development of our Party crisis will readily show that in the main, with minor exceptions, the composition of the two contending sides remained unchanged throughout. It was a struggle between the revolutionary wing and the opportunist wing in our Party. But this struggle passed through the most varied stages, and anyone who wants to find his bearings in the vast amount of literature already accumulated, the mass of fragmentary evidence, passages torn from their context, isolated accusations, and so

on and so forth, must thoroughly familiarise himself with the peculiarities of each of these stages.

Let us enumerate the principal and clearly distinct stages: 1) The controversy over Paragraph 1 of the Rules. A purely ideological struggle over the basic principles of organisation. Plekhanov and I are in the minority. Martov and Axelrod propose an opportunist formulation and find themselves in the arms of the opportunists. 2) The split in the *Iskra* organisation over the lists of candidates for the Central Committee: Fomin or Vasilyev in a committee of five, Trotsky or Travinsky in a committee of three. Plekhanov and I gain the majority (nine to seven), partly because of the very fact that we were in the minority on Paragraph 1. Martov's coalition with the opportunists confirmed my worst fears over the Organising Committee incident. 3) Continuation of the controversy over details of the Rules. Martov is again saved by the opportunists. We are again in the minority and fight for the rights of the minority on the central bodies. 4) The seven extreme opportunists withdraw from the Congress. We become the majority and defeat the coalition (the *Iskra*-ist minority, the "Marsh", and the anti-*Iskra*-ists) in the elections. Martov and Popov decline to accept seats in our trios. 5) The post-Congress squabble over co-optation. An orgy of anarchistic behaviour and anarchistic phrase-mongering. The least stable and steadfast elements among the "minority" gain the upper hand. 6) To avert a split, Plekhanov adopts the policy of "killing with kindness". The "minority" occupy the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Council and attack the Central Committee with all their might. The squabble continues to pervade everything. 7) First attack on the Central Committee repulsed. The squabble seems to be subsiding somewhat. It becomes possible to discuss in comparative calm two purely ideological questions which profoundly agitate the Party: a) what is the political significance and explanation of the division of our Party into "majority" and "minority" which took shape at the Second Congress and superseded all earlier divisions? b) what is the significance in principle of the new *Iskra*'s new position on the question of organisation?

In each of these stages the circumstances of the struggle and the immediate object of the attack are materially differ-

ent; each stage is, as it were, a separate battle in one general military campaign. Our struggle cannot be understood at all unless the concrete circumstances of each battle are studied. But once that is done, we see clearly that development does indeed proceed dialectically, by way of contradictions: the minority becomes the majority, and the majority becomes the minority; each side passes from the defensive to the offensive, and from the offensive to the defensive; the starting-point of ideological struggle (Paragraph 1) is "negated" and gives place to an all-pervading squabble*; but then begins "the negation of the negation", and, having just about managed to "rub along" with our god-given wife on different central bodies, we return to the starting-point, the purely ideological struggle; but by now this "thesis" has been enriched by all the results of the "antithesis" and has become a higher synthesis, in which the isolated, random error over Paragraph 1 has grown into a quasi-system of opportunist views on matters of organisation, and in which the connection between this fact and the basic division of our Party into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing becomes increasingly apparent to all. In a word, not only do oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social-Democrats war among themselves according to Hegel.

But the great Hegelian dialectics which Marxism made its own, having first turned it right side up, must never be confused with the vulgar trick of justifying the zigzags of politicians who swing over from the revolutionary to the opportunist wing of the Party, with the vulgar habit of lumping together particular statements, and particular developmental factors, belonging to different stages of a single process. Genuine dialectics does not justify the errors of individuals, but studies the inevitable turns, proving that they were inevitable by a detailed study of the process of development in all its concreteness. One of the basic principles of dialectics is that there is no such thing as abstract truth, truth is always concrete.... And, one thing

* The difficult problem of drawing a line between squabbling and differences of principle now solves itself: all that relates to co-optation is squabbling; all that relates to analysis of the struggle at the Congress, to the controversy over Paragraph I and the swing towards. Opportunism and anarchism is a difference of principle.

more, the great Hegelian dialectics should never be confused with that vulgar worldly wisdom so well expressed by the Italian saying: *mettere la coda dove non va il capo* (sticking in the tail where the head will not go through).

The outcome of the dialectical development of our Party struggle has been two revolutions. The Party Congress was a real revolution, as Comrade Martov justly remarked in his *Once More in the Minority*. The wits of the minority are also right when they say: "The world moves through revolutions; well, we have made a revolution!" They did indeed make a revolution after the Congress; and it is true, too, that generally speaking the world does move through revolutions. But the concrete significance of each concrete revolution is not defined by this general aphorism; there are revolutions which are more like reaction, to paraphrase the unforgettable expression of the unforgettable Comrade Makhov. We must know whether it was the revolutionary or the opportunist wing of the Party that was the actual force that made the revolution, must know whether it was revolutionary or opportunist principles that inspired the fighters, before we can determine whether a particular concrete revolution moved the "world" (our Party) forward or backward.

Our Party Congress was unique and unprecedented in the entire history of the Russian revolutionary movement. For the first time a secret revolutionary party succeeded in emerging from the darkness of underground life into broad daylight, showing everyone the whole course and outcome of our internal Party struggle, the whole character of our Party and of each of its more or less noticeable components in matters of programme, tactics, and organisation. For the first time we succeeded in throwing off the traditions of circle looseness and revolutionary philistinism, in bringing together dozens of very different groups, many of which had been fiercely warring among themselves and had been linked solely by the force of an idea, and which were now prepared (in principle, that is) to sacrifice all their group aloofness and group independence for the sake of the great whole which we were for the first time actually creating—the *Party*. But in politics sacrifices are not obtained gratis, they have to be won in battle. The battle over the slaughter of organisations necessarily proved terribly fierce. The

fresh breeze of free and open struggle blew into a gale. The gale swept away—and a very good thing that it did!—each and every remnant of all circle interests, sentiments, and traditions without exception, and for the first time created genuinely Party institutions.

But it is one thing to call oneself something, and another to be it. It is one thing to sacrifice the circle system in principle for the sake of the Party, and another to renounce one's own circle. The fresh breeze proved too fresh as yet for people used to musty philistinism. "The Party was unable to stand the strain of its first congress," as Comrade Martov rightly put it (inadvertently) in his *Once More in the Minority*. The sense of injury over the slaughter of organisations was too strong. The furious gale raised all the mud from the bottom of our Party stream; and the mud took its revenge. The old hidebound circle spirit overpowered the still young party spirit. The opportunist wing of the Party, routed though it had been, got the better—temporarily, of course—of the revolutionary wing, having been reinforced by Akimov's accidental gain.

The result is the new *Iskra*, which is compelled to develop and deepen the error its editors committed at the Party Congress. The old *Iskra* taught the truths of revolutionary struggle. The new *Iskra* teaches the worldly wisdom of yielding and getting on with everyone. The old *Iskra* was the organ of militant orthodoxy. The new *Iskra* treats us to a recrudescence of opportunism—chiefly on questions of organisation. The old *Iskra* earned the honour of being detested by the opportunists, both Russian and West-European. The new *Iskra* has "grown wise" and will soon cease to be ashamed of the praises lavished on it by the extreme opportunists. The old *Iskra* marched unswervingly towards its goal, and there was no discrepancy between its word and its deed. The inherent falsity of the new *Iskra*'s position inevitably leads—independently even of anyone's will or intention—to political hypocrisy. It inveighs against the circle spirit in order to conceal the victory of the circle spirit over the party spirit. It hypocritically condemns splits, as if one can imagine any way of avoiding splits in any at all organised party except by the subordination of the minority to the majority. It says that heed must be paid to revolution-

ary public opinion, yet, while concealing the praises of the Akimovs, indulges in petty scandal-mongering about the committees of the revolutionary wing of the Party.* How shameful! How they have disgraced our old *Iskra*!

One step forward, two steps back.... It happens in the lives of individuals, and it happens in the history of nations and in the development of parties. It would be the most criminal cowardice to doubt even for a moment the inevitable and complete triumph of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy, of proletarian organisation and Party discipline. We have already won a great deal, and we must go on fighting, undismayed by reverses, fighting steadfastly, scorning the philistine methods of circle wrangling, doing our very utmost to preserve the hard-won single Party tie linking all Russian Social-Democrats, and striving by dint of persistent and systematic work to give all Party members, and the workers in particular, a full and conscious understanding of the duties of Party members, of the struggle at the Second Party Congress, of all the causes and all the stages of our divergence, and of the utter disastrousness of opportunism, which, in the sphere of organisation as in the sphere of our programme and our tactics, helplessly surrenders to the bourgeois psychology, uncritically adopts the point of view of bourgeois democracy, and blunts the weapon of the class struggle of the proletariat.

In its struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organisation. Disunited by the rule of anarchic competition in the bourgeois world, ground down by forced labour for capital, constantly thrust back to the "lower depths" of utter destitution, savagery, and degeneration, the proletariat can, and inevitably will, become an invincible force only through its ideological unification on the principles of Marxism being reinforced by the material unity of organisation, which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class. Neither the senile rule of the Russian autocracy nor the senescent rule of international capital will be able to withstand this army. It will

* A stereotyped form has even been worked out for this charming pastime: our special correspondent X informs us that Committee Y of the majority has behaved badly to Comrade Z of the minority.

more and more firmly close its ranks, in spite of all zigzags and backward steps, in spite of the opportunist phrase-mongering of the Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy, in spite of the self-satisfied exaltation of the retrograde circle spirit, and in spite of the tinsel and fuss of *intellectualist* anarchism.

Appendix

THE INCIDENT OF COMRADE GUSEV AND COMRADE DEUTSCH

This incident is closely bound up with the so-called "false" (Comrade Martov's expression) list mentioned in the letter of Comrades Martov and Starover, which has been quoted in Section J. The substance of it is as follows. Comrade Gusev informed Comrade Pavlovich that this list, consisting of Comrades Stein, Egorov, Popov, Trotsky, and Fomin, had been communicated to him, Gusev, by Comrade Deutsch (Comrade Pavlovich's *Letter*, p. 12). Comrade Deutsch accused Comrade Gusev of "deliberate calumny" on account of this statement, and a comrades' arbitration court declared Comrade Gusev's "statement" "*incorrect*" (see the court's decision in *Iskra*, No. 62). After the *editorial board* of *Iskra* had published the court decision, *Comrade Martov* (not the editorial board this time) issued a special leaflet entitled *The Decision of the Comrades' Arbitration Court*, in which he reprinted in full, not only the decision of the court, but the whole report of the proceedings, together with *a postscript of his own*. In this postscript, Comrade Martov among other things spoke of "the disgraceful fact of the forgery of a list in the interests of a factional struggle". Comrades Lyadov and Gorin, who had been delegates to the Second Congress, replied to this leaflet with one of their own entitled *An Onlooker at the Arbitration Court*, in which they "vigorously protest against Comrade Martov permitting himself to go further than the court decision and to ascribe evil motives to Comrade Gusev", whereas the court did not find that there had been a deliberate calumny, but only that Comrade Gusev's statement was incorrect. Comrades Gorin and

Lyadov explained at length that Comrade Gusev's statement might have been due to a quite natural mistake, and described as "*unworthy*" the conduct of Comrade Martov, who had himself made (and again made in his leaflet) a number of erroneous statements, arbitrarily attributing evil intent to Comrade Gusev. There could be no evil intent there at all, they said. That, if I am not mistaken, is all the "literature" on this question, which I consider it my duty to help clear up.

First of all, it is essential that the reader have a clear idea of the time and conditions in which this list (of candidates for the Central Committee) appeared. As I have already stated in this pamphlet, the *Iskra* organisation conferred during the Congress about a list of candidates for the Central Committee which it could jointly submit to the Congress. The conference ended in disagreement: the majority of the *Iskra* organisation adopted a list consisting of Travinsky, Glebov, Vasilyev, Popov, and Trotsky, but the minority refused to yield and insisted on a list consisting of Travinsky, Glebov, Fomin, Popov, and Trotsky. The two sections of the *Iskra* organisation did not meet together again after the meeting at which these lists were put forward and voted on. Both sections entered the arena of free agitation at the Congress, wishing to have the issue between them settled by a vote of the Party Congress as a whole and each trying to win as many delegates as it could to its side. This free agitation at the Congress at once revealed the political fact I have analysed in such detail in this pamphlet, namely, that in order to gain the victory over us, it was essential for the *Iskra*-ist minority (headed by Martov) to have the support of the "Centre" (the Marsh) and of the anti-*Iskra*-ists. This was essential because the vast majority of the delegates who consistently upheld the programme, tactics, and organisational plans of *Iskra* against the onslaught of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" very quickly and very staunchly took their stand on our side. Of the thirty-three delegates (or rather votes) not belonging to the anti-*Iskra*-ists or the "Centre", we very quickly won twenty-four and concluded a "direct agreement" with them, forming a "compact majority". Comrade Martov, on the other hand, was left with only nine votes; to gain the victory, he needed all the votes of the

anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre"—with which groups he might join forces (as over Paragraph 1 of the Rules), might form a "coalition", that is, might have their support, but with which he *could not* conclude a direct agreement—could not do so because throughout the Congress he had fought these groups no less sharply than we had. Therein lay the tragicomedy of Comrade Martov's position! In his *State of Siege* Comrade Martov tries to annihilate me with the deadly venomous question: "We would respectfully request Comrade Lenin to answer explicitly—*to whom* at the Congress were the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group an outside element?" (P. 23, footnote.) I answer respectfully and explicitly: they were an outside element to Comrade Martov. And the proof is that whereas I very quickly concluded a direct agreement with the *Iskra*-ists, Comrade Martov did not conclude, and could not have concluded, a direct agreement with *Yuzhny Rabochy*, nor with Comrade Makhov, nor with Comrade Brouckère.

Only when we have got a clear idea of this political situation can we understand the "crux" of this vexed question of the celebrated "false" list. Picture to yourself the actual state of affairs: the *Iskra* organisation has split, and we are freely campaigning at the Congress, defending our respective lists. During this defence, in the host of private conversations, the lists are varied in a hundred different combinations: a committee of three is proposed instead of five; all sorts of substitutions of one candidate for another are suggested. I very well recall, for instance, that the candidatures of Comrades Rusov, Osipov, Pavlovich, and Dyedov[124] were suggested in private conversations among the majority, and then, after discussions and arguments, were withdrawn. It may very well be that other candidatures too were proposed of which I have no knowledge. In the course of these conversations each Congress delegate expressed his opinion, suggested changes, argued, and so on. It is highly unlikely that this was the case only among the majority. There is no doubt, in fact, that the same sort of thing went on among the minority, for their original five (Popov, Trotsky, Fomin, Glebov, and Travinsky) were later replaced, as we have seen from the letter of Comrades Martov and Starover, by a trio—Glebov, Trotsky, and Popov—Glebov, moreover, not being

to their taste, so that they were very ready to substitute Fomin (see the leaflet of Comrades Lyadov and Gorin). It should not be forgotten that my demarcation of the Congress delegates into the groups defined in this pamphlet was made on the basis of an analysis undertaken post-factum; actually, during the election agitation these groups were only just beginning to emerge and the exchange of opinions among the delegates proceeded quite freely; no "wall" divided us, and each would speak to any delegate he wanted to discuss matters with in private. It is not at all surprising in these circumstances that among all the various combinations and lists there should appear, alongside the list of the minority of the *Iskra* organisation (Popov, Trotsky, Fomin, Glebov, and Travinsky), the not very different list: Popov, Trotsky, Fomin, Stein, and Egorov. The appearance of such a combination of candidates was very natural, because our candidates, Glebov and Travinsky, were patently not to the liking of the minority of the *Iskra* organisation (see their letter in Section J, where they remove Travinsky from the trio and expressly state that Glebov is a compromise). To replace Glebov and Travinsky by the Organising Committee members Stein and Egorov was perfectly natural, and it would have been strange if no one of the delegates belonging to the Party minority had thought of it.

Let us now examine the following two questions: 1) Who was the author of the list: Egorov, Stein, Popov, Trotsky, and Fomin? and 2) Why was Comrade Martov so profoundly incensed that such a list should be attributed to him? To give an *exact* answer to the first question, it would be necessary to question all the Congress delegates. That is now impossible. It would be necessary, in particular, to ascertain who of the delegates belonging to the Party minority (not to be confused with the *Iskra* organisation minority) had heard at the Congress of the lists that caused the split in the *Iskra* organisation; what they had thought of the respective lists of the majority and minority of the *Iskra* organisation; and whether they had not suggested or heard others suggest or express opinions about desirable changes in the list of the minority of the *Iskra* organisation. Unfortunately, these questions do not seem to have been raised in the arbitration court either, which (to judge by the text of its decision) did

not even learn over just what lists of five the *Iskra* organisation split. Comrade Byelov, for example (whom I class among the "Centre"), "testified that he had been on good comradely terms with Deutsch, who used to give him his impressions of the work of the Congress, and that if Deutsch had been campaigning on behalf of any list he would have informed Byelov of the fact." It is to be regretted that it was not brought out whether Comrade Deutsch gave Comrade Byelov at the Congress his impressions as to the lists of the *Iskra* organisation, and if he did, what was Comrade Byelov's reaction to the list of five proposed by the *Iskra* organisation minority, and whether he did not suggest or hear others suggest any desirable changes in it. Because this was not made clear, we get that contradiction in the evidence of Comrade Byelov and Comrade Deutsch which has already been noted by Comrades Gorin and Lyadov, namely, that Comrade Deutsch, notwithstanding his own assertions to the contrary, did "campaign in behalf of certain Central Committee candidates" suggested by the *Iskra* organisation. Comrade Byelov further testified that "he had heard about the list circulating at the Congress a couple of days before the Congress closed, in private conversation, when he met Comrades Egorov and Popov and the delegates from the Kharkov Committee. Egorov had expressed surprise that his name had been included in a list of Central Committee candidates, as in his, Egorov's, opinion his candidature could not inspire sympathy among the Congress delegates, whether of the majority or of the minority". It is extremely significant that the reference here is apparently to the minority *of the "Iskra" organisation*, for among the rest of the Party Congress minority the candidature of Comrade Egorov, a member of the Organising Committee and a prominent speaker of the "Centre", not only could, but in all likelihood would have been greeted sympathetically. Unfortunately, we learn nothing from Comrade Byelov as to the sympathy or antipathy of those among the Party minority who did not belong to the *Iskra* organisation. And yet that is just what is important, for Comrade Deutsch waxed indignant about this list having been attributed to the minority of the *Iskra* organisation, whereas it may have originated with the minority which did not belong to that organisation!

Of course, it is very difficult at this date to recall who first suggested this combination of candidates, and from whom each of us heard about it. I, for example, do not undertake to recall even just who among the majority first proposed the candidatures of Rusov, Dyedov, and the others I have mentioned. The only thing that sticks in my memory, out of the host of conversations, suggestions, and rumours of all sorts of combinations of candidates, is those "lists" which were directly put to the vote in the *Iskra* organisation or at the private meetings of the majority. These "lists" were mostly circulated orally (in my *Letter to the Editors of "Iskra"*, p. 4, line 5 from below, it is the combination of five candidates which I orally proposed at the meeting that I call a "list"); but it also happened very often that they were jotted down in notes, such as in general passed between delegates during the sittings of the Congress and were usually destroyed after the sittings.

Since we have no exact information as to the origin of this celebrated list, it can only be assumed that the combination of candidates which we have in it was either suggested by some delegate belonging to the Party minority, without the knowledge of the *Iskra* organisation minority, and thereafter began to circulate at the Congress in spoken and written form; or else that this combination was suggested at the Congress by some member of the *Iskra* organisation minority who subsequently forgot about it. The latter assumption seems to me the more likely one, for the following reasons: already at the Congress the *Iskra* organisation minority were *undoubtedly* sympathetic towards the candidature of Comrade Stein (see present pamphlet); and as to the candidature of Comrade Egorov, *this* minority did undoubtedly arrive at the idea after the Congress (for both at the League Congress and in *State of Siege* regret was expressed that the Organising Committee had not been endorsed as the Central Committee—and Comrade Egorov was a member of the Organising Committee). Is it then not natural to assume that this idea, which was evidently in the air, of converting the members of the Organising Committee into members of the Central Committee was voiced by some member of the minority in private conversation at the Party Congress too?

But instead of a natural explanation, Comrade Martov and Comrade Deutsch are determined to see here something *sordid*—a plot, a piece of dishonesty, the dissemination of "*deliberately* false rumours *with the object* of defaming", a "*forgery in the interests of a factional struggle*", and so forth. This morbid urge can only be explained by the unwholesome conditions of émigré life, or by an abnormal nervous condition, and I would not even have taken the question up if matters had not gone to the length of an unworthy attack upon a comrade's honour. Just think: what grounds could Comrades Deutsch and Martov have had for detecting a sordid, evil intent in an incorrect statement, in an incorrect rumour? The picture which their morbid imaginations conjured up was apparently that the majority "defamed" them, not by pointing to the minority's political mistake (Paragraph 1 and the coalition with the opportunists), but by ascribing to the minority "deliberately false" and "forged" lists. The minority preferred to attribute the matter not to their own mistake, but to sordid, dishonest, and disgraceful practices on the part of the majority! How irrational it was to seek for evil intent in the "incorrect statement", we have already shown above, by describing the circumstances. It was clearly realised by the comrades' arbitration court too, which did not find any calumny, or any evil intent, or anything disgraceful. Lastly, it is most clearly proved by the fact that at the Party Congress itself, prior to the elections, the minority of the *Iskra* organisation entered into discussions with the majority regarding this false rumour, and Comrade Martov even stated his views in a letter which was read at a meeting of all the twenty-four delegates of the majority! It never even occurred to the majority to conceal from the minority of the *Iskra* organisation that such a list was circulating at the Congress: Comrade Lensky told Comrade Deutsch about it (see the court decision); Comrade Plekhanov spoke of it to Comrade Zasulich ("You can't talk to her, she seems to take me for Trepov,"[125] Comrade Plekhanov said to me, and this joke, repeated many times after, is one more indication of the abnormal state of excitement the minority were in); and I informed Comrade Martov that his assurance (that the list was not his, Martov's) was quite enough for me (League

Minutes, p. 64). Comrade Martov (together with Comrade Starover, if I remember rightly) thereupon sent a note to us on the Bureau which ran roughly as follows: "The majority of the *Iskra* editorial board request to be allowed to attend the private meeting of the majority in order to refute the defamatory rumours which are being circulated about them." Plekhanov and I replied on the same slip of paper, saying: "We have not heard any defamatory rumours. If a meeting of the editorial board is required, that should be arranged separately. Lenin, Plekhanov." At the meeting of the majority held that evening, we related this to all the twenty-four delegates. To preclude all possible misunderstanding, it was decided to elect delegates from all the twenty-four of us jointly and send them to talk it over with Comrades Martov and Starover. The delegates elected, Comrades Sorokin and Sablina, went and explained that nobody was specifically attributing the list to Martov or Starover, particularly after their statement, and that it was of absolutely no importance whether this list originated with the minority of the *Iskra* organisation or with the Congress minority not belonging to that organisation. After all, we could not start an investigation at the Congress and question all the delegates about this list! But Comrades Martov and Starover, not content with this, sent us a letter containing a formal denial (see Section J). This letter was read out by our representatives, Comrades Sorokin and Sablina, at a meeting of the twenty-four. It might have seemed that the incident could be considered closed—not in the sense that the origin of the list had been ascertained (if anybody cared about that), but in the sense that the idea had been completely dispelled that there was any intention of "injuring the minority", or of "defaming" anybody, or of resorting to a "forgery in the interests of a factional struggle". Yet at the League Congress (pp. 63-64) Comrade Martov again brought forth this sordid story conjured up by a morbid imagination, and, what is more, made a number of *incorrect statements* (evidently due to his wrought-up condition). He said that the list included a Bundist. That was untrue. All the witnesses in the arbitration court, including Comrades Stein and Byelov, declared that the list had Comrade Egorov in it, Comrade Martov said that the list implied a coalition

in the sense of a direct agreement. That was untrue, as I have already explained. Comrade Martov said that there were no other lists originating with the minority of the *Iskra* organisation (and likely to repel the majority of the Congress from this minority), "not even forged ones". That was untrue, for the entire majority at the Party Congress knew of no less than three lists which originated with Comrade Martov and Co., and which did not meet with the approval of the majority (see the leaflet by Lyadov and Gorin).

Why, in general, was Comrade Martov so incensed by this list? Because it signified a swing towards the Right wing of the Party. At that time Comrade Martov cried out against a "false accusation of opportunism" and expressed indignation at the "misrepresentation of his political position"; but now everybody can see that the question whether this list belonged to Comrade Martov and Comrade Deutsch could have had no political significance whatever, and that *essentially*, *apart from this or any other list*, the accusation was not false, but true, and the characterisation of his political position absolutely correct.

The upshot of this painful and artificial affair of the celebrated false list is as follows:

1) One cannot but join Comrades Gorin and Lyadov in describing as unworthy Comrade Martov's attempt to asperse Comrade Gusev's honour by crying about a "disgraceful fact of the forgery of a list in the interests of a factional struggle".

2) With the object of creating a healthier atmosphere and of sparing Party members the necessity of taking every morbid extravagance seriously, it would perhaps be advisable at the Third Congress to adopt a rule such as is contained in the Rules of Organisation of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party. Paragraph 2 of these Rules runs: "No person can belong to the Party who is guilty of a gross violation of the principles of the Party programme or of dishonourable conduct. The question of continued membership in the Party shall be decided by a court of arbitration convened by the Party Executive. One half of the judges shall be nominated by the person demanding the expulsion, the other half by the person whose expulsion is demanded; the chairman shall be appointed by the Party Executive. An appeal against a

decision of the court of arbitration may be made to the Control Commission or to the Party Congress." Such a rule might serve as a good weapon against all who frivolously level accusations (or spread rumours) of dishonourable conduct. If there were such a rule, all such accusations would once and for all be classed as indecent slanders unless their author had the moral courage to come forward *before the Party* in the role of accuser and seek for a verdict from the competent Party institution.

LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Dear Friends,

Boris has informed me that five Central Committee members (he, Loshad, Valentin, Mitrofan,[126] and Travinsky) have passed a vote of censure on me for having voted in the Council in favour of a congress and for agitating on behalf of a congress. I request each of the five to confirm this fact or to explain it to me, for I cannot conceive *how* a member of a body can be censured for doing what it is his right and duty to do. You may not agree with him, you may recall I him from the Council, but to "censure" him is strange indeed; for as long as I sat on the Council *I could not do otherwise* than vote in accordance with my convictions. And to agitate for a congress is likewise the right of every Party member and every member of the Central Committee, so that the powers of a Party body in relation to its members do not entitle it (either formally *or morally*) to restrict any of us in the exercise of that right. All I am obliged to do is to announce that half or more of the Central Committee are opposed to a congress.

As regards the Council, the matter has now been arranged as follows: Boris has been appointed (by five votes, he says) in place of Kol. My resignation (he says) has not been accepted. I withdraw my resignation and remain on the Council. As far as that is concerned, the conflict has been settled, and I only ask for an explanation of the "censure".

But far more important is the following conflict: Boris has informed me that he finds it impossible to remain a member of the Central Committee unless I (1) stop agitating for a congress, and (2) work against a congress. Naturally, I can do neither of these things, and I have accordingly told Boris that I shall discuss the matter with *all* my colleagues on the Central Committee and shall then *let him have my reply*, which will say whether *I am* resigning from

the Central Committee or not. As regards this conflict, which threatens to lead to the resignation of one of us (or even of one of the two sections of the Central Committee), I consider it of the utmost importance to discuss it thoroughly, without heat, and with a proper knowledge of the facts. I think Boris is much to blame for having presented his "ultimatum" without reading either the *Council minutes* (highly important!) or my pamphlet,* in which I set forth the *principles* on which I take my stand. Is it wise to aggravate the conflict without going to the bottom of the matter, which is a highly complicated one?? Is it wise to aggravate it when *basically* we agree (at any rate, the declaration written in the name of the Central Committee by Valentin, which was sent to us but *did not reach us* and which Boris told me about, stresses our common stand on principles of organisation, as against the opportunist stand of the minority)? Even as regards the congress, we differ only as to the date, for Boris has no objection to a congress being convened six months or a year later. See what emerges. According to the Rules, there should be a congress next summer; I consider that *at best*, assuming that our agitation is an unqualified success, it will be *impossible* to convene one in under six months, and most likely it will take even longer. It turns out that our "difference" boils down to a matter of the date! Does it make sense to part company over that? Look at the matter from the purely political angle: Boris declares that agitation for a congress is incompatible with building up positive work, that the former is injurious to the latter. I do not agree that they are incompatible; but even assuming that Boris is right, what would be the result if he succeeded in getting those who disagree with him about this to resign from the Central Committee? The result would *unquestionably* be to intensify the agitation enormously, to exacerbate relations between the majority and the Central Committee, and to aggravate for Boris himself the business—which he finds so unpleasant—of working against a congress. Is there any sense in aggravating matters in this way? Boris says that he is against a congress because it would mean a split. I think he misjudges the position as it is today

* See pp. 201-423 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and as it is likely to be tomorrow; but even if he is right, by securing our resignation from the Central Committee he would enormously *increase* the likelihood of a split, because he would undoubtedly be aggravating the situation. To aggravate the conflict within the Central Committee would be unwise from any angle.

Essentially, the *only* difference of opinion between Boris and me is that he considers a split at the Third Congress inevitable, while I consider it unlikely. We both believe that the majority at the Third Congress will be on our side. Boris thinks that the minority will leave the Party: neither we nor Martov, he feels, will be able to restrain the extremists. I think that he fails to take account of the swiftly moving situation, which today is not what it was yesterday, and tomorrow will not be what it is today. Boris sees the situation as it existed yesterday (when the squabbling pushed principles into the background, when there *could be* hopes of smoothing things over, of toning them down, of personal concessions being successful). That situation exists no longer, as I show at length in my pamphlet, and as is shown by the general dissatisfaction with the new *Iskra* (even on the part of such mild people as the writers' group of the Central Committee in Russia). The situation today is different: principles are pushing the squabbling into the background. Today it is no longer co-optation that is the issue not by any means. The issue is *whether the new "Iskra" is right in principle*. And it is the dissatisfaction with the new *Iskra*'s principles, which is bound to keep growing, that is producing an ever stronger agitation for a congress. That is what Boris does not appreciate. Tomorrow the squabbling will recede even further into the background. On the one hand, the minority will not be in a position, morally and politically, to quit (the moment for that which existed after the League Congress is *gone*). On the other hand, as I *already declared at the Council* (I once more beg you all to be sure to read the Council minutes before rushing at this difficult problem), we by no means refuse to make terms. I say to all and sundry that I for one am *absolutely* prepared (1) to give all the old editors a guarantee that everything they write will be published at the Party's expense, without alteration or comment; (2) to suspend until the Fourth

Congress the Central Committee's right to appoint and dismiss members of the local committees; (3) to guarantee, in a special resolution, the more sensitively-felt rights of the *minority*, and even (4) *conditionally*, *as a last resort*, to make *Iskra* neutral, keeping its columns free of mutual controversy (with the help of a commission of practical workers from both sides, etc.). I think that under such circumstances the minority at the Third Congress, being only a small minority, will not venture to withdraw from the Congress. I think that at the Third Congress we shall, by formally adopted decisions, finally dispel the fantasy of a "state of siege" and bring about a position where controversies will take their course *without interfering with positive work*. And that, after all, is the crux of the whole crisis, that is what I tried to secure at the Council, and four-fifths of the congress are bound to support it! I know very well that this is what Boris wants too, but there is no achieving it without a congress. Boris is mistaken in thinking that we started the onslaught (by agitating for a congress) and that put the minority's back up. Quite the contrary: it was only after a number of letters and appeals, prior to the Council and at the Council itself, that we pronounced for a congress, and by the agitation we have only shown our strength a little. Whoever does not want to land in the ridiculous (if not worse) position of Plekhanov (read his article in No. 65) must frankly and openly take up a stand in the struggle. Nothing can now stop the agitation for a congress. One must be tolerant—neutral, if you will—towards it, and then it will not interfere with positive work. To rage against this agitation is useless.

I earnestly request a reply from *each* of the Central Committee members. It is essential to come to an understanding and clear up the matter, so that we may work together, not without some differences, perhaps, but without conflicts and without attempts to oust one another.

Written on May 13 (26), 1904

Published, with some changes, in the pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress*, by N. Shakhov, Geneva, 1904

Published according to the manuscript

STATEMENT BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The three Central Committee members Glebov, *Zverev*,[127] *and Lenin*, having discussed the differences within the Central Committee, have arrived at the following conclusions, which shall be communicated to all members of the Central Committee:

1) The differences arose over the question of summoning a congress. After Lenin and Vasilyev had declared in the Party Council in favour of a congress, the majority of the Central Committee (by five votes to four, *Travinsky*'s vote having been transferred to Comrade *Glebov*) declared against a congress. *Lenin* and *Vasilyev* thereupon announced their provisional resignation from the Council. This conflict has now been adjusted* by having *Glebov* and *Lenin* serve as the Central Committee's representatives on the Council.

2) Comrade Glebov has informed Comrade Lenin that he, Glebov, will resign from the Central Committee unless Lenin gives up agitating (outside the Central Committee) for a congress and works against a congress. Lenin, considering such an attitude to the question wrong and impermissible in principle, states that he will canvass the opinion of each of the Central Committee members and will then give his reply, which can only be whether he, Lenin, is resigning from the Central Committee or not. (What applies to Lenin likewise applies, from Comrade *Glebov*'s standpoint, to all Central Committee members sharing Lenin's view.)

3) To give an accurate picture of the differences within the Central Committee at the present time, it should be

* Concerning this see the letter by Lenin appended hereto, which has been approved by Comrade *Glebov*. (Pp. 424-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

stated that Comrade *Valentin* and Comrade *Nikitich*,[128] in the declaration written by them in March and approved by Comrade *Glebov*, stated (1) that they were emphatically opposed to co-optation at the demand of the minority; (2) that they shared the views on organisation set out in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* and (3) that they, or at least two of them, did not approve of the opportunist position of certain Party writers. As regards a congress, Comrade Glebov is convinced (1) that the difference on this question is causing a duality of policy in the Central Committee, and (2) that a congress may lead to a split. It is because he does not wish to assume responsibility for this that he declares himself bound to resign from the Central Committee. Lenin, on the other hand, considers that the Central Committee, being a body accountable to the congress, must be neutral in the matter of the congress and allow all its members freedom of agitation. As to a split, it is unlikely, for the majority are prepared in principle to make terms at the congress, even to the point of neutralising *Iskra*.

4) Pending settlement of this conflict all official steps and statements by Comrade *Glebov* and Comrade Lenin on behalf of the Central Committee shall only be undertaken by their common consent and over their joint signatures.

Central Committee members
Glebov
Zverev
Lenin

Geneva, May 26, 1904

Published, with some changes, in the pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress*, by N. Shakhov, Geneva, 1904

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE PARTY

I. Answer the tittle-tattle about Bonapartism. Nonsense. Beneath dignity to reply. Freedom of agitation for congress. No stand by Central Committee *qua talis*,* unlike Central Organ.

It's the committees that must decide, and the Central Committee invites them to weigh the pros and cons calmly and carefully, hear both sides, study the documents without undue haste, with an awareness of Party duty.

II. Call for positive work. Importance of present juncture: the war. Appeal of Central Committee delegates in the Council.** Repeat. Ideological struggle must not interfere with positive work. Impermissible forms of struggle. Differences and divergencies should not be exaggerated.

III. Attempt gradually to establish passable relations. (Karl Kautsky's appeal.[129])

Central Committee proposes terms for a *modus vivendi*:

1) The right for all *six* to publish everything at the Party's expense.

2) *Idem* for writers' group with representation at congress.

3) Suspension for a prolonged period of the appointment and dismissal of members.

4) Guarantee for a prolonged period of certain rights of the minority.

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* As such.—*Ed.*

** See pp. 145-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

5) Guarantee that *all* Party publications will be distributed and delivered at a committee's wish.

6) Truce for at least six months; the finale—a 16-page pamphlet shared half-and-half. The minority to have the last word.

Written after May 15 (28), 1904

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Published according to the manuscript

SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

MAY 31 (JUNE 13) AND JUNE 5 (18), 1904[130]

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Published according to the text
of the Council Minutes

1

SPEECHES CONCERNING AN INTER-PARTY CONFERENCE MAY 31 (JUNE 13)

I

Does the Council wish to have the Polish Socialist Party proposal read out? (*Plekhanov*: "Yes, it would be desirable.") "The Polish Socialist Party has always believed in the need for close association between the Polish and Russian socialist camps with a view to making the struggle against the common enemy—tsarism—more effective. Up to the present this was unfortunately not possible, with resultant inconveniences for both sides in their practical work. We therefore warmly welcome the re-establishment of the R.S.D.L.P. as a united whole, with central institutions responsible for all its activities, since this allows the first step to be taken towards what has long been our purpose. We realise that the prolonged absence of regular contacts between you and ourselves has given rise to a number of mutual misunderstandings and dissonances, which must be settled and smoothed out before the final framing of the desired agreement can be undertaken. Accordingly, our Central Working Committee has decided to propose to you that a conference should be held abroad at an early date at which delegates from your Party could discuss with three delegates of ours the possibilities and conditions for joint struggle by our two parties. The results of this conference could serve as the basis for an agreement to be concluded between the appropriate bodies of the R.S.D.L.P. and the P.S.P. Hoping for an early reply, etc."

In reply to this letter the Central Committee asked the P.S.P. for fuller particulars as to the nature of the conference, the exact bodies to be represented, and the proposed time and place. It also inquired how the P.S.P. would feel about having the Polish Social-Democrats take part.

The P.S.P. replied with the following letter:

"Dear Comrades,

"We were somewhat surprised by your letter, for it seems to us that the answers to the questions it asks are already contained in our original letter. The conference we propose would be of a preliminary nature, to explore the possibilities of closer association between our parties; it could, for example, work out the draft of a permanent agreement.

"Our three delegates to negotiate with you have been appointed by the Central Committee, which is between congresses the highest authority in our Party. Presumably the delegates you appoint to negotiate with us will represent the corresponding authority in your Party, or whatever body the powers to conduct such negotiations are vested in.

"We would propose meeting at some place abroad. The actual spot is a secondary matter, though Vienna would suit us best. The delegates have been appointed by our Central Committee to negotiate with your Party, and not the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, and there can therefore be no question of delegates from the latter participating."

Those are all the documents relating to the P.S.P. overtures to our Party. I for my part would say that, with the P.S.P. refusing to invite delegates from the Polish Social-Democrats to the projected conference, we cannot accept its proposal. As to the proposal of the Finns, we could consent in principle to a preliminary conference. Accordingly I think our resolution could be formulated as follows:

"The R.S.D.L.P. consents in principle to a preliminary conference with representatives of various revolutionary and opposition parties, with a view to reaching agreement on certain specific issues."

As regards Comrade Martov's proposal for a prior conference of Social-Democratic groups only, I doubt whether this is advisable, because besides the Bund, the Polish Social-Democrats, and the Proletariat Party,[131] there are

other Social-Democratic organisations in the border regions, which it would hardly be convenient to invite to the conference, while if not invited they might be offended.

II

Comrades Axelrod and Martov say the Letts have two groups. (*Martov*: "Two trends.") The way it comes out now is that we are to hold a conference with the one that gravitates towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries and *Osvobozhdeniye* and inclines towards terrorism (according to Comrade Axelrod), while the other group is very weak. We must find out more exactly how matters stand. If they are merely two trends, that is no concern of ours and we are joining forces with what is the Lettish Party. But if they are distinct groups, we may land in a very awkward position by choosing the wrong one. We must first find out both their strength and their complexion. As for the Caucasus, it should, I think, be brought into the conference. For that we must find out if there are Social-Democratic organisations there which could make common cause with us.

2

SPEECHES ON CO-OPTATION TO THE COMMITTEES AND THE RIGHT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO APPOINT NEW MEMBERS TO THEM
JUNE 5 (18)

I

In this resolution, irrespective of its practical conclusion, I would suggest altering the beginning. Since we cannot pass any decisions on the rights and wrongs of the Moscow dispute for lack of sufficient information, the resolution ought not to be linked up either with any disputes there have been. I would in general propose that where one part of an organisation lodges a complaint against the other, the other part should be notified, so as to have a chance to put its case too. For example, as regards the Moscow dispute things were not as Comrade Martov says they were. According to my information, three out of the five members wanted to co-opt two new members to the committee, and the rest were willing, only provided another member from their side was co-opted too, which would still have maintained—and even strengthened—the predominant trend. It was only the majority's categorical refusal to agree to this combination that made the Moscow comrades want to invoke the Rules. And while one Central Committee member was in favour of the committee majority's interpretation of the Rules, another Central Committee representative opposed it.

I say this only by way of a statement of fact and to have it recorded in the minutes. And so, I move that the beginning of Comrade Martov's resolution be altered so that it will lay down a definite ruling to operate henceforth, in

the future. As for the ruling itself, I would suggest that all fractions be treated as a full unit.

II

This incident goes to show anew that in cases where one side lodges a complaint, the other side should at once be notified, so that it may offer its explanations. Only in that case shall we be in a position to adopt appropriate decisions on the disputes. According to our information, what happened was this. The Nikolayev Committee consisted of people belonging to the majority. Then all of them were arrested. Thereupon the Central Committee, or possibly a representative of it, appointed three members to the Nikolayev Committee, among them two who had not previously been in Nikolayev and one who had already worked there before and possessed numerous contacts. It may be that at the moment of the arrests this third one was not in Nikolayev either. When the Central Committee's candidates arrived in Nikolayev, they already found there two minority members who wanted to work, and agreed to admit them. So the fact is that the three co-opted the two. That is how it was. To verify it, inquiries can be made of the committee members, if they have not been arrested yet.... (*Martov*: "They already have....")

According to our information, the facts are quite different from what has been represented, and to my way of thinking the two majority members were right in acting as they did. The place where the candidates named by the Central Committee happen to be cannot serve as a reason for not admitting them. I again suggest passing a resolution to the effect that in cases of complaints both sides shall be given a hearing. As to the actual point at issue, I disagree with Comrade Martov's resolution in principle. The Central Committee cannot be deprived of the right to appoint its own candidates to the committees. Of course, all authority is open to abuse, but to combat that evil there is control—in the form of the press, for example, or action by the Council, etc. I join in the view that in the co-optation of new members the question of group distinctions should not be allowed to have any place. I do not know so far of a single case of the

Central Committee forcing anyone upon a committee. All this talk of forcible appointment causes it to be very careful, and sheer tact restrains it from exercising its right.

III

There are a few comments I want to make. First of all I should like to point out that the claim that two of the candidates were sent to the Nikolayev Committee from Odessa or even by the Odessa Committee is based on some sort of misunderstanding. Most likely there was a Central Committee agent in Odessa, who duly took steps to re-establish the Nikolayev Committee after the arrests. At any rate we know quite definitely that these three people were appointed to it by the Central Committee, not anybody else. I say this in passing, so as to remove any possible misunderstandings on this score. Secondly, Comrade Martov's statement that he too does not know of a single case of the Central Committee forcing its candidates on local committees is very important, particularly as the editorial board, through its agents, has full information about what goes on in the Party. As to the young woman who Comrade Martov says demanded to be co-opted to the Moscow Committee without a ballot, that example can hardly carry any weight, for we do not know either the circumstances of the case or the extent of her authorisation; and anyway, she was in fact admitted to the committee only after a ballot. Thirdly, I also think it very important to note Comrade Martov's remark that in normal conditions the Central Committee's power of influencing the composition of the local committees cannot be restricted. It has been said here that people accuse the Central Committee of artificially "manufacturing" the committees; but then, accusations of a similar nature are not infrequently to be heard against the Central Organ. And since, as acknowledged by Comrade Martov himself, there are in reality no such cases, and the whole thing comes down to no more than the *possibility* of them, I don't think that is a sufficient reason for restricting the Central Committee's powers, particularly as in practice the mere fact of such an approach will arouse a certain resentment. I am quite ready to concur in Comrade Martov's opinion that the two members of the

Nikolayev Committee whom he speaks of are very valuable revolutionary workers—but then, they *were*, in point of fact, admitted to the committee.

In general, one may say that, precisely because of the various imputations that have been current recently, the Central Committee has acted with the greatest circumspection and has been in no haste to avail itself of its right to appoint new members to the local organisations. And I have nothing against these cautious tactics being formally laid down for a time, by way of precluding and putting an end to false rumours about the Central Committee.

As regards our point about notifying the other side in cases of a complaint being lodged, I move the following resolution: "The Party Council requests Party organisations, in all cases of a complaint or inquiry being addressed to it by any part of an organisation, immediately and fully to notify the other part of the organisation of the contents of that complaint or inquiry, for in order to settle disputes the Party Council must have a statement of both sides of the case. The same applies to complaints by one organisation against another."[132]

3

SPEECH ON THE NEWSPAPER *RASSVET*[133]
JUNE 5 (18)

Unfortunately, there is not very much I can say in defence of *Rassvet*. So far this experiment does have to be acknowledged not altogether successful. Bonch-Bruyevich is not an experienced journalist and was entitled to expect help from other Party writers. This help was not forthcoming, and under the circumstances it is not fair to put all the blame for the failure on him alone. It is only five months so far since the beginning of publication. The paper may still get on its feet, particularly if other writers come to its aid. Something has, after all, been accomplished: contacts among the sects are broadening, both in America and in Russia. It should also be mentioned that financially this publication does not tax the Party's resources, since it is financed out of other funds. I think closing it down would be premature and move that the experiment be continued.

WHAT WE ARE WORKING FOR

(TO THE PARTY)[134]

A private meeting was recently held of nineteen members of the R.S.D.L.P. (among them Second Congress delegates, members of committees and other Party organisations, and revolutionaries not belonging to any Party organisation). This conference of persons who are at one in sharing the views of the Second Party Congress majority discussed our Party crisis and ways and means of overcoming it, and decided to address the following appeal to all Russian Social-Democrats.

Comrades, the grave crisis in our Party is dragging on interminably. The strife keeps growing, breeding dispute after dispute, disastrously hampering positive work all along the line, and increasingly destroying the bond between the Party and its Central Organ, which has definitely become the organ of a circle and mainly an émigré circle at that. That organ is manufacturing differences, ferreting out old questions that have long been settled and are a thing of the past; it coquettes with the consistent opportunists and betrays incredible confusion in its thinking; it shamelessly ignores the Party Congress, its debates and decisions, and mocks at Party organisation and discipline and at the majority of the revolutionaries who created the Party and are doing the work on the spot; basing itself on unprovable allegations and unauthenticated anonymous reports, it carpingly and maliciously crows over shortcomings in the work of the committees of the Party's revolutionary wing. That is what we are getting from the new *Iskra*, which has become a fountainhead of strife; that is what we are getting from the editorial board which the Congress rejected, and which has taken

advantage of personal concessions to start new squabbles over co-optation and disrupt the Party.

Yet the historical juncture Russia is now passing through calls for the exertion of all our Party's energies. The revolutionary unrest among the working class and the ferment among other sections of the population is growing apace; the war and crisis, starvation and unemployment are undermining the foundations of the autocracy ever more deeply; a shameful end to the shameful war is not far off, and it is bound to heighten the revolutionary unrest still more, it will bring the working class face to face with its enemies, and will require the most vigorous offensive action on the part of the Social-Democrats. A united Party organisation, a consistent revolutionary Marxist line, decent and dignified bounds to the internal struggle in the Party so as to prevent its becoming disruptive and hampering positive work—these are urgent demands of the entire working-class movement of Russia, and they must be satisfied immediately and at all costs, or the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will risk completely forfeiting its good name and all the influence it has won.

The first step towards this end, in our opinion, is to establish the fullest clarity, frankness, and outspokenness in the relations between the various groups, trends, and shades in our Party. There are times, to be sure, when in the interests of the work minor differences should be passed over in silence; but to think that the present is such a moment in our Party's life would be a most deplorable and unpardonable mistake. Personal concessions to the minority did not check the strife, the disputed issues have now been put point-blank, a direct challenge has been hurled at the entire Party, and only flabby and ignorant individuals can dream of bringing back the irrevocable past, of concealing, withholding, glossing over or shutting their eyes to anything. No, the policy of washing one's hands, the policy of passive abstention, the policy of *laisser faire*, *laisser passer* has already proved its utter futility in our Party struggle. Any further evasion, equivocation or concealment would be not only fruitless and contemptible, but downright criminal. We are taking the initiative of making a frank and full statement of our programme of struggle within the Party;

and we call on the representatives of each and every shade in the Russian Social-Democratic movement, whether already belonging to the Party or intending to join it under certain conditions, to do likewise. Only complete clarity and frankness can furnish all class-conscious workers and all members of the Party with the material for a rational and firm decision of the disputed Party issues.

We uphold the standpoint of the Second Party Congress majority. We consider that the erroneous position of the Congress minority, and their determination to persist in this position regardless of the will of the Party, was the prime cause of all subsequent mistakes and of all the strife. The error in that position was twofold: firstly, the old editorial circle of *Iskra* could look for support to no one but the opportunist wing of our Congress and our Party; secondly, this alliance with acknowledged opportunists (who were, and are, headed by Comrade Akimov) took final shape and became a Party division only over such an issue as the elections to the central bodies. From the first error there logically and inevitably followed all that confusion as to principle and all that opportunist wobbling which we find in the thinking of the new *Iskra*, insofar as that thinking can be considered to be based on principle at all. From the second error followed their insistence on the old editorial circle against the will of the Party, their defence and justification of the circle spirit as against the party spirit, their employment in our controversies of methods only associated with philistine squabbling and circle wrangling, but certainly not with a struggle among Party members who respect their Party and themselves. From the first error it followed as a logical and inevitable consequence that those who rallied around the minority included all who tend towards opportunism, all who want to drag the Party back and be revenged for injuries done by the revolutionary Social-Democrats to their opponents, all who express the intellectualist trend in our movement, all who incline towards the intellectual's anarchistic rejection of organisation and discipline. From the second error followed the supremacy of an émigré circle over the majority of the Party workers in Russia and the orgy of specifically émigré brawling which among the minority takes the place of methods of persuasion.

There is no longer any room for doubt. No one who is a Party member not only in name, no one who really wants to uphold the vital interests of our working-class movement, can hesitate now. The minority have declared war and are fighting all along the line; and we accept the challenge and declare that the war will be relentless, a war to a finish. We are fighting against the circle spirit in general, and the old editorial circle in particular, on behalf of the party spirit. We are fighting in the interests of the working-class movement in Russia against émigré squabbling. We are fighting on behalf of the revolutionary proletarian trend in our movement against the opportunist intellectualist trend. We are fighting for the consistent revolutionary Social-Democratic line against vacillation, zigzags, and reversions to the long-obsolete past. We are fighting for a close-knit Party organisation of our working-class vanguard and against intellectualist license, disorganisation, and anarchy. We are fighting for respect for Party congresses and against spineless veering about, against divergence of word and deed, against contempt for agreements and decisions adopted by common consent. We are fighting for publicity in the Party as against the new *Iskra*'s and the new Party Council's tactics of keeping their minutes a secret and gagging the majority.

From our programme of struggle the methods and immediate aims of that struggle follow of themselves. The first method is all-embracing agitation, spoken and written, on the widest possible scale. This point would not be worth dwelling on were it not that the minority's squabbling has given rise in our Party to the notorious "conciliatory trend" (so justly ridiculed by the Ekaterinoslav Committee and many other organisations), which hides its head under its wing and preaches that the majority should cease its struggle against the minority. The existence of such childish views, unworthy of any adult Party member, can only be attributed to faint-heartedness, weariness, or remoteness from reality. One may and should demand that the party struggle be confined within party bounds, one may and should use other means besides exhortation to secure it; but the proposal to cease upholding what was upheld before the entire Party at the Congress and what is deemed essential in the Party's

vital interests—such a proposal, if anyone dared to make it publicly, would only earn universal contempt.

The second, and decisive, means of struggle, in our opinion, is a Party congress. We unreservedly support those committees which demand that the Third Party Congress be summoned immediately. We consider it our duty, in particular, to deal with the hypocritical arguments which the editors of the new *Iskra* and their overt and covert abettors bring against a congress, while assiduously concealing these arguments (which are scarcely consistent with Party duty) from the eyes of the world (as is being done by the League Abroad and the *Iskra* editors, whose agitation has only partly been brought into the open and exposed by the committees). First argument: a congress would lead to a split. The very fact that the minority employ such an argument demonstrates the entire falsity of their position. For in saying that, the minority admit that the Party is against them, that their émigré circle has forced itself upon the Party and manages to maintain itself only because of the remoteness of Russia and the external difficulties under which the real revolutionaries have to work. Those who are honest towards the Party and sincerely anxious to work together will not fear a congress, but desire it, in order to put an end to the strife, bring the Party and its official bodies into conformity, and remove unseemly ambiguity. Those who hold up the bogey of a split only make it obvious that their consciences are not clear. Without the subordination of minority to majority there can be no working-class party at all worthy of the name; and if mutual (not one-sided) concessions are necessary, if arrangements and agreements between different parts of the Party have sometimes to be made, they are only possible and permissible at a congress. No self-respecting revolutionary will want to remain in a party that manages to hold together only because a party congress is artificially put off.

Second argument: a reconciliation is still possible without a congress. What this opinion is based on is unknown. Its proponents talk and act only behind the scenes. Is it not time to abandon these back-stage intrigues, which only increase mutual distrust, intensify animosity, and obscure the situation? Why is it that no one ventures to come forward publicly with a plan of reconciliation?—is it not because, the posi-

tion being what it is, no such plan is conceivable which would not at best provoke laughter? Those who understand peace to mean the co-optation of minority favourites to the Central Committee do not want peace, but intensification of the majority's struggle; they fail to understand that the struggle in the Party has once and for all outgrown the limits of a mere squabble over co-optation. Those who understand it to mean the cessation of controversy and struggle are reverting to the old circle mentality: there will always be controversy and struggle in a party, all that is necessary is to confine them within Party bounds—and that only a congress can do. In short, whichever way you turn this slogan of peace without a congress, however you revolve this idea of reconciling the contending sides without satisfying either, you will find that this brilliant idea only reflects confusion and emptiness of mind, it is the idea of people who do not know what they want and what they ought to strive for. If even the plan of so influential (formerly influential) a man as Plekhanov—to quench the fire at the very start by making the maximum personal concessions—suffered a complete fiasco, can one seriously speak of such plans now?

Third argument: the congress may be manipulated. The St. Petersburg Committee has already replied to this argument by calling it an insinuation.[135] And this statement by a local committee was a well-deserved slap in the face for those who make sneaking charges without a shadow of fact to support them, although the minority control both the supreme Council and the press organ of the Party, so that they have not only the means of publicly exposing any suspected abuses, but also the means of administrative correction and pressure. Everyone knows that if there were any such facts the minority would have trumpeted them forth long ago, and that the recent Council resolution, which shows that there have been no such facts in the past, rules out their possibility in the future.[136] By resorting to this argument *Iskra* only shows yet again that instead of controversy it now engages in fishwives' abuse, and compels us to turn to all Party members and ask: Have we in fact a party? Do we want to follow the Socialist-Revolutionaries' example and rest content with a facade and signboard, or is it not rather our duty to tear down all shams?

PROPERTY OF MARXIST COMMUNIST PARTY NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Fourth argument: the differences have not yet been clarified. The best answer to that argument is supplied by the new *Iskra* itself, a study of which will show the Party that differences are being manufactured, not clarified, and that the confusion is growing endlessly. Only a congress, at which all comrades can openly and fully state their wishes, can bring clarity into these incredibly confused issues and this confused situation.

Fifth argument: a congress would divert forces and funds from positive work. This argument, too, sounds like a dismal mockery, for no greater diversion of forces and funds can be imagined than that which the strife is producing.

No, all the arguments against a congress testify either to hypocrisy or to ignorance of the position and pusillanimous doubts of the Party's strength. Our Party is again very sick, but it has strength enough to recover and become worthy of the Russian proletariat. As the methods of cure we would recommend the three following reforms, which we shall work for by every available loyal means.

Firstly, the editorship of the Central Organ to be handed over to the adherents of the Second Party Congress majority.

Secondly, the local organisation abroad (the League) to be subordinated in fact to the all-Russia central organisation (the Central Committee).

Thirdly, the Rules to provide guarantees that Party struggles are conducted by Party methods.

Regarding these three fundamental points of our programme little remains to be added after what has already been said. That the old editorial board of *Iskra* has now palpably demonstrated its unfitness, we consider incontrovertible. It is not *Iskra*-ism that has outlived its day, as Comrade Martov professed to discover after his defeat in the elections, but the old *Iskra* editorial board. It would be sheer hypocrisy not to say that bluntly now, after the challenges this circle has flung down to the entire Party. On the abnormal position of the organisation abroad, which has converted itself into a second (if not a third) leadership and completely ignores the Party's Central Committee, there is no need to expatiate at length. Lastly, the entire experience of the post-Congress struggle compels us to give thought to the juridical position of the minority (any minority) in our Party. That

experience shows, we are convinced, that it is necessary to include in the Party Rules guarantees of minority rights, so that the dissatisfactions, irritations and conflicts that will constantly and unavoidably arise may be diverted from the accustomed philistine channels of rows and squabbling into the still unaccustomed channels of a constitutional and dignified struggle for one's convictions. As one of these essential guarantees, we propose that the minority be allowed one or more writers' groups, with the right to be represented at congresses and with complete "freedom of speech". In general, the widest guarantees should be given as regards publication of Party literature criticising the activities of the central Party institutions. The committees should be given the right to receive (through the general Party transport system) the particular Party publications they desire. The Central Committee's right to influence the personal composition of the committees otherwise than by advice should, until the Fourth Congress, be suspended. We do not here elaborate our proposals in detail, for we are not compiling draft Rules, but only a general programme of struggle. We consider it highly important that the arrangements for publication of minority literature which the Central Committee proposed to the minority of the Second Congress should be incorporated in the Rules, in order that dissatisfaction may find seemly forms of expression, that the foolish fantasy of a state of siege (invented by the heroes of co-optation) may be finally and completely dispelled, and that the inevitable internal struggles in the Party may not interfere with positive work.

We must teach our minority to fight about the personal composition of the central bodies only at congresses, and not hamper our work after congresses by squabbling; we must achieve this if our Party is not to perish. Lastly, in this general programme we shall only briefly mention certain specific amendments we would wish to see made in the Rules, 9, to wit: the conversion of the Council from a tripartite arbitration body into a body elected by the Congress amendment of Paragraph 1 of the Rules along the lines advocated by the Second Congress majority, with the inclusion among Party organisations of all workers' organisations and all groups of Russian Social-Democrats which had an indepen-

dent existence during the circle period and which desire to join the Party, etc., etc.

In putting forward this programme of our struggle within the Party, we invite all Party organisations and the representatives of all shades in the Party to make a statement of their own programmes, so as to permit of gradual, serious, circumspect, and judicious preparation for a congress.

We have no Party—the conspirators in our editorial palace coup said to themselves, banking on the remoteness of Russia, the frequent changes of workers there, and on their own indispensability. Our Party is coming into being!—say we, seeing the committees awakening to active intervention, seeing the growing political understanding of the advanced workers. Our Party is coming into being; we have ever more numerous young forces capable both of reinvigorating and of replacing decrepit literary bodies; we have revolutionaries, and their number is steadily growing, who prize the trend of the old *Iskra* that schooled them above any editorial circle. Our Party is coming into being, and no subterfuges or delays, no senile malicious vituperation of the new *Iskra* can hold back the decided and final verdict of this Party.

From these new forces in our Party we derive our certainty of victory.

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TO THE PARTY

A private meeting was recently held of twenty-two members of the R.S.D.L.P.,[137] persons who are at one in sharing the views of the Second Party Congress majority. This conference discussed our Party crisis and ways and means of overcoming it, and decided to address the following appeal to all Social-Democrats of Russia:

Comrades, the grave crisis in our Party life is dragging on and on, and no end is in sight. The strife keeps growing, breeding dispute after dispute, and the Party's positive work all along the line is hampered by it to the utmost. The energies of the Party, still young and not yet consolidated, are being grievously dissipated.

Yet the present historical juncture makes vast demands on the Party, vaster than ever before. The revolutionary unrest among the working class is growing, and so is the ferment among other sections of society; the war and crisis, starvation and unemployment are with elemental and inevitable force undermining the foundations of the autocracy. A shameful end to the shameful war is not far off; and it is bound to heighten the revolutionary unrest still more, it is bound to bring the working class face to face with its enemies, and it will require of the Social-Democrats tremendous effort, a colossal exertion of energy to organise the last decisive fight against the autocracy.

Is our Party equal to these demands in its present condition? Every honest man will unhesitatingly answer: No!

The unity of the Party has been deeply undermined, its internal struggle has gone beyond all party bounds. Organised discipline has been shaken to its very foundations, and

the Party's capacity for harmonious and united action is fading into a mere dream.

Nonetheless, we regard the Party's sickness as a matter of growing pains. We consider that the underlying cause of the crisis is the transition from the circle form to party forms of the life of Social-Democracy; the essence of its internal struggle is a conflict between the circle spirit and the party spirit. And, consequently, only by shaking off this sickness can our Party become a *real* party.

Under the name of the Party "minority" there have united a variety of elements who are linked by a conscious or unconscious desire to preserve circle relationships, pre-party forms of organisation.

Certain prominent figures in the more influential of the former circles, unaccustomed to the organisational self-limitations which Party discipline demands, are inclined from force of habit to confuse their own circle interests with the general Party interests, with which in the period of the circles they may in many cases indeed have coincided. A number of these people (part of the former *Iskra* editorial board, part of the former Organising Committee, the members of the former *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, and others) have been the leaders in a struggle on behalf of the circle spirit as against the party spirit.

Their allies proved to be all those elements who in theory or practice had deviated from the principles of strict Social-Democracy (the Economists, *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, etc.), for only the circle atmosphere could preserve the ideological individuality and the influence of these elements, whereas the Party atmosphere threatened to absorb them or deprive them of all influence. Lastly, the opposition cadres have in general been drawn chiefly from those elements in our Party which consist primarily of intellectuals. The intelligentsia is always more individualistic than the proletariat, owing to its very conditions of life and work, which do not directly involve a large-scale combination of efforts, do not directly educate it through organised collective labour. The intellectual elements therefore find it harder to adapt themselves to the discipline of Party life, and those of them who are not equal to it naturally raise the standard of revolt against the necessary organisational limitations, and elevate

their instinctive anarchism to a principle of struggle, misnaming it a desire for "autonomy", a demand for "tolerance", etc.

The section of the Party abroad, where the circles are comparatively long-lived, where theoreticians of various shades are gathered, and where the intelligentsia decidedly predominates, was bound to be most inclined to the views of the "minority", which there as a result soon proved to be the actual majority. Russia, on the other hand, where the voice of the organised proletarians is louder, where the Party intelligentsia too, being in closer and more direct contact with them, is trained in a more proletarian spirit, and where the exigencies of the immediate struggle make the need for organised unity more strongly felt, came out in vigorous opposition to the circle spirit and the disruptive anarchistic tendencies. It gave quite clear expression to this attitude in numerous statements by committees and other Party organisations.

The struggle developed and grew increasingly acute. And to what lengths has it not gone!

The Party organ, of which the "minority" managed to seize control against the will of the Congress and thanks to personal concessions by the editors elected at the Congress, has become an organ of struggle against the Party!

It is now least of all the ideological leader of the Party in its struggle against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, and most of all the leader of circle opposition to the party spirit. On the one hand, conscious that its fundamental position is indefensible from the standpoint of the Party's interests, it is busy searching out real and imaginary differences to provide an ideological screen for that position; and in this search, seizing on one slogan one day and on another the next, it is turning more and more for its material to the Right wing of the Party—the former opponents of *Iskra*—and drawing ever closer to them ideologically, trying to rehabilitate their theories, which the Party has rejected, and to turn the Party's ideological life back to what had already seemed the bygone period of vagueness of principle-and ideological wavering and vacillation. On the other hand, in an endeavour to undermine the moral influence of the Party majority, the new *Iskra* is even busier searching out

and denouncing mistakes on the part of their adherents, magnifying every real slip to monstrous proportions and trying to lay the blame for it on the Party majority as a whole, and seizing on every insinuation and piece of circle gossip that could prove damaging to its opponents, often enough not even troubling about their verisimilitude, let alone verifying their truth. In this course the men of the new *Iskra* have gone so far as to impute to members of the majority absolutely non-existent and in fact impossible crimes—and not only of a political nature (as when they accuse the Central Committee of forcibly ejecting individuals and breaking up organisations), but even crimes against common ethics (as when prominent figures in the Party are accused of forgery or moral complicity in forgery). Never before has the Party been immersed in such a sea of mud as the émigré minority have stirred up in the present controversy.

How could all this have happened?

The mode of action of each of the sides corresponded to its fundamental trend. The Party majority, anxious at all costs to preserve the Party's unity and organisational cohesion, fought only by loyal Party means, and more than once made concessions for the sake of reaching a reconciliation. The minority, following an anarchistic trend, showed no concern for peace and unity in the Party. They turned every concession into a weapon with which to continue the fight. Of all the minority's demands, only one has not now been met—that discord should be brought into the Party's Central Committee by the co-optation of minority men forcibly foisted upon it; yet the attacks of the minority are more vicious than ever. Having gained control of the Central Organ and the Party Council, the minority do not scruple to exploit in their circle interests the very discipline that they are in fact fighting.

The position has become intolerable, impossible; to allow it to drag on any longer would be a positive crime.

The first means of ending it, in our opinion, is complete clarity and frankness in Party relations. Amidst all this mud and fog there is no finding the true path. Every Party trend, every group must openly and definitely state what it thinks of the present position in the Party and what solution it desires. And that is what we are proposing to all

comrades, to the representatives of all shades in the Party. The practical way out of the crisis, we consider, is the immediate summoning of the Third Party Congress. It alone can clarify the situation, settle the disputes, and confine the struggle within proper bounds. Without a congress all we can expect is the progressive disintegration of the Party.

All the arguments brought against a congress are, we maintain, totally invalid.

We are told that a congress would lead to a split. But why? If the minority are irreconcilable in their anarchistic leanings, if they are prepared to have a split rather than submit to the Party, then they have already virtually seceded from it, and to defer the inevitable formal split would be more than irrational: chained together, both sides would more and more senselessly dissipate their strength in wrangling and squabbling, exhausting themselves morally and growing ever pettier and shallower. But we do not grant the possibility of a split. In face of the real strength of the organised Party, the anarchistically minded elements are bound to, and we think will, bow in submission, for by their very nature they are incapable of constituting an independent force. It is argued that a reconciliation is possible without a congress. But what sort of reconciliation? Total surrender to the circle spirit, co-optation of the minority to the Central Committee, which would complete the disorganisation of the central institutions. That would make the Party nothing but a name, and the Party majority would be compelled to start the struggle anew. And the minority? They have used every concession hitherto won only as a buttress for their disruptive activities; even from their point of view, the struggle has far outgrown the bounds of a squabble over co-optation; how then can they discontinue it? And still less will they do so if they have not gained all their demands. We are told that a congress will not achieve its purpose because the differences have not yet been clarified. But are they being clarified now, is not the confusion growing worse confounded? Differences are not being clarified, but deliberately searched out and manufactured, and only a congress can put an end to this. It alone, by bringing the contending parties face to face and making them frankly and definitely state their objects, can thoroughly clarify

the mutual relations between the different trends and forces in the Party. But, the minority declare, the congress may be manipulated by the breaking up of organisations. That is a lying insinuation, we reply, an insinuation unsupported by a single fact. If there were any such facts, we may be sure that the minority, being in possession of the Party organ, would have given them wide publicity, and, controlling the Party Council as they do, would have had ample opportunity to correct them. Lastly, the recent Council resolution, which points to no such facts in the past, completely rules out their possibility in the future. Who is now going to believe this far-fetched insinuation? Fears are expressed that a congress would divert too much of our forces and funds from positive work. What a bitter mockery! Can any greater diversion of forces and funds, be imagined than that which the strife is producing? A congress is imperative! It would be imperative even if Party life had proceeded normally, in view of the exceptional historical juncture and the new tasks with which the world events may confront the Party. It is doubly imperative in the present Party crisis, in order to find an honest and reasonable way out of it, to preserve the forces of the Party and uphold its honour and dignity.

What must the Third Congress do to put an end to the strife and restore Party life to normal? Most essential for this, in our view, are the following reforms, which we shall advocate and work for by every available loyal means:

I. The editorship of the Central Organ to be handed over to the adherents of the Party majority. The need for this, in view of the manifest inability of the present editorial board to conduct the Central Organ as required by the general Party interests, has been sufficiently demonstrated. The organ of a circle cannot and must not be the organ of the Party.

II. The relationship of the local organisation abroad (the League) to the all-Russia central body, the Central Committee, to be clearly defined. The present position of the League, which has converted itself into a second Party leadership and manages its associated groups without any control, completely ignoring the Central Committee, is obviously abnormal and must be ended.

III. The Rules to provide guarantees that Party struggles are conducted by Party methods. That this reform is essential is shown by the entire experience of the post-Congress struggle. It is necessary to include in the Party Rules guarantees of the rights of any minority, so that the disagreements, dissatisfactions, and irritations that will constantly and unavoidably arise may be diverted from the old, philistine, circle channels of rows and squabbling into the still unaccustomed channels of a constitutional and dignified struggle for one's convictions. Among the conditions needed for such a change we class the following. The minority should be allowed one or more writers' groups, with the right to be represented at congresses; the widest formal guarantees should be given as regards publication of Party literature criticising the activities of the central Party institutions. The right of the committees to receive (through the general Party transport system) the particular Party publications they desire should be formally recognised. The limits of the Central Committee's right to influence the personal composition of the committees should be precisely defined. We consider it highly important that the arrangements for publication of minority literature which the Central Committee proposed to the minority of the Second Congress should be incorporated in the Rules, in order that the fantasy of a "state of siege" invented by the minority themselves may be dispelled, and that the inevitable internal struggles in the Party may be conducted in seemly forms and not allowed to interfere with positive work.

We do not here elaborate our proposals in detail, for we are not putting forward draft Rules, but only a general programme of struggle for Party unity. We shall therefore only briefly indicate certain specific amendments to the Rules which are in our opinion desirable, without in any way binding ourselves as regards subsequent elaboration of the Rules, in the light of further experience. For example, it is necessary to reform the Party Council, as an institution which, in its present form, has proved in practice to be unfit for its function of co-ordinating and exercising supreme supervision over the activities of the central bodies. It should be made a body entirely elected by the Congress, instead of being a court where the Congress-elected fifth member sits as

arbiter over the central bodies, which defend themselves through their delegates. Further, Paragraph 1 of the Rules should be revised, in line with the criticisms voiced in the Party, to define the Party's boundaries more precisely, etc.

In putting forward this programme of struggle for Party unity, we invite the representatives of all other shades and all Party organisations to make a clear statement of their own programmes, so as to permit of serious and systematic, conscious and methodical preparation for a congress. An issue involving the very life, the honour and dignity of the Party is at stake: is it an ideological and material force capable of sufficient rational self-organisation to act as the real leader of our country's revolutionary working-class movement? By all their actions, the émigré minority answer: No! And they continue to act in this way with confident assurance, banking on the remoteness of Russia, the frequent changes of workers there, and the indispensability of their own leaders and literary forces. Our Party is coming into being!—we answer, seeing the growing political understanding of the advanced workers, the vigorous activity of the committees in general Party life. Our Party is coming into being, we have ever more numerous young forces capable of replacing or reinvigorating old literary bodies which forfeit the Party's confidence; we have ever more revolutionaries who prize the consistent Party trend above any circle of former leaders. Our Party is coming into being, and no subterfuges or delays can hold back its decided and final verdict.

From these forces in our Party we derive our certainty of victory.

Comrades, reprint and distribute this appeal!

Written in the early part of August 1904

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TO FIVE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

FOR RUSSIA

August 18, 1904

To Members of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., Glebov, Konyagin,[138] Travinsky, Loshad, and Osipov.

I was informed today, through the Central Committee's Berlin agent, of the decisions taken by four (?) members of the Central Committee at their meeting in Russia.[139] I cannot acknowledge these decisions lawfully adopted, for the following reasons:

1) The statement at the beginning of the resolution that the meeting was attended by all Central Committee members but one (that is, myself) is *not true*. After the arrest of Vasilyev and Zverev and the resignation of Mitrofanov,[140] the Central Committee still has another member—Comrade Osipov. The rumours of his resignation have proved false: Comrade Osipov himself considers that he is a member of the Central Committee. That was also the view of Vasilyev (who wrote to me about it), Zverev, and myself. In any case, the four Central Committee members had no right to declare Osipov no longer a member without first clarifying the matter of his alleged resignation. It has to be added that neither I nor the Central Organ nor any of the Central Committee's foreign agents was ever formally notified of Osipov's resignation. Yet Osipov was not invited to the meeting.

2) I too, so far from being invited to the meeting, was not even informed of it or notified of the matters to be discussed. The Central Committee has of course the right to decide matters by a majority vote, but its decisions cannot be lawful

unless all members have been given the opportunity to share in the proceedings and, if necessary, enter a dissenting opinion. I was denied that opportunity *altogether unlawfully*.

3) The four Central Committee members have not stated their attitude to the agreement of May 26, 1904, between Glebov and myself, although that agreement and my accompanying letter were, with Glebov and Zverev's consent, sent to all members of the Central Committee with the request to give me a direct answer. The majority on the Central Committee are fully entitled to overrule the minority, but certainly not to evade official inquiries by the minority and issues expressly raised by the minority for discussion.

4) In view of the above I demand an immediate answer from the four Central Committee members to the following: a) on what grounds was Comrade Osipov, a member of the Central Committee, not invited to the meeting? b) ditto as regards myself; c) do they recognise that the majority of a body has the right to adopt decisions in the name of the body as a whole only if the minority has been invited to the proceedings and given the opportunity to state its views and enter a dissenting opinion? d) do they recognise their obligation to give an answer on the substance of all the issues raised in the agreement of May 26, 1904?

5) Since the four Central Committee members have communicated their unlawfully adopted decisions (as supposed decisions of the whole Central Committee) to the Central Organ, I am obliged to address a letter regarding their mode of procedure to Party workers whom this matter rather closely concerns.

Central Committee member *N. Lenin*

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Published according
to the manuscript

LETTER TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE AGENTS AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. SIDING WITH THE SECOND PARTY CONGRESS MAJORITY

Comrades,

The conflict within the Central Committee has reached such a pitch that I consider myself morally obliged to bring it to the knowledge of all who support the Second Party Congress majority. I am compelled to do so both by the unlawful proceedings of four members of the Central Committee and by the fear of again taking some incautious step harmful to the Party (such as my resignation from the editorial board) unless I consult like-minded comrades who are working on the spot, who have a better knowledge of the real sentiment in the Party, and who have in fact, and not merely in word, declared war on the old émigré circle spirit in the name of the young party spirit.

What the conflict within the Central Committee consists in will be seen from the four appended documents: 1) the agreement of May 26, 1904, between three Central Committee members—Glebov, Zverev, and Lenin; 2) my letter of the same date to the members of the Central Committee; 3) a resolution allegedly adopted by all members of the Central Committee but one; 4) my protest impeaching the lawfulness of this alleged resolution.[141]

I would earnestly request all like-minded comrades in the present struggle in the Party to read these instructive documents carefully, and frankly and unreservedly state their opinion concerning them. I for my part shall refrain from any public statement in the press on these issues, at least for a time, until I know the views of some of those working

in Russia, or until compelled to such a statement by events.

I shall confine myself here to a few questions to the Party, if the members of our organisations find that we do in fact have a party: 1) can a working-class party worthy of the name tolerate a Central Committee, elected by the majority, that proclaims the policy of the majority to be a "group" policy? 2) are people morally entitled to our confidence who in a declaration written in March say one thing and in July quite another?—3) people who take advantage of the arrest of two majority members of the Central Committee to trample on the interests of the majority?—4) people who in the name of combating group policies talk of a conference with the minority group, ignoring the majority?—5) people who are afraid of having their actions judged by a congress, and for that reason dare to intimidate the Party with the prospect of a split and to "forbid" Party members their elementary right of agitating for a congress?—6) people so childishly incapable of understanding our Party crisis that they insist in all seriousness on the "legitimacy" of the Central Organ and decree the "*high standard*" of that Central Organ?—7) people who, in deliberate defiance of the will of the Party, try to oust consistent adherents of the Party majority from the Central Committee?

I conclude with the request for an answer to these questions and for steps to be taken to acquaint all active Party members with the situation and with this letter. I don't think there is any necessity for the present of publishing the letter.

Central Committee member *N. Lenin*

Written on August 5 (18), 1904

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to the manuscript

LETTER TO GLEBOV (V. A. NOSKOV)

September 11, 1904

Dear Comrade,

You again repeat that the wish that I join the editorial board of the Central Organ was expressed "by the Central Committee". And I for my part must repeat that this is, to say the least, inaccurate. When you formally stated that the Central Committee's declaration had been adopted unanimously by a meeting of all its members but one, I replied immediately (August 18, 1904) that this was not true. The declaration was signed by three Central Committee members[142] out of the recent total of nine; and these three quite unlawfully proclaimed Comrade Osipov no longer a member of the Central Committee, whereas he informed me in writing that he still considered himself a member. It was unlawful to declare that a comrade had resigned without having discussed the matter with him. Both the arguments with which you and your two colleagues tried to justify this unlawful act are patently unsound. You said that Comrade Osipov had formally announced his resignation at the preceding regular meeting of the Central Committee. That is not true, for at the end of May (that is, months after that meeting, which took place in February or March) the Central Committee still counted nine members, as is certified by the agreement of May 26, 1904, signed by three members of the Central Committee, and the letter appended to that agreement.* You said that after that Central Committee meeting Comrade Osipov had joined one of the local committees, which a member of the Central Committee would have had no right to do.

* See pp. 424-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Comrade Osipov had already written to me on this point, stating that he had gone to take part in the local work in the district in question on the instructions of those very members of the Central Committee who now declare that he has resigned, and that he had not worked as a formal member of the committee. Besides, even if it were a fact that a member of the Central Committee had irregularly and in contravention of the Rules joined a local committee, it does not at all follow that to correct this irregularity he had necessarily to resign from the Central Committee, and not from the local committee. Lastly, you yourself had to admit in your letter to me that the meeting of the three Central Committee members was informed that Comrade Osipov's resignation was a disputed matter. That this disputed matter should have been decided by three Central Committee members in the absence of Osipov, and without even hearing his opinion, was a patent and outrageous piece of lawlessness. Of course, the three Central Committee members could count on the support of the Party Council, which is controlled by the editors; of course, the three Central Committee members could rely on their formal or tacit compact with the minority adherents on the Council. But that does not make their action lawful; on the contrary, it aggravates its unlawfulness by elements of political bad faith. Similarly, it was unlawful for the three Central Committee members to accept the resignation of Comrade Travinsky, of which all members of the Central Committee had not been informed prior to the meeting. To this day you have not been able to tell me exactly when this resignation was tendered, and to whom. You disposed of the matter with a reply that sounded like a sneer: "Make inquiries of the collegium in Russia"—that is, the "collegium" (that very same collegium of three!) from which you had just come and with which I have no means of communicating except through you!!

Hence, I challenge the lawfulness of the composition of the Central Committee and of its last meeting (at which the "declaration" was adopted). I should therefore be fully entitled to leave unanswered your proposal that I join the editorial board of the Central Organ. But I regard this proposal as coming not from the Central Committee but from three members of the Party, and consider it my duty to

give a reasoned reply, the more so since you say it is the wish of the editors of the Central Organ, stated to you in writing, to have me on the editorial board.

You suggest that my joining the editorial board of the Central Organ "would secure almost complete peace in the Party, which you are so anxious to have". This "almost" of yours is highly significant! Yes, I am anxious to have peace in the Party. I made an offer of peace in printed form in December 1903, in my "Letter to the Editors of *Iskra* (Why I Resigned from the Editorial Board)".* I made another offer of peace, officially, in the Party Council in January 1904.** Peace was not accepted on the terms I offered then on behalf of the majority. I may remark that, contrary to the present fashion of mouthing hypocritical phrases about "peace", when by peace is meant complete surrender to the minority, complete ignoring of the majority, and complete oblivion of the Congress, I said quite definitely in the Council what I understood by peace in the Party. With my then fellow delegate from the Central Committee on the Council, I plainly stated that by peace I meant purging the ideological struggle of all contention over post and place, of all squabbling and underhand methods of fighting. Let the minority have the Central Organ and the majority the Central Committee I proposed then, let us call on everyone to stop all boycotts and all squabbling over posts and co-optation and argue out our differences and the causes of our divergence at the Congress in a comradely manner, let us train the Party to discuss its internal disagreements in an honest and dignified way. My appeal was ridiculed by Plekhanov and Martov. I am not surprised that they took the disgraceful decision to withhold publication of the Council minutes (in spite of the insistence of the minority of the Council, namely, the two representatives of the Central Committee), or that the three Central Committee members have now (clandestinely) endorsed that decision. People who would arrange a hypocritical peace, taking advantage of the accidents unavoidable in the lives of Russian revolutionaries and ousting from the Central Committee those who think differently from them-

* See pp. 118-24 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 145-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

selves,* are bound to want to conceal from the Party membership a timely attempt to achieve an honest peace. Fortunately, I have reason to believe that this miserable trick to deceive the Party will not succeed and that the Council minutes will see the light after all.

When the editors who had usurped control of the Council scornfully rejected my offer of peace, I declared then and there that I considered a congress the only honest way out. The tactics of the minority (including Plekhanov)—to keep control of the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Council and claim to represent on these central bodies the interests of the Party as a whole while in fact trying to secure, without a congress, a remodelling of the Central Committee in the interests of the minority—such tactics I cannot regard as honest fighting. I have never entered, and do not deem it possible to enter, into any bargains with people who follow such tactics. Besides, since January the complexion of the new *Iskra* has become quite clear; it is a central organ of tittle-tattle and squabbling, of muddled thinking and of flirting with the opportunists, of settling personal scores and searching out points of difference. That the new *Iskra* is the organ of a circle, the organ of a new "trend", is now clear to everyone, even to the editors themselves, who initially set themselves up as champions of "continuity" and now systematically drag the old *Iskra* through the mire. And so, in what sense can one now speak of peace? If by peace is meant purging the ideological struggle of squabbles over co-optation, I am still quite ready to agree to peace and to renew the proposal I made in the Council. But if by peace is meant cessation of the ideological struggle, conciliation with the line, or rather with the complexion of the new *Iskra*, for it has no such thing as a line, then such a "peace" can only be proposed by unprincipled or hypocritical people, or by people for whom the organs of the Party are so much newsprint (*Druckerschwärze*, printer's ink, as one of the "conciliators" called the writings of the new *Iskra*). If the editors of the new *Iskra*, whose position of "principle" has amounted almost

* This applies in the first place to Comrade Osipov, and secondly to me too, of course, for to propose that I join the editorial board of the Central Organ amounts to proposing that I resign from the Central Committee.

entirely to personal attacks on me, to a hue and cry against what they have dubbed "Leninism", and to a searching out of differences with me, now express the wish to have me on the editorial board, they are only admitting thereby that they do not take their own writings seriously, that they invented the whole controversy just "for the sake of co-optation" and are prepared to throw all their new "principles" overboard once co-optation has been secured. As for me, I reject as, unworthy the very suggestion that the majority could give up a Party struggle for its position, for the consistent line, against the circle spirit. In common with all principled supporters of the majority, whose numbers in Russia are growing, I consider it my inalienable right and duty to carry on this struggle. And it should, in my view, be carried on openly, for nine-tenths of the history of the conflict is already public knowledge and any further attempts to conceal it from the eyes of the world would only be a petty and senseless prolonging of the crisis.

You write that "numerous committees, too, undoubtedly wish" to see me join the present *Iskra* editorial board. I note with regret that here too you are uttering a deliberate untruth. In the present circumstances of the struggle, not one committee has up to now expressed any such wish. It has only been expressed by the editorial circle of the Central Organ and by three members of the Central Committee, who consider it the acme of political wisdom to join the minority in abusing the majority and the majority in abusing the minority. I make bold to believe that my duty is to heed, not the will of any group of politicians, but the will of the entire Party, which has also laid down the method of giving formal expression to that will, viz., the congress. I make bold to believe that a leader who adopts a certain line at the congress and leads a section of the Party along that line forfeits every claim to respect or even to having his words taken seriously if he then deserts to the side of his opponents.

Your reference to "numerous committees" is very instructive and significant, in spite of its ... divergence from the truth. It points to a shred of Party conscience, to some little recognition of the fact that official institutions appointed by the Party must take cognisance of the Party's will when

they undertake to revise the composition and line of the central bodies. If this recognition were not obscured in you by the confused position you have adopted, you would have no difficulty in seeing that there is no other way of really ascertaining the real wishes of really numerous committees than by convening a congress. But while your reference to "numerous committees" betrays a shred of Party conscience, it also points very clearly to an uneasy conscience. You fear a congress like the plague because you realise that your policy of adventures glaringly conflicts with the will of the Party.

My general views as to the hypocrisy of your peace-making are fully borne out by a number of additional facts. The three Central Committee members now admire the "high standard" of the Central Organ, while in March *these very same* three members of the Central Committee drew up a statement expressing regret that certain Party writers (the majority of the present editorial board of the Central Organ) should have lapsed into opportunism. While talking about "peace", these three Central Committee members dissolve the Southern Bureau (an agent body of the Central Committee) because majority adherents have been working on it and have had the audacity to agitate for a congress. While talking about reconciling the two contending sides, the three Central Committee members arrange a conference with representatives of one side, ignoring the other. What demoralisation is brought into the Party by these private, hole-and-corner transactions, which affect the whole Party's vital interests and which are so carefully kept from its knowledge, when there is absolutely no necessity for secrecy precautions! How much mutual distrust and suspicion is brought into the Party's whole life by these tricks behind the back of the Party! Only today I received a letter from a comrade in Russia describing the rumours that are circulating in connection with these transactions: it is said in Party circles that three sections have developed among the minority; one insists on the co-optation of Dan and Trotsky to the Central Committee, and will not hear of anything else; the second agrees to a conference; the third contents itself with the Central Committee's declaration, and this section includes the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists (who quite rightly interpret the

starting of a popular organ as nothing but a masked re-establishment of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, which the Congress closed down). I do not know what truth there is in this Party gossip. But that the minority consists of heterogeneous groups, that Comrade Brouckère, for example, probably takes no part at all in the minority's "ultimatums" or the co-optation squabble generally, and that the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group represents quite a distinct shade—these are all generally known facts, with which everyone who has studied our Party Congress is familiar. Can you really not see how degrading is all this huckstering of various groups behind the back of the Party? Is it surprising that the hypocrisy of the three Central Committee members is earning them the utter distrust of the majority, which stands aloof from all this trickery? Is it surprising that a "peace" inaugurated by dismissing people who agitate for a congress should be regarded as a prelude to the systematic faking of Party opinion? Is it surprising that the majority should suspect a deal between the Central Committee and the Central Organ (and, consequently, the Council) to force minority adherents upon the committees, to withhold publication of majority resolutions (the St. Petersburg and Ekaterinoslav resolutions have been withheld *for months already*), etc., etc.?

I hope you will now understand why, with the present situation in the Party, there can be no thought of my joining the editorial board of the Central Organ.

Your statement that I "abstained" from voting on the co-optation of three new members to the Central Committee *is not true*. I emphatically protest against considering "the elections as valid". This is another piece of lawlessness. It is the *duty* of *all three* Central Committee members to consider my protest, and only *after that* can they raise the question of co-optation. According to the Rules, co-optation must be unanimous; my consent has not been given. Consequently, without the matter being taken to the Council there can be no talk of the co-optation being valid. The decision of the Council (if you unlawfully take the co-optation issue there before a scrutiny of the composition of

the Central Committee has been made by all its members) must be sent to me together with the Council minutes.

I cannot share your regret at our not having met. After your tricks with regard to Comrade Osipov and your attitude to your pledged word (agreement of May 26, 1904), I do not wish to have anything to do with you except in a purely official way, and only in writing.

Central Committee member *N. Lenin*

Published in slightly abridged form in the pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress*, by N. Shakhov, Geneva, 1904

Published according to the manuscript

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

REPLY BY N. LENIN TO ROSA LUXEMBURG[143]

Comrade Rosa Luxemburg's article in Nos. 42 and 43 of the *Neue Zeit* is a criticism of my Russian book on the crisis in our Party.* I cannot but thank our German comrades for their attention to our Party literature and their attempts to acquaint German Social-Democrats with it, but I must point out that Rosa Luxemburg's *Neue Zeit* article does not acquaint the reader with my book, but with something else. This may be seen from the following instances. Comrade Luxemburg says, for example, that my book is a clear and detailed expression of the point of view of "intransigent centralism". Comrade Luxemburg thus supposes that I defend one system of organisation against another. But actually that is not so. From the first to the last page of my book, I defend the elementary principles of any conceivable system of party organisation. My book is not concerned with the difference between one system of organisation and another, but with how any system is to be maintained, criticised, and rectified in a manner consistent with the party idea. Rosa Luxemburg further says that "according to his [Lenin's] conception, the Central Committee has the right to organise all the local Party committees". Actually that is not so. What my views on this subject are can be documentarily proved by the draft Rules of Party Organisation which I proposed. In that draft there is nothing about any right to organise the local committees. That right was introduced into the Party Rules by the commission elected by the Party Congress to frame them, and the Congress adopted

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* *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*—pp. 203-425 of this volume.—Ed.

the commission's text. But besides myself and one other majority adherent, the commission included three members of the Congress minority, so that in this commission which gave the Central Committee the right to organise the local committees, it was my opponents that had the upper hand. Comrade Luxemburg has confused two different things. In the first place, she has confused my organisational draft with the modified draft of the commission and with the Rules of Organisation as actually adopted by the Congress; secondly, she has confused the defence of a specific point relating to a specific clause of the Rules (in that defence I was by no means intransigent, for I did not object at the plenary session to the amendment made by the commission) with the defence of the thesis (truly "ultra-centralist", is it not?) that Rules adopted by a Party congress must be adhered to until amended by a subsequent congress. This thesis (a "purely Blanquist" one, as the reader may readily observe) I did indeed defend in my book quite "intransigently". Comrade Luxemburg says that in my view "the Central Committee is the only active nucleus of the Party". Actually that is not so. I have never advocated any such view. On the contrary, my opponents (the Second Party Congress minority) charged in their writings that I did not sufficiently uphold the independence of the Central Committee, that I made it too subordinate to the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Party Council, bodies located abroad. To these charges I replied in my book that when the Party majority had the upper hand in the Party Council, the latter never made any attempt to interfere with the Central Committee's independence, but that when the Party council became a weapon of the minority, this did immediately happen. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg says that there are no two opinions among the Russian Social-Democrats as to the need for a united party, and that the whole controversy is over the degree of centralisation. Actually that is not so. If Comrade Luxemburg had taken the trouble to acquaint herself with the resolutions of the many local Party committees that constitute the majority, she would readily have seen (which incidentally is also clear from my book) that our controversy has principally been over whether the Central Committee and Central Organ should represent the trend of

the majority of the Party Congress, or whether they should not. About this "ultra-centralist" and "purely Blanquist" demand the worthy comrade says not a word, she prefers to declaim against mechanical subordination of the part to the whole, against slavish submission, blind obedience, and other such bogeys. I am very grateful to Comrade Luxemburg for explaining the profound idea that slavish submission is very harmful to the Party, but I should like to know: does the comrade consider it normal for supposed party central institutions to be dominated by the minority of the Party Congress? —can she imagine such a thing?—has she ever seen it in any party? Comrade Luxemburg fathers on me the idea that all the conditions already exist in Russia for forming a large and extremely centralised workers' party. Again an error of fact. Nowhere in my book did I voice such an idea, let alone advocate it. The thesis I advanced expressed and expresses something else: I insisted, namely, that all the conditions already existed for expecting Party Congress decisions to be observed, and that the time was past when a Party institution could be supplanted by a private circle. I brought proof that certain academics in our Party had shown themselves inconsistent and unstable, and that they had no right to lay the blame for their own lack of discipline upon the Russian proletarians. The Russian workers have already pronounced repeatedly, on various occasions, for observance of the Party Congress decisions. It is nothing short of laughable when Comrade Luxemburg proclaims such a view "optimistic" (should it not rather be considered "pessimistic"?) without uttering a single word about the factual basis of my thesis. Comrade Luxemburg declares that I glorify the educational influence of the factory. That is not so. It was my opponent, not I, who said that I pictured the Party as a factory. I properly ridiculed him and proved with his own words that he confused two different aspects of factory discipline, which, unfortunately, is the case with Comrade Luxemburg too.*

Comrade Luxemburg says that I characterised my standpoint more acutely, perhaps, than any of my opponents could

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* Cf. the Russian pamphlet *Our Misunderstandings*, the article "Rosa Luxemburg vs. Karl Marx".

have done when I defined a revolutionary Social-Democrat as a Jacobin who has identified himself with the organisation of the class-conscious workers. Yet another error of fact. It was P. Axelrod, not I, who first started talking about Jacobinism. He was the first to liken our Party trends to those of the days of the great French Revolution. I merely observed that the parallel could only be allowed in the sense that the division of present-day Social-Democracy into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing corresponded to some extent to the division into Montagnards and Girondists. The old *Iskra*, which the Party Congress endorsed, often drew such a parallel. Just because it recognised this division, the old *Iskra* fought against the opportunist wing in our Party, against the *Rabocheye Dyelo* trend. Rosa Luxemburg here confuses *comparison* of the two revolutionary trends of the eighteenth and the twentieth century with identification of those trends. If I say, for example, that the Jungfrau stands in the same relation to the Little Scheidegg as a house of four storeys to one of two, that does not mean I identify a four-storey house with the Jungfrau. Comrade Luxemxburg leaves completely out of sight the factual analysis of the different trends in our Party. Yet the greater half of my book is devoted precisely to this analysis, based on the minutes of our Party Congress, and in the preface I call special attention to the fact. Rosa Luxemburg sets out to talk about the present position in our Party while totally ignoring our Congress, which was what really laid our Party's foundation. A rash enterprise, it has to be said! Particularly since I point out a hundred times in my book that my opponents ignore our Party Congress and by so doing leave all their assertions devoid of all foundation of fact.

Comrade Luxemburg commits exactly the same basic error. She repeats naked words without troubling to grasp their concrete meaning. She raises bogeys without informing herself of the actual issue in the controversy. She puts in my mouth commonplaces, general principles and conceptions, absolute truths, and tries to pass over the relative truths, pertaining to perfectly definite facts, with which alone I operate. And then she rails against set formulas and invokes the dialectics of Marx! It is the worthy comrade's own article that consists of nothing but manufactured formulas

and runs counter to the ABC of dialectics. This ABC tells us that there is no such thing as abstract truth, truth is always concrete. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg loftily ignores the concrete facts of our Party struggle and engages in grandiloquent declamation about matters which it is impossible to discuss seriously. Let me cite one last example from Comrade Luxemburg's second article. She quotes my remark that the way the Rules of Organisation are formulated can make them a more or a less trenchant weapon against opportunism.* Just what formulations I talked about in my book and all of us talked about at the Congress, of that she does not say a word. What the controversy at the Party Congress was, and against whom I advanced my theses, she does not touch on in the slightest. Instead, she favours me with a whole lecture on opportunism ... in the parliamentary countries!! But about the peculiar, specific varieties of opportunism in Russia, the shades which it has taken on there and with which my book is concerned, we find not a word in her article. The upshot of all these very brilliant arguments is: "Party Rules are not meant in themselves [?? understand this who can!] to be a weapon of resistance to opportunism, but only an outward instrument for exerting the dominant influence of the actually existing revolutionary-proletarian majority of the Party." Quite so. But how this actually existing majority of our Party was formed Rosa Luxemburg does not say, yet that is exactly what I talk about in my book. Nor does she say what influence it was that Plekhanov and I defended with the help of this outward instrument. I can only add that never and nowhere have I talked such nonsense as that the Party Rules are a weapon "in themselves".

The best way to answer this kind of presentation of my views will be to set forth the concrete facts of our Party struggle. Anyone will then be able to see how ill Comrade Luxemburg's abstract commonplaces and formulas sort with the concrete facts.

Our Party was founded in Russia in the spring of 1898 at a congress of representatives of several Russian organisations. It was named the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,

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* See p. 273 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Rabochaya Gazeta[144] was made the Central Organ, and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad became the Party's foreign representative. Very soon after the congress, the Central Committee of the Party was arrested. *Rabochaya Gazeta* had to cease publication after its second issue. The whole Party became a shapeless conglomeration of local Party organisations (known as committees). The only bond between these local committees was an ideological, purely spiritual one. A period of disunity, vacillation, and splits was bound to set in again. The intellectuals, who in our Party made up a much larger percentage than in the West-European parties, had taken up Marxism as a new vogue. This vogue very soon gave place to slavish acceptance of the bourgeois criticism of Marx, on the one hand, and an infatuation for a purely trade-unionist labour movement (strikeism—Economism), on the other. The divergence between the intellectual-opportunist and proletarian revolutionary trends led to a split in the Union Abroad. The newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*, and the *Rabocheye Dyelo* magazine published abroad, expressed (the latter in somewhat lesser degree) the standpoint of Economism, they belittled the importance of political struggle and denied the existence of a bourgeois-democratic element in Russia. The "legal" critics of Marx—Messrs. Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, and the rest—swung all the way to the Right. Nowhere in Europe do we find Bernsteinism arriving so speedily at its logical consummation—the formation of a liberal group—as was the case in Russia. There, Mr. Struve began with "criticism" in the name of Bernsteinism and ended by setting up the liberal magazine *Osvobozhdeniye*, liberal in the European sense of the term. Plekhanov and his friends, who broke away from the Union Abroad, met with support from the founders of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. These two publications waged (even Comrade Luxemburg has heard something about that) a "brilliant three-year campaign" against the opportunist wing of the Party, a campaign of the Social-Democratic "Mountain" against the Social-Democratic "Gironde" (the expression belongs to the old *Iskra*), a campaign against *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Comrades Krichevsky, Akimov, Martynov, and others), against the Jewish Bund, against the organisations in Russia that eagerly espoused this trend (notably the St. Petersburg

so-called Workers' Organisation and the Voronezh Committee).

It became more and more obvious that the purely ideological bond between the committees was not enough. The need to create a really united party, that is, to effect what was only foreshadowed in 1898, asserted itself more and more insistently. Finally, at the end of 1902 an Organising Committee was formed to convene the Second Party Congress. This Organising Committee, which was largely set up by the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, also included a representative of the Jewish Bund. In the autumn of 1903 the Second Congress was at last held; it ended, on the one hand, in the Party's formal unification, and on the other, in a split into "majority" and "minority". That division did not exist before the Congress. Only a detailed analysis of the struggle at the Congress can explain this division. Unfortunately, the supporters of the minority (including Comrade Luxemburg) shy away fearfully from any such analysis.

In my book, presented to the German reader by Comrade Luxemburg in such a singular manner, I devote over a hundred pages to a close study of the Congress minutes (which make up a volume of some 400 pages). This analysis caused me to divide the delegates, or rather votes (we had delegates with one vote and with two), into four main groups: 1) majority *Iskra*-ists (adherents of the trend of the old *Iskra*)—twenty-four votes; 2) minority *Iskra*-ists—nine votes; 3) "Centre" (also referred to ironically as the "Marsh")—ten votes; and, lastly, 4) anti-*Iskra*-ists—eight votes, making fifty-one votes in all. I analyse the part played by these groups in *all* the voting at the Congress, and prove that on all issues (of programme, of tactics, and of organisation) the Congress was an arena of struggle between the *Iskra*-ists and the anti-*Iskra*-ists, with the "Marsh" making various zigzags. Anyone even slightly familiar with our Party's history is bound to see that it could not have been otherwise. But all supporters of the minority (including Rosa Luxemburg) modestly close their eyes to this struggle. Why? Because this struggle makes manifest the utter falsity of the minority's present political position. Throughout the struggle at the Party Congress, on dozens of questions, in dozens of votes, the *Iskra*-ists fought the anti-*Iskra*-ists

and the "Marsh", which sided the more definitely with the anti-*Iskra*-ists, the more concrete the matter at issue, the more positively it affected the fundamentals of Social-Democratic activity, the more tangibly it involved putting into practice the old *Iskra*'s long-standing plans. The anti-*Iskra*-ists (particularly Comrade Akimov and the St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation delegate, Comrade Brouckère, who always agreed with him, and nearly always Comrade Martynov and the five delegates of the Jewish Bund) were against recognising the trend of the old *Iskra*. They defended the old separate organisations and voted against their subordination to the Party, their fusion into the Party (the Organising Committee incident, the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group—the leading group of the "Marsh", and so on). They fought against centralistic Rules of Organisation (14th sitting of the Congress) and accused *all* the *Iskra*-ists at that time of wanting to introduce "organised distrust", "emergency laws", and other such horrors. *All* the *Iskra*-ists, without exception, laughed at it then; it is remarkable that Comrade Rosa Luxemburg should now take these bogeys seriously. On the great majority of questions the *Iskra*-ists carried the day; they predominated at the Congress, as is clear from the figures given above. But during the second half of the Congress, when less fundamental issues were being decided, the anti-*Iskra*-ists had the better of it—some of the *Iskra*-ists voted with them. That was the case, for example, with regard to proclaiming equality of all languages in our programme; on this point the anti-*Iskra*-ists nearly succeeded in defeating the Programme Committee and getting their formulation carried. It was also the case over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, when the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Marsh" put through Martov's formulation. According to this formulation, Party members are not only those who belong to Party organisations (the formulation defended by Plekhanov and myself), but also all persons working under the control of Party organisations.*

* Comrade Kautsky has sided with Martov's formulation, and the argument he pleads is expediency. In the first place, at our Party Congress this point was not discussed from the standpoint of expediency, but of principle. That was the way the question was put by Axelrod. Secondly, Comrade Kautsky is mistaken if he thinks that

The same thing happened in the elections to the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ. The compact majority consisted of 24 *Iskra*-ists, and they put through the long since planned reconstitution of the editorial board; of the six former editors, three were elected. The minority consisted of nine *Iskra*-ists, ten members of the "Centre", and one anti-*Iskra*-ist (the other seven anti-*Iskra*-ists, representing the Jewish Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, had withdrawn from the Congress by then). This minority was so displeased with the elections that it decided to take no part in the rest of the elections. Comrade Kautsky was quite right when he said that the reconstitution of the editorial board was the main cause of the struggle that followed. But his view that I (*sic*!) "expelled" three comrades from the editorial board can only be attributed to his being totally uninformed about our Congress. In the first place, non-election is far from the same thing as expulsion, and I certainly had no power at the Congress to expel anyone; and secondly, Comrade Kautsky seems to have no inkling that the fact of a coalition between the anti-*Iskra*-ists, the "Centre", and a small section of the *Iskra* adherents had political implications too and could not fail to influence the outcome of the elections. Anyone who does not wilfully close his eyes to what happened at our Congress is bound to see that our new division into minority and majority is only a variant of the old division into a proletarian-revolutionary and an intellectual-opportunist wing of our Party. That is a fact, and there is no explaining or laughing it away.

Unfortunately, after the Congress the principles involved in this division were obscured by squabbling over co-optation: the minority would not work under the control of the central institutions unless the three ex-editors were again co-opted. This fight went on for two months. The weapons used were boycott and disruption of the Party. Twelve committees (out of the fourteen that spoke out on the subject) severely condemned these methods of struggle. The minority

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under the Russian police regime there is such a big difference between belonging to a Party organisation and simply working under its control. Thirdly, it is particularly misleading to compare the position in Russia today to that in Germany under the Anti-Socialist Law.[145]

would not even accept the proposal, made by Plekhanov and myself, that they should set forth their point of view in *Iskra*. At the Congress of the League Abroad the thing was carried to the length of showering the members of the central bodies with personal insults and abuse (autocrats, bureaucrats, gendarmes, liars, etc., etc.). They were accused of suppressing individual initiative and wanting to introduce slavish submission, blind obedience, and so on. Plekhanov's attempts to characterise these minority methods of struggle as anarchistic did not avail. After this Congress Plekhanov came out with his epoch-making article against me, "What Should Not Be Done" (in No. 52 of *Iskra*). In this article he said that fighting revisionism did not necessarily, mean fighting the revisionists; and it was clear to all that he was referring to our minority. He further said that one should not always fight the anarchistic individualism so deeply ingrained in the Russian revolutionary, that at times some concessions were a better way to subdue it and avoid a split. I resigned from the editorial board as I could not share this view, and the minority editors were co-opted. Then followed a fight for co-optation to the Central Committee. My offer to conclude peace on the basis of the minority keeping the Central Organ and the majority the Central Committee was rejected. The fight went on, they were fighting "on principle" against bureaucracy, ultra-centralism, formalism, Jacobinism, Schweitzerism (I was dubbed a Russian Schweitzer), and other such bogeys. I ridiculed all these accusations in my book and pointed out that they were either just a matter of squabbling about co-optation, or (if they were to be recognised, conditionally, as involving "principles") nothing but opportunist, Girondist phrases. The present minority are only repeating what Comrade Akimov and other acknowledged opportunists said at our Congress against the centralism of all the adherents of the old *Iskra*.

The committees in Russia were outraged at the conversion of the Central Organ into the organ of a private circle, an organ of co-optation squabbling and Party scandal. A number of resolutions expressing the severest censure were passed. Only the so-called St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation already mentioned and the Voronezh Committee (both of them supporters of Comrade Akimov's trend)

pronounced their satisfaction *in principle* at the trend of the new *Iskra*. Demands to have the Third Party Congress summoned became ever more numerous.

The reader who takes the trouble to make a first-hand study of the struggle in our Party will readily see that, concretely and practically, Comrade Rosa Luxemburg's talk about "ultra-centralism", about the need for centralisation to be gradual, and the like, is a mockery of our Congress, while abstractly and theoretically (if one can speak here of theory at all) it is nothing but a vulgarisation of Marxism, a perversion of true Marxian dialectics, etc.

The latest phase in our Party struggle is marked by the fact that the majority members have in part been ousted from the Central Committee, in part rendered useless, reduced to nonentities. (This happened owing to changes in the Central Committee's composition,[146] etc.) The Party Council (which after the co-optation of the old editors like wise fell into the minority's hands) and the present Central Committee have condemned all agitation for summoning the Third Congress and are taking the path of personal deals and negotiations with some members of the minority. Organisations which dared to commit such a crime as to agitate for a congress—as for instance a certain agent body of the Central Committee—have been dissolved.[147] A campaign against the summoning of the Third Congress has been proclaimed by the Party Council and the new Central Committee all along the line. The majority have replied with the slogan "Down with Bonapartism!" (that is the title of a pamphlet by Comrade Galyorka,[148] who speaks for the majority). More and more resolutions are being passed declaring that Party institutions which fight against a congress are anti-Party and Bonapartist. How hypocritical was all the minority's talk against ultra-centralism and in favour of autonomy is obvious from the fact that a new majority publishing house started by myself and another comrade (which issued the above-named pamphlet by Comrade Galyorka and some others) has been declared outside the Party.[149] This new publishing house affords the majority their only opportunity of propagating their views, for the columns of *Iskra* are as good as closed to them. Yet—or rather just because of it—the Party Council has made the above ruling, on the purely formal grounds

that our publishing house has not been authorised by any Party organisation.

It need hardly be said how greatly positive work has been neglected, how greatly the prestige of Social-Democracy has suffered, how greatly the whole Party is demoralised by this nullification of all the decisions, all the elections made by the Second Congress, and this fight which Party institutions accountable to the Party are waging against the convening of the Third Congress.

Written in the latter half of September 1904

First published in 1930 in Lenin Miscellany XV

Russian text translated from the German

Published according to the manuscript

FROM MARX TO MAO

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

AN OBLIGING LIBERAL

Obliging services are welcome, as we know;
But shun the service or a clumsy f riend.
From such as Struve heaven us defend,
Obliging Struve's worse than any foe.[150]

The latest issue (No. 57) of Mr. Struve's *Osvobozhdeniye* contains the following instructive lines:

"The process of disintegration within the so-called Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has entered a new phase. The extreme centralists ('Leninists', 'firm-liners', 'Bolshevists') are beginning to lose ground, and the position of their opponents is becoming stronger and stronger—at least in the 'colonies' abroad. Whereas the 'Menshevists' (Martovites) are getting the upper hand nearly everywhere and gaining control of one party organ after another, the 'Bolshevists' are losing individuals and whole groups, who, while not definitely accepting the 'platform' of the minority, nevertheless do not wish to war with the latter and endeavour to establish peace in the still discordant party. 'Conciliators' are appearing on the scene who are anxious to put an end to this unseemly wrangling in which people have ceased to understand not only each other, but even themselves. The appearance of these 'conciliators' has compelled the irreconcilable centralists to start a 'publishing house of Social-Democratic Party literature devoted to the defence of the principles of the Second Party Congress majority'. (Announcement by V. Bonch-Bruyevich and N. Lenin.) We have before us three products of this new publishing house: 1) *To the Party*, Geneva, 1904, 16 pp., price 20 cent. or 15 pf.; 2) Galyorka, *Down with Bonapartism!*, Geneva, 1904, 23 pp., price 25 cent. or 20 pf.; 3) Galyorka and Ryadovoy,[151] *Our Misunderstandings*, Geneva, 1904, price 50 cent. or 40 pf. These three pamphlets are chiefly devoted to a critical examination of certain methods—which are indeed not altogether above reproach—employed by the 'Menshevists' in their struggle against the 'majority', and to advocacy of the thesis that the convening of a third congress to settle party conflicts is not only feasible, but essential.

"While *formally*, from the standpoint of party loyalty, the position of the 'Bolshevists' is the sounder one, they yield to their opponents *in substance*. In substance, the latter are *now* defending some-

thing more vital and effectual than the 'Bolshevists'. Only it is unfortunate that this defence is being conducted by not altogether proper, or rather altogether improper, and sometimes positively indecent, means. As examples of such improper methods we may cite countless recent articles in *Iskra* and the newly published pamphlet *Our Political Tasks* (*Tactical and Organisational Questions*) by N. Trotsky, Geneva, 1904, 107 pp., price 75 cent. While marked in many places by empty phrase-mongering, this pamphlet is however quite right in taking up the cudgels for certain ideas with which those interested in Social-Democratic literature are already familiar from the writings of Messrs. Akimov, Martynov, Krichevsky, and other so-called 'Economists'. Only it is a pity that in places the author carries their views to the point of caricature."

How much malicious rejoicing we find here over the troubles of our Party! But then, by his very political nature your liberal is bound to rejoice at any weakening and demoralisation of Social-Democracy.

How much conscious and heartfelt sympathy for the Akimovite *substance* of the minority's views! But then, is it not a fact that the only hope of vitality, ideological vitality, for Russian liberalism lies in the vitality of Social-Democratic opportunism?

The new *Iskra* has no luck with its supporters.

Recall Plekhanov's celebrated, stupendous, epoch-making "What Should Not Be Done". How subtly conceived was this policy of finesse and personal concessions, and what a sad mess our diplomat landed in! How accurately did that consistent opportunist, Mr. Struve, perceive the "significant change of front" of the new *Iskra*! The "gulf" between the old and the new *Iskra* is now admitted by the leaders of the latter themselves.

Recall Plekhanov's complacent assertion in *Iskra*, No. 65, that "nobody is afraid of Akimov; you couldn't use him now even to scare the sparrows in a cabbage-patch". Plekhanov made this remark, which was not particularly mild or accommodating towards the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, and he also declared that at our Party Congress "nobody spoke against orthodox Marxism except an Akimov or so". And then, right after these complacent assertions, the leaflet of the Voronezh Committee—which as everybody knows solidly supports Comrades Akimov and Brouckère—was reprinted *in full*; and it turned out that the editors of the new *Iskra* had *concealed* from the public (in No. 61) the whole section

of this leaflet that had to do with principles, and all its expressions of sympathy with the new *Iskra*. Who is it that has proved to resemble a sparrow? And what Party institution may now be likened to a cabbage-patch?

Recall the author of "High Time!", the article in the supplement to Nos. 73-74 of *Iskra*. As a frank and honest spokesman of the views advocated throughout our Congress by all the "Marsh" delegates, this comrade bluntly proclaimed his disagreement with Plekhanov, he bluntly stated his opinion that "at the Congress Akimov played the part of a spectre of opportunism rather than of a real representative of it". And the poor editors had once more to undergo a self-inflicted thrashing. They appended the following note to this statement of the author of "High Time!":

> "We cannot agree with this opinion. Comrade Akimov's programmatic views bear the clear stamp of opportunism, as is admitted even by an *Osvobozhdeniye* critic when he says in a recent issue that Comrade Akimov belongs to the 'realistic'—read, revisionist—trend."

Very nice, is it not? In the programmatic views of Comrade Akimov—with whom, in the disputes over the programme, Comrades Martynov, Brouckère, and the Bundists voted almost invariably, and the delegates of the Marsh very often—there is opportunism. But in his tactical and organisational views there is no opportunism—is that your idea, gentlemen? Why is it that you prefer to say nothing about these latter views? Isn't it because, after loudly announcing its new differences over organisational questions, the new *Iskra* has said just what, and only what, Martynov and Akimov used to say against the old *Iskra*? Isn't it because the new tactical differences that the new *Iskra* has lately announced also amount to nothing but a repetition of what Martynov and Akimov used to say long ago against the old *Iskra*? How useful it would be to republish today No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*!

And whom do the editors of the new *Iskra* cite as judge and witness against Comrade Akimov? Mr. Struve. And a fine judge he is, truly a specialist, connoisseur, champion, and expert in opportunism. All the more significant is the testimony of this witness, summoned by the editors themselves, on the substance of Trotsky's views. And Trotsky's

pamphlet, please do not forget, was published *under the editorship of* "*Iskra*" (No. 72, p. 10, col. 3). Trotsky's "new" views are the views of the editorial board, approved by Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, and Martov.

Empty phrase-mongering and Akimovism, the latter, unfortunately, in caricature—such is the verdict of a judge sympathetic to the new *Iskra* and appealed to by that organ itself.

This time the obliging liberal inadvertently blurted out the truth.

Written in October 1904

Published in leaflet form in Geneva in November 1904

Published according to the leaflet text

PREFACE TO N. SHAKHOV'S PAMPHLET *THE FIGHT FOR A CONGRESS*

In the pamphlet here offered to the reader we have endeavoured to give as full as possible a collection of documents showing the attitude of various Party organisations working on the spot towards the present crisis in our Party. These documents are reproduced partly from texts already published in *Iskra* and partly direct from the manuscripts, and the reader should bear in mind that owing to the conditions under which these manuscripts were delivered mistakes and omissions were sometimes bound to creep in.

The contents of the documents revolve around one central point—the fight for the party spirit against the circle spirit, the fight for a congress. Originally this was a fight for the Second Party Congress, for the recognition and honest observance of its decisions; now it is for the Third Congress, as the only method worthy of the Party of ending the present intolerable situation. We have also tried to show as fully as possible, on the basis of documentary evidence, the fight of the Party's present central institutions against a third congress.

Our work has been confined to arranging the documents in chronological order (as far as possible) and adding the briefest explanations to indicate the connection between them. We leave all comment for subsequent publications. The bare facts regarding the fight for a congress speak for themselves, and anybody who studies them will be able to form his own judgement of the internal struggle in our Party.

Published in the pamphlet
The Fight for a Congress,
by N. Shakhov, Geneva, 1904

Published according
to the manuscript

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FORMATION OF A BUREAU OF MAJORITY COMMITTEES[152]

DRAFT

The crisis in the Party is dragging on interminably and becoming ever more difficult to resolve. The adherents of the majority have repeatedly stated in the press their views concerning the causes of the crisis and the means by which it could be ended. The statement of the twenty-two,* which was supported by a number of committees (the Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Riga, St. Petersburg, and Moscow committees and the Caucasian League), by the declaration of the nineteen,[153] and by the majority members, abroad gave a full and precise exposition of the majority's programme. Everyone at all acquainted with the development of the crisis and at all concerned for the Party's honour and dignity has long realised that the only way out is a Party congress. But now the new declaration by a section of the Central Committee and the new decisions of the Party Council aggravate the division in the Party still more. The Central Committee members who have deserted to the minority have not shrunk from the grossest violation of the rights of those members of the Central Committee who remain on the side of the majority. In proclaiming its reconciliation policy the new Central Committee has not only failed to take account of the wishes of the majority, but has totally ignored the latter and entered into a compact with the minority alone, and moreover by means of private, secret transactions. Anyone sincerely desiring a reconciliation would first of all bring together all the warring, contending,

* See pp. 452-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and mutually incensed, and that means calling a Party congress. To talk of peace and fear a congress, to go about peacemaking and at the same time hold up the bogey of a split because of the minority's probable defeat at the Third Congress also, is to be a hypocrite, to try to force the caprice of an émigré circle on the Party workers in Russia, to sanctify with the specious slogan of peace a complete betrayal of the majority. In the name of peace the new Central Committee is breaking up organisations which have the audacity to want a congress. In the name of peace the new Central Committee proclaims the publications of the majority to be non-Party publications and refuses to supply them to the committees. In the name of peace the new Central Committee is injecting a squabbling element into the decisions of the Party Council, which dares to talk in print about "deceit" on the part of comrades whose actions have not been investigated yet and who have not even been presented with the charges made against them. The Party Council is now directly falsifying the opinion and verdict of the Party membership, by having the committee resolutions scrutinised by a Central Committee notoriously hostile to a congress, by casting suspicion on these resolutions, delaying their publication, gerrymandering the number of votes, arrogating to itself the congress prerogative of declaring mandates invalid, and disorganising positive work by stirring up the local committees' "peripheral organisations" against them. Meanwhile the centrally conducted positive work is also at a standstill because the Central Committee and Central Organ are engrossed in resisting a congress.

No course remains to the majority committees and organisations but to unite to fight for a congress, against the so-called central institutions of the Party, which in fact are directly flouting the Party. We are making a beginning of such unity by forming a Bureau of Majority Committees, on the initiative and by the common consent of the Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Riga, St. Petersburg, and Moscow committees.

Our slogan is the fight for the party spirit against the circle spirit, the fight for the consistent revolutionary line against zigzags, confusion, and a reversion to *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism, a



Front page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Announcement of the Formation of a Bureau of Majority Committees", 1904
Rescued

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Announcement of the Formation of a Bureau of Majority Committees", 1904
Reduced

fight in the name of proletarian organisation and discipline against the disrupters of organisation.

Our immediate objects are to build up ideological and organisational unity of the majority in Russia and abroad, to support and promote in every way the publishing house of the majority (started abroad by Comrades Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin), to combat the Bonapartism of our central institutions, to ensure the correctness of measures for convening the Third Congress, and to assist the positive work of the committees, which is being disrupted by the agents of the editorial board and the new Central Committee.

Bureau of Majority Committees

In Russia the Bureau can be contacted through the majority committees, and abroad through the Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin publishing house.

Written before October 20 (November 2), 1904

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Published according to the manuscript

THE ZEMSTVO CAMPAIGN AND *ISKRA*'S PLAN[154]

Written in November 1904

Published in pamphlet form in Geneva in November 1904

Published according to the pamphlet text

FOR PARTY MEMBERS ONLY

The editorial board of *Iskra* has just issued ("for Party members") a letter addressed to the Party organisations. Russia has never been within such close distance of a constitution, say the editors; and they expound a complete plan for a "political campaign", a complete plan for influencing our liberal Zemstvo-ist petitioners for a constitution.

Before analysing this exceedingly instructive plan of the new *Iskra*'s, let us recall how the Russian Social-Democrats have regarded the question of their attitude towards the liberal Zemstvo-ists since a mass working-class movement arose. Everyone knows that, practically from the inception of the mass working-class movement, a struggle went on between the "Economists" and the revolutionaries over this question too. The former went so far as directly to deny the existence of a bourgeois-democratic element in Russia and ignore the proletariat's task of influencing the opposition strata of society; at the same time, by narrowing the scope of the political struggle of the proletariat, they consciously or unconsciously left the role of political leadership to the liberal elements of society, assigning to the workers "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". The adherents of revolutionary Social-Democracy fought in the old *Iskra* against this trend. This struggle may be divided into two main periods: the period before the appearance of a liberal organ—*Osvobozhdeniye*—and the period after it appeared. During the first period we directed our attack mainly against the narrowness of the Economists; we tried to "wake them up" to the fact, which they failed to perceive, of the existence of a bourgeois-democratic element in Russia; we emphasised the need for political activity by the proletariat in every sphere, we stressed that the proletariat must influence all sections of society,

that it must become the vanguard in the battle for freedom. It is the more fitting and necessary to recall this period and its main features now because the adherents of the new *Iskra* grossly falsify it (see Trotsky's *Our Political Tasks*, published under the editorship of *Iskra*), banking on the unfamiliarity of the younger generation with the recent history of our movement.

From the time of the appearance of *Osvobozhdeniye*, the second period in the old *Iskra*'s fight began. When the liberals came out with an organ and political programme of their own, the proletariat's task of influencing "society" naturally underwent a modification: working-class democrats could no longer confine themselves to "shaking up" the liberal democrats and rousing their opposition spirit; they had to put the emphasis on revolutionary criticism of the half-heartedness so clearly exhibited in the political position of liberalism. The influence we brought to bear on the liberal strata now took the form of constantly pointing out the inconsistency and inadequacy of the liberals' political protest (it is sufficient to mention *Zarya*, which criticised Mr. Struve's preface to the Witte Memorandum,* also numerous articles in *Iskra).*

By the time of the Second Party Congress this new attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the now articulate liberals was already so well-defined and established that there was no question in anyone's mind about whether a bourgeois-democratic element existed in Russia and whether the opposition movement ought to receive support (and what kind of support) from the proletariat. The only question was how to formulate the Party's views on the subject; and I need only point out here that the views of the old *Iskra* were much better expressed in Plekhanov's resolution, which emphasised the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian character of the liberal *Osvobozhdeniye*, than in the confused resolution tabled by Starover, which, on the one hand, aimed (quite inopportunely) at an "agreement" with the liberals, and, on the other, stipulated for it conditions that were manifestly unreal, being altogether impossible for the liberals to fulfil.

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80.—*Ed.*

I

Now let us examine the new *Iskra*'s plan. The editors acknowledge that we must make full use of all material showing the irresolution and half-heartedness of the liberal democrats and the antagonism of interests between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat, must do so "in accordance with the fundamental demands of our programme". "But," the editors continue, "*but* within the framework of the struggle with absolutism, notably in its present phase, our attitude towards the liberal bourgeoisie *is determined by the task* of spurring it to greater boldness and inducing it to join in the demands which the proletariat, led by the Social-Democrats, *will put forward* [? has put forward?]." We have italicised the particularly strange words in this strange tirade. For what is it if not strange to contrast criticism of half-heartedness and analysis of antagonistic interests, on the one hand, and the task of spurring these people to greater boldness and inducing them to join, on the other? How can we spur the liberal democrats to greater boldness except by relentless analysis and devastating criticism of the half-heartedness of their democracy? Insofar as the bourgeois (liberal) democrats intend to act as democrats, and are forced to act as democrats, they necessarily seek the support of the widest possible sections of the people. This inevitably produces the following contradiction. The wider these sections of the people, the more representatives are there among them of the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata, who demand the complete democratisation of the political and social system—such complete democratisation as would threaten to undermine very important pillars of all bourgeois rule (the monarchy, the standing army, the bureaucracy). Bourgeois democrats are by their very nature incapable of satisfying these demands, and are therefore, by their very nature, doomed to irresolution and half-heartedness. By criticising this half-heartedness, the Social-Democrats keep prodding the liberals on and winning more and more proletarians and semi-proletarians, and partly petty bourgeois too, from liberal democracy to working-class democracy. How then is it possible to say: we must criticise the half-heartedness of the liberal bourgeoisie, *b u t* (but!) our attitude

towards it is determined by the task of spurring it to greater boldness? Why, that is plain muddle-headedness, which shows that its authors are either marching backward, reverting to the days when the liberals did not come forward openly at all, when they had still to be roused, stirred, induced to open their mouths—or else are slipping into the idea that one can "spur" the liberals to greater boldness by subtracting from the boldness of the proletarians.

Preposterous as this idea is, we find it again, even more clearly expressed, in the very next passage of the editors' letter: "But"—again that editorial reservation—"but we should be making a fatal mistake if we tried by strong measures of *intimidation* to *force* the Zemstvos or other organs of the bourgeois opposition to give here and now, under the influence of *panic*, a formal promise to present our demands to the government. Such a tactic would discredit the Social-Democrats, because it would make our entire political campaign a lever for reaction." (Editors' italics.)

So that's how it is, is it? Before the revolutionary proletariat has dealt the tsarist autocracy a single serious blow, at a time when that autocracy is so visibly shaken and when a serious blow is so imperative, would be so useful, and might prove decisive, there are Social-Democrats who go about mumbling about levers for reaction. This is not just muddle-headedness, it is sheer inanity. This is what the editors have come to with their terrible bogey, invented specially to start this talk about becoming a lever for reaction. Just think of it: that people should talk in all seriousness, in a letter to the Social-Democratic Party organisations, of tactics of intimidating the Zemstvo-ists and forcing them to give formal promises under the influence of panic! Even among Russian officialdom, even among our Ugryum-Burcheyevs,[155] it would not be easy to find a political infant who would believe in such a bogey. We have among our revolutionists hotheaded terrorists, desperate bomb-throwers; but even the most hare-brained of the hare-brained defenders of bomb throwing have yet, I believe, to propose intimidating ... the Zemstvo-ists and striking panic into ... the opposition. Cannot the editors see that the inevitable effect of their ridiculous bogeys and inane phrases is to perplex and mislead, to befog and confuse the minds of the fighting prole-

tarians? After all, these catchwords about levers for reaction and the discrediting tactics of intimidation do not fly into empty space; they fall upon the specific soil of police-ridden Russia, so eminently suited for the sprouting of weeds. Talk about levers for reaction is indeed to be heard at every street corner nowadays, but it comes from the *Novoye Vremya* gentry.[156] The story about the discrediting tactics of intimidation has indeed been repeated *ad nauseam*—by the cowardly leaders of the bourgeois opposition.

Take Prof. Prince E. N. Trubetskoy. A sufficiently "enlightened" and—for a legal Russian personality—a sufficiently "bold" liberal, one would think. Yet how fatuously he discourses in the liberal *Pravo* (No. 39) on the "internal danger", namely, the danger from the extreme parties! There you have a live example of who really is close to panic; a graphic instance of what really does have an intimidating effect on real liberals. What they are afraid of, it need hardly be said, is not the plan conjured up by the *Iskra* editors, the plan of extorting from the Zemstvo-ists formal promises to the revolutionaries (Mr. Trubetskoy would only roar with laughter if told of such a plan); they are afraid of the revolutionary socialist aims of the "extreme" parties, they are afraid of leaflets, those first harbingers of independent revolutionary action by the proletariat, which will not stop, will not lay down its arms until it has overthrown the rule of the bourgeoisie. This fear is not inspired by ludicrous bogeys, but by the actual nature of the working-class movement; and it is a fear ineradicable from the hearts of the bourgeoisie (not counting a few individuals and groups, of course). And that is why the new *Iskra*'s talk about the discrediting tactics of intimidating the Zemstvo-ists and representatives of the bourgeois opposition rings so false. Afraid of leaflets, afraid of anything that goes beyond a qualified franchise constitution, the liberal gentry will always stand in fear of the slogan "a democratic republic" and of the call for an armed uprising of the people. But the class-conscious proletariat will indignantly reject the very idea that we could renounce this slogan and this call, or could in general be guided in our activity by the panic and fears of the bourgeoisie.

Take *Novoye Vremya*. What dulcet melodies it weaves about the lever-for-reaction theme! "The youth and reaction," we read in the "Notes" in No. 10285 (October 18). "...The words go ill together, and yet unconsidered actions, impulsive ardour, and the desire at all costs to share immediately in shaping the nation's fortunes may bring the youth to this hopeless impasse. The demonstration a few days ago in front of the Vyborg prison; then the attempt at some sort of demonstration in the heart of the capital; in Moscow, the procession of 200 students with banners and protests against the war.... All this explains the reaction.... Student disturbances, youth demonstrations—why, they are a real godsend, a trump card, an unexpected ace of trumps in the hands of the reactionaries. Truly a welcome present for them, which they will know how to make the most of. We should not make them these presents, should not go about smashing imaginary [!!!] window-bars; the very doors are open now [the doors of the Vyborg and other prisons?], wide open!"

This disquisition requires no comment. One has only to quote it to see how tactless it is to talk about a lever for reaction now—*now*, when not one door of the all-Russia prison has opened a hair's breath for the struggling workers; when the tsarist autocracy has not yet made a single concession that would affect the proletariat in the slightest; when all attention and efforts should be centred on preparing for a real and decisive battle with the Russian people's enemy. Of course, the very thought of such a battle strikes fear and panic into the Trubetskoys and the thousands of less "enlightened" liberal gentlemen. But we should be fools if we took their panic into consideration. What we should take into consideration is the state of our forces, the growth of popular ferment and indignation, the moment when the proletariat's direct onslaught on the autocracy will link up with one of the spontaneous and spontaneously growing movements.

II

In speaking above of the bogey our editors conjured up, we did not mention another characteristic little point in their argument. The editors denounce the discrediting tactics of seeking to extort from the Zemstvo-ists "a formal

promise to present our demands to the government". Over and above the absurdities already noted, the very idea that "our" demands, the demands of working-class democrats, should be presented to the government by liberal democrats is a peculiar one. On the one hand, the liberal democrats, being bourgeois democrats, can never identify themselves with "our" demands, can never uphold them sincerely, consistently, and resolutely. Even if the liberals gave, and gave "voluntarily", a formal promise to present our demands, it is a foregone conclusion that they would fail to keep that promise, would betray the proletariat. On the other hand, if we should be strong enough to exert serious influence on the bourgeois democrats generally and the Zemstvo gentlemen in particular, we should be quite strong enough to present our demands to the government ourselves.

The editors' peculiar idea is no slip of the pen, but an inevitable product of their general confused position on this issue. Listen to this: "As our focal point and guiding thread ... we must take the practical task ... of exerting powerful organised pressure upon the bourgeois opposition"; "the draft of the workers' statement to the liberal opposition organ in question" must "explain why the workers are not approaching the government, but an assembly of representatives of that opposition". To put the thing in this way is a fundamental mistake. We, the party of the proletariat, should, of course, "go to all classes of the population", openly and vigorously championing our programme and our immediate demands before the people at large; we should seek to present these demands to the Zemstvo gentlemen too; but our focal point and guiding thread must be pressure on the government, not on the Zemstvo-ists. The editors of *Iskra* have turned this question of the focal point completely upside down. The bourgeois opposition is merely bourgeois and merely an opposition because it does not itself fight, because it has no programme of its own that it unconditionally upholds, because it stands between the two actual combatants (the government and the revolutionary proletariat with its handful of intellectual supporters) and hopes to turn the outcome of this struggle to its own advantage. Accordingly, the more heated the struggle becomes, the nearer the moment of the decisive battle, the more must we focus

our attention and bring our pressure to bear on our actual enemy, and not on a *notoriously* conditional, problematic, unreliable, half-hearted ally. It would be foolish to ignore this ally, and absurd to try to intimidate and frighten him—all that is so self-evident that it is strange even to talk about it. But, I repeat, the focal point and guiding thread in our agitation must not be pressure on this ally, but preparation for the decisive battle with the enemy. For while it has been flirting with the Zemstvos and has granted them some paltry concessions, the government has not, in actual fact, conceded anything whatever to the people; it may still well revert to (or rather continue) its reactionary course, as has happened in Russia tens and hundreds of times after a momentary flash of liberalism from one autocrat or another. At a moment like this, when the government is flirting with the Zemstvos and the people are being hoodwinked and lulled with empty words, we must particularly beware of the fox's cunning, must be particularly insistent in pointing out that the enemy has yet to be defeated, must call with particular vigour for continuing and intensifying the fight against the enemy, and not shift the emphasis from "approaching" the government to approaching the Zemstvos. None other than the notorious cream-skimmers and betrayers of freedom are hard at work at this moment to put the Zemstvos in the focus of public and popular attention and to inspire confidence in them, when actually they do not in the least deserve the confidence of genuine democrats. Take *Novoye Vremya*: in the article we have already quoted you will find the following argument: "Anyone can see that once all our failings and shortcomings can be boldly and candidly discussed and there is freedom for the activity of every public personality, it should not be long before we see the last of these shortcomings and Russia is able to set foot confidently on the path of the progress and improvement she so sorely needs. We do not even have to invent the organisation to serve as the instrument of this progress: it is already to hand in the form of the Zemstvos, which only [!!] need to be given the freedom to grow; therein lies the earnest of genuinely national, not borrowed, progress." This kind of talk not only "conceals a desire for a limited monarchy and a qualified-franchise constitution" (as the

editors put it elsewhere in their letter); it directly prepares the ground for reducing the whole business to a bestowal of smiles on the Zemstvos, without even any limitation of the monarchy.

Making pressure on the Zemstvos instead of on the government the focal point leads naturally to the unfortunate idea that underlay Starover's resolution—the idea of trying to find, now at once, a basis for some sort of "agreements" with the liberals. "As regards the present Zemstvos," the editors say in their letter, "our task reduces itself [!!] to presenting to them those political demands of the revolutionary proletariat which they must support if they are to have any right to speak in the name of the people and count on the energetic support of the worker masses." A fine definition of the tasks of the workers' party, I must say! At a time when an alliance of the moderate Zemstvo-ists and the government to fight the revolutionary proletariat is only too clearly possible and probable (the editors themselves admit the possibility of such an alliance), we are to "reduce" our task, not to redoubling our efforts in the struggle against the government, but to drawing up casuistic conditions for agreements with the liberals on mutual support. If I put before someone demands which he must undertake to support to have me support him, what I am doing is concluding an agreement. And we ask all and sundry: what has become of the "conditions" for agreements with the liberals which were prescribed in Starover's resolution* (signed also by Axelrod and Martov), and which our press has already predicted could never be fulfilled? The editors' letter does not say a word about these conditions. The editors advocated the resolution at the Congress only to throw

* The reader will recall that Starover's resolution, which was passed by the Congress (in spite of Plekhanov's opinion and mine), lays down three conditions for temporary agreements with the liberals: 1) the liberals "shall clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocratic government they will resolutely side with the Social-Democrats"; 2) "they shall not include in their programmes any demands running counter to the interests of the working class or the democracy generally, or obscuring their political consciousness"; 3) "they shall make universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage the slogan of their struggle".

it into the waste-paper basket afterwards. At the very first attempt to tackle the matter in practice it became apparent that presenting Starover's "conditions" would only provoke Homeric laughter from the Zemstvo liberals.

Let us proceed. Can it in general be acknowledged correct *in principle* to set the workers' party the task of presenting to the liberal democrats or the Zemstvo-ists political demands "which they must support if they are to have any right to speak in the name of the people"? No, such an approach is wrong in principle and can only obscure the class consciousness of the proletariat and lead to the most futile casuistry. To speak in the name of the people is what speaking as a democrat means. Any democrat (the bourgeois democrat included) has a right to speak in the name of the people, but he has this right only insofar as he champions democracy consistently, resolutely, going all the way. Consequently, *every* bourgeois democrat "has some right to speak in the name of the people" (for every bourgeois democrat, so long as he remains a democrat, champions some democratic demand); but at the same time *no* bourgeois democrat has a right to speak in the name of the people all along the line (for no bourgeois democrat is capable today of championing democracy resolutely and all the way). Mr. Struve has a right to speak in the name of the people insofar as *Osvobozhdeniye* fights against the autocracy; but Mr. Struve has no right to speak in the name of the people insofar as *Osvobozhdeniye* turns and twists, stops short at a qualified-franchise constitution, equates Zemstvo opposition with struggle, and will not commit itself to a clear and consistent democratic programme. The German National-Liberals had a right to speak in the name of the people insofar as they fought for freedom of movement. The German National-Liberals had no right to speak in the name of the people insofar as they supported the reactionary policy of Bismarck.

Therefore, to set the workers' party the task of presenting to the liberal bourgeois demands which they must support in order to have any right to speak in the name of the people is an absurd and nonsensical proceeding. There is no need for us to invent any special democratic demands over and above those contained in our programme. In the name of that programme we must support every democrat (including

the bourgeois democrat) insofar as he champions democracy, and must relentlessly expose every democrat (including the Socialist-Revolutionary) insofar as he deviates from democracy (as, for instance, in such questions as the freedom of the peasant to leave the commune or to sell his land). As for trying to establish in advance the permissible degree of turpitude, so to speak, to determine beforehand what deviations from democracy a democrat can permit himself and still have some right to speak as a democrat, that is such a clever idea that one can't help wondering whether Comrade Martynov or Comrade Dan did not lend our editors a hand in inventing it.

III

After setting forth their guiding political considerations, the editors' letter proceeds to expound the details of their great plan.

The Gubernia Zemstvo Assemblies are petitioning for a constitution. In the towns of X, Y, Z, our committeemen plus the enlightened workers draw up a plan of political campaign "according to Axelrod". The focal point in their agitation is pressure on the bourgeois opposition. An organising group is elected. The organising group elects an executive committee. The executive committee elects a special spokesman. Efforts are made "to bring the masses into direct contact with the Zemstvo Assembly, to concentrate the demonstration before the actual premises where the Zemstvo assemblymen are in session. Some of the demonstrators penetrate into the session hall, and at a suitable moment, through the spokesman specially authorised for the purpose, they ask the permission of the Assembly [? of the Marshal of the Nobility, who presides at the Assembly?] to read out a statement on behalf of the workers. If this is not granted, the spokesman enters a loud protest against the refusal of an Assembly which speaks in the name of the people to hear the voice of the people's genuine representatives".

Such is the new *Iskra*'s new plan. We shall see in a moment how modest is the editors' opinion of it; but first let us quote their highly profound explanations as to the functions of the executive committee:

"...The executive committee must take measures in advance to ensure that the appearance of several thousand workers outside the building where the Zemstvo assemblymen are in session, and of several score or hundred in the building itself, *shall not plunge the Zemstvo-ists into panic fear* [!!], under the impact of which they might throw themselves [!] under the shameful protection of the police and Cossacks, thus transforming a peaceful demonstration into an ugly fight and brutal battering, distorting its whole meaning...." (The editors themselves seem to have been taken in by the bogey of their own making. Taking the sentence in its literal, grammatical sense, they even seem to be saying that it is the Zemstvo-ists who would be transforming the demonstration into a brutal battering and distorting its meaning. We have a very low opinion of the Zemstvo liberals, but even so the editors' panic fear that the liberals in a Zemstvo Assembly might call in the police and Cossacks seems to us quite nonsensical. Anyone who has ever attended a Zemstvo Assembly will know that, in the event of so-called disorder, the police would be sent for either by the presiding Marshal of the Nobility or by the police officer unofficially present in an adjoining room. Or perhaps the members of the executive committee are to explain to this police officer that it is no part of the new *Iskra*'s "plan" to have a peaceful demonstration transformed into a brutal battering?)

"To obviate such a surprise, the executive committee must inform the liberal assemblymen beforehand [so that they may give a "formal promise" not to send for the Cossacks?] of the forthcoming demonstration and its true purpose [i.e., inform them that our true purpose does not consist in being brutally battered and so having the meaning of Axelrod's plan distorted]. Furthermore, it must try to reach some agreement [mark this!] with the representatives of the Left wing of the bourgeois opposition and secure, if not their active support, at any rate their sympathy with our political action. Its negotiations with them must, it need hardly be said, be conducted in the name of the Party and on the instructions of the workers' circles and meetings, which should not only discuss the general plan of the polit-

ical campaign but hear reports of its progress—the rules of secrecy being, of course, strictly observed."

Yes, yes, we can well see that Starover's great idea of an agreement with the liberals on the basis of exactly prescribed conditions is gaining strength and substance daily and hourly. To be sure, all these exactly prescribed conditions have been shelved "for the time being" (we are no formalists!); but, on the other hand, an agreement is being reached in practice, now, at once, viz., *an agreement not to cause panic fear*.

Whichever way one reads the editors' letter, no other meaning of its famous "agreement" with the liberals can be found than that we have indicated: either it is an agreement about the conditions on which the liberals would have a right to speak in the name of the people (and in that case the very idea of it very seriously discredits the Social-Democrats who advance it); or else it is an agreement about not causing panic fear, an agreement about sympathising with a peaceful demonstration—in which case it is just nonsense that can hardly be discussed seriously. Nor could the absurd idea of the paramount importance of pressure on the bourgeois opposition, instead of on the government, have resulted in anything but an absurdity. If we are in a position to organise an imposing mass demonstration of workers in the hall of a Zemstvo Assembly, we shall, of course, do so (though if we have forces enough for a mass demonstration it would be much better to "concentrate" them "before the premises" not of the Zemstvo, but of the police, the gendarmerie, or the censorship). But to be swayed when doing so by considerations like the Zemstvo-ists' panic fears, and to engage in negotiations on that score, would be the height of ineptitude, the height of absurdity. Among a good proportion, most likely the majority, of Russia's Zemstvo-ists, the very *content* of a speech by a consistent Social-Democrat will always and inevitably arouse panic fear. To parley with the Zemstvo-ists beforehand about the undesirability of *that* sort of panic fear would place one in the falsest and most undignified kind of position. A brutal battering, or the prospect of one, will just as inevitably arouse panic fear of another sort. To engage in negotiations with the Zemstvo-ists concerning this panic

fear would be very foolish, because not even the most moderate liberal will ever bring about such a battering or sympathise with it—but the thing does not depend upon him. What is needed here is not "negotiations", but the actual mustering of force; not pressure on the Zemstvo-ists, but pressure on the government and its agents. If we have no force behind us, better not to hold forth about great plans; and if we do have it, then it is force we must oppose to the Cossacks and police, we must try to gather a crowd of such size and in such a spot that it should be able to repel, or at least to check, the onslaught of the Cossacks and police. And if we are indeed capable of exerting "powerful organised pressure upon the bourgeois opposition", it is assuredly not by silly "negotiations" about not causing panic fear, but by force and force alone, the force of mass resistance to the Cossacks and the tsarist police, the force of a mass onslaught capable of growing into a popular uprising.

The editors of the new *Iskra* see things differently. They are so pleased with their plan for an agreement and negotiations that they cannot admire it enough, cannot find praise enough to lavish on it.

...The active demonstrators must be "imbued with an understanding of the fundamental difference between an ordinary demonstration against the police or the government in general, and a demonstration immediately designed to further the struggle against absolutism, through direct pressure by the revolutionary proletariat on the political tactics [indeed!] of the liberal elements at the *present* [italicised by the editors] moment.... To organise demonstrations of the ordinary, so to speak, general-democratic [!!] type, not aiming directly at a concrete counterposing of the revolutionary proletariat and the liberal bourgeois opposition as two independent political forces, the mere existence of strong political ferment among the masses is sufficient.... Our Party must utilise this mood of the masses even for such, so to say, a lower type [note that!] of their mobilisation against absolutism.... We are taking our first [!] steps on a new [!l path of political activity, the path of organising planned intervention by the worker masses [N.B.] in public life with the direct aim of counterposing them to the bourgeois opposition as an independent force,

which has opposite class interests, but which at the same time offers it conditions [what conditions?] for waging a vigorous joint struggle against the common enemy."

It is not given to everyone to appreciate all the profundity of this remarkable disquisition. The Rostov demonstration,[157] where thousands and thousands of workers were made familiar with the aims of socialism and the demands of working-class democracy, is a "lower type of mobilisation", the ordinary, *general-democratic* type; here there is no concrete counterposing of the revolutionary proletariat and the bourgeois opposition. But when a specially authorised spokesman appointed by an executive committee, which has been elected by an organising group, which has been set up by the committeemen and active workers—when that spokesman, after first negotiating with the Zemstvo-ists, enters a loud protest in the Zemstvo Assembly because it declines to hear him—that will be a "concrete" and "direct" counterposing of two independent forces, that will be "direct" pressure on the tactics of the liberals, that will be "a first step on a new path". For heaven's sake, gentlemen! Why, even Martynov in the worst days of *Rabocheye Dyelo* hardly sank quite so low as this!

The mass meetings of workers in the streets of the southern towns, dozens of worker speakers, direct clashes with the real, tangible force of the tsarist autocracy—all that is a "lower type of mobilisation". Agreements with the Zemstvo-ists about a peaceful statement by our spokesman who will undertake not to cause panic among Messrs. the liberals—that is a "new path". There you have the new tactical tasks, the new tactical views of the new *Iskra*, of which the world was informed with such pomp by the editorial Balalaikin.[158] On one point, though, this Balalaikin happened to speak the truth: between the old *Iskra* and the new there is indeed a yawning gulf. The old *Iskra* had only contempt and derision for people who could admire, as a 'new path", a theatrically staged agreement between classes. *This* new path is one we have long known, from the record of those French and German Socialist "statesmen" who similarly regard the old revolutionary tactics as a "lower type" and never weary of praising "planned and direct intervention in public life" in the form of agreements to allow

the workers' spokesmen to make peaceful and modest statements after negotiations with the Left wing of the bourgeois opposition.

The editors are in such panic fear of the panic fear of the Zemstvo liberals that they insistently enjoin "particular caution" on those who take part in their "new" plan. "As an extreme case of external caution in the way the action is actually carried out," says the letter, "we can envisage mailing the workers' statement to the assemblymen's homes and scattering a considerable number of copies in the Zemstvo Assembly hall. Only people affected with bourgeois revolutionism [*sic*!], for which the external effect is everything and the process of the systematic development of the class-consciousness and initiative of the proletariat is nothing, could have any objection to this."

Well, we are not wont to object to the mailing or scattering of leaflets, but we shall certainly always object to pompous and hollow phrase-mongering. To make the mailing and scattering of leaflets the occasion for talking with serious men about the process of the systematic development of the class-consciousness and initiative of the proletariat, one must be a veritable paragon of complacent banality. To clamour from the housetops about new tactical tasks and then reduce the whole thing to the mailing and scattering of leaflets is really priceless; and nothing could be more characteristic of the exponents of the intellectualist trend in our Party, who, now that their new words in organisation have proved a fiasco, rush about frantically in search of a new word in tactics. And then they talk, with their usual modesty, about the vanity of external effect! Can't you see, my good sirs, that at best, even supposing your so-called new plan were entirely successful, having a workingman address the Zemstvo gentry would only achieve an external effect, and that to talk of its really exerting "powerful" pressure on "the tactics of the liberal elements" is nothing but a joke? Is it not rather the other way round—that what has really exerted powerful pressure on the tactics of the liberal elements is those mass workers' demonstrations which to you are of the "ordinary, general-democratic, lower type"? And if the Russian proletariat is destined again to exert

effective pressure on the tactics of the liberals, it will, I assure you, be by a mass onslaught against the government, not by an agreement with the Zemstvo-ists.

IV

The Zemstvo campaign, launched with the gracious permission of the police; the blandishments of Svyatopolk-Mirsky[159] and the government press; the rising tone of the liberal press; the animation in what is known as educated society—all this faces the workers' party with very serious tasks indeed. But these tasks are quite wrongly formulated in the letter of the *Iskra* editors. At this of all times, the political activity of the proletariat must be focused on organising powerful pressure on the government, not on the liberal opposition. Particularly now, agreements between the workers and the Zemstvo-ists about peaceful demonstrations—agreements which would inevitably boil down to the staging of musical-comedy effects—are utterly out of place; what is needed is to rally the advanced, revolutionary elements of the proletariat in preparation for a decisive struggle for freedom. Particularly now, when our constitutional movement is beginning conspicuously to display the original sins of all bourgeois liberalism, and notably the Russian variety—phrase-mongering, inconsistency of word and action, a sheerly philistine disposition to trust the government and every adroit politician—talk about the undesirability of frightening and panicking the Zemstvo gentry, about levers for reaction, etc., etc., is especially out of place. Particularly now, it is vital to build up in the revolutionary proletariat the firm conviction that the present "emancipation movement in society" will necessarily and inevitably prove a bubble like all the others before it unless the force of the worker masses, capable of and ready for an uprising, intervenes.

The political unrest among all sections of the people—that essential condition for an uprising and earnest of its success, an earnest that the initiative of the proletariat will meet with support—is spreading, growing, becoming more intense all the time. It would therefore be very poor judgement if at this moment anyone were to start shouting

again for immediate launching of the assault, for forming at once into assault battalions,[160] etc. The whole course of events goes to show that the tsarist government will very soon find itself in a still worse tangle and faced with an even more formidable resentment. The game it has started with the Zemstvo constitutionalists is bound to get it into a tangle: whether it makes some paltry concessions or whether it makes no concessions at all, discontent and exasperation will inevitably spread still wider. And it is likewise bound to get into a tangle with its shameful and criminal Manchurian adventure, which spells a political crisis in either event: decisive military defeat, or the protraction of a war so hopeless for Russia.

What the working class must do is to broaden and strengthen its organisation and redouble its agitation among the masses, making the most of every vacillation of the government, propagating the idea of an uprising, demonstrating the necessity for it from the example of all those half-hearted and foredoomed "steps" about which so much fuss is now being made. It need hardly be said that the workers' response to the Zemstvo petitions must be to call meetings, scatter leaflets, and—where there are forces enough—organise demonstrations to present all the Social-Democratic demands, regardless of the "panic" of Mr. Trubetskoy and his like or of the philistines' cries about levers for reaction. And if one is really to risk talking in advance, and from abroad at that, about a possible and desirable higher type of *mass* demonstration (because demonstrations not of a mass nature are altogether without significance); if one is really to discuss before what particular premises the demonstrators' forces should be concentrated—we would point to the premises where the business of police persecution of the working-class movement is carried on, to the police, gendarmerie, censorship headquarters, to the places where political "offenders" are confined. The way for the workers to give serious support to the Zemstvo petitions is not by concluding agreements about the conditions on which the Zemstvo-ists would have a right to speak in the name of the people, but by striking a blow at the people's enemies. And there need be little doubt that the idea of such a demonstration will meet with the sympathy of the proletariat. The workers now-

adays hear magniloquent phrases and lofty promises on every hand, they see a real—infinitesimal but nonetheless real—extension of freedom for "society" (a slackening of the curb on the Zemstvos, the return of banished Zemstvo-ists, an abatement of the ferocity against the liberal press); but they see nothing whatever that gives *their* political struggle more freedom. Under pressure of the revolutionary onslaught of the *proletariat* the government has allowed the *liberals* to talk a little about freedom! The condition of the slaves of capital, downtrodden and deprived of rights, now comes home to the proletarians more clearly than ever. The workers do not have any regular widespread organisations for the relatively free (by Russian standards) discussion of political matters; nor halls to hold meetings in; nor newspapers of their own; and their exiled and imprisoned comrades are not coming back. The workers see now that the liberal bourgeois gentry are setting about dividing the bearskin, the skin of the bear which the workers have not yet killed, but which they, and they alone, have seriously wounded. They see that, at the very start of dividing the skin in anticipation, these liberal bourgeois gentry already snap and snarl at the "extreme parties", at the "enemies at home"—the relentless enemies of bourgeois rule and bourgeois law and order. And the workers will rise still more fearlessly in still greater numbers, to finish off the bear, to win by force *for themselves* what is promised as charity to the liberal bourgeois gentry—freedom of assembly, freedom of the workers' press, full political freedom for a broad and open struggle for the complete victory of socialism.

We are issuing this pamphlet with the superscription "For Party Members Only" inasmuch as the *Iskra* editors' "letter" was issued with that superscription. Actually, to stage "secrecy precautions" in regard to a plan that is to be circulated to dozens of towns, discussed in hundreds of workers' circles, and explained in agitation leaflets and appeals is nothing short of ridiculous. It is an instance of the bureaucratic mystification which Comrade Galyorka, in "On the New Road", has already noted to be a practice of the editors and the Council. There is just one angle from

which one might justify concealing the editorial letter from the public in general and the liberals in particular: a letter like that is altogether too discreditable to our Party....

We are cancelling the superscription restricting the readership of this pamphlet, since our so-called Party editorial board has issued a reply to it that is supposedly for the Party membership but is in fact circulated only to gatherings of the minority and withheld from Party members known to belong to the majority.

If *Iskra* has decided not to consider us Party members (while at the same time fearing to say so openly), we can only resign ourselves to our sad fate and draw the appropriate conclusions from that decision.

December 22, 1904

Manuscript of the “Outline of a Talk on the Situation Within the Party”. 1904

Reduced

Manuscript of the "Outline of a Talk on the Situation Within the Party", 1904

Reduced

OUTLINE OF A TALK ON THE SITUATION WITHIN THE PARTY

OUTLINE OF MY TALK[161]

1. Already at the Second Congress the minority *Iskra*-ists displayed instability of principle (or went astray) and in the elections found themselves in coalition with their ideological opponents.

2. After the Congress too—even at the League—the minority championed the continuity of the old *Iskra* but actually shifted further and further away from it.

3. Plekhanov at the time of his swing-over (No. 52) saw clearly that the minority constituted the opportunist wing of the Party and were fighting like anarchistic individualists.

(*Contra* Vasilyev and Lenin in the matter of circle spirit.)*

4. Defending, justifying, elevating to a principle our organisational backwardness and the organisational nullification of the Congress already constitutes opportunism. No one will today venture to support, as such, theses on programme versus Rules, etc.

5. To accuse the majority of ignoring the economic struggle, of Jacobinism, of ignoring the workers' independent initiative, is nothing but totally groundless repetition of the attacks of *Rabocheye Dyelo* on *Iskra*.

6. Fear of the Third Congress and opposition to it completes the false position of both the minority and the conciliators.

7. In the Zemstvo campaign plan the *Iskra* editors have embarked on a particularly false and harmful, an undoubt-

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* See pp. 145-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

{{edly opportunist tactical course by bringing up the question of panic and extolling agreements with the Zemstvo-ists about peaceful demonstrations as being a new type.

The campaign plan is connected with Starover's mistaken resolution.

Written on November 19
(December 2), 1904

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Published according
to the manuscript

A LETTER TO THE COMRADES

(WITH REFERENCE TO THE FORTHCOMING PUBLICATION OF THE ORGAN OF THE PARTY MAJORITY)

Dear Comrades,

Today, at a meeting of a close circle of Bolsheviks abroad, a final decision was taken on a question that in principle has long been decided: the publication of a Party periodical that will uphold and develop the principles of the majority against the organisational and tactical discord brought into the Party by the minority, and will serve the needs of the positive work of the organisations in Russia, against whom such a bitter fight is now being carried on by minority agents practically all over the country—a fight that terribly disorganises the Party at this vital historical juncture, and one that is carried on throughout by the most shameless splitting methods and tactics, amid hypocritical deploring of the split by the so-called Central Organ of the Party. We have done everything in our power to steer the struggle into a Party channel; ever since January we have been fighting for a congress, as the only worthy Party way to end this impossible situation. By now it is perfectly clear that the activities of the Central Committee following its desertion to the minority consist almost entirely in desperately resisting a congress, and that the Council is resorting to the most outrageous and unpardonable tricks to put off convening it. The Council is directly sabotaging a congress; whoever has still to be convinced of that after its latest decisions, printed in the supplement to Nos. 73-74 of *Iskra*, will see it from Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*,[162] which we published the other day. It is perfectly clear now that unless

they unite and resist our so-called central institutions, the majority will not be able to uphold their position, to uphold the party spirit in its struggle against the circle spirit. Union of the Bolsheviks in Russia has long been put forward by them as an urgent need. Recall the tremendous sympathetic response to the programmatic resolution of the twenty-two* (programmatic for our struggle within the Party); recall the proclamation of the nineteen, issued in printed form by the Moscow Committee (October 1904); lastly, nearly all Party committees are aware that a number of private conferences of majority committees have lately been held, and in part are still being held,[163] and that the most vigorous and definite efforts are being made to solidly unite the majority committees for resistance to the overweening Bonapartists on the Council, Central Organ, and Central Committee.

We hope that these efforts (or rather steps) will be made generally known in the very near future, when the results will allow of a definite statement of what has already been achieved. It need hardly be said that the majority would have been quite unable to conduct their self-defence without a publishing house of their own. As you may already know from our Party literature, the new Central Committee simply ejected our pamphlets (and even the covers of pamphlets already set up) from the Party printing office, thus turning the latter into the printing office of a circle, and refused the direct request of the majority members abroad and of committees in Russia—the Riga Committee, for instance—to have majority literature delivered to Russia. It became quite evident that falsification of Party opinion was a systematic tactic of the new Central Committee. We found ourselves faced unavoidably with the necessity of expanding our publishing activities and setting up our own transport arrangements. The committees that had broken off comradely relations with the editorial board of the Central Organ (see Dan's admission in his account of the Geneva meeting of September 2, 1904[164]—an interesting pamphlet) could not and cannot do without a periodical organ. A party without an organ, an organ without a party!

* See pp. 454-61 of this volume.—*Ed.*

This tragic formulation put forward by the majority as far back as August inexorably decreed the one solution—the starting of our own organ. The young literary forces that have been coming abroad to uphold the vital cause of the majority of the comrades in Russia need a field for their energies. A number of Party writers in Russia likewise call insistently for an organ. In starting this organ, which will probably be called *Vperyod*, we are acting in full agreement with the mass of the Bolsheviks in Russia, and in full harmony with our conduct in the Party struggle. We are resorting to this weapon after a whole year spent in trying every, absolutely every way that is simpler, more economical for the Party, more perfectly in accordance with the interests of the working-class movement. We are by no means abandoning the struggle for a congress; on the contrary, we want to extend, co-ordinate, and support this struggle, want to help the committees to decide the new question now facing them—that of arranging a congress without the Council and Central Committee, and against the wishes of the Council and Central Committee—a question that requires the fullest and most serious discussion. We openly champion views and aims that have long since been stated, in a number of pamphlets, before the whole Party. We are fighting and will continue to fight for the consistent revolutionary line, against discord and wabbling in matters of both organisation and tactics (see the monstrously muddled letter of the new *Iskra* to the Party organisations, printed for Party members only and concealed from the eyes of the world[165]). The announcement about the new organ will probably appear in a week or so, and the first issue somewhere between January 1 and 10, New Style. The editorial board will include all the majority writers that have so far come to the fore (Ryadovoy, Galyorka, Lenin, Orlovsky, who contributed regularly to *Iskra* from its 46th to 51st issue, when it was conducted by Lenin and Plekhanov, and also very valuable younger forces). The body practically directing and organising the complex business of distribution, agencies, etc., etc., will be formed (has already been formed in part)[166] through direct assignment of definite functions to definite comrades by a number of Russian committees (the Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, and Niko-

layev committees, the four Caucasian committees, and several northern ones, more particulars of which you will receive shortly). We now appeal to all comrades to give us all the support they can. We shall conduct the organ on the understanding that it is the organ of the movement in Russia, not of any émigré circle. This requires, first and foremost, the most vigorous "*literary*" support, or rather literary participation, from Russia. I have put the word "literary" in italics and inverted commas in order to draw attention from the first to its special sense and caution against a misconception that is very common and highly detrimental to the work. It is a misconception that writers and only writers (in the professional sense of the term) can successfully contribute to a publication; on the contrary, it will be vital and alive only if for five leading and regularly contributing writers there are five hundred or five thousand contributors who are not writers. One of the shortcomings of the old *Iskra*, one which I always tried to rid it of (and which has grown to monstrous proportions in the new *Iskra*) was that too little was done for it from Russia. We always used to print everything, practically without exception, that we received from Russia. A really live organ should print only a tenth of what it receives, using the rest as material for the information and guidance of the journalists. We must have as many Party workers as possible correspond with us, correspond in the ordinary, not the journalistic sense of the term.

Isolation from Russia, the engulfing atmosphere of the accursed émigré slough, weighs so heavily on one here that living contact with Russia is our only salvation. Let all remember that who want in fact, and not just in word, to consider (and to *make*) our organ the organ of the entire "majority", the organ of the mass of Russian comrades. Let everyone who regards this organ as his own and who is conscious of the duties of a Social-Democratic Party member abandon once and for all the bourgeois habit of thinking and acting as is customary towards legally published papers—the habit of feeling: it is *their* business to write and ours to read. All Social-Democrats must work for the Social-Democratic paper. We ask everyone to contribute, and especially the workers. Give the workers the widest opportunity to write

for our paper, to write about positively everything, to write as much as they possibly can about their daily lives, interests, and work—without such material a Social-Democratic organ will not be worth a brass farthing and will not deserve the name. In addition, please send us *private letters*, not intended as contributions to the paper, i.e., not for publication, but by way of comradely intercourse with the editors and to keep them informed, and not only about facts and incidents, but about the prevailing sentiment and the everyday, "uninteresting", humdrum, routine side of the movement. People who have not lived abroad cannot imagine how much we need such letters (there is absolutely nothing secret about them either, and to write such an uncoded letter once or twice a week is really something the busiest person can do). So write to us about the discussions at the workers' study circles, the nature of these discussions, the subjects of study, and the things the workers ask about; about the state of propaganda and agitational work, and about contacts among the general public, in the army, and among the youth; above all write about any dissatisfaction the workers feel with us Social-Democrats, about the things that trouble them, about their suggestions, criticisms, etc. Matters relating to the practical organisation of the work are particularly interesting now, and there is no way of acquainting the editors with them except by a lively correspondence not of a journalistic nature, but simply of a comradely kind. Of course, not everyone has the ability or inclination to write, but ... don't say "I can't", say "I don't want to"; given the desire, one or two comrades who could write can be found in any circle, any group, even the smallest, even the most minor (the minor groups are often especially interesting, for they sometimes do the most important, though inconspicuous, part of the work). We here have from the start placed the secretarial work on a broad footing, drawing on the experience of the old *Iskra*; and you for your part should know that *anybody*, absolutely anybody who sets about it with patience and determination can without much difficulty make sure that all his letters, or nine-tenths of them, reach their destination. I say this on the basis of the three years' experience of the old *Iskra*, which had many such an informal correspondent (often unacquainted

with any of the editors) who wrote with the utmost regularity. The police have long been quite unequal to the task of intercepting all foreign correspondence (they only seize a letter occasionally, if the writer has been unusually careless); and the great bulk of the old *Iskra*'s material always used to arrive in the most usual way, in ordinary letters sent to our addresses. A special word of warning against the practice of concentrating correspondence only in the hands of the committee and the secretaries. Nothing could be more harmful than such a monopoly. Essential as unity is in actions and decisions, in the matter of general information, of correspondence, it is quite wrong. It very often happens that the most interesting letters are from comparative "outsiders" (people more remote from the committees), who perceive more *freshly* much that old experienced workers overlook because they are too used to it. Give every opportunity to the younger people to write to us—to the youth, to Party workers, to "centralists", to organisers, and to ordinary rank-and-filers at impromptu meetings and mass rallies.

Only given such a wide correspondence can we, by our joint efforts, make our paper a real organ of *the working-class movement in Russia*. We earnestly request, to have this letter read to every kind of meeting, study circle, subgroup, etc., etc.—as widely as possible—and to be informed how the workers receive this appeal. As to the idea of publishing a separate workers' ("popular") organ and a general—guiding—intellectual organ, we are very sceptical about it; we should like to see the Social-Democratic newspaper the organ of the whole movement, to see the workers' paper and the Social-Democratic paper fused in one. This can be achieved only if we have the most active support of the working class.

With comradely greetings, *N. Lenin*

Written on November 29 (December 12), 1904

Published in leaflet form in December 1904

Published according to the leaflet text

FROM THE ICMACS NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

STATEMENT AND DOCUMENTS ON THE BREAK OF THE CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS WITH THE PARTY

Written in December 1904

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according
to the pamphlet text

In No. 77 of *Iskra*, three members of the Central Committee, claiming to act on behalf of that body as a whole, summon Comrade N[167] to a court of arbitration on the charge of "making a false statement designed to disrupt the Party". The allegedly false statement in question was made "through a member of the Central Committee who took no part in drawing up the declaration", that is, through me. In view of my close connection with the affair, and acting on the authority of Comrade N, I consider it my right and duty to participate in the arbitration proceedings, and I bring the following charges against Central Committee members Glebov, Valentin, and Nikitich.

I charge them with unlawful, improper, formally and morally impermissible behaviour towards their fellow-members of the Central Committee and towards the Party as a whole.

Inasmuch as this improper behaviour is greatly protracting and aggravating the Party crisis, and as it moreover directly affects the mass of the Party workers, I consider publicity of the proceedings absolutely essential in regard to everything that does not affect the secrecy of the organisation, and I shall therefore set forth my charges in detail.

I. *I charge the three Central Committee members*, *Glebov*, *Valentin*, *and Nikitich*, *with systematically deceiving the Party*.

1) I charge them with having used the powers conferred on them by the Second Party Congress to suppress the public opinion of the Party as expressed in the agitation for a Third Congress. They had no right to suppress this agitation, which is an inalienable right of every Party member. In particular, they had no right to dissolve the Southern Bureau for agitating on behalf of a congress. They had neither the formal nor the moral right to censure me, a mem-

ber of the Party Council, for having voted in the Council in favour of a congress.

2) I charge them with having concealed from the Party the committee resolutions in favour of a congress, and with taking advantage of the confidence they enjoy as members of one of the Party's highest institutions to mislead the committees by a deliberately false account of the state of affairs in the Party. They have obstructed the elucidation of the truth by refusing to meet the Riga Committee's request to have the resolution of the twenty-two printed and distributed and to have majority literature delivered to Russia, on the pretext that it is not Party literature.

3) I charge them with not having hesitated, in their agitation against a congress, even to disrupt the work on the spot by appealing against the pro-congress committees to their peripheral organisations, doing everything to discredit these committees in the eyes of the local workers, and thus tending to destroy that confidence between the committees and their periphery without which all work is impossible.

4) I charge them with having, through the Central Committee delegate on the Council, shared in devising the Council rulings as to the conditions for summoning the Third Congress—rulings which made a congress impossible and thus deprived the Party of the opportunity of settling the, conflict within it in a normal way.

5) I charge them with having told the committees that they agreed in principle with the position of the majority and that any agreement with the minority was only possible if the latter gave up its secret separate organisation and its demand for co-optation to the Central Committee, yet having at the same time, *in secret from the Party and in deliberate defiance of its will*, made a deal with the minority on the following terms: 1) preservation of the autonomy of the minority's technical enterprises, and 2) co-optation to the Central Committee of three of the most inveterate minority adherents.

6) I charge them with having taken advantage of their authority as members of one of the Party's highest institutions to cast aspersions on their political opponents. They have behaved dishonourably towards Comrade P.[168]

in resolving *last July* on an investigation into his alleged false statement to the Northern Committee and *to this day* (December 22) not even presenting him with the charges made against him, although Glebov has met P. several times, and although this same Glebov, in his capacity of member of the Party Council, allowed himself to apply the term "deceit" in *Iskra* to the action of this comrade, who had no opportunity to defend himself. They told a deliberate untruth when they declared that Lidin[169] was not a representative (*Vertrauensmann*) of the Central Committee. They deceived the Party members, with the object of discrediting in their eyes Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich and his associates in the Distribution Centre, by publishing a statement in *Iskra* (No. 77) in which only the liabilities of the Distribution Centre were shown (and that inaccurately)—and this after they had, through their representatives, issued Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich a written certificate to the effect that he had conducted the business properly and that the accounts were in good order.

7) I charge them with having taken advantage of the absence of Comrade Vasilyev and Comrade Zverev, the former foreign representatives of the Central Committee, to discredit Party institutions (the library and archives of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva). They published a statement in *Iskra*, signed by a Central Committee "representative" unknown to me, in which the history and true character of these institutions was absolutely distorted.

II. *In addition, I charge the three members of the Central Committee, Glebov, Valentin, and Nikitich, with a number of morally and formally impermissible actions towards fellow-members of that body.*

1) They violated every principle of Party organisation and discipline by presenting me (through Comrade Glebov) with an ultimatum to resign from the Central Committee or cease agitating for a congress.

2) They broke the agreement concluded in their name by Central Committee member Glebov, when, as a result of the altered composition of the Central Committee, it was no longer to their advantage to observe this agreement.

3) They had no right, at their meeting in July, to declare Comrade N as having resigned from the Central Committee

without hearing either his statement or mine, particularly as these three members of the Central Committee were aware of our demand (the demand of four Central Committee members[170]) to have this disputed matter examined at a general meeting of the Central Committee. To declare Comrade N no longer a member of the Central Committee was also impermissible in itself, for in doing so the three Central Committee members took improper advantage of a statement which Comrade N had made conditionally (and of which not all the comrades had been informed).

4) The three Central Committee members had no right to conceal from me the change in-their views and intentions. Comrade Glebov assured me at the end of May that their views were expressed in the declaration they had drawn up in March.[171] Thus the July declaration, which conflicts basically with the March declaration, was adopted in secret from me, and Glebov's statements were a piece of deception.

5) Glebov broke the agreement he had made with me that in the report to the Amsterdam Congress,[172] which was to be written by Dan (as delegate from the Central Organ) and himself, Glebov (as delegate from the Central Committee), there would be no reference to the differences in the Party. The report, which was written by Dan alone, proved to be full of veiled controversy and permeated through and through with the views of the "minority". Glebov did not protest against Dan's report, and thus indirectly shared in this attempt to deceive the international Social-Democratic movement.

6) The three Central Committee members had no right to deny me the opportunity to announce and publish my dissenting opinion on an important issue of Party life. The July declaration was sent to the Central Organ *for publication* before I had been given a chance to express an opinion about it. On August 24, I sent the Central Organ a protest against this declaration. The Central Organ declared that it would print it only if so desired by the three Central Committee members who had written the declaration. They did not so desire, and thus they concealed my protest from the Party.

7) They had no right to withhold from me the minutes of the Council and to deprive me, without formally expel-

ling me from the Central Committee, of all information about what was happening in the Central Committee, about the appointment of new agents in Russia and abroad, the negotiations with the "minority", the state of the Party funds, etc., etc.

8) They had no right to co-opt three new comrades (conciliators) to the Central Committee without taking the matter to the Council, as required by the Party Rules in the absence of unanimity; and there was no unanimity, since I had lodged a protest against the co-optation.

Appendix

In view of the importance attaching to the position of the Central Committee in the conflict within the Party, I deem it necessary to publish the following documents.

I. Letters from Comrade Glebov to members of the "collegium".[173]

a) September.

"Relations with the Central Organ and the League have not been settled yet. I must say that since our declaration they have become impudent and their appetites have been growing. Our position here is very difficult: control of things abroad is in the hands of the League, private sources are in the hands of the Central Organ, and so we are up to our ears in debt. In these straits (with a debt of 9,000 round our necks), I have to think about finding some solution. I have therefore asked the minority to let me have an outline of their desired reforms."

b) September 7.

"Last night I had a business meeting, in the presence of S., with three spokesmen of the minority: Popov, Blumenfeld, and Martov."

Of the questions discussed at this meeting, which, in Glebov's words, turned into "a preliminary meeting for the arrangement of peace", let me mention the following:

1) Organisational relations abroad.

"Responsibility for the movement in Russia to be assumed by the Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the League. With a view to removing mutual friction and creating a greater interest in the

work and complete confidence, the general direction of affairs to be entrusted to a commission of representatives of the Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the League. The Central Committee to have two votes and the right of veto...."

2) Transport.

"The Central Organ to come under the Central Committee's control with a certain amount of autonomy, as follows: There must only be one distribution centre abroad, the Central Committee's. But the Central Organ is to keep charge of its own part of the border. Literature distribution in Russia to be in the Central Committee's hands. To give it greater autonomy, however, the Central Organ is to have charge of the South. Let me explain. The Central Organ has its own transport arrangements It fears that in the event of a change of administration it might be deprived of its routes. It therefore requests to be guaranteed them by organisational means."

c) September 7.

"Dan and possibly others here too are furious over yesterday's agreement as to the management of affairs. What a greedy lot! What they would like is to set up abroad a committee of representatives of the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the League, which would decide everything abroad- each only to have one vote, of course. Not bad, eh?"

d) September.

"I want to draw your attention to the desire the Council has expressed for replenishment [this refers to replenishment of the Central Committee representation on the Council]. Somebody will have to be elected in place of Lenin, who will, of course, proclaim it unlawful. I would suggest Dan or Deutsch—with the express proviso that they are being appointed only for the purpose of representation on the Council. There is nobody else we can elect, it seems to me."

II. Letter from a Central Committee agent (*now officially co-opted to the Central Committee*) *to Comrade Glebov*:

September 4.

"Over the declaration there's such a to-do that it's hard to sort things out. The one thing that's clear is that all the committees except the Kharkov, Crimea, Mining Area, and Don are majority committees. The Don Committee is neutral, I think, but I don't know for certain. Of the 'majority' committees, the Riga, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Northern have, as I informed you before, expressed lack of confidence in the Central Committee on account of the declaration. Full confidence in it has been expressed by only a very few committees. The rest have expressed confidence in it as regards attempts at reconciliation—with the proviso that if these should fail a special congress is to be called

immediately. Of these last-named committees, some make it a condition of reconciliation that the minority should cease to regard themselves as a 'contracting party' and abandon their demand for co-optation as a 'contracting party'(?). That is the picture. If the reconciliation doesn't come off, the Central Committee forfeits the confidence of the majority of the committees and will, consequently itself be obliged to agitate for a congress in order to surrender its mandate. **And the committees' frame of mind makes it quite clear that a congress would pass decisions along the lines proposed by the twenty two, viz., to dismiss the editors and hand over the editorship to the majority, to reform the party Council, etc.** But, as I have already told you, if the reconciliation is to satisfy the committees, the minority must accept the declaration and cease to regard themselves as a 'contracting party'. If they do that, I think Lenin will lose all support in Russia and it will be possible to restore peace. Your remark that matters with Martov are straightening out 'little by little' surprised me. The editors' obstinacy is becoming positively exasperating, and in spite of my sympathies for them ideologically and otherwise, I am beginning to lose confidence in them as political 'leaders'. They now have the organisational question cleared up, and if they persist in their obstinacy in the absence of support from Russia **(the minority are powerless here)**, it will show that they are only fighting for posts."

That was the beginning of the bargain; and here is the finale.

The Central Committee circulated a letter to the committees informing them that

"The negotiations will be completed very shortly (in a couple of weeks at the outside), and meanwhile we can inform you that (1) the Central Committee has not co-opted any minority members (somebody is circulating a slander to that effect); ... (3) the negotiations with the minority are being conducted precisely along the lines that Valentin reported to you, namely, that if there are to be any concessions, they can only be on the part of the minority and must consist in the Central Organ abandoning factional controversy and in the minority dissolving their secret organisation, renouncing their demand for co-optation to the Central Committee, and turning over all their enterprises (technical equipment, transport arrangements, contacts) to the Central Committee. Only on these conditions can peace be restored in the Party. And there is reason to hope that is how it will be. At all events if the minority should now evince a desire to continue their old policy, the Central Committee will immediately break off the negotiations and proceed to summon a special congress."

That is how the Central Committee tried to soothe the committees, which expressed lack of confidence in it; and here are some *letters of "prominent" members of the minority*. The letters were received in the middle of December 1904, Old Style.

"At last we have had a meeting with the riffraff. Their reply was as follows: they agree to autonomy for our technical enterprises; but as regards the agitation commission, they object, considering that to be a direct function of the Central Committee (direction of agitation), and prefer reform of the Central Committee to this plan; **however, they cannot co-opt officially just now, and propose instead the de facto (unofficial) co-optation of three members of the minority (Popov, Fomin, and Fischer). Naturally, X. and I at once agreed, and henceforth the Menshevik opposition is officially dissolved.** It is a veritable load off our minds. The entire Central Committee is to have a meeting with us in a day or two, after which we shall arrange a conference of the committees closest to us....

"**We are, of course, quite certain that we shall gain control of the Central Committee and direct it along the lines we want.** That will be all the easier since many of them already admit the correctness of the minority's criticism on points of principle.... In all the consistent firm-liner committees (Baku, Odessa, Nizhni-Novgorod, and St. Petersburg) the workers are demanding the system of office by election. That is a clear symptom that the firm-liners are in their death-agony."

Simultaneously with this another letter was received:

"An agreement has been reached between 'minority' representatives and the Central Committee. The representatives signed an undertaking. But as there had been no canvass of the 'minority' first, the undertaking, not unnaturally, turned out not altogether satisfactory: it expresses 'confidence' in the Central Committee, instead of in its unity policy; it speaks both of absorption in the Party and of terminating our separate existence, whereas the latter alone would be sufficient. Lastly, the undertaking does not contain the 'credo' of the 'minority'. In view of this, it has been decided to have all the 'minority' organisations pass a resolution containing the 'credo' and the amendments indicated, while of course recognising our representatives' agreement with the Central Committee as valid."

* *
*

It is very likely that the individuals caught red-handed and exposed by these documents will, with their usual "moral sensitivity", do their best to divert the Party's attention from the contents of the documents to the moral issue of the right to publish them. I am certain that the Party will not allow itself to be fooled, by this sleight-of-hand. I declare that I take upon myself full moral responsibility for this exposure, and will give all necessary explanations to the court of arbitration that investigates the matter as a whole.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FORMATION OF AN ORGANISING COMMITTEE AND THE CONVENING OF THE THIRD REGULAR CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[174]

The severe crisis our Party has been experiencing for a year and a half, ever since the time of the Second Congress, has led to an inevitable and long-foreseen result: to a complete break of the central institutions with the Party. We shall not recapitulate here the painful history of that crisis and repeat facts sufficiently dealt with in the Party press, and in particular in numerous resolutions and statements by the committees in Russia and conferences of them. It is sufficient to state that the last such conference, the Northern, in which the St. Petersburg, Riga, Tver, Moscow, Northern, and Nizhni-Novgorod committees took part, elected a Bureau which it instructed to act as an Organising Committee for the immediate convening of the Third Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

After waiting beyond all time limits set by the committees for an answer from the so-called Central Committee, the Bureau has come to an understanding with representatives of the three Southern (Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, and Nikolayev) and four Caucasian committees. It is now coming forward in the capacity of Organising Committee to convene the Third Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, without the consent of the central bodies, which are accountable to the Party but have shirked their responsibility to it.

This is a time of unprecedented political upsurge in Russia, and the proletariat is faced with immense historic tasks in the struggle against the autocracy. All Social-Democrats working in Russia know what tremendous harm the division within our Party has done to the work of organising and rallying the forces of the proletariat; what infinite damage the work of propaganda, agitation, and achievement of workers' unity in Russia has suffered through the pernicious influence of the émigré circle spirit. And if it is not possible to unite the émigré circles and their placemen, let there be unity at least among all Social-Democratic Party workers in Russia, all who uphold the consistent line of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Their unification is the only true road to complete and lasting unity in future among all Russian Social-Democrats.

Long live Russian, long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Concerning the arrangements for convening the Congress, the Organising Committee considers it necessary to make the following announcement:

1) The Organising Committee recognises the unqualified right to representation at the Third Regular Congress, with voice and vote, of all Russian committees and organisations endorsed by the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Nikolayev, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Saratov, Ural, Northern, Tula, Tver, Nizhni-Novgorod, Baku, Batum, Tiflis, Mining Area, Siberian, and Crimean committees).

2) The Organising Committee recognises the conditional right to representation at the Congress of committees endorsed by the Central Committee after the Second Congress (the Mingrelian, Astrakhan, Orel-Bryansk, Samara, Smolensk, Riga, Kursk, and Voronezh committees, and also the League Abroad). All these committees were endorsed by central bodies which have forfeited the confidence of the Party. We are in duty bound to invite them to the Third Congress, but only the Congress itself can make the final decision as to their participation (actual status of the committee, its right to voice only or to voice and vote, etc.).

3) On behalf of the majority of the Russian committees, the Organising Committee expresses the wish that *all* organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, both abroad and in Russia, and particularly all workers' organisations that consider themselves part of it, should be represented at its Third Regular Congress. The participation of the last-named appears to us especially desirable because the Party crisis and the demagogic preaching of office by election and of democracy *à la Rabocheye Dyelo* have already caused several splits. We must take advantage of the Congress to try, with the participation of representatives from most of the Russian committees, to heal these splits or lessen the harm from them.

4) The Organising Committee accordingly invites all wishing to participate in the Congress to respond immediately and communicate with it (through one of the thirteen committees named above).

5) The question of *invitation* to the Congress shall in disputed cases be decided by the two nearest committees and a third person representing the Organising Committee.

6) The terms of *representation* at the Congress (with voice only or with voice and vote) for committees and other organisations not endorsed by the Second Party Congress shall be determined by the Third Congress itself.

7) The time and place of the Congress will be fixed by the Organising Committee.

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NOTES

[1] The *Account of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, written at the time of the Bolsheviks' bitter struggle against the disruptive, splitting activities of the Mensheviks after the Second Congress, played a big part in exposing the Mensheviks' opportunist tactics and rallying the supporters of the majority. Until the publication of the Congress minutes (in January 1904) it was the only Party document dealing with the results of the Second Congress and the causes of the split in the Party. The ideas contained in it were further developed in subsequent articles, letters, and speeches by Lenin, and particularly in his book *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (pp. 201-423 of this volume) p. 15

[2] Lenin here gives the figures of voting rights as they stood at the time of the Credentials Committee report at the second sitting of the Congress, on July 18 (31), 1903. 42 voting delegates had arrived at the Congress by then: 33 with one vote each, 8 with two votes each, and one of the two delegates from the Foreign Committee of the Bund also had two votes temporarily, pending the arrival of the other. After the arrival of this latter on July 22 (August 4), there were 43 voting delegates, 35 of them with one vote each and 8 with two. p. 19

[3] *The Bund* (General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia), founded at a congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilno in 1897, was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in Russia's western regions. It joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (1898) "as an autonomous organisation independent only in regard to questions specifically concerning the Jewish proletariat" (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, 1954, Part I, p. 14).

The Bund brought nationalist and separatist tendencies into the Russian working-class movement. Its Fourth Congress, in April 1901, voted to replace the autonomy relationship established by the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. by a relationship based on the federal principle. This congress of the Bund also declared, in a resolution on methods of political struggle, that "the best way to draw the broad masses into the movement is the economic struggle".

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected its demand to be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund withdrew from the Party. It rejoined in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P., the Bundists always supported the opportunist wing (the Economists, the Mensheviks, the Liquidators) and fought against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. As against the Bolsheviks' programme demand for the right of nations to self-determination, they called for national cultural autonomy. During the First World War the Bund took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917 it supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Bund leadership joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time, the Bund rank and file began to show a change of heart and favour co-operation with the Soviet government. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself, part of its membership joining the Communist Party on the basis of the general rules of admission. p. 19

[4] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*) was an Economist journal, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, published at irregular intervals in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902 under the editorship of B. N. Krichevsky, P. F. Teplov (Sibiryak), V. P. Ivanshin, and later A. S. Martynov. Nine issues (three of them double ones, thus making twelve) appeared in all. The editorial board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was the Economists' centre abroad. It supported Bernstein's slogan of "freedom of criticism" of Marxism, took an opportunist stand on the tactical and organisational problems of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, and denied the revolutionary potentialities of the peasantry. The journal propagated the opportunist idea of subordinating the workers' political struggle to the economic and glorified spontaneity in the working-class movement, denying the leading role of the Party. One of its editors, V. P. Ivanshin, also took part in editing *Rabochaya Mysl*, organ of the avowed Economists, which *Rabocheye Dyelo* supported. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists represented the extreme Right, opportunist wing of the Party. p. 19

[5] *The Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was founded in 1894 in Geneva, on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group. The latter was at first the leader in it and edited its publications, but afterwards the opportunist elements—the Economist "younger group"—secured the upper hand. At the Union's First Congress in November 1898 the Emancipation of Labour group refused to edit the Union publications; and at the Second Congress, in April 1900, it broke with the Union finally, withdrawing with its supporters from the Congress to establish an independent organisation called *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 19

[6] The *League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class*, organised by Lenin in the autumn of 1895, embraced some twenty Marxist workers' study circles in St. Petersburg and was headed by a Central Group led by Lenin. It was the first organisation in Russia to link up socialism with the working-class movement, going over from the propagation of Marxism among a small number of advanced workers to political agitation among the broad masses of the proletariat, it was significant because, as Lenin put it, it was the rudiment of a revolutionary party based on the working-class movement and directing the class struggle of the proletariat.

On the night of December 8 (20), 1895, the League was dealt a severe blow: many of the leading members, headed by Lenin, were arrested. The first issue of its paper *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*), all ready for the press, was also seized.

While in prison Lenin continued to direct the work of the League; he helped it with advice, smuggled out coded letters and leaflet texts, and wrote the pamphlet *On Strikes* (unfortunately not found so far) and his "Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party" (present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 93-121). Those of the old League members who escaped arrest helped to prepare and arrange the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and to draw up the Manifesto issued in its name. However, the long absence of the League's founders, who had been exiled to Siberia, and above all of Lenin, gave freer scope to the opportunist policies of the Economist "younger group" of Social-Democrats, who from 1897 on preached through their newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* the ideas of mere trade unionism and Bernsteinism. Beginning with the latter half of 1898 the leadership of the League was in the hands of the extreme Economists of the *Rabochaya Mysl* persuasion. p. 19

[7] *Yuzhny Rabochy* (*Southern Worker*) was a Social-Democratic group formed in the South of Russia in the autumn of 1900 around an illegal newspaper of that name (the first issue was published in January 1900 by the Ekaterinoslav Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the twelfth and last—in April 1903). Among the members of the group and the editors of the paper were, at various times, I. K. Lalayants, A. Vilensky, O. A. Kogan, B. S. Zeitlin, Y. Y. and Y. S. Levin, and V. N. Rozanov.

In contrast to the Economists, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group considered the proletariat's political struggle, the overthrow of the autocracy, to be the prime task; they opposed terrorism, upheld the need to develop a mass revolutionary movement, and carried out extensive revolutionary activities in the South of Russia. At the same time, they overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie and ignored the importance of the peasant movement. As against the *Iskra* plan of building a centralised Marxist party by uniting all revolutionary Social-Democrats around *Iskra*, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group advocated a plan of restoring the Party by creating regional Social-Democratic associations. A practical attempt to carry out this plan was made through convening in

December 1901 a conference of the Party committees and organisations of the South, at which a League of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. was formed, with *Yuzhny Rabochy* as its press organ. The attempt proved impracticable (as was the group's entire organisational plan), and following wholesale arrests in the spring of 1902, the League fell to pieces. In August 1902 those *Yuzhny Rabochy* members who remained at liberty entered into negotiations with the *Iskra* editorial board about working together to restore Party unity. The group's statement of solidarity with *Iskra* (published in No. 27 of *Iskra*, November 1, 1902, and in No. 10 of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, December 1902) was of much importance in consolidating the Social-Democratic forces. In November 1902 *Yuzhny Rabochy* joined with the *Iskra* organisation in Russia and the St. Petersburg Committee and Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P. in establishing the Organising Committee for convening the Second Party Congress, and they shared in that committee's work. But in this period too the group did not adhere to the consistent revolutionary line and evinced separatist tendencies (proposing, for example, to set up another all-Russia newspaper in addition to *Iskra*). Lenin classed *Yuzhny Rabochy* among the organisations "which, while verbally recognising *Iskra* as the leading organ, actually pursued plans of their own and were unstable in matters of principle" (p. 209 of this volume). At the Second Party Congress the *Yuzhny Rabochy* delegates adopted a "Centre" position (that of "middling opportunists", as Lenin called the "Centre").

The Second Party Congress voted to dissolve *Yuzhny Rabochy*, like all other separate, independently existing Social-Democratic groups and organisations. p. 19

8 *Iskra* (*The Spark*) was the first all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper, it was founded by Lenin in 1900, and it played a vital part in building the Marxist revolutionary party of the working class of Russia.

It was impossible to publish the paper in Russia on account of police persecution, and while still in exile in Siberia Lenin evolved a detailed plan for its publication abroad. When his term of exile ended (January 1900) he at once set about putting his plan into effect. In February he negotiated in St. Petersburg with Vera Zasulich (who had come illegally from abroad) on the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group. At the end of March and beginning of April, Lenin, Martov (Y. O. Zederbaum), A. N. Potresov, and S. I. Radchenko held a conference in Pskov with the "legal Marxists" P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky; this conference discussed Lenin's draft declaration of the editorial board of the all-Russia newspaper (*Iskra*) and theoretical and political journal (*Zarya*) on the programme and aims of these publications. Lenin also travelled to various cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga, Smolensk, Samara, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, Syzran), establishing contacts with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats and obtaining their support for *Iskra*.

In August 1900, when Lenin arrived in Switzerland, he and Potresov held discussions with the Emancipation of Labour group on the programme and aims of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, on possible contributors, and on the membership and location of the editorial board. These negotiations very nearly ended in failure, but finally agreement was reached on all disputed questions.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* appeared in December 1900 in Leipzig; afterwards the paper was published in Munich, in London (from July 1902), and, beginning with the spring of 1903, in Geneva. Considerable help in getting the paper going was afforded by the German Social-Democrats Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun, and others, by the Polish revolutionary Julian Marchlewski, who was living in Munich at the time, and by Harry Quelch, one of the leaders of the British Social-Democratic Federation.

The editorial hoard of *Iskra* consisted of Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, Martov, P. B. Axelrod, Potresov, and Vera Zasulich. Its secretary in the initial days was I. G. Smidovich-Leman; then, in the spring of 1901, the post was taken over by N. K. Krupskaya, who also conducted all *Iskra*'s correspondence with the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia. Lenin was actually editor-in-chief and the leading figure in *Iskra*. His articles in it dealt with all major issues in the work of building the Party and in the class struggle of the Russian proletariat, as well as with important developments in world affairs.

Iskra became the centre around which the unification of the Party proceeded and Party forces were mustered and trained. Party committees and groups adhering to Lenin's *Iskra* line were formed in many places in Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara, and others), and a conference of *Iskra*-ists held in Samara in January 1902 founded the *Iskra* Organisation in Russia. The *Iskra*-ist organisations grew up and worked under the immediate leadership of Lenin's associates and disciples—N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, and others. The paper played a decisive role in the fight for a Marxist party, in the defeat of the Economists and the unification of the scattered and isolated Social-Democratic circles.

On the initiative and with the immediate participation of Lenin the *Iskra* editorial board drafted the Party programme (the draft was published in *Iskra*, No. 21) and prepared the Second Party Congress, which was held in July-August 1903. By the time of the Congress most of the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had associated themselves with *Iskra*, approved its programme, tactical line, and organisational plan, and recognised it as their leading organ. A special resolution of the Congress noted *Iskra*'s exceptional role in the struggle to build the Party and adopted the paper as the Central Party Organ. The Congress appointed an editorial board consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov, and Martov; but Martov, who insisted that all six of the old- editors should be retained, refused to serve on the board, in spite of the Congress decision, and Nos. 46-51 of *Iskra* were edited by Lenin and Plekhanov. Subsequently Plekhanov went over to the Men-

sheviks and demanded the co-optation to the board of all the old Menshevik editors whom the Congress had rejected. Lenin could not agree to this, and on October 19 (November 1), 1903, he resigned his editorship; he was co-opted to the Central Committee and struck at the Menshevik opportunists from this position. Issue No. 52 of *Iskra* was edited by Plekhanov alone. On November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, acting on his own and in violation of the will of the Congress, co-opted all the Menshevik ex-editors to the editorial board. Beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* became the organ of the Mensheviks. p. 19

[9] The *Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was originally elected at the Belostok Conference held in March (April) 1902, but soon after the conference all the committee members but one were arrested. At Lenin's suggestion, a new Organising Committee was set up at a conference of Social-Democratic committees held in November 1902 in Pskov. On this committee the *Iskra*-ists had an overwhelming majority.

Under Lenin's guidance, the Organising Committee carried out extensive preparatory work for the Second Congress. Draft Regulations for the convening of the Congress were adopted at a plenary session held in Orel in February 1903. Following this plenary session, members of the Organising Committee twice visited the local Party organisations with a view to assisting them in their work. With their participation, the local committees discussed the draft Regulations, after which the Organising Committee finally endorsed the Regulations and approved a list of the local organisations entitled under them to representation at the Congress.

The Organising Committee prepared for the Congress a detailed written report on its activities. p. 20

[10] *T* was the Bolshevik P. A. Krasikov (referred to in the Congress minutes as Pavlovich). p. 21

[11] *Borba* (*Struggle*) was a group of writers residing abroad, which considered itself part of the R.S.D.L.P.; it took shape as an independent group in Paris in 1901. Since it departed from Social-Democratic views and tactics, engaged in disorganising activities, and had no contacts with Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the group was not allowed representation at the Second Party Congress. It was dissolved by decision of that Congress. p. 22

[12] *N* or *NN* was the Menshevik Yekaterina Alexandrova (referred to in the Congress minutes as Stein). p. 22

[13] The "*renegade*" was I. V. Chernyshov: originally an Economist, he then went over to the *Iskra* organisation abroad but in April 1903 again deserted to the Economists. p. 22

[14] The *Emancipation of Labour group* was the first Russian Marxist group, it was founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva in 1883. Apart from Plekhanov, the members were P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, Vera Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov.

The Emancipation of Labour group did a great deal for the propagation of Marxism in Russia. They translated into Russian, published abroad, and distributed in Russia Marx's and Engels's *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx's *Wage-Labour and Capital*, Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, and other works of the founders of Marxism; their work dealt a severe blow to Narodism. Plekhanov's two drafts of a programme for Russian Social-Democrats, written in 1883 and 1885 and published by the group, were an important step towards the formation of a Social-Democratic Party in Russia; and his essays *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885), and *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) played a big part in spreading Marxist views. At the same time, however, the Emancipation of Labour group were guilty of serious errors; they clung to certain remnants of Narodnik views, underestimated the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry, and overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie. These errors were the embryo of the future Menshevik views of Plekhanov and other members of the group. The Emancipation of Labour group had no practical ties with the working-class movement. Lenin pointed out that it "only founded Social-Democracy theoretically and took the first step in the direction of the working-class movement" (present edition, Vol. 20, "The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement").

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Emancipation of Labour group proclaimed itself dissolved. p. 28

[15] The *League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was founded in October 1901 on Lenin's initiative, incorporating the *Iskra-Zarya* organisation abroad and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation (which included the Emancipation of Labour group). The objects of the League were to propagate the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy and help to build a militant Social-Democratic organisation. Actually, the League was the foreign representative of the *Iskra* organisation. It recruited supporters for *Iskra* among Social-Democrats living abroad, gave the paper material support, organised its delivery to Russia, and published popular Marxist literature. The Second Party Congress endorsed the League as the sole Party organisation abroad, with the status of a Party committee and the obligation of working under the Central Committee's direction and control.

After the Second Party Congress, the Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the League and used it in their fight against Lenin and the Bolsheviks. At the Second Congress of the League, in October 1903, they adopted new League Rules that ran counter to the Party Rules adopted at the Party Congress. From that time on the League was a bulwark of Menshevism. It continued in existence until 1905. p. 30

[16] This refers to the explanatory comments Lenin appended to his draft agenda and Standing Orders of the Congress, submitted by him under the title "Programme for the Second Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.". p. 31

[17] *Starover*—pseudonym of the Menshevik A. N. Potresov. p. 31

[18] *Zarya* (*Dawn*) was a Marxist theoretical and political journal published in Stuttgart by the editors of *Iskra* in 1901-02. Four issues appeared.

The following articles by Lenin were published in *Zarya*: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (the *Zarya* title was "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". *Zarya* also printed theoretical articles by Plekhanov. p. 31

[19] The *Party Council* (1903-05), established under the Rules adopted by the Second Congress, was the supreme institution of the Party. The Council was to co-ordinate and harmonise the activities of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ, to restore either of these institutions in the event of its entire membership no longer being able to function, and to represent the Party in relations with other parties. Convening the Party Congress was also the function of the Council, and it was obligated by the Rules to do so at stated intervals or at the demand of Party organisations together entitled to half of the votes at the Congress. The Council consisted of five members: two delegated by the Central Committee, two by the Central Organ, and the fifth elected by the Congress. The fifth member elected at the Second Congress was Plekhanov. Lenin was on the Council first as delegate of the Central Organ, then, after his resignation from the editorial board—as delegate of the Central Committee. After Plekhanov swung over to the Menshevik opportunists and they captured the Central Organ, the Council became a weapon in their fight against the Bolsheviks. Lenin battled consistently on the Council for Party unity, exposing the Mensheviks' disruptive, splitting activities (pp. 143-85 and 433-41 of this volume). Under the Rules adopted by the Third Party Congress, the Party Council was abolished. p. 33

[20] The *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s) were a petty-bourgeois party formed in Russia at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 through the amalgamation of Narodnik groups and circles with the newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*; 1900-05) and the magazine *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*; 1901-05) as its official organs. The views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were an eclectic mixture of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to "mend the holes in Narodism" with "patches of the fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, "Socialism and the Peas-

antry"). They failed to see the class distinctions between proletariat and peasantry, glossed over the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and rejected the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The individual terrorism which they advocated as the principal means of fighting the autocracy did great harm to the revolutionary movement, for it interfered with organising the masses for revolutionary struggle.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries' agrarian programme envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land and its transfer to the village communes on the basis of equalised tenure, and also the development of co-operatives of all kinds. There was nothing socialist in this programme of so-called "socialisation of the land", since, as Lenin pointed out, abolition of private ownership of the land alone cannot end the domination of capital and the poverty of the masses. The actual, and historically progressive, content of the Socialist-Revolutionary agrarian programme was a struggle for the abolition of landlordism; objectively that programme expressed the interests and aspirations of the peasantry in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The Bolsheviks exposed the Socialist-Revolutionaries' attempts to masquerade as socialists, battled stubbornly with them for influence over the peasantry, and showed how harmful their tactics of individual terrorism were to the working-class movement. At the same time they were prepared, under certain conditions, to make temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against tsarism.

The heterogeneous class character of the peasantry was responsible, in the final analysis, for political and ideological instability and organisational disunity among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and their constant vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There was a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party already in the years of the first Russian revolution (1905-07): its Right wing formed the legal Labour Popular-Socialist Party, akin in its views to the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats (Cadets); the "Left" wing took shape as the semi-anarchist Maximalist League. During the years of reaction that followed the 1905-07 Revolution, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were in a state of complete ideological and organisational breakdown, and the First World War saw most of them adopt the standpoint of social-chauvinism.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, of which leaders of the party (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) were members. In face of the revolutionary spirit of the peasantry the "Left" wing of the party founded at the end of November 1917 an independent Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party and, in an effort to maintain their influence among the peasant masses, formally recognised the Soviet government and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks; but as the class struggle in the countryside

developed, they set out to fight Soviet power. During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries actively supported the interventionists and white-guard generals, engaged in counter-revolutionary subversion and plotting, and organised terrorist acts against Soviet leaders. After the civil war, they continued their anti-Soviet activities within the country and as whiteguard émigrés abroad. p. 33

[21] *Ivan Ivanovich*, *Ivan Nikiforovich*—an allusion to Gogol's *Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich*. p. 34

[22] *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) was a Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper published from the close of 1900 to 1905; from January 1902 on, the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 36

[23] *The affair of April 2*—the reference is to the assassination of Minister of the Interior Sipyagin on April 2 (15), 1902, by the student Balmashov. p. 36

[24] *Nozdrev*—a notorious braggart and cheat in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 37

[25] The *Petrashevsky circle* was a group of progressive-minded commoner-intellectuals formed in St. Petersburg in the mid-forties of the last century around M. V. Butashevich-Petrashevsky, a follower of the French utopian socialist Fourier. Among the members were writers, teachers, students, minor government officials, army officers, and so on. While not uniform in their political views, most of them were opponents of the tsarist autocracy and the serf system.

Among those connected with the Petrashevsky circle were the writers Dostoyevsky and Saltykov-Shchedrin and the poets Pleshcheyev, Maikov, and Taras Shevchenko. p. 41

[26] No subsequent letters appeared. The article was reprinted as a mimeographed pamphlet under the title "To the Students. The Tasks of the Revolutionary Youth (Social-Democracy and the Intelligentsia)"; and Department of Police documents for 1904-05 show that copies of the pamphlet were discovered during arrests and house-searches in Ekaterinoslav, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kazan, Odessa, Arzamas, and the Smolensk and Minsk gubernias. p. 43

[27] *Student*—a revolutionary student newspaper. Three issues appeared: No. 1 in April and No. 2-3 in September 1903. p. 43

[28] *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly journal of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, published abroad in 1902-05 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. The followers of *Osvobozhdeniye* later made up the core of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party, the principal bourgeois party in Russia. p. 43

[29] The *raznochintsy* (i.e., "men of different estates") were the Russian commoner-intellectuals, drawn from the small townsfolk, the clergy, the merchant classes, the peasantry, as distinct from those drawn from the nobility. p. 47

[30] *Zemstvos*—the so-called local self-government bodies, dominated by the nobility, were set up in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. Their competence was confined to purely local economic and welfare matters (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.), and they functioned under the control of the provincial governors and the Ministry of the Interior, who could invalidate any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 47

[31] No article of Lenin's written according to this plan has been discovered. The last paragraph of the plan, relating to the Bund, is expanded in the article "Maximum Brazenness and Minimum Logic" (pp. 59-65 of this volume). p. 57

[32] "*End of 'nomad' period*"—the end of the ideological and organisational disunity among the Social-Democratic organisations. p. 57

[33] *Posledniye Izvestia* (*News*)—a periodical bulletin issued by the Foreign Committee of the Bund from 1901 to 1906. p. 59

[34] *Arakcheyev, A. A.* (1769-1834)—the powerful favourite of Paul I and Alexander I, whose name is associated with a period of crushing police tyranny and jackboot rule. p. 64

[35] Lenin says that the Central Committee "*has not been born yet*" out of secrecy considerations; actually, the Central Committee already existed—it had been elected at the Second Party Congress on August 7 (20), 1903. p. 64

[36] This member of the Central Committee was F. V. Lengnik (pseudonyms—Vasilyev, Kol). p. 66

[37] The *Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was held in Geneva on October 13-18 (26-31), 1903; it was called at the insistence of the Mensheviks. Fifteen of the delegates (with 18 votes) were majority adherents, headed by Lenin; 18 delegates (22 votes) were minority adherents; and one delegate (with two votes) belonged to neither majority nor minority.

The main item on the agenda was the report by Lenin, who had been the League's delegate at the Second Party Congress. A co-report was then made by Martov, who defended the opportunism of the Mensheviks and indulged in calumnious attacks upon the Bolsheviks. Lenin and his supporters thereupon withdrew from the Congress. For refusal to submit to the decisions of the Second Party Congress, the Central Committee and the Party Council pronounced the League Congress unlawful. p. 69

[38] This paper on the national question Lenin later worked up into an article for *Iskra*, under the title "The National Question in Our Programme" (present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 454-63). p. 74

[39] The *Polish Socialist Party* (P.S.P.), founded in 1892, was a petty-bourgeois nationalist party. p. 74

[40] The "*Iskra*" organisation in Russia served to unite the *Iskra* supporters working within the country. Even before the paper began publication and during the first year of its existence (December 1900-December 1901), a network of *Iskra* "agents" (P. N. and O. B. Lepeshinsky, P. A. Krasikov, A. M. Stopani, G. M. and Z. P. Krzhizhanovsky, S. I. and L. N. Radchenko, A. D. Tsurupa, N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, and others) was set up in various parts of the country, and in a number of towns (St. Petersburg, Pskov, Samara, Poltava, and others), groups for assistance to *Iskra* were formed. These groups and agents collected funds for the paper, acted as its correspondents, arranged for its transport and distribution, and set up facilities for reprinting it in Russia. During this period, however, they had little contact with each other and for the most part communicated directly with the editorial board.

But as the revolutionary movement mounted and the volume of practical work increased, it became essential to concert their efforts, to work on planned and organised lines to counter the parochial amateurishness which the Economists were fostering and win the Social-Democratic committees to *Iskra* 's side. Lenin accordingly put forward a plan for an all-Russia *Iskra* organisation, which was to pave the way for uniting Russia's scattered Social-Democratic organisations into a single centralised Marxist party. This plan he originally outlined in his article "Where To Begin?" (May 1901), and subsequently elaborated in detail in *What Is To Be Done?* (autumn 1901-February 1902).

In carrying out this plan Lenin and his associates had to combat parochial tendencies among some of the *Iskra* practical workers. "We must say," Lenin wrote in a letter to S. O. Zederbaum in July 1901 (present edition, Vol. 34), "that we in general regard any plan for the publication of any district or local organ by the *Iskra* organisation in Russia as absolutely incorrect and harmful. The *Iskra* organisation exists in order to support and build up *Iskra* and to *unite* the Party thereby, not to cause a *dispersion* of forces, of which there is quite enough without it."

In January 1902 a conference of *Iskra*-ists was held in Samara, with G. M. and Z. P. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, M. A. Silvin, V. P. Artsybushev, and D. I. and M. I. Ulyanov taking part. This conference set up a Bureau of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, established regular arrangements for contacts among members of the organisation and with the editorial board and for the collection and allocation of funds, and mapped out the line in relation to the committees and local publications. It was further decided, with a view to the cardinal objective of securing the committees' adherence to *Iskra* and recognition of it as the general Party organ, to

send members out to various parts of the country. "Your initiative," Lenin wrote to the organisers of the conference, "has heartened us tremendously. Hurrah! That's the right way! Reach out wider! And operate more independently, with greater initiative you are the first to have begun in such a broad way, and that means the continuation, too, will be successful" (*Lenin Miscellany VIII*, p. 221).

Although the arrest of a number of *Iskra*-ists in February 1902 put added difficulties in the way of carrying out the conference decisions, the *Iskra* organisation, with *What Is To Be Done?* to guide it, launched a vigorous drive to propagate and practically execute Lenin's plan for building a real party. It achieved far-reaching results in effecting actual unity of the Social-Democratic organisations on the principles of revolutionary Marxism. By the end of 1902 nearly all the leading committees had proclaimed their solidarity with *Iskra*.

The *Iskra*-ists were the leading spirits in setting up, at the Pskov conference of November 2-3 (15-16), 1902, the Organising Committee for convening the Second Party Congress, and to this committee they handed over all their contacts. The *Iskra* organisation, which remained in existence until the Second Party Congress played a vital part in preparing and arranging that Congress which brought into being a revolutionary Marxist party in Russia. p. 74

[41] The *Statement Concerning Martov's Report* was read by Lenin at the third sitting of the League Congress and handed in to the Congress Bureau. No court of arbitration to examine Martov's slanderous accusations was ever held, as Martov was obliged to admit, in a letter of November 16 (29), 1903, that he had no doubts of Lenin's sincerity and good faith. p. 84

[42] This *Unsubmitted Statement* was to have been presented to the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, but Lenin confined himself, at the Congress sitting of October 16 (29), 1903, to some brief oral remarks. p. 86

[43] Lenin resigned from the Party Council and the editorial board of the Central Organ after Plekhanov openly swung over to the Mensheviks and proposed co-opting to the *Iskra* editorial board all the former editors the Second Party Congress had rejected.

On November 5 (18) Lenin requested Plekhanov to insert in *Iskra* an announcement of his resignation from the editorial board (p. 113 of this volume). The changes in the membership of the board were announced in No. 53 of the new, Menshevik *Iskra* (November 25, 1903). p. 91

[44] The *Arbeiterstimme* (*Worker's Voice*) was the Central Organ of the Bund; it appeared from 1897 to 1905. p. 92

[45] The reference is to the decision of the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. that the Bund "is affiliated to the Party as an autonomous organisation independent only in regard to questions specifically concerning the Jewish proletariat". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, 1954, Part I, p. 14.) p. 92

[46] Mephistopheles' injunction to the student in Goethe's *Faust*. p. 97

[47] The incident of the Bund's campaign against the Ekaterinoslav Party Committee is described in Lenin's article "Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an 'Independent Political Party'?" (present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 330-35). p. 97

[48] "*Tail-ism*" (*khvostism*), "*tail-enders*"—expressions originally coined by Lenin to describe the Economists (see Note 59), who denied the leading role of the Party and the importance of theory in the working-class movement; their position implied that the Party should trail after the spontaneously developing movement, follow in the tail of events. p. 98

[49] *Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923; edited until October 1917 by Karl Kautsky and subsequently by Heinrich Cunow. Some of the works of Marx and Engels were first published in its columns, among them Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Programme" (in No. 18 for 1890-91) and Engels's "Contribution to the Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme" (in No. 1 for 1901-02). While Engels was alive he constantly helped the editors with suggestions and advice, and not infrequently criticised them for departures from Marxism. Contributors included August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, G. V. Plekhanov, Paul Lafargue, and other leading figures in the German and international working-class movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Beginning with the latter half of the nineties, the *Neue Zeit* made a practice of publishing the writings of the revisionists, notably Bernstein's series "Problems of Socialism", which inaugurated the revisionists' campaign against Marxism. During the First World War it adopted a Centrist, Kautskian position, in effect supporting the social-chauvinists. p. 99

[50] The quotations are from Alfred Naquet's article "Drumont and Bernard Lazare", published on September 24, 1903, in the Paris *La Petite République*, at that time the organ of the French reformist Socialists. The paper was founded in 1875- its contributors included Jaurès, Millerand, and other well-known personalities. p. 99

[51] The *Pale of Settlement* in tsarist Russia was the territory outside which Jews were not allowed to live. p. 100

[52] *Ernest Renan* was a prominent French philologist and historian. The quotation is from his lecture "Judaism as a Race and as a Religion", published in *Discours et Conférences par Ernest Renan*, Paris, 1887, p. 373. p. 100

[53] *V. V.* and *Nikolai—on* were the pseudonyms of V. P. Vorontsov and N. F. Danielson—ideologues of the liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties. p. 103

[54] *Millerand*—a French reformist "Socialist" who in 1899 joined a reactionary bourgeois government. p. 105

[55] The *cut-off lands* (*otrezki*) were the portions of the land cut off from the peasant holdings by the landlords at the time of the abolition of serfdom in 1861. p. 107

[56] This *Unissued Statement* was proposed by Lenin as a decision of the Central Committee at a meeting of the latter on November 14 (27), 1903. It was not adopted because of the conciliationist attitude of some of the Central Committee members towards the Mensheviks. p. 113

[57] *The Central Committee's ultimatum* to the Mensheviks was presented on November 12 (25) 1903. On October 22 (November 4) Lenin had sent the Central Committee a letter (present edition, Vol. 34) in which he proposed offering the Mensheviks the following conditions:

1) co-optation of three of the ex-editors to the editorial board of the Central Organ;

2) re-establishment of the status quo in the League Abroad;

3) allowing the Mensheviks one seat on the Party Council.

These initial conditions did not meet with the support of the conciliationist members of the Central Committee. In the same letter Lenin outlined and proposed simultaneously approving but not yet presenting to the Mensheviks the main points of an ultimatum, that is, a statement of the practical concessions the Central Committee could permissibly make to them: 1) co-optation of the four ex-editors to the editorial board; 2) co-optation to the Central Committee of two members of the opposition, to be chosen by the Central Committee itself; 3) re-establishment of the status quo in the League; 4) allowing the Mensheviks one seat on the Party Council. "If the ultimatum is rejected," Lenin wrote, "then—war to a finish. An extra condition: 5) cessation of all talk, gossip, and arguments about the dissensions at the Second Party Congress and after." These proposals of Lenin's (except the extra condition) were included in the ultimatum of November 12 (25), but were toned down somewhat by the conciliationist members of the Central Committee.

The Mensheviks, whom Plekhanov helped greatly by co-opting all the ex-editors to the editorial board the day after the Central Committee's ultimatum, rejected the ultimatum and took the way of open war against the majority of the Party.

An evaluation of the Central Committee's ultimatum is given at Lenin in *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (pp, 373-75 of this volume). p. 113

[58] This *Letter to "Iskra"* was written by Lenin in reply to Plekhanov's article "What Should Not Be Done" in *Iskra*, No. 52 (November 7, 1903). p. 114

[59] *Economism* was the opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international opportunism; its organs were the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Worker's Thought*; 1897-1902), published in Russia, and the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*, 1899-1902), published abroad.

The Economists restricted the tasks of the working-class movement to the economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie, and denied the leading role of the workers' party, which, they considered, should merely observe the spontaneous development of the movement and follow in its wake. In their glorifying of "spontaneity" they belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and consciousness, declaring that the socialist ideology could grow out of the spontaneous movement; and by thus denying the need to imbue the workers' movement with socialist consciousness, they cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. They championed the scattered, isolated circles, with their parochial amateurish approach, fostering disunity, confusion, and wavering in the Social-Democratic ranks and opposing the creation of a centralised working-class party. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the revolutionary, class path and reduce it to a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The Economists' programme was set forth in the *Credo*, a manifesto drawn up in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova. When this *Credo* reached Lenin, then in exile in Siberia, he replied with *A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats*—a trenchant criticism of the Economist ideas. This protest was discussed and unanimously adopted by a meeting of 17 Marxists serving terms of political exile, held in the village of Yermakovskoye, Minusinsk Region.

A major part in the fight against Economism was played by Lenin's *Iskra*; and by his book *What Is To Be Done?*, published in March 1902, Lenin completed its ideological defeat. p. 114

[60] *Sobakevich*—the reference is to the notorious character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 114

[61] This *Letter to the Editors of "Iskra"* played a big part in exposing the opportunist tactics of the Mensheviks, their disruptive activity at the Second Party Congress and after it. After the Menshevik editors refused pusillanimously to print the "Letter" in *Iskra*, the Bolsheviks published it in leaflet form. It had a wide circulation in Russia, where it was illegally reprinted. Police documents for 1904-05 show that copies were found during house-searches and

arrests in Moscow, Kharkov, Tula, Tomsk, Riga, Nikolayev, Poltava, Astrakhan, and the Donbas coalfield. p. 118

[62] *Aus der Weltpolitik* (*From the Realm of World Politics*)—a weekly bulletin published by Parvus in Munich from 1898 to 1905. p. 121

[63] This pamphlet was *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back* (pp. 201-423 of this volume). p. 129

[64] It was on November 13 (26), 1903, that Plekhanov co-opted the Mensheviks Martov, Axelrod, Zasulich, and Potresov to the editorial board of *Iskra*. p. 136

[65] *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—the daily Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. Originally founded in 1876 in Leipzig, it was banned under the Anti-Socialist Law, but in January 1891 resumed publication in Berlin as successor to the *Berliner Volksblatt* (*Berlin People's Gazette*, founded in 1884), under the editorship of Wilhelm Liebknecht. Engels fought in the columns of the Vorwärts against every manifestation of opportunism; but in the late nineties, after Engels's death, the paper fell into the hands of the Right wing of the party and from then on regularly printed the writings of the opportunists who dominated in the German Social-Democratic movement and the Second International. The *Vorwärts* gave a tendentious picture of the fight against opportunism and revisionism in the R.S.D.L.P., supporting the Economists and later, after the split in the Party, the Mensheviks. In the years of reaction that followed the defeat of the Russian Revolution of 1905-07 it published slanderous articles by Trotsky while denying Lenin and the Bolsheviks the opportunity to controvert him and give an objective account of the state of affairs in the Party.

During the First World War the *Vorwärts* took a social-chauvinist stand. After the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia it became one of the fountain-heads of anti-Soviet propaganda. It ceased publication in 1933. p. 137

[66] The author of this letter was the worker N. Y. Vilonov, a member of the Ekaterinoslav Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin replied to the letter on December 9 (22), 1903. p. 138

[67] This appeal was written by Lenin in connection with Martov's article "Problems of the Day (A Circle or a Party?)" in *Iskra*, No. 56 (January 1, 1904). p. 139

[68] The Party Council session held in Geneva on January 15-17 (28-30), 1904, was "called on the initiative of the representatives of the Central Organ to discuss measures for harmonising the activities of the Central Committee and Central Organ in the publication of Party literature" (*Lenin Miscellany X*, p. 181). It was attended by Lenin, Lengnik, Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Martov.

On Lenin's proposal, the Council resolved to include in the agenda and discuss as the first item the question of measures to restore peace in the Party. On January 15 (28) Lenin, on behalf of the Central Committee, moved a resolution on this question (pp. 145-47 of this volume). When the debate showed that the Mensheviks would not agree to this resolution, Lenin and Lengnik proposed, on January 16 (29), another resolution on restoring peace in the Party, which the Council adopted by three votes (Lenin, Lengnik, and Plekhanov) to two (Martov and Axelrod). However, instead of then practically discussing what must be done to restore peace, the Council, over Lenin's protest, proceeded to vote Plekhanov's resolution, which demanded co-optation of Mensheviks to the Central Committee. By the votes of Plekhanov, Martov, and Axelrod, this resolution was passed. Thereupon the Central Committee representatives (Lenin and Lengnik) recorded on January 17 (30) a dissenting opinion which censured Plekhanov's resolution as ignoring the will of the majority of the Second Party Congress. The text of the dissenting opinion (pp. 148-51 of this volume) was drawn up by Lenin.

After the Mensheviks frustrated every effort to establish peace in the Party, Lenin moved a resolution on convening the Third Party Congress, as the only way out of the situation (p. 152 of this volume). By the votes of Plekhanov, Martov, and Axelrod this resolution was rejected and Martov's resolution against a congress was passed. Concerning the publication of Party literature no agreement was reached either. Rejecting the resolutions moved on this subject by Lenin (p. 155 of this volume), the Council adopted resolutions which endorsed the factional, disruptive activities of the Menshevik editorial board of *Iskra*.

The Council session of January 1904 made it plain that with Plekhanov's defection to the Mensheviks the Council had become an instrument of the Mensheviks' fight against the Party.

p. 143

[69] *Travinsky*—pseudonym of G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, member of the Central Committee. p. 157

[70] In Point 3 of its ultimatum of November 12 (25), 1903, the Central Committee had offered to co-opt two members of the minority. The Central Committee consisted at that time of Lenin, Krzhizhanovsky, Lengnik, Noskov (Glebov), Gusarov, Zemlyachka, Krasin, Essen, and Galperin. p. 162

[71] *Ru*—pseudonym of L. Y. Galperin, also referred to as Y. Valentin, and Konyagin. p. 165

[72] The document in question was the Central Committee's ultimatum of November 12 (25), 1903, presented to the Mensheviks on Lenin's proposal. p. 167

[73] This letter, which Central Committee member Lengnik (Vasilyev) sent on November 29 (December 12), 1903, to the *Iskra* editorial board, was written by Lenin. p. 170

[74] Lenin is referring to his letter to Potresov of August 31 (September 13), 1903. He published it in slightly abridged form in *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back* (see pp. 348-50 of this volume). p. 170

[75] These Central Committee members were Lengnik, who was appointed the Central Committee's official foreign representative, and Krzhizhanovsky, who came to Switzerland in November 1903 specially to negotiate with the Mensheviks. p. 171

[76] Resolutions censuring the Central Committee for its concessions to the League Abroad and condemning the Mensheviks' conduct at the Second Congress of the League were adopted, for example, by the Saratov and Odessa committees. They were published in N. Shakhov's pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress*, Geneva, 1904, p. 28. p. 174

[77] This refers to the preceding speech of Plekhanov, who claimed that Krzhizhanovsky (Travinsky) had conceded in negotiations with him that the composition of the *Iskra* editorial board with the Mensheviks co-opted to it would be normal, and went on to add: "And if the truth of my words were to be called in question, I would reply as a certain Minister once did to Louis Philippe, who questioned his words: 'I say that it was so. You say that it was not. We shall see whom France will believe.'" (*Lenin Miscellany X*, p. 238.) p. 175

[78] *Zagorsky*—pseudonym of the Menshevik V. N. Krokhmal. p. 180

[79] Lenin is quoting a letter of December 24, 1903 (January 6, 1904), from I. K. Lalayants to N. K. Krupskaya. p. 181

[80] *Martyn*—pseudonym of the Menshevik V. N. Rozanov. p. 181

[81] Lenin is quoting a letter of January 1 (14), 1904, from L. B. Krasin to the Foreign Branch of the Central Committee. p. 181

[82] In his first letter the Central Committee's distribution secretary, M. Leibovich, asked the editors of the Menshevik *Iskra* to tell him for his report to the Central Committee what they did with the fifty copies of *Iskra* allotted to the editorial board. The editors refused to give him this information, and demanded to be given a larger number of copies. In his second letter the distribution secretary refused to supply more than the allotted fifty copies without permission from the Central Committee. p. 182

[83] Lenin is quoting a letter sent the editors of *Iskra* on December 14 (27), 1903, in the name of Central Committee Foreign Representa-

tive Lengnik. The letter was written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 34). p. 183

[84] Lenin is quoting a letter sent the *Iskra* editorial board on December 26, 1903 (January 8, 1904), in the name of Central Committee Foreign Representative Lengnik. The passage quoted was written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 34). p. 184

[85] *Starover's ultimatum*—Potresov's letter to Plekhanov of October 21 (November 3), 1903. In this letter Potresov, speaking for the Menshevik opposition, demanded to have the old editorial board of *Iskra* reinstated, Mensheviks co-opted to the Central Committee and the Party Council, and the decisions of the Congress of the League Abroad recognised as lawful. p. 184

[86] By *Z* is meant V. N. Krokhmal. p. 185

[87] Characters in Gogol's *Dead Souls* and *Inspector-General*. p. 196

[88] Lenin devoted several months to the writing of *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (*The Crisis in Our Party*), making a careful study of the minutes and resolutions of the Second Party Congress, of the speeches of each of the delegates and the political groupings at the Congress, and of the Central Committee and Party Council documents.

The book evoked fury among the Mensheviks. Plekhanov demanded that the Central Committee disavow it. The conciliators on the Central Committee tried to prevent its publication and circulation.

Though published abroad, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* had a wide circulation among advanced workers in Russia. Copies of the book were found during arrests and house-searches in Moscow St. Petersburg, Riga, Saratov, Tula, Orel, Ufa, Perm, Kostroma Shchigri, Shavli (Kovno Gubernia), and elsewhere. Lenin included the book in the *Twelve Years* collection published in 1907 (the date on the title-page is 1908), omitting sections J, K, L, M, O, and P making abridgements in other sections, and adding a few explanatory notes.

The present edition contains the full text as originally published in 1904 and all the additions made by the author in 1907. p. 201

[89] "*Practical Worker*"—pseudonym of the Menshevik M. S. Makadzyub, also referred to as Panin. p. 207

[90] The *conference of 1902*—a conference of representatives of R.S.D.L.P. committees held on March 23-28 (April 5-10), 1902, in Belostok. The Economists and Bundists intended to proclaim this conference a Party Congress; a report drawn up by Lenin and presented by the *Iskra* delegate proved that the gathering lacked proper preparation and authority to constitute itself such. The

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

conference set up an Organising Committee to convene the Second Party Congress, but nearly all its members were arrested soon after. A new Organising Committee to convene the Second Congress was formed in November 1902 at a conference in Pskov. Lenin's views on the Belostok conference are set forth in his "Report of the *Iskra* Editorial Board to the Meeting (Conference) of R.S.D.L.P. Committees" (present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 97-106).
p. 207

[91] Pavlovich, *Letter to the Comrades on the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, Geneva, 1904. p. 215

[92] *Sorokin*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik N. E. Bauman; *Lange*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik A. M. Stopani. p. 215

[93] *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Worker's Thought*) was an Economist group which published a paper under this name. The paper, edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others, appeared from October 1897 to December 1902; 16 issues were published altogether.

Rabochaya Mysl advocated frankly opportunist views. It opposed the political struggle and restricted the tasks of the working-class movement to "the interests of the moment", to pressing for individual partial reforms, chiefly of an economic nature. Glorifying "spontaneity" in the movement, it opposed the creation of an independent proletarian party and belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and consciousness, maintaining that the socialist ideology could grow out of the spontaneous movement.

The views expounded by *Rabochaya Mysl*, as the Russian variety of international opportunism, were criticised by Lenin in the article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy" (present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85), in his *Iskra* articles, and in *What Is To Be Done?* p. 223

[94] By this was meant general redistribution of all the land (*chorny peredel*)—a slogan widespread among the peasantry of tsarist Russia. p. 235

[95] *Kostrov*—pseudonym of the Caucasian Menshevik N. N. Jordania.
p. 236

[96] *Zemlya i Volya* (*Land and Freedom*) was a revolutionary Narodnik organisation formed in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1876; originally known as the Northern Revolutionary Narodnik Group, it took the name Zemlya i Volya in 1878. Among the members were Mark and Olga Natanson, G. V. Plekhanov, O. V. Aptekman, A. D. and A. F. Mikhailov, A. A. Kvyatkovsky, M. R. Popov, S. M. Kravchinsky, D. A. Klements, A. D. Oboleshev, Sophia Perovskaya and other prominent revolutionaries of the seventies. While not renouncing socialism as the ultimate goal, Zemlya i Volya put forward as the immediate aim the satisfaction of "the people's demands and desires as they are at the moment", namely, the demand for "land and freedom". "Needless to say", its programme

declared, "this formula can be made a reality *only through violent revolution*", with a view to which it advocated exciting "popular discontent" and "disorganising the power of the state". For the purpose of agitation among the peasantry, members of the organisation set up rural "colonies", chiefly in the agricultural gubernias along the Volga and in the fertile central regions. They also carried on agitation among the workers and the student youth. On December 6 (18), 1876, they organised a demonstration in the Kazan Square in St. Petersburg. In the course of 1878-79 Zemlya i Volya published five issues of a journal of the same name.

Although connected with some of the workers' circles, Zemlya i Volya could not and did not want to be the leader of the working-class movement, since in common with other Narodniks it denied the vanguard role of the working class. Nor did it understand the importance of political struggle, which in its view only diverted the revolutionaries' energies and might weaken their ties with the people.

Unlike the Narodnik groups of the early seventies, Zemlya i Volya built up a close-knit organisation, based on principles of strict centralisation and discipline. There was a central "core" and around it there were territorial and specialised groups (for work among the peasantry and among the workers, for "disorganising" activities, and so on); the "core" was headed by an "administration" (or "commission") which controlled the activities of the groups and supplied them with literature, funds, etc. The Zemlya i Volya Rules, adopted in the winter of 1876-77, stipulated subordination of minority to majority, bound every member to dedicate and sacrifice to the organisation's interests "all his energies, means, connections, sympathies and antipathies, and even life itself", and imposed absolute secrecy in regard to all the organisation's internal affairs.

By 1879, with their socialist agitation among the peasants having little effect and with government persecution increasing, the majority of the members began to lean towards political terrorism as the principal means of achieving their programme. There were sharp disagreements about this, and at its Voronezh Congress in June 1879 Zemlya i Volya split in two: the adherents of the old tactics (headed by Plekhanov) formed an organisation called *Chorny Peredel* (General Redistribution), while the advocates of terrorism (A. I. Zhelyabov and others) founded Narodnaya Volya (People's Will). p. 256

[97] *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*)—the secret political organisation of the terrorist Narodniks, formed in August 1879 following the split in Zemlya i Volya. It was headed by an Executive Committee consisting of A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, Vera Figner, Sophia Perovskaya, A. A. Kvyatkovsky, and others.

While still adhering to the Narodnik utopian-socialist ideas, Narodnaya Volya believed in political struggle also, regarding the overthrow of the autocracy and the achievement of political freedom

as a major aim. Its programme envisaged a "permanent popular representative body" elected by universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of the land to the people, and measures to put the factories in the hands of the workers. "The Narodnaya Volya members," Lenin wrote, "made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 8, "Working-Class Democracy and Bourgeois Democracy").

Narodnaya Volya fought heroically against the tsarist autocracy. But, going by the erroneous theory of "active" heroes and a "passive" mass, it expected to achieve the remaking of society without the participation of the people, by its own efforts, through individual terrorism that would intimidate and disorganise the government. After the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the government was able, by savage reprisals, death sentence and acts of provocation, to crush it out of existence.

Repeated attempts to revive the organisation during the eighties ended in failure. Thus, in 1886 a group in the Narodnaya Volya tradition was formed by A. I. Ulyanov (elder brother of Lenin) and P. Y. Shevyryov; but after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III in 1887, the group was uncovered and its active members executed.

While criticising Narodnaya Volya's erroneous, utopian programme, Lenin expressed great respect for its members' selfless struggle against tsarism. In *A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats* (1899) he pointed out that "the members of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia, despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory which served as the banner of the movement" (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 181). p. 256

[98] *Manilovism* (from the name of Manilov in Gogol's *Dead Souls*)—smug complacency, empty sentimental day-dreaming. p. 258

[99] The reference is to an incident which took place in Hamburg in 1900 in connection with the conduct of a group of members of the Free Bricklayers' Union who performed piece work during a strike in violation of the instructions of the trade union centre. The Hamburg Bricklayers' Union complained to the local Social-Democratic Party organisation about the strike-breaking activities of the Social-Democrat members of the group. A court of arbitration appointed by the Central Executive of the Social-Democratic Party condemned the conduct of these Social-Democrats but turned down the proposal that they be expelled from the Party. p. 262

[100] There were sixteen members of the *Iskra* organisation present at the Second Party Congress—9 majority adherents, headed by Lenin, and 7 minority adherents, headed by Martov. p. 277

[101] *Sablina*—pseudonym of N. K. Krupskaya, Lenin's wife and closest Party associate. p. 280

[102] *Hertz*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik D. I. Ulyanov, younger brother of Lenin. p. 287

[103] For *Arakcheyev* see Note 34. p. 291

[104] *Osipov*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik Rosalia Zemlyachka, co-opted after the Congress to the Central Committee. p. 327

[105] Lenin is referring to a speech made by the Economist Akimov during the Congress discussion of the Party programme. One of Akimov's objections against the *Iskra* draft programme was that it did not mention the word "proletariat" in the nominative case, as subject of the sentence, but only in the genitive ("party of the proletariat"). This, Akimov claimed, showed a tendency to exalt the party above the proletariat. p. 331

[106] Lenin is alluding to the following passage in Marx's Introduction to his "Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law":

"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, take the place of criticism with weapons; it is by material force that material force must be overthrown." p. 332

[107] *Mountain and Gironde*—the two political groups of the bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution at the close of the eighteenth century. Montagnards, or Jacobins, was the name given to the more resolute representatives of the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary class of the time; they stood for the abolition of absolutism and the feudal system. The Girondists, in distinction to them vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution, and their policy was one of compromise with the monarchy.

Lenin applied the term "Socialist Gironde" to the opportunist trend in the Social-Democratic movement, and the term "Mountain" or proletarian Jacobins, to the revolutionary Social-Democrats. p. 341

[108] The *Voronezh Committee* and the *St. Petersburg* "*Workers' Organisation*" were in the hands of the Economists and were hostile to Lenin's *Iskra* and its organisational plan for building a Marxist party. p. 343

[109] This new member of the Central Committee was F . V . Lengnik. p. 351

[110] Probably Carouge and Cluse, where the supporters of the majority and the minority lived. p. 368

[111] *Orthodox*—pseudonym of the Menshevik Lyubov Axelrod. p. 369

[112] *Bazarov*—the main character in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. p. 372

[113] Together with Lenin's "Letter to *Iskra*" (pp. 113-16 of this volume), *Iskra*, No. 53 (November 25, 1903) had printed an editorial reply written by Plekhanov. Lenin in his letter proposed a full discussion in the paper of the differences of principle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Plekhanov rejected this, describing the differences as "the squabbling of circle life". p. 372

[114] *Y* was L. Y. Galperin (also referred to as Ru, Valentin, and Konyagin), a Central Organ delegate to the Party Council, afterwards co-opted to the Central Committee. p. 375

[115] *Schweitzer, J. B.* (1833-1875)—a leader of the German Lassalleans in the sixties; after Lassalle's death, president of the German General Labour League, of which he made himself virtual dictator arousing widespread resentment among the membership. p. 377

[116] The reference is to the views of P. B. Struve, leading representative of "legal Marxism", and his book *Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia's Economic Development* (1894). Already in this early work Struve's bourgeois-apologetic thinking was clearly discernible. The views of Struve and the other "legal Marxists" were assailed by Lenin in a paper read to a St. Petersburg Marxist circle in the autumn of 1894, entitled "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". This paper Lenin then worked up, at the close of 1894 and the beginning of 1895, into his essay "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book" (present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507). p. 379

[117] Lenin is referring to Martov's *Iskra* article "Is This the Way To Prepare?", in which Martov opposed preparations for an all-Russia armed uprising, regarding them as utopian conspiracy. p. 381

[118] A quotation from Lermontov's poem "Journalist, Reader, and Writer". p. 382

[119] A line from the satirical "Hymn of the Contemporary Russian Socialist" published in No. 1 of *Zarya* (April 1901) and ridiculing the Economists with their trailing after the spontaneous movement. Signed Nartsis Tuporylov (Narcissus Blunt-Snout), the "Hymn" was written by Martov. p. 388

[120] *Oblomov*—the landowner hero of Goncharov's novel of the same name, an embodiment of supine inertia and a passive, vegetating existence. p. 390

[121] The *Dresden Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party* was held on September 13-20, 1903. It condemned the revisionists Bern-

stein, Braun, Göhre, David, and others, but did not expel them from the party, and they continued to have full scope for preaching their opportunist views. p. 395

[122] The *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist Monthly*), published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933, was the chief organ of the opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party and one of the organs of international opportunism. During the First World War it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 395

[123] "*Ministerial*" *tactics*, "ministerialism", "ministerial socialism" (or Millerandism)—the opportunist tactics of participation by Socialists in reactionary bourgeois governments. The term originated when in 1899 the French Socialist Millerand joined the bourgeois government of Waldeck-Rousseau. p. 402

[124] *Dyedov*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik Lydia Knipovich. p. 416

[125] *Trepov*, *F. F.*—Governor of St. Petersburg, whom Vera Zasulich fired at in 1878 in protest against his orders to flog the political prisoner Bogolyubov. p. 420

[126] *Boris*, *Loshad*, *Valentin*, *Mitrofan*—pseudonyms of the conciliators V. A. Noskov (Glebov), L. B. Krasin, L. Y. Galperin, and F. V. Gusarov. p. 424

[127] *Zverev*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik Maria Essen, member of the Central Committee. p. 428

[128] *Nikitich*—pseudonym of L. B. Krasin. p. 429

[129] In a letter printed in *Iskra*, No. 66 (May 15, 1904), Karl Kautsky had urged that no Party Congress to discuss the differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks should be called until a "truce" was established in the Party. p. 430

[130] The Party Council session of May 31 and June 5 (June 13 and 18), 1904, was held in Geneva, with Lenin, Plekhanov, Noskov, Axelrod, and Martov attending. The first sitting discussed the convening of an inter-party conference of all revolutionary and opposition parties in Russia, and the forthcoming Amsterdam International Congress. The second dealt with internal Party affairs: 1) the right of the central Party institutions (the Central Organ and Central Committee) to recall their representatives from the Council, 2) the number of votes required under the Rules for effecting co-optation to the local committees; 3) co-optation to the committees and the right of the Central Committee to appoint new members to them; 4) the voting qualifications of Party organisations on the question of convening the Third Party Congress, and certain other items.

On the more important questions of internal Party life, Menshevik decisions were passed. p. 433

[131] The *Proletariat Party* was a socialist party formed in Poland in 1900 of groups that had broken away from the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.). While in general accepting the Social-Democratic programme, it believed in individual terrorism and the federal principle of organisation. The party stood for closer contact between the Polish and Russian revolutionary movement; its immediate aim was a democratic constitution for Russia with autonomy for Poland. The Proletariat Party did not play any noticeable part in the Polish revolutionary movement, and went out of existence after the Revolution of 1905-07. p. 436

[132] This resolution was unanimously adopted by the Council. p. 441

[133] *Rassvet* (*Dawn*) was a Social-Democratic paper for members of the religious sects, started under a decision of the Second Party Congress. The first issue appeared in January 1904. Although the Party Council session in June 1904 ruled that publication be discontinued, the paper went on appearing until September of that year. Nine issues were published in all. p. 442

[134] *What We Are Working For* was the initial variant of the appeal "To the Party" (pp. 452-59 of this volume). p. 443

[135] Lenin is referring to a resolution passed by the St. Petersburg Committee on June 23 (July 6), 1904, which demanded the speedy convening of the Third Party Congress. p. 448

[136] This refers to the Party Council resolution of June 5 (18), 1904, restricting the Central Committee's right to appoint new members to the local Party committees. p. 448

[137] This conference of twenty-two Bolsheviks, under Lenin's leadership, was held in Switzerland in August (New Style) 1904. Nineteen persons actually attended, and three others subscribed to its decisions. The present appeal "To the Party", adopted by the conference became the Bolsheviks' programme of struggle for the convening of the Third Party Congress. p. 452

[138] *Konyagin*—pseudonym of L. Y. Galperin. p. 460

[139] Lenin is speaking of the "July Declaration"—a resolution adopted in the name of the Central Committee in July 1904 by the conciliator members Krasin, Noskov (Glebov), and Galperin it was published in *Iskra*, No. 72 (August 25, 1904) under the title "Statement by the Central Committee". In this resolution the conciliators recognised as legitimate the Plekhanov-co-opted Menshevik editorial board of *Iskra* and defended the opportunism of the Mensheviks; they co-opted to the Central Committee three other conciliators—Lyubimov, Karpov, and Dubrovinsky; they came out against convening the Third Party Congress and dissolved the

Central Committee's Southern Bureau, which had been agitating for a congress. They deprived Lenin of the powers of foreign representative of the Central Committee and forbade his writings to be published without their sanction.

The adoption of the "July Declaration" meant total betrayal of the Second Party Congress decisions and the open defection of the conciliators on the Central Committee to the side of the Mensheviks. p. 460

[140] *Mitrofanov*—pseudonym of F. V. Gusarov. p. 460

[141] Of these documents, the letter to the members of the Central Committee, the agreement between three Central Committee members, and the protest impeaching the lawfulness of the Central Committee resolution are published in this volume (pp. 424-29 and 460-61). The Central Committee resolution is the "July Declaration" of the conciliators Krasin, Noskov, and Galperin. p. 462

[142] The "July Declaration" (see Note 139) was signed by the conciliators Krasin, Noskov, and Galperin, referred to on p. 467 as the Central Committee "collegium in Russia". p. 464

[143] This article, written in reply to Rosa Luxemburg's article "Organisational Issues in the Russian Social-Democratic Movement", was sent to Kautsky for publication in the German Social-Democratic journal *Neue Zeit*, but Kautsky would not print it. p. 472

[144] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*) was an illegal paper published in 1897 by the Kiev group of Social-Democrats. Two issues appeared: No. 1 in August and No. 2 in December (dated November). The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official organ of the Party, but the paper had to cease publication as a result of a police raid on the printing press and the arrest of the Central Committee. Concerning attempts to resume publication in 1899, see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 207-09. p. 477

[145] The *Anti-Socialist Law* in Germany was promulgated in 1878. It suppressed all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party mass working-class organisations, and the labour press; socialist literature was confiscated, and many Social-Democrats were deported. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. 480

[146] The members elected to the Central Committee at the Second Party Congress were Lengnik, Krzhizhanovsky, and Noskov. In October (New Style) 1903, Zemlyachka, Krasin, Essen, and Gusarov were co-opted; in November, Lenin and Galperin were co-opted. In July September 1904 further changes took place in the Central Committee's composition: Lengnik and Essen—supporters of Lenin—

were arrested; the conciliators Krzhizhanovsky and Gusarov resigned; over Lenin's protests, the conciliators Krasin, Noskov, and Galperin unlawfully ousted the majority adherent Zemlyachka and co-opted three conciliators: Lyubimov, Karpov, and Dubrovinsky. As a result of these changes, the majority of the Central Committee now consisted of conciliators. p. 482

[147] Lenin is referring to the Central Committee's decision to dissolve its Southern Bureau, which had been agitating for the convening of the Third Party Congress. p. 482

[148] *Galyorka*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik M. S. Olminsky (Alexandrov). p. 482

[149] This refers to the Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin Publishing House of Social-Democratic Party Literature, started by the Bolsheviks after the Menshevik editors of *Iskra* closed the columns of the paper to them and refused to print statements by Party organisations and members upholding the Second Party Congress decisions and demanding the convening of the Third Congress. It issued a number of pamphlets directed against the Mensheviks and conciliators: Lenin, *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan*; Galyorka, *Down with Bonapartism!*; Orlovsky, *The Council Against the Party*, and others. p. 482

[150] A modification of a quatrain in Krylov's fable "The Hermit and the Bear". p. 484

[151] *Ryadovoy*—pseudonym of A. A. Malinovsky, better known as Bogdanov. p. 484

[152] The *Announcement of the Formation of a Bureau of Majority Committees* was sent to Russia in a letter to Bogdanov on October 20 (November 2), 1904; it was not published. p. 489

[153] The *declaration of the nineteen*, published by the Moscow Party Committee in October 1904 under the title "Appeal to Members of the R.S.D.L.P.", was a response to the appeal "To the Party" issued by the conference of twenty-two Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership. p. 489

[154] *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan* is a criticism of a letter to the Party organisations issued by the editors of the Menshevik *Iskra* in November 1904. It evoked a reply from the editors, in the form of a second letter; both letters bore the superscription "For Party Members Only". The second letter was, however, circulated exclusively among Mensheviks, and this caused Lenin to add a postscript to his pamphlet (last two paragraphs on p. 516). As the pamphlet had already been printed and circulated to the committees, the postscript was printed separately and pasted into the copies still on hand. The date "December 22, 1904" relates to the postscript only.

The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" *Plan* had a wide circulation among the local Party organisations: during house-searches and arrests copies were discovered in Smolensk, Batum, Riga, Saratov, Suvalki, and elsewhere. p. 495

[155] *Ugryum-Burcheyev*—the type of the stolid, narrow-minded dignitary, depicted by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his *History of a Town*. By "our Ugryum-Burcheyevs" Lenin meant the palace clique of Nicholas II. p. 500

[156] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a paper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. Originally moderately liberal, after 1876 it became the organ of the reactionary nobility and bureaucracy, fighting not only the revolutionary, but also the liberal-bourgeois movement. Starting with 1905 it was one of the mouthpieces of the Black Hundred arch-reactionaries. p. 501

[157] The *Rostov demonstration*—the great political demonstration, with 30,000 workers taking part, which grew out of the strike in Rostov in November 1902. The strike, which began on November 2 (15) as an economic one, was led by the *Iskra*-ist Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin discussed the Rostov strike in his article "New Events and Old Questions" (present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 276-81). p. 511

[158] *Balalaikin*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's "Modern Idyll", a liberal windbag, adventurer, and liar. By the "editorial Balalaikin" of the Menshevik *Iskra* Lenin meant Trotsky. p. 511

[159] *Svyatopolk-Mirsky*—Minister of the Interior in the latter half of 1904, whose tenure of the post was marked by a brief "liberal season" of minor concessions by the autocracy to the liberal bourgeoisie. p. 513

[160] Lenin is referring to the adventurist calls of the Economists (*Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists) in the spring of 1901 for an immediate assault on "the fortress of despotism". p. 514

[161] This talk on the situation within the Party was given by Lenin shortly after he wrote *The Zemstvo Campaign and* "Iskra's" *Plan* at meetings of Russian political émigrés in Paris on November 19 (December 2), in Zurich on November 23 and 24 (December 6 and 7), and in Berne on November 25 (December 8), 1904. p. 519

[162] The *Council Against the Party*, by Orlovsky (V. V. Vorovsky), was issued in Geneva in November 1904 by the Bolshevik Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin Publishing House of Social-Democratic Party Literature. p. 521

[163] Three conferences of Bolshevik local committees were held in September-December 1904: 1) the Southern (Odessa, Ekaterino-

slav, and Nikolayev committees); 2) the Caucasian (Baku, Batum, Tiflis, and Imeretian-Mingrelian committees); and 3) the Northern (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, Northern, and Nizhni-Novgorod committees).

At Lenin's suggestion, the conferences elected a Bureau of Majority Committees for preparing and convening the Third Party Congress, consisting of Gusev, Zemlyachka, Lyadov, Litvinov, and others. The Bureau, of which Lenin became a member, was formally constituted in December 1904. p. 522

[164] The meeting in Geneva on August 20 (September 2), 1904, was called by the Mensheviks by way of providing support for the "July Declaration" of the Central Committee. Both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were invited. The Bolsheviks refused, however, to take part, and their representative withdrew after announcing that the meeting was not competent to pass resolutions in the name of both minority and majority. The Mensheviks were obliged to admit at this meeting that the Party committees in Russia opposed the conciliation policy of the Central Committee and that the great majority of them had broken off all relations with the Menshevik *Iskra*. p. 522

[165] Lenin is referring to the letter to the Party organisations issued by the Menshevik *Iskra* in November 1904, a criticism of which will be found in *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan* (pp. 495-516 of this volume). p. 523

[166] Lenin is referring to the Bureau of Majority Committees. p. 523

[167] By *N* is meant Central Committee member Rosalia Zemlyachka. p. 529

[168] By *P*. is meant P. A. Krasikov. p. 530

[169] *Lidin*—pseudonym of M. N. Lyadov. p. 531

[170] These four Central Committee members were Lenin, Lengnik, Essen, and Zemlyachka. p. 532

[171] Concerning the contents of this declaration see pp. 428-29 of this volume. p. 532

[172] The reference is to the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International, held on August 14-20, 1904. The report presented to it in the name of the R.S.D.L.P. delegation was a Menshevik document; to counterbalance it the Bolsheviks presented a report of their own, in the form of a pamphlet entitled *Material for an Understanding of the Party Crisis in the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia*, which Lenin helped to compile and edit. p. 532

[173] For the "*collegium*" see Note 142. p. 534

[174] The *Announcement of the Formation of an Organising Committee and the Convening of the Third Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party* was written by Lenin in December 1904 and sent at that time to members of the Bureau of Majority Committees. It formed the basis of the official Announcement of the convening of the Third Party Congress published in *Vperyod*, No. 8 (February 28 [15], 1905) over the signature of the Bureau of Majority Committees. p. 538

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Chronology

(*September 1903-December 1904*)

1903

Early part of September	Lenin writes his "Account of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P".
September 12-15 (25-28)	Lenin and Plekhanov negotiate with Dan concerning terms of agreement with the minority. The negotiations fail.
September 21 (October 4)	Lenin, with Plekhanov and Lengnik, negotiates with Martov, Axelrod, Potresov, and Zasulich concerning agreement. The negotiations fail.
September	Lenin's article "The Tasks of the Revolutionary Youth" is published in No. 2-3 of the newspaper *Student*.
October 1 (14)	Lenin's article "Maximum Brazenness and Minimum Logic" is published in No. 49 of *Iskra*.
October 13-17 (26-30)	Lenin attends the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, held in Geneva.
October 14 (27)	At the second sitting, of the League Congress, Lenin makes the report on the Second Party Congress.
October 15 (28)	At the third sitting of the League Congress, Lenin protests against the unworthy methods of struggle employed by Martov, and with the other majority adherents withdraws from the sitting.
October 16 (29)	At the fourth sitting of the League Congress, Lenin refuses to participate in or reply to the debate on the report on the Second Party Congress.
October 19 (November 1)	Lenin resigns from the editorial board of *Iskra* in order to entrench himself in the Central Committee and strike at the opportunists from that position.

October 22 (November 4)	Lenin's article "The Position of the Bund in the Party" is published in No. 51 of *Iskra*.
October 24 or 25 (November 6 or 7)	Lenin attends a meeting of the Geneva Bolshevik group, which condemns Plekhanov's defection to the Mensheviks.
November 5 (18)	Lenin finishes and sends Plekhanov his article "The Narodnik-Like Bourgeoisie and Distraught Narodism", published in *Iskra*, No. 54 (December 1, 1903).
November 6-8 (19-21)	Lenin is co-opted to the Central Committee.
November 12 (25)	Lenin attends a Central Committee meeting in Geneva, which on his proposal draws up an ultimatum to the Mensheviks regarding terms for peace in the Party.
November 14 (27)	Lenin proposes in the Central Committee a statement denouncing Plekhanov's co-optation of the Menshevik ex-editors to the *Iskra* editorial board.
November 16 (29)	Lenin is delegated by the Central Committee to the Party Council.
Between November 25 and 29 (December 8 and 12)	Lenin writes his open letter to the editors of the Menshevik *Iskra*—"Why I Resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board", which is published in leaflet form and sent to Russia.
November 27 (December 10)	In a letter to the Central Committee members in Russia Lenin calls for the convening of the Third Party Congress.
December 9 (22)	Lenin protests against a Central Committee statement circulated to the committees and declaring that peace has been made with the Mensheviks.
December 17 (30)	In a letter to the Central Committee Lenin demands that its members should state their attitude on the question of convening a Party congress.
Before December 31 (January 13 1904)	Lenin writes a Preface and Postscript to his pamphlet *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*.

1904

After January 4 (17)	Lenin drafts the appeal "To the Party Membership" assailing the opportunist views of the Menshevik *Iskra*.
January 15-17 (28-30)	Lenin attends a session of the Party Council in Geneva and speaks on measures to restore peace in the Party and on the convening of the Third Party Congress.
Between January 20 and 25 (February 2 and 7)	In a letter to Central Committee member Krzhizhanovsky Lenin warns of the danger of the Mensheviks usurping the Central Committee and insists that preparations should be launched in the local committees for convening the Third Party Congress.
Latter part of January (beginning of February)	Lenin begins work on *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*.
End of January (early part of February)	Lenin drafts the appeal "To the Party" on the subject of the Party crisis and the splitting activities of the Mensheviks.
January	Lenin discusses with a group of Bolsheviks in Geneva the organisation of propaganda of the Party programme.
February 7 (20)	Lenin writes a letter to the compilers of the Commentary on the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, explaining the circumstances of his resignation from the *Iskra* editorial board.
March 1 (14)	Lenin resigns provisionally from the Party Council.
March 9 (22)	Lenin addresses a meeting of Social-Democrats in Geneva commemorating the anniversary of the Paris Commune.
End of March (early part of April)	Lenin drafts a May Day leaflet, which is issued over the signatures of the Central Committee and Central Organ of the Party.
March-April	Lenin leads a group among Social-Democrats in Geneva for study of the Party Rules.
May 6 (19)	Publication of Lenin's book *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (*The Crisis in Our Party*).

May 13 (26)	Lenin writes a letter to the members of the Central Committee discussing the aggravation of the differences within the Central Committee and announcing that he is resuming his seat on the Party Council.
After May 15 (28)	Lenin draws up a plan of an appeal to the Party calling on the committees to decide the issue of convening the Third Party Congress.
May 31 and June 5 (June 13 and 18)	Lenin attends a session of the Party Council.
May or June	Lenin writes a letter to Bogdanov criticising his book *Empirio-Monism*.
June 11-12 (24-25)	Lenin rejects the proposal of the conciliator Central Committee member Noskov that he should join the *Iskra* editorial board and consent to the co-optation of two Mensheviks to the Central Committee.
Between July 22 and 30 (August 4 and 12)	Lenin edits the Bolsheviks' report to the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International.
End of July (early part of August)	Under Lenin's leadership, a conference of 22 Bolsheviks is held in Switzerland; it adopts the appeal "To the Party", written by Lenin, which becomes the Bolsheviks' programme of struggle for the convening of the Third Party Congress.
August 5 (18)	In a letter to the members of the Central Committee Lenin protests against the "July Declaration" adopted by its conciliator members.
August	Lenin directs the organisation abroad of a Bolshevik publishing house of Social-Democratic Party literature. In a letter to the majority committees Lenin urges collecting literary contributions for the Bolshevik publishing house.
Early part (latter part) of September	Lenin writes the article "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. Reply by N. Lenin to Rosa Luxemburg".
After September 22 (October 5)	In a letter to the Central Committee's Southern Bureau Lenin proposes that the Organising Commit-

	tee for convening the Third Congress should be called the Bureau of Majority Committees.
After October 2 (15)	Lenin writes the article "An Obliging Liberal".
Before October 20 (November 2)	Lenin drafts an Announcement of the Formation of a Bureau of Majority Committees.
Between November 1 and 8 (14 and 21)	Publication of Lenin's pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan.*
Before November 19 (December 2)	Lenin gives a talk for Party members in Geneva on the Zemstvo campaign and *Iskra's plan.*
November 19 and 21 (December 2 and 4)	At a meeting of Party members in Paris Lenin delivers a talk on the situation within the Party and speaks in the discussion.
November 20 (December 3)	In a letter to the members of the Bureau of Majority Committees Lenin urges at once setting up a Bolshevik organ abroad.
November 23 and 24 (December 6 and 7)	Lenin delivers his talk on the situation within the Party at a meeting in Zurich.
November 25 (December 8)	Lenin delivers his talk on this subject in Berne.
November 26 (December 9)	Lenin returns to Geneva.
November 27 (December 10)	In a letter to Bureau of Majority Committees member Zemlyachka Lenin demands speedy publication in Russia of a printed announcement of the Bureau's formation.
November 29 (December 12)	Lenin leads a meeting of Bolsheviks which decides on the publication of an organ of the Party majority—the newspaper *Vperyod.* Lenin writes "A Letter to the Comrades (With Reference to the Forthcoming Publication of the Organ of the Party Majority)".
After November 29 (December 12)	Lenin receives the resolution of a conference of the Caucasian committees on the convening of the Third Party Congress.
December 9 (22)	Lenin writes the pamphlet *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party.*

Before December 13 (26)	Lenin receives the resolutions of a conference of the northern committees on the convening of the Third Party Congress and the election of the Bureau of Majority Committees.
December	Lenin sends the members of the Bureau of Majority Committees in Russia a draft Announcement of the Formation of an Organising Committee and the Convening of the Third Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

Сочинения

Том 7

На английском языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

8

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.S.R.

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 8 contains the works of Lenin written between January and July 1905, during the early period of the first Russian revolution. Most of the book consists of articles published in the underground Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*.

The articles "The Autocracy and the Proletariat", "The Fall of Port Arthur", "European Capital and the Autocracy", and "Debacle" give an analysis of the military defeat and political crisis of the autocracy and predict the inevitability of the revolution in Russia.

The articles "Two Tactics", "Should We Organise the Revolution?", "New Tasks and New Forces", "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government", "The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry", and "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government" examine and develop the revolutionary tactics of the Bolshevik Party and expose and criticise the opportunist tactics of the Mensheviks.

Lenin's campaign against the splitting activities of the Mensheviks and for preparing the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—the first Bolshevik congress—is unfolded in his articles "Time to Call a Halt!", "A Brief Outline of the Split in the R.S.D.L.P.", "General Plan of the Third Congress Decisions", "Draft Resolutions for the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", "The First Step", "What the Bonapartists Are Up To", "The Second Step", and "Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov, Chairman of the Council of the R.S.D.L.P.".

A considerable part of the volume consists of documents pertaining to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—Lenin's reports and speeches at the Congress, and resolutions

drafted by him on the armed uprising; on the provisional revolutionary government, on support to the peasant movement, on the events in the Caucasus, and on other questions.

The volume includes articles directed against bourgeois liberalism, such as "The Agrarian Programme of the Liberals", "Political Sophisms", "The First Steps of Bourgeois Betrayal", "'Revolutionaries' in Kid Gloves", and "The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie".

Fourteen articles and briefer items, published for the first time in the *Collected Works* of Lenin, are devoted to an analysis of the revolutionary events in Russia and to questions pertaining to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

In his article "Revolution in Russia", Lenin for the first time evaluates the events of January 9 as the beginning of the revolution and salutes the insurgent proletariat. His articles "The First Steps", "The Eve of Bloody Sunday", "The Number of Killed or Wounded", "The Battles on the Barricades", and "St. Petersburg After January 9" deal with the early days of the revolutionary struggle in St. Petersburg and with the growing political consciousness of the Russian proletariat.

In his "First of May" leaflet, Lenin sets forth the tasks of the proletariat and the peasantry in the revolution and calls for the preparation of the popular armed uprising.

The item "Conferences of the Committees" reports on the conferences of the local committees which went on record for the immediate convocation of the Third Party Congress. The article "From the New-*Iskra* Camp" exposes the systematic deception of the Party by the Mensheviks.

The documents "Resolution on the Armed Uprising", "Speech on the Procedure of the Discussion of the Resolutions on the Relations Between Workers and Intellectuals Within the Social-Democratic Organisations", "Resolution on the Publication of the Congress Proceedings", and "Draft Resolution on the Events in the Caucasus" pertain to the materials of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

In the short article "The New Russian Loan" Lenin deals with the decline of the tsarist government's credit abroad due to the military defeats and the growing discontent within the country.

THE AUTOCRACY AND THE PROLETARIAT[1]

Published in *Vperyod*, No. 1,
January 4, 1905
(December 22, 1904)

Published according to
the text in the
newspaper *Vperyod*

EN AVANT

ВПЕРЕДЪ

№ 1 ЖЕНЕВА, 4 ЯНВАРЯ (22 ДЕКАБРЯ) 1905 г.

Front page of the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*, No. 1, January 4, 1905 (December 22, 1904), with Lenin's article "The Autocracy and the Proletariat"

Reduced

Russia is experiencing a resurgence of the constitutional movement. Our generation has never witnessed anything like the present political ferment. Legal newspapers are attacking the bureaucracy, demanding participation of the people's representatives in the state administration, and pressing for liberal reforms. All varieties of meetings of Zemstvo officials,[2] doctors, lawyers, engineers, farmers, municipal councillors,[3] etc., etc., are adopting resolutions more or less definitely demanding a constitution. Passionate appeals for liberty and political accusations of a boldness to which the Russian man in the street is unaccustomed can be heard at every turn. Under pressure of the workers and the radical youth, liberal gatherings are converted into open public meetings and street demonstrations. Undercurrents of discontent are manifestly stirring among wide sections of the proletariat, among the poor of town and country. Although the proletariat is taking a comparatively small part in the more spectacular and ceremonious manifestations of the liberal movement, although it seems to be standing somewhat aloof from the polite conferences of the solid citizens, everything points to the fact that the workers are keenly interested in the movement. Everything points to the fact that the workers are eager for big public meetings and open street demonstrations. The proletariat is holding itself back, as it were, carefully taking its bearings, gathering its forces, and deciding the question whether or not the moment for the decisive struggle for freedom has come.

Apparently, the wave of liberal excitation is beginning to subside somewhat. The rumours and foreign newspaper reports to the effect that reactionaries have gained the upper hand in the most influential Court circles are being confirmed. The ukase of Nicholas II, published the other day, was a direct slap in the face for the liberals.[4] The tsar intends to

preserve and uphold the autocratic regime. The tsar does not want to change the form of government and has no intention of granting a constitution. He promises—only promises—all manner of reforms of a quite paltry nature. No guarantees, of course, are given that these reforms will really be implemented. Police restrictions against the liberal press are becoming daily and hourly more stringent. All open demonstrations are being suppressed again, if anything, with greater severity than before. The screw is being put on the liberal councillors again, both Zemstvo[5] and municipal, still more so in the case of those officials who play the liberal. The liberal newspapers are falling into a despondent tone and apologising to their correspondents for not publishing their letters, which they dare not do.

It is quite within the realm of possibility that the wave of liberal agitation which rose so rapidly after the permission granted by Svyatopolk-Mirsky[6] will abate just as quickly after the new ban. One must distinguish between the profound causes, which inevitably and unavoidably lead—and will lead more and more—to opposition and struggle against the autocracy, and the trivial reasons of a passing liberal ferment. The profound causes lead to profound, powerful, and persistent popular movements. Trivial reasons are at times Cabinet changes or the usual attempt on the part of the government to pursue for an hour the policy of "the sly fox" after some terrorist act. The assassination of Plehve[7] evidently cost the terrorist organisation tremendous effort and involved long preparation. The very success of this terrorist act bears out all the more strikingly the experience of the entire history of the Russian revolutionary movement, which warns us against such methods of struggle as terrorism. Russian terrorism has always been a specifically intellectualist method of struggle. And whatever may be said of the importance of terrorism, not in lieu of, but in conjunction with, the people's movement, the facts irrefutably testify that in our country individual political assassinations have nothing in common with the forcible actions of the people's revolution. In capitalist society a mass movement is possible only as a class movement of the workers. This movement is developing in Russia according to its own independent laws; it is proceeding in its own way, gaining in depth and io breadth, and

passing from a temporary lull to a new upsurge. It is only the liberal wave that rises and falls strictly in accord with the moods of the different ministers, whose replacement is accelerated by bombs. Small wonder, then, that sympathy with terrorism is to be met with so often in our country among the radical (or radical-posing) representatives of the bourgeois opposition. Small wonder that, among the revolutionary intelligentsia, the people most likely to be carried away (whether for long or for a moment) by terrorism are those who have no faith in the vitality and strength of the proletariat and the proletarian class struggle.

The fact that the spurt of liberal activity for one or another reason is short-lived and unstable cannot, of course, make us forget the irremovable contradiction that exists between the autocracy and the needs of the developing bourgeois society. The autocracy is bound to be a drag on social development. The interests of the bourgeoisie as a class, as well as the interests of the intelligentsia, without which modern capitalist production is inconceivable, clash more and more with the autocracy as time goes on. Superficial though the reason for the liberals' declarations may be and petty though the character of the liberals' half-hearted and equivocal position, the autocracy can maintain real peace only with a handful of highly privileged magnates from the landowning and merchant class, but in no sense with that class as a whole. Direct representation of the interests of the ruling class in the form of a constitution is essential for a country that wants to be a European country and, on pain of political and economic defeat, is obliged by its position to become a European country. It is therefore extremely important for the class-conscious proletariat to have a clear understanding both of the inevitability of the liberals' protests against the autocracy and of the actual bourgeois character of these protests.

The working class is setting itself the great and epoch-making aims of liberating humanity from every form of oppression and exploitation of man by man. Throughout the world it has striven hard for decades on end to achieve these aims, steadily widening its struggle and organising itself in mass parties, undaunted by occasional defeats and temporary setbacks. Nothing can be more vital for such a truly revolutionary class than to rid itself of all self-deception, of all

mirages and illusions. One of the most widespread and persistent illusions with us in Russia is the notion that our liberal movement is not a bourgeois movement, and that the impending revolution in Russia will not be a bourgeois revolution. The Russian intellectual, from the most moderate *Osvobozhdeniye* liberal[8] to the most extreme Socialist-Revolutionary,[9] always thinks that one makes our revolution colourless, that one degrades and vulgarises it, by admitting it to be a bourgeois revolution. To the Russian class-conscious proletarian this admission is the only true class characterisation of the actual state of affairs. To the proletarian the struggle for political liberty and a democratic republic in a bourgeois society is only one of the necessary stages in the struggle for the social revolution which will overthrow the bourgeois system. Strictly differentiating between stages that are essentially different, soberly examining the conditions under which they manifest themselves, does not at all mean indefinitely postponing one's ultimate aim, or slowing down one's progress in advance. On the contrary, it is for the purpose of accelerating the advance and of achieving the ultimate aim as quickly and securely as possible that it is necessary to understand the relation of classes in modern society. Nothing but disillusionment and unending vacillation await those who shun the allegedly one-sided class point of view, who would be socialists, yet are afraid openly to call the impending revolution in Russia—the revolution that has begun in Russia—a bourgeois revolution.

Characteristically, at the very height of the present constitutional movement, the more democratic of the legal publications took advantage of the unusual freedom to attack, not only the "bureaucracy", but also the "exclusive and hence erroneous theory of the class struggle" which is alleged to be "scientifically untenable" (*Nasha Zhizn*,[10] No. 28). If you please, the problem of bringing the intelligentsia closer to the masses "has hitherto been dealt with solely by throwing the emphasis on the class contradictions existing between the masses and those sections of society from which ... the greater part of the intelligentsia springs". Needless to say, this presentation of the facts is completely at variance with the real state of affairs. The very opposite is true. The entire mass of the Russian legally-active uplift intelligentsia, all

the old Russian socialists, all political figures of the *Osvobozhdeniye* type have always completely ignored the profound nature of the class contradictions in Russia in general and in the Russian countryside in particular. Even the extreme Left Russian radical intelligentsia, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, sins most in ignoring this fact; one need only recall its usual arguments about the "labouring peasantry", or about the impending revolution being "not a bourgeois, but a democratic one".

No, the nearer the moment of revolution draws and the more acute the constitutional movement becomes, the more strictly must the party of the proletariat guard its class independence and not allow its class demands to be swamped in general democratic phrases. The more frequently and decidedly the representatives of so-called society come forward with what they claim to be the demands of the whole people, the more relentlessly must the Social-Democrats expose the class nature of this "society". Take the notorious resolution of the "secret" Zemstvo congress held on November 6-8.[11] You will find there, thrust into the background, deliberately hazy and half-hearted constitutional aspirations. You will find mention there of the people and society, more often society than the people. You will find the most detailed and comprehensive suggestions for reforms of the Zemstvo and municipal institutions—institutions, that is, which represent the interests of the landowners and the capitalists. You will find mention of reforms in the living conditions of the peasantry, of the liberation of the peasantry from tutelage, and of the safeguarding of correct judicial forms. It is quite clear that you are dealing with representatives of the propertied classes who are only bent on securing concessions from the autocracy and have no thought of changing in any way the foundations of the economic system. If people like these want a "radical [allegedly radical]* change in the present state of inequality and oppression of the peasantry", it only proves anew that the Social-Democrats were right in tirelessly stressing the backwardness of the system and of the

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

living conditions of the peasantry in relation to the general conditions of the bourgeois order. The Social-Democrats have always urged that the class-conscious proletariat should strictly distinguish in the general peasant movement the over-riding interests and demands of the peasant bourgeoisie, however much these demands may be veiled and nebulous, and in whatever cloak of utopian "levelling" the peasant ideology (and "Socialist-Revolutionary" phrase-mongering) may invest them. Take the resolutions of the engineers' banquet in St. Petersburg on December 5. You will find that the 590 banquet guests, and together with them the 6,000 engineers who subscribed to the resolution, declared for a constitution, "without which Russian industry cannot be properly protected", while at the same time protesting against the placing of government orders with foreign concerns.

Can anyone still fail to see that it is the interests of all sections of the landowning, commercial, industrial and peasant bourgeoisie which are at the bottom of the constitutional aspirations that have erupted to the surface? Are we to be led astray by the fact that these interests are represented by the democratic intelligentsia, which everywhere and always, in all European revolutions of the bourgeoisie, has assumed the role of publicists, speakers, and political leaders?

A grave task now confronts the Russian proletariat. The autocracy is wavering. The burdensome and hopeless war into which it has plunged has seriously undermined the foundations of its power and rule. It cannot maintain itself in power now without an appeal to the ruling classes, without the support of the intelligentsia; such an appeal and such support, however, are bound to lead to constitutional demands. The bourgeois classes are trying to force an advantage for themselves out of the government's predicament. The government is playing a desperate game; it is trying to wriggle out of its difficulties, to get off with a few paltry concessions, non-political reforms, and non-committal promises, with which the tsar's new ukase is replete. Whether this game will succeed, even temporarily and partially, will in the long run depend on the Russian proletariat, on the degree of its organisation and the force of its revolutionary onset. The proletariat must take advantage of the political situation, which is greatly in its favour. The proletariat must support the constitutional

movement of the bourgeoisie; it must rouse and rally to its side the broadest possible sections of the exploited masses, muster all its forces, and start an uprising at the moment when the government is in the most desperate straits and popular unrest is at its highest.

What immediate form should the proletariat's support of the constitutionalists take? Chiefly, the utilisation of the general unrest for the purpose of carrying on agitation and organising the least involved and most backward sections of the working class and the peasantry. Naturally, the organised proletariat, Social-Democracy, should send its forces among all classes of the population; yet the more independently the classes now act, the more acute the struggle becomes, and the nearer the moment of the decisive battle approaches, the more should our work be concentrated on preparing the proletarians and semi-proletarians themselves for the direct struggle for freedom. At such a moment only opportunists can qualify the speeches of individual workingmen in Zemstvo and other public assemblies as a very active struggle, or a new method of struggle, or the highest type of demonstration. Such manifestations can only be of quite secondary importance. It is far more important now to turn the attention of the proletariat to really high and active forms of struggle, such as the famous mass demonstration in Rostov and a number of mass demonstrations in the South.[12] It is far more important now to increase our ranks, organise our forces, and prepare for an even more direct and open mass conflict.

Of course, there is no suggestion in this that the ordinary day-to-day work of the Social-Democrats should be abandoned. Social-Democrats will never give up that work, which they regard as the real preparation for the decisive fight; for they rely wholly and exclusively on the activity, the class-consciousness, and the organisation of the proletariat, on its influence among the labouring and exploited masses. It is a question of pointing out the right road, of calling attention to the need for going forward, to the harmfulness of tactical vacillations. The day-to-day work, which the class-conscious proletariat should never forget under any circumstances, includes also the work of organisation. Without broad and diverse workers' organisations, and without their connection with revolutionary Social-Democracy, it is

impossible to wage a successful struggle against the autocracy. On the other hand, organisational work is impossible without a firm rebuff to the disorganising tendencies displayed in our country, as everywhere else, by the weak-willed intellectual elements in the Party, who change their slogans like gloves; organisational work is impossible without a struggle against the absurd and reactionary organisation-as-process "theory", which serves to conceal confusion of every description.

The development of the political crisis in Russia will now depend chiefly on the course of the war with Japan. This war has done more than anything else to expose the rottenness of the autocracy; it is doing more than anything else to drain its strength financially and militarily, and to torment and spur on to revolt the long-suffering masses of the people, of whom this criminal and shameful war is demanding such endless sacrifices. Autocratic Russia has already been defeated by constitutional Japan, and dragging on the war will only increase and aggravate the defeat. The best part of the Russian navy has been destroyed; the position of Port Arthur is hopeless, and the naval squadron sent to its relief has not the slightest chance of even reaching its destination, let alone of achieving success; the main army under Kuropatkin has lost over 200,000 men and stands exhausted and helpless before the enemy, who is bound to crush it after the capture of Port Arthur. Military disaster is inevitable, and together with it discontent, unrest, and indignation will inevitably increase tenfold.

We must prepare for that moment with the utmost energy. At that moment, one of the outbreaks which are recurring, now here, now there, with such growing frequency, will develop into a tremendous popular movement. At that moment the proletariat will rise and take its stand at the head of the insurrection to win freedom for the entire people and to secure for the working class the possibility of waging the open and broad struggle for socialism, a struggle enriched by the whole experience of Europe.

GOOD DEMONSTRATIONS OF PROLETARIANS AND POOR ARGUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTELLECTUALS

The present-day constitutional movement among the propertied classes in our country differs sharply from former movements of the same type at the end of the fifties and seventies. The constitutional demands of the liberals are essentially the same. The speeches of the radical orators reiterate the familiar propositions of Zemstvo liberalism. The proletariat's participation in the movement provides a significant and very important new factor. The Russian working class, whose movement was the pivot of the entire revolutionary movement of the past decade, has long since reached the stage of open struggle, of street demonstrations, of popular mass meetings in defiance of the police, and of head-on clashes with the enemy in the streets of the southern cities.

And the liberal-bourgeois movement is at this moment marked by the bold, determined, incomparably sharper and more daring entry of the proletariat upon the scene. We would mention, first, the demonstration in St. Petersburg, in which the workers' participation was unfortunately weak, owing to the disorganising activity of the "Mensheviks", and the demonstration in Moscow. Next we would mention the presence of workers at a liberal-bourgeois banquet in Smolensk; at a meeting of the Educational Society in Nizhni-Novgorod; and at conferences of scientific, medical, and other societies in various cities. Further, there were the large meeting of workers in Saratov, the demonstration of November 6 in the Kharkov Law Society, that of November 20 in the Ekaterinodar Municipal Council, that of November 18 in the Odessa Health Protection Society, and, again in Odessa, somewhat later, in the Regional Law Court. We would add that both

demonstrations in Odessa and the one in Kharkov were accompanied by street demonstrations of workers, by processions with banners through the streets, by the singing of revolutionary songs, and so forth.

The last four demonstrations are described, incidentally, in *Iskra*, No. 79,[13] under the heading "Proletarian Demonstrations", to which descriptions I should like to draw the reader's attention. First, I shall indicate the facts according to *Iskra*, following which I shall give *Iskra*'s comments.

Kharkov. The Committee organises the participation of workers in a meeting of the Law Society. Over two hundred workers are present; some of the workers felt embarrassed about attending such an august assembly, while others could not enter because "muzhiks were not admitted". The liberal chairman takes to his heels after the first revolutionary speech. Then follows the speech of a Social-Democrat, leaflets are tossed into the air, the *Marseillaise* is sung, and the participants pour out into the street, and together with a crowd of close on 500 workers march along with a red flag, singing labour songs. Towards the end some are beaten up and arrested.

Ekaterinodar. A large crowd flocks to the hall of the municipal council (attracted by rumours of liberals' speeches to be delivered there). The telephone is cut off. A speaker from the committee makes his way into the hall with 30 or 40 workers and delivers a short, fully revolutionary Social-Democratic speech. Applause. Leaflets. Consternation among the councillors. The Mayor protests unavailingly. At the conclusion, the demonstrators leave the hall calmly. That night—numerous house searches by the police.

Odessa. First demonstration. A meeting attended by about two thousand people, the *mass* of them workers. A number of revolutionary speeches (Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary), thunderous applause, revolutionary outcries, leaflets. Marching through the streets with revolutionary songs. Dispersing without a clash.

Odessa. Second demonstration. A gathering of several thousand. A similarly vast revolutionary public rally and march through the streets as in the previous demonstration. A clash. Many hurt, some seriously. One woman worker dies. Sixty arrests.

Such are the facts of the case. Such are the demonstrations of the Russian proletarians.

Now, as to the line of reasoning of certain Social-Democratic intellectuals. It relates to the demonstration in Ekaterinodar, to which an entire article has been devoted. Read attentively: "In this demonstration for the first time the organised Russian proletariat came face to face with our liberal-minded bourgeoisie!"... The demonstration "is a further step in the development of forms of political struggle"; it is, "when all is said and done, a really new method of political struggle which yields very evident fruitful results"; the workers in such demonstrations "feel that they are acting as definite political units", they acquire "a sense of competence to act as the political fighters of the party". We see spreading "in the broadest social circles the idea of the party as of something quite definite, something that has taken shape, and, what is most important, something that has the right *to put forth demands*". People are beginning to look upon the whole party "as an active, fighting political force which states its demands clearly and definitely". It is necessary "to make wider use of the new method of struggle—in the councils, in the Zemstvos and at every kind of assembly of public figures". And the editors of *Iskra*, in unison with the author of these views, speak of "the idea of demonstrations of a new type", of the fact that "in Ekaterinodar in particular our comrades were able to show 'society' that they were acting as an independent party which feels capable of influencing the course of events and endeavours to do so".

Well, well. "In Ekaterinodar in particular."... A new step, a new method, a new practice, face to face for the first time, very evident fruitful results, definite political units, a sense of political competence, the right to put forth demands.... To me these pompous attempts at profound reasoning smacked of something stale, *passé*, and almost forgotten. But before accounting to myself how I sensed the staleness, I involuntarily asked: Pardon me, gentlemen, but why "in Ekaterinodar in particular"? Why indeed is it a new method? Why is it that the Kharkov and Odessa comrades do not brag (excuse the vulgar expression) about the newness of the method and the evident fruitful results, about meeting face to face for the first time, and a sense of political competence?

Why are the results of a meeting of a few dozen workers together with several hundred liberals within the four walls of a council hall more evident and fruitful than the meetings of thousands of workers, not only in medical and law societies, but *in the streets*? Can it really be that street meetings (in Odessa, as well as those previously held in Rostov-on-Don and other cities) are less likely to develop a sense of political competence and the right to put forth demands than meetings in municipal councils?... True, I must admit that I feel rather uncomfortable in quoting this last expression (the right *to put forth demands*); it is so stupid. But you can't throw the words out of a song.

In one instance, however, this expression acquires some meaning, and not only this expression, but *Iskra*'s entire line of reasoning, namely, if we presume the existence of parliamentarism, if we visualise for a moment that the Ekaterinodar Municipal Council has been transplanted to the banks of the Thames, next to Westminster Abbey. On this slight assumption it becomes clear why, within the four walls of a delegates' meeting hall one can have more "right to put forth demands" than in the streets; why struggle against a Prime Minister, that is, the Mayor of Ekaterinodar, is more fruitful than struggle against a policeman; why the sense of political competence and the knowledge of oneself as a definite political unit is heightened precisely in the hall of a parliament or in the hall of a Zemstvo Assembly. Indeed, why not play at parliamentarism for lack of a real parliament? One can obtain here such a vivid mental picture of "a meeting face to face", of "a new method", and all the rest of it. True, these mental pictures will inevitably divert our thoughts from the issues of a real mass struggle *for* parliamentarism, instead of playing *at* parliamentarism; that, however, is a trifle. But then what evident, tangible results....

Tangible results.... The expression immediately reminds me of Comrade Martynov and *Rabocheye Dyelo*.[14] Without reverting to the latter it is impossible to appraise the new *Iskra* correctly. The arguments about "a new method of struggle" in connection with the Ekaterinodar demonstration are a repetition of the arguments used by the editors in their "Letter to Party Organisations" (incidentally, is it wise to keep the original a secret, stacked away, and to circulate

only a copy openly for general information?). The editors' arguments follow *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s usual trend of thought, but in another connection.

Wherein lay the error and the harmfulness of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* "theory" of imparting a political character to the economic struggle itself, the "theory" of the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government, of the need to present to the government concrete demands which promise certain tangible results? Should we not impart a political character to the economic struggle? We certainly should. But when *Rabocheye Dyelo* deduced the political aims of a revolutionary party of the proletariat from the "economic" (trade-unionist) struggle, it unjustifiably narrowed and vulgarised the Social-Democratic conception, it detracted from the tasks of the proletariat's all-round political struggle.

Wherein lie the error and the harmfulness of the new *Iskra*'s theory of a new method, of a higher type of mobilisation of the proletarian forces, of a new way of developing the sense of political competence among the workers, their "right to put forth demands", and so on, and so forth? Should we not organise workers' demonstrations both in the Zemstvo Assemblies and on the occasion of these assemblies? We certainly should. But in speaking of good proletarian demonstrations we should not talk highbrow nonsense. We shall only demoralise the class-consciousness of the proletariat, we shall only divert the proletariat from the tasks, increasingly pressing, of the real, serious, open struggle, if we extol as a new method those very features of our ordinary demonstrations which least resemble active struggle and which it would be ludicrous to declare as productive of excellent results or as heightening the sense of political competence, etc.

Both our old acquaintance, Comrade Martynov, and the new *Iskra* are guilty of the sin peculiar to the intelligentsia—lack of faith in the strength of the proletariat; in its ability to organise, in general, and to create a party organisation, in particular; in its ability to conduct the political struggle. *Rabocheye Dyelo* believed that the proletariat was still incapable, and would be incapable for a long time to come, of conducting the political struggle that goes beyond the limits of the economic struggle against the employers and the

government. The new *Iskra* believes that the proletariat is still incapable, and will be incapable for a long time to come, of independent revolutionary action, and it calls a demonstration of a few dozen workers before the Zemstvo people a new method of struggle. Both the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the new *Iskra* religiously repeat the phrases about the independent activity and self-education of the proletariat only because this religious fervour screens the intellectualist incomprehension of the real forces of the proletariat and of the urgent tasks that confront it. Both the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the new *Iskra* talk absolute nonsense with an air of profundity about the special significance of tangible and evident results, and about a concrete contraposition of bourgeoisie and proletariat, thereby diverting the attention of the proletariat from the increasingly pressing task of a direct onset upon the autocracy, at the head of a popular uprising, towards playing at parliamentarism. In undertaking to *revise* the old organisational and tactical principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy and fussily searching for new formulas and "new methods", both the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the new *Iskra* are in fact dragging the Party back, proposing superseded, at times even downright reactionary, slogans.

We have had enough of this new revision that leads to the old rubbish! It is time to go forward and stop covering up disorganisation with the notorious organisation-as-process theory; it is time, in workers' demonstrations, to accentuate and advance to the foreground those features that tend to bring them closer to the real, open struggle for freedom.

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TIME TO CALL A HALT!

All eyewitnesses agree that the demonstration of November 28 was a failure because of the almost complete absence of workers. But why did the workers keep away from the demonstration? Why did the St. Petersburg Committee, in response to whose call the student youth had come to the demonstration, fail to take steps to secure the attendance of the workers, thus defeating its own enterprise? The answer to these questions is given in the following letter from a worker, a member of the Committee, from which we print the most important passages:

"Feeling (at the beginning of November) was running high and seeking an outlet. This outlet was to be provided by a demonstration, and in fact a leaflet did appear at that time, issued in the name of the Students' Social-Democratic Organisation and calling for a demonstration on November 14. On learning of this, the Committee proposed to the organisation that the demonstration be postponed until the end of November, to permit joint participation with the St. Petersburg proletariat. The students agreed.... The class-conscious workers were very eager to have a demonstration. Many workers came to Nevsky Prospekt on November 14 under the impression that the students' demonstration would take place. When they were told that they should not have come without a call by the Committee, they conceded the point, but said that they 'thought there would be something doing there anyway'. At any rate, this fact illustrates the mood of the class-conscious workers.

"At a meeting of the Committee on November 18 it was decided to hold the demonstration on the 28th. A subcommittee was immediately set up to organise the demonstration and work out a plan of action; it was decided to issue two preparatory agitational leaflets and a call. We threw ourselves into the job with all energy. The writer of these lines personally arranged several meetings of workers, study circle members, at which we discussed the role of the working class and the aim and significance of a demonstration at the present moment. We discussed the question of an armed or an unarmed demonstration, and all these meetings adopted resolutions supporting the decision of the Committee. The workers demanded as many leaflets as possible for distribution. 'Give us wagon-loads,' they said.

"And so, a demonstration, which promised to be really impressive was being prepared for the 28th. But here our St. Petersburg 'Minority', like the 'all-Russian' 'Minority' and the 'Minority' abroad, could not help playing a purely negative role, the role of a disorganiser. To make that role perfectly clear, I shall have to say a few words about the local 'Minority' and its activities. Before the demonstration, and after, the Committee consisted largely of adherents of the Majority of the Second Party Congress.* Arrests and the differences that are tearing the Party asunder have in many ways weakened the activity of the local Social-Democratic organisations. In its fight against the 'Majority' the local 'Minority' tries, for its own factional purposes, to discredit our local Committee. District representatives who adhere to the 'Minority' do not admit comrades of the 'Majority' into their districts and do not supply the Committee with any contacts. The result is terrible disorganisation and lowered efficiency in the districts concerned. The following is a case in point. For the last five or six months the representative of one district has been a 'Menshevik'. Due to the fact that it has been out of touch with the genera] activity, this district has lost ground terribly. Where there were formerly from fifteen to twenty study circles, there are now barely from four to five. The workers are dissatisfied with this state of affairs, and their representative is seeking to exploit this dissatisfaction against the 'Majority' by setting the workers against the Committee. The 'Minority' seeks to turn every weakness in the local Social-Democratic organisation to account against the 'Majority'. Whether its attempts are successful or not is another matter, but the fact remains that this is so.

"Three days before the demonstration, the Committee was called together on the initiative of the 'Minority'. For certain reasons three members of the 'Majority' on the Committee could not be notified in advance and were absent. The 'Minority' made a motion to call off the demonstration, threatening, otherwise, to work against it and not distribute a single leaflet. Owing to the absence of the three comrades that would have supported the demonstration, the motion was carried. It was decided not to distribute any leaflets and to destroy those containing the call.

"The broad mass of the general public, as well as the workers, prepared to attend the demonstration and waited only for the Committee's call. Rumours began to circulate that the demonstration had been called off and indefinitely postponed. Many strongly objected to the cancellation; the technical workers[15] protested and refused to work for the Committee in the future.

"A meeting of the Committee was called on Friday, and the three members who had been absent at the previous meeting protested against the improper revision of the decision to hold the demonstration.

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* The Russian terms for "majority" and "minority" are, respectively, *bolshinstvo* and *menshinstvo*. Hence, Lenin's adherents, who obtained a majority of votes in the elections to the leading organs of the Party at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in London in 1903, were called Bolsheviks, and their opponents, the minority, were called Mensheviks.—*Ed.*

Since a mass of people would gather in Nevsky Prospekt anyway, even if no leaflets were distributed, they urged that all steps be taken to get the workers as well to participate in the demonstration. A representative of the 'Minority' objected on the grounds that '*not all workers are sufficiently developed to participate consciously in the demonstration and to be able to defend the demands put forward by the Committee*'. The question was put to the vote; the meeting decided, with only one opposing vote, to hold the demonstration. But it transpired that many of the printed leaflets—over 12,000—containing the call had been burnt. Besides, their mass distribution at the factories was impossible, since they could not be delivered anywhere by Saturday morning, and on Saturdays the factories stop work at two or three o'clock. Thus, the leaflets could be distributed only among a small circle of workers, among acquaintances, but not among the broad masses. Under the circumstances the demonstration was foredoomed to failure. And fail it did....

"Now our 'Minority' can rejoice. It has won! Here is a new fact that discredits the Committee (read: the 'Majority'). But we hope that the reader will consider more seriously the reasons why the demonstration turned out as it did, and will say with us: 'Yes, as things now are in the Party it is impossible to work with any success. We must put an end to the crisis within the Party as soon as possible, we must close our ranks, otherwise we are in danger of complete enfeeblement and, unless we take advantage of the present favourable moment, we shall find ourselves trailing at the tail-end of great events.'"

This disruptive act of the St. Petersburg "Minority", which, in their own petty factional interests, prevented a proletarian demonstration, is the last drop that should make the cup of the Party's patience run over. That our Party is seriously ill and has lost a good half of its influence during the past year is known to the whole world. We appeal now to those who are incapable of regarding this serious ailment with sneers or malicious joy, who cannot dismiss the accursed questions of the Party crisis with mere sighs and shakes of the head, with snivelling and whining, who consider it their duty, even at the cost of a supreme effort, to achieve full clarity on the causes of the crisis—to fulfil that duty and pluck up the evil by its roots. For these people, *and these people only*, we shall recapitulate the history of the crisis; for without studying this history it is impossible to understand the present split, which the "Mensheviks" have finally contrived to bring about.

First stage of the crisis: At the Second Congress of our Party the principles of the *Iskra* position win, despite the opposition of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* and semi-*Rabocheye Dyelo*

people. After the Congress, the Minority begins to tear the Party asunder over the question of bringing into the Editorial Board persons whom the Congress rejected. Disorganisation, boycott, and preparation for a split go on *for three months*, from the end of August to the end of November.

Second stage: Plekhanov yields to the gentlemen who yearn for co-optation and makes manifest to all in public print, in the article "What Should Not Be Done" (No. 52), that he is offering a personal concession to the revisionists and anarchists-individualists in order to avert a greater evil. The gentlemen take advantage of this concession to go on rending the Party. Having taken their seats on the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and on the Council of the Party, they form a *secret organisation* for the purpose of getting their people into the Central Committee and obstructing the Third Congress. Unheard-of and incredible though it may be, this fact is proved by documentary evidence in the form of a letter of the new Central Committee concerning deals made with this worthy crew.

Third stage: Three members of the Central Committee side with the conspirators against the Party. They *co-opt three pretenders from the Minority* (assuring the committees, in writing, of the contrary), and, with the aid of the Council, *decidedly obstruct the Third Congress*, which was favoured by the overwhelming majority of the committees that voiced their opinions on the crisis. In Orlovsky's[16] pamphlet (*The Council Against the Party*) and in Lenin's (*Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party**), these facts are likewise proved by documentary evidence. The mass of the Party workers in Russia are unaware of these facts, but they should be known to everyone who wishes to be a Party member in more than name.

Fourth stage: The Party workers in Russia unite for action against the group abroad which has disgraced our Party. The adherents and the *Committees of the Majority arrange several private conferences* and elect representatives. The new Central Committee, which is controlled completely by the co-opted pretenders, *makes it its business to disorganise*

* First published in pamphlet form, January 1905, Geneva. See present edition, Vol. 7. pp. 527-37.—*Ed.*

and split all local committees of the Majority. The comrades should not entertain any illusions on this score; the Central Committee has no other purpose. The creatures of the clique abroad are preparing and forming new committees everywhere (in Odessa, Baku, Ekaterinoslav, Moscow, Voronezh, etc.). The group abroad is preparing its own, hand-picked congress. The secret organisation, having finished with the central bodies, has turned against the local committees.

The disruptive trick of the St. Petersburg Mensheviks is no accident; it is a calculated step towards splitting the Committee, a move made with the help of the "Mensheviks" co-opted into the Central Committee. We repeat: The Party workers in Russia in their majority are unaware of these facts. We warn them and say to them most emphatically that everyone who wishes to struggle for the Party and against disorganisation, everyone who does not want to be utterly duped, must know all these facts.

We have made all possible concessions and several quite impossible ones in order to continue working in one party with the "Minority". Now that the Third Congress has been obstructed and the disruptive tactics have been directed against the local committees, all hope of achieving this is lost. Unlike the "Mensheviks", who work by underhand means, behind the Party's back, we must declare openly and prove by deeds that the Party has broken off any and all relations with these gentry.

Vperyod, No. 1, January 4, 1905
(December 22, 1904)

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

CONFERENCES OF THE COMMITTEES[17]

Three conferences of local committees of our Party have recently been held: (1) the conference of the four Caucasian committees, (2) the conference of the three southern committees (Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, and Nikolayev), and (3) the conference of the six northern committees (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, the North, and Nizhni-Novgorod). We hope shortly to be able to give detailed information about these conferences.[18] For the time being we can report that all three conferences emphatically went on record for the immediate convocation of the Third Congress of the Party and in support of the publicists group of the "Majority".

Vperyod, No. 1, January 4, 1905
(December 22, 1904)

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

THE NEW RUSSIAN LOAN

Under the above headline, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, mouthpiece of the big German stockjobbers, gives the following interesting report:

"Rumours of a new big Russian loan have been current for several weeks now. All these rumours were promptly denied. It is now officially admitted, however, that a loan was recently [reported on December 29, new style] negotiated in St. Petersburg. No doubt, these official negotiations were preceded by private inquiries, which gave rise to the rumours. It is reported that German financiers took part this time in the negotiations. The loan is to be floated on the German market. Until now, since the beginning of the war, Russia has raised funds in three different ways: first, about 300 million rubles was borrowed from the cash holdings of the Treasury, increased by cuts in previous allocations. This was followed by a loan of 800 million francs (about 300 million rubles) obtained through French bankers. In August Russia floated a domestic loan of 150 million rubles. The war is consuming heavy sums which are growing from month to month, and Russia is again planning to raise a big foreign loan. Russian stocks have recently shown a strong (serious, *bedenkliche*) downward trend. How the German public will react to the Russian loan is unpredictable. The fortunes of war, so far, have invariably favoured the Japanese. And whereas, so far, Russian loans have been considered a safe investment, they are now becoming more or less speculative (*Beigeschmack*), especially in view of the tsar's recent Manifesto, which throws characteristic light on what is going on in Russia. It remains to be seen whether the new loan will be offered to the German public on terms (the interest rate and the price of issue) that would make up for the impaired quality of the Russian loan."— — —

Another warning to the Russian autocracy by the European bourgeoisie! It is losing credit as a result both of the military defeats and of the growing discontent within the country. The European bankers are beginning to regard the autocracy as a gambling speculation, while the "quality" of Russian loans, in the sense of their reliability, is frankly declared to be impaired.

And what a mass of money this criminal war, which must be consuming no less than *three million rubles a day*, is still going to cost the people!

Written after December 16 (29), 1904

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Published according to the manuscript

TO A. A. BOGDANOV

January 10, 1905

My dear friend,

At last we have launched *Vperyod*, and I would like to discuss it with you in greater detail. Issue No. 2 will appear the day after tomorrow. We intend to bring it out weekly. We have sufficient literary forces for the task. We are all in excellent spirits and at the top of our working form (with the slight exception of Vasily Vasilyevich,[19] who has a touch of the blues). We are sure that things will go well, so long as we don't go bankrupt. We need 400 francs (150 rubles) per issue, but we have only 1,200 francs all in all. We shall need the deuce of a lot of help for the first few months; for, unless we can make it a regular publication, the entire position of the Majority will be dealt a terrific, well-nigh irreparable blow. Do not forget this and get whatever you can (*especially from Gorky*).

Next. It is particularly important now to let Rakhmetov[20] know that he should push on as hard as he can with the arrangements for literary contributions from Russia. The success of a weekly depends largely upon the energetic collaboration of Russian writers and Social-Democrats. Write to Rakhmetov that he should mobilise *both Finn and Kollontai* for the purpose (we badly need articles *on Finland*), *as well as Rumyantsev and Andrei Sokolov*, the latter especially and particularly. I know by long experience that the people in Russia are devilishly, unpardonably, and incredibly slow at this sort of thing. It is therefore necessary to act, first of all, by personal example; secondly, not to rely on promises, but to see that you get the things written. Let Rakhmetov be sure to order the articles and the correspondence himself, and receive them himself, and send them off himself, keeping at it until he gets the material. (I would also

add S u v o r o v and L u n t s, but I am sure Rakhmetov knows many others besides.) We badly need: (1) articles on questions of Russian life, from 6,000 to 18,000 letters; (2) paragraphs on the same subjects, from 2,000 to 6,000 letters; (3) correspondence of diverse length about everything; (4) interesting passages and quotations from local Russian and special Russian publications; (5) paragraphs on articles in Russian newspapers and magazines. The last three points are quite within the range of contribution by working-class and especially the student youth, and therefore the thing should be given attention; this work should be popularised, people should be roused and filled with zeal; they should, by concrete example, be taught what is wanted and how necessary it is to utilise every trifle; they should be made to see how badly needed the *raw* material from Russia is abroad (we shall be able to work it up from a literary angle and make use of it ourselves), that it is foolish in the extreme to feel embarrassed about literary shortcomings, that they must learn to speak simply and correspond simply with the periodical abroad if they wish to make it their own journal. In view of this I would consider it simply necessary and positively essential to hand out a *Vperyod* address (a foreign address, of which we have many now and shall have more) to *every* student circle and to *every* workers' group. I assure you that there is an idiotic prejudice among our committee-men against handing out addresses on a broad scale to the periphery youth. Combat this prejudice with all your might, hand out the addresses, and demand *direct contact* with the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*. Unless this is done there will be no newspaper. Workers' correspondence is very badly needed, and there is so little of it. What we need is scores and hundreds of workers corresponding directly with *Vperyod*.

We must also get the workers to communicate their own addresses to which *Vperyod* may be mailed in closed envelopes. The workers will not be afraid. The police will not be able to intercept a tenth of the envelopes. The small (four-page) size and frequent appearance of *Vperyod* make the question of envelope delivery a most vital one for our newspaper. We should make it our direct objective to develop workers' subscriptions to *Vperyod*, to develop the habit of sending the money (a ruble isn't something God knows what!)

and one's address abroad. If we tackle this properly, my word, we could revolutionise the distribution of underground literature in Russia. Don't forget that transportation, at best, takes four months. And that's with a weekly paper! As for the enveloped copies, probably from 50 to 75 per cent will be delivered at postal speed.

Now, as to the writers. They ought simply to be obligated to write regularly once a week or once a fortnight; otherwise—so, indeed, tell them—we cannot consider them decent people and will have nothing more to do with them. The usual excuse is: We don't know what theme to choose, we're afraid to waste our effort, we think "they already have this". It is against these trite and idiotic pretexts that Rakhmetov must wage a personal, a definitely personal, fight. The principal themes are the domestic topics of Russia (of the kind that comprise in periodical literature reviews of the domestic political scene and reflections of social life), as well as articles and brief comments on material appearing in Russian special publications (statistical, military, medical, prison, ecclesiastical, and other periodicals). We are always in need of copy for these two sections. Only people living in Russia, and such people alone, can conduct these two sections well. *The keynote here is fresh facts, fresh impressions, special materials that are inaccessible to the people abroad, and not just arguments, not evaluations from the Social-Democratic point of view.* Therefore, such articles and comments will never go to waste, for we shall always make use of them. It is Rakhmetov's duty now to organise this thing at once and give us at least half a dozen good, useful contributors, who would not be lazy or try to shirk their jobs, but would each get in direct touch with the Editorial Board. Only by direct contact with contributors can we arrange all the details of the work. People should be enlisted by being made to realise that nowhere else can they "get into print" as quickly as in a weekly newspaper.

In conclusion, a word or two about the organisational slogan of today. After the article "Time to Call a Halt!" *Vperyod*, No. 1),* this slogan should be clear; but people are so inert that Rakhmetov, here again, will have to explain and

* See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

explain again, and hammer it into their heads as hard as he can. The *split is* now *complete*; for we have exhausted all means. It is the *Third Congress* against the will of the Central Committee and the Council and *without them*. Complete rupture with the Central Committee. An open statement that we have our own Bureau. The complete removal of the Mensheviks and the new-Iskrists everywhere. We did everything we could to get on together, and should now declare openly and bluntly that we are obliged to work separately. All trustfulness and naïveté can only cause tremendous harm.

For Christ's sake hurry up and issue an open and emphatic statement on the Bureau.[21] It is necessary: (1) to line up fully with "Time to Call a Halt!" and re-issue its appeal; (2) to declare that *Vperyod* is the organ of the majority of the committees and that the Bureau is working with it in complete and friendly agreement; (3) that the C.C. and the Council have deceived the Party in the most disgraceful way and sabotaged the Congress; (4) that there is no way out now other than the convening of a congress of the committees themselves *without* the C.C. and the Council; (5) that the Bureau undertakes to help the constructive work of the committees; (6) that the Central Organ has utterly lost the membership's confidence by its vacillations and lies.

Believe me, we highly appreciate Zemlyachka, but she is wrong in her opposition to Papasha,[22] and it is for you to correct her mistakes. Let us hurry up and break with the C.C. all along the line, and publish a statement about the Bureau at once to the effect that it is the Organising Committee and that it is convening the Third Congress.

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Published according to
the manuscript

THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR[23]

"Port Arthur has surrendered.

"This event is one of the greatest events in modern history. These four words, flashed yesterday to all parts of the civilised world, create a crushing impression, the impression of an overwhelming and appalling catastrophe, a disaster that beggars description. The moral power of a mighty empire is crumbling, the prestige of a young race is waning before it has had the chance to prove itself. Sentence has been passed upon an entire political system. A long chain of asserted claims has been broken and mighty efforts have been frustrated. True, the fall of Port Arthur had long been predicted, and for a long time people had sought to dismiss it in a few words and to find consolation in ready-made phrases. But the hard, brutal fact shatters all conventional lies. The significance of the disaster cannot be underrated now. For the first time the old world has been humiliated by an irreparable defeat dealt it by the new world, a world mysterious, and, to all appearances, adolescent, which was only yesterday won to civilisation."

Thus writes a respectable European bourgeois newspaper under the direct impact of the event. Admittedly, it has done more than merely express in trenchant words the sentiments of the entire European bourgeoisie. Through the words of this newspaper speaks the true class instinct of the bourgeoisie of the old world, which is perturbed by the victories of the new bourgeois world and alarmed by the collapse of Russia's military power, which for a long time had been considered the bulwark of European reaction. Small wonder that even the European bourgeoisie, which has taken no part in the war, feels humiliated and depressed. It had grown so accustomed to identify Russia's moral strength with the

military strength of the gendarme of Europe. In its eyes the prestige of the young Russian race was inseparably bound up with that of tsarism, that unshakable authority, which strongly safeguarded the existing "order of things". Small wonder that the disaster which has overtaken the rulers and commanders of Russia seems "appalling" to the whole European bourgeoisie. This disaster implies a tremendous acceleration of world-wide capitalist development, a quickening of history's pace; and the bourgeoisie knows only too well from bitter experience that this means the acceleration of the social revolution of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie of Western Europe felt so secure in the atmosphere of long-lasting stagnation, under the wing of the "mighty Empire", and now suddenly some "mysterious, adolescent" power dares to disturb this stagnation and shatter this pillar.

Indeed, the European bourgeoisie has cause for alarm. The proletariat has cause for rejoicing. The disaster that has overtaken our mortal enemy not only signifies the approach of freedom in Russia, it also presages a new revolutionary upsurge of the European proletariat.

But why and to what extent is the fall of Port Arthur really an historic disaster?

The first thing that strikes the eye is the effect of this event on the trend of the war. The main objective of the Japanese in this war has been attained. Advancing, progressive Asia has dealt backward and reactionary Europe an irreparable blow. Ten years ago this reactionary Europe, with Russia in the lead, was perturbed by the defeat of China at the hands of young Japan, and it united to rob Japan of the best fruits of her victory. Europe was protecting the established relations and privileges of the old world, its prerogative to exploit the Asian peoples—a prerogative held from time immemorial and sanctified by the usage of centuries. The recovery of Port Arthur by Japan is a blow struck at the whole of reactionary Europe. Russia held Port Arthur for six years and spent hundreds of millions of rubles on the building of strategic railways, harbours, and new towns, on fortifying a stronghold which the entire mass of European newspapers, bribed by Russia and fawning on Russia, declared to be impregnable. Military commentators write that Port Arthur was as strong as six Sevastopols. And behold, little Japan, hitherto

despised by all, captures this stronghold in eight months, when it took England and France together a whole year to capture Sevastopol. The military blow is irreparable. The question of supremacy on the seas, the main and vital issue of the present war, has been settled. The Russian Pacific fleet, which at the outset was certainly not weaker, if actually not stronger, than the Japanese fleet, has been completely destroyed. The very base for naval operations has been lost, and the only thing left for Rozhdestvensky's naval squadron is to turn back shamefully after a useless expenditure of more millions, after the great victory of his formidable battleships over the English fishing smacks. It is believed that Russia's loss in naval tonnage alone amounts to 300,000,000 rubles. More important, however, is the loss of some ten thousand of the navy's best men, and the loss of an entire army. Many European papers are now trying to minimise the importance of these losses, and their efforts to do so lead them to such ridiculous assertions as that Kuropatkin is now "relieved", "freed" of his worries over Port Arthur! Russia's military forces have also been relieved of an entire army. According to the latest English reports, no fewer than *48,000 men* have been taken prisoner, and there is no telling how many thousands more were killed in the battles of Kinchow and at the fortress itself. The Japanese are in complete possession of the Liaotung Peninsula; they have acquired a base of operations of incalculable importance for exerting pressure on Korea, China, and Manchuria; they have released for action against Kuropatkin a battle-tried army of from 80,000 to 100,000 strong, reinforced by formidable heavy artillery which, when brought up to the Shaho River, will give them an overwhelming superiority over the main Russian forces.

According to reports in the foreign press, the autocratic government has decided to continue the war at all costs, and to send Kuropatkin 200,000 more men. It is highly probable that the war will drag on for a long time, but its hopelessness is already apparent, and all delays will only aggravate the innumerable calamities which the Russian people are suffering because they still tolerate the yoke of the autocracy on their neck. As it is, the Japanese have reinforced their troops after every big battle in less time and in greater numbers

than the Russians. And now that they have achieved complete supremacy on the sea and have utterly annihilated one of Russia's armies, they will be able to send twice as many reinforcements as the Russians. As it is, the Japanese beat the Russian generals time and again, although the bulk of their best artillery was engaged in siege warfare. Now they have achieved complete concentration of their forces, while the Russians have to fear for Vladivostok, as well as for Sakhalin. The Japanese have occupied the best and most populated part of Manchuria, where they can maintain an army at the expense of the conquered territory and with the help of China, whereas the Russians have to depend more and more upon supplies transported from Russia, and it will soon be impossible for Kuropatkin to increase his army any further, in view of the impossibility of bringing up sufficient supplies.

But the military debacle which the autocracy has suffered has deeper implications; it signifies the collapse of our entire political system. The days when wars were fought by mercenaries or by representatives of a caste half-isolated from the people have gone for ever. Wars today are fought by peoples; even Kuropatkin, according to Nemirovich-Danchenko, has begun to realise that this is the truth and not a mere copy-book motto. Wars today are fought by peoples; this now brings out more strikingly than ever a great attribute of war, namely, that it opens the eyes of millions to the disparity between the people and the government, which heretofore was evident only to a small class-conscious minority. The criticism of the autocracy by all progressive Russians, by the Russian Social-Democrats, by the Russian proletariat, has now been confirmed in the criticism by Japanese arms, confirmed in such wise that the impossibility of living under the autocracy *is felt* more and more even by those who do not know what autocracy means, even by those who do know, but yet would maintain it with all their soul. The incompatibility of the autocracy with the interests of social development, with the interests of the entire people (apart from a handful of bureaucrats and bigwigs), became evident as soon as the people actually had to pay for the autocracy with their lifeblood. Its foolish and criminal colonial adventure has landed the autocracy in an impasse, from which the people can ex-

tricate themselves only by their own efforts and only at the cost of destroying tsarism.

The fall of Port Arthur is a great historic outcome of tsarism's crimes, which began to reveal themselves at the outset of the war, and which will now reveal themselves more and more extensively and unrestrainedly. After us the deluge! argued all the big and little Alexeyevs,[24] scarcely thinking or believing that the deluge would actually come. The generals and commanders-in-chief proved themselves incompetent nonentities. In the expert opinion of an English military observer (in *The Times*), the whole story of the 1904 campaign was one of criminal neglect of the elementary principles of naval and military strategy. The civil and military bureaucracy proved as parasitic and venal now as in the days of serfdom. The officers proved uneducated, undeveloped, and untrained. They were not in close touch with the soldiers, nor did they enjoy their confidence. The ignorance, illiteracy, and backwardness of the peasant masses became appallingly obvious when they came up against a progressive nation in modern warfare, which requires high-quality manpower as imperatively as does modern technique. Success in modern warfare is impossible without intelligent soldiers and sailors who possess initiative. No amount of endurance or physical strength, no herding of men into solid ranks for mass actions can guarantee superiority in an age of quick-firing small arms and quick-firing cannon, when naval battles are fought with the aid of intricate mechanisms and land actions are fought in extended order. The military might of autocratic Russia has proved to be a sham. Tsarism has proved to be a hindrance to the organisation of up-to-date efficient warfare, that very business to which tsarism dedicated itself so wholeheartedly, of which it was so proud, and for which it offered such colossal sacrifices in defiance to all opposition on the part of the people. A whited sepulchre is what tsarism has proved to be in the field of external defence, which was its favourite speciality, so to say. Events have corroborated the opinion of those foreigners who laughed upon seeing hundreds of millions squandered on the purchase and building of splendid warships, and who declared that those expenditures were useless if no one knew how to manipulate such modern vessels, if there were no people with the necessary technical

knowledge to utilise the latest achievements of military engineering. Both the navy and the fortress, the field fortifications and the army proved to be antiquated and utterly useless.

Never before has the military organisation of a country had such a close bearing on its entire economic and cultural system. The military debacle, therefore, could not but precipitate a profound political crisis. Here again, as so often in history, the war between an advanced and a backward country has played a great revolutionary role. And the class-conscious proletariat, an implacable enemy of war—this inevitable and inseverable concomitant of all class rule in general—cannot shut its eyes to the revolutionary task which the Japanese bourgeoisie, by its crushing defeat of the Russian autocracy, is carrying out. The proletariat is hostile to every bourgeoisie and to all manifestations of the bourgeois system, but this hostility does not relieve it of the duty of distinguishing between the historically progressive and the reactionary representatives of the bourgeoisie. It is quite understandable, therefore, that the most consistent and staunch representatives of revolutionary international Social-Democracy, such as Jules Guesde in France and Hyndman in England, unequivocally expressed their sympathy with Japan, which is routing the Russian autocracy. Here in Russia, of course, some socialists were found to have muddled ideas on this question, too. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[25] rebuked Guesde and Hyndman, saying that a socialist could only be in favour of a workers' Japan, a people's Japan, and not of a bourgeois Japan. This rebuke is as absurd as blaming a socialist for admitting the progressive nature of the free-trade bourgeoisie as compared with the protectionist bourgeoisie. Guesde and Hyndman did not defend the Japanese bourgeoisie or Japanese imperialism; they correctly noted in this conflict between two bourgeois countries the historically progressive role of one of them. The muddle-headedness of the "Socialists-Revolutionaries" was, of course, an inevitable result of the failure on the part of our radical intelligentsia to understand the class point of view and historical materialism. Neither could the new *Iskra* help showing muddled thinking. It had quite a lot to say at first about peace at any price. It then made haste to "correct itself", when Jaurès showed

plainly whose interests, those of the progressive or those of the reactionary bourgeoisie, would be served by a quasi-socialist campaign for peace in general. And now it has ended up with platitudes about the unreasonableness of "speculating" (?!) on a victory of the Japanese bourgeoisie and about war being a calamity "regardless of whether" it ends in the victory or the defeat of the autocracy.

No. The cause of Russian freedom and of the struggle of the Russian (and the world) proletariat for socialism depends to a very large extent on the military defeats of the autocracy. This cause has been greatly advanced by the military debacle which has struck terror in the hearts of all the European guardians of the existing order. The revolutionary proletariat must carry on a ceaseless agitation against war, always keeping in mind, however, that wars are inevitable as long as class rule exists. Trite phrases about peace *à la* Jaurès are of no use to the oppressed class, which is not responsible for a bourgeois war between two bourgeois nations, which is doing all it can to overthrow every bourgeoisie, which knows the enormity of the people's sufferings even in time of "peaceful" capitalist exploitation. While struggling against free competition, we cannot, however, forget its progressive character in comparison with the semi-feudal system. While struggling against every war and every bourgeoisie, we must draw a clear line in our agitational work between the progressive bourgeoisie and the feudal autocracy; we must recognise the great revolutionary role of the historic war in which the Russian worker is an involuntary participant.

It was the Russian autocracy and not the Russian people that started this colonial war, which has turned into a war between the old and the new bourgeois worlds. It is the autocratic regime and not the Russian people that has suffered ignoble defeat. The Russian people has gained from the defeat of the autocracy. The capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of tsarism. The war is not ended yet by far, but every step towards its continuation increases immeasurably the unrest and discontent among the Russian people, brings nearer the hour of a new great war, the war of the people against the autocracy, the war of the proletariat for liberty. There is good reason for the concern shown by that most sedate and sober European bourgeoisie,

which would heartily sympathise with the granting of liberal concessions by the Russian autocracy, but which stands in mortal fear of a Russian revolution, as the prologue to a European revolution.

"There is a deep-rooted opinion," writes one such sober organ of the German bourgeoisie, "that it is absolutely impossible for a revolution to break out in Russia. Every kind of argument is used to support this view: the inertness of the Russian peasantry, its faith in the tsar, its dependence on the clergy; the extreme elements among the discontented, it is claimed, constitute a mere handful, who can organise putsches and terrorist attempts, but are absolutely incapable of calling forth a general popular uprising. The broad mass of the discontented, we are told, lack organisation, arms, and—most important of all—the determination to risk their lives. As for the Russian intellectual, he is usually revolutionary-minded only until about the age of thirty, after which he settles down comfortably in some cushy government job, and thus most of the hotheads undergo a metamorphosis and become run-of-the-mill officials." But now, the newspaper continues, there are many indications of a big change. The revolutionaries are not the only ones now who speak about a revolution in Russia; the topic is even in the mouths of such "unenthusiastic" and solid pillars of law and order as Prince Trubetskoi, whose letter to the Minister of the Interior is now being reprinted by the entire European press. "There is evidently real ground for the fear of a revolution in Russia. True, no one believes that the Russian peasants will take up their pitchforks and go forward to fight for a constitution. But, then, are revolutions made in villages? In modern history the big cities long ago became the vehicles of the revolutionary movement. And in Russia it is the cities that are in ferment, from north to south and from east to west. No one will venture to predict the outcome, but it is an incontrovertible fact that the number of people who consider a revolution in Russia impossible is diminishing day by day. And if a serious revolutionary outbreak does occur, it is more than doubtful whether the autocracy, weakened by the war in the Far East, will be able to cope with it."

Yes, the autocracy is weakened. The most sceptical of the sceptics are beginning to believe in the revolution.

General belief in revolution is already the beginning of revolution. The government itself, by its military adventure, is seeing to its continuation. The Russian proletariat will see to it that the serious revolutionary onset is sustained and extended.

Vperyod, No. 2,
January 14 (1), 1905

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the text in *Vperyod*

FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

FINE WORDS BUTTER NO PARSNIPS

We draw the attention of our readers to the pamphlet *Workers and Intellectuals in Our Organisations*, by "A Worker", which the new-Iskrists have just issued with a foreword by Axelrod. We shall probably have occasion more than once to refer to this edifying tract, which illustrates beautifully what fruits the demagogic preaching of the "Minority", or new-Iskrists, has borne and continues to bear, and how the latter are now trying to get out of the verbal mess into which they have talked themselves. For the present we shall merely note the main points in the pamphlet and the foreword.

"A Worker" had the misfortune to believe the rantings of the new-Iskrists. Hence we find so many *Rabocheye Dyelo* phrases *à la* Akimov in his pamphlet. "Our leaders from among the intellectuals ... did not set themselves the task ... of developing the class-consciousness and initiative of the workers...." Any endeavour to display initiative was "systematically persecuted". "In no single type of organisation has there been room for developing independent activity of the workers...." "The economic struggle was wholly neglected"; "workers were not admitted" even to agitation and propaganda meetings (who would have believed it!). Demonstrations "have outlived themselves"—all these horrors (which the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* used to cast in the teeth of the old *Iskra* long ago) are, of course, the work of "the bureaucratic centralists", viz., the majority at our Second Congress, which fought against *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism. Set on against the Party Congress by the sulky minority, the poor "Worker" attacks this Congress because it was held "without us" (without the workers), "without our participation", because there was "hardly a single worker" there. Of course, the fact that all the real worker delegates at the Congress—Stepanov, Gorsky, and

Braun—staunchly supported the majority and opposed the spinelessness of the intellectuals is discreetly passed over. But this does not matter. What matters is the depth of depravity that results from the rantings of these new-*Iskra* people, who "attack" the Congress after being defeated at the elections, who attack it before those who did not participate in the Congress, inciting them to treat all Social-Democratic congresses with contempt; who attack it at the very time when they have so nobly wormed their way into the central bodies which act exclusively by authority of the Congress. Is not Ryazanov's stand far more honest? (See his pamphlet *Shattered Illusions*.) He bluntly declared that the Congress was *packed*; but at least he has not been invested by this "packed congress" with any title or office.

It is highly characteristic of the psychology of a worker, even though his mind has been turned against the "Majority", that he is not satisfied with phrases about autonomy, workers' independent activity, etc. He repeats these words like every new-Iskrist or *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ist; but with sober proletarian instinct he insists on *deeds in confirmation of words*, he does not want his parsnips buttered with fine words. "*Without a change in the composition*" ("A Worker's" italics) of the leadership, fine words remain but words, he declares. It is necessary to demand the *admission* of workers to all important Party bodies, to secure for them *equal rights* with the intellectuals. With the deep distrust of a true proletarian and a true democrat towards all bombast, "A Worker" exclaims: *What guarantee is there that the committees will not have only intellectuals sitting on them?* This hits the nail on the head as far as our new-Iskrists are concerned. This excellent question shows that the *Rabocheye Dyelo* incitements have so far failed to befuddle the clear mind of the proletarian. He states bluntly that the committee in which he worked "remained a committee of the Minority only in principle, on paper [mark this!], while in its actions it differed in no way from a committee of the Majority. We workers have had no access to any important, that is to say leading, Party body (let alone the Committee)".

No one could have shown up the Mensheviks better than this Menshevik worker has done. He understands that *without guarantees* all this ranting about autonomy and independent

activity of the proletariat remains what it is—cheap phrase-mongering. But what *guarantees* are possible in Social-Democratic organisations—have you ever thought of that, Comrade "Worker"? What guarantees are there that revolutionaries who gathered at a Party congress, resentful over the fact that the Congress did not elect them, will not afterwards shout that the Congress was a reactionary attempt to put over the viewpoint of the Iskrists (see Trotsky's pamphlet issued *under the editorship of the new "Iskra"*), that its decisions are not sacred, that there were no workers from among the masses at the Congress? What guarantees are there that the general decision concerning the forms and guiding rules of Party organisation, a decision called the Organisational Rules of the Party and which cannot exist except in the form of such Rules—that this decision is not broken eventually by characterless people, with regard to that part of it which they find distasteful, on the pretest that such things as Rules are bureaucratic and formalistic? What guarantees are there that people who have broken the collectively adopted Rules of organisation will not afterwards begin to argue that organisation is a process, that organisation is a tendency, that organisation is a form that keeps in step with its content, and that it is therefore absurd and utopian to demand observance of the Rules of organisation? "A Worker", the author of the pamphlet, did not ponder over any one of these questions. But he approached them so closely, so very closely, he put them so bluntly, so candidly and boldly to the phrase-mongers and politicians, that we heartily recommend his pamphlet. It shows admirably how the knights of the "fine phrase" are exposed by their own followers.

"A Worker", acting on second-hand information, objects to Lenin's "organisational plan", but as usual he does not indicate *a single* clear and precise ground for his objection. He mentions Panin and Cherevanin[26] (who have contributed nothing but angry words), but he does not so much as *take a glance* at Lenin's much-talked-of letter to a St. Petersburg comrade. If "A Worker" had not taken his abettors at their word, but had looked at that letter, he would have read, to his great surprise, the following:

"*We should particularly see to it that as many workers as possible become fully class-conscious and professional*

revolutionaries and members of the committee. We must try to get on the committee revolutionary workers who have the greatest contacts and the best 'reputation' among the mass of the workers. The committee should, therefore, include, as far as possible, all the principal leaders of the working-class movement from among the workers themselves." ("*Letter*", pp. 7-8).*

Read and re-read these lines, Comrade "Worker", and you will see how *you have been hoodwinked* by the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and new-Iskrists, who are attacking the old *Iskra* and its followers, the "majority" of the Second Congress. Read the lines carefully and see if you will accept the challenge I put forth. Find me *another passage* in our Social-Democratic literature where the question you raised about "the workers and intellectuals in our organisations" is presented *so clearly*, *directly*, *and decidedly*, and where, moreover, the necessity is pointed out of getting as many workers as possible *on the committee*, of getting to the extent possible all leaders of the labour movement from among the working class *on the committee. I say that you will not be able to point to another such passage.* I say that anyone who takes the trouble to study our Party differences from documents, *from Rabocheye Dyelo*, from *Iskra*, and from the pamphlets—and not from tales spread by gossips—will see the falsity and the demagogic nature of the new *Iskra*'s preaching.

You will perhaps answer: Lenin may have written this, but his advice was not always taken. Of course, that is possible. No Party writer will vouch that all who call themselves his adherents always actually follow his counsels. But, in the first place, would not a Social-Democrat who called himself an adherent of the "Letter" while at the same time not following its counsels be exposed by that very letter? Was the letter printed for intellectuals only, and not for workers as well? Has a writer any means of stating his views other than a printed statement? Secondly, if these counsels were not heeded, as "A Worker", for instance, testifies, either by the Mensheviks or by the Bolsheviks, does it not clearly follow that the Mensheviks had no right to *invent* such a "disagreement" with the Bolsheviks, that their incitement of the

* "Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks." See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 235.—*Ed.*

workers against the Bolsheviks on the grounds that the latter ignored the workers' independent activity was sheer demagogy?

Wherein, then, lies the *real* difference *on this point* between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks? Is it not in the fact that the Bolsheviks came forward much earlier and much more directly with clear and definite advice to place workers on the committee? Is it not in the fact that the Bolsheviks have always despised "fine phrases" about the workers' autonomy and independent activity, when such utterances remain mere words (as they do with the Mensheviks)?

See now how the respectable, worthy, patriarchal Axelrod wriggles in his foreword when he is driven into a corner by the proletarian bluntness and boldness of a worker, who has imbibed so much *Rabocheye Dyelo* wisdom from Axelrod's "admirable" *feuilletons*, Martov's unforgettable articles, and (from the point of view of the interests of the "Majority") Trotsky's excellent pamphlet.

"A Worker" tries to question Ryadovoi's[27] assertion that since the time of Economism the membership of our Party organisation has become relatively more proletarian. "A Worker" is obviously wrong. Anyone who has observed the activities of our Party at close range for any length of time knows this. Most curious of all, however, is the sight of our old Axelrod changing front. Who does not remember his stout assertions, so skilfully utilised by the enemies of Social-Democracy, the *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals, that the Social-Democratic Party is an organisation of intellectuals? Who does not remember how the new-Iskrists, with their grudge against the Party, harped on this slander of the Party? And now the selfsame Axelrod, frightened by the direct and honest conclusions which "A Worker" has drawn from this slander, tries to dodge the issue:

"During the period of the inception and early development of Social-Democracy," he says in his foreword, "the Russian revolutionary party was purely a party of the intelligentsia.... Now the class-conscious revolutionary workers form the main body [mark this!] of the Social-Democratic Party" (*op. cit.*, p. 15).

Poor "Worker"! How severe his punishment is for having believed Axelrod's "fine words"! Such punishment is the inev-

itable consequence of trust in writers who for a year and a half have been saying first one thing then another to suit the exigencies of "co-optation".

See how Axelrod dodges the question of "guarantees" when he has to meet it outright. Why, it is a positive delight, a gem of new-*Iskra* literature. "A Worker" speaks of the relation between the workers and the intellectuals *within the organisations*. "A Worker" *is profoundly correct* in declaring that without guarantees, without equal rights, i.e., without the principle of elective office, all fine words about non-bureaucratic centralism are mere phrase-mongering. And what does Axelrod say in answer? "Over-zealousness for the idea of change in the status of the workers in our organisations is one-sidedness." The author erroneously shifts the issue of eradicating evil "into the sphere of formal organisational relations"; he forgets that "the particular question of equalisation of rights" can be solved only "in the process of the further development of our experience in a Social-Democratic direction". "The problem that particularly engages the author of the pamphlet can be radically dealt with only in the process of consciously collective work by our Party."

Truly a gem! Why, it was none other than Axelrod who was the first to raise this very question of organisation, and only of organisation, at the League Congress* and in the new *Iskra* (No. 55); but when "A Worker" writes a special pamphlet on organisation, he is told pontifically that it is not formality that counts, but the process of work!

It is not the principles of organisation that matter to the new *Iskra* and to Axelrod, but the process of twaddle to justify an unprincipled stand. There is no meaning except a defence of unprincipledness in the whole notorious organisation-as-process theory (see particularly Rosa Luxemburg's articles), a theory that vulgarises and prostitutes Marxism.

We repeat, "A Worker's" admirable pamphlet cannot be recommended too highly as evidence of the utter falseness of the new-Iskrist position on the organisational question. We recommend this pamphlet particularly to workers whom the Mensheviks are trying to turn against the Bolsheviks by

* See Note 52.—*Ed.*

preaching the elective principle.* The workers are splendid at exposing phrase-mongers and liars. They put the question excellently: either the elective principle or only the advice to place workers on the committees. If it is to be the elective principle, give us formal guarantees, guarantees of equality embodied in the Rules. The workers will see the new-Iskrists running from a solution of this question as the devil runs from holy water. If advice to place workers on the committees is desirable, if the old *Iskra* was right in maintaining that democracy, i.e., the universal application of the elective principle in *Russian* secret organisations, is incompatible with the autocratic police-ridden regime, then *nowhere* will you find such direct and instructive advice to place workers on the committees as that given by the Majority.

Vperyod, No. 2,
January 14 (1), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

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* See N. Lenin, *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party* [see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 527-37.—*Ed.*] The letter by the *leader of the Mensheviks* quoted in this pamphlet reads as follows: "... the workers are demanding the system of office by election. That is a clear symptom of the agony of the Stone-Hards". I belong to the Stone-Hards, but this agony satisfies me very well. The workers' demand that offices be elective shows plainly that the new-Iskrists did not succeed in buttering the workers' parsnips with fine words, and that no evasions can now save Axelrod from complete exposure.

A LETTER TO THE ZURICH GROUP OF BOLSHEVIKS

Genève, le 18. I. 1905*

Dear Comrades,

We are unable to call a meeting of the Editorial Board to answer your inquiry, and I therefore take the liberty of answering you myself. The Zurich group of Bolsheviks asks "what our attitude is to the Central Organ and the Central Committee; whether we consider them as existing legitimately but operating illegitimately and are in opposition to them, or whether we refuse to recognise them altogether as Party centres."

It seems to me that your question savours somewhat of casuistry. The announcement of the newspaper *Vperyod*[28] and the first issue ("Time to Call a Halt!"**), together with my *Statement and Documents*,*** would seem to have answered this question *in substance*. The leading centres (the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the Council) *have broken* with the Party, sabotaged the Second and the Third Congresses, duped the Party in the most brazen way, and usurped their snug jobs in a truly Bonapartist manner. How can one speak here of the legitimate existence of the centres? Is a swindler the legitimate owner of the money he has pocketed on a forged note?

It seems strange to me that the Zurich Bolsheviks should still be puzzled, after this question has been thrashed out again and again. That the centres did not want to submit to the Party has been proved conclusively. Then what are we to

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* Geneva, January 18, 1905.—*Ed.*

** See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 527-37.—*Ed.*

do? Convene the Third Congress? They have deceived us on that score, too. One thing remains—to break with the Mensheviks as *completely*, as quickly, and as definitely (openly, publicly) as possible, and to convene our own Third Party Congress, without the consent of the central bodies and without their participation, to begin *immediately* (without waiting for this centre either) to work with our own Party centres, the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, and the Russian Bureau elected by the Northern Conference.

I repeat: the centres *have put themselves o u t s i d e* the Party. There is no middle ground; one is either with the centres or with the Party. It is time to draw the line of demarcation and, unlike the Mensheviks, who are splitting the Party secretly, to accept their challenge openly. Yes, a split, for you have gone the whole hog with your splitting. Yes, a split, for we have exhausted *all* means of delay and of obtaining a *Party* decision (by a Third Congress). Yes, a split, for everywhere the disgusting squabbles with the disorganisers have only harmed the cause. We have received letters from St. Petersburg saying that things have taken a turn for the better since the split, that one can work without squabbles, with people whom one trusts. Is not this perfectly clear? Down with the Bonapartists and the disorganisers!

Let us know whether you are satisfied with this answer.

It is essential that the groups of the Majority abroad close their ranks. Write about the issue immediately to the Berne comrades (Herrn Kazakow, Bäckereiweg, 1. Bern). They are already at it and will answer you better than I can. We must tackle the matter more energetically. Correspond with all the groups, spur them on in regard to money and material, initiate groups in new places, etc.

We likewise have begun to feel much better since we broke decisively with the Minority. We heartily wish you, too, a speedy riddance of them.

I clasp your hand,

Yours,

N. Lenin

P. S. Please give my special personal regards to Meyerson. How is he getting on? Does he feel better?

I am angry at Steiner—tell her it's disgusting; she promised to write about Nikolayev by Christmas, and we're nearly at the end of January!

The Berne group has undertaken to unite the Bolsheviks abroad, under the leadership of the Bureau, of course. Ask the Berne group for their letter to us on this question and the answer of the Geneva group.

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in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to
the manuscript

A LETTER TO Y. D. STASOVA AND TO THE OTHER COMRADES IN PRISON IN MOSCOW

January 19, 1905

Dear Friends,

I have received your inquiry concerning the tactics to be pursued in court (in Absolute's[29] letter and the note "reported verbatim" through an unknown person). Absolute writes of two points of view. The note speaks of three groups; perhaps it has in mind three shades of opinion, which I shall attempt to reconstruct as follows: (1) To refuse to recognise the court and to boycott it outright. (2) To refuse to recognise the court and not to participate in the court proceedings; to employ a lawyer only with the understanding that he speak exclusively about the court's lack of jurisdiction from the point of view of abstract law; in the concluding speech for the defence to make a *profession de foi** and to demand a trial by jury. (3) The same applies to the defendant's last statement. To use the trial as a means of agitation and, for this purpose, to take part in the court proceedings with the aid of legal counsel; to show up the unlawfulness of the trial and even to call witnesses (to prove alibis, etc.).

There is this further question: should you say only that you are a Social-Democrat by conviction, or should you admit that you are a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party?

You write that a pamphlet is needed on this question. I do not think it is advisable to issue a pamphlet straight away

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* Declaration of faith, a programme, the exposition of a world outlook .—*Ed*.

without any experience to go by. Perhaps we shall mention it somehow in the newspaper when the opportunity occurs. Perhaps one of the people in prison will write a short article for the paper (from 5,000 to 8,000 letters)? I think this would be the best way to start the discussion.

I personally have not yet formed a definite opinion and should prefer, before committing myself, to talk it over in detail with comrades who are in prison or have stood trial. To get such a talk started I shall state my own ideas on the subject. Much depends, I think, on *the kind* of trial it will be, viz., whether or not there will be a possibility to utilise it for purposes of agitation. In the first instance, policy No. 1 will not do; in the second, it is appropriate, but only after an open, definite, and energetic protest and statement. However, if there is a chance of taking advantage of the trial for agitational purposes, policy No. 3 is desirable. A speech with a *profession de foi* is generally most desirable, and, I think, very useful, and it could in most cases have an agitational effect. Particularly when the government has begun to utilise the courts, the Social-Democrats should speak out about the Social-Democratic programme and tactics. Some hold that it is not advisable to declare oneself a member of the Party, particularly of any definite organisation; that one should rather declare oneself a Social-Democrat by conviction and limit the statement to that. I think that one's affiliations should be omitted entirely from the speech, i.e., that one should say: For obvious reasons I shall not speak about my affiliations; but I am a Social-Democrat and I shall speak of *o u r* Party. Such a formulation has two advantages: it states directly and specifically that one is not to speak of one's affiliations (viz., whether one belongs to an organisation, and if so, to which, etc.), while at the same time one speaks of *our* Party. This is necessary in order that Social-Democratic speeches in court may become Party speeches and statements, in order that the Party may benefit by this propaganda. In other words, I waive my formal affiliations; I pass them over in silence, I do not speak formally in the name of any organisation whatever, but as a Social-Democrat I speak to the court of *our* Party and ask it to accept my statements as an endeavour to expound precisely the Social-Democratic views that have been set forth in all *our* Social-Democratic

literature, in such-and-such pamphlets, leaflets, and newspapers.

As to lawyers. Lawyers should be kept well in hand and made to toe the line, for there is no telling what dirty tricks this intellectualist scum will be up to. They should be warned in advance: Look here, you confounded rascal, if you permit yourself the slightest impropriety *or political opportunism* (if you speak of socialism as something immature or wrong-headed, or as an infatuation, or if you say that *the Social-Democrats reject the use of force*, speak of their teachings and their movement as peaceful, etc., or anything of the sort), then I, the defendant, will pull you up publicly, right then and there, call you a scoundrel, declare that I reject such a defence, etc. And these threats must be carried out. Only clever lawyers should be engaged; we do not need others. They should be told beforehand: Confine yourselves to criticising and "laying traps" for witnesses and the public prosecutor on the facts of the case, and to nailing trumped-up charges; confine yourselves exclusively to discrediting the Shemyakin-trial[30] features of the proceedings. Even a smart liberal lawyer is extremely prone to mention *or hint* at the peaceful nature of the Social-Democratic movement, at the recognition of its cultural influence even by people like Adolf Wagner, etc. All such attempts should be nipped in the bud. The lawyers, as Bebel, I believe, said, are the most reactionary of people. The cobbler should stick to his last. Be a lawyer only, ridicule the witnesses for the State and the Public Prosecutor; at most, draw a comparison between such a trial and a trial by jury in a free country; but leave the defendant's convictions alone, do not even dare to mention what you think of his convictions and actions. For you, a measly liberal, have so little understanding of these convictions that even in praising them you will not be able to avoid saying something banal. Of course, all this need not be explained to the lawyer *à la* Sobakevich[31]; it can be done mildly, tactfully, discreetly. Still, it is better to be wary of lawyers and not to trust them, *especially* if they say that they are Social-Democrats and Party members (as defined by our Clause 1!)

The question of taking part in the court proceedings, it seems to me, depends on the question of the lawyer. Retaining counsel means participating in the court proceed-

ings. And why not participate in order to show up witnesses and agitate against the court? Of course, one must be very careful not to slip into a tone of unbecoming self-vindication—that goes without saying. It is best to declare immediately, *before* the taking of testimony, in answering the presiding judge's first questions: I am a Social-Democrat, and in my speech to the court I shall explain what that means. In each case, the question whether or not to take part in the court proceedings depends entirely upon the circumstances. Let us assume that you have been proved guilty, that the witnesses are telling the truth, that the entire accusation rests on unassailable documentary evidence. In that case it may be of no use to take part in the court proceedings, and all attention should be centred on the declaration of principles. If, however, the facts are dubious, if the police witnesses are confused and lie, then it is hardly worth while to miss an opportunity of making propaganda by exposing the case as a frame-up. Much depends also on the defendants; if they are very tired, ill, or worn-out, and if there is no one among them with experience in "pleading" and word-tilting, then, perhaps, it would be more expedient to refuse to participate in the court proceedings, to make a statement to that effect, and to concentrate on the declaration of principles, which it is desirable to prepare in advance. At any rate, the speech on the principles, the programme, and the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party, on the working-class movement, on the socialist aims, and on uprising is the most important thing.

In conclusion, I repeat once more: These are my first reflections, which should not be regarded in the least as an attempt to solve the problem. We must wait until experience gives us certain hints. And while accumulating this experience the comrades, in the majority of cases, will have to be guided by a consideration of the concrete circumstances and by their *revolutionary instinct*.

My very best regards to Kurz, Ruben, Bauman, and all the other friends. Cheer up! Things are going well with us now. We are through with the trouble-makers at last. We have done with the tactics of retreat. We are attacking

now. The committees in Russia are also beginning to break with the disorganisers. We have founded a newspaper of our own. We have our own practical centre (the Bureau). Two issues of the paper have appeared and shortly (January 23, 1905, new style) the third will be coming out. We hope to publish it as a weekly. Best of health and good cheer! We shall meet again, I am sure, and carry on the fight under better conditions than amid the squabbling and wrangling we have here, after the manner of the League congresses.

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REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

Geneva, January 10 (23)

The working class, which would seem to have stood aside for a long time from the bourgeois opposition movement, has raised its voice. With incredible speed the broad masses of the workers have caught up with their advanced comrades, the class-conscious Social-Democrats. The workers' movement in St. Petersburg these days has made gigantic strides. Economic demands are giving way to political demands. The strike is turning into a general strike and it has led to an unheard-of colossal demonstration; the prestige of the tsarist name has been ruined for good. The uprising has begun. Force against force. Street fighting is raging, barricades are being thrown up, rifles are crackling, guns are roaring. Rivers of blood are flowing, the civil war for freedom is blazing up. Moscow and the South, the Caucasus and Poland are ready to join the proletariat of St. Petersburg. The slogan of the workers has become: Death or freedom!

Today and tomorrow a great deal will be decided. The situation changes with every hour. The telegraph brings breathtaking news, and all words now seem feeble in comparison with the events we are living through. Everyone must be ready to do his duty as a revolutionary and as a Social-Democrat.

Long live the revolution!

Long live the insurgent proletariat!

Vperyod, No. 3,
January 24 (11), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

WORKING-CLASS AND BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY

The question of the attitude of the Social-Democrats, or working-class democrats, to the bourgeois democrats is an old and yet ever new question. It is old because it has been an issue ever since the inception of Social-Democracy. Its theoretical principles were elucidated in the earliest Marxist literature, in the *Communist Manifesto* and in *Capital*. It is ever new because every step in the development of every capitalist country produces a peculiar, original blending of different shades of bourgeois democracy and different trends within the socialist movement.

In Russia, too, this old question has become particularly new at the present time. To make clear for ourselves how this question should be presented today, we shall begin with a brief excursion into history. The old Russian revolutionary Narodniks[32] held a utopian, semi-anarchist point of view. They considered the peasants in the village communes ready-made socialists. Behind the liberalism of the educated Russian society they clearly perceived the ambitious desires of the Russian bourgeoisie. They repudiated the struggle for political freedom on the grounds that it was a struggle for institutions advantageous to the bourgeoisie. The Narodnaya Volya members[33] made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism. The clear socialist approach to the question was even overshadowed when the waning faith in the socialist nature of our communes began to be renewed with theories in the spirit of V. V.[34] about the non-class, non-bourgeois nature of the Russian democratic intelligentsia. The result was that Narodism, which in the past had positively rejected bourgeois liberalism, began gradually to merge with the latter in a single

liberal-Narodist trend. The bourgeois-democratic nature of the movement among the Russian intellectuals, beginning with the most moderate, the uplift movement, and ending with the most extreme, the revolutionary terrorist movement, became more and more obvious with the rise and development of a proletarian ideology (Social-Democracy) and a mass working-class movement. But the growth of the latter was attended by a split among the Social-Democrats. A revolutionary and an opportunist wing of Social-Democracy became clearly defined, the former representing the proletarian tendencies in our movement, the latter the tendencies of the intelligentsia. Legal Marxism[35] soon proved in fact to be "the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature",[36] and, via Bernsteinian opportunism,[37] ended up in liberalism. On the one hand, the Economists in the Social-Democratic movement were carried away by the semi-anarchist conception of a labour movement pure-and-simple; they regarded socialist support of the bourgeois opposition as a betrayal of the class point of view and declared bourgeois democracy in Russia to be a phantom.* On the other hand, the Economists of another shade, carried away by the selfsame idea of a labour movement pure-and-simple, accused the revolutionary Social-Democrats of ignoring the social struggle against the autocracy which our liberals, Zemstvo men and uplifters wage.**

The old *Iskra* pointed to elements of bourgeois democracy in Russia at a time when many did not yet perceive them. It demanded support for this democratic trend on the part of the proletariat (see *Iskra*, No. 2, on support of the student movement***; No. 8, on the illegal Zemstvo Congress; No. 16, on the liberal Marshals of the Nobility****; No. 18*****, on the ferment within the

* See the *Rabocheye Dyelo* pamphlet *Two Conferences* (p. 32), directed against *Iskra*.

** See "Separate Supplement" to *Rabochaya Mysl*, September 1899.

*** "The Drafting of 183 Students into the Army", *Iskra*, February 1901. See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*

**** "Political Agitation and 'The Class Point of View'", *Iskra*, February 1, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 337-43.—*Ed.*

***** "A Letter to the Zemstvo-ists", *Iskra*, March 10, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 149-57.—*Ed.*

Zemstvo* *et al.*). It constantly stressed the class, bourgeois nature of the liberal and radical movement and said of the vacillating *Osvobozhdeniye* people: "It is high time to understand the simple truth that it is not political chicanery, not what the late Stepnyak** once called self-restriction and self-concealment, not the conventional lie of diplomatic mutual recognition that ensure a genuine (and not merely verbal) joint struggle against the common enemy, but actual participation in the struggle, actual unity in struggle. When the struggle of the German Social-Democrats against the military-police and feudal-clerical reaction really became one with the struggle of any genuine party which relied for support upon a definite class of the people (for instance, the liberal bourgeoisie), then joint action was instituted without any phrase-mongering about mutual recognition" (No. 26).***

This approach to the question on the part of the old *Iskra* brings us directly to the present differences over the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the liberals. These disputes, as we know, began at the Second Congress, which adopted two resolutions representing the points of view of the majority (Plekhanov's resolution) and of the minority (Starover's resolution[38]), respectively. The first resolution accurately defines the class character of liberalism, as a movement of the bourgeoisie, and brings to the fore the task of explaining to the proletariat the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian essence of the main liberal trend (the *Osvobozhdeniye* movement). While recognising the need for the proletariat's support of bourgeois democracy, this resolution does not resort to the politicians' mutual recognition device, but, in the spirit of the old *Iskra*, makes it a question of concerted struggle. "To

PROMARX LE MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* I take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to Starover and Plekhanov, who undertook the very useful job of revealing the authors of the unsigned articles in the old *Iskra*. It is to be hoped that they will complete this work—the material will be highly interesting for an appraisal of the new *Iskra*'s *volte-face* to the standpoint of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

** Stepnyak-Kravchinsky, S. M. (1851-95)—Narodnaya Volya revolutionary; author.—*Ed.*

*** "Political Struggle and Political Chicanery", *Iskra*, October 15, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 258-59.—*Ed.*

the extent that the bourgeoisie *is* revolutionary or merely oppositional *in its struggle* against tsarism", the Social-Democrats "must support" it.

Starover's resolution, on the contrary, does not give a class analysis of liberalism and democracy. It is full of good intentions, it devises terms of agreement that are possibly loftier and better, but unfortunately fictitious, *just words*: the liberals or the democrats must *declare* so-and-so, must not put forward such-and-such *demands*, must adopt such-and-such a *slogan*. As if the history of bourgeois democracy anywhere and everywhere has not warned the workers against putting their trust in declarations, demands, and slogans. As if history has not afforded us hundreds of instances in which bourgeois democrats came forward with slogans demanding, not only full liberty, but also equality, with socialist slogans—without thereby ceasing to be bourgeois democrats—and thus "befogged" the minds of the proletariat all the more. The intellectualist wing of Social-Democracy wants to combat this befogging by setting conditions to the bourgeois democrats that they abstain from befogging. The proletarian wing, in its struggle, resorts to an analysis of the class content of democratism. The intellectualist wing hunts out words for terms of an agreement. The proletarian wing demands actual co-operation in the struggle. The intellectualist wing devises a criterion of a good and kind bourgeoisie, worthy of concluding agreements with. The proletarian wing expects no kindness from the bourgeoisie, but supports any, even the very worst bourgeoisie, *to the extent that it actually fights tsarism*. The intellectualist wing slips into a huckster's standpoint: if you side with the Social-Democrats and not with the Socialists-Revolutionaries, we shall agree upon a pact against the common enemy; otherwise we won't. The proletarian wing maintains the point of view of expediency: the support we shall lend you will be exclusively conditioned on whether it will put us in a better position to aim a blow—greater or lesser—at our enemy.

All the shortcomings of Starover's resolution came to light upon its very first impact with reality. The touchstone was provided by the famous plan of the new *Iskra*'s

Editorial Board, the plan "of a higher type of mobilisation", bearing on the debated questions of principle in No. 77 (the editorial "Democracy at the Parting of the Ways") and No. 78 (Starover's *feuilleton*). The plan was dealt with in Lenin's pamphlet, but the arguments will need to be more closely discussed here.

The main idea (or rather the main confusion of ideas) of the new *Iskra*'s arguments is the differentiation *between* the Zemstvo liberals *and* the bourgeois democrats. This differentiation is the guiding thread that runs through both articles. Incidentally, the attentive reader will observe that in place of the term bourgeois democracy, parallel with it and synonymously, the following terminology is used: democracy, radical intelligentsia (*sic*!), nascent democracy, and intellectualist democracy. This differentiation was hailed by the new *Iskra* with characteristic modesty as a great discovery, an original conception that was "beyond" poor Lenin. The differentiation is linked directly with the new method of struggle of which we have heard so much both from Trotsky and directly from the *Iskra* editors, namely, that Zemstvo liberalism "is fit only to be chastised with scorpions", while intellectualist democracy is suitable for agreements with us. Democracy must act independently, as an independent force. "Russian liberalism, bereft of its historically essential part, its motive nerve [mark that!], its bourgeois-democratic half, is fit only to be chastised with scorpions." In Lenin's conception "of Russian liberalism there was no room for such social elements on which the Social-Democrats, in their role of vanguard of democracy, could at any time [!l exert their influence".

Such is the new theory. Like all new theories of the present *Iskra*, it is a complete muddle. In the first place, the claim to priority in the discovery of intellectualist democracy is unfounded and absurd. Secondly, the differentia ion made *between* Zemstvo liberalism *and* bourgeois democracy is erroneous. Thirdly, the conception that the intelligentsia can become an independent force does not hold water. Fourthly, the assertion that Zemstvo liberalism (without its "bourgeois-democratic" half) is fit only to be chastised, etc., is unjust. Let us examine all these points.

Lenin is supposed to have ignored the birth of intellectualist democracy and the third element.

Let us open *Zarya*,[39] No. 2-3*, and take the "Review of Home Affairs" which is quoted in Starover's feuilleton. We read *the heading of the third section*, "The Third Element". Throughout this section we read about "the increase in the numbers and in the influence of such persons serving in the Zemstvos as doctors, technicians, and so on"; of "the unsubmissive economic development ... which gives rise to the need for intellectuals, who are becoming increasingly numerous"; of "the inevitability of conflicts between these intellectuals and the bureaucrats and administration bigwigs"; of "the outright epidemic character of these conflicts lately"; of "the irreconcilability of autocracy with the interests of the intelligentsia generally". We read a *direct appeal* to these elements to rally "to the banner" of Social-Democracy....

Quite a pretty account, wouldn't one say? The newly discovered intellectualist democracy and the need for rallying it to the banner of Social-Democracy were "discovered" by that mischievous Lenin *three years ago*!

Of course, the antithesis between the Zemstvo men and the bourgeois democrats had not yet been discovered at that time. But contraposing the two would be just as rational as saying, "Moscow Gubernia** *and* the territory of the Russian Empire". Both the Zemstvo people, who believe in qualified suffrage, and the Marshals of the Nobility are *democrats*, to the extent that they oppose autocracy and serfdom. Their democratism is limited, narrow, and inconsistent, just as any and all bourgeois democratism is in one or another degree limited, narrow and inconsistent. The editorial in *Iskra*, No. 77, analyses our liberals by dividing them into the following groups: (1) serf-owning landlords; (2) liberal landlords; (3) the liberal intelligentsia,

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 281-89.—*Ed.*

** *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

which stands for a constitution with qualified suffrage; and (4) the extreme Left—the democratic intelligentsia. This analysis is incomplete and muddled, since the division of the intelligentsia is confounded with those of various classes and groups whose interests are expressed by the intelligentsia. Besides the interests of a broad section of the landlords, Russian bourgeois democratism reflects the interests of the mass of tradesmen and manufacturers, chiefly medium and small, as well as (and this is particularly important) those of the mass of proprietors and petty proprietors among the peasantry. The first flaw in *Iskra*'s analysis is its ignoring of this broadest section of Russia's bourgeois-democratic sphere. The second flaw is its failure to see that the Russian democratic intelligentsia breaks up necessarily, not by accident, into three main trends corresponding to their political stand: the *Osvobozhdeniye*, the Socialist-Revolutionary, and the Social-Democratic. All these trends have a long history, and each expresses (as definitely as is possible in an autocratic state) the point of view of the moderate and the revolutionary ideologists of the bourgeois democrats and the point of view of the proletariat. Nothing could be more amusing than the innocent wish of the new *Iskra* that "the democrats should act as an independent force", while at the same time the democrats are identified with the radical intelligentsia! The new *Iskra* has forgotten that the radical intelligentsia or intellectual democratic movement, which has become "an independent force", is *none other than our* "*Socialist-Revolutionary Party*"! Our democratic intelligentsia could have no other "extreme Left". It stands to reason, however, that one can speak of the independent force of such an intelligentsia only in the ironical or terrorist sense of the word. To stand on the same platform with the bourgeois democrats and move Leftward away from the *Osvobozhdeniye* means to move towards the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and in no other direction.

Finally, still less does the latest discovery of the new *Iskra* stand up to criticism, namely, the discovery that "liberalism without its bourgeois-democratic half" is fit only to be chastised with scorpions, that "it is wiser to scrap the idea of hegemony" if there is no one to turn to except

the Zemstvo people. Liberalism, of whatever kind, merits support by the Social-Democrats only to the extent that it actually opposes the autocracy. It is this support of all the inconsistent (i.e., bourgeois) democrats by the only really consistent democrat (i.e., the proletariat) that makes the idea of hegemony a reality. Only a petty-bourgeois huckster's idea of hegemony can conceive it as a compromise, mutual recognition, a matter of worded terms. From the proletarian point of view hegemony in a war goes to him who fights most energetically, who never misses a chance to strike a blow at the enemy, who always suits the action to the word, who is therefore the ideological leader of the democratic forces, who criticises half-way policies of every kind.* The new *Iskra* is sadly mistaken if it thinks that half-heartedness is a moral and not a politico-economic attribute of bourgeois democracy, if it thinks it possible and necessary to fix such a degree of half-heartedness *up to* which liberalism deserves only the scorpion's lash and *beyond* which it deserves agreements. This simply means "determining in advance the permissible degree of baseness". Indeed, ponder the meaning of these words: to make it the term of an agreement with the opposition groups that they recognise universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot means "to present them with the infallible reagent of our demands, the litmus-paper test of democracy, and to place the whole weight of the proletariat's valuable support on the scale of their political plans" (No. 78). How prettily this is put! And how one feels like saying to the author of these fine words, Starover: My dear friend, Arkady Nikolayevich, your fine words are wasted! Mr. Struve rendered Starover's infallible reagent ineffectual with a single stroke of the pen when he wrote universal suffrage into the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League. And the same Struve has proved to us in deeds on more than one occasion that all these programmes are

* A note for a shrewd new-Iskrist. We shall probably be told that the energetic struggle of the proletariat *without any terms* will result in the theft of the fruits of victory by the bourgeoisie. Our reply to this is the question: what possible guarantee can there be for the fulfilment of the proletariat's terms other than the independent force of the proletariat?

mere scraps of paper as far as the liberals are concerned, not litmus-paper, but ordinary paper, since a bourgeois democrat thinks nothing of writing one thing today and another tomorrow. This is characteristic even of many bourgeois intellectuals who go over to the Social-Democrats. The entire history of European and Russian liberalism provides hundreds of instances wherein word and deed are at variance, which is why Starover's desire to think up infallible paper reagents is so naïve.

This naïve desire leads Starover to the great idea that supporting the anti-tsarist struggle of bourgeois who do not agree to universal suffrage means "bringing to nought the idea of universal suffrage"! Perhaps Starover will write us another pretty* *feuilleton* to prove that by supporting the monarchists in their struggle against the autocracy we are reducing to nought the "idea" of a republic? The trouble is that Starover's thoughts revolve helplessly in a vicious circle of terms, slogans, demands, and declarations, and overlook the only real criterion—the degree of actual participation in the struggle. In practice, this inevitably results in varnishing the radical intelligentsia with whom an "agreement" is declared to be possible. With disdain for Marxism, the intelligentsia is declared to be the "motive nerve" (not the glib servant?) of liberalism. The French and Italian radicals are honoured with the designation of people to whom anti-democratic or anti-proletarian demands are alien, although everyone knows that these radicals have betrayed their platforms and misled the prole-

* Another specimen of our Arkady Nikolayevich's prose: "Anyone who has been following public life in Russia during the last few years could not have failed to note the growing democratic urge towards an untouched-up concept of constitutional liberty stripped of all ideological trappings, of all survivals of the historical past. This urge was, in a way, the realisation of a long process of molecular changes within the democratic trend, of its Ovidian metamorphoses, whose kaleidoscopic variety has held the attention and interest of several successive generations over a period of two decades." A pity, indeed, that this is not true; for the idea of liberty is not stripped but, on the contrary, touched up with the idealism of the latest philosophers of bourgeois democracy (Bulgakov, Berdayev, Novgorodtsev, and others. See "Problems of Idealism" and *The New Way*). A pity, too, that all these kaleidoscopic Ovidian metamorphoses of Starover, Trotsky, and Martov reveal an unadulterated urge for florid phrases.

tariat times out of number, although on the very next page (p. 7) of the same issue of *Iskra* (No. 78) you may read that the monarchists and the republicans in Italy were "at one in the fight against socialism". The resolution of the Saratov intellectuals (the Sanitary Service Society), pressing for participation of representatives of all the people in legislative activities, is declared to be "the real voice [!] of democracy" (No. 77). The practical plan for proletarian participation in the Zemstvo campaign is accompanied by the advice "to enter into some agreement with the representatives of the Left Wing of the oppositional bourgeoisie" (the famous agreement not to create panic fear). In answer to Lenin's question, what had happened to Starover's notorious terms of agreement, the Editorial Board of the new *Iskra* wrote:

> "These terms should always be present in the minds of Party members, and the latter, knowing on what conditions the Party consents to enter into formal political agreements with a democratic party, are morally bound, even in the case of local agreements referred to in the letter, to differentiate strictly between the reliable representatives of the bourgeois opposition—the real democrats, and the liberal milk-skimmers."*

Step leads to step. In addition to Party agreements (the only permissible ones, according to Starover's resolution), local agreements have appeared in various cities. Side by side with formal agreements, moral ones have appeared. It now seems that verbal recognition of "terms" and their "moral" binding force carries with it the title of a "reliable" and "real democrat", although every child understands that hundreds of Zemstvo windbags would make any verbal statements and even give the word of honour of a radical that they are socialists—anything to keep the Social-Democrats quiet.

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* See the second editorial, "A Letter to the Party Organisations", likewise published secretly ("for members of the Party only"), although there is nothing secret about it. It is very instructive to compare this reply of the whole Editorial Board with Plekhanov's "secret" pamphlet, *On Our Tactics Towards the Struggle of the Liberal Bourgeoisie Against Tsarism* (Geneva, 1905. A letter to the Central Committee. For Party members only). We hope to return to both these works.

No, the proletariat will not be drawn into this game of slogans, declarations, and agreements. The proletariat will never forget that bourgeois democrats never make reliable democrats. The proletariat will support the bourgeois democrats, not on the basis of deals to abstain from creating panic fear, not on the basis of belief in their reliability, but when and to the extent that they actually struggle against the autocracy. Such support is necessary in the interests of achieving the independent social-revolutionary aims of the proletariat.

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FROM NARODISM TO MARXISM

ARTICLE ONE

A legal newspaper recently expressed the opinion that this is no time to dwell on the "antagonism" of interests among the different classes opposing the autocracy. This opinion is not new. We have come across it, of course, with reservations of one sort or other, in the columns of *Osvobozhdeniye* and *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*. It is natural that such a point of view should prevail among the representatives of the bourgeois democrats. As far as the Social-Democrats are concerned, there can be no two opinions among them on this question. The combined struggle of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie against the autocracy must not and cannot make the proletariat forget the antagonism of interests between it and the propertied classes. To get a clear idea of this antagonism it is necessary to have a clear idea of the profound differences that exist between the points of view of the different trends. This does not imply, of course, that we should reject temporary agreements with the adherents of other trends, both with the Socialists-Revolutionaries and the liberals, such as the Second Congress of our Party declared permissible for Social-Democrats.

The Social-Democrats consider the Socialists-Revolutionaries to be the representatives of the extreme Left group of our bourgeois democracy. The Socialists-Revolutionaries resent this opinion of them and regard it as a mean attempt to humiliate an opponent and to question his sincerity and good faith. Actually, such an opinion has nothing whatever to do with suspicion; it is merely a Marxist definition of the class origin and the class nature

of the views of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. The more clearly and definitely the Socialists-Revolutionaries state their views, the more they confirm the Marxist characterisation of them. Of great interest in this respect is the draft programme of the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries published in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 46.

This draft is a considerable step forward, not only in relation to clarity of exposition of principles. The progress is to be noted in the content of the principles themselves, the progress from Narodism to Marxism, from democracy to socialism. Our criticism of the Socialists-Revolutionaries has obviously borne fruit; it has compelled them to lay particular stress on their socialist good intentions and the views which they hold in common with Marxism. All the more glaring, on the other hand, are the features of their old, Narodnik, vaguely democratic views. We would remind those who are prone to accuse us of being contradictory (recognising the socialist good intentions of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, while defining their social nature as bourgeois-democratic) that examples of socialism, not only of the petty-bourgeois but of the bourgeois variety, were long ago analysed in the *Communist Manifesto*. The good intentions of being a socialist do not rule out a bourgeois-democratic essence.

A study of the draft reveals three main features of the Socialist-Revolutionary world outlook. First, theoretical emendations of Marxism. Second, the survivals of Narodism in their views of the labouring peasantry and the agrarian question. Third, the same Narodnik survivals in their view of the impending Russian revolution as non-bourgeois in character.

I said *emendations* of Marxism. Precisely. The whole main trend of thought, the whole framework of the programme, points to the victory of Marxism over Narodism. The latter is still alive (kept so with the aid of injections of revisionism of the latest style), but only as partial "corrections" of Marxism. Let us take the main general theoretical emendation, the theory of the favourable and unfavourable relation between the positive and negative sides of capitalism. This emendation, insofar as it is not completely muddled, introduces the old Russian subjectiv-

ism into Marxism. The recognition of the "creative" historical activity of capitalism, which socialises labour and creates "a social force" capable of transforming society, the force of the proletariat, denotes a break with Narodism and a transition to Marxism. The theory of socialism is founded on the objective development of economic forces and of class division. The emendation: "In some branches of industry, especially agriculture, and in entire countries" the relation between the positive and negative sides of capitalism "is becoming [how far they have gone!] less and less favourable". This is a repetition of Hertz and David, of Nik.—on,[40] and of V. V. with his theory of the special "destinies of capitalism in Russia". The backwardness of Russia in general and of Russian agriculture in particular is no longer regarded as the backwardness of *capitalism*, but as a uniqueness justifying backward theories. Alongside the materialist conception of history we get the time-worn view according to which the intelligentsia is capable of choosing more or less favourable paths for the country and of becoming the supraclass judge of capitalism, not the mouthpiece of the class that is begotten by capitalism's destruction of the old forms of life. The fact that capitalist exploitation in Russia takes on particularly repellent forms because of the survival of pre-capitalist relations is overlooked in typical Narodnik fashion.

The Narodnik theory stands revealed still more clearly in the notions on the peasantry. Throughout the draft the following words and phrases are used without discrimination: the toilers, the exploited, the working class, the labouring masses, the class of the exploited, the exploited classes. If the authors stopped to think over the last term ("classes"), which escaped them unguardedly, they would realise that it is the petty bourgeois as well as the proletarians who work and are exploited under capitalism. What has been said of the legal Narodniks can be said of our Socialists-Revolutionaries: to them goes the honour of discovering an unheard-of type of capitalism without a petty bourgeoisie. They speak of the labouring peasantry, but shut their eyes to a fact which has been proved, studied, weighed, described, and pondered, namely, that the

peasant bourgeoisie now definitely predominates among our labouring peasantry, and that the well-to-do peasantry, although entitled to the designation labouring peasantry, cannot get along without hiring farm-hands and already controls the better half of the peasantry's productive forces.

Very odd, indeed, from this point of view, is the goal which the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries has set itself in its minimum programme: "In the interests of socialism and of the struggle against bourgeois-proprietary principles, to make use of the views, traditions, and modes of life of the Russian peasantry, both as toilers in general and as members of the village communes, particularly its conception of the land as being the common property of all the toiling people." This objective seems, at first blush, to be a quite harmless, purely academic repetition of the village-commune utopias long since refuted both by theory and life. In reality, however, we are dealing with a pressing political issue which the Russian revolution promises to solve in the very near future: Who will take advantage of whom? Will the revolutionary intelligentsia, which believes itself to be socialist, utilise the toiler conceptions of the peasantry in the interests of the struggle against bourgeois-proprietary principles? Or will the bourgeois-proprietary and at the same time toiling peasantry utilise the socialist phraseology of the revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia in the interests of the struggle against socialism?

We are of the view that the second perspective will be realised (despite the will and the consciousness of our opponents). We are convinced that it will be realised because it has already nine-tenths been realised. The "bourgeois-proprietary" (and at the same time labouring) peasantry has already made good use of the socialist phrases of the Narodnik, democratic intelligentsia, which harboured illusions of sustaining "the toiler traditions and modes of life" by means of its artels, co-operatives, fodder grass cultivation, ploughs, Zemstvo warehouses, and banks, but which actually promoted the development of capitalism within the village commune. Russian economic history has thus proved what Russian political history will prove tomorrow. The class-conscious proletariat has the duty to

explain to the rural proletarian, without in any way withholding support of the progressive and revolutionary aspirations of the *bourgeois* labouring peasantry, that a struggle against that peasantry is inevitable in the future; it has the duty to explain to him the real aims of socialism, as opposed to the bourgeois-democratic fancies of equalised land tenure. With the bourgeois peasantry, against the survivals of serfdom, against the autocracy, the priests, and the landlords; with the urban proletariat against the bourgeoisie in general and against the bourgeois peasantry in particular—this is the only correct slogan for the rural proletarian, this is the only correct agrarian programme for Russian Social-Democracy at the present moment. It was this programme that our Second Congress adopted. With the peasant bourgeoisie for democracy, with the urban proletariat for socialism—this slogan will have a far stronger appeal to the rural poor than the showy but empty slogans of the Socialist-Revolutionary dabblers in Narodism.

We come now to the third of the above-mentioned main points of the draft. Its authors have by now broken with the view of the consistent Narodniks, who were opposed to political freedom on the grounds that it could only result in turning over power to the bourgeoisie. But the survivals of Narodism stand out very clearly in the part of the draft which characterises the autocracy and the attitude of the various classes towards it. Here too, as always, we see that the very first attempts of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary intelligentsia to clarify its conception of *reality* lead inevitably to the complete exposure of its contradictory and superannuated views. (Let us, therefore, remark, parenthetically, that disputes with the Socialists-Revolutionaries should always be reduced to this very question of their conception of reality, since this question alone clearly reveals the causes of our deep-seated political divergence.)

"The class of big manufacturers and tradesmen, who are more reactionary than anywhere else," we read in the draft, "stands more and more in need of the protection of the autocracy against the proletariat".... This is false; for nowhere in Europe is the indifference of the advanced bourgeoisie towards the autocratic form of rule so evident as

in our country. Discontent with the autocratic regime is growing among the bourgeoisie, regardless of its fear of the proletariat, in part simply because the police, for all its unlimited powers, cannot crush the working-class movement. In speaking of "a class" of *big* manufacturers, the draft confounds the subdivisions and groups within the bourgeoisie with the entire bourgeoisie as a class. The incorrectness is all the more patent in that it is precisely the middle and petty bourgeoisie that the autocracy is least of all capable of satisfying.

"...The landed nobility and the village kulaks stand more and more in need of such support against the labouring masses in the villages...." Indeed? Where, then, does Zemstvo liberalism come from? Whence the attraction for the enterprising muzhik on the part of the uplift (democratic) intelligentsia and vice versa? Or does the kulak have nothing in common with the enterprising muzhik?

"...An irreconcilable and growing antagonism is arising between the existence of autocracy and the whole economic, social-political and cultural development of the country...."

In this they have reduced their own premises *ad absurdum*. Is it possible to conceive of an "irreconcilable antagonism" with the entire economic, as well as other, growth of the country that would not be reflected in the mood of the classes in economic command? It is one or the other: *Either* the autocracy is really incompatible with the economic development of the country; in that case it is incompatible also with the interests of the *entire class* of manufacturers, tradespeople, landlords, and enterprising muzhiks. That this class has been controlling "our" economic development since 1861[41] is probably not unknown even to the Socialists-Revolutionaries (although they were taught the contrary by V. V.). That a government incompatible with the bourgeois class in general can make capital out of the conflicts between the groups and strata of the bourgeoisie, that it can make peace with the protectionists against the free traders, enlist the support of one stratum against another, and keep up these equilibristics for years and decades, is borne out by the whole trend of European history. *Or*, in our country the manufacturers, the landlords, and the peasant bourgeoisie "stand more

and more in need" of the autocracy. In that case we should have to accept the notion that they, the economic lords of the country, even taken as a whole, as a class, do not understand the interests of the country's economic development, that not even the advanced, educated and intelligent representatives and leaders of these classes understand these interests!

But would it not be simpler to accept the idea that it is our Socialists-Revolutionaries who do not understand the situation? We need but see: a little further on, they themselves admit "the existence of a liberal-democratic opposition, which embraces chiefly (in point of class) the intermediate elements of the educated society". But is our educated society not a bourgeois society? Is it not bound by a thousand ties to the tradesmen, manufacturers, landlords, and enterprising muzhiks? Can God have possibly ordained for Russia a capitalism in which the liberal-democratic opposition is not a bourgeois-democratic opposition? Do the Socialists-Revolutionaries know of any precedent in history or can they conceive of any case in which the opposition of the bourgeoisie to the autocratic regime *was not* or *would not* be expressed through the liberal, educated "society"?

The muddle in the draft is the inevitable outcome of confounding Narodism with Marxism. Only Marxism has given a scientifically correct analysis, confirmed more and more by reality, of the relation between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism. We, like the rest of the world, have bourgeois democratism and working-class democratism. With us, as with the rest of the world, the Social-Democrats must expose mercilessly the inevitable illusions of the bourgeois democrats and their ignorance of their own nature. With us, as with the rest of the world, the class-conscious proletariat must support the bourgeois democrats in their opposition to the survivals of serfdom and their struggle against them, against the autocracy, without forgetting for an instant that it is a class by itself, and that it has as its class aim the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

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THE ST. PETERSBURG STRIKE

The strike that began at the Putilov Works on January 3 is developing into one of the most imposing manifestations of the working-class movement. Our information so far is limited to reports in the foreign newspapers and the legal Russian press. But even these sources leave no doubt that the strike has already become a political event of tremendous importance.

The strike started quite spontaneously. It was one of the clashes between labour and capital that are ever recurring. This time the impetus was the dismissal of four workers by the factory management. The workers rose in a high spirit of solidarity and demanded their reinstatement. The movement gained rapidly. The legally functioning Russian Factory and Mill Workers' Society is taking part in it, and the strike is entering its next and higher phase.

This legal workers' society has been an object of special attention on the part of the Zubatovists.[42] And now the Zubatov movement is outgrowing its bounds. Initiated by the police in the interests of the police, in the interests of supporting the autocracy and demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, this movement is turning against the autocracy and is becoming an outbreak of the proletarian class struggle.

The Social-Democrats long ago predicted that *such* would be the inevitable outcome of the Zubatov movement in our country. The legalisation of the working-class movement, they said, would definitely benefit us Social-Democrats. It would draw certain sections of the workers into the movement, especially the backward sections; it would

help to rouse those who would not soon, perhaps ever, be roused by a socialist agitator. And once drawn into the movement and having acquired an interest in their own future, the workers would go further. The legal labour movement would only be a new and broader basis for the Social-Democratic labour movement.*

Without a doubt, this is precisely what happened in St. Petersburg.

The movement owes its rapid expansion to two circumstances: first, the moment was propitious for an economic struggle (the government was in pressing need of the fulfilment of the orders placed by the War Ministry and the Admiralty); secondly, the constitutional movement among the social strata was expanding. Having begun the strike in defence of some dismissed comrades, the workers took the further step of presenting broad economic demands. They demanded an eight-hour day, a minimum wage (one ruble for men and seventy kopeks for women), the abolition of compulsory overtime work (and double pay for overtime), improvement of sanitary conditions and medical aid, etc. The strike began to develop into a general strike.

The foreign papers report under date of Saturday, January 8 (21, new style), that even according to official Russian information 174 mills, factories, and workshops involving 96,000 workers are on strike.

We are witnessing one of the great clashes between the developing proletarian class and its enemies, clashes that will leave their mark for many years to come.

But things did not stop at economic demands. The movement has begun to assume a political character. The local Social-Democrats have attempted (although, it seems, still very feebly) to participate in it. At huge mass meetings of the workers attended by several thousand people political demands have come to be discussed and resolutions in favour of political freedom have been put to the vote. The petition drawn up by the workers, it is reported, comprises three parts.[43] The first sets forth demands of

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* Cf. N. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 86-88. (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 454-56.—*Ed.*)

rights for the people; the second, measures to relieve the people's poverty; the third, measures against the oppression of labour by capital. The first part contains the following demands: inviolability of the person; freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience; compulsory schooling at the expense of the state; participation of elected representatives of the people in the legislature; equality of all before the law; a responsible Cabinet; abolition of the redemption payments[44]; cheap credit; gradual sharing out of the state lands among the people; an income-tax. (If this report is true, it points to an extremely interesting interpretation of the Social-Democratic programme in the minds of the masses or their not very class-conscious leaders.) The correspondent of *The Standard*, an English newspaper, reports that three meetings took place on January 5 (18) (of which one was attended by 4,000 and another by 2,000) and that the following political demands were endorsed: (1) the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly elected by a general vote; (2) an end to the war; (3) full amnesty for political exiles and prisoners; (4) freedom of the press and of conscience; (5) freedom of assembly and the right of association. The foreign press for January 8 (21) reports that preparations are under way for a demonstration to be held on Sunday, January 9 (22), outside the Winter Palace, at which a petition is to be presented "to the tsar himself". Freedom or death, declare the workers. Moscow and Libau are sending workers' delegates to St. Petersburg.

Such is the limited and still unconfirmed information to have reached us to date. Obviously the movement has not yet attained its zenith by far, and we must await further events before we can form a definite opinion of what is occurring. One is struck by the amazingly rapid shift of the movement from the purely economic to the political ground, by the tremendous solidarity and energy displayed by hundreds of thousands of proletarians—and all this, notwithstanding the fact that conscious Social-Democratic influence is lacking or is but slightly evident. The primitive character of the socialist views held by some of the leaders of the movement and the tenacity with which some elements of the working class cling to their naïve faith in

the tsar enhance rather than lessen the significance of the revolutionary instinct now asserting itself among the proletariat. The political protest of the leading oppressed class and its revolutionary energy break through all obstacles, both external, in the form of police bans, and internal, in the form of the ideological immaturity and backwardness of some of the leaders. The work of the Social-Democrats during the last ten years and the lessons of the working-class movement during this period have borne fruit; the ideas of socialism and of the political struggle are streaming through the broadest channels. The proletariat is proving in action that on the political scene in Russia there are not only two forces (autocracy and bourgeois society), as some in their faintness of heart have been ready to believe. It is showing us manifestly superior forms of mobilisation of the revolutionary class forces; this mobilisation, of course, is not to be classed with demonstrations of minor importance in this or that municipal council, but with mass movements, like the Rostov demonstration and the strikes of 1903 in the South. The mobilisation of the revolutionary forces of the proletariat in this new and higher form is bringing us with gigantic strides nearer to the moment when the proletariat will even more decisively and more consciously join battle with the autocracy.

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OUR TARTUFFES

Issue No. 83 of *Iskra*, which we have just received, contains a declaration by the Mensheviks and the Central Committee concerning "the complete cessation of the Minority's organisational separateness". "The Minority," we are assured, "ceases to consider itself *a camp*, and there can be no further question of either boycotting the Central Committee or presenting *ultimatums* to it." This statement comes just a wee bit late! The Party now knows from Lenin's pamphlet (*Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party**) that the "ultimatums" to co-opt Popov, Fisher, and Fomin *have already been enforced*, to be sure, on the quiet, *by deception of the Party*. The ultimatum to sabotage the Third Congress through similar deceptions has also been enforced. The disorganisation of local work is continuing, and the so-called Central Committee has approved the setting-up in St. Petersburg (by the report in *Iskra*) of "*a special organisation*" or group, "in view of the fact that its numerous [?] members are obviously unable to work under the leadership of the local committee".

And so, what the "Majority" said and predicted, beginning with Lenin's "Letter" ("Why I Resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board", December 1903**) and ending with Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*, has now been *wholly and unquestionably* confirmed by events. The actual object of the eighteen months' struggle was the co-optation of four to the Central Organ and three to

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* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 527-37.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, pp. 118-24.—*Ed.*

the Central Committee. For the sake of co-optation the organisation-as-process theory and a heap of differences "on points of principle" were concocted. For the sake of this co-optation our centres have now broken completely with the Party and are breaking with the local committees piecemeal. The correctness of our slogan that "the Majority must break off all relations with the disorganisers" (*Vperyod*, No. 1, "Time to Call a Halt!"*) is now fully confirmed.

Extremely interesting, too, is the following passage from the *Iskra* statement: "The decision of the delegates [of the Minority] was submitted for discussion to all the adherents of the Minority working in the Kiev, Kharkov, Don, Kuban, St. Petersburg, and Odessa committees, the Donets and Crimean leagues, and other Party organisations." Thus, after a furious campaign of *nearly eighteen months*, the circle abroad, with the aid of the Central Organ, the Council, and (since May) the Central Committee, won to its side *only five Russian committees out of the twenty attending the Second Congress*!** Outside the committees, sizable groups considered worthy of being listed in *Iskra* were set up in only two cities, in St. Petersburg and in Odessa. The Kuban Committee, apparently, was only recently knocked together for the sake of an extra pair of votes.

Consequently, *Iskra*, the organ of the Minority, now, in January, confirms the correctness of the analysis of the Party situation which another Menshevik gave in September. It was the agent of the Central Committee, sympathising with the Minority and now co-opted to the C.C., who wrote in September to Glebov,*** a member of the C.C.,

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* See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Of the committees attending the Congress only the Kiev Committee went over from the Majority to the Minority, i.e., at the Congress both its delegates were Bolsheviks, but now in the committee the Mensheviks predominate. In the Nikolayev and Siberian committees, on the contrary, both delegates to the Congress were Mensheviks, but after the Congress these committees sided with the Majority. The Odessa, Don, Ufa, and Moscow committees were divided at the Congress between the Majority and the Minority (one delegate in each). Of these only the Don Committee is now Menshevist.

*** See Note 77.—*Ed.*

that "*in Russia the Minority is powerless*", that it is backed by only *four committees*. It was this powerlessness of the circle abroad that made it engineer the Bonapartist coup in the C.C. and sidetrack, by deceit, the Third Congress.

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THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Geneva, Wednesday, January 25 (12)

Events of the greatest historical importance are developing in Russia. The proletariat has risen against tsarism. The proletariat was driven to revolt by the government. There can hardly be any doubt now that the government deliberately allowed the strike movement to develop and a wide demonstration to be started more or less without hindrance in order to bring matters to a point where military force could be used. Its manoeuvre was successful. Thousands of killed and wounded—such is the toll of Bloody Sunday, January 9, in St. Petersburg. The army defeated unarmed workers, women, and children. The army vanquished the enemy by shooting prostrate workers. "We have taught them a good lesson!" the tsar's henchmen and their European flunkeys from among the conservative bourgeoisie say with consummate cynicism.

Yes, it was a great lesson, one which the Russian proletariat will not forget. The most uneducated, backward sections of the working class, who naïvely trusted the tsar and sincerely wished to put peacefully before "the tsar himself" the petition of a tormented people, were all taught a lesson by the troops led by the tsar or his uncle, the Grand Duke Vladimir.

The working class has received a momentous lesson in civil war; the revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence. The slogan of the heroic St. Petersburg proletariat, "Death or freedom!" is reverberating throughout Russia. Events

are developing with astonishing rapidity. The general strike in St. Petersburg is spreading. All industrial, public, and political activities are paralysed. On Monday, January 10, still more violent clashes occurred between the workers and the military. Contrary to the mendacious government reports, blood is flowing in many parts of the capital. The workers of Kolpino are rising. The proletariat is arming itself and the people. The workers are said to have seized the Sestroretsk Arsenal. They are providing themselves with revolvers, forging their tools into weapons, and procuring bombs for a desperate bid for freedom. The general strike is spreading to the provinces. Ten thousand have already ceased work in Moscow, and a general strike has been called there for tomorrow (Thursday, January 13). An uprising has broken out in Riga. The workers are demonstrating in Lodz, an uprising is being prepared in Warsaw, proletarian demonstrations are taking place in Helsingfors. Unrest is growing among the workers and the strike is spreading in Baku, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Kovno, and Vilna. In Sevastopol, the naval stores and arsenals are ablaze, and the troops refuse to shoot at the mutineers. Strikes in Revel and in Saratov. Workers and reservists clash with the troops in Radom.

The revolution is spreading. The government is beginning to lose its head. From the policy of bloody repression it is attempting to change over to economic concessions and to save itself by throwing a sop to the workers or promising the nine-hour day. But the lesson of Bloody Sunday cannot be forgotten. The demand of the insurgent St. Petersburg workers—the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot—must become the demand of all the striking workers. Immediate overthrow of the government—this was the slogan with which even the St. Petersburg workers who had believed in the tsar answered the massacre of January 9; they answered through their leader, the priest Georgi Gapon, who declared after that bloody day: "We no longer have a tsar. A river of blood divides the tsar from the people. Long live the fight for freedom!"

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! say we. The general strike is rousing and rallying increasing masses

of the working class and the urban poor. The arming of the people is becoming an immediate task of the revolutionary moment.

Only an armed people can be the real bulwark of popular liberty. The sooner the proletariat succeeds in arming, and the longer it holds its fighting positions as striker and revolutionary, the sooner will the army begin to waver; more and more soldiers will at last begin to realise what they are doing and they will join sides with the people against the fiends, against the tyrant, against the murderers of defenceless workers and of their wives and children. No matter what the outcome of the present uprising in St. Petersburg may be, it will, in any case, be the first step to a wider, more conscious, better organised uprising. The government may possibly succeed in putting off the day of reckoning, but the postponement will only make the next step of the revolutionary onset more stupendous. This will only mean that the Social-Democrats will take advantage of this postponement to rally the organised fighters and spread the news about the start made by the St. Petersburg workers. The proletariat will join in the struggle, it will quit mill and factory and will prepare arms for itself. The slogans of the struggle for freedom will be carried more and more widely into the midst of the urban poor and of the millions of peasants. Revolutionary committees will be set up at every factory, in every city district, in every large village. The people in revolt will overthrow all the government institutions of the tsarist autocracy and proclaim the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

The immediate arming of the workers and of all citizens in general, the preparation and organisation of the revolutionary forces for overthrowing the government authorities and institutions—this is the practical basis on which revolutionaries of every variety can and must unite to strike the common blow. The proletariat must always pursue its own independent path, never weakening its connection with the Social-Democratic Party, always bearing in mind its great, ultimate objective, which is to rid mankind of all exploitation. But this independence of the Social-Democratic proletarian party will never cause us to forget the importance of a common revolutionary onset at the

moment of actual revolution. We Social-Democrats can and must act independently of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries and guard the class independence of the proletariat. But we must go hand in hand with them during the uprising, when direct blows are being struck at tsarism, when resistance is offered the troops, when the bastilles of the accursed enemy of the entire Russian people are stormed.

The proletariat of the whole world is now looking eagerly towards the proletariat of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, so valiantly begun by our working class, will be the turning-point in the history of all countries; it will facilitate the task of the workers of all nations, in all states, in all parts of the globe. Let, therefore, every Social-Democrat, every class-conscious worker bear in mind the immense tasks of the broad popular struggle that now rest upon his shoulders. Let him not forget that he represents also the needs and interests of the whole peasantry, of all who toil, of all who are exploited, of the whole people against their enemy. The proletarian heroes of St. Petersburg now stand as an example to all.

Long live the revolution!

Long live the insurgent proletariat!

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REVOLUTIONARY DAYS

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Checked against the manuscript

1

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN RUSSIA?

Revolt or revolution? This is the question that European journalists and reporters have been asking themselves in connection with the events in St. Petersburg, which they are reporting to the whole world and attempting to evaluate. Are they rebels or insurgents—the tens of thousands of proletarians against whom the tsarist army successfully took the field? And the foreign papers, though sooner in a position to view the events with "detachment", with the impartiality of chroniclers, find it difficult to answer the question. They are constantly getting their terms mixed. And small wonder. It is not without reason that a revolution is said to be a successful revolt, and a revolt an unsuccessful revolution. People who witness the beginning of great and momentous events, who can obtain only very incomplete, inexact, and third-hand information of what is taking place, will not, of course, hazard a definite opinion until a timelier moment comes. The bourgeois papers, which continue as of old to speak of revolt, rioting, and disturbances, cannot help seeing the truly national, nay, international, significance of these events. Yet it is this significance which invests events with the character of revolution. And those who have been writing of the last days of the rioting find themselves involuntarily referring to them as the first days of the revolution. A turning-point in Russia's history has been reached. This is not denied even by the most hidebound of European conservatives, however enthusiastic and sentimental they may wax over the mighty, unrestricted power of the all-Russian autocracy. Peace between the autocracy and the people is unthinkable. Revolution is not only in the mouths of a few fearless souls, not only of "nihilists"—as Europe persists in calling the Russian revolutionaries—but of every person capable of taking any interest in world politics.

The Russian working-class movement has risen to a higher level in the last few days. It is developing before our very eyes into a national uprising. Naturally, here in Geneva, so damnably far away, we find it exceedingly difficult to keep pace with events. But so long as we have to linger at such an accursed distance, we must try to keep pace with events, to sum them up, to draw conclusions, to draw from the experience of today's happenings lessons that will be useful tomorrow, in another place, where today "the people are still mute" and where in the near future, in some form or other, a revolutionary conflagration will break out. We must make it the constant job of publicists to write the history of the present day, and to try to write it in such a way that our chronicles will give the greatest possible help to the direct participants in the movement and to the heroic proletarians there, on the scene of action—to write it in such a way as to promote the spread of the movement, the conscious selection of the means, ways, and methods of struggle that, with the least expenditure of effort, will yield the most substantial and permanent results.

In the history of revolutions there come to light contradictions that have ripened for decades and centuries. Life becomes unusually eventful. The masses, which have always stood in the shade and have therefore often been ignored and even despised by superficial observers, enter the political arena as active combatants. These masses are learning in practice, and before the eyes of the world are taking their first tentative steps, feeling their way, defining their objectives, testing themselves and the theories of all their ideologists. These masses are making heroic efforts to rise to the occasion and cope with the gigantic tasks of world significance imposed upon them by history; and however great individual defeats may be, however shattering to us the rivers of blood and the thousands of victims, nothing will ever compare in importance with this direct training that the masses and the classes receive in the course of the revolutionary struggle itself. The history of this struggle is measured in days. And for good reason some foreign newspapers have already started a "diary of the Russian revolution". Let us, too, start one.

2

FATHER GAPON

That Father Gapon is an *agent-provocateur* is a surmise that would seem to be borne out by the fact that he is a member and one of the ringleaders of the Zubatov society. Furthermore, the foreign newspapers, like our own correspondents, note the fact that the police deliberately allowed the strike movement to spread as widely and freely as possible, and that the government generally (and Grand Duke Vladimir in particular) *wanted* to provoke bloody reprisals under conditions most favourable to itself. The English correspondents even point out that the energetic participation of the Zubatovists in the movement could only have been of especial advantage to the government under the circumstances. The revolutionary intelligentsia and the class-conscious proletarians, who would have been the most likely to provide themselves with arms, were bound to keep aloof from the Zubatov movement, to give it a wide berth. The government thus had its hands free to play a winning game. The demonstration, so they reckoned, would be made up of the most peaceful, least organised, and most backward workers; it would be child's play for our soldiery to handle them, and the proletariat would be taught a wholesome lesson; an excellent excuse would be furnished for shooting down anybody and everybody in the streets; at Court the victory of the reactionary (or Grand Ducal) party over the liberals would be complete; the harshest repressions would follow.

Both the English and the conservative German newspapers directly ascribe such a plan of action to the government (or to Vladimir). It is most likely true. The events of the bloody Ninth of January confirm this only too well.

But the existence of such a plan by no means rules out the possibility that Father Gapon was an *unconscious* instrument of this plan. That there is a liberal, reformative movement among certain sections of the young Russian clergy cannot be doubted; this movement has found its spokesmen both at meetings of the religio-philosophic society and in church publications. It has even been given a name of its own -- the "New-Orthodox" movement. We cannot, therefore, flatly dismiss the idea that Father Gapon may be a sincere Christian Socialist and that it was Bloody Sunday which converted him to the truly revolutionary path. We are inclined to support this idea, especially since Gapon's letters written after the massacre of January 9 declaring that "we have no tsar", his call to fight for freedom, etc., are facts that speak for his honesty and sincerity; for it could not possibly be part of the duties of an *agent-provocateur* to agitate so powerfully for the continuation of the uprising.

However that may be, the policy of the Social-Democrats in regard to this new leader was self-evident: to maintain a careful, guarded, sceptical attitude towards this Zubatovist; in any case, to participate vigorously in the initiated strike movement (even though it was initiated by a Zubatovist); to popularise energetically the Social-Democratic views and slogans. As appears from the letters printed above, these have been the tactics followed by our comrades on the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.[45] "Cunning" as the plans of the reactionary Court clique may have been, the realities of the class struggle and of the political protest of the proletarians acting as the vanguard of the whole people have proved infinitely more so. That the plans of the police and the military have worked against the government, that out of the Zubatov movement, which served as a minor cause, there has emerged a great and extensive revolutionary movement embracing all Russia, is an established fact. Despite all police snares and stratagems, the revolutionary energy and the revolutionary instinct of the working class have asserted themselves with irresistible force.

3

THE PLAN OF THE ST. PETERSBURG BATTLE

It seems strange, at first glance, to refer to the peaceful march of unarmed workers to present a petition as a battle. It was a massacre. But the government had looked forward to a battle, and it doubtlessly acted according to a well-laid plan. It considered the defence of St. Petersburg and of the Winter Palace from the military standpoint. It took all necessary military measures. It removed all the civil authorities, and placed the capital with its million and a half population under the complete control of the generals (headed by Grand Duke Vladimir), who were thirsting for the blood of the people.

The government deliberately drove the proletariat to revolt, provoked it, by the massacre of unarmed people, to erect barricades, in order to drown the uprising in a sea of blood. The proletariat will learn from these military lessons afforded by the government. For one thing, it will learn the art of civil war, now that it has started the revolution. Revolution is war. Of all the wars known in history it is the only lawful, rightful, just, and truly great war. This war is not waged in the selfish interests of a handful of rulers and exploiters, like any and all other wars, but in the interests of the masses of the people against the tyrants, in the interests of the toiling and exploited millions upon millions against despotism and violence.

All detached observers now are of one accord in admitting that in Russia this war has been declared and begun. The proletariat will rise again in still greater masses. What is left of the childish faith in the tsar will now vanish as quickly as the St. Petersburg workers changed from

petitioning to barricade fighting. The workers everywhere will arm. What matters it that the police will keep a tenfold greater watch over the arsenals and arms stores and shops? No stringencies, no prohibitions will stop the masses in the cities, once they have come to realise that without arms they can always be shot down by the government on the slightest pretext. Everyone will try his hardest to get himself a gun or at least a revolver, to conceal his fire-arms from the police and be ready to repel any attack of the bloodthirsty servitors of tsarism. Every beginning is difficult, as the saying goes. It was very difficult for the workers to go over to the armed combat. The government has now forced them to it. The first and most difficult step has been taken.

An English correspondent reports a typical conversation among workers in a Moscow street. A group of workers was openly discussing the lessons of the day. "Hatchets?" said one. "No, you can't do anything with a hatchet against a sabre. You can't get at him with a hatchet any more than you can with a knife. No, what we need is revolvers, revolvers at the very least, and better still, guns." Such conversations can be heard now all over Russia. And these conversations after "Vladimir's Day" in St. Petersburg will not remain mere talk.

The military plan of the tsar's uncle, Vladimir, who directed the massacre, was to keep the people from the suburbs, the workers' suburbs, away from the centre of the city. No pains were spared to make the soldiers believe that the workers wanted to demolish the Winter Palace (by means of icons, crosses, and petitions!) and kill the tsar. The strategic task was simply to guard the bridges and the main streets leading to the Palace Square. And the principal scenes of "military operations" were the squares near the bridges (the Troitsky, Samsonievsky, Nikolayevsky, and Palace bridges), as well as the streets leading from the working-class districts to the centre (the Narvskaya Zastava, Schlüsselburg Highway, and Nevsky Prospekt), and, lastly, the Palace Square itself, to which thousands upon thousands of workers penetrated in spite of the massed troops and the resistance they met with. Military operations were, of course, rendered much easier by the fact that everybody

knew perfectly well where the workers were going, that there was but one rallying point and one objective. The valiant generals attacked "successfully" an enemy who had come unarmed and made his destination and purpose known in advance.... It was a dastardly, cold-blooded massacre of defenceless and peaceful people. For a long time to come now the masses will think over and relive in memory and in story all that took place. The sole and inevitable conclusion drawn from these reflections, from the assimilation of "Vladimir's lesson" in the minds of the masses, will be *à la guerre comme à la guerre*. The working-class masses, and, following their lead, the masses of the rural poor, will realise that they are combatants in a war, and then ... then the next battles of our civil war will be fought according to plan, but no longer according to the "plan" of grand dukes and the tsars. The call "To arms!" which sounded among a crowd of workers in Nevsky Prospekt on January 9 cannot die away now without reverberation.

4

SUPPLEMENT TO THE ARTICLE "THE PLAN OF THE ST. PETERSBURG BATTLE"

The plan of the St. Petersburg battle was described by us in *Vperyod*, No. 4.* The English newspapers now give us some details of this plan which are not without interest. The Grand Duke Vladimir appointed General Prince Vasilchikov Commander of the Army in the Field. The entire capital was split up into areas among the officers. The tsar played at war quite seriously, as though confronted by the invasion of an armed foe. During the military operations the General Staff sat round a green-topped table on Vasilyevsky Island, receiving reports from every area commander at half-hour intervals.

For the information of the St. Petersburg workers.

Written later than January 18 (31), 1905

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Published according to the manuscript

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* See pp. 107-09 of this volume.—*Ed.*

5

"OUR FATHER THE TSAR" AND THE BARRICADES

In reviewing the events of Bloody Sunday one is struck by the combination of naïve patriarchal faith in the tsar and the fierce armed street fighting against the tsarist rule. The first day of the Russian revolution brought the old Russia and the new face to face with startling force and showed the death agony of the peasants' age-old faith in "Our Father the Tsar", and the birth of a revolutionary people, the urban proletariat. No wonder the European bourgeois newspapers say that Russia of January 10 is no longer the Russia of January 8. No wonder the cited German Social-Democratic newspaper[46] recalls how seventy years ago the working-class movement started in England, how in 1834 the English workers held street demonstrations to protest against the banning of the trade unions, how in 1838 they drew up the "People's Charter" at monster meetings near Manchester, and how Parson Stephens proclaimed "the right of every man that breathes God's free air and treads upon God's free earth to have his home and hearth". And the same parson called on the assembled workers to take up arms.

Here, in Russia, too, a priest found himself at the head of the movement; one day he appealed for a march with a peaceful petition to the tsar himself, and the next day he issued a call for revolution. "Comrades, Russian workers!" Father Georgi Gapon wrote, after that bloody day, in a letter read at a meeting of liberals. "We no longer have a tsar. Today a river of blood divides him from the Russian people. It is time for the Russian workers to begin the struggle for the people's freedom without him. For today I give you my blessing. Tomorrow I shall be with you. Today I am busy working for our cause."

This is not Father Georgi Gapon speaking. This is the voice of those thousands upon thousands, of those millions upon millions of Russian workers and peasants who until

now could believe naively and blindly in the Tsar Father and seek alleviation of their unbearable lot from Our Father the Tsar "himself", who put the blame for all the atrocities and outrages, the tyranny and plunder, *only* on the officials that were deceiving the tsar. Generation after generation of downtrodden, half-civilised, rustic existence cut off from the world tended to strengthen this faith. Every month of life of the new, urban, industrial, literate Russia has been undermining and destroying this faith. The past decade of the working-class movement has produced thousands of advanced proletarian Social-Democrats who have consciously broken with this faith. It has educated scores of thousands of workers in whom the class instinct, strengthened in the strike movement and fostered by political agitation, has shattered this faith to its foundations. Behind these scores of thousands, however, stood hundreds of thousands, millions, of toiling and exploited people, proletarians and semi-proletarians, suffering every insult and indignity, in whom this faith could still survive. They were not ready for revolt, they could only beg and plead. Their feelings and their mood, their level of knowledge and political experience were expressed by Father Georgi Gapon; herein lies the historic significance of the role played at the beginning of the Russian revolution by a man who, but yesterday unknown, has today become the hero of the hour in St. Petersburg and, as a result, in the entire European press.

It is clear now why the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, whose letters we quoted above, at first treated Gapon, as they could not help doing, with distrust. A man who wore the cassock, who believed in God and acted under the august patronage of Zubatov and the secret police, could not but arouse suspicion. Whether he was sincere or not in rending his cassock and cursing the fact that he belonged to that vile social-estate, the priesthood, which robs and demoralises the people, no one could say with certainty, beyond those who knew him well personally, that is, a mere handful. Only the course of historical events could decide this, only facts, facts, facts. And the facts decided in Gapon's favour.

Will Social-Democracy be able to gain the lead of this

spontaneous movement? our St. Petersburg comrades asked themselves with concern, seeing the swift irresistible growth of the general strike, which is involving unusually broad strata of the proletariat, seeing the magnetism of Gapon's influence on the "backward" masses who were so ignorant that they could be swept off their feet even by an *agent-provocateur*. And the Social-Democrats not only did not encourage any naïve illusions with regard to the possibility of peaceful petitioning but, on the contrary, opposed Gapon in argument, openly and firmly defending all their views and their tactical line. History, which the working-class masses were making without Social-Democracy, has confirmed the correctness of these views and the tactical line. The logic of the proletariat's class position proved stronger than Gapon's mistakes, naïvetés, and illusions. Grand Duke Vladimir, acting on behalf of the tsar and invested with all the power of the tsar, undertook by his executioner's exploit to demonstrate to the working-class masses the very thing that the Social-Democrats have always demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate to them through the printed and spoken word.

The masses of workers and peasants who still retained a vestige of faith in the tsar were not ready for insurrection, we said. After January 9 we have the right to say that now they are ready for insurrection and will rise. By his massacre of unarmed workers "Our Father the Tsar" himself has driven them to the barricades and given them their first lessons in barricade fighting. The lessons of "Our Father the Tsar" will not be lost.

It remains for the Social-Democrats to see to it that the news of the bloody days in St. Petersburg is spread as far and as wide as possible; to rally and organise their forces still better and popularise still more energetically the slogan they have long since advanced: *general armed uprising of the people*.*

* True, our wise new-Iskrists (wise *à la* Martynov) have done their best to confuse, weaken and drag back this slogan (cf. the Editorial, *Iskra*, No. 62, "Are We Preparing the Right Way?"). The new-*Iskra* Martynovism, however, is meeting with a determined rebuff in our Party, especially since the famous plan for an "agreement" with the Zemstvo people on not causing panic fear.

6

THE FIRST STEPS

The fire was sparked off by a quite ordinary clash between labour and capital—a strike at a factory. It is interesting to note, however, that this strike of twelve thousand Putilov workers, which broke out on Monday, January 3, was before everything a strike in the name of proletarian solidarity. It was caused by the dismissal of four workers. "When the demand for their reinstatement was turned down," writes a comrade from St. Petersburg on January 7, "the factory struck work immediately to a man. The strike is fully disciplined. The workers put several men to protect the machines and other property against possible damage by the less class-conscious workers. They then sent a delegation to other factories to communicate to them their demands and to ask them to join the strike." Many thousands of workers began to join the movement. The legal Zubatov workers' society, sponsored by the government in order to demoralise the proletariat by systematic monarchist propaganda, rendered no little service in organising the movement in its early stages and in extending it. What happened was something that the Social-Democrats had long pointed out to the Zubatovists, namely, that the revolutionary instinct of the working class and the spirit of solidarity would prevail over all petty police ruses. The most backward workers would be drawn into the movement by the Zubatovists, and then the tsarist government would itself take care to drive the workers farther; capitalist exploitation itself would turn them away from the peaceable and out-and-out hypocritical Zubatov fold towards revolutionary Social-Democracy. The practice of proletarian life and proletarian struggle would prove superior

to all the "theories" and all the vain efforts of the Zubatov gentry.*

And that is what has happened. One comrade, a worker and member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, gives his impressions as follows in a letter addressed to us under date of January 5.

"I am writing under the fresh impression of a meeting of workers of the Semyannikov Shipyard just held at the Nevskaya Zastava. But first, a word about the feeling among the St. Petersburg workers. As you know, '*Zubatov*' *organisations have lately begun to crop up here, or rather are being revived under the leadership of the priest Gapon. These organisations have grown considerably in number and strength in a very short time. There are now 11 branches of the so-called Russian Factory Workers' Assembly. As was to be expected, the results of these meetings were inevitably the same as in the South.*

"*We can now say with certainty that a sweeping strike movement is starting in St. Petersburg. Almost every day you hear of a new strike at one or another factory. The Putilov Works has been on strike now for two days.* About a fortnight ago the Schau Cotton Mills in the Vyborg Quarter went on strike. The strike lasted about four days. The workers lost it. The strike may break out anew any day. A fighting spirit prevails everywhere, but it could hardly be said to be in favour of the Social-Democratic line. Most of the workers stand for a purely economic struggle and against a political one. However, we may expect and hope that this feeling will change and the workers will realise that without a political struggle they can achieve no economic improvements. Today the Nevsky Shipyard (Semyannikov's) went on strike. The local branch of the Russian Factory Workers' Assembly is trying to lead the strike, but it will not succeed, of course. The Social-Democrats will be the leaders, notwithstanding the fact that they are woefully weak here.

"Leaflets have been issued by the St. Petersburg Committee: two addressed to the Schau Cotton Mills and one to

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* Cf. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 86-88. (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 454-56.—*Ed.*)

the Putilov workers. A meeting of the Nevsky Shipyard workers was held today. It drew about 500 workers. Members of the local branch of the Assembly spoke for the first time. They avoided political demands and put forward chiefly economic demands. Shouts of disapproval were heard in the crowd. At this point Stroyev, of *Russkaya Gazeta*, who is greatly respected among the St. Petersburg workers, came forward and proposed a resolution, which, he said, had been drafted by him and representatives of Social-Democracy. The resolution, though emphasising the antagonism of class interests between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, did this inadequately. Social-Democratic workers spoke after Stroyev and supported the resolution in principle, although stressing its limited character and its inadequacy. This started a commotion; some of those present did not like the speeches of the Social-Democrats and tried to obstruct the meeting. The majority voted against the chairman, who was among the obstructionists, and elected a new chairman, a socialist. The members of the (Zubatov) 'society', however, refused to keep silent and continued to make disturbances. Although the overwhelming majority of the meeting (90 per cent) sided with the socialists, the meeting in the long run broke up without achieving anything and postponed its decision until the next day. One thing can be said at any rate—the Social-Democrats succeeded in turning the mood of the workers in their favour. Tomorrow there is to be a big meeting. There may be two or three thousand people there. An imposing demonstration is to be expected one of these days, something like the July demonstration in the South in 1903. The Franco-Russian Society Works is on strike—about four to five thousand people. They say a strike has started at the Stieglitz Cotton Mills—about five thousand. A strike is expected at the Obukhov Works—five or six thousand."

Comparing this information of a Social-Democrat, a local committee-man (who could only know, of course, what was happening in a small area in St. Petersburg), with the foreign press reports, especially the English, we are led to the conclusion that the latter are distinguished by a high degree of accuracy.

The strike spread from day to day with amazing speed. The workers held numerous meetings and drew up a "charter" of their own—their economic and political demands. Both these demands, despite the Zubatovist leadership, coincided on the whole with the demands of the Social-Democratic Party programme, including the slogan for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The spontaneous growth of this strike, unexampled in point of magnitude, was far, far in advance of the planned participation in the movement on the part of the organised Social-Democrats. But let them speak for themselves.

7

THE EVE OF BLOODY SUNDAY

In our account of the movement's progress we stopped at the point at which, on the initiative of Gapon, the procession of the working-class masses to the Winter Palace to present a "petition" to the tsar for convening a Constituent Assembly was set for Sunday, January 9. By Saturday, the 8th, the strike in St. Petersburg had become a general strike. Even official reports placed the number of strikers at 100-150 thousand. Russia had never yet witnessed such a gigantic outbreak of the class struggle. The whole industrial, business, and public life of the great centre with its population of one and a half million was paralysed. The proletariat showed by deeds that modern civilisation owes its existence to *it* and to *it alone*, that its labour creates wealth and luxury and that upon it rests our whole "culture". The city found itself without newspapers, without lighting, and without water. And the general strike bore a clearly defined political character; it was a direct prelude to the revolutionary events.

An eyewitness thus describes the eve of the historic day in a letter addressed to us:

"Beginning with January 7 the strike in St. Petersburg became a general strike. Not only all the big factories and mills, but many workshops came to a standstill. Today, January 8, not a single newspaper, except for *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*[47] and *Vedomosti S. Peterburgskovo Gradonachalstva*,* has appeared. The leadership of the movement

* *St. Petersburg City Administration News.—Ed.*

is still in the hands of the Zubatovists. We are witnessing an unprecedented scene in St. Petersburg, and the suspense makes one's heart contract with fear as to whether the Social-Democratic organisation will be able to take the movement into its own hands, at least after a while. The situation is extremely grave. Throughout these past days mass meetings of workers are daily taking place in all city districts at the headquarters of the 'Association of Russian Workers'. The surrounding streets are filled with thousands of workers. From time to time the Social-Democrats make speeches and distribute leaflets. They are received on the whole sympathetically, although the Zubatovists try to set up an opposition. When the autocracy is mentioned, the Zubatov people shout: 'We don't care about that, the autocracy doesn't stand in our way!' On the other hand, the speeches which the Zubatovists make at the 'Association' headquarters contain all the Social-Democratic demands, beginning with the eight-hour day and ending with the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Only the Zubatovists assert that the granting of these demands implies, not the overthrow of the autocracy, but the bringing of the people closer to the tsar and the elimination of the bureaucracy, which stands between the tsar and the people.

"The Social-Democrats address meetings, too, in the headquarters of the Association, and their speeches are listened to sympathetically; but the initiative in practical proposals comes from the Zubatovists. Despite the objections of the Social-Democrats, these proposals are adopted. They boil down to the following: on Sunday, January 9, the workers are to go to the Winter Palace and, through the priest Georgi Gapon, hand the tsar a petition listing all the demands of the workers and ending with the words, 'Give us all this or we must die'. Those who direct the meetings add: 'If the tsar refuses, then our hands will be untied; for it means that he is our enemy, and then we will come out against him and unfurl the red banner. If our blood is shed, it will be upon his head.' The petition is being adopted everywhere. The workers swear that they will come out into the square on Sunday 'with their wives

and children'. Today the petition is going to be signed by districts, and at 2 o'clock all are to assemble at the 'People's House' for the final meeting.

"All this is taking place with the full connivance of the police, who have been everywhere withdrawn, although some buildings have mounted gendarmes hidden in the yards.

"Today the streets are placarded with notices from the City Administrator banning meetings and threatening the use of armed force. The workers tear them off. Troops are being drawn up into the city from the environs. The tramway employees (conductors and drivers) have been forced to go to work by Cossacks with drawn sabres."

8

THE NUMBER OF KILLED OR WOUNDED

Reports as to the number of killed or wounded differ. Naturally, there can be no question of an exact count, and a visual estimate is very difficult. The government's report giving 96 killed and 330 wounded is obviously false, and no one believes it. According to the latest press reports, journalists handed the Minister of the Interior a list of *4,600 killed or wounded*, as compiled by reporters. Of course, even this figure *cannot be* complete, since it would be impossible even in the day-time (let alone at night) to count all the killed and wounded in the various clashes.

The victory of the autocracy over the unarmed people took a toll no smaller than did the big battles in Manchuria. No wonder the St. Petersburg workers, according to the reports of foreign correspondents, cried out to the officers that they were more successful at fighting the Russian people than they were the Japanese.

9

THE BATTLES ON THE BARRICADES[48]

As we have seen, most of the correspondents' reports refer to the barricades on Vasilyevsky Island, and partly in Nevsky Prospekt. The official report published on Monday, January 10 (23), reads: "The mob threw up barricades with barbed wire entanglements and red flags on the Schlüsselburg Highway, then at the Narvskaya Zastava, on the Troitsky Bridge, at the Alexandrovsky Gardens, and at the public gardens in Nevsky Prospekt. Stones were thrown and shots fired at the troops from the adjoining houses. The crowd disarmed the police. Schoff's armoury was looted. In the first and second areas of Vasilyevsky Island the mob cut the telegraph-wires and knocked down the telegraph-poles. A police station was smashed up."

A French correspondent telegraphed at 2:50 p.m. on Sunday: "Shooting is continuing. The troops, apparently, have lost their head completely. Crossing the Neva, I saw several signal lights and heard volleys of rifle shots. On Vasilyevsky Island the barricades are illumined with bonfires kindled by the strikers. This was as far as I could get. A sinister bugle sound is the signal to fire; A battalion of soldiers with bayonetted rifles atilt charged a barricade made of piled up sleighs. A real massacre started. The bodies of about a hundred workers were strewn over the scene of battle. Some fifty wounded prisoners were escorted past me. The officer threatened me with his pistol and ordered me to be off."

Correspondents give very few details of the barricade fighting. This is understandable, because they tried to keep more or less at a safe distance from the danger spots.

As for the participants in the barricade fighting, probably only very few survived. There is even a report that the barricades were subjected to artillery fire, but it does not seem to have been confirmed.

Published according to
the manuscript

THE TSARIST PEACE

The foreign press reported that at recent conferences in Tsarskoye Selo (after the victory of January 9), with or without the tsar attending, the question of the desirability of peace with Japan was animatedly discussed. In principle, all who surround the adored monarch stand for peace now. The number of state dignitaries who ten days ago were emphatically for continuing the war has now dwindled considerably, and many of them have now become convinced advocates of peace.

We mention this for the information of the simple Social-Democrats of the so-called Central Organ of our Party, who failed to understand that the phrases about "peace *at any price*", while remaining empty phrases (for no one asked the opinion of the Social-Democrats, and their opinion counted for nought), actually, in the present situation, have merely played into the hands of the frightened adherents of the autocracy. Our new-Iskrists missed the change of mood on the part of the whole European bourgeoisie (which began with sympathy towards Japan and has long since started to shift in favour of Russia through fear of the revolution—cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung* and others). Now they miss the fact that the empty, hackneyed phrases about peace *at any price* are beginning to be utilised also by the St. Petersburg Ugryum-Burcheyevs[49] for their own purpose.

Written January 19 (February 1), 1905

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SPLIT IN THE R.S.D.L.P.[50]

In his letter of February 1, 1905, to the editors of the newspaper *Vperyod* (Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party), the well-known leader of the Swiss Social-Democrats, Hermann Greulich, incidentally expressed his regret at the new split in the ranks of the Russian Social-Democrats and remarked: "*Wer die grössere Schuld an dieser Zersplitterung trägt, das werde ich nicht entscheiden und ich habe den internationalen Entscheid bei der deutschen Parteileitung angeregt*" ("I do not undertake to decide who is more to blame for this split. I have proposed to the leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party that this question be settled through international channels").

The editors of *Vperyod*, together with Comrade Stepanov, representative abroad of the Russian Bureau of Committees of the Majority, answered Greulich in the letter appended below.

Since Comrade Greulich intends to call for an international decision, we are communicating to all friends of *Vperyod* in foreign countries the contents of our letter to him and request them to *translate* it into their respective languages, and to bring it to the notice of the greatest possible number of foreign Social-Democrats.

It is also desirable to translate into foreign languages Lenin's *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party*, as well as: (1) the resolutions of the Northern Conference, (2) the resolutions of the Caucasian Conference; and (3) the resolutions of the Southern Conference.

Please let us know whether this request will be carried out.

THE LETTER TO GREULICH

February 3, 1905

Dear Comrade,

In your letter you touch on the question of which group of our Party (the R.S.D.L.P.) is to blame for the split. You say that you have asked for the opinion of the German Social-Democrats and the International Bureau on this point. In view of this, we feel bound to explain to you how the split occurred. We shall confine ourselves to the *presentation of definitely proved facts* and refrain, as far as possible, from an evaluation of the facts.

Until the end of 1903, our Party was the aggregate of the disconnected local Social-Democratic organisations called *committees*. The Central Committee and the Central Organ elected at the Party's First Congress (in the spring of 1898) were non-existent. They had been suppressed by the police and never been revived. Abroad, a split had occurred between the Union of Russian Social-Democrats (publication—*Rabocheye Dyelo*; hence, *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists) and Plekhanov. *Iskra*, founded in 1900, sided with the latter. In the space of three years, between 1900 and 1903, *Iskra* gained overwhelming influence among the Russian committees. *Iskra* upheld the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy against "Economism" (alias *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism=Russian variety of opportunism).

The lack of unity in the Party was felt keenly by all.

Finally, in August 1903, it became possible, abroad, to assemble the *Second Party Congress*, at which were represented all the Russian committees, the Bund[51] (independent organisation of the Jewish proletariat), and *both* groups abroad—the *Iskra* group and the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group.

All participants in the Congress recognised its validity. The struggle at the Congress was between the Iskrists and the anti-Iskrists (the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and the Bund); in between was the so-called "Marsh". The Iskrists carried the day. They achieved the adoption of the Party programme (*Iskra*'s draft). *Iskra* was recognised as the Central Organ, and its line as the line of the Party. A number of resolutions on tactics were Iskrist in spirit, and the

accepted Rules on organisation (Lenin's draft) were Iskrist. Only with respect to certain details were the Rules marred by the anti-Iskrists with the aid of a minority of the Iskrists. The voting at the Congress was as follows: of the total 51 votes, 33 were *Iskra* (24 Iskrists of the present *Majority* and 9 of the present *Minority*), 10 were "Marsh", and 8 were anti-Iskrists (3 *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and 5 Bundists). Towards the end of the Congress, before the elections, *seven* delegates (2 *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and the 5 Bundists) walked out. (The Bund withdrew from the Party.)

The minority of the Iskrists, supported, because of their mistakes, by all the anti-Iskrists and the "Marsh", became the *minority of the Congress* (24 against 9+10+1, or, 24 against 20). At the election of the central bodies it was decided to choose three persons to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and three to the Central Committee. Out of the six members who constituted the old Editorial Board of *Iskra*—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Lenin, and Martov—there were elected Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov. The intention was that the Central Committee should consist of two elected from the majority and one from the minority.

Martov refused to take his seat on the Editorial Board without the three "excluded" (non-elected) comrades, and the entire minority refused to participate in the election of a Central Committee. No one ever disputed or disputes now the validity of the elections, but after the Congress the Minority refused to work under the leadership of the centres elected by the Congress.

This boycott continued for three months, from the end of August to the end of November 1903. *I s k r a* (*six issues, Nos. 46-51*) *was edited by Plekhanov and Lenin alone.* The Minority formed a secret organisation within the Party (a *fact* now corroborated *in the press* by the Minority followers themselves and denied *by no one* at the present time). The overwhelming majority of the Russian committees (12 of the 14 that had managed to go on record at the time) condemned this disruptive boycott.

But Plekhanov, following the turbulent congress of the League Abroad[52] (=the Party organisation abroad), which took place *in the last days of October* 1903, decided

to give way to the Minority, declaring before the whole Party in the article "What Should Not Be Done" (*Iskra*, No. 52, November 1903) that for the sake of avoiding a split one must at times make concessions even to those who lean in error towards *revisionism* and act as *anarcho-individualists* (the underlined expressions are employed by Plekhanov literally in his article "What Should Not Be Done"). Lenin withdrew from the Editorial Board, not wishing to go against the decisions of the Congress. Plekhanov then co-opted all the four former editors. The Russian committees declared that they would wait and see what line the new *Iskra* would take and whether the Mensheviks had really joined the Editorial Board with peaceful intentions.

Precisely what the Bolsheviks had predicted came to pass. The old-*Iskra* line was not retained, nor was peace brought into the Party by the new, Menshevik Editorial Board. The *Iskra* line veered so sharply towards the old *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism, which had been repudiated by the Second Congress, that *even* Trotsky, a prominent member of the Minority, author of the programmatic pamphlet *Our Political Tasks*, which appeared under the editorship of the new "Iskra", stated literally: "*There is a gulf between the old 'Iskra' and the new 'Iskra'*." We confine ourselves to this declaration, made by one of our opponents, in order not to have to go into lengthy explanations concerning the instability of *Iskra* on questions of principle.

On the other hand, "the secret organisation of the Minority" was not disbanded, but continued its boycott of the Central Committee. This covert split of the Party into an open and a secret organisation was an intolerable hindrance to the work. An overwhelming majority of the Russian committees that took a position on the crisis emphatically condemned both the line of the new *Iskra* and the disorganising behaviour of the Minority. A general clamour was raised on all sides for the immediate summoning of a Third Congress, to find some way out of the intolerable situation.

Under our Party Rules, a special congress may be called only on the demand of organisations commanding in the

aggregate at least one half of the total votes (regular congresses are called, "as far as possible", every two years). *This half had been mustered already.* But here the C.C. played the Majority false by taking advantage of the fact that several of its members belonging to the Majority had been arrested. Under the pretext of "reconciliation", the members of the C.C. who had escaped arrest *made a deal with the secret organisation of the Minority* and declared that the organisation had been dissolved; at the same time, in spite of the written declarations of the C.C. and behind the back of the Party, *three Mensheviks were co-opted into the C.C.* This co-optation took place in November or December 1904. Thus, the Minority was fighting from August 1903 to November 1904, tearing the Party asunder, for the sake of co-opting three persons into the Central Organ and three into the C.C.

The spurious central institutions thus formed met the demand for another congress with silence or abuse.

Then the patience of the Russian committees gave out. They began to call their own private conferences. So far three such conferences have been held: (1) the Conference of the four Caucasian committees; (2) the Conference of three southern committees (Odessa, Nikolayev, and Ekaterinoslav); and (3) the Conference of six northern committees (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, "the North"—i.e., Yaroslavl, Kostroma, and Vladimir—and, lastly, Nizhni-Novgorod). All these conferences declared for the "Majority", decided to support the publicists' group of the Majority (the group consisting of Lenin, Ryadovoi, Orlovsky, Galyorka,[53] Voinov,[54] and others), and elected *their own Bureau.* This Bureau was instructed by the third, viz., the Northern, conference to constitute itself as an *Organising Committee* and to convene a congress of the Russian committees, i.e., the Third Congress of the Party, without regard for the centres abroad that had split from the Party.

This is how things stood on January 1, 1905 (new style). The Bureau of Committees of the Majority has begun its work (conditions in our police-ridden country are such that the convening of the Congress will, of course, be delayed for a few months; the Second Congress was announced in December 1902, but was not convened until August 1903). The

publicists' group of the Majority founded *an organ of the Majority*, the newspaper *Vperyod*, published as a *w e e k l y* since January 4 (N. S.), 1905. To date (February 3, 1905) four numbers have already appeared. The line of *Vperyod* is *the line of the old "Iskra"*. In the name of the old *Iskra*, *Vperyod* resolutely combats the new *Iskra*.

Hence, in actual fact, there are now two Russian Social-Democratic Labour Parties. One has the organ *Iskra*, "officially" called the Central Organ of the Party; it has the C.C., and four committees in Russia *out of twenty* (the other committees in Russia, apart from the twenty represented at the Second Congress, were organised later, and the validity of their confirmation is still in dispute). The other party has the organ *Vperyod*, the Bureau of Russian Committees of the Majority, fourteen committees in Russia (the thirteen above-named committees and the Voronezh Committee, and most likely also the committees of Saratov, the Urals, Tula, and Siberia*).

The *new-Iskrists* have on their side all the opponents of the old *Iskra*, all the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, and a large part of the intelligentsia or the fringe of the Party. The *Vperyod*-ists have on their side all who followed the old *Iskra* from conviction and on principle, as well as a large part of the class-conscious, advanced workers, and of the practical Party functionaries in Russia. Plekhanov, who was a Bolshevik at the Second Party Congress (August 1903) and at the Congress of the League (October 1903), but who has been fighting the "Majority" furiously since November 1903, declared publicly *on September 2, 1904* (this statement has appeared in print) that the forces on both sides were approximately equal.

We Bolsheviks maintain that we have on our side the majority of real Party workers active in Russia. We consider that the main cause of the split and the chief obstacle to unity is the disruptive behaviour of the Minority, which refused to bow to the decisions of the Second Congress and preferred to have a split rather than call the Third Congress.

At the present time the Mensheviks are splitting the local

* At least all the four last-named committees declared for the "Majority" after the Second Party Congress.

organisations everywhere in Russia. In St. Petersburg, for instance, they prevented the Committee from organising a demonstration on November 28 (see *Vperyod*, No. 1*). Now they have broken away in St. Petersburg as a separate group known as the "Group Attached to the Central Committee" and work against the local committee of the Party. Recently they organised in Odessa another such local ("Central Committee") group for fighting the Party Committee. The falsity of their position has made the Menshevik central institutions disorganise the local work of the Party, since these central bodies did not want to accept the decision of the Party committees that had elected them.

The differences in principle between *Vperyod* and new *Iskra* are essentially the same as those between the old *Iskra* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*. We consider these differences important, but, given the opportunity fully to defend our views, the views of the old *Iskra*, we would not consider these differences of themselves to be a bar to working together in one Party.

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Published according to the manuscript

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* See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

TREPOV IN THE SADDLE

Cruel reprisals against all the discontented have become the government's slogan since January 9. On Tuesday, Trepov, one of the most hated servitors of tsarism in the whole of Russia, notorious in Moscow for his brutality, his coarseness, and his participation in the Zubatovist attempts to demoralise the workers, was appointed Governor-General of St. Petersburg with dictatorial powers.

Arrests came thick and fast as from a horn of plenty. The first to be arrested were the members of the liberal delegation, which, late on Saturday evening, had gone to Witte and Svyatopolk-Mirsky to request the government to receive the workers' petition and not to order the troops to fire on the peaceful demonstration. It goes without saying that these requests proved of no avail. Witte referred the delegation to Svyatopolk-Mirsky; the latter refused to receive it. The Deputy-Minister of the Interior, Rydziewski, received the delegation very coldly and declared that it was not the government that had to be persuaded, but the workers, that the government was fully informed of everything that was going on, and that it had already made decisions which no requests could alter. It is interesting that at the meeting of the liberals which appointed this delegation the suggestion had even been made to dissuade the workers from marching to the Winter Palace, upon which a friend of Gapon's who was present at the meeting declared that this would be useless, since the workers' decision was irrevocable. (This information was reported by Mr. Dillon, correspondent of the English *Daily Telegraph*, and subsequently corroborated by other correspondents.)

The members of the delegation—Gessen, Arsenyev, Kareyev, Peshekhonov, Myakotin, Semevsky, Kedrin, Shnitnikov, Ivanchin-Pisarev, and Gorky (who was arrested in Riga and brought to St. Petersburg)—were held in custody on the ridiculous charge that they intended to organise a "provisional government of Russia" on the day after the revolution. Such a charge, of course, is bound to collapse of itself. A number of the arrested men (Arsenyev, Kedrin, and Shnitnikov) have been released. A vigorous campaign in behalf of Gorky has been started in educated bourgeois circles abroad, and a petition to the tsar for his release was signed by many prominent German scientists and writers. These have now been joined by scientists and men of letters in Austria, France, and Italy.

On Friday evening, four members of the staff of the newspaper *Nasha Zhizn* were arrested: Prokopovich and his wife, Khizhnyakov, and Yakovlev (Bogucharsky). Of the staff of the newspaper *Nashi Dni*,[55] Ganeiser was arrested on Saturday morning. The police are trying very hard to intercept the funds sent from abroad for the strikers or for the widows and orphans of those killed in the massacre. People are being arrested *en masse*. The warrant for Bogucharsky's arrest was numbered 53 and for Khizhnyakov 109. On Saturday the offices of both mentioned papers were raided and all manuscripts without exception were confiscated, including detailed accounts of the events of the entire week, accounts written and signed by reliable eyewitnesses who had noted down all they had seen for the edification of future generations. None of this material will ever see the light of day now.

On Wednesday the number of arrests was so considerable that the prisoners had to be placed two and three in a cell. In the case of workers, the new dictator is casting all ceremony aside. Since Thursday they have been rounded up in batches and hustled back to their home towns and villages. There they will, of course, spread the story of the events of January 9 and advocate struggle against the autocracy.

Trepov is falling back on his old Moscow tactics of ensnaring the working-class masses with economic sops.

Employers are conferring with the Minister of Finance to devise various concessions to the workers; there is talk of

the nine-hour day. On Tuesday the Minister of Finance received a delegation of workers, promised economic reforms, and warned against political agitation.

The police are trying their hardest to sow distrust and enmity between the general public and the workers. Wednesday's reports in foreign newspapers state most definitely that the police are trying to terrorise the population of St. Petersburg with lurid accounts of robberies and other atrocious deeds alleged to have been committed by the strikers. Deputy-Minister of the Interior Rydziewski himself assured a visitor on Tuesday that the strikers were out to loot, burn, destroy, and kill. Wherever they have been able, the strikers—at least their class-conscious leaders—have branded this as slander. *The police themselves sent out agents-provocateurs and house janitors to smash windows*, *burn news-stands*, *and loot shops*, in order to terrorise the population. The workers, in fact, behaved so peacefully that they roused the wonder of the foreign press correspondents who had witnessed the horrors of January 9.

The police agents are now busy with a new "workers' organisation". They pick suitable elements from among the workers, supply them with money, set them on students and writers, and praise "the true public-spirited policy of Our Father the Tsar". It is not difficult to find among two or three hundred thousand uneducated workers, crushed in spirit by starvation, a few thousand who will nibble at this bait. These will be "organised", they will be made to curse "the liberal frauds" and to declare loudly that they were fooled last Sunday. Then this scum of the working class will appoint a delegation which will "humbly beseech the tsar to allow them to fall at his feet and repent them of the crimes they committed last Sunday". "According to my information," continues the correspondent, "this is precisely what the police are now engaged in arranging. After they have put the finishing touches to this organisation, His Majesty will most graciously deign to receive the delegation in the Manège, which will be specially prepared for this occasion. He will make a moving speech professing His fatherly concern for the workers and His anxiety that measures be taken to improve their condition."

P. S. These lines were already set up in type when tele-

grams arrived confirming the predictions of the English correspondent. At his residence in Tsarskoye Selo the tsar received a delegation of thirty-four workers hand-picked by the police, and he delivered a speech reeking with official hypocrisy about the government's paternal solicitude and about the forgiveness it held out to the offending workers. Of course, this ghastly farce will not deceive the Russian proletariat. The proletariat will never forget Bloody Sunday. It will yet speak to the tsar in a different strain.

Vperyod, No. 5,
February 7 (January 25), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

ST. PETERSBURG AFTER JANUARY 9

On Monday, January 10, St. Petersburg looked like a city just conquered by an enemy. Cossack patrols kept riding through the streets. Here and there stood excited groups of workers. In the evening many of the streets were plunged in darkness. There was no electricity or gas. The aristocratic houses were guarded by groups of janitors. Blazing newsstands threw a lurid light on knots of people.

In Nevsky Prospekt there were clashes between the people and the military. Shots were again fired at the crowd. Three volleys were fired outside the Anichkov Palace. The police shut the fire-arms shops and removed all weapons to the cellars, taking apparently all possible measures to prevent the workers from arming. The officials in the government offices were particularly alarmed; they feared fires and explosions and fled from St. Petersburg in a panic.

The barricades which the troops had captured on Sunday on Vasilyevsky Island were thrown up again on Monday and were recaptured by the soldiers.

There were no newspapers. The schools were closed. At numerous private meetings the workers discussed the events and measures of resistance. Crowds of sympathisers, especially students, besieged the hospitals.

The workers of Kolpino, twenty to thirty thousand strong, were said to have marched out to Tsarskoye Selo on Tuesday morning with a petition. The garrison of Tsarskoye Selo sent out a regiment of infantry and a field battery to intercept them. A clash occurred within five versts of Kolpino; the troops fired and finally repulsed and scattered the workers at 4 p.m. There were many killed and wounded. The workers twice attacked the Tsarskoye Selo railway,

but were repulsed. The rails were pulled up for a distance of seven versts and no trains ran in the morning.

The government buried the victims of Bloody Vladimir Sunday at night, in secret. The relatives and friends of the slain were deliberately misled, so that no demonstrations would be held at the burials. Corpses were taken to the Preobrazhensky Cemetery by the car-load. In some places the crowd nevertheless attempted, despite all police precautions, to hold demonstrations in honour of the fallen fighters for liberty.

Feeling against the army among the population ran high. The foreign newspapers, on the basis of accounts by eyewitnesses, report that on Tuesday, January 11, the Cossacks stopped a horse tram full of workers in Bolshoi Prospekt. One of the workers had shouted at the Cossacks, "Butchers!" The Cossacks stopped the tram, made all the passengers get out and beat them with the flats of their swords. One of the men was wounded. The tenants of nearby houses opened their windows and shouted at the Cossacks, "Murderers! Bandits!" Thursday's telegrams reported that during this incident a woman passenger was also driven out of the tram by the Cossacks. In her fright she dropped her child, which was trampled to death by the Cossacks' horses (*The Times*). Such victories of our troops over the workers are truly Pyrrhic victories.

Vperyod, No. 5,
February 7 (January 25), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

THE FIRST LESSONS

The first wave of the revolutionary storm is receding. We are on the eve of an inescapable, inevitable second wave. The proletarian movement is spreading wider and has now reached the remotest outlying regions of the country. Unrest and discontent have seized the most diverse sections of society, even the most backward. Commerce and industry are paralysed, schools are closed, and the Zemstvo employees, following the example of the workers, have gone on strike. In the lulls between the mass actions, individual terrorist acts are, as usual, becoming more frequent: the attempt on the life of the Odessa Chief of Police, the assassination in the Caucasus, the assassination of the Senate Procurator in Helsingfors. The government is veering from the policy of the bloody knout to a policy of promises. It tries to fool at least part of the workers with the tsar's farcical reception of a delegation.* It tries to divert public attention with war news, and it orders Kuropatkin to start an offensive on the Hunho. On January 9 the massacre in St. Petersburg took place; the 12th saw the launching of the offensive, from the military point of view absolutely senseless, which ended in another serious defeat of the tsar's generals. The Russians were repulsed with casualties, which even according to the *Novoye Vremya* correspondent amounted to 13,000 men, or about twice as many as the Japanese. There is the same corruption and demoralisation in the handling of military affairs in Manchuria that there is in St. Petersburg. In the foreign press, dispatches confirming and denying Kuropatkin's quarrel with Grippenberg alternate

* See pp. 134-35 of this volume.—*Ed.*

with dispatches confirming and denying the news that the Grand Ducal party is alive to the danger which the war is creating for the autocracy and wants peace as quickly as possible.

Small wonder that under such circumstances even the most sober bourgeois papers of Europe never stop talking of a revolution in Russia. The revolution is growing and maturing with a rapidity unknown before January 9. Whether the next wave will surge up tomorrow, the day after, or months hence, depends on quite a number of unpredictable circumstances. All the more urgent, therefore, is the task of summing up the revolutionary events and drawing from them the lessons that may stand us in good stead much sooner than some are inclined to expect.

To evaluate correctly the revolutionary events we should have to make a general survey of the most recent history of our working-class movement. Nearly twenty years ago, in 1885, the first big workers' strikes took place in the central manufacturing district, at the Morozov Mills and elsewhere. At that time Katkov wrote that the labour question had emerged in Russia. With what astonishing speed the proletariat has developed, passing from economic struggles to political demonstrations, from demonstrations to the revolutionary onset! Let us recall the chief milestones along the road traversed. 1885—widespread strikes, in which an insignificant number of socialists participated, acting entirely individually, not united in any organisations. Public sentiment over the strikes compelled Katkov, that faithful watchdog of the autocracy, to speak, in reference to the trial, about a "one-hundred-and-one gun salute in honour of the labour question which has emerged in Russia". The government made economic concessions. 1891—participation of the St. Petersburg workers in the demonstration at Shelgunov's funeral[56]; political speeches at the St. Petersburg May Day rally. We had here a Social-Democratic demonstration of the advanced workers in the absence of a mass movement. 1896—the St. Petersburg strike involving scores of thousands of workers. A mass movement and the beginnings of street agitation, this time with the participation of an entire Social-Democratic organisation. Small as this almost exclusively student organisation may have been in compar-

ison with our present-day party, its class-conscious, systematic, Social-Democratic intervention and leadership gave this movement tremendous scope and significance, as compared with the Morozov strike. Again the government made economic concessions. A firm basis was achieved for a strike movement throughout Russia. The revolutionary intelligentsia turned Social-Democrat *en masse*. The Social-Democratic Party was founded. 1901—the workers came to the aid of the students. A demonstration movement set in. The proletariat carried its rallying call, "Down with the Autocracy!", into the streets. The radical intelligentsia definitely broke up into three parts—liberal, revolutionary-bourgeois, and Social-Democratic. The participation of revolutionary Social-Democratic organisations in the demonstrations became more and more widespread, active, and direct. 1902—the huge Rostov strike developed into an impressive demonstration. The political movement of the proletariat was no longer an adjunct of the movement of the intellectuals, of the students, but grew directly out of the strike. The participation of organised revolutionary Social-Democrats became still more active. The proletariat won for itself and for the revolutionary Social-Democrats of its committee the right to hold mass meetings in the streets. For the first time the proletariat stood as a class against all other classes and against the tsarist government. 1903—again strikes merged with political demonstrations, but now on a still broader basis. The strikes involved an entire district and more than a hundred thousand workers; in a number of cities political mass meetings were repeatedly held in the course of the strikes. There was a feeling of being on the eve of barricades (the opinion which the local Social-Democrats expressed on the movement in Kiev in 1903[57]). But the eve proved rather protracted, teaching us, as it were, that it takes powerful classes sometimes months and years to gather strength; putting, as it were, the sceptical intellectual adherents of Social-Democracy to the test. And sure enough, the intellectualist wing of our Party, the new-Iskrists or, what amounts to the same thing, the new-*Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, have already begun to seek "higher types" of demonstrations, in the form of agreements between the workers and the Zemstvo people not to create panic fear.

With the lack of principle characteristic of all opportunists, the new-Iskrists have now talked themselves into the preposterous, incredibly preposterous, thesis that in the political arena there are two (!) forces: the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie (see the *Iskra* editors' *second* letter in connection with the Zemstvo campaign). The opportunists of the new *Iskra*, these believers in *carpe diem*, have forgotten that the proletariat constitutes an independent force! Came the year 1905, and January 9 once again showed up all such backsliding types of the intelligentsia brood. The proletarian movement at once rose to a higher plane. The general strike rallied at least a million workers all over Russia. The political demands of the Social-Democrats found their way even to the sections of the working class that still believed in the tsar. The proletariat broke down the framework of the police-sponsored Zubatov movement, and virtually the entire membership of the legal workers' society founded for the purpose of combating the revolution took the path of revolution together with Gapon. Strikes and demonstrations began to develop into an *uprising* before our very eyes. The participation of organised revolutionary Social-Democracy was incomparably more in evidence than in the previous stages of the movement; yet it was still weak, weak in comparison with the overwhelming demand of the active proletarian masses for Social-Democratic leadership.

Altogether, the two movements, strikes and demonstrations, combining in various forms and on various occasions, grew in breadth and in depth, became more and more revolutionary, came ever more closer in practice to the general armed uprising of the people, of which revolutionary Social-Democracy had long spoken. We drew this conclusion from the events of January 9 in Nos. 4* and 5 of *Vperyod*. The St. Petersburg workers drew this conclusion for themselves, forthwith and directly. On January 10 they forced their way into a legal printing office, set up the following leaflet sent to us by the St. Petersburg comrades, printed it in over 10,000 copies, and distributed it throughout St. Petersburg. The text of this remarkable leaflet follows.**

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* See pp. 98-100 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See p. 154 of this volume.—*Ed.*

This appeal needs no comment. The initiative of the revolutionary proletariat found full expression here. The call of the St. Petersburg workers was not answered as quickly as they wished; it will have to be repeated time and again; the attempts to carry it out will more than once result in failure. But the tremendous significance of the fact that the task has been set by the workers themselves is indisputable. The gain made by the revolutionary movement, which has brought about a realisation of the practical urgency of this task and made it an essential issue of every popular movement, is a gain that nothing can now take away from the proletariat.

It is worth dwelling on the history of the idea of insurrection. The new *Iskra* has given us so many nebulous platitudes on this question, beginning with the famous leader in issue No. 62, it has presented us with so many muddled opportunist ideas, entirely worthy of our old acquaintance Martynov, that the precise reproduction of the old formulation of the question is of particular importance. In any case, it is impossible to keep track of all the platitudes and muddled ideas of the new *Iskra*. It is much wiser to have the old *Iskra* more often in mind and enlarge more concretely upon its old constructive slogans.

At the end of Lenin's pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*, on p. 136,* the slogan of a *general armed uprising of the people* was advanced. The following was said on this subject at the very beginning of 1902, that is, three years ago: "Picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this uprising and prepare for it...."**

Written prior to February 1 (14), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to the manuscript

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 515.—*Ed.*
** Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

A LETTER TO A. A. BOGDANOV AND S. I. GUSEV

February 11, 1905

I wired my consent to your changes yesterday, although I emphatically do not agree with what I could gather from your letter. But I am so sick of this procrastination, and your questions seemed such a mockery, that I just gave it up, thinking, if only they did something! If only they gave notice of the Congress, *any kind of notice*, so long as they *gave* it, instead of just talking about it. You will be surprised at my use of the word mockery. But just stop and think: two months ago I sent my draft to *all* members of the Bureau.* Not one of them is interested in it or finds it necessary to discuss it. And now—by wire.... A nice business: we talk of organisation, of centralism, while actually there is such disunity, such amateurism among even the closest comrades in the centre, that one feels like chucking it all in disgust. Just look at the Bundists: they do not prate about centralism, but *every one* of them writes to the centre weekly and contact is thus *actually* maintained. You only have to pick up their *Posledniye Izvestia*** to see this contact. We, however, here are issuing the sixth number of *Vperyod*, yet one of our editors (Rakhmetov) has not written a single line, either about or for *Vperyod*. Our people "talk" of extensive literary connections in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, and of the Majority's young forces, while we here, *two months* after the issuance of the call for collaboration (the announcement of *Vperyod* and a letter in connection with it), have seen or heard nothing from them. The Russian committees

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* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 538-40.—*Ed.*
** *The Latest News*.—*Ed.*

(Caucasus, Nizhni-Novgorod, not to speak of the Volga region or the South) consider the Bureau a "myth", and with perfect justification. We did "hear" from strangers about some sort of alliance between the St. Petersburg Committee of the Majority and a group of Mensheviks, but from our own people not a word. We refuse to believe that Bolsheviks could have taken such an imbecilic, suicidal step. We did "hear" from strangers about a conference of Social-Democrats and the formation of a "bloc", but from our own people *not a word*, although there are rumours that this is a *fait accompli*. Evidently, the members of the Majority are anxious to be imposed upon again.

Our only strength lies in utter frankness, in solidarity, and in determined assault. But people, it seems, have gone soft now that we have a "revolution"! At a time when organisation is needed a hundred times more than ever before they sell out to the disrupters. It is evident from the proposed changes in the draft of the declaration and Congress call (set forth in the letter so vaguely as to be almost unintelligible) that "loyalty" has been put on a pedestal. Papasha* actually uses that word, adding that if the centres are not mentioned, no one will come to the Congress! Well, gentlemen, I can wager that if *t h i s* is the way you are going to act, you will never have a congress and never escape from under the thumb of the Bonapartists of the Central Organ and the Central Committee. To call a congress *against* the central bodies, in which lack of confidence has been expressed, to call this Congress in the name of a *revolutionary* bureau (which, if we are to pay slavish obeisance to the loyal Party Rules, is non-existent and fictitious), and to recognise the *unqualified* right of the nine Bonapartists, the League (ha! ha!), and the Bonapartist creatures (the freshly hatched committees) to attend that Congress, means to make ourselves ridiculous and to lose all right to respect. The centres may and should be invited, but to accord them voting status is, I repeat, madness. The centres, of course, will not come to *our* Congress anyway; but why give them another chance to spit in our faces? Why this hypocrisy, this game of hide-and-seek? It is a positive shame! We bring *the split* into the open,

* See Note 22.—*Ed.*

we call the *Vperyod*-ists to a congress, we want to organise a *Vperyod*-ist party, and we break immediately *any and all* connections with the disorganisers—and yet we are having loyalty dinned into our ears, we are asked to act as though a joint congress of *Iskra* and *Vperyod* were possible. What a farce! The very first day, the very first hour of the Congress (if it does take place) will beyond doubt ring down the curtain on this farce; but until the Congress meets such deceit can do us untold harm.

Really, I sometimes think that nine-tenths of the Bolsheviks are actually formalists. Either we shall rally all who are out to fight into a really iron-strong organisation and with this small but strong party quash that sprawling monster, the new-*Iskra* motley elements, or we shall prove by our conduct that we deserve to go under for being contemptible formalists. How is it that people do not understand that *prior to* the Bureau and *prior to* "*Vperyod*" we did all we could to save loyalty, to save unity, to save the formal, i.e., higher methods of settling the conflict?! But now, *after* the Bureau, *after* "*Vperyod*", the split is a fact. And when the split had become a fact it became evident that *materially we were very much weaker*. We have yet to convert our moral strength into material strength. The Mensheviks have more money, more literature, more transportation facilities, more agents, more "names", and a larger staff of contributors. It would be unpardonable childishness not to see that. And if we do not wish to present to the world the repulsive spectacle of a dried-up and anaemic old maid, proud of her barren moral purity, then we must understand that we need war and a battle organisation. Only after a long battle, and only with the aid of an excellent organisation can we turn our moral strength into material strength.

We need funds. The plan to hold the Congress *in London* is sublimely ridiculous, for it would cost twice as much. We cannot suspend publication of *Vperyod*, which is what a long absence would mean. The Congress must be a simple affair, brief, and small in attendance. This is a congress for the organisation of the battle. Clearly, you are cherishing illusions in this respect.

We need people to work on *Vperyod*. There are not enough of us. If we do not get two or three extra people from Russia

as permanent contributors, there is no sense in continuing to prate about a struggle against *Iskra*. Pamphlets and leaflets are needed, and needed desperately.

We need young forces. I am for shooting on the spot anyone who presumes to say that there are no people to be had. The people in Russia are legion; all we have to do is to recruit young people more widely and boldly, more boldly and widely, and again more widely and again more boldly, *without fearing them*. This is a time of war. The youth—the students, and still more so the young workers—will decide the issue of the whole struggle. Get rid of all the old habits of immobility, of respect for rank, and so on. Form *h u n d r e d s* of circles of *Vperyod*-ists from among the youth and encourage them to work at full blast. Enlarge the Committee *threefold* by accepting young people into it, set up half a dozen or a dozen subcommittees, "co-opt" any and every honest and energetic person. Allow every subcommittee to write and publish leaflets without any red tape (there is no harm if they do make a mistake; we on *Vperyod* will "gently" correct them). We must, with desperate speed, unite all people with revolutionary initiative and set them to work. Do not fear their lack of training, do not tremble at their inexperience and lack of development. In the first place, if you fail to organise them and spur them on to action, they will follow the Mensheviks and the Gapons, and this very inexperience of theirs will cause five times more harm. In the second place, events themselves will teach them *in our spirit*. Events are already teaching everyone precisely in the *Vperyod* spirit.

Only you must be sure to organise, organise, and organise *hundreds* of circles, completely pushing into the background the customary, well-meant committee (hierarchic) stupidities. This is a time of war. Either you create *n e w*, young, fresh, energetic battle organisations everywhere for revolutionary Social-Democratic work of all varieties among all strata, or you will go under, wearing the aureole of "committee" bureaucrats.

I shall write of this in *Vperyod** and speak of it at the Congress. I am writing to you in one more *endeavour* to evoke

* See pp. 211-20 of this volume.—*Ed.*

an exchange of ideas, to call upon you *to bring* a dozen *y o u n g*, *f r e s h* workers' (and other) circles *into direct contact* with the Editorial Board, although ... although between ourselves be it said, I do not cherish the slightest hope that these daring ideas will be fulfilled, unless, perhaps, two months from now you will ask me to wire whether I agree to such-and-such changes in the "plan".... I reply in advance that I agree to everything. Good-bye until the Congress.

Lenin

P.S. You must make it your aim to revolutionise the delivery of *Vperyod* into Russia. Carry on widespread propaganda for subscriptions from St. Petersburg. Let students and especially *workers* subscribe for scores and hundreds of copies to be sent to their own addresses. It is absurd to have fears on this score in times like these. The police can never intercept all the copies. Half the number or a third will arrive, and that amounts to very much. Suggest this idea to *any* youth circle, and it will find hundreds of ways of its own to make connections abroad. Distribute addresses more widely, as widely as possible, for the transmission of letters to *Vperyod*.

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TWO TACTICS

From the very beginning of the mass working-class movement in Russia, i.e., approximately for the past ten years, profound differences have existed among Social-Democrats on questions of tactics. As we know, it was differences of this kind that gave rise, in the late nineties, to the trend of Economism, which led to the split into an opportunist (*Rabocheye Dyelo*) wing and into a revolutionary (old-*Iskra*) wing of the Party. Russian Social-Democratic opportunism, however, differed from that of Western Europe in certain peculiar features. It strikingly reflected the point of view, or rather the absence of any independent point of view, of the intellectualist wing of the Party, which was carried away both by the current catchwords of Bernsteinism and by the forms and immediate results of the pure-and-simple labour movement. This infatuation led to wholesale treachery on the part of the legal Marxists, who went over to liberalism, and to the creation by Social-Democrats of the famous "tactics-as-process" theory, which firmly attached to our opportunists the label of "tail-enders". They trailed helplessly behind events, plunged from one extreme to another, and in all cases reduced the scope of activity of the revolutionary proletariat and its faith in its own strength, all of which was usually done on the pretext of raising the independent activity of the proletariat. Strange, but true. No one talked so much about the independent activity of the workers, and no one did so much by his propaganda to narrow, curtail, and diminish that activity as did the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists.

"Talk less about 'raising the activity of the working masses'," the class-conscious, advanced workers said to their zealous but misguided advisers. "We are far more active than

you think, and we are quite able to support, by open street fighting, even demands that do not promise any 'tangible results' whatever. It is not for you to 'raise' our activity, because activity is precisely the thing you yourselves lack. Bow less in subservience to spontaneity, and think more about raising your own activity, gentlemen!" This is how the attitude of the revolutionary workers towards the opportunist intellectuals had to be characterised. (*What Is To Be Done?*, p. 55.*)

The two steps back which the new *Iskra* took towards *Rabocheye Dyelo* revived this attitude. Once again the columns of *Iskra* pour forth the preachings of tail-ism under cover of the same nauseating vows: Verily, O Lord, I do profess and believe in the independent activity of the proletariat. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that Axelrod, Martynov, Martov, and Lieber (the Bundist) defended at the Congress the right of professors and students to become members of the Party without joining any Party organisation. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that the "organisation-as-process" theory was invented, a theory that justified disorganisation and glorified the anarchism of the intellectuals. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that the no less famous "higher-type-of-demonstration" theory was invented, in the form of an *agreement* between a workers' delegation, which had been passed through the sieve of a three-stage system of elections, *and the Zemstvo men* for a peaceful demonstration that was to create no panic fear. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that the idea of the armed uprising was perverted and vulgarised, debased and confused.

In view of its vast practical importance, we should like to draw the reader's attention to this question. The development of the working-class movement played a cruel joke on the wise men of the new *Iskra*. They circulated a letter in Russia, which, in the name of "the process of the systematic development of the class-consciousness and independent activity of the proletariat", recommended, as a higher type of demonstration, "that the workers' petitions be posted to the

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 417.—*Ed.*

homes of the municipal councillors and a considerable number of copies scattered in the Zemstvo Assembly Hall"; they sent a second letter to Russia, conveying the most sensational discovery that at the present "historical moment the political stage is fully occupied [!] by the conflict between the organised bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy" and that "every [mark well!] revolutionary movement of the lower strata has only one [!] objective meaning, to support the slogans of that one of the two [!!] forces which is interested in breaking down the present regime" (the democratic intelligentsia was declared to be "a force"); hardly had the first letter been circulated and the second letter reached Russia, hardly had the class-conscious workers had time to read these marvellous missives and to have a good laugh at them, when the events of the real struggle of the proletariat promptly swept all this political rubbish of the new-*Iskra* publicists on to the waste heap. The proletariat showed that there is a third *force* (actually, of course, not third, but, in sequence, second and in fighting ability first), which is not merely interested in breaking down the autocratic regime, but is *ready to start on the actual job of breaking it down*. Since the Ninth of January, the working-class movement *has been developing* before our very eyes into the popular uprising.

Let us see how this transition to the uprising was evaluated by the Social-Democrats, who had discussed it in advance as a question of tactics, and how the workers themselves began to settle this question in practice.

Three-years ago the following was said on insurrection as a slogan that defines our immediate, practical tasks: "Picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this uprising and prepare for it. But how? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the purpose of preparing the uprising! Even if we had a Central Committee, it could achieve absolutely nothing by such appointments under present-day Russian conditions. But a network of agents that would form in the course of establishing and distributing the common newspaper would not have to 'sit about and wait' for the call to insurrection, but could carry on such regular activity as would guarantee the highest probability of success in the event of an insurrection. Such activ-

ity would strengthen our connections with the broadest masses of the workers and with all strata that are discontented with the autocracy, which is of such importance for an uprising. Precisely such activity would serve to cultivate the ability to estimate correctly the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to select the proper moment for the uprising. Precisely such activity would train *all* local organisations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate the whole of Russia and to react to these 'incidents' in the most vigorous, uniform, and expedient manner possible; for the uprising is in essence the most vigorous, most uniform, and most expedient 'answer' of the entire people to the government. And lastly, it is precisely such activity that would train all revolutionary organisations throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most secret, contacts with one another, thus creating *real* Party unity; for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan for the uprising and to take the necessary preparatory measures on the eve, measures that must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

"In a word, the 'plan for an all-Russian political newspaper', far from representing the fruits of the labour of armchair workers, infected with dogmatism and bookishness (as it seemed to those who gave but little thought to it), is the most practical plan *for immediate and all-round preparation of the uprising*, *with*, *at the same time*, *no loss of sight for a moment of the pressing day-to-day work*." (*What Is To Be Done?**)

The concluding words, which we have underlined, give a clear answer to the question how the revolutionary Social-Democrats envisaged the work of preparing the uprising. But clear as this answer is, the old tail-ist tactics could not fail to assert themselves on this point also. Quite recently Martynov published a pamphlet entitled *Two Dictatorships*, which has been strongly recommended by the new *Iskra* (No. 84). The author is stirred to the depths of his *Rabocheye Dyelo* soul with indignation at the fact that Lenin could bring himself to speak of "preparing, *timing*, and

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 516.—*Ed.*

carrying out the general armed uprising of the people". The stern Martynov smites the enemy with the statement: "On the basis of historical experience and a scientific analysis of the dynamics of social forces, international Social-Democracy has always recognised that only palace revolutions and pronunciamentos can be *timed* in advance and carried out successfully according to a previously prepared plan, for the very reason that they are not popular revolutions, i.e., revolutions in social relations, but only reshufflings among the ruling cliques. Social-Democracy has always and everywhere recognised that a people's revolution cannot be *timed* in advance, that it is not prepared artificially, but that it comes about of itself."

Perhaps, having read this tirade, the reader will say that obviously Martynov is "anything but" a serious opponent and that it would be absurd to take him seriously. We would quite agree with the reader. We would even say to such a reader that no greater evil on earth could befall us than to have to take all the theories and all the arguments of our new-*Iskra* people seriously. The only trouble is that this nonsense appears also in the editorials of *Iskra* (No. 62). Worse still, there are people in the Party, by no means few, who stuff their heads with this nonsense. And so we have to discuss non-serious matters, just as we have to discuss the "theory" of Rosa Luxemburg, who discovered the "organisation-as-process". We are obliged to explain to Martynov that uprising must not be confused with people's revolution. We have to keep explaining that profound allusions to a revolution in social relations when what is at issue is the practical question of the ways of overthrowing Russian autocracy are worthy only of a Kifa Mokiyevich.[58] This revolution began in Russia with the abolition of serfdom, and it is the backwardness of our political superstructure as compared with the accomplished revolution in social relations that makes the collapse of the superstructure inevitable; an immediate collapse *as the result of a single blow* is quite possible, since "the people's revolution" in Russia has already dealt tsarism a hundred blows, and whether the hundred and first or the hundred and tenth will finish it off is really a matter of conjecture. Only opportunist intellectuals, who try to impute their own philistine ways to the proletarians, can

flaunt their high school knowledge of a "revolution in social relations" at a time when practical ways are being discussed for delivering one of the blows in the second hundred. Only the opportunists of the new *Iskra* can raise hysterical clamours about a sinister "Jacobin" plan, the keynote of which, as we have seen, is all-round mass agitation by means of a political newspaper.

A people's revolution, true, cannot be timed. We cannot but praise Martynov and the writer of the leader in *Iskra*, No. 62, for knowing this truth ("what thought of preparing the uprising can there possibly be in our Party?" asked Martynov's loyal associate, or disciple, in that article, warring on the "utopians"). But if we have really prepared an uprising, and if a popular uprising is realisable by virtue of the revolutions in social relations *that have already taken place*, then it is quite possible to time the uprising. We shall attempt to clarify the point for the new-*Iskra* followers by a simple example. Can the working-class movement be timed? No, it cannot; for that movement is made up of thousands of separate acts arising from a revolution in social relations. Can a strike be timed? It can, despite the fact—just imagine, Comrade Martynov—*despite* the fact that every strike is the result of a revolution in social relations. When can a strike be timed? When the organisation or group calling it has influence among the *masses* of the workers involved and is able correctly to gauge the moment when discontent and resentment among them are mounting. Do you see the point now, Comrade Martynov and Comrade "leader-ist" of *Iskra*, No. 62? If you do, then please take the trouble to compare an uprising with a people's revolution. "A people's revolution cannot be timed in advance." An uprising can be, if those preparing it have influence among the masses and can correctly estimate the situation.

Fortunately, the initiative of the advanced workers happens to be far ahead of the tail-ist philosophy of the new *Iskra*. While the latter is squeezing itself dry for theories to prove that an uprising cannot be timed by those who have prepared for it and have organised the vanguard of the revolutionary class, events show that those who have not prepared may time, indeed, are sometimes compelled to time, an uprising.

Here is a leaflet sent to us by a St. Petersburg comrade. It was set up, printed, and distributed in more that 10,000 copies by the workers themselves, who had seized a legal printing-press in St. Petersburg on January 10.

"Workers of All Countries, Unite!

"*Citizens*! Yesterday you witnessed the brutality of the autocratic government. You saw blood flowing in the streets. You saw hundreds of fighters for the working-class cause lying dead; you saw death, you heard the groans of wounded women and defenceless children. The blood and brains of workers bespattered the roadways that workers' hands had laid. Who directed the troops, the rifles, and the bullets against the workers' breasts?

"The tsar, the grand dukes, the Ministers, the generals, and the scoundrels at Court.

"*They are the murderers! Death to them! To arms*, *comrades*, seize the arsenals, the munitions depots, and armourers' shops. Break down the prison walls, comrades, and release the fighters for freedom. Smash up the gendarme and police stations and all government institutions. Let us overthrow the tsarist government and establish our own. *Long live the revolution!* Long live the Constituent Assembly of People's Representatives!

"*Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*."

The call to insurrection issued by this handful of advanced enterprising workers did not meet with success. Several unsuccessful calls to insurrection, or several unsuccessful "timings" of insurrection would not surprise or discourage us. We leave it to the new *Iskra* to hold forth in this connection on the necessity of a "revolution in social relations" and grandiloquently to condemn the "utopianism" of the workers who exclaimed, "Let us establish our own government!" Only hopeless pedants or muddle-heads would regard this watchword as the central point of such an appeal. What is important for us to note and emphasise is the remarkably bold and practical manner in which the problem now squarely confronting us was posed.

The call of the St. Petersburg workers was not answered and could not have been answered as quickly as they wished. This call will be repeated time and again, and the attempts at an uprising may result in more failures. But the very fact

that the workers themselves have raised this issue is of tremendous significance. The gain which the working-class movement has made in bringing home the practical urgency of this problem and in moving it closer to the forefront of any popular unrest is a gain that nothing can take away from the proletariat.

As much as three years ago the Social-Democrats had on general grounds advanced the slogan of preparing the uprising. The independent activity of the proletariat arrived at the same slogan as a result of the direct lessons taught by the civil war. There are two kinds of independent activity. There is the independent activity of a proletariat possessed of revolutionary initiative, and there is the independent activity of a proletariat that is undeveloped and is held in leading-strings; there is a consciously Social-Democratic independent activity, and there is a Zubatovist independent activity. And there are Social-Democrats who to this day contemplate with reverence the second kind of independent activity, who believe that they can evade a direct reply to the pressing questions of the day by repeating the word "class" over and over again. We need but take No. 84 of *Iskra*. "Why," asks its "leader-ist", bearing down on us with a triumphant air, "why was it not the narrow organisation of professional revolutionaries, but the Workers' Assembly that set this avalanche in motion [January 9]? *Because this Assembly was a really* [mark this!] *broad organisation based on the independent activity of the working-class masses*." If the author of this classical phrase were not an admirer of Martynov, he might have understood that the Assembly rendered a service to the movement of the revolutionary proletariat only when and to the extent that it passed from Zubatovist independent activity to Social-Democratic independent activity (after which it immediately ceased to exist as a legally functioning organisation).

Had the new-Iskrists, or the new-*Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists not been tail-enders, they would have realised that it was the Ninth of January that justified those who had said that "...in the long run the legalisation of the working-class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs" (*What Is To Be Done?**). It was the Ninth of January

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 455.—*Ed.*

that proved again and again the importance of the task formulated in that pamphlet: "...we must prepare reapers, both to cut down the tares of today [paralyse today's corrupting influence of the Zubatov movement] *and to reap the wheat of tomorrow*" (give a revolutionary lead to the movement that has advanced a step with the aid of legalisation). The Simple Simons of the new *Iskra*, however, use the bountiful wheat harvest as a pretext for minimising the importance of a strong organisation of revolutionary reapers. Like the Bundists, they fuss over the catchphrase "independent activity of the workers" as a child with a new toy.

It would be criminal, the new-*Iskra* leader-writer continues, "to attack the revolution in the rear". What this sentence means, God only knows. As to its bearing on the general opportunist complexion of *Iskra*, we shall probably deal with the point on another occasion. Here it will suffice to indicate that this sentence can have but one true political meaning, namely, that the author grovels in the dust before the rear of the revolution and disdainfully turns up his nose at the "narrow" and "Jacobin" van of the revolution.

The more the new *Iskra* displays its Martynovist zeal, the clearer becomes the contrast between the tactics of tailism and the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy. We pointed out in the first issue of *Vperyod** that an uprising must connect itself with one of the spontaneous movements. Consequently, we do not in the least forget the importance of "guarding the rear", to employ a military term. In *Vperyod*, No. 4,** we referred to the correct tactics of the St. Petersburg Committee members, who from the outset directed all their efforts towards supporting and developing the revolutionary elements in the spontaneous movement, while at the same time maintaining an attitude of reserve and distrust towards the shady, Zubatov rear of that movement. We shall conclude now with a piece of advice, which no doubt we shall have to repeat more than once to the new-Iskrists: Do not minimise the tasks of the revolution's vanguard, do not forget our obligation to support this vanguard by our *organised* independent activity. Use fewer

* See p. 28 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See p. 106 of this volume.—*Ed.*

platitudes about the development of the independent activity of the workers—the workers display no end of independent revolutionary activity which you do not notice!—but see to it rather that you do not demoralise undeveloped workers by your own tail-ism.

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FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

A MILITANT AGREEMENT FOR THE UPRISING

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya, No. 58, says: "May the spirit of fighting unity now at long last pervade the ranks of the revolutionary socialist groups, which are torn by fratricidal animosity, and may it revive the consciousness of socialist solidarity which has been so criminally sapped.... Let us spare the revolutionary forces as much as we can and increase their effectiveness by means of a concerted attack!"

We have often had occasion to protest against the tyranny of the phrase among the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and we must do so again. Why these frightful words, gentlemen, about "fratricidal animosity" and so forth? Are they worthy of a revolutionary? Now of all times, when the real fight is on, when blood is flowing—the blood of which *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* speaks in such flamboyant terms, these grotesque exaggerations about "fratricidal animosity" ring falser than ever. Spare the forces, say you? But surely this is done by a united, welded organisation which is at one on questions of principle, and not by lumping together heterogeneous elements. Strength is not spared but wasted by such barren attempts at lumping. To achieve a "fighting unity in deed and not merely in word, we must know clearly, definitely, and *from experience* exactly wherein and to what extent we *can* be united. *Without* this, all talk of fighting unity will be mere words, words, words; *this* knowledge, incidentally, comes from the very controversy, struggle, and animosity of which you speak in such "frightful" terms. Would it really be better if we hushed up the differences that divide vast sections of Russian public opinion and Russian socialist thought? Was it only the "cult of discord" that provoked the bitter struggle between Narodism,

that nebulous ideology of the democratic bourgeoisie woven of socialistic dreams, and Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat? Nonsense, gentlemen; you only make yourselves ridiculous by saying such things, by continuing to regard as an "insult" the Marxist view that Narodism and your "social-revolutionism" are essentially bourgeois-democratic. We shall inevitably argue, differ, and quarrel also in the future revolutionary committees in Russia, but surely we must learn from history. We must not have unexpected, unintelligible, and muddled disputes at a time when action is called for; we must be prepared to argue on fundamental issues, to know the points of departure of each trend, to anticipate possible unity or possible antagonism. The history of revolutionary epochs provides many, all too many, instances of tremendous harm caused by hasty and half-baked experiments in "fighting unity" that sought to lump together the most heterogeneous elements in the committees of the revolutionary people, but managed thereby to achieve *mutual friction and bitter disappointment.*

We want to profit by this lesson of history. Marxism, which to you seems a narrow dogma, is to us the quintessence of this historical lesson and guidance. We see in the *independent*, uncompromisingly Marxist party of the revolutionary proletariat the sole pledge of socialism's victory and the road to victory that is most free from vacillations. We shall never, therefore, not even at the most revolutionary moments, forego the complete independence of the Social-Democratic Party or the complete intransigence of our ideology.

You believe this *rules out* fighting unity? You are mistaken. You can see from the resolution of our Second Congress that we do not renounce agreements for the struggle and in the struggle. In *Vperyod*, No. 4, we stressed the fact that the beginning of the revolution in Russia undoubtedly brings closer the moment when such agreements can be practically implemented.* A joint struggle of the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the revolutionary elements of the democratic movement is inevitable and indispensable in the era of the fall of the autocracy. We think that we should serve

* See pp. 99-100 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the cause of future militant agreements better if, instead of indulging in bitter recriminations, we sanely and coolly weighed the conditions under which they would become possible and the likely limits of their "jurisdiction", if one may use the term. We began this work in *Vperyod*, No. 3, in which we undertook a study of the progress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party from Narodism to Marxism.*

"The masses took to arms themselves," *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* wrote in connection with the Ninth of January. "Sooner or later, without doubt, the question of arming the masses will be decided." "That is when the fusion between terrorism and the mass movement, to which we are striving by word and deed in accordance with the entire spirit of our Party tactics, will be manifested and realised in the most striking manner." (We would remark parenthetically that we would gladly put a question mark after the word "deed"; but let us proceed with the quotation.) "Not so long ago, before our own eyes, these two factors of the movement were separate, and this separateness deprived them of their full force."

What is true is true! Exactly! Intelligentsia terrorism and the mass movement of the working class *were separate, and this separateness deprived them of their full force*. That is precisely what the revolutionary Social-Democrats have been saying all along. For this very reason they have always been opposed to terrorism and to all the vacillations towards terrorism which members of the intellectualist wing of our Party have often displayed.** For this reason precisely the old *Iskra* took a position against terrorism when it wrote in issue No. 48: "The terrorist struggle of the *old type* was the riskiest form of revolutionary struggle, and those who engaged in it had the reputation of being resolute, self-sacrificing people.... Now, however, when demonstrations develop into acts of open resistance to the government, ... the old terrorism ceases to be an exceptionally daring method of struggle.... Heroism has now come out into the open; the

* See pp. 83-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Krichevsky in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. Martov and Zasulich concerning the shot fired by Lekert. The new-Iskrists generally in a leaflet in connection with the assassination of Plehve.[59]

true heroes of our time are now the revolutionaries who lead the popular masses, which are rising against their oppressors.... The terrorism of the great French Revolution ... began on July 14, 1789, with the storming of the Bastille. Its strength was the strength of the revolutionary movement of the people.... *That* terrorism was due, not to disappointment in the strength of the mass movement, but, on the contrary, to unshakable faith in its strength.... The history of *that* terrorism is exceedingly instructive for the Russian revolutionary."*

Yes, a thousand times yes! The history of *that* terrorism is instructive in the extreme. Instructive, too, are the quoted passages from *Iskra*, which refer to an epoch of eighteen months ago. These quotations show us, in their full stature, the ideas which even the Socialists-Revolutionaries, under the influence of the revolutionary lessons, would like to arrive at. They remind us of the importance of *faith* in the mass movement; they remind us of revolutionary tenacity, which comes only from high principles and which alone can safeguard us against the "disappointments" induced by a prolonged *apparent* standstill of the movement. Now, after the Ninth of January, there can be no question, on the face of it, of any "disappointments" in the mass movement. But only on the face of it. We should distinguish between the momentary "attraction" evoked by a striking display of mass heroism and the steadfast, reasoned convictions that link inseparably the entire activity of the Party with the movement of the masses, owing to the paramount importance which is attached to the principle of the class struggle. We should bear in mind that the revolutionary movement, however high its level since the Ninth of January, still has many stages to pass through before our socialist and democratic parties will be reconstructed on a new basis in a free Russia. And through all these stages, through all the vicissitudes of the struggle, we must maintain the ties between Social-Democracy and the class struggle of the prole-

* This article in *Iskra*, written by Plekhanov, dates back to the time when *Iskra* (Nos. 46-51) was edited by Plekhanov and Lenin. Plekhanov had at that time not begun to contemplate the new line of notorious compliance to opportunism.

tariat unbroken, and we must see to it that they are continuously strengthened and made more secure.

It seems to us, therefore, a gross exaggeration for *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* to assert that "the pioneers of the armed struggle were swallowed up in the ranks of the roused masses".... "This is the desirable future rather than the reality of the moment. The assassination of Sergei in Moscow on February 17 (4),[60] which has been reported by telegraph this very day, is obviously an act of terrorism of the old type. The pioneers of the armed struggle have *not yet* been swallowed up in the ranks of the roused masses. Pioneers with bombs evidently lay in wait for Sergei in Moscow while the masses (in St. Petersburg), without pioneers, without arms, without revolutionary officers, and without a revolutionary staff "flung themselves in implacable fury upon bristling bayonets", as this same *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* expresses it. The separateness of which we spoke above *still exists*, and the individual intellectualist terror shows all the more strikingly its inadequacy in face of the growing realisation that "the masses have risen to the stature of individual heroes, that mass heroism has been awakened in them" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 58). The pioneers should submerge among the masses *in actual fact*, that is, exert their selfless energies in real inseparable connection with the insurgent masses, and proceed with them in the literal, not figurative, symbolical, sense of the word. That this is essential can hardly be open to doubt now. That it is possible has been proved by the Ninth of January and by the deep unrest which is still smouldering among the working-class masses. The fact that this is a new, higher, and more difficult task in comparison with the preceding ones cannot and should not stop us from meeting it at once in a practical way.

Fighting unity between the Social-Democratic Party and the revolutionary-democratic party—the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, might be one way of facilitating the solution of this problem. Such unity will be all the more practicable, the sooner the pioneers of the armed struggle are "swallowed up" in the ranks of the insurgent masses, the more firmly the Socialists-Revolutionaries follow the path which they themselves have charted in the words, "May

these beginnings of fusion between revolutionary terrorism and the mass movement grow and strengthen, may the masses act as quickly as possible, armed cap-à-pie with terrorist methods of struggle!" With a view to bringing about speedily such a fighting unity, we take pleasure in publishing the following letter which we have received from Georgi Gapon:

"An Open Letter to the Socialist Parties of Russia.

"The bloody January days in St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia have brought the oppressed working class face to face with the autocratic regime, headed by the blood-thirsty tsar. The great Russian revolution has begun. All to whom the people's freedom is really dear must either win or die. Realising the importance of the present historic moment, considering the present state of affairs, and being above all a revolutionary and a man of action, I call upon all the socialist parties of Russia to enter immediately into an agreement among themselves and to proceed to the armed uprising against tsarism. All the forces of every party should be mobilised. All should have a single technical plan of action. Bombs and dynamite, individual and mass terror—everything that can help the popular uprising. The immediate aim is the overthrow of the autocracy, a provisional revolutionary government which will at once amnesty all fighters for political and religious liberties, at once arm the people and at once convoke a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. To the task, comrades! Onward to the fight! Let us retreat the slogan of the St. Petersburg workers on the Ninth of January—Freedom or Death! Delay and disorder now are a crime against the people, whose interests you are defending. Having given all of myself to the service of the people, from whom I myself am sprung (the son of a peasant), and having thrown in my lot irrevocably with the struggle against the oppressors and exploiters of the working class, I shall naturally be heart and soul with those who will undertake the real business of actually liberating the proletariat and all the toiling masses from the capitalist yoke and political slavery.

"Georgi Gapon."

On our part, we consider it necessary to state our view of this letter as clearly and as definitely as possible. We consider that the "agreement" it proposes is possible, useful, and essential. We welcome the fact that Gapon speaks explicitly of an "agreement", since only through the preservation of complete independence by each separate party on points of principle and organisation can the efforts at a fighting unity of these parties rest on hope. We must be very careful, in making these endeavours, not to spoil things by vainly trying to lump together heterogeneous elements.

We shall inevitably have to *getrennt marschieren* (march separately), but we can *veretnt schlagen* (strike together) more than once and particularly now. It would be desirable, from our point of view, to have this agreement embrace the *revolutionary* as well as the socialist parties, for there is nothing socialistic in the immediate aim of the struggle, and we must not confound or allow anyone ever to confound the immediate democratic aims with our ultimate aims of socialist revolution. It would be desirable, and from our point of view *essential*, for the agreement that, instead of a general call for "*individual* and mass terror", it should be stated openly and definitely that this joint action pursues the aim of a direct and actual *fusion* between terrorism and the uprising of the masses. True, by adding the words "everything that can help the popular uprising", Gapon clearly indicates his desire to make even individual terror subservient to this aim; but this desire, which suggests the idea that we noted in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 58, should be expressed more definitely and embodied in absolutely unequivocal practical decisions. We should like, finally, to point out, regardless of the realisability of the proposed agreement, that Gapon's extra-party stand seems to us to be another negative factor. Obviously, with so rapid a conversion from faith in the tsar and petitioning of the tsar to revolutionary aims, Gapon was not able to evolve for himself immediately a clear revolutionary outlook. This is inevitable, and the faster and broader the revolution develops, the more often will this kind of thing occur. Nevertheless, complete clarity and definiteness in the relations between parties, trends, and shades are absolutely necessary if a temporary agreement among them is to be in any way successful. Clarity and definiteness will be needed at every practical step; they will be the pre-condition for definiteness and the absence of vacillation in the real, *practical* work. The beginning of the revolution in Russia will probably lead to the emergence upon the political arena of many people and perhaps trends representing the view that the slogan "revolution" is, for "men of action", a quite adequate definition of their aims and their methods of operation. Nothing could be more fallacious than this opinion. The extra-party position, which seems higher, or more con-

venient, or more "diplomatic", is in actual fact *more vague*, more obscure, and inevitably fraught with inconsistencies and vacillations in practical activity. In the interests of the revolution our ideal should by no means be that all parties, all trends and shades of opinion fuse in a revolutionary chaos. On the contrary, the growth and spread of the revolutionary movement, its constantly deeper penetration among the various classes and strata of the people, will inevitably give rise (all to the good) to constantly newer trends and shades. Only full clarity and definiteness in their mutual relations and in their attitude towards the position of the revolutionary proletariat can guarantee maximum success for the revolutionary movement. Only full clarity in mutual relations can guarantee the success of an agreement to achieve a common immediate aim.

This immediate aim is *outlined* quite correctly, in our opinion, in Gapon's letter, namely: (1) the overthrow of the autocracy; (2) a provisional revolutionary government; (3) the immediate amnesty to all fighters for political and religious liberties, including, of course, the right to strike, etc.; (4) the immediate arming of the people; and (5) the immediate convocation of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. The immediate translation into life by the revolutionary government of complete equality for all citizens and complete political freedom during elections is, of course, taken for granted by Gapon; but this might have been stated explicitly. It would be advisable also to include in the general policy of the provisional government the establishment everywhere of revolutionary peasant committees for the purpose of supporting the democratic revolution and putting into effect its various measures. The success of the revolution depends largely on the revolutionary activity of the peasantry itself, and the various socialist and revolutionary-democratic parties would probably agree on a slogan such as we have suggested.

It is to be hoped that Gapon, whose evolution from views shared by a politically unconscious people to revolutionary views proceeds from such profound personal experiences, will achieve the clear revolutionary outlook that is essential for a man of politics. It is to be hoped that

his appeal for a militant agreement for the uprising will meet with success, and that the revolutionary proletariat, side by side with the revolutionary democrats, will strike at the autocracy and overthrow it all the more quickly and surely, and with the least sacrifices.

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SHOULD WE ORGANISE THE REVOLUTION?

It happened a long, long time ago, more than a year ago. According to the testimony of the not unknown German Social-Democrat, Parvus, "fundamental differences" had arisen in the Russian Party. It had become the primary political task of the party of the proletariat to combat the extremes of centralism, the idea of "giving orders" to the workers from some obscure Geneva and the over-estimation of the idea of an organisation of agitators, of an organisation of leaders. Such was the deep, firm, and unshakable conviction of the Menshevik Parvus, expressed in his weekly German news-sheet *Aus der Weltpolitik* for November 30, 1903.

It was pointed out at the time to the estimable Parvus (see Lenin's letter to the editors of *Iskra*, December 1903*) that he was the victim of a piece of scandal-mongering, that what he took for fundamental differences were at bottom mere squabbles, and that the shift in the new *Iskra*'s ideas, which was becoming noticeable, was a shift towards opportunism. Parvus fell silent, but his "ideas" on over-estimating the importance of an organisation of leaders were taken up and worked to death by the new-Iskrists.

Fourteen months went by. The disruptive work of the Mensheviks within the Party and the opportunist nature of their propaganda became perfectly clear. January 9, 1905, fully revealed the vast reserve of revolutionary energy possessed by the proletariat, as well as the utter inadequacy of Social-Democratic organisation. Parvus came to his senses. He wrote an article in *Iskra*, No. 85, which, in fact, was a *volte-face* from the new ideas of the opportunist

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 121-22.—*Ed.*

new *Iskra* to the ideas of the revolutionary old *Iskra*. "There was a hero," Parvus exclaims, referring to Gapon, "but no political leader, no programme of action, no organisation.... The lack of organisation produced tragic results.... The masses are disunited, everything is without plan, there is no coalescing centre, no guiding programme of action.... The movement has declined for lack of a coalescing and guiding organisation." And Parvus proposes the slogan which we suggested in issue No. 6 of *Vperyod*—"*Organise the Revolution!*"* The lessons of the revolution have convinced Parvus that "under present political conditions we cannot organise the hundreds of thousands" (the reference is to the masses ready for revolt). "But," he says, repeating with good reason an idea expressed long ago in *What Is To Be Done?*, "we can create an organisation that would serve as a combining ferment, and, at the moment of revolution, rally the hundreds of thousands to its side. We must organise workers' circles which shall have a clearly defined task, namely, to prepare the masses for the uprising, to rally them to our side at the time of the uprising, and to launch the uprising when the slogan is issued."

At last! we exclaimed with relief, when we came across these old truths buried amid the rubbish of the new *Iskra*. At last the revolutionary instinct of a functionary of the proletarian party has prevailed, if only temporarily, over *Rabocheye Dyelo* opportunism. At last we hear the voice of a Social-Democrat who does not cringe before the revolution's rearguard but fearlessly points to the need for supporting the van of the revolution.

The new-Iskrists, of course, could not agree with Parvus. "We do not share all the views expressed by Comrade Parvus," says the editors' note.

We should say not! Catch them "sharing" views which hit out at all the opportunist nonsense they have been spewing for the last eighteen months!

"Organise the Revolution!" But have we not our wise Comrade Martynov, who knows that a revolution is caused by a complete change in social relations, that a revolution cannot be timed? Martynov will point out to Parvus

* See pp. 148-57 of this volume.—*Ed.*

his mistake and prove that even if the latter had in mind the organisation of the vanguard of the revolution, it is nevertheless a "narrow" and noxious "Jacobin" idea. Besides, our wise Martynov has a Tryapichkin[61] on a string in the shape of Martov, who is capable of rendering his teacher more profound and who can well substitute the slogan "*Unleash* the Revolution!" for the slogan "Organise the Revolution!" (see No. 85; the author's italics).

Yes, dear reader, this is the slogan we are given in *Iskra*'s leading article. These days, apparently, it is enough to "unleash" one's tongue for a free chatter-process, or for the process of chatter, in order to be able to write leading articles. The opportunist invariably requires slogans that, on closer scrutiny, are found to be nothing but high-sounding phrases, nothing but decadent word-jugglery.

"Organise, and again organise!" Parvus urges, for all the world as if he had turned Bolshevik. He does not understand, poor fellow, that organisation is a *process* (*Iskra*, No. 85, as well as all the previous numbers of the new *Iskra*, particularly the magnificent *feuilletons* of the magnificent Rosa). He does not know, poor devil, that according to the whole spirit of dialectical materialism, tactics are as much a process as organisation is. Like a "conspirator" he runs about with his organisation-as-plan. Like a "utopian", he imagines that one can simply up and organise the thing offhand at some, God forbid, Second or Third Congress.

The "Jacobin" Pillars of Hercules this Parvus talks himself up to! "To launch the uprising when the slogan is issued"—imagine that! It is even worse than the idea of "timing" the uprising, which has been exploded by our redoubtable Martynov. Really, Parvus ought to take a lesson or two from Martynov. He should read *Iskra*, No. 62; the leading article will tell him of the harmful "*utopian*" ideas about preparing the insurrection, which were spread so prematurely in our Party in 1902 and 1904. He should read Axelrod's foreword to "A Worker's" pamphlet to learn what "a deep-seated, harmful canker [*sic*!], downright destructive to the Party", Social-Democracy is threatened with on the part of people who "pin all their hopes on spontaneous revolts of the most backward, least class-conscious, and positively uncivilised [!] elements of the masses".

Parvus admits that it is impossible at present to organise the hundreds of thousands, and he considers it our primary task "to create an organisation that would serve as a combining ferment". How can the new-Iskrists help squirming when such things appear in the columns of their paper? Obviously, an organisation that will serve as a combining ferment is simply an organisation of professional revolutionaries, at the mere mention of which our new-Iskrists go off into a swoon.

We are grateful indeed to *Iskra* for its leading article, which it has printed alongside Parvus's. How marked is the contrast between this empty, muddled phrase-mongering of the tail-ender and the clear, distinct, forthright, and bold revolutionary slogans of the old *Iskra*. Is it not sheer bombast to say that "the policy of confidence is quitting the stage *never again* to fool Russia or Europe"? As a matter of fact, any issue of a European bourgeois newspaper shows that this fooling is still being carried on with success. "Moderate Russian liberalism has been dealt its death-blow." It is childish political naïveté to believe liberalism dead when it is merely trying to be "politic" and to lie low. Liberalism is very much alive, it has taken on a new lease of life. Indeed, it is now on the threshold of power. The reason it is lying low is that it wants to make its bid for power at the right moment with the greatest certainty of success and the least risk. For this reason it is so assiduously making up to the working class. One must be hopelessly short-sighted to take this flirtation (a hundred times more dangerous for being practised at the moment) seriously and to declare boastfully that "the proletariat—the liberator of the country, the proletariat—the vanguard of the whole nation, has now had its *heroic role recognised* by the public opinion of the progressive elements of the liberal-democratic bourgeoisie." Gentlemen of the new *Iskra*, when will you understand that the liberal bourgeoisie acknowledges the proletariat as hero *for the very reason* that this proletariat, though dealing a blow at tsarism, is not yet strong enough, not yet Social-Democratic enough, to *win* for itself the kind of freedom *it* wants. When will you understand that what we must do is not to boast about the present bowing and scraping of the liberals, but to warn the proletariat

against it and show up what lies behind it. You do not see that? Then look at what the *industrialists*, *merchants*, *and stockbrokers are saying* about the necessity of a constitution. How plainly these declarations speak of the death of moderate liberalism! The liberal windbags prate about the heroism of the proletarians, while the industrialists weightily and imperiously demand a skimpy constitution—that is how matters stand, dear "leaders"!*

But nothing can compare with *Iskra*'s arguments on the question of arming. "The work of arming the proletariat and systematically building up the organisation which shall guarantee that the people's attack upon the government shall take place simultaneously everywhere" is declared to be a "technical" (?!) job. And we, of course, are above such trivialities as technique, we go to the root of things. "Important though they are (the 'technical' jobs), *it is not upon them that our efforts should be concentrated* in preparing the masses for revolt.... All the efforts of the underground organisations will count for nothing if they fail to arm the people with the one indispensable weapon—*a sense of the burning necessity to attack the autocracy and to arm for the purpose. It is on propaganda among the masses to arm themselves for the purpose of revolt* that we should concentrate our efforts." (The italics in the last two passages are the author's.)

This is indeed a profound way of stating the issue, nothing like the narrow-minded Parvus, who almost reached the point of "Jacobinism". The crux of the matter is not in the work of arming or in the systematic building up of the organisation, but in arming the people with a sense of the burning necessity to arm. What a painful feeling of

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* The above lines had been written when we received from the liberal camp the following information, which is not without interest. The St. Petersburg special correspondent of the German bourgeois-democratic newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung* (February 17, 1905) quotes a *liberal St. Petersburg journalist* on the political situation: "The liberals would be fools to let a moment like the present slip by. The liberals now hold all the trumps, for *they have succeeded in hitching the workers to their cart*, whereas the government has no one, since the bureaucracy does not give anyone a chance to get ahead." What sublime simplicity must be reigning in the new *Iskra* for them to be writing about the death of liberalism at such a moment!

shame for Social-Democracy comes upon one at the sight of these philistine platitudes, which seek to drag our movement back! To arm the people with a sense of the burning necessity to arm is the constant, common duty of the Social-Democrats always and everywhere, and it can be applied equally to Japan as it can to England, to Germany as it can to Italy. Wherever there are oppressed classes struggling against exploitation, the doctrine of the socialists, from the very start, and in the first place, arms them with a sense of the burning necessity to arm, and this "*necessity*" is present when the labour movement *begins*. Social-Democracy has only to make this burning necessity a conscious one, to bring home to those who are conscious of it the need for organisation and planned action, the need for considering the whole political situation. Dear Editor of *Iskra*! Please drop in at any meeting of German workers and see the hatred towards, let us say, the police, that burns in the faces there; what bitter sarcasms and clenched fists you will hear and see there! What is the force that holds in check this burning necessity to mete out summary justice to the bourgeoisie and its servitors who ill-use the people? It is the force of organisation and discipline, the force of consciousness, the consciousness that individual acts of assassination are absurd, that the hour for the serious revolutionary struggle of the people has not yet struck, that the political situation is not ripe for it. That is why, under such circumstances, no socialist will ever bid the people arm, but he will always make it his duty (otherwise he is no socialist, but a mere windbag) to arm them with a sense of the burning necessity to arm and attack the enemy. However, the conditions in Russia today differ from these everyday conditions of work; therefore, the revolutionary Social-Democrats, who until now have never issued a call to arms but have always equipped the workers with a sense of the burning necessity to arm—therefore, the revolutionary Social-Democrats, following the initiative of the revolutionary workers, have *now* issued the slogan, *To arms*! At such a time, when this slogan has at last been issued, *Iskra* delivers itself of the statement that the main thing is not arming, but the burning necessity to arm. What is this but sterile intellectualist logic-chopping and hopeless Tryapichkin-ism? Are not these people dragging

the Party back, away from the pressing tasks of the revolutionary vanguard to the contemplation of the proletariat's "posterior"? This unbelievable vulgarisation of our tasks is due not to the individual qualities of one or other Tryapichkin, but to their entire position, which has been so inimitably formulated in the catchwords organisation-as-process and tactics-as-process. Such a position in itself necessarily condemns a man to fear all definite slogans, to shy at all "plans", to back away from bold revolutionary initiative, to philosophise and chew the cud, to be in fear of running too far ahead—and this at a time when we Social-Democrats are obviously lagging behind the proletariat in revolutionary activity. Truly the dead are clutching at the living; the dead theories of *Rabocheye Dyelo* lie like a dead hand upon the new *Iskra* too.

Let us consider *Iskra*'s arguments regarding "the politically leading role of Social-Democracy as the vanguard of the class destined to emancipate the nation." "We can neither attain that role," we are told, "nor firmly establish our title to it even if we take over full control of the technical organisation and conduct of the uprising." Think of it! We cannot attain the role of vanguard even if we succeed in taking full control of the conduct of the uprising! And these people presume to speak of vanguard! They *fear* history will impose upon them the leading role in the democratic revolution, and they are *terrified* at the thought of having "to conduct the uprising". The thought lurks at the back of their minds—only they do not yet dare to voice it outright in the columns of *Iskra*—that the Social-Democratic organisation *must not* "conduct the uprising", that it must not strive to take full control over the revolutionary transition to the democratic republic. They scent in this, these incorrigible Girondists of socialism, monstrous Jacobinism.[62] They do not understand that the harder we strive to take full control of the conduct of the uprising, the greater will our share in the undertaking be, and that the greater this share is, the less will the influence of the anti-proletarian or non-proletarian democrats be. They are determined to be at the tail-end; they have even invented a philosophy of their own to prove that the tail-end is the right place for them. Martynov has actually begun to expound this

philosophy, and tomorrow, no doubt, he will dot the i's in the columns of *Iskra*.

Let us try to follow the argument step by step:

"The class-conscious proletariat, governed by the logic of the spontaneous process of historical development, will utilise for its own purposes all the elements of organisation, all the elements of ferment which the eve of the revolution creates...."

Fine! But to utilise *all* elements means to assume *full* leadership. *Iskra* defeats its own purpose and, realising this, hastens to add:

"... wholly undismayed by the fact that all these elements rob it of a share in the technical leadership of the revolution itself and thus involuntarily help to carry our demands to the most backward sections of the masses."

Can you make anything of this, dear reader? To utilise *all* elements, *undismayed* by the fact that they rob us of a share in the *leadership*?! But, hold on, gentlemen, if *we* really utilise all elements, if it is really *our* demands that are adopted by those we utilise, then they do not *rob* us of the leadership, but *accept* our leadership. If, on the other hand, *all* these elements really rob us of the leadership (and of course not only "technical" leadership, because to separate the "technical" side of a revolution from its political side is sheer nonsense), then it is not we who utilise them, but they us.

"We should be only too glad if, following the priest who popularised among the masses our demand for the separation of the Church from the State, if, following the monarchist workers' society which arranged the popular procession to the Winter Palace, the Russian revolution would find itself the richer by a general, who would be the first to lead the masses in the last fight against the tsar's troops, or by a government official who would be the first to proclaim the formal overthrow of the rule of the tsars."

Yes, we too should be glad of it, but we should not want a feeling of joy over pleasant *prospects* to overshadow our sense of logic. What is meant by the *Russian revolution* finding itself the richer by a priest or a general? What is meant is that the priest or the general will become an adher-

ent or leader of the revolution. These "tyros" may be fully or not quite fully conscious adherents of the revolution. In the latter event (which is the more probable with tyros) we must deplore, not welcome, their lack of consciousness and *do our utmost to cure and fill this lack*. As long as we leave this undone, as long as the masses follow a leader who is lacking in consciousness, we have to admit that it is not the Social-Democrats who utilise these elements, but vice versa. Yesterday's priest, general, or government official who becomes an adherent of the revolution, may be a prejudice-ridden bourgeois democrat, and insofar as the workers will follow *him* the bourgeois democrats will be "utlising" the workers. Is this clear to you, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*? If it is, then why do you *fear* the assumption of leadership by the fully conscious (*that is*, Social-Democratic) adherents of the revolution? Why do you fear lest a Social-Democratic officer (I purposely select an analogous example) and member of the Social-Democratic organisation assume, "completely take over", the functions and tasks of your hypothetical general at the initiative and on the instructions of that organisation?

To return to Parvus. He concludes his excellent article with the excellent advice to get rid of the disorganisers by "throwing them overboard". To get rid of the disorganisers is, as the items in our Party News column show,[63] the most impassioned and emphatic slogan of the majority of the Russian Social-Democrats. Precisely, Comrade Parvus, they must be "thrown overboard" in the most ruthless fashion, and the throwing must start with those heroes of the Social-Democratic press who have been sanctioning disruption by their organisation-as-process and organisation-as-tendency "theories". The thing is not merely to talk of it, but to *do* it. We must convene immediately a congress of all Party workers who wish to organise the Party. We must not confine ourselves to persuasion and to appeals, but must put a direct and inexorable ultimatum to all who hesitate, to all who waver, vacillate, and doubt: "Make your choice!" From the first issue of our newspaper we have sounded that ultimatum on behalf of the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, on behalf of the mass of Russian Party workers who have been driven to intense exasperation by the

disorganisers. Make haste, then, and throw them overboard, comrades, and let us settle down to the work of organisation with a hearty good will. Better a hundred revolutionary Social-Democrats who have accepted organisation-as-plan than a thousand intellectuals of the Tryapichkin tribe who prattle about organisation-as-process.

Vperyod, No. 7,
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THE CONVENING OF THE THIRD PARTY CONGRESS

FROM THE EDITORS

The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* can only state that it is completely in sympathy with the initiative of the Russian Bureau. At last an energetic step has been made towards a way out of the situation created by the Bonapartists abroad,[64] and a way out along *Party* lines! In our Party News column we publish reports showing the alacrity with which the committees are responding to the call issued by the Bureau. May their example be followed by *each* and *every* group and organisation, as well as by individuals who consider themselves members of the R.S.D.L.P. or who at least stand close to it in their views and sympathies. The Third Congress is the *first* to be convened under conditions whereby its composition (as set forth in the Party Rules), its proceedings, and the basis of participation are known beforehand. Let all comrades then make the most of these conditions! Let them not forget that our Party Rules guarantee to everybody an opportunity to appeal to the Congress. (See Clause 10: "Every Party member, as well as *any person having any dealings with the Party*, has the right to demand that any statement he may submit to the Central Committee, to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, *or to a Party Congress* be delivered in the original.") Let everyone take advantage of this opportunity *immediately*. The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* undertakes to deliver such statements to the Russian Bureau, which has now been constituted as the Organising Committee of the Congress. The right to vote at the Congress is restricted to representatives of committees and of other qualified Party organisations as defined by the Rules.

But the Congress itself may extend to everyone the right of participation with *consultative* voice, while the Organising Committee may grant this right to delegates from Party organisations not possessing full-rights status. (Clause 3, Note 2, of the Party Rules: "The Central Committee is authorised to invite to a congress, with consultative voice, delegates from organisations which do not fulfil the conditions stipulated in Note 1," viz., organisations whose qualification has not been confirmed a year prior to the Congress.

It goes without saying that when the Organising Committee is instructed by the majority of the committees to convene a congress against the will of the Bonapartist Central Committee and Council, it takes over all the rights of the C.C. with regard to such convocation.)

The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* proposes to the Congress the following tentative *agenda*: (1) Constitution of the Congress (standing orders, report of the Organising Committee, examination of credentials). (2) Delegates' reports. (3) The Party crisis.* (4) Organisational question. (5) Attitude towards insurrection. (6) Agreement with the revolutionary democrats for purposes of the insurrection. (7) Attitude towards the liberals. (8) Work among the peasantry and support of the revolutionary peasant movement. (9) Work among the troops. (10) Improvement of propaganda and agitation. (11) election of officers.

The active participation of all Party members in drafting and preparing reports and resolutions on these and other major questions (as well as in the collection of material for reports) is absolutely essential for the success of the Congress. We call upon all adherents of the Party principle to start on this work *at once*. *Everyone* who has been involved in one way or other in the trials and tribulations of the Party crisis can help the Congress by a brief statement of his experiences and his view of the way out. *Everyone* who has

* Bebel wrote to Lenin offering his services as arbitrator between the supporters of *Iskra* and the supporters of *Vperyod*. Lenin replied that neither he nor any other *Vperyod* supporters within his knowledge had the right to take any action binding upon the whole Party, and that Bebel's proposal would, therefore, have to be submitted to the Party Congress that was being called by the Russian Bureau. We think the Congress could include this proposal in the item "Party crisis".

worked in any Party or Party-connected organisation can give invaluable information, based on personal experience, for solving various aspects of the organisational question. (The contributions might cover such points as time and place of the activity; membership of the particular organisation—number of workers and number of intellectuals; the relations between them; whether written rules are needed, and which; whether there should be any fixed rules—and if so, to what extent—governing the limits of autonomy and of the division of labour of the groups belonging to the Party or connected with it, co-optation and expulsion of members; the elective principle; the attitude of the committees to the groups of propagandists, agitators, and organisers, to the district circles and factory circles, to the publicists' committees, technical committees, etc., etc.)

The *Vperyod* Editorial Board has already received some material on work among the peasants and the soldiers. We know of one group which is working systematically on a summary of the experience acquired by its members in the field of propaganda, agitation, and organisation, and is preparing a report for the Congress. We have been promised the report of a comrade who helped to organise *hundreds* of workers for armed resistance in the event of an anti-Jewish pogrom in a certain large city, and a report on the question of street fighting from another comrade who has made a study of military science. It is of the highest importance that the greatest possible number of comrades undertake such and similar work *at once*.

The Party crisis has been clarified in our literature down to the minutest detail. The discussion of this question cannot and should not take up much time. The keynote of the Congress should be the *new questions* of organisation and tactics, which are being brought to the fore by the new gigantic upswing in our revolutionary movement. In the solution of these questions the collective experience of *all* Social-Democrats who have been in any way active in the movement will be of inestimable value. But we must gather this experience as soon as possible and make it available for discussion at the Congress.

To work, then, comrades! Let everyone who has the interests of the Social-Democratic working-class movement at

heart bestir himself at once to give the Congress his active aid. Then the Party will quickly emerge from this period of temporary abasement and enfeeblement on to the path of most active participation in the great Russian revolution, the path leading to victory over the accursed enemy of the Russian people!

Vperyod, No. 8,
February 28 (15), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

FROM THE NEW-*ISKRA* CAMP

In the leading article of *Iskra*, No. 87, Plekhanov, deferring suavely to Martov, successfully applies the tactics of *killing with kindness**. Though playing up to the author of the leading article in issue No. 85, Plekhanov, *in substance*, *wholly refutes him* and subscribes to the very views which *Vperyod* has always maintained. Congratulations! Only bear in mind your kinship with Martynov, most honourable dialectician. Get him to tell you about the awful and disastrous fate that lies in store for you, if, upon having "*prepared the victory*" (slogan in issue No. 87), you achieved it! Get him to tell you of the grave danger involved in "the seizure of power", in "participation in the provisional government", and in "the revolutionary dictatorship". Poor Plekhanov, it will take him a long time to extricate himself from the mess in which the pamphlets of Trotsky, Martynov, "A Worker", and Axelrod, approved by the entire (?) Editorial Board have entangled him! In the supplement to *Iskra*, No. 86, Popov *admits to being the author of the letter published in Lenin's "Statement"*. Which but needed proof! The systematic deception of the Party by the gentlemen of the Minority has been proved. As we predicted, these gentlemen are trying to get out of it by drawing a red herring across the reader's track in the form of the question whether Lenin had the right to confiscate a letter that exposed the Bonapartists. Martov and Popov, so distinguished for their moral sensitivity, are yelling about theft, spying, and so on. Scold away, gentlemen, to your hearts' content. Lacking arguments, what else is left for you to do?

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the text in *Vperyod*

* The words "kill with kindness" are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

A LETTER TO THE ORGANISATIONS IN RUSSIA

February 28, 1905

Dear Comrades,

We have just received the news that St. Petersburg, Tula, Moscow, the North, Nizhni-Novgorod, the Caucasus, and Odessa have declared for the Congress, and other places will, of course, follow suit. The Central Committee is said to have gone on record for the Congress. Naturally, no one will believe the C.C. now. Everyone says it may as well come to the Congress, since everyone has been invited, but it is the Bureau and the Bureau alone that is convening the Congress. There is hardly any need to ask why there is not a grain of confidence left in the C.C, (even the few completely isolated voices raised in its favour were immediately retracted). Everybody understands that the C.C. is only deceiving people and playing the diplomat.

It is extremely important that preparations for the Congress be started immediately and that zealous efforts be made to enlist the co-operation of all circles, including district, propaganda, and factory circles, in short, all, especially workers', circles. We speak of this also in *Vperyod*, No. 8,* (out today). It would be very useful to have workers attend the Congress. (In our opinion admittance on a consultative voice basis should be accorded as liberally as possible. Thus, it is only a question of funds. Spread your agitation wider. We are convinced that it is possible to find workers who will collect from 150 to 200 rubles to cover the expenses of a delegate; special donors for the same purpose can also be

* See pp. 177-80 of this volume.—*Ed.*

found among the intellectuals.) Important questions will be discussed at the Congress: organisation, the attitude towards the periphery organisations, the insurrection, arming of the workers (installation of dynamite workshops), agreement with the Socialists-Revolutionaries for an uprising, support of the revolutionary peasant movement, and many other issues. Reports on work among the troops and the peasantry are of the utmost importance. Make the widest possible use of contacts with officers, students, and so on for the Congress. The Congress will be asked to substitute Lenin's formulation of Clause 1 of the Rules for Martov's, and to extend the rights of *Party* and Party-*connected* organisations. This will cover many elements of revolutionary democracy. Let each and every one prepare most actively for the Congress.

Hearty greetings,
Lenin

St. Petersburg has begun to send us copies of the minutes of workers' meetings held in various districts. An example worth imitating. It is our earnest request that the workers themselves write, and keep on writing, to *Vperyod*.

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to
the manuscript

GENERAL PLAN OF THE THIRD CONGRESS DECISIONS

Resolutions:

1. (a) Read object of the Minority: composition of the centres.

(b) Non-compliance with Congress decisions.

(c) Split before the League Congress: formation of a secret organisation.

(d) Dishonesty of this act and all resultant disorganisation.

(e) The shame of trying to justify disruptive activities by theories concerning organisation-as-process, organisation-as-tendency, by hypocritical cries about bureaucratism, formalism, etc.

(f) Enormous harm done to the constructive work in Russia by their disorganisation.

(g) Necessity of complete dissociation from the disorganisers.

(h) Authorisation to the centres to issue a pamphlet briefly setting forth the causes and the history of the split, and notification to international Social-Democracy.

2. (a) It is necessary to have expressions of opinion on the so-called conciliationist tendency.

(b) Its only honest non-hypocritical representative was Plekhanov, when he wrote No. 52 of *Iskra*.

(c) Congress acknowledges the correctness of Plekhanov's stand at the Second Congress of the Party and at the Congress of the League, and the sincerity of his desire for peace through co-optation.

(d) Unfortunately, Plekhanov failed to maintain his position on concessions towards the revisionists and individualist anarchists; the attempts on his part at justification *in principle* are obviously wrong and are only likely to create confusion in people's minds and introduce an element of artfulness in inner-Party relations.

(e) The so-called conciliators are nothing but hypocritical Mensheviks. No *independent* platform of conciliation exists other than Plekhanov's, and that, too, he has now rejected (personal concessions, but *disputes* on points of principle with the revisionists and anarcho-individualists).

3. (a) The Congress recognises differences on points of principle between our position and that of the new-Iskrists.

(b) The new-Iskrists' utter instability on points of principle goes back to the Second Congress, where they first wholly opposed the opportunist wing and ended up (albeit against their own will and consciousness) by turning towards it.

(c) After the Second Congress the opportunist tendency became still more pronounced; in the organisation itself systematic petty betrayals were justified. The blunting of such a weapon of the proletarian class struggle as organisation. Distortion of Marxism to the extent of justifying and extolling disorganisation and intellectualist anarchism.

(d) In regard to questions of the general line of its policy, *Iskra* should have admitted the "gulf between the new *Iskra* and the old *Iskra*". A shift towards tail-ism.

(e) In tactics this was expressed in the attitude towards the liberals. The Zemstvo campaign.

(f) " " " " " " " towards the insurrection. Attempts to drag back and confuse.

(g) " " " " " " " towards arming.

(h) " " " " " " " towards demoralisation of the backward workers with the slogan "independent activity of the workers", etc.

(i) On the whole, the new-Iskrists = an opportunist wing of the Party.

Basically ill-assorted elements in their camp

Organisation-as-process Party and class Liberals and Zemstvo campaign Insurrection Arming Revolutionary dictatorship	Instability on questions of principle (Second Congress). Shift towards opportunist *Rabocheye Dyelo* (a gulf). Their approval by party-fringe intellectuals and open opportunists *à la* Struve. Necessity of struggle for the line of the old *Iskra*.

4. (a) Insincere nature of the cries about a party of the intelligentsia. Utilised by the liberals. New-Iskrists themselves have disavowed it.

(b) Demagogic nature of propaganda among the workers. The "elective principle", its necessity under *free* political conditions, its impossibility on a *wide* scale in Russia.

(c) Empty words about "independent activity of the workers" serving as a screen for tail-ism; they promise organisationally *the impossible*, use cheap methods to decry "bureaucratism", "formalism", etc., but give nothing; they fail to notice the *revolutionary* independent activity of the workers and hang about the lowest and most backward strata of the movement.

(d) Warn the workers. Class-conscious workers should know and bear in mind the analogous methods of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists; they should know and bear in mind the position of the old *Iskra*, namely, the importance for the working-class masses to advance from their midst class-conscious, Social-Democratic workers, worker-revolutionaries, our Bebels, and the necessity *to organise* every district, every factory, etc.

(e) Only the full consciousness of the advanced workers, the complete elimination of all distinctions between intellectuals and workers within Social-Democracy, can guarantee a *Social-Democratic* class party of the proletariat.

5. (a) Necessity of immediately preparing for the uprising.

(b) " " creating an organisation or organisations of a fighting character.

+7. (c) Necessity of increasing the number of organisations generally: organising the revolution.

(d) Terrorism must be merged in actual practice with the movement of the masses.

(e) Aim of the insurrection: provisional revolutionary government, arming of the people, Constituent Assembly, revolutionary peasant committees.

(f) Tasks of Social-Democrats in wielding power: full implementation of the whole democratic programme, independent organisation and organisations of the working class, the striving to develop the revolutionary independent activity of the proletariat and the rural poor, steadfast safeguarding of the class programme and point of view, and a critical attitude towards the illusions of revolutionary democracy.

or 7: (g) These (preceding) conditions determine also the militant agreement between Social-Democracy and revolutionary democracy for the insurrection.

(h) By revolutionary democracy is meant the consistent and firm democratic currents that accept the *whole* democratic programme of Social-Democracy, do not hold back from any revolutionary measures, but lack the clear Social-Democratic class-consciousness.

9. (a) Starover's resolution[65] is wrong in principle: the crux of the matter is not in declarations but in struggle, in the common struggle.

(b) The declarations and slogans of the liberals and liberal democrats do not inspire confidence (Struve).

(c) The arbitrary and false interpretation of these groups as democratic intelligentsia. Agreement with a *force*, but the intelligentsia is not a force. Starover has this muddled.

(d) On the order of the day an agreement not on the condition of declarations, but on the condition of *participation* in the uprising, not with the liberal democrats, but with the *revolutionary* democrats.

10. (a) Agreement with the Zemstvo men violates even the conditions of Starover's resolution.

(b) As to not frightening the liberals, that is irrelevant and inopportune. Impossibility of justifying this by the danger of anarchism.

(c) The reactionary meaning of the slogans about "a higher type of demonstrations".

(d) The impressionist opportunism of the new *Iskra*.

(e) Abuse of words about "class independent activity" and systematic development of the class.

(f) To publish their first letter for the edification of the young Party members.

N.B.:

11. (a) Most important at the present time: together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landlords, together with the rural proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

(b) to stress the democratic aspects,

(c) not to overlook for a single moment the *socialist* (the *entire* socialist) programme,

(d) to maintain steadfastly the standpoint of the proletariat generally and of the *socialist proletariat* in particular.

12. (e) To support the *revolutionary* movement of both the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie against the landlords, down to the complete expropriation of the landlords' lands, without, however, in any way indulging the illusions of petty-bourgeois socialism by action or inaction, but struggling vigorously against monarchist and Caesarist speculations on the reactionary elements of the peasant bourgeoisie.

13. (a) Importance of work among the soldiers:

(b) Leaflets.

(c) Military organisation, its elements? Special military organisation may be useful *je nachdem*.*

(d) **

14. (a) To take the *programme* as a basis....

(b) Travelling groups.

(c) Lectures and agitational speeches.

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* Depending on circumstances.—*Ed*.

** Point "d" was not written. Paragraph 13 has a question mark across it.—*Ed*.

* * *

In the basic resolution against the new-Iskrists it is important to note the following:

(a) The negation or belittlement of the idea of a strong organisation of the class-conscious proletariat and its vanguard, the Social-Democratic Labour Party, tends to convert the working-class movement into the tailpiece of the bourgeois-democratic movement.

(b) This is the end-result of the demagogic belittlement of the role of the class-conscious Social-Democratic influence on the spontaneous movement of the proletariat and the theoretical vulgarisation of Marxism through an interpretation that acts as a drag on revolutionary initiative and the progressive tasks of Social-Democracy.

This is the end-result, too, of the idea of contraposing the technical and the political leadership of the revolution and—

and—*

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* At this point the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

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1

RESOLUTION ON THE DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOUR OF THE MENSHEVIKS, OR NEW-ISKRISTS

The Congress deems it necessary to place definitely on record the conclusively proved facts concerning the behaviour of the Mensheviks, or new-Iskrists, after the Second Party Congress. Without even attempting to question the validity of the decisions adopted by, and the elections held at, this Congress, they have shamelessly flouted its decisions. Immediately after the Congress they boycotted the central bodies it set up, and formed within the Party, and behind its back, a separate organisation. The aim of this organisation was to foist on the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and on the Central Committee of the Party the six candidates who had been turned down by the Congress. To attain this end, in opposition to the will and the interests of the Party, the Mensheviks everywhere disorganised the Party's constructive work. Everywhere they secretly split the Party and demoralised the comradely relations among the Social-Democrats; they turned the Central Organ of the Party into an organ of gossip and squabbles, heaping vulgar abuse on the Party committees that had elected the central bodies and demanded from them an accounting; they reduced the Party Council to a mere instrument of factional feuds and had no scruples about falsifying the voice of the Party which demanded the Third Congress.

The Congress most emphatically condemns this disruptive conduct and warns all Party-conscious Social-Democrats against the notorious organisation-as-process theory which has been used to justify disorganisation and which has debased the theory of revolutionary Marxism in an unheard-of manner.

The Congress affirms that the adherents of the Party Majority, in drawing up resolutions against the disorganisers and in demanding the Third Congress, have exhausted all the resources of honest, comradely struggle against fellow-members of the Party. Now that the centres set up by the Party have definitely cast off all responsibility to the Party, the Congress is compelled to consider them beyond the pale of the Party. The Congress declares that adherents of the Party principle have no alternative but to work separately from, and independently of, these disorganisers. The Congress therefore resolves that followers of the Minority, or new-Iskrists, may not be admitted to membership in any organisation of our Party.

The Congress instructs the Central Committee of the Party to issue a small pamphlet in explanation of this resolution, for the information of Russian and international Social-Democracy.

2

RESOLUTION ON PLEKHANOV'S CONDUCT DURING THE PARTY CRISIS

The Congress admits the correctness of Plekhanov's position at the Second Party Congress and at the Congress of the League Abroad on the questions of programme, tactics, and organisation. The Congress acknowledges that after the League Congress Plekhanov, in order to restore peace within the Party and heal the split caused by the Mensheviks, proposed a policy of concessions to people whom he had aptly characterised before the whole Party as revisionists and anarcho-individualists (*Iskra*, No. 52, November 7, 1903). The Congress expresses deep regret that Plekhanov did not maintain this position; that, against the will of the Party, he began to apply the most shameless methods to secure satisfaction of all the demands of the Mensheviks; that, to justify the Mensheviks, he lowered himself to the point of defending their stand, which he himself had declared to be incorrect in principle, and of inventing the most fantastic differences with the Party Majority.

The Congress emphatically condemns such crafty practices in dealing with fellow-members of the Party; for such a

policy, no matter by what humane motives in respect to certain individuals it may be prompted, cannot but have a demoralising effect on the Party.

3

RESOLUTION ON THE THEORETICAL POSITION OF THE NEW-ISKRISTS

The Congress considers it of imperative necessity to combat the theoretical position of the Mensheviks, or new-Iskrists, who have deviated from revolutionary Social-Democracy towards opportunism. This had become evident at the Second Congress of the Party, from certain lines of argument, as well as from the very membership of the Minority, composed as it was of the opponents of the old *Iskra* and the elements least stable in point of principle. After the Second Congress this shift of the Mensheviks towards *Rabocheye Dyelo* opportunism became so obvious that they themselves admitted the existence of a gulf between the old *Iskra* and the new *Iskra*. Indeed, on several questions the new *Iskra* has put forward slogans and theories which are definitely false and which obscure the class-consciousness of the proletariat. One such is the organisation-as-process theory, which reduces Marxism to an apologia for disorganisation and intellectualist anarchism. Another is the reversion to the false ideas concerning the relation of Party to class, which lower the tasks of the Party as vanguard, leader, and organiser of the class. Equally erroneous and reactionary were the points advanced by the new *Iskra*, in disagreement with the old *Iskra*, on such questions as the attitude towards the liberals and the plans for a Zemstvo campaign, on the preparation of the uprising and the alleged utopianism of the ideas of timing and carrying through the uprising, on the arming of the masses and their technical and organisational leadership in time of revolution, on the impossibility and undesirability of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in the period of the overthrow of the autocracy, etc. The views expressed on these questions tend to set the Party back, not only in the field of theory, but in actual practice, and they are particularly harmful and disastrous to the Party of the revolutionary proletariat in the present revolutionary situation prevailing in

Russia. The Congress therefore instructs all Party members to explain the falseness of these views in their agitation and propaganda.

4

RESOLUTION ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Congress strongly condemns the policy pursued by the new-Iskrists of sowing distrust and animosity between workers and intellectuals within the Social-Democratic organisations. The Congress reminds all class-conscious workers that a few years ago similar methods of struggle were used by the *Rabocheye Dyelo* wing of the Party and that at that time they repudiated such methods. The empty phrases thrown about by the new-Iskrists concerning the independent activity of the workers and the elective principle are not accompanied by any real improvement in the work of our organisations and they demagogically promise the unattainable. Under conditions of political freedom, our Party can and will be built entirely on the elective principle. Under the autocracy this is impracticable for the collective thousands of workers that make up the Party.

The Congress once more calls attention to the task of the consistent adherents of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, namely, to strengthen with all their might the ties between this Party and the masses of the working class, by raising ever broader masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians to full Social-Democratic consciousness, by stimulating their revolutionary and Social-Democratic initiative, and by taking care that the working-class masses advance from their own midst the maximum number of workers fully capable of leading the movement and all the Party organisations.

The Congress, on behalf of the Party, repeats the advice of the revolutionary Social-Democrats: to form as many workers' organisations belonging to our Party as possible; to strive to bring those workers' organisations that do not wish to enter the Party, or have no opportunity for so doing, at least into association with the Party; and to make efforts to get the greatest possible member of class-conscious Social-Democratic workers on the Party committees.

MODIFICATION OF THE CLAUSE IN THE RULES CONCERNING THE CENTRES

A good many of the comrades working in Russia, including the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, are going on record for a *single* centre *in Russia.*

What would such a reform actually mean? The idea unmistakably implied in this tendency is that comrades active in Russia should predominate in the one centre. Its realisation depends entirely upon the will of the Congress, which will elect the members of the centre. Consequently, there is nothing to discuss or to talk about on this point.

But, to go further, what will be the relation of the Central Organ to the Central Committee? The Central Organ, we are told, is to be a commission appointed by the C.C. One (or two) members of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ may (say these comrades) sit on the C.C. as part of it, a *minor* part. There arises the question in what way this foreign section of the C.C. will participate in its work. The idea that real *participation* in the work of the C.C. can be achieved "by correspondence" is obviously utopian and could not be suggested seriously. It is only with great difficulty, at the cost of tremendous effort, trouble, quarrelling, and vexation, that those working abroad can obtain the scantiest information *post factum*, so that one can only speak of "taking part in deciding things" from abroad through sheer hypocrisy or in order to "sound important".

And so, the choice must be made: either the C.C. members (or, correspondingly, member) residing abroad secure provision *in the Party Rules* (other "agreements" being invalid) for the *entire* C.C. to meet abroad periodically, in *which* case this supreme centre will, *in actual fact*, be identical

with the present Party Council, i .e., it will become a body that meets three, four, or five times a year and gives only *general direction* to the work; *or else* for the C.C. to meet in Russia and settle all business *there*, *without* its component from abroad. In this case the latter is but nominally listed, *avowedly fictitiously*, as a member of the C.C. *Actually*, he can have *no say* in deciding general questions. Under such circumstances it is open to doubt whether any people will be found to fill this "post" (or shall we say sinecure?) of "members from abroad" on the C.C.!

Another (and the last possible) assumption: the C.C. to consist *entirely* of comrades who work in Russia and to constitute a single centre. Only such a central body will *really* be a single Russian centre. For work abroad it establishes an agency. *In actual practice*, however, this agency will exist as an independent centre. To take the case of the editors of the Central Organ. Clearly we shall need a *full Board* here, that will only *by a long drawn-out process* take shape, form a team, and pull together. (It took the people in Russia *eighteen months* of hard effort to build up a *new* Central Organ after the Second Congress, and that notwithstanding the intense concern shown throughout Russia for solving the grave *general Party* crisis.) In practice this Board will issue the *weekly* organ independently. *At best* the C.C. in Russia will show its interest in the way the publication is managed by calling a "conference" once in six months (or once in eighteen months)—in what way will such a "conference" differ from the "Council"?—or by a "letter" from an *individual* member of the C.C. In practice this foreign Board will conduct agitation and train functionaries abroad (lectures, meetings) among *hundreds* of Party members. The C.C. will be *physically* unable *actually* to direct this work, *actually* to manage this work of the foreign Board. It will be physically unable to *participate* in this work, except through *rare* conferences with the persons conducting it. Here again—in what way will these conferences differ from the Council?

To sum up: in actual fact, in practice, a "single" Centre will either be a *myth*, or it will merely boil down, positively and inevitably, to the present system of what is scornfully called "the Triple Centre". In actual fact, in practice, differences in geographic and political conditions, as well as

differences in the character of the work, inevitably and unavoidably necessitate, and will continue to necessitate (until the fall of the autocracy), two centres in our Party, united only *from time to time* by "*c o n f e r e n c e s*", which *actually* will always play the role of supreme or highest "Council" of the Party.

It is quite understandable that the reaction against the people abroad should have evoked from those in Russia the general outcry: Down with the people abroad! Down with two centres! This reaction is legitimate and *laudable*; for it indicates the tremendous growth of the Party's strength and of Party consciousness since the Second Congress. This reaction is undeniably a step forward by our Party. But we must not be misled by the fascination of words; we must not elevate to a "system" the *mood* of the moment, the passing "resentment" against the "fellows abroad". No Party system can be built on anger. Nothing is easier than to lay down the short and simple rule of "one centre". But such a decision would bring us no nearer to the solution of the intricate problem of finding methods for uniting actually (not merely on paper) the diverse functions of the work in Russia and abroad.

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QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

In view of the convocation of the Third Congress of the Party some comrades, practical workers, have asked us to publish the following statement. It would be most desirable at the forthcoming debate on the organisational question at the Congress if the counsels and opinions of the greatest possible number of comrades who have been working in Russia were most carefully considered and discussed. Therefore, let *every* such person express his opinion and submit his answers to the following questions. The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* will collect them and refer them to the Congress, so that every delegate will be able to benefit from the collective experience of the mass of his comrades. The main questions requiring to be clarified with a view to the redrafting of the Rules and the formulation of the resolutions of the Congress are approximately as follows: (1) Place, time and duration of work? (2) Worked as member of a committee, or committee body, if so, of which? Of factory circle, etc.? (3) What was the membership of each of the committees or committee branches, organising groups, etc., as far as you know it? How many workers and how many intellectuals were there in each? (4) What was the normal practice of co-optation to the committee from the periphery? Could you give the average duration of work in the periphery? Are there any instances of dissatisfaction arising from co-optation, etc.? In your answers a clear line should be drawn between the periods before and after the Second Congress. Detailed information on the period *before* the Second Congress is particularly desirable. (5) How many Party organisations, groups, circles, etc., were there *altogether* in the

area where you worked? List each group, the number of members, functions, etc. (6) Were there any groups (organisations, circles, etc.) that were not considered Party groups, but were close to the Party? (7) How did the periphery (and the various kinds of periphery circles) and the committee maintain contact? Did these forms of contact satisfy the members? (8) Do you consider it possible and desirable to introduce the elective principle? If not, why not? If you do, then in what manner? Please state explicitly to what groups the right of election ought to be applied. (9) Do you consider the separation of the committees (groups, circles, organisations, etc.) into committees of intellectuals and committees of workers to be advisable? If not, why not? If you do, please indicate what form of separation is desirable. (10) Did the committee elect a central, directing group? If it did, how? How often was it controlled? Were you satisfied with its inauguration? (11) Do you consider it useful and possible for the local organisations to have written Rules? (12) Do you consider it useful to include any regulation concerning the local organisations (committees and others) in the Party Rules? If you do, please mention what regulations. (13) Do you consider it desirable for the Party Rules to define the exact rights of the Central Committee in the matter of including (and excluding) members from the committees and other organisations? What should be the precise rights of the Central Committee? (14) Is it desirable to protect the autonomy of the local committees by introducing special regulations, and if so, what regulations? (15) How often did the committee, or the group, circle, etc., of which you were a member meet? If possible, list all the meetings held during the period of your work. If not, give a rough estimate. Were there any inconveniences in the holding of frequent meetings? What, in your experience, is the average number of possible and necessary meetings per month and how large should the number of participants be?

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PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *MEMORANDUM OF POLICE DEPARTMENT SUPERINTENDENT LOPUKHIN*

There can be too much of a good thing, or so Mr. Lopukhin seems to say in his memorandum. A good thing from the point of view of the police is the "temporary" Security Regulations, which, since 1881, have been one of the most stable fundamental laws of the Russian Empire. The police are given all kinds of rights and powers to "keep the populace in hand", according to the apt expression of the memorandum, which is all the more striking the more often one stumbles over the incredibly ponderous and clumsy official turns of speech in which the memorandum is written. Yes, the police have lived in clover under these "Regulations", but their "good" features have spoiled them. That is one aspect of the matter. Another is the fact that the emergency measures of suppression, which may have seemed extraordinary twenty-five years ago, have since become so ordinary that the population has adjusted itself to them, so to speak. The repressive significance of these emergency measures has weakened, just as a new spring weakens from long and excessive use. The game is not worth the candle, Mr. Lopukhin, Superintendent of the Police Department, implies in his memorandum, which is written in a curiously melancholy and dismal tone.

How gratifying to a Social-Democrat is this dismal tone, this dry, business-like, yet nonetheless devastating criticism by a police official of Russia's fundamental police law. Gone are the palmy days of policedom! Gone are the sixties, when the very existence of a revolutionary party was unthought of. Gone are the seventies, when the strength of such a party,

whose existence was an undoubted and terrifying fact, was "only equal to individual acts of violence, but not to a political revolution". In those days, when "underground agitation found support only among individual persons or circles", the newly invented spring could still produce some effect. But how slack this spring has now become, "in the present state of society, when dissatisfaction with the existing order of things and a strong opposition movement are becoming so widespread in Russia"! How absurd and meaningless these emergency security measures proved to be when they had to be, actually *had to* be, applied in thousands of cases "against workers for engaging in strikes of a peaceful nature and purely economic in motive", when even cobblestones had to be classed as dangerous political weapons!

In his despair, poor Lopukhin resorts to a double exclamation mark, which invites Messieurs the Ministers to join him in laughing at the absurd consequences to which the Security Regulations have led. Everything in these Regulations has proved useless ever since the revolutionary movement really penetrated among the people and became inseparably bound up with the class movement of the working masses—everything, from the rules requiring the registration of passports to the military tribunals. Even the "institution of house janitors," that blessed godsend to the police, is scathingly criticised by the *Polizei*-Minister, who accuses it of having an enervating effect on the preventive activities of the police.

In truth, the complete bankruptcy of the police regime!

This bankruptcy is confirmed, apart from the assertions of such a highly competent person as the most honourable Mr. Lopukhin, by the entire course of development of the tsarist policy. When there was no really popular revolutionary movement, when the political struggle was not yet connected and integrated with the class struggle, simple police measures against individuals and study circles had their use. Against classes these measures proved ludicrously ineffective; by their very profusion they became a hindrance to the work of the police. The once awesome clauses of the Security Regulations have proved to be just miserable, petty, quibbling chicaneries, which tend to stir up discontent among the "plain people" who do not belong to the revolutionaries

rather than seriously to affect the revolutionaries themselves. Against the people's revolution, against the class struggle the police cannot be depended on; one must have the backing of the people, too, the support of classes. Such is the moral of Mr. Lopukhin's memorandum. And such is the moral which the autocratic government is drawing from practical experience. The springs of the police machinery have lost their snap; military force alone is now insufficient. One must stir up national hatred, race hatred; one must recruit "Black Hundreds"[66] from among the politically least developed sections of the urban (*and*, *following that*, *naturally*, *of the rural*) petty bourgeoisie; one must attempt to rally to the defence of the throne all reactionary elements among the population at large; one must turn the struggle of the police against study circles into a struggle of one part of the people against the other.

That is precisely what the government is now doing when it sets the Tatars against the Armenians in Baku; when it seeks to provoke new pogroms against the Jews; when it organises Black-Hundred gangs against the Zemstvo people, students, and rebellious Gymnasium youths; and when it appeals to the loyal nobles and to the conservative elements among the peasants. Ah, well! We Social-Democrats are not surprised at these tactics of the autocracy; nor shall we be frightened by them. We know that it will no longer help the government to stir up racial animosity since the workers have begun to organise armed resistance to the pogrom-bandits; and by relying on the exploiting sections of the petty bourgeoisie the government will only antagonise still broader masses of real proletarians. We have never expected any political or social revolutions to come from "convincing" the powers that be, or from educated persons turning to the paths of "virtue". We have always taught that it is the class struggle, the struggle of the exploited part of the people against the exploiters, that lies at the bottom of political transformations and *in the final analysis* determines the fate of all such transformations. By admitting the complete failure of the pettifogging police methods and passing over to the direct organisation of civil war, the government shows that *the final reckoning* is approaching. So much the better. It is launching the civil war. So much the better. We, too, are

for the civil war. If there is any sphere in which we feel particularly confident, it is here, in the war of the vast masses of the oppressed and the downtrodden, of the toiling millions who keep the whole of society going, against a handful of privileged parasites. Of course, by fanning racial antagonism and tribal hatred, the government may for a time arrest the development of the class struggle, but only for a short time and at the cost of a still greater expansion of the field of the new struggle, at the cost of a more bitter feeling among the people against the autocracy. This is proved by the consequences of the Baku pogrom, which deepened tenfold the revolutionary mood of all sections against tsarism. The government thought to frighten the people by the sight of bloodshed and the vast toll of street battles; but actually it is *dispelling the people's* fear of bloodshed, of a direct armed encounter. Actually, the government is furthering our cause, with agitation of a scope wider and more impressive than we could ever have dreamed of. *Vive le son du canon!* say we in the words of the French revolutionary song: "Hail the thunder of the cannon!" Hail the revolution! Hail the open war of the people against the tsarist government and its adherents!

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Published by *Vperyod*, Geneva
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text of the pamphlet

PLAN OF A LECTURE ON THE COMMUNE[67]

1. Historical outline of the Commune.

France under Napoleon III. Foundations of imperialism: the bourgeoisie no longer, the proletariat not yet....[68]

Adventurism of Napoleon III. Need for pomp, wars.

2. Growth of proletariat after June 1848. *Internationale Arbeiterassoziation*,* 1864. Its persecution by Napoleon III. Protest of the French workers against war (July 12, Paris Section of the International, *S.***16) and of the German workers (Brunswick workers' meeting, July 16, Chemnitz, Berlin Section of International, *S.* 18).[69]

3. Sedan: September 2, 1870, and proclamation of republic on *September 4, 1870*. Artful liberals seize power.

Liberal lawyers and double-faced monarchists: *Thiers*.

4. Government of national defence = government of national betrayal. Trochu: "plan" for defending Paris. Comedy of defence. Heroism of the Paris workers. *Capitulation* on January 28, 1871.

5. Bismarck imposes conditions for convocation of the National Assembly *in eight days* (*S.* 34) to decide question of war and peace. Thiers' intrigues with the monarchists. Chamber of Country Gentry (*ruraux*). *National Assembly* at *Bordeaux*: 630 members = 30 Bonapartists + 200 republicans (100 moderates and 100 radicals) + 400 monarchists (200 Orleanists + 200 Legitimists).

Thiers' talk with Falloux.

6. Paris provoked: appointment of monarchist ambassadors: "30 sou" pay cut for soldiers of the National Guard;

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* International Working Men's Association.—*Ed.*

** *Seite*—page.—*Ed.*

in Paris Prefect of the Police Valentin, Commander of the National Guard d'Aurelle de Paladines, and others (Trepov and Vasilchikov!)[70]; National Assembly moved to Versailles; suppression of republican newspapers and so on. Making the poor pay for the war. (*S.* 35.) Armed Paris workers and—a monarchist assembly. Conflict inevitable.

7. Marx's warning*: second address of General Council of the International, September 9, 1870: "They must not allow themselves to be swayed by the national memories of 1792"; to proceed with "the organisation of their own class"; not to set itself the aim of overthrowing the government ("a desperate folly"): *S.* 25. Eugène Dupont, Secretary of the International (General Council) for France, wrote the same on September 7, 1870 (Weill, 134).[71]

8. Last act of provocation. Seizure of the guns from the National Guard, March 18, 1871, Thiers' fraudulent pretexts. Attempt fails. Central Committee of National Guard proclaims the Commune. *Civil war begun* between Paris Commune and Versailles Government.

9. Trends in the Commune: (a) *Blanquists*. In November *1880* Blanqui in *Ni Dieu ni maître*** condemns the theory of the class struggle and the separation of the interests of the proletariat and those of the nation. (Weill, 229) (draws no line between the workers and the revolutionary bourgeoisie). (b) Proudhonists (Mutualists) "organisation of barter and credit".

Revolutionary instinct of the working class asserts itself *despite* fallacious theories.

10. *Political measures of the Commune*:

(1) Abolition of the standing army.

(2) Abolition of the bureaucracy (a) Electivity of all officials; (b) Salary not > 6,000 fr.

(3) Separation of Church from State

(4) Introduction of free tuition

Minimum Programme

Commune and peasants. In three months it would all be different! (*S.* 49-50).***

* *Contra Blanqui*, who founded *Patrie en danger* (*The Fatherland in Danger.—Ed.*) in 1870 (N. B.).

** *Neither God nor Master.—Ed.*

*** Baring of "secrets": tricks of Trochu, "goings on" in the monasteries (*S.* 54). *Very little has yet been done!*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Commune and International. Franckel, the Poles (banner of world republic).

11. *Economic measures of the Commune*.

(1) Ban on night-work for bakers.

(2) Ban of fines.

(3) Registration of abandoned factories, their transfer to workers' associations with compensation on basis of decision by arbitration committees. (*S*. 54.)

N. B. Did not take over the bank. Eight-hour day did not go through. Weill, 142.

(4) Halt to foreclosures of mortgages. Deferment of payments (of rent).

12. Crash. Deficiencies of organisation. Defensive attitude. Thiers-Bismarck deal {role of Bismarck = hired assassin}. *Bloody Week*, *May 21-28*, *1871*.

Its horrors, exile, etc. Slanders (*S*. 65-66).

Women and children....

P. 487: 20,000 killed in streets, 3,000 died in prisons, etc. Military tribunals: until January 1, 1875—*13,700* persons sentenced (80 women, 60 children), exile, prison.[72]

13. Lessons: Bourgeoisie will *stop at nothing*. Today liberals, radicals, republicans, tomorrow betrayal, shootings.

Independent organisation of the proletariat—class struggle—civil war.

In the present movement we all stand on the shoulders of the Commune.

Written in February-March 1905

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Published according to the manuscript



First page of Lenin's manuscript
"New Tasks and New Forces", 1905

Reduced

NEW TASKS AND NEW FORCES

The development of a mass working-class movement in Russia in connection with the development of Social-Democracy is marked by three notable transitions. The first was the transition from narrow propagandist circles to wide economic agitation among the masses; the second was the transition to political agitation on a large scale and to open street demonstrations; the third was the transition to actual civil war, to direct revolutionary struggle, to the armed popular uprising. Each of these transitions was prepared, on the one hand, by socialist thought working mainly in one direction, and on the other, by the profound changes that had taken place in the conditions of life and in the whole mentality of the working class, as well as by the fact that increasingly wider strata of the working class were roused to more conscious and active struggle. Sometimes these changes took place imperceptibly, the proletariat rallying its forces behind the scenes in an unsensational way, so that the intellectuals often doubted the lasting quality and the vital power of the mass movement. There would then be a turning-point, and the whole revolutionary movement would, suddenly, as it were, rise to a new and higher stage. The proletariat and its vanguard, Social-Democracy, would be confronted with new *practical* tasks, to deal with which, new forces would spring up, seemingly out of the ground, forces whose existence no one had suspected shortly before the turning-point. But all this did not take place at once, without vacillations, without a struggle of currents within the Social-Democratic movement, without relapses to outworn views long since thought dead and buried.

Social-Democracy in Russia is once again passing through such a period of vacillation. There was a time when political agitation had to break its way through opportunist theories, when it was feared that we would not be equal to the new tasks, when excessive repetition of the adjective "class", or a tail-ender's interpretation of the Party's attitude to the class, was used to justify the fact that the Social-Democrats lagged behind the demands of the proletariat. The course of the movement has swept aside all these short-sighted fears and backward views. The new upsurge now is attended once more, although in a somewhat different form, by a struggle against obsolete circles and tendencies. The *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists have come to life again in the new-Iskrists. To adapt our tactics and our organisation to the new tasks, we have to overcome the resistance of opportunist theories of "a higher type of demonstration" (the plan of the Zemstvo campaign), or of the "organisation-as-process"; we have to combat the reactionary fear of "timing" the uprising, or the fear of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Once again, excessive (and very often foolish) repetition of the word "class" and belittlement of the Party's tasks in regard to the class are used to justify the fact that Social-Democracy is lagging behind the urgent needs of the proletariat. The slogan "workers' independent activity" is again being misused by people who worship the lower forms of activity and ignore the higher forms of really Social-Democratic independent activity, the really revolutionary initiative of the proletariat itself.

There is not the slightest doubt that the movement, in its course, will once again sweep aside these survivals of obsolete and lifeless views. Such sweeping aside, however, should not be reduced to mere rejection of the old errors, but, what is incomparably more important, it should take the form of constructive revolutionary work towards fulfilling the new tasks, towards attracting into our Party and utilising the new forces that are now coming into the revolutionary field in such vast masses. It is these questions of constructive revolutionary work that should be the main subject in the deliberations of the forthcoming Third Congress; upon these questions all our Party members should concentrate in their local and general work. As to the new

tasks that confront us, of this we have spoken in general terms on more than one occasion. They are: to extend our agitation to new strata of the urban and rural poor; to build up a broader, more flexible, and stronger organisation; to prepare the uprising and to arm the people; and, to these ends, to conclude agreements with the revolutionary democrats. That new forces have arisen for the fulfilment of these tasks is eloquently borne out by the reports of general strikes all over Russia, of the strikes and the revolutionary mood among the youth, among the democratic intelligentsia generally, and even among many sections of the bourgeoisie. The existence of these tremendous fresh forces and the positive assurance that only a small portion of the whole vast stock of inflammable material among the working class and the peasantry has so far been affected by the present unprecedented revolutionary ferment in Russia are a reliable pledge that the new tasks can and will be unfailingly fulfilled. The practical question confronting us now is, first, *how* to utilise, direct, unite, and organise these new forces; *how* to focus Social-Democratic work on the new, higher tasks of the day without for a moment forgetting the old, ordinary run of tasks that confront us, and will continue to confront us, so long as the world of capitalist exploitation continues to exist.

To indicate several methods for dealing with this practical question we shall begin with an individual, but to our mind very characteristic, instance. A short time ago, on the very eve of the outbreak of the revolution, the liberal-bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye* (No. 63) touched on the question of the organisational work of the Social-Democrats. Closely following the struggle between the two trends in Social-Democracy, *Osvobozhdeniye* lost no opportunity again and again to take advantage of the new Iskra's reversion to Economism, in order to emphasise (in connection with the demagogic pamphlet by "A Worker") its own profound sympathy with the principles of Economism. This liberal publication correctly pointed out that the pamphlet (see *Vperyod*, No. 2, on the subject*) implies inevitable negation, or belittlement, of the role of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Referring to

* See pp. 56-62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"A Worker's" absolutely incorrect assertions that since the victory of the orthodox Marxists the economic struggle has been ignored, *Osvobozhdeniye* says:

"The illusion of present-day Russian Social-Democracy lies in its fear of educational work, of legal ways, of Economism, of so-called non-political forms of the labour movement, and in its failure to understand that only educational work, legal and non-political forms, can create a sufficiently strong and broad foundation for a working-class movement that will really be worthy of the name revolutionary." *Osvobozhdeniye* urges its adherents "to take upon themselves the initiative in building a trade union movement", not in opposition to Social-Democracy, but hand in hand with it; and it draws a parallel between this situation and that which prevailed in the German labour movement during the operation of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists.[73]

This is not the place to deal with this analogy, a totally erroneous one. In the first place, it is necessary to reassert the truth about the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the legal forms of the working-class movement. "The legalisation of non-socialist and non-political labour unions in Russia has begun," we wrote in 1902 in *What Is To Be Done?** "Henceforth, we cannot but reckon with this tendency." How shall we reckon with it?—the question is raised there and answered by a reference to the need of exposing, not only the Zubatov theories, but also all liberal harmony speeches about "class collaboration". (In inviting the collaboration of the Social-Democrats, *Osvobozhdeniye* fully acknowledges the first task, but ignores the second.) "Doing this," the pamphlet goes on to say, "does not at all mean forgetting that in the long run the legalisation of the working-class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs." In exposing Zubatovism and liberalism at legal meetings we are separating the tares from the wheat. "By the wheat we mean attracting the attention of ever larger numbers, including the most backward sections, of the workers to social and political questions, and freeing ourselves, the revolutionaries, from functions that are essentially legal (the distribution of legal books, mutual aid,

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 455.—*Ed.*

etc.), the development of which will inevitably provide us with an increasing quantity of material for agitation."

It follows clearly from this that if anyone is suffering from an "*illusion*" with regard to the question of "*fearing*" the legal forms of the movement, it is *Osvobozhdeniye*. Far from fearing these forms, the revolutionary Social-Democrats clearly point to the existence within them of *tares* as well as *wheat*. *Osvobozhdeniye*'s arguments, consequently, only cover up the liberals' real (and founded) *fear* that revolutionary Social-Democracy will expose the *class essence of liberalism*.

But what interests us most, from the point of view of present-day tasks, is the question of relieving the revolutionaries of some of their functions. The very fact that we are now experiencing the beginning of the revolution makes this a particularly topical and widely significant question. "The more energetically we carry on our revolutionary struggle, the more the government will be compelled to legalise part of the trade union work, thereby relieving us of part of our burden," we said in *What Is To Be Done?** But the energetic revolutionary struggle relieves us of "part of our burden" in many other ways besides this. The present situation has done more than merely "legalise" much of what was formerly banned. It has widened the movement to such an extent that, regardless of government legalisation, many things that were considered and actually were within reach only of revolutionaries have now entered the sphere of practice, have become customary and accessible to the masses. The whole course of Social-Democracy's historical development is characterised by the fact that in face of all obstacles it has been winning for itself increased freedom of action, despite tsarist laws and police measures. The revolutionary proletariat surrounds itself, as it were, with a certain atmosphere, unthinkable for the government, of sympathy and support both within the working class and within other classes (which, of course, agree with only a small part of the demands of the working-class democrats). In the initial stages of the movement a Social-Democrat had to carry on a great deal of what almost amounted to cultural work, or to concentrate

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 491.—*Ed.*

almost exclusively on economic agitation. Now these functions, one after another, are passing into the hands of new forces, of wider sections that are being enlisted in the movement. The revolutionary organisations have concentrated more and more on carrying out the function of real *political* leadership, the function of drawing *Social-Democratic* conclusions from the workers' protest and the popular discontent. In the beginning we had to teach the workers the ABC, both in the literal and in the figurative senses. Now the standard of political literacy has risen so gigantically that we can and should concentrate all our efforts on the more direct Social-Democratic objectives aimed at giving an organised direction to the revolutionary stream. Now the liberals and the legal press are doing a great deal of the "preparatory" work upon which we have hitherto had to expend so much effort. Now the open propaganda of democratic ideas and demands, no longer persecuted by the weakened government, has spread so widely that we must learn to adjust ourselves to this entirely new scope of the movement. Naturally, in this preparatory work there are both tares and wheat. Naturally, Social-Democrats will now have to pay greater attention to combating the influence of the bourgeois democrats on the workers. But this very work will have much more real Social-Democratic content than our former activity, which aimed mainly at rousing the politically unconscious masses.

The more the popular movement spreads, the more clearly will the true nature of the different classes stand revealed and the more pressing will the *Party*'s task be in leading the class, in becoming its organiser, instead of dragging at the tail-end of events. The more the revolutionary independent activity of all kinds develops everywhere, the more obvious will be the hollowness and inanity of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* catchwords, so eagerly taken up by the new-Iskrists, about independent activity in general, the more significant will become the meaning of *Social-Democratic* independent activity, and the greater will be the demands which events make on our *revolutionary initiative*. The wider the new streams of the social movement become, the greater becomes the importance of a strong Social-Democratic organisation capable of creating new channels for these streams. The

more the democratic propaganda and agitation conducted independently of us works to our advantage, the greater becomes the importance of an organised Social-Democratic leadership to safeguard the independence of the working class from the bourgeois democrats.

A revolutionary epoch is to the Social-Democrats what wartime is to an army. We must broaden the cadres of our army, we must advance them from peace strength to war strength, we must mobilise the reservists, recall the furloughed, and form new auxiliary corps, units, and services. We must not forget that in war we necessarily and inevitably have to put up with less trained replacements, very often to replace officers with rank-and-file soldiers, and to speed up and simplify the promotion of soldiers to officers' rank.

To drop metaphor, we must considerably increase the membership of all Party and Party-connected organisations in order to be able to keep up to some extent with the stream of popular revolutionary energy which has been a hundredfold strengthened. This, it goes without saying, does not mean that consistent training and systematic instruction in the Marxist truths are to be left in the shade. We must, however, remember that at the present time far greater significance in the matter of training and education attaches to the military operations, which *teach* the untrained precisely and entirely in *our* sense. We must remember that our "doctrinaire" faithfulness to Marxism is now being reinforced by the march of revolutionary events, which is everywhere furnishing *object lessons to the masses* and that all these lessons confirm precisely our dogma. Hence, we do not speak about abandoning the dogma, or relaxing our distrustful and suspicious attitude towards the woolly intellectuals and the arid-minded revolutionaries. Quite the contrary. We speak about new methods of teaching dogma, which it would be unpardonable for a Social-Democrat to forget. We speak of the importance for our day of using the object lessons of the great revolutionary events in order to convey—not to study circles, as in the past, but to the masses—our old, "dogmatic" lessons that, for example, it is necessary in practice to combine terror with the uprising of the masses, or that behind the liberalism of the educated Russian society one must be able to discern the class interests of our

bourgeoisie (cf. our polemics with the Socialists-Revolutionaries on this question in *Vperyod*, No. 3*).

Thus, it is not a question of relaxing our Social-Democratic exactingness and our orthodox intransigence, but of strengthening both in *new* ways, by new methods of training. In war-time, recruits should get their training lessons directly from military operations. So tackle the new methods of training more boldly, comrades! Forward, and organise more and more squads, send them into battle, recruit more young workers, extend the normal framework of all Party organisations, from committees to factory groups, craft unions, and student circles! Remember that every moment of delay in this task will play into the hands of the enemies of Social-Democracy; for the new streams are seeking an immediate outlet, and if they do not find a Social-Democratic channel they will rush into a non-Social-Democratic channel. Remember that every practical step in the revolutionary movement will decidedly, inevitably give the young recruits a lesson in Social-Democratic science; for this science is based on an objectively correct estimation of the forces and tendencies of the various classes, while the revolution itself is nothing but the break-up of old superstructures and the independent action of the various classes, each striving to erect the new superstructure in its own way. But do not debase our revolutionary science to the level of mere book dogma, do not vulgarise it with wretched phrases about tactics-as-process and organisation-as-process, with phrases that seek to justify confusion, vacillation, and lack of initiative. Give more scope to all the diverse kinds of enterprise on the part of the most varied groups and circles, bearing in mind that, apart from our counsel and regardless of it, the relentless exigencies of the march of revolutionary events will keep them upon the correct course. It is an old maxim that in politics one often has to learn from the enemy. And at revolutionary moments the enemy always forces correct conclusions upon us in a particularly instructive and speedy manner.

To sum up, we must reckon with the growing movement, which has increased a hundredfold, with the new tempo of

* See pp. 83-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the work, with the freer atmosphere and the wider field of activity. The work must be given an entirely different scope. Methods of training should be refocussed from peaceful instruction to military operations. Young fighters should be recruited more boldly, widely, and rapidly into the ranks *of all and every kind* of our organisations. *Hundreds* of new organisations should be set up for the purpose without a moment's delay. Yes, hundreds; this is no hyperbole, and let no one tell me that it is "too late" now to tackle such a broad organisational job. No, it is never too late to organise. We must use the freedom we are getting by law and the freedom we are taking despite the law to strengthen and multiply the number of Party organisations of all varieties. Whatever the course or the outcome of the revolution may be, however early it may be checked by one or other circumstance, all its real gains will be rendered secure and reliable only insofar as the proletariat is organised.

The slogan "Organise!" which the adherents of the majority wanted to issue, fully formulated, at the Second Congress must now be put into effect immediately. If we fail to show bold initiative in setting up new organisations, we shall have to give up as groundless all pretensions to the role of vanguard. If we stop helplessly at the achieved boundaries, forms, and confines of the committees, groups, meetings, and circles, we shall merely prove our own incapacity. Thousands of circles are now springing up everywhere without our aid, without any definite programme or aim, simply under the impact of events. The Social-Democrats must make it their task to establish and strengthen direct contacts with the greatest possible number of these circles, to assist them, to give them the benefit of their own knowledge and experience, to stimulate them with their own revolutionary initiative. Let all such circles, except those that are avowedly non-Social-Democratic, either directly join the Party or *align themselves with the Party*. In the latter event we must not demand that they accept our programme or that they necessarily enter into organisational relations with us. Their mood of protest and their sympathy for the cause of international revolutionary Social-Democracy in themselves suffice, provided the Social-Democrats work effectively among them, for these circles of *sympathisers* under the

impact of events to be transformed at first into democratic assistants and then into convinced members of the Social-Democratic working-class party.

There are masses of people, and we are short of people; this contradictory formula has long expressed the contradictions between the organisational life and the organisational needs of the Social-Democratic Party. Today this contradiction is more salient than ever before; we often hear from all sides passionate appeals for new forces, complaints about the shortage of forces in the organisations, while at the same time we have everywhere countless offers of service, a growth of young forces, especially among the working class. The practical organiser who complains of a shortage of people under such circumstances becomes the victim of the illusion from which Madame Roland suffered, when she wrote in 1793, at the peak of the Great French Revolution, that France had no men, that there were only dwarfs. People who talk in this manner do not see the wood for the trees; they admit that they are blinded by events, that it is not they, the revolutionaries, who control events in mind and deed, but events that control them and have overwhelmed them. Such organisers *had better retire* and leave the field clear for younger forces who often make up with verve what they lack in experience.

There is no dearth of people; never has revolutionary Russia had such a multitude of people as now. Never has a revolutionary class been so well off for temporary allies, conscious friends, and unconscious supporters as the Russian proletariat is today. There are masses of people; all we need do is get rid of tail-ist ideas and precepts, give full scope to initiative and enterprise, to "plans" and "undertakings", and thus show ourselves to be worthy representatives of the great revolutionary class. Then the proletariat of Russia will carry through *the whole great Russian revolution* as heroically as it has begun it.

Vperyod, No. 9,
March 8 (February 23), 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

OSVOBOZHDENIYE-ISTS AND NEW-ISKRISTS, MONARCHISTS AND GIRONDISTS

Osvobozhdeniye, No. 66, published a review of Martynov's pamphlet *Two Dictatorships* (approved and recommended by the editors of *Iskra*; see issue No. 84). As was to be expected, the liberal bourgeois does not conceal his sympathies with the opportunist wing of the Social-Democratic movement. *Osvobozhdeniye* regards Martynov's pamphlet, "*like the work of Mr. Akimov*", as "*one of the most interesting contributions to Social-Democratic literature of the present day*". Could a liberal have reacted in any other way to the preaching of tail-ism, which seeks to frighten the revolutionary class with the dire perspective of participation in the provisional government and the "revolutionary dictatorship" in a *democratic* revolution (which Martynov, in his fear of "Jacobinism" confounds with the socialist revolution!)? Is it merely a coincidence that *Osvobozhdeniye*, in the article "A Significant Turn", welcomed Plekhanov's ideas of making concessions to the revisionists? How is one to account for *Osvobozhdeniye*'s assertion (No. 57) that "in fact the Menshevists are now defending something more vital and essential than the Bolshevists"? Is it not because "the only hope for the ideological vitality of Russian liberalism lies in the vitality of Social-Democratic opportunism" (see our publication *An Obliging Liberal**)? Was Mr. Struve right or wrong in contending that Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Political Tasks*, published *under the editorship of* "*Iskra*" (see issue No. 72) "is perfectly right in defending certain

* First published as a leaflet, Geneva, November 6, 1904. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 484-87.—*Ed.*

ideas with which readers of Social-Democratic literature have been familiar from the writings of Messrs. Akimov, Martynov, Krichevsky, and other so-called Economists" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 57)? Had Martynov and Co. stopped to think of these questions, they might perhaps have been able to grasp the puzzling (how very, very puzzling!) ideas of the old *Iskra* about the similarity of the relations between the Jacobins and the Girondists, on the one hand, and between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists, on the other. (This idea was first advanced, if we are not mistaken, in the leading article of *Iskra*, No. 2, written by Plekhanov.) Were the Girondists traitors to the cause of the Great French Revolution? They were not. But they were inconsistent, wavering, opportunist champions of that cause. *That is why* they were opposed by the Jacobins, who upheld the interests of the advanced class of the eighteenth century as consistently as the revolutionary Social-Democrats uphold the interests of the advanced class of the twentieth. That is why the downright betrayers of the cause of the great revolution, the monarchists, the clerical constitutionalists, etc., supported the Girondists and shielded them from the attacks of the Jacobins. Are you beginning to see light now, most honourable Girondist Martynov? Not yet? Well, we shall try to clarify the point further. Are the new-Iskrists traitors to the proletarian cause? No. But they are inconsistent, wavering, opportunist champions of the cause (and of the organisational and tactical principles illumining the cause). That is why their position is opposed by the revolutionary Social-Democrats (by some directly and overtly, by others covertly, behind the closed doors of their editorial offices, with devices and ruses). That is why the new-Iskrists are ideologically supported and shielded by the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd—the *downright betrayers* of the proletarian cause. Are you beginning to see light now, most honourable Girondist Martynov?

Vperyod, No. 9,
March 8 (February 23), 1905

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EVASIONS WITHOUT END

Iskra and the so-called Council are continuing their tactics of delay, of pretexts, and of evasion in the matter of convening the Congress. Plekhanov tries to take a formal stand by reiterating with an insistence worthy of a better cause that the Congress is convened by the Council and that therefore any congress not so convened is illegal. This argument is so one-sided and naïvely self-interested that one is strongly tempted "to give the hare a bit of the bear's ear"*—to give Plekhanov a medal for his meticulous observance of the Party Rules and Party laws! We would most humbly ask the very honourable advocate of the dialectic, that is, of the all-round approach: does the Council exist for the Party or the Party for the Council? Is the Council accountable to, and controllable by, the Party or is the Party accountable to the Council? Does discipline for the higher body eliminate discipline for the lower body? Will our vigilant limb of the law try to remember the arguments he used in this connection at the Second Congress of the Party?

The Council, according to our Rules, is duty bound to convene a congress when half the votes are cast for it. What is the Party to do when the Council shirks its duties? The Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party give a direct answer to this question, namely, the Congress in such an event is convened not by the supreme governing body of the Party, but by a special control committee independent of that body. Our Rules give no answer at all to that question.

* The allusion is to I. A. Krylov's fable "The Hare at the Hunt".—*Ed.*

Does this mean, we ask our friends of the new *Iskra*, that the problem is insoluble? Does it mean that should the Council shirk its Party responsibilities the Party would have to dissolve and be superseded by the Council? The Party for the Council—is that it?

We make bold to say that this is not so, that the Party itself is *obliged* to see to it that its Rules are observed by its functionaries, that "to see to it" does not only mean to criticise by word but to rectify by deed. He who is unable to demand *successfully* of his agents the discharge of their duties towards those who entrusted them is unworthy of the name of a politically free citizen. He who cannot demand *successfully* of his agents the discharge of their Party duties towards those who entrusted them is unworthy of the name of Party member. The Council is the agent of the committees. The committees *are in duty bound* to demand of this agent the discharge of its duties towards those who have entrusted it. This the committees can do *only* by electing their bureau for convening the Congress. And that is what the committees have done. That is what they were *obliged* to do, if they were conscious of their elementary Party obligations.

Will the honourable Comrade Plekhanov, perhaps, try to deny the correctness of this statement? Will he try to name *any* Social-Democratic party in the world whose members would have refrained from acting as our committees acted, when faced with the refusal of a given Party body to convene the Party Congress? We challenge you to try, Comrade Plekhanov.

Now let us proceed to the second factual question, whether our Council actually did shirk its Party duties in the matter of convening the Congress. This is no mere formal question, since apart from duty under the Rules there is still the duty....*

Written after February 24 (March 9), 1905

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Published according to the manuscript

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* The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

WHOM ARE THEY TRYING TO FOOL?

In issue No. 89 of *Iskra*, just arrived, we find a decision of the "Party Council" dated March 8, 1905. As was to be expected, the "Council" abroad frets and fumes against the Party Congress which is being convened by the Party committees in Russia, declaring that "in acting the way they do, its participants place themselves outside the Party". We quite understand the resentment of the group abroad, from whom the Party working in Russia has long since moved away in actual fact and is now moving away also formally. We also understand that only under the spur of resentment and despair can people argue so illogically and "deviate from the truth" as maladroitly as does the Council. "According to the Party Rules," we are told, "the Congress can be convened only by the Council." Yes, except in those cases when the Council breaks these Rules and, instead of convening the Congress, as it is in duty bound to do, fraudulently evades the issue. Precisely such a "case" was proved long ago by the Party against the Council (see Orlovsky's *The Council Against the Party*, where he shows, among other things, that according to the "Council's" arithmetic, $16 \times 4 = 61$!). We are told further that on January 1, 1905, according to the unanimous decision of the Council (including Lenin's vote) there were 33 qualified organisations besides the centres. That is not true. The Party has long known, from that pamphlet, that on January 1, 1905, the number of such organisations was only 29. The Kuban and Kazan committees mentioned by *Iskra* were never approved by the Council, while the Polesye and North-Western committees were approved only as of April 1, 1905. This leaves 29 organisations (the committees of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, the North,

Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Saratov, Ural-Ufa, Siberia, Don, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Riga, Orel-Bryansk, Smolensk, Samara, Voronezh, the Caucasian Federation= 4 committees, Kursk, Astrakhan, Nikolayev, Crimea, the Mining and Metal District, and the League). The "Bureau of Committees of the Majority" maintains that it has been authorised by ten organisations, the Council further states. That is a lie. The Bureau was elected, as everyone knows, before January 1, 1905, at three conferences, by 13 committees (6 Northern, 3 Southern, and 4 Caucasian). After the Bureau announced the convening of the Congress, the Voronezh and Tula committees aligned themselves with it. So that up to January 1, 1905, out of the 28 qualified organisations in Russia, 15 declared for the Congress, in defiance of the Bonapartist centres. This does not include the qualified organisations (the Saratov, Siberian, and other committees) which long ago declared themselves generally in favour of the Congress (see Shakhov's pamphlet *The Struggle for the Congress*). How ludicrous and clumsy are the Council's attempts to deceive the uninformed public, which learns of what is happening, not from documents, but from gossip abroad, is strikingly illustrated in the following two reports. In the very interesting pamphlet *Report of the Geneva Meeting on September 2, 1904*, issued by the Minority, Dan admits that the majority of the Party committees broke off all comradely relations with *Iskra*, while Plekhanov, a bitter opponent of the Majority, was compelled to declare that the forces of the warring camps were approximately equal! (This is the opinion of a resident abroad, mark you.) In Lenin's *Statement**—which, far from being refuted by the Minority, was openly acknowledged by Popov—no less a person than an agent of the Central Committee admits that the Minority has only four committees in Russia, and that at a real Party congress the Editorial Board and the Council are certain to be removed from office. Once more: whom are you trying to fool, you heroes of co-optation? You are mortally afraid of the only real Party solution—the Congress—while at the same time you claim that your opponents are backed by a negligible fraction of the total number of organisations,

* See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 535.—*Ed.*

only about a quarter at the most! In your fury you fail to see that you are castigating no one but yourselves. Is Nicholas II, then, afraid of a Constituent Assembly because the enemies of tsarism constitute only a negligible fraction of the people?

Vperyod, No. 10,
March 15 (2), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

THE PROLETARIAT AND THE BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATS

We have pointed out the unpardonable short-sightedness of the new-Iskrists' view that moderate Russian liberalism has been dealt its death-blow* and that the vanguard role of the proletariat has been recognised by our democrats. On the contrary, the bourgeois democrats are striving more than ever now to gain control of the working-class movement; more harmful now than ever, therefore, is *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism, which the new-Iskrists are attempting to revive. Here is an interesting leaflet which is being circulated in Russia and which offers valuable material on this question:

"The bourgeoisie has lately shown a tendency towards organisation; but what is still more significant is that the bourgeois democrats are turning to the workers. The democrats want to act as leaders of the proletariat's economic and political struggle. 'By conviction,' they say, 'we are, strictly speaking, Social-Democrats; but Social-Democracy, owing to Party dissensions, does not grasp the importance of the present moment and has failed to lead the working-class movement; this is where we want to step in.' We learn from what they have to say further that these new 'Social-Democrats at heart' have not worked out any programme of their own but merely intend to explain things to the workers and answer their inquiries. The literature is to meet the same needs and is by no means to bear a Party character. And so these 'clean Social-Democrats', dissatisfied with the tactics and the present behaviour of the Committee, have turned to the methods of 'lending ear to the masses', which history

* See p. 170 of this volume.—*Ed.*

has long ago rejected, to the methods of Economism of blessed memory. Considering themselves to be Social-Democrats and the true spokesmen of working-class aspirations, these gentlemen do not understand or do not want to understand that the working-class movement will achieve substantial results only if it is led by a united working-class party, if the proletariat is conscious of its class distinctness and realises that its real emancipation lies in its own hands and not in the hands of the bourgeois democrats, who are discrediting the actions of the workers' party. These 'strictly-speaking' Social-Democrats, alleged Marxists, ought to realise the demoralisation they are bringing among the working-class masses by seeking to prove that certain 'democrats' (but not Social-Democrats) consisting exclusively of bourgeois intellectuals are called upon to show the workers the way to freedom and socialism.

"The last point, though, they seem to have entirely forgotten in their absorption with politics of the day. Little by little they are carrying elements of opportunism into the working-class movement. The workers are not so keen now on founding a party of their own, relying as they do on the intelligentsia. Why, then, do these new friends of the working class allow and even encourage such things to happen? The 'democrats' themselves give a frank reply to this question. 'Our group used to work only among the intellectuals,' they say, 'but recent events have compelled us to turn to the workers.'

"The democratic milk-skimmers, who call themselves Social-Democrats in 'principle', began to give their gracious attention to the proletarian movement only after the masses had come out into the streets and the blood of thousands of workers had stained the pavements. Posing as the true friends of the working class, they pass by with a hypocritical mien the work of decades, work which has created and directed the revolutionary mood of the Russian proletariat and, at the cost of great sacrifices, brought into being the united Social-Democratic working-class party. Apparently, these modernistic Social-Democrats have learned only one thing from the whole of Marxist doctrine (and that only recently), namely, that only the power of the organised proletariat is capable of overthrowing autocratic tyranny and

winning political freedom, the benefit of which will be derived mainly by the bourgeoisie. The new friends of the proletariat are trying to saddle themselves upon the working-class movement and urge it on with the whip of immediate results, to the shout, 'Onward, to our freedom!' How apt the Russian proverb, God save us from our friends, from our enemies we shall save ourselves."

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THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

The peasant uprisings have begun. Reports of peasants raiding landed estates and confiscating the landlords' grain and cattle are coming in from various provinces. The tsarist armies, routed by the Japanese in Manchuria, are taking their revenge on the defenceless people, making expeditions against the enemy at home, against the rural poor. The urban working-class movement is acquiring a new ally in the revolutionary peasantry. The attitude of the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat, the Social-Democrats, towards the peasant movement is becoming a question of immediate practical significance and must be placed on the order of the day in all our Party organisations, in all speeches by propagandists and agitators.

The Social-Democrats have pointed out repeatedly that the peasant movement sets before them a twofold task. Unquestionably we must support this movement and spur it on, inasmuch as it is a revolutionary-democratic movement. At the same time we must unswervingly maintain our class proletarian point of view; we must organise the rural proletariat, like the urban proletariat and together with it, into an independent class party; we must explain to it that its interests are antagonistic to those of the bourgeois peasantry; we must call upon it to fight for the socialist revolution, and point out to it that liberation from oppression and poverty lies, not in turning several sections of the peasantry into petty bourgeois, but only in replacing the entire bourgeois system by the socialist system.

This twofold task of the Social-Democrats was often stressed in the old *Iskra*, beginning with issue No. 3,* i.e., even

* "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry". See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

before the first peasant movement of 1902; it found expression in our Party programme; it was also repeated in our newspaper (issue No. 3*). Now, when it is particularly important to throw light on the practical aspects of this problem, it would be of interest to quote the remarks of Karl Kautsky, who published an article entitled "The Peasants and the Revolution in Russia" in the German Social-Democratic journal, *Die Neue Zeit*. As a Social-Democrat, Kautsky stoutly upholds the truth that the task facing our revolution *now* is not that of effecting the socialist revolution but that of removing the political obstacles to the development of the existing, capitalist, mode of production. He goes on to say: "On the question of the relations between peasant and landlord, the revolutionary urban movement should remain neutral. It has no reason to step in between the peasants and the landlord, to champion the latter against the former; its sympathies are wholly with the peasantry. But neither is it the task of the revolutionary urban movement to incite the peasants against the landlords, who in present-day Russia play an entirely different role from that, let us say, of the French feudal nobility in the days of the *ancien régime*. Besides, even if they wished to, the urban revolutionaries could have very little influence on the relations between the landlords and the peasants. That is a matter the landlords and the peasants must settle between themselves." For a correct understanding of Kautsky's remarks, which, taken out of context, might create no little misunderstanding, one must bear in mind also the following remark at the end of the article: "A victorious revolution would not have too much difficulty in using the large latifundia of the worst enemies of the revolution ... to improve the conditions of the proletarians and the peasants."

The reader who carefully compares these statements of Kautsky will easily recognise in them the Social-Democratic presentation of the question we have just outlined. Certain inaccuracies and unclarities in Kautsky's expressions can be accounted for by the cursory nature of his remarks and his insufficient acquaintance with the agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy. The crux of the matter is that

* See pp. 83-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the attitude of the revolutionary proletariat towards the antagonism between the peasants and the landlords cannot, in all the exigencies of the Russian revolution, remain the same in all cases and under all circumstances. Under certain circumstances, in certain situations, this attitude must be one not only of sympathy, but of direct support, and not merely support, but actual "incitement". Under other circumstances, the attitude can and should be neutral. Judging from what we have quoted, Kautsky has correctly grasped this double aspect of our task, in contrast, not only to our "Socialists-Revolutionaries", who are sunk completely in the vulgar illusions of revolutionary democracy, but also to many Social-Democrats, who, like Ryazanov or X,[74] have been seeking a "simple" solution of the problem, valid for all combinations. The fundamental error of such Social-Democrats (and of all Socialists-Revolutionaries) is that they do not adhere to the class viewpoint, and that, in seeking a universal solution of the problem in all its combinations, they forget the dual nature of the well-to-do and the middle peasant. They take into account, virtually, only two classes—either landlords and "peasant and working class", or proprietors and proletarians. Actually, however, there are three classes, all of which differ in their immediate and ultimate aims: the landlords, the well-to-do peasantry and partly the middle peasantry, and, finally, the proletariat. Actually, the task of the proletariat under these circumstances is necessarily twofold. The entire difficulty of a Social-Democratic agrarian programme and agrarian policy in Russia lies in defining, as clearly and precisely as possible, the conditions under which the proletariat must observe neutrality and the conditions under which support and "incitement" are necessary.

There can be only one solution to this problem: with the peasant bourgeoisie against all manner of serfdom and against the serf-owning landlords; with the urban proletariat against the peasant bourgeoisie and every other bourgeoisie—such is the "line" of the rural proletariat and of its ideologists, the Social-Democrats. In other words: to support the peasantry and urge it on even to the point of seizing any seigniorial "property", no matter how "sacred", *insofar as* this peasantry acts in a revolutionary-democratic

manner; to be wary of the peasantry, to organise separately from it, to be ready to combat it, *insofar as* this peasantry acts in a reactionary or anti-proletarian manner. Or, to put it still differently: aid to the peasant when his struggle with the landlord contributes to the development and strengthening of the democratic forces; neutrality towards the peasant when his struggle with the landlord is merely a matter of squaring accounts between two factions of the landowning class, a matter to which the proletariat and the democrats are indifferent.

Such an answer, of course, will not satisfy people who approach the peasant question without well thought-out theoretical views, who are intent on popular "revolutionary" slogans calculated for effect, and who do not understand the great and serious danger of revolutionary adventurism, particularly in the sphere of the peasant question. In regard to such people—of whom there are now a considerable number among us, such as the Socialists-Revolutionaries, with the development of the revolution and of the peasant movement promising an increase in their ranks—the Social-Democrat must firmly uphold the standpoint of the class struggle against every kind of revolutionary vagueness; they must contrapose to revolutionary phrase-mongering the sober estimate of the heterogeneous elements in the peasantry. Speaking practically and concretely, the following statement will bring us nearest the truth: All opponents of Social-Democracy on the agrarian question fail to take into consideration the fact that in European Russia proper there is an entire stratum of well-to-do peasants (one and a half to two million households out of a total of about ten million). This stratum controls no less than half of all the implements of production and all the property owned by the peasants. It cannot exist without employing seasonal and day labourers. It is certainly hostile to serfdom, to the landlords, and to the bureaucracy, and is capable of becoming democratic, but still more certain is its hostility to the rural proletariat. Any attempt in an agrarian programme or in an agrarian policy to tone down or ignore this class antagonism is a conscious or unconscious departure from the socialist point of view.

Between the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie lies the stratum of the middle peasantry, whose position

contains features to be found in both of these antipodes. The common features in the position of all these strata, of the peasantry as a whole, undoubtedly tend to make the entire peasant movement democratic, great as may be the evidences of non-class-consciousness and of reactionary sentiment in particular instances. It is our task never to depart from the class standpoint and to organise the closest possible union between the urban and the rural proletariat. It is our task to clarify for ourselves and for the people the *real* democratic and revolutionary content that lies in the general, albeit vague, striving towards "land and freedom". It is, therefore, our task to lend the most energetic support and impetus to this striving, while at the same time preparing the elements of socialist struggle in the countryside as well.

To determine clearly the practical attitude of the Social-Democratic working-class party towards the peasant movement, the Third Congress of our Party must adopt a resolution calling for support to that movement. The following is the draft of such a resolution formulating the above views, which have repeatedly been amplified in Social-Democratic literature; it must now be discussed in the widest possible circle of Party functionaries:

"The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as the party of the class-conscious proletariat, strives to bring about the complete emancipation of all working people from every kind of exploitation, and supports every revolutionary movement against the present social and political system. Therefore, the R.S.D.L.P. strongly supports the present-day peasant movement, among others, and stands for all revolutionary measures capable of improving the condition of the peasantry, not halting at the expropriation of the landed estates to this end. At the same time, as the class party of the proletariat, the R.S.D.L.P. works undeviatingly towards an independent class organisation of the rural proletarians, ever mindful of its obligation to make clear to them the antagonism of their interests to those of the peasant bourgeoisie, to bring them to understand that only the common struggle of the rural and the urban proletariat against the whole of bourgeois society can lead to the socialist revolution, which alone is capable of really freeing the mass of the rural poor from poverty and exploitation.

"As a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry, and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into this movement, the R.S.D.L.P. proposes the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees for all-round support of all democratic reforms and for their implementation in detail. In these committees as well the R.S.D.L.P. will strive for an independent organisation of the rural proletarians for the purpose of supporting the entire peasantry in all its revolutionary-democratic actions, on the one hand, and, on the other, of safeguarding the true interests of the rural proletariat in its struggle against the peasant bourgeoisie."

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FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

STREET FIGHTING[75]

(THE ADVICE OF A GENERAL OF THE COMMUNE)

Editors' foreword: The article presented below is a translation from the memoirs of Cluseret, a famous leader of the Paris Commune. As is evident from the short biographical sketch here given, Cluseret based his considerations chiefly, though not exclusively, on the experience of the Paris street uprisings. Moreover, he had in mind specifically a revolution of the proletariat against all propertied classes, whereas we in Russia are now experiencing a revolution which is largely a movement of the whole people against the government clique. It goes without saying, therefore, that Cluseret's original ideas should serve the Russian proletariat only as material for an independent analysis of the experience of the West-European comrades with a view to its adaptation to our own conditions. We believe it would be useful to acquaint the reader briefly with the author's life, which is not devoid of interest.

Gustave-Paul Cluseret was born in Paris on June 13, 1823. He studied at the Military School of Saint-Cyr, from which he graduated in 1843 as a second lieutenant. In 1848, with the rank of lieutenant, he took a very active part in suppressing the workers' revolt in Paris (the June Days). Within six hours he took eleven barricades and captured three banners. For this "heroic deed" he was awarded the Order of the Legion of Honour. In 1855, now a captain, he fought in the Crimean campaign, and then retired. He served under Garibaldi in Italy's war of liberation. In 1861 he went to America, where he fought in the Civil War against the slave states. He was raised to the rank of general and (after the victory at Cross Keys) was granted American citizenship. He then

returned to France. In 1868 he received a prison term for his articles in the newspaper *L'Art*. In Sainte-Pélagie prison he became connected with leaders of the International. His sharp military criticisms in the newspapers resulted in his deportation as an American citizen. Upon the proclamation of the Republic (September 4, 1870), he returned to Paris and took part in the attempts at a revolt in Lyons and in Marseilles. On April 3, 1871, he was appointed Minister of War of the Commune. On April 16, he was elected a member of the Commune. For surrendering Fort Issy he was dismissed by the Commune and arrested, but he was acquitted by a court of honour. After the fall of the Commune he escaped from France. He was sentenced to death on August 30, 1872, by the Court of Versailles. After the amnesty of 1881 he returned to France and contributed to the newspapers *La Commune* and *La Marseillaise*. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for inciting the army to insubordination and fled from France. In the 1888 elections to the Chamber of Deputies he was a candidate of the Revolutionary Party. He waged a zealous campaign against parliamentarism and the "Clemencist" Radical Party. In 1889 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies by the second *arrondissement* of Toulon. Belonged to the Socialist Labour group. Wrote a book *The Army and Democracy* (1869) and two volumes of *Memoirs* (1887) dealing with the Commune.

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THE FIRST STEP

Knock, and it shall be opened unto you, we said after reading the Party Council's resolution of March 10, 1905, in *Iskra*, No. 91. No sooner had the news of the Council's resolution of March 8, 1905, and our answer in issue No. 10 of *Vperyod** reached Russia, than we find ourselves confronted with a remarkable new change of front on the part of the Council, a change for which we can only congratulate our comrades of the new *Iskra* with all our heart and wish them to take a further step in the same direction.

The Council's resolution of March 10 addresses itself to the participants at the Third Party Congress that is being convened by the Russian Bureau, proposing that the Congress accept the mediation of the German Party and of Bebel towards restoring Party unity, and expresses the Council's consent to send two representatives to the Congress for talks on implementing the idea of arbitration.

In taking this first step "*on the new path*", the Council, of course, could not help employing some of its old methods; it could not help repeating an untruth, the inherent absurdity of which we exposed in *Vperyod*, No. 10, namely, that the Congress, which is being called by a majority of the Russian committees, is not a Party Congress, but that "an insignificant group of Party members" wants "to force its decisions on the real majority of the Party". These ruses would be pathetic were they not so ridiculous, and we should not care to dwell on them again, all the more so since our attention now is naturally drawn to the new step taken by the

* See pp. 225-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Council, which at last (at long last!) has realised the importance of the Party Congress as a means of resolving the Party crisis and has finally made the first, albeit feeble, timid, and inconsistent attempt—but still an attempt—to look at things simply, to call a spade a spade, and to essay a path, a "new path", for restoring Party unity by means of direct talks between the two sections of the Party that arose after the Second Congress.

Excellent! It should have been done long ago. The party of the proletariat would have been spared many months of excruciating, senseless, drawn-out crisis and clandestine splitting. A slightly more serious and sincere desire to reckon openly and frankly with the will of the Party functionaries working in Russia would have helped Russian Social-Democracy out of its temporary state of disintegration a full year ago. Yes, a year ago, even sooner.

It was at the end of January 1904. The Party Council met for the first time to discuss the new situation in the Party and the Party crisis, with Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Vasilyev,[76] and Lenin attending. The last two, members of the Central Committee and adherents of the Majority, saw clearly that the Party had *in fact* already been split by the Minority and that the *clandestine* character of the split brought an unspeakable corruption into the Party and demoralised it completely, in that it left one side free to employ the most reckless "brawling" methods, while the other side was in duty bound to abide by the general decisions. The *clandestine* split of the Party (in its moral and political significance and in its moral and political consequences) stands to an open split approximately in the same relation as clandestine adultery to open free love.

Thus, the above-mentioned Council members proposed a resolution (January 28, 1904), which was published in full by Shakhov (*The Struggle for the Congress*, p. 81), in which *the Bolsheviks*, although outnumbered by their opponents both on the Editorial Board and in the Council, the highest Party body, were the first to raise their voice for peace in the Party, in view of the crucial problems of the historic moment. The Bolsheviks drew there a clear line between the necessary and inevitable ideological struggle, on the one hand, and the "mean brawling", disorganisation, petty

rivalry, boycott, etc., on the other. They asked the Party Council to call on all Party members to "sink their petty differences as quickly as possible and keep the ideological struggle once and for all within such limits as would not lead to breaches of the Rules and not hamper practical activities and constructive work". We have so many Party members with short memories who like to speak of the Party's independent activity, but prefer idle gossip to a study of the documents bearing on our Party split, that we urgently recommend to all comrades desiring to have an understanding of Party affairs that they take a look at page 81 of the pamphlet *The Struggle for the Congress*.

The Mensheviks, of course, rejected the resolution proposed by Lenin and Vasilyev and adopted (Plekhanov, Martov, and Axelrod) a resolution asking the Central Committee to "co-opt" the Mensheviks. Since the Central Committee had on November 26, 1903, agreed to co-opt *two* Mensheviks of its own choice, this resolution of the Council could only mean that *three* definite individuals were being forced upon the C.C. Now the entire Party knows from published documents (Lenin's *Statement**) that it was because of these "three" that differences on points of principle were invented and a "mean brawling" was engaged in *up to November 1904*. In reply to the resolution on co-optation, Lenin and Vasilyev submitted a dissenting report (Shakhov, p. 84), which likewise we recommend to the uninformed and the forgetful to read for their own edification. This report stated that these members of the C.C. "positively and emphatically fail to see any honest and right way out of the present Party dissensions, any way of stopping this impermissible struggle over the composition of the centres other than the immediate convocation of a Party congress".

The Mensheviks, of course, are sabotaging the Congress. No reminders that at the Congress compromises of all kinds are permissible, that otherwise the struggle will assume the same revolting form as clandestine and mercenary love, produce any effect on them. Incidentally, while such tactics may be natural and understandable in the case of the Mensheviks, seeing that they have decided not to be embarrassed

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 527-37.—*Ed.*

by "mercenary love", in the case of the *conciliator* Plekhanov this is an enormous mistake, which has become obvious during the further progress of the crisis. Now anybody and everybody sees, and knows from the facts (namely, from the facts of Glebov[77] and Company's subsequent behaviour) that had Plekhanov voted in January 1904 for a Congress, the Congress would have been convened very quickly and *such an imposing conciliatory party would have been formed at the Congress* that it would have given *no* preponderance *whatever* to either the Majority or the Minority. At *that* time the Congress was not only likely to have been but was bound to be a *conciliatory* congress. We repeat, this is no mere conjecture, but a reflection that has been *definitely confirmed* by the subsequent course of events. But Plekhanov, too, preferred "mercenary love", viz., a clandestine split, to an attempt to talk things over directly and openly until a definite agreement would be achieved.

What do we see now? The Mensheviks have to accept, albeit timidly, inconsistently, and belatedly, the solution proposed by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks stuck to their guns and succeeded in having the Congress called, rightly maintaining that if the two "better halves" are not destined to go on "cohabiting", they must part openly, and not hide themselves like contemptible cowards.

Better late than never, of course, and we heartily welcome even this timid step taken by the Council, its readiness to send two "representatives". But we absolutely object to the timidity and inconsistency of this move. Why do you want to send to the Congress only two representatives *from the Council abroad*, gentlemen? Why not representatives from *all* Party organisations? The members of the Russian Bureau of Committees of the Majority have, as you know, *invited* everybody to the Congress, and have specially sent registered letters to the Editorial Board, to the Council, and to the League. Why this strange and inexplicable contradiction? On the one hand, when it came to securing a *hypocritical* peace with the three knights-errant of the Central Committee (in deliberate violation of the will of the Committees of the Majority) you did not rest content with sending "two representatives" from the Council, but *canvassed all the committees and organisations of the Minority*, as was openly stated in

issue No. 83 of *Iskra*. On the other hand, when it comes to securing *real* peace with the entire Party, you send for "direct talks" only two representatives, and those from the Council abroad alone. Where are the Russian Mensheviks, with whom it is a hundred times more important for us to come to terms than with a coterie of *littérateurs*? Where are the *workers*, the members and spokesmen of the organisations—those very workers whom you incited against the Second Congress, and about whose independent activity you shouted so much? Where are Comrades Akimov and Brouckère, Makhov and Yegorov (or their friends and comrades-in-idea), who, quite consistently from their point of view, supported the Mensheviks without, however, compromising themselves, i.e., without taking part in the co-optation squabbles? Where are Comrade Krichevsky and the other former "Economists", with whom you are supposed to have made peace, as Plekhanov and many others have asserted in the new *Iskra*? Where is Comrade Ryazanov, your solidarity with whom on many points we can also understand, but who nevertheless *refused to join the League, because it was a Menshevik organisation*?

Perhaps you will say that all these comrades have no credentials? But then you yourselves write a letter to the Congress "*waiving all formalities*"!

No, gentlemen, you will not satisfy us with half-measures, nor can you butter our parsnips with fine words. If you really want, speaking frankly and without "formalities", to work together, in the ranks of a single organisation, then *come to the Congress*, *all of you*, and invite all the comrade~ who are divided from us *only* in matters of ideology and not of co-optation. Then reckon with the "good will of revolutionaries", to which you so fatuously referred when trying to hide from the Congress, and which *alone* can positively and conclusively decide the fate of the *whole* Party represented at the Congress. Then look for mediators capable of influencing the "good will" of *all members of the Congress*. We shall heartily welcome every such mediator.

Knock, and it shall be opened unto you.... What we Bolsheviks have achieved by our open struggle is that we have come very close to a possibly direct and unequivocal way out of the crisis. We have succeeded in getting the Congress.

We have succeeded in getting the Mensheviks to change over from the drill-sergeant methods of the Party Council that has been left without a party to a straightforward, open offer of direct negotiations. Whether or not the Council will be sensible and honest enough to take the second step along the "new path", we are convinced in any case that we shall win the complete victory of the Party principle over circle narrowness.

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ON THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME[78]

By insisting that the draft programme was not written by me, Plekhanov is the first to carry our disputes over the matter into the open in the form of insinuations, rebukes, and reproaches. Unfortunately, he does not expound these disputes, but confines himself to gossip—to a statement, which though it may be piquant, is vague and unverifiable. Therefore, to my colleague's article against Plekhanov I must add that I have documentary evidence concerning our disputes during the discussion of the draft programme and that I shall publish this evidence when occasion offers. The readers will then see: (1) that Plekhanov's assertion that our relations cooled on account of *What Is To Be Done?* is absolutely untrue; they cooled because the Board of six, in the dispute over the programme, split into two halves; (2) that I advocated the thesis of the displacement of small-scale industry by large-scale industry and had it included in the programme. Plekhanov sought to confine himself to a nebulous expression in the nature of the famous "more or less"; (3) that I advocated and secured the substitution of the term "proletariat" for that of "toiling and exploited masses" in the passage dealing with the class character of our Party; and (4) that Plekhanov, when my adherents and I among the six on the Board criticised him for the fact that in his draft the proletarian character of our Party had not been brought out with sufficient clarity, parried with the counter-charge that I understood the proletarian character of the Party the way Martynov does.

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ON OUR AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

(A LETTER TO THE THIRD CONGRESS)

The new peasant movement, which is daily growing and gathering strength, is again forcing the question of our agrarian programme to the fore. The basic principle underlying this programme cannot, of course, give rise to differences of opinion and discussions. The party of the proletariat must support the movement of the peasantry. It will never defend the present system of landlordism against the revolutionary onset of the peasantry, but at the same time it will always strive to develop the class struggle in the countryside and to introduce political consciousness into this struggle. These principles, I believe, are shared by all Social-Democrats. Opinion is divided only when it comes to putting the principles into practice, when it comes to formulating them in a programme to meet the tasks of the moment.

Reality is the best arbiter of all theoretical differences, and I am confident that the rapid march of revolutionary events will eliminate also these differences on the agrarian question in the Social-Democratic movement. Hardly anyone will deny that it is not our business to indulge in project-mongering for all manner of land-reform schemes, or that we must strengthen the ties with the proletariat and *support* the peasant movement, without however losing sight of the possessive tendencies of the peasant proprietor—tendencies whose antagonism to the proletariat will be all the more rapidly and sharply revealed the more rapidly the revolution advances.

On the other hand, the present revolutionary moment plainly calls for a thoroughly definite and concrete slogan. The formation of *revolutionary peasant* committees must

become that slogan, and our Party's agrarian programme has quite correctly advanced it. There is a great amount of ignorance and backwardness in the peasant movement, and it would be extremely dangerous to cherish any illusions on that score. The ignorance of the peasant is revealed, first of all, in his failure to perceive the *political* aspect of the movement, to perceive, for instance, that without radical democratic changes in the *entire* political structure of the *entire state* it is absolutely impossible to make any lasting progress in the direction of extending the ownership of the land. The peasant needs land, and his revolutionary feeling, his instinctive, primitive sense of democracy *cannot* express itself otherwise than by laying hands on the landlords' land. No one will attempt to dispute this, of course. The Socialists-Revolutionaries let it go at that instead of analysing these vague aspirations of the peasantry from the class point of view. The Social-Democrats maintain, on the basis of such an analysis, that it is scarcely *possible* for the entire peasantry to go solid on any issue beyond the demand for the return of the cut-off lands,[79] for when the limits of such an agrarian reform are exceeded, the antagonism between the rural proletariat and the "enterprising muzhiks" will inevitably assert itself more sharply than ever. The Social-Democrats, of course, can have no objection to the insurgent muzhik's "dealing the landlord the final blow" and to his taking *all* his land away from him, but they cannot embark on adventurism in a proletarian programme, they cannot let the class struggle against the property-owners be obscured by roseate prospects of such changes in the landowning system (even though these changes may be democratic) as would merely reshuffle the classes or categories of property-owners.

Until now our programme contained the demand for the return of the cut-off lands, while the various commentaries on the programme pointed out that the cut-off lands are not a barrier, but "a door leading farther"*, and that the proletariat would gladly support the peasantry in this further advance, while having to keep a watchful eye on its temporary ally, the peasant proprietor, lest he

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* *To the Rural Poor*, first published in pamphlet form, Geneva, May 1903. See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 418.—*Ed.*

show his proprietary teeth. Now, in face of the revolutionary events, the question naturally arises whether it would not be more appropriate to transfer *such* a statement of our tactics from the commentaries to the programme proper. After all, the programme is the official general Party expression of the views of Social-Democracy, whereas a commentary necessarily represents the more or less personal views of this or that Social-Democrat. Would it not, therefore, be wiser to put into the programme a more general statement of our policy on this question, and leave it to the commentaries to elaborate on specific measures and separate demands, as, for instance, the cut-off lands?

To clarify my idea, I shall state here how the corresponding place in our programme ought to be formulated: (The R.S.D.L.P. demands above all) ... "(4) the formation of revolutionary peasant committees for the purpose of eliminating all remnants of the serf-owning system, transforming all rural relations in general along democratic lines, taking revolutionary measures to improve the lot of the peasantry, even to the extent of taking the land away from the landlords. Social-Democracy will back the peasantry in all its revolutionary-democratic undertakings, while at the same time defending the independent interests and the independent organisation of the rural proletariat."

The proposed formulation introduces into the programme what has hitherto usually been elaborated in the commentaries and transfers the cut-off lands from the programme to them. Such a change has the advantage of bringing out more clearly in the programme the specific, independent character of the proletarian position; and clarity on such an important issue outweighs all editorial inconveniences (such as the inclusion in the programme of an explanation usually placed in the commentaries, instead of a definite demand; we might mention, incidentally, that our programme contains such explanations: compare, for instance, the clause on combating reforms that tend to consolidate the tutelage of the police and the bureaucracy).[80] Another advantage is that the programme quashes once and for all the absurd idea alleging that the Social-Democrats tell the peasants they cannot and must not go beyond the cut-off lands. We must dispel this idea by a clear formulation in the programme, and not

confine ourselves to explaining it in the commentaries. The tact that no concrete methods for expropriating the land are mentioned in the proposed formulation may appear to be a defect. But is it, strictly speaking, a defect?

Social-Democrats who have written on the agrarian question have pointed out repeatedly how inappropriate it is for us to occupy ourselves with project-mongering in this connection, since the chief measure of an agrarian reform—nationalisation of the land—would, *in a police-ridden state*, necessarily be perverted and would serve only to obscure the class nature of the movement. Yet all other measures for transforming agrarian relations will, under the capitalist system, be only an approach to nationalisation; they will be only partial measures, only a few of the possible measures, i.e., measures to which Social-Democracy has no intention whatever of *restricting itself*. At the present time the Social-Democrats are against nationalisation, and even the Socialists-Revolutionaries, under the influence of our criticism, have become much more cautious on the subject (compare their draft programme with their former "élan").

But the point is that the revolutionary movement leads us towards the democratic republic, which, with the abolition of the standing army, etc., constitutes one of our immediate demands.

In a democratic republic, with the people armed and with other measures of a like republican character realised, Social-Democracy cannot renounce nationalisation of the land and thereby tie their own hands on this issue. Thus, the defect in the formulation I propose is only an apparent one. In point of fact, this formulation provides a consistent class slogan for the present moment—indeed, an absolutely concrete slogan—while leaving ample scope for the "revolutionary-democratic" measures which may prove necessary or desirable in the event of a favourable development of our revolution. At the present time, as well as in the future, pending the complete victory of the peasant uprising, a revolutionary slogan must necessarily take into account the antagonism between *peasant and landlord*; and the cut-off lands clause quite correctly emphasised this circumstance. On the other hand, all and every "nationalisation", "transfer of rents",

"socialisation", etc., ignore and obscure this characteristic antagonism, and therein lies their defect.

At the same time, the formulation I propose widens the aims of the revolutionary peasant committees to include "transforming all rural relations in general along democratic lines". The peasant committees are presented as a slogan in our programme, which correctly characterises them as *peasant*, i.e., social-estate, in essence, since oppression of one social-estate by another can be destroyed only by the whole of the lower, oppressed estate. But is there any reason for confining the aims of these committees to agrarian reforms? Must *other* committees really be set up for other, e.g., administrative, reforms? The trouble with the peasants, as I have previously pointed out, is their utter failure to perceive the political aspect of the movement. If we could succeed, even in a few instances, in connecting the effective revolutionary measures taken by the peasantry to improve their position (confiscation of grain, of livestock, and of *land*) with the formation and activity of *peasant committees* and with the full sanctioning of these committees by the revolutionary parties (and, under especially favourable conditions, by a provisional revolutionary government), we could consider the struggle to win the peasants for the democratic republic as won. Unless the peasantry is thus won over, all its revolutionary steps will be very insecure, and all its gains will easily be wrested from it by the social classes in power.

Finally, in speaking of supporting "revolutionary-democratic" measures, the proposed formulation draws a clear line between the deceptive, pseudo-socialist *appearance* of such measures as the peasant seizure of land and their actual democratic content. To realise how important it is for a Social-Democrat to draw such a line, it suffices to recall the attitude of Marx and Engels towards the agrarian movement, for instance, in America (Marx in 1848 on Kriege,[81] Engels in 1885 on Henry George[82]). Today, of course, no one will attempt to *deny* the existence of a peasant war for land, of the land fever (in semi-feudal countries or in the colonies). We fully recognise its legitimacy and its progressiveness, but at the same time we reveal its democratic, i.e., *in the final analysis*, its bourgeois-democratic content. Therefore,

while endorsing this content, we, for our part, make special "reservations"; we point to the "independent" role of the *proletarian* democratic movement and to the specific aims of the Social-Democratic Party as a class party that is working for the socialist revolution.

These are the reasons that lead me to suggest that the comrades discuss my proposal at the forthcoming Congress and broaden the corresponding clause of the programme in the direction I propose.

Vperyod, No. 12,
March 29 (16), 1905
[signed] —

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

WHAT THE BONAPARTISTS ARE UP TO

Geneva, March 29 (16)

We have just received the following report from Tver: "A periphery meeting held jointly with the Committee on March 9, and attended by a representative of the Central Committee, discussed the question of the attitude to the Third Party Congress which is being convened by the C.C. (appeal to the Party dated March 4, 1905). The resolution of the Tver Committee was read out: 'The Tver Committee welcomes the call of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to prepare for the Third Party Congress (resolution of the C.C. dated March 4, 1905) and it has resolved at its meeting to participate in the Congress by sending a delegate. In view, however, of the statement made by the Tver Committee to a representative of the Organising Bureau about participating in the Congress organised by that Bureau, the Tver Committee feels obligated to point out that this statement was made in response to the Bureau representative's* assurance of the C.C. decision to make the Congress then in preparation a regular one.'"

The periphery meeting did not support the resolution of the Tver Committee. The following resolution was adopted

* The representative of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, who made the report on the Third Congress at a meeting of the Tver committee and the periphery in February, informs us that this assertion of the Tver Committee is "inaccurate". "I told them, he declares "according to the *direct statement* of C.C. member Nikitich,[83] that the C.C. *had intended* to announce the Third Congress, thus making the Congress convened by the Bureau a regular congress by agreement, but that it *had not had time* for various reasons to enter into official negotiations with the Bureau on the question."

by a majority of seven votes to one with one abstention: "Having at last received the call of the Central Committee to prepare for the immediate convocation of the Third Congress, and welcoming this act of the C.C., we declare that we have already decided to take part in the *Party* Congress that is being convened by the Organising Bureau. We consider it possible to avail ourselves of the offer made by the C.C. in its appeal 'To the Party' dated March 4 only on the condition that a formal agreement is reached between the C.C. and the Organising Bureau" (6 for, 3 against). To note the mood of the other three comrades, who voted in the negative, I cite the other resolution, offered by two of the comrades who thus voted: "The local organisation welcomes the decision of the Central Committee to convene a Third Party Congress and strongly urges it and the Organising Bureau to come to an agreement between themselves. Should an agreement not eventuate, the local organisation leaves itself a free hand."

It follows from this report that: (1) the Tver Committee, together with the periphery, had declared, according to the Committee's own admission, its consent to participate in the Congress organised by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority; (2) subsequently, the Tver Committee, under the influence of the C.C.'s new promises to convene the Third Congress, withdrew its consent. The periphery, however, did not support the Committee and did not decline to participate in the Congress which the Bureau had called; (3) the C.C.'s new promises to convene the Third Congress were given in the appeal "To the Party, dated March 4, 1905", which has so far remained unpublished and is unknown to us.

To appraise the behaviour of our famous C.C. at its true worth, we would remind our comrades, first, of the Party Rules, and secondly, of certain facts. According to the Rules a congress is convened by the *Council*, and not by the Central Committee. Consequently, the C.C. is giving promises it cannot live up to. It promises to do what, under the Rules, it cannot do. The C.C. promises or proposes, but the Council disposes. As for those members of the Party who are naïve enough to lend an ear to the C.C.'s promises and are unfamiliar with the Rules, they find themselves in the position of dupes. How the Council "disposes" the facts reveal. In its resolution of March 8 (new style) the Council declares

(*Iskra*, No. 89) that "*with the assent of the majority of the Party workers*" (perhaps including the Tver Committee?) "*it considers it inexpedient to convene the Party Congress at such a moment*". Can anything be clearer? Does this not show that the Council, time and again, is shamelessly deceiving the Party, since it never did have the "assent" of the "majority of Party workers"?

Further, on March 10 (N.S.), that is, two days later, the Council adopted another resolution (*Iskra*, No. 91) agreeing to send two representatives to the Congress convened by the Russian Bureau of Committees of the Majority, *but saying not a word about agreeing to the convening of the Congress*.

We would add that the Council not only takes a position officially against the "expediency" of convening the Congress but *rigs the votes to the Congress* by increasing the number of allegedly qualified committees and refusing to inform the Party which new committees it considers to be accredited and when they were accredited. In the resolution of the Council of March 8 (discussed in *Vperyod*, No. 10*), the committees considered qualified as of January 1, 1905, were those of Polesye, the North-West, Kuban, and Kazan, whereas the last two committees were not accredited at all by the C.C. and the former will not be qualified until April 1, 1905.

We ask the Party members who wish to be real and not just registered members whether they are going to stand for this game. The Council rigs the votes and declares against the Congress, while the C.C. gives "promises" as regards the Congress, taking advantage of the naïveté of people who do not know that according to the Rules these promises *can have no* formal weight. Do not the facts *wholly* confirm what we wrote on February 28 (15) in *Vperyod*, No. 8, at the first reports of the C.C.'s "assent" to the Congress? We would remark that *a month has passed* since then, that *Iskra* has since issued Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91, and 92 (dated March 10, O.S.) without saying *a word* on this "ticklish" question of the C.C.'s "assent" to the Congress. We can only repeat what we said in *Vperyod*, No. 8:

"We have just received a report that can be interpreted to mean that the Central Committee agrees to an immediate congress. We can in no

* See pp. 225-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

way vouch for the authenticity of the report at the present moment, but we consider it probable. The C.C. has campaigned against the Congress for many months; it has cashiered the organisations and boycotted and disorganised the committees that have declared for the Congress. These tactics have failed. Now, following the rule 'expediency is everything, formality is nothing', the C.C., for the sake of 'expediency' (*that is, for the sake of preventing the Congress*) is prepared formally to declare a hundred times if need be that it is for the immediate convocation of the Congress. We hope that neither the Bureau nor the local committees will let themselves be deceived by the subterfuges of the Party's 'Shidlovsky Commission'."[84]

P.S. Geneva, March 30 (17). We are obliged to keep a regular diary of the C.C.'s subterfuges. We have received the following letter of the C.C. to the Bureau of Committees of the Majority:

"The Central Committee decided on March 4 to call upon the committees of the Party to prepare for the Third Congress of the Party and on its part has decided to take steps to convene the Congress at the earliest possible date.

"Since the success of an *all-Party* congress and its speedy convocation depend on the unanimous collaboration of the utmost possible number of all comrades and organisations that are declaring *n o w* for the Congress, the C.C. proposes to the Organising Bureau of Committees of the so-called 'Majority' to enter into an agreement on this matter and work together towards convening the Congress speedily and towards ensuring the fullest possible representation of the *e n t i r e* Party. March 6, 1905. C.C., R.S.D.L.P."

Infinite indeed is the long-suffering patience of the Russian committees and their credulity! Why does not the C.C. publish its appeal of March 4? Why does it mouth mendacious phrases about an "agreement" with the Bureau? The Bureau invited *everyone* to the Congress without exception, the *entire Party*; it did so over a month ago openly and publicly. The Bureau answered the C.C. long since that *no delays* were now *possible*. Everyone who wants an *all-Party congress* not merely in words is invited; it's as clear as that. Besides, what sense would there be in an agreement between the Bureau and the C.C., when it is not the C.C. that convenes the Congress under the Rules but the Council, which has gone on record against the Congress?

It is to be hoped that *everyone* now will see through the double game which the Council and the C.C. are playing. The Bureau, we are sure, will not retreat a single step from its work of convening the Congress upon the date it has *set* for it and of which it has *notified the C.C.*

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A REVOLUTION OF THE 1789 OR THE 1848 TYPE?

An important question in connection with the Russian revolution is the following:

I. Will it go on to the *complete* overthrow of the tsarist government and the establishment of a republic?

II. Or will it limit itself to a curtailment of tsarist power, to a monarchist constitution?

In other words, are we to have a revolution of the 1789 type or of the 1848 type?* (We say *type* in order to dispose of the preposterous idea that there can be any repetition of the irrevocably vanished social, political, and international situations of 1789 and 1848.)

That a Social-Democrat must want and *w o r k f o r* the former, of this there can hardly be any doubt.

Yet Martynov's way of stating the issue reduces itself wholly to a tail-ender's desire for a more modest revolution. In type II the "danger", so frightening to the Martynovs, of the proletariat and the peasantry seizing power is entirely eliminated. In this case Social-Democracy will unavoidably remain "in opposition"—*even to the revolution*; this indeed is what Martynov wants—to remain in opposition even to the revolution.

The question is, which type is the more probable?

In favour of type I we have: (1) An immeasurably greater store of resentment and revolutionary feeling among the lower classes in Russia than there was in the Germany of 1848. With us the change is *sharper*; with us there have been

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* N. B. Some might add here "or of the 1871 type"? This question must be considered as a probable *objection* raised against us by many non-Social-Democrats.

no intermediate stages between autocracy and political freedom (the Zemstvo does not count); with us despotism is Asiatically virginal. (2) With us a disastrous war increases the likelihood of a *severe* collapse, for it has involved the tsarist government completely. (3) With us the international situation is more favourable, for proletarian Europe will make it impossible for the crowned heads of Europe to help the Russian monarchy. (4) With us the development of class-conscious revolutionary parties, their literature and organisation, is on a much higher level than it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871. (5) With us the various nationalities oppressed by tsarism, such as the Poles and Finns, provide a powerful impulse to the attack on the autocracy. (6) With us the peasantry is in particularly sorry plight; it is incredibly impoverished and has absolutely nothing to lose.

Of course, all these considerations are by far not absolute. Others may be contraposed to them: (1) We have very few survivals of feudalism. (2) The government is more experienced and has greater facilities for detecting the danger of revolution. (3) The spontaneity of a revolutionary outburst is complicated by the war, which creates problems that have no bearing on the revolution. The war demonstrates the weakness of the Russian revolutionary classes, which would not have had the strength to rise without it (cf. Karl Kautsky in *The Social Revolution*). (4) Other countries provide no stimulus to a revolution in ours. (5) The national movements towards the dismemberment of Russia are likely to tear the bulk of the Russian big and petty bourgeoisie away from our revolution. (6) The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie with us is much deeper than it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871; hence, the bourgeoisie will be more fearful of the *proletarian* revolution and will throw itself more readily into the arms of reaction.

Only history, of course, can weigh these pros and cons in the balances. Our task as Social-Democrats is to *drive* the bourgeois revolution onward as far as it will go, without ever losing sight of our *main* task—the independent organisation of the proletariat.

This is where Martynov gets muddled. The complete revolution means seizure of power by the proletariat and the poor peasantry. *These classes*, once in power, *cannot* but

strive for the *socialist* revolution. *Ergo*, seizure of power, from being at first a step in the *democratic* revolution, will, by force of circumstances, and against the will (and sometimes without the awareness) of its participants, *pass into* the socialist revolution. *And here failure is inevitable*. If attempts at the socialist revolution are bound to end in failure, we must (like Marx in 1871, when he foresaw the inevitable failure of the insurrection in Paris) *advise* the proletariat *not to rise*, but to wait and organise, *reculer pour mieux sauter*.*

Such, in substance, is Martynov's *idea* (and that of the new *Iskra*, too), had he been able to reason it out to its logical end.

FROM MARX TO MAO

Written in March-April 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to the manuscript

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* To step back, the better to leap.—*Ed*.

TO THE PARTY

Comrades, you all know what a distressing crisis our Party has been passing through these past eighteen months and more. Ever since the Second Party Congress, owing to a series of deplorable circumstances, the central bodies of our Party abroad—the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the Council—have come under the control of the adherents of the Party Congress Minority. The dissatisfaction among our Party workers continued to grow and developed into a concealed, intense struggle, which seriously hampered the entire activity of Social-Democracy and impaired the prestige of the proletarian party. Seeing the harm this secret split was causing, the Party committees began to demand the convening of the Third Congress as the only party way out of the crisis. The struggle for the Congress has been the vitalising breath of the Party activities since the spring of 1904. The Party Council abroad opposed the idea of the Congress in every way it could. The Central Committee sought to meet the demands of the Minority in the matter of co-optation in the hope thereby to restore peace within the Party. But this hope was dashed. Instead of peace being restored, the struggle was intensified.

The ensuing great events in the development of the working-class movement and the revolution in Russia, the events of January 9 and its aftereffects, created a new situation which taxed the Party's powers and energies still more. For the overwhelming majority of the Party workers in Russia the Congress became a pressing need. The resistance of the Council abroad resulted in the election by a number of committees in Russia of a special Bureau for convening the Party Congress. Under the circumstances the C.C.

deemed it its party duty to join the Bureau of Committees of the Majority for the immediate convening of the Party Congress.

The need for the Congress, even from a narrow formal point of view, is borne out by the following. The members of the Party learned from issue No. 89 of *Iskra* that, apart from the central bodies, the Party Council considered 33 organisations qualified. Consequently, even on this count (disputed by a large number of Party workers, who set the number of Party organisations at 31) 38 votes were required to make the convocation of the Congress obligatory ($33 \times 2 = 66$; $66 + 9 = 75$; $75 : 2 = 37\frac{1}{2}$).

The thirteen committees that elected the Bureau of Committees of the Majority have long since declared for the Congress. The 13 have been joined by the committees of the Urals, Tula, Voronezh, Samara, the North-West, Smolensk, Kharkov, and Kazan, i.e., by 8 committees. These 21 committees, together with the four votes of the C.C. (two votes of the C.C. itself and two of its delegates on the Council), give $42 + 4 = 46$ votes.

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THE SECOND STEP

In issue No. 11 of *Vperyod* we hailed the first step of the Party Council which was left without a party.* We asked ourselves whether the Council would have the sense and honesty to make the second step along its new path. Now we have just received news from Russia that *the Central Committee has made the second step*. We are able to publish immediately the following documents in the case.

1) Appeal of the Central Committee to the Party of March 4, 1905.

To the Party

Comrades, the revolution in Russia has begun! Its prelude has proved in the most incontrovertible manner that the principal force deciding its outcome is the urban proletariat. However, in the matter of speeding the issue of the revolution, of bringing system into the revolutionary struggle of the masses, and, especially, of turning the results of the revolution to the fullest account in favour of the proletariat, a great deal depends on the actual state of our Party's forces and its organisation. History has imposed upon our Party the political and moral responsibility towards the Russian proletariat, towards our whole nation, and, lastly, towards the proletariat the world over. In its present state our Party is not capable of fulfilling its obligations to the extent necessary and possible, considering the potential strength of Russian Social-Democracy. The C.C. deems it untimely and useless at the present juncture to prove, chapter and verse, whether and to what extent certain prominent Party members, influential groups, and entire Party bodies were guided in their inner-Party activities by profound political motives or by intellectualist politicking, in short, without trying to apportion the blame for the deep-going disorganisation of the Party, the C.C., fully realising the weight of the responsibility that rests upon it, declares before the whole Party that it has firmly decided to do everything in its power to ensure necessary unity in the Party and prevent a final split. The development of the revolution

* See pp. 239-44 of this volume.—*Ed*.

confronts Russian Social-Democracy almost daily with new problems. Many of these issues have barely been touched upon by our tactics, which were evolved chiefly for "peace-time" use. Others have no precedent whatever in former Party practice, since they have arisen from new causes which never existed before. Party literature, of course, is a help, but its answers do not always satisfy local workers as regards adequacy, unity, and generally recognised competence. Quite recently a considerable number of committees, which united after private meetings, have adopted a policy of distrust towards the central bodies of the Party, existing by virtue of the Party Rules adopted at the Second Congress of the Party, and have carried this policy to the extent of forming their own organ and their own centre, and are at present engaged in convening their own congress. Finally, the time set by the Party Rules for convening the Third regular Congress falls due this summer.

Under the circumstances the C.C considers that the only and final means of avoiding a split is *the convening of the all-Party Congress in the very near future*.

Convinced that the useful results of the Congress, in the sense both of dealing with the vital tasks that the present political situation has put before our Party and of achieving real, lasting unity in the Party, will depend entirely on the broad and full representation of all the important and influential currents at the Congress, the C.C., in pursuance of the Rules, has decided, in the interests of fuller representation, to make wide use of its right to invite to the Congress comrades with consultative voice. In view of the fact that the dissensions which have been rending the Party have led in some places to a complete break-away of major groups from the committees, and in others to sharp antagonism between committees and peripheries, the C.C. invites the following bodies to send their own delegates to the Congress with consultative voice: (1) all groups that broke away from the committees prior to March 1, 1905; (2) all peripheries of large industrial centres in which there are 20,000 workers or over in the area of the committee's activity and where over half the periphery members vote no confidence in the local committee on the question of the election of a delegate to the Congress.

Note. The C.C. proposes that for this purpose only those comrades shall be considered members of the periphery who belong to a committee organisation and engage in active revolutionary work under the direction and control of the committee, such as propaganda, agitation, organisation, and the writing, printing, and distribution of literature. Moreover, since the all-Party Congress, according to the Rules, is convened by the Party Council, the C.C., while calling upon the local committees to declare for the Third Congress as the only means now of ensuring Party unity, will, for its part, support its decision for the immediate convocation of the Congress through its representatives on the Party Council, and will straight away take a number of practical preparatory steps. In addition, the C.C. declares that it will do everything in its power to enlist to the business of convening the Congress the "Organising Bureau" set up for that purpose on the initiative of several of the committees; the preparatory work of this Bureau may help to speed and facilitate the convening of the Congress.

Note. The details of enlisting the services of the "Organising Bureau" of committees of the so-called "Majority" for the work of convening the Congress should be worked out by mutual agreement. Viewing the *immediate* convocation of the all-Party Congress as the last means of avoiding a split and creating real unity of the Party, which alone can give us the necessary strength to tackle the great tasks confronting Russian Social-Democracy, the Central Committee calls upon all members of the Party to make the most energetic preparations for the *Congress* which must *urgently* be held.

Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.

March 4, 1905

2) A letter of the C.C. to the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, dated March 6, 1905.

On March 4 the Central Committee decided to call upon the committees of the Party to prepare for the Third Congress, and for its part it decided to take steps for convening the Congress at the earliest possible date.

Since the success of the *all-Party* Congress and its convocation at the earliest possible date depend on the co-operation of all the comrades and organisations *now* declaring for the Congress, the C.C. proposes to the Organising Bureau of Committees of the so-called "Majority" to enter into an agreement on this matter and work together for convening the Congress at the earliest and for ensuring the fullest possible representation at the Congress of the *whole* Party.

Central Committee R.S.D.L.P.

March 6, 1905

3) Joint appeal to the Party by the C.C. and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, dated March 12, 1905.

To the Party

The Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority have taken upon themselves the initiative for convening the Third Congress of the Party and notify all Party organisations that, proceeding from the urgent need for immediately holding the Third Party Congress to establish the general line of Party tactics and the Party's organisational unity, they have come to an agreement for the joint organisation of the Congress on the following basis:

1) The Congress is to be convened on the basis of the programmes set forth in the declarations of the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority; these programmes provide for the following agenda:

(a) Constitution of the Congress; (b) questions of Party tactics; (c) questions of Party organisation: (1) organisation of the centres, (2) organisation of the committees, (3) relations between the various Party bodies and their divisions; (d) reports; (e) elections.

2) All Party organisations having the right to participate with a vote under the Rules of the Second Congress are invited to the Congress (viz., the four Caucasian committees, the Moscow, St. Petersburg Tver, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Northern, Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Don Region, Voronezh, Nikolayev, Saratov, Samara, North-Western, Polesye, and the Astrakhan committees, and the League; the Donets, Crimean, Urals, and Siberian leagues)*; all the rest are invited to participate with consultative voice.

3) The organising work in connection with the convening of the Third Party Congress so far carried out by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority is herewith endorsed.

4) All further work in connection with convening the Congress is to be carried out jointly by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the Central Committee, which form an Organising Committee.

5) The resolution of the Party Council against convening the Third Party Congress published in *Iskra*, No. 89, is not accepted by the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority as grounds for suspending work on organising the Congress.

March 12, 1905

The agreement between the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority of March 12, 1905, is for the time being not to be made public.

* * *

We can thus celebrate a complete moral victory. Russia has gained the upper hand over the "foreigners". The Party spirit has triumphed over circle parochialism. At the last minute the Central Committee saw that the Congress which was being convened by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority was a real Party congress and joined it. The Central Committee at the eleventh hour had courage enough to abandon its anti-Party policy and to defy the Council abroad. According to the Rules of our Party the Congress is convened by the Council and not by the Central Committee. Consequently, legally speaking, no statements or agreements on this question by the Central Committee are valid. But when the Council violated the Rules and avoided rendering an account to a congress, it was the duty and not only the right of the committees to take the initiative in convening

* With reference to the Riga, Smolensk, Kursk Orel-Bryansk Kazan, Kremenchug, Elisavetgrad, and Kuban committees, see Point 3 of the agreement between the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority.

the Congress; and the Central Committee, by recognising the Bureau elected by the committees, refused to follow the unfortunate example of the Party Council which was left without a party.

We cannot at the moment express any opinion on the concrete questions of the agreement between the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. All these questions, as well as the question of the agenda, the constitution of the Congress, etc., will, of course, be decided by the Congress itself. We shall therefore confine ourselves merely to wishing the Congress success and appealing to all comrades to apply themselves immediately and with the utmost energy to all the necessary preparations for the Congress. It is left for us in conclusion to repeat what we said in *Vperyod*, No. 11, namely, that "...we have come very close to a possibly direct and unequivocal way out of the crisis."*

Vperyod, No. 13,
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* See p. 243 of this volume.—*Ed.*

EUROPEAN CAPITAL AND THE AUTOCRACY

The Social-Democratic press has repeatedly pointed out that European capital is the saviour of Russian autocracy. Without foreign loans Russian autocracy would not be able to survive. It was advantageous to the French bourgeoisie to support its military ally, so long, especially, as payments on the loans were punctually forthcoming. And the French bourgeoisie lent the autocratic government the round little sum of *ten milliard francs* (about 4,000 million rubles).

However ... there is nothing eternal under the moon. The war with Japan revealed the utter rottenness of the autocracy and ultimately undermined Russia's credit even with the French bourgeoisie, its "friend and ally". In the first place, the war showed up Russia's military weakness; secondly, a continuous chain of reverses, one more crushing than the other, has shown the hopelessness of the war and the inevitability of the complete downfall of the whole absolutist system of government; thirdly, the formidable growth of the revolutionary movement in Russia has inspired the European bourgeoisie with a mortal dread of an explosion that might set all Europe ablaze. Mountains of inflammable material have piled up within the last few decades. And now all these factors, taken together, have led ultimately to the refusal of further loans. The recent attempt of the autocratic government to borrow from France, as it had done in the past, ended in failure. On the one hand, capital no longer has confidence in the autocracy; on the other, fearing a revolution, capital wants to put pressure on the autocracy to have it conclude peace with Japan and to come to terms with the Russian liberal bourgeoisie.

European capital is speculating on peace. The bourgeoisie in Europe as well as in Russia has begun to see the connection between war and revolution, to fear a really popular and victorious movement against tsarism. The bourgeoisie wants to preserve the "social order" of a society based on exploitation against excessive shocks; it wants to preserve the Russian monarchy as a constitutional, or pseudo-constitutional, monarchy, and is therefore speculating on peace in pursuance of anti-proletarian and anti-revolutionary interests. This indubitable fact clearly shows us that even so "simple" and plain an issue as that of war and peace cannot properly be posed if the class antagonisms of modern society are lost sight of, if the fact is overlooked that the bourgeoisie in everything it does, howsoever democratic or humanitarian it may appear, defends first and foremost the interests of its own class, the interests of "social peace", viz., the suppression and disarming of all oppressed classes. The proletarians' way of presenting the question of peace, therefore, differs and must inevitably differ from that of the bourgeois democrats, as it does on the questions of free trade, anticlericalism, etc. The proletariat struggles against war and will always struggle against it unremittingly, without, however, forgetting for a moment that war can be abolished only with the complete abolition of society's division into classes; that while class rule continues to exist war cannot be regarded only from the sentimentally democratic standpoint; that in a war between exploiting nations one must distinguish between the roles of the progressive and of the reactionary bourgeoisie of each nation. Russian Social-Democracy has had to apply these general principles of Marxism concretely to the war with Japan. In dealing with the significance of this war (see *Vperyod*, No. 2, the article "The Fall of Port Arthur"*), we pointed out that not only our Socialists-Revolutionaries (who blamed Guesde and Hyndman for sympathising with Japan), but also the new-Iskrists, had adopted a false, bourgeois-democratic standpoint. With the latter this found expression, first, in considerations of "peace *at any price*", and, secondly, in the contention that it is impermissible "to speculate on a victory of the

* See p. 52 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Japanese bourgeoisie". Both these considerations were worthy only of a bourgeois democrat, who deals with political questions on sentimental grounds. Reality has now shown that "peace *at any price*" has become the slogan of the European financiers and Russian reactionaries (Prince Meshchersky in *Grazhdanin*[85] now speaks clearly of the need for peace for the salvation of the autocracy). It is now perfectly clear that speculation on peace for the purpose of suppressing the revolution is a speculation of reactionaries, in contrast to the speculation of the *progressive* bourgeoisie on a victory of the Japanese bourgeoisie. The new *Iskra*'s phrase-mongering against "speculation" in general is actually mere sentimental balderdash, far from the class standpoint and from any consideration of the various social forces.

The events that have exposed the new visage of the reactionary bourgeoisie were so glaring that now even *Iskra* has begun to see its error. Whereas in issue No. 83 it "snapped back" at our article in *Vperyod*, No. 2, we now read with pleasure in issue No. 90 (leader): "We should not demand *only* peace; for if the autocracy continues to exist, peace will spell ruin to the country." Exactly: we should not demand only peace; for a tsarist peace is no better (and is sometimes worse) than a tsarist war. We should not put forward the slogan of "peace at any price", but only of peace with the fall of the autocracy, of peace concluded by a liberated nation, by a free Constituent Assembly, i.e., peace not at any price, but solely at the price of overthrowing absolutism. Let us hope that *Iskra*, having realised this, will also realise the inappropriateness of its highly moral tirades against speculation on a victory of the Japanese bourgeoisie.

Let us return, however, to European capital and its political "speculations". How much tsarist Russia quails before this capital may be seen, for instance, from the following highly instructive incident. *The Times*, organ of the conservative English bourgeoisie, published an article entitled "Is Russia Solvent?" The article described in detail the "subtle mechanism" of the financial manipulations of Messrs. Witte, Kokovtsev & Co. They are always running their business at a loss. They muddle through only by getting deeper and deeper into debt. In between loans the proceeds of the preceding loan are placed in the Treasury, and the "gold

reserve" is then triumphantly proclaimed a "free cash balance". The gold obtained as a loan is shown to everybody as proof of Russia's wealth and solvency! Small wonder that the English merchant compared this hanky-panky to the tricks of the Humberts, the famous impostors, who used to display borrowed or swindled money (or even a safe purporting to contain money) in order to obtain new loans. *The Times* writes: "The frequent appearances of the Russian Government as a borrower in the Continental money market are due, not to capital requirements—that is to say, to reproductive enterprises or exceptional and transitory expenses—but almost exclusively to the normal deficiency of national income. This means that, as she is situated today, Russia is marching direct to insolvency. Her national balance-sheet leaves her every year deeper in debt. Her liabilities to the foreigner are more than her people can bear, and she has practically nothing to show for them. Her gold reserve is a colossal Humbert safe, the vaunted millions of which are unconsciously lent by her dupes for their own further deception."

How artful! To pick a dupe, borrow money from him, then show him this very money as evidence of your wealth, in order to wheedle further loans from him!

The comparison with those notorious swindlers, the Humbert family, was so apt and the "gist" and purpose of the famous "free cash balance" were so neatly nailed that that article in such a respectable conservative newspaper created a sensation. Kokovtsev, the Minister of Finance, personally sent a telegram to *The Times*, which it printed forthwith (March 23 [10]). In his telegram the insulted Kokovtsev invited the editors of *The Times* to come to St. Petersburg and verify the gold reserve in person. The editors thanked him for the kind invitation, but declined it, on the simple grounds that the article which had hurt the feelings of the tsar's servant did not in the least deny the existence of a gold reserve. The comparison with the Humberts implied, not that Russia did not have the gold reserve to which it referred, but that this reserve was actually made up of other people's money, of wholly unsecured borrowings which did not in the least testify to Russia's wealth, and to which it would be ridiculous to refer as security for fresh loans!

Mr. Kokovtsev missed the *point* of this witty but malicious comparison, and set the whole world laughing by his telegram. Investigating gold reserves in banks was not in the range of duties of journalists, *The Times* said in its reply to the Minister of Finance. Indeed, it was the duty of the press to expose the trick played with the aid of these really existing "gold reserves" fictitiously displayed as evidence of the country's wealth. The question is not whether you have this gold reserve or not, the newspaper lectured the Russian Minister of Finance in an article dealing with this comic telegram. We believe that you have it. The question is, what are your assets and your liabilities? What is the amount of your debts and what security have you? Or, more plainly put, is your stored reserve your property, or is it borrowed and liable to be refunded, which you cannot do in full because you do not possess so much? The English bourgeois, making fun of the simple Minister, tried to explain to him this none-too-subtle thing in a variety of ways, adding for his edification: If you are looking for someone to investigate your assets and liabilities, why not call on the representatives of the Russian people? As it happens, the people's representatives are keen to get together in a representative assembly, be it called Zemsky Sobor or by some other name. Surely they will not refuse to investigate *properly*, not only the famous "gold reserve", but *all* the finances of the autocracy. And they will certainly be able to make a thorough job of it.

"Possibly", *The Times* sarcastically concludes, "the knowledge that the representative assembly would claim this office as a right" makes the tsarist government fear the convocation of such an assembly, "at least in any shape in which it could exercise real power."

An insidious assertion. It is all the more insidious, all the more significant, for being made, in reality, not by *The Times*, but by the entire *European bourgeoisie*—made, not as a polemical manoeuvre, but as an open expression of its distrust of the autocracy, of its unwillingness to lend it money, of its desire to deal with the lawful representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie. It is not an assertion, but a warning. It is not a sneer, but an *ultimatum*, the ultimatum of European capital to the Russian autocracy. While

Japan's allies, the English, word this ultimatum in the form of sarcasm, Russia's allies, the French, in their most conservative, most bourgeois paper, *Le Temps*, say the same thing, only a little more mildly—sugar-coating the pill, but virtually nonetheless refusing to lend any more, and advising the autocracy to make peace with Japan and with the Russian bourgeois liberals. Here is another voice, that of a no less respectable English magazine, *The Economist*: "The truth about Russian finance is at length coming to be appreciated in France. We have pointed out again and again that Russia has long been living on borrowed money, that, despite glowing statements issued by succeeding Ministers of Finance, the budgets have shown a large deficit year fter year, though these have been cunningly concealed by a book-keeping device, and that the much-vaunted 'free cash balances' of the Treasury consist principally of the proceeds of loans and partly of the deposits of the State Bank." After telling the Russian autocracy these home truths, this financial magazine finds it necessary, however, to add some bourgeois consolations to the effect that if you can manage to make peace immediately and to make some paltry concessions to the liberals, Europe will doubtlessly begin again to lend you millions upon millions.

We are witnessing what is virtually a speculative gamble of the international bourgeoisie to save Russia from revolution and tsarism from utter ruin. The speculators are putting pressure on the tsar by refusing to grant loans. They are making use of their power, the power of the money-bag. They want a moderate and tidy bourgeois-constitutional (or pseudo-constitutional) regime in Russia. The rapid march of events unites them ever more closely into a single counter-revolutionary bourgeois alliance, regardless of differences of nationality—French financiers and English business magnates, German capitalists, and Russian merchants. *Osvobozhdeniye* has acted in the spirit of this mildly moderate bourgeois party. In issue No. 67, where he sets forth the "programme of the Democratic Party" and even recognises (for how long?) universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot (passing over in modest silence the arming of the people!), Mr. Struve ends his new *profession de foi* with the following characteristic statement, printed in bold type "for the sake of impor-

tance": "At the present moment the demand for the immediate cessation of the war should stand outside and *above the programme of every progressive* party in Russia. In practice this means that *the government now existing in Russia* should, through the medium of France, begin peace negotiations with the Japanese Government." The distinction between the bourgeois-democratic and the Social-Democratic demands to end the war could hardly be stated more trenchantly. The revolutionary proletariat does not put this demand "above the programme"; it addresses it, not to "the government now existing", but to the free, truly sovereign popular Constituent Assembly. The revolutionary proletariat does not "speculate" on the mediation of the French bourgeoisie, which is seeking peace for avowedly anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian purposes.

Finally, it is essentially with this same international party of the moderate bourgeoisie that Mr. Bulygin is now bargaining—skilfully playing for time, wearing his opponent down, feeding him with promises, but giving absolutely nothing definite, and leaving everything, absolutely everything, in Russia as it was before, beginning with the use of troops against strikers, continuing with the arrest of political suspects and repressive measures against the press, and ending with a dastardly incitement of the peasants against the intellectuals and the brutal flogging of rebel peasants. And the liberals rise to the bait; some are already beginning to believe Bulygin, while in the Lawyers' Association Mr. Kuzmin-Karavayev tries to persuade the liberals to sacrifice universal suffrage for the sake of ... Mr. Bulygin's blue eyes![86]

There is only one force that can stand up to the international alliance of the moderate conservative bourgeoisie, and that is the international alliance of the revolutionary proletariat. With respect to political solidarity, this alliance is already fully formed. As for the practical side and the revolutionary initiative, everything depends on Russia's working class and the success of its joint democratic action for the decisive struggle in conjunction with the millions of the urban and rural poor.

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SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

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I

Only five years ago many representatives of Social-Democracy thought the slogan "Down with the Autocracy!" premature and unintelligible to the mass of the workers. These representatives were rightly classed as opportunists. It was explained to them again and again and finally made clear that they were lagging behind the movement, that they did not understand the tasks of the Party as vanguard of the class, as its leader and organiser, as the representative of the movement as a whole and of its fundamental and principal aims. These aims might be overshadowed for a time by the day-to-day routine, but they should never lose their significance as the guiding star of the fighting proletariat.

Now the time has come when the flames of revolution have spread throughout the land, and when even the most sceptical have come to believe in the inevitable overthrow of the autocracy in the near future. But Social-Democracy, as if by some irony of history, has to deal once more with precisely the same reactionary and opportunist attempts to drag the movement back, to play down its tasks, and to obscure its slogans. Polemics with the proponents of such attempts become the task of the day, and (contrary to the opinion of the very many who dislike intra-Party polemics) acquire tremendous *practical* importance. For the nearer we get to realising our immediate political tasks, the greater is the need to have an absolutely clear understanding of those tasks and the more harmful is all ambiguity, all reticence and mental inconclusiveness on this question.

And yet mental inconclusiveness is by no means a rare thing among the Social-Democrats of the new *Iskra* or (what is practically the same) the *Rabocheye Dyelo* camp. Down

with the Autocracy!—everyone agrees with this, not only all Social-Democrats, but all democrats, even all liberals, if one is to believe their current declarations. But what does it mean? How is this overthrow of the present government to take place? Who is to convene the Constituent Assembly, which even the *Osvobozhdeniye* people (see issue No. 67 of *Osvobozhdeniye*) are now prepared to advance as their slogan, including the demand for universal, direct, and equal suffrage? Precisely what should constitute the real guarantee that the elections to such an assembly will be free and will express the interests of the whole people?

He who fails to give a clear and definite answer to these questions does not grasp the meaning of the slogan "Down with the Autocracy". And these questions inevitably bring us to the question of the provisional revolutionary government; it is not difficult to understand that really free, popular elections to a Constituent Assembly, fully guaranteeing truly universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, are not only improbable, but actually impossible under the autocracy. And if we are in earnest in putting forward a practical demand for the immediate overthrow of the autocratic government, we must be clear in our minds as to *precisely what other government* we want to replace the one that is to be overthrown. In other words, what do we think should be the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards a provisional revolutionary government?

On this question the opportunists of present-day Social-Democracy, viz., the new-Iskrists, are dragging the Party back just as strenuously as the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists did five years ago on the question of political struggle in general. Their reactionary views on this point are fully elaborated in Martynov's pamphlet *Two Dictatorships*, which *Iskra*, No. 84, approved and recommended in a special review, and to which we have repeatedly called our readers' attention.

At the outset of his pamphlet Martynov tries to frighten us with the following grim prospect: If a strong, revolutionary Social-Democratic organisation could "time and carry out the general armed uprising of the people" against the autocracy, as Lenin dreamed, "is it not obvious that the general will of the people would on the morrow after the

revolution designate precisely this party as the provisional government? Is it not obvious that the people would entrust the immediate fate of the revolution precisely to this party, and to no other?"

This is incredible, but true. The future historian of Russian Social-Democracy will have to record with surprise that at the very outset of the Russian revolution the Girondists of Social-Democracy *tried to frighten* the revolutionary proletariat with such a prospect! Martynov's pamphlet (as well as a host of articles and passages in the new *Iskra*) is nothing but an attempt to daub the "horrors" of such a prospect. The ideological leader of the new-Iskrists is haunted by fear of "a seizure of power", by the bogy of "Jacobinism", of Bakuninism, of Tkachovism,[87] and of all the other dreadful isms with which old wives on the fringe of the revolution are so eager to scare political infants. Naturally, this is done not without "quoting" Marx and Engels. Poor Marx and poor Engels, what abuses their works have suffered through quotations! You remember how the maxim "Every class struggle is a political struggle"[88] was invoked to *justify* the narrowness and backwardness of *our* political tasks and methods of political agitation and struggle? Now it is Engels who is made to give false evidence in favour of tail-ism. In *The Peasant War in Germany*, he wrote: "The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents, and for the realisation of the measures which that domination requires." One has only to read carefully this opening of the lengthy passage which Martynov quotes to see plainly how our tail-ender distorts the author's meaning. Engels speaks of *a government that is required for the domination of a class*. Is this not obvious? Applied to the proletariat, it consequently means a government *that is required for the domination of the proletariat*, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat for the effectuation of the socialist revolution. Martynov fails to understand this, and confounds the provisional revolutionary government in the period of the overthrow of the autocracy with the requisite domination of the proletariat in the period of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; he confounds the democratic dictatorship of the

proletariat and the peasantry with the socialist dictatorship of the working class. Yet if we continue reading the quoted passage, Engels' idea becomes still clearer. The leader of the extreme party, he says, will have to "advance the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class with *phrases and promises, and with the assurances that the interests of that alien class are its own interests*. Whoever finds himself in this *false position* is irrevocably lost."[89]

The underlined passages clearly show that Engels expressly warns against the false position that results from a leader's failure to understand the real interests of "his own" class and the real class content of the revolution. To make this clearer to the subtle mind of our Martynov we shall essay a simple illustration. When the adherents of the Narodnaya Volya, in the belief that they represented the interests of "Labour", assured themselves and others that 90 per cent of the peasants in the future Russian Constituent Assembly would be socialists, they put themselves in a false position which was bound to spell their irrevocable political doom, since these "promises and assurances" were at variance with objective reality. Actually they would have advanced the interests of the bourgeois democrats, "the interests of an alien class". Are you not beginning to perceive a ray of light, most worthy Martynov? When the Socialists-Revolutionaries describe the agrarian reforms that must inevitably come about in Russia as "socialisation", as "the transfer of the land to the people", as the beginning of "equality in land tenure", they place themselves in a false position which is bound to lead to their irrevocable political doom, because, in practice, the very reforms for which they strive will bring about the domination of *an alien class*, of the peasant bourgeoisie, so that the more rapidly the revolution develops, the more rapidly will their phrases, promises, and assurances be refuted by reality. Do you still fail to see the point, most worthy Martynov? Do you still fail to comprehend that the *essence* of Engels' thought is that it is fatal *not to understand* the real historical tasks of the revolution and that Engels' words are applicable, therefore, to the Narodnaya Volya adherents and the "Socialists-Revolutionaries"?

II

Engels points to the danger of failure on the part of the leaders of the proletariat to understand the *non-proletarian* character of the revolution, but our sage Martynov infers from this the danger that the leaders of the proletariat, who, by their programme, their tactics (i.e., their entire propaganda and agitation), and their organisation, have separated themselves from the revolutionary democrats, will play a leading part in establishing the democratic republic. Engels sees the danger in the leader's confounding of the pseudo-socialist with the really democratic character of the revolution, while our sage Martynov infers from this the danger that the proletariat, together with the peasantry, may consciously assume the dictatorship in the establishment of the democratic republic, the last form of bourgeois domination and the best form for the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Engels sees the danger in the false, deceptive position of saying one thing and doing another, of promising the domination of one class and actually ensuring that of another. Engels sees the irrevocable political doom consequent upon such a false position, while our sage Martynov deduces the danger that the bourgeois adherents of democracy will not permit the proletariat and the peasantry to secure a really democratic republic. Our sage Martynov cannot for the life of him understand that *such* a doom, the doom of the leader of the proletariat, the doom of thousands of proletarians in the struggle for a truly democratic republic, would well be a physical doom, but not, however, a political doom; on the contrary, it would be a momentous political victory of the proletariat, a momentous achievement of its hegemony in the struggle for liberty. Engels speaks of the political doom of one who unconsciously strays from the path of his own class to that of an alien class, while our sage Martynov, reverently (quoting Engels, speaks of the doom of one who goes further and further along the sure road of his own class.

The difference between the point of view of revolutionary Social-Democracy and that of tail-ism is glaringly obvious. Martynov and the new *Iskra* shrink from the task which the proletariat, together with the peasantry, is called upon

to shoulder—the task of the most radical democratic revolution; they shrink from the Social-Democratic leadership and of this revolution and thus surrender, albeit unwittingly, the interests of the proletariat into the hands of the bourgeois democrats. From Marx's correct idea that we must prepare, not a government party, but an opposition party *of the future*, Martynov draws the conclusion that we must form a tail-ist opposition to the *present* revolution. This is what his political wisdom adds up to. His line of reasoning, which we strongly advise the reader to ponder, is as follows:

"The proletariat cannot win political power in the state, either wholly or in part, until it has made the socialist revolution. This is the indisputable proposition which separates us from opportunist Jaurèsism..." (Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 58)—and which, we would add, conclusively proves that the worthy Martynov is incapable of grasping what the whole thing is about. To confound the participation of the proletariat in a government that is resisting the socialist revolution with its participation in the democratic revolution is to miss the point hopelessly. It is like confounding Millerand's participation in the Cabinet of the murderer Galliffet with Varlin's[90] participation in the Commune, which defended and safeguarded the republic.

But listen further, and see what a tangle our author gets himself into: "But that being the case, it is evident that the coming revolution cannot realise any political forms *against the will of the whole* bourgeoisie, for the latter will be the master tomorrow..." (Martynov's italics). In the first place, why are only political forms mentioned here, when the previous sentence referred to the power of the proletariat in general, even to the extent of the socialist revolution? Why does not the author speak of realising economic forms? Because, without noticing it, he has already leaped from the socialist to the democratic revolution. Secondly, that being the case, the author is absolutely wrong in speaking *tout court* (bluntly) of "the will of the whole bourgeoisie", because the very thing that distinguishes the epoch of democratic revolution is the diversity of wills of the various strata of the bourgeoisie which is just emancipating itself from absolutism. To speak of the democratic revolution and confine oneself to a bald

contrast of "proletariat" and "bourgeoisie" is sheer nonsense, for *that* revolution marks the period in the development of society in which the mass of society virtually stands between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and constitutes an immense petty-bourgeois, peasant stratum. For the very reason that the democratic revolution has not yet been consummated, this immense stratum has far more interests in common with the proletariat in the matter of realising political forms than has the "bourgeoisie" in the real and strict sense of the word. Failure to understand this simple thing is one of the main sources of Martynov's muddle.

Further: "That being the case, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, by simply frightening the majority of the bourgeois elements, can have but one result—the restoration of absolutism in its original form ... and, of course, the proletariat will not halt before this possible result; at the worst, if things tend decidedly towards a revival and strengthening of the decaying autocratic regime by means of a pseudo-constitutional concession, it will not hold back from frightening the bourgeoisie. In entering the struggle, however, the proletariat obviously does not have this 'worst' in view."

Can you make anything of this, dear reader? The proletariat will not hold back from frightening the bourgeoisie, which course will lead to the restoration of absolutism, if there should be a threat of a pseudo-constitutional concession! This is as much as to say: I am threatened with an Egyptian plague in the form of a one-day conversation with Martynov alone; therefore, if the worst comes to the worst, I shall fall back on the method of intimidation, which can lead only to a two-day conversation with Martynov and Martov. This is the sheerest gibberish, sir!

The idea that haunted Martynov when he wrote the nonsense here quoted was the following: if in the period of the democratic revolution the proletariat uses the threat of the socialist revolution to frighten the bourgeoisie, this can lead only to reaction, which will also weaken the democratic gains already won. That and nothing more. There can be no question, of course, either of restoring absolutism in its original form or of the proletariat's readiness, if the worst comes to

the worst, to resort to the worst kind of stupidity. The whole thing takes us back to the difference between the democratic and the socialist revolution, overlooked by Martynov, to the existence of that immense peasant and petty-bourgeois population which is capable of supporting the democratic revolution, but is at present incapable of supporting the socialist revolution.

Let us listen further to our sage Martynov: "Evidently, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on the eve of the bourgeois revolution must differ in some respects from the same struggle at its concluding stage, on the eve of the socialist revolution...." Yes, this is evident; and if Martynov had paused to think what this difference actually is, he would hardly have written the above-given drivel, or, indeed, his whole pamphlet.

"The struggle to influence the course and outcome of the bourgeois revolution can find expression only in the exertion of revolutionary pressure by the proletariat on the will of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie, and in the compulsion on the part of the more democratic 'lower strata' of society to bring the 'upper strata' into agreement to carry through the bourgeois revolution to its logical conclusion. The struggle will find expression in the fact that the proletariat will at every opportunity confront the bourgeoisie with the dilemma—either backward, into the strangling grip of absolutism, or forward, with the people."

This tirade is the central point of Martynov's pamphlet. We have here its sum and substance, all its fundamental "ideas". And what do all these clever ideas turn out to be? Who are these "lower strata" of society, the "people" of whom our sage has at last bethought himself? They are precisely that multitudinous petty-bourgeois stratum of town and village which is quite capable of functioning in a revolutionary-democratic capacity. And what is this *pressure* that the proletariat and the peasantry can exert on the upper social strata, what is meant by the proletariat advancing together with the people in despite of the upper social strata? It is *that same revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry* against which our tail-ender is declaiming! Only he is afraid to think to the end, to call a spade a spade. And so he utters words whose meaning he

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

does not understand. In ludicrous, florid language,* he timidly repeats slogans, the true significance of which escapes him. None but a tail-ender could deliver himself of such a curio in the most "interesting" part of his summary as: revolutionary pressure of the proletariat and the "people" on the upper strata of society, but without a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Only a Martynov could show himself so adept! Martynov wants the proletariat to threaten the upper strata of society that it will go forward with the people, while at the same time firmly deciding with its new-*Iskra* leaders *not to go forward* along the democratic path, because that is the path of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. Martynov wants the proletariat to exert pressure on the will of the upper strata by displaying its own lack of will. Martynov wants the proletariat to bring the upper strata "into agreement" to carry the bourgeois revolution through to its logical, democratic-republican conclusion, but to do so by expressing its own fear of *assuming*, jointly with the people, the task of carrying the revolution through, its fear of taking power and forming the democratic dictatorship. Martynov wants the proletariat to be the vanguard in the democratic revolution and *therefore* our sage Martynov *frightens* the proletariat with the perspective of participation in the provisional revolutionary government in the event of the success of the insurrection!

Reactionary tail-ism could go no further. We should all prostrate ourselves before Martynov, as we would before a saint, for having developed the tail-ist tendencies of the new *Iskra* to their logical conclusion and for having given them emphatic and systematic expression with regard to the most pressing and basic political questions.**

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* We have already pointed out the absurdity of the idea that, if the worst comes to the worst, the proletariat might push the bourgeoisie back.

** This article was already set up when we received issue No. 93 of *Iskra*, with which we shall deal on another occasion.[91]

III

What is Martynov's muddle-headedness due to? To the fact that he confounds democratic revolution with socialist revolution; that he overlooks the role of the intermediate stratum of the people lying between the "bourgeoisie" and the "proletariat" (the petty-bourgeois masses of the urban and rural poor, the "semi-proletarians", the semi-proprietors); and that he fails to understand the true meaning of our minimum programme. Martynov has heard that it is wrong for a socialist to participate in a bourgeois Cabinet (when the proletariat is struggling for the socialist revolution), and he hastens to "understand" this as meaning that we should not participate with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats in the democratic revolution and in the dictatorship that is essential for the full accomplishment of such a revolution. Martynov read our minimum programme, but he missed the fact that the strict distinction it draws between transformations that can be carried out in a bourgeois society and socialist transformations is not merely booklore but is of the most vital, practical significance; he missed the fact that in a revolutionary period this programme must be immediately tested and applied in practice. It did not occur to him that rejecting the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship in the period of the autocracy's downfall is tantamount to renouncing the fulfilment of our minimum programme. Indeed, let us but consider all the economic and political transformations formulated in that programme—the demand for the republic, for arming the people, for the separation of the Church from the State, for full democratic liberties, and for decisive economic reforms. Is it not clear that these transformations cannot possibly be brought about in a bourgeois society without the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the lower classes? Is it not clear that it is not the proletariat alone, as distinct from the "bourgeoisie", that is referred to here, but the "lower classes", which are the active motive force of every democratic revolution? These classes are the proletariat *plus* the scores of millions of urban and rural poor whose conditions of existence are petty-bourgeois. Without a doubt, very many representatives of these masses belong to the bourgeoisie. But

there is still less doubt that the complete establishment of democracy is in the interests of these masses, and that the more enlightened these masses are, the more inevitable will be their struggle for the complete establishment of democracy. Of course, a Social-Democrat will never forget the dual political and economic nature of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural masses; he will never forget the need for a separate and independent class organisation of the proletariat, which struggles for socialism. But neither will he forget that these masses have "a future as well as a past, judgement as well as prejudices",[92] a judgement that urges them onward towards the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship; he will not forget that enlightenment is not obtained from books alone, and not so much from books even as from the very progress of the revolution, which opens the eyes of the people and gives them a political schooling. Under such circumstances, a theory that rejects the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship cannot be otherwise designated than as a philosophical justification of political backwardness.

The revolutionary Social-Democrat will reject such a theory with contempt. He will not confine himself on the eve of the revolution to pointing out what will happen "if the worst comes to the worst". Rather, he will also show the possibility of a better outcome. He will dream—he is obliged to dream if he is not a hopeless philistine—that, after the vast experience of Europe, after the unparalleled upsurge of energy among the working class in Russia, we shall succeed in lighting a revolutionary beacon that will illumine more brightly than ever before the path of the unenlightened and downtrodden masses; that we shall succeed, standing as we do on the shoulders of a number of revolutionary generations of Europe, in realising all the democratic transformations, the whole of our minimum programme, with a thoroughness never equalled before. We shall succeed in ensuring that the Russian revolution is not a movement of a few months, but a movement of many years; that it leads, not merely to a few paltry concessions from the powers that be, but to the complete overthrow of those powers. And if we succeed in achieving this, then ... the revolutionary conflagration will spread to Europe; the European worker, languishing under bourgeois reaction, will rise in his turn

and show us "how it is done"; then the revolutionary upsurge in Europe will have a repercussive effect upon Russia and will convert an epoch of a few revolutionary years into an era of several revolutionary decades; then—but we shall have ample time to say what we shall do "then", not from the cursed remoteness of Geneva, but at meetings of thousands of workers in the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, at the free village meetings of the Russian "muzhiks".

IV

Such dreams, of course, are strange and alien to the philistines of the new *Iskra* and to that "master of men's minds", our good dogmatist Martynov. They fear the full achievement of our minimum programme through the revolutionary dictatorship of the simple, common people. They are afraid for their own political consciousness, afraid of losing the book knowledge they have learned by rote (but not assimilated), afraid that they may not be able to distinguish the correct and bold steps of the democratic transformations from the adventurous leaps of non-class, Narodnik socialism or of anarchism. Their philistine souls warn them with good reason that in a rapid onward march it is more difficult to distinguish the right path and quickly to solve the new and complex problems than in the routine of small-scale, everyday work; therefore, they mutter instinctively: Away, away! Let this cup of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship pass from me! It's as much as our life is worth! Gentlemen, better "go slow, with timid zigzags".

Small wonder that Parvus, who had so generously supported the new-Iskrists as long as it was a question chiefly of co-opting the most venerable and the most deserving, finally began to feel very uncomfortable in this stagnant company. Small wonder, too, that he began more and more to feel the *taedium vitae*, life weariness, in this company. In the end he rebelled. He did not stop at defending the slogan "Organise the revolution", which had frightened the new *Iskra* to death; he did not limit himself to writing manifestos, which *Iskra* published as separate leaflets, carefully avoiding all mention of the name of the Social-Democratic

Labour Party in view of the "Jacobin" horrors.* No, having freed himself from the nightmare of the profound organisation-as-process theory advanced by Axelrod (or was it Luxemburg?), Parvus managed at last to go forward, instead of moving backward like a crab. He refused to perform the Sisyphean labour[93] of endlessly correcting Martynov's and Martov's follies. He openly advocated (unfortunately, together with the windbag Trotsky in a foreword to the latter's bombastic pamphlet *Before the Ninth of January*) the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, the idea that it was the duty of Social-Democrats to take part in the provisional revolutionary government after the overthrow of the autocracy. Parvus is profoundly right in saying that the Social-Democrats must not fear to take bold strides forward, to deal joint "blows" at the enemy, shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, on the definite understanding, however (very appropriately brought to mind), that the organisations are not to be merged, that we march separately but strike together, that we do not conceal the diversity of interests, that we watch our ally as we would our enemy, etc.

But for all our warm sympathy for these slogans of a revolutionary Social-Democrat** who has turned away from the tail-enders, we could not help feeling jarred by certain false notes that Parvus struck. We mention these slight errors, not out of captiousness, but because from him to whom much

* I do not know whether our readers have noticed the following characteristic fact: among all the trash issued by the new *Iskra* in the form of leaflets, there were some good writings bearing Parvus' signature. The editors of the new *Iskra* turned their back on these leaflets, which they printed without the name of our Party or of the publishers.

** On the issue raised in Trotsky's pamphlet with Parvus' foreword published at the Party's printing house, *Iskra* maintains a judicious silence. Obviously, it would not be to its advantage to unravel the mess: while Martynov is pulling one way and Parvus the other way, we shall hold our tongue until Plekhanov has pulled Martov out by the ears! And that, with us, is called "ideological leadership of the party"! Incidentally, a curious piece of "formalism". Our Solomons on the Council have decided that the Party's cachet is permissible only on pamphlets commissioned by Party organisations. It would be interesting to learn from these Solomons what organisation commissioned the pamphlets of Nadezhdin, Trotsky and others. Or were those people right who declared the above-mentioned "decision" to be a mean trick in the parochial spirit against Lenin's publishing house?

is given, much is demanded. It would be most dangerous at present for Parvus to compromise his correct position by his own imprudence. Among the least imprudent is the following sentence in his preface to Trotsky's pamphlet: "If we wish to keep the revolutionary proletariat apart from the other political currents, we must learn to stand ideologically at the head of the revolutionary movement [this is correct], to be more revolutionary than anyone else." This is incorrect. That is to say, it is incorrect, if the statement is taken in the general sense in which it is expressed by Parvus; it is incorrect from the point of view of the reader to whom this preface is something standing by itself, apart from Martynov and the new-Iskrists, whom Parvus does not mention. If we examine this statement dialectically, i.e., relatively, concretely, in all its aspects, and not after the manner of those literary jockeys, who, even many years after, snatch separate sentences from some single work and distort their meaning, it will become clear that Parvus directs the assertion expressly against tail-ism, *to which extent* he is right (compare particularly his subsequent words: "If we *lag behind* revolutionary development", etc.). But the reader cannot have in mind only tail-enders, since there are others besides tail-enders among the dangerous friends of the revolution in the camp of the revolutionaries—there are the "Socialists-Revolutionaries"; there are people like the Nadezhdins, who are swept along by the tide of events and are helpless in the face of revolutionary phrases; or those who are guided by instinct rather than by a revolutionary outlook (like Gapon). These Parvus forgot; he forgot them because his presentation, the development of his thoughts, was not free, but was hampered by the pleasant memory of the very Martynovism against which he seeks to warn the reader. Parvus' exposition is not sufficiently concrete because he does not consider the totality of the various revolutionary currents in Russia, which are inevitable in the epoch of democratic revolution and which naturally reflect the still unstratified classes of society in such an epoch. At such a time, revolutionary-democratic programmes are quite naturally veiled in vague, even reactionary, socialist ideas concealed behind revolutionary phrases (to wit, the Socialists-Revolutionaries and Nadezhdin, who, it seems, changed only his

label when he went over from the "revolutionary socialists" to the new *Iskra*). Under such circumstances we, the Social-Democrats, never can and never will advance the slogan "Be more revolutionary than anyone else". We shall not even try to keep up with the revolutionariness of a democrat who is detached from his class basis, who has a weakness for fine phrases and flaunts catchwords and cheap slogans (especially in agrarian matters). On the contrary, we will always be critical of such revolutionariness; we will expose the real meaning of words, the real content of idealised great events; and we will teach the need for a sober evaluation of the classes and shadings within the classes, even in the hottest situations of the revolution.

Equally incorrect, for the same reason, are Parvus' statements that "the revolutionary provisional government in Russia will be a government of working-class democracy", that "if the Social-Democrats are at the head of the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat, this government will be a Social-Democratic government", that the Social-Democratic provisional government "will be an integral government with a Social-Democratic majority". This is impossible, unless we speak of fortuitous, transient episodes, and not of a revolutionary dictatorship that will be at all durable and capable of leaving its mark in history. This is impossible, because only a revolutionary dictatorship supported by the vast majority of the people can be at all durable (not absolutely, of course, but relatively). The Russian proletariat, however, is at present a minority of the population in Russia. It can become the great, overwhelming majority only if it combines with the mass of semi-proletarians, semi-proprietors, i.e., with the mass of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural poor. Such a composition of the social basis of the possible and desirable revolutionary-democratic dictatorship will, of course, affect the composition of the revolutionary government and inevitably lead to the participation, or even predominance, within it of the most heterogeneous representatives of revolutionary democracy. It would be extremely harmful to entertain any illusions on this score. If that windbag Trotsky now writes (unfortunately, side by side with Parvus) that "a Father Gapon could appear only once", that "there is no room for a second

Gapon", he does so simply because he is a windbag. If there were no room in Russia for a second Gapon, there would be no room for a truly "great", consummated democratic revolution. To become great, to evoke 1789-93, not 1848-50, and to surpass those years, it must rouse the vast masses to active life, to heroic efforts, to "fundamental historic creativeness"; it must raise them out of frightful ignorance, unparalleled oppression, incredible backwardness, and abysmal dullness. The revolution is already raising them and will raise them completely; the government itself is facilitating the process by its desperate resistance. But, of course, there can be no question of a mature political consciousness, of a Social-Democratic consciousness of these masses or their numerous "native" popular leaders or even "muzhik" leaders. They cannot become Social-Democrats at once without first passing a number of revolutionary tests, not only because of their ignorance (revolution, we repeat, enlightens with marvellous speed), but because their class position is not proletarian, because the objective logic of historical development confronts them at the present time with the tasks, not of a socialist, but of a democratic revolution.

In this revolution, the revolutionary proletariat will participate with the utmost energy, sweeping aside the miserable tail-ism of some and the revolutionary phrases of others. It will bring class definiteness and consciousness into the dizzying whirlwind of events, and march on intrepidly and unswervingly, not fearing, but fervently desiring, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, fighting for the republic and for complete republican liberties, fighting for substantial economic reforms, in order to create for itself a truly large arena, an arena worthy of the twentieth century, in which to carry on the struggle for socialism.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY[94]

The question of the participation of Social-Democracy in the provisional revolutionary government has been highlighted less by the course of events than by the theoretical reasonings of Social-Democrats of a certain trend. We dealt in two articles (issues Nos. 13 and 14) with the arguments of Martynov, who was the first to bring up this question. It appears, however, that the interest in the question is so keen and the misconceptions to which the afore-mentioned arguments have given rise (see in particular *Iskra*, No. 93) are so great that it is necessary to go into this matter once more. However Social-Democrats may assess the probability of our having to give more than a theoretical answer to this question in the near future, the Party at any rate must be clear as to its immediate aims. Unless there is clarity in this matter there can no longer be any consistent propaganda and agitation free from vacillations and mental reservations.

Let us try to reconstruct the essence of the controversial question. If what we want is not only concessions from the autocracy but its actual overthrow, we must work to replace the tsarist government by a provisional revolutionary government, which would, on the one hand, convene a Constituent Assembly on the basis of really universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, and, on the other, be in a position to ensure real and complete freedom during the elections. Thus, the question arises whether it is right for the Social-Democratic Labour Party to participate in such a provisional revolutionary government. This question was first raised by spokesmen of the opportunist wing of

our Party, specifically by Martynov, prior to the Ninth of January, when he, and with him *Iskra*, answered it in the negative. Martynov sought to carry the conceptions of the revolutionary Social-Democrats to an absurdity; he *frightened* them by saying that in the event of a successful outcome to our work of organising the revolution, with our Party's assumption of leadership of the popular armed uprising, we would *have to* participate in the provisional revolutionary government. This participation would mean inadmissible "seizure of power", it would be "crass Jaurèsism", which no class-conscious Social-Democratic Party could tolerate.

Let us dwell on the contentions of those who hold to such a point of view. By participating in the provisional government, we are told, Social-Democracy would have the power in its hands; but as the party of the proletariat, Social-Democracy cannot hold the power without attempting to put our maximum programme into effect, i.e., without attempting to bring about the socialist revolution. In such an undertaking it would, at the present time, inevitably come to grief, discredit itself, and play into the hands of the reactionaries. Hence, participation by Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government is inadmissible.

This argument is based on a misconception; it confounds the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution, the struggle for the republic (including our entire minimum programme) with the struggle for socialism. If Social-Democracy sought to make the socialist revolution its immediate aim, it would assuredly discredit itself. It is precisely such vague and hazy ideas of our "Socialists-Revolutionaries" that Social-Democracy has always combated. For this reason Social-Democracy has constantly stressed the bourgeois nature of the impending revolution in Russia and insisted on a clear line of demarcation between the democratic minimum programme and the socialist maximum programme. Some Social-Democrats, who are inclined to yield to spontaneity, might forget all this in time of revolution, but not the Party as a whole. The adherents of this erroneous view make an idol of spontaneity in their belief that the march of events will compel the Social-Democratic Party in such a position to set about achieving the socialist revolution, despite itself. Were this so, our programme would be incorrect, it would

КАВКАЗСКІЙ СОЮЗЪ РОС. СОЦ.-ДЕМ. РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Брошюры по партійнымъ вопросамъ № 3.

Революціонная демократическая диктатура пролетаріата и крестьянства.

(Перепеч. изъ № 14 „Впередъ“).

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Facsimile

not be in keeping with the "march of events", which is exactly what the spontaneity worshippers fear; they fear for the correctness of our programme. But this fear (a psychological explanation of which we attempted to give in our articles) is entirely baseless. Our programme is correct. And the march of events will assuredly confirm this more and more fully as time goes on. It is the march of events that will "impose" upon us the imperative necessity of waging a furious struggle for the republic and, in practice, guide our forces, the forces of the politically active proletariat, in this direction. It is the march of events that will, in the democratic revolution, inevitably impose upon us such a host of allies from among the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, whose real needs will demand the implementation of our minimum programme, that any concern over too rapid a transition to the maximum programme is simply absurd.

On the other hand, however, these very allies from among the petty-bourgeois democrats create in the minds of Social-Democrats of a certain trend new misgivings, namely, fear of "crass Jaurèsism". Participation in a government with the bourgeois democrats has been banned by a resolution of the Amsterdam Congress[95]; it is Jaurèsism, i.e., unconscious betrayal of the interests of the proletariat, the reduction of the proletariat to a hanger-on of the bourgeoisie, its corruption with the illusion of power, which in reality is completely unattainable in bourgeois society.

That reasoning is no less fallacious. It shows that those who resort to it have memorised good resolutions without understanding their meaning; they have learned a few anti-Jaurèsist catchwords by rote, but have not duly weighed them and thus misapply them; they have learned the letter but not the spirit of the recent lessons of international revolutionary Social-Democracy. To judge Jaurèsism from the point of view of dialectical materialism one must draw a clear line between subjective motives and objective historical conditions. Subjectively, Jaurès wanted to save the republic by entering into an alliance with the bourgeois democrats. The objective conditions of this "experiment" were that the republic in France had become an established fact and was in no grave danger; that the working class had every opportunity of developing an independent class

political organisation but did not take full advantage of this opportunity, partly because it was influenced by the parliamentary humbug of its leaders; that in actual practice, history was already objectively posing before the working class the tasks of the socialist revolution, *from which* the Millerands were *luring* the proletariat with promises of paltry social reforms.

Now to take Russia. Subjectively, revolutionary Social-Democrats like the *Vperyod*-ists or Parvus want to secure the republic by entering into an alliance with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. The objective conditions differ from those in France as night differs from day. Objectively, the historical course of events has now posed before the Russian proletariat precisely the task of carrying through the democratic bourgeois revolution (the whole content of which, for brevity's sake, we sum up in the word Republic); this task confronts the people as a whole, viz., the entire mass of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry; without such a revolution the more or less extensive development of an independent class organisation for the socialist revolution is unthinkable.

Try to visualise concretely this complete difference in the objective conditions and then tell us: what is one to think of people who, carried away by the similitude of certain words, by the resemblance between certain letters, and by the sameness of subjective motives, forget this difference?

Because in France Jaurès paid homage to bourgeois social reform on the mistaken subjective plea of defending the republic, we Russian Social-Democrats are to abandon all serious struggle to win the republic! This exactly is what the profound wisdom of the new-Iskrists amounts to.

Indeed, is it not clear that as far as the proletariat is concerned the struggle for the republic is inconceivable without an alliance with the petty-bourgeois masses? Is it not clear that without the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry there is not a shadow of hope for the success of this struggle? One of the chief flaws in the argument under discussion is its deadness, its stereotyped character, its failure to make allowance for the revolutionary situation. Struggling for the republic while at the same time renouncing the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship is as though

Oyama had decided to fight Kuropatkin at Mukden, but disavowed beforehand any intention of taking the city. If we, the revolutionary people, viz., the proletariat and the peasantry, want to "fight together" against the autocracy, we must fight against it together to the last, finish it off together, and stand together in repelling the inevitable attempts to restore it! (It should be said again, to avoid possible misunderstanding, that by the republic we understand not only and not so much a form of government as the sum-total of democratic changes envisaged in our minimum programme.) One must have a schoolboy's conception of history to imagine the thing without "leaps", to see it as something in the shape of a straight line moving slowly and steadily upwards; first it will be the turn of the liberal big bourgeoisie—minor concessions from the autocracy; then of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie—the democratic republic; and finally of the proletariat—the socialist revolution. That picture, by and large, is correct, correct *à la longue*, as the French say—spread over a century or so (in France, for instance, from 1789 to 1905); but one must be a virtuoso of philistinism to take this as a pattern for one's plan of action in a revolutionary epoch. If the Russian autocracy, even at this stage, fails to find a way out by buying itself off with a meagre constitution, if it is not only shaken but actually *overthrown*, then, obviously, a tremendous exertion of revolutionary energy on the part of all progressive classes will be called for to defend this gain. This "defence", however, is nothing else than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry! The more we gain now and the more vigorously we defend the gains, the less will the inevitable future reaction be able to reappropriate afterwards, the shorter will the intervals of reaction be, and the easier will the task be for the proletarian fighters who will come after us.

But here come those who, yardstick in hand, *à la* Ilovaisky,* would measure off in advance, before the struggle has begun, a modest little bit of our future conquests—people who, before the downfall of the autocracy, even before the events of the Ninth of January, took it into their heads to intimidate the working class of Russia with the bogy of

* D. I. Ilovaisky (1832-1920)—a Russian historian, apologist of monarchism.—*Ed.*

a terrible revolutionary-democratic dictatorship! And these knights of the yardstick lay claim to the name of revolutionary Social-Democrats....

Participation in the provisional government with the bourgeois revolutionary democrats, they weep, means sanctioning the bourgeois order; it means sanctioning the perpetuation of prisons and the police, of unemployment and poverty, of private property and prostitution. This is an argument worthy either of anarchists or of Narodniks. Social-Democrats do not hold back from struggle for political freedom on the grounds that it is bourgeois political freedom. Social-Democrats regard this "sanctioning" of the bourgeois order from the historical point of view. When Feuerbach was asked whether he sanctioned the materialism of Büchner, Vogt, and Moleschott, he said: Backwards I fully agree with the materialists; but not forwards. That is precisely how Social-Democrats sanction the bourgeois system. They have never been afraid of saying, and never will be, that they sanction the republican-democratic bourgeois order in preference to an autocratic serf-owning bourgeois order. But they "sanction" the bourgeois republic only because it is the last form of class rule, because it offers a most convenient arena for the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; they sanction it, not for its prisons and police, its private property and prostitution, but for the scope and freedom it allows to combat these charming institutions.

Far be it from us to contend that our participation in the revolutionary provisional government entails no dangers for Social-Democracy. There is not, nor can there be, any form of struggle, any political situation that does not involve dangers. If there is no revolutionary class instinct, if there is no integral world outlook on a scientific level, if (with due apologies to our friends of the new *Iskra*) there are no brains in the head, then it is dangerous even to take part in strikes—it may lead to Economism; to engage in parliamentary struggle—it may end in parliamentary cretinism[96]; to support the Zemstvo liberal democrats—it may lead to a "plan for a Zemstvo campaign". It would then be dangerous even to read the extremely useful writings of Jaurès and Aulard on the French Revolution—it may lead to Martynov's pamphlet on two dictatorships.

It goes without saying that if the Social-Democrats were to forget, even for a moment, the class distinctiveness of the proletariat vis-à-vis the petty bourgeoisie, if they were to form an ill-timed and unprofitable alliance with one or another untrustworthy petty-bourgeois party of the intelligentsia, if the Social-Democrats were to lose sight, even for a moment, of their own independent aims and the need (in all political situations and exigencies, in all political crises and upheavals) for attaching paramount importance to developing the class-consciousness of the proletariat and its independent political organisation, then participation in the provisional revolutionary government would be extremely dangerous. But under such circumstances, any political step, we repeat, would be equally dangerous. The groundlessness of these possible apprehensions as applied to the present formulation of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary Social-Democrats is borne out by a few simple statements of fact. We shall not speak about ourselves or quote the numerous declarations, warnings, and counsels on this question given in *Vperyod*; we shall, instead, cite Parvus. He subscribes to the opinion that the Social-Democrats should participate in the provisional revolutionary government, and he is emphatic on the conditions, which we must never forget, namely, to strike together, but to march separately, not to merge organisations, to watch our ally as we would our enemy, etc. We shall not dwell in detail on this aspect of the question, having dealt with it in our previous article.

No, the real political danger to Social-Democracy today does not lie where the new-Iskrists are looking for it. It is not the thought of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry that should frighten us, but rather the spirit of tail-ism and torpidity which has such a demoralising effect on the party of the proletariat and finds expression in all kinds of organisation-as-process, arming-as-process theories, and what not. To take, for instance, *Iskra*'s latest attempt to set up a distinction between the provisional revolutionary government and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Is this not an example of lifeless scholasticism? People who invent such distinctions are capable of stringing together fine words but are absolutely incapable of thinking.

Actually, these concepts stand to each other roughly in the relation of legal form to class content. To speak of the "provisional revolutionary government" is to stress the constitutional aspect of the case, the fact that the government originates, not from the law, but from the revolution, that it is a temporary government committed to the future Constituent Assembly. But whatever the form, whatever the origin, whatever the conditions, one thing at any rate is clear—that the provisional revolutionary government must have the support of definite classes. One has only to remember this simple truth to realise that the provisional revolutionary government can be nothing else but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Therefore, *Iskra*'s distinction only drags the Party back to fruitless disputes, away from the task of making a concrete analysis of the class interests in the Russian revolution.

Or, to take another *Iskra* argument. The slogan "Long Live the Revolutionary Provisional Government!" draws from that paper the didactic remark: "The combination of the words 'long live' and 'government' sullies the lips." What is this, if not sheer bombast? They talk about overthrowing the autocracy and yet fear to sully themselves by acclaiming the revolutionary government! Surprisingly, they are not afraid of sullying themselves by acclaiming a republic, for a republic necessarily implies a government, and—no Social-Democrat ever doubted it—a bourgeois government at that. In what way, then, does acclaiming the provisional revolutionary government differ from acclaiming the democratic republic? Must Social-Democracy, the political leader of the most revolutionary class, take after an anaemic and hysterical old maid who finically insists on a figleaf? Is it right to acclaim what the bourgeois-democratic government stands for, but wrong directly to acclaim the provisional revolutionary-democratic government?

Picture it: the uprising of the workers in St. Petersburg has been victorious; the autocracy is overthrown; the provisional revolutionary government has been proclaimed; the armed workers jubilate, with outcries of "Long Live the Provisional Revolutionary Government!" The new-Iskrists stand on the side lines, their innocent eyes raised heavenward, solemnly uttering as they beat their chaste breasts:

"We thank Thee, O Lord, that we are not like these wretches and have not sullied our lips with such word combinations...."

No, comrades, a thousand times no! Have no fear of sullying yourselves by most energetic halting-at-nothing participation in a republican revolution together with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Do not exaggerate the dangers of such participation; our organised proletariat is quite capable of coping with them. More will be accomplished in months of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry than in decades of the peaceful, stupefying atmosphere of political stagnation. If, after the Ninth of January, the Russian working class, under conditions of political slavery, was able to mobilise over a million proletarians for staunch, disciplined, collective action, then, given the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, we will mobilise scores of millions of the urban and rural poor, and we will make the Russian political revolution the prelude to the socialist revolution in Europe.

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the text in *Vperyod*

GRAFT: A FRANCO-RUSSIAN CUSTOM

Under this headline the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts* recently published an extremely valuable document—the original text of a letter written by M. Jules Gouin, the manager of a large machine works in Batignolles (a suburb of Paris), to a ministry official in St. Petersburg. Through the medium of this gentleman the French works received an order for 114 locomotives. The total value of the order (at 27,700 francs per locomotive) is some 3,000,000 francs, or about 1,200,000 rubles. For his good offices in this transaction the honourable ministerial official (who, we may add, probably occupies a fairly high post) receives for a start, as we see from the letter, two per cent of the purchase price. This amounts to about 25,000 rubles. It further appears from the letter (which we do not quote in full for lack of space) that of this sum 13,000 francs have already been received by the go-between; the rest is payable in instalments. Moreover, alterations in the standard type of locomotives to the specifications of the Russian railways are to be paid for separately. The St. Petersburg representative of the Paris firm undertakes to inform this official in advance what this extra charge demanded by the works will amount to. If the official can "get" from the Russian Government a higher price than that fixed by the works, the difference too will be placed to his credit as the "go-between". In the German translation of the letter (written in French) this is called *Vermittlungsgebühr*, "broker's commission". Actually, of course, this expression is merely a veil to cover a most brazen swindle, an embezzlement of public funds, committed by a French capitalist and a Russian ministry official working under a collusive contract.

Vorwärts rightly says that the letter casts a lurid light on Russian venality and the advantage that foreign capital takes of it. The letter is documentary proof of the usual "business" practices prevailing in civilised, capitalist countries. These things are done everywhere in Europe, too, but nowhere in such a shameless manner as in Russia; and nowhere is there such "political safety" (safety from exposure) for corruption as in autocratic Russia. No wonder, conclude the German Social-Democrats, that European industry is interested in preserving the Russian autocracy with its irresponsible officials and their shady practices. No wonder Russian officials fight tooth and nail against a constitution that threatens to establish public control over the administration. One can gather from this exposure what the Russian officialdom is "making" on the war with Japan, what sums have found their way into the pockets of officials employed in the St. Petersburg ministries from, say, the sale of German marine shipping to Russia! The national calamity is a gold mine for the war contractors and venal officials.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE GUILTY BLAMING THE INNOCENT*

Iskra, No. 92, contains an article "The Zigzags of a Firm Course", purporting to show that, in reality, *Vperyod* is not at all maintaining the principles and the line of the old *Iskra* firmly and consistently, but, on the contrary, is zigzagging in the wake of the new *Iskra*. Strictly speaking, this allegation is too ludicrous to merit serious consideration. What strikes us here is not the content of the new-*Iskra* polemic, for it has no content, but its methods. These methods are worth considering; upon examination they reveal that there are polemics and polemics. The old *Iskra* was disliked for its polemics, but no one ever thought of calling them unprincipled. The new *Iskra* is despised for its polemics, because their unprincipled nature is evident to the mass of the Party members engaged in practical work and the consistent *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, as well as to the "conciliators" headed by Plekhanov.

It is our intention to show the reader with what methods these polemics operate.

Let us follow *Iskra* step by step. *Vperyod* is leading the Party towards a split, it says. This is not true. All who have studied the Party crisis, not from old wives' tales, but from documents, know that it was the Minority that split the Party immediately after the Second Congress, and that it did so clandestinely by setting up a secret organisation. *Iskra* is engaging in hypocrisy now and is misrepresenting the facts. An open split may evoke hatred, but a secret split can evoke only contempt. *Vperyod* wants no secret split; that is all there is to it.

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* Delayed for lack of space.

Further, they want to charge us with contradicting ourselves on the question of autonomy and centralism. Lenin, they allege, asserted in *Steps** that autonomy is a principle of opportunism, whereas now the Bureau of Committees of the Majority itself is in favour of the broadest possible autonomy for the local committees. Lenin maintained that bureaucracy stands in the same relation to democracy as the organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy to the organisational principle of the opportunists, whereas now the Bureau of Committees of the Majority itself complains of bureaucracy. This is the substance of their accusation against us. This charge too is built on downright falsehood. In *Steps* (and, before *Steps*, in his "Letter to *Iskra*"** Lenin cautioned, declared, reiterated, and emphasised countless times that the phrases used against bureaucracy, for autonomy, etc., were extremely vague, that they were open to any number of different constructions and could be made to mean almost anything. Lenin declared hundreds of times that, in substance, these phrases were used exclusively to veil the desire for co-optation. These words of Lenin have now been fully borne out by the most authentic documentary evidence. If, however, we take these words in the sense of principle, said Lenin (*if* we take!), we shall find the following: Bureaucracy, taken in general, may denote officialism, red tape, formalism, paper answers. This sort of bureaucracy is evil, said Lenin, illustrating his remarks with Martov's well-known draft of the Rules. It is clear to every reader who is at all conscientious that this is the kind of bureaucracy meant by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, so that to accuse *Vperyod* of contradicting itself is utter childishness. Bureaucracy may mean infringement of the legitimate and, if we may say so, of the "natural" rights of every opposition, a fight waged against a minority by unfair means. Such bureaucracy is possible, said Lenin, but there is no principle involved in it. It must be combated by the establishment of constitutional guarantees of the rights of minorities. Such guarantees

* *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, Geneva, May 1904. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 201-423.—*Ed.*

** *Iskra*, November 25, 1903. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 114-17.—*Ed.*

were proposed clearly, frankly, and openly for the first time by the Stone-Hards, or *Vperyod*-ists, as they are now called, in the well-known Declaration of the Twenty-Two,* which was issued in August, seven months ago, without having since evoked the slightest attempt on the part of the new-Iskrists unequivocally to define their attitude towards it.

But apart from these interpretations of bureaucracy, anti-autonomy, etc., it is possible to have interpretations based on real principles—not in the form of any irregularities, extremes, etc., but as general principles governing the entire organisation. This was the interpretation the Mensheviks tried to force upon us against our will, despite our resistance. Lenin, both in his "Letter to *Iskra*" and in *Steps*, sounded innumerable warnings against such an interpretation, which obscures the actual concrete course that the crisis and the split have been taking. Lenin made a straightforward appeal in his "Letter to *Iskra*": Drop this nonsense, gentlemen; nine-tenths of it is squabbling! Lenin was attacked for this, and the Central Organ tried to prove that principles were involved. Well, if that is so, Lenin replied and the *Vperyod*-ists always will reply, then the *principle* of autonomy is really an opportunist principle for a Social-Democratic organisation. If that is so, then your outcries against bureaucracy are, in principle, of a piece with those of the Jaurèsists in France, the Bernsteinians in Germany, and the reformists in Italy. That is how the matter stands; and to prove it, one has only to study the Party crisis from documents and not from the assurances of friends. Lenin had told the Bundist Lieber at the Second Congress (see proceedings) that he would defend the autonomy of "any", even a Tula, Committee,** against petty centralism; Lenin did not utter a word against the guarantee of such autonomy in Clause 8 of our Party Rules. The *principle* of autonomy, however, was never defended either by Lenin or by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority; it was defended by Akimov, by Lieber, by the new-Iskrists. It is not difficult, of course, to confuse the issue in the

* "To the Party". See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 452-59.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 485.—*Ed.*

mind of the unenlightened reader by tearing words from their context regardless of the circumstances under which they were used and of their original meaning; but newspapers that employ such methods in polemics can only expect to be treated like *Novoye Vremya*[97].

Let us take the pamphlet by "A Worker". What essentially is the point that *Iskra* confuses? It is that certain unprincipled people have only let themselves in for it with their shouting about the principle of autonomy and the like, since the only reply could be a demand for the elective principle. Thereupon these people began to beat a retreat. The *Vperyod*-ists, on the other hand, have always held that talking big and flaunting the "principles" of autonomy and democracy is indecent; but if the Rules require serious, practical amendments along the line of democracy, as far as it is feasible under Russian conditions, let us discuss them openly and above-board. *Vperyod* challenged "A Worker" to produce, if he could, any passage in Social-Democratic literature where the necessity of drawing workers into the Party committees is put as clearly as Lenin put it.* "A Worker", led astray by the new-Iskrists, replied in print that he accepted the challenge; it turned out, however, that he did not understand what accepting the challenge implied, for he did not point out any such passage, but only threatened to "give it" to Lenin, to "get even" with him. Naturally, *Vperyod* left these terrible threats unanswered.

Now let us take again the question of a single centre. Lenin, it is alleged, said in *Steps* that it was the opportunists who stood for a single centre, whereas now this is the position of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. Again the same gross distortion of facts, with an eye to the uninformed or inattentive reader. Whoever wishes to read *Steps* will find (on page 28, mention of which is so studiously avoided by the *Iskra* columnist) that long before the first article written by a Bolshevik against two centres (Ryadovoi's articles in *Our Misunderstandings*), Lenin had written that the idea of two centres "took into account the temporary [mark this!] and special requirements of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class movement in the

* See pp. 58-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

existing conditions of political slavery, with the initial base of operations for the revolutionary assault being set up abroad". "The first idea," the author of *Steps* goes on to say at once in regard to the idea of centralism in general, "as the one [!] matter of principle, had [according to the plan of the old *Iskra*] to pervade the entire Rules; the second, being a particular idea necessitated by temporary circumstances of place and mode of action, took the form of a seeming departure from centralism in the proposal to set up two centres" (p. 28).* Now, we leave it to the reader to judge the methods of controversy employed by our Party's *Novoye Vremya*! *Iskra* simply tries to mislead the reader by keeping back from him the fact (1) that Lenin pointed out long ago the temporary, *particular* significance of the idea of two centres; and (2) that, therefore, Lenin never explained the opportunists' defence of a single centre by general principles, but only by "temporary circumstances of place and mode of action", by circumstances under which the opportunist wing of the Party *actually* stood for and had to stand for a single centre. That the old *Iskra* was a bulwark in the struggle against opportunism is a fact. That it was the opportunist wing which constituted the minority at the Congress is also a fact. Why, then, should it be a matter of surprise that now, when the new *Iskra* has turned out to be opportunist and when those in Russia have shown greater firmness in principle and Party consistency than those abroad, the "temporary circumstances" have changed? We should not be at all surprised now if the *Rabocheye Dyelo*ists, Martynov, the "Marsh", and the new-Iskrists all took up a stand (say, at the Third Congress) for two centres, while all the Bolsheviks (or nearly all) stood for one centre. It would only be a change, in keeping with the "temporary circumstances", in the methods of struggle for the same principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy, the principles of the old *Iskra* for which Lenin and the Bolsheviks fought and continue to fight steadfastly. It is only people of the *Novoye Vremya* type who can see anything "miraculous" in such a change. (We said that nearly all Bolsheviks were likely to stand for one centre. We have yet to see how things

* See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 240.—Ed.

will turn out at the Third Congress. There are differences of opinion among us as to the significance of "temporary circumstances of place and mode of action". We shall compare these different opinions at the Congress and "strike a balance".)

The new-*Iskra* methods of polemising would seem to have been made sufficiently clear in the foregoing, so that we can now be more brief. *Iskra* contends that the Bureau of Committees of the Majority violated Party discipline by calling the Congress, in contravention of the Rules, over the head of the Council. This is untrue, for the Council had broken the Rules long before by its evasion of the Congress. We openly declared this in the press quite some time ago (Orlovsky).[98] After the Mensheviks had torn the Party asunder by a secret split and dodged the Congress on all kinds of false pretexts, we had no practical way out of the preposterous situation other than to convene the Congress against the will of the centres. *Iskra* says that the editorial in issue No. 9 of *Vperyod*, "New Tasks and New Forces", by insisting on the necessity of considerably increasing the number of Party organisations of every description, contradicts the spirit of Clause 1 of the Rules as formulated by Lenin, who, in defending his idea at the Congress, had urged the necessity of narrowing the concept of Party. The objection raised by *Iskra* can be recommended as a high-school problem in logic to train young people in debating. The Bolsheviks have always held that the Party should be limited to the sum-total of Party organisations and that the number of these organisations should then be increased (see Proceedings of the Congress and *Steps*, p. 40 *et al.*, particularly pp. 40-41 and 46).* The new *Iskra* confounds extension of the Party's *framework* with extension of the *concept* of Party, it confounds extension of the *number of Party organisations* with extension of the Party *beyond the limits of the Party organisations*! To explain this perplexing riddle, we shall give a plain, easy illustration: let us assume for the sake of simplicity an army consisting exclusively of men of a single arm of the service; the manpower of the army must be narrowed down to a total of men who have actually proved

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 256-58 and 263-64.—*Ed.*

themselves able to shoot, with none allowed to get past with general phrases or verbal assurances of military fitness; after that every effort must be made to increase the number of men who can pass the rifleman's test. Aren't you beginning to see a glimmer of light, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*?

Iskra writes, accusing *Vperyod*: "Previously only consistent Social-Democrats, who had to be recognised as such, were wanted; now all sorts of elements are admitted to the holy of holies, except those that are avowedly non-Social-Democratic." Take *Vperyod*, No. 9. There you will read: "Let all... circles, except those that are avowedly non-Social-Democratic, either directly join the Party or *align themselves with the Party* [author's italics]. In the latter event we must not demand that they accept our programme or that they necessarily enter into organisational relations with us...."* Is it not clear that *Iskra* is simply juggling, confounding what was "previously needed" for joining the Party with what "is now permitted" for aligned groups? The Bolsheviks have constantly said, and say now in *Vperyod*, that self-enrolment in the Party is intellectualist anarchism, that Party members must accept "obligatory organisational relations" not in words alone. Only people set on creating confusion can fail to understand this. *Vperyod*'s slogan was: Organise new forces for the new tasks into Party organisations or, at least, into organisations aligned with the Party. *Iskra*'s slogan is: "Open the doors wider!" The ones say: "Take new marksmen into your regiments, organise those who are learning to shoot into auxiliary units." The others say: "Open the doors wider! Let all comers enrol themselves in the army, any way they please!"

As to the question of organising the revolution and organising the arming, *Iskra* now seeks to assure us that it has no differences with *Vperyod*. We would ask first of all: what about Parvus? If the differences have merely been invented by the perfidious *Vperyod*, why don't you have it out with the new-Iskrist Parvus, who cannot be suspected of picking on *Iskra*? You yourselves had to admit your disagreement with Parvus and were the first to do so. Why then this game of

* See p. 219 of this volume.—*Ed.*

hide-and-seek? Essentially, the new *Iskra* argues here against *Vperyod* in the very manner in which *Rabocheye Dyelo* used to argue against the old *Iskra*. We cannot too strongly advise comrades interested in the history of *their own* Party tore-read *Rabocheye Dyelo*, particularly issue No. 10. It had been pointed out to *Rabocheye Dyelo* that it minimised the tasks of the political struggle. Its retort was that *Iskra* underestimated the economic struggle. It is pointed out to the new *Iskra* that it minimises the tasks of organising the revolution, the conduct of the uprising and the arming of the workers, and the participation of Social-Democracy in the provisional revolutionary government. The new *Iskra* retorts that *Vperyod* underestimates the spontaneity of revolution and insurrection, the primacy of politics over "technique" (arming). Like tail-ender views lead to like tail-ender conclusions. These people seek to cover up their inability to provide a guiding slogan for the new tasks by moralising on the importance of the old tasks. Words are torn out of context to show that the opponent himself appreciates the importance of the old tasks, the significance of the ABC of Social-Democracy. Of course, comrades of the new *Iskra*, we prize the ABC of Social-Democracy very highly, but *we do not want to remain at the abecedarian stage for ever*. Let this be plain. Neither Parvus nor the Bureau of Committees of the Majority nor *Vperyod* would ever think of disputing the elementary truth that the workers themselves can, will, and must arm, even without the organisations and the Party. But if *Iskra* makes its famous "self-arming" a *slogan*—then, of course, everyone smiles at the sight of such a worshipful attitude towards spontaneity. When *Iskra*, *correcting* Parvus, discovers a new task—worthy of the lucubrations of Krichevsky and Akimov—the task of "arming the workers with a sense of the burning necessity to arm", it is only natural that it should meet with nothing but ridicule. If at a time when the new tasks of arming the masses, organising street fighting, etc., have been added to the old tasks of Social-Democracy, *Iskra* hastens to belittle these tasks (which we have scarcely begun to tackle) with its disparaging sophisms about "technique" and its secondary role; if instead of *supplementing* the old, customary, constant political tasks of the Party with the new tasks of

"technique", *Iskra* argues about the *separation* of the former from the latter, then, of course, everyone regards such arguments as a new variety of tail-ism.

In conclusion, as a curiosity, we would mention *Iskra*'s attempt to discard its sterling reputation as the author of the famous no-panic-mongering theory. *Iskra* itself now calls this a "famous" question and tries to prove that the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, too, advocates "no panic-mongering" when in its leaflet on the insurrection it recommends caution in destroying property belonging to petty bourgeois (except in cases of absolute necessity), so as not to frighten them needlessly.[99] "Ah," *Iskra* exults, "so you, too, do not want to frighten people!"

Isn't this just too precious? An agreement with the Zemstvo men not to cause a panic during a peaceful demonstration is compared to a warning against the unwarranted destruction of property during the uprising! In the first case, moreover, it is "demonstrations of a higher type"; in the second, the base, contemptible "technique" of armed street fighting.... Just one slight question, friends: why is it that every Social-Democrat* agrees and will agree with the advice not to frighten the petty bourgeoisie needlessly during an uprising? And why, on the other hand, did your plan for a Zemstvo campaign become "famous" among Social-Democrats, by your own admission? Why did Parvus and many others from your own ranks protest against it? Why are you yourselves to this very day ashamed to publish this famous plan? Is it not because the advice contained in your notorious letter was as irrelevant and ridiculous as the advice of the Bureau is indisputably correct and generally accepted by Social-Democrats?

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* So far only the anarchists have expressed their disagreement on this point. They attacked *Vperyod* in their paper, revealing an absolute lack of understanding of the difference between a democratic and a socialist revolution.

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE LIBERALS

The legal press reported some time ago that a conference of Zemstvo leaders from various parts of Russia had been held in Moscow. *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[100] even sought to give the alarm, shouting that the government was allowing revolutionary assemblies to be held in Russia, and that it was necessary to call a congress of the monarchist party, etc.; but no one paid serious attention to these outcries, since the police these days have their hands full with affairs of a much more disturbing nature. By all accounts, however, the Zemstvo men kept within the bounds of their usual constitutional aspirations. Still, their conference proceedings were of considerable interest, inasmuch as they comprehended the agrarian question. We quote in full the theses which, by the reports, were adopted by a majority of the conference:

"1) State interference in the economic life should be extended to agrarian relations as well. 2) Proper agrarian legislation presumes a radical change [??]. 3) The impending agrarian reform should be framed on the following principles: I. Improvement of the economic conditions of the farming class by the compulsory redemption of the necessary supplementary plots from private holdings for the benefit of the land-poor of various categories [the elaboration of this question has been entrusted to several persons]. II. Crown lands and some of the royal demesnes to be declared state lands; these state lands to be increased by the purchase and redemption of privately owned land and to be utilised for the benefit of the labouring population. III. The conditions of lease to be regulated through governmental intervention in the relations between owners and tenants. IV. The establishment of public and state mediation commissions to enforce agrarian measures in accordance with the above-mentioned principles. V. The proper organisation of a widely conceived system of migration and settlement, better credit facilities, reform of the Peasant Bank, and assistance to co-operative

enterprises. VI. The radical revision of land-surveying legislation with a view to simplifying, facilitating, and cheapening demarcation abolishing the open-field system on privately owned lands and peasant allotments, making possible the exchange of lots, etc."

Before dealing with this most instructive programme point by point, let us dwell on its significance as a whole. Undoubtedly, the very fact that spokesmen of the landlord class present such a programme proves more conclusively than lengthy arguments that Russia differs substantially in some respect from all the fully formed capitalist nations of Western Europe. In what does this difference consist? Is it in the semi-socialist village communal system that prevails in our country with the corresponding absence of a bourgeois intelligentsia and of bourgeois democracy, as the old Narodnik socialists used to think and as the "Socialists-Revolutionaries" still think to some extent? Or is it in the multitude of feudal survivals that enmesh our countryside, making it impossible for capitalism to develop widely and freely and creating Narodnik moods precisely in bourgeois-democratic circles? This is a question no thinking socialist will dismiss with evasive excuses, or on the grounds that it is too abstract and theoretical, supposedly out of place in an epoch of revolution, or by reference to the fact of peasant uprisings as a sufficient explanation of the landlords' complaisance. Now, in the epoch of revolution, evasiveness or lack of principle in theoretical questions is tantamount to utter ideological bankruptcy; for now of all times a socialist requires a well-thought-out and consistent world outlook, so that he may control the events and not the events him. Reference to the peasant uprisings contributes nothing either, for the programme now adopted by the landed proprietors, who are politically organised in Zemstvo unions, embodies the wishes which have been expressed for many a decade by the whole liberal press and by all liberal leaders. The Narodnik programme has become the programme of the landlords—a fact that gives a clear political answer to the question we have raised. In a revolutionary epoch theoretical disputes over social issues are settled by the direct action of the diverse classes.

Let us now examine the agrarian programme of the liberals more closely. Our legal press is inclined to sing its

praises. *Economicheskaya Gazeta*, for instance, "records the fact that the Zemstvo people have come forward with an agrarian programme that is incomparably more extreme [really!] than could have been expected, judging from the prevailing impression of the composition of the Zemstvo at the present time" (extreme, that is, from the point of view of the landlords?). "This is evidence of the fact," continues the article, "that the Zemstvo political group possesses both political tact and a deep understanding of what is taking place about us...."

The tact and the understanding of the landlords consist in the fact that when the peasants themselves began to intervene actively and definitely in agrarian relations, these landlords began to speak of the necessity of state interference. The same old story! State intervention in agrarian relations has always been a fact in Russia. When it was intervention in the interests of the upper classes, it was called in police parlance "order"; when the intervention comes from below, it is called "disorder". Yes, but what kind of intervention do the landlords want? Their programme shows that they want intervention exclusively to regulate the relations between owners and tenants. All the measures which they propose, from redemption of supplementary plots to credit facilities and the exchange of lots, etc., apply exclusively to those persons who use the land, i.e., the various categories of farmers. And what of the rural labourers who have no farms of their own? As far back as the nineties of the past century, in Russia's fifty "interior" gubernias alone there were estimated to be no fewer than *three and a half million* farm-hands and day-labourers for whom farm employment was the principal means of earning a livelihood. Today, the number of agricultural wage-labourers is undoubtedly still greater, and the overwhelming majority of them are entirely or almost entirely farmless. Apart from those who possessed neither home nor farm, it was estimated that more than three million of the approximately ten million peasant *farms* in the stated gubernias possessed no horses; and that was ten years ago. All these are farmers in name alone. Their most vital interests lie in higher wages, shorter hours, and improved working conditions. The landlords are discreetly

silent on the subject of intervention in the relations between employers and workers. And we may rest assured that no one will give this kind of intervention serious thought until the rural workers themselves intervene.

We Social-Democrats must pay most serious attention to *this* kind of intervention. Both the immediate practical interests of the movement and our general principles demand it. The bourgeois-democratic nature of Russian liberalism and of Russian Narodism has always manifested itself, among other things, in the fact that the interests of small farming completely overshadow the interests of rural hired labour. Of course, convinced Narodniks, and sometimes "Socialists-Revolutionaries", are prone to regard this as quite natural in view of the "secondary" role (in their imagination, but not in actual peasant life) of hired labour, in view of the fact that with the further development of "village communal traditions", "labour views", and "equalised tenure", this role *might* even be reduced to nought. But this tendency, however earnest, sincere, and socialistic the justifying speeches may be, is in fact a sign of nothing but petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness. This sort of day-dreaming, a quality possessed by both the Russian peasant and the Russian intellectual, is petty-bourgeois day-dreaming. The flowers of this Narodnik day-dreaming are the same fictitious flowers that decorate one of the chains of labouring mankind, and Social-Democratic criticism must ruthlessly pluck out such flowers, "not that man should continue to wear his chain bereft of all joy and pleasure, but that he should throw off the chain and reach for the living flower."[101]

We are in full sympathy with the peasant movement. We would consider it a tremendous gain both for the general social development of Russia and for the Russian proletariat if the peasantry, with our help, succeeded in wresting from the landlords *all* their lands by revolutionary means. But even assuming this most favourable outcome—*even then*, the mass of agricultural hired labourers would only temporarily diminish in number but could in no event disappear altogether. *Even then*, the independent interests of the rural hired labourers would remain independent interests.

The transfer of the land to the peasants would not at all do away with the predominance of the capitalist mode

of production in Russia; it would, on the contrary, provide a broader base for its development; it would bring this development from the type approximating the Italian closer to the American. The property distinctions among the peasants, which are already tremendous, but relatively not very noticeable chiefly on account of the general oppression under the absolutist serf-owning system, would not in any way cease to exist. The expansion of the home market, the development of exchange and commodity production on a new scale, the rapid growth of industry and of cities—all these inevitable effects of a substantial improvement in the condition of the peasants would unavoidably increase property distinctions. The more illusions on that score are widespread among us, the more energetically must the Social-Democrats combat them, if they really want to represent the interests of the working-class movement as a whole, and not merely of one of its stages.*

Until there has been a complete socialist revolution, not even the most radical and most revolutionary measures for agrarian reform will eliminate the class of agricultural wage-workers. The dream of making all people petty-bourgeois is a reactionary platitude. For this reason we should start working now to develop the class-consciousness of the rural wage-workers and to rally them into an independent class organisation. The strike wave in the towns can and should spread to the villages, not only in the form of peasant uprisings, but in the form of real labour strikes, especially at mowing and harvesting time. The demands contained in the working-class section of our programme, which are so often presented by the urban workers to their employers, must, with the corresponding changes necessitated by the different living conditions, be put forward by the rural workers, too. We must take advantage of the fact that so far there are no special laws in Russia degrading the position of the rural workers below that of the urban workers (except for the law forbidding them to leave their work without permission). We must see to it that the rising tide of the proletarian movement creates a specifically proletarian mood

* Cf. Marx's article of 1846 printed below. (See pp. 323-29 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

and proletarian methods of struggle among the farm-hands and day-labourers.

The petty-bourgeois stratum of the rural population, the peasantry in the strict and narrow sense of the word, cannot help being revolutionary at certain periods in history. Its present revolutionary attitude is an inevitable product of the conditions of the "old order", and we must vigorously support and develop it. But it will follow just as inevitably from the conditions of the new order, of the new, free, capitalist Russia, that part of the rural petty bourgeoisie will side with "order"; and the more land the peasants take away from the landlords now, the sooner this will come about. In the countryside, too, only the rural proletariat can be a truly revolutionary class, a class that, under all circumstances, is revolutionary to the end. The conversion of the wretched, downtrodden muzhik into a free, energetic European farmer will be a tremendous democratic gain; but we socialists shall not forget for a moment that this gain will be of no real use to the cause of mankind's complete emancipation from all oppression unless and insofar as the farmer is confronted by a class-conscious, free, and organised rural proletariat.

The liberal landlords keep quiet about the rural worker. As far as the future farmer is concerned, their sole concern is to get him converted as quickly as possible, with the minimum loss to their pockets (it would, perhaps, be more correct to say with the maximum gain to their pockets), into their ally, into a man of property, a pillar of order. What miserable sops they hope to get off with! Their only revolutionary measure, the confiscation of the royal demesnes, is restricted to a *part* of these lands; they are afraid to call confiscation confiscation, and say nothing about the church lands. While promising supplementary plots to the land-poor, they firmly insist on redemption, with not a word about who should make the redemption payment. They obviously take it for granted that the peasant will pay, as in the case of the famed redemption of 1861. The landlords will give up their worst lands at exorbitant prices, which is what their supplementary endowments promise. All the measures they propose in regard to credits, co-operation, exchange of lots, etc., are restricted entirely to narrow proprietary

interests. With regard to leases—one of the most acute problems of peasant farming—they offer nothing but the vaguest of catchwords—"regulation". This may mean anything at all, even an increase in rents, on the pretext of standardisation; we indicated above what the representatives of the ruling classes have always understood by "order".

However, the most important and politically most dangerous feature of the liberal programme is, in our view, the clause concerning the "public and state mediation commissions". The method of realising the agrarian reform is a matter of great importance; for on the method of realisation, concretely and actually, will depend the earnest character of the reform. In regard to this question too (as in regard to many others), we have the Narodniks to thank when we pay the main attention to the economic advantage, ignoring or underestimating the political aspect of the matter. This point of view, natural in a petty bourgeois, understandable in a farmer, is absolutely inadmissible in a Social-Democrat. To the Social-Democrat shifts within the classes and categories of farmers and proprietors are of no consequence unless accompanied by a political gain that facilitates the class struggle of the proletariat. From the point of view of petty-bourgeois day-dreaming, all schemes for "equalised tenure", etc., are important. From the point of view of the Social-Democrat, all such projects are idle and harmful day-dreams that divert the public mind from the realities of real democratic gains. The Social-Democrats will never forget that the ruling classes always and everywhere try to divide and corrupt the working people with economic sops. In the sphere of agrarian reform they find this policy particularly easy and pursue it with particular skill.

All the more definitely and emphatically must we insist on the *basic* demand of our agrarian programme, namely, the establishment of revolutionary peasant committees that will themselves enforce really radical (not in the landlords' sense "radical") agrarian reforms. Short of this, every agrarian reform will inevitably and inescapably be a new fraud, a new trap, like the famed "Reform" of 1861. This is precisely what the "public [?] and state mediation commissions" are—the laying of a trap! By "public" we understand the landlords; by "state"—the bureaucrats. "Public and state

commissions" means *landlord*s' and *bureaucrats*' commissions pure and simple.

That is the point on which we must immediately focus our agitation in the countryside. Peasants, do you hear? They want once again to load you with benefits in true bureaucratic manner, to "regulate" your life by landlord intervention, to "redeem" land for you on the pattern of that old-time land redemption of dismal memory! The landlords are so kind, so very kind: seeing that their lands are in danger of being taken away for nothing, they magnanimously consent to *sell* them—at a suitable price, of course.... Do you agree to such intervention on the part of landlords and bureaucrats? Or do you want to intervene *yourselves* and build up a life of freedom for yourselves? Then unite with the urban proletariat, fight for the republic, arise for the insurrection which will bring you a revolutionary government and revolutionary peasant committees!

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MARX ON THE AMERICAN "GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION"

In *Vperyod*, No. 12,* there was a reference to Marx's polemic against Kriege on the agrarian question. The year was not 1848, as erroneously stated in the article by Comrade—, but 1846. Hermann Kriege, a co-worker of Marx and at the time a very young man, had gone to America in 1845 and there started a journal, the *Volks-Tribun*, for the propaganda of communism. But he conducted this propaganda in such a manner that Marx was obliged to protest very strongly in the name of the German Communists against Hermann Kriege's discrediting of the Communist Party. The criticism of Kriege's trend, published in 1846 in *Westphälische Dampfboot*[102] and reprinted in Volume II of Mehring's edition of Marx's works, is of tremendous interest to present-day Russian Social-Democrats.

The point is that the agrarian question at that time had been brought to the fore by the course of the American social movement, as is the case now in Russia; it was not a question of a developed capitalist society, but, on the contrary, of the creation of the primary and fundamental conditions for a real development of capitalism. This circumstance is of particular importance for drawing a parallel between Marx's attitude towards the American ideas of "general redistribution" and the attitude of Russian Social-Democrats towards the present-day peasant movement.

Kriege gave no data in his journal for a concrete study of the distinctive features of the American social system and for defining the true character of the movement of the

* See p. 250 of this volume.—*Ed.*

contemporary agrarian reformers who campaigned for the abolition of rent. What Kriege did do, though (quite in the style of our "Socialists-Revolutionaries"), was to clothe the question of the agrarian revolution in bombastic and high-sounding phrases: "Every poor man," wrote Kriege, "will become a useful member of human society as soon as he is given an opportunity to engage in productive work. He will be assured such an opportunity for all time if society gives him a piece of land on which he can keep himself and his family.... If this immense area (the 1,400,000,000 acres of North American public domain) is withdrawn from commerce and is secured in restricted amounts for labour,* an end will be put to poverty in America at one stroke...."

To this Marx replies: "One would have expected him to understand that legislators have no power to decree that the evolution of the patriarchal system, which Kriege desires, into an industrial system be checked, or that the industrial and commercial states of the East coast be thrown back to patriarchal barbarism."

Thus, we have before us a real plan for an American general redistribution: the withdrawal of a vast land expanse from commerce, the securing of title to the land, limitation of the extent of landownership or land tenure. And from the very outset Marx subjects this utopianism to sober criticism, he points out that the patriarchal system evolves inevitably into the industrial system, i.e., to use present-day idiom, he points out the inevitability of the development of capitalism. But it would be a great mistake to think that the utopian dreams of the participants in the movement caused Marx to adopt a negative attitude to the movement in general. Nothing of the kind. Already then, at the very beginning of his literary activity, Marx was able to extract the real and progressive content of a movement from its tawdry ideological trappings. In the second part of his criticism, entitled "The Economics [i.e., the political economy]

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* Recall what *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, beginning with issue No. 8, wrote on the passing of the land from capital to labour, on the importance of state lands in Russia, on equalised land tenure, on the bourgeois idea of drawing land into commercial transactions, etc. Precisely like Kriege!

of the *Volks-Tribun* and Its Attitude to Young America", Marx wrote:

"We fully recognise the historical justification of the movement of the American National Reformers. We know that this movement strives for a result which, true, would give a temporary impetus to the industrialisation of modern bourgeois society, but which, as a product of the proletarian movement, and as an attack on landed property in general, especially under prevailing American conditions, must inevitably lead, by its own consequences, to communism. Kriege, who with the German Communists in New York joined the Anti-Rent *Bewegung* [movement], clothes this simple fact in bombastic phrases, without entering into the content of the movement, thereby proving that he is quite at sea as regards the connection between young America and American social conditions. We will cite another example of his outpouring of enthusiasm for humanity over the agrarians' plan for parcelling the land on an American scale.

"In issue No. 10 of the *Volks-Tribun*, in an article entitled 'What We Want', we read: 'The American National Reformers call the land the common heritage of all men ... and demand that the national legislature pass measures to preserve the 1,400,000,000 acres of land not yet fallen into the hands of the grabbing speculators, as the inalienable common property of the whole of mankind.' In order to preserve for all mankind this 'inalienable common property', he accepts the plan of the National Reformers: 'to provide every peasant, whatever country he may come from, with 160 acres of American land for his subsistence'; or, as it is expressed in issue No. 14, in 'An Answer to Conze': 'Of these unappropriated public lands no one is to have a holding in excess of 160 acres, and this only provided he tills it himself.' Thus, in order to preserve the land as 'inalienable common property', and for 'the whole of mankind' besides, it is necessary immediately to begin parcelling it out. Kriege, moreover, imagines that he can rule out the necessary consequences of this allotment—concentration, industrial progress, and the like, by legislation. He regards 160 acres of land as an invariable quantity, as though the value of such an area did not vary according to its quality. The 'peasants' will have to exchange the produce of the land, if

not the land itself, among themselves and with others, and, having gone thus far, they will soon find that one 'peasant', even without capital, thanks to his labour and the greater original fertility of his 160 acres, has reduced another to the position of his farm-hand. Besides, what matters it whether it is 'the land' or the produce of the land that 'falls into the hands of grabbing speculators'? Let us seriously examine Kriege's gift to mankind. One thousand four hundred million acres are to be preserved as the 'inalienable common property of the whole of mankind', with every 'peasant' getting 160 acres. We can therefore compute the magnitude of Kriege's 'mankind': exactly 8,750,000 'peasants', who, counting five to a family, represent 43,750,000 people. We can also compute the duration of the 'for all time' during which 'the proletariat, as the representative of the whole of mankind', at least in the U.S.A., can lay claim to all the land. If the population of the U.S.A. continues to increase at its present rate, i.e., if it doubles in 25 years, then this 'for all time' will last something under 40 years; by then these 1,400,000,000 acres will have been occupied, and future generations will have nothing to 'lay claim to'. But as the free grant of land would greatly increase immigration, Kriege's 'for all time' might come to an end even sooner, particularly if it is borne in mind that land for 44,000,000 people would not be an adequate outlet even for the pauperism existing in Europe today; for in Europe one out of every 10 persons is a pauper, and the British Isles alone account for 7,000,000 paupers. A similar example of naïveté in political economy is to be found in issue No. 13, in the article 'To the Women', in which Kriege says that if the city of New York gave up its 52,000 acres of land on Long Island, this would suffice to rid New York of all pauperism, misery, and crime 'at one stroke' and for ever.

"Had Kriege regarded the movement for freeing the land as an early form of the proletarian movement, necessary under certain conditions, as a movement which, by reason of the position in social life of the class from which it emanates, must necessarily develop into a communist movement; had he shown why the communist aspirations in America had to manifest themselves initially in this agrarian form,

which seems to contradict all communism, there would have been nothing to object to. But he declares what is merely a subordinate form of a movement of definite, real people to be a cause of mankind in general. He represents this cause ... as the ultimate and highest aim of every movement in general, thus turning the definite aims of the movement into sheer bombastic nonsense. In the same article (issue No. 10) he continues to chant his paean: 'And so the old dreams of the Europeans would at last come true. A place would be prepared for them on this side of the ocean which they would only have to take and to fructify with the labour of their hands, so as to be able proudly to declare to all the tyrants of the world, 'This is *my* cabin, which you have not built; this is *my* hearth whose glow fills your hearts with envy.'

"He might have added, This is *my* dunghill, which I, my wife, my children, my manservant, and my cattle have produced. And who are the Europeans whose 'dreams' would thus come true? Not the communist workers, but bankrupt shopkeepers and handicraftsmen, or ruined cottars, who yearn for the good fortune of once again becoming petty bourgeois and peasants in America. And what is the 'dream' that is to be fulfilled by means of these 1,400,000,000 acres? No other than that all men be converted into private owners, a dream which is as unrealisable and as communistic as the dream to convert all men into emperors, kings, and popes."

Marx's criticism is full of caustic sarcasm. He scourges Kriege for those very aspects of his views which we now observe among our "Socialists-Revolutionaries", namely, phrase-mongering, petty-bourgeois utopias represented as the highest revolutionary utopianism, incomprehension of the real foundations of the modern economic system and its development. With remarkable penetration, Marx, who was then only the *future* economist, points to the role of exchange and commodity production. The peasants, he says, will exchange the produce of the land, if not the land itself, and that says everything! The question is dealt with in a way that is largely applicable to the Russian peasant movement and its petty-bourgeois "socialist" ideologists.

Marx, however, does not simply "repudiate" this petty-bourgeois movement, he does not dogmatically ignore it, he

does not fear to soil his hands by contact with the movement of the revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats—a fear that is characteristic of many doctrinaires. While mercilessly ridiculing the absurd ideological trappings of the movement, Marx strives in a sober, materialist manner to determine its *real* historical content, the consequences that must inevitably follow from it because of objective conditions, regardless of the will and the consciousness, the dreams and the theories, of the various individuals. Marx, therefore, does not condemn, but fully approves communist support of the movement. Adopting the dialectical standpoint, i.e., examining the movement from every aspect, taking into account both the past and the future, Marx notes the revolutionary aspect of the attack on private property in land. He recognises the petty-bourgeois movement as a peculiar initial form of the proletarian, communist movement. You will not achieve what you dream of by means of this movement, says Marx to Kriege: instead of fraternity, you will get petty-bourgeois exclusiveness; instead of inalienable peasant allotments, you will have the drawing of the land into commerce; instead of a blow at the grabbing speculators, you will witness the expansion of the basis for capitalist development. But the capitalist evil you are vainly hoping to avoid is a historical benefit, for it will accelerate social development tremendously and bring ever so much nearer new and higher forms of the communist movement. A blow struck at landed property will facilitate the inevitable further blows at property in general. The revolutionary action of the lower class for a change that will temporarily provide a restricted prosperity, and by no means for all, will facilitate the inevitable further revolutionary action of the very lowest class for a change that will really ensure complete human happiness for all toilers.

Marx's presentation of the case against Kriege should serve as a model for us Russian Social-Democrats. That the peasant movement in Russia today is of a really petty-bourgeois nature there can be no doubt. We must explain this fact by every means in our power, and we must ruthlessly and irreconcilably combat all the illusions of all the "Socialists-Revolutionaries" or primitive socialists on this score. The organisation of an independent party of the proletariat

which, through all democratic upheavals, will strive for the complete socialist revolution, must be our constant aim, not to be lost sight of for a moment. But to turn away from the peasant movement for this reason would be sheer philistinism and pedantry. No, there is no doubt as to the revolutionary and democratic nature of this movement, and we must with all our might support it, develop it, make it a politically conscious and definitely class movement, advance it, and go hand in hand with it to the end—for we go much further than the end of any peasant movement; we go to the very end of the division of society into classes. There is hardly another country in the world where the peasantry is experiencing such suffering, such oppression and degradation as in Russia. The worse this oppression has been, the more powerful will now be the peasantry's awakening, the more irresistible its revolutionary onset. The class-conscious revolutionary proletariat should support this onset with all its might, so that it may leave stand no stone of this old, accursed, feudal, autocratic, and slavish Russia; so that it may create a new generation of free and courageous people, a new republican country in which our proletarian struggle for socialism will be able freely to expand.

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THE COUNCIL IS CAUGHT OUT

A reprint of the decision of the "Party Council" from *Iskra*, No. 95, dated Geneva, April 7, 1905, has just appeared. This decision is a veritable maze of "deviations from the truth". Let us consider the major ones.

We are told that the Council has taken care not to let the inner struggle in the Party undermine its unity. This is untrue. All Party members should know from unrefuted and irrefutable documents that over a year ago, in January 1904, Lenin and Vasilyev, members of the Central Committee, proposed in the Council that a call be issued to the entire Party to stop the boycott and the secret appropriation of Party funds by the circles.* *The Council rejected their proposal*. Instead, it participated directly in the *secret split* of the Party, thus sanctioning the struggle of the secret organisation of the Minority for "co-optation". This struggle, as is now proved by documentary evidence, had been going on since the Second Congress, viz., from August 1903 to November or December 1904.

Thus, from January 1904 on, the Council was no longer the supreme Party body, but a tool of the secret organisation of the Minority. The existence of this organisation was admitted publicly and in print, not only by the conciliatory C.C., but even by *Iskra*, at the time when the C.C. sided with the Minority.

As a tool of the Minority's secret organisation, the Council has exerted all efforts to evade the demand of the committees for an all-Party congress. For eighteen months Social Democratic activities in Russia were hampered by the dis-

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 145-47.—*Ed.*

ruptive tactics of the Minority abroad. For eighteen months the committees in Russia waged an intense unremitting struggle for a congress against the Geneva Council, which either pigeonholed the committees' resolutions or returned them with insulting remarks ("blackguards, sheer humbug, fabrication of documents" are the-expressions contained in a letter by Martov; see Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*). Every important step in this painful struggle against the machinations of the promoters of the secret split is now documented in Party literature. As far back as October 1904, i.e., *six months ago*, it was proved—e.g., in Orlovsky's *The Council Against the Party*—that the Council, without offering reasons, had refrained from convening the Congress, although called upon to do 90 by the Party Rules. After that, one Party committee in Russia after another *formally voiced no confidence* in the Council and in all the central bodies. The Council, however, ignored these actions and with no sense of shame flouted the Party. The Council was a tool of the Minority. Now the Council, in its decision of April 7, 1905, has openly declared itself *a party to the dispute*, but at the same time it has had no scruples about using the title, the rights, and the powers of an *all-Party* body, and it has refused to return to the Party the mandate it has received from it. The thing has been a flagrant breach of confidence from beginning to end.

When, finally, the Party committees in Russia, seeing that the Council was evading the Congress, *themselves called the Congress* through the "Bureau" which they had elected at three conferences, *even the C.C.*, *which had gone over to the Minority*, hastened to rectify its mistake. *The C.C. in Russia*, which not only did not sympathise with the Committees of the Majority but actually combated them, *upon seeing how matters stood in Russia* and knowing the Majority to be really preponderant there, had to admit that the Bureau of Committees of the Majority had been absolutely impartial in convening the Congress and had had to *rebel against the Council*. In its appeal of March 12, 1905, to the, general membership of the Party, the C.C. in Russia, as we noted in the press and as all Party workers in Russia know from the declaration, *openly rebelled against*

the Council; it declared in Point 5 of the declaration that "the March 8 resolution of the Council (*Iskra*, No. 89) against the Congress is not considered grounds for halting organisation work for the Congress".

What is the significance of this announcement, which our Council so studiously passes over? The significance is that the C.C. in Russia, knowing Russian affairs and, evidently, having investigated the assertions of the Council abroad, *designates the assertions* as untrue and the pretexts for not convening the Congress as pure invention; it considers as a *proved* fact that the demand for the Congress has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Russian committees that had a chance to study the facts of the case.

Hence, the silence of our Council regarding the declaration made by the C.C. in Point 5! For it is in effect a direct admission to the whole Party membership that the Council has made false allegations, that it has misrepresented the general opinion of the Party!

In vain, therefore, does the Council attempt to mislead the Party once more by proposing conferences and agreements between the disputants. *In Russia such an agreement has already been reached*. The centre of the Mensheviks in Russia was the Central Committee; *Iskra* itself admitted as much in its announcement that the July declaration of the C.C. had been accepted by the Menshevik organisations. The centre of the Majority in Russia was the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. The *Russian* centres of both sides to the dispute *have agreed to hold a joint congress*. It is evident from this that there are Mensheviks in Russia who set a slightly higher value on the Party spirit and Party unity than do the Mensheviks abroad. It is evident that the Russian Mensheviks themselves, as represented by their centre, the C.C., expose the Council abroad and turn their backs on it. It is evident that after an agreement has been reached between the Russian centres of the disputants, any agreement with the Council abroad, i.e., with the gentlemen sitting in Geneva, is entirely out of the question.

In vain, therefore, does our Council speak of its deposition by the C.C. in the future tense. It is not a matter of the future but of the past. Point 5 of the C.C.'s appeal to the Party, dated March 12, 1905, proves to all who can under-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

stand what they read that this deposition has actually taken place. Russia, represented by the united centres of the two sides, has overthrown the group abroad. The Party Council now represents merely the Geneva group and not the Party.

How accurately this describes the state of affairs in the Party may be seen very clearly from the following. The Council declares that its decision of April 7, 1905, was adopted unanimously. Party members who read this are, of course, supposed to believe that *the two members of the C.C. on the Council also* had a hand in this decision. However, any such idea, which the Council tries to inspire in the readers, is very much open to question.

The proof: As we stated in *Vperyod*, No. 13, we are not yet authorised to publish the agreement between the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the C.C. Still, we were informed that at least one point of the agreement might be made public, should the Party Council decide against convening the Third Party Congress.

This eventuality has now arisen.

We, therefore, now publish this point—Point 1 of the unpublished agreement.

"*Agreement between the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the Central Committee, signed March 12, 1905.*

"*Point 1.* The Organising Committee composed of representatives of the Central Committee and of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority shall organise the Third Party Congress immediately, regardless of any resolution the Council may adopt on the convocation of the Congress."

Clear enough, it would seem.

The C.C. expressly stipulated that it would refuse to abide by any *future* resolutions of the Council, without making this public for the time being, in the hope that the Council might for once act honestly. This means that the Russian Mensheviks still believed it possible for the Council to do the right thing, even if by way of exception.

The Russian Mensheviks, represented by their Russian centre, have now been disillusioned.

Hence, it is now proved conclusively that even the C.C. whose sympathies were entirely on the side of the Council, was compelled to expose its colleague abroad to the full.

It now remains for us in conclusion to put one small question to the reader: In view of all this, what is one to think of the members of the Council sitting in Geneva, who have declared publicly, in print, that the Council decision dated Geneva, April 7, 1905, had been adopted unanimously?

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OPEN LETTER TO COMRADE PLEKHANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[103]

Dear Comrade,

On April 4 (17), the Central Committee notified the Party Council that it had appointed Comrades Johansen[104] and Valerian[105] to represent it on the Council and requested that a meeting of the Council as constituted in conformity with the Party Rules be called in the immediate future.

Having received no reply to this request, we took the liberty of approaching you a second time, and on April 22 (9) we received an answer in which you refused to call a meeting of the Council as long as we "go on acting as violators of the Party Rules and usurpers of the Council's functions".

The situation arising from your refusal to call an official meeting of the Council prevents us from presenting a number of communications to the Party Council; and since, in our opinion, it is impossible to withhold them any longer, we are obliged to address ourselves to you before the whole Party membership with a written recital of the main statements that we intended to submit to the next meeting of the Council.

1. The Central Committee informs the Party Council that up to April 4 (17) the following qualified Party organisations went on record for the Third Party Congress: the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Northern League, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tver, Tula, Riga, Siberian League, Voronezh, Saratov, Odessa, Caucasian League (8 votes), Nikolayev, Ural, Orel-Bryansk, Kursk, Smolensk, Polesye, North-Western, Kharkov, and Samara committees—a total of 21 organisations, entitled

to 48 votes. The C.C. also declared itself in favour of calling the Congress and decided to send a delegate, as well as its representatives on the Party Council, to the Congress.

From the Astrakhan, Kazan, Kuban, and Don committees, from the League of the Mining and Metal District, from the Ekaterinoslav Committee, from the Crimean League, from the League, from the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, and from the three members of the Council residing abroad either no resolutions were received or the resolutions received declared the convening of the Congress to be undesirable.

Finally, the Kiev Committee, although it had adopted a resolution against the Congress on March 25, subsequently elected a delegate to the Congress and sent him abroad.

Thus, out of the 75 votes* that would represent the whole Party at the Congress, 52 (not counting the Kiev Committee) were in favour of convening the Third Party Congress.

Under these circumstances the C.C. deems it necessary to insist, through its representatives on the Party Council, that the Council immediately fulfil its formal obligation, in accordance with Clause 2 of the Party Rules, to convene the Congress when this is demanded by Party organisations commanding aggregately half the total voting strength of the Congress.

Since, according to the information of the C.C., many more votes have now been cast for the Congress than are required by the Rules (52 out of 75), the Council must immediately and unconditionally give notice of the convening of the Congress, without stipulating any prior conditions or demands not provided for in the Party Rules.

2. The Central Committee is profoundly convinced that, even granting the fullest sincerity of all Council members, a question of such extraordinary importance as the convening of the Party Congress, at a time such as the Party and all Russia are now living through, cannot be decided on purely formal grounds. Our Party Rules are not explicit enough for that. Thus, they give no answer to the question of the time limit within which the Party Council is *obliged* to convene the Congress after the required number of

* See the list of qualified organisations published in *Iskra*, No. 89.

votes in favour has been cast. Respecting this and other questions, the central bodies of the Party are obliged to resort to an *interpretation* of the Rules and act not only in keeping with the formally expressed will of the Party, which, as is evident from Clause 1, has declared in favour of the Congress, but in conformity with the actual state of affairs in the Party as well as in Russia generally.

The C.C. considers it its duty to inform the Party Council that the Party crisis in Russia has grown to such dimensions that Party work has been brought to an almost complete standstill. The situation in the committees has reached the height of confusion. There is hardly a single question of tactics or organisation that does not provoke the most violent dissension locally between the groups, more often than not because the disputants belong to different camps in the Party rather than on essential matters. Neither the Party Council, nor the Central Organ, nor the C.C. has sufficient prestige with the majority of the Party workers; dual organisations are springing up everywhere, hampering each other's work and discrediting the Party in the eyes of the proletariat. To comrades active chiefly as publicists, whose work can go on uninterrupted even in an atmosphere of mistrust on the part of a large portion of the Party membership, the present unbearable, blind-alley situation in which general Party matters stand is perhaps not so apparent as to the Party workers of the practical centre, who come daily up against increasing difficulties in their work in Russia. The time has come when the growth of the internal contradictions in our Party life begins to tax the narrow and, as we can all see now, far from perfect framework of the Rules which the Second Party Congress has given us. New forms are needed, or at least a modification of the old; and this can only be done by the sole lawgiver of the Social-Democratic Party—the Party Congress, since it and it alone has the right to establish rules *binding on all*, rules that cannot be imposed by any conference, or any local agreement. Realising the importance of resolving the Party crisis by means of an immediate congress, the majority of the committees in Russia have taken all the necessary steps for the convening of the Congress as soon as possible, including the election and the sending of delegates; this applies not only to the

committees of the Majority, which had previously declared for the Congress, but also to the greater part of the Minority committees, of the groups and the periphery organisations. The Party has declared for the Congress and has expended considerable means and efforts in preparation for it. The central bodies of the Party have no formal right to postpone notice of the Congress now that the obligation to convene it is incontestable, and they are morally bound to do their utmost to ensure that the Party's expenditure of energy shall not have been wasted. To keep scores of delegates, our most active comrades, abroad indefinitely, when they are so badly needed in Russia, or still worse, to have them go back to Russia from a congress not held because the comrades of the Central Organ refused to forego the letter of the Party Rules for the spirit, for the higher interest of preserving Party unity, would be an unpardonable waste of Party forces and would mean that the leaders of the Party fell short of the tasks which Party life has put before them. When forms have outlived themselves, when a growing and developing Party feels cramped in these forms, we cannot remedy things by harping for the hundredth time on the sanctity of the letter of the law. That is no way out of the crisis; the only possible solution is to call the Party Congress.

3. On the strength of Clause 6 of the Party Rules which empowers it to organise and conduct all activities of general Party importance, the C.C. insists upon its right, inalienable and not subject to restriction, to take all the preparatory measures and to perform all the practical work involved in the organisation of Party congresses. The C.C., as the only practical centre of the Party, considers all attempts of other Party bodies to interfere in this work a breach of the Party Rules, and it protests against them as an encroachment upon its rights. As for the rights granted to the Party Council in Clause 2 of the Rules with regard to the convocation of Party congresses, the C.C. interprets them to mean that the Council shall give notice of such convocation and control the work actually done by the C.C.

In view of the foregoing, the C.C. admits that its agreement with the Bureau of Committees of the Majority to call the Third Party Congress contravenes the Party Rules only

insofar as it expresses (see Point 1 of the agreement) the intention of convening the Congress even without prior official notice by the Party Council.

4. Having received word that eighteen qualified Party organisations, apart from the C.C. itself, had passed resolutions in favour of convening the Third Congress, the C.C., on March 12, decided to bring this to the attention of the Council, to whom it sent the following statement: "The Central Committee notifies the Party Council that to date (March 12) eighteen qualified Party committees (besides the C.C.), or more than half the total voting strength at the Third Congress under the Party Rules, have declared in favour of convening the Third Party Congress. Similar resolutions from several other committees are expected in the very near future. Under the circumstances the C.C. deems it necessary to convene the Congress immediately and asks the Party Council to give due notice of its convocation by adopting a corresponding resolution. All documents in the possession of the C.C. relating to this question will be submitted to the Party Council in the near future." Besides this, the C.C., as early as March 10, instructed its agent, Comrade Vadim,[106] to go abroad immediately in order to report the situation to the Party Council, to which he had been accredited by the C.C. Owing to an unfortunate coincidence, Comrade Vadim was arrested before he reached the frontier. As for the document cited above, in which the C.C. records the receipt of resolutions that oblige the Council to give immediate notice of the Congress, we find that, according to private information received on April 4 (17) from Comrade Deutsch by the members of the C.C., Comrades Johansen and Valerian, it was not received at all. Afterwards Comrade Deutsch corrected this information, stating that the document had been received at Locarno, but only after the Council's meeting of April 7. Since we, the representatives of the C.C., were barred from the session of the Council, we are not in a position to determine why there was such a delay in delivering the C.C.'s statement to the Council members. However, even if it was received after the meeting of the three Council members at Locarno, the document, which established a clear case for the convocation of the Congress, was of such importance that the comrades from the

Central Organ and the fifth member of the Council should have met immediately and taken the decision prescribed by the Party Rules, or, at least, in view of the failure of the C.C. representative to arrive because of his arrest before reaching the frontier, they should have held up publication of the resolution of April 7.

5. The C.C. questions the validity of the decisions which the Party Council has adopted since February 1905, because after the return of Comrades B. and Vtorov[107] from abroad at the end of January, the C.C. did not accredit anyone to the Party Council. Long before the present conflict between the C.C. and the Council members abroad, specifically, on February 14, 1904, a plenary meeting of the C.C. adopted a decision construing Clause 4 of the Party Rules relating to the representation of the C.C. on the Council to mean that the members of the C.C. who are delegated to the Council must be accredited by the C.C. as a body, and that even members of the C.C. who for one reason or another are abroad have no right to attend meetings of the Council unless a resolution to that effect has been adopted by a plenary meeting of the C.C.

This explanatory decision of the C.C. has served as the basis for representation of the C.C. abroad. Since February 1904 all representatives of the C.C. without exception have sat in the Party Council only after having previously been endorsed by a plenary meeting of the C.C. Comrades Glebov and Lenin, Comrade Glebov in the course of his second stay abroad, Comrade Bem, who was the C.C. representative on the Council until his departure for Russia, Comrade Vtorov, who went abroad in January with authority to negotiate certain questions with the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and to attend the meetings of the Council, all received their credentials, not from any member of the C.C. or from his predecessor on the Party Council, but from a plenary meeting of the C.C. The reason that prompted the C.C. to reach the mentioned decision of February 14, 1904, and to adhere to it so rigidly in its entire subsequent practice was that such a method of organising the representation of the C.C. on the Council was the only way to prevent comrades who are not in close enough touch with the C.C. and not familiar in detail with its policy on all questions of Party

life from speaking at the Party Council in the name of the C.C. We go further: the provision that *only a plenary meeting of the C.C.* could appoint the two Council members was the sole means whereby the centre working in Russia could have anything like parity of influence in the Party Council with the comrades from the Central Organ, who preponderate in the Council not only numerically, but also in point of authority, which some of them have won through long years of honourable service in the front ranks of Social-Democracy, both Russian and international. With all due respect to these comrades on the Council, the C.C. would, however, fail in its duty to the entire Party if it permitted, even for a short time, a change in the composition of the Party Council whereby all questions would be decided by a body consisting exclusively of comrades, who, worthy and respected though they be, cannot by dint of circumstances be in direct contact with the real practical work carried on in Russia. Since our request for a meeting of the Council was denied, we could not determine on what grounds Comrade Deutsch, whom Comrade Vtorov had appointed C.C. representative *pro tem.* on the "Technical Committee" abroad, considered himself entitled to speak at the Party Council in the name of the C.C., with whose activities in Russia he never had any contact. The C.C. declares Comrade Deutsch's action to be invalid, since it was not authorised by the C.C.; even assuming that Comrade Vtorov (at that time only an agent of the C.C.) or any member of the C.C. had asked Comrade Deutsch to represent it on the Party Council, this will not cure the illegality of Comrade Deutsch's position, since such authorisation can be granted only by a plenary meeting of the C.C., which was not done in the case of Comrade Deutsch. On the grounds aforesaid, the C.C. considers all decisions of the Party Council subsequent to the departure from abroad of Comrades Bem and Vtorov to have been taken wholly without the participation of the C.C. and demands a reconsideration of all questions at a new meeting to which the rightful representatives of the C.C. shall be invited.

6. The C.C. denies the right of the Party Council to pass judgement on any of the centres and to demand from them absolute submission to all its decisions. According to the

Rules, the function of the Council is to co-ordinate and unify the activities of the C.C. and of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ. However, in the event of a conflict between one of the centres and the Council, obviously only a special Party congress can settle the dispute. The word of the Party Council cannot be final in case of a disagreement between itself and one of the centres, since then the Council would simultaneously be both judge and a party to the dispute. However, as a result of the refusal to call a meeting of the Party Council with the participation of C.C. representatives, the C.C. is not only condemned by the three members of the Council (editors of the Central Organ) but even penalised by being deprived of its inalienable right, guaranteed by the Party Rules, to be represented in the Party Council.

Still other measures are being taken to force the C.C. to submit under all circumstances to the decisions of the three members of the Council (editors of the Central Organ). Thus, in reply to the C.C.'s legitimate demand to its own agent abroad, Comrade Deutsch, that all its technical and financial affairs be handed over to Comrade Valerian, the member of the C.C. entrusted by it with assuming charge of them, Comrade Deutsch, refused, giving as his reason the conflict between the C.C. and the Council.

Thus, while the C.C. in Point 1 of its agreement with the Bureau of Committees of the Majority expressed its willingness to convene the Congress even in the event of a refusal on the part of the Council and thus came into conflict with the Rules, the three Council members in their turn broke the Rules twice by depriving the C.C. of its right to participate in the Council and to manage and control its own technical and financial undertakings abroad (a breach of Clauses 2 and 6 of the Party Rules).

In placing before the Party this conflict (for which the Party Rules provide no solution) between the Party Council (represented only by two members from the Central Organ and the fifth member of the Council), on the one side, and the C.C. on the other, the C.C., in view of the refusal of Comrade Plekhanov Chairman of the Party Council, to call a meeting of that body, declares that by this action,

which is a flagrant breach of the Rules, the Chairman of the Council makes it impossible for the Council to function and, in effect, wilfully annuls the Party Council.

Absolute submission of the C.C. to the Party Council, on which you, comrade, insist, as the *sine qua non* for calling a meeting of the Council, actually amounts to postponing the Congress indefinitely and flouting the clearly expressed will of the Party.

Placing its loyalty to the Party above loyalty to three foreign-resident members of the Council, the C.C. submits the entire conflict to the judgement of the Party itself.

April 23 (10), 1905

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Vperyod, No. 16,
April 30 (17), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

CONCERNING THE THIRD CONGRESS

The news of the Central Committee's support to the Bureau of Committees of the Majority on the question of convening the all-Party Congress has brought from *Iskra*, No. 94, a retort of abuse and hysteria, further personal suspicions, fairy-tales about the strength of the Minority groups, and so on. Naturally, we ignore all these tricks, which are worthy of the famous League Congress. Strictly speaking, only two points are worth taking up. If the Congress does take place, says *Iskra*, it will be only as a *conference of separated trends*. In other words, the new-Iskrists admit their break-away from the Party, they admit the split as an accomplished fact. We would always prefer this frank admission to a sneaking secret split. But how do you make this out, gentlemen? You admit yourselves to be one part of the Party that has broken away from the other and yet modestly retain the titles and ranks that belong to the whole Party ("Central Organ", "Council") and at the same time you keep the money which comrades abroad have collected for the whole Party, you keep the printing-house, which belongs to the *whole* Party!* Is this honourable?

Secondly, *Iskra* usually considers the Party to be split when it is a question of the centres reporting to the Party, while considering the Party to be united when the issue is the power of the centres over the Party. The very thing is now happening again. On the one hand, "separated trends" on the other, "the Congress can be convened only by the

* In the manuscript the text from the words "and at the same time you keep" to the words "the *whole* Party" is crossed out.—*Ed.*

Council". Fine, gentlemen! But why, then, is your "Council" silent? Why did it not respond to the C.C.'s statement of March 4, 1905? Why no word about the Council in *Iskra*, No. 94? Are not the Party members justified in asking whether the Council exists at all, whether it is in a position to meet and make decisions?

Written in April 1905

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Published according to the manuscript

PLAN FOR A MAY DAY LEAFLET

1. "Springtime" of words and vileness of deeds.
2. The Bulygin fraud.
3. The war and the collapse of the government system.
4. Ruin, famine, cholera....
5. St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw, etc. *January 9.*
6. Baku and the sinister anti-Jewish movement.
7. The revolutionary strike and the revolutionary movement of January 9 and later. Revolution!
8. Peasant movement. Its suppression and its aims.
9. The Constituent Assembly and the provisional revolutionary government.
10. The struggle for the republic and all democratic liberties.
11. The proletarian struggle for the republic and for socialism.
12. The revolutionary Russian proletariat at the head of the world revolutionary proletariat.

First of May generally.
It has come to such a pass. 1-4.
Revolutionary movement. 5 and 7.
Government incitements. 6.
Peasant movement. 8.
Armed uprising.
Aims of the struggle. 9-11.

Z. First of May generally.
A. Beginning of the revolution 1-6.
B. Struggle of the workers and peasants 7-8.
C. Aims of the struggle 9-11.
D. World-wide historical significance of the Russian revolution 12.

Written prior to April 12 (25), 1905

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Published according to
the manuscript

RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

Workers of All Countries, Unite!

THE FIRST OF MAY [108]

Comrades workers! The great holiday of the workers of all the world is coming. On the First of May they celebrate their awakening to light and knowledge, their association in one fraternal union for the struggle against all oppression, against all tyranny, against all exploitation, for a socialist system of society. All who work, who feed the rich and the nobility by their labour, who spend their lives in back-breaking toil for scanty wages, who never enjoy the fruits of their own labour, who live like beasts of burden amidst the luxury and splendour of our civilisation—all stretch out their hands to fight for the emancipation and happiness of the workers. Down with enmity between workers of different nationalities or different creeds! This enmity can only benefit the plunderers and tyrants, who live by the ignorance and disunion of the proletariat. Jews and Christians Armenians and Tatars, Poles and Russians, Finns and Swedes, Letts and Germans—all, all of them march together under the one common banner of socialism. All workers are brothers, and their solid union is the only guarantee of the well-being and happiness of all working and oppressed mankind. On the First of May this union of the workers of all countries, international Social-Democracy, reviews its forces and gathers its strength for a further unremitting and unswerving struggle for freedom, equality, and fraternity.

Comrades! We stand now in Russia on the eve of great events. We are engaged in the last desperate fight with the autocratic tsarist government, we must carry this fight on to its victorious end. See what calamities this government of brutes and tyrants, of venal courtiers and hangers-on of capital, has brought upon the entire Russian people! The tsarist government has plunged the Russian people into

an insane war against Japan. Hundreds of thousands of young lives have been torn away from the people to perish in the Far East. Words cannot describe all the calamities that this war brings upon us. And what is the war for? For Manchuria, which our predatory tsarist government has seized from China! Russian blood is being shed and our country ruined for the sake of foreign territory. Life is becoming harder and harder for the workers and peasants; the capitalists and officials keep tightening the noose round their necks, while the tsarist government is sending the people out to plunder foreign territory. Bungling tsarist generals and venal officials have led to the destruction of the Russian fleet, squandered hundreds and thousands of millions of the nation's wealth, and lost entire armies, but the war still goes on, claiming further sacrifices. The people are being ruined, industry and trade are coming to a standstill, and famine and cholera are imminent; but the autocratic government in its blind madness follows the old path; it is ready to ruin Russia if only it can save a handful of brutes and tyrants; it is launching another war besides the one with Japan—war against the entire Russian people.

Never before has Russia experienced such an awakening from her slumber, from her oppression and enslavement, as she is experiencing today. All classes of society are stirring, from the workers and peasants to the landlords and capitalists, and voices of protest have been raised everywhere, in St. Petersburg and the Caucasus, in Poland and Siberia. Everywhere the people demand an end to the war; they demand the establishment of a free people's rule, the convocation of deputies of all citizens without exception in a Constituent Assembly to institute a people's government and save the nation from the abyss into which the tsarist government is pushing it. Workers of St. Petersburg, about two hundred thousand strong, went to the tsar on Sunday, the Ninth of January, with the priest Georgi Gapon in order to submit these demands of the people. The tsar received the workers as enemies. He shot down thousands of unarmed workers in the streets of St. Petersburg. The struggle is now on all over Russia. Workers are on strike, demanding freedom and a better life. Blood is being spilt in Riga and in Poland, on the Volga and in the South. Everywhere the peasants are

rising. The struggle for freedom is becoming the struggle of the entire people.

The tsarist government has gone mad. It wants to borrow money to carry on the war, but no one will trust it with a loan any longer. It promises to convene representatives of the people, but actually everything remains unchanged; the persecutions do not cease, the lawlessness of the officials proceeds as before; there are no free public meetings, no freely circulated people's newspapers; the prisons in which fighters for the working-class cause are languishing have not been thrown open. The tsarist government is trying to set one people against another. It has brought about a massacre in Baku by maligning the Armenians among the Tatars; now it is preparing a fresh massacre aimed at the Jews by fanning hatred against them among the ignorant people.

Comrades workers! We will tolerate no longer such outrageous treatment of the Russian people. We will rise to defend freedom, we will strike back at all who try to deflect the wrath of the people from the real enemy. We will rise up in arms to overthrow the tsarist government and win freedom for the entire people. To arms, workers and peasants! HoId secret meetings, form fighting squads, get whatever weapons you can, send trusted men to consult with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! Let this year's First of May be for us the celebration of the people's uprising, let us prepare for it and await the signal for the decisive attack on the tyrant. Down with the tsarist government! We will overthrow it and set up a provisional revolutionary government to convene a Constituent Assembly of the people. Let people's deputies be elected by universal, direct, and equal vote, through secret ballot. Let all fighters for freedom be released from prison or brought back from exile. Let public meetings be held openly and people's newspapers be printed without surveillance by the accursed officials. Let all the people arm, let a rifle be given to every worker, so that the people themselves, not a handful of plunderers, may decide their own destiny. Let free peasants' committees be set up in the countryside to overthrow the serf-owning landlord power, to free the people from the hateful oppression of the officials, to restore to the peasants the land that has been taken away from them.

This is what the Social-Democrats want, this is what they call upon you to fight for, arms in hand: for complete freedom, for the democratic republic, for the eight-hour day, for peasants' committees. Prepare then for the great battle, comrades workers, stop work in the factories and mills on the First of May, or take up arms according to the advice of the committees of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. The hour of the insurrection has not yet struck, but it is not far off now. The workers of the world are now looking with bated breath to the heroic Russian proletariat which has offered incalculable sacrifices to the cause of freedom. The St. Petersburg workers proclaimed on the famed Ninth of January: Freedom or death! Workers of all Russia, we will repeat that great battle-cry, we will not shrink from any sacrifices: through the uprising we will win freedom; through freedom, socialism!

Long live the First of May, long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Long live the freedom of the workers and peasants, long live the democratic republic! Down with the tsarist autocracy!

1905

Bureau of Committees of the Majority
Editorial Board of "Vperyod"

Written prior to April 12 (25), 1905

Published in 1905 as a separate leaflet

Published according to the text of the leaflet

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARKET-PLACE

Bulygin, as the St. Petersburg aristocratic circles justly remark, is now playing for time. He is trying to postpone the reforms promised by the tsar as long as possible, and to reduce them to trifles that will in no way diminish the power of the autocratic tsar and of autocratic officialdom. In place of a constitution, he is preparing, as we pointed out once before in *Vperyod*,* a consultative body enjoying no rights whatever. Now we have confirmation of what we said, namely, the text of Bulygin's project published in the German liberal newspaper *Vossische Zeitung*. According to that newspaper, Bulygin, Yermolov, Shcherbatov, Meshchersky, Count Sheremetyev, and Prince Urusov have been mentioned as authors of the project, which in substance is as follows:

For the discussion (no more than that!) and the drafting of all bills, two bodies shall be set up: (1) a State Council, and (2) a State Assembly. Bills may be introduced by any member of the State Council or by no fewer than twenty members of the Assembly. Bills are discussed and passed by the Assembly, after which they go to the Council and finally *to the tsar for his approval*. The tsar decides the form in which bills shall become law, or he vetoes them altogether.

Thus, the Bulygin "constitution" does not limit the autocratic regime at all but merely introduces two exclusively consultative bodies: an Upper House and a Lower House! The Upper House, or State Council, is to consist of 60 members elected by the Assemblies of the Nobles of 60 gubernias (including the Polish gubernias), as well as of members appointed by the tsar from among the officials and

* See p. 273 of this volume.—*Ed.*

officers. The total number of members is not to exceed 120. The term of office of the elected members is three years. The sessions of the Council may be open to the public or closed, at the discretion of the Council.

The Lower House, or State Assembly, is to consist of elective members only (Ministers and heads of departments may sit *ex officio* in both Houses), namely: 10 representatives from each of the 34 Zemstvo gubernias (a total of 340); 8 representatives from each of the three gubernias having Zemstvo institutions but no institutions of the nobility (a total of 24); 8 from each of the nine North-Western gubernias (72); 5 from each of the 10 Polish gubernias (50); 5 from each of the three Baltic gubernias (15); 30 from Siberia; 30 from the Caucasus; 15 from Central Asia and the Transcaspian region; 32 from Finland; 20 from the big cities (St. Petersburg, 6; Moscow, 5; Warsaw, 3; Odessa, 2; Lodz, Kiev, Riga, and Kharkov, 1 each); 10 from the Greek Orthodox clergy; 1 each from the Catholics, Lutherans, Armenians, Mohammedans, and Jews. That makes a total of 643 members. This Assembly is to elect an Executive Committee consisting of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and 15 members. Their term of office will be three years. The Executive Committee is to be a permanent institution; the Assembly is to meet only twice a year: February-March and October-November. The sessions may be open or closed at the discretion of the Assembly. During their term of office the members of the Assembly will enjoy personal immunity. Only Russian subjects not under 25 years of age, with the ability to read and write Russian, will be eligible. They will receive a salary of 3,000 rubles a year.

Elections shall be held as follows: in each of the 34 Zemstvo gubernias, two members will be elected by the Assembly of the Nobles, three by the gubernia Zemstvo Assembly, one from the towns through special electors, three from the peasants through special electors, and one from the merchants, also through electors. The deputies from the non-Zemstvo gubernias are to be elected on a similar basis; we shall not enumerate all these absurd bureaucratic and police institutions. To illustrate the proposed method of indirect election, we shall instance the procedure for the election of peasant representatives in the Zemstvo gubernias.

Every volost elects three electors. These meet at the uyezd centre, the *Marshal of the Nobility presiding* (!), and choose three electors of the second degree. These electors meet at the gubernia capital, the gubernia Marshal of the Nobility presiding, and elect the three representatives of the peasantry, who must themselves be peasants. Thus the elections go through three stages!

Mr. Bulygin does not work at all badly. He gets his salary from the tsar for services rendered. His constitution, as the reader can see, is a downright travesty of popular representation. The power of the autocracy, as we have shown, is not in the least restricted. Both Houses are purely consultative, while the tsar alone has the power to decide. The whole thing is simply a fine promise never meant to be kept. In the first place, it is a "representation" specifically of the *nobility*, of the *landlords*. The nobility has half the votes in the Upper House and close to half in the Lower (of the ten representatives from each Zemstvo gubernia, two are from the nobility direct and three from the Zemstvo Assemblies, which to all intents and purposes are assemblies of the nobility). The participation of the peasants in the elections is ludicrously remote. The three-stage system of elections makes sure that the common people are thoroughly sifted out before they get to the Assembly.

In the second place, one is struck by the *complete exclusion of the workers*. Representation in this sheep's parliament is based entirely on the social-estate principle. There is no workers' "estate", and there cannot be. In the case of the townsfolk and the merchants, the elections are so manipulated that only the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie filter through the various gradations of electors, and it is extremely illuminating to see how this bourgeoisie is pushed well into the background as compared with the nobility. The tsar's servants, it seems, do not much fear landlord liberalism; they are shrewd enough to perceive under this veneer of liberalism the profoundly conservative social nature of "The Wild Gentleman".[109]

It would be serving a very useful purpose to make Bulygin's constitution widely known among the workers and the peasants. One could hardly show up more plainly the real aspirations and the class basis of the tsarist power which

is supposed to stand above the classes. One could hardly conceive of better material for object lessons in universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

It is interesting also to view this skimpy "constitution" of landlords and bureaucrats in the light of the latest reports on the Russian political parties. Except for the extreme parties, the terrorists and the reactionaries, a certain English correspondent (who evidently mixes in "society" and therefore does not see common people such as the workers) counts three parties: (1) the conservative, or pan-Slavic, party (the "Slavophil" system: to the tsar, the power of authority; to his subjects, the power of opinion, viz., a representative assembly with consultative powers only); (2) the liberal, or "opportunist", party (its leader, Shipov; its programme—like that of all opportunists—"between two stools"); and (3) the radical, *or* (a very characteristic "or"!) constitutional party, which includes most of the Zemstvo people, professors "and students" (?). Its programme: universal suffrage by secret ballot.

The conservatives are said to be meeting now in St. Petersburg, the liberals will meet at the beginning of May in Moscow, and the radicals at the same time in St. Petersburg. Government circles are said to regard universal suffrage by secret ballot as equivalent to "*the proclamation of the republic*". The "radicals" are the most numerous of all the parties.

Bulygin's project is, to all appearances, the project of the conservative party. The project of the *Osvobozhdeniye* camp is very similar to the programme of the "radical or constitutional" party (in reality, not at all radical and but poorly constitutional). Finally, the "liberal", or Shipov, party probably wants a little more than is offered by Bulygin and a little less than is demanded by the constitutionalists.

The market-place is having a great day. The bargaining is brisk. The fine gentlemen of society are standing out for a high price and so are the cunning gentlemen of the Court. Everything points to the two of them knocking a bit off and then—striking a bargain, *before the workers and peasants step in*.

The government is playing a deep game. It threatens the conservatives with the liberals; it threatens the liberals

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

with the *Osvobozhdeniye* "radicals"; it threatens the last-named with the spectre of a republic. Translated into the language of class interests, particularly of the chief interest—exploitation of the workers by the bourgeoisie—this game means: Let us come to terms, my dear landlords and merchants; let us divide the power peaceably, in bonds of harmony, before it is too late, before the real popular revolution sets in, before we have the rising of the whole proletariat and the whole peasantry, who will not swallow skimpy constitutions, indirect elections, or any other bureaucratic rubbish.

The class-conscious proletariat must have no illusions. The only pledge of Russia's real emancipation from the entire serf-holding, absolutist system lies in it alone, in the proletariat supported by the peasantry, in the armed uprising of the two, in their desperate struggle under the slogan of "Death or freedom".

Vperyod, No. 16,
April 30 (17), 1905
Signed: *K—v*

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

FORTNIGHTLY REPORTS OF THE PARTY ORGANISATIONS

Fortnightly reports by *all* the Party organisations, especially all the *workers*' Party organisations, would contribute greatly towards consolidating the membership and the organisational unity of the Party, particularly towards readjusting the Party's representation (at congresses) in conformity with the number of the organised workers.

The Central Organ of the Party could publish extracts from these reports which would serve as valuable material on the actual and genuine state of affairs in the Party.

The number of members in the study circles, groups, etc., could also be published by using one or two letters of the alphabet to denote this or that group or organisation. Such reports concerning the membership of our Party organisations would serve as useful material for control. (The objection that they would occupy too much space is groundless. With two letters and two figures to show the number of members—e.g., ab 13, cd 41, ef 17, etc.—we would have *eleven* such reports to each line of column space.)

The Congress should break up the interval between the Third and Fourth Congresses (one year) into two parts. During the first half, *every* Party organisation down to the lowest workers' unit of our Party should constitute itself and *arrange* without fail regular contact with the centre and the regular submission of fortnightly reports. I say "arrange", because it is not enough to take the address and write; it is necessary to check the addresses, to make sure

that the reports are delivered, etc., etc. Four to five months* is quite sufficient for organising this new practice of fortnightly reports with full regularity. Without a doubt, *given the will*, this could be done in a *third* of the time.

After that, in the second half-year, the fortnightly reports of the Party organisations could be placed on a constitutional basis, so to speak, i.e., they would be used directly to readjust the Party's representation at the Fourth Congress. Thus, let us say, the Third Congress decides in April 1905 that only Party organisations submitting the regular fortnightly reports to the centre as of September 1, 1905, shall be entitled to consideration in the readjusted Party representation for the Fourth Congress. The Party's representation at congresses pro rata to the number of workers organised in Social-Democratic leagues in each area will be determined at the Fourth Congress only on the basis of these reports for a period of not less than three months (a minimum of six reports). The number of members, therefore, must be given in each report.

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* During this period *every* organisation should submit its cipher (two or three letters = *name* of the organisation) to the centre and achieve the publication of at least one of its reports in the Central Organ, so that *all* the members of that organisation may conceive themselves of its connection with the centre.

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[110]

APRIL 12 (25)-APRIL 27 (MAY 10), 1905

Speeches, reports, resolutions, and draft resolutions first published in 1905 in the book *The Third Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Full Text of the Proceedings*

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Российская Соц. Дем. Рабочая Партія.

ПРОЛЕТАРІИ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ!

ТРЕТІЙ ОЧЕРЕДНОЙ СЪѢЗДЪ

Росс. Соц.-Дем. Рабочей Партіи.

ПОЛНЫЙ ТЕКСТЪ ПРОТОКОЛОВЪ.

Изданіе Центральнаго Комитета.

ЖЕНЕВА

Типографія Партіи. 6, Quai du Cheval Blanc, 6.

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Cover of the book *The Third Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Full Text of the Proceedings*
Published by the C.C., Geneva, 1905

Reduced

1

SPEECH ON THE VALIDITY OF THE CONGRESS
APRIL 13 (26)

I wish to reply to the remarks made here concerning the validity of the convocation of this Congress. The Central Committee considered the Congress to be unauthorised. The C.C. has characterised its own message to the Party Council as "repentant". But was there anything for the C.C. to repent? The Congress is perfectly valid. It could, admittedly, be held invalid according to the *letter* of the Rules, but it would be grotesque formalism on our part to give the Rules such an interpretation. According to the spirit of the Rules, the validity of the Congress is beyond question. The Party Council exists for the Party, and not the Party for the Council. At the Second Congress, in connection with the Organising Committee incident, it was pointed out, by none other than Comrade Plekhanov, that discipline with regard to a lower body yields precedence to discipline with regard to a higher body. The C.C. declared its readiness to submit to the Party Council, if the latter would submit to the Party, viz., to the Congress. This was a perfectly legitimate demand, yet the Party Council rejected it. But the C.C., we are told, began to doubt the loyalty of the Party Council and expressed its lack of confidence in it. However, as we know, in all constitutionally governed countries the citizens have a right to express their lack of confidence in any public servant or institution. This is their inalienable right. Finally, even if the C.C. acted unwarrantedly, did that give the Party Council the right also to act unwarrantedly? What guarantee is there that the clause in the Rules which puts the Party Council under obligation to call a congress upon its endorse-

ment by half the qualified votes will actually be enforced? The Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party contain a clause authorising the Control Commission to convene a congress, if the *Vorstand** refuses to do so. We have no such provision, and it rests entirely with the Party to ensure that the Congress is convened. From the spirit of the Rules, and even from their letter, if taken as a whole, it is clear that the Party Council is the agent of the Party committees. The agent of the committees refuses to do the bidding of its principals. If the agent does not carry out the will of the Party, the only thing left for the Party is to execute its will itself. The Party committees not only had the right to call the Congress themselves, but were in duty bound to do so. I maintain that the Congress was convened in a perfectly legitimate way. Who is the judge in this dispute between the Party Council and the committees? Why, these very committees, the Party. The will of the Party was expressed long ago. All the delay and procrastination on the part of the centres abroad could not alter it. The committees were obligated to convene the Congress themselves, and the Congress has been convened lawfully.

Now, to meet Comrade Tigrov's point. Comrade Tigrov says we ought not to judge the Party Council. But the whole report of the Organising Committee is a judgement of the Party Council. I think Comrade Tigrov errs in holding that we must not judge the accused *in absentia*. In politics one is constantly compelled to judge *in absentia*. Do we not constantly judge the Socialists-Revolutionaries, the Bundists, and others in our writings, at our meetings, and everywhere? What else can we do but judge *in absentia*, if the Party Council refuses to appear at the Congress? In that case we could never judge anyone. Even the official court judges *in absentia* if the accused refuses to appear before it.

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* The executive body.—*Ed.*

2

SPEECH ON THE QUALIFIEDNESS OF THE KAZAN AND KUBAN COMMITTEES APRIL 14 (27)

The findings of the Credentials Committee show that the Party is represented by a total number of 75 votes, so that our Congress, as now constituted, must beyond a doubt be recognised as valid. Considering the present attitude of suspicion towards the Congress, we must recognise as commendable the "liberal" tendency of the Credentials Committee to confirm the largest possible number of committees in order to increase the lawful majority necessary for the Congress. From this angle I am even ready to express my sympathy with such "liberality". But, on the other hand, one must be equally careful and impartial towards all, and for that reason I feel constrained to oppose the Credentials Committee's confirmation of the Kazan and Kuban committees. They are included in the list of qualified committees published in issue No. 89 of *Iskra*, but not in the list recorded in the minutes of the Party Council. At the Council session Comrade Martov read the list of qualified committees valid until September 1, 1904.

(*An excerpt from the minutes of the Party Council follows*):

"Martov reads his resolution: According to Clause 2 of the Rules the Party Council is obligated to convene a congress when this is demanded by Party organisations commanding aggregately at least half the total voting strength of the congress. According to Note 1 to Clause 3, only organisations duly confirmed after the adoption of the Party Rules shall be entitled to representation at a congress.

"Organisations not represented at the Second Congress are to be considered confirmed, if their confirmation by the C.C. was accorded not

later than one year prior to the Congress. (I) The Party Council resolves that any organisation which shall have been confirmed within the specified period of time shall be entitled to have its vote counted at the computation of the number of organisations that have gone on record in favour of convening the Congress. The organisations represented at the Second Congress and elected by it shall be considered qualified organisations. (II) In view of this, only the following organisations shall hereafter and until September 1904 be entitled to vote on the question of convening a congress: (1) the C.C.; (2) the Central Organ; (3) the League Abroad; (4-20) the committees of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Nikolayev, of the Don region, of Ekaterinoslav Saratov, Ufa (now the Ural region), of the North, of Tula, Tver, Nizhni-Novgorod, Baku, Batum, and Tiflis (until the expiration of one year from the time of the confirmation of the Caucasian League); (21-23) the League of the Mining and Metal District (Donets), and the Siberian and the Crimean leagues.

"The qualifiedness of these organisations assumed, the number of votes they are entitled to cast at the Congress is 46. With the 5 votes of the Party Council members, the total voting strength of the Congress is 51; therefore, to convene a congress 26 votes are required, viz., the votes of 13 of the above-named qualified organisations. The C.C. is requested to furnish the Party Council with the dates of its confirmation of the new committees since the Congress."

The first part of the resolution was adopted unanimously.

Later in his speech at that meeting, Comrade Glebov read out a list of the newly-formed committees.

Comrade Glebov's speech (*from the minutes of the Party Council*):

"I agree with Comrade Martov and would like to state that the following new committees have been organised: Smolensk and Astrakhan, confirmed in September 1903; Voronezh (the Fund for the Struggle), in January 1904; Riga, in January, Polesye, in April, North-Western, in April; Kursk, in January; Orel-Bryansk, in September 1903; Samara, in September 1903; Ural (Ufa), in April."

These facts were made public in Comrade Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*, and so far the Council has neither refuted them nor published the dates of the confirmation of the committees under dispute, which would seem to indicate that there is no evidence of such confirmation. At the stated meeting of the Party Council, Comrade Martov declared in one of his speeches that in his opinion two more committees were to be confirmed in August, namely, the Kremenchug and Poltava committees—but again not a word about the Kazan and Kuban committees.

After the July declaration, Comrade Glebov sent me the full minutes of the C.C. meetings, in which no reference is made to the confirmation of either the Kazan or the Kuban Committee; at subsequent C.C. meetings, as Comrade Letnev,[111] a member of the C.C., has testified, there was likewise no mention of their confirmation. True, Comrade Zimin,[112] a member of the C.C., has a hazy recollection of the Kazan and Kuban committees having been confirmed, but he can state nothing definite.

The Credentials Committee's decision to recognise these committees as qualified on the evidence of their having functioned for over a year, is not correct, and I move, therefore, that these committees be declared non-qualified.

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TOWARDS THE ARMED UPRISING

1. Whereas the proletariat, being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and most consistent revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the role of leader and guide of the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;

2. Whereas only the performance of this role during the revolution will ensure the proletariat the most advantageous position in the ensuing struggle for socialism against the propertied classes of the bourgeois-democratic Russia about to be born; and

3. Whereas the proletariat can perform this role only if it is organised under the banner of Social-Democracy into an independent political force and if it acts in strikes and demonstrations with the fullest possible unity;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves that the task of organising the forces of the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of mass political strikes and the armed uprising, and of setting up for this purpose an apparatus for information and leadership, is one of the chief tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment; for which reason the Congress instructs both the C.C. and the local committees and leagues to start preparing the political mass strike as well as the organisation of special groups for the obtainment and distribution of arms, for the elaboration of a plan of the armed uprising and the direct leadership of the rising. The fulfilment of this task can and should proceed in such a way as will not only not in the least prejudice the general work of awakening the class-consciousness of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, will render that work more effective and successful.

Written on April 14 (27), 1905

4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ARMED UPRISING

The Congress holds, on the basis of the practical experiences of the functionaries and on the basis of the mood of the working-class masses, that preparations for the uprising imply, not only the preparation of weapons, the formation of groups, etc., but also the accumulation of experience by means of practical attempts at separate armed actions, such as attacks by armed squads on the police and on troops during public meetings, or on prisons, government offices, etc. While fully relying on the local Party centres and on the C.C. to determine the limits of such actions and the most convenient occasions for them, while fully relying on the comrades' discretion in avoiding a useless expenditure of effort on petty acts of terror, the Congress draws the attention of all Party organisations to the need for taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts of experience.

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5

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMED UPRISING APRIL 15 (28)

It has been said here that the question is clear enough in principle. Nevertheless, statements have been made in Social-Democratic literature (see *Iskra*, No. 62, and Comrade Axelrod's foreword to the pamphlet by "A Worker") which go to show that the question is not so clear after all. *Iskra* and Axelrod talked about conspiracy and expressed the fear that too much thought would be given to the uprising. The facts show, however, that there has been too little thought on the subject.... In his foreword to the pamphlet by "A Worker", Comrade Axelrod maintains that it can only be a question of an uprising of the "uncivilised masses". Events have shown that we are dealing, not with an uprising of the "uncivilised masses", but with an uprising of politically conscious masses capable of carrying on an organised struggle. The entire history of the past year proved that we underestimated the significance and the inevitability of the uprising. Attention must be paid to the practical aspect of the matter. In this respect the experience of those engaged in practical work and of the workers of St. Petersburg, Riga, and the Caucasus is of exceptional importance. I would suggest, therefore, that the comrades tell us of their experience; that will make our discussion practical instead of academic. We must ascertain the mood of the proletariat—whether the workers consider themselves fit to struggle and to lead the struggle. We must sum up this collective experience, from which no generalised conclusions have as yet been drawn.

6

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMED UPRISING APRIL 16 (29)

During the debate the question was put on a practical plane: what is the mood of the masses? Comrade Leskov[113] was right in saying that it was chequered. But Comrade Zharkov is right, too, in saying that we must reckon with the fact that the uprising, whatever we may think of it, is bound to take place. The question arises whether there are any differences in principle between the resolutions submitted. I fail totally to see any. Although I am viewed as an arch-intransigent, I will, nevertheless, try to reconcile and bring these two resolutions into line—I will undertake their reconciliation. I have nothing against the amendment to Comrade Voinov's resolution. Nor do I see any difference in principle in the addendum. Very energetic participation does not necessarily imply hegemony. I think Comrade Mikhailov expressed himself in a more positive manner; he emphasises hegemony, and in a concrete form, too. The English proletariat is destined to bring about a socialist revolution—that is beyond doubt; but its inability to bring it about at the present moment, owing to its lack of socialist organisation and its corruption by the bourgeoisie, is equally beyond dispute. Comrade Voinov expresses the same thought: the most energetic participation is undoubtedly the most decisive participation. Whether the proletariat will decide the outcome of the revolution—no one can assert absolutely. This is likewise true of the role of leader. Comrade Voinov's resolution is worded more carefully. Social-Democracy may organise the uprising, it may even be the deciding factor in it. But whether Social-Democracy will

have the leading role in it cannot be predetermined; that will depend on the strength and organisation of the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie may be better organised and its diplomats may prove to be superior and better trained. Comrade Voinov is the more cautious; he says, "You may be able to do it." "You will do it," says Comrade Mikhailov. The proletariat may possibly decide the outcome of the revolution, but this cannot be asserted positively. Comrades Mikhailov and Sosnovsky are guilty of the very error they charge Comrade Voinov with: "Count not your trophies before the battle."

"For guarantee, it is necessary," says Voinov; "necessary and sufficient," say Mikhailov and Sosnovsky. As to organising special fighting groups, I might say that I consider them necessary. We need not fear to form them.

7

RESOLUTION ON THE ARMED UPRISING[114]

1. Whereas the proletariat being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;

2. Whereas this movement at the present time has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising;

3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably take the most energetic part in this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution in Russia;

4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only if it is united in a single and independent political force under the banner of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically; and

5. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism against the propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment.

Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations:

a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not only the political significance, but the practical organisational aspect of the impending armed uprising,

b) to explain in that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during the progress of the uprising, and

c) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof, for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and when necessary.

Written on April 16 (29), 1905

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8

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S TACTICS ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION APRIL 18 (MAY 1)

We are in a quandary. We have three resolutions and three amendments. The resolutions are growing in number and scope, and this process is not being regulated in any way. The subject has proved to be broader than the speaker who made the report anticipated. We shall have to refer the resolution back to the committee, although Comrade Sergeyev[115] evidently ridicules this proposal. The question of open action was touched upon by all the speakers. The report was appropriate to the subject, but needs amplifying. On the question of participation in the societies opinion is divided. The Congress cannot lay down a hard and fast rule on this point. All methods should be used for agitation. The experience of the Shidlovsky Commission gives no grounds whatever for a downright negative attitude. Some say that there is nothing new in the resolution. A good thing bears repeating again and again. Comrade Zimin's view is too rigid. It is impossible to reply categorically whether it is advisable to participate in the Zemsky Sobor. Everything will depend on the political situation, on the electoral system, and on other specific factors which cannot be estimated in advance. Some say that the Zemsky Sobor is a fraud. That is true. But there are times when we must take part in elections to expose a fraud. We can give nothing more than a general directive. I repeat, in my opinion all the resolutions should he referred back to the committee, the membership of which should be enlarged.

9

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THE EVE AND AT THE MOMENT OF THE REVOLUTION

Could we not satisfy Comrade Alexandrov[116] with the following amendments to Schmidt's[117] resolution (roughly):

1) instead of (the Congress) "resolves": the Congress *confirms* the old tactics of the Social-Democrats as laid down at the Second Congress, with a detailed explanation applicable to the present moment (or something of the kind);

2) to add another clause to the resolution approximately as follows:

As regards the actual and sham concessions which the weakened autocracy is now making to the democrats in general and to the working class in particular, the Social-Democratic party of the working class should *take advantage of them* in order, on the one hand, to *consolidate* for the people every improvement in the economic conditions and every extension of liberties with a view to intensifying the struggle, and on the other, steadily to expose before the proletariat the reactionary aims of the government, which is trying to disunite and corrupt the working class and draw its attention away from its urgent class needs at the moment of the revolution.

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10

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF OPEN POLITICAL ACTION BY THE R.S.D.L.P.

1. Whereas the revolutionary movement in Russia has already to a certain degree shaken and disorganised the autocratic government, which has been compelled to tolerate the comparatively extensive exercise of freedom of political action by the classes inimical to it;

2. Whereas this freedom of political action is mostly, almost exclusively, enjoyed by the bourgeois classes, which thereby strengthen their existing economic and political domination over the working class and increase the danger that the proletariat may be transformed into a mere appendage of bourgeois democracy; and

3. Whereas there is developing (breaking through, coming to light) among increasingly wider masses of the workers the urge towards independent open action in the political arena, even though (on occasions of lesser importance) without the participation of the Social-Democrats;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. calls the attention of all Party organisations to the fact that it is necessary

a) to make use of each and every case of open political action on the part of the educated spheres and the people, whether in the press, in associations, or at meetings, for the purpose of contraposing the independent class demands of the proletariat to the general democratic demands, so as to develop its class-consciousness and to organise it in the course of such actions into an independent socialist force;

b) to make use of all legal and semi-legal channels for creating workers' societies, associations, and organisations,

and to put forward every effort towards securing (in whatever way) the predominance of Social-Democratic influence in such associations and to convert them into bases for the future openly functioning Social-Democratic working-class party in Russia;

c) to take the necessary steps to ensure that our Party organisations, while maintaining and developing their underground machinery, will proceed at once to the preparation of expedient forms of transition, wherever and whenever possible, to open Social-Democratic activity, even to the point of clashes with the armed forces of the government.

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11

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

1. Whereas a really free and open mass struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie requires the widest possible political liberty and, consequently, the fullest possible realisation of republican forms of government;

2. Whereas various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sections of the population, the peasantry, etc., are now coming out in increasing numbers with revolutionary-democratic slogans, which are the natural and inevitable expression of the basic needs of the masses, the satisfaction of which—impossible under the autocracy—has been made imperative by the objective development of the entire socio-economic life of Russia;

3. Whereas international revolutionary Social-Democracy has always recognised that the proletariat must render most energetic support to the revolutionary bourgeoisie in its struggle against all reactionary classes and institutions, provided that the party of the proletariat maintain absolute independence and a strictly critical attitude towards its temporary allies;

4. Whereas the overthrow of the autocratic government in Russia is inconceivable without its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government, and whereas only such a change can ensure real freedom and a true expression of the will of the whole people during the inauguration of the new political system in Russia and guarantee the realisation of our programme of immediate and direct political and economic changes;

5. Whereas without the replacement of the autocratic government by a provisional revolutionary government supported by all revolutionary-democratic classes and class elements in Russia, it will be impossible to achieve a republican form of government and win over to the revolution the backward and undeveloped sections of the proletariat and particularly of the peasantry—those sections whose interests are completely opposed to the absolutist, serf-holding order and which cling to the autocracy or stand apart from the struggle against it largely on account of the oppressive stupefying atmosphere; and

6. Whereas with the existence in Russia of a Social-Democratic party of the working class, which, though only in the initial stage of its development, is nevertheless already organised and capable, particularly under conditions of political freedom, of controlling and directing the actions of its delegates in a provisional revolutionary government, the danger that these delegates may deviate from the correct class line is not insurmountable;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that representatives of the Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of relentlessly combating, together with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, all attempts at counter-revolution, and of defending the independent class interests of the proletariat, provided that the Party maintain strict control over its representatives and firmly safeguard the independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which aims at the complete socialist revolution and is in this respect hostile to all bourgeois-democratic parties and classes.

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12

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Another argument in favour of participating in a provisional revolutionary government:

Whereas the categorical refusal to participate in a provisional revolutionary government, which is at this moment recommended by the Right Wing of our Party, inevitably dooms the activity of the revolutionary proletariat aimed at preparing, organising, and carrying out the armed uprising, to irresolution, half-way policies, and disunity;—

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13

REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT APRIL 18 (MAY 1)

My task is to present the question of the participation of the Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government. It may seem strange, at first glance, that such a question should have arisen. One might think the cause of Social-Democracy to be thriving and the probability of its participation in a provisional revolutionary government to be very great. Actually it is not so. To debate this question as an immediately realisable prospect would be quixotic. But the question has been forced upon us not so much by the actual state of affairs as by literary polemics. It must always be borne in mind that the question was first raised by Martynov, and that he raised it *before January 9*. He wrote in his pamphlet *Two Dictatorships* (pp. 10-11):

> "Imagine, dear reader, for a moment, that Lenin's utopia has been realised; imagine that the Party, whose membership has been narrowed down to only professional revolutionaries, has succeeded in 'preparing, *timing*, and carrying out the general armed uprising of the people'. Is it not obvious that it would be this Party which would be *designated* as the provisional government by the will of the whole people immediately after the revolution? Is it not obvious that the people would place the immediate fate of the revolution in the hands of this Party, and no other? Is it not obvious that this Party, not wishing to betray the confidence previously placed in it by the people, would be forced, be *in duty bound*, to assume power and maintain it until it had consolidated the victory of the revolution by revolutionary measures?"

Incredible as it may seem, this is actually how the question is presented: Martynov believes that if we were thor-

oughly to prepare and launch the uprising, we should find ourselves in a desperate predicament. If we were to submit our dispute to a foreigner, he would never believe it possible for the question to be formulated in that manner and he would not understand us. Our dispute cannot be understood without a knowledge of the history of Russian Social-Democratic views and the nature of the tail-endist views of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. This question has become an urgent question of theory and must be clarified. It is a question of clarity in our aims. I urge the comrades when reporting on our discussion to the members engaged in practical Party work in Russia to emphasise strongly Martynov's formulation of the question.

Iskra, No. 96, contains an article by Plekhanov. We have always held Plekhanov in great esteem for the "offence" he has repeatedly given to the opportunists, which, to his honour, has earned him a mass of enemies. But we cannot esteem him for defending Martynov. This is not the Plekhanov we knew. He entitles his article "On the Question of the Seizure of Power". This artificially narrows the issue. We have never thus presented the question. Plekhanov presents things as though *Vperyod* called Marx and Engels "virtuosi of philistinism". But that is not so; it is a slight substitution. *Vperyod* expressly stressed the correctness of Marx's general conception of this question. The charge of philistinism referred to Martynov or to L. Martov. Well disposed though we are to hold in high esteem all who collaborate with Plekhanov, it must be said, however, that Martynov is not Marx. Plekhanov errs in seeking to hush up Martynovism.

Martynov asserts that if we take a decisive part in the uprising, we shall be in great danger of being forced by the proletariat to take power. This argument has a certain original logic of its own, although a logic of retreat. It is in reference to this peculiar warning against the danger of victory in the struggle against the autocracy that *Vperyod* asks Martynov and L. Martov what they are talking about: a socialist or a democratic dictatorship? We are referred to Engels' famous words about the danger involved in the position of a leader who has been given power in behalf of a class that is not yet mature for the exercise of complete domination. We explained in *Vperyod* that Engels points out the danger to the position of a leader when he establishes

post factum a divergence between principle and reality, between words and facts. Such a divergence leads to disaster in the sense of political failure, not in the sense of physical defeat*; you must affirm (this is Engels' thought) that the revolution is socialistic, when it is really only democratic. If we promised the Russian proletariat now that we could secure its complete domination immediately, we would fall into the error of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. It is this mistake of the Socialists-Revolutionaries that we Social-Democrats have always ridiculed—their claim that the revolution will be "democratic and not bourgeois". We have constantly said that the revolution would strengthen the bourgeoisie, not weaken it, but that it would create for the proletariat the necessary conditions for waging a successful struggle for socialism.

But since it is a question of a democratic revolution, we are faced with two forces: the autocracy and the revolutionary people, viz., the proletariat as the chief combatant, and the peasantry and all the different petty-bourgeois elements. The interests of the proletariat do not coincide with those of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Social-Democracy has always stressed the fact that these class differences in the midst of a revolutionary people are unavoidable. In a hard-fought struggle, the object of the struggle may change from hand to hand. A revolutionary people strives for the sovereignty of the people; all the reactionary elements defend the sovereignty of the tsar. A successful revolution, therefore, cannot be anything but the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, whose interests, equally *opposed to the sovereignty of the tsar*, coincide. Both *Iskra* and *Vperyod* are agreed on the slogan "To march separately but strike together", but *Vperyod* adds that striking jointly means jointly striking the final blow and jointly beating off the enemy's attempts to recover the ground he has lost. After the overthrow of the autocracy, the struggle will not cease, but become more intense. That is precisely the time when the reactionary forces will organise for the struggle in real earnest. If we are going to employ the slogan of the uprising, we must not frighten the

* See pp. 279-80 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Social-Democrats with the possibility of victory in the uprising. When we have won the sovereignty of the people, we shall have to consolidate it—this is what is meant by the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. We have no reason whatever to fear it. The establishment of the republic would be a tremendous victory for the proletariat, although, unlike the bourgeois revolutionary, the Social-Democrat does not regard the republic as the "absolute ideal" but merely as something that will guarantee him freedom to wage the struggle for socialism on a broad basis. Parvus says that in no other country has the struggle for freedom entailed such tremendous sacrifices. This is true. It is confirmed by the European bourgeois press, which is following events in Russia very closely from the outside. The autocracy's resistance to the most elementary reforms is incredibly strong, and the greater the action the greater the counter-action. Hence the autocracy's utter collapse is highly probable. The entire question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship hinges on the complete overthrow of the autocracy. Possibly the history of 1848-50 will repeat itself with us, that is, the autocracy will not be overthrown but only limited in power and converted into a constitutional monarchy. In that case a democratic dictatorship will be out of the question. If, however, the autocratic government is really overthrown, it will have to be replaced by another. This other can be only a provisional revolutionary government. It can base itself for support only on the revolutionary people—on the proletariat and the peasantry. It can be only a dictatorship, that is, not an organisation of "order", but an organisation of war. If you are storming a fortress, you cannot discontinue the war even after you have taken the fortress. Either the one or the other: either we take the fortress to hold it, or we do not storm the fortress and explain that all we want is a little place next to it.

Let me pass on to Plekhanov. His method is totally incorrect. He evades important questions of principle to indulge in quibbling, with an element of misstatement. (*Exclamation by Comrade Barsov*: "Hear, hear!") *Vperyod* maintains that Marx's general scheme is correct (that of replacing the autocracy first by a bourgeois monarchy and then by a petty-bourgeois democratic republic); but if we set out

beforehand to restrict the limits to which we shall go in accordance with this scheme, we shall prove ourselves philistines. Thus, Plekhanov's defence of Marx is *verlorene Liebesmühe* (love's labour's lost). In defending Martynov, Plekhanov refers to the Address[118] of the Central Committee of the Communist League[119] to the League membership. Plekhanov misstates this Address too. He draws a veil over the fact that it was written at a time when the people had failed to score a complete victory, notwithstanding the victorious uprising of the Berlin proletariat in 1848. Absolutism had been superseded by a bourgeois constitutional monarchy, and, consequently, a provisional government backed by the entire revolutionary people was out of the question. The whole point of the Address is that after the failure of the popular uprising Marx advises the working class to organise and prepare. Can these counsels serve to clarify the situation in Russia before the uprising has begun? Can they resolve the moot question which presupposes the victorious uprising of the proletariat? The Address begins thus: "In the two revolutionary years 1848-49 the League proved itself in double fashion: first, in that its members energetically took part in the movement in all places.... The League further proved itself in that its conception of the movement [as set forth, by the way, in the *Communist Manifesto*] turned out to be the only correct one.... At the same time, the former firm organisation of the League was considerably slackened. A large part of the members who directly participated in the revolutionary movement believed the time for secret societies to have gone by and public activities alone sufficient. The individual circles and communities allowed their connections with the Central Committee (*Zentralbehörde*) to become loose and gradually dormant. *Consequently*, *while the democratic party*, *the party of the petty bourgeoisie*, *organised itself more and more in Germany*, *the workers' party lost its only firm hold*, remained organised at the most in separate localities for local purposes and *in the general movement* (*in der allgemeinen Bewegung*) *thus came completely under the domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats*" (*Ansprache*, p. 75).

Thus, Marx found in 1850 that the petty-bourgeois democrats had gained in organisation during the Revolution of

PROPAGANDA TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

1848, which had run its course, while the workers' party had lost. Naturally, Marx's chief concern was that the workers' party should not lag behind the bourgeoisie a second time. It is "extremely important that ... precisely at this moment, when a new revolution is impending, the workers' party must act in the most organised, most unanimous and most independent fashion possible, if it is not to be exploited and taken in tow again by the bourgeoisie as in 1848" (*Ansprache*, p. 76).

It is because the bourgeois democrats were better organised that Marx did not doubt that they would definitely predominate, should a second revolution take place at once. "That, during the further development of the revolution, the petty-bourgeois democracy will for a moment (*für einen Augenblick*) obtain predominating influence in Germany is not open to doubt" (*Ansprache*, p. 78). Taking all this into consideration, we can understand why Marx does not mention a word in *Ansprache* about the participation of the proletariat in a provisional revolutionary government. Plekhanov, therefore, is entirely incorrect in asserting that Marx "considered inadmissible the thought that the political representatives of the proletariat could work together with the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie for the creation of a new social order" (*Iskra*, No. 96). This is not correct. Marx *does not raise* the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, whereas Plekhanov makes it appear as though *Marx decided this question in the negative*. Marx says: We Social-Democrats have all been lagging behind, we are worse organised, we must organise independently for the eventuality that the petty bourgeoisie will come to power after a new revolution. From these premises of Marx, Martynov draws the following conclusion: We Social-Democrats, now better organised than the petty-bourgeois democrats and constituting undoubtedly an independent party, ought to shrink from *having* to participate in a provisional revolutionary government in the event of a successful uprising. Yes! Comrade Plekhanov, Marxism is one thing and Martynovism another. To bring out more clearly the great difference between the situation in Russia in 1905 and that in Germany in 1850, let us deal with some further interesting passages in the Address. Marx did not

even mention the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, for he believed in the direct socialist dictatorship of the proletariat immediately after the petty-bourgeois revolution. On the agrarian question, for instance, he says that the democrats want to create a petty-bourgeois peasant class, but that the workers must oppose this plan in the interests of the rural proletariat and in their own interests; they must demand that the confiscated feudal landed property remain state property, and that it be used for labour colonies in which the associated rural proletariat should employ all the means of large-scale agriculture. Obviously, with such plans in mind, Marx *could not* speak of a democratic dictatorship. He wrote, not on the eve of the revolution, as the representative of the organised proletariat, but after the revolution, as the representative of the workers in the process of organising. Marx emphasises the first task as follows: "After the overthrow of the existing governments, the Central Committee will, as soon as it is at all possible, betake itself to Germany, immediately convene a congress, and put before the latter the necessary proposals for the centralisation of the workers' clubs...." Thus, the idea of an independent workers' party, which has become with us bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, was then something new. We must not forget that in 1848, when Marx was editing the free and extremely revolutionary newspaper (*Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[120]), he had no working-class organisation behind him. His paper was supported by bourgeois radicals, who nearly wrecked it when Marx made his scathing attack on the Paris bourgeoisie after the June Days. That is why the Address has so much to say about the independent organisation of the workers. It deals with the formation of revolutionary workers' governments parallel with the new official government, whether in the form of workers' clubs and committees or of local communal councils and municipalities. The point made therein is that the workers should be armed and that they should form an independent workers' guard. The second clause in the programme states that working-class candidates, preferably members of the League, should be nominated for these bodies alongside the bourgeois candidates. How weak the League was is shown by the fact that Marx had to argue the need for nominating

independent candidates. The inference to be drawn from all this is that Marx did not mention and had no intention of deciding the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, since that question could have no practical significance at the time; the entire attention was concentrated exclusively on the organisation of an independent workers' party.

Plekhanov says further in *Iskra* that *Vperyod* produces no relevant evidence, but confines itself to repeating a few favourite catchwords, and he alleges that *Vperyod* seeks to criticise Marx. With what truth? Do we not see, on the contrary, that *Vperyod* puts the question on a concrete basis, taking into account the real social forces engaged in Russia in the struggle for the democratic revolution? Plekhanov, on the other hand, does not say a word about the concrete conditions in Russia. His stock-in-trade consists of a couple of inapposite quotations. Monstrous, but true. The situation in Russia differs so greatly from that in Western Europe that even Parvus was prompted to ask: Where is our revolutionary democracy? Unable to prove that *Vperyod* wants to "criticise" Marx, Plekhanov drags in Mach and Avenarius by the ears. I cannot for the life of me understand what these writers, for whom I have not the slightest sympathy, have to do with the question of social revolution. They wrote on individual and social organisation of experience, or some such theme, but they never really gave any thought to the democratic dictatorship. Does Plekhanov mean to say that Parvus, perhaps, has become a disciple of Mach and Avenarius? (*Laughter*.) Or perhaps things have come to such a pass with Plekhanov that he has to make a butt of Mach and Avenarius without rhyme or reason. Plekhanov goes on to say that Marx and Engels soon lost faith in an imminent social revolution. The Communist League broke up. Petty squabbles arose among the political emigrants abroad, which Marx and Engels put down to the fact that while there were revolutionaries there was no revolution. Plekhanov writes in *Iskra*: "They [Marx and Engels, who had lost faith in an imminent social revolution] would have formulated the political tasks of the proletariat on the assumption that the democratic system would be predominant for a fairly long time. But for this very reason they would have been

more emphatic than ever in condemning the socialists' participation in a petty-bourgeois government" (*Iskra*, No. 96). Why? No answer. Once more Plekhanov uses democratic dictatorship interchangeably with socialist dictatorship, i.e., he falls into Martynov's error, against which *Vperyod* has time and again strongly warned. Without the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry no republic is possible in Russia. This assertion was made by *Vperyod* on the basis of an analysis of the actual situation. Unfortunately, Marx did not know this situation and he did not write of it. Therefore the analysis of this situation can neither be confirmed nor refuted with simple quotations from Marx. As to the concrete conditions, Plekhanov says not a word.

Even less felicitous is the adducing of the second quotation from Engels. For one thing, it is rather odd of Plekhanov to refer to a private letter without mention of the time and place of its publication.[121] We could only be grateful for the publication of Engels' letters, but we should like to see their full text. We have, however, some information which permits us to judge of the true meaning of Engels' letter.

We know definitely, in the second place, that the situation in Italy in the nineties was nothing like the present situation in Russia. Italy had been enjoying freedom for forty years. In Russia the working class cannot even dream of such freedom without a bourgeois revolution. In Italy, consequently, the working class had long been in a position to develop an independent organisation for the socialist revolution. Turati is the Italian Millerand. It is quite possible, therefore, that even at that time Turati advocated Millerandian ideas. This assumption is borne out by the fact that, according to Plekhanov himself, Engels had to explain to Turati the difference between a bourgeois-democratic and a socialist revolution. Thus, Engels feared that Turati would find himself in the false position of a leader who did not understand the social significance of the revolution in which he was taking part. Accordingly, we must say again of Plekhanov that he confounds democratic with socialist revolution.

But perhaps we might find in Marx and Engels an answer which, though not applying to the concrete situation in

Russia, would apply to the general principles of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat? *Iskra* at any rate raises one such general question.

It states in issue No. 93: "The best way to organise the proletariat into a party in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic state is to develop the bourgeois revolution *from below* through the pressure of the proletariat on the democrats in power." *Iskra* goes on: "*Vperyod* wants the pressure of the proletariat on the revolution [?] to be exerted not only from below, not only from the street, but also from above, from the marble halls of the provisional government." This formulation is correct; *Vperyod* does want this. We have here a really general question of principle: is revolutionary action permissible only from below, or also from above? To this general question we can find an answer in Marx and Engels.

I have in mind Engels' interesting article "The Bakuninists at Work"[122] (1873). Engels describes briefly the Spanish Revolution of 1873, when the country was swept by a revolution of the Intransigentes, i.e., the extreme republicans. Engels stresses the fact that the immediate emancipation of the working class was out of the question at that time. The task was to accelerate for the proletariat the transition through the preliminary stages that prepare the social revolution and to clear the obstacles in its way. The working class of Spain could utilise this opportunity only by taking an active part in the revolution. In this it was hindered by the influence of the Bakuninists and, among other things, by their idea of the general strike, which Engels criticised so effectively. Engels describes, in passing, the events in Alcoy, a city with 30,000 factory workers, where the proletariat found itself master of the situation. How did the proletariat act? Despite the principles of Bakuninism, they were obligated to participate in the provisional revolutionary government. "The Bakuninists," says Engels, "had for years been propagating the idea that all revolutionary action from above downward was pernicious, and that everything must be organised and carried out from below upward."

This, then, is Engels' answer to the general question of "from above or from below" raised by *Iskra*. *The "Iskra" principle of "only from below and never from above" is an anarchist principle*. Drawing his conclusion from the events of the

Spanish revolution, Engels says: "The Bakuninists repudiated the credo which they had just proclaimed: that the establishment of a revolutionary government was only a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class [as Plekhanov is trying to persuade us now], by figuring quite complacently on the government committees of the various cities, and at that almost everywhere as an impotent minority outvoted and exploited politically by the bourgeoisie." *Thus, what displeases Engels is the fact that the Bakuninists were in the minority, and not the fact that they sat there on these committees.* At the conclusion of his pamphlet, Engels declares that the example of the Bakuninists is "an example of how *not* to make a revolution."

If Martov confined his revolutionary work exclusively to action from below, he would be repeating the mistake of the Bakuninists.

Iskra, however, after inventing differences on points of principle with *Vperyod*, comes round to our own point of view. Martynov, for instance, says that the proletariat, in common with the people, must force the bourgeoisie to consummate the revolution. This, however, is nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of "the people", viz., of the proletariat and the peasantry. The bourgeoisie has no wish whatever to consummate the revolution. But the people cannot help wanting this because of the social conditions of their existence. The revolutionary dictatorship will educate them and draw them into political life.

Iskra writes in issue No. 95:

> "If, however, we should finally be swept into power against our will by the inner dialectics of the revolution at a time when the national conditions for the establishment of socialism are not yet mature, we would not back out. We would make it our aim to break down the narrow national framework of the revolution and impel the Western world towards revolution, as France impelled the East a century ago."

Thus, *Iskra* itself admits that, were it our misfortune to be victorious, we should have to act in keeping with the *Vperyod* position. *Hence, in the practical aspect of the question, "Iskra" follows "Vperyod"* and undermines its own position. The only thing I fail to understand is how Martov and Martynov can be dragged to power against their own will. If ever there was idiocy!

Iskra cites France as an example. But that was Jacobin France. To make a bogy of Jacobinism in time of revolution is a cheap trick. A democratic dictatorship, as I have pointed out, is not an organisation of "order", but an organisation of war. Even if we did seize St. Petersburg and guillotined Nicholas, we would still have several Vendées[123] to deal with. Marx understood this perfectly when in 1848, in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, he recalled the Jacobins. He said that "the Reign of Terror of 1793 was nothing but a plebeian manner of settling accounts with absolutism and counter-revolution."[124] We, too, prefer to settle accounts with the Russian autocracy by "plebeian" methods and leave Girondist methods to *Iskra* The situation confronting the Russian revolution is singularly auspicious (an anti-popular war, the Asiatic conservatism of the autocracy, etc.), and it justifies the hope that the uprising may prove successful. The revolutionary temper of the proletariat is mounting almost hourly. At such a moment Martynovism is not mere folly, but a downright crime, for it saps the revolutionary energy of the proletariat, clips the wings of its revolutionary enthusiasm. (*Lyadov*: "Hear, hear!") It is the mistake Bernstein made in the German Party, under different circumstances, on the question, not of the democratic, but of the socialist dictatorship.

To give you a definite idea of what these celebrated "marble halls" of the provisional revolutionary government are really like, I shall quote still another source. In his article "*Die Reichsverfassungskampagne*"* Engels recounts how he took part in a revolution in the precincts of these "marble halls". He describes, for instance, the uprising in Rhenish Prussia, which was one of the most industrialised centres in Germany. The chances for the victory of the democratic party, he says, were particularly strong there. The thing to do was to rush all available forces to the right bank of the Rhine, spread the insurrection over a wider area and try to set up the nucleus of a revolutionary army with the aid of the *Landwehr* (militia). This was precisely what Engels proposed when he went to Elberfeld to do everything possible to put his plan into operation. He attacks the

* "The Campaign for an Imperial Constitution".—*Ed.*

petty-bourgeois leaders for their inability to organise the insurrection, for their failure to furnish funds, for instance, for the maintenance of the workers fighting on the barricades, etc. They should have acted more energetically, he says. Their first step should have been to disarm the Elberfeld Citizens' Army and distribute its arms among the workers, and then to levy a compulsory tax for the maintenance of the workers thus armed. But this suggestion, says Engels, came only and exclusively from me. The highly respectable Committee of Public Safety was not in the least inclined to take such "terrorist measures".

Thus, while our Marx and Engels—that is, Martynov and Martov (*Homeric laughter*)—try to frighten us with the bogy of Jacobinism, Engels castigated the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie for its disdain of the "Jacobin" mode of operation. He understood that going to war and—in the course of the war—renouncing the State Treasury and government power meant engaging in an unworthy game of words. Where, then, will you get money for the uprising, if it becomes an all-people's uprising, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*? Not from the State Treasury, surely? That is bourgeois! That is Jacobinism!

Concerning the uprising in Baden Engels writes that "the insurgent government had every chance of success, in that it found ... a ready army, well-stocked arsenals ... a full State Treasury, and what was practically solid support of the population". After the event everyone understood what had to be done under the circumstances. What had to be done was to organise an army for the protection of the National Assembly, to drive the Austrians and Prussians back, to spread the revolt to the neighbouring states, and "bring the trembling German so-called National Assembly under the terroristic influence of an insurgent population and insurgent army.... It was necessary, furthermore, to centralise the power of the insurrection, put the necessary funds at its disposal and win for the insurrection the sympathy of the vast farming majority of the population by immediately abolishing all feudal burdens.... All this should have been done at once, however, if it was to be carried out promptly. A week after the appointment of the Committee of Safety it was too late".

We are convinced that when the uprising starts in Russia the revolutionary Social-Democrats, following the example of Engels, will enlist as soldiers of the revolution and will give the same kind of "Jacobin" advice. But our *Iskra* prefers to discuss the colour of the ballot envelopes, relegating to the background the question of the provisional revolutionary government and of a revolutionary guard for the Constituent Assembly. Our *Iskra* will not act "from above" under any circumstances.

From Karlsruhe Engels went to Pfalz, where his friend D'Ester (who had once freed Engels from arrest) was on the provisional government. "Official participation in a movement that was utterly alien to our party was plainly out of the question in this case as well," Engels says. He had "to take the only position in this movement that anyone working on the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* could take: that of a soldier". We have spoken of the break-up of the Communist League, which deprived Engels of practically all ties with the workers' organisations. This clarifies the passage we quoted: "I was offered many civilian and military posts," writes Engels, "posts that I would not have hesitated for a moment to accept in a proletarian movement. Under the circumstances I declined them all."

As we see, Engels did not fear to act from above; he did not fear that the proletariat might become too organised and too strong, which could lead to its participation in the provisional government. On the contrary, he regretted that the movement was not successful enough, not proletarian enough, because the workers were completely unorganised. But even under these circumstances, Engels accepted a post; he served in the army as Willich's adjutant, took over the delivery of ammunition, transporting under the greatest difficulties powder, lead, cartridges, etc. "To die for the republic was (thenceforward) my aim," writes Engels.

I leave it to you, comrades, to judge whether this picture of a provisional government drawn according to the words of Engels resembles the "marble halls" which the new *Iskra* is holding up as a bogy to frighten the workers away from us. (*Applause.*) (*The speaker reads his draft of the resolution and explains it.*)

14

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

1. Whereas both the direct interests of the Russian proletariat and those of its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the democratic republic;

2. Whereas the armed uprising of the people, if completely successful, i.e., if the autocracy is overthrown, will necessarily bring about the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government, which alone is capable of securing complete freedom of agitation and of convening a Constituent Assembly that will really express the will of the people, an Assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot; and

3. Whereas this democratic revolution in Russia will not weaken, but, on the contrary, will strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie, which, at a certain juncture, will inevitably go to all lengths to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the revolutionary period as possible;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:

a) that we should spread among the working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is absolutely necessary, and discuss at workers' meetings the conditions required for the full and prompt realisation of all the immediate political and economic demands of our programme;

b) that in the event of the victorious uprising of the people and the complete overthrow of the autocracy, representa-

tives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending the independent interests of the working class;

c) that essential conditions for such participation are strict control of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the bourgeois parties;

d) that, irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate among the broadest sections of the proletariat the idea that the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pressure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating, and extending the gains of the revolution.

Written prior to April 18 (May 1), 1905

15

SPEECH ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT APRIL 19 (MAY 2)

On the whole I share the opinion of Comrade Zimin. It is only natural that, as publicist, I should have given my attention to the literary formulation of the question. Comrade Zimin has very properly stressed the importance of the aim which our struggle pursues, and I subscribe to all he has said. You cannot fight if you do not expect to capture the point you are fighting for....

Comrade Zimin's amendment to Point 2: "that the establishment, etc. ... a provisional government, which alone", etc., is quite to the purpose, and I readily accept it.

This is likewise true of the amendment to Point 3; it is very appropriate to show here that under the present social and economic conditions the bourgeoisie will of necessity grow stronger.

In point (a) of the resolution, the wording "the proletariat will demand" is better than my formulation, since it shifts the emphasis to the proletariat. In point (b) the reference to the dependence on the relation of forces is also quite appropriate. This formulation, in my opinion, renders Comrade Andreyev's amendment unnecessary.[125] Incidentally, I should like to know the opinion of the comrades from Russia as to whether the expression "immediate demands" is clear enough or whether we should not add "the minimum programme" in parenthesis. In point (c) I use the word "are", while Comrade Zimin proposes "should be"; evidently a stylistic correction is needed here. Where Party control is dealt with, I think my old formulation "the safeguarding of the

independence of the Social-Democratic Party" is better than "preserving", which Comrade Zimin proposes. Our task is not only to "preserve" the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, but constantly to "safeguard" it. Comrade Sosnovsky's amendment to this point only mars the formulation by making it vaguer. Comrade Andreyev's proposals for changes are covered in part in the points of my resolution and of Comrade Zimin's. Incidentally, it is hardly appropriate to put "provisional government" in the plural in the formulation, as Comrade Andreyev proposes. Of course, we may have many provisional governments; but we should not make a point of it, for we do not in any sense strive for such partitioning. We shall always stand for a single provisional government of all-Russia and strive to create "a single centre, and a Russian one at that". (*Laughter.*)

16

REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT APRIL 19 (MAY 2)

In view of the statement of seventeen comrades calling attention to the urgent need for speeding up the work of the Congress, I shall try to be as brief as possible. Strictly speaking, there are no moot points of principle in the question under discussion; none arose even during the Party crisis, which was rich in differences on points of "principle".

Moreover, the draft resolution was published in *Vperyod* quite some time ago; I shall therefore confine myself merely to supporting the resolution.

The question of supporting the peasant movement divides itself into two aspects: (1) fundamentals, and (2) the practical experience of the Party. The latter will be dealt with by our second reporter, Comrade Barsov,[126] who is thoroughly familiar with our most advanced peasant movement—that in Guria. As regards the fundamentals involved, it is now a matter of reaffirming the slogans elaborated by Social-Democracy and adapting them to the peasant movement of today. This movement is growing and spreading before our eyes. The government is up to its old game of trying to fool the peasantry with sham concessions. This policy of corruption must be countered with the slogans of our Party.

These slogans, in my opinion, are set forth in the following Draft Resolution:

"The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as the party of the class-conscious proletariat, strives to bring about the complete emancipation of all working people

from every kind of exploitation, and supports every revolutionary movement against the present social and political system. Therefore, the R.S.D.L.P. strongly supports the present-day peasant movement, among others, and stands for all revolutionary measures capable of improving the condition of the peasantry, not halting at the expropriation of the landed estates to this end. At the same time, as the class party of the proletariat, the R.S.D.L.P. works undeviatingly towards an independent class organisation of the rural proletarians, ever mindful of its obligation to make clear to them the antagonism of their interests to those of the peasant bourgeoisie, to bring them to understand that only the common struggle of the rural and the urban proletariat against the whole of bourgeois society can lead to the socialist revolution, which alone is capable of really freeing the mass of the rural poor from poverty and exploitation.

"As a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry, and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into this movement, the R.S.D.L.P. proposes the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees for all-round support of all democratic reforms and for their implementation in detail. In these committees as well the R.S.D.L.P. will strive for an independent organisation of the rural proletarians for the purpose of supporting the entire peasantry in all its revolutionary-democratic actions, on the one hand, and, on the other, of safeguarding the true interests of the rural proletariat in its struggle against the peasant bourgeoisie" (*Vperyod*, No. 11*).

This Draft was discussed by the Agrarian Committee, which the delegates had appointed in advance of the Congress for its preparation. Although opinion was considerably divided, certain major trends were clearly in evidence, and it is with these that I intend to deal. The nature of the possible and necessary revolutionary measures in the sphere of the agrarian question is according to the Draft Resolution "the improvement in the condition of the peasantry". Thus, the Resolution clearly expresses thereby the general conviction of all Social-Democrats that no fundamental change in the present social and economic system can be achieved by

* See pp. 235-36 of this volume.—*Ed.*

these measures. In this we differ from the Socialists-Revolutionaries. The revolutionary movement of the peasants may lead to a considerable improvement in their condition, but not to the supplanting of capitalism by another mode of production.

The Resolution speaks of measures that will not halt at the expropriation of the landed estates. It has been said that this formulation modifies our agrarian programme. I consider this opinion wrong. The wording could be improved, of course, to read that it is the peasantry and not our Party that will not halt at expropriation; our Party supports the peasantry and will support it also when it does not halt at such measures. The narrower concept "confiscation" should be used instead of expropriation, since we are emphatically opposed to compensation in any shape or form. We will never hesitate to employ such measures as confiscation of the land. But apart from these partial emendations, we see nothing in our Resolution that modifies our agrarian programme. All Social-Democratic publicists have constantly expressed the view that the point concerning the cut-off lands does not by any means set limits to the peasant movement, either to curtail or to restrict it. Both Plekhanov and I have stated in the press that the Social-Democratic Party will never hold the peasantry back from revolutionary measures of agrarian reform, including the "general redistribution"[127] of the land. Thus, we are not modifying our agrarian programme. We must now take a definite stand on the practical question of consistent support to the peasants, to avoid any possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations. The peasant movement is now on the order of the day, and the party of the proletariat should declare officially that it gives this movement full support and does not in any way limit its scope.

The Resolution goes on to speak of the need to bring the interests of the rural proletariat into focus and to organise this proletariat separately. There is hardly any need to defend this simple axiom before a gathering of Social-Democrats. It was stated in the Agrarian Committee that it would be a good thing to add a point on the support of strikes of the farm labourers and peasants, especially during the harvesting, haymaking, etc. In principle, of course, there can

be nothing against this. Let our practical workers say what they think of the possible significance of such a point for the immediate future.

The Resolution further speaks of the formation of revolutionary peasant committees.

The idea that the demand for the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees should be made the pivot of our agitation was developed in *Vperyod*, No. 15.* Even the reactionaries now talk of "improving the living conditions", but they stand for an official, bureaucratic way of pseudo-improvement, whereas the Social-Democrats, of course, must stand for the revolutionary way of effecting the improvement. The main task is to instil political consciousness into the peasant movement. The peasants know what they want in a vague sort of way, but they are unable to see their wishes and demands in relation to the entire political system. That is why they are such easy game for political tricksters, who reduce the question of political changes to economic "improvements", which cannot really be effected without political changes. Therefore, the slogan calling for revolutionary peasant committees is the only correct one. Unless these committees are able to enforce the revolutionary law, the peasants will never be able to hold what they may now win. It is objected that here, too, we are modifying the agrarian programme, which says nothing about *revolutionary* peasant committees or their functions in the field of democratic reforms. This objection does not hold water. We are not modifying our programme but applying it to a concrete case. Since no doubt exists that the peasant committees cannot be anything but revolutionary under the given conditions, by noting this fact we are merely applying the programme to the revolutionary moment, not changing it. Our programme, for instance, declares that we recognise the right of nations to self-determination; if concrete conditions brought us to express ourselves in favour of self-determination of a definite nation, of its complete independence, that would be, not a change of the programme, but its application. The peasant committees are an elastic institution, suitable both under present conditions and

* See pp. 321-22 of this volume.—*Ed.*

under, let us say, a provisional revolutionary government, when they would become organs of the government. Some hold that these committees may become reactionary instead of revolutionary. But we Social-Democrats have never forgotten the dual nature of the peasant or the possibility of a reactionary peasant movement against the proletariat. Not this is the point at issue, but rather that at the present time peasant committees formed to sanction land reforms cannot be anything but revolutionary. At the present time the peasant movement is unquestionably revolutionary. Some say that the peasants will quieten down after they have seized the land. Possibly. But the autocratic government will not quieten down if the peasants seize the land, and this is the crux of the matter. Only a revolutionary government or revolutionary peasant committees can sanction this seizure.

Lastly, the concluding part of the Resolution defines once more the position of the Social-Democrats in the peasant committees, namely, the necessity of marching together with the rural proletariat and organising it separately and independently. In the countryside, too, there can be only one consistently revolutionary class—the proletariat.

17

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT

1. Whereas the growing peasant movement, though spontaneous and politically unconscious, is nonetheless inevitably directed against the existing political order and *against the privileged classes*;

2. Whereas it is one of the tasks of Social-Democracy to support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order;

3. Whereas, in view of the aforesaid, the Social-Democrats must strive to bring out the revolutionary-democratic features (characteristics) of the peasant movement, to uphold them and develop them to their logical conclusion; and

4. Whereas the Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the proletariat, must in all cases and under all circumstances work steadfastly for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and to clarify for this class the irreconcilable antagonism between its interests and those of the peasant bourgeoisie;—

Therefore, the Third Party Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. instructs all Party organisations:

a) to carry on propaganda among the proletariat at large, explaining that the R.S.D.L.P. makes it its aim to support with the utmost vigour the present-day peasant movement, *without opposing* its revolutionary manifestations, including the confiscation of the landed estates;

b) as a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into the peasant movement, a plan should be launched

for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees that shall have as their aim the carrying out of all revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interests of the peasantry and the liberation of the peasantry from the tyranny of the police, the officials, and the landlords;

c) to recommend to the peasantry non-performance of military service, flat refusal to pay taxes, and refusal to recognise the authorities, in order to disorganise the autocratic regime and support the revolutionary onset directed against it;

d) to work within the peasant committees for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and for its closest possible association with the urban proletariat in a single Social-Democratic party of the working class.

Written on April 20 (May 3), 1905

18

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS APRIL 20 (MAY 3)

I cannot agree with the comrades who said it was inappropriate to broaden the scope of this question. It is quite appropriate.

It has been said here that the exponents of Social-Democratic ideas have been mainly intellectuals. That is not so. During the period of Economism the exponents of revolutionary ideas were workers, not intellectuals. This is confirmed by "A Worker", the author of the pamphlet published with a foreword by Comrade Axelrod.

Comrade Sergeyev asserted here that the elective principle will not make for better information. That is not so. If the elective principle were applied *in practice*, we should unquestionably be much better informed than we now are.

It has also been pointed out that splits have usually been the work of intellectuals. This is an important point, but it does not settle the question. In my writings for the press I have long urged that as many workers as possible should be placed on the committees.* The period since the Second Congress has been marked by inadequate attention to this duty—such is the impression I have received from talks with comrades engaged in practical Party work. If in Saratov only one worker was placed on the committee, this means that they did not know how to choose suitable people

* *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*, September 1902. See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 235.—*Ed.*

from among the workers. No doubt, this was due also to the split within the Party; the struggle for the committees has had a damaging effect on practical work. For this very reason we endeavoured in every way possible to speed the convening of the Congress.

It will be the task of the future centre to reorganise a considerable number of our committees; the inertness of the committee-men has to be overcome. (*Applause and booing*.)

I can hear Comrade Sergeyev booing while the non-committee-men applaud. I think we should look at the matter more broadly. To place workers on the committees is a political, not only a pedagogical, task. Workers have the class instinct, and, given some political experience, they pretty soon become staunch Social-Democrats. I should be strongly in favour of having eight workers to every two intellectuals on our committees. Should the advice given in our Party literature—to place as many workers as possible on the committees—be insufficient, it would be advisable for this recommendation to be given in the name of the Congress. A clear and definite directive from the Congress will give you a radical means of fighting demagogy; this is the express will of the Congress.

19

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

1. Whereas the Right Wing of our Party still continues the systematic attempts, begun in the days of Economism, to spread hostility and distrust among the Party members—the workers and the intellectuals—attempts to represent our Party organisations as consisting solely of intellectuals (an allegation of which the enemies of Social-Democracy make clever use); attempts to accuse the Social-Democratic organisations of striving to fetter the initiative of the working class through the instrumentality of Party discipline; attempts to flaunt the elective-principle slogan for the most part without any design to apply it in practice; and

2. Whereas the *full* assertion of the elective principle, possible and necessary under conditions of political freedom, is unfeasible under the autocracy, though even under the autocracy this principle could be applied to a much larger extent than it is today, were it not for the obstacle presented by the Party organisation's diffuse form and actual disorganisation, for which the Party is indebted to the selfsame Right Wing of Social-Democracy;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., recognising its duty to prepare for the coming congresses, by a series of organisational reforms, the pre-conditions for a real application of the elective principle in Party life, to the extent possible, calls attention once more to the task confronting the class-conscious adherents of the Social-Democratic workers' party: that they make every effort to

strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses of the working class by raising still wider sections of proletarians and semi-proletarians to full Social-Democratic consciousness, by developing their revolutionary Social-Democratic activity, by seeing to it that the greatest possible number of workers capable of leading the movement and the Party organisations be advanced from among the mass of the working class to membership on the local centres and on the all-Party centre through the creation of a maximum number of working-class organisations adhering to our Party, by seeing to it that working-class organisations unwilling or unable to enter the Party should at least be associated with it.

Written on April 22 (May 5), 1905

20

A REMARK DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

I could hardly keep my seat when it was said here that there are no workers fit to sit on the committees. The question is being dragged out; obviously there is something the matter with the Party. Workers must be given places on the committees. Oddly enough, there are only three publicists at the Congress, the others being committee-men; it appears however that the publicists are for placing the workers, whereas the committee-men for some reason are quite wrought up over it.

The statements by Comrades Golubin[128] and Mikhailov are highly valuable.

21

SPEECH ON THE PROCEDURE OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE RESOLUTIONS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS APRIL 22 (MAY 5)[129]

I am not of accord with Comrade Sergeyev in this; it is precisely such congress resolutions that do not exist. The wishes of the publicists are not enough. Besides, the resolutions were not rejected, but merely shifted to another item of the agenda. Some point to the fact that the workers have the right, with the consent of the Central Committee, to cashier the committees. That is not enough; we want a directive, not demagogy. Comrade Sergeyev misinterprets *Vperyod* when he talks about "fine words buttering no parsnips". It is the brevity of the Rules clause that makes us adopt a resolution containing a certain directive. I am against Comrade Andreyev's proposal. It is not true that it was neither the "Economists" nor the "Mensheviks" who started the demagogy. On the contrary, it was they who were the demagogues. Precisely this is what the resolution is—a warning against demagogy. For this reason I insist upon the resolution.

22

SPEECH DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE PARTY RULES APRIL 21 (MAY 4)

I must confess that the arguments employed by Comrade Ivanov in defence of his idea of a single centre seem to me untenable. (*The speaker reads the argumentation of Comrade Ivanov*):

"On Clauses 4 and 5. The system of two centres with a balancer, the Council, has been condemned by past experience. The history of the Party crisis plainly shows that this system provides too favourable a soil for the growth of differences, squabbles and Court intrigues. It means the subordination of the people in Russia to those abroad: owing to arrests, the Central Committee personnel is unstable, whereas the Editorial Board of the Central Organ is constant; and the Council resides abroad. On the one hand, all the most important objections against a single centre, based on the actual severance of Russia from the people abroad, only confirm the idea that a split between the two centres is possible and even probable. On the other hand, these objections largely fall away if the Congress makes periodic conferences obligatory between the Russian members of the C.C. and the members abroad."

It has been found, however, that the fine qualities here alluded to are possessed in equal measure both by the Central Organ abroad and by the "genuinely Russian" Central Committee. In Comrade Ivanov's entire reasoning I discern the fallacy envisaged by logic as *post hoc*, *ergo propter hoc*.* Because the three centres have, pardon the expression, played us dirty, let us have a single centre. I fail to see the *propter* here. Our troubles were not due to the mechanism but to persons; what happened was that certain persons, using a formal interpretation of the Rules as a subterfuge,

* After this, therefore on account of this.—*Ed*.

ignored the will of the Congress. Has not the "genuinely Russian" C.C. "dialectically" turned into its exact opposite? Comrade Ivanov's reasoning is—the group abroad has acted shabbily; we must therefore put it under a "state of siege" and keep a "tight hold" on it. As you know, I have always been an advocate of a "state of siege" and of a "tight hold", so that I shall raise no objection to such measures. But does not the C.C. deserve the same treatment? Besides, who will deny that the Central Organ can be constant, while the C.C. cannot? This, after all, is a fact. But in practice I shall abstain from all polemic. Formerly we had the Council, and now we shall have a conference (of the C.C. section working abroad and of the section working in Russia). A difference of only a couple of letters. Our cart has been lurching all the time to the right, towards the Central Organ—Comrade Ivanov has been laying the straw on the right side, to cushion the fall. But I think it ought to be laid on the left side as well, on the side of the C.C. I would subscribe to Comrade Mikhailov's proposal to cashier the committees, but I really don't know what the periphery exactly is. "Chair-warmers and keepers of the seal" should all be smoked out; but how is one to define precisely the concept "periphery"? "Two-thirds of the votes of the periphery!"—but who can keep a strict record of the periphery? I must, besides, warn the Congress against cramming the Rules with too many clauses. It is easy enough to pen nice clauses, but in practice they usually prove superfluous. The Rules should not be made a collection of pious wishes....

23

SPEECH ON THE WORDING OF CLAUSE 9 OF THE PARTY RULES APRIL 21 (MAY 4)

I was for cashiering the committees, but in the Party Council, at the time when our factional strife was raging, I spoke against it, since there would have been a certain impropriety in the exercise of that right. If this clause constitutes a threat to the committees consisting of intellectuals, then I am all for it. A tight hold must always be kept on the intelligentsia. It is always the instigator of all sorts of squabbles, and therefore I move that we substitute the words "organised workers" for the word "periphery" (*the speaker submits his amendment in writing*): "Clause 9. A local committee must be dissolved by the C.C. if two-thirds of the local workers belonging to the Party organisations declare for such dissolution."

One cannot rely on a small periphery of intellectuals, but one can and should rely on hundreds of organised workers. I would like to connect this clause closely with the question of submitting reports. In this respect we should take an example from the Bund, which always knows the exact number of organised workers it has. And when our C.C. is constantly posted on the number of organised workers in any particular organisation, it will have to reckon with their opinion and will be bound to cashier the local committee on the demand of the organised workers.

24

SPEECH ON AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONARIES APRIL 23 (MAY 6)

I have to inform the Congress of an unsuccessful attempt to come to an agreement with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. Comrade Gapon arrived abroad. He met with the Socialists-Revolutionaries, then with the *Iskra* people, and finally with me. He told me that he shared the point of view of the Social-Democrats, but for various reasons did not deem it possible to say so openly. I told him that diplomacy was a good thing, but not between revolutionaries. I shall not repeat our conversation; it was reported in *Vperyod*.* He impressed me as being an enterprising and clever man, unquestionably devoted to the revolution, though unfortunately without a consistent revolutionary outlook.

Some time later I received a written invitation from Comrade Gapon to attend a conference of socialist organisations, convened, according to his idea, for the purpose of co-ordinating their activities. Here is a list of the eighteen organisations which, according to that letter, were invited to Comrade Gapon's conference:

(1) The Socialist-Revolutionary Party, (2) the *Vperyod* R.S.D.L.P., (3) the *Iskra* R.S.D.L.P., (4) the Polish Socialist Party, (5) the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, (6) the P.S.P., *Proletariat*, (7) the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, (8) the Bund, (9) the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation, (10) the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Droshak), (11) The Byelorussian Socialist

* See pp. 162-66 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Hromada, (12) the Lettish Social-Democratic League, (13) the Active Resistance Party of Finland, (14) the Workers' Party of Finland, (15) the Georgian Party of Socialist-Federalist Revolutionaries, (16) the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, (17) the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party, and (18) the Ukrainian Socialist Party.

I pointed out both to Comrade Gapon and to a prominent Socialist-Revolutionary that the dubious make-up of the conference might create difficulties. The Socialists-Revolutionaries were building up an overwhelming conference majority. The convocation of the conference was greatly delayed. *Iskra* replied, as documents submitted to me by Comrade Gapon show, that it preferred direct agreements with organised parties. A "gentle" hint at *Vperyod*'s being an alleged disrupter, etc. In the end *Iskra* did not attend the conference. We, the representatives of both the *Vperyod* Editorial Board and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, did attend. Arriving on the scene, we saw that the conference was a Socialist-Revolutionary affair. As it became clear, either the working-class parties had not been invited at all, or there was no record of their having been invited. Thus, the Active Resistance Party of Finland was represented, but not the Workers' Party of Finland.

When we asked for the reason, we were told that the invitation to the Workers' Party of Finland had been sent via the Active Resistance Party, since, in the words of the Socialist-Revolutionary who offered the explanation, they did not know how to send it directly. Yet anyone who is at all familiar with things abroad knows that connections with the Workers' Party of Finland can be established, if only through Branting, the leader of the Swedish Social-Democratic Labour Party. There were representatives from the Polish Socialist Party in attendance, but no representative from the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania. Nor was it possible to ascertain whether an invitation had been extended. No reply had been received from the Lithuanian Social-Democracy or from the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, we were told by the same Socialist-Revolutionary.

From the outset the national question was made an issue. The Polish Socialist Party raised the question of having several constituent assemblies. This gives me reason to say

that in the future it will be necessary for us either to refuse outright to take any part in such conferences, or to convene a conference of representatives of the working-class parties of one nationality, or to invite to the conference representatives of local party committees from the regions with a non-Russian population. But I certainly do not infer from this that conferences are impossible because of differences on points of principle. All that is necessary is that only practical questions be taken up.

We cannot control the composition of conferences, etc., from abroad. The Russian centre must be represented, and representatives of the local committees must take part without fail. The question that led to our withdrawal concerned the Letts. On leaving the conference we submitted the following declaration:

"The important historical period through which Russia is passing confronts the Social-Democratic and revolutionary-democratic parties and organisations working within the country with the task of reaching a practical agreement for a more effective attack on the autocratic regime.

"While, therefore, attaching very great importance to the conference called for that purpose, we must naturally subject the composition of the conference to the closest scrutiny.

"In the conference called by Comrade Gapon this condition, so essential to its success, has unfortunately not been properly observed, and we were therefore obliged, at its very initiation, to take measures calculated to ensure the genuine success of the gathering.

"The fact that the conference was to deal solely with practical matters made it necessary, in the first place, that only organisations truly constituting a real force in Russia should be afforded participation.

"Actually, the composition of the conference, as far as the reality of some of the organisations is concerned, is most unsatisfactory. Even an organisation of whose fictitious nature there is not the slightest doubt, found representation. We refer to the Lettish Social-Democratic League.

"The representative of the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party objected to the seating of this League and couched his objection in the form of an ultimatum.

"The utter fictitiousness of the 'League', as subsequently established at a special meeting of the representatives of the four Social-Democratic organisations and the delegates of the 'League', naturally compelled us, the remaining Social-Democratic organisations and parties attending the conference, to endorse the ultimatum.

"At the outset, however, we came up against the strong resistance of all the revolutionary-democratic parties, which, in refusing to meet our peremptory demand, showed that they preferred one fictitious group to a number of well-known Social-Democratic organisations.

"Finally, the practical significance of the conference was still further lowered by the absence of a number of other Social-Democratic organisations, whose participation, as far as we could ascertain, no proper measures had been taken to ensure.

"Though compelled, in view of all this, to leave the conference, we express our conviction that the failure of this one attempt will not stand in the way of earnest efforts to renew the endeavour in the very near future, and that the task that confronts all revolutionary parties of reaching a practical agreement will be accomplished by the coming conference, to be composed of organisations actually working in Russia, and not of fictitious organisations.

"For the Lettish S.D.L.P. . . . . F. Rozin.
"For the *Vperyod* R.S.D.L.P. . . . N. Lenin.
"For the Central Committee of the Bund I. Gelfin.
"For the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation . . Lerr."

A week and a half or two weeks later Comrade Gapon sent me the following statement:

"Dear Comrade,

"I am forwarding to you two declarations issued by the conference of which you know, and I request that you communicate their contents to the forthcoming Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. I deem it my duty to state that for my own part I accept these declarations with certain reservations on the questions of the socialist programme and the principle of federalism.

"Georgi Gapon."

This statement was accompanied by two interesting documents, containing the following striking passages:

"The application of the federative principle to the relations between nationalities remaining under one state roof....

"Socialisation, i.e., the transfer under public administration to the use by the labouring agricultural population of all lands whose cultivation is based on the exploitation of the labour of others; the determination of the concrete forms this measure is to take, of the order in which it is to be instituted, and of its scope, is to remain within the jurisdiction of the parties of the different nationalities, in keeping with the specific local conditions of each country; the development of public, municipal, and communal economy....

"... Bread for the starving!

"The land and its bounties for all the toilers!

"... A Constituent Assembly of representatives of all parts of the Russian Empire, exclusive of Poland and Finland!

"... Convocation of a Constituent Assembly for the Caucasus, as an autonomous part of Russia with which it is to be federated...."

The result of the conference, as appears from these quotations has fully confirmed the fears which induced us to leave the conference. We have here a copy of the Socialist-Revolutionary programme with all sorts of concessions to the nationalist non-proletarian parties. It was strange taking part in deciding the questions raised at the conference without the participation of the national proletarian parties. For instance, the conference presented the demand for a separate Constituent Assembly for Poland. We can be neither for nor against the demand. Our programme recognises the principle of the self-determination of nationalities. But to decide this question without the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania is impermissible. The conference divided up the Constituent Assembly, and this in the absence of the working-class parties! We cannot allow any practical solution of such questions to be reached without the party of the proletariat.

At the same time, I find that differences on points of principle do not exclude the possibility of practical conferences, provided, first, that they be held in Russia; secondly, that the reality of the forces be verified; and, thirdly, that questions concerning the various nationalities be dealt with separately, or at least, that representatives of the local committees of the regions where there are Social-Democratic and non-Social-Democratic national parties be invited to the conference.

I now pass to the proposed resolution on practical agreements with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. (*The speaker reads the draft as worded by Comrade Voinov*):

"Confirming the attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards the Socialist-Revolutionary Party as set forth in the resolution of the Second Congress, and

"1. Whereas temporary militant agreements between the Social-Democratic Party and the organisation of the Socialists-Revolutionaries for the purposes of combating the autocracy are on the whole desirable at the present time, and

"2. Whereas such agreements should under no circumstance restrict the complete independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, or affect the integrity and purity of its proletarian tactics and principles;—

"Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. instructs the C.C. and the local committees, should the necessity arise, to enter into temporary militant agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionary organisa-

tions, provided that local agreements are concluded only under the direct supervision of the C.C."

I agree with this draft. We might perhaps tone down the end. For instance, instead of "under the direct supervision of the Central Committee", we might have only "under the supervision of the Central Committee".

25

SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

Actually, the report on the work of the Central Committee dealt more with its technical than its political activities. I have been following the work of the central apparatus of the Party since 1900 and I must say that gigantic progress has been made. If it does not quite satisfy us, well, complete satisfaction can be expected only under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and even then, hardly! Let us not forget that "co-optation" is still working harm! The C.C. had little to say about its policies, for it cannot say anything good about them. Its major mistake was its opposition to the calling of the Congress. Had the Congress been called a year earlier, it would have proved more conciliatory. I am myself in favour of cashiering; but I am definitely against it in one case—if it is done because of agitation for the Congress. However, I shall not dwell on this. There is more joy over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons. As to the reproaches levelled at me, let me say only that a publicist is not in a position to do anything without the Party.

26

RESOLUTION ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS[130]

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to proceed immediately to the publication of a brief report on the Third Congress with the full text of the Programme, the Rules, and the Resolutions.

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to speed the publication of this report in every possible way.

The Congress instructs the Congress Proceedings Publication Committee: (1) to determine definitely what materials, for reasons of secrecy, are not to be published under any circumstances; (2) to determine in what manner and to what extent the Party membership should be made acquainted with the unpublished proceedings of the Third Congress; (3) to make the necessary cuts for publication, exclusively in regard to the discussion of points of order or of rejected minor amendments to the resolutions.

Written on April 25 (May 8), 1905

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

27

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE EVENTS IN THE CAUCASUS[131]

1. Whereas the specific social and political conditions in the Caucasus have favoured the creation there of the most militant organisations of our Party;

2. Whereas the revolutionary mood of the majority of the population in the Caucasus, both in the towns and in the villages, has reached the stage of a people's uprising against the autocracy;

3. Whereas the autocratic government has begun to send troops and artillery to Guria for the ruthless destruction of all the important seats of rebellion; and

4. Whereas a victory of the autocracy over the popular uprising in the Caucasus, which would be rendered easier by the non-Russian composition of the population, would most grievously affect the success of the uprising throughout Russia;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, on behalf of the class-conscious proletariat of Russia, sends ardent greetings to the heroic proletariat and peasantry of the Caucasus and instructs the Central Committee and the local Party committees to take the most energetic measures towards promulgating information on the state of affairs in the Caucasus as widely as possible by means of pamphlets, meetings, workers' rallies, study circle talks, etc., as well as measures towards rendering timely support to the Caucasus by armed force.

Written on April 26 (May 9), 1905

POLITICAL SOPHISMS

The Russian revolution has only just begun, but already all the features peculiar to political revolutions of the bourgeoisie stand clearly revealed. The lower classes fight, the upper reap the benefit of it. All the incredible hardships of the revolutionary struggle have fallen upon the proletariat, as a class, and on a few young intellectuals from among the bourgeoisie. Nine-tenths of all the liberties that have been partially won (rather, scant strips of liberty) go to the upper classes of society, to those who do not work. Despite the law, there is now incomparably greater freedom of speech, assembly, and the press in Russia than there was ten years, one year, ago; but only the bourgeois newspapers and the "liberal" meetings benefit thereby to any extent worth mentioning. In their powerful urge towards freedom the workers keep forcing their way into new realms hitherto thought inaccessible to them; but this infiltration of the proletarian element proves, rather than refutes, our point. Active participation in the political struggle is in inverse ratio to the active appropriation of its fruits. The more advantageous the status of a given class in the socio-economic structure is, the more "advantageous" is the relation between the legal and the illegal movement (i.e., between what is permitted by law and what is contrary to the law). The movement of the liberal bourgeoisie, especially since January 9, has spread so widely in forms *tolerated* by the law that the illegal liberal movement has begun to dwindle before our very eyes with amazing rapidity. The movement of the working class, *despite* its assumptions, in one of its crucial phases, of an ultra-"legal" form (the presentation of a petition to the tsar by the working people of St. Petersburg),

finds itself completely outlawed and subject to harsh military reprisals. The movement of the working class has grown incomparably wider, but the relation between the legal and the illegal elements has hardly changed in favour of the former.

Whence this difference? Because the whole social and economic structure of Russia yields most fruit to those who work the least. Under capitalism that cannot be otherwise. It is the law of capital, which rules the political as well as the economic life. The movement of the lower classes raises a revolutionary force; it raises a mass of people, who, for one thing, are capable of tearing down the whole rotten structure, and, for another, are not attached to that structure by any special features of their position and would gladly tear it down. What is more, even though they are not fully conscious of their aims, these masses are nonetheless able and prone to tear the structure down, because their position is desperate, since constant oppression drives them to take the revolutionary way, and they have nothing to lose but their chains. This popular force, the proletariat, looms formidable before the lords of the rotten structure because there is something in the very position of the proletariat that is a menace to all exploiters. For that reason, any movement of the proletariat, however small, however modest it may be at the start, however slight its occasion, inevitably threatens to outgrow its immediate aims and to develop into a force irreconcilable to the *entire* old order and destructive of it.

The movement of the proletariat, by reason of the essential peculiarities of the position of this class under capitalism, has a marked tendency to develop into a desperate *all-out* struggle, a struggle for complete victory over all the dark forces of exploitation and oppression. The movement of the liberal bourgeoisie, on the contrary, and for the same reasons (i.e., by virtue of the essential peculiarities of the bourgeoisie's position), has a tendency towards compromise instead of struggle, towards opportunism instead of radicalism, towards modest calculation of the likeliest and most possible immediate gains instead of a "tactless", bold, and determined bid for complete victory. He who puts up a real fight will naturally go *all out*; he who prefers compromise to struggle will naturally point out beforehand what "morsels" he would be inclined, at best, to content himself

with (at worst, he would be content even with no struggle at all, i.e., he would make a lasting peace with the masters of the old world).

It is therefore quite natural for Social-Democracy, as the party of the revolutionary proletariat, to be so concerned for its *programme*, to take such pains to establish well in advance its ultimate aim, the complete emancipation of the working people, and jealously to guard this aim against any attempts to whittle it down. For the same reasons Social-Democracy is so dogmatically strict and firmly doctrinaire in keeping its ultimate goal clear of all minor, immediate economic and political aims. He who goes *all out*, who fights for complete victory, must alert himself to the danger of having his hands tied by minor gains, of being led astray and made to forget that which is still comparatively remote, but without which all minor gains are hollow vanities. Such concern for the programme and the ever critical attitude towards small and gradual improvements are incomprehensible and foreign to a party of the bourgeoisie, however great its love for freedom and the people may be.

We were launched upon these reflections by the "Draft of a Russian Constitution", recently published by *Osvobozhdeniye* under the title "The Fundamental State Law of the Russian Empire". This draft, known in Russia for some time, has now been issued with annotations and an explanatory comment as "the only complete, definitive edition revised by the authors themselves". It appears that this draft originates, not with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, but rather with a private group belonging to the League. Thus, we see here once again the dread of a clear, definite, and straightforward programme, which is typical of liberalism. The liberal party in Russia possesses immeasurably greater funds and publication capacities, and immeasurably greater freedom of movement on legal ground than does Social-Democracy; yet, with regard to programmatic definiteness, it falls strikingly behind Social-Democracy. The liberals fight shy of programmes; they prefer various contradictory statements in their newspaper (e.g., on the question of universal suffrage), or the "drafts" of private groups, which do not in any way commit the party as a whole (or the whole *Osvobozhdeniye* League). This is no accident, of course. It is the

inevitable result of the bourgeoisie's social position, as a class, in modern society—a class caught between the autocracy and the proletariat and rent into factions over petty differences in interests. Political sophisms follow naturally from such a situation.

We should like to draw the reader's attention to one such sophism. The main features of *Osvobozhdeniye*'s draft constitution are well known: the monarchy is retained—the question of the republic is not even discussed (apparently the "*Realpolitiker*" of the bourgeoisie do not consider this question important enough!); a *bicameral* parliamentary system is to be set up with universal, *direct*, and equal suffrage by secret ballot for the Lower House, and with *two-stage* elections for the Upper. The members of the Upper House are to be elected by the Zemstvo Assemblies and the municipal councils. There is no need to dwell on the details of this draft. The interest lies in its general conception and its advocacy on grounds of principle.

Our generous-spirited liberals want to share the state power as evenly and "fairly" as possible among three forces: the monarch, the Upper House (the Zemstvo House), and the Lower House (the House of People's Representatives), that is, the autocratic bureaucracy, the bourgeoisie, and the "people" (the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie at large). The liberal publicists, in their heart of hearts, want the strife between these contending forces and the various combinations of these forces to be superseded by a "fair" concord of unity ... on paper! The thing is to have a gradual, balanced development, to justify universal suffrage from the point of view of the conservatives (Mr. Struve's preface to this draft); a real guarantee for the interests of the ruling classes (i.e., real conservatism) is to be created in the form of the monarchy and the Upper House; and this supposedly cunning, but actually very naïve, construction is to be clothed in highflown sophisms. The Russian proletariat will have to deal with liberal sophisms for a long time to come. It is time we examined them more closely.

The liberals begin their defence of the bicameral system by analysing anticipated objections to it. Characteristically, these objections are borrowed entirely from the usual

font of liberal-Narodnik ideas, which are being widely promulgated by our legal press. The nature of Russian society, it is claimed, is "profoundly democratic" and there is nothing in Russia like an upper class that owes its strength to its political services, to wealth, etc., for our nobility has been a class of servants of the government without "political ambitions", besides which its material power has been "sapped". From the point of view of a Social-Democrat it is absurd to take this Narodnik phrase-mongering seriously; there is not a word of truth in it. The political privileges enjoyed by the nobility in Russia are only too well known; the nobility's strength is plainly evident in the tendencies of the conservative and moderate, or Shipov, party; its material power is "sapped" only by the bourgeoisie, with which the nobility is merging, and which does not in the least prevent it from amassing immense wealth that enables it to rob tens of millions of toilers. The class-conscious workers should have no illusions on this score. Narodnik phrase-mongering on the insignificance of the Russian nobility merely serves the liberals as a means of sugaring the pill of future constitutional privileges of the nobility. This liberal logic is psychologically inevitable; our nobility must be depicted as negligible in order that its privileges may seem only a negligible departure from democracy.

With the bourgeoisie occupying a position between the hammer and the anvil, idealistic phrases, too, are psychologically inevitable, phrases which our liberals in general and their pet philosophers in particular are now mouthing with such bad taste. "As far as the Russian liberation movement is concerned," we read in the explanatory comment, "democracy is not only a fact but a moral and political postulate. It places moral justification for any social form above its historical justification...." Not a bad example of the turgid meaningless phraseology with which our liberals "justify" their approach towards betrayal of democracy! They complain of the "*obloquy* [?l that is heaped upon the Russian liberal party by representatives of the more extreme elements, who allege that this party seeks to put a bourgeois-aristocratic autocracy in the place of the bureaucratic autocracy"—yet our liberals would have the only truly democratic institution in their scheme, the House of People's

Representatives, share power with both the monarchy and the Upper, Zemstvo, House!

Their "ethical" and "moral-political" arguments for an Upper House are these. In the first place, "a bicameral system exists everywhere in Europe, except in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Luxemburg...." Not everywhere, then, if there are exceptions? Besides, what sort of argument is this: there are a great many anti-democratic bodies in Europe, therefore ... therefore they should be copied by our "profoundly democratic" liberals? The second argument: "It is dangerous to concentrate the legislative power in a single body"; another body should be set up to rectify mistakes and "too hasty" decisions...; "should Russia be bolder than Europe?" Thus, Russian liberalism does not want to be bolder than European liberalism, which has *knowingly* lost its progressive character through fear of the proletariat! Fine leaders of the "liberation" movement, indeed! Not a single serious step towards freedom has been made in Russia; yet the liberals already fear "hastiness". Cannot the same arguments be used, gentlemen, to justify the renunciation of universal suffrage as well?

A third argument: "One of the principal dangers to any political system in Russia is that it may be converted into a regime of Jacobin centralisation." How dreadful! The liberal opportunists evidently do not mind borrowing ammunition against lower-class democracy from the Social-Democratic opportunists, the new-Iskrists. The ridiculous bogy of "Jacobinism" dragged out by Axelrod, Martynov & Co. is doing the *Osvobozhdeniye* camp a good turn. But, gentlemen, if you really feared the excesses of centralism (and not the "excesses" of consistent democracy), why should you *limit* universal suffrage in elections of the *local*—Zemstvo and municipal—bodies, as you are doing? Article 68 of your draft stipulates that "every person having the right to vote in the elections to the House of People's Representatives has equally the right to vote in the local elections, *if he has been domiciled in the given uyezd or town for a definite period of time*, *such restricted period not to exceed one year*". This article introduces a *qualification*, thereby virtually making the franchise *non-universal*; for everyone understands that it is the workers, farm-hands, and day-

labourers who are mostly obliged to move from town to town and from district to district without a permanent place of residence. Capital drives masses of workers from one end of the country to the other, giving them no chance to claim permanent residence; and *because of that* the working class is to forfeit a part of its political rights!

This limitation of universal suffrage is to apply to the very bodies, rural and municipal, that elect the Upper, Zemstvo, House. To combat alleged excesses of Jacobin centralism, a *double* departure is made from democracy: first, *universal* suffrage is to be limited by the residence qualification; secondly, the principle of *direct* suffrage is to be annulled by the introduction of two-stage elections! Can anything be clearer than that the bogy of Jacobinism only serves the purpose of every type of opportunists?

Small wonder, indeed, that Mr. Struve expressed his sympathy in principle with the Social-Democratic Girondists—the new-Iskrists, that he sang the praises of Martynov, the famous champion of anti-"Jacobinism". The Social-Democratic enemies of Jacobinism have paved the way for the liberal bourgeois.

The contention of the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd that the Upper House, elected by the Zemstvo bodies, can best express "the principle of decentralisation", the "multiformity of the different parts of Russia", is sheer nonsense. Decentralisation cannot be expressed by limitation of the universal basis of the elections; multiformity cannot be expressed by limitation of the principle of direct elections. This is not the crux of the matter, which the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are trying to obscure. The real point is that by their system the Upper House is bound to become *pre-eminently* and chiefly an organ of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, since it is the proletariat that is largely affected by the residence qualification and the two-stage system of elections. The point is so plain to anyone at all familiar with political questions that the authors of the draft anticipate this inevitable objection.

"Some people will say," we read in the explanatory comment, "that no matter how the elections are organised, the *big landowners and employer class* stand a chance of keeping control in the local community. We think [what a

profoundly democratic thought!] that this is just another case of exaggerated fear of the 'bourgeois element'. There is nothing unfair [!] in the landowning and manufacturing classes obtaining an adequate [!] chance of representing their interests [universal suffrage is not enough for the bourgeois element!], so long as other social groups are granted wide opportunities for representation. Only privileges are morally objectionable and politically dangerous...."

Let the workers make a careful note of this "liberal" morality. It presumes to boast of democracy, to condemn "privileges", while at the same time *justifying* residence qualification, two-stage elections, and the monarchy.... The monarchy, evidently, is not a "privilege", or perhaps it is a morally unobjectionable and politically non-dangerous privilege!

Our society leaders of the "liberation" movement have started off well! Even in their most ambitious projects, which do not in the least commit their party as a whole, they devise advance apologies for reaction, defending the privileges of the bourgeoisie with sophistic attempts to prove that privileges are not privileges. Even in their publishing activities that least depend on material calculations and are least affected by immediate political aims, they contrive to prostitute the idea of democracy and slander the most consistent of all bourgeois democrats—the Jacobins of the Great French Revolution. And what are we to expect further? What are the practical politicians of the liberal bourgeoisie, responsible to their party, going to say, if the most idealistic of the liberals are already now preparing the theoretical ground for betrayal? If the boldest ambitions of the extreme Left Wing of the *Osvobozhdeniye* camp do not go beyond a monarchy with a bicameral parliament, if that is the only *price* the ideologues of liberalism *demand*, then on what terms will liberalism's businessmen *strike a bargain*?

The political sophisms of liberalism offer the revolutionary proletariat slight, yet valuable, documentation as to the real class nature of even the most advanced elements of the bourgeoisie.

Vperyod, No. 18,
May 18 (5), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

REPORT ON THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

Comrades Workers! The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was recently held. This Congress should mark a new phase in the history of our Social-Democratic working-class movement. Russia is passing through a great historical period. Revolution has broken out and its flames are spreading wider and wider, embracing new regions and new sections of the population. The proletariat stands at the head of the fighting forces of the revolution. It has already borne the greatest sacrifices in the cause of freedom and is now preparing for the decisive battle with the tsarist autocracy. The class-conscious representatives of the proletariat know that freedom will not rid the working people of poverty, oppression, and exploitation. The bourgeoisie, which now stands for the cause of freedom, will, on the morrow of the revolution, try to deprive the workers of as large a part of its conquests as possible and will show itself to be the implacable enemy of the socialist demands of the proletariat. But we do not fear a free, united, and strengthened bourgeoisie. We know that freedom will enable us to wage a broad and open mass struggle for socialism. We know that economic development will inexorably sap the power of capital and prepare the victory of socialism, and that it will do this the more rapidly, the more freely it proceeds.

Comrades Workers! To achieve this great aim we must unite all class-conscious proletarians in a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Our Party began to constitute itself quite some time ago, immediately following the broad working-class movement of 1895 and 1896. The year 1898 saw the convocation of its First Congress,

which founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and outlined its aims. The Second Congress was held in 1903. It gave the Party a programme, adopted a series of resolutions on tactics, and endeavoured, for the first time, to build an integral Party organisation. True, the Party did not at once succeed in this effort. The minority at the Second Congress refused to submit to the majority and started a split that has caused great harm to the Social-Democratic working-class movement. The first step towards this split was the refusal to carry out the decisions of the Second Congress and to accept the leadership of the central bodies it had set up. The last step was the refusal to participate in the Third Congress. The Third Congress was convened by a Bureau elected by the majority of the committees working in Russia, and by the Central Committee of the Party. All the committees, breakaway groups, and the periphery organisations dissatisfied with the committees were invited to the Congress. The vast majority of these organisations, including nearly all the committees and organisations of the Minority, elected delegates and sent them abroad to attend the Congress. Thus everything possible under our police regime was done to convene an all-Party congress; it was only the refusal of three members of the former Party Council resident abroad that resulted in the boycott of the Congress by the entire Party Minority. The Third Congress, as will be seen from its resolution[132] printed below, lays the entire responsibility for the split in the Party on these three members. Nevertheless, despite the absence of the Minority, the Third Congress took every measure to enable the Minority to work with the Majority in one party. The Congress held the reversion to the antiquated and superseded views of Economism discernible in our Party to be incorrect; at the same time, it provided precise and definite guarantees of the rights of every minority, guarantees embodied in the Rules of the Party and binding on all its members. The Minority now has the unconditional right, guaranteed by the Party Rules, to advocate its views and to carry on an ideological struggle, so long as the disputes and differences do not lead to disorganisation, so long as they do not impede constructive work, split our forces, or hinder the concerted struggle against the autocracy and the

LE PROLÉTAIRE

Пролетарій

№ 1.

Центральный Органъ Россійской Соціальдемократической Рабочей Партіи.

Front page of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*, No. 1, May 27 (14), 1905, with Lenin's article "Report on the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" and the main resolutions of the Congress"

Reduced

capitalists. The right to publish Party literature is now granted by the Rules to every qualified Party organisation. It has now been made incumbent on the C.C. of the Party to transport all kinds of Party literature upon the demand of five qualified committees, or one-sixth of all such committees in the Party. The autonomy of the committees has been defined more precisely and their membership declared inviolable, which means that the C.C. no longer has the right to remove members from local committees or to appoint new members without the consent of the committees themselves. This rule admits of only one exception, namely, in cases where two-thirds of the organised workers demand the removal of a committee; under the Rules adopted by the Third Congress such removal is incumbent on the C.C. if two-thirds of its members agree with the decision of the workers. Every local committee has been accorded the right to confirm periphery organisations as Party organisations. The periphery organisations have been accorded the right to nominate candidates for committee membership. The boundaries of the Party have been defined more precisely, in accordance with the wishes of the Party majority. A single centre has been set up instead of two or three. The comrades working in Russia have been guaranteed a decided preponderance over the Party's section abroad. In a word, the Third Congress has done everything to remove all possibility of charging the Majority with abuse of numerical superiority, with mechanical suppression, with despotism of the central bodies of the Party, and so on and so forth. Full opportunity has been provided for all Social-Democrats to work in co-operation, to join confidently the ranks of a single party, broad and virile enough, strong and welded enough to cut loose from the old traditions of the study circle days and to wipe out all traces of past friction and petty conflicts. Let all members of the Social-Democratic Party who really cherish the Party spirit now respond to the call of the Third Congress; let its decisions serve as the starting-point for restoring the unity of the Party, for eliminating all disorganisation, and for consolidating the ranks of the proletariat. We are convinced that the class-conscious workers, who are best able to appreciate the importance of united and concerted work, and who have most

keenly felt all the harmful effects of discord, vacillation, and strife, will now insist with the utmost vigour on universal and unreserved recognition of Party discipline by all Party members, whether rank and file or leaders.

While striving, in all its decisions on organisation and tactics, to maintain continuity with the work of the Second Congress, the Third Congress sought to take into consideration the new tasks of the moment in its resolutions on the Party's preparation for open action; on the necessity for the Party to participate practically and most energetically in the armed uprising and to give it leadership; and, finally, on the Party's attitude towards a provisional revolutionary government. The Congress drew the attention of all Party members to the need for taking advantage of all waverings on the part of the government and of every legal or actual extension of freedom for our activities in order to strengthen the class organisation of the proletariat and to prepare for its open action. But apart from these general and basic tasks of the Social-Democratic working-class party, the present revolutionary moment demands of the Party that it assume the role of foremost champion of freedom, of vanguard in the armed uprising against the autocracy. The more stubbornly the tsarist government resists the people's strivings towards freedom, the more powerful will be the force of the revolutionary onset and the more likely the complete victory of democracy, headed by the working class. The conduct of a victorious revolution and the defence of its conquests lay tremendous tasks on the shoulders of the proletariat. But the proletariat will not flinch at these great tasks. It will contemptuously brush aside all who predict that its victory will bring it misfortune. The Russian proletariat will be able to do its duty to the very end. It will be capable of taking the lead of the people's insurrection. It will not be daunted by the difficult task of participating in a provisional revolutionary government, if it has to tackle this task. It will be able to repel all attempts at counter-revolution, to crush ruthlessly all enemies of freedom, to defend staunchly the democratic republic, and to realise, in a revolutionary way, the whole of our minimum programme. The Russian proletarians should not fear such an outcome, but should passionately desire it. Our victory in the coming

democratic revolution will be a giant stride forward towards our socialist goal; we shall deliver all Europe from the oppressive yoke of a reactionary military power and help our brothers, the class-conscious workers of the whole world who have suffered so much under the bourgeois reaction and who are taking heart now at the sight of the successes of the revolution in Russia, to advance to socialism more quickly, boldly, and decisively. With the help of the socialist proletariat of Europe, we shall be able, not only to defend the democratic republic, but to advance with giant strides towards socialism.

Forward, then, comrades workers, to the organised, concerted, and staunch struggle for freedom!

Long live the revolution!

Long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.

Proletary, No. 1,
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Published according to
the text in the newspaper
Proletary

HOW THE CONGRESS WAS CONSTITUTED[133]

In supplementation of the resolution adopted at the beginning of the Congress, the Central Committee deems it necessary, on the basis of subsequent information, to add the following. The Congress set the total number of votes in our Party at 71, namely: 62 from the 31 qualified organisations and 9 from the central bodies. The Congress did not recognise the Kremenchug, Kazan, and Kuban committees as qualified Party organisations. The following committees had voting delegates at the Congress: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver (at the conclusion of the Congress), Riga, Northern, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ural, Samara, Saratov, the Caucasian League (8 votes, the equivalent of four committees), Voronezh, Nikolayev, Odessa, Polesye, North-Western, Kursk, and Orel-Bryansk. Altogether 21 organisations with 42 votes. In addition there were the C.C. delegates and the representatives of the C.C. on the Council commanding four votes. All in all, 46 votes out of 71. Present with consultative voice were: the delegates from the Archangel Committee, the League of the Urals (a second delegate, who arrived towards the end of the Congress), the Kazan Committee, the Odessa Committee, the Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Minsk groups, the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, and the Committee of the Organisation Abroad. The delegate of the Kremenchug Committee had expressed a desire to take part in the Congress proceedings, but he arrived too late. Furthermore, the delegates to the Third Congress received a document during the proceedings from which it appears that, owing to the efforts of the Organising Committee to convene the all-Party Congress, representatives of the following organisations had arrived abroad: the St. Petersburg

group of the C.C., the Odessa group of the C.C., the Nikolayev Committee, the Kharkov Committee, the Kiev Committee, the Ekaterinoslav Committee, the Kuban Committee, the Don Committee, the Donets League, the Siberian League, the periphery of the Moscow Committee, the Sormovo periphery, the Smolensk Committee, the Crimean League, and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic League. The document is a letter to "The comrades assembled in Congress at the invitation of the Organising Committee", signed by the representatives of all the above-mentioned organisations. From this it will be seen that the Organising Committee actually succeeded in making possible an all-Party congress in the full sense of the word.

Altogether the Congress held 26 sessions. The following questions of tactics were on the agenda: (1) the armed uprising; (2) the attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of and during the revolution; (3) the position on the peasant movement. Then questions of organisation: (4) the relations between the workers and the intellectuals within the Party organisations; (5) the Party Rules. Further, the questions dealing with our relationship towards other parties and organisations, namely: (6) the relationship to the breakaway section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, (7) to the non-Russian Social-Democratic parties, (8) to the "Socialists-Revolutionaries", and (9) to the liberals. Further, (10) improvement of propaganda and agitation; (11) report of the C.C.; (12) reports of delegates from the local committees; (13) elections; (14) standing order for publication of the proceedings and decisions of the Congress, and for the assumption of office by newly elected functionaries.

The publication of the proceedings of the Congress has been entrusted to a committee specially elected by the Congress. This committee has already commenced its work.

C.C., R.S.D.L.P.

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THE THIRD CONGRESS[134]

The long and stubborn struggle within the R.S.D.L.P. for the Congress is over at last. The Third Congress has been held. A detailed appraisal of all its work will be possible only after the proceedings of the Congress have been published. At present we propose, on the basis of the published "Report"* and the impressions of the Congress delegates, to touch on the principal landmarks of Party development as reflected in the decisions of the Third Congress.

Three major questions confronted the Party of the class-conscious proletariat in Russia on the eve of the Third Congress. First, the question of the Party crisis. Second, the more important question of the form of organisation of the Party in general. Third, the main question, namely, our tactics in the present revolutionary situation. Let us see how these questions were dealt with, in the order of lesser to major.

The Party crisis solved itself by the mere fact that the Congress was convened. The root cause of the crisis, as everyone knows, was the stubborn refusal of the minority at the Second Congress to submit to the majority. The agonising and protracted nature of the crisis was conditioned by the delay in convening the Third Congress, by the fact that there was virtually a split in the Party, a split that was kept hidden and secret beneath a hypocritical show of unity, while the Majority was making desperate efforts to find a quick and direct way out of the impossible situation. The Congress provided this way out by bluntly asking the Minority whether it accepted the decisions of the Majority, i.e., whether Party unity was to be restored in actual fact

* See pp. 433-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

or to be formally and completely broken. The Minority chose the latter course. It preferred a split. The Council's refusal to take part in the Congress in face of the clearly expressed will of the majority of qualified Party organisations and the refusal of the entire Minority to attend the Congress represented, as the "Report" states, the final step towards the split. We shall not dwell here on the formal validity of the Congress, which has been conclusively evidenced in the "Report". The argument that the Congress was invalid, that is, not in accordance with the Party Rules, because it had not been convened by the Council, can hardly be treated seriously after all that happened as a result of the Party conflict. It is clear to anyone who has any idea of the general principles of Party organisation that discipline in regard to a lower body is conditional upon discipline in regard to the higher body; the discipline which the Council may command is conditional upon the Council's subordination to its principals, that is, the committees and their totality, the Party Congress. To disagree with this elementary principle is to come to the absurd conclusion that it is not the agents who are responsible and accountable to their principals, but vice versa. But this question, we repeat, is not worth dwelling upon, not only because those do not see the point who do not wish to see it, but because, from the outset of the split, the dispute on formalities between the breakaway groups becomes barren, pointless, and scholastic.

The Minority has split away from the Party; that is an accomplished fact. Some of them will probably be brought to see by the decisions of the Congress, and still more by its proceedings, how naïve the sundry tales about mechanical suppression, etc., are; they will come to see that the rights of the Minority in general are fully guaranteed by the new Rules, that the split is harmful; and this section of the Minority will re-enter the Party. The other section may persist for a while in refusing to recognise the Party Congress. As to this section, we can but hope that it will lose no time in organising itself internally into a separate organisation with its own tactics and its own Rules. The sooner it does this, the easier it will be for all, for the broad mass of the Party workers, to understand the causes of the split and its implications; the more practicable it will be for our Party to come

to a working agreement with the breakaway organisation, depending on the needs of local work; and the sooner will a way be found for the inevitable future restoration of the Party's unity.

Let us now pass to the second question, to the general organisational standards of the Party. The Third Congress made changes of a substantial character in these standards in the course of revising the Party Rules. The revision affected three main points: (a) the amendment of Clause 1 of the Rules; (b) the precise definition of the rights of the C.C. and the autonomy of the committees, with the extension of the scope of this autonomy; and (c) the creation of a single centre. As to the famous Clause 1 of the Rules, this has been sufficiently clarified in Party literature. The erroneousness of defending in principle Martov's vague formula has been demonstrated conclusively. Kautsky's attempt to defend this formula from considerations, not of principle, but of expediency, namely, the conditions of secrecy prevailing in Russia, was not successful, as indeed it could not be. Anyone who has worked in Russia knows well that such considerations of expediency do not exist. The only thing now is to wait for the first results of the Party's collective *work* in implementing the new Clause 1 of the Rules. We emphasise the fact that a great deal of work has still to be done for this implementation. No work at all is needed to enrol oneself as a member of the Party "under the control of a Party organisation", since this formula is a mere name and remained such from the Second Congress to the Third. A wide network of varied Party organisations, from narrow and secret organisations to the broadest possible and least secret, can only be built up by dint of long, hard, and efficient organising work; this is the work that has now devolved upon our C.C. and to a still greater extent upon our local committees. It is the committees that will have to confirm the largest number of organisations in the capacity of Party branches and in the course avoid all unnecessary red tape and faultfinding; it is the committees that will have to propagate among the workers constantly and unremittingly the idea of the necessity to create the greatest possible number of diverse workers organisations affiliated to our Party. We cannot deal here with this interesting question at greater length. We

should like to point out, however, that the revolutionary epoch makes it particularly essential to draw a line of demarcation between Social-Democracy and all the other democratic parties. But this demarcation is unthinkable unless sustained efforts are made to increase the number of Party organisations and strengthen the ties among them. The fortnightly reports decided upon by the Congress will, among other things, serve to strengthen these ties. Let us hope that the reports will not remain an unrealised wish; that they will not cause the practical workers to draw for themselves a horrible picture of red tape and bureaucracy; that these comrades will start off in a small way till they develop the habit, by perhaps just reporting the number of members of every Party organisation, even the smallest and the farthest from the centre. "The first step is the hardest", runs the proverb. After that they will realise how tremendously important it is to acquire the habit of maintaining regular organisational connections.

We shall not dwell at length on the question of the single centre. The Third Congress rejected "bicentrism" by as huge a majority as the Second Congress had adopted it. The reasons will easily be understood by anyone who has carefully followed the history of the Party. Congresses do not so much create something new as consolidate results already achieved. At the time of the Second Congress the *Iskra* Editorial Board was the recognised pillar of stability, and it enjoyed dominant influence. The preponderant position of the comrades in Russia in relation to those resident abroad still seemed problematical at that stage of the Party's development. After the Second Congress it was the Editorial Board abroad that proved to be unstable. The Party, on the other hand, had developed considerably and unquestionably in Russia. Under these circumstances the appointment of an Editorial Board of the Central Organ by the Party C.C. could not but meet with the approval of the mass of the Party workers.

Finally, the attempts to delimit more precisely the rights of the C.C. and of the local committees, to draw a line between ideological struggle and disruptive squabbles, followed inevitably also from the whole course of events after the Second Congress. We have here a consistent and system-

atic "accumulation of Party experience". Plekhanov's and Lenin's letter of October 6, 1903,* to the disgruntled editors was an attempt to distinguish between irritation and disagreement. The C.C.'s ultimatum of November 25, 1903, was a similar attempt in the form of a proposal formulated by a group of publicists. The statement issued by the C.C. representatives on the Council at the end of January 1903** was an attempt to call upon the whole Party to differentiate the ideological forms of struggle from boycott, etc. Lenin's letter of May 26, 1904,*** to the members of the C.C. in Russia was an admission of the necessity of formally guaranteeing the rights of the Minority. The well-known Declaration of the Twenty-Two (autumn 1904) was a similar admission in a more distinct, detailed, and categorical form. Quite naturally, the Third Congress took the same path when it "finally dispelled, dispelled by formal decisions, the mirage of a state of siege". What these formal decisions were, viz., the changes in the Party Rules, can be seen from the Rules and the "Report"; therefore we shall not repeat them here. We shall mention only two things. First, it is to be hoped that the guarantee of the right to publish literature and the safeguarding of the committees against "cashiering" will help the seceded non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations to return to the Party. Secondly, in view of the inviolability of committee membership, some provision had to be made against the possible abuse of this guarantee, viz., against being saddled with a perfectly useless committee that was "undeposable". That accounts for Clause 9 of the new Party Rules, which sets forth the conditions under which a committee may be dissolved upon the demand of two-thirds of the local workers belonging to the Party organisations. Let us wait for the guidance of experience before deciding to what extent this rule is practical.

Finally, in passing to the last and most important item of the Congress proceedings, the determination of the Party's tactics, we must state that this is not the place to list and analyse the various resolutions. Possibly we shall have to do

* See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 352.—*Ed.*
** *Ibid.*, pp. 145-47.—*Ed.*
*** *Ibid.*, pp. 424-27.—*Ed.*

this in special articles devoted to the major resolutions. Here we need only outline the general political situation which the Congress had to analyse. Two alternative courses and outcomes are open to the Russian revolution, which has begun. The tsarist government may yet succeed by means of trivial concessions and a "Shipov" constitution in extricating itself from the vice in which it is now caught. There is little likelihood of such an outcome; but should the international position of the autocracy improve as the result, let us say, of a relatively favourable peace, should the betrayal by the bourgeoisie of the cause of freedom be brought quickly to a head by a compromise with the powers that be, should the inevitable revolutionary outbreak or outbreaks end in the defeat of the people, then such an outcome is likely. We Social-Democrats and the entire class-conscious proletariat must then face a long dreary period of harsh, ostensibly constitutional class rule of the bourgeoisie, with all manner of suppression of the political activity of the workers and slow economic progress under the new conditions. We shall not lose heart, of course, whatever the outcome of the revolution; we will take advantage of every change in conditions to widen and strengthen the independent organisation of the working-class party, to train the proletariat politically for renewed struggle. The Congress took this task, among others, into account in its resolution on open action by the R.S.D.L.P.

The other possible and more probable outcome of the revolution is the "complete victory of democracy, headed by the working class", of which the "Report" speaks.* We need hardly say that we will do all in our power to achieve this result, to eliminate the possibility of the other alternative. The objective historical conditions, too, are shaping themselves favourably for the Russian revolution. The senseless and shameful war is tightening the noose round the neck of the tsarist government and creating an exceptionally favourable situation for the revolutionary destruction of militarism, for the widespread propaganda of the idea of arming the people in lieu of standing armies and for the speedy

* See p. 438 of this volume.—*Ed.*

effectuation of this measure, in view of its support by the masses of the population. The long and undivided rule of the autocracy has stored up revolutionary energy among the people to a degree perhaps never before known in history. Simultaneously with the vast movement of the working class, the peasant revolt is spreading and growing, and the petty-bourgeois democratic forces, consisting mostly of the professional classes, are coming into alliance. The irony of history has punished the autocracy in that even friendly social forces, such as clericalism, must organise against it to some extent, thereby breaking down or widening the framework of the bureaucratic police regime. Discontent among the clergy, the striving among them after new forms of life, the emergence of clericals as a separate group, the appearance of Christian Socialists and Christian Democrats, the resentment of the "heterodox", sectarians, etc.—this all serves the purpose of the revolution and creates exceedingly favourable conditions for agitation for the complete separation of the Church from the State. The allies of the revolution, voluntary and involuntary, conscious and unconscious, are growing and multiplying hour by hour. The outlook brightens for the victory of the people over the autocracy.

This victory is possible only through a heroic effort of all the forces of the proletariat. It makes demands of Social-Democracy such as history has never before and nowhere made of a working-class party in an epoch of democratic revolution. We have before us now, not the well-trodden paths of slow preparatory work, but the colossal, grandiose tasks of organising the insurrection, mustering the revolutionary forces of the proletariat, uniting them with the forces of the whole revolutionary people, launching the armed attack, and establishing a provisional revolutionary government. In the resolutions which have now been published for general information, the Third Congress has sought to take into account these new tasks and give all possible directives to the organisations of the class-conscious proletariat.

Russia is nearing the denouement of the age-long struggle of all the progressive popular forces against the autocracy. No one doubts any longer that the proletariat will take the most energetic part in this struggle and that its participation in the struggle will decide the outcome of the revolution in

Russia. We Social-Democrats will now have to prove ourselves worthy representatives and leaders of the most revolutionary class, to help it win the fullest freedom, which is, the pledge of our victorious march towards socialism.

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VICTORIOUS REVOLUTION

We often hear and read these words nowadays. What do they actually mean? We should not idolise the concept of "revolution" (the bourgeois revolutionaries will assuredly do that and are indeed doing that). We must not create illusions or myths for ourselves; this would be entirely incompatible with the materialist conception of history and the class point of view.

Yet there is no question that a struggle of two forces is taking place before our eyes, a life-and-death struggle of precisely two forces; for the issue at stake now is the sovereignty of the tsar versus the sovereignty of the people. These two forces are: revolution and counter-revolution.

Our task, therefore, is to be quite clear in our minds as to (1) the class content of these social forces, and (2) the real economic content of their struggle now, at the present time.

The following may be taken as a brief answer to these questions (an answer that requires to be thoroughly elaborated):

Revolutionary forces = proletariat and peasantry (the peasantry as the chief representative of the *revolutionary* petty bourgeoisie; the intelligentsia negligible as a *revolutionary* factor).

Victorious revolution = democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Content of the revolution = the creation of a democratic political system, economically equivalent to (1) free development of capitalism; (2) abolition of the survivals of serfdom; (3) the raising of the living and cultural standards of the masses, especially of the lower strata. [America and Russia, pauperism and capitalism.]

Mythenbildung,* as the inevitable consequence of the historical position of the bourgeois democrats. [Cf. the lawyers' resolutions.[135]] All are "socialists"....

Umwälzung,** *Umsturz****... Where? Among the intelligentsia? Among the lawyers? *N i l*. Only among the proletariat and the *p e a s a n t r y*. What can guarantee their conquests? Only the republic, the democratic dictatorship.

Written in May-June 1905

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Published according to the manuscript

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* Myth-making.—*Ed.*
** Revolution, upheaval.—*Ed.*
*** Overthrow.—*Ed.*

ON CONFOUNDING POLITICS WITH PEDAGOGICS

We have quite a few Social-Democrats who give way to pessimism every time the workers suffer a reverse in single battles with the capitalists or with the government, and who scornfully dismiss all mention of the great and lofty aims of the working-class movement by pointing to the inadequate degree of our influence on the masses. Who and what are we, they say, to strive towards such things? It is purposeless to speak of the role of Social-Democracy as vanguard of the revolution when we do not even really know the mood of the masses, when we are unable to merge with them and to rouse the working masses! The reverses suffered by the Social-Democrats last May Day have considerably intensified this mood. Naturally, the Mensheviks, or new-Iskrists, have seized this opening to raise anew the special slogan "To the masses!"—as if in spite, as if in answer to those who have thought and spoken of the provisional revolutionary government, of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, etc.

It must be admitted that in this pessimism, and in the conclusions which the hasty publicists of the new *Iskra* draw from it, there is one very dangerous feature that may cause great harm to the Social-Democratic movement. To be sure, self-criticism is vitally essential to every live and virile party. There is nothing more disgusting than smug optimism. There is nothing more warranted than the urging of attention to the constant, imperative necessity of deepening and broadening, broadening and deepening, our influence on the masses, our strictly Marxist propaganda and agitation, our ever-closer connection with the economic struggle of the working class, etc. Yet, because such urging is at all times

warranted, under all conditions and in all situations, it must not be turned into special slogans, nor should it justify attempts to build upon it a special trend in Social-Democracy. A border-line exists here; to exceed the bounds is to turn this indisputably legitimate urging into a narrowing of the aims and the scope of the movement, into a doctrinaire blindness to the vital and cardinal political tasks of the moment.

It is our duty always to intensify and broaden our work and influence among the masses. A Social-Democrat who does not do this is no Social-Democrat. No branch, group, or circle can be considered a Social-Democratic organisation if it does not work to this end steadily and regularly. To a great extent, the purpose of our strict separation as a distinct and independent party of the proletariat consists in the fact that we always and undeviatingly conduct this Marxist work of raising the whole working class, as far as possible, to the level of Social-Democratic consciousness, allowing no political gales, still less political changes of scenery, to turn us away from this urgent task. Without this work, political activity would inevitably degenerate into a game, because this activity acquires real importance for the proletariat only when and insofar as it arouses the mass of a definite class, wins its interest, and mobilises it to take an active, foremost part in events. This work, as we have said, is always necessary. After every reverse we should bring this to mind again, and emphasise it, for weakness in this work is *always* one of the causes of the proletariat's defeat. Similarly, we should always call attention to it and emphasise its importance after every victory, otherwise the victory will be only a seeming one, its fruits will not be assured, its real significance in the great struggle for our ultimate goal will be negligible and may even prove adverse (particularly if a partial victory should slacken our vigilance, lull our distrust of unreliable allies, and cause us to forgo the right moment for a renewed and more vigorous attack on the enemy).

But for the very reason that the work of intensifying and broadening our influence on the masses is always necessary, after each victory as after each defeat, in times of political quiescence as in the stormiest periods of revolution, we should

not turn the emphasis upon this work into a special slogan or build upon it any special trend if we do not wish to court the risk of descending to demagogy and degrading the aims of the advanced and only truly revolutionary class. There is and always will be an element of pedagogics in the political activity of the Social-Democratic Party. We must educate the whole class of wage-workers to the role of fighters for the emancipation of mankind from all oppression. We must constantly teach more and more sections of this class; we must learn to approach the most backward, the most undeveloped members of this class, those who are least influenced by our science and the science of life, so as to be able to speak to them, to draw closer to them, to raise them steadily and patiently to the level of Social-Democratic consciousness, without making a dry dogma out of our doctrine—to teach them not only from books, but through participation in the daily struggle for existence of these backward and undeveloped strata of the proletariat. There is, we repeat, a certain element of pedagogics in this everyday activity. The Social-Democrat who lost sight of this activity would cease to be a Social-Democrat. That is true. But some of us often forget, these days, that a Social-Democrat who would reduce the tasks of politics to pedagogics would also, though for a different reason, cease to be a Social-Democrat. Whosoever might think of turning this "pedagogics" into a special slogan, of *contraposing* it to "politics", of building a special trend upon it, and of appealing to the masses under this slogan against the "politicians" of Social-Democracy, would instantly and unavoidably descend to demagogy.

That comparisons are odious is an old axiom. In every comparison a likeness is drawn in regard to only one aspect or several aspects of the objects or notions compared, while the other aspects are tentatively and with reservation abstracted. Let us remind the reader of this commonly known but frequently ignored axiom and proceed to compare the Social-Democratic Party to a large school which is at once elementary, secondary, and collegiate. The teaching of the ABC, instruction in the rudiments of knowledge and in independent thinking, will never, under any circumstances, be neglected in this big school. But if anyone sought to invoke the need for teaching the ABC as a pretext for dis-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

missing questions of higher learning, if anyone attempted to offset the impermanent, dubious, and "narrow" results of this higher learning (accessible to a much smaller circle of people than those learning the ABC) to the durable, profound, extensive, and solid results of the elementary school, he would betray incredible short-sightedness. He might even help to pervert the whole purpose of the big school, since by ignoring higher education he would simply be making it easier for charlatans, demagogues, and reactionaries to mislead the people who had only learned the ABC. Or again, let us compare the Party to an army. Neither in peace-time nor in war-time dare we neglect the training of recruits, dare we neglect rifle drill, or the dissemination of the rudiments of military science as intensively and extensively as possible among the masses. But if those directing the manoeuvres or actual battles....*

Written in June 1905

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Published according to the manuscript

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* Hero the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

A LETTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Geneva, June 2, 1905

To the International Socialist Bureau

Dear Comrades,

A few weeks ago the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party held its Third Congress. French and German translations of the Congress resolutions will appear shortly in a special pamphlet,[136] which will be forwarded to the Bureau. By decision of the Congress, *Iskra* has ceased to be the Central Organ of the Party. Henceforth, the weekly, *Proletary*[137] published in Geneva, will be the Central Organ.

The Central Committee, which is, according to the new Rules, the sole central body of our Party, will appoint the Party's representative on the International Bureau. Please address all future communications to Comrade Ulyanov, Representative of the Central Committee, 3, Rue de la Colline, Genève.

Accept, dear comrades, our fraternal greetings.

For the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

N. Lenin (*V. Ulyanov*)

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as a hectographed leaflet

Published according to
the text of
the hectographed leaflet

THE ADVICE OF THE CONSERVATIVE BOURGEOISIE

The Second Congress of the Zemstvo representatives was held in Moscow a few weeks ago. Russian newspapers are not allowed to print a word about it. The English newspapers report numerous details received from eyewitnesses who attended the Congress and who telegraphed, not only its decisions, but the substance of the speeches made by the representatives of the various shadings. The decisions of the 132 Zemstvo representatives amount in their essence to an acceptance of the constitutional programme published by Mr. Struve and analysed by us in *Vperyod*, No. 18 ("Political Sophisms").* This programme provides for a bicameral popular legislature and the retention of the monarchy. The Upper House is to consist of deputies from the Zemstvos and the municipal councils, the Lower is to be elected on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Our legal newspapers, forced to keep silent about the Congress, have begun to publish details of the programme, which makes it all the more important now to analyse it.

As regards the Congress, we shall probably have occasion more than once to return to it. For the time being we shall recount, on the authority of the English newspapers, a particularly interesting event at this Congress, namely, the disagreement, or split, between the "liberal", or opportunist or Shipov, party and the "radical" party. The disagreement arose over the question of universal suffrage, to which the former party is opposed. On Sunday, May 7 (April 24), it transpired that 52 members of the Congress backed Shipov and were ready to walk out if the Congress declared for

* See pp. 425-32 of this volume.—*Ed.*

universal suffrage. On Monday a score among them voted with the majority for universal suffrage. Thereupon a resolution on the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage was adopted unanimously, a considerable majority declaring for direct elections and for the non-admission (to the Constituent Assembly) of representatives of the municipal councils and Zemstvos. Thus, *for the time being*, the followers of Shipov have been defeated at the Congress of the Zemstvo representatives. The majority has come to the conclusion that the only way to preserve the monarchy and prevent revolution is to grant universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, rendered innocuous through indirect and unequal elections to one of the two houses.

The opinion of the English conservative bourgeoisie on this Congress and on this decision is most instructive. "It is quite impossible," writes *The Times*, "for foreigners to gauge the political importance of this remarkable meeting until we learn from trustworthy authority what measure of support it commands amongst the huge mass of the Russian people. It may mark the beginning of a real constitutional reform; it may be the first stage on the road to revolution; it may be a mere fire of straw which the bureaucracy have tolerated because they know it will burn harmlessly out."

A remarkably true characterisation! Indeed, the further course of the Russian revolution is far from being determined by an event like this Congress. "The support of the huge mass of the people" is still a moot question, not as regards the actual fact of the people's support (which is assured), but rather as regards the strength of this support. If the government puts down the uprising, then the liberal Congress will indeed have been a fire of straw. And the moderate European liberals, of course, advise the golden mean: a moderate constitution which would stave off the revolution. The government's confusion, however, fills them with dismay and discontent. The ban on publishing the decisions of the Congress puzzles *The Times*, since the delegates, now dispersed to their home districts, have every means of informing the entire Russian public of their decisions. "To have refused to allow the Congress to meet, to have arrested its members when they did meet, or to have used them as a screen

for a sham reform would all have been intelligible courses. But to let them meet and disperse, and then to try and silence them is merely inept."

The stupidity of the tsarist government, as proved by its confusion and impotence (for confusion at a revolutionary moment is a sure sign of impotence), fills European capital with grave concern (*The Times* is a mouthpiece of "the City", the high financiers of the world's richest city). This confusion increases the probability of a real, victorious revolution sweeping everything in its path, a revolution that strikes terror into the hearts of the European bourgeoisie. The latter blames the autocracy for losing its head and the liberals for making "immoderate" demands! Upon the question (universal suffrage) "which the ... most experienced Legislatures in Europe would hesitate to decide in the course of a prolonged session [fumes *The Times*]—they seem to have practically reversed their attitude in five short days" and adopted extremist decisions. European capital advises Russian capital to follow its example. We do not doubt that this advice will be taken—but hardly before the autocracy has had its power *curtailed*. The European bourgeoisie in its day fought against absolutism still more "immoderately", by still more revolutionary methods than the Russian bourgeoisie does in its day. The "obduracy" of the-Russian autocracy and the immoderacy of Russian liberalism are due, not to their inexperience, as *The Times* seems to imply, but to factors beyond their control—the international situation, foreign policy, and most of all to that heritage of Russian history which has driven the autocracy to the wall and piled up under its dominance contradictions and conflicts never known in Western Europe. The proverbial stability and strength of Russian tsarism in the past necessarily condition the force of the revolutionary assault upon it. This is most unpleasant to all gradualists and opportunists; it terrifies even many Social-Democrats from the tail-ender camp, but such is the fact.

The Times deplores the defeat of Shipov. Why, only last November he was the undisputed chief of the reform party and now ... "so rapidly does revolution devour its children". Poor Shipov! To suffer defeat and be branded as the evil genius of the revolution—could fate be more unjust? The

"radicals" who voted Shipov down at the Congress of the Zemstvo representatives shock *The Times*, which cries in horror that they adhere to the theoretical principles of the French Convention. The doctrine of equality, of equal rights for all citizens, of the sovereignty of the people, etc., "has been proved by many ... experiments to be, perhaps, the most prolific of evil amongst all the brood of disastrous sophistries which Jean Jacques Rousseau bequeathed to mankind. It is the tap-root of Jacobinism, fatal by its mere presence to the growth of just and wholesome reforms."

The opportunists of liberalism touchingly embrace with the opportunists of Social-Democracy in their partiality for employing the bogy of "Jacobinism". In an epoch of democratic revolution only hopeless reactionaries or hopeless philistines can raise the bogy of Jacobinism.

Proletary, No. 2,
June 3 (May 21), 1905

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ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Published on June 3 and 9
(May 21 and 27), 1905
in the newspaper *Proletary*,
Nos. 2 and 3

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ARTICLE ONE

PLEKHANOV'S REFERENCE TO HISTORY

The Third Congress of the Party adopted a resolution on the question of the provisional revolutionary government. The resolution expresses the position we have taken in *Vperyod*. We now propose to examine in detail all objections to our position and to clarify from all points of consideration the true doctrinal significance and the practical implications of the Congress resolution. We shall begin with Plekhanov's attempt to deal with the question strictly as a point of principle. Plekhanov entitled his article "On the Question of the Seizure of Power". He criticises the "tactics aimed [evidently by *Vperyod*] at the seizure of political power by the proletariat". As everyone who knows *Vperyod* is perfectly well aware, it has never raised the question of the *seizure of power* nor ever aimed at any "tactics of seizure". Plekhanov seeks to substitute a fictitious issue for the real issue. We have only to recollect the course of the controversy to see this.

The question was first raised by Martynov in his famous *Two Dictatorships*. He stated that if our Party took the lead in the uprising and the uprising were successful, this would inevitably bring about our participation in the provisional revolutionary government, which participation was inadmissible in principle and could only lead to disaster and discredit. *Iskra* defended this view. *Vperyod* contended that, on the contrary, such an outcome was highly desirable, that Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government, which would be tantamount to the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, was permissible, and that without such a dictatorship the republic could not be maintained. Thus, in answering

the question *posed by Martynov*, both camps to the dispute proceeded from two like premises but reached different conclusions. Both assumed: 1) that the party of the proletariat would take the lead in the uprising, and 2) that the uprising would be victorious and the autocracy completely overthrown; they differed in the evaluation of the tactical conclusions to be drawn from these premises. Does this bear any resemblance to "tactics aimed [!] at the seizure [?] of power"? Is it not obvious that Plekhanov seeks to *evade* Martynov's presentation of the question discussed by *Iskra* and *Vperyod*? At issue was the question whether a victorious uprising would be dangerous or disastrous, since it might necessitate participation in a provisional revolutionary government. The point that Plekhanov wants to argue is whether the tactics should be aimed at seizure of power. We are afraid that Plekhanov's wish (which can only be understood as a desire to obscure Martynov's presentation of the question) will remain a pious wish, since this is a subject that no one has discussed or is arguing.

What this substitution of the question signifies for the whole of Plekhanov's argumentation is clearly revealed in the "virtuosi-of-philistinism" incident. Plekhanov cannot get over this expression, which was used by *Vperyod*. He reverts to it time and again, sternly and angrily assuring his readers that *Vperyod* has dared to apply this none too flattering epithet to Marx and Engels, that *Vperyod* was beginning to "*criticise*" Marx, etc., etc. Seeing that Plekhanov's aim was to rehabilitate Martynov and to give *Vperyod* a "dressing down", we quite understand how pleased he would have been had *Vperyod* said anything like the nonsense he attributes to it. The point is that "*Vperyod*" *did not say anything of the kind*, and any attentive reader could easily challenge Plekhanov, who has confused an interesting question of principle by meaningless and paltry cavil.

Tedious though it is to answer cavils, the notorious "virtuosi-of-philistinism" incident will have to be explained at length. *Vperyod* reasoned as follows. We all talk of achieving the republic. To achieve it in reality, we must "strike together" at the autocracy—"we" being the revolutionary people, the proletariat and the peasantry. But that is not all. It is not enough even to "strike the finishing blow together"

at the autocracy, that is, completely to overthrow the autocratic government. We shall also have to "repulse together" the inevitable desperate attempts to restore the deposed autocracy. In a revolutionary epoch this "repulsing together" is, in effect, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, the participation of the proletariat in the revolutionary government. Therefore, they who seek to *frighten* the working class with the perspective of such a dictatorship, as people like Martynov and L. Martov have done in the new *Iskra*, contradict their own slogan of struggling for the republic and consummating the revolution. At bottom, these people reason as if they wanted to restrict, to prune down their struggle for freedom—in a word, to measure off in advance the tiniest of modest gains, some sort of skimpy constitution in place of the republic. Such people, said *Vperyod*, vulgarise, philistine fashion, the well-known Marxist thesis concerning the three major forces of the revolution in the nineteenth (and the twentieth) century and its three main stages. The gist of this thesis is that the first stage of revolution is the restriction of absolutism, which satisfies the bourgeoisie; the second is the attainment of the republic, which satisfies the "people"—the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie at large; the third is the socialist revolution, which alone can satisfy the proletariat. "*That picture, by and large, is correct*", *Vperyod* said. We actually have here an ascent by three different schematic stages, varying according to the classes, which, at best, will accompany us in this ascent. But if we interpret this correct Marxist scheme of three stages to mean that we must measure off in advance, *before any ascent begins*, a very modest part, let us say, not more than one step, if, in keeping with this scheme and before any ascent begins, we sought to "*draw up a plan of action in the revolutionary epoch*", we should be virtuosi of philistinism.

This was *Vperyod*'s line of thought in issue No. 14.* And it was on the concluding italicised words that Plekhanov decided to pick. *Vperyod*, he triumphantly declared, thereby dubs Marx a philistine, because it was in keeping with

* See p. 299 of this volume.—*Ed.*

this scheme that Marx drew up his plan of activity in the revolutionary epoch itself!

The evidence? The evidence is that in 1850, when the revolutionary people of Germany was defeated in the struggle of 1848-49 because it failed to deal the autocracy the finishing blow, when the liberal bourgeoisie had secured a skimpy constitution and passed over to the side of reaction—in a word, when the German democratic-revolutionary movement had only ascended the first step and halted for want of strength to mount higher, ... then Marx said that the next revolutionary ascent would be an ascent to the second step.

You smile, dear reader? Plekhanov's syllogism is in fact somewhat—shall we say, to put it mildly—"dialectic". *Because* Marx, in the corresponding concrete situation of a concrete democratic revolution, said that the ascent to the first step would be followed by the ascent to the second, *therefore* only "critics" of Marx could apply the word philistines to people who, before the first step is ascended, try to scare us with the awful perspective (in the event of an exceptionally well organised and accomplished uprising) of having to leap two steps at once.

No, indeed, it is not a nice thing to "criticise" Marx ... but neither is it nice to cite Marx maladroitly. Martynov was unfortunate in interpreting Marx; Plekhanov was unfortunate in defending Martynov.

Let no hypercritical reader infer from what we have said that we advocate "tactics aimed" at unconditionally leaping over one step, regardless of the correlation of the social forces. No, we advocate no such tactics. We only seek to prevent the proletariat from coming under the influence of people capable of talking of the republic and of carrying through the revolution while at the same time frightening themselves and others with the possibility of having to participate in a democratic dictatorship. We pointed out in *Vperyod*, No. 14, that after the present revolutionary upsurge, reaction would inevitably set in, but that the more freedom we win now and the more ruthlessly we suppress and destroy the counter-revolutionary forces in the epoch of the possible (and desirable) democratic dictatorship, the less will reaction be able to take away from us. We also pointed

out in the same issue that the very question of this dictatorship makes no sense unless one assumes a course of events in which the democratic revolution goes to the length of completely overthrowing absolutism and establishing the republic without stopping midway.

Let us now pass from the "virtuosi-of-philistinism" incident to the substance of the famous Address (of the Central Committee of the Communist League to the League members, March 1850) which Plekhanov cites. In this extremely interesting and informative Address (deserving to be translated fully into Russian) Marx deals with the concrete political situation in Germany in 1850. He indicates the likelihood of another political outbreak, establishes the inevitability of the transition of power to the republican, petty-bourgeois democratic party in the event of a revolution, and analyses the tactics of the proletariat. Dealing with the tactics before and during the revolution, and following the victory of the petty-bourgeois democrats, Marx urges the necessity of creating "an independent secret and open organisation of the workers' party"; he struggles with might and main against "its reduction to the role of appendage of the official bourgeois-democratic party"; and he stresses the importance of arming the workers, of forming an independent proletarian guard, and of having the proletarians keep a close watch on the treacherous petty-bourgeois democracy, etc.

There is not a word in the Address on the participation of the workers' party in a provisional revolutionary government, or on the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. From that Plekhanov infers that Marx "apparently regarded as inconceivable the idea that the political representatives of the revolutionary proletariat could work together with those of the petty bourgeoisie to create a new social order". The logic of this deduction limps. Marx *does not raise* the question of the participation of the workers' party in a provisional revolutionary government, but Plekhanov concludes that Marx decides this question generally and in principle in a definitely negative sense. Marx speaks only of the concrete situation; Plekhanov draws a general conclusion without at all considering the question in its concreteness. Yet one has only to scan some passages in the Address which Plekhanov

has omitted to see that his conclusions are entirely false.

The Address was written from the experience of two years in a revolutionary epoch, 1848 and 1849. Marx formulates the results of this experience as follows: "At the same time [i.e., in 1848-49] the former firm organisation of the League was considerably slackened. A large part of the members who directly participated in the revolutionary movement believed the time for secret societies to have gone by and public activities alone sufficient. The individual districts and communities [*Gemeinden*] allowed their connections with the Central Committee to become loose and gradually dormant. *Consequently, while the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, organised itself more and more in Germany, the workers' party lost its only firm hold*, remained organised at the most in separate localities for local purposes, and *in the general movement thus came completely under the domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats*."* On the following page of the Address Marx declares: "At this moment, when a new revolution is imminent ... it is extremely important that the workers' party ... act in the most organised, most unanimous, and most independent fashion possible, if it is not to be exploited and taken in tow again by the bourgeoisie as it was in 1848."

Consider the meaning of these categorical statements! After two years of open revolution, after the victory of the popular uprising in Berlin, after the convocation of a revolutionary parliament, after part of the country had been in open revolt and the power had passed temporarily into the hands of the revolutionary governments, Marx records the defeat of the revolutionary people, and as regards party organisation, a *gain* for the petty-bourgeois democrats and a loss for the workers' party. Is it not as plain as plain can be that this implies a political situation in which it would

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* *Ansprache der Zentralbehörde an den Bund, von März 1850, K. Marx: Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprocess zu Köln*, 1885, Anhang IX, S. 75. (*Address of the Central Committee to the League*, March 1850, K. Marx: *Revelations Concerning the Cologne Trials of the Communists*, 1885, Appendix IX p. 75.—*Ed.*) The italics in the quotation are ours.

have been pointless to raise the question of the participation of the workers' party in the government? After two years of a revolutionary epoch, when Marx, for nine months, had openly published the most revolutionary newspaper of the workers' party, it had to be recorded that the party was completely disorganised, that there was no clearly marked proletarian current in the mainstream (Stephan Born's[138] Workers' Brotherhoods were too negligible), and that the proletariat had fallen completely, not only under the domination of the bourgeoisie, but under its leadership! Obviously, economic relations were still extremely undeveloped, there was practically no large-scale industry, nor was there an independent workers' movement of any appreciable size, and the petty bourgeoisie was in complete control. Naturally, under such circumstances, the idea of participation by the workers' party in a provisional government could never be entertained by a writer who was dealing with the concrete situation. Naturally, in his Address, Marx had to knock (pardon the expression) into the heads of the Communist League members axioms, which today seem elementary to us. He had to demonstrate the need for workers to nominate their own candidates in elections independently of the bourgeois democrats. He had to refute the democratic phrase-mongering to the effect that the workers' separation would "split" the democratic party (mark well!—you can only split what was yesterday united and what in the ideological sense is still united). Marx had to *warn* the members of the Communist League not to be carried away by such phrases. On behalf of the Central Committee of the League, he had to promise to convene a congress of the workers' party at the first opportunity with the object of centralising the workers' clubs; in the revolutionary years of 1848-49 the conditions were still lacking for anyone to entertain the idea of convening a separate congress of the workers' party.

The conclusion is obvious: Marx, in the famous Address, does not even mention the question whether it is admissible in principle for the proletariat to participate in a provisional revolutionary government. He deals exclusively with the concrete situation that prevailed in Germany in 1850. He does not say a word about the participation of the Communist

League in a revolutionary government, because, under the conditions then prevailing, the idea of such participation in the name of the workers' party for the purpose of the democratic dictatorship could not have arisen.

Marx's idea consists in the following: We, the German Social-Democrats of 1850, are unorganised, we were defeated in the first period of the revolution and were taken completely in tow by the bourgeoisie; we must organise independently—absolutely and under all circumstances independently—if we do not wish to be caught lagging again in an eventual victory of the organisationally strengthened and powerful petty-bourgeois party.

Martynov's idea consists in the following: We, the Russian Social-Democrats of 1905, are organised in an independent party and we want to march at the head of the petty-bourgeois people for the first assault on the fortress of tsarism. But if we organise the assault too efficiently and carry it through successfully—which heaven forfend!—we may have to participate in a provisional revolutionary government, or even in the democratic dictatorship. Such participation is inadmissible in principle.

Does Plekhanov seriously want to convince us that Martynov can be defended according to Marx? Plekhanov must take the readers of *Iskra* for children. All we can say is: Marxism is one thing; Martynovism, another.

Before concluding with the Address we must clarify another incorrect view of Plekhanov. He rightly points out that in March 1850, when the Address was written, Marx believed that capitalism was in a state of senile decay and the socialist revolution seemed to him "quite near". Shortly afterwards Marx corrected this mistake; as early as September 15, 1850, he broke with Schapper (Schapper found himself with Willich in a minority in the League and resigned from it), who had succumbed to bourgeois-democratic revolutionism or utopianism to the extent of saying, "We must achieve power at once, otherwise we may as well go to sleep." Marx answered that it was incorrect to regard solely one's own will, instead of the actual conditions, as the motive force of the revolution. The proletariat might still have

to face fifteen, twenty, or fifty years of civil wars and international conflicts "not only to change the conditions, but to change yourselves [the proletarians] and to render yourselves fit for political rule".[139] Plekhanov briefly mentions this change in Marx's views and concludes:

"They [Marx and Engels after this "change"] would have formulated the political tasks of the proletariat on the assumption that the democratic system had come to stay for a fairly long time. *But for that very reason they would have all the more emphatically condemned the participation of socialists in a petty-bourgeois government.*" (*Iskra*, No. 96.)

Plekhanov's inference is entirely false. It brings us back to the confusion of socialist dictatorship and democratic dictatorship for which we have so often had occasion to criticise L. Martov and Martynov. Marx and Engels in 1850 did not differentiate between democratic dictatorship and socialist dictatorship, or, rather, they did not mention the former at all, since they considered capitalism to be in a state of senile decay and socialism near. Nor did they, for the same reason, differentiate at the time between a minimum and a maximum programme. If this distinction is to be made (as it is being made now by all of us, Marxists, who are combating the bourgeois-democratic revolutionariness of the "Socialists-Revolutionaries", because they do not understand the distinction), then the question of the socialist and the democratic dictatorship must be dealt with *separately*. In not so doing, Plekhanov is guilty of inconsistency. By choosing an evasive formulation and speaking in general terms of "the participation of socialists in a petty-bourgeois government", he substitutes the question of the socialist dictatorship for the clearly, definitely and precisely presented question of the democratic dictatorship. He confounds (to cite the comparison of *Vperyod**) the participation of Millerand in a Cabinet together with Galliffet in the epoch immediately preceding the socialist revolution with that of Varlin in a revolutionary government together with petty-bourgeois democrats who defended and safeguarded the republic.

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* See p. 282 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Marx and Engels considered socialism near in 1850; hence, they underestimated the democratic gains, which seemed to them to be well established in view of the unquestionable victory of the petty-bourgeois democratic party.[140] Twenty-five years later, in 1875, Marx drew attention to the undemocratic system in Germany—"military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms".[141] Thirty-five years later, in 1885, Engels predicted that in the coming European upheaval the power in Germany would pass to the petty-bourgeois democrats.[142] What follows from this is the very reverse of what Plekhanov seeks to prove. If Marx and Engels had realised that the democratic system was bound to last for a fairly long time, they would have attached *all the more* importance to the *democratic* dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry with the object of consolidating the republic, of completely eradicating all survivals of absolutism, and of clearing the arena for the battle for socialism. They would *all the more* strongly have condemned the tail-enders, who, on the eve of the democratic revolution, were capable of *frightening* the proletariat with the *possibility* of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.

Plekhanov is aware of the weakness of his position, which is based on a misinterpretation of the Address. He therefore makes the discreet reservation that his reference to history does not claim to exhaust the subject, although he draws "exhaustively" categorical conclusions based on nothing beyond a reference which has no bearing on the matter, with no attempt even to examine the question posed concretely by *Vperyod*. Plekhanov seeks to impute to *Vperyod* both the desire to "criticise" Marx and the point of view of Mach and Avenarius. The attempt but makes us smile. Plekhanov's position must be weak indeed if he can find no target for his darts among *Vperyod*'s actual assertions but needs must contrive a target from subjects as foreign to *Vperyod* as to the point in question. Finally, Plekhanov produces another piece of evidence, which he thinks "incontrovertible". Actually, this evidence (a letter of Engels to Turati written in 1894) is worse than useless.

From Plekhanov's version of this letter (unfortunately he does not quote it in full and does not say whether it was published and where), it appears that Engels *had to demon-*

strate to Turati the difference *between a socialist and a petty-bourgeois* revolution. No more need be said, Comrade Plekhanov! Turati is an Italian Millerand, a Bernsteinian, whom Giolitti had offered a portfolio in his Cabinet. Turati evidently *confounded* two revolutions of an entirely different class content. He imagined he would be furthering the interests of proletarian rule; but Engels explained to him that in the given situation in Italy in 1894 (i.e., several decades *after* Italy's ascent to the "first step", after the conquest of political freedom, which enabled the proletariat to organise openly, widely, and independently!), he, Turati, in a Cabinet of the victorious petty-bourgeois party, would actually be defending and promoting the interests of an *alien class*, the petty bourgeoisie. What we have here, consequently, is a case of Millerandism. It was against this confounding of Millerandism with the democratic dictatorship that *Vperyod* spoke out; but Plekhanov made no mention whatever of *Vperyod*'s arguments. This is a characteristic instance of the false position against which Engels had long warned the leaders of the extreme parties, that is, a position in which they fail to grasp the true nature of the revolution and unconsciously further the interests of an "alien" class. In the name of all that is sacred, Comrade Plekhanov, what on earth has this to do with the question raised by Martynov and analysed by *Vperyod*? If there is the danger that people who have risen to the first step may confound the second step with the third, can this danger serve as justification for frightening us, as we are about to mount the first step, with the perspective of possibly having to take two at once?

No, Plekhanov's "brief reference to history" proves precisely nothing. His basic conclusion that "to participate in a revolutionary government together with representatives of the petty bourgeoisie would be a betrayal of the proletariat" is not in the least corroborated by references to the situation in Germany in 1850 or in Italy in 1894, which were radically different from the situation in Russia in January and May 1905. These references add nothing to the question of the democratic dictatorship and of the provisional revolutionary government. And if Plekhanov should want to apply his conclusion to *this* question, if he considers *every* participation of the proletariat in a revolutionary government

in the course of the struggle for the republic, in the course of the democratic revolution, *inadmissible in principle*, we undertake to prove to him that this is an anarchistic "principle" unequivocally condemned by Engels. We shall demonstrate this point in our next article.

ARTICLE TWO

ONLY FROM BELOW, OR FROM ABOVE AS WELL AS FROM BELOW?

In our previous article analysing Plekhanov's reference to history we showed that he draws unwarranted general conclusions on points of principle from statements by Marx, which apply wholly and exclusively to the concrete situation in Germany in 1850. That concrete situation fully explains why Marx did not raise, and at that time could not have raised, the question of the Communist League's participation in a provisional revolutionary government. We shall now proceed to examine the general, fundamental question of the admissibility of such participation.

In the first place, the question at issue must be accurately presented. In this respect, fortunately, we are able to use a formulation given by our opponents and thus avoid arguments on the essence of the dispute. *Iskra*, No. 93, says: "The best way towards achieving such organisation [the organisation of the proletariat into a party in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic state] is to develop the bourgeois revolution *from below* [*Iskra*'s italics] through the pressure of the proletariat on the democrats in power." *Iskra* goes on to say that *Vperyod* "wants this pressure of the proletariat on the revolution to proceed not only 'from below', not only from the street, but also from above, from the marble halls of the provisional government".

The issue is thus clearly stated. *Iskra* wants pressure from below, *Vperyod* wants it "from above as well as from below". Pressure from below is pressure by the citizens on the revolutionary government. Pressure from above is pressure by the revolutionary government on the citizens. Some *limit* their activity to pressure from below; others do not agree with such a limitation and demand that pressure from

below be *supplemented* by pressure from above. The issue, consequently, reduces itself to the question contained in our subtitle: only from below, or from above as well as from below? Some consider it wrong in principle for the proletariat, in the epoch of the democratic revolution, to exert pressure from above, "from the marble halls of the provisional government". Others consider it wrong in principle for the proletariat, in the epoch of the democratic revolution, to reject entirely pressure from above, to renounce participation in the provisional revolutionary government. Thus, the question is not whether pressure from above is probable in a given situation, or whether it is practicable under a given alignment of forces. We are for the moment not considering any concrete situation, and in view of the numerous attempts to substitute one question at issue for another, we urgently ask the readers to bear this in mind. We are dealing with the general question of principle, whether in the epoch of the democratic revolution it is *admissible* to pass from pressure from below to pressure from above.

To elucidate this question, let us first refer to the history of the tactical views of the founders of scientific socialism. Were there no disputes in this history over the general question of the admissibility of pressure from above? There was such a dispute. It was caused by the Spanish insurrection of the summer of 1873. Engels assessed the lessons which the socialist proletariat should learn from that insurrection in an article entitled "The Bakuninists at Work", printed in the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Volksstaat*[143] in 1873 and reprinted in the pamphlet *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat* in 1894. Let us see what general conclusions Engels drew.

On February 9, 1873, King Amadeo of Spain abdicated the throne—"the first king to go on strike", as Engels facetiously remarks. On February 12 the republic was proclaimed, soon to be followed by a Carlist revolt in the Basque provinces. April 10 saw the election of a Constituent Assembly which, on June 8, proclaimed the federal republic. On June 11 a new Cabinet was formed by Pi y Margall. In the commission charged with drafting the constitution the extreme republicans, known as the "Intransigentes", were not represented.

And when, on July 3, the new constitution was proclaimed the Intransigentes rose in revolt. Between July 5 and 11 they gained the upper hand in the Seville, Granada, Alcoy, Valencia, and several other provinces. The government of Salmeron, who succeeded Pi y Margall when the latter resigned, sent troops against the rebel provinces. The revolt was suppressed after a more or less stiff resistance. Cádiz fell on July 26, 1873, and Cartagena on January 11, 1874. Such are the brief chronological facts with which Engels introduces his subject.

In evaluating the lessons to be drawn from these events, Engels stresses, first, that the struggle for the republic in Spain was not and could not have been a struggle for the socialist revolution. "Spain," he says, "is such an industrially backward country that there can be no thought of an *immediate* complete emancipation there of the working class of that country. Before it comes to that, Spain will have to pass through various preliminary stages of development and remove a considerable number of obstacles from its path. The republic offered that country the chance of going through those preliminary stages in the shortest possible time and of quickly surmounting the obstacles. But that chance could be utilised only through the active *political* intervention of the Spanish working class. The mass of the workers felt this. They strove everywhere to have a part in the events, to take advantage of the opportunity for action, instead of leaving the owning classes, as heretofore, a clear field for action and intrigues."

It was thus a question of struggle for the republic, a question of the democratic, not of the socialist, revolution. The question of the workers' taking a hand in the events presented itself in a twofold aspect at the time. On the one hand, the Bakuninists (or "Alliancists"—the founders of the "Alliance" for struggle against the Marxist "International") negated political activity, participation in elections, etc. On the other hand, they were against participation in a revolution which did not aim at the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class; they were against participation of whatever kind in a revolutionary government. It is this second aspect of the question that holds special interest for us in the light of our dispute.

It was this aspect, incidentally, which gave rise to the formulation of the difference *in principle* between the two tactical slogans.

"The Bakuninists," says Engels, "had for years been propagating the idea that *all revolutionary action from above was pernicious*, and that *everything must be organised and carried out from below upward*."

Hence, the principle, "only from below" is an *anarchist* principle.

Engels demonstrates the utter absurdity of this principle in the epoch of the democratic revolution. It naturally and inevitably leads to the practical conclusion that the establishment of revolutionary governments is a betrayal of the working class. The Bakuninists drew this very conclusion, which they elevated into a principle, namely, that "*the establishment of a revolutionary government is but a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class*."

We have here, as the reader will see, the same two "principles" which the new *Iskra* has arrived at, namely: (1) that only revolutionary action from below is admissible, as opposed to the tactics of "from above as well as from below"; (2) that participation in a provisional revolutionary government is a betrayal of the working class. Both these new-*Iskra* principles are anarchist principles. The actual course of the struggle for the republic in Spain revealed the utter preposterousness and the utterly reactionary essence of both these principles.

Engels brings this truth home with several episodes from the Spanish revolution. The revolution, for example, breaks out in Alcoy, a manufacturing town of comparatively recent origin with a population of 30,000. The workers' insurrection is victorious despite its leadership by the Bakuninists, who will, in principle, have nothing to do with the idea of organising the revolution. After the event the Bakuninists began to boast that they had become "masters of the situation". And how did these "masters" deal with their "situation", asks Engels. First of all, they established in Alcoy a "Welfare Committee", that is, a revolutionary government. Mind you, it was these selfsame Alliancists (Bakuninists), who, only ten months before the revolution, had

resolved at their Congress, on September 15, 1872, that "every organisation of a political, so-called provisional or revolutionary power can only be a new fraud and would be as dangerous to the proletariat as all existing governments". Rather than refute this anarchist phrase-mongering, Engels confines himself to the sarcastic remark that it was the supporters of this resolution who found themselves "members of this provisional and revolutionary governmental power" in Alcoy. Engels treats these gentlemen with the scorn they deserve for the "utter helplessness, confusion, and passivity" which they revealed when in power. With equal contempt Engels would have answered the charges of "Jacobinism", so dear to the Girondists of Social-Democracy. He shows that in a number of other towns, e.g., in Sanlúcar de Barrameda (a port of 26,000 inhabitants near Cádiz) "the Alliancists ... here too, in opposition to their anarchist principles, formed a revolutionary government". He reproves them for "not having known what to do with their power". Knowing well that the Bakuninist labour leaders participated in provisional governments *together with the Intransigentes*, i.e., together with the republicans, the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, Engels reproves the Bakuninists, not for their participation in the government (as he should have done according to the "principles" of the new *Iskra*), but for their *poor organisation*, *the feebleness of their participation*, their subordination to the leadership of the bourgeois republican gentry. With what withering sarcasm Engels would have flayed those people who, in the epoch of the revolution, try to minimise the importance of "technical" and military leadership, may incidentally be seen from the fact that he reproved the Bakuninist labour leaders for having, as members of the revolutionary government, left the "political and *military* leadership" to the bourgeois republican gentry, while they fed the workers with bombastic phrases and paper schemes of "social" reforms.

A true Jacobin of Social-Democracy, Engels not only appreciated the importance of action from above, he not only viewed participation in a revolutionary government together with the republican bourgeoisie as perfectly legitimate, but he *demanded* such participation, as well as energetic military initiative on the part of the revolutionary power,

considering it his duty to give *practical* and guiding *military* advice.

'Nevertheless," he says, "the uprising, even if begun in a brainless way, would have had a good chance to succeed, *had it been conducted with some intelligence*,* if only in the manner of the Spanish military revolts, in which the garrison of one town rises, marches on to the next, sweeping along with it the town's garrison previously worked on by propaganda, and, growing into an avalanche, the insurgents press on to the capital, until a fortunate engagement, or the crossing over to their side of the troops sent against them, decides the victory. This method was especially applicable in the given situation. The insurgents had long been organised everywhere into volunteer battalions, whose discipline, true, was pitiable, yet assuredly not more pitiable than that of the remnants of the old, largely demoralised Spanish army. The government's only dependable troops were the gendarmes, and these were scattered all over the country. The thing was, above all, to prevent these gendarmes from being drawn together, which could be done only by a bold assumption of the offensive in the open field. Such a course of action would not have involved much danger, since the government could only put up against the volunteers equally undisciplined troops. For anyone bent on winning there was no other way."

That is how a founder of scientific socialism reasoned when faced with the problems of an uprising and direct action in the epoch of a revolutionary upheaval! Although the uprising was begun by the petty-bourgeois republicans and although confronting the proletariat was neither the question of the socialist revolution nor that of elementary political freedom, Engels set very great store on the highly active participation of the workers in the struggle for the republic; he demanded of the proletariat's leaders that they should subordinate their entire activity to the need for

* *Wäre er nur mit einigem Verstand geleitet worden*. Poor Engels! A pity he was not acquainted with the new *Iskra*! He would have known then how disastrous, noxious, utopian, bourgeois, technically one-sided, and conspiratorially narrow is the "Jacobin" idea that an insurrection can be *conducted* (*geleitet werden*)!

achieving victory in the struggle, which had begun. Engels himself, as a leader of the proletariat, even went into the details of military organisation; he was not averse to using the old-fashioned methods of struggle by military revolts when victory demanded it; he attached paramount importance to offensive action and the centralisation of the revolutionary forces. He bitterly reproved the Bakuninists for having made a principle of "what in the German Peasant War and in the German uprisings of May 1849 was an unavoidable evil, namely, *the state of disunion and isolation of the revolutionary forces*, which enabled the same government troops to put down one uprising after another." Engels' views on the conduct of the uprising, on the organisation of the revolution, and on the utilisation of the revolutionary governmental power are as far removed from the tail-ist views of the new *Iskra* as heaven is from earth.

Summarising the lessons of the Spanish revolution, Engels established in the first place that "the Bakuninists, as soon as they were confronted with a serious revolutionary situation, were compelled to give up their whole former programme". To begin with, they had to scrap the principle of abstention from political activity and from elections, the principle of the "abolition of the state". Secondly, "they gave up the principle that the workers must not participate in any revolution that did not aim at the immediate and complete emancipation of the proletariat, and they themselves participated in an avowedly purely bourgeois movement". Thirdly, and this conclusion answers precisely the point in dispute, "they trampled underfoot the article of faith they had only just proclaimed—that the establishment of a revolutionary government is but a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class; they did this, sitting coolly in the government committees of the various towns, almost everywhere as an impotent minority outvoted and politically exploited by the bourgeois". By their inability to lead the uprising, by splitting the revolutionary forces instead of centralising them, by leaving the leadership of the revolution to the bourgeois, and by dissolving the solid and strong organisation of the International, "the Bakuninists in Spain gave us an unsurpassable example of how *not* to make a revolution".

Summing up the foregoing, we arrive at the following conclusions:

1) Limitation, in principle, of revolutionary action to pressure from below and renunciation of pressure also from above is *anarchism*.

2) He who does not understand the new tasks in the epoch of revolution, the tasks of action from above, he who is unable to determine the conditions and the programme for such action, has no idea whatever of the tasks of the proletariat in every democratic revolution.

3) The principle that for Social-Democracy participation in a provisional revolutionary government with the bourgeoisie is inadmissible, that every such participation is a betrayal of the working class, is a principle of *anarchism*.

4) Every "serious revolutionary situation" confronts the party of the proletariat with the task of giving purposive leadership to the uprising, of organising the revolution, of centralising all the revolutionary forces, of boldly launching a military offensive, and of making the most energetic use of the revolutionary governmental power.

5) Marx and Engels could not have approved, and never would have approved, the tactics of the new *Iskra* at the present revolutionary moment; for these tactics are nothing short of a repetition of all the errors enumerated above. Marx and Engels would have called the new *Iskra*'s doctrinal position a contemplation of the "posterior" of the proletariat, a rehash of anarchist errors.

In the next article we shall discuss the tasks of the provisional revolutionary government.[144]

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

DEBACLE

The naval battle in the Korea Strait has captured the attention of the political press the world over. At first the tsarist government tried to conceal the bitter truth from its loyal subjects, but it soon realised the hopelessness of such an attempt. In any case it would have been impossible to conceal the utter rout of the entire Russian navy.

In appraising the political significance of the last naval battle, we can only repeat what we said in *Vperyod*, No. 2,* on the fall of Port Arthur. The complete military debacle of tsarist Russia had become evident by then, but the Baltic squadron still gave the Russian patriots a ray of hope. All realised that the outcome of the war depended on victory at sea. The autocracy understood that an adverse outcome of the war would be tantamount to a victory of the "internal enemy", viz., of the revolution. It, therefore, staked its all. Hundreds of millions of rubles were spent on hastily dispatching the Baltic fleet, motley crews were scraped together, final preparations to get the warships into sea trim were rushed through, and old tubs were added to the new and powerful battle-ships to increase the total number of craft. The great armada—as huge and unwieldy, as absurd, helpless, and monstrous as the whole Russian Empire—put to sea, expending a fortune in coal and maintenance, making itself the laughing-stock of Europe, especially after its brilliant victory over the fishing smacks, and grossly violating all the usages and principles of neutrality. According to the most conservative estimates this armada cost nearly 300,000,000 rubles, besides 100,000,000 rubles on the expedi-

* See pp. 47-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tion. Altogether *400,000,000 rubles* were thrown away on this last war gamble of the tsarist autocracy.

Now this last gamble, too, has failed. Everyone had expected the defeat of the Russian fleet, but no one had thought it would be so crushing. Like a horde of savages, the Russian ships flung themselves headlong upon the Japanese fleet, which was magnificently armed and equipped with the most up-to-date means of defence. After a two-day battle, thirteen of Russia's twenty warships manned by from twelve to fifteen thousand, were sunk or destroyed, four were captured, and only one (the *Almaz*) escaped and reached Vladivostok. More than half the crews were killed or drowned, and Rozhdestvensky "himself" and his right-hand man, Nebogatov, were taken prisoner, while the Japanese fleet came out of the engagement unscathed, except for the loss of three destroyers.

Russia's naval strength has been completely destroyed. The war has been lost irretrievably. The complete expulsion of the Russian troops from Manchuria and the seizure of Sakhalin and Vladivostok by the Japanese are now only a matter of time. We are witnessing, not just a military defeat, but the complete military collapse of the autocracy;

With every new blow struck by the Japanese, the significance of this collapse, as the collapse of the entire political system of tsarism, grows clearer both to Europe and to the whole Russian people. Everything is up in arms against the autocracy: the wounded national pride of the big and petty bourgeoisie, the outraged pride of the army, the bitter feeling over the loss of hundreds of thousands of young lives in a senseless military adventure, the resentment against the embezzlement of hundreds of millions from the public funds, the fears of an inevitable financial collapse and a protracted economic crisis as a result of the war, and the dread of a formidable people's revolution which (in the opinion of the bourgeoisie) the tsar could and should have avoided by means of timely and "reasonable" concessions. The demand for peace is spreading far and wide. The liberal press is indignant. Even the most moderate elements, like the landowners of the "Shipov" trend, are beginning to utter threats, and even the sycophantic *Novoye Vremya* is demanding the immediate convening of representatives of the people.

The European bourgeoisie, that most faithful prop of the tsarist government, is also beginning to lose patience. It is alarmed at the inevitable realignment in international relations, at the growing power of the young and fresh Japan, and the loss of a military ally in Europe. It is disturbed over the fate of the thousands of millions which it has so generously lent to the autocracy. It is seriously perturbed by the revolution in Russia, which is unduly exciting the European proletariat and may lead to a revolutionary conflagration on a world scale. In the name of "friendship" with tsarism it appeals to its common sense, insists on the necessity of peace—peace with Japan, and peace with the liberal Russian bourgeoisie. Europe does not for a moment shut its eyes to the fact that peace with Japan can now be bought only at a very high price; but it figures out in sober and business-like fashion that every extra month of war abroad and of revolution at home is bound to raise the price still higher and increase the danger of a revolutionary explosion that would blow the entire policy of "concessions" away like whiffs of smoke. Europe understands that it is terribly difficult, almost impossible, for the autocracy to call a halt now—it has gone too far for that; and so this bourgeois Europe tries to reassure itself and its ally with roseate dreams.

The following, for example, is from a short article by Cornély entitled "The End of an Epic", which appeared in *Le Siècle*, a newspaper of the patriotic French bourgeoisie: "Now with the Russians beaten at sea after having been defeated on land, it is incumbent upon their government to conclude peace and reorganise its armed forces. Adventurist governments are sometimes compelled, on the strength of their pretensions or by considerations of security, to involve the peoples over which they rule in war. Since they have staked their very existence on a victorious outcome, they demand sacrifice upon sacrifice from their peoples, thus leading them to ultimate disaster. Such was the history of our two empires in France. Such would have been the history of the third empire, if its establishment in our country had met with success.

"Such, on the contrary, is not the position of the Russian Government; this government is deeply rooted among the Russian people, so that common misfortunes do not divide

the government and the people but only cement the bonds between them. A Caesar vanquished is no longer Caesar. An unfortunate tsar may yet remain august and popular."

Alack and alas! The braggadocio of this chauvinistic French shopkeeper is "all too obvious". His assurances that the war has caused no rift between the Russian Government and the people are at such variance with the generally known facts that one can only smile, as at some naïve and innocent ruse. To warn his friend and ally, the Russian autocrat, of the inevitable ruin towards which he, like a true "Caesar", is heading blindly and doggedly, the French bourgeois kindly assures this Caesar that he need not resemble other Caesars, that he has a different, a better way out. We soon believe what we desire. The French bourgeoisie is so desirous of having a powerful ally in the person of the tsar that it comforts itself with the romantic fable that misfortune unites the Russian people with its tsar. M. Cornély does not take this fable seriously himself, and still less should we.

Not only the Caesarian governments were given to adventurism, but also the governments of the most legitimate monarchs of a most ancient dynasty. There has been more adventurism in the Russian autocracy, which is a whole century behind the times, than in any of the French empires. It was sheer adventurism that made the autocracy plunge the people into this senseless and shameful war. Now the autocracy is facing the end it deserves. The war has laid bare all its sores, revealed its rottenness to the core, proved its complete alienation from the people, and destroyed the sole pillars of its Caesarian rule. The war has proved a stern trial. The people have already passed sentence on this government of brigands. The revolution will execute the sentence.

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REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AND LIBERAL BROKERAGE

The rise of political parties is one of the most interesting and characteristic features of our interesting epoch. The old order, the autocracy, is falling to pieces. Increasing sections, not only of so-called "society", i.e., the bourgeoisie, but also of the "people", i.e., the working class and the peasantry, have begun to reflect on the kind of new order that has to be built and on the way to build it. For the class-conscious proletariat these attempts of the various classes to frame a programme and organise the political struggle are of momentous importance. Although these attempts largely originate from individual "figures" responsible to no one and leading no one, and are therefore often fortuitous, arbitrary, and at times bombastic, the basic interests and tendencies of the big social classes, broadly speaking, assert themselves with irresistible force. Out of the seeming chaos of declarations, demands, and platforms there clearly emerge the political physiognomy of our bourgeoisie and its real (not only specious) political programme. The proletariat is obtaining increasingly more material by which to judge how the Russian bourgeoisie, which now talks of political action, is really going to act—what stand it will take in the decisive revolutionary struggle towards which Russia is so rapidly heading.

Valuable material for studying the policy of the bourgeoisie is sometimes offered by *Osvobozhdeniye*, published abroad, which is able to review the numerous public utterances of the Russian liberals without censorship restrictions. The Programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, which this

journal has just published (or reprinted from *Novosti** of April 5) with instructive commentaries by Mr. P. S., is an excellent addendum to the resolutions of the Zemstvo congresses and to the *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals' draft constitution, of which we wrote in *Vperyod*, No. 18.** "The drafting and voting of this programme," as Mr. P. S. justly remarks, "is a big step towards the creation of a Russian Constitutional-Democratic Party."

For the Russian liberals this is unquestionably a big step, which stands out in the long list of liberal activities. Nevertheless, how little this big "step" of the liberals is, as compared with what is needed for building a real party, as compared even with what Social-Democracy has already done to this end. The bourgeoisie has far greater freedom of legal expression than the proletariat, incomparably more intellectual forces and financial means, and far greater facilities for party organisation; yet we still have before us a "party" without an official name, without a common, distinct, and lucid programme, without worked-out tactics, without a party organisation, a "party" which, according to the competent testimony of Mr. P. S., consists of the "Zemstvo group" and the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, i.e., of an unorganised conglomeration of individuals plus an organisation. But perhaps the members of the Zemstvo group are "party members" in the now famous sense that they accept the programme and work "under the control of a party organisation", of a group of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League? Such a conception of party membership is as convenient and suitable to the liberals and as natural a part of the liberal political pattern as it is alien to the whole spirit of Social-Democracy. Such a conception of party (expressed not in written Rules, but in the actual structure of that "party") implies, among other things, that the organised members, i.e., the members of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, stand, in their majority, *for a unicameral system*, while at the same time rejecting it in their programme, passing the whole question over in silence in deference to the unorganised membership, to the "Zemstvo group", which favours a bicameral system. The balance of

* *News.—Ed.*

** See p. 427 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"forces", one might say, is providential for the politically active bourgeoisie. The organised intellectuals propose, and the unorganised businessmen, money-bags, and capitalists dispose.

While heartily welcoming the Programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, Mr. P. S., *in principle*, defends both the vagueness, inadequacy, and incompleteness of the programme and its organisational haziness and silence on tactics—all for reasons of "*Realpolitik*"! We shall revert to this incomparable conception, so singularly characteristic of the essence of bourgeois liberalism, and shall now proceed to examine the basic principles of the liberal programme.

The party, as we have said, has no official designation Mr. P. S. calls it by the name under which, I believe, it goes in the columns of our legal newspapers of the liberal trend, namely, "Constitutional-Democratic Party". Unimportant though the question of name may appear at first glance, here too we immediately find material that explains why the bourgeoisie, unlike the proletariat, *must* content itself with political vagueness and even defend it "in principle"; it "must" do this, not only on account of the subjective moods or qualities of its leaders, but by reason of the objective conditions governing the existence of the bourgeois class as a whole. The name "Constitutional-Democratic Party" immediately calls to mind the well-known adage that speech was given to man in order that he might conceal his thoughts. The name "C.D.P." was invented to conceal the *monarchist* nature of the party. Indeed, who does not know that this entire party, in the person both of its master section, the Zemstvo group, and of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, stands for the monarchy? Neither section so much as mentions the question of the republic, which they consider "idle talk", while their draft constitution bluntly and unequivocally accepts the monarchy as the form of government. We have therefore to do with a party that advocates a constitutional monarchy, a party of constitutional monarchists. This is a fact of which there is not the slightest doubt and which cannot be dismissed by any arguments about acceptance "in principle" of the idea of a republic (though we have heard no such arguments yet from the "Constitutional-Democrats"!), since the issue is not acceptance of the

republic purely "in principle", but acceptance in practical politics, acceptance of the will to achieve the republic and of the necessity to struggle for it.

The fact is that the bourgeois gentlemen *cannot* call themselves by their real name yet, any more than they can go out into the street naked. They cannot tell the truth openly; they cannot *aussprechen was ist* (speak out the truth), for that would mean admitting one of the most outrageous and pernicious of political privileges, it would mean admitting their *anti*-democratism. No bourgeoisie in struggle for political liberty can admit this, and not only because it would be disgraceful, scandalous, and indecent. Nothing is too indecent for bourgeois politicians where their interests are concerned. But their *interests* at the moment demand liberty, and liberty cannot be won *without the people*, and the backing of the people cannot be secured unless one calls oneself a "democrat" (=an adherent of the rule of the people), *unless one conceals one's monarchism*.

And so the class position of the bourgeoisie inevitably gives rise to an inherent instability and falsity in the very formulation of its basic political tasks. The struggle for freedom, for the abolition of the ancient privileges of the autocracy, is incompatible with the defence of the privileges of private property, since these privileges entail "gentle handling" of the monarchy. The real programme of the monarchist constitution, therefore, is draped in the fine, airy raiment of a democratic constitution. And this embellishment of the programme's real content with a display of tawdry tinsel is called "*Realpolitik*".... Thus, the ideologist of the liberal bourgeoisie speaks with inimitable contempt and sublime self-complacency about the "theoretical self-indulgence" which the "representatives of the extreme parties" are practising (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 69-70, p. 308). The *Realpolitiker* of the bourgeoisie do not want to indulge in talk or even in day-dreams of the republic because they do not want to struggle for the republic. For this reason, however, they feel the irresistible urge to *edify* the people with the enticement of "democracy". They do not want to deceive themselves with regard to their inability to renounce the monarchy, and so they must needs deceive the people by keeping silent about their monarchism.

The name of a party, as can be seen, is not such an incidental and unimportant affair as one might think at first glance. Sometimes the very showiness and pretentiousness of the name betray the inherent flaw in a party' s entire programme and tactical line. The deeper an ideologist of the big bourgeoisie feels himself devoted to the monarchy, the louder he calls upon heaven to witness that he is a democrat. The more an ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie reflects its instability and its incapacity to wage a consistent, steadfast struggle for the democratic revolution and for socialism, the more ardently he holds forth on the party of the "Socialists-Revolutionaries", of which it has been aptly said that its socialism is anything but revolutionary, and its revolutionariness anything but socialist. All we need now is for the adherents of the autocracy to call themselves (as they have on more than one occasion attempted to do) "people's party", and we shall have a complete picture of the metamorphosis which class interests undergo on political signboards.

The signboard of the liberal bourgeoisie (or the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) starts, as befits a signboard, with a striking preamble: "The *Osvobozhdeniye* League finds that the grave external and internal crisis through which Russia is passing has become so acute at the present time that the people must take its solution into their own hands in conjunction with the other social groups opposed to the existing regime."

And so, let the power pass into the hands of the people, long live the autocracy of the people in place of the autocracy of the tsar. Isn't that it, gentlemen? Isn't that what democratism demands?

No, this is theoretical self-indulgence and a failure to understand practical politics. All power is now in the hands of the absolute monarchy. Ranged against it is the people, namely, the proletariat and the peasantry, who have launched the struggle, are waging it furiously, and ... very likely will maintain their zeal until they have completely overthrown the enemy. But ranged alongside the "people" are "the other social groups", viz., "society", i.e., the bourgeoisie, the landowners, the capitalists, and the professional intelligentsia. Thus, the power is to be

divided into three equal parts. One-third is to be left to the monarchy, another goes to the bourgeoisie (an Upper House based on indirect, and as far as possible actually unequal and non-universal, suffrage), while the remaining third goes to the people (a Lower House on the basis of suffrage that is universal, etc.). This will be a "square deal" providing adequate protection for private property and making it possible to use the organised power of the monarchy (the army, bureaucracy, and police) against the people, should they show "zeal" for any of the "unreasonable" demands put forward by the "representatives of the extreme parties out of sheer theoretical self-indulgence". This square deal, which reduces the revolutionary people to a harmless minority of one-third, is presented as "a radical reform on democratic principles", and not at all on the principles of monarchism or of bourgeois privilege.

How is this deal to be put through? By means of honest brokerage. Mr. Struve predicted this long ago in his preface to the Witte Memorandum when he said that it is always the moderate parties that gain from the intensification of the struggle between the extreme parties. The struggle between the autocracy and the revolutionary people is gaining in intensity. One has to manoeuvre between the one and the other, enlisting the support of the revolutionary people against the autocracy (with the enticement of "democracy") and the support of the monarchy against the "excesses" of the revolutionary people. By skilful manoeuvring a deal like that should come off, with the bourgeoisie getting at least a "third" share in any case, while the shares allotted to the people and the autocracy would depend on the outcome of the decisive struggle between them. Whose backing should be sought most will depend on the exigencies of the moment—such is the essence of the huckstering tactics, that is to say, "practical" politics.

At present all power is still in the hands of the autocracy. The thing to do, therefore, is to say that the people must take power into their hands. The thing to do, therefore, is to call yourself a democrat, to put forward a demand for "the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of suffrage that is universal, etc., for the purpose of drawing up a Russian constitution". The people now

are unarmed, disunited, unorganised, and helpless in the face of the absolute monarchy. A popular Constituent Assembly will rally them and become a great force which will oppose the power of the tsar. Only then, when the power of the tsar and the united force of the revolutionary people confront each other, will the bourgeoisie have its day; then only will it be possible to "co-ordinate" these two forces with positive chances of success and ensure the most advantageous result for the propertied classes.

Such is the plan of the practical politicians of liberalism. Not a foolish plan at all. It deliberately provides for the preservation of the monarchy and the admission of a Constituent Assembly of the whole people only alongside of the monarchy. The bourgeoisie does not want to have the existing government overthrown or the monarchy replaced by a republic. Therefore, the Russian bourgeoisie (on the pattern of the German bourgeoisie of 1848) stands for a "deal" between the people and the throne. Such a policy can be successful only if neither of these parties engaged in the struggle, neither the people nor the throne, is able to win the day, only if their strength is balanced. Then and only then will the bourgeoisie be able to join with the monarchy and keep a tight hold on the people, compel them to put up with one-"third"—or perhaps one-hundredth part, of the power. The Constituent Assembly of the whole people will be just strong enough to make the tsar grant a constitution, but it will not *and must not* (from the point of view of the bourgeoisie's interests) be any stronger. It must only counterbalance the monarchy, but not overthrow it; it must leave the material instruments of power (the army, etc.) in the hands of the monarchy.

The *Osvobozhdeniye* Leaguers laugh at the Shipovists for wanting to give the tsar the power of authority and the people the power of opinion. But is not their position essentially identical with that of the Shipovists? They do not want to give the people *all* the power either; they, too, stand for a *compromise* between the power of the tsar and the opinion of the people!

We thus see that the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class quite naturally and inevitably lead it at the present revolutionary moment to advance the slogan of a Constituent

Assembly of the people, *but in no case the slogan of a provisional revolutionary government*. The first slogan is or has become the slogan of the policy of compromise, huckstering, and brokerage; the second is the slogan of revolutionary struggle. The first is the slogan of the monarchist bourgeoisie, the second, the slogan of the revolutionary people. The first slogan makes it possible chiefly to preserve the monarchy, despite the revolutionary onset of the people; the second offers the straight road to the republic. The first leaves the power with the tsar, restricted only by public opinion; the second is the only slogan which consistently and unreservedly leads to the sovereignty of the people in the full sense of the word.

Only this radical difference in the political aims of the liberal bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat can explain a number of secondary features in the *Osvobozhdeniye* programme besides those mentioned above. Only in the light of this difference is it possible to understand, for example, why the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents *require* the reservation that the decisions of their League are to be "regarded as *binding* only insofar as political conditions remain unchanged", and that the programme allows for "a provisional and conditional element". This reservation (developed at length and with keen "relish" in the commentaries of Mr. P. S.) is absolutely essential for a party of "compromise" between the people and tsarism. It is a reservation that makes it as clear as daylight that in pursuance of their line of huckstering ("practical") politics the *Osvobozhdeniye* Leaguers will throw over a good many of their democratic demands. Their programme is not an expression of steadfast convictions (a quality alien to the bourgeoisie), not something designated to be fought for. Rather, their programme is simply a *haggling price*, fixed beforehand with a definite view to "reduction", depending on which of the warring parties can "hold out" longer. *The Constitutional-"Democratic" (read: constitutional-monarchist) bourgeoisie will strike a bargain with tsarism at a cheaper price than its present programme*—there is no doubt of that, and the class-conscious proletariat should have no illusions on that score. Hence Mr. P. S.'s hostility towards the division into a minimum programme and a maximum programme, and towards

"firm decisions of programme in general". Hence, his assurances that the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (purposely couched, not in terms of definite demands precisely formulated, but in the form of a literary, approximative *description* of the demands) "*is more than adequate* for a party engaged in practical politics". Hence, the omission of any mention of the arming of the people in the programme of the monarchist "democrats", the avoidance of any definitely formulated demand for the disestablishment of the Church, the insistence on the impracticability of abolishing indirect taxes, the substitution of cultural self-determination of the oppressed nationalities for their political self-determination. Hence, the naïvely frank admission that democracy and the interests of capital are linked together; that instead of "protection for enterprises and businessmen, there must be greater protection for the development of the productive forces of the people"; that "industrial prosperity", etc., must be promoted. Hence, the reduction of the agrarian reform to the level of a purely bureaucratic "granting" of land to the peasants with an absolute guarantee that the landowners will be "*compensated*" for the lands assigned to the peasants. In other words, the sanctity of "property" derived from bondage and serfdom is to be upheld at all costs. All this, we repeat, is the natural and inevitable result of the position of the bourgeoisie as a class in modern society. All this confirms the radical difference between the proletarian policy of revolutionary struggle and the bourgeois policy of liberal brokerage.

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TO THE JEWISH WORKERS[145]

In publishing the Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in Yiddish, the Editorial Board of the Party Central Organ considers it necessary to say a few words in connection with this publication.

The conditions under which the class-conscious proletariat of the whole world lives tend to create the closest bonds and increasing unity in the systematic Social-Democratic struggle of the workers of the various nationalities. The great slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!", which was proclaimed for the first time more than half a century ago, has now become more than the slogan of just the Social-Democratic parties of the different countries. This slogan is being increasingly embodied both in the unification of the tactics of international Social-Democracy and in the building of organisational unity among the proletarians of the various nationalities who are struggling under the yoke of one and the same despotic state for freedom and socialism.

In Russia the workers of all nationalities, especially those of non-Russian nationality, endure an economic and political oppression such as obtains in no other country. The Jewish workers, as a disfranchised nationality, not only suffer general economic and political oppression, but they also suffer under the yoke which deprives them of elementary civic rights. The heavier this yoke, the greater the need for the closest possible unity among the proletarians of the different nationalities; for without such unity a victorious struggle against the general oppression is impossible. The more the predatory tsarist autocracy strives to sow the seeds of discord, distrust and enmity among the nationalities it oppresses, the more abominable its policy of inciting the

ignorant masses to savage pogroms becomes, the more does the duty devolve upon us, the Social-Democrats, to rally the isolated Social-Democratic parties of the different nationalities into a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The First Congress of our Party, held in the spring of 1898, set itself the aim of establishing such unity. To dispel any idea of its being national in character, the Party called itself "*Rossiiskaya*" and not "*Russkaya*".* The organisation of Jewish workers—the Bund—affiliated with the Party as an autonomous section. Unfortunately, from that moment the unity of the Jewish and non-Jewish Social-Democrats within the single party was destroyed. Nationalist ideas began to spread among the leading members of the Bund, ideas which are in sharp contradiction to the entire world view of Social-Democracy. Instead of trying to draw the Jewish and the non-Jewish workers closer together, the Bund embarked upon a policy of weaning the former away from the latter; at its congresses it claimed a separate existence for the Jews as a nation. Instead of carrying on the work begun by the First Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party towards still closer unity between the Bund and the Party, the Bund moved a step away from the Party. First, it withdrew from the united organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad and set up an independent organisation abroad; later, it withdrew from the R.S.D.L.P as well, when the Second Congress of our Party in 1903 refused by a considerable majority to recognise the Bund as sole representative of the Jewish proletariat. The Bund held to its position, claiming not only that it was the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, but that no territorial limits were set to its activities. Naturally, the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. could not accept such conditions, since in a number of regions, as, for instance, in South Russia, the organised Jewish proletariat constitutes part of the general Party organisation. Ignoring that stand, the Bund withdrew from the Party and thereby broke the unity of the Social-Democratic proletariat, despite the work that had

* The adjective *Russkaya* (Russian) pertains to nationality, *Rossiiskaya* (Russian) pertains to Russia as a country.—*Ed.*

been carried out in common at the Second Congress, and despite the Party Programme and Rules.

At its Second and Third Congresses the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party expressed its firm conviction that the Bund's withdrawal from the Party was a grave and deplorable mistake on its part. The Bund's mistake is a result of its basically untenable nationalist views; the result of its groundless claim to be the sole, monopolistic representative of the Jewish proletariat, from which the federalist principle of organisation necessarily derives; the result of its long-standing policy of keeping aloof and separate from the Party. We are convinced that this mistake must be rectified and that it will be rectified as the movement continues to grow. We consider ourselves ideologically at one with the Jewish Social-Democratic proletariat. After the Second Congress our Central Committee pursued a non-nationalist policy; it took pains that such committees should be set up (Polesye, North-Western) as would unite all the local workers, Jewish as well as non-Jewish, into a single whole. At the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. a resolution was adopted providing for the publication of literature in Yiddish. In fulfilment of that resolution we are now issuing a complete translation into Yiddish of the Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which has appeared in Russian. The Report will show the Jewish workers—both those who are now in our Party and those who are temporarily out of it—how our Party is progressing. The Report will show the Jewish workers that our Party is already emerging from the internal crisis from which it has been suffering since the Second Congress. It will show them what the actual aspirations of our Party are and what its attitude is towards the Social-Democratic parties and organisations of the other nationalities, as well as the attitude of the entire Party and its central body to its component parts. Finally, it will show them—and this is most important—the tactical directives that were drawn up by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. with regard to the policy of the entire class-conscious proletariat in the present revolutionary situation.

Comrades! The hour of political struggle against the tsarist autocracy is drawing near—the struggle of the proletariat for the freedom of all classes and peoples in Russia,

for the freedom of the proletarian drive towards socialism. Terrible trials are in store for us. The outcome of the revolution in Russia depends on our class-consciousness and preparedness, on our unity and determination. Let us set to work then with greater boldness and greater unity, let us do all in our power for the proletarians of the different nationalities to march to freedom under the leadership of a really united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Editorial Board of the Central Organ
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

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A NEW REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' ASSOCIATION

We have received the following leaflets of the Central Committee of the Russian Liberation Union (R.L.U.), printed and distributed in Russia: (1) an unaddressed appeal setting forth the aims and the nature of the R.L.U.; (2) an appeal to the workers concerning the establishment of the R.L.U. Workers' Union, and (3) the Rules of this Workers' Union. From these documents it is evident that "the R.L.U. is not a party with a definite and specific programme, but rather an association of all who desire the transfer of power from the autocracy to the people by means of the armed uprising and through the convocation of a Constituent Assembly" based on universal suffrage with all its democratic aspects. "The urgent necessity," we read in the first appeal, "of achieving the universal immediate objective, i.e., a Constituent Assembly, has given rise to the R.L.U., which has made it its aim to unite all who strive for the political freedom of Russia and to take practical steps to achieve the revolution. With the achievement of this objective the R.L.U. will discontinue its activities and entrust the protection of the people's representatives and of public safety to a civil militia to be organised for the purpose."

The Rules of the Workers' Union consist of 43 clauses, and their aim is set forth as follows: "(1) to organise combat groups for the armed uprising; (2) to raise the necessary funds for arms and for literature of a strictly proletarian nature." The organisation of the Workers' Union consists of four-stage bodies: (1) groups of workers (mainly from one and the same workshop); (2) factory councils; (3) district meetings; and (4) committees of the Workers' Union. All higher bodies consist of elected representatives of the lower bodies, with

two exceptions: first, each committee of the Workers' Union contains a member of the C.C. of the Russian Liberation Union; second, it is not specified whether this C.C. is elected or whether it is subject to any control. All that is said on the relations between the Workers' Union and the R.L.U. is: "Through us (the C.C. of the R.L.U.) the Workers' Union will be connected with all the other workers' and non-working-class associations." Not a word is mentioned about the organisation of the R.L.U. itself and the relation of its C.C. to the R.L.U. as a whole. In its appeal to the workers the C.C. of the R.L.U. sets forth its immediate task as follows: "We shall work out a detailed plan of the uprising, tell you how to form combat squads, teach you how to arm, and supply fire-arms. Lastly, we shall unite the activities of all people scattered in all towns and places, who want to free Russia from the yoke of the autocracy, and, when that unity has been achieved, we will give the signal for the general uprising." Finally, we would point out that the Rules of the Workers' Union (§ 4) say: "The appeal to form the Workers' Union will be distributed at all the factories of St. Petersburg and its environs."

From all this it is apparent that we have to do here with an attempt at an "independent" non-party organisation of the armed popular uprising in general and the uprising of the St. Petersburg workers in particular. We shall not dwell here on the question to what extent this attempt is serious; that can be judged conclusively only from its results and tentatively from private and secret information about the R.L.U., but we have *no* such information. We wish to touch therefore on the significance of this attempt in terms of principle and the tactical and organisational tasks which it poses for Social-Democracy.

Without doubt, we are dealing here with weighty evidence pointing to the fact that the question of the armed popular uprising is now looming large. It is a question which practical workers as well as theoreticians have now raised. It is posed, not as a conclusion drawn from a definite programme (as it was, for instance, in Social-Democratic literature abroad in 1902),* but as a vital issue

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 515.—*Ed.*

of the practical movement today. It is not a question now of discussing the problem, or even of preparing for the uprising in general, but of actually carrying out the uprising. Manifestly, the whole course of events *brings to the fore* the question of the uprising; the whole struggle for freedom has made necessary such a decisive outcome. From this it is clear, by the way, how deeply mistaken those Social-Democrats are who seek to prevent the Party from putting this task on the order of the day.

Furthermore, the attempt we have considered proves that the *revolutionary-democratic movement* in Russia has made a great stride forward. A long time back, in issue No. 7 of *Vperyod*,* we pointed out the emergence of this new group among the forces, parties, and organisations hostile to the autocracy. We pointed out that the very nature of the revolution taking place in Russia, namely, the bourgeois-democratic revolution, inevitably increased and multiplied, and would continue to increase and multiply, the most diverse militant elements who expressed the interests of the most diverse sections of the people, who were prepared for decisive struggle and were passionately devoted to the cause of freedom and prepared to sacrifice their all for that cause, but who did not and could not grasp either the historic significance or the class content of the revolution that was taking place. The rapid growth of these social elements is highly characteristic of an epoch in which the whole people is oppressed by the autocracy and in which the direct political struggle has not yet succeeded in clearly demarcating the classes and creating clearly defined parties understandable to the broad masses. All these undissociated and undefined elements form the cadres of the revolutionary democrats. Their militant significance for the democratic revolution is very great. Their non-party, indefinite position is, on the one hand, symptomatic of the fact that the intermediate sections of the population are rising to desperate struggle and revolt—the sections that have least of all merged with either of the two hostile classes in capitalist society, the sections of the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, etc. On the other hand, the fact that these non-party revolutionaries

* See pp. 164-65 of this volume.—*Ed.*

have set out upon the revolutionary path is a pledge that the utterly backward sections of the people, those farthest removed from class definiteness, will now be more easily, quickly, and broadly aroused and drawn into the struggle. Formerly only the intelligentsia in Russia was revolutionary. Later the urban proletariat turned revolutionary. Today a considerable number of other social elements, deeply rooted "in the people" and closely linked with the masses, are turning revolutionary against the autocracy. The active participation of these elements is essential to the cause of the *popular* uprising. Their militant significance, we repeat, is very great. But their political significance for the *proletarian* movement may sometimes be small, if not actually negative. These elements are simply revolutionary and simply democratic because association with the one definite class which has cut loose from the ruling bourgeoisie, viz., the proletariat, is alien to them. By fighting for freedom without close connection with the proletarian struggle for socialism, they play a role that objectively amounts to promoting the interests of the bourgeoisie. They who serve the cause of freedom in general without serving the specific cause of proletarian utilisation of this freedom, the cause of turning the freedom to account in the proletarian struggle for socialism, are, in the final analysis, plainly and simply, fighters for the interests of the bourgeoisie. We do not in the least belittle the heroism of these people. We certainly do not belittle their tremendous role in the struggle for freedom. But we do not cease to maintain with the utmost emphasis that their activity does not yet in the least guarantee that the fruits of victory, the fruits of freedom, will be utilised in the interest of the proletariat, of socialism. They who stand outside the parties thereby serve the interests of the ruling party, albeit unwittingly and against their will. They who struggle for freedom outside the parties thereby serve the interests of the force that will inevitably rule when freedom is won, viz., the interests of the bourgeoisie. For this reason we called the non-party organisation of the uprising "independent" in inverted commas. Actually, non-partyism, with its appearance of independence, implies utter lack of independence and utter dependence on the ruling party. Actually, the just plain revolutionaries, the just

plain democrats are no more than the vanguard of the bourgeois-democratic movement, and sometimes merely its auxiliary force, even its cannon-fodder.

We pass now from these general theses to a more detailed examination of the documents in hand. "Let us abandon for a time party disputes and differences on points of principle," exclaims the C.C. of the R.L.U. in its first call, "let us rally into a mighty whole, into the Russian Liberation Union, and give our strength, our funds, and our knowledge to the people in its great struggle with the common enemy, the autocracy. Until the Constituent Assembly is held, we must all go along together. Only the Constituent Assembly can bring political freedom, without which a proper struggle of the parties is inconceivable." Any worker who is at all class-conscious knows full well that the people struggling against the autocracy consists of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is very keen on freedom, it is making a great stir about it, writing in the press and addressing meetings against the autocracy. Yet is there a person so naïve who does not understand that the bourgeoisie will never give up private ownership of the land and of capital, but, on the contrary, will fight to the last ditch to retain it against the encroachment of the workers? For the worker to abandon differences on questions of principle with the bourgeoisie, alongside which he is fighting the autocracy, is tantamount to *abandoning socialism*, to abandoning the idea of socialism, and the preparatory work for socialism. For the worker, in short, it means abandoning the idea of his economic emancipation, the emancipation of the working people from poverty and oppression. All over the world the bourgeoisie struggled for freedom, which it won largely with the hands of the workers, only thereafter to launch a furious struggle against socialism. Therefore, the appeal to sink differences is a *bourgeois* appeal. Under the guise of non-partyism the C.C. of the R.L.U. is feeding the workers with bourgeois phrases, instilling into them bourgeois ideas, demoralising their socialist consciousness with bourgeois exhalations. Only the enemies of socialism, the liberal bourgeois, the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, can be consciously in sympathy with the idea of the workers and the bourgeois sinking their differences for a time, and only revolutionary

democrats like the Socialists-Revolutionaries, who care little about socialism, can unconsciously be in sympathy with it. The workers should fight for freedom, without *even for a minute* abandoning the idea of socialism, without ceasing to work for its realisation, to prepare the forces and the organisation for the achievement of socialism.

The C.C. of the R.L.U. says: "As far as our attitude towards the existing parties and organisations is concerned, we, the Central Committee of the R.L.U., declare that we foresee no possibility of the appearance of fundamental differences with the Social-Democratic parties, since the principle of the Union does not contradict their programmes".... These words show the extent to which the C.C. of the R.L.U. misunderstands socialism. The C.C. does not even foresee the possibility of the appearance of differences with Social-Democracy, whereas we have shown that a fundamental difference exists! The C.C. sees no contradiction between the principle of the Union and the programme of Social-Democracy, whereas we have shown that this contradiction is as profound as the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Our radical disagreement with the R.L.U. arises precisely from the fact that it *passes* socialism *over* in silence. Any political trend that passes socialism over in silence is radically opposed to the Social-Democratic programme.

The quoted passage shows that the R.L.U. is in sympathy with Social-Democracy. Knowing nothing about the R.L.U. beyond the leaflet it has issued, we are not yet in a position to judge the sincerity of that sympathy. At any rate, mere Platonic sympathy cannot satisfy us, mere Platonic love is not enough. We want more than sympathy, we want to be understood and we want our programme to be shared by those who would not like their ideas to contradict this programme. The Russian Liberation Union speaks of its task of "widely distributing among the workers literature advocating a *strictly proletarian* ideology" (our italics). These are very good words, but words are not enough. And if these fine words contradict the deeds, no amount of sincerity will save their authors in actual deeds from becoming carriers of bourgeois ideas into the working class. Let us consider the matter: what does this "strictly proletarian ideology" actually mean? Who is going to judge whether it

FOR MARXIST IQMACH NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

is strictly proletarian? Can the problem conceivably be solved by "abandoning for a time party disputes and differences on points of principle"? Would it not then first be necessary to "abandon for a time" the distribution of literature among the workers?

The C.C. of the R.L.U. once more launches the slogan of the "independent activity" of the workers. Our Party has often witnessed attempts to call into life a special trend in Social-Democracy under the banner of this notorious slogan. Thus it was with the "Economists" in the past, thus it is now with the Mensheviks or the new-Iskrists. Ever and always it turned out that this slogan (whether those who released it were conscious of it or not) only suited the purpose of elements who least appreciated the consistency of principle and the idea-content of the movement. We need only see the new use to which this old slogan has been put: we see before our eyes a fusion of the appeal to "independent activity" in assessing a "strictly proletarian ideology" with the "independently active" repetition of anti-proletarian, bourgeois phrases, with the advocacy of the bourgeois idea of non-partyism. We would answer the C.C. of the R.L.U.: there is only one strictly proletarian ideology, and that is, *Marxism*. A strictly proletarian programme and strictly proletarian tactics are the programme and the tactics of international revolutionary Social-Democracy. This is borne out, among other things, by proletarian experience, by the experience of the proletarian movement throughout the world, from Germany to America, from England to Italy. It is over half a century since this movement first emerged upon the broad political scene in 1848; the parties of the proletariat formed and grew into vast armies; they experienced a number of revolutions, underwent all kinds of trials, passed through deviations to both the Right and the Left, and waged a struggle with opportunism and with anarchism. This entire gigantic experience serves to confirm the Marxist ideology and the Social-Democratic programme. It is a *pledge* that even those workers who are now following the lead of the R.L.U. will, in the mass, inevitably and unavoidably come to Social-Democracy!

To quote further from the Appeal: "Being largely a practical organisation, the R.L.U. is at one in its activity

also with the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, inasmuch as we are united with it by a common method—armed struggle against the autocracy, and a common aim—the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on democratic lines....” After what has been said we are not surprised, of course, at this rapprochement of the revolutionary democrats with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. While stressing the practical nature of its organisation in the cited passage of the Appeal and limiting its solidarity with the Socialists-Revolutionaries (“inasmuch as”) to common grounds of method and immediate aim, the R.L.U. obviously abstains for the present from determining the relationship between the “principles” of the Socialists-Revolutionaries and those of a “strictly proletarian ideology”. Such an abstention would be a very bad recommendation for a Social-Democrat, but a very good one for a revolutionary democrat. Unfortunately, however, the ensuing sentence in the Appeal shows what a “non-party” stand may lead to.... “We have nothing against even the *Osvobozhdeniye* League,” says the C.C. of the R.L.U., “notwithstanding the radical difference in our political convictions, provided, of course, that it brings itself to realise the inevitability of the armed uprising if a Constituent Assembly is to be convened.”

In the first place, we would remark in this connection that if the R.L.U. differs radically only with the political views of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, we can infer that it does not differ with its economic programme, in which case it explicitly renounces socialism and fully subscribes to the views of the revolutionary *bourgeois* democrats! This deduction, of course, is at variance with the R.L.U.’s sympathies for a “strictly proletarian ideology”, but the essence of a “non-party” stand consists precisely in the fact that it engenders endless and hopeless contradictions.

Secondly, what exactly is the radical difference between the political views of the R.L.U. and the *Osvobozhdeniye* League? The R.L.U. has just rapped its own knuckles; it has spoken of “going along together to a Constituent Assembly” and “abandoning for a time party disputes and differences on points of principle” (obviously, until the Constituent Assembly is convened), and now, before the Constituent Assembly, it precipitates a dispute and expresses its dis-

agreement with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, which adopted in its programme the convocation of a popular Constituent Assembly on democratic lines! How does it happen that the R.L.U., while expressing a desire to "propagandise its political convictions", manages to say nothing on the content of those convictions? Is the R.L.U. a republican organisation, as distinct from the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, which is monarchist? Do the political convictions of the R.L.U. include, say, the abolition of the standing army and its replacement by the arming of the people? the demand for the complete disestablishment of the Church? the complete abolition of indirect taxes, etc. ? In its desire to simplify and ease things by abandoning party disputes and fundamental differences, the R.L.U. has actually complicated and made things more difficult by the utter vagueness of its position.

Thirdly, how are we to know whether the *Osvobozhdeniye* League will fulfil the condition which the R.L.U. has set it, whether it will "bring itself to realise the inevitability of the armed uprising"? Are we to wait for its official announcement on that score? But the *Osvobozhdeniye* League refuses to say anything about the methods by which its programme is to be carried out. It gives its members full scope both in the choice of those methods and in the matter of modifying the programme itself. It considers itself to be a part of the "Constitutional-Democratic" (read constitutional-monarchist) party, whose other part forms the Zemstvo grouping which refuses to commit itself to any programme or to any tactics whatever. This being the case, what does the condition set to the *Osvobozhdeniye* League by the R.L.U. amount to? Further, who does not know that the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents do not commit themselves to any definite programme or tactical line, in order to be completely free in certain cases to declare themselves (especially unofficially) both for terrorism and for the uprising? Hence, we arrive at the indubitable conclusion that influential members and even influential groups of the League will experience no difficulty in joining, should they wish to do so, the R.L.U. and in occupying key positions therein. Given the R.L.U.'s non-party position, quite a number of circumstances beyond its control (large financial resources, social connections, etc.) will favour such an

outcome. This outcome would mean the conversion of the armed fighting squads of the people into an instrument of the liberal bourgeoisie, the subjection of the workers' uprising to its interests. It would mean the political exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie in the Russian democratic revolution. In the event of such an outcome the bourgeoisie would furnish the money to arm the proletariat, taking care to divert the proletariat from socialism by preaching non-partisanship interests, to weaken its ties with Social-Democracy, and thus to render its own chances most favourable for using the workers as its tool and for depriving them of the possibilities to advance their own, "party", proletarian interests in the revolution.

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The tactical tasks, which the appearance of this new union sets before the Social-Democrats, follow naturally from what has been said above. Whether this particular union, the R.L.U., especially its C.C., subject to no control and answerable to no one, merits confidence, we cannot say. We shall not dwell on the C.C. of the R.L.U., but on the R.L.U. Workers' Union, and not so much on this particular workers' union as on workers' unions of this type in general. Similar "unions", organisations, groups, and circles in varying forms, under varying names, and of varying sizes, are today springing up all over Russia. The whole policy of the autocracy, which compels the people to resort to arms and prepare for the uprising, inevitably stimulates the organisation of such groups. The motley, often accidental, nature of their social composition, with its indeterminate class character, in conjunction with an extremely limited scope of effective Social-Democratic work, inevitably lends these groups the character of non-party revolutionary-democratic groups. The practical attitude of the Social-Democrats towards them is one of our Party's most pressing problems.

We must, in the first place, decidedly use all means to make the Social-Democratic standpoint clear to the members of these groups, especially to the workers, without vagueness or reservation in the slightest, that the proletariat must organise definitely on a party basis and definitely in the

Social-Democratic Party, if it does not wish to be politically exploited by the bourgeoisie. It would be sheer pedantry for us simply to dismiss these groups, or to "overlook" their formation and their tremendous importance for the struggle for freedom. It would be unpardonable doctrinairism for the Social-Democrats to adopt a snobbish or contemptuous attitude towards the "non-party" workers belonging to such groups. We should like in particular to warn all members of the Party against such mistakes, which are possible as a result of the revival of Economism of rueful memory and a narrow, tail-ist interpretation of our tasks in the ranks of Social-Democracy. Every effort should be made to effect a mutual exchange of assistance between these groups and the organisations of our Party for the purpose of arming the greatest possible number of workers. There should be an extremely discreet, tactful, and comradely attitude towards the workers, who are ready to die for freedom, who are organising and arming for the fight, who are in complete sympathy with the proletarian struggle, and who are yet divided from us by the lack of a Social-Democratic world outlook, by anti-Marxist prejudices, and by survivals of superannuated revolutionary views. Nothing is easier than the method of immediately breaking with such otherwise-minded workers or of simply keeping aloof from them; nor is there anything more stupid than such a method. We should remember that Social-Democracy's strength lies in the unity of the broad masses of the proletariat, and that such unity, owing to the splitting, disuniting, and dulling conditions of capitalism, is not achieved with immediacy, but only at the cost of persistent effort and tremendous patience. We should remember the experiences of our European comrades, who consider it their duty to show an attitude of comradely concern even towards the workers who are members of the Catholic unions and try not to antagonise them by treating their religious and political prejudices with contempt, but persistently, tactfully, and patiently make use of every act of the political and economic struggle in order to enlighten them and bring them closer to the class-conscious proletariat on the ground of common struggle. How much more careful should our attitude be towards the worker-revolutionaries, who are prepared to fight for freedom

but are still strangers to Social-Democracy! We repeat: no concealment of Social-Democratic views, but no slighting of the revolutionary workers' groups that do not share these views. So long as these groups have not officially joined any non-Social-Democratic party, we are entitled, nay, obligated to regard them as associated with the R.S.D.L.P. Thus, too, we should regard the Workers' Union of the Russian Liberation Union. We should make every effort to introduce the members of this union to socialist literature and conduct propaganda of our views by word of mouth at all meetings of all the branches of this union. Even in the free countries of Europe the idea that all proletarians can be made class-conscious Social-Democrats under capitalism is considered utopian. But neither in Europe nor in Russia is the idea of the Social-Democrats' leading influence upon the mass of the proletariat considered utopian. The thing is to learn how to exercise this influence, to remember that our best ally in educating the unenlightened workers will be our enemies, the government and the bourgeoisie; then we shall be sure that, at the decisive moment, the whole working-class mass will respond to the call of Social-Democracy!

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THE DEMOCRATIC TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT[146]

The Social-Democratic Party, as the conscious exponent of the working-class movement, aims at the complete liberation of the toiling masses from every form of oppression and exploitation. The achievement of this objective—the abolition of private property in the means of production and the creation of the socialist society—calls for a very high development of the productive forces of capitalism and a high degree of organisation of the working class. The full development of the productive forces in modern bourgeois society, a broad, free, and open class struggle, and the political education, training, and rallying of the masses of the proletariat are inconceivable without political freedom. Therefore it has always been the aim of the class-conscious proletariat to wage a determined struggle for complete political freedom and the democratic revolution.

The proletariat is not alone in setting this task before itself. The bourgeoisie, too, needs political freedom. The enlightened members of the propertied classes hung out the banner of liberty long ago; the revolutionary intelligentsia, which comes mainly from these classes, has fought heroically for freedom. But the bourgeoisie as a whole is incapable of waging a determined struggle against the autocracy; it fears to lose in this struggle its property which binds it to the existing order; it fears an all-too revolutionary action of the workers, who will not stop at the democratic revolution but will aspire to the socialist revolution; it fears a complete break with officialdom, with the bureaucracy, whose interests are bound up by a thousand ties with the interests of the propertied classes. For this reason

the bourgeois struggle for liberty is notoriously timorous, inconsistent, and half-hearted. One of the tasks of the proletariat is to prod the bourgeoisie on, to raise before the whole people slogans calling for a complete democratic revolution, to start working boldly and independently for the realisation of these slogans—in a word, to be the vanguard, to take the lead in the struggle for the liberty of the whole people.

In the pursuit of this aim the Russian Social-Democrats have had to fight many a battle against the inconsistency of bourgeois liberalism. Let us recall, for instance, how Mr. Struve began his career, unhampered by the censor, as a political champion of the "liberation" of Russia. He made his *début* with his preface to the Witte "Memorandum", in which he advanced the markedly "Shipovian" (to use the current political nomenclature) slogan, "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo". The Social-Democratic Party exposed the retrogressive, absurd, and reactionary nature of that slogan; it demanded a definite and uncompromising democratic platform, and itself put forward such a platform as an integral part of its Party programme. Social-Democracy had to combat the narrow conception of the aims of democracy which obtained in its own ranks when the so-called Economists did their best to play down these aims, when they advocated the "economic struggle against the employers and the government", and insisted that we must start by winning rights, continue with political agitation, and only then gradually (the theory of stages) pass on to political struggle.

Now the political struggle has become vastly extended, the revolution has spread throughout the land, the mildest liberals have become "extremists"; it may therefore seem that historical references to the recent past such as we have just made are out of place, with no bearing on the actual turbulent present. But this may seem so only at first glance. To be sure, such slogans as the demand for a Constituent Assembly and for universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot (which the Social-Democrats long since and in advance of all presented in their Party programme) have become common property; they have been adopted by the illegal *Osvobozhdeniye*, incorporated in the programme of

the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, turned into Zemstvo slogans, and are now being repeated in every shape and form by the legal press. That Russian bourgeois democracy has made progress in recent years and months cannot be doubted. Bourgeois democracy is learning by experience, is discarding primitive slogans (like the Shipovian "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo") and is hobbling along behind the revolution. But it is only hobbling along behind; new contradictions between its words and its deeds, between democracy in principle and democracy in "*Realpolitik*", are arising in place of the old; for revolutionary developments are making steadily growing demands on democracy. But bourgeois democracy always drags at the tail of events; while adopting more advanced slogans, it always lags behind; it always formulates the slogans several degrees below the level really required in the real revolutionary struggle for real liberty.

Indeed, let us take that now current and generally accepted slogan, "For a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot". Is that slogan adequate from the standpoint of consistent democracy? Is it adequate in the light of the urgent revolutionary tasks of the present moment? The answer to both these questions can be only in the negative. To be convinced that this is so one has only to examine carefully our Party programme, to which our organisations, unfortunately, do not often refer and which they quote and disseminate all too little. (As a happy exception, worthy of the widest emulation, we note the recent reprint of our Party programme in leaflet form by the Riga, Voronezh, and Moscow committees.) The keynote of our programme, too, is the demand for a popular Constituent Assembly (let us agree, for brevity's sake, to use the word "popular" as denoting suffrage that is universal, etc.). But this slogan does not stand isolated in our programme. The context and the addenda and notes prevent any misconstruction on the part of those who are least consistent in the struggle for liberty or who even struggle against it. It occurs in our programme in conjunction with the following other slogans: (1) the *overthrow* of the tsarist autocracy; (2) its replacement by the democratic *republic*; (3) the *sovereignty of the people*, safeguarded by a democratic constitution, i.e., the concentration of supreme

governmental authority *entirely* in the hands of a legislative assembly composed of representatives of the people and forming a single chamber.

Can there be any doubt that every consistent democrat is obligated to accept all these slogans? Why, the very word "democrat", both by its etymology and by virtue of the political significance it has acquired throughout the history of Europe, denotes an adherent of the sovereignty of the people. It is absurd, therefore, to talk of democracy and in the same breath to reject even a single one of these slogans. But the main contradiction, the contradiction between the desire of the bourgeoisie to preserve private property at all costs and its desire for liberty, is so profound that spokesmen or followers of the liberal bourgeoisie inevitably find themselves in this ridiculous position. As everyone knows, a very broad liberal party is forming itself in Russia with enormous rapidity, a party which has the adherence of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, of the mass of the Zemstvo people, and of newspapers like *Nasha Zhizn*, *Nashi Dni*, *Syn Otechestva*, *Russkiye Vedomosti*,* etc., etc. This liberal-bourgeois party likes to be called the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party. In actual fact, however, as can be seen from the declarations and the programme of the illegal *Osvobozhdeniye*, it is a *monarchist* party. It does not want a republic at all. It does not want a unicameral assembly, and it proposes for the Upper House indirect and virtually non-universal suffrage (residence qualification). It is anything but anxious for the supreme governmental authority to pass *entirely* into the hands of the people (although for window-dressing purposes it is very fond of talking about the transfer of power to the people). It does not want the autocracy to be *overthrown*. It wants only a division of power among (1) the monarchy; (2) the Upper House (where landowners and capitalists will predominate); and (3) the Lower House, which *alone* is to be built on democratic principles.

Thus, we have before us the indisputable fact that our "democratic" bourgeoisie, even as represented by its most advanced, most educated elements, those least subject to

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* *Our Life*, *Our Days*, *Son of the Fatherland*, *Russian Recorder*.—*Ed.*

the direct influence of capital, is trailing behind the revolution. This "democratic" party *fears* the sovereignty of the people. While repeating our slogan of a popular Constituent Assembly, it in fact completely distorts its sense and significance and misleads the people by its use, or, rather, abuse.

What is a "popular Constituent" Assembly? It is an assembly which, in the first place, really expresses the will of the people. To this end we must have universal suffrage in all of its democratic aspects, and a full guarantee of freedom to conduct the election campaign. It is an assembly which, in the second place, *really has the power and authority* to "inaugurate" a political order which will ensure the sovereignty of the people. It is clear as daylight that without these two conditions the assembly can be neither truly popular nor truly constituent. Yet our liberal bourgeois, our constitutional monarchists (whose claim to be democrats is a mockery of the people) do not want real safeguards to ensure *either* of these conditions! Not only do they fail to ensure in any way complete freedom of election propaganda or the actual transfer of power and authority to the Constituent Assembly, but, on the contrary, they *seek to make* both *impossible* since they aim at maintaining the monarchy. The real power and authority is to remain in the hands of Nicholas the Bloody. This means that the dire enemy of the people is to convene the assembly and "ensure" that the elections will be free and universal. How very democratic! It means that the Constituent Assembly will never have and (according to the idea of the liberal bourgeois) must never have all power and all authority; it is to be utterly devoid of power, devoid of authority; it is merely *to come to terms*, *to reach an agreement*, *to arrive at an understanding*, *to strike a bargain* with Nicholas II for the assembly to be granted a modicum of his royal power! The Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage is to differ in no way from a Lower House. That is to say, the Constituent Assembly, convened for expressing and executing the will of the people, is designed by the liberal bourgeoisie to "constitute", *over the will of the people*, the will of an Upper House and on top of that the will of the monarchy, the will of Nicholas.

Is it not obvious that in talking, speechifying, and shouting about a popular Constituent Assembly, the liberal bourgeois, the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, are actually planning an *anti-popular consultative* assembly? Instead of emancipating the people, they want to subject the people, by constitutional means, first, to the power of the tsar (monarchism), and, secondly, to the power of the organised big bourgeoisie (the Upper House).

If anyone wishes to dispute this conclusion, let him assert: (1) that there can be a true expression of the popular will in elections without complete freedom of propaganda and without the actual abolition of all the propaganda privileges of the tsarist government; or (2) that an assembly of delegates devoid of real power and authority, in that these are left in the hands of the tsar, is not, in effect, a mere consultative body. To make either of these assertions one must be either a brazen charlatan or a hopeless fool. History proves conclusively that a representative assembly coexisting with a monarchical form of government is in actual fact, so long as governmental power remains in the hands of the monarchy, a consultative body which does not bend the will of the monarch to the will of the people, but only *conforms* the will of the people to the will of the monarch, i.e., divides the power between monarch and people, bargains for a new order, but does not constitute it. History proves conclusively that there can be no such thing as really free elections, that the significance and character of these elections can hardly be brought home to the *whole* people unless the government that is combating the revolution is replaced by a provisional revolutionary government. Granting for a moment the improbable and the impossible, namely, that the tsarist government, having decided to convene a "Constituent" (read: consultative) Assembly, will give *formal* guarantees of freedom of propaganda, all the vast advantages and superior facilities for campaigning which accrue from the organised power of the state will nevertheless remain in its hands. These advantages and facilities for propaganda during the elections to the first people's assembly will be enjoyed by the very ones who have oppressed the people by all the means in their power, and from whom the people have begun to wrest liberty by force.

In a word, we arrive at the very conclusion we reached on the previous occasion (*Proletary*, No. 3),* when we examined this question from another angle. The slogan of a popular Constituent Assembly, taken by itself, separately, is at the present time a slogan of the monarchist bourgeoisie, a slogan calling for a deal between the bourgeoisie and the tsarist government. Only the overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government, whose duty it will be to convene the popular Constituent Assembly, can be the slogan of the revolutionary struggle. Let the proletariat of Russia have no illusions on this score; in the din of the general excitation it is being deceived by the use of its own slogans. If we fail to match the armed force of the government with the force of an armed people, if the tsarist government is not utterly defeated and replaced by a provisional revolutionary government, every representative assembly, whatever title—"popular", "constituent", etc.—may be conferred upon it, will in fact be an assembly of representatives of the big bourgeoisie convened for the purpose of bargaining with the tsar for a division of power.

The more the people's struggle against the tsar comes to a head and the greater likelihood there is of a speedy realisation of the demand for an assembly of people's representatives, the more closely must the revolutionary proletariat watch the "democratic" bourgeoisie. The sooner we gain freedom, the sooner will this ally of the proletariat become its enemy. Two circumstances will serve to cloak this change: (1) the vagueness, incompleteness, and non-committal character of the would-be democratic slogans of the bourgeoisie; and (2) the endeavour to turn the slogans of the proletariat into mere phrases, to substitute empty promises for *real* safeguards of liberty and revolution. The workers must now watch the "democrats" with intensified vigilance. The words "popular Constituent Assembly" will be nothing more than words if, owing to the actual conditions under which the election campaign and the elections themselves are conducted, this assembly fails to express the will of the people, if it lacks the strength independently to establish the new order.

* See pp. 492-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The cardinal issue is now shifting from the question of summoning the popular Constituent Assembly to the question of the *method* by which it is to be summoned. We are on the eve of decisive events. The proletariat must not pin its faith in general democratic slogans but must contrapose to them its own proletarian-democratic slogans in their full scope. Only a force guided by these slogans can really ensure the complete victory of the revolution.

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THE FIRST STEPS OF BOURGEOIS BETRAYAL

Geneva, Wednesday, June 21 (8)

Yesterday the telegraph brought the news that Nicholas II had received a Zemstvo deputation last Monday. Responding to speeches by Prince Sergei Trubetskoi and Mr. Fyodorov, the tsar emphatically confirmed his promise to convene an assembly of people's representatives.

To appreciate fully the significance of this "event" we must first of all reconstruct certain facts that were reported in the foreign press.

On May 24 and 25, old style, about 300 Zemstvo and municipal representatives held three meetings in Moscow. In the lithographed copies we have received from Russia of their petition to the tsar and of a resolution adopted by them the number of attending delegates is not indicated; mention is made only of City Mayors and Marshals of the Nobility, as well as Zemstvo and municipal councillors, having attended the Conference. The representatives of landlordism and urban capital discussed the political fortunes of Russia. According to the foreign correspondents, the debate was very heated. The Shipov party, with its moderate policy and its extensive Court connections, enjoyed great influence. The most radical were the provincial delegates, the most moderate those from St. Petersburg, while the "Centre" was formed by the Moscow delegates. Every word of the petition was debated, St. Petersburg finally joining in the vote for it. The resulting document was a patriotic and loyal petition. "Actuated solely by ardent love of country", the respectable bourgeois gentlemen sink "all discord

and all differences that divide them" and appeal to the tsar. They point to "the grave danger to Russia and to the Throne itself", which emanates not so much from abroad as from "internal strife". (True, "Russia" comes before the "Throne", but our patriots appealed to the Throne first and only threatened—privately and *à la sourdine*—to appeal to the people.) As usual, the petition is full of official eyewash: everything is blamed on the tsar's councillors, on the distortion of his designs and prescriptions which has led to a tightening of the police regime and prevented the "voice of truth" from ascending to the Throne, etc. They conclude with the request, "before it is too late", that "representatives of the people elected for this purpose by all subjects on an equal basis, without any distinction, be convoked without delay". The representatives of the people are to decide the question of war or peace "in concert" with the tsar and to "establish [also *in concert* with the tsar] an improved system of government". Thus, the petition contains no explicit demand for universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, which was alleged to have been adopted by the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party (all reference to direct suffrage and secret ballot is omitted and, of course, not by accident); and no guarantees whatever are demanded to ensure that the elections will be free. The authors of the petition state pathetically: "Oppression of the individual and of society, denial of free speech, and all manner of tyranny are multiplying and growing"; but no measures against them are suggested. Tyranny is growing "in concert" with the tsar; so let the political system be "improved" in concert with the tsar.... The representatives of the bourgeoisie are holding fast to the theory of an "agreement", not, of course, on the part of the people, but on the part of the bourgeoisie, and the people's oppressors.

The Conference elected a delegation to present the petition to the tsar. It consisted of Messrs. Heyden, Golovin, Petrunkevich, G. and N. Lvov, Pyotr and Pavel Dolgorukov, Kovalevsky, Novosiltsev, Rodichev, Shakhovskoi, and Segrei Trubetskoi. Later, at the audience given by Nicholas II, they were joined by Messrs. Korf, Nikitin, and Fyodorov, from St. Petersburg.

The Conference then adopted the following *resolution*,

which was not reported in the foreign press but is reproduced in the Russian leaflet:

"This Conference of united groups of Zemstvo and municipal representatives, imbued, notwithstanding differences of opinion on certain political questions, with the common conviction that the root cause of the present difficult position of Russia, domestic and foreign, is the still existing system of government by decree, which denies individual and public freedom, represses the self-realisation and independent activity of the people, debars the population from participation in the life of the state, and breeds unrestrained and constantly increasing lawlessness on the part of an irresponsible administration; that this system of government, which for many years has been a source of violence, falsehood, and corruption in our internal life, has now led to the dire threat of grave external danger, by having involved the nation in a disastrous war, in the course of which it has engendered and sustained internecine strife, and brought the country to a series of defeats culminating in a disaster to its naval forces unprecedented in Russian history;—and, firm in the conviction that the further existence of this regime menaces, not only the internal peace, the order, and the welfare of the people, but also the stability of the Throne and the territorial integrity and external security of Russia, this Conference declares that the salvation of the country makes it imperatively necessary:

"1. That freely elected popular representatives be immediately convoked to decide, jointly with the Sovereign, the question of war and peace and of establishing a constitutional state system;

"2. That all laws, institutions, decisions, and orders which contravene the principles of personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the press, and of association and assembly, be immediately nullified, and that a political amnesty be proclaimed;

"3. That the administrative personnel be immediately renewed through the placement of the central administration in the charge of persons who are sincerely devoted to the cause of reforming the state and who enjoy the confidence of the community."

We do not know in what relation this resolution stands to the petition and to the mandates of the delegation, whether the delegation undertook to set forth the substance of the resolution or to present it together with the petition. Perhaps the petition is the official document for the "Throne", and the resolution the unofficial document for the "people"?

As regards the character of the debates at the Conference, the correspondent of the French paper *Le Matin*,[147] M. Gaston Leroux, reports that the most "progressive-minded" of the delegates, those from the provincial Zemstvos, stood for a two-stage electoral system, fearing that under

direct elections they would be overwhelmed by the "towns" (evidently they feared that under direct elections the privileges of the landlords over the peasants would not be fully guaranteed). The correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote:

"The Russian Zemstvo as a political party consists of three groupings: the *liberal* Zemstvo majority (with Count Heyden as its leader), the *moderately liberal* nationalist-Slavophil Zemstvo minority headed by Mr. Shipov, and the group of radical Zemstvo constitutionalists. It is characteristic that at the election of delegates ... it was the 'feudal' candidates that got through. The moderates wanted to be worthily represented before the tsar by members of respected old families. And the radicals, who entertained no illusions as to the outcome of the petition, wanted the representatives of the old families to see with their own eyes that the government would not yield an inch *voluntarily*."

The conveniences of that nebulous organisation of the "Constitutional-Democratic" (read: monarchist) party eulogised by Mr. Struve were not long in revealing themselves in practice. A strong, firmly knit party organisation will not lend itself to dickering and bargaining, to dodges and subterfuges. Let the "party" include both the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (perhaps this is the "group of radicals" mentioned by the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*) and the "Zemstvo group" (i.e., the followers of Heyden and of Shipov, from whom Mr. Struve is *now* officially seeking to dissociate himself). But the Zemstvo group includes the Heydenists, the Shipovists, and ... the "radicals". Work this out if you can! But they are all agreed, moved as they were by ardent love for their country and for the privileges of the bourgeois, on the *theory of agreement*, with which we have often dealt in *Proletary*, and which is clearly in evidence both in the "petition" and in the "resolution".

The resolution was probably designed to satisfy the "ideal" demands of the radicals, while the petition, as interpreted by the "moderate" delegates, was to serve the purpose of a material deal with tsarism. Such things as the numerical representation of the groupings at the Conference, the powers of the delegates, the terms of the deal,

and the further intentions of the Zemstvo men were very carefully concealed from the uninitiated plebs. The "people", in whose name the bourgeois gentlemen are bargaining with tsarism, have no need to know the high politics of the "Constitutional-*Democratic* Party"! The bourgeois gentlemen will converse with the tsar about the suppression of free speech and the voice of truth, about *people*'s representatives, about a Russia that has "rallied round the one standard of the *people*", etc.; but for this people to know the whole truth about the policy pursued by the liberal and *Osvobozhdeniye* hagglers is quite superfluous.... Indeed, not without reason did Mr. Struve, in *Osvobozhdeniye*, recently reproach the "extreme parties" (the Social-Democrats in particular) for their immoderate leaning to narrow, conspiratorial, Jacobin "secrecy". We Social-Democrats resort to secrecy from the tsar and his bloodhounds, while taking pains that the people should know everything about our Party, about the shades of opinion within it, about the development of its programme and policy, that they should even know what this or that Party congress delegate said at the congress in question. The enlightened bourgeois of the *Osvobozhdeniye* fraternity surround themselves with secrecy ... from the people, who know nothing definite about the much-talked-of "Constitutional-Democratic" Party; but they make up for this by taking the tsar and his sleuths into their confidence. Who can say they are not democrats?

What secrets the Zemstvo delegates unbosomed to the Court cabal, who refused to admit them to the tsar, we do not know. But the confidences and talks continued for quite a while. The foreign press was agog for news about the delegates' every step in the game of "high politics". St. Petersburg, June 9 (May 27): The Zemstvo deputation will in the first place see Mr. Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, in order to lodge a complaint against Trepov. June 10 (May 28): Bulygin told the deputation that it would not be received by the tsar and advised it to leave St. Petersburg.- June 12 (May 30): It is thought probable that the tsar will receive the deputation. June 15 (2): A special telegram from M. Gaston Leroux to *Le Matin*: "*The Zemstvo delegates have accepted the conditions set by the Minister of the Court for an audience with the Emperor*. There upon Baron Fred-

ericks went this evening to Tsarskoye Selo to inquire of the tsar whether he had decided to receive the deputation."

Do you hear this, Russian workers and peasants? This is how they behave, these "liberationists" and "democrats", these foes of conspiracy, these abhorrers of secrecy! They conspire with the Minister of the Court of His Policemanic Majesty, hugger-mugger with the spies against the people. They pose as the representatives of the "people", while accepting conditions framed by spies on *how* to speak with a tsar on the needs of the "people"!

This is how they act, the rich, independent, enlightened, and liberal-minded patriots who are "actuated by ardent love of country". How unlike the rough unschooled working-class rabble, dependent on every clerk, which tries to push its way straight to the tsar without any concealment, led by an audacious priest, without having even talked with the influential spies about the conditions of an interview with the tsar. How can one think of a republic, or even of direct elections or of a unicameral system with such politically uneducated masses? The politically educated know the ropes and understand that one should first make a backstairs call on the spies—perhaps even consult them as to the substance and style of the petition to the tsar—after which the "voice of truth" will surely "ascend to the Throne".

What sort of bargain the "representatives [save the mark!] of the people" struck with the tsar's spies we do not know. We know from the telegrams that at the reception of the delegation Prince Trubetskoi delivered "a lengthy speech" in which, for half an hour, he described to the tsar the plight of Russia and the conditions that had compelled the Zemstvo men to appeal directly to the tsar (and not through his spies?). The speech made a profound impression upon the tsar. Mr. Fyodorov spoke on behalf of the representatives of St. Petersburg. The tsar responded with a long speech. He expressed regret at the enormous sacrifices caused by the war, lamented the latest defeat at sea, and concluded with the words: "I thank you, gentlemen, *for the sentiments you have expressed* [fine sentiments they must have been, considering that the "democrat" Trubetskoi had consulted the spies on how to express them!] I believe in your desire to work with me [the tsar believes

the liberal bourgeoisie; the liberal bourgeoisie believes the tsar; claw me—claw thee] in setting up a new system of government built on new principles. My desire to convene a popular assembly [When? Are the representatives to be elected? If so, in what manner and by whom? This is not known. Evidently Mr. Trubetskoi concealed from his beloved sovereign the "resolution" of the conference; the spies must have advised him not to broach this subject to the tsar!] is unshakable. It is daily in my thoughts. My will shall be carried out. You may announce this to the population of town and countryside this very day. You will help me in this new work. The popular assembly will restore unity between Russia and its emperor [between the Trubetskois and Fyodorovs and the emperor?]. It will lay the foundation of the system which will repose on Russian national principles." The delegates—says the official telegram—came away from the audience tremendously impressed. The tsar seemed pleased, too....

This does look like the real truth! The tsar is pleased, the liberal bourgeois are pleased. They are ready to conclude a lasting peace with one another. The autocracy and the police (the true Russian national principles) are pleased. The money-bags as well are pleased (from now on their advice will be sought constantly and regularly).

But will the workers and peasants be pleased—they whose interests the bourgeois traitors are bartering away?

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"REVOLUTIONARIES" IN KID GLOVES

Friday, June 23 (10)

The press abroad has begun to comment on the audience granted to the Zemstvo deputation by the tsar. As usual, the bourgeois press fawns, waxing sentimental over the tsar's amenability and the reasonableness of the Zemstvo representatives, though certain doubts creep in as to the value of promises given in so vague a form. The socialist papers bluntly and definitely declare that the audience was a farce.

The autocracy is playing for time and leading the liberal bourgeoisie by the nose. On the one hand, dictatorial powers for Trepov; on the other, meaningless and worthless promises to the liberals in order to cause further vacillation in their all-too vacillating ranks. The tactics of the autocratic government are not so stupid. The liberals are playing at loyalty, moderation, and modesty. Why should not the government take advantage of their stupidity and cowardice? "*A la guerre comme à la guerre*." There are no wars without military stratagems. And when the "enemy" (the liberal bourgeoisie) is something between a foe and a gullible friend, why not lead him by the nose?

M. Gaston Leroux, referred to in our leading article, reports the following details concerning the audience, details which, though not very authentic, are at any rate characteristic and significant. "Baron Fredericks, Minister of the Court, told the delegates that, with the best of intentions, it was difficult for him to obtain an imperial audience for Mr. Petrunkevich, who was said to have revolutionary connections. It was pointed out to the Minister that the Austrian Emperor had had among his Ministers M. Andrássy,

who had at one time been sentenced. This argument removed the last difficulty and the delegates ... were conducted to the Court."

The argument is a good one. The West-European bourgeoisie did fight in earnest at first; at times it was even republican, its leaders were "sentenced"—sentenced for *treason*, i.e., not only for revolutionary connections, but for *actual revolutionary deeds*. Then, many years, sometimes decades, later these bourgeois accommodated themselves to the most wretched of skimpy constitutions without a republic and without even universal suffrage or real political freedom. The liberal bourgeois became fully reconciled to "the Throne" and the police; they rose to power themselves and brutally suppressed, as they do to this day, every aspiration of the workers towards freedom and social reforms.

Russia's liberal bourgeoisie wants to combine pleasure with profit. *To be regarded* as a man with "revolutionary connections" is pleasant; to be capable of occupying a ministerial seat under the Emperor Nicholas the Bloody is profitable. The bourgeois liberals of Russia have no desire whatever to risk "being sentenced" for treason. They prefer *the direct leap* into the stage in which ex-revolutionaries like Andrássy became Ministers on the side of law and order. In 1848 Count Andrássy had taken such an energetic part in the revolutionary movement that, after the suppression of the revolution, he was sentenced *to death and hanged in effigy*. He lived as an émigré in France and in England, and he did not return to Hungary until after the amnesty of 1857. That is when his "ministerial" career began. The Russian liberals do not want a revolution; they dread it; they want to be accepted as *ex-revolutionaries* straight away, without ever having been revolutionaries! They want to leap from 1847 into 1857 at a single bound! They want to make a deal with the tsar straight away for a constitution like those operating in Europe during the violent reaction which followed the *defeat* of the Revolution of 1848.

Indeed, the example of Andrássy was an ideal choice. As the sun is reflected in a tiny drop of water, so the parallel between the bourgeois democracy of Europe, once revolutionary and republican, and the monarchist constitutionalist (even

after January 9, 1905) bourgeois "democracy" of Russia is reflected in the comparison between Andrássy and Petrunkevich. First the European bourgeois fought on the barricades for the republic, then they lived in exile, and they ended up by turning traitors to the cause of liberty, betraying the revolution, and taking service with the constitutional monarchs. The Russian bourgeois want to "learn from history" and "reduce the stages of development": they want to betray the revolution straight away, to turn traitor to liberty straight away. In private conversation they repeat the words of Christ to Judas: "That thou doest, do quickly."

"They were ushered into another hall, ... where the tsar was to receive them," continues M. Gaston Leroux, "when it was suddenly discovered that the revolutionary Petrunkevich had no kid gloves. Colonel of the Life Guards Putyatin instantly took off his own and hastily handed them to the revolutionary."

The audience began. Prince Trubetskoi delivered his speech. As reported by M. Gaston Leroux, he began by stating how grateful they were to the tsar for having "deigned to receive us, thereby proving your confidence in us.... We are simply people of peace and order," declared Prince Trubetskoi (on behalf of the whole "Constitutional-Democratic", or *Osvobozhdeniye*, Party), adding that "the tsar had been deceived" by his councillors. The most "daring" passage in his speech was the one in which he declared that an assembly of representatives based on social-estates, as proposed by Bulygin, was "*inadmissible*" ... why, you think? ... because "You, Your Majesty, are not the Tsar of the nobles, of the merchants and the peasants; you are the Tsar of All the Russias, and the representation must be of the entire people without exception". As to the resolution of the Zemstvo Conference, which we publish in our leading article,* of that *not a whisper*, as was only to be expected.

Mr. Fyodorov dealt in his speech with the *financial side* ... of the "revolution in kid gloves". The national budget would increase after the war by an amount ranging from three hundred to four hundred millions; "an enormous exertion for progress and civilisation" will be necessary, and this,

* See pp. 520-21 of this volume.—*Ed.*

requires the "independence of society" and the "call to life of all men of talent among the people" (chosen under the control of Trepov?).

The tsar's answer we know. "His speech over," telegraphs M. Gaston Leroux, "the tsar conversed amiably with each member of the deputation. He went so far as to ask the famous revolutionary [Petrunkevich] if he was a Marshal of the Nobility. The latter replying in the negative, the tsar expressed the hope that the day would come when he would attain that rank and passed on to another delegate. When he had taken leave of the company, the delegates were ushered into a back room in the palace, where they were served a lunch, which, they estimated, might cost 75 kopeks. In any case, the delegates were pleased with the outcome. [If not at once a ministerial portfolio, at least the post of Marshal of the Nobility had been promised! Even Andrássy must have started as a Marshal of the Nobility, or something of the sort!] They had begun dispatching innumerable telegrams [to the effect that confidence between the tsar and the "people" had now been restored?] ... when they received the official text of the tsar's reply. Great was their stupefaction when they failed to find in it the only important sentence that seemed to promise at least something. The words: 'Our imperial will to convene representatives of the people is unshakable' was changed to the simple affirmation: 'Our imperial will is unshakable.' The delegates immediately returned this official text as unacceptable. Today, not without impatience, they looked forward to receiving a text that would contain the words they all had heard. One of the deputies told me tonight [the telegram of M. Leroux is dated June 20 (7)] with reference to this fantastic manipulation of sentences: This is no longer an autocracy, it's hocus-pocus."

Well put, or well invented, if M. Leroux invented it all. There is hocus-pocus in it even if the promise to convene the popular representatives had been included in the official text of the speech. Kid gloves, and a flunkey's at that, are the true emblem of the political act performed by the Petrunkeviches and the Rodichevs. They started with hocus-pocus themselves, not only by accepting the terms of the audience, but by hiding their resolution in their pockets, by concealing

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

their real wishes, and by most improperly misrepresenting the tsar as a victim of deception, etc., etc. They have no right to complain now that their trickery was answered with trickery. For a general promise to convene representatives of the people means absolutely nothing and yields absolutely nothing while leaving a clear field for a Bulygin and Trepov "constitution", and ample opportunity for procrastination of every description. Everything remains as it was, except that the liberals, fooled like schoolboys, and disgraced by the promise of a Marshal's rank, have done a service to the autocracy by dispatching telegrams hailing the return of "confidence" and making reports about the audience like Mr. Nikitin's in the St. Petersburg municipal council.

We should not like to assume the role of Cassandra.[148] We should not like to prophesy a ludicrous and ignoble end for the Russian revolution. But it is our duty to tell the worker, bluntly and openly, to tell the whole people that things are heading that way. The Constitutional would-be Democratic Party and all these gentlemen of *Osvobozhdeniye* are bringing matters to such an end and to no other. Do not be deceived by the claptrap of the radical-*Osvobozhdeniye* speeches and the Zemstvo resolutions. This is the gaudily painted stage set for the "people", while a brisk trade is going on behind the scenes. The liberal bourgeoisie knows how to cast parts: the radical spellbinders are sent to speechify at banquets and meetings, while the hard-boiled businessmen are sent to "prepare the ground" among the Court clique. And since the power remains perfectly intact and unlimited in the hands of the autocracy, the inevitable result of *such* a course of development will be a "constitution" a hundred times more like the Bulygin scheme than that of *Osvobozhdeniye*.

The destiny of the Russian revolution now rests with the proletariat. Only the proletariat can put a stop to this haggling. Only the proletariat can, by a new heroic effort, rouse the masses, split the wavering army, win over the peasantry, and, arms in hand, gain freedom for the whole people by ruthlessly crushing the enemies of liberty and hurling aside its self-seeking and wavering bourgeois bell-ringers.

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OPEN LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG[149]

Dear Comrades,

In issue No. 135 of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* Comrade Karl Kautsky writes on the split in the Russian Social-Democracy. We feel compelled to ask that you publish our reply to Kautsky's attacks and to allow us to refute the factual inaccuracies which his article contains. We shall be brief.

Kautsky says that "the German edition of the resolutions adopted at the recent Russian Congress could not have appeared at a more inopportune moment", that the resolutions "will give most readers a totally false picture of the relations that exist in the Russian Social-Democracy". Kautsky goes so far as to propose to the German comrades that they should not make these resolutions public.

We take the liberty of pointing out that nothing could give our German comrades a better idea of the relations within the Russian Social-Democracy than the original resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as well as the resolutions of the "conference" held by the new-Iskrists.

We declare that Kautsky is making a great mistake in writing on matters of which, at best, he knows only by hearsay, and that his picture of the relations that exist in the Russian Social-Democracy is a highly distorted one. It is utterly ridiculous, for instance, to hear Kautsky suggest that "the resolutions [of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.] may have lost their significance at the

present moment even for those who drafted* them". Many unity negotiations between us and the new-Iskrists have been held in the course of the past two or three months, but the outcome of these negotiations so far has amounted to nothing.

We strongly protest against the attempt to silence us in the German Social-Democratic press by means of such a crude, mechanical, and unheard-of method as boycotting a pamphlet which contains only a translation of the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and which was issued by the Munich Party publishing house of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany (G. Birk & Co.). Kautsky has no right to speak about his impartiality. He has always been partial as regards the present struggle within the Russian Social-Democracy. This is his right, of course. But one who is partial would do better not to speak too much of impartiality, if he does not want to be accused of hypocrisy.

Kautsky tries to make out that all the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. are "attacks by Lenin and his friends against Plekhanov and his friends". We have three brief remarks to make on this score. In the first place, only four of the seventeen resolutions directly or indirectly touch on our opponents within the R.S.D.L.P. Secondly, Plekhanov has now retired from the Editorial Board of *Iskra* (see *Iskra*, No. 101). This shows how little Kautsky understands our relations. Thirdly, we would ask the German comrades to consider the impression that is likely to be created on the Russian Social-Democrats when a man with Kautsky's authority tries to discredit the work of an entire Party Congress by "representing" it as "attacks by Lenin and his friends". What would people in Germany think of men who (without having read the record of the proceedings) presumed to represent the deliberations, say, of the Dresden Party Congress as an attack by Kautsky and his friends...?

A word of warning to all the German Social-Democrats: Comrades! If you really consider the R.S.D.L.P. to be a fraternal party, do not believe a word of what the so-called impartial Germans tell you about our split. Insist on seeing

* Misprinted "hated" in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.

the documents, the authentic documents. And do not forget that prejudice is further from the truth than ignorance.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

The Editorial Board of the Central Organ ("*Proletary*")
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

P.S. The French socialists' idea of impartiality differs from that of the Germans. Their Central Organ *Le Socialiste* has just published a translation of the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in a special supplement.

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Translated from the German

SKETCH OF A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Setting: Tsarism in St. Petersburg struck down, the autocratic government overthrown—struck down but not utterly destroyed, not killed, *not annihilated*, not extirpated.

The provisional revolutionary government appeals to the people. Workers and peasants *take the initiative*. Complete freedom. The people organise their own lives. The *government programme*=full republican liberties, peasant committees for the *complete* reform of agrarian relations. The Programme of the Social-Democratic Party *is a thing standing by itself*. Social-Democrats in the provisional government=people delegated, *commissioned* by the Social-Democratic *Party*.

Next—the Constituent Assembly. *If* the people have risen, they ...* *may* (even though not immediately) find themselves in the majority (peasants and workers). *Ergo*, the revolutionary *dictatorship* of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Frantic resistance of evil forces. Civil war *in full sweep—annihilation* of tsarism.

Organisation of the proletariat grows, propaganda and agitation of the Social-Democrats increases ten thousandfold—all the government printing-presses, etc., etc. "*Mit der Gründlichkeit der geschichtlichen Aktion wird auch der Umfang der Masse zunehmen, deren Aktion sie ist.*"**

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* One word illegible.—*Ed.*

** "As the thoroughness of the historic action increases, the magnitude of the mass whose cause it represents will also increase."[150]—*Ed.*

The peasantry takes *all* agrarian relations; all the land, into its own hands. *Then nationalisation* becomes a fact.

Tremendous growth of productive forces—the entire rural intelligentsia, all technical knowledge, is brought into action to increase agricultural production, to get rid of fettering influences (uplifters, Narodniks, etc., etc.).... Gigantic development of **capitalist** progress....

War: the *fort* keeps changing hands. Either the bourgeoisie overthrows the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or this dictatorship sets Europe aflame, and them...?

If we are to consider the question of revolutionary dictatorship from the standpoint of Marxism, we shall have to reduce it to an analysis of the *struggle of the classes*.

Ergo, what major social forces should be taken into account? *Ordre de bataille?*

(α) The bureaucratic, military, and Court elements stand *for* absolutism *plus* the unenlightened elements among the people (a rapidly disintegrating conglomerate, yesterday all-powerful, tomorrow powerless). (Dynastic and other conflicts within inevitable.)

Degree of organisation very high—maximum

(β) The more or less big, moderately liberal bourgeoisie. (Here I include the liberal landlords, the top financiers, the merchants, manufacturers, etc., etc. This = Σ lords and masters of a bourgeois country. "Can do anything".)

Degree of organisation very slight

Conflicts between the groupings inevitable; but all stand for a Constitution even now, and still more so tomorrow.

Ideological leaders—in abundance, from among the officials, landlords, and journalists.

(γ) The petty-bourgeois and peasant section. Tens of millions. The "people" *par excellence*.

Degree of organisation—minimum

Greatest state of benightedness and disorganisation.

Their plight most desperate, they have most to gain *directly* from the revolution. The greatest instability (today—for the revolution, tomorrow—for "law and order" after slight improvements).

Democracy. Ideological leaders—a great number of democratic intellectuals. The Socialist-Revolutionary "type".

(δ) The proletariat.

Very high level of organisation, and discipline

Revolutionary-minded. Critical attitude towards the petty bourgeoisie. Has *fewer* ideological leaders than all the others—*only* the Social-Democratic intelligentsia and the educated Social-Democratic workers. Compared with the preceding groups numerically very much weaker, but *Kampffähigkeit** very much stronger.

Object of the struggle = *Republic* (including *all* democratic liberties, the **minimum programme** and far-reaching social reforms).

α—absolutely against.

β—*for* a Constitution, *against* the Republic (½ and ½). ((Bargaining.))

γ—in a revolutionary moment (not firmly) for the Republic ((the unstable elements of the struggle)).

δ—wholly and entirely *for* the Republic.

Written in June-July 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to the manuscript

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* Fighting capacity.—*Ed.*

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE SERVILITY OF THE BOURGEOISIE

An uprising and armed barricade fighting in Lodz, a bloody affray in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, general strikes and shooting at workers in Warsaw and Odessa, the ignominious end of the Zemstvo deputation farce—such are the major political events of the past week. If we add to this what the Geneva papers report today (June 28 [15]) concerning peasant disturbances in Lebedin Uyezd, Kharkov Gubernia, the pillaging of five estates, and the dispatch of troops to these places, we see, reflected in the events of a single week, the character of all the main social forces, which is now so openly and clearly revealing itself in the course of the revolution.

The proletariat has been in a constant state of unrest, especially since the Ninth of January, never giving the enemy a moment's respite. It is keeping up its offensive mainly in the form of strikes, while avoiding direct clashes with the armed forces of tsarism and preparing its forces for the great and decisive battle. In the industrially more developed areas, where the workers are better trained politically and where national oppression is added to the economic and general political yoke, the tsarist police and troops are going out of their way to incense and provoke the workers. And the workers, even those who are unprepared for the struggle, even those who at first confined themselves to defence, are now, through the proletariat of Lodz, setting a new example, not only of revolutionary enthusiasm and heroism, but of superior forms of struggle. They are still poorly, very poorly armed, and their uprising is still

local, isolated from the general movement; nevertheless, they are making a step forward, they are covering the city streets with scores of barricades thrown up with amazing speed, they are inflicting serious losses on the tsarist troops, they are putting up a desperate resistance in some of the houses. The armed uprising is gaining in breadth and intensity. The new victims of the tsar's executioners—nearly 2,000 people have been killed or wounded in Lodz—are kindling intense hatred towards the accursed autocracy in the hearts of hundreds of thousands of citizens. The new armed clashes demonstrate more and more strikingly that the decisive armed struggle of the people against the armed forces of tsarism is inevitable. All these separate outbreaks form more and more distinctly the picture of a widespread all-Russian conflagration. More and more districts, even the most backward, are being drawn into the proletarian struggle, and the zeal of the tsar's myrmidons but serves the revolution by turning economic conflicts into political conflicts, by making the workers everywhere realise from their own hard lot that the autocracy must be overthrown at all costs, and by making of them future heroes and fighters of the popular uprising.

Armed uprising of the people! This is the slogan—advanced so resolutely by the party of the proletariat, as represented by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—which the very course of events, the spontaneous process of expansion and intensification of the revolutionary movement, powerfully impels. Away, then, with all doubts and vacillations. Let it be realised by one and all, now and without delay, how absurd and discreditable are all pretexts today for evading this urgent task of the most energetic preparation of the armed uprising—how perilous it is to delay, how vital it is to unite and co-ordinate the local uprisings which are breaking out all over the country. Taken separately, these outbreaks are ineffectual. The organised force of the tsarist government can crush the insurgents group by group, if the movement continues to spread from town to town and from district to district as slowly and sporadically as it has been doing until now. But united, these outbreaks can converge into a mighty torrent of revolutionary flame, which no power on earth will be able to

withstand. This unity is on the way, it is coming by a thousand paths we do not know of or even suspect. These sporadic outbreaks and skirmishes are giving the people a lesson in revolution, and our job is never to lag behind the exigencies of the moment, but to be able always to point to the next, higher stage of the struggle, deriving experience and instruction from the past and from the present, and urging the workers and peasants on and on more boldly and more broadly to the complete victory of the people, to the complete destruction of the autocratic gang that is now fighting with the desperation of the doomed.

How often we would find people in the Social-Democratic movement, particularly in its intellectualist wing, who belittled the aims of the movement, faint-hearts who have lost faith in the revolutionary energy of the working class. Even now some think that because the democratic revolution is bourgeois by its social and economic nature, the proletariat should not aspire to enact the leading role in the revolution, to take the most energetic part in it, or to put forward such advanced slogans as the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. Events are teaching even these politically backward people. Events are bearing out the militant conclusions that follow from the revolutionary theory of Marxism. The bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution does not mean that this revolution can benefit only the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it is advantageous most of all, and necessary most of all, to the proletariat and the peasantry. Events are making it increasingly clear that only the proletariat is capable of waging a determined struggle for complete liberty, for the republic, in contradistinction to the unreliability and instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat can become the leader of the entire people and win over the peasantry, which can expect nothing from the autocracy except oppression and violence, and nothing from the bourgeois friends of the people except betrayal and treachery. Because of its class position in modern society, the proletariat can understand, sooner than any other class, that, in the final analysis, great historic issues are decided only by force, that freedom cannot be achieved without tremendous sacrifices, that the armed resistance of

tsarism must be broken and crushed by force of arms. Otherwise we shall never live to see liberty, otherwise Russia will meet the fate of Turkey—a long painful decline and disintegration, particularly painful for all the toiling and exploited masses of the people. Let the bourgeoisie abase itself and cringe, let it bargain and beg for sops, for a wretched travesty of liberty. The proletariat will go into action and lead with it the peasantry, which suffers under the vilest and most intolerable conditions of serfdom and humiliation; it will march forward to complete liberty, which can be made secure only by an armed people basing itself upon revolutionary power.

Social-Democracy has not advanced the slogan of insurrection on the spur of the moment. It has always fought, and will continue to fight, against revolutionary phrase-mongering, and it will always demand a sober estimation of forces and an analysis of the given situation. The Social-Democratic Party has ever since 1902 spoken of preparing the uprising, without ever confounding this work of preparation with the senseless artificial improvisation of rebellions which would merely dissipate our forces uselessly. And only now, after the Ninth of January, has the workers' party placed the slogan of insurrection on the order of the day, only now has the necessity of the uprising and the urgency of mobilising for it been recognised. The autocracy itself has made this slogan a practical slogan of the working-class movement. The autocracy has given the broad masses their first lessons in civil war. This war has begun, and it is being fought on an increasingly wider front and with increasing intensity. We have only to generalise its lessons, to explain the great significance of the words "civil war", to derive practical guidance from each encounter in this war, to organise our forces and prepare directly and immediately all that is necessary for a real war.

Social-Democracy does not fear to face the truth. It knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie. It knows that liberty will bring the workers, not tranquillity and peace, but the new and still greater struggle for socialism, a struggle against the present bourgeois friends of freedom. But in spite of this—indeed, because of this—freedom is absolutely necessary to the workers, more necessary to them than to

anyone else. Only the workers are capable of fighting at the head of the people for complete freedom, for a democratic republic. And they will fight for it to the death.

Needless to say, ignorance and degradation are still widespread among the people; a good deal has yet to be done to develop the class-consciousness of the workers, not to speak of the peasantry. But see how quickly the slave of yesterday is straightening his back, how the spark of liberty is gleaming even in his half-dimmed eyes. Look at the peasant movement. It lacks unity and political consciousness, and we have only a faint inkling of its magnitude and its character. But one thing we know: the class-conscious worker and the peasant who is rising to the struggle will understand each other upon the first exchange of words, every ray of light will bring them closer together in the struggle for freedom; they will then not surrender *their* revolution to the contemptibly pusillanimous and selfish bourgeois and landlords—their democratic revolution which can give them land and freedom, which can give the working people every alleviation of their living conditions conceivable in bourgeois society to enable them to continue the struggle for socialism. We need but look at the central industrial region. How long is it since we thought it to be sunk in deep slumber? How long is it since only a sporadic, partial, petty trade union movement was considered possible there? And now a general strike has broken out in that region. In the hundreds of thousands they have risen there, and more are rising. Political agitation is spreading as never before. To be sure, the workers there are still far behind the heroic proletariat of heroic Poland, but the tsarist government is fast educating them; it is fast making them "catch up with Poland".

No, the general armed uprising of the people is no dream. The complete victory of the proletariat and the peasantry in this democratic revolution is no idle thought. And what great perspectives such a victory would open before the European proletariat, which for so many years has been artificially held back from the pursuit of happiness by the reactionary militarists and landlords! The victory of the democratic revolution in Russia will be the signal for the beginning of the socialist revolution, for a new victory of

our brothers, the class-conscious proletarians of all countries.

How utterly contemptible, as compared with the mighty and heroic struggle of the proletariat, was the exhibition of loyalty displayed by the Zemstvo men and the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry at the famous audience granted by Nicholas II. These mountebanks got their deserts. Before the ink had dried on their grovelling and rapturous reports of the tsar's gracious words, the true meaning of those words was revealed to all in new deeds. The censorship is on the rampage. The newspaper *Rus*[151] has been suspended solely for publishing a more than moderate address. The police dictatorship headed by Trepov is in its hey day. The tsar's words are officially interpreted as a promise to call a *consultative* assembly of representatives of the people, with the ancient autocracy "rooted in the native soil" remaining inviolate.

Prince Meshchersky's opinion of the reception, published in *Grazhdanin*, proved to be right. Nicholas knew how to *donner le change* to the Zemstvo men and the liberals, he wrote. Nicholas knew how to *lead them by the nose*!

The gospel truth! The leaders of the Zemstvo people and of the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd have been led by the nose. It serves them right. They got what they deserved for their servile speeches, for their concealment of their true decisions and ideas on the constitution, and for their shameful silence after the tsar's jesuitical speech. They have haggled for a parody of freedom that will be "safe" for the bourgeoisie. All have haggled—Shipov with Bulygin, Trubetskoi with Shipov, Petrunkevich and Rodichev with Trubetskoi, and Struve with Petrunkevich and Rodichev. They are haggling while agreeing "provisionally" to the purely Shipovian programme of the Zemstvo delegation. These hucksters got what they asked for—a kick from the military jackboot.

Surely, this humiliation of the leaders of the Russian bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye* trend should mark the beginning of the end I Surely, those who have the making of sincere and honest *democrats* will now at last turn their backs on that notorious Constitutional-Democratic Party. Surely they ought to realise that they are hopelessly disgracing themselves and betraying the cause of the revolution by support-

ing a "party", the "Zemstvo group" of which crawls on its belly before the autocracy, while the *Osvobozhdeniye* League repeats the like before the Zemstvo group.

We greet the finale of the Zemstvo deputation. The mask has been torn off. Choose, gentlemen of the landowning classes and of the bourgeoisie! Choose, gentlemen of education and members of "leagues" of every description: for revolution or for counter-revolution? for freedom or against freedom? He who would be a true democrat must fight, he must break with the grovellers and traitors, he must create an honest party that will have respect for itself and for its convictions, he must take his stand firmly and irrevocably on the side of the armed uprising. As for those who want to continue the game of diplomatising, of withholding their true opinions, who want to bargain and cringe, to make rhetorical threats believed by none and to go into raptures at the promise of a post of Marshal of the Nobility from the deified sovereign—as for such, let them be publicly branded with the unanimous contempt of all believers in freedom.

Down with the bourgeois betrayers of freedom!

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! Long live the armed uprising for complete freedom, for the republic, for the vital, urgent interests of the proletariat and the peasantry!

Proletary, No. 6,
July 3 (June 20), 1905

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A THIRD STEP BACK

All comrades know from the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party what our attitude should be, in point of principle and organisation, towards the so-called Minority, or the new-Iskrists. While recognising the need for an ideological struggle against the survivals of "Economism", the Third Congress ruled that adherents of the Minority may be admitted to membership in Party organisations, provided they recognise the congresses of the Party and submit to Party discipline. Since this condition has not been met, all "Minority" groups must be regarded as being outside the Party. Practical *agreements* may, of course, be concluded with them at the discretion of the Central Committee and the local committees, along the same lines as the agreements with the Bund, etc.

At present all we can give the comrades is some information regarding the section abroad of the seceded Minority. Immediately after the Congress the C.C. wrote to the "League", as well as to the heads of the technical and financial departments of the Party, asking the former to state its attitude to the Third Congress, and the latter to turn over the Party property to the C.C. No reply was received to either of the letters. The new-Iskrists were not averse to using the Party printing-house and store, and to receiving money from the German Social-Democratic Party and from abroad in general, in the name of the entire Party; but they showed no desire to account to the Party for the use of Party property and the disbursement of Party funds. We consider comment on such behaviour superfluous.

In the article on the Third Congress (*Proletary*, No. 1*) we expressed the wish that the breakaway group of the Party might at least organise itself into some cohesive form as quickly as possible, since this would make agreements easier and the path towards future unity clearer. Unfortunately, even this wish of ours has proved almost unrealisable. The resolutions of the Minority "Conference" have now been published (see the highly interesting pamphlet, *The First All-Russian Conference of Party Functionaries*, a separate supplement to *Iskra*, No. 100; also *Iskra*, No. 100). We earnestly recommend this pamphlet to all Party organisations, for we cannot imagine any better material than this for combating the ideas of the breakaway section of the Party. These resolutions show the Minority's total incapacity to organise even its own followers. They could not even convene their own Conference; we did it for them, the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the C.C., when we convened the Third Congress. The delegates of the Menshevik organisations went to the Congress on the instructions of their organisations, but arrived instead at the Conference! The Conference resolved not to recognise the decisions of the Third Congress—and to rescind the Party Rules adopted at the Second Congress! The Conference was unable to constitute itself as a congress; its decisions were the decisions of a *consultative* assembly, subject to the approval of each organisation. There is no complete list of the participants at the Conference, nor are there any minutes. The organisations of the Minority can therefore only give their ayes and noes to the question whether they will recognise any particular resolution. Thus, a vote will be taken on the resolutions with no opportunity for the voters to offer proposals for changes or to have before them a complete record of the discussion of the resolutions. Heaven only knows how these votes are to be counted, since the polls in favour of confirming or rejecting particular sections of the resolutions may differ. We have here the principle of Bonapartist plebiscites, as opposed to the principle of democratic representation generally recognised by Social-Democrats the world over. With us, democratically elected and responsible represent-

* See p. 443 of this volume.—*Ed.*

atives of qualified organisations consult with one another and reach a decision. With them, representatives as well as guests confer and make proposals, and the qualified organisations vote aye or no *post factum*. It is difficult to imagine a system better suited for disorganising the Social-Democrats. In practice this system of plebiscites always ends in a farce.

The Rules adopted by the Conference and consisting of thirteen clauses are a gem of their kind. They erect a six-storey party structure rising in the following order: (1) Directing Board; (2) Committee; (3) Regional Congress; (4) Regional Committee; (5) Conference; and (6) Executive Committee. Generally speaking, the lower body elects the higher. But the relations between the Directing Board and the Committee are not based on the principle of election but on the principle of "agreement", as the new-Iskrists see it, or on the principle of "confusion", as we see it. On the one hand, the Committee is included *en bloc* in the membership of the Directing Board, together with all the members, not only of the District Committees, but of "the groups working among the special sections of the population". On the other hand, "the District Committee includes also a representative of the Committee"! On the one hand, all important decisions must come from the Directing Board; on the other, in emergency cases, the Committee may act on its own initiative "before inviting the opinion [!] of the District Committees". What is more, "the Committee is obliged to report periodically on its activities to the district committees". If a majority of the members of the District Committees express no confidence in the Committee, the latter is reorganised "by mutual agreement between the Regional Committee and the District Committees". Neither the powers nor the composition of the other Party organisations (including the District Committee) are defined in any way. The concept of Party membership, of which the Mensheviks made a major issue at the Second Congress, has been jettisoned! Heretofore the principle of "agreement" among members of one and the same organisation or party, who sing in unison on all essential questions of programme and tactics, was regarded as an anarchist principle. Social-Democrats throughout the world have in such cases always followed the principle

of the subordination of the minority to the majority. The new-Iskrists want to show the world a shining example of the manner in which these two principles can be commingled in the most "poetic" disorder. Recently we came across a copy of a German newspaper bearing the motto, "*Weder Autorität noch Majorität*" ("Neither Authority nor Majority"), a principle akin to the organisation-as-process theory of the new-Iskrists. The newspaper is the organ of the German anarchists: *Der Anarchist*.

In the election of the centre ("the body that unifies all Party work") the new-Iskrists prefer indirect voting, through electors, to direct voting. The Executive Committee is not elected by the direct vote of the representatives of the Directing Boards, but in *four stages*! Why this sudden dislike of direct elections God alone knows. Some people wonder whether the new-Iskrists may not have been influenced by the example of Mr. Struve, who wants the Upper House to be elected by universal suffrage, but not by direct vote. How this four-stage election is to be carried out, again God alone knows, for there is not a word about it in the "Rules".

Obviously it would be absurd to take the Rules seriously, though we have not exhausted their charms by far. They will never be put into practice. The six-decker bus would not be able to budge an inch, even if it could be built. These Rules are of importance, not for their practical value, but as a statement of principles. They are a superb, peerless illustration of the famous "organisation-as-process" theory. Now even the blind must see that organisation-as-process means disorganisation. Hitherto the Mensheviks have acted as disorganisers of their opponents, of the Second Congress and the bodies created by it. Now they act as disorganisers of their own followers. This is truly disorganisation exalted to a principle.

That the Mensheviks have begun by breaking their own Rules does not surprise us. They have mapped out no scheme for the division of Russia into regions. They have elected no Executive Committee, not even *pro tem.*, pending the confirmation of the committees and organisations. The Conference elected an Organisation Committee, which was not provided for in the Rules, and assigned to it special

tasks! At present even temporary and partial agreements with the Mensheviks are made extremely difficult, for this Organisation Committee lacks official status, and no steps that it takes can have decisive significance. Anyone desiring to have dealings with the Mensheviks must now take the trouble of communicating with each of their organisations separately, and even with each individual "Pan" who may say, "*Nie pozwalam*!"*

Finally, the most astonishing thing about the "Rules" of the Minority is the omission of all reference to Party organs and to Party literature in general. Organs there are (*Iskra*, *Sotsial-Demokrat*[152]) and will be, but the "Rules" adopted by the Conference establish *no* connection between them and the Party. This is incredible, but it is a fact. The publicists are outside the Party, above the Party. No control, no reports, no material dependence. Something reminiscent of the worst days of opportunism among the French socialists: the Party unto itself, and the publicists unto themselves. From this point of view the following decision of the Conference, viz., the resolution on *Party* (?) literature, should perhaps not seem accidental: "The Conference deems it necessary: (1) that the Organisation Committee take measures to furnish the Party publicists greater possibilities to wage a struggle in the legal press for the theoretical principles of the Party." A kind of prototype of Menshevik organisation: a group of "Party publicists", non-responsible and "independent", indispensable and irreplaceable. And attached to them—a committee to have charge of the work of ... legal publication!

It is difficult to discuss this type of organisation with the necessary seriousness. The nearer the revolution and the nearer the opportunity for Social-Democrats to write openly in the "legal" press, the more strictly should the party of the proletariat adhere to the principle of the unconditional responsibility of "Party publicists" to the Party, of their dependence on the Party.

As regards the tactical resolutions of the Conference, they admirably confirm the declaration of the Third Congress

* "I do not permit!"—the expression of the "*Liberum veto*" possessed by every member of the Polish Sejm in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.—*Ed*.

on the shadings of Social-Democracy "akin to Economism", and on "the constriction of the scope of Party work". We shall say nothing of the incredibly careless editing of the resolutions, which rather resemble jottings, aphorisms, reflections, and scraps of rough copy. In this respect the resolutions of the Conference can be rivalled only by the "Programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League". Instead of precise, clear-cut directives issued by the highest body of the Party, we find here ... stylistic exercises of some Party *literati*.

To take the contents. On the pressing question of the uprising, we are not told that it has become "essential"; that it is necessary to elucidate, not only its political significance, but its "practical and organisational aspect"; that we must "organise the proletariat" to this end and "form special groups as the need arises". (Resolution of the Third Congress.) Not at all. First we are told that the possibility of timing the uprising and preparing it by methods of secret organisation is "excluded"; we then read that, with broader agitation and organisation, it is possible to convert spontaneous movements into "planned insurrections". From this muddle the party of the proletariat is expected to derive ideological guidance! The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. *repeats and confirms* all the old truths about propaganda, agitation, the general democratic movement, etc., but *adds* to this a new task: to organise the proletariat for the uprising, to elucidate the "practical and organisational aspect" of *new* methods of struggle, of the determined struggle for freedom. The Conference speaks only of "the preparation of the uprising" in general, with stale repetitions about agitation and organisation in general; it cannot bring itself to formulate a single new task independently, it advances no guiding slogan on the necessity to take a step forward from the general preparation, of which we have spoken since 1902, to the treatment of the matter from the point of view of practical organisation. Like the old Economists to a T. When new tasks of the political struggle emerged upon the scene, they were belittled, broken up into stages, and subordinated to the tasks of the economic struggle.

Not only economic struggle, but political struggle, and in the broadest and boldest forms, said the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The best means of political agitation is

economic struggle, answered the Economists. Not only propaganda and agitation in general, the revolutionary Social-Democrats now say, not only clarification of the political significance of the uprising, but also the formation of special groups, the immediate commencement of practical organisational work, "the most energetic measures for the arming of the proletariat." A planned uprising is excluded, retort the new-Iskrists; we must expand agitation, strengthen organisation, prepare the conversion of the spontaneous into the planned; only in this way "can the moment of insurrection be brought nearer", only in this way "can the technical fighting preparations acquire more or less serious importance"....

For them the moment of insurrection has not yet "come near"! For them the practical preparations have still to "acquire more or less serious importance"! Is this not tail-ism *par excellence*? Is this not a degradation of the "urgent" task (urgent in the opinion of the Third Congress), towards which we have as yet done dreadfully little? Are not these people backing away from uprising to agitation, as the Economists backed away from political struggle to economic struggle with the employers and the government? Read in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71, how Mr. Struve is backing away from the slogan of the "armed uprising", how this leader of the liberal bourgeoisie is questioning the inevitability of the uprising (p. 340), how he lays himself out to minimise the importance of "the technical aspect of the revolution", how he "*gives depth*" to the slogan of the uprising by pointing to the "socio-psychical conditions", how he substitutes for this slogan the slogan of "imbuing the masses with the ideas of democratic reform"—and you will understand what a profoundly demoralising influence the tail-ism of the new-Iskrists must exercise on the proletariat, and into whose hands it plays.

The second urgent political question is that of the provisional revolutionary government. This question is clearly and distinctly formulated in the resolution of the Third Congress. The preamble speaks of the struggle for the republic, which can be won only through a completely successful uprising; of the need for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly by a provisional revolutionary government in order to guarantee truly free and fair elections; of the need to

prepare for the struggle with the bourgeoisie to safeguard the gains of the revolution. The conclusions and directives of the Congress: The proletariat must be made to realise the need for a provisional revolutionary government. The proletariat must put clearly defined demands before this government, namely, the realisation of the entire minimum programme. Social-Democrats may participate in the government (action "from above"), the object of such participation being clearly specified (a ruthless struggle against counter-revolution and defence of the independent interests of the working class). The conditions of such participation are made equally explicit. The formal condition is strict control by the Party; the material condition, i.e., the condition determining the expediency of such participation, is jealous preservation of the independence of the Social-Democratic position and the creation of the conditions for the socialist revolution. This enumeration of the conditions of participation in the government, the conditions of pressure from above, as a new form of activity characteristic of the revolutionary epoch, is supplemented by an indication of the form and the purpose of pressure from below, which must be steadily maintained under all circumstances—pressure on the provisional revolutionary government by the armed proletariat led by the Social-Democratic Party. Broadly, we have here a complete answer to the *new* political question, a precise indication of the significance of the *new* forms of struggle and their purpose, of the programme of the struggle and the conditions under which these forms may be employed.

And in the Conference resolution? The resolution begins with the grossly *erroneous* assertion that "the decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism" may be signalised either by the establishment of a provisional government "or by the revolutionary initiative of a representative institution, which, under the direct revolutionary pressure of the people, decides to organise a popular Constituent Assembly".

The Party may and should be given tactical directions both for the contingency of a victory of the uprising and for the contingency of its defeat, both for the contingency of the convocation of a true Constituent Assembly along revolutionary lines and for the contingency of the convocation of

a travesty of popular representation by the tsar. But to apply the term decisive victory to something that lacks the essential element of victory is to confuse the revolutionary consciousness, not to lead it. Any "decision" of any representative institution to organise a Constituent Assembly is as far removed from decisive victory as word is from deed; for the tsarist government wields the power that can prevent word from becoming deed. There is nothing whatever to choose between the resolution of the new-Iskrists and the affirmation of the old Economists that the decisive victory of the workers may consist either in their winning the eight-hour day or in the government's granting them the ten-hour day, from which stage the workers will pass to the nine-hour day.

The Conference resolution repeats the incontestable theses of Marxism on the bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution, but interprets them narrowly or incorrectly. Instead of the militant slogan of "Republic", we are given a description of the process of "liquidation of the monarchist regime". Instead of setting forth the conditions and tasks of the *new* method of struggle "from above", which can and must be employed in a successful course of the proletarian uprising in the epoch of revolution, we are given the guiding rule "to remain the party of the extreme revolutionary opposition". This is a very useful thesis for the parliamentary struggle and action from below, but it would certainly be inadequate in the time of insurrection. At such a time the task of the "opposition" consists in the violent overthrow of the government; on this question the Conference was unable to offer a guiding slogan.

While admitting the possibility of partial and sporadic "seizures of power" in separate cities and districts, the Conference resolution abandons the "principle" of the new *Iskra* that participation in a provisional revolutionary government with the bourgeoisie constitutes a betrayal of the proletariat, that it is Millerandism, etc. Betrayal that is partial and sporadic is betrayal none the less. Limiting the problem to separate cities and districts does not solve it, however, but merely divides our attention and splits up the question, thereby befogging the issue. Lastly, the slogan of "revolutionary communes", embodied in the Con-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ference resolution, is more like an empty phrase on account of its unclarity, in contrast to the slogan of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The resolution of the new-Iskrists on the provisional revolutionary government suffers from the very fault that glares from their resolution on insurrection, namely, an inability to determine the new tactical tasks of the moment; reiteration of the much reiterated instead of the summons to go forward; the lack of a guiding slogan for the advanced class in the democratic revolution; a belittlement of the tasks and the scope of activity of this class, of its revolutionary enthusiasm and revolutionary energy. The political tendency of this erroneous tactical line is to bring new-Iskrism closer to *Osvobozhdeniye*-ism, to yield the leadership in the democratic revolution to the liberal bourgeoisie, to make the proletariat a mere satellite of the liberal bourgeoisie.

This basic error manifests itself also in the minor resolutions of the Conference. Thus, instead of the slogan of winning the eight-hour day by revolutionary means (resolution of the Third Congress), the old, now inadequate slogan of campaigning for the legislative introduction of the eight-hour day is put forward. Instead of the call for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees, we have the proposal solely to bring to the Constituent Assembly the demand for their formation. Instead of the slogan of combating the inconsistency, narrowness, and inadequacy of the liberation movement of the bourgeoisie wherever these traits manifest themselves (resolution of the Third Congress), the Conference resolution, repeating Starover's error, pursues the illusory aim of finding "the litmus paper", of enumerating the "points" conformity with which, if he meets them, entitles the bourgeois democrat to be called a true friend of the people. Of course, the "points" in the resolution of the new-Iskrists have shown themselves to be incomplete. The demand for the republic is missing. One is left to conclude that a democratic group like the "Russian Liberation Union" (*Proletary*, No. 4*) conforms to these

* See pp. 499-510 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"points", although in reality there is no guarantee whatever that the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd will not predominate in this group.

It need hardly be said that in a newspaper article we could only give a very brief and general idea of the main error pervading the new *Iskra*'s tactical line, as expressed in the Conference resolutions. The erroneous tendencies of the new *Iskra*'s tactical line are as serious and important to the Party as its "organisation-as-process" is not serious. We therefore deal with these tendencies in detail in a special pamphlet which is now in the press and will appear very shortly.[153]

Proletary, No. 6,
July 3 (June 20), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Proletary*

TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Dear Citizens,

The editors of *Proletary* received a telegram today from Berlin. A comrade asks us to inform the International Socialist Bureau that, according to a private telegram to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the Russian Government has requested the powers to dispatch their ships stationed at Constantinople to Odessa to help restore order in that city.

It is quite possible that the Russian Government, no longer trusting its own naval forces, will try to make the warships of European states fight against the Russian revolution under the pretext of defending the foreign *residents* of Odessa.

Thus, there is a great danger that the European peoples may be forced to play the part of executioners of Russian freedom. Therefore we request you, dear citizens, to consider this question and seek the means of preventing such an eventuality. Perhaps it would be advisable to publish in the name of the International Socialist Bureau an appeal to the workers of all countries. The appeal should emphasise that what is taking place in Russia is not mob rioting, but a revolution, a struggle for freedom, that this struggle has as its object the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which is demanded by all progressive parties, in the first place by the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia. Perhaps such an appeal, translated into all languages, printed in the socialist press of the entire world and distributed by every means at our disposal, will be able to influence public opinion and frustrate the designs of the Russian Government—designs that would be fatal to freedom.

We hope that you will let us know your opinion on this matter.

Accept, dear citizens, our fraternal greetings.

On behalf of the Central Committee
of the S.D.L.P. of Russia

N. Lenin (*Vl. Ulyanov*)

Written June 21 (July 4), 1905
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Translated from the French

RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

Workers of all countries, unite!

THREE CONSTITUTIONS OR THREE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

What do the police and officials want?	What do the most liberal of the bourgeois (the people of the *Osvobozhdeniye*, or the Constitutional-Democratic Party) want?	What do the class-conscious workers (the Social-Democrats) want?
The absolute monarchy.	The constitutional monarchy.	The democratic republic.

OF WHAT DO THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT CONSIST?

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY	CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
1. The tsar—an absolute monarch.	1. The tsar—a constitutional monarch.	1. No tsar.
2. A Council of State (officials appointed by the tsar).	2. An Upper House of popular representatives (indirect, not quite equal and not quite universal elections).	2. No Upper House.

3. A State Duma, or consultative body of popular representatives (indirect, unequal, and non-universal elections).	3. A Lower House (universal, direct, and equal elections by secret ballot).	3. A single republican house (universal, direct, and equal elections by secret ballot).

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT?

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY	CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
1. and 2. Complete power of the police and the officials over the people.	1. One-third of the power in the hands of the police and the officials, headed by the tsar.	1. No independent power for either the police or the officials; their complete subordination to the people.
3. Consultative voice of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords.	2. One-third of the power in the hands of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords.	2. No privileges for either the capitalists or the landlords.
No power for the people.	3. One-third of the power in the hands of the whole people.	3. All power—wholly, completely and indivisibly—in the hands of the whole people.

WHAT PURPOSE SHALL THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT SERVE?

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY	CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
That the courtiers, the police, and the officials may live on the fat of the land; that the rich may rob the workers and peasants at their own free will; that the people may remain for ever without rights and live in darkness and ignorance.	That the police and the officials may be dependent on the capitalists and landlords; that the capitalists, landlords, and rich peasants may freely and easily rob the workers of town and country, by right and not by arbitrary rule.	That the free and enlightened people may learn to run things themselves, and, principally, that the working class may be free to struggle for socialism, for a system under which there will be neither rich nor poor and all the land, all the factories and works, will belong to all the working people.

Published in leaflet form in June-July 1905

Published according to the text of the leaflet

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

The uprising in Odessa and the siding of the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* with the revolution marked a further big step forward in the development of the revolutionary movement against the autocracy. Events have confirmed with amazing rapidity the timeliness of the calls to insurrection and to the formation of a provisional revolutionary government, which were addressed to the people by the class-conscious spokesmen of the proletariat as represented by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The new outbreak of the revolutionary conflagration throws light on the practical significance of these calls and makes us determine more precisely the tasks of the revolutionary fighters in the present situation in Russia.

The armed uprising of the people is maturing and is organising itself before our very eyes under the impact of the spontaneous course of events. It was not so very long ago that the only manifestation of the people's struggle against the autocracy was *revolts*—unconscious, unorganised, spontaneous, sometimes wild outbreaks. But the labour movement, as the movement of the most advanced class, the proletariat, rapidly outgrew this initial stage. The goal-conscious propaganda and agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats had their effect. Disturbances gave way to organised strike struggles and *political demonstrations* against the autocracy. The brutal military reprisals of the past few years have "educated" the proletariat and the common people of the towns, and have prepared them for higher forms of revolutionary struggle. The criminal and ignominious war into which the autocracy has plunged the

people filled the cup of their endurance to overflowing. The crowds began to offer armed resistance to the tsarist troops. Real *street fighting*, *barricade battles*, started between the people and the troops. Quite recently the Caucasus, Lodz, Odessa, and Libau have shown us examples of proletarian heroism and popular enthusiasm. The struggle grew into an insurrection. Even the tsar's troops gradually began to see that they were being made to play the shameful role of executioners of freedom, of henchmen of the police. And the army began to waver. At first isolated cases of insubordination, outbreaks among reservists, protests from officers, propaganda among the soldiers, refusal of some companies and regiments to shoot at their own brothers, the workers. Then—*the siding of part of the army with the uprising*.

The tremendous significance of the recent events in Odessa lies precisely in the fact that, for the first time, an important unit of the armed force of tsarism—a battleship—has openly gone over to the side of the revolution. The government made frantic efforts and resorted to all possible tricks to conceal this event from the people, to stifle the mutiny of the sailors from the outset. But to no avail. The warships sent against the revolutionary armoured cruiser "*Potemkin*" *refused to fight* against their comrades. By spreading throughout Europe the report that the *Potemkin* had surrendered and that the tsar had ordered the revolutionary armoured cruiser to be sunk, the autocratic government only completed its disgrace in the eyes of the entire world. The squadron has returned to Sevastopol, and the government is hastening to disband the crews and to disarm the warships; reports are current of wholesale resignations of officers of the Black Sea Fleet; a fresh mutiny broke out on the armoured cruiser *Georgi Pobedonosets*, which had surrendered. The sailors are also rising in Libau and in Kronstadt; clashes with the troops are becoming more frequent; sailors and workers are fighting the troops on the barricades (in Libau). The foreign press reports mutinies on a number of other warships (the *Minin*, the *Alexander II*, and others). The tsarist government finds itself *without a navy*. The most that it has been able to achieve so far is to hold back the fleet from actively going over to the side of

the revolution. Meanwhile, the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* remains an unconquered territory of the revolution, and whatever its fate may be, the undoubted fact and the point of highest significance is that here we have the attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*.

No reprisals, no partial victories over the revolution can diminish the importance of this event. The first step has been taken. The Rubicon has been crossed. The siding of the army with the revolution has impressed itself as a fact upon the whole of Russia and the entire world. The events in the Black Sea Fleet will inevitably be followed by further and still more energetic attempts to form a revolutionary army. It is our task now to give the utmost support to these efforts, to explain to the broadest masses of the proletariat and the peasantry the nation-wide significance of a revolutionary army in the struggle for freedom, to assist various units of this army to unfurl the popular *banner of freedom*, the banner capable of attracting the masses and rallying the forces that will crush the tsarist autocracy.

Outbreaks—demonstrations—street fighting—units of a revolutionary army—such are the stages in the development of the popular uprising. Now at last we have reached the final stage. This does not mean, of course, that the movement in its entirety has advanced to this new and higher stage. No, there is still a good deal of backwardness in the movement; in the Odessa events there are unmistakable signs of old-time rioting. But it does mean that the advance waves of the elemental flood have already reached the very threshold of the absolutist "stronghold". It does mean that the advanced representatives of the popular masses have themselves arrived, not as a result of theoretical reasoning, but under the impact of the growing movement, at new and higher tasks of the struggle, the final struggle against the enemy of the Russian people. The autocracy has done *everything* to prepare this struggle. For years it has provoked the people to an armed struggle with its troops, and now it is reaping what it sowed. The units of the revolutionary army are springing up out of the army itself.

The task of these units is to proclaim the insurrection, to give the masses *military leadership*, as essential in civil war as in any other war; to create strong points for the open

mass struggle; to spread the uprising to neighbouring districts; to establish complete political freedom, if only at first in a small part of the country; to embark on the revolutionary transformation of the decayed absolutist system; and to give full scope to the revolutionary creative activity of the masses, who participate but little in this activity in time of peace, but who come to the forefront in revolutionary epochs. Only by clearly understanding these new tasks, only by posing them boldly and broadly, can the units of the revolutionary army win complete victory and become the strong points of a *revolutionary government*. And a revolutionary government is as vitally essential at the present stage of the popular uprising as a revolutionary army. The revolutionary army is needed for military struggle and for military leadership of the masses against the remnants of the military forces of the autocracy. The revolutionary army is needed because great historical issues can be resolved only *by force*, and, in modern struggle, the *organisation of force* means military organisation. Besides the remnants of the autocracy's military forces there are the military forces of the neighbouring states for whose support the tottering Russian Government is already begging, of which later.*

The revolutionary government is needed for the political leadership of the masses, at first in that part of the country which has been wrested from tsarism by the revolutionary army, and later in the country at large. The revolutionary government is needed for the immediate launching of the political reforms, for the sake of which the revolution is being made—the establishment of a revolutionary self-government of the people, the convocation of a truly popular and truly Constituent Assembly, and the introduction of "liberties" without which there can be no true expression of the people's will. The revolutionary government is necessary for the political unification and the political organisation of the insurgent section of the people, which has actually and finally broken away from the autocracy. Of course, that political organisation can only be provisional, just as the revolutionary government, which has taken power in

* See pp. 569-73 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the name of the people in order to enforce the will of the people and to act through the instrumentality of the people, can only be provisional. But this work of organisation must start *immediately*, and it must be indissolubly combined with every successful step of the uprising; for political consolidation and political leadership cannot be delayed for a single moment. Immediate political leadership of the insurgent people is no less essential for the complete victory of the people over tsarism than the military leadership of its forces.

No one who is at all capable of forming a judgement can doubt the eventual outcome of the struggle between the supporters of the autocracy and the masses of the people. Yet we must not shut our eyes to the fact that the serious struggle is only beginning, that there are great trials in store for us. Both the revolutionary army and the revolutionary government are "organisms" of so high a type, they demand institutions so complicated and a civic consciousness so developed, that it would be a mistake to expect a simple, immediate, and perfect fulfilment of these tasks from the outset. No, we do not expect that; we are able to appreciate the importance of the slow, steady, and often imperceptible work of political education which Social-Democrats have always conducted and always will conduct. But we must not allow what in the present circumstances would be still more dangerous—a lack of faith in the powers of the people. We must remember what a tremendous educational and organising power the revolution has, when mighty historical events force the man in the street out of his remote corner, garret, or basement and make a *citizen* out of him. Months of revolution sometimes educate citizens more quickly and fully than decades of political stagnation. The task of the class-conscious leaders of the revolutionary class is always to march ahead of it in the matter of education, to explain to it the meaning of the new tasks, and to urge it forward towards our great ultimate goal. The failures inevitably involved in our further attempts to form a revolutionary army and a provisional revolutionary government will only teach us to meet these tasks *in practice*; they will serve to draw the new and fresh forces of the people, now lying dormant, to the work of solving them.

To take the military aspect. No Social-Democrat at all familiar with history, who has studied Engels, the great expert on this subject, has ever doubted the tremendous importance of military knowledge, of military technique, and of military organisation as an instrument which the masses of the people, and classes of the people, use in resolving great historical conflicts. Social-Democracy never stooped to playing at military conspiracies; it never gave prominence to military questions until the actual conditions of civil war had arisen.* But *now* all Social-Democrats have advanced the military questions, if not to the first place, at least to one of the first places, and they are putting great stress on studying these questions and bringing them to the knowledge of the masses. The revolutionary army must apply the military knowledge and the military means on the practical plane for the determination of the further destiny of the Russian people, for the determination of the most vital and pressing question—the question of freedom.

Social-Democracy has never taken a sentimental view of war. It unreservedly condemns war as a bestial means of settling conflicts in human society. But Social-Democracy knows that so long as society is divided into classes, so long as there is exploitation of man by man, wars are inevitable. This exploitation cannot be destroyed without war, and war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes. There are wars and wars. There are adventurist wars, fought to further dynastic interests, to satisfy the appetite of a band of freebooters, or to attain the objects of the knights of capitalist profit. And there is another kind of war—the only war that is *legitimate* in capitalist society—war against the people's oppressors and enslavers. Only utopians and philistines can condemn such a war on principle. Only the bourgeois betrayers of freedom can stand aloof from such a war in Russia today, the war for

* Cf. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats", p. 23, on the untimeliness (in 1897) of the question concerning the methods of decisive attack upon tsarism. (First published in pamphlet form, Geneva, 1898. See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 342-43.—*Ed.*)

the people's freedom. The proletariat in Russia has started that great war of liberation, and it will go on with it, forming units of a revolutionary army, reinforcing the units of the soldiers or sailors that have come over to its side, enlisting the peasants, imbuing the new *citizens* of Russia, formed and steeled in the fire of civil war, with the heroism and enthusiasm of fighters for the freedom and happiness of all mankind.

The task of establishing a revolutionary government is as new, as difficult, and as complicated as the task of the military organisation of the revolutionary forces. But this task, too, can and must be fulfilled by the people. In this matter, too, every partial failure will lead to an improvement in methods and means, to the consolidation and extension of the results. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. outlined in its resolution the general conditions for dealing with this new task; it is now time to consider and prepare the conditions for its practical realisation. Our Party has a minimum programme, a complete programme of the changes that are immediately achievable within the framework of the democratic (i.e., bourgeois) revolution, and which the proletariat needs in its further struggle for the triumph of the socialist revolution. But this programme contains basic demands, as well as partial demands that follow from the basic ones or are assumed. In every attempt to establish a provisional revolutionary government it is important to advance precisely the basic demands in order to show to the whole of the people, even to the most unenlightened masses, in brief formulation, in sharp and clear outline, the aims of this government and its tasks that are of significance to the entire people.

There are, in our view, *six* such fundamental points that must become the political banner and the immediate programme of any revolutionary government. They should enlist the sympathy of the people for that government and should be regarded as the most urgent task, upon the accomplishment of which the whole revolutionary energy of the people must be concentrated.

The six points are: (1) a Constituent Assembly of all the people, (2) arming of the people, (3) political freedom, (4) complete freedom for the oppressed and disfranchised nation-

alities, (5) the eight-hour day, and (6) peasant revolutionary committees. Of course, this is only a tentative list, representing the *headings*, the designations, of a series of changes that are required immediately for winning the democratic republic. We do not claim that the list is complete. We merely want to stress the importance of certain basic tasks. The revolutionary government must strive to secure the support of the masses, of the mass of the working class and of the peasantry; short of doing this, it will not be able to maintain itself; without the revolutionary activity of the people it will be a mere nothing, worse than nothing. It is our duty to warn the people against the adventurism of high-sounding but absurd promises (like immediate "socialisation", which even its advocates do not understand), while at the same time we must propose changes that are really practicable at the present moment and really necessary for strengthening the cause of the revolution. The revolutionary government must rouse the "people" and *organise* its revolutionary activity. Complete freedom for the oppressed nationalities, i.e., the recognition, not only of their cultural, but of their political, self-determination; the introduction of urgent measures for the protection of the working class (the eight-hour day as the first in a series of such measures), and lastly, the guarantee of serious measures, without regard for the egotistic interests of the landlords, in favour of the mass of the peasantry—such, in our opinion, are the chief points that every revolutionary government must especially emphasise. We shall not discuss the first three points, which are too obvious to require comment. Nor shall we discuss the need for practically implementing reforms even in a small territory, one, for instance, that has been wrested from tsarism; practical implementation is a thousand times more important than manifestos, and, of course, a thousand times more difficult. We merely wish to draw attention to the fact that it is necessary now, without delay, to spread by every possible means a correct idea of our general and immediate tasks. We must know how to appeal to the people—in the true sense of the word—not only with a general call to struggle (this suffices in the period preceding the formation of the revolutionary government), but with a direct call for the immediate

implementation of the most essential democratic reforms, for their independent realisation without delay.

The revolutionary army and the revolutionary government are two sides of the same medal. They are two institutions equally necessary for the success of the uprising and for the consolidation of its results. They are two slogans which must be advanced and explained as the only consistent revolutionary slogans. There are many people today who call themselves democrats; however, many are called, but few are chosen. There are many spokesmen of the "Constitutional-Democratic Party"; but in so-called "society", in the would-be democratic Zemstvos, there are few *true* democrats, men who are sincerely in favour of the complete sovereignty of the people and are capable of waging a life-and-death struggle against the enemies of that sovereignty, the defenders of the tsarist autocracy.

The working class is free of the cowardice, the hypocritical half-heartedness that is characteristic of the bourgeoisie as a class. The working class can and must be fully and consistently democratic. The working class has proved its right to the role of vanguard in the democratic revolution by the blood it has shed on the streets of St. Petersburg, Riga, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Odessa, Baku, and many other cities. It must prove equal to this great role at the present decisive moment too. While never for a moment forgetting their socialist goal, their class and Party independence, the class-conscious representatives of the proletariat, the members of the R.S.D.L.P., must come forward before the whole of the people with the advanced democratic slogans. For us, for the proletariat, the democratic revolution is only the first step on the road to the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation, to the great socialist goal. All the more quickly, therefore, must we pass this first stage; all the more decisively must we settle accounts with the enemies of the people's freedom; all the louder must we proclaim the slogans of consistent democracy: a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government.

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THE RUSSIAN TSAR SEEKS THE PROTECTION OF THE TURKISH SULTAN AGAINST HIS PEOPLE

The foreign press of all countries and all parties is teeming with reports, telegrams, and articles concerning the siding of part of the Black Sea Fleet with the Russian revolution. The newspapers are at a loss for words in which to express their astonishment; they find no terms strong enough to describe the disgrace which the autocratic government has brought upon itself.

The peak in this disgrace was *the tsarist government's appeal to Rumania and Turkey for police assistance* against the mutinous sailors. Here is proof positive that the "Turks within" are a greater menace to the Russian people than all the "Turks without". The Sultan of Turkey is to protect the tsarist autocracy from the Russian people; the tsar cannot rely on Russia's armed forces, and so he begs other powers for help. Better proof of the utter bankruptcy of the tsarist regime can hardly be imagined. Better material to make the soldiers of the Russian army see the role they are playing could hardly be found.

Observe what *The Times* of July 4 (new style) writes editorially. It should be noted that this is one of the most affluent and best-informed newspapers in the world, and that this mouthpiece of the conservative English bourgeoisie finds even our *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals over-radical, sympathises with the "Shipovians", etc. In a word, no one can possibly suspect it of exaggerating the strength and importance of the Russian revolution.

"The impotence of the [Russian] Government at sea," writes *The Times*, "receives a striking illustration from the Note it is stated to have sent to the *Porte*, [i.e., to the

Turkish Government] and to the Government of *Rumania*. This document [of the Russian Government] calls upon the Governments in question to treat the mutinous sailors of the Russian fleet as common criminals, and warns them that should they act otherwise international complications may follow. In other words, the Government of the Tsar is stooping to beg the *Sultan of Turkey* and the *King of Rumania* to be good enough to do for him the police work which he is no longer able to do for himself. Whether *Abdul Hamid* will condescend to give him the required assistance or not remains to be seen. So far the only result of the mutiny upon the Turkish authorities has been to induce them to exhibit unusual vigilance, and the first exhibition of it has been that they fired a blank shot across the bows of the Russian guardship on Saturday, when she was entering the Bosporus after dark with the *Russian Ambassador* on board. They would hardly have asserted their watchfulness in that fashion twelve months ago. The Government of Rumania rightly ignored the demand that the mutineers should be treated as criminals, as was to be expected from the rulers of a self-respecting nation. They issued orders that the mutineers were not to be furnished with coals or provisions, but they informed the 700 sailors on board the *Kniaz Potemkin* that if they choose to land they will be treated only as foreign deserters."

And so the Rumanian Government does not in the least side with the revolution; far from it! Yet it has no desire to stoop to police service for the universally hated and despised tsar of all the Russias. It refuses the tsar's request. It acts in the only way the "*government of a self-respecting nation*" can act.

That is how the Russian autocracy is now spoken of in Europe by those who only yesterday fawned on the "great and mighty monarch"!

Now comes confirmation in the German press as well of this new, unheard-of disgrace of the autocracy. A report telegraphed to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* from *Constantinople* under date of July 4 (N.S.) states: "The Russian Ambassador Zinoviev handed a Note yesterday [to the Turkish Government] from the St. Petersburg Cabinet stating that about 400 Russian seamen, after sinking a cruiser, had been

picked up the day before yesterday by an English merchant vessel bound for Constantinople. The [Russian] Ambassador demanded of Turkey the detention of the steamer during its passage through the Bosporus and the arrest and extradition of the mutinous Russian seamen. That evening the Turkish Government called a special meeting of the Council of Ministers which considered the Russian request.... Turkey replied to the Russian Embassy that she was *unable* to comply, since according to her international obligations Turkey had no right to exercise police power on a steamer sailing under the English flag, even when the steamer puts into a Turkish harbour. Besides, there existed no extradition treaty between Russia and Turkey."

Turkey replied "courageously", the German newspaper comments on the incident. The Turks refuse to do police duty for the tsar!

It is also reported that when the destroyer *Stremitelny** and several other warships came to Constanta (Rumania) in pursuit of the *Potemkin*, the Rumanian Government pointed out to the Russian authorities that in Rumanian waters it was the Rumanian army and the Rumanian police that maintained order, even if the *Potemkin* was still in Rumanian waters.

Thus, instead of the *Potemkin* creating trouble for foreign ships (as the tsarist autocracy had predicted in order to frighten Europe), these ships are plagued by a host of annoying incidents caused by the Russian fleet. The English are indignant at the detention and search of their ship *Granley* at Odessa. The Germans are incensed by reports that, at the request of the Russians, the Turks will stop and search the German ship *Pera* on her way to Constantinople from Odessa. Perhaps, under these circumstances, it will not be so easy for Russia to secure European assistance against the Russian revolutionaries. The question of rendering such assistance is being discussed by a great many foreign papers, but in most cases they come to the conclusion that it is not Europe's business to help the tsar fight the *Potemkin*. The *Berliner Tageblatt* publishes a report that the Russian

* It is said that there are no ratings on the *Stremitelny*. Its crew consists almost entirely of officers. The aristocracy against the people!

Government has even requested the powers to send their warships from Constantinople to Odessa to help restore order! How much truth there is in this statement (denied by certain other papers) the near future will show. But one thing is certain: with the *Potemkin* joining the uprising the first step has been taken towards converting the Russian revolution into an international force by bringing it face to face with the European states.

This fact should not be forgotten in appraising the telegraphic report of M. *Leroux* to the Paris newspaper *Le Matin* from St. Petersburg on July 4 (N.S.): "Throughout this [*Potemkin*] affair," he writes, "the lack of foresight on the part of the [Russian] authorities has been astonishing; one cannot overstate the lack of *organisation of the revolution*. The revolution gains possession of a battleship, an event unique in history, but it does not know what to do with it."

There is, undeniably, a great deal of truth in this report. Without a doubt we are to blame for not organising the revolution sufficiently. We are to blame that certain Social-Democrats are but faintly conscious of the fact that revolution must be organised, that the uprising must be included among the urgent practical problems, and that the necessity of a provisional revolutionary government must be stressed in our propaganda. We revolutionaries deserve the criticism now levelled at us by bourgeois writers for our poor organisation of revolutionary functions.

But whether the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* deserves this reproach we do not venture to say. Perhaps it was the deliberate aim of the crew to show themselves in the harbour of a European power? Did not the Russian Government keep all news of the events in the Black Sea Fleet from the people until the *Potemkin* had freely entered the waters of Rumania? In Rumania the revolutionary battleship delivered a proclamation to the consuls with a declaration of war on the tsarist fleet and a statement to the effect that it would commit no hostile acts against neutral ships. *The Russian revolution has declared to Europe that a state of open war exists between the Russian people and tsarism*. By doing so the Russian revolution has actually made an attempt to speak in the name of a new, revolutionary government of

Russia. Undoubtedly, this is merely a first, feeble attempt, but, as the saying goes, the first step is always the hardest.

According to the latest reports, the *Potemkin* has arrived at Feodosia, demanding provisions and coal. The local population is in a turmoil. The workers demand that the request of the revolutionary battleship be granted. The Municipal Council decided to refuse coal, but to supply provisions. The whole of South Russia is agitated as never before. The number of victims of the civil war in Odessa is estimated at *6,000*. Telegraphic reports speak of the shooting of 160 insurgents by court martial, and of an order from St. Petersburg "*to give no quarter*!" But the troops are powerless; the troops themselves are unreliable. In the factory suburbs of Odessa the turmoil has not subsided. Last night (July 4-5, N.S.) thirty-five people were killed. By order of the Governor-General, many of the troops have been withdrawn from the city *following the discovery of a serious lack of discipline among them*. In Nikolayev and Sevastopol disturbances arose in the government arsenals. Thirteen people have been killed at Sevastopol. Peasant uprisings have broken out in five uyezds of Kherson Gubernia. *Nearly 700 peasants were killed in the last four days*. "A life-and-death struggle between the people and the bureaucracy has apparently begun," says a telegram from Odessa to London dated July 5, N.S.

Yes, the real struggle for freedom, the life-and-death struggle, is only beginning. The revolutionary armoured cruiser has not said its last word yet. Long live the revolutionary army! Long live the revolutionary government!

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Proletary, No. 7,
July 10 (June 27), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Proletary*

THE BOURGEOISIE BARGAINS WITH THE AUTOCRACY, THE AUTOCRACY BARGAINS WITH THE BOURGEOISIE

Almost every day brings fresh evidence of this "bargaining", to which we have been directing the attention of the Russian proletarians for so long a time. Here is an interesting telegram from M. Leroux dated St. Petersburg, July 2 (new style): A meeting of municipal and Zemstvo representatives held on June 28 and 29 (15 and 16, old style) once more (for the hundredth time!) formulated constitutional demands and telegraphed them to the ministries. The demands are higher than usual: popular representation is made an absolute condition, and is to be incorporated in the *constitution*; the "Bulygin" Constitution is rejected outright; the demand is put forth for the immediate proclamation of the inviolability of the person, freedom of speech, etc. The conference is said to have unanimously adopted (*but not to have included in the petition*—in bargaining one must not show all one's cards!) the demand for universal suffrage.

How does the correspondent of the bourgeois paper judge this significant increase in the demands of the landlords and manufacturers? Oh, his judgement is a most sober one:

"*It is obvious*," he writes, "*that the delegates demand more in order to get at least a little. But it is certain also that this little, to be acceptable to them, must lie between that which they demand and that which Bulygin is offering them*."

A veritable market, at which the bourgeoisie is bargaining away the rights and interests of the Russian workers and the Russian peasants. As in a market, the buyer—the bourgeoisie, and the seller—the tsar shake hands on the

bargain, shout for the hundredth time that this is their "last word", swear that they are "losing money", threaten to go away, but cannot bring themselves to break up their close friendship.

If the tsar does not meet our demands, "one of the most prominent members of the [Zemstvo] conference" said to M. Leroux, "we will appeal to the people".

What is one to understand by this oft-repeated "appeal to the people"? the French correspondent asks himself and his readers. And he answers: here there is no Faubourg St. Antoine (the workers' district in Paris; cf. the article in *Vperyod*, No. 2[154]). The people are inclined to keep off the street and to stay at home, to protest in the Tolstoian manner by refusing to pay taxes!...

Do not slander the people, you bourgeois betrayers of liberty! No slander will ever cleanse the stain of your shameful cowardice. The people are shedding their blood throughout Russia. Faubourgs St. Antoine of our own are springing up in a number of towns and in countless villages. The people are waging a desperate struggle. If you had really wanted to "appeal to the people" (and not merely threaten your ally, the tsar, to do so) you should not have assigned hundreds and thousands of rubles for your talking-shops, but millions for the armed uprising. You should have elected a delegation, not to cool its heels in the antechambers of the tsar, but to make contact with the revolutionary parties, with the revolutionary people.

The tsar and his gang know only too well that you are incapable of doing so because you are afraid for your moneybags, because you are afraid of the people. Therefore the tsar is entirely right in treating you as flunkeys; in feeding you the same old promises, the same old Bulygin Constitution; in assuming that you will not dare to make even a real, emphatic protest, not even against that Bulygin sop. Small wonder that the special correspondent of the *Journal de Genève*, a "respectable" liberal paper, wrote recently: "The liberals do not conceal from themselves the imperfections [!] of the Bulygin plan, but *they think it should be accepted* in the interests of *order* and progress.... *To reject the government's plan would mean deliberately to destroy the last hope for a peaceful outcome to the present conflict between the*

people and the bureaucratic regime." (The last sentence is underscored by the correspondent himself.)

The bourgeoisie wants *peace* with the tsar and fears *the war of the people against the tsar*. The tsar wants peace with the bourgeoisie, but does not fear the war with the people, which he has started and is ruthlessly continuing. Is it not obvious that *if the people fail to achieve complete victory in spite of the treachery of the bourgeoisie*, the inevitable outcome of this situation will be the Bulygin Constitution?

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NOTES

[1] Lenin's article "*The Autocracy and the Proletariat*" was published as an editorial in issue No. 1 of the newspaper *Vperyod*.

Vperyod (*Forward*) was an underground Bolshevik weekly published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905), to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen numbers were issued. The newspaper's organiser, manager, and guiding spirit was V. I. Lenin. Other members of the Editorial Board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky, and A. V. Lunacharsky.

The outstanding role which the newspaper played in combating Menshevism, re-establishing the Party principle, and formulating and elucidating the issues posed by the rising revolution was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress, which recorded a vote of thanks to the Editorial Board.

Over forty articles and minor items by Lenin were published in *Vperyod*. Some issues of the newspaper, e.g., Nos. 4 and 5, which dealt with the events of January 9 (22), 1905, were written almost entirely by Lenin.

Vperyod maintained regular contacts with the Party organisations in Russia. Especially close connections existed with the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Baku, Ekaterinoslav, and other Party committees, as well as with the Caucasian League Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which formed a special publicists' group to assist Lenin's paper.

Lenin's articles in *Vperyod* were often reprinted in the local Bolshevik press and published in the form of leaflets and pamphlets. p. 17

[2] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies formed in the central provinces of tsarist Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility and their powers were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the Provincial Governors and by the Ministry of the Interior, which could rescind any decisions of which the government disapproved. p. 21

[3] *Municipal councillors*—members of municipal councils in tsarist Russia. p. 21

[4] The reference is to the tsar's ukase of December 12 (25), 1904, to the Senate. p. 21

[5] *Zemstvo councillors*—members of Zemstvo assemblies in tsarist Russia. p. 22

[6] The reference is to the tsarist government's brief flirtation with the liberals in 1904. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, the Minister of the Interior, sanctioned the Zemstvo meetings, slightly relaxed the censorship, pardoned several banished liberal politicians, etc. p. 22

[7] *Plehve, V. K.*—a statesman in tsarist Russia; between 1902 and 1904 Minister of the Interior and Chief of the Gendarmes. He waged a bitter fight against the revolutionary movement. p. 22

[8] *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals—bourgeois liberals grouped round the magazine *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*), which was published abroad in 1902-05 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. The *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals organised the liberal-monarchist *Osvobozhdeniye* League in January 1904. Later they formed the nucleus of the principal bourgeois party in Russia—the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets). p. 24

[9] *Socialists-Revolutionaries* (S.R.'s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the union of the Narodnik groups and circles. The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the magazine *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05) became its official organs. The views of the S.R.'s were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to patch up "the rents in the Narodnik ideas" with "bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism". (See present edition, Vol. 9, "Socialism and the Peasantry", p. 310.) The S.R.'s failed to see the class distinctions between proletariat and peasantry, glossed over the class differentiation and contradictions within the peasantry, and rejected the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. The tactics of individual terrorism which the S.R.'s advocated as a basic method of struggle against the autocracy caused great harm to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the S.R.'s envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land and its transfer to the village communes on the basis of equalised tenure, as well as the development of all forms of co-operation. There was nothing socialistic in this programme, which the S.R.'s sought to present as a programme for "socialising the land", since abolition of private ownership of the land alone, as Lenin pointed out, cannot abolish the domination of capital and the poverty of the masses. The real, historically progressive content of the S.R. agrarian programme was the struggle for the abolition of landlord ownership, for the "American" way of capitalist development in Russian agriculture. This programme objectively expressed the interests and aspirations of the peasantry at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The Bolshevik Party fought hard against the attempts of the S.R.'s to camouflage themselves as socialists and to spread their influence to the working class, against their tactics of individual

terrorism; the S.R.'s were the chief opponents of the Bolsheviks, who struggled to gain influence over the peasantry and to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks concluded temporary agreements with the S.R.'s in the struggle against tsarism.

In the final analysis, the absence of class homogeneousness in the peasantry was responsible for the political and ideological instability and the organisational confusion in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and for its constant vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There had been a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party during the first Russian revolution, its Right Wing forming the legal Toilers' Popular-Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Constitutional-Democrats and the "Left" Wing taking shape as the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party experienced a complete ideological and organisational break-down, and the First World War saw most S.R.'s adopt the standpoint of social-chauvinism.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917, the S.R.'s, together with the Mensheviks and Constitutional-Democrats, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, in which leaders of the party (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) participated. Influenced by the revolutionising of the peasantry, the "Left" Wing of the S.R.'s founded an independent party of Left S.R.'s at the end of November 1917. Striving to maintain their influence among the peasant masses, the Left S.R.'s formally recognised the Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but with the development of the class struggle in the villages they turned against the Soviet power. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War, the S.R.'s carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activity, strongly supported the interventionists and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state. After the Civil War, the S.R.'s continued their hostile activity against the Soviet state within the country and abroad among whiteguard émigrés. p. 24

[10] *Nasha Zhizn* (*Our Life*)—a newspaper close to the Left Wing of the Constitutional-Democrats, published in St. Petersburg between 1904 and 1905. p. 24

[11] Lenin applies the word "secret" ironically to the congress of chairmen of Zemstvo Boards and other Zemstvo officials which was due to be held on November 6, 1904, in St. Petersburg by permission of the tsar. Five days before the opening when the delegates had begun to arrive, it was announced that the tsarist government had proposed the postponement of the congress for a year. However, Minister of the Interior Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who was flirting with the liberals, allowed the Zemstvo delegates to have a chat "over a cup of tea in private apartments". p. 25

[12] The famous Rostov strike broke out on November 2 (15), 1902. It quickly developed into a political demonstration in which up to thirty thousand workers took part. The strike lasted until November 25 (December 8). It was led by the Iskrist Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (See present edition, Vol. 6, "New Events and Old Questions", pp. 276-81.)

The *number of mass demonstrations in the South* mentioned by Lenin refers to the mass political strikes and demonstrations which took place in the South of Russia in 1903, involving the Transcaucasus (Baku, Tiflis, and Batum) and the chief Ukrainian cities (Odessa, Kiev, and Ekaterinoslav). p. 27

[13] *Iskra* (*The Spark*) was the first all-Russian underground Marxist newspaper; it was founded by Lenin in 1900.

Iskra became the centre for the unification of Party forces, for the rallying and training of Party workers. It played a decisive role in the struggle for a Marxist party, in the defeat of the "Economists", and in the unification of the scattered Social-Democratic circles.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin, the *Iskra* Editorial Board drew up a draft programme of the Party and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held in July-August 1903. After the Second Congress the Mensheviks, with the aid of Plekhanov, seized control of *Iskra*. Beginning with November 1903 (with issue No. 52), *Iskra* became the organ of the Mensheviks and was published up to October 1905. Since then Lenin's *Iskra* became known as the old *Iskra* and the Menshevik opportunist organ as the new *Iskra*. The reference here is to the new, Menshevik *Iskra*. p. 30

[14] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*)—publication of the "Economists", appeared irregularly in Geneva between April 1899 and February 1902 as organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It was edited by B. N. Krichevsky, P. F. Teplov (Sibiryak), and V. P. Ivanshin and subsequently by A. S. Martynov. Twelve numbers appeared (in nine issues). The Editorial Board was the centre abroad of the "Economists" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists). *Rabocheye Dyelo* supported the Bernsteinian slogan of "freedom to criticise" Marxism and took an opportunist stand on the questions of the tactics and organisational tasks of Russian Social-Democracy; it rejected the revolutionary potentialities of the peasantry, etc. The *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists propagated opportunist ideas of the subordination of the political struggle to the economic struggle; they bowed to the spontaneity of the labour movement and denied the leading role of the Party. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists represented the extreme Right, opportunist, Wing of the Party. A critique of the views of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group is to be found in Lenin's work *What Is To Be Done?* (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.) p. 32

[15] *Technical workers*—a group of Bolsheviks authorised by the Party to handle the business of organising underground printing-press,

the printing and distribution of underground Party literature, and obtaining and transporting weapons. p. 36

[16] *Orlovsky*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik V. V. Vorovsky. p. 38

[17] Bolshevik (Majority) organisational centre—the Bureau of Committees of the Majority—was elected at the conferences of the local Majority committees. The southern conference was held in September 1904. The Majority conference of the Caucasian committees was held in Tiflis in November 1904; it was attended by 15 delegates representing the Baku, Batum, Imeretian-Mingrelian and Tiflis committees. The northern conference was held in December 1904. p. 40

[18] The resolutions of the northern conference were published by Lenin in 1905 in *Vperyod*, No. 2, for January 14 (1), in the Party News column.

The resolutions of the southern conference were first published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany** *XV*, pp. 217-19. The resolutions of the Caucasian conference were published in the same volume, pp. 249-53. p. 40

[19] *Vasily Vasilyevich*—the Bolshevik M. S. Olminsky (Alexandrov). p. 43

[20] *Rakhmetov*—A. A. Malinovsky, better known by the name of Bogdanov; joined the Bolsheviks in 1903, but deserted Bolshevism after the Fifth, London, Congress. p. 43

[21] Meaning the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. p. 46

[22] *Papasha*—the Bolshevik M. M. Litvinov. p. 46

[23] Preparatory materials for the article "The Fall of Port Arthur"—several variants of a plan for the article, numerous jottings from the foreign press, etc.—were published in *Lenin Miscellany V*, 1929, pp. 57-59, *Lenin Miscellany XVI*, 1931, pp. 37-42, *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*, 1934, pp. 242-51. p. 47

[24] *Alexeyev*, *Y. I.*—admiral, from 1903 the tsar's viceroy in the Far East. p. 51

[25] *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*)—newspaper of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, published from the end of 1900 to 1905; from January 1902 the central organ of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 52

[26] *Panin*—pseudonym of M. S. Makadzyub; *Cherevanin*—pseudonym of F. A. Lipkin. Both Menshevik publicists. p. 58

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* All references to *Lenin Miscellany* are to the Russian editions.—*Ed.*

[27] *Ryadovoi*—pseudonym of A. A. Malinovsky. p. 60

[28] Refers to the notice announcing the publication of *Vperyod*; the announcement was printed in leaflet form, December 1904, by the Bolshevik publishing house of Social-Democratic Party literature in Geneva, headed by V. Bonch-Bruyevich and N. Lenin. p. 63

[29] *Absolute*—the Bolshevik Y. D. Stasova. p. 66

[30] *Shemyakin trial*—an unjust trial, from the title of an old Russian story about the Judge Shemyaka. p. 68

[31] *Sobakevich*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls* typifying a bullying, tight-fisted landlord. p. 68

[32] *Narodism* (from the word *narod*—people)—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement, which began to manifest itself in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. The Narodniks stood for the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landlords' lands to the peasantry. At the same time, they believed capitalism in Russia to be a fortuitous phenomenon with no prospect of development, and they therefore considered the peasantry, and not the proletariat, to be the main revolutionary force in Russia. They regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. With the object of rousing the peasantry to struggle against absolutism, the Narodniks "went among the people", to the village, but they found no support there. In the eighties and nineties the Narodniks adopted a policy of conciliatoriness to tsarism, expressed the interests of the kulak class, and waged a persistent fight against Marxism. p. 72

[33] *Narodnaya Volya members*—participants in the secret political organisation of the Narodnik terrorists called Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will), which came into being in August 1879 as a result of the split in the Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom) secret society. The immediate aim of the Narodnaya Volya was the overthrow of the autocracy. Its programme called for the organisation of "a permanent representative assembly of the people" elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, transfer of the land to the people, and adoption of measures for transferring the factories and mills to the workers. The Narodnaya Volya members, however failed to and a way to the broad masses and took the path of political conspiracies and individual terrorism. Their terroristic struggle was not supported by the revolutionary movement of the masses, and this enabled the government to wreck the organisation by means of savage persecutions, death sentences, and provocations.

After 1881 the Narodnaya Volya broke up. Abortive attempts to revive it were made repeatedly in the course of the eighties. Thus, in 1886 a terrorist group was formed, headed by A. I. Ulyanov (Lenin's brother) and P. Y. Shevyryov, which followed the tradi-

tions of the Narodnaya Volya. After the failure of the attempt to assassinate Alexander III the group was discovered and its active members were executed.

While criticising their fallacious and utopian programme, Lenin thought highly of the noble struggle of the Narodnaya Volya members against tsarism. In 1899, in "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats", he pointed out that "the members of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia, despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory which served as the banner of the movement". (See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 181.) p. 72

[34] *V. V.*—pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov, one of the ideologues of liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties of the past century. p. 72

[35] *Legal Marxism*—a bourgeois perversion of Marxism, which originated in the nineties of the past century among the bourgeois intellectuals. The "legal Marxists" tried to make the labour movement serve the interests of the bourgeoisie. While criticising the Narodniks and acknowledging the capitalist path of development the "legal Marxists" denied the inevitability of capitalism's downfall. They threw out of the Marxian doctrine its most important tenet, the doctrine of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. p. 73

[36] See Lenin, "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book" (present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507). p. 73

[37] *Bernsteinian opportunism*—an anti-Marxian trend in the international Social-Democratic movement which appeared in the late nineteenth century in Germany, so called from the name of the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein. The latter tried to revise the revolutionary teaching of Marx in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism.

The followers of Bernstein in Russia were the "legal Marxists", the "Economists", the Bundists, and the Mensheviks. p. 73

[38] *Starover*—pseudonym of the Menshevik A. N. Potresov. p. 74

[39] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political magazine published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* Editorial Board. The following articles by Lenin appeared in this publication: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (under the heading of "Messrs. the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), "Review of Home Affairs", "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". Altogether four numbers (in three issues) appeared: No. 1, No. 2-3, and No. 4. p. 77

[40] *Nikolai—on*—pseudonym of N. F. Danielson, an ideologue of liberal Narodism in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 85

[41] The reference is to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 88

[42] *Zubatov*—colonel of the gendarmerie who tried to introduce a type of "police socialism". He set up pseudo-labour organisations under the patronage of the gendarmerie and the police in order to divert the workers from the revolutionary movement. p. 90

[43] The petition of the St. Petersburg workers to the tsar was printed in leaflet form and reprinted in *Vperyod*, No. 4, January 31 (18), 1905. p. 91

[44] *Redemption payments*—payments which the peasants had to make to the landlords for the allotments which they received under the Regulations of February 19, 1861, abolishing serfdom. The redemption payments were considerably in excess of the actual value of the allotments. In making them, the peasants in actuality were not only paying the landlords for the land which they had been using since time immemorial, but were paying for their emancipation as well. p. 92

[45] The letters mentioned by Lenin came from a Bolshevik in St. Petersburg and were published in *Vperyod*, No. 4, January 31 (18) 1905, under the heading "Letters of St. Petersburg Social-Democrats". p. 106

[46] The reference is to the newspaper *Vorwärts*, central organ of the German Social-Democrats, mentioned in *Vperyod*, No. 4, January 31 (18), 1905, in the article "On Palace Square: Letter of an Eyewitness". p. 111

[47] *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* (*Government Herald*)—a newspaper, official organ of the tsarist government; published in St. Petersburg between 1869 and 1917. p. 118

[48] The article "*The Battles on the Barricades*", devoted to the beginning of the revolution in Russia, was written for *Vperyod*, No. 4, but was not published. It first appeared in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*. p. 122

[49] *Ugryum-Burcheyev*—a type of dull and narrow-minded dignitary depicted by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his story *History of a Town*. By the St. Petersburg Ugryum-Burcheyevs Lenin meant members of the palace clique of Tsar Nicholas II. p. 124

[50] *A Brief Outline of the Split in the R.S.D.L.P.* was printed in leaflet form by the Berne (Switzerland) R.S.D.L.P. promotion group on February 2 (15), 1905, with the following introduction: "The Berne

promotion group of the R.S.D.L.P., *Vperyod*, publishes this letter because it considers it very important, especially for the comrades in Russia, to have a brief outline of the split. Will the comrades abroad please forward the letter to Russia." p. 125

[51] *The Bund* (*the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia*), organised in 1897, was an association mainly of Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (March 1898).

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists demanded that the Bund be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat. Upon the rejection of this organisational nationalism by the Congress, the Bund left the Party.

In 1906, after the Fourth (Unity) Congress, the Bund re-entered the R.S.D.L.P. The Bundists persistently supported the Mensheviks and waged an unremitting struggle against the Bolsheviks. Although formally belonging to the R.S.D.L.P., the Bund was a bourgeois-nationalist type of organisation. It countered the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy. During the First World War (1914-18) it adopted the position of the social-chauvinists. In 1917 it supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. During the Civil War leading Bund members joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time, a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with the Soviet power. When the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the internal counter-revolution and the foreign interventionists became clearly revealed, the Bund declared that it relinquished its struggle against the Soviet power. In March 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and part of its membership entered the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the basis of the rules of admission. p. 126

[52] *The League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was founded in October 1901 on Lenin's initiative. Members of the League were the foreign section of the *Iskra-Zarya* organisation, and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, which included the Emancipation of Labour group. The aim of the League was to disseminate the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy and help to build up a militant Social-Democratic organisation. Actually the League was *Iskra*'s representative abroad. It recruited *Iskra* adherents from among Russian Social-Democrats living abroad, gave financial support to *Iskra*, organised delivery of the paper to Russia, and published Marxist popular literature. It also brought out several bulletins and pamphlets. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. endorsed the League as the only Party organisation abroad with the status of a committee and authorised it to work under the direction and control of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Following the Second Congress, the Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the League and launched a struggle against Lenin and the

Bolsheviks. At the League's Second Congress, in October 1903, the Mensheviks slandered the Bolsheviks, after which Lenin and his adherents left the session. The Mensheviks adopted new Rules of the League, which were directed against the Party Rules approved by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. After this the League, which existed until 1905, became a stronghold of Menshevism. p. 127

[53] *Galyorka*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik M. S. Olminsky (Alexandrov). p. 129

[54] *Voinov*—pseudonym of the Bolshevik A. V. Lunacharsky. p. 129

[55] *Nashi Dni* (*Our Days*)—a liberal-bourgeois newspaper which appeared in St. Petersburg in 1904-05. p. 133

[56] *Shelgunov, N. V.* (1824-91)—democratic writer and publicist; contributed to the periodical *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*). His progressive activity was well known to the advanced workers of St. Petersburg. His funeral on April 15 (27), 1891, turned into an anti-government demonstration. p. 139

[57] The reference is to the mass political strike which occurred in Kiev in July 1903. A lengthy report dealing with this strike was published in *Iskra*, No. 47, September 1, 1903, under the headline "The General Strike in Kiev". p. 140

[58] *Kifa Mokiyevich*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls* depicted as a type of person who is absorbed in the solution of idle and senseless problems. p. 152

[59] On May 5 (18), 1902, the worker Hirsh Lekert made an attempt on the life of the Governor of Wilno, von Wal. Martov and Zasulich hailed this act of individual terror.

The leaflet on the assassination of Plehve mentioned by Lenin refers to leaflet No. 16 "To the Working People", signed by the Editorial Board of the Menshevik *Iskra*, which openly defended the Socialist-Revolutionary tactics of individual terror. p. 160

[60] The reference is to the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei, Governor-General of Moscow, by the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorists. p. 162

[61] *Tryapichkin*—a type of unscrupulous journalist mentioned in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*. p. 169

[62] The *Mountain* and the *Gironde*—designation of the two political groupings of the bourgeoisie at the time of the French bourgeois revolution towards the end of the eighteenth century. The Mountain, or Jacobins, was the name given to the more consistent representatives of the revolutionary class of the time, the bourgeoisie,

who advocated the abolition of absolutism and feudalism. Unlike the Jacobins, the Girondists wavered between revolution and counter-revolution, and entered into deals with the monarchy.

Lenin called the opportunist trend in Social-Democracy the "Socialist Gironde", and the revolutionary Social-Democrats—proletarian Jacobins, the "Mountain". After the R.S.D.L.P. split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin frequently stressed that the Mensheviks were the Girondist trend in the working-class movement. p. 173

[63] Lenin has in view the item "Disorganisation of the Local Committees" and the resolutions of the Minsk and Odessa groups of the Social-Democrats published in *Vperyod*, No. 7, February 21 (8), 1905, in the Party News column. p. 175

[64] *Bonapartists abroad*—applied by Lenin to the Mensheviks who, in defiance of the Party, bad seized control of the Party's Central Organ, *Iskra*, of the Central Committee, and of the Council of the Party. p. 177

[65] The reference is to the resolution of Starover (A. N. Potresov) on the attitude towards the liberals, adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. At the Third Congress this resolution was disaffirmed. p. 187

[66] *Black Hundreds*—a reactionary, monarchist, pogrom-making organisation set up by the tsarist police to combat the revolution ary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals, and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 204

[67] *Plan of a Lecture on the Commune*—an outline of Lenin's lecture on the Paris Commune delivered by him in Geneva on March 5 (18), 1905, for the Russian colony of political emigrants. p. 206

[68] In his introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France*, Engels analysed the situation in France after the June insurrection of 1848, saying: "If the proletariat was not yet able to rule France, the bourgeoisie could no longer do so." (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 475.) p. 206

[69] Here and further below Lenin refers to the German edition of Karl Marx's pamphlet *The Civil War in France*, which appeared in Berlin in 1891. p. 206

[70] Lenin draws a comparison between the executioners of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the executioners of the first Russian revolution of 1905.

Trepov, *D. F.*—Governor-General of St. Petersburg; responsible for the suppression of the first Russian revolution.

Vasilchikov, *S. I.*, Prince—tsarist general; commanded the tsarist

troops in St. Petersburg which shot down the peaceful demonstration of workers on January 9 (22), 1905. p. 207

[71] Here and further below Lenin refers to the book *Histoire du mouvement social en France 1852-1902* by G. Weill, Paris, 1904. p. 207

[72] The number of Communard victims is quoted from Prosper Olivier Lissagaray's *Histoire de la Commune de 1871*, Paris, 1896. p. 208

[73] *The Exceptional Law Against the Socialists* was promulgated in Germany in 1878. The law suppressed all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, mass working-class organisations, and the labour press; socialist literature was confiscated; and the banishing of socialists began. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. 214

[74] *X*—pseudonym of the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 233

[75] This paragraph is a foreword by Lenin to the translation of Cluseret's article published in *Vperyod*, No. 11, March 23 (10), 1905, under the heading "Street Fighting. (The Advice of a General of the Commune)". The translation was edited by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*, 1934, pp. 355-65). p. 237

[76] *Vasilyev*—the Bolshevik F. V. Lengnik. p. 240

[77] *Glebov*—V. A. Noskov; was elected to the Central Committee by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In the summer of 1904 he deserted the Bolsheviks and adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mensheviks. p. 242

[78] This paragraph was printed as a footnote by Lenin to V. V. Vorovsky's article "The Fruits of Demagogy" in *Vperyod*, No. 11, March 23 (10), 1905.

The materials dealing with the history of the Party's Marxist programme were given in Vol. 6 of this edition. p. 245

[79] *Cut-off lands* (*otrezki*—Russian term)—lands seized by the landlords from the peasants' allotments at the time of the emancipation of the serfs in Russia in 1861. p. 247

[80] The reference is to the following point in the Party's programme adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.: "In striving to achieve its immediate aims, the R.S.D.L.P. supports any and every opposition and revolutionary movement directed against the existing social and political order in Russia, while at the same time emphatically rejecting all reformatory projects that are in any way connected with the extension or consolidation of police-bureaucratic patronage over the toiling classes" (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1953, Part I, p. 43; Russ. ed.). p. 248

[81] "*The Anti-Kriege Circular*" was written by Karl Marx in collaboration with Frederick Engels at the beginning of May 1846 and published in the monthly *Das Westphälische Dampfboot* (see *Aus dem literarischen Nachlaß von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*. Herausgegeben von Franz Mehring; Band II, Stuttgart, 1902, S. 414-28). p. 250

[82] Engels wrote on Henry George in his preface to the American edition of his *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. The work appeared in New York in 1887. p. 250

[83] *Nikitich*—L. B. Krasin. p. 252

[84] *The Shidlovsky Commission* (headed by Senator Shidlovsky) was set up by the tsarist government on January 29 (February 11), 1905, "to enquire into the causes of the discontent among the workers", but actually to deceive the workers and draw them away from the revolutionary struggle. Speaking of the "subterfuges of the Party's 'Shidlovsky Commission'" Lenin had in mind the double-dealing of the Central Committee, where the Mensheviks had seized control and which formally went on record for a Third Congress while actually opposing the convocation of the Party Congress. p. 255

[85] *Grazhdanin* (*The Citizen*)—a reactionary newspaper published in St. Petersburg between 1872 and 1914. Founded by Prince Meshchersky. From the eighties of the last century it was the organ of the extreme monarchists. It existed mainly on government subsidies. From 1906 it appeared as a weekly. p. 269

[86] *Bulygin*—tsarist Minister of the Interior; author of a draft law on the State Duma, which was a caricature of popular representation (see pp. 352-56 of this volume). p. 273

[87] *Bakuninism*—an anarchist trend hostile to Marxism. Named after its founder Mikhail Bakunin (1814-76). The basic postulate of Bakuninism was the negation of the state as such including the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bakuninists held that the revolution was to take the form of immediate popular revolts directed by a secret revolutionary society, made up of "outstanding" individuals. The theory and the tactics of the Bakuninists were severely condemned by Marx and Engels. Lenin described Bakuninism as the world outlook "of the petty bourgeois who despairs of his salvation". Bakuninism was one of the ideological sources of Narodism.

Tkachovism—from Tkachov, one of the ideologists of Narodism. He ignored the role of the popular masses and advocated the idea of a conspiratorial organisation and the tactics of individual terrorism. p. 279

[88] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 42-43. p. 279

[89] See Frederick Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*, Moscow, 1956, p. 139. p. 280

[90] *Millerand*—French reformist socialist. In 1899, joined the reactionary bourgeois government, in which he collaborated with General Galliffet, executioner of the Paris Commune.

Varlin, *Louis-Eugène* (1839-71)—a French worker, prominent leader of the First International, member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and member of the Paris Commune of 1871. p. 282

[91] L. Martov's article "On the Order of the Day: The Workers' Party and 'the Seizure of Power' as Our Immediate Task" was published in the Menshevik *Iskra*, No. 93. Lenin criticised the article in his "The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry" and in his Report at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. "On the Participation of the Social-Democrats in a Provisional Revolutionary Government". (See p. 293 and pp. 390-92 of this volume.) p. 285

[92] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 335. p. 287

[93] *Sisyphean labour*—synonym for hard, wearisome and futile toil, which originated in the ancient Greek myth about King Sisyshus condemned by the gods to roll to the top of a hill a huge stone which constantly rolled back again. p. 289

[94] The article "*The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry*" was published also in pamphlet form by the Caucasian League Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Georgian, Russian, and Armenian. p. 293

[95] The reference is to the resolution on "International Rules of Socialist Tactics" adopted at the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International in August 1904. p. 297

[96] By the term *parliamentary cretinism* Lenin characterised the opportunists' view that the parliamentary system of government was all-powerful and parliamentary struggle the sole and, under all conditions, the principal form of political struggle. p. 300

[97] The reactionary newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*) waged against its political opponents a virulent campaign in which it made wide use of malicious slander and other dishonest methods of controversy.

Further below, Lenin calls the Menshevik *Iskra* "our Party's *Novoye Vremya*" and the Mensheviks people of the "*Novoye Vremya*" type". p. 309

[98] The reference is to the pamphlet by Orlovsky (V. V. Vorovsky) *The Council Against the Party*, published in Geneva in 1904. p. 311

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[99] *The leaflet on the insurrection*, signed by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, was published in full in *Vperyod*, No. 9, March 8 (February 23), 1905, under the title "Pressing Problems". p. 314

[100] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a newspaper, founded in 1756. Since the sixties of the nineteenth century it voiced the views of the most reactionary monarchist sections of the landlords and the clerical order. From 1905, it was one of the chief organs of the Black Hundreds. Its publication continued until the October Revolution, 1917. p. 315

[101] Lenin quotes from Marx's Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. MEGA, 1. Abt., Bd. 1, S. 608. p. 318

[102] *Das Westphälische Dampfboot* (*Westphalian Steamer*)—a German periodical of a democratic trend published in Westphalia between 1845 and 1848. The journal published occasional articles by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. p. 323

[103] *Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov*, *Chairman of the Council of the R.S.D.L.P.*, was published at first as a leaflet and reprinted in *Vperyod*. The message to the Party Council was forwarded to Plekhanov on April 4 (17),1905. On the following day the Organising Committee (consisting of members of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and representatives of the Central Committee) met and decided to give the Council seven days in which to reply and after that to open the Party Congress. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. started exactly within seven days—on April 12 (25). p. 335

[104] *Johansen*—L. B. Krasin. p. 335

[105] *Valerian*—A. I. Lyubimov. p. 335

[106] *Vadim*—D. S. Postolovsky. p. 339

[107] *B.* or *Bem*—M. A. Silvin, representative of the Central Committee on the Party Council at the beginning of 1905; *Vtorov*—the Menshevik V. N. Krokhmal. p. 340

[108] *The First of May* was written by Lenin in Geneva and issued as a leaflet over the signature of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*. The leaflet was reprinted by a number of local Social-Democratic committees. p. 348

[109] *The Wild Gentleman*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's fairy tale under the same title. p. 354

[110] *The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London between April 12 and 27 (April 25 and May 10), 1905. The Congress was

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organised and convened by the Bolsheviks under the direction of Lenin. It was the first Bolshevik congress.

The agenda, drawn up by Lenin and approved by the Congress, consisted of the following items: (I) *Report of the Organising Committee*. (II) *Questions of Tactics*: 1) the armed uprising; 2) attitude towards the government's policy on the eve and at the moment of the revolution (this point was devoted to two questions: a. attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of the revolution; b. the provisional revolutionary government); 3) attitude towards the peasant movement. (III) *Organisational Questions*: 4) relations between workers and intellectuals in the Party organisations; 5) the Party Rules. (IV) *Attitude Towards Other Parties and Trends*: 6) attitude towards the breakaway group of the R.S.D.L.P.; 7) attitude towards the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations; 8) attitude towards the liberals; 9) practical agreements with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. (V) *Internal Questions of Party Life*: 10) propaganda and agitation. (VI) *Delegates' Reports*: 11) report of the Central Committee; 12) reports of the delegates of the local committees. (VII) *Elections*: 13) elections; 14) procedure for publishing the resolutions and the proceedings of the Congress and for the assumption of office by the newly elected functionaries.

On all the basic issues dealt with by the Third Congress Lenin had written the draft resolutions, which he substantiated in articles published in *Vperyod* prior to the Congress. Lenin spoke at the Congress on the question of the armed uprising, on the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government, on the attitude towards the peasant movement, on the Party Rules, and on a number of other questions. The proceedings of the Congress record 138 speeches and motions made by Lenin.

The Congress amended the Party Rules: a) it adopted Lenin's wording of Clause 1; b) it defined precisely the rights of the Central Committee and its relations with the local committees, c) it modified the organisational structure of the Party's central bodies: in place of the three centres (the Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the Council of the Party) the Congress established a single competent party centre—the Central Committee.

On the work and the significance of the Third Party Congress see Lenin's article "The Third Congress" (pp. 442-49 of this volume) and his book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. p. 359

[111] *Letnev*—A. I. Lyubimov. p. 367

[112] *Zimin*—L. B. Krasin. p. 367

[113] *Leskov*—N. V. Romanov, delegate from the Northern Committee. Others mentioned in the speech *Zharkov*—M. S. Leshchinsky, delegate from the Ekaterinoslav Committee, *Mikhailov*—D. S. Postolovsky, delegate from the North-Western Committee; *Sosnovsky*—V. A. Desnitsky, delegate from the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee. p. 371

[114] The document has no heading. The title has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee, C.P.S.U. p. 373

[115] *Sergeyev*—A. I. Rykov. p. 375

[116] *Alexandrov*—D. S. Postolovsky. p. 376

[117] *Schmidt*—P. P. Rumyantsev, delegate from the Voronezh Committee. p. 376

[118] Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, March 1850. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 106-17.) p. 386

[119] *The Communist League*—the first international association of the revolutionary proletariat, founded in the summer of 1847 in London at the congress of delegates from revolutionary proletarian organisations. The organisers and leaders of the Communist League were Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who were commissioned by that organisation to write the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. The Communist League existed up to 1852. Its most prominent members eventually played a leading role in the First International. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, pp. 338-57.) p. 386

[120] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared in Cologne between June 1, 1848, and May 19, 1849, under the management of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Editor-in-Chief was Marx. Under the blows of reaction the newspaper ceased its existence after issue No. 301. On the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, pp. 328-37. p. 388

[121] The reference is to Engels' letter to Filippo Turati dated January 26, 1894, and published in the Italian bi-monthly *Critica Sociale*, No. 3, for February 1, 1894, under the heading "The Future Italian Revolution and the Socialist Party". (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 551-55.) p. 390

[122] The Russian translation of Engels' article "Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit. Denkschrift über den Aufstand in Spanien im Sommer 1873" (published in 1873 in "Internationales aus dem *Volksstaat*"), was edited by Lenin and issued in pamphlet form by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva in 1905 and in St. Petersburg in 1906. p. 391

[123] *Vendée*—a department of France where, during the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century, a counter-revolutionary insurrection of the backward, reactionary peasantry took place against the revolutionary Convention The revolt was engineered by the counter-revolutionary clergy and landlords with the help of religious catchwords. p. 393

[124] Lenin quotes from Marx's article "The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution; Second Article", written on December 11, 1848. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 67.) p. 393

[125] *Andreyev*—N. A. Alexeyev, attended the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. with consultative voice. p. 398

[126] *Barsov*—the Bolshevik M. G. Tskhakaya. p. 400

[127] "*General redistribution*"—a slogan popular among the peasants of tsarist Russia and expressing their desire for a general redistribution of the land. p. 402

[128] *Golubin*—the Bolshevik P. A. Japaridze, a delegate to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 411

[129] The document has no heading. The title has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 412

[130] The document has no heading. The title has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 423

[131] The resolution "*On the Events in the Caucasus*" was first published in issue No. 1 of the newspaper *Proletary*, May 27 (14), 1905, and in issue No. 1 of the Georgian underground Bolshevik newspaper, official organ of the Caucasian League of the R.S.D.L.P., *Borba Proletariata* (*The Struggle of the Proletariat*), July 1 (14), 1905. p. 424

[132] The reference is to the resolution "On the Constitution of the Congress" published in issue No. 1 of *Proletary*, May 27 (14), 1905 (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1953, Part I, pp. 75-76; Russ. ed.). p. 434

[133] This item was published as an editorial note to the resolution of the Third Congress "On the Constitution of the Congress" in *Proletary*, No. 1, May 27 (14), 1905. p. 440

[134] The article "*The Third Congress*" was reprinted on July 1 (14), 1905, in issue No. 1 of *Borba Proletariata*. p. 442

[135] The reference is to the resolutions of the All-Russian Lawyers' Congress held in St. Petersburg on March 28-30 (April 10-12), 1905. These resolutions are criticised in the leading article of *Proletary*, No. 2, June 3 (May 21), 1905. p. 451

[136] The "special pamphlet" referred to appeared on June 12 (25), 1905, in French, as a supplement to the newspaper *Le Socialiste*, Central Organ of the Socialist Party of France, and in German in the Munich

edition *Bericht über den III. Parteitag der S.-D.A.-P.R.* (Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Resolutions of the Congress). The issue of these pamphlets was announced in *Proletary*, No. 15, September 5 (August 23), 1905, in the Party News column. p. 456

[137] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—underground Bolshevik weekly, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., founded in accordance with a resolution of the Third Party Congress. By a decision of the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee of April 27 (May 10), 1905, Lenin was appointed Editor-in-Chief.

Proletary was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25), 1905. Twenty-six numbers were put out. V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, and M. S. Olminsky regularly helped in the work of the Editorial Board. *Proletary* carried on the line of the old, Leninist, *Iskra* and preserved complete continuity with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

Lenin wrote over fifty articles and minor items for the newspaper His articles in *Proletary* were reprinted in the local Bolshevik periodicals and published in leaflet form.

Shortly after Lenin's departure for Russia in November 1905 *Proletary* suspended publication. The last two issues of *Proletary* (Nos. 25 and 26) were edited by Vorovsky. p. 456

[138] *Stephan Born* (1824-98)—representative of the German labour movement, participant in the revolution of 1848, member of the Communist League (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, pp. 352-53). p. 469

[139] See Karl Marx, "Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln", Berlin, 1952, S. 39. p. 471

[140] Lenin refers to the Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League written by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in March 1850 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 106-17). p. 472

[141] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 106-17. p. 472

[142] Lenin refers to Engels' "On the History of the Communist League" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 338). p. 472

[143] *Der Volksstaat* (*The People's State*)—Central Organ of German Social-Democracy, published in Leipzig from 1869 to 1876, edited by Wilhelm Liebknecht. Marx and Engels contributed to the newspaper. p. 475

[144] Lenin's third article on the subject of "The Provisional Revolutionary Government" did not appear in print. Lenin dealt with the question of the aims of the provisional revolutionary government

in his "Sketch of a Provisional Revolutionary Government" (see pp. 534-36 of this volume), in his article "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government" (see pp. 560-68 of this volume), and in his book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. p. 481

[145] The document is an editorial preface to the pamphlet *Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, published in Yiddish in 1905. p. 495

[146] The article "*The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat*" was reprinted in *Borba Proletariata*, No. 2, July 15 (28), 1905. p. 511

[147] *Le Matin*—French bourgeois daily newspaper, founded in 1884. p. 521

[148] *Cassandra*—daughter of Priam, legendary King of Troy. Cassandra, according to ancient Greek legend, possessed the gift of prophecy and prophesied the downfall of Troy. p. 530

[149] "*Open Letter to the Editorial Board of the 'Leipziger Volkszeitung'*" was written by Lenin in answer to an article by Kautsky "The Split in Russian Social-Democracy", published in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. In a letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. dated June 29 (July 12) Lenin wrote in regard to Kautsky's article: "Kautsky has published a mean article on the German edition of the 'Report'", that is, the Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin's "Open Letter" was not published by the newspaper. p. 531

[150] See Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique*, Moscow, 1956, p. 110. p. 534

[151] *Rus* (*Russia*)—a bourgeois-liberal newspaper, which appeared at intervals in St. Petersburg between December 1903 and June 1908 under different names: *Rus*, *Molva* (*Hearsay*), and *Dvadtsaty Vek* (*The Twentieth Century*). p. 542

[152] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—a Menshevik newspaper, appeared in Geneva from October 1904 to October 1905. p. 548

[153] The reference is to Lenin's *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, which appeared at the end of July 1905. p. 554

[154] The reference is to A. V. Lunacharsky's article "Outline of the History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the European Proletariat", published in *Vperyod*, No. 2, January 14 (1), 1905. p. 575

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*January-July 1905*)

1904-05

December 22 (January 4)	Issue No. 1 of the newspaper *Vperyod*, edited by Lenin, appears in Geneva. The issue contains his articles: "The Autocracy and the Proletariat" (editorial), "Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals", "Time to Call a Halt!", and others. Lenin writes the pamphlet "Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party."
December 24 (January 6)	In "A Letter to a Comrade in Russia" Lenin sharply criticises the attitude of the Menshevik newspaper *Iskra* towards bourgeois democracy.
	Lenin reads a paper at the Russian colony of political emigrants in Geneva on the question of working-class and bourgeois democracy.
December 28 (January 10)	In a letter to A. A. Bogdanov, a member of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, Lenin urges a definite and complete break with the Mensheviks.

1905

January 1 (14)	Lenin's articles "The Fall of Port Arthur" (editorial) and "Fine Words Butter No Parsnips" are published in *Vperyod*, No. 2.
January 5 (18)	In a letter to the Zurich group of Bolsheviks Lenin calls for a definite break with the Mensheviks and the immediate convocation of the Third Party Congress.
January 6 (19)	In a letter to Y. D. Stasova and to the other comrades in prison in Moscow Lenin offers advice on the conduct of Social-Democrats in the tsarist law court.
Between January 10 and 17 (23 and 30)	Lenin writes the series of articles entitled "Revolutionary Days" concerning the events of January 9 in St. Petersburg.

January 11 (24)	*Vperyod*, No. 3, publishes the following articles by Lenin: "Working-Class and Bourgeois Democracy" (editorial), "From Narodism to Marxism", "Revolution in Russia", "The St. Petersburg Strike", and "Our Tartuffes".
January 12 (25)	Lenin writes the article "The Beginning of the Revolution in Russia" calling for the preparation of the armed uprising. The article is published as an editorial in *Vperyod*, No. 4, for January 31 (18).
January, after the 13th (26th)	Lenin addresses a meeting of Bolsheviks in Geneva on the events of January 9.
January 18 (31)	*Vperyod*, No. 4, publishes the following articles by Lenin under the heading "Revolutionary Days": "What Is Happening in Russia?", "The First Steps", "Father Gapon", "The Plan of the St. Petersburg Battle", "'Our Father the Tsar' and the Barricades".
January 19 (February 1)	Lenin writes the article "The Tsarist Peace".
January 21 (February 3)	In a letter to Hermann Greulich, the Swiss Social-Democrat, Lenin outlines in brief the history of the split in the R.S.D.L.P.
January 25 (February 7)	Lenin writes to August Bebel rejecting his proposal for a court of arbitration between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.
	Vperyod, No. 5, publishes Lenin's articles "St. Petersburg After January 9", "Trepov in the Saddle", and others.
	In Geneva Lenin attends a lecture by M. S. Olminsky on the subject "A Variety of Opportunism" in which Menshevism is criticised.
February 1 (14)	Lenin's article "Two Tactics" is published as an editorial in *Vperyod*, No. 6.
February 2 (15)	In a letter to S. I. Gusev in St. Petersburg Lenin urges that contacts be strengthened and extended between the Editorial Board of *Vperyod* and the workers' study circles, and especially with the youth.
February 8 (21)	Lenin's articles "A Militant Agreement for the Uprising" (editorial) and "Should We Organise the Revolution?" are published in *Vperyod*, No. 7.

February 12 (25)	In a letter to S. I. Gusev, Lenin insists on the preservation of complete independence by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority in preparing and convening the Third Congress of the Party.
February 15 (28)	Lenin writes his "Letter to the Organisations in Russia" pressing for the immediate preparation of the Third Congress. Lenin's article "The Convening of the Third Party Congress" (editorial) is published in *Vperyod*, No. 8.
February, prior to the 20th (March 5)	Lenin draws up the questionnaire for reports by local Party organisations for the Third Congress.
February 20 (March 5)	Lenin addresses a meeting of the Organising Section of the Bolshevik Club in Geneva following a report by A. M. Essen (Stepanov) on the work among the non-proletarian sections of the population (students, soldiers and peasants).
February 23 (March 8)	Lenin's articles "New Tasks and New Forces" (editorial) and "*Osvobozhdeniye*-ists and New-Iskrists, Monarchists and Girondists" are published in *Vperyod*, No. 9.
February 28 (March 13)	Lenin informs the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. of the receipt of money from the English Labour Representation Committee for the relief of the victims of January 9, 1905.
February	Lenin writes a general plan of the decisions and draft resolutions for the Third Congress of the Party.
March 2 (15)	*Vperyod*, No. 10, publishes Lenin's articles "The Proletariat and the Bourgeois Democrats" and "Whom Are They Trying to Fool?"
March 3 (16)	In a letter to S. I. Gusev in St. Petersburg Lenin writes that the conference of socialist parties arranged by G. A. Gapon has been postponed and urges the need for A. A. Bogdanov's immediate departure for Switzerland.
March 5 (18)	Lenin delivers a lecture on the Paris Commune at a meeting of the Russian colony of political emigrants in Geneva.

March, prior to the 10th (23rd)	Lenin edits the Russian translation of a chapter from the *Memoirs of General Cluseret* and writes a short biography of the author. The translation was published in the newspaper *Vperyod*, No. 11, under the title "Street Fighting. (*The Advice of a General of the Commune*)".
March 10 (23)	Lenin's articles "The Proletariat and the Peasantry" (editorial) and "The First Step" are published in *Vperyod*, No. 11.
March 12 (25)	Lenin writes a letter to the Odessa Committee concerning the nomination of delegates to the Third Congress of the Party.
March 16 (29)	Lenin writes his article "What the Bonapartists Are Up To". It was published as a reprint from *Vperyod*, No. 13.
March 20 (April 2)	Lenin attends a conference of the Russian socialist organisations held in Geneva. Upon convincing himself of its opportunist character, Lenin walks out. Lenin is elected delegate to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. from the Odessa Party organisation.
March 23 (April 5)	Lenin's articles "European Capital and the Autocracy" (editorial), "The Second Step", and the beginning of the article "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government" are published in *Vperyod*, No. 13.
March 30 (April 12)	Lenin's article "The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry" is published in *Vperyod*, No. 14. The article was also issued in pamphlet form by the Caucasian League Committee in Russian, Georgian, and Armenian.
March-April	Lenin writes the plan of his article "A Revolution of the 1789 or the 1848 Type?"
April 5 (18)	Lenin takes part in the Geneva meeting of the Organising Committee for Convening the Third Congress of the Party.
April 6 (19)	Lenin authorises G. D. Leiteizen, a member of the staff of *Vperyod*, to address the Congress of the Socialist Party of France with greetings on behalf of the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*.

April 7 (20)	Lenin's articles "The Agrarian Programme of the Liberals" (editorial), "Marx on the American 'General Redistribution'", and others are published in *Vperyod*, No. 15.
April 10 (23)	Lenin, on behalf of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., writes the "Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov, Chairman of the Council of the R.S.D.L.P.". The letter was published in *Vperyod*, No. 16.
April not later than 11 (24)	Lenin drafts a resolution of the Organising Committee on representation of various organisations at the Congress and a resolution of the O.C. on the constitution of the Congress.
April 11 (24)	Lenin takes part in the meeting of the Organising Committee for Convening the Third Congress of the Party and drafts the resolution of the Organising Committee on the validity of the Congress.
April, prior to the 12th (25th)	Lenin writes the leaflet "The First of May" published by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*.
	Lenin receives mandates from the Kursk and Odessa committees of the Party to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
	Lenin leaves Geneva for London to attend the Third Congress of the Party.
	Lenin draws up the agenda for the Third Congress, holds conferences with members of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and with members of the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, and has talks with delegates on questions concerning the work of the forthcoming Congress.
April 12-27	Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
(April 25-May 10)	Lenin directs the work of the Congress. He keeps the Congress chairman's diary.
April 12 (25)	Opening of the Congress. Lenin is elected to the chair.
April 13 (26)	Lenin makes a speech on the question of the validity of the Congress. He is elected to the Resolutions Drafting Committee.
April 14 (27)	Lenin edits A. V. Lunacharsky's report on the armed uprising.

Lenin speaks at the fourth and fifth sessions of the Congress on the report of the Credentials Committee.

April 15 (28) Lenin speaks at the sixth session of the Congress on the question of the armed uprising.

April 16 (29) Lenin makes a speech at the eighth session of the Congress on the armed uprising and edits the resolution on this question.

April 17 (30) Lenin's article "The Constitutional Market-Place" is published in *Vperyod*, No. 16. It was published in leaflet form by the Baku Bolshevik Committee on May 15 (28).

April 18 (May 1) Lenin makes a speech at the tenth session of the Congress on the question of the attitude towards the government's tactics on the eve of the revolution.

At the eleventh session of the Congress Lenin makes the report, "On the Participation of the Social-Democrats in a Provisional Revolutionary Government", and moves a draft resolution on this question.

April 19 (May 2) Lenin makes a speech at the twelfth session of the Congress on the amendments to the resolution on the provisional revolutionary government.

At the thirteenth session of the Congress Lenin makes the report on the "Resolution on the Support of the Peasant Movement".

Lenin's resolution on "Open Political Action by the R.S.D.L.P." is adopted at the thirteenth session of the Congress.

April 20 (May 3) Lenin's resolution "On the Support of the Peasant Movement" is debated and adopted at the fourteenth and fifteenth sessions of the Congress.

Lenin makes a speech at the fifteenth session of the Congress on the relations between workers and intellectuals within the Social-Democratic organisations.

April 21 (May 4) Lenin speaks during the discussion of the Party Rules at the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions of the Congress.

The Congress at its sixteenth session adopts Clause 1 of the Rules as formulated by Lenin.

April 22 (May 5) Lenin offers to the nineteenth session of the Congress the "Draft Resolution on the Relations Between Workers and Intellectuals Within the Social-Democratic Organisations" and takes the floor three times on this question.

April 22 and 23 (May 5 and 6) Lenin submits the resolution "On the Breakaway Section of the Party" and speaks in the discussion of this question at the nineteenth and twentieth sessions of the Congress.

April 23 (May 6) Lenin makes a speech at the twenty-first session of the Congress on a practical agreement with the Socialists-Revolutionaries.

April 25 (May 8) Lenin speaks at the twenty-second session of the Congress on the question of propaganda and agitation.

April 26 (May 9) Lenin makes a speech at the twenty-third session of the Congress on the report on the work of the Central Committee.

April 27 (May 10) Lenin is elected to the Central Committee of the Party.

Lenin's resolution on the standing order for the publication of the Congress proceedings is adopted at the twenty-third session.

April, after the 27th (May 10th) Lenin's resolution on the events in the Caucasus is adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the Congress.

Lenin closes the Third Congress of the Party.

Lenin chairs the first meeting of the Central Committee elected by the Third Congress of the Party.

Lenin outlines the plan for the allocation of functions among the members of the Central Committee for carrying on work abroad and in Russia.

Lenin draws up the password, the code, and the assumed names to be used in communication between members of the Central Committee, as well as the technique of organisation and financing of Party work.

The C.C. appoints Lenin Editor-in-Chief of the Party's Central Organ, *Proletary*, and representative of the C.C. abroad.

Lenin visits Karl Marx's grave at Highgate Cemetery, London, together with the Third Congress delegates.

Between April 27 and May 2 (May 10 and 15)	Lenin leaves London for Geneva. In Paris, en route, Lenin and a group of Third Congress delegates visit the place where the Paris Communards were shot—the Wall of the Confederates at the Père-Lachaise Cemetery.
May 5 (18)	Lenin's article "Political Sophisms" is published in *Vperyod*, No. 18.
May 7 (20)	Lenin participates in a meeting of members of the staff of the Party's Central Organ, *Proletary*, at which the Editorial Board's plan of work is discussed.
May, after the 10th (23rd)	Lenin, on behalf of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., writes a letter "To the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad" asking it to state its attitude towards the decisions of the Third Congress of the Party.
May 14 (27)	Issue No. 1 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*, edited by Lenin, appears, containing the following articles by Lenin: "Report on the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" (editorial), "The Third Congress" and "How the Congress Was Constituted".
May, prior to the 20th (June 2nd)	Lenin writes his article "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government". The article was published in *Proletary*, Nos. 2 and 3.
May 20 (June 2)	Lenin writes a letter to the International Socialist Bureau concerning the recent Third Congress of the Party and its decision to consider the newspaper *Proletary* the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.
May 21 (June 3)	Lenin's article "The Advice of the Conservative Bourgeoisie" is published in *Proletary*, No. 2.
May 27 (June 9)	Lenin's articles "Debacle" (editorial) and "Revolutionary Struggle and Liberal Brokerage" are published in *Proletary*, No. 3.
End of May	Lenin writes the article "To the Jewish Workers", published in Yiddish as preface to the pamphlet, *Report on the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*.
	Lenin reports twice in Geneva on the Third Congress of the Party and the Menshevik Conference.
June 4 (17)	Lenin's articles "The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat" (editorial) and "A New

	Revolutionary Workers' Association" are published in *Proletary*, No. 4.
June 5 (18)	Lenin endorses the Statutes of the R.S.D.L.P. organisation abroad.
June, after the 12th (25th)	Lenin writes an open letter to the Editorial Board of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* protesting against Kautsky's garbled version of the split in the R.S.D.L.P.
June 13 (26)	Lenin's articles "The First Steps of Bourgeois Betrayal" and "'Revolutionaries' in Kid Gloves" are published in *Proletary*, No. 5.
June, prior to the 14th (27th)	Lenin arranges the publication of the Report on the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the major decisions of the Congress in German and in French.
June 20 (July 3)	Lenin's articles "The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie" (editorial) and "A Third Step Back", both on the question of the Mensheviks' Geneva Conference, are published in *Proletary*, No. 6.
June 21 (July 4)	In a letter to the International Socialist Bureau Lenin asks that an appeal be issued to the workers of all countries to prevent the suppression of the revolt on the armoured cruiser *Potemkin*.
June 27 (July 10)	Lenin's articles "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government" (editorial), "The Russian Tsar Seeks the Protection of the Turkish Sultan Against His People", and "The Bourgeoisie Bargains with the Autocracy, the Autocracy Bargains with the Bourgeoisie" are published in *Proletary*, No. 7.
End of June	Lenin instructs M. I. Vasilyev-Yuzhin, who is leaving for Russia, to establish contact with the Social-Democratic organisation directing the revolt in the Black Sea Fleet and on the armoured cruiser *Potemkin*.
June-July	Lenin writes the leaflet "Three Constitutions or Three Systems of Government".
	Lenin writes the book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*.

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NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

В. И. ЛЕНИН
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LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

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PREFACE

Volume 9 contains works written by V. I. Lenin in the second half (June-November) of 1905.

The volume includes the historic *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* in which Lenin gave a classical criticism of the Mensheviks' tactics and a masterly exposition of the Bolsheviks' tactics, and enriched Marxism with a new theory of revolution. Chapter II of the epilogue to the book is published *in toto* for the first time after the manuscript, part of which was found in 1940.

The volume includes the following articles: "While the Proletariat Is Doing the Fighting the Bourgeoisie Is Stealing Towards Power", "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and Insurrection", "In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie, or in the Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry?", "Playing at Parliamentarianism", "From the Defensive to the Offensive". In these articles Lenin defends the revolutionary tactics of the working class, gives advice on preparations for an insurrection, and exposes the false "democratism" of the liberal bourgeoisie and the conciliatory tactics of the Mensheviks.

In the articles "Social-Democracy's Attitude Towards the Peasant Movement", "Socialism and the Peasantry", and "Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism", Lenin sets forth and explains the Bolsheviks' strategic plan of struggle to make the bourgeois-democratic revolution develop into a socialist revolution.

The articles "The Political Strike and the Street Fighting in Moscow", "The Lessons of the Moscow Events", "The All-Russia Political Strike", and "The First Victory of the

Revolution", all deal with the October political general strike.

Lenin's "Preface to the Pamphlet *Workers on the Split in the Party*", "On the Question of Party Unity", and several others are directed against the Mensheviks' acts of schism.

The following works, included in the *Collected Works* for the first time, are published in this volume: "Concluding Paragraph to the Article 'The Paris Commune and the Tasks of the Democratic Dictatorship'", "Original Variant of the Preface to the Pamphlet *Workers on the Split in the Party*", "Note on a Resolution of the Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad", "Editorial Epilogue to the Article 'The Third Congress on Trial Before the Caucasian Mensheviks'", "Note on P. Nikolayev's Pamphlet *The Revolution in Russia*", "On the Current Moment", "On the So-Called Armenian Social-Democratic Workers' Organisation", "The Struggle of the Proletariat", "The Youth Abroad and the Russian Revolution", "Notes on 'The British Labour Movement and the Trade Union Congress'", "Insert to V. Kalinin's Article 'The Peasant Congress'", and the article "Between Two Battles". In the last-named article Lenin sums up the results of the political general strike of October 1905 and calls upon the Russian proletariat to rally its forces for the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy by means of an insurrection of the whole people.

TWO TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION[1]

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Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ.

Двѣ тактики соціальдемократіи въ демократической революціи.

Изданіе Центр. Ком. Р. С. Д. Р. П.

ЖЕНЕВА

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Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
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Reduced

PREFACE

In a revolutionary period it is very difficult to keep abreast of events which provide an astonishing amount of new material for an appraisal of the tactical slogans of revolutionary parties. The present pamphlet was written before the Odessa events.* We have already pointed out in *Proletary*[3] (No. 9—"Revolution Teaches")** that these events have forced even those Social-Democrats who created the "uprising-as-process" theory and who rejected propaganda for a provisional revolutionary government actually to go over, or begin to go over, to their opponents' side. Revolution undoubtedly teaches with a rapidity and thoroughness which appear incredible in peaceful periods of political development. And, what is particularly important, it teaches not only the leaders, but the masses as well.

There is not the slightest doubt that the revolution will teach Social-Democratism to the masses of the workers in Russia. The revolution will confirm the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy in actual practice by demonstrating the true nature of the various classes of society, by demonstrating the bourgeois character of our democracy and the real aspirations of the peasantry, who, while being revolutionary in the bourgeois-democratic sense, carry within themselves not the idea of "socialisation", but the seeds of a new class struggle between the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat. The old illusions of the old Narodism, so clearly visible, for instance, in the draft

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* The reference is to the mutiny on the armoured cruiser *Potemkin*.[2] (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

** See p. 148 of this volume.—*Ed.*

programme of the "Socialist-Revolutionary Party"[4] on the question of the development of capitalism in Russia, the question of the democratic character of our "society", and the question of the significance of a complete victory of a peasant uprising—all these illusions will be completely and mercilessly dispelled by the revolution. For the first time, the various classes will be given their real political baptism. These classes will emerge from the revolution with a definite political physiognomy, for they will have revealed themselves not only in the programme and tactical slogans of their ideologists but also In open political action by the masses.

Undoubtedly, the revolution will teach us and will teach the masses of the people. But the question that now confronts a militant political party is: shall we be able to teach the revolution anything? Shall we be able to make use of the correctness of our Social-Democratic doctrine, of our bond with the only thoroughly revolutionary class, the proletariat, to put a proletarian imprint on the revolution, to carry the revolution to a real and decisive victory, not in word but in deed, and to paralyse the instability, half-heartedness, and treachery of the democratic bourgeoisie?

It is to this end that we must direct all our efforts, and the achievement of that end will depend, on the one hand, on the accuracy of our appraisal of the political situation and the correctness of our tactical slogans, and, on the other hand, on whether these slogans will be backed by the real fighting strength of the masses of the workers. All the usual, regular, and current work of all organisations and groups of our Party, the work of propaganda, agitation, and organisation, is directed towards strengthening and expanding the ties with the masses. Necessary as this work always is it cannot be considered adequate at a time of revolution. In such a contingency the working class feels an instinctive urge for open revolutionary action, and we must learn to set the aims of this action correctly, and then make these aims as widely known and understood as possible. It must not be forgotten that the current pessimism about our ties with the masses very often serves as a screen for bourgeois ideas regarding the proletariat's role in the revolution. Undoubtedly, we still have a great deal to do in educating

and organising the working class; but now the gist of the matter is: where should we place the main political emphasis in this work of education and organisation? On the trade unions and legally existing associations, or on an insurrection, on the work of creating a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government? Both serve to educate and organise the working class. Both are, of course, necessary. But in the present revolution the problem amounts to this: which is to be emphasised in the work of educating and organising the working class, the former or the latter?

The outcome of the revolution depends on whether the working class will play the part of a subsidiary to the bourgeoisie, a subsidiary that is powerful in the force of its onslaught against the autocracy, but impotent politically, or whether it will play the part of leader of the people's revolution. The more intelligent representatives of the bourgeoisie are perfectly aware of this. That is why *Osvobozhdeniye*[5] praises Akimovism, Economism in Social-Democracy, the trend which is *now* bringing the trade unions and legally existing associations to the forefront. That is why Mr. Struve (in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72) welcomes the Akimovist tendency in the new-*Iskra* ideas. That is why he comes down so heavily on the detested revolutionary narrowness of the decisions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

It is exceptionally important at the present time for Social-Democrats to have correct tactical slogans for leading the masses. There is nothing more dangerous in a revolutionary period than belittling the importance of tactical slogans that are sound in principle. For example, *Iskra*[6] in No. 104 actually goes over to the side of its opponents in the Social-Democratic movement, and yet, at the same time, it disparages the importance of slogans and tactical decisions that are ahead of the times and indicate the path along which the movement is proceeding, though with a number of failures, errors, etc. On the contrary, preparation of correct tactical decisions is of immense importance for a party which desires to lead the proletariat in the spirit of sound Marxist principles, and not merely to lag in the wake of events. In the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the

Conference of the section that has split away from the Party,* we have the most precise, most carefully considered, and most complete expression of tactical views—views not casually expressed by individual writers, but accepted by the responsible representatives of the Social-Democratic proletariat. Our Party is in advance of all the others, for it has a precise and generally accepted programme. It must also set the other parties an example of a principled attitude to its tactical resolutions, as distinct from the opportunism of the democratic *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie, and the revolutionary phrase-mongering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was only during the revolution that they suddenly thought of coming forward with a "draft" programme and of investigating for the first time whether it is a bourgeois revolution that is going on before their eyes.

That is why we think it the most urgent task of the revolutionary Social-Democrats carefully to study the tactical resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference, define what deviations from the principles of Marxism they contain, and get a clear understanding of the Social-Democratic proletariat's concrete tasks in a democratic revolution. It is to this work that the present pamphlet is devoted. The testing of our tactics from the standpoint of the principles of Marxism and of the lessons of the revolution is also necessary for those who really desire to pave the way for unity of tactics as a basis for the future complete unity of the whole Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and not to confine themselves solely to verbal admonitions.

July 1905 *N. Lenin*

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* The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (London, May 1905) was attended only by Bolsheviks, while Mensheviks alone participated in the "Conference" (Geneva, time the same). In the present pamphlet the latter are frequently referred to as the "new-*Iskra* group" because, while continuing to publish *Iskra*, they declared through their then adherent Trotsky that there was a gulf between the old and the new *Iskra*. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

1. AN URGENT POLITICAL QUESTION

At the present revolutionary juncture the question of the convocation of a popular constituent assembly is on the order of the day. Opinions are divided as to how this question should be solved. Three political trends are taking shape. The tsarist government admits the necessity of convening representatives of the people, but under no circumstances does it want to permit their assembly to be popular and constituent. It seems willing to agree, if we are to believe the newspaper reports on the work of the Bulygin Commission,[7] to a consultative assembly, which is to be elected without freedom of agitation, and by a system of restrictive qualifications or one that is restricted to certain social estates. Since it is led by the Social-Democratic Party, the revolutionary proletariat demands complete transfer of power to a constituent assembly, and for this purpose strives to achieve not only universal suffrage and complete freedom to conduct agitation, but also the immediate overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government. Finally, the liberal bourgeoisie, expressing its wishes through the leaders of the so-called "Constitutional-Democratic Party",[8] does not demand the overthrow of the tsarist government; nor does it advance the slogan of a provisional government, or insist on real guarantees that the elections will be absolutely free and fair and that the assembly of representatives will be genuinely popular and genuinely constituent. As a matter of fact, the liberal bourgeoisie, the only serious social support of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend, is striving to effect as peaceful a deal as possible between the tsar and the revolutionary people, a deal, moreover,

that would give a maximum of power to itself, the bourgeoisie, and a minimum to the revolutionary people—the proletariat and the peasantry.

Such is the political situation at the present time. Such are the three main political trends, corresponding to the three main social forces in contemporary Russia. We have already shown on more than one occasion in *Proletary* (Nos. 3, 4, 5)* how the *Osvobozhdeniye* group use pseudo-democratic phrases to cover up their half-hearted, or, to put it more bluntly and plainly, their treacherous, perfidious policy towards the revolution. Let us now see how the Social-Democrats appraise the tasks of the moment. Excellent material for this is provided by the two resolutions quite recently adopted by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and by the "Conference" of the Party's break-away section. The question as to which of these resolutions appraises the political situation more correctly and defines the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat more correctly is of enormous importance, and every Social-Democrat who is anxious to perform his duties intelligently as propagandist, agitator, and organiser, must study this question with the closest attention disregarding all irrelevant considerations.

By the Party's tactics we mean the Party's political conduct, or the character, direction, and methods of its political activity. Tactical resolutions are adopted by Party congresses in order to accurately define the political conduct of the Party as a whole with regard to new tasks or in view of a new political situation. Such a new situation has been created by the revolution that has started in Russia, i.e., the complete, decisive, and open break between the overwhelming majority of the people and the tsarist government. The new question concerns the practical methods of convening a genuinely popular and a genuinely constituent assembly (the theoretical question concerning such an assembly was officially settled by Social-Democracy long ago, before all other parties, in its Party programme).

* "Revolutionary Struggle and Liberal Brokerage", 1905; "The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat", 1905 and "The First Steps of Bourgeois, Betrayal", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 486-94, 511-25.—*Ed.*

Since the people have broken with the government and the masses realise the necessity of setting up a new order, the party which set itself the object of overthrowing the government must necessarily consider what government should replace the old, deposed government. There arises a new question concerning a provisional revolutionary government. To give a complete answer to this question the party of the class-conscious proletariat must clarify: 1) the *significance* of a provisional revolutionary government in the revolution now in progress and in the entire struggle of the proletariat in general; 2) its *attitude* towards a provisional revolutionary government; 3) the precise conditions of Social-Democratic *participation* in this government; 4) the conditions under which pressure is to be brought to bear on this government *from below*, i.e., in the event of there being no Social-Democrats in it. Only when all these questions have been clarified, will the political conduct of the party in this sphere be principled, clear, and firm.

Let us now consider how the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party answers these questions. The following is the full text of the resolution:

"*Resolution on a Provisional Revolutionary Government*

"Whereas:

1) both the direct interests of the proletariat and those of its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the democratic republic;

2) the establishment of a democratic republic in Russia is possible only as a result of a victorious popular insurrection whose organ will be a provisional revolutionary government, which alone will be capable of securing complete freedom of agitation during the election campaign and of convening a constituent assembly that will really express the will of the people, an assembly elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot;

3) under the present social and economic order this democratic revolution in Russia will not weaken but strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie which at a certain juncture

will inevitably go to any length to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the revolutionary period as possible:

"Therefore the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party resolves:

a) that it is necessary to spread among the working class a concrete idea of the most probable course of the revolution, and of the necessity, at a certain moment in the revolution, for the appearance of a provisional revolutionary government, from which the proletariat will demand the realisation of all the immediate political and economic demands of our programme (the minimum programme);

b) that subject to the alignment of forces and other factors which cannot be exactly predetermined, representatives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending the independent interests of the working class;

c) that an indispensable condition for such participation is strict control of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the independence of Social-Democracy which strives for the complete socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the bourgeois parties;

d) that irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate among the broadest sections of the proletariat the idea that the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pressure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating, and extending the gains of the revolution."

2. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT?

As is evident from its title, the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is devoted wholly and exclusively to the question of a provisional revolutionary government. Hence, the participa-

tion of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government constitutes part of that question. On the other hand, the resolution deals with a provisional revolutionary government only, and with nothing else; consequently, the question of the "conquest of power" in general, etc., does not at all come into the picture. Was the Congress right in eliminating this and similar questions? Undoubtedly it was, because the political situation in Russia does not by any means turn such questions into immediate issues. On the contrary, the whole people have now raised the issue of the overthrow of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly. Party congresses should take up and decide not issues which this or that writer has happened to mention opportunely or inopportunely, but such as are of vital political importance by reason of the prevailing conditions and the objective course of social development.

Of what significance is a provisional revolutionary government in the present revolution and in the general struggle of the proletariat? The resolution of the Congress explains this by pointing at the very outset to the need for the "fullest possible measure of political liberty", both from the standpoint of the immediate interests of the proletariat and from the standpoint of the "final aims of socialism". And complete political liberty requires that the tsarist autocracy be replaced by a democratic republic, as our Party programme has already recognised. The stress the Congress resolution lays on the slogan of a democratic republic is necessary both as a matter of logic and in point of principle, for it is precisely complete liberty that the proletariat, as the foremost champion of democracy, is striving to attain. Moreover, it is all the more advisable to stress this at the present time, because right now the monarchists, namely, the so-called Constitutional-"Democratic" or the *Osvobozhdeniye* Party in our country, are flying the flag of "democracy". To establish a republic it is absolutely necessary to have an assembly of people's representatives, which must be a popular (i.e., elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections, and secret ballot), and constituent assembly. That is exactly what is recognised further on in the Congress resolution. However the resolution

does not stop at that. To establish a new order "that will really express the will of the people" it is not enough to term a representative assembly a constituent assembly. Such an assembly must have the authority and power to "constitute". Conscious of this the Congress resolution does not confine itself to the formal slogan of a "constituent assembly", but adds the material conditions which alone will enable such an assembly to carry out its task properly. This specification of the conditions enabling an assembly that is constituent in name to become one in fact is imperatively necessary, for, as we have more than once pointed out, the liberal bourgeoisie, as represented by the Constitutional-Monarchist Party, is deliberately distorting the slogan of a popular constituent assembly, and reducing it to a hollow phrase.

The Congress resolution states that a provisional revolutionary government *alone*, and one, moreover, that will be the organ of a victorious popular insurrection, can secure full freedom to conduct an election campaign and convene an assembly that will really express the will of the people. Is this thesis correct? Whoever took it into his head to dispute it would have to assert that it is possible for the tsarist government not to side with reaction, that it is capable of being neutral during the elections, that it will see to it that the will of the people really finds expression. Such assertions are so absurd that no one would venture to defend them openly; but they are being surreptitiously smuggled in under liberal colours, by our *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry. Somebody must convene the constituent assembly; somebody must guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections; somebody must invest such an assembly with full power and authority. Only a revolutionary government, which is the organ of the insurrection, can desire this in all sincerity, and be capable of doing all that is required to achieve this. The tsarist government will inevitably oppose it. A liberal government which has come to terms with the tsar and which does not rely in full on the popular uprising, cannot sincerely desire this, and could not accomplish it, even if it most sincerely desired to. Therefore, the Congress resolution gives the only correct and entirely consistent democratic slogan.

But an appraisal of a provisional revolutionary government's significance would be incomplete and wrong if the class nature of the democratic revolution were lost sight of. The resolution, therefore, adds that a revolution will strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie. This is inevitable under the present, i.e., capitalist, social and economic, system. And the strengthening of the bourgeoisie's rule over a proletariat that has secured some measure of political liberty must inevitably lead to a desperate struggle between them for power, must lead to desperate attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie "to take away from the proletariat the gains of the revolutionary period". Therefore, the proletariat, which is in the van of the struggle for democracy and heads that struggle, must not for a single moment forget the new antagonisms inherent in bourgeois democracy, or the new struggle.

Thus, the section of the resolution which we have just reviewed fully appraises the significance of a provisional revolutionary government both in its relation to the struggle for freedom and for a republic, in its relation to a constituent assembly, and in its relation to the democratic revolution which clears the ground for a new class struggle.

The next question is that of the proletariat's attitude in general towards a provisional revolutionary government. The Congress resolution answers this first of all by directly advising the Party to spread among the working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is necessary. The working class must be made aware of this necessity. Whereas the "democratic" bourgeoisie keeps in the background the question of the overthrow of the tsarist government, we must bring it to the fore and insist on the need for a provisional revolutionary government. Moreover, we must outline for such a government a programme of action that will conform with the objective conditions of the present period and with the aims of proletarian democracy. This programme is the *entire* minimum programme of our Party, the programme of the immediate political and economic reforms which, on the one hand, can be fully realised on the basis of the existing social and economic relationships and, on the other hand, are requisite

for the next step forward, for the achievement of socialism.

Thus, the resolution clearly defines the nature and the purpose of a provisional revolutionary government. In origin and basic character such a government must be the organ of a popular uprising. Its formal purpose must be to serve as an instrument for convening a national constituent assembly. The content of its activities must be the implementation of the minimum programme of proletarian democracy, the only programme capable of safeguarding the interests of a people that has risen in revolt against the autocracy.

It might be argued that a provisional government, being only provisional, cannot carry out a constructive programme that has not yet received the approval of the entire people. Such an argument would merely be the sophistry of reactionaries and "absolutists". To refrain from carrying out a constructive programme means tolerating the existence of the feudal regime of a corrupt autocracy. Such a regime could be tolerated only by a government of traitors to the cause of the revolution, but not by a government that is the organ of a popular insurrection. It would be mockery for anyone to propose that we should refrain from exercising freedom of assembly pending the confirmation of such freedom by a constituent assembly, on the plea that the constituent assembly might not confirm freedom of assembly. It is equal mockery to object to the immediate execution of the minimum programme by a provisional revolutionary government.

Finally, we will note that the resolution, by making implementation of the minimum programme the provisional revolutionary government's task, eliminates the absurd and semi-anarchist ideas of giving immediate effect to the maximum programme, and the conquest of power for a socialist revolution. The degree of Russia's economic development (an objective condition), and the degree of class-consciousness and organisation of the broad masses of the proletariat (a subjective condition inseparably bound up with the objective condition) make the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class impossible. Only the most ignorant people can close their eyes to the bourgeois nature

of the democratic revolution which is now taking place; only the most naïve optimists can forget how little as yet the masses of the workers are informed about the aims of socialism and the methods of achieving it. We are all convinced that the emancipation of the working classes must be won by the working classes themselves; a socialist revolution is out of the question unless the masses become class-conscious and organised, trained, and educated in an open class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie. Replying to the anarchists' objections that we are putting off the socialist revolution, we say: we are not putting it off, but are taking the first step towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct path, namely, the path of a democratic republic. Whoever wants to reach socialism by any other path than that of political democracy, will inevitably arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary both in the economic and the political sense. If any workers ask us at the appropriate moment why we should not go ahead and carry out our maximum programme we shall answer by pointing out how far from socialism the masses of the democratically-minded people still are, how undeveloped class antagonisms still are, and how unorganised the proletarians still are. Organise hundreds of thousands of workers all over Russia; get the millions to sympathise with our programme! Try to do this without confining yourselves to high-sounding but hollow anarchist phrases—and you will see at once that achievement of this organisation and the spread of this socialist enlightenment depend on the fullest possible achievement of democratic transformations.

Let us continue. Once the significance of a provisional revolutionary government and the attitude of the proletariat towards it have been made clear, the following question arises: is it permissible for us to participate in such a government (action from above) and, if so, under what conditions? What should be our action from below? The resolution supplies precise answers to both these questions. It emphatically declares that it is *permissible* in principle for Social-Democrats to participate in a provisional revolutionary government (during the period of a democratic revolution, the period of struggle for a republic). By this

declaration we once and for all dissociate ourselves both from the anarchists, who answer this question in the negative in principle, and from the tail-enders in Social-Democracy (like Martynov and the new-*Iskra* supporters), who have *tried to frighten* us with the prospect of a situation in which it might prove necessary for us to participate in such a government. By this declaration the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party irrevocably rejected the new-*Iskra* idea that the participation of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government would be a variety of Millerandism,[9] that it is impermissible in principle, as sanctifying the bourgeois order, etc.

It stands to reason, however, that the question of permissibility in principle does not solve the question of practical expediency. Under what conditions is this new form of struggle—the struggle "from above", recognised by the Party Congress—expedient? It goes without saying that it is impossible at present to speak of concrete conditions, such as the relation of forces, etc., and the resolution, naturally, refrains from defining these conditions in advance. No intelligent person would venture at present to predict anything on this subject. What we can and must do is to determine the nature and aim of our participation. That is what is done in the resolution, which points to the two purposes for which we participate: 1) a relentless struggle against counter-revolutionary attempts, and 2) the defence of the independent interests of the working class. At a time when the liberal bourgeoisie is beginning to talk with such zeal about the psychology of reaction (see Mr. Struve's most instructive "Open Letter" in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71) in an attempt to frighten the revolutionary people and induce it to show compliance towards the autocracy—at such a time it is particularly appropriate for the party of the proletariat to call attention to the task of waging a real war against counter-revolution. In the final analysis force alone settles the great problems of political liberty and the class struggle, and it is our business to prepare and organise this force and to employ it actively, not only for defence but also for attack. The long reign of political reaction in Europe, which has lasted almost uninterruptedly since the days of the Paris Commune, has made us too greatly

accustomed to the idea that action can proceed only "from below", has too greatly inured us to seeing only defensive struggles. We have now undoubtedly entered a new era—a period of political upheavals and revolutions has begun. In a period such as that which Russia is now passing through, it is impermissible to confine ourselves to old, stereotyped formulas. We must propagate the idea of action from above, must prepare for the most energetic, offensive action, and must study the conditions for and forms of such action. The Congress resolution brings two of these conditions into the forefront: one refers to the formal aspect of Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government (strict control by the Party over its representatives), the other, to the nature of such participation (without for an instant losing sight of the aim of effecting a complete socialist revolution).

Having thus explained all aspects of the Party's policy with regard to action "from above"—this new, hitherto almost unprecedented method of struggle—the resolution also provides for the eventuality that we shall not be able to act from above. We must in any case exercise pressure on the provisional revolutionary government from below. To be able to exercise this pressure from below, the proletariat must be armed—for in a revolutionary situation matters develop with exceptional rapidity to the stage of open civil war—and must be led by the Social-Democratic Party. The object of its armed pressure is "to defend, consolidate, and extend the gains of the revolution", i.e., those gains which from the standpoint of the proletariat's interests, must consist in fulfilling the whole of our minimum programme.

With this, we conclude our brief analysis of the Third Congress resolution on a provisional revolutionary government. As the reader will see, the resolution explains the importance of this new question, the attitude of the party of the proletariat towards it, and the policy the party must pursue both within a provisional revolutionary government and outside it.

Let us now consider the corresponding resolution of the "Conference".

3. WHAT IS MEANT BY "THE REVOLUTION'S DECISIVE VICTORY OVER TSARISM"?

The resolution of the "Conference" is devoted to the question: "*The conquest of power and participation in a provisional government.*"* As we have already pointed out, there is confusion in the very manner in which the question is presented. On the one hand, the question is presented in a narrow way: it deals only with our participation in a provisional government and not with the Party's tasks in regard to a provisional revolutionary government in general. On the other hand, two totally different questions are confused, viz., the question of our participation in one of the stages of the *democratic* revolution and the question of the *socialist* revolution. Indeed, the "conquest of power" by Social-Democracy is precisely a socialist revolution, nor can it be anything else if we use these words in their direct and usual meaning. If, however, we are to understand these words to mean the conquest of power for a democratic revolution and not for a socialist revolution, then what is the point in talking not only about participation in a provisional revolutionary government but also about the "conquest of power" *in general*? Obviously our "conferees" were themselves not very certain as to what they should talk about—the democratic or the socialist revolution. Those who have followed the literature on this question know that this confusion was started by Comrade Martynov in his notorious *Two Dictatorships*; the new-Iskrists are reluctant to recall the manner in which this question was presented (even before January 9)[10] in that model of tail-ender writing. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that it exerted an ideological influence on the Conference.

But enough about the title of the resolution. Its contents reveal errors incomparably more serious and profound. Here is the first part:

"A decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be marked either by the establishment of a provisional

* The full text of this resolution can be reconstructed by the reader from the quotations given on pp. 400, 403, 407, 431, and 433 of the pamphlet. (Author's note to the 1907 edition. See pp. 32-33, 38-39, 44, 78, 82 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

government, which will emerge from a victorious popular insurrection, or by the revolutionary initiative of a representative institution of one kind or another, which, under direct revolutionary pressure from the people, decides to set up a popular constituent assembly."

Thus, we are told that a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be marked either by a victorious insurrection, or ... by a representative institution's decision to set up a constituent assembly! What does that mean? How are we to understand it? A decisive victory may be marked by a "decision" to set up a constituent assembly?? And such a "victory" is put side by side with the establishment of a provisional government which will "emerge from a victorious popular insurrection"!! The Conference failed to note that a *victorious* popular insurrection and the *establishment* of a provisional government would signify the victory of the revolution *in actual fact*, whereas a "decision" to set up a constituent assembly would signify a victory of the revolution *in words* only.

The Conference of the new-*Iskra* Mensheviks fell into the very error that the liberals, the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, are constantly making. The *Osvobozhdeniye* group prattle about a "constituent" assembly, bashfully shutting their eyes to the fact that power and authority remain in the hands of the tsar and forgetting that to "constitute" one must possess the *power* to do so. The Conference also forgot that it is a far cry from a "decision" adopted by representatives—no matter who they are—to the fulfilment of that decision. The Conference also forgot that while power remains in the hands of the tsar all decisions of any representatives whatsoever will remain empty and miserable prattle, as was the case with the "decisions" of the Frankfort Parliament, famous in the history of the German Revolution of 1848. In his *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[11] Marx, the representative of the revolutionary proletariat, castigated the Frankfort *Osvobozhdeniye*-type liberals with merciless sarcasm, precisely because they uttered fine words, adopted all sorts of democratic "decisions", "constituted" all kinds of liberties, while in fact they left power in the hands of the king and failed to organise an armed struggle against the military forces at the king's disposal. And while the Frankfort-

Osvobozhdeniye liberals were prattling, the king bided his time and consolidated his military forces, and the counter-revolution relying on real force utterly routed the democrats, with all their fine "decisions".

The Conference put on a par with a decisive victory the very thing that lacks the essential condition for victory. How was it possible for Social-Democrats, who recognise the republican programme of our Party, to commit such an error? To understand this strange phenomenon we must turn to the Third Congress's resolution on the break-away section of the Party.* This resolution refers to the fact that various trends "akin to Economism" exist in our Party. Our "conferees" (it is not fortuitous that they are under the ideological guidance of Martynov) talk of the revolution in exactly the same way as the Economists talked of the political struggle or the eight-hour day. The Economists immediately brought forward the "theory of stages": 1) the struggle

* We cite this resolution in full. "The Congress places on record that since the time of the Party's fight against Economism certain trends have survived in the R.S.D.L.P. which are akin to Economism in varying degrees and respects and betray a common tendency to belittle the importance of the class-conscious elements in the proletarian struggle and to subordinate it to the element of spontaneity. On questions of organisation the representatives of these trends put forward, in theory, the organisation-as-process principle which is out of harmony with methodically conducted Party work, while in practice they systematically deviate from Party discipline in very many cases, and in other cases preach to the least enlightened section of the Party the idea of a wide application of the elective principle, without taking into consideration the objective conditions of Russian life, and so strive to undermine the only basis for Party ties that is possible at the present time. In tactical questions they betray a striving to narrow the scope of Party work, declaring their opposition to the Party pursuing completely independent tactics in relation to the liberal-bourgeois parties, denying that it is possible and desirable for our Party to assume the role of organiser in the people's insurrection and opposing the participation of the Party in a provisional democratic-revolutionary government under any conditions whatsoever.

"The Congress instructs all Party members everywhere to conduct an energetic ideological struggle against such partial deviations from the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy; at the same time, however, it is of the opinion that persons who share such views to any degree may belong to Party organisations on the indispensable condition that they recognise the Party congresses and the Party Rules and wholly submit to Party discipline." (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

for rights, 2) political agitation, 3) political struggle; or, 1) a ten-hour day, 2) a nine-hour day, 3) an eight-hour day. The results of this "tactics-as-process" are sufficiently well known to all. Now we are invited to make a preliminary and neat division of the revolution as well into the following stages: 1) the tsar convenes a representative institution; 2) this institution "decides" under pressure of the "people" to set up a constituent assembly; 3) ... the Mensheviks have not yet agreed among themselves as to the third stage; they have forgotten that the revolutionary pressure of the people will meet with the counter-revolutionary pressure of tsarism and that therefore either the "decision" will remain unfulfilled or the issue will be decided after all by the victory or the defeat of a popular insurrection. The Conference resolution duplicates the following Economist reasoning: a decisive victory of the workers may be marked either by the realisation of the eight-hour day in a revolutionary way, or by the granting of a ten-hour day and a "decision" to go over to a nine-hour day.... The duplication is perfect.

The objection may be made to us that the authors of the resolution did not mean *to place on a par* the victory of an insurrection and the "decision" of a representative institution convened by the tsar, and that they only wanted to provide for the Party's tactics in either case. To this we shall answer: 1) The text of the resolution plainly and unambiguously describes the *decision* of a representative institution as "a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism". Perhaps that is the result of careless wording; perhaps it could be corrected after consulting the minutes, but, until corrected, the present wording can have only one meaning, and that meaning is entirely in keeping with the *Osvobozhdeniye* line of reasoning, 2) The *Osvobozhdeniye* line of reasoning into which the authors of the resolution have drifted stands out in far greater relief in other literary productions of the new-*Iskra* group. For instance, in its article "The Zemsky Sobor* and our Tactics", *Sotsial-Demokrat*,[12] organ of the Tiflis Committee (published in the Georgian language; praised by *Iskra* in No. 100), goes so far as to say

* National Assembly.—*Ed.*

that "tactics" "which would make the Zemsky Sobor our centre of action" (about the convocation of which, we may add, nothing definite is known as yet!) "*are more to our advantage*" than the "tactics" of insurrection and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. We shall again refer to this article later. 3) No objection can be made to a preliminary discussion of the tactics the Party should adopt both in the event of the victory of the revolution and in the event of its defeat, both in the event of a successful insurrection and in the event of the insurrection failing to develop into a serious force. It is possible that the tsarist government will succeed in convening a representative assembly for the purpose of striking a deal with the liberal bourgeoisie; providing for that eventuality, the Third Congress resolution speaks plainly about "hypocritical policy", "pseudo-democracy", "a travesty of popular representation, such as the so-called Zemsky Sobor".* But the whole point is that this is not said in a resolution on a provisional revolutionary government, for it had nothing to do with a provisional revolutionary government. This eventuality defers the problem of the insurrection and of

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* The following is the text of this resolution on the attitude towards the tactics of the government on the eve of the revolution:

"Whereas for purposes of self-preservation, the government during the present revolutionary period while intensifying the usual measures of repression directed mainly against the class-conscious elements of the proletariat, at the same time 1) tries by means of concessions and promises of reform to corrupt the working class politically and thereby to divert it from the revolutionary struggle; 2) with the same object clothes its hypocritical policy of concessions in pseudo-democratic forms, ranging from an invitation to the workers to elect their representatives to commissions and conferences, to the establishment of a travesty of popular representation, such as the so-called Zemsky Sobor; 3) organises the so-called Black Hundreds[13] and incites against the revolution all those elements of the people in general who are reactionary, ignorant, or blinded by racial or religious hatred:

"The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves to call on All Party organisations:

a) while exposing the reactionary purpose of the government's concessions to emphasise in their propaganda and agitation the fact that on the one hand, these concessions were wrested by force, and, on the other, that it is absolutely impossible for the autocracy to grant reforms satisfactory to the proletariat;

b) taking advantage of the election campaign to explain to the

the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government; it alters this problem, etc. The point at issue today is not that all kinds of combinations are possible, that both victory and defeat are possible or that there may be direct or circuitous paths; the point is that it is impermissible for a Social-Democrat to cause confusion in workers' minds as to which is the genuinely revolutionary path; that it is impermissible to describe as a decisive victory, as *Osvobozhdeniye* does, something which lacks the *main* condition for victory. It is possible that we shall win even the eight-hour day, not at one stroke, but only in a long and roundabout way; but what would you say of a man who calls such impotence, such weakness as renders the proletariat *incapable* of counteracting procrastination, delays, haggling, treachery, and reaction—a victory for the workers? It is possible that the Russian revolution will end in an "abortive constitution", as was once stated in *Vperyod*,* but can this justify a Social-Democrat, who on the eve of a decisive struggle would call this abortion a "decisive victory over tsarism"? It is possible that at worst we shall not only fail to win a republic but that even the constitution will be illusory, a constitution "*à la* Shipov",[14] but would it be pardonable for a Social-Democrat to tone down our republican slogan?

Of course, the new-Iskrists have not as yet gone so far as to tone it down. But the degree to which the revolutionary

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workers the real significance of these governmental measures and to show that it is necessary for the proletariat to convene by revolutionary means a constituent assembly on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot;

c) to organise the proletariat for the immediate realisation in a revolutionay way of the eight-hour working day and of the other immediate demands of the working class;

d) to organise armed resistance to the actions of the Black Hundreds and, in general, of all reactionary elements led by the government." (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

* The newspaper *Vperyod*, which was published in Geneva, began to appear in January 1905 as the organ of the Bolshevik section of the Party. From January to May eighteen issues appeared. In May by virtue of the decision of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, *Proletary* replaced *Vperyod* as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. (This Congress took place in London, in May; the Mensheviks did not appear there but organised their own "Conference" in Geneva.) (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

spirit has abandoned them, the degree to which lifeless pedantry has blinded them to the militant tasks of the moment, is most vividly shown by the fact that in their resolution they, of all things, *forgot* to say a word about the republic. This is incredible but it is a fact. All the slogans of Social-Democracy were endorsed, repeated, explained, and presented in detail in the various resolutions of the Conference—even the election of shop-stewards and deputies by the workers was not forgotten, but they simply found no occasion to mention the republic in a resolution on a provisional revolutionary government. To talk of the "victory" of the people's insurrection, of the establishment of a provisional government without indicating what these "steps" and acts have to do with winning a republic amounts to writing a resolution with the intention of crawling along in the wake of the proletarian movement, and not of giving guidance to the proletariat's struggle.

To sum up: the first part of the resolution 1) gave no explanation whatever of the significance of a provisional revolutionary government from the standpoint of the struggle for a republic and of securing a genuinely popular and genuinely constituent assembly; 2) quite confused the democratic consciousness of the proletariat by placing on a par with revolution's decisive victory over tsarism a state of affairs in which precisely the main condition for a real victory is lacking.

4. THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY. THE REPUBLIC

Let us go over to the next section of the resolution: "... in either case such a victory will inaugurate a new phase in the revolutionary epoch.

"The final abolition of the whole regime of the monarchy and the social estates in the process of mutual struggle between the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society for the satisfaction of their social interests and for the direct acquisition of power—such is the task in this new phase which the objective conditions of social development spontaneously evoke.

"Therefore, a provisional government that would undertake to carry out the tasks of this revolution, bourgeois in its historical nature, would, in regulating the mutual struggle between antagonistic classes of a nation in the process of emancipation, not only have to advance revolutionary development, but also to combat factors in that development threatening the foundations of the capitalist system."

Let us examine this section which forms an independent part of the resolution. The basic idea in the arguments quoted above coincides with the one set forth in the third clause of the Congress resolution. However, collation of these parts of the two resolutions will at once reveal the following radical difference between them. The Congress resolution, which briefly describes the social and economic basis of the revolution, concentrates attention entirely on the clear-cut struggle of classes for definite gains, and places in the forefront the militant tasks of the proletariat. The resolution of the Conference, which carries a long, nebulous, and confused description of the socio-economic basis of the revolution, speaks very vaguely about a struggle for definite gains, and leaves the militant tasks of the proletariat completely in the background. The resolution of the Conference speaks of the old order in the process of mutual struggle among the various elements of society. The Congress resolution says that we, the party of the proletariat, must effect this abolition; that only establishment of a democratic republic signifies genuine abolition of the old order; that we must win that republic; that we shall fight for it and for complete liberty, not only against the autocracy, but also against the bourgeoisie, when it attempts (and it will surely do so) to wrest our gains from us. The Congress resolution calls on a definite class to wage a struggle for a precisely defined immediate aim. The Conference resolution discourses on the mutual struggle of various forces. One resolution expresses the psychology of active struggle, the other that of the passive onlooker; one resounds with the call for live action, the other is steeped in lifeless pedantry. Both resolutions state that the present revolution is only our first step, which will be followed by a second; but from this, one resolution draws the conclusion that we must take this

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first step all the sooner, get it over all the-sooner, win a republic, mercilessly crush the counter-revolution, and prepare the ground for the second step. The other resolution, however, oozes, so to speak, with verbose descriptions of the first step and (excuse the crude expression) simply masticates it. The Congress resolution takes the old, yet eternally new, ideas of Marxism (the bourgeois nature of a democratic revolution) as a preface or first premise, whence it draws conclusions as to the progressive tasks of the progressive class, which is fighting both for the democratic and for the socialist revolution. The Conference resolution does not go beyond the preface, chewing it over and over again, and trying to be clever about it.

This is the very distinction which has long divided the Russian Marxists into two wings: the moralising and the militant wings of the old days of "legal Marxism", and the economic and political wings of the period of the nascent mass movement. From the correct Marxist premise concerning the deep economic roots of the class struggle in general and of the political struggle in particular, the Economists have drawn the singular conclusion that we must turn our backs on the political struggle and retard its development, narrow its scope, and reduce its aims. The political wing, on the contrary, has drawn a different conclusion from these same premises, namely, that the deeper the roots of our present struggle, the more widely, the more boldly, the more resolutely, and with greater initiative must we wage this struggle. We have the very same controversy before us now, only under different circumstances and in a different form. From the premises that a democratic revolution is far from being a socialist revolution, that the poor and needy are by no means the only ones to be "interested" in it, that it is deeply rooted in the inescapable needs and requirements of the *whole* of bourgeois society—from these premises we draw the conclusion that the advanced class must formulate its democratic aims all the more boldly, express them all the more sharply and completely, put forward the immediate slogan of a republic, and popularise the idea of the need to establish a provisional revolutionary government and to crush the counter-revolution ruthlessly. Our opponents, the new-*Iskra* group,

however, deduce from these very same premises that the democratic conclusions should not be expressed fully, that the republic may be omitted from the practical slogans, that we can refrain from popularising the idea of the need for a provisional revolutionary government, that a mere decision to convene a constituent assembly can be termed a decisive victory, that there is no need to advance the task of combating counter-revolution as our active aim, so that it may be submerged in a nebulous (and, as we shall presently see, wrongly formulated) reference to a "process of mutual struggle". This is not the language of political leaders, but of archive fogeys.

The more closely one examines the various formulations in the resolution of the new-*Iskra* group, the clearer its afore-mentioned basic features become. We are told, for instance, of a "process of mutual struggle between the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society". Bearing in mind the subject this resolution deals with (a provisional revolutionary government) one asks in astonishment, "If you are referring to the process of mutual struggle, how can you keep silent about the elements which are politically *enslaving* bourgeois society? Do the 'conferees' really imagine that, since they have assumed the revolution will be victorious, these elements have already disappeared?" Such an idea would be absurd in general and an expression of the greatest political naïveté and political short-sightedness in particular. After the revolution's victory over counter-revolution the latter will not disappear; on the contrary, it will inevitably start a new and even more desperate struggle. Since the purpose of our resolution is to analyse the tasks that will confront us when the revolution is victorious, it is our duty to devote tremendous attention to the tasks of repelling counter-revolutionary attacks (as is done in the Congress resolution), and not to submerge these immediate, urgent, and vital political tasks of a militant party in general discussions on what will happen *after* the present revolutionary period, or what will happen when a "politically *emancipated* society" already exists. Just as the Economists would, by repeating the truism that politics are subordinated to economics, cover up their incapacity to understand urgent political tasks, so the new-

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Iskra group, by repeating the truism that struggles will take place in a politically *emancipated* society, cover up their incapacity to understand the urgent revolutionary tasks of that society's political *emancipation*.

Take the expression "the final abolition of the whole regime of the monarchy and the social estates". In plain language the final abolition of the monarchist system means the establishment of a democratic republic. But our good Martynov and his admirers think that this expression is far too clear and simple. They insist on making it "deeper" and putting it more "cleverly". As a result, we get, on the one hand, ridiculous and vain efforts to appear profound; on the other hand, we get a description instead of a slogan, a kind of melancholy retrospection instead of a stirring appeal to march forward. We get the impression not of living people eager to fight for a republic here and now, but of so many withered mummies who, *sub specie aeternitatis*,* consider the question from the *plusquamperfectum* viewpoint.

Let us continue: "... the provisional government ... would undertake to carry out the tasks of this ... bourgeois revolution...". Here we at once see the result of our conferees having overlooked a concrete question confronting the proletariat's political leaders. The concrete question of a provisional revolutionary government has been obscured from their field of vision by the question of the future series of governments which will carry out the aims of the bourgeois revolution in general. If you want to consider the question "historically", the example of any European country will show you that it was a series of governments, by no means "provisional", that carried out the historical aims of the bourgeois revolution, that even governments which defeated the revolution were nevertheless forced to carry out the historical aims of that defeated revolution. But what you speak of is not called a "provisional revolutionary government": that is the name given to the government of a revolutionary epoch, one that immediately replaces the overthrown government and rests on the people's insurrection,

* From the viewpoint of eternity (Latin).—*Ed.*

and not on some kind of representative institution coming from the people. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ of struggle for the immediate victory of the revolution, for the immediate repulsion of attempts at counter-revolution, and not at all an organ for the implementation of the historical aims of the bourgeois revolution in general. Let us leave it to the future historians of a future *Russkaya Starina*[15] to determine exactly what aims of the bourgeois revolution we, or some government or other, shall have achieved—there will be time enough to do that thirty years from now; at present we must put forward slogans and give practical directives for the struggle for a republic and for the proletariat's most active participation in that struggle.

For the reasons stated, the final propositions in the foregoing section of the resolution quoted above are also unsatisfactory. The expression that the provisional government would have to "regulate" the mutual struggle among the antagonistic classes is most inapt, or at any rate awkwardly put; Marxists should not use such liberal-*Osvobozhdeniye* formulas, which would have us believe that it is possible to have governments which serve not as organs of the class struggle but as its "regulators". ...The government would "not only have to advance revolutionary development but also to combat factors in that development threatening the foundations of the capitalist system". But it is the proletariat, in whose name the resolution speaks, that constitutes this "factor"! Instead of indicating just how the proletariat should "advance revolutionary development" at the present time (advance it farther than the constitutionalist bourgeoisie would care to go), instead of advice to make definite preparations for the struggle against the bourgeoisie when the latter turns against the conquests of the revolution, we are offered a general description of a process, a description which says nothing about the concrete aims of *our* activity. The new-*Iskra* manner of expressing its views reminds one of Marx's opinion (stated in his famous Theses on Feuerbach) of the old materialism, which was alien to the ideas of dialectics. The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways, said Marx; the point, however, is to *change* it.[16] Similarly, the new-*Iskra* group can

give a tolerable description and explanation of the process of struggle taking place before their eyes, but they are altogether incapable of giving a correct slogan for this struggle. Good marchers but poor leaders, they disparage the materialist conception of history by ignoring the active, leading, and guiding part which can and must be played in history by parties that have realised the material prerequisites of a revolution and have placed themselves at the head of the progressive classes.

5. HOW SHOULD "THE REVOLUTION BE ADVANCED"?

Let us quote the next section of the resolution:

"Under such conditions, Social-Democracy must strive to maintain throughout the revolution a position which will best of all ensure it the possibility of advancing the revolution, will not tie the hands of Social-Democracy in its struggle against the inconsistent and self-seeking policy of the bourgeois parties, and will preserve it from being dissolved in bourgeois democracy.

"Therefore, Social-Democracy must not set itself the aim of seizing or sharing power in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

The advice to occupy a position which best ensures the possibility of advancing the revolution pleases us very much indeed. We would only desire that this piece of good advice should be accompanied by a direct indication as to how Social-Democracy should further advance the revolution right now, in the present political situation, in a period of rumours, conjectures, and talk and schemes about the convocation of the people's representatives. Can the revolution now be further advanced by those who fail to understand the danger of the *Osvobozhdeniye* theory of "compromise" between the people and the tsar, by those who call a mere "decision" to convene a constituent assembly a victory, who do not set themselves the task of carrying on active propaganda of the idea of the need for a provisional revolutionary government, or who leave the slogan of a democratic republic in the background? Such people actually

pull the revolution back, because, as far as *practical politics* are concerned, they have stopped at the level of the *Osvobozhdeniye* stand. What is the use of their recognising a programme which demands that the autocracy be replaced by a republic, if in a resolution on tactics that defines the Party's present and immediate tasks in the period of revolution they omit the slogan of a struggle for a republic? It is the *Osvobozhdeniye* position, the position of the constitutionalist bourgeoisie, that is now actually characterised by the fact that a decision to convene a popular constituent assembly is considered a decisive victory, while a prudent silence is maintained on the subject of a provisional revolutionary government and a republic! To *advance* the revolution, to take it beyond the limits to which the monarchist bourgeoisie advances it, it is necessary actively to produce, emphasise, and bring into the forefront slogans that will *preclude* the "inconsistency" of bourgeois democracy. At present there are *only two* such slogans: 1) a provisional revolutionary government, and 2) a republic, because the slogan of a popular constituent assembly *has been accepted* by the monarchist bourgeoisie (see the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) and accepted for the very purpose of devitalising the revolution, preventing its complete victory, and enabling the big bourgeoisie to strike a huckster's bargain with tsarism. And now we see that of the two slogans, which alone are capable of advancing the revolution, the Conference completely forgot the slogan of a republic, and plainly put the slogan of a provisional revolutionary government on a par with the *Osvobozhdeniye* slogan of a popular constituent assembly, calling both the one and the other "a decisive victory of the revolution"!!

Indeed, such is the undoubted fact, which, we are sure, will serve as a landmark for the future historian of Russian Social-Democracy. The Conference of Social-Democrats held in May 1905 passed a resolution which contains fine words about the necessity of advancing the democratic revolution, but in fact pulls it back and goes no farther than the democratic slogans of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

The new-*Iskra* group likes to accuse us of ignoring the danger of the proletariat becoming dissolved in bourgeois

democracy. We should like to see the person who would undertake to prove this charge on the basis of the text of the resolutions passed by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Our reply to our opponents is—a Social-Democratic Party which operates in a bourgeois society cannot take part in politics without marching, in certain cases, *side by side* with bourgeois democracy. The difference between us in this respect is that we march side by side with the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie, without merging with it, whereas you march side by side with the *liberal and the monarchist bourgeoisie*, without merging with it either. *That is how matters stand.*

The tactical slogans you have formulated in the name of the Conference *coincide* with the slogans of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party, i.e., *the party of the monarchist bourgeoisie*; moreover, you have not even noticed or realised this coincidence, thus actually following in the *wake* of the *Osvobozhdeniye fraternity*.

The tactical slogans we have formulated in the name of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party coincide with the slogans of the democratic-revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie. In Russia this bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie have not yet formed themselves into a big people's party.* But only one who is utterly ignorant of what is now taking place in Russia can doubt that elements of such a party exist. We intend to guide (if the great Russian revolution makes progress) not only the proletariat, organised by the Social-Democratic Party, but also this petty bourgeoisie, which is capable of marching side by side with us.

Through its resolution the Conference unconsciously *descends* to the level of the liberal and monarchist bourgeoisie. Through its resolution, the Party Congress consciously *raises* to its own level those elements of revolutionary democracy

* The Socialist-Revolutionaries are a terrorist group of intellectuals rather than the embryo of such a party, although the objective significance of this group's activities can be reduced to this very task of achieving the aims of the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie.

that are capable of waging a struggle, and not acting as brokers.

Such elements are mostly to be found among the peasants. In classifying the big social groups according to their political tendencies we can, without danger of serious error, identify revolutionary and republican democracy with the mass of the peasants—of course, in the same sense and with the same reservations and implied conditions that we can identify the working class with Social-Democracy. In other words, we can formulate our conclusions in the following terms as well: in a revolutionary period the Conference, through its *nation-wide** *political* slogans, unconsciously *descends to the level of the mass of the landlords*. Through its country-wide political slogans, the Party Congress *raises the mass of the peasants to a revolutionary level*. To anyone who, because of this conclusion, would accuse us of a penchant for paradoxes, we issue the following challenge: let him refute the proposition that, if we are not strong enough to bring the revolution to a successful conclusion, if the revolution *ends* in a "decisive victory" in the *Osvobozhdeniye* sense, i.e., only in the form of a representative assembly convened by the tsar, one that could be called a constituent assembly only in derision—then that will be a revolution in which the *landlord and big bourgeois* element will preponderate. On the other hand, if we are destined to live through a really great revolution, if history does not allow a "miscarriage" this time, if we are strong enough to carry the revolution to a successful conclusion, to a decisive victory, not in the *Osvobozhdeniye* or the new-*Iskra* sense of the word, then that will be a revolution in which the peasant and proletarian element will preponderate.

Some people may, perhaps, interpret our admission that such a preponderance is possible as renunciation of the view that the impending revolution will be bourgeois in character. This is very likely, considering how this concept is misused in *Iskra*. For this reason it will not be at all superfluous to dwell on this question.

* We are not referring here to the special peasant slogans which have been dealt with in separate resolutions.

6. WHENCE IS THE PROLETARIAT THREATENED WITH THE DANGER OF FINDING ITSELF WITH ITS HANDS TIED IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INCONSISTENT BOURGEOISIE?

Marxists are absolutely convinced of the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution. What does that mean? It means that the democratic reforms in the political system, and the social and economic reforms that have become a necessity for Russia, do not in themselves imply the undermining of capitalism, the undermining of bourgeois rule; on the contrary, they will, for the first time, really clear the ground for a wide and rapid, European, and not Asiatic, development of capitalism; they will, for the first time, make it possible for the bourgeoisie to rule as a class. The Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot grasp this idea, for they do not know the ABC of the laws of development of commodity and capitalist production; they fail to see that even the complete success of a peasant insurrection, even the redistribution of the whole of the land in favour of the peasants and in accordance with their desires ("general redistribution" or something of the kind) will not destroy capitalism at all, but will, on the contrary, give an impetus to its development and hasten the class disintegration of the peasantry itself. Failure to grasp this truth makes the Socialist-Revolutionaries unconscious ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie. Insistence on this truth is of enormous importance for Social-Democracy not only from the standpoint of theory but also from that of practical politics, for it follows therefrom that complete class independence of the party of the proletariat in the present "general democratic" movement is an indispensable condition.

But it does not by any means follow that a *democratic* revolution (bourgeois in its social and economic essence) would not be of *enormous* interest to the proletariat. It does not follow that the democratic revolution could not take place both in a form advantageous mainly to the big capitalist, the financial magnate, and the "enlightened" landlord, and in a form advantageous to the peasant and the worker.

The new-*Iskra* group completely misunderstands the meaning and significance of bourgeois revolution as a

category. The idea that is constantly running through their arguments is that a bourgeois revolution is one that can be advantageous only to the bourgeoisie. And yet nothing can be more erroneous than such an idea. A bourgeois revolution is a revolution which does not depart from the framework of the bourgeois, i.e., capitalist, socio-economic system. A bourgeois revolution expresses the needs of capitalist development, and, far from destroying the foundations of capitalism, it effects the contrary—it broadens and deepens them. This revolution, therefore, expresses the interests not only of the working class but of the entire bourgeoisie as well. Since the rule of the bourgeoisie over the working class is inevitable under capitalism, it can well be said that a bourgeois revolution expresses the interests not so much of the proletariat as of the bourgeoisie. But it is quite absurd to think that a bourgeois revolution does not at all express proletarian interests. This absurd idea boils down either to the hoary Narodnik theory that a bourgeois revolution runs counter to the interests of the proletariat, and that, therefore, we do not need bourgeois political liberty; or to anarchism which denies any participation of the proletariat in bourgeois politics, in a bourgeois revolution and in bourgeois parliamentarianism. From the standpoint of theory this idea disregards the elementary propositions of Marxism concerning the inevitability of capitalist development on the basis of commodity production. Marxism teaches us that at a certain stage of its development a society which is based on commodity production and has commercial intercourse with civilised capitalist nations must inevitably take the road of capitalism. Marxism has irrevocably broken with the Narodnik and anarchist gibberish that Russia, for instance, can bypass capitalist development, escape from capitalism, or skip it in some way other than that of the class struggle, on the basis and within the framework of this same capitalism.

All these principles of Marxism have been proved and explained in minute detail in general and with regard to Russia in particular. And from these principles it follows that the idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything save the further development of capitalism is *reactionary*. In countries like Russia the working class

suffers not so much from capitalism as from the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is, therefore, *most certainly interested* in the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism. The removal of all the remnants of the old order which hamper the broad, free, and rapid development of capitalism is of absolute *advantage* to the working class. The bourgeois revolution is precisely an upheaval that most resolutely sweeps away survivals of the past, survivals of the serf-owning system (which include not only the autocracy but the monarchy as well), and most fully guarantees the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism.

That is why a *bourgeois* revolution is *in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat*. A bourgeois revolution is *absolutely* necessary in the interests of the proletariat. The more complete, determined, and consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more assured will the proletariat's struggle be against the bourgeoisie and for socialism. Only those who are ignorant of the ABC of scientific socialism can regard this conclusion as new, strange, or paradoxical. And from this conclusion, among other things, follows the thesis that *in a certain sense* a bourgeois revolution is *more advantageous* to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie. This thesis is unquestionably correct in the following sense: it is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to rely on certain remnants of the past, as against the proletariat, for instance, on the monarchy, the standing army, etc. It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie for the bourgeois revolution not to sweep away all remnants of the past too resolutely, but keep some of them, i.e., for this revolution not to be fully consistent, not complete, and not to be determined and relentless. Social-Democrats often express this idea somewhat differently by stating that the bourgeoisie betrays its own self, that the bourgeoisie betrays the cause of liberty, that the bourgeoisie is incapable of being consistently democratic. It is of greater advantage to the bourgeoisie for the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy to take place more slowly, more gradually, more cautiously, less resolutely, by means of reforms and not by means of revolution; for these changes to spare the "venerable" institutions of the serf-owning system (such as

the monarchy) as much as possible; for these changes to develop as little as possible the independent revolutionary activity, initiative, and energy of the common people, i.e., the peasantry and especially the workers, for otherwise it will be easier for the workers, as the French say, "to change the rifle from one shoulder to the other", i.e., to turn against the bourgeoisie the weapon the bourgeois revolution will supply them with, the liberty the revolution will bring, and the democratic institutions that will spring up on ground cleared of the serf-owning system.

On the other hand, it is more advantageous to the working class for the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy to take place by way of revolution and not by way of reform, because the way of reform is one of delay, procrastination, the painfully slow decomposition of the putrid parts of the national organism. It is the proletariat and the peasantry that suffer first of all and most of all from that putrefaction. The revolutionary path is one of rapid amputation, which is the least painful to the proletariat, the path of the immediate removal of what is putrescent, the path of least compliance with and consideration for the monarchy and the abominable, vile, rotten, and noxious institutions that go with it.

So it is not only because of the censorship, not only "for fear of the Jews", that our bourgeois-liberal press deplores the possibility of the revolutionary path, fears the revolution, tries to frighten the tsar with the bogey of revolution, seeks to avoid revolution, and grovels and toadies for the sake of miserable reforms as the foundation of the reformist path. This standpoint is shared not only by *Russkiye Vedomosti*,[17] *Syn Otechestva*,[18] *Nasha Zhizn*,[19] and *Nashi Dni*,[20] but also by the illegal, uncensored *Osvobozhdeniye*. The very position the bourgeoisie holds as a class in capitalist society inevitably leads to its inconsistency in a democratic revolution. The very position the proletariat holds as a class compels it to be consistently democratic. The bourgeoisie looks backward in fear of democratic progress which threatens to strengthen the proletariat. The proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains, but with the aid of democratism it has the whole world to win. That is why the more consistent the bourgeois revolution is in achieving

its democratic transformations, the less will it limit itself to what is of advantage exclusively to the bourgeoisie. The more consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more does it guarantee the proletariat and the peasantry the benefits accruing from the democratic revolution.

Marxism teaches the proletarian not to keep aloof from the bourgeois revolution, not to be indifferent to it, not to allow the leadership of the revolution to be assumed by the bourgeoisie but, on the contrary, to take a most energetic part in it, to fight most resolutely for consistent proletarian democratism, for the revolution to be carried to its conclusion. We cannot get out of the bourgeois-democratic boundaries of the Russian revolution, but we can vastly extend these boundaries, and within these boundaries we can and must fight for the interests of the proletariat, for its immediate needs and for conditions that will make it possible to prepare its forces for the future complete victory. There is bourgeois democracy and bourgeois democracy. The Zemstvo monarchist who favours an upper chamber and "asks" for universal suffrage, while secretly, on the sly, striking a bargain with tsarism for a docked constitution, is a bourgeois democrat too. The peasant, who has taken up arms against the landlords and the government officials, and with a "naïve republicanism" proposes "to send the tsar packing",* is also a bourgeois democrat. There are bourgeois-democratic regimes like the one in Germany, and also like the one in England; like the one in Austria and also like those in America and Switzerland. He would be a fine Marxist indeed, who in a period of democratic revolution failed to see this difference between the degrees of democratism and the difference between its forms, and confined himself to "clever" remarks to the effect that, after all, this is "a bourgeois revolution", the fruit of "bourgeois revolution".

Our new-Iskrists are just such clever fellows, who actually flaunt their short-sightedness. They confine themselves to disquisitions on the bourgeois character of revolution, just when and where it is necessary to be able to draw a distinction between republican-revolutionary and monarch-

* See *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71, p. 337, footnote 2.

ist-liberal bourgeois democracy, to say nothing of the distinction between inconsistent bourgeois democratism and consistent proletarian democratism. They are satisfied—as if they had really become like the "man in the muffler"[21]—with doleful talk about a "process of mutual struggle of antagonistic classes", when the question is one of providing *democratic leadership* in the present revolution, of emphasising *progressive democratic* slogans, as distinct from the treacherous slogans of Mr. Struve and Co., of bluntly and straightforwardly stating the immediate aims of the really revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry as distinct from the liberal haggling of the landlords and manufacturers. Such now is the gist of the matter, which you, gentlemen, have missed, namely: will our revolution result in a real, immense victory, or merely in a wretched deal; will it go so far as the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or will it "peter out" in a liberal constitution *à la* Shipov?

At first sight it may appear that in raising this question we are deviating entirely from our subject. However, that may appear so only at first sight. As a matter of fact, it is precisely this question that lies at the root of the difference in principle which has already become clearly marked between the Social-Democratic tactics of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the tactics initiated by the Conference of the new-*Iskra* supporters. The latter have already taken not two but three steps back resurrecting the mistakes of Economism in solving problems that are incomparably more complex, more important, and more vital to the workers' party, viz., questions of its tactics in time of revolution. That is why we must analyse the question we have raised with all due attention.

The above-quoted section of the new-Iskrists' resolution points to the danger of Social-Democracy tying its own hands in the struggle against the inconsistent policy of the bourgeoisie, of its becoming dissolved in bourgeois democracy. The thought of this danger pervades all specifically new-Iskrist literature; it lies at the very heart of the principle involved in our Party split (ever since the bickering in the split wag completely overshadowed by the turn towards

Economism). Without any equivocation we admit that this danger really exists, that just at the present time, at the height of the Russian revolution, this danger has become particularly grave. The pressing and extremely responsible duty that devolves on all of us theoreticians or—as I should prefer to say of myself—publicists of Social-Democracy is to find out *from what direction* this danger actually threatens. For the source of our disagreement is not a dispute as to whether such a danger exists, but the dispute as to whether it is caused by the so-called tail-ism of the "Minority" or the so-called revolutionism of the "Majority".

To remove all misinterpretations and misunderstandings let us first of all note that the danger to which we are referring lies not in the subjective, but in the objective aspect of the matter, not in the formal stand which Social-Democracy will take in the struggle, but in the material outcome of the entire present revolutionary struggle. The question is not whether this or that Social-Democratic group will want to dissolve in bourgeois democracy, or whether they realise that they are doing so. Nobody suggests that. We do not suspect any Social-Democrat of harbouring such a desire, and this is not at all a matter of desire. Nor is it a question of whether this or that Social-Democratic group will formally retain its separate identity, individuality, and independence of bourgeois democracy throughout the course of the revolution. They may not merely proclaim such "independence", but may even retain it formally, and yet *it may turn out* that their hands will nevertheless be tied in the struggle against the inconsistency of the bourgeoisie. The ultimate political outcome of the revolution may prove to be that, despite the formal "independence" of Social-Democracy, despite its complete organisational individuality as a separate party, it will in fact not be independent; it will not be able to place the imprint of its proletarian independence on the course of events; it will prove so weak that, on the whole and in the last analysis, its "dissolution" in bourgeois democracy will nevertheless be a historical fact.

That is what constitutes the real danger. Now let us see from what direction the danger threatens—from the deviation of Social-Democracy, as represented by the new *Iskra*,

to the Right, as we believe; or from the deviation of Social-Democracy, as represented by the "Majority", *Vperyod*, etc., to the Left—as the new-*Iskra* group believes.

The answer to this question, as we have pointed out, is determined by the objective combination of the operation of the various social forces. The character of these forces has been defined theoretically by the Marxist analysis of Russian life; at present it is being determined in practice by open action by groups and classes in the course of the revolution. Now the entire theoretical analysis made by the Marxists long before the period we are now passing through, as well as all the practical observations of the development of revolutionary events, show that, from the standpoint of objective conditions, there are two possible courses and two possible outcomes of the revolution in Russia. The transformation of the economic and political system in Russia along bourgeois-democratic lines is inevitable and inescapable. No power on earth can prevent such a transformation, but the combined action of the existing forces which are effecting it may result in either of two things, may bring about either of two forms of that transformation. Either 1) matters will end in "the revolution's decisive victory over tsarism", or 2) the forces will be inadequate for a decisive victory and matters will end in a deal between tsarism and the most "inconsistent" and most "self-seeking" elements of the bourgeoisie. By and large, all the infinite variety of details and combinations, which no one is able to foresee, lead to one outcome or the other.

Let us now consider these two possibilities, first, from the standpoint of their social significance and, secondly, from the standpoint of the position of Social-Democracy (its "dissolution" or "having its hands tied") in one outcome or the other.

What is meant by "the revolution's decisive victory over tsarism"? We have already seen that in using this expression the new-*Iskra* group fail to grasp even its immediate political significance. Still less do they seem to understand the class essence of this concept. Surely, we Marxists must not under any circumstances allow ourselves to be deluded by *words*, such as "revolution" or "the great Russian revolution", as do many revolutionary democrats (of the Gapon

type). We must be perfectly certain in our minds as to what real social forces are opposed to "tsarism" (which is a real force perfectly intelligible to all) and are capable of gaining a "decisive victory" over it. The big bourgeoisie, the landlords, the factory owners, and "society", which follows the *Osvobozhdeniye* lead, cannot be such a force. We see that they do not even want a decisive victory. We know that owing to their class position they are incapable of waging a decisive struggle against tsarism; they are too heavily fettered by private property, by capital and land to enter into a decisive struggle. They stand in too great need of tsarism, with its bureaucratic, police, and military forces for use against the proletariat and the peasantry, to want it to be destroyed. No, the only force capable of gaining "a decisive victory over tsarism", is the *people*, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main, big forces, and distribute the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie (also part of "the people") between the two. "The revolution's decisive victory over tsarism" means the establishment of the *revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*. Our new-*Iskra* group cannot escape from this conclusion, which *Vperyod* indicated long ago. No other force is capable of gaining a decisive victory over tsarism.

And such a victory will be precisely a dictatorship, i.e., it must inevitably rely on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an insurrection, and not on institutions of one kind or another established in a "lawful" or "peaceful" way. It can be only a dictatorship, for realisation of the changes urgently and absolutely indispensable to the proletariat and the peasantry will evoke desperate resistance from the landlords, the big bourgeoisie, and tsarism. Without a dictatorship it is impossible to break down that resistance and repel counter-revolutionary attempts. But of course it will be a democratic, not a socialist dictatorship. It will be unable (without a series of intermediary stages of revolutionary development) to affect the foundations of capitalism. At best, it may bring about a radical redistribution of landed property in favour of the peasantry, establish consistent and full democracy, including the formation of a republic, eradicate all the oppressive features of Asiatic bondage, not only in rural but also in factory life,

lay the foundation for a thorough improvement in the conditions of the workers and for a rise in their standard of living, and—last but not least—carry the revolutionary conflagration into Europe. Such a victory will not yet by any means transform our bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution; the democratic revolution will not immediately overstep the bounds of bourgeois social and economic relationships; nevertheless, the significance of such a victory for the future development of Russia and of the whole world will be immense. Nothing will raise the revolutionary energy of the world proletariat so much, nothing will shorten the path leading to its complete victory to such an extent, as this decisive victory of the revolution that has now started in Russia.

How far such a victory is probable is another question. We are not in the least inclined to be unreasonably optimistic on that score; we do not for a moment forget the immense difficulties of this task, but, since we are out to fight, we must desire victory and be able to point out the right road to it. Trends capable of leading to such a victory undoubtedly exist. True, our influence on the masses of the proletariat—the Social-Democratic influence—is as yet very, very inadequate; the revolutionary influence on the mass of the peasantry is quite insignificant; the proletarians, and especially the peasants, are still frightfully disunited, backward, and ignorant. However, revolution unites rapidly and enlightens rapidly. Every step in its development rouses the masses and attracts them with irresistible force to the side of the revolutionary programme, as the only programme that fully and consistently expresses their real and vital interests.

According to a law of mechanics, action and reaction are always equal. In history too, the destructive force of a revolution is to a considerable degree dependent on how strong and protracted the suppression of the striving for liberty has been, and how profound is the contradiction between the outmoded "superstructure" and the living forces of our times. The international political situation, too, is in many respects taking shape in a way most advantageous to the Russian revolution. The workers' and peasants' insurrection has already begun; it is sporadic, spontaneous, and

weak, but it unquestionably and undoubtedly proves the existence of forces capable of waging a decisive struggle-and marching towards a decisive victory.

If these forces prove inadequate tsarism will have time to conclude a deal, which is already being prepared at the two extremes by the Bulygins and the Struves. Then the whole matter will end in a docked constitution, or, if the worst comes to the worst, even in a travesty of a constitution. This, too, will be a "bourgeois revolution", but it will be a miscarriage, a premature birth, an abortion. Social-Democracy entertains no illusions on that score; it knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie; it will not lose heart or abandon its persistent, patient, and sustained work of giving the proletariat class training, even in the most drab, humdrum days of bourgeois-constitutional "Shipov" bliss. Such an outcome would be more or less similar to that of almost all the nineteenth-century democratic revolutions in Europe, and our Party development would then proceed along the arduous, long, but familiar and beaten track.

The question now arises: in which outcome of the two possible will Social-Democracy find its hands actually tied in the struggle against the inconsistent and self-seeking bourgeoisie, find itself actually "dissolved", or almost so, in bourgeois democracy?

It is sufficient to put this question clearly to have a reply without a moment's difficulty.

If the bourgeoisie succeeds in frustrating the Russian revolution by coming to terms with tsarism, Social-Democracy will find its hands actually tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; Social-Democracy will find itself "dissolved" in bourgeois democracy in the sense that the proletariat will not succeed in placing its clear imprint on the revolution, will not succeed in settling accounts with tsarism in the proletarian or, as Marx once said, "in the plebeian manner".

If the revolution gains a decisive victory—then we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the Jacobin, or, if you like, in the plebeian way. "The whole French terrorism," wrote Marx in 1848 in the famous *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, "was nothing but a plebeian manner of settling accounts with the enemies of the bourgeoisie, with absolutism, feudalism,

and philistinism" (see Marx, *Nachlass*, Mehring's edition, Vol. III, p. 211).[22] Have those people who in a period of a democratic revolution try to frighten the Social-Democratic workers in Russia with the bogey of "Jacobinism" ever given thought to the significance of these words of Marx?

The new-*Iskra* group, the Girondists of contemporary Russian Social-Democracy, does not merge with the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, but actually, by reason of the nature of its slogans, it follows in the wake of the latter. And the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, i.e., the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, wishes to settle accounts with the autocracy in a reformist manner, gently and compliantly, so as not to offend the aristocracy, the nobles, or the Court—cautiously, without breaking anything—kindly and politely as befits gentlemen in white gloves (like the ones Mr. Petrunkevich borrowed from a bashi-bazouk to wear at the reception of "representatives of the people" [?] held by Nicholas the Bloodstained, see *Proletary*, No. 5*).

The Jacobins of contemporary Social-Democracy—the Bolsheviks, the *Vperyod* supporters, the "Congress" group, *Proletary* supporters—or whatever else we may call them—wish by their slogans to raise the revolutionary and republican petty bourgeoisie, and especially the peasantry, to the level of the consistent democratism of the proletariat, which fully retains its individuality as a class. They want the people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, to settle accounts with the monarchy and the aristocracy in the "plebeian way", ruthlessly destroying the enemies of liberty, crushing their resistance by force, making no concessions whatever to the accursed heritage of serf-ownership, Asiatic barbarism, and human degradation.

This, of course, does not mean that we necessarily propose to imitate the Jacobins of 1793, and borrow their views, programme, slogans, and methods of action. Nothing of the kind. Our programme is not an old one but a new—the minimum programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. We have a new slogan: the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. If we live to see the real victory of the revolution we shall

* "'Revolutionaries' in Kid Gloves", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 526-30.—*Ed.*

also have new methods of action in keeping with the nature and aims of the working-class party that is striving for a complete socialist revolution. By our parallel we merely want to explain that the representatives of the progressive class of the twentieth century, the proletariat, i.e., the Social-Democrats, are divided into two wings (the opportunist and the revolutionary) similar to those into which the representatives of the progressive class of the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie, were divided, i.e., the Girondists and the Jacobins.

Only in the event of a complete victory of the democratic revolution will the proletariat have its hands free in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; only in that event will it not become "dissolved" in bourgeois democracy, but will leave its proletarian, or rather proletarian-peasant, imprint on the whole revolution.

In a word, to avoid finding itself with its hands tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeois democracy the proletariat must be class-conscious and strong enough to rouse the peasantry to revolutionary consciousness, guide its assault, and thereby independently pursue the line of consistent proletarian democratism.

That is how matters stand in the question—so ineptly dealt with by the new-*Iskra* group—of the danger of our hands being tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will always be inconsistent. There is nothing more naïve and futile than attempts to set forth conditions and points* which, if satisfied, would enable us to consider that the bourgeois democrat is a sincere friend of the people. Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter for democracy. It can become a victorious fighter for democracy only if the peasant masses join its revolutionary struggle. If the proletariat is not strong enough for this the bourgeoisie will be at the head of the democratic revolution and will impart an inconsistent and self-seeking nature to it. Nothing but a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry can prevent this.

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* As was attempted by Starover in his resolution, annulled by the Third Congress,[23] and as the Conference attempts in an equally poor resolution.

Thus, we arrive at the indubitable conclusion that it is the new-*Iskra* tactics which, by its objective significance, is *playing into the hands of the bourgeois democrats*. The preaching of organisational diffuseness which goes to the length of plebiscites, the principle of compromise, and the divorcement of Party literature from the Party; belittling of the aims of insurrection; confusing of the popular political slogans of the revolutionary proletariat with those of the monarchist bourgeoisie; distortion of the requisites for "revolution's decisive victory over tsarism"—an these taken together produce that very policy of tail-ism in a revolutionary period, which bewilders the proletariat, disorganises it, confuses its understanding, and belittles the tactics of Social-Democracy instead of pointing out the only way to victory and getting all the revolutionary and republican elements of the people to adhere to the proletariat's slogan.

To bear out this conclusion, reached by us through analysis of the resolution, let us approach this same question from other angles. Let us first see how in the Georgian *Sotsial-Demokrat* a naïve and outspoken Menshevik illustrates the new-*Iskra* tactics. Secondly, let us see who is actually making use of the new-*Iskra* slogans in the present political situation.

7. THE TACTICS OF "ELIMINATING THE CONSERVATIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT"

The article in the organ of the Tiflis Menshevik "Committee" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1), to which we have just referred, is entitled "The Zemsky Sobor and Our Tactics". Its author has not yet entirely forgotten our programme; he advances the slogan of a republic, but this is how he discusses tactics:

"It is possible to point to two ways of achieving this goal" (a republic): "either completely ignore the Zemsky Sobor that is being convened by the government and defeat the government by force of arms, form a revolutionary government and convene a constituent assembly, or declare the Zemsky Sobor the centre of our action, influencing its composition and activities, by force of arms, forcibly

compelling it to declare itself a constituent assembly, or convene a constituent assembly through it. These two tactics differ very sharply from each other. Let us see which of them is of more advantage to us."

This is how the Russian new-Iskrists set forth ideas subsequently incorporated in the resolution we have analysed. Note that this was written before the battle of Tsushima,[24] when the Bulygin "scheme" had not yet seen the light of day. Even the liberals were losing patience and voicing their distrust from the pages of the legal press; however, a Social-Democrat of the new-*Iskra* brand has proved more credulous than the liberals. He declares that the Zemsky Sobor "is being convened" and trusts the tsar so much that he proposes to make this as yet non-existent Zemsky Sobor (or, possibly, "State Duma" or "Advisory Legislative Assembly"?) the centre of our action. Being more outspoken and straightforward than the authors of the resolution adopted at the Conference, our Tiflisian does not put the two "tactics" (which he expounds with inimitable naïveté) on a par, but declares that the second is of greater "advantage". Just listen:

"The first tactic. As you know, the coming revolution is a bourgeois revolution, i.e., its purpose is to effect such chances in the present system as are of interest not only to the proletariat but to the whole of bourgeois society. All classes are opposed to the government, even the capitalists themselves. The militant proletariat and the militant bourgeoisie are in a certain sense marching together and jointly attacking the autocracy from different sides. The government is completely isolated and has no public sympathy. For this reason it is very easy to destroy it. The Russian proletariat, as a whole, is not yet sufficiently class-conscious and organised to be able to carry out the revolution by itself. And even if it were able to do so it would carry through a proletarian (socialist) revolution and not a bourgeois revolution. Hence, it is in our interest that the government should remain without allies, that it should be unable to divide the opposition, join hands with the bourgeoisie, and leave the proletariat in isolation...."

So it is in the interests of the proletariat that the tsarist government should be unable to divide the bourgeoisie and the proletariat! Is it not by mistake that this Georgian organ is called *Sotsial-Demokrat* instead of *Osvobozhdeniye*? And note its peerless philosophy of democratic revolution! Is it not obvious that this poor Tiflisian is hopelessly confused by the pedantic tail-ist interpretation of the concept "bourgeois revolution"? He discusses the question of the

possible isolation of the proletariat in a democratic revolution, and *forgets* ... forgets a trifle ... the peasantry! Of the possible allies of the proletariat he knows and favours the Zemstvo landlords, but is not aware of the peasants. And this in the Caucasus! Well, were we not right when we said that in its reasoning the new *Iskra* was sinking to the level of the monarchist bourgeoisie instead of raising the revolutionary peasantry to the position of our ally?

"...Otherwise the defeat of the proletariat and the victory of the government are inevitable. This is just what the autocracy is striving for. In its Zemsky Sobor it will undoubtedly attract to its side representatives of the nobility, the Zemstvos, the cities, the universities, and similar bourgeois institutions. It will try to appease them with petty concessions, and thereby reconcile them to itself. Strengthened in this way, it will direct all its blows against the working people, who will have been isolated. It is our duty to prevent such an unfortunate outcome. But can this be done by the first method? Let us assume that we paid no attention whatever to the Zemsky Sobor, but started to prepare for insurrection ourselves, and one fine day came out in the streets armed and ready for battle. The result would be that we would be confronted not with one but with two enemies: the government and the Zemsky Sobor. While we were preparing, they were able to come to terms, enter into an agreement with each other, draw up a constitution advantageous to themselves, and divide power between them. This tactic is of direct advantage to the government, and we must reject it in the most energetic fashion...."

Now this is frank! So we must resolutely reject the "tactics" of preparing an insurrection because "meanwhile" the government would come to terms with the bourgeoisie. Can one find in the old literature of the most rabid Economism anything that would even approximate such a disgrace to revolutionary Social-Democracy? It is a fact that insurrections and outbreaks by workers and peasants are occurring, first in one place and then in another. The Zemsky Sobor, however, is a Bulygin promise. And the *Sotsial-Demokrat* of the city of Tiflis decides that the tactic of preparing an insurrection should be rejected, and a "centre of influence" should be awaited—the Zemsky Sobor....

"...The second tactic, on the contrary, consists in bringing the Zemsky Sobor under our supervision, in not giving it the opportunity to act according to its own will, and enter into an agreement with the government.*

* By what means can the Zemstvo people be deprived of their own will? Perhaps by use of a special sort of litmus-paper?

"We support the Zemsky Sobor inasmuch as it fights the autocracy, and we fight it whenever it becomes reconciled with the autocracy. By energetic intervention and by force we shall bring about a split among the deputies,* rally the radicals to our side, eliminate the conservatives from the government, and thus put the whole Zemsky Sobor on the path of revolution. Thanks to such tactics, the government will always remain isolated, the opposition will be strong, and the establishment of a democratic system will thereby be facilitated."

Well, well! Let anyone now say that we exaggerate the new-Iskrists' turn to the most vulgar semblance of Economism. This is positively like the famous powder for exterminating flies: first you catch your fly, stick it on the fly-paper, and the sly will die. Bring about a split among the deputies of the Zemsky Sobor by *force*, "eliminate the conservatives from the government"—and the *whole* Zemsky Sobor will take *the path of revolution*.... No "Jacobin" armed insurrection of any sort, but just like that, in genteel, almost parliamentary fashion, "influencing" *the members of the Zemsky Sobor*.

Poor Russia! It has been said that she always wears the old-fashioned bonnets that Europe has discarded. We have no parliament as yet, even Bulygin has not yet promised one, but we have any amount of parliamentary cretinism.[25]

"...How should this intervention be effected? First of all, we shall demand that the Zemsky Sobor be convened on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections by secret ballot. Simultaneously with the announcement** of this electoral procedure, complete freedom to carry on the election campaign, i.e., freedom of assembly, speech and the press, the inviolability of electors and candidates, and the release of all political prisoners, must be made law.*** The elections themselves must be fixed as late as possible, to give us sufficient time to inform and prepare the people. And since the drafting of the regulations governing the convocation of the Sobor has been entrusted to a commission headed by Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, we should also exert pressure on this commission and on its members.**** If the Bulygin Commission refuses to satisfy our demands***** and

* Heavens! This is certainly rendering tactics "profound"! There are no forces available to fight in the streets, but it is possible "to bring about a split among the deputies" "by force". Listen, comrade from Tiflis, lie if you must, but there's a limit....

** In *Iskra*?

*** By Nicholas?

**** So this is what is meant by the tactic of "eliminating the conservatives from the government"!

***** But surely such a thing cannot happen if we follow this correct and profound tactic!

grants suffrage only to property owners, then we must intervene in these elections and by revolutionary means make the voters elect progressive candidates and in the Zemsky Sobor demand a constituent assembly. Finally, we must by all possible measures—demonstrations, strikes, and insurrection if need be—compel the Zemsky Sobor to convene a constituent assembly or declare itself to be such. The armed proletariat must be the defender of the constituent assembly, and together* both will march forward to a democratic republic.

"Such is the Social-Democratic tactics, and it alone will secure us victory."

Let not the reader imagine that this incredible nonsense comes from some new-*Iskra* maiden writer, a man with no authority or influence. No, this is stated in the *organ* of an entire committee of new-*Iskra* supporters, the Tiflis Committee. More than that. This nonsense has been *openly endorsed by Iskra*, in No. 100 of which we read the following about that issue of the *Sotsial-Demokrat*:

"*The first issue is edited in a lively and talented manner. The experienced hand of a capable editor and writer is perceptible.... It may be said with all confidence that the newspaper will carry out brilliantly the task it has set itself.*"

Yes! If that task is to show clearly to all and sundry the utter ideological decay of the new-*Iskra* trend, then it has indeed been carried out "brilliantly". No one could have expressed new-*Iskra* degradation to liberal bourgeois opportunism in a more "lively, talented, and capable" manner.

8. THE *OSVOBOZHDENIYE* AND NEW-*ISKRA* TRENDS

Let us now proceed to another striking confirmation of the political significance of the new-*Iskra* trend.

In a splendid, remarkable, and most instructive article, entitled "How to Find Oneself" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71), Mr. Struve wages war against the "programmatic revolutionism" of our extreme parties. Mr. Struve is particularly displeased with me personally.** As far as I am concerned,

* Both the armed proletariat and the conservatives "eliminated from the government"?

** "In comparison with the revolutionism of Mr. Lenin and his associates the revolutionism of the West-European Social-Democracy of Bebel, and even of Kautsky, is opportunism; but the foundations of even this already toned-down revolutionism have been undermined and washed away by history." A most irate thrust. Only Mr. Struve

Mr. Struve could not have pleased me more: I could not wish for a better ally in the fight against the renascent Economism of the new-*Iskra* group and the absence of principles displayed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. On some other occasion we shall relate how Mr. Struve and *Osvobozhdeniye* have proved in practice how utterly reactionary are the "amendments" to Marxism made in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' draft programme. We have already repeatedly* spoken of the honest, faithful and real service rendered to

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should not think he can lay all the blame on me, as he could on an opponent no longer alive. I have only to challenge Mr. Struve, though I am sure he will never accept such a challenge, to answer the following questions. When and where did I call the "revolutionism of Bebel and Kautsky" opportunism? When and where did I ever claim to have created any sort of special trend in international Social-Democracy *not identical* with the trend of Bebel and Kautsky? When and where have there been brought to light differences between me, on the one hand, and Bebel and Kautsky, on the other—differences even slightly approximating in gravity the differences between Bebel and Kautsky, for instance, on the agrarian question in Breslau?[26] Let Mr. Struve try to answer these three questions.

To our readers we say: the liberal bourgeoisie *everywhere* and *always* resorts to the method of assuring its adherents in a given country that the Social-Democrats of that country are most unreasonable, whereas their comrades in a neighbouring country are "goody-goodies". The German bourgeoisie has *hundreds of times* held up "goody-goody" French socialists as models for the Bebels and the Kautskys. The French bourgeoisie quite recently pointed to "goody-goody" Bebel as a model for the French socialists. That is an old trick, Mr. Struve! You will find only children and ignoramuses swallowing such bait. The complete unanimity of international revolutionary Social-Democracy on all major questions of programme and tactics is a most incontrovertible fact.

* Let us remind the reader that the article "What Should Not Be Done" (*Iskra*, No. 52) was vociferously hailed by *Osvobozhdeniye* as a "noteworthy turn" towards concessions to the opportunists. The principles underlying the new-*Iskra* ideas were especially lauded by *Osvobozhdeniye* in an item on the split among Russian Social-Democrats. Commenting on Trotsky's pamphlet, *Our Political Tasks*, *Osvobozhdeniye* noted the similarity between this author's ideas and what was once written and said by the *Rabocheye Dyelo* writers Krichevsky, Martynov, Akimov (see the leaflet entitled "An Obliging Liberal" published by *Vperyod*). *Osvobozhdeniye* welcomed Martynov's pamphlet on the two dictatorships (see the item in *Vperyod*, No. 9). Finally, Starover's belated complaints about the old slogan of the old *Iskra*, "first draw a line of demarcation and then unite", met with particular sympathy from *Osvobozhdeniye*.

me by Mr. Struve whenever he approved of the new-*Iskra* trend *in principle*, and we shall now speak of that once more.

Mr. Struve's article contains a number of very interesting statements, which we can note here only in passing. He intends "to create Russian democracy by relying on class collaboration and not on class struggle", in which case "the socially privileged intelligentsia" (something like the "cultured nobility" to which Mr. Struve makes obeisance with the grace of a true high-society ... lackey) will bring "the weight of its social position" (the weight of its money-bags) to this "non-class" party. Mr. Struve expresses the desire to acquaint the youth with the worthlessness "of the hackneyed radical opinion that the bourgeoisie has become frightened and has betrayed the proletariat and the cause of liberty". (We welcome this desire with all our heart. Nothing can confirm the correctness of this Marxist "hackneyed opinion" better than a war waged against it by Mr. Struve. Please, Mr. Struve, don't put off this splendid plan of yours!)

For the purposes of our subject it is important to note the *practical* slogans now being warred against by this politically sensitive representative of the Russian bourgeoisie who is so responsive to the slightest change in the weather. First, he is warring against the slogan of republicanism. Mr. Struve is firmly convinced that this slogan is "incomprehensible and foreign to the mass of the people" (he has forgotten to add: comprehensible to, but not to the advantage of, the bourgeoisie!). We should like to see what reply Mr. Struve would get from the workers in our study circles and at our mass meetings. Or perhaps the workers are not the people? And what about the peasants? They are sometimes given to what Mr. Struve calls "naïve republicanism" ("to send the tsar packing")—yet the liberal bourgeoisie believes that *naïve* republicanism will be replaced not by enlightened republicanism, but by enlightened monarchism! *Ca dépend*, Mr. Struve; it will depend on circumstances. Both tsarism and the bourgeoisie cannot but oppose a radical improvement in the condition of the peasantry at the expense of the landed estates, whereas the working class cannot but assist the peasantry in this respect.

Secondly, Mr. Struve asserts that "in a civil war the attacker is always in the wrong". This idea verges closely on the above-mentioned new-*Iskra* trends. We will not say, of course, that in civil war it is *always* advantageous to attack; no, sometimes defensive tactics is obligatory *for the time being*. But to apply to the Russia of 1905 a proposition like the one Mr. Struve has made means precisely to demonstrate a little of the "hackneyed radical opinion" ("the bourgeoisie takes fright and betrays the cause of liberty"). Whoever now refuses to attack the autocracy and reaction, whoever fails to prepare for such an attack, and whoever does not advocate it, has no right to call himself an adherent of revolution.

Mr. Struve condemns the slogans: "secrecy" and "rioting" (a riot being "an insurrection in miniature"). Mr. Struve despises both of these—and he does so from the standpoint of "the approach to the masses". We should like to ask Mr. Struve whether he can point to any passage in, for instance, *What Is To Be Done?*—the work, from his standpoint, of an extreme revolutionary—which advocates rioting. As regards "secrecy", is there really much difference between, for example, us and Mr. Struve? Are we not both working on "illegal" newspapers which are being smuggled into Russia "secretly" and serve the "secret" groups of either the *Osvobozhdeniye* League or the R.S.D.L.P.? Our workers' mass meetings are often held "secretly"—we do commit that sin. But what about the meetings held by gentlemen of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League? Have you any grounds to brag, Mr. Struve, and look down upon contemptible partisans of contemptible secrecy?

True, strict secrecy is required in supplying the workers with arms. On this point Mr. Struve is rather more outspoken. Just listen: "As regards insurrection, or a revolution in the technical sense, only mass propaganda in favour of a democratic programme can create the socio-psychological conditions for a general armed uprising. Thus, even from the point of view of an insurrection being the *inevitable* consummation of the present struggle for emancipation—a view I do not share—the imbuing of the masses with ideas of democratic reform is a most fundamental and most necessary task."

Mr. Struve tries to evade the issue. He speaks of the inevitability of an insurrection instead of speaking of its necessity for the victory of the revolution. An insurrection—unprepared, spontaneous, sporadic—has already begun. No one can positively vouch that it will develop into a full-fledged and integral insurrection of the people, for that depends on the state of the revolutionary forces (which can be fully gauged only in the course of the struggle itself), on the behaviour of the government and the bourgeoisie, and on a number of other circumstances, which cannot be estimated with precision. It is pointless to speak of inevitability, in the meaning of absolute certainty with regard to some concrete event, to which Mr. Struve would reduce the matter. What you must speak of, if you would be a partisan of revolution, is whether insurrection is *necessary for the victory* of the revolution, whether it is necessary to proclaim it vigorously, to advocate it and make immediate and energetic preparations for it. Mr. Struve cannot fail to understand this difference: he does not, for instance, obscure the question of the need for universal suffrage—which to a democrat is indisputable—by questioning the inevitability of its attainment in the course of the present revolution—which, to people engaged in political activity, is disputable and of little account. By evading the issue of the need for an insurrection, Mr. Struve reveals the innermost essence of the liberal bourgeoisie's political stand. In the first place, the bourgeoisie would prefer to come to terms with the autocracy rather than crush it; secondly, the bourgeoisie, in all cases, shifts the armed struggle on to the workers' shoulders. That is the real meaning of Mr. Struve's evasiveness. That is why he backs out of the question of the need for an insurrection, towards the question of its "socio-psychological conditions", and preliminary "propaganda". Just as in the Frankfort Parliament of 1848 the bourgeois windbags were busy drawing up resolutions, declarations, and decisions, engaging in "mass propaganda" and preparing the "socio-psychological conditions" when it was a matter of repelling the government's armed forces, when the movement had "led to the necessity" of an armed struggle, when verbal persuasion alone (which is a hundredfold necessary during the preparatory period) had become banal, bourgeois inactivity and cowardice

—so Mr. Struve also evades the question of insurrection, and takes cover behind *phrases*. Mr. Struve shows us revealingly what many Social-Democrats turn a blind eye to, namely, that a revolutionary period differs from ordinary, everyday, preparatory periods in history in that the temper, excitement, and convictions of the masses must and do express themselves in *action*.

Vulgar revolutionism fails to see that words are action, too; this proposition is indisputable when applied to history in *general*, or to those periods of history when no open political mass action takes place. No putsches of any sort can replace or artificially evoke such action. Tail-ist revolutionaries fail to understand that when a revolutionary period has set in, when the old "superstructure" has cracked from top to bottom, when open political action by the classes and masses that are creating a new superstructure for themselves has become a fact, and when civil war has begun—it is apathy, lifelessness, pedantry, or else betrayal of the revolution and treachery to it to confine oneself to "words" *in the old way*, without advancing the *direct slogan* on the need to pass over to "action", and to try to avoid action by pleading the need for "psychological conditions" and "propaganda" in general. The democratic bourgeoisie's Frankfort windbags are a memorable historical example of just such treachery or of just such pedantic stupidity.

Would you like an instance provided by the history of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia to explain this difference between vulgar revolutionism and tail-ism in revolutionaries? We shall provide you with such an explanation. Call to mind the years 1901 and 1902, which are so recent, but already seem ancient history to us today. Demonstrations had begun. Vulgar revolutionism had raised a wail about "assault tactics" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*[27]), "bloodthirsty leaflets" were being issued (of Berlin origin, if my memory does not fail me), and attacks were being made on the "literary pretentiousness" and armchair nature of the idea of agitation being conducted on a country-wide scale through a newspaper (Nadezhdin).[28] On the contrary, revolutionaries' tail-ism found expression at the time in the teaching that "the economic struggle is the *best* means of political agitation". How did the revolutionary Social-

FOR MARX FOR MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Democrats behave? They attacked both these trends. They condemned pyrotechnic methods and the cries about assault tactics, for it was, or should have been, obvious to all that open mass action was a matter of the morrow. They condemned tail-ism and openly issued the slogan *even* of a popular insurrection, not in the meaning of a direct appeal (Mr. Struve would not discover any appeal to "riot" in our utterances of that period), but in the meaning of a *necessary* deduction, the meaning of "propaganda" (of which Mr. Struve has only now bethought himself—our worthy Mr. Struve is always several years behind the times), in the sense of preparing those very "socio-psychological conditions" on which the representatives of the bewildered and huckstering bourgeoisie are now "sadly and inappropriately" holding forth. *At that time* propaganda and agitation, agitation and propaganda were really brought to the fore by the objective state of affairs. *At that time* work on an all-Russia political newspaper, the weekly publication of which seemed an ideal, could be proposed (and was proposed in *What Is To Be Done?*) as the touchstone of the work of preparing for an insurrection. *At that time* slogans advocating mass agitation *instead of* direct armed action, preparation of the socio-psychological conditions for insurrection *instead of* pyrotechnics were revolutionary Social-Democracy's only correct slogans. *At the present time* these slogans have been overtaken by events; the movement has left them behind; they have become tatters, rags fit only to cover *Osvobozhdeniye* hypocrisy and new-*Iskra* tail-ism!

Or perhaps I am mistaken? Perhaps the revolution has not yet begun? Perhaps the time has not yet arrived for open political action by the classes? Perhaps there is no civil war yet, and the criticism of weapons should not yet be the *necessary* and obligatory successor, heir, trustee, and consummator of the weapon of criticism?

Get out of your study, look about you, and seek your answer in the streets. Has not the government itself started civil war by everywhere shooting down crowds of peaceful and unarmed citizens? Have not the armed Black Hundreds come out as an "argument" of the autocracy? Has not the bourgeoisie—even the bourgeoisie—recognised the need for a citizens' militia? Does not Mr. Struve himself, the ideally

moderate and punctilious Mr. Struve, say (alas, he does so only to evade the issue!) that "the open nature of revolutionary action" (that's what we are like today!) "is now one of the most important conditions for exerting an educational influence upon the mass of the people"?

Those who have eyes to see can have no doubt as to how the question of an insurrection must now be presented by partisans of revolution. Examine the *three* presentations of this question provided in those organs of the free press that are at all capable of influencing the *masses*.

Presentation one. The resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.* It is publicly acknowledged and declared that the general

* The following is the text in full:

"1. Whereas the proletariat being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;

"2. Whereas this movement at the present time has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising;

"3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably take the most energetic part in this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution in Russia;

"4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only if it is united in a single and independent political force under the banner of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically;

"5. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism, against the propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;

"Therefore the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment.

"Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations:

"a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not only the political significance, but the practical organisational aspect of the impending armed uprising,

"b) to explain in that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during the progress of the uprising, and

"c) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof, for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and when necessary." (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

democratic revolutionary movement *has already brought about the necessity* of an insurrection. The organisation of the proletariat for an insurrection has been placed on the order of the day as one of the essential, principal, and *indispensable* tasks of the Party. Instructions have been issued for *most energetic* measures to be taken to arm the proletariat and ensure the possibility of direct leadership of the insurrection.

Presentation two. An article in *Osvobozhdeniye*, with a statement of principles, by the "leader of the Russian constitutionalists" (as Mr. Struve was recently described by so influential an organ of the European bourgeoisie as *Frankfurter Zeitung*[29]) or the leader of the Russian progressive bourgeoisie. He does not share the opinion that an insurrection is inevitable. Secret activity and rioting are the specific methods of unreasonable revolutionism. Republicanism is the method of stunning. An insurrection is really a mere technical question, whereas "the fundamental and most necessary task" is to carry on mass propaganda and to prepare the socio-psychological conditions.

Presentation three. The resolution of the new-*Iskra* Conference. Our task is to prepare an insurrection. A planned insurrection is out of the question. Favourable conditions for an insurrection are created by the disorganisation of the government, by our agitation, and by our organisation. Only then "can technical combat preparations acquire more or less serious significance".

Is that all? Yes, that is all. Whether insurrection has become necessary is something the new-*Iskra* leaders of the proletariat do not yet know. Whether the task of organising the proletariat for the immediate struggle is an urgent one is not yet clear to them. It is not necessary to urge the adoption of the most energetic measures; it is far more important (in 1905, and not in 1902) to explain in general outline under what conditions these measures "may" acquire "more or less serious" significance....

Do you see now, comrades of the new *Iskra*, where your turn to Martynovism has led you? Do you realise that your political philosophy has proved a rehash of the *Osvobozhdeniye* philosophy?—that (against your will, and without your being aware of it) you are following in the wake of the monarchist

bourgeoisie? Is it now clear to you that, while repeating stale truths and perfecting yourselves in sophistry, you have lost sight of the fact that—in the memorable words of Pyotr Struve's memorable article—"the open nature of revolutionary *action* is now one of the most important conditions for exerting an educational influence upon the mass of the people"?

9. WHAT IS MEANT BY BEING A PARTY OF EXTREME OPPOSITION IN TIME OF REVOLUTION?

Let us return to the resolution on a provisional government. We have shown that new-Iskrist tactics does not push the revolution forward—the possibility of which they would like to ensure by their resolution—but pull it back. We have shown that it is precisely this tactics that *ties the hands* of Social-Democracy in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie and does not prevent its being dissolved in bourgeois democracy. The false premises of the resolution naturally lead to the following false conclusion: "Therefore, Social-Democracy must not set itself the aim of seizing or sharing power in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition." Consider the first half of this conclusion, which contains a statement of aims. Do the new-Iskrists declare that the revolution's decisive victory over tsarism is the aim of Social-Democratic activity? They do. They are unable correctly to formulate the conditions of a decisive victory, and lapse into the *Osvobozhdeniye* formulation, but they do set themselves this aim. Further, do they associate a provisional government with insurrection? Yes, they do so directly by stating that a provisional government "will emerge from a victorious popular insurrection". Finally, do they set themselves the aim of guiding the insurrection? Yes, they do. Like Mr. Struve they evade the admission that an insurrection is an urgent necessity, but at the same time, unlike Mr. Struve, they say that "Social-Democracy strives to *subordinate* it (the insurrection) to its influence and *leadership* and to use it in the interests of the working class".

How nicely this hangs together, does it not? We set ourselves the *aim* of subordinating the insurrection of both the

proletarian and *non-proletarian* masses to our influence and our leadership, and of using it in our interests. Hence, we set ourselves the aim of leading, in the insurrection both the proletariat, and the revolutionary bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie ("the non-proletarian groups"), i.e., of "*sharing*" the leadership of the insurrection between the Social-Democracy and the revolutionary bourgeoisie. We set ourselves the aim of securing *victory* for the insurrection, which is to lead to the establishment of a provisional government ("which will emerge from a victorious popular insurrection"). *Therefore* ... therefore we must not set ourselves the aim of seizing power or of sharing it in a provisional revolutionary government!!

Our friends cannot make their arguments dovetail. They vacillate between the standpoint of Mr. Struve, who evades the issue of an insurrection, and the standpoint of revolutionary Social-Democracy, which calls upon us to undertake this urgent task. They vacillate between anarchism, which on principle condemns all participation in a provisional revolutionary government as betrayal of the proletariat, and Marxism, which demands such participation, given Social-Democracy's guiding influence in the insurrection.* They have no independent stand whatever: neither that of Mr. Struve, who wants to come to terms with tsarism and is, therefore, compelled to resort to evasions and subterfuges on the question of insurrection, nor that of the anarchists, who condemn all action "from above" and all participation in a bourgeois revolution. The new-*Iskra* group confuses a deal with tsarism and a victory over the latter. They want to take part in a bourgeois revolution. They have gone somewhat beyond Martynov's *Two Dictatorships*. They even consent to lead an insurrection of the people—in order to renounce that leadership immediately after victory is won (or, perhaps, immediately before the victory?), i.e., *in order not to avail themselves of the fruits of victory*, but to turn all these fruits over *entirely to the bourgeoisie*. This is what they call "using the insurrection in the interests of the working class...".

* See *Proletary*, No. 3, "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government", article two, 1905. (See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 474-81.—*Ed.*)

There is no need to dwell on this muddle any longer. It will be more useful to examine how this muddle *originated* in the formulation which reads: "remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition".

This is one of the familiar propositions of international revolutionary Social-Democracy. It is a perfectly correct proposition. It has become a common place to all opponents of revisionism or opportunism in parliamentary countries. It has become generally accepted as the legitimate and necessary rebuff to "parliamentary cretinism", to Millerandism, Bernsteinism,[30] and Italian reformism of the Turati brand. Our good new-Iskrists have learned this excellent proposition by heart and are zealously applying it ... *quite inappropriately*. Categories of the parliamentary struggle are introduced into resolutions written for conditions in which no parliament exists. The concept "opposition', which is the reflection and the expression of a political situation in which no one seriously speaks of an *insurrection*, is meaninglessly applied to a situation in which insurrection *has begun* and in which all supporters of revolution are thinking and talking about leadership in it. The desire to "*remain*" with the old methods, i.e., action only "from below", is voiced with pomp and clamour *precisely at a time* when the revolution has confronted us with the necessity, in the event of a victorious insurrection, of acting *from above*.

No, our new-*Iskra* group is decidedly out of luck! Even when they formulate a correct Social-Democratic proposition they do not know how to apply it correctly. They have failed to understand that when the revolution gets under way, and there are civil war and insurrectionary outbursts, but still no parliament, terms and concepts of parliamentary struggle undergo a transformation and turn into their opposites. They do not realise that in the conditions under examination amendments are introduced by means of street demonstrations, interpellations are made by means of offensive action by armed citizens, and opposition to the government is effected by the forcible overthrow of that government.

Just as the well-known hero of our folk epos repeated good advice when it was out of place, our admirers of Martynov repeat the lessons of peaceful parliamentarianism at a time when, as they themselves state, actual hostilities have begun.

There is nothing more ridiculous than this pompous advancement of the slogan of "extreme opposition" in a resolution which begins by referring to a "decisive victory of the revolution" and to a "popular insurrection"! Try to conceive, gentlemen, what it means to be the "extreme opposition" in a period of insurrection. Does it mean exposing the government, or deposing it? Does it mean voting against the government, or defeating its armed forces in open battle? Does it mean refusing to replenish the government's exchequer, or the revolutionary seizure of that exchequer for the needs of the uprising, to arm the workers and peasants, and to convoke a constituent assembly? Are you not beginning to understand, gentlemen, that the term "extreme opposition" expresses only negative actions—exposing, voting against, refusing? Why is that so? Because this term applies only to the parliamentary struggle and, moreover, in a period when no one makes "decisive victory" the immediate object of the struggle. Are you not beginning to understand that things change cardinally in this respect, from the moment the politically oppressed people launch a determined attack along the whole front in desperate struggle for victory?

The workers ask us: Must the urgent business of insurrection be energetically begun? What is to be done to make the incipient insurrection victorious? What use should be made of victory? What programme can and should then be implemented? The new-Iskrists, who are making Marxism more profound, answer: we must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition.... Well, were we not right in calling these knights past masters of philistinism?

10. "REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNES" AND THE REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

The Conference of the new-*Iskra* group did not keep to the anarchist stand into which the new *Iskra* had talked itself (action only "from below", not "from below and from above"). The absurdity of admitting the possibility of an insurrection and not admitting the possibility of victory and participation in a provisional revolutionary government was too glaring. The resolution, therefore, introduced certain

reservations and restrictions into the Martynov-Martov solution of the question. Let us consider these reservations, as stated in the following section of the resolution:

"This tactic" ("to remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition") "does not, of course, in any way exclude the expediency of a partial and episodic seizure of power and the establishment of revolutionary communes in one city or another, or in one district or another, exclusively for the purpose of helping to spread the insurrection and of disrupting the government."

If that is the case, it means the admission in principle of action not only from below, but also from above. It means that the proposition laid down in L. Martov's well-known *feuilleton* in *Iskra* (No. 93) is discarded, and that the tactics of *Vperyod*, i.e., not only "from below", but also "from above", is acknowledged as correct.

Further, the seizure of power (even if partial, episodic, etc.) obviously presupposes participation not only of Social-Democrats, and not only of the proletariat. This follows from the fact that it is not the proletariat alone that is interested and takes an active part in a democratic revolution. It follows from the insurrection being a "popular" one, as is stated at the beginning of the resolution under examination, with "non-proletarian groups" (the words used in the Conference resolution on the uprising), i.e., the bourgeoisie, also taking part in it. Hence, the principle that any participation of socialists in a provisional revolutionary government jointly with the petty bourgeoisie is betrayal of the working class *was thrown overboard by the Conference*, which is what *Vperyod* sought to achieve. "Betrayal" does not cease to be betrayal because the action constituting it is partial, episodic, local, etc. Hence, the idea that participation in a provisional revolutionary government is tantamount to vulgar Jaurèsism *was thrown overboard* by the Conference, which is what *Vperyod* sought to achieve.[31] A government does not cease to be a government because its power extends not to many cities but to a single city, not to many districts but to a single district, or because of the name it bears. Thus, *the theoretical presentation of this question*, as attempted by the new *Iskra*, *was discarded by the Conference.*

Let us see whether the restrictions the Conference imposed on the formation of revolutionary governments and on participation in them, which are now admitted in principle, are reasonable. We are not aware of the distinction between "episodic" and "provisional".* We are afraid that the former word, which is "new" and foreign, is merely a screen for lack of clear thinking. It *seems* "more profound", but actually it is only more obscure and confused. What is the difference between the "expediency" of a partial "seizure of power" in a city or district, and participation in a provisional revolutionary government of the entire state? Do not "cities" include a city like St. Petersburg where the events of January 9 took place? Do not districts include the Caucasus, which is bigger than many a state? Will not the problems (which at one time embarrassed the new *Iskra*) of what to do with the prisons, the police, the treasury, etc., confront us the moment we "seize power" even in a single city, let alone in a district? No one will deny, of course, that if we lack sufficient forces, if the insurrection is not wholly successful, or if the victory is indecisive, provisional revolutionary governments may possibly be set up in individual localities, in individual cities and the like. But what has all that got to do with the point at issue, gentlemen? Do not you yourselves, in the beginning of the resolution, speak of a "decisive victory of the revolution", a "victorious popular insurrection"?? Since when have Social-Democrats taken over the job of the anarchists: splitting the attention and the aims of the proletariat, and directing its attention to the "partial", instead of the general, the single, the integral, and the complete? While presupposing "seizure of power" in a city, you yourselves speak of "extending the insurrection"—to another city, may we venture to think?—to all cities, may we dare to hope? Your conclusions, gentlemen, are as unsound and haphazard, as contradictory and confused, as your premises. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. gave an exhaustive and clear answer to the question of a provisional revolutionary government in general. This answer covers all cases of local provisional governments as

* The first word was in scholarly use at the time, while the second was, and still is, colloquial Russian.—*Tr.*

well. However, by artificially and arbitrarily isolating a *part* of the question, the Conference's answer merely *evades* the issue as a whole (and that unsuccessfully), and creates confusion.

What is meant by "revolutionary communes"? Does this concept differ from "a provisional revolutionary government", and, if so, in what respect? The gentlemen of the Conference do not know themselves. Confusion of revolutionary thought leads them, as very often happens, to *revolutionary phrase-mongering*. Indeed, the use of the words "revolutionary commune" in a resolution passed by representatives of Social-Democracy is revolutionary phrase-mongering and nothing else. Marx often condemned such phrase-mongering in which some "charming" terms from the *outworn past* are used to conceal the tasks of the future. In such cases the charm of a term which has already played its part in history becomes so much useless and harmful tinsel, a child's rattle. We must give the workers and the whole people a clear and unambiguous notion as to *why* we want a provisional revolutionary government to be set up, and *exactly what changes* we shall bring about if we exercise decisive influence on the government on the very day following the victory of the popular insurrection which has already commenced. These are questions confronting political leaders.

The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. replied to these questions with absolute clarity, and drew up a complete programme of these changes—our Party's minimum programme. The word "commune", however, gives no answer at all; it only confuses people's minds with the distant echo of a sonorous phrase or empty rhetoric. The more we cherish, for instance, the memory of the Paris Commune of 1871, the less permissible is it to refer to it offhand, without analysing its mistakes and the special conditions attending it. To do so would mean repeating the absurd example of the Blanquists—whom Engels ridiculed—who (in 1874, in their "Manifesto") paid homage to every act of the Commune.[32] What reply will a conferee give to a worker who asks him about *this* "revolutionary commune", the one that is mentioned in the resolution? He will only be able to tell him that this is the name by which a certain workers' government is known in history, a government that was unable, and could

not at that time, distinguish between the elements of a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution, a government that confused the tasks of fighting for a republic with those of fighting for socialism, was unable to launch an energetic military offensive against Versailles, made a mistake in failing to seize the Bank of France, etc. In short, whether in your answer you refer to the Paris Commune or to some other commune, your answer will be: it was a government *such as ours should not be*. A fine answer, indeed! Does it not testify to pedantic moralising and impotence on the part of a revolutionary, when a resolution says nothing about the practical programme of the Party and inappropriately begins giving lessons from history? Does this not reveal the very mistake we have unsuccessfully been accused of, i.e., confusing a democratic revolution with a socialist revolution, between which none of the "communes" was able to distinguish?

Extending the insurrection and disorganising the government are presented as the "exclusive" aim of a provisional government (so inappropriately termed a "commune"). Taken in its literal sense, the word "exclusive" eliminates all other aims; it is an echo of the absurd theory of "only from below". Such elimination of other aims is another instance of short-sightedness and lack of reflection. A "revolutionary commune", i.e., a revolutionary government, even if only in a single city, will inevitably have to administer (even if provisionally, "partly, episodically") *all* affairs of state and it is the height of folly to hide one's head under one's wing and refuse to see this. This government will have to enact an eight-hour working day, establish workers' inspection of factories, institute free universal education, introduce the election of judges, set up peasant committees, etc.; in a word, it will certainly have to carry out a number of reforms. To designate these reforms as "helping to spread the insurrection" would be playing with words and deliberately causing greater confusion in a matter that calls for absolute clarity.

The concluding part of the new-*Iskra* Conference resolution provides no fresh material for a criticism of basic

Economist trends that have been revived in our Party, but it does illustrate, from a somewhat different angle, what has been said above.

Here is that concluding part:

"Only in one event should Social-Democracy on its own initiative direct its efforts towards seizing power and holding it as long as possible—namely, in the event of the revolution spreading to the advanced countries of Western Europe, where conditions for the achievement of socialism have already reached a certain [?] degree of maturity. In that event the limited historical scope of the Russian revolution can be considerably widened and the possibility will arise of entering on the path of socialist reforms.

"By basing its tactics on the expectation that during the entire revolutionary period the Social-Democratic Party will retain its stand of extreme revolutionary opposition to all governments that may succeed one another in the course of the revolution, Social-Democracy will best be able to prepare itself to utilise governmental power if it falls [??] into its hands."

The basic idea here is the one repeatedly formulated by *Vperyod*, which has stated that we must not be afraid (as Martynov is) of Social-Democracy's complete victory in a democratic revolution, i.e., of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, for such a victory will enable us to rouse Europe; after throwing off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, the socialist proletariat of Europe will in its turn help us to accomplish the socialist revolution. But see how the new-*Iskra* rendering impairs this idea. We shall not dwell on details; on the absurd assumption that power could "fall" into the hands of a class-conscious party which considers seizure of power harmful tactics; on the fact that in Europe the conditions for socialism have reached not a certain degree of maturity, but maturity in general; on the fact that our Party programme knows no socialist reforms, but only the socialist revolution. Let us take the principal and basic difference between *Vperyod*'s idea and the one presented in the resolution. *Vperyod* set the revolutionary proletariat of Russia an active task: winning the battle for democracy and using this victory to bring the revolution into Europe. The resolution fails to grasp this link

between our "decisive victory" (not in the new-*Iskra* sense) and the revolution in Europe, and, therefore, it does not speak of the tasks of the proletariat or the prospects of the *latter*'s victory, but of one of the possibilities in general: "in the event of the revolution spreading...." *Vperyod* pointedly and definitely indicated—and this was incorporated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—how "governmental power" can and must "be utilised" in the interests of the proletariat, bearing in mind what can be achieved immediately, at a given stage of social development, and what must first be achieved as a democratic prerequisite of the struggle for socialism. Here, too, the resolution lags hopelessly behind when it states: "will be able to prepare itself to utilise", but fails to say *how* it will be able, *how* it will prepare itself, and to utilise *for what purpose*. We have no doubt, for instance, that the new-Iskrists may be "able to prepare themselves to utilise" their leading position in the Party, but the point is that so far their experience of that utilisation, their preparation, does not hold out much hope of possibility becoming reality....

Vperyod stated quite definitely wherein lies the real "possibility of retaining power"—namely, in the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry; in their joint mass strength, which is capable of outweighing all the forces of counter-revolution; in the inevitable concurrence of their interests in *democratic* reforms. Here, too, the resolution of the Conference gives us nothing positive; it merely evades the issue. Surely, the possibility of retaining power in Russia must be determined by the composition of the social forces in Russia herself, by the circumstances of the democratic revolution now taking place in our country. A victory of the proletariat in Europe (it is still quite a far cry from bringing the revolution into Europe to the victory of the proletariat) will give rise to a desperate counter-revolutionary struggle on the part of the Russian bourgeoisie—yet the resolution of the new-Iskrists does not say a word about this counter-revolutionary force whose significance was appraised in the resolution of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Third Congress. If, in our fight for a republic and democracy, we could not rely upon the peasantry as well as upon the

proletariat, the prospect of our "retaining power" would be hopeless. But if it is not hopeless, if the "revolution's decisive victory over tsarism" opens up such a possibility, then we must indicate it, call actively for its transformation into reality, and issue practical slogans not only *for the contingency* of the revolution being brought into Europe, but also for the *purpose* of taking it there. The reference made by tail-ist Social-Democrats to the "limited historical scope of the Russian revolution" merely serves to cover up their limited understanding of the aims of this democratic revolution, and of the proletariat's leading role in it!

One of the objections raised to the slogan of "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is that dictatorship presupposes a "single will" (*Iskra*, No. 95), and that there can be no single will of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. This objection is unsound, for it is based on an abstract, "metaphysical" interpretation of the term "single will". There may be a single will in one respect and not in another. The absence of unity on questions of socialism and in the struggle for socialism does not preclude singleness of will on questions of democracy and in the struggle for a republic. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the logical and historical difference between a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the character of the democratic revolution as one *of the whole people*: if it is "of the whole people", that means that there is "singleness of will" precisely in so far as this revolution meets the needs and requirements of the whole people. Beyond the bounds of democratism there can be no question of the proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie having a single will. Class struggle between them is inevitable, but it is in a democratic republic that this struggle will be the most thoroughgoing and widespread struggle of the people *for socialism*. Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy, and privilege. In the struggle against this past, in the struggle against counter-revolution, a "single will" of the proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for here there is unity of interests.

Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle of the wage-worker against the employer, the struggle for socialism. Here singleness of will is impossible.* Here the path before us lies not from autocracy to a republic, but from a petty-bourgeois democratic republic to socialism.

Of course, in actual historical circumstances, the elements of the past become interwoven with those of the future; the two paths cross. Wage-labour with its struggle against private property exists under the autocracy as well; it arises even under serfdom. But this does not in the least prevent us from logically and historically distinguishing between the major stages of development. We all contrapose bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution; we all insist on the absolute necessity of strictly distinguishing between them; however, can it be denied that in the course of history individual, particular elements of the two revolutions become interwoven? Has the period of democratic revolutions in Europe not been familiar with a number of socialist movements and attempts to establish socialism? And will not the future socialist revolution in Europe still have to complete a great deal left undone in the field of democratism?

A Social-Democrat must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage a class struggle for socialism even against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. This is beyond doubt. Hence, the absolute necessity of a separate, independent, strictly class party of Social-Democracy. Hence, the temporary nature of our tactics of "striking a joint blow" with the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict watch "over our ally, as over an enemy", etc. All this also leaves no room for doubt. However, it would be ridiculous and reactionary to deduce from this that we must forget, ignore, or neglect tasks which, although transient and temporary, are vital at the

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* The development of capitalism, more extensive and rapid in conditions of liberty, will inevitably soon put an end to singleness of will; that will take place the sooner, the earlier counter-revolution and reaction are crushed.

present time. The struggle against the autocracy is a temporary and transient task for socialists, but to ignore or neglect this task in any way amounts to betrayal of socialism and service to reaction. The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is unquestionably only a transient, temporary socialist aim, but to ignore this aim in the period of a democratic revolution would be downright reactionary.

Concrete political aims must be set in concrete circumstances. All things are relative, all things flow, and all things change. German Social-Democracy does not put into its programme the demand for a republic. The situation in Germany is such that this question can in practice hardly be separated from that of socialism (although with regard to Germany too, Engels in his comments on the draft of the Erfurt Programme in 1891 warned against belittling the importance of a republic and of the struggle for a republic!).[33] In Russian Social-Democracy the question of eliminating the demand for a republic from its programme and its agitation has never even arisen, for in our country there can be no talk of an indissoluble link between the question of a republic and that of socialism. It was quite natural for a German Social-Democrat of 1898 not to place special emphasis on the question of a republic, and this evokes neither surprise nor condemnation. But in 1848 a German Social-Democrat who would have relegated to the background the question of a republic would have been a downright traitor to the revolution. There is no such thing as abstract truth. Truth is always concrete.

The time will come when the struggle against the Russian autocracy will end, and the period of democratic revolution will have passed in Russia; it will then be ridiculous even to speak of "singleness of will" of the proletariat and the peasantry, about a democratic dictatorship, etc. When that time comes we shall deal directly with the question of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat and speak of it in greater detail. At present the party of the advanced class cannot but strive most energetically for the democratic revolution's decisive victory over tsarism. And a decisive victory means nothing else than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Note[34]

1) We would remind the reader that in the polemic between *Iskra* and *Vperyod*, the former referred, among other things, to Engels's letter to Turati, in which Engels warned the (future) leader of the Italian reformists against confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist.[35] The impending revolution in Italy, Engels wrote about the political situation in Italy in 1894, would be a petty-bourgeois, democratic and not a socialist revolution. *Iskra* reproached *Vperyod* with having departed from the principle laid down by Engels. This reproach was unjustified, because, on the whole, *Vperyod* (No. 14)* fully acknowledged the correctness of Marx's theory of the distinction between the three main forces in nineteenth-century revolutions. According to this theory, the following forces take a stand against the old order, against the autocracy, feudalism, and the serf-owning system: 1) the liberal big bourgeoisie, 2) the radical petty bourgeoisie, 3) the proletariat. The first fights for nothing more than a constitutional monarchy; the second, for a democratic republic; the third, for a socialist revolution. To confuse the petty bourgeoisie's struggle for a complete democratic revolution with the proletariat's struggle for a socialist revolution threatens the socialist with political bankruptcy. Marx's warning to this effect is quite justified. It is, however, precisely for this very reason that the slogan of "revolutionary communes" is erroneous, because the very mistake made by the communes known to history was that of confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. On the other hand, our slogan—a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—fully safeguards us against this mistake. While recognising the incontestably bourgeois nature of a revolution incapable of *directly* overstepping the bounds of a mere democratic revolution our slogan *advances* this particular revolution and strives to give it forms most advantageous to the proletariat; consequently, it strives to make the utmost of the democratic revolution in order to attain the greatest success in the proletariat's further struggle for socialism.

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* "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 275-92.—*Ed.*

11. A CURSORY COMPARISON BETWEEN SEVERAL OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND THOSE OF THE "CONFERENCE"

The question of the provisional revolutionary government is at present the pivotal tactical question of the Social-Democratic movement. It is neither possible nor necessary to dwell in similar detail on the other resolutions of the Conference. We shall confine ourselves merely to referring briefly to several points which confirm the difference in principle, analysed above, between the tactical trend in the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and that in the Conference resolutions.

Take the question of the attitude towards the government's tactics on the eve of revolution. Once again you will find a comprehensive answer to this question in a resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. This resolution takes into account all the multifarious conditions and tasks of the particular moment: exposure of the hypocrisy of the government's concessions; utilisation of "travesties of popular representation"; the revolutionary realisation of the working class's urgent demands (the principal one being the eight-hour working day), and, finally, resistance to the Black Hundreds. In the Conference resolutions this question is dealt with piecemeal in several sections: "resistance to the evil forces of reaction" is mentioned only in the preamble to the resolution on the attitude towards other parties. Participation in elections to representative bodies is considered apart from tsarism's "compromises" with the bourgeoisie. Instead of calling for the achievement of an eight-hour working day by revolutionary means a special resolution with the pretentious title "On the Economic Struggle" merely repeats (after high-flown and very stupid phrases about "the central place occupied by the labour question in Russian public life") the old slogan of campaigning for "the legislative institution of an eight-hour day". The inadequacy and the belatedness of this slogan at the present time are too obvious to require proof.

The question of open political action. The Third Congress takes into consideration the impending *radical* change in our activities. Secret activities and the development of

the underground organisation must on no account be abandoned: this would be playing into the hands of the police and be of the utmost advantage to the government. But at the same time we must give thought to open action as well. Expedient forms of such action and, consequently, special bodies—less secret—must be *prepared* immediately for this purpose. Legal and semi-legal associations must be made use of with a view to transforming them, as far as possible, into bases for the future open Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia.

Here, too, the Conference splits up the issue and fails to bring forward any integral slogans. What strikes the eye is the ridiculous instruction to the Organising Committee to see to the "placement" of legally functioning publicists. Then there is the totally absurd decision "to subordinate to our influence the democratic newspapers that set themselves the aim of rendering assistance to the working-class movement". This is the professed aim of all our legal liberal newspapers, nearly all of which are of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend. Why should not the *Iskra* Editorial Board themselves make a start in carrying out their advice and give us an example of how to subordinate *Osvobozhdeniye* to Social-Democratic influence? Instead of the slogan of utilising legally existing associations so as to establish bases for the *Party*, we are given, first, a particular piece of advice about "trade" unions only (Party members must be active in them), and, secondly, advice to guide "the revolutionary organisations of the workers"="unofficially constituted organisations"="revolutionary workers' clubs". How these "clubs" have come to be classed as unofficially constituted organisations, and what these "clubs" really are—goodness only knows. Instead of definite and clear instructions from a supreme Party body we have some thoughts jotted down at random and some rough drafts made by men of letters. There is no complete picture of the beginning of the Party's transition to an entirely new basis in all its work.

The "peasant question" was presented in entirely different ways by the Party Congress and the Conference. The Congress drew up a resolution on the "attitude to the peasant movement"; the Conference—on "work among the peasants". In the one case prominence is given to the task of

guiding the entire revolutionary-democratic movement in the general national interests of the struggle against tsarism. In the other case the question is reduced to mere "work" among a particular section of society. In the one case a central practical slogan for our agitation is advanced calling for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees in order to carry out all democratic changes. In the other, a "demand for the organisation of committees" is to be presented to a constituent assembly. Why should we wait for this constituent assembly? Will it really be constituent? Will it be stable without the preliminary and simultaneous establishment of revolutionary peasant committees? The Conference has lost sight of all these questions. Its decisions all reflect the general idea which we have been following up—namely, that in the bourgeois revolution we must do only our own special work, without pursuing the aim of guiding the entire democratic movement, and of conducting that movement independently. Just as the Economists were constantly falling into the fallacy that the economic struggle is for the Social-Democrats, while the political struggle is for the liberals, so the new-*Iskra* supporters, in all their reasonings, keep falling into the idea that we should modestly sit in a corner out of the way of the bourgeois revolution, with the bourgeoisie doing the active work of carrying out the revolution.

Finally, note must also be taken of the resolution on the attitude towards other parties. The resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. speaks of exposing all limitedness and inadequacy in the bourgeois movement for emancipation, without entertaining the naïve idea of enumerating, from congress to congress, every possible instance of such limitedness, or of drawing a line of distinction between bad bourgeois and good bourgeois. Repeating the mistake made by Starover the Conference persistently searched for that line and developed the famous "litmus-paper" theory. Starover proceeded from a very good idea—that of presenting the severest possible conditions to the bourgeoisie. Only he forgot that any attempt to separate in advance bourgeois democrats that deserve approval, agreements, etc., from those that do not deserve them leads to a "formula" which is immediately scrapped by developments and intro-

duces confusion into proletarian class-consciousness. From real unity in the struggle the emphasis is shifted to declarations, promises, and slogans. Starover held that "universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and the secret ballot" was such a radical slogan. Hardly had two years elapsed when the "litmus-paper" proved its uselessness and the slogan of universal suffrage was taken over by the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, who thereby not only came no closer to Social-Democracy, but, on the contrary, tried by means of that very slogan to mislead the workers and divert them from socialism.

Now the new-Iskrists are presenting "conditions" that are even "severer". They are "demanding" from the enemies of tsarism "energetic and unequivocal [!?] support of every determined action by the organised proletariat", etc., up to, and including, "active participation in the self-arming of the people". The line has been carried much further—but nevertheless this line is *again already obsolete*, at once revealing its uselessness. Why, for instance, is there no slogan for a republic? How is it that the Social-Democrats—in the interests of "relentless revolutionary war against all the foundations of the system of social estates and the monarchy" —"demand" from the bourgeois democrats anything you like except the struggle for a republic?

That this question is not mere captiousness, that the new-Iskrists' mistake is of vital political significance is proved by the Russian Liberation Union (see *Proletary*, No. 4).* These "enemies of tsarism" will meet in full all the "requirements" of the new-*Iskra* supporters. And yet we have shown that the *Osvobozhdeniye* spirit reigns in the programme (or lack of programme) of this Russian Liberation Union, and that the *Osvobozhdeniye* group can easily take it in tow. However, in the concluding section of the resolution the

* *Proletary*, No. 4, which appeared on June 4, 1905, contained a lengthy article entitled "A New Revolutionary Workers' Association", (see present, edition, Vol. 8, pp. 499-510.—*Ed.*). The article gives the contents of the appeals issued by this union, which assumed the name of the "Russian Liberation Union" and set itself the aim of convening a constituent assembly with the aid of an insurrection. Further, the article defines the attitude of Social-Democrats to such non-party unions. In what measure this union really existed and what its fate was in the revolution is absolutely unknown to us. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

Conference declares that "Social-Democracy will continue to oppose, as *hypocritical friends of the people*, all those political parties which, though they display a liberal and democratic banner, refuse to render genuine support to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat". The Russian Liberation Union not only does not withhold this support, but offers it most insistently. Is that a guarantee that the leaders of this union are not "hypocritical friends of the people", even though they are "liberationists".

You see: by inventing "conditions" in advance, and presenting "demands" that are ludicrous by reason of their redoubtable impotence, the new-Iskrists immediately put themselves in a ridiculous position. Their conditions and demands immediately prove inadequate when it comes to an appraisal of living realities. Their chase after formulas is hopeless, for no formula can embrace all the various manifestations of hypocrisy, inconsistency, and narrow-mindedness displayed by the bourgeois democrats. It is not a question of "litmus-paper", forms, or written and printed demands, nor is it a question of drawing, in advance, a line of distinction between hypocritical and sincere "friends of the people"; it is a question of real unity in the struggle, of the Social-Democrats unabatingly criticising every "uncertain" step taken by bourgeois democracy. What is needed for "genuine consolidation of all the social forces interested in democratic change" is not the "points" over which the Conference laboured so assiduously and so vainly, but the ability to put forward genuinely revolutionary slogans. For this slogans are needed that will raise the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie to the level of the proletariat, and not lower the aims of the proletariat to the level of the monarchist bourgeoisie. What is needed for this is the most energetic participation in the insurrection, not sophistical evasion of the urgent task of an insurrection.

12. WILL THE SWEEP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION BE DIMINISHED IF THE BOURGEOISIE RECOILS FROM IT?

The foregoing lines were already written when a copy came to hand of the resolutions adopted by the Caucasian Conference of the new-Iskrists, and published by *Iskra*. Even if

we tried we could not invent anything better *pour la bonne bouche* (as a titbit).

The editors of *Iskra* remark with full justice: "On the fundamental question of tactics the Caucasian Conference also arrived at a decision *analogous*" (in truth!) "to that adopted by the All-Russia Conference" (i.e., of the new-*Iskra* group). "The question of Social-Democracy's attitude towards a provisional revolutionary government has been settled by the Caucasian Comrades in the spirit of most outspoken opposition to the new method advocated by the *Vperyod* group and the delegates of the so-called Congress who joined it." "It must be admitted that the formulation of the proletarian party's tactics in a bourgeois revolution, as given by the Conference, is *most apt*."

What is true is true. No one could have given a more "apt" formulation of the fundamental error of the new-*Iskra* group. We shall quote this formulation in full, first mentioning parenthetically the blossoms, and then, at the end, the fruit.

Here is the resolution on a provisional government adopted by the Caucasian Conference of new-*Iskra* supporters:

"Whereas we consider it to be our task to take advantage of the revolutionary situation so as to deepen [of course! They should have added: "*à la* Martynov!"] Social-Democratic consciousness in the proletariat [only to render the consciousness more profound, and not to win a republic? What a "profound" conception of revolution!] and in order to secure for the Party complete freedom to criticise the nascent bourgeois-state system [it is not our business to secure a republic! Our business is only to secure freedom of criticism. Anarchist ideas engender anarchist language: "bourgeois-state" system!], the Conference declares itself against the formation of a Social-Democratic provisional government, and entering such a government [recall the resolution passed by the Bakuninists ten months before the Spanish revolution and referred to by Engels: see *Proletary*, No. 3][36], and considers it to be the most expedient course to exercise pressure from without [from below and not from above] upon the bourgeois provisional government in order to secure a feasible measure [!?] of democratisation of the state system. The Conference believes that the formation of a provisional government by Social-Democrats, or their entering such a government

would lead, on the one hand, to the masses of the proletariat becoming disappointed in the Social-Democratic Party and abandoning it, because the Social-Democrats, despite the seizure of power, would not be able to satisfy the pressing needs of the working class, including the establishment of socialism [a republic is not a pressing need! The authors in their innocence do not notice that they are speaking purely anarchist language, as if they were repudiating participation in bourgeois revolutions!], and, on the other hand, *would cause the bourgeois classes to recoil from the revolution and thus diminish its sweep.*"

That is the crux of the matter. That is where anarchist ideas become interwoven (as is constantly the case among the West-European Bernsteinians too) with the sheerest opportunism. Just imagine: these people will not enter a provisional government because that would cause the bourgeoisie to recoil from the revolution, thereby diminishing the sweep of the revolution! Here, indeed, we have the new-*Iskra* philosophy as a whole, in a pure and consistent form: since the revolution is a bourgeois revolution, we must bow to bourgeois philistinism and make way for it. If we are even in part, even for a moment, guided by the consideration that our participation may cause the bourgeoisie to recoil, we thereby simply hand over leadership of the revolution entirely to the bourgeois classes. We thereby place the proletariat entirely under the tutelage of the bourgeoisie (while retaining complete "freedom of criticism"!!) compelling the proletariat to be moderate and meek, so that the bourgeoisie should not recoil. We emasculate the most vital needs of the proletariat, namely, its political needs—which the Economists and their imitators have never properly understood—so as not to make the bourgeoisie recoil. We go over completely from the platform of revolutionary struggle for the achievement of democracy to the extent required by the proletariat, to a platform of chaffering with the bourgeoisie, buying the bourgeoisie's voluntary consent ("so that it should not recoil") at the price of our principles, by betraying the revolution.

In two short lines, the Caucasian new-Iskrists managed to express the gist of the tactic of betraying revolution and

converting the proletariat into a wretched appendage of the bourgeois classes. That which we deduced above from the errors of the new-*Iskra* tendency we now see elevated to a clear and definite principle, viz., following in the wake of the monarchist bourgeoisie. Since the establishment of a republic would make the bourgeoisie recoil (and is already doing so—Mr. Struve is an example), down with the fight for a republic. Since every energetic and consistent democratic demand on the part of the proletariat makes the bourgeoisie recoil, always and everywhere in the world—hide in your lairs, working-men; act only from without; do not dream of using, in the interests of the revolution, the instruments and weapons of the "bourgeois-state" system; reserve for yourselves "freedom of criticism"!

The fundamental fallacy in their very conception of the term "bourgeois revolution" has come to the surface. The Martynov or new-*Iskra* "conception" of this term leads directly to the proletariat's cause being betrayed to the bourgeoisie.

Those who have forgotten the old Economism and do not study or remember it will find it difficult to understand the present resurgence of Economism. Call to mind the Bernsteinian *Credo*.[37] From "purely proletarian" views and programmes its authors drew the following conclusion: we Social-Democrats must concern ourselves with economics, with the real working-class cause, with freedom to criticise all political chicanery, with really rendering Social-Democratic work more profound. Politics are for the liberals. God save us from falling into "revolutionism": that will make the bourgeoisie recoil. Those who will re-read the whole *Credo* or the Separate Supplement to No. 9 of *Rabochaya Mysl* (September 1899)[38] will discern the entire course of this reasoning.

Today we have the same thing, only on a large scale, applied to an appraisal of the whole of the "great" Russian revolution—alas, vulgarised and reduced in advance to a travesty by the theoreticians of orthodox philistinism! We Social-Democrats must concern ourselves with freedom of criticism, with making class-consciousness more profound, with action from without. They, the bourgeois classes, must have freedom to act, a free field for revolutionary

(read: liberal) leadership, freedom to effect "reforms" from above.

These vulgarisers of Marxism have-never given thought to what Marx said about the need to replace the weapon of criticism by the criticism of weapons.[39] Taking the name of Marx in vain they, in actual fact, draw up resolutions on tactics wholly in the spirit of the Frankfort bourgeois windbags, who freely criticised absolutism and deepened democratic consciousness, but failed to understand that a time of revolution is a time of action, of action from both above and below. By turning Marxism into sophistry they have turned the ideology of the advanced, the most determined, and energetic revolutionary class into an ideology of its most backward strata, of those who shrink from difficult revolutionary-democratic tasks, and leave them to Messrs. the Struves to take care of.

If the bourgeois classes recoil from revolution because Social-Democrats enter a revolutionary government they will thereby "diminish the sweep" of the revolution.

Listen to that, Russian workers: the sweep of the revolution will be the mightier if it is effected by the Struves, who are not scared of the Social-Democrats, and do not want victory over tsarism, but want to come to terms with it. The sweep of the revolution will be mightier if the first of the two possible outcomes outlined above eventuates, i.e., if the monarchist bourgeoisie comes to terms with the autocracy on a "constitution" *à la* Shipov!

Social-Democrats, who write such disgraceful things in resolutions for the guidance of the whole Party, or who approve of such "apt" resolutions, are so blinded by sophistry, which has utterly driven the living spirit out of Marxism, that they fail to notice that these resolutions turn all their other fine words into empty phrases. Take any of their articles in *Iskra*, or even the notorious pamphlet written by our notorious Martynov—there you will read about a *popular* insurrection, about carrying the revolution to *completion*, about striving to rely upon the *common people* in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie. However, all these excellent things become miserable phrases as soon as you accept or approve the idea that "the sweep of the revolution" will be "diminished" as a consequence of the bourgeoisie's

alienation. These are the alternatives, gentlemen: either we, together with the people, must strive to carry out the revolution and win complete victory over tsarism *despite* the inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly bourgeoisie, or else we do not accept this "despite", and are afraid that the bourgeoisie may "recoil" from the revolution; in the second case we are betraying the proletariat and the people to the bourgeoisie—the inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly bourgeoisie.

Don't take it into your heads to misinterpret my words. Don't shrill that you are being accused of deliberate treachery. No, you have always crawled towards the marsh, and have at last crawled into it, just as unconsciously as the Economists of old, who were irresistibly and irrevocably drawn down the inclined plane of "deeper" Marxism, until it at last became an anti-revolutionary, soulless, and lifeless intellectual pose.

Have you, gentlemen, ever given thought to real social forces that determine "the sweep of the revolution"? Let us disregard the foreign political forces, the international combinations, which have developed very favourably for us at the present time, but which we all leave out of the discussion, and rightly so, inasmuch as we are concerned with the question of Russia's internal forces. Examine these internal social forces. Aligned against the revolution are the autocracy, the imperial court, the police, the bureaucracy, the army, and a handful of the aristocracy. The deeper the indignation of the people grows, the less reliable the troops become, and the more the bureaucracy wavers. Moreover, the bourgeoisie, on the whole, is now in favour of revolution, zealously speechifying about liberty and holding forth more and more frequently in the name of the people and even in the name of the revolution.* But we Marxists all know from theory and from daily and hourly observation of our liberals, Zemstvo people, and *Osvobozhdeniye* supporters that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly in its support of the revolution. The bourgeoisie, in the mass, will inevitably turn towards counter-revolution,

* Of interest in this connection is Mr. Struve's open letter to Jaurès recently published by the latter in *l'Humanité*[40] and by Mr. Struve in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72.

towards the autocracy, against the revolution, and against the people, as soon as its narrow, selfish interests are met, as soon as it "recoils" from consistent democracy (*and it is already recoiling from it!*). There remains the "people", that is, the proletariat and the peasantry: the proletariat alone can be relied on to march on to the end, for it goes far beyond the democratic revolution. That is why the proletariat fights in the forefront for a republic and contemptuously rejects stupid and unworthy advice to take into account the possibility of the bourgeoisie recoiling. The peasantry includes a great number of semi-proletarian as well as petty-bourgeois elements. This makes it also unstable, compelling the proletariat to rally in a strictly class party. However, the instability of the peasantry differs radically from that of the bourgeoisie, for at present the peasantry is interested not so much in the absolute preservation of private property as in the confiscation of the landed estates, one of the principal forms of private property. Without thereby becoming socialist, or ceasing to be petty-bourgeois, the peasantry is capable of becoming a wholehearted and most radical adherent of the democratic revolution. The peasantry will inevitably become such if only the course of revolutionary events, which brings it enlightenment, is not prematurely cut short by the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the defeat of the proletariat. Subject to this condition the peasantry will inevitably become a bulwark of the revolution and the republic, for only a completely victorious revolution can give the peasantry *everything* in the sphere of agrarian reforms—*everything* that the peasants desire, dream of, and truly need (not for the abolition of capitalism as the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" imagine, but) in order to emerge from the mire of semi-serfdom, from the gloom of oppression and servitude, in order to improve their living conditions, as much as they can be improved within the system of commodity production.

Moreover, it is not only by the prospect of radical agrarian reform that the peasantry is attached to the revolution, but by all its general and permanent interests as well. Even when fighting with the proletariat, the peasantry stands in need of democracy, for only a democratic system is capable of accurately expressing its interests and ensuring its pre-

dominance as a mass, as the majority. The more enlightened the peasantry becomes (and since the war with Japan it is becoming enlightened at a pace unsuspected by many who are accustomed to measure enlightenment with the school yardstick), the more consistently and resolutely will it stand for a thoroughgoing democratic revolution; for, unlike the bourgeoisie, it has nothing to fear from the people's supremacy, but on the contrary stands to gain by it. A democratic republic will become the peasantry's ideal as soon as it begins to throw off its naïve monarchism, because the conscious monarchism of the bourgeois stockjobbers (with an upper chamber, etc.) implies for the peasantry the same absence of rights and the same oppression and ignorance as it suffers today, only slightly polished over with the varnish of European constitutionalism.

That is why, as a class, the bourgeoisie naturally and inevitably tends to come under the wing of the liberal-monarchist party, while the peasantry, in the mass, tends to come under the leadership of the revolutionary and republican party. That is why the bourgeoisie is incapable of carrying through the democratic revolution to its consummation, while the peasantry is capable of doing so, and we must exert all our efforts to help it do so.

The objection may be raised that this goes without saying, is all ABC, something that all Social-Democrats understand perfectly well. No, that is not the case; it is not understood by those who can talk about "the diminishing sweep" of the revolution as a consequence of the bourgeoisie falling away from it. Such people repeat the words of our agrarian programme, which they have learned by rote without understanding their meaning, for otherwise they would not be frightened by the concept of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which inevitably follows from the entire Marxist world outlook and from our programme; otherwise they would not restrict the sweep of the great Russian revolution to the limits to which the bourgeoisie is prepared to go. Such people defeat their abstract Marxist revolutionary phrases by their concrete anti-Marxist and anti-revolutionary resolutions.

Those who really understand the role of the peasantry in a victorious Russian revolution would not dream of saying

that the sweep of the revolution will be diminished if the bourgeoisie recoils from it. For, in actual fact, the Russian revolution will begin to assume its real sweep, and will really assume the widest revolutionary sweep possible in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolution, only when the bourgeoisie recoils from it and when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side by side with the proletariat. To be consistently carried through to the end, our democratic revolution must rely on forces capable of paralysing the inevitable inconsistency of the bourgeoisie (i.e., capable precisely of "making it recoil from the revolution", which the Caucasian adherents of *Iskra* fear so much because of their thoughtlessness).

The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Such are the tasks of the proletariat, so narrowly presented by the new-*Iskra* group in all their arguments and resolutions on the sweep of the revolution.

One circumstance, however, should not be forgotten, one that is frequently lost sight of in discussions about the "sweep" of the revolution. It should not be forgotten that it is not a question of the difficulties presented by this problem, but the way in which its solution is to be sought and attained. It is not a question of whether it is easy or difficult to render the sweep of the revolution mighty and invincible, but of how to act so as to make that sweep more powerful. It is on the fundamental nature of our activities, the direction they should follow, that our views differ. We emphasise this because inattentive and unscrupulous people only too frequently confuse two different problems, viz., that of the direction to be followed, i.e., the choice of one of two different roads, and that of the ease of attaining our goal, or the nearness of its attainment along a given road.

In the foregoing we have not dealt with this last problem at all because it has not evoked any disagreement or differ-



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Reduced

ences in the Party. The problem itself is, of course, extremely important and deserving of the most serious attention from all Social-Democrats. It would be unforgivable optimism to forget the difficulties involved in drawing into the movement the masses not only of the working class, but also of the peasantry. These difficulties have more than once wrecked efforts to carry through a democratic revolution to completion, the inconsistent and self-seeking bourgeoisie triumphing most of all, because it has "made capital" in the shape of monarchist protection against the people, at the same time "preserving the virginity" of liberalism ... or of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend. However, difficulty does not imply impossibility. The important thing is to be confident that the path chosen is the right one, this confidence multiplying a hundredfold revolutionary energy and revolutionary enthusiasm, which can perform miracles.

The depth of the rift among present-day Social-Democrats on the question of the path to be chosen can at once be seen by comparing the Caucasian resolution of the new-*Iskra* supporters with the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Congress resolution says: the bourgeoisie is inconsistent and will without fail try to deprive us of the gains of the revolution. Therefore, make more energetic preparations for the fight, comrades and workers! Arm yourselves, win the peasantry over to your side! We shall not, without a struggle, surrender our revolutionary gains to the self-seeking bourgeoisie. The resolution of the Caucasian new-*Iskra* supporters says: the bourgeoisie is inconsistent and may recoil from the revolution. Therefore, comrades and workers, please do not think of joining a provisional government, for, if you do, the bourgeoisie will certainly recoil, and the sweep of the revolution will thereby be diminished!

One side says: advance the revolution to its consummation despite resistance or passivity on the part of the inconsistent bourgeoisie.

The other side says: do not think of independently advancing the revolution to completion, for if you do, the inconsistent bourgeoisie will recoil from it.

Are these not two diametrically opposite paths? Is it not obvious that one set of tactics absolutely excludes the other,

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that the first tactics is the only correct tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy, while the second is in fact purely *Osvobozhdeniye* tactics?

13. CONCLUSION. DARE WE WIN?

People who are superficially acquainted with the state of affairs in Russian Social-Democracy, or who judge as mere onlookers, with no knowledge of the whole history of our inner-Party struggle since the days of Economism, very often dismiss the disagreements on tactics which have now taken shape, especially after the Third Congress, with the simple argument that there are two natural, inevitable, and quite reconcilable trends in every Social-Democratic movement. One side, they say, lays special emphasis on the ordinary, current, and everyday work, on the necessity of developing propaganda and agitation, of preparing forces, deepening the movement, etc., while the other side lays emphasis on the militant, general political, revolutionary tasks of the movement, points to the necessity of insurrection, and advances the slogans of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship, and a provisional revolutionary government. Neither side should exaggerate, they say; extremes are bad in both cases (and, generally speaking, everywhere in the world), etc., etc.

The cheap truism of the pedestrian (and "political" in quotation marks) wisdom undoubtedly contained in such arguments, too often conceals an inability to understand the urgent and acute needs of the Party. Take the present-day tactical differences among Russian Social-Democrats. Of course, the special emphasis on the everyday, routine aspect of the work, such as we see in the new-*Iskra* arguments about tactics, could not of itself present any danger or give rise to any divergence of opinion regarding tactical slogans. But it is sufficient to compare the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party with the Conference resolutions for this divergence to become striking.

What, then, is the trouble? In the first place, it is not enough to speak in the abstract of two currents in the movement, and of the harmfulness of extremes. One must know concretely what ails a given movement at a given time, and

what constitutes the real political danger to the Party at the present time. Secondly, one must know what real political forces profit by the tactical slogans advanced—or perhaps by the absence of certain slogans. If one were to listen to the new-Iskrists one would arrive at the conclusion that the Social-Democratic Party is threatened with the danger of throwing overboard propaganda and agitation, the economic struggle, and criticism of bourgeois democracy, the danger of becoming inordinately absorbed in military preparations, armed attacks, the seizure of power, etc. Actually, however, real danger is threatening the Party from an entirely different quarter. Anyone who is at all familiar with the state of the movement, anyone who follows it carefully and thoughtfully, cannot fail to see the ridiculous aspect of the new-Iskrists' fears. The entire work of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has already taken definite and unvarying shape, which absolutely guarantees that our main attention will be fixed on propaganda and agitation, extemporaneous and mass meetings, the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets, assisting in the economic struggle and championing the slogans of that struggle. There is not a single Party committee, not a single district committee, not a single central delegates' meeting or a single factory group where ninety-nine per cent of all the attention, energy, and time is not always and invariably devoted to these functions, which have become firmly established ever since the middle of the nineties. Only those who are entirely unfamiliar with the movement do not know that. Only very naïve or ill-informed people will accept new *Iskra*'s repetition of stale truths at their face value, when that is done with an air of great importance.

The fact is that, far from displaying excessive zeal with regard to the tasks of insurrection, to general political slogans and to giving leadership to the entire popular revolution, we, on the contrary, display a most striking *backwardness* in this very respect, a backwardness which constitutes our greatest weakness and is a real danger to the movement, which may degenerate, and in some places is degenerating, from one that is revolutionary in deed into one that is revolutionary in word. Among the many, many hundreds of organisations, groups, and circles that are conducting the work of the Party you will not find one which has not, since its

very inception, conducted the kind of day-by-day work the new-*Iskra* wiseacres now talk of with the air of people who have discovered new truths. On the other hand, you will find only an insignificant percentage of groups and circles that have understood the tasks an insurrection entails, have begun to carry them out, and have realised the necessity of leading the entire popular revolution against tsarism, the necessity of advancing certain definite progressive slogans and no other, for that purpose.

We have incredibly fallen behind our progressive and genuinely revolutionary tasks; in very many instances we have not even become aware of them; here and there we have failed to notice that revolutionary bourgeois democracy has gained strength owing to our backwardness in this respect. But, with their backs turned to the course of events and the requirements of the times, the new-*Iskra* writers keep insistently repeating: "Don't forget the old! Don't let yourselves be carried away by the new!" This is the unvarying *leit-motiv* in all the important resolutions of the Conference; whereas in the Congress resolutions you just as unvaryingly read: while confirming the old (but not stopping to masticate it over and over again precisely because it is old and has already been settled and recorded in literature, in resolutions and by experience), we bring forward a new task, draw attention to it, issue a new slogan, and demand that genuinely revolutionary Social-Democrats immediately set to work to put it into effect.

That is how matters really stand with regard to the question of the two trends in Social-Democratic tactics. The revolutionary period has presented new tasks, which only the totally blind can fail to see. Some Social-Democrats unhesitatingly recognise these tasks and place them on the order of the day, declaring: the armed uprising brooks no delay; prepare yourselves for it immediately and energetically; remember that it is indispensable for a decisive victory; bring forward slogans for a republic, for a provisional government, for a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Other Social-Democrats, however, draw back, mark time, write prefaces instead of giving slogans; instead of seeing what is new, while confirming what is old, they masticate the latter tediously and at great

length, inventing pretexts to avoid the new, unable to determine the conditions for a decisive victory or to bring forward slogans which alone are in line with a striving to achieve full victory.

The political outcome of this tail-ism stares us in the face. The fable about a *rapprochement* between the "majority" of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and revolutionary bourgeois democracy remains a fable unconfirmed by a single political fact, by a single important resolution of the "Bolsheviks" or a single document of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. On the other hand, the opportunist, monarchist bourgeoisie, as represented by the *Osvobozhdeniye*, has long been *welcoming* the trends in the "principles" advocated by the new-*Iskra* group, and is now actually using their stream to drive its ~ill and is adopting their catchwords and "ideas", which are directed against "secrecy" and "riots", against exaggerating the "technical" aspect of the revolution, against openly proclaiming the slogan of insurrection, against the "revolutionism" of extreme demands, etc., etc. The resolution of an entire Conference of "Menshevik" Social-Democrats in the Caucasus and the endorsement of that resolution by the editors of the new *Iskra* sums up the whole matter politically in no mistakable way: what if the bourgeoisie should recoil in case the proletariat takes part in a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship! This puts the matter in a nutshell and gives the finishing touches to the proletariat's transformation into an appendage to the monarchist bourgeoisie. The *political significance* of the new *Iskra*'s tail-ism is thereby proved in fact—not by a casual observation from some individual but by a resolution especially endorsed by an entire trend.

Anyone who gives thought to these facts will understand the real significance of stock references to two sides and two trends in the Social-Democratic movement. For a full-scale study of these trends one should take Bernsteinism. In exactly the same way the Bernsteinians have been dinning into our ears that it is they who understand the proletariat's true needs and the tasks of building up its forces, the task of deepening all the work, preparing the elements of a new society, and the task of propaganda and agitation. Bernstein says: we demand a frank recognition of that which is, thus sanctifying "move-

ment" *without* any "ultimate aim", sanctifying defensive tactics alone, preaching the tactics of fear "lest the bourgeoisie recoil". So the Bernsteinians raised an outcry against the "Jacobinism" of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, against "publicists" who fail to understand the "workers' initiative", etc., etc. In reality, as everyone knows, revolutionary Social-Democrats have never even thought of abandoning day-by-day, petty work, the mustering of forces, etc., etc. All they demanded was a clear understanding of the ultimate aim, a clear presentation of the revolutionary tasks; they wanted to raise the semi-proletarian and semi-petty-bourgeois strata to the revolutionary level of the proletariat—not to reduce the latter level to that of opportunist considerations such as "lest the bourgeoisie recoil". Perhaps the most vivid expression of this rift between the intellectual opportunist wing and the proletarian revolutionary wing of the Party was the question: *dürfen wir siegen?* "Dare we win?" Is it permissible for us to win? Would it not be dangerous for us to win? Ought we to win? This question, so strange at first sight, was however raised and had to be raised, because the opportunists were afraid of victory, were frightening the proletariat away from it, predicting that trouble would come of it and ridiculing slogans that straightforwardly called for it.

The same fundamental division into an intellectual-opportunist and proletarian-revolutionary trend exists among us too, with the very material difference, however, that here we are faced with the question of a democratic, not of a socialist revolution. The question "dare we win?", which seems so absurd at first sight, has been raised among us as well. It has been raised by Martynov in his *Two Dictatorships*, wherein he prophesies dire misfortune if we prepare well for an insurrection, and carry it out quite successfully. The question has been raised in all the new-*Iskra* literature dealing with a provisional revolutionary government, and persistent if futile efforts have all the time been made to liken Millerand's participation in a bourgeois-opportunist government to Varlin's[41] participation in a petty-bourgeois revolutionary government. It is embodied in the resolution: "lest the bourgeoisie recoil". And although Kautsky, for instance, now tries to wax ironical and says that our dispute about a

provisional revolutionary government is like sharing out the meat before the bear is killed, this irony only proves that even clever and revolutionary Social-Democrats are liable to put their foot in it when they talk about something they know of only by hearsay. German Social-Democracy is not yet so near to killing its bear (carrying out a socialist revolution), but the dispute as to whether we "dare" kill the bear has been of enormous importance from the point of view of principles and of practical politics. Russian Social-Democrats are not yet so close to being able to "kill their bear" (carry out a democratic revolution), but the question as to whether we "dare" kill it is of extreme importance to the whole future of Russia and that of Russian Social-Democracy. An army cannot be energetically and successfully mustered and led unless we are sure that we "dare" win.

Take our old Economists. They, too, clamoured that their opponents were conspirators and Jacobins (see *Rabocheye Dyelo*, especially No. 10, and Martynov's speech at the Second Congress, in the debate on the programme), that by plunging into politics they were divorcing themselves from the masses, that they were losing sight of the fundamentals of the working-class movement, ignoring the workers' initiative, etc., etc. In reality these supporters of "workers' initiative" were opportunist intellectuals, who tried to foist on the workers their own narrow and philistine conception of the tasks of the proletariat. In reality the opponents of Economism, as everyone can see from the old *Iskra*, did not neglect or relegate into the background any of the aspects of Social-Democratic work, nor did they in the least forget the economic struggle; at the same time they were able to present the urgent and immediate political tasks in their full scope and thus opposed the transformation of the workers' party into an "economic" appendage to the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Economists learned by rote that politics are based on economics and "understood" this to mean that the political struggle should be reduced to the level of the economic struggle. The new-Iskrists have learned by rote that in its economic essence, the democratic revolution is a bourgeois revolution, and "understand" this to mean that the democratic aims of the proletariat should be lowered to the level of bourgeois moderation, a level beyond which "the bourgeoisie

will recoil". On the pretext of deepening their work, on the pretext of rousing the workers' initiative and pursuing a purely class policy, the Economists were actually delivering the working class into the hands of the liberal-bourgeois politicians, i.e., were leading the Party along a path whose objective significance was exactly such. On the same pretexts the new-Iskrists are actually betraying to the bourgeoisie the interests of the proletariat in the democratic revolution, i.e., are leading the Party along a path whose objective significance is exactly such. The Economists thought that leadership in the political struggle was not the concern of Social-Democrats, but, properly speaking, that of the liberals. The new-Iskrists think that the active conduct of the democratic revolution is no concern of the Social-Democrats, but, properly speaking, that of the democratic bourgeoisie, for, they argue, the proletariat's guidance and pre-eminent part will "diminish the sweep" of the revolution.

In short, the new-Iskrists are imitators of Economism, not only in having their origin at the Second Party Congress, but also in the manner in which they now present the tactical tasks of the proletariat in the democratic revolution. They, too, constitute an intellectual-opportunist wing of the Party. In the sphere of organisation they made their *début* with the anarchist individualism of intellectuals and ended up with "disorganisation-as-process", establishing in the "Rules"[42] adopted by the Conference the separation of Party publishing activities from the Party organisation, and an indirect and practically four-stage system of elections, a system of Bonapartist plebiscites instead of democratic representation, and finally the principle of "agreements" between the part and the whole. In Party tactics they slid down the same inclined plane. In the "plan of the Zemstvo campaign" they declared that addresses to the Zemstvo-ists were "the highest type of demonstration", and discerned only two active forces on the political scene (on the eve of January 9!)—the government and the bourgeois democrats. They made the urgent task of arming the people "more profound" by replacing a direct and practical slogan with a call to arm the people with a burning desire to arm themselves. In their official resolutions they have distorted and emascu-

lated the tasks connected with an insurrection, with the establishment of a provisional government, and with a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. "Lest the bourgeoisie recoil"—this final chord of their latest resolution throws clear light on the question of where their path is leading the Party.

In its social and economic essence, the democratic revolution in Russia is a bourgeois revolution. It is, however, not enough merely to repeat this correct Marxist proposition. It has to be properly understood and properly applied to political slogans. In general, all political liberty founded on present-day, i.e., capitalist, relations of production is bourgeois liberty. The demand for liberty expresses primarily the interests of the bourgeoisie. Its representatives were the first to raise this demand. Its supporters have everywhere used like masters the liberty they acquired, reducing it to moderate and meticulous bourgeois doses, combining it with the most subtle suppression of the revolutionary proletariat in peaceful times, and with savage suppression in times of storm.

But only rebel Narodniks, anarchists, and Economists could conclude therefrom that the struggle for liberty should be negated or disparaged. These intellectualist-philistine doctrines could be foisted on the proletariat only for a time and against its will. The proletariat has always realised instinctively that it needs political liberty, needs it more than anyone else, although the immediate effect of that liberty will be to strengthen and organise the bourgeoisie. It is not by evading the class struggle that the proletariat expects to find its salvation, but by developing it, by extending its scope, its consciousness, organisation, and resoluteness. Whoever disparages the tasks of the political struggle transforms the Social-Democrat from a tribune of the people into a trade union secretary. Whoever disparages the proletarian tasks in a democratic bourgeois revolution transforms the Social-Democrat from a leader of the people's revolution into a leader of a free labour union.

Yes, the *people*'s revolution. Social-Democracy has fought, and is quite rightly fighting, against the bourgeois-democratic abuse of the word "people". It demands that this word shall not be used to cover up failure to understand

class antagonisms within the people. It insists categorically on the need for complete class independence for the party of the proletariat. However, it does not divide the "people" into "classes" so that the advanced class will become locked up within itself, will confine itself within narrow limits, and emasculate its activity for fear that the economic rulers of the world will recoil; it does that so that the adanced class, which does not suffer from the half-heartedness, vacillation, and indecision of the intermediate classes, should fight with all the greater energy and enthusiasm for the cause of the whole people, at the head of the whole people.

That is what the present-day new-Iskrists so often fail to understand, people who substitute for active political slogans in the democratic revolution a mere pedantic repetition of the word "class", declined in all cases and genders!

The democratic revolution is bourgeois in nature. The slogan of a general redistribution, or "land and freedom"—that most widespread slogan of the peasant masses, downtrodden and ignorant, yet passionately yearning for light and happiness—is a bourgeois slogan. But we Marxists should know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry, than the path of bourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress. We must not forget that there is not, nor can there be at the present time, any other means of bringing socialism nearer, than complete political liberty, than a democratic republic, than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. As representatives of the advanced and only revolutionary class, revolutionary without any reservations, doubts, or looking back, we must confront the whole of the people with the tasks of the democratic revolution as extensively and boldly as possible and with the utmost initiative. To disparage these tasks means making a travesty of theoretical Marxism, distorting it in philistine fashion, while in practical politics it means placing the cause of the revolution into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which will inevitably recoil from the task of consistently effecting the revolution. The difficulties that lie on the road to complete victory of the revolution are very great. No one will be able

to blame the proletariat's representatives if, when they have done everything in their power, their efforts are defeated by the resistance of reaction, the treachery of the bourgeoisie, and the ignorance of the masses. But everybody, and, above all, the class-conscious proletariat will condemn Social-Democracy if it curtails the revolutionary energy of the democratic revolution and dampens revolutionary ardour because it is afraid to win, because it is actuated by the consideration: lest the bourgeoisie recoil.

Revolutions are the locomotives of history, said Marx.[43] Revolutions are festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no other time are the mass of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order, as at a time of revolution. At such times the people are capable of performing miracles, if judged by the limited, philistine yardstick of gradualist progress. But it is essential that leaders of the revolutionary parties, too, should advance their aims more comprehensively and boldly at such a time, so that their slogans shall always be in advance of the revolutionary initiative of the masses, serve as a beacon, reveal to them our democratic and socialist ideal in all its magnitude and splendour, and show them the shortest and most direct route to complete, absolute, and decisive victory. Let us leave to the opportunists of the *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie the task of inventing roundabout, circuitous paths of compromise, out of fear of the revolution and of the direct path. If we are forcibly compelled to drag ourselves along such paths we shall be able to fulfil our duty in petty, everyday work also. But first let the choice of path be decided in ruthless struggle. We shall be traitors, betrayers of the revolution, if we do not use this festive energy of the masses and their revolutionary ardour to wage a ruthless and self-sacrificing struggle for the direct and decisive path. Let the bourgeois opportunists contemplate the future reaction with craven fear. The workers will not be intimidated either by the thought that reaction intends to be terrible, or that the bourgeoisie proposes to recoil. The workers do not expect to make deals; they are not asking for petty concessions. What they are striving towards is ruthlessly to crush the reactionary forces, i.e., to set up a *revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*.

Of course, in stormy times greater dangers threaten the ship of our Party than in periods of the smooth "sailing" of liberal progress, which means the painfully steady sucking of the working class's life-blood by its exploiters. Of course, the tasks of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship are infinitely more difficult and more complex than the tasks of an "extreme opposition", or of an exclusively parliamentary struggle. But whoever is consciously capable of preferring smooth sailing and the course of safe "opposition" in the present revolutionary situation had better abandon Social-Democratic work for a while, had better wait until the revolution is over, until the festive days have passed, when humdrum, everyday life starts again, and his narrow routine standards no longer strike such an abominably discordant note, or constitute such an ugly distortion of the tasks of the advanced class.

At the head of the whole people, and particularly of the peasantry—for complete freedom, for a consistent democratic revolution, for a republic! At the head of all the toilers and the exploited—for socialism! Such in practice must be the policy of the revolutionary proletariat, such is the class slogan which must permeate and determine the solution of every tactical problem, every practical step of the workers' party during the revolution.

EPILOGUE

ONCE AGAIN THE *OSVOBOZHDENIYE* TREND, ONCE AGAIN THE NEW-*ISKRA* TREND

Osvobozhdeniye, Nos. 71-72, and *Iskra*, Nos. 102-103, provide a wealth of additional material on the question dealt with in Chapter 8 of our pamphlet. Since it is quite impossible here to make use of all this rich material we shall confine ourselves to the most important points only: firstly, the kind of "realism" in Social-Democracy that *Osvobozhdeniye* praises, and why the latter should praise it; secondly, the relationship between the concepts of revolution and dictatorship.

1. WHY DO BOURGEOIS LIBERAL REALISTS PRAISE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC "REALISTS"?

Articles entitled "The Split in Russian Social-Democracy" and "The Triumph of Common Sense" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72) express an opinion on Social-Democracy held by representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, an opinion of remarkable value to class-conscious proletarians. We cannot too strongly recommend to every Social-Democrat that he should read these articles in full and *ponder over* every sentence in them. We shall first of all reproduce the most important propositions in these two articles.

"It is fairly difficult," writes *Osvobozhdeniye*, "for an outside observer to grasp the real political meaning of the differences that have split the Social-Democratic Party into two factions. A definition of the 'Majority' faction as the more radical and unswerving, as distinct from the 'Minority' which allows of certain compromises in the interests of the cause, is not quite exact, and in any case does not provide an exhaustive characterisation. At any rate the traditional dogmas of Marxist orthodoxy are observed by the Minority faction with even greater zeal, perhaps, than by the Lenin faction. The

following characterisation would appear to us to be more accurate. The fundamental political temper of the 'Majority' is abstract revolutionism, rebelliousness, and eagerness to stir up insurrection among the popular masses by any and every means and to immediately seize power on their behalf, to a certain extent this brings the 'Leninists' close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and makes the idea of a Russian revolution of the whole people overshadow in their minds the idea of the class struggle. While in practice abjuring much of the narrow-mindedness of the Social-Democratic doctrine, the 'Leninists' are, on the other hand, thoroughly imbued with the narrow-mindedness of revolutionism; they renounce all practical work except the preparation of an immediate insurrection, ignore on principle all forms of legal and semi-legal agitation and any kind of practically useful compromise with other oppositional trends. On the contrary, the Minority, while steadfastly adhering to the doctrine of Marxism, at the same time preserves the realistic elements of the Marxist world outlook. Contraposing the interests of the 'proletariat' to those of the bourgeoisie is the fundamental idea of this group. On the other hand, however, the proletariat's struggle is conceived—of course within certain bounds dictated by the immutable dogmas of Social-Democracy—in realistically sober fashion, with a clear realisation of all the concrete conditions and aims of this struggle. Neither of the two factions pursues its basic point of view quite consistently, for in their ideological and political activities they are bound by the stringent formulas of the Social-Democratic catechism, which prevent the 'Leninists' from becoming unswerving rebels after the fashion of, at least, some Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the '*Iskra* group' from becoming practical leaders of the real political movement of the working class."

After quoting the contents of the most important resolutions the *Osvobozhdeniye* writer goes on to illustrate his general "ideas" with several concrete remarks about them. In comparison with the Third Congress, he says, "the Minority Conference takes a totally different attitude towards an insurrection". "In connection with the attitude towards an insurrection" there is a difference in the respective resolutions on a provisional government. "A similar difference is revealed with regard to the workers' trade unions. In their resolution the 'Leninists' have not said a single word about this most important starting-point in the political education and organisation of the working class. The Minority, on the contrary, drew up a very weighty resolution." With regard to the liberals, both factions, he says, see eye to eye, but the Third Congress "repeats almost word for word the Plekhanov resolution on the attitude towards the liberals, adopted at the Second Congress, and rejects the Starover resolution adopted by the same Congress, which was more favourably inclined towards the liberals". Although the Congress and the Conference resolutions on the peasant movement coincide on the whole, "the 'Majority' lays more emphasis on the idea of the revolutionary confiscation of the landlords' estates and other land, while the 'Minority' wants to make the demand for democratic state and administrative reforms the basis of its agitation".

Finally, *Osvobozhdeniye* cites from No. 100 of *Iskra* a Menshevik resolution, whose main clause reads as follows: "Since underground work alone does not at present secure adequate participation of the masses in Party life, and in some degree leads to the masses as such being contraposed to the Party as an illegal organisation, the latter must assume leadership of the trade union struggle of the workers on a legal basis, strictly linking up this struggle with the Social-Democratic tasks." Commenting on this resolution *Osvobozhdeniye* exclaims: "We heartily welcome this resolution as a triumph of common sense, as evidence that a definite section of the Social-Democratic Party is beginning to see the light with regard to tactics."

The reader now has before him all the noteworthy opinions of *Osvobozhdeniye*. It would, of course, be a most grave error to regard these opinions as correct in the sense of corresponding to the objective truth. Mistakes in them will easily be detected by every Social-Democrat at every step. It would be naïve to forget that these opinions are thoroughly imbued with the liberal bourgeoisie's interests and points of view, and that in this sense they are utterly biased and tendentious. They reflect the Social-Democrats' views in the same way as objects are reflected in a concave or convex mirror. It would, however, be an even greater mistake to forget that in the final analysis these bourgeois-distorted opinions reflect the actual interests of the bourgeoisie, which, as a class, undoubtedly understands correctly which trends in Social-Democracy are advantageous, close, akin, and agreeable to it, and which trends are harmful, distant, alien, and antipathetic. A bourgeois philosopher or a bourgeois publicist will never understand Social-Democracy properly, whether it is Menshevik or Bolshevik Social-Democracy. But if he is at all a sensible publicist, his class instinct will not fail him, and he will always grasp the essence of what one trend or another in the Social-Democratic movement may mean to the bourgeoisie, although he may present it in a distorted way. That is why our enemy's class instinct, his class opinion always deserves the closest attention from every class-conscious proletarian.

What, then, does the Russian bourgeoisie's class instinct, as voiced by *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents, tell us?

It quite definitely expresses its satisfaction with the trend resented by the new *Iskra*, praising it for realism, sobermindedness, the triumph of common sense, the soundness of

its resolutions, its having begun to see the light on questions of tactics, its practicalness, etc.—and it expresses dissatisfaction with the trend of the Third Congress, censuring it for its narrow-mindedness, revolutionism, rebelliousness, its repudiation of practically useful compromises, etc. The class instinct of the bourgeoisie suggests to it exactly what has been repeatedly proved in our literature with the aid of most precise facts, namely, that the new-*Iskra* supporters are the opportunist wing of the present-day Russian Social-Democratic movement, and their opponents—the revolutionary wing. The liberals cannot but sympathise with the trends in the former, and cannot but censure the trends in the latter. As ideologists of the bourgeoisie the liberals understand perfectly well that the bourgeoisie stands to gain by the "practicalness, sober-mindedness, and soundness" of the working class, by actually restricting its field of activity within the framework of capitalism, reforms, the trade union struggle, etc. The proletariat's "revolutionary narrow-mindedness", its endeavours to win the leadership in a popular Russian revolution in order to promote its own class aims—these things are dangerous and frightening to the bourgeoisie.

That this is the actual significance of the word "realism" in its *Osvobozhdeniye* sense is evident, among other things, from the way it was previously used by *Osvobozhdeniye* and by Mr. Struve. *Iskra* itself could not but admit that such was the significance of *Osvobozhdeniye*'s "realism". Take, for instance, the article entitled "High Time!" in the supplement to *Iskra*, No. 73-74. The author of this article (a consistent exponent of the views of the "Marsh" at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) frankly expressed the opinion that "at the Congress Akimov played the part of the ghost of opportunism rather than of its real representative". And the editors of *Iskra* were forthwith obliged to correct the author of the article "High Time!" by stating in a note:

"This opinion cannot be agreed with. Comrade Akimov's views on the programme bear the clear imprint of opportunism, which fact is admitted even by the *Osvobozhdeniye* critic, who—in one of its recent issues—stated that Comrade Akimov is an adherent of the 'realist'—read: revisionist—tendency."

Thus, *Iskra* itself is perfectly aware that *Osvobozhdeniye*'s "realism" is simply opportunism and nothing else. If in attacking "liberal realism" (*Iskra*, No. 102) *Iskra* now says nothing about *its having been praised by the liberals* for its realism, this silence is explained by the circumstance that such praise is bitterer than any censure. Such praise (which *Osvobozhdeniye* uttered not by mere chance and not for the first time) actually proves the affinity between liberal realism and those tendencies of Social-Democratic "realism" (read: opportunism) that stand out in every resolution of the new-Iskrists, in consequence of the fallacy of their entire tactical stand.

Indeed, the Russian bourgeoisie has already fully revealed its inconsistency and cupidity in the "popular" revolution —has revealed it in Mr. Struve's arguments, in the entire tenor and content of the bulk of liberal newspapers, and in the nature of the political utterances of most Zemstvo members, the bulk of the intellectuals, and in general of all the adherents of Messrs. Trubetskoi, Petrunkevich, Rodichev, and Co. Of course, the bourgeoisie does not always reveal a clear understanding, but by and large, its class instinct enables it to realise perfectly well that, on the one hand, the proletariat and the "people" are useful for *its* revolution as cannon fodder, as a battering-ram against the autocracy, but that, on the other hand, the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry will be terribly dangerous to it if they win a "decisive victory over tsarism" and carry the democratic revolution to completion. That is why the bourgeoisie strains every effort to induce the proletariat to be content with a "modest" role in the revolution, to be more sober-minded, practical, and realistic, and let its activities be guided by the principle, "lest the bourgeoisie recoil".

Intellectual bourgeois know full well that they will not be able to get rid of the working-class movement. That is why they do not at all come out against the working-class movement as such, or against the proletariat's class struggle as such—no, they even pay lip service to the right to strike and to a genteel class struggle, since they understand the working-class movement and the class struggle in the Brentano or Hirsch-Duncker sense. In other words they are fully prepared to "yield" to the workers the right to

strike and freedom of association (which in fact has already been almost won by the workers themselves), if only the workers renounce their "rebelliousness", their "narrow-minded revolutionism", their hostility to "compromises of practical use", their claims and aspirations to place upon the "revolution of the whole Russian people" the imprint of *their* class struggle, the imprint of proletarian consistency, proletarian determination, and "plebeian Jacobinism". That is why intellectual bourgeois all over Russia are exerting every effort, resorting to thousands of ways and means—books,* lectures, speeches, talks, etc., etc.—to imbue the workers with the ideas of (bourgeois) sober-mindedness, (liberal) practicalness, (opportunist) realism, (Brentano) class struggle, (Hirsch-Duncker) trade unions,[44] etc. The last two slogans are particularly convenient for the bourgeois of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party, the *Osvobozhdeniye* party, since in appearance they coincide with Marxist slogans, and, with some minor omissions and slight distortions, can easily be confused with and sometimes even passed off as Social-Democratic slogans. For instance, the legal liberal newspaper *Rassvet* (which we shall some day try to discuss in greater detail with *Proletary* readers) frequently says such "outspoken" things about the class struggle, the possible deception of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, the working-class movement, the proletariat's initiative, etc., etc., that the inattentive reader or unenlightened worker might easily be led to believe that its "Social-Democratism" is genuine. Actually, however, it is a bourgeois imitation of Social-Democratism, an opportunist distortion and perversion of the concept of the class struggle.

At the root of all this gigantic bourgeois subterfuge (gigantic in the extent of its influence on the masses) lies an urge to reduce the working-class movement mainly to a trade union movement, to keep it as far away as possible from an independent policy (i.e., one that is revolutionary and directed towards a democratic dictatorship), "to make the idea of the class struggle overshadow, in the workers' minds, the idea of a Russian revolution of the whole people".

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* Cf. Prokopovich, *The Labour Question in Russia.*

As the reader will perceive, we have turned the *Osvobozhdeniye* formulation upside down. This is an excellent formulation, one that excellently expresses two views upon the proletariat's role in a democratic revolution—the bourgeois view and the Social-Democratic view. The bourgeoisie wants to confine the proletariat to the trade union movement, and thereby to "make the idea of the (*Brentano*) class struggle overshadow in its mind the idea of a Russian revolution of the whole people"—fully in the spirit of the Bernsteinian authors of the *Credo*, who tried to make the idea of a "purely working-class movement" overshadow in the workers' minds the idea of political struggle. On the contrary, Social-Democracy wants to develop the proletariat's class struggle to the level of leadership in the Russian revolution of the whole people, i.e., to bring that revolution to the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The revolution in our country is one of the whole people, says the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. As a separate class, you should, therefore, confine yourselves to your class struggle; in the name of "common sense" you should devote your attention mainly to the trade unions and their legalisation; you should consider these trade unions as "the most important starting-point in your political education and organisation"; in a revolutionary situation you should for the most part draw up "sound" resolutions like the new-*Iskra* resolution; you should give heed to resolutions "more favourably inclined towards the liberals"; you should show preference for leaders with a tendency to become "practical leaders of the real political movement of the working class", and should "preserve the realistic elements of the Marxist world outlook" (if you have unfortunately already become infected with the "stringent formulas" of this 'unscientific" catechism).

The revolution in our country is one of the whole people, the Social-Democrats say to the proletariat. As the most progressive and the only thoroughly revolutionary class, you should strive to play not merely a most active part in it, but the leading part as well. Therefore, you must not confine yourself within a narrowly conceived framework of the class struggle, understood mainly as the trade union movement;

on the contrary, you must strive to extend the framework and the content of your class struggle so as to make it *include* not only *all* the aims of the present, democratic Russian revolution of the whole people, but the aims of the subsequent socialist revolution as well. Therefore, without ignoring the trade union movement, or refusing to take advantage of even the slightest legal opportunities, you must in a revolutionary period bring into the forefront the tasks of an insurrection and the formation of a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government, as being the only way to the people's complete victory over tsarism, to the achievement of a democratic republic and genuine political freedom.

It would be superfluous to speak about the half-hearted and inconsistent stand, naturally so pleasing to the bourgeoisie, taken on this question by the new-*Iskra* resolutions because of their mistaken "line".

II. COMRADE MARTYNOV AGAIN GIVES "PROFUNDITY" TO THE QUESTION

Let us pass on to Martynov's articles in Nos. 102 and 103 of *Iskra*. We shall, of course, make no reply to Martynov's attempts to prove the incorrectness of our interpretation, and the correctness of his own interpretation, of a number of quotations from Engels and Marx. These attempts are so trivial, Martynov's subterfuges so obvious, and the question so clear that it would be of no interest to dwell on this point again. Every thoughtful reader will be able easily to see through the simple wiles employed by Martynov in his full retreat, especially when the complete translations of Engels's pamphlet *The Bakuninists at Work* and Marx's *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* of March 1850,[45] now being prepared by a group of *Proletary* collaborators, are published. A single quotation from Martynov's article will suffice to make his retreat clear to the reader.

"*Iskra* 'admits'," says Martynov in No. 103, "that setting up a provisional government is a possible and expedient way of furthering the revolution, but denies the expediency of Social-Democrats participating in a *bourgeois* provisional government, precisely so as to be able, in the future, to gain

complete control of the state machinery for a socialist revolution." In other words, *Iskra* now admits the absurdity of all its fears concerning a revolutionary government's responsibility for the exchequer and the banks, concerning the danger and impossibility of taking over the "prisons", etc. But *Iskra* is only muddling things as previously, confusing democratic with socialist dictatorship. This muddle is unavoidable; it is a means to cover up the retreat.

But among the muddle-heads of the new *Iskra* Martynov stands out as Muddle-head No. 1, as a muddle-head of talent, if one might say so. By confusing the question by his laboured efforts to "give it profundity", he almost invariably "arrives" at new formulations which lay bare all the falseness of the stand he has taken. You will remember how in the days of Economism he rendered Plekhanov "more profound" and created the formulation: "economic struggle against the employers and the government". In all Economist literature it would be difficult to find a more apt expression of this trend's falseness. It is the same today. Martynov serves the new *Iskra* zealously and almost every time he opens his mouth he furnishes us with new and excellent material for an appraisal of the new *Iskra*'s false position. In No. 102 he says that Lenin "has imperceptibly put the concept of dictatorship in place of that of revolution" (p. 3, col. 2).

In essence, all the accusations the new-Iskrists have levelled at us can be reduced to this one. Indeed, we are grateful to Martynov for this accusation! He has rendered us most invaluable service in the struggle against the new-*Iskra* ideas by formulating his accusation in this way! We must positively beg the editors of *Iskra* to let Martynov loose against us more often for the purpose of making the attacks on *Proletary* "more profound", and for a "truly principled" formulation of these attacks. For the more Martynov exerts himself to argue on the plane of principles, the worse do his arguments appear, and the more clearly does he reveal the gaps in the new-*Iskra* trend, the more successfully does he perform on himself and on his friends the useful *reductio ad absurdum* pedagogical operation (reducing the principles of the new *Iskra* to an absurdity).

Vperyod and *Proletary* use the concepts of dictatorship and revolution "interchangeably". *Iskra* does not want such

"interchangeability". Just so, most esteemed Comrade Martynov! You have unwittingly stated a great truth. With this *new* formulation you have confirmed our contention that *Iskra* is lagging behind the revolution and straying into an *Osvobozhdeniye* formulation of its tasks, whereas *Vperyod* and *Proletary* are issuing slogans that advance the democratic revolution.

Is this something you don't understand, Comrade Martynov? In view of the importance of the question we shall try to give you a detailed explanation.

The bourgeois character of the democratic revolution expresses itself, among other things, in the fact that a number of classes, groups, and sections of society which fully stand for recognition of private property and commodity production and are incapable of going beyond these bounds, are compelled by force of circumstances to recognise the uselessness of the autocracy and of the whole feudal order in general, and join in the demand for liberty. The bourgeois character of *this* liberty, which is demanded by "society" and advocated in a flood of words (and only words!) from the landowners and the capitalists, is manifesting itself more and more clearly. At the same time the radical difference between the workers' and the bourgeoisie's struggle for liberty, between proletarian and liberal democratism, is also becoming more palpable. The working class and its class-conscious representatives are marching forward and carrying this struggle forward, not only unafraid of bringing it to completion, but striving to go far beyond the uttermost limits of the democratic revolution. Inconsistent and selfish, the bourgeoisie accepts the slogans of liberty hypocritically and only in part. Doomed to inevitable failure are all attempts to establish, by some particular line or by drawing up particular "points" (like those in Starover's resolution or that of the conferees), the limits beyond which this hypocrisy of the bourgeois friends of liberty, or, rather, this betrayal of liberty by its bourgeois friends, begins. That is because the bourgeoisie, caught between two fires (the autocracy and the proletariat), is capable of changing its position and slogans by a thousand ways and means, adapting itself by moving an inch to the left or an inch to the right, haggling and chaffering all the time. The task of proletarian democratism is

not to invent such lifeless "points", but to criticise the developing political situation ceaselessly, to expose the ever new and unforeseeable inconsistencies and betrayals on the part of the bourgeoisie.

Recall the history of Mr. Struve's political pronouncements in the illegal press, the history of Social-Democracy's war with him, and you will clearly see how these tasks have been carried out by Social-Democracy, the champion of proletarian democratism. Mr. Struve began with a purely Shipov slogan: "Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo" (see my article in *Zarya*, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism"*). Social-Democracy exposed him and drove him towards a definitely constitutionalist programme. When these "shoves" took effect, thanks to the particularly rapid progress of revolutionary events, the struggle shifted to the *next* problem of democratism: not merely a constitution in general, but one providing for universal and equal suffrage, direct elections, and a secret ballot. When we "captured" this new position from the "enemy" (the adoption of universal suffrage by the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) we began to press further; we showed up the hypocrisy and falseness of a two-chamber system, and the fact that universal suffrage had not been fully recognised by the *Osvobozhdeniye* League; we pointed to their *monarchism* and showed up the huckstering nature of their democratism, or, in other words, the *bartering away* of the interests of the great Russian revolution by these *Osvobozhdeniye* heroes of the money-bag.

Finally, the autocracy's obduracy, the tremendous progress of the civil war, and the hopelessness of the plight to which the monarchists have reduced Russia have begun to penetrate into even the thickest of skulls. The revolution became a *fact*. It was no longer necessary to be a revolutionary to acknowledge the revolution. The autocratic government has actually been disintegrating before our eyes. As has justly been remarked in the legal press by a certain liberal (Mr. Gredeskul), actual disobedience to this government has set in. Notwithstanding its apparent might the

* First published in 1901. See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80.—*Ed.*

autocracy has proved impotent; the events attending the developing revolution have simply begun to thrust aside this parasitic organism, which is rotting alive. Compelled to base their activities (or, to put it more correctly, their shady political deals) on relationships as they are actually taking shape, the liberal bourgeois *have begun to see the necessity of recognising the revolution*. They do so not because they are revolutionaries, but despite the fact that they are *not* revolutionaries. They do so of necessity and against their will, glaring angrily at the success of the revolution, and levelling the accusation of revolutionism against the autocracy, which does not want to strike a bargain, but wants a life-and-death struggle. Born hucksters, they hate struggle and revolution, but circumstances force them to stand on the ground of revolution, for there is no other ground under their feet.

We are witnessing a highly instructive and highly comical spectacle. The bourgeois liberal prostitutes are trying to drape themselves in the toga of revolution. The *Osvobozhdeniye* people—*risum teneatis*, *amici*!*—the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are beginning to speak in the name of the revolution! They are beginning to assure us that they "do not fear revolution" (Mr. Struve in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72)!!! They are voicing their claim "to be at the head of the revolution"!!!

This is a most significant phenomenon, one that characterises not only an advance in bourgeois liberalism, but even more so the advance of the real successes of the revolutionary movement, which has *compelled* recognition. Even the bourgeoisie is beginning to feel that it is more to its advantage to take its stand on the side of the revolution, for the autocracy is so shaky. On the other hand, however, this phenomenon, which testifies to the new and higher level reached by the entire movement, sets us new and higher tasks as well. The bourgeoisie's recognition of the revolution cannot be sincere, irrespective of the personal integrity of one bourgeois ideologist or another. The bourgeoisie cannot but bring selfishness and inconsistency, the spirit of chaffering and petty reactionary dodges even into this higher

* Restrain your laughter, friends!

stage of the movement. We must now formulate the immediate *concrete* tasks of the revolution in a *different* way, in the name of our programme, and in amplification of our programme. What was adequate yesterday is *inadequate today*. Yesterday, perhaps, the demand for the recognition of the revolution was adequate as an advanced democratic slogan. Today that is not enough. The revolution has forced even Mr. Struve to recognise it. The advanced class must now define exactly *the very content* of the urgent and pressing tasks of this revolution. While recognising the revolution, Messrs. the Struves again and again show their asses' ears and strike up the old tune about the possibility of a peaceful outcome, about *Nicholas* calling on the *Osvobozhdeniye* group to take power, etc., etc. The *Osvobozhdeniye* people recognise the revolution so as to emasculate and betray it the more safely for themselves. It is now our duty to show the proletariat and the whole people the inadequacy of the slogan of "revolution"; we must show how necessary it is to have a clear and unambiguous, consistent, and determined definition of *the very content* of the revolution. And this definition is provided by the one slogan that is capable of correctly expressing a "decisive victory" of the revolution, the slogan of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.[46]

Abuse of terms is a most common practice in politics. The name "socialist", for example, has often been appropriated by supporters of English bourgeois liberalism ("We are all socialists now,"* said Harcourt), by supporters of Bismarck, and by friends of Pope Leo XIII. The term "revolution" also fully lends itself to abuse, and, at a certain stage in the development of the movement, such abuse is inevitable. When Mr. Struve began to speak in the name of revolution we could not but recall Thiers. A few days before the February revolution this monstrous gnome, this most perfect embodiment of the bourgeoisie's political venality sensed that a storm was brewing among the people, and announced from the parliamentary tribune that he was *of the party of revolution*! (See Marx's *The Civil War in France*.[47]) The political significance of *Osvobozhdeniye*'s joining the

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

party of revolution is *exactly the same as* Thiers's. When the Russian Thiers begin to speak of their belonging to the party of revolution, that means that the slogan of revolution has become inadequate, is meaningless, and defines no tasks since the revolution has become a fact, and the most diverse elements are going over to its side.

Indeed, what is revolution from the Marxist point of view? The forcible demolition of the obsolete political superstructure, the contradiction between which and the new relations of production have caused its collapse at a certain moment. The contradiction between the autocracy and the entire structure of capitalist Russia and all the needs of her bourgeois-democratic development has now caused its collapse, all the more severe owing to the lengthy period in which this contradiction was artificially sustained. The superstructure is cracking at every joint, is yielding to pressure, and growing weaker. Through the representatives of the most diverse classes and groups, the people must now, by their own efforts, build themselves a new superstructure. At a certain stage of development, the uselessness of the old superstructure becomes obvious to all; the revolution is recognised by all. The task now is to define *which* classes must build the new superstructure, and *how* they are to build it. If this is not defined the slogan of revolution is empty and meaningless at the present time; for the feebleness of the autocracy makes "revolutionaries" even of the Grand Dukes and of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*![48] If this is not defined there can be no talk about the advanced democratic tasks of the advanced class. The slogan "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" provides that definition. This slogan defines the classes upon which the new "builders" of the new superstructure can and must rely, the character of the new superstructure (a "democratic" as distinct from a socialist dictatorship), and how it is to be built (dictatorship, i.e., the forcible suppression of resistance by force and the arming of the revolutionary classes of the people). Whoever now refuses to recognise this slogan of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, the slogan of a revolutionary army, of a revolutionary government, and of revolutionary peasant committees, either hopelessly fails to understand the tasks of the revolution, is unable to define the new and higher tasks

evoked by the present situation, or is deceiving the people, betraying the revolution, and misusing the slogan of "revolution".

Comrade Martynov and his friends are instances of the former, and Mr. Struve and the whole of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Zemstvo party—of the latter case.

Comrade Martynov was so sharp and shrewd that he charged us with having made the concepts of dictatorship and revolution "interchangeable" just at a time when the development of the revolution required that its tasks be defined by the slogan of dictatorship. Comrade Martynov has again been so unlucky as to be left behind, stranded at the stage before the last, *at the level reached by Osvobozhdeniye*; for recognition of "revolution" (in word) and refusal to recognise the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (i.e., revolution in deed) today amounts to taking the political stand of *Osvobozhdeniye*, i.e., is to the interests of the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie. Through Mr. Struve the liberal bourgeoisie is now expressing itself in favour of revolution. Through the revolutionary Social-Democrats the class-conscious proletariat is demanding a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And at this stage the new-*Iskra* wiseacre intervenes in the controversy and yells: "Don't dare make the ideas of dictatorship and revolution 'interchangeable'!" Well, is it not true that the false stand taken by the new-Iskrists dooms them to be constantly dragging along at the tail-end of *Osvobozhdeniye* trend?

We have shown that the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are ascending (not without prodding from the Social-Democrats) step by step in the matter of recognising democratism. At first, the issue in dispute between us was: Shipovism (rights and an authoritative Zemstvo) or constitutionalism? Then it was: limited suffrage or universal suffrage? Later: recognition of the revolution or a huckster's bargain with the autocracy? Finally, it is now: recognition of the revolution without the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or recognition of the demand for a dictatorship of these classes in the democratic revolution? It is possible and probable that the *Osvobozhdeniye* people (it makes no difference whether these are present ones, or their successors in the Left wing of the bourgeois democrats) will ascend another

step, i.e., recognise in due course (perhaps by the time Comrade Martynov ascends another step) the slogan of dictatorship as well. This will inevitably be the case if the Russian revolution continues to forge ahead, and achieves a decisive victory. What will the position of Social-Democracy then be? The complete victory of the present revolution will mark the end of the democratic revolution and the beginning of a determined struggle for a socialist revolution. Satisfaction of the present-day demands of the peasantry, the utter rout of reaction and the achievement of a democratic republic will mark the utter limit of the revolutionism of the bourgeoisie, and even that of the petty bourgeoisie, and the beginning of the proletariat's real struggle for socialism. The more complete the democratic revolution, the sooner, the more widespread, the cleaner, and the more determined will the development of this new struggle be. The slogan of a "democratic" dictatorship expresses the historically limited nature of the present revolution and the necessity of a new struggle on the basis of the new order for the complete emancipation of the working class from all oppression and all exploitation. In other words, when the democratic bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie ascends another step, when not only the revolution but the complete victory of the revolution becomes an accomplished fact, we shall "change" (perhaps amid the horrified cries of new and future Martynovs) the slogan of the democratic dictatorship to the slogan of a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., of a full socialist revolution.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

III. THE VULGAR BOURGEOIS AND THE MARXIST VIEWS ON DICTATORSHIP

In his notes to Marx's articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of 1848, which he published, Mehring[49] tells us that one of the reproaches levelled at this newspaper by bourgeois publications was that it had allegedly demanded "the immediate introduction of a dictatorship as the sole means of achieving democracy" (Marx, *Nachlass*, Vol. III, p. 53). From the vulgar bourgeois standpoint the terms dictatorship and democracy are mutually exclusive. Failing to understand the theory of class struggle and accustomed to

seeing in the political arena the petty squabbling of the various bourgeois circles and coteries, the bourgeois understands by dictatorship the annulment of all liberties and guarantees of democracy, arbitrariness of every kind, and every sort of abuse of power in a dictator's personal interests. In fact, it is precisely this vulgar bourgeois view that is manifested in the writings of our Martynov, who winds up his "new campaign" in the new *Iskra* by attributing the partiality of *Vperyod* and *Proletary* for the slogan of dictatorship to Lenin's "passionate desire to try his luck" (*Iskra*, No. 103, p. 3, col. 2). In order to explain to Martynov the meaning of the term class dictatorship, as distinct from personal dictatorship, and the tasks of a democratic dictatorship, as distinct from those of a socialist dictatorship, it would not be amiss to dwell on the views of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.

"After a revolution," wrote the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on September 14, 1848, "every provisional organisation of the state requires a dictatorship and an energetic dictatorship at that. From the very beginning we have reproached Camphausen" (the head of the Ministry after March 18, 1848) "for not acting dictatorially, for not having immediately smashed up and eliminated the remnants of the old institutions. And while Herr Camphausen was lulling himself with constitutional illusions the defeated party (i.e., the party of reaction) strengthened its positions in the bureaucracy and in the army, and here and there even began to venture upon open struggle."[50]

These words, Mehring justly remarks, sum up in a few propositions all that was propounded in detail in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in long articles on the Camphausen Ministry. What do these words of Marx tell us? That a provisional revolutionary government *must* act dictatorially (a proposition which *Iskra* was totally unable to grasp since it was fighting shy of the slogan of dictatorship), and that the task of such a dictatorship is to destroy the remnants of the old institutions (which is precisely what was clearly stated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the struggle against counter-revolution and was omitted in the resolution of the Conference, as shown above). Thirdly, and lastly, it follows from these words that Marx castigated the bourgeois democrats

for entertaining "constitutional illusions" in a period of revolution and open civil war. The meaning of these words becomes particularly obvious from the article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of June 6, 1848. "A constituent national assembly," Marx wrote, "must first of all be an active, revolutionary-active assembly. The Frankfort Assembly, however, is busying itself with school exercises in parliamentarianism while allowing the government to act. Let us assume that this learned assembly succeeds, after mature consideration, in evolving the best possible agenda and the best constitution, but what is the use of the best possible agenda and of the best possible constitution, if the German governments have in the meantime placed the bayonet on the agenda?"[51]

That is the meaning of the slogan: dictatorship. We can judge from this what Marx's attitude would have been towards resolutions which call a "decision to organise a constituent assembly" a decisive victory, or which invite us to "remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition"!

Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force. The reactionary classes themselves are usually the first to resort to violence, to civil war; they are the first to "place the bayonet on the agenda", as the Russian autocracy has systematically and unswervingly been doing everywhere ever since January 9. And since such a situation has arisen, since the bayonet has really become the main point on the political agenda, since insurrection has proved imperative and urgent—constitutional illusions and school exercises in parliamentarianism become merely a screen for the bourgeois betrayal of the revolution, a screen to conceal the fact that the bourgeoisie is "recoiling" from the revolution. It is precisely the slogan of dictatorship that the genuinely revolutionary class must advance, in that case.

On the question of the tasks of this dictatorship Marx wrote in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*: "The National Assembly should have acted dictatorially against the reactionary attempts of the obsolete governments; and thus gain for itself the power of public opinion against which all bayonets and rifle butts would be shattered.... But this Assembly bores the German people instead of carrying them with it or being carried away by them."[52] In Marx's opinion, the

National Assembly should have "eliminated from the regime actually existing in Germany everything that contradicted the principle of the sovereignty of the people", and then it should have "established the revolutionary ground on which it stands in order to make the sovereignty of the people, won by the revolution, secure against all attacks".[53]

Consequently, in their content the tasks which Marx set a revolutionary government or dictatorship in 1848 amounted first and foremost to a *democratic* revolution: defence against counter-revolution and the actual elimination of everything that contradicted the sovereignty of the people. That is nothing else than a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.

To proceed: which classes, in Marx's opinion, could and should have achieved this task (to fully exercise in deed the principle of the people's sovereignty and beat off the attacks of the counter-revolution)? Marx speaks of the "people". But we know that he always fought ruthlessly against petty-bourgeois illusions about the unity of the "people" and the absence of a class struggle within the people. In using the word "people" Marx did not thereby gloss over class distinctions, but united definite elements capable of bringing the revolution to completion.

After the victory of the Berlin proletariat on March 18, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* wrote, the results of the revolution proved twofold: "On the one hand, the arming of the people, the right of association, the actual achievement of the sovereignty of the people; on the other hand, the retention of the monarchy and the Camphausen-Hansemann Ministry, i.e., the government of representatives of the big bourgeoisie. Thus, the revolution had two series of results, which had inevitably to diverge. The people had achieved victory; they had won liberties of a decisively democratic nature, but immediate power did not pass into their hands, but into the hands of the big bourgeoisie. In short, the revolution was not consummated. The people let representatives of the big bourgeoisie form a ministry, and these representatives of the big bourgeoisie at once showed what they were after by offering an alliance to the old Prussian nobility and bureaucracy. Arnim, Canitz, and Schwerin joined the ministry.

"*The upper bourgeoisie, ever anti-revolutionary, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with the reactionaries for fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie.*" (Italics ours.)[54]

Thus, not only a "decision to organise a constituent assembly", but even its actual convocation is insufficient for a decisive victory of the revolution! Even after a partial victory in an armed struggle (the victory of the Berlin workers over the troops on March 18, 1848) an "incomplete" revolution, a revolution "that has not been carried to completion", is possible. On what, then, does its completion depend? It depends on whose hands immediate power passes into, into the hands of the Petrunkeviches and Rodichevs, that is to say, the Camphausens and the Hansemanns, or into the hands of the *people*, i.e., the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie. In the first instance, the bourgeoisie will possess power, and the proletariat—"freedom of criticism", freedom to "remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition". Immediately after the victory the bourgeoisie will conclude an alliance with the reactionaries (this would inevitably happen in Russia too, if, for example, the St. Petersburg workers gained only a partial victory in street fighting with the troops and left it to Messrs. Petrunkeviches and Co. to form a government). In the second instance, a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, i.e., the complete victory of the revolution, would be possible.

It now remains to define more precisely what Marx really meant by "democratic bourgeoisie" (*demokratische Bürgerschaft*), which, together with the workers, he called the people, in contradistinction to the big bourgeoisie.

A clear answer to this question is supplied by the following passage from an article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of July 29, 1848: "...The German Revolution of 1848 is only a parody of the French Revolution of 1789.

"On August 4, 1789, three weeks after the storming of the Bastille, the French people in a single day prevailed over all feudal burdens.

"On July 11, 1848, four months after the March barricades, the feudal burdens prevailed over the German people. *Teste Gierke cum Hansemanno.**

"The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not for a moment leave its allies, the peasants, in the lurch. It knew that its rule was grounded in the destruction of feudalism in the countryside, the creation of a free landowning (*grundbesitzenden*) peasant class.

"The German bourgeoisie of 1848 is, without the least compunction, betraying the peasants, who are its most natural allies, the flesh of its flesh, and without whom it is powerless against the aristocracy.

"The continuance of feudal rights, their sanction under the guise of (illusory) redemption—such is the result of the German Revolution of 1848. The mountain brought forth a mouse."[55]

This is a very instructive passage, which provides us with four important propositions: 1) The uncompleted German revolution differs from the completed French revolution in that the German bourgeoisie betrayed not only democracy in general, but also the peasantry in particular. 2) The creation of a free class of peasants is the foundation for the consummation of a democratic revolution. 3) The creation of such a class means the abolition of feudal services, the destruction of feudalism, but does not yet mean a socialist revolution. 4) The peasants are the "most natural" allies of the bourgeoisie, that is to say, of the democratic bourgeoisie, which without them is "powerless" against reaction.

With the proper allowances for concrete national peculiarities and with serfdom substituted for feudalism, all

* "Witnesses: Herr Gierke together with Herr Hansemann." Hansemann was a Minister who represented the party of the big bourgeoisie (Russian counterpart: Trubetskoi or Rodichev, and the like); Gierke was Minister of Agriculture in the Hansemann Cabinet, who drew up a plan, a "bold" plan for "abolishing feudal burdens", professedly "without compensation", but in fact for abolishing only the minor and unimportant burdens, while preserving or granting compensation for the more essential ones. Herr Gierke was something like the Russian Kablukovs, Manuilovs, Hertzensteins, and similar bourgeois liberal friends of the muzhik, who desire the "extension of peasant landownership" but do not wish to offend the landlords.

these propositions are fully applicable to the Russia of 1905. There is no doubt that by learning from the experience of Germany as elucidated by Marx, we can arrive at no other slogan for a decisive victory of the revolution than: a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. There is no doubt that the proletariat and the peasantry are the chief components of the "people" as contrasted by Marx in 1848 to the resisting reactionaries and the treacherous bourgeoisie. There is no doubt that in Russia, too, the liberal bourgeoisie and the gentlemen of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League are betraying and will betray the peasantry, i.e., will confine themselves to a pseudo-reform and take the side of the landlords in the decisive battle between them and the peasantry. In this struggle only the proletariat is capable of supporting the peasantry to the end. There is no doubt, finally, that in Russia, too, the success of the peasants' struggle, i.e., the transfer of the whole of the land to the peasantry, will signify a complete democratic revolution, and constitute the social basis of the revolution carried through to its completion, but this will by no means be a socialist revolution, or the "socialisation" that the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, talk about. The success of the peasant insurrection, the victory of the democratic revolution will merely clear the way for a genuine and decisive struggle for socialism, on the basis of a democratic republic. In this struggle the peasantry, as a landowning class, will play the same treacherous, unstable part as is now being played by the bourgeoisie in the struggle for democracy. To forget this is to forget socialism, to deceive oneself and others, regarding the real interests and tasks of the proletariat.

In order to leave no gaps in the presentation of the views held by Marx in 1848, it is necessary to note one essential difference between German Social-Democracy of that time (or the Communist Party of the proletariat, to use the language of that period) and present-day Russian Social-Democracy. Here is what Mehring says:

"The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared in the political arena as the 'organ of democracy'. There is no mistaking the trend running through all its articles. But in the direct sense it championed the interests of the bourgeois revolu-

tion against absolutism and feudalism more than the interests of the proletariat against those of the bourgeoisie. Very little is to be found in its columns about an independent working-class movement during the years of the revolution, although one should not forget that along with it there appeared, twice a week, under the editorship of Moll and Schapper, a special organ of the Cologne Workers' League.[56] At any rate, the present-day reader will be struck by the little attention the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* paid to the German working-class movement of its day, although Stephan Born, its most capable mind, was a pupil of Marx and Engels in Paris and Brussels, and in 1848 was their newspaper's Berlin correspondent. In his *Memoirs* Born says that Marx and Engels never expressed a single word in disapproval of his agitation among the workers. However, subsequent statements by Engels make it appear quite probable that they were at least dissatisfied with the methods of this agitation. Their dissatisfaction was justified inasmuch as Born was obliged to make many concessions to the as yet totally undeveloped class-consciousness of the proletariat in the greater part of Germany, concessions which do not stand the test of criticism from the viewpoint of the *Communist Manifesto*. Their dissatisfaction was unjustified inasmuch as Born managed nonetheless to maintain his agitation on a relatively high plane.... Without doubt, Marx and Engels were historically and politically right in thinking that the primary interest of the working class was to drive the bourgeois revolution as far forward as possible.... Nevertheless, remarkable proof of how the elementary instinct of the working-class movement is able to correct conceptions of the most brilliant thinkers is provided by the fact that in April 1849 they declared in favour of a specific workers' organisation and decided to participate in a workers' congress which was being prepared especially by the East Elbe (Eastern Prussia) proletariat."

Thus, it was only in April 1849, after a revolutionary newspaper had been appearing for almost a year (the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* began publication on June 1, 1848) that Marx and Engels declared in favour of a special workers' organisation! Until then they were merely running an "organ of democracy" unlinked by any organisational ties with

an independent workers' party. This fact, monstrous and improbable as it may appear from our present-day standpoint, clearly shows us the enormous difference between the German Social-Democratic Party of those days and the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party of today. This fact shows how much less the proletarian features of the movement, the proletarian current within it, were in evidence in the German democratic revolution (because of the backwardness of Germany in 1848 both economically and politically—her disunity as a state). This should not be forgotten in appraising Marx's repeated declarations during this period and somewhat later about the need for organising an independent proletarian party. Marx arrived at this practical conclusion only as a result of the experience of the democratic revolution, almost a year later—so philistine, so petty-bourgeois was the whole atmosphere in Germany at the time. To us this conclusion is the well-known and solid gain of half a century's experience of international Social-Democracy—a gain on the basis of which we *began* to organise the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. In our case there can be no question, for instance, of revolutionary proletarian newspapers standing outside the Social-Democratic Party of the proletariat, or of their appearing even for a moment simply as "organs of democracy".

But the contrast which hardly began to reveal itself between Marx and Stephan Born exists in our case in a form which is the more developed by reason of the more powerful manifestation of the proletarian current in the democratic stream of our revolution. Speaking of the probable dissatisfaction of Marx and Engels with the agitation conducted by Stephan Born, Mehring expresses himself too mildly and too evasively. Here is what Engels wrote of Born in 1885 (in his preface to the *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, Zürich, 1885*):

The members of the Communist League[57] everywhere stood at the head of the extreme democratic movement, proving thereby that the League was an excellent school of revolutionary activity. "The compositor Stephan Born, who had worked in Brussels and Paris as an active member of

* *Revelations About the Cologne Communist Trial*, Zürich, 1885.—*Ed.*

the League, founded a Workers' Brotherhood [*Arbeiterverbrüderung*] in Berlin which became fairly widespread and existed until 1850. Born, a very talented young man, who, however, was too much in a hurry to become a political figure, 'fraternised' with the most miscellaneous ragtag and bob-tail [*Krethi und Plethi*] in order to get a crowd together, and was not at all the man who could bring unity into the conflicting tendencies, light into the chaos. Consequently, in the official publications of the association the views represented in the *Communist Manifesto* were mingled hodge-podge with guild recollections and guild aspirations, fragments of Louis Blanc and Proudhon, protectionism, etc.; in short, they wanted to please everybody [*allen alles sein*]. *In particular, strikes, trade unions, and producers' co-operatives were set going, and it was forgotten that above all it was a question of first conquering, by means of political victories, the field* in which alone such things could be realised on a lasting basis. [Italics mine.] When, afterwards, the victories of the reaction made the leaders of the Brotherhood realise the necessity of taking a direct part in the revolutionary struggle, they were naturally left in the lurch by the confused mass which they had grouped around themselves. Born took part in the Dresden uprising in May 1849, and had a lucky escape. But, in contrast to the great political movement of the proletariat, the Workers' Brotherhood proved to be a pure *Sonderbund* (separate league), which to a large extent existed only on paper and played such a subordinate role that the reaction did not find it necessary to suppress it until 1850, and its surviving branches until several years later. Born, whose real name was Buttermilch,*

* In translating Engels I made a mistake in the first edition by taking the word *Buttermilch* to be not a proper noun but a common noun. This mistake naturally afforded great delight to the Mensheviks. Koltsov wrote that I had "rendered Engels more profound" (reprinted in *Two Years*, a collection of articles) and Plekhanov even now recalls this mistake in *Tovarishch*[58]—in short, it afforded *an excellent pretext to slur over the question of the two tendencies in the working-class movement* of 1848 in Germany, the Born tendency (akin to our Economists) and the Marxist tendency. To take advantage of the mistake of an opponent, even if it concerns Born's name, is more than natural. But to use a correction to a translation to slur over the substance of the question of the two tactics is to dodge the real issue. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

has not become a political figure but a petty Swiss professor, who no longer translates Marx into guild language, but the meek Renan into his own fulsome German."[59]

That is how Engels judged the two tactics of Social-Democracy in the democratic revolution!

Our new-Iskrists are also leaning towards Economism and with such unreasonable zeal as to earn the praises of the monarchist bourgeoisie for "seeing the light". They too gather a motley crowd around themselves, flattering the Economists, demagogically attracting the undeveloped masses by the slogans of "initiative", "democracy", "autonomy", etc., etc.; their workers' unions, too, often exist only on the pages of the Khlestakov-type[60] new *Iskra*. Their slogans and resolutions betray a similar failure to understand the tasks of the "great political movement of the proletariat".

CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH TO THE ARTICLE "THE PARIS COMMUNE AND THE TASKS OF THE DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP"[61]

This article teaches us, first and foremost, that for representatives of the socialist proletariat to take part in a revolutionary government together with the petty bourgeoisie is fully permissible in principle, and, in certain conditions, even obligatory. It shows us further that the real task the Commune had to perform was primarily the achievement of the democratic and not the socialist dictatorship, the implementation of our "minimum programme". Finally, the article reminds us that when we study the lessons of the Paris Commune we should imitate not the mistakes it made (the failure to seize the Bank of France and to launch an offensive against Versailles, the lack of a clear programme, etc.), but its successful practical measures, which indicate the correct road. It is not the word "Commune" that we must adopt from the great fighters of 1871; we should not blindly repeat each of their slogans; what we must do is to single out those programmatic and practical slogans that bear upon the state of affairs in Russia and can be formulated in the words "a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry".

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TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU, BRUSSELS

Geneva, July 24, 1905

Dear Comrades,

We received your letter of June 28 several days ago, with some interesting documents (letters from Comrades Bebel and Plekhanov) enclosed, but being extremely busy we were unable to reply at once.

I. As regards Comrade Plekhanov's letter, we are obliged to make the following observations:

1) Comrade Plekhanov's assertion that since the Second Congress of our Party (August 1903) we have differed only on the question of organisation is not in full keeping with the facts. The "Minority" at the Second Congress (headed by Comrades Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, and Martov) actually split the Party immediately after the Congress by declaring a boycott of the central bodies elected by the Congress and by setting up a secret "Minority" organisation, which was dissolved only in the autumn of 1904. Comrade Plekhanov himself, who sided with us at the Second Congress of the Party and at the Congress of the League of Russian Social-Democracy Abroad (October 1903), evidently held a somewhat different opinion concerning our differences when he publicly stated in *Iskra*, No. 52 (November 1903) that we must make skilful concessions to the "revisionists" (Plekhanov's expression) in order to avoid a split in the Party.

2) The assertion that the Third Congress of the Party was convened "quite arbitrarily" does not correspond to the facts either. According to Party Rules, the Council is obliged to call a congress if so demanded by half of the committees. As you know from the resolutions of the Third Congress, which have been translated into French, the Council ignored the Party Rules. The Party committees and the "Bureau of

Majority Committees"[62] which they elected were morally and formally obliged to convene the Congress, even against the will of the Council, which did nothing to convene it.

3) You know from the selfsame resolutions of the Third Congress that it was not "something like half of the duly authorised organisations" that were represented at the Congress, but a considerable majority of the biggest committees. 4) It is true that there are comrades in our Party who are referred to in jest as the "Marsh". Its members were continually changing sides during the controversies within our Party. The first of these turncoats was Plekhanov, who went over from the Majority to the Minority in November 1903, only to leave the Minority on May 29 of this year, when he resigned from *Iskra*'s Editorial Board. We do not approve of changing sides like that, but think we cannot be blamed if after much vacillation members of the "Marsh" are inclined to follow us. 5) In his letter to the Bureau (June 16, 1905) Comrade Plekhanov most inappropriately forgot to mention his letter of May 29, 1905, published in *Iskra* (No. 101), a complete and exact translation of which we have already forwarded to you. 6) When he says that the other section in the Party is grouped around *Iskra*, the Party's former Central Organ, Comrade Plekhanov again forgot to add that the "Minority" Conference (May 1905) annulled the Rules drawn up at the Second Congress, and failed to set up a new Central Organ. We think that the International Socialist Bureau should have a complete translation of all resolutions of that conference. If *Iskra* refuses to send them to the Bureau we are prepared to do so ourselves. 7) Comrade Plekhanov states that only the two remaining members of the Central Committee (the others had been arrested) declared themselves in favour of convening the Third Congress.

Comrade Plekhanov's letter is dated June 16, 1905. The next day, June 17, No. 4 of *Proletary*, the Central Organ of the Party, which had been set up by the Third Congress, published the following statement: "After reading the Central Committee's Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov, Chairman of the Party Council, and being in full agreement with the Central Committee, we consider it necessary—for reasons which comrades acquainted with the state of affairs in the Party will understand—publicly to declare

our solidarity with the Central Committee." Signed (pseudonyms): Ma, Bem, Vladimir, Innokenty, Andrei, Voron. We may inform you in confidence that these pseudonyms belong to the arrested members of the Central Committee.[63] Consequently, as soon as the members of the Central Committee learned of the conflict between the Central Committee and Comrade Plekhanov (and, therefore, the Council as well) regarding the convocation of the Congress, most of them at once declared in favour of the Central Committee and against Comrade Plekhanov. We earnestly request the International Secretariat to inform us whether Comrade Plekhanov deemed it necessary to acquaint the Bureau with this important statement by the arrested members of the Central Committee, which completely refutes the assertions contained in Comrade Plekhanov's letter of June 16. 8) Comrade Plekhanov is mistaken in saying that both groups asked him to go on representing the Party in the International Bureau. To date the Central Committee of our Party has not made any such request. As we informed you a few days ago, this question has not yet been finally decided, although it stands on the order of the day. 9) Comrade Plekhanov thinks that it is not difficult for him to be impartial in the question of our differences. After what has been set forth above, however, we believe that he finds it quite difficult, and at the present moment, at any rate, next to impossible.[64]

II. I pass on to Comrade Bebel's proposal on the subject of our affairs.

Here I must make the following observations: 1) I am only one of the members of the Central Committee and the responsible editor of *Proletary*, the Party's Central Organ. I can act for the whole of the Central Committee only in regard to our affairs abroad and certain other matters specially entrusted to me. In any case, all my decisions may be annulled by a general meeting of the Central Committee. Therefore, I cannot decide on the question of the Bureau's intervention in the affairs of our Party. However, I immediately forwarded your letter, as well as the letters of Comrades Bebel and Plekhanov, to Russia, to all the members of the Central Committee. 2) In order to speed up the Central Committee's reply it would be very useful to obtain certain necessary explanations from the Bureau: a) should the term

"intervention" be taken to mean only conciliatory mediation, and advice having merely moral, and not binding, force; b) or does the Bureau have in view a binding ruling by a court of arbitration; c) does the Bureau's Executive Committee propose to submit our differences to the general meeting of the International Socialist Bureau for final decision, without right of appeal? 3) On my part I consider it my duty to inform the Bureau that shortly before the Third Congress Comrade Bebel made a similar proposal to me and to those who share my views offering his services or the services of the entire Executive Committee of the German Party (*Parteivorstand*), as arbitrator in the dispute between the Majority and the Minority in our Party.

I replied that the Party Congress would take place soon and that I personally could not decide for the Party or in its name.

The Bureau of Majority Committees rejected Bebel's offer. The Third Congress passed no decision on this offer, and thereby tacitly endorsed the reply given by the Bureau of Majority Committees. 4) Since the International Bureau considers it proper to obtain its information from "certain German newspapers", I am compelled to state that nearly all German socialist papers, especially *Die Neue Zeit* and *Leipziger Volkszeitung*,[65] are entirely on the side of the "Minority", and present our affairs in a very one-sided and inaccurate way. Kautsky, for instance, also calls himself impartial, and yet, in actual fact, he went so far as to refuse to publish in the *Neue Zeit* a refutation of an article by Rosa Luxemburg, in which she defended disruption in the Party.[66] In *Leipziger Volkszeitung* Kautsky even urged that the German pamphlet with the translation of the resolutions of the Third Congress should not be circulated!! After this it is easy to understand why many comrades in Russia are inclined to regard the German Social-Democratic Party as partial and extremely prejudiced in the question of the split in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy.

Accept, dear comrades, our fraternal greeting.

Vl. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

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REVOLUTION TEACHES

Differences within or between political parties are usually resolved not only by polemics over principles, but also by the course of political developments. In particular, differences on a party's tactics, i.e., its political conduct, are often resolved by those with incorrect opinions going over in fact to the correct path of struggle, under the pressure of the course of developments that simply brush aside erroneous opinions, making them pointless and devoid of any interest. This, of course, does not mean that fundamental differences on questions of tactics do not call for explanations of principles, explanations which alone can keep the Party equal to its theoretical convictions. No. This means only that decisions made with regard to tactics must be *verified* as often as possible in the light of new political events. Such verification is necessary from the standpoint of both theory and practice: from the standpoint of theory in order to ascertain in fact whether the decisions taken have been correct, and what amendments to these decisions subsequent political events make necessary; from the standpoint of practice, in order to learn how to use the decisions as a proper guide, to learn to consider them as directives for practical application.

A revolutionary period, more than any other, provides material for such verification, thanks to the tremendous speed of political development and the sharpness of political clashes. In a revolutionary period the old "superstructure" falls apart, and, in full view of everyone, a new one is created by the independent action of the most diverse social forces, which reveal their true nature in practice.

Thus, the Russian revolution, too, provides us almost weekly with an amazing wealth of political material for verifying previously-made tactical decisions, and for drawing most instructive lessons with regard to our entire practical activities. Take the Odessa events. An attempt at insurrection has failed. A bitter reverse, a severe defeat. But what a world of difference there is between this set-back in the struggle and the set-backs in the efforts made by the Shipovs, Trubetskois, Petrunkeviches, Struves, and all such bourgeois flunkeys of the tsar, to strike a deal! Engels once said that defeated armies learn their lessons well. These splendid words apply in far greater measure to revolutionary armies, whose replacements come from the progressive classes. Until the old, corrupt superstructure, whose putrefaction infects the whole people, is swept away, each new defeat will produce ever new armies of fighters. Of course, there also exists mankind's far wider collective experience, which has left its impress upon the history of international democracy and of international Social-Democracy, and has been systematised by the foremost representatives of revolutionary thought. Our Party draws on that experience for material to be used in its everyday propaganda and agitation. But while society is based on the oppression and exploitation of millions of working people, only the few can learn directly from that experience. The masses have to learn mostly from their own experience, paying dearly for every lesson. The lesson of January 9 was a hard one, but it revolutionised the temper of the entire proletariat of the whole of Russia. The lesson of the Odessa uprising is a hard one, but, with sentiments already revolutionised, it will now teach the revolutionary proletariat not only how to fight but also how to win. Regarding the Odessa events we say: the revolutionary army has been defeated—long live the revolutionary army!

We have already stated in No. 7 of our paper that the Odessa uprising has shed new light on our slogans calling for a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government.* In the preceding number we spoke about the military lessons

* "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 560-68.—*Ed.*

of the uprising (Comrade V.S.'s article). In this issue we dwell once more on some of its political lessons (the article "Urban Revolution"). We must now deal with the verification of our recent tactical decisions in the double aspect of theoretical correctness and practical expediency we have spoken of above.

Insurrection and a revolutionary government are the most vital political questions of the present time. These are questions that Social-Democrats have most of all discussed and argued about among themselves. It was to these questions that the main resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and of the Conference of the break-away section of the Party were devoted. It may now be asked: in what light do these differences appear *after* the Odessa uprising? Anyone who will now go to the trouble of re-reading, on the one hand, the statements and articles on this uprising, and, on the other, the four resolutions on issues of insurrection and of a provisional government adopted by the Party Congress and by the new-Iskrists' Conference will at once notice how, under the influence of events, the latter have *in actual fact* begun to side with their opponents, i.e., to act not according to their own resolutions, but according to those of the Third Congress. There is no better critic of an erroneous doctrine than the course of revolutionary events.

Under the influence of these events *Iskra*'s Editorial Board has issued a leaflet entitled "The First Victory of the Revolution", addressed to "Russian citizens, workers, and peasants". Here is the most important passage in the leaflet:

"The time has come to act boldly and to support the soldiers' bold rebellion with all our might. It is boldness that will now win the day!

"Therefore, call open meetings of the people and bring them tidings of the collapse of tsarism's military prop! Wherever possible seize municipal institutions and make them the bulwark of the people's revolutionary government! Oust the tsarist officials and appoint general elections to bodies of revolutionary government, to which you will entrust the provisional administration of public affairs pending the final victory over the tsar's government and the establishment of a new political regime. Seize the branches of the State Bank and the arsenals and arm the people! Establish contacts between the cities, between town and countryside, and let armed citizens hasten to each other's assistance wherever aid is needed! Take the prisons and free the champions of our cause imprisoned there—they will swell your ranks! Proclaim everywhere the overthrow of the tsarist

monarchy and its replacement by a free democratic republic! Arise, citizens! The hour of liberation has struck! Long live the revolution! Long live the democratic republic! Long live the revolutionary army! Down with the autocracy!"

Thus, we have before us a determined, open, and clear call for an armed uprising of the whole people. We also have here an equally determined call—though, regrettably, inexplicit and incompletely worded—to form a provisional revolutionary government. Let us first consider the question of an uprising.

Is there any difference in principle between the way this question was handled by the Third Congress and by the Conference? Undoubtedly there is. We have already dealt with this in *Proletary*, No. 6 ("A Third Step Back"*) and we shall now refer, furthermore, to the instructive testimony of *Osvobozhdeniye*. In No. 72 of the magazine we read that the "Majority" is lapsing into "abstract revolutionism, rebelliousness, an eagerness to stir up insurrection among the popular masses by any and every means, and to immediately seize power on their behalf". "On the contrary, the Minority, while steadfastly adhering to the dogma of Marxism, at the same time preserves the realistic elements of the Marxist world outlook." This opinion of liberals who have gone through the preparatory school of Marxism and through Bernsteinism is extremely valuable. The liberal bourgeois have always reproached the revolutionary wing of Social-Democracy with "abstract revolutionism and rebelliousness" and have always praised the opportunist wing for its "realism" in stating the question. *Iskra* itself has had to admit (see No. 73, note referring to Mr. Struve's approval of the "realism" of Comrade Akimov's pamphlet) that, when spoken by the *Osvobozhdeniye* League members, "realist" means "*opportunist*". The *Osvobozhdeniye* League members know only pedestrian realism; the revolutionary dialectics of Marxist realism, which emphasises the urgent tasks of the advanced class, and discovers in the existing state of things those elements that will lead to its overthrow, are absolutely alien to them. Therefore, *Osvobozhdeniye*'s characterisation of the two trends in Social-Democracy once

* First published in 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54.—*Ed.*

more confirms a fact proved by our literature, namely, that the "Majority" is the revolutionary wing of Russian Social-Democracy, and the "Minority" its opportunist wing.

Osvobozhdeniye definitely admits that, compared with the Congress, "the Conference of the Minority regards insurrection in a quite different way". Indeed, the Conference resolution in the first place defeats its own purpose by now denying the possibility of a planned uprising (Clause 1), now admitting it (par. d), and, in the second place, confines itself to a mere enumeration of the *general* conditions for "preparing an uprising" such as: a) extending agitation; b) strengthening the ties with the mass movement; c) promoting a revolutionary consciousness; d) establishing connections between the various localities; e) winning over non-proletarian groups to support the proletariat. The Congress resolution, on the contrary, outspokenly proclaims positive slogans, recognises that the movement *has already made* insurrection imperative, and calls for the organisation of the proletariat for the immediate struggle, for the adoption of the most energetic measures to arm it, for the explanation through propaganda and agitation "not only of the political significance" of the uprising (in essence, the resolution of the Conference confines itself to this), but also its practical and organisational aspect.

For a clearer understanding of the difference between the two solutions of the problem let us recall the evolution of Social-Democratic views on insurrection since the very inception of the mass working-class movement. The first stage: 1897. In his *Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* Lenin states that "to decide at the present time the question of what methods the Social-Democracy will resort to for the direct overthrow of the autocracy, whether it will choose an uprising, or a widespread political strike, or some other form of attack, would be akin to generals calling a council of war before they have mustered an army" (p. 18).* Here, as we see, there is not the slightest reference to preparations for an uprising; what is spoken of is merely the mustering of an army, i.e., propaganda, agitation, and organisation in general.

* First published in pamphlet form in Geneva, 1898. See present edition, Vol. 2, p. 342.—*Ed.*

The second stage: 1902. In Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* we read:

"...Picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now (February 1902) agree that we must think of this and prepare for it. But *how*? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the purpose of preparing the uprising! Even if we had a Central Committee it could achieve absolutely nothing by such appointments under present-day Russian conditions. But a network of agents that would form in the course of establishing and distributing the common newspaper would not have to "sit about and wait" for the call for an uprising, but could carry on the regular activity that would guarantee the highest probability of success in the event of an uprising. Such activity would strengthen our contacts with the broadest strata of the working masses and with all social strata that are discontented with the autocracy, which is of such importance for an uprising. Precisely such activity would serve to cultivate the ability to estimate correctly the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to select the proper moment for an uprising. Precisely such activity would train *all* local organisations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate the whole of Russia and to react to such 'incidents' in the most vigorous, uniform, and expedient manner possible; for an uprising is in essence the most vigorous, most uniform, and most expedient 'answer' of the entire people to the government. Lastly, it is precisely such activity that would train all revolutionary organisations throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most secret, contacts with one another, thus creating *real* Party unity; for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan for the uprising and to take the necessary preparatory measures on its eve, measures that must be kept in the strictest secrecy" (pp. 136-37*).

What points does this reasoning bring out with regard to the question of an uprising? 1) The absurdity of the idea of "preparing" an uprising by appointing special agents

* First published in *Iskra*, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 515-16.—*Ed.*

who would "sit around and wait" for the call. 2) The necessity of contacts *established in the course of work done in common* between people and organisations engaged in the regular work. 3) The necessity of strengthening the ties between the proletarian (workers) and the non-proletarian (all the discontented) sections of the population in the course of such work. 4) The necessity of jointly cultivating the ability to appraise correctly the political situation and to "react" to political events in the most expedient manner. 5) The need for actual unification of all local revolutionary organisations.

Consequently, the slogan of *preparations for an uprising* is already plainly advanced, but as yet there is no direct call to rise, no recognition that the movement "has already led up to" the necessity for an uprising, that it is necessary to arm immediately, to organise ourselves in combat squads, etc. Before us is an analysis of those very conditions for preparing an uprising which are *repeated almost literally* in the Conference resolution (in 1905!!).

The third stage: 1905. A further step forward is made in the newspaper *Vperyod* and later on in the resolution of the Third Congress. *Besides* general political preparations for an uprising, a *direct slogan* is issued, namely, that we should immediately organise and arm for an uprising, and that special (combat) squads should be formed, as the movement "has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising" (Clause 2 of the Congress resolution).

This piece of historical information leads us to three indubitable conclusions: 1) The assertion of the liberal bourgeoisie, the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, that we are lapsing into "*abstract* revolutionism and rebelliousness" is a downright lie. We have always raised, and are now raising, this question not in an "abstract" way, but on a *concrete basis*, answering it differently in 1897, in 1902, and in 1905. The accusation of rebelliousness is an opportunist phrase of the liberal bourgeois gentry, who are preparing to betray the interests of the revolution and to play it false at a time of decisive conflict with the autocracy. 2) The Conference of the new-Iskrists stopped short at the second stage in the evolution of the question of insurrection. In 1905 it merely reiterated what had been enough in 1902.

It *lagged* some three years *behind* revolutionary developments. 3) Under the influence of the lessons of life, namely, the Odessa uprising, the new-Iskrists have in fact acknowledged the necessity of acting according to the Congress resolution and not according to their own, i.e., they have recognised that the task of an insurrection is an urgent one, that a direct call must be made forthwith for the immediate organisation of an uprising and for the arming of the people.

The revolution has dislodged a backward Social-Democratic doctrine at one stroke. Another obstacle to practical unity in work in common with the new-Iskrists has been removed, which, of course, does not yet mean that differences on principles have been entirely eliminated. We cannot be content to have our tactical slogans limp behind events and to their being adapted to events after their occurrence. We must have slogans that lead us forward, light up the path before us, and raise us above the immediate tasks of the moment. To wage a consistent and sustained struggle the party of the proletariat cannot determine its tactics from occasion to occasion. In its tactical decisions it must combine fidelity to the principles of Marxism with due regard for the progressive tasks of the revolutionary class.

Take another urgent political question, that of a provisional revolutionary government. Here we see, perhaps, even more clearly that in its leaflet the *Iskra* Editorial Board has in fact abandoned the slogans of the Conference and has accepted the tactical slogans of the Third Congress. The absurd theory of "not setting ourselves the aim of seizing" (for a democratic revolution) "or sharing power in a provisional government" has gone by the board, for the leaflet makes a direct appeal for the "seizure of municipal institutions" and the organisation of a "provisional administration of public affairs". The absurd slogan of "remaining a party of extreme revolutionary opposition" (absurd in a period of revolution, although quite appropriate in a period of parliamentary struggle alone) has in fact been shelved, for the Odessa events have forced *Iskra* to realise that during an insurrection it is ridiculous to confine oneself to this slogan, that it is necessary to call energetically for an uprising, for its vigorous prosecution and for the

use of revolutionary power. The absurd slogan of "revolutionary communes" has also been discarded, for the events in Odessa have forced *Iskra* to realise that this slogan merely serves to confuse the democratic revolution with the socialist. To confuse these two very different things would be sheer adventurism, testifying to complete obscurity in theoretical thinking, and capable of hampering implementation of essential practical measures facilitating the working-class struggle for socialism in a democratic republic.

Call to mind the polemic between the new *Iskra* and *Vperyod*, the former's tactics of action "only from below", as opposed to the *Vperyod* tactics of action "both from below and from above", and you will see that *Iskra* has accepted our solution of the question by now itself calling for action from above. Remember *Iskra*'s apprehensions that we might discredit ourselves by assuming responsibility for the treasury, finances, etc.—and you will see that, though our arguments failed to convince *Iskra*, the events did convince it of the correctness of those arguments, for in the leaflet quoted above *Iskra* clearly recommends "seizure of branches of the State Bank". The absurd theory that a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, their joint participation in a provisional revolutionary government constitutes "treason to the proletariat" or "vulgar Jaurèsism (Millerandism)" has simply been forgotten by the new-Iskrists, who are themselves now calling upon the workers and peasants to seize municipal institutions, branches of the State Bank and arsenals "to arm the whole people" (apparently, this time meaning to arm with *weapons* and not merely with a "burning desire to arm themselves"), to proclaim the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, etc.—in a word, to act wholly in accordance with the programme provided in the resolution of the Third Congress, to act precisely as is indicated by the slogan calling for a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship and a provisional revolutionary government.

True, *Iskra* mentions neither of these slogans in its leaflet. It enumerates and describes actions whose sum is characteristic of a provisional revolutionary government, but avoids mentioning the term. That is to be regretted. In

actual fact it accepts this slogan, but the absence of a clear term can only create vacillation and uncertainty, and sow confusion in fighters' minds. Fear of the *words* "revolutionary government" and "revolutionary power" is a purely anarchist fear, and unworthy of a Marxist. To "seize" institutions and banks, "appoint elections", establish "provisional administration", and "proclaim the overthrow of the monarchy"—for all this the first and absolutely necessary step is the proclamation of a provisional revolutionary government to unite all the military and political activities of the revolutionary people and direct these activities towards a single aim. Unless there is such unity, unless the provisional government is universally recognised by the revolutionary people, unless it assumes all power, any "seizure" of institutions and any "proclamation" of a republic will remain merely an outburst of senseless rebelliousness. Unless it is concentrated by the revolutionary government the people's revolutionary energy will merely dissipate after the first success of the uprising squander itself on trifles, and lose its national scope. It will be unable to cope with the task of keeping what has been seized, or of giving effect to what has been proclaimed.

We repeat: Social-Democrats who do not recognise the decisions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. have been in actual fact forced by the course of events to act in full accordance with the slogans proclaimed by the Congress and to throw the Conference's slogans by the board. Revolution teaches. It is our duty to make the most of the lessons it provides, frame our tactical slogans in conformity with our conduct and our immediate aims, give the masses a proper understanding of those immediate aims, and start most extensively organising the workers everywhere to fight in an uprising, create a revolutionary army, and form a provisional revolutionary government!

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

WRATHFUL IMPOTENCE

No. 104 of *Iskra* carries a retort to our *feuilleton* "A Third Step Back"* (*Proletary*, No. 6), which spoke quite calmly of the new-*Iskra* group having made use of a printing-press, supplies, and funds in the name of the Party, but having refused to return Party property. The state *Iskra* has been reduced to by its irritation over this statement is to be seen in the language it has been using, which is reminiscent of the Bund's inimitable brand of vituperation. *Iskra* has courteously applied to us such terms as "filthy swab", "slanderous cowards", and so on and so forth. All this reminds one of the way Engels once characterised the polemic waged by a certain variety of *émigrés*: "Each word is like a chamber-pot, and not an empty one at that" (*Jedes Wort—ein Nachttopf und kein leerer*).[67] We have, of course, not forgotten the French saying, "Abuse is the argument of those who are wrong". We shall ask the unbiased reader calmly to pass judgement on the cause of all this fuss. The new-Iskrists have made no reply to a letter from the Central Committee asking them, after the Third Congress, to return Party property. They do not recognise the Third Congress or the Central Committee's turn towards the Bolsheviks. That is all so. However, the only conclusion to be drawn from such non-recognition is that, as the new-Iskrists see it, they should return not all Party property, but only part of it. This is so obvious that in its retort *Iskra* itself now speaks of "the possibility of dividing up all Party property". If that is the case, our dear oppo-

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54.—*Ed.*

nents, why could you not have replied to the Central Committee's letter in that vein? Otherwise, it is beyond doubt that, however energetic the expressions you have used, the Majority has rendered a full account of all its affairs by publishing the minutes of the Third Congress, while you have rendered no account to anybody concerning the use of Party property, have published no minutes at all, but have only used bad language. Consider in a moment of calm the impression such behaviour must produce on all thinking people.

Further, the Central Committee's turn towards the Congress is displeasing to *Iskra*. That is natural. But this turn is not the first to have taken place. A year ago, in August 1904, the Central Committee sided with the Minority. A year ago we stated in print and publicly that we did not recognise the legality of the Central Committee's actions. It may be asked: How did we then behave with respect to Party property? *We handed over the printing-press*, *stores*, *and funds to the Mensheviks*. *Iskra* may hurl as much abuse as it likes, but facts are facts. We rendered due account and turned the property over to our opponents wishing to fight in the Party spirit and to get a congress called. Our opponents have been steering clear of a congress and have rendered no account to anybody (except their own adherents, and even to them in private, for no minutes of the "Conference" were kept, in the first place, and in the second, nothing is known either of its agenda or of the scope of its powers, i.e., the degree in which its decisions are binding upon the Mensheviks themselves).

The struggle within our Party has ended in a split; it is now merely a struggle between two parties, one of which is in the throes of organisation-as-process. Today, looking back at the history of the struggle prior to the split, anybody (of course of those who *study* the history of their Party using the documents, and do not merely give ear to old wives' tales, in the way practised by many who come here from Russia)—anybody can clearly see the general nature of the struggle. The Majority, which has been accused of "formalism", bureaucratism, and so on, has surrendered *all* its formal privileges and bureaucratic institutions to its opponents—first the Central Organ's Editorial Board, then the

Party Council, and finally the Central Committee. The Congress is the only thing it has refused to give up. The outcome has been that the Bolsheviks have restored the Party (or rather, as the new-Iskrists naturally think, have created their own Party), founding *all* their Party institutions wholly on the voluntary consent of Party workers—first the Bureau of Majority Committees, then *Vperyod*, and, finally, the Third Party Congress. Our opponents, on the contrary, are holding on to their formal privileges and bureaucratic institutions given to them out of commiseration. Consider the following fact: have not Lenin and Plekhanov made them the gift of the Central Organ's Editorial Board? When it calls itself the Central Organ of the Party, *Proletary* bases its claim on the Third Congress decisions which are not recognised by the Mensheviks, but have been clearly, precisely, and definitely recognised by the Party Majority whose composition is known to all. For its part, *Iskra*, which styles itself "Central Organ of the Party", bases that claim on the decisions of the Second Congress, which today are recognised neither by the Bolsheviks (we have replaced them by the decisions of the Third Congress), *nor by the Mensheviks*!! That is the gist of the whole matter! After all, it was the Menshevik Conference that revoked the Rules of the Second Congress. It is the new-*Iskra* group *that is now clinging to a heading* rejected by its own adherents!

Even Plekhanov himself, who could never see eye to eye with the new-Iskrists in matters of principle, but has made countless personal concessions to them, launched more than his share of attacks against the Bolsheviks, for which the new-Iskrists have been bowing and scraping to him—even Plekhanov has declared that the Conference has dealt a death blow at the central institutions, and has preferred to wash his hands of the matter. As for the new-*Iskra* people, they go on calling themselves the "Central Organ", and rail against those who tell them that their Party stand is not merely wrong but downright indecent. The abusive language that has provided the occasion for this writing is the psychologically inevitable consequence of a dim realisation of that indecency. We shall remind the reader that even Mr. Struve, who has often voiced sympathy *in principle* with

Trotsky, Starover, Akimov, and Martynov, and with the new-*Iskra* trends in general and the new-*Iskra* Conference in particular—even Mr. Struve was in his time obliged to acknowledge that their stand is not quite a correct one, or rather quite an incorrect one (see *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 57).

We are well aware that the mass of Social-Democrats, especially the workers, are most dissatisfied with the split (but then, who can be pleased with it?), and are ready to look for a solution "*wherever possible*". We fully understand this frame of mind and have every respect for it, but we would warn all and sundry that a frame of mind is not enough. The formula "wherever possible" is worthless, for it lacks the chief thing—an understanding of the *means* of putting an end to the split. Bitter words, attempts to create a "third something", neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik, will not help matters, but will only introduce greater confusion. The example provided over the last two years by so powerful a personality as Plekhanov is a practical illustration of this. Let bitter words be resorted to by German Social-Democrats, who, like Karl Kautsky, have, in the main, learnt of the split in the Party from biased sources. Their ignorance may be pardoned, though their claims to judge things they know nothing of are, of course, unpardonable. Russian Social-Democrats must at last learn to despise those whose only recourse is to bitter words, who chop and change, hold forth on the subject of "peace", but reveal their impotence when it comes to doing something real for the cause of peace. The real path to peace and unity in the Party does not lie through hasty agreements, which will lead to new conflicts and to new and worse confusion, but through thorough and *factual ascertainment* of the tactical and organisational tendencies of both sides. In this respect we are most satisfied with the new-*Iskra* Conference, which has revealed the irreparable disintegration of the new-*Iskra* trend. Their tail-ism in questions of tactics has been smashed by the revolution, and their "organisation-as-process" has become a laughing-stock. They have been left, on the one hand, by Plekhanov, who has evidently been "enlightened" by the Conference not only with regard to its organisational significance but also with regard to adherence to principle on the part of the new-

Iskrists. On the other hand, they have been abandoned by Akimov, who has called the promises or "principles" of the St. Petersburg Mensheviks "*a hollow phrase*" (*Posledniye Izvestia*,[68] No. 235). The Party's Third Congress has rallied the ranks of one of the sides. The other side has been smashed by the Conference itself. It remains for us only to advise the "conciliators" to study the history of the split, examine the causes of the failure of Plekhanov's conciliation, and refrain from putting new wine into old bottles.

Proletary, No. 9,
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ORIGINAL VARIANT OF THE PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *WORKERS ON THE SPLIT IN THE PARTY*[69]

COVER: *The Voice of the Workers and the Split in the Party*

Published by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Contents:

I. Preface by the Editorial Board of *Proletary*.
II. Letter from an Odessa Worker.
III. Reply to a Letter from a Worker. By *Abramov*.
IV. Open Letter from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Organising Committee.

PREFACE

In No. 8 of *Proletary* we mentioned the forthcoming publication of a letter from an Odessa worker, who, in our opinion, has expressed the temper of a fairly large number of workers. In reply to this letter we are publishing, in the first place, an article by Comrade Abramov of the *Proletary* staff "Reply to a Letter from a Worker", and in the second place, "An Open Letter to the Organising Committee" from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.,[70] which was recently released in Russia and featured in No. 10 of *Proletary*.

As for us, we would emphasise only one thing—unification is essential. "Worker" is quite right in insisting on this. However, insistence is not sufficient; what is needed is the ability to bring about unification, the strength to achieve unification. It is not hard to stand aside and form a third

party or neutral group. That will not bring unification closer, but will only defer it; it will not simplify the present confused state of affairs, but will only make it more confused. The decisions made at the Conference of the Minority or new-Iskrists give no direct or clear answer to the question of *precisely how* unification can and should be achieved. The decisions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. provide that answer in the shape of the Party Rules, which fully guarantee the Minority's rights. It would be ridiculous to consider that answer infallible or ideal. But anyone who would not merely talk of unification but really work for its achievement through effective measures and proposals should not limit himself to reproaches and reproofs, should not increase the split by forming a third party, but should set about preparing his answer to the question of the conditions and forms of unification. That is a far more difficult matter than the preaching of peace and love, but then it is far more useful.

Editorial Board of "Proletary"

Written in July 1905

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Published according to the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *WORKERS ON THE SPLIT IN THE PARTY*

When, in *Proletary* (No. 8), we promised to publish in full a letter signed "A Worker, One of Many", we had no idea who he was. We do know that the ideas expressed by him are really shared by many workers, and this was sufficient reason for us to decide to publish his letter. Now we learn from *Iskra*, No. 105 that the author of the letter "formerly considered himself one of the Minority", that "he had for a long time past been a bitter enemy of the so-called Majority". So much the better. So much more valuable to us is this former Menshevik's admission that well-meant intentions as to "proletarian initiative" were just so many "fine words"; so much more precious is his outright condemnation of the intellectual's "Manilovism".[71] This is an indubitable sign that the Mensheviks' demagogy, their indiscriminate promises of boons of every description—autonomy, initiative, democracy, etc.—are, as should have been expected, beginning to weary class-conscious workers and evoke their legitimate distrust and criticism.

Another highly characteristic fact, and one which we are sure will turn many more Menshevik workers into "former Mensheviks", is that *Iskra* has seen in this letter from "Worker" a "fist from below"! This is a fact that is very much worth considering.

What has a "fist" to do with it anyway? Does this "dreadful word", which the Mensheviks have worked almost to death, denote certain definite organisational concepts, or does it simply express the intellectual's annoyance at, or outburst against, any strong organisation which would hold intellectual caprices in check?

What does the author of the letter want? He wants the split to be closed. Does *Iskra* sympathise with this aim? Yes, it states so plainly. Does it consider that this can be achieved right now? Yes, it does, for it declares: "Differences (in tactics) are not so great as to justify a split."

That being the case, why does *Iskra* again bring up the tactical differences in its reply to "Worker", mentioning even the "Plan of the Zemstvo Campaign" which was buried in the *Iskra* bulletins published "for Party members only" and in Plekhanov's "confidential" pamphlet? What is the point of this? "Worker" does not deny the necessity of polemics and disputes, nor do the Bolsheviks deny it! And the Party Rules adopted at the Third Congress clearly establish the right of every committee to publish literature. After all, the question revolves around what should be done for tactical disagreements not to lead to a split, i.e., to a break in the organisational ties. Why then does *Iskra evade* this clearly presented question, by dragging in irrelevant arguments about tactical differences? Is it not, perhaps, because "Worker" would rule out any irrelevant chatter that they speak of his "fist"?

A mere desire to put an end to the split is not sufficient to end it. It is necessary to know *how* to do it. Putting an end to the split means merging in a *single* organisation. And whoever really wants to bring the split speedily to an end must not confine himself to complaints, reproaches, recriminations, exclamations, and declamations about the split (as is done by "Worker" and also by Plekhanov, for instance, since he has found himself in the Marsh)—he must immediately start *developing* the type of that common and united organisation.

The weak point in the letter from "Worker" is that the author merely *bewails* the split, but makes no definite proposals for *specific* organisational measures to close it. Instead of remedying this defect, *Iskra aggravates* it by yelling in "panic": "A fist?", at the mere *idea* voiced by "Worker" concerning obligatory recognition of common organisational rules!! The split is not justified by the differences, says "Worker". That is true, *Iskra* agrees. This, "Worker" continues, means that it is now necessary to spin a rope so strong (fie, for shame! What grossly mechanical terms I am using!

What a "fistic" idea! But bear up a moment, comrades of *Iskra*, don't fall into a swoon at the idea of "nooses" and other such horrors!) that it would firmly bind both sections and keep them tied together *despite* tactical differences.

In reply to this *Iskra* has another fit of hysterics, and screams: "A fist!"

We, on our part, say in reply: You are right, Comrade Worker! You reason in a business-like way. A new, strong rope is needed. But go further, take the next step: begin to consider *what sort* of rope this should be, *what exactly this common* organisation, which is to be *obligatory* (help! the "fist" again!) upon both sections, should be like.

Comrade Worker did not go far *enough* in specifying his *organisational* proposals (because the question of closing the split is an exclusively organisational question, *provided both sides* acknowledge that tactical differences do not justify a split!); *Iskra*, however, finds that he went too far, so far, indeed, that it has again raised the cry about a fist!!

Once more we ask our readers: In point of fact, what is the real meaning of this notorious "fist", which, one might say, is scaring the new *Iskra* out of its wits? Does this fist express any definite organisational ideas, or is it merely the intellectual's blind and ridiculous fear of *any kind* of "ties" imposed by any organisation that is *obligatory* upon all members of the Party?

We leave it to the class-conscious workers to decide this question for themselves, and shall proceed.

The real difficulty in a merger, assuming both sides sincerely desire it, is the following. In the first place, organisational standards, Party Rules absolutely binding on all, should be laid down; secondly, all parallel, competing local and central Party organisations and institutions should be merged.

So far *only* the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. has attempted to solve the first of these problems, by establishing rules providing constitutional guarantees for the rights of any minority. The Third Congress has, so to say, provided a place in the Party for every minority that accepts the Party programme, tactics, and discipline of organisation. The Bolsheviks have taken care to provide the Mensheviks as well with a definite place in a united Party. We cannot say

the same of the Mensheviks: their rules provide for no constitutional guarantees whatever of the rights of any minority in the Party.

It goes without saying that no Bolshevik regards the Rules adopted by the Third Congress as ideal or infallible. Whoever thinks the Rules have to be changed should come forward with a draft of clear-cut amendments—this would be a *practical step* towards closing the split; it would be something more than mere complaints and recriminations.

We may, perhaps, be asked, why we have not ourselves started doing this with regard to the Rules adopted by the "Conference". Our answer is that we have started to do so: see *Proletary*, No. 6, "A Third Step Back".* We are prepared to repeat the *fundamental principles of organisation*, recognition of which is, in our opinion, necessary for a merger: 1) Submission of the minority to the majority (not to be confused with the "Minority" and the "Majority" in quotation marks! Here we deal with the principle of Party organisation in general, not with the fusion of the "Minority" with the "Majority", which we shall speak of later. It is possible, speaking in the abstract, to visualise the merger between an equal number of both "Mensheviks" and "Bolsheviks", but even such a merger is *impossible* unless the submission of the minority to the majority is recognised *in principle and as obligatory*). 2) The congress, i.e., an assembly of elected delegates from all duly authorised organisations must be the Party's supreme organ, moreover, any decision by these elected delegates must be final (this is the principle of democratic representation, as opposed to the principle of consultative conferences whose decisions are submitted to the organisations for endorsement, i.e., a plebiscite). 3) Elections to the Party's central body (or bodies) must be by direct vote and must be held at a congress. Elections outside a congress, two-stage elections, etc., are impermissible. 4) All Party publications, both local and central, must be completely subordinate to both the Party Congress and the relevant central or local organisation of the Party. Existence of Party publications organisationally unconnected with the Party is impermissible. 5) There must be an

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54.—*Ed.*

absolutely clear definition of what membership of the Party implies. 6) In like manner, the rights of any Party minority must also be clearly defined in the Party Rules.

Such, in our opinion, are the absolutely indispensable organisational principles, without recognition of which no merger is possible. We should like to hear the opinion of "A Worker, One of Many" in the matter, and, in general, of all in favour of fusion.

We may be asked: What about the question of the committees' attitude towards provincial organisations? What about the elective principle? Our reply is that no fundamental principles of organisation are involved in this matter, once the absolute application of the elective principle is not suggested. That is something the Mensheviks have not suggested. In conditions of political liberty the elective principle will be necessary, but, for the present, even the Rules adopted by the "Conference" have not introduced it for the committees. One definition or another of the rights and powers of the provincial organisations is not a question of principle (assuming, of course, that what is said is actually carried out, that there is no indulgence in demagogy and merely "fine words"). The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. tried to give an exact definition of what is meant by committees and provincial organisations, a definition of the relations between them. Any proposals for certain changes, amendments, or deletions would be quite calmly discussed by any Bolshevik. So far as I am aware, there are no "intransigents" in our midst on any point of the question, and the minutes of the Third Congress will bear out this assertion.

The next and probably no less difficult question is how to merge all parallel organisations. In conditions of political liberty this would be easy, since we would have Party organisations with a certain number of definitely known members. With a secret organisation it is different. Establishment of membership is all the more difficult, the more lightly membership is sometimes understood, and, the more often recourse is made to demagogy, to fictitious enrolment in the Party of people who are not class-conscious. We think that the comrades working on the spot and well acquainted with the state of affairs should have the final say on how these difficulties are to be overcome. The temporary

absence of members of organisations, who are "on holiday" in prison, are in exile, or abroad, is another impediment that should be taken into account. Then there is, of course, the considerable difficulty of merging the central bodies. Without a single guiding centre, without a single central press organ, real unity of the Party is impossible. In this respect the question stands as follows: either the class-conscious workers, ignoring all plaints about fists, will succeed in forcing the actual minority in the Party to advocate their views, without disorganising the work, in the various bodies of the local committees, at conferences, congresses, meetings, etc.; or the class-conscious Social-Democratic workers will not be able to cope with this task at present (generally speaking, they will undoubtedly and inevitably manage to cope with it: this is vouched for by the entire labour movement of Russia)—and in that event only agreements, and not fusion, will be possible between rival centres and rival organs.

In conclusion, we shall repeat: it is not by means of complaints and accusations, not by forming new, third parties or groups, circles, etc. (similar to the one Plekhanov has now founded with his new Party publishing organisation[72] outside the Party), that Comrade Worker and those who share his views must strive to achieve their aims. The formation of a third party or new groups will only complicate and confuse matters. Preparation of concrete terms of fusion must be started: when all Party groups and organisations, all class-conscious workers, set about this, they will undoubtedly be able to work out reasonable terms, and not only work them out, but force the Party leaders (disregarding all plaints about fists) to submit to these terms.

In addition to Comrade Worker's letter we are publishing an Open Letter from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Organising Committee, as a first step towards a practical solution of the problem of a possible closing of the split.

Editorial Board of "Proletary"

July 1905

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WHILE THE PROLETARIAT IS DOING THE FIGHTING THE BOURGEOISIE IS STEALING TOWARDS POWER

In war-time the diplomats stand idle, but when hostilities are over they are very much in the picture, casting up the results, making out the bills, and acting the honest broker.

Something of the kind is under way in the Russian revolution as well. During the armed clashes between the people and the forces of autocracy, the liberal bourgeois lie low; they are against violence either from above or from below, and are opposed both to the authorities' acts of despotism and to mob anarchy. It is only when the fighting is over that they appear on the scene, their political decisions clearly reflecting the change in the political situation brought about by the fighting. After January 9 the liberal bourgeoisie turned "pink"; it has now begun to go "red" following the Odessa events, which (in connection with events in the Caucasus, Poland, etc.) point to a steep rise in the people's insurrection against the autocracy during six months of revolution.

Highly instructive in this respect are three recent liberal congresses. The most conservative of them was that of the merchants and manufacturers, who are most trusted by the autocracy and are undisturbed by the police. They criticise and condemn the Bulygin scheme and demand a constitution, but, as far as we can judge from the incomplete information available, they do not even raise the question of boycotting the Bulygin elections. The most radical of the three was a delegate Congress of the Union of Unions[73]

held in secret within a stone's throw of St. Petersburg, but on non-Russian soil—in Finland. Congress members are said to have taken the precaution of concealing their papers, police searches at the border yielding no results. By a majority vote (though there seems to have been a sizable minority) this Congress approved a thorough and determined boycott of the Bulygin elections and called for a widespread campaign for universal suffrage.

In the middle stood the most "influential", fanfared, and vociferous of the three, the Zemstvo and Municipal Congress, which enjoyed almost legal status. The police drew up a protocol just as a matter of form, their demand that the Congress break up merely evoking smiles. But newspapers that began to report the Congress were either suspended (*Slovo*)[74] or cautioned (*Russkiye Vedomosti*). According to Mr. Pyotr Dolgorukov's concluding address as reported in *The Times*, the Congress was attended by 216 delegates. Reports on its proceedings were cabled to all parts of the world by foreign correspondents. No opinion whatever was expressed on the main political issue—a boycott of the Bulygin "constitution". According to British newspapers, the majority stood for a boycott, but the Organising Committee was against it. A compromise was reached, leaving the question open pending publication of the Bulygin scheme, after which a new congress was to be convened by telegraph. Naturally, the Bulygin scheme was strongly condemned by the Congress, which adopted the *Osvobozhdeniye* draft constitution (providing for a monarchy and a two-chamber system), rejected an appeal to the tsar, and decided to "appeal to the people".

We are not yet in possession of the latter appeal. According to the foreign press, it amounts to a survey, couched in moderate terms, of events since the November Zemstvo Congress, as well as a list of facts revealing the government's unconscionable procrastination, its broken promises, and cynical flouting of the demands of public opinion. Besides an appeal to the people, an almost unanimous resolution was passed calling for resistance to the government's unjust and arbitrary acts. "In view of the arbitrary acts of the Administration and the constant violation of the rights of the public," the resolution declares, "the Congress deems it incumbent upon all to defend the natural rights of man by

peaceful means, including resistance to the acts of the authorities violating these rights, although such acts may be based on the letter of the law." (We quote from *The Times*.)

So our liberal bourgeoisie has beyond doubt taken a step to the left. The revolution marches on—the bourgeois democrats hobble along in the rear. The true nature of this democracy, as *bourgeois* democracy, representing the propertied classes' interests and inconsistently and self-interestedly defending the cause of freedom, is being revealed ever more clearly, even though bourgeois democracy is going "red" and sometimes attempts to use "almost revolutionary" language.

Indeed, postponement of a decision on the boycott of the Bulygin constitution can denote nothing but a desire to go on haggling with the autocracy, a lack of self-confidence within the majority which seemed to emerge in favour of a boycott, and a tacit admission that, while asking for nothing short of a constitution, the landowners and the merchants would, probably, agree to something less. Even if a congress of liberal bourgeois does not venture to break at once with the autocracy and the Bulygin farce, what can be expected of that congress of all and sundry bourgeois which is to be styled the Bulygin "Duma" and will be elected (if ever elected it will be!) under every kind of pressure from the autocratic government?

That is exactly how the autocratic government looks upon this act of the liberals, which it considers merely an episode in the bourgeoisie's chaffering. On the one hand, the autocracy, in view of the liberals' discontent, is "adding to" its promises—the Bulygin scheme, according to reports in the foreign press, is to include a number of new "liberal" changes. On the other hand, the autocracy is replying to Zemstvo discontent with a new threat: characteristic in this respect is a *Times* report, which says that Bulygin and Goremykin propose, as a measure against Zemstvo "radicalism", to stir up the peasants against "the quality" by promising them extra land in the name of the tsar, and holding a "people's" plebiscite (with the aid of the Rural Superintendents[75]), on the question of whether or not the elections should be held on a social-estate basis. This report is, of course, just a rumour set afloat, probably with a definite purpose,

but there can be no doubt that the government is not afraid to resort to the grossest, most brutal, and most unbridled demagogy; nor is it afraid of an uprising by "masses on the rampage" and the dregs of society, while the liberals are afraid of the people rising up against their oppressors, against the heroes of plunder, looting, and bashi-bazouk atrocities. The government has long been shedding blood in a way and on a scale that have no precedent, yet the liberals respond by saying they want to prevent bloodshed! After a reply of this kind, is not any hired thug entitled to despise them as bourgeois hagglers? After this, is it not ridiculous to adopt a resolution calling for an appeal to the people and recognising "peaceful resistance" to violence and arbitrary acts? The government is distributing arms right and left, and bribing all comers to beat up and massacre Jews, "democrats", Armenians, Poles, and so on. But our "democrats" still think that campaigning for "peaceful resistance" is a "revolutionary" step!

In No. 73 of *Osvobozhdeniye*, which we have just received, Mr. Struve is ireful against Mr. Suvorin[76] for the latter's condescendingly patting Mr. Ivan Petrunkevich on the back and suggesting that such liberals should be mollified with posts in ministries and government departments. Mr. Struve is indignant, for it is precisely Mr. Petrunkevich and his Zemstvo supporters ("who, before history and the nation, have committed themselves to a programme"—What kind of programme? Where did they commit themselves?) that he has designated for ministerial posts in some future Cabinet to be formed by the Constitutional-Democratic Party. We, however, hold that the way in which the Petrunkeviches behaved both at their reception by the tsar and at the Zemstvo Congress of July 6 (19) has given even the Suvorins good reason to despise such "democrats". "Every sincere and thinking liberal in Russia demands a revolution," Mr. Struve writes. For our part we shall add that if in July 1905 this "demand for a revolution" is voiced in a resolution on peaceable methods of resistance then the Suvorins have every right to despise and sneer at such a "demand" and at such "revolutionaries".

Mr. Struve will, probably, retort that events which have until now swung our liberals to the left will in due course

carry them farther still. Here is what he has written in the selfsame No. 73:

"Conditions for the army's physical intervention in the political struggle will actually be provided only when the autocratic monarchy clashes with a nation organised through popular representation. The army will then have to choose between the government and the nation, and the choice will not be difficult or mistaken."

This peaceful idyll looks very much like putting revolution off until the Greek calends.[77] Who is to organise the nation in a popular representation? The autocracy? But the latter consents to organise only the Bulygin Duma, which you yourselves are protesting against and refuse to recognise as popular representation! Or, perhaps, the "nation" will itself organise representation of the people? If so, why is it that the liberals are dead set against a provisional revolutionary government, which can rely only on a revolutionary army? Why is it that, while at their congress they spoke in the name of the people, the liberals are taking no step that would signify the nation being organised in a popular representation? If, gentlemen, you really represent the people and not the bourgeoisie which betrays the interests of the people in the revolution, why don't you appeal to the army? Why don't you announce a break with the autocratic monarchy? Why do you shut your eyes to the inevitability of a decisive struggle between the army of revolution and the army of tsarism?

The reason is that you are afraid of the revolutionary people; you address them in trite words, while in actual fact you reckon and haggle with the autocracy. Additional proof of that is provided by the talks held by Mr. Golovin, Chairman of the Zemstvo Congress's Organising Committee, with Kozlov, Governor General of Moscow. Mr. Golovin assured Kozlov that rumours of any intent to turn the Congress into a constituent assembly were absurd. What does that mean? It means in effect that a representative of organised bourgeois democracy gave his pledge to a representative of the autocracy that bourgeois democracy has no intention of breaking with the autocracy! Only political tyros will fail to realise that an undertaking not to declare the Congress a constituent assembly was tantamount to promising to refrain

from all genuinely revolutionary measures: Kozlov, of course, shied not at the words "constituent assembly" but at *acts* that could exacerbate the conflict and lead to the people and the army beginning a determined struggle against tsarism. Is it not political hypocrisy for you to call yourselves revolutionaries, talk of appealing to the people and placing no more reliance in the tsar, while in actual fact you reassure the tsar's servants as to your intentions?

Oh, those florid liberal phrases! How many were uttered at the Congress by Mr. Petrunkevich, leader of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party! Let us see what commitments to "history and the nation" he has assumed. The source is *The Times*.

Mr. de Roberti spoke in favour of petitioning the tsar. This was opposed by Petrunkevich, Novosiltsev, Shakhovskoi, and Rodichev. A ballot produced only six votes for a petition. Mr. Petrunkevich had said that "when they went to Peterhof on June 6 (19), they still hoped the tsar would understand the terrible dangers of the situation and do something to avert them. All hope in that direction must be abandoned. There remained only one issue. Till now they had hoped for reform from above, but henceforth their only hope was in the people. (*Loud applause.*) They must tell them the truth in plain and homely words. The inability and impotence of the government had promoted revolution. That was a fact which they all had to recognise. Their duty was to use every effort to prevent the accompaniment of bloodshed. Many of them had devoted long years to the service of their countrymen; they must go boldly to the people, no longer to the tsar." On the following day Mr. Petrunkevich continued: "We must break out of the narrow confines of our activities and go to the peasant. Till now we hoped for reforms from above, but, while we waited, time was doing its work. Expedited by the government revolution has overtaken us. Yesterday two of our members were so much frightened by the word revolution that they left the Congress, but we must face the situation manfully. We cannot wait with folded arms. The objection has been raised that any appeal to the nation by the Zemstvos and Municipal Councils will amount to agitation that stirs up unrest. But does calm reign in the villages? No, unrest already exists there, and of the worst kind.

We cannot keep the storm in check, but we must at least try to avert too much turmoil. We must tell the people that it is useless to destroy factories and estates. We cannot regard such destruction as mere vandalism: it is the peasants' blind and ignorant way of remedying an evil which they instinctively feel but are unable to understand. The authorities may reply with the knout. It is nevertheless our duty to go to the people. We should have done that earlier. The Zemstvos have been in existence for forty years without coming into close and intimate contact with the peasants. Let us lose no time in rectifying this error. We must tell the peasant that we stand with him."

Excellent, Mr. Petrunkevich! You stand with the peasants, with the people; you recognise the revolution as a fact, and have abandoned all hope in the tsar.... Good luck to you, gentlemen! Only ... only, what exactly do you mean? You say you are not with the tsar, but with the people, *so therefore* you promise Governor General Kozlov that the Congress will not act as a constituent assembly, i.e., as a body that is genuinely and actually representative of the people. You recognise the revolution, *so therefore* you reply with peaceful methods of resistance to the atrocities, killings, and pillage perpetrated by the government's servants. You go to the peasant and stand with the peasant, *so therefore* you confine yourselves to a most vague programme, whose only promise is that the peasants may *buy back* land, given the landlords' consent. You are not with the tsar, but with the people, *so therefore* you accept a draft constitution which, in the first place, provides for a monarchy and the tsar's control of the army and the bureaucracy, and, in the second place, guarantees in advance the political supremacy of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie through an upper chamber.*

The liberal bourgeoisie is turning to the people. That is true. It has been forced to do so, for without the people it is powerless to fight the autocracy. But it is also afraid of the revolutionary people; it does not turn to the latter as a representative of their interests, or as a new and ardent

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* See the leaflet "Three Constitutions" published by our newspaper. (See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 557-58.—*Ed.*)

comrade-in-arms, but as a chafferer, a stockjobber, who dashes from one belligerent to the other. Today it is with the tsar and implores him on behalf of the "people" to grant a monarchist constitution, at the same time cravenly renouncing the people, "unrest", "sedition", and revolution. On the morrow it threatens the tsar at its congress, threatens him with a monarchist constitution, and with peaceable resistance to his bayonets. And yet, gentlemen, you are surprised that the tsar's servants have taken the measure of your craven, petty, double-dealing souls. You are afraid to remain without a tsar, but the tsar is not afraid to remain without you. You are afraid of a decisive struggle; the tsar is not afraid of that, but wants it; he is himself provoking and commencing the struggle; he wants a test of strength before he yields. It is quite natural for the tsar to despise you. It is quite natural for his contempt to be conveyed to you by his lackeys, the Suvorins, who patronisingly pat your Mr. Petrunkevich on the back. You deserve this contempt, for you are not fighting on the people's side, but are only stealing towards power behind the backs of the revolutionary people.

On occasions foreign correspondents and bourgeois publicists grasp the gist of the matter very aptly, although their rendering is somewhat peculiar. M. Gaston Leroux has undertaken to present the Zemstvo views in *Matin*[78]: "There is disorder above and disorder below; we alone are people of order," he writes. That, indeed, is what the Zemstvos think. Translated into plain Russian that means: Both above and below, there are people ready to do the fighting, but as for us, we are honest brokers—we are stealing towards power. We are waiting in the hope that our March 18 will also come round, that the people will at least once defeat the government in street fighting, and that, like the German liberal bourgeoisie, we shall get an opportunity to take over power, following the first victory of the people. Then, after becoming a force against the autocracy, we shall turn against the revolutionary people and strike a deal with the tsar, against the people. Our draft constitution is a ready-made programme of such a deal.

Quite a skilful calculation! One has sometimes to say of the revolutionary people that which the Romans said of

Hannibal: "You know how to win victories, but you don't know how to profit by them." A victorious rising will not yet be a victory of the people unless it leads to a revolutionary upheaval, to the complete overthrow of the autocracy, to the ousting of the inconsistent and selfish bourgeoisie, and to a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Le Temps, organ of the French conservative bourgeoisie, has straightforwardly advised the Zemstvos to put a speedy end to the conflict by *coming to terms* with the tsar (editorial of July 24, New Style). Reforms, it says, are impossible without a union of moral force and material force. Only the government has material force. The Zemstvos are a moral force.

This is an excellent rendering of bourgeois views—and excellent confirmation of our analysis of Zemstvo policy. The bourgeois has forgotten a petty detail, the people, the scores of millions of workers and peasants, whose labour creates all the bourgeoisie's wealth, and who are fighting for the liberty they need as they do light or air. The bourgeois has been entitled to forget them, inasmuch as they have not yet proved their "material force" by defeating the government. No major historical issue has ever been decided otherwise than by "material force", and the tsarist autocracy, we repeat, is itself starting the struggle by challenging the people to a test of strength.

The French bourgeoisie is advising the Russian bourgeoisie to come speedily to terms with the tsar. It is afraid, albeit vicariously, of a decisive struggle. If the people are victorious it remains to be seen whether they will allow the Petrunkeviches to take power, although the latter are stealing towards it. It cannot be gauged in advance how decisive the victory will be and what consequences it will have—and this fully accounts for the bourgeoisie's timidity.

All over Russia the proletariat is preparing for the decisive struggle. It is marshalling its forces; it learns and gains strength after each new clash; past encounters have all ended in failure, but have invariably led to fresh and stronger attacks. The proletariat is marching to victory and rousing the peasantry to follow its leadership. Relying on the peasantry it will paralyse the instability and

treachery of the bourgeoisie, brush aside bourgeois bidders for power, crush the autocracy by force, and eradicate from Russian life all traces of the accursed system of serf-ownership. When that time comes we shall win for the people not a monarchist constitution, which secures political privileges for the bourgeoisie—no, we shall win for Russia a republic, with full liberty for all oppressed nationalities, for the peasants and the workers. We shall then use all the revolutionary energy of the proletariat for the boldest and most far-reaching struggle for socialism, for the complete emancipation of all toilers from exploitation of any kind.

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THE BOYCOTT OF THE BULYGIN DUMA, AND INSURRECTION

At present the political situation in Russia is as follows: the Bulygin Duma may soon be convened—a consultative assembly of representatives of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, elected under the supervision and with the assistance of the autocratic government's servants on the basis of an electoral system so indirect, so blatantly based on property and social-estate qualifications, that it is sheer mockery of the idea of popular representation. What should our attitude towards this Duma be? The liberal democrats give two replies to this question. The Left wing, represented by the "Union of Unions"—mostly representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia—is in favour of boycotting this Duma, of abstaining from participation in the elections, and of taking advantage of the opportunity for increased agitation for a democratic constitution on the basis of universal suffrage. The Right wing, as represented by the Zemstvo and Municipal Congress of July, or, to be more correct, by a certain section of that Congress, is opposed to a boycott and favours participation in the elections and getting as many of its candidates as possible elected to the Duma. True, the Congress has not yet passed any resolution on this question and has postponed the matter until the next Congress which is to be convened by telegraph following promulgation of the Bulygin "constitution". However, the opinion of liberal democracy's Right wing has already taken shape.

Revolutionary democracy, i.e., in the main, the proletariat, and Social-Democracy, the vehicle of its conscious expression, is, by and large, fully in favour of insurrection.

This difference in tactics has been correctly appraised by *Osvobozhdeniye*, organ of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. Its latest issue (No. 74), on the one hand roundly condemns "open advocacy of insurrection" as "insane and criminal"; on the other hand it criticises the idea of a boycott as "fruitless for practical purposes" and expresses the conviction that not only the Zemstvo section of the Constitutional-"Democratic" (read: Monarchist) Party but the Union of Unions, too, will "pass their state examination", i.e., abandon the idea of a boycott.

The question arises: what attitude should the party of the class-conscious proletariat take towards the idea of a boycott, and what tactical slogan should it bring into the foreground for the masses of the people? For a reply to this question we must first of all call to mind the essence and radical significance of the Bulygin "constitution". It is, in fact, tsarism's deal with the landlords and big bourgeoisie, who, in return for innocent, pseudo-constitutional sops that are quite innocuous to the autocracy, are to be gradually drawn away from the revolution, i.e., from the fighting people, and reconciled with the autocracy. The possibility of such a deal cannot be doubted, since all our Constitutional-"Democratic" Party is eager to preserve the monarchy and the upper chamber (i.e., in advance to secure for the moneyed "upper ten thousand" political privileges and political domination in the country's system of state). Moreover, such a deal is sooner or later inevitable in one form or another, at least with a section of the bourgeoisie, for it is prescribed by the very class position of the bourgeoisie in the capitalist system. The only question is when and how this deal will take place. The task confronting the party of the proletariat is to delay conclusion of this deal for as long as possible, to split up the bourgeoisie as much as possible, to derive from the bourgeoisie's temporary appeals to the people the greatest possible advantage for the revolution, and meanwhile to prepare the forces of the revolutionary people (the proletariat and the peasantry) for the forcible overthrow of the autocracy and for the alienation, the neutralisation of the treacherous bourgeoisie.

In fact, the gist of the bourgeoisie's political position is, as we have frequently pointed out, that it stands between

the tsar and the people, and would play the part of the "honest broker" and steal into power behind the back of the militant people. That is why the bourgeoisie appeals to the tsar one day, and to the people the next, making "serious" and "business-like" proposals for a political deal to the former, and addressing empty phrases about liberty (Mr. I. Petrunkevich's speeches at the July Congress) to the latter. It is to our advantage that the bourgeoisie should appeal to the people, for by doing so it provides material that will help to rouse and enlighten politically those huge backward masses of people to reach whom through Social-Democratic agitation would be sheer utopianism for the time being. Let the bourgeoisie stir up those that are most backward; let it break the soil here and there; we shall untiringly sow the seeds of Social-Democracy in that soil. Everywhere in the West, in its struggle against autocracy the bourgeoisie was compelled to rouse the people's political consciousness, while at the same time striving to sow the seeds of bourgeois theories among the working class. It is for us to take advantage of the bourgeoisie's work of destroying the autocracy and systematically enlighten the working class concerning its socialist aims and the irreconcilable antagonism between its interests and those of the bourgeoisie.

Hence it is clear that our tactics at present should first of all consist in support for the idea of a boycott. The very question of a boycott lies within the bounds of bourgeois democracy. The working class is not directly interested in it, but it is definitely interested in supporting that section of bourgeois democracy which is more revolutionary; it is interested in extending and intensifying political agitation. A boycott of the Duma means a more vigorous appeal to the people by the bourgeoisie, a development of its agitation, a greater number of opportunities for our agitation, and a more intense political crisis, which is the source of the revolutionary movement. The participation of the liberal bourgeoisie in the Duma means a slackening in its agitation at the present time, its appealing more to the tsar than to the people, and the approach of a counter-revolutionary deal between the tsar and the bourgeoisie.

Even if it is not prevented from meeting, the Bulygin Duma must of necessity give rise to political conflicts that

the proletariat should not fail to take advantage of—but that is a matter for the future. It would be ridiculous to renounce utilising this bourgeois-bureaucratic Duma for purposes of agitation and struggle, but at the moment that is not the point. At present the Left wing of bourgeois democracy itself has raised the issue of waging a direct and immediate struggle against the Duma by means of a boycott, and we must exert all our efforts to support this more determined onslaught. We must take the bourgeois democrats, the *Osvobozhdeniye* people, at their word, give the widest publicity to their "Petrunkevich-like" phrases about an appeal to the people, expose them to the people, and show that the first and least real test of these phrases was the question of whether we should boycott the Duma (i.e., turn in protest to the people) or accept the Duma (i.e., abstain from protesting, go once more to the tsar, and accept this travesty of popular representation).

Secondly, we must exert every effort to make the boycott of real use in extending and intensifying agitation, so that it shall not be reduced to mere passive abstention from voting. If we are not mistaken this idea is already fairly widespread among the comrades working in Russia, who express it in the words: an *active* boycott. As distinct from passive abstention, an active boycott should imply increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth. It goes without saying that to further agitation and struggle in this connection, temporary agreements with various groups of revolutionary bourgeois democrats, generally permitted by a number of our Party resolutions, are especially expedient. But here we must, on the one hand, steadfastly preserve the class individuality of the party of the proletariat, and must not for a single moment abandon our Social-Democratic criticism of our bourgeois allies; on the other hand, we should be failing in our duty as the party of the advanced class if in our agitation we failed to produce an advanced revolutionary slogan at the present stage of the democratic revolution.

That is our third direct and immediate political task. As we have already said, "an active boycott" means agitation,

recruiting, organising revolutionary forces on a larger scale, with redoubled energy, and bringing redoubled pressure to bear. Such work, however, is unthinkable without a clear, precise, and immediate slogan. Only an armed uprising can be that slogan. The government's convocation of a crudely faked "popular" representative body provides excellent opportunities for agitation for a truly popular representative body, for making the broadest masses of the people understand that at present (after the tsar's frauds and his mockery of the people) only a provisional revolutionary government can convene a truly representative body, and that to establish such a government the victory of an insurrection and the actual overthrow of tsarist rule are necessary. It would be hard to imagine a better time for widespread agitation for an uprising and in order to conduct that agitation full clarity regarding the programme of a provisional revolutionary government is also necessary. This programme should consist of the *six* points which we have indicated previously (see *Proletary*, No. 7, "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government"*): 1) convocation of a popular constituent assembly; 2) arming of the people; 3) political freedom—the immediate repeal of all laws that contradict it; 4) complete cultural and political freedom for all oppressed and disfranchised nationalities—the Russian people cannot win liberty for themselves without fighting for the liberty of the other nationalities; 5) an eight-hour working day; 6) the establishment of peasant committees for the support and implementation of all democratic reforms, among them agrarian reforms, up to and including the confiscation of the landlords' land.

To sum up: the most energetic support for the idea of a boycott; exposure of the Right wing of bourgeois democracy, which rejects the boycott, as traitors; making the boycott an active one, i.e., building up a most widespread agitation; advocating an insurrection and calling for the immediate organisation of combat squads and contingents of a revolutionary army for the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government; spreading and popularising the fundamental and absolutely

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 566-67.—*Ed.*

obligatory programme of this provisional revolutionary government, a programme which is to serve as the banner of the uprising and as a model for all future repetitions of the Odessa events.

Such should be the tactics of the party of the class-conscious proletariat. In order to make this tactics perfectly clear and to achieve unity we must also deal with *Iskra*'s tactics. It is set forth in No. 106 of that paper in an article entitled "Defence or Attack". We shall not take up the minor and partial differences, which will dissolve at the first attempts to take action; we shall deal only with the fundamental difference. While quite correctly condemning a passive boycott, the *Iskra* contraposes to it the idea of the immediate "organisation of revolutionary self-government bodies", as a "possible prologue to an uprising". In *Iskra*'s opinion we must "seize the right to carry on agitation in the election campaign by establishing workers' agitation committees". These committees "must set themselves the aim of organising popular elections of revolutionary deputies by going outside the 'legal' limits which will be established by Ministerial Bills", we must "cover the country with a network of revolutionary self-government bodies".

Such a slogan is absolutely useless. Viewed in the light of the political tasks in general it is a jumble, while in the light of the immediate political situation it brings grist to the mill of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend. The organisation of revolutionary self-government, the election of their own deputies by the people is not the *prologue* to an uprising, but its *epilogue*. To attempt to bring about this organisation now, before an uprising and apart from an uprising, means setting oneself absurd aims and causing confusion in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat. It is first of all necessary to win the victory in an uprising (if only in a single city) and to establish a provisional revolutionary government, so that the latter, as the organ of the uprising and the recognised leader of the revolutionary people, should be able to get down to the organisation of revolutionary self-government. To obscure the slogan of insurrection or relegate it into the background by proposing a slogan demanding the organisation of a revolutionary self-government is something like giving advice that the fly should first be caught and

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then stuck on the fly-paper. If during the celebrated Odessa events our Odessa comrades had been advised to organise not a revolutionary army, but the election of deputies by the people of Odessa as a prologue to an uprising, those comrades would undoubtedly have laughed such advice to scorn. *Iskra* is repeating the mistake made by the Economists, who wished to see in the "struggle for rights" a prologue to the struggle against the autocracy. *Iskra* is reverting to the misadventure of the unfortunate "plan of the Zemstvo campaign", which obscured the slogan of insurrection with the theory of a "higher type of demonstration".

This is not the place to dwell on the origin of *Iskra*'s tactical blunder. We shall refer the interested reader to N. Lenin's pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. It is more important here to point out how the slogan of the new *Iskra* lapses into that of *Osvobozhdeniye*. In actual practice attempts to organise popular elections of deputies before the uprising is victorious would only play into the hands of the *Osvobozhdeniye* people with the result that the Social-Democrats would be trailing behind them. Until replaced by a provisional revolutionary government the autocracy will not permit the workers and the people to conduct any elections that can in any way be called popular (and Social-Democrats will not agree to a travesty of "popular" elections under the autocracy); but the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, Zemstvo members and the municipal councillors will conduct elections and blatantly pass them off as "popular", and as an expression of "revolutionary self-government". The line now taken by the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie consists in trying to avert an uprising, compel the autocracy to recognise the Zemstvo elections as popular elections without the people's victory over tsarism and convert the Zemstvo and municipal self-government bodies into organs of "revolutionary" (in the Petrunkevich sense) "self-government", without a real revolution. An excellent expression of this line is to be found in No. 74 of *Osvobozhdeniye*. It would be hard to imagine anything more disgusting than this ideologist of the cowardly bourgeoisie, who asserts that advocacy of insurrection "demoralises" both the army and the people! And this is said at

a time when even the blind can see that it is only through an uprising that the ordinary Russian citizen and soldier can save himself from utter demoralisation and vindicate his right to citizenship! The bourgeois Manilov pictures to himself an Arcadian idyll in which the mere pressure of "public opinion" alone "will compel the government to make concession after concession, until finally it can go no further and will have to hand over the power to a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections, and a secret ballot, as is demanded by society ..." (! with an upper chamber?). "There is nothing at all improbable in this peaceful [!!] transition of power from the present government to a national constituent assembly, which will organise state and governmental power on a new basis." And this masterly philosophy of the cringing bourgeoisie is rounded off with the advice that the army, particularly the officers, should be won over; that a people's militia be established "without official authorisation", and that local self-government bodies (read: of landlords and capitalists) should be set up as "elements of a future provisional government".

There is method in *this* muddle. What the bourgeoisie wants is to be given power "peacefully", *without a popular uprising*, which may prove victorious, win a republic and genuine liberty, arm the proletariat, and rouse millions of peasants. To obscure the slogan of insurrection, to abandon it and make others follow suit, to advise the immediate establishment, by way of a "prologue", of popular self-government (to which only the Trubetskois, Petrunkeviches, Fyodorovs, and the like will be admitted)—that is what the bourgeoisie needs in order to betray the revolution and strike a bargain with the tsar (a monarchy with an upper chamber) *against* the "mob". Liberal Manilovism, therefore, voices the innermost thoughts of the money-bags, their most profound interests.

Iskra's Social-Democratic Manilovism expressed merely the thoughtlessness of a section of the Social-Democrats, their departure from the proletariat's only revolutionary tactics, viz., ruthless exposure of the bourgeois-opportunist illusions that peaceful concessions from tsarism are possible, that popular self-government can be instituted without

the autocracy being overthrown, and that election of deputies by the people is possible as a prologue to an uprising. No, we must clearly and resolutely show the necessity of an insurrection in the present state of affairs; we must issue a direct call for an uprising (without, of course, fixing the date beforehand) and call for the immediate organisation of a revolutionary army. Only the boldest and most widespread organisation of such an army can be the prologue to an uprising. Only an uprising can actually guarantee the victory of the revolution; of course, those who know the local conditions will always caution against attempts at a premature uprising. The real organisation of real people's self-government can take place only as the epilogue of a victorious uprising.

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NOTE ON A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFERENCE OF R.S.D.L.P. ORGANISATIONS ABROAD[79]

From the Editors. The measure in which the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. is working energetically for unity is to be seen in its Open Letter to the Organising Committee, which is published in the present issue. We would only like to remind the reader that for unification a common ground of organisation is needed. The only such ground we are aware of to date is the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P., which were adopted at the Party's Third Congress, and fully guarantee the legitimate rights of a minority.

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NOTE ON M. N. POKROVSKY'S ARTICLE "THE PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS"

It seems to us that the differences between the author of the article entitled "The *Osvobozhdeniye* People at Work" and Comrade "*Uchitel*"[80] are not as great as the latter thinks. Anybody of long standing in the revolutionary movement becomes accustomed to the political struggle between various trends, acquires definite views of his own, and is, naturally, inclined to presuppose equally definite views in others, whom he classes as members of this or that "party" because of some opinion—or lack of opinion—of theirs on a particular question. It stands to reason that an agitator at public meetings would do well to take into account not only the "political", but also the "pedagogical" point of view, place himself in the position of his audience, explain more than "decry", etc. Extremes are bad everywhere, but if the choice lay with us, we would prefer narrow and intolerant concision to mild and limp diffuseness. It is only flabby and weak-kneed characters who will be frightened away from us by fear of "tyranny". Anyone who has the least "go" in him will soon see for himself, and be shown by events, that clear-cut and sharply expressed political opinions concerning a "mythical *Osvobozhdeniye* member" are fully justified and that he himself considered this typical *Osvobozhdeniye* member "mythical" only because of lack of political experience. Comrade "*Uchitel*", whose suggestions are very helpful in view of his knowledge of the environment, himself speaks of the rapidity with which "bitter truths are assimilated".

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REPLY FROM THE *PROLETARY* EDITORIAL BOARD TO QUESTIONS PUT BY COMRADE "WORKER"[81]

From the Editors. We reply to the comrade's questions: 1) yes, it will both lead and govern, pending convocation of a popular constituent assembly; 2) in circumstances in which this participation will ensure the possibility of "a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts, and also of defence of the independent interests of the working class" (from the resolution of the Third Congress); 3) the Third Congress resolution on insurrection speaks clearly of the necessity "to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation *not only* the political significance *but* the practical-organisational aspect of the impending armed uprising". This means that the political consciousness of the masses must be developed, and the political significance of the uprising must be made clear to them. That, however, is not enough. The masses must be called upon to begin an armed struggle and at once to arm and organise in contingents of the revolutionary army. Further, we must tell the author of the letter that an explanation of the resolutions of the Congress and the Conference regarding a provisional revolutionary government is given in a pamphlet by N. Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. Finally, we can say with reference to the split that the author's indignation is perfectly justified. We advise him to work for general recognition of single rules for Party organisations, and to do that regardless of all intellectualist plaints of both the fist from above and the fist from below, work towards that end not secretly, not through intrigues, or by founding new groups or a new party, but openly, directly, within the framework of any R.S.D.L.P. organisation.

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"ONENESS OF THE TSAR AND THE PEOPLE, AND OF THE PEOPLE AND THE TSAR"

In *Proletary*, No. 12, which appeared on August 3 (16), we spoke of the possibility of the Bulygin Duma being convened in the near future, and analysed the tactics of Social-Democracy towards it.* The Bulygin scheme has now become law and the Manifesto of August 6 (19) has proclaimed that a "State Duma" will be called "no later than mid-January 1906".

It is on the anniversary of January 9, when the St. Petersburg workers placed the seal of their blood on the beginning of the revolution in Russia and showed their determination to fight desperately for its victory—it is on the anniversary of that great day that the tsar proposes to convene this grossly faked, police-sifted assembly of landowners, capitalists, and a negligible number of rich peasants who cringe to the authorities. The tsar intends to consult this assembly as one consisting of representatives of the "people". But the entire working class, all the millions of toilers and those who are not householders are completely barred from the elections of the "people's representatives". We shall wait and see whether the tsar is right in banking thus on the impotence of the working class....

Until the revolutionary proletariat has armed itself and defeated the autocratic government nothing more could have been expected than this sop to the big bourgeoisie, one that costs the tsar nothing and commits him to nothing. Even this sop would, probably, not have been given at this time, if the ominous question of war or peace had not loomed large. Without consulting the landlords and capitalists, the autocratic government does not venture either to impose on the people the burden of the senseless continuation of

* See pp. 179-87 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the war, or to work out measures to shift the entire burden of paying for the war from the shoulders of the rich to the shoulders of the workers and peasants.

As for the provisions of the State Duma Act, they fully confirm our worst expectations. It is not known as yet whether this Duma will actually be convened. Such doles can easily be taken away again, and the autocratic monarchs of every country have made and broken similar promises by the score. It is not yet known to what extent this future Duma, if it meets at all and is not wrecked, will be able to become the centre of really far-reaching political agitation among the masses of the people, against the autocracy. But there can be no doubt that the very provisions of the new State Duma Act furnish us with a wealth of material with which to conduct agitation, explain the nature of the autocracy, disclose its class basis, reveal the irreconcilability of its interests with those of the people, and spread and popularise our revolutionary-democratic demands. It may be stated without exaggeration that the Manifesto and Act of August 6 (19) ought now to become a *vademecum* to every political agitator, every class-conscious worker, for it faithfully reflects all the infamy, viciousness, Asiatic barbarity, violence, and exploitation that pervade the whole social and political system of Russia. Practically every sentence in the Manifesto and the Act provides excellent basis for the most comprehensive and convincing political commentaries, which will stimulate democratic thought and revolutionary consciousness.

As the Russian saying runs: "Leave it alone and it won't stink." When one reads the Manifesto and the State Duma Act one feels as though a mass of sewage that has been accumulating since time immemorial were being stirred up under one's very nose.

Centuries of oppression of the working people, the ignorance and downtrodden state of the people, and the stagnation in economic life and all fields of culture have enabled the autocracy to maintain its position. This formed the background for the untrammelled development and hypocritical dissemination of the doctrine of "the indissoluble oneness of the tsar and the people and the oneness of the people and the tsar", the doctrine that the tsar's autocratic

power stands above all social estates and classes of the nation, above the division of the people into rich and poor, and expresses the general interests of the entire nation. What we now have before us is a *practical* attempt to display this "oneness" in the most diffident and embryonic fashion, through simple *consultation* with the "elected representatives of the whole of Russia". And what do we see? We at once see that "the oneness of the tsar and the people" is possible only through the medium of an army of bureaucrats and policemen who see to it that the muzzle put on the people is kept firmly in place. This "oneness" requires that the people should not dare to open their mouths. By "people" is meant only the landlords and capitalists, who are allowed to take part in the two-stage elections (voting first for electors, by rural districts or city wards, and these electors in their turn elect the members of the State Duma). Peasant *householders* are classed among the people only after having been sifted through *four-stage* elections, under the supervision and with the assistance and instruction of the Marshals of the Nobility,[82] the Rural Superintendents, and police officials. First the householders elect members of the volost assembly; then the volost assemblies elect delegates from the volosts, two from each assembly; then these volost delegates elect the gubernia electors. Finally, the gubernia electors of the peasants, together with the gubernia electors of the landlords and (urban) capitalists elect the members of the State Duma! Almost everywhere the peasants constitute a minority of the gubernia electors. They are guaranteed the election of only one member of the State Duma from each gubernia, who has to be a peasant, i.e., 51 seats out of 412 (in the 51 gubernias of European Russia).

The entire urban working class, all the village poor, agricultural labourers, and peasants who are not householders, take no part whatever in any elections.

The oneness of the tsar and the people is in effect the oneness of the tsar and the landlords and capitalists, with a handful of rich peasants thrown in, and with all elections placed under the strictest police control. Freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of association, without which elections are a mere farce, are not even mentioned.

The State Duma has no rights whatever, for none of its

decisions are binding, being merely of an advisory nature. All its decisions are submitted for consideration and approval to the Council of State, i.e., again to the bureaucrats. It is only a flimsy annexe to the bureaucratic and police edifice. The public are not admitted to sittings of the State Duma. Reports on the proceedings of the State Duma may be published in the press only when its sittings are not held *in camera*; any session may be closed, however, by an official order, which means that the Minister has merely to qualify the matter under consideration as a state secret.

The new State Duma is the same old Russian police station, only on a larger scale. The rich landlord and capitalist manufacturer (on rare occasions, a rich peasant) are admitted for "consultation" to the "open" sittings of the police station (or the Rural Superintendent, or factory inspector, etc.); they always have the right to submit their opinion for the "gracious attention" of the Emperor ... I mean the police inspector. As for "the common people", the city workers and the rural poor, it goes without saying that they are never admitted to any kind of "consultation" whatever.

The only difference is that there are many police stations and everything in them is kept out of sight, whereas there is only one State Duma, and it has now become necessary to publish the rules governing its election and the extent of its rights. Publication of this is, we repeat, in itself an excellent exposure of the utter viciousness of the tsarist autocracy.

From the standpoint of the people's interests the State Duma is the most barefaced mockery of "popular representation". And, as if to emphasise this mockery we have, on top of this, such facts as Mr. Durnovo's speech, the arrest of Mr. Milyukov and Co., the scandalous statement made by Mr. Sharapov. In his speech Mr. Durnovo, the new Governor General of Moscow, who is being rapturously hailed by the reactionary press, blurted out the real plans of the government, which, besides the August 6 Manifesto and the State Duma Act, issued an ukase on the same day, revoking the "ukase to the Senate" of February 18, 1905. The ukase of February 18 permitted private individuals to work out projects and propositions designed to improve organisation of the state. Zemstvo members and representatives of the

intelligentsia appealed to this ukase whenever they held meetings, conferences, and congresses tolerated by the police. Now this ukase has been revoked, and all "projects and propositions designed to improve organisation of the state" must be "submitted" to the autocratic government "according to the procedure provided for in establishing the State Duma"! This means the end of agitation, the end of meetings, and congresses. There is a State Duma; and there is nothing more to discuss. This is just what Mr. Durnovo stated when he declared that they would no longer tolerate Zemstvo congresses of any kind.

The liberals of our "Constitutional-Democratic" (read: Monarchist) Party find themselves duped again. They counted on a constitution, and now they are forbidden to carry on any agitation for a constitution on the occasion of the "granting" of an institution which makes a mockery of constitution!

Mr. Sharapov has blurted out still more. In his government-subsidised paper (*Russkoye Dyelo*) he suggests nothing less than the stationing of *Cossacks* in the palace where the Duma is to sit ... to provide against the contingency of "unseemly" behaviour on the part of the Duma. The oneness of the tsar and the people requires that the latter's representatives should speak and act as the tsar wishes. Otherwise the Cossacks will disperse the Duma. Otherwise the members of the Duma may be arrested, even without the assistance of the Cossacks, before they ever get into the Duma. The Manifesto on the oneness of the tsar with the people appeared on Saturday, August 6. On Sunday, August 7, Mr. Milyukov, one of the leaders of the *moderate* wing of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League or the "Constitutional-Democratic" (read: Monarchist) Party, was arrested near St. Petersburg, together with some ten of his political colleagues. They are to be prosecuted for membership of the Union of Unions. In all probability they will soon be released, but it will be an easy matter to shut the doors of the Duma against them: all that is needed is to announce that they are "under court investigation"...!

The Russian people are getting their first little lessons in constitutionalism. All these laws on the elections of popular representatives are not worth a brass farthing until the sovereignty of the people has *actually been won* and

there is complete freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association, until citizens are armed and are able to safeguard the inviolability of the person. We have said above that the State Duma is a mockery of popular representation. That is undoubtedly so from the standpoint of the theory of the *sovereignty of the people*. But this theory is recognised neither by the autocratic government nor by the monarchist-liberal bourgeoisie (the *Osvobozhdeniye* League or the Constitutional-Monarchist Party). In present-day Russia we have before us *three* political theories, of whose significance we shall yet speak on more than one occasion. These are: 1) The theory of the tsar's *consultation* with the people (or "the oneness of the tsar and the people, and of the people and the tsar", as it is put in the Manifesto of August 6). 2) The theory of an *agreement* between the tsar and the people (the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League and the Zemstvo Congress). 3) The theory of the *sovereignty of the people* (the programme of Social-Democracy, as well as of revolutionary democracy in general).

From the standpoint of the *consultation* theory it is quite natural that the tsar should consult only those he wishes to, and only by the methods he wishes. The State Duma is a splendid object lesson showing whom the tsar wants to consult and how. From the standpoint of the theory of an *agreement*, the tsar is not subject to the will of the people; he must only take it into account. But how he is to take it into account and to what extent, cannot be gathered from the *Osvobozhdeniye* theory of "agreement", and whilst power is in the tsar's hands the *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie is inevitably condemned to the wretched position of a cadger, or a go-between, who would use the people's victories against the people. From the angle of the *sovereignty of the people* full freedom of agitation and election should first be secured in practice, and then a really popular constituent assembly convened, i.e., an assembly elected by universal and equal suffrage, direct elections, and secret ballot, and endowed with complete power—full, integral, and indivisible power—an assembly which will actually express the sovereignty of the people.

This brings us to our slogan of agitation (the slogan of the R.S.D.L.P.) on the State Duma. Who can really guar-

antee freedom of elections and full power to a constituent assembly? Only the armed people, organised in a *revolutionary army*, which has won over to its side all decent and honest elements in the tsar's army, has overcome the tsar's forces and substituted a *provisional revolutionary government* for the tsar's autocratic government. The setting up of the State Duma, which, on the one hand, "lures" the people with the idea of a representative form of government, and, on the other hand, is the crudest counterfeit of popular representation, will prove an inexhaustible source of the most widespread revolutionary agitation among the masses, will serve as an excellent occasion for meetings, demonstrations, political strikes, etc. The slogan for all this agitation will be: insurrection, the immediate formation of combat squads and contingents of a revolutionary army, the overthrow of tsarist rule, and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government which is to convene a popular constituent assembly. The timing of the uprising will depend, of course, on local conditions. We can only state that, generally speaking, it is now in the interests of the revolutionary proletariat to put off somewhat the timing of an uprising: the workers are being armed gradually, the troops are becoming more and more unreliable, the war crisis is reaching its climax (war or an onerous peace), and in such conditions premature attempts at insurrection may cause enormous harm.

In conclusion, it remains for us to draw a comparison between the tactical slogan briefly outlined above, and other slogans. As we have already stated in *Proletary*, No. 12, our slogan coincides with what the majority of the comrades working in Russia understand by the term "active boycott". The tactics of *Iskra*, which in its No. 106 recommended the immediate setting up of revolutionary self-government bodies and election by the people of their own representatives as a possible prologue to an uprising, is absolutely erroneous. So long as the forces for an armed uprising and its victory are still lacking, it is ridiculous even to speak of revolutionary people's self-government. That is not the prologue to an uprising, but its epilogue. Such erroneous tactics would merely play into the hands of the *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie, in the first place by obscuring or shelving the

slogan of an uprising, and replacing it with the slogan of the organisation of revolutionary self-government. In the second place, it would make it easier for the liberal bourgeois to represent *their* (Zemstvo and municipal) elections as popular elections, since there can be no popular elections so long as the tsar retains power, and the liberals may yet succeed in carrying out Zemstvo and municipal elections despite Mr. Durnovo's threats.

The proletariat has been barred from the Duma elections. Actually, the proletariat has no need to boycott the Duma, since by its very institution this tsarist Duma is itself boycotting the proletariat. It is to the proletariat's advantage, however, to support that section of the bourgeois democrats which is inclined to prefer revolutionary action to haggling, and which favours boycotting the Duma and more intensive agitation among the people for a protest against this Duma. The proletariat must not pass over in silence this first betrayal or inconsistency on the part of the bourgeois democrats, which is expressed in the fact that their representatives talk of boycotting the Duma (at the July Zemstvo Congress the first voting even showed a *majority* in favour of a boycott), utter pompous phrases about appealing to the people and not to the tsar (Mr. I. Petrunkevich at that same Congress), whereas in reality they are prepared to overlook this new flouting of the people's demands, without making a protest in the real sense of the word or giving it wide publicity, and to abandon the idea of a boycott and enter the Duma. The proletariat cannot but refute the false phrases that are now so much in vogue in articles published in the legal liberal press (see, for instance, *Rus* of August 7), which has entered the fray against the idea of a boycott. The gentlemen of the liberal press are corrupting the people with their assurances that the peaceful path, a "peaceful clash of opinions" is possible (why is it that Milyukov could not struggle "peacefully" against Sharapov, gentlemen, why?). The gentlemen of the liberal press are deceiving the people when they declare that the Zemstvos "can to a certain extent [!] paralyse [!!] the pressure which will, undoubtedly, be brought to bear on the peasant electors by the Rural Superintendents and by the local authorities in general". (*Rus*, *loc. cit.*) The liberal journalists are wholly

distorting the role of the State Duma in the Russian revolution, when they compare it with the Prussian Chamber of the period of the budget conflict with Bismarck (1863). Actually, if one is to make a comparison at all, one must take as an example not a constitutional period but a period of struggle for a constitution, a period of incipient revolution. To do otherwise means to skip directly from a period when the bourgeoisie is revolutionary into a period when the bourgeoisie has made its peace with reaction. (cf. *Proletary*, No. 5 on the comparison drawn between our Messrs. Petrunkeviches and Mr. Andrássy, "once a revolutionary" and subsequently a Minister.*) The State Duma brings to mind the Prussian "United Landtag" (Diet) established on February 3, *1847*, one year before the revolution. The Prussian liberals of those days were also preparing —although they never actually got round to it—to boycott this consultative chamber of landlords, and were asking the people: "*Annehmen oder ablehnen?*" ("Accept or Decline?"—the title of a pamphlet by Heinrich Simon, a bourgeois liberal, which was published in 1847.) The Prussian United Landtag met (the first session was opened on April 11, 1847, and closed on June 26, 1847) and gave rise to a series of clashes between the constitutionalists and the autocratic government; nevertheless it remained a lifeless institution, until *the revolutionary people*, *headed by the proletariat of Berlin*, defeated the royal army in the *uprising of March 18*, *1848*. Then the State Duma ... I mean the United Landtag—went up in smoke. An assembly of people's representatives was then convened (unfortunately not by a revolutionary government but by the king, whom the heroic workers of Berlin had "not finished off") on the basis of universal suffrage with relative freedom to carry on agitation.

Let the bourgeois betrayers of the revolution enter this still-born State Duma. The proletariat of Russia will intensify its agitation and its preparations for our Russian March 18, 1848 (or better still, August 10, 1792).

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* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 526-30.—*Ed.*

THE BLACK HUNDREDS AND THE ORGANISATION OF AN UPRISING

The events in Nizhni-Novgorod and Balashov have attracted general attention. In the previous issue we published a detailed account of the Nizhni-Novgorod massacre; in this issue we are giving an account of the massacre in Balashov. The misdeeds of the Black Hundreds are on the increase, and Social-Democrats would do well to turn their attention to this phenomenon and its significance in the general course of revolutionary development. As a supplement to the correspondence from Samara, the following leaflet, issued by the Borisoglebsk group of the R.S.D.L.P., is of interest:

"Workers and inhabitants of the town of Borisoglebsk! The Balashov and Nizhni-Novgorod events, in which the police have proved their ability to organise a massacre of all who hold dissenting views, have shown you the gravity of the situation the revolution is confronting us with. The time for words and platonic criticism has passed. By force of circumstances, the government drives us from words to deeds. It sees that the revolutionary movement has advanced beyond the point where it could be fought against, as has been the case hitherto, by the police and the gendarmerie alone. It realises that in the struggle against the 'internal foe' the regular armed forces of the Ministry of the Interior will not be sufficient. The entire population of the Russian Empire has become an 'internal foe' and 'rebellious', and the government is obliged to enlist volunteers for the regular army. But in this wholesale enlistment into 'government service' of tramps, rowdies, hawkers, and similar disreputable characters, who recognise no bureaucratic restrictions whatever, our government has at the same time been forced to change its time-honoured methods of influencing the masses and the time-honoured secret methods of the immediate struggle against the revolution. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Hitherto our government confined itself to waging a struggle against the printed word. It now itself publishes proclamations in the *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, *Russkoye Dyelo*, *Grazhdanin*, *Dyen*, and other official organs. Hitherto our government only

hunted down agitators. It now itself sends out prelates, generals, Sharapovs, Gringmuts, and other agitators of its own to conduct agitation among the people. Hitherto our government only throttled all organisation. It now itself organises unions of the Russian people, leagues of patriots, and unions of monarchists. Hitherto our government trembled at the mere thought of an uprising. It now itself organises uprisings of the Black Hundreds, and hopes to provoke a civil war. Terrified at the prospect of the impending revolution the government has seized on such of the latter's weapons as organisation, propaganda, and agitation. With the aid of these double-edged weapons and with the help of the Black Hundreds, the government is beginning to stage scenes of popular indignation, of counter-revolution. After a 'try-out' in the marginal provinces it is now beginning a tour of the heart of Russia. We have recently witnessed such scenes in Nizhni-Novgorod and in Balashov, and it cannot be said that the autocracy met with no success there. 'Revolutionary' methods of struggle proved efficacious, many enemies of the autocracy were murdered or manhandled and the population was terrorised by this legalised terrorism on the part of our government.

"There can be no doubt that the experiment will be further extended. The laurels won by some of the Black Hundreds will give the others no rest until they too will have put their strength to the test. Where there is revolution there is counter-revolution too, and, therefore, Borisoglebsk must also be prepared to experience the organising skill of the eminent representatives of the Black-Hundred trend. We have reason to expect also in Borisoglebsk pogroms against the Jews, against the workers, and against the intellectuals; therefore, in preparation for proper resistance to the 'illegal measures' which the government has adopted to suppress the revolutionary movement, the Borisoglebsk group is starting a subscription for the organisation of armed self-defence, and invites all those whose sympathies do not lie with the government and the Black Hundreds to help in the organisation of self-defence groups with money and arms."

In fact, civil war is being forced on the population by the government itself. It is a fact that "tramps, rowdies, and hawkers" are being taken into government service. Under these circumstances bourgeois talk by the *Osvobozhdeniye* League about the crime and folly of advocating insurrection, about the harmfulness of organising self-defence (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 74) is now not merely inordinate political platitudinarianism, or justification of the autocracy and (in actual fact) servility to *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. But, in addition to this, it is impotent peevishness on the part of the *Osvobozhdeniye* dodderers whom the revolutionary movement has relentlessly consigned to the scrap heap or some old curiosity shop—the place most suitable for them. Theoretical discussions on

the necessity of an uprising may and should be held, and the tactical resolutions on this question should be the outcome of careful thought and deliberation; meanwhile it should not be forgotten that spontaneous events take their own authoritative course regardless of all philosophising. It should not be forgotten that all the tremendous contradictions that have been piling up in Russian life for centuries are now developing with irresistible force bringing the masses to the fore and relegating outworn and dead teachings about peaceful progress to the rubbish heap. Opportunists of all sorts like to tell us: learn from life. Unfortunately, what they mean by life is only the standing water of peaceful periods, of times of stagnation, when life makes scarcely any progress whatever. These blind people always *lag behind* the lessons of *revolutionary* life. Their dead doctrines always fall behind the stormy torrent of revolution, which expresses the most far-reaching demands of life, those involving the most vital interests of the masses.

See, for instance, how ridiculous, in face of these lessons given by life, are the plaints being made by a certain section of Social-Democracy about the danger of a conspiratorial view of the uprising, about a narrow "Jacobin" approach to the question of its necessity, about exaggerating the importance and role of material forces in the impending political events. These plaints started on the eve of an insurrection becoming a most real and vital necessity to the people, just when the masses, who stand farthest from all "conspiracies", began to be drawn into an insurrection because of the misdeeds of the Black Hundreds. *A bad doctrine is splendidly rectified by a good revolution*. In the new *Iskra* one can read feeble witticisms (or are they sneers?) of a purely Burenin type[83] about the publication of a special military pamphlet discussing the military questions of the revolution and even going into the question of day and night attacks, about thought having to be given to the matter of headquarters for the uprising, and of about having members of the organisation "on duty" to get timely information of any pogrom, of any "enemy" action, and to give proper and timely orders to our fighting forces, to the organised revolutionary proletariat. And at the same time, as if in derision of the lifeless doctrine of the Mensheviks abroad, we see the actions of the

Mensheviks in Russia. We read that in Ekaterinoslav (see *Proletary*, No. 13) an agreement was concluded between the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, and the Bund,[84] in anticipation of violence (a pogrom by the Black Hundreds was expected! Is there a city or village in Russia today that is not expecting something of that kind?). "Joint collection of money for the purchase of arms, a joint plan of action, etc." What kind of plan this was is evidenced by the fact that at the Bryansk Works, for instance, the Social-Democrats, at a meeting of five hundred workers, called for the organisation of resistance. "Then in the evening the organised workers of the Bryansk Works were quartered in various houses; patrols were stationed, a headquarters was appointed, etc.—in short, we were in complete fighting trim" (incidentally, they let each other know the "location of the headquarters of each organisation" of the three mentioned above).

It is at their own comrades, who are engaged in practical work, that the new-*Iskra* journalists are sneering.

However much you may turn up your noses, gentlemen at the question of night attacks and similar purely tactical military questions, however much you may pull wry faces about the "plan" of assigning secretaries of organisations, or their members in general, to stand on duty to provide for any military exigency—life goes its own way, revolution teaches, taking in hand and shaking up the most inveterate pedants. During civil war military questions must *of necessity* be studied down to the last detail, and the interest the workers show in these questions is a most legitimate and healthy phenomenon. Headquarters (or members of the organisations on duty) must *of necessity* be organised. The stationing of patrols and the billeting of squads are all purely military functions; they are all initial operations of a *revolutionary army* and constitute the organisation of an insurrection, the organisation of *revolutionary rule*, which matures and becomes stronger through these small preparations, through these minor clashes, testing its own strength, learning to fight, training itself for victory—a victory that will come the sooner and the more probably, the more profound the general political crisis becomes, the stronger the discontent, disaffection, and vacillation within the ranks of the tsarist army.

Social-Democratic comrades all over Russia must and will follow on an ever wider scale the example set by the comrades of Ekaterinoslav and Borisoglebsk. The appeal for aid in money and arms is most timely. There are ever increasing numbers of people to whom all "plans" and even revolutionary ideas of any sort are quite alien, but who nevertheless *see* and *feel* the necessity for an armed struggle when they witness the atrocities perpetrated by the police, the Cossacks, and the Black Hundreds against unarmed citizens. There is no choice, all other ways are blocked. One cannot help being agitated by what is taking place in Russia at the present time; one cannot help thinking of war and of revolution, and whoever is agitated, whoever thinks, whoever takes an interest, is *obliged* to join one armed camp or the other. You may be beaten up, maimed, or murdered no matter in what supremely peaceful and scrupulously lawful way you behave. Revolution does not recognise neutrals. The struggle has already flared up. It is a life-and-death struggle between the old Russia, the Russia of slavery, serfdom, and autocracy, and the new, young, people's Russia, the Russia of the toiling masses, who are reaching out towards light and freedom, in order afterwards to start once again a struggle for the complete emancipation of mankind from all oppression and all exploitation.

May the day of the insurrection of the people come soon!

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EDITORIAL EPILOGUE TO THE ARTICLE "THE THIRD CONGRESS ON TRIAL BEFORE THE CAUCASIAN MENSHEVIKS"

In reproducing this article from the organ of the Caucasian League of the R.S.D.L.P. (*Borba Proletariata*,[85] No. 1 in Russian; No. 6 has appeared in the Armenian language, and No. 9 in Georgian) we shall for our part add that the Caucasian Mensheviks were practically the first to come out in the press not merely with groundless abuse against the Congress (in the new-*Iskra* spirit), but with an attempt to question the representation of absolutely definite Party committees. In its organ the Caucasian Union has calmly and with close reasoning refuted the Mensheviks' arguments and splendidly proved the complete validity of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., even if the five mandates disputed by the Mensheviks were considered non-valid.

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ARE THE ZEMSTVO "LIBERALS" ALREADY TURNING BACK?

We have just read a message from the St. Petersburg correspondent of the liberal bourgeois *Frankfurter Zeitung* dated August 8 (21) to the effect that the Congress of Zemstvo and municipal leaders, which by decision of the July Congress was to have met immediately after publication of the Bulygin scheme and was already fixed for the end of August, *will not take place*. What would you think the reason is? It is because on August 6 the tsar withdrew his ukase to the Senate, dated February 18, 1905! The correspondent goes on to say: "This absolutely inexplicable [??—*Editorial Board of* "*Proletary*"] cowardice on the part of the Zemstvo representatives has aroused general amazement in political quarters here, since at a moment like the present nobody was inclined to expect such flabbiness in the Zemstvos. That is why the news I have sent has not yet been given full credence, and people are cautious in their attitude towards it." We long ago foretold that the government would not find it hard to win the liberal bourgeois over to its side and make them "recoil from the revolution".

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THE WORKING CLASS AND REVOLUTION

1. The democratic and the socialist revolution.
2. The bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution. ("Bourgeois and socialist revolution.")
3. The tasks of Social-Democracy as an independent class party of the proletariat.
4. The role of the peasantry in the democratic revolution.
5. Insurrection and the revolutionary army.
6. The revolutionary government. Its tasks.
7. The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

1. α) The aims of the working class. β) *Social-Democracy*. Our programme. γ) The *maximum* and δ) the *minimum* programme. {A description of it (compare 6 points*)}
ε) The democratic and the bourgeois revolution.

2. *The bourgeois and the socialist revolution.* Why is the democratic revolution bourgeois in nature? α) Commodity and capitalist production. β) The economic essence. γ) The Constitutional-Democratic Party, its programme, and its class essence. *A class party*. Zemstvo congresses. Unions of intellectuals. The legal press. δ) Bourgeois advice to the proletariat: the trade union struggle, etc.

3. Conclusions from the above. **An independent class party**. Organisation—trade union and *Party*, agitational, and *military*. Marxism: "a doctrine".

4. The peasantry's special interests. Remnants of serf-ownership. Why is the role of the peasantry in the democratic revolution of particular importance? The

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* See p. 183 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"general redistribution" and its significance. The peasants are the workers' natural allies. The **peasantry's petty-bourgeois nature**.

5. The uprising. Moral and material force.
   Arming of the people. *Military* organisation (military problems, etc.). The revolutionary army. (Example: Nizhni-Novgorod and Ekaterinoslav) ((bombs, arms)).
6. The revolutionary government, the *organ* of uprising. The significance of a revolutionary government and revolutionary *power*. Participation in a revolutionary government. The programme of a revolutionary government: 6 *points*. *Get Europe moving*.
7. What is dictatorship? Dictatorship of a *class* and dictatorship of an individual. Democratic dictatorship. Classes.

Written in August 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION OF THE PAMPHLET *THE TASKS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS*

The third edition of this pamphlet appears at a moment in the development of the revolution in Russia which differs considerably from 1897, when it was written, and from 1902, when its second edition appeared. It need hardly be said that the pamphlet gives only a general outline of the tasks of Social-Democracy as a whole, and not a concrete exposition of the present-day tasks that stem from the present state of the working-class and revolutionary movements, and also from the state of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The present-day tasks of our Party are dealt with in my pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (Geneva, 1905). A comparison of the two pamphlets will enable the reader to judge whether the author's views on the general tasks of Social-Democracy and the special tasks of the given moment have been developing with consistency. That such a comparison is not useless is shown, incidentally, by the recent crude sally made by Mr. Struve, leader of our liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, who in *Osvobozhdeniye* accuses revolutionary Social-Democracy (as represented by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) of presenting the question of an insurrection in a manner befitting seditionists and revolutionaries in the abstract. We have already stated in *Proletary* (No. 9, "Revolution Teaches") that a simple comparison of *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (1897), *What Is To Be Done?* (1902), and *Proletary* (1905) will refute the accusation of the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, and will

show the connection between the development of Social-Democratic views on an insurrection and the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia. The *Osvobozhdeniye* accusation is merely a crude opportunist sally on the part of the supporters of a liberal monarchy, who are trying to cover up their betrayal of the revolution, their betrayal of the people's interests, and their desire to strike a bargain with the tsarist government.

N. Lenin

August 1905

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Published according to the text of the pamphlet

NOTE ON P. NIKOLAYEV'S PAMPHLET *THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA*[86]

FROM MARX TO MAO

This pamphlet was written before August 6. The State Duma has now been set up. The working class and all the poor have no right at all to elect Duma members. The rich landlords and the merchants elect Duma members through gubernia electors. The peasants elect even gubernia electors not directly, but through uyezd delegates elected at volost meetings. Freedom of election, of the press, and of assembly is non-existent. The police retain full power. The Duma makes decisions that are not binding on the government, but are merely advisory, i.e., the Duma has no power at all.

First published in the autumn of 1905

Published according to the manuscript

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

IN THE WAKE OF THE MONARCHIST BOURGEOISIE, OR IN THE VAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT AND PEASANTRY?

Social-Democracy's tactics towards the State Duma still heads all the questions of the revolutionary struggle on the agenda of the day. The differences which have arisen between the opportunist (*Iskra*) and the revolutionary (*Proletary*) wings of the R.S.D.L.P. on the score of these tactics must be analysed most painstakingly not for the sake of captious polemising (which sometimes degenerates into a squabble), but for the purpose of thoroughly elucidating the question and assisting the comrades on the spot to work out the most exact, definite, and uniform slogans possible.

First of all, a few words on the origin of these differences. Even before the State Duma Act had been promulgated, we set forth in *Proletary*, No. 12 the fundamentals of our tactics and of our differences with *Iskra*. We demanded: 1) support for the idea of a boycott, in the sense of increased agitation and an appeal to the people, in the sense of the proletariat's support for the Left wing of bourgeois democracy, and constant exposure of the treachery of its Right wing; 2) an active boycott at all costs, and not "passive abstention", i.e., "increasing agitation tenfold", going so far as "to force our way into election meetings", and, finally, 3) "a clear, precise, and immediate agitational slogan", namely, for an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government. We categorically rejected the slogan of *Iskra* (No. 106) for "organisation of a revolutionary self-government", as confusing and as playing into the hands of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, i.e.,

the monarchist bourgeoisie. At the same time, anticipating, as it were, that *Iskra* would once more "beget" more differences we immediately added that we agreed with *Iskra*'s condemnation of the idea of a passive boycott.

So if *Iskra*, No. 108, now drops sundry hints about a theory of "non-interference", "absenteeism", "abstention", "folded arms", and the like, we must first of all brush aside "objections" of this sort, since this is not polemising, but merely an attempt to "get under the opponent's skin". By such methods of "polemising", culminating in the aspersion that some of the leaders would like to get into a provisional government themselves, the new *Iskra* has long evoked a very definite attitude towards itself among the widest circles of Social-Democrats.

Thus, the essence of the differences is that *Iskra* does not accept our slogan of agitation, which we consider the main slogan (for an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government). *Proletary*, on the other hand, considers it absolutely impermissible "to obscure or relegate into the background the slogan of insurrection by bringing forward the slogan of revolutionary self-government" (*Proletary*, No. 12). All the other points of disagreement are relatively less important. On the contrary, what is especially important is that (as has been the case on more than one occasion) in No. 108 *Iskra* begins to back out, to twist and turn; to the slogan of revolutionary self-government it adds the slogan of "active militant action by the masses of the people" (wherein this differs from an armed uprising God only knows). *Iskra* goes even so far as to say that the "organisation of a revolutionary self-government is the only means of really 'organising' an uprising of the whole people". *Iskra*, No. 108, is dated August 13 (26); and on August 24 (N. S.) the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* carried an article by Comrade Martov setting forth *Iskra*'s "plan" wholly in the spirit of No. 106, and not in the spirit of the "amendments" in No. 108. We are giving below* a translation of the most important parts of this invaluable article by Comrade Martov, as a specimen of "Social-Democratic Manilovism".

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* See pp. 224-26 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Let us try to unravel this tangle.

To make matters clear it is necessary first of all to realise what forces are at present "making history" for the Russian Revolution, and just how they are doing it. The autocracy has adopted the theory of "consultation" between the tsar and the people. Desirous of consulting with a police-screened handful of persons elected by the landowners and shopkeepers, the autocracy is beginning with desperate ferocity to suppress the revolution. Broader circles of the monarchist bourgeoisie are in favour of the theory of compromise between the tsar and the people (the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, or the Constitutional-"Democratic" Party). By this theory the bourgeoisie is showing its treachery to the revolution, its readiness first to support it and then to unite with the reactionaries against it. The Revolutionary proletariat, inasmuch as it is led by Social-Democracy, demands the *sovereignty of the people*, i.e., the complete destruction of the forces of reaction, and, above all, the actual overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government. The proletariat strives (often without being aware of it, but unswervingly and energetically) to win over the peasantry, and with the latter's assistance to carry forward the revolution to complete victory, despite the bourgeoisie's instability and treachery.

The State Duma is undoubtedly a concession to the revolution, but a concession made (and this is still more indubitable) so as to suppress the Revolution and withhold a constitution. The bourgeois "compromisers" want to achieve a constitution so as to suppress the revolution; this desire of the liberal bourgeoisie, which is an inevitable result of its class position, has been most clearly expressed by Mr. Vinogradov (in *Russkiye Vedomosti*).

The question now arises: under such circumstances, what is the significance of the decision to boycott the Duma, passed by the Union of Unions (see *Proletary*, No. 14), i.e., by the most comprehensive organisation of the bourgeois intelligentsia? By and large, the bourgeois intelligentsia also wants "a compromise". That is why, as *Proletary* has repeatedly pointed out, it too vacillates between reaction and revolution, between haggling and fighting, between a deal with the tsar and an uprising against him. Nor can

it be otherwise, in view of the class position of the bourgeois intelligentsia. However, it would be a mistake to forget that this intelligentsia is more capable of expressing the essential interests of the bourgeois class as a whole, in their broadest implications, as distinct from the temporary and narrow interests of the bourgeoisie's "upper crust". The intelligentsia is more capable of expressing the interests of the masses of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. With all its vacillations, it is therefore more capable of waging a revolutionary struggle against the autocracy, and, *provided it draws closer to the people*, it could become an important force in this struggle. Powerless by itself, it could nevertheless give quite considerable sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry just what they lack—knowledge, programme, guidance, and organisation.

Thus, the essence of the "boycott" idea, as it first arose in the Union of Unions, is that the *big bourgeoisie's first step towards consultation*, *towards compromise with the tsar* has inevitably led to the *petty-bourgeois intelligentsia's first step towards drawing close to the revolutionary people*. The landlords and capitalists have swung to the right, while the bourgeois intelligentsia, representing the petty bourgeoisie, has swung to the left. The former are going to the tsar, although they have by no means given up their intention of threatening him again and again with the might of the people. The bourgeois intelligentsia is considering whether it should not rather go to the people, without as yet finally breaking with the theory of "compromise", and without *fully* taking the revolutionary path.

Such is the essence of the boycott idea, which, as we have pointed out in *Proletary*, No. 12, arose among the bourgeois democrats. Only very short-sighted and superficial people could discern in this idea non-interference, absenteeism, abstention, and so on. The bourgeois intelligentsia need not *abstain*, since the high property qualification actually *keeps it out* of the State Duma. In its resolution on the boycott the bourgeois intelligentsia makes "the mobilisation of all the democratic elements of the country" its most important point. The bourgeois intelligentsia is the most active, resolute, and militant element of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, the Constitutional-"Democratic" Party. To accuse

this intelligentsia of abstention, etc., because of its boycott idea, or even to refuse to support its idea *and to develop it* means to display short-sightedness and thus play into the hands of the monarchist big bourgeoisie, whose organ, *Osvobozhdeniye*, has good reason to combat the idea of a boycott.

Besides the general and basic considerations, the correctness of the view just outlined is supported by the valuable admissions of Mr. *S.S.*[87] in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 75. It is highly significant that Mr. *S.S.* describes advocates of the boycott idea as the "radical" group, and opponents of that idea as the "moderate" group. He accuses the former of a "Narodnaya Volya attitude", of repeating the mistakes of the "active revolutionary groups" (an accusation doing honour to those it is levelled against by *Osvobozhdeniye*); about the latter he states flatly that they stand "between two fires", between the autocracy and the "social [*sic*!] revolution", poor Mr. S. S. being so terrified that he has very nearly mistaken the democratic republic for a social revolution! But the most valuable admission by Mr. S. S. is the following: for the radicals—he says, comparing the Congress of the Union of Unions with the Zemstvo Congress—"everything undoubtedly centred [mark this!] around the demand to amend the electoral system, *whereas for the more moderate group the main interest lay in extending the rights of the Duma*".

This sums up matters in a nutshell! Mr. S. S. has blurted out the innermost "thoughts" of the landlords and capitalists, which we have laid bare hundreds of times. Their "main interest" lies not in getting the people to take part in the elections (they are afraid of that), but in extending the rights of the Duma, i.e., in converting the assembly of the big bourgeoisie from a consultative into a legislative body. That is the crux of the matter. The big bourgeoisie will never be satisfied with a "consultative" Duma. Hence, the inevitability of constitutional conflicts in the State Duma. But the big bourgeoisie can never become a true and dependable supporter of people's sovereignty. It will always be taking the constitution (for itself) with one hand, and taking away the rights of the people, or opposing the extension of popular rights, with the other. The big bourgeoisie cannot

but strive for a constitution that secures privileges for the big bourgeoisie. The radical intelligentsia cannot but strive to express the interests of the broader strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. Once it got the bird in the hand the Right wing of bourgeois democracy immediately began to see reason, and, as we have seen, is already renouncing "illegal" congresses. The Left wing saw itself without even a bird in the hand; it saw that the landlords and capitalists, having taken advantage of the services of the "third element"[88] (agitation, propaganda, organisation of the press, etc.), are now prepared to betray it, directing their efforts in the State Duma not towards securing the people's rights but towards securing their own rights, which militate against those of the people. And now sensing incipient treachery the bourgeois intelligentsia brands the State Duma as an "audacious challenge" made by the government to all the peoples of Russia, declares a boycott, and counsels "the mobilisation of the democratic elements".

Under such conditions the Social-Democrats would be playing the part of political simpletons if they were to attack the idea of a boycott. The revolutionary proletariat's unerring class instinct has prompted most of the comrades in Russia to adopt the idea of an *active* boycott. This means supporting the Left wing and *drawing it closer to us*, means endeavouring to single out the elements of *revolutionary democracy*, so as to strike at the autocracy together with them. The radical intelligentsia has held out a finger to us—we must catch it by the hand! If the boycott is not mere bragging, if mobilisation is more than a word, if indignation at the audacious challenge is not just mummery, then you must break with the "compromisers", come over to the theory of the sovereignty of the people, and adopt, adopt *in deed*, the only consistent and integral slogans of revolutionary democracy—an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government. To make all those who indeed accept these slogans join us, and to pillory all who remain on the side of the "compromisers"—such is the only correct tactics of the revolutionary proletariat.

Our new-Iskrists have failed to see both the class origin and the real political significance of the boycott idea, and

have opened fire ... into the air. Comrade Cherevanin writes in No. 108: "As is evident from the bulletins of the Don Committee and the St. Petersburg group, both these organisations [N. B.: *Menshevik* organisations. Note by the *Proletary* Editorial Board] have declared for the boycott. They consider participation in elections to such a Duma a disgrace, treason to the cause of the revolution, and they condemn in advance those liberals who will take part in the elections. *Thus, the very possibility of making the State Duma a weapon of the democratic revolution is precluded, and agitation directed towards that end is evidently rejected.*" The words we have italicised reveal the mistake indicated just now. Those who rant against "non-intervention" are only *obscuring* the really important question of the *methods* of intervention. There are two methods of intervention, two types of slogans. The first method is: "increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth". (*Proletary*, No. 12.) We have already explained the slogans of *this* campaign of agitation. The other method is: to demand "a revolutionary pledge to enter the State Duma for the purpose of bringing about its transformation into a revolutionary assembly which will depose the autocracy and convene a constituent assembly" (Comrade Cherevanin in *Iskra*, No. 108), or "to bring pressure to bear on the electors so that only resolute advocates of democratic and free representation should be elected to the Duma" (Comrade Martov in the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*).

It is just this difference in methods that reflects the difference in the "two tactics" of Social-Democracy. The opportunist wing of Social-Democracy is always inclined to "bring pressure to bear" on bourgeois democracy by *demanding pledges* from it. The revolutionary wing of Social-Democracy "brings pressure to bear" on bourgeois democracy and impels it to the left *by condemning it for its shifts to the right*, by spreading among the masses the slogan of a determined revolution. The theory of "demanding pledges", this famous Starover *litmus-test* theory, is sheer naïveté and can only serve to sow confusion among the proletariat and corrupt it. Whom will Comrade Cherevanin hold responsible for the

carrying out of the "pledges" he has received? Perhaps God Almighty? Can it be that Comrade Cherevanin does not know that under the pressure of material class interests *all* pledges will go by the board? Is it not childishness on the part of the selfsame Comrade Cherevanin to think that the bourgeois deputies to the State Duma can be bound to the revolutionary proletariat by means of "binding instructions"? And if Comrade Martov were to begin *actually* to carry out his plan he would have to *announce* to the working class that certain members of the given assembly of landlords are "resolute advocates of free and democratic representation!" To make such announcements would mean sowing the greatest political corruption!

And now note another thing: all these "revolutionary pledges" on the part of the Petrunkeviches, Rodichevs, and *tutti quanti*, all these "binding instructions", all these pledges "resolutely to support democratic and free representation" (could anyone have picked a more general, vague, and nebulous phrase?) would be demanded and given *in the name of Social-Democracy and behind the proletariat's back*. After all, this cannot be done openly, for even in free countries, where agitation is carried on openly, political figures are bound not so much by private deals as by *party* programmes; in our case we *do not and shall not have* definite and established parties at the elections to the State Duma! Just see, comrades of the new *Iskra*, what a mess you have again managed to get into: you keep repeating "the masses", "to the masses", "with the masses", "the initiative of the masses", but in fact your "plan" boils down to secret deals obliging Mr. Petrunkevich to be not a traitor to the revolution but its "resolute" advocate!

The new-Iskrists have themselves reduced their position to absurdity. No one, anywhere in Russia, even among their followers, would dream of concluding deals on the basis of those absurd "revolutionary pledges". No. This is not the way to intervene. You must intervene by ruthlessly *branding* the theory of compromise and the bourgeois compromisers, all those Petrunkeviches, etc. Expose their bourgeois betrayal of the revolution and unite the revolutionary forces *for an uprising* against the autocracy (*and*, *to be on the safe side*, *against the Duma as well*)—that is the only

reliable method of really "bringing pressure to bear" on the Duma, of really paving the way for the victory of the revolution. It is only with such a slogan that we should intervene in the election campaign, not for electioneering purposes, deals, or pledges, but in order to preach insurrection. And it is only the real strength of the armed people that will enable us to take advantage of possible and probable future conflicts within the State Duma, or between the State Duma and the tsar, in the interests of the revolution (and not of a strictly bourgeois constitution). Less confidence in the State Duma, gentlemen, and more confidence in the forces of the proletariat which is now arming itself!

We have now come to the slogan of the organisation of revolutionary self-government bodies. Let us examine it more closely.

In the first place it is wrong from a purely theoretical standpoint to give pre-eminence to the slogan of revolutionary self-government instead of the slogan of the people's sovereignty. The former bears on the administration, the second on the organisation of the state. The former is, therefore, compatible with the treacherous bourgeois theory of "compromise" (a self-governing people headed by the tsar, "who reigns but does not govern"); the latter is wholly incompatible with it. The first is acceptable to the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, the second is not.

In the second place, it is utterly absurd to identify the organisation of revolutionary self-government with the organisation of a people's uprising. An uprising is civil war, and war requires an army, whereas self-government does not in itself require an army. There are countries with a system of self-government, but without an army. And revolutionary self-government does not require a revolutionary army where a revolution takes place in the Norwegian fashion: the king was "sacked" and a plebiscite held. But when the people are oppressed by a despotic government which relies on an army and starts civil war, then to identify revolutionary self-government with a revolutionary army, to advocate the former and to maintain silence about the latter, is almost indecent and signifies either betrayal of the revolution or the utmost stupidity.

Thirdly, history also confirms the truth (incidentally, a self-evident truth) that only the complete and decisive victory of an uprising can make it fully possible to establish genuine self-government. Would the municipal revolution in France in July 1789 have been possible if on July 14 the people of Paris, who had risen in arms, had not defeated the royal troops, taken the Bastille, and completely smashed the resistance of the autocracy? Or will the new-Iskrists, perhaps, cite in this connection the example of the city of Montpellier, where the municipal revolution, the establishment of revolutionary local self-government took place peacefully, and a vote of thanks to the intendant was even passed for the kindness with which he had assisted in his own deposition? Does the new *Iskra* perhaps expect that during our Duma election campaign we shall thank the governors for having eliminated themselves *before the capture* of the Russian Bastilles? Is it not significant that in the France of 1789 the period of the municipal revolution took place when the *emigration of reactionaries* was under way, while in our country the slogan of revolutionary self-government *instead of* the slogan of an uprising is being advanced at a time when the *emigration of revolutionaries* is still going on? When a certain Russian high official was asked why an amnesty was not granted on August 6 he replied: "Why should we set free 10,000 people whom it took us considerable trouble to arrest and who tomorrow would start a desperate struggle against us?" This dignitary reasoned intelligently, whereas those who speak about "revolutionary self-government" before the release of these 10,000 reason unintelligently.

Fourthly, present-day Russian life plainly shows the inadequacy of the slogan of "revolutionary self-government" and the need for a direct and definite slogan of insurrection. Consider what took place in Smolensk on August 2 (Old Style). The Municipal Council declared the billeting of the Cossacks contrary to law, stopped all payments to them, organised a city militia to protect the population, and appealed to the soldiers to refrain from violence against citizens. We should like to know whether our good new-Iskrists find this adequate. Should not this militia be regarded as a *revolutionary army*, as an organ of attack as well

as of defence?—and of attack not only against the Smolensk Cossack detachment, but against the autocratic government in general? Should not this idea of proclaiming a revolutionary army and its tasks be popularised? Can the administration of the city of Smolensk by genuine government *of the people* be considered secure until a revolutionary army has won a decisive victory over the tsarist army?

Fifthly, the facts prove incontrovertibly that the slogan of revolutionary self-government instead of the slogan of insurrection, or as implying (?) the slogan of insurrection, is not only "acceptable" to the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, but has actually been accepted by it. Take *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 74. You will find there a sweeping condemnation of the "senseless and criminal advocacy of insurrection" and at the same time a plea for city militias and the establishment of local self-government bodies as elements of a future provisional government (cf. *Proletary*, No. 12).

No matter how one approaches the question, it will invariably turn out that the new slogan of the new *Iskra* is an *Osvobozhdeniye* slogan. The Social-Democrats who either relegate to the background or reject a slogan calling for an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional government in favour of one demanding the organisation of revolutionary self-government are trailing along in the wake of the monarchist bourgeoisie, instead of marching in the van of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry.

We are accused of stubbornly "hammering away" at the same slogans. We think such an accusation a compliment. For it is plainly our task to hammer away persistently at vital political slogans, while spreading the general truths of the Social-Democratic programme. We succeeded in giving the widest publicity to the "quartet" formula so repugnant to the liberals (universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and a secret ballot). We acquainted the masses of the working people with the "sextet" of political liberties (freedom of speech, conscience, the press, assembly, association, and the right to strike). We must now repeat millions and billions of times the "trio" of immediate revolutionary tasks (an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government). The popular forces which will accomplish these tasks are shooting up

spontaneously, not only with every day but with every hour that passes. Attempted uprisings are becoming more frequent, their organisation is growing, and arming is proceeding apace. From the ranks of the workers and peasants clad in rustic coats, city suits, and uniforms nameless heroes are emerging, people fused with the mass and ever more deeply imbued with a noble obsession to liberate the people. It is our business to see to it that all these rivulets merge into a mighty torrent, that the light of a class-conscious, direct, clear, and precise revolutionary programme of our immediate tasks be thrown on the spontaneous movement, multiplying its strength tenfold.

To sum up. Our tactics with regard to the State Duma may be formulated in five points: 1) intensified agitation in connection with the State Duma Act and the elections to the Duma, the organisation of meetings, utilisation of the election campaign, demonstrations, etc., etc.; 2) the centring of this entire agitational campaign on slogans calling for an insurrection, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government; popularisation of the programme of this provisional government; 3) gaining the adherence for the promotion of this agitation and of the armed struggle of all revolutionary democratic elements, and of such elements only, i.e., only those who accept the above-mentioned slogans in deed; 4) support of the boycott idea, which arose among the Left-wing bourgeois democrats, with the purpose of making it an active boycott in the sense of the most widespread agitation as described above; winning over the Left-wing representatives of bourgeois democracy to the revolutionary-democratic programme and to activities which will draw them closer to the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry; 5) ruthless exposure of the bourgeois theory of "compromise" and the bourgeois "compromisers", and their denunciation to the broadest masses of workers and peasants; making public and explaining every treacherous and irresolute step they take, both before and after they enter the Duma; warning the working class against these bourgeois betrayers of the revolution.

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A MOST LUCID EXPOSITION OF A MOST CONFUSED PLAN

In a leading article* we pointed out what a muddle the new-*Iskra*'s new plan for a "Duma campaign" is. Here is a most lucid exposition of it given by Martov himself in the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*[89] (of August 24, New Style). (The italics everywhere are Martov's own.)

"The plan is as follows," says Comrade Martov, referring to its "endorsement by many organisations in Russia". "Working-class organisations are to assume the initiative in establishing *people's agitation committees*, to be elected by all elements of the population that are not satisfied with the tsar's reform. The task of such committees consists first of all in developing agitation for genuine popular representation throughout the country. These committees are to be set up formally for the purpose of enabling the mass of the population to take part in the forthcoming elections. Since by virtue of the electoral law they are barred from *direct* participation in the elections, the citizens may take part indirectly by communicating their opinions and demands to the more exclusive bodies of privileged voters. The committees bring pressure to bear on the electoral body with the object of getting *only resolute advocates of democratic and free representation* elected to the Duma. At the same time the committees strive to set up, apart from the 'legal' representative body, an *illegal representative* body which would *be able* at the right moment *to come forward* as the country's *provisional organ of the people's will*. The committees call on the population to *elect* their representatives *by universal suffrage*; *at a given moment* these representatives should *gather in some one city and proclaim themselves a constituent assembly*. Such is, so to say, the ideal objective of this campaign. Whether matters will get so far as this or not, a movement along these lines will serve to organise revolutionary self-government, which will smash the shackles of tsarist legality, and lay the foundation for the future triumph of the revolution. Little by little the rudiments of

* See pp. 212-23 of this volume.—*Ed*.

such revolutionary self-government are arising all over Russia, as, for instance, has already happened at the present time *in two Caucasian gubernias* where the official authorities are being boycotted by the entire population, and the latter is being governed by its own elected authorities. (In parentheses: *the peasants of Guria* demand *that these authorities be endorsed by our Committee.*)

"The abolition of the autocracy, which does not wish to inaugurate a constitutional era voluntarily, must proceed by way of setting up such publicly functioning self-government bodies everywhere. It goes without saying that opportunities for this are engendered by the increasing disorganisation of the government apparatus and the growth of an effective power (*wirkenden Kraft*) among the people."

We recommend this peerless plan to the comrades as *the ideal objective of the monarchist* (*Osvobozhdeniye*) *bourgeoisie*, as the *ideal objective of liquidating the Russian proletarian-peasant revolution by the liberal landlords*.

As we have pointed out hundreds of times, the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, i.e., the monarchist bourgeoisie, wants just such a "liquidation" as would bring about the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie without a popular uprising, or, at any rate, without the complete victory of an uprising of the people. Manilovist plans for "elections" while the autocracy remains in power *play entirely into the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie*, which alone is capable of producing anything at all resembling such elections.

We shall dwell on the details of this ridiculous plan only briefly. Is it not naïve to forget that self-government in the Caucasus (not in two gubernias, but in a few volosts) rests on *an armed uprising*? Is it not puerile to imagine that what is possible in a few mountain villages in a remote frontier district is possible in the heart of Russia without the people's victory over the autocracy? Is not this plan of multi-stage "elections" *while power remains in the hands of the autocratic government*, *a bit of superb pedantry*? "The dissatisfied elements of the population" (?) elect people's agitation committees (without a programme, without clear slogans). The committees set up an "illegal representative body" (in all probability, simply replacing the illegal organisation of the *Socialist* Labour Party by an *Osvobozhdeniye* organisation!). It is obvious that the substitution of the obscure term, "*organ of the people's will*", for the clear revolutionary term, "a provisional government as the organ of the uprising", is

simply playing into the hands of the Zemstvo-bourgeois party. *Universal* elections to a constituent assembly on the initiative of "illegal" committees, while Trepov[90] and Co. are left in power is an idea which is altogether infantile.

In disputes it is sometimes useful to have a "devil's advocate"—one who defends an absurd view which is rejected by everyone. *Iskra* has now assumed this role. Its plan is most helpful for educational purposes in refuting absurdities at meetings of study circles, extemporaneous meetings, mass meetings, etc.; it is very helpful for the purpose of bringing out more distinctly the contrast between the slogans of the revolutionary proletariat and those of the monarchist liberal bourgeoisie.

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KEEPING INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY INFORMED OF OUR PARTY AFFAIRS

Keeping international Social-Democracy informed of our Party affairs is one of the most important duties of all Social-Democrats living abroad. We remind the comrades of this and appeal for the most energetic agitation in defence of the stand taken by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. This agitation must be conducted indefatigably, on any pretext, on any suitable occasion, and in positively all study circles of workers abroad, as well as with individual members of foreign Social-Democratic parties. This agitation must be conducted in ways that are worthy of conscious Social-Democrats and members of a workers' party. It must be based on the principle of *full* information concerning the *documentary* aspect of the matter. Priority should be given to the circulation of the Third Congress resolutions published *in the French language* (the supplement to the newspaper *Le Socialiste* of June 25, 1905. Address of *Le Socialiste*, central organ of the French socialists: *Rue de la Corderie 16*, *Paris*) as well as *in the German language* (the pamphlet *Bericht über den 3. Parteitag*; publisher's address: *Birk et Co.*, *Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt*, *München*, *Vittelsbacherplatz 2. Preis 20 pf.*). Both the French and the German translations are also available from the Party office.

In addition to this basic material, the most important documents and articles from our literature should also be translated. In doing so we must constantly expose the indecency of the Khlestakov-like new *Iskra*. The latter has not published, either in French or in German, the full text of its Conference resolutions (which reveals its usurping

arrogation of the title of Central Organ). *Iskra* has published in the European Social-Democratic press such "statistics" about organised labour that evoke nothing but laughter (suffice it to say that the new *Iskra* has not yet made so bold as to make these "statistics" public in Russian, for fear of disgracing itself, but we have printed these statistics in full in No. 9 of *Proletary*).[91] *Iskra* is now circulating among all colonies abroad a letter over the Editorial Board's signature containing the same brand of amusing Khlestakovian claims regarding the Minority's forces, claims which have been shamefacedly withheld from Russian readers of our Social-Democratic newspapers. Publicity-mongers should be fought against to the utmost, but that struggle should be conducted in a dignified way, so as to get the public *fully informed*, and make matters as clear as possible, without the least boasting and literary bombast, without falling into gossip and private allusions which cannot stand the light of publicity.

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NOTE TO THE ARTICLE "RUSSIA'S FINANCES AND THE REVOLUTION"

From the Editorial Board. Rudolf Martin's book *The Future of Russia and Japan*, which recently appeared in Berlin, is splendid confirmation of the conclusions drawn by the author of this article. We have as yet had no opportunity to examine this book, and shall, therefore, merely take note of its main arguments as reported in the foreign press. The author's approach to the matter is one of pure scholarship and devoid of any political sympathies. A statistician by profession, he has made a thorough study of Russia's financial standing and arrives at the conclusion that a declaration of insolvency is inevitable, whether the war goes on or whether peace is concluded. Russian agriculture is in a state of complete decline, a capital of 50 thousand million rubles being required to put it on its feet again. Over the next ten years the budget deficit will amount to at least 300 million rubles annually. Russia's national debt, estimated by the author at approximately eight thousand million rubles today, will reach 12 thousand million rubles in five years' time. There is nothing with which to pay the interest on the loans because nobody will now give Russia any money. The parallel between the Russia of 1905 and the France of Louis XVI is simply amazing. Rudolf Martin strongly advises Germany to get all Russian loans off her hands at the earliest opportunity (in America, if possible)—loans in which 1,500 million rubles' worth of German money has been invested. The European bourgeoisie is hurrying to escape, foreseeing the inevitability of a Russian collapse.

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SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PEASANT MOVEMENT

The tremendous importance of the peasant movement in the democratic revolution Russia is now passing through has been repeatedly explained in the entire Social-Democratic press. As is well known, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. passed a special resolution on this question in order to define more exactly and to co-ordinate the activities of the whole party of the class-conscious proletariat with regard to the peasant movement of today. Although the resolution was drawn up in advance (the first draft was published in *Vperyod*, No. 11, March 10 [23], 1905*), and although it was carefully gone over at the Party Congress, which took pains to formulate the views already established throughout the Russian Social-Democratic movement—the resolution has nevertheless perplexed a number of comrades working in Russia. The Saratov Committee has unanimously declared this resolution unacceptable (see *Proletary*, No. 10).[92] It is to be regretted that an explanation of this verdict, as requested by us at the time, has not yet been forthcoming. We only know that the Saratov Committee has declared also unacceptable the agrarian resolution passed by the new-*Iskra* Conference—consequently they are dissatisfied by what is common to both resolutions, not by what distinguishes them.

New material on this question is provided by a letter we have received from a Moscow comrade (issued in the form of a hectographed leaflet). We print this letter in full:

* "The Proletariat and the Peasantry", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 235-36.—*Ed.*

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND TO THE COMRADES WORKING IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS

Comrades,

The regional organisation of the Moscow Committee has taken up work among the peasants. The lack of experience in organising such work, the special conditions prevailing in the rural districts of Central Russia, and also the lack of clarity in the directives contained in the resolutions of the Third Congress on this question, and the almost complete absence of material in the periodical and other press on work among the peasantry, compel us to appeal to the Central Committee to send us detailed directives, covering both the theoretical aspect and the practical questions involved, while we ask comrades who are doing similar work to acquaint us with the practical knowledge your experience has given you.

We consider it necessary to inform you about the misgivings that have arisen among us after reading the resolution of the Third Congress "on the attitude towards the peasant movement", and about the organisational plan which we are already beginning to apply in our work in the rural districts.

"§ a) To carry on propaganda among the mass of the people, explaining that Social-Democracy aims at giving the most energetic support to all revolutionary measures taken by the peasantry and likely to improve their condition, measures including confiscation of land belonging to the landlords, the state, the church, the monasteries, and the imperial family" (from the resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.).

First of all, this paragraph does not clarify how Party organisations will, or should, carry on their propaganda. Propaganda requires, first and foremost, an organisation standing very close to those who are to be propagandised. Whether this organisation should consist of committees of the rural proletariat, or whether other organisational forms of oral and printed propaganda are possible—this question remains unanswered.

The same applies to the promise to give energetic support. To give support, and energetic support at that, is also possible only if local organisations exist. To us the question of "energetic support" seems in general very vague. Can Social-Democracy support the expropriation of landlords' estates that are farmed most intensively with the use of machinery, cultivating high-grade crops, etc.? The transfer of such estates to petty-bourgeois proprietors, however important improvement of their condition may be, would be a step back from the standpoint of the capitalist development of the given estate. In our opinion we as Social-Democrats should have made a reservation on this matter of "support": "provided the expropriation of this land and its transfer to peasant (petty-bourgeois) ownership results in a higher form of economic development on these estates."

Further:

"§ d) To strive for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat, for its fusion with the urban proletariat under the banner of

the Social-Democratic Party, and for the inclusion of its representatives in the peasant committees."

Doubts arise with regard to the latter part of this paragraph. The fact is that bourgeois-democratic organisations such as the Peasant Union, and reactionary-utopian organisations such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries organise under their banner both bourgeois and proletarian elements of the peasantry. By bringing into such "peasant" committees our representatives from rural proletarian organisations we shall be contradicting ourselves, our stand regarding a bloc, etc.

Here, too, we believe, amendments, and very serious ones, are needed.

These are a few general remarks on the resolutions of the Third Congress. These should be analysed as soon and in as great detail as possible.

As regards the plan for a "rural" organisation in our Regional Organisation, we must say that we have to work under conditions which are not even mentioned in the resolutions of the Third Congress. First of all, it should be noted that the territory we cover—Moscow Gubernia and the adjoining uyezds of neighbouring gubernias—is mainly an industrial area with a relatively low level of handicraft industry and with a very small section of the population engaged *exclusively* in agriculture. Huge textile mills, each employing 10,000 to 15,000 workers, alternate with small factories, employing 500 to 1,000 workers and scattered in out-of-the-way hamlets and villages. One would think that in such conditions Social-Democracy would find here a most favourable field for its activities, but facts have proved that so superficial an assumption does not hold water. Although some of the factories have been in existence for 40 or 50 years, the overwhelming majority of our "proletariat" have not yet become divorced from the land. The "village" has such a strong hold over them, that none of the psychological and other characteristics acquired by a "pure" proletarian in the course of collective work develops among our proletarians. The farming carried on by our "proletarians" is of a peculiarly linsey-woolsey type. A weaver employed in a mill hires a labourer to till his patch of land. His wife (if she is not working at the mill), his children, and the aged and invalid members of the family work on this same piece of land, and he himself will work on it when he becomes old or maimed, or is discharged for violent or suspicious behaviour. Such "proletarians" can hardly be called proletarians. Their economic status is that of paupers; their ideology is that of petty bourgeois. They are ignorant and conservative. It is from such that Black-Hundred elements are recruited. However, even among these people class-consciousness has begun to awaken of late. Through the agency of "pure" proletarians we are endeavouring to rouse these ignorant masses from their age-old slumber, and not without success. Our contacts are increasing in number, and in places our foothold is becoming firmer, the paupers are coming under our influence, beginning to adopt our ideology, both in the factory and in the village. And we believe that it will not be unorthodox to form organisations in an environment that is not "purely" proletarian. We have no other environment, and were we to insist on orthodoxy

and organise only the rural "proletariat", we would have to disband our organisation and those in the neighbouring districts. We know we shall have difficulties in struggling against the urge to expropriate the arable and other land neglected by the landlords, or those lands which the holy fathers in cowl and cassock have not been able to farm properly. We know that bourgeois democracy, from the "democratic"-monarchist faction (such a faction exists in Ruza Uyezd) down to the "Peasant" Union, will fight us for influence among the "paupers", but we shall arm the latter to oppose the former. We shall make use of all Social-Democratic forces in the region, both intellectual and proletarian, to set up and consolidate our Social-Democratic committees of "paupers". And we shall do this in accordance with the following plan. In each uyezd town, or big industrial centre we shall set up uyezd committees of groups coming under the Regional Organisation. In addition to setting up factory committees in its district the uyezd committee will also set up "peasant" committees. For reasons of secrecy these committees should not have many people on them and should be made up of the most revolutionary and capable pauperised peasants. Wherever there are both factories and peasants, workers and peasants should be organised in a single subgroup committee.

In the first place, such committees should have a clear and exact idea of local conditions: A) Agrarian relationships: 1) peasant allotments, leases, form of tenure (communal, by households, etc.); 2) the neighbouring land: a) to whom it belongs; b) the amount of land; c) what relation the peasants have to this land; d) on what terms the land is held: 1) labour rent, 2) excessive rent for "cut-off lands", etc.; e) indebtedness to kulaks, landlords, etc. B) Imposts, taxes, the rate of assessment of peasant and landlord lands respectively. C) Migratory labour and handicraft industries, passports, whether there is winter hiring,[93] etc. D) Local factories and plants: the working conditions there; 1) wages, 2) working hours, 3) the attitude of the management, 4) housing conditions, etc. E) The administration: the Rural Superintendents, the volost headman, the clerk, the volost judges, constables, the priest. F) The Zemstvo: councillors representing the peasants, Zemstvo employees: the teacher, the doctor, libraries, schools, tea-rooms. G) Volost assemblies: their composition and procedure. H) Organisations: the Peasant Union, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democrats.

After familiarising itself with all these data the Peasant Social-Democratic Committee is obliged to get such decisions passed by the assemblies as may be necessitated by any abnormal state of affairs. This committee should simultaneously carry on among the masses intense propaganda and agitation for the ideas of Social-Democracy, organise study circles, impromptu meetings, mass meetings, distribute leaflets and other literature, collect funds for the Party, and keep in touch with the Regional Organisation through the uyezd group.

I we succeed in setting up a number of such committees the success of Social-Democracy will be assured.

Regional Organiser

It goes without saying that we shall not undertake the task of working out the detailed practical directives to which the comrade refers: this is a matter for the comrades on the spot and for the central body in Russia which is guiding the practical work. We propose to take the opportunity presented by our Moscow comrade's interesting letter to explain the resolution of the Third Congress and the urgent tasks of the Party in general. It is obvious from the letter that the misunderstandings caused by the resolution of the Third Congress are only partly due to doubts in the field of theory. Another source is the *new* question, which has not arisen before, about the relations between the "revolutionary peasant committees" and the "*Social-Democratic Committees*" which are working among the peasants. The very posing of this question testifies to the big step forward made in Social-Democratic work among the peasants. Questions of—relatively speaking—detail are now being brought into the foreground by the practical requirements of "rural" agitation, which is striking root and assuming stable and permanent forms. And the author of the letter keeps forgetting that when he blames the Congress resolution for lack of clarity, he is in fact seeking an answer to a question which the Congress of the Party did not raise and could not have raised.

For instance, the author is not quite right when he says that both propagation of our ideas and support for the peasant movement are possible "only" if local organisations exist. Of course such organisations are desirable, and as the work increases they will become necessary; but such work is possible and necessary even where no such organisations exist. In all our activities, even when carried on exclusively among the urban proletariat, we must never lose sight of the peasant question and must disseminate the declaration made by the *entire party of the class-conscious proletariat* in the person of the Third Congress, namely, that we support a peasant uprising. The peasants must learn this—from literature, from the workers, from special organisations, etc. The peasants must learn that in giving this support the Social-Democratic proletariat will *not stop short* of any form of confiscation of the land (i.e., expropriation without compensation to the owners).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A question of theory has in this connection been raised by the author of the letter, whether the expropriation of the big estates and their transfer to "peasant, petty-bourgeois ownership" should not be specifically qualified. But by proposing such a reservation the author has arbitrarily limited the purport of the resolution of the Third Congress. There is *not a word* in the resolution about the Social-Democratic Party undertaking to support transfer of the confiscated land to petty-bourgeois proprietors. The resolution states: we support ... "up to and including confiscation", i.e., including expropriation without compensation; however, the resolution does not in any way decide to whom the expropriated land is to be given. It was not by chance that the question was left open: it is obvious from the articles in *Vperyod* (Nos. 11, 12, 15*) that it was deemed unwise to decide this question in advance. It was stated there, for instance, that under a democratic republic Social-Democracy cannot pledge itself and have its hands tied with regard to nationalisation of the land.

Indeed, it is the revolutionary-democratic aspect of the peasant uprisings and a particular organisation of the rural proletariat in a class party that *at present* form the crux of the matter for us, as distinct from the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries. It is not schemes of a "general redistribution" or nationalisation that is the kernel of the question; the essential thing is that the peasantry see the need for, and accomplish, the *revolutionary* demolition of the old order. That is why the Socialist-Revolutionaries are pressing for "socialisation", etc., while we are pressing for *revolutionary peasant committees*: without the latter, we say, all reforms amount to nothing. With them and supported by them the *victory of the peasant uprising* is possible.

We must help the peasant uprising in every way, up to and including confiscation of the land, *but certainly not including all sorts of petty-bourgeois schemes*. We support the peasant movement to the extent that it is revolutionary-democratic. We are making ready (doing so now, at once)

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* "The Proletariat and the Peasantry", 1905; "On Our Agrarian Programme", 1905; "The Agrarian Programme of the Liberals", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 231-36, 246-51, 315-22.—*Ed.*

to fight it when, and to the extent that, it becomes reactionary and anti-proletarian. The essence of Marxism lies in that double task, which only those who do not understand Marxism can vulgarise or compress into a single and simple task.

Let us take a concrete instance. Let us assume that the peasant uprising has been victorious. The revolutionary peasant committees and the provisional revolutionary government (relying, in part, on these very committees) can proceed to any confiscation of big property. We are in favour of confiscation, as we have already declared. But to whom shall we recommend giving the confiscated land. On this question we have not committed ourselves nor shall we ever do so by declarations like those rashly proposed by the author of the letter. The latter has forgotten that the same resolution of the Third Congress speaks of "*purging the revolutionary-democratic content of the peasant movement of all reactionary admixtures*"—that is one point—and, secondly, of the need "*in all cases and under all circumstances for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat*". These are our directives. There will always be reactionary admixtures in the peasant movement, and we declare war on them in advance. Class antagonism between the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie is unavoidable, and we disclose it in advance, explain it, *and prepare for the struggle on the basis of that antagonism*. One of the immediate causes of such a struggle may very likely be provided by the question: to whom shall the confiscated land be given, and how? We do not gloss over that question, nor do we promise equalitarian distribution, "socialisation", etc. What we do say is that this is a question we shall fight out later on, fight again, on a new field and with other allies. There, we shall certainly be with the rural proletariat, with the entire working class, *against* the peasant bourgeoisie. In practice this may mean the transfer of the land to the class of petty peasant proprietors—wherever big estates based on bondage and feudal servitude still prevail, and there are as yet no material conditions for large-scale socialist production; it may mean nationalisation—given complete victory of the democratic revolution—or the big capitalist estates being transferred to *workers' associations*, for from

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the democratic revolution we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half-way. If we do not now and immediately promise all sorts of "socialisation", that is because we know the actual conditions for that task to be accomplished, and we do not gloss over the new class struggle burgeoning within the peasantry, but reveal that struggle.

At first we support the peasantry *en masse* against the landlords, support it to the hilt and with all means, including confiscation, and then (it would be better to say, at the same time) we support the proletariat against the peasantry *en masse*. To try to calculate *now* what the combination of forces will be within the peasantry "on the day after" the revolution (the democratic revolution) is empty utopianism. Without falling into adventurism or going against our conscience in matters of science, without striving for cheap popularity we can and do assert *only one thing*: we shall bend every effort to help the entire peasantry achieve the democratic revolution, *in order thereby to make it easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on as quickly as possible to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution. We promise no harmony, no equalitarianism or "socialisation" following the victory of the *present* peasant uprising, on the contrary, we "promise" a new struggle, new inequality, the new revolution we are striving for. Our doctrine is less "sweet" than the legends of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but let those who want to be fed solely on sweets join the Socialist-Revolutionaries; we shall say to such people: good riddance.

In our opinion this Marxist point of view settles also the question of the committees. In our opinion *there should be no Social-Democratic peasant* committees. If they are Social-Democratic, that means they are not purely peasant committees; if they are peasant committees, that means they are not purely proletarian, not Social-Democratic committees. There is a host of such who would confuse the two, but we are not of their number. Wherever possible we shall strive to set up *our* committees, committees of the *Social-*

Democratic Labour Party. They will consist of peasants, paupers, intellectuals, prostitutes (a worker recently asked us in a letter why not carry on agitation among the prostitutes), soldiers, teachers, workers—in short, *all Social-Democrats*, *and none but Social-Democrats*. These committees will conduct the whole of Social-Democratic work, in its full scope, striving, however, to organise the rural proletariat especially and particularly, since the Social-Democratic Party is the class party of the proletariat. To consider it "unorthodox" to organise a proletariat which has not entirely freed itself from various relics of the past is a *tremendous delusion*, and we would like to think that the relevant passages of the letter are due to a mere misunderstanding. The urban and industrial proletariat will inevitably be the nucleus of our Social-Democratic Labour Party, but we must attract to it, enlighten, and organise all who labour and are exploited, as stated in our programme—all without exception: handicraftsmen, paupers, beggars, servants, tramps, prostitutes—of course, subject to the necessary and obligatory condition that they join the Social-Democratic movement and not that the Social-Democratic movement join them, that they adopt the standpoint of the proletariat, and not that the proletariat adopt theirs.

The reader may ask—what is the point, then, of having revolutionary peasant committees? Does this mean that they are not necessary? No, they are necessary. Our ideal is purely Social-Democratic committees in all rural districts, and then agreement between them and *all* revolutionary-democratic elements, groups, and circles of the peasantry for the purpose of establishing revolutionary committees. There is a perfect analogy here to the independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in the towns and its alliance with all the revolutionary democrats for the purpose of insurrection. We are in favour of a peasant uprising. We are absolutely opposed to the mixing and merging of heterogeneous class elements and heterogeneous parties. We hold that for the purpose of insurrection Social-Democracy should give an impetus to *all* revolutionary democracy, should help it *all* to organise, should *march shoulder to shoulder* with it, but without merging with it, to the barricades

in the cities, and against the landlords and the police in the villages.

Long live the insurrection in town and country against the autocracy! Long live revolutionary Social-Democracy, the vanguard of all revolutionary democracy in the present revolution!

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WHAT OUR LIBERAL BOURGEOIS WANT, AND WHAT THEY FEAR

In Russia political education of the people and the intelligentsia hardly exists as yet. Clear political convictions and firm party opinions have as yet scarcely developed in our country. People in Russia are too ready to give credence to any protest against the autocracy and frown upon any criticism of the character and substance of that protest, regarding such criticism as something that maliciously disunites the movement for emancipation. It is not surprising, therefore, that under this general flag of emancipation the *Osvobozhdeniye** too, which is published under the editorship of Mr. Struve, has a wide circulation among all and sundry free-thinking intellectuals who resent any analysis of the class content of *Osvobozhdeniye* liberalism.

And yet, *Osvobozhdeniye* liberalism is merely a more systematic, uncensored expression of the fundamental features of Russian liberalism as a whole. The farther the revolution advances, the more that liberalism exposes itself, and the more unpardonable is the fear of looking the truth full in the face and understanding the real essence of that liberalism. The "Political Letters" of the well-known historian Mr. Pavel Vinogradov, published in *Russkiye Vedomosti* (August 5), the well-known liberal organ, are highly characteristic in this respect. No less characteristic is the fact that other liberal newspapers, like *Nasha Zhizn*, quoted excerpts from this admirable piece of writing, without a single word of indignation or protest. Mr. Pavel

* *Osvobozhdeniye*—Russian for "emancipation, liberation".—*Tr.*

Vinogradov has expressed in bold relief, in a way rarely to be met, the interests, tactics, and psychology of the self-seeking bourgeoisie; his outspokenness might, perhaps, be considered inappropriate by certain of the shrewder liberals, but then that makes it all the more valuable to class-conscious workers. Here are the concluding words of Mr. Vinogradov's article, which express its very quintessence:

> "I do not know whether Russia will succeed in reaching the new system along a road close to that taken by Germany in 1848, but I have no doubt that every effort must be exerted to enter upon this road, and not upon the one chosen by France in 1789.
>
> "Along the latter path Russian society—raw, poorly organised, and torn by internecine strife—will encounter tremendous dangers, if not its doom. To wait until we get object lessons on the subject of power, order, national unity, and social organisation is undesirable, the more so since these object lessons will be given either by the police sergeant, who will have gained new strength, or by the German corporal, whom anarchy in Russia will provide with a providential mission."

That is what the Russian bourgeois is thinking of most of all: the tremendous dangers of the "road" of 1789! The bourgeois has no objection to the path taken by Germany in 1848, but he will exert "every effort" to avoid the path taken by France. An instructive pronouncement, one which provides much food for thought.

What is the radical difference between the two roads? It is that the bourgeois-democratic revolution carried out by France in 1789, and by Germany in 1848, was brought to its consummation in the first case, but not in the second. The first ended in a republic and complete liberty, whereas the second stopped short without smashing the monarchy and reaction. The second proceeded under the leadership mainly of the liberal bourgeoisie, which took the insufficiently mature working class in tow, whereas the first was carried out, at least to a certain extent, by the revolutionarily active mass of the people, the workers and peasants, who, for a time at least, pushed the respectable and moderate bourgeoisie aside. The second led rapidly to the "pacification" of the country, i.e., the suppression of the revolutionary people and the triumph of "the police sergeant and the corporal"; whereas for a certain period the first placed power in the hands of the revolutionary people

which crushed the resistance of "the police sergeants and the corporals".

And now a learned lackey of the Russian bourgeoisie comes out in a "highly respectable" liberal organ with a warning against the first road, the "French". The learned historian wants the "German" road, and is quite outspoken about it. He knows perfectly well that the German road did not escape an armed uprising of the people. In 1848 and 1849 there were a number of uprisings and even provisional revolutionary governments in Germany. *But none of these uprisings was fully victorious*. The most successful of them, the Berlin uprising of March 18, 1848, terminated not in the overthrow of the royal power, but in *concessions* granted by the king, who remained in power and very soon managed to recover from his partial defeat and withdraw all these concessions.

And so, the learned historian of the bourgeoisie does not fear an uprising of the people. *He fears the victory of the people*. He is not afraid of the people administering a slight lesson to the reactionaries and the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy which he hates so much. *He is afraid of the people overthrowing the reactionary government*. He hates the autocracy and desires its overthrow with all his heart; it is not from the preservation of the autocracy, not from the poisoning of the people's organism by the slow putrefaction of the still living parasite of monarchist rule that he expects the *doom* of Russia, but *from the complete victory of the people*.

This man of cheap-jack scholarship knows that a time of revolution is a time of object lessons for the people, but he does not want object lessons on the *destruction of reaction*, and tries to scare us with object lessons on *the destruction of the revolution*. He is scared to death of the road which has led to the complete victory of the revolution, even for a short time, and yearns with all his heart for an outcome like the German, in which reaction secured complete victory for a long, long time.

He does not welcome revolution in Russia, but merely tries to find extenuating circumstances for it. He desires not a victorious revolution, but an unsuccessful revolution. He considers reaction a phenomenon that is in order and legitimate, natural and durable, reliable and reasonable.

He regards revolution as a phenomenon that is illegitimate, fantastic, and unnatural, one that can at best be *justified* to a certain degree on the grounds of the instability, the "weakness", the "unsoundness" of the autocratic government. This "objective" historian regards revolution not as the most lawful right of the people, but merely as a sinful and dangerous method of correcting the extremes of reaction. In his opinion a revolution which has been completely victorious is "anarchy", whereas completely victorious reaction is not anarchy, but merely a slight exaggeration of certain necessary functions of the state. He knows of no other "rule" but a monarchy, no other "system" and no other "social organisation" but those of the bourgeoisie. Of the European forces which revolution in Russia will "provide with a providential mission" he knows only the "German corporal", but he neither knows nor cares to know *the German Social-Democratic worker*. He detests most of all the "presumption" of those who "are preparing to outstrip the Western bourgeoisie" (the Professor writes the word bourgeoisie in ironical quotation marks as if to say: what a stupid term to apply to European—Eu-ro-pe-an—civilisation!). This "objective historian" smugly closes his eyes to the fact that it is precisely because of the old abomination of the Russian autocracy that Europe has for decades and decades been marking time and even retrogressing politically. He fears the object lesson of the "police sergeant who will have gained new strength" and therefore—O leader of the people! O statesman!—he utters a warning above all against resolutely smashing all the "forces" of the contemporary police sergeant. What contemptible servility! What a despicable betrayal of the revolution, dished up with the sauce of a pseudo-scholarly and pseudo-objective analysis of the question! Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar, said Napoleon. We say, scratch a Russian liberal bourgeois and you will find a police sergeant in a brand-new uniform, who is permitted to retain nine-tenths of his *old* strength for the very profound, "scholarly", and "objective" reason that otherwise, he may, perhaps, want to "gain *new* strength"! Every bourgeois ideologist has the soul of a thoroughgoing huckster; he does not think of destroying the *forces* of reaction and of the "police sergeant", but

of bribing this police sergeant, of greasing his palm and appeasing him by striking a bargain with him as quickly as possible.

How inimitably this most learned ideologist of the bourgeoisie corroborates all that we have so often said in Proletary about the nature and character of Russian liberalism! Unlike the European bourgeoisie, which was revolutionary in its time and went over to the side of reaction decades later, our home-grown wiseacres immediately skip revolution, or want to do so, and arrive at the moderate and tidy rule of the reactionary bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie does not and, because of its class position, cannot want revolution. It merely wants to strike a bargain with the monarchy against the revolutionary people; it merely wants to steal to power behind the backs of that people.

And what an instructive lesson this liberal bourgeois sage teaches those doctrinaire Social-Democrats who have gone as far as the following resolution, which was adopted by the Caucasian supporters of the new *Iskra* and *specially approved* by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* in a special supplement. This resolution (together with *Iskra* 's approval) is given in full in N. Lenin's *Two Tactics* (pp. 68-69),* but since many comrades in Russia are not acquainted with this resolution, and since the *Iskra* Editorial Board refused to publish this, in their opinion, so "very apt" resolution, we reproduce it here in full so as to edify all Social-Democrats and put *Iskra* to shame:

"Whereas we consider it to be our task to take advantage of the revolutionary situation so as to deepen Social-Democratic consciousness in the proletariat, and in order to secure for the Party complete freedom to criticise the nascent bourgeois-state system, the Conference" (the Caucasian new-*Iskra* Conference) "declares itself against the formation of a Social-Democratic provisional government, and entering such a government, and considers it to be the most expedient course to exercise pressure from without upon the bourgeois provisional government in order to secure a feasible measure of democratisation of the state system. The Conference believes that the formation of a provisional government by

* See pp. 93-94 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Social-Democrats, or their entering such a government, would lead, on the one hand, to the masses of the proletariat becoming disappointed in the Social-Democratic Party and abandoning it, because the Social-Democrats, despite the seizure of power, would not be able to satisfy the pressing needs of the working class, including the establishment of socialism, and, on the other hand, *would cause the bourgeois classes to recoil from the revolution and thus diminish its sweep*."

This is a shameful resolution, for (against the will and mind of its authors, who have stepped on to the inclined plane of opportunism) it expresses a betrayal of the interests of the working class to the bourgeoisie. This resolution sanctifies the conversion of the proletariat into the tail-end of the bourgeoisie for the duration of the democratic revolution. One need but place this resolution side by side with the passage from Mr. Vinogradov's article quoted above (and anybody will find hundreds and thousands of similar passages in the writings of the liberal publicists) to realise what a marsh the new-Iskrists have got into. Mr. Vinogradov, this typical ideologist of the bourgeoisie, has *already recoiled* from the cause of the revolution. Has he not thereby diminished the "sweep of the revolution", gentlemen of the new *Iskra*? Should you not go penitently to the Vinogradovs and beg them, *at the price of your refraining from leading the revolution*, not "to recoil from the revolution"?

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THE THEORY OF SPONTANEOUS GENERATION

"*Iskra* has shown that a constituent assembly can be formed by way of spontaneous generation, without the aid of any government whatever, and consequently without the aid of a provisional government as well. Henceforth this terrible problem may be regarded as settled, and all disputes in connection with it must cease."

Thus runs the Bund statement made in No. 247 of *Posledniye Izvestia*, dated September 1 (August 19). Unless this is irony, no better "development" of *Iskra*'s views could be imagined. In any case, the theory of "spontaneous generation" has been established, the "terrible problem" has been settled, and disputes "must cease". What a blessing! We shall now live without disputes about this terrible question, cherishing this new, recently discovered, and simple theory of "spontaneous generation", a theory as clear as the eyes of a child. True, this theory of spontaneous generation was not generated spontaneously, but appeared to the common view as the fruit of cohabitation between the Bund and the new *Iskra*—but after all what is important is not the origin, but the value of a theory!

How slow-witted were those unfortunate Russian Social-Democrats who discussed this "terrible question" both at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and at the Conference of new-Iskrists: some of these discussed at length the question of a provisional government *for the purpose* of generating, but not spontaneously, a constituent assembly. Others (the Conference resolution) thought it possible that "the revolution's decisive victory over tsarism may be marked" also by the "decision of some representative institution to call, under the direct revolutionary pres-

sure of the people, a constituent assembly". No one, however, not even the new *Iskra*'s Editorial Board, who attended the Conference in full together with Plekhanov, could ever have thought up what "'*Iskra*' *has now shown*", and what the Bund has now summarised, confirmed, and christened with a magnificent name. Like all great discoveries, *the theory of the spontaneous generation of a constituent assembly* immediately sheds light on what was utter confusion. Now everything has become clear. There is no need to think of a revolutionary provisional government (remember *Iskra*'s famous dictum: let not the combination of the words "long live" and "government" defile your lips); there is no need to make the members of the State Duma give a "revolutionary pledge" to "transform the State Duma into a revolutionary assembly" (Cherevanin, in *Iskra*, No. 108). *A constituent assembly can be generated spontaneously!!* It will be immaculately brought forth by the people themselves, who will not defile themselves with any "intermediary" by way of a government, even a provisional, even a revolutionary one. This will be birth "without original sin", by the pure method of general elections with no "Jacobin" struggle for power, with no defilement of the holy cause through betrayal by bourgeois representative assemblies, and even without any coarse midwives, who hitherto in this profane, sinful, and unclean world had punctually appeared on the scene every time the old society was pregnant with a new one.

Hail spontaneous generation! Let all the revolutionary peoples of all Russia now appreciate its "possibility"—and consequently its necessity *to them* as the most rational, easy, and simple road to freedom! Let a monument be speedily erected in honour of the Bund and the new *Iskra*, the spontaneous progenitors of the theory of spontaneous generation!

But however much we may be blinded by the glaring light of this new scientific discovery, we must touch up on certain base features in this sublime creation. Just as the moon is very badly made in Hamburg,[94] so too new theories are fabricated none too carefully at the editorial office of *Posledniye Izvestia*. The recipe is a simple one, long a favourite with people who could never be accused of harbouring a single original thought—take contrasting views, mix

them, and divide into two parts! From *Proletary* we take the criticism of popular elections under the autocracy, from *Iskra* —condemnation of the "terrible problem"; from *Proletary*— the active boycott, from *Iskra*—the uselessness of insurrection as a slogan ... "like a bee that gathers a fee from each flowering tree". And the good Bundists are smugly preening themselves, rejoicing at the termination of disputes on the terrible problem, and admiring themselves: how superior they are to the narrow and biased views of both contending parties!

It doesn't work out, comrades of the Bund. You have shown no other "way of spontaneous generation" than that of the new *Iskra*. And as regards the latter, you yourselves have had to admit that "under the autocracy and against the will of the government, which holds the entire machinery of state in its hands", elections of popular representatives can only be *farcical* elections. Do not abandon us half-way, O creators of the new theory; tell us in what "way" other than the new *Iskra*'s you "visualise" "spontaneous generation"?

In opposition to *Iskra*, *Proletary* wrote that the only people who will be able to conduct elections under the autocracy are the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, who will willingly call them popular elections.* The Bund replies: "This argument does not hold water, since it is beyond doubt that the autocracy will allow no one—not even the *Osvobozhdeniye* League—to conduct elections except within limits established by law." We may respectfully remark: the Zemstvos, municipal councillors, and members of "unions" have held, and are holding, elections. That is a fact. Their numerous bureaux provide proof of it.

The Bund writes: "We should not start agitation against the Duma and for an insurrection in general [!] since insurrection, as merely a means of effecting a political revolution, cannot in this case [and not "in general"?] serve as a slogan for agitation. We can and must reply to the Duma by extending and intensifying political agitation for a constituent assembly to be elected on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage." To this we answer: in the first place, had the Bundists done a little thinking, or even simply consulted

* See p. 198 of this volume.—*Ed.*

our Party programme, they would have seen that a constituent assembly, too, is only a "means". It is illogical to declare one "means" suitable as a slogan, and another unsuitable "in general". Secondly, we have already for a long time past repeatedly explained in detail that a slogan calling for a constituent assembly alone is inadequate, since it has become an *Osvobozhdeniye* slogan, the slogan of the bourgeois "compromisers" (see *Proletary*, Nos. 3 and 4*). It is *quite natural* for the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie to *gloss over* the question of the *method* of convening a constituent assembly. For representatives of the revolutionary proletariat it is totally impermissible. The theory of spontaneous generation fully befits the former, but as regards the latter, it can only disgrace them in the eyes of class-conscious workers.

The Bund's final argument: "An armed uprising is imperative, and we must keep on preparing for it all the time. However, we are as yet unable to launch an uprising, therefore [!!] there is no point in linking it up with the Duma." To this we reply: 1) to acknowledge that insurrection and preparations for it are imperative and at the same time to turn up one's nose contemptuously at the question of "combat squads" ("taken from the *Vperyod* arsenal", as the Bund writes) means to defeat one's own purpose and reveal a lack of thought in one's writings. 2) A provisional revolutionary government is an organ of insurrection. This principle, which is clearly expressed in a resolution of the Third Congress, was accepted in essence by the new-*Iskra* Conference too, although, in our opinion, it was less aptly put (a provisional revolutionary government "emerging from a victorious popular insurrection": both logic and historical experience show that it is possible to have provisional revolutionary governments as organs of insurrection which are far from victorious, or which are not completely victorious; moreover, a provisional revolutionary government does not only "emerge" from an uprising, but also directs it). The Bundists do not attempt to dispute this proposition,

* "Revolutionary Struggle and Liberal Brokerage", "The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat". See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 492-93, 511-18.—*Ed.*

and indeed it cannot be disputed. To recognise that an uprising and preparations for it are imperative, and at the same time to demand the cessation of disputes about the "terrible problem" of a provisional government means to write without thinking. 3) The phrase about the formation of a constituent assembly "without the aid of any government whatever, and consequently, without the aid of a provisional government as well" is an *anarchist* one. It is wholly on a level with the famous *Iskra* phrase about "defiling" the lips by combining the words "long live" with "government". It shows a failure to understand the significance of a revolutionary government as one of the greatest and finest "*means*" of effecting a political revolution. The paltry "liberalism" flaunted here by the Bund in emulation of *Iskra* (that is to say, we can manage without any government, even a provisional one!) is sheer anarchist liberalism. The formation of a constituent assembly *without the aid* of an uprising is an idea worthy only of bourgeois philistines, as even the comrades of the Bund realise. Moreover, an uprising *without the aid* of a provisional revolutionary government can be neither an uprising of the whole people nor a victorious uprising. Again and again we must state with regret that the Bundists' conclusions do not hang together. 4) If it is necessary to prepare for an uprising, such preparation must of necessity include the dissemination and explanation of slogans calling for an armed uprising of the people, the formation of a revolutionary army, and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. We must ourselves study new methods of struggle, their conditions, their forms, their dangers, their practical realisation, etc., and enlighten the masses on these matters. 5) The proposition: "we are as yet unable to launch an uprising" is wrong. The *Potemkin* events have proved rather that *we are unable to prevent premature outbreaks of the uprising that is being prepared*. The *Potemkin* sailors were less prepared than those on other ships, and the sweep of the uprising was less than it might have been. What is the conclusion to be drawn from this? First, that the task of preparing an uprising should include that of preventing premature outbreaks of an uprising that is being or has almost been prepared. Secondly, that the uprising now

developing spontaneously is *outstripping* the purposeful and planned work we are doing to prepare it. We are unable now to restrain the insurrectionary outbreaks which occur here and there sporadically, disconnectedly, and spontaneously. So much the more are we in duty bound to *speed up* dissemination and explanation of all the political tasks and political requisites of a successful uprising. All the more ill-advised, therefore, are suggestions that an end be put to the disputes about the "terrible problem" of a provisional government. 6) Is the idea that "there is no point in linking up insurrection with the Duma" correct? No, it is wrong. To determine beforehand just when the uprising should take place is absurd, especially for us who are living abroad. In this sense there can be no question of any "linking up", as has been repeatedly pointed out by *Proletary*. But *agitation in favour of insurrection and advocacy of the latter* must of necessity be "linked up" with all the important political events which are stirring the people. Our entire dispute now centres on the slogan of agitation which should be made the hub of our "Duma" agitation campaign. Is the Duma an event of that kind? Undoubtedly, it is. Will the workers and peasants ask us: What would be the best reply to the Duma? Undoubtedly, they will, and are even doing so already. How are we to reply to these questions? Not by referring to spontaneous generation (which can only be treated as a joke), but by *explaining* the conditions, forms, prerequisites, tasks, and organs of an *insurrection*. The more we achieve by such explanations, the more likely will it be that the inevitable insurrectionary outbreaks will be able to develop more smoothly and rapidly into a successful and victorious uprising.

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LETTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

September 16, 1905

Dear Comrade,

All your letters proposing that the International Socialist Bureau intervene to reconcile the two groups in our Party have been forwarded to the Central Committee in Russia. I am now in a position to inform you that the Central Committee is prepared to take part in the conference referred to, on condition that it will be confined to a preliminary exchange of views. I hope the delegates of the Central Committee will arrive in Geneva or Berlin in the very near future, probably in September.

However, I must inform you that the Central Committee is preparing to conclude an agreement with the Organising Committee in Russia, which is the executive body of the Minority in the Party. Preliminary negotiations have already taken place, and both parties have arrived at an understanding concerning sums contributed to the cause of the Russian revolution by organisations abroad. The text of this agreement was forwarded to you a fortnight ago.

Since only full understanding between the comrades in Russia can guarantee a lasting reconciliation, it would be advisabie to await the outcome of these negotiations before calling the conference you mention in your letter to us.

Vladimir Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

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FRIENDS MEET

During the last few days foreign papers, which are very carefully following the development of the political crisis in Russia, have published a number of interesting reports on the activities of the Zemstvos and the *Osvobozhdeniye* League. Here is what they say:

"After a two-hour discussion the St. Petersburg Conference of Marshals of the Nobility arrived at complete agreement with the Minister of the Interior concerning the elections" to the State Duma (*Vossische Zeitung*,[95] September 16). "Reports from all the gubernias and cities of Russia show that most electors are utterly indifferent to the political rights granted them" (*ibid.*). Golovin (Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo Board) is conducting negotiations with Durnovo (Governor General of Moscow) concerning permission to hold a Zemstvo Congress. Durnovo told Golovin that he was in full sympathy with the Zemstvos, but that he had been ordered to exert every effort to prevent the Congress. Golovin made reference to the Congress of Professors. Durnovo replied that "this is an altogether different matter, since the students had to be persuaded to resume their studies at all events" (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 17). "The Zemstvo Congress has been authorised to meet in Moscow on the 25th inst. in order to discuss the electoral programme, provided it keeps strictly to that subject." (*The Times*, September 18, cablegram from St. Petersburg.) "M. Golovin today visited the Governor General with reference to the forthcoming Zemstvo Congress. His Excellency stated that the Congress would be permitted to assemble, but that the programme must be confined to three points—first, the participation of the

Zemstvos and towns in the elections to the State Duma; secondly, the organisation of the electoral campaign; and, thirdly, the participation of the Zemstvos and towns in the work of assisting in relief work in famine-stricken districts." (*Ibid.*, cablegram from Moscow.)

Friends have met and come to terms. An agreement has been reached between Golovin (the leader of the Zemstvo party) and Durnovo. Only infants could fail to see that the agreement is based on mutual concessions, on the principle of *do ut des* (I give you that you may give me). What the autocracy has conceded is clear: it has permitted the Congress. What has been conceded by the Zemstvo party (or is it the *Osvobozhdeniye* Party? God alone knows! And is it worth while finding out?) no one mentions. The bourgeoisie has every reason to conceal its negotiations with the autocracy. But even if we do not know the details, the particulars, we are fully aware of the *gist* of the concessions made by the bourgeoisie. *The bourgeoisie has promised the autocracy to moderate its revolutionary fervour* which consisted in Petrunkevich having been regarded in Court circles as a former revolutionary.... *The bourgeoisie has promised a discount in return for a discount.* We do not know how big this discount is. However, we do know that the "bargaining price" asked for by the bourgeoisie was twofold: for the people—a monarchist constitution with two chambers; for the tsar—the convocation of people's representatives, nothing more (since the celebrated Zemstvo delegation did not dare to ask Nicholas II for more). It is on this double bargaining price that the bourgeoisie has now promised the autocracy a discount. *The bourgeoisie has promised to be dutiful, loyal, and law-abiding.**

Friends met and came to an agreement.

About the same time, other friends began to meet and come to terms. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the

* Foreign papers of September 21 (N. S.) reported from St. Petersburg that the Bureau of the Zemstvo Congress had received many withdrawals from participation in the September 25 Congress on the ground that *its programme had been considerably curtailed by the government.* We cannot vouch for the accuracy of this information, but even if it is only a rumour, it undoubtedly confirms our views on the significance of the negotiations between Golovin and Durnovo.

Frankfurter Zeitung, a Bourse paper (September 15), reports that a secret congress of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League has taken place, evidently in Moscow. "At this meeting it was decided that the *Osvobozhdeniye* League should be turned into a *democratic-constitutional* party. A motion to this effect was tabled by Zemstvo members belonging to the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, and was carried unanimously by the Congress" (or was it a conference?). "Thereupon forty members of the League were elected to draft and edit *the party programme*. This commission is to start work soon." The question of the State Duma was discussed. After a lively debate it was decided *to take part in the elections* "on condition, however, that party members elected participate in the State Duma not in order to concern themselves with current affairs, but for the purpose of continuing the struggle within the Duma itself". In the course of the debates it was pointed out that a widespread (or far-reaching—*weitgehencier*) boycott is impossible, and only a boycott of that nature would have any sense. (Is it possible, gentlemen, that no one cried out at your meeting: "Don't say 'I cannot', say 'I don't want to!'"—Note by the Editors of *Proletary*.) However, the meeting holds that the State Duma is a good arena for the propaganda of democratic ideas. "A true friend of the people," according to the minutes of the meeting, "a friend of freedom, will enter the State Duma only for the purpose of fighting for a constitutional state." (Remember *S.S.* of *Osvobozhdeniye*, who explained to all and sundry that for the radical intelligentsia extension of suffrage is the focal point, whereas for the Zemstvos, for the landlords, and capitalists, it is the extension of the rights of the State Duma.—Editors of *Proletary*.) "At the same time the meeting pointed out that the democratic members of the Duma should bear in mind that in this struggle there must be a *complete break with the existing government*" (the italics are in the original) "and such a break should not be feared. These decisions of the meeting will, of course, be printed and circulated." (The Editors of *Proletary* have so far obtained neither this leaflet nor any information about it from Russia.) "In view of the far-reaching influence of the *Osvobozhdentsi*, as members of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League call themselves, who count among their number representatives of

the most diverse strata of society and who are headed by Zemstvo leaders, their election campaign among circles of society closest to them and qualified to vote acquires great importance. There is no doubt that a strong nucleus of these *Osvobozhdentsi* will penetrate into the State Duma and constitute its Left wing, as soon as the State Duma turns into a body genuinely representative of the people. If these radicals succeed in winning the candidates of the moderate Zemstvos and the towns over to their side, a constituent assembly may eventually be proclaimed.

"The participation of Russian political parties in the elections is thus apparently a settled matter, for the Union of Unions has also finally declared itself in favour of participation. Only the Jewish Bund is campaigning against the Duma elections, and at big meetings held in various cities ... the workers in general have taken a categorical stand *against* the State Duma, from which they are excluded."

That is how the correspondent of a German bourgeois newspaper writes the history of the Russian revolution. His reports, probably, contain errors of detail, but by and large they are undoubtedly close to the truth—of course, so far as facts, not predictions, are concerned.

What is the real significance of the facts he describes?

The Russian bourgeoisie, as we have pointed out hundreds of times, is acting as intermediary between the tsar and the people, between the government and the revolution, in a desire to make use of the latter in order to secure power for *itself* in its own class interests. Therefore, until it attains power, it is *bound* to strive for "friendship" both with the tsar and with the revolution. And that is what it is doing. The dignitary Golovin is sent to strike up a friendship with Durnovo. An anonymous scribbler is sent to strike up a friendship with the "people", with the revolution. In the first case friends met and came to terms. In the second case they hold out their hands, nod their heads in friendly fashion, promise to be true friends of the people, friends of liberty, swear to take part in the Duma only for the sake of the struggle and nothing but the struggle, avow that they will make a complete and final

break with the existing government, and hold out even the prospect of a constituent assembly being proclaimed. They act the radical, dance attendance on revolutionaries, and make up to them in order to win the title of friends of the people and of liberty; they are prepared to promise anything—*on the off-chance of someone swallowing the bait*!

The bait has been swallowed. The new *Iskra* with Parvus at its head has done that. Friends have met and begun negotiations about an agreement. Cherevanin cries out (in *Iskra*, No. 108): "We must make the *Osvobozhdeniye* League members who are entering the Duma give us a revolutionary pledge." "We agree, we quite agree," is the reply. "We shall proclaim a constituent assembly." Martov (in the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* translated into Russian in *Proletary*, No. 15) seconds Cherevanin: "Pressure must be brought to bear so that only resolute advocates of free and democratic representation are elected." "Of course, of course," the *Osvobozhdeniye* League replies, "honest to God, we are most resolute people; we are out for a complete break with the existing government." "We must remind them that they are in duty bound to express the interests of the people," Parvus, our Ledru-Rollin[96] thunders. "They must be forced to express the interests of the people."—"Most assuredly," the *Osvobozhdeniye* League replies. "We even have it recorded in the minutes that we are true friends of the people, friends of liberty." "Political parties must be formed," Parvus demands. "Done," the *Osvobozhdeniye* League replies. "We are already called the Constitutional-Democratic Party." "A clear programme is needed," Parvus persists. "Why, of course," the *Osvobozhdeniye* League replies, "we have set forty men to write a programme, and are only too glad to do it ..." "An agreement on Social-Democratic support for the *Osvobozhdeniye* League must be concluded," all the new-*Iskra* crowd wind up in chorus. The *Osvobozhdeniye* League is moved to tears. Golovin pays a call on Durnovo to tender his congratulations.

Which of them are the buffoons, and which the dupes?

All the mistakes of *Iskra*'s tactics in the Duma question have now led up to a natural and inevitable finale. The disgraceful part played by *Iskra* in its war against the idea of an active boycott is now obvious to each and all. There

is no doubt now as to who *benefited* by *Iskra*'s tactics. The idea of an active boycott has been buried by the majority of the monarchist bourgeoisie. *Iskra*'s tactics will inevitably be buried by the majority of Russian Social-Democrats.

Parvus let his tongue run away with him to the extent of talking about a formal agreement with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (the "democrats"), about joint political responsibility binding them and the Social-Democrats, and about Social-Democratic support for the *Osvobozhdeniye* League on the basis of precisely defined conditions and demands—even new-Iskrists will, probably, repudiate this absurd and disgraceful talk. Parvus, however, has simply given franker and blunter expression to the idea underlying the new-*Iskra* views. The formal support he proposes is merely the inevitable consequence of the *moral* support the new *Iskra* has all along been giving the monarchist bourgeoisie by condemning an active boycott of the Duma, by justifying and championing the idea of democrats entering the Duma, and by playing at parliamentarianism when no parliament whatever exists. It has been well said: we have no parliament as yet, but we have parliamentary cretinism galore.

The fundamental error of the new-Iskrists has come to the fore. They have constantly turned a blind eye to the *theory of compromise*, the political theory underlying the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend, and the truest and most profound expression of the Russian bourgeoisie's class stand and class interests. They have kept harping on only one aspect of the matter—the conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the autocracy, with complete disregard of the other aspect—the *compromise* between the bourgeoisie and the autocracy, against the people, the proletariat, and the revolution. And yet it is precisely this second aspect that is coming more and more to the fore acquiring ever greater and more fundamental importance with each advance of the Russian revolution, each month of a situation which is so intolerable to bourgeois adherents of law and order.

The fundamental error of the new-Iskrists led them to a radically incorrect appraisal of the ways in which Social-Democracy should take advantage of the conflicts between

the bourgeoisie and the autocracy, and the ways of *fanning* the flames of these conflicts by our efforts. Yes, it is our absolute duty to fan the flames of these conflicts at all times, be it without a Duma, or prior to a Duma, or in the Duma itself, if it ever meets. But the new-Iskrists do not see where the *proper means* are to be found. Instead of encouraging the flames by breaking the windows and allowing fresh air—the workers' uprisings—to rush in, they sweat at making toy bellows and fanning the revolutionary zeal of the *Osvobozhdeniye* people by presenting them with farcical demands and conditions.

Indeed, it is our duty to support the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way. But with us this support has always consisted (remember the attitude of *Zarya* and the old *Iskra* towards *Osvobozhdeniye*), and, as far as revolutionary Social-Democrats are concerned, will always consist, first and foremost, in ruthlessly exposing and branding every false step of this "democratic"—save the mark!—bourgeoisie. If it is at all possible for us to exert influence on the democratism of the bourgeoisie, that influence will have effect only when all acts of treachery, all the bourgeoisie's errors, its unfulfilled promises and fine words that are belied by events and deeds, are stigmatised on every occasion when a bourgeois democrat speaks to workers or politically conscious peasants. Since this bourgeoisie, which only yesterday was proclaiming from the house-tops that it would boycott the Duma, has today already basely retracted its promises, changed its decisions, redrafted its resolutions, and come to an agreement with the Durnovos about a legal mode of action, we must withhold moral support of these liars and lackeys of the autocracy, prevent them from getting away with broken promises and making new ones to the workers (which will likewise be cast to the wind the moment the Duma becomes a legislative instead of a consultative body). No, we must brand them and impress upon the whole of the proletariat that fresh betrayals on the part of these bourgeois "democrats", who reconcile the constitution with Trepov, and Social-Democracy with *Osvobozhdeniye* politics, are inescapable and inevitable. We must demonstrate and prove to all the workers—using the instance of the bourgeois betrayal of the people on the

question of the boycott, as well as other examples—we must demonstrate that all these Petrunkeviches and the like are already full-fledged Cavaignacs and Thiers.[97]

Let us assume that we shall not cope with the task of frustrating this Duma before it makes an appearance. Let us assume that the Duma meets. Constitutional conflicts within it will be inevitable, for the bourgeoisie is certain to aspire to power. Even then, we must support this aspiration, since the proletariat also has something to gain from a constitutional system too, because the rule of the bourgeoisie as a class will clear the ground for our struggle for socialism. That is all true. But this is just where our radical divergence of opinion from the new *Iskra* begins, not ends. This divergence is not on the question of whether support should be given to bourgeois democrats, but on the question of the means of giving that support in a revolutionary epoch and of exerting pressure on them. By justifying their treachery or shutting one's eyes to it, by hastening to make deals with them, rushing to play at parliamentarianism, exacting promises and pledges from them, you achieve only one thing—*they exert pressure on you*, *not you on them*! We have lived to see the revolution. The time of mere literary pressure is gone; the time of parliamentary pressure has not yet arrived. It is *only* an uprising that can exercise *effective*, not paltry pressure. When civil war spreads over the whole country, pressure is exercised by armed force, by giving battle, and then any other attempt to bring pressure to bear amounts to hollow and wretched phrase-mongering. Nobody has yet ventured to assert that the period of insurrection has passed in Russia. And since that is so, any avoidance of the tasks of a rising, any argument against its necessity, any "watering-down" of our demands to the bourgeois democrats that they participate in the uprising, means laying down our arms at the feet of the bourgeoisie, converting the proletariat into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. Nowhere in the world has the proletariat as yet ever laid down its arms when a serious struggle has commenced, nor has it ever yet yielded to the accursed heritage of oppression and exploitation without measuring swords with the enemy. Such are now our means and hopes of bringing pressure to bear. No one can foretell the outcome of the struggle. If

the proletariat is victorious—it will be the workers and peasants who will make the revolution, and not the Golovins and Struves. If the proletariat is defeated—the bourgeoisie will obtain new constitutional rewards for assisting the autocracy in this struggle. Then and only then a new era will be inaugurated, a new generation will come forward, European history will repeat itself, parliamentarianism will for a time become the real touchstone of all politics.

If you want to exercise pressure now, then prepare for insurrection, preach it, and organise it. Only an uprising holds out the possibility that the Duma farce will not be the end of the Russian bourgeois revolution, but the beginning of a complete democratic upheaval, which will kindle the fire of proletarian revolutions all over the world. Only an uprising can guarantee that our "United Landtag" will become the prelude to a constituent assembly of a non-Frankfort type, that the revolution will not end in a mere March 18 (1848), that we shall have not only a July 14 (1789), but also an August 10 (1792). Only an uprising, and not pledges obtained from the *Osvobozhdeniye* League members, can be a surety that from the ranks of the latter there will emerge individual Johann Jacobys,[98] who, finally disgusted by the loathsomeness of the Golovin's cringing and fawning, will at the last minute march in the ranks of the proletariat and the peasantry to fight for the revolution.

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ARGUE ABOUT TACTICS, BUT GIVE CLEAR SLOGANS!

The argument about the tactics in respect of the State Duma is becoming more and more heated. The differences between *Iskra* and *Proletary* are becoming ever deeper, especially since Parvus's article in *Iskra*.

Tactics must be debated, but in this the utmost clarity must be striven for. Questions of tactics are questions of the Party's political conduct. A line of conduct can *and should* be grounded in theory, in historical references, in an analysis of the entire political situation, etc. But in all these discussions the party of a class engaged in a struggle should never lose sight of the need for absolutely clear answers—*which do not permit of a double interpretation*—to concrete questions of our political conduct: "yes" or "no"? Should this or that be done right now, at the given moment, or should it not be done?

Such clear replies are essential to prevent differences from being exaggerated or confused, and also to make definitely known to the working class the specific kind of advice being offered it by this or that group of Social-Democrats at a given moment.

With a view to introducing complete clarity into our controversy with *Iskra* we have drawn up the following list of concrete questions concerning the political conduct of the Social-Democrats in the present Duma election campaign. We do not in the least claim that this list is complete, and would welcome suggestions for amending, changing, or subdividing any of the questions. It stands to reason that what is said here concerning election meetings applies to all meetings in general.

WHAT IS THE ADVICE THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ARE GIVING THE PROLETARIAT WITH REFERENCE TO THE STATE DUMA?

	Iskra	*Proletary*
1. Should workers endeavour to gain entry to election meetings?	Yes	Yes
2. Should workers endeavour to gain entry to election meetings even by force?	Yes	Yes
3. Should we speak at such meetings about the uselessness of the Duma and explain all the aims and the entire programme of Social-Democracy?	Yes	Yes
4. Should the workers and the people as a whole be called upon at such meetings to rise up in arms and form a revolutionary army and provisional Revolutionary government?	?	Yes
5. Should these slogans (point 4) be made the focus of our whole "Duma" campaign?	No	Yes
6. Should *Osvobozhdeniye* League members (or "Constitutional-Democrats") entering the State Duma be denounced as bourgeois traitors who are pursuing a policy of "compromise" with the tsar?	No	Yes
7. Should we Social-Democrats tell the people that it would be preferable to elect to the State Duma the Petrunkeviches rather than the Stakhevich, etc.?	Yes	No
8. Should we conclude any agreement whatever with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League on our support of the latter on the basis of certain conditions, demands, pledges, etc.?	Yes	No

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	Iskra	*Proletary*
9. Should we make the slogan of "revolutionary self-government" the central point of our agitation?	Yes	No
10. Should we call upon the people immediately to elect, on the basis of universal suffrage, bodies of revolutionary self-government and through these a constituent assembly?	Yes	No
11. Should we elect Social-Democratic election committees? Should we put up Social-Democratic candidates for the State Duma?	Yes	No

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PLAYING AT PARLIAMENTARIANISM

We have on repeated occasions (in *Proletary*, No. 12, before promulgation of the State Duma Act, and in Nos. 14 to 17 after August 6) enlarged on our tactics with regard to the State Duma, and now we must consider them anew in their relation to the new views expressed by Parvus (special reprint from *Iskra*, No. 110, the article: "Social-Democracy and the State Duma").

Let us first follow Parvus's main arguments step by step. He begins his article by stating, "We must fight to the last against a packed parliament, that mixture of baseness and paltriness", and to this true statement he immediately adds the following, which is no less true: "We can overthrow the State Duma ... only by a popular uprising. Likewise, it is only by a popular uprising that we can force the government to change the election laws and extend the rights of the Duma." Excellent. What, it may be asked, should be our slogans of *agitation* with regard to the State Duma? What are the main and particularly important forms of *organisation* for the struggle against the mixture of baseness and paltriness? Parvus puts the question in essentially the same way when he says: "What we, for our part, can contribute to the preparation of an uprising is agitation and organisation." And here is how he answers the first part of this question, about the attitude to election meetings.

"If we interfere with these meetings," writes Parvus, "if we disrupt them, we shall merely be rendering a service to the government."

So Parvus is opposed to having the workers *interfere* with the attempts of a handful of landlords and merchants to *limit* the subject of discussion at election meetings to

the base and paltry State Duma? He is against workers taking advantage of the election meetings in order to criticise the "base" State Duma and to expound *their* Social-Democratic views and their slogans?

So it seems, but, immediately after the sentence quoted, Parvus states something that is already quite different. "What is not given to the workers voluntarily," we read in his article, "they must take by force. They must show up at assemblies of voters *en masse* and transform them *into workers' meetings*." (The italics in the quotations are ours throughout—*Editorial Board of "Proletary"*.) "*Instead of* discussing whether to elect Ivan Fomich or Foma Ivanich, they will put political questions on the agenda." (Parvus probably wanted to say Social-Democratic questions, for the question of the election of Ivan or Foma is also a political question.) "At these meetings we can discuss the policy of the government, the tactics of the liberals, the class struggle, and the State Duma itself. All this will lead to the masses becoming revolutionised."

Now see how it all works out in Parvus's article. On the one hand, we must not interfere with the meetings of the Trubetskois, Petrunkeviches, and Stakhoviches. At the end of his article Parvus definitely condemns the idea of a boycott. On the other hand, we must show up at the meetings 1) by force; 2) "*transform*" the meetings of the Petrunkeviches and Stakhoviches into "workers' meetings"; 3) *instead of* discussing the question for which the meetings have been called (whether to elect Foma or Ivan?), we must discuss our Social-Democratic questions—the class struggle, socialism, and, of course, the need for a popular uprising, the requisites for it, its aims, means and methods, weapons, and its organs, such as a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government. We say "of course", for even though he did not say a word about preaching insurrection at the election meetings, Parvus himself acknowledged at the outset that we must fight to the last and that we can attain our immediate objects *only* by means of an uprising.

It is obvious that Parvus has got into a tangle. He fights against the idea of a boycott, does not advise interfering with meetings and disrupting them, and yet simultaneously, side by side with this, he advises breaking into meetings

by force (does this not mean "disrupting"?), transforming them into workers' meetings (does this not mean "interfering" with the Petrunkeviches and Stakhoviches?), and discussing *not the Duma*, but our own Social-Democratic, revolutionary questions, which the Petrunkeviches do not want to discuss seriously, but which the workers and class-conscious peasants are very eager to discuss, and undoubtedly will discuss.

Why has Parvus got into such a tangle? Because he has failed to understand the point at issue. He set out to fight against the idea of a boycott, imagining that a boycott means mere abstention, rejection of the idea of utilising election meetings for the purposes of *our* agitation. Yet no one, even in the legal press, let alone the illegal press, advocates such a passive boycott. Parvus reveals utter ignorance of Russian political problems when he confuses a passive and an active boycott, when, in discussing the boycott, he does not devote a single word to an analysis of the *second kind of boycott*.

We have more than once spoken of the conventional meaning of the term "an active boycott", and stated that there is no need for the workers to boycott the Duma, since the Duma itself is boycotting them. We, however, clearly defined the real content of this conventional term from the very outset, as far back as a month and a half ago, when we wrote in *Proletary*, No. 12, prior to the promulgation of the State Duma Act: "As distinct from passive abstention, an active boycott should imply increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth." And somewhat further: "'An active boycott'" (we give this term in quotation marks as a conventional term) "means agitation, recruiting, organising the revolutionary forces on a larger scale, with redoubled energy and bringing triple pressure to bear."

This is expressed so clearly that only people completely alien to Russian political problems could fail to understand it, or people with hopelessly confused thinking, *Konfusionsräthe* ("councillors of confusion"), as the Germans say.

Now then, what is it that Parvus really wants? When he advises breaking into election meetings by force, transforming them into workers' meetings, discussing Social-Democratic questions and insurrection, "instead of discussing whether to elect Ivan Fomich or Foma Ivanich" (note "instead of" and not "together with, in addition to"), what he is advising is an active boycott. As you see, Parvus met with a slight mishap: he was heading for one door, but stumbled through another. He declared war on the idea of a boycott, but himself declared (on the question of election meetings) in favour of an active boycott, i.e., the only kind of boycott that was discussed in the Russian political press.

Of course, Parvus may object that conventional terms are not binding on him. Formally, such an objection would be justified, but it is worthless in essence. One must surely know what is under discussion. We are not going to quibble about words, but here we are dealing with political terms which have already taken root in Russia, on the scene of action—a *fait accompli* that must be reckoned with. Any Social-Democratic writer abroad who took it into his head to ignore slogans which develop on the scene of action would merely be displaying narrow-minded and sterile literary conceit. We repeat: no one in Russia ever spoke, and no one ever wrote in the revolutionary press, of any other boycott but an active one. Parvus might be fully entitled to criticise the term, reject its conventional meaning, or interpret it differently, etc., but to ignore it, or to distort the meaning it has already acquired, means confusing the issue.

We have pointed out above that Parvus says "not together with" but "instead of". What Parvus advises is not bringing forward our Social-Democratic questions and the question of an uprising together with that of having Foma or Ivan elected, but bringing forward the question of the class struggle and an uprising *instead of* the question of elections. This distinction between "not together with" and "instead of" is highly significant and calls for attention, the more so that, as is shown by the further content of his article, it might have entered Parvus's head to change the wording and say: not instead of but together with.

We must consider two questions: 1) Is it possible to discuss, at election meetings, the election of Ivan or of Foma "together with" the class struggle, socialism, and insurrection? 2) If that is possible, should the former and the latter questions be discussed together, or the latter in place of the former? Anyone who is familiar with Russian conditions will scarcely be at a loss in replying to these two questions. Getting into election meetings and transforming them into workers' meetings calls for the use of force, i.e., crushing the resistance of the police and the military first of all. In the more or less important workers' centres (and it is only there that the workers' Social-Democratic Party can count on leading a really broad, popular movement), the resistance of the police and the military will be most serious. It would be plain folly on our part to shut our eyes to this. Parvus himself says that the "election agitation may at any moment turn into a revolutionary uprising". If that is so, then it is our duty to take stock of our forces and adapt them to this very *task of insurrection*, and not to the task of furthering the election of Foma as against Ivan to the State Duma. If that is so, the main and central slogan of our entire Duma campaign of agitation should be one calling for an insurrection, a revolutionary army, and a revolutionary government. If that is so, then it is our duty, before and above all else, to advocate and explain these very slogans at each and every meeting. Hence, Parvus once again blows up his own argument in, on the one hand, expecting an uprising "at any moment", and, on the other, maintaining complete silence about propaganda of insurrection and an analysis of its prerequisites, methods, and organs as the "mainspring" of the Duma campaign.

To proceed. Let us consider another contingency, possible in individual centres, especially the smaller. Let us assume that attempts to force our way into meetings do not give rise to a serious struggle against the government, or go so far as an insurrection. Let us assume that in individual instances these attempts are crowned with success. In that case, we must in the first place not lose sight of an institution called *martial law*. To every partial victory of the people over the police and the military, the government retaliates, as is probably known even to Parvus, by proclaiming martial

law. Does this prospect frighten us? No, because it is a step that brings the uprising nearer and renders the entire struggle in general more acute. Does it frighten the Zemstvos and the Duma electors generally? It undoubtedly does, for it would facilitate the arrest of the Milyukovs, for it provides the government with pretexts for banning some election meetings, and perhaps all meetings and the whole Duma to boot! Consequently, it all boils down again to the fact that some want an uprising, advocate it, make preparations for it, agitate for it, organise insurrectionary detachments, etc., whereas others do not want an uprising, struggle against the idea of insurrection, condemn the advocacy of insurrection as mad and criminal, etc. Is Parvus really ignorant of the fact that these "others" are *all Osvobozhdeniye League members*, i.e., even the extreme Left wing of the bourgeois democrats who may get into the Duma??

And (this in the second place) if Parvus does know this, then he must also know the following. Resistance to forcible entry into election meetings and to their transformation into workers' meetings will be offered not only (and sometimes even not so much) by the police and the military *but by the Zemstvo and "Osvobozhdeniye" people themselves*. Only infants can shut their eyes to this. The Zemstvo and the *Osvobozhdeniye* people pose the question more clearly and directly than some Social-Democrats do: either prepare an uprising and make it the hub of our agitation and all our work, or go over to the Duma platform and make it the basis of all political struggle. The Zemstvo and *Osvobozhdeniye* people have already solved this question, as we have often pointed out and emphasised in *Proletary*, beginning with No. 12. They call meetings precisely and solely in order to discuss the election of Foma or Ivan, Petrunkevich or Stakhovich, and to adopt a programme of "struggle" ("struggle" in quotation marks, struggle while wearing a lackey's white gloves) based on the Duma, and not on insurrection. The Zemstvo and *Osvobozhdeniye* people (we are linking the two together purposely, for there are no grounds for drawing any political distinction between them) will certainly not be averse to admitting revolutionaries and Social-Democrats to a meeting of theirs (only when and where this can be done without recourse to any considerable

degree of force!!), if they can find among them stupid people who are ready to promise "support" to Foma as against Ivan, to Petrunkevich as against Stakhovich. But the Zemstvos will never tolerate any attempts to have *their* meetings transformed into workers' meetings, to have *their* meetings turned into revolutionary mass meetings, to make open and direct appeals for armed insurrection from *their* tribune. It is even somewhat awkward to go into elaborate explanations of this obvious truth, but it has to be masticated for the benefit of Parvus and *Iskra*. The Zemstvo and *Osvobozhdeniye* people will inevitably resist *such* use being made of their meetings, although these bourgeois hagglers will of course offer resistance not by force, but by safer, "peaceful", and circuitous means. They will enter into no deals with people who promise them "popular" support for Petrunkevich against Stakhovich, for Stakhovich against Gringmut, otherwise than on condition that election meetings are not turned into workers' meetings, that their platform is not used for a call to insurrection. If they learn that workers are coming to their meetings (and they almost always will find this out, since one cannot conceal a mass demonstration) some of them will straightaway inform the authorities, others will take to urging the Social-Democrats to refrain, a third group will hasten to assure the Governor that "they are not to blame", that they want a Duma, want to enter the Duma, and that they have always, through their "faithful colleague" Mr. Struve, condemned the "mad and criminal" advocacy of insurrection; a fourth group will advise changing the time and plane of the meeting; a fifth group, those who are "bolder" and shrewder politically, will discreetly say that they will be delighted to hear the workers, will thank the Social-Democratic speaker, will scrape and bow to the "people", will make high-flown, pretentious, and emotion-charged speeches assuring each and all that they are always for the people, heart and soul for the people, that they are with the people and not with the tsar, that "their" Petrunkevich said so a long time ago, that they "fully agree" with the Social-Democratic speaker about the "baseness and paltriness" of the State Duma, but that it is necessary, in the splendid words of that highly esteemed parliamentarian, Parvus, who so appropriately transplants

to non-parliamentary Russia the parliamentary patterns of the Vollmar alliances between the Social-Democrats and the Catholics—that it is necessary "not to interfere with the election campaign, but rather to extend it"; extending it means not senselessly jeopardising the fate of the State Duma, but getting the whole people to "support" Foma's election instead of Ivan's, the election of Petrunkevich and Rodichev instead of Stakhovich, Stakhovich instead of Gringmut, and so on.

In a word, the more stupid and the more cowardly the Zemstvos will be, the less chance will there be of their listening to Parvus at their election meeting. The more intelligent and bolder the Zemstvo people, the more chance of that will there be, and also the more chances, that, in his role of supporter of Foma against Ivan, Parvus will have proved the dupe.

No, my dear Parvus! So long as there is no parliament in Russia, applying the tactics of parliamentarianism to Russia means so much unbecoming playing at parliamentarianism, means turning into hangers-on to the landlords, instead of being leaders of the revolutionary workers and politically conscious peasants. To enter into secret deals with the Rodichevs and the Petrunkeviches about support for them against Stakhovich, as a substitute for temporary agreements between open political parties, which are non-existent in our country, means sowing corruption in the workers' midst.

To the direct and clear slogan of the Zemstvo and *Osvobozhdeniye* people—down with criminal advocacy of insurrection, let us work in the Duma and through the Duma—we must reply with our direct and clear slogan—down with the bourgeois betrayers of liberty, the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry and their like, down with the Duma, and hail the armed uprising!

To combine the insurrection slogan and "participation" in the elections of Foma or Ivan means introducing utter confusion, under the pretext of "comprehensiveness" and "multiformity" of agitation, and "flexibility" and "responsiveness" of slogans; in practice such a combination amounts to Manilovism. In practice, Parvus's and Martov's appearance before the Zemstvos in "support" of Petrunkevich against Stakhovich (admitting the possibility of exceptional

cases when such an appearance would be at all feasible) will not be an open appearance before the mass of the people, but the backstage appearance of a duped leader of the workers before a handful of betrayers of the workers. From the standpoint of theory or of the general principles of our tactics, to combine these slogans now, at the given moment, is a variety of parliamentary cretinism. For us revolutionary Social-Democrats insurrection is not an absolute slogan, but a concrete one. We put it off in 1897, in 1902 we put it forward in the sense of general preparations, and only after January 9, 1905, did we advance it as a direct appeal. We do not forget that Marx was in favour of an uprising in 1848, whereas in 1850 he condemned the ravings and phrase-mongering about an uprising[99]; that before the war of 1870-71 Liebknecht denounced participation in the Reichstag, whereas after the war he participated in it himself. We at once stated in *Proletary*, No. 12, that it would be ridiculous to renounce for the future all struggle based on the Duma. We know that not only a parliament but even a travesty of a parliament may, when the conditions for an uprising are lacking, become the focal point of all our agitation for the entire period when an uprising is out of the question.

However, we demand a clear and precise presentation of the question. If you think that the period of insurrection is over in Russia—say so, and uphold your opinion openly. We shall appraise and discuss it thoroughly and calmly, from every angle, from the standpoint of the concrete conditions. But when you yourselves talk of the possibility of an uprising "at any moment" and of its necessity—then we denounce, and shall continue to denounce as miserable Manilovism, all the various disquisitions against an active boycott of the Duma. If an uprising is possible and necessary, then that is precisely what we must make the central slogan of the whole of our campaign around the Duma;- then we must expose the venal soul of a "Frankfort Parliament windbag" in every *Osvobozhdeniye* adherent who shuns this slogan of insurrection. If an uprising is possible and necessary, that means there can be no legal centre for a legal struggle for the aims of the uprising, nor can Manilov-like phrase-mongering take its place. If an uprising is possible

and necessary, it means that the government "*has placed the bayonet as the main point on the agenda*", has launched civil war, proclaimed martial law as a form of counter-criticism of democratic criticism; under such circumstances, to take the "near-parliamentary" signboard of the State Duma seriously, to begin to play a shady and furtive two-some at parliamentarianism with the Petrunkeviches, means substituting the political chicanery of clowning intellectuals for the policy of the revolutionary proletariat.

Having shown the basic falsity of Parvus's position, we can deal only briefly with a few of the most glaring manifestations of this falsity. Parvus writes: "Before the elections or after the elections, a legal basis for the existence of political parties is created in connection with the State Duma." That is not true. What is actually being created *now* is a "legal basis" for governmental manipulation of elections. That basis is termed: 1) the Rural Superintendent (peasant elections are entirely under his thumb); 2) the secret police (the arrest of Milyukov); 3) martial law. When a "legal basis for the existence of political parties" (including the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) is created *in fact*, and not in the language of journalists, then we shall have to reconsider the whole question of insurrection, for to us insurrection is only one of the important means, but one that is not always obligatory, of clearing the way for the struggle for socialism.

"It is necessary to come out immediately, not as individual social groups, not as lawyers, engineers, or Zemstvo members, but as liberal, democratic, Social-Democratic, parties—officially and openly. The representatives of the various tendencies could come to an agreement among themselves in this respect, just as agreements are made between the various parties in a parliament."

Yes, this they can do, only not openly but in secret, for if Parvus has forgotten Trepov, Trepov has not forgotten Parvus. What Parvus terms a parliamentary agreement (sometimes indispensable to Social-Democrats in a *parliamentary* country) is in present-day Russia, in September 1905, the most contemptible playing at parliamentarianism.

The betrayers of the revolution are now making an agreement between the *Osvobozhdeniye* supporters and the revolutionaries their prime objective; the supporters of revolution—an agreement between the Social-Democrats and all revolutionary democrats, i.e., supporters of an uprising. If the new *Iskra*, Parvus, and Plekhanov* *now* enter into a "parliamentary" agreement with the *Osvobozhdeniye* group (about the latter forming a party—see above, the article entitled "Friends Meet"**), we shall publicly declare that these Social-Democrats have lost all sense of reality and must go by the board. We shall then conclude an agreement with the revolutionary democrats on the basis of joint agitation for an uprising, for its preparation, and accomplishment.

We have already shown, in an analysis of the new-*Iskra* resolutions (Lenin: *Two Tactics*), that *Iskra* is descending to the level of the liberal landlord, whereas *Proletary* is raising and inspiring the revolutionary peasant.***

"Each party should organise its own election committee for the conduct of the election campaign throughout the country. The parties should agree among themselves about practical measures for extending freedom of speech, of assembly, and so forth, during the elections. They should bind themselves by joint political responsibility" (just listen, fellow-workers! The new-*Iskra* group want to bind you to the Petrunkeviches! Down with the Petrunkeviches and the new-Iskrists!) "so that if an official representative of any political party is prosecuted as such by the police or is condemned in court, the representatives of all the other [!] parties should declare their solidarity with him and all together organise [!] a popular [??] protest and, if possible, [mark this!] a popular uprising in his defence."

Good riddance to you, my dear Parvus! Organise protests and an uprising with the Petrunkeviches (democrats) and

* We mention Plekhanov because he has stated in print that *Iskra*'s tactic is better than *Proletary*'s. True, Plekhanov makes *no mention of the new-"Iskra" resolutions* and those of the Third Congress; however, dodges and evasions on the part of a Social-Democratic writer are a circumstance that enhances rather than extenuates the blame attaching to him.

** See pp. 254-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** See p. 47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the Stakhoviches (liberals)—our ways have parted. It is with the revolutionary democrats that we shall do *that*. Only, while you are about it, change your slogans as well, most esteemed heroes of "parliamentary agreement". Instead of the slogan "an uprising is imperative", just say: "an uprising, *if possible*, will supplement the protests". Then all the *Osvobozhdeniye* supporters will agree with you! Instead of the slogan "universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot", advance the following: "*If possible*, the government should guarantee direct, equal, universal and secret suffrage". Good riddance to you, gentlemen! We shall patiently wait for Parvus, Petrunkevich, Stakhovich, and Martov to "organise a popular protest and, if possible, a popular uprising" in defence of Milyukov. For in our "near-parliamentary" era it seems to be more timely, gentlemen, to defend Mr. Milyukov than the hundreds and thousands of workers who are being arrested and beaten up!...

Parvus declares categorically: "We have no chance whatever of getting our representatives elected to the Duma independently." Yet he writes: "If, however, election committees prove unfeasible, we shall still have to bend every effort to put up our own candidates." Despite the qualifications demanded Parvus believes that "in individual cases the possibility of putting up Social-Democratic candidates is not excluded". "One or two Social-Democratic candidates, irrespective of where they may be put up, will become a political slogan for the whole country."

Thank you for at least being clear. But then, what stands in your way, gentlemen? The newspaper *Rus* long ago put forward its candidates, all those Stakhoviches, Petrunkeviches, and other betrayers of the revolution who cool their heels in Mr. Durnovo's antechamber. Why is *Iskra* silent? Why does it not go from words to deeds? Why does it not put forward Axelrod, Starover, Parvus, and Martov as candidates for the State Duma? Try it, gentlemen, conduct an experiment, *experimentum in corpore vili*.* Try it, and we shall see at once which of us is right: you who believe that these candidates will become "a slogan for the whole

* An experiment on a vile body.—*Ed.*

country", or we who believe that at the present time these candidates will only play the role of buffoons.

Parvus writes: "The government has given a handful of people the right to elect a body which is to manage the affairs of the whole nation. This imposes on the artificially selected voters the duty of using their exclusive right with due regard to the opinion of the popular masses and of not being guided by arbitrary personal" (but by class and party?) "considerations. Our task is to remind them of this duty, force [!!l them to perform it, and we must stop at nothing in carrying out this task."

This reasoning, quite naturally supplemented by the assurance that the tactics of (active) boycott expresses disbelief in the "revolutionary forces of the country" (*sic*!), is fundamentally wrong. It is a typically bourgeois-sentimentalist presentation of the question that all Social-Democrats should rise up against. Parvus's reasoning is bourgeois, for he fails to see the class essence of the Duma—the agreement between the bourgeoisie and the autocracy. Parvus's reasoning is so much empty and sentimental phrase-mongering, for he is prepared —even if fleetingly—to take seriously the false words of the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents that they desire to "act with due regard to the opinion of the popular masses". The esteemed Parvus is some three years behind the times. When the liberals had no press and no illegal organisation, whereas we possessed both, we helped them in their political development. History will not fail to record this service among the deeds of the Social-Democratic movement. But from political sucklings the liberals have now become the chief political wirepullers and have shown their treachery to the revolution in deed. To lay the main stress *at the present time* not on the need to expose the treachery of the bourgeois "compromisers", but to remind them of their "duty" to manage the affairs (*not of the bourgeoisie*, *but*) of the whole people, means toadying to the *Osvobozhdeniye* League! It is only they who can seriously seek an expression of "the revolutionary forces of the country" in the State Duma. The Social-Democrats know that the best we can achieve now is the neutralisation, the paralysing of the bourgeoisie's efforts at treachery. The Zemstvo and the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are not "a revolutionary force of the country", and you should feel

ashamed to be ignorant of that, Comrade Parvus. The proletariat and the peasantry, which is fighting against the landlords, are now the only revolutionary force in the democratic revolution.

The formulation of the *conditions* of proletarian support for the *Osvobozhdeniye* League is the gem of gems in Parvus's remarkable article. "It is necessary," writes Parvus, "to impose definite political demands on the opposition candidates who wish to avail themselves of our support." "These might, for instance, be: 1) the demand in the Duma itself that it be immediately dissolved and a constituent assembly convened, elected on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot; 2) the denial of all military and financial credits to the government until this demand is fulfilled." (A poor Russian translation from the German, but the meaning is clear.)

One downward step is followed by another. One misstep on to an inclined plane, and the fall becomes headlong. Our supermen like Parvus and Plekhanov, who hold themselves aloof from both sections of the Party, loftily ignore those very new-*Iskra* resolutions for which they are morally and politically responsible. These supermen imagine themselves superior to both the "Majority" and the "Minority"; in actual fact they are *inferior* to both, since to all the shortcomings in the Majority they have been able to add the shortcomings in the Minority, *as well as all the shortcomings of the turncoat.*

Take Parvus. He has always gone hand in glove with *Iskra*, even when the plan of the Zemstvo campaign and of January 9 opened his eyes, though not for long, to its opportunist stand. Nevertheless, Parvus wanted to be considered a "conciliator"—most likely because of the fact that when, after January 9, he began to advance the slogan calling for a provisional government, the Bolsheviks were obliged to correct him and point out that his slogans contained elements of phrase-mongering. "No tsar, but a workers' government!" Parvus vociferated under the impression of January 9. "Without the people, but with a liberal Duma!" is what his present "tactics" amount to after August 6. No, comrade, we shall not base our tactics on fleeting impulses, bowing to the exigencies of the moment!

Parvus has now concocted "new" *conditions* for the liberals.

Poor new-Iskrists, how exhausted they must feel after concocting "conditions" for an agreement with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League! At the Second Congress, Starover (see his resolution, which was rejected by the Third Congress) concocted one set of conditions, which immediately fell through, for neither in the plan of the Zemstvo campaign, nor now have these conditions been advanced in full by any of the new-Iskrists who wrote about an "agreement" with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League. The new-*Iskra* Conference advanced other and stricter conditions in the resolution on the attitude to the liberals. Parvus of the *Iskra* bears moral responsibility for this resolution—but what do literary supermen care for mere resolutions drawn up with the participation of responsible representatives of the proletariat! Supermen snap their fingers at Party resolutions!

The new-*Iskra* resolution on the attitude to *opposition* parties states in black and white that the Social-Democrats "demand of all enemies of tsarism":

"1) Active and unequivocal support of all determined action by the organised proletariat directed towards dealing fresh blows at tsarism."

In proposing an "agreement" with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League and promising them "support", Parvus demands nothing of the kind.

"2) Open recognition and unqualified support of the demand for a popular constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage, *and open action against all parties and groups that are trying to curtail the rights of the people*, whether it be by limiting suffrage or by accepting the grant of a monarchist constitution in lieu of a constituent assembly."

Parvus repudiates the whole of the second part of these conditions. He even completely disregards the question of whom the *Osvobozhdeniye* League members in the Duma should "demand the convocation" of a constituent assembly from. From the tsar, no doubt? But why shouldn't you convoke it yourselves, esteemed heroes of "parliamentary agreement"? Or are you no longer opposed to having it "*granted*" by the tsar?

"3) Resolute support of the working-class struggle against the government and the magnates of capital, for the right to strike and the right of association."

Parvus exempts the *Osvobozhdeniye* League from this "condition", evidently on the occasion of the Duma's convocation and the injuriousness of the tactic—"the worse, the better" (although in the same breath Parvus mockingly assures the reader that it would be worse if the Duma had legislative rights, i.e., that the one step towards something better, the one the *Osvobozhdeniye* League is striving for, is a step for the worse!!).

"4) Open resistance to all attempts by the government and the feudal nobility to suppress the peasant revolutionary movement by measures of barbarous violence against the persons and property of the peasants."

Why have you forgotten this condition, my good Parvus? Can it be that you are no longer prepared to put this excellent demand to Petrunkevich? Stakhovich? Rodichev? Milyukov? Struve?

"5) Refusal to support any measures intended to preserve, in a free Russia, any restrictions of the rights of individual nationalities and any traces of national oppression."

And

"6) Active participation in helping the people to arm themselves for the fight against reaction, and support for the Social-Democrats' endeavours to organise an armed mass struggle."

Why, my dear Parvus, have you forgotten these conditions?

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September 26 (13), 1905

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THE LIBERAL UNIONS AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY[100]

Of what importance are the "trade unions" of intellectuals to the proletariat, and should we Social-Democrats join them so as to fight against any beclouding of the workers' class-consciousness?

The "trade" unions of intellectuals and the Union of Unions are political organisations. In fact, they are *liberal* unions. These unions constitute, on the whole, the nucleus of the so-called Constitutional-Democratic, i.e., bourgeois-liberal, Party. A most important duty now falls to us: to exert every effort to instil a *party spirit* into the proletariat, to weld its vanguard into a genuine political party *absolutely* independent of all other parties, and absolutely its own master. It is therefore incumbent upon us to exercise extreme caution in taking any step likely to cause confusion in clear-cut and definite Party relations. The entire liberal bourgeoisie is now doing its very utmost to prevent the formation of a fully independent class party of the proletariat in order to "unite" and "merge" the *entire* "liberation" movement in a single stream of democratism with the purpose of concealing the *bourgeois* nature of that democratism.

Under these circumstances it would be a great mistake for members of the Social-Democratic Party to enter the liberal unions. It would place them in the extremely false position of being members of two different and mutually hostile parties. One cannot serve two gods. One cannot belong to two parties. Owing to the absence of political liberty in our country, and in the gloom of the autocratic regime, it is very easy to confuse the parties; the interests of the bourgeoisie *demand* such confusion. The interests of the proletariat demand a definite and clear demarcation of the parties. At present it is

impossible to obtain genuine and not merely verbal guarantees that groups of Social-Democrats joining intellectualist "trade" unions would preserve complete independence, remain members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party alone and of no other party, who would account for their every step to *their* party organisation. The chances are a hundred to one that these members would not be able to preserve their independence, that they would be obliged to resort to shifts, which are useless from the standpoint of results, and injurious as serving to corrupt the still young *party* spirit of the workers.

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FROM THE DEFENSIVE TO THE OFFENSIVE

The special correspondent of *Le Temps*, a highly reputable conservative paper, wired the following to that paper from St. Petersburg on September 21 (8):

"The night before last a group of 70 persons attacked the Riga Central Prison, cut the telephone wires and, using rope ladders, made their way into the prison yard, where after a stiff engagement two prison warders were killed and three seriously wounded. The demonstrators then freed two political prisoners who were to be court-martialled and expected to be sentenced to death. During the pursuit of the demonstrators, who managed to escape, except for two who were arrested, one policeman was killed and several others wounded."

And so matters are moving ahead! Despite the incredible and utterly indescribable difficulties, headway is being made in the matter of getting armed. Individual terrorism, bred of intellectualist impotence, is gradually becoming a thing of the past. Instead of spending tens of thousands of rubles and a vast amount of revolutionary energy on the assassination of some Sergei[101] (who probably did more to make Moscow revolutionary-minded than many revolutionaries), on assassinations "in the name of the people"—military operations *together with the people* are now commencing. It is by engaging in such operations that the pioneers of armed struggle become fused with the masses not merely in word but in deed, assume leadership of the combat squads and contingents of the proletariat, train in the crucible of civil war *dozens of popular leaders* who, tomorrow, on the day of the workers' uprising, will be able to help with their experience and their heroic courage thousands and tens of thousands of workers.

Hail the heroes of the Riga revolutionary contingent! May their success serve as encouragement and example to

Social-Democratic workers throughout Russia. Long live the pioneers of the people's revolutionary army!

See how successful the venture of the Riga revolutionaries was even from a purely military standpoint. The enemy losses are three killed and probably five to ten wounded. Our loss is only two men, who were probably wounded and thus taken prisoner by the enemy. Our trophies are two revolutionary leaders rescued from prison. This is indeed a brilliant victory!! It is a real victory, scored in a battle against an enemy armed to the teeth. It is no longer a plot against some detested individual, no act of vengeance or desperation, no mere "intimidation"—no, it was a well thought-out and prepared commencement of operations by a contingent of the revolutionary army, planned with due regard for the correlation of forces. The number of such contingents of 25 to 75 men each can be increased to several dozen in every big city, and frequently in the suburbs of a big city. Workers will join them in hundreds; it is only necessary to begin extensive propaganda of this idea immediately, form such contingents, supply them with all sorts of weapons, ranging from knives and revolvers to bombs, and give these contingents military training and education.

Fortunately, the time has passed when revolution was "made" by individual revolutionary terrorists, because the people were not revolutionary. The bomb has ceased to be the weapon of the solitary "bomb thrower", and is becoming *an essential weapon of the people*. With the improvements in military *matériel* the technique of street fighting is also changing, and necessarily so. At present time we are all (and very wisely so) making a study of how to put up barricades and defend them. Though this old work is useful, we must not overlook the newest developments in military weapons. The progress made in the use of explosives has resulted in a number of innovations in gunnery. The Japanese proved stronger than the Russians partly because they were able to make much better use of explosives. Extensive use of high explosives was one of the characteristic features of the recent war. And the Japanese, now recognised throughout the world as experts in military matters, have now adopted the *hand bomb*, which they used with such telling effect against Port Arthur. Let us learn from the Japanese! Let us not lose heart

because of the grave set-backs that have attended attempts to transport large quantities of arms. No failures can sap the energy of those who feel and actually see how intimately they are bound up with the revolutionary class, and realise that truly the whole people has now risen in defence of their immediate objectives. Bombs can be manufactured anywhere and everywhere. They are now being produced in Russia on a far larger scale than any of us know (and every member of the Social-Democratic organisation undoubtedly knows of more than one instance of such workshops being set up). They are manufactured on an incomparably larger scale than is known to the police (and the latter undoubtedly know more than the revolutionaries in each separate organisation). No force will be able to stand up to contingents of a revolutionary army armed with bombs, contingents that one fine night will launch simultaneously several such attacks as the one in Riga, and will be backed—and this is the last and most important condition—by the rising of hundreds of thousands of workers who have not forgotten the "peaceful" 9th of January, and who long for an *armed* January 9.

Matters in Russia are obviously heading towards that. Consider reports in the legal newspapers about bombs being found in the baggage of peaceful steamer passengers, Read about the *hundreds* of attacks on the police and the military, about the *scores* killed on the spot and the scores seriously injured during the last two months. Even correspondents of the treacherous bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye*, which is so busy condemning the "mad" and "criminal" advocacy of insurrection, admit that never before have tragic events been so imminent as they are now.

To work, comrades! Let each stand at his post! Let every workers' circle bear in mind that any day events may require that it take a leading part in the final and decisive battle.

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ON THE CURRENT MOMENT

The determined stand taken by the Smolensk Municipal Council has been held up by *Proletary*, in issue No. 15,* as an instance of what might be called "revolutionary self-government" (which *Iskra* confuses with the slogan of a popular uprising). The Council declared the billeting of the Cossacks contrary to law, stopped all payments to them, organised a city militia to protect the population, and appealed to the soldiers to refrain from violence against citizens.

To illustrate the workings of the same idea and to characterise the moment we are living through, we shall quote from *l'Humanité* a resolution passed by the Kerch Municipal Council in connection with the recent pogrom in that city.

The Council decreed: 1) that sympathy be expressed to the Jewish inhabitants on the casualties (killed and injured) and the material losses incurred; 2) that two scholarships be established at the local Gymnasium in memory of pupils killed during the disturbances; 3) inasmuch as the local authorities proved incapable and little disposed to protect the lives and property of the population, that payments for the upkeep of the police be discontinued from local funds; 4) that a sum of 1,500 rubles be distributed among the poorer Jews who had suffered most during the disturbances; 5) that the harbour-master be commended as the only local official who had energetically and humanely prevented the further spread of the mass manhandling; 6) that the Minister for the Interior be informed of the authorities' unlawful behaviour during the disturbances, and a Senate investigation be demanded.

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* See pp 221-22 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In the measure that the Kerch Municipal Council has, of its own free will, extended the scope of the powers it is entitled to by law, and in the measure that it is participating in the revolutionary life of the whole country, it is embarking upon really "revolutionary self-government". But where are the *guarantees* that that self-government will turn into one by the *people*? And should we Social-Democrats emphasise this "piece of revolution" as the main slogan of agitation, or speak of a complete and decisive victory of the revolution, which is impossible without an uprising?

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FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

Comrades,

We wish to draw your attention to one of the methods of co-operation between the Central Organ and the press of the various localities, in the matter of agitation. The Central Organ is very often accused of being out of touch with the movement, being couched in unpopular language, etc., etc. There is of course some truth in these reproaches, and we are fully aware that our work, which is conducted from afar, is inadequate in such an eventful period. However, our isolation is in part due to the infrequent and irregular communications between the Central Organ and the *masses* of local Social-Democrats, and to insufficient co-operation between the two. We quite agree that we are not helping you sufficiently, but then, neither are you giving us enough help. We now want to draw your attention in a comradely way to the elimination of *one* of these shortcomings.

The comrades on the spot do not make sufficient use of the Central Organ for purposes of agitation. The Central Organ arrives late, and the number of copies received is small. It is therefore necessary more frequently: 1) to have articles and items reprinted in local bulletins; 2) more often to adapt or paraphrase in more popular language the slogans (and articles) of the Central Organ, in local bulletins, in doing which you may complement, alter, abridge them, etc., since you, who are on the spot, can see what is best, and all Party publications belong to the Party as a whole; 3) *to quote* the Central Organ in local bulletins more often, so as

to familiarise the masses with the title of the Central Organ, with the *idea* of having their own permanent paper, the idea of having their own ideological centre, of always being able to turn to it, etc., etc. You should on all occasions endeavour to indicate in your bulletins that the very same idea was propounded in such and such an article in *Proletary*, or that news to the same effect is contained in such and such of the letters it has published, etc., etc. This is most important for the purpose of familiarising the *masses* with our Central Organ, and widening our entire sphere of influence.

The local committees have often republished articles, selecting whatever appealed to them most. What is particularly important now is *to have uniform slogans* (on the attitude towards the liberals, the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, their "theory of agreement", their draft constitution, etc.; on the question of a revolutionary army and the programme of a revolutionary government; on the boycott of the State Duma, etc., etc.). You should try to make every possible use of the Central Organ in your local agitation, not only by republishing but also by *p a r a p h r a s i n g* its idea and slogans in your bulletins, *developing* or amending them to conform with the local conditions, etc. This is extremely important for establishing actual co-operation between us, for exchanging opinions, correcting our slogans and acquainting the *masses* of the workers with the fact that we have a permanent Central Organ of the Party.

We earnestly request that this letter be read and discussed in absolutely all organisations and study circles of the Party, down to the very lowest.

The Editorial Board of "Proletary"

Rabochy,[102] No. 2,
September 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

THE JENA CONGRESS OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' PARTY

Congresses of the German Social-Democrats have long become events whose importance goes far beyond the confines of the German labour movement. The German Social-Democratic movement ranks first in respect of organisation, integrality and coherence, and the extent and rich content of its Marxist literature. It is natural that under such circumstances resolutions of the German Social-Democratic congresses also frequently acquire almost international significance. Such was the case with the question of the latest opportunist tendencies in socialism (Bernsteinism). The decision of the Dresden Social-Democratic Congress, which confirmed the old and tested tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy, was adopted by the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress, and has now become the common decision of the whole class-conscious proletariat throughout the world. Such is now the case too. The question of a mass political strike—the main question at the Jena Congress—is agitating the entire international Social-Democratic movement. It has been brought to the fore lately by events in a number of countries, including Russia, and even perhaps Russia in particular. The German Social-Democrats' decision will undoubtedly exercise considerable influence on the entire international labour movement by giving support and strength to the revolutionary spirit of militant workers.

However, let us first take brief note of the other and less important questions discussed and decided by the Jena Congress. First of all, it considered the question of Party organisation. We shall not of course dwell here on the details

of the revision of the German Party Rules. It is important that the highly characteristic basic feature of this revision should be stressed, i.e., the tendency towards further, more comprehensive and stricter application of the principle of *centralism*, the establishment of a stronger *organisation*. This tendency found expression, first, in the inclusion in the Rules of a direct provision to the effect that every Social-Democrat is obliged to belong to a Party organisation, with the exception of cases when this is precluded by very serious reasons. Secondly, it found expression in the institution of a system of Social-Democratic local branches instead of the system of delegates, the replacement of the principle of one-man authority and confidence in an individual, by the principle of collective, organisational links. Thirdly, it expressed itself in a decision to the effect that all Party organisations must contribute 25 per cent of their revenue to the Party's central treasury.

On the whole, this obviously shows that the growth of the Social-Democratic movement and of its revolutionary spirit necessarily and inevitably leads to the more consistent establishment of centralism. In this respect the development of the German Social-Democratic movement is highly instructive to us Russians. Not so long ago organisational questions occupied a disproportionate place among current problems of Party life, and to some extent this holds true of the present as well. Since the Third Congress two organisational tendencies in the Party have become fully defined. One is towards consistent centralism and consistent extension of the democratic principle in Party organisations, not for the sake of demagogy, or because it sounds good, but in order to put this into effect as Social-Democracy's free field of activity extends in Russia. The other tendency is towards diffusiveness of organisation, "vagueness of organisation", whose injuriousness is now understood even by Plekhanov, who defended it for such a long time (let us hope that events will soon force him to understand likewise the connection between this vagueness of organisation and vagueness of tactics).

Recall the disputes about Clause 1 of our Rules. The Conference of the new-Iskrists, who had been previously fervently defending the "idea" underlying their mistaken formulation

of this clause, now simply discarded all the clause and the idea as a whole. The Third Congress confirmed the principle of centralism and *organisational* ties. The new-Iskrists immediately attempted to put on a basis of general principles the question whether every Party member must belong to an organisation. We now see that the Germans—opportunists and revolutionaries alike—do not even question the legitimacy of such a requirement as a matter of *principle*. When they brought this requirement (that every Party member must belong to a Party organisation) straight into their Rules, they explained the need of *exceptions to this rule*, not by considerations of principle but by the *absence of sufficient freedom* in Germany! Vollmar, who at Jena delivered the report or the organisational question, justified toleration of exceptions to the rule on the ground that it would be impossible for such people (petty officials) to belong to the Social-Democratic Party *openly*. It goes without saying that the situation in Russia is different: since there is no freedom all organisations are equally secret. Under conditions of revolutionary freedom it is particularly important that parties be quite distinct from each other, and that no "diffusiveness" be permitted in this respect. However the principle of the desirability of stronger organisational ties remains unshaken.

As regards the delegate system, which the German Social-Democrats have now discarded, its existence was due entirely to the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists. The farther this law receded into the past, the more natural and inevitable became the transition to a Party system based on direct links between organisations, instead of on links through delegates.

Another question that came up for discussion at Jena prior to the question of political strike is also highly instructive for Russia. This was the question of the May Day celebrations, or, to be more exact (to take the gist of the matter and not the item that gave rise to the discussion), the question of the relation of the trade union movement to the Social-Democratic Party. *Proletary* has spoken several times about the profound impression made on German Social-Democrats and not only on them alone, by the Cologne Trade Union Congress.[103] It became more than evident at this Congress that even in Germany, where the traditions of Marxism

and its influence are strongest, *anti-socialist* tendencies, tendencies towards "pure trade-unionism" of the British, i.e., absolutely bourgeois type, are developing in the trade unions—mark you, *Social-Democratic* trade unions. That is why from the question of a May Day demonstration in its literal sense, there inevitably arose at the Jena Congress the question of trade-unionism and Social-Democracy, the question of Economism, to speak in terms of trends within the Russian Social-Democratic movement.

Fischer, who delivered the report on the question of May Day, frankly stated that it would be a bad mistake to ignore the fact that in the trade unions the socialist spirit is disappearing now here, now there. Things had gone so far that, for instance, Bringmann, representative of the carpenters' union, had uttered and published statements like the following: "The strike on May Day is like a foreign body in the human body." "In the given circumstances the trade unions are the sole means for improving the condition of the workers", etc. And these "symptoms of disease", as Fischer aptly termed them, are being supplemented by a number of others. In Germany, as in Russia and indeed everywhere, a narrow trade-unionism, or Economism, is linking up with opportunism (revisionism). The newspaper published by this same carpenters' union wrote about the crumbling foundations of scientific socialism, the erroneousness of the theory of crises, the theory of collapse, etc. The revisionist Calwer did not call on the workers to show discontent or increase their demands, but to be modest, etc., etc. Liebknecht met with approval from the Congress when he spoke against the idea of the trade unions' "neutrality", and remarked that "Bebel, it is true, also spoke in favour of neutrality, but, in my opinion, this is one of the few points on which Bebel does not have the backing of the majority of the Party".

Bebel himself denied that he had advised the trade unions to be neutral with regard to the Social-Democratic movement. Bebel fully recognised the danger of narrow trade-unionism. He went on to say that he knew even worse examples of this craft union apathy: young trade union leaders go so far as to jeer at the Party in general, at socialism in general, at the theory of the class struggle. These statements of Bebel's evoked general indignation at the Social-Democratic Congress.

There was loud applause when he resolutely declared: "Comrades, be on your guard, think of what you are doing; you are travelling a fatal path, which in the end will lead to your doom."

It thus stands to the credit of the German Social-Democratic movement that it faced the danger squarely. It did not gloss over the extremes of Economism, or invent lame excuses and subterfuges (such as were so abundantly invented by our Plekhanov, for instance, after the Second Congress). No, it bluntly named the disease, resolutely condemned the injurious tendencies, and straightforwardly and openly called on all Party members to combat them. This is instructive to Russian Social-Democrats, some of whom have earned the praise of Mr. Struve for having begun to "see the light" on the question of the trade union movement.

FROM MARX TO MAO

Written in September 1905

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Pod Znamenem Marxizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*), No. 2

Published according to the manuscript

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NO FALSEHOOD!
OUR STRENGTH LIES IN STATING THE TRUTH!

LETTER TO THIS EDITORIAL BOARD[104]

"We are not strong enough to launch an uprising ... therefore there is no point in linking it up with the Duma ... a constituent assembly should be the battle-cry of our agitation." That is what the Bund wrote, and no adequate reply was provided by the author of the article in No. 16.*

These words of the Bund's are an excellent reflection of *philistinism* within the Social-Democratic movement, philistinism in the sense of banality, the golden mean, insipidity, generalities, mediocrity (qualities that have always been characteristic of the Bund, which, as is known, played the part of an ideological parasite in 1897-1900, in 1901-03, in 1904, and now in 1905).

That is the current view, the commonly accepted standpoint, "common sense" ("the triumph of common sense" in *Osvobozhdeniye* and "seeing the light").

This is a tremendous *falsehood*, the exposure of which is of the utmost import to the Russian revolution and to the class-conscious proletariat, as the *only* possible creator of a *victorious revolution*.

We are not strong enough to launch an uprising; *therefore* we should not link it up with anything; *therefore* the slogan must not call for an armed uprising, but for a constituent assembly.

It is just like saying: "Naked and unfortunate, hungry and tormented, we are unable to emerge from the swamp in which

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* See pp. 246-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

we are perishing, and ascend to the mountain top where there is light and sunshine, clean air and all the fruits of the earth. We have no ladder, and without it we cannot ascend. We are unable to acquire a ladder. Therefore we should not link up our struggle for an ascent with the slogan of obtaining (*respective*, making) a ladder. Therefore our slogan should be 'To the mountain top, to the mountain top: there happiness and deliverance, air and light, new spirit and vigour await us'."

Since there is no ladder, without which an ascent is impossible—*therefore* you should not make the acquisition of a ladder your slogan, and work on making one—therefore the slogan should be: "Get to the summit; to the mountain top, there happiness, etc., await you!"

"As ever, weakness had taken refuge in a belief in miracles," as Marx said![105]

Is it the weakness of the proletariat, or the *weak thinking* of the Bund and the new *Iskra* that is now taking refuge in a bellef in miracles, in the belief that the mountain can be scaled without a ladder, in the belief that a constituent assembly is possible without an uprising?

Such belief is that of the insane. Without an armed uprising a constituent assembly is a phantasm, a phrase, a lie, a Frankfort talking shop.

The deceit and falsity of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend, of that *first b o u r g e o i s s l o g a n* in Russia to assume a broadly political, mass-political, popular form, consist in that very support of a belief in miracles, in the support of that lie. For the liberal bourgeoisie needs the lie, since to it that is no lie, but the greatest of truths, the truth of its class interests, the truth of bourgeois liberty, the truth of capitalist equality, the holy of holies of the huckster fraternity.

This is its (the bourgeoisie's) truth, for what it needs is not the victory of the people, or the *mountain top* but a swamp for the masses; it wants the bosses and money-bags to be seated on the backs of the common people; it needs not a victory, but a deal, a *compromise* with the enemy = a sell-out to the enemy.

For the bourgeoisie this is no "miracle", but reality, the reality of treason to the revolution, not of the victory of the revolution.

"...We are not strong enough to acquire a ladder ... we are not strong enough to launch an uprising." Is that the case, gentlemen?

If that is the case, then recast *a l l* your propaganda and agitation, begin to speak to the workers and the entire people in *new* and different words, in language framed in a new and different way.

Tell the people: workers of St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw, Odessa, Tiflis ... we are not strong enough to launch a rising and be victorious in a rising. Therefore there is *no point* in thinking, no point in vain talking about a *popular constituent assembly*. Don't debase grand words with petty subterfuges. Don't cover up your weakness with a belief in miracles. Proclaim your weakness aloud to one and all—a fault confessed is half redressed. False rhetoric and false boastfulness spell moral ruin and lead unfailingly to political extinction.

Workers! We are too weak to bring about an uprising and win victory in one! Therefore stop all talk about a *popular constituent assembly*, drive away those liars who speak about it, expose the treachery of the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, the "Duma enthusiasts", the Constitutional-Democrats, and the rest of the vile crew, for it is only *i n w o r d* that they want a popular constituent assembly; actually they want an assembly directed *against the people*, one that will not constitute anything new, but will merely patch up the old, one that will not give you new garments, a new life, a new weapon for the great new struggle, but will give you only tinsel over your old rags, only mirages and deceptions, popguns instead of rifles and chains instead of weapons.

Workers! We are too weak for an uprising. Therefore, do not talk and do not let the *Osvobozhdeniye* prostitutes, the *Constitutional-Democrats*, and Duma supporters talk of a *r e v o l u t i o n*; do not allow those bourgeois scoundrels to sully a great popular concept with their claptrap.

We are weak? That means that we have no revolution, nor can there *be one*. That is not a revolution of the people, but swindling of the people by the Petrunkeviches and a pack of liberal lackeys of the tsar. That is not a struggle for liberty, but a bartering away of the people's freedom in exchange for parliamentary seats for the *Osvobozhdeniye*

League. That is not the beginning of a new life, but perpetuation of the old starvation and drudgery, the old stagnancy, and putrefaction.

We are not strong enough to bring about an uprising, fellow-workers! We are not strong enough to rouse the people to the pitch of revolution! We are not strong enough to attain freedom.... We have only enough strength to jostle the enemy, but not to overthrow him, to jostle him in such a way that Petrunkevich will be able to take a seat beside him. Hence, away with all talk about revolution, liberty, and popular representation; whoever talks of these things *without actually working* at the ladder needed to attain to these things, at the uprising needed to win them, is a liar and a humbug, who is merely deceiving you.

We are weak, fellow-workers! We are backed only by the proletariat, and by the millions of peasants who have started a scattered and unarmed struggle in their blind and ignorant way.

Against us are the entire Court clique and all the workers and peasants clad in soldiers' uniform and*

To sum up. We are weak. Weakness seeks salvation in a belief in miracles. That is a fact which emerges from the Bund's statements, from *Iskra*'s plan.

But what is the fact, gentlemen? Is it the weakness of the forces of the proletariat of all Russia or the weak thinking of the Bundists and the new-Iskrists?

Speak the truth:

1) There is no revolution. There is only a deal between the liberal bourgeoisie and the tsar....

2) There is no struggle for liberty. There is only the bartering away of the people's freedom.

3) There is no struggle for popular representation. There is only representation for the *money-bag*.

We are weak ... from this inevitably follows all treachery to the *revolution*.

If you want a revolution, freedom, popular representation ... *you must be strong*.

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* This sentence is unfinished in the MS.—*Ed*.

You are weak?
Revolution is for the strong!
Our lot is to remain in rags.
You are weak?
Only the strong win freedom.
The weak will always *remain slaves*. The experience of all history.
You are weak?
You will be represented by your masters, the slave-owners, the exploiters.
"Representation" is either conquest by the strong, or a scrap of paper, a hoax, *blindfolding the one who is weak so as to dull his faculties....*

Starting from the end

ω) Who is weak? The forces of the proletariat, the minds of the Iskrists and Bundists?

χ) Do you want a revolution? Then you ***must*** be strong!

ξ) We must speak the *truth*: therein lies *our* strength, and the *masses*, *the people*, the *multitude* will decide in actual practice, after the struggle, whether we have strength.
Have we strength?
Or are we weak.

ω) Who is weak.

Written in September 1905

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Published according to the manuscript

ON THE SO-CALLED ARMENIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' ORGANISATION

We are in receipt of a letter from the Central Committee, informing us that the Armenian Social-Democratic Workers' Organisation has expressed a desire to sign the resolution adopted at the conference of all Social-Democratic parties.[106] The Central Committee, however, does not agree to accept this signature, because it was opposed to the participation in the conference of this organisation, which is purely foreign and has no serious links within Russia. We hope soon to publish in *Proletary* more detailed information concerning the true nature of this organisation. For the time being we shall merely observe that all those who wish to help a really Social-Democratic movement among the Armenian workers in the Caucasus should have dealings only with the Caucasian organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., which publish Armenian literature in the Caucasus, and not in Geneva.

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THE ZEMSTVO CONGRESS

On Monday, September 12 (25), there opened in Moscow a Zemstvo and Municipal Congress, which discussed and finally determined the attitude to the Duma. Like previous Zemstvo congresses, this Congress marks a further step in the political development and political organisation of the Russian bourgeoisie. That is why every class-conscious worker must give attention to this birth of a bourgeois constitutional party. The political development of the proletariat as a class has always and everywhere proceeded hand in hand with the political development of the bourgeoisie as a class.

But besides this general significance, the Zemstvo Congress is also of tremendous importance in connection with the burning question of our attitude towards the Duma. A compromise between the bourgeoisie and tsarism, or the former's more resolute struggle against the latter—such is the gist of this question, which, as is known, is giving rise to differences on Social-Democracy's tactics too.

To begin with, let us remind the reader that at their preceding Congress the Zemstvo people roundly condemned the Bulygin Duma, and accepted the well-known *Osvobozhdeniye* draft constitution (a monarchy and a two-chamber system). The question of boycotting the Duma was at first decided in the affirmative by the majority, but later it was reconsidered and deferred until the next congress, which was to be called *immediately* following the promulgation of the State Duma Act—there was even talk of calling it by telegraph. In fact, the Congress was not called for a long time. At first, as we noted in *Proletary*, No. 14, rumour had it that the Zemstvos had cancelled the Congress. Later, the public learned of the negotiations between Mr. Golovin and Durnovo, which we described and appraised in the

preceding issue of *Proletary*,* and which resulted in the police *permitting* the Congress. The Congress was therefore held under conditions entirely different from the preceding, which had been banned by the police, who had threatened to disperse it, had made out a report and, after the Congress, ordered a Senate investigation. This time the Zemstvos and the police came to terms and *reached an agreement* in advance.

To give the reader a better idea of the significance of the difference between "then" and "now", let us remind him of the statement that appeared in the latest issue of *Osvobozhdeniye*. Mr. "Independent" (probably, independent of the police?) wrote the following in No. 76, in full accord with the author of the leading article in that issue: "There should be no question of any sort of compromise whatever. As before, liberty must be won and not begged for.... We should not—and this is in the highest degree important—for a moment renounce either the former methods of struggle or the positions that have already been won. If compromises are possible here too, then that possibility must be removed immediately and in good earnest. All that has till now been done to organise the forces of emancipation must also be done in the future.... The activities of the congresses, unions, and assemblies should continue in the same spirit and in the same direction as hitherto."

It is impossible to express oneself more clearly. After August 6, the organ of the Zemstvo or "Constitutional-Democratic" Party resolutely and unconditionally expresses itself against *renouncing the former methods of struggle*. However, the gist of the false stand taken by the liberal bourgeoisie lies in the fact that, along with a desire for liberty, they no less ardently desire a deal with tsarism. That is why they say one thing and do another. In order "not to renounce the former methods of struggle", they should be boycotting the Duma. After renouncing the boycott, it was logically inevitable for them *to renounce some* of the "former methods of struggle". *Osvobozhdeniye* began to fulminate against compromises at the very moment Golovin was making a compromise with Durnovo. *Osvobozhdeniye* began to vociferate, "we should not for a moment renounce", just when the Zemstvo Congress renounced the former freedom of its sessions. On

* See pp. 253-61 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the occasion of the "granting" of a Duma, that purported inception of liberty, the Zemstvos agreed to confer less freely.

And indeed: 1) the programme for the Congress was cut down by Mr. Durnovo, i.e., by the police; 2) the chairman promised to adjourn the Congress in the event of a discussion on questions not on the agenda authorised by the police; 3) the Congress consented to hold its sittings in the presence of a police agent—sent by Durnovo (*chef de cabinet*)—who was empowered to close the Congress if the "terms" of the agreement between Mr. Golovin and Mr. Durnovo were infringed; 4) also on pain of closure of the Congress, police forbade all "seditious outcries" (according to a wire from the special correspondent of the conservative paper *Le Temps*, who added that all these terms were *faithfully observed*).

It goes without saying that since we derive our information from foreign newspapers we cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy or the exhaustive nature of this information. But there are no grounds for doubting that on the whole it is accurate. On the contrary, Mr. Golovin (who certainly did not intend his negotiations with Durnovo to become known to the public!) most likely promised the police even more regarding the loyal behaviour of the Zemstvos!

The undeniable fact is that *Osvobozhdeniye* 's words are utterly at variance with the deeds of its adherents. *Osvobozhdeniye*'s journalists harangue against the police, while the wirepullers most amicably arrange matters with the police. The beginning of the Zemstvo campaign for the Duma elections coincided with the beginning of agreement between the Zemstvo bourgeoisie and the autocracy.

Foreign correspondents speak unanimously of the *peaceful* nature of this Zemstvo Congress as compared with the preceding. Only one speaker, or according to other information two, favoured boycotting the Duma. The majority stood for participation (we stated in No. 12* of *Proletary*, even before the Duma Act was promulgated, that the Zemstvo Right wing had already made up its mind on this question). The majority considered that non-participation in the elections would be a "sign of timidity"—a view fully shared, as we know, by Parvus and the new *Iskra*. On the other hand,

* See pp. 179-87 of this volume.—*Ed.*

our Zemstvos displayed their *boldness* ... by coming to terms with the police....

The Congress adopted a resolution which, instead of condemning the Duma, merely states (we are at a loss to say whether timidly or boldly) that the "Duma will not be a popular representative body in the literal sense of the term". Russian citizens are invited to unite on the programmes adopted at previous Zemstvo Congresses and to carry on their struggle on the basis of the Duma. The resolution does not say a single word about fighting outside the Duma and apart from the Duma: that is what the *Osvobozhdeniye* writer, who is "independent" of the police, calls "not for a moment renouncing the former methods of struggle...."

Moderating their formerly excessive "revolutionary" zeal, the Zemstvos are applying their efforts to "constructive" work in connection with the Duma. They have drawn up a detailed political programme (we are not yet in possession of its complete text); they have endeavoured to cover up their retreat from democracy by reiterating the main points of moderate constitutionalism; they have dealt in detail with the question of the election campaign, the organisation of local and central election committees, drawing up lists of candidates, etc.

After all this is it still not clear what the landlord and merchant liberalism of the Zemstvos and *Osvobozhdeniye* League is driving at?

What they want is: to start discarding, one by one, the militant demands of democracy, everything that guarantees the rights of the revolutionary people, that develops and extends the struggle for liberty (while maintaining silence in the resolution about the struggle apart from the Duma, etc.); to start clinching all such demands of democracy that secure power for the bourgeoisie alone (snug berths in the Duma above all)! Less agitation among the people and more activity in the Duma!

As William Stead, that "liberal" who but yesterday was an admirer of the autocracy, so aptly put it (see his letter to *The Times* of September 26), external peace called for peace within the country, peace between the tsar and the liberal bourgeoisie, such as was proclaimed by the Law of August 6! By their *behaviour* the Zemstvos are proving



First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Socialism and the Peasantry". 1905
Reduced

that they are *willing to make peace*, although, of course, by no means immediately or in all respects. "Mr. Mikhail Stakhovich, a friend and colleague of Shipov's," wrote the *Temps* correspondent on September 27, "is counting on the creation of a party of the centre, which would favour the autocracy and a consultative Duma; he asserts that many members of the extreme parties" (!! what aspersion on the *Osvobozhdeniye* supporters—*Editors of* "*Proletary*") "are prepared to join this party." Mr. Stakhovich's assertion is confirmed not only by the statements of many legally published newspapers, but even more so by the Zemstvo gentlemen's *deeds*. The *Times* correspondent informs us on September 26 that Mr. M. Stakhovich was present at the Congress. "The last named is still a strong believer in the victory of the moderate elements, indeed, the *almost total absence* of the usual fiery denunciations of the government, except casual [!!] references to the horrors of the Caucasus, rather confirms his forecast." The same correspondent of this conservative British paper writes: "The temper of the Assembly offers a singular contrast to the sentiment dominating the July Congress, when a large number of delegates advocated a boycott of the government [Duma] scheme."

Can it be that *Iskra* will still refuse to abandon its erroneous opinion that those who favoured a boycott wanted passive abstention, whereas the Stakhoviches, who favour participation, want a serious struggle? Will it really continue even now to stand, together with Parvus, for an agreement with the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents and support for them, after they have obviously begun to come to terms with the Durnovos?

P. S. In all fairness it must be said that more and more information keeps coming in showing that the Russian new-Iskrists do not agree with the new *Iskra*. We have just received a leaflet issued by the St. Petersburg (Menshevik) group, entitled: "The State Duma or a Constituent Assembly." Together with criticism of the Duma we find here the slogan "Down with the Duma!" The workers' representatives are urged to tell the liberals "that they must not recognise the State Duma", "that they must renounce their right [the print in the leaflet is not legible] of election to the Duma", that they must help the workers "to arm for the struggle against the Black Hundreds and the State Duma".

The St. Petersburg Mensheviks have thus adopted the slogan of an active boycott. Here too, as in the well-known case of the "Zemstvo campaign plan",[107] *Iskra* is at variance with its adherents in Russia. Only in one respect do the St. Petersburg Mensheviks come close to *Iskra*: they urge the workers immediately to elect "representatives in factories, workshops, and departments, just as they did for the Shidlovsky[108] Commission.... When they meet, let our representatives wage a struggle against the State Duma, just as our delegates in the Shidlovsky Commission fought against that cunning trap set by the autocracy." This slogan is very similar to the *Iskra* slogan calling for "revolutionary self-government", although the comrades of the St. Petersburg group do not, of course, use this inept and high-sounding phrase. We have no doubt but that the St. Petersburg workers will see the erroneousness of this slogan and a false analogy with the Shidlovsky Commission. At that time the workers were boycotting the Commission; now the Duma is boycotting the workers.

While the tsar retains power, revolutionary self-government can be only a fragment of the revolution (the decision of the Smolensk Municipal Council, etc.). Making it the main slogan of the revolutionary proletariat means, sowing confusion and playing into the hands of the *Osvobozhdeniye* people. In developing, extending, strengthening, and spreading the organisation of the *revolutionary* forces of the proletariat and the peasantry, we must not confuse this organisation of war, this organisation of an uprising, with *self-government*. In purpose, manner of origin, and character, the organisation of an armed uprising, the organisation of a revolutionary army, is *quite unlike* the organisation of revolutionary self-government. The more zealously the liberal bourgeoisie, the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, endeavour to curtail, blur, and dock the consistent revolutionary-democratic slogans, the more clearly and directly must we bring forward such slogans—the convocation of a popular constituent assembly by a provisional revolutionary government, the organisation of an armed uprising, and a revolutionary army for the overthrow of tsarist rule.

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SOCIALISM AND THE PEASANTRY

The revolution Russia is going through is a revolution of the entire people. The interests of the whole people have come into irreconcilable conflict with those of a handful of men constituting the autocratic government or backing it. The very existence of present-day society, which is based on commodity production and wherein the interests of the various classes and population groups are extremely varied and conflicting, calls for the destruction of the autocracy, the establishment of political liberty, and the open and direct expression of the dominating classes' interests in the organisation and administration of the state. Bourgeois in its social and economic essence, the democratic revolution cannot but express the needs of all bourgeois society.

However, this society, which now seems a united whole in the struggle against the autocracy, is itself irremediably split by the chasm between capital and labour. The people that have risen against the autocracy are not a united people. Employers and wage-workers, the insignificant number of the rich ("the upper ten thousand") and the tens of millions of those who toil and own no property—these are indeed "two nations", as was said by a far-sighted Englishman as long ago as the first half of the nineteenth century.[109] The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie stands on the order of the day throughout Europe. This struggle has long spread to Russia as well. In present-day Russia it is not two contending forces that form the content of the revolution, but two distinct and different social wars: one waged within the present autocratic-feudal system, the other within the future bourgeois-democratic system, whose birth we are already witnessing. One is the struggle of the entire people

for freedom (the freedom of bourgeois society), for democracy, i.e., the sovereignty of the people; the other is the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for a socialist organisation of society.

An arduous and formidable task thus devolves on the socialists—to wage two wars simultaneously, wars that are totally different in their nature, their aims, and the composition of the social forces capable of playing a decisive part in either of them. The Social-Democratic movement has explicitly set itself this difficult task, and has definitely coped with it thanks to its having based its entire programme on scientific socialism, i.e., Marxism, and thanks to its having become one of the contingents of the army of world Social-Democracy, which has verified, confirmed, explained, and developed in detail the principles of Marxism on the basis of the experience of so many democratic and socialist movements in the most diverse countries of Europe.

Revolutionary Social-Democracy has long indicated and proved the bourgeois nature of Russian democratism, ranging from the liberal-Narodnik to the *Osvobozhdeniye* varieties. It has always pointed out that it is inevitable for bourgeois democratism to be half-hearted, limited, and narrow. For the period of the democratic revolution it has set the socialist proletariat the task of winning the peasant masses over to its side, and, paralysing the bourgeoisie's instability, of smashing and crushing the autocracy. A decisive victory of the democratic revolution is possible only in the form of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But the sooner this victory is achieved, and the fuller it is, the faster and the more profoundly will fresh contradictions and a fresh class struggle develop within the fully democratised bourgeois system. The more completely we achieve the democratic revolution, the closer shall we approach the tasks of the socialist revolution, the more acute and incisive will be the proletariat's struggle against the very foundations of bourgeois society.

The Social-Democrats must wage a relentless struggle against any departure from this presentation of the revolutionary-democratic and socialist tasks of the proletariat. It is absurd to ignore the democratic, i.e., essentially bourgeois, nature of the present revolution, and hence it is absurd to

bring forward such slogans as the one calling for the establishment of revolutionary communes. It is absurd and reactionary to belittle the tasks of the proletariat's participation—and leading participation at that—in the democratic revolution, by shunning, for instance, the slogan of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It is absurd to confuse the tasks and prerequisites of a democratic revolution with those of a socialist revolution, which, we repeat, differ both in their nature and in the composition of the social forces taking part in them.

It is on this last mentioned mistake that we propose to dwell in detail. The undeveloped state of the class contradictions in the people in general, and in the peasantry in particular, is an unavoidable phenomenon in the epoch of a democratic revolution, which for the first time lays the foundations for a really extensive development of capitalism. This lack of economic development results in the survival and revival, in one form or another, of the backward forms of a socialism which is petty-bourgeois, for it idealises reforms that do not go beyond the framework of petty-bourgeois relationships. The mass of the peasants do not and cannot realise that the fullest "freedom" and the "justest" distribution even of all the land, far from destroying capitalism, will, on the contrary, create the conditions for a particularly extensive and powerful development of capitalism. Whereas Social-Democracy singles out and supports only the revolutionary-democratic substance of these peasant aspirations, petty-bourgeois socialism elevates to a theory this political backwardness of the peasants, confusing or jumbling together the prerequisites and the tasks of a genuine democratic revolution with those of an imaginary socialist revolution.

The most striking expression of this vague petty-bourgeois ideology is the programme, or rather draft programme, of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries", who made the more haste to proclaim themselves a party, the less developed among them were the forms and prerequisites for a party. When analysing their draft programme (see *Vperyod*, No. 3*) we already had occasion to point out that the Socialist-Revolutionaries' views are rooted in the old Russian Narodnik ideas.

* "From Narodism to Marxism", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 83-89.—*Ed.*

However, as the entire economic development of Russia, the entire course of the Russian revolution, is remorsely and ruthlessly cutting the ground from under the foundations of pure Narodism day by day and hour by hour, the views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries inevitably tend to become eclectic. They are trying to patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist "criticism" of Marxism, but this does not make the tattered garment wear any the better. All in all, their programme is nothing but an absolutely lifeless and self-contradictory document, which is merely an expression of a stage in the history of Russian socialism on the road from the Russia of serfdom to bourgeois Russia, the road "from Narodism to Marxism". This definition, which typifies a number of more or less small streams of contemporary revolutionary thought, is also applicable to the latest draft agrarian programme of the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.), published in No. 6-8 of *Przedświt*.*

The draft divides the agrarian programme into two parts. Part I sets forth "reforms for the realisation of which social conditions have already matured"; Part II—"formulates the consummation and integration of the agrarian reforms set forth in Part I". Part I, in its turn, is subdivided into three sections: A) labour protection—demands for the benefit of the agricultural proletariat; B) agrarian reforms (in the narrow sense, or, so to say, peasant demands), and C) protection of the rural population (self-government, etc.).

This programme takes a step towards Marxism in attempting to single out something in the nature of a minimum from the maximum programme—then in providing a wholly independent formulation of demands of a purely proletarian nature; further, the preamble to the programme recognises that it is wholly inadmissible for socialists to "flatter the proprietory instincts of the peasant masses". As a matter of fact, if the truth contained in this latter proposition had been given sufficient thought and carried to its logical conclusion, that would have inevitably resulted in a strictly Marxist programme. The trouble is that the P.S.P. which draws its ideas just as willingly from the fount of opportunist criticism

* *The Dawn.—Ed.*

of Marxism is not a consistently proletarian party. "Since it has not been proved that landed property tends to concentrate," we read in the preamble to the programme, "it is inconceivable to champion this form of economy with absolute sincerity and assurance, and to convince the peasant that the small farms will inevitably disappear."

This is nothing but an echo of bourgeois political economy. Bourgeois economists are doing their utmost to instil in the small peasant the idea that capitalism is compatible with the well-being of the small independent farmer. That is why they veil the general question of commodity production, the yoke of capital, and the decline and degradation of small peasant farming by stressing the particular question of the concentration of landed property. They shut their eyes to the fact that large-scale production in specialised branches of agriculture producing for the market is also developing on small and medium-sized holdings, and that ownership of this kind is deteriorating because of greater leasing of land, as well as under the burden of mortgages and the pressure of usury. They obscure the indisputable fact of the technical superiority of large-scale production in agriculture and the fall in the peasant's living standards in his struggle against capitalism. There is nothing in the P.S.P. statements but a repetition of these bourgeois prejudices, resurrected by the present-day Davids.[110]

The unsoundness of theoretical views affects the practical programme as well. Take Part I—the agrarian reforms in the narrow sense of the term. On the one hand, you read in Clause 5: "The abolition of all restrictions on the purchase of land allotments," and in 6: "The abolition of *szarwark*[111] and obligatory cartage (compulsory services)." These are purely Marxist minimum demands. By presenting them (especially Clause 5) the P.S.P. is making a step forward in comparison with our Socialist-Revolutionaries, who in company with *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* have a weakness for the vaunted "inalienability of land allotments". By presenting these demands the P.S.P. is verging on the Marxist idea regarding the struggle against remnants of serfdom, as the basis and content of the present-day peasant movement. Although the P.S.P. verges on to this idea, it is far from fully and consciously accepting it.

The main clauses of the minimum programme under consideration read as follows: "1) nationalisation through confiscation of the royal and state demesnes[112] as well as estates belonging to the clergy; 2) nationalisation of the big landed estates in the absence of direct heirs; 3) nationalisation of forests, rivers, and lakes." These demands have all the defects of a programme whose main demand at present is the nationalisation of the land. So long as full political liberty and sovereignty of the people do not exist, whilst there is no democratic republic, it is both premature and inexpedient to present the demand for nationalisation, since nationalisation means transference to the state, and the present state is a police and class state; the state of tomorrow will in any case be a class state. As a slogan meant to lead forward towards democratisation, this demand is quite useless, for it does not place the stress on the peasants' relations to the landlords (the peasants take the land of the landlords) but on the landlords' relations to the state. This presentation of the question is totally wrong at a time like the present, when the peasants are fighting in a revolutionary way for the land, against both the landlords and the landlords' state. Revolutionary peasant committees for confiscation, as instruments of confiscation—this is the only slogan that meets the needs of such a time and promotes the class struggle against the landlords, a struggle indissolubly bound up with the revolutionary destruction of the landlords' state.

The other clauses of the agrarian minimum programme in the draft programme of the P.S.P. are as follows: "4) limitation of property rights, inasmuch as they become an impediment to all improvements in agriculture, should such improvements be considered necessary by the majority of those concerned; ... 7) nationalisation of insurance of grain crops against fire and hail, and of cattle against epidemics; 8) legislation for state assistance in the formation of agricultural artels and co-operatives; 9) agricultural schools."

These clauses are quite in the spirit of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or (what amounts to the same thing) of bourgeois reformism. There is nothing revolutionary about them. They are, of course, progressive—no one disputes that—but progressive in the interests of property-owners. For a socialist to advance them means nothing but flattering proprietory

instincts. To advance them is the same as demanding state aid to trusts, cartels, syndicates, and manufacturers' associations, which are no less "progressive" than co-operatives, insurance, etc., in agriculture. All this is capitalist progress. To show concern for that is not our affair, but that of the employers, the *entrepreneurs*. Proletarian socialism, as distinct from petty-bourgeois socialism, leaves it to the Counts de Rocquigny, the landowning Zemstvo members, etc., to take care of the co-operatives of the landowners, big and little—and concerns itself entirely and exclusively with *wage-workers*' co-operatives for the purpose of *fighting the landowners*.

Let us now consider Part II of the programme. It consists of only one point: "Nationalisation of the big landed estates through confiscation. The arable land and pastures thus acquired by the people must be divided up into allotments and turned over to the landless peasants and those with small holdings, on guaranteed long-term leases."

A fine "consummation", indeed! Under the guise of "consummation and integration of agrarian reforms" a party calling itself socialist proposes what is by no means a socialist organisation of society, but rather an absurd petty-bourgeois utopia. Here we have a most telling example of complete confusion of the democratic and the socialist revolutions, and complete failure to understand the difference in their aims. The transfer of the land from the landlords to the peasants may be—and in fact has in Europe everywhere been—a component part of the democratic revolution, one of the stages in the bourgeois revolution, but only bourgeois radicals can call it "consummation" or "final realisation". The redistribution of land among the various categories of proprietors, among the various classes of farmers, may be advantageous and necessary for the victory of democracy, the complete eradication of all traces of serf-ownership, for raising the living standards of the masses, accelerating the development of capitalism, etc.; the most resolute support of a measure like that may be incumbent upon the socialist proletariat in the epoch of a democratic revolution, but only *socialist* production and not petty peasant production, can constitute a "consummation and final realisation". "Guaranteeing" small-peasant leaseholds whilst commodity production and

capitalism are preserved, is nothing but a reactionary petty-bourgeois utopia.

We see now that the P.S.P.'s fundamental error is not peculiar to that Party alone, is not an isolated instance or something fortuitous. It expresses in a clearer and more distinct form (than the vaunted "socialisation" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, which they themselves are unable to understand) the *basic* error of all Russian Narodism, *all* Russian bourgeois liberalism and radicalism in the agrarian question, including the bourgeois liberalism and radicalism that found expression in the discussions at the recent (September) Zemstvo Congress in Moscow.

This basic error may be expressed as follows:

In the presentation of immediate aims the programme of the P.S.P. is not revolutionary. In its ultimate aims it is not socialist.

In other words: a failure to understand the difference between a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution leads to a failure to express the genuinely revolutionary aspect of the democratic aims, while all the nebulousness of the bourgeois-democratic world outlook is brought into the socialist aims. The result is a slogan which is not revolutionary enough for a democrat, and inexcusably confused for a socialist.

On the other hand, Social-Democracy's programme meets all requirements both of support for genuinely revolutionary democratism and the presentation of a clear socialist aim. In the present-day peasant movement we see a struggle against serfdom, a struggle against the landlords and the landlords' state. We give full support to this struggle. The only correct slogan for such support is: confiscation through revolutionary peasant committees. What should be done with the confiscated land is a secondary question. It is not we who will settle this question, but the peasants. When it comes to being settled a struggle will begin between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie within the peasantry. That is why we either leave this question open (which is so displeasing to the petty-bourgeois projectors) or merely indicate the *beginning* of the road to be taken, by demanding the return of the cut-off lands[113] (in which unthinking people see an obstacle to the movement, despite the numerous explanations given by the Social-Democrats).

There is only one way to make the agrarian reform, which is unavoidable in present-day Russia, play a revolutionary-democratic role: it must be effected on the revolutionary initiative of the peasants themselves, despite the landlords and the bureaucracy, and despite the state, i.e., it must be effected by revolutionary means. The very worst distribution of land after a reform of *this sort* will be better from all standpoints than what we have at present. And this is the road we indicate when we make our prime demand the establishment of revolutionary peasant committees.

But at the same time we say to the rural proletariat: "The most radical victory of the peasants, which you must help with all your force to achieve, will not rid you of poverty. This can be achieved only by one means: the victory of the entire proletariat—both industrial and agricultural—over the entire bourgeoisie and the formation of a socialist society."

Together with the peasant proprietors, against the landlords and the landlords' state; together with the urban proletariat, against the entire bourgeoisie and all the peasant proprietors. Such is the slogan of the class-conscious rural proletariat. And if the petty proprietors do not immediately accept this slogan, or even if they refuse to accept it altogether, it will nevertheless become the workers' slogan, will inevitably be borne out by the entire course of the revolution, will rid us of petty-bourgeois illusions, and will clearly and definitely indicate to us our socialist goal.

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A REPLETE BOURGEOISIE AND A CRAVING BOURGEOISIE

Le Temps, one of the most influential organs of the French conservative bourgeoisie, is waging a most desperate campaign against socialism, and it is a rare day on which one fails to see in its columns the names of Marx, Bebel, Guesde and Jaurès, accompanied by the most vicious comment and vituperation. *Le Temps* cannot speak of socialism without trembling with rage.

The newspaper is following what well-intentioned Europeans call the Russian "crisis", with the utmost attention, and never fails to offer edifying counsel to *la nation amie et alliée*—the "friendly and allied nation". Thus on the present occasion, too, it devotes its leading article to the recent Zemstvo Congress. It recalls the preceding July Congress and cannot refrain even in retrospect from expressing its dissatisfaction. It was, you see, "a spectacle of utter incoherence of ideas and of complete incertitude of intention"; the Bulygin scheme was already known, but the delegates nevertheless confined themselves to "violent speeches", without being able to come to a decision on the question of boycott or participation. The organ of the French ruling bourgeoisie even reminds the Zemstvo delegates with irritation that they had no mandates!

On the contrary, what a smile of satisfaction has now come over the face of the bourgeois who is replete with political power! How graciously he hastens to shake the noble hand of his *confrère* who as yet is only craving for political power, but who is already revealing his "maturity"! The boycott has been rejected, and now nothing more is being said about the absence of mandates. "The decision of the Zemstvo delegates," says *Le Temps*, "does them credit.... It shows that

the political education of the most enlightened elements of the Russian people is progressing, and that they are abandoning vague plans of political prestidigitation, to enter boldly on the path of necessary evolution."

The bourgeois who is replete with political power and who has experience of what real victories of the people, the workers and peasants, lead to in revolutions, has no hesitation in declaring the September Congress of the liberal landlords and merchants a victory of evolution over revolution.

He praises the "moderation" of the Congress. He points with evident satisfaction to the rejection of the resolutions on "parcelling up the land" and on suffrage for women. "The wisdom and moderation of these decisions clearly indicate that the opinions of the extreme parties did not prevail at this Congress. The programme agreed on is sufficiently democratic *to disarm the revolutionaries*. Since the Zemstvo Congress expects to put its plans into effect solely by lawful means, its programme may also rally those reformists whom personal issues will not cut off from the rest of the Congress."

The replete bourgeois slaps the craving bourgeois encouragingly on the shoulder—to have advanced a programme "sufficiently democratic" to throw dust into people's eyes and *disarm the revolutionaries*, and have taken the path of legality, that is in plain and straightforward language to have come to terms with the Trepovs and Romanovs—that is true statesman-like wisdom.

That the hopes which the shrewd bourgeois places in simple-minded revolutionaries are not quite groundless has been proved by our wiseacres of the new *Iskra*. They have dropped the reins and dashed into a trap; they are eagerly proposing to exact democratic pledges from the moderate bourgeois, who are now prepared heart and soul to promise anything and to pledge themselves to anything. It is not only in struggle between hostile parties, but even in the struggle within the socialist parties (as we found from experience after the Second Congress) that all promises go by the board, once the more or less substantial interests of the contending parties are involved. As the English saying goes—promises like pie-crust are leaven to be broken.*

* This phrase is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

What did *Iskra*'s tactics with regard to the Duma boil down to? To the ideological and tactical *disarmament of the revolutionaries*. The wiseacres of the opportunist *Iskra* worked for this disarmament by denouncing the idea of an active boycott, substituting (fully in the spirit of *Novoye Vremya*,[114] and almost in the same terms) a passive boycott for an active, preaching confidence and trustfulness in the Milyukovs and Stakhoviches who now embrace each other, and *replacing* the revolutionary slogan of insurrection with *Osvobozhdeniye* 's bourgeois twaddle, such as the "revolutionary self-government of citizens".

It is only the blind who can still fail to see what a swamp *Iskra* has floundered into. In the illegal press it is completely isolated, with *only Osvobozhdeniye* on its side. The Bund, which even Martov and Axelrod will not suspect of any liking for the "*Vperyod* arsenal", has come out resolutely for an active boycott. In the legal press all the scoundrels and all the moderate liberals have united against the radical bourgeois who have voiced sympathy with the boycott and are disposed towards the peasantry in a most friendly way.

Well, did Lenin tell any falsehood when, in analysing the new-*Iskra* resolutions, he said in his *Two Tactics* that "*Iskra*" *is descending to the level of the liberal landlords*, while *Proletary* is endeavouring to raise the level of the revolutionary peasants?

We have mentioned *Novoye Vremya*. Both that reptile of an organ and *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* are waging a desperate struggle against the idea of a boycott, thereby revealing to all and sundry the Duma's actual political significance. As a sample, here is a typical outburst by *Novoye Vremya*, which we shall dwell on the more readily as it is shedding new light on the abysmal bourgeois vileness displayed by even such a "respectable" liberal organ as *Russkiye Vedomosti*.

Mr. Yollos, its well-known Berlin correspondent, deals with the Jena Congress in No. 247. To begin with, his philistine soul rejoices at the fact that there has appeared such a kind-hearted and fair-minded bourgeois liberal, the wealthy Abbe, who has made to the city of Jena the gift of a People's House, in which all parties, including even the Social-Democrats, are free to meet. And Mr. Yollos draws the moral: "One can benefit the people outside definite party bounds

too." That, of course, is true. But what are we to say of a writer, who, at a time of desperate party struggle in Russia, indulges in praise of non-partisanship? Doesn't Mr. Yollos really understand that this is a piece of the worst political tactlessness, since he is thereby playing into the hands of *Novoye Vremya*? The true meaning of this philistine delight in non-partisanship will, however, become apparent to the reader from the following statement by Mr. Yollos: "Needless to say there are political conditions under which it is useful for the time being *to keep ultimate aims to oneself*, and to bear in mind the immediate aims common to socialism and to liberalism."

Now that is frank! Thank you, Mr. Yollos, for at least being explicit! It remains for us, whenever addressing the workers, to make use of such declaration at all times and on all occasions to show up the *bourgeois* nature of Russian liberalism, and to make clear to the workers the need for an *independent* party of the proletariat, one that is undeviatingly hostile to the bourgeoisie, even the most liberal.

But all these tirades by our "democrat" are nothing compared with what is to come. Mr. Yollos does not confine himself to advising the proletariat "to keep its ultimate aims to itself for the time being", i.e., renounce socialism. No, he also advises renouncing the idea of bringing the present political revolution to its consummation. Mr. Yollos cites a speech by Bebel and plays up the passage in which Bebel expresses doubt as to whether we can succeed in transforming Russia into a civilised state "so soon", while at the same time declaring that the old autocratic regime will never return, and "the old Russia is no longer possible". Concerning this passage Mr. Yollos writes the following: "I do not consider Bebel an authority on Russian affairs, but I must observe that in this part of his speech he differs favourably from Kautsky and several other doctrinaires who recommend *Revolution in Permanenz* (uninterrupted revolution). As a clever man and politician who realises what concrete forms a state of uninterrupted anarchy assumes in the life of a nation, Bebel sees progress primarily in the promotion of cultural aims, and his words make it quite clear that he draws no line of demarcation and certainly erects no barriers between the Russian

intelligentsia and the Russian proletariat, at any rate before the elementary rights of man have been secured."

First of all this is a *libel on Bebel*, a libel fully in the style of *Novoye Vremya*. Bebel always and unequivocally draws a "line of demarcation" between bourgeois and proletarian democratism; Mr. Yollos cannot be ignorant of that. Bebel distinguishes in no uncertain fashion between the bourgeois intelligentsia and the Social-Democratic intelligentsia. To assure the Russian reader that Bebel, while fighting for "culture", ever hushes up the mendacity and treachery of the bourgeois democrats on the one hand, and the socialist aims of the working class on the other, means slandering in the grossest manner the leader of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Germany.

Secondly, it does not at all follow from Bebel's speech that he regards the Russian revolution otherwise than Kautsky. The "favourable difference" in this respect between Bebel and Kautsky is a sheer fabrication by Mr. Yollos, who has extracted and distorted a single passage in Bebel's speech, while maintaining silence about Bebel's numerous declarations fully in favour of the Russian revolution and its decisive victory.

Thirdly—and for us this is the most interesting feature of the stand taken by *Russkiye Vedomosti*—Mr. Yollos's outburst shows that he is *afraid* of a decisive victory of the revolution in Russia. Mr. Yollos says that "uninterrupted revolution" is "uninterrupted anarchy". To say that means saying that revolution is sedition; to say that means becoming a *traitor to the revolution*. And let not the *Osvobozhdeniye* diplomatists, who are so fond of asserting that they have no enemies on their left, try to tell us that this is only an accidental slip on the part of *Russkiye Vedomosti*. That is not true. It is an expression of the most profound sentiments and the most deep-rooted interests of the liberal landlord and the liberal manufacturer. It is the same thing as the statement made by Mr. Vinogradov, who is calling for a struggle to prevent the Russian revolution from entering on the path of 1789. It is the same as the servility of Mr. Trubetskoi, who told the tsar that he disapproved of sedition. This is no slip. It is the sole truthful statement in words on the countless disgraceful deeds of our bourgeois democrats, who are

wearied of "uninterrupted anarchy", are beginning to long for *law and order*, are already *tired* of "fighting" (even though they never did any fighting), and *already recoil* from revolution at the mere sight of workers and peasants actually rising for actual battle, eager to strike blows, and not receive them. The bourgeois democrats are prepared to wink at the misdeeds of the Trepovs and the slaughter of unarmed people; they are not afraid of that, but of "anarchy" of a quite different kind, when power will no longer be wielded by Trepov or by Petrunkevich and Rodichev, and the uprising of the peasants and workers will be *victorious*. The bourgeois democrats rally to the Duma idea so eagerly for the very reason that they see in it an earnest of the betrayal of the revolution, an earnest of the prevention of the complete victory of the revolution—that terrible "uninterrupted anarchy".

Novoye Vremya provides evidence of the fact that our analysis of the liberals' psychology is a faithful one. These dyed-in-the-wool lackeys of the Trepovs took immediate note of *Russkiye Vedomosti*'s baseness and hastened to heartily embrace their *confrères*. It is precisely this lie of Mr. Yollos's about Bebel "differing favourably" from Kautsky that *Novoye Vremya* of September 13 (26) cites approvingly, remarking in its turn:

"Thus, our radical 'absentees' will have to exclude Bebel too from the number of their allies."

This is a perfectly legitimate conclusion. The professional *Novoye Vremya* traitors have correctly appraised the sum and substance of the "slip" made by *Russkiye Vedomosti*. Moreover, *Novoye Vremya*, that past master of politics, at once drew a conclusion *with regard to the Duma*. Although Mr. Yollos did not say a word about Bebel's views on the boycott, *Novoye Vremya* nevertheless labelled as "absentees" those in favour of the boycott. *Novoye Vremya* supplemented the libel against Bebel with a libel against the "radicals", expressing, however, the absolutely correct opinion that the "radical absentees'" tactics are governed by the idea of the complete victory of the revolution, the idea of uninterrupted revolution, whereas the pro-Duma liberals are prompted by the fear of "uninterrupted anarchy". *Novoye Vremya* is right. Trepov's lackeys were fully justified in catching Mr. Yollos in the act

TRUMPARA TUMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and telling him: If you do not want "uninterrupted anarchy" then it follows that you are my ally, and no democratic bombast will dissuade me of this. Ours is a minor family quarrel—against the "doctrinaires", the supporters of "uninterrupted anarchy", however, we shall be at one!

Will *Iskra* fail to realise even now that in reproaching the boycott supporters with abstention, i.e., *absenteeism*, it was talking after the *Novoye Vremya* fashion? Can it fail to realise that this concurrence of its slogans with those of *Novoye Vremya* proves that there is something fundamentally false in its stand?

The replete European bourgeoisie lauds the moderation of the Russian bourgeoisie, which is craving for power. Trepov's lackeys laud Mr. Yollos of *Russkiye Vedomosti* for censuring the idea of "uninterrupted anarchy". The *Novoye Vremya* and new-*Iskra* gentry scoff at "absenteeism"....

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THE LANDLORDS ON THE BOYCOTT OF THE DUMA

The abridged minutes of the July Zemstvo Congress have been published in No. 76 of *Osvobozhdeniye*. At present, when the question of the tactics towards the State Duma is in the limelight, this material is most noteworthy, for it is unique in showing *just how* the Zemstvo and *Osvobozhdeniye* people discussed the boycott issue. Certainly no one doubts that prior to the conclusion of peace—the appearance of the Duma Act—they were, or tried to appear, more revolutionary than they are at present. Nevertheless, the nature of their arguments is most useful for a verification of our own appraisal of the issue. After all, this is probably the first case in Russian political history of concrete political steps being discussed simultaneously by both opposition and revolutionary parties.

It is quite natural that the bourgeois democrats were impelled to raise the boycott issue not by the general programme of their struggle or by the interests of definite classes, but primarily by a vague feeling of embarrassment, of shame at the contradictory and false position they have placed themselves in. "How can we take part in something we have ourselves condemned?" Mr. Shishkov asked. "Why, the people will think that we endorse the scheme." As you see, this liberal's very first thought of the boycott is linked with the question of the people—he feels instinctively that to go into the Duma means wronging the people. He cannot get rid of gleams of good intentions to march with the people. Mr. Rayevsky, another speaker, puts the question on a more abstract plane: "We have always been steadfast in principle, but in tactics we are entering into a compromise. It will

turn out that we condemned the Bulygin scheme and yet are bent on becoming representatives of the people. We shall not tread this slippery path." This, of course, is a slight exaggeration on the part of Mr. Rayevsky, for the *Osvobozhdeniye* League *has never been* steadfast in principle. It is also incorrect to reduce the question to a bare repudiation of compromise: revolutionary Social-Democrats who have absorbed the spirit of Marxism would have told this speaker that it is ridiculous to absolutely reject compromises that are imposed by life itself, and that this is not the point at issue; what matters is a clear understanding and persistent pursuit of the aims of the struggle under all circumstances. However, we repeat, any materialistic presentation of the problem is basically alien to a bourgeois democrat. His doubts are merely a symptom of the deep split within the various strata of bourgeois democracy.

Mr. Rodichev, the phrase-monger who spoke after Mr. Rayevsky, settled the question very simply: "At one time we protested against the new Zemstvo regulations, yet we entered the Zemstvos.... If we had the forces with which to effect a boycott, we should declare one" (and is not this "lack of forces", gentlemen, due to the fact that the interests of the property-owners are hostile to an unyielding struggle against the autocracy, and hostile to the workers and peasants?).... "The first rule of military art is to get away in time..." (believe it or not, that is what this knight of liberalism from Tver actually said! And yet the liberals jeer at Kuropatkin). "There will be a boycott if we, after entering the Duma, make the following our first decision: 'We are leaving. This is not a genuine representation, which you can no longer do without. Give us a real representation!'" That would be a real "boycott". (Why, of course! To say "give us"!—could anything be more "real" for a Zemstvo Balalaikin?[115] No wonder they laughed so heartily when Mr. Golovin told them how "easily he had dispelled" the Governor of Moscow's apprehensions lest the Zemstvo Congress declare itself a constituent assembly.)

Mr. Kolyubakin said: "The preceding speakers put the question as follows: 'Either go into the Bulygin Duma, or do nothing at all'" (*Iskra* puts the question exactly like these "preceding speakers" of the monarchist bourgeoisie's right

wing). "We must appeal to the people, who will be unanimously opposed to the Bulygin Duma.... Appeal to the people, exercise freedom of speech and of assembly in actual practice. But by entering a disreputable institution you are disgracing yourselves. You will be in the minority there, and this minority will disgrace itself in the eyes of the population." In this speech one again senses the link between the boycott idea and an appeal to the peasantry, the significance of that idea as a turn away from the tsar and towards the people. And with admirable candour, Mr. Shchepkin hastened to rejoin to Mr. Kolyubakin's speech, which he so thoroughly understood: "Never mind if we make a mistake in the eyes of the people, if only we save the cause" (... *the cause of the bourgeoisie*, would probably have been the workers' interjection had they been present at this illustrious gathering). "I do not dispute that we may soon have to tread the revolutionary path. But the draft drawn up by the Bureau" (the draft resolution against a boycott) "seeks to avoid this, since we are not revolutionary either by upbringing or by inclination" (class upbringing, class inclination).

Mr. Shchepkin argues wisely! Better than the whole new-*Iskra* lot taken together, he understands that the crux of the matter is not the choice of ways and means, but the disparity of aims. It is necessary to "save the cause" of law and order—that is what really matters. The revolutionary path, which may lead to the victory of the workers and peasants, cannot be risked.

On the other hand, that magniloquent windbag Mr. de Roberti talks exactly like a new-*Iskra* adherent: "What is to be done if, owing to its inefficacy, the draft becomes law? An armed uprising?" (Come, come, Mr. Roberti, how can one "link up an uprising with the Duma!"? What a pity you are not acquainted with our Bund, which would have explained to you that the two cannot be linked together.) "That, I believe, will undoubtedly come in due time. But at present, resistance can either be merely passive, or passive while always ready to become active." (Oh, what a charming radical! He ought to borrow the slogan "revolutionary self-government" from the new-*Iskra*—what arias he could render on this theme, what arias!...) ... "to elect only those who would enter with the determination to effect a revolution

at all costs". That's the kind of people we are! Well, were we wrong when we said that Parvus met a friend in such an *Osvobozhdeniye* man, or that the new-*Iskra* had risen to the bait of the high-flown phrases of the magniloquent landed proprietors?

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ON THE QUESTION OF PARTY UNITY[116]

On our part, we can only welcome the perfectly clear and definite presentation of the question by the Central Committee—either fusion with the Party on the basis of the decisions of the Third Congress, or a unity congress. The Organising Committee will have to make the final choice. If it rejects entry into the Party on the basis of the decisions of the Third Congress, then the preparation and elaboration of the terms for a unity congress should be begun at once. To this end, both sides should first of all declare formally and quite explicitly that in principle the convening of two congresses at the same time and in the same place has been deemed necessary; secondly, it should likewise be formally established that all organisations in each section of the Party must unreservedly submit to decisions of the congress of their own section. In other words, both congresses should be of binding and not merely advisory significance to their respective Party sections; thirdly, the basis on which the congresses are to be convened should be definitely established in advance, i.e., what organisations are to send delegates and how many delegates with the right to vote each may send (for the section of the Party that has recognised the Third Congress, points 2 and 3 have already been defined in the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P. as adopted by that congress); fourthly, negotiations should at once be started on the time and place of the congress (the congresses themselves will decide as to the terms on which they will fuse, and the time of fusion); fifthly, it is extremely important that work should at once begin on drawing up a most explicit and detailed draft proposal on fusion, which should be submitted for decision to both congresses. This is a matter of imperative

necessity. The experience of other parties and of our own shows clearly that unless a draft proposal or draft proposals for fusion are prepared, published, and thoroughly discussed beforehand, it will be quite impossible for the congresses to come to a decision on so difficult a question.

So, it is now up to the Organising Committee, and its decision will be eagerly awaited by all who favour unity.

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AN IRATE REPLY

Our article, "The Theory of Spontaneous Generation" (*Proletary*, No. 16*), has evoked an extremely irate reply from the Bund. The latter even ran short of its own supply of virulent words and borrowed some from Plekhanov, that well-known opponent of coarse polemics. What is the trouble? Why is the Bund so incensed? It is so because we, on the one hand, mentioned the possibility of there being irony in the Bund's praise for *Iskra*, and, on the other hand, ridiculed the Bund's solidarity with *Iskra* on a number of questions. It is such duplicity that the Bund imputes to us, accusing us of prestidigitation, etc., while *maintaining complete silence* about all our analysis of the Bund's indubitably unironical and just as indubitably incorrect arguments. Why has the Bund maintained silence over this analysis of the crux of a question it has itself raised? That is because this analysis reveals *the duplicity in the stand of the Bund itself*, which, on the one hand, has renounced *Iskra*'s "Duma" tactics, and, on the other, has in dead earnest repeated a number of *Iskra*'s mistakes. What the irate Bund puts down to our duplicity should in fact be put down to the *duplicity of the Bund's own stand* on the question of whether our slogan should be the convocation of a constituent assembly by a provisional revolutionary government, or by the tsar or by the State Duma, or whether it should be the spontaneous generation of this constituent assembly.

We have shown that the Bund *is all muddled on this issue*. Till this very moment the Bund has not provided a straightforward answer. And if the Bund is now railing because we have held up a mirror to it, we can only answer by quoting the saying: "It's no use blaming the mirror if...."

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* See pp. 246-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

A NEW MENSHEVIK CONFERENCE

We are in receipt of hectographed copies of the resolutions passed by the "Southern Constituent [!?] Conference" of the Mensheviks.[117] The most important of these resolutions (on the State Duma) will be dealt with by us on some other occasion. For the present we shall only note that of the two main points of *Iskra*'s "Duma" tactics the Conference rejected "pressure for the election of resolute people to the State Duma" (like Martov, Cherevanin, and Parvus), but accepted "organisation of nation-wide popular elections to a constituent assembly". Three resolutions were adopted on the composition of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board, yet the question was not settled. One resolution asks Axelrod not to leave the Editorial Board; another requests Plekhanov to return to the Board (the Conference—probably without humorous intention—expressing "surprise" at Plekhanov's resignation); the third thanks *Iskra*, expresses complete confidence in it, etc., but refers the question of the composition of the Editorial Board to an "all-Russia constituent conference for final decision". The "First All-Russia Conference", as is known, "referred" this question for decision to the local organisations. The latter "refer" it to the decision of a *constituent* conference.... This is probably what is called doing away with red tape and formalities.... In the meantime *Iskra* continues calling itself the Central Organ, although even its own supporters have not conferred such a title on it. A convenient position this, indeed!

The organisational Rules of the Southern Conference are a copy of the Rules we are already familiar with, but contain some minor changes. A new clause has been added: "Party congresses, which must be convened as far as possible once

a year, are the supreme organ of the Party." We heartily welcome this amendment. In connection with the new and excellent point that the "Central Committee shall be elected at the Congress", and also with the excellent desire to have the question of the Editorial Board decided at the Congress (be it even in the future), this amendment shows progress towards the decisions of the Third Congress. Let us hope that in another four months the next "constituent" conference will also set up the procedure for convening congresses, these supreme organs of the Party.... On the question of unity the Conference unfortunately beats about the bush, without giving a clear reply to the question: "Do you want to unite on the basis of the Third Congress? If not, do you want to prepare two congresses to assemble at the same time and in the same place?" Let us hope that the next "constituent" conference (preferably in something under four months !) will decide the matter.

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REPRESENTATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

"The Southern Constituent Conference" of the Mensheviks has passed the following resolution on this question:

"After acquainting itself with documents which show that Comrade Lenin, without taking any steps towards reaching an agreement with the 'Minority' on the question of R.S.D.L.P. representation in the International Bureau, has made this question an issue there between the two sections of the Party, and has laid stress on minor points of sectional differences, the Conference of Southern Organisations expresses its profound regret on this score. At the same time it requests Comrade Plekhanov to continue representing our section of the Party in the International Bureau and urges all 'Majority' organisations immediately to give their opinion on this question, and for their part to authorise Comrade Plekhanov to act as such representative in the interests of the unity which we are striving to attain, and to preserve with regard to all other socialist parties in all other countries the prestige of the R.S.D.L.P., which is equally dear to all of us."

This resolution compels the undersigned to state the actual facts of the case: 1) The Mensheviks cannot but know that all agreements are contingent on the Central Committee located in Russia. By deliberately referring to "Comrade Lenin" alone, they are telling an untruth. 2) Immediately after the Third Congress, two members of the Central Committee in Russia applied to Plekhanov in person, expressing the wish that he act both as representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Bureau and as editor of a theoretical

organ. Plekhanov refused. The phrase "without ... any steps" is based on a departure from the truth. 3) When, after this refusal, Plekhanov resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board he declared in print (May 29), *without writing to the Central Committee* of the R.S.D.L.P., that he would consent to represent *only* both sections of the R.S.D.L.P., and likewise through the press asked those who recognise the Third Congress whether they agreed to this. 4) *Proletary*'s Editorial Board immediately published Plekhanov's statement (in No. 5 of June 26 [13]), adding that this question had been referred to the Central Committee for decision. 5) Pending the Central Committee's decision on this question, I got in touch with the International Bureau, on behalf of the Central Committee, in order to inform the International Bureau about the Third Congress, and to inform the Central Committee about the work of the International Bureau; at the same time I stated that the question of R.S.D.L.P. representation on the International Bureau had not yet been settled.* In other words, the Central Committee maintained contacts with the International Bureau through its representative abroad, pending a decision on the question of a special representative on the Bureau. 6) When I plainly and explicitly informed the International Bureau of the provisional nature of my relations with it, I raised *no* question *whatever* of a "struggle" or "differences", but confined myself exclusively to communicating the decisions of the Third Congress, which I was absolutely bound to do. 7) On *June 16* Plekhanov sent a letter to the International Bureau in which he (a) erroneously asserted that he had already been authorised by both groups to act as their representative and (b) set forth the history of the split from the time of the Second Congress, telling this story with many digressions from the truth, wholly in the Menshevik spirit, and calling the convocation of the Third Congress by the Central Committee "an utterly arbitrary act", dubbing the conciliators in our Party "the Marsh", and stating that "something like half the organisations 'with full rights'" were represented at the Congress, which was a "combination of ultra-centralists and the Marsh", etc.

* "A Letter to the International Socialist Bureau", 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 456.—*Ed.*

8) I refuted this letter of Plekhanov's point by point in my letter of *July 24, 1905* to the International Bureau.* (I learned of Plekhanov's letter only a month after it had been sent by him, when the International Bureau sent me a copy.) On the question of the "Marsh" I wrote in my letter to the following effect. "It is true that there is a 'Marsh' in our Party. Its members were continually changing sides during the controversies within our Party. The first of these turncoats was Plekhanov, who went over from the Majority to the Minority in November 1903, only to leave the Minority on May 29 of this year, when he resigned from *Iskra*'s Editorial Board. We do not approve of changing sides like that, but think we cannot be blamed if, after much vacillation, irresolute people who were members of the 'Marsh', are inclined to follow us." Dealing with the state of affairs after the split, I referred, in the same letter, to the necessity of providing the International Bureau with "a complete translation of all resolutions of the Conference". "If *Iskra* refuses to send the translation to the Bureau," I added, "we are prepared to do so ourselves."

Let the readers now judge for themselves whether Plekhanov's behaviour is anything like impartial, and whether the statement of the facts by the new conference bears any relation to the truth. Who is to blame for undermining the prestige of the R.S.D.L.P.? For taking the initiative in acquainting the International Bureau with the history of the split after the Second Congress? For stressing "sectional differences"??

N. Lenin

P. S. To satisfy the Southern Conference's desire to learn the opinion of the Majority organisations, we are publishing elsewhere in this issue the resolution of the Kostroma Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.,[118] forwarded to us in August 1905. The Editors have not received any other resolutions on this question.

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* See pp. 142-45 of this volume.—*Ed.*

TALKS WITH OUR READERS[119]

From the Editors. We are publishing excerpts from a letter written by a comrade who is a member of one of our Party committees. This comrade is one of the few that not only write to the Central Organ, but speak of *their* understanding of tactics and of the way *they* apply this tactics. Without such talks, not intended specially for publication, it is impossible to work out uniform Party tactics in common. Without such an exchange of opinions with those engaged in practical work, the editorial board of a paper brought out abroad will never be the real mouthpiece of the whole Party. That is why we are publishing an opinion expressed by a comrade who is familiar with a small part of the most recent literature, because we wish to encourage the largest possible number of practical workers to talk to us and exchange opinions on all Party problems.

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DAYS OF BLOODSHED IN MOSCOW[120]

Geneva, October 10 (September 27), 1905

A new outbreak of the workers' insurrection—a mass strike and street fighting in Moscow. On January 9 the first peal of revolutionary action by the proletariat thundered forth in the capital. The rumbling of this thunderclap reverberated throughout Russia, and with unparalleled rapidity roused over a million proletarians to titanic battle. St. Petersburg was followed by the outlying regions, where oppression of local nationalities had rendered the already insufferable political yoke still more intolerable. Riga, Poland, Odessa, the Caucasus—all in turn became centres of insurrection which spread and gained in intensity with every month, with every week. It has now reached the centre of Russia, the heart of the "true Russian" regions, whose stability had longest been movingly eulogised by the reactionaries. A number of circumstances explain this relative stability, i.e., backwardness, in the Russian central regions. These are: the less developed forms of big industry which involves masses of workers but is less divorced from the land and has in less measure concentrated proletarians in intellectual centres; the greater distances from foreign countries; the absence of national discord. The labour movement, which manifested itself with such great force in this region as far back as 1885-86, seemed to have died down for a long time, and the obstacles presented by the particularly difficult local conditions of work frustrated the efforts of the Social-Democrats scores of times.

But at last things began to move in the central areas too. The Ivanovo-Voznesensk strike[121] has revealed an unex-

pectedly high degree of political maturity in the workers. Ever since this strike the entire central industrial region has been in a state of unrest, which has been steadily developing, gaining in intensity and sweep. This unrest has now begun to manifest itself openly in the form of an uprising. Without any doubt the outbreak was intensified by the revolutionary students in Moscow, who have just passed a resolution, quite analogous to the St. Petersburg resolution, branding the State Duma, calling for a struggle on behalf of a republic and for the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. The "liberal" professors, who had just selected a most liberal rector, the notorious Mr. Trubetskoi, closed the University under the pressure of police threats; as they themselves said, they were afraid of a repetition of the Tiflis shambles[122] within the University walls. They thereby merely precipitated bloodshed in the streets, outside the University.

As far as we can judge from the brief telegrams in the foreign press, the course of events in Moscow was the "customary" one, which has, so to speak, become the regular thing ever since January 9. It began with a compositors' strike, which spread rapidly. On Saturday, September 24 (October 7), the printing-shops, electric trams, and tobacco factories were already at a standstill. No newspapers appeared, and a general strike of factory and railway workers was expected. In the evening big demonstrations were held, attended, besides the compositors, by workers of other trades, students, and so on. The Cossacks and gendarmes dispersed the demonstrators time and again, but they kept reassembling. Many policemen were injured; the demonstrators used stones and revolvers; an officer in command of the gendarmes was severely injured. One Cossack officer and one gendarme were killed, and so on.

On Saturday the bakers joined the strike.

On Sunday, September 25 (October 8), events at once took an ominous turn. From 11 a. m. workers began to assemble in the streets—especially on Strastnoi Boulevard and elsewhere. The crowd sang the *Marseillaise*. Printing-shops which refused to go on strike were wrecked. It was only after overcoming stubborn resistance that the Cossacks managed to disperse the demonstrators.

A crowd of about 400, consisting chiefly of bakery apprentices assembled in front of Filippov's shop, near the Governor General's residence. The crowd was attacked by Cossacks. The workers made their way into houses, climbed on to roofs, and showered the Cossacks with stones. The Cossacks opened fire at the roofs and, unable to dislodge the workers, resorted to a regular siege. One house was surrounded. A detachment of police and two companies of grenadiers made a flank movement, penetrated into the house from the rear and finally occupied the roof too. One hundred and ninety-two apprentices were arrested. Eight of them were injured and two workers were killed (we repeat that these are all telegraphic reports in the foreign press, of course, far from complete and providing only an approximate idea of the scale of the fighting). A reputable Belgian newspaper has published a report that janitors were busy cleaning the streets of traces of blood. This minor detail, it says, testifies to the seriousness of the struggle more than lengthy reports can.

St. Petersburg papers seem to have been allowed to write about the massacre in Tverskaya Street. However, on the very next day the censor became frightened of publicity, so that official reports as of Monday, September 26 (October 9) stated that there had been no serious disturbances in Moscow. A different story was contained in telephone messages reaching St. Petersburg newspapers. It appears that the crowd reassembled near the Governor General's house, where sharp clashes took place. The Cossacks opened fire several times. As they dismounted to fire, their horses trampled on many people. In the evening crowds of workers thronged the boulevards, shouting revolutionary slogans and holding red banners aloft. The crowd wrecked bakers' and gunsmiths' shops. They were finally dispersed by the police. Many were injured. A company of soldiers are standing guard at the Central Telegraph office. The bakers' strike has become general. Unrest among the students is still mounting, their assemblies growing ever larger and more revolutionary. The St. Petersburg correspondent of *The Times* reports that leaflets with a call to fight have been circulated in St. Petersburg, that unrest is rife among the bakers there, that a demonstration has been fixed for

Saturday, October 1 (14), and that the public are greatly alarmed.

Meagre as this information is, it nevertheless leads us to the conclusion that the insurrectionary outbreak in Moscow is not a relatively high stage of the movement, compared with the others. No previously trained and well-armed revolutionary contingents were in evidence; no section of the troops went over to the side of the people, nor was wide use made of bombs, the "new" type of popular armament (which created such panic among the Cossacks and soldiers in Tiflis on September 26 [October 9]). In the absence of any of these conditions, it was impossible to count either on the arming of a large number of workers, or on the victory of the uprising. As we have already pointed out, the Moscow events are of moment for quite a different reason: they mark the baptism of fire of a big centre, the involvement of an enormous industrial region in a serious struggle.

The uprising in Russia does not and cannot, of course, advance at an even and regular rate. The outstanding feature of the St. Petersburg events of January 9 was the rapid and unanimous movement of huge masses, unarmed and not out for battle, who nevertheless received a great lesson in the struggle. In Poland and in the Caucasus the movement is characterised by great stubbornness and the relatively more frequent use of arms and bombs by the population. The events in Odessa were distinguished by the fact that part of the troops went over to the rebels. In all cases and at all times, the movement has been essentially proletarian, inseparably merged with the mass strike. In Moscow the movement proceeded along the same lines, as was the case in a number of other and smaller industrial centres.

The question which naturally arises now is: will the revolutionary movement stop at the stage of development it has already reached, a stage which has become "customary" and familiar, or will it advance to a higher level? If we venture into the field of appraisal of such intricate and incalculable events as those of the Russian revolution, we shall inevitably arrive at the conclusion that the second alternative is infinitely the more probable. True, even the present form of struggle, already rehearsed if we may use such an expression—guerilla warfare, constant strikes,

wearing down the enemy in street fighting, now in this part of the country, now in another—this form of struggle has also yielded and continues to yield very important results. No state is able to withstand *à la longue** a stubborn struggle of this sort, which brings industrial life to a standstill, introduces utter demoralisation into the bureaucracy and the army, and spreads dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs among all sections of the people. Still less is the Russian autocratic government capable of enduring such a struggle. We may be quite confident that a persistent continuation of the struggle, even in forms that have already been created by the working-class movement, will inevitably bring about the collapse of tsarism.

However, it is highly improbable that the revolutionary movement in present-day Russia will halt at the stage it has already reached. On the contrary, all the facts indicate rather that this is only an initial stage in the struggle. Far from all the consequences of the shameful and ruinous war have as yet been felt by the people. The economic crisis in the cities and famine in the villages are exacerbating public feeling. Judging by available information, the Manchurian army is in an extremely revolutionary temper, and the government is afraid to bring it back—yet it is impossible not to bring it back in view of the danger of new and even more serious uprisings. Never before has political agitation among the workers and peasants in Russia been so widespread, so methodical, or so far-reaching. The State Duma farce inevitably entails fresh defeats for the government, and fresh ill-will in the population. Within the last ten months or so, the insurrection has grown tremendously before our very eyes, and the conclusion that the uprising will soon reach a new and higher stage, wherein fighting detachments of revolutionaries or of mutinous military units will come to the assistance of the multitude, helping the masses to procure arms, and introducing the greatest vacillation into the ranks of the "tsarist" (still tsarist, but already far from wholly tsarist) troops, wherein the uprising will lead to an important *victory* which tsarism will be unable to recover from—this conclusion is not a figment of the

* For a long time.—*Ed.*

imagination or a piece of wishful thinking, but one that stems directly and necessarily from the facts of the mass struggle.

The tsar's troops were victorious over the workers in Moscow. This victory has not enfeebled the vanquished, but has only welded them more closely together, deepened their hatred, and brought them closer to the practical tasks of a serious struggle. It is one of those victories that cannot fail to introduce vacillation in the ranks of the victors. Only now are the troops beginning to learn, and to learn not only by looking up laws but from their own experience, that they are being mobilised wholly and exclusively to fight the "enemy at home". The war with Japan is over, but mobilisation continues, mobilisation *against the revolution. Such* mobilisation holds no terrors for us, nor do we hesitate to welcome it, for the greater the number of soldiers called upon to wage a systematic struggle against the people, the more rapidly will the political and revolutionary education of these soldiers proceed. By mobilising ever new military units to wage war on the revolution, tsarism is delaying the issue, but such delay is of the greatest advantage to us, for in such protracted guerilla warfare the proletarians will learn how to fight, while the army will inevitably be drawn into political life, and the call of that life, the militant call of young Russia, is penetrating even the tightly locked doors of the army barracks, is awakening even the most ignorant, the most backward, and the most cowed.

An insurrectionary outbreak has once more been suppressed. Once more we say: Hail the insurrection!

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THE BOURGEOISIE AWAKENED FROM ITS SLUMBER

SUBJECT FOR AN ARTICLE

Imagine a small number of people fighting against a crying and hideous evil, of which the masses of sleeping people are unaware or to which they are indifferent. What should the fighters do first? 1) awaken as many of the sleepers as possible; 2) enlighten them as to the aims of their struggle, and its conditions; 3) organise them into a force capable of achieving victory; 4) teach them to make the proper use of the fruits of their victory.

Naturally, point *1* must precede points 2 to 4, which are impossible without *1*.

And so we have a small number of people *waking* everybody, shaking up *one and all*.

Owing to the course taken by events, their efforts have been crowned with success. The masses have been awakened. Now it seems that a section of those who have been awakened is *interested* in preserving the evil, and intends either consciously to uphold it or else to preserve such of its features or parts as are of advantage to the given groups of the awakened.

Is it not natural, then, that the fighters, the heralds of battle, the awakeners, the bell-ringers of the revolution, should turn *against* these awakened ones, whom *they themselves* have roused? Is it not natural that the fighters should *then* no longer waste their energies on stirring up "one and all", but rather transfer the main attention to those who have proved capable 1) of awakening—in the first place; 2) of assimilating the ideas of consistent struggle—in the second place; 3) of fighting in earnest and to the end—in the third place?

Such has been the Russian Social-Democrats' attitude to the liberals in 1900-02 (they did the rousing), in 1902-04 (they drew distinctions among the awakened), and in 1905 (they fought against the awakened ... traitors).

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TO THE COMBAT COMMITTEE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE

October 16, 1905

Dear Comrades,

Many thanks for sending 1) the report of the Combat Committee and 2) a memorandum on the organisation of preparations for insurrection +3) a scheme of the organisation. After reading these documents, I think it my duty to write directly to the Combat Committee for a comradely exchange of opinions. I need hardly say that I do not undertake to judge of the practical side of the matter; there can be no doubt that everything possible is being done under the difficult conditions in Russia. However, judging by the documents, the whole thing threatens to degenerate into office routine. All these schemes, all these plans of organisation of the Combat Committee create the impression of red tape—forgive me my frankness, but I hope that you will not suspect me of fault-finding. Schemes, and disputes and discussions about the functions of the Combat Committee and its rights, are of the least value in a matter like this. What is needed is furious energy, and again energy. It horrifies me—I give you my word—it horrifies me to find that there has been talk about bombs for *over six months*, yet not one has been made! And it is the most learned of people who are doing the talking.... Go to the youth, gentlemen! That is the only remedy! Otherwise—I give you my word for it—you will be too late (everything tells me that), and will be left with "learned" memoranda, plans, charts, schemes, and magnificent recipes, but without an organisation, without a living cause. Go to the youth. Form fighting squads *at once* everywhere,

among the students, and *especially among the workers*, etc., etc. Let groups be at once organised of three, ten, thirty, etc., persons. Let them arm themselves at once as best they can, be it with a revolver, a knife, a rag soaked in kerosene for starting fires, etc. Let these detachments at once select leaders, and as far as possible *contact* the Combat Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee. Do not demand any formalities, and, for heaven's sake, forget all these schemes, and send all "functions, rights, and privileges" to the devil. Do not make membership in the R.S.D.L.P. an absolute condition—that would be an absurd demand for an armed uprising. Do not refuse to contact any group, even if it consists of only three persons; make it the one sole condition that it should be reliable as far as police spying is concerned and prepared to fight the tsar's troops. Let the groups join the R.S.D.L.P. or *associate* themselves with the R.S.D.L.P. if they want to; that would be splendid. But I would consider it quite wrong to *insist* on it.

The role of the Combat Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee should be to *help* these contingents of the revolutionary army, to serve as a "bureau" for contact purposes, etc. Any contingent will willingly accept your *services*, but if in *such a matter* you begin with schemes and with talk about the "rights" of the Combat Committee, you will ruin the whole cause; I assure you, you will ruin it irreparably.

You must proceed to propaganda on a wide scale. Let five or ten people make the round of *hundreds* of workers' and students' study circles in a week, penetrate wherever they can, and everywhere propose a clear, brief, direct, and simple plan: organise combat groups immediately, arm yourselves as best you can, and work with all your might; we will help you in every way we can, but *do not wait for our help*; act for yourselves.

The principal thing in a matter like this is the initiative of the mass of small groups. They will do everything. Without them your entire Combat Committee is nothing. I am prepared to gauge the efficiency of the Combat Committee's work by the number of such combat groups it is in contact with. If in a month or two the Combat Committee does not have a minimum of 200 or 300 groups in St. Petersburg, then it is a dead Combat Committee. It will have to be

buried. If it cannot muster a hundred or two of groups in seething times like these, then it is indeed remote from real life.

The propagandists must supply each group with brief and simple recipes for making bombs, give them an elementary explanation of the type of the work, and then leave it all to them. Squads must *at once* begin military training by launching operations immediately, at once. Some may at once undertake to kill a spy or blow up a police station, others to raid a bank to confiscate funds for the insurrection, others again may drill or prepare plans of localities, etc. But the essential thing is to begin at once to learn from actual practice: have no fear of these trial attacks. They may, of course, degenerate into extremes, but that is an evil of the morrow, whereas the evil today is our inertness, our doctrinaire spirit, our learned immobility, and our senile fear of initiative. Let every group learn, if it is only by beating up policemen: a score or so victims will be more than compensated for by the fact that this will train hundreds of experienced fighters, who tomorrow will be leading hundreds of thousands.

I send you warm greetings, comrades, and wish you success. I have no desire to impose my views on you, but I consider it my duty to tender my word of *advice*.

Yours,
Lenin

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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THE POLITICAL STRIKE AND THE STREET FIGHTING IN MOSCOW

The revolutionary events in Moscow have been the first flashes of lightning in a thunderstorm and they have lit up a new field of battle. The promulgation of the State Duma Act and the conclusion of peace have marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Russian revolution. Already weary of the workers' persistent struggle and disturbed by the spectre of "uninterrupted revolution", the liberal bourgeoisie has heaved a sigh of relief and joyously caught at the sop thrown to it. All along the line a struggle has begun against the idea of a boycott, and liberalism has turned openly towards the right. Unfortunately, even among the Social-Democrats (in the new-*Iskra* camp) there are unstable people who are prepared on certain terms to support these bourgeois traitors to the revolution, and to take the State Duma "seriously". The events in Moscow, it may be hoped, will put the sceptics to shame, and will help the doubters to make a proper appraisal of the state of affairs on the new field of battle. Anaemic intellectuals' dreams of the possibility of popular elections under the autocracy, as well as illusions harboured by dull-witted liberals regarding the State Duma's crucial importance, vanished into thin air at the very first major revolutionary action by the proletariat.

Our information on the Moscow events is as yet (October 12, N. S.) very meagre. It is confined to brief and often contradictory reports in foreign newspapers, and to censor-screened accounts of the beginning of the movement, published in the legal press. One thing is certain: in its initial stage the Moscow workers' struggle proceeded along lines that have become customary during the past revolutionary year. The

working-class movement has left its imprint on the entire Russian revolution. Starting with sporadic strikes it rapidly developed into mass strikes, on the one hand, and into street demonstrations, on the other. In 1905 the political strike has become an established form of the movement, developing before our eyes into insurrection. Whereas it took the entire working-class movement of Russia ten years to reach its present (and of course far from final) stage, the movement in certain parts of the country has progressed in a few days from a mere strike to a tremendous revolutionary outbreak.

The compositors' strike in Moscow, we are informed, was started by politically backward workers. But the movement immediately slipped out of their control, and became a broad trade union movement. Workers of other trades joined in. Street demonstrations by workers, inevitable if only for the purpose of letting uninformed fellow-workers learn of the strike, turned into political demonstrations, with revolutionary songs and speeches. Long suppressed bitterness against the vile farce of "popular" elections to the State Duma came to the surface. The mass strike developed into a mass mobilisation of fighters for genuine liberty. The radical students appeared on the scene, who in Moscow passed a resolution absolutely analogous to that of the St. Petersburg students. In the language of free citizens, not of cringing officials, this resolution very properly branded the State Duma as brazen mockery of the people, and called for a struggle for a republic, for the convocation of a genuinely popular and genuinely constituent assembly by a revolutionary provisional government. The proletariat and progressive sections of the revolutionary democrats began street fighting against the tsarist army and police.

This is how the movement developed in Moscow. On Saturday, September 24 (October 7), the compositors were no longer alone—the tobacco factories and electric trams were also at a standstill, and a bakers' strike had begun. In the evening big demonstrations were held, attended, besides workers and students, by very many "outsiders" (revolutionary workers and radical students no longer regarded each other as outsiders at open actions by the people). The Cossacks and gendarmes did their utmost to disperse the demonstra-

tors, who kept reassembling. The crowd offered resistance to the police and the Cossacks; revolver shots were fired and many policemen were wounded.

On Sunday, September 25 (October 8), events at once took a formidable turn. At 11 a. m. workers began to assemble in the streets, with the crowd singing the *Marseillaise*. Revolutionary mass meetings were held, and printing-shops whose staff refused to strike were wrecked. Bakeries and gunsmiths' shops were attacked, for the workers needed bread to live and arms to fight for freedom (just as the French revolutionary song has it). It was only after stubborn resistance that the Cossacks managed to disperse the demonstrators. There was a regular battle in Tverskaya Street, near the Governor General's house. In front of the Filippov bakery a crowd of bakers' apprentices assembled. As the management of the bakery subsequently declared, they were going out peacefully into the street, after stopping work in solidarity with the other strikers. A Cossack detachment attacked the crowd, who made their way into a house, climbed on to the roof and into the garrets, and showered the soldiers with stones. There began a regular siege of the house, with the troops firing on the workers. All communication was cut. Two companies of grenadiers made a flank movement, penetrated into the house from the rear, and captured the enemy's stronghold. One hundred and ninety-two apprentices were arrested, of whom eight were injured; two workers were killed. There were injured among the police and the troops, a captain of gendarmes sustaining fatal injuries.

Naturally, this information is extremely incomplete. According to private telegrams, quoted in some foreign newspapers, the brutality of the Cossacks and soldiers knew no bounds. The Filippov bakery management has protested against the unprovoked outrages perpetrated by the troops. A reputable Belgian newspaper has published a report that janitors were busy cleaning the streets of traces of blood. This minor detail—it says—testifies to the seriousness of the struggle more than lengthy reports can. On the basis of information from private sources that has found its way into the press, *Vorwärts*[123] has stated that in Tverskaya Street 10,000 strikers clashed with an infantry battalion, which

fired several volleys. The ambulance service had its hands full. It is estimated that no less than 50 people were killed and as many as 600 injured. The arrested are reported to have been taken to army barracks, where they were mercilessly and brutally manhandled, being made to run the gauntlet. It is further reported that during the street fighting the officers distinguished themselves by their inhuman brutality, even towards women (a St. Petersburg cable from the special correspondent of the conservative bourgeois *Temps*, dated October 10 [September 27]).

Information on the events of the subsequent days is more and more scanty. The workers' wrath mounted frightfully, the movement gathering momentum. The government took all measures to ban or slash all reports. Foreign newspapers have openly written of the contradiction between the reassuring news from the official agencies (which at one time were believed) and the news transmitted to St. Petersburg by telephone. Gaston Leroux wired to the Paris *Matin* that the censorship was performing prodigies by way of preventing the spread of news that might be in the least alarming. Monday, September 26 (October 9), he wrote, was one of the most sanguinary days in the history of Russia. There was fighting in all the main streets and even near the Governor General's residence. The demonstrators unfurled a red flag. Many were killed or injured.

The reports in other papers are contradictory. Only one thing is certain—the strike is spreading and has been joined by most workers employed at the big factories, and even in the light industries. The railwaymen too have stopped work. The strike is becoming general. (Tuesday, October 10 [September 27], and Wednesday.)

The situation is extremely grave. The movement is spreading to St. Petersburg: the workers of the San-Galli Works have already downed tools.

This is as far as our information goes to date. Any complete appraisal of the Moscow events on the strength of such information is, of course, out of the question. One still cannot say whether these events are a full-scale rehearsal for a decisive proletarian onslaught on the autocracy, or whether they are actually the beginning of this onslaught; whether they are only an extension of the "usual" methods of struggle

described above to a new area of Central Russia, or whether they are destined to mark the beginning of a higher form of struggle and of a more decisive uprising.

To all appearances, the answer to these questions will be forthcoming in the near future. One thing is certain: before our very eyes, the insurrection is spreading, the struggle is becoming ever more widespread, and its forms ever more acute. All over Russia the proletariat is pressing onward with heroic efforts, indicating now here, now there, in what direction the armed uprising can and, undoubtedly, will develop. True, even the present form of struggle, already created by the movement of the working masses, is dealing very telling blows at tsarism. The civil war has assumed the form of desperately stubborn and universal guerilla warfare. The working class is giving the enemy no respite, disrupting industrial life, constantly bringing the entire machinery of local government to a standstill, creating a state of alarm all over the country, and is mobilising ever new forces for the struggle. No state is able to hold out for long against such an onslaught, least of all the utterly corrupt tsarist government, from which its supporters are falling away one by one. And if the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie finds the struggle at times too persistent, if it is terrified by the civil war and by the alarming state of uncertainty which has gripped the country, the continuation of this state of affairs and the prolongation of the struggle is a matter of the utmost necessity to the revolutionary proletariat. If, among ideologists of the bourgeoisie, people are beginning to appear who are set on smothering the revolutionary conflagration with their sermons on peaceful and law-abiding progress, and are concerned with blunting the political crisis instead of making it more acute, the class-conscious proletariat, which has never doubted the treacherous nature of the bourgeois love of freedom, will march straight ahead, rousing the peasantry to follow it, and causing disaffection in the tsar's army. The workers' persistent struggle, the constant strikes and demonstrations, the partial uprisings—all these, so to say, test battles and clashes are inexorably drawing the army into political life and consequently into the sphere of revolutionary problems. Experience in the struggle enlightens more rapidly and more profoundly than years of propaganda

under other circumstances. The foreign war is over, but the government is obviously afraid of the return home of war prisoners and of the army in Manchuria. Reports of the revolutionary temper of the latter are coming in thick and fast. The proposed agricultural colonies in Siberia for officers and men of the army in Manchuria cannot but increase the unrest, even if these plans remain on paper. Mobilisation has not ceased, though peace has been concluded. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the army is needed wholly and exclusively *against the revolution*. Under such circumstances, we revolutionaries do not in the least object to the mobilisation; we are even prepared to welcome it. In delaying the denouement by involving ever more army units in the struggle, and in getting more and more troops used to civil war, the government is not doing away with the source of all crises, but, on the contrary, is extending the field for them. It is winning some respite at the price of the inevitable extension of the field of battle and of rendering the struggle more acute. It is stirring to action the most backward people, the most ignorant, the most cowed, and the politically inert—and the struggle will enlighten, rouse, and enliven these people. The longer the present state of civil war lasts, the more inevitably will large numbers of neutrals and a nucleus of champions of revolution be drawn from the ranks of the army of counter-revolution.

The entire course of the Russian revolution during the last few months shows that the stage now reached is not, and cannot be, the peak stage. The movement is still on the upgrade, as it has been ever since January 9. It was then that for the first time we saw a movement that amazed the world with the unanimity and solidarity of the huge masses of workers who had risen to advance political demands. This movement was still quite devoid of revolutionary consciousness, and helpless as regards arms and military preparedness. Poland and the Caucasus have provided an example of struggle on a higher plane; there the proletariat has partly begun to fight with weapons, and hostilities have assumed a protracted form. The Odessa uprising was marked by a new and important factor needed for victory—part of the forces went over to the side of the people. It is true that this did not bring immediate success; the difficult task of "co-ordinating

operations of land and sea forces" (a most difficult task even for a regular army) had not yet been accomplished. But the problem was posed, and by all tokens the Odessa events will not remain an isolated incident. The Moscow strike shows us the spread of the struggle to a "genuinely Russian" region, whose reliability had so long delighted the hearts of the reactionaries. The revolutionary action that has started in this region is of enormous significance even if only for the fact that proletarian masses here, who are receiving their baptism of fire, have been most inert and at the same time are concentrated in a relatively small area in numbers unequalled in any other part of Russia. The movement started in St. Petersburg, spread through all the marginal regions of Russia, and mobilised Riga, Poland, Odessa, and the Caucasus; the conflagration has now spread to the very heart of Russia.

The disgraceful farce of the State Duma appears all the more contemptible in comparison with this genuinely revolutionary action by a class ready for battle and truly progressive. The union of the proletariat and revolutionary democracy, which we have spoken of on more than one occasion, is becoming a fact. The radical students, who both in St. Petersburg and in Moscow adopted the slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, are the vanguard of all the democratic forces. Loathing the baseness of the "Constitutional-Democratic" reformists who have accepted the State Duma, these forces gravitate towards a real and decisive struggle against the accursed enemy of the Russian people rather than towards a policy of bargaining with the autocracy.

Look at the liberal professors, rectors, vice-rectors, and the entire company of Trubetskois, Manuilovs, and their like. These people are the finest representatives of liberalism and the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the most enlightened, the best educated, the most disinterested, the least affected by the direct pressure and the influence of the money-bag. And how do these best people behave? What use did they make of the first authority they obtained, authority they were invested with by election, their authority over the universities? They are already afraid of the revolution, they fear the aggravation and the extension of the movement, they are already trying to extinguish the fire

and bring about tranquillity, thereby earning well-merited insults in the form of praise from the Princes Meshchersky.

And they were well punished, these philistines of bourgeois science. They closed Moscow University, fearing a shambles on its premises. They merely succeeded in precipitating incomparably greater slaughter in the streets. They wanted to extinguish revolution in the University, but they only kindled it in the streets. They got into a quandary, along with the Trepovs and the Romanovs, whom they now hasten to persuade that freedom of assembly is needed: If you shut the University—you open the way for street fighting. If you open the University—you provide a platform for revolutionary mass meetings which will train new and even more determined champions of liberty.

How infinitely instructive is the instance of these liberal professors for an appraisal of our State Duma! Is it not clear now, from the experience of the universities, that the liberals and the Constitutional-Democrats will tremble for the "fate of the Duma" just as much as these miserable knights of cheap-jack science tremble for the "fate of the universities"? Is it not now clear that the liberals and the Constitutional-Democrats cannot use the Duma in any other way save the purpose of still more extensive and still more evil-smelling preaching of peaceful and law-abiding progress? Is it not clear now how ridiculous are the hopes of transforming the Duma into a revolutionary assembly? Is it not clear that there is only *one* method of "influencing"—not specifically the Duma or specifically the universities but the whole of the old autocratic regime—the *method of the Moscow workers*, the method of insurrection by the people? It is this alone that will not merely force the Manuilovs in the universities to ask for freedom of assembly, and the Petrunkeviches in the Duma to ask for liberty for the people, but will win genuine liberty for the people.

The Moscow events have shown the real alignment of social forces: the liberals scampered from the government to the radicals, urging the latter to desist from the revolutionary struggle. The radicals fought in the ranks of the proletariat. Let us not forget this lesson: it also bears directly on the State Duma.

Let the Petrunkeviches and the other Constitutional-Democrats play at parliamentarianism in autocratic Russia—the workers will wage a revolutionary struggle for genuine sovereignty of the people.

Irrespective of how the insurrectionary outbreak in Moscow ends, the revolutionary movement will in any case emerge even stronger than before, will spread to a wider area, and gather new forces. Let us even assume that the tsarist troops are now celebrating a complete victory in Moscow—a few more such victories and the utter collapse of tsardom will become a fact. This will then be the actual, genuine collapse of the entire heritage of serf-ownership, autocracy, and obscurantism—not the flabby, craven, and hypocritical patching up of tattered rags, with which the liberal bourgeois are trying to delude themselves and others. Let us even assume that tomorrow's post will bring us the sad news that the insurrectionary outbreak has been crushed once again. We shall then exclaim: once again—hail insurrection!

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THE LATEST IN *ISKRA* TACTICS, OR MOCK ELECTIONS AS A NEW INCENTIVE TO AN UPRISING

We have spoken many times already about the inefficacy of the *Iskra* tactics in the "Duma" campaign. The two main lines of this tactics—the urge to support the *Osvobozhdeniye* League which wants to enter the Duma on the strength of certain revolutionary pledges and the release of a slogan calling for "revolutionary self-government of citizens" and for popular elections to a constituent assembly under the autocracy—are both unsound. In the resolution of the Mensheviks' "Southern Constituent [?] Conference" we at last have an attempt to formulate the *Iskra* tactics accurately and officially. At this Conference the best of the new-*Iskra* forces in Russia were represented. The resolution is an attempt at a business-like exposition of purely practical advice addressed to the proletariat. That is why a careful analysis of this resolution is so essential, both for the purpose of evolving a definite line of practical activity and for an appraisal of *Iskra*'s tactical stand as a whole.

We quote the full text of the resolution:

Resolution on the State Duma
Adopted by the Constituent Conference of the Southern Organisations

Whereas,

we see the only way out of the present difficult conditions, compatible with the interests of the whole people, in the convocation of a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and a secret ballot, for the purpose of abolishing the autocratic regime, and establishing a democratic republic necessary in the first place to the proletariat in its struggle against all the foundations of the bourgeois system and for the achievement of socialism; and whereas,

1) the system of elections to the State Duma does not enable the whole people to participate in them, the proletariat being excluded from the elections by reason of the high property qualification fixed for urban dwellers, while the peasantry—a mere section of it at that—will vote on the basis of a four-stage system, which provides the authorities with every opportunity for exerting pressure on them and whereas,

2) the whole of Russia is still deprived of all essential civil liberties, in the absence of which there can be no election campaign and, consequently, no elections conducted with any degree of fairness, and whereas, on the contrary, at the present time the authorities' arbitrary procedure is everywhere becoming worse than ever before, and vast areas are one after the other placed under martial law; and, finally, whereas,

3) a system of representation which is even more of a travesty is being worked out for all the marginal regions; —

the Conference urges all organisations to build up a most energetic campaign of agitation to expose the entire travesty of representation by which the autocratic government proposes to deceive the people, and declares deliberate traitors to the people all those who are prepared to content themselves with the State Duma, and who will not at this decisive moment set themselves the task of supporting by their actions and tactics the revolutionary people's demand for the convocation of a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and a secret ballot.

To achieve the speediest possible realisation of the said demand, the Southern Conference recommends the following tactics to the Party organisations:

1) The launching of an energetic agitation campaign among the industrial proletariat and the peasant masses for the creation of comprehensive democratic organisations and their amalgamation in an all-Russia organisation with the purpose of waging an energetic struggle against the State Duma and for the establishment of a popular constituent assembly with the immediate introduction of freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, and the right to strike. The establishment of this all-Russia people's organisation should proceed through the formation of agitation committees elected by the workers at their respective factories, and the amalgamation of these agitation committees; through the creation of similar agitation committees among the peasantry; through the establishment of closer ties between the urban and rural committees; through the setting up of gubernia committees and the establishment of contact between them.

2) If this organisation proves sufficiently strong, and the working masses' temper appropriate, the inauguration of the election campaign should be used to organise nation-wide popular elections to a constituent assembly, bearing in mind the prospect that the organised movement of the people, aimed at getting these elections held, may naturally lead to the whole people rising against tsarism, since inevitable resistance by the latter and the clash with it on the occasion

of the elections will provide the rising with new incentives, while the people's preliminary organisation will give the rising universality and unity.

3) In addition, the Conference proposes that efforts be made to secure freedom of election meetings and recommends energetic intervention in the election campaign, intervention by the people in electors' meetings, and public discussion of the tasks confronting representatives elected to the State Duma, these discussions to be conducted by electors at mass meetings. At the same time, the Social-Democratic Party must induce those sections of the population with the right to vote in the State Duma elections, to take to the road of revolution. This may find expression either in their joining an uprising led by the democratic organisations of the people, or, in the absence of such, in their striving to transform the incipient State Duma into a revolutionary assembly that will convoke a popular constituent assembly, or facilitate its convocation by the democratic organisations of the people.

4) Preparations should be made for exerting pressure on the State Duma along the same lines, should the mass movement fail to have brought about the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a constituent assembly by the time the Duma is finally convened. Preparations should be made for an ultimatum to the State Duma demanding the convocation of a constituent assembly and the immediate introduction of freedom of speech, assembly, the press and association, and the arming of the people. Preparations should be made to back up this ultimatum with a political strike and other mass action by the people.

5) All this tactics shall be approved at general mass meetings, organised prior to and during the election campaign among the proletariat and the peasantry.

We shall not dwell on the shortcomings in the redaction of the resolution which is far too wordy. Let us deal with its fundamental mistakes.

1. The preamble speaks of the only way out of the present situation. In this connection the entire stress is placed on the *idea* of a constituent assembly, and not a word is said as to *who* is to call it, so that the "way out" should be not merely on paper, but *in actual fact*. Silence on this score amounts to Social-Democrats yielding to the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry. As we have repeatedly pointed out, it is the interests of the monarchist-liberal bourgeoisie that oblige the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry to limit themselves to the convocation of a popular constituent assembly, and *pass over in silence* the question of who is to call it. This, as we have repeatedly pointed out, is the very question that the developing revolution has brought into the forefront, and herein

at present lies the fundamental difference between the bourgeoisie's opportunist ("compromise") tactics and the proletariat's revolutionary tactics. By their resolution the new-*Iskra* supporters have furnished documentary proof of their incurable blindness in fundamental questions of tactics, and of their relapsing into *Osvobozhdeniye* slogans.

In the succeeding sections the resolution still more confuses the question of the convocation of a popular constituent assembly. Propaganda which proclaims confidence in the State Duma on this score is downright reactionary, while to say that a constituent assembly should be convened by a "democratic organisation of the people" is much like proposing to call a constituent assembly through a committee of friends of the people living on the planet Mars. At their all-Russia Conference the new-Iskrists committed an unpardonable error in placing the convocation of a popular constituent assembly by a revolutionary government *on a par* with its convocation by a representative institution. The new-Iskrists have now gone even farther in reverse: they have not even mentioned a revolutionary provisional government. Why? On what grounds? In what respect have their views changed? All this remains a mystery. Instead of developing tactical directives, the Mensheviks' conferences merely provide exhibitions of plunges and vacillations now to the right, now to the left.

2. To call "deliberate traitors to the people all those who are prepared to content themselves with the State Duma", etc., is just such a plunge ostensibly to the left, but one that is not towards a genuinely revolutionary path, but rather towards revolutionary phrase-mongering. In the first place, what is the point of the stinging adjective "deliberate" (traitor)? Was Johann Jacoby, who entered the State Duma or the United Landtag in 1847 as a bourgeois liberal, and went over to the Social-Democrats after the war of 1870-71, a deliberate traitor to the people? Will any peasant who goes into the Duma and is "prepared" to content himself with very, very little be a deliberate traitor? Secondly, is it reasonable to establish as criteria of treachery things like: "whoever is *prepared* to content himself", "whoever does not set himself the task", etc.? How does one reveal one's "being prepared" and "setting oneself the task"—in word,

or in deed? If in word, then it is necessary to obtain from those C.D.s ("Constitutional-Democrats", as the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry now call themselves) who are entering the State Duma, a written promise or revolutionary pledge (Parvus, Cherevanin, Martov). In that case the resolution should express this idea clearly instead of being so vague about it. On the other hand, if being "prepared" is proved in deed, then why does the resolution not state openly and straightforwardly *what* "actions" it considers proof of this preparedness? The reason is because the resolution reflects the fundamental error of the new *Iskra*, which is unable to distinguish between revolutionary democracy and liberal-monarchist democracy. Thirdly, is it rational for a militant party to talk in general about persons ("all who") instead of speaking concretely about trends or parties? At present it is of particular importance for us to expose to the proletariat that trend—the Party of Constitutional-Democrats—whose "actions" have already shown us what demands it supports, and how it does so. Addressing the workers in the name of Social-Democratic organisations, speaking to them about entrants into the Duma, and about Duma electors, etc., while keeping silent about the Constitutional-Democratic Party (i.e., the *Osvobozhdeniye* people) means either shilly-shallying and scheming (coming to terms on the sly with the *Osvobozhdeniye* people to support them on conditions stipulated by Parvus or Cherevanin), or unwittingly spreading corruption among the workers and giving up the struggle against the Constitutional-Democrats.

Besides the historical facts regarding the activity of *Osvobozhdeniye*, its adherents, the Zemstvo members, and all other Constitutional-Democrats, we have no important data for gauging the "preparedness" of democrats from among the bourgeoisie to fight together with the people. The new-Iskrists ignore these facts and dismiss the matter with meaningless phrases. Yet Plekhanov is still trying to convince us that the organisational vagueness in *Iskra*'s views is not supplemented by vagueness in tactics!

The *Iskra* supporters have in fact not only shut their eyes to the Constitutional-Democrats' "preparedness" to commit treachery, proved by their obvious and universally noted turn to the right during the period between the July

and September Zemstvo congresses, but have even *assisted* these Constitutional-Democrats by fighting against the boycott! The Iskrists are threatening hypothetical *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents ("all those who are prepared", etc.) with "frightfully terrifying" words, but by their tactics they are assisting the genuine *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents. This is wholly in the spirit of Rodichev, one of the Constitutional-Democratic leaders, who thunders: "We will not accept liberty from hands steeped in the blood of the people!" (this statement of Rodichev's, uttered at a private meeting and directed against William Stead, is now making the rounds of the entire foreign press)—and in the same breath demands that those very hands convoke a popular constituent assembly.

3. The next fundamental error in the resolution is the slogan for "the creation of comprehensive democratic organisations and their amalgamation in an all-Russia organisation". The frivolity of the Social-Democrats who advance such a slogan is simply staggering. What does creating comprehensive democratic organisations mean? It can mean one of two things: either the socialists' organisation (the R.S.D.L.P.) being submerged in the democrats' organisation (and the new-Iskrists cannot do that deliberately, for it would be sheer betrayal of the proletariat)—or a temporary alliance between the Social-Democrats and certain sections of the bourgeois democrats. If the new-Iskrists want to advocate such an alliance, why do they not say so frankly and openly? Why do they hide behind the word "creation"? Why do they not specify the exact trends and groups in the bourgeois-democratic camp, with which they are urging the Social-Democrats to unite? Is this not a fresh example of impermissible *vagueness of tactics*, which in practice inevitably transforms the working class into an appendage to the bourgeois democracy?

The resolution's only definition of the nature of these "comprehensive democratic organisations" consists of a statement of the two aims set them: 1) a struggle against the State Duma, and 2) a struggle for a popular constituent assembly. The latter aim, as lamely formulated by *Iskra*, i.e., without any indication of who is to convene the popular constituent assembly, has been fully endorsed by the

Constitutional-Democrats. Does this mean that the Iskrists advocate an alliance between the Social-Democrats and the Constitutional-Democrats, but are ashamed to say so openly? The former aim is formulated with an obscurity we are accustomed to seeing only in Russian laws, which are deliberately designed to deceive the people. What is meant by a struggle against the State Duma? If we take the expression literally—assuming the authors of the resolution want to express themselves unequivocally—it means a *boycott of the Duma*, for to fight against an institution that does not yet exist means opposing its establishment. But we know that the Iskrists are opposed to the boycott, we see from the resolution itself that further on they no longer talk of a struggle *against* the State Duma, but of exerting *pressure* on the State Duma, of a striving to transform it into a revolutionary assembly, etc. This means that the words "struggle against the State Duma" should not be taken literally, or in their narrow sense. But in that case, how should they be taken? Perhaps, as understood by Mr. M. Kovalevsky, who reads papers criticising the State Duma? What constitutes a struggle *against* the State Duma? That remains a mystery. Our muddle-heads have said nothing precise on this score. Aware of the class-conscious workers' mood, which is definitely opposed to the tactic of agreements with the Constitutional-Democrats, the tactic of supporting the Duma on certain conditions, our new-Iskrists have cravenly taken a middle course: on the one hand, they repeat the slogan "Struggle against the State Duma" which is popular among the proletariat and, on the other hand, they are depriving this slogan of any exact meaning, are throwing dust into the eyes of the people, are interpreting the struggle against the Duma in the sense of exerting pressure on the Duma, etc. And this wretched muddle is being advanced by the most influential of the new-*Iskra* organisations at a time the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry are loudly protesting for the world to hear that they are entering the State Duma only in order to carry on a struggle and exclusively for the struggle, that they are "prepared" to make a complete break with the government!

We ask the readers: has more disgraceful vacillation in tactics ever been seen anywhere in the Social-Democratic movement? Is it possible to imagine anything more ruinous

to Social-Democracy than this advocacy of "creating comprehensive democratic organisations" *together with the Osvobozhdeniye* people (for the Constitutional-Democrats are in agreement with the aims of such organisations as set forth by *Iskra*), but without mentioning these people by name??

And Plekhanov, who has degraded himself in the eyes of all Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats by defending *Iskra*'s "organisational vagueness" for almost two years, will now try to assure us that this new-*Iskra* tactic is good!...

4. Further. It is most unwise to call an alliance of comprehensive (and amorphous) democratic organisations "an all-Russia people's organisation" or "a democratic organisation of the people". First of all, this is incorrect theoretically. As we know, the Economists erred by confusing party with class. Reviving old mistakes the Iskrists are now confusing the sum of democratic parties or organisations with an organisation of the people. That is empty, false, and harmful phrase-mongering. It is empty because it has no specific meaning whatever, owing to the absence of any reference to definite democratic parties or trends. It is false because in a capitalist society even the proletariat, the most advanced class, is not in a position to create a party embracing the entire class—and as for the whole people creating such a party, that is entirely out of the question. It is harmful because it clutters up the mind with bombastic words and does nothing to further the real work of explaining the actual significance of actual democratic parties, their class basis, the degree of their closeness to the proletariat, etc. The present, the period of a democratic revolution, bourgeois in its social and economic content, is a time when bourgeois democrats, all Constitutional-Democrats, etc., right down to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are revealing a particular inclination to advocate "comprehensive democratic organisations" and in general to encourage, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, non-partisanship, i.e., an absence of any strict division between the democrats. Class-conscious representatives of the proletariat must fight this tendency resolutely and ruthlessly, for it is profoundly bourgeois in essence. We must bring exact party distinctions into the foreground, expose all confusion, show up the falsity of phrases about allegedly united, broad, solid democratism, phrases

our liberal newspapers are teeming with. In proposing an alliance with certain sections of the democrats for the achievement of definite tasks, we should single out only *revolutionary* democrats—particularly at a time like this; we should indicate what most clearly distinguishes those "prepared" to fight (right now, in the ranks of the revolutionary army) from those who are "prepared" to bargain with the autocracy.

To bring home their mistake to the Iskrists, let us take a very simple example. Our programme speaks of peasant committees. The resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. defines their role more precisely by calling them revolutionary peasant committees (in this respect the new-*Iskra* Conference agreed, in essence, with the Third Congress). We have set them the task of bringing about democratic reforms in general and agrarian reforms in particular, *going as far as the confiscation* of the landed estates by *revolutionary action*. The *Iskra* resolution now recommends a new kind of "agitation committees among the peasantry". Such advice is worthy not of socialist workers but of liberal bourgeois. Had they been formed, such "peasant committees of agitation" would play right into the hands of the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, for their revolutionary character would be supplanted by liberalism. We have already pointed out that the content of the agitation of these committees, as defined by *Iskra* (the struggle "against" the State Duma and for a popular constituent assembly), does not exceed the limits set by the *Osvobozhdeniye* programme. Is it now clear to the new-Iskrists that by supplementing the slogan of revolutionary peasant committees with one calling for "peasant committees of agitation" it is transforming Social-Democratic slogans into *Osvobozhdeniye* slogans?

5. Finally, we reach the main task of this "all-Russia people's organisation"—the organisation of nation-wide popular elections to a constituent assembly. Nation-wide popular elections with the autocracy left intact! And "clashes" with the autocracy provide "new incentives for an uprising".... Mock elections as a new incentive for an uprising is what this amounts to!

The slogan calling for "revolutionary self-government", and the theory of the "spontaneous generation" of a

constituent assembly could not but lead to this absurdity, which is destined to become classical. To speak of nation-wide popular elections under the rule of the Trepovs, i.e., before the victory of the uprising, before the actual overthrow of the tsarist government, is the height of Manilovism, and can serve only to spread incredible political corruption among the workers. Only people attuned to phrase-mongering by the new *Iskra* can accept such slogans, which crumble to dust at the merest contact with sober criticism. One has only to reflect a little on precisely what is meant by nation-wide *popular* elections, if the term be taken seriously; one has only to remember that they imply freedom of agitation, keeping the entire population informed, and recognition by the entire population of the centre or local centres that will register the entire population, and canvass literally everyone, with no exceptions—one has only to give such things a little thought to realise that the "nation-wide popular elections" proposed by *Iskra* would amount to a nation-wide joke or a nation-wide swindle. Not a *single* deputy who could claim to have been "elected by the entire people", i.e., who has had 50,000 to 100,000 votes freely and consciously cast for him—not one such deputy can be elected anywhere in Russia "in the inauguration of the election campaign".

The *Iskra* resolution advises the proletariat to *stage a farce*, and no reservations or excuses can change the farcical import of this resolution. We are told that elections can be carried out only "if this organisation proves sufficiently strong", only when "preliminary organisation will give the rising universality and unity". Our answer to this is that strength is revealed in action, not in word. Prior to the victory of an uprising it is ridiculous to talk of a force that will be able, without evoking laughter, even to proclaim "nation-wide popular elections", let alone conduct them. No organisation, no matter how universal or united, can ensure the victory of an uprising unless 1) this organisation consists of people who are really capable of insurrection (and we have seen that the resolution advocates merely "comprehensive", organisations, i.e., actually organisations of the *Osvobozhdeniye* type which would undoubtedly betray an uprising once it had started); and unless 2) there exist forces

for the victory of the uprising (and to achieve victory, the material force of a revolutionary army is needed, besides the moral force of public opinion, the people's welfare, etc.). To put the main stress on this moral force and on high-sounding phrases about "the whole people", while *maintaining silence*, in a call to arms, about the actual material force, is to reduce the revolutionary slogans of the proletariat to bourgeois-democratic phrase-mongering.

Mock elections do not constitute a "natural transition to an uprising", but rather an *artificial* transition invented by a handful of intellectuals. The fabrication of such artificial transitions is absolutely similar to Nadezhdin's old occupation—the concoction of "excitative" terrorist acts. In the same way, the new-Iskrists want to "excite" the people to insurrection artificially—an idea that is basically false. We cannot create an organisation that will really embrace the whole people; any elections we would take it into our heads to appoint under the autocracy would inevitably be a farce, and to utilise such a *fabricated* pretext for an uprising is just like decreeing an uprising at a moment when the people are not *genuinely* roused. Only people who have no faith in the proletariat's revolutionary activity, only intellectuals who are fond of using fancy words, could start inventing "new incentives for an uprising", in September 1905. One might think that we in Russia lack *genuine* incentives for an uprising and need farcical ones, that there are so few cases of genuine *unrest* among the masses that such a sentiment has to be staged or faked! Mock elections will never rouse the masses. However, a strike, a demonstration, mutiny in the armed forces, a serious students' outbreak, famine, mobilisation, or a conflict in the State Duma, etc., etc., etc., can really *rouse* the masses, constantly, at any hour. Not only is it the crassest stupidity to think of concocting "new incentives for an uprising", but the very thought of indicating in advance that this and no other will be the real incentive for the masses would be foolish. People who have the slightest degree of self-respect, who are in the least earnest in what they say, would never allow themselves to concoct "new incentives for an uprising".

What is lacking is not "new incentives", my most esteemed Manilovs, but a military force, the military force of

the revolutionary people (and not the people in general), consisting of 1) the armed proletariat and peasantry, 2) organised advance detachments of representatives of these classes, and 3) sections of the army that are prepared to come over to the side of the people. It is all this taken together that constitutes a *revolutionary army*. To talk of an uprising, of its force, of a natural transition to it, and to say nothing of a revolutionary army is folly and muddle-headedness—and the greater the degree of the counter-revolutionary army's mobilisation, the more that is so. To invent "new incentives for an uprising" at a time of uprisings in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea, in Poland and Riga means deliberately withdrawing into one's shell and isolating oneself from the movement. We are witnesses of the greatest unrest among the workers and peasants, of a series of insurrectionary outbreaks which have been steadily and with enormous speed spreading and becoming more forceful and more stubborn ever since January 9. No one can guarantee that these outbreaks will not repeat themselves tomorrow in any big city, or any military camp, or any village. On the contrary, everything goes to show that such outbreaks are probable, imminent, and inevitable. Their success depends, first of all, on the success of *revolutionary* agitation and organisation—revolutionary and not the "comprehensively democratic" agitation and organisation that *Iskra* prattles of, since among democrats there are many non-revolutionaries. In the second place, success depends on the might and preparedness of the revolutionary army. The first condition has long been acknowledged by all, and is being applied throughout Russia by all revolutionaries, at literally all meetings of study circles, group gatherings, impromptu and mass meetings. The second condition is as yet very little recognised. By reason of its class stand, the liberal bourgeoisie does not care to recognise it, and cannot afford to do so. As for the revolutionaries, only those who are hopelessly plodding along in the wake of the monarchist bourgeoisie are silent about it.

"Insurrection" is an important word. A call to insurrection is an extremely serious call. The more complex the social system, the better the organisation of state power, and the more perfected the military machine, the more

impermissible is it to launch such a slogan without due thought. And we have stated repeatedly that the revolutionary Social-Democrats have long been preparing to launch it, but have launched it as a direct call only when there could be no doubt whatever of the gravity, widespread and deep roots of the revolutionary movement, no doubt of matters having literally come to a head. Important words must be used with circumspection. Enormous difficulties have to be faced in translating them into important deeds. It is precisely for that reason that it would be unpardonable to dismiss these difficulties with a mere phrase, to use Manilovist inventions to brush aside serious tasks or to put on one's eyes the blinkers of sweet dreams of so-called "natural transitions" to these difficult tasks.

A revolutionary army are also important words. The creation of a revolutionary army is an arduous, complex, and lengthy process. But when we see that it has already begun and is proceeding on all sides—though desultorily and by fits and starts—when we know that a genuine victory of the revolution is *impossible* without such an army, we must issue a definite and direct slogan, advocate it, make it the touchstone of the current political tasks. It would be a mistake to think that the revolutionary classes are invariably strong enough to effect a revolution whenever such a revolution has fully matured by virtue of the conditions of social and economic development. No, human society is not constituted so rationally or so "conveniently" for progressive elements. A revolution may be ripe, and yet the forces of its creators may prove insufficient to carry it out, in which case society decays, and this process of decay sometimes drags on for very many years. There is no doubt that Russia is ripe for a democratic revolution, but it still remains to be seen whether the revolutionary classes have sufficient strength at present to carry it out. This will be settled by the struggle, whose crucial moment is approaching at tremendous speed—if the numerous direct and indirect indications do not deceive us. The moral preponderance is indubitable—the moral force is already overwhelmingly great; without it, of course, there could be no question of any revolution whatever. It is a necessary condition, but it *is not sufficient*. Only the outcome

of the struggle will show whether it will be translated into a material force sufficient to smash the very serious (we shall not close our eyes to this) resistance of the autocracy. The slogan of insurrection is a slogan for deciding the issue by material force, which in present-day European civilisation can only be military force. This slogan should not be put forward until the general prerequisites for revolution have matured, until the masses have definitely shown that they have been roused and are ready to act, until the external circumstances have led to an open crisis. But once such a slogan has been issued, it would be an arrant disgrace to retreat from it, back to moral force again, to one of the conditions that prepare the ground for an uprising, to a "possible transition", etc., etc. No, once the die is cast, all subterfuges must be done with; it must be explained directly and openly to the masses what the practical conditions for a successful revolution are at the present time.

We have by no means exhausted the list of mistakes in the *Iskra* resolution, which—to people who think and who do not confine themselves to "clutching at opportunities"—will long remain a sad memento of a vulgarisation of Social-Democracy's tasks. It seems to us more important to investigate the underlying source of the errors rather than to enumerate all, including even the comparatively petty manifestations of the basic fallacy. We shall therefore only note, in passing, the absurdity and reactionary nature of the idea of presenting "ultimatums" (a military term, which in the absence of a trained military force, sounds like vulgar bragging) *to the Duma*, of the endeavour to transform *this Duma* into a revolutionary assembly, and will

* If we prove strong in the impending decisive conflict with tsarism, the State Duma will inevitably turn to the left (at least its liberal section will do so—we are not speaking about its reactionary section), but to attempt to influence the State Duma seriously *without* destroying the rule of the tsar would be just as stupid as for Japan to present "ultimatums" to China or to attach much weight to Chinese assistance *without* destroying the military might of Russia. After March 18, 1848, the Prussian State Duma (the United Landtag) immediately affixed its signature to a paper providing for the convocation of a constituent assembly, but until that all "ultimatums"

pass on to the general meaning of the slogan: "revolutionary self-government of the people".

This slogan or rather its conversion into the focal slogan is at the root of all *Iskra*'s shilly-shallying. *Iskra* has attempted to defend it by referring to "dialectics"—the very same Plekhanov dialectics, by virtue of which *Iskra*'s "organisational vagueness" was first defended by Plekhanov, and then exposed by him!

Revolutionary self-government of the people, we have said, is not a prologue to an uprising, nor is it a "natural transition to it", it is its epilogue. There can be no serious talk of genuine and complete self-government unless the uprising is victorious. And we have added that the very idea of placing the main emphasis on state administration rather than on state organisation is reactionary, that to identify revolutionary self-government with a revolutionary army is the height of absurdity, that a victorious revolutionary army necessarily presupposes a revolutionary self-government, whereas a revolutionary self-government does not necessarily include a revolutionary army.

Iskra tried to defend the confusion in its deliberately chosen slogans by referring to the "dialectics" of the unconscious and spontaneous process. Life, it says, knows of no sharply defined boundaries. Labour exchanges exist even now (*Sotsial-Demokrat*,[124] No. 12)—here you have the elements of self-government. In a dialectical process of development, the prologue and the epilogue often intertwine, it says.

The latter consideration is quite true. Yes, the process of actual development is *always* tangled, with bits of the epilogue emerging before the true prologue. But does this mean that it is permissible for a leader of a class-conscious party to *jumble* the tasks of the struggle, to confuse the prologue with the epilogue? Can the dialectics of a jumbled and spontaneous process justify confusion in the logic of conscious Social-Democrats? Does not this imply substitution of dialectics *à la* Plekhanov for Marxist dialectics?

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of the revolutionaries, all their "endeavours" to influence the State Duma, all their threats, were hollow phrases to the Petrunkeviches, Rodichevs, Milyukovs, and their like, who sat in that State Duma.

To make our idea clearer, let us take an example. Let us assume that we are discussing not a democratic but a socialist revolution. The crisis is maturing, the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat is approaching. At this point the opportunists make the establishment of consumers' societies their central slogan, while the revolutionaries advance a slogan calling for the conquest of political power by the proletariat. The opportunists argue that consumers' societies constitute a real force for the proletariat, the conquest of a real economic position, and a genuine bit of socialism; you revolutionaries do not understand dialectical development, the evolution of capitalism into socialism, the penetration of nuclei of socialism into the very heart of capitalism, the purging of capitalism by giving it a new socialist content.

Yes, the revolutionaries answer, we agree that in a way consumers' societies do constitute a bit of socialism. In the first place, socialist society is one big consumers' society with production for consumption organised according to plan. In the second place, socialism cannot be achieved without a powerful, many-sided working-class movement, and consumers' societies will inevitably be one of these many sides. But that is not the point at all. While power remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie, consumers' societies will remain a paltry fragment, ensuring no serious changes whatever, introducing no decisive alterations whatever, and sometimes even diverting attention from a serious struggle for revolution. No one disputes the fact that the habits acquired by the workers in consumers' societies are very useful. But only transfer of power to the proletariat can give full scope to these habits. Then the system of consumers' societies will have surplus-value at its disposal; at present the scope of this useful institution is bound to be paltry by reason of the paltry wages. Then it will become a consumers' union of really free workers; at present it is a union of wage-slaves, oppressed and stifled by capitalism. Thus the consumers' societies are a fragment of socialism. The dialectical process of development really does intrude elements of the new society, elements both material and spiritual, even under capitalism. But socialists should be able to distinguish the part from the whole; they should demand the *whole* in their

slogan, and not a part; they must contrapose to bits of patchwork, which often divert fighters from the truly revolutionary path, the basic requisites for a real revolution.

What is *Iskra*'s opinion, who is right in this dispute?

It is the same with the slogan calling for "revolutionary self-government" in the period of a democratic revolution. We are not against revolutionary self-government, we long ago gave it a certain modest place in our minimum programme (see the paragraph on extensive local self-government). We agree that it is a fragment of a democratic revolution, as has already been stated in No. 15 of *Proletary** with reference to the Smolensk Municipal Council. A democratic revolution would be impossible without a powerful and many-sided democratic movement, and the movement for self-government is one of those many sides. However, the democratic revolution would likewise be impossible without, for example, revolutionary schools, which are as much an indubitable sign of tsarism's actual disintegration as are labour exchanges, which exist despite the police ban, as the unrest among the clergy, as local self-government instituted in violation of the law, etc. Comrades of the *Iskra*, consider what conclusion should be drawn from all this! Is it that all these elements of disintegration should be summed up in an integral slogan of insurrection? Or that the slogan of insurrection should be mutilated by tying it down to one of the elements, namely, self-government?

"The organisation of revolutionary self-government, or, what amounts to the same, the organisation of popular forces for an uprising," wrote the audacious *Iskra* (No. 109, page 2, line 1). That is just like saying that organising revolutionary schools means organising forces for an uprising, that organising unrest among the clergy means organising forces for an uprising, or that organising consumers' societies means organising forces for a socialist revolution. No, you are poor dialecticians, comrades of the *Iskra*. You are unable to reason dialectically, although you are very well able to twist and squirm, like Plekhanov, when it comes to the question of the organisational and tactical vagueness of your views. You have overlooked the fact that,

* See pp. 221-22 of this volume.—*Ed.*

given victory of the uprising, all these fragments of revolution will inevitably merge in an integral and complete "epilogue" to the uprising, whereas if the uprising is not victorious these fragments will remain fragments, paltry, changing nothing, and satisfying only the philistines.

The moral is: 1) Both on the eve of a socialist revolution and on the eve of a democratic revolution, opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement have a bad habit of working themselves up over a single petty fragment of a big process, exalting this fragment to the status of the whole, and subordinating the whole to this fragment, thereby mutilating the whole, and thereby themselves becoming toadies to the inconsistent and cowardly reformists. 2) The dialectics of the spontaneous process, which is always and necessarily confused, does not justify confusion in logical conclusions and political slogans which are quite often (but not necessarily) confused.

P. S. This article was already in the page proofs when we received the resolutions of the Southern Constituent Conference, published abroad by *Iskra*. The text of the resolution on the State Duma differs somewhat from the one published in Russia, which we have reproduced above. But these differences are not essential, and do not affect our criticism in any way.

Proletary, No. 21,
October 17 (4), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Proletary*

PROMMAPP
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NOTE TO M. BORISOV'S ARTICLE "ON THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND THE TASKS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY"[125]

It is with pleasure that we publish this article by a comrade engaged in practical work in Russia, since an all-round discussion of the trade union question is now on the order of the day. Only the experience of the whole Party, constantly illuminated by the theory of Marxism, can help work out the forms of Social-Democratic trade unions most suited to Russian conditions. It is likewise necessary to learn from the lessons given us by our enemies. The bourgeoisie of the whole world was jubilant over the "craft union" tendencies of the Cologne Congress, hoping to divert the workers from socialism to "pure", i.e., bourgeois, trade-unionism. In Russia, even *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* has learned to sing this tune. And once the bourgeoisie begins to praise any one of us for having "seen the light" or for "zeal" in respect of a "rational" trade union movement, it is a sure sign that there are shortcomings in our work. This is just how Comrade M. Borisov puts the question, namely, that we should fulfil our socialist duty in every respect, and by no means allow such shortcomings.

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ON THE DEATH OF TRUBETSKOI

The liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* was highly indignant at the consistently revolutionary resolution adopted by the Moscow students, who demanded that a constituent assembly be convened not by the tsar, not by the State Duma, and not even (let not the comrades of the new *Iskra* get wrathful at this!) by a "democratic organisation of the people", but by a provisional revolutionary government. In this connection the liberal German stockbrokers bewailed the "immaturity" of the students, etc. This very same paper now carries a telegram about Trubetskoi's death (*Abendblatt*, October 13) and remarks: "It is possible that they had treated him (Trubetskoi) to a scene at the Ministry of Public Education." Poor Trubetskoi! To aim at liberty for the people and to die of a "scene" in a tsarist minister's antechamber.... We are prepared to admit that this is too cruel a punishment even for a Russian liberal. Only, would it not be better and more dignified, gentlemen, for the supporters of popular liberty to discontinue all dealings with the government of butchers and spies? Is it not better to fall in a straightforward, honest, open street fighting—fighting which enlightens and educates the people—against vipers without whose destruction genuine liberty is impossible, rather than to die of "scenes" while conversing with the Trepovs and their contemptible lackeys?

Written in mid-October 1905

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according to
the manuscript

THE LESSONS OF THE MOSCOW EVENTS

The rising tide of revolutionary enthusiasm among the Moscow proletariat, so vividly expressed in the political strike and in the street fighting, has not yet subsided. The strike continues. It has to some extent spread to St. Petersburg, where the compositors are striking in sympathy with their Moscow comrades. It is still uncertain whether the present movement will subside and await the next rise of the tide, or whether it will be of a sustained character. But certain results of the Moscow events, and very instructive ones at that, are already apparent, and it would be worth while to dwell on them.

On the whole, the movement in Moscow did not attain the pitch of a decisive battle between the revolutionary workers and the tsarist forces. It consisted only of small skirmishes at the outposts, part perhaps of a military demonstration in the civil war, but it was not one of those battles that determine the outcome of a war. Of the two suppositions we advanced a week ago, it is apparently the first that is being justified, namely, that what we are witnessing is not the beginning of the decisive onslaught, but only a rehearsal. This rehearsal has nevertheless fully revealed all the characters in the historical drama, thus spotlighting the probable—and in part even inevitable—development of the drama itself.

The Moscow events were inaugurated by incidents which at first glance appear to have been of a purely academic character. The government conferred partial "autonomy", or alleged autonomy, on the universities. The professorate were granted self-government, and the students were granted the right of assembly. Thus a small breach was

forced in the general system of autocratic-feudal oppression. New revolutionary currents immediately swept into this breach with unexpected force. A miserable concession, a paltry reform, granted with the object of blunting the edge of the political antagonisms and of "reconciling" robbers and robbed, actually served to stimulate the struggle tremendously, and increase the number of its participants. Workers flocked to the students' gatherings, which began to develop into popular revolutionary meetings, where the proletariat, the foremost class in the struggle for liberty, predominated. The government was outraged. The "respectable" liberals who had received professorial self-government began to scurry back and forth between the revolutionary students and the government of police rule and the knout. The liberals made use of liberty in order to betray liberty, restrain the students from extending and intensifying the struggle, and appeal for "order"—this in the face of the bashi-bazouks and Black Hundreds, the Trepovs and the Romanovs! The liberals made use of self-government so as to do the work of the butchers of the people, and to close the University, that holy sanctuary of "science" permitted by the knout-wielders, which the students defiled by allowing the "rabble" to enter it for discussion of questions "unauthorised" by the autocratic gang. The self-governing liberals betrayed the people and liberty, because they feared carnage in the University. They were punished in exemplary fashion for their contemptible cowardice. By closing the revolutionary University they opened the way to revolution in the streets. Wretched pedants that they are, they were ready to jubilate in concert with rascals like Glazov over the fact that they had managed to extinguish the conflagration in the school. But as a matter of fact they only started a conflagration in a huge industrial city. These manikins on stilts forbade the workers to go to the students, but they only drove the students to the revolutionary workers. They appraised all political matters from the standpoint of their own chicken coop, which reeks of age-old hidebound officialism. They implored the students to spare this chicken coop. The first fresh breeze—the manifestation of the free and youthful revolutionary elements—was enough for the chicken coop to be forgotten, for the breeze freshened and grew into a

blast against the tsarist autocracy, the prime source of all officialism and all the humiliations heaped upon the Russian people. And even now, when the first danger has passed and the storm has clearly subsided, the lackeys of the autocracy still quake at the mere recollection of the chasm that yawned before them during the days of bloodshed in Moscow. "It is not yet a conflagration, but that it is arson is already beyond question," mutters Mr. Menshikov in the servile *Novoye Vremya* (of September 30). "It is not yet a revolution ... but it is already the prologue to a revolution." "'It is on the move,' [Mr. Menshikov] argued in April. And what frightful strides 'it' has since made! The popular element has been stirred to its very depths...."

Yes, the Trepovs and the Romanovs, together with the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, have got themselves into a predicament. Open the University—and you provide a platform for popular revolutionary meetings, and render invaluable service to the Social-Democrats. Close the University down—and you open the way for a street struggle. And so our knights of the knout dash to and fro, gnashing their teeth. They reopen Moscow University, pretending that they want to allow the students to maintain order themselves during street processions; they turn a blind eye to revolutionary self-government of the students, who are dividing into Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., thus bringing about proper political representation in the student "parliament" (and, we are confident, will not confine themselves to revolutionary self-government, but will immediately and in dead earnest set about organising and equipping contingents of a revolutionary army). Together with Trepov, the liberal professors are dashing to and fro, hastening one day to persuade the students to be more moderate, and the next day to persuade the knout-wielders to be more lenient. The scurryings of both of these give us the greatest satisfaction; they show that a fine revolutionary breeze must be blowing if the political commanders and the political turncoats are staggering about on the upper deck in such a lively manner.

But besides legitimate pride and legitimate satisfaction, true revolutionists must derive something else from the Moscow events—an understanding of the social forces oper-

ating in the Russian revolution and just how they operate, and a clearer idea of the forms they take when they operate. Call to mind the political sequence of the Moscow events, and you will see a remarkably typical picture of the whole revolution, one that is characteristic of the class relationships. Here is the sequence: a small breach is forced in the old order; the government tries to mend the breach with petty concessions, illusory "reforms", etc.; instead of calming down, the struggle becomes even more acute and widespread; the liberal bourgeoisie wavers and dashes from one thing to another, urging the revolutionists to desist from revolution, and the police to desist from reaction; headed by the proletariat, the revolutionary people arrive on the scene, and the open struggle gives rise to a new political situation; the conflict shifts to the newly won battlefield—a more elevated and broader field—a new breach is made in the enemy strongholds, and in that way the movement proceeds to an ever higher plane. A general retreat on the part of the government is taking place before our eyes, as *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* aptly remarked recently. A certain liberal newspaper[126] rather cleverly added: a retreat under cover of rearguard action. On October 3 (16) the St. Petersburg correspondent of the liberal Berlin *Vossische Zeitung* wired to his paper about his interview with Trepov's *chef de cabinet*. As the police underling told the correspondent: "You cannot expect the government to follow a consistent plan of action, since every day brings with it events that could not have been foreseen. The government is obliged to manoeuvre. Force cannot crush the present movement which may last for two months or two years."

Indeed the government's tactics have now become quite clear. They indubitably lie in manoeuvring and retreating under cover of rearguard action. Such tactics are quite correct from the standpoint of the autocracy's interests. It would be a grievous error and a fatal illusion for revolutionists to forget that the government can still continue to retreat for a very long time to come, without losing what is most essential. The example of the abortive, unfinished semi-revolution in Germany, in 1848—an example to which we shall return in the next issue of *Proletary*, and which we shall never tire of recalling—shows

that even if it retreats so far as to convoke a (*nominally*) constituent assembly, the government will still retain sufficient strength to defeat the revolution in the final and decisive battle. That is why, in studying the Moscow events, the most recent in a long series of conflicts in our civil war, we must soberly consider the developments, prepare with the maximum of energy and persistence for a long and desperate war, and be on our guard against such allies that are already turncoat allies. When absolutely nothing decisive has as yet been won, when the enemy still has an enormous area for further advantageous and safe retreats, when battles are becoming ever more serious—confidence in such allies, attempts to conclude agreements with them or simply to support them on certain conditions may prove not only stupid but even treacherous to the proletariat.

Indeed, was the liberal professors' behaviour before and during the Moscow events fortuitous? Was it an exception, or is it the rule for the entire Constitutional-Democratic Party? Does this behaviour express the individual peculiarities of a given group of the liberal bourgeoisie, or does it express the fundamental interests of this entire class in general? Among socialists there can be no two opinions on these questions, but not all socialists know how to consistently pursue genuinely socialist tactics.

For a clearer understanding of the gist of the matter, let us take the liberals' own exposition of their tactics. They avoid coming out against the Social-Democrats or even speaking directly about them in the columns of the Russian press. But here is an interesting report in the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung*, which undoubtedly is more outspoken in its expression of the liberals' views:

"Extremely stormy student disturbances have reoccurred both in St. Petersburg and in Moscow since the very beginning of the academic year, although autonomy has been granted—belatedly, it is true—to the universities and other higher educational institutions. Moreover, in Moscow these disturbances are accompanied by a widespread workers' movement. These disturbances indicate that a new phase has begun in the Russian revolutionary movement. The course of the student meetings and their resolutions show that the students have adopted the watchword of the Social-Democratic leaders to convert the universities into popular meeting places, and thus spread

revolution among wide sections of the population. The Moscow students have already shown how this is being put into effect: they invited to the University premises such large numbers of workers and other persons who have no connection with the University that the students themselves were in a minority. It stands to reason that such a state of affairs cannot go on for long under the existing conditions. The government will close the universities rather than tolerate such meetings. This is so obvious that at first glance it appears inconceivable that the Social-Democratic leaders could have issued such a watchword. They knew perfectly well what this would lead to, but what they wanted was for the government to close the universities. For what purpose? Simply because they intend to hinder the *liberal* movement by all available means. They admit that they are not strong enough to effect any major political action with their own forces; therefore the liberals and radicals must not do anything either, for that would allegedly only harm the socialist proletariat. The latter must win its rights for itself. The Russian Social-Democratic Party may take great pride in these 'inflexible' (*unbeugsame*) tactics, but they must appear very short-sighted to any unprejudiced observer; they will scarcely lead Russian Social-Democracy to victories. It is quite incomprehensible what it will gain by the closing of the universities, which is inevitable if the present tactics continue. On the other hand, it is of the utmost importance to all progressive parties that there should be no interruption in the work of the universities and higher schools. The protracted strikes of students and professors have already caused great damage to Russian culture. It is imperative that academic work be resumed. Autonomy has enabled the professors to conduct their classes freely. That is why the professors of all universities and higher schools are agreed that it is necessary to start tuition once more and in energetic fashion. They are exerting all their influence to persuade the students to abandon their efforts to give effect to the Social-Democratic watchword."

Thus, the struggle between bourgeois liberalism (the Constitutional-Democrats) and the Social-Democrats has taken definite shape. Do not hinder the liberal movement! Such is the slogan so splendidly expressed in the article quoted above. What does this liberal movement amount to? It is *a retrograde movement*, for the professors use and desire to use the freedom of the universities not for revolutionary propaganda, but for *counter-revolutionary* propaganda; not to fan the conflagration, but to extinguish it; not to extend the field of battle, but to draw the masses away from decisive struggle and induce them to collaborate peacefully with the Trepovs. With the struggle becoming more acute, the "liberal" movement (as we have seen in practice) has become marked by desertion from revolution to reaction. Of course,

the liberals are, in a way, useful to us, since they introduce vacillation into the ranks of the Trepovs and other lackeys of Romanov. This good, however, will be outweighed by the harm they cause by bringing vacillation into our ranks, unless we make a clean break with the Constitutional-Democrats, and brand every hesitant step they take. Their knowledge, or, more frequently, their sense of their dominant position in the existing economic system has led the liberals to aspire to dominate the revolution as well. They say that each step aimed at continuing, extending and intensifying the revolution and taking it farther than the most ordinary patchwork is a "*hindrance*" to the liberal movement. Fearful for the fate of the so-called freedom of the universities granted by Trepov, they are today fighting against revolutionary freedom. Fearful for the legal "freedom of assembly" which the government will grant tomorrow in a police-distorted form, they will hold us back from using these assemblies for genuinely proletarian aims. Fearful for the fate of the State Duma, they already displayed wise moderation at the September Congress, and continue to display it now by combating the idea of a boycott; why, they say, you must not hinder us from getting things done in the State Duma!

It must be confessed that, to the shame of Social-Democracy, there have been opportunists in its ranks who fell for this bait by reason of their doctrinaire and lifeless distortion of Marxism! They argue that the revolution is a bourgeois one and therefore ... therefore we must retrace our steps in the measure the bourgeoisie succeeds in obtaining concessions from tsarism. To this day the new-Iskrists have not seen the real significance of the State Duma, because they are themselves drawing back and therefore naturally do not notice the Constitutional-Democrats' regression. That the Iskrists have already retraced their steps since the promulgation of the State Duma Act is an indisputable fact. Prior to the State Duma Act they never thought of placing the question of an agreement with the Constitutional-Democrats on the order of the day. After the State Duma Act they (Parvus, Cherevanin and Martov) raised this question, and not merely as a matter of theory, but in an immediately practical form. Prior to the State

Duma Act they presented quite stringent conditions to the democrats (right up to co-operation in arming the people, etc.). After the State Duma Act they immediately reduced the conditions, confining themselves to a promise to convert the Black-Hundred or the liberal Duma into a revolutionary one. Prior to the State Duma Act the reply their official resolution gave to the question as to who should convoke the popular constituent assembly was: either a provisional revolutionary government or a representative institution. After the State Duma Act they deleted the provisional revolutionary government, and they now say: either "democratic" (like the Constitutional-Democrats?) "organisations of the people" (?), or ... or the State Duma. We thus see in fact *how* the new-Iskrists are guided by their magnificent principle: the revolution is a bourgeois revolution—therefore, comrades, watch out lest the bourgeoisie recoil!

The Moscow events, which for the first time since the State Duma Act have shown the *real* nature of the Constitutional-Democrats' tactics at grave political junctures, have also shown that Social-Democracy's opportunist appendage, which we have described, is inevitably being transformed into a mere appendage to the bourgeoisie. We have just said: a Black-Hundred or a liberal State Duma. To an *Iskra* supporter these words would appear monstrous, for he considers distinction between a Black-Hundred State Duma and a liberal State Duma highly important. But these selfsame Moscow events have disclosed the fallaciousness of this "parliamentary" idea, which had been so inappropriately advanced in a pre-parliamentary period. The Moscow events have shown that the liberal turncoat has actually played the part of a Trepov. The closing of the University, which would have been decreed by Trepov yesterday, has been carried out today by Messrs. Manuilov and Trubetskoi. Is it not clear that the "Duma" liberals will also scurry back and forth between Trepov and Romanov, on the one hand, and the revolutionary people on the other? Is it not clear that the slightest support for liberal turncoats is something befitting only political simpletons?

Under a parliamentary system it is often necessary to support a more liberal party against a less liberal one. But during a revolutionary struggle for a parliamentary system it

is treachery to support liberal turncoats who are "reconciling" Trepov with the revolution.

The events in Moscow have revealed in practice the alignment of social forces that *Proletary* has spoken of so many times: the socialist proletariat and the vanguard of revolutionary bourgeois democracy *have waged a struggle*, while the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie *has conducted negotiations*. Therefore, fellow-workers, study the lessons of the Moscow events, and do so most attentively. For it is in this way, and inevitably so, that matters will take their course throughout the whole of the Russian revolution. We must rally more solidly than ever in a genuinely socialist party, which shall consciously express the interests of the working class, and not drift along in the wake of the masses. In the struggle we must place reliance only on revolutionary democrats, permit agreements with them alone, and carry out these agreements only on the field of battle against the Trepovs and Romanov. We must bend every effort to rouse, in addition to the students, who are the vanguard of revolutionary democracy, also those broad masses of the people whose movement is not only democratic in a general way (today every turncoat calls himself a democrat), but a genuinely revolutionary movement—namely, the masses of the peasantry. We must remember that the liberals and Constitutional-Democrats, who are bringing vacillation into the ranks of supporters of the autocracy, will inevitably strive in every way to bring vacillation into our ranks as well. Only an open revolutionary struggle which consigns all liberal chicken coops and all liberal Dumas to the rubbish heap will be of serious and decisive consequence. Therefore, prepare for ever new battles, without losing a single moment! Arm as best you can; immediately form squads of fighters who will be prepared to battle with devoted energy against the accursed autocracy; remember that tomorrow or the following day events will certainly call you to rise in revolt, and the question now is only whether you will be able to take prepared and united action, or whether you will be caught off your guard and disunited!

The events in Moscow have once again and for the hundredth time confuted the sceptics. They have shown that we are still inclined to underestimate the revolutionary



Кавказскій Союзъ Рос. Соціальдемократической Рабочей Партіи.

БОРЬБА ПРОЛЕТАРІАТА

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ соединяйтесь!

ОРГАНЪ КАВКАЗСКАГО СОЮЗА РОССІЙСКОЙ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ.

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ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКІЯ ЗАДАЧИ РЕВОЛЮЦІОННАГО ПРОЛЕТАРІАТА.

Соціальдемократія, какъ сознательная выразительница рабочаго движенія, ставитъ себѣ цѣлью полное освобожденіе всѣхъ трудящихся отъ полнаго гнета и эксплуатаціи. Достиженіе этой цѣли, уничтоженіе частной собственности на средства производства и созданіе соціалистическаго общества, требуетъ очень высокаго развитія производительныхъ силъ капитализма и громадной организованности рабочаго класса. Безъ политической свободы немыслимо ни полное развитіе производительныхъ силъ въ современномъ буржуазномъ обществѣ, ни широкая, открытая и свободная классовая борьба, ни политическое просвѣщеніе, воспитаніе и политическій массъ пролетаріата. Вотъ почему сознательный пролетаріатъ всегда ставитъ своей задачей рѣшительную борьбу за общую политическую свободу, за демократическую революцію.

Эту задачу ставитъ себѣ не одинъ пролетаріатъ. Буржуазіи тоже нужна политическая свобода. Образованные представители имущихъ классовъ давно мечтали о своей свободѣ; революціонная интеллигенція, происходящая главнымъ образомъ изъ этихъ классовъ, геройски боролась за свободу. Но вся буржуазія въ общемъ не способна на упорную борьбу съ самодержавіемъ; она боится потерять въ этой борьбѣ свою собственность, которая принадлежитъ не ея существующему обществу; она боится слишкомъ решительнаго выступленія рабочихъ, которыя никогда не остановятся на одной демократической революціи, а будутъ стремиться къ соціалистическому переворогу; она боится полнаго разрыва съ чиновничествомъ, съ бюрократіей, которому которой опасаетъ и интересами имущихъ классовъ тысячами нитей. Поэтому буржуазія борьбы за свободу отличается робостью, непослѣдовательностью, половинчатостью. Одно изъ задачъ пролетаріата—тянуть впередъ буржуазію, ставить передъ всѣмъ народомъ лозунги полнаго демократическаго переворота, бросать самоотверженно и смѣло за осуществленіе этихъ лозунговъ, однимъ словомъ, быть авангардомъ, передовымъ отрядомъ въ борьбѣ за свободу всего народа.

Уроками соціальдемократовъ въ общемъ выполненіе этой задачи преобразовалось вновь тяжелое время не разъ съ непослѣдовательностью буржуазного либерализма. Напомнимъ, напримѣръ, какъ начинали г. Струве свою свободную отъ цензуры дѣятельность съ начатой политическаго бюрда на „освобожденіе" Россіи. Онъ началъ не предисловіемъ къ „Запискѣ" Витте, гдѣ онъ выставилъ совершенно „Шиповскій" (говоря языкомъ нынѣшнихъ политическихъ дѣлецовъ) лозунгъ: „права и властное земство". Соціальдемократія обнаружила всю отсталость, всю робкость, всю непослѣдовательность этого лозунга, требуя опредѣленной и рѣшительной демократической программы, какой выставила такую программу, какъ передовой составъ часть своей партійной программы. Соціальдемократія должна была бороться съ такимъ пониманіемъ демократическихъ задачъ въ ея собственномъ рядѣ, когда такъ называемые оппортунисты всячески принимали или задачи, провозглашали „экономическую борьбу съ помѣщиками и съ пролетаріатомъ", настаивали на необходимости начать съ выполненія правъ, продолжать политической агитаціей и снизу вверхъ, постепенно (теорія стадій) переходить къ политической борьбѣ.

Теперь политическая борьба страшно разгорелась, революція охватила всю страну, самые умѣренные либералы стали „крайними" и можетъ оказаться, что такія историческія справки изъ недавняго прошлаго, какія мы сейчасъ привели, окажутся, не могутъ имѣть никакого отношенія къ жизни, бурному настоящему. Но это можетъ показаться лишь на первый взглядъ. Поистинѣ, такіе лозунги, какъ учредительное собраніе, всеобщее, прямое и равное избирательное право съ тайной подачей голосовъ (выставленные давно и раньше всѣхъ соціальдемократами въ ихъ партійной программѣ) стали общимъ достояніемъ, принятыми всеми партіями. „Освободительство", вошедшее въ программу „Союза Освобожденія", стало лозунгомъ замѣнъ, которыхъ на всѣ виды легальной печати. Прогрессъ русскаго буржуазнаго демократизма за полгодія сдѣлалъ и измѣнилъ неожиданно. Буржуазная демократія учится у событій, отбрасываетъ прежнія лозунги (въ родѣ выполненія права и властное земство), вошедшіе всѣдъ за революціей. Но она именно вошедшіе за революціей; на этого отмѣчаетъ противорѣчій между ея словами и дѣлами, между демократизмомъ въ прошлыхъ и демократизмомъ въ „реальной политикѣ" нарождается новый пролетаріатъ, ибо ростъ революціи все понимаетъ и понимаетъ требованія отъ демократіи. Буржуазная не демократія, меняя свои лозунги, всегда отстаетъ отъ событій, всегда тащится въ хвостѣ, всегда формулируетъ эти лозунги на общепонятномъ грубомъ языкѣ, тамъ этого требуетъ дѣйствительно революционная, дѣйствительная борьба за дѣйствительную свободу.

Въ самомъ дѣлѣ, возьмемъ этотъ знаменитый уже лозунгъ, общепризнанный теперь: учредительное собраніе на основѣ всеобщаго и т. д. избирательнаго права. Достаточенъ-ли онъ съ точки зрѣнія послѣдовательнаго демократизма? Достаточенъ-ли онъ съ точки зрѣнія настоящихъ революціонныхъ задачъ пролетаріата сегодня? На обѣ эти вопроса нельзя отвѣтить иначе, какъ отрицательно. Чтобы убѣдиться въ этомъ, стоитъ только разобрать внимательно нашу партійную программу, которую, съ сожалѣніе, отличается часто исполненіемъ, приводятъ в распространяетъ наши организаціи. (Какъ отмѣтимъ недостаткомъ, замѣчающимъ широкаго подражанія, отмѣтимъ недавнее перепечатку программы нашей партіи въ листкахъ нѣкоторыхъ рязьскаго, воронежскаго, и московскаго). Наша программа тоже ставитъ на главу угла лозунгъ полнаго учредительнаго собранія (основанъ „непосредственно" или равномѣрно обнимаетъ для протяжности свободы и т. д. избир. права). Но этотъ лозунгъ стоитъ у насъ въ программѣ не одинокъ, а

Front page of the newspaper *Borba Proletariata*, No. 2, with Lenin's article "The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat". 1905

Reduced

activity of the masses. They will bring round many of those who have already begun to waver, who have begun to lose faith in the idea of an uprising after the conclusion of peace and the granting of a Duma. No, it is precisely now that the uprising is gaining ground and increasing in intensity with unparalleled rapidity. Let us all be at our posts when the imminent explosion comes, one in comparison with which both January 9 and the memorable Odessa days will seem mere child's play.

Proletary, No. 22,
October 24 (11), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Proletary*

"THE STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT"[127]

In the article "Reply to *Sotsial-Demokrat*" we should like to mention the splendid way in which the problem of the celebrated "introduction of a consciousness from without" had been posed. The author divides the problem into four independent parts: 1) The philosophical problem of the relation of man's consciousness to his social being—social being determines consciousness. Corresponding to the existence of two classes, two kinds of consciousness are evolved —the bourgeois and the socialist. Socialist consciousness corresponds to the position of the proletariat. 2) "Who can and does evolve this socialist consciousness (scientific socialism)?" "Contemporary socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge" (Kautsky), i.e., its evolution "is a matter for a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who possess the necessary means and time". 3) How does this consciousness penetrate into the proletariat? "It is here that Social-Democracy (and not only Social-Democratic intellectuals) comes in, and introduces socialist consciousness into the working-class movement." 4) What does Social-Democracy meet with when it comes to the proletariat with the message of socialism? It meets with an instinctive *urge* towards socialism. "Together with the proletariat, a tendency towards socialism is of necessity engendered both among the proletarians themselves, and among those who adopt the viewpoint of the proletariat; this accounts for the birth of an urge towards socialism" (Kautsky). From this the Menshevik draws the following ridiculous conclusion: "Hence it is clear that socialism is not introduced into the proletariat from without, but, on the contrary, comes from the proletariat and enters the minds of those who adopt the views of the proletariat"!

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THE YOUTH ABROAD AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The letter from an out-of-the-way place, calling upon all to return to Russia from abroad (*Proletary*, No. 19) has evoked a reply from Comrade "Revolutionary", writing to *Proletary* from Berne. Comrade "Revolutionary" insists on importance of theory in the movement, the need to study, and the like. We of course fully agree with him in the matter, and that was just the sense of our reservation regarding the above-mentioned letter.[128] Comrade "Revolutionary" advises the Party to organise at some place, for example in Geneva, something in the nature of a university, for the youth to be able to engage in serious studies. There have been many such plans, but their implementation meets with too many practical difficulties.

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A LETTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Geneva, October 27, 1905

Dear Comrade,

On June 28 you sent us Comrade Bebel's proposal concerning the differences in our Party.

On July 24 I wrote to you* that I could not give you a reply on behalf of the Central Committee of our Party, as I am only one of the members of the Committee, and asked the Bureau to clear up a few points for me. In reply I received a letter from Citizen Huysmans, dated August 5, in which he writes that the Executive Committee's intervention is directed only towards moral suasion. I immediately informed the Central Committee of our Party of the exact nature of Bebel's proposal. I am now in receipt of a reply from the Central Committee, which accepts your offer and appoints as its representatives Comrades Vasilyev, Schmidt,[129] and Lenin. Comrade Schmidt is in Russia. We must therefore be informed in advance of the date fixed for the conference (at least three weeks ahead of time).

The other two delegates are in Switzerland.

Accept, etc.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

P. S. I have just received another letter informing me that Comrade Schmidt will soon leave for abroad (arriving probably in November) in order to settle a number of matters pertaining to our Party. It is therefore of the utmost impor-

* See pp. 142-45 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tance for me to obtain as soon as possible the reply of the other section of our Party concerning the date for the conference. It is extremely difficult for members of our Party working in Russia to go abroad, which makes it desirable that the date on which the conference is to be convened should be fixed now, in other words, that the other section and the members of the International Bureau advise us as early as possible when they propose to call this conference.

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which has been checked against
a French typewritten copy
of the text

THE ALL-RUSSIA POLITICAL STRIKE

Geneva, October 26 (13)

The barometer indicates a storm—that is what is stated in today's foreign newspapers, which carry telegraphic dispatches on the mighty growth of the *all-Russia political strike*.

Nor is it only the barometer that indicates a storm: everything has been dislodged by the mighty whirlwind of a concerted proletarian onslaught. The revolution is progressing at astonishing speed, unfolding an amazing wealth of events, and if we wanted to give our reader a detailed account of the last three or four days, we should have to write a whole book. However, we shall leave it to future generations to write detailed history. We are witnesses of thrilling scenes of one of the greatest of civil wars, wars for liberty, mankind has ever experienced, and we must live at higher tempo so as to devote all our energies to this war.

The storm has burst—and how insignificant do the liberal and democratic speeches, suppositions, conjectures and plans about the Duma seem now. How out-of-date have all our disputes about the Duma already become—in the space of a few days, a few hours! Some of us doubted whether the revolutionary proletariat was sufficiently strong to frustrate the infamous farce staged by police ministers; some of us were afraid to speak with all boldness about boycotting the elections. But, as it turns out, elections have not yet started everywhere, and already a mere wave of the hand has been enough to rock the whole house of cards. A mere wave of the hand has forced not only the liberals and

the craven *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, but even Mr. Witte, head of the new "liberal" tsarist government, to talk (true, so far only to *talk*) of reforms that would undermine all the artful devices of the entire Bulygin farce.

This hand, whose wave brought such an upheaval in the Duma question, is that of the Russian proletariat. A German socialist song runs as follows: "*All the wheels stand still if your mighty arm so will.*" This mighty arm has now been raised. Our indications and predictions on the political mass strike's enormous importance to the armed uprising have been strikingly borne out. The *all-Russia political strike* has this time really involved the whole country, uniting *all the peoples* of the accursed Russian "Empire" in the heroic rising of a class that is the most oppressed and the most advanced. Proletarians of all nations of this empire of oppression and violence are now mustering in a great army—an army of liberty and an army of socialism. Moscow and St. Petersburg share the honour of having taken revolutionary proletarian initiative. Both capitals have gone on strike. Finland is striking. Headed by Riga, the Baltic provinces have joined the movement. Heroic Poland has again joined the ranks of the strikers, as if in mockery of the impotent rage of her enemies, who imagined that they could crush her with their blows and have, instead, only welded her revolutionary forces more closely together. The Crimea is rising (Simferopol), and also the South. In Ekaterinoslav barricades are being erected, and blood is being shed. The Volga region (Saratov, Simbirsk, Nizhni-Novgorod) is on strike, and the strike is spreading both to the central agricultural provinces (Voronezh) and to the industrial Centre (Yaroslavl).

A modest delegation of the Railwaymen's Union has taken the lead of this army of workers, many million strong and speaking many languages. On a stage where political comedies were played by the liberals, with their highflown and cowardly speeches to the tsar, and with their smirking and scraping to Witte—on this stage a worker suddenly makes an appearance and presents his *ultimatum* to Mr. Witte, the new head of the new "liberal" tsarist government. The railway workers' delegation refused to await that "board of burghers", the State Duma. The workers' delegation did not even care to waste valuable time on

"criticism" of this Punch-and-Judy show. The workers' delegation first prepared *criticism by deeds*—the political strike—and then declared to the buffoon of a minister: "There can be only one solution—the convocation of a constituent assembly, elected on the basis of universal and direct suffrage."

The buffoon-minister spoke, to use the apt expression of the railway workers themselves, "like a real hidebound bureaucrat, hedging as usual, and not committing himself to anything definite". He promised decrees on freedom of the press, but rejected universal suffrage; according to foreign press reports, he declared a constituent assembly "impossible at present".

The workers' delegation called a general strike. After leaving the Minister the workers' delegation went to the University, where political meetings attended by some ten thousand people were taking place. The proletariat made good use of the platform placed at its disposal by the revolutionary students. At the first systematic and free political mass meetings held in Russia, in all cities, at schools and factories, and in the streets, the answer given by the buffoon-minister was discussed, and speeches centred around the task of waging a resolute armed struggle, which would make the convocation of a constituent assembly both "possible" and *necessary*. The foreign bourgeois press, including even the most liberal newspapers, is horrified by the "terroristic and seditious" slogans proclaimed by speakers at the free popular meetings, as though the tsar's government, by all its policy of oppression, had not itself made insurrection imperative and inevitable.

The uprising is drawing near, is evolving from the all-Russia political strike before our very eyes. The appointment of a buffoon-minister, who assures the workers that a popular constituent assembly is impossible "at present" clearly shows the growth of the revolutionary forces, and the decline of the forces of the tsar's government. The autocracy is *no longer* strong enough to come out against the revolution openly. The revolution is *not yet* strong enough to deal the enemy a decisive blow. This fluctuation of almost evenly balanced forces inevitably engenders confusion among the authorities, makes for transitions from repression to

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

concession, to laws providing for freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.

Forward, then, to a new, still more widespread and persistent struggle—the enemy must not be given a chance to pull himself together! The proletariat has already performed wonders for the victory of the revolution. The all-Russia political strike has brought this victory tremendously closer, causing the enemy to toss about on his death-bed. However, we are very far indeed from having done everything that we can and must do for final victory. The struggle is approaching, but has not yet reached its real climax. At this very moment the working class is rising, mobilising and arming, on a scale hitherto unparalleled. And it will finally sweep away the abhorrent autocracy, send all the buffoons of ministers packing, set up *its own* provisional revolutionary government, and show all the peoples of Russia how "possible" and necessary it is, just "at present", to convoke a truly popular and truly constituent assembly.

Proletary, No. 23,
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THE FIRST RESULTS OF THE POLITICAL ALIGNMENT

The account of the Conference of Social-Democratic Parties and Organisations in Russia published in our previous issue affords an opportunity of drawing certain conclusions, at least preliminary, regarding the present-day political alignment. The Conference of Social-Democratic Parties and Organisations (the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Polish Social-Democratic Party, and the revolutionary Ukrainian Party) unanimously accepted the tactic of an active boycott of the State Duma. The necessity for increased agitation against the State Duma in the direct sense of that word, the necessity to agitate against all parties favouring participation in the State Duma, and, finally, the imperativeness of preparing for armed uprising have now, it may be said without exaggeration, been recognised by the entire revolutionary Social-Democratic movement, irrespective of national distinctions. The principles underlying the tactics adopted by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and advocated by us in *Proletary*, beginning with No. 12 of our paper, i.e., for the last two and a half months, now underlie the tactics of practically the entire Social-Democratic movement in Russia, with one lamentable exception.

This exception, as the reader knows, is the *Iskra* and the "Minority", which has seceded from the R.S.D.L.P. The "Organising Committee"—its practical centre—was represented at the Conference. We do not know how its delegate voted, but it is a fact that the Organising Committee refused to endorse the Conference's resolution. This was to

be expected after the Southern "Constituent" Conference of new-Iskrists adopted its extremely unwise and fundamentally opportunist resolution on the State Duma, which we analysed in detail in *Proletary*, No. 21.*

In this way, the political alignment is quite clear. The question of the attitude towards the State Duma has occasioned what is probably the first joint discussion of political tactics by the opposition and the revolutionary parties, by the legal and the illegal press. This is a giant stride forward in comparison with the previous period in the movement. Formerly, a gulf separated the opposition from the revolutionaries, legal work from illegal work. The movement has made such tremendous progress during the last ten months or so that the gulf has in considerable measure been removed. The revolutionary struggle has carried the "legal" opposition on to the crest of the wave, almost to recognising that a revolution is on. Hitherto, strictly speaking, we could not even discuss tactics or the behaviour of political parties with representatives of the legal opposition, for in fact there were no parties except the revolutionary and illegal, and "political activities" coincided fully with those of "political offenders", if one disregards the "activities" of the autocracy and its henchmen. Now, the State Duma has naturally and inevitably become a subject of discussion for the mass of the people—for people of all shades of opinion, all tendencies and parties. The revolutionary struggle has cleared the road for revolutionary discussion in the legal press, at Zemstvo meetings, student assemblies, and workers' mass meetings.

Practically the first to start the discussion on the attitude to the State Duma were the Zemstvos and the radical intelligentsia, who are most directly concerned with the sop thrown by the tsar, and who were best informed of it—even prior to the publication of the Manifesto of August 6. The discussion then spread to the whole political press in Russia, both the free (i.e., illegal) press which gave frank and full expression to all its arguments and slogans, and to the legal press, which wrote in Aesopian language for a boycott, and openly against it.

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* See pp. 356-73 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The political alignment, that precursor of a demarcation between the political parties and classes of all the peoples of Russia, began to take shape on the boycott issue. Should the Duma be entered, or not? Should the Duma be nipped in the bud, or accepted? Should the struggle be waged within the Duma, on the basis of the Duma, or outside the Duma, apart from the Duma, against the Duma? That was the inescapable issue both for the privileged handful of the electorate and for the masses, "who had no rights". Today we have on this issue, which was of course tackled from a thousand various points of view and with thousands of variations and "dissenting opinions", the *returns* supplied by a "canvass" of public opinion as presented by the entire press and by the aggregate of the declarations made by all the various political organisations, political meetings, assemblies, etc.

These returns are as follows:

Views on the Duma fall into three clearly defined main categories, which fully correspond to the three main and basic social forces involved in the present revolution: the views of the *Black Hundreds* (the autocracy), of the *liberals* (the bourgeoisie), and of the *revolutionaries* (the proletariat). The Black Hundreds seized on the Duma as the best means, most likely the only possible or even conceivable means, of saving the autocracy. The liberals criticised the Duma adversely, but accepted it, being irresistibly drawn to lawful paths and to compromise with the tsar. Headed by the proletariat, the revolutionary people, denounced the Duma, proclaimed an active boycott of it, and by their deeds have already shown that they are striving to convert this active boycott into an armed uprising.

It would be worth our while to dwell on these three main categories in somewhat greater detail.

As regards the Black Hundreds, it might have been expected (and this expectation was expressed by people inclined to take the Duma in all earnest, even, if we are not mistaken, the *Iskra* group) that the supporters of the autocracy would directly or indirectly sympathise with a boycott, or absenteeism, as our servile press frequently puts it. These people might have been expected to say in effect: Let them boycott the Duma; so much the better for us, for in that case the Duma will be composed more completely of

Black-Hundred elements. Since there are conservative organs in Russia capable of denouncing tsarist ministers for excessive liberalism, and voicing discontent with "an excessively weak" government, such a view could easily be expressed just as clearly as many views held by constitutionalists, or even more clearly. But it was here that a mistake made itself felt, a mistake made by people who took the Duma seriously, and began to talk of a struggle on the basis of the Duma, of supporting a struggle in the Duma, etc. It could be seen immediately that the autocracy was terribly in need of a legal Duma opposition, that it was terribly afraid of a boycott. Why? The answer is very simple: because it had become absolutely clear that it was utterly impossible to govern the country without coming to terms with at least a section of the bourgeoisie as a class. It was impossible to govern the country, to obtain money, or to continue existing without coming to terms with the Right wing of the bourgeoisie. Irrespective of our autocracy's Asiatic savagery, and the many features of antediluvian barbarism it has retained in such an unusually pure form throughout the centuries, the autocratic government is nevertheless the government of a capitalist country, linked with Europe, with international markets and international capital by thousands of inseverable ties. The dependence of the autocracy on the bourgeoisie of All Russia is a supreme material dependence, which may be concealed behind hundreds of medieval annexes, or weakened by millions of bribes doled out to individuals or groups by the Court (titles, sinecures, concessions, sops, favours, etc., etc., etc.), but at every crisis in the people's life it must manifest itself with decisive force.

It is not a matter of mere chance that we now see Mr. Witte currying favour with the liberals, delivering liberal speeches, which are reported in the legal press, conducting "informal negotiations with Mr. Gessen", the leader of the Constitutional-Democrats (the cable from the St. Petersburg correspondent of *The Times*), or that we see the foreign press teeming with news about the tsar's liberal plans. Of course, there is no end of lies and intrigues in all this, but then the tsarist government, and for that matter any bourgeois government, cannot make a single step in its policies

without resorting to lies and intrigues. Of course, there is a great deal of the most shabby chicanery, occasioned by the arrival in St. Petersburg of representatives of French and German bankers to negotiate a new loan of 500,000,000 rubles of which the tsarist government stands in dire need. But then the entire system of governmental dependence on the bourgeoisie inevitably engenders cases of chicanery in connection with all the various deals and trickery accompanying this dependence.

It is imperative for the autocracy to "make peace" with the bourgeoisie, and it is obliged to exert itself to this end; naturally, in this connection it wants to dupe public opinion in Europe and Russia. And the State Duma is a splendid means for achieving this end. A legal bourgeois opposition in the Duma is just the façade for a state system recognised by the bourgeoisie, a façade that might help the autocracy to extricate itself from its predicament.

This explains why *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, that organ of conservative opposition to the government, speaks of the Duma boycott not with malicious joy or derision, but with a gnashing of teeth and the rage of despair. This explains why *Novoye Vremya*, organ of the Black Hundreds, attacks the "absentees" and tries to enlist even Bebel for the struggle against the idea of a boycott (*Proletary*, No. 20*). *The Black Hundreds are afraid of a boycott*, and only the blind or those out to justify the liberals can now deny that the boycott would be fully successful if it were endorsed by the leading figures of the Zemstvo and municipal congresses.

But the gist of the matter is that the liberal bourgeoisie's fundamental interests as a class incline it towards the monarchy, a two-chamber system, law and order, and moderation, towards a struggle against the "horrors" of an "uninterrupted revolution", the "horrors" of a revolution after the French model.... The turn taken by the liberal bourgeoisie, the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents and the Constitutional-Democrats away from radical phrases about a boycott towards a determined war against it, is the *first* major political step by the Russian bourgeoisie as a class, a step which reveals its treacherous nature, its "criminal intent"—to perpetrate

* See p. 321 of this volume.—*Ed.*

treachery against the revolution. This is no mere intent (for which alone no law can hold one accountable, as some smart lawyer among the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry would probably object), but an actual attempt to commit this crime, and even a consummation of the crime. We are living at a very rapid pace now. The times have long gone when it was *necessary* for us to rouse the bourgeoisie to political awareness in general (though such times are quite recent according to ordinary chronology, which is inapplicable to revolution). Gone, even, are the times when it was *necessary* for us to help the bourgeoisie to organise itself into a political opposition. They are now awakened, have organised themselves, and an entirely different task stands on the order of the day, a great task which only the tremendous strides of the revolution have made real and possible—that of reaching an agreement with the tsar (the task of capital) and that of neutralising treacherous capital (the task of labour).

It is this task that the revolutionary proletariat, which is marching at the head of the revolutionary people, has assumed, while remaining true to its duty of awakening, encouraging and rousing its "mates" in the struggle against medievalism and serfdom, and at the same time passing on from less revolutionary to more revolutionary "mates". It is not the Duma that has been "taken in earnest" by the revolutionary proletariat under the guidance of Social-Democracy, but those words, promises and slogans about a Duma boycott which popped out of the mouths of the radical windbags of the bourgeoisie by reason of their levity, extreme youthfulness and exuberance. The proletariat has translated boycott talk into reality; it has done so by openly and unequivocally raising the standard of armed uprising; it has done so by inaugurating not only the broadest possible agitation, but open street fighting as well (in Moscow); it has done so by fraternising with the radical youth, the vanguard of the masses, the peasant masses in particular, whose class characteristics have not yet fully taken shape, but which are infinitely oppressed and exploited. Without entering into any agreements or concluding any pacts, the socialist proletariat has united with the awakened sections of revolutionary bourgeois democracy, for the accomplishment of a practical militant task. During the great Moscow

events (great as a portent, not in themselves), the proletariat and the revolutionary democrats did the fighting, while the liberals, the *Osvobozhdeniye* people and the Constitutional-Democrats conducted negotiations with the autocracy.

The political alignment has become quite clear: for the Duma, to preserve the autocracy; for the Duma, to limit the autocracy; against the Duma, to destroy the autocracy. In other words: for the Duma, to suppress the revolution; for the Duma, to halt the revolution; against the Duma, to bring the revolution to a victorious conclusion.

There was an exception—a sad and regrettable exception—which marred the distinctness of the class alignment (thereby, like all exceptions proving the general rule). This was the opportunist wing of the Social-Democratic movement, as represented by the new *Iskra*. However, this exception too—the narrow sphere of illegal organisations abroad—stemmed from a very important and very instructive logical development, which we predicted. The Conference which we mentioned above united the revolutionary Social-Democrats. *Iskra* remained *united*—not by virtue of an agreement, but by virtue of the course of events—with *Osvobozhdeniye*. In the illegal press, the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the extreme Left wing of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats came out for an active boycott. It was the opportunist Social-Democrats and the extreme Right wing of the bourgeois democrats who declared against the boycott.

Thus we have confirmation of what was shown in the analysis of the most important of the new-*Iskra* resolutions on tactics (see Lenin's *Two Tactics*),* namely, that *Iskra* is descending to the level of the liberal landlords, whereas *Proletary* is raising the masses of the peasants to its own level; *Iskra* is descending to the liberal bourgeoisie, whereas *Proletary* is raising the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie.

Anyone familiar with Social-Democratic literature knows the catch phrase long ago launched by *Iskra*—the Bolsheviks and *Proletary* have veered towards the Socialist-

* See p. 47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Revolutionaries, towards the extreme bourgeois democrats. There is a grain of truth in this, as there is in all catch phrases. It does not express mere chagrin on the part of the Iskrists; it reflects an actual phenomenon, but does so as a concave mirror would reflect an object. This actual phenomenon is the *fact* that the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks represent respectively the opportunist and the revolutionary wings of the Russian Social-Democratic movement. Since the Iskrists turned to opportunism, they were bound to arrive at the conclusion that the Bolsheviks are "Jacobins" (to use a term of eighteenth-century political divisions). These accusations merely *confirm* our view on the Right and Left wings of the present-day Social-Democratic movement. These accusations by the opportunists are *just as flattering* to us as was the accusation hurled at us by *Rabochaya Mysl* in 1900 to the effect that we were following in the footsteps of Narodnaya Volya. The actual way in which political tendencies throughout Russia are grouped politically on a major question of tactics has proved in practice the correctness of our appraisal of *Iskra*'s stand ever since the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

The alignment of illegal parties effected at the Conference of all Social-Democrats thus naturally supplements the alignment of all parties on the Duma question. If the Iskrists have proved a regrettable exception, the fact that they are only an exception gives us new faith in the validity of the rule, in the victory of revolutionary Social-Democracy, in the realisation of the consistent slogans of the Russian revolution. Although the liberals' banality and the vulgarisation of Marxism by some Marxists may at moments of gloom seem an omen that our revolution too will turn out to be a banal, abortive, and incomplete revolution like the German Revolution of 1848, nevertheless the vitality of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy inspires us with a stimulating faith, and the actions of the heroic working class uphold that faith. The revolution draws a splendid line of division between political tendencies, serves as a splendid *reductio ad absurdum* of erroneous opinions. So far the revolution in Russia has been progressing in such a way as to justify the hopes for its complete victory inspired by the present situation at home and abroad. And the

sight of the autocracy's consternation and the liberals' confusion, the sight of the bold revolutionary energy of the proletariat, which is taking the peasantry in tow, lead us to believe that "our train will go as the German never did".[130]

Proletary, No. 23,
October 31 (18), 1905

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the manuscript

THE HYSTERICS OF THE DEFEATED

Our article, "The First Results of the Political Alignment", had already been written when we received No. 112 of *Iskra*, which contains a sort of overwrought, spiteful, tearful and fuming article full of conceits, entitled "The Fruits of Parochialism". What else can you call this article but a fit of hysterics. It is quite impossible to discern even the shadow of *reasoning* in this hysterical shriek. What has parochialism to do with it, dear *Iskra* comrades, when *you yourselves*, *of your own free will*, *attended* the Conference of the various Social-Democratic parties and organisations in Russia? Just give the matter a little thought, if you have not entirely lost the capacity to think; give it at least some thought when your fit of hysterics is over! Surely if you consented to attend the Conference, if your delegate was there, that means that you yourselves regarded this Conference as a serious matter, a Party matter of the utmost importance to the proletariat. You are only discrediting yourselves for good and all in the eyes of intelligent workers when you start fulminating *after* being defeated at a Conference you yourselves acknowledged as serious and necessary by your voluntary participation!

You are displeased with the fact that the Conference, in your opinion, condemned your tactics too sharply, by calling participation in the Duma treason to the cause of liberty? But were you not aware, dear *Iskra* comrades, that you were going to attend a Conference together with the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., and that *Proletary*, organ of this Central Committee, has for ever so long, both in pamphlets and in articles, been showing up your transformation

into toadies of the monarchist liberal party? You were perfectly well aware of that, dear *Iskra* comrades, and if you are now infuriated beyond all reason, we are really unable to help you. After all, it is an inescapable and indisputable fact that of all the illegal parties, organisations, tendencies and press organs of all the peoples of Russia, only you have remained in the company of *Osvobozhdeniye*. It is this *fact* that constitutes the severest indictment against you, an indictment so severe that history has rarely known its equal; yet you imagined that the *words* "treason to the cause of liberty" were the source of this severity!

You have lost your head so much that after your defeat at the Conference you have raised a hullabaloo about the harmfulness of federalism in organisation, such as is cherished by the Bund and other national Social-Democratic groups. How unwise this is of you, dear *Iskra* comrades, for you are thereby only *stressing* the gravity of your defeat. And, indeed, just think, dear *Iskra* comrades, who is it that for two years has been advocating organisational vagueness and amorphousness, the principles of compromise and decentralisation? You yourselves, the new-Iskrists. And it was the federalists of the Bund and of the Lettish and Polish Social-Democratic Labour Parties who at the time played up in the press all your disorganising catchwords against the so-called excesses of centralism, and so on and so forth. And, it is likewise a fact, an inescapable and indisputable fact, that *all* the federalists of the above-mentioned parties wrote and published articles in the spirit of the Minority! Just see, dear *Iskra* comrades, how inappropriately you have brought up the subject of federalism: you have thereby stressed the fact that your erstwhile well-wishers of the Social-Democratic Bund and the Lettish and Polish parties were forced to desert you, being unable to put up with the utter banality of your Duma tactics! No, dear *Iskra* comrades, if you just think matters over, after calming down, you will yourselves see what is obvious to all—it is not the "Majority" that has come over to federalism, but the Bund and the Lettish and Polish Social-Democrats who, influenced by the objective logic of the revolutionary events, have arrived at a standpoint that has always been upheld by the "Majority".

Of course, dear *Iskra* comrades, you have sustained a telling defeat. That, however, is not due to any spiteful machinations on the part of the Majority or the Polish Social-Democrats, etc., but rather to the hopeless muddle that manifested itself already in the resolutions on tactics adopted by the All-Russia Conference of Mensheviks. So long as you stand on the basis of these resolutions, you will inevitably find yourselves the "*sole companion*" of *Osvobozhdeniye*, against all Social-Democrats and even against all revolutionary democrats.

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REVOLUTIONARY RIGA'S ULTIMATUM

The German newspapers, which usually devote much attention to events in the Baltic provinces, have reported the following instructive fact. Things are happening at the Riga Polytechnic, as they are at all other higher educational institutions: student assemblies have turned into political meetings. The students are organising into a combatant force of the revolution. The liberal bigwigs are turning up their noses and muttering under their breath about the weakness of the government. But in Livonia, things have gone so hard with the landed gentry that they have energetically set about organising armed protection for their estates, without relying on the government, which cannot do anything with the peasants, or the workers, or the students. The Baltic barons are organising civil war in earnest: they are hiring whole squads, arming them with good magazine rifles, and posting them about their extensive estates. And now it turns out that part of the members of the German student corporations in the Baltic provinces have joined such squads! Naturally, the Lettish and Russian students have not only proclaimed a boycott against these Black Hundreds in student uniform, but have even appointed a special commission to investigate the participation of students in the landlord Black-Hundred bands. Two members of this commission were sent into the countryside to gather information from the peasants. Both were arrested by the government and sent to prison in Riga.

The Lettish and Russian students then rose. They called a huge meeting which passed a vigorous resolution. The head of the Polytechnic, who had been invited to attend, was called upon to take immediate measures to secure the

release of the arrested. The resolution ended with a direct ultimatum: if within three days the arrested persons were' not released at the time fixed, the students, with the aid of the Riga workers, would use every means in their power to effect that release.

The Governor was away from Riga at the time, for he had gone to St. Petersburg to obtain the powers of Governor General. The acting Governor funked, and diplomatically wriggled out of the situation. He summoned (so the *Vossische Zeitung* of October 20, N. S., reports) the head of the Polytechnic and the two arrested students, and asked the latter whether they were aware that their actions were unlawful. They, of course, replied that they saw nothing unlawful in them. The acting Governor, a Riga newspaper is said to have stated, then urged them to refrain from such unlawful acts, and—set both free.

"In the eyes of the students," the correspondent, who feels for the Baltic barons, gloomily adds, "and in the eyes of the masses who stand behind them, the government has bowed to the ultimatum. And even a non-partisan must have gained the same impression."

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THE PLANS OF A BUFFOON-MINISTER

To gain a better understanding of today's politics, it is sometimes worth while to look back at yesterday's. Here is what the usually well-informed correspondent of the London *Times* cabled from St. Petersburg on October 10 (23):

> "From a high source I learn that the government has resolved to grant the four liberties demanded by the reformers subject however, to restrictions. It is hoped that this concession will rally the Moderates. Count Witte yesterday had a long conference on the subject with the tsar. Mr. Goremykin is drafting a measure for endowing peasants with state lands. This will be placed on the table when the Duma meets. It is thereby hoped to conciliate the peasant vote.
>
> "Such briefly is the government's plan of campaign. It apparently excludes the intention of voluntarily granting a constitution before the meeting of the Duma, although some hope of this prevails among the Constitutional-Democrats. One of the principal points to be discussed at their Congress on Wednesday will be with regard to the action of the party in the event of a constitution's being granted on or before the assembling of the Duma—namely, whether the party shall consent in that case to work in the Duma or insist upon the convocation of a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage.
>
> "The supporters of the bureaucracy hope that the concessions which will be granted by the government will at last check the constitutional movement without an extension of the suffrage or an endorsement of the legislative character of the Duma, but all the indications are the other way."

Indeed, the government's "plan of campaign" is clear. Equally clear to all people who have eyes to see is the "campaign" of the Constitutional-Democratic gentry, who are *bargaining* with the government. There is only one snag: the working class is stirring, and stirring in such a way that all the ingenious plans of both Mr. Witte and the Constitutional-Democrats are crumbling to dust.

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THE AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA

It is under this headline that the Berlin liberal *Vossische Zeitung* has published the following interesting dispatch:

"It is with irresistible force that events are developing in the empire of the tsars. To every impartial observer it must be obvious that neither the government nor any of the opposition or revolutionary parties is in control of the situation. The late Prince Trubetskoi and other professors of the higher educational institutions made vain attempts to dissuade the Russian students from the dangerous path, which they had taken when they decided to convert the universities into places of political mass meetings. The students paid enthusiastic homage to the memory of Trubetskoi, marched in masses in the funeral procession, and turned the obsequies into an imposing political demonstration, but they did not follow his advice to keep outsiders out of the University. At the University of St. Petersburg, the Mining Academy and the Polytechnic mammoth meetings are being held, at which the students are often in the minority and which last from early morning till late at night. Impassioned and fiery orations are delivered and revolutionary songs are sung. Moreover, the liberals are roundly berated at these meetings, especially for their half-heartedness, which, it is claimed, is no accidental attribute of Russian liberalism, but a quality that has been conditioned by eternal historical laws.

"There is something profoundly tragic in these reproaches, which, despite the historical references adduced to substantiate them, are in fact absolutely unhistorical, if only because the liberals in Russia have never had the slightest opportunity of displaying any half-heartedness that could in any way prejudice the cause of emancipation which is so important for all parties. It is not their deeds, but rather their sufferings that handicap the liberals in their life course. The government is just as *helpless* [italics in the original] in the face of these events as it is in the face of the labour troubles and the general unrest. It is possible, of course, that it is planning a new blood-bath, and is only waiting for the moment when the movement becomes ripe for a Cossack attack. But even if that should be the case, none of the powers that be is certain that it will not lead to a still more violent outbreak of disaffection. Not even General Trepov has faith in his own cause. He does not conceal from his friends that he considers

himself a doomed man, and that he expects no favourable results whatever from his administration. 'I am merely fulfilling my duty, and shall fulfil it to the end,' he says.

"The tsar's throne must be in a sad way indeed if the head of the police arrives at such conclusions. And indeed it cannot but be recognised that despite all of Trepov's efforts, despite the feverish activity of endless commissions and conferences, the tension has not only failed to relax since last year, but has even become much more accentuated. Wherever one looks, the position everywhere has become worse and more threatening, everywhere the situation has become noticeably aggravated."

There is a great deal of truth in this appraisal, but at the same time a great deal of liberal stupidity. "The liberals could not display a half-heartedness prejudicial to the cause." Is that so? Why is it then that these poor liberals *could* nevertheless come forward more openly and freely than the other parties? No! The students are guided by a sound revolutionary instinct, enhanced by their contact with the proletariat, when they zealously disassociate themselves from the Constitutional-Democrats, and discredit these Constitutional-Democrats in the eyes of the people. The morrow will bring us great and epoch-making battles for liberty. It is possible that the champions of liberty will yet suffer more than one defeat. But defeats will only serve to stir up the workers and peasants ever more profoundly, will only render the crisis more acute, and will only make more formidable the inevitable ultimate victory of the cause of liberty. For our part, we shall bend every effort to prevent the bourgeois leeches of monarchist landlord liberalism from attaching themselves to this victory, and to prevent the gentlemen of the big bourgeoisie from deriving the main benefit from this victory, as has happened more than once in Europe. We shall bend all our efforts to bring this victory of the workers and peasants to its consummation, to bring about the utter destruction of all the loathsome institutions of autocracy, monarchy, bureaucracy, militarism and serf-ownership. Only such a victory will put a real weapon into the hands of the proletariat—and then we shall set Europe ablaze, so as to make of the Russian democratic revolution the prologue to a European socialist revolution.

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NOTES ON "THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS"[131]

1

This is how the matter stood: the Taff Vale Railway sued the railway workers' union for losses caused by the strike. Despite bitter resistance by the workers, the bourgeois judges awarded damages to the capitalists! Court injunctions instructing trade unions to compensate the capitalists for losses caused by a strike means in fact destroying the right to strike. Judges who play the lackey to the bourgeoisie know well how to nullify even constitutionally guaranteed liberties, when it comes to the struggle between labour and capital.

2

Unfortunately, the British working-class movement promises to serve for a long time to come as a sad example of how the labour movement's divorcement from socialism leads of necessity to its becoming shallow and bourgeois in character.

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AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES[132]

1) The result to date (Monday, October 30 [17]) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in *Proletary* No. 23.

2) Tsarism is *no longer* strong enough, the revolution *not yet* strong enough, to win.

3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. *The troops are wavering*.

4) The tsar's Court is wavering (*The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*) between dictatorship and a constitution.

The Court is wavering and *biding its time*. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, *for power is in its hands*.

The revolution has reached a stage at which it is *disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack*, *to assume the offensive*.

For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, *this is not enough*. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop halfway, then the *bourgeoisie will fool the workers*.

5) Rumour has it that a *constitution* has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to *grant* a constitution *without* a constituent assembly, *before* a constituent assembly, *apart* from a constituent assembly.

What kind of constitution? At best (for the tsar) = a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.

This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats' ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for *all the same there will be no* complete and actual freedom of elections.

Should not the revolution skip this *granted* constitution?

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FROM MARX TO MAO

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SWEETHEART

To acclamation from *Osvobozhdeniye*, Comrade Starover continues to repent in the new *Iskra* for the sins he committed (unwisely) by participating in the old *Iskra*. Comrade Starover very much resembles the heroine of a story by Chekhov entitled "Sweetheart". At first Sweetheart lived with an impresario and used to say: "Vanichka and I are staging serious plays." Later she lived with a timber merchant and would say: "Vasichka and I are indignant at the high duties on timber." Finally, she lived with a veterinary surgeon and used to say: "Kolechka and I doctor horses."—It is the same with Comrade Starover. "Lenin and I" abused Martynov. "Martynov and I" are abusing Lenin. Charming Social-Democratic Sweetheart! In whose embrace will you find yourself tomorrow?

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ON P. B. AXELROD'S PAMPHLET *THE PEOPLE'S DUMA AND A WORKERS' CONGRESS*

ANALYSIS OF THE PAMPHLET[133]

In connection with P. B. Axelrod's little pamphlet entitled *The People's Duma and a Workers' Congress*, the following should be noted:

This is the prototype of *all* of *Iskra*'s follies—both of a parallel parliament and a deal with the Constitutionalists-Democrats.

By and large, it is all *playing at parliamentarianism*—in the People's Duma, and in arranging a deal with the Constitutionalists-Democrats—in the parliamentary interpretation of a "Workers' Congress" with illustrations "from Lassalle" (who was working *in conditions of a constitution* ten years *after* it had been won by a revolution).

We have no end of ineptitudes here: "the first and primary foundation" (page 13) "of serious negotiations and agreements between our party and liberal organisations"... of *action*. What kind?

Comrade P. B. Axelrod is three years late! Can this be considered an agreement with *a political party*? It amounts to services rendered, technical in the first place, which were sufficient three years ago.

1) Material means ...
2) premises ...
3) *arms* ["delivery"]
4) influence on public institutions,
5) utilisation of connections in the bureaucracy and the military, in the interests of open political action.

"School-level pedagogy": even if the convoking of a *People's Duma* and *a Workers' Congress* is a failure

(page 12), "*the agitation and organisational work done will not have been lost*".

Compare with an insurrection—can organisational work in one "*have been lost*"? No. And agitation work? No, since an insurrection is in progress, is a fact. As for the *P e o p l e ' s D u m a*—that is a comedy, a phantom, a hollow phrase.

A saccharine approach to the workers.

Page 7: "of a constituent *popular* assembly, i.e., a really 'People's Duma'."

{Not "*i.e.*" and not "really"}

(page 7) "'The duties' of the People's Duma

I° 1) "to present to the State Duma the demand that a constituent assembly be convened, and that it declare [?—and?] itself non-competent, without the right to function."

2) ~"~

!! ha-ha! and what about the "right" to convene a constituent assembly?

II° 3) "to serve as the centre and spokesman of the will of all democratic (page 7) sections of the population, and organiser of defensive and offensive action by these sections against the government and its allies."

Compare this nonsense with a provisional revolutionary government as the organ of insurrection.

A spate of meaningless words, and the reality of revolution.

The difficulty of an uprising = the difficulty of climbing Mt. Blanc.

The difficulty of a "People's Duma" under the autocracy = "the difficulty" of flying through the air on to the top of Mt. Blanc.

Note should be taken of confirmation of our Central Committee's opinion, as expressed in its leaflet, that *Iskra*'s plan is a piece of invention coming from abroad. Axelrod wants to *bring round to his point of view* his correspondent, who (a) (page 6) doubts whether the slogans of the People's Duma and a Workers' Congress will win over the mass of the people; (b) (page 14) has motivated the policy of an "active boycott" (page 15 and page 14 *in fine*).

Axelrod considers the policy of an active boycott
"reactionary and utopian".

— reaction?—a conference of Social-Democrats+*Osvobozhdeniye* have settled this question. A coalition with the Black Hundreds?—fear of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* and *Novoye Vremya*.

— utopia? Two "utopias": *insurrection* and *playing at parliamentarianism*.

Which of these is *being effected* is shown by the general strike and street fighting all over Russia.

The utter jumble of ideas about a "deal", an "agreement" (page 7) "*with the central organisations of liberal democracy*".

Complete inability to single out *revolutionary* democracy and indicate *concrete* slogans on a political agreement with the latter. Axelrod's slogans are all of an *Osvobozhdeniye* nature.

Regarding a "workers' congress".

The Third Congress: utilisation of open action so as to create *points d'appui* for the *Party*.[134]

(Clear and precise.)

With P. B. Axelrod one cannot make out anything.

An All-Russia workers' congress *sans phrase* (page 3)—or a "*phrase*"?

Quid est?

It would be best to have *two congresses*

1) a "General Congress" (page 4)

2) a "Social-Democratic congress" ("of members of a General Congress

?|| who share our programme, plus representatives of our Party organisations, for a reform of the whole Party". Page 4)

|The ridiculousness of a comparison with the Lassalle affair 1) there was already a *constitution* then. 2) Then Lassalle was *openly* appealed to, and his appeal was an open one. 3) Then the formation of the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter-Verein* was a pretext for abuse of "workers' independent activity" against the Social-Democratic Workers' Party.|

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TASKS OF REVOLUTIONARY ARMY CONTINGENTS

1. Independent military action.
2. Leadership of the mass.

The contingents may be of any strength, beginning with two or three people.

They must arm themselves as best they can (rifles, revolvers, bombs, knives, knuckle-dusters, sticks, rags soaked in kerosine for starting fires, ropes or rope ladders, shovels for building barricades, pyroxylin cartridges, barbed wire, nails [against cavalry], etc., etc.). Under no circumstances should they wait for help from other sources, from above from the outside; they must procure everything themselves.

As far as possible, the contingents should consist of people who either live near each other, or who meet frequently and regularly at definite hours (preferably people of both categories, for regular meetings may be interrupted by the uprising). They must arrange matters so as to be able to get together at the most critical moments, when things may take the most unexpected turns. Therefore, each group must work out beforehand ways and means of joint action; signs in windows, etc., so as to find each other easily; previously agreed upon calls or whistles so that the comrades recognise one another in a crowd; previously arranged signals in the event of meetings at night, etc., etc. Any energetic person, with the aid of two or three comrades, could work out a whole series of such rules and methods, which should be drawn up, learned and practised beforehand. It must not be forgotten that the chances are 100 to 1 that events will take us unawares, and that it will be necessary to come together under terribly difficult conditions.

Even without arms, the groups can play a most important part: 1) by leading the mass; 2) by attacking, whenever a favourable opportunity presents itself, policemen, stray Cossacks (as was the case in Moscow), etc., and seizing their arms; 3) by rescuing the arrested or injured, when there are only few police about; 4) by getting on to the roofs or upper storeys of houses, etc., and showering stones or pouring boiling water on the troops, etc. Given sufficient push, an organised and well-knit combat group constitutes a tremendous force. Under no circumstances should the formation of the group be abandoned or postponed on the plea of lack of arms.

As far as possible members of combat groups should have their duties assigned in advance, leaders or chiefs of groups being sometimes selected in this way. It would be unwise, of course, to play at conferring ranks, but the enormous importance of uniform leadership and rapid and determined action should not be forgotten. Determination and push are three-quarters of success.

As soon as the groups are formed—i.e., right now—they must get down to comprehensive work—not only theoretical, but most certainly practical work as well. By theoretical work we mean a study of military science, an acquaintance with military problems, the arrangement of lecture meetings on military questions, talks by military men (officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., etc., including also workers who have served in the army); the reading, discussion and assimilation of illegal pamphlets and newspaper articles on street fighting, etc., etc.

Practical work, we repeat, should be started at once. This falls into preparatory work and military operations. The preparatory work includes procuring all kinds of arms and ammunition, securing premises favourably located for street fighting (convenient for fighting from above, for storing bombs and stones, etc., or acids to be poured on the police, etc., etc.; also suitable for headquarters, for collecting information, for sheltering fugitives from the police, for use as hospitals, etc., etc.). Further, preliminary activity includes the immediate work of reconnaissance and gathering information—obtaining plans of prisons, police stations, ministries, etc., ascertaining the routine in govern-

ment offices, banks, etc., and learning how they are guarded, endeavouring to establish contacts which could be of use (with employees in police departments, banks, courts, prisons, post- and telegraph-offices, etc.), ascertaining the whereabouts of arsenals, of all the gunsmiths' shops in the city, etc. There is a great deal of this sort of work to be done, and—what is more—it is work in which even those who are quite incapable of engaging in street fighting, even the very weak, women, youngsters, old people, and so on, can be of immense service. Efforts should be made immediately to get into combat groups absolutely all those who *want*. to take part in the uprising, for there is *no* such person, nor can there be one, who, provided he desires to work, cannot be of immense value, even if he is unarmed and is personally incapable of fighting.

Further, revolutionary army groups should under no circumstances confine themselves to preparatory work alone, but should begin military action as soon as possible so as to 1) train their fighting forces; 2) reconnoitre the enemy's vulnerable spots; 3) inflict partial defeats on the enemy; 4) rescue prisoners (the arrested); 5) procure arms; 6) obtain funds for the uprising (confiscation of government funds), and so on and so forth. The groups can and should immediately take advantage of every opportunity for active work, and must by no means put matters off until a general uprising, because fitness for the uprising cannot be acquired except by training *under fire*.

All extremes, of course, are bad. All that is good and useful, if carried to extremes, may become—and beyond a certain limit is bound to become—bad and injurious. Disorderly, unorganised and petty terrorist acts may, if carried to extremes, only scatter and squander our forces. That is a fact, which, of course, should not be forgotten. On the other hand, under no circumstances should it be forgotten that a slogan calling for an uprising *has already been issued*, that the uprising has already *begun*. To launch attacks under favourable circumstances is not only every revolutionary's right, but his plain duty. The killing of spies, policemen, gendarmes, the blowing up of police stations, the liberation of prisoners, the seizure of government funds for the needs of the uprising—such operations are already being carried

out wherever insurrection is rife, in Poland and in the Caucasus, and every detachment of the revolutionary army must be ready to start such operations at a moment's notice. Each group should remember that if it allows a favourable opportunity for such an operation to-slip by today, it will be guilty of *unpardonable inactivity*, of passivity—and such an offence is the greatest crime a revolutionary can commit at a time of insurrection, the greatest disgrace that can befall anyone who is striving for liberty in deed, and not in word alone.

As for the composition of these combat groups, the following may be said. Experience will show how many members are desirable in each group, and how their duties should be distributed. Each group must itself begin to acquire this experience, without waiting for instructions from outside. The local revolutionary organisation should, of course, be asked to send a revolutionary with military experience to deliver lectures, conduct discussions and give advice, but if such a person is not available it is absolutely incumbent upon the group to do this work itself.

As regards Party divisions, it is natural that members of the same Party will prefer to belong to the same group. But there should be no hard and fast rule debarring members of other parties from joining. It is precisely here that we must put into practice the alliance, the working agreement (without any merging of parties, of course), between the socialist proletariat and revolutionary democracy. Whoever wants to fight for liberty and proves in fact his readiness to do so may be regarded as a revolutionary democrat, and we must strive to carry on with such people the work of preparing for the uprising (provided, of course, the given person or group is quite trustworthy). All other "democrats" should be emphatically rejected as quasi-democrats, as liberal windbags who must not be relied on at all, and whom it would be criminal for a revolutionary to trust.

It is, of course, desirable for combat groups to unite their activities. It would be extremely useful to work out the forms and terms of joint action. Under no circumstances, however, should this be carried to the extreme of inventing complex plans and general schemes, or of postponing practical work for the sake of pedantic concoctions, etc. The

uprising will inevitably take place under circumstances in which the unorganised elements will outnumber the organised thousands of times over; there will inevitably be cases when it will be necessary to take immediate action, right then and there, in twos or even singly—and one must be prepared to act on one's own initiative, and at one's own risk. All delays, disputes, procrastination and indecision spell ruin to the cause of the uprising. Supreme determination, maximum energy, immediate utilisation of each suitable moment, immediate stimulation of the revolutionary ardour of the mass and the direction of this ardour to more vigorous and the most determined action—such is the prime duty of a revolutionary.

The fight against the Black Hundreds is an excellent type of military action, which will *train* the soldiers of the revolutionary army, give them their baptism of fire, and at the same time be of tremendous benefit to the revolution. Revolutionary army groups must at once find out who organises the Black Hundreds and where and how they are organised, and then, without confining themselves to propaganda (which is useful, but inadequate) they must act with armed force, beat up and kill the members of the Black-Hundred gangs, blow up their headquarters, etc., etc.

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WHAT THE LIBERALS EXPECT OF THE DUMA

The liberals are trying to make the public optimistic regarding the composition of the Duma. Here is what the *Frankfurter Zeitung* correspondent wrote from St. Petersburg on October 14 (New Style): "Consideration of the results of the pre-election meetings now taking place leads one to the conclusion that the composition of the Duma will not be as bad as it seemed before. It may now be foretold with a certain degree of probability that conservative elements proper will hardly make up one half of the Duma. The *moderate liberals* and the *liberals* have the best chances of being elected, whereas the radicals' prospects are far less favourable, though they may be called relatively good from the viewpoint of the pessimism with which the radicals regarded the future as recently as in August. There can hardly be any doubt that the radicals' representation in the Duma will not be too weak. The only question is in what degree they will be able to make the liberals and the moderate liberals follow in their wake, since only if these three elements present a solid front to the conservative core will a constituent assembly be ensured."

By radicals the correspondent undoubtedly means the Constitutional-Democrats. Their candidates in St. Petersburg are Nabokov, Kedrin, and Vinaver. The "moderate liberals" are not defined with any precision, but among their candidates mention has been made of Fyodorov (a conservative "proper", but "one who might be supported by the liberals as well"!), and Nikitin (a candidate of the Right, but at the same time also a moderate-liberal candidate).

So a constituent assembly is "ensured", with the liberals and moderate liberals subordinated to the leadership of the "radical" *Osvobozhdeniye* League members.... Indeed, here we have the liberal optimists "clutching at straws". What is most curious is their failure to see that even should a Duma majority vote for a constituent assembly, it will not be the latter that will be "ensured" in actual fact, but only a determined revolutionary struggle for one. The Constitutional-Democrats would like to have two irons in the fire—to have dealings with the autocracy (legal opposition in a legal Duma), and with the revolution ("we have done our bit" for a constituent assembly).

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THE FIRST VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

Geneva, November 1 (October 19)

Late Monday night the telegraph brought Europe the news of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17. The *Times* correspondent wired: "The people have won the day. The Emperor has surrendered. The autocracy has ceased to exist." Friends of the Russian revolution living in distant Baltimore (U.S.A.) expressed themselves differently in a cable they sent to *Proletary*: "Congratulations on the first great victory of the Russian revolution."

The latter appraisal of the events is undoubtedly far more accurate. We have every reason to be jubilant. The concession made by the tsar is indeed a great victory for the revolution, but this victory is still a long way from deciding the fate of the entire cause of liberty. The tsar is far from having surrendered. The autocracy has by no means ceased to exist. It has merely retreated, leaving the field of battle to the enemy; it has retreated after an exceedingly heavy battle, but it has not yet been defeated by a long way. It is mustering its forces, and the revolutionary people have still to solve many important military problems before they will be able to carry the revolution to real and final victory.

October 17 will go down in history as one of the great days of the Russian revolution. On this day the nation-wide strike, the like of which the world had never before seen, reached its climax. The mighty arm of the proletariat, which was raised in an outburst of heroic solidarity all over Russia, brought the entire industrial, commercial and

administrative life of the country to a standstill. It was the lull before the storm. Reports, one more alarming than the other, began pouring in from various big cities. The troops were wavering. The government refrained from taking repressive measures, the revolutionaries had not yet launched any serious open attacks, but insurrection was erupting on all sides.

At the eleventh hour the tsarist government decided to yield, realising that an explosion was inevitable, that already under no circumstances was it at all capable of gaining a full victory, but was very likely to suffer complete defeat. Trepov is reported as having said, "First there will be bloodshed, and then a constitution." The inevitability of a constitution could no longer be doubted, even if the uprising were suppressed, so the government decided that it was better to avoid the risk of serious and general bloodshed, for tsarist rule would be swept away altogether in the event of the victory of the people.

We know only an infinitesimal portion of that information possessed by the government on Monday, October 17, which compelled it to evade a desperate battle and yield. The local and central authorities strained every effort to hold up or curtail messages about the alarming progress of the uprising, but even the scanty, random and curtailed reports that found their way into the European press leave no doubt that this was a genuine uprising, capable of inspiring mortal fear in the tsar and his ministers.

The forces of tsarism and of the revolution are equally balanced, we wrote a week ago, on the basis of the first news of the country-wide political strike. Tsarism was no longer strong enough to crush the revolution; the revolution was not yet strong enough to crush tsarism. But with such an equilibrium of forces, all delay was fraught with the greatest danger to tsarism, for delay was bound to cause the troops to waver.

The uprising was spreading. Blood was already being spilt all over Russia. The people were fighting at the barricades, from Revel to Odessa, from Poland to Siberia. In isolated and small encounters the troops were victorious, but at the same time tidings of a new and unprecedented phenomenon began to come in, a phenomenon plainly testifying

to the *military* impotence of the autocracy. This was the news of the *negotiations* between the tsarist troops and the insurgent people (Kharkov), the news of the *withdrawal* of troops from cities (Kharkov, Revel) as the *only* way to restore tranquillity. Negotiations with the insurgent people, the withdrawal of troops—that is the beginning of the end. Better than any arguments it proves that the military authorities were aware of the extreme precariousness of their position. It shows that disaffection among the troops has spread to a truly formidable extent. Scattered news items and rumours seeped through to the foreign press. In Kiev soldiers who had refused to fire were arrested. Similar cases occurred in Poland. In Odessa the infantry were confined to their barracks, the authorities fearing to bring the men out into the streets. In St. Petersburg unrest was beginning to manifest itself in the navy, and it was reported that the guards regiments were totally unreliable. As for the Black Sea Fleet, it has been impossible to this very day to ascertain the whole truth. On October 17, telegrams were already reporting that rumours of a new mutiny in this fleet were very persistent, that all telegrams were being intercepted by the authorities, who resorted to every means in an attempt to prevent reports of the events from spreading.

If we bring together all these fragmentary reports we cannot but arrive at the conclusion that even from a purely military standpoint the autocracy's position was desperate. It was still suppressing isolated outbreaks, its troops were still taking barricades here and there, but these isolated encounters merely served to inflame passions, merely increased indignation, merely accelerated a mightier general outbreak, which the government particularly dreaded, since it could no longer rely on the army.

The enemy declined a pitched battle. He retreated, abandoning the battlefield to the revolutionary people—retreated to new positions, which he considers better fortified, and where he hopes to rally more reliable forces, weld them together and infuse a new spirit into them, and choose a better moment for an offensive.

This appraisal of the great day of October 17 is confirmed by a number of relatively "unbiased" reports in the European bourgeois press.

On the one hand, the European bourgeoisie is sighing with relief. The tsar's Manifesto promises a regular constitution; the Duma is invested with legislative powers; no law can come into force prior to approval by the people's representatives, ministerial responsibility has been granted; civil liberties have been granted—inviolability of the person, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and association. The stock exchange is hastening to express fuller confidence in Russia's finances. Russian securities, which have been falling for the last few days, are now going up. The foreign bankers who fled from revolutionary St. Petersburg are promising to return within a fortnight. In the constitution the European bourgeoisie sees a pledge of "peaceful" minor concessions, which will wholly satisfy the propertied classes without at the same time allowing the revolutionary proletariat to acquire "too much" freedom.

On the other hand, even the liberal bourgeois cannot but see that the tsar's Manifesto contains only hollow words, mere promises. Who nowadays will believe promises alone? Are not all these phrases about inviolability of the person and freedom of speech sheer mockery when the prisons are still packed with so-called political offenders, and the censorship is still operating? What kind of people will carry out the tsar's promise? The Witte government, which is rumoured to include Kuzmin-Karavayev, Kosich, Koni? This government will not even be one of the liberal bourgeoisie. It will only be a government of the liberal *bureaucracy*, which has so often been defeated by the reactionary Court clique. Can it be that the people have spilt their blood in the struggle for liberty only to have to rely on the liberal bureaucrats, who confine themselves to mere words and promises?!

No, tsarism is still far from having surrendered. The autocracy has by no means fallen as yet. Many great battles will still have to be fought by the revolutionary proletariat, and the first victory will help it to rally its forces and enlist new allies in the struggle.

"The very success of the cause of freedom," The *Times* correspondent wrote the day the Manifesto was proclaimed, "will only stimulate the reactionary elements to greater activity, and so long as the army remains under its present

chiefs Russia cannot be safe from the possibility of a *pronunciamento*." "It is ... doubtful whether the forced surrender of the government in the very midst of a revolutionary upheaval can be regarded otherwise than as a signal for further strife." "It is not known whether the bureaucracy has been ousted from its citadel or whether it has merely retreated from its advance positions," say the bourgeois optimists, although the facts show clearly that the "citadel" of the autocracy is still quite intact.

The enforced nature of the concession is what most of all disturbs the moderate bourgeois. *Le Temps*, organ of the ruling money-bags of France, waxed highly indignant over "anarchy", and showered abuse and slander on the organisers of the all-Russia political strike and its participants. Though satisfied by the tsar's constitutional promises as such, this newspaper now remarks with concern: "Instead of acting on his own initiative, the tsar contended himself with signing the 'instructions' of the liberal opposition. This is a poor method, lending the subsequent reforms an enforced nature, the nature of something fragmentary and sudden. This method places the government at odds with itself and sets a premium on violence. Unfortunately, it is only too clear that matters had reached a point where there was no other way out of the impasse into which the government had been led. Let us pass a wet sponge over the nature of this capitulation—capitulation not only to the constitutionalists, moderate souls, who should have been heeded sooner, but capitulation to a strike and revolution."

No, gentlemen of the bourgeoisie, the workers will never forget the enforced nature of the tsar's capitulation! The workers will never forget that it was only by force, by the force of their organisation, their unanimity and their mass heroism, that they wrested from tsarism a recognition of liberty in a paper manifesto; and only in this way will they win real liberty for themselves.

We stated above that the enemy retreated, abandoning the battlefield to the revolutionary proletariat. We must add now: the retreating enemy is being hard pressed. On Monday, October 17, the tear's Manifesto was issued. On Tuesday, October 18, according to a Wolff Press Agency report, a Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour

Party was issued in St. Petersburg in a huge number of copies. It declares that the struggle of the proletariat will by no means cease as a result of the tsar's Manifesto. It must be the proletariat's tactics to take advantage of rights granted under the force of its blows, to arrange workers' meetings to decide the question of the continuation of the strike, to organise a militia to protect revolutionary rights, and to put forward the demand for a full amnesty. At mass meetings Social-Democratic speakers are urging the convocation of a constituent assembly. According to telegrams, the Strike Committee[135] is demanding an amnesty and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal and direct suffrage.

Their revolutionary instinct at once prompted the St. Petersburg workers to adopt the right slogan—energetic continuation of the struggle, and utilisation of the newly-won positions for a continued onslaught and the actual destruction of the autocracy. The struggle continues. Meetings are being held ever more frequently and are being attended by larger number of people. The joy and the legitimate pride evoked by the first victory are not hampering the new organisation of forces for the purpose of carrying the revolution to completion. Its success depends on still broader sections of the people being won over to the side of liberty, on their enlightenment and organisation. The working class has shown its titanic might in the all-Russia political strike, but there is still much to be done among the backward sections of the urban proletariat. While establishing a workers' militia—the only bulwark of the revolution—while preparing ourselves for new and even more determined struggles, while upholding our old slogans, we must also pay special attention to the army. The tsar's enforced concession was bound to give rise to the greatest wavering in its ranks, and now we must attract the soldiers to workers' meetings, intensify our agitation in the barracks, extend our liaisons with officers, creating, alongside of the revolutionary army of workers, cadres of class-conscious revolutionaries among the troops as well, troops which only yesterday were most loyal to the tsar and are now on the verge of becoming a people's army.

The revolutionary proletariat has succeeded in neutralising

the army, after paralysing it in the great days of the general strike. It must now work to bring the army completely over to the side of the people.

The revolutionary proletariat has brought about the first great victory of the urban revolution. It must now broaden and deepen the foundations of the revolution by extending it to the countryside. To raise the peasantry to the level of conscious defence of the cause of liberty, to demand that serious measures be taken in the interests of the peasantry, and to prepare in the countryside a movement which, in conjunction with the advanced urban proletariat, will deal the final blow at the autocracy and win complete and genuine liberty—such is Russian Social-Democracy's next task.

The success of the revolution depends on the size of the proletarian and peasant masses that will rise in its defence and for its consummation. Revolutionary war differs from other wars in that it draws its main reserves from the camp of its enemy's erstwhile allies, erstwhile supporters of tsarism, or people who blindly obeyed tsarism. The success of the all-Russia political strike will have a greater influence over the minds and hearts of the peasants than the confusing words of any possible manifestoes or laws.

When the Russian revolution was just getting under way, the liberal bourgeoisie occupied the whole political foreground; such was the situation a year ago.

The revolution asserted itself when the urban working class appeared on the scene on January 9.

The revolution won its first victory when the proletariat of all the nations of Russia rose as one man and made the tsar's throne tremble, the throne that had caused such incalculable distress to all the nations, and most of all to the toiling classes of all the nations.

The revolution will deal the enemy the final blow and sweep the throne of the blood-thirsty tsar from the face of the earth, when the workers rise once more, with the peasantry following their lead.

And further, the Russian revolution has another reserve. Gone are the times when nations and states could live isolated from one another. Look—Europe is already stirring. Its bourgeoisie is disconcerted and prepared to give millions

and billions to stop the conflagration in Russia. The rulers of the militarist European powers are contemplating military assistance for the tsar. Kaiser Wilhelm has already dispatched several cruisers and destroyers to establish direct links between the German militarists and Peterhof. European counter-revolution is holding out a hand to Russian counter-revolution.

Just you try, citizen Hohenzollern! We too have a European reserve of the Russian revolution. This reserve is the international socialist proletariat, the international revolutionary Social-Democratic movement. The workers of the whole world are hailing the victory of the Russian workers with enthusiasm and, conscious of the close links between the various contingents of the international army of socialism, are themselves preparing for the great and decisive struggle.

You are not alone, workers and peasants of all Russia! If you succeed in overthrowing, crushing and destroying the tyrants of feudal, police-ridden, landlord and tsarist Russia, your victory will serve as a signal for a world struggle against the tyranny of capital, a struggle for the complete, economic as well as political emancipation of the toilers, a struggle for the deliverance of humanity from destitution, and for the realisation of socialism.

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THE LATEST NEWS

Geneva, November 4 (October 22)

Nicholas the Bloodstained's "Constitutional" Manifesto has been followed by countless new killings organised by Trepov and his thugs. The ferocity of the Cossacks, the anti-Jewish pogroms, the shooting down in the streets of freshly "amnestied" political offenders, the pillage conducted by the Black Hundreds with the aid of the police—everything has been brought into play so as to crush the revolutionary struggle.

The tsar has given the revolutionaries excellent help by confirming their appraisal of his false concession, their appraisal of the vile comedy of a "liberal" manifesto. The tsar is out to provoke a new and determined struggle. So much the better! All of Social-Democracy's activities, the entire energy of the proletariat will now be directed towards preparing for the next onslaught and destroying the monster of tsarism, which, in its death throes, is trying for the last time to arouse evil instincts in the ignorant mob. The greater Trepov's display of zeal, the more certain is the complete downfall of the entire Trepov set-up and of all the Romanovs.

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NIKOLAI ERNESTOVICH BAUMAN

Today? November 3 (New Style), the news arrived by telegraph that N. E. Bauman, veterinary surgeon and member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has been murdered in Moscow by the tsar's soldiers. A demonstration was held at his graveside, at which the widow of the deceased, also a member of our Party, delivered a speech calling on the people to rise in arms. We are unable as yet to give a detailed biography of our fallen comrade. For the time being, we shall merely enumerate the main events in his life. He started work in the Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg in the nineties. He was arrested, spent twenty-two months in the Peter and Paul Fortress, and was then exiled to Vyatka Gubernia. He escaped from his place of exile, went abroad, and in 1900 participated in the organisation of *Iskra*. From its very inception he was one of the principal practical leaders of this enterprise, making frequent secret visits to Russia. He was arrested in February 1902 in Voronezh (betrayed by a doctor) in connection with the organisation of *Iskra*, and was imprisoned in Kiev. In August 1902, he escaped together with ten other Social-Democratic comrades. He was a delegate of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Congress of the Party (under the assumed name of Sorokin). He took part in the Second Congress of the League[136] (under the assumed name of Sarafsky). Following this he became a member of the Moscow Committee of the Party. He was arrested on June 19, 1904, and was held at Taganka Prison. He must have been released from prison only a few days ago.

May the memory of this fighter in the ranks of the Russian Social-Democratic proletariat never die! May the memory

of this revolutionary, who has fallen in the first days of the victorious revolution, live for ever! May the honours paid to his remains by the people who have risen in revolt be a pledge of the complete victory of the uprising and the complete destruction of accursed tsarism!

The murder of N. E. Bauman clearly shows how correct the Social-Democratic speakers in St. Petersburg were when they described the Manifesto of October 17 as a trap, and the conduct of the government after publication of the Manifesto as provocative. What are all these promised liberties worth, so long as power and armed force remain in the hands of the government? Is not this "amnesty" actually a trap, when those who are released from prison are shot down in the streets by Cossacks?

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PETTY-BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIAN SOCIALISM[137]

Of the various socialist doctrines, Marxism is now predominant in Europe, the struggle for the achievement of a socialist order being almost entirely waged as a struggle of the working class under the guidance of the Social-Democratic parties. This complete predominance of proletarian socialism grounded in the teachings of Marxism was not achieved all at once, but only after a long struggle against all sorts of outworn doctrines, petty-bourgeois socialism, anarchism, and so on. Some thirty years ago, Marxism was not predominant even in Germany, where the prevailing views of the time were in fact transitional, mixed and eclectic, lying between petty-bourgeois and proletarian socialism. The most widespread doctrines among advanced workers in the Romance countries, in France, Spain and Belgium, were Proudhonism, Blanquism and anarchism, which obviously expressed the viewpoint of the petty bourgeois, not of the proletarian.

What has been the cause of this rapid and complete victory of Marxism during the last decades? The correctness of the Marxist views has been confirmed to an ever greater extent by all the development of contemporary societies, both politically and economically, and by the whole experience of the revolutionary movement and of the struggle of the oppressed classes. The decline of the petty bourgeoisie inevitably led, sooner or later, to the extinction of all kinds of petty-bourgeois prejudices, while the growth of capitalism and the intensification of the class struggle within capitalist society were the best agitation for the ideas of proletarian socialism.

Russia's backwardness naturally accounts for the firm footing that various obsolete socialist doctrines gained in our country. The entire history of Russian revolutionary thought during the last quarter of a century is the history of the struggle waged by Marxism against petty-bourgeois Narodnik socialism. While the rapid growth and remarkable successes of the Russian working-class movement have already brought victory to Marxism in Russia too, the development of an indubitably revolutionary peasant movement—especially after the famous peasant revolts in the Ukraine in 1902—has on the other hand caused a certain revival of senile Narodism. The Narodnik theories of old, embellished with modish European opportunism (revisionism, Bernsteinism, and criticism of Marx), make up all the original ideological stock-in-trade of the so-called Socialist-Revolutionaries. That is why the peasant question is focal in the Marxists' controversies with both the pure Narodniks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

To a certain extent Narodism was an integral and consistent doctrine. It denied the domination of capitalism in Russia; it denied the factory workers' role as the front-line fighters of the entire proletariat; it denied the importance of a political revolution and bourgeois political liberty; it preached an immediate socialist revolution, stemming from the peasant commune with its petty forms of husbandry. All that now survives of this integral theory is mere shreds, but to understand the controversies of the present day intelligently, and to prevent these controversies from degenerating into mere squabbles, one should always remember the general and basic Narodnik *roots* of the errors of our Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Narodniks considered the muzhik the man of the future in Russia, this view springing inevitably from their faith in the socialist character of the peasant commune, from their lack of faith in the future of capitalism. The Marxists considered the worker the man of the future in Russia, and the development of Russian capitalism in both agriculture and industry is providing more and more confirmation of their views. The working-class movement in Russia has won recognition for itself, but as for the peasant movement, the gulf separating Narodism and Marxism is

to this day revealed in their different *interpretations* of this movement. To the Narodniks the peasant movement provides a refutation of Marxism. It is a movement that stands for a direct socialist revolution; it does not recognise bourgeois political liberty; it stems from small-scale, not large-scale, production. In a word, to the Narodnik, it is the peasant movement that is the genuine, truly socialist and immediately socialist movement. The Narodnik faith in the peasant commune and the Narodnik brand of anarchism fully explain why such conclusions are inevitable.

To the Marxist, the peasant movement is a democratic, not a socialist, movement. In Russia, just as was the case in other countries, it is a necessary concomitant of the democratic revolution, which is bourgeois in its social and economic content. It is not in the least directed against the foundations of the bourgeois order, against commodity production, or against capital. On the contrary, it is directed against the old, serf, pre-capitalist relationships in the rural districts, and against landlordism, which is the mainstay of all the survivals of serf-ownership. Consequently, full victory of this peasant movement will not abolish capitalism; on the contrary, it will create a broader foundation for its development, and will hasten and intensify purely capitalist development. Full victory of the peasant uprising can only create a stronghold for a democratic bourgeois republic, within which a proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie will for the first time develop in its purest form.

These, then, are the two contrasting views which must be clearly understood by anyone who wishes to examine the gulf in principles that lies between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats. According to one view, the peasant movement is socialist, while according to the other it is a democratic-bourgeois movement. Hence one can see what ignorance our Socialist-Revolutionaries reveal when they repeat for the hundredth time (see, for example, *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 75) that orthodox Marxists have ignored the peasant question. There is only one way of combating such crass ignorance, and that is by repeating the ABC, by setting forth the old consistently Narodnik views, and by pointing out for the hundredth or the

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thousandth time that the real distinction between us does not lie in a desire or the non-desire to reckon with the peasant question, in recognition or non-recognition of it, but in our *different appraisals* of the present-day peasant movement and of the present-day peasant question in Russia. He who says that the Marxists ignore the peasant question in Russia is, in the first place, an absolute ignoramus since all the principal writings of Russian Marxists, beginning with Plekhanov's *Our Differences* (which appeared over twenty years ago), have in the main been devoted to explaining the erroneousness of the Narodnik views on the Russian peasant question. Secondly, he who says that the Marxists ignore the peasant question thereby proves his desire to avoid giving a complete appraisal of the actual difference in principles, giving the answer to the question whether or not the present-day peasant movement is democratic-bourgeois whether or not it is objectively directed against the survivals of serfdom.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have never given, nor will they ever be able to give, a clear and precise answer to this question, for they are floundering hopelessly between the old Narodnik view and the present-day Marxist view on the peasant question in Russia. The Marxists say that the Socialist-Revolutionaries represent the standpoint of the petty bourgeoisie (are ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie) for the very reason that they cannot rid themselves of petty-bourgeois illusions and of the Narodnik imaginings in appraising the peasant movement.

That is why we have to go over the ABC once again. What is the present-day peasant movement in Russia striving for? For land and liberty. What significance will the complete victory of this movement have? After winning liberty, it will abolish the rule of the landlords and bureaucrats in the administration of the state. After securing the land, it will give the landlords' estates to the peasants. Will the fullest liberty and expropriation of the landlords do away with commodity production? No, it will not. Will the fullest liberty and expropriation of the landlords abolish individual farming by peasant households on communal, or "socialised", land? No, it will not. Will the fullest liberty and expropriation of the landlords bridge the deep gulf that

separates the rich peasant, with his numerous horses and cows, from the farm-hand, the day-labourer, i.e., the gulf that separates the peasant bourgeoisie from the rural proletariat? No, it will not. On the contrary, the more completely the highest *social-estate* (the landlords) is routed and annihilated, the more profound will the *class* distinction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat be. What will be the objective significance of the complete victory of the peasant uprising? This victory will do away with all survivals of serfdom, but it will by no means destroy the bourgeois economic system, or destroy capitalism or the division of society into classes—into rich and poor, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Why is the present-day peasant movement a democratic-bourgeois movement? Because, after destroying the power of the bureaucracy and the landlords, it will set up a democratic system of society, without, however, altering the bourgeois foundation of that democratic society, without abolishing the rule of capital. How should the class-conscious worker, the socialist, regard the present-day peasant movement? He must support this movement, help the peasants in the most energetic fashion, help them throw off completely both the rule of the bureaucracy and that of the landlords. At the same time, however, he should explain to the peasants that it is not enough to overthrow the rule of the bureaucracy and the landlords. When they overthrow that rule, they must at the same time prepare for the abolition of the rule of capital, the rule of the bourgeoisie, and for that purpose a doctrine that is fully socialist, i.e., Marxist, should be immediately disseminated, the rural proletarians should be united, welded together, and organised for the struggle against the peasant bourgeoisie and the entire Russian bourgeoisie. Can a class-conscious worker forget the democratic struggle for the sake of the socialist struggle, or forget the latter for the sake of the former? No, a class-conscious worker calls himself a Social-Democrat for the reason that he understands the relation between the two struggles. He knows that there is no other road to socialism save the road through democracy, through political liberty. He therefore strives to achieve democratism completely and consistently in order to attain the ultimate goal—socialism. Why are the conditions for the

democratic struggle not the same as those for the socialist struggle? Because the workers will certainly have different allies in each of those two struggles. The democratic struggle is waged by the workers together with a section of the bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the socialist struggle is waged by the workers against the whole of the bourgeoisie. The struggle against the bureaucrat and the landlord can and must be waged together with all the peasants, even the well-to-do and the middle peasants. On the other hand, it is only together with the rural proletariat that the struggle against the bourgeoisie, and therefore against the well-to-do peasants too, can be properly waged.

If we keep in mind all these elementary Marxist truths, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries always prefer to avoid going into, we shall have no difficulty in appraising the latter's "latest" objections to Marxism, such as the following:

"Why was it necessary," *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (No. 75) exclaims, "first to support the peasant in general against the landlord, and then (i.e., at the same time) to support the proletariat against the peasant in general, instead of at once supporting the proletariat against the landlord; and what Marxism has to do with this, heaven alone knows."

This is the standpoint of the most primitive, childishly naïve anarchism. For many centuries and even for thousands of years, mankind has dreamt of doing away "at once" with all and every kind of exploitation. These dreams remained mere dreams until millions of the exploited all over the world began to unite for a consistent, staunch and comprehensive struggle to change capitalist society in the direction the evolution of that society is naturally taking. Socialist dreams turned into the socialist struggle of the millions only when Marx's scientific socialism had linked up the urge for change with the struggle of a definite class. Outside the class struggle, socialism is either a hollow phrase or a naïve dream. In Russia, however, two different struggles of two different social forces are taking place before our very eyes. The proletariat is fighting against the bourgeoisie wherever capitalist relations of production exist (and they exist—be it known to our Socialist-Revolutionaries—even in the peasant commune, i.e., on the land which from

their standpoint is one hundred per cent "socialised"). As a stratum of small landowners, of petty bourgeois, the peasantry, is fighting against all survivals of serfdom, against the bureaucrats and the landlords. Only those who are completely ignorant of political economy and of the history of revolutions throughout the world can fail to see that these are two distinct and different social wars. To shut one's eyes to the diversity of these wars by demanding "at once", is like hiding one's head under one's wing and refusing to make any analysis of reality.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have lost the integrity of the old Narodnik views, have even forgotten many of the teachings of the Narodniks themselves. As the selfsame *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* writes in the same article: "By helping the peasantry to expropriate the landlords, Mr. Lenin is unconsciously assisting in building up petty-bourgeois economy on the ruins of the more or less developed forms of capitalist agriculture. Is not this a 'step backward' from the standpoint of orthodox Marxism?"

For shame, gentlemen! Why, you have forgotten your own Mr. V. V.! Consult his *Destiny of Capitalism*, the *Sketches* by Mr. Nikolai—on,[138] and other sources of your wisdom. You will then recollect that landlord farming in Russia combines within itself features both of capitalism and of serf-ownership. You will then find out that there is a system of economy based on labour rent, which is a direct survival of the corvée system. If, moreover, you take the trouble to consult such an orthodox Marxist book as the third volume of Marx's *Capital*, you will find that nowhere could the corvée system develop, and nowhere did it develop, and turn into capitalist farming except through the medium of petty-bourgeois peasant farming. In your efforts to scatter Marxism to the winds, you resort to methods too primitive, methods too long ago exposed; you ascribe to Marxism a grotesquely oversimplified conception of large-scale capitalist farming directly succeeding to large-scale farming based on the corvée system. You argue that since the yield on the landlords' estates is higher than on the peasant farms the expropriation of the landlords is a step backward. This argument is worthy of a fourth-form schoolboy. Just consider, gentlemen: was it not a "step backward" to separate the low-

yielding peasant lands from the high-yielding landlords' estates when serfdom was abolished?

Present-day landlord economy in Russia combines features of both capitalism and serf-ownership. Objectively, the peasants' struggle against the landlords today is a struggle against survivals of serfdom. However, to attempt to enumerate all individual cases, to weigh each individual case, and to determine with the precision of an apothecary's scales exactly where serf-ownership ends and pure capitalism begins, is to ascribe one's own pedantry to the Marxists. We cannot calculate what portion of the price of provisions bought from a petty shopkeeper represents labour-value and what part of it represents swindling, etc. Does that mean, gentlemen, that we must discard the theory of labour-value?

Contemporary landlord economy combines features of both capitalism and serfdom. But only pedants can conclude from this that it is our duty to weigh, count and copy out every minute feature in every particular instance, and pigeon-hole it in this or that social category. Only utopians can hence conclude that "there is no need" for us to draw a distinction between the two different social wars. Indeed, the only actual conclusion that does follow is that both in our programme and in our tactics we must combine the purely proletarian struggle against capitalism with the general democratic (and general peasant) struggle against serfdom.

The more marked the capitalist features in present-day landlord semi-feudal economy, the more imperative is it to get right down to organising the rural proletariat separately, for this will help purely capitalist, or purely proletarian, antagonisms to assert themselves the sooner, whenever confiscation takes place. The more marked the capitalist features in landlord economy, the sooner will democratic confiscation give an impetus to the real struggle for socialism—and, consequently, the more dangerous is false idealisation of the democratic revolution through use of the catchword of "socialisation". Such is the conclusion to be drawn from the fact that landlord economy is a mixture of capitalism and serf-ownership relations.

Thus, we must combine the purely proletarian struggle with the general peasant struggle, but not confuse the two.

We must support the general democratic and general peasant struggle, but not become submerged in this non-class struggle; we must never idealise it with false catchwords such as "socialisation", or ever forget the necessity of organising both the urban *and the rural* proletariat in an entirely independent class party of Social-Democracy. While giving the utmost support to the most determined democratism, that party will not allow itself to be diverted from the revolutionary path by reactionary dreams and experiments in "equalisation" under the system of commodity production. The peasants' struggle against the landlords is now a revolutionary struggle; the confiscation of the landlords' estates at the present stage of economic and political evolution is revolutionary in every respect, and we back this revolutionary-democratic measure. However, to call this measure "socialisation", and to deceive oneself and the people concerning the possibility of "equality" in land tenure under the system of commodity production, is a reactionary petty-bourgeois utopia, which we leave to the socialist-reactionaries.

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THE DENOUEMENT IS AT HAND

The forces are in equilibrium, we wrote a fortnight ago,* when the first news of the all-Russia political strike came in, and it was becoming evident that the government dare not make immediate use of its military forces.

The forces are in equilibrium, we repeated a week ago,** when the Manifesto of October 17 was the latest in the political news, betokening to the whole people and to the world at large that tsarism was in the grip of irresolution, and was in retreat.

However, equilibrium of forces in no way precludes a struggle; on the contrary it makes the struggle more acute. The sole purpose of the government's retreat is, as we have already said, to enable it to choose what it considers a new and a more favourable situation for a battle. The proclamation of the "liberties" that adorn the scrap of paper known as the Manifesto of October 17 is merely an attempt to prepare the moral conditions for a struggle against the revolution, while Trepov, at the head of the all-Russia Black Hundreds, prepares the material conditions for that struggle.

The denouement is at hand, the new political situation is taking shape at breath-taking speed, one that marks only revolutionary epochs. In words, the government has begun to fall back, but in deed it has immediately begun to prepare for an offensive. Promises of a constitution have been followed by the most brutal and ugly acts of violence, which have seemed purposely designed to give the people a still more striking object lesson of the real significance of the

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* See pp. 394-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See p. 428 of this volume.—*Ed.*

autocracy's real power. The contrast between promises, words and scraps of paper, on the one hand, and the facts of reality on the other has become infinitely more manifest. Events have begun to provide telling confirmation of a truth we long ago proclaimed to our readers, and shall repeat over and over again, namely, that until tsarism's actual power is overthrown, all its concessions, and even a constituent assembly, are a phantom, a mirage, a piece of deception.

The revolutionary workers of St. Petersburg made this perfectly clear in one of those daily bulletins[139] that have not yet reached us, but are being referred to more and more frequently by foreign newspapers, astounded and frightened by the might of the proletariat. "We have been granted freedom of assembly," the strike committee has written (we are translating from the English back into the Russian, so some inaccuracy is of course inevitable in the rendering), "but our meetings are surrounded by soldiers. We have been granted freedom of the press, but censorship continues. Freedom of learning has been promised, but the University is occupied by troops. Inviolability of the person has been promised, but the prisons are packed with arrested people. We have been granted Witte, but Trepov still exists. We have been granted a constitution, but the autocracy still exists. We have been granted everything, but we have nothing."

The "Manifesto" has been suspended by Trepov. The constitution has been held up by Trepov. The real significance of the liberties granted has been clarified by the selfsame Trepov. The amnesty has been mangled by Trepov.

But who is this Trepov? Is he some extraordinary personality, whose removal is of special significance? Nothing of the kind. He is just a most ordinary policeman, who is doing the autocracy's everyday work, with the military and the police at his disposal.

Why is it that this most ordinary policeman and his routine "job" have suddenly acquired such extraordinary importance? It is because the revolution has made immense progress, and had brought the denouement closer. Led by the proletariat, the people are becoming politically more mature with every day, nay with every hour, or, if you will, not by the year but by the week. While to a people that was

politically asleep, Trepov was just a most ordinary policeman, to a people that has grown aware that it is a political force, he has become insufferable, for he personifies all the brutality, criminality and senselessness of tsarism.

Revolution teaches. It provides all classes of the people and all the nations of Russia with excellent object lessons on the subject of *the nature of a constitution*. Revolution teaches by bringing to the fore the immediate and pressing political tasks, in their most manifest and compelling forms; it compels the masses to realise these tasks, and makes the people's very existence impossible, without fulfilment of these tasks; it unmasks the worthlessness of all and sundry pretences, evasions, promises and acknowledgements. "We have been granted everything, but we have nothing." Indeed, we have been "granted" only promises, since we have no real power. We have come close to liberty, have compelled all and sundry, even the tsar, to acknowledge the need for liberty. What we want, however, is not recognition of that need, but liberty itself. What we want is not a scrap of paper with promises of legislative powers for the people's representatives, but actual sovereignty of the people. The closer we approach that sovereignty, the more intolerable its absence becomes. The more tempting the tsar's manifestoes are, the more unbearable is his rule.

The struggle is approaching its denouement, the answer to the question whether actual power is to remain with the tsar's government. As for recognition of the revolution, it has now been generally recognised. It was recognised quite long ago by Mr. Struve and the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry. It is now recognised by Mr. Witte and by Nicholas Romanov. "I promise you anything you wish," says the tsar, "only let me retain power, let me fulfil my own promises." That is the gist of the tsar's Manifesto, and it obviously had to spark off a determined struggle. "I grant you everything except power," tsarism declares. "Everything is illusory except power," the revolutionary people reply.

The real significance of the seeming senselessness into which Russian affairs have fallen lies in tsarism's desire to deceive the people and evade revolution by striking a bargain with the bourgeoisie. The tsar is making ever greater promises to the bourgeoisie, in the hope that the propertied

classes, to the man, will at last turn towards "law and order". However, whilst that "law and order" is exemplified in the excesses of Trepov and his Black Hundreds, the tsar's appeal seems likely to remain a voice crying in the wilderness. The tsar stands in need of both Witte and Trepov in equal measure—Witte to attract some, and Trepov to intimidate others; Witte for promises, and Trepov for action; Witte for the bourgeoisie, and Trepov for the proletariat. Before our eyes there is again unfolding, only this time on a far higher level of development, a scene the same as that witnessed at the beginning of the Moscow strikes—the liberals are doing the negotiating, while the workers are doing the fighting.

Trepov has an excellent understanding of his role and his real significance. He may have been somewhat too precipitate for the diplomatic Witte, but then he has been afraid of being left behind by the rapid development of the revolution. He has been even obliged to make haste, for he realises that the forces at his disposal are on the wane.

Simultaneously with its Manifesto on the Constitution, the autocracy has begun to take steps to preclude a constitution. The Black Hundreds have got down to work in a way Russia has never seen before. Reports of massacres, pogroms, and acts of unparalleled brutality are pouring in from all parts of the country. The white terror is rampant. Wherever they can, the police are inciting and organising the dregs of capitalist society for pillage and violence, plying the scum of the urban population with liquor, staging anti-Jewish pogroms, exhorting to violence against "students" and rebels, and helping in "giving a lesson" to Zemstvo members. Counter-revolution is working at full blast. Trepov has proved worthy of his salt. Machine-guns are opening fire (Odessa), eyes are being put out (Kiev), people are being hurled from the upper storeys into the streets below, houses are being taken by assault and then sacked, fires are started and nobody allowed to put them out, and those who dare offer resistance to the Black Hundreds are being shot down. From Poland to Siberia, from the shores of the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea—the picture is the same.

But simultaneously with this spate of Black-Hundred brutality, this orgy staged by the autocracy, these last

convulsions of the tsarist monster, fresh onslaughts are being launched by the proletariat, which, as always, only appears to quieten down after each upsurge of the movement. In actual fact, it is only mustering its forces and preparing to deal a decisive blow. For reasons already mentioned, police atrocities in Russia have acquired a character quite different from that of the past. Parallel with the outbursts of Cossack vengeance and Trepov's vindictiveness, the power of the tsar is disintegrating apace. This is to be seen in the provinces, in Finland, and in St. Petersburg; it is apparent in places where the people are the most downtrodden and the least developed politically, in the marginal areas with a non-Russian population, as well as in the capital, which promises to become a scene of the revolution's greatest drama.

Indeed, compare the following two telegraph messages, which we quote from a Vienna bourgeois liberal newspaper[140]: "*Tver*. The premises of the Zemstvo were attacked by a mob in the presence of Governor Sleptsov. After a siege the mob set fire to the building. The firemen refused to extinguish the flames, while the troops stood by without taking any measures to curb the ruffians." (Of course we cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy of this particular report, but it is an undeniable fact that similar things, and others a hundred times worse, are being perpetrated on all sides.) "*Kazan*. The police have been disarmed by the people. Arms taken from the police have been distributed among the population. A people's militia has been set up. Perfect order prevails."

Is not a comparison of these two reports instructive? In one case there is vengeance, atrocities, and pogroms; in the other, the tsar's authority has been overturned and a victorious uprising organised.

Finland presents a similar picture, only on a far greater scale. The tsar's viceroy has been expelled, and the lackey-senators removed by the people. The Russian gendarmes are being driven out and are trying to take reprisals (a telegram from Haparanda, dated November 4, N. S.) by damaging railway communications. In such cases armed detachments of the people's militia are sent to arrest the disorderly gendarmes. A meeting of Tornio citizens has decided

to organise the import of weapons and free literature. Thousands and tens of thousands in town and countryside are enrolling in the Finnish militia. The Russian garrison of a strong fortress (Sveaborg) are reported to have expressed sympathy with the insurgents, and turned the fortress over to the people's militia. Finland is rejoicing. The tsar is making concessions. He is prepared to summon the Diet, has repealed the unlawful manifesto of February 15, 1899, and has accepted the "resignation" of the senators ousted by the people. Meanwhile, *Novoye Vremya* is advising the government to blockade all Finnish ports, and to crush the uprising by armed force. According to foreign press reports, numerous Russian troops have been quartered in Helsingfors (it cannot be ascertained to what extent they can be relied on to crush the uprising). There are reports that Russian warships have entered the inner harbour of Helsingfors.

St. Petersburg. Here Trepov is wreaking vengeance for the rejoicings of the revolutionary people (over the concessions wrested from the tsar). Atrocities are being perpetrated by the Cossacks, and massacres are on the increase. The police are openly organising the Black Hundreds. The workers intended to hold a gigantic demonstration on Sunday, November 5 (October 23), to pay public homage to their heroes, their comrades who had fallen in the struggle for liberty. For its part, the government prepared a gigantic blood-bath. It was preparing for St. Petersburg something similar to what had already taken place on a smaller scale in Moscow (the massacre at the funeral of Bauman, the workers' leader). Trepov wanted to take advantage of the situation before his forces were weakened by part of them being dispatched to Finland, and while the workers were preparing to demonstrate, not to fight.

The St. Petersburg workers saw through the enemy's scheme, and the demonstration was called off. The workers' committee decided that the final battle should not take place at the time Trepov deigned to choose. The committee were quite right in thinking that a number of reasons (including the uprising in Finland) made postponement of the struggle disadvantageous to Trepov and advantageous to us. Meanwhile arming of the people has proceeded apace, and propaganda in the army has met with remarkable

success. A hundred and fifty ratings of the 14th and the 18th Naval Depots are stated to have been arrested, and during the last week and a half ninety-two reports are said to have been submitted concerning sympathy for revolutionaries shown by officers. Handbills calling on soldiers to go over to the side of the people are being distributed even among patrols "guarding" St. Petersburg. Freedom of the press, which was promised within limits prescribed by Trepov, is being extended to a greater degree by the mighty arm of the revolutionary proletariat. According to messages in the foreign press, only those St. Petersburg newspapers came out on Saturday, October 22 (November 4), which accepted the workers' demand that they ignore the censorship. Two St. Petersburg German-language papers that wished to remain "loyal" (i.e., servile) could not come out. From the moment the St. Petersburg strikers' union, but not Trepov, began to determine the bounds of legality, the "legal" papers began speaking up in extremely bold tones. "The strike has been only suspended," reads a cable to the *Neue Freie Presse* of October 23 (November 5). "The strike, it is reported, will be resumed when the time for a final blow at the old order arrives. Concessions no longer make the least impression on the proletariat. The situation is highly dangerous. Revolutionary ideas are gaining an increasing hold on the masses. The working class feels that it is master of the situation. Those who are afraid of impending disaster are beginning to leave the city [St. Petersburg]."

The denouement is at hand. The victory of the people's uprising is not far off now. Revolutionary Social-Democracy's slogans are being put into effect with unexpected rapidity. Let Trepov go on dashing to and fro between revolutionary Finland and revolutionary St. Petersburg, between the revolutionary marginal areas and the revolutionary provinces. Let him try to choose a single safe place for untrammelled military operations. Let the tsar's Manifesto be circulated more widely; let the news of the events in the revolutionary centres become more widespread—that will win us new supporters, and bring fresh vacillation and disintegration into the dwindling ranks of the tsar's adherents.

The all-Russia political strike has performed its tasks excellently by furthering the uprising, by inflicting frightful

wounds on tsarism, and by frustrating the disgusting comedy of the disgusting State Duma. The general rehearsal is over. The indications are that we are now on the eve of the drama itself. Witte is wallowing in a spate of words, while Trepov is wallowing in rivers of blood. The tsar is running short of promises he might yet make, while Trepov is running short of Black-Hundred forces he might send into the final battle. The ranks of the army of revolution are swelling all the time. Its forces are being steeled in individual engagements, and the red flag is rising higher and higher over the new Russia.

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INSERTS TO V. KALININ'S ARTICLE "THE PEASANT CONGRESS"[141]

1

We see, consequently, that consistent socialists must unequivocally support the revolutionary struggle of any section of the peasantry, even the well-to-do, against the bureaucracy and the landlords; however, consistent socialists must make it clearly understood that the "general redistribution" desired by the peasants is still not socialism. Socialism demands the abolition of the power of the money-bag, the power of capital, the abolition of all private ownership of the means of production, the abolition of commodity economy. Socialism demands that the land and the factories should pass into the hands of all the working people, who, following an all-over plan, will organise large-scale—and not scattered and small-scale—production.

The peasants' struggle for land and freedom is a big step towards socialism, but one that is very, very far from socialism.

2

The resolution on tactics as adopted by the Congress is amazing in its feebleness. We are inclined to think that here one of the peasantry's well-wishers (the liberals) has again been giving some kind of "explanation".

Here is the resolution:

"The activities of the Peasant Union may be public or secret (underground), this depending on local conditions. All members of the Union must propagate their views and give effect to their demands, making use of all available

methods, and disregarding opposition from Rural Superintendents, the police, or other authorities. It is also insistently advised that use be made of the right to draw up public resolutions at village and volost gatherings and private conferences, regarding improvements in the organisation of the State, and in the welfare of the people."

A resolution like this is most unsatisfactory. Instead of the organisation of a revolutionary party, the resolution organises merely an extension to the liberal party. The course of the movement itself must of necessity and inevitably bring about a split between the liberal landowners and the revolutionary peasants, and we, Social-Democrats, will try to accelerate that split.

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BETWEEN TWO BATTLES

Geneva, November 15 (N. S.)

The big battle in which the proletariat has engaged tsarism is over. The all-Russia political strike seems to have come to an end almost everywhere. The enemy has made the biggest withdrawal on one flank (Finland), but he has dug himself in on the other (martial law in Poland). In the centre, the enemy has fallen back very little, but holds a strong new position, and is preparing for an even more bloody and more decisive battle. Clashes are taking place along the whole battle line. Both sides are hastening to make good their losses, rally their ranks, get properly organised, and arm themselves as best they can for the next battle.

Such, approximately, is the state of things at present in the theatre of the struggle for freedom. Civil war naturally differs from other kinds of warfare in that the forms of the fighting are far more varied, the strength and the composition of the combatants on both sides are harder to estimate and fluctuate far more, and attempts to conclude peace, or at least an armistice do not originate in those engaged in the fighting, and are most fantastically interwoven with the pattern of military operations.

Lulls in the fighting have a most encouraging effect on the initiative of the "conciliators". Witte is doing his utmost to pose as such a "conciliator", both directly and through the agency of the servile press, and is covering up in every possible way his role of tsarism's diplomatic servant. To the delight of naïve liberals, a government report has acknowledged the participation of the police in Black-Hundred outrages. Press organs that fawn upon the government (*Novoye Vremya*, for example) are making a pretence of condemning the extremes the reactionaries have gone to, and, of course, the "extremes" of the revolutionaries. Displeased

with the petty stakes involved, extremist representatives of reaction (Pobedonostsev, Vladimir, and Trepov) are leaving the scene. It is partly because of their obtuseness that these people do not realise the importance of this game for the preservation of the greatest power for tsarism, another reason is that they assume—and rightly so—that it is more convenient for them to acquire a free hand, and take part in the same game, but only in another role—that of "independent" fighters for the might of the monarchy, the role of "free" avengers for the "insulted national sentiments of the Russian people"—insulted by the revolutionaries—or, in other words, the role of leaders of the Black Hundreds.

Witte is rubbing his hands in delight at the sight of the "great" successes of the amazingly shrewd game he is playing. He is preserving liberalism's innocence by pressing ministerial posts upon leaders of the Constitutional-Democrats (even upon Milyukov, as telegraphed by the *Temps* correspondent), by addressing in his own handwriting a letter to Mr. Struve with an invitation to return to Russia, and by trying to present himself as a "White", who is equally far removed from both the "Reds"' and the "Blacks". At the same time, he is acquiring, together with innocence, a tidy amount of capital, for he remains head of the tsar's government, which retains full power and is only awaiting a suitable opportunity to go over to a decisive offensive against the revolution.

Our qualification of Witte, as given in *Proletary*, is being borne out in full. He is a minister-buffoon in his methods, "talents", and the ends to which he has been put. With regard to the real forces till now at his disposal, he is a minister of the liberal bureaucracy, since he has not yet been able to strike a deal with the liberal bourgeoisie. True, the haggling is making gradual progress. The chafferers are bawling out their rock-bottom prices, calling it a deal, but putting off the final agreement until the Zemstvo Congress, which is to meet in a few days, makes its decisions. Witte is trying to win over the bourgeois intelligentsia by extending their voting rights in the Duma elections, providing educational qualifications and even making paltry concessions to the workers (who are supposed to content themselves

with 21st place in the system of indirect elections "on behalf of the workers"!!); he avers that if only the Duma meets, and if only that body—or at least a minority in it—comes out for universal suffrage, his support for this demand will be fully ensured.

Till now the haggling has led nowhere. The two sides are conducting their talks with no regard for those who are doing the actual fighting, and this cannot but paralyse the efforts of our "honest brokers". For their own part, the liberal bourgeoisie would willingly accept the State Duma—they were willing to accept it even in a "consultative" variant, and already in September rejected an active boycott. However, the essence of the matter is that the revolution has made a tremendous stride forward in the two months that have since elapsed, the proletariat has given important battle, and at once scored its first big victory. The State Duma, that vile and despicable travesty of popular representation, has been buried. It was shattered by the first blow delivered by the mighty onslaught of the proletariat. In the space of a few weeks, the revolution has shown up the short-sightedness of those who wanted to enter the Bulygin Duma, or support those who wanted to do so. The tactics of an active boycott received the most striking confirmation that the tactics of political parties can receive in the thick of a struggle—confirmation in deed, verification in the course of events, recognition as an indubitable fact of that which but yesterday seemed to short-sighted people and cowardly chafferers to be too bold a "leap into the unknown".

The working class has given a good fright to the Duma comedians, such a fright that the latter are afraid to set foot on this rickety and unreliable bridge, are afraid even to test the strength of the "latest", hasty repairs made by the state botchers. The roles have changed somewhat. Only yesterday Comrades Parvus, Cherevanin and Martov wanted to obtain a revolutionary pledge from those who were about to mount this bridge—a pledge that, in the Duma, they would demand a constituent assembly. Today the place of these Social-Democrats has been taken by Count Sergei Yulyevich Witte, President of the Council of Ministers, who is already giving a "revolutionary" pledge to support

any deputy to the Duma, even if he is the only one, who will demand that a constituent assembly be convoked.

So disgraceful was the showing the liberal bourgeois—the Constitutional-Democrats—made the first time that they were unwilling to repeat the unpleasant experience. They had already got the "election campaign" under way, had our good parliamentarians of *Osvobozhdeniye* and *Russkiye Vedomosti*; they had already elected a central committee to give guidance to that campaign; they had even set up a law office to advise the public as to whether the Rural Superintendent has the right to disperse peasant electors on his own initiative, or whether he must first ask the governor for permission. In a word, they were making ready to lay themselves down to sleep on the sofa graciously provided to all Russian Oblomovs,[142] when suddenly ... when suddenly the proletariat squared its shoulders and impolitely shook off the Duma and the entire Duma campaign. It is therefore not surprising that the liberal bourgeois are now disinclined to give credence to "revolutionary pledges" made by the suave Count. It is not surprising that they are even less inclined to accept the hand the Count is holding out to them, that they are more and more often glancing leftwards, though their mouths are literally watering at the sight of the wonderful iced cake known as the Duma.

Without any doubt, Witte's talks with leaders of the liberal bourgeoisie are of serious political significance, but only in the respect that they reconfirm the affinity of the would-be-liberal bureaucracy to those who are defending the interests of capital—only in the respect that they once again show who is out to *bury* the Russian revolution, and how. These negotiations and deals, however, are not succeeding, for the simple reason that the revolution lives on. The revolution is not only alive, but it is stronger than ever, and is very, very far from having said its last word; it is only beginning to deploy all the forces of the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry. That is why the buffoon-minister's talks and deals with the bourgeoisie are so pointless; they cannot acquire serious significance at the height of the struggle, when the hostile forces are confronting each other between two decisive battles.

At such a time, the policy of the revolutionary proletariat,

which is conscious of its historic aims, is striving not only for the political but also for the economic emancipation of the working people, without, however, forgetting its socialist aims—the policy of the proletariat must be most firm, clear and definite. To the vicious lies of the minister-buffoon and the obtuse illusions of the liberal and bourgeois democrats regarding a constitution, it must contrapose, more resolutely than ever before, its slogan of the overthrow of the tsar's rule by means of an armed uprising of the whole people. The revolutionary proletariat abhors all cant, and is fighting relentlessly against all and any attempts to obscure the actual state of affairs. In present-day talk about a constitutional regime there is not a single word but that reeks of cant, and not a single sentence that is not a repetition of the old bureaucratic falsehood aimed at saving some remnant or other of the autocratic, serf-owning Russia.

There is talk of liberty, of popular representation; some hold forth on a constituent assembly, but what is being constantly, hourly and minutely lost sight of is that, without serious guarantees, all these fine things are but hollow phrases. A serious guarantee can be provided *only* by a victorious rising of the people, *only* by the complete domination of the armed proletariat and the peasantry over all representatives of tsarist power, who, under pressure by the people, have retreated a pace but are far from having yielded to the people, and far from having been overthrown by the people. Until *that* aim is achieved there *can be no* real liberty, no genuine popular representation, or a really *constituent* assembly with the power to set up a new order in Russia.

What is a constitution? A sheet of paper with the people's rights recorded on it. What is the guarantee of these rights being really recognised? It lies in the *strength* of those classes of the people that have become aware of those rights, and have been able to win them. Let us then not allow words to delude us—that befits only babblers for bourgeois democracy—let us not for a moment forget that *strength* is proved *only* by victory in the struggle, and that we are as yet far from having achieved complete victory. Let us not believe handsome phrases, for we are living through times when an open struggle is going on, when all phrases and promises at once are tested in action, when words, manifestoes,

and promises of a constitution are being used to *fool* the people, weaken its forces, scatter its ranks, and induce it to disarm. Nothing can be more false than such promises and phrases, and it is with pride that we can say that the proletariat of Russia has matured for the struggle both against brute force and against liberal-constitutional cant. This is borne out by the appeal made by the railwaymen, recently reported in the foreign press (unfortunately we are not in possession of the original). "Collect arms, comrades," the appeal says, "organise yourselves for the struggle tirelessly, with multiplied energy. It is only by arming and rallying our ranks that we shall be able to defend what has been won, and achieve complete satisfaction of our demands. The time will come when we shall again rise as one man in a new and still more stubborn struggle for full liberty."

Such are our sole guarantees. Such is the only genuine *constitution* of a free Russia! Indeed, consider the Manifesto of October 17 and the facts of Russian life: can anything be more instructive than the contrast between this *recognition* of a constitution *by the tsar* on paper, and the actual "constitution", the actual application of the *tsar's power?* On the face of it, the tsar's Manifesto holds out promises of an unequivocally constitutional character. But we have been shown the price of these promises. The person of the individual has been declared inviolate, yet those who are not to the liking of the autocracy remain in prison, in exile or in banishment. Freedom of assembly has been declared, yet the universities, which were the first to create actual freedom of assembly in Russia, have been closed, and their entrances are under police and military guard. The press is free, so therefore the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*,[143] spokesman for the interests of the workers, has been confiscated for having published the programme of the Social-Democrats. The places of Black-Hundred ministers have been taken by ministers who have declared that they stand for the rule of law, yet the Black Hundreds are "operating" ever more intensely in the streets with the aid of the police and the military, and citizens of a free Russia who are not to the liking of the autocracy are being shot, beaten up and mauled freely and with impunity.

With such edifying examples before one's eyes, one must

be blind, or else blinded by class selfishness, to attach any really serious significance at the present time to whether Witte promises universal suffrage, or whether the tsar will sign a manifesto on the convocation of a "constituent" assembly. Even if these "acts" were to take place, they would not decide the outcome of the struggle; nor would they create actual freedom of election agitation, or ensure that a popular assembly of representatives would have a genuinely constituent character. A constituent assembly should give legal shape and parliamentary form to the structure of a new Russia, but before the victory of the new over the old can be consolidated, and to give due form to this victory, actual victory has to be won, the power of the old institutions has to be broken, and the latter have to be swept away, the old edifice has to be levelled to the ground, and the possibility destroyed of any serious resistance on the part of the police and its gangs.

Full freedom of election, and full power for a constituent assembly can be ensured only by the complete victory of the uprising, the overthrow of tsarist rule, and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government. To this end all our efforts must be directed; the organisation and preparation of an uprising must absolutely stand in the foreground. Only in the measure in which the rising is victorious and in which victory leads to the decisive destruction of the enemy—only in that measure will an assembly of the people's representatives be a popular one not only on paper, and constituent not only in name.

Down with all cant, all falseness, and all equivocation! War has been declared, fighting has flared up, and what we are now experiencing is but a lull between two battles. There is no half-way. The party of the "Whites" is sheer deception. He who is not for revolution is one of the Black Hundreds. It is not only we that say so. The designation has not been devised by us. The blood-stained stones cry out these words in the streets of Moscow and Odessa, in Kronstadt and the Caucasus, in Poland and Tomsk.

He who is not for revolution is one of the Black Hundreds. He who does not wish to put up with Russian freedom becoming freedom for the police to use violence, subornation, vodka, and treacherous attacks upon unarmed people,

must arm himself and immediately get ready for battle. We must win genuine freedom, not promises of freedom, not scraps of paper about freedom. We must achieve not merely humiliation of the tsar's power, not only recognition of the people's rights by that power, but the destruction of that power, since the power of the tsar means the power of the Black Hundreds over Russia. That conclusion does not belong to us either. It has been drawn by the facts of life itself; it is the lesson taught by the events of the times. It is the voice of those who till now have stood aside from any revolutionary doctrine and dare not make a single free step or say a single free word in the street, at a meeting, or at home, without running the imminent and terrible risk of being crushed, tormented or torn to pieces by some gang of adherents of the *tsar*.

Finally, the revolution has obliged *this* "popular force" to come into the open—the force of the tsar's adherents. It has revealed to the general view whom the tsar's rule banks on, and who really supports that rule. There you have it, this army of ferocious policemen, martinet-trained, half-witted soldiers, priests run wild, brutal shopkeepers, and the vodka-dazed riffraff of capitalist society. It is they that now *reign* in Russia, with the connivance or direct support of nine-tenths of all our governmental institutions. Here it is—the Russian Vendée,[144] which resembles the French Vendée in the same measure that the "lawful" monarch Nicholas Romanov resembles the adventurer Napoleon. Our Vendée has not yet said its last word either—make no mistake on that score, citizens. It, too, is just beginning to deploy its forces properly. It, too, has its "reserves of combustibles", accumulated during centuries of ignorance, oppression, serfdom, and police omnipotence. It combines within itself unmitigated Asiatic backwardness with all the loathsome features of the refined methods used to exploit and stultify those that are most downtrodden and tormented by the civilisation of the capitalist cities, and been reduced to conditions worse than those of wild beasts. This Vendée will not vanish at any manifesto from the tsar, or messages from the Synod, or at changes in the upper or lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It can be smashed only by the strength of an organised and enlightened proletariat, for only the proletar-

iat, exploited as it is, is capable of rousing all that stand below it, awaken in them a sense that they are human beings and citizens, and show them the path of deliverance from all exploitation. Only the proletariat can create the nucleus of a mighty revolutionary army, mighty both in its ideals, its discipline, its organisation, and its heroism in the struggle, a heroism no Vendée can stand up to.

Guided by Social-Democracy, the proletariat has everywhere begun forming that revolutionary army. Its ranks should be joined by all who do not wish to be in the army of the Black Hundreds. Civil war knows no neutrals. Those who stand aside in it are thereby rendering support, by being passive, to the jubilant Black Hundreds. The armed forces, too, are dividing into a Red army and a Black army. Only a fortnight ago we wrote of the speed with which they are being drawn into the struggle for freedom. The example of Kronstadt was ample proof of this. The government of the scoundrel Witte may have put down the Kronstadt mutiny[145]; it is now shooting down hundreds of sailors who have again raised the red flag—but that flag will fly much higher, for it is the flag of all working people and all the exploited the world over. Let the servile press, like *Novoye Vremya*, bawl about the troops being neutral; this foul and hypocritical lie will vanish like smoke at every misdeed of the Black Hundreds. The troops cannot be, have never been, and will never be neutral. Today, they are rapidly splitting up into troops that stand for freedom, and troops that stand for the Black Hundreds. We shall accelerate the process. We shall brand all those who are irresolute and vacillating, all those who balk at the idea of the immediate formation of a people's militia (according to the latest reports in the foreign press, the Municipal Council of Moscow has rejected plans for the creation of a people's militia). We shall multiply our agitation among the masses, and our organisational activities to set up revolutionary detachments. Then the army of the conscious proletariat will merge with the Red detachments of the Russian fighting forces—and then we shall see whether the police's Black Hundreds will be able to vanquish all the new, young and free Russia!

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTES

[1] *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* was written by Lenin in Geneva, in June-July 1905. The book was published in late July 1905, in Geneva, by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. It was twice republished in Russia in the same year, once by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., and the second time by the Moscow Committee of the Party, this time in 10,000 copies.

The book was illegally distributed throughout the country—particularly in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Tiflis and Baku. On February 19, 1907 it was banned by the St. Petersburg Press Department, and on December 22 of the same year the St. Petersburg Court issued an injunction for its destruction.

In 1907 Lenin had *Two Tactics* published in the miscellany *Twelve Years*, supplementing the book with new notes. The material prepared by Lenin for this book, his plans, précis, and other notes, were published in *Lenin Miscellany V*, pp. 315-20, and *XVI*, pp. 151-56. p. 15

[2] *The mutiny on the armoured cruiser Potemkin.* The mutiny broke out on June 14 (27), 1905. The crew brought the warship to the Port of Odessa, where a general strike was in progress. However, the favourable conditions that had arisen for joint action by the *Odessa* workers and the sailors of the *Potemkin* were not utilised. Numerous arrests of its members had weakened the Odessa Bolshevik organisation and it lacked unity. The Mensheviks were opposed to an armed uprising and held the workers and sailors back from taking offensive action. The tsarist government ordered the entire Black Sea Fleet to crush the *Potemkin*, but the crews refused to open fire on the cruiser. The officers were compelled to withdraw their ships. After eleven days of cruising in the Black Sea the crew of the *Potemkin* were forced by shortage of food and coal to take their vessel to a Rumanian port and surrender to the authorities. Most of the sailors remained abroad. Those who returned to Russia were arrested and court-martialled.

The *Potemkin* mutiny was unsuccessful, but the fact that the crew of a big naval vessel had joined the revolution marked an important stage in the development of the struggle against the autocracy. Lenin called it "the attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 562). p. 17

[3] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—the name of an illegal Bolshevik weekly, official organ of the R.S.D.L.P. It was founded in accord-

ance with a resolution of the Third Congress of the Party. Lenin was appointed editor-in-chief of *Proletary* by a decision of a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee, on April 27 (May 10), 1905.

Proletary was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) till November 12 (25), 1905, a total of twenty-six issues being brought out. Active in the work of the editorial board were V. Vorovsky, A. Lunacharsky, and M. Olminsky. *Proletary* continued the policy of the old, Leninist *Iskra*, and maintained full continuity with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

In all, Lenin wrote about 90 articles and items for *Proletary* his articles being reprinted in local Bolshevik periodicals, and also published in the form of leaflets.

Publication of *Proletary* was discontinued shortly after Lenin's departure for Russia in November 1905, the last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26) being edited by V. Vorovsky. p. 17

4 *The Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries*—the Socialist-Revolutionaries (S.R.s) was the name by which a petty-bourgeois party in Russia was known. It came into being in late 1901 and early 1902 as a result of the merging of various Narodnik groups and circles, such as *The Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries*, the *Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries*, etc. Its views found official expression in the newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*), published between the years 1900 and 1905, and the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*)—1901-05. The S.R.s saw no class distinctions between the proletarian and the petty proprietor, glossed over the class stratification and the contradictions within the peasantry, and rejected the proletariat's guiding role in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism. As Lenin put it, they tried to mend "the rents in the Narodnik ideas" with "bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see p. 310 of this volume). Advocated by the S.R.s as the chief method of struggle against the autocracy, the tactic of individual terrorism was greatly detrimental to the revolutionary movement, and hampered organisation of the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land, which was to be transferred to the village commune on the basis of the labour principle and equalitarian tenure, and also the development of co-operatives. There was nothing socialist in this programme, which the S.R.s termed "socialisation of the land", since, as Lenin pointed out, the preservation of commodity production and private farming of communal land cannot do away with the domination of capital, or rid the working peasantry of exploitation and impoverishment. Neither can co-operatives be the salvation of the small peasant in conditions of capitalism, for they serve only to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time, the demand for equalitarian tenure of the land, though

not socialist in character, was, as Lenin pointed out, of progressive, revolutionary-democratic significance, inasmuch as it was spearheaded against landlordism.

The Bolshevik Party unmasked the S.R.s' attempts to pass themselves off as socialists, waged an unrelenting struggle against them for influence over the peasantry, and revealed the injurious effects of their tactic of individual terrorism on the working-class movement. At the same time, on certain conditions, the Bolsheviks entered into temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries for the struggle against tsarism.

The absence of class homogeneity in the peasantry was the reason of the political and ideological instability in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and of its constant vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. During the first Russian revolution there was a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, its Right wing forming the legal "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party", whose views were close to those of the Constitutional-Democrats (Cadets), and the Left wing, taking shape as the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the period of the Stolypin reaction, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party underwent a complete breakdown in respect of ideology and organisation, and during the First World War most of its members took a social-chauvinistic stand.

Following the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries together with the Mensheviks and the Constitutional-Democrats, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, such leaders of the party as Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov becoming members of that government. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party discontinued its support of the peasants' demand that landlord ownership of the land be abolished, on the contrary it came out for maintenance of that ownership, the S.R. members of the Provisional Government authorising punitive action against peasants who had seized land belonging to landlords.

Late in November 1917, the Left wing of the S.R. Party formed an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who in an effort to preserve their influence among the peasant masses, formally recognised Soviet rule and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. However, they soon began a struggle against the Soviets.

During the years of foreign intervention and civil war, the S.R.s carried on counter-revolutionary, subversive work, gave active support to the interventionists and White generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terroristic acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the conclusion of the Civil War the S.R.s continued their hostile anti-Soviet acts within the country and in the camp of the White émigrés. p. 18

[5] *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly journal published abroad from June 18 (July 1), 1902 until October 5 (18), 1905,

under the editorship of P. Struve. Mouthpiece of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie, it consistently expressed the ideas of moderate monarchist liberalism. In 1903 the *Osvobozhdeniye* League developed around the journal, taking definite shape in January 1904, and existing until October 1905.

Together with the Zemstvo constitutionalists, the *Osvobozhdeniye* group formed the nucleus of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets) which came into being in October 1905, and became the chief party of the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. p. 19

[6] The reference is to the new, Menshevik *Iskra*. Following the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks gained control of *Iskra*, with the connivance of Plekhanov, and from November 1903, beginning with number 52, *Iskra* became the organ of the Mensheviks. It came out until October 1905. p. 19

[7] *The Bulygin Commission*—created by an imperial ukase in February 1905 and headed by Minister of the Interior Bulygin—hence its name—drafted a bill for the establishment of a State Duma with advisory powers, and the Regulations on the Duma elections. The Bill and the Regulations were made public together with the tsar's Manifesto of August 6 (19), 1905. An active boycott of the Bulygin Duma was proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, and the government's attempt to convene the Duma failed under the impact of the revolution. For information on the boycott of the Bulygin Duma see pages 179-87 of this volume. p. 21

[8] *The Constitutional-Democratic Party* (Cadets)—was the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in October 1905, its membership was made up of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders of the landowning class, and bourgeois intellectuals. To hoodwink the working people, the Cadets hypocritically called themselves "the party of the people's freedom", while in actual fact they did not go beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered it their primary task to wage a struggle against the revolutionary movement, and were out to share power with the tsar and the feudal landlords. During the First World War they actively supported the tsarist government's predatory foreign policy, and did their best to save the monarchy during the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917. They held leading posts in the bourgeois Provisional Government, conducting a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people. When the Great October Socialist Revolution was victorious, the Cadets became irreconcilable enemies of the Soviets, and took part in all armed counter-revolutionary acts and campaigns of the interventionists. They continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activities when they fled abroad after the rout of the interventionists and white-guards. p. 21

[9] *Millerandism*—an opportunist trend named after the French socialist-reformist Millerand, who in 1899 entered the reactionary bourgeois government of France, in which the post of war minister was held by General Gaston Galliffet, butcher of the Paris Commune. p. 30

[10] *The Ninth of January*—it was on this day that, by order of the tsar, a peaceful demonstration of St. Petersburg workers was brutally shot down by the troops. Led by the priest Gapon, the demonstrators were marching towards the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. This cold-blooded massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia, under the slogan of "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January 9 marked the beginning of the revolution of 1905-07. p. 32

[11] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was published in Cologne from June 1, 1848 until May 19, 1849. It was managed by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Marx being editor-in-chief. Following the appearance of No. 301, the paper ceased publication because of its persecution by the reactionaries. Regarding *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. II, pp. 328-37. p. 33

[12] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—a Menshevik Georgian-language newspaper published in Tiflis between April and November 1905.

The article "The Zemsky Sobor and Our Tactics" was written by N. Jordania, leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks. It was criticised in detail by Lenin in Chapter Seven of *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see pp. 61-65 of this volume). p. 35

[13] *The Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to fight against the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, organised attacks on progressive intellectuals, and carried out anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 36

[14] *A constitution à la Shipov*—Lenin's name for the draft of state structure drawn up by D. Shipov, a moderate liberal leader of the Zemstvos' Right wing. In an attempt to curb the sweep of the revolution and also to obtain certain concessions from the tsarist government in favour of the Zemstvos, Shipov proposed the creation of an advisory representative body under the tsar. By a deal of this kind the moderate liberals wanted to deceive the masses, preserve the monarchy, and at the same time win certain political rights for themselves. p. 37

[15] *Russkaya Starina* (*The Russian Antiquary*) a monthly journal of history published in St. Petersburg from 1870 to 1918. p. 43

[16] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. II, p. 405. p. 43

[17] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards by a group of Moscow University liberal professors and Zemstvo leaders. It was the mouthpiece of liberal landowners and bourgeoisie. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democrats. After the October Revolution it ceased publication, together with other counter-revolutionary papers. p. 51

[18] *Syn Otechestva* (*Son of the Fatherland*)—a liberal daily published in St. Petersburg from 1856 to 1900, and after November 18 (December 1), 1904. Its contributors represented the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend and various shades of Narodism. Following November 15 (28), 1905, it became the organ of the S.R.s. It was suppressed on December 2 (15), 1905. p. 51

[19] *Nasha Zhizn* (*Our Life*)—a liberal daily newspaper that appeared in St. Petersburg, with intervals, from November 6 (19), 1904 to July 11 (24), 1906. p. 51

[20] *Nashi Dni* (*Our Days*)—a liberal daily published in St. Petersburg from December 18 (31), 1904 to February 5 (18), 1905. Publication was resumed on December 7 (20), 1905, but only two issues came out. p. 51

[21] *The man in the muffler*—chief character in Chekhov's story of the same name, a man typifying the narrow-minded philistine who abhors all innovations or initiative. p. 53

[22] Lenin is referring to the book *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle. Herausgegeben von Franz Mehring*, Band III, Stuttgart 1902, S. 211. See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. I, p. 67. p. 59

[23] The reference is to the resolution tabled by Starover (pseudonym of the Menshevik A. N. Potresov) on the attitude towards the liberals, which was adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and was criticised by Lenin in the article "Working-Class and Bourgeois Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 72-82). p. 60

[24] The reference is to the naval engagement near the Island of Tsushima, which took place on May 14-15 (27-28), 1905, and ended in the defeat of the tsar's fleet. p. 62

[25] The expression "parliamentary cretinism", which is often met in Lenin's writings, was coined by Marx and Engels. As Engels wrote, "parliamentary cretinism" is an incurable disease, an ailment "whose unfortunate victims are permeated by the lofty conviction that the whole world, its history and its future are

directed and determined by a majority of votes of just that very representative institution that has the honour of having them in the capacity of its members".

This expression was applied by Lenin to those opportunists who considered the parliamentarian system all-powerful, and parliamentarian activities the sole form of political struggle. p. 64

[26] Differences of opinion were revealed during the discussion of the draft agrarian programme at the Breslau Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party, 1895. p. 66

[27] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*)—an Economist journal appearing irregularly in Geneva between April 1899 and February 1902 as the organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. For a criticism of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group see Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). p. 70

[28] The reference is to Nadezhdin's press attack on the plan of the Leninist *Iskra* (Nadezhdin was the pseudonym of Y. O. Zelensky). Lenin criticised this attack as far back as 1902, in his *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). p. 70

[29] *The Frankfurter Zeitung*—a bourgeois daily that spoke for the big financial interests of Germany. It was published in Frankfort on Main from 1856 to 1943. It resumed publication in 1949 under the title of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, as the mouthpiece of the West-German monopolists. p. 73

[30] *Bernsteinism*—an anti-Marxist trend in international Social-Democracy. It arose towards the close of the nineteenth century and bore the name of the Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein, who tried to revise Marx's theory of revolution in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism. In Russia this trend was represented by the "legal Marxists", the Economists, the Bundists, and the Mensheviks. p. 76

[31] The reference is to Lenin's articles entitled "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government", and "The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry", which were published in issues 13 and 14 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod* (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 275-303). p. 78

[32] Lenin has in view the programme published in 1874 by the London Blanquist group of former members of the Paris Commune (see F. Engels, "Flüchtlingsliteratur. II. Programm der blanquistischen Kommuneflüchtlinge", *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat*, Berlin 1957, S. 47-56).

The *Blanquists* were adherents of the trend in the socialist movement of France headed by the outstanding revolutionist and representative of utopian communism Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-81).

The Blanquists, as Lenin wrote, expected "that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals" (see present edition, Vol. 10, "The Congress Summed Up"). They took no account of the concrete situation required for an uprising to be victorious, and showed their disdain for ties with the masses by substituting for a revolutionary party activities by a handful of plotters. p. 80

[33] *The Erfurt Programme* of German Social-Democracy was adopted in October 1891 at a congress held in Erfurt. For a criticism of this programme see F. Engels, "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891", *Die Neue Zeit*, Jg. XX, 1901, B. II, H. 1 and Lenin's *The State and Revolution*. p. 86

[34] In July 1905 Lenin wrote a note to Chapter Ten of *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. This note was not published in the first edition of the book, and first appeared in 1926, in *Lenin Miscellany V*. p. 87

[35] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow 1953, pp. 551-55. p. 87

[36] "Lenin has in view the article "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 461-81), and also the article by F. Engels, *Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit. Denkschrift über den Aufstand in Spanien im Sommer 1873*, in which he criticises the Bakuninist resolution Lenin is referring to (see *Der Volksstaat*, Nos. 105, 106, 107, 1873). p. 93

[37] *Credo* was the name given to a manifesto issued in 1899 by a group of Economists (S. Prokopovich, Y. Kuskova, and others, who later became Constitutional-Democrats). This manifesto was a most outspoken expression of Russian Economism's opportunism. Lenin countered the Credo with a trenchant protest denouncing the Economists' views (*A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats*, see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82). p. 95

[38] *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*)—organ of the Economists, which was published in 1897-1902. The views of this newspaper as a Russian variety of international opportunism were criticised by Lenin in the article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", and in his work *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85 and Vol. 5, pp. 347-529) and also in articles published in *Iskra*. p. 95

[39] The reference is to Marx's words in his *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilolophie*, MEGA, 1. Abt., Bd. 1, S. 614. p. 96

[40] *L'Humanité*—a daily paper founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. Soon after the split

in the Socialist Party at the Tours Congress (December 1920) and the formation of the Communist Party of France, the paper became the latter's organ. It now appears in Paris as the central organ of the C.P.F. p. 97

[41] *Varlin*, *Louis-Eugène* (1839-71)—French worker and leader of the First International, member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune of 1871. p. 108

[42] The reference is to the "*Rules of Organisation*" adopted at the Geneva Menshevik Conference in 1905. The "Rules" were also criticised by Lenin in the article "A Third Step Back" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54) and in "Preface to the Pamphlet *Workers on the Split in the Party*" (see pp. 163-68 of this volume). p . 110

[43] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. I, p. 217. p. 113

[44] The *Hirsch-Duncker Trade Unions*—founded in 1865 in Germany by two bourgeois liberals—Hirsch and Duncker who, like the bourgeois economist Brentano, advocated "the harmony of class interests", distracted the workers from the revolutionary class struggle against the bourgeoisie, and limited the role of the trade unions to the bounds of mutual aid societies and educational activities. p. 120

[45] Engels's article *Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit. Denkschrift über den Aufstand in Spanien im Sommer 1873* was translated into Russian under Lenin's editorship and in 1905 was published in Geneva by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in the form of a pamphlet. A second edition came out in 1906 in St. Petersburg (see *Der Volksstaat*, Nos. 105, 106, 107, 1873).

Written by Marx and Engels in March 1850, the *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* was published in Russian in 1906 in the supplement to Marx's pamphlet *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, which was brought out by the *Molot* Publishers in St. Petersburg (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. I, pp. 106-17). p. 122

[46] The following passage, as far as the words "We have shown that the *Osvobozhdeniye* people..." (see page 129) was omitted in the first edition of the book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. The passage was first published in the newspaper *Pravda* in No. 112 of April 22, 1940. p. 127

[47] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. I, pp. 473-545. p. 127

[48] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a newspaper founded in 1756. From the sixties of the nineteenth century it voiced the views

of the most reactionary monarchist sections of the landlords and the clergy. In 1905 it became a leading organ of the Black Hundreds, and was banned following the October Revolution of 1917. p. 128

[49] *Franz Mehring* (1846-1919)—a leading Left-winger in German Social-Democracy, historian, and publicist. He was one of the founders of the revolutionary Spartacus League, and then joined the Communist Party of Germany. p. 130

[50] See K. Marx and F. Engels, MEGA, 1. Abt., Bd. 7, Moskau, 1935, S. 362. p. 131

[51] *Ibid.*, S. 28. p. 132

[52] *Ibid.*, S. 28-29. p. 132

[53] *Ibid.*, S. 8. p. 133

[54] *Ibid.*, S. 50-51. p. 134

[55] *Ibid.*, S. 260-61. p. 135

[56] The organ of the Cologne Workers' League was originally called *Zeitung des Arbeiter-Vereins zu Köln*, with the subtitle *Freiheit*, *Bruderlichkeit*, *Arbeit* (*Freedom*, *Brotherhood*, *Labour*). Forty issues came out between April and October 1848, and another 23 between October 1848 and June 1849, during which period the subtitle became the paper's title. p. 137

[57] *The Communist League*—the first international organisation of the revolutionary proletariat, was founded in London in the summer of 1847 by a congress of delegates of revolutionary proletarian organisations. The League was organised and guided by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, who, on instructions from the League, wrote its programme—the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. It existed until 1852, its foremost members subsequently playing a leading part in the First International. See the article by F. Engels, *On the History of the Communist League* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. II, pp. 338-57). p. 138

[58] *Tovarishch* (*The Comrade*)—a daily that was published in St. Petersburg from March 1906 till January 1908. Though formally not the organ of any particular party it was in fact the mouthpiece of the Left Constitutional-Democrats, and published contributions from Mensheviks. p. 139

[59] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. II, p. 352. p. 140

[60] *Khlestakov*—the leading character in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*, an arrant boaster and liar. p. 140

[61] The article "The Paris Commune and the Tasks of the Democratic Dictatorship" was published in *Proletary*, No. 8 of July 17 (4), 1905. Its author, who is not known, provided a historical note on the activities of the Paris Commune and the composition of its government, which, besides representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, included socialist workingmen prominent in the labour movement. The article was directed against the tactics of the Mensheviks, who denied the possibility of Social-Democrats participating in a provisional revolutionary government. The article was edited by Lenin, who changed the title, made a number of changes in the wording, and wrote the conclusion. p. 141

[62] *Bureau of Majority Committees*—the Bolsheviks' organisational centre, was formed on Lenin's initiative to prepare for the R.S.D.L.P.'s Third Congress. It was elected at the close of 1904 at three regional conferences—the Southern, the Caucasian, and the Northern. p. 143

[63] The conciliator members of the Central Committee who were arrested at its session on February 9 (22), 1905 in Moscow were: *Ma*—V. A. Noskov, *Bem*—M. A. Silvin; *Vladimir*—L. Y. Karpov; *Innokenty*—I . F . Dubrovinsky; *Andrei*—A . A . Kvyatkovsky; *Voron*—L. Y. Galperin. p. 144

[64] On May 7 (20), 1905 the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. appointed Plekhanov its representative in the International Socialist Bureau (the executive body of the Second International), on the condition that he recognise the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Third Congress as binding. Plekhanov did not accept this condition, upon which his appointment was cancelled. In October 1905 the Central Committee appointed Lenin its representative in the International Socialist Bureau. Regarding the R.S.D.L.P.'s representation in the Bureau see also this volume, pp. 332-34. p. 144

[65] *The Leipziger Volkszeitung*—organ of the Left wing of German Social-Democracy, was founded in 1894. p. 145

[66] Lenin is referring to the article by Rosa Luxemburg *Organisationsfragen der Russischen Sozialdemokratie*, written by her at the request of the Mensheviks, and published in July 1904 in the Menshevik *Iskra* and in *Die Neue Zeit*. A refutal of this article was contained in *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. Reply by N. Lenin to Rosa Luxemburg* (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 472-83) which was sent to *Die Neue Zeit*. Kautsky, who supported the Mensheviks, refused to publish the reply. p. 145

[67] See F. Engels, "Flüchtlingsliteratur. II. Programm der blanquistischen Kommuneflüchtlinge", *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat*, Berlin 1957, S. 50. p. 156

[68] *Posledniye Izvestia* (*News*)—a periodical published abroad by the Bund from 1901 till 1906. It expressed the Bundists' bourgeois-nationalist views. p. 160

[69] This document is the original draft of Lenin's introduction to the pamphlet *Workers on the Split in the Party*, which was published in Geneva in August 1905. One of the variants of the title of the pamphlet was *The Voice of the Workers and the Split in the Party*. The title of the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee, C.P.S.U. p. 161

[70] *An Open Letter to the Mensheviks' Organising Committee from the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee* was to have been published in No. 10 of *Proletary*, but was actually published in No. 11, August 9 (July 27), 1905. The letter proposed negotiations on problems of uniting the Party on the basis of the Programme and Rules adopted by the Third Congress. The first and second conferences of representatives of the Central Committee and the Organising Committee took place in July, and the third in September 1905. The conferences showed that by their schismatic action the Mensheviks were wrecking unification of the Party. p. 161

[71] *Manilovism*—from Manilov, a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, whose name has come to typify smug complacency, empty and saccharine prattle, and pipe-dreaming. p. 163

[72] Lenin is referring to *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Diary of a Social-Democrat*)—a non-periodical organ published by Plekhanov in Geneva from March 1805 till April 1912. In all, sixteen issues were brought out, at considerable intervals. Publication was resumed in Petrograd in 1916, but only one issue appeared.

In the first eight issues (1905-06) Plekhanov advocated extremely Right-wing, Menshevik and opportunist views, defended a bloc between Social-Democracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, rejected the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, and condemned the December insurrection.

In Nos. 9-16 (1909-12) he came out against the Menshevik liquidators, who wanted to disband underground party organisations. In the basic questions of tactics, however, he remained on a Menshevik platform. In No. 1 for 1916, Plekhanov's social-chauvinist views found full expression.

Plekhanov's opportunism and departure from revolutionary Marxism were roundly criticised by Lenin. p. 168

[73] *The Union of Unions*—a political organisation of liberal bourgeois intellectuals, founded in May 1905 at the first congress of representatives of 14 unions, such as lawyers, writers, medical men, engineers, teachers, and the like. In 1905 the Union favoured a boycott of the Bulygin Duma, but soon changed its stand, deciding to take part in the Duma elections. It fell apart towards the close of 1906.

LIMITED COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION NOT FOR

Regarding the attitude of Social-Democracy towards the liberal unions see pp. 281-82 in this volume. p. 169

[74] *Slovo* (*The Word*)—a bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from 1903 till 1909. Originally a Right-wing Zemstvo organ, it became the mouthpiece of the Octobrist Party from November 1905 till July 1906, when it ceased publication. Publication was resumed on November 19 (December 2), 1906, when the paper became the organ of the constitutional monarchist party of "Peaceful Renovation", which in essence in no way differed from the Octobrists. p. 170

[75] *Rural Superintendent* (*Zemsky Nachalnik*)—an administrative post instituted in 1889 by the tsarist government with the aim of strengthening the landlords' authority over the peasants. Rural Superintendents were selected from among the local landed nobility, and were given very great powers not only of an administrative character, but also judicial, which included the right to arrest peasants and administer corporal punishment. p. 171

[76] *Suvorin, A. S.*—editor of the reactionary newspaper *Novoye Vremya* from 1876 till 1912. p. 172

[77] *Until the Greek calends*—a translation of the Latin *ad calendas graecas*. The *calends* was the name given in the Roman calendar to the first day of each month. The Greek calendar had no calends, so the expression means "never". p. 173

[78] *Le Matin*—the name of a French bourgeois daily paper that was founded in 1884. p. 176

[79] *The conference of R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad* (of Bolshevik and Menshevik representatives) was held in the summer of 1905. Party branches in South Germany were represented at the conference, whose resolution spoke of the need for a unity congress of the Party to be called, so as to resolve the problem of unification with the seceding section of the R.S.D.L.P. (the Mensheviks). The resolution was published in No. 12 of *Proletary*, with a note "from the Editors" written by Lenin. p. 188

[80] *Uchitel* (*Teacher*) was the pseudonym used by M. N. Pokrovsky. The article "The *Osvobozhdeniye* People at Work" was written by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich. p. 189

[81] The present article is a reply to a letter from *A Worker* from Dvinsk. The writer posed the following questions to the Editorial Board of *Proletary*, with reference to the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Third Congress: "1) What role will be played by a provisional government; will it guide or rule the country, or do neither? 2) Under what circumstances is participation of proletarians in a provisional government possible? 3) What is all this agitation and propaganda about an insurrection?" p. 190

[82] *Marshal of the Nobility*—the elected representative of the nobility of a gubernia or uyezd, who was in charge of all the nobles' affairs in the area represented. He held a position of influence in the administration, and took the chair at Zemstvo meetings. p. 193

[83] *Burenin, V. P.*, worked on the staff of the reactionary newspaper *Novoye Vremya*, engaged in libelling and besmearing representatives of all progressive public and political trends. Lenin uses his name as a synonym for dishonest methods of conducting polemics. p. 202

[84] *The Bund* (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) came into being in 1897 at the founding Congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilna. In the main, it comprised semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the west of Russia. At the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898, the Bund joined the latter "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in respect of questions affecting the Jewish proletariat specifically". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Russ. ed., Moscow 1954, Part 1, p. 14.)

The Bund was an expression of nationalism and separatism in the Russian working-class movement. In April 1901 the Bund's Fourth Congress decided to alter the organisational ties with the R.S.D.L.P., as established by the latter's First Congress. In its resolution, the Bund Congress declared that it regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federation of national organisations, and that the Bund should enter the R.S.D.L.P. as a federal section. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. turned down the Bund's demand that it should be recognised the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party, but rejoined it in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bund constantly supported the Party's opportunist wing (the Economists, Mensheviks, and Liquidators), and waged a struggle against Bolshevism and the Bolsheviks. To the latter's programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination the Bund contraposed the demand for autonomy of national culture. While the Stolypin reaction was raging, the Bund took a liquidationist stand, and was active in the formation of the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War the Bundists held a social-chauvinist stand, and in 1917 they supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and sided with the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War the Bund's leaders made common cause with the forces of counter-revolution. Meanwhile there was a turn among the Bund's rank and file for collaboration with the Soviets. In March 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself, part of the membership joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the basis of the general rules of admission. p. 203

[85] *Proletariatis Brdzola* (*The Struggle of the Proletariat*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, organ of the Caucasian League of the R.S.D.L.P. It was published between April-May 1903 and October 1905, twelve issues coming out in all. The paper was published in Georgian, Armenian and Russian. The editorial board was in close touch with Lenin and the Bolshevik centre abroad, and systematically published reprints of articles by Lenin, and material from the Leninist *Iskra*, and later from *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. p. 205

[86] P. Nikolayev's pamphlet *The Revolution in Russia* was published by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905 in Geneva. Lenin wrote the present note on the Bulygin Duma while he was amending the manuscript of the pamphlet. The note refers to the passage that reads, "Minister for the Interior Bulygin intends to set up a State Duma... etc." Also extant is the manuscript, written in Lenin's hand, on the title page of the pamphlet, with the inscription, "P. Nikolaew. *Die Revolution in Russland*. Workers of All Countries, Unite! Published by the Central Committee" (*Lenin Miscellany XXVI*, p. 345). p. 211

[87] *S. S.*—the pseudonym of P. N. Milyukov, leader of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. p. 216

[88] *The third element*—an expression used to designate the Zemstvo democratic intelligentsia. p. 217

[89] The Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*—a daily newspaper that was the central organ of Austrian Social-Democracy. It was founded by V. Adler in Vienna in 1889.

In 1905 the paper reflected the militant temper of the workers and the toiling masses of Austria-Hungary who under the influence of the first Russian revolution were fighting for the introduction of universal suffrage in their country.

During the First World War the paper took a social-chauvinist stand, for which Lenin called it the newspaper of "The Viennese traitors to socialism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 29, "Heroes of the Berne International"). Banned in 1934, the paper resumed publication in 1945 as the central organ of the Socialist Party of Austria. p. 224

[90] *D. F. Trepov*—Governor General of St. Petersburg, who was active in the suppression of the first Russian revolution. p. 226

[91] The reference is to an item "Our Khlestakovs" by Lenin, published in No. 9 of *Proletary*, July 26 (13), 1905, which quoted a message sent by the Menshevik *Iskra* to a French socialist newspaper, containing exaggerated and false figures about the number of its adherents among the organised workers (see *Lenin Miscellany XVI*, pp. 128-29). p. 228

[92] Issue No. 10 of *Proletary*, August 2 (July 20), 1905, published a resolution of the Saratov Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which held a conciliatory stand; the resolution had been adopted on a report on the Third Congress of the Party and the Mensheviks' Conference. *Proletary* published the resolution with an epilogue by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XVI*, p. 130). p. 230

[93] *Winter hiring*—the hiring of peasants for summer work, practised by the landlords and kulaks during the winter, when the peasants were particularly in need of cash, and would agree to extortionate terms. p. 233

[94] An expression from Gogol's *Diary of a Madman*. p. 247

[95] *Die Vossische Zeitung*—a moderate liberal newspaper published in Berlin between 1704 and 1934. p. 253

[96] *Ledru-Rollin*, *Alexandre-Auguste* (1807-1874)—French politician, representative of the petty-bourgeois democrats. p. 257

[97] *Cavaignac*, *Louis-Eugène*—French general; Minister for War in the provisional government following the February revolution of 1848. During the June days of 1848, he was in charge of the suppression of the Paris workers' uprising.

Thiers, *Louis-Adolphe*—French bourgeois politician and bitter enemy of the working class. In 1871 he was head of the government and displayed great brutality in putting down the uprising of the Paris Communards. p. 260

[98] *Jacoby*, *Johann* (1805-1877)—German bourgeois democrat, participant in the revolution of 1848. Became a Social-Democrat after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. p. 261

[99] The reference is to the following works: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Revue*, *Mai bis October*, 1850; K. Marx, *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Werke*, Berlin 1960, Band 7, S. 440-41 and Band 8, S. 412-13). p. 273

[100] *The Liberal Unions and Social-Democracy*—an insert written by Lenin to an article by V. V. Vorovsky, which was published under the same title in *Proletary*, No. 18, September 26 (13), 1905. p. 281

[101] *Sergei*—the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich Romanov, the tsar's uncle, Governor General of Moscow and one of the most reactionary representatives of the tsarist autocracy. Assassinated by the Socialist-Revolutionary Kalyaev on February 4 (17), 1905. p. 283

[102] *Rabochy* (*The Worker*)—an illegal and popular Social-Democratic newspaper, which was published in Moscow by the R.S.D.L.P.'s

Central Committee in 1906 by decision of the Party's Third Congress. Four issues came out between August and October. p. 289

[103] *The Cologne Congress of German Trade Unions* took place in May 1905. p. 292

[104] The present draft of the article was not completed by Lenin. p. 295

[105] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow 1958, Vol. I, p. 251. p. 296

[106] *The Conference of Social-Democratic Organisations in Russia* was held in Riga on September 7-9 (20-22), 1905. For the resolutions passed by the Conference see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Russ. ed., Moscow 1953, Part 1, pp. 91-94.

In a letter to members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. dated September 7, 1905 Lenin spoke of the close ties between the "Armenian Social-Democratic Workers' Organisations" and the Bund (see *Lenin Miscellany V*, p. 493). p. 300

[107] The reference is to the Mensheviks' plan of support for the "Zemstvo campaign" which was conducted by bourgeois liberals between the autumn of 1904 and January 1905. The campaign consisted of a series of conferences public meetings, and banquets arranged by Zemstvo leaders. At these affairs speeches were made and resolutions passed in support of moderate constitutionalist demands. Lenin sharply criticised the "plan of the Zemstvo campaign" in an article entitled "The Zemstvo Campaign and *Iskra*'s Plan" (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516). p. 306

[108] *The Shidlovsky Commission*, which was headed by Senator Shidlovsky, was set up by an imperial ukase of January 29 (February 11), 1905 ostensibly "to enquire without delay into the causes of discontent among the workers in the city of St. Petersburg and its suburbs". The commission was made up of officials, the heads of government-owned factories, and factory owners. The intention was also to include elected representatives of the workers. The Bolsheviks, who considered this manoeuvre on the part of the tsarist regime an attempt to distract the workers from the revolutionary struggle, proposed that elections to the commission be used to present political demands to the tsar's government (see the book *Leaflets of the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks*, Vol. 1, 1939, pp. 197-202). When the demands were rejected by the government the electors refused to nominate their representatives to the commission, and called upon the St. Petersburg workers to strike. On the following day mass political strikes began, and on February 20 (March 5) the authorities were obliged to abolish the commission. p. 306

[109] The reference is to Benjamin Disraeli. p. 307

[110] *David, Eduard*—German economist and adherent of Bernstein. A criticism of his views is given by Lenin in *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*. p. 311

[111] *Szarwark*—statute labour for the repair and construction of roads, bridges and other, mostly military, structures, imposed on the peasants in Poland. p. 311

[112] *Demesnes*—lands belonging to members of the tsar's family. p. 312

[113] *Cut-off lands* (*otrezki*)—land which the landlords "cut-off", i.e., took away from the peasants, when serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861. p. 314

[114] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. Moderately liberal at the outset, it became, after 1876, the organ of reactionary circles of the nobility and the bureaucracy. The paper was hostile not only to the revolutionary movement, but even to the liberal-bourgeois. Following 1905 it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* the acme of venality in the press. p. 318

[115] *Balalaikin*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's *Modern Idyll*, a liberal windbag, adventurer and liar. p. 324

[116] *On the Question of Party Unity*—it was under this headline that *Proletary*, No. 20 of October 10 (September 27), 1905 published the following documents: minutes of the third conference of representatives of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee and the Mensheviks' Organising Committee as elected at the Geneva Conference, and the Central Committee's comments on these minutes. In its appraisal of the Mensheviks' behaviour at the joint conference and the demands presented by them, the Central Committee pointed out that their policy was the same as it had been prior to the Third Congress, and that it was leading to "the greatest chaos and anarchy, to the disintegration of the Party".

The documents were published with a note "From the Editorial Board" written by Lenin. p. 327

[117] *The Southern Russian Constituent Conference of the Mensheviks* was held in Kiev in August 1905. Its decisions were criticised by Lenin also in the article "The Latest in *Iskra* Tactics, or Mock Elections as a New Incentive to an Uprising" (see pp. 356-73 of this volume). p. 330

[118] The Kostroma Committee, which adhered to the Bolshevik stand, opposed the appointment of Plekhanov as representative to the International Socialist Bureau. p. 334

[119] "*Talks with Our Readers*" is the editor's introduction to a letter, published by *Proletary* in excerpts, from the Bolshevik S. Gusev, who in the second half of 1905 was the secretary of the Odessa Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. In his letter Gusev expressed his opinion of the Bolsheviks' tactics in the 1905 Revolution, reported on the explanatory work among the masses that was being conducted on these questions, and criticised the decisions of the Geneva Conference of the Mensheviks. Replying to Gusev on September 7 (20), 1905, Lenin wrote that he was instituting contacts between the Central Organ and practical workers, and that the editorial board intended publishing his letter in part. "On the whole we are in agreement and hold the same opinions (your ideas coincide with mine in *Two Tactics*)," Lenin wrote (*Collected Works*, Vol. 34, " A Letter to S. I. Gusev"). p. 335

[120] *Days of Bloodshed in Moscow* is a draft of the article "The Political Strike and the Street Fighting in Moscow", which is published in this volume on pages 347-55. p. 336

[121] *The Ivanovo-Voznesensk strike*, which began at the end of May and lasted till early August in 1905, involved about 70,000 workers of both sexes. Leadership was provided by the Northern Committee of the Bolsheviks. During the strike the workers formed a Council of Workers' Representatives which in fact was one of the earliest Soviets of Workers' Deputies in Russia. p. 336

[122] The police fired on Tiflis workers who had gathered on August 29 (September 11), 1905 in the building of the City Council to discuss the elections to the State Duma. By order of the tsarist authorities, the police and the Cossacks surrounded the building, broke into the hall where over 2,000 persons were assembled, and fell upon them. Sixty people were killed and about 300 injured.

All over the Caucasus—in Tiflis, Kutaisi, Sukhumi, etc.—political demonstrations and strikes took place in protest against the crimes perpetrated by the tsarist regime. Leaflets calling for an armed uprising against the autocracy were published by the Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and No. 18 of *Proletary* dated September 26 (13), 1905 carried a special bulletin signed by the Caucasian League Committee regarding the events in Tiflis. p. 337

[123] *Vorwärts*—central organ of German Social-Democracy, was published from 1876 onwards, under the editorship of Wilhelm Liebknecht and others. In its columns Frederick Engels waged a struggle against all manifestations of opportunism. From the middle nineties, after the death of Engels, the paper began systematic publication of writings by the opportunists dominant in German Social-Democracy and the Second International. p. 349

[124] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—a Menshevik newspaper published in Geneva from October 1904 till October 1905. p. 370

[125] The article signed *M. Borisov* was first published in *Proletary*, and then republished in the St. Petersburg Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*), No. 7 of November 8 (21), 1905. p. 374

[126] The reference is to the liberal-bourgeois newspaper Rus which came out at intervals in St. Petersburg between 1903 and 1908 under various names, such as *Rus* (*Russia*), *Molva* (*Hearsay*), and *Dvadtsaty Vek* (*The Twentieth Century*). p. 379

[127] No. 22 of *Proletary*, October 24 (11), 1905 carried a review of No. 3 of the Russian language edition of *Borba Proletariata*, organ of the Caucasian League of the R.S.D.L.P. Part of the review published in this volume was written by Lenin, and contains an appraisal of the article by J. Stalin entitled "Reply to *Sotsial-Demokrat*". p. 388

[128] No. 19 of *Proletary*, October 3 (September 20), 1905 published "An Open Letter to Comrades Abroad" from a group of Social-Democrats working in Kazan, Simbirsk and Nizhni-Novgorod gubernias. The letter described the difficult conditions of underground work in Russia and the shortage of Party forces, and called upon the youth to remain in Russia to work there. The letter was accompanied by the following editorial note: "We are publishing this statement by 'comrades from out-of-the-way places' so as to enable them to express in our columns their frame of mind and their opinion of Party work. While we do not share the author's too extreme opinion regarding the uselessness of 'studies' abroad we do however think it necessary more often to remind our comrades abroad and the Party as a whole of the out-of-the-way places in Russia." It has not been established who used the pseudonym of "Revolutionary". p. 389

[129] *Vasilyev*—the Bolshevik F. Lengnik; *Schmidt*—the Bolshevik P. Rumyantsev. The latter left the Party during the period of the Stolypin reaction. p. 390

[130] Lenin is quoting from the poem by N. Dobrolyubov *In a Prussian Railway Carriage*, signed "Konrad Lilienschwager" and published in 1862 in No. 8 of *Svistok* (*The Whistle*), a supplement to *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*) magazine. p. 404

[131] The article "The British Labour Movement and the Trade Union Congress" was published without the author's signature in No. 23 of *Proletary*, October 31 (18), 1905. The manuscript of the translation of this article was edited by Lenin, who attached two notes to it—one on the Taff Vale case, mentioned in the article, and the second on the concluding part of the article. p. 413

[132] *An Equilibrium of Forces* was completed several hours before the telegraph brought the news to Geneva that the tsar's Manifesto of

October 17 (30) has been made public. The questions touched upon in *An Equilibrium of Forces* were developed in detail in the article "The Denouement Is at Hand" (see pp. 447-54 of this volume). p. 414

[133] Lenin's pamphlet on this subject was not published. p. 417

[134] The reference is to the resolution written by Lenin and adopted by the Third Congress of the Party. It was worded, "On the Question of Open Political Action by the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 377-78). p. 419

[135] The reference is to the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which arose as the united strike committee during the (October All-Russia political strike. On October 13 (26), St. Petersburg workers elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies so as to give leadership to the strike. In point of organisation the Soviet took shape on October 17 (30), when the provisional executive committee was elected.

The first Soviets of Workers' Deputies arose out of the strike movement even prior to the October general strike. In May 1905 a Soviet was formed in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and a month later in Kostroma, while in September Soviets of Deputies were formed in Moscow by workers in individual trades, such as printers and tobacco workers. These first Soviets were already marked by a trend towards functions wider than those of strike committees, so that when the October strike broke out and a Soviet was formed in St. Petersburg they gave an impetus to the appearance of Soviets in other parts of the country. Shortly before the December insurrection in Moscow, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies came into being, the example being followed in Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Odessa, Nikolayev, Ekaterinoslav, Vladikavkaz, Revel, Novorossiisk, Saratov, Chita, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Baku, and elsewhere.

In defiance of all the institutions of the tsar's government, the Soviets issued their own decrees, orders and instructions, and on their own authority they introduced the eight-hour working day and instituted democratic liberties.

The Bolsheviks everywhere entered the Soviets, and wherever they succeeded in gaining dominant influence the Soviets became militant centres for the mobilisation of revolutionary forces, where preparations for an insurrection were made and carried out. Thus, the Moscow Soviet was the headquarters of the December insurrection, and in Krasnoyarsk and Novorossiisk the Soviets took over power. The St. Petersburg Soviet "was weakest as an organ of the new power" (Lenin). Leadership in that Soviet was seized by the Mensheviks, so that it could not perform its main task—become the organ of an armed uprising and of the struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy.

Lenin, who developed the theory of the Soviets, regarded them as a mass political organisation of the working class, as organs of insurrection, and embryos of a new revolutionary system of rule.

The Bolsheviks differed sharply from the Mensheviks on the question of the role and significance of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. The Mensheviks belittled the role of the Soviets, reducing them merely to organs of local self-government. In their practical activities, the Mensheviks limited the functions of the Soviets to the defence of the workers' economic interests.

The Soviets of 1905, one of the greatest historic gains of the working class, were the prototype of Soviet power as established in 1917.

On the Soviets of Workers' Deputies see the following articles by Lenin: "Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies"; "Resolution of the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies on Measures for Counteracting the Lockout, Adopted on November 14 (27), 1905"; "The Provocation that Failed"; "The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule"; "Socialism and Anarchism", "The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism"; "The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party", etc. p. 432

[136] *The Second Congress of the "League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad"* was held on October 13-18 (26-31), 1903 in Geneva. It was convened by demand of the Mensheviks, who wished to contrapose it to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Expressing himself against the congress of the League Abroad, Lenin wrote, "A League congress *at present* will provide everything for a squabble but nothing for practical purposes, i.e., for work abroad" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, "Letter to G. D. Leiteizen", October 10, 1903). p. 436

[137] The article "Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism" was reprinted in No. 9 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* of November 10 (23), 1905. p. 438

[138] *V. V.*—pseudonym of V. Vorontsov, author of the book *The Destiny of Capitalism in Russia*; *Nikolai—on*—pseudonym of N. Danielson, author of the book *Sketches on Our Post-Reform Social Economy*. Both men were ideologists of liberal Narodism of the 1880s and 1890s. p. 444

[139] Lenin is referring to *Izvestia Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov* (*Bulletin of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies*)—official organ of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, published from October 17 (30) till December 14 (27), 1905. It was made up and printed by the workers at the print-shops of various bourgeois newspapers. In all, ten issues appeared, the eleventh being confiscated by the police while it was being printed. p. 448

[140] The reference is to the *Neue Freie Presse*, a liberal-bourgeois newspaper, published in Vienna from 1864 onwards. p. 451

[141] This insert was written by Lenin while he was editing the article, "The Peasant Congress" by V. Kalinin (pseudonym of V. Karpinsky), which was published in No. 25 of *Proletary*, November 16 (3), 1905. p. 455

[142] *Oblomov*—the main character in the novel *Oblomov* by the writer I. Goncharov. The name has come to signify routine stagnation and incapacity for action. p. 460

[143] *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published as a St. Petersburg daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. Lenin took over the editorship upon his return to Russia in early November. *Novaya Zhizn* was the actual central organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Closely associated with the paper were V. Vorovsky, M. Olminsky, and A. Lunacharsky, while Maxim Gorky contributed articles and gave the paper financial aid.

No. 9 of the paper, which appeared on November 10 (23), carried Lenin's first article "On the Reorganisation of the Party", which was followed by more than ten articles from his pen. The paper's circulation reached 80,000, though it was constantly persecuted. Of the 27 issues, 15 were confiscated. It was banned after publication of No. 27 on December 2 (15), No. 28 coming out illegally. p. 462

[144] *Vendée*—a department in France where, during the French bourgeois revolution, a counter-revolutionary insurrection of the ignorant and reactionary peasantry took place, directed against the revolutionary Convention. Staged under religious slogans, the uprising was directed by the counter-revolutionary clergy and landlords. p. 464

[145] The mutiny of soldiers and naval ratings in Kronstadt began on October 26 (November 8), 1905. The following demands were put forward by the rebels: convening of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage; establishment of a democratic republic; freedom of speech, assembly and association; improvement of the conditions of soldiers and ratings. The uprising was put down on October 28 (November 10). p. 465

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*June-November 1905*)

1905

June-July	Lenin writes *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution.*
June 28 (July 11)	In a letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin proposes that political guidance of Party organisations should be improved by means of regular publication of leaflets and bulletins by the Central Committee.
June 29 (July 12)	Lenin writes a letter to the Central Committee regarding the terms of G. Plekhanov's appointment as the R.S.D.L.P.'s representative to the International Socialist Bureau.
July 11 (24)	In a letter to the International Socialist Bureau Lenin exposes the Mensheviks' schismatic tactics.
July 13 (26)	Lenin's articles "Revolution Teaches" and "Wrathful Impotence" are published in No. 9 of *Proletary*.
July, following 13 (26)	Lenin writes the preface to *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution.*
July 15 (28)	In a letter to the Central Committee, Lenin advises cancellation of the Central Committee's decision to appoint Plekhanov as the R.S.D.L.P.'s representative to the International Socialist Bureau.
July 20 (August 2)	Lenin's article "While the Proletariat Is Doing the Fighting the Bourgeoisie Is Stealing Towards Power" is published as the leading article in No. 10 of *Proletary*.
July 27 (August 9)	No. 11 of *Proletary* carries a report of the publication of Lenin's *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution.*
July	Lenin writes the preface to the pamphlet *Workers on the Split in the Party.*

July-August	Lenin edits the Russian translation of Marx's *The Civil War in France* for the second edition which was brought out in 1905 by the *Burevestnik* Publishers in Odessa.
August 1 (14)	In a letter to the Central Committee, Lenin criticises the conciliatory stand taken by Central Committee members in Russia (Bogdanov, Krasin and others), and demands that the decisions of the Party's Third Congress be unswervingly applied in solving the problem of unification with the break-away section of the R.S.D.L.P. (the Mensheviks).
August 3 (16)	Lenin's article "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and Insurrection" is published as a leader in No. 12 of the newspaper *Proletary*.
August 9 (22)	No. 13 of *Proletary* carries Lenin's article "Reply from the *Proletary* Editorial Board to Questions Put by Comrade Worker" and his note on M. N. Pokrovsky's article "The Professional Intelligentsia and the Social-Democrats".
August 16 (29)	No. 14 of *Proletary* carries the following articles by Lenin: "'Oneness of the Tsar and the People, and of the People and the Tsar'" (leading article), "The Black Hundreds and the Organisation of an Uprising", "Are the Zemstvo 'Liberals' Already Turning Back?", and an editorial epilogue to the article, "The Third Congress on Trial Before the Caucasian Mensheviks", the latter republished from No. 1 of the newspaper *Borba Proletariata*.
August	Lenin writes the preface to the third edition of the pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*.
	He writes the plan of his pamphlet, *The Working Class and Revolution*.
	Publication of Lenin's pamphlet *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* (reprint of the first four chapters).
August 23 (September 5)	No. 15 of *Proletary* carries the following articles by Lenin: "In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie, or in the Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry?" (leading article), "A Most Lucid Exposition of a Most Confused Plan", and "Keeping International Social-Democracy Informed of Our Party Affairs".

August 25 (September 7)	In a letter to members of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee in Russia, Lenin protests against their conciliatory stand in matters of tactics and categorically insists on the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, *Proletary*, being kept abreast of the Central Committee's activities.
September 1 (14)	No. 16 of *Proletary* carries the following articles by Lenin: "Social-Democracy's Attitude Towards the Peasant Movement" (leading article), "What Our Liberal Bourgeois Want, and What They Fear" and "The Theory of Spontaneous Generation".
	In a letter to P. A. Krasikov, Lenin gives instructions on the consolidation of R.S.D.L.P. local committees and on the need to establish closer relations between the St. Petersburg Committee and the *Proletary* Editorial Board.
September 2 (15)	In a letter to the Central Committee, Lenin insists on being informed in time of the Central Committee's activities in Russia.
September 3 (16)	In a letter to the International Socialist Bureau, Lenin informs the latter of the consent of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee to a conference proposed by the Bureau in connection with differences within the R.S.D.L.P.
September 7 (20)	In a letter to S. I. Gusev Lenin writes of the need for Party workers from Russia to apply to the *Proletary* Editorial Board on matters of Bolshevik tactics and their implementation.
Following September 10 (23)	Lenin delivers a paper to Russian emigrants in Switzerland on the subject of Party tactics towards the Bulygin Duma.
September 13 (26)	No. 18 of *Proletary* carries the following articles by Lenin: "Friends Meet" (leading article), "Argue About Tactics, but Give Clear Slogans!", "Playing at Parliamentarianism", "From the Defensive to the Offensive", "On the Current Moment", and an insert to V. V. Vorovsky's article "The Liberal Unions and Social-Democracy".
Middle of September	*Rabochy*, mass organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., publishes in issue No. 2 an appeal to all Party organisations, written by Lenin and entitled "From the Editorial Board of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P."

September 20 (October 3)	Lenin's article, "The Zemstvo Congress" is published in No. 19 of *Proletary*.
	Lenin writes two letters to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with instructions on preparations for the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and stresses the importance of political literature in giving leadership to Party work.
September 25 (October 8)	In a letter to the Central Committee, Lenin communicates the decision of the Southern Russian Conference of the Mensheviks regarding Plekhanov being empowered to act as the Mensheviks' representative to the International Socialist Bureau, and proposes that V. Vorovsky should represent the Bolsheviks.
September, prior to the 27th (October 10)	Lenin writes the articles: "No Falsehood! Our Strength Lies in Stating the Truth!", and "The Jena Congress of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party".
September 27 (October 10)	No. 20 of *Proletary* carries the following articles by Lenin: "Socialism and the Peasantry" (leading article), "A Replete Bourgeoisie and a Craving Bourgeoisie", "The Landlords on the Boycott of the Duma", "On the Question of Party Unity", "An Irate Reply", "A New Menshevik Conference" and "Representation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the International Socialist Bureau".
	He writes the article "Days of Bloodshed in Moscow".
September 30 (October 13)	In a letter to S. I. Gusev Lenin writes of the need to strengthen Party leadership in the trade unions.
End of September	Lenin writes the draft of the article "The Bourgeoisie Awakened from Its Slumber".
September-October	*Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* is illegally republished in Russia by the Central Committee, and separately by the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
	Lenin's pamphlet To the Rural Poor is illegally republished by the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., and legally by the *Molot* Publishers in St. Petersburg, under the title of *The Needs of the Countryside* (*To the Rural Poor*).

Early October — Lenin writes an item against A. N. Potresov (Starover) entitled "A Social-Democratic Sweetheart".

October 3 (16) — In a letter to the Combat Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin gives directions on the formation of combat groups and contingents of the revolutionary army for an insurrection.

October 4 (17) — The following articles by Lenin are published in No. 21 of *Proletary*: "The Political Strike and the Street Fighting in Moscow" (leading article), "The Latest in *Iskra* Tactics, or Mock Elections as a New Incentive to an Uprising".

Between October 4 and 11 (17 and 24) — The draft decisions of the Party's Third Congress, which were written by Lenin, and the reports and speeches Lenin delivered at the Congress are published for the first time in the book *The Third Regular Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Full Text of the Minutes*, which was brought out in Geneva by the Central Committee.

October 7 (20) — Lenin writes the Rules of the Business Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee.

October 11 (24) — No. 22 of *Proletary* carries the following: Lenin's article "The Lessons of the Moscow Events"; his note "The Youth Abroad and the Russian Revolution", and his review of the article "Reply to *Sotsial-Demokrat*" which was published in No. 3 (in Russian) of the newspaper *Borba Proletariata*.

October 12 (25) — In a letter to the Central Committee, Lenin acknowledges notification of his appointment as the R.S.D.L.P.'s representative to the International Socialist Bureau.

October 13 (26) — Lenin writes "The All-Russia Political Strike", which is published as the leading article in No. 23 of *Proletary*, October 31 (18).

A letter is sent by Lenin to M. M. Essen in St. Petersburg, regarding the need to build up preparations for an insurrection, and the formation of hundreds and thousands of combat groups.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

October 14 (27)	Lenin writes to the International Socialist Bureau, informing it that F. Lengnik, P. Rumyantsev and he have been appointed to represent the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. at the conference proposed by the Bureau.
The second half of October	Lenin writes the articles "Tasks of Revolutionary Army Contingents" and "What the Liberals Expect of the Duma".
	Lenin draws up the plan of a pamphlet criticising P. Axelrod's *The People's Duma and a Labour Congress* (1905).
October 17 (30)	Lenin writes an outline of the article "An Equilibrium of Forces".
October 18 (31)	The following articles by Lenin are published in No. 23 of *Proletary*: "The First Results of the Political Alignment", "The Hysterics of the Defeated", "Revolutionary Riga's Ultimatum", "The Plans of a Buffoon-Minister", and "The Aggravation of the Situation in Russia".
October 19 (November 1)	Lenin writes the article "The First Victory of the Revolution", on the occasion of the Manifesto of October 17. This article is published as the leader in No. 24 of *Proletary*, November 7 (October 25).
October 20 (November 2)	At a meeting of Russian Social-Democrats in Geneva Lenin delivers a report on the recent political events in Russia.
October 25 (November 7)	No. 24 of *Proletary* publishes Lenin's articles "Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism", and "Nikolai Ernestovich Bauman" (an obituary).
Late October	Lenin leaves Geneva for Russia via Stockholm.
November 2 (15)	Lenin writes the article "Between Two Battles", which is subsequently published as the leading article in No. 26 of *Proletary*, November 25 (12).
November 3 (16)	Lenin's "The Denouement Is at Hand" is published as the leading article in No. 25 of *Proletary*.

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 9

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

10

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.S.R.

ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Издание четвертое

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ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

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PREFACE

Volume Ten contains works by V. I. Lenin written between November 1905 and June 6 (19), 1906, during the period when he was active in St. Petersburg upon his return from exile abroad.

The articles "The Reorganisation of the Party", "The Armed Forces and the Revolution", "The Proletariat and the Peasantry", "The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule", etc., which were published in *Novaya Zhizn*, a legal Bolshevik newspaper, define the tasks of the Party during the first Russian revolution.

The pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party* and the articles written by Lenin after the defeat of the armed uprising in December 1905 sum up and generalise the experience of the first year of the revolution.

In his *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, Lenin sets forth and substantiates the Bolshevik agrarian programme for confiscation of the landed estates and for nationalisation of all the land.

Considerable space is taken up in this volume by works dealing with the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party: "A Tactical Platform for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", speeches and statements made at the Congress, and the "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.".

This volume also contains "Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies", an article included in Lenin's *Collected Works* for the first time. In it Lenin appraises the Soviets as organs of insurrection and as the rudiments of a new, revolutionary power.

Other documents included in the present edition for the first time are various statements made by Lenin at the

Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.: Statement in Support of Muratov's (Morozov's) Amendment Concerning a Parliamentary Social-Democratic Group; Resolution on the Accountability of the Credentials Committee to the Congress; Statement on the Necessity of the Congress Approving the Minutes; Written Statement at the Seventeenth Session of the Congress; Written Statement at the Twenty-First Session of the Congress; Speeches and Statements at the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (February and March 1906). Published for the first time in the *Collected Works* are the articles "Resolution and Revolution" and "They Won't Even Bargain!", which appeared in *Volna*, a legal Bolshevik newspaper, in 1906. Both articles are directed against the Cadets.



First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies",
November 1905

Reduced

OUR TASKS AND THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR[1]

Written on November 2-4 (15-17), 1905

First published on November 5, 1940, in *Pravda*, No. 308

Published according to the manuscript

Comrades, the question of the significance and role of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is now immediately facing the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats and the entire proletariat of the capital. I take up my pen to set out certain ideas on this burning issue; but before doing so, I consider it absolutely necessary to make a most important reservation. I am speaking as an *onlooker*. I still have to write from that accursed "afar", from the hateful "abroad" of an exile. And it is all but impossible for anyone to form a correct opinion of this concrete, practical matter if he has not been in St. Petersburg, if he has never seen the Soviet of Workers' Deputies or exchanged views with comrades on the spot. Therefore I leave it to the discretion of the editorial board to publish or not to publish this letter, written by an uninformed person. I reserve the right to revise my opinion when I have at last had an opportunity of acquainting myself with the matter from something more than "paper" information.

And now to get down to business. It seems to me that Comrade Radin is wrong in raising the question, in No. 5 of *Novaya Zhizn*[2] (I have seen only five issues of the virtual Central Organ of our R.S.D.L.P.): the Soviet of Workers' Deputies or the Party? I think that it is wrong to put the question in this way and that the decision must *certainly* be: *both* the Soviet of Workers' Deputies *and* the Party. The only question—and a highly important one—is how to divide, and how to combine, the tasks of the Soviet and those of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

I think it would be inadvisable for the Soviet to adhere wholly to any one party. As this opinion will probably surprise the reader, I shall proceed straightway to explain my views (stating again and most emphatically that it is the opinion of an onlooker).

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies came into being through the general strike, in connection with the strike, and for its aims. Who led the strike and brought it to a victorious close? The *whole* proletariat, which includes non-Social-Democrats—fortunately a minority. What were the aims of the strike? They were both economic and political. The economic aims concerned the *whole* proletariat, all workers, and partly even all working people, not the wage-workers alone. The political aims concerned all the people, or rather all the peoples, of Russia. These aims were to free all the peoples of Russia from the yoke of the autocracy, survivals of serfdom, a rightless status, and police tyranny.

Let us go further. Should the proletariat continue its economic struggle? By all means; there is no disagreement over this point among Social-Democrats, nor could there be any. Should this struggle be conducted only by the Social-Democrats or only under the Social-Democratic banner? I do not think so; I still hold the view I have expressed (in entirely different, now outdated conditions, it is true) in *What Is To Be Done?*, namely, that it is inadvisable to limit the composition of the trade unions, and hence of those taking part in the trade union, economic struggle, to members of the Social-Democratic Party.* It seems to me that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, as an organisation representing all occupations, should *strive* to include deputies from *all* industrial, professional and office workers, domestic servants, farm labourers, etc., from *all* who want and are able to fight in common for a better life for the whole working people, from *all* who have at least an elementary degree of political honesty, from all but the Black Hundreds. As for us Social-Democrats, we shall do our best, first, to have all our Party organisations represented on all trade unions as fully as possible and, secondly, to use the struggle we are waging jointly with our fellow-proletarians, irrespective of their views, for the tireless, steadfast advocacy of the *only* consistent, the only truly proletarian world outlook, *Marxism*. To propagate it, to carry on this propaganda and agitation work, we shall by all means preserve, strengthen and expand our com-

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 451-67.—*Ed.*

pletely independent, consistently principled class party of the class-conscious proletariat, i.e., the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Every step in the proletarian struggle, if inseparably linked with our Social-Democratic, methodical and organised, activities, will bring the *masses* of the working class in Russia and the Social-Democrats ever closer together.

This aspect of the problem, concerning the economic struggle, is comparatively simple and hardly gives rise to any particular disagreement. But the other aspect, concerning political leadership and the political struggle, is a different matter. And yet, at the risk of surprising the reader still more, I must say here and now that in this respect, too, I think it inadvisable to demand that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should accept the Social-Democratic programme and join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It seems to me that to lead the political struggle, *both* the Soviet (*reorganised* in a sense to be discussed forthwith) *and* the Party are, to an equal degree, absolutely necessary.

I may be wrong, but I believe (on the strength of the incomplete and only "paper" information at my disposal) that politically the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should be regarded as the embryo of a *provisional revolutionary government*. I think the Soviet should proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government of the whole of Russia as early as possible, or should *set up* a provisional revolutionary government (which would amount to the same thing, only in another form).

The political struggle has just reached a stage of development where the forces of revolution and counter-revolution are roughly equal and where the tsar's government is *already* powerless to suppress the revolution, while the revolution is not *yet* strong enough to sweep away the Black-Hundred government. The decay of the tsar's government is complete. But even as it rots alive, it is contaminating Russia with the poison of its putrefaction. It is absolutely necessary, in contrast to the decay of the tsarist, counter-revolutionary forces, to *organise* the revolutionary forces at once, immediately, without the slightest delay. This organisation has been making splendid progress, particular-

ly of late. This is evident from the formation of contingents of a revolutionary army (defence squads, etc.), the rapid development of Social-Democratic mass organisations of the proletariat, the establishment of peasants' committees by the revolutionary peasantry, and the first free meetings of our proletarian brothers in sailor's or soldier's uniform, who are paving for themselves a strenuous and difficult but true and bright way to freedom and to socialism.

What is lacking now is the unification of all the genuinely revolutionary forces, of all the forces that are already operating in revolutionary fashion. What is lacking is an all-Russian political centre, a fresh, living centre that is strong because it has struck deep roots in the people, a centre that enjoys the absolute confidence of the masses, that possesses tireless revolutionary energy and is closely linked with the organised revolutionary and socialist parties. Such a centre can be established only by the revolutionary proletariat, which has brilliantly carried through a political strike, which is now organising an armed uprising of the whole people, and which has won half freedom for Russia and will yet win full freedom for her.

The question may be asked: Why cannot the Soviet of Workers' Deputies become the embryo of such a centre? Is it because there are not only Social-Democrats in the Soviet? But this is an advantage, not a disadvantage. We have been speaking all the time of the need of a militant alliance of Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats. We have been speaking of it, and the workers have actually done it. It is splendid that they have done it. When I read in *Novaya Zhizn* a letter from *worker comrades* who belong to the Socialist-Revolutionary Party,[3] and who protest against the Soviet being included in one of the parties, I could not help thinking that those worker-comrades were right in many practical respects. It goes without saying that our views differ from theirs, and that a merger of Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries is out of the question, but then there is no suggestion of it. We are deeply convinced that those workers who share Socialist-Revolutionary views and yet are fighting within the ranks of the proletariat are inconsistent, for they retain non-proletarian views while championing a truly proletarian cause. Their incon-

sistency we must combat, from the ideological point of view, with the greatest determination, but in so doing we must see to it that the revolutionary cause, a vital, burning, living cause that is recognised by all and has brought all honest people together, does not suffer. We still consider the views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to be revolutionary-democratic and not socialist. But for the sake of our militant aims, we must march together while fully retaining Party independence, and the Soviet is, and must be, a militant organisation. To expel devoted and honest revolutionary democrats at a time when we are carrying out a democratic revolution would be absurd, it would be folly. We shall have no difficulty in overcoming their inconsistency, for our views are supported by history itself, are supported at every step by reality. If our pamphlet has not taught them Social-Democracy, our revolution will. To be sure, those workers who remain Christians, who believe in God, and those intellectuals who defend mysticism (fie upon them!), are inconsistent too; but we shall not expel them from the Soviet or even from the Party, for it is our firm conviction that the actual struggle, and work within the ranks, will convince all elements possessing vitality that Marxism is the truth, and will cast aside all those who lack vitality. And we do not for one moment doubt our strength, the overwhelming strength of Marxists, in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

To my mind, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, as a revolutionary centre providing political leadership, is not too broad an organisation but, on the contrary, a much too narrow one. The Soviet must proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government, or form such a government, and must by all means enlist to this end the participation of new deputies not only from the workers, but, first of all, from the sailors and soldiers, who are everywhere seeking freedom; secondly, from the revolutionary peasantry, and thirdly, from the revolutionary bourgeois intelligentsia. The Soviet must select a strong nucleus for the provisional revolutionary government and reinforce it with representatives of all revolutionary parties and all revolutionary (but, of course, only revolutionary and not liberal) democrats. We are not afraid of so broad and mixed a composi-

tion—indeed, we want it, for unless the proletariat and the peasantry unite and unless the Social-Democrats and revolutionary democrats form a fighting alliance, the great Russian revolution cannot be fully successful. It will be a temporary alliance that is to fulfil clearly defined immediate practical tasks, while the more important interests of the socialist proletariat, its fundamental interests and ultimate goals, will be steadfastly upheld by the independent and consistently principled Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The objection may be raised that if the composition is broad and mixed, it will be hardly possible to establish a centre solid and united enough to exercise practical leadership. I shall answer that with a question: What are the lessons of the October revolution?[4] Did not the strike committee prove *in fact* to be the generally recognised centre, the real government? And would not that committee readily admit into its ranks representatives of that section of the unions and of the "Union of Unions"[5] which is really revolutionary and really supports the proletariat in its relentless struggle for freedom? The essential thing is that the main, purely proletarian body of the provisional revolutionary government should be strong and that for, say, hundreds of workers, sailors, soldiers and peasants there should be dozens of deputies from the unions of the revolutionary intelligentsia. I believe the proletarians will soon be able in practice to establish the proper ratio.

The objection may be raised that it is hardly possible to advance for such a government a programme complete enough to ensure victory for the revolution and broad enough to make possible a fighting alliance free from all reservations, vagueness, reticence or hypocrisy. I shall answer: such a programme has already been advanced in full by reality. It is already recognised in principle by all the politically-conscious elements of absolutely all the classes and sections of the population, including even Orthodox priests. The complete realisation of political freedom, which the tsar has promised so hypocritically, should come first in this programme. The repeal of all legislation restricting freedom of speech, conscience, assembly, the press, association and strikes, and the abolition of all institutions

limiting these liberties, should be immediate and real, they should be guaranteed and actually put into practice. The programme should provide for the convocation of a national constituent assembly that would enjoy the support of a free and armed people and have full authority and strength to establish a new order in Russia. It should provide for the arming of the people. The necessity of arming the people is realised by all. What remains to be done is to complete and unify the work already begun and being carried on everywhere. The programme of the provisional revolutionary government should also provide for the immediate granting of real and full freedom to the nationalities oppressed by the tsarist monster. A free Russia has been born. The proletariat is at its post. It will not allow heroic Poland to be crushed again. It will itself go into action; it will fight both for a free Russia and a free Poland, not only by peaceful strikes, but by force of arms as well. The programme should provide for the eight-hour working day, which the workers are already "seizing", and for other urgent measures to curb capitalist exploitation. Lastly, the programme must necessarily include transfer of all the land to the peasants, support for every revolutionary measure that the peasantry is carrying out to take away all the land (without, of course, supporting the illusion of "equalised" small land tenure), and the establishment everywhere of revolutionary peasants' committees, which have already begun to take shape spontaneously.

Who but the Black Hundreds and the Black-Hundred government will deny today the pressing character and practical indispensability of this programme? In fact, even bourgeois liberals are willing to accept it in theory! As for us, we must put it into practice with the help of the forces of the revolutionary people; to do this, we must unite those forces as speedily as possible through the proletariat proclaiming a provisional revolutionary government. True, only an armed uprising can really form the basis of such a government. But the projected government will in fact be the *organ* of this growing and already maturing uprising. The formation of a revolutionary government could not be initiated in practice until the insurrection had assumed proportions evident to all, proportions that were, so to

speak, tangible to all. But now is the time to unify this uprising politically, to organise it, to give it a clear-cut programme, to turn all the contingents of the revolutionary army, which are already numerous and are growing fast in strength, into the mainstay and into instruments of this new, truly free and truly popular government. The struggle is imminent, the uprising inevitable, and the decisive battle close at hand. It is time to issue a direct challenge, to set the organised power of the proletariat against the decaying tsarist regime, to address to the whole people a manifesto on behalf of the provisional revolutionary government constituted by the foremost workers.

It is now obvious to us that among the revolutionary people there can be found persons capable of accomplishing this great task, persons thoroughly devoted to the revolution, and more important still, persons of tireless, inexhaustible energy. It is now obvious to us that there exist the elements of a revolutionary army, which will back this cause, and that all who are fair-minded and alert and politically-conscious in every class of the population will turn away completely from tsarism when the new government declares a decisive war on the dying semi-feudal, police state of Russia.

Citizens—it would be proper to say in that declaration of war, in that manifesto of the revolutionary government—citizens, make your choice! There we have the whole of old Russia, all the sinister forces of exploitation, oppression, and violence against man. And here we have a union of free citizens who have equal rights in all affairs of the state. There we have a union of exploiters, of the wealthy, of policemen. And here we have a union of all working people, of all the vital forces of the people, of all fair-minded intellectuals. There we have the Black Hundreds, here we have the organised workers fighting for freedom, for education, for socialism.

Make your choice, citizens! Here is our programme, which has long since been put forward by the whole people. These are our aims in the name of which we declare war on the Black-Hundred government. We are not trying to impose on the people any innovations thought up by us, we are merely taking the initiative in bringing about that without

which it is impossible to live in Russia any longer, as is acknowledged generally and unanimously. We do not shut ourselves off from the revolutionary people but submit to their judgement every step and every decision we take. We rely fully and solely on the free initiative of the working masses themselves. We unite absolutely all revolutionary parties, and we call into our ranks deputies from every group of the population that is willing to fight for freedom, for our programme, which guarantees the elementary rights and meets the elementary needs of the people. In particular, we hold out our hand to our worker comrades in soldier's uniform and to our peasant brothers, so that we may fight together to the end against the yoke of the landlords and the bureaucrats, for land and freedom.

Prepare for the decisive struggle, citizens! We will not allow the Black-Hundred government to use violence against Russia. We will not be deluded by the replacement of a few bureaucrats or by the resignation of a few police officers while the whole mass of Black-Hundred police retains the power to kill, plunder and commit outrages against the people. Let the liberal bourgeois stoop to pleading with that Black-Hundred government. The Black Hundreds laugh when anyone threatens them with trial in the very same old tsarist court by the very same old tsarist officials. We shall order our army units to arrest the Black-Hundred heroes who fuddle ignorant people with vodka and corrupt them; we shall commit all those monsters, such as the chief of police in Kronstadt, for public, revolutionary trial by the whole people.

Citizens, everyone but the Black Hundreds has turned away from the tsarist government. Rally, then, behind the revolutionary government, stop paying any duties or taxes, and bend all your energies to organise and arm a free people's militia force. Russia will have genuine freedom only insofar as the revolutionary people gain the upper hand over the forces of the Black-Hundred government. There are not, and cannot be, any neutrals in a civil war. The white-flag party is sheer cowardly hypocrisy. Whoever shies away from the struggle bolsters up Black-Hundred rule. Who is not for the revolution is against the revolution. Who is not a revolutionary is one of the Black Hundreds.

We undertake to rally and train forces for an uprising of the people. Let there not be a trace left of the institutions of tsarist power in Russia by the anniversary of that great day, the Ninth of January.[6] May the spring holiday of the world proletariat find Russia already a free country, with a freely convened constituent assembly of the whole people!

That is how I visualise the development of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies into a provisional revolutionary government. And these first and foremost are the tasks that I would set all our Party organisations, all class-conscious workers, the Soviet itself, the workers' forthcoming congress in Moscow, and the congress of the Peasant Union.[7]

THE REORGANISATION OF THE PARTY[8]

I

The conditions in which our Party is functioning are changing radically. Freedom of assembly, of association and of the press has been captured. Of course, these rights are extremely precarious, and it would be folly, if not a crime, to pin our faith to the present liberties. The decisive struggle is yet to come, and preparations for this struggle must take first place. The secret apparatus of the Party must be maintained. But at the same time it is absolutely necessary to make the widest possible use of the present relatively wider scope for our activity. In addition to the secret apparatus, it is absolutely necessary to create many new legal and semi-legal Party organisations (and organisations associated with the Party). Unless we do this, it is unthinkable that we can adapt our activity to the new conditions or cope with the new problems.

In order to put the organisation on a new basis, a new Party congress is required. According to the Rules, the Party should meet in congress once a year, and the next congress should be held in May 1906; but now it is essential to bring it forward. If we do not seize this opportunity, we shall lose it—in the sense that the need for organisation which the workers are feeling so acutely will find its expression in distorted, dangerous forms, strengthen some "Independents"[9] or other, etc. We must hasten to organise in a new way, we must submit new methods for general discussion, we must boldly and resolutely lay down a "new line".

The appeal to the Party, published in this issue and signed by the Central Committee of our Party,[10] lays down

that new line, I am profoundly convinced, quite correctly. We, the representatives of revolutionary Social-Democracy, the supporters of the "Majority", have repeatedly said that complete democratisation of the Party was impossible in conditions of secret work, and that in such conditions the "elective principle" was a mere phrase. And experience has confirmed our words. It has been repeatedly stated in print by former supporters of the Minority (see the pamphlet by "A Worker" with a preface by Axelrod, the letter signed "A Worker, One of Many", in *Iskra*[11] and in the pamphlet *Workers on the Party Split*) that in fact it has proved impossible to employ any real democratic methods and any real elective principle. But we Bolsheviks have always recognised that in new conditions, when political liberties were acquired, it would be essential to adopt the elective principle. The minutes of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. prove this most conclusively, if, indeed, any proof is required.

Thus the task is clear: to preserve the secret apparatus for the time being and to develop a new, legal apparatus. As applied to the Congress, this task (the concrete fulfilment of which demands, of course, practical ability and a knowledge of all the conditions of time and place) may be formulated as follows: to convene the Fourth Congress on the basis of the Party Rules and at the same time to begin immediately, at once, application of the elective principle. The Central Committee has solved this problem. Committee members, in form as representatives of fully authorised organisations, in fact as representatives of the Party's continuity, attend the Congress with the right to vote. Delegates elected by the *entire* Party membership, and consequently by the masses of the workers belonging to the Party, *are invited* by the Central Committee, in virtue of its right to do so, to attend the Congress with voice but no vote. The Central Committee has declared, furthermore, that it will at once propose to the Congress to change this consultative voice into the right to vote. Will the full delegates of the committees agree to this?

The Central Committee declares that in its opinion they will unquestionably agree to it. Personally, I am profoundly convinced of this. It is impossible not to agree to such a thing. It is inconceivable that the majority of the leaders

of the Social-Democratic proletariat will not agree to it. We are sure that the opinion of Party workers, most carefully registered by *Novaya Zhizn*, will very soon prove the correctness of our view; even if a struggle takes place over this step (to convert the consultative voice into the right to vote), the outcome is a foregone conclusion.

Look at this question from another angle—from the point of view of the substance of the matter, not of its form. Is Social-Democracy endangered by the realisation of the plan we propose?

Danger may be said to lie in a sudden influx of large numbers of non-Social-Democrats into the Party. If that occurred, the Party would be dissolved among the masses, it would cease to be the conscious vanguard of its class, its role would be reduced to that of a tail. That would mean a very deplorable period indeed. And this danger *could* undoubtedly become a *very serious* one *if* we showed any inclination towards demagogy, if we lacked party principles (programme, tactical rules, organisational experience) entirely, or if those principles were feeble and shaky. But the fact is that no such "ifs" exist. We Bolsheviks have never shown any inclination towards demagogy. On the contrary, we have always fought resolutely, openly and straightforwardly against the slightest attempts at demagogy; we have demanded class-consciousness from those joining the Party, we have insisted on the tremendous importance of continuity in the Party's development, we have preached discipline and demanded that *every* Party member be trained in one or other of the Party organisations. We have a firmly established Party programme which is officially recognised by all Social-Democrats and the fundamental propositions of which have not given rise to any criticism (criticism of individual points and formulations is quite legitimate and necessary in any live party). We have resolutions on tactics which were consistently and systematically worked out at the Second and Third Congresses and in the course of many years' work of the Social-Democratic press. We also have some organisational experience and an actual organisation, which has played an educational role and has undoubtedly borne fruit, a fact which may not be immediately apparent, but which can be denied only by the blind or by the blinded.

Let us not exaggerate this danger, comrades. Social-Democracy has established a name for itself, has created a trend and has built up cadres of Social-Democratic workers. And now that the heroic proletariat has proved by deeds its readiness to fight, and its ability to fight consistently and in a body for clearly-understood aims, to fight in a purely Social-Democratic spirit, it would be simply ridiculous to doubt that the workers who belong to our Party, or who will join it tomorrow at the invitation of the Central Committee, will be Social-Democrats in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. The working class is instinctively, spontaneously Social-Democratic, and more than ten years of work put in by Social-Democracy has done a great deal to transform this spontaneity into consciousness. Don't invent bugaboos, comrades! Don't forget that in every live and growing party there will always be elements of instability, vacillation, wavering. But these elements can be influenced, and they will submit to the influence of the steadfast and solid core of Social-Democrats.

Our Party has stagnated while working underground. As a delegate to the Third Congress rightly said, it has been suffocating underground during the last few years. The "underground" is breaking up. Forward, then, more boldly; take up the new weapon, distribute it among new people, extend your bases, rally all the worker Social-Democrats round yourselves, incorporate them in the ranks of the Party organisations by hundreds and thousands. Let their delegates put new life into the ranks of our central bodies, let the fresh spirit of young revolutionary Russia pour in through them. So far the revolution has justified all the basic theoretical propositions of Marxism, all the essential slogans of Social-Democracy. And the revolution has also justified the work done by us Social-Democrats, it has justified our hope and faith in the truly revolutionary spirit of the proletariat. Let us, then, abandon all pettiness in this imperative Party reform; let us strike out on the new path at once. This will not deprive us of our old secret apparatus (there is no doubt that the Social-Democratic workers have recognised and sanctioned it; practical experience and the course of the revolution have proved this a hundred times more convincingly than it could have been proved by

decisions and resolutions). It will give us fresh young forces rising from the very depths of the only genuinely and thoroughly revolutionary class, the class which has won half freedom for Russia and will win full freedom for her, the class which will lead her through freedom to socialism!

II

The decision of the Central Committee of our Party to convene the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 9, is a decisive step towards the full application of the democratic principle in Party organisation. The election of delegates to the Congress (who will come there first with the right to a voice but no vote and will then, undoubtedly receive the right to vote) must be carried through within a month. All Party organisations must, therefore, begin as soon as possible to discuss candidates and the tasks of the Congress. It is unquestionably necessary to reckon with the possibility of the dying autocracy making fresh attempts to withdraw the promised liberties and to attack the revolutionary workers, above all their leaders. Therefore it would hardly be advisable (except perhaps in special cases) to publish the real names of delegates. The assumed names to which the epoch of political slavery has accustomed us must not be discarded so long as the Black Hundreds are in power, nor would it be amiss to elect, as of old, alternates, in case of arrests. However, we shall not dwell on all these precautions of secrecy, since comrades acquainted with the local conditions of work will easily overcome all the difficulties that may arise in this respect. Comrades who have ample experience in revolutionary work under the autocracy must help by their counsel all those who are starting Social-Democratic work in the new and "free" conditions (free in inverted commas, for the time being). It goes without saying that in doing so our committee members must show great tact: previous formal prerogatives inevitably lose their significance at the present time, and it will be necessary in very many cases to start "from the beginning", to *prove* to large sections of new Party comrades the importance of a consistent Social-Democratic programme, Social-Democratic tactics and organisation. We must not

forget that so far we have had to deal too often only with revolutionaries coming from a particular social stratum, whereas now we shall have to deal with typical representatives of the masses. This change calls for a change not only in the methods of propaganda and agitation (a more popular style, ability to present a question, to explain the basic truths of socialism in the simplest, clearest and most convincing manner), but also in organisation.

In this article I should like to dwell on one aspect of the new tasks in organisation. The Central Committee decision invites *all* Party organisations to send delegates to the Congress and calls upon *all* worker Social-Democrats to join such organisations. If this excellent desire is to be really fulfilled, a mere "invitation" to the workers will not do, nor will it do merely to increase the number of organisations of the old type. For this purpose, it is necessary for all comrades to devise *new* forms of organisation by their independent, creative joint efforts. It is impossible to lay down any predetermined standards for this, for we are working in an entirely new field: a knowledge of local conditions, and above all the initiative of *all* Party members must be brought into play. The new form of organisation, or rather the new form of the basic organisational nucleus of the workers' party, must be definitely much broader than were the old circles. Apart from this, the new nucleus will most likely have to be a less rigid, more "free", more "loose" (*lose*) organisation. With complete freedom of association and civil liberties for the people, we should, of course, have to found Social-Democratic unions (not only trade unions, but political and Party unions) everywhere. In the present conditions we must strive to approach that goal by all ways and means at our disposal.

We must immediately arouse the initiative of all Party functionaries and of all workers who sympathise with Social-Democracy. We must arrange at once, everywhere, lectures, talks, meetings, open-air rallies at which the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. should be announced, the tasks of the Congress explained in the most popular and comprehensible way, the new form of organisation of the Congress pointed out, and an appeal made to all Social-Democrats to take part in building up a genuinely proletarian Social-Democratic

Party on new lines. Such work will supply us with a wealth of information based on experience; it will, in the course of two or three weeks (if we act energetically), produce new Social-Democratic forces from among the workers, and revive among far wider sections an interest in the Social-Democratic Party, which we have now decided to reconstruct on new lines jointly with all the worker comrades. At all meetings the question will immediately be raised about the founding of unions, organisations, Party groups. Each union, organisation or group will immediately elect its bureau, or board, or directing committee—in a word, a central standing body which will conduct the affairs of the organisation, maintaining relations with local Party institutions, receive and circulate Party literature, collect subscriptions for Party work, arrange meetings and lectures, and, finally, prepare the election of a delegate to the Party Congress. The Party committees will, of course, take care to help each such organisation, to supply it with material explaining what the R.S.D.L.P. stands for, its history and its present great tasks.

It is high time, furthermore, to take steps to establish local economic strong points, so to speak, for the workers' Social-Democratic organisations—in the form of restaurants, tea-rooms, beer-halls, libraries, reading-rooms, shooting galleries,* etc., etc., maintained by Party members. We must not forget that, apart from being persecuted by the "autocratic" police, the Social-Democratic workers will also be persecuted by their "autocratic" employers, who will dismiss agitators. Therefore it is highly important to organ-

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* I do not know the Russian equivalent of *tir* [Lenin uses the French word.—*Tr.*], by which I mean a place for target practice, where there is a supply of all kinds of fire-arms and where anyone may for a small fee practise shooting at a target with a revolver or rifle. Freedom of assembly and association has been proclaimed in Russia. Citizens have the right to assemble and to learn how to shoot; this can present no danger to anyone. In any big European city you will find such shooting galleries open to all, situated in basements, sometimes outside the city, etc. And it is very far from useless for the workers to learn how to shoot and how to handle arms. Of course we shall be able to get down to this work seriously and on a large scale only when the freedom of association is guaranteed and we can bring to book the police scoundrels who dare to close such establishments.

ise bases which will be as independent as possible of the tyranny of the employers.

Generally speaking, we Social-Democrats must take every possible advantage of the present extension of freedom of action, and the more this freedom is guaranteed, the more energetically shall we advance the slogan: "Go among the people!" The initiative of the workers themselves will now display itself on a scale that we, the underground and circle workers of yesterday, did not even dare dream of. The influence of socialist ideas on the masses of the proletariat is now proceeding, and will continue to proceed along paths that we very often shall be altogether unable to trace. With due regard to these conditions, we shall have to distribute the Social-Democratic intelligentsia* in a more rational way to ensure that they do not hang about uselessly where the movement has already stood up on its own feet and can, so to speak, shift for itself, and that they go to the "lower strata" where the work is harder, where the conditions are more difficult, where the need for experienced and well-informed people is greater, where the sources of light are fewer, and where the heartbeat of political life is weaker. We must now "go among the people" both in anticipation of elections, in which the entire population, even of the remotest places, will take part, and (more important still) in anticipation of an open struggle—in order to paralyse the reactionary policies of a provincial Vendée,[12] to spread all over the country, among all the proletarian masses, the slogans issuing from the big centres.

To be sure, it is always bad to run to extremes: to organise the work on the most stable and "exemplary" lines possible, we shall even yet have often to concentrate our best forces in some important centre or other. Experience will show the proportion to be adhered to in this respect. Our task now is not so much to invent rules for organising

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* At the Third Congress of the Party I suggested that there be about eight workers to every two intellectuals in the Party committees. (See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 408.—*Ed.*) How obsolete that suggestion seems today!

Now we must wish for the new Party organisations to have one Social-Democratic intellectual to several hundred Social-Democratic workers.

on new lines, as to develop the most far-reaching and courageous work which will enable us at the Fourth Congress to sum up and set down the data obtained from the experience of the Party.

III

In the first two sections we dealt with the general importance of the elective principle in the Party and the need for new organisational nuclei and forms of organisation. We shall now examine another extremely vital question, namely, the question of Party unity.

It is no secret to anyone that the vast majority of Social-Democratic workers are exceedingly dissatisfied with the split in the Party and are demanding unity. It is no secret to anyone that the split has caused a certain cooling-off among Social-Democratic workers (or workers ready to become Social-Democrats) towards the Social-Democratic Party.

The workers have lost almost all hope that the Party "chiefs" will unite of themselves. The need for unity was formally recognised both by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and by the Menshevik Conference held last May. Six months have passed since then, but the cause of unity has made hardly any progress. No wonder the workers are beginning to show signs of impatience. No wonder "A Worker, One of Many", who wrote on unity in *Iskra* and in a pamphlet published by the "Majority" (*Workers on the Party Split*, published by the Central Committee, Geneva, 1905), has at last threatened the Social-Democratic intelligentsia with a "fist from below". Some Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) did not like that threat at the time, others (Bolsheviks) thought it legitimate and, at bottom, fully justified.

It seems to me that the time has come when the *class-conscious* worker Social-Democrats can and must carry out their intention (I will not say "threat", because this word smacks of accusations, of demagogy, and we must do our utmost to avoid both). Indeed, the time has come, or, in any case, is coming, when the elective principle can be applied in the Party organisation not in words only, but in deeds, not as a fine-sounding but hollow phrase, but as a really new principle which really renovates, extends and strengthens Party ties. The "Majority" represented by the

Central Committee has directly appealed for the immediate application and introduction of the elective principle. The Minority is following in the same direction. And the Social-Democratic workers constitute the enormous, overwhelming majority in all the Social-Democratic organisations, committees, gatherings, meetings, etc.

Hence it is now possible not only to *urge* unity, not only to obtain *promises* to unite, but actually *to unite*—by a simple decision of the majority of organised workers in both factions. There will be no imposition, since, in principle, the need for unity has been recognised by all, and the workers have only to decide in practice a question that has already been decided in principle.

The relation between the functions of the intellectuals and of the proletariat (workers) in the Social-Democratic working-class movement can probably be expressed, with a fair degree of accuracy, by the following general formula: the intelligentsia is good at solving problems "in principle", good at drawing up plans, good at reasoning about the need for action—while the workers act, and transform drab theory into living reality.

And I shall not in the slightest degree slip into demagogy, nor in the least belittle the great role played by consciousness in the working-class movement, nor shall I in any way detract from the tremendous importance of Marxist theory and Marxist principles, if I say now: both at the Congress and at the Conference we created the "drab theory" of Party unity. Comrade workers, help us to transform this drab theory into living reality! Join the Party organisations in huge numbers! Turn our Fourth Congress and the Second Menshevik Conference into a grand and imposing Congress of Social-Democratic workers. Join with us in settling this practical question of fusion; let this question be the exception (it is an exception that proves the opposite rule!) in which we shall have one-tenth theory and nine-tenths practice. Such a wish is surely legitimate, historically necessary, and psychologically comprehensible. We have "theorised" for so long (sometimes—why not admit it?—to no use) in the unhealthy atmosphere of political exile, that it will really not be amiss if we now "bend the bow" slightly, a little, just a little, "the other way" and put practice a

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little more in the forefront. This would certainly be appropriate in regard to the question of unity, about which, owing to the causes of the split, we have used up such an awful lot of ink and no end of paper. We exiles in particular are longing for practical work. Besides, we have already written a very good and comprehensive programme of the whole democratic revolution. Let us, then, unite also to make this revolution!

Novaya Zhizn, Nos. 9, 13, 14,
November 10, 15, 16, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

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to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY[13]

The Congress of the Peasant Union now in session in Moscow once again raises the vital question of the attitude of Social-Democrats to the peasant movement. It has always been a vital question for Russian Marxists when determining their programme and tactics. In the very first draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democrats, printed abroad in 1884 by the Emancipation of Labour group,[14] most serious attention was devoted to the peasant question.

Since then there has not been a single major Marxist work dealing with general questions, or a single Social-Democratic periodical, which has not repeated or developed Marxist views and slogans, or applied them to particular cases.

Today the question of the peasant movement has become vital not only in the theoretical but also in the most direct practical sense. We now have to transform our general slogans into direct appeals by the revolutionary proletariat to the revolutionary peasantry. The time has now come when the peasantry is coming forward as a conscious maker of a new way of life in Russia. And the course and outcome of the great Russian revolution depend in tremendous measure on the growth of the peasants' political consciousness.

What does the peasantry expect of the revolution? What can the revolution give the peasantry? Anyone active in the political sphere, and especially every class-conscious worker who goes in for politics, not in the sense vulgarised by bourgeois politicians, but in the best sense of the word, must answer these two questions.

The peasantry wants land and freedom. There can be no two opinions on this score. All class-conscious workers

support the revolutionary peasantry with all their might. All class-conscious workers want and are fighting for the peasantry to receive all the land and full freedom. "All the land" means not putting up with any partial concessions and hand-outs; it means reckoning, not on a compromise between the peasantry and the landlords, but on abolition of landed estates. And the party of the class-conscious proletariat, the Social-Democrats, have most vigorously proclaimed this view: at its Third Congress held last May, the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution directly declaring for support of the peasants' revolutionary demands, *including confiscation of all* privately-owned estates. This resolution clearly shows that the party of the class-conscious workers supports the peasants' demand for all the land. And in *this* respect the content of the resolution adopted at the conference of the other half of our Party fully coincides with that of the resolution passed by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

"Full freedom" means election of officials and other office-holders who administer public and state affairs. "Full freedom" means the complete abolition of a state administration that is not wholly and exclusively responsible to the people, that is not elected by, accountable to, and subject to recall by, the people. "Full freedom" means that it is not the people who should be subordinated to officials, but the officials who should be subordinated to the people.

Of course, not all peasants fighting for land and freedom are fully aware of what their struggle implies, and go so far as to demand a republic. But for all that, the democratic trend of the peasants' demands is beyond all doubt. Hence the peasantry can be certain that the proletariat will support these demands. The peasants must know that the red banner which has been raised in the towns is the banner of struggle for the immediate and vital demands, not only of the industrial and agricultural workers, but also of the millions and tens of millions of small tillers of the soil.

Survivals of serfdom in every possible shape and form are to this day a cruel burden on the whole mass of the peasantry, and the proletarians under their red banner have declared war on this burden.

But the red banner means more than proletarian support of the peasants' demands. It also means the independent demands of the proletariat. It means struggle, not only for land and freedom, but also against all exploitation of man by man, struggle against the poverty of the masses of the people, against the rule of capital. And it is here that we are faced with the second question: what can the revolution give the peasantry? Many sincere friends of the peasants (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, for instance, among them) ignore this question, do not realise its importance. They think it is sufficient to raise and settle the question of what the peasants want, to get the answer: land and freedom. This is a great mistake. Full freedom, election of all officials all the way to the head of the state, will not do away with the rule of capital, will not abolish the wealth of the few and the poverty of the masses. Complete abolition of private landownership, too, will not do away either with the rule of capital or with the poverty of the masses. Even on land belonging to the whole nation, only those with capital of their own, only those who have the implements, livestock, machines, stocks of seed, money in general, etc., will be able to farm independently. As for those who have nothing but their hands to work with, they will inevitably remain slaves of capital even in a democratic republic, even when the land belongs to the whole nation. The idea that "socialisation" of land can be effected without socialisation of capital, the idea that equalised land tenure is possible while capital and commodity economy exist, is a delusion. In nearly all countries of Europe, socialism has experienced periods when this or some similar delusions have been prevalent. The experience of working-class struggle in all countries has shown in practice how dangerous such an error is, and today the socialist proletarians of Europe and America have completely rid themselves of it.

Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might the peasants' struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism. The fight for socialism is a fight against the rule of capital. It is being carried on first and foremost by the

wage-workers, who are directly and wholly dependent on capital. As for the small farmers, some of them own capital themselves, and often themselves exploit workers. Hence not all small peasants join the ranks of fighters for socialism; only those do so who resolutely and consciously side with the workers against capital, with public property against private property.

That is why the Social-Democrats say they are fighting together with the entire peasantry against the landlords and officials, besides which they -- the town and village proletarians together -- are fighting against capital. The struggle for land and freedom is a democratic struggle. The struggle to abolish the rule of capital is a socialist struggle.

Let us, then, send our warm greetings to the Peasant Union, which has decided to stand together and fight staunchly, selflessly and unswervingly for full freedom and for all the land. These peasants are true democrats. We must explain to them patiently and steadily where their views on the tasks of democracy and socialism are wrong, regarding them as allies with whom we are united by the great common struggle. These peasants are truly revolutionary democrats with whom we must and shall carry on the fight for the complete victory of the present revolution. We are fully in sympathy with the plan to call a general strike and the decision to rise together the next time, with the town workers and all the peasant poor acting in unison. All class-conscious workers will make every effort to help carry out this plan. Yet no alliance, even with the most honest and determined revolutionary democrats, will ever make the proletarians forget their still greater and more important goal, the fight for socialism, for the complete abolition of the rule of capital, for the emancipation of all working people from every kind of exploitation. Forward, workers and peasants, in the common struggle for land and freedom! Forward, proletarians, united by international Social-Democracy, in the fight for socialism!

Novaya Zhizn, No. 11,
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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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PARTY ORGANISATION AND PARTY LITERATURE

The new conditions for Social-Democratic work in Russia which have arisen since the October revolution have brought the question of party literature to the fore. The distinction between the illegal and the legal press, that melancholy heritage of the epoch of feudal autocratic Russia, is beginning to disappear. It is not yet dead, by a long way. The hypocritical government of our Prime Minister is still running amuck, so much so that *Izvestia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov*[15] is printed "illegally"; but apart from bringing disgrace on the government, apart from striking further moral blows at it, nothing comes of the stupid attempts to "prohibit" that which the government is powerless to thwart.

So long as there was a distinction between the illegal and the legal press, the question of the party and non-party press was decided extremely simply and in an extremely false and abnormal way. The entire Illegal press was a party press, being published by organisations and run by groups which in one way or another were linked with groups of practical party workers. The entire legal press was non-party—since parties were banned—but it "gravitated" towards one party or another. Unnatural alliances, strange "bed-fellows" and false cover-devices were inevitable. The forced reserve of those who wished to express party views merged with the immature thinking or mental cowardice of those who had not risen to these views and who were not, in effect, party people.

An accursed period of Aesopian language, literary bondage, slavish speech, and ideological serfdom! The proletariat has put an end to this foul atmosphere which stifled every-

thing living and fresh in Russia. But so far the proletariat has won only half freedom for Russia.

The revolution is not yet completed. While tsarism is *no longer* strong enough to defeat the revolution, the revolution is *not yet* strong enough to defeat tsarism. And we are living in times when everywhere and in everything there operates this unnatural combination of open, forthright, direct and consistent party spirit with an underground, covert, "diplomatic" and dodgy "legality". This unnatural combination makes itself felt even in our newspaper: for all Mr. Guchkov's[16] witticisms about Social-Democratic tyranny forbidding the publication of moderate liberal-bourgeois newspapers, the fact remains that *Proletary*,[17] the Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, still remains outside the locked doors of *autocratic*, police-ridden Russia.

Be that as it may, the half-way revolution compels all of us to set to work at once organising the whole thing on new lines. Today literature, even that published "legally", can be nine-tenths party literature. It must become party literature in contradistinction to bourgeois customs, to the profit-making, commercialised bourgeois press, to bourgeois literary careerism and individualism, "aristocratic anarchism" and drive for profit, the socialist proletariat must put forward the principle of *party literature*, must develop this principle and put it into practice as fully and completely as possible.

What is this principle of party literature? It is not simply that, for the socialist proletariat, literature cannot be a means of enriching individuals or groups: it cannot, in fact, be an individual undertaking, independent of the common cause of the proletariat. Down with non-partisan writers! Down with literary supermen! Literature must become *part* of the common cause of the proletariat, "a cog and a screw" of one single great Social-Democratic mechanism set in motion by the entire politically-conscious vanguard of the entire working class. Literature must become a component of organised, planned and integrated Social-Democratic Party work.

"All comparisons are lame," says a German proverb. So is my comparison of literature with a cog, of a living move-

ment with a mechanism. And I daresay there will even be hysterical intellectuals to raise a howl about such a comparison, which degrades, deadens, "bureaucratises" the free battle of ideas, freedom of criticism, freedom of literary creation, etc., etc. Such outcries, in point of fact, would be nothing more than an expression of bourgeois-intellectual individualism. There is no question that literature is least of all subject to mechanical adjustment or levelling, to the rule of the majority over the minority. There is no question, either, that in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy, form and content. All this is undeniable; but all this simply shows that the literary side of the proletarian party cause cannot be mechanically identified with its other sides. This, however, does not in the least refute the proposition, alien and strange to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois democracy, that literature must by all means and necessarily become an element of Social-Democratic Party work, inseparably bound up with the other elements. Newspapers must become the organs of the various party organisations, and their writers must by all means become members of these organisations. Publishing and distributing centres, bookshops and reading-rooms, libraries and similar establishments—must all be under party control. The organised socialist proletariat must keep an eye on all this work, supervise it in its entirety, and, from beginning to end, without any exception, infuse into it the life-stream of the living proletarian cause, thereby cutting the ground from under the old, semi-Oblomov,[18] semi-shopkeeper Russian principle: the writer does the writing, the reader does the reading.

We are not suggesting, of course, that this transformation of literary work, which has been defiled by the Asiatic censorship and the European bourgeoisie, can be accomplished all at once. Far be it from us to advocate any kind of standardised system, or a solution by means of a few decrees. Cut-and-dried schemes are least of all applicable here. What is needed is that the whole of our Party, and the entire politically-conscious Social-Democratic proletariat throughout Russia, should become aware of this new problem, specify it clearly and everywhere set about solving it. Emerging

from the captivity of the feudal censorship, we have no desire to become, and shall not become, prisoners of bourgeois-shopkeeper literary relations. We want to establish, and we shall establish, a free press, free not simply from the police, but also from capital, from careerism, and what is more, free from bourgeois-anarchist individualism.

These last words may sound paradoxical, or an affront to the reader. What! some intellectual, an ardent champion of liberty, may shout. What, you want to impose collective control on such a delicate, individual matter as literary work! You want workmen to decide questions of science, philosophy, or aesthetics by a majority of votes! You deny the absolute freedom of absolutely individual ideological work!

Calm yourselves, gentlemen! First of all, we are discussing party literature and its subordination to party control. Everyone is free to write and say whatever he likes, without any restrictions. But every voluntary association (including the party) is also free to expel members who use the name of the party to advocate anti-party views. Freedom of speech and the press must be complete. But then freedom of association must be complete too. I am bound to accord you, in the name of free speech, the full right to shout, lie and write to your heart's content. But you are bound to grant me, in the name of freedom of association, the right to enter into, or withdraw from, association with people advocating this or that view. The party is a voluntary association, which would inevitably break up, first ideologically and then physically, if it did not cleanse itself of people advocating anti-party views. And to define the border-line between party and anti-party there is the party programme, the party's resolutions on tactics and its rules and, lastly, the entire experience of international Social-Democracy, the voluntary international associations of the proletariat, which has constantly brought into its parties individual elements and trends not fully consistent, not completely Marxist and not altogether correct and which, on the other hand, has constantly conducted periodical "cleansings" of its ranks. So it will be with us too, supporters of bourgeois "freedom of criticism", *within* the Party. We are now becoming a mass party all at once, changing abrupt-

ly to an open organisation, and it is inevitable that we shall be joined by many who are inconsistent (from the Marxist standpoint), perhaps we shall be joined even by some Christian elements, and even by some mystics. We have sound stomachs and we are rock-like Marxists. We shall digest those inconsistent elements. Freedom of thought and freedom of criticism within the Party will never make us forget about the freedom of organising people into those voluntary associations known as parties.

Secondly, we must say to you bourgeois individualists that your talk about absolute freedom is sheer hypocrisy. There can be no real and effective "freedom" in a society based on the power of money, in a society in which the masses of working people live in poverty and the handful of rich live like parasites. Are you free in relation to your bourgeois publisher, Mr. Writer, in relation to your bourgeois public, which demands that you provide it with pornography in frames* and paintings, and prostitution as a "supplement" to "sacred" scenic art? This absolute freedom is a bourgeois or an anarchist phrase (since, as a world outlook, anarchism is bourgeois philosophy turned inside out). One cannot live in society and be free from society. The freedom of the bourgeois writer, artist or actress is simply masked (or hypocritically masked) dependence on the money-bag, on corruption, on prostitution.

And we socialists expose this hypocrisy and rip off the false labels, not in order to arrive at a non-class literature and art (that will be possible only in a socialist extra-class society), but to contrast this hypocritically free literature, which is in reality linked to the bourgeoisie, with a really free one that will be *openly* linked to the proletariat.

It will be a free literature, because the idea of socialism and sympathy with the working people, and not greed or careerism, will bring ever new forces to its ranks. It will be a free literature, because it will serve, not some satiated heroine, not the bored "upper ten thousand" suffering from fatty degeneration, but the millions and tens of

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* There must be a misprint in the source, which says *ramkakh* (frames), while the context suggests *romanakh* (novels).—*Ed.*

millions of working people—the flower of the country, its strength and its future. It will be a free literature, enriching the last word in the revolutionary thought of mankind with the experience and living work of the socialist proletariat, bringing about permanent interaction between the experience of the past (scientific socialism, the completion of the development of socialism from its primitive, utopian forms) and the experience of the present (the present struggle of the worker comrades).

To work, then, comrades! We are faced with a new and difficult task. But it is a noble and grateful one—to organise a broad, multiform and varied literature inseparably linked with the Social-Democratic working-class movement. All Social-Democratic literature must become Party literature. Every newspaper, journal, publishing house, etc., must immediately set about reorganising its work, leading up to a situation in which it will, in one form or another, be integrated into one Party organisation or another. Only then will "Social-Democratic" literature really become worthy of that name, only then will it be able to fulfil its duty and, even within the framework of bourgeois society, break out of bourgeois slavery and merge with the movement of the really advanced and thoroughly revolutionary class.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 12,
November 13, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES ON MEASURES FOR COUNTERACTING THE LOCK-OUT ADOPTED ON NOVEMBER 14 (27), 1905[19]

Citizens, over a hundred thousand workers have been thrown on to the streets in St. Petersburg and other cities.

The autocratic government has declared war on the revolutionary proletariat. The reactionary bourgeoisie is joining hands with the autocracy, intending to starve the workers into submission and disrupt the struggle for freedom.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies declares that this unparalleled mass dismissal of workers is an act of provocation on the part of the government. The government wants to provoke the proletariat of St. Petersburg to isolated outbreaks; the government wants to take advantage of the fact that the workers of other cities have not yet rallied closely enough to the St. Petersburg workers, and to defeat them all piecemeal.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies declares that the cause of liberty is in danger. But the workers will not fall into the trap laid by the government. The workers will not accept battle in the unfavourable conditions in which the government wants to impose battle on them. We must and shall exert every effort to unite the whole struggle—the struggle that is being waged both by the proletariat of all Russia and by the revolutionary peasantry, both by the Army and by the Navy, which are already heroically rising for freedom.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolves;

(1) All factories that have been shut down must immediately be reopened and all dismissed comrades reinstated. All sections of the people that cherish freedom in reality, and not in words only, are invited to support this demand.

(2) In support of this demand, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies considers it necessary to appeal to the solidarity of the entire Russian proletariat, and, if the demand is rejected, to call upon the latter to resort to a general political strike and other forms of resolute struggle.

(3) In preparation for this action, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies has instructed the Executive Committee to enter into immediate communication with the workers of other cities, with the railwaymen's, post and telegraph employees', peasant and other unions, as well as with the Army and Navy, by sending delegates and by other means.

(4) As soon as this preliminary work is completed, the Executive Committee is to call a special meeting of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies to take a final decision with regard to a strike.

(5) The St. Petersburg proletariat has asked all the workers and all sections of society and the people to support the dismissed workers with all the means at their disposal—material, moral and political.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 13,
November 15, 1905

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

THE PROVOCATION THAT FAILED

The resolution of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies* which we print in this issue marks an exceedingly important stage in the development of the revolution.

The alliance of the government and the bourgeoisie is making an attempt to defeat the proletariat, taking advantage of its exhaustion. In answer to the introduction of an eight-hour day in the St. Petersburg factories by revolutionary means, the bourgeoisie has announced a lock-out.

The plot has been hatched. They have decided to fight the strike by means of a mass dismissal of workers. Government-owned works are being shut down, together with many private works. Tens of thousands of workers have been thrown on to the streets. The intention is to provoke the St. Petersburg proletariat exhausted by the previous battles, to a new conflict in most unfavourable conditions.

Following the advice of the Social-Democratic representatives, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies has decided to expose the plot of the counter-revolution before the workers and to caution the proletariat of St. Petersburg against allowing itself to be drawn into a trap. The Soviet has answered the challenge to fight single-handed by appealing for a united struggle throughout Russia; it has answered by immediate steps to consolidate the alliance of the revolutionary workers with the revolutionary peasants and with those sections of the Army and Navy which are beginning to revolt in all parts of Russia.

At such a moment, more than at any other time, it is essential to direct all our efforts towards uniting the army of the revolution all over Russia, it is essential to preserve our forces, to use the liberties we have won for agitation

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* See pp. 50-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and organisation increased a hundredfold, to prepare for new decisive battles. Let the autocracy unite with the reactionary bourgeoisie! Let the liberal bourgeoisie (as represented by the congress of Zemstvo[20] and municipal leaders in Moscow[21]) vote confidence in the government, which hypocritically talks about liberty and at the same time uses armed force to crush Poland for demanding the most elementary guarantees of liberty!

We must counteract the alliance between the autocracy and the bourgeoisie by an alliance between the Social-Democrats and all revolutionary bourgeois democrats. The socialist proletariat holds out its hand to the peasantry fighting for freedom, and calls on it to join in a concerted general onslaught all over the country.

It is in this that the enormous importance of the decision of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies lies. We Social-Democrats must see to it that the whole Party comes to the assistance of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. We are bent on more than just the democratic revolution. We are fighting for socialism, i.e., for the complete emancipation of the toilers from all oppression, economic as well as political. Our Party admits into its ranks only those who recognise this great aim and who never for a moment forget the necessity of preparing the forces for its attainment.

But just because we socialists want to reach our socialist goal, we are striving for the most thorough fulfilment of the democratic revolution, for the winning of complete liberty in the interests of a successful fight for socialism. That is why we must go hand in hand with those revolutionary democrats who do not want to bargain with the government, but to fight it, who do not want to curtail the revolution, but to carry it to completion—with these people we must go hand in hand, without, however, merging with them. Long live, then, the alliance of the socialist proletariat and the whole revolutionary people! All the forces of reaction, all the attacks of the counter-revolution will break down before their joint onslaught.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 13,
November 15, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

THE ARMED FORCES AND THE REVOLUTION

The insurrection at Sevastopol continues to spread. Things are coming to a head. The sailors and soldiers who are fighting for freedom are removing their officers. Complete order is being maintained. The government is unable to repeat the dirty trick it played at Kronstadt,[22] it is unable to engineer riots. The squadron has refused to put to sea and threatens to shell the town if any attempt is made to suppress the insurgents. Command of the *Ochakov* has been taken over by Lieutenant Schmidt (retired), who was dismissed from the service for an "insolent" speech about defending, arms in hand, the liberties promised by the Manifesto of October 17.[23] According to a report in *Rus*,[24] the term fixed {or the sailors' surrender expires today, the 15th.

We are thus on the eve of the decisive moment. The next few days—perhaps hours—will show whether the insurgents will win a complete victory, whether they will be defeated, or whether a bargain will be struck. In any case, the Sevastopol events signify the complete collapse of the old slavish order in the armed forces, the system which transformed soldiers into armed machines and made them instruments for the suppression of the slightest striving after freedom.

Gone for ever are the days when Russian troops could be sent abroad to suppress a revolution—as happened in 1849.[25] Today the armed forces have irretrievably turned away from the autocracy. They have not yet become wholly revolutionary. The political consciousness of the soldiers and sailors is still at a very low level. But the important thing is that it has already awakened, that the soldiers have started a movement of their own, that the spirit of

liberty has penetrated into the barracks everywhere. Military barracks in Russia are as a rule worse than any prisons; nowhere is individuality so crushed and oppressed as in the barracks; nowhere are torture, beating and degradation of the human being so rife. And these barracks are becoming hotbeds of revolution.

The Sevastopol events are neither isolated nor accidental. Let us not speak of former attempts at open insurrection in the Navy and in the Army. Let us compare the sparks at St. Petersburg with the fire at Sevastopol. Let us recall the soldiers' demands which are now being formulated in various military units at St. Petersburg (they appeared in yesterday's issue of our paper). What a remarkable document this list of demands is! How clearly it shows that the slavish army is being transformed into a revolutionary army. And what power can now prevent the spread of similar demands throughout the Navy and throughout the Army?

The soldiers stationed in St. Petersburg want better rations, better clothing, better quarters, higher pay, a reduction in the term of service and shorter daily drill. But more prominent among their demands are those which could be presented only by the civic-minded soldier. They include the right to attend in uniform at all meetings, "on an equal footing with all other citizens", the right to read all newspapers and keep them in the barracks, freedom of conscience, equal rights for all nationalities, complete abolition of all deference to rank outside the barracks, the abolition of officers' batmen, the abolition of courts martial, jurisdiction for the civil courts over all military offences, the right to present complaints collectively, the right to defend oneself against any attempt on the part of a superior to strike a subordinate. Such are the principal demands of the soldiers in St. Petersburg.

These demands show that a great part of the Army is already at one with the men of Sevastopol who have risen for liberty.

These demands show that the hypocritical talk of the henchmen of the autocracy about the neutrality of the armed forces, about the need to keep the forces out of politics, etc. cannot count on the slightest sympathy among the soldiers.

The armed forces cannot and should not be neutral. Not to drag them into politics is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and of tsarism, who in fact have always dragged the forces into reactionary politics, and turned Russian soldiers into henchmen of the Black Hundreds, accomplices of the police. It is impossible to hold aloof from the struggle the whole people is waging for liberty. Whoever shows indifference to this struggle is supporting the outrages of the police government, which promised liberty only to mock at it.

The demands of the soldier-citizens are the demands of Social-Democracy, of all the revolutionary parties, of the class-conscious workers. By joining the ranks of the supporters of liberty and siding with the people, the soldiers will ensure victory for the cause of liberty and the satisfaction of their own demands.

But in order to secure the really complete and lasting satisfaction of these demands, it is necessary to take another little step forward. All the separate wishes of the soldiers, worn out by the accursed convict life of the barracks, should be brought together into a single whole. And put together, these demands will read: abolition of the standing army and introduction of the arming of the whole people in its stead.

Everywhere, in all countries, the standing army is used not so much against the external enemy as against the internal enemy. Everywhere the standing army has become the weapon of reaction, the servant of capital in its struggle against labour, the executioner of the people's liberty. Let us not, therefore, stop short at mere partial demands in our great liberating revolution. Let us tear the evil up by the roots. Let us do away with the standing army altogether. Let the army merge with the armed people, let the soldiers bring to the people their military knowledge, let the barracks disappear to be replaced by free military schools. No power on earth will dare to encroach upon free Russia, if the bulwark of her liberty is an armed people which has destroyed the military caste, which has made all soldiers citizens and all citizens capable of bearing arms, soldiers.

The experience of Western Europe has shown how utterly reactionary the standing army is. Military science has

proved that a people's militia is quite practicable, that it can rise to the military tasks presented by a war both of defence and of attack. Let the hypocritical or the sentimental bourgeoisie dream of disarmament. So long as there are oppressed and exploited people in the world, we must strive, not for disarmament, but for the arming of the whole people. It alone will fully safeguard liberty. It alone will completely overthrow reaction. Only when this change has been effected will the millions of toilers, and not a mere handful of exploiters, enjoy real liberty.

Written on November 15 (28), 1905

Novaya Zhizn, No. 14,
November 16, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

THE SCALES ARE WAVERING

Russia's present condition is often described as anarchy. In reality, this incorrect and lying designation expresses the fact that there is no established order in the country. The war of a new, free Russia against the old, feudal-autocratic Russia is raging all along the line. The autocracy is no longer strong enough to defeat the revolution, and the revolution is not yet strong enough to defeat tsarism. The old regime has been smashed but not yet destroyed, and the new, free order exists unrecognised, half-concealed, very often persecuted by the minions of the autocratic regime.

Such a state of affairs may last for quite a while yet, it will inevitably be attended by manifestations of instability and vacillation in all spheres of social and political life: people hostile to liberty, who now profess to be friends of liberty by way of a military stratagem, will inevitably try to fish in these troubled waters. But the longer this state of transition lasts, the more surely will it lead to the complete and decisive victory of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry. For nothing opens the eyes of the most ignorant masses of town and country so effectively, nothing so greatly rouses even the most indifferent and most sleepy, as this long-drawn-out decay of the autocracy, which has been condemned by all and has acknowledged its condemnation.

What do the latest political events tell us—this new and great strike of the post and telegraph employees,[26] this growing ferment and growing revolutionary organisation in the armed forces and even in the police, this victory of politically-backward troops fettered by discipline over the army of freedom in Sevastopol, this unparalleled slump in

government securities? They tell us that the autocracy is firing its last shots and using up its last reserves. Even the stock exchange—loyal to the tsar in its bourgeois cowardice and its bourgeois longing for the end of the revolution—even the stock exchange has no faith in the "victors" of Sevastopol. These events tell us that the revolutionary people is steadily extending its conquests, rousing new fighters, exercising its forces, improving its organisation and marching forward to victory, advancing as irresistibly as an avalanche.

The weapon of the political strike is being perfected; new contingents of workers are now learning to wield this weapon, workers without whom a modern civilised community cannot exist even for a single day. The awareness of the need for freedom is growing in the armed forces and in the police, preparing new centres of insurrection, new Kronstadts and new Sevastopols.

The victors of Sevastopol have hardly any reason for rejoicing. The Crimean insurrection has been defeated. The insurrection of all Russia is invincible.

Let worker Social-Democrats therefore prepare for even greater events, which will impose on them an immense responsibility!

Let them not forget that only a solidly united Social-Democratic Party can lead the proletariat of Russia to victory, hand in hand with the Social-Democratic proletariat of the whole world!

Novaya Zhizn, No. 16,
November 18, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

LEARN FROM THE ENEMY

The bourgeois democrats of *Nasha Zhizn*[27] have launched a campaign against "the mixture of Marxism and barbarism". We strongly recommend all class-conscious workers to look closely into the arguments of the radical democrats.

Nothing facilitates an understanding of the political essence of developments as greatly as their evaluation by one's adversaries (that is, of course, unless the latter are hopelessly stupid).

Nasha Zhizn does not like "the struggle of one section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party against the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies", or, to be exact, the struggle of the Social-Democrats against "non-partisan" class organisations, as the newspaper itself puts it. Our radicals say that the workers must unite. That means—that means that the leaders of the Soviet who "are endeavouring to unite the *entire* proletariat without distinction of political creed" are right. And the radicals triumphantly show us up as contradicting our own principle of the "*class struggle*".

Learn from your enemies, comrade workers, who sympathise with the formation of a non-partisan workers' organisation, or are at least indifferent to this desire! Call to mind the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels, which speaks of the *transformation* of the proletariat *into a class* in keeping with the growth not only of its unity, but also of its political *consciousness*.[28] Remember the example of such countries as England, where the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie has been going on everywhere and at all times, in spite of which the proletariat has remained disunited, its elected representatives have been

bought up by the bourgeoisie, its class-consciousness has been corrupted by the ideologists of capital, its strength has been dissipated through the desertion of the masses of the workers by the labour aristocracy. Think of all this, comrade workers, and you will come to the conclusion that only a Social-Democratic proletariat is a proletariat conscious of its class tasks. Down with non-partisanship! Non-partisanship has always and everywhere been a weapon and slogan of the bourgeoisie. Under certain conditions, we can and must march together with proletarians who are not class-conscious, with proletarians who accept non-proletarian doctrines (the programme of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries"). But under no circumstances and at no time must we relax our strict Party approach, under no circumstances and at no time must we forget, or allow others to forget, that hostility to Social-Democracy within the ranks of the proletariat is a relic of bourgeois views among the proletariat.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 16,
November 18, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

REVOLUTIONARY OFFICE ROUTINE AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

It was only natural and inevitable in our revolutionary movement that the question of a constituent assembly should be brought forward. To sweep away the survivals of the old, semi-feudal institutions of autocratic Russia for good and all, to determine the institutions of new, free Russia, one cannot conceive of any consistent and logical path save that of calling a constituent assembly of the whole people. True, in actual life consistent and logical objectives are rarely realised in full; life always introduces many unforeseen features which complicate and confuse the issue, which mix up the old and the new. But whoever sincerely wishes to have done with the old and knows how to work for that end must define clearly what a constituent assembly stands for, and fight with all his might for its realisation in its full and unadulterated form.

The party of the class-conscious proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party, advanced the demand for a constituent assembly as far back as 1903, in its Programme adopted at the Second Congress. "The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," reads the last section of our Programme, "is firmly convinced that the complete, consistent and lasting attainment of the above-mentioned political and economic reforms [the establishment of a democratic state system, labour protection, etc.]* can be achieved only by overthrowing the autocracy and convoking a constituent assembly, freely elected by the whole people."

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

These words clearly show that our Party is concerned not only with the purely formal, but also with the material conditions for the convocation of a constituent assembly, i.e., with the conditions which would make such an assembly truly national and truly constituent. It is not enough to call an assembly "constituent", it is not enough to convene representatives of the people, even though they be chosen by universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot, even though freedom of elections be really guaranteed. In addition to all these conditions, it is necessary that the constituent assembly have the authority and the force to constitute a new order. There have been cases in the history of revolutions when an assembly was nominally constituent, while in actual fact real force and power were not in its hands but in the hands of the old autocracy. This was the case in the German revolution of 1848, which explains why the "constituent" assembly of that period, the notorious Frankfurt Parliament, acquired the shameful reputation of a contemptible "talking shop". That assembly babbled about freedom, decreed freedom, but took no practical steps to remove the government institutions which were destroying freedom. It is quite natural, therefore, that that pitiable assembly of pitiable liberal-bourgeois prattlers withdrew from the scene in ignominy.

In present-day Russia the question of the convocation of a constituent assembly heads the list of the political questions of the day. And it is now that the practical side of this question is becoming a matter of the utmost urgency. What is important is not so much whether a constituent assembly will be convoked (it is probable that even Count Witte, that ministerial broker, will agree to it tomorrow), but whether it will be a truly national and truly constituent assembly.

As a matter of fact, the experience of our revolution, despite the fact that it is only just beginning, has already shown clearly what jugglery may be performed with words and promises in general, and with the constituent assembly slogan in particular. Just call to mind the recent congress of Zemstvo and municipal leaders—the "Cadets"[29]—in Moscow. Recall their famous formula: a State Duma with constituent functions for drawing up a constitution to be approved by the Emperor.... Even the bourgeois-democratic

press noted the inherently contradictory nature and absurdity of this formula. To "constitute" a new political order "to be approved" by the head of the old government—what does this mean but legalising two governments, two equal (on paper) supreme authorities—the authority of the people risen in revolt and the authority of the old autocracy. It is obvious that equality between them is a sheer semblance, that in practice the terms of any "compromise" between them depend on which side has the preponderance of *force*. Thus, in their "ideal" plan of transition from the old Russia to the new, the liberal bourgeois were legitimising the coexistence of two equal, mutually hostile and contending forces, i.e., they were legitimising an eternal and hopeless struggle.

This contradiction cannot be explained by simple formal logic. But it is fully explained by the logic of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is afraid of complete freedom, of full democracy, for it knows that the class-conscious, i.e., socialist, proletariat will use this freedom to fight against the domination of capital. Therefore what the bourgeoisie really wants is not complete freedom, not the full sovereignty of the people, but a deal with reaction, with the autocracy. The bourgeoisie wants parliamentarism in order to ensure the domination of capital rather than that of the bureaucracy, and at the same time it wants the monarchy, a standing army, the preservation of certain privileges for the bureaucracy, because it does not want to allow the revolution to reach its final goal, because it does not want to arm the proletariat—"arming" meaning both direct arming with weapons and arming with complete freedom. The contradictory class position of the bourgeoisie between the autocracy and the proletariat inevitably gives rise, irrespectively of the will or consciousness of this or that individual, to senseless and absurd formulas of "compromise". The constituent assembly slogan is turned into an empty phrase the great demand of the proletariat which has risen to win freedom is reduced to a farce—this is the way the bourgeoisie profanes absolutely everything, substituting haggling for struggle.

The radical bourgeois of *Nasha Zhizn* do not see this inevitably false and spurious presentation of the question by the liberals, when they extol with serious mien the "draft"

for the convocation of a constituent assembly prepared by Messrs. Falbork and Charnolusky, and then also by the Central Bureau of the Union of Unions. It is ridiculous to make such "drafts", gentlemen! You are following in the footsteps of the "Cadets", who have betrayed the revolution. You forget that paper drafts, like all constitutional illusions, corrupt the revolutionary consciousness of the people and weaken their fighting spirit, for they obscure the main point and entirely distort the question itself. After all, you are not engaged in propaganda for a political ABC. You are putting the question *practically*, as is indicated by the very nature of the discussion of the draft "by representatives of the extreme and the moderate parties", which you have proposed. It is Manilovism[30] on your part, esteemed bourgeois democrats, to admit, on the one hand, that it is desirable for the constituent assembly to possess "full" power and attempt, on the other hand, to unite the extreme parties with the "moderate" parties, i.e., those who desire such full power with those who do not desire it.

Off with the frills and furbelows! We have had enough of lying liberal phrases! It is time to draw the line. To the right—the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, who have in effect been brought together by their opposition to the transfer of all power—sole, full and indivisible—to a constituent assembly. To the left—the socialist proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry or, more broadly, the whole of revolutionary bourgeois democracy. They want the constituent assembly to have full power. For this they can and must conclude a fighting alliance, without, of course, merging. It is not paper drafts they need, but fighting measures, not the organisation of office routine, but the organisation of a victorious struggle for liberty.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 18,
November 20, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

THE DYING AUTOCRACY AND NEW ORGANS OF POPULAR RULE[31]

The insurrection is gaining ground. The impotence, confusion and disintegration of the autocratic Witte Government are increasing. The organisation of the most diverse groups, sections and classes of the people, the organisation of the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary forces, is growing in breadth and depth.

Such is the situation at present. It can be expressed in the words: organisation and mobilisation of the revolution. Land battles in Voronezh and Kiev follow on the heels of the naval battle in Sevastopol. In Kiev the armed uprising apparently goes a step further, a step in the direction of merging the revolutionary army with the revolutionary workers and students. That, at any rate, is the testimony of the report in *Rus* about a meeting of 16,000 people in the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, held under the protection of a sapper battalion of insurgent soldiers.

It is quite natural that in the circumstances even the liberal bourgeoisie, which longs from the bottom of its heart for a deal with the autocracy, is beginning to lose patience, to lose faith in the "great" acrobat Witte, and to cast its eyes towards the left, in search of a force capable of carrying out the revolution which has become an absolute necessity.

In this respect, the stand taken by *Rus* is highly instructive. This newspaper clearly sees that "events are beginning to pile up in just such an avalanche as preceded October 17". And so, on the one hand, it appeals to the very Zemstvo leaders who have manifested no less confusion, impotence and helplessness than the autocratic government.

It calls on them "not to delay" and to take "part in the impending events", in order "to give the outcome of these events mild forms, least prejudicial and most favourable to the country". On the other hand, this very same *Rus* disagrees with *Slovo*,[32] declaring that "no one believes that the present government could convoke a State Duma under the present circumstances". "At present," states *Rus*, "it is necessary to think of forming a government that could convoke a Duma."

Thus, under the pressure of the revolutionary proletariat, the liberal bourgeoisie takes another step to the left. Yesterday it was expressing a desire to bargain with Witte and adopted a conditional vote of confidence in him (at the Zemstvo Congress). Today confidence in Witte is waning, and capital is demanding a new government. *Rus* proposes that all liberation parties set up a special national council of deputies, which would become a "powerful instrument of pressure on the government, if the latter shows itself still [!!] capable of functioning, and an organ of power of the people ready for use, to take over the duties of the government provisionally in the event of the latter's utter incapacity and collapse".

In plain and simple Russian, an organ of power of the people which temporarily assumes the duties of a government that has collapsed is called a provisional revolutionary government. Such a government is bound to be provisional, for its authority expires with the convocation of a constituent assembly representing the whole people. Such a government is bound to be revolutionary, for it replaces a government that has collapsed, and it does so with the support of the revolution. The very replacement of one by the other cannot occur other than by revolutionary means. Such a government must become an "organ of power of the people", carrying out everywhere the demands put forward by the people and replacing at once, immediately and everywhere all the old, autocratic and Black-Hundred "organs of power" by organs of power of the people, i.e., either by representatives of the provisional revolutionary government or by elected persons in all cases where elections are possible—on the basis, of course, of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

We are very glad that the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie has arrived at the idea of a provisional revolutionary government. We are glad not because we believe that the liberals have sided with the revolution, not because we have suddenly begun to put faith in their sincerity, steadfastness and consistency. No, we are glad because it is an obvious and indubitable sign of the strength of the revolution. The revolution must have become a force since even the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie has come to realise the necessity for a provisional revolutionary government.

We are not forgetting, of course, that the liberals want to use such a government as a threat to the autocracy more than they desire its establishment, just as a customer threatens the shopkeeper that he will go to another shop. Lower your price, Mr. Witte, or we shall go into the provisional revolutionary government, "mildly" termed "general council of deputies" or "national council of deputies"! Only this desire to go on haggling can explain the seeming senselessness and absurdity of *Rus* declaring the Witte Government incapable of convening representatives of the people, and yet in the same breath granting that it is possible for this government to "show itself *still* capable of functioning".

Oh, no, gentlemen of the liberal camp, these are not times in which such wiles can succeed or in which duplicity can remain unexposed! The people are fighting against the autocracy, which (on October 17) promised liberty only to make a mock of liberty, to outrage it. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ of a people fighting for liberty. The struggle for liberty against a government which is trampling liberty underfoot is (at a certain stage in the development of this struggle) an armed uprising, and this is what is now taking place in Russia all along the line. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ of insurrection, uniting all who have risen in revolt and exercising political leadership of the insurrection. Therefore anyone who talks of the possibility and necessity of a provisional revolutionary government, and yet permits of a deal with the old government which is to be superseded, is either confusing matters or committing an act of treachery. Indeed, just think, gentlemen who write in *Rus*: can there really be such simpletons among the supporters of the revo-

lution who would voluntarily accept as members of a provisional revolutionary government individuals, or representatives of parties, who regard the old government as still "capable of functioning" and who continue to pay it visits by the back door, to bargain with it? Just consider: would the Russian Army have gained or lost by including the patriotic young men of Manchuria in its ranks? Most likely it would have lost, for the Manchurian patriots would have betrayed the Russians to the Japanese. The revolutionary people of Russia will likewise lose if the "patriots", the monarchist-minded patriots of the money-bag (i.e., the liberal bourgeois), betray them to the Witte autocracy.

Let the liberal bourgeoisie regard the provisional revolutionary government as a mere threat to the autocracy. For the socialist proletariat, for the revolutionary peasantry, and for all those who are resolutely and irrevocably taking a stand with them in the struggle for liberty, the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government is a great and extremely important task, which becomes more pressing with every day. The October revolution, together with the military risings which followed it, has so weakened the autocracy that the organs of a new power—that of the people—have begun to spring up spontaneously, on the ground ploughed up by the political strike and fertilised with the blood of the champions of liberty. These organs are the revolutionary parties and militant organisations of the workers, peasants and other sections of the people who are waging a genuine revolutionary struggle. These organs are bringing about in practice the alliance between the socialist proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. We must now extend and consolidate this fighting alliance, give it shape and cement it, so that the organs of the new power are prepared for the coming repetition of October 17, so that all the fighters for liberty throughout Russia may then come forward with a common programme of immediate political changes—organised, self-disciplined, well aware of their aim, keeping out all traitors, all waverers, all windbags. For us representatives of the socialist proletariat the forthcoming democratic revolution is only one of the steps to the great goal, the socialist revolution. Bearing this in mind, we shall never merge with the petty-bourgeois parties or groups,

however sincere, revolutionary or strong they may be; we know for certain that on the road to socialism, the ways of the worker and of the petty proprietor will very often inevitably diverge. But it is in the interests of socialism that we shall now do our utmost for the democratic revolution to be accomplished as speedily, as fully and as resolutely as possible. With this end in view, we shall conclude, and are concluding, a temporary fighting alliance with all the revolutionary-democratic forces to attain our common immediate political aim. It is to this end that, while strictly preserving our Party identity and independence, we enter the Soviets of Workers' Deputies and other revolutionary associations. Long live the new organs of power of the people! Welcome to the single, supreme and victorious organ of popular rule!

And to the radical bourgeois we shall say in parting: Gentlemen, you chatter about organs of power of the people. It is only strength that makes power. In present-day society, only the armed people headed by the armed proletariat can constitute this strength. If sympathy with liberty were proved by words, we should probably have to call even the authors of the Manifesto of October 17 supporters of liberty. But if it has to be proved by deeds, then the only such deed at the present time is assistance in arming the workers, assistance in forming and building up a genuinely revolutionary army. So make your choice, gentlemen: will you go to Mr. Witte's antechamber to beg for crumbs of liberty, to haggle over the curtailment of liberty, or to the "organs of power of the people", to the provisional revolutionary government, to fight selflessly for complete liberty? Choose!

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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SOCIALISM AND ANARCHISM

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies decided yesterday, November 23, to reject the application of the anarchists for representation on the Executive Committee and on the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The Executive Committee itself has given the following reasons for this decision: "(1) In the whole of international practice, congresses and socialist conferences have never included representatives of the anarchists, since they do not recognise the political struggle as a means for the achievement of their ideals; (2) only parties can be represented, and the anarchists are not a party."

We consider the decision of the Executive Committee to be in the highest degree correct, and of enormous importance from the point of view both of principle and of practical politics. If we were to regard the Soviet of Workers' Deputies as a workers' parliament or as an organ of proletarian self-government, then of course it would have been wrong to reject the application of the anarchists. However insignificant (fortunately) the influence of the anarchists among our workers may be, nevertheless, a certain number of workers undoubtedly support them. The question whether the anarchists constitute a party, an organisation, a group, or a voluntary association of like-minded people, is a formal question, and not of major importance in terms of principle. Lastly, if the anarchists, while rejecting the political struggle, apply for representation in an institution which is conducting such a struggle, this crying inconsistency merely goes to show once again how utterly unstable are the philosophy and tactics of the anarchists. But, of course, instability is no reason for excluding anyone from a "parliament", or an "organ of self-government".

We regard the decision of the Executive Committee as absolutely correct and in no way contradicting the functions, the character and the composition of this body. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is not a labour parliament and not an organ of proletarian self-government, nor an organ of self-government at all, but a fighting organisation for the achievement of definite aims.

This fighting organisation includes, on the basis of a temporary, unwritten fighting agreement, representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (the party of proletarian socialism), of the "Socialist-Revolutionary" Party (the representatives of petty-bourgeois socialism, or the extreme Left wing of revolutionary bourgeois democrats), and finally many "non-party" workers. The latter, however, are not non-party in general, but are non-party revolutionaries, their sympathies being entirely on the side of the revolution, for the victory of which they are fighting with boundless enthusiasm, energy and self-sacrifice. For that reason it will be quite natural to include representatives of the revolutionary peasantry in the Executive Committee.

For all practical purposes, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is an inchoate, broad fighting alliance of socialists and revolutionary democrats, the term "non-party revolutionary", of course, representing a series of transitional stages between the former and the latter. Such an alliance is obviously necessary for the purpose of conducting political strikes and other, more active forms of struggle, for the urgent democratic demands which have been accepted and approved by the overwhelming majority of the population. In an alliance of this sort, the anarchists will not be an asset, but a liability; they will merely bring disorganisation and thus weaken the force of the joint assault; to them it is still "debatable" whether political reform is urgent and important. The exclusion of anarchists from the fighting alliance which is carrying out, as it were, our democratic revolution, is quite necessary from the point of view of this revolution and is in its interests. There can be a place in a fighting alliance only for those who fight for the aim of that alliance. If, for example, the "Cadets" or the "Party of Law and Order"[33] had managed to recruit at least several hundred workers into their St. Petersburg branches, the Executive Committee of the

Soviet of Workers' Deputies would hardly have opened its doors to the representatives of such organisations.

In explaining its decision, the Executive Committee refers to the practice of international socialist congresses. We warmly welcome this statement, this recognition by the executive body of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies of the ideological leadership of the international Social-Democratic movement. The Russian revolution has already acquired international significance. The enemies of the revolution in Russia are already conspiring with Wilhelm II and with all sorts of reactionaries, tyrants, militarists and exploiters in Europe against free Russia. Neither shall we forget that the complete victory of our revolution demands an alliance of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia with the socialist workers of all countries.

It is not for nothing that international socialist congresses adopted the decision not to admit the anarchists. A wide gulf separates socialism from anarchism, and it is in vain that the *agents-provocateurs* of the secret police and the newspaper lackeys of reactionary governments pretend that this gulf does not exist. The philosophy of the anarchists is bourgeois philosophy turned inside out. Their individualistic theories and their individualistic ideal are the very opposite of socialism. Their views express, not the future of bourgeois society, which is striding with irresistible force towards the socialisation of labour, but the present and even the past of that society, the domination of blind chance over the scattered and isolated small producer. Their tactics, which amount to a repudiation of the political struggle, disunite the proletarians and convert them in fact into passive participators in one bourgeois policy or another, since it is impossible and unrealisable for the workers really to dissociate themselves from politics.

In the present Russian revolution, the task of rallying the forces of the proletariat, of organising it, of politically educating and training the working class, is more imperative than ever. The more outrageous the conduct of the Black-Hundred government, the more zealously its *agents-provocateurs* strive to fan base passions among the ignorant masses and the more desperately the defenders of the autocracy, which is rotting alive, clutch at every opportunity

to discredit the revolution by organising hold-ups, pogroms and assassinations, and by fuddling lumpen proletarians with drink, the more important is the task of organisation that falls primarily to the party of the socialist proletariat. And we shall therefore resort to every means of ideological struggle to keep the influence of the anarchists over the Russian workers just as negligible as it has been so far.

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THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND NON-PARTY REVOLUTIONISM

I

The revolutionary movement in Russia, which is rapidly spreading to ever new sections of the population, is giving rise to a number of non-party organisations. The longer the urge for association has been suppressed and persecuted, the more forcibly it asserts itself. All sorts of organisations, frequently loose in form, and most original in character, are constantly springing up. They have no hard and fast boundaries, as have organisations in Europe. Trade unions assume a political character. The political struggle blends with the economic struggle—as, for instance, in the form of strikes—and this gives rise to temporary, or more or less permanent, organisations of a blended type.

What is the significance of this phenomenon, and what should be the attitude of Social-Democrats towards it?

Strict adherence to the party principle is the corollary and the result of a highly developed class struggle. And, vice versa, the interests of the open and widespread class struggle demand the development of the strict party principle. That is why the party of the class-conscious proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party, has always quite rightly combated the non-party idea, and has worked steadily to establish a closely-knit, socialist workers' party consistent in its principles. The more thoroughly the development of capitalism splits up the entire people into classes, accentuating the contradictions among them, the greater is the success of this work among the masses.

It is quite natural that the present revolution in Russia should have given rise, and should continue to give rise, to so many non-party organisations. This is a democratic revo-

lution, i.e., one which is bourgeois as regards its social and economic content. This revolution is overthrowing the autocratic semi-feudal system, extricating the bourgeois system from it, and thereby putting into effect the demands of all the classes of bourgeois society—in this sense being a revolution of the whole people. This, of course, does not mean that our revolution is not a class revolution; certainly not. But it is directed against classes and castes which have become or are becoming obsolete from the point of view of bourgeois society, which are alien to that society and hinder its development. And since the entire economic life of the country has already become bourgeois in all its main features, since the overwhelming majority of the population is in fact already living in bourgeois conditions of existence, the anti-revolutionary elements are naturally extremely few in number, constituting truly a mere "handful" as compared with the "people". Hence the class nature of the bourgeois revolution inevitably reveals itself in the "popular", at first glance non-class, nature of the struggle of all classes of a bourgeois society against autocracy and feudalism.

The epoch of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, no less than in other countries, is distinguished by a relatively undeveloped state of the class contradictions peculiar to capitalist society. True, in Russia capitalism is more highly developed at the present time than it was in Germany in 1848, to say nothing of France in 1789; but there is no doubt about the fact that in Russia purely capitalist antagonisms are very very much overshadowed by the antagonisms between "culture" and Asiatic barbarism, Europeanism and Tartarism, capitalism and feudalism; in other words, the demands that are being put first today are those the satisfaction of which will develop capitalism, cleanse it of the slag of feudalism and improve the conditions of life and struggle both for the proletariat and for the bourgeoisie.

Indeed, if we examine the demands, instructions and *doléances*, which are now being drawn up in infinite numbers in every factory, office, regiment, police unit, parish, educational institution, etc., etc., all over Russia, we shall easily see that the overwhelming majority of them contain purely "cultural" demands, if we may call them so. What I mean is that actually they are not specifically class demands.

but demands for elementary rights, demands which will not destroy capitalism but, on the contrary, bring it within the framework of Europeanism, and free it of barbarism, savagery, corruption and other "Russian" survivals of serfdom. In essence, even the proletarian demands are limited, in most cases, to reforms of the sort that are fully realisable within the framework of capitalism. What the Russian proletariat is demanding now and immediately is not something that will undermine capitalism, but something that will cleanse it, something that will accelerate and intensify its development.

Naturally, as a result of the special position which the proletariat occupies in capitalist society, the striving of the workers towards socialism, and their alliance with the Socialist Party assert themselves with elemental force at the very earliest stages of the movement. But purely socialist demands are still a matter of the future: the immediate demands of the day are the democratic demands of the workers in the political sphere, and economic demands within the framework of capitalism in the economic sphere. Even the proletariat is making the revolution, as it were, within the limits of the minimum programme and not of the maximum programme. As for the peasantry, the vast and numerically overwhelming mass of the population, this goes without saying. Its "maximum programme", its ultimate aims, do not go beyond the bounds of capitalism, which would grow more extensively and luxuriantly if all the land were transferred to the whole of the peasantry and the whole of the people. Today the peasant revolution is a bourgeois revolution—however much these words may jar on the sentimental ears of the sentimental knights of our petty-bourgeois socialism.

The character of the revolution now in progress, as outlined above, quite naturally gives rise to non-party organisations. The whole movement, therefore, on the surface inevitably acquires a non-party stamp, a non-party appearance —but only on the surface, of course. The urge for a "human", civilised life, the urge to organise in defence of human dignity, for one's rights as man and citizen, takes hold of everyone, unites all classes, vastly outgrows all party bounds and shakes up people who as yet are very very far from being able to rise to party allegiance. The vital need of immediate,

elementary, essential rights and reforms puts off, as it were, all thought and consideration of anything further. Preoccupation with the struggle in progress, a preoccupation that is quite necessary and legitimate, for without it success in the struggle would be impossible, causes people to idealise these immediate, elementary aims, to depict them in rosy colours and sometimes even to clothe them in fantastic garb. Simple democracy, ordinary bourgeois democracy, is taken as socialism and "registered" as such. Everything seems to be "non-party"; everything seems to fuse into a single movement for "liberation" (actually, a movement liberating the whole of bourgeois society); everything acquires a faint, a very faint tint of "socialism", owing above all to the leading part played by the socialist proletariat in the democratic struggle.

In these circumstances, the idea of non-partisanship cannot but gain certain temporary successes. The slogan of non-partisanship cannot but become a fashionable slogan, for fashion drags helplessly at the tail of life, and it is the non-party organisation that appears to be the most "common" phenomenon on the surface of political life: non-party democratism, non-party strike-ism, non-party revolutionism.

The question now arises: what *should* be the attitude of the adherents and representatives of the various classes towards this fact of non-party organisation, towards this idea of non-partisanship? "Should", that is, not in the subjective sense, but objectively, i.e., not in the sense of what view to take of it, but in the sense of what attitude is inevitably taking shape under the influence of the respective interests and viewpoints of the various classes.

II

As we have already shown, the non-party principle is the product—or, if you will, the expression—of the bourgeois character of our revolution. The bourgeoisie cannot help inclining towards the non-party principle, for the absence of parties among those who are fighting for the liberation of bourgeois society implies that no fresh struggle will arise against this bourgeois society itself. Those who carry on a "non-party" struggle for liberty are not aware of the bourgeois nature of liberty, or they sanctify the bourgeois system, or

else they put off the struggle against it, its "perfecting", to the Greek calends. And, conversely, those who consciously or unconsciously stand for the bourgeois system cannot help feeling attracted by the idea of non-partisanship.

In a society based upon class divisions, the struggle between the hostile classes is bound, at a certain stage of its development, to become a political struggle. The most purposeful, most comprehensive and specific expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. The non-party principle means indifference to the struggle of parties. But this indifference is not equivalent to neutrality, to abstention from the struggle, for in the class struggle there can be no neutrals; in capitalist society, it is impossible to "abstain" from taking part in the exchange of commodities or labour-power. And exchange inevitably gives rise to economic and then to political struggle. Hence, in practice, indifference to the struggle does not at all mean standing aloof from the struggle, abstaining from it, or being neutral. Indifference is tacit support of the strong, of those who rule. In Russia, those who were indifferent towards the autocracy prior to its fall during the October revolution tacitly supported the autocracy. In present-day Europe, those who are indifferent towards the rule of the bourgeoisie tacitly support the bourgeoisie. Those who are indifferent towards the idea that the struggle for liberty is of a bourgeois nature tacitly support the domination of the bourgeoisie in this struggle, in the free Russia now in the making. Political unconcern is political satiety. A well-fed man is "unconcerned with", "indifferent to", a crust of bread; a hungry man, however, will always take a "partisan" stand on the question of a crust of bread. A person's "unconcern and indifference" with regard to a crust of bread does not mean that he does not need bread, but that he is always sure of his bread, that he is never in want of bread and that he has firmly attached himself to the "party" of the well-fed. The non-party principle in bourgeois society is merely a hypocritical, disguised, passive expression of adherence to the party of the well-fed, of the rulers, of the exploiters.

The non-party idea is a bourgeois idea. The party idea is a socialist idea. This thesis, in general and as a whole is applicable to all bourgeois society. One must, of course,

be able to adapt this general truth to particular questions and particular cases; but to forget this truth at a time when the whole of bourgeois society is rising in revolt against feudalism and autocracy means in practice completely to renounce socialist criticism of bourgeois society.

The Russian revolution, despite the fact that it is still in the early stages of its development, has already provided no little material to confirm the general considerations here outlined. Only the Social-Democratic Party, the party of the class-conscious proletariat, has always insisted, and insists now, upon strict adherence to the party principle. Our liberals, who voice the views of the bourgeoisie, cannot bear the socialist party principle and will not hear of class struggle. One need but recall the recent speeches of Mr. Rodichev, who for the hundredth time repeated what has been said over and over again by *Osvobozhdeniye*[34] abroad, as well as by the innumerable vassal organs of Russian liberalism. Finally, the ideology of the intermediate class, the petty bourgeoisie, has found a clear expression in the views of the Russian "radicals" of various shades, from *Nasha Zhizn* and the "radical-democrats"[35] to the "Socialist-Revolutionaries". The latter have demonstrated their confusion of socialism with democracy most clearly over the agrarian question, particularly by their slogan of "socialisation" (of the land without socialising capital). It is likewise well known that being tolerant towards bourgeois radicalism, they are intolerant towards the Social-Democratic Party principle.

An analysis of just how the interests of the various classes are reflected in the programme and tactics of the Russian liberals and radicals of all shades is beyond our subject. We have touched upon this interesting question only in passing, and must now proceed to draw the practical political conclusions with regard to the attitude of our Party towards non-party organisations.

Is it permissible for socialists to participate in non-party organisations? If so, on what conditions? What tactics should be pursued in these organisations?

The answer to the first question cannot be an unconditional and categorical "no". It would be wrong to say that in no case and under no circumstances should Social-Democrats participate in non-party (i.e., more or less consciously or

unconsciously bourgeois) organisations. In the period of the democratic revolution, a refusal to participate in non-party organisations would in certain circumstances amount to a refusal to participate in the democratic revolution. But undoubtedly socialists should confine these "certain circumstances" to narrow limits, and should permit of such participation only on strictly defined, restrictive conditions. For while non-party organisations, as we have already said, arise as a result of the relatively undeveloped state of the class struggle, strict adherence to the party principle, on the other hand, is one of the factors that make the class struggle conscious, clear, definite, and principled.

To preserve the ideological and political independence of the party of the proletariat is the constant, immutable and absolute duty of socialists. Whoever fails to fulfil this duty ceases to be a socialist *in fact*, however sincere his "socialist" (in words) convictions may be. Socialists may participate in non-party organisations only by way of exception; and the very purpose, nature, conditions, etc., of this participation must be wholly subordinated to the fundamental task of preparing and organising the socialist proletariat for conscious leadership of the socialist revolution.

Circumstances may compel us to participate in non-party organisations, especially in the period of a democratic revolution, specifically a democratic revolution in which the proletariat plays an outstanding part. Such participation may prove essential, for example, for the purpose of preaching socialism to vaguely democratic audiences, or in the interests of a joint struggle of socialists and revolutionary democrats against the counter-revolution. In the first case, such participation will be a means of securing the acceptance of our ideas; in the second case, it will represent a fighting agreement for the achievement of definite revolutionary aims. In both cases, participation can only be temporary. In both cases, it is permissible only if the independence of the workers' party is fully safeguarded and if the party as a whole controls and guides its members and groups "delegated" to non-party unions or councils.

When the activities of our Party were conducted secretly, the exercise of such control and guidance presented extreme-

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ly great, and sometimes almost insuperable difficulties. But now that the activities of our Party are becoming more and more open, this control and this guidance can and should be exercised on the largest scale, not only by the higher bodies of the Party, but also by the rank and file, by all the organised workers belonging to our Party. Reports on the activities of Social-Democrats in non-party unions and councils, lectures on the conditions and aims of such activities, resolutions of party organisations of all types about these activities, should become a regular practice in a workers' party. Only by such *real* participation of the Party as a whole, by participation in the *direction* of such activities, can we contrast in practice truly socialist work with general democratic work.

What tactics should we pursue in the non-party unions? First of all, we should use every opportunity to establish independent contacts and to propagate the whole of our socialist programme. Secondly, we should define the immediate political tasks of the day in terms of the fullest and most resolute accomplishment of the democratic revolution; we should put forward the political watchwords of the democratic revolution and advance a "programme" of those reforms which should be carried out by militant revolutionary democrats as distinct from haggling, liberal democrats.

Only if matters are arranged in this way will it be permissible and useful for members of our Party to participate in the non-party revolutionary organisations which are being set up one day by the workers, the next day by the peasants, the day after by the soldiers, etc. Only in that event shall we be in a position to fulfil the twofold task of a workers' party in a bourgeois revolution, namely, to carry the democratic revolution to completion and to extend and strengthen the forces of the socialist proletariat, which needs freedom in order to carry on a ruthless struggle for the overthrow of the rule of capital.

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SOCIALISM AND RELIGION

Present-day society is wholly based on the exploitation of the vast masses of the working class by a tiny minority of the population, the class of the landowners and that of the capitalists. It is a slave society, since the "free" workers, who all their life work for the capitalists, are "entitled" only to such means of subsistence as are essential for the maintenance of slaves who produce profit, for the safeguarding and perpetuation of capitalist slavery.

The economic oppression of the workers inevitably calls forth and engenders every kind of political oppression and social humiliation, the coarsening and darkening of the spiritual and moral life of the masses. The workers may secure a greater or lesser degree of political liberty to fight for their economic emancipation, but no amount of liberty will rid them of poverty, unemployment, and oppression until the power of capital is overthrown. Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, overburdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation. Impotence of the exploited classes in their struggle against the exploiters just as inevitably gives rise to the belief in a better life after death as impotence of the savage in his battle with nature gives rise to belief in gods, devils, miracles, and the like. Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labour of others are taught by religion to practise charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven. Religion is opium for the people. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze,

in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man.

But a slave who has become conscious of his slavery and has risen to struggle for his emancipation has already half ceased to be a slave. The modern class-conscious worker, reared by large-scale factory industry and enlightened by urban life, contemptuously casts aside religious prejudices, leaves heaven to the priests and bourgeois bigots, and tries to win a better life for himself here on earth. The proletariat of today takes the side of socialism, which enlists science in the battle against the fog of religion, and frees the workers from their belief in life after death by welding them together to fight in the present for a better life on earth.

Religion must be declared a private affair. In these words socialists usually express their attitude towards religion. But the meaning of these words should be accurately defined to prevent any misunderstanding. We demand that religion be held a private affair so far as the state is concerned. But by no means can we consider religion a private affair so far as our Party is concerned. Religion must be of no concern to the state, and religious societies must have no connection with governmental authority. Everyone must be absolutely free to profess any religion he pleases, or no religion whatever, i.e., to be an atheist, which every socialist is, as a rule. Discrimination among citizens on account of their religious convictions is wholly intolerable. Even the bare mention of a citizen's religion in official documents should unquestionably be eliminated. No subsidies should be granted to the established church nor state allowances made to ecclesiastical and religious societies. These should become absolutely free associations of like-minded citizens, associations independent of the state. Only the complete fulfilment of these demands can put an end to the shameful and accursed past when the church lived in feudal dependence on the state, and Russian citizens lived in feudal dependence on the established church, when medieval, inquisitorial laws (to this day remaining in our criminal codes and on our statute-books) were in existence and were applied, persecuting men for their belief or disbelief, violating men's consciences, and linking cosy gov-

ernment jobs and government-derived incomes with the dispensation of this or that dope by the established church. Complete separation of Church and State is what the socialist proletariat demands of the modern state and the modern church.

The Russian revolution must put this demand into effect as a necessary component of political freedom. In this respect, the Russian revolution is in a particularly favourable position, since the revolting officialism of the police-ridden feudal autocracy has called forth discontent, unrest and indignation even among the clergy. However abject, however ignorant Russian Orthodox clergymen may have been, even they have now been awakened by the thunder of the downfall of the old, medieval order in Russia. Even they are joining in the demand for freedom, are protesting against bureaucratic practices and officialism, against the spying for the police imposed on the "servants of God". We socialists must lend this movement our support, carrying the demands of honest and sincere members of the clergy to their conclusion, making them stick to their words about freedom, demanding that they should resolutely break all ties between religion and the police. Either you are sincere, in which case you must stand for the complete separation of Church and State and of School and Church, for religion to be declared wholly and absolutely a private affair. Or you do not accept these consistent demands for freedom, in which case you evidently are still held captive by the traditions of the inquisition, in which case you evidently still cling to your cosy government jobs and government-derived incomes, in which case you evidently do not believe in the spiritual power of your weapon and continue to take bribes from the state. And in that case the class-conscious workers of all Russia declare merciless war on you.

So far as the party of the socialist proletariat is concerned, religion is not a private affair. Our Party is an association of class-conscious, advanced fighters for the emancipation of the working class. Such an association cannot and must not be indifferent to lack of class-consciousness, ignorance or obscurantism in the shape of religious beliefs. We demand complete disestablishment of the Church so as to be able to combat the religious fog with purely ideo-

logical and solely ideological weapons, by means of our press and by word of mouth. But we founded our association, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, precisely for such a struggle against every religious bamboozling of the workers. And to us the ideological struggle is not a private affair, but the affair of the whole Party, of the whole proletariat.

If that is so, why do we not declare in our Programme that we are atheists? Why do we not forbid Christians and other believers in God to join our Party?

The answer to this question will serve to explain the very important difference in the way the question of religion is presented by the bourgeois democrats and the Social-Democrats.

Our Programme is based entirely on the scientific, and moreover the materialist, world-outlook. An explanation of our Programme, therefore, necessarily includes an explanation of the true historical and economic roots of the religious fog. Our propaganda necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism; the publication of the appropriate scientific literature, which the autocratic feudal government has hitherto strictly forbidden and persecuted, must now form one of the fields of our Party work. We shall now probably have to follow the advice Engels once gave to the German Socialists: to translate and widely disseminate the literature of the eighteenth-century French Enlighteners and atheists.[36]

But under no circumstances ought we to fall into the error of posing the religious question in an abstract, idealistic fashion, as an "intellectual" question unconnected with the class struggle, as is not infrequently done by the radical-democrats from among the bourgeoisie. It would be stupid to think that, in a society based on the endless oppression and coarsening of the worker masses, religious prejudices could be dispelled by purely propaganda methods. It would be bourgeois narrow-mindedness to forget that the yoke of religion that weighs upon mankind is merely a product and reflection of the economic yoke within society. No number of pamphlets and no amount of preaching can enlighten the proletariat, if it is not enlightened by its own struggle against the dark forces of capitalism.

Unity in this really revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class for the creation of a paradise on earth is more important to us than unity of proletarian opinion on paradise in heaven.

That is the reason why we do not and should not set forth our atheism in our Programme; that is why we do not and should not prohibit proletarians who still retain vestiges of their old prejudices from associating themselves with our Party. We shall always preach the scientific world-outlook, and it is essential for us to combat the inconsistency of various "Christians". But that does not mean in the least that the religious question ought to be advanced to first place, where it does not belong at all; nor does it mean that we should allow the forces of the really revolutionary economic and political struggle to be split up on account of third-rate opinions or senseless ideas, rapidly losing all political importance, rapidly being swept out as rubbish by the very course of economic development.

Everywhere the reactionary bourgeoisie has concerned itself, and is now beginning to concern itself in Russia, with the fomenting of religious strife—in order thereby to divert the attention of the masses from the really important and fundamental economic and political problems, now being solved in practice by the all-Russian proletariat uniting in revolutionary struggle. This reactionary policy of splitting up the proletarian forces, which today manifests itself mainly in Black-Hundred pogroms, may tomorrow conceive some more subtle forms. We, at any rate, shall oppose it by calmly, consistently and patiently preaching proletarian solidarity and the scientific world-outlook—a preaching alien to any stirring up of secondary differences.

The revolutionary proletariat will succeed in making religion a really private affair, so far as the state is concerned. And in this political system, cleansed of medieval mildew, the proletariat will wage a broad and open struggle for the elimination of economic slavery, the true source of the religious humbugging of mankind.

Novaya Zhizn, No. 28
December 3, 1905
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION ADOPTED BY THE "MAJORITY" CONFERENCE AT TAMMERFORS[37]

DECEMBER 12-17 (25-30), 1905

1. The Conference recognises that the development of the peasant movement fully confirms the fundamental views of revolutionary Marxism, with regard to both the revolutionary nature and the real social and economic essence of this movement, which is destroying the survivals of serfdom and creating free bourgeois relationships in the countryside. The Conference holds that it is desirable to amend the agrarian programme of our Party as follows: to delete the clause on cut-off lands[38]; to declare, instead, that the Party supports the revolutionary measures of the peasantry, including the confiscation of all state, church, monastery, crown and privately-owned land, making it its principal and constant task to ensure the independent organisation of the rural proletariat, explain to it the irreconcilable conflict between its interests and those of the rural bourgeoisie, and point out the ultimate goal of socialism, which alone is capable of doing away with the division of society into classes and all exploitation of man by man.

2. The Conference expresses the desire that the demand for the refunding of land redemption payments[39] and the establishment of a special fund out of the sums thus collected be deleted from the agrarian programme. The demand for the confiscation of state, monastery, etc., lands should be transferred to another clause.

Hectographed leaflet of the Conference resolutions, issued in December 1905

Published according to the leaflet text



First page of Lenin's manuscript
"The Stages, the Trend, and the Prospects of the Revolution",
1905

Reduced

THE STAGES, THE TREND, AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION

1. The working-class movement rouses the proletariat from the beginning under the leadership of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and *awakens* the liberal bourgeoisie: 1895 to 1901-02.

2. The working-class movement passes to open political struggle and *enlists* the politically awakened strata of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie: 1901-02 to 1905.

3. The working-class movement flares up into a direct *revolution*, while the liberal bourgeoisie has already formed itself into the Constitutional-Democratic Party and thinks of stopping the revolution by compromising with tsarism; but the *radical* elements of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are inclined to enter into an alliance with the proletariat for the *continuation of the revolution*: 1905 (especially the end of that year).

4. The working-class movement achieves victory in the *democratic* revolution, the liberals passively waiting to see how things go and the *peasants* actively assisting. Plus the radical, republican intelligentsia and the corresponding strata of the petty bourgeoisie in the towns. The rising of the peasants is victorious, the power of the landlords is broken.

("The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.")

5. The liberal bourgeoisie, temporising in the third period, passive in the fourth, becomes downright counter-revolutionary, and organises itself in order to take away from the proletariat the gains of the revolution. Among the peasantry, the whole of the well-to-do section, and a fairly large part of the middle peasantry, also grow "wiser",

quieten down and turn to the side of the counter-revolution in order to wrest power from the proletariat and the rural poor, who sympathise with the proletariat.

6. On the basis of the relations established during the fifth period, a new crisis and a new struggle develop and blaze forth, with the proletariat now fighting to preserve its democratic gains for the sake of a socialist revolution. This struggle would have been almost hopeless for the Russian proletariat alone and its defeat would have been as inevitable as the defeat of the German revolutionary party in 1849-50, or of the French proletariat in 1871, *had the European socialist proletariat* not come to the assistance of the Russian proletariat.

Thus, at this stage, the liberal bourgeoisie and the well-to-do peasantry (plus partly the middle peasantry) organise counter-revolution. The Russian proletariat *plus* the European proletariat organise revolution.

In such conditions the Russian proletariat can win a second victory. The cause is no longer hopeless. The second victory will be the *socialist revolution in Europe*.

The European workers will show us "how to do it", and then together with them we shall bring about the socialist revolution.

Written late in 1905
or early 1906

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Published according
to the manuscript

THE WORKERS' PARTY AND ITS TASKS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION[40]

The general tasks of the students in the Russian liberation movement have been explained more than once in the Social-Democratic press, and we shall not dwell on them in this article. There is no need to explain to student Social-Democrats the leading role of the working-class movement, the immense importance of the peasant movement, or the importance of assistance to both by those intellectuals who have pondered the Marxist world-outlook, have taken the side of the proletariat, and are prepared to train themselves to become real members of the workers' party.

We propose to dwell, if only briefly, on another question which is now of paramount practical importance.

What is the special feature of the present state of the great Russian revolution?

It is that events have completely exposed the illusory nature of the Manifesto of October 17. Constitutional illusions have been dispersed. Reaction is rampant all along the line. The autocracy has been fully restored, and even "reinforced" by the dictatorial powers granted to the local satraps, from Dubasov[41] down to the lowest ranks of the police.

Civil war is raging. The political strike, as such, is beginning to exhaust itself, and is becoming a thing of the past, an obsolete form of the movement. In St. Petersburg, for instance, the famished and exhausted workers were not able to carry out the December strike. On the other hand, the movement as a whole, though held down for the moment by the reaction, has undoubtedly risen to a much higher plane.

The heroic proletariat of Moscow has shown that an active struggle is possible, and has drawn into this struggle a large body of people from strata of the urban population hitherto considered politically indifferent, if not reactionary. And yet the Moscow events[42] were merely one of the most striking expressions of a "trend" that has broken through all over Russia. The new form of action was confronted with gigantic problems which, of course, could not be solved all at once. But these problems are now confronting the whole people in a clear and definite way; the movement has been raised to a higher level, consolidated and tempered. No power on earth can wrest these gains from the revolution.

Dubasov's guns have revolutionised new masses of the people on an unprecedented scale. The refurbished caricature of a Duma has been greeted beforehand with far greater hostility by the advanced fighters, and with incomparably greater scepticism by the bourgeoisie, than the old Bulygin Duma.[43]

What now?

Let us look realities squarely in the face. We are now confronted with the new task of studying and utilising the experience of the latest forms of struggle, the task of training and organising forces in the most important centres of the movement.

It would be very much to the advantage of the government to suppress the still isolated actions of the proletarians. The government would like to challenge the workers of St. Petersburg immediately, to go into battle under circumstances that would be most unfavourable for them. But the workers will not allow themselves to be provoked, and will know how to continue on their path of independent preparation for the next all-Russian action.

Forces for such an action exist: they are growing faster than ever. Only a small part of them was drawn into the vortex of the December events. The movement has not by any means developed to its full breadth and depth.

It is enough to glance at the moderate bourgeois and Black-Hundred press. No one, not even *Novoye Vremya*,[44] believes the government's boast that it is able immediately

to nip in the bud any new active manifestation of the movement. No one doubts that the gigantic mass of combustible material—the peasantry—will dare up properly only towards the spring. No one believes that the government sincerely wants to convene the Duma, or that it is able to do so under the old system of repressions, red tape, officialism, denial of civic rights, and ignorance.

It is not excessive optimism on the part of revolutionaries, extremely dangerous in a question like that of decisive action; it is obvious facts, acknowledged even by opponents of the revolution, which testify that the government gained a "victory" in Moscow that rendered its position even more desperate than it was prior to October.

The peasant uprising is growing. Financial collapse is drawing near. The gold currency is declining. The deficit of 500 million rubles cannot be made good in spite of the readiness of the reactionary bourgeoisie of Europe to come to the aid of the autocracy. All the troops fit to fight against the revolution have been brought into action, and still the "pacification" of the Caucasus and Siberia drags on. The ferment in the Army and Navy, which became so marked after October 17, will certainly not be allayed by recourse to violence against the champions of liberty all over Russia. The return of the war prisoners and of the Manchurian army means an intensification of that ferment. The mobilisation of new army units against the internal enemy creates new dangers for the autocracy. The crisis, far from being solved, has, on the contrary, been extended and aggravated by the Moscow "victory".

Let the workers' party clearly realise its tasks. Away with constitutional illusions! We must rally the new forces which are siding with the proletariat. We must "garner the experience" of the two great months of the revolution (November and December). We must re-adapt ourselves to the restored autocracy, and be able wherever necessary to go underground once more. We must present the colossal tasks of a new active encounter in a more definite and practical way, must prepare ourselves for it in a more sustained, more systematic and more persevering fashion, husbanding as far as possible the strength of the proletariat which has become exhausted by the strike struggle.

Wave follows on wave. After the capital, the provinces. After the outlying regions, the very heart of Russia. After the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie. After the towns, the villages. The effort of the reactionary government to carry out its vast tasks is bound to fail. Much in the outcome of the first phase of the great Russian revolution will depend on our preparation for the spring of 1906.

Written at the end of December 1905

Published in *Molodaya Rossiya*, No. 1, January 4, 1906
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the newspaper text

SHOULD WE BOYCOTT THE STATE DUMA?

THE PLATFORM OF THE "MAJORITY"

The party of the working class, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, is becoming united. Its two halves are merging and are preparing for a unity congress, the convocation of which has already been announced.

But there is still one point on which the two halves of the Party disagree—the State Duma. All Party members must be clear on this question, in order to be able to make a deliberate choice of delegates for the joint congress, in order to settle the dispute in accordance with the wishes of all members of the Party, and not only with those of its present central and local bodies.

Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are agreed that the present Duma is a miserable travesty of popular representation, that this fraud must be exposed, and that preparations must be made for an armed uprising to bring about the convocation of a constituent assembly freely elected by the whole people.

The dispute is only about the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma. The Mensheviks say that our Party should take part in the election of delegates and electors. The Bolsheviks advocate an active boycott of the Duma. In this leaflet we shall set forth the views of the Bolsheviks, who at a recent conference of representatives of twenty-six organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution against participation in the elections.*

What does an active boycott of the Duma mean? Boycott means refusing to take part in the elections. We have no wish to elect either Duma deputies, electors or delegates.

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* See pp. 103-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Active boycott does not merely mean keeping out of the elections; it also means making extensive use of election meetings for Social-Democratic agitation and organisation. Making use of these meetings means gaining entry to them both legally (by registering in the voters' lists) and illegally, expounding at them the whole programme and all the views of the socialists, exposing the Duma as a fraud and humbug, and calling for a struggle for a constituent assembly.

Why do we refuse to take part in the elections?

Because by taking part in the elections we should involuntarily foster belief in the Duma among the people and thereby weaken the effectiveness of our struggle against this travesty of popular representation. The Duma is not a parliament, it is a ruse employed by the autocracy. We must expose this ruse by refusing to take any part in the elections.

Because if we recognised the permissibility of taking part in the elections, we should have to be logical and elect deputies to the Duma. Indeed, the bourgeois democrats, such as Khodsky in *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo*, actually advise us to enter into election agreements with the Cadets for that purpose. But all Social-Democrats, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, reject such agreements because they realise that the Duma is not a parliament, but a new police fraud.

Because we cannot at present derive any advantage for the Party from the elections. There is no freedom to carry on agitation. The party of the working class is outlawed; its representatives are imprisoned without trial; its newspapers have been closed and its meetings prohibited. The Party cannot legally unfurl its banner at the elections, it cannot publicly nominate its representatives without betraying them to the police. In this situation, our work of agitation and organisation is far better served by making revolutionary use of meetings without taking part in the elections than by taking part in meetings for legal elections.

The Mensheviks are opposed to electing deputies to the Duma, but wish to elect delegates and electors. What for? Is it in order that they may form a People's Duma, or a free, illegal, representative assembly, something like an All-Russian Soviet of Workers' (and also Peasants') Deputies?

To this we reply: if free representatives are needed, why bother with the Duma at all when electing them? Why supply the police with the lists of our delegates? And why set up new Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and in a new way, when the old Soviets of Workers' Deputies still exist (e.g., in St. Petersburg)? This would be useless and even harmful, for it would give rise to the false, utopian illusion that the decaying and disintegrating Soviets can be revived by new elections, instead of by making new preparations for insurrection and extending it. And it would simply be ridiculous to appoint legal elections on legally fixed dates for the purpose of an insurrection.

The Mensheviks argue that Social-Democrats in all countries take part in parliaments, even in bad parliaments. This argument is false. We, too, will take full part in a parliament. But the Mensheviks themselves realise that the Duma is not a parliament; they themselves refuse to go into it. They say that the masses of the workers are weary and wish to rest by participating in legal elections. But the Party cannot and must not base its tactics on the temporary weariness of certain centres. This would be fatal for the Party; for weary workers would choose non-party delegates, who would merely discredit the Party. We must perseveringly and patiently pursue our work, husbanding the strength of the proletariat, but not ceasing to believe that this depression is only temporary, that the workers will rise still more powerfully and more boldly than they did in Moscow, and that they will sweep away the tsar's Duma. Let the unenlightened and ignorant go into the Duma—the Party will not bind its fate with theirs. The Party will say to them: your own practical experience will confirm our political forecasts. Your own experience will reveal to you the utter fraud the Duma is; and you will then turn back to the Party, having realised the correctness of its counsel.

The tactics of the Mensheviks are contradictory and inconsistent (to take part in the elections, but not to elect deputies to the Duma). They are unsuitable for a mass party, for instead of a simple and clear solution they propose one that is involved and ambiguous. They are not practical, for if the lists of delegates fall into the hands of the police, the Party will suffer a heavy loss. Finally, these tac-

tics cannot be put into effect, because if the Mensheviks appear at the meetings with our programme, the inevitable result will be that instead of legal elections there will be the illegal use of meetings without elections. The police regime will transform the Mensheviks' participation in meetings from Menshevik participation in elections into Bolshevik revolutionary use of the meetings.

Down with the Duma! Down with the new police fraud! Citizens! Honour the memory of the fallen Moscow heroes by fresh preparations for an armed uprising! Long live a freely-elected national constituent assembly!

Such is our battle-cry; and only the tactics of an active boycott are compatible with it.

Written in January 1906

Published in January 1906 as a leaflet both by the C.C. and the Joint C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published according to the leaflet of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.

THE STATE DUMA AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TACTICS[45]

Written in January 1906

Published in February 1906
in the pamphlet *The State Duma and Social-Democracy*
by *Proletarskoye Dyelo* Publishers
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the pamphlet text

THE STATE DUMA AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TACTICS[45]

Written in January 1906

Published in February 1906
in the pamphlet The State Duma
and Social-Democracy
by Proletarskoye Dyelo Publishers
Signed: N. Lenin

Published according
to the pamphlet text

The Law of December 11[46] has brought up, once again, the question of our tactics in relation to the Duma. Shall we take part in the Duma elections, or not? This is the question that is being eagerly discussed in the columns of our bourgeois-democratic press. And it was on this question that the conference of organisations of the "Majority" in the R.S.D.L.P. recently expressed its opinion. This conference, which was attended by representatives of twenty-six organisations (fourteen of them composed of workers, elected by over four thousand organised members of the Party), took the place of the proposed Fourth Congress of the Party, the convocation of which had been announced by the Central Committee. The Congress could not be held because of the railway strike, the Moscow insurrection, and various other events in the most far-flung parts of Russia. But the delegates who had gathered organised a conference of the "Majority" which, among other things, also discussed the Duma elections. This question it decided in the negative, that is, in the sense that the Party should not take part in the elections. The following is the relevant part of the resolution adopted by the conference:

"Ever since October 17, the autocratic government has been trampling upon all the fundamental civil liberties won by the proletariat. The government has drenched the country in blood, shooting down with artillery and machine-guns the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors fighting for liberty. The government scoffs at the nation-wide demand for the convocation of a constituent assembly, and by its Law of December 11 is trying once again to deceive the proletariat and the peasantry, and to stave off its final destruction.

"The Law of December 11 practically bars the proletariat and the bulk of the peasantry from the State Duma; and its object is by all sorts of ruses and police restrictions to ensure in advance the predominance in the Duma of the Black-Hundred elements of the exploiting classes.

"This conference is convinced that the whole of the class-conscious proletariat of Russia will reply to this new tsarist law by resolutely

fighting against it, as well as against any other travesty of popular representation.

"This conference holds that the Social-Democrats must strive to prevent the convocation of this police Duma, and must refuse to take any part in it."

The resolution then goes on to recommend all Party organisations to take full advantage of the election meetings, but not in order to carry out any sort of elections under police restrictions. They should do so in order to expand the revolutionary organisation of the proletariat and conduct agitation among all sections of the people in favour of a resolute struggle against the autocracy; for only after complete victory has been achieved over the latter will it be possible to convene representatives of the people elected in a truly free manner.

Is this decision correct? To answer this question, let us first of all examine the objections that may be raised against it. What may now be urged in favour of participating in the Duma is that the workers have obtained some rights in electing the Duma, and also that there is now somewhat greater freedom to carry on agitation than in the period of the "first", Bulygin, Duma promised by the Law of August 6. These considerations—together with the suppression of the insurrection in Moscow and elsewhere, after which some period of lull is necessary to rally and train fresh forces—have naturally been inclining the "Minority" in the R.S.D.L.P. in favour of participation in the election of at least the delegates and electors. Such Social-Democrats believe that we ought not to try to get into the State Duma, that we ought not to go beyond the stage of electing electors; but that we ought to use the opportunities offered by the election in the workers' curia to carry on agitation, and to organise and politically educate the proletariat.

In reply to these arguments, we will first of all observe that they follow quite naturally from the general principles of the Social-Democratic world-outlook and from Social-Democratic tactics. We representatives of the "Majority" must admit this, to avoid running to factional extremes that may prove an obstacle to Party unity, which is so absolutely essential now. We must by all means carefully reconsider the question of tactics. Although events

have confirmed the correctness of our tactics towards the 6th of August Duma, which was really frustrated, boycotted, swept away by the proletariat, it does not automatically follow that the new Duma can be frustrated in the same way. The situation has changed, and we must carefully weigh up the arguments for and against participation.

We have briefly outlined what we believe to be the main arguments in favour of participation. Let us now pass to the arguments against it.

The new Duma is undoubtedly a caricature of popular representation. Our participation in the elections will give the masses of the people a distorted idea of our appraisal of the Duma.

There is no freedom to carry on agitation. Meetings are dispersed. Delegates are arrested.

If we swallow the bait of Dubasov's "constitutionalism", we shall be unable to unfurl our Party banner before the masses, and shall weaken our Party forces with little benefit to the cause; for if our candidates come forward "legally" we shall merely provide the police with ready-made lists of people to be arrested.

In most parts of Russia civil war is raging. The lull can only be a temporary one. Continuous preparation is essential. It is both inadvisable and impracticable for our Party to combine this with elections held under the Law of December 11. We shall be unable to take part in the elections "legally", even if we wanted to; the conditions of the struggle will not permit it. There may be exceptions, of course; but it would be irrational for their sake to cause confusion, disorganisation and disunity in our nation-wide proletarian tactics.

Duma elections held under the Law of December 11 and under the rule of the Dubasovs and Durnovos[47] are mere playing at parliamentarism. It is beneath the dignity of the proletariat to be a party to such a game.

The tactics of the mass party of the proletariat must be simple, clear and straightforward. The proposal to elect delegates and electors, without electing deputies to the Duma, however, is a confused and ambiguous solution of the problem. On the one hand, it accepts the legal form

of elections under the law. On the other hand, it "frustrates" the law, for the proposed elections will not be conducted for the purpose of carrying out the law, of electing deputies to the Duma. On the one hand, an election campaign begins; on the other, it breaks off at the most important stage (in the elections as a whole), just when the actual composition of the Duma is to be decided. On the one hand, the workers are to restrict their elections (of delegates and electors) within the absurd and reactionary limits of the Law of December 11. On the other hand, these workers' elections, which avowedly give an incomplete and distorted picture of the progressive aims of the proletariat, are expected to achieve these aims outside the Duma (in the shape of some sort of illegal representation or illegal Duma, or popular Duma, etc.). The result is an absurdity: elections on the basis of a non-existent franchise to a non-existent parliament. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg and Moscow were elected by the workers themselves, not in accordance with "legal forms" prescribed by the police. And the arrest of the members of these Soviets taught the workers a very important lesson. These arrests showed how dangerous it is to trust pseudo-constitutionalism, how insecure "revolutionary local self-government" without the victory of the revolutionary forces, how inadequate a temporary non-party organisation, which can sometimes supplement, but cannot in any sense replace a solid, lasting militant party organisation. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the two capitals fell because they lacked firm support in the shape of militant proletarian organisation. If we replace these Soviets by meetings of electors or of delegates, we shall be substituting verbal support for militant support, would-be parliamentary support for revolutionary support. This will be the same as trying to replace a missing gun by one drawn on cardboard.

Furthermore, if we participate in the elections, we put the proletariat in a false relation to the bourgeois democrats. The latter are splitting up again. The moderate liberals (Cadets) are staunchly in favour of participating in the elections. The radicals are prone to boycott them. The class background of this split is clear: the Right wing of the bourgeoisie is prone to come to terms with reaction through

the Duma. The Left wing of the bourgeoisie is prone to form an alliance with the revolution, or at any rate to back it (recall how the Union of Unions associated itself with the manifesto on the financial bankruptcy of the government issued by the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies[48]). The boycott tactics provide a clear and correct expression of the proletariat's attitude towards the revolutionary and the opportunist bourgeoisie. The tactics of participation would cause utter chaos, and prevent the proletariat from distinguishing between its immediate allies and its enemies.

Lastly, the practical objects of participation can be attained to an equal, if not greater, degree by the boycott. An assessment of the strength of the proletariat, agitation and organisation, and the predominance of the Social-Democrats in the workers' curia can all be achieved by the revolutionary use of election meetings instead of formal participation in them; for this there is no need whatever to elect "delegates" and "electors". There is less chance of achieving all this if forces are diverted to these ridiculous legal elections; for we ourselves reject the objects of these elections, and it is not in the least to our advantage to inform the police about them. In practice, what will happen probably in nearly every case will be the revolutionary use of the election meetings, and not participation in them; for the workers will not submit to the police restrictions, will not eject "unauthorised persons" (i.e., the Social-Democrats), and will not abide by the election regulations. By the force of circumstances, of the revolutionary situation, there will be no elections at the "election" meetings; they will be transformed into meetings for party agitation outside of and despite the elections; in other words, the result will be what is called "active boycott". Whatever view we take of things, however we interpret our views, and whatever reservations we make, our participation in the elections will inevitably tend to foster the idea of substituting the Duma for a constituent assembly, the idea of convening a constituent assembly through the Duma, etc. The tactics of exposing the fraudulent and fictitious character of representation in the Duma, of demanding the convocation of a constituent assembly by revolutionary

means and yet participating in the Duma, can only confuse the proletariat at a revolutionary moment: they can only strengthen the position of the least class-conscious elements of the mass of the workers, and of those working-class leaders who are least scrupulous and least principled. We may declare that our Social-Democratic candidates are completely and absolutely independent, and that we are participating in the elections on the strictest possible Party lines: but the political situation is more potent than any number of declarations. Things will not, and cannot, turn out in keeping with these declarations. Whether we like it or not, if we participate now in the present Duma elections, the result will inevitably be neither Social-Democratic nor workers' party policy.

The tactics recommended by the conference of the "Majority" are the only correct tactics.

The position taken up by the "Cadets" provides interesting confirmation (indirect) of this conclusion. In its "death-bed" issue (of December 20) *Narodnaya Svoboda* argues as follows on a question which has arisen once more—whether to go into the Duma.[49] The immediate task is to convene a national constituent assembly. The newspaper takes this proposition for granted. Who is to convene this constituent assembly, and how? In *Narodnaya Svoboda*'s opinion, three answers may be given to this question: (1) The lawful (or *de facto*, the autocratic) government; (2) a provisional revolutionary government; (3) the State Duma, as an "authority competing with authority". It goes without saying that the "Cadets" are in favour of the third "solution" and urge the necessity of participating in the Duma precisely in order to achieve it. They reject the first solution, as they have given up all hopes of the government. Concerning the second solution they give us the following highly characteristic specimen of argument:

"Can we count on the *practical* achievement of that provisional government of which even today—amidst the bloody fumes of a suppressed insurrection—the revolutionary parties still dream? We say quite plainly: no, we cannot—and not because armed uprising is impossible: Moscow has proved the reverse, and not because such an insurrection must, as sure as fate, be suppressed by armed force: who can foretell the future?

"We cannot count on a provisional government because it will not *in any circumstances*—not even in the event of a successful insurrection—be strong and authoritative enough to 'restore the shattered temple' of the land of Russia. It will be swept away by the waves of counter-revolution surging up from the depths of society.

"The Russian revolution has been going on, not for months, but for years; during this period it has managed to take a sharp and definite course; and we must say quite candidly that this course is neither towards armed uprising nor towards a provisional government. Let us not shut our eyes to facts. The liberal intelligentsia, the peasantry and the proletariat are all revolutionary; but the revolutionary co-operation of these three elements under the banner of armed uprising is *impossible*. We will not go into the question of who is right and who is to blame: the fact remains a fact. That being so, from what elements can the vaunted provisional government of the revolutionary parties arise? What can it be? The dictatorship of the proletariat? But it is useless talking about the dictatorship of the proletariat in present-day Russia...."

We have deliberately reproduced this argument in full, because it splendidly, and with a lucidity rare for the "Cadets", conveys the substance of the liberal-bourgeois point of view. The flaws in this argument are so obvious that we need dwell on them only briefly. If the possibility of armed uprising has now been proved, and if the hopelessness of its victory cannot be proved in advance, then of what value is the argument that "it will be swept away by counter-revolution"? It is a ridiculously weak excuse. There has never been a revolution without counter-revolution, nor can there be. Today, for instance, October 17 itself has been swept away by the wave of counter-revolution; but does that prove that constitutional demands have lost their vitality? The question is not whether there will be counter-revolution, but who, in the last analysis, after the inevitably long battles, with their many vicissitudes, will be the victor.

Narodnaya Svoboda realises that this question can be answered only by an analysis of the social forces. It makes this analysis, and admits that the proletariat, the peasantry and the liberal intelligentsia are all revolutionary. But then it "decrees": their "co-operation under the banner of armed uprising is impossible". Why? This is the pivot of the question, and it cannot be settled by bare state-

ments. The fact that remains a fact is that the proletariat and the peasantry are rising, with the co-operation of at least some part of the bourgeois intelligentsia. By admitting the fact (which now no longer needs anyone's admission) that armed insurrection is possible, admitting that it is impossible to predict that all later outbreaks will fail, the newspaper has cut the ground from under its own arguments. It saves itself only by a quibble: it repudiates the possibility of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., of a socialist dictatorship, whereas it should have talked about the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. These classes are assured of the sympathy and co-operation of a certain section of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and of the bourgeois intelligentsia in particular; the only question is the degree of organisation and fighting capacity. This is a very important and serious question, of course; but only those who obviously want to evade an answer would attempt to answer it offhand in the negative.

The position of the liberal landlords is clear. They want to take part in the Duma precisely because they do not want to take part in the revolutionary struggle. They want the Duma convened precisely because they do not want the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly. They want the Duma precisely because they want a deal. Thus the difference between the attitude of the liberals and that of the Social-Democrats towards the Duma quite distinctly reflects the difference between the class attitude of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat. And how hopeless is this sighing for a deal and for a Duma, in a period of acute civil war, is shown, among other things, by the suppression of the "Cadet" newspapers and the miserable existence of the whole liberal press in general. Every day all this press publishes heaps of facts which show that the representation in the Duma is an utter fraud, and that anything like free agitation and proper elections are utterly impossible. The realities of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary situation prove, more convincingly than any number of arguments, that dreams about participating in the Duma for the purpose of fighting are futile, and that the tactics of active boycott are correct.

A few words in conclusion about how our agitation for an active boycott of the Duma should be conducted within the Party in view of the amalgamation of the factions and the complete unification of the R.S.D.L.P. now taking place.

Amalgamation is essential. It must be supported. In the interests of amalgamation, we must contend with the Mensheviks on tactics in a comradely way; we must strive to convince all the members of the Party, and convert our polemics into a practical setting forth of the pros and cons, an explanation of the position of the proletariat and its class aims. But amalgamation does not in the least oblige us to gloss over disagreements on tactics or to refrain from explaining our tactics fully and sincerely. Nothing of the kind. The ideological struggle for the tactics that we regard as correct should be carried on openly, straightforwardly and resolutely to the end, that is to say, until the unity congress of the Party meets. Tactics determine the immediate activities of a party, and therefore a united party can have only one set of tactics. These tactics must be those agreed to by the majority of the members of the Party: when the majority has taken a definite stand, the minority must submit to it in its political conduct, while retaining the right to criticise and to advocate a settlement of the question at the next congress.

In the present situation in our Party, both factions have agreed to the convocation of a unity congress, and both have agreed to submit to its decisions. The unity congress will decide what are to be the united tactics of the Party. Our duty is to do everything to hasten the convocation of this congress, and to strive with the utmost vigour to bring home to every Party member as clearly as possible the tactical differences on the question of taking part in the Duma, so that, in voting for delegates to the joint congress that will unite our Party and our tactics, all Party members may make their choice not haphazardly, but with deliberation, with a complete knowledge of the case, and after fully weighing up the arguments of both sides.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN RUSSIA AND THE TACTICS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY[50]

The Russian Social-Democratic Party is passing through a very difficult time. Martial law, shootings and floggings, overcrowded prisons, a proletariat worn out by starvation, chaos in organisation, aggravated by the destruction of many of the underground centres and by the absence of legal centres, and lastly the controversy over tactics, coinciding with the difficult task of restoring Party unity, are all inevitably causing a certain disarray of Party forces.

The formal way out of this disarray is the convening of the unity congress of the Party; and it is our profound conviction that all Party workers should do their utmost to hasten this event. But while the work of convening the congress is proceeding, we must bring to everybody's notice, and very seriously discuss, the extremely important question of the more profound causes of this disarray. Strictly speaking, the question of boycotting the State Duma is only a minor part of the big question of revising the whole tactics of the Party. And this question, in its turn, is only a minor part of the big question of the present situation in Russia and of the significance of the present moment in the history of the Russian revolution.

We can see two lines of tactics, which are due to two different appraisals of the present moment. Some (see, for example, Lenin's article in *Molodaya Rossiya**) regard the suppression of the insurrection in Moscow and elsewhere merely as preparing the ground and the conditions for another, more decisive, armed struggle. They see the real significance of the present moment in the dispelling of con-

* See pp. 93-96 of this volume.—*Ed.*

stitutional illusions. They regard the two great months of the revolution (November and December) as the period in which the peaceful general strike grew into an armed uprising of the whole people. The possibility of such an uprising has been proved; the movement has been raised to a higher plane; the broad masses have acquired the practical experience needed for the success of the future uprising; peaceful strikes have spent themselves. This experience must he very carefully collected; the proletariat must be given an opportunity to recuperate; all constitutional illusions and all idea of participating in the Duma must be emphatically discarded. We must more perseveringly and patiently prepare for a new insurrection and establish closer links with the organisations of the peasantry, which in all probability will rise in greater strength towards the spring.

Others appraise the situation differently. Comrade Plekhanov, in No. 3, and particularly in No. 4 of his *Dnevnik*,[50a] has formulated this other appraisal more consistently than anybody, although, unfortunately, he has not everywhere fully set forth his ideas.

"The political strike, inopportunely begun," says Comrade Plekhanov, "resulted in armed uprising in Moscow, Rostov, and elsewhere. The strength of the proletariat proved inadequate for victory. It was not difficult to foresee this. And therefore it was wrong to take up arms." The practical task of the class-conscious elements in the working-class movement "is to point out to the proletariat its mistake, and to explain to it how risky is the game called armed uprising". Plekhanov does not deny that he wants to put a brake on the movement. He recalls that, six months before the Commune, Marx warned the proletariat of Paris against untimely outbreaks.[51] "The facts of life have shown," says Plekhanov, "that the tactics our Party has pursued during the past months are unsound. On pain of further defeats, we must learn to adopt new tactics." ... "The main thing is immediately to pay much more attention to the workers' trade union movement." "A very large number of our comrades have become too engrossed with the idea of armed uprising to devote any serious attention to the task of helping the trade union movement."... "We must value

the support of the non-proletarian opposition parties, and not repel them by tactless actions." Quite naturally, Plekhanov also declares against boycotting the Duma (without saying definitely whether he is in favour of taking part in the Duma, or of the electors forming "organs of revolutionary local self-government", the pet idea of the "Mensheviks"). "Election agitation in the rural districts would sharply bring up the question of the land." Confiscation of the land has been approved by both sections of our Party and "it is now high time to put their resolutions into effect".

Such are Plekhanov's views, which we have outlined almost entirely as the author himself formulated them in his *Dnevnik*.

We hope that this outline has convinced the reader that the question of the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma is only part of the general question of tactics, which, in its turn, is subordinate to the question of how the present revolutionary moment as a whole should be appraised. The roots of the disagreement on tactics may be summed up as follows. Some say it was wrong to take up arms, and urge that the risks involved in insurrection be explained and that the emphasis be shifted to the trade union movement. Both the second and third strikes and the insurrection were blunders. Others say it was necessary to take up arms, for otherwise the movement would not have risen to a higher plane, it would not have obtained the necessary practical experience of insurrection nor freed itself from the narrow limits of the peaceful strike alone, which had spent itself as a weapon in the struggle. Thus for some the question of insurrection is shelved, at all events until a new situation arises that will compel us to revise our tactics once again. The logical conclusion that inevitably follows from this is that we must adjust ourselves to the "constitution" (participate in the Duma and work vigorously in the legal trade union movement). For others, on the contrary, it is now that the question of insurrection comes to the forefront, on the basis of the practical experience which has been acquired, which has proved that it is quite possible to fight against regular troops, and which has suggested the immediate task of a more persevering and more patient preparation for the next outbreak. Hence the slogan "Away

with constitutional illusions!" and the assignment to the legal trade union movement of a modest, at any rate not the "principal", place.

It goes without saying that we must examine this point of dispute in the light of the present objective conditions and of an assessment of social forces, not from the point of view of whether any particular line of action is desirable. We think that Plekhanov's views are wrong. His appraisal of the Moscow insurrection, summed up in the words, "it was wrong to take up arms", is extremely one-sided. Shelving the question of insurrection virtually means admitting that the revolutionary period has drawn to a close, and that a "constitutional" period of the democratic revolution has set in, i.e., it means placing the suppression of the December uprisings in Russia on a par, for example, with the suppression of the insurrections in Germany in 1849. Of course, it is by no means impossible for our revolution to end like that; and in the light of the present moment, when reaction is becoming rampant, it is quite easy to draw the conclusion that such a finale has already set in. Nor can there be any doubt that it is more advisable fully to abandon the idea of insurrection, if objective conditions have made it impossible, than to waste our forces on new and fruitless attempts.

But that would mean making too hasty a generalisation about the state of affairs at the present moment, and elevating it to a law for a whole period. Have we not seen reaction raging in all its fury after nearly every important advance of our revolution? And has not the movement risen again after a time with mightier force despite the reaction? The autocracy has not yielded to the inexorable demands of all social development; on the contrary, it is retrogressing, and is now evoking protests even among the bourgeoisie, which welcomed the suppression of the insurrection. The strength of the revolutionary classes, the proletariat and the peasantry, is far from exhausted. The economic crisis and financial dislocation are growing and becoming more acute, rather than diminishing. The probability of a fresh outbreak even now, when the first insurrection has not yet been completely crushed, is admitted even by the "law-abiding" bourgeois press, which is certainly hostile to in-

surrection.* The farcical character of the Duma is becoming clearer and clearer, and the hopelessness of the Party attempting to participate in the elections more and more unquestionable.

It would be short-sightedness, slavish acquiescence in the present situation, if we shelved the question of insurrection in these circumstances. See how Plekhanov contradicts himself when, on the one hand, he strongly advises us to put into effect the resolutions on agitation among the peasantry in favour of confiscating the land, and, on the other hand, warns us against repelling the opposition parties by tactless actions, and dreams about the question of the land coming up "sharply" in the course of election agitation in the countryside. It is safe to say that the liberal landlords will forgive you a million "tactless" actions, but they will never forgive you for advocating the confiscation of the land. No wonder even the Cadets say that they, too, are in favour of suppressing peasant revolts with the aid of troops, provided they, and not the bureaucracy, are in command of the troops (see Prince Dolgorukov's article in *Pravo*[52]). We can be quite sure that the question of land will never come up as "sharply" in election agitation as it did come, is coming, and will come up outside the Duma and outside elections conducted with the aid of the police.

We have whole-heartedly accepted the slogan of confiscating the land. But this slogan is merely a hollow sound if it does not imply the victory of armed uprising; for the peasants are now confronted not only by regular troops, but also by volunteers hired by the landlords. When we preach the confiscation of the land, we are actually calling upon peasants to revolt. And unless we want to indulge in revolutionary phrase-mongering, have we a right to do this if we do not count on a workers' insurrection in the towns, on the workers supporting the peasants? It would be cruel

* This, for example is what the conservative bourgeois Slovo (No. 364 of January 25) writes: "Among the most convinced adherents of the Centre, one more and more often hears the opinion, hesitant and timid though it still is, that unless there is another outbreak, prepared by the revolutionary parties, reform will not be brought about with the necessary fulness and completeness.... There is now hardly any hope that reforms will be brought about peacefully from above."

mockery if, when the peasants rise in a body and begin to confiscate the land, the workers were to offer them the co-operation of trade unions that were under the tutelage of the police, instead of the co-operation of fighting organisations.

We really have no grounds for shelving the question of insurrection. We must not revise our Party tactics to suit the conditions of the present moment of reaction. We cannot, and must not, give up hope of at last merging the three separate streams of insurrection—workers', peasants' and military—into a single victorious insurrection. We must prepare for this, without, of course, renouncing any "legal" means of extending propaganda, agitation and organisation: but harbouring no illusions about the durability and importance of these means. We must collect the experience of the Moscow, Donets, Rostov and other uprisings and spread knowledge of them far and wide; we must perseveringly and patiently prepare new fighting forces, train and steel them in a series of fighting guerrilla operations. The new outbreak may not take place in the spring; but it is approaching, and in all probability is not very far off. We must meet it armed, organised in military fashion, and prepared for determined offensive operations.

We will make a slight digression here about the guerrilla operations by the fighting squads. We think it is wrong to put these operations on a par with the old type of terrorism. Terrorism consisted in acts of vengeance against individuals. Terrorism was a conspiracy by groups of intellectuals. Terrorism in no way reflected the temper of the masses. Terrorism never served to train fighting leaders of the masses. Terrorism was the result—and also the symptom and concomitant—of lack of faith in insurrection, of the absence of conditions for insurrection.

Guerrilla operations are not acts of vengeance, but military operations. They no more resemble adventurous acts than the harassing of the enemy's rear by raiding parties of huntsmen during a lull on the main battlefield resembles the killing of an individual in a duel or by assassination. Guerrilla operations conducted by fighting squads—formed long ago by Social-Democrats of both factions in all the important centres of the movement and consisting mainly of

workers—undoubtedly reflect, clearly and directly, the temper of the masses. Guerrilla operations by fighting squads directly train fighting leaders of the masses. The guerrilla operations of the fighting squads today do not spring from lack of faith in insurrection, and are not conducted because insurrection is impossible; on the contrary, they are an essential component of the insurrection now in progress. Of course, mistakes may be made in all things and always: premature and unnecessary attempts at insurrection are possible; so also are over-zealousness and excesses, which are always and definitely harmful, and may injure even the best of tactics. But the fact is that in most of the purely Russian centres we have so far been suffering from the other extreme, namely, insufficient initiative among our fighting squads, lack of fighting experience, and insufficient determination in their activities. In this respect we have been outstripped by the Caucasus, Poland and the Baltic Provinces, i.e., the centres where the movement has left the old terrorism farthest of all behind, where preparations for insurrection have been made best, and where the proletarian struggle most clearly and vividly bears a mass character.

We must catch up with these centres. We must not restrain but encourage the guerrilla operations of the fighting squads if we want to prepare for insurrection not merely in words, and if we recognise that the proletariat is seriously ready for insurrection.

The Russian revolution started with petitions to the tsar to grant freedom. Shootings, reaction and Trepovism[53] did not stamp out, but fanned the names of the movement. The revolution took a second step forward. It forcibly compelled the tsar to recognise freedom. It defended this freedom arms in hand. It did not succeed at the first attempt. Shootings, reaction and Dubasovism will not stamp out the movement, they will fan its flames. Taking shape before our eyes is the third step, which will decide the outcome of the revolution: the struggle of the revolutionary people for an authority that will really introduce freedom. In this struggle, we must count on the support of the revolutionary-democratic parties, and not of the opposition parties. Shoulder to shoulder with the socialist proletariat will march the democratic and revolutionary peasantry. It will be a great

and arduous struggle, a struggle for the completion, for the complete victory, of the democratic revolution. But all the signs now are that such a struggle is being brought near by the course of events. Let us see to it that the new wave finds the proletariat of Russia at a new stage of fighting preparedness.

Partiiniye Izvestia, No. 1,
February 7, 1906
Signed: A Bolshevik

Published according to
the text in *Partiiniye Izvestia*

THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[54]

FEBRUARY 11(24), 1906

STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE FROM THE OKRUZHNOI AND VYBORG DISTRICT ORGANISATIONS

1

The decision taken on the Okruzhnoi organisation has annulled the original Conference decision on the general verification of credentials from the formal point of view. There were 56 doubtful votes in the Okruzhnoi organisation, and it could be a question of them alone. The Committee and the district conference have verified the election; if we are not to trust the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee on the Okruzhnoi organisation, then we must be consistent and undertake to verify all districts.

2

The question posed by Martov bears on the formal aspect; if you have decided to examine here one district in view of the protests voiced, you should take a similar decision on the other districts about which protests are being made. Comrade Akim[55] sees an irregularity in Vyborg District, and the Conference, which has passed a decision on the Okruzhnoi organisation, should extend its decision to Vyborg District.

3

On a point of order. If the St. Petersburg Committee has recognised the competence of the Okruzhnoi organisation, then I am surprised at Comrade Martov's proposal to bar the organisation from this Conference.

4

Comrade Martov's proposal cannot be put to the vote—only the St. Petersburg Committee can decide the question he has raised.

5

Think, comrades, of the monstrosity proposed to you. An important question has been under discussion in the decision of which the whole St. Petersburg organisation should take part, and it is suddenly proposed that you should cut off a huge section—Okruzhnoi District. Think of it. I consider voting on a thing like that impermissible in principle. I move that this meeting vote to decide whether it wants Comrade Martov's proposal to be put to the vote.

6

We must consider the matter cooly. The question is whether we may deprive the Okruzhnoi organisation of the right to vote at this Conference. Since its delegation is validly accredited, it would be the height of unlawfulness to debar it from voting here. You have recognised its credentials to be valid; it did not vote when the issue of their validity was under discussion, but it must take part in the voting on all subsequent questions.

RESOLUTION
AGAINST MARTOV'S PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW THE REPORT OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE

This meeting considers that the question raised by Comrade Martov is not open to discussion and does not require voting.

ARGUMENTATION OF RESOLUTION

Comrade Martov is wrong; he says that remarks like "there he is again" are not allowed, but they are. All sorts of remarks are allowed at meetings. As regards the report, we must hear it. It will take a mere fifteen or twenty minutes; if we do not hear it, it may be said that juridical in addition to moral irregularities were committed at the Conference (that there were juridical as well as moral omissions). We must certainly hear the report. If you see fit to approve it, do so; and if you do not see fit, do not approve it.

PROPOSAL ON THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE REPORT

I wish to table a motion. The question brought up by Comrade Akim—that the report be approved—may be shelved. I move the following decision: "Having heard the report of the St. Petersburg Committee, this meeting recognises the Conference delegations to be validly accredited, the Conference duly established, and its decision binding on the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation."

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL

I agree that we must vote in logical order, but I hold my proposal to be the most radical, while the others are conciliatory. If you reject the radical proposal, you will then vote on the conciliatory proposals.

COMMENT ON THE RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE TACTICS OF BOYCOTT

I am sorry if I have wearied this meeting by a long resolution, but if we want to discuss its substance, we must have a clear idea of what we are criticising. My draft sums up all that has been said in the course of previous discussions and what there has been no time to speak of here. We must not drag out this meeting any longer. If there is no time to discuss the resolution, we can elect a committee.

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of the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (II)

LATE FEBRUARY (EARLY MARCH) 1906

STATEMENTS IN DEFENCE OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE TACTICS OF BOYCOTT

1

The resolution is lengthy—"long-winded", as Comrade Dan put it. That is true; but it has a merit compensating for this defect—the resolution examines all the arguments, without which the explanation of the tactics would be superficial, and would be wrong. The masses want brevity, but this resolution is for the organisations and not for the masses. Not all the points have been debated, but all of them have been touched upon. It is necessary to expound the whole set of views advocated in political agitation. There can be no question of the majority suppressing the minority in any way, although the position of the defeated section is not a happy one. As a way out, I can propose a division of labour: you will criticise the Duma, and we shall elaborate the tactics. No one wants to impose on Comrade Dan the defence of points he does not agree with. The accusation of engaging in factionalism and polemics is groundless.

2

There is also a polemic in the short resolution (Martov's), but why do you want to make us ridiculous by proposing that we should adopt it? The long draft resolution seems

to contain propositions that have not been discussed by the proletariat. But the dummy made by the Rasterayev workers mocked at the very idea of representation,[56] and they must have been thinking of the peasantry as well.

OBJECTIONS TO THE AMENDMENTS TO POINTS 3 AND 6 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION

1

You are weakening the resolution; the government is not only obstructing the elections, it is also planting rural superintendents[57] as delegates.

2

Comrade Dan's amendment is inexact. The Union of October Seventeenth[58] is an opposition group, but it is not persecuted. We must stand up for the Cadets if they are persecuted, even if they are persecuted for no particular reason.

3

"Zubatovism"[59] is not merely a police form of netting suspects, for it takes account of the working-class movement; it is an organisation of the working class. "Zubatovism" is a truly Russian invention. And it is being used now too. The Duma is a police game, but there is no hint of a constitution in it. Speaking generally, the term "Zubatovism" has been used here for comparison and is therefore incomplete as a definition. Besides, we do say that it is a "new" form of *all-Russian*, *state* "Zubatovism". Our tactics here are the same as they have always been in relation to "Zubatovism". We have attended even Zubatovist meetings, but we have never been members.

STATEMENTS DURING THE DEBATE ON POINTS 7 AND 8 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION

1

Comrade Dan's statement about a factual inaccuracy is something quite new to me. So far no formal statement has been made anywhere of the permissibility of "participating in the Duma".[60] Neither Parvus, nor even Plekhanov has said that so far. Furthermore, it would be narrow-minded of us to ignore the fact that the class-conscious section of the proletariat has this opinion of the issue and no other, and we take that fact into consideration, it is not accidental. I am willing to amend "everyone" to "the overwhelming majority".

2

Comrade Dan's formal statement is particularly valuable to me, it is the first time I have heard such a statement. One can only wish to see it in the press, for the press has so far published no such thing. Indeed, the Mensheviks have protested whenever such an opinion was attributed to them. The leaflet of the Joint Central Committee affirms that both sections of the Party are agreed that we must not go into the Duma. It is a document, and nothing contradicts it in the relevant point of our resolution. Dan's remark about Plekhanov is wrong. He merely said: "I am against boycott", and came to a stop at the most interesting point. We are sufficiently well informed, and the allusion to Poltava has not shaken our opinion of the view taken by the majority of the proletariat on the question of participating in the Duma. Solidarity must be stressed.

3

Dan believes that the very convocation of the Duma will bring back the year 1849. He is wrong. The Duma is the United Landtag of 1847,[61] and that Landtag we will not enter. I think we must take Lunacharsky's remarks into consideration. I believe we should answer three questions: (1) Is it a fact that the majority is right? Yes, it is; no one has refuted us, all that has been said is groundless and cannot serve as a sufficient reason for crossing out the reference to

the fact. (2) Should we take this fact into account? We must. (3) What is the attitude of the editorial board of the Central Organ to the question touched on in this point of the preamble? I maintain that the editorial board regarded participation in the Duma as *impossible*. I had no idea this would offend the Menshevik comrades so much; so far no one has ever said anything like what Comrade Dan said. Comrade Dan is wavering, and I feel very unhappy about it.

4

It is said that the rest is full of polemics. That is not true, we would never pursue any such aims. Why must we not go into the Duma? Because the people may imagine that it is worth going to the polls irrespective of what the Menshevik comrades think of the people. We are not bickering, we are examining an argument. We hold that we must send nothing but dummies.

WRITTEN STATEMENT TO THE CONFERENCE BUREAU

Statement of fact. I declare that Comrade Dan's assertions are wrong and that he has not refuted any of my statements about the absence in the press of assertions similar to the statement made by Comrade Dan.

RESOLUTION ON THE MOTIVATION OF THE BOYCOTT TACTICS

This Conference deems it necessary to give a detailed motivation of the decision of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation on the inadvisability of participating in the elections, not at all in order to engage in polemics with the comrades who were formerly Mensheviks or to cast aspersions on them as Social-Democrats, but with the aim of giving an accurate and official statement of the opinion of the majority of the organisation as to the character and significance of a complete boycott.

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TO ALL WORKING MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG AND VICINITY[62]

Comrade workers, the organised Social-Democratic workers of the whole St. Petersburg and Okruzhnoi organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. have adopted a final decision on the State Duma elections that is binding on the Party Committee and all the local Party organisations. Despite all police obstacles and traps, the workers have succeeded in holding *120 circle meetings*, which have discussed the question in detail, with the participation of spokesmen for the two tactics which have emerged in our Party. *Over 2,000 workers* and intellectuals belonging to our Party have voted on the question, and by a majority of 1,168 votes to 926 (the number of voters totalling 2,094) they have declared *for a complete boycott*, not only of the Duma, but of *all elections* to it. The conference of delegates elected in all districts (one delegate for every 30 Party members who voted) discussed the question once more, and by 36 votes to 29 (the total number of delegates with the right to vote being 65) it adopted a *final* decision in favour of the tactics of an *active boycott*.

And so, the Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg has spoken. All the forces of the Party organisation, and all the efforts of the foremost workers who sympathise with the Social-Democratic Party and desire to take its decision into account, should now be directed towards acquainting the broadest sections of the working class and the population as a whole with the Social-Democrats' decision, towards spreading among the masses a correct understanding of the aims which the class-conscious proletariat sets itself, and of the ways and means it chooses for achieving its aims.

Why have the Social-Democrats of St. Petersburg declared a complete boycott of the Duma and refused completely to participate in any elections to it?

Because the State Duma is a sham Duma. It is a travesty of a popular representative assembly. It is not a people's Duma but a police and landlord Duma. The elections are not to be equal for all; they have been so devised as to give the landlords and the big capitalists complete superiority over the workers and peasants. Three-quarters of the whole working class have been totally deprived of the right to elect, and as for the remaining quarter, it is invited to elect on the basis of the deputies being sifted through three sieves, so that first the workers will elect delegates, then the delegates will elect electors, and then the electors (24 in all) will, jointly with the landlords and capitalists (over 100 in number), elect members of the Duma.

The government mocks at the peasants even more outrageously. Peasant deputies are sifted through four sieves: first, representatives per ten households are elected in the volosts (even so, the peasant poor who have neither house nor land are excluded from this election); then the ten-household representatives elect delegates, the delegates elect electors, and the electors elect members of the Duma, with the result, however, that among the electors in the gubernias the peasants mostly find themselves in the minority.

Why has this sifting through three or four sieves been devised? It has been done to prevent the workers and peasants from getting their real representatives elected to the Duma, to bar from the Duma people who are for the workers and peasants, to enable a handful of Black-Hundred landlords and capitalists, who are plundering the whole working people with the help of the police, to call themselves people's representatives.

Workers and peasants, do not trust the police and landlord Duma! It is not people's representatives but enemies of the people that are being convoked there, so that they may the more effectively plot against the workers and against the peasants. Look around you: How can the workers and peasants freely elect their real representatives, their deputies, to the Duma? Does not the police government jail the finest workers and finest peasants without trial? Shootings and

punitive measures carried out against peasants who fought for the people's cause are taking place throughout Russia. The whole of Russia has been delivered into the hands of a gang of ruined petty aristocrats in military uniform to be plundered and outraged. All the promises of freedom that we have heard from the government have been trampled underfoot by the tyrants. All the prisons are packed with the champions of freedom for the people.

The government wants to deceive the people by convening a sham Duma. It wants, with the help of a landlord Duma, to borrow more money to oppress the people, to wage war against its own people, against the peasants and workers. The government wants to decoy us into a police trap, wants us to agree to participate in this fraud called the Duma elections.

The class-conscious workers refuse to walk into this police trap. Without resorting to any elections, we must tell the government and the whole people outright that we shall not take part in a farce. We shall not allow a fraud. We shall expose this police falsehood for all to see. We warn those workers and those peasants who have not yet seen through the fraud and expect the Duma to benefit the people: If they try nevertheless to take part in the elections, they will see that it will not be workers' or peasants' deputies who get into the Duma, but capitalists and landlords who suit the police. We call on all workers and all peasants, on all honest people, to fight against the police fraud.

We are continuing our struggle for a genuine assembly of real representatives of the people. That assembly must be elected freely, and by all alike, without any privileges for the landlords and the wealthy, and without any hindrance on the part of the authorities and the police. Only a freely elected constituent assembly of the whole people can be a genuine Duma and not a sham one. Only such an assembly can establish a better order in Russia, make life easier for the workers, give land to the peasants, and bring freedom to the whole people.

On October 17 the workers by their struggle wrested from the government the promise of freedom. The government has broken all its promises. The workers will now fight still more concertedly and stubbornly to win freedom for the

people. The workers do not lose heart from temporary reverses. They know that the struggle for freedom is difficult and severe, but that the cause of freedom is the cause of the whole people. The cause of freedom will triumph; the struggle will grow in breadth. The workers will recover from the reverses inflicted upon them. They will rally in still closer unity against the government. They will gather fresh strength. They will explain to still wider sections of the peasantry all the frauds of the government and the need to counteract it. The workers will rise together with the peasants and overthrow the government of police tyrants, who are using violence against the people.

Down with the sham, police and landlord, Duma!

Long live a freely elected constituent assembly of the whole people!

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RESOLUTION OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON THE TACTICS OF BOYCOTT[63]

Whereas:

(1) the State Duma to be convened under the Law of August 6-December 11 is the grossest travesty of a popular representative assembly, since the vast majority of the proletariat and the peasantry has virtually been debarred from participation in the Duma owing to the fact that the suffrage is not universal and the electors from the workers and peasants are sifted through three or four sieves;

(2) by artificially controlling the composition of the body of electors and by establishing a number of privileges in favour of the rich landlords and big capitalists, the government seeks to ensure complete preponderance in the Duma of representatives, not merely of the exploiting classes, but of the Black-Hundred elements of those classes;

(3) the government most brazenly rigs even these elections—which are restricted within the narrow limits of the social-estates—by ruling out all freedom of agitation, establishing martial law and unbounded police tyranny everywhere, and persecuting, in defiance of all legislation and without trial, not only members of the revolutionary and socialist parties, but even members of the parties of the monarchist-liberal bourgeoisie (Constitutionalist-Democrats, etc.);

(4) the government is now repealing its own law on simultaneous elections in order artificially to appoint, in the various localities, the dates that suit it best, and to force the elections through at such speed that it will be impossible

for those elected to establish any contact with the population;

(5) the autocratic government expects by convening the Duma to influence Russian, and especially foreign, public opinion and thereby to put off its inevitable downfall and obtain further millions of rubles in loans to crush the revolution and continue oppressing the people;

(6) the Law of February 20,[64] which transforms the Council of State into an Upper Chamber, makes still worse the statute governing the Duma, by seeking to reduce the latter completely to the role of an impotent advisory appendage of the autocratic bureaucracy;

(7) under these political conditions, participation in such a Duma is considered impossible by the overwhelming majority of the Social-Democratic parties and organisations of all nations in the country;

(8) participation of the Social-Democrats in the State Duma elections at any stage is likely to encourage among the people the incorrect idea that there is a possibility of reasonably fair elections for the parties that uphold the interests of the broad masses;

(9) participation in the elections is likely to divert the attention of the proletariat from the revolutionary movements of the workers, peasants, soldiers, etc., that are taking place apart from the Duma to the tiny matter of a pseudo-legal, sham constitutional election campaign and to lower still more the temporarily depressed mood of the working class by creating the impression that the revolutionary period of the struggle is over, the question of an uprising has been shelved, and the Party is taking the constitutional path;

(10) elections to the State Duma imply a situation in which the Party must keep within legal and peaceful bounds; for this reason our participation in the elections would have a harmful effect on the pressing revolutionary task—that of more vigorous actions against the government during the Duma elections and at the time of its convocation;

(11) the Party of the Social-Democrats cannot go to the polls with the less developed masses if it wants to educate them from the practical point of view, for these insufficiently developed masses want to go as far as the Duma and, more-

over, want to do so in the legal way, while the Party would, by refusing to submit to the laws, merely incur natural distrust on the part of those masses and prevent them from learning the lessons of the Duma campaign sincerely and consistently;

(12) the workers' delegates and electors cannot contribute anything towards a truly revolutionary organisation of the broad sections of the working class because of the artificial composition of the voters, who have been picked by police methods, because of the short term and limited nature of their powers, and because of the circumstances of the elections mentioned above;

(13) the Duma cannot be frustrated through the withdrawal from the gubernia election meetings of that part of the electors whom at best the Social-Democrats could draw away with them;

(14) class-conscious spokesmen for the proletariat of the most oppressed nationalities of Russia (the Polish, Jewish Lettish, and Lithuanian Social-Democrats) flatly reject all participation in the election farce and are fighting with might and main against those who have enacted it;

(15) public opinion of all the militant elements of bourgeois democracy and of the peasantry (Peasant Union, Teachers' Union,[65] Union of Unions, Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Polish Socialist Party,[66] Polish Progressive Party, etc.) rejects both the Duma and the elections to it;—

Therefore, this meeting of representatives of St. Petersburg workers, members of the R.S.D.L.P., deems it necessary:

(1) to reject absolutely all participation in the State Duma;

(2) to reject absolutely any elections to the State Duma at any stage whatever;

(3) to develop agitational work among the people on as large a scale as possible in order to expose the true nature of the Duma, put an end to the deception of public opinion in Russia and Europe, and show the inevitable disappointment of that section of the peasantry which expects benefits from the Duma;

(4) to utilise in every way, legal and illegal, all meetings connected with the elections for stating the Social-

Democrats' views in general and criticising the Duma in particular, and above all for issuing a call to fight for the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly of the whole people;

(5) in counterposing revolutionary methods of struggle for freedom to the struggle through the Duma, to devote especial attention during this agitation to familiarising the workers and the people as a whole with the experience of the December uprising, which marks the beginning of a higher stage of the revolutionary struggle for genuine freedom for the people;

(6) to lay stress, during this agitation in respect of the Duma, on the deep economic and financial crisis, the extreme intensification of exploitation of the workers by the reactionary capitalists, the aggravation of unemployment in the towns and of hunger in the countryside, the peasant movement that is bound to begin in the spring, and the instances of unrest among the troops, as circumstances which make a new popular outbreak highly probable before long, an outbreak that will sweep away the State Duma either before its convocation or after it, when the population is thoroughly disillusioned with it;

(7) to use this agitation, among other things, for branding those cowardly representatives of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (such as the Cadets) who pervert the civic consciousness of the population by fostering constitutional illusions at a time of bitter civil war, by recommending the Duma and participation in it, by rejecting the use of force in defence of freedom and of the rights of the vast majority of the people at a time when the armed gangs that call themselves the government are holding their ground only by dint of savage tyranny.

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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

I

What is the state of the democratic revolution in Russia? Is it defeated, or are we merely passing through a temporary lull? Was the December uprising the climax of the revolution, and are we now rushing headlong towards a "Shipov Constitution" regime[67]? Or is the revolutionary movement, on the whole, not subsiding, but rising, in preparation for a new outbreak, using the lull to muster new forces, and promising, after the first unsuccessful insurrection, a second, with much greater chances of success?

These are the fundamental questions that now confront the Social-Democrats in Russia. If we are to remain true to Marxism, we cannot and should not try, by resorting to generalities, to shirk the task of analysing the objective conditions; for, in the last analysis, the appraisal of these conditions provides the final answer to these questions. On this answer wholly depend the tactics of the Social-Democrats; and our disputes about boycotting the Duma, for example (which, incidentally, are drawing to a close, as the majority of the organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. have declared in favour of the boycott), are only a tiny particle of these big questions.

We have just said that it would be unbecoming for a Marxist to try to evade these questions by resorting to generalities. A sample of these generalities is the argument that we have never regarded the revolution merely as being one of "pikes and pitchforks"; that we were revolutionaries even when we did not call for immediate insurrection; that we will remain revolutionaries also in the parliamentary period

when it sets in, etc. Such arguments would be miserable evasions, replacing the concrete historical question by abstract considerations which explain absolutely nothing, and merely serve to cover up paucity of ideas, or political confusion. To support our statement with an example, we will refer to Marx's attitude to the German revolution in 1848. This may be all the more useful since in our country we see a number of symptoms of the same, and perhaps even more sharp, division among the bourgeoisie into a reactionary and a revolutionary section—a division that was absent in the Great French Revolution, for example. Strictly speaking, the fundamental questions about the state of the Russian revolution that we posed above can also be put in a form adapted to the analogy with Germany (in the relative and limited sense, of course, in which any historical analogies may be drawn). We can put it as follows: 1847 or 1849? Are we going through (like Germany in 1847, when the German State Duma, the so-called United Landtag, was being convened) the closing period of the climax of the revolution, or are we experiencing (as Germany did in 1849) the closing period of final exhaustion of the revolution, and the beginning of a humdrum life under a dock-tailed constitution?

Marx was putting this question all through 1850, was studying it and answered it at last, not by an evasion, but with a direct reply deduced from his analysis of the objective conditions. In 1849 the revolution was crushed, a number of insurrections ended unsuccessfully; the liberty actually won by the people was taken away from them, and reaction was raging against the "revolutionaries". Open political action by the Communist League (the Social-Democratic organisation of the time, virtually led by Marx) became impossible. "Everywhere the need arose," we read in the Address of the Central Committee to the members of the League in June 1850, "for a strong, *secret* (our italics) organisation of the revolutionary party throughout Germany." The Central Committee, which has its headquarters abroad, sends an emissary to Germany, who concentrates "all the available forces in the hands of the League". Marx writes (in the Address of March 1850) that a revival, a new revolution, is probable; he advises the workers to organise independently, and particularly urges the necessity of arming

the whole proletariat, of forming a proletarian guard, and of "frustrating by force any attempt at disarming". Marx calls for the formation of "revolutionary workers' governments", and discusses what the proletariat should do "during and after the coming insurrection". Marx points to Jacobin France of 1793 as the model for the German democrats (see *The Revelations About the Cologne Communist Trial*, Russ. transl., p. 115 and foll.).[68]

Six months pass. The expected revival does not come about. The efforts of the League fail. "In the course of the year 1850," wrote Engels in 1885, "the prospects of a new upswing of the revolution became more and more improbable, indeed impossible."[69] The industrial crisis of 1847 had been overcome. A period of industrial prosperity was setting in. And so Marx, reckoning with the objective conditions, raises the question sharply and definitely. In the autumn of 1850 he categorically declares that now, with the productive forces of bourgeois society developing so profusely, "*there can be no talk of a real revolution*".[70]

As the reader will see, Marx makes no attempt to dodge a difficult question. He does not play with the word revolution; he does not substitute empty abstractions for a burning political issue. He does not forget that the revolution, in general, is making progress in any case, because bourgeois society is developing; but he says straightforwardly that a democratic revolution in the direct and narrow sense of the term is impossible. He solves a difficult problem without reference to the "mood" of dejection and weariness prevailing among a particular section of the proletariat (as some Social-Democrats who have slipped into tail-ism often do). No, so long as he had no other facts to go by except that the mood was subsiding (in March 1850), he continued to call to arms and insurrection, to prepare for it, and not to depress the mood of the workers by personal scepticism and dismay. Not until he was absolutely convinced that the "exhaustion" of the "real revolution" was inevitable did he change his views. And having changed them, he openly and straightforwardly demanded a fundamental change of tactics and the complete cessation of preparations for insurrection: for such preparations could then only be playing at insurrection. The slogan of insurrection was definitely shelved. It was

openly and definitely admitted that "the form of the movement has changed".

We must always keep this example of Marx before us in the present difficult times. We must treat the possibility of a "real revolution" in the immediate future, the question of the main "form of the movement", the question of insurrection and of preparing for it, as seriously as possible; but a fighting political party must solve this problem straightforwardly and definitely, without equivocation, without evasion, and without any reservation. The party that failed to find a clear answer to this question would not deserve to be called a party.

II

And so, what objective facts have we to go by in solving this problem? There are a number of superficial and conspicuous facts that would seem to support the opinion that the directly revolutionary "form of the movement" is completely exhausted, that a new insurrection is impossible, and that Russia has entered the era of paltry bourgeois quasi-constitutionalism. That a turn has taken place among the bourgeoisie is beyond doubt. The landlords have deserted the Cadets and have joined the Union of October Seventeenth. The government has already granted a two-chamber "Constitution". Martial law, arrests and other punitive measures make possible the convening of a sham Duma. Insurrection in the towns has been suppressed, and the peasant movement in the spring may prove to be isolated and impotent. The landlords are selling out their estates, and that means that the bourgeois, "orderly" section of the peasantry is growing. That a mood of dejection prevails after the suppression of the insurrection is a fact. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that it is easier and cheaper, so to speak, to predict the defeat of revolution in general than to predict its revival; for at present power is on the side of reaction, and in "most cases", up to now, revolutions have finished unfinished.

What evidence is there that supports an opposite opinion? We will allow this question to be answered by K. Kautsky, whose sober views and ability calmly, practically and thoroughly to discuss topical and acute political problems are

known to all Marxists. Kautsky expressed his opinion soon after the suppression of the Moscow insurrection, in an article entitled "The Chances of the Russian Revolution". This article has appeared in Russian—of course, mutilated by the censor (in much the same way as was the Russian translation of another splendid essay by Kautsky, *The Agrarian Question in Russia*).

Kautsky does not attempt to dodge the difficult problem. He does not try to get rid of it by uttering empty phrases about the revolution in general being invincible, about the proletarian class being always and constantly revolutionary, etc. No, he bluntly puts the concrete historical question of the chances of the present democratic revolution in Russia, here and now. Without beating about the bush, he starts his article by stating that since the beginning of 1906 hardly any news other than sad has been received from Russia, which "*might give rise to the opinion that the revolution has been utterly suppressed and is at its last gasp*". It is not only the reactionaries that are exultant over this, but also the Russian liberals, writes Kautsky, showering on these heroes of the "coupon"[71] a string of contemptuous epithets that they fully deserve (evidently Kautsky has not yet been converted to Plekhanov's theory that Russian Social-Democrats should "value the support of the non-proletarian *opposition* parties").

And so Kautsky analyses in detail this naturally plausible opinion. That there is an outward resemblance between the defeat of the Moscow workers in December and the defeat of the Paris workers in June (1848) is beyond doubt. In both cases the armed uprising of the workers was "provoked" by the government at a time when the working class was not yet sufficiently organised. In both cases reaction triumphed despite the heroic resistance of the workers. What conclusion does Kautsky draw from this? Does he repeat Plekhanov's pedantic admonition that it was wrong to take up arms? No. He does not hasten to indulge in cheap and short-sighted moralising after the event. He *studies* the objective facts that can reply to the question whether the Russian revolution is completely crushed or not.

Kautsky sees four radical points of difference between the defeat of the proletariat in Paris in 1848 and the defeat of the

proletariat in Moscow in 1905. First, the defeat of Paris was the defeat of the whole of France. Nothing like this can be said about Moscow. The workers of St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa, Warsaw and Lodz are not defeated. They have been exhausted by the frightfully hard, twelve months' struggle; but their spirit has not been broken. They are gathering their strength to renew the struggle for freedom.

Secondly, an even more essential difference is that in France, in 1848, the peasants were on the side of reaction, whereas in Russia, in 1905, the peasants are on the side of the revolution. Peasant revolts are in progress. Whole armies are engaged in crushing these revolts. These armies are devastating the country as only Germany was devastated during the Thirty Years' War.[72] Military reprisals cow the peasants for a time; but they only aggravate their poverty and make their conditions more desperate. They, like the devastation caused during the Thirty Years' War, will inevitably rouse larger and larger masses who will be compelled to declare war on the existing system, who will prevent the restoration of peace in the country, and will join every insurrection.

The third and extremely important difference is the following. The way for the revolution of 1848 was paved by the crisis and famine of 1847. The reaction was strengthened by the termination of the crisis and a period of industrial prosperity. "The present reign of terror in Russia, however, must inevitably lead to an aggravation of the economic depression which has been weighing on the country for years." The full effects of the famine of 1905 will yet be felt within the next few months. The suppression of a revolution represents civil war on the very greatest scale, war against the whole people. This war is costing no less than a foreign war, and besides is devastating the home country, not some foreign land. Financial collapse is imminent. Moreover, the new trade agreements threaten particularly severe consequences for Russia, and may even give rise to a world economic crisis. Thus the longer the reign of reactionary terror lasts, the more desperate will become the economic position of the country and the more will anger against the hated regime grow. "Such a situation," says Kautsky, "will make any powerful movement against tsarism invin-

cible. And there will be no lack of such a movement. The Russian proletariat, which has already given so many great proofs of its heroism and devotion, will see to that."

The fourth difference that Kautsky points out is of particular interest for Russian Marxists. Nowadays, unfortunately, we hear a lot of inane, virtually and purely Cadet, snickering over "Brownings" and "fighting squads". No one has the courage and straightforwardness, of which Marx gave such an example, to say that insurrection is impossible, and that it is no use making further preparations for it. But people here are very fond of snickering over military operations by revolutionaries. They call themselves Marxists, but prefer to shirk the task of analysing the *military* aspect of insurrection (to which Marx and Engels always attached great importance[73]) by declaring with the inimitable majesty of a doctrinaire: "It was wrong to take up arms...." Kautsky behaves differently. Few as the facts about the insurrection at his disposal have been, he nevertheless tries to analyse the military aspect of the question as well. He tries to appraise the movement as a new form of struggle devised by the masses, unlike our revolutionary Kuropatkins,[74] who appraise a battle according to the rule: if they're giving something away, take it; if there's a fight on, run; if you're beaten, well, you shouldn't have taken up arms!

"Both the June fighting in Paris," says Kautsky, "and the December fighting in Moscow were barricade fighting. But the former was a disaster, it marked the end of the old barricade tactics. The latter marked the beginning of new barricade tactics. And consequently we must revise the opinion which Engels expressed in his "Introduction" to Marx's *Class Struggles*, that the period of barricade fighting is over for good.[75] Actually, only the period of the *old* barricade tactics is over. This is what the Moscow fighting showed, when a handful of insurgents managed to hold out for two weeks against superior forces armed with all the resources of modern artillery."

That is how Kautsky speaks. He does not sing a requiem for the insurrection because the first attempt failed. He does not grumble over the failure, but *studies* the birth and growth of a new and higher form of struggle, examines the significance of the disorder and discontent among the troops, the assistance the workers received from the townspeople, the combination of the mass strike with insurrection. He

studies the way in which the proletariat is *learning* the art of insurrection. He revises obsolete military theories, and thereby calls upon the whole Party to analyse and assimilate the experience of Moscow. He regards the whole movement as a transition from strike to insurrection, and tries to grasp how the workers should combine the two for the purpose of achieving success.

Kautsky concludes his article as follows: "Such are the lessons of Moscow. How far they will influence the forms of the struggle in future, it is impossible, as yet, to foresee from here [i.e., from Germany]. Indeed, in all preceding manifestations of the Russian revolution so far we have seen spontaneous outbreaks of the unorganised masses; none of these were planned or prepared beforehand. Probably this will continue to be the case for some time.

"But while it is impossible, as yet, definitely to predict the forms that the struggle will assume in the future, all the signs are that we must expect further battles, that the present ominous [*unheimliche*] stillness is merely the calm before the storm. The October movement made the masses in town and country conscious of their power. Then the reaction in January hurled them into an abyss of torment. Here everything inflames them, arouses their anger, and they are ready to pay any price, however high, to escape. Soon the masses will rise again and attack with mightier force than ever! Let the counter-revolution celebrate its triumph over the bodies of the heroes who fell in freedom's cause. The end of this triumph is approaching: the red dawn is rising, the *proletarian revolution* is at hand."

III

The question we have outlined is the fundamental question of Social-Democratic tactics as a whole. This is the first question that the coming Party congress will have to settle in the clearest and most unambiguous manner; and all members of the Party, all class-conscious workers should immediately do their utmost to collect the comprehensive material that will help to settle it, discuss it and send delegates to the congress who will be fully prepared for their important and responsible task.

The elections of delegates for the congress should take place on the basis of a clear distinction between tactical platforms. Strictly speaking, the consistent and complete reply that is given to this question, one way or the other, will settle all the minor details of Social-Democratic tactics.

Either—or.

Either we admit that at the present time "there can be no talk of a real revolution", in which case we must say so openly and emphatically, in the hearing of all, so as not to mislead either ourselves, or the proletariat, or the people. In that case, we must absolutely reject the task of completing the democratic revolution as the *immediate* task of the proletariat. In that case, we must completely shelve the question of insurrection and cease all work of arming and organising fighting squads; for it is unbecoming for the workers' party to play at insurrection. In that case, we must admit that the strength of revolutionary democrats is exhausted and make it our immediate business to support one or other section of the liberal democrats, as the real oppositional force under a constitutional regime. In that case, we must regard the State Duma as a parliament, even if a bad one, and not only participate in the elections, but also go into the Duma. In that case we must put the legalisation of the Party first, change the Party programme accordingly, and adjust all our work to the "legal" limits, or at any rate relegate underground work to a minor and subordinate place. In that case, we can regard the organisation of trade unions just as primary a Party task as armed uprising was in the preceding historical period. In that case, we should also shelve the revolutionary slogans of the peasant movement (such as confiscation of the landed estates), because these slogans are in practice slogans of insurrection, and to call for insurrection without previously preparing for it in military fashion, without believing in it, would be unworthy playing at insurrection. In that case, we must stop talking not only about a provisional revolutionary government, but also about so-called "revolutionary local self-government"; for experience has shown that bodies that are rightly or wrongly called by that name are actually transformed by the force of circumstances into organs of insurrection, into rudiments of a revolutionary government.

Or we admit that we can and must talk of a real revolution at the present time; we admit that new and higher forms of the open revolutionary struggle are inevitable, or at all events, most probable. In that case, the principal political task of the proletariat, the nerve centre of all its work, the soul of all its organised class activities, must be the task of *completing the democratic revolution*. In that case, all evasion of this task would merely mean degrading the concept of class struggle to Brentano's interpretation[76] of it: it would mean converting the proletariat into a hanger-on of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. In that case, the Party's urgent and central political task is to prepare the forces of the proletariat, and to organise it, for armed uprising as the highest form of struggle achieved by the movement. In that case, it is our bounden duty critically to study the whole experience of the December uprising for the most direct practical purposes. In that case, we should increase tenfold our efforts to organise and arm fighting squads. In that case, we should prepare for insurrection also by means of fighting guerrilla operations, for it would be ridiculous to "prepare" only by enrolling and registering new recruits. In that case, we should regard civil war as having been declared and in progress, and the *whole* of the Party's activities should be guided by the rule: "In war as in war!". In that case, it is absolutely essential to train the cadres of the proletariat for *offensive* military operations. In that case, it is logical and consistent to issue revolutionary watchwords for the masses of the peasantry. The task of concluding fighting agreements with the revolutionary, and only the revolutionary, democrats comes into the foreground: the criterion for distinguishing between the various sections of the bourgeois democrats is the question of insurrection. With those who are in favour of insurrection the proletariat "strikes together", although it "marches separately"; those who are opposed to insurrection we ruthlessly fight, or spurn them as contemptible hypocrites and Jesuits (the Cadets). In that case, we put into the foreground of all our agitation the criticism and exposure of constitutional illusions from the standpoint of open civil war, and concentrate on circumstances and conditions that will steadily pave the way for spontaneous revolutionary outbreaks. In that case, we regard the Duma,

not as a parliament, but as a police headquarters, and reject all participation in the farcical elections because it can only corrupt and disorganise the proletariat. In that case, we take as the basis of organisation of the party of the working class (as Marx did in 1849) a "strong, secret organisation", which must have a separate apparatus for "public activities", and send its special feelers into all legal societies and institutions, from the workers' trade unions to the legal press.

To put it in a nutshell: either we must admit that the democratic revolution is at an end, shelve the question of insurrection and take the "constitutional" path. Or we recognise that the democratic revolution is still in progress, make it our primary task to complete it, develop and apply in practice the slogan of insurrection, proclaim civil war and ruthlessly denounce all constitutional illusions.

It is scarcely necessary to tell the reader that we are emphatically in favour of the *latter* solution of the problem that now confronts the Party. The purpose of the tactical platform published in this issue is to sum up and expound in systematic form the views that we shall uphold at the congress and in the course of our work in preparing for it. This platform should be regarded not as something complete, but as an outline explanation of tactical problems, and as a preliminary draft of the resolutions and decisions we shall advocate at the Party congress. This platform has been discussed at private gatherings of like-minded ex-"Bolsheviks" (including the editors of, and contributors to, *Proletary*) and is a product of collective effort.

Partiiniye Izvestia, No. 2,
March 20, 1906
Signed: *A Bolshevik*

Published according to
the text in *Partiiniye Izvestia*

A TACTICAL PLATFORM FOR THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS FOR THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[77]

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The eleven resolutions herewith submitted to the reader have been drawn up by a group consisting of the former editors of, and contributors to, *Proletary*, and of several Party members engaged in practical work, who all share the same views. These are not finished resolutions, but rough drafts, the object of which is to give as complete an idea as possible of the sum-total of views on tactics held by a certain section of the Party, and to facilitate the systematic discussion that is now being started in all our Party circles and organisations on the invitation of the Joint Central Committee.

The resolutions on tactics fit in with the Congress agenda[78] that was proposed in the leaflet of the Joint Central Committee. But members of the Party are by no means obliged to confine themselves to this agenda. With a view to making a complete exposition of all opinions on tactics, we felt bound to add two questions that do not appear in the agenda proposed by the Joint Central Committee, namely, "The present stage of the democratic revolution" and "The class tasks of the proletariat in the present stage of the democratic revolution". Unless these questions are cleared up, the more specific questions of tactics cannot be discussed. We therefore propose that the Congress should include in its agenda the following general question: "The present stage of the democratic revolution and the class tasks of the proletariat".

As for the agrarian programme, and the attitude to be adopted towards the peasant movement, a special-pamphlet is needed.* Moreover, the Joint Central Committee has appointed a special committee to draw up a report on this question[79] for the Congress.

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* See pp. 165-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In publishing these rough drafts, we invite all Party members to discuss, amend and supplement them. Written reports and drafts may be sent through our Party organisations to the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to be delivered to the group which drew up the resolutions.

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Whereas:

(1) with the wholesale destruction of productive forces and the unprecedented impoverishment of the people, the economic and financial crisis that Russia is experiencing, far from subsiding, is spreading and becoming more acute, causing frightful unemployment in the towns and famine in the countryside;

(2) although the big capitalist and landlord class, frightened by the independent revolutionary activity of the people who are menacing its privileges and predatory interests, is turning sharply away from opposition towards a deal with the autocracy, with the object of suppressing the revolution, the demands for real political liberty and social and economic reforms are gaining ground and becoming stronger among new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry;

(3) the present reactionary government, striving in effect to preserve the old autocracy, trampling upon all the liberties it has proclaimed, granting only a consultative voice to the upper strata of the propertied classes, offering a gross travesty of popular representation, subjecting the whole country to a regime of military repression, savage brutalities and mass executions, and intensifying police and administrative tyranny to an unprecedented degree, is thereby causing unrest and discontent among broad sections of the bourgeoisie, arousing the resentment and indignation of the masses of the proletariat and peasantry, and paving the way for a new, wider and more acute political crisis;

(4) the course of events at the end of 1905—mass strikes in the towns, unrest in the countryside and the armed uprising in December, produced by the desire to defend the liberties obtained by the people and taken away from them by the government, and the subsequent ruthless military suppression of the emancipation movement—has revealed the futility of

constitutional illusions, and has opened the eyes of the broad masses of the people to the harmfulness of such illusions in a period when the struggle for freedom has reached the intensity of open civil war;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the democratic revolution in Russia, far from subsiding, is on the eve of a new upswing, and that the present period of comparative lull must be regarded, not as the defeat of the forces of revolution, but as a period of accumulation of revolutionary energy, assimilation of the political experience of preceding stages, enlistment of new strata of the people in the movement and, consequently, of preparation for a new and mightier revolutionary onslaught;

(2) that the main form of the emancipation movement at the present time is not legal struggle on a quasi-constitutional basis, but the direct revolutionary movement of broad masses of the people, breaking the police and semi-feudal laws, making revolutionary law, and destroying by force the instruments for the oppression of the people;

(3) that the interests of the proletariat, as the foremost class in modern society, demand that a relentless struggle be waged against the constitutional illusions which the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (including the Constitutional-Democratic Party) is spreading in order to cover up its narrow class interests and which, in a period of civil war, produce the most corrupting effect upon the political consciousness of the people.

ARMED UPRISING

Whereas:

(1) the whole history of the present democratic revolution in Russia shows us that, on the whole, the movement is steadily rising towards ever more determined, offensive forms of struggle against the autocracy, forms that are assuming an increasingly mass character and are embracing the whole country;

(2) the political strike in October, which swept away the Bulygin Duma, compelled the autocratic government to proclaim the principles of political liberty and revealed the

gigantic strength of the proletariat and its ability to take unanimous action on a country-wide scale, in spite of all the deficiencies of its class organisations;

(3) with the further growth of the movement, the peaceful general strike proved inadequate, while partial recourse to it failed its aim and disorganised the forces of the proletariat;

(4) the entire revolutionary movement led with elemental force to the armed uprising in December, when not only the proletariat but new forces of the urban poor and the peasantry took up arms to defend the liberties gained by the people from the encroachments of the reactionary government;

(5) the December uprising gave rise to new barricade tactics, and proved generally that the open armed struggle of the people is possible even against modern troops;

(6) owing to the introduction of a military and police dictatorship, despite constitutional promises, the masses of the people are becoming increasingly conscious of the necessity of fighting for real power, which the revolutionary people can capture only in open battle against the forces of the autocracy;

(7) the autocracy is weakening and demoralising its military forces by employing them to suppress by force of arms the very people of whom they are a part, by not carrying out the now urgent military reforms that all honest elements in the army are demanding, by not taking steps to relieve the desperate conditions of the reservists, and by responding to the demands of the soldiers and sailors only by tightening police and barrack-room severities;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that at the present time armed uprising is not only the necessary means of fighting for freedom, but a stage actually reached by the movement, a step which, in view of the growth and intensification of a new political crisis, begins the transition from defensive to offensive forms of armed struggle;

(2) that in the present stage of the movement, the general political strike must be regarded not so much as an independent means of struggle as an auxiliary means in relation to insurrection; that therefore the timing of such a strike, and the choice of its place and of the industries it is to involve should

preferably depend upon the time and circumstances of the main form of struggle, namely, armed uprising;

(3) that in its work of propaganda and agitation the Party must take special care to study the practical experience of the December uprising, examine it critically from the military point of view, and draw practical lessons from it for the future;

(4) that still greater efforts must be made to form more fighting squads, improve their organisation, and supply them with weapons of every type; and, as experience suggests, it is necessary to form not only Party fighting squads, but also squads associated with the Party, and entirely non-Party squads;

(5) that there should be increased work among the armed forces, bearing in mind that discontent alone in the forces is not enough to achieve success for the movement, that there is also a need for direct agreement with the organised revolutionary-democratic elements in the armed forces, for the purpose of launching determined offensive operations against the government;

(6) that in view of the growing peasant movement, which may flare up into a regular insurrection in the very near future, it is desirable to work for combining actions by the workers and the peasants, in order to organise, as far as possible, joint and simultaneous fighting operations.

FIGHTING GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Whereas:

(1) scarcely anywhere in Russia since the December uprising has there been a complete cessation of hostilities, which the revolutionary people are now conducting in the form of sporadic guerrilla attacks upon the enemy;

(2) these guerrilla operations, which are inevitable when two hostile armed forces face each other, and when repression by the temporarily triumphant military is rampant, serve to disorganise the enemy's forces and pave the way for future open and mass armed operations;

(3) such operations are also necessary to enable our fighting squads to acquire fighting experience and military

training, for in many places during the December uprising they proved to be unprepared for their new tasks;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the Party must regard the fighting guerrilla operations of the squads affiliated to or associated with it as being, in principle, permissible and advisable in the present period;

(2) that the character of these fighting guerrilla operations must be adjusted to the task of training leaders of the masses of workers at a time of insurrection, and of acquiring experience in conducting offensive and surprise military operations;

(3) that the paramount immediate object of these operations is to destroy the government, police and military machinery, and to wage a relentless struggle against the active Black-Hundred organisations which are using violence against the population and intimidating it;

(4) that fighting operations are also permissible for the purpose of seizing funds belonging to the enemy, i.e., the autocratic government, to meet the needs of insurrection, particular care being taken that the interests of the people are infringed as little as possible;

(5) that fighting guerrilla operations must be conducted under the control of the Party and, furthermore, in such a way as to prevent the forces of the proletariat from being frittered away and to ensure that the state of the working-class movement and the mood of the broad masses of the given locality are taken into account.

THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL ORGANS OF REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITY

Whereas:

(1) in developing into armed struggle, the revolutionary movement against the autocratic government has so far taken the form of sporadic local insurrections;

(2) in this open struggle, the elements of the local population that are capable of fighting resolutely against the old regime (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced

sections of the petty bourgeoisie) have been compelled to set up organisations that in practice have been embryonic forms of a new revolutionary authority—the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities, the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies at Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk and elsewhere, the railwaymens' committees in Siberia and in the South, the peasant committees in Saratov Gubernia, the town revolutionary committees in Novorossiisk and other towns, and lastly, the elected village bodies in the Caucasus and in the Baltic Provinces;

(3) in keeping with the initial, rudimentary form of the insurrection, these bodies were just as sporadic, haphazard, irresolute in their activities, and lacked the support of an organised armed force of the revolution, and were therefore doomed to fall at the very first offensive operations of the counter-revolutionary armies;

(4) only a provisional revolutionary government, as the organ of a victorious insurrection, can completely crush all resistance by reaction, ensure complete freedom for election agitation, convene on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot a constituent assembly capable of really establishing the sovereignty of the people and putting into effect the minimum social and economic demands of the proletariat;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that in order to complete the revolution, the urgent task now confronting the proletariat is, jointly with the revolutionary democrats, to help to unite the insurrection, and to set up an organ that will unite it, in the shape of a provisional revolutionary government;

(2) that one of the conditions for the successful fulfilment of the functions of the revolutionary government is the establishment, in all the towns and village communities that have joined the insurrection, of organs of revolutionary local self-government, elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot;

(3) that the participation of delegates of our Party in the provisional revolutionary government jointly with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats is permissible depending on the alignment of forces, and must formally be made con-

ditional on control of these delegates by the Party and, in substance, on their upholding the independent interests of the working class and staunchly maintaining the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete socialist revolution and is therefore relentlessly hostile to all bourgeois parties;

(4) that, irrespective of whether it will be possible for Social-Democrats to participate in the provisional revolutionary government or not, propaganda must be carried on among the broadest possible sections of the proletariat to explain that the armed proletariat, guided by the Social-Democratic Party, should bring constant pressure to bear upon the provisional government, with a view to protecting, consolidating and enlarging the gains of the revolution.

SOVIETS OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES

Whereas:

(1) Soviets of Workers' Deputies spring up spontaneously in the course of mass political strikes as non-party organisations of the broad masses of the workers;

(2) in the course of the struggle, these Soviets inevitably undergo a change both as regards their composition, by absorbing the more revolutionary elements of the petty bourgeoisie, and as regards the nature of their activities, by growing from purely strike organisations into organs of the general revolutionary struggle;

(3) insofar as these Soviets are rudiments of revolutionary authority, their strength and importance depend entirely on the strength and success of the insurrection;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should participate in non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies, unfailingly form the strongest possible groups of Party members in each Soviet, and direct the activities of these groups strictly in accordance with the general activities of the Party;

(2) that the formation of such organisations for the purpose of increasing Social-Democratic influence on the pro-

letariat, and the influence of the proletariat on the course and outcome of the democratic revolution, may, in certain conditions, be left to the local organisations of our Party;

(3) that the broadest possible sections of the working class, and also of representatives of the revolutionary democrats, particularly peasants, soldiers and sailors, should be induced to take part in the non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies;

(4) that as the activities and sphere of influence of Soviets of Workers' Deputies expand, it must be pointed out that these institutions are bound to collapse unless they are backed by a revolutionary army and unless the government authorities are overthrown (i.e., unless the Soviets are transformed into provisional revolutionary governments); and that therefore one of the main tasks of these institutions in every revolutionary situation must be to arm the people and to strengthen the military organisations of the proletariat.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES

Whereas:

(1) the Social-Democratic Party has always recognised the necessity of supporting every opposition and revolutionary movement against the existing social and political system in Russia;

(2) at the present time, when the revolution is bringing various classes into open action, thus stimulating the formation of political parties, it is the urgent duty of the Social-Democratic Party to ascertain the class character of these parties, to appraise the present relations between the classes, and to determine its own attitude to the various parties accordingly;

(3) the main task of the working class at the present stage of the democratic revolution is to carry it to its completion and therefore, in determining its attitude towards the other parties, the Social-Democratic Party must particularly take into account the extent to which each party is capable of actively promoting this object;

(4) from this point of view, all existing non-Social-Democratic parties in Russia (bar the reactionary parties) may be

divided into two main groups: liberal-monarchist parties and revolutionary-democratic parties;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the Right liberal-monarchist parties (the Union of October Seventeenth, the Party of Law and Order, the Commercial and Industrial Party,[80] etc.) represent the class organisations of the landlords and the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and are openly counter-revolutionary, but have not yet made a final deal with the autocratic bureaucracy on sharing power; that the party of the proletariat, while taking advantage of this conflict which is still in progress, must at the same time wage a relentless struggle against these parties;

(2) that the Left liberal-monarchist parties (the Party of Democratic Reforms,[81] the Constitutional-Democratic Party, etc.), not being definitely class organisations, are constantly vacillating between the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary elements of the big bourgeoisie, between the desire to lean on the people and fear of its independent revolutionary activity, and aim at nothing that goes beyond the limits of a well-ordered bourgeois society protected from the encroachments of the proletariat by a monarchy and a two-chamber system; and that the Social-Democratic Party must utilise the activities of these parties for the political education of the people, counteract their hypocritical democratic phrase-mongering by the consistent democracy of the proletariat, and ruthlessly expose the constitutional illusions they spread;

(3) that the revolutionary-democratic parties and organisations (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Peasant Union, some of the semi-trade union and semi-political organisations, etc.) most closely express the interests and point of view of the broad masses of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie, strongly opposing landlordism and the semi-feudal state, consistently striving for democracy and clothing their virtually bourgeois-democratic aims in a more or less nebulous socialist ideology; and that the Social-Democratic Party deems it possible and necessary to enter into fighting agreements with these parties, while at the same time systematically exposing their pseudo-socialist character and

combating their attempts to obscure the class antithesis between the proletarian and the small proprietor;

(4) that the immediate political object of such temporary fighting agreements between the Social-Democratic Party and the revolutionary democrats is to secure the convocation by revolutionary means of a constituent assembly of the whole people with full powers, on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot;

(5) that temporary fighting agreements are possible and advisable at the present time only with those elements which recognise armed uprising as a means of struggle and are actually assisting to bring it about.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NATIONAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Whereas:

(1) in the course of the revolution the proletariat of all the nationalities in Russia is becoming more and more united by the common struggle;

(2) this common struggle is bringing the various national Social-Democratic parties in Russia closer together;

(3) in many towns amalgamated committees of all the national Social-Democratic organisations of the particular locality are being formed, in place of the former federal committees;

(4) most of the national Social-Democratic parties no longer insist on the principle of federation, which was rightly rejected by the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the most energetic measures must be taken to achieve the speedy amalgamation of all the national Social-Democratic parties in Russia into a united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

(2) that the basis of this amalgamation must be the complete merging of all the Social-Democratic organisations in each locality;

(3) that the Party must really ensure the satisfaction of all the Party interests and requirements of the Social-Democratic proletariat of each nationality, giving due consideration also to the specific features of its culture and way of life; and that this may be ensured by holding special conferences of Social-Democrats of the particular nationality, giving representation to the national minorities on the local, regional and central bodies of the Party, forming special groups of authors, publishers, agitators, etc.

Note. The representation of a national minority on the Central Committee of the Party could, for example, be arranged in the following manner: the general Party congress may elect to the Central Committee a definite number of members from among candidates nominated by the regional congresses in those parts of Russia where at present separate Social-Democratic organisations exist.

THE TRADE UNIONS

Whereas:

(1) the Social-Democratic Party has always regarded the economic struggle as a component of the proletarian class struggle;

(2) the experience of all capitalist countries shows that the most advisable form of organisation of the working class for the economic struggle is that of broad trade unions;

(3) at the present time a general striving is observed among the masses of the workers in Russia to associate in trade unions;

(4) the economic struggle can bring about a lasting improvement in the conditions of the masses of the workers, and a strengthening of their truly class organisation, only if this struggle is properly combined with the political struggle of the proletariat;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that all Party organisations must promote the formation of non-party trade unions, and induce all Party members to join the trade unions in their respective trades;

(2) that the Party must exert every effort to educate the workers who belong to trade unions in the spirit of a broad

understanding of the class struggle and the socialist aims of the proletariat; by its activities to win a virtually leading position in these unions; and lastly to ensure that these unions, under certain conditions, come into direct association with the Party—however, without at all expelling non-party members from their ranks.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE DUMA

Whereas:

(1) the State Duma is a gross travesty of popular representation, since:

(a) the suffrage is not universal, not equal, and not direct, the bulk of the workers and peasants are practically debarred from participation in the State Duma, and the ratio of electors from the various groups of the population has been made to fit in with the views of the police;

(b) as regards its powers and its position in relation to the Council of State, the Duma is an impotent appendage of the autocratic bureaucracy;

(c) the conditions under which the elections are proceeding make it utterly impossible for the people really to express their will, owing to the absence of freedom to carry on agitation, to military repressions, mass executions, arrests, and police and administrative tyranny;

(d) the government's sole purpose in convening such a State Duma is to deceive the people, strengthen the autocracy, make further financial swindles easier for it, and strike a bargain with the reactionary elements of the exploiting classes, whose predominance in the State Duma is assured;

(2) participation in elections to the State Duma, while in no way helping to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat or to strengthen and enlarge its class organisation and fighting preparedness, is more likely to disorganise and corrupt the proletariat, since:

(a) if the Social-Democratic Party participated in the elections, it would inevitably foster among the people constitutional illusions, belief that the elections can to some extent truly express the will of the people, and the notion that the Party is taking the path of pseudo-constitutionalism;

(b) in view of their small number, the shortness of their period of office and their special functions, the groups of delegates elected by the workers, and of electors, can in no way help in building a really revolutionary organisation of the proletariat;

(c) participation in the elections focuses the attention of the proletariat on the farce being played by the government rather than on the revolutionary movement that is going on outside the Duma, and concentrates attention on agitation among small groups of electors rather than on extensive agitation among the masses;

(d) our participation in the elections cannot facilitate the Social-Democratic education of the more ignorant sections of the masses who want to take part in the Duma elections, exclusively in the legal way, a method which the R.S.D.L.P. cannot at present adopt;

(e) the withdrawal of a section of the electors from the gubernia election meetings could neither frustrate the convocation of the Duma nor give rise to a broad popular movement;

(3) participation in the elections in the present political situation will compel the Social-Democrats either to step aside, without any benefit to the movement, or to stoop to the position of silent abettors of the Constitutional-Democrats;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the R.S.D.L.P. must emphatically refuse to take part in the State Duma;

(2) that the R.S.D.L.P. must emphatically refuse to participate in the State Duma elections at any stage;

(3) that the R.S.D.L.P. must make most vigorous use of all meetings connected with the elections to expound Social-Democratic views in general, and ruthlessly to criticise the State Duma in particular, and especially to call for a struggle for the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly of the whole people;

(4) that the R.S.D.L.P. must also use the agitation about the Duma to acquaint the broadest possible masses of the people with all the Party's views on tactics in the present revolutionary situation, and on the tasks arising from it.

PRINCIPLES OF PARTY ORGANISATION

Whereas:

(1) the principle of democratic centralism in the Party is now universally recognised;

(2) although made difficult, it can nevertheless be put into effect within certain limits in existing political conditions;

(3) mixing the secret with the legal apparatus of the Party organisation has proved most fatal for the Party, and plays into the hands of government provocation;

We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that the elective principle in the Party organisations should be applied from top to bottom;

(2) that departures from this principle, for example: two-stage elections or co-optation to elected bodies, etc., may be permitted only when police obstacles are insurmountable, and in exceptional cases especially provided for;

(3) that it is imperative to preserve and strengthen the secret nucleus of the Party organisation;

(4) that for public activities of all kinds (in the press, at meetings, in the unions, particularly trade unions, etc.) special departments of the Party organisations should be formed, which could not in any way jeopardise the secret nuclei;

(5) that there must be one central body for the Party, i.e., the general congress of the Party must elect a single Central Committee, which shall appoint the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ, etc.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

REVISION OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE WORKERS' PARTY[82]

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Н. ЛЕНИНЪ.

Пересмотръ аграрной программы РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ.

№ 1.

Цѣна 10 коп.

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ.
1906.

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party, 1906
Reduced

Everybody now admits that it is necessary to revise the agrarian programme of the workers' party. This urgent question was formally brought up at the last conference of the "Majority" (December 1905), and it has now been placed on the agenda of the Unity Congress.

We propose first of all to make a very brief survey of how the agrarian question has been posed in the history of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, then to review the various draft programmes now proposed by Social-Democrats, and lastly, to present a rough draft of our own.

I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC VIEWS ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

Ever since it came into being, the Russian Social-Democratic movement has recognised the vast importance of the agrarian question in Russia and of the peasant question in particular, and in all its policy documents has included an independent analysis of this question.

The contrary opinion, often spread by the Narodniks[83] and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, is based either on com plete ignorance or on deliberate distortion of the facts.

The very first draft programme of the Russian Social-Democrats, published by the Emancipation of Labour group in 1884, contained the demand for the "radical revision of agrarian relations" and the abolition of all feudal relations in the countryside (not having at hand the old Social-Democratic literature that was published abroad at the time, we

are compelled to quote from memory, so that we can vouch for the general sense, but not for the actual wording of the quotations).

Later Plekhanov, both in the magazine *Sotsial-Demokrat*[84] (late 1880s), as well as in the pamphlets: *Russia's Ruin and The Tasks of the Socialists in Fighting the Famine in Russia* (1891-92), repeatedly, and in the most emphatic terms, stressed the vast importance of the peasant question in Russia. He even pointed out that in the impending democratic revolution a "general redistribution"[85] was possible, and that the Social-Democrats did not fear or shrink from such a prospect. He argued that while by no means a socialist measure, a "general redistribution" would give a powerful impetus to the development of capitalism, to the growth of the home market, to an improvement in the conditions of the peasantry, to the disintegration of the village commune, to the development of class contradictions in the countryside and to the eradication of all vestiges of the old, feudal bondage system in Russia.

Plekhanov's reference to a "general redistribution" is of special historical importance to us, for it clearly shows that the Social-Democrats adopted from the very outset the theoretical formulation of the agrarian question in Russia to which they have adhered up to the present day.

Ever since they founded their Party, the Russian Social-Democrats have maintained the following three propositions. *First*. The agrarian revolution will necessarily be a part of the democratic revolution in Russia. The content of this revolution will be the liberation of the countryside from the relations of semi-feudal bondage. *Second*. In its social and economic aspect, the impending agrarian revolution will be a bourgeois-democratic revolution; it will not weaken but stimulate the development of capitalism and capitalist class contradictions. *Third*. The Social-Democrats have every reason to support this revolution most resolutely, setting themselves immediate tasks, but not tying their hands by assuming commitments, and by no means refusing to support even a "general redistribution".

Those who are unaware of these three propositions, who have not noticed them in *all* the Social-Democratic literature on the agrarian question in Russia, are either ignorant

of the subject or evade its essence (as the Socialist-Revolutionaries always do).

Reverting to the history of the evolution of Social-Democratic views on the peasant question, we may also mention, among the literature of the late 1890s, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" (1897),* where the opinion that Social-Democrats are "indifferent" to the peasantry is emphatically denied, and the general views of the Social-Democrats on this subject are reiterated—and also the newspaper *Iskra*.[86] The third issue of that paper, published in the **spring** (March and April) of **1901**, that is, *twelve months* before the first major peasant uprising in Russia, contained an editorial entitled "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry",** which re-emphasised the importance of the peasant question and, among a series of other demands, put forward the demand for restitution of the cut-off lands.

This article may be regarded as the first rough draft of the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. that was published in the name of the editors of *Iskra* and *Zarya*[87] in the summer of 1902, and which was adopted by the Second Congress of our Party (August 1903) as the official Party programme.

In this programme the *whole* struggle against the autocracy is regarded as a struggle waged by the bourgeois order against feudalism, and the imprint of Marxist principles is very distinctly seen in the main proposition of its agrarian section: "With a view to eliminating the survivals of serfdom which are a direct and heavy burden upon the peasantry, and for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Party demands...."

The critics of the Social-Democratic programme nearly all *evade* this main proposition: they overlook the obvious.

In addition to demands that raised no controversy (abolition of the social-estate taxation of the peasantry, reduction of rents, freedom to use land at will), the agrarian programme adopted at the Second Congress also contained a number of clauses demanding the refunding of land re-

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* See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

demption payments, and the establishment of peasant committees for the restitution of cut-off lands and for the abolition of survivals of serfdom.

The last clause about cut-off lands gave rise to most criticism among Social-Democrats. It was criticised by the Social-Democratic *Borba* Group, which proposed (if I remember rightly) the expropriation of all the landed estates,[88] and also by Comrade X.[89] (whose criticism, together with my reply,* was published in pamphlet form in Geneva, in the summer of 1903, just before the Second Congress. The delegates to that Congress had copies of it). Comrade X. proposed substituting, for the clause about cut-off lands and the refunding of land redemption payments, (1) the confiscation of church, monastery and crown lands, to be "transferred to the democratic state", (2) "the imposition of a progressive tax on ground-rent drawn by the big landowners, so that this form of revenue should go to the democratic state for the needs of the people", and (3) "the transfer of part of the private land (big estates), and of all the land, if possible, to large self-governing public organisations (the Zemstvos)".

I criticised this programme and said that it was an "inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for nationalisation of the land"; I stressed that the demand for peasant committees was important as a fighting slogan to rouse the oppressed social-estate; that the Social-Democrats must not tie their hands by pledging themselves to oppose even the "sale" of the confiscated land; that the restitution of cut-off lands *does not in the least restrict the aims* of Social-Democracy, but merely restricts the possibility of the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie advancing common aims. I stressed that "if the demand for all the land is a demand for the nationalisation of the land or its transference to the land-holding peasants of today, we shall appraise this demand from the standpoint of the proletariat's interests, *taking all factors into consideration* [our italics]; we cannot, for instance, say in advance whether, when the revolution awakens them to political life, our land-holding peasants will come out as a democratic revolu-

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 436-51.—*Ed.*

tionary party, or as a party of order" (pp. 35-36).*

The same idea—that the cut-off lands will restrict neither the magnitude of the peasant movement nor our support for it, if it develops further—I also expressed in my pamphlet *To the Rural Poor* (published in 1903, before the Second Congress), where I say that cut-off lands are not a "barrier" but a "door",** and where, far from rejecting the idea of *all the land* going to the peasantry, I even welcome it in certain political conditions.

As regards the "general redistribution", I wrote the following in August 1902 (*Zarya*, No. 4, p. 176) in defending the draft agrarian programme:

"The demand for general redistribution contains the reactionary utopian idea of generalising and perpetuating small-scale peasant production, but it also contains (in addition to the utopian idea that the 'peasantry' can serve as the vehicle of the *socialist* revolution) a revolutionary element, namely, the desire to sweep away by means of a peasant revolt all the remnants of the serf-owning system."***

Thus, reference to the literature of 1902-03 irrefutably proves that the authors of the demand about cut-off lands never regarded it as restricting the peasant movement, or our support of it. Nevertheless, the course of events proved that this part of the programme was unsatisfactory, because the peasant movement was growing in breadth and depth with tremendous speed, and our programme was giving rise to bewilderment among the broad masses. Yet the party of the working class must reckon with the broad masses and cannot keep on referring only to commentaries, which explain a programme that is obligatory for all by arguments that are not obligatory for the Party.

The necessity for revising the agrarian programme was growing. At the beginning of 1905, one of the issues of the "Bolshevik" Social-Democratic newspaper *Vperyod* (published weekly in Geneva from January to May 1905) contained proposals for amending the agrarian programme,

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* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 444-45.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 418.—*Ed.*

*** Ibid., p. 137.—*Ed.*

among which was the proposal for deleting the clause about cut-off lands and substituting for it "support for the peasant demands, up to and including confiscation of all the landed estates".*

However, at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (May 1905), and at the "conference" of the "Minority" held at the same time, the question of revising the programme as such was not raised. Matters did not go beyond the adoption of a resolution on *tactics*, both sections of the Party agreeing to support the peasant movement, *including confiscation of all the landed estates*.

Strictly speaking, those resolutions predetermined the question of revising the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. The last conference of the "Majority" (December 1905) accepted my proposal to suggest deleting clauses about cut-off lands and about the refunding of land redemption payments, and replacing them by the statement that we support the peasant movement to the point of confiscation of all the landed estates.**

With this we may conclude our brief historical outline of the evolution of the views of the R.S.D.L.P. on the agrarian question.

II. FOUR TRENDS AMONG SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ON THE QUESTION OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

At the present time, in addition to the resolution of the "Bolshevik" conference already referred to, we have on this question two finished drafts of an agrarian programme—those of Comrades Maslov and Rozhkov—and comments and views of Comrades Finn, Plekhanov and Kautsky, which are incomplete, i.e., offer no finished draft of a programme.

Let us briefly outline the views of these authors.

Comrade Maslov offers us Comrade X.'s draft, slightly modified. Specifically, he deletes the progressive tax on ground-rent, and amends the demand for transfer of the pri-

* See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 235.—*Ed.*

** The resolution was published in *Rus*, *Nasha Zhizn* and *Pravda*[90] (see p. 88 of this volume.—*Ed.*).

vate lands to the Zemstvos. Maslov's amendment consists, first, in that he deletes X.'s phrase: "and all the land, if possible" (i.e., to transfer all the land to the Zemstvos). Secondly, he deletes from X.'s draft all reference to the "Zemstvos"; and for the phrase "large self-governing public organisations (the Zemstvos)", he substitutes the phrase "large regional organisations". The whole clause as amended by Maslov reads as follows:

"The transfer of private lands (big estates) to large self-governing regional organisations. The minimum size of land holdings to be alienated shall be determined by the regional popular representative body. "Thus Maslov emphatically rejects complete nationalisation, tentatively proposed by X., and demands "municipalisation", or, to be precise, "provincialisation". Against nationalisation, Maslov advances three arguments: (1) nationalisation would be an encroachment on the self-determination of nationalities; (2) the peasants, and particularly, homestead peasants, will not agree to the nationalisation of their land; (3) nationalisation will strengthen the bureaucracy inevitable in a bourgeois-democratic class state.

Maslov criticises the division of the landed estates ("dividing up") merely as a pseudo-socialist utopia of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but does not give his opinion of this measure as compared with "nationalisation".

As for Rozhkov, he wants neither division nor nationalisation. All he wants is deletion of the clause about cut-off lands and the substitution of a clause like the following: "Transfer to the peasants without redemption of all lands that serve as instruments for their economic enslavement" (see Comrade N. Rozhkov's article in the symposium *The Present Situation*,[91] p. 6). Comrade Rozhkov demands the confiscation of church and other lands, but says nothing about their "transfer to the democratic state" (which Comrade Maslov proposes).

The next is Comrade Finn, who in his unfinished article (in *Mir Bozhy*,[92] 1906) rejects nationalisation and evidently is inclined to support the demand that the landed estates be divided up among the peasantry as their private property.

Nor does Comrade Plekhanov say anything at all in his *Dnevnik*, No. 5, about making definite changes in our agrarian

programme. In criticising Maslov, he merely advocates "flexible tactics" in general, rejects "nationalisation" (using the old arguments advanced in *Zarya*), and appears to be in favour of dividing the landed estates among the peasantry.

Lastly, K. Kautsky, in his splendid essay "The Agrarian Question in Russia", sets forth the general principles of the Social-Democratic views on the subject, expresses his complete sympathy with the idea of dividing up the landed estates and apparently admits the possibility of nationalisation too, in certain conditions; but he says absolutely nothing at all either about the old agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. or about the proposals to amend it.

Summing up the opinions which exist in our Party on the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., we obtain the following *four* main types:

(1) The agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. should demand neither nationalisation nor confiscation of the landed estates (a view held by advocates of the present programme, or of slight amendments, like those proposed by Comrade N. Rozhkov);

(2) The agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. should demand confiscation of the landed estates, but not nationalisation of the land in any form (this view is evidently supported by Comrade Finn, and perhaps by Comrade Plekhanov, though his opinion is not clear);

(3) Alienation of the landed estates, together with a peculiar and restricted sort of nationalisation ("Zemstvoisation" and "provincialisation", as proposed by X., Maslov, Groman and others);

(4) Confiscation of the landed estates and, *in definite political conditions*, nationalisation of the land (the programme proposed by the majority of the committee appointed by the Joint Central Committee of our Party; this programme, which this writer advocates, is given at the end of the present pamphlet).*

Let us examine these opinions.

The supporters of the present programme, or of a pro gramme like that proposed by Comrade Rozhkov, start out

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* See pp. 194-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

either with the idea that confiscation of the big estates, which will result in their division into small ones, is altogether indefensible from the Social-Democratic point of view, or with the idea that confiscation should not appear in the programme, that its place is in the resolution on tactics.

Let us begin by examining the first opinion. We are told that the big estates represent an advanced capitalist type. Their confiscation and division would be a reactionary measure, a step backward to small-scale production. Social-Democrats cannot support such a measure.

We think that this opinion is wrong.

We must take into account the general and ultimate result of the present peasant movement, and not lose sight of it over individual cases and particulars. Taken as a whole, the landed estate in Russia today rests on a system of feudal bondage rather than on the capitalist system. Those who deny this cannot explain the present breadth and depth of the revolutionary peasant movement in Russia. Our mistake in putting forward the demand for the restitution of cut-off lands was that we did not sufficiently appraise the breadth and depth of the democratic, that is, the bourgeois-democratic movement among the peasantry. It would be unwise to persist in this mistake now that the revolution has taught us so much. The advantages of the confiscation of all the landed estates for the development of capitalism would far outweigh the disadvantages that would ensue from dividing up the big capitalist farms. Division will not destroy capitalism, and will not throw back its development but will to a very great extent clear the ground for it and provide a more general, extensive and firm basis for its (capitalism's) further development. We have always said that it is not by any means the business of the Social-Democrats to restrict the scope of the peasant movement: and at the present time to reject the demand for confiscation of all the landed estates would obviously mean restricting the scope of a social movement which has taken definite shape.

Hence those comrades who are at present opposing the demand for confiscation of all the landed estates are committing the same mistake as those British miners who, working less than eight hours a day, are opposing the enactment of an eight-hour day for the whole country.

Other comrades make a concession to the "spirit of the times". They say: In the programme, let us have the cut-off lands, or alienation of the lands which serve as instruments of enslavement. In the resolution on tactics, let us have confiscation. The programme must not be mixed up with tactics.

Our reply to this is that the attempt to draw a hard and fast line between programme and tactics can only result in scholasticism and pedantry. The programme defines the general and basic relations between the working class and other classes. Tactics define particular and temporary relations. This is quite true, of course. But we must not forget that the entire struggle we are waging against the survivals of serfdom in the countryside is a particular and temporary task in comparison with the general socialist aims of the proletariat. If a "constitutional regime" *à la* Shipov lasts in Russia for ten or fifteen years, these survivals will disappear; they will cause the population untold suffering, but nevertheless they will disappear, die out of themselves. Anything like a powerful democratic peasant movement will then become impossible, and it will no longer be possible to advocate any sort of agrarian programme "with a view to abolishing the survivals of the serf-owning system". Thus the distinction between programme and tactics is only a relative one. But a mass party which is now operating more openly than before would be put to a very great disadvantage if the programme contained a particular, limited and restricted demand, while the resolution on tactics contained a general, broad and all-embracing demand. Whatever the case may be—whether the Dubasov-Shipov "Constitution" becomes firmly established or whether the peasants' and workers' insurrection is victorious—we shall have to revise our Party's agrarian programme again fairly soon just the same. So we need be in no particular hurry to build a house for all time.

Let us now examine the second type of opinion. We are told: confiscation and division of the landed estates—yes, but no nationalisation in any circumstances. Kautsky is quoted in support of division, and the arguments formerly advanced by all Social-Democrats (cf. *Zarya*, No. 4) against nationalisation are reiterated. We fully and absolutely

agree that, on the whole, division of the landed estates would, at the present time, be a decidedly progressive measure, both economically and politically. We also agree that in bourgeois society, the small proprietor class is, *in certain conditions*, "a stauncher pillar of democracy than the class of tenant farmers dependent on a police-controlled class state, even if it is a constitutional state" (*Lenin*, "Reply to X.", p. 27*).

But we think that if we confine ourselves to these considerations at the present stage of the democratic revolution in Russia, if we confine ourselves to advocating the old position we took up in 1902, it will certainly mean that we are discounting the material changes that have taken place in the social-class and political situation. In August 1902 *Zarya* pointed out (see Plekhanov's article in No. 4, p. 36) that *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[93] was advocating nationalisation, and expressed the undoubtedly correct opinion that the demand for nationalisation of the land is far from everywhere, and certainly not always, a revolutionary demand. This is true, of course; but in the same article Plekhanov says (p. 37) that "*in a revolutionary period*" (Plekhanov's italics), the expropriation of the big landowners may be essential in Russia, and in certain circumstances this question will have to be raised.

Undoubtedly, the present situation is substantially different from what it was in 1902. The revolution rose to a high pitch in 1905, and is now gathering force for a new rise. That *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* should advocate nationalisation of the land (at all seriously) is out of the question. Quite the reverse: the keynote of the speeches delivered by Nicholas II and of the howling of Gringmut[94] & Co. has been defence of the inviolability of private landed property. The peasant uprising has already shaken up old serf-ridden *Rus*, and the dying autocracy is now placing its hopes entirely on the possibility of a deal with the landlord class, which has been scared to death by the peasant movement. Not only *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, but *Slovo* too, the organ of the Shipovites, is attacking Witte and Kutler's[95] "socialist" draft, which proposes not nationalisation of the land, but only

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 437.—*Ed.*

compulsory *redemption payments* for part of the land. The savage suppression of the Peasant Union by the government, and the savage "dragonnades" against the turbulent peasantry, show as clearly as anything can show that the peasant movement has definitely assumed a revolutionary-democratic character.

This movement, like every profoundly popular movement, has already roused the peasantry to tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm and revolutionary energy and is continuing to do so. In their struggle against the private ownership of large estates, against landlordism, the peasants necessarily arrive, and through their foremost representatives have already arrived, at the demand for the abolition of all private ownership of land in general.*

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the idea that the land should belong to the whole people is now very widespread among the peasantry. Nor can there be any doubt that, in spite of all the ignorance of the peasantry, in spite of all the reactionary-utopian elements in its aspirations, this idea on the whole is revolutionary-democratic in character.**

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See *Resolutions of the Congresses of the Peasant Union, August 1 and November 6, 1905*, St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 6, and *Minutes of the Inaugural Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union* (St. Petersburg, 1905), *passim*.

** In his *Dnevnik*, No. 5, Comrade Plekhanov warns Russia not to repeat the experiments of Wang Hang-che (a Chinese reformer of the eleventh century who unsuccessfully introduced nationalisation of the land), and tries to show that the peasants' idea of land nationalisation is of reactionary origin. The far-fetched nature of this argument is only too obvious. Truly, *qui prouve trop, ne prouve rien* (he who proves too much, proves nothing). If twentieth-century Russia could be compared with eleventh-century China probably Plekhanov and I would hardly be talking either about the revolutionary-democratic character of the peasant movement or about capitalism in Russia. As for the reactionary origin (or character) of the peasants' idea of land nationalisation, well, even the idea of a general redistribution of the land has undoubted features not only of a reactionary origin, but also of its reactionary character at the present time. There are reactionary elements in the whole peasant movement, and in the whole peasant ideology, but this by no means disproves the general revolutionary-democratic character of this movement as a whole. That being so, Comrade Plekhanov by his exceedingly far-fetched argument has not proved his thesis (that Social-Democrats cannot, in certain political conditions put forward the demand for nationalisation of the land) and has, indeed, weakened it very considerably.

Social-Democrats must cleanse this idea of its reactionary and petty-bourgeois socialist distortions—there is no question about that. But they would be committing a serious error if, failing to perceive its revolutionary-democratic side, they were to throw this demand entirely overboard. We must very frankly and emphatically tell the peasants that land nationalisation is a bourgeois measure, that it is useful *only* in definite political circumstances; but it would be a short-sighted policy for us socialists to come before the masses of the peasants and *baldly* repudiate this measure. And it would not only be a short-sighted policy, but also a theoretical distortion of Marxism, which has very definitely established that nationalisation of the land is possible and conceivable even in bourgeois society; that it will not retard, but stimulate, the development of capitalism, and that it is the *maximum* bourgeois-democratic reform in the sphere of agrarian relations.

And how can anyone deny that it is our duty *at the present time* to come before the peasantry, advocating the maximum bourgeois-democratic reforms? How can anyone still fail to see the connection between the radicalism of the peasants' agrarian demands (abolition of private ownership of land) and the radicalism of their political demands (a republic, etc.)?

The only stand Social-Democrats can take on the agrarian question at the present time, when the issue is one of carrying the democratic revolution to its conclusion, is the following: against landlord ownership and for peasant ownership, if private ownership of land is to exist at all. Against private ownership of land and for nationalisation of the land in definite political circumstances.

This brings us to the third type of opinion: the "Zemstvoisation" or "provincialisation" proposed by X., Maslov and others. In answering Maslov, I must to some extent repeat what I said in 1903 in answering X., namely, that his was "an inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for the nationalisation of the land" (*Lenin*, "Reply to X.", p. 42*). And I went on to say: "The land should (generally speaking) preferably be transferred to a democratic state,

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 450.—Ed.

and not to *small* public organisations (like the present or future Zemstvos)."

What does Maslov propose? He proposes a hodge-podge of nationalisation *plus* Zemstvo-isation, *plus* private ownership of land, but he *does not indicate at all* the different political circumstances in which this or that agrarian system would benefit (relatively) the proletariat. Indeed, in Point 3 of his draft Maslov demands the "confiscation" of church and other lands and their "transfer to the democratic state". This is nationalisation pure and simple. Why, one may ask, did he make no reservation about the political circumstances that would make nationalisation innocuous in bourgeois society? Why did he not propose *here* Zemstvo-isation instead of nationalisation? Why did he choose a formulation that *precludes* the sale of the confiscated land?* Maslov has replied to none of these questions.

In proposing the nationalisation of church, monastery and crown lands, and yet arguing against nationalisation in general, Maslov defeats his own purpose. His arguments against nationalisation are partly incomplete and inexact, and partly very feeble. First argument: nationalisation encroaches on the self-determination of nationalities. The authorities in St. Petersburg should not control the land in Transcaucasia. This is not an argument, but a sheer misunderstanding. In the first place, our programme recognises the right of nationalities to self-determination, and therefore, Transcaucasia, too, "has a right" to self-determination by secession from St. Petersburg. Maslov does not object to the four points[96] on the ground that "Transcaucasia" may not agree, does he? In the second place, our programme recognises *extensive* local and regional self-government as a *general principle*, and so it is positively ridiculous to talk about "the St. Petersburg bureaucracy controlling the land of the mountaineers" (Maslov, p. 22). Thirdly, it is in any case the *St. Petersburg* constituent assembly that will have

* Cf. *Lenin*, "Reply to X.", p. 27: "It would be wrong to say that, under all circumstances and at all times, the Social-Democrats will be opposed to the sale of the land." (See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 437.—*Ed.*) It is both illogical and unwise to assume that private ownership of land has not been abolished, yet commit oneself against the sale of the land.

to pass a law for the "Zemstvo-isation" of the land in *Transcaucasia*, for surely Maslov does not agree to any of the border territories having the right to preserve the landed estates. Consequently, Maslov's whole argument falls to the ground.

Second argument: "Nationalisation of the land presupposes the transfer of all the land to the state. But will the peasants, and particularly the homestead peasants, voluntarily agree to transfer their land to anybody?" (Maslov, p. 20).

First, Maslov is juggling with words, or else is confusing terms. Nationalisation means transferring to the state the right of ownership of the land, the right to draw rent, but not the land itself. Nationalisation does not by any means imply that all the peasants will be forced to transfer their land to anyone at all. We will explain this to Maslov by the following example. The socialist revolution implies the transfer to the whole of society, not only of property in the land, but of the land itself as an object of economic activity; but does that mean that the socialists want to deprive the small peasants of their land against their will? No, not a single sensible socialist has ever proposed anything so stupid.

Does anybody think it is necessary to make a special reservation about this in the section of the socialist programme which deals with the substitution of public ownership for private ownership of land.? No, not a single Social-Democratic Party makes such a reservation. We have all the less reason to invent imaginary horrors about nationalisation. Nationalisation means transferring rent to the state. The majority of the peasants receive no rent from land. Consequently they will not have to pay anything when the land is nationalised; and the democratic peasant state (tacitly implied in Maslov's vaguely formulated proposal for Zemstvo-isation) will in addition introduce a progressive income tax and reduce payments by the small proprietors. Nationalisation will facilitate the mobilisation of the land, but it does not in the least imply that the small peasants will be forcibly deprived of their land.

Secondly, if the argument against nationalisation hinges on the homestead peasants' "voluntary consent", then we ask Maslov: will the peasant proprietors "voluntarily con-

sent" to the "democratic state"—in which the peasants will be a force—*only renting* the best land, that is, the landlord, church and crown land, to them? Why, that would be just like saying to them: "You may own the bad, allotment land; as for the good, landed estates, you can only rent them. Black bread you may get free; for white bread, pay up in hard cash." The peasants will never agree to this. One of two things, Comrade Maslov: either economic relations necessitate private ownership of land, and the latter is advantageous—in that case we must speak of dividing up, or confiscating altogether, the landed estates. Or nationalisation of all the land is possible and advantageous—in that case there is no need whatever to make any exception for the peasants. To combine nationalisation with provincialisation, and provincialisation with private ownership, is evidence of utter confusion. We can be quite sure that such a measure would be impracticable *even if the democratic revolution achieved the most complete victory.*

III. COMRADE MASLOV'S PRINCIPAL MISTAKE

Here we must deal with another argument, which follows from the preceding one but requires more detailed examination. We have just said that we can be quite sure Maslov's programme will be impracticable even if the democratic revolution achieves the most complete victory. Speaking generally, the argument that certain demands in the programme are "impracticable", by which we mean that they are not likely to be carried out in present conditions or in the immediate future, cannot serve as an argument against those demands. K. Kautsky brought this out very clearly in his article in reply to Rosa Luxemburg on the question of the independence of Poland.* R. Luxemburg had said that the independence of Poland was "impracticable", to which K. Kautsky rejoined that it was not a question of "practicability" in the sense mentioned above, but whether a certain demand corresponds to the general trend of development

* An excerpt from it is quoted in my article on the draft agrarian programme in *Zarya*, No. 4. (See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 121—*Ed.*)

of society, or to the general economic and political situation throughout the civilised world. Take, for example, the demand in the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party for the election of all government officials by the people, said Kautsky. Of course, this demand is "impracticable" in present conditions in Germany. Nevertheless, it is quite a correct and necessary demand, for it is an inseparable part of the consistent democratic revolution towards which all social development is tending and which the Social-Democrats are demanding as a condition for socialism and as an essential element in the political superstructure of socialism.

That is just why, in saying that Maslov's programme is impracticable, we emphasise the words: even if the democratic revolution were to achieve the most complete victory. We do not merely say that Maslov's programme is impracticable in the light of present political relations and conditions. No, we assert that it would be impracticable even after a complete and fully consistent democratic revolution, i.e., in political conditions that would be most remote from the present, and most favourable for fundamental agrarian reforms. Precisely in these conditions Maslov's programme would be impracticable, not because it would be too big, so to speak, but because it would be too small for these conditions. In other words: if the democratic revolution is not completely victorious, then the abolition of landlordism, confiscation of the crown and other lands, municipalisation, and so forth, will be entirely out of the question. On the other hand, if the democratic revolution is completely victorious, it *cannot* confine itself to municipalising part of the land. A revolution that will sweep away all landlordism (and it is such a revolution that Maslov and all those who stand for division or confiscation of the landed estates assume) demands revolutionary energy and revolutionary action on a scale unprecedented in history. To assume that such a revolution is possible without confiscation of the landed estates (in his draft programme Maslov only speaks of "alienation", not of confiscation), without the idea of nationalising all the land becoming widespread among the "people", and without the most politically advanced forms of democracy being created, is to assume an

absurdity. All sides of social life are closely interconnected and, in the last analysis, are entirely subordinate to relations of production. A radical measure like the abolition of landlordism is unthinkable without a radical change in the forms of the state (a change which, given this economic reform, is possible only in the direction of democracy); it is unthinkable unless the "people" and the peasantry who demand the abolition of the most large-scale form of private property in land, are opposed to private ownership of land in general. In other words: a far-reaching revolution like the abolition of landlordism must, in itself, inevitably give a mighty impetus to the whole of social, economic and political development. A socialist who raises the question of such a revolution must also of necessity carefully consider the new problems that arise from it: he must examine this revolution in terms of the future as well as of the past.

It is from this aspect that Comrade Maslov's draft is particularly unsatisfactory. First, it wrongly formulates the slogans that should now, at once, immediately, kindle, fan, spread and "organise" the agrarian revolution. The only slogans that can serve this purpose are *confiscation* of all the landed estates and the establishment, for this purpose, of none other than *peasant committees*, as the only advisable form of local revolutionary authority that is close to the people and powerful. Secondly, the draft is defective in that it does not specify the political conditions without which "municipalisation" is a measure that is not necessarily useful, and is, indeed, positively harmful for the proletariat and the peasantry; that is to say, it does not give a precise and unambiguous definition of the term "democratic state". Thirdly, and this is one of the most serious and least frequently noticed defects in the draft, it does not examine the present agrarian revolution from the standpoint of its future, does not indicate the tasks that directly follow from this revolution, and suffers from a discrepancy between the economic and political postulates upon which it is based.

Examine carefully the strongest argument (the third) which might support Maslov's draft. This argument reads: nationalisation will strengthen the bourgeois state, whereas the municipal bodies, and local bodies generally, in such a state are usually more democratic, are not burdened with expendi-

ture for the maintenance of the armed forces, do not directly fulfil the police functions of oppressing the proletariat, and so on, and so forth. This argument clearly assumes that the state *will not be fully democratic*; it assumes that the most important part of the state, the central authority, will retain most of the features of the old military and bureaucratic regime, and that the local bodies, being of second-rate importance and subordinate, will be better, more democratic, than the central bodies. In other words, this argument assumes that the *democratic revolution will not be a complete one*. This argument *tacitly* assumes something between Russia in the reign of Alexander III, when the Zemstvos were better than the central bodies, and France at the time of the "republic without republicans", when the *reactionary* bourgeoisie, frightened by the growing strength of the proletariat, set up an anti-democratic "monarchist republic" with central bodies that were far worse than the local ones, less democratic and more permeated with the militarist, bureaucratic and police spirit. In essence, Maslov's draft tacitly assumes a situation in which the demands of our political minimum programme have not been carried out in full, the sovereignty of the people has not been ensured, the standing army has not been abolished, officials are not elected, and so forth. In other words, it assumes that our democratic revolution, like most of the democratic revolutions in Europe, has not reached its complete fulfilment and that it has been curtailed, distorted, "rolled back", like all the others. Maslov's draft is especially intended for a half-way, inconsistent, incomplete, or curtailed democratic revolution, "made innocuous" by reaction.*

This is what makes Maslov's draft absolutely artificial, mechanical, impracticable in the above-mentioned sense of the word, inherently contradictory and rickety, and lastly, lop-sided (for it only conceives of the transition from the democratic revolution to anti-democratic bourgeois reaction, and not to the intensified struggle of the proletariat for socialism).

* In his *Agrarfrage* Kautsky, to whom Maslov refers, points out particularly that nationalisation, which would be absurd in the conditions prevailing in Mecklenburg, would have a different significance in democratic England or Australia.

It is absolutely impermissible *tacitly* to assume that the democratic revolution will not be carried through to the end, and that the fundamental demands of our political minimum programme will not be carried out. Such things must not be passed over in silence, but stated in very precise terms. If Maslov wanted to do justice to himself, if he wanted to eliminate any element of reticence and inherent falsity in his draft, he should have said: as the state that will emerge from the present revolution will "probably" not be very democratic, it will be better not to increase its power by nationalisation, hut to keep to Zemstvo-isation, for "*we must assume*" that the Zemstvos will be better and more democratic than the central bodies of the state. This, and this alone, is the tacit assumption in Maslov's draft. Therefore, when he uses the term "democratic state" in his draft (Point 3), and without any reservation at that, he is uttering a glaring untruth and misleading himself, the proletariat and the whole people. For in reality he is "adjusting" his draft precisely to a *non*-democratic state, a reactionary state arising out of a democracy that has been left incomplete, or has been "taken over" by reaction.

That being the case, it is clear why Maslov's draft is so artificial and "synthetic". Indeed, if we assume a state with a central authority that is more reactionary than the local authorities, a state like the third French republic without republicans, then it is positively ridiculous to imagine that landlordism can be abolished in such a state, or that it will at least be possible to prevent the restoration of landlordism abolished by the revolutionary onslaught. In that part of the world that is called Europe, and in the century that is called the Twentieth, every state of *that* kind would be compelled by the objective logic of the class struggle to *start by protecting* landlordism, or by *restoring* it if it had been partly abolished. The whole purpose, the objective purpose, of such a semi-democratic, but actually reactionary, state is to preserve the *foundations* of bourgeois, landlord and bureaucratic rule, and to sacrifice only the least important of its prerogatives. The existence in such states of a reactionary central authority side by side with comparatively "democratic" local bodies, Zemstvos, municipal councils, and so forth, is due solely and exclusively to the

fact that these local bodies are engaged in matters that are *harmless for the bourgeois state*: they are engaged in "tinkering with wash-basins", water supply, electric trams, and similar matters that do not endanger the *foundations* of what is called "the existing social system". It would be childishly naïve to imagine that because the Zemstvos engage in activities such as supplying water and light, they can engage in the "activity" of abolishing landlordism. This is the same as if a municipal council with a 100 per cent Social-Democratic majority somewhere in the French Poshekhonye[97] were to set about "municipalising" all the privately-owned land in France that had privately-owned buildings erected on it. The whole point is that the measure which abolishes landlordism differs just a little from measures to improve water supply, lighting, sewage, and so forth. The whole point is that the first "*measure*" very daringly "encroaches" upon the foundations of the *whole* "existing social system", it violently shakes and undermines these foundations, and facilitates the proletariat's onslaught upon the bourgeois system as a whole, on a scale unprecedented in history. Yes, in such circumstances the first and most important thing any bourgeois state will have to concern itself with will be to preserve the foundations of bourgeois domination. As soon as the fundamental interests of the bourgeois and landlord state are encroached upon, all rights and privileges as regards autonomous "tinkering with wash-basins" will be abolished in the twinkling of an eye; all municipalisation will at once be scrapped, and every vestige of democracy in local government bodies will be extirpated by "punitive expeditions". The innocent assumption that democratic municipal autonomy is possible under a reactionary central authority, and that this "autonomy" can be used to abolish landlordism, is a matchless specimen of visual incongruities, or of infinite political naïveté.

IV. THE OBJECTS OF OUR AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

The question of the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. would be very much clearer if we attempted to set it forth in the form of clear and plain advice that the Social-Democratic

Party should offer the proletariat and the peasantry in the period of the democratic revolution.

The first advice would necessarily be the following: make every effort to achieve the complete victory of the peasant uprising. Without such a victory, it will be impossible even to talk seriously either about "taking the land" from the landlords, or about setting up a truly democratic state. And the only slogan that can rouse the peasantry to revolt is: confiscation of all the landed estates (and not alienation in general, or expropriation in general, which would leave the question of compensation in the shade), and definitely confiscation by peasant committees pending the convocation of a constituent assembly.

Any other advice (including Maslov's slogan of "alienation", and all his municipalisation) is a call to the peasantry to settle the question, not by means of insurrection, but by a deal with the landlords, with the reactionary central authority. It is a call for a settlement of the question, not in a revolutionary but in a bureaucratic way, for even the most democratic regional and Zemstvo organisations are bound to be bureaucratic compared with revolutionary peasant committees, which should settle accounts with the landlords there and then, and take over powers later to be sanctioned by a national constituent assembly.

The second advice would necessarily be: unless the political system is made thoroughly democratic, unless a republic is established and the sovereignty of the people really assured, it will be useless to think either of retaining the gains won by the peasant revolt, or of making further progress. We should formulate this advice to the workers and peasants in the clearest and most precise terms to preclude all doubts, ambiguities, misinterpretations, or the tacit assumption of absurdities such as the possibility of abolishing landlordism under a reactionary central authority. And therefore, in pressing our political advice, we must say to the peasants: after taking the land, you should go further, otherwise you will be beaten and hurled back by the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. You cannot take the land and retain it without achieving new political gains, without striking another and even stronger blow at private ownership of land in general. In politics, as in all the life

of society, if you do not push forward, you will be hurled back. Either the bourgeoisie, strengthened after the democratic revolution (which naturally strengthens the bourgeoisie), will rob both the workers and the peasant masses of all their gains, or the proletariat and the peasant masses will fight their way further forward. And that means a republic and the complete sovereignty of the people. It means—if a republic is established—the nationalisation of all the land as the most that a bourgeois-democratic revolution can attain, as the natural and necessary step from the victory of bourgeois democracy to the beginning of the real struggle for socialism.

The third and last advice is: proletarians and semi-proletarians of town and country, organise separately. Don't trust any petty proprietors—not even small, or "working", proprietors. Don't be tempted with small-scale ownership, so long as commodity production continues. The nearer the peasant uprising is to victory, the more likely is the peasant proprietor to turn against the proletariat, the more necessary is it for the proletariat to have its independent organisation, and the more vigorously, perseveringly, resolutely and loudly should we call for the complete socialist revolution. We stand by the peasant movement to the end; but we have to remember that it is the movement of another class, not the one which can and will bring about the socialist revolution. That is why we leave aside the question of what is to be done about distributing the land as an object of economic activity: in bourgeois society, that question can and will be settled only by the proprietors, big and small. What we are mostly (and after the victory of the peasant uprising exclusively) interested in is: what should the rural proletariat do? We have been and will be concerned mainly with this question, leaving it to the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie to invent such things as equalised land tenure and the like. Our reply to this question, the fundamental question of the new, bourgeois-democratic Russia is: the rural proletariat must organise independently together with the town proletariat to fight for the complete socialist revolution.

Hence our agrarian programme should consist of three main parts. First, the formulation of the most emphatic call for a revolutionary peasant onslaught upon landlordism;

secondly, a precise definition of the next step the movement can and should take to consolidate the peasants' gains and to pass from the victory of democracy to the direct proletarian struggle for socialism; third, an indication of the Party's proletarian class aims, which, as the victory of the peasant uprising draws nearer, more urgently confront us and more persistently demand a clear formulation.

Maslov's programme does not solve a single one of the fundamental problems that now confront the R.S.D.L.P.; it does not give the slogan that could now, immediately, under the present most anti-democratic state, indicate the path of victory for the peasant movement. This programme does not define exactly the political reforms that are necessary to complete and consolidate the agrarian reforms; it does not indicate the agrarian reforms that will be necessary in a complete and consistent democracy; it does not describe the proletarian attitude of our Party towards all bourgeois-democratic reforms. It defines neither the conditions of the "first step" nor the objects of the "second step", but lumps everything together: beginning with the transfer of the crown lands to a non-existent "democratic state", and going on to the transfer of the landed estates to democratic municipalities out of fear of the undemocratic nature of the central authority! Non-revolutionary as regards its present practical significance, based on the assumption of an absolutely artificial and entirely improbable deal with a semi-reactionary central authority, this programme can give no guidance to the workers' party in any of the possible and conceivable lines of development of the democratic revolution in Russia.

To sum up. The only correct programme, provided there is a democratic revolution, is the following: confiscation of the landed estates and establishment of peasant committees*; this we must demand immediately, without hedging

* Like X., Maslov "sees a contradiction in the fact that we demand abolition of the social-estates and the establishment of peasant, i.e., social-estate, committees. In fact, the contradiction is only a seeming one: the abolition of the social-estates requires a 'dictatorship' of the lowest, oppressed social-estate, just as the abolition of classes in general, including the class of proletarians, requires the dictatorship of the proletariat. The object of our entire agrarian programme is

it round with restricting reservations. Such a demand is revolutionary and advantageous both to the proletariat and to the peasantry in all circumstances, even the worst. Such a demand inevitably involves the collapse of the police state and the strengthening of democracy.

But we cannot limit ourselves to confiscation. In the period of democratic revolution and peasant uprising, we cannot under any circumstances flatly reject nationalisation of the land; but we must specify the particular political conditions without which nationalisation might be detrimental to the proletariat and the peasantry.

Such a programme will be complete and integral. It will unquestionably offer the maximum of what is conceivable in any bourgeois-democratic revolution. It will not tie the hands of the Social-Democrats, for it will allow for division of the land or nationalisation, according to political circumstances. It will under no circumstances cause any friction between the peasants and the proletariat as fighters for democracy.* It will here and now, under the present political regime of police-ridden autocracy, advance absolutely revolutionary slogans that will revolutionise this regime; and it will also contain further demands, provided the democratic revolution is completely victorious, i.e., provided a situation arises in which the completion of the democratic revolution opens new prospects and brings forward new tasks.

It is absolutely essential that the programme should precisely indicate the special proletarian position we occupy throughout the democratic agrarian revolution. We need not be embarrassed by the fact that the place for this is a

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the eradication of feudal and social-estate traditions in the sphere of agrarian relations, and to bring that about the only possible appeal can be to the lowest social-estate, to those who are oppressed by these remnants of the serf-owning system." *Lenin*, "Reply to X.", p. 29. (See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 438.—*Ed.*)

* To remove any idea that the workers' party wants to impose upon the peasantry any scheme of reforms against their will and independently of any movement among the peasantry, we have attached to the draft programme *Variant* A, in which, instead of the direct demand for nationalisation, we say first that the Party supports the striving of the revolutionary peasantry to abolish private ownership of land.

resolution on tactics, or that it repeats the general part of our programme.

It is worth sacrificing the symmetrical division of subjects into programmatic and tactical, if by doing so we make our position clear and intelligible to the masses.

Herewith we submit the draft agrarian programme drawn up by the majority of the "Agrarian Committee" (appointed by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to draft a new agrarian programme).

V. DRAFT AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

With a view to eradicating the survivals of the serf-owning system, which are a direct and heavy burden upon the peasants, and for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Party demands:

(1) the confiscation of all church, monastery, crown, state, and landlord estates;

(2) the establishment of peasant committees for the purpose of immediately abolishing all traces of landlord power and privilege, and of actual disposal of the confiscated lands, pending the establishment of a new agrarian system by a constituent assembly of the whole people;

(3) the abolition of all taxes and services at present exacted from the peasantry, as the tax-paying social-estate;

(4) the repeal of all laws that restrict the peasants in disposing of their land;

(5) the authorisation of the courts elected by the people to reduce exorbitant rents and to annul all contracts that entail an element of bondage.

If, however, the decisive victory of the present revolution in Russia brings about the complete sovereignty of the people, i.e., establishes a republic and a fully democratic state system, the Party will* seek the abolition of private

* Variant A.

... the Party will support the striving of the revolutionary peasantry to abolish private ownership of land and seek the transfer of all the land to the state.

ownership of land and the transfer of all the land to the whole people as common property.

Furthermore, the object of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in all circumstances, and whatever the situation of democratic agrarian reform, is steadily to strive for the independent class organisation of the rural proletariat; to explain that its interests are irreconcilably opposed to those of the peasant bourgeoisie; to warn it against being tempted by small-scale ownership, which cannot, so long as commodity production exists, abolish poverty among the masses; and lastly, to urge the necessity for a complete socialist revolution as the only means of abolishing all poverty and all exploitation.

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF K. KAUTSKY'S PAMPHLET *SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY WIPED OUT!*

This is the Russian translation of a pamphlet written by one of the most outstanding representatives of German Social-Democracy. The author has succeeded in covering a far wider ground than the subject he has chosen would lead one to expect. Instead of merely refuting the lying assertions of Herr Burger, an unscrupulous henchman of the manufacturers, he has provided a wonderfully lucid and popular outline of the fundamental problems of the working-class movement, not only in Germany but all over the world. The decay of small-scale production and the impoverishment of the people are taking place everywhere. Like Herr Burger, the bourgeois politicians and economists in all countries are trying hard to obscure this fact. A methodical examination of the arguments usually advanced by these gentlemen is therefore of great value.

The author deals almost exclusively with facts concerning Germany. On some questions it would be useful to supplement these with facts concerning Russia. The publishers will probably make an effort to do so if this pamphlet achieves the circulation it fully deserves. It must be observed, however, that Russian industrial and agricultural statistics are in a most pitiable condition compared with German. In the case of Germany, it is possible to compare the returns of two national industrial and agricultural censuses, taken at different times. In Russia, not a single census of this kind has ever been taken, and apart from the Zemstvo statistics which have analysed in a European way

only small, isolated sections of our national economy, we have nothing more than the lying, slipshod, bureaucratically muddled statistics of various "departments", which would better deserve the title of police whitewash.

The Russian bureaucracy is preventing the Russian people from learning the whole truth about their conditions. But every educated Russian reader will easily recall hundreds and thousands of examples from our literature, illustrating the conditions of peasant farming, the handicraft trades and factory life, which fully bear out the conclusions arrived at by the author of this pamphlet. Every Russian worker and peasant will easily see that the impoverishment of the people described in this pamphlet is going on in Russia on a still larger scale, and in still more intense and cruder forms.

March 1906 *N. Lenin*

Published in March-April 1906 in the pamphlet: K. Kautsky, *Social-Democracy Wiped Out!*

Published according to the pamphlet text

THE VICTORY OF THE CADETS AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY

Written on March 24-28
(April 6-10), 1906

Published in pamphlet form
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I

WHAT WAS THE OBJECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE DUMA ELECTIONS?

The Cadets' victories have turned the head of our liberal press. In the course of the election campaign the Cadets succeeded in rallying all, or nearly all, the liberals. Newspapers which hitherto had not been associated with the Cadet Party have in effect become the organs of that party. The liberal press is overjoyed. On all sides we hear cries of exultation and threats addressed to the government. And a very characteristic circumstance is that these cries are constantly intermingled with sometimes malicious and sometimes condescending digs at the Social-Democrats.

Look what a mistake you made by keeping out of the elections! Now you see it, don't you? You will admit that you were mistaken, won't you? Now you appreciate the advice of the wise and far-sighted Plekhanov, don't you?—These and similar utterances may be read in the columns of the liberal press, bubbling over with elation. Comrade Stepanov (in his article "From Afar", in the symposium *The Present Situation*) has very aptly remarked that Plekhanov's present experience is something like what happened to Bernstein. Just as Bernstein was once carried shoulder-high by the German liberals, and lauded to the skies by all the "progressive" bourgeois newspapers, so today there is not a liberal newspaper in Russia, or even a liberal newspaper article (even *Slovo*, yes, even the Octobrist *Slovo*!) that does not embrace and kiss and fondle the wise and far-sighted, reasonable and sober-minded Plekhanov, who had the courage to rise in arms against the boycott.

Let us, then, see what the victories of the Cadets have proved. Whose mistake have they revealed? Whose tactics have they proved to be barren?

Plekhanov, Struve and Co. keep on telling us that the boycott was a mistake. Why the Cadets should think so is quite clear. Their proposal to secure the election to the Duma of one working man from Moscow (see *Nasha Zhizn*, March 23) shows that the Cadets appreciate the assistance of the workers, that they desire to strike a bargain with the Social-Democrats in order to round off and consolidate their victory, and that they are just as ready to strike such a bargain with the non-party workers as with the Social-Democratic Party. That the Cadets should abhor the boycott is quite natural, for it implies refusal to support them, the Cadets, refusal of the "Left" to strike a bargain with them, the Cadets.

But what does Plekhanov want—and the Mensheviks, or our Russian anti-boycott Social-Democrats, who gravitate towards him (some unwittingly and others wittingly)? Alas, alas! Plekhanov, the boldest of them all, the one who most consistently, most freely and most clearly expounds his views, shows again and again, in the fifth issue of his *Dnevnik*,* that *he does not know what he wants*. We must take part in the elections, he shouts. What for? To organise revolutionary local self-government, as advocated by the Mensheviks? Or in order to go into the Duma?

Plekhanov twists and turns and wriggles, and resorts to sophistry to avoid answering these plain, blunt and clear questions. After remaining silent for months and months when the Mensheviks, in the columns of *Iskra*, were already advocating revolutionary local self-government (*and when he was unequivocally signifying his sympathy with the Mensheviks' tactics*), Plekhanov now suddenly hurls a most contemptuous phrase at this "celebrated revolutionary local self-government" of the Mensheviks. Why and how celebrated, Comrade Plekhanov? Was it not the very Bolsheviks whom Plekhanov now wants to fight, and who long ago proved that this slogan was inadequate, indefinite and half-hearted, that helped to make it "celebrated"?

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* *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 5.

No reply. Plekhanov explains nothing. He pronounces his dictum like an oracle and passes on. But the difference between an oracle and Plekhanov is that an oracle predicts events, whereas Plekhanov pronounces his dictum after the event; he brings in the mustard when the meal is over. When, before the October revolution, before the December uprising, before the revolutionary upsurge, the Mensheviks were talking about "revolutionary local self-government", Plekhanov was silent, although he approved of the Mensheviks' tactics in general; he was silent, as if waiting in bewilderment, not daring to make up his mind. Now, when the revolutionary tide has ebbed, when the "days of freedom" and the days of insurrection are past, when all the various Soviets of workers', soldiers', railwaymen's and other deputies have left the scene (Soviets which the Mensheviks thought were organs of revolutionary local self-government, and which the Bolsheviks regarded as rudimentary, disconnected, spontaneous and therefore impotent organs of revolutionary state power)—in short, when the question has lost its acuteness, when the meal has been consumed, Plekhanov comes along with the mustard; he displays that wisdom and far-sightedness concerning yesterday that Messrs. Struve and Co. admire so much.

Why Comrade Plekhanov is displeased with revolutionary local self-government remains a secret. Plekhanov now agrees with the Bolsheviks that revolutionary local self-government "confuses" a lot of people (*Dnevnik*, No. 5); but by all appearances, Plekhanov thinks that this slogan is too radical, whereas the Bolsheviks think it too moderate. Plekhanov thinks that this slogan goes too far, whereas we think that it does not go far enough. What Plekhanov wants is to draw the Mensheviks away from this idea of "revolutionary local self-government" to sober, practical work in the Duma. We, however, want—and not only want, but consciously and distinctly call for—a step forward from the idea of revolutionary local self-government to recognition of the necessity for systematically setting up integral, methodical and dynamic organs of insurrection, organs of revolutionary power. For all practical purposes, Plekhanov shelves the slogan of insurrection (although he dares not say so openly and definitely); it is therefore quite natural that he should

also reject the slogan of revolutionary self-government, which without an insurrection, and unconnected with an insurrectionary situation, would be ridiculous and harmful make-believe. Plekhanov is slightly more consistent than his fellow-thinkers, the Mensheviks.

And so, why should we after all take part in the elections, Comrade Plekhanov, and how? Not for the sake of revolutionary local self-government, which only "confuses" people. To participate in the Duma, then? But here Plekhanov is overcome with timidity. He does not want to reply. But as n+1 comrades in Russia desire to do something definite among the masses of the workers, and not merely "do the reading" of the diaries of an author who "does the writing", and as these n+1 pestering correspondents demand a specific reply, Plekhanov loses his temper. It is difficult to imagine anything more helpless and more curious than his angry statement that it would be pedantic, formalistic, etc., to expect the voters to know what they are voting for, and why. But dear Comrade Plekhanov! Your friends the Cadets, and our workers as well, will simply laugh you out of court if you come before the masses and seriously begin to advocate this magnificent programme: take part in the elections; vote; but don't ask what you are voting for, or why. Vote on the basis of the Duma election law; but don't dare think (that would be pedantic and formalistic) that you are voting for candidates for the Duma.

Why has Comrade Plekhanov, who was once able to write clearly and give specific answers, become so obviously muddled? Because, having wrongly appraised the December uprising, he has formed a totally wrong notion of the present political situation. He finds himself in a position where he does not dare to think out his ideas to their logical conclusion; he is afraid to face realities squarely.

But the unvarnished realities of the "Duma campaign" are now clear to everyone. Facts have now answered the question what was the objective significance of the elections and of participating in them, irrespective of the will, consciousness, speeches and promises of those participating in them. The very reason why Comrade Plekhanov, the most determined of Mensheviks, dare not declare straightforwardly for participating in the Duma elections is that it

is now perfectly clear what this participation means. *Participation in the elections means either supporting the Cadets and striking a bargain with them, or playing at elections.* The very facts of life have proved this. In No. 5 of his *Dnevnik* Plekhanov was compelled to admit the correctness of the second half of this argument; he was compelled to admit that the slogan of "revolutionary local self-government" is absurd. In No. 6 of his *Dnevnik*, Plekhanov will be compelled, unless he refuses to consider the issue on its merits, to admit that the first half is also correct.

Political realities have utterly shattered the Menshe-viks' tactics, the tactics they advocated in their "platform" (the hectographed leaflet mentioning the names of Martov and Dan, issued in St. Petersburg at the end of 1905 or beginning of 1906) and in their printed statements (the Bulletin of the Joint Central Committee outlining the tactics of both sides, and Dan's article in a certain pamphlet). These tactics were to participate in the elections, but not to elect members of the Duma. We repeat, not a single more or less prominent Menshevik dared even hint in the press that we should go into the Duma. And it is these "pure" Menshevik tactics that the facts of life have completely shattered. It is hardly possible now to so much as talk seriously about participating in the elections for the sake of "revolutionary local self-government", of withdrawing from the gubernia election meetings, etc. Events have shown very clearly that such playing at elections, at parliamentarism, can only compromise Social-Democracy, can only result in disgrace and scandal, and nothing else.

If any further confirmation of this is required, it is provided most strikingly by the Moscow Regional Committee of our Party. This is an amalgamated organisation, consisting of the Majority and Minority factions. The tactics it adopted were also "amalgamated", i.e., they were at least half Menshevik tactics, namely, to take part in the election of delegates for the purpose of consolidating Social-Democratic influence in the workers' curia, and then to wreck the elections by refusing to elect the electors. This was an attempt to repeat the tactics adopted towards the Shidlovsky Commission.[98] It was the "first step" on the lines recommended by Comrade Plekhanov:

we will take part in the elections, and go into the matter more thoroughly afterwards.

As was to be expected, the Menshevik-Plekhanov tactics of the Moscow Regional Committee ended in a complete fiasco. The delegates were elected, among them Social-Democrats and even members of the organisation. Then came the anti-boycott law.[99] The delegates found themselves on the horns of a dilemma: either to go to prison for agitating in favour of the boycott, or elect the electors. The Regional Committee, like all our Party organisations, conducts its agitation underground, and so it proved unable to cope with the forces it had set in motion. *The delegates broke their promise*, they tore up their imperative mandates and—*elected the electors*. Among those elected were also Social-Democrats, and even members of the organisation.

This writer witnessed a very painful scene during the meeting of the Moscow Regional Committee, when that leading Social-Democratic organisation discussed what was to be done after the failure of the (Plekhanov) tactics. The failure of the tactics was so obvious that *not a single* Menshevik member of the Committee spoke in favour of the electors participating in the gubernia election meeting, or of revolutionary local self-government, or anything of the sort. On the other hand, it was difficult to decide to impose any penalty on the worker delegates who had acted contrary to their mandates. The Committee could do nothing but wash its hands of the situation, and tacitly confess that it had blundered.

Such was the result of the Plekhanov tactics of voting without carefully considering (without even desiring to think carefully, without desiring to think at all: see *Dnevnik*, No. 5) what we were to vote for, and why. At the first impact with reality the Menshevik "tactics" were shattered; and this is not surprising, for these "tactics" (participation in the elections, but not in order to elect) consisted entirely of good words and good intentions. The intentions remained intentions and the words, words; but what actually occurred was dictated by the inexorable logic of the objective political situation: either elect in order to support the Cadets, or play at elections. Thus events have fully borne out what I wrote in my article, "The State Duma and Social-

Democratic Tactics": "We may declare that our Social-Democratic candidates are completely and absolutely independent, and that we are participating in the elections on the strictest possible Party lines: but *the political situation is more potent than any number of declarations*. Things will not, and cannot, turn out in keeping with these declarations. Whether we like it or not, if we participate now in the present Duma elections, the result will inevitably be neither Social-Democratic nor workers' party policy" (p. 5).*

Let the Mensheviks or the Plekhanovites try to refute this conclusion—not by words but by deeds, by facts. After all, every local organisation of our Party is now autonomous as far as tactics are concerned. How is it that nothing good and practical has come of Menshevik tactics anywhere in Russia? Why has not the Moscow group of the R.S.D.L.P., which is a Menshevik group and not amalgamated with the Bolshevik Committee, drawn up a "Plekhanov" plan of campaign, or one of its own, for the elections that are to take place in Moscow the day after tomorrow, on Sunday, March 26? Not because it did not want to, of course. And, I am sure, not because it did not know how. It was because the objective political situation dictated either boycott, or support for the Cadets. Now among the electors elected for Moscow Gubernia there are Social-Democrats. The results of the elections are quite definite. The gubernia election meeting will not be held yet awhile. There is still time, Comrade Plekhanov. There is still time, Menshevik comrades! Why don't you advise these electors what to do?** Show

* See p. 108 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** These lines had been written when I read in *Rech*,[100] No. 30, of March 24, the following correspondence from Moscow: "So far as one can judge at present, the chances of the Cadets and Right parties at the coming gubernia elections are about equal: the Octobrists (11), the Commercial and Industrial Party (26) and the representatives of the extreme Right parties (13) have a fairly definite total of 50 votes; the Cadets (22), if to them we add the non-party progressives (11) and the workers (17), also have 50. Success in the contest will be determined by 9 electors whose sympathies are unknown."

Let us assume that these 9 are liberals and that the 17 workers are delegates of the Social-Democratic Party (as Plekhanov and the Mensheviks would like them to be). The totals will then be: Cadets 42, Rights 50, Social-Democrats 17. What else can the Social-Democrats do except enter into an electoral agreement with the Cadets about the distribution of the seats in the Duma?

them, at least for once, that you have tactics for an event and not after it. Should these electors simply walk out of the gubernia election meeting? Or should they walk out and form a revolutionary local self-government? Or should they hand in blank ballot papers? Or, lastly, should they vote for candidates for the Duma, and if so, for whom? For their own Social-Democratic candidates, for the sake of a futile and hopeless hole-and-corner demonstration? And lastly, the main question that you, Menshevik comrades and Comrade Plekhanov, must answer is: What are these electors to do if their votes are to decide whether the Cadets or Octobrists are to be elected? If, for example, the Cadets have A minus 1 electors, the Octobrists have A, and there are two Social-Democratic electors? To abstain* would mean helping the Octobrists to defeat the Cadets! Thus, the only course open is to vote for the Cadets and *to beg the latter to leave you a seat in the Duma as a reward for that service*.

This is by no means an imaginary conclusion. Nor is it a polemical dig at the Mensheviks. It is a conclusion drawn from reality. The participation of the workers and of the Social-Democrats in the elections leads to this *in practice*, and only to this. The Cadets rightly took into account what happened in St. Petersburg, where the non-party worker tenants voted for them to prevent the Octobrists from winning. Taking this into account, they made a forthright offer to

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* There is hardly need to add that by voting for their own Social-Democratic candidate, these two would *actually be helping the Black Hundreds*. Voting for the Social-Democratic candidate would be tantamount to abstaining, that is to say, to passively retiring from the fight in which the Black Hundreds were beating the Cadets.

P.S. In the text above it was erroneously stated that the gubernia election meeting would not meet yet awhile. It has already met. The Black Hundreds have won, because the peasants could not come to terms with the Cadets. Incidentally, the same issue of *Nasha Zhizn* from which we obtained this information (No. 405, March 28) says: "The newspaper *Put* reports from a reliable source that many Menshevik Social-Democrats took an active part in the elections (in Moscow) yesterday, and voted for the people's 'freedom ticket'." Is this true?

the Moscow workers: support us and we will get one of your electors into the Duma. The Cadets appreciated the real significance of Plekhanov's tactics better than Plekhanov himself. By their proposal they anticipated the inevitable political result of the elections. If Social-Democratic worker electors had been in the place of the non-party worker electors, they would have been confronted with the same dilemma: either retire from the elections, and thus help the Black Hundreds; or enter into a direct or indirect agreement or deal, tacit or written, with the Cadets.

O yes, it is *not for nothing* that the Cadets are now smothering Plekhanov in their embraces! And the price of these embraces is obvious. *Do ut des*, as the Latin saying has it: give and take. I embrace you because you, by your advice, are getting *me* extra votes. True, that may not have been your intention; you have even been ashamed to confess publicly that we have embraced you. You tried by fair means and foul (particularly by foul!) to get away from answering the questions that too importunately, too closely probed into the details of our love match. But it is not what you want, not what you think, not your good (from the Social-Democratic standpoint) intentions that count. What counts are the *results*—and those are in our favour.

The Cadets' interpretation of Plekhanov's tactics is correct. That is why they obtain the results they desire: the workers' votes, a deal with the workers, and *involvement of the workers in joint responsibility* with the Cadets *for a Cadet Duma*, for the Cadet policy.

Plekhanov's interpretation of the tactics he proposes is wrong. That is why his good intentions merely pave the way to hell. Social-Democratic election agitation among the *masses*, organisation of the *masses*, mobilisation of the *masses* around the Social-Democrats, and so on, and so forth (see the rhetoric of Dan, Plekhanov's fellow-thinker, in his pamphlet), all remain a dead letter. Much as some of us may desire these things, objective conditions are against them.- We do not succeed in unfurling the banner of Social-Democracy before the masses (remember the case of the Moscow Regional Committee); it is impossible to transform an underground organisation into a legal one; the helm is wrenched

from the powerless steersman who has been flung into the quasi-parliamentary torrent without proper equipment. *What we actually get is not a Social-Democratic*, *not a workers' party policy*, but a Cadet labour policy.

But your boycott has proved absolutely useless and impotent, the Cadets shout at us from all sides. The workers who wanted to make a laughing-stock of the Duma and of us Cadets, by their example of a boycott, the workers who elected a dummy to the Duma, were very clearly mistaken! The Duma will not be a dummy, but a Cadet Duma!

Have a heart, gentlemen! You are naïve, or pretending to be naïve. If the Duma turns out to be a Cadet Duma, the situation will be different; but the Duma will be a dummy all the same. The workers were guided by a wonderfully sensitive class instinct when, by their matchless demonstration of voting for a dummy, they symbolised the future Duma, warned credulous people, and disclaimed all responsibility for playing at dummies.

You don't understand that? Let us explain it to you.

II

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIRST ELECTIONS

The first political elections in Russia have very important political and social significance. But the Cadets, intoxicated by their victory, and totally submerged in constitutional illusions, are absolutely incapable of understanding the real significance of these elections.

First of all, let us see what class elements are grouped around the Cadets. On this question the elections provide highly instructive and valuable evidence, which is still far, very far, from being complete, however. Nevertheless, it already reveals some things that are worthy of special attention. The following are the returns of the election of electors up to March 18, i.e., before the elections in St. Petersburg. We have taken the figures from *Russkiye Vedomosti*.[101]

Political trend*	Number of electors elected by meetings of: City Voters	Landowners	*Total*
Lefts	268	128	396
Rights	118	172	290
Non-party	101	178	279
Total	487	478	965

Scanty as these figures are, they nevertheless show (and the St. Petersburg elections merely serve to confirm it) that the Russian liberation movement in general, and the Cadet Party in particular, is undergoing a social evolution. The centre of this movement is steadily shifting to the cities. The movement is becoming democratised. The "small fry" among the townspeople are coming to the forefront.

Among the landowners, the Rights predominate (if we assume that the non-party electors are evenly divided between the Lefts and the Rights, an assumption which, if anything, errs on the side of pessimism rather than of optimism). Among the city voters, the Lefts predominate to a far greater extent.

The landlords have deserted the Cadets for the Union of October Seventeenth and other similar parties. On the other hand, the petty bourgeoisie, or at any rate, the urban petty bourgeoisie (no figures are yet available for the rural petty bourgeoisie, and it will be more difficult to obtain them before the Duma elections), is clearly coming into the political arena, and is clearly turning towards democracy. In the bourgeois liberation (and *Osvobozhdeniye*) movement of Zemstvo congresses, the landlords predominated; but the peasant revolts and the October revolution have now thrown back a large section of them definitely to the side of the counter-revolution. The Cadet Party remains a dual party—in it we see both urban petty bourgeoisie and liberal landlords: but the latter, apparently, are already a minority in the party. The petty-bourgeois democrats predominate.

* Among the Lefts we include the Social-Democrats (2), Cadets (304), Party of Democratic Reforms (4) the progressive trend (59), the moderate liberals (17), the Jewish Equality League (3) and the Polish nationalists (7). Among the Right we include the Octobrists (124), Commercial and Industrial Party (51) Constitutional Monarchist (7), Party of Law and Order (5), the Right (49) and monarchists (54).

Thus, with a large margin of probability, almost with certainty, we can draw the following two conclusions: first, that the petty bourgeoisie is taking shape politically, and is definitely opposing the government; second, that the Cadet Party is becoming the "parliamentary" party of the petty-bourgeois democrats.

These two conclusions are not identical, as might appear at first sight. The second is much narrower than the first, for the Cadet Party does not comprise all the petty-bourgeois democratic elements, and moreover, it is only a "parliamentary" (i.e., *of course*, *a quasi-parliamentary*, *mock-parliamentary*) party. As for the significance of the St. Petersburg elections, there is an astonishing agreement among all witnesses; beginning with the pert *Rus*, which is flirting with radicalism, continuing with Mr. Nabokov, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party and candidate for the Duma, and ending with *Novoye Vremya*. All agree that the election returns are not so much a vote *for* the Cadets as a vote *against the government*. The Cadets achieved their victory largely *because they were* (thanks to Durnovo and Co.) *the most extreme Left party in the field*. The genuinely Left parties were kept out of the field by violence, arrests, massacres, the election law, and so forth. By the very force of circumstances, by the logic of the election struggle, all the discontented, irritated, angry and vaguely revolutionary elements were compelled to rally around the Cadets.* The combination of all the progressive electors with the Cadets that we made in the table given above is a reflection of what actually took place. Virtually there were two big forces contending: one for the government the counter-revolutionary landlords, the capitalists, and the dehumanised officials), and the other against the government (the liberal landlords, the petty bourgeoisie, and all the vaguely revolutionary-democratic elements). That elements to the left of the Cadets voted for the latter is a fact that stands out

* *Molva* of March 22 wrote: "It is no secret that nobody expects any constructive work from this Duma, and many of those who are voting for the Cadets disagree with their programme; they are merely imposing upon them the sacred and arduous duty of cleaning out the accumulated filth of years from our Augean stables, or in other words, from the government."

beyond doubt from the general picture of the St. Petersburg elections*; it is confirmed by the direct evidence of numerous witnesses (the fact that the "common people" voted for "freedom", and so on, and so forth); and it is borne out indirectly by the swing to the Cadet camp of the whole of the democratic press that stands slightly to the left of the Cadet press. Thus, while the core of the present Cadet Party consists of people who are certainly good for nothing better than toy-parliament oratory, this cannot be said about the bulk of the petty-bourgeois voters who voted for the Cadets. "Virtually, our experience is the same as that of the Social-Democrats during elections in Germany," said a Cadet to the reporter of the Cadet (or semi-Cadet) *Nasha Zhizn* (No. 401, March 23). "Many people vote for them because they are the party most strongly opposed to the government."

This is very true, but a tiny little thing must be added: the German Social-Democratic Party, being a militant and advanced socialist party in the fullest sense of the word, groups around itself many relatively backward elements. But the Russian Cadets, who in the fullest sense of the word are a backward and not a militant, democratic party, have carried with them many advanced and potentially militant democratic elements because the genuinely democratic parties have been forcibly removed from the battlefield. In other words, the German Social-Democratic Party carries with it those who trail behind it; whereas the Russian Cadets themselves trail behind the democratic revolution and can carry with them many advanced people only when most of those who march in front of them are inmates of prisons or are lying in their graves.** We say this

* The St. Petersburg elections, in which all the 160 electors returned were Cadets only serve to bring out more distinctly what has been noted in the elections in many other parts of the country. This is the real significance of the St. Petersburg elections.

** It is interesting to note the admission of *Rus* that one of the reasons for the Cadets' victory was that they allowed the "Left" to attend their meetings. Mr. S. A-ch, in *Molva*, No. 18 (March 22) writes as follows: "This party [the Cadets] gained quite a deal in the eyes of the voters also from the fact that it allowed representatives of the extreme Left parties to attend its meetings and victoriously entered into debate with them." Mr. A-ch may have his opinion about the Cadets' victories in debate with us. We are quite satisfied with the results of the

in passing lest our Cadets get above themselves on account of this comparison with the German Social-Democrats.

Owing to the elimination of the advanced democratic elements from the scene of this toy-parliament struggle, and so long as they are kept out of it, the Cadets, naturally, have a chance of gaining control of the toy parliament that goes by the name of the Russian State Duma. If we take the above-quoted figures, bear in mind the St. Petersburg and later victories of the Cadets, roughly estimate the enormous predominance of rural electors over urban, and add the peasant electors to the landowner electors, we shall have to admit that, on the whole, it is quite possible, and even probable, that the Duma will be a Cadet Duma.

III

WHAT IS THE PARTY OF PEOPLE'S FREEDOM?

What role, then, can and must a Cadet Duma play? To answer this question, we must first of all examine in greater detail the character of the Cadet Party itself.

We have already noted the main feature of the class structure of this party. Unconnected with any one particular class in bourgeois society, but absolutely bourgeois in composition, character and ideals, this party is wavering between the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary elements of the big bourgeoisie. The social basis of this party consists, first, of the masses of the townspeople, the very townspeople who eagerly built barricades in Moscow in the famous December days; secondly, it consists of the liberal landlords who want to come to a deal with the autocracy, through the good offices of pro-liberal officials, for an "inoffensive" division of power between the people and those who by the grace of God oppress the people. This extremely broad, indefinite and inherently contradictory class basis (which, as has been noted above,

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contests between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets at the meetings in St. Petersburg in March 1906. Some day impartial people who attended those meetings will say who were the victors.

is clearly discernible in the figures regarding the Cadet electors) is reflected with remarkable vividness in the Cadets' programme and tactics. Their programme is entirely bourgeois; the Cadets simply cannot conceive of a social system other than capitalism, beyond which even their boldest suggestions do not go. In politics, their programme combines democracy, "people's freedom", with counter-revolution, with the freedom of the autocracy to oppress the people; and it combines them with particularly petty-bourgeois and professorial-pedantic scrupulousness. The Cadet's ideal is that power in the state should be divided into approximately three parts. One part goes to the autocracy. The monarchy remains. The monarch retains equal power with the popular representative body, which is to "agree" with him on the laws to be passed, and submit its *bills* to him for *approval*. The second part goes to the landlords and the big capitalists. They get the Upper Chamber, from which the "common people" are to be barred by a two-stage electoral system and a residential qualification. Lastly, the third part goes to the people, who get a Lower Chamber elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Why fight, why this internecine strife? wails Judas Cadet,[102] lifting up his eyes and reproachfully glancing, now towards the revolutionary people, now towards the counter-revolutionary government. Brothers! Love one another! Let the wolves have their fill without any harm to the sheep, let the monarchy with its Upper Chamber be inviolate and "people's freedom" assured.

The hypocrisy underlying these Cadet principles is most glaring, and the fallacies of the "scientific" (professorially-scientific) arguments with which they are defended are amazing. It would be a great mistake, of course, to attribute this hypocrisy and these fallacies to the personal qualities of the Cadet leaders, or of individual Cadets. Such a vulgar explanation, which our opponents often attribute to us, is repugnant to Marxism. Undoubtedly, there are many most sincere Cadets who really believe that their party stands for "people's freedom". But the dual and vacillating class basis of their party inevitably engenders their double-faced policy, their fallacies, and their hypocrisy.

These amiable features stand out even more clearly, perhaps, in the Cadets' tactics than in their programme. *Polyarnaya Zvezda*,[103] in which Mr. Struve has so sedulously and successfully merged Cadetism with *Novoye Vremya*-ism, has given us an excellent, magnificent and inimitable example of Cadet tactics, at the moment when the firing in Moscow was subsiding, and when the military and police dictatorship was indulging in its savage orgies, when repressions and mass torture were raging all over Russia, *Polyarnaya Zvezda* protested against the use of force by the Lefts, and against the strike committees organised by the revolutionary parties. The Cadet professors who are trading in their science for the benefit of the Dubasovs went to the length (like Mr. Kiesewetter, member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party and candidate for the Duma) of translating the word "dictatorship" by the words "reinforced security"! These "men of science" even distorted their high-school Latin in order to discredit the revolutionary struggle. Please note once and for all, Messrs. Kiesewetter, Struve, Izgoyev and Co., that dictatorship means unlimited power based on force, and not on law. In civil war, any victorious power can only be a dictatorship. The point is, however, that there is the dictatorship of a minority over the majority, the dictatorship of a handful of police officials over the people; and there is the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority of the people over a handful of tyrants, robbers and usurpers of people's power. By their vulgar distortion of the scientific concept "dictatorship", by their outcries against the violence of the Left at a time when the Right are resorting to the most lawless and outrageous violence, the Cadet gentlemen have given striking evidence of the position the "compromisers" take in the intense revolutionary struggle. When the struggle flares up, the "compromiser" cravenly runs for cover. When the revolutionary people are victorious (October 17), the "compromiser" creeps out of his hiding-place, boastfully preens himself, shouting and raving until he is hoarse: "That was a 'glorious' political strike!" But when victory goes to the counter-revolution, the compromiser begins to heap hypocritical admonitions and edifying counsel on the vanquished. The successful strike was "glorious". The defeated strikes were

criminal, mad, senseless, and anarchistic. The defeated insurrection was folly, a riot of surging elements, barbarity and stupidity. In short, his political conscience and political wisdom prompt the "compromiser" to cringe before the side that for the moment is strongest, to get in the way of the combatants, hindering first one side and then the other, to tone-down the struggle and to blunt the revolutionary consciousness of the people who are waging a desperate struggle for freedom.

The peasants are fighting against landlordism, and this struggle is now reaching its climax. It has become so acute that the issue is put squarely: the landlords are demanding machine-guns in reply to the slightest attempt of the peasants to seize the land that the nobles have been grabbing for centuries. The peasants want to take all the land. If they attempt it, *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, with an unctuous excuse, will send the Kaufmans into the field to prove that the landlords haven't very much land: that, strictly speaking, it is not the land that is the cause of the trouble, and that everything can be settled peacefully.

The resolution on tactics adopted by the last Cadet congress[104] very well sums up the Cadets' political chicanery. After the December uprising, when it had become perfectly obvious to everybody that the peaceful strike was obsolete, that it had spent itself and become useless as an independent weapon in the struggle, the Cadet congress came along with a resolution (proposed, I think, by Mr. Vinaver) which recognised the *peaceful* political strike as a weapon in the struggle!

This is magnificent, matchless, Cadet gentlemen. You have assimilated the spirit and meaning of bourgeois political chicanery with inimitable facility. The bourgeoisie must seek the support of the people; without it, it will never achieve power, and has never done so. But at the same time it must restrain the revolutionary onslaught of the people to prevent the workers and peasants from winning—God forbid—complete and consistent democracy, genuine, and not monarchist and "two-Chamber", freedom for the people. That is why it must throw a spoke in the wheel of the revolution every time it is winning. And for this purpose every means, every device, must be brought into play—from

the "scientific" distortion of Latin by "professors" to discredit the very idea of the people achieving a decisive victory, to, say, recognising only such weapons in the revolutionary struggle as are *already* obsolete at the time when you recognise them! This is both harmless and advantageous. Harmless, because blunted weapons obviously cannot bring the people victory, will not put the proletariat and the peasantry in power; at best, they will shake the autocracy a little and help the Cadets to bargain for an extra bit of "rights" for the bourgeoisie. It is advantageous because on the surface it creates the impression that the Cadets are "revolutionary", that they sympathise with the people's struggle, and this wins them the support of large numbers who sincerely and earnestly want the revolution to win.

The very essence of the economic condition of the petty bourgeoisie, wavering between capital and labour, inevitably engenders the political instability and duplicity of the Cadet Party, leads to the latter's notorious "arrangement" theory ("the people have rights, but it is the prerogative of the monarch to sanction these rights") and converts it into a party of constitutional illusions. The ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie cannot grasp the "essence of the constitution". The petty bourgeois is always inclined to take a scrap of paper for the essence of the thing. He is ill-fitted for independent organisation—that is, independent of the militant class—for the direct revolutionary struggle. Being the most far-removed from the most acute economic struggle of our epoch, he prefers, in politics as well, to yield first place to other classes when it comes to really winning a constitution, to actually achieving a genuine constitution. Let the proletariat fight for the constitutional ground, and on this constitutional ground, so long as it holds, even on the corpses of workers killed during the insurrection, let the toy-business mannikins[105] play at parliamentarism—such is the immanent tendency of the bourgeoisie. And the Cadet Party, this refined, ennobled, sublimated, perfumed, idealised, and sweetened incarnation of general bourgeois aspirations, is working on these lines with wonderful consistency.

You call yourselves the party of people's freedom? Don't give us that! You are a party of philistine betrayers of

people's freedom, a party of philistine illusions about people's freedom. You are a party of freedom—in that you want to subject freedom to a monarch and a landlord Upper Chamber. You are a party of the people—in that you dread the victory of the people, that is, the complete victory of a peasant revolt, of the workers' struggle for the cause of labour. You are a party of the struggle—in that every time a real, direct, immediate revolutionary struggle against the autocracy flares up, you take refuge behind unctuous, professorial excuses. You are a party of words, not of deeds; a party of promises, not of fulfilment; a party of constitutional illusions, not a party for an earnest struggle for a real (not merely a paper) constitution.

When a lull sets in after a desperate battle; when up above "the sated beast, the victor, lies a-weary",* and down below the people are "sharpening their swords" and gathering fresh strength; when slowly the ferment is beginning to bubble and seethe among the masses again, when a new political crisis and a new great battle are only in the making—then the party of philistine illusions about people's freedom reaches the culminating point of its development and exults over its victories. The sated beast feels too languid to pounce once more upon the liberal talkers (there's no hurry; it can wait!), for the champions of the working class and the peasantry, the time has not yet come for another upheaval. This is just the golden opportunity; this is the time to gather the votes of all the discontented (and who is contented nowadays?); this is the time for our Cadets to sing full-throated, like any nightingale.

The Cadets are the worms in the grave of the revolution. The revolution lies buried. It is being eaten by worms. But revolution has the power of speedy resurrection and of blossoming forth again on well-prepared soil. The soil has been

* Skitalets, "Silence Reigns". "The strings are broken; song, be silent now! All we had to say we said before the fray. The dragon, dying monster, has come to lite again; the clash of swords has drowned the thrum of strings.... Silence reigns; the familiar sounds of life are stilled in this gruesome night. The vanquished, down below, are sharpening their swords; above, the victor lies a-weary. The sated beast is old and feeble. There, down below, he sees something new a-foot; the old door is trembling and shaking; the giant is breaking his chains."

wonderfully, magnificently prepared by the October days of freedom and by the December uprising; but we would not for a moment deny that the worms, too, are doing useful work while the revolution lies buried. Why, these fat worms manure the soil so well....

Mr. Struve once exclaimed in *Polyarnaya Zvezda*: "The peasant in the Duma will be a Cadet!" Very likely. The bulk of the peasants are, of course, in favour of freedom for the people. They will hear these fine, lofty words, they will see the police officials, face-smashing policemen, and feudal-minded landlords dressed up in all sorts of "Octobrist" costumes: and, of course, they will be on the side of freedom for the people, they will be attracted by the beautifully coloured labels, they will not see through this philistine deception all at once. They will become Cadets—and remain Cadets until the course of events shows them that the people's freedom has *still* to be won, that the real fight for freedom for the people has still to be fought *outside* the Duma. And then—then the peasants as well as the bulk of the town petty bourgeoisie will split: a small but economically powerful kulak minority may this time definitely side with the counter-revolution, another section will go over to the side of "compromise", of "reconciliation", of an amicable deal with the monarchy and the landlords; and a third section will side with the revolution.

In December, during the great struggle, the townspeople built barricades. In March, when the insurrection is suppressed, they protest against the government by voting for the Cadets. When their present constitutional illusions are dispelled, they will leave the Cadets and go over to the revolution again. How many of the townspeople abandon Cadet word-spinning for revolutionary struggle, how many of the peasantry join them, how vigorously, how well-organised, how successfully the proletariat goes forward in the next onslaught, will determine the outcome of the revolution.

The Cadet Party is an ephemeral, lifeless party. This may sound paradoxical at a time when the Cadets are achieving brilliant election victories, and will probably achieve still more brilliant "parliamentary" victories in the Duma. But Marxism teaches us to examine all phenomena in their

process of development, and not to be content merely with superficial descriptions; not to believe in pretty labels, but to investigate the economic, class basis of parties; to study the objective political situations which will determine the significance and outcome of their political activities. Apply this method to the Cadets, and you will see that our assertion is correct. The Cadets are not a party, but a symptom. They are not a political force, but foam resulting from the collision of more or less equally balanced contending forces. They do in very truth combine in themselves the swan, crab and pile of the fable—the garrulous, boastful, smug, narrow-minded, craven bourgeois intellectual, the counter-revolutionary landlord who wants to ransom himself from revolution at a reasonable price, and lastly the hard, shrewd, cheese-paring and tight-fisted petty bourgeois. This party neither desires, nor is it able, to rule at all firmly in bourgeois society; it neither desires, nor is it able, to lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution along anything like a definite path. The Cadets have no desire to rule; they prefer to "belong" under a monarchy and an Upper Chamber. They cannot rule, because the real masters of bourgeois society, the Shipovs and Guchkovs, the representatives of big capital and big property, hold aloof from this party. The Cadets are a party of dreamers about a nice white, clean, orderly, "ideal" bourgeois society. The Guchkovs and Shipovs are the party of real, genuine, grimy capital in modern bourgeois society. The Cadets cannot lead the revolution forward, because they lack the backing of a united and really revolutionary class. They dread the revolution. They rally everybody, the whole "people", only on the basis of constitutional illusions and unite them only with a negative bond: hatred for the sated beast, for the autocratic government, in opposition to which, on the present "legal" basis, the Cadets are *more to the left than anybody* else.

The historical role of the Cadets is a transient, fleeting one. They will fall together with the inevitable and speedy fall of constitutional illusions; they will fall like the French Social-Democrats of the late 1840s, who very much resembled our Cadets, and were also petty-bourgeois. The Cadets will fall, after preparing the soil—either for a prolonged triumph

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of the Shipovs and Guchkovs, for a prolonged burial of the revolution, for "serious" bourgeois constitutionalism, or for the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

IV

THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF A CADET DUMA

And so the State Duma will be a Cadet Duma, say the liberal newspapers. We have already said that this is quite probable. We can only add that even if, despite their present victories, the Cadets prove to be a minority in the Duma, it is not likely to affect very materially the course of the political crisis that is again maturing in Russia. The elements of this revolutionary crisis are too deep-rooted to be seriously affected by the composition of the Duma. The attitude of the broad masses of the people towards the government is quite clear. The attitude of the government towards the pressing needs of the whole of social development is more than clear. Naturally, in these circumstances, the revolution will advance. The predominance of the Black Hundreds in the First Duma can have only one probable delaying effect upon certain aspects of the political development of Russia: the collapse of the Cadet Party and of its prestige among the people will be delayed if the Cadets are now in the minority. At the present time it would be very convenient for them to be in a minority and to remain in opposition. The public would attribute the predominance of the Black Hundreds to the government's repressive measures during the elections. The opposition speeches of the Cadets, who realise how "harmless" their opposition is, would be particularly fervid. Their prestige among the broad masses of the politically uneducated population might rise, in circumstances when their "words" sounded even louder than at present, while their "deeds" remained even more vague because of their being outvoted by the Octobrists. Even then, the growth of discontent with the government and preparations for a new revolutionary upsurge would continue; but the exposure of Cadet futility might be somewhat delayed.

Let us now make another assumption, a more probable one, if we are to believe the present assertions of the Cadet newspapers. Let us assume that the Cadets will have a majority in the Duma, consisting, of course, of the same combination of Cadets and various non-party, "petty-party" and other liberals that we now see in the elections. What will the role and significance of a Cadet Duma be then?

The Cadets themselves give a very specific answer to this question. Their statements, promises and high-sounding phrases breathe firmness and determination. And it is extremely important that we members of the workers' party should carefully collect all these statements, keep them well in mind, spread them among the people and ensure by all means that these lessons in politics (which the Cadets are giving the people) are not wasted, that the workers and peasants know exactly *what* the Cadets *are promising and how they carry out their promises*.

In this pamphlet—which contains no more than the cursory comments of a wandering Social-Democratic publicist who by the grace of Durnovo and Co. has had to retire from journalistic work—in this pamphlet, we cannot hope to collect all, or even all the most important, statements and promises of the Cadets who are going into the Duma. We can only note one or two things in the literature that we happen to have at our disposal.

Here is the newspaper *Narodnaya Svoboda*, which started publication in December and was soon suppressed by the government. This was the avowed, official organ of the Cadet Party. It was edited by such pillars of this party as Messrs. Milyukov and Hessen. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the whole Cadet Party is responsible for its contents.

In its issue of December 20, *Narodnaya Svoboda* sets about convincing its readers that it is necessary to go into the Duma. What arguments does the Cadet organ advance in support of this? *Narodnaya Svoboda* does not attempt to deny that the political task that immediately confronts Russia is to convene a constituent assembly. The Cadet organ takes this for granted. The only question is, you see, who is to convene the constituent assembly? This question may be answered in three ways: (1) the present, i.e., in practice the autocratic, government; (2) a provisional

revolutionary government; and (3) the State Duma as "*an authority competing with authority*". The Cadets reject the first two outcomes—they place no hopes in the autocratic government, and have no faith in the success of an insurrection. They accept the third outcome. They urge that it is necessary to go into the Duma because this is the best, surest, and so on and so forth, method of convening a national constituent assembly.

Mark this conclusion well, gentlemen! The Cadet Party, the party of "people's freedom", *has promised the people* to use the "authority competing with authority", to use its predominance in the State Duma (if the people help it to achieve this predominance), to *convene a national constituent assembly*.

This is a historical fact. It is an important pledge. It will be the first test of how the party of "people's freedom" (in inverted commas) will serve people's freedom (without inverted commas).

In the current issues of the Cadet Party newspapers (and we repeat, nearly all the liberal newspapers, including *Rus*, *Nasha Zhizn*, etc., have *virtually* gone over to that party), you will no longer find this promise. You may find references to the "constituting functions" of the Duma; but nothing is said now about the Duma convening a national constituent assembly. As the time to back promises with deeds draws nearer, *they already take a step backwards*, they prepare a *loophole*.

Perhaps the whole trouble is that the present ferocious laws are preventing you from speaking openly about a constituent assembly? Is that so, gentlemen? But in the Duma, where your deputies will *by law* enjoy freedom of speech, you will again give full voice to your demand for the convocation—what am I saying?—you will *convene* the national constituent assembly, will you not?

Let us wait and see. And we shall not forget the Cadets' promise to convene a national constituent assembly through the medium of the Duma. The Cadet newspapers now bristle with statements to the effect that they, the Cadets, will be "the government", that they will be "in power", and so on, and so forth. Good luck, gentlemen! The sooner you have a majority in the Duma, the sooner will your promissory notes

be presented to you for payment. The Cadet newspaper Rus, welcoming the victory of the party of "people's freedom" in St. Petersburg, publishes in its issue of March 22 an impassioned article entitled "With the People or Against It?" It says nothing specifically about the Duma convening a national constituent assembly. But despite this step back from the Cadets' promises, it paints a fairly rosy picture of the Cadets' prospects:

> "The principal mission of the Duma that is about to assemble and of the Party of People's Freedom in it, is to be the whips and scorpions of the people's anger.
>
> "After expelling and impeaching the criminal members of the government, it will have to deal only with urgent measures and then convene a real Duma—on a broader basis, the representative of the whole people [i.e., the constituent assembly?].
>
> "This is the indubitable function of the Duma, i.e., the function that the people itself now imposes on it."

So. Expel the government. Impeach the government. Convene a real Duma.

Rus writes well. The Cadets speak well; they speak wonderfully well. It is only a pity that their newspapers are suppressed for these fine words....

Gentlemen, let us remember this new promise you have made on the day following the St. Petersburg elections; let us remember it very well. The Cadets are going into the Duma to expel the government, to impeach the government, to convene a real Duma.

Let us now pass from the Cadets' promises regarding the Duma to the government's "views" about the Cadet Duma. Of course, nobody is allowed to know exactly what these "views" are; but those same optimistic Cadet newspapers provide us with some material from which to appraise them. For example, the reports published about the proposed loan in France[106] appear to be more and more confident that this matter is settled, and that the loan will be floated before the Duma is convened. Thus, the government will, of course, be still less dependent on the Duma.

Then, as regards the prospects of the Witte-Durnovo Ministry, the same *Rus* (or *Molva*), in the article quoted above, calls upon the government to "go with the people, i.e., with the Duma". As you see, "expelling the criminal

members of the government" merely means making certain changes in its composition. The nature of these changes can be seen from the following statement in this newspaper:

"Today, a Ministry formed by a man of repute like D. N. Shipov would be most advantageous even for the reaction. It alone could avert a final collision between the government and society in the Duma." But we are assuming that "the worst happens", observes the newspaper, anticipating the formation of a purely bureaucratic Ministry. "Here no proof is required," says *Molva*. "It is obvious to everybody that if the government does not intend to rob the Duma of all significance, it must, it is in duty bound to, dismiss Durnovo, Witte and Akimov forthwith. And it is equally clear that if this does not happen, if this is not done, it will show that the gendarme policy of 'curbing and preventing' is to be applied both to the representatives of the people and to the State Duma. And for this purpose, of course, the most suitable men are those whose arms are already steeped to the elbows in the blood of the people. It is quite obvious that if Mr. Durnovo remains in office with the Duma in opposition, it can only be for the purpose of dispersing the Duma. It has no other purpose, nor can it have. Everybody understands this. It is understood on the stock exchange, and it is understood abroad." "To resist" the Duma means "sending the ship of state out into such a raging storm", etc., etc.

Lastly, to complete the picture, we will quote the following report published in the Cadet *Nasha Zhizn* of March 21 about the "bureaucratic spheres", concerning which this newspaper tries to give its readers as much information as possible.

"The increasing successes of the Cadet Party have attracted the attention of the higher spheres. At first they were somewhat alarmed by these successes, but now they are treating them quite calmly. Last Sunday a private conference of the highest representatives of the government was held to discuss this question, where this attitude became apparent, and, moreover, tactics, so to speak, were decided on. Incidentally, some very characteristic observations were made. Some held that a Cadet victory is positively to the government's advantage, for, if the Right elements were to win in the Duma elections, it would only play into the hands of the extreme groups who would use the composition of the Duma as a pretext for conducting propaganda against it, and would argue that it was deliberately picked to ensure a reactionary majority. The more representatives of the Cadet Party there are

in the Duma, the more the bulk of the nation will respect it as regards the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma, the majority held that there are no grounds for apprehending and 'surprises' in view of 'the restrictions that are imposed on the Duma', as one of those present candidly remarked. In view of this, the majority believed that the future members of the Duma should not be hindered, 'even if they do criticise individual members of the government'. A great many expect this, and the general opinion of the bureaucrats on this point can be summed up as follows: 'Let them talk'; 'there will be demands for proceedings to be taken; perhaps proceedings will be started, and so forth, and then they will get tired of it. What becomes of these cases, we shall see; meanwhile the members will have to concern themselves with questions affecting the country—and then everything will slip into its normal course. Even if the members take it into their heads to express no confidence in the government, that will not be serious either; after all, the Ministers are not appointed by the Duma'. It is reported that these arguments had a soothing effect even upon Durnovo and Witte, who were at first alarmed by the successes of the Cadet Party."

Thus you have the opinions, views and intentions of the persons directly interested and participating in these "affairs". On the one hand, there are prospects of a struggle. The Cadets promise to expel the government and convene a new Duma. If the government attempts to dissolve the Duma, there will be "a raging storm". The question therefore is: who will expel, or who will dissolve? On the other hand, there is the prospect of a deal. The Cadets think that a Shipov Ministry could avert a collision between the government and society. The government thinks: let them talk; let them even take one or two to court; after all, the Ministers are not appointed by the Duma. We have deliberately quoted only the opinions of those who are involved in the deal, and have quoted them entirely in their own words. We have added nothing. To have added anything would have weakened the impression created by the evidence of the witnesses. And their evidence gives us a vivid picture of what a Cadet Duma will be like.

Either a struggle, and in that case it will not be the Duma that will fight, but the revolutionary people. The Duma hopes to reap the fruits of victory. Or a deal, and then in any case it will be the people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, who will be deceived. As regards the terms of the deal, men who are really business-like say nothing until the time is ripe. Only hot-headed "radicals" sometimes blurt it

out. Let us say, for example, the Ministry of bureaucrats is replaced by a Ministry formed by that "honest bourgeois", Shipov; it will then be possible to strike a bargain that will be fair to both sides.... Then we shall come very, very near to achieving the Cadet ideal: first place for the monarchy; second place for a landlord and factory-owner Upper Chamber, with a Shipov Ministry that will harmonise with it, and third place for a "popular" Duma.

It goes without saying that this alternative, like every assumption concerning the social and political future, indicates only the main and fundamental lines of development. In real life, we often see mixed solutions; lines intercross—struggles alternate with deals, and struggles supplement the deals. This is exactly how Mr. Milyukov, in *Rech* of Friday, March 24, argues about the prospects that are already arising out of the Cadet victory, which is now evident. It is quite wrong, he says, to regard us as, and to declare that we are, revolutionaries. It all depends upon circumstances, gentlemen, says our "charming dialectician" for the edification of the powers that be; even Shipov was a "revolutionary" up to October 17. If you agree to a deal with us in a peaceful and friendly way, we shall agree to reforms and not revolution. If you do not agree, we shall probably have to exert some pressure from below upon you, release a little bit of revolution to frighten you, to weaken you by a blow struck by the revolutionary people, and then you will be more accommodating, and before you know where you are, we shall have got a better bargain.

Thus, the elements of the problem are as follows. A government is in power which the majority of the bourgeoisie avowedly do not trust, and which the workers and class-conscious peasants hate. The government has a tremendous force at its command. Its one weak spot is finance; and even that is not certain. It may still be able to raise a loan before the Duma assembles. Against the government, according to our assumption, stands the Cadet Duma. What does it want? Its bargaining price we know: the Cadet programme, i.e., a monarchy and an Upper Chamber, with a democratic Lower Chamber. What is its rock-bottom price? No one knows. Well, something in the nature of a Shipov Ministry, perhaps. True, Shipov is opposed to direct suffrage; but after

all, he is an honest man—we could probably come to terms with him, somehow. What are the Cadet Duma's methods of fighting? To refuse to vote money. An unreliable method, first, because the government may probably get the money without the Duma; and secondly, because according to the law, the Duma's right of control over finance is very, very slight. The other method is: "They will shoot." You remember how Katkov depicted the attitude of the liberals towards the government: yield, or "they" will shoot.[107] But in Katkov's time "they" were a handful of heroes who were unable to do anything except assassinate individuals. Today, "they" are the whole mass of the proletariat, which in October showed that it was capable of amazingly concerted country-wide action, and in December showed that it was capable of waging a stubborn armed struggle. And now "they also include the peasant masses, who have shown that they are capable of waging a revolutionary struggle, if in an unco-ordinated, unconscious and disunited fashion; but among them there are increasing numbers of those who, given appropriate conditions, given the slightest breath of free air (it is so difficult to escape the draught nowadays!), will be capable of leading millions. "They" are not only capable of assassinating Cabinet Ministers; "they" can completely sweep away the monarchy, and all traces of an Upper Chamber, and landlordism, and even the standing army. "They" are not only capable of doing this, "they" will inevitably do it, if the severity of the military dictatorship—the last refuge of the old order, last not in the light of theoretical calculations, but of acquired practical experience—is relaxed.

Such are the elements of the problem. How it will be solved cannot be predicted with absolute certainty. There can be no doubt about how we Social-Democrats *want* to solve it, and how all class-conscious workers and class-conscious peasants *will* solve it: by striving for the complete victory of the peasant uprising and for the winning of a really democratic republic. What *will* Cadet tactics be in these circumstances; what *should* they be, not according to what individuals want and think, but in virtue of the objective conditions of existence of a petty bourgeoisie in capitalist society fighting for its emancipation?

The Cadets' tactics will certainly and inevitably reduce themselves to manoeuvring between the autocracy and the victory of the revolutionary people, and to preventing either of the opponents from finally and completely crushing the other. If the autocracy succeeds in finally and completely crushing the revolution, the Cadets will become powerless, for their strength is derived from the strength of the revolution. If the revolutionary people, i.e., the proletariat, and the peasantry rising in revolt against the whole system of landlordism, crush the autocracy finally and completely, and hence, sweep away the monarchy with all its frills and trimmings, the Cadets will also be powerless, for all the virile elements will desert them either for the revolution or for the counter-revolution; and the party will be left with a couple of Kiesewetters sighing about the "dictatorship", and digging Latin dictionaries for the appropriate Latin terms. Briefly, the Cadets' tactics may be formulated as follows: *to ensure the support of the revolutionary people for the Cadet Party*. By "support" they evidently mean such action by the revolutionary people as will, first, be entirely subordinated to the interests of the Cadet Party and carried out according to its instructions, etc.; and secondly, not be too resolute and aggressive, and above all, not be too drastic. The revolutionary people must not be independent, that is the first point; and it must not achieve final victory, it must not crush its enemy, that is point two. These are the tactics that, on the whole, will inevitably be pursued by the entire Cadet Party and by any Cadet Duma. And, of course, these tactics will be backed, defended and justified with the aid of the rich ideological stock-in-trade of "scientific" investigations,* "philosophical" obscurities, political (or politicians') banalities, "literary-critical" squealing (*à la* Berdayev), etc., etc.

On the other hand, the revolutionary Social-Democrats cannot at the present time define their tactics by the proposition: support of the Cadet Party and a Cadet Duma. Such tactics would be wrong and utterly useless.

The retort to us will be, of course: What? Do you repudiate what is recognised in your programme and by all internation-

* Like those of Mr. Kiesewetter, who has discovered that "dictatorship" in Latin means reinforced security.

al Social-Democracy? Do you deny that the Social-Democratic proletariat must support the revolutionary and oppositionist bourgeois democrats? Why, that is anarchism, utopianism, rebelliousness, senseless revolutionism.

But wait a minute, gentlemen. Permit us first of all to remind you that this is not a general, or abstract, question of whether to support bourgeois democrats in general, but a concrete question of whether to support precisely the Cadet Party and precisely a Cadet Duma. We are not repudiating a general proposition; we are demanding a special analysis of the conditions for applying these general principles in a concrete case. Truth is never abstract, it is always concrete. This is forgotten by Plekhanov, for example, who, not for the first time, is proposing, and laying special emphasis on the tactics: "Reaction is trying to isolate us. We must try to isolate reaction." This proposition is correct, but it is ridiculously general: it applies equally to Russia of 1870, to Russia of 1906, to Russia generally, and to Africa, America, China and India. It tells us nothing and helps us in no way; for the whole problem is to define what reaction is, whom we must unite with, and how (or if not unite, then co-ordinate our activities with), in order to isolate reaction. Plekhanov is afraid to specify; but actually, in practice, his tactics, as we have already shown, amount to election agreements between the Social-Democrats and the Constitutional-Democrats, to Social-Democrats supporting the Cadets.

The Cadets are opposed to reaction? I turn again to *Molva*, No. 18 of March 22, which I have already quoted. The Cadets want to expel the government. That is splendid; that is opposition to reaction. The Cadets want to make peace with the autocratic government on the basis of a Shipov Ministry.* That's bad. That's one of the worst

* I may be told that this is a lie, that it was simply nonsense blurted out by the loquacious *Molva*. But excuse me, I think it is true. The loquacious *Molva* blurted out the truth—of course, the approximate, not literal, absolute truth. How can this dispute be settled? By reference to Cadet statements? But in politics I don't believe in words. Cadet deeds? Yes, I would accept that criterion. And whoever inquires into the political conduct of the Cadets as a whole, will have to admit that, what *Molva* has said is, in the main, true.

forms of reaction. You see, gentlemen: abstract propositions, bald phrases about reaction, do not carry you a single step forward.

The Cadets are bourgeois democrats? That is true. But then the peasant masses, who are out for the confiscation of all the landed estates—which the Cadets don't want—are also bourgeois democrats. Both the forms and the content of the political activities of these two sections of bourgeois democrats are different. Which of them is it more important for us to support at the present time? Can we, *generally speaking*, in the period of democratic revolution, support the former? Will it not mean betraying the latter? Or perhaps you will deny that Cadets who in politics are ready to resign themselves to a Shipov, in the agrarian question are capable of resigning themselves to a Kaufman? You see, gentlemen: abstract propositions, bald phrases about bourgeois democracy, do not carry you a single step forward.

But the Cadets are a united, strong and virile parliamentary party!

That is not true. The Cadets are neither a united, nor a strong, nor a virile, nor a parliamentary party. They are not united, for many of the people who voted for them are ca able of fighting to the very end and not merely of striking a bargain. They are not united, for their social basis is inherently contradictory: it ranges from the democratic petty bourgeoisie to the counter-revolutionary landlords. They are not strong, for as a party they refuse to, and cannot, take part in the intense and open civil war that flared up in Russia at the end of 1905, and very likely will flare up again with added force in the near future. They are not a virile party, for even if their ideal is achieved, not they but the "solid" bourgeois, the Shipovs and Guchkovs, will be the power in the society formed in conformity with this ideal. They are not a parliamentary party, for we have no parliament. We have no Constitution; we have only a constitutional autocracy, only constitutional illusions, which are particularly harmful in a period of intense civil war, and which the Cadets are spreading with particular zeal.

This brings us to the pivot of the question. The specific feature of the present state of the Russian revolution is

that objective conditions are pushing into the forefront a resolute, extra-parliamentary struggle for parliamentarism; and for that reason there can be nothing more harmful and dangerous at such a time than constitutional illusions and playing at parliamentarism. At such a time the parties of "parliamentary" opposition may be more dangerous and harmful than completely and avowedly reactionary parties: this proposition may sound paradoxical only to those who are totally incapable of thinking dialectically. Indeed, if the demand for parliamentarism has fully matured among the widest masses of the people, if it is based on the whole of the age-long social and economic evolution of the country, and if political evolution has brought us to the point of achieving it, what can be more dangerous and harmful than a fictitious realisation of this demand? Avowed anti-parliamentarism is harmless. Its doom is sealed. It is dead. The attempts to resurrect it are only having the very good effect of revolutionising the more backward strata of the population. A "constitutional autocracy", the creation and spreading of constitutional illusions, are becoming the only possible means of saving the autocracy. This is the only correct and wise policy the autocracy can pursue.

And I assert that at the present time the Cadets are doing more to help the autocracy to pursue this wise policy than *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. Take, for example, the controversy between the latter and the liberal press as to whether Russia is a constitutional monarchy. It is not, says *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. It is, say the Cadet newspapers in unison. In this controversy, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* is progressive and the Cadet newspapers are reactionary; for *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* is telling the truth, exposing illusions, *adusspreehen was ist*,* whereas the Cadets are telling a lie—a well-meaning benevolent, sincerely-conscientious, beautiful, graceful scientifically-smooth, Kiesewetter-varnished, drawing-room polite lie: but a lie nevertheless. And there is nothing more dangerous, nothing more harmful, in the present period of the struggle—considering the present objective conditions —than such a lie.

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* Speaks out what exists.—*Ed.*

A slight digression. Recently I delivered a lecture on political topics at the house of a very enlightened and extremely amiable Cadet. We had a discussion. Our host said: Imagine there is a wild beast before us, a lion; and we two are slaves who have been thrown to this lion. Would it be appropriate if we started an argument? Is it not our duty to unite to fight this common enemy, to "isolate reaction", as that most wise and most far-sighted of Social-Democrats, G. V. Plekhanov, so excellently puts it? The analogy is a good one, and I accept it, I replied. But what if one of the slaves advises securing weapons and attacking the lion, while the other, in the very midst of the struggle, notices a tab reading "Constitution" suspended from the lion's neck, and starts shouting: "I am opposed to violence, both from the Right and from the Left"; "I am a member of a parliamentary party and stand for constitutional methods." Under those circumstances would not the lion's cub who blurted out the lion's real intentions, be doing more to educate the masses and to develop their political and class consciousness, than the slave being mauled by the lion who was preaching faith in tabs?

The whole point is that, in using the stock argument that Social-Democrats must support the bourgeois democrats, people too often allow general abstract propositions to obscure the concrete situation, in which a resolute struggle for parliamentarism is maturing and in which the autocratic government is playing at parliamentarism as one of the means of combating parliamentarism. In such circumstances, when the final battle outside parliament still lies ahead, to advocate that the workers' party should support the party of parliamentary compromisers, the party of constitutional illusions, would be a really fatal mistake, if not a crime against the proletariat.

Let us imagine that we have in Russia a firmly established parliamentary system. This would mean that parliament had already become the main form of the domination of the ruling classes and forces, that it had become the principal arena of the conflict of social and political interests. There would be no revolutionary movement in the direct sense of the term; the economic and other conditions would not be engendering revolutionary outbreaks in the period we are

assuming. No declamations, however revolutionary, could of course "call forth" revolution in such circumstances. It would be utterly wrong for Social-Democrats in such conditions to renounce the parliamentary struggle. It would be the duty of the workers' party to take up parliamentarism most seriously; to take part in "Duma" elections and in the "Duma" itself; and to adjust all its tactics to the conditions favourable for the formation and successful functioning of a parliamentary Social-Democratic Party. In those circumstances, it would be our bounden duty to support the Cadet Party in parliament against all parties to the right of it. Then, too, it would be wrong categorically to object to election agreements with this party in joint elections, say, in gubernia election meetings (if the elections were indirect). More than that. It would be the duty of the Social-Democrats in parliament to support even the Shipovites against the real, brazen reactionaries. We would then say: reaction is trying to isolate us; we must try to isolate reaction.

Today, however, there is nothing like an established, universally-recognised and really parliamentary regime in Russia. The main form of domination of the ruling classes and social forces in Russia today is an avowedly non-parliamentary form; parliament is admittedly not the principal arena of the conflict of social and political interests. In these circumstances, it would be suicidal for the workers' party to support the party of parliamentary compromisers. On the other hand, support for the bourgeois democrats who are operating in a non-parliamentary manner, even if spontaneously, sporadically and unconsciously (like the peasant outbreaks) comes to the forefront, becomes a real, serious business, to which all else must be subordinated. In such social and political conditions, insurrection is a reality, while parliamentarism is a plaything, an unimportant field of struggle, a bait rather than a real concession. Hence the point is not that we repudiate or underrate the importance of parliamentarism; and general phrases about parliamentarism do not affect our position at all. The point is that in the particular conditions precisely of the present stage of the democratic revolution the bourgeois compromisers, the liberal monarchists, while not denying that Durnovo may simply send the Duma packing, or that the law may finally reduce

this Duma to a cipher, nevertheless declare that parliamentarism is a serious affair and that insurrection is utopia, anarchism, rebelliousness, impotent revolutionism, or whatever else the Kiesewetters, Milyukovs, Struves, Izgoyevs and other heroes of philistinism may call it.

Let us imagine that the Social-Democratic Party had taken part in the Duma elections, and that a number of Social-Democratic electors had been elected. Having plunged into this stupid election farce, we would have had to support the Cadets to prevent the Black Hundreds from winning. The Social-Democratic Party would have had to conclude an election agreement with the Cadets. With the aid of the latter, a certain number of Social-Democrats would have been elected to the Duma. We ask, would the game have been worth the candle? Would we have gained or lost by this? In the first place, we would not have been able to inform the masses about the terms and the character of our election agreements with the Cadets from the Social-Democratic point of view. The Cadet newspapers, in hundreds of thousands and millions of copies, would have spread bourgeois lies and bourgeois distortions of the class aims of the proletariat far and wide. Our leaflets and our little reservations in individual declarations would have been but a drop in the bucket. *In practice*, we would have turned out to be a dumb appendage of the Cadets. Secondly, by entering into an agreement we would undoubtedly, tacitly or openly and formally—it makes no difference—have undertaken before the proletariat a certain amount of responsibility for the Cadets; we would have vouched for them being better than all the others; we would have guaranteed that their Cadet Duma would help the people; we would have been responsible for the whole of their Cadet policy. Whether we would have been able to disclaim responsibility for any particular steps taken by the Cadets, by means of subsequent "*declarations*", is an open question; and besides, the declarations would have remained mere declarations, whereas the election agreement would have remained a *fact*. But have we any grounds whatever for even indirectly vouching for the Cadets before the proletariat and the masses of the peasantry? Have not the Cadets given us thousands of proofs of their affinity with those German Cadet professors, with those "Frankfurt phrase-mongers", who man-

aged to convert, not merely a Duma, but a National Constituent Assembly from an instrument for the development of the revolution into an instrument for toning down the revolution, for throttling (morally) the revolution? It would have been a mistake for the Social-Democrats to support the Cadet Party, and our Party has done the right thing in boycotting the Duma elections.

Even now it cannot be the task of the Social-Democrats to support the Cadet Party. We cannot support a Cadet Duma. In war, compromisers and deserters may be even more dangerous than the enemy. Shipov, at any rate, does not call himself a "democrat", and the "muzhik" who wants "people's freedom" will not follow his lead. But if the party of "people's freedom", after concluding a pact of mutual assistance with the Social-Democrats, were to strike a bargain with the autocracy to substitute a Ministry headed by this very Shipov for a constituent assembly, or were to confine its "activities" to making high-sounding speeches and proposing grandiloquent resolutions, we would find ourselves in a most false position.

To say that the task of the workers' party at the present time is to support the Cadets would be the same as saying that the function of steam is not to drive a ship's engine, but to keep up the possibility of sounding the ship's siren. If there is steam in the boiler, it will be possible to sound the siren. If the revolution is strong, the Cadets will also be able to sound their siren. It is quite easy to imitate the sound of a siren, and in the history of the struggle *for* parliamentarism bourgeois betrayers of people's freedom have many times imitated the sound of the siren and bamboozled simple-hearted folk who put their trust in various "first representative assemblies".

Our task is not to support the Cadet Duma, but to use the conflicts within this Duma, or connected with it, for choosing the right moment to attack the enemy, the right moment for an insurrection against the autocracy. What we have to do is to take account of how the political crisis in the Duma and around it is growing. As a means of testing public opinion and defining as correctly and precisely as possible the moment when "boiling point" is reached, this Duma campaign ought to be of enormous value to us,

but only as a symptom, not as the real field of struggle. It is not the Cadet Duma that we shall support; it is not with the Cadet Party that we must reckon, but with those elements of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and particularly of the peasantry, who have voted for the Cadets, and who will inevitably be disillusioned with them and get into a fighting mood. And the more decisive the victory of the Cadets in the Duma, the more rapidly will this take place. Our task is to use the respite that will be provided by an opposition Duma (and as the proletariat needs time to rally its forces properly, this respite will be very much to our advantage), to organise the workers, to expose constitutional illusions, and to prepare for a military offensive. Our task is to be at our post when the Duma farce develops into a new great political crisis; and our aim then will be, not support for the Cadets (at best they will be only a weak mouthpiece of the revolutionary people), but the overthrow of the autocratic government and the transfer of power to the revolutionary people. If the proletariat and the peasantry are victorious in their insurrection, the Cadet Duma will in a trice draw up a document declaring its association with the manifesto of the revolutionary government announcing the convocation of a national constituent assembly. If the insurrection is suppressed, the victor, exhausted by the struggle, may be compelled to yield a good half of his power to the Cadet Duma, which will sit down to the feast, as it were, and adopt a resolution deploring the "folly" of armed uprising at a time when a genuine constitutional system was supposed to be so possible and so near at hand.... Find the corpses, and you will always find the worms.

V

A SAMPLE OF CADET SMUGNESS

To appraise the victories of the Cadets and the present tasks of the workers' party, it is vastly important to analyse the preceding period of the Russian revolution and its relation to the present period. The draft resolutions on tactics, published by the Majority and the Minority respectively, lay down two lines, express two trends of thought, which arise

from two different appraisals of this period. We refer the reader to those resolutions. Here we propose to deal with an article published in the Cadet newspaper *Nasha Zhizn*. The article discusses the first Menshevik resolution, and provides ample material with which to test, supplement and explain what we have said above about the Cadet Duma. For this reason we quote the article in full (R. Blank, "Topical Questions in the Russian Social-Democratic Movement", *Nasha Zhizn*, No. 401, March 23, 1906):

"The resolution of the 'Menshevik' faction of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on party tactics, published the other day, is a very valuable document. It shows that the severe lessons of the first period of the Russian revolution have not been lost on that section of the Russian Social-Democrats which is *most sensitive* to the demands of real life, and is most thoroughly permeated with the principles of scientific socialism. The *object of the new tactics* formulated in this resolution *is to direct* the Russian Social-Democratic movement *along the path that is being followed by the whole of the international Social-Democratic movement* led by the great Social-Democratic Party of Germany. I say '*new tactics*', but this is not quite correct, because in many respects they represent a reversion to the old principles that were laid down by the founders of the Russian Social-Democratic movement at its very inception, which since then have been repeatedly elaborated by its theoreticians and publicists, and which were accepted by nearly all Russian Social-Democrats right up to the outbreak of the Russian revolution. But these principles were forgotten. The revolutionary whirlwind caught up the whole of our Social-Democratic movement like a feather and swept it forward at a dizzying speed. All the Social-Democratic and Marxist principles and ideas, elaborated with such zeal and devotion in the course of a quarter of a century, disappeared from view in an instant, as though they were merely a light dust on the surface. The very pillars of the Social-Democratic world-outlook were shaken to their very foundations, and even seemed to have been uprooted.

"But the whirlwind raged for a time and then subsided on the spot where it began; the Social-Democrats returned to their starting-point. The force of the whirlwind can be judged from the fact that it even carried away Parvus, as he himself admits; and those who know what a heavy-weight Parvus is, will understand what this means.... 'The revolutionary torrent swept us forward with irresistible force,' writes Parvus in his well-known pamphlet. 'We were merely the strings of a harp on which the revolutionary hurricane was playing,' he observes elsewhere in that pamphlet. This too, is absolutely true and explains why Social-Democratic music at that time was so unlike the symphonies of Beethoven, Bach or—Marx. All theories and principles, and even intellect and simple reason, retreat into the background, almost vanish behind the scenes, when the mighty elements appear upon the stage in all their fury.

"But now the turn of intellect and reason has come again, and it is possible to resume deliberate, methodical and systematic activities. Obviously, the first thing to do is to take precautions to prevent a repetition of what occurred in the first period of the Russian revolution, in its Sturm- und Drang-Zeit, that is, measures against the destructive effects of revolutionary torrents and hurricanes. The only effective precaution against this is to enlarge and strengthen the organisation. It is quite natural, therefore, that the 'Menshevik' faction should push this task into the forefront and formulate it on broad lines, by including in its programme economic organisations as well, and by recognising the necessity of utilising all legal possibilities. The resolution is free from romantic contempt for 'legality' and from aristocratic disdain for 'economics'.

'The resolution expresses an equally sober attitude towards the question of the relations between the workers and the bourgeois democrats, it fully recognises the need for mutual assistance and the danger of the proletariat entering single-handed into a decisive struggle against the armed reaction. Particularly noteworthy is the attitude the resolution adopts towards the question of armed uprising. It recognises the necessity of 'avoiding such actions as will bring the proletariat into armed conflict with the government, in conditions that will doom it to remain isolated in this struggle'.

"Only in this way can we in this country avoid a repetition of the June days of 1848 in Paris and make it possible to co-ordinate, if not to coalesce, the struggle of the workers and the bourgeois democrats for unless this is done the movement cannot be successful. The bourgeois democrats who according to Karl Marx, 'are of supreme importance in every advanced revolution', are of no less importance in the Russian revolution. If the Russian Social-Democratic Party cannot, or has no desire to, make them its open allies, it must at all events take care not to push them into the opposite camp, into the camp of reaction and counter-revolution. This the revolutionary Social-Democrats must not do, have no right to do; they are *in duty bound* to prevent this by every means in their power, for the sake of the cause of freedom, and for the sake of Social-Democracy itself. If the bourgeois democrats are opposed to insurrection at the present time, then it is useless talking about insurrection. This fact must be reckoned with, even if the bourgeoisie is prompted only by its characteristic flabbiness, feebleness and cowardice. Such factors must also be reckoned with. Did not the leader of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats himself say:

"'*In der Gewalt sind sie uns stets über!*'—'As far as brute force is concerned, they, i.e., the reactionaries, will always be superior to us!'

"Perhaps it is wrong to say 'always', but as far as the 'present' is concerned, one can share the opinion of Liebknecht, and of German Social-Democracy which unanimously agrees with him, without being a coward or even merely 'flabby'.... Evidently, the resolution of the 'Mensheviks' is based on this point of view, or at all events on something like it. And on a number of other points, too, it is permeated with the same spirit of political realism that distinguishes the German Social-Democrats, and to which their unexampled successes are due.

"Will the Russian Social-Democratic Party as a whole subscribe to the resolution of the 'Mensheviks'? This is something on which much in our revolutionary movement, especially in our Social-Democratic movement—perhaps its very fate for many years to come—will depend. In Russia, as was also the case in other countries, Social-Democracy can take root and become strong only when it penetrates deeply into the democratic masses. Should it, however, limit itself to cultivating the upper, even if the most fruitful, layer of democrats, a new hurricane may easily uproot it from Russian soil in the same way as Social-Democracy was uprooted in France in 1848, or as the Social-Democratic movement known as the 'Chartist movement' was uprooted in England in the 1840s."

Such is Mr. Blank's article. The most typical "Cadet" arguments, the origins of which are familiar to everyone who has carefully read Mr. Struve's *Osvobozhdeniye* and the later legal Cadet publications, are so arranged here that the appraisal of present-day political tactics is based on an appraisal of the past period of the Russian revolution. First of all, therefore, we will examine this *appraisal of the past*, to see whether it is right or wrong.

Mr. Blank compares two periods of the Russian revolution. The first period covers approximately October-December 1905. This is the period of the revolutionary whirlwind. The second is the present period, which, of course, we have a right to call the period of Cadet victories in the Duma elections, or, perhaps, if we take the risk of running ahead somewhat, the period of a Cadet Duma.

Regarding this period Mr. Blank says that the turn of intellect and reason has come again, and it is possible to resume deliberate, methodical and systematic activities. On the other hand, Mr. Blank describes the first period as a period in which theory diverged from practice. All Social-Democratic principles and ideas vanished; the tactics that had always been advocated by the founders of Russian Social-Democracy were forgotten, and even the very pillars of the Social-Democratic world-outlook were uprooted.

Mr. Blank's main assertion is merely a statement of fact: the whole theory of Marxism diverged from "practice" in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind.

Is that true? What is the first and main "pillar" of Marxist theory? It is that the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, and therefore, the advanced class in every revolution, is the proletariat. The question is then;

has the revolutionary whirlwind uprooted this "pillar" of the Social-Democratic world-outlook? On the contrary, the whirlwind has vindicated it in the most brilliant fashion. It was the proletariat that was the main and, at first, almost the only *fighter* in this period. For the first time in history, perhaps, a bourgeois revolution was marked by the employment of a purely proletarian weapon, i.e., the mass political strike, on a scale unprecedented even in the most developed capitalist countries. The proletariat marched into battle, which was definitely revolutionary, at a time when the Struves and Blanks were calling for participation in the Bulygin Duma, and when the Cadet professors were exhorting the students to keep to their studies. With its proletarian weapon, the proletariat won for Russia the whole of that so-called "constitution", which since then has only been mutilated, chopped about and curtailed. The proletariat in October 1905 employed those tactics of struggle that *six months before* had been laid down in the resolution of the *Bolshevik* Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which had strongly emphasised the necessity of combining the mass political strike with insurrection; and it is this combination that characterises the *whole* period of the "revolutionary whirlwind", the whole of the last quarter of 1905. Thus our ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie has distorted reality in the most brazen and glaring manner. He has not cited a single *fact* to prove that Marxist theory diverged from practical experience in the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind"; he has tried to obscure the main feature of this whirlwind, which most brilliantly confirmed the correctness of "all Social-Democratic principles and ideas", of "all the pillars of the Social-Democratic world-outlook".

DIGRESSION

A POPULAR TALK WITH CADET PUBLICISTS AND LEARNED PROFESSORS

But what was the real reason that induced Mr. Blank to come to the monstrously wrong conclusion that all Marxist principles and ideas vanished in the period of the "whirlwind"? It is very interesting to examine this circumstance;

it still further exposes the real nature of philistinism in politics.

What is it that mainly distinguished the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind" from the present "Cadet" period, as regards the various forms of political activity and the various methods by which the people make history? First and mainly, it is that during the period of the "whirlwind" certain special methods of making history were employed which are foreign to other periods of political life. The following were the most important of these methods: (1) *the "seizure" by the people of political liberty*—its exercise without any rights and laws, and without any limitations (freedom of assembly, even if only in the universities, freedom of the press, freedom of association, the holding of congresses, etc.); (2) the creation of new organs of *revolutionary authority*—Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Railwaymen's and Peasants' Deputies, new rural and urban authorities, and so on, and so forth. These bodies were set up exclusively by the *revolutionary* sections of the people; they were formed irrespective of all laws and regulations, entirely in a revolutionary way, as a product of the native genius of the people, as a manifestation of the independent activity of the people which had rid itself, or was ridding itself, of its old police fetters. Lastly, they were indeed organs of *authority*, for all their rudimentary, spontaneous, amorphous and diffuse character, in composition and in activity. They acted as a government when, for example, they seized printing plants (in St. Petersburg) and arrested police officials who were preventing the revolutionary people from exercising their rights (such cases also occurred in St. Petersburg, where the new organ of authority concerned was weakest, and where the old government was strongest). They acted as a government when they appealed to the whole people to withhold money from the old government. They confiscated the old government's funds (the railway strike committees in the South) and used them for the needs of the new, people's government. Yes, these were undoubtedly the embryos of a new, people's, or, if you will, revolutionary government. In their social and political character, they were the rudiments of the dictatorship of the revolutionary elements of the people. This surprises you, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter! You do not see here the "reinforced

security", which for the bourgeois is tantamount to dictatorship? We have already told you that you have not the faintest notion of the scientific concept "dictatorship". We will explain it to you in a moment; but first we will deal with the *third* "method" of activity in the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind"; *the use by the people of force against those who used force against the people.*

The organs of authority that we have described represented a dictatorship in embryo, for they recognised *no* other authority, *no* law and *no* standards, no matter by whom established. Authority—unlimited, outside the law, and based on force in the most direct sense of the word—is dictatorship. But the force on which this new authority was based, and sought to base itself was not the force of bayonets usurped by a handful of militarists, not the power of the "police force", not the power of money nor the power of any previously established institutions. It was nothing of the kind. The new organs of authority possessed neither arms, nor money, nor old institutions. Their power—can you imagine it, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter?—had nothing in common with the old instruments of power, nothing in common with "reinforced security", if we do not have in mind the reinforced security established to protect the people from the tyranny of the police and of the other organs of the old regime.

What was this power based on, then? It was based on the mass of the people. This is the *main* feature that distinguished this new authority from all the preceding organs of the old regime. The latter were the instruments of the rule of the minority over the people, over the masses of workers and peasants. The former was an instrument of the rule of the people, of the workers and peasants, over the minority, over a handful of police bullies, over a handful of privileged nobles and government officials. Such is the difference between dictatorship *over* the people and dictatorship *of* the revolutionary people: mark this well, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter! As the dictatorship of a minority, the old regime was able to maintain itself solely with the aid of police devices, solely by preventing the masses of the people from taking part in the government and from supervising the government. The old authority persistently distrusted the masses, feared the light, maintained itself by deception. As the dictatorship of the over-

whelming majority, the new authority maintained itself and could maintain itself solely because it enjoyed the confidence of the vast masses, solely because it, in the freest, widest and most resolute manner, enlisted all the masses in the task of government. It concealed nothing it had no secrets, no regulations, no formalities. It said, in effect: Are you a working man? Do you want to fight to rid Russia of the gang of police bullies? You are our comrade. Elect your deputy. Elect him at once, immediately, whichever way you think best. We will willingly and gladly accept him as a full member of our Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Peasant Committee, Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, and so forth. It was an authority open to all, it carried out all its functions before the eyes of the masses, was accessible to the masses, sprang directly from the masses, and was a direct and immediate instrument of the popular masses, of their will. Such was the new authority, or, to be exact, its embryo, for the victory of the old authority trampled down the shoots of this young plant very soon.

Perhaps, Mr. Blank or Mr. Kiesewetter, you will ask: Why "dictatorship", why "force"? Is it necessary for a vast mass to use force against a handful? Can tens and hundreds of millions be dictators over a thousand or ten thousand?

This question is usually put by people who for the first time hear the term dictatorship used in what to them is a new connotation. People are accustomed to see only a police authority and only a police dictatorship. The idea that there can be government without any police, or that dictatorship need not be a police dictatorship, seems strange to them. You say that millions need not resort to force against thousands? You are mistaken; and your mistake arises from the fact that you do not regard a phenomenon in its process of development. You forget that the new authority does not drop from the skies, but grows up, arises parallel with, and in opposition to, the old authority, in struggle against it. Unless force is used against tyrants armed with the weapons and instruments of power, the people cannot be liberated from tyrants.

Here is a very simple analogy, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter, which will help you to grasp this idea, which seems so remote and "fantastic" to the Cadet mind. Let us suppose that Avramov is injuring and torturing Spiridonova. On

Spiridonova's side, let us say, are tens and hundreds of unarmed people. On Avramov's side there is a handful of Cossacks. What would the people do if Spiridonova were being tortured, not in a dungeon, but in public? They would resort to force against Avramov and his body-guard. Perhaps they would sacrifice a few of their comrades, shot down by Avramov; but in the long run, they would forcibly disarm Avramov and his Cossacks, and in all probability would kill on the spot some of these brutes in human form; and they would clap the rest into some gaol to prevent them from committing any more outrages and to bring them to judgement before the people.

So you see, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter, when Avramov and his Cossacks torture Spiridonova, that is military and police dictatorship over the people. When a revolutionary people (that is to say, a people capable of fighting the tyrants, and not only of exhorting, admonishing, regretting, condemning, whining and whimpering; not a philistine narrow-minded, but a revolutionary people) resorts to force against Avramov and the Avramovs, that is a *dictatorship* of the revolutionary people. It is a dictatorship, because it is the authority of the people over Avramov, an authority unrestricted by any laws (the philistine, perhaps, would be opposed to rescuing Spiridonova from Avramov by force, thinking it to be against the "law". They would no doubt ask: Is there a "law" that permits the killing of Avramov? Have not some philistine ideologists built up a theory of non-resistance to evil?).* The scientific term "dictatorship" means nothing more nor less than authority untrammeled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force. The term "dictatorship" *has no other meaning but this*—mark this well, Cadet gentlemen. Again, in the analogy we have drawn, we see the dictatorship of the people, because the people, the mass of the population, unorganised, "casually" assembled at the given spot, itself appears on the scene, exercises justice and metes out punishment, exercises power

* Mr. Berdayev! Messrs. editors of *Polyarnaya Zvezda* or *Svoboda i Kultura*![108] Here is another subject for your lengthy lamentations—I mean, for lengthy articles against the "hooliganism" of revolutionaries. Fancy, they dare to call Tolstoi a philistine!! "Quelle horreur!"—as the lady with many good points[109] used to say.

and creates a new, revolutionary law. Lastly, it is the dictatorship of the *revolutionary* people. Why only of the revolutionary, and not of the whole people? Because among the whole people, constantly suffering, and most cruelly, from the brutalities of the Avramovs, there are some who are physically cowed and terrified; there are some who are morally degraded by the "resist not evil" theory, for example, or simply degraded not by theory, but by prejudice, habit, routine; and there are indifferent people, whom we call philistines, petty-bourgeois people who are more inclined to hold aloof from intense struggle, to pass by or even to hide themselves (for fear of getting mixed up in the fight and getting hurt). That is why the dictatorship is exercised, not by the whole people, but by the revolutionary people who, however, do not shun the whole people, who explain to all the people the motives of their actions in all their details, and who willingly enlist the *whole* people not only in "administering" the state, but in governing it too, and indeed in organising the state.

Thus our simple analogy contains *all the elements* of the scientific concept "dictatorship of the revolutionary people", and also of the concept "military and police dictatorship". We can now pass from this simple analogy, which even a learned Cadet professor can grasp, to the more complex developments of social life.

Revolution, in the strict and direct sense of the word, is a period in the life of a people when the anger accumulated during centuries of Avramov brutalities breaks forth into *actions*, not merely into words; and into the actions of *millions of the people*, not merely of individuals. The people awaken and rise up to rid themselves of the Avramovs. The people rescue the countless numbers of Spiridonovas in Russian life from the Avramovs, use force against the Avramovs, and establish their authority over the Avramovs. Of course, this does not take place so easily, and not "all at once", as it did in our analogy, simplified for the benefit of Professor Kiesewetter. This struggle of the people against the Avramovs, a struggle in the strict and direct sense of the word, this act of the people in throwing the Avramovs off their backs, stretches over months and years of "revolutionary whirlwind". This act of the people in throwing the Avramovs off their backs is the real content of what is called the great

Russian revolution. This act, regarded from the standpoint of the methods of making history, takes place in the forms we have just described in discussing the revolutionary whirlwind, namely: the people seize political freedom, that is, the freedom which the Avramovs had prevented them from exercising; the people create a new, revolutionary authority, authority over the Avramovs, over the tyrants of the old police regime; the people use force against the Avramovs in order to remove, disarm and make harmless these wild dogs, all the Avramovs, Durnovos, Dubasovs, Mins, etc., etc.

Is it good that the people should apply such unlawful, irregular, unmethodical and unsystematic methods of struggle as seizing their liberty and creating a new, formally unrecognised and revolutionary authority, that it should use force against the oppressors of the people? Yes, it is very good. It is the supreme manifestation of the people's struggle for liberty. It marks that great period when the dreams of liberty cherished by the best men and women of Russia *come true*, when liberty becomes the cause of the vast masses of the people, and not merely of individual heroes. It is as good as the rescue by the crowd (in our analogy) of Spiridonova from Avramov, and the forcible disarming of Avramov and making him harmless.

But this brings us to the very pivot of the Cadets' hidden thoughts and apprehensions. A Cadet is the ideologist of the philistines precisely because he looks at politics, at the liberation of the whole people, at revolution, through the spectacles of that same philistine who, in our analogy of the torture of Spiridonova by Avramov, would try to restrain the crowd, advise it not to break the law, not to hasten to rescue the victim from the hands of the torturer, since he is acting in the name of the law. In our analogy, of course, that philistine would be morally a monster; but in social life as a whole, we repeat, the philistine monster is not an individual, but a social phenomenon, conditioned, perhaps, by the deep-rooted prejudices of the bourgeois-philistine theory of law.

Why does Mr. Blank hold it as self-evident that all Marxist principles were forgotten during the period of "whirlwind"? Because he distorts Marxism into Brentanoism, and thinks that such "principles" as the seizure of liberty, the establishment of revolutionary authority and the use of

force by the people are not Marxist. This idea runs through the whole of Mr. Blank's article; and not only Mr. Blank's, but the articles of all the Cadets, and of all the writers in the liberal and radical camp who, today, are praising Plekhanov for his love of the Cadets; all of them, right up to the Bernsteinians of *Bez Zaglavia*,[110] the Prokopoviches, Kuskovas and *tutti quanti*.

Let us see how this opinion arose and why it was bound to arise.

It arose directly out of the Bernsteinian or, to put it more broadly, the opportunist concepts of the West-European Social-Democrats. The fallacies of these concepts, which the "orthodox" Marxists in Western Europe have been systematically exposing all along the line, are now being smuggled into Russia "on the sly", in a different dressing and on a different occasion. The Bernsteinians accepted and accept Marxism *minus* its directly revolutionary aspect. They do not regard the parliamentary struggle as one of the weapons particularly suitable for definite historical periods, but as the main and almost the sole form of struggle making "force", "seizure", "dictatorship", unnecessary. It is this vulgar philistine distortion of Marxism that the Blanks and other liberal eulogisers of Plekhanov are now smuggling into Russia. They have become so accustomed to this distortion that they do not even think it necessary to prove that Marxist principles and ideas were forgotten in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind.

Why was such an opinion bound to arise? Because it accords very well with the class standing and interests of the petty bourgeoisie. The ideologists of "purified" bourgeois society agree with *all* the methods used by the Social-Democrats in their struggle *except those to which the revolutionary people resort in the period of a "whirlwind"*, and which revolutionary Social-Democrats approve of and help in using. The interests of the bourgeoisie demand that the proletariat should take part in the struggle against the autocracy, but only in a way that does not lead to the supremacy of the proletariat and the peasantry, and does not completely eliminate the old, feudal-autocratic and police organs of state power. The bourgeoisie wants to preserve these organs, only establishing its direct control over them. It needs them *against the*

proletariat, whose struggle would be too greatly facilitated if they were completely abolished. That is why the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class require both a monarchy and an Upper Chamber, and the prevention of the dictatorship of the revolutionary people. Fight the autocracy, the bourgeoisie says to the proletariat, but do not touch the old organs of state power, for I need them. Fight in a "parliamentary" way, that is, within the limits that we will prescribe by agreement with the monarchy. Fight with the aid of organisations, only not organisations like general strike committees, Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' Deputies, etc., but organisations that are recognised, restricted and made safe for capital by a law that we shall pass by agreement with the monarchy. It is clear, therefore, why the bourgeoisie speaks with disdain, contempt, anger and hatred about the period of the "whirlwind",* and with rapture, ecstasy and boundless philistine infatuation for reaction, about the period of constitutionalism as protected by Dubasov. It is once again that constant, invariable quality of the Cadets: seeking to lean on the people and at the same time dreading their revolutionary initiative.

It is also clear why the bourgeoisie is in such mortal fear of a repetition of the whirlwind, why it ignores and obscures the elements of the new revolutionary crisis, why it fosters constitutional illusions and spreads them among the people.

Now we have fully explained why Mr. Blank and his like declare that in the period of the "whirlwind" all Marxist principles and ideas were forgotten. Like all philistines, Mr. Blank accepts Marxism *minus* its revolutionary aspect;

* Compare, for example, the views of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, No. 1, 1906, on the activities of the Peasant Union—which is nothing less than a denunciation to Dubasov of the revolutionary democrats, of their Pugachev aspirations,[111] of their approval of the idea of seizing the land and of establishing a new government, and so forth. Even the Left Cadets of *Bez Zaglavia* (No. 10) admonished *Russkiye Vedomosti*, and rightly put it on a par with *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, for publishing such views. Unfortunately, the Left Cadets admonish *Russkiye Vedomosti* in a tone that sounds like an apology. *Bez Zaglavia* defends the Peasant Union, but does not accuse the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Whether this not altogether decent method of controversy with *Russkiye Vedomosti* is due to its "fear of the Jews", or to the fact that Mr. Blank writes for that paper, I cannot say. The Left Cadets are, after all, Cadets.

he accepts Social-Democratic methods of struggle *minus* the most revolutionary and directly revolutionary methods.

Mr. Blank's attitude towards the period of "whirlwind" is extremely characteristic as an illustration of bourgeois failure to understand proletarian movements, bourgeois horror of acute and resolute struggles, bourgeois hatred for every manifestation of a radical and directly revolutionary method of solving social historical problems, a method that breaks up old institutions. Mr. Blank has betrayed himself and all his bourgeois narrow-mindedness. Somewhere he heard and read that during the period of whirlwind the Social-Democrats made "mistakes"—and he has hastened to conclude, and to declare with self-assurance, in tones that brook no contradiction and require no proof, that all the "principles" of Marxism (of which he has not the least notion!) were forgotten. As for these "mistakes", we will remark: Has there been a period in the development of the working-class movement, in the development of Social-Democracy, when no mistakes were made, when there was no deviation to the right or the left? Is not the history of the parliamentary period of the struggle waged by the German Social-Democratic Party—the period which all narrow-minded bourgeois all over the world regard as the utmost limit—filled with such mistakes? If Mr. Blank were not an utter ignoramus on problems of socialism, he would easily call to mind Mülberger, Dühring, the *Dampfersubvention*[112] question, the "Youth",[113] the Bernsteiniad[114] and many, many more. But Mr. Blank is not interested in studying the actual course of development of the Social-Democratic movement; all he wants is to minimise the scope of the proletarian struggle in order to exalt the bourgeois paltriness of his Cadet Party.

Indeed, if we examine the question in the light of the deviations that the Social-Democratic movement has made from its ordinary, "normal" course, we shall see that even in this respect there was *more* and not less solidarity and ideological integrity among the Social-Democrats in the period of "revolutionary whirlwind" than there was before it. The tactics adopted in the period of "whirlwind" did not further estrange the two wings of the Social-Democratic Party, but brought them closer together. Former disagreements gave way to unity of opinion on the question of armed uprising.

Social-Democrats of both factions were active in the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, these peculiar instruments of embryonic revolutionary authority; they drew the soldiers and peasants into these Soviets, they issued revolutionary manifestos jointly with the petty-bourgeois revolutionary parties. Old controversies of the pre-revolutionary period gave way to unanimity on practical questions. The upsurge of the revolutionary tide pushed aside disagreements, compelling Social-Democrats to adopt militant tactics; it swept the question of the Duma into the background and put the question of insurrection on the order of the day; and it brought closer together the Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats in carrying out immediate tasks. In *Severny Golos*[115] the Mensheviks, jointly with the Bolsheviks, called for a general strike and insurrection; and they called upon the workers to continue this struggle until they had captured power. The revolutionary situation itself suggested practical slogans. There were arguments only over matters of detail in the appraisal of events: for example, *Nachalo*[116] regarded the Soviets of Workers' Deputies as organs of revolutionary local self-government, while *Novaya Zhizn* regarded them as embryonic organs of revolutionary state power that united the proletariat with the revolutionary democrats.

Nachalo inclined towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. *Novaya Zhizn* advocated the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But have not disagreements of this kind been observed at every stage of development of every socialist party in Europe?

Mr. Blank's misrepresentation of the facts and his gross distortion of recent history are nothing more nor less than a sample of the smug bourgeois banality, for which periods of revolutionary whirlwind seem folly ("all principles are forgotten", "even intellect and reason almost vanish"). while periods of suppression of revolution and philistine "progress" (protected by the Dubasovs) seem to be periods of reasonable, deliberate and methodical activity. This comparative appraisal of two periods (the period of "whirlwind" and the Cadet period) runs through the whole of Mr. Blank's article. When human history rushes forward with the speed of a locomotive, he calls it a "whirlwind", a "torrent", the "vanishing" of all "principles and ideas". When history plods along at

dray-horse pace, the very symbol of it becomes reason and method. When the masses of the people themselves, with all their virgin primitiveness and simple, rough determination begin to make history, begin to put "principles and theories" immediately and directly into practice, the bourgeois is terrified and howls that "intellect is retreating into the background" (is not the contrary the case, heroes of philistinism? Is it not the intellect of the masses, and not of individuals, that invades the sphere of history at such moments? Does not mass intellect at such a time become a virile, effective, and not an armchair force?). When the direct movement of the masses has been crushed by shootings, repressive measures, floggings, unemployment and starvation, when all the bugs of professorial science financed by Dubasov come creeping out of their crevices and begin to administer affairs *on behalf of* the people, *in the name of the masses*, selling and betraying their interests to a privileged few—then the knights of philistinism think that an era of calm and peaceful progress has set in and that "the turn of intellect and reason has come". The bourgeois always and everywhere remains true to himself: whether you take *Polyarnaya Zvezda* or *Nasha Zhizn*, whether you read Struve or Blank, you will always find this same narrow-minded, professorially pedantic and bureaucratically lifeless appraisal of periods of revolution and periods of reform. The former are periods of madness, *tolle Jahre*, the disappearance of intellect and reason. The latter are periods of "deliberate and systematic" activities.

Do not misinterpret what I am saying. I am not arguing that the Blanks prefer some periods to others. It is not a matter of preference; our subjective preferences do not determine the changes in historical periods. The thing is that *in analysing the characteristics* of this or that period (quite apart from our preferences or sympathies), the Blanks shamelessly *distort the truth*. The thing is that it is just the revolutionary periods which are distinguished by wider, richer, more deliberate, more methodical, more systematic, more courageous and more vivid making of history than periods of philistine, Cadet, reformist progress. But the Blanks turn the truth inside out! They palm off paltriness as magnificent making of history. They regard the inactivity of the oppressed or downtrodden masses as the triumph of "system" in the work of

bureaucrats and bourgeois. They shout about the disappearance of intellect and reason when, instead of the picking of draft laws to pieces by petty bureaucrats and liberal *penny-a-liner** journalists, there begins a period of direct political activity of the "common people", who simply set to work without more ado to smash all the instruments for oppressing the people, seize power and take what was regarded as belonging to all kinds of robbers of the people—in short, when the intellect and reason of millions of downtrodden people awaken not only to read books, but for action, vital human action, to make history.

Look how majestically this Cadet knight argues: "The whirlwind raged for a time and then subsided *on the spot where it began*." Why, the fact that the liberal philistines are still alive, that they have not been gobbled up by the Dubasovs, *is due entirely to this whirlwind*. "On the spot where it began," you say? You say that Russia in the spring of 1906 is on the same spot as she was in September 1905?

Yes, throughout the "Cadet" period the Dubasovs and Durnovos have been dragging, and *will drag Russia* "deliberately, methodically and systematically" back, in order to return her to September 1905; *but they haven't the strength to do so*, because during the whirlwind the proletarians, the railwaymen, the peasants, the mutinous soldiers, have driven all Russia forward with the speed of a locomotive.

Had this unreasoning whirlwind really subsided, the Cadet Duma would have been doomed to engage only in tinkering with wash-basins.

But Mr. Blank has no inkling that the question whether the whirlwind has subsided is a separate and purely scientific question, the answer to which will settle a number of problems of tactics, and an answer to which is essential if we want to understand at all clearly the problems of present-day tactics. Mr. Blank has not based his conclusion that the conditions for a movement in the form of a whirlwind are lacking at present on the examination of facts and arguments (if it were well-founded, such a conclusion would really be of fundamental importance in determining tactics, for, we repeat, these tactics cannot be determined simply by

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

one's "preference" for one course or another). No, he is simply and frankly expressing his profound (and profoundly short-sighted) conviction that it cannot be otherwise. Strictly speaking, Mr. Blank regards the "whirlwind" just as it is regarded by the Wittes, Durnovos, Bülows and other German bureaucrats, who long ago pronounced the year 1848 to have been a "mad year". Mr. Blank's phrase "the whirlwind subsided" expresses, not a scientific conviction, but philistine stupidity, which regards every whirlwind, and whirlwinds in general, as the "disappearing of intellect and reason".

"The Social-Democrats have returned to their starting-point," Mr. Blank assures us. The Mensheviks' new tactics direct the Russian Social-Democratic movement along the path that is being followed by the entire international Social-Democratic movement.

You see that for some reason Mr. Blank declares the parliamentary path to be the "starting-point" (although it could not have been the starting-point for Social-Democracy in Russia). Mr. Blank regards the parliamentary path as what may be called the normal, the main and even the sole, all-embracing and exclusive path for international Social-Democracy. He has no inkling that, in this respect, he is repeating in its entirety the bourgeois distortion of Social-Democracy that predominates in the German liberal press, and which at one time was borrowed by the followers of Bernstein. The liberal bourgeois imagines that one of the methods of fighting is the sole method. This fully expresses the Brentano conception of the working-class movement and the class struggle. Mr. Blank has no inkling that the Social-Democrats in Europe took the parliamentary path, and were able to do so, only when objective conditions had removed the question of carrying the bourgeois revolution to its complete fulfilment from the agenda of history, only when the parliamentary system had really become the principal form of bourgeois rule and the principal arena of the social struggle. He does not even stop to think whether there is a parliament and a parliamentary system in Russia, but declares in a peremptory manner: the Social-Democrats have returned to their starting-point. The bourgeois mind can conceive only of incomplete democratic revolutions (for at bottom

the *interests* of the bourgeoisie require incomplete revolutions). The bourgeois mind shuns all non-parliamentary methods of struggle, all open mass actions, any revolution in the direct sense of the term. The bourgeois instinctively hastens to declare, proclaim and accept all sham parliamentarism as real parliamentarism in order to put a stop to the "dizzying whirlwind" (which may be dangerous not only for the heads of many weak-headed bourgeois, but also for their pockets). That is why the Cadet gentlemen are totally incapable even of understanding the scientific and really important question whether the parliamentary method of struggle can be recognised as having any real meaning for Russia, and whether the movement in the form of a "whirlwind" has spent itself. And the material, class background of this incomprehension is quite clear: let the workers support a Cadet Duma by a peaceful strike or some other action, but they must not think of waging an earnest and resolute war of extermination, they must not think of rising in revolt against the autocracy and the monarchy.

"Now the turn of intellect and reason has come again," says Mr. Blank, going into raptures over the period of Dubasov's victories. Do you know what, Mr. Blank? There has been no period in the history of Russia to which the expression "the turn of intellect and reason has come again" could be better applied than the period of Alexander III! That is really a fact. It was in that period that the old Russian Narodism ceased to be merely the dreamy contemplation of the future and made its rich contribution to Russian social thought by its researches into the economic life of Russia. It was in that period that Russian revolutionary thought worked hardest, and laid the groundwork for the Social-Democratic world-outlook. Yes, we revolutionaries are far from denying the revolutionary role of reactionary periods. We know that the form of the social movement changes, that periods of direct, constructive political activity by the masses of the people give way in history to periods of outward calm, when the masses, downtrodden and crushed by back-breaking toil and want, are silent or dormant (appear to be dormant), when modes of production become revolutionised with particular rapidity, when the intellect of the foremost representatives of human thought is summing up the past and devising

new systems and new methods of research. After all, in Europe, too, the period after the suppression of the revolution of 1848 was distinguished by unprecedented economic progress and by the labours of the intellect that created, say, Marx's *Capital*. In short, "the turn of intellect and reason" comes sometimes in periods of human history just as a period of imprisonment in the life of a political leader gives him an opportunity to engage in scientific study and work.

But the trouble with our bourgeois philistine is that he does not realise that his remarks have, so to speak, a prison or Dubasov ring. He does not notice the fundamental question: Is the Russian revolution crushed, or is it on the eve of a revival? Has the form of the social movement changed from a revolutionary form to one adjusted to the Dubasov regime? Have the forces making for a "whirlwind" spent themselves, or not? The bourgeois intellect does not trouble itself with these questions because, in general, it regards revolution as an unreasoning whirlwind, and reform as the return of intellect and reason.

Examine his most edifying argument about organisation. "The first thing" intellect and reason must do, he informs us, "is to take precautions to prevent a repetition of what occurred in the first period of the Russian revolution, in its *Sturm- und Drang-Zeit*, that is, measures against the destructive effects of revolutionary torrents and hurricanes. The only effective precaution against this is to enlarge and strengthen the organisation."

You see that, as the Cadet conceives it, the period of hurricane destroyed organisations and organisation itself (see *Novoye Vremya*, I mean *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, containing Struve's articles against anarchy, spontaneity, lack of firm authority during revolutions, etc., etc.); whereas the period of intellect and reason protected by Dubasov is a period for building up organisations. Revolution is evil; it destroys, it is a hurricane, a dizzying whirlwind. Reaction is good; it creates, it is a favourable wind and a time for deliberate, methodical, and systematic activity.

So once again the philosopher of the Cadet Party slanders the revolution and betrays all his infatuation with bourgeois-restricted forms and conditions of the movement. The hurricane destroyed organisations! What a glaring untruth!

Mention a period in Russian or world history, find any six months or six years, when as much was done for the free and independent organisation of the masses of the people as was done during the six weeks of the revolutionary whirlwind in Russia when, according to the slanderers of the revolution, all principles and ideas were forgotten and reason and intellect disappeared! What was the all-Russian general strike? Was it not organisation? True, it was not registered by the police, it was not a permanent organisation, and therefore you refuse to take it into account. Take the political organisations. Do you know that the working people, the raw masses, never joined political organisations so eagerly, never increased the membership of the political associations so enormously, never created such original, semi-political organisations as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies? But you are a bit afraid of the political organisations of the proletariat. Like a true disciple of Brentano, you think that trade unions are safer for the bourgeoisie (and therefore more sound and respectable). If we take the trade unions, we shall find that, in spite of all the philistine tittle-tattle about their being ignored in time of revolution, Russia never saw such a multitude of trade union organisations formed by the workers as in those days. The columns of the socialist, and precisely the socialist, newspapers, both *Novaya Zhizn* and *Nachalo*, were packed with reports of the formation of more and more trade unions. Even backward sections of the proletariat, like domestic servants, who could barely be roused in decades of "methodical and systematic" philistine progress, displayed the greatest eagerness and ability to organise. Take the Peasant Union. One often meets Cadets today who speak about this Union with magnificent disdain. Why, it was a semi-fictitious organisation, they say. It has disappeared without leaving a trace. I wonder, gentlemen, how much of your Cadet organisations would be left had you been obliged to contend with punitive expeditions, with innumerable rural Luzhenovskys, Rimans, Filonovs, Avramovs and Zhdanovs. The Peasant Union grew with fabulous speed in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind. It was a genuinely popular, mass organisation, sharing, of course, in a number of peasant prejudices, and susceptible to the petty-bourgeois illusions of the peasants (just

like our Socialist-Revolutionaries); but it was undoubtedly a real organisation of the masses, of "men of the soil", unquestionably revolutionary at bottom, capable of employing genuinely revolutionary methods of struggle. It did not restrict but extended the scope of the political initiative of the peasantry, and brought them, with their hatred of the government officials and the landlords, into the arena—not the semi-intellectuals who are so often inclined to hatch all sorts of proposals for a deal between the revolutionary peasantry and the liberal landlords. The current disdain for the Peasant Union most of all expresses the philistine bourgeois narrow-mindedness of the Cadet, who has no faith in the independent revolutionary activity of the masses and is afraid of it. In the days of liberty, the Peasant Union was one of the mightiest realities, and we can confidently predict that, if the Luzhenovskys and Rimans do not butcher more tens of thousands of young, progressive peasants, if the slightest breeze of liberty blows again, this Union will grow with lightning speed, and will become an organisation against which the present Cadet committees will look like specks of dust.*

To sum up: the organising abilities of the people, particularly of the proletariat, but also of the peasantry, are revealed a million times more strongly, fully and productively in periods of revolutionary whirlwind than in periods of so-called calm (dray-horse) historical progress. The Blanks'

* Of course, not being a class organisation, the Peasant Union also contains elements of disintegration. The more imminent the victory of the peasant uprising and the fuller that victory, the more imminent will be the disintegration of this Union. But up to the victory of the peasant uprising, and for such a victory, the Peasant Union is a mighty and viable organisation. Its function will cease with the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, whereas the function of the proletarian organisations at that moment will be particularly important and vital in the struggle for socialism. But the function of the Cadet organisations is to hamper the complete victory of the bourgeois revolution, to excel in the preparatory periods of that revolution, in the periods of depression, stagnation and Dubasov rule. In other words, the peasantry will be victorious in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then cease to be revolutionary as a peasantry. The proletariat will be victorious in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and only thereby will fully develop its true, genuine, socialist revolutionary nature. But the Cadet petty bourgeoisie will cease to be an opposition on the very next day after constitutional illusions are dispelled.

opinion to the contrary is a bourgeois-bureaucratic distortion of history. The good bourgeois and honest bureaucrat regard as "genuine" only such organisations as have been properly registered by the police and scrupulously conform to all sorts of "provisional regulations". They cannot conceive of methods and system without provisional regulations. We must therefore have no illusions about the true significance of high-sounding words from a Cadet about romantic contempt for legality and aristocratic disdain for economics. These words have only one real meaning—a bourgeois opportunist dread of the independent revolutionary activity of the people.

Finally, let us examine the last point in Mr. Blank's Cadet "theory": the relation between worker democrats and bourgeois democrats. Mr. Blank's arguments on this subject deserve the closest attention of Social-Democrats, for they provide an example of how Marx is misrepresented by quotations from Marx. Just as Brentano, Sombart, Bernstein and Co. substituted Brentanoism for Marxism by employing Marxian terminology, by quoting some of Marx's statements and by assuming a Marxist disguise, so our Cadets indulge in the "subtle art" of faking Marxism on the question of the relation between worker democrats and bourgeois democrats.

Unless the activities of the worker democrats and bourgeois democrats are co-ordinated, the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be successful. This is gospel truth. Absolute truth. It seems to you, Messrs. Blank, Izgoyev and Co., that the revolutionary Social-Democrats forgot this particularly during the days of the "whirlwind"? You are mistaken, or are deliberately substituting for the concept *revolutionary bourgeois* democrats the concept bourgeois democrats in general, which includes the monarchist-liberal democrats and the opportunist democrats, but above all the monarchist-liberal democrats. Take *Novaya Zhizn*, and you will find that it deals with the question of joint action, of a fighting agreement between the worker democrats and the revolutionary bourgeois democrats *in nearly every issue*. It speaks of the importance of the Peasant Union and of the peasant movement in the most emphatic terms. Despite the Cadet fables about the Marxists' intolerance and narrow-minded dogmatism, you will find that that paper fully recognises the importance of

non-party associations and organisations*: but of course only non-party *revolutionary* organisations. The pivot of the question that is so artfully concealed by our Brentanoists in politics is: *Which* elements of bourgeois democracy are capable of pushing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its complete fulfilment when that revolution is, so to speak, half-way towards its goal? Is it the elements that accept the monarchist-liberal programme, that are completely submerged in constitutional illusions and bespatter revolutionary periods and revolutionary methods of making history with the slime of their philistine anger, condemnation and regret? Or is it those who accept the programme of a complete victory of the peasant uprising (instead of a deal between the peasants and the landlords), of complete victory for democracy (instead of a deal between the democratic Lower Chamber, on the one hand, and the Upper Chamber and the monarchy, on the other)? Have these gentlemen, the Blanks and the Izgoyevs, ever given a thought to this question? Must we at the present time "strike together" with the bourgeois-democratic *compromisers* or with the bourgeois-democratic *revolutionaries*?

Have you, esteemed gentlemen, who are so fond of quoting and misrepresenting Marx, ever heard how mercilessly Marx lashed the bourgeois-democratic compromisers in Germany in 1848?[117] And yet these compromisers were members of a National Assembly and not of a paltry State Duma: as democrats, they were far more "resolute" (in words) than our Cadets.

And fifteen years later, during the "constitutional conflict" in Prussia, the same Marx and Engels advised the workers' party to support the bourgeois-democratic Progressists, who were not a whit better than the Frankfurt democrats.[118] You think that this shows that Marx and Engels were inconsistent and contradicted themselves? You think this proves that they, too, in the period of the "revolutionary whirlwind" almost lost their "intellect and reason" (this view is held by the majority of the Bernsteinians and most of the Cadets)? As a matter of fact, there is no con-

* See my article in *Novaya Zhizn*: "The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism". (See pp. 75-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

tradiction here at all. In the period of revolutionary struggle, Marx concentrated his attack on constitutional illusions and constitutional compromisers. When the force of the revolutionary "whirlwind" was spent, and there could no longer be any doubt that the German Cadets had utterly betrayed the revolution, when the insurrections had been finally and completely suppressed, and economic prosperity was making any repetition of them hopeless, then and *only then* (Marx and Engels were not craven-hearted, and their faith in insurrection did not dwindle after the very first defeat!), did they recognise the parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle. In parliament, once you have gone into it, it is not only permissible but obligatory, in certain circumstances, to support the turncoat Izgoyev against Shipov, and Shipov against Durnovo. In the fight *for* real parliamentarism there is sometimes nothing more dangerous than Cadet "compromisers".

If you want to quote Marx, gentlemen, try to prove that our Duma is already an instrument of the rule of the bourgeoisie in a free Russia, and not a fig-leaf for the autocracy. You will say that the latter may evolve into the former through a few slight changes, and that the election of the Cadets is already not a slight, but an important testimony of this "evolution".

Very well. But in that way you are only putting the question off, you are not answering it. Has the present Duma, right now, already outgrown its limits to such an extent that it can become an organ of state power? Those of you who think so, and are trying to make the people think so, are deliberately spreading the most harmful constitutional illusions: you are downright counter-revolutionaries. Those of you, however, who think it probable that "Durnovo will remain in order to disperse the Duma",* or who realise that nothing is certain yet without an extra-"parliamentary", revolutionary onslaught,** are proving how shaky your position is. Their admissions clearly show that the Cadets' policy is a *policy of the moment*, and not a policy of earnestly

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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* *Rus* and *Molva*.

** P. Milyukov, "The Elements of the Conflict", in *Rech*, No. 30, March 24—the extremely interesting credo of a compromiser.

defending the *permanent* and fundamental interests of the revolution. These admissions show that during the solution of the *new revolutionary crisis* that is now maturing, a large number of revolutionary bourgeois democrats will break away from the Cadets, and will be impelled by the Durnovos' outrages against the Duma to go to the barricades. Thus the whole difference is that you want to *restrict* this inevitable new battle, to fetter it, to *narrow it down* to the task of supporting the Cadet Duma; whereas we want to concentrate all our plans, all our energies, all our work of agitation, propaganda and organisation on extending the scope of this battle beyond the limits of Cadet programmes, to extend it to the complete overthrow of the autocracy, to the complete victory of the peasant uprising, to the convocation of a national constituent assembly by revolutionary means.

It seems to you that there are no revolutionary bourgeois democrats in Russia, that the Cadets are the only, or at all events, the main force of bourgeois democracy in Russia. But it seems so to you only because you are short-sighted, because you are content to observe only the surface of political events; you do not see or understand the "essence of the constitution". Being hand-to-mouth politicians, you are most typical opportunists, for the momentary interests of democracy shut out from your view its more profound and fundamental interests: because, engrossed in the tasks of the moment, you forget the more serious tasks of the future: the label prevents you from seeing the contents. There are revolutionary bourgeois democrats in Russia, and there must be, so long as there is a revolutionary peasantry, which by thousands of millions of threads is also bound up with the poorer classes in the towns. These democrats are lying low *only* because of the activities of the Rimans and Luzhenovskys.[119] The events of the very near future will dispel Cadet illusions. Either the regime of repression continues, the Rimans and Luzhenovskys "do things" while the Cadet Duma talks—and in that case the paltriness of this Duma and of the party that predominates in it will immediately become evident to the vast masses of the people. There will be a strong outbreak, in which it will not be the Cadets as a party that will participate, of course, but those elements among the people that constitute the revolutionary democracy. Or the regime of repression

will be relaxed, the government will make a few concessions, and the Cadet Duma, of course, will begin to melt as a result of the very first concessions, and will settle for Shipov, or even perhaps for something worse. The counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets (which stood out in striking relief during the days of the "whirlwind", and is constantly evident in their literature) will display itself in full. But the very *first* fresh breeze of liberty, the slightest relaxation of repression, will again *inevitably* call into being hundreds and thousands of organisations, unions, groups, circles and undertakings of a revolutionary-democratic nature. And this will as inevitably result in another "whirlwind", in a repetition of the October-December struggle, but on an immeasurably greater scale. The Cadets, who are shining so brightly today, will be dimmed once again. Why? Because maggots are found near corpses, not near living people.

In other words, the Cadets may finally make the people "acquire a taste", as Durnovo would say, for "people's freedom", but they can never under any circumstances wage a genuine struggle for real freedom of the people, freedom without inverted commas, without a compromise with the autocracy. This struggle has still inevitably to be waged; but it will be waged, not by the Cadets, but by other parties, other social elements. It is clear, therefore, why the revolutionary Social-Democrats do not in the least envy the successes of the Cadets, and continue to concentrate on this forthcoming real, and not sham, fight.

Mr. Blank quotes what Marx said about the supreme significance of bourgeois democracy. To express Marx's real opinion, he should have added: and *supremely treacherous significance*. Marx said this a thousand times in different passages in his various writings. Comrade Plekhanov, who is inclining towards Brentanoism in present-day politics, has forgotten what Marx said on this score. Indeed, Comrade Plekhanov has no inkling of *what* the liberal democrats may betray. The answer to this is very simple, Comrade Plekhanov. The party of "people's freedom" has betrayed the freedom of the people, and will continue to do so.

Mr. Blank admonishes us not to push the bourgeois democrats "into the camp of reaction and counter-revolution". We ask this sagacious Cadet: do you want to take the

world of ideas, theories, programmes and lines of tactics, or the world of material class interests? Let us take both. Who pushed your friend Mr. Struve into the camp of counter-revolution, and when? Mr. Struve was a counter-revolutionary in 1894, when, in his *Critical Remarks*, he made Brentanoist reservations concerning Marxism. And despite the efforts some of us made to "push" him from Brentanoism to Marxism, Mr. Struve went over entirely to Brentanoism. And *the counter-revolutionary* tone *never* left the pages of Osvobozhdeniye, the *illegal* "*Osvobozhdeniye*". Was this mere chance? Was it by chance that Mr. Struve was prompted to start that model organ of reactionary spleen, *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, precisely in the period of the "whirlwind", of the independent revolutionary activity of the people?

What, in general, pushes the small producer in a commodity economy over to the side of reaction and counter-revolution? The position he occupies in capitalist society between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The petty bourgeois inevitably, in all countries and in every combination of political circumstances, vacillates between revolution and counter-revolution. He wants to free himself from the yoke of capital and to strengthen his position as a small proprietor. This is virtually impossible; and the vacillations of the petty bourgeois are inevitable and ineradicable owing to the very system of modern society. That is why no one but the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie can imagine that it is *thinkable* for the workers, or for the peasants rising in revolt against landlordism, to display independent revolutionary activity that *will not push* a certain section of the bourgeois democrats into the camp of reaction. Only knights of philistinism can regret this.

Do the Blanks and the Izgoyevs (or Comrade Plekhanov) really imagine that it is possible, for example, to have a complete victory of the peasant uprising, that it is possible completely to "*take the land*" (Plekhanov's slogan) from the landlords without compensation, without three-fifths of the Cadet "bourgeois democrats" being pushed into the camp of counter-revolution? Should we, therefore, begin bargaining with the Cadets about a "reasonable" peasant programme? What do you think, Comrade Plekhanov? What is your opinion, Messrs. Blank and Izgoyev?

And now for the finale of the political arguments advanced by our Cadet: *if the bourgeois democrats are opposed to armed uprising at the present time*, it is useless talking about it.

These words express the whole sum and substance of Cadet policy: to subordinate the proletariat to the Cadets, to take it in tow on the fundamental question of its political conduct and its political struggle. It is no use shutting our eyes to that. Mr. Blank rather dexterously tries to distract our attention from the main point. He speaks not about the Cadets, but about bourgeois democrats in general. He talks about the "present juncture", but not about insurrection in general. But only a child could be taken in by this trick, and fail to realise that the true meaning of Blank's conclusion is the one we have indicated. We have already cited a number of examples to show that Mr. Blank (like all the Cadets) systematically ignores the bourgeois democrats who are more to the left than the Cadets; and that, in keeping with his whole position as an advocate of constitutional illusions, he identifies the Cadets with the bourgeois democrats, and ignores the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. It only remains for us to prove that the Cadets are opposed to armed uprising in general, and not only to choosing the wrong "moment" (it is curious how often these two things are confused, and it is particularly to the advantage of the Cadets to confuse them, and to cover up their repudiation of insurrection by arguments about the moment chosen for it). This is quite easy to prove. It is sufficient to refer to the *illegal* "*Osvobozhdeniye*", where Mr. Struve, in the spring and summer of 1905, after January 9 and before October 9, strongly opposed armed uprising, and argued that to preach it was "*folly and a crime*". Events have sufficiently refuted this counter-revolutionary. Events have proved that it was the *combination of general strike and armed uprising*—which the Marxists foresaw and put forward as a watchword—that alone won the recognition of liberty and the rudiments of constitutionalism in Russia. Only a very few Social-Democrats, with no supporters in Russia (like Plekhanov), cravenly said about the December insurrection: "It was wrong to take up arms." On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of Social-Democrats agree that insurrection was a necessary act of resistance to the withdrawal of liberties; that it raised

the entire movement to a higher plane and demonstrated the possibility of fighting against regular troops. The latter circumstance has been admitted by such an impartial, sober-minded and cautious witness as Kautsky.

Now let us see what the moral that the Blanks draw amounts to: the proletariat must not think of insurrection if the Cadet Party (which was never revolutionary) is not in sympathy with it (although at present, and at *all other times*, it is opposed to insurrection). No, Mr. Blank! The proletariat will certainly reckon with the bourgeois democrats on the question of insurrection in general, and on the question of the moment to be chosen for it in particular—only, it will reckon *not* with the Cadet bourgeois democrats, *but* with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats; not with the liberal-monarchist, but with the revolutionary-republican trends and parties; not with windbags who are satisfied with a toy parliament, but with the masses of the peasantry (who are also bourgeois democrats), whose attitude towards insurrection differs from that of the Cadets.

"The Cadets are opposed to insurrection." Why, they have never been in favour, nor can they ever be in favour of it. They dread it. They naïvely imagine that it *depends* on their wishes—the wishes of the intermediary elements who stand aloof from the most acute and direct struggle—whether there is to be an insurrection or not. What a delusion! The autocracy is preparing for civil war, and is just now preparing for it very methodically. A new, much wider and more profound political crisis is maturing because of the Duma. Both the peasant masses and the proletariat still have in their midst vast numbers of militants who are emphatically demanding freedom for the people, not deals that will curtail the freedom of the people. Can the wishes of this or that party determine in these circumstances whether an insurrection will break out or not?

Just as the West-European philistine on the eve of socialist revolution yearns for an abatement of the class antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, pleads with the latter not to push the representatives of the bourgeoisie into the camp of reaction, declares in favour of social peace, and with profound moral indignation rejects the unscientific, narrow-minded, conspiratorial, anarchist, and

so forth, idea of a cataclysm, so the Russian philistine, half-way on the road towards our bourgeois-democratic revolution, yearns for an abatement of the antagonism between the autocracy and people's freedom, pleads with the revolutionaries, that is, with all resolute and consistent supporters of the people's freedom, not to push the liberal bourgeoisie into the camp of reaction, advocates the constitutional path, and with sincere indignation, reinforced with philosophical idealism, rejects the unscientific, narrow-minded, conspiratorial, anarchist, and so forth, idea of insurrection. The class-conscious worker says to the West-European philistine: "The question of a cataclysm will be decided by the intensification of extremes and not by the intermediary elements." To the Russian philistine (and the Cadet is the ideal philistine in politics) the class-conscious worker says: "The question of insurrection depends, not on the will of the liberals, but on the actions of the autocracy and the growth of the class-consciousness and the indignation of the revolutionary peasantry and the proletariat. The West-European philistines say to the proletariat: "Don't repel the small peasants and the enlightened, social-liberal, reforming petty bourgeoisie generally; don't isolate yourselves; it is the reactionaries who want to isolate you." To this the proletarian replies: "I must, in the interests of the whole of toiling humanity, isolate myself from those who advocate compromise between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, for these compromisers are advising me to disarm; they are exercising the most harmful, immediately and practically harmful influence on the minds of the oppressed class by preaching compromise, abatement of antagonisms, etc. But I do not isolate myself from that vast mass of the petty bourgeoisie, the working masses, who are capable of adopting the point of view of the proletariat, of not yearning for compromise, of not being carried away by the consolidation of petty economy in capitalist society, and of not renouncing the struggle against the capitalist system itself."

Much the same is taking place in Russia, but in different conditions, in a different historical period, on the eve (and not even on the eve, but in the midst) of a bourgeois-democratic and not a socialist revolution. The philistine says to the proletarian: "The reactionaries want to isolate you; you must

isolate the reactionaries; don't repel the enlightened, politically-liberal Cadets who want reforms." To this the proletarian replies: "In the interests of the genuine struggle for real freedom, I must isolate myself from the advocates of a compromise between the autocracy and the representatives of the people, for these compromisers are advising us to disarm, they are befogging the civic consciousness of the people by their advocacy of 'political peace' and constitutional illusions. But these compromisers, all these Cadets, are not the people at all, they are not the masses at all, they are not a force at all, as seems to those who give way to the moods and impressions of the moment, and are now shouting about the danger of the proletariat being isolated. The real masses are the revolutionary peasantry and the poorer sections of the town population. From *these* masses I do not isolate myself; I call upon them to cast off their constitutional illusions, I call upon them to take up the real struggle, I call them to insurrection. In deciding on the moment for the insurrection, I will pay very serious attention to the mood and to the process of political development of these masses (not of the Cadet compromisers); but I will not for a moment forget the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy that is maturing very fast, and will probably break out in the near future, for the sake of momentary successes, for the sake of the tawdry brilliance of Cadet parliamentarism (or rather Dubasov parliamentarism, to put it more correctly)."

In Europe, not so long ago, the flashy and loud-mouthed social-liberal, the petty-bourgeois compromiser, importunately pressed his offers of alliances and agreements upon the proletariat. The intellectual wing of the Social-Democratic parties took the bait, succumbed to the policy of the moment, founded the notorious Bernsteiniad, etc. A year or two passed, the fog of "social peace" was completely dispelled, and the correctness of the position taken up by the revolutionary wing of the Social-Democratic parties, which consistently adhered to the proletarian point of view, became perfectly evident.

In Russia today everybody is intoxicated with the Cadet victories and with the prospect of a Cadet Duma. There is a danger that the intellectual wing of our Party will be fascinated by these brilliant successes and will be taken in by the

idea of an election bloc with the Cadets, by the idea of supporting them, by a policy of "dealing tactfully" with the Cadets. There is a danger that they will be reluctant clearly and distinctly to define from the proletarian point of view the petty-bourgeois class nature of this party, the harmfulness of its constitutional illusions and the constant danger created by its tactics of "compromise". But in a few years, or perhaps even months, the fog will be dispelled; the views of the revolutionary Social-Democrats will be borne out by reality, and the columns of the Cadet newspapers and magazines will cease to ring with eulogies of certain Social-Democrats, which are offensive to the proletariat and are symptomatic of some disease within the Social-Democratic Party.

VI

CONCLUSION

In discussing the views of Mr. Blank, this highly typical exponent of Cadet policy, we said hardly anything about the views of our Menshevik comrades. But the conclusion to be drawn about their position logically follows from what we have said. The very fact that the Cadets are so effusive in their praise of the Mensheviks shows that the latter must be making some mistake. The Cadet press constitutes nearly nine-tenths of the whole of the political press in Russia at the present time; and if the whole of this bourgeois press is systematically and continuously praising Plekhanov one day, Potresov another day (*Nasha Zhizn*), and the resolution adopted by all the Mensheviks yet another day, it is a true, if of course indirect, sign that our Menshevik comrades are making, or are about to make, some mistake. It is hardly possible for the public opinion of the whole bourgeois press to diverge very sharply from the class instinct of the bourgeoisie, which is very sensitive to the way the wind is blowing.

But, we repeat, this is only an indirect sign. What we have said above also leads us to a direct formulation of the mistakes that are evident in the draft Menshevik resolutions. This is not the place to examine these resolutions in detail;

we can only briefly deal with the most important points, relevant to the question of "the victories of the Cadets and the tasks of the workers' party".

The mistake the Mensheviks make is that they do not at all formulate, and evidently have even quite forgotten, such an important political task that now confronts the class-conscious, Social-Democratic proletariat as combating constitutional illusions. The socialist proletariat, strictly adhering to the class point of view, unswervingly applying the materialist conception of history in appraising present conditions, and hostile to all petty-bourgeois sophistries and deceptions, cannot ignore this task in the period Russia is passing through. If it were to ignore this task, it would cease to be the vanguard fighter for complete freedom for the people; it would cease to be the fighter who stands above bourgeois-democratic narrow-mindedness. If it were to ignore this task it would trail helplessly behind events, which are converting these very constitutional illusions into an instrument for the bourgeois corruption of the proletariat, just as the theory of "social peace" lately served in Europe as the principal instrument of the bourgeoisie for diverting the workers from socialism.

Constitutional illusions represent an entire period in the Russian revolution which naturally set in after the suppression of the *first* armed uprising (which will yet be followed by a second one), and after the Cadets' election victories. Constitutional illusions are a politically opportunist and bourgeois poison, which the Cadet press, taking advantage of the enforced silence of the socialist newspapers, is pouring into the brains of the people through its millions of copies. We have before us the newspaper *Tovarishch*,[120] an organ of those Cadets who go among "the people", and especially among the working class. In its first issue it sings dithyrambs to the Cadets: "In its programme it [the Cadet Party] promises [humph, humph, prom-is-es!] to defend the interests of the peasants [*à la* Kaufman?] and the workers [why, of course!] and the political rights of all Russian citizens without exception. If it obtains a majority in the State Duma, the present government, which has done so much harm to the people, will have to go, and the state will be administered by new men [the Muravyovs in place of Witte?] *who will*

heed the voice of the people." Yes, yes—heed the voice of the people!... How beautifully those Cadets write!

We are sure that there is not a single socialist who will not feel outraged by this shameless bourgeois lie, who will deny that it is absolutely necessary to combat this bourgeois corruption of the working class with the utmost vigour, a corruption which is all the more dangerous because the Cadets have heaps of newspapers, whereas we have not a single one, in spite of our innumerable attempts to start a most moderate, most restrained and most modest socialist newspaper.

Moreover, there is no denying that this bourgeois lie, this befogging of the revolutionary consciousness of the people, is not an isolated sortie, but a regular campaign. More than that. A Cadet Duma (if the Duma will be Cadet) will be, so to speak, the incarnation of constitutional illusions, their hotbed, the focus of all the most ostentatious aspects of political life (which to the superficial and idealistic mind of the petty bourgeois seem the essence of, or at least the main factor in, contemporary political life). We are faced not merely with a systematic campaign by the whole of the bourgeois press and by all the bourgeois ideologists who are striving to take the proletariat in tow, but with an all-Russian representative institution that is surrounded with the halo of the first "parliament"—if we may call it that—and must perpetuate this transformation of the working class into an appendage of the Cadets. Recall the opinion of the "spheres" that we mentioned above. They said in effect: how good it would be if the Cadets could win public confidence for the Duma, and make it the centre of all public hopes. The Duma is to serve as a plaster to draw the heat out of the revolution. On this our Cadets are virtually agreed with the Durnovos and Dubasovs. This is a fact. *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, especially, has proved this very clearly. Methodical and systematic reforms are better than a revolutionary whirlwind in which intellect and reason disappear—say the Blanks. It is better to haggle with the Cadets in the Duma than to fight with unreliable troops against the workers and peasants—say the Durnovos and Dubasovs. *Les beaux esprits se rencontrent*. Birds of a feather flock together.

Everybody says that we are slandering the liberals. We were called slanderers when, long ago, in *Zarya* and in the

old *Iskra*, we gave the first issues of *Osvobozhdeniye* a hostile reception.[121] The slanders turned out to be a Marxist analysis of bourgeois ideology which was wholly confirmed by reality. It will therefore not surprise or grieve us if we are now accused of slandering the party of "people's freedom".

Every political period confronts the Social-Democratic Party, as the representative of the only thoroughly revolutionary class, with a particular and specific task which becomes the urgent task of the day, but which is always obscured or pushed into the background in one way or another by the opportunist sections of the bourgeois democrats. The specific political task at the present time—which only the revolutionary Social-Democrats can fulfil, and which they must fulfil if they do not want to betray the lasting, fundamental and vital interests of the proletariat—is to combat constitutional illusions. Petty-bourgeois opportunists are always content with the achievements of the moment, with the gleam of the latest novelty, with momentary "progress". We, however, must look further and deeper into things, and must point at once and immediately to those aspects of this progress that are the basis and guarantee of *retrogression*, that express the one-sidedness, narrowness and flimsiness of what has been achieved and make it necessary to *continue the fight in other forms and under other conditions*.

The more decisive the victory of the Cadets and of the opposition generally in the elections, and the more probable and imminent a Cadet Duma, the more dangerous constitutional illusions become and the more acutely perceptible is the contradiction between the complete maintenance and even intensification of the reactionary policy of the autocracy —which still exercises all power—and "popular" representation. This contradiction is very rapidly creating a new revolutionary crisis, immeasurably wider and deeper, more conscious and acute than all its predecessors. In 1906 we are verily experiencing the *reproduction* of the revolution, as some Social-Democrat aptly expressed it. It is as if the history of 1905 were being repeated, starting from the beginning, from the autocracy in full power, going through the stage of public excitement and of a country-wide opposition movement of unprecedented power, and ending with—who knows

what? Perhaps with a "reproduction" of the liberal deputation that waited on the tsar last summer, but this time in the form of an address or a resolution of the Cadet Duma; or perhaps a "reproduction" of the autumn upsurge of 1905. It would be ridiculous to attempt to forecast the exact forms and dates of the future steps of the revolution. The important thing is to bear in mind the immeasurably wider sweep of the movement, and the greater political experience of the whole people. The important thing is to remember that what is impending is a *revolutionary* and not a parliamentary crisis. The "parliamentary" struggle in the Duma is a small stage; indeed, it is a tiny railway station—"Cadet Halt"—on the road from Constitution to Revolution. Owing to the fundamental peculiarities of the present social and political situation, the struggle in the Duma *cannot* decide the fate of people's freedom. It cannot be the *main* form of the struggle, because this "parliament" is admittedly not recognised by *either* of the combatants—either the Durnovos, Dubasovs and Co. or the proletariat and the peasantry.

And the Social-Democrats, taking all the concrete, specific features of the present historical situation into account, must therefore resolutely recognise and systematically instil into the minds of the workers and politically-conscious peasants that the main form of social movement in present-day Russia continues to be the directly revolutionary movement of the broad masses of the people, breaking the old laws, destroying the instruments for oppressing the people, winning political power, making new laws. The Duma convened by the Dubasovs and Durnovos, and protected by these worthy gentlemen, will play a very important part in the movement, but will not in any circumstances change its main form. The opposite opinion, already expressed and being spread by the Cadets, is a deception of the people, a petty-bourgeois philistine utopia.

And bound up with this is the question of the bourgeois democrats, and of whether the proletariat should support them or not. On this point, too, the Mensheviks' resolutions are partly inadequate and partly mistaken. The Cadets are doing their utmost to identify their party with the bourgeois democrats in general, and are claiming that their party is the principal representative of bourgeois democracy. This is

a monstrous lie; and all vagueness on the part of Social-Democrats in defining the term "bourgeois democracy" merely serves to foster this lie. We must find a solution for the concrete political problem of supporting the bourgeois democrats that will be based on an absolutely definite appraisal of specific trends, tendencies and parties among the bourgeois democrats. And the main task of the day in this respect is to separate the revolutionary bourgeois democrats—who, even if they are not quite politically conscious and cling to a number of prejudices and so forth, are capable of waging a resolute and unrelenting struggle against all the remnants of serfdom in Russia—from the liberal monarchists and opportunist bourgeois democrats who are capable of entering into all sorts of deals with the reaction, and who at every critical moment advance their counter-revolutionary aspirations. That there are extremely large numbers of revolutionary democrats in Russia is beyond doubt; their lack of organisation, their non-party character, and the fact that they are crushed by the present reign of terror can mislead only the most superficial and thoughtless observers. It is with these democrats, and only with these, that we must "march separately, but strike together", with the object of fulfilling the democratic revolution to the very end, and ruthlessly exposing the unreliability of the now "dominant" Cadet Party.

And setting itself the object of carrying through to the end the democratic revolution, the party of the socialist proletariat must be able not only to expose at any time all constitutional illusions, not only to separate the elements capable of struggle from the mass of bourgeois democrats, but also precisely and frankly to define and put clearly before the masses the conditions in which this decisive victory of the revolution can be achieved. It must show the masses, and bring out in all its propaganda and agitation, what precisely this decisive victory of the revolution must mean. Unless we do this (and this our Menshevik comrades have failed to do in their resolutions), all our talk about "carrying through the revolution to the end" will be nothing more than bare and empty phrases.

In his article Mr. Blank refers to the French "Social-Democrats" of 1848-49. Our worthy Cadet does not realise that he is

drawing a caricature of himself. It is, after all, the Cadets who today are repeating the mistakes of the French "Social-Democrats", who in fact were not Social-Democrats, i.e., Marxists, at all. They were not a class party of the workers, but a regular petty-bourgeois party; they were thoroughly permeated with constitutional illusions and with belief in "parliamentary" methods of struggle in all, even revolutionary, circumstances. And that is precisely why in spite of their stupendous, purely "Cadet", parliamentary successes, they suffered that shameful fiasco which Marx so derided.[122]

And our Party, too—if it were imprudently to enter into all sorts of election blocs, agreements and deals with the Cadets, if it were to leave the task of combating constitutional illusions in the shade, if, in seeking a *rapprochement* with the bourgeois democrats, it were to identify the latter with their opportunist wing, i.e., the Cadets, and if it were to forget the necessity of seriously preparing for extra-parliamentary methods of struggle in a period like the one we are now passing through—our Party, too, would run the serious risk of meeting with the same deplorable fate as that met with by the French petty-bourgeois, quasi-Social-Democrats in 1848-49.

We have no reason to be envious of the Cadets' successes. Petty-bourgeois illusions and faith in the Duma are still fairly strong among the people. They must be dispelled. The more complete the Cadets' triumph in the Duma, the sooner will this be done. We welcome the successes of the Girondists[123] of the great Russian revolution! They will be followed by the rise of broader masses of the people; more energetic and revolutionary sections will come to the fore; they will rally around the proletariat; they will carry our great bourgeois revolution to complete victory, and will usher in the era of socialist revolution in the West.

March 28, 1906

THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[124]

APRIL 10 (23) - APRIL 25 (May 8), 1906

Published in *Minutes of the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Held in Stockholm in 1906*, Moscow, 1907

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1

SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION[125]

I advance two main theses: (1) the peasants will never agree to municipalisation; (2) without a democratic republic, without the fully guaranteed sovereignty of the people and without the election of government officials, municipalisation would be harmful. In developing these theses, I will first deal with the more serious objections raised against nationalisation. Undoubtedly, the most important objection is the one raised by Comrade Plekhanov. Comrade Plekhanov said literally the following, I took down his words: "We cannot under any circumstances be in favour of nationalisation." This is a mistake. I venture to assert that if a peasant revolution is really brought about in Russia, and if the political revolution that will accompany it reaches the point of creating a really democratic republic, Comrade Plekhanov will consider it possible to support nationalisation; and if a democratic republic is really brought about in Russia in the forthcoming revolution, then not only the Russian but the entire international situation of the movement will push things towards nationalisation. But if this condition does not arise, municipalisation will still prove to be a fiction; in those circumstances it can be carried out only as possibly a new form of compensation. Comrade John[126] uses the term alienation instead of confiscation, and, as was evident from his speech, he did not choose this term by chance. Yet it is a purely Cadet term: it can be taken to mean anything you please, and the compensation scheme proposed by the Cadets fits in with it completely. To go on. "What guarantee is there against restoration?" asked Comrade Plekhanov. I don't think.

this question has any close and inseparable bearing on the programme we are discussing; but since it has been raised, a definite and unambiguous answer must be given to it. If we mean a real, fully effective, economic guarantee against restoration, that is, a guarantee that would create the economic conditions precluding restoration, then we shall have to say: the only guarantee against restoration is a socialist revolution in the West. There can be no other guarantee in the real and full sense of the term. Without this condition, in whichever other way the problem is solved (municipalisation, division of the land, etc.), restoration will be not only possible, but positively inevitable. I would formulate this proposition as follows: the Russian revolution can achieve victory by its own efforts, but it cannot possibly hold and consolidate its gains by its own strength. It cannot do this unless there is a socialist revolution in the West. Without this condition restoration is inevitable, whether we have municipalisation, or nationalisation, or division of the land: for under each and every form of possession and property the small proprietor will always be a bulwark of restoration. After the complete victory of the democratic revolution the small proprietor will inevitably turn against the proletariat; and the sooner the common enemies of the proletariat and of the small proprietors, such as the capitalists, the landlords, the financial bourgeoisie, and so forth are overthrown, the sooner will this happen. Our democratic republic has no other reserve than the socialist proletariat in the West. And in this connection we must not lose sight of the fact that the classical bourgeois revolution in Europe, namely, the Great French Revolution of the eighteenth century, took place in an international situation that was entirely different from the one in which the Russian revolution is taking place. France at the end of the eighteenth century was surrounded by feudal and semi-feudal states. Russia in the twentieth century, accomplishing her bourgeois revolution, is surrounded by countries in which the socialist proletariat stands fully prepared on the eve of the final battle with the bourgeoisie. If such relatively insignificant events as the tsar's promise of freedom in Russia on October 17 gave the powerful impetus it did to the proletarian movement in Western Europe, if a telegram from St. Petersburg announcing the issue of the

notorious Constitutional Manifesto was sufficient to make the Austrian workers pour into the streets, to lead to a number of demonstrations and collisions with the troops in the largest industrial towns of Austria, you can imagine what the international socialist proletariat will do when it receives news from Russia, not of promises of freedom, but of its actual achievement, and the complete victory of the revolutionary peasantry. If, however, the question of a guarantee against restoration is put on a different basis, that is, if we mean a conditional and relative guarantee against restoration, then we shall have to say: the only conditional and relative guarantee against restoration is that the revolution should be effected in the most drastic manner possible, effected by the revolutionary class directly with the least possible participation of go-betweens, compromisers and all sorts of conciliators; that this revolution should really be carried to the end. In this respect, my draft provides the maximum as regards guarantees against restoration.

My draft proposes the formation of peasant committees as the direct levers of the revolutionary peasant movement, and as the most desirable form of that movement. Translated into simple language, peasant committees mean calling upon the peasants to set to work immediately and directly to settle accounts with the government officials and the landlords in the most drastic manner. Peasant committees mean calling upon the people who are being oppressed by the survivals of serfdom and the police regime to eradicate these survivals "in a plebeian manner",[127] as Marx put it. Comrade Plekhanov thinks that this premise of a revolution carried to the end, of a revolution which introduces the election of government officials by the people, is reminiscent of anarchism, which is abhorrent to him, just as to all of us, of course. But it is extremely strange that the question of the people electing the government officials should remind anyone of anarchism, or should, at a time like the present, bring a smile to the lips of any Social-Democrat, except Bernstein, perhaps. It is at the present time that this slogan—the election of government officials by the people—assumes direct and immense practical significance. All our activity, our propaganda and agitation among the masses of the peasantry should consist largely in propagating, spreading and

explaining this slogan. To advocate a peasant revolution, to speak of an agrarian revolution at all seriously, and at the same time to say nothing about the need for real democracy, which, among other things, includes the election of government officials by the people, is a crying contradiction. This reproach about anarchism in this connection only reminds me of the German Bernsteinians who not long ago, in controversy with Kautsky, accused him of advocating anarchism.

We must plainly and definitely say to the peasants: if you want to carry the agrarian revolution to the end, you must also carry the political revolution to the end; for unless the political revolution is carried to the end there will be no durable agrarian revolution, and perhaps none at all. Without a complete democratic revolution, without the election of government officials by the people, we shall have either peasant disturbances, or Cadet agrarian reforms. We shall not have what would deserve the lofty title used by Plekhanov—a peasant revolution. To go on. Municipalisation provides a wide arena for the class struggle, said Plekhanov. I have tried to use his own words as nearly as possible, and I must say emphatically that what he says is definitely *wrong*. It is wrong both in the political and in the economic sense. Other things being equal, a municipality and municipal landownership undoubtedly allow a narrower arena for the class struggle than the whole nation, and the nationalisation of the land. In a democratic republic, nationalisation of the land would undoubtedly provide the widest field for the class struggle—the widest field possible and thinkable under capitalism. Nationalisation means the abolition of absolute rent, a reduction in the price of grain, the maximum freedom for competition and the free penetration of capital into agriculture. Municipalisation, on the contrary, narrows the field of the nation-wide class struggle, for it does not free all production relations in agriculture from absolute rent, and it cuts up our general demands into particular demands. At all events, municipalisation obscures the class struggle. From this point of view, only one answer can be given to Comrade Plekhanov's question. From this point of view municipalisation does not hold water. Municipalisation means narrowing and obscuring the class struggle.

Plekhanov's next objection concerns the question of seizing power. He perceives in my draft of the agrarian programme the idea of seizing power. I must admit that my draft does, indeed, contain the idea of the seizure of power by the revolutionary peasantry; but it is a great mistake to put this on a par with the Narodnaya Volya[128] idea of seizing power. In the 1870s and 1880s, when the idea of seizing power was fostered by the Narodnaya Volya, the latter consisted of a group of intellectuals, and there was no really mass revolutionary movement of any extent to speak of. Seizure of power was the desire, or the phrase of a handful of intellectuals, but not the inevitable next step of an already developing mass movement. Now, after October, November and December 1905, after the broad masses of the working class, the semi-proletarian elements and the peasantry have shown the world forms of the revolutionary movement such as have not been witnessed for a long time; after we have had the struggle of the revolutionary people for power flaring up in Moscow, in the South and in the Baltic Provinces, to put the idea of the revolutionary people winning political power on a par with the ideas of the Narodnaya Volya means being fully twenty-five years behind the times, means striking out a whole vast period of Russian history. Plekhanov said we must not be afraid of an agrarian revolution. But this fear that the revolutionary peasantry will win power is fear of an agrarian revolution. Agrarian revolution is an empty phrase if its victory does not presuppose the winning of power by the revolutionary people. Without this latter condition, it will not be an agrarian revolution but a peasant revolt, or a Cadet agrarian reform. In concluding the examination of this point, I should like to remind you that even the resolution of the comrades of the Minority, published in the second issue of *Partiiniye Izvestia*, says that we are already being confronted with the task of wresting power from the government.

Comrade Plekhanov thinks that the expression "the creative activity of the people", which I don't think you will find in our resolutions, but which, if we are to trust Comrade Plekhanov's memory, I used in my speech, is reminiscent of old acquaintances—the Narodnaya Volya and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. I think that this recollection of

Comrade Plekhanov's is also twenty-five years behind the times. Recall what happened in Russia in the last quarter of 1905—strikes, Soviets of Workers' Deputies, insurrections, peasant committees, railwaymen's committees, and so forth. All this shows that the popular movement was passing into the form of insurrection, and these bodies were undoubtedly rudimentary organs of revolutionary authority. And what I said about the creative activity of the people had a very definite and concrete meaning: it referred precisely to these historic days of the Russian revolution, and it characterised this method of fighting not only against the old regime, but by means of a revolutionary authority, a method employed for the first time by the broad masses of the Russian workers and peasants in the famous October and December days. If our revolution has been buried, then so have these rudimentary forms of the revolutionary authority of the peasants and workers. But if your reference to a peasant revolution is not a mere phrase, if we have a real agrarian revolution in the true sense of the word, then we shall undoubtedly see a repetition of the October and December events on a much greater scale. A revolutionary authority, not of intellectuals, not of a group of conspirators, but of the workers and peasants, has already existed in Russia, has already been put into effect in the course of our revolution. It was crushed by the triumph of reaction; but if there are real grounds for our conviction that the revolution will revive, then we must also anticipate the inevitable revival, development and success of new organs of revolutionary authority that will be even more resolute and more closely connected with the peasantry and the proletariat than the preceding ones. Hence, by raising this battered and ridiculous bogy of the Narodnaya Volya, Plekhanov has merely dodged the task of analysing the October and December forms of the movement.

Lastly, let us examine the question whether my programme is flexible and "well shod on all four hoofs". I think that in this respect, too, my agrarian programme is more satisfactory than all the others. What if things go badly with the revolution? What if it turns out to be impossible to carry through to the end our democratic revolution unless all the "ifs" I have put in my draft are met? In that case, we shall certainly have to reckon with the conditions of

peasant farming and of peasant land tenure that already exist. In this connection I will mention the extremely important factor of rented land. If we can conceive of things going badly with the revolution, of it not being carried through to the end, we must undoubtedly reckon with the existence and persistence of this factor. And in my draft, the Party's tasks in the event of this worst contingency arising, in the event of all the allegedly utopian "ifs" being absent, are formulated more fully, more precisely and much more soberly I than in Comrade Maslov's draft. Thus my programme provides practical slogans both for the present conditions of peasant farming and peasant land tenure, and for the contingency that capitalism will have the best possible prospects of development. Comrade John tried to be witty and said that my programme contains too many programmes, that it provides for both confiscation and the renting of land, and that the one precludes the other. But his joke fell flat, because confiscation of the landed estates does not preclude the renting of land: this takes place on the peasants' land as well. Hence Comrade Plekhanov was particularly wrong when he advanced his particularly slashing argument against me. He implied that it was easy to draw up a programme for the contingency that everything will go off splendidly. Anybody can draw up a programme like that; but try to draw up a programme for the contingency that the best conditions don't exist. In answer to this argument, I assert that it is precisely having in view the contingency of the worst possible course or outcome of our revolution that my programme is particularly realistic and particularly "well shod", for it speaks of the confiscation of the landed estates and makes provision for questions such as that of renting land. But Comrade John's draft, which says nothing about these worst conditions, that is, about the absence of complete political democracy, merely provides for municipalisation; and municipalisation without the election of government officials by the people, without the abolition of the standing army, and so forth, is as dangerous as nationalisation, and even more so. That is why I insist on retaining all the "ifs" that Plekhanov has so unjustly condemned.

And so, the peasants will not accept municipalisation. Comrade Kartvelov[129] said that in the Caucasus the peasants

are fully in agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but they ask whether they will have the right to sell the land they obtain as a result of division, or of socialisation. Quite right, Comrade Kartvelov! Your observations fully coincide with the peasants' interests in general, and with the peasants' conception of their interests. But it is precisely because the peasants regard every agrarian reform from the point of view of whether they will have the right to sell the extra land they obtain that they will undoubtedly be opposed to municipalisation, or Zemstvo-isation. The peasants still confuse the Zemstvo with the rural superintendent, and they have much more reason to do so than is assumed by the haughty Cadet professors of law who scoff at the ignorance of the peasants. That is why, before speaking about municipalisation, it is necessary, absolutely necessary, to speak about the election of government officials by the people. At present, however, until this democratic demand is carried out, it is appropriate to speak only of confiscation in general, or of division of the land. That is why, to simplify matters for the Congress on this fundamental question, I propose the following: as Comrade Borisov's[130] programme has a number of features in common with mine and is based on the principle of division and not of nationalisation, I withdraw my programme and leave it to the Congress to express its opinion on the question of division or municipalisation. If you reject division—or perhaps it would be more correct to say "when" you reject division—I, of course, shall have to withdraw my draft for good, as hopeless. If, however, you accept division, I will submit my programme in its entirety as an amendment to Comrade Borisov's draft. I would also remind you, in reply to the reproach that I want to foist nationalisation on the peasants, that my programme contains "*Variant A*", which expressly speaks of removing any idea of foisting anything upon the peasants against their will. Hence the substitution of Borisov's draft for mine in the preliminary voting will not affect the substance of the matter in the least, and will only make it easier and simpler for us to ascertain what the Congress really wants. In my opinion, municipalisation is wrong and harmful; division is wrong, but not harmful.

I will refer briefly to the difference between the two.

The "divisionists" rightly interpret the facts, but they have forgotten what Marx said about the old materialism: "The materialists interpreted the world; the point, however, is not only to interpret the world, but to change it."[131] The peasant says: "The land is God's, the land is the people's, the land is nobody's." The "divisionists" tell us that the peasant says this without realising what he is saying; that he says one thing and means another. All that the peasants are really striving for, they tell us, is additional land; they want to enlarge their small farms, and no more. All this is quite true. But our disagreement with the "divisionists" does not end here, it only begins. We must use what the peasants say, even if it is economically unsound or meaningless, as a hook for our propaganda. We must say to them: You say that everybody ought to have the right to use the land? You want to transfer the land to the people? Excellent! But what does transferring the land to the people mean? Who controls the people's wealth and the people's property? The government officials, the Trepovs. Do you want to transfer the land to Trepov and to the government officials? No. Every peasant will say that it is not to them that he wants to transfer the land. Do you want to transfer the land to the Petrunkevich and Rodichevs,[132] who, perhaps, will sit on the municipal councils? No. The peasant will certainly not want to transfer the land to these gentlemen. Hence—we will explain to the peasants—if the land is to be transferred to the whole people in a way that will benefit the peasants, it is necessary to ensure that all government officials without exception are elected by the people. Hence my proposal for nationalisation, with the proviso that a democratic republic is fully guaranteed, suggests the right line of conduct to our propagandists and agitators; for it clearly and vividly shows them that discussion of the agrarian demands of the peasantry should serve as a basis for political propaganda in general, and for propaganda in favour of a republic in particular. For example, the peasant Mishin, who was elected to the Duma by the Stavropol peasants, brought with him an instruction from his electors which has been published in full in *Russkoye Gosudarstvo*.[133] In this instruction, the peasants demand the abolition of Zemstvo officials, the erection of elevators, and the transfer of all the

land to the state. This last demand is undoubtedly a reactionary prejudice, for in constitutional Russia today and tomorrow the state is and will be a police and military despotism. But we must not simply reject this demand as a harmful prejudice; we must "hook on" to it in order to explain to Mishin and his like how things really stand. We must tell Mishin and his like that the demand for the transfer of the land to the state expresses, although very badly, an idea that is extremely important and useful for the peasants. The transfer of the land to the state can and will be very useful for the peasants only when the state becomes a fully democratic republic, when all government officials are elected by the people, when the standing army is abolished, and so forth. For all these reasons I think that if you reject nationalisation, you will cause our practical workers, our propagandists and agitators, to make the same mistakes as we brought about by our mistaken demand for restitution of the cut-off lands in our programme of 1903. Just as our demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands was interpreted in a narrower sense than it was meant by its authors, so now rejection of nationalisation and its replacement by the demand for division, to say nothing of the utterly confused demand for municipalisation, will inevitably lead to so many mistakes by our practical workers, our propagandists and agitators, that very soon we shall regret having adopted the "division" or the municipalisation programme.

I will conclude by repeating my two main theses: first, the peasants will never agree to municipalisation; secondly, without a democratic republic, without the election of government officials by the people, municipalisation would be harmful.

2

SPEECH IN REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE CLASS TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

I shall try to keep to the most important points. Comrade Ptitsyn[134] reminded me of the saying: the ball comes to the player. He asked: "What makes the Bolsheviks think that the main form of the struggle now is breaking the laws, etc.?" Do take your Cadet spectacles off, Comrade Ptitsyn! It seems to you that parliamentarism is the main form of the struggle. Look at the unemployed movement, the movement among the armed forces, the peasant movement. The main form of the movement is not in the Duma; it can only play an indirect role. Comrade Plekhanov said that Hegel would have turned in his grave twice over had he heard my reference to him. But Comrade Plekhanov spoke before Comrade Ptitsyn, and it is to him that this remark applies. Comrade Ptitsyn worships the present; he sees only things that lie on the surface; he does not notice what is going on deep below the surface. He does not study things in their process of development. He thinks that talk about the head and the tail, about whether the proletariat should play the part of vanguard or rearguard, is mere phrase-mongering. This brought out all the more vividly the fundamental mistake of the Mensheviks. They do not see that the bourgeoisie is counter-revolutionary, that it is deliberately striving for a deal. They refer to the Jacobins, and say that they were naïve monarchists and yet became republicans. The Cadets, however, are not naïve, but deliberate monarchists. This is what the Mensheviks forget.

Our formidable Comrade Leonov[135] said: "Look, the 'Bolsheviks' talk about the revolutionary people; but so do the 'Mensheviks', in their resolution." Comrade Leonov mentioned Marx, who in his *Class Struggles in France* said that a republic is the supreme political form of the rule of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Leonov should have read on. He would have found that the republic was imposed on the bourgeoisie by a temporary situation and that, having broken up into two factions—Legitimists and Orleanists[136]—it endured the republic against its will.[137]

Dan said: "The 'Bolsheviks' ignore the importance of political organisation." That is not true; but it would be merely a truism to talk about the importance of organisation in general. The point is, what particular forms of political organisation are necessary today? We must say on what ground we are building a political organisation. The "Mensheviks" take as their premise an upsurge of the revolution, and yet recommend tactics that would be suitable for a decline, and not for an upsurge, of the revolution. In this way they play into the hands of the Cadets, who are doing everything to discredit the period of October-December. The "Mensheviks" talk about an explosion. Put that word into the resolution. If you do, the present form of the movement —the elections to the State Duma, and so forth—will appear only as a transitory form.

Comrade Dan said: "The slogans of the 'Minority' have been confirmed"; and he referred to revolutionary local self-government bodies, to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. But take Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*, No. 5. There Plekhanov says that revolutionary local self-government "misleads people". But whom has this slogan misled, and when? We have never repudiated this slogan; but we regarded it as inadequate. It is half-hearted; it is not a slogan of victorious revolution. The reference to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies is beside the point. We have not yet discussed them.

Plekhanov's mistake is that he does not at all analyse the forms of the movement in October. He said: "Soviets of Workers' Deputies are desirable and necessary." But he has not taken the trouble to investigate what Soviets of Workers' Deputies are. What are they? Organs of revolutionary local self-government, or rudimentary organs of authority? I

assert, and this thesis cannot be refuted, that they represent a struggle by means of revolutionary authority. This, and this alone, is the characteristic that distinguishes the struggle in October-December from the present struggle; we cannot impose any particular form of struggle on the movement.

Plekhanov said: "Bernstein was praised for his theory, for having abandoned theoretical Marxism, whereas I was praised for my tactics." The situation is different now," said Comrade Plekhanov. To this Comrade Varshavsky rightly answered that Bernstein was praised for his tactics, for trying to blunt antagonisms, as the Cadets are doing. Bernstein tried to blunt social contradictions on the eve of the socialist revolution. Plekhanov is trying to blunt political contradictions at the height of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. That is why the Cadets are praising Plekhanov and the Mensheviks.

Comrade Plekhanov said: "We do not reject the seizure of power, but we want it to be seized in the way it was done in the period of the Convention,[138] and not by conspirators." Well, put that into your resolution, "Menshevik" comrades. Reject Leninism, denounce the Socialist-Revolutionary conspirators, and so on, and so forth; that doesn't frighten me in the least. But put in a clause about seizing power on the lines of the Convention, and we will sign that resolution with both hands. But remember, Comrade Plekhanov: as soon as you do that, the Cadets will stop praising you —they really will.

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE STATE DUMA SUBMITTED TO THE UNITY CONGRESS[139]

Whereas:

(1) the election Law of December 11 and the conditions in which the elections were actually conducted prevented the proletariat and the Social-Democratic Party from participating in the elections by putting up and independently securing the election of real Party candidates;

(2) in view of this, the real significance of participation by the workers in the elections was bound to, and as experience has shown, actually did, lead to the obscuring of the strictly class position of the proletariat as a consequence of agreements with the Cadets or other bourgeois groups;

(3) only complete and consistent boycott enabled the Social-Democrats to maintain the slogan of convening a constituent assembly by revolutionary means, to place all responsibility for the State Duma on the Cadet Party and to warn the proletariat and the peasant or revolutionary democrats against constitutional illusions;

(4) the State Duma, with its now evident (predominantly) Cadet composition, cannot possibly fulfil the function of a real representative of the people, and can only indirectly help to develop a new, wider and deeper revolutionary crisis;

We are of the opinion and propose that the Congress should agree:

(1) that by boycotting the State Duma and the Duma elections, the Party organisations acted correctly;

(2) that the attempt to form a Social-Democratic parliamentary group in present political conditions, and in view

of the absence in the Duma of really party Social-Democrats capable of representing the Social-Democratic Party, holds out no promise of reasonable success, but rather threatens to compromise the R.S.D.L.P. and place upon it responsibility for a particularly harmful type of parliamentarians, midway between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats;

(3) that in view of the foregoing, conditions do not yet exist to enable our Party to take the parliamentary path;

(4) that the Social-Democrats must utilise the State Duma and its conflicts with the government, or the conflicts within the Duma itself, fighting its reactionary elements, ruthlessly exposing the inconsistency and vacillation of the Cadets, paying particular attention to the peasant revolutionary democrats, uniting them, contrasting them with the Cadets, supporting such of their actions as are in the interests of the proletariat, and preparing to call upon the proletariat to launch a determined attack on the autocracy at the moment when, perhaps, in connection with a crisis in the Duma, the general revolutionary crisis becomes most acute;

(5) in view of the possibility that the government will dissolve the State Duma and convene a new Duma, this Congress resolves that in the subsequent election campaign no blocs or agreements shall be permitted with the Cadet Party or any similar non-revolutionary elements; as for the question whether our Party should take part in a new election campaign, it will be decided by the Russian Social-Democrats in accordance with the concrete circumstances prevailing at the time.

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4

CO-REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE DUMA

Comrades, I will not read you the Bolshevik resolution, as in all probability you are all familiar with it. (*Nevertheless, in response to requests from delegates, the speaker reads the Bolshevik resolution again.*) If you compare this resolution with that of the Mensheviks, you will find the following four main points of difference, or four main defects in the latter:

(1) The Menshevik resolution contains no appraisal of the elections, no assessment of the objective results of our political experience in this field.

(2) This resolution is permeated with an imprudent, to put it mildly, or optimistic attitude towards the State Duma.

(3) The resolution does not clearly distinguish the various trends or parties among the bourgeois democrats, from the point of view of our tactics towards them.

(4) Your resolution proposes that a parliamentary group be formed under conditions and at a time when the value of such a step for the proletarian party cannot in any way be proved.

Such are the real disagreements between us, if we examine our disagreements seriously, and not seize upon words or trivialities.

Let us examine these four points.

It is highly important to sum up our experience of the elections if we want to base our conclusions on the actual alignment of political forces, and not on general phrases about parliamentarism in general, and so forth. We have advanced, and advance today, the very definite proposition

that participation in the elections really means supporting the Cadets; that participation is impossible without blocs with the Cadets. Do you analyse the substance of this proposition? Do you examine the situation in the light of the actual facts on this question? Nothing of the kind. Axelrod completely evaded the first two points, and on the next two he made two contradictory statements. At first he referred to blocs with the Cadets in general in the most disparaging terms. Then he said that he would have no objection to such blocs, provided, of course, they were not arranged by the old hole-and-corner methods and backstairs agreements, but by public and direct methods visible to the whole proletariat. This last "proposition" of Axelrod's is a magnificent specimen of "Cadet" dreaming, of real "pious wishes" engendered by constitutional illusions. In reality we have no constitution and no basis for open activities; what we have is Dubasov "constitutionalism". Axelrod's dreams will remain empty dreams, while the Cadets will obtain real benefit from the agreements, tacit or signed, formal or informal.

And when people talk about our "self-elimination" from the elections, they always forget that it was the political conditions and not our desire that kept our Party out; kept it out of newspapers and meetings; prevented us from putting up prominent members of the Party as candidates. In these circumstances, parliamentarism is a futile and pitiful game rather than a means of educating the proletariat. It is naïve to take parliamentarism "in its pure form", as an "idea", isolated from the real situation.

When people talk about the elections they usually forget that actually the contest took place, on the basis of Dubasov constitutionalism, between two strong "parties"—the Cadets and the Black Hundreds. The Cadets were right when they told the voters that any split in the vote, any nomination of "third" candidates, could lead only to the victory of the Black Hundreds. Take the case of Moscow, for example. Guchkov receives, say, 900 votes and the Cadet, 1,300. It would have been enough for the Social-Democrats to obtain 401 votes for the Black-Hundred candidate to win. Thus the Cadets rightly understood the significance of Social-Democratic participation in the elections (they gave the Moscow workers a seat in the State Duma as a reward for

participating in the elections), while you Mensheviks misunderstand its significance and thus indulge in an empty and idle dream. Either don't take up parliamentarism and don't talk commonplaces about it, or take it up seriously. Your present position is no use at all.

The second point. Axelrod in his speech even more glaringly revealed the defects in the resolution that I have pointed to. The resolution speaks of transforming the Duma into an instrument of the revolution. You regard the Duma exclusively in the light of the pressure the government exercises on us, of the government's efforts to crush the revolution. We regard the State Duma as a body that represents a definite class, as an institution that has a definite party composition. Your argument is absolutely wrong, incomplete and non-Marxist in its approach. You fail to take into account the Duma's internal structure, which is conditioned by the class composition of the Cadet Party. You say that the government is strangling the revolution, but you forget to add that the Cadets have already fully displayed their desire to extinguish it. A Cadet Duma cannot but display the characteristics of the Cadet Party. You completely overlook the example of the Frankfurt Parliament which, although a representative institution in a revolutionary period, betrayed an obvious desire to extinguish the revolution (owing to the petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness and cowardice of the Frankfurt windbags).

The reference to "authority recognised by the tsar and established by law", is most unfortunate in a Social-Democratic resolution. The Duma is not really an authority. The reference to the law does not strengthen, but weakens your whole argument and all your agitational slogans that follow from this resolution. Witte will most readily of all appeal to the "law" and to the "will of the tsar", in thwarting the slightest attempt of the Duma to go beyond the ridiculously narrow limits of its powers. Not the Social-Democrats, but *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* stands to gain by these references to the tsar and the law.

I come now to the third point. A fundamental mistake in the resolution, and one closely connected with all the preceding ones, is the absence of a clear characterisation of the Cadets, the refusal to expose all their tactics, the failure

to draw a distinction between the Cadets and the peasant and revolutionary democrats. Yet it is the Cadets who are masters of the situation in the present Duma. And these Cadets have already revealed more than once their betrayal of the "people's freedom". When, after the elections, the amiable windbag Vodovozov, wanting to be more Left than the Cadets, reminded the latter of the promises they had made about a constituent assembly, and so forth, Rech, adopting a "Great Power" tone, rudely and coarsely told him that it did not need gratuitous advice.

And your resolution is equally mistaken as regards the striving to weaken the revolution. As I have already said, this striving exists not only in the government, but also in those petty-bourgeois compromisers who are now making the most noise on the surface of our political life.

Your resolution says that the Duma is trying to lean on the people. This is only half true, and therefore not true at all. What is the State Duma? Is it tolerable that we should confine ourselves to general references to this institution, instead of analysing the classes and parties that actually determine its content and significance? Which Duma is striving to lean on the people? Not the Octobrist Duma, because such a striving is totally alien to the Octobrists. And not the peasant Duma, for the peasant deputies are an inseparable part of the people, and there is no need for them to "strive to lean on the people". The *striving* to lean on the people is characteristic precisely of the *Cadet* Duma. But characteristic of the Cadets is both their striving to lean on the people and their *fear* of independent revolutionary activity by the people. By pointing to one aspect of the question and saying nothing at all about the second, your resolution presents not only a wrong, but a positively harmful picture. Objectively, silence on this second aspect—which is emphasised in our resolution on the attitude to be adopted towards other parties—is the utterance of a lie.

In defining our tactics towards the bourgeois democrats we cannot possibly remain silent about the Cadets, or refrain from criticising them sharply. We can, and must, seek the support only of the peasant and revolutionary democrats, and not of those who try to blunt the political contradictions of the present time.

Lastly, let us glance at the proposal to form a parliamentary group. Even the Mensheviks dare not deny that Social-Democrats must handle this new weapon, "parliamentarism", very cautiously. They are quite ready to admit this "in principle". But the point now is not admitting things in principle; the point is to make a correct appraisal of concrete conditions. Recognition of caution "in principle" is worthless if actual conditions transform this recognition into innocent and idle dreams. The comrades from the Caucasus, for example, talk very finely about independent elections, about purely Party candidates and about repudiating blocs with the Cadets. But what are these fine phrases worth when—as one of the comrades from the Caucasus informed me in conversation—in Tiflis, that Menshevik stronghold in the Caucasus, the Left Cadet Argutinsky will probably be elected and, probably, not without the aid of the Social-Democrats? What good are our wishes for public and open statements before the masses if we only have—as we have now—the *Partiiniye Izvestia* of the Central Committee against a host of Cadet newspapers?

Note also that even the most optimistic Social-Democrats hope to get their candidates elected only through the peasant curia. Thus they want to "start parliamentarism" in the practice of the workers' party with the petty-bourgeois, semi-Socialist-Revolutionary curia and not with the workers' curia. Just think, which has most chance of emerging out of this situation—a Social-Democratic or a non-Social-Democratic workers' policy?

5

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF ARMED UPRISING

A comrade stated recently that we were collecting material for agitation against the decisions of the Congress. I at once answered that this was a very strange thing to say about voting by roll-call. Anyone who is dissatisfied with the Congress decisions will always agitate against them.[140] Comrade Vorobyov[141] said that the "Mensheviks" could not work in one party with us "Bolsheviks". I am glad that Comrade Vorobyov was the first to raise this subject. I have not the slightest doubt that his statement will serve as "material for agitation". But material for agitation on questions of principle is more important, of course. And better material for agitation against the present Congress than your resolution against armed uprising could not be imagined.[142]

Plekhanov said that this important question ought to be discussed calmly. He is a thousand times right. Calm discussion, however, is indicated, not by the absence of debate before and at the Congress, but by the really calm and practical content of the resolutions to be discussed. And precisely from this standpoint, a comparison of the two resolutions is particularly edifying. It is not the polemics in the "Menshevik" resolution that we object to—Plekhanov entirely misunderstood what Comrade Winter[143] said on that score—it is not the polemics we object to, but the petty, paltry polemics running through the "Menshevik" resolution. Take the question of appraising the experience of the past, the question of the criticism of the proletarian movement by the conscious exponent of that movement, the Social-Democratic Party. Here criticism and "polemics" are absolutely essential; but it must be open, straightforward, obvious and clear criticism

and not petty attacks, pinpricks or intellectual insinuations. And so our resolution, scientifically summing up the experience of the past year, straightforwardly criticises and says: the peaceful strike has proved to be "dissipation of forces", it is becoming obsolete. Insurrection is becoming the main form of struggle, and strikes the auxiliary form. Take the "Menshevik" resolution. Instead of calm discussion, instead of a consideration of experience, instead of a study of the relationship between strikes and insurrection, we get a covert, sneakingly covert renunciation of the December uprising. Your resolution is thoroughly saturated with Plekhanov's view: "It was wrong to take up arms" (although the majority of the "Mensheviks" in Russia have declared that they do not agree with Plekhanov). Comrade Cherevanin completely gave himself away in his speech when, in order to defend the "Menshevik" resolution, he had to depict the December uprising as a hopeless manifestation of "despair", as an insurrection which did not prove in the least that armed struggle is possible.

Kautsky, as you know, has expressed a different opinion. He has admitted that the December uprising in Russia makes it necessary to "reconsider" Engels's view that barricade fighting was no longer possible, and that the December uprising marks the *beginning* of new tactics. K. Kautsky's view may be wrong, of course, and the "Mensheviks" may be nearer to the truth. If you attach any value to "calm" and serious discussion, and not to petty criticism, you should openly and straightforwardly express your opinion in your resolution and say: "It was wrong to take up arms." But it is impermissible to express this view in a resolution covertly, without definitely formulating it. It is this sneaking, covert disavowal of the December insurrection, unsupported by the slightest criticism of past experience, that is the main and vast defect in your resolution. And it is this defect that provides an enormous amount of material for agitation against a resolution which virtually inclines towards Comrade Akimov's views, only hiding its rough edges.[144]

The first clause in your resolution suffers from the same defect. It starts with a *platitude*, for "stupid stubbornness" is typical of all reactionary governments; but this in itself does not prove that insurrection is necessary and inevitable.[145]

"Wrest power" is the same as "seize power", and it is amusing to note that those who opposed the latter term accepted the former. Thereby they revealed the hollowness of all their declamations against Narodnaya Volya-ism, etc. Comrade Plekhanov's proposal to substitute the term "wrest their rights" for "wrest power" is particularly unfortunate, because *this* is a purely Cadet formula. The main thing, I repeat, is that your resolution approaches the question of "wresting power" and of armed uprising on the basis of unproved and unprovable platitudes, and not of a study and consideration of past experience and of the facts about the growth of the movement.

6

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MURATOV'S (MOROZOV'S) AMENDMENT CONCERNING A PARLIAMENTARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP[146]

Comrade Muratov has relinquished to me the right to reply to the debate. It is quite untrue that he is forcing an open door. On the contrary, it is he who is opening it. His amendment puts the question squarely. This Congress has approved tactics different from those used by the workers in many places; in forming a Party group in the Duma, it is necessary to prevent sharp conflicts, and to ask the workers whether they wish to be represented in the Duma by those they did not participate in electing.

7

DISSENTING OPINION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

FROM MARX TO MAO

I

Regarding the rejection of Stodolin's[147] amendment as a departure even from the principles of parliamentarism, I declare that I am submitting a dissenting opinion on this question.

II

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In accordance with the declaration I have already submitted, I enclose herewith my dissenting opinion on the question of Stodolin's amendment.

In his amendment, Comrade Stodolin proposed that the official parliamentary group of the R.S.D.L.P. should consist exclusively of Party members who not only work in one of the Party organisations, and not only submit to the Party as a whole, and to their Party organisations in particular, but who, in addition, have been put up as candidates by the latter (i.e., the respective Party organisations).

Consequently Comrade Stodolin wanted our first Social-Democratic steps on the path of parliamentarism to be taken exclusively on the direct instructions of the respective organisations, and in their name. It is not enough that members of the parliamentary group should belong to one of the Party organisations. In view of the conditions prevailing in Russia, this does not preclude the most undesirable incidents, for our Party organisations cannot exercise open and

public control over their members. It is highly important therefore that our first steps on the path of parliamentarism should be accompanied by every precaution devised by the experience of the socialist parties in Europe. The West-European parties, and particularly their Left wings, even insist on parliamentary candidates being nominated by the local party organisations by agreement with the Central Committees. The revolutionary Social-Democrats in Europe have very serious grounds for demanding this *triple* control over their members of parliament: first, the general control that the party exercises over all its members; secondly, the special control of the local organisations who nominate the parliamentary candidates in their own name; and thirdly, the special control of the Central Committee, which, standing above local influences and local conditions, must see to it that only such parliamentary candidates are nominated as satisfy general party and general political requirements.

By rejecting Comrade Stodolin's amendment, by rejecting the demand that the parliamentary group should consist exclusively of those whom the Party organisations had directly nominated as parliamentary candidates, by rejecting this demand, the Congress has revealed far less prudence in parliamentary tactics than the West-European revolutionary Social-Democrats. And yet there can hardly be any doubt that, in view of the especially difficult conditions prevailing in Russia for the public activities of the Social-Democrats, we unquestionably require far greater prudence than that prompted by the experience of the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Western Europe.

8

RESOLUTION ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE TO THE CONGRESS

This Congress makes it the duty of the Credentials Committee to present reports that will show the considerations which guided the organisation in electing delegates to the Congress, and the criterion applied in determining Party membership.

9

STATEMENT ON THE NECESSITY OF THE CONGRESS APPROVING THE MINUTES

All minutes should be approved by the Congress. Hence the official minutes will be those kept by the secretaries. Stenographers should record only individual speeches.

10

WRITTEN STATEMENT AT THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

I did not say that the Tiflis comrades had decided to secure the election of Argutinsky. I said that Argutinsky's victory was considered probable, and moreover, probably not without help from the Social-Democrats.

11

WRITTEN STATEMENT AT THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

We declare that to describe voting on important questions by roll-call as "material for agitation against the authoritative character of Congress decisions" means to misunderstand the role of the Congress or to display narrow factionalism.

12

WRITTEN STATEMENTS AT THE TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

I

It is not true that I "supported" Comrade Vorobyov's statement that the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks cannot work together in one party. I did not in any way "support" such an assertion, and *do not share that opinion at all*. The sense of my statement: "I am glad Comrade Vorobyov was the *first* to say that," was purely ironical; for the victors, having a majority at the Congress, only revealed their weakness by being the *first* to speak of a split.

II

I propose that the following note be added to the rules on amalgamation with the Bund:

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to give effect to these rules immediately after they are confirmed by the Bund.

AN APPEAL TO THE PARTY BY DELEGATES TO THE UNITY CONGRESS WHO BELONGED TO THE FORMER "BOLSHEVIK" GROUP[148]

Comrades,

The Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. has been held. The split no longer exists. Not only have the former "Bolshevik" and "Menshevik" factions completely amalgamated organisationally, but unity has also been achieved between the R.S.D.L.P. and the Polish Social-Democrats,[149] a unity agreement has been signed with the Lettish Social-Democrats,[150] and unity has been assured with the Jewish Social-Democrats, i.e., the Bund.[151] The political significance of these events would have been very great in any circumstances, but it is truly enormous in the historic period through which we are now passing.

The fate of the great Russian revolution is apparently to be determined in the near future. The proletariat leading the broad masses of the town and rural poor has been marching at the head of the revolution from the very beginning of the movement up to this day. In view of the coming formidable, decisive events in the people's struggle, it is all the more essential to attain the practical unity of the class-conscious proletariat of the whole of Russia, and of all her nationalities. In a revolutionary epoch like the present, all theoretical errors and tactical deviations of the Party are most ruthlessly criticised by experience itself, which enlightens and educates the working class with unprecedented rapidity. At such a time, the duty of every Social-Democrat is to strive to ensure that the ideological struggle within the Party on questions

of theory and tactics is conducted as openly, widely and freely as possible, but that on no account does it disturb or hamper the unity of revolutionary action of the Social-Democratic proletariat .

The great Russian revolution is now on the eve of its turning-point. The struggle waged by all classes of bourgeois Russia against the autocracy brought into being a paper constitution. A section of the bourgeoisie is completely satisfied with this and has turned away from the revolution. Another section, wishing to go further, deludes itself with hopes of a "constitutional" path of struggle, and is ready to regard the election victory of the wavering and hypocritical bourgeois Cadet Party as an important victory for people's freedom.

The broad masses of the peasants, fighting courageously against old, semi-feudal Russia, against the omnipotence of officials and the yoke of the landlords, remain on the side of the revolution, but they are far from being fully class-conscious. The revolutionary-democratic section of the town petty bourgeoisie also shows but little political awareness. Only the proletariat, which fought heroically for freedom in October, and took up arms in defence of it in December, remains, as before, a consistently revolutionary class, which is gathering fresh forces and is now consciously preparing for a new and still greater battle.

The tsarist government is now with cynical frankness playing at a constitution. It retains its former power, it continues and intensifies the persecution of the fighters for liberty, its obvious intention is to make the Duma a futile talking shop, a screen for the autocracy, an instrument for deceiving the people. Whether these tactics will be crowned with success or not will be decided in the very near future, by the outcome of the new revolutionary explosion now coming to a head.

If the proletariat of the whole of Russia closes its ranks, if it succeeds in rousing all the genuinely revolutionary sections of the people, all those who want to fight and not to strike a bargain, if it trains itself well for the struggle and selects the proper moment for the final battle for freedom, it will be victorious. Then the tsar's cynical playing at a constitution will fail; then the bourgeoisie will not succeed in striking

a bargain with the autocracy; then the Russian revolution will not turn out to be as incomplete, half-hearted, and three-fourths fruitless for the interests of the working class and the peasants, as were the revolutions of the nineteenth century in Western Europe. Then it will really be a great revolution, a complete victory of the people's uprising will free bourgeois Russia of all the old fetters, and will perhaps open the epoch of socialist revolution in the West.

While striving for a complete democratic revolution, Social-Democrats must in all their work reckon with the inevitability of a new revolutionary explosion. We must ruthlessly expose the constitutional illusions fostered both by the government and by the bourgeoisie as represented by its liberal party—the Cadets; we must call upon the revolutionary peasantry to close its ranks for the sake of a complete victory of a peasant uprising; we must explain to the masses of the people the great importance of the first December uprising and the inevitability of a new revolt, which alone will be able really to wrest power from the tsarist autocracy and really transfer it to the people. Such must be the basic aims of our tactics at the present moment in history.

We cannot and must not conceal the fact that we are profoundly convinced that the Unity Congress did not quite appreciate these tasks. The three most important resolutions of the Congress clearly bear the stamp of the erroneous views of the former "Menshevik" faction, which numerically was predominant at the Congress.

The Congress accepted the principle of "municipalisation" in its agrarian programme. Municipalisation means peasant ownership of allotment land and the renting by the peasants of the landed estates transferred to the Zemstvos. This, in effect, is something midway between real agrarian revolulion and Cadet agrarian reform. The peasants will not accept such a plan. They will either demand the simple division of the land, or its complete transfer to the people as their property. Municipalisation would be a serious democratic reform only in the event of a complete democratic revolution, if a republican regime were established and if government officials were elected by the people. We proposed to the Congress that it should at least link municipalisation with these conditions, but the Congress rejected our proposal. And without

these conditions municipalisation, as a liberal bureaucratic reform, will give the peasants something very different from what they require, and at the same time it will give new strength, new influence to the bourgeois anti-proletarian elements which dominate the Zemstvos. For it virtually puts the distribution of the land into their hands. We must explain this point to the broad masses of the workers and peasants.

In its resolution on the Duma, the Congress declared it desirable that a Social-Democratic parliamentary group in this Duma should be formed. The Congress refused to reckon with the fact that nine-tenths of the class-conscious workers of Russia, including all the Polish, Lettish and Jewish Social-Democratic proletarians, boycotted the Duma. The Congress rejected a proposal to make participation in the elections conditional on whether it would be possible to conduct really wide agitation among the masses. It rejected a proposal that only those whom workers' organisations had nominated for election to the Duma could be members of the Social-Democratic parliamentary group. The Congress, therefore, embarked on parliamentarism without even providing the safeguards for the Party which in this connection have been produced by the experience of revolutionary Social-Democrats in Europe.

As Social-Democrats we, of course, have recognised the obligation in principle of using parliamentarism as a weapon of the proletarian struggle. But the point is whether it is admissible for Social-Democrats to take part, in present conditions, in a "parliament" like our Duma. Is it admissible to form a parliamentary group without Social-Democratic members of parliament elected by workers' organisations? Our opinion is that it is not.

The Congress rejected the proposal to make it one of the tasks of the Party to combat playing at constitutionalism, to combat constitutional illusions. The Congress stated no opinion on the dual nature of the Cadet Party, which is predominant in the Duma and which inclines so strongly towards making a deal with the autocracy, towards blunting and putting an end to the revolution. The Congress allowed itself to be too greatly impressed by the fleeting and tinsel success of the party of bourgeois compromisers between the autocracy and people's freedom.

Nor, in its resolutions on the armed uprising, did the Congress provide what was necessary, namely, direct criticism of the mistakes of the proletariat, a clear assessment of the experience of October-December 1905—it did not even attempt in them to study the relationship between strike and insurrection. Instead of all this, a sort of timid evasion of the armed uprising predominates in the resolutions. The Congress did not openly and clearly tell the working class that the December uprising was a mistake; but at the same time, in a covert way, it condemned that uprising. We think that this is more likely to befog the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat than to promote it.

We must and shall fight ideologically against those decisions of the Congress which we regard as erroneous. But at the same time we declare to the whole Party that we are opposed to a split of any kind. We stand for submission to the decisions of the Congress. Rejecting boycott of the Central Committee and valuing joint work, we agreed to those who share our views going on the Central Committee, although they will comprise a negligible minority in it. We are profoundly convinced that the workers' Social-Democratic organisations must be united, but in these united organisations there must be wide and free discussion of Party questions, free comradely criticism and assessment of events in Party life.

On the question of organisation, we differed only as regards the rights of the editorial board of the Central Organ. We insisted on the right of the Central Committee to appoint and dismiss the editors of the Central Organ.[152] We were all agreed on the principle of democratic centralism, on guarantees for the rights of all minorities and for all loyal opposition, on the autonomy of every Party organisation, on recognising that all Party functionaries must be elected, accountable to the Party and subject to recall. We see the observance in practice of these principles of organisation, their sincere and consistent application, as a guarantee against splits, a guarantee that the ideological struggle in the Party can and must prove fully consistent with strict organisational unity, with the submission of all to the decisions of the Unity Congress.

We call upon all our fellow-thinkers to accept such submission and such ideological struggle: we invite all the members

of the Party carefully to assess the resolutions of the Congress. Revolution teaches: and we believe that practical unity in struggle of the Social-Democratic proletariat throughout Russia will safeguard our Party against fatal errors during the climax of the impending political crisis. In the course of the fight, events themselves will suggest to the working masses the right tactics to adopt. Let us do all in our power to ensure that our estimate of these tactics contributes to the fulfilment of the tasks of revolutionary Social-Democracy, to prevent the workers' party from deviating from the consistent proletarian path to hunt after some cheap fleeting success, so that the socialist proletariat may perform to the end its great role of vanguard fighter for liberty!

Written on April 25-26
(May 8-9), 1906
Published in leaflet form

Published according
to the leaflet text

REPORT
ON THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

A LETTER TO THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS[153]

Written early in May 1906

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Published according
to the pamphlet text

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ.

ДОКЛАДЪ

ОБЪ ОБЪЕДИНИТЕЛЬНОМЪ СЪѢЗДѢ РОССІЙСКОЙ СОЦІАЛЪ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ

(Письмо къ петербургскимъ рабочимъ).

Цѣна 25 коп.

МОСКВА.
1906.

Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
Report on the Unity Congress
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, 1906
Reduced

Comrades, you elected me your delegate to the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. As I am unable to come to St. Petersburg at present, permit me to send my report in writing and, in passing, to express a few ideas on the Congress.

Before proceeding with the subject, I must make an important reservation. It is quite impossible for me to remember in detail everything that happened at the Congress, at which there were one hundred and twenty or more delegates, and which held about thirty sessions. Being a member of the Bureau of the Congress, and one of the chairmen, and a member of several committees in addition, I was unable to take notes during the sessions. One cannot entirely trust one's memory without notes. Besides, being absent from the hall while engaged in work in committees, or for casual or personal reasons, I did not witness a number of episodes at the Congress, nor did I hear all the speeches. The experience of previous congresses (the Second and the Third), which were attended by fewer delegates, has convinced me that, even if one pays the closest attention to the proceedings, one cannot draw an exact picture of the congress from memory. When the minutes of the Second and Third Congresses appeared, I read them as if they were new books, although I myself was present at those congresses; for these books really provided me with much new material and compelled me to revise a number of inexact or incomplete personal impressions. Therefore I earnestly request you to bear in mind that this letter is only a rough outline of a report, subject, at all events, to correction on the basis of the minutes of the Congress.

I

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS

I will start with the general composition of the Congress. As you know, delegates with the right to vote were elected on the basis of one per 300 Party members. There were in all about 110 such delegates—at the beginning of the Congress, I think, slightly less (not all had arrived); at the close there were as many as 113. Delegates with a consultative voice were the 5 editors of the Central Organ (3 from the "Minority" and 2 from the "Majority", for you had given me a full mandate) and five, if I am not mistaken, members of the Joint Central Committee. Then also, there were delegates with consultative voice from organisations who had not been granted full mandates, and several persons who had been especially invited to the Congress (two members of the "Agrarian Committee", Plekhanov and Axelrod, Comrade Akimov, and several others). There were also several consultative delegates from large organisations having over 900 members (from St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Southern regional organisation, and others). Lastly, there were consultative delegates representing the national Social-Democratic parties: three each from the Polish Social-Democratic Party, the Lettish Social-Democratic and the Jewish organisation (the Bund), and one from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (it appears that this is the name that the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party[154] adopted at its last conference). Thus there were 30 delegates, or a little more, with a consultative voice. The total number present was therefore not 120, but over 140.

Taken according to their "trend" in relation to the tactical platforms, or their factional position, if you will, the delegates with the right to vote were divided approximately as follows: 62 Mensheviks and 46 Bolsheviks. At all events, these are the figures that impressed themselves most on my mind during the numerous "factional" votes that took place at the Congress. Some of the delegates, of course, were indefinite, or wavered on certain questions; these were what in parliamentary language are called the "Centre", or the "Marsh". This "Centre" was very feeble at the Congress, although a number of comrades whom I have

grouped with the Mensheviks according to the voting, claimed to be "conciliators", or the "Centre". Of all the more or less important votes that were taken at the Congress, I remember only one (that on the question of the Bund's affiliation to the Party) in which these "Menshevik conciliators" did not vote on factional lines. With this vote, in which, as far as I remember, the definitely factional Mensheviks were beaten by a majority of 59, I will deal in detail later on.

Thus, 62 and 46. The Congress was a Menshevik congress. The Mensheviks had a solid and safe majority, which enabled them to come to terms with one another beforehand and thus predetermine the decisions of the Congress. Strictly speaking, these private arrangements at factional meetings are quite natural when there is a definite and compact majority; and when several delegates, particularly those from the so-called Centre, complained about this, I said in conversation with the delegates that it was "the Centre complaining about its own weakness". Attempts were made at the Congress to raise the question of these factional meetings, but it was dropped, for it turned out that the factions had become closely welded just the same, and it became possible to allow outsiders to attend the factional meetings, to allow them to become "open" meetings. Towards the close of the Congress, for example, the question of the composition of the Central Committee was virtually decided, as will be seen later on, not by the voting in open Congress, but simply by an "agreement" between the factions. I will not pass any opinion on this; and I think it is useless bewailing it, because it is absolutely inevitable so long as the old factional divisions exist.

As regards divisions within the factions, I will note that they were marked only on the agrarian question (a section of the Mensheviks were opposed to municipalisation, while the Bolsheviks were divided into "Rozhkovists"—that is, those who advocated the division of the land—and the advocates of confiscation, with nationalisation in the event of a republic being established); and on the question of the affiliation of the Bund. Further, a striking thing was the complete absence among the Mensheviks of the trend that was so clearly revealed in *Nachalo*, and which in the Party we are accustomed to connect with the names of Comrades Parvus and Trotsky. True, it is quite possible that there were some

"Parvusites" and "Trotskyites" among the Mensheviks—I was told that there were about eight of them—but, owing to the removal from the agenda of the question of the provisional revolutionary government, they had no opportunity of making a show. It is probable, however, that in view of the general turn that the Mensheviks made at the Congress towards Plekhanov, with whose *Dnevnik* they had disagreed before the Congress, the "Parvusites" also took a step to the right. I remember only one episode in which, perhaps, the "Parvusites" among the Mensheviks made them all slightly change their attitude. It was an incident over the question of armed uprising. Plekhanov, the chairman of the committee, had altered the original Menshevik resolution, and instead of "wrest power" (this part of the resolution concerned the aims of the movement) inserted "wrest rights by force" (or "capture rights"—I don't quite remember which). The opportunism of this alteration was so glaring that the most heated protests were raised against it in open Congress. We attacked the alteration with redoubled vigour. The ranks of the Mensheviks wavered. I do not know exactly whether any factional meetings had been held, or what took place at them if they were; nor can I vouch for the truth of the statement made to me that ten Mensheviks who were inclined towards "Parvusism" had emphatically declared their disagreement with the alteration. The fact is that, after the debates in open Congress, Plekhanov himself withdrew the alteration and did not allow it to be put to a vote; did this on the pretext (a skilful piece of diplomacy, perhaps, but it raised a smile) that it was not worth arguing about questions of "style".

Lastly, to finish with the composition of the Congress, I will say something about the Credentials Committee (the committee which scrutinised the credentials of the delegates). There were two such committees, for the first one elected by the Congress resigned in a body.[155] This was a most extraordinary affair, and had never occurred at previous congresses. At all events, it was evidence of something extremely abnormal in the work of scrutinising the credentials. I remember that the chairman of the first committee was a conciliator, who at first had the confidence of our faction, too. But since he proved unable to weld his committee together, and since he and the whole committee

were compelled to resign, it shows that this conciliator was unable to conciliate. The details of the fight at the Congress over the reports of the Credentials Committee have escaped my attention most of all. The fight was often a very heated one, Bolshevik credentials were annulled, passions rose, and things reached their climax with the resignation of the first committee; but I was not in the hall at that time. I remember yet another, evidently fairly big, incident over this work of determining the composition of the Congress. It was a protest sent by a number of workers in Tiflis (about 200, I think) against the mandate of the Tiflis delegation, which consisted almost entirely of Mensheviks and was extraordinarily large, with as many as eleven members, I think. The protest was read at the Congress and should therefore appear in the minutes.[156]

The record of the proceedings of the Credentials Committees should also appear in the minutes, that is, if the committees have performed their functions at all carefully, and have drawn up proper reports on the scrutiny of the credentials and of all the elections for the Congress. Whether they have done this, and whether the reports will appear in the minutes, I cannot say. If not, it will prove beyond doubt that the committees have not performed their functions with the necessary care and attention. If the reports do appear in the minutes, then I may have to correct a great deal of what I have said above, for on a question like this, which is not one of principle, but a purely concrete and practical question, it is particularly easy to make mistakes in forming general impressions, and it is particularly important carefully to study the records.

Incidentally, to finish with all the formalities and to proceed with the more interesting questions of principle, I will say something about the minutes. I am afraid that in this respect, too, the Congress will prove to be less satisfactory than the Second and Third Congresses. At both the previous congresses the minutes were adopted in their entirety by the Congress. At the Unity Congress the secretaries, for the first time, proved to be so inefficient, there was such a hurry to finish the Congress (in spite of the fact that a number of extremely important questions had been withdrawn from the agenda), that *not all* the minutes were

passed by the Congress. The Minutes Committee (consisting of two Mensheviks and two Bolsheviks) was given unprecedentedly wide and indefinite powers: to adopt the unfinished minutes. In the event of disagreement, it is to appeal to the Congress delegates who are in St. Petersburg. All this is very deplorable. I am afraid that we shall not get as good minutes as we have of the Second and Third Congresses. True, we had two stenographers, and some of the speeches are reported almost verbatim, and not in the form of condensed reports, as was the case in the past; but a complete verbatim report of the debates at the Congress cannot be expected, for this was more than the two stenographers could cope with, as they informed the Congress more than once. As chairman, I strongly insisted that the secretaries should at least make good condensed reports of the speeches, even if very brief. Let the verbatim reports of some of the speeches, I said, be a sort of supplement de luxe to the minutes; but it was essential to have the basis—not some of the speeches, but all the speeches without exception, at least in the form of condensed reports.[157]

II

ELECTION OF THE BUREAU. THE CONGRESS AGENDA

I will now proceed with my narrative of the deliberations of the Congress in the order of its sessions. The election of the Bureau was the first vote that was taken, and virtually predetermined (strange as this may seem to an outsider) all the most important votes at the Congress. About 60 votes (not less than 58, if my memory is not at fault) were cast for Plekhanov and Dan, many leaving blank the space on their ballot papers for the third candidate. Forty-odd, or about forty votes, were cast for me. Then the "Centre" made a show, adding 10 or 15 votes to one or the other candidate. Those elected were: Plekhanov, with 69 votes, I think (or 71?), Dan 67 votes, and I obtained 60 votes.

On the question of the agenda, the debate on two occasions was very interesting and threw a great deal of light on the composition and character of the Congress. First there was the debate on whether the question of amalgamation

with the national Social-Democratic parties should be taken as the first item. The national parties wanted this, of course. We, too, were in favour of it. The Mensheviks, however, voted it down. Their argument was: let the R.S.D.L.P. define its own position first and then amalgamate with others; let "us" first determine *what* "we" are ourselves, and after that we can amalgamate with "them". To this argument (psychologically quite intelligible, and from the factional Menshevik point of view quite correct), we answered: is it not strange to deny the national parties the right to define their position *together* with us? If "they" are to amalgamate with "us", "we" will, and ought to, determine *what* "we" are together. It must also be added that before the Congress the Joint Central Committee had already concluded an agreement with the Polish Social-Democratic Party for its complete merging with us. Nevertheless, the proposal to take this as the first item on the agenda was defeated. Comrade Warszawski, a member of the Polish delegation, protested against this so outspokenly that he turned to the Mensheviks and exclaimed, amidst general laughter: "First of all you want to 'gobble up' or 'slaughter' the Bolsheviks and then amalgamate with us!" This was said in jest, of course, and I am least of all inclined to cavil at "frightful words" like "gobble up"; but this jest was a very striking and apt appraisal of a peculiar political situation.

The second interesting debate was on whether the question of the present state of our revolution and the class tasks of the proletariat should be put on the agenda. We Bolsheviks were, of course, in favour of this, in keeping with our declaration in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2.* From the standpoint of principle there could be no question of shirking the fundamental issue as to whether the revolution is really on the eve of an upswing, what forms of the revolutionary movement are the most important today in view of the objective conditions, and, consequently, what tasks confront the proletariat. In opposing the inclusion of this question in the agenda, the Mensheviks put themselves in a very unenviable position. Their arguments to the effect that this was a theoretical question, that the Party could not be bound by resolutions on

* See p. 149 of this volume.—*Ed.*

such questions, and so forth, were quite amazingly artificial and far-fetched. There was a burst of laughter when, in reply to a speech by no less a person than Dan, who had vehemently opposed the inclusion of this question in the agenda, a speaker took out a copy of *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, and calmly read the "fatal words" in the Menshevik tactical platform: "We"—yes, we Mensheviks—"are of the opinion and *propose that the Congress should agree*." How is that, comrades? asked the speaker. Yesterday you said: "We propose that the Congress should agree," but today you say: "We propose that the Congress" should not discuss this question? The question was put on the agenda, but subsequently, as we shall see later on, the Mensheviks had their own way after all.

III

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

The agrarian question, or rather, the question of the agrarian programme, was taken by the Congress as the first item on the agenda. There was a big debate on this, and a large number of most interesting points of principle were raised. There were five reporters. I spoke in favour of the draft of the Agrarian Committee (published in the pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, and attacked Maslov's proposal for municipalisation. Comrade John spoke in favour of the latter. The third reporter, Plekhanov, defended Maslov, and tried to persuade the Congress that Lenin's proposal for nationalisation smacked of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Narodnaya Volya. The fourth reporter, Schmidt,[158] supported the Agrarian Committee's draft with amendments on the lines of "Variant A" (for which see the pamphlet mentioned above*). The fifth reporter, Borisov, advocated division of the land. His programme was rather original in construction, but in substance it approximated most to our programme, except that for nationalisation—made conditional on the establishment of a republic—he substituted division of the land among the peasants as their property.

* See p. 194 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Of course, it is quite impossible for me to give in this report a full account of that lengthy debate in all its details. I shall try to deal with the more important points, i.e., the nature of "municipalisation", and the arguments advanced against nationalisation made conditional on the establishment of a republic, and so forth. I will remark that the pivot of the debate was Plekhanov's formulation of the question: this was due to its polemical acerbity, which is always good and desirable for the purpose of clearly distinguishing between the fundamental tendencies of the various trends of thought.

What is the essence of "municipalisation"? It is the transfer of the landed estates (or to be precise, of all large private estates) to the Zemstvos, or to local self-government bodies in general. The peasants' allotments, and the land of the smallholders, are to remain their property. The large estates are to be "alienated" and transferred to democratically organised local self-government bodies. This can be more simply expressed as follows: the peasants' land can remain the peasants' property; as for the landed estates, let the peasants rent them from the Zemstvos, only they must be democratic Zemstvos.

As the first reporter, I emphatically opposed this proposal. It is not revolutionary. The peasants will not agree to it. It would be harmful without a fully consistent democratic state system, including a republic, the election of government officials by the people, abolition of the standing army, etc. Such were my three main arguments.

I think that this draft is not revolutionary, first, because instead of confiscation (alienation without compensation) it speaks of alienation in general; secondly, and this is most important, it does not call for a *revolutionary method* of changing the agrarian system. Phrases about democracy mean nothing whatever at a time when the Cadets, those hypocritical advocates of compromise between the autocracy and the people, call themselves democrats. All methods of changing the agrarian system will be reduced to a liberal-bureaucratic *reform*, a Cadet reform, and not to a peasant revolution, if there is no slogan of the *immediate* seizure of the land by the peasants themselves, on the spot, that is, by revolutionary peasant committees, and of the peasants themselves *dispos-*

ing of the land thus seized,* pending the convocation of a national constituent assembly. Without this slogan we shall have a programme for a Cadet, or semi-Cadet, agrarian reform, and not for a peasant revolution.

Furthermore, the peasants will not agree to municipalisation. Municipalisation means you can have the allotment land gratis, but for the landed estates you must pay rent to the Zemstvo. The revolutionary peasants will not agree to this. They will say either let us divide all the land among ourselves or let us make all the land the property of the whole people. Municipalisation will never become the slogan of a revolutionary peasantry. If the revolution is victorious it cannot *in any circumstances* stop at municipalisation. If the revolution is not victorious, "municipalisation" will only be another swindle for the peasants, like the Reform of 1861.[159]

My third main argument. Municipalisation will be harmful if made conditional on "democracy" in general, and not specifically on a republic and the election of government officials by the people. Municipalisation means transferring the land to the local authorities, to the self-government bodies. If the central government is not *fully* democratic (a republic, and so forth), the local authorities may be "autonomous" only in minor matters, may be independent only in "tinkering with wash-basins": they may be no more "democratic" than, say, the Zemstvos were under Alexander III. In important matters, however, particularly in such a fundamentally important matter as the landed estates, the democracy of local authorities in face of an undemocratic central authority would be merely a plaything. Without a republic and the election of government officials by the people, municipalisation would mean transferring the landed estates to elected local authorities even though the central government

* My draft said "confiscated". Comrade Borisov quite rightly remarked that this was a wrong formula. We should say "seized". Confiscation is the legal recognition of seizure, its legalisation. We should advance the slogan of confiscation. To put it into effect, we should call upon the peasants to *seize* the land. This seizure by the peasantry must be recognised, legalised, by the national constituent assembly, which, as the supreme organ of a sovereign people, will transform seizure into *confiscation* by passing a law to that effect.

remained in the hands of the Trepovs and Dubasovs. Such a reform would be a plaything, and a harmful one, because the Trepovs and Dubasovs would allow the elected local authorities to provide water, electric trams, and so forth, but *never could* leave them in control of land taken from the landlords. The Trepovs and Dubasovs would *transfer* these lands from the "jurisdiction" of the Zemstvos to the "jurisdiction" of the Ministry of the Interior, and the peasants would be trebly swindled. We must call for the overthrow of the Trepovs and Dubasovs, for the election of all government officials by the people, and not design—instead of that and before that—toy models of liberal local reform.

What were Plekhanov's arguments in favour of municipalisation? In both his speeches he laid most stress on the question of *guarantees against restoration*. This curious argument runs as follows. Nationalised land was the economic basis of Muscovy before the reign of Peter I. Our present revolution, like every other revolution, contains no guarantees against restoration. Therefore, in order to prevent the possibility of restoration (i.e., the restoration of the old, pre-revolutionary regime), we must particularly shun nationalisation.

To the Mensheviks this argument seemed particularly convincing, and they enthusiastically applauded Plekhanov, especially for the "strong language" he used about nationalisation ("Socialist-Revolutionary talk", etc.). And yet, if one ponders over the matter a little, one will easily see that the argument is sheer sophistry.

First of all, look at this "nationalisation in Muscovy before the reign of Peter I". We will not dwell on the fact that Plekhanov's views on history are an exaggerated version of the liberal-Narodnik view of Muscovy. It is absurd to talk about the land being nationalised in Russia in the period before Peter I; we have only to refer to Klyuchevsky, Yefimenko[160] and other historians. But let us leave these excursions into history. Let us assume for a moment that the land was really nationalised in Muscovy before the reign of Peter I, in the seventeenth century. What follows from it? According to Plekhanov's logic, it follows that nationalisation would facilitate the restoration of Muscovy. But such logic is sophistry and not logic, it is juggling with words without analysing the economic basis of developments, or the eco-

nomic content of concepts. Insofar as (or if) the land was nationalised in Muscovy, the economic basis of this nationalisation was the *Asiatic mode of production*. But it is the *capitalist mode of production* that became established in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, and is absolutely predominant in the twentieth century. What, then, remains of Plekhanov's argument? He confused nationalisation based on the Asiatic mode of production with national sation based on the capitalist mode of production. Because the words are identical he failed to see the fundamental difference in economic, that is, production relations. Although he built up his argument on the restoration of Muscovy (i.e., the alleged restoration of Asiatic modes of production), he actually spoke about political restoration, such as the restoration of the Bourbons (which he mentioned), that is, the restoration of the anti-republican form of government on the basis of capitalist production relations.

Was Plekhanov told at the Congress that he had got himself muddled up? Yes, a comrade who at the Congress called himself Demyan[161] said in his speech that Plekhanov's "restoration" bogy was an out-and-out fizzle. The logical deduction from his premises is the restoration of Muscovy, i.e., the restoration of the Asiatic mode of production—which is a sheer absurdity in the epoch of capitalism. What actually followed from his conclusions and examples is the restoration of the Empire by Napoleon, or the restoration of the Bourbons after the great French bourgeois revolution. But first, this sort of restoration had nothing in common with pre-capitalist modes of production. And secondly, *this* sort of restoration followed, not on the nationalisation of the land, but on the sale of the landed estates, that is, a measure that was arch-bourgeois, purely bourgeois and certainly one that strengthened bourgeois, i.e., capitalist production relations. Thus *neither* form of restoration that Plekhanov dragged in—neither the restoration of the Asiatic mode of production (the restoration of Muscovy), nor restoration in France in the nineteenth century, had anything at all to do with the question of nationalisation.

What was Comrade Plekhanov's reply to Comrade Demyan's absolutely irrefutable arguments? He replied with uncommon adroitness. He exclaimed: "Lenin is a Socialist-

Revolutionary. And Comrade Demyan is feeding me a new brand of Demyan hash."[162]

The Mensheviks were delighted. They laughed till their sides ached at Plekhanov's sparkling wit. The hall rocked with applause. The question whether there was any logic in Plekhanov's argument about restoration was completely shelved at this Menshevik Congress.

I am far from denying, of course, that Plekhanov's reply was not only a superb piece of wit, but, if you will, also of Marxist profundity. Nevertheless, I take the liberty of thinking that Comrade Plekhanov got himself hopelessly muddled up over the restoration of Muscovy and restoration in France in the nineteenth century. I take the liberty of thinking that "Demyan hash" will become a "historic term" that will be applied *to Comrade Plekhanov* and not to Comrade Demyan (as the Mensheviks, fascinated by the brilliance of Plekhanov's wit, think). At all events, when Comrade Plekhanov, in speaking about the seizure of power in the present Russian revolution, was tickling his Mensheviks with a story about a Communard in some provincial town in France who munched sausage after the unsuccessful "seizure of power", several delegates at the Unity Congress remarked that Plekhanov's speeches were like a "Moscow stew", and that they sparkled with "sausage wit".

As I have already said, I was the first reporter on the agrarian question. And in winding up the debate, I was not the last to be given the floor but the first, preceding the other four reporters. Consequently I spoke *after* Comrade Demyan and *before* Comrade Plekhanov. Hence I was unable to foresee Plekhanov's brilliant defence against Demyan's arguments. I briefly reiterated these arguments and concentrated on the question of restoration as such, rather than on revealing the utter futility of the talk about restoration as an argument in favour of municipalisation. What guarantees against restoration have you in mind?—I asked Comrade Plekhanov. Is it absolute guarantees in the sense of eliminating the economic foundation which engenders restoration? Or a relative and temporary guarantee, i.e., creating political conditions that would not rule out the possibility of restoration, but would merely make it less probable, would hamper restoration? If the former, then my answer is: the *only*

complete guarantee against restoration in Russia (after a victorious revolution in Russia) is a socialist revolution in the West. There is and can be no other guarantee. Thus, from this aspect, the question is: how can the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia facilitate, or accelerate, the socialist revolution in the West? The only conceivable answer to this is: if the miserable Manifesto of October 17 gave a powerful impetus to the working-class movement in Europe, then the *complete* victory of the bourgeois revolution in Russia will almost inevitably (or at all events, in all probability) arouse a number of such political upheavals in Europe as will give a very powerful impetus to the socialist revolution.

Now let us examine the "second", i.e., relative guarantee against restoration. What is the economic foundation of restoration on the basis of the capitalist mode of production, i.e., not the comical "restoration of Muscovy" but restoration of the type that occurred in France at the beginning of the nineteenth century? The condition of the small commodity producer in any capitalist society. The small commodity producer wavers between labour and capital. Together with the working class he fights against the survivals of serfdom and the police-ridden autocracy. But at the same time he longs to strengthen his position as a property-owner in bourgeois society, and therefore, if the conditions of development of *this* society are at all favourable (for example, industrial prosperity, expansion of the home market as a result of the agrarian revolution, etc.), the small commodity producer *inevitably* turns against the proletarian who is fighting for socialism. Consequently, I said, restoration on the basis of small commodity production, of small peasant property in capitalist society, is not only possible in Russia, but even *inevitable*, for Russia is mainly a petty-bourgeois country. I went on to say that from the point of view of restoration, the position of the Russian revolution may be expressed in the following thesis: the Russian revolution is strong enough to achieve victory by its own efforts; but it is not strong enough to retain the fruits of victory. It can achieve victory because the proletariat jointly with the revolutionary peasantry can constitute an invincible force. But it cannot retain its victory, because in a country where small

production is vastly developed, the small commodity producers (including the peasants) will inevitably turn against the proletarians when they pass *from* freedom to socialism. To be able to retain its victory, to be able to prevent restoration, the Russian revolution will need non-Russian *reserves*, will need outside assistance. Are there such reserves? Yes, there are: the socialist proletariat in the West.

Whoever overlooks this in discussing the question of restoration reveals that his views on the Russian revolution are extremely narrow. He forgets that France at the end of the eighteenth century, in the period of her bourgeois-democratic revolution, was surrounded by far more backward, semi-feudal countries, which served as the reserves of restoration; whereas Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the period of her bourgeois-democratic revolution, is surrounded by far more advanced countries, where there is a social force capable of becoming the reserve of the revolution.

To sum up. In raising the question of guarantees against restoration, Plekhanov touched upon a number of most interesting subjects but he explained nothing at all on the point at issue and led away (led his Menshevik audience away) from the question of municipalisation. Indeed, if the small commodity producers, as a class, are the bulwark of capitalist restoration (this is what we shall for short call restoration on the basis, not of the Asiatic, but of the capitalist mode of production), where does municipalisation come in? Municipalisation is a form of *landownership*; but is it not clear that the forms of landownership do not alter the main and fundamental features of a *class*? The petty bourgeois will certainly and inevitably serve as the bulwark of restoration against the proletariat, no matter whether the land is nationalised, municipalised or divided. If any sharp distinctions between the forms of landownership can be drawn in this respect, it can, perhaps, only be in favour of division, since that creates closer ties between the small proprietor and the land—closer and, therefore, more difficult to break.* But to

* We say "perhaps", because it is still an open question whether these closest ties between the small proprietor and his "plot" are not the most reliable bulwark of Bonapartism. But this is not the place to go into the details of this concrete question.

urge municipalisation as an argument against restoration is simply ridiculous.

Comrades John and Plekhanov, who spoke after me in winding up the debate, tried once again to jump imperceptibly from this flimsy argument about restoration to another, which seemed to resemble it, but was really of an entirely different nature. They began to defend municipalisation, not as a guarantee against restoration of the monarchy after the establishment of a republic, that is, not as a measure that would safeguard the republic, not as a permanent institution, but as a basis in the *process of the struggle* against the monarchy for a republic, i.e., a measure that would facilitate further gains, a temporary and transitional institution. Plekhanov even went to the length of calling the large local self-government bodies that would municipalise the land local "republics" that would serve as strongholds in the war against the monarchy.

On this argument, we would make the following observations:

First, *neither* Maslov's original programme *nor* the John-Plekhanov-Kostrov[163] programme that was adopted at the Congress indicated *by a single word* that they regarded municipalisation as a temporary, transitional measure *in the course* of the revolution, i.e., as *a weapon in the struggle for further gains*. Thus such an interpretation is "a free invention", which is not confirmed but refuted by the text of the programme. For example, in advocating in my programme the establishment of revolutionary peasant committees as an instrument of the revolution, as a basis in the struggle for further gains, I say in so many words: the Party advises the peasant committees to 'seize the land and dispose of it *pending the convocation of a constituent assembly*. The Maslov-John-Plekhanov-Kostrov programme, not only does not say this,* but on the

* It was because Plekhanov's programme does not say this that we, at the Congress, had every right to put this new interpretation of municipalisation on a par with the "revolutionary local self-government" advocated by the Mensheviks. But it was none other than Plekhanov who, after the Bolsheviks had explained the point at great length was compelled to admit that the slogan of "revolutionary local self-government" explained nothing and, indeed, misled many people (see *Dnevnik*, No. 5). Even in *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, the Bolsheviks had already said that the slogan of "revolutionary local self-government

contrary, outlines beyond question a plan for a permanent system of land tenure.

Secondly, the main and fundamental answer to the argument we are examining is that in the guise of a guarantee against restoration or against reaction, Plekhanov's programme actually advocates *a deal with reaction*. Just think. Do we not write our programme, and particularly the agrarian (peasant) programme, for the broad masses whom we want to lead? But what do we get? Some members of the Party, be they even leaders, will say that Zemstvos which have municipalised the land will be republics, fighting against the monarchy at the centre. In the programme, the agrarian revolution is directly and definitely linked with democratic local administration; but *not by one word* is it linked with *complete* democracy in the central government and state system! I ask you: What is to guide our rank-and-file Party workers in their everyday agitation and propaganda? Plekhanov's talk about local "republics" fighting against the central monarchy, or the text of our new Party programme, in which the demand for land for the peasants is definitely linked only with democratic local administration, not with democratic central government and state system? Plekhanov's statements, muddled in themselves, will inevitably play the same role of a "*misleading*" slogan as the "*celebrated*" ("celebrated" in Plekhanov's opinion) slogan of "revolutionary local self-government". *In practice*, our Party programme remains the programme of a *deal with reaction*. If we take *its real political* significance in the present situation in Russia, and not the motives advanced by some of our speakers, it is not a Social-Democratic programme, but a Cadet programme. Some of our speakers' motives are of the very best, their intentions are most Social-Democratic; but the programme has turned out in practice to be a Cadet programme, filled with the spirit of a "deal" and not of a "peasant revolution" (incidentally, Plekhanov

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was inadequate and incomplete, that it did not express the conditions of the complete victory of the revolution. It is not revolutionary local self-government that is needed for such a victory, but revolutionary authority; and not only local revolutionary authorities, but also a central revolutionary authority. (See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 179-87, 212-23, 356-73.—*Ed.*)

said that formerly we were afraid of the peasant revolution but now we must get rid of this fear).

Above, I examined the *scientific* significance of the argument about "guarantees against restoration". I now come to its *political* significance, in the period of Dubasov constitutionalism and of the Cadet State Duma. The scientific significance of this argument is zero, or minus one. Its political significance is that it is a weapon borrowed from the Cadet arsenal and brings grist to the mill of the Cadets. Look around! Which *trend in politics* has made almost a monopoly of pointing to the danger of restoration? The Cadet trend. What answer have the Cadets given millions of times to our Party comrades who have pointed to the contradiction between the "democratic principles" of the Cadets and their monarchist, etc., programme? That to touch the monarchy means creating the danger of restoration. The Cadets have been shouting to the Social-Democrats in a thousand different sharps and flats: "Don't touch the monarchy, for you have no guarantee against restoration. Why create the danger of restoration, the danger of reaction? Far better to strike a bargain with reaction!" This is the sum and substance of the Cadets' political wisdom, all their programme, all their tactics. And these are the logical outcome of the class position of the petty bourgeois, of the danger that democratic revolution carried through to the end represents for the bourgeoisie.

I will give only two examples in confirmation of the foregoing. In December 1905, *Narodnaya Svoboda*, the organ of Milyukov and Hessen, wrote that Moscow had proved that insurrection was possible; nevertheless, insurrection was fatal, not because it was hopeless, but because reaction would sweep away the gains of the insurrection (quoted in my pamphlet *Social-Democracy and the State Duma**). The other example. In *Proletary*, in 1905, I quoted an extract from an article by Vinogradov in *Russkiye Vedomosti*.** Vinogradov had expressed a desire that the Russian revolution should follow the lines of 1848-49 and not 1789-93; that is to say, that we should not have any *victorious* insurrections, that our revolution should not be carried to its

* See p. 109 of this volume.—*Ed*.

** See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 240-45.

complete fulfilment, that it should be cut short as early as possible by the treachery of the liberal bourgeoisie, by the latter's deal with the monarchy. He raised the bogy of restoration in the guise of the Prussian drill sergeant—without saying a word, of course, about such a "guarantee of revolution" as the German proletariat.

This argument about the absence of guarantees against restoration is a purely Cadet idea: it is the bourgeoisie's political weapon against the proletariat. The interests of the bourgeoisie force it into struggling to prevent the proletariat from completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution jointly with the revolutionary peasantry. In this struggle, the bourgeois philosophers and politicians inevitably clutch at historical arguments and examples from the past. In the past it always happened that the workers were bamboozled, that even the victory of the revolution was followed by restoration. Consequently, the same thing must happen here, says the bourgeoisie, naturally striving to undermine the faith of the Russian proletariat in its own strength and in the strength of European socialism. The sharpening of political contradictions and of the political struggle results in reaction, says the bourgeois for the edification of the workers: therefore these contradictions must be *blunted*. Rather than run the risk of reaction coming after victory, it would be better not to fight for victory, but to strike a bargain with reaction.

Is it an accident that Plekhanov began to snatch at the ideological weapon that the bourgeoisie uses against the proletariat? No, this was inevitable after he had wrongly appraised the December uprising ("it was wrong to take up arms") and, without calling a spade a spade, had begun, in his *Dnevnik*, to advocate that the workers' party should support the Cadets. At the Congress this question was touched upon during the debate on another item of the agenda, when the question was raised as to why the bourgeoisie was praising Plekhanov. I shall deal with this point in its proper place; but here I will note that I did not elaborate the foregoing arguments at length, but presented them in the most general outline. I said that our "guarantee against restoration" was the complete fulfilment of the revolution, and not a deal with reaction. And it is this, and this alone, that is emphasised in my agrarian programme which is entirely a pro-

gramme of peasant uprising and of the complete fulfilment of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. For example, "peasant revolutionary committees" are the only line along which peasant uprising can advance (moreover, I do not counterpose peasant committees to revolutionary power, in the way the Mensheviks draw a contrast between the latter and revolutionary self-government; I regard these committees as one of the instruments of such authority, an instrument that must be supplemented by other, central instruments, by a provisional revolutionary government and a national constituent assembly). This is the *only* formulation of the agrarian programme that can preclude a bourgeois-bureaucratic settlement of the agrarian question, a settlement by the Petrunkeviches, Rodichevs, Kaufmans and Kutlers.

Plekhanov could not but see this fundamental feature of my programme. He saw it, and admitted it at the Congress. But (true to his nature) his admission was just another Demyan hash, or Plekhanov trash: oh, Lenin's programme contains the idea of seizing power. Lenin himself admits it. But that's just what is bad. It's Narodnaya Volya-ism. Lenin is reviving Narodnaya Volya-ism. Comrades, fight against the revival of Narodnaya Volya-ism! Lenin even talks about "the creative activity of the people". Isn't that Narodnaya Volya-ism? And so on, and so forth.

We Bolsheviks, both Voyinov[164] and I, heartily thanked Plekhanov for these arguments. Arguments like these can only benefit us, and we welcome them. Ponder over this argument, comrades: "Since Lenin's programme contains the idea of seizing power, Lenin is a Narodnaya Volya-ist." Which programme are we discussing? The agrarian programme. Who is to seize power, according to this programme? The revolutionary peasantry. Does Lenin confuse the proletariat with the peasantry? Far from doing that, he singles it out in the third part of his programme, which (the third part) the Menshevik Congress copied in full in its resolution on tactics!

Good, isn't it? Plekhanov himself said that it is unbecoming for Marxists *to be afraid of a peasant revolution*. But at the same time he fancies he can see Narodnaya Volya-ism in the *seizure of power by the revolutionary peasants*!! But how can a peasant revolution win if the revolutionary peasantry

does not seize power?? Plekhanov has reduced his own arguments to absurdity. Having stepped on to a slope, he irresistibly rolls down. First he denied that it was possible for the proletariat to seize power in the present revolution. Now he denies that it is possible for the revolutionary peasantry to seize power in the present revolution. But if *neither* the proletariat *nor* the revolutionary peasantry can seize power, then, logically, that power *must remain in the hands of the tsar and of Dubasov*. Or should the Cadets take power? But the Cadets do not want to seize power themselves, for they are in favour of retaining the monarchy, the standing army, the Upper Chamber and all the other delights.

Was I not right when I said at the Congress that Plekhanov's *fear of seizing power is fear of the peasant revolution*? Was not Voyinov right when he said that in his youth Plekhanov had been so scared by the Narodnaya Volya that he fancies he can see it even when he himself admits that a peasant revolution is inevitable, and when not a single Social-Democrat has any illusions as to peasant socialism? Was not Voyinov right when, in connection with the Menshevik resolution on armed uprising (Clause 1 of which starts with the admission that the task is "to wrest power from the autocratic government"), he ironically remarked at the Congress that to "seize power" means reviving the Narodnaya Volya, but to "wrest power" is true and profound Marxism? But really, it has turned out that in order to combat a Narodnaya Volya trend among the Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks have bestowed on our Party a programme which advocates the "*wresting of power*"—*by the Cadets*.

Of course, these outcries about Narodnaya Volya-ism did not surprise me in the least. I remember only too well that the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement have always (ever since 1898-1900) raised this bogy against the revolutionary Social-Democrats. And Comrade Akimov, who at the Unity Congress made a brilliant speech in defence of Axelrod and the Cadets, quite appropriately recalled this. I hope to return to this subject on another occasion in the literature.

A word about "the creative activity of the people". In what sense did I speak about this at the Congress? In the same sense as I speak about it in my pamphlet *The Victory of the*

*Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party** (this pamphlet was distributed among the delegates at the Congress). I contrast October-December 1905 to the present Cadet period, and say that in the revolutionary period the creative activity of the people (the revolutionary peasants plus the proletarians) is richer and more productive than in the Cadet period. Plekhanov thinks that this is Narodnaya Volya-ism. I think that from the scientific point of view, Plekhanov's opinion is an evasion of the highly important question of appraising the period of October-December 1905 (it never occurred to him to analyse the forms of the movement of this period in his *Dnevnik*; he confined himself to moralising!). From the political point of view, it is merely additional proof of how close Plekhanov's tactics are to those of Mr. Blank, and of the Cadets in general.

To finish with the agrarian question, I will deal with the last of the important arguments. Plekhanov said: "Lenin is a dreamer; he has fantastic ideas about the election of government officials by the people, and so forth. It is not difficult to draw up a programme for such a favourable contingency. Try to draw one up for an unfavourable contingency. Draw up your programme so as to have it 'well shod on all four hoofs'."

Undoubtedly, this argument contains an idea to which every Marxist should pay the strictest attention. Indeed, it would be a very poor programme that allowed for *only* a favourable contingency. But it is from this standpoint, I said in reply to Plekhanov, that my programme is obviously superior to Maslov's. To satisfy oneself of this, one has only to remember that there is such a thing as the *renting of land*. What distinguishes the capitalist (and semi-capitalist) mode of production in agriculture? Everywhere it is the renting of land. Does this apply to Russia? Yes, on a very large scale. And Comrade John was wrong when, in replying to me, he said that my programme contained an absurdity, namely, that the renting of land remains after the landed estates are confiscated. On this point, Comrade John was thrice wrong: first, the *whole* of the first part of my programme speaks of the first steps of the peasant revolution (seizure of the land *pending* the convocation of a national constituent

* See pp. 242-70 of this volume.—*Ed.*

assembly); hence, in my programme, the renting of land does not "remain after" confiscation, but is taken for granted, because it is a fact. Secondly, confiscation means transferring the ownership of land to other hands, and in itself, the transference of ownership does not in the least affect the renting of land. Thirdly, as everybody knows, peasant land and allotment land are also being rented.

See how things stand as regards being "well shod on all four hoofs", as regards taking the worst as well as the best possible conditions into account. Maslov, with a majestic gesture, completely strikes out the renting of land. He assumes straightway a revolution that will abolish the renting of land. As I pointed out, this assumption is absolutely absurd from the point of view of "unpleasant reality" and of having to take it into account. Indeed, the whole of the first part of my programme is *entirely* based on the assumption of "unpleasant reality", against which the revolutionary peasants are rebelling. Therefore in my programme the renting of land does not vanish into the realm of shades (the abolition of the renting of land in capitalist society is a reform no less, if not more, "fantastic", from the point of view of Plekhanov's "common sense", than the abolition of the standing army, etc.). Hence I take "*unpleasant* reality" into account much more seriously than Maslov, while I preach *pleasant* reality to the peasants, not in terms of a Cadet deal (local republics versus the central monarchy), but in terms of the complete victory of the revolution and the winning of a really democratic republic.

I especially emphasised at the Congress that it was particularly important to have this element of political propaganda in the agrarian programme; and in all probability I shall have to deal with this point again more than once in the literature. At the Congress we Bolsheviks were told: we have a political programme, and that is where we ought to talk about a republic. This argument shows that those who made it have not thought out the question at all. True, we have a general programme, in which we formulate our principles (the first section of the Party programme) and we have special programmes: political, workers', and peasants' programmes. *Nobody* proposes that a reservation should also be made in the workers' section of the programme (eight-hour day,

etc.) regarding the special political conditions required for the various reforms proposed in it. Why? Because the eight-hour day and similar reforms must *inevitably* become instruments of progress under *all* political conditions. But is it necessary to *make special reservations* as regards political conditions in the peasant programme? Yes, because the very best redistribution of the land *may* become an instrument of retrogression under the regime of the Trepovs and Dubasovs. Take even Maslov's programme. It advocates the transfer of the land to the *democratic* state and to *democratic* local self-government bodies. Thus, although the Party has a political programme, Maslov's programme makes special reservations as regards the political conditions for present-day agrarian reforms. Hence there can be no argument about the necessity of making reservations as regards special political conditions for agrarian demands. The point at issue is: is it permissible, either from the standpoint of science or of consistent proletarian democracy, to link a radical agrarian revolution, not with the election of government officials by the people, not with a republic, but with "democracy" in general, i.e., with Cadet democracy as well, which today, whether we like it or not, is the principal and most widespread form of pseudo-democracy, and the most influential in the press and in "society". I think that this is not permissible. I predict that the mistake in our agrarian programme will have to be, and will be, put right by practical experience, that is to say, the political situation will *compel* our propagandists and agitators in their fight against the Cadets to emphasise, not Cadet democracy, but the election of government officials by the people, and a republic.

As for the programme which advocates the division of the land, I expressed my attitude towards it at the Congress in the following terms: municipalisation is wrong and harmful; division, as a programme, is mistaken, but not harmful. Therefore I, of course, am closer to those who are for division, and I am prepared to vote for Borisov as against Maslov. In the first place, division cannot be harmful, because the peasants will agree to it; and in the second place, it does not have to be made conditional on the consistent reorganisation of the state. Why is it mistaken? Because it one-sidedly regards the peasant movement only in the light of the past

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and present, and gives no consideration to the future. In arguing against nationalisation, the "divisionists" say: when you hear the peasants talking about nationalisation, you must understand that it is not what they want. Don't pay attention to words, but to the substance. The peasants want private ownership, the right to sell land; and their talk about "God's land", and so forth, is merely an ideological cloak for their desire to take the land away from the landlords.

In my answer to the "divisionists" I said: all that is true; but our disagreements only begin where you think the question is settled. You repeat the mistake made by the old materialists, concerning whom Marx said: the old materialists have interpreted the world, but we must change it.[165] Similarly, the advocates of division *rightly* understand what the peasants say about nationalisation, they *rightly interpret what they say*; but the point is that they do not know how to convert this correct interpretation into *an instrument for changing the world*, into an instrument of progress. We are not suggesting that we should impose nationalisation on the peasants instead of division (Variant A in my programme removes all ground for such absurd ideas if they do occur to anyone). What we are suggesting is that a socialist, in ruthlessly exposing the peasants' petty-bourgeois illusions about "God's land", should be able to show them the road of progress. I told Plekhanov at the Congress, and I will repeat it a thousand times, that the practical workers will vulgarise the present programme just as they vulgarised the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands; they will convert a minor mistake into a major one. They will try to convince the crowds of peasants—who are shouting that the land is nobody's, the land is God's, the land is the state's—of the advantages of division, and by that will discredit and vulgarise Marxism. This is not what we must tell the peasants. We must say: there is a great deal of truth in what you say about the land being God's, nobody's or the state's; but we must look at the truth very closely. If the land is the state's and Trepov is at the head of the state, then the land will be Trepov's. Is that what you want? Do you want the land to pass into the hands of the Rodichevs and Petrunkeviches if they should succeed in capturing power, and consequently, the state, as

they would like to do? Of course, the peasants will answer: no, we don't want that. We will not surrender the land taken from the landlords either to the Trepovs or to the Rodichevs. If that is so, we must say, all government officials must be elected by the people, the standing army must be abolished, we must have a republic. *Only* then will the transfer of the land to the "state", to "the people", be a useful and not a harmful measure. And from the strictly scientific point of view, from the point of view of the conditions of development of capitalism in general, we must undoubtedly say if we do not want to differ with Volume III of *Capital*—that the nationalisation of land is possible in bourgeois society, that it promotes economic development, facilitates competition and the influx of capital into agriculture, reduces the price of grain, etc. Hence, in a period of real peasant revolution, given fairly well-developed capitalism, we *cannot* in any circumstances adopt a crude and sweepingly negative attitude towards nationalisation. That would be narrow, one-sided, crude and short-sighted. We should only explain to the peasants what political conditions are necessary for nationalisation to make it a useful measure, and then proceed to show its bourgeois character (as is done in Section 3 of my programme, now incorporated in the resolution of the Unity Congress*).

In concluding my narrative of the arguments about the agrarian question at the Congress, I will mention the amendments that were proposed to Maslov's draft programme. When the question of which draft to take as a basis was voted on, Maslov's draft at first obtained only 52 votes, *that is*, *less than half*. About 40 voted in favour of division (I voted with the "divisionists" to avoid splitting the vote against municipalisation). Only when a second vote was taken did Maslov's draft obtain 60-odd votes, as all the waverers voted for it, to save the Party from being left without any agrarian programme at all.

One of the amendments that the Mensheviks voted down was aimed at a more precise definition of the term: democratic state. We proposed the formulation: "a democratic republic fully guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people". This

* See pp. 194-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*

amendment was based on the idea, outlined above, that without *complete* democratisation of the central state authority, municipalisation would be positively harmful, and might degenerate into a Cadet agrarian reform. The amendment caused a storm. I was not in the hall at the time. I remember that as I was passing through an adjoining room on my way back to the hall, I was struck by the extraordinary noise in the "lobbies" and heard people jesting, saying: "Comrade John has proclaimed a republic!" "He could find no guarantees against restoration!" "Comrade Plekhanov has restored the monarchy."

As I was told afterwards, what happened was this. The Mensheviks, thin-skinned as usual, took offence at this amendment, which they regarded as an attempt to prove that they were opportunists, that they were opposed to a republic. There were angry speeches and shouts. The Bolsheviks also got heated, of course. They demanded a vote by roll-call. This stirred passion to fever heat. Comrade John was embarrassed, and being loath to create discord—he was not at all "against a republic", of course—he got up and announced that he would withdraw his formulation and support the amendment. The Bolsheviks applauded the "proclamation of a republic". But Comrade Plekhanov, or some other Menshevik, intervened, the argument started afresh, a demand was made for another vote, and the "monarchy was restored" by—according to what I was told—a matter of 38 votes to 34 (evidently many of the delegates were absent from the hall, or abstained from voting).

Of the amendments that were accepted, I must mention the substitution of the term "confiscation" for the term "alienation". Then the "municipalisers" had, after all, to make a concession to the "divisionists", and Comrade Kostrov proposed an amendment which in certain conditions permitted of division as well. Thus, instead of Maslov's original programme, the result was, as someone wittily put it at the Congress, a "castrated" programme. It is, in effect, a blend of nationalisation (certain lands are to become *national* property), municipalisation (part of the land is to be transferred to large local self-government bodies), and lastly, division. To this must be added that neither the programme nor the resolution on tactics specifies when

we are to support municipalisation and when division. The upshot was a programme, not well shod on all four hoofs, but with all four shoes loose.*

IV

APPRAISAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AND OF THE CLASS TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

The question mentioned in the above heading was the second item on the agenda of the Congress. The reporters were Martynov and I. Strictly speaking, Comrade Martynov in his report did not defend the Menshevik draft resolution, printed in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2. He preferred to give a "general outline" of his views and a general criticism of what the Mensheviks call Bolshevik views.

He spoke of the Duma as a political centre, of the harmfulness of the idea of seizing power, and of the importance of the country's constitutional development in a revolutionary period. He criticised the December uprising, called upon us openly to admit our defeat, and condemned our resolution for its "technical" presentation of the question of strike and insurrection. He said that "the Cadets, although they are anti-revolutionary, are erecting the scaffolding for the further development of the revolution". (Then why do you not say so in your resolutions, we asked.) He said that "we are on the eve of a revolutionary explosion".** (Why isn't that in your resolution, we asked again.) Incidentally, he said: "Objectively, the Cadets will play a more important role than the Socialist-Revolutionaries." The idea of seizing power is akin to the ideas of Tkachov; the Duma must be put into the foreground as the first step in the country's "constitutional

* The sharpest criticism of Maslov's "castrated" programme was uttered at the Congress by a Menshevik comrade (Strumilin), an advocate of partial division. He read a written statement in which he very aptly and ruthlessly exposed—perhaps it would be more correct to say flayed—the inherent contradictions in the programme as it finally emerged. Unfortunately, I did not take any notes of his speech.

** I have put in inverted commas the words that I have found in my notes.

development", as the corner-stone of the edifice of "representative institutions"—such was the gist of Comrade Martynov's report. Like all Mensheviks, he passively adjusted our tactics to the slightest turn in the course of events, subordinated them to fleeting interests, to momentary (or apparent) needs, and involuntarily belittled the main and fundamental tasks of the proletariat as the vanguard fighter in the bourgeois democratic revolution.

I based my report on a precise comparison of the two resolutions before the Congress. I said that both resolutions admit that the revolution is on the rise again, that our task is to strive to carry the revolution to the end, and lastly, that only the proletariat together with the revolutionary peasantry can accomplish this. One would think that these three propositions should lead to complete unanimity on the tactical course to be adopted. But which of the two resolutions more consistently upholds this main point of view, more correctly motivates it, and more accurately indicates the conclusions to be drawn from it?

And I went on to show that the argument of the Menshevik resolution was utterly untenable, that it was a mere collection of phrases and not an argument ("the struggle has left the government no choice". This is a splendid specimen of sheer phrase-mongering! It is the very thing that has to be proved, but not in this form. The Mensheviks, however, start out from unproved and unprovable premises). I said that whoever *really* admits that an upswing of the revolution is inevitable must draw the proper conclusion as to the *main* form of the movement. For this is the fundamental scientific and political problem that we have to solve, and which the Mensheviks are dodging. They argue as follows. When there is a Duma, we will support the Duma; when there is a strike and insurrection, we will support the strike and insurrection. But they are unwilling, or unable, to determine whether the one or the other form of the movement is inevitable. They do not dare tell the proletariat, and the whole people, which is the *main* form of the movement. That being the case, all those phrases about the upswing of the revolution and about its completion (the Mensheviks very ineptly said: its *logical* completion) are so many platitudes. They imply that the proletariat—whose conception of the

revolution is the deepest and broadest, and whose tactics are prompted by the general and fundamental interests of democracy—must not be elevated to the position of foremost leader of the revolution, but must be degraded to the position of a passive participant and humble "labourer" in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The Mensheviks, I said, accept only the first half of Hegel's celebrated proposition: "All that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real." The Duma is real; therefore the Duma is reasonable, they say, and rest content with that. We say: the fight outside the Duma is "reasonable". It is the objectively inevitable result of the whole of the present situation. Therefore it is "real", although it is held down for the moment. We must not slavishly follow the fleeting moment; that would be opportunism. We must ponder over the more profound causes of events and over the more far-reaching implications of our tactics.

The Mensheviks in their resolution admit that the revolution is on the rise and that the proletariat jointly with the peasantry must carry it to completion. But whoever seriously takes that view must also be able to draw the necessary conclusions. If you say: jointly with the peasantry, it shows that you think that the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Cadets, etc.) is unreliable. Why, then, don't you say so, as we do in our resolution? How is it that you do not say a single word about the necessity of combating constitutional illusions, that is, belief in the promises and laws of the old autocratic government? It is habitual for the Cadets to forget about this; they themselves spread constitutional illusions. But a Social-Democrat who at a moment of revolution forgets the task of combating constitutional illusions, *politically* puts himself on a footing with the Cadets. What is the use of phrases like "upswing of the revolution", "carrying it to completion", or "a new revolutionary explosion", if the Social-Democrats do nothing to dispel the constitutional illusions that are widespread among the people?

At the present time the question of constitutional illusions is the best and surest criterion by which to distinguish the opportunist from those who want the revolution to develop further. The opportunist shirks the task of dispelling these illusions. The advocate of revolution ruthlessly exposes

their deceptive character. And yet the Menshevik Social-Democrats are silent on a question like this!

Not daring to say openly and frankly that the October-December forms of struggle are unfit and undesirable, the Mensheviks say it in the worst, covert, indirect and evasive way. This is quite unbecoming for Social-Democrats.

Such were the main points of my report.

As regards the debate on these reports, the following characteristic incidents are worth mentioning. A comrade who at the Congress was known as Boris Nikolayevich[166] gave me occasion to exclaim in my reply to the debate: "The ball comes to the player!" It would be difficult to express the "sum and substance" of Menshevism more vividly than he did. He said that it was "curious" that the Bolsheviks should regard the revolutionary movements of the broad masses of the people, and not the legal or constitutional form, as the "*main* form of the movement". He said this was "ridiculous", for there were no such movements, whereas there was a Duma. All this talk about the proletariat being the "head", or "leader", about the possibility of it becoming the "tail", and so forth, was "metaphysics" and "phrase-mongering".

Take off your Cadet spectacles, I said in reply to this consistent Menshevik. You will then see a peasant movement in Russia, and unrest among the armed forces, and the movement of the unemployed: you will see forms of struggle that at the moment are "lying low", but the existence of which even bourgeois moderates do not dare to deny. They openly say that these forms are harmful and needless; but the Menshevik Social-Democrats *scoff* at them. This is the difference between the bourgeoisie and the Menshevik Social-Democrats. This was exactly the case with Bernstein, the German Menshevik, the German Right Social-Democrat. The bourgeoisie in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century held, and openly declared, that revolutionary forms of struggle were harmful. Bernstein *scoffed* at them.

Being raised at the Congress, the question of Bernstein naturally led to the question, why was the bourgeoisie praising Plekhanov? The fact that all the numerous liberal-bourgeois newspapers and other publications in Russia, including even the Octobrist *Slovo*, were most zealously praising Plekhanov could not pass unnoticed at the Congress.

Plekhanov picked up the gauntlet. He said that the bourgeoisie was not praising him for what it had praised Bernstein for. Bernstein was praised for surrendering to the bourgeoisie our theoretical weapon, Marxism. He (Plekhanov) was being praised for his tactics. The situation was different.

Plekhanov was answered by the representative of the Polish Social-Democratic Party and by myself. We both pointed out that Plekhanov was *wrong*. The bourgeoisie praised Bernstein not only for theory, and, in fact, not for theory at all. The bourgeoisie doesn't care a pin for any theory. The bourgeoisie praised the German Right Social-Democrats because they advocated different *tactics*. They were praised for their tactics, for their reformist tactics as distinct from revolutionary tactics; for regarding the legal, parliamentary, reformist struggle as the main, or almost the sole, form of struggle; for striving to convert the Social-Democratic Party into one of democratic social reforms. That is why Bernstein was praised. The bourgeoisie praised him for trying to *blunt* the antagonisms between labour and capital in the period preceding socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie is praising Plekhanov for trying to *blunt* the antagonisms between the revolutionary people and the autocracy in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Plekhanov is being praised for regarding the "parliamentary" struggle as the main form of struggle; for condemning the October-December struggle, and particularly the armed uprising. Plekhanov is being praised because on the question of present-day tactics he has become the leader of the Right Social-Democrats.

I have forgotten to add what stand the Mensheviks took in the debate on constitutional illusions. Theirs was not a firm stand. Some of them said that it was always the task of the Social-Democrats to combat constitutional illusions, and that this was not the special task of the present moment. Others (Plekhanov) declared that to combat constitutional illusions was anarchism. These two extreme and opposite opinions on constitutional illusions glaringly revealed the utter helplessness of the Mensheviks' position. When a constitutional system has become firmly established, when, for a certain period, the constitutional struggle becomes the main form of the class struggle and of the political struggle generally,

the task of dispelling constitutional illusions is not the special task of the Social-Democrats, not the task of the moment. Why? Because at such times affairs in constitutional states are administered *in the very way* that parliament decides. By constitutional illusions we mean deceptive faith in a constitution. Constitutional illusions prevail when a constitution seems to exist, but actually does not: in other words, when affairs of state are *not* administered *in the way* parliament decides. When actual political life *diverges* from its reflection in the parliamentary struggle, then, and *only then*, does the task of combating constitutional illusions become the immediate task of the advanced revolutionary class, the proletariat. The liberal bourgeois, dreading the extra-parliamentary struggle, spreads constitutional illusions even when parliaments are impotent. The anarchists flatly reject participation in parliament under all circumstances. Social-Democrats stand for utilising the parliamentary struggle, for participating in parliament; but they ruthlessly expose "parliamentary cretinism", that is, the belief that the parliamentary struggle is the *sole* or *under all circumstances the main* form of the political struggle.

Are the political realities of Russia at variance with the decisions of, and speeches made in, the Duma? Are affairs of state in our country administered in the way the Duma decides? Do the "Duma" parties reflect with any degree of accuracy the *real* political forces in the present state of the revolution? One has only to put these questions to understand the Mensheviks' helpless confusion on the question of constitutional illusions.

This confusion was revealed with uncommon vividness at the Congress when, although in the majority, the Mensheviks dared not put their resolution appraising the present situation to the vote. They withdrew their resolution! The Bolsheviks had a good laugh over this at the Congress. The victors are withdrawing their victorious resolution—that is what was said about the extraordinary behaviour of the Mensheviks, unprecedented in the history of congresses. A vote by roll-call was demanded and secured on this question, although, curiously enough, the Mensheviks were angry over this and submitted to the Bureau a written statement which said that "Lenin is collecting material for agitation against

the decisions of the Congress". As if the right to collect material were not the right and duty of every opposition! And as if our victors were not, by their chagrin, accentuating the impossibly awkward predicament into which they had put themselves by withdrawing their own resolution! The vanquished insist on the victors accepting their own victorious resolution! We could not wish for a more outspoken confirmation of the moral victory we had achieved.

The Mensheviks said, of course, that they did not wish to impose upon us something we did not agree with, that they did not want to resort to coercion, and so forth. Naturally, these excuses only raised a smile, and led to more demands for a vote by roll-call. For on those questions, on which the Mensheviks were convinced they were right, they did not hesitate to "impose" their opinion upon us, and to resort to "coercion" (why this terrible word, I wonder?), and so forth. The resolution appraising the present situation did not commit the Party to any particular action. But without it, the Party could not *understand* the principles and *motives* underlying all the tactics adopted by the Congress.

In this respect, the withdrawal of the resolution was a supreme manifestation of practical opportunism. Our business is to be in the Duma when there is a Duma, and we don't want to hear anything like general arguments, general appraisals or well-considered tactics—this, in effect, is what the Mensheviks said to the proletariat by withdrawing their resolution.

Undoubtedly the Mensheviks had convinced themselves that their resolution was wrong and worthless. It is quite out of the question that people who are convinced that their views are correct should refuse to express them openly and definitely. But the crux of the matter was that the Mensheviks could not even propose any amendments to their resolution. This suggests that they could not agree among themselves on a single important point concerning the appraisal of the situation and of the class tasks of the proletariat in general. They could agree only on a negative decision: to withdraw the resolution altogether. They had a vague presentiment that if their resolution defining *principles* were adopted, it would undermine their *practical* resolutions. But they did not gain anything thereby. The resolutions of

the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks on the appraisal of the present situation can and must be discussed and compared by the *whole* Party, by *all* Party organisations. The question was left open. But it must be settled. And a comparison of these two resolutions with the experience of political life, with the lessons taught by, say, the Cadet Duma, will splendidly confirm the correctness of the Bolshevik views on the present state of the Russian revolution and on the class tasks of the proletariat.

V

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE STATE DUMA

On the question of the Duma, the reporter from the faction that predominated at the Congress was Comrade Axelrod. He too, in a long speech, refrained from discussing the comparative merits of the two resolutions (the committee submitted two resolutions, because the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks could not reach agreement), from stating in precise terms the views of the Minority on this question, but gave a "general outline" of the meaning of parliamentarism. He went far afield, took a long excursion into history, and drew a picture of parliamentarism, of its significance, its role in the development of proletarian organisation, in agitation, in the awakening of the class-consciousness of the proletariat, and so forth. Casting innuendoes all the time at "anarchistic-conspiratorial" views, he soared entirely in the realm of abstractions, in the lofty sphere of platitudes and magnificent reflections on history which were applicable to all times, to all nations and to all periods in history in general: but which, owing to their abstract character, were useless for dealing with the concrete features of the concrete matter in hand. I remember the following particularly glaring example of the incredibly abstract, vapid and general way in which Axelrod presented his case. Twice in his speech (I made a note of this) he touched on the question of bargains, or agreements, between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Once he touched on it in passing, spoke of it in disparaging terms, and in a word or two expressed his opposition to all agreement. The second time he dealt with it at greater length and said that, speaking generally, agreements were permissible, ex-

cept that they must not be hole-and-corner doings by committees, but public agreements visible and clear to all the workers, and must represent important political steps, or actions. Such agreements, he said, would enhance the significance of the proletariat as a political force, would more clearly and distinctly reveal to it the machinery of politics and the different positions and different interests of the various classes. They would draw the proletariat into definite political relationships, teach it to see its enemies and ill-wishers, and so on and so forth. It was arguments of this kind that Comrade Axelrod's very long "report" consisted of. One cannot relate them—one can only give an idea of them by giving an example or two.

In my report in reply I said, first of all, that Axelrod had painted a very pretty, in fact, a charming picture. He had painted it lovingly and skilfully, applying vivid colours and fine strokes. The only pity was that the picture was not drawn from life. It was a fine picture—there could be no doubt about that—but its subject was purely imaginary. It was a splendid study on the theme of the significance of parliamentarism in general, a fine popular lecture on the functions of representative institutions. The only pity was that he said and explained absolutely nothing about the concrete historical conditions of the existing Russian "parliament", if one may call it that. Axelrod, I said, had given himself entirely away by his remarks on agreements with the Cadets. He had admitted that the importance of such agreements—sometimes inevitable when genuine parliamentarism exists—depended on the possibility of coming out openly before the masses, on the possibility of banishing the old "hole-and-corner" method and substituting for it agitation among the masses, the independence of the masses, and public utterances before the masses.

Magnificent things, sure enough. But are they possible under the Russian "parliamentary" system? Or rather, is this the form that real mass actions take in Russia under the present real (and not pictorial) objective conditions? Is it not the case, Comrade Axelrod, that Social-Democrats are obliged to make the appeals to the masses that you desire by means of illegal leaflets, while the Cadets have newspapers printed in millions of copies at their disposal? Would it not

have been better if, instead of uselessly depicting the charms of parliamentarism (which nobody denies), you had told us how matters really stand as regards Social-Democratic newspapers, meetings, clubs, and unions? Surely there is no need for me to prove to you, a European, that your general remarks about parliamentarism tacitly presuppose newspapers, meetings, clubs and unions, and that all these are part and parcel of the parliamentary system?

Why did Axelrod in his report confine himself to platitudes and abstract propositions? In order to leave in the background the concrete political realities of Russia in the period February-April 1906. These realities reveal much too *sharp* antagonisms between the *autocracy* and the downtrodden but indignant *proletariat and peasantry*. To charm his audience with the picture of parliamentarism in general, he had to tone down these antagonisms, to *blunt* them, to draw an "ideal" plan of an ideal, open agreement with the Cadets; and above all he had to make an *abstraction* of these sharp antagonisms, forget them, say nothing about them.

In order to assess our actual disagreements and not to soar in the skies, I, in my report, compared the two resolutions and analysed them in detail. It appeared that there were four main points of difference between the Menshevik and Bolshevik resolutions on the Duma.

First, the Mensheviks made no appraisal of the elections. At the time of the Congress the elections had been held in nine-tenths of Russia. These elections had undoubtedly provided ample political material for a realistic, and not fanciful, picture of the situation. We weighed up this material very frankly and carefully, and said: it shows that in the vast majority of places in Russia participation in the elections meant supporting the Cadets, and that it was not really a Social-Democratic policy. The Mensheviks say not a word about this. They are *afraid* to put the question on a concrete basis. They are afraid to face the facts and to draw the necessary conclusions from this position between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds. They do not appraise the *actual* elections, their results *as a whole*, because such an appraisal would *prove them wrong*.

Secondly, throughout their resolution the Mensheviks take, or regard, the Duma as a legal institution, and not as

an instrument that expresses the will (or lack of will) of certain elements of the bourgeoisie, not as an instrument that serves the interests of certain bourgeois parties. In their resolution, they speak of the Duma in general, of the Duma as an "institution", as an instrument of popular representation in its "pure" form. This is not a Marxist method of argument but a purely Cadet method; not a materialist but an idealist method, in the worst sense of the word; not a proletarian class method, but one of philistine vagueness.

Take, for example, the following extremely characteristic expression in the Menshevik resolution, I said at the Congress: "(4) that these conflicts [with reaction], compelling the State Duma to seek support among the broad masses..." (I am quoting from the draft which the Mensheviks submitted to the Congress). Is it true to say that the Duma can and will seek support among the broad masses? *Which* Duma? An Octobrist Duma? Certainly not. A Duma of peasants' and workers' deputies? It has no need to *seek* support, for it has, has had, and will have support. A Cadet Duma? Yes, this is true as regards such a Duma, and only such a Duma. A Cadet Duma certainly has to *seek support* among the broad masses. But as soon as you give the Mensheviks' abstract, idealistic and general formulation a definitely class content, you at once see that its wording is incomplete, and therefore wrong. The Cadets *strive* to lean on the people. That is true. That is word for word what our (Bolshevik) resolution on the attitude towards the bourgeois parties says about them. But our resolution goes on to say that the Cadets *waver* between the desire to lean on the people and *fear of its revolutionary independence.* No socialist will dare deny the justice of the words I have underlined. Why, then, did the Mensheviks, in a resolution on the Duma, when it was already known that the Duma would be Cadet in character, tell only *half the truth*? Why did they only note the *bright side* of the Cadets, and say nothing about the reverse side of the medal?

Our Duma is not the incarnation of the "pure idea" of popular representation. Only bourgeois philistines among our Cadet professors can think so. Our Duma is what the representatives in it of definite *classes* and definite parties make of it. Our Duma is a Cadet Duma. If we say that it is striving to lean on the people and do not add that it is afraid of

independent revolutionary activity by the people, we will be telling a downright lie, we will be misleading the proletariat and the whole people. We will be yielding in the most unpardonable way to the mood of the moment, and show that we are under the spell of the victories of a party that wavers between liberty and the monarchy, that we are incapable of appraising the true nature of that party. The Cadets, of course, will praise us for this reticence, but will the class-conscious workers do as much?

Another example. "The tsarist government is striving to check the revolutionary upsurge," say the Mensheviks in their resolution. That is true. But is it only the tsarist government that is striving to do that? Have not the Cadets shown a thousand times already that they, too, are striving *both* to lean on the people *and* to check its revolutionary upsurge? Is it proper for Social-Democrats to put the Cadets in a better light than they deserve?

And I drew the following conclusion. Our resolution says that the Duma will *indirectly* help to develop the revolution. This is the *only* correct formula, for the Cadets waver between revolution and reaction. Speaking *about the Duma*, our resolution plainly and bluntly says that the instability of the Cadets must-be exposed. To say nothing about this in a resolution on the Duma means indulging in a bourgeois idealisation of "popular representation in its pure form".

And practical experience has already begun to refute the Mensheviks' illusions. In *Nevskaya Gazeta*,[167] you will even now find statements (not systematically consistent, unfortunately) to the effect that the Cadets in the Duma have not been behaving in a revolutionary way and that the proletariat will not permit "deals between the Milyukovs and the old regime". In saying this, the Mensheviks fully bear out the correctness of my criticism of their resolution at the Congress. In saying this, they are following in the wake of the revolutionary tide, which, although relatively weak, has already begun to reveal the true nature of the Cadets, and is already proving that the Bolshevik presentation of the question is correct.

Thirdly, I said, the Menshevik resolution does not draw a clear distinction between the various types of bourgeois democrats from the point of view of proletarian tactics.

The proletariat must, to a certain extent, march with the bourgeois democrats, or "march separately, but strike together". But with which section of the bourgeois democrats must the proletariat "strike together", in the present Duma period? You yourselves, Menshevik comrades, realise that the very existence of the Duma is bringing up this question—yet you dodge it. We, however, have said plainly and bluntly: with the peasant or revolutionary democrats, neutralising, by our agreement with them, the instability and inconsistency of the Cadets.

In reply to this criticism, the Mensheviks (especially Plekhanov, who, I repeat, was the actual ideological leader of the Mensheviks at the Congress) tried to make their position "more profound". Yes, they exclaimed, you want to expose the Cadets! But we are exposing *all* the bourgeois parties. Look at the last part of our resolution: "to reveal to the masses the inconsistency of *all* the bourgeois parties", etc. And Plekhanov proudly added that only bourgeois radicals attack solely the Cadets; we socialists expose all the bourgeois parties.

The sophistry hidden in this seeming "deepening" of the question was resorted to so often at the Congress, and is so often resorted to now, that it is worth saying a few words about it.

What is this resolution about? Is it the socialist exposure of all bourgeois parties, or defining which section of the bourgeois democrats can help the proletariat *now* to carry the bourgeois revolution still further forward?

Clearly, it deals with the latter and not with the former question.

If that is clear, there is no point in substituting the first question for the second. As regards the attitude to be adopted towards the bourgeois parties, the Bolshevik resolution clearly speaks of the socialist exposure of all bourgeois democracy, including that of revolutionary and peasant democrats. But as far as present-day proletarian tactics are concerned, the question is not one of socialist criticism, but of mutual political support.

The further the bourgeois revolution advances, the farther left the proletariat seeks for allies among the bourgeois democrats, and the deeper it goes from their upper ranks to their lower ranks. There was a time when help could come

from Marshals of the Nobility and from Mr. Struve, who (in 1901) put forward the Shipov slogan: "Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo".[168] The revolution has gone far beyond that. The upper ranks of the bourgeois democrats have begun to desert the revolution. The lower ranks have begun to awaken. The proletariat has begun to seek allies (for a bourgeois revolution) in the lower ranks of the bourgeois democrats. And today, the only correct definition of the tactics of the proletariat in this respect will be: with the peasantry (who are also bourgeois democrats: don't forget this, Menshevik comrades) and with the revolutionary democrats, paralysing the instability of the Cadets.

And again. Whose line have the first steps of the Cadet Duma proved correct? Reality has already outstripped our debates. Reality has compelled even *Nevskaya Gazeta* to single out the Peasant ("Trudovik") Group[169] in preference to the Cadets, to seek a *rapprochement* with it and to expose the Cadets. Reality has proved that we were right in our watchword: the proletariat's allies until the victory of the bourgeois revolution is achieved are the peasant and revolutionary democrats.

Fourthly, I criticised the last clause of the Menshevik resolution concerning a Social-Democratic group in the Duma. I pointed out that the great bulk of the class-conscious proletariat had not voted. Would it be advisable under these conditions to impose official representatives of the Party on this mass of workers? Can the Party guarantee that the candidates had really been chosen by Party organisations?- Will not the fact that the first Social-Democratic members of the Duma are expected to come from the *peasant* and town petty-bourgeois curias create a certain danger and an abnormal situation? The first candidates of the Social-Democratic Labour Party to the Duma, not chosen by the workers' organisations, and not under their control.... Comrade Nazar's[170] amendment, which demanded that Social-Democratic candidates to the Duma be *nominated* by local workers' organisations, was rejected by the Mensheviks. We demanded a vote by roll-call, and recorded our dissenting opinion in the minutes.*

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* See pp. 303-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

We voted for the amendment moved by the comrades from the Caucasus (to participate in the elections where they have not yet taken place, but not to enter into any blocs with other parties), because the prohibition of blocs, of agreements with other parties, was undoubtedly of great political significance for the Party.

I will add that the Congress rejected the amendment of Comrade Yermansky (a Menshevik who regarded himself as a conciliator), who wanted participation in the elections to be permitted only in those cases where it was possible to carry on agitation among the masses and to organise them on a large scale.

The representatives of the national Social-Democratic parties—the Poles, Bundists and, I think, also the Letts—took part in the debate on this question, and emphatically declared for the boycott. They stressed the necessity of taking specific local conditions into account, and protested against the settlement of a question like this on the basis of abstract arguments.

On the question of the formation of a Social-Democratic group in the Duma, the Congress also passed an instruction to the Central Committee, which, unfortunately, was not included in the decisions of the Congress published by the Central Committee. The Congress instructed the Central Committee to inform *all* Party organisations specifically: (1) whom, (2) when, and (3) on what conditions it has appointed as Party representatives in the parliamentary group, and also to submit periodical reports of the activities of these Party representatives.[171] This resolution instructs the local workers' organisations to which the Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma belong to keep control over their "delegates" in the Duma. I will mention, in parenthesis, that this important resolution, which shows that the views of Social-Democrats on parliamentarism differ from those of bourgeois politicians, was unanimously condemned, or ridiculed, both in Mr. Struve's newspaper *Duma*[172] and in *Novoye Vremya*.

Lastly, in concluding my narrative of the debate on the State Duma, I will mention two more episodes. The first was the speech of Comrade Akimov, who had been invited to attend the Congress as a consultative delegate. For the information of those comrades who are not familiar with the his-

tory of our Party, I will say that since the late 1890s Comrade Akimov has been the most consistent, or one of the most consistent, opportunists in the Party. Even the new *Iskra* has had to admit this. Akimov was an "Economist"[173] in 1899 and subsequent years, and has remained true to type. Mr. Struve, in *Osvobozhdeniye*, has extolled him more than once for his "realism" and for the scholarly quality of his Marxism. There is hardly any difference between Comrade Akimov and the Bernsteinians of *Bez Zaglavia* (Mr. Prokopovich and others). Naturally, the presence at the Congress of such a comrade could not but be valuable in the struggle between the Right and Left wings of Social-Democracy.

Comrade Akimov was the first to speak after the reporters on the question of the State Duma. He said that he did not agree with the Mensheviks on many points, but he fully agreed with Comrade Axelrod. He was in favour not only of going into the Duma, but also of supporting the Cadets. Comrade Akimov was the only consistent Menshevik at the Congress in openly standing up for the Cadets (and not in a covert way, not by saying, for example, that the Cadets were more important than the Socialist-Revolutionaries). He openly rose in arms against the appraisal of the Cadets that I made in my pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*. The Cadets, he said, "are really a party of people's freedom, but a more moderate one". The Cadets are "orphan democrats", said our orphan Social-Democrat. "The Mensheviks have to put up artificial barriers to prevent themselves from becoming accomplices of the Cadets."

The reader will see that Comrade Akimov's speech merely served as additional and convincing evidence of the direction our Menshevik comrades are taking.

The second episode showed this from another angle. This is what happened. In the original draft of the Menshevik resolution on the State Duma proposed by the committee, Clause 5 (on the armed forces) contained the following sentence: ... "Seeing for the first time on Russian soil a new authority, sprung from the depths of the nation, *called into being by the tsar himself and recognised by the law*", etc. In criticising the Menshevik resolution for what may mildly be called its imprudent and optimistic attitude towards the State Duma, I also criticised the words I have underlined,

and said jestingly: should we not add "and sent by God's grace" (meaning authority)? Comrade Plekhanov, a member of the committee, was frightfully angry with me for cracking this joke. What, he exclaimed in his speech, must I listen to these "suspicions of being an opportunist"? (His exact words, as I wrote them down.) I have served in the army myself, and I know the military man's attitude towards authority; I know of the importance he attaches to authority recognised by the tsar, etc., etc. Comrade Plekhanov's resentment exposed his vulnerable spot, and showed still more clearly that he had "overdone it". In my speech in reply to the debate, I said that it was not a matter of "suspicions", and it was ridiculous to use such pitiful expressions. Nobody was accusing Plekhanov of believing in the tsar. But resolutions are not written for Plekhanov; they are written for the people. And it was indecent to disseminate among the people such ambiguous arguments, fit only for Messrs. Witte and Co. These arguments would turn against us, for if we stressed that the State Duma was an "authority" (?? this word alone reveals the excessive optimism of our Mensheviks), and an authority called into being by the tsar, then it would be inferred that this lawful authority must act according to the law, and obey the one who "called it into being".

The Mensheviks themselves realised that Plekhanov had overdone it. On a motion that came from their ranks, the words underlined above were deleted from the resolution.

VI

ARMED UPRISING

The two main questions, the agrarian question and that of the State Duma, together with the debate on the appraisal of the situation, took up most of the attention of the Congress. I do not remember how many days we spent on these questions, but the fact remains that many of those present were beginning to show signs of fatigue, and probably not only of fatigue, but of a desire to shelve some of the items on the agenda. A motion was adopted to accelerate the proceedings of the Congress, and the time allotted for the reports on the question of armed uprising was *cut down* to fifteen minutes

(the reporters on the preceding questions had their time repeatedly extended beyond the allotted half-hour). The questions now began to be rushed through.

The reporter on armed uprising from the "Minority", which predominated at the Congress, was Comrade Cherevanin, and as was to be expected—and as the Bolsheviks more than once foretold—he "slipped down towards Plekhanov", that is to say, he virtually took the view of the *Dnevnik*, with which, before the Congress, many Mensheviks had expressed disagreement. The notes I have on his speech contain sentences like the following: "The December uprising was only a product of despair", or: "The defeat of the December uprising was a foregone conclusion in the very first days." Plekhanov's dictum: "It was wrong to take up arms" ran through his whole speech, which, as usual, was replete with thrusts at the "conspirators" and at those who "exaggerated the importance of technique".

Our reporter, Comrade Winter, vainly tried in his short speech to induce the Congress to appraise the exact texts of the two resolutions. He was even obliged once to refuse to continue with his report. This was when he was about half-way through, and was reading the first clause of the Menshevik resolution: "The struggle is bringing to the forefront the direct task of wresting power from the autocratic government." It transpired that our reporter, a member of the committee entrusted with drawing up a resolution on armed uprising, *did not know* that *at the last moment* this committee had submitted to the Congress a hectographed draft of the resolution in a *new* version, namely, the Menshevik section of the committee, headed by Plekhanov, proposed that the words "*wresting rights by force*" be substituted for the words "wresting power".

This alteration of the text of the resolution submitted to the Congress, without the knowledge of the reporter, a member of the committee, was so flagrant a violation of all rules and customs of Congress procedure that in his indignation our spokesman refused to continue with his report. Only after lengthy "explanations" had been made by the Mensheviks did he agree to say a few words in conclusion.

The alteration was truly flabbergasting. A resolution on insurrection speaks, not of the struggle for power, but of the

struggle for rights! Just imagine what incredible confusion this opportunist formula would have caused in the minds of the masses, and how absurd would have been the glaring discrepancy between the majesty of the means (insurrection) and the modesty of the aim (to wrest rights, i.e., to wrest rights from the old regime, to obtain concessions from the old regime, and not to overthrow it).

It goes without saying that the Bolsheviks attacked this amendment with the utmost vigour. The ranks of the Mensheviks wavered. Evidently they had convinced themselves that Plekhanov had again overdone it, and that in practice they would have a hard time of it trying to explain away this moderate and trim appraisal of the aims of insurrection. Plekhanov had to back out. He withdrew his amendment, saying that he did not attach any importance to what was, strictly speaking, merely a matter of "style". This was only gilding the pill, of course. Everybody realised that it was not a matter of style at all.

Plekhanov's amendment clearly revealed what the Mensheviks were aiming at on the question of insurrection: to invent dissuading arguments against insurrection, to repudiate the December uprising, to advise against launching another uprising, to nullify the aims of the insurrection, or define them in such a way as to rule out insurrection as a means of achieving them. But the Mensheviks could not bring themselves to say this straightforwardly and emphatically, plainly and openly. Their position was utterly false: to express their most cherished idea by veiled hints. The representatives of the proletariat can and should openly criticise its mistakes, but to do so in a veiled, ambiguous and vague form is quite unworthy of Social-Democrats. And the Menshevik resolution involuntarily expressed this ambiguous position: dissuading arguments against insurrection, along with a sham recognition of it by the "people".

The talk about technique and conspiratorial methods was too obviously an attempt to distract attention, too crude an attempt to muffle up disagreements on the *political* appraisal of insurrection. To avoid making this appraisal, to avoid saying bluntly whether the December uprising was a step forward and had raised the movement to a higher plane, it was necessary to divert the discussion from politics to

technique, from concrete appraisal of the events of December 1905 to generalities about conspiratorial methods. What a stain on Social-Democracy will be left by this talk about conspiracy in connection with such a *people*'s movement as the December struggle in Moscow!

You want to indulge in polemics, we said to the Menshevik comrades; you want to have a "dig" at the Bolsheviks; your resolution on insurrection is full of thrusts at those who disagree with you. Indulge in polemics as much as you like. It is your right and your duty. But don't reduce the great question of appraising historic days to petty and pettifogging polemics. Don't humiliate the Party by making it appear as if, in speaking of the December struggle of the workers, peasants and town petty bourgeoisie, it could do no better than snarl and dig at another Party group. Rise a little higher: write a special polemical resolution against the Bolsheviks, if you want to, but do give the proletariat and the whole people a plain, straightforward and unambiguous answer concerning insurrection.

You shout about the overrating of technique and about conspiratorial methods. But compare the two draft resolutions. In our resolution, you will not find technique, but *historical and political* material. You will find that it is based, not on bare and unprovable platitudes ("the object of the struggle is to wrest power"), but on facts taken from the *history of the movement*, from the political experience of the last quarter of 1905. You lay the blame at the door of another, for it is your resolution that is utterly lacking in historical and political material. It speaks of insurrection, but says not a word about the relation between strike and insurrection, not a word about how the struggle after October necessarily and inevitably led to insurrection; there is not a single plain and straightforward statement in it about December. It is in our resolution that insurrection appears, not as a call from conspirators, not as a question of technique, but as the *political result* of a very specific historical situation created by the October strike, by the promise of liberties, by the attempt to withdraw these liberties and by the struggle to protect them.

Your phrases about technique and conspiracy are only a screen to cover up your *retreat* on the question of insurrection.

At the Congress, the Mensheviks' resolution on insurrection was actually called "a resolution *against* armed uprising". And anyone who at all carefully reads the texts of the two resolutions submitted to the Congress will hardly venture to challenge this statement.*

Our arguments influenced the Mensheviks only in part. Whoever compares the *draft* of their resolution with the resolution they finally adopted will see that they deleted a number of really petty attacks and expressions. But the general spirit of the resolution remained unaltered, of course. It is a historical fact that a Menshevik-dominated Congress, held after the first armed uprising in Russia, betrayed bewilderment, evaded a straight answer, did not have the courage to tell the proletariat in plain language whether this insurrection had been a mistake or a step forward, whether a second insurrection was necessary, and what historical connection it would have with the first.

The evasiveness of the Mensheviks, who wanted to shelve the question of insurrection, who longed to do so but could not bring themselves to admit it, resulted in the question virtually remaining open. The *Party still* has to draw up its appraisal of the December uprising; and all Party organisations must devote the most serious attention to this matter.

The practical aspect of the question of insurrection is also still an open one. In the name of the Congress, it was admitted that the *immediate* (note this!) task of the movement is to "*wrest power*". Why, this formulation is, if you will, ultra-Bolshevik: it reduces the whole matter to a phrase, the very thing that we were accused of doing. But since the Congress has said this, we must be guided by it. We must *on these grounds* very strongly criticise those local and central bodies and organisations of the Party that might forget this *immediate* task. On the basis of the Congress decision we can, and must, put this *immediate* task *first* in certain political situations. Nobody will have the right to object to this,

* In order to help the reader to study the debates at the Congress intelligently and critically, I print in the appendix the texts of the first drafts of the resolutions of the Majority and of the Minority, and the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Congress. Only by carefully studying and comparing these texts can one arrive at an independent opinion on the question of Social-Democratic tactics.

for since the words "wrest rights" have been deleted, and we have secured recognition of "*wresting power as the immediate task*", this will be wholly and entirely in accordance with the line laid down by the Congress.

We advise the Party organisations not to forget this, particularly at a time when our far-famed Duma is being so grossly snubbed by the autocratic government.

During the debate on armed uprising, Comrade Voyinov very aptly hit off the tight spot in which the Mensheviks had landed. To say "wrest rights" means expressing an utterly opportunist formula. To say "wrest power" means throwing away all weapons in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Now we know what orthodox Marxism and conspiratorial heresy are, said Voyinov ironically. "To wrest power" is orthodox: "to conquer power" is conspiracy....

The same speaker depicted the characteristics that are common to all Mensheviks in this connection. The Mensheviks, he said, are impressionists, people who yield to the mood of the moment. When the revolutionary tide rose and October-November 1905 arrived, *Nachalo* galloped off at breakneck speed, and went even more Bolshevik than the Bolsheviks. It galloped from democratic dictatorship to socialist dictatorship. But when the revolutionary tide turned, when enthusiasm ebbed and the Cadets rose to the top, the Mensheviks hastened to adjust themselves to this subdued mood. They now trot behind the Cadets, and disdainfully brush aside the October-December forms of struggle.

Highly interesting confirmation of the foregoing was provided at the Congress by a written statement from the Menshevik Larin. He submitted his statement to the Bureau, and it should therefore be fully recorded in the minutes. Larin's statement said that the Mensheviks had made a mistake in October-December by behaving like Bolsheviks. I heard verbal and informal protests against this "valuable admission" from individual Mensheviks at the Congress, but I will not vouch that these protests were expressed in speeches or statements.

Plekhanov's speech was also edifying. He was talking (if I am not mistaken) about the seizure of power, but in doing so he made a very curious slip. I am opposed to the conspiratorial seizure of power, he exclaimed: but I am wholly

in favour of the seizure of power on the lines of, say, the Convention during the great French Revolution.

We took Plekhanov at his word. Excellent, Comrade Plekhanov, I replied. Put what you have said in the resolution! Condemn conspiracy as sharply as you like—we Bolsheviks will whole-heartedly and unanimously vote for a resolution that recognises and recommends to the proletariat the seizure of power on the lines of the Convention. Condemn conspiracy, but recognise in your resolution a dictatorship like the Convention, and we will agree with you entirely and unreservedly. More than that. I guarantee that the moment you sign such a resolution the *Cadets will stop praising you*!

Comrade Voyinov also pointed to the glaring contradiction in which Comrade Plekhanov had landed as a result of his "slip of the tongue" about the Convention. The Convention was precisely a dictatorship of the lower classes, that is, of the lowest and poorest sections of the town and village population. In the bourgeois revolution this was a body with full powers, wholly and entirely dominated, not by the upper or middle bourgeoisie, but by the common people, the poor, that is, precisely those whom we call "the proletariat and the peasantry". To recognise the Convention and to oppose the seizure of power means juggling with words. To recognise the Convention and be violently opposed to "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" means defeating one's own purpose. But the Bolsheviks have at all times and invariably spoken about the capture of power by the masses of the people, by the proletariat and the peasantry and not by any "politically-conscious minority" All the talk about conspiracy and Blanquism was just pious declamation, which evaporated at the mere mention of the Convention.

VII

THE END OF THE CONGRESS

Armed uprising was the last question to be discussed more or less thoroughly and on principle at the Congress. The other questions were rushed through or decided without discussion.

The resolution on fighting guerrilla operations was adopted as an addendum to the resolution on armed uprising. I was not in the hall when it was taken; nor did I hear from any of the comrades that the debate on this question was at all interesting. Besides, this is not a question of principle, of course.

The resolution on trade unions and that on the attitude to be adopted towards the peasant movement were passed unanimously. In the committees which drafted these resolutions, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks reached agreement. I will note that the resolution on the peasant movement contains an absolutely correct appraisal of the Cadet Party, and recognises insurrection as "the only means" of winning freedom. Both these points should be kept in mind more often in our day-to-day work of agitation.

The question of amalgamating with the national Social-Democratic parties took up a little more time. Amalgamation with the Poles was accepted unanimously. So was amalgamation with the Letts, I remember: at all events it was accepted without much discussion. There was a big battle, however, over the question of amalgamating with the Bund. As far as I remember, this was carried by 54 votes, or thereabouts. Those voting *in favour* were the Bolsheviks (nearly all), the Centre, and the least factional-minded of the Mensheviks. It was agreed that the local guiding committees of the R.S.D.L.P. should be joint committees, and that all delegates to congresses should be elected according to the general procedure. A resolution was adopted which recognises the necessity of striving for centralist principles of organisation (we proposed a resolution, worded differently, but to the same effect, in which we stressed the practical significance of the concession we had made to the Bund, and urged the necessity of a steady effort to unite the forces of the proletariat more closely and in more up-to-date fashion).

Some of the Mensheviks got quite heated over the amalgamation with the Bund, and accused us of departing from the principles laid down by the Second Congress. The best reply to this accusation is a reference to *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2. In that issue, *long before the Congress*, the Bolsheviks published a draft resolution proposing a number of *further* concessions to *all* the national Social-Democratic parties,

even to the extent of "proportional representation in the local, regional and central bodies of the Party".* In that same issue, No. 2 of *Partiiniye Izvestia*, the Mensheviks in reply to our resolution published a counter-resolution, in which there was *not a single word* to suggest that they disagreed with our proposal to make further concessions to the Bund and to the other national Social-Democratic parties.

I think that this is the best answer to the controversial question whether it was the Bolsheviks who voted *for* the Bund for factionaI reasons, or the Mensheviks who for factional reasons voted *against* the Bund.

The Party Rules were adopted very quickly. I was a member of the committee that drafted them. The Mensheviks wanted to raise the proportion of the Party membership necessary to authorise the convocation of an extraordinary congress to two-thirds of the membership. Together with my Bolshevik colleagues, I then emphatically declared that the slightest attempt to curtail that minimum of autonomy and of rights of the opposition which had been recognised in the Rules adopted by the factional Third Congress would inevitably lead to a split. It is up to you, Menshevik comrades, I said. If you choose to remain loyal to the agreement and respect all the rights of the minority, all the rights of the opposition,** then we will submit, we will elect our fellow-thinkers to the Central Committee and condemn a split. If you do not, then a split is inevitable.

The Mensheviks agreed to come down from two-thirds to one-half The Rules were adopted unanimously, including Clause 1, and the principle of democratic centralism. Only two points gave rise to disagreement.

First, we proposed that a note be added to Clause 1, to the effect that members of the Party, on changing their place of residence, should have the right to belong to the local Party organisation.

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* See pp. 159-60 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** I will remind the reader that in my pamphlet, *Social-Democracy and the State Duma* (published together with an article by Dan). I pointed out before the Congress that the trend that remained in the minority must be ensured *freedom to criticise the decisions of the Congress and freedom to agitate for another Congress* (p. 8). (See p. 111 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

The purpose of this note was to preclude petty squabbling, the ejection of dissidents from the organisation, and the refusal of Mensheviks to accept Bolsheviks and vice versa. The Party is growing. It is becoming a mass party. Fighting for posts must stop. All the leading bodies in the Party are elected bodies. The local organisation of the Party, however, should be open to all members of the Party. Only this will prevent the ideological struggle from being besmirched by organisational squabbles.

In spite of our insistence, the Mensheviks rejected our note. But to prove that their intentions were loyal, they agreed to adopt the following resolution: "The Congress rejects this note solely because it considers it to be superfluous and *self-evident*" (I am quoting from memory, as I have not found the text of this resolution in my notes). It is very important to bear this resolution in mind in the event of any controversy and organisational friction arising.

The second point on which there was disagreement was the relation between the Central Committee and the Central Organ. The Mensheviks carried the point that the editorial board of the Central Organ is to be elected by the Congress and that the members of the editorial board are to act as members of the Central Committee when questions of policy are discussed (a vague point which will probably give rise to misunderstanding). The Bolsheviks, referring to the melancholy conflicts between writers in the Russian and German* party press, advocated the appointment of the editorial board of the Central Organ by the Central Committee, the latter to have the right to dismiss the editors. In my opinion, the decision of the Mensheviks undoubtedly shows that there is something abnormal in the relations between the writers and the practical-political leaders in the Right wing of our Party.

As a curiosity, I must mention that at the Congress the Mensheviks endorsed the resolution of the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress on the attitude to be adopted towards bourgeois parties.[175] This decision will go down in

* The recent "affair" of the six editors of *Vorwärts* who made quite a fuss because they bad been dismissed by the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party.[174]

the history of our Social-Democratic congresses precisely as a curiosity. Are not *all* the decisions of international socialist congresses binding on the Social-Democratic parties of *all* countries? What point is there in singling out and endorsing one of these decisions? Who has ever heard that a Social-Democratic party in any particular country has, instead of deciding its attitude towards a particular bourgeois party in its *own* country, taken its stand on the common attitude in all countries towards all bourgeois parties? Before the Congress, both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks drafted resolutions on the attitude to be adopted towards the bourgeois parties in Russia, in the Year of Our Lord *1906*. If there was no time to examine this question at the Congress, then it ought to have been simply put off. But to choose this "middle" course of not examining the question of Russian parties, but of endorsing the international decision on the general question, was merely betraying one's confusion to the world. It was like saying: as we haven't the brains to decide what attitude to adopt towards the Russian parties, let us at least repeat the international decision. This was the most inept and ridiculous way of leaving the question open.

Yet the question is an extremely important one. The reader will find the draft resolutions of the Majority and the Minority in the appendix. We recommend those who are interested in this question (and which practical worker, agitator or propagandist is not?) to compare these drafts from time to time with the "lessons of the revolution", that is, with the political facts about the life of various parties that experience in Russia today provides so amply. Whoever makes this comparison will see that the revolution is increasingly corroborating our appraisal of the two main trends among the bourgeois democrats: the liberal-monarchist (mainly, the Cadets) and the revolutionary-democratic trend.

The Menshevik resolution, however, bears obvious traces of the helplessness and confusion which led at the Congress to the curious device of endorsing the international decision. The Menshevik resolution consists entirely of generalities, and makes no attempt to solve (or indicate a solution of) the concrete problems of political life in Russia. We must criticise all parties, says this bewildered resolution: we must expose them, we must state that there are no really consistent

democratic parties. But *how* the *different* bourgeois parties in Russia, or the different types of these parties, should be "criticised and exposed", the resolution *does not know*. It says we must "criticise", but it does not know how to criticise; for the Marxist criticism of bourgeois parties consists in a *concrete* analysis of the *class* basis of the different bourgeois parties, whatever it is. The resolution helplessly says there are no really consistent democratic parties. But it does not know how to define the *different degrees* of consistency of the *Russian* bourgeois-democratic parties that have already appeared and are appearing in the course of our revolution. The empty phrases and platitudes in the Menshevik resolution have even obscured the dividing lines of the three main types of bourgeois party in Russia: the Octobrist type, the Cadet type and the revolutionary-democratic type. And these our Right Social-Democrats, so ludicrously helpless when it comes to appraising the class foundations and trends of the various parties in bourgeois Russia, have the effrontery to accuse the Left Social-Democrats of "true socialism", that is, of ignoring the historically concrete role of the bourgeois democrats! Now this is once again, indeed, laying the blame at someone else's door.

I have digressed somewhat from my main subject; but I warned the reader at the very outset that I intended to combine my report on the Congress with a few ideas about the Congress. And I think that in order to be able to appraise the Congress intelligently, the members of the Party must ponder, not only over what the Congress did, but also over what the Congress left undone though it should not have. And every thinking Social-Democrat is beginning to realise more clearly every day the importance of a Marxist analysis of the different bourgeois-democratic parties in Russia.

The elections at the Congress took only a few minutes. Virtually, everything had been arranged before the general sessions. The Mensheviks took all five seats on the editorial board of the Central Organ. As for the Central Committee, we agreed to elect three persons to it, the other seven being Mensheviks. What the position of these three will be, as a kind of supervisors and guardians of the rights of the opposition, is something that only the future can tell,

VIII

THE CONGRESS SUMMED UP

Summing up the work of the Congress and the effect it has had upon our Party, we must draw the following main conclusions.

An important practical result of the Congress is the proposed (partly already achieved) amalgamation with the national Social-Democratic parties. This amalgamation will strengthen the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It will help to efface the last traces of the old circle habits. It will infuse a new spirit into the work of the Party. It will greatly enhance the might of the proletariat of all the peoples of Russia.

Another important practical result was the amalgamation of the Minority and Majority groups. The split has been stopped. The Social-Democratic proletariat and its Party must be united. Disagreements on organisation have been almost entirely eliminated. There remains an important, serious and extremely responsible task: really to apply the principles of democratic centralism in Party organisation, to work tirelessly to make the local organisations the principal organisational units of the Party in fact, and not merely in name, and to see to it that all the higher-standing bodies are elected, accountable, and subject to recall. We must work hard to build up an organisation that will include all the class-conscious Social-Democratic workers, and will live its own independent political life. The autonomy of every Party organisation, which hitherto has been largely a dead letter, must become a reality. The fight for posts, fear of the other "faction", must be eliminated. Let us have really united Party organisations, in which there will only be a purely ideological struggle between different trends of Social-Democratic thought. It will not be easy to achieve this; nor shall we achieve it at one stroke. But the road has been mapped out, the principles have been proclaimed, and we must now work for the complete and consistent putting into effect of this organisational ideal.

We think that an important ideological result of the Congress is that there is now a clearer and more definite line of demarcation between the Right wing and the Left wing in

Social-Democracy. There is a Right and a Left wing in all the Social-Democratic parties in Europe; and their existence in our Party has been evident for a long time. A more distinct line of demarcation between the two, a clearer definition of the points of disagreement, is essential for the healthy development of the Party, for the political education of the proletariat, and for the checking of every inclination of the Social-Democratic Party to stray too far from the right path.

The Unity Congress has provided a wealth of practical, documentary material that will enable us to determine precisely and indisputably what we agree on, what we disagree on, and how much we disagree. This documentary material must be *studied*; we must know the *facts* which reveal the true nature and dimensions of the disagreement. We must wean ourselves of the old circle habits—vehemence, abuse and portentous accusations instead of earnest discussion of particular disagreements that have arisen on particular questions. And we have thought it essential to append to this pamphlet as much *documentary* material as possible on the Unity Congress, to enable the members of the Party to *study* the disagreements really independently instead of taking battered catchwords on faith. This documentary material is dry, of course. Not everybody will have the patience and perseverance to read the draft resolutions and compare them with the resolutions that were adopted, to ponder over the significance of the different formulations of each point and of each sentence. But whoever takes a really intelligent interest in the decisions of the Congress cannot shirk such serious work.

And so, summing up what I have said above about the disputes at the Congress and the different trends of the draft resolutions that the Congress did not discuss (or postponed), I come to the conclusion that the Congress has helped us a great deal to draw a more distinct line of demarcation between the Right wing and the Left wing in Social-Democracy.

The Right wing of our Party does not believe in the complete victory of the present, i.e., bourgeois-democratic, revolution in Russia; it dreads such a victory; it does not emphatically and definitely put the slogan of such a victory before the people. It is constantly being misled by the essentially erroneous idea, which is really a vulgarisation of Marx-

ism, that only the bourgeoisie can independently "make" the bourgeois revolution, or that only the bourgeoisie should lead the bourgeois revolution. The role of the proletariat as the vanguard in the struggle for the complete and decisive victory of the bourgeois revolution is not clear to the Right Social-Democrats.

For example, they—or at all events some of their speakers at the Congress—advance the slogan of a *peasant revolution*, but they do not uphold this slogan consistently. They do not formulate in the programme a clear revolutionary line of propaganda and agitation among the people (*seizure* of the land by revolutionary peasant committees *pending* the national constituent assembly). They are afraid of expressing in the programme of the peasant revolution the idea that the revolutionary peasantry should seize power. In spite of their promises, they do not carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture to its "logical" conclusion, for the only "logical" (*and economic*) conclusion under capitalism is the nationalisation of land, which abolishes absolute rent. They invent an incredibly artificial middle course, with nationalisation cut up into local areas and with democratic Zemstvos under an undemocratic central government. They try to scare the proletariat with the bogy of restoration, not suspecting that they are clutching at the political weapon that the bourgeoisie uses against the proletariat, that they are bringing grist to the mill of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

And in their entire tactical line our Right Social-Democrats overrate the importance and role of the unstable, wavering, monarchist-liberal bourgeoisie (the Cadets, etc.) and underrate the importance of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats (the Peasant Union, the Trudovik Group in the Duma, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the numerous semi-political and semi-trade-union organisations, etc.). Their overrating of the Cadets and underrating of the revolutionary-democratic rank and file is very intimately linked with their mistaken views on the bourgeois revolution, referred to above. Our Right Social-Democrats are dazzled by the tawdry successes of the Cadets, by their glittering "parliamentary" victories and by their bombastic "constitutional" speeches. Beguiled by the politics of the moment, they forget the more fundamental and more important interests of democracy;

they forget those forces which make less "noise" on the surface of the "constitutionalism" permitted by the Trepovs and Dubasovs, but which are doing much more profound, if less ostentatious, work among the revolutionary-democratic rank and file, preparing for conflicts of a not quite parliamentary character.

Hence the sceptical (to put it mildly) attitude of our Right Social-Democrats towards insurrection; hence their effort to brush aside the experience of October and December, and the forms of struggle that then arose. Hence their irresolution and passivity in the struggle against constitutional illusions, a struggle which comes into the forefront at every truly revolutionary juncture. Hence their failure to understand the historical role of the boycott of the Duma, and their efforts to dodge the task of taking stock of the concrete conditions of the movement at any particular moment*

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* I have just received a copy of Karl Kautsky's new pamphlet entitled *The State Duma*. His formulation of the question of the boycott and that of the Mensheviks are as wide apart as heaven and earth. Our would-be Social-Democrats, like Negorev in *Nevskaya Gazeta*, clumsily blurt out: the boycott is anarchism! But Kautsky, after analysing the concrete conditions, writes: "Under these conditions it is not surprising that the majority of our Russian comrades regarded the Duma convened in this way as nothing more than a most outrageous travesty of popular representation, and decided to boycott it...." "It is not surprising that the majority of our Russian comrades thought it more expedient to fight in order to wreck this Duma and secure the convocation of a constituent assembly, than to take part in the election campaign for the purpose of getting into this Duma."

Oh, how we should like to have Axelrod's platitudes about the benefits of parliamentarism and the harmfulness of anarchism published soon, as a parallel to Kautsky's historically concrete appraisal!

By the way. This is what Kautsky says about the victory of the revolution in the same pamphlet: "The peasants and the proletariat will more and more vigorously and unceremoniously push the members of the Duma to the left [this is what *Nevskaya Gazeta* would contemptuously call "the crude exposure of the Cadets"], will weaken and paralyse their opponents more and more *until they have utterly defeated them*." Thus the *peasantry and the proletariat* will defeat "them", that is, both the government and the liberal bourgeoisie. Poor Kautsky! He does not realise that only the bourgeoisie can make a bourgeois revolution. He is uttering a "Blanquist" heresy: the victory ("dictatorship") of the proletariat and the peasantry.

by use of the "biting" word "anarchism". Hence their extraordinary eagerness to go into a pseudo-constitutional institution and hence their overrating of the positive role of this institution.

Against this tendency of our Right Social-Democrats we must wage a most determined, open and ruthless ideological struggle. We should seek the widest possible discussion of the decisions of the Congress. We must call upon every member of the Party to take a conscious and critical stand on these resolutions. We must see to it that every workers' organisation, after making itself thoroughly familiar with the subject, declares whether it approves or disapproves of any particular decision. If we have really and seriously decided to introduce democratic centralism in our Party, and if we have resolved to draw the masses of the workers into intelligent decision of Party questions, we must have these questions discussed in the press, at meetings, in circles and at group meetings.

But in the united Party this ideological struggle must not split the organisations, must not hinder the unity of action of the proletariat. This is a new principle as yet in our Party life, and considerable effort will be needed to implement it properly.

Freedom of discussion, unity of action—this is what we must strive to achieve. The decisions of the Unity Congress allow sufficient scope for all Social-Democrats in this respect. Practical measures on the lines of "municipalisation" are still a long way off; but in the matter of supporting the revolutionary activities of the peasantry, and of criticising petty-bourgeois utopias, all Social-Democrats are agreed among themselves. Hence we must discuss municipalisation, and condemn it, without being afraid of hindering the unity of action of the proletariat.

As regards the Duma, the situation is somewhat different. During elections there *must* be complete unity of action. The Congress has decided: we will *all* take part in elections, wherever they take place. During elections there must be no criticism of participation in elections. *Action* by the proletariat must be united. We shall all and always regard the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, whenever it is formed, as *our* Party group.

But beyond the bounds of unity of action there must be the broadest and freest discussion and condemnation of all steps, decisions and tendencies that we regard as harmful. Only through such discussions, resolutions and protests can the real public opinion of our Party be formed. Only on this condition shall we be a real Party, *always* able to express its *opinion*, and finding the right way to convert a definitely formed opinion into the *decisions* of its next congress.

Take the third resolution that caused disagreement, the one on insurrection. Here unity of action in the midst of the struggle is absolutely essential. In the heat of battle, when the proletarian army is straining every nerve, no criticism *whatever* can be permitted in its ranks. But before the call for action is issued, there should be the broadest and freest discussion and appraisal of the resolution, of its arguments and its various propositions.

Thus we have a very wide field. The resolutions of the Congress provide plenty of scope. Any infatuation with quasi-constitutionalism, any exaggeration of the "positive" role of the Duma by anybody, any appeals of the extreme Right Social-Democrats for moderation and sobriety—we have in our possession a most powerful weapon against them. This weapon is Clause 1 of the Congress resolution on insurrection.

The Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has recognised that the immediate task of the movement is to *wrest power* from the autocratic government. Whoever forgets about this *immediate* task, whoever attempts to push it into the background, will *infringe* the will of the Congress; and we shall fight all who are guilty of this in the sternest fashion.

I repeat: there is plenty of scope from the parliamentary group to the immediate task of wresting power. Within these wide limits, the ideological struggle can and must proceed without causing a split, without affecting the unity of action of the proletariat.

And we call upon all Social-Democrats who do not want our Party to stray too far to the right to join in this ideological struggle.

FROM MARXIST TO MAOIST NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Appendix

MATERIAL FOR APPRAISING THE WORK OF THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To enable the reader, pending the publication of the minutes of the Congress, to study the questions that were discussed at the Congress with the aid of the records concerned, we append herewith the draft resolutions submitted to the Congress by the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks respectively, together with the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Congress. As we have already stated in the pamphlet, only by studying this material can one gain a clear and precise idea of the true significance of the ideological struggle at the Congress. We also append the more important resolutions that appeared in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, and which were not discussed at the Congress, or not brought up there; for all the delegates had these in mind during the debates and sometimes quoted them, but unless one reads them, one cannot fully understand the nature of the disagreements.

THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND THE FIGHT FOR POWER

Novoye Vremya exposes. That newspaper, serving the government which has in practice remained an autocracy, hurls a number of frightful charges against our paper,[176] and warns the Cadets of the dangers the proletarian class struggle holds in store for the bourgeoisie. Besides its usual denunciations to the authorities, the arguments in *Novoye Vremya* contain a number of points that are of vital, public interest.

"Are not the Cadets ashamed," asks *Novoye Vremya*, "to represent social-revolutionaries [referring to *Volna*] as 'the vanguard in the struggle for political freedom'? They are nothing of the kind. They are not fighting for freedom, but for power, and as against the old autocracy they are advancing their own sovereignty—the sovereignty of the proletariat."

Novoye Vremya is a faithful servant of the autocratic government. The servant, in his master's interests, is at pains to scare the bourgeoisie with the spectre of socialist revolution. That is its first object. Its second object is to depict the revolution now in progress as socialist: to confuse "sovereignty of the people" with "sovereignty of the proletariat".

It is no accident that the servants of the autocracy resort to trickery and fraud to achieve these two objects. The servants of old autocracies have everywhere and always resorted to such fraud, and not only in newspaper articles, but in all their policy.

That is why it is most important to examine the deception perpetrated by *Novoye Vremya*. First of all, we shall deal with the "horrible" discovery that "they" are fighting, *not* for freedom, *but* for power. Let us see what this means. People's freedom can be ensured only when the people can really,

without let or hindrance, form their associations, hold meetings, publish newspapers, make their own laws and elect and replace all officials in the state who are entrusted with carrying out the laws and administering the country on the basis of the laws. Thus people's freedom can be really and fully ensured only when all power in the state really and fully belongs to the people. This is absolutely obvious; and it is only the deliberate desire to confuse the minds of the people that prompts such servants of the government as *Novoye Vremya*. It is this obvious truth that is established in the programme of the workers' party. In this programme, the *political* demands that are feasible in bourgeois society, i.e., a society in which the private ownership of the means of production and production for the market prevails, are headed by the demand for the *sovereignty of the people*. Whoever fights for freedom for the people, but does not fight for the sovereignty of the people in the state, is either inconsistent or insincere.

This is how matters stand as regards the struggle for freedom and the struggle for power, arguing in purely logical terms. In the history of the struggle for freedom, the position has always been that the people, in fighting for freedom, at the beginning of their struggle received *promises* from the old regime to the effect that it would ensure their freedom. Prompted by fear of revolution, the old state power, which is independent of the people and is a power over the people, *promises the people* that it will ensure their freedom. But its promises remain unfulfilled; they cannot be fulfilled in their entirety so long as there exists a government which cannot be recalled by the people. And so, at a certain stage in the history of all revolutions, a moment arrives when the obvious logic of the foregoing argument penetrates the minds of the broad masses of the people, under the influence of the lessons taught by experience.

Such a moment is also approaching in Russia. In its historical aspect, the struggle in October 1905 was a struggle for a promise by the old regime to ensure freedom. And a promise is all that the people have succeeded in getting so far. But the numerous unsuccessful efforts to fight for something more have not been in vain. They prepared the people for a more serious struggle. The contradiction between the

promise of freedom and the absence of freedom, between the omnipotence of the old regime, which conducts all affairs, and the impotence of the "people's representatives" in the Duma, who do nothing but talk, is now, precisely as a result of the experience of the Duma, penetrating the minds of the masses more and more clearly, deeply and sharply. The struggle for full power for the people with the aim of ensuring full freedom for the people is approaching with amazing rapidity, not only because of the subjective logic of our arguments, but also because of the objective logic of political events. That is why a few days' sessions of the Duma were sufficient to cause a fresh breeze to blow. The Duma is a splendid instrument of exposure, and it particularly well exposes deceptive ideas about the power of such a Duma, about the value of promises, about the usefulness of constitutions bestowed from above, or of agreements between the old regime and the new freedom. And that is why signs of a new and real step forward by the movement for freedom are revealing themselves so early. The Cadet election victories at first turned everybody's head. The Cadets' behaviour in the Duma is already causing their halo to fade. And advocates of a compromise between the old regime and the new freedom are losing, and inevitably will lose, their glamour in the eyes of the people as the struggle for full power for the people, for full freedom for the people, draws nearer.

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Signed: *N. L—n*

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A NEW UPSWING

The opening of the Duma sessions has coincided with the outbreak of Black-Hundred riots. The first steps on the path of "peaceful parliamentarism", a path which caused the Cadets and all philistines in politics to go into raptures and tears of joy, have coincided with the most brutal, most direct and immediate manifestations of civil war. The introduction of the "constitutional" method of deciding affairs of state, the method of ballot-papers and the counting of votes, has coincided with outbreaks of the most primitive violence, with the settlement of affairs of state by exterminating dissidents, by annihilating political opponents (literally annihilating by fire and sword).*

Is this a chance coincidence? Of course not. And it would be inadequate as an explanation to say that the police is organising riots for provocative purposes, for the purpose of discrediting the Duma. Of course, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that the police is directly involved. Of course, the police is organising, inciting and provoking. All this is true. In a war which the bureaucracy is waging, virtually for its very existence, its servants and supporters literally stick at nothing. But why do they have to resort to such methods of struggle, and on such a large scale, precisely at the present time? This question is worth considering in order to avoid ascribing whole periods of revolutionary development to the exceptional viciousness, exceptional bloodthirstiness and exceptional bestiality of the combatants.

* The burning down of the People's House at Vologda by a mob instigated by the police, and the beating up of demonstrators at Simbirsk are the outstanding cases of riots during the past few days.

We are witnessing the beginning of a social revival. The unemployed movement, the May Day demonstrations, the growing unrest among the peasantry and in the armed forces, the meetings, the press, the unions, are all unambiguous indications of this revival. In a matter of days the revival of the broad popular movement has already outstripped the revival that was expressed in the victory of the Cadets and of the "Left" in general at the elections. The Cadets have already fallen behind. The Cadet Duma is already fading—it is withering before it has had time to blossom. This withering of our barren petty-bourgeois flowers, this consternation of the Cadets, is most characteristically expressed, among other things, in an article by Mr. D. Protopopov (a Cadet member of the State Duma) in yesterday's issue of *Duma*. Mr. Protopopov says, complaining and wailing: "The country expects from the State Duma the radical and immediate solution of a number of extremely intricate problems and, above all, the equally immediate practical introduction of the expected reforms." But have a heart, my dear fellow-citizens—wails this Cadet. We have neither a "magician's wand", nor "complete power" (the Cadet forgets to add that neither does the programme, i.e., the political ideal, of the Cadets, include complete power for the people). The State Duma is not the Convention. And from the lips of this Cadet comes the matchless, almost touching admission of a terrified philistine: "Only such a Duma-Convention could satisfy the demands of the bulk of the nation." What is true is true. "The bulk", perhaps the whole mass of the workers and peasants, are demanding a Convention, and all they get is—a Cadet Duma. Poor, poor Cadets! Could they have anticipated that they would be so quickly and so hopelessly overtaken by the rising tide?

And now this great tide is the material basis of the fact that the struggle is becoming extraordinarily acute, that "peaceful parliamentarism" is fading and slipping into the background, and that playing at a constitution is giving way to the settlement of affairs of state by force. The result is the resumption of the October uprising, but on a much wider basis, on a much greater scale, with the masses of the peasantry and the working class more politically conscious and (thanks to what they passed through in the period of

October-December) with incomparably more political experience. In October the combatant forces were equally balanced. The old autocracy proved to be no longer strong enough to govern the country. The people were not yet strong enough to secure complete power that would ensure complete freedom. The Manifesto of October 17 was the juridical expression of this equilibrium of forces. But this equilibrium, which compelled the old regime to make a concession, forced it into recognising freedom on paper, merely signified a temporary halt, but not the cessation of the struggle. In October and November it was said that our government had "gone on strike", that it had been "standing rigid" like a setter over the revolution, that it had paused as it waited for the opportune moment, and had plunged into a desperate battle which ended in its victory. Political philistines, narrow-minded as usual, with the timidity and flabby, Pharisaical "idealism" that is characteristic of them, expostulated, wept, and voiced their indignation at the "immorality" of the government's "strike", of its standing rigid like a setter over the revolution. Their indignation was totally out of place. "In war as in war." In every war, when the belligerents' forces are equally balanced, they pause, gather strength, recuperate, assimilate the experience they have obtained, make preparations, and then plunge into the next battle. This is what happened in the case of the armies of Kuropatkin and Oyama. So it has been, and always will be, in any great civil war. "In war as in war."

But civil war differs from ordinary war by its immeasurably greater complexity, by the fact that the belligerents are unknown and unknowable—because of desertions from one camp to another (Octobrists go over to the side of the government, a section of the armed forces go over to the side of the people), and because it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between "combatants" and "non-combatants". When the government "goes on strike", when the police pauses waiting and "stands rigid", the war goes on just the same, precisely because it is a civil war, because among the population itself there are those who are interested in defending the old regime and those who are fighting for freedom. That is why the present upswing, which has equalised the belligerent forces, is also with inexorable necessity weakening the government,

compelling it to "go on strike", to "stand rigid over the revolution" again to a certain extent, and on the other hand, is leading to a resumption of the October, November and December forms of struggle. Whoever wants to take a conscious stand on the great events unfolding before us, whoever wants to learn from the revolution, must realise that these forms of struggle are inevitable, and must think out the tasks that these forms of struggle impose upon us.

The Cadets, intoxicated with their election victories, have written reams of paper about Russia having taken the path of parliamentarism. The Social-Democrats in the Right wing of our Party have allowed themselves to be carried away by the general stream. At the Unity Congress of the Party, although they were the victors, and in spite of the protests of the Left Social-Democrats, they withdrew their resolution on the upswing of the revolution, on the main forms of the movement at the present time, and on the tasks of the proletariat. They behaved in this respect like Mr. Milyukov who, at the last congress of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, touched on the question whether the people were not more revolutionary than the Duma, whether a revolutionary struggle in the narrow sense of the word was not inevitable, but at once timidly withdrew the question from discussion. It was natural for a Cadet to evade such an issue; but it is unseemly for Social-Democrats to do so, and they are already paying the penalty for this. Forms of struggle are already arising, with elemental force, that are pushing the Duma into the background and are bringing nearer another October and another December, whether we like it or not.

At the Party Congress, a Right Social-Democrat scoffed at the resolution of the Left Social-Democrats which openly and straightforwardly recognised as the "*main* form of the movement", not the toy-constitutional, but the October-December form, i.e., the action of the broad masses, who directly sweep away the old laws and the old instruments of authority, and make use of a new authority, created in the very course of the struggle, as a weapon for winning freedom. There is no evidence of these forms of struggle, exclaimed this Right Social-Democratic speaker. They do not exist, they are the figment of the imagination of our Lefts, those visionaries, those rebels, those anarchists. "Take off your

Cadet spectacles!"—we retorted to this comrade at the Congress. You will then see something more than what is taking place on the surface. You will see that it is not the Duma struggle that is the *main* struggle, you will realise that objective conditions are making the *extra-Duma* forms of the movement inevitable, are making them the main, vital, fundamental and decisive forms.

A week or two has passed since these debates took place at the Congress. And already the revolution is knocking the Cadet spectacles off the noses not only of the Right Social-Democrats, but also of the broad masses of the people. The Duma is already fading, constitutional illusions are being dispelled. The October-December forms of struggle, which only yesterday short-sighted people, and those who yield to the moods of the moment, refused to see, are already approaching. And the Social-Democrats will be failing in their duty to the proletariat if they do not realise that these forms of struggle must inevitably grow and develop, if they do not fully explain to the masses the tasks which the situation is calling forth, and which will soon confront them. The Social-Democrats will prove unworthy of the class they represent if they attempt to evade the study and appraisal of these forms by uttering disparaging catchwords like "rebelliousness" and "Narodnaya Volya-ism" that are so often heard from the Right wing of our Party. The tide is rising spontaneously, and we must do all in our power to bring more consciousness and organisation into this upsurge than we were able to do in October and December.

We must not force the pace of events. It is not in our interest to hasten an explosion at present. There can be no doubt about that. This is the lesson we must learn from the experience of the end of 1905. But this is only a small part of our task: it is a purely negative definition of our tactics. Whoever confines himself to this aspect of the matter, whoever exalts this negative task to something positive, is bound to slide into the role of a bourgeois advocate of compromise between people's freedom and the autocracy.

The party of the working class has an extremely serious, urgent and fundamental task to fulfil. We must concentrate all our plans, all our efforts, all our propaganda, agitation, organisation and immediate practical work on ensuring that

the proletariat and the peasantry are better prepared for the new, decisive struggle. We cannot will the choice of the forms of this struggle: they are being determined with iron necessity by the historical development of the Russian revolution. We already know from experience what the government's "standing rigid" means, and what the growing agitation among the masses over the rapidly maturing general political crisis means. We know with what dizzying rapidity the October struggle grew, and how inevitably it developed into the December struggle. Therefore let everybody be at his post. Nobody can forecast the moment when things will reach their climax; nobody knows in what order and in what combination the December and October forms of the movement will finally develop. But they are already beginning to develop. The organs of this movement are already springing up. On the solidarity, class-consciousness, self-control and resolution of the advanced class depends in large measure, if not entirely, the outcome of the great revolution.

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Signed: *N. L—n*

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THE CONGRESS SUMMED UP

"There are signs," writes *Rech* today, "that the brilliant success of the opposition has revived old illusions that seemed to have been buried, and threatens to turn the revolutionary movement back to the path of Blanquism, from which the reasonable 'Minority' of the Russian Social-Democratic Party made such strenuous efforts to divert it after the unsuccessful 'armed uprising' last December."

This is a valuable admission which the Russian workers would do well to ponder over. Why does the bourgeoisie insult certain Social-Democrats by slapping them on the back and calling them reasonable? Because they have made strenuous efforts to divert the movement from the path of Blanquism, from the "December" path. Is it true that the December struggle was a manifestation of Blanquism? No, it is not. Blanquism is a theory which repudiates the class struggle. Blanquism expects that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals. Was there such a conspiracy, or anything like one, in December? No, there was not. It was the class movement of vast masses of the proletariat who resorted to the purely proletarian weapon of struggle, the strike, and won over to its side the masses of semi-proletarians (railwaymen, post-office employees, etc.), peasants (in the South, the Caucasus, the Baltic Provinces) and town petty bourgeoisie (Moscow), who had never before been seen on the Russian political scene. The bourgeoisie wants, by using the bogy of "Blanquism", to belittle, discredit and slander the people's struggle for power. The bourgeoisie stands to gain if the proletarians and peasants fight only for concessions from the old regime.

The Right Social-Democrats use the word "Blanquism" merely as a rhetorical device in their polemics. The bourgeoisie converts this word into a weapon against the proletariat: "Workers, be reasonable! Fight for the extension of the powers of the Cadet Duma! Pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the bourgeoisie, but don't dare to think of such madness, anarchism, Blanquism, as fighting for complete power for the people!"

Are the bourgeois liberals telling the truth when they say that the Right Social-Democrats have made strenuous efforts to divert the movement from the path and the methods of October and December? Unfortunately, they are. Not all the Right Social-Democrats realised that this is what their tactics meant, but actually this is what they did mean. Insisting on participation in the Duma elections virtually meant supporting the Cadets, who had been burying the revolution and had described the revolutionary struggle as an "old illusion". All of the Unity Congress's three resolutions of major importance in principle, adopted by the Right Social-Democrats against the bitter opposition of the Left Social-Democrats, i.e., the agrarian programme, the resolution on the State Duma and the resolution on armed uprising bear obvious marks of the efforts of the "reasonable section of the Social-Democratic Party" to divert the revolutionary movement from the path of October-December. Take the vaunted "municipalisation". True, as a result of our pressure, Maslov's original proposal for municipalisation was undoubtedly pushed leftward. "Confiscation" was substituted for "alienation"; his proposal now allows for the division of the land; a clause was inserted pledging support for the "revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including confiscation", etc. But for all that, municipalisation, even if a castrated municipalisation, is there. Municipalisation means transferring the landed estates to democratic Zemstvos. The revolutionary peasants will not agree to this. They quite rightly do not, and will not, trust the Zemstvos, even if they are democratic, so long as this local democracy exists side by side with an undemocratic central authority. They will quite rightly reject the proposal to transfer the land to the local and central authorities before the whole, absolutely the whole, administration is elected by, accountable to, and sub-

ject to recall by, the people. But this condition, in spite of the struggle of the Left Social-Democrats, was rejected by the Congress. Instead of voting for transferring the land to the people when all state authorities are elected by the people, the Congress voted in favour of transferring the land to elected local bodies. On what grounds? On the grounds that the idea of seizing power should not be in the programme: that it was necessary to have guarantees against restoration. But the fear lest the revolutionary peasants seize power is a purely Cadet fear of peasant revolution.

As for a guarantee against restoration in the real sense of the word, there can only be one: a socialist revolution in the West. Without this, nothing in the world can guarantee us against restoration of the undemocratic central authority, so long as capitalism, and the always unstable, always wavering, small commodity producer, exist. Consequently, instead of idly dreaming about relative guarantees against restoration, we should be thinking about carrying our revolution through to the end. At the Congress, however, the Right Social-Democrats thought that they had found a guarantee against restoration by adopting a programme that looks very much like a compromise with restoration: we shall guarantee ourselves against restoration of the undemocratic central authority if we say nothing in our agrarian programme about the necessity of completely democratising *this* authority.

Take the resolution on the Duma. The Congress adopted it when the Cadets had already achieved their election victories. And in spite of our protests, the Congress in its resolution speaks of a Duma of people's representatives in general and not of the present Cadet Duma. The Right Social-Democrats did not wish to indicate the two-faced nature of *this* Duma; it did not warn the workers about the counter-revolutionary role which the Cadet Duma is trying to play; it refused to say plainly and definitely that the socialist workers should march with the peasant and revolutionary democrats against the Cadets. It expressed the desire to have a Social-Democratic parliamentary group, without troubling to think whether we have a parliament, or whether we have any Social-Democratic members of parliament.

Take the third of the above-mentioned resolutions. It starts with an ultra-revolutionary phrase, but nevertheless

it is permeated with scepticism, if not hostility, towards the October-December struggle. It says nothing at all about the necessity of taking into account the historic experience that the Russian proletariat and the Russian people acquired at the end of 1905. Nor does it admit that very definite forms of struggle arose out of historical necessity in the past, and are arising again now. We have indicated, only in very brief and general outline, the main defects of the resolutions over which the struggle was waged at the Congress. We shall yet return to these subjects again more than once. The party of the proletariat must carefully discuss and review these resolutions in the light of the new facts that are provided by the Cadet Duma and the rapidly unfolding panorama of the new revolutionary upswing. The party of the proletariat must learn to examine very critically the resolutions of its representatives. And the unanimous chorus of praise coming from the bourgeois press for the reasonable, well-behaved Russian Social-Democrats clearly indicates to the proletariat that the Party must be suffering from some malady.

We must, and will, cure this malady.

Written on May 6 (19), 1906

Published in *Volna*, No. 11, May 7, 1906
Signed: *N. L—n*

Published according to the newspaper text

THE DUMA AND THE PEOPLE

The question of the Duma's attitude towards the people is the topic of the day. Everybody is discussing it, and it is being discussed with particular zeal by the Cadets who predominate in the Duma. Here is a very interesting opinion expressed by the Left-Cadet *Nasha Zhizn*, which often reflects the views of the best of the Cadets.

"The question naturally arises, where is the border-line of unity between the Duma and the people? Where is the limit beyond which the Duma will either become the plaything of popular passions or on the contrary, will be dissociated from the people and the parties? The attitudes of the people to the Duma will become dangerous if they are allowed to be spontaneous. Some important event will occur, and an outbreak of spontaneous discontent will at once affect the Duma, which will not find it easy to maintain the position of an independent instrument of the popular will, acting in an organised way. The history of, say, the French Revolution, provides numerous examples of the people's representatives becoming playthings of the mob. But the opposite may happen: complete indifference. Can we say with certainty that if the Duma is dispersed the people will really support it? Will not even those who are demanding immediate and extremely radical decisions from the Duma pass by with a sceptical smile and say: we told you that the Duma was impotent? But what will they do; and when will they do it?"

And the author calls for the organisation of all sorts of clubs and meetings for the purpose of establishing living contacts between the Duma and the people. "Friendly criticism of the Duma and active support for it—this is the noble task of the present day."

How strikingly these well-meaning utterances of a high-minded Cadet reflect the impotence of his party, and of the Duma in which that party reigns! Clubs, meetings, living

contacts with the people! Why talk so pompously about obvious things? Does it need proof that clubs and meetings are useful? The very first breath of free air that came with the present upswing led to the holding of meetings, the organisation of clubs, the expansion of the press. This will continue, so long as outside obstacles do not put an end to it. But this is all a matter of technique, so to speak. Clubs, meetings, newspapers, the press, petitions (very strongly advocated by our Right Social-Democrats) all help the Duma to know the opinion of the people, and the people to know the Duma. All these things are a thousand times necessary, of course. They all undoubtedly organise and inform. They all serve to establish "contact". But think, what kind of contact? Purely technical contact. The Social-Democratic workers' organisations must carefully watch the Cadet Duma. There can be no argument about that. But however well they are informed and however well they may be organised, their "contact" will not be contact of interests, of identical tasks, or of identical political behaviour. And that is the whole point. Our high-minded radical sees only *how* contacts are established, he has not noticed the *content* of the contacts; he has overlooked the difference in class interests, the difference in political tasks.

Why has he overlooked this? Because, being a Cadet, he is unable to see, or is afraid to admit, that the Cadet Duma is *behind* the broad masses of the people. The Duma is not leading the masses of the politically conscious peasants in the struggle for land and freedom. It is lagging behind the peasants, *restricting* the range of their struggle. Needless to say how far the Duma is lagging behind the proletariat. The Cadet Duma is not the leader of the peasant masses and of the working class, but a "high-minded" mediator, dreaming of an alliance on the right and of sympathy from the left. The Cadet Duma is what the Cadets have made of the Duma. And the party of "people's freedom" is a bourgeois party, wavering between the democratic petty bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary big bourgeoisie, between the desire to lean on the people and fear of the latter's independent revolutionary activity. The more acute the struggle between the people and the old regime becomes, the more intolerable is the position of the mediator, the more impotent will be those who waver.

Hence the dejected tone which marks the above-quoted passage and all the speeches of the Cadets. Hence their bitter complaints about their own impotence. Hence their eternal attempts to throw the blame for their own weakness, irresoluteness and instability on the people.

Ponder deeply over the significance of this fear of a "high-minded" bourgeois radical lest the Duma become the plaything of popular passions, the plaything of the crowd! These wretched people realise that they cannot be the vehicle of popular passion, the leader of the people, and so they blame the people for their own impotence and backwardness, contemptuously refer to it as the crowd, and disdainfully refuse to serve as a "plaything". And yet all the freedom that still exists in Russia was won only by the "crowd", only by the people, who heroically came out into the street, who made countless sacrifices in the fight, and who with their deeds supported the great watchword: freedom or death. All these actions of the people were the actions of the crowd. The whole new era in Russia was won, and is being maintained, only by popular passion.

But you, the party of words about "people's freedom", you dread popular passion, you are afraid of the crowd. And yet you have the effrontery to accuse the "crowd" of being indifferent! You, sceptics by nature, sceptics in your entire programme, sceptics in all your half-hearted tactics, describe the people's disbelief in your phrases as "scepticism"! Your political horizon does not stretch further than the question: will the people support the Duma?

We put the question the other way round. Are the Cadets in the Duma supporting the people? Or are they trailing in the wake of the people? Will these sceptics support the people when it "does" again what it has already done for the cause of freedom? Or will they put spokes in its wheel, damp down its energy, accuse it of anarchism and Blanquism, the spontaneity of folly and the folly of spontaneity?

But the masses of the peasantry and the working class will do as they see fit, contemptuously throwing aside the miserable fears and doubts of the flabby bourgeois intelligentsia. They will not support the Duma. They will support their own demands, which the Cadet Duma has so incompletely and inadequately expressed.

The Cadets think that they are the hub of the universe. They dream about peaceful parliamentarism. They have taken dreams for reality. They, if you please, are fighting, and so they must be supported. But is not the opposite the case, gentlemen? Is it not you who are constantly uttering a phrase that nobody in really parliamentary countries ever thinks of uttering, the phrase: "They will disperse the Duma?" Whoever takes the trouble to ponder seriously over the meaning of this phrase, over the state of affairs in which it has to be uttered, will realise that the future holds out for us either an abomination of desolation painted up with spurious phrases, or new deeds accomplished by the crowd, new deeds accomplished by the great passion of the people.

We cannot expect any help for this cause from the Cadets. Let us hope that the minority in the Duma, the "Trudovik Group" and the "Workers' Group", will take a stand different from that of the Cadets. It is not support for themselves that they will solicit from the people, nor will they proclaim themselves a force in our toy parliament: they will concentrate all their efforts and all their activities on helping in some way to promote the great work ahead.

Volna, No. 12, May 9, 1906
Signed: *N. L—n*

Published according to the *Volna* text

AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS[177]

In an article entitled "Liberal Praises", in *Nevskaya Gazeta*, No. 6, Comrade L. M. tries to prove that the bourgeoisie is praising the Right Social-Democrats for being genuine Social-Democrats, and is abusing the Left Social-Democrats for being anarchists. He suggests that the bourgeoisie is particularly afraid of anarchism, because of its crude methods of fighting, bomb-throwing, etc.

This opinion is a downright mockery of the truth.

Does not Comrade L. M. know that the bourgeoisie praised the Bernsteinians in Germany and Millerandists[178] in France precisely for their opportunism, for their attempts to blunt antagonisms in the midst of an intense struggle? Has L. M. become so much "wiser" that he is prone to regard the Bernsteinians and Millerandists as genuine Social-Democrats?

Or let Comrade L. M. think at least about the attitude the Russian liberal bourgeoisie adopted until recently towards the terrorism of the Narodnaya Volya and of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and about their present attitude towards the December forms of struggle. The liberal bourgeoisie after all praised the Socialist-Revolutionaries more than the Social-Democrats, when the terrorism of the former was directed against the hated autocracy. Isn't that so, Comrade L. M.? But what do you think, Comrade L. M., would the liberal bourgeoisie praise the Right Social-Democrats if they were to abandon their *present* position and adopt that of pure parliamentarism? In that case, Comrade L. M., would you say that the liberal bourgeoisie simply did not realise that the pure parliamentarism of the Social-Democrats would *at the present time* be far more harmful for it, and much more useful for the proletariat, than the present position of the Right Social-Democrats?

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THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION ON THE STATE DUMA[179]

In publishing this draft resolution, we invite the impartial reader to say whether this draft provides any excuse for playing with words like "anarchism", "Blanquism", etc. Furthermore, which resolution has been justified by experience: the one adopted by the Congress, or this one? Is it not clear now that none but indirect use can be made of the Duma? Is it not clear now which of these two resolutions more directly meets genuine revolutionary democracy, and more correctly appraises "Cadetism" as it has manifested itself in practice, in the Duma?

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THE WORKERS' GROUP IN THE STATE DUMA

In the State Duma there is a Workers' Group of fifteen. How did these deputies get into the Duma? They were not nominated by workers' organisations. The Party did not authorise them to represent its interests in the Duma. Not a single local organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution (although it might have done) to nominate its members for the State Duma.

The worker deputies got into the Duma through non-party channels. Nearly all, or even all, got in by direct or indirect, tacit or avowed, agreements with the Cadets. Many of them got into the Duma in such a way that it is difficult to tell whether they were elected as Constitutional-Democrats or as Social-Democrats. This is a fact, and a fact of enormous political importance. To hush it up, as many Social-Democrats are doing today, is unpardonable and useless. Unpardonable, because it means keeping in the dark the electorate generally, and the workers' party in particular. Useless, because the fact is bound to come out in the course of events.

In declaring that the formation of a Social-Democratic parliamentary group was desirable, the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. made a mistake by not taking this fact into account. As is evident from the resolution of the Left Social-Democrats* that we published yesterday, this fact was pointed out at the Congress. But it must be stated in fairness that on the insistence of the Left wing, the Congress adopted a very important instruction to the Central Committee of the Party. The failure to print this resolution has left a very serious gap in the Central Committee's publi-

* See pp. 292-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

cation, from which we reproduced the Congress resolutions. The resolution on the parliamentary group instructs the Central Committee to inform *all* Party organisations (1) whom, (2) when and (3) on what conditions the Central Committee recognises as the Party's representative in the State Duma. Further, it instructs the Central Committee to give the Party periodical reports of the activities of the parliamentary group, and lastly, it imposes on those workers' organisations to which the Social-Democratic members of the State Duma belong the duty of exercising special control over these members.

Having mentioned this extremely important resolution, let us proceed to examine the question of the Workers' Group in the Duma. On entering the Duma, Mikhailichenko, the leader of this group, proclaimed himself a Social-Democrat. Through him the Workers' Group clearly expressed its desire to dissociate itself from the Cadets and become a genuine Social-Democratic group.

Such a desire is worthy of all sympathy. At the Congress we were opposed to the formation of an official parliamentary group. Our motives are set out precisely and in detail in our resolution published yesterday. But it goes without saying that the fact that we did not think it opportune to form an official parliamentary group does not in the least prevent us from encouraging *any* desire of *any* workers' representative to *shift* from the Constitutional-Democrat towards the Social-Democrats.

But there is some distance between desire and fulfilment. It is not enough to proclaim oneself a Social-Democrat. To be a Social-Democrat, one must pursue a genuinely Social-Democratic workers' policy. Of course, we fully understand the difficulties of the position of parliamentary novices. We are well aware of the need to be indulgent towards the mistakes that may be made by those who are beginning to pass from the Constitutional-Democrats to the Social-Democrats. But if they are destined ever to complete this passage, it will only be through open and straightforward criticism of these mistakes. To look at these mistakes through one's fingers would be an unpardonable transgression against the Social-Democratic Party and against the whole proletariat.

We must mention at once one mistake that the Workers' Group in the Duma has made. A few days after the vote on the reply to the address from the throne the members of the Workers' Group declared in the press that "they had abstained from voting, but had not made a demonstration of their refusal to vote, because they did not want to be confused with Count Heyden's[180] group". The Cadets are a party that wavers between revolution and reaction. The Heydens on the right and the Social-Democrats on the left must, and always will, demonstrate against this party. The Workers' Group made a mistake by not making a demonstration. Over the heads of the Cadets, it should have openly and plainly stated for all to hear: "You, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, are taking the wrong tone. Your address smacks of a deal. Drop that diplomacy. Speak out loudly and say that the peasants are demanding all the land, that the peasants must obtain all the land without compensation. Say that the people are demanding complete freedom, and that the people will take full power in order to ensure real freedom, and not merely freedom on paper. Do not trust written 'constitutions', trust only the strength of the fighting people! We vote against your address."

Had the Workers' Group said this, it would have performed an act of genuine Social-Democratic workers' policy. By doing so, it would have expressed the interests not only of the workers, but of the whole revolutionary people, which is fighting for freedom. And concerning the rejection of the request for an audience, it would have been able to say: "See, Cadet gentlemen, you have received a good lesson! You are properly punished for the wrong tone of your address. If you continue in the same key, the day will not be far distant when the people will speak of you with the withering scorn of the disillusioned son for his garrulous father'."[181]

We say again, in order to avoid malicious misinterpretation, that we are criticising the conduct of the Workers' Group, not to reproach its members, but to assist the political development of the Russian proletariat and peasantry.

And with the same object in view, we must point to a serious mistake made by *Nevskaya Gazeta*. "We cannot regard the incident over the address," writes that paper,

"as an excuse for stopping the activities of the Duma".... "We see no ground for putting the question bluntly just now" (No. 6). This is the wrong tone. It is unseemly for Social-Democrats to pose as people who can in any way be responsible for the Duma. If the Social-Democrats had a majority in the Duma, the Duma would not be a Duma, or else the Social-Democrats would not be Social-Democrats. Let the Cadets bear all the responsibility for the Duma. Let the people learn to cast off constitutional illusions at their expense, and not ours.

You yourselves say, comrades: "The proletariat will not agree to the Milyukovs being left free to strike a bargain with the old regime." Well spoken. But what, in substance, are the bargains struck by the Cadets? Not personal acts of treachery, of course. Such a crude opinion is utterly alien to Marxism. The substance of the bargains is (and is only) that the Cadets don't abandon, and don't want to abandon, their stand for preserving the old regime and for obeying the commands of this regime. The Cadets, so long as they remain Cadets, are quite right when they say: to abandon this position means putting the question bluntly, providing an excuse for stopping the activities of the Duma.

It is unseemly for Social-Democrats to argue in a way that might give the people cause for seeing in their arguments a justification of the Cadets. It is not our business to justify their hypocritical statements that it was all a question of the Duma's "politeness" and Trepov's "rudeness" (Struve in *Duma*). We must expose that hypocrisy, and show that the "first lesson" which the Cadets have received is a result of the intrinsic duplicity of their whole position, of their entire address. We must not appraise the revolutionary situation in the country from the standpoint of what goes on in the Duma. On the contrary, we must appraise questions and incidents that arise in the Duma from the standpoint of the revolutionary situation in the country.

Volna, No. 13, May 10, 1906

Published according to the *Volna* text

THE QUESTION OF ORGANISATION[182]

The Bolsheviks plainly stated, in the committee appointed by the Congress to draft the Party Rules, that any attempt to curtail the autonomy of the local organisations and the rights of the opposition as formulated by the factional Third Congress will inevitably lead to a split. That is why the Bolsheviks insisted that the right to call for another Congress should not be restricted, etc. The Bolsheviks proposed that a clause be inserted in the Rules to the effect that members of the Party, on changing their place of residence, should have the right to belong to the local Party organisation. The Congress rejected this proposal, *but adopted a resolution stating that it rejected the clause solely because it was superfluous and self-evident.*

Thus the Mensheviks promised to remain loyal to the agreement, and not to resort to the mean trick of "chucking out" dissidents. Let the Party watchfully see to it that they keep their promise. The Party's control is the only guarantee that a split will be precluded.

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SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING HELD IN COUNTESS PANINA'S PALACE, MAY 9 (22), 1906[183]

I. BRIEF REPORT IN *NEVSKAYA GAZETA*

Comrade Karpov expressed the opinion that the Duma will not be dissolved, because the Cadets will do everything possible to prevent it. This is already obvious from their activities in the Duma. The Cadets are trying to combine the people's freedom with the old regime. The speaker then went on to deal with the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. The Congress, in his opinion, adopted a resolution on the Duma that was "far from complete and far from correct. We must carry out the decisions of the united R.S.D.L.P., but we shall supplement them in our activities".

In the speaker's opinion, the boycott was not a mistake. The proletariat had told them that it must sweep away this Duma. It failed to do this, but what of that? Of course, the people will only derive benefit from the Duma. The peasants' and workers' deputies will do a lot of good if they act consistently. But pressure on the Duma will be fruitless. When the government stands opposed to the people, we must remember that only the combatant sides can settle the conflict.

We will say to the peasants: learn, comrades, so that you, too, may be ready to support the revolutionary movement when the time comes.

Nevskaya Gazeta, No. 8
May 11 (24), 1906

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Gazeta*

II. BRIEF REPORT IN *VOLNA*

Comrade Karpov replied to him and to citizen Myakotin. He explained to citizen Myakotin that a deal is the practical outcome of negotiations, and negotiations are preparations for a deal. Therefore, citizen Myakotin was quite wrong in what he said about the Cadet Party. Fully recognising that the decisions of the Unity Congress were binding on the whole Party, the speaker, however, stated that some of these resolutions were mistaken, and that this was the cause of the wrong tone taken by Comrade Bartenyev with regard to the Cadet Party. Exposing the Cadet Party, said the speaker, was not merely a matter of abusing it, but the necessary and most advisable means of drawing the broad masses of the people away from the liberal bourgeoisie—which was half-hearted and timid, and was striving to make a deal with the old regime—to the revolutionary democratic bourgeoisie, which was preparing for a decisive struggle for power. To discredit a party like the Cadet Party meant giving a powerful impetus to the political development of the masses of the people. Of course, the time when the conflict will set in does not depend on our will but on the behaviour of the government, and on the degree of the political consciousness and the temper of the masses of the people. Our task is to do all in our power to enable the organised proletariat to be the leader of the victorious revolutionary army both in the present upsurge and in the inevitable decisive struggle ahead.

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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE PUBLIC MEETING IN COUNTESS PANINA'S PALACE, MAY 9 (22), 1906

This meeting calls the attention of all citizens to the fact that the autocratic government, by organising riots and constantly intensifying police and military tyranny, is obviously making a mockery of popular representation, and is preparing to resort to force in reply to the universal demand for freedom and to the peasants' demand for land.

This meeting declares that the party of "people's freedom" (Cadets) only timidly and inadequately expresses the people's demands, and is not keeping its promise to proclaim the convocation of a national constituent assembly. We warn the people against this party, which is wavering between people's freedom and the old autocratic regime, which is oppressing the people.

This meeting calls upon the Peasant ("Trudovik") and Workers' Groups in the State Duma resolutely to state their respective demands, and the full demands of the people, absolutely independently of the Cadets.

This meeting calls the attention of all those who value the cause of freedom to the fact that the behaviour of the autocratic government and its utter failure to satisfy the needs of the peasants, and of the people as a whole, is making inevitable a decisive fight outside the Duma, a fight for complete power for the people, which alone can ensure freedom for the people and meet their needs.

This meeting expresses confidence that the proletariat will continue to be at the head of all the revolutionary elements of the People.

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THE PEASANT, OR "TRUDOVIK", GROUP AND THE R.S.D.L.P.

Yesterday we examined the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the Workers' Group in the Duma.* Let us now look at the question of the Trudovik Group.

This is the name of the group of 130 to 140 peasant deputies in the Duma who are beginning to dissociate themselves from the Cadets and to form an independent party. This process of dissociation is far from being completed, but it has become quite marked. Goremykin magnificently expressed this by his winged words: one-third of the members of the Duma (the Trudovik and Workers' Groups together roughly make up one-third) are asking for the gallows.

These winged words have clearly defined the difference between the revolutionary and the non-revolutionary (Cadet) bourgeois democrats. In what way is the Peasant Group revolutionary? Not so much in its political demands—which are far from being stated in full—as in its agrarian demands. The peasants are demanding land, and all the land at that. The peasants are demanding land on terms that will really improve their conditions, i.e., without compensation, or with a very moderate compensation. In other words, the peasants are virtually demanding an agrarian revolution, and not agrarian reform. They are demanding a revolution that will not in the least affect the power of money: it will not affect the foundations of bourgeois society, but will very drastically undermine the *economic* foundations of the old serf-owning system, the whole, of semi-feudal Russia—

* See pp. 402-05, of this volume.—*Ed.*

Russia of the landlords and bureaucrats. That is why the socialist proletariat will with all its heart and all its energy help the peasants to achieve their demands in full. Unless the peasants are completely victorious over all their oppressors left over from the old order, it will be impossible to achieve the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But the whole people need such a victory, and the proletariat needs it in the interests of its great struggle for socialism.

But while supporting the revolutionary peasantry, the proletariat must not for a moment forget about its own class independence and its own special class aims. The peasant movement is the movement of another class. It is not a proletarian struggle, but a struggle waged by small proprietors. It is not a struggle against the foundations of capitalism, but a struggle to cleanse them of all the survivals of serfdom. The masses of the peasantry are engrossed in their great struggle. It naturally appears to them that by taking all the land they will solve the agrarian problem. They long for an equalised distribution of the land and for its transfer to all the toilers; but they forget about the power of capital, about the power of money, about commodity economy, which even under the "fairest" division will inevitably again give rise to inequality and exploitation. Engrossed in their struggle against survivals of serfdom, they do not see the subsequent, still greater and more arduous struggle against capitalist society as a whole for the complete achievement of socialism. The working class will always wage this struggle, and for this purpose will organise itself in an independent political party. And the harsh lessons of capitalism will inevitably enlighten the small proprietors more and more rapidly, convincing them that the Social-Democrats are right, and will induce them to side with the proletarian Social-Democratic Party.

The proletariat often hears the bourgeoisie say nowadays: you must march together with the bourgeois democrats. Without their aid the proletariat will be unable to carry out a revolution. That is true. But the question is: with which democrats can and should the proletariat march now? With the Cadet democrats, or the peasant revolutionary democrats? There can be only one answer to this question:

not with the Cadet democrats, but with the revolutionary democrats; not with the liberals, but with the masses of the peasantry.

Bearing this reply in mind, we must not lose sight of the fact that the more rapidly the peasants become enlightened and the more openly they act in politics, the more markedly do all revolutionary elements among the bourgeois democrats gravitate towards the peasantry and, of course, also towards the petty-bourgeois townsfolk. Minor distinctions become unimportant. What comes to the forefront is the primary question: are the various parties, groups and organisations going all the way with the revolutionary peasantry? More and more clearly we see the Socialist-Revolutionaries, certain independent socialists, the most Left of the radicals and a number of peasant organisations merging *politically* into one *revolutionary democracy*.

That is why the Right Social-Democrats at the Congress (Martynov and Plekhanov) were greatly mistaken when they exclaimed: "The Cadets are more important as a party than the Socialist-Revolutionaries." Taken by themselves, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a cipher. But as exponents of the spontaneous aspirations of the peasantry, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a part of the broad, mighty revolutionary-democratic masses without whose support the proletariat cannot even think of achieving the complete victory of our revolution. The *rapprochement* between the Peasant, or "Trudovik", Group in the Duma and the Socialist-Revolutionaries is not an accident. A section of the peasantry will, of course, understand the consistent point of view of the Social-Democratic proletariat; but the other section will undoubtedly regard "equalised" land tenure as the solution of the agrarian problem.

The Trudovik Group will no doubt play an important role both inside and, what is more important, outside the Duma. The class-conscious workers must do all in their power to increase their agitation among the peasants, to induce the Trudovik Group to separate from the Cadets, and to get this group to advance full and explicit political demands. Let the Trudovik Group organise itself more compactly and independently, let it enlarge the scope of its contacts outside the Duma, let it remember that the great land

question will not be settled in the Duma. That question will be settled by the people's struggle against the old regime, and not by voting in the Duma.

Today there is nothing more important for the success of the revolution than this organisation, education and political training of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. The socialist proletariat, while ruthlessly exposing the instability of the Cadets, will do everything it can to promote this great work. And in doing so it will shun all petty-bourgeois illusions. It will abide by the strictly class and proletarian struggle for socialism,

Long live the complete victory of the peasants over all their oppressors, the proletariat will say. That victory will be the surest earnest of success in our proletarian struggle for socialism.

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THE LAND QUESTION IN THE DUMA

The Cadets' first move in the Duma was to draw up an address in reply to the address from the throne. Instead of a demand, they drew up a timid request. Their second "move" was silently to pass to the order of the day when their request that a deputation be received to present the Address was rejected. This time they behaved still more timidly. Now comes the third move—the debate on the land question, which has been included in the business of the Duma.

All workers should pay particular attention to this question. The land question is the one that is most of all worrying the masses of the peasants; and the peasants have now become the principal and almost the sole allies of the workers in the revolution. The land question will show better than anything else whether the Cadets, who call themselves the party of people's freedom, are loyally serving the cause of people's freedom.

What do the people, i.e., primarily the peasantry, want? The peasants want the land. Everybody knows that. The peasants are demanding that all the land in the country should belong to them. They want to throw off the tyranny of the landlords and the bureaucrats. They want to take the land from the landlords so that the latter may no longer impose labour-service upon them, which is virtually the old corvée; and they want to take power away from the bureaucrats, to prevent them from lording it any longer over the common people. The workers must help the peasants in their fight for the land, and also must help them to formulate the land question in straightforward, clear and definite terms.

It is particularly easy to confuse and obscure the land question. It is easy to argue that, of course, land must be allotted to the peasants, and then to hedge this allotting of land around with such conditions as will make it quite useless for the peasants. If the government officials do the allotting again, if the liberal landlords are again appointed as "civil mediators", and if the old autocratic government determines the "modest dimensions" of the compensation to be paid, then the peasants, instead of deriving any benefit, will be swindled as they were in 1861, and there will only be another noose around their necks. Therefore the class-conscious workers must most vigorously explain to the peasants that on the question of the land they should be particularly cautious and distrustful. As matters stand today, the question of compensation, and the question of which authority is to "allot" the land, are of the greatest importance. The question of compensation will serve as an immediate and infallible test of who stands for the peasants and who for the landlords, and also who is trying to desert from one side to the other. The Russian peasant knows—ah, how well he knows!—what compensation means. On this question, the divergence of interests of the peasants and the landlords is splendidly revealed. And the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was therefore quite right in substituting the word "confiscation" (i.e., alienation without compensation) for the word "alienation" in the original draft of the agrarian programme.

On the question of which authority is to allot the land, the interests of the peasants and the government officials diverge as sharply as do those of the peasants and the landlords on the question of compensation. The socialist workers must therefore show especial perseverance in explaining to the peasants how important it is that the land question should not be handled by the old authorities. Let the peasants know that no agrarian reform whatever will be of any use if it is handled by the old authorities. Happily, on this question too, agreement was reached at the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. as regards the substance of the matter, for the Congress resolution unreservedly recognised the necessity of supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry. True, the Congress in our opinion made a mis-

take by not stating plainly that the land reform can be entrusted only to a *fully* democratic state, only to government officials who are elected by, accountable to, and subject to recall by, the people. But we intend to deal with this point in greater detail on another occasion.

In the Duma, two main agrarian programmes will be proposed. The Cadets, who predominate in the Duma, want the landlords to have their own way without harm to the peasants. They agree to the compulsory alienation of a large part of the landed estates, but first, they stipulate compensation, and secondly, they want a liberal-bureaucratic and not a revolutionary-peasant settlement of the question of the ways and means of carrying out the agrarian reform. In their agrarian programme the Cadets, as always, wriggle like eels between the landlords and the peasants, between the old authorities and people's freedom.

The Trudovik, or Peasant, Group has not yet definitely formulated its agrarian programme. It urges that all the land must belong to the working people, but for the time being it says nothing about compensation, or about the question of the old authorities. We shall have more than one occasion to discuss this programme when it is definitely formulated.

The bureaucratic government, of course, refuses to consider even a Cadet agrarian reform. The bureaucratic government, which is headed by some of the richest landlord-bureaucrats, many of them owning tens of thousands of dessiatines of land each, "would sooner accept the Mohammedan faith" (as a certain writer wittily expressed it) than agree to the compulsory alienation of the landed estates. Thus the "*settlement*" of the agrarian question by the Duma will not be a settlement in the true sense of the term, but only a proclamation, only a declaration of demands. In the case of the Cadets, we shall again hear timid requests instead of the proud and bold, honest and open demands befitting representatives of the people. Let us hope that at least on this occasion the Trudovik Group will come out quite independently of the Cadets.

As for the socialist workers, they now have a particularly important duty to fulfill. In all ways and with all their strength they should enlarge their organisation in general,

and their contacts with the peasantry in particular. They should explain to the peasants—as widely, clearly, minutely and circumstantially as possible—the significance of the question of compensation and of whether they can put up with leaving the agrarian reform in the hands of the old authorities. They must strain every nerve to strengthen and enlarge the alliance between the socialist proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry, in preparation for the inevitable climax of the present political crisis. This alliance is the only earnest that the question of "all the land" for the peasants, and of full freedom and complete power for the people, will be effectively settled.

Volna, No. 15, May 12, 1906

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RESOLUTION AND REVOLUTION

The leading article in yesterday's Nasha Zhizn, and in today's *Rech*, *Duma*, *Nasha Zhizn*, *Strana* and *Slovo*—the whole bourgeois press without exception—is storming against the Left Social-Democrats. What has happened? Where is that "victor's" pride which until recently enabled the Cadets scornfully to brush aside the "boycotters"? The heyday of Cadet hegemony—when those gentlemen taught the proletariat genuine statesmanship and expressed sympathy for its errors—is a thing of the past. What has happened?

Revolutionism is being reborn, answers Mr. Struve in the *Duma* leading article on May 11. He is right. Faith in the Duma is dwindling hourly. The notion of how freedom for the people is won becomes clearer as the true face is revealed of the party which, prattling in the name of that freedom, contrived during the elections to take into account both the fact that the people were somewhat tired and the Witte-Durnovo policy which shut the election arena to the true representatives of the true interests of the people. The inevitability of new forms of struggle is strikingly emphasised by the activity of an organisation whose counter-revolutionary nature has become obvious. Yes, the bourgeoisie imagined during the elections that the revolution was at an end and the sweet moment had come when the bourgeoisie could turn to its own benefit the fruits of the struggle of the workers and peasants. But it had misjudged. It had mistaken a temporary lull for the final exhaustion of the revolution, for its end. It had only just settled more comfortably into the Duma chairs and begun nicely and politely to discuss with the old regime the terms of an amicable deal at the expense of the workers and peasants. And then, all

of a sudden, it turned out that the workers and peasants were prepared to interfere in the game and upset the deal.

The popular meeting in the Panina Palace seemed particularly outrageous to the Cadet gentlemen. The Social-Democrats' speeches at the meeting stirred up that putrid swamp. "Have a heart," cry the Cadet gentlemen, "you are helping the government with your criticism of our party." It is a familiar argument. Whenever the Social-Democrats. step forward to explain to the proletariat and the people as a whole the real meaning of the events that are taking place, to dispel the fog which the bourgeois politicians are spreading over the workers, to warn the workers against the bourgeois traders of people's freedom, and to show the workers their true place in the revolution, the liberal gentlemen cry that this weakens the revolution. Whenever the Social-Democrats say that it does not befit the workers to march under bourgeois banners and that they have a banner of their own, the banner of Social-Democracy, the liberals begin to yell that this renders a service to the government. That is not true. The strength of the revolution lies in the growing class-consciousness of the proletariat, in the growing political consciousness of the peasantry. A Social-Democrat who criticises Cadet policy promotes that consciousness and strengthens the revolution. A Cadet who fools the people by his preachings befogs that consciousness and robs the revolution of its strength. To tell the Cadets that we do not trust them because they do not state the demands of the people fully and emphatically enough, and because they prefer bargaining with the government to fighting against it, does not mean forgetting the government on account of the Cadets.

It means showing the people the road to the real struggle and real victory. When the proletarian and peasant masses gain a clear idea of this road, the Cadets will have no one to bargain with, for the old regime will be doomed to be scrapped.

"You are driving the proletariat to open action," cry the Cadets. Wait a moment, gentlemen! It is not for you to talk of action, not for you, who have built up your political career on the blood of workers and peasants, to mouth Judas' discourses about "useless sacrifice".

At the same meeting, perfectly correct words were spoken fully expressing the conviction of all Social-Democrats that there is no need to urge the proletariat on. In *Volna* anyone could have read that events should not be forced.* But it is one thing to force events and another to force the conditions in which the next act of the great drama is to be played. What we are calling on the proletariat and the peasantry to do is to prepare for that moment, which, after all, does not depend on us alone but, among other things, on the extent to which the Cadet gentlemen will betray the cause of freedom. Our task is to explain the conditions for the struggle, point to its possible forms, show the proletariat its place in the coming struggle, and work to organise its forces and to promote its class-consciousness. And at present this means, among other things, indefatigably unmasking the Cadets and warning against the Cadet Party. That is what we are doing and will continue to do. When the Cadets get agitated and fly into a passion over this, it is a sign that we are not doing our job badly. And when in this connection the Cadets whine pitifully about the revolution being weakened, it is a sign that they already have a clear foreboding that the real revolution, the revolution of the workers and peasants, is about to overwhelm the Cadet Duma. The Cadets fear that the revolution may go beyond the limit which the bourgeoisie has set for its own convenience. The working class and the peasantry must not forget that their interests go beyond these limits and that their task is to carry the revolution through to the end.

And that is what was said in the resolution of the popular meeting, a resolution which made the Cadet Protopopov sigh wistfully as he thought of local police inspectors. You must write more cautiously, gentlemen of the Cadet Party.

Volna, No. 16, May 13, 1906
Signed, —Ъ

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* See p. 390 of this volume.—*Ed.*

NEITHER LAND NOR FREEDOM

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers has communicated to the Duma the government's "declaration" in reply to the Duma's Address.

Everybody has been waiting impatiently for this declaration. It was to set forth the government's programme.

And, indeed, it formulates the government's "programme" in the clearest possible manner. We shall quote its two main points in full.

"As regards the settlement of the peasant land question by the means indicated by the State Duma, namely, by using for this purpose the crown, monastery and church lands, and by the compulsory alienation of privately-owned land, in which must be included the land of peasant proprietors who have acquired it by purchase, the Council of Ministers considers itself in duty bound to declare that the settlement of this question on the lines proposed by the State Duma is absolutely impermissible. The State cannot recognise the right of some to own land and at the same time deprive others of this right. Nor can the State repudiate in general the right to private property in land, without at the same time repudiating the right to own all other property. The principle of the inalienability and inviolability of property is, throughout the world and at all stages in the development of civic life, a corner-stone of national prosperity and social development and the mainstay of the State, without which the very existence of the State is inconceivable. Nor is the proposed measure necessitated by the substance of the matter. With the extensive and far from exhausted resources available to the State, and by the wide application of all lawful methods for the purpose, the land question can undoubtedly be satisfactorily settled without disintegrating the very foundations of our statehood and without sapping the vital forces of our country.

"The other legislative measures proposed in the Address of the State Duma consist in the appointment of Ministers who shall be responsible to the popular representative body and enjoy the confidence of the majority in the Duma, consist in abolition of the Council of State, and in removal of the limits to the legislative functions of the State Duma laid down by special enactments. The Council of Minis-

ters does not consider itself empowered to discuss these proposals: they involve a radical change in the fundamental laws of the State, which by their very nature are not subject to revision on the initiative of the State Duma."

Thus, as regards the *land*: "absolutely impermissible". As regards *freedom*, that is to say, the real rights of the representatives of the people: "not subject to revision on the initiative of the State Duma".

As regards the land, the peasants must depend entirely on the good will of the landlords, entirely on the consent of the landlords. Compulsory alienation of the land is absolutely impermissible. The slightest appreciable improvement in the conditions of life of the peasantry is absolutely impermissible.

As regards freedom, the people must depend entirely on the bureaucrats. Without their consent the people's representatives dare not decide anything. The Council of Ministers even thinks that it is not entitled to discuss the wishes of the Duma as regards the extension of the rights of the people's representatives. The people's representatives must not even think of rights. Their function is to petition. The function of the bureaucrats is to examine these petitions—in the way the Duma's "petitions" were examined in the declaration we have quoted.

Neither land nor freedom.

We cannot here go into a more detailed examination of the declaration itself.

We shall see whether the deputies to the Duma learn anything from this declaration. The Cadets will certainly learn nothing from it. The Trudovik and Workers' Groups must now show whether they have become at all independent of the Cadets—whether they have realised that it is necessary to give up petitioning—whether they are able to talk straightforwardly and clearly to the people.

Volna, No. 17, May 14, 1906

Published according to the *Volna* text

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ELECTION VICTORY IN TIFLIS

Telegrams from Tiflis report that the Social-Democrats in that city have achieved a complete victory in the elections. Of the 81 electors who were elected, 72 are Social-Democrats, and only 9 are Cadets.[184] In Kutais four deputies have been elected, Social-Democrats all.[185] The candidate for the Duma nominated for Tiflis is Noah Jordania, a very influential Social-Democrat in that city.

We welcome the successes of our comrades in the Caucasus. After the decision of the Unity Congress of our Party, participation in the elections became obligatory, on the condition, however, that the workers' party did not enter into any blocs, i.e., agreements, with other parties.[186] If our comrades in the Caucasus have secured the election of their candidates quite independently, as one may believe was the case in Tiflis, then they have avoided the mistakes made by our comrades in Armavir.[187] In that case the decision of the Congress will have been fully adhered to; we shall have in the Duma truly Party Social-Democrats, elected on strictly Party lines; and soon we shall hear of the appointment by the Central Committee of the official representatives of our Party in the Duma.

Our readers know that we were in favour of boycotting the Duma. At the Congress we voted against the formation of a Social-Democratic parliamentary group, for reasons that were given in detail in the resolution published in *Volna*, No. 12.* These reasons did not involve matters of principle; they were prompted by considerations of pru-

* See pp. 292-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

dence and the practical conditions prevailing. But it goes without saying that, if real party Social-Democrats have now been elected to the Duma on really party lines, all of us, as members of a united party, will do all we can to help them to fulfil their arduous duties.

Let us not exaggerate the importance of the Tiflis victory. We could rejoice whole-heartedly at the parliamentary victories of Social-Democrats if we were really living under conditions of anything like a "serious" and established parliamentary system. But this is not the case in Russia. The present conditions in Russia impose on the Social-Democrats tasks of a magnitude that no Social-Democratic Party in Western Europe has to face. We are incomparably more remote than our Western comrades from the socialist revolution; but we are faced with a bourgeois-democratic peasant revolution in which the proletariat will play the leading role. As an inevitable result of these specific features of the situation, it is not in the Duma that the rapidly maturing political crisis will be solved.

In times such as Russia is now passing through, the participation of Social-Democrats in the elections does not at all mean that the masses really become stronger in the course of the election campaign. Without unfettered newspapers, without public meetings and without wide agitation, the election of Social-Democrats often expresses, not a consolidation of the proletarian and fully Social-Democratic Party, but only a sharp protest of the people. In such circumstances, large sections of the petty-bourgeoisie sometimes vote for any anti-government candidate. Opinions on the value of the boycott tactics for the whole of Russia, if based on the returns of the Tiflis elections alone, would be much too rash and ill-considered.

Nobody can tell as yet what overall role the Cadet Duma will play in the long run. That the Cadets are masters in the Duma is a fact. All Social-Democrats are agreed that the Cadets in the Duma are behaving like bad democrats, like timid and inconsistent, unstable and wavering partisans of people's freedom. Being in command of the Duma, the Cadets are now more than ever spreading constitutional illusions among the people, and thereby befogging the political consciousness of the workers and peasants.

Let us wait and see what experience shows before judging of the extent to which it will be possible to counteract these reactionary strivings of the Cadets within the Duma as well. Let us wish our comrades from the Caucasus, deputies to the Duma, for the first time to speak from this new platform in full voice, to speak the whole, bitter truth, to expose ruthlessly belief in words, promises and scraps of paper, to fill the gaps in our newspapers, which continue to be restricted and persecuted for speaking frankly, and to call upon the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry to pose their problems clearly and distinctly and to settle the impending final contest for freedom outside the Duma.

Volna, No. 17, May 14, 1906

Published according to the *Volna* text

GOVERNMENT, DUMA AND PEOPLE

The Duma is at loggerheads with the government. It has passed a vote of no confidence in the Ministry and has demanded its resignation. The Ministry has ignored the Duma's declaration and is jeering at it even more openly than before, suggesting that it should concern itself with the question of providing a laundry for office care-takers in the town of Yuriev.

That is at the bottom of this quarrel, of this conflict between the Duma and the government? The broad masses of the peasantry, the ordinary townspeople, and also a number of bourgeois politicians (the Cadets) imagine, or are trying to convince themselves and others, that the conflict is due to the government not understanding its duties and its position. When this misunderstanding is cleared up, when people become accustomed to the novelty, i.e., to the constitutional regime, to the necessity of deciding affairs of state by the vote of the citizens and not by the orders of the old authority, things will settle down in their normal course. According to this opinion, we are in the presence of a "constitutional conflict", i.e., a conflict between different institutions in a constitutional state which recognises both the old authority and the authority of the representatives of the people. They will get used to each other—this is what the man in the street thinks, and how the bourgeois politician reasons. The man in the street thinks so because of his simplicity and political inexperience. The bourgeois politician thinks so because these thoughts answer to the interests of his class.

For example, Rech, the chief organ of the Cadets, says: "Our Ministers are even less experienced in the theory and

practice of constitutionalism than most of our deputies." The point, you see, is the inexperience of the Ministers who have not taken lessons in constitutional law from Professors Kovalevsky and Milyukov. That is just the point. Well, if they have not learned from books, they will learn from the speeches delivered in the Duma. They will get used to each other. To prove its case, the Cadet *Rech* refers to the German bourgeoisie. The German bourgeoisie, too, was—let us put it mildly—at loggerheads with the government in 1848. It, too, sought, or meant to seek, complete power and complete freedom for the people. After the German Government had suppressed the struggle of the people, the bourgeoisie was permitted to have its representatives in parliament. While the representatives talked, the old authority acted. The representatives talked and explained to the Ministers that they "did not understand"; they taught them "constitutionalism", and kept on teaching them for a matter of fifteen years, from the late 1840s to the early 1860s. In the 1860s Bismarck openly quarrelled with the bourgeois "representatives of the people", but this was the last outburst in the family quarrel. The bourgeoisie was swept off its feet by the victories of the German army, and fully contented itself with manhood suffrage, while the aristocratic and bureaucratic government retained all its powers.

Now it is this last serious quarrel between Bismarck and the representatives of the "people" that the Cadet *Rech* is particularly pleased with. The German bourgeoisie (fifteen years after the revolution had been finally crushed) yielded to Bismarck. But in Russia the bourgeoisie will at one stroke compel Goremykin to yield. And the Cadets are rejoicing in anticipation: Goremykin will have to concede more than Bismarck conceded in his day.

We readily agree that Goremykin is far from being a Bismarck. But we think that it is particularly important now for the working class to understand the *very substance* of the deals between the bourgeoisie and the Bismarcks, whereas the question of the measure of the future concessions is a matter for the future. The Bismarcks made up their quarrel with the bourgeoisie only after the revolution had been finally crushed, when the bourgeoisie had completely betrayed the "people's freedom", when it was living

in peace and harmony with the old aristocratic and bureaucratic authority which was protecting the landlord against the peasant and, above all, protecting the capitalist against the worker.

This was the real and actual basis of the reconciliation between Bismarck and the German Cadets, that is, with the Prussian Progressives. This was the vital background of the "constitutionalism" which the German Kovalevskys and Milyukovs taught the Bismarcks fifteen years after the suppression of the revolution. Perhaps our professors do not know this; professors know their books, but they do not know what goes on in real life. The workers, however, must know this.

The grim struggle that is going on in Russia today is not at all over the concessions on which the Goremykins and the liberal bourgeoisie could agree. The struggle is being waged between the masses of the people, who cannot any longer live in the old conditions, and the old feudal and bureaucratic regime, which cannot exist in truly constitutional conditions. It is not a fight over how the lessons of constitutionalism should be applied, but over whether constitutionalism is possible at all.

This is not a parliamentary conflict, and the Duma itself is far from being a parliament as yet, far from being an instrument of the bourgeois "order" under an established constitution. It is only an indicator and a very feeble reflector of the people's movement, which is growing outside or independently of the Duma.

The Duma's conflict with the government is only an *indirect* indication of the conflict between all the fundamental and mature aspirations of the masses of the peasantry and the working class and the whole intact power of the old regime. These mature aspirations are often briefly expressed by the words: land and freedom. These aspirations have not been met. The forces behind these demands have not developed to the full by a very long way. The conditions under which they can reveal themselves to the full are only just ripening.

It is not to the lessons in constitutionalism given to the Goremykins by the Kovalevskys that we must draw the attention of the people, nor need we keep on recalling

the petty quarrels between the Bismarcks and the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie. The working class and the peasantry will not allow the Cadets to convert the Duma into an arena for such quarrels and such agreements. Every step that expresses the Cadets' leanings in this direction must be exposed. The Trudovik and Workers' Groups in the Duma must know that only by dissociating themselves from the Cadets, only by rising above schoolroom lessons in constitutionalism, only by loudly proclaiming all the demands and needs of the people, only by speaking the whole bitter truth, can they make their greatest contribution to the struggle for real freedom.

Volna, No. 20, May 18, 1906

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THE CADETS ARE PREVENTING THE DUMA FROM APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE

We have just heard that the following incident occurred in the Duma today. The Bill for the abolition of capital punishment was under discussion. Aladyin, a member of the Trudovik Group, put the question more emphatically than it has been put so far. "We must fight against the executive authority," he said (we are quoting from the stop-press news in the evening edition of *Birzheviye Vedomosti*). "We intend to wear down the Ministers with interpellations; but is it not obvious that they will ignore them? We must choose between two paths: either continue playing at interpellations, or *take the cause of the people into our own hands*." Aladyin proposed that the question be decided at once and not postponed for a month by sending the Bill to a committee. He concluded his speech by saying: "And woe to us *if we do not tell the people the whole truth*, if we do not tell them clearly that the guilt rests on those who control the guns and the machine-guns."

The priest Poyarkov spoke in the same strain. He said: "The government is *mocking* at the State Duma. We must not petition, we must demand: abolish capital punishment today, or at latest tomorrow. If not, then I propose that we all return home, because I think it is dishonest to deliberate here and receive salaries while capital punishment is still in force."

Thus a proposal was heard from the Trudovik Group of which the sense is perfectly clear: appeal to the people, make demands and not requests, ignore the bureaucratic regulations, don't drag out questions, and don't send them to committees.

The Cadets prevented the Duma from appealing to the people. The Cadet Nabokov, who spoke after Poyarkov, called on the members of the Duma "to keep to the legal path". He insisted on the Bill being sent to a committee.

At the close of the debate the Chairman of the Duma (the Cadet Dolgorukov) announced: "We have *four* proposals before us: two of these *I cannot put to the vote*, as they *are contrary to the rules of parliamentary procedure*. These two proposals are: to appeal to the people and to appeal to the monarch."

Of the two other proposals—(1) that the Bill be sent to a committee and (2) that it be discussed immediately—the former was carried *unanimously*, as the latter was withdrawn.

Evidently the Trudovik Group again yielded to the importunities and threats of the Cadets, and did not keep to the resolute position it at first took up.

The people, who realise the meaning of the struggle for freedom, must protest against the Cadets' behaviour in the Duma and call upon the Trudovik Group resolutely and emphatically to declare that it will appeal to the people and to *do so*!

Written on May 18 (31), 1906

Published in *Volna*, No. 21
May 19, 1906
Signed: *N. L—n*

Published according
to the newspaper text

THEY WON'T EVEN BARGAIN!

Struve's noblest feelings have been hurt. The government has proved to be more stupid than he thought, and he has found it to be downright unprofitable from a business point of view to deal with the government. Mr. Struve imagined politics to be a very simple thing; as he saw it, the Duma, i.e., the Cadet majority in the Duma, would bargain in courteous' language customary in the most highly cultured merchant quarters; the government would come down a bit, the Duma in its turn would reduce the price, and thus the reign of freedom for the people would come about in Russia. The things the Cadet gentlemen did to bring this about! And suddenly the government shows such an utter lack of understanding, such a complete absence of commercial gumption!

Mr. Struve is indignant:

Of the demands and propositions of the Duma, it (the government) could have evaded some and others it could have accepted and made its own. It could have made radical concessions in the political sphere and tried to reduce some prices in the economic sphere. Or it could have done the opposite. But to reject all the essential points in all the disputed spheres, and to challenge the people's need and the people's conception of their rights by refusing a land reform based on compulsory alienation of private holdings, could have been done only by people whose statesmanship stands at the lowest level.

And so, the demands of the Duma, stated in its Address, constitute a *disputed* field; they are not something *indispensable* that has to be won by all and every means and which must immediately be extended further; they are only a basis for bargaining.

Amnesty, universal suffrage, liberties, and the forcible alienation of land are all disputable; one can haggle over

all of them and—reduce the price, provided the government gives something in exchange.

This has to be remembered. In the heat of his indignation Mr. Struve has blurted out those Cadet tactics to which the Social-Democrats have always called the attention of the people.

The people's demands, even in the curtailed and Cadettishly-distorted form in which they have been included in the Address, are not an indispensable minimum for the Cadet Party, but merely the highest price, which it was planned beforehand to reduce. To Mr. Struve's regret, the deal has not come off—for lack of "statesmanship" on the part of the government. According to Mr. Struve's testimony, that statesmanship stands at the lowest level. Why? For the simple reason that the Trepovs and Goremykins and Stishinskys refuse to bargain with the Cadets over the people's rights, which they reject outright.

As for a high level of "statesmanship", it is clear that it consists in openly selling the people's freedom.

Mark that well, workers and peasants! On the eve of Goremykin's Duma speech the Cadet gentlemen believed "statesmanship" to consist in striking a bargain with Trepov over a curtailment of the people's demands expressed in the Address.

To the profound sorrow of the Cadet gentlemen, the deal just does not come off. The conflict between the real interests of the proletariat and the peasantry and the likewise real interests of the old regime, which is fighting to survive, cannot be forced into the framework of diplomatic deals. And it is not because of any particular "level of statesmanship" on the part of Mr. Struve or Mr. Trepov that the Russian revolution cannot adopt a Cadet course. The very nature of the conflicting interests is pushing the Russian revolution on to the path of an open struggle between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.

That is precisely why the gentlemen who are trading in the people's freedom, and who serve as brokers during the revolution and as diplomats in a time of war, are doomed to be disappointed again and again.

Volna, No. 21, May 19, 1906
Signed, —Ъ

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THE MANIFESTO OF THE WORKERS' DEPUTIES IN THE STATE DUMA[188]

We warmly welcome the manifesto of the Workers' Group of Duma deputies, who stand closer to us in their convictions than any other group. This is the first appeal that Duma deputies have made, not to the government, but directly to the people. The example of the workers' deputies should, in our opinion, have been followed by the Trudovik, or Peasant, Group in the Duma.

The appeal of the workers' deputies contains much that is true, but in our opinion it also contains certain flaws.

Our worker comrades want "to strive to make the Duma prepare for the convocation of a constituent assembly". They can hardly count on the whole Duma, or even on the majority of the deputies, for this. The liberals, who predominate in the Duma, have repeatedly promised the people that they would convene a constituent assembly; but far from keeping their promise, they have not even openly and firmly voiced this demand in the Duma. In this matter, the workers' deputies can count with any certainty only on the Trudovik Group, on the representatives of the peasants. And that is why the working class cannot set out to support the *whole* Duma: the Russian liberals are too unreliable. The workers would, therefore, do better to concentrate on supporting the *peasant deputies*, in order to stimulate them to speak out independently, and to act like real representatives of the revolutionary peasantry.

The proletariat has proved its ability to fight. It is now mustering its forces to launch another determined struggle, but to launch it only together with the peasantry. The workers' deputies are therefore right in calling upon the

proletariat not to allow itself to be provoked by anyone, and not to enter, unless really necessary, into isolated collisions with the enemy. Proletarian blood is too precious to be shed needlessly and without certain hope of victory.

Only the peasant masses, when they halve realised how powerless and inadequate the present Duma is, can serve as a reliable bulwark for the workers that will ensure victory. Although the resolutions and decisions adopted at workers' meetings are very useful in promoting the organisation of the working class for the struggle, they cannot provide a real bulwark against an enemy who has already prepared to reply to the demands of the people with the most brutal violence. On the contrary, the working class must explain to the peasant masses as well that they are mistaken when in their simple-mindedness they place their hopes in requests, resolutions, petitions and complaints.

Affairs in Russia are not moving in the direction where the great argument about the destiny of the people—the question of *land* and *freedom*—can be settled by speeches and voting.

Volna, No. 21, May 19, 1906

Published according to the *Volna* text

THE LAND QUESTION AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

The Duma is discussing the land question. Two main proposals are offered for the solution of this problem: one advocated by the Cadets, and the other advocated by the "Trudoviks", i.e., the peasant deputies.

Concerning these solutions the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. quite rightly said in its resolution on the attitude to be taken towards the peasant movement: "The bourgeois parties are trying to utilise the peasant movement and to bring it under their control—one (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) in pursuit of their object of utopian petty-bourgeois socialism, and the other (the Cadets) with an eye to preserving, in some measure, large-scale private landownership and at the same time, to weakening the revolutionary movement by satisfying the property instincts of the peasantry with partial concessions."

Let us see what this resolution of the Social-Democratic Congress means. The Cadet Party is a semi-landlord party. Many liberal landlords belong to it. It strives to protect the interests of the landlords and agrees only to such *concessions* to the peasantry as are inevitable. The Cadets are striving as far as possible to protect large-scale private landownership and are opposed to complete alienation of all the landed estates for the benefit of the peasantry. The object of their proposal that the peasants should pay compensation for the land, i.e., should *buy* the land from the landlords through the state, is to transform the upper sections of the peasantry into a "party of order". In fact, no matter how this compensation is arranged, no matter how "fair" a price may be fixed for the land, compensation will be an easier matter for the well-to-do peasants and will

fall as a heavy burden upon the poorer peasantry. No matter what regulations may be drawn up on paper providing for purchase by the village community, etc., the land will in practice remain inevitably in the hands of those who are able to pay for it. Hence the compensation scheme will strengthen the rich peasants at the expense of the poor; it will disunite the peasantry and thereby weaken its struggle for complete freedom and for all the land. The compensation scheme is a *bait* held out to the more prosperous section of the peasantry to induce it to *desert* the cause of freedom and to go over to the side of the *old authorities*. Paying compensation for the land means paying ransom to be freed from the struggle for freedom; it means bribing a section of the fighters for freedom to desert to the enemies of freedom. The well-to-do peasant who pays compensation money for his land will become a small landlord, and it will be very easy for him to desert to the side of the old landlord and bureaucratic authorities and remain there.

Hence the resolution of the Social-Democratic Congress is quite right when it says that the Cadet Party (this semi-landlord party) advocates measures that will *weaken* the revolutionary movement, i.e., the struggle for freedom.

Now let us examine the solution of the land problem proposed by the "Trudovik", or peasant, deputies in the Duma. They have not quite cleared up their views as yet. They stand midway: between the Cadets and the "rustics" (Popular Socialist Party), between compensation for part of the land (the Cadets' proposal) and confiscation of all the land (proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries); but they are steadily moving away from the Cadets and drawing nearer to the "rustics".

Is the resolution of the Social-Democratic Congress right in describing the "rustics" as a bourgeois party, whose objects are those of utopian petty-bourgeois socialism?

Let us take the very latest Land Reform Bill proposed by the "rustics" and published in yesterday's issue of their *Narodny Vestnik* (No. 9).[189] This Bill provides for the complete abolition of all private landownership and for "universal and equalised land tenure". Why do the "rustics" want to introduce equalised land tenure? Because they want to abolish the distinction between rich and poor. This is a

socialist aim. All socialists want this. But there are different kinds of socialism; there is even clerical socialism; there is petty-bourgeois socialism, and there is proletarian socialism.

Petty-bourgeois socialism expresses the dream of the small proprietor of how to abolish the distinction between rich and poor. Petty-bourgeois socialism assumes that it is possible for all to become "equalised" proprietors, neither poor nor rich; and so the petty-bourgeois socialists draft Bills providing for universal and equalised land tenure. But in reality, poverty and want cannot be abolished in the way the small proprietor wants to do it. Equalised use of the land is impossible so long as the rule of money, the rule of capital, exists. No laws on earth can abolish inequality and exploitation so long as production for the market continues, and so long as there is the rule of money and the power of capital. Exploitation can be completely abolished only when all the land, factories and tools are transferred to the working class, and when large-scale socialised and planned production is organised. That is why proletarian socialism (Marxism) shows that all the hopes of petty-bourgeois socialism of the possibility of "equalised" small-scale production, or even of the possibility of preserving small-scale production at all under capitalism, are groundless.

The class-conscious proletariat fully supports the peasant struggle for all the land and for complete freedom; but it warns the peasants against all false hopes. The peasants can, with the aid of the proletariat, completely throw off the tyranny of the landlords, they can completely put an end to landlordism and to the landlord and bureaucratic state. The peasants may even abolish all private ownership of land. All such measures will greatly benefit the peasants, the working class, and the whole people. It is in the interests of the working class to render the utmost assistance to the peasants' struggle. But the overthrow of the power of the landlords and the bureaucrats, however complete, will not in itself undermine the power of capital. And only in a society freed from the rule of the landlords and bureaucrats will the last great struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the fight for a socialist system, be fought out.

That is why the Social-Democrats fight so resolutely against the treacherous programme of the Cadets, and warn the peasants against harbouring false hopes about "equalisation". To achieve success in the present struggle for land and freedom, the peasants must be entirely self-reliant and independent of the Cadets. They should not be misled by the discussion of all sorts of land reform Bills. As long as power remains in the hands of the old autocratic, landlord and bureaucratic government, it will be a waste of time to discuss these proposals for "labour norms", "equalisation", etc. The peasants' struggle for the land will only be weakened by this jumble of clauses and regulations in the various Bills, which the old authorities will either throw out or else transform into new instruments for deceiving the peasantry. "Land Reform Bills" will not help the peasants to understand how to obtain the land: if anything, they will make it more difficult. They merely clutter up the question of the power of the old bureaucratic government with petty and trivial legalistic crotchets. They merely muddle heads with hopes of the coming of good, kind government officials, when as a matter of fact the old savage officials retain all their unlimited power of violence. Drop this playing with paper "Land Reform Bills", gentlemen. The peasants will settle the land question easily enough as soon as the obstacle of the old authorities is swept away. Better devote all your attention to the peasants' struggle for the complete removal of all such obstacles.

Written on May 19 (June 1), 1906

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to the newspaper text

THE SORRY GOREMYKINS,[190] THE OCTOBRISTS AND THE CADETS

Yesterday we commented on the latest inglorious victory the Cadets have achieved over the Trudoviks in the State Duma. The Cadets compelled the Trudoviks to withdraw their proposal to appeal to the people and to open the debate on the Bill for the abolition of capital punishment without observing the formalities which reduce the Duma to a wretched and impotent appendage of the bureaucracy.

Today, the sorry Goremykins of *Novoye Vremya* and the Octobrists of *Slovo* fully confirm our appraisal of the Cadets' victory over the Trudoviks. "The Trudovik Group," writes *Novoye Vremya*, "proposed something that ran counter to the law establishing the Duma. It proposed that the Duma should proceed to discuss the substance of the Bill and then to take a vote, without the prescribed one month's interval, and therefore without giving the Minister of Justice an opportunity to express his opinion. The slightest indulgence towards the sort of laxity to which Russians are at times prone to the detriment of the law would have the Duma committing actions that would undoubtedly have been outside the law, with all the consequences that follow from pursuing the smooth and slippery path of "unauthorised action'."

The Cadet speakers, continues *Novoye Vremya*, "hotly protested against the illegal measures proposed by the Trudoviks" and "gained a brilliant victory". Concerning the withdrawal of their proposal by the Trudoviks *Novoye Vremya* observes: "Things ended to everybody's satisfaction, and to the greater triumph of law." It is quite natural for the sorry Goremykins to rejoice at the triumph of *this sort*

of law; nobody expects anything different from them. From the Cadets, unfortunately, too many people expect something different. In conclusion *Novoye Vremya* writes: "Any deputy who follows Mr. Aladyin's example will undoubtedly deserve to be reproached with his unpardonable frivolity."

In the Octobrist *Slovo*, Mr. Hippolit Hofstätter lectures the Cadets and admonishes them in a fatherly way. "Real revolution is in the air," he says. The Cadets don't want that, and therefore, they must be sensible. "As long as the present law provides the slightest opportunity of achieving further, fully legitimate, legal, political and social gains, it is the sacred duty of the intelligently-progressive members of the State Duma to act as a steadfast opposition while keeping within the law, and not to provoke conflicts at all costs...."

The position of the sorry Goremykins and the Octobrists is clear. It is high time we made a clearer and more sober appraisal of the Cadets' position, which is akin to it.

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Signed: *N. L—n*

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to the newspaper text

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

FREEDOM TO CRITICISE AND UNITY OF ACTION[191]

The editors have received the following communication, signed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

"In view of the fact that several Party organisations have raised the question *of the limits within which the decisions of Party congresses may be criticised*, the Central Committee, bearing in mind that the interests of the Russian proletariat have always demanded the greatest possible unity in the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P., and that *this unity in the political activities* of the various sections of our Party is now more necessary than ever is of the opinion:

(1) that in the Party press and at Party meetings, everybody must be allowed *full freedom* to express his personal opinions and to advocate his individual views;

(2) that at public political meetings members of the Party should refrain from conducting *agitation* that runs counter to congress decisions;

(3) that no Party member should at *such* meetings *call for action that runs counter to congress decisions*, or propose resolutions that are out of harmony with congress decisions." (All italics ours.)

In examining the substance of this resolution, we see a number of queer points. The resolution says that "at Party meetings" "full freedom" is to be allowed for the expression of personal opinions and for criticism (§1), but at "public meetings" (§2) "no Party member should call for action that runs counter to congress decisions". But see what comes of this: at Party meetings, members of the Party *have the right* to call for action that runs counter to congress decisions; but at public meetings they are *not* "allowed" full freedom to "express personal opinions"!!

Those who drafted the resolution have a totally wrong conception of the relationship between *freedom to criticise* within the Party and the Party's *unity of action*. Criticism within the limits of the *principles* of the Party Programme must be quite free (we remind the reader of what Plekhanov said on this subject at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.), not only at Party meetings, but also at public meetings.

Such criticism, or such "agitation" (for criticism is inseparable from agitation) cannot be prohibited. The Party's political action must be united. No "calls" that violate the unity of definite actions can be tolerated either at public meetings, or at Party meetings, or in the Party press.

Obviously, the Central Committee has defined freedom to criticise inaccurately and too narrowly, and unity of action inaccurately and too broadly.

Let us take an example. The Congress decided that the Party should take part in the Duma elections. Taking part in elections is a very definite action. During the elections (as in Baku today, for example), no member of the Party *anywhere* has any right whatever to call upon the people *to abstain from voting*; nor can "criticism" of the decision to take part in the elections be tolerated during this period, for it would in fact jeopardise success in the election campaign. *Before* elections have been announced, however, Party members *everywhere* have a perfect right to *criticise* the decision to take part in elections. Of course, the application of this principle in practice will sometimes give rise to disputes and misunderstandings; but *only* on the basis of *this* principle can *all* disputes and all misunderstandings be settled honourably for the Party. The resolution of the Central Committee, however, creates an impossible situation.

The Central Committee's resolution is essentially wrong and runs *counter to the Party Rules*. The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy for local Party organisations implies universal and full *freedom to criticise*, so long as this does not disturb the unity *of a definite action*; it rules out *all* criticism which disrupts or makes difficult the *unity* of an action decided on by the Party.

We think that the Central Committee has made a big mistake by publishing a resolution on this important question without first having it discussed in the Party press and by Party organisations; such a discussion would have helped it to avoid the mistakes we have indicated.

We call upon all Party organisations to discuss this resolution of the Central Committee now, and to express a definite opinion on it.

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BAD ADVICE

Comrade Plekhanov, in *Kuryer*,[192] has addressed a letter to the workers. In that letter he advises the workers how to act. He argues as follows. The government is allowing full freedom for the sharpest criticism of the Duma. It is doing so in order to weaken the people's support of the Duma. The government wants to provoke the workers to fight before they are ready. The workers must thwart the government's plans. The fact that bourgeois parties predominate in the Duma should not deter them. The bourgeoisie, which predominates in the Duma, is demanding freedom for all and land for the peasants. Therefore the whole people should support the Duma.

This argument is a mixture of truth and error. Let us calmly examine Comrade Plekhanov's ideas and advice in detail.

According to Comrade Plekhanov's first idea, the government is allowing full freedom for the sharpest criticism of the Duma in order to weaken the people's support of the Duma.

Is that true? Let us see. Where has the sharpest criticism of the Duma been expressed lately? In the columns of such newspapers as *Nevskaya Gazeta*, *Dyelo Naroda*[193] and *Volna*, and at public meetings. The liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets who are in the majority in the Duma, are beside themselves with rage over this criticism, and particularly over the public meetings held in St. Petersburg. The Cadets even went so far as to express surprise that the police is ignoring socialist meetings.

How has the government reacted? It has suppressed *Dyelo Naroda* and *Nevskaya Gazeta*, and has prosecuted *Volna* three times. It has banned public meetings and has

announced that it will take proceedings against those responsible for the meeting held in the Panina Palace on May 9.

This clearly shows that Comrade Plekhanov is *wrong*. He is guilty of a gross error.

Now let us examine Comrade Plekhanov's second idea. The government wants to provoke the workers to fight before they are ready. The workers would be unwise to allow themselves to be provoked; they would be unwise to issue a call to arms at the present time.

This is quite true, but Comrade Plekhanov expresses this idea so inadequately as to invite the most harmful misinterpretation. He forgets to add, first, that the government's whole conduct and its entire attitude towards the Duma are making inevitable another struggle outside the Duma. Secondly, he does not say that the workers in common with the peasantry will have to take up this struggle despite the wavering and treacherous liberal bourgeoisie.

Comrade Plekhanov does not realise that by inadequately expressing a correct idea he brings grist to the mill of the liberal bourgeoisie, which has secured the banning of socialist meetings. The bourgeoisie is making out that *all* of the socialists' references to the Cadets being no good and to the struggle outside the Duma are a harmful challenge to the workers to fight *immediately*. The bourgeoisie is deliberately lying about the socialists, and Plekhanov, wrongly appraising the political situation, helps these lies.

Take *Volna*, for example, which the bourgeoisie has attacked and reviled most of all. Has *Volna* called for a fight immediately? No. The bourgeoisie was lying about *Volna*. *Two weeks ago Volna* (No. 10) wrote: "We must not force the pace of [i.e., artificially accelerate, drive on, whip up] events. It is not in our interest to hasten an explosion at present. There can be no doubt about that."* That is clear enough, isn't it? Why, then, did the bourgeoisie spread lies and slander about the socialists? Because the socialists were telling the truth when they said that a struggle outside the Duma was inevitable, and that this struggle would be

* See p. 390 of this volume.—*Ed.*

waged by the proletariat and the peasantry *despite* the treachery of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Take the resolution adopted at the meeting in the Panina Palace (this resolution was published in *Volna*, No. 14, and in a number of other newspapers).* Does this resolution call for an *immediate* fight? No, it does not. Why, then, did the liberal bourgeoisie and all the Cadets go mad with rage against this resolution? Because it tells the truth, by exposing first of all the government ("making a mockery of popular representation", "preparing to resort to force"), and then the liberals ("*timidly and inadequately* express the people's demands", "waver between freedom and the old regime"); because this resolution calls upon the Trudoviks, the peasant deputies, *to act resolutely*, *absolutely independently of the Cadets*; and lastly, because this resolution plainly says that a decisive struggle outside the Duma is *inevitable*. The bourgeoisie has distorted the meaning of this resolution in order to make it appear that the socialists were insanely calling for a fight immediately, and in order to *divert attention* from the charges that were actually being made against the bourgeoisie. It has behaved in this way because it understands its own interests correctly. Comrade Plekhanov is wrong in echoing the bourgeoisie, for he misunderstands the proletariat's real attitude towards the government and the bourgeoisie.

Take Comrade Plekhanov's third idea. "The bourgeoisie in the Duma is demanding freedom for all and land for the peasants." Is this true? No, it is only half true, or only a quarter true. The bourgeoisie is not demanding, but begging from the old authorities. The bourgeoisie has forbidden all talk about 'demands" in the Duma. The bourgeoisie (the Cadets) is demanding *such* "freedom", of the press for example, that people can be clapped in gaol or sent to penal servitude for publishing socialist speeches.**[194] The bourgeoisie is demanding, *not* land for the peasants, but *sale of part of the land* to the peasants (for the payment of compensation is a form of buying and selling). Is Comrade Plekhanov right in keeping silent about this *inadequacy*

* See p. 409 of this volume.—Ed.
** See the article, "The New Draconian Bill", in *Volna*, No. 22.

and *timidity* of the bourgeois proposals, about the wavering of the Cadets? No, he is absolutely wrong. What is the significance of Comrade Plekhanov's mistake? It is extremely dangerous for the proletariat, and jeopardises success in the struggle for freedom. All socialists agree that this struggle will be decided outside the Duma, and that it may flare up, even if we do not wish it, in the not very distant future. In this struggle the proletariat can, and must, march with the peasantry, and *not trust* the wavering, treacherous, turncoat liberal bourgeoisie. There is nothing more dangerous in a fight than trust in turncoats. Keeping silent about the timidity, vacillations and treachery of the liberal bourgeoisie on the eve of a new turn towards a new struggle, we do harm to the proletariat and to the cause of freedom.

Now for Comrade Plekhanov's last idea, or piece of advice. "The whole people must unanimously support the Duma." The fact that bourgeois parties predominate in the Duma should not deter the workers.

It is true that the workers should not be "deterred" by this. In fact, they are not. They are prepared to support the bourgeoisie in the fight against the government. But the question is, *which* bourgeoisie, *how* is it to be supported, and in *which* struggle? It is customary for the Cadets to hush up these questions, which expose their instability; but it is unseemly for the Social-Democrat Comrade Plekhanov to keep silent about them.

Supporting the "Duma" as such means supporting a *Cadet* Duma, for the Cadets predominate there. Marxists should not regard the Duma as an organ of "popular" representation in general. They are in duty bound to inquire which classes this Duma represents.

Can we support a Cadet Duma at all? No, because the proletariat must expose and denounce every wavering and irresolute step the Duma takes. On the very page on which Comrade Plekhanov's article appears, the comrades of *Kuryer* write: "...the Left section of the Duma [i.e., the Trudovik and Workers' Groups] meekly suffer the humiliating and *reactionary* tutelage of Mr. Muromtsev and Mr. Dolgorukov..." (the Chairmen of the Duma, Cadets both). Now that is true. That is exactly what genuine socialists should

say. Can the "people", or the proletariat, unanimously support a "Duma" that is the instrument of the reactionary tutelage of the liberals over the Trudoviks? No, they cannot and will not.

There are two main bourgeois parties in the Duma—the Cadets and the Trudoviks. The former represent the compromising, treacherous bourgeoisie, which is obviously preparing to make a deal with the autocracy and is obviously incapable of waging a resolute struggle. The latter represent the toiling petty bourgeoisie, who are incredibly downtrodden, who dream of an equalised division of the land and who are capable of waging a resolute and self-sacrificing struggle, into which they are being driven by the whole course of events and by the whole conduct of the government. *Which* bourgeoisie should the proletariat support "*immediately*"? The *latter*, warning the "people" against the unreliability of the former. The proletariat must and will support the Trudoviks against the Cadets, exposing the "reactionary tutelage" of the Cadets over the Trudoviks, and calling upon the Trudoviks to throw off this tutelage.

Now for the last question: how to support, and in which struggle? To support anybody in the Duma means voting for him. It is common knowledge that the Workers' Group refused to vote for the Cadet (in general, the "Duma's") reply to the address from the throne. The workers' deputies unanimously refused to "support" the Duma. Were the workers "mistaken" in this, too? If Comrade Plekhanov thinks they were, let him say so plainly; such things must be said without equivocation.

Real and serious support will be given outside the Duma. It is not we who determine this, but the whole course of events, the very nature of the present struggle; for this is not a struggle between the Duma and the Ministry, but a struggle between the people and the old authorities. It is strange and wrong to call such "support of the Duma" merely "support". It will be a resolute fight outside the Duma. The proletariat must start this fight only jointly with the peasantry. The proletariat and the peasantry will win this fight, despite the instability, vacillations and treachery of the liberal, Cadet, "Duma" bourgeoisie, and its philandering with reaction.

We now see how bad is the advice Comrade Plekhanov gives the working class. Our Unity Congress made a slight mistake in pushing the Party somewhat towards the right, and in inadequately appraising the danger of overdoing support of the Cadets. Comrade Plekhanov is making a big mistake by going much too far to the right, and by calling upon the proletariat to support the Cadets and the Cadet Duma fully, completely and without reservation.

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TALK AND RUMOURS ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE STATE DUMA

The newspapers have already commented on the brief communication published by *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*[195] to the effect that it is proposed to adjourn the State Duma on June 15 for the summer recess! Now the news agencies are denying this, but as *Rech* quite rightly says, they are denying it in an ambiguous and unconvincing way.

Nevertheless, the possibility that in a few weeks' time the Duma will be adjourned "for the summer" is real. Hence the question asked by *Kuryer*—whether the Duma will *disperse*—is a very interesting one. *Kuryer* quotes Mr. Rodichev as saying in the Duma: "We will not disperse until we have done what we were sent here to do." And it also quotes another Cadet, Mr. Gredeskul, as saying: "In its struggle [against the government] the Duma still has another very important resource—its legislative power; and only when it has exhausted this will it have the right to disperse, and to announce to the people that it is powerless."

"*Kuryer*" *hopes* that Mr. Rodichev was "in earnest" when he proposed that the Duma should not disperse if the government dissolves it. And so *Kuryer* emphatically supports Rodichev against Gredeskul, and in this connection speaks with legitimate contempt of the prospect of "piling up a heap of laws" (and we will add—some of them positively Draconian, and some timid and irresolute) "only to certify their impotence to the people, and step aside".

We are very glad that our comrades of *Kuryer* have admitted that the Duma will play a ludicrous and sordid role if it merely "piles up a heap of laws" and "displays its impotence". And we are also very glad that our comrades of

Kuryer can speak of the Duma as "the rallying-centre of the forces of the people, the core around which the organisation of these forces is being built up, and the movement is uniting" *only* in connection with the prospect of the Duma *refusing* to disperse. We are ready to admit that the Duma, by *refusing* to confine itself to the present legal limits, could serve the movement better than it is serving it now. The only fight we have seen the Cadet Duma wage so far, however, is that against the timid attempts of the Trudoviks to take this line. We have no "hopes" that Mr. Rodichev spoke "in earnest". Moreover, we think that if the Rodichevs are at all capable of going beyond the legal limits and of taking a step like that of refusing to disperse, then *the choice of the moment for such a step should not be left to the government*. Refusing to disperse means timing a decisive collision to a moment that will be determined by the government, for it is the government which will decree the dissolution of the Duma. Those who want to choose the best moment for the collision (we mean the Trudoviks, for we have no right to trust the Cadets) must proceed in such a way as *to choose* the moment *themselves*, and not leave it to the government to do so. After all, the government may do nothing to prevent the Cadets from "piling up a heap of laws", as *Kuryer* puts it so aptly and venomously.

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KAUTSKY ON THE STATE DUMA[196]

A new pamphlet by K. Kautsky has appeared, entitled *The State Duma* (Amiran Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1906, price 3 kopeks). The author expresses a number of highly interesting ideas on questions that are matters of controversy among Russian Social-Democrats. First of all there is the question of the boycott of the Duma. Our readers are, of course, aware of the cheap manoeuvre to which our Right Social-Democrats resorted and still resort to evade this issue. Their argument is a very simple one. Participation in the parliamentary struggle is Social-Democracy, non-participation is anarchism. *Therefore*, the boycott was a mistake, and the Bolsheviks are anarchists. This is how that sorry Social-Democrat, Comrade Negorev, for example, argued, and how a great many of his friends argue.

Kautsky is a Marxist. *That is why* he argues differently. He thinks it necessary to examine the *concrete historical* conditions in Russia, and not repeat what to Europeans are battered phrases.

"In these circumstances," writes Kautsky, after briefly describing the Dubasov regime, "*it is not surprising* that the majority of our Russian comrades regarded a Duma convened in this way as nothing more than a most outrageous travesty of popular representation, and decided to boycott it and not take part in the election campaign."

Kautsky sees nothing surprising in the tactics of "Blanquism" and "anarchism". It would be very useful for Comrade Plekhanov and all the Mensheviks to think about this, wouldn't it?

"It is not surprising," continues Kautsky, "that most of our Russian comrades thought it *more advisable* to fight

in order to wreck this Duma and to secure the convocation of a constituent assembly, than to join in the election campaign in order to get into the Duma."

The inference is clear. In solving concrete historical problems, Marxists must carefully analyse all the political conditions of the moment, and not draw deductions from empty phrases about the antithesis between Blanquism-anarchism, etc.

While it is becoming the fashion among our Social-Democrats to repeat after the Cadets that the boycott was a mistake, Kautsky, examining the question quite impartially, does not even think of drawing such a conclusion. He does not hurry slavishly to bow before the fact that the Duma is being convened, although he is writing at a time when the failure of the attempt to "prevent the Duma" from being convened has already become obvious. But Kautsky is not one of those who after every set-back (like that in December, for example) hastens to repent and to confess "mistakes". He knows that set-backs in the proletarian struggle do not by a very long way prove that the proletariat had made "mistakes".

Another important passage in Kautsky's pamphlet is the one dealing with the question of who, i.e., which classes or groups in society, can win in the present Russian revolution.

"The peasants and the proletariat," writes Kautsky, "will more and more vigorously and unceremoniously [remember this, comrades of *Nevskaya Gazeta* who wrote so approvingly about the "wisdom" of the Cadets] push the members of the Duma to the left, will steadily strengthen *its Left wing*, and steadily weaken and paralyse their opponents, until *they have utterly defeated them*" (p. 8).

Thus, Kautsky expects *the peasants and the proletariat* to win in the present Russian revolution. Will not our Menshevik comrades explain to us the difference between the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry and the victory of the proletariat and the peasantry? Will they not accuse Kautsky of being a Blanquist, or a follower of Narodnaya Volya, because he thinks that the peasants and the proletariat, and not the bourgeoisie, can *win* in a *bourgeois* revolution?

Whoever takes the trouble to ponder over this question will get a clearer idea of the fundamental mistake of the Mensheviks, who are always prone to believe that only the bourgeoisie can be at the head of a bourgeois revolution, and are therefore always scared by the idea of the peasants and the proletariat winning power (and victory in a revolution means winning power).

The third important and valuable idea expressed by Karl Kautsky is that about the Duma being a new centre, an important step forward in the organisation of the movement. "No matter which direction the Duma may take," says Kautsky, "the indirect or direct, the deliberate or unintentional impulses it henceforth gives the revolution will have a simultaneous effect over the whole of Russia, and will everywhere call forth a simultaneous reaction."

This is quite true. Whoever now says the Bolsheviks are advocating that the Duma be "disregarded", or even dissolved—whoever says they are ignoring the Duma—is not telling the truth. At the Unity Congress the Bolsheviks moved a resolution which said:

"The Social-Democrats *must utilise* the State Duma and its conflicts with the government, or the conflicts within the Duma itself, fighting its reactionary elements, ruthlessly exposing the inconsistency and vacillation of the Cadets, *paying particular attention* to the peasant revolutionary democrats, uniting them in opposition to the Cadets, supporting such of their actions as are in the interests of the proletariat,"* etc.

Those who want to judge the Bolsheviks by their resolutions, and not by what the Negorevs say about them, will see that there is *no disagreement whatever* between Kautsky and the Bolsheviks on the question of the *State Duma*.

In his pamphlet Kautsky says nothing at all about a Social-Democratic group in the Duma.

Vestnik Zhizni, No. 6, May 23, 1906
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Vestnik Zhizni*

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* See p. 293 of this volume.—*Ed.*

CADETS, TRUDOVIKS AND THE WORKERS' PARTY

However distorted popular representation in the State Duma may be by virtue of the election law and the conditions under which the elections were held, it nevertheless provides a fair amount of material for a study of the policies of the various classes in Russia. And it also helps to correct erroneous or narrow views on this question.

The correctness of the division of the bourgeois parties into three main types that the Bolsheviks insisted on in their draft resolution for the Unity Congress is becoming ever more evident.* The Octobrists, the Cadets, and the revolutionary, or peasant, democrats—such are these three main types. We cannot, of course, expect the full and final consolidation of the parties of each type: the open entry of the various classes in Russian society into anything like a free political arena is too recent for that.

The Octobrists are a real class organisation of the landlords and the big capitalists. The counter-revolutionary (anti-revolutionary) character of this section of the bourgeoisie is perfectly obvious. It stands on the side of the government, although still haggling with it over the division of power. The Heydens and Co. sometimes even merge with the Cadets in opposition to the old authorities, but this does not make even the most credulous people, who are taken in by all sorts of "opposition", forget the real nature of the Octobrist Party.

The Cadets are the chief party of the second type. This party is not exclusively connected with any particular class in bourgeois society, but it is thoroughly bourgeois

* See pp. 157-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

none the less. Its ideal is a well-ordered bourgeois society, purged of feudal survivals and protected from the encroachments of the proletariat by institutions such as an Upper Chamber, a standing army, a non-elected bureaucracy, Draconian press laws, etc. The Cadets are a semi-landlord party. They want to ransom themselves from revolution. They long for a deal with the old authorities. They are afraid of independent revolutionary activity by the people. The more this party develops its public political activities, particularly in the Duma, the more marked become its inconsistency and instability. That is why the voices of short-sighted people, who are dazzled by momentary successes, in favour of supporting the Cadets, will never find wide support among the working class.

The third type of bourgeois party is the Trudoviks, i.e., the peasant deputies to the Duma, who issued their programme the other day. Revolutionary Social-Democrats have long been watching the rise of this type of political party in Russia. The Peasant Union was a nucleus of such a party. The radical unions of propertiless intellectuals gravitated towards it to some extent. The Socialist-Revolutionaries developed in the same direction, growing out of the narrow shell that encased them as a group of intellectuals. The variety of types and shades of this trend fully corresponds to the variety of types and vast numbers of the "toiling" petty bourgeoisie in Russia. The main bulwark of this trend, of these parties, is the peasantry. Objective conditions compel the peasantry to wage a determined struggle against landlordism, against the power of the landlords and the whole of the old political system that is closely connected with it. *These* bourgeois democrats are *compelled* to become revolutionary, whereas the liberals, the Cadets and so forth, represent the bourgeoisie, whose conditions of existence *compel* it to seek a deal with the old authorities. It is natural also that the peasantry should clothe its aspirations in the mantle of utopias, i.e., unrealisable hopes, such as equalised land tenure under capitalism.

Being aware that its class interests differ from the interests of the revolutionary democrats, the proletariat is compelled to organise in a strictly independent class party. But its duty to criticise idle dreams never causes the socia-

list proletariat to forget its positive duty to do all it can to support the revolutionary democrats in their struggle against the old authorities and the old order, warning the people against the instability of the liberal bourgeoisie, and counteracting the harmful effects of this instability by its fighting agreement with the revolutionary peasantry.

Such should be the *basis* of all the tactics, of the whole political conduct of the Social-Democratic proletariat at the present time. To be able to act in common with the peasantry, it must strive to enlighten, rouse, and draw the peasantry into the struggle, while at the same time steadily weaning it from its faith in "petitions" and "resolutions", and in the Duma, that all-Russian institution for petitioners. "To make the broad masses of the people realise the utter uselessness of the Duma" (resolutions of the Unity Congress)—such is the proletariat's task. And for the sake of joint actions with the peasantry, it must strictly refrain from isolated and untimely outbreaks. But bearing in mind this very same object—ensuring success in the inevitably coming struggle—it must most ruthlessly expose the instability of the Cadets, emphasise as clearly as possible "the utter uselessness of the Duma", and most resolutely counteract every attempt to obscure the distinctions between the Cadets and the Trudoviks.

This is the light in which the socialist proletariat should appraise the relations between the Cadets and the Trudoviks. Take the land reform question. The Cadets advocate *compensation*. The Trudoviks declare only for some *reward*—perhaps in the shape of pensions, or free places in an alms-house. *Volna* has already explained the vast difference between compensation and a free place in an alms-house. The workers' party demands the *confiscation* of the land, i.e., alienation without compensation or reward, although, of course, it does not reject the idea of sheltering indigent landlords in alms-houses. Obviously, the workers' party must support the Trudoviks against the Cadets. Compensation for the land has already once before had a most harmful effect in Russia, ruining the peasants, enriching the landlords and strengthening the old state power. Compensation can be advocated in Russia today only by those who are half-supporters of the government.

Take the political programme. The Cadets want an Upper Chamber and incomplete people's rule. The Trudoviks emphatically declare that over a parliament elected by universal etc., suffrage, there must be "no superstructure or barriers in the shape of a Council of State, House of Lords, Second Chamber, and so forth". The Trudovik Group accepts almost in its entirety the workers' minimum programme, including an eight-hour day, etc. Obviously, here, too, the workers' party must support the Trudoviks in opposition to the Cadets.

Let us take the question of what to do with the land. The Cadets want to leave part of the land in the possession of the peasants and the landlords, and to transfer part of it to the state. The Trudoviks want to transfer all the land to the state, although not all at once, and to introduce equalised tenure. Obviously the Trudoviks *go further* than the Cadets in the struggle against landlordism, and against the private ownership of land in general. The workers' party would be committing a gross error if, in this question as well, it did not support the Trudoviks in opposition to the Cadets. The fact that both parties are mistaken should not serve the workers' party as an excuse for refusing to support the genuinely revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Both the Cadets and the Trudoviks are mistaken in thinking that even part of the land can be transferred to a state that is far from democratic. Division of the land would be far better than transferring it to such a state. Unfortunately, the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. also made this mistake by allowing for the transfer of part of the land to a "democratic" state, without *specifying* the *degree* and fulness of the democracy of that state. This comparison between the Cadet and Trudovik programmes shows up with particular clearness the mistake committed by the Social-Democratic Congress.

The Trudoviks are also mistaken in believing that "equalised" land tenure is possible in a commodity economy. The workers' party must emphatically expose and refute this petty-bourgeois utopia.

But it would be unwise to allow this fight against the trivial *dreams* of the small proprietors to obscure the genuinely revolutionary *action* of this class in the present

revolution. A Marxist cannot do that. This mistake is committed, for example, by *Kuryer* when it says (No. 5): "In its main features, the Bill proposed by the Trudovik Group is far from satisfactory [this is true!] and does not deserve the support of the working class [this is not true!]."

In this, too, the workers' party must support the Trudoviks in opposition to the Cadets, while preserving its complete independence. In exposing the mistakes of the Cadets and the Trudoviks, we must not forget that the latter go further than the former, that the Trudoviks' mistakes will be of practical importance at a higher stage of the revolution than are those of the Cadets. With the help of the Cadets, the people are *casting off* illusions about the possibility of combining people's freedom with the old authorities. With the help of the Trudoviks, the people *will cast off* illusions about the possibility of combining "equalisation" with capitalism. With the help of the Cadets, the people are casting off their first bourgeois illusions; with the help of the Trudoviks, the people will cast off their last bourgeois illusions. The Cadet illusions are an obstacle to the victory of the bourgeois revolution. The Trudoviks' mistakes will be an obstacle to the immediate victory of socialism (but the workers are not uselessly dreaming about an immediate victory for socialism). Hence the vast difference between the Cadets and the Trudoviks: and the workers' party must take this difference strictly into account.

If we did not do this, we would convert the socialist proletariat from the vanguard of the revolution, the more class-conscious adviser of the peasantry, into an unwitting accomplice of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Volna, No. 25, May 24, 1906

Published according to the *Volna* text

HOW COMRADE PLEKHANOV ARGUES ABOUT SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TACTICS

The last two issues of *Kuryer* contain Comrade Plekhanov's first letter "On Tactics and Tactlessness". The liberal-bourgeois press has already quite rightly observed that Comrade Plekhanov is going far more to the right than *Kuryer*. The whole of this press is praising Comrade Plekhanov to the skies, and holding him up as a model for all other Social-Democrats.

Let us, then, examine Comrade Plekhanov's arguments as calmly as we can.

Comrade Plekhanov is arguing with the Poltava Social-Democratic newspaper *Kolokol*,[197] and quotes the following passages from it:

> "The mere adoption of a Social-Democratic programme does not in itself make a single individual, or even a whole group, Social-Democratic. To become a Social-Democrat, one must also adopt in their entirety the principles of Social-Democratic tactics.
>
> "The feature that sharply distinguishes the Social-Democratic Party from all other parties is, in addition to its programme, its unrelenting class position in relation to all other, bourgeois parties."

Comrade Plekhanov is very severe in his "strictures" of this passage. First, he demands that the word "opposition" be substituted for the word "position". In our opinion, this change would not improve the original wording in the least: if anything, it would worsen it. Secondly, Comrade Plekhanov undertakes the functions of a proof-reader. In the original there was no comma after the word "other". Unpretentious proof-readers usually correct such mistakes without making a fuss about it. Pretentious proof-readers write a *feuilleton* nearly half a column long about it!

But let us get down to the subject. What is Comrade Plekhanov's objection on the point at issue? He says: "The author depicts all the other* bourgeois parties as one reactionary mass."

This is *not true*. There is not a hint of anything like it in the passage we have quoted. And in the ensuing lines, which Plekhanov himself quotes, the author *clearly distinguishes* between two types of bourgeois party: "Cadet opposition" parties and (2) "Right" parties. Comrade Plekhanov's attempt to ascribe to the author the idea of "one reactionary mass" is not only unfair, but positively unworthy of a socialist who wants to discuss a real issue.

"Different bourgeois parties wear different colours", says Comrade Plekhanov. We have already demonstrated that this correct idea is by no means alien to the author of the article in Kolokol, for he distinguishes between the Cadet opposition "colour" and the Right "colour". Hence the author has not transgressed against the "principles" of Social-Democratic tactics, in spite of the opinion of the carping, but clumsy, critic. But for the purpose of defining *Russian* Social-Democratic tactics *in the period* of revolution it is *not enough* to distinguish between these two "colours" of the bourgeois parties. Here indeed there is a gap in the ideas, or in the way they are set forth, in *Kolokol*, but Comrade Plekhanov did not notice it. While inventing non-existent gaps, he overlooked the real gap.

If Comrade Plekhanov had wanted to debate real issues with the Bolsheviks** and not argue for the pleasure and entertainment of the Cadet newspapers, he could not but have mentioned that it is the Bolsheviks who have long insisted that it is necessary to distinguish at least *three* main "colours" among the bourgeois parties. Herein lies one of the main differences between the *two tactics*; and Comrade

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* Comrade Plekhanov *also* forgets to put a comma here, or to leave out the word "other", i.e., *he himself makes the same* slip that he so sternly admonishes our comrade for!

** We know neither the author of the article in *Kolokol*, nor the editors, nor the trend of this Social-Democratic newspaper. We are here concerned with the general ideas underlying Plekhanov's "criticism", and not specifically with his polemics with *Kolokol*.

Plekhanov's hopes of being able to obscure this difference in political tactics by sighing like a philistine petty bourgeois over "tactlessness" are vain.

A year ago the Bolshevik pamphlet *Two Tactics** appeared abroad, and was subsequently republished in Russia. Its author maintained that the main fallacy of Menshevism as a whole was the fact that it did not understand which elements of the bourgeoisie can, together with the proletariat, carry through to the end the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. The Mensheviks even now go astray by thinking that the bourgeois revolution must be made by the "bourgeoisie" (bourgeoisie in general, irrespective of "colour"!), while it is the function of the proletariat to help it. That explains why the Mensheviks (including Plekhanov) have never been able to define, in anything like a Marxist way, *what* the "decisive victory of the present revolution" will be in the light of the political regrouping of classes, although they did not mind talking about the decisive victory, even in resolutions. The Bolsheviks' assertion that decisive victory can mean only the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was repugnant to them, but they have been unable to refute, correct, or modify it.

The Bolsheviks have asserted, and still do, that the only firm and reliable ally the proletariat can have in the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution (until that revolution wins) is the peasantry. The peasants are also "bourgeois democrats", but entirely different in "colour" from the Cadets or Octobrists. Before *these* bourgeois democrats, irrespective of what they themselves want, *history has set* aims that are genuinely revolutionary as regards the "old order" in Russia. *These bourgeois* democrats are *compelled* to fight against the *very foundations* of landlord power and the old state authority connected with it. *These* bourgeois democrats are not "compelled" by objective conditions to do their utmost to preserve the old authorities and to complete the revolution by *striking a bargain* with the old authorities. Therefore in their tendencies—which are determined by what they are *compelled* to do—*these* bourgeois democrats are *revolutionary democrats*. And the Bolsheviks defined

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

the tactics of the socialist proletariat during the bourgeois-democratic revolution as follows: the proletariat must lead the peasantry, without merging with it, against the old authorities and the old order, paralysing the instability and inconsistency of the liberal bourgeoisie, which wavers between people's freedom and the old authorities.

It is exactly these principles of the tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic proletariat in the present period that the Mensheviks have not understood. Nor has Comrade Plekhanov understood them. And it is this *concrete* question of our tactics that he is trying to evade, obscure and cover up by his arguments about slips and misprints, by his irrelevant quotations, and so forth.

Judge for yourselves. In *Kuryer*, No. 5, Plekhanov goes to the length of ascribing to the Bolsheviks the idea that "the proletariat cannot march by the side of the bourgeoisie ... this would be opportunism".

We are not dead yet, Comrade Plekhanov! Anyone who invents legends about us as if we were dead makes himself ridiculous. Even those who are only slightly familiar with *Vperyod*, *Proletary*, *Two Tactics*, *The Victory of the Cadets*, and other Bolshevik pamphlets, will see at once that Plekhanov is not speaking the truth.

For eighteen months already the Bolsheviks have been asserting that the Mensheviks' mistakes are due to their inability to distinguish between the revolutionary bourgeois democrats and all those bourgeois democrats who precisely at the present time are rapidly shedding their revolutionism. For eighteen months already the Bolsheviks have been asserting that owing to their ludicrous dread of "coming close" to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks are coming far too *close* to the Cadets, and are underrating the importance of the bourgeois democrats of the *revolutionary colour*. The Bolsheviks assert that the *opportunism* of the Mensheviks consists in their forgetting the basic interests of democracy, and consequently of *socialism*, because it cannot achieve real successes in an era of bourgeois revolution unless democracy is successful—on account of the temporary successes of liberalism, and in blind awe at the tawdry triumphs of the Zemstvo people or the Cadets.

This is what constitutes your *opportunism*, Comrade Plekhanov!

Marx taught us, exclaims Plekhanov, "to inquire what the bourgeoisie is *compelled* to do, and not what it *wants* to do".

Quite so, Comrade Plekhanov. But it is this lesson of Marx's that you forget when you take his name in vain, just as Bernstein did while undermining Marxism. You forget that the *Cadets* are "compelled" to seek a *bargain* with the old authorities, while the *peasant or revolutionary democrats* are "compelled" to wage a resolute struggle against it; or at any rate, that the Cadets are only capable of striking a bargain, whereas the peasants are also capable of waging a serious struggle. By means of *general* phrases about what the "bourgeoisie" *in general* is compelled to do, Comrade Plekhanov *obscures* the concrete issue, namely, what the "bourgeoisie" of the Cadet *colour* and the bourgeoisie of the revolutionary-democratic *colour* are compelled to do.

Now judge who is *actually* incapable of distinguishing the different colours among the *Russian* bourgeoisie in our day. Who treats the workers to scholastics, pedantry and "mummified truth", instead of pointing to the differences within bourgeois democracy that are essential precisely today?

Readers who are seriously interested in this problem should solve it not on the basis of casual impressions, but by seriously studying Social-Democratic literature and congress decisions. Compare the resolution on the State Duma adopted by the Congress with the resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks.* You will find that it is the Congress (Menshevik) resolution that *is unable* to draw a clear distinction between the peasant democrats and the Cadet democrats. On the other hand, it is just the Bolshevik resolution that stresses this distinction. The Congress resolution merely advises us to expose the inconsistency of *all* the bourgeois parties, whereas our resolution refers to the instability of the Cadets, and states that we must unite the peasant democrats against the Cadets. The Congress reso-

* See pp. 292-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

lution is quite worthless in this respect, for to expose *all* bourgeois parties is the duty of the socialists in *all* countries at *all* times. Whoever confines himself to this merely repeats Marxist phrases—like a schoolboy learning a lesson by heart—without being able to digest them and apply them to Russia. It is in the period of a bourgeois revolution that to say "expose all bourgeois parties" means saying nothing, and indeed, saying what is not true; for bourgeois parties can be seriously and thoroughly exposed only when *particular* bourgeois parties step into the foreground of *history*. Our resolution, on the other hand, distinguishes those particular "colours" that are of political importance *today*. And that is why the very first steps taken by the Duma confirmed the correctness of *our* resolution, for they clearly revealed to all the instability of the Cadets and the more revolutionary nature of the "Trudoviks".

Another example: the attitude to be taken towards the bourgeois parties. How did the Mensheviks decide this question before the Congress? With general phrases—see their draft resolution. And the Bolsheviks? They pointed to *three* types of bourgeois opposition: the Octobrists, the Cadets and the revolutionary democrats (see the Bolsheviks' draft resolution).* How did the Congress decide this question? The Mensheviks *did not dare* to submit their resolution, and *endorsed the Amsterdam resolution*! The Russian Social-Democrats in the period of a bourgeois revolution have nothing to say about the Russian bourgeoisie of different colours except to repeat what is being said in all European countries a hundred years after a bourgeois revolution!!

Is it not obvious that our esteemed Plekhanov is laying the blame at someone else's door?

Take Comrade Plekhanov's arguments about "true socialism" in Germany in the 1840s. What was the essence of this "true socialism"? First, incomprehension of the class struggle and the significance of political liberty. Second, inability to see the relative importance of the different strata of the bourgeoisie in the political struggle then being waged. Is it not ridiculous for Comrade Plekhanov to accuse *us*

* See pp. 157-58 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of this, when it is he, at the head of the Mensheviks, who is *obscuring* the fundamental—because of present conditions—difference between the Cadet oppositionist bourgeoisie and the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie?

This accusation that there is an affinity between the Bolsheviks and "true socialism" in any case deserves a good laugh. Just think of it. We have always heard a chorus of accusation that we were too inflexible and ossified, too adamant. And yet our opponents call us "Blanquists", "anarchists" and "true socialists". The Blanquists are conspirators (they have never been in favour of the general strike), they exaggerate the importance of revolutionary government. The anarchists completely repudiate all government, revolutionary or otherwise, and as against the strict organisation of the Blanquists, they advocate complete licence to disorganise. The "true socialists" are something like peaceful Lavrovists,[198] semi-uplifters, non-revolutionaries, heroes of abstruse thought and abstract sermonising. The Mensheviks could not have found a better stick with which to beat themselves than these *mutually exclusive* accusations against the Bolsheviks. Our best answer to their charges is to point to this confusion in the Mensheviks' minds.

We, on the other hand, have always said, and say, that the Mensheviks constitute the Social-Democratic Right wing, inclining towards opportunism, i.e., towards forgetting the permanent, important and fundamental interests of the proletariat for the sake of momentary interests, for the sake of seeming possibilities of "adjusting" oneself to momentary moods, situations and relations.

What do Comrade Plekhanov's present tactics come down to? To grovelling before the Cadets' successes, forgetting the very shady sides of their present conduct, disguising their reactionary character *compared with* the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, and befogging the minds of those workers and peasants who are prone to believe in "petitions" and in a toy parliament.

The Cadets are doing their utmost to appear like ordinary bourgeois democrats, to hide their disagreement with the Trudovik Group, to cover up their disagreements with the peasant democrats and to obtain support for precisely the Right, unreliable wing of the bourgeois democrats.

No matter what Comrade Plekhanov's intentions may be, all he achieves is that he is in practice supporting these reactionary strivings of the Cadets. And that is why they are so lavish in their praise of him.

Comrade Plekhanov says that as far back as 1903 (Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.) he, in controversy with the then Right wing of the Party (Akimov, Martynov and others), urged that it was necessary to support every opposition movement against the autocracy. Marx held the same opinion in 1847. And Plekhanov wants to assure his readers that the Bolsheviks have forgotten this axiom.

Comrade Plekhanov is mistaken. The general thesis that oppositions must be supported is not rejected by those who answer the concrete question whether a particular section of the opposition and revolutionary bourgeoisie should be supported at a given moment. The mistake Comrade Plekhanov makes is, first, that he substitutes an abstract consideration for a concrete historical question. And secondly, his views on bourgeois democracy in Russia are totally unhistorical. He forgets that the position of the different strata of these bourgeois democrats changes as the revolution advances. The higher the revolution rises, the faster do the least revolutionary strata of the bourgeoisie desert it. Those who do not understand this cannot explain anything at all in the course of the bourgeois revolution.

We will take two examples to illustrate the foregoing.

In 1847 Marx supported the most timid opposition of the German bourgeoisie to the German government.[199] In 1848, he ruthlessly, furiously denounced and lashed the extremely radical German Cadets—much more to the left than our Cadets—who were carrying on "constructive work" in the Frankfurt Parliament, assuring the world that this constructive work was of the greatest agitational importance, and being unable to understand that the struggle for real power was inevitable.[200] Had Marx been false to himself? Had he changed his mind? Had he slipped into Blanquism (as the Bernsteinians and the German liberal professors think)? Not in the least. *The revolution had advanced.* Not only the German "Shipovites" of 1847, but the German "Cadets" of 1848 as well had *fallen behind.* As the true guardian of the interests of the advanced class, Marx ruthlessly

flayed the stragglers, particularly the more influential among them.

In quoting Marx, Plekhanov misrepresents him.

Second example.

In 1903, and even earlier, in 1901-02, the old *Iskra* supported the "Shipovites", i.e., the timid liberal Zemstvo people of that time who, together with Mr. Struve, issued the slogan of "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo". The revolution advanced, and the Social-Democrats descended, as it were, from the opposition upper ranks of the bourgeoisie to its revolutionary lower ranks. They "badgered" the Shipovites for their vague demands for a constitution; the constitutionalists, for ignoring universal, etc., suffrage; those who accepted the latter, for not accepting the revolution, etc., always in proportion to the development, expansion and deepening of the whole democratic movement. Did the revolutionary Social-Democrats contradict themselves, if from support of the oppositionist "Shipovites" in 1901-02 they went over to support of the revolutionary peasants in 1905-06? Not in the least. They were quite consistent.

It is Comrade Plekhanov who is inconsistent, in allowing the momentary successes of the Cadets to obscure from him the loftier democratic tasks that experience is already bringing to the front.

To proceed. Here is a particularly striking example of Plekhanov's exceedingly uncritical attitude towards the Cadet Duma.

Comrade Plekhanov quotes the following passage from *Kolokol*:

"Applying these general propositions to the parliamentary workers' group, we may say that this group will express the real aspirations of the more militant and class-conscious section of the Russian proletariat, in other words, will deserve to he called a Social-Democratic group insofar as it bases its activities in the Duma on the fundamental tactical principles of Social-Democracy.

"Not to sink in the general Cadet-opposition marsh in the Duma not to trail behind the Cadet majority in it, but to oppose this majority, and to expose the narrowness of its aspirations its leanings towards compromise with the 'Right' parties and with the government—these are the only tactics worthy of representatives of the proletariat the truly Social-Democratic tactics that we must strongly recommend to the representatives of the workers in the Duma. If they pursue any

other tactics, tactics that obscure the class-consciousness of the proletariat whose representatives the members of this group consider themselves to be in the Duma, they will become hangers-on of the bourgeois parties, tools with which to hinder the proletariat in fulfilling its independent tasks in the general course of the Russian revolution."

Plekhanov comments on this as follows:

"If our Poltava comrade had to apply his general propositions to the Socialist Party in France, he would not have to make any serious changes in the last lines of his article. He could merely substitute the word 'radical' for the word 'Cadet', 'Chamber of Deputies' for 'Duma', and lastly, the phrase 'social-historical movement' for 'Russian revolution'. That is amazingly convenient."

We invite our readers to go over this passage from *Kolokol* and Plekhanov's comment once again. The latter reveals to us with rare clarity one of the causes of Plekhanov's turn towards Bernstein.

Just think. "*Kolokol*" *could merely* substitute, in the last lines of its article, the word "radical" for "Cadet" and the phrase "Chamber of Deputies" for "Duma".

This argument nails Comrade Plekhanov's fallacies to the counter. It shows how very far he is from understanding what constitutional illusions are, and hence from understanding the present situation in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

Plekhanov has lost sight of the *fundamental* difference between the Russian Cadets and the Russian Duma, and the French radicals and the French Chamber of Deputies, between the relations of the former and those of the latter. He has overlooked a *very short phrase* in the *Kolokol* article, a very short but very characteristic and notable one. That phrase is: "*compromise with the government*".

Think of it, Comrade Plekhanov. Can there be any talk in France about a "compromise" between the Chamber of Deputies and the government? No. Why? Because in France, in all things that matter, the government is subordinate to the Chamber. The majority in the Chamber is itself the actual *government*, for it appoints to the Ministry the men it desires. *By* securing a majority in the Chamber, the radicals *become* the government. Today the alignment of parliamentary forces corresponds, more or less, to the alignment of real forces among the people, and to the attitude

of the state to the people. Today the written Constitution does not to any extent diverge from the actual Constitution, from the alignment of forces.

In Russia there can *and must* be talk about an agreement between the majority in the Duma and the government. Why? Because in our country real power belongs, in law and in fact, *not at all to the Duma*, but to the old autocratic government. Unlike the Chamber of Deputies, the Duma is not an organ of state power, but merely an instrument for the presentation of the petitions, requests and demands of a section of the people to the old authorities. Therefore the majority in the Duma can "enter into an agreement" with the government; for France this would be an absurdity. The alignment of parliamentary forces does not in the least correspond either to the alignment of real forces in the country or to the relations between the state and the people.

In France the actual class struggle is being waged between the forces that are represented in the Chamber, and even the proportion in which these forces are represented corresponds, more or less, to their present relative "fighting strength".

In Russia the actual struggle is *not being waged at all between the forces* that are represented in the Duma, and their representation in the Duma is just now very distinctly and fundamentally out of proportion to their present relative "fighting strength". The real government of Russia is hardly represented in the Duma at all: it has other "institutions". The proletariat, too, is hardly represented, while the peasantry is very poorly represented in proportion to its numbers.

Comrade Plekhanov's attempt to draw a parallel between Russia and France shows that he is entirely immersed in constitutional illusions. He takes the name (parliament, chamber) for the object; the label for the contents. That is why he completely loses sight of all the more important special features of the present situation in Russia, when a struggle is maturing between the "people"—which is least represented in the Duma—and the old authorities, and the role of the "compromisers", of deserters in this struggle, *is becoming* particularly important and particularly *dangerous*.

Just as Bernstein in 1899 did an enormous amount of harm to the German proletariat by taking the petty-bourgeois intellectual "compromisers" (the social-liberals who were trying to reconcile the proletariat with the bourgeoisie) for the actual bourgeoisie that was wielding real power, so Plekhanov in 1906 is doing enormous harm to the Russian proletariat by taking the semi-reactionary bourgeois "compromisers" (the Cadets, who are trying to reconcile people's freedom with the old authorities) for an independent political force in the state, for an authority which it is possible and worth while to support.

Bernstein, in appealing for "tactfulness" towards the social-liberals, in appealing for support for them and pleading that they should not be pushed into the camp of reaction, appealed for support for a *fiction*. He was chasing the *shadow* of social peace and was oblivious of the fundamental tasks of the struggle for power.

Plekhanov, in appealing for "tactfulness" towards the Cadets, in appealing for support for them and pleading that they should not be pushed into the camp of reaction, is appealing for support for a *fiction*. He is chasing the *shadow* of parliamentarism (in the period of a bourgeois, not a socialist revolution) *and is oblivious of the fundamental tasks of the struggle for power*.

The social-liberal, Cadet bourgeoisie is carrying both Bernstein and Plekhanov shoulder-high, praising them to the skies, advertising them, reprinting their writings *for the services* they are rendering it in its struggle against the proletariat.

Make no mistake about it, workers. These phrases about Social-Democrats having to be "tactful" and about "supporting" the Cadets have a *specific* meaning in real politics, a meaning that is determined *by the actual alignment of forces* and not by Plekhanov's good intentions. It may not have been Plekhanov's intention to allay or blunt political and social antagonisms between the classes, and between the people and the old authorities; he may assure other people that he had no such intention; but in the present political situation this is *precisely the effect* of his arguments, whether he wanted it or not.

Bernstein was not striving for social peace (or so he said);

but the bourgeoisie rightly understood that this is what his arguments implied. And look at the Cadet press here in Russia. It is praising Plekhanov and, regardless of his wishes, is drawing its *own deductions* from what he says. In yesterday's *Duma* (No. 22), Mr. Kotlyarevsky argued that all "*class* struggle and class hatred" were an obstacle to the cause of national liberation. He drew a parallel between the struggle that *Volna* is conducting and the struggle of the Guesdists against the Jaurèsists, of Ferri against Turati, and of Kautsky against Bernstein. He expressed fear that "this preaching of class hatred that is now making itself heard in Russia, by undermining the solidarity of the various social groups that is so essential for joint political action, may cut away [mark this!] the ground for the activities of any sort of properly constituted popular representative body". "Is not this [class hatred] sapping the very spirit of constitutionalism?"

In today's *Svoboda i Kultura*[201] (No. 7), Mr. Struve bewails the fact that the Social-Democrats "are throwing liberty to be rent asunder by the *furies of class strife*", that they have "a biassed and morbid craze for the *ideas of the class struggle*" (p. 458), that "*political peace* [recall the words "social peace" uttered by the European bourgeoisie!] is making entirely new claims upon us" (p. 514?. The bourgeoisie understands perfectly well that Plekhanov's ideas foster false hopes of "political peace" and in practice serve to blunt all class strife and all class struggle. Like the bird in the fable, Comrade Plekhanov was caught in the snare by only one tiny claw, but the whole "birdie" now finds itself entirely in Mr. Struve's cage, so far as present-day politics are concerned.

"Abuse is not criticism," writes Comrade Plekhanov. "Criticism really develops the mind, whereas abuse obscures it. Take the abusive term 'treachery'. We shout so often about the treachery of the bourgeoisie that when it does 'betray', that is, when it makes peace with the bureaucracy, and it becomes really necessary for us to shout about this from the house-tops, our cries will no longer have the desired effect, and we shall meet with the same fate as the boy who shouted, 'Wolf! Wolf!', when there was no wolf."

What a beautiful specimen of Russian Bernsteinianism is this little fragment of Plekhanov's reasoning!

First, see how clear it is that Comrade Plekhanov has not a leg to stand on. In November 1905, he wrote in *Dnevnik*, No. 3: "... we have had a lot of shouting lately about the bourgeoisie having betrayed *something or other* [!]. But what can the bourgeoisie have betrayed? At all events, not the revolution, for it has never served the idea of revolution."

As you see, in November 1905 Comrade Plekhanov did not even understand what the bourgeoisie *could* betray. Now he does. He not only believes that the bourgeoisie *can* betray something, but holds that it *actually will betray*. Within six months Comrade Plekhanov has changed his mind. First he said that the bourgeoisie could not betray anything. Now he says that it actually will betray, that is, will make peace with the bureaucracy.

We should have been very pleased with Comrade Plekhanov's progress, had his views in other respects not remained just as changeable. Treachery is an abusive term, he says. This opinion is not new. It is the opinion held by every liberal bourgeois. The Cadets are dinning into the ears of the Russian public in thousands of newspaper articles that this talk about the "treachery" of the bourgeoisie is merely the abusive language of the "wild" Bolsheviks. Now the bourgeoisie has found a new ally on this issue. Comrade Plekhanov has also become convinced that "treachery" is an "abusive term".

Just as it was necessary at one time to repeat and reiterate the ABC of Marxism to counter Bernstein, so it is necessary to do so now to counter Plekhanov. He is greatly mistaken. "Treachery" is not "an abusive term"; it is the only scientifically and politically correct term with which to express the actual facts about, and the actual aspirations of, the bourgeoisie. The word "treachery" expresses the same idea as the phrase "striking a bargain". Plekhanov himself cannot help admitting this, for he identifies treachery with reconciliation with the bureaucracy. And now see what the "wild" *Volna* has said about the phrase "striking a bargain".

"But what, in substance, are the bargains struck by the Cadets?" we read in *Volna*, No. 13. "*Not personal acts of*

treachery, of course. Such a crude opinion is utterly alien to Marxism. The substance of the bargains is (and is only) that the Cadets don't abandon, and don't want to abandon, their stand for preserving the old regime and for obeying the commands of this regime."*

Thus the essence of treachery, or of striking bargains, is not personal acts of treachery. Treachery, or striking bargains, *only* means that the party of "people's" (read "bourgeois") freedom is striving to keep the old autocracy in power, to induce it to *share* power with the bourgeoisie.

The party of "people's freedom" is betraying people's freedom just because it is surrendering a large share of the people's rights and the people's power to the representatives of the *old authorities*. Comrade Plekhanov's unwillingness to understand this simple truth is quite monstrous. He is making out that the bourgeoisie in Russia has not *yet* betrayed anything, that it will do so only in the future.

This is total incomprehension of the very essence of treachery and bargains.

The bourgeoisie and the Cadets have betrayed freedom and *made peace with* the bureaucracy *a thousand times*. What is the programme of the Constitutional-Democratic Party? Does it represent a certain political step taken by the bourgeoisie? Undoubtedly it does. But this programme is precisely a programme of treachery, of striking bargains! And *every* political step the Cadets take is, in one way or another, a step in the fulfilment of *this* programme. Trubetskoi's[202] speech in the summer of 1905, the Cadets' hedging on the issue of the four-point system and the Draconian Freedom of the Press Bill, are all steps taken by the liberal bourgeoisie in fulfilment of this programme of treachery.

As Comrade Plekhanov sees it, the bourgeoisie cannot be accused of treachery unless it takes some new *special* step. This is not true. If the bourgeoisie, and the Cadets in particular, continue doing what they have been doing so far, *the sum-total of all their actions will produce the most complete picture of treachery*. The essence of present-day

* See p. 405 of this volume.—*Ed*.

Social-Democratic opportunism is precisely failure to understand this.

If the philistine dreams of the Cadets come true, if the "peaceful pressure" of the Duma and of "public opinion" compels the government to make minor concessions, if the Council of State is prepared to yield a little—as it is advised to do by Mr. Khomyakov, a member of the Council, whose plans the Cadet newspaper *Duma* reported yesterday—if the old government reorganises the Ministry and gives several comfortable seats in it to the Right Cadets, and so forth, the result, in the long run, will be *precisely* "reconciliation" between the Cadets and the bureaucracy. The sum and substance of Plekhanov's mistake is that he thinks that the path of "treachery" is, or will be, a "new" path for our bourgeoisie, whereas it is really a continuation of its old path that constitutes the "*corpus delicti*" of its treachery, to use a legal term.

When the bourgeoisie does "actually" betray, says Plekhanov, nobody will believe us when we raise a cry about it, because everybody will have become too accustomed to the word "treachery".

What infinite political naïveté The whole policy of Social-Democracy is to *light up* the path that *lies ahead before the masses* of the people. We hold aloft the torch of Marxism and show, by every step the various classes take, by every political and economic event, that life *confirms* our doctrines. As capitalism develops, and as the political struggle becomes more acute, larger and larger sections of the people become convinced by what we say and by this factual (or historical) *confirmation* of what we say. At present, let us say, hundreds of thousands of men and women in Russia are convinced that our appraisal of the Cadets is correct. If the revolution develops fast, or takes a sharp turn towards an important deal between the Cadets and the autocracy, millions and even tens of millions will be convinced that we are right.

Therefore it is the greatest absurdity to say that later on people will not believe us when we raise a cry about treachery, because we are shouting about it *too often* now. Comrade Plekhanov is vainly trying to cover up this absurdity by arguments that elderly spinsters, *dames de classe* and

the like, usually produce for the benefit of high-school girls. "Criticism must be well founded," he tells us for our edification.

Both new and clever. Your criticism too, Comrade Plekhanov, should be well founded. As it happens, you *do not quote* a single *fact*, or a single important example, to prove that our criticism of the Cadets is unfounded; by your general arguments, however, you have sown a number of *unfounded* opinions in the minds of your readers! Just imagine, you are reducing the concept of "treachery" to that of a term of abuse!

Then there is this sentence. "In our ranks, the realisation of this antithesis [the antithesis of the interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat] has acquired, one may say, the *rigidity of a prejudice*." What do you mean by "our ranks", Comrade Plekhanov? The ranks of the Russian philistines in Geneva? Or of the members of our Party, in general? But should not the broad ranks of the masses of the people also be borne in mind?

As a worker aptly remarked in *Prizyv*,[203] Plekhanov judges "*from afar*". The masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians have as yet no idea of either this general antithesis or the bourgeois character of the Cadets. The Cadet press just now is probably ten times as large as the Social-Democratic press. The Cadets are also steadily corrupting the minds of the people through the Cadet Duma and through all sorts of liberal institutions. One must indeed have lost all sense of reality to imagine that we are *running ahead* of events and of the needs of the masses by exposing the instability and treachery of the Cadets. On the contrary, in this matter we are *lagging behind* events and the needs of the masses! It would be far better, Comrade Plekhanov, if you wrote a popular and "well-founded" criticism of the Cadets: that would be more useful.

Let us now examine Plekhanov's deductions concerning the Duma.

"Our government has already committed many unpardonable blunders," he writes. "These blunders have brought it to the brink of an abyss, but they have not yet pushed it into the abyss. *It will fall into the abyss when the Duma is dispersed*.... The Duma is rousing even the most somnolent;

it is pushing forward even the most backward; it is dispelling from the minds of the masses the last political illusions bequeathed by history.... The organic work of the Duma will have the most agitational effect."

Examine these arguments closely. The government will fall when the Duma is dispersed. Let us admit this for argument's sake. But why assume that the Duma will be dispersed if it engages solely in organic work? What is organic work? The work the Duma does within the law. The Duma submits Bills to the Council of State and interpellates the Ministers. The Council of State and the Ministers procrastinate and, as far as possible, smooth out all the conflicts that arise. *Russkoye Gosudarstvo*, the mouthpiece of the Russian Government, long ago said: let the Duma be an opposition Duma, but not a revolutionary one. In other words: you may engage in organic work, but not a single step beyond that!

What sense would there be in dissolving the Duma for doing organic work?? *And it never will be dissolved* if it never takes a revolutionary, quite non-organic step, or if no movement flares up outside the Duma that will convert even a Cadet Duma into an obstacle to the government. We think that there are far more reasons for such an assumption than for the bare statement that "the Duma will be dispersed".

The dissolution of the Duma is not the only cause likely to bring about the fall of the government. The government may fall for other reasons; for the Duma is by no means the *chief* factor, nor the surest index of the movement. It will not fall of itself, but as a result of the vigorous action—of a third force (neither the government, nor the Duma). It is the duty of the Social-Democrats to explain that this action is inevitable; to explain the forms it is likely to assume, the character and class composition of the forces capable of carrying out such an "action"; to explain the conditions under which it can be successful, and so on and so forth. It is the Cadets, however, who are relentlessly fighting the Social-Democrats for doing this. Therefore one of the conditions for success in this work, and a guarantee that the masses will sympathise with it, is that the Cadets must be discredited.

Whoever talks about the government "falling" into the abyss and yet says that it is inopportune to criticise the Cadets and to accuse them of treachery, is utterly inconsistent. If I wanted to copy Plekhanov's style, I would say: falling "into the abyss" is merely a figure of speech, it is a revolutionary *phrase*. Into whose hands will power pass? Can the workers and peasants permit power to pass to the Cadets, who would at once share it with the old autocracy? Is it not, therefore, particularly necessary to *warn* the people against the Cadets?

We think it is. We think that Plekhanov's opportunism, his absolutely groundless opposition to tactics which expose the true nature of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, is hampering and damaging this necessary work of enlightening the masses about the Cadets.

In saying that constructive work in the Duma will have the most agitational effect, Plekhanov shows that he takes an extremely one-sided view of things. As we have already pointed out in *Volna*, the Mensheviks themselves put Plekhanov right on this point when they quite justifiably ridicule the prospect of the Duma "piling up a heap of laws".* So far Russia has been the country with the largest number of paper police laws. If the Duma spends all its time on "constructive" work, Russia will soon become the country with the largest number of paper radical laws. It is the greatest pedantry to imagine that the agitational effect of these laws or Bills will be in direct proportion to their length and number. To think so, one must have forgotten the example of the Frankfurt Parliament, which very zealously engaged in "constructive work" and, as Plekhanov does now, imagined that it was constructive work that had the most agitational effect. To think so, one must be blind to what is already going on in Russia; one must be blind to the signs that the public is growing weary of the endless blather of Cadet speeches in the Duma, blind to the impression that is being created by the Cadets' "Draconian" Bills and their lame excuses in justifying themselves for introducing them; one must be blind to the Cadets' infinitely loathsome, philistine fear of the new wave that is approaching, of the in

* See pp. 450-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

evitable new struggle, of what Plekhanov has called "falling into the abyss". Exposing the Cadets, Comrade Plekhanov, means preparing the minds of the masses of the people for this fall, preparing them to take an active part in bringing it about, to *keep the Cadets away* from the government "pie" when the fall comes; it means making bold and vigorous preparations for it.

The Duma is rousing the people; the Duma is dispelling the last illusions, we are told. True. But the "Duma" is doing this only to the extent that *we* are exposing the timidity and instability of the *Cadet* Duma, only to the extent that *we* are explaining the facts about the Duma that indicate the dispelling of illusions. The Cadets are not doing this. They are trying to counteract it. They are spreading constitutional illusions. Zubatovism also roused the workers, also exposed illusions; but it did this only to the extent that we combated the corruption of the minds of the people by Zubatovism. And let no one try to attempt to refute this argument by stating that the Duma is not Zubatovism. Comparing things does not mean identifying them. Show me a Cadet newspaper, or an important political statement by the Cadets, which does not contain elements of the political *corruption* of the minds of the people.

That is what Comrade Plekhanov forgets when he declares majestically and portentously: "This is the meaning of all philosophy: all that contributes to the political education of the people is good; all that hinders it is bad." Everything else is prejudice, scholasticism.

Yes, yes, a certain wing of Social-Democracy is indeed slipping into hopeless scholasticism. But which wing, the Right or the Left? Can one imagine anything more pedantic, lifeless and truly scholastic than reducing the tactics of the proletariat in a period of revolution to the task of politically educating the people? Where, then, is the borderline between the Social-Democratic class struggle and the struggle of a common or garden bourgeois "uplifter"? Revolution is in full swing, different classes are coming to the forefront, the masses have set about making history, bourgeois parties of different shades are arising, the complicated political crisis is becoming more acute, the struggle is entering a new stage for which the ground was prepared by

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the unusually rich crop of events and experience of 1905—and all this is reduced to one thing: the political education of the people! Truly, our *dame de classe* has made a brilliant discovery. Truly, a wonderful "key" to all the concrete problems of politics and, moreover, a key that any Cadet, and even the Party of Democratic Reforms, and even Heyden, would accept in full, would clutch at with both hands. Yes, this is exactly the "broad" criterion we need, this is what will rally and unite the classes, and not sow hatred and strife. Precisely! Bravo, Plekhanov—say all these good people. This is the "solution" that will certainly obscure, or force into the background, that new "period of madness", the new "whirlwind" which the bourgeois dreads so much. No whirlwinds—then no cataclysms, Comrade Plekhanov, be consistent: no abysses either! The political education of the people—that is our banner, that is the meaning of all philosophy!

Comrade Plekhanov has wholly and completely taken on the likeness of that average German Cadet in the Frankfurt Parliament. Oh, how many matchless speeches these windbags delivered on the political consciousness of the people! How many magnificent "constructive" laws they drafted for this purpose! And how nobly they protested when they were dispersed *after* they had bored the people to death and had lost all revolutionary importance.

We are told that the Russian revolution goes deeper, its tide is rising, it will not be stopped at the dam of the Cadet Duma, Cadet phrase-mongering, Cadet timidity, and Cadet Draconian Bills. Yes, gentlemen, that is absolutely true: the Russian revolution is broader, mightier and deeper. Its tide is rising. It is sweeping on over the Cadets. And we revolutionary Social-Democrats express this deeper movement, we are striving to explain this loftier task to the workers and peasants, we are helping them, as best we can, to rise above the Cadet dam.

Vperyod, No. 1, May 26, 1906
Signed: *N. L.*

Published according to the *Vperyod* text

RESOLUTION (II) OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON THE ATTITUDE[204]

The autocratic government is treating the representatives the people of Russia have sent to the State Duma with coarse mockery and scorn. It rejects every declaration of the Duma that in any way expresses the needs and demands, of the people, and persists in its policy of murder and violence.

The Duma is powerless. It is powerless not only because it lacks the bayonets and machine guns that the government has at its command, but also because, as a whole, it is not revolutionary, and is incapable of waging a resolute struggle. The liberal parties in the Duma only inadequately and timidly back the strivings of the people; they are more concerned to allay and weaken the revolutionary struggle now proceeding than to destroy the people's enemy. Apart from the workers' deputies, the Trudovik Group is the only group that shows any inclination openly and boldly to proclaim the demands of the people; but it too is still being handicapped by the influence of the liberal parties and by its lack of independence in relation to them.

We call upon the Trudovik Group to pursue a more resolute and consistent policy. We call upon it to demand that the Duma shall make a direct and public appeal to the people; and if the majority in the Duma refuses to make such an appeal independently, the Trudovik Group should tell the people *the whole truth* that the Duma is powerless, that land and freedom cannot be expected from it, that obviously the people must take these themselves, and that

events are marching towards a decisive struggle outside the Duma.

The Trudovik Group should declare that the old authorities can be overthrown only by *joint* militant actions of the workers and peasants, that they must prepare and organise for these actions pending the arrival of the decisive moment for a revolutionary uprising. Until that moment comes, the people must collect and husband their forces and not fritter them away in fruitless minor struggles; they must not allow the government to provoke them to untimely action.

If the Trudovik Group does all this, it will perform its duty to the people; and then only will it be able, side by side with the revolutionary organisation of the proletariat, to take its place at the head of the great people's movement which will smash the old chains that are fettering the development of society.

Published as a leaflet
by the St. Petersburg Committee
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Published according
to the leaflet text

THE SLOGAN OF A DUMA MINISTRY

The documents reproduced above reveal an extremely important controversy in the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party. This controversy is important for two reasons.

First, the right of every autonomous Party organisation to adopt its own independent resolution, and not merely to subscribe to the resolutions of the Central Committee, is absolutely indisputable—if one regards it from the formal point of view.

That the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee does not contradict any of the decisions of the Unity Congress is obvious. It is, indeed, the duty of the local organisations to work out independently—within the framework of the Congress resolutions—their own directives.

Secondly, on the point at issue, the Central Committee's resolution is obviously unsatisfactory and *contradicts the decision of the Congress*. This resolution does not contain a single word to explain what is meant by "the Duma is useless", nor does it widen and sharpen the conflicts within the Duma. The resolution proposes a slogan ("substitute for the present Ministry a Ministry appointed by the Duma") which *does not in the least follow from the resolution of the Congress*. This slogan is ambiguous. It confuses the minds of the proletariat. For the Cadets use the demand for a Duma Ministry as a screen to hide their desire to strike a bargain with the autocratic government and to weaken the revolution, to hamper the convocation of a constituent assembly.

We propose to go into this resolution in greater detail on another occasion*; in the meantime we invite all members of the Party to pay the closest attention to the extremely important controversy in the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Vperyod, No. 2, May 27, 1906

Published according to the *Vperyod* text

* See pp. 500-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

The political situation is clearing up at a rate that is truly gratifying. It is good to be alive at a time when the masses begin to stir with political life. All the main social groups in Russia today have already, in one way or another, taken the path of open and mass political action. Open action relentlessly reveals the basic differences of the interests involved. The parties are seen in their true colours. Events, with an iron hand, sort out the adherents of the various classes and make them decide who is on one side and who is on the other.

In the Duma, these fundamental differences of class interests which are bringing about political realignment show themselves much more dimly and obscurely than they do among the masses of the people. In the Duma there is for this purpose the Constitutional-Democratic Party, whose particular function is, by fair means or foul, to rub off the sharp edges, blunt acute antagonisms, subdue the clashes of struggle that break out here and there. But among the "masses" the ferment is rising. Again the proletarians, the peasants, the soldiers, the railwaymen are stirring in all their mass strength. The strike movement is growing and assuming new forms ("striking by turn", one industry after the other—we shall deal with this form of strike another time). The direct struggle of the peasants for land is becoming more intense. Reports of the awakening of the downtrodden soldiers and sailors are coming in more often. The railwaymen are beginning to "recover". Something fresh and new is moving, rumbling, fermenting and heaving everywhere. New shoots are forcing their way up out of the heaps of ruins.

And although the Cadets are trying to close the shutters of the Taurida Palace as tightly as they possibly can, they cannot keep out the fresh breeze of life that is blowing. Even there the process of class differentiation and political clarification is going on. The Cadets still dominate the Trudoviks. They are still celebrating their recent victory in blocking the Trudovik motion for the immediate enactment of a law abolishing capital punishment, and in compelling them to withdraw their motion for the immediate establishment of land committees, local, freely elected committees for settling the land question.

But the very fact that the Cadets are compelled to fight more and more frequently to maintain their supremacy in the Duma clearly shows that there is some profound difference between them and the Trudoviks. The more frequent and sharp these collisions become, the more definitely the masses of the people see the difference between the liberal landlords, factory owners, lawyers and professors—and the peasants. The peasants are striving heart and soul for freedom for the people, and that is why they cannot live in harmony with the party of "people's freedom". The peasants are striving to obtain land and freedom, and this striving of theirs alone is enough to burst at the seams the vaunted love for the people of the vaunted party of "people's freedom".

The Cadets are still defeating the Trudoviks, but their victories either result in real trouble for their party, or expose their true "nature" with a thoroughness that gladdens the heart of the proletariat.

The first incident occurred over the Cadets' Draconian Freedom of the Press Bill. They wriggle and twist to justify themselves, but their miserable efforts only worsen the tangle in which they are caught. They have admitted that they made a "mistake" in publishing a "rough draft", but to this day they have been unable publicly to rectify the mistake or produce a finished draft.

The second incident was in connection with the local land committees.[205] The open political struggle immediately united all the "Lefts", i.e., the Trudoviks and the Social-Democratic proletariat, against the Cadets. The Mensheviks agreed with the Bolsheviks in their appraisal of the Cadets'

true intentions: to betray the revolution, extinguish the revolution with the aid of "bureaucratic" schemes, by *uniting the bureaucrats and the liberals against the peasants*. The issue became clear: should the bureaucrats and the liberal landlords submit to the tens of millions of peasants, or should these tens of millions submit to a handful of bureaucrats and liberals? The whole working class, all the Social-Democratic representatives of the proletariat, to a man took the side of the peasants against the bureaucrats and the liberals. The Cadets discredited themselves splendidly. We compelled them to admit in public that *they do not want to give the peasants complete freedom and all the land*, and that *they seek the aid of the bureaucrats against the peasants*. One side said: the peasants must certainly predominate in the local land committees; the peasants number tens of millions while the bureaucrats and the landlords number hundreds of thousands. The other side replied: the landlords and the peasants must be equally represented, while the bureaucrats will participate and "supervise".

The proletariat and the politically-conscious peasants on one side and the bureaucrats and the Cadets on the other—this is the alignment that experience is dictating in the present, immediately impending, struggle.

All praise to you, Cadet statesmen! All praise to you, writers for *Rech* and *Duma*! You are helping us revolutionary Social-Democrats immensely to explain unvarnished political reality to the people! You are helping us both with your theories and with your deeds.

In your theories, you *have* to go further and further. You state the issue very well today: it is all a matter "of a fundamental difference of opinion" (*Rech*, No. 84). "Some say the Duma is only a 'stage in the revolution',* while others say the Duma is a means of consolidating the constitutional system on a broad democratic basis."

Excellent, admirable, gentlemen who write for *Rech*! Quite true: we have before us *two* fundamentally different opinions. Either the Duma is a stage in the revolution, or it is an instrument for securing an agreement between the

* The resolution of the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. says: "instrument of the revolution".

bureaucrats and the Cadets against the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry. What, you don't like this paraphrase? You protest? You are joking! Have you not completely shown your hand on the question of the local land committees? Is there anybody so foolish as not to understand that "a broad democratic basis" is a screen for *as equal* a representation of peasants and liberals *as possible*, with the Goremykins or other bureaucrats *participating and having the right to supervise*?

And whoever remains deaf to all the Cadets' phrases, speeches, declarations and theories will be enlightened tomorrow by their *deeds*. Nor is that a long way off. We can only say to the party of "people's freedom": "That thou doest, do quickly!"

As for what it is doing, this is evident from what follows.

Our government's change of policy is being zealously discussed in the newspapers. The French bankers are not lending any more money: they refuse to pay the next instalments. *Le Temps*, the most influential French capitalist newspaper, is strongly advising the Russian Government to make concessions to the Cadets. Witte and Durnovo have gone abroad to try to talk over the French bankers. But it doesn't come off. The bankers won't believe them. Trepov is busily discussing the question of the composition of a new Ministry. Kokovtsov, or some other bureaucrat, is contemplated as Prime Minister. Certain Right Cadets are contemplated as Ministers.

We shall probably be told that this is all newspaper gossip. Perhaps it is, but it may well contain a particle of truth. There is no smoke without fire. *Novoye Vremya* has long been known as a weathercock. Its ability to keep its nose to the wind and to obey orders from above has been proved for decades. And this newspaper has been obviously changing front during the past few days. Instead of a continuous torrent of abuse of the Cadets, we now read in its columns the most fervent appeals to the government to make concessions to the Cadets and *to form a Cadet Ministry*. But perhaps the Cadets are indignant about the lies *Novoye Vremya* is telling? Not in the least. *Rech* has already *quoted* "*Novoye Vremya*" *twice* on this question (in Nos. 82 and 84) without a word of protest, with obvious

satisfaction, merely regretting now and again the echoes of the past that one still finds in that same *Novoye Vremya*.

And so, it is possible that we are on the eve of a Cadet Ministry headed by someone like Kokovtsov. The evening papers today even report that the Goremykin Ministry resigned yesterday. Again we shall say to the party of "people's freedom": "That thou doest, do quickly!" Nothing would serve to clear up the present political situation as fully and finally as the appointment of a Cadet Ministry by the supreme authority. This will help to dispel the last short-sighted hopes pinned on the Cadets; then all the "Lefts" will finally unite for real political action; then all the arguments about supporting the Duma and a Duma Ministry will cease; and the political alignment that is now taking shape will become an actual fact, and the basis of a new "stage".

Incidentally, this "stage" will come even if a Cadet Ministry is not appointed. We are "well shod on all four hoofs", gentlemen of the Cadet Party!

Written on May 27 (June 9), 1906

Published in *Vperyod*, No. 3, May 28, 1906

Published according to the newspaper text

THE TACTICS OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE TASKS OF THE MOMENT

The report we published the other day of the resignation of the Goremykin Ministry is officially denied. But the newspapers which have some access to "reliable" sources of information do not believe this denial. The *Novoye Vremya* campaign in favour of a Cadet Ministry is now more cautious, but is going on. *Novoye Vremya* has discovered a Japanese diplomat who believes that "the Cadet Party is pursuing state aims". It even assures its readers, in an article by Mr. Rozanov, that "the Cadets will not relinquish civilisation even for the revolution", and that "this is all that can be expected at the moment". *Rech* believes that "the resignation of the Goremykin Cabinet can be considered a foregone conclusion, and the only question is, who is to be its successor". In short, the question of a Cadet Ministry is still on the order of the day.

The Cadets realise this, and perhaps something more. They have come to a dead stop and are "standing rigid" like setters. They are clutching with both hands at even the shadow of support from the left that would help them to execute their plans. It is significant that *Rech*, the chief organ of the Cadet Party, devoted the leading article in its last issue to the question of the Social-Democrats' attitude towards the idea of a Cadet Ministry. We publish elsewhere the full text of that article as a most instructive sign of the times.

The authors of the article sum up their main idea as follows: to create "common ground on which the liberation movement could take its stand with complete unanimity, *without distinction of shades*". This, in fact, is the principal

aim of the Cadets' entire policy. Moreover, this, in fact, is the principal aim of all the liberal-bourgeois policy in the Russian revolution in general. To eliminate the "different shades" in the liberation movement means eliminating the difference in the democratic demands of the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the proletariat. It means recognising with "complete unanimity" the liberal bourgeoisie as the medium of expression and champion of the aspirations of the whole liberation movement. It means converting the proletariat into a blind tool of the liberal bourgeoisie. But since everybody knows that the supreme political ideal of the liberal bourgeoisie—dictated by its most profound class interests—is a deal with the old authority, we may formulate our last thesis differently. We can say that the bourgeois *Rech* wants to convert the proletariat into a blind accessory to the deal that the liberals want to make with the old authority. But the main target against which this deal will be directed will be the proletariat, and the next, of course, the revolutionary peasantry.

This is what a Cadet Ministry really means. The recent conflict in the State Duma over the question of instituting local land committees threw a glaring light on Cadet policy. The committees should have been the local authority, while the Ministry is to be the central authority; but in substance the Cadets' policy remains unchanged, always and everywhere. They are opposed to the election of local committees by universal suffrage: they are in favour of "equal representation of the landlords and the peasants, under the supervision of the old authorities". They have been *compelled* to admit this, against their own will, because for a long time they *concealed the truth*, tried to befog the issue and asserted that, "in general", they were wholeheartedly in favour both of local land committees and of universal suffrage. Similarly, the Cadets are opposed to the convocation of a constituent assembly: they are in favour of a Cadet Ministry to be appointed by the supreme authority. Such a Ministry, as the instrument of central authority, will be quite on a par with local committees established on the vaunted principle of equal representation, etc.

The tactics the proletariat must adopt in face of this Cadet policy are clear. The proletariat must ruthlessly expose

the true meaning of this policy, tolerating no ambiguities, no attempts to obscure the political consciousness of the workers and peasants. The proletariat must fully use all the vacillations in the policy of the "powers that be" and of the would-be "sharers of power" to enlarge and strengthen *its own* class organisation, and to strengthen its contacts with the revolutionary peasantry as the only class that is capable of carrying the liberation movement *beyond* the Cadet "dam", beyond a Cadet deal with the old authorities.

But should not the proletariat *support* the demand of the liberal bourgeoisie that the supreme authority should appoint a Cadet Ministry? Is it not the duty of the proletariat to do so since the appointment of a Cadet Ministry would facilitate the struggle for freedom and for socialism?

No, such a step would be a gross mistake, and *betrayal* of the interests of the proletariat. It would mean sacrificing the fundamental interests of the proletariat in the revolution for the sake of a momentary success. It would mean chasing a shadow and advising the proletariat to "lay down its arms", without even the slightest *real* guarantee that its struggle will *really* be facilitated. It would be the worst kind of opportunism.

The appointment of a Cadet Ministry by the supreme authority will not shake the foundations of the old authorities in the least. It will not necessarily change the real alignment of forces in favour of the truly revolutionary classes. Such a "reform" will not eliminate the struggle between the people and the old authorities in the least. There have been cases in the history of revolutions where such liberal Ministries appointed by the old authorities (for example, in Germany in 1848) served only as a screen for autocracy, and did more to stamp out the revolution than many a bureaucratic Ministry.

The Russian proletariat has no reason to fear a Cadet Ministry, which, at all events, will help the people to realise the true nature of the Cadets; but it must under no circumstances support the appointment of such a Ministry, for, in essence, this is a most ambiguous, sinister and treacherous measure.

Since the Duma was not swept away, it was to the proletariat's advantage that the Cadets obtained a majority in

the elections. They will "exhaust" themselves much sooner than they would have done had they been in the minority. But the proletariat refused to render the Cadets any support during the elections, and the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. endorsed this decision by prohibiting all blocs (agreements, alliances) with other parties. A Cadet Ministry will be to the proletariat's advantage *in the sense* that, if one were formed, the Cadets would the sooner "spend" themselves, become "played out", "winded", and reveal themselves in their true colours. But the proletariat will never support a *deal* between the bourgeoisie and Trepov for the purpose of carving up the people's freedom.

The only real way of "supporting" the liberation movement and really developing it is to stimulate the growth of the political and industrial organisations of the proletariat and to strengthen its ties with the revolutionary peasantry. This alone will really sap the strength of the old authority and prepare for its downfall. The bargaining of the Cadets is a dubious game. It would be both useless to support it, with a view to achieving some truly lasting gains for the revolution, and harmful to do so, because of the effect it would have on the development of the political consciousness, solidarity and organisation of the revolutionary classes.

Vperyod, No. 4, May 30, 1906

Published according to the *Vperyod* text

THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ON THE CADETS

The liberal-bourgeois press throughout Russia is doing its utmost to convince its readers that the Russian Social-Democratic "Bolsheviks" have nothing in common with international Social-Democracy. They are anarchists, if you please, rebels, conspirators. They still have a lot to learn from the German Social-Democrats. They ought to recognise that the "parliamentary" path is the main path, as the German Social-Democrats have done. This and similar stuff can be read in the columns of dozens of Cadet newspapers.

The open political struggle is still a novelty for the Russian public. The Russian public does not yet know that it is the common trick of *the bourgeoisie in all countries* to assert that the socialists in their particular countries are rascals, rebels, and so forth, whereas the socialists in neighbouring countries are "reasonable" people. The French bourgeoisie abuses Jaurès and praises Bebel. The German bourgeoisie abuses Bebel and praises Jaurès. The Russian bourgeoisie abuses the Russian Social-Democrats and praises the German Social-Democrats. It is an old, old trick!

But here are the facts. *Vorwärts* (*Forward*), the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party—which we get very rarely, thanks to the "zeal" of the Russian police censors—recently published two articles entitled "The Duma and the Cadets". The editors not only published these "Letters from Russia" as leading articles, but even wrote a comment, stating that they contained "a true description of the position of the Cadets in the Russian revolutionary movement".

Let us see the assessment of the Cadets that the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party regards as a *true* one. We hope our readers will forgive us for quoting these lengthy excerpts, but Russian liberal newspaper hacks must be taught once and for all to stop inventing disagreements between the Russian and the German Social-Democrats.

"Until quite recently," we read in the article "The Duma and the Cadets", "nothing was heard about the Cadets. They were not to be found where blood was flowing and bullets flying. They were not to be found where the masses of the people, inspired by the heroism of the revolutionary struggle, were sacrificing their lives, determined to die or win under the banner of proletarian freedom. These realist politicians were too statesmanlike, too far-sighted, to allow themselves to be carried away by the mass movement headed by 'reprobates', dreamers and revolutionary 'fanatics'. These cool-headed, sapient phrase-mongers and tinsel knights of pseudo-liberalism, sat quietly by their firesides. They shook their heads disapprovingly, fearing lest the revolution should go too far and shake the ancient and sacred pillars of bourgeois life, property, political decorum and order.

"The Cadets have long shown their versatility in the flunkey's art. At the time of the Bulygin Duma they already dreamed of throwing a bridge between the as yet 'innocent' Witte and liberalism, which was brazenly flirting with the foreign stock exchanges. Generally speaking, the stock exchange is the weak spot of our Party of 'People's Freedom'. Only a few days ago the Cadets were indignantly denying the accusation that they were conducting 'treacherous' propaganda against the new loan of many million rubles. And this is quite understandable. When police tyranny was rampant, they tried to explain that it was called forth by the conduct of the democrats. When fires and riots organised by the camarilla were raging, they, with might and main, defended the throne and the altar[206] from the attacks of the socialists, who recognise nothing and deny and destroy everything.

"Then came the celebrated boycott, the great October strike, the bloody period of popular insurrections, civil war and mutiny among the armed forces on land and sea. The Cadets were swept away by the great, purifying tide.

"Then, nothing was heard of the Cadets. The knights of the golden mean ran to cover. At best, they loudly protested and loudly complained; but owing to the raging revolutionary storm, nobody heard them.

"The reaction rendered the Cadets the greatest service. When the prisons were filled again, when the Russian fighters for freedom were again being packed off to a living death in exile, the Cadets found their opportunity. Their opponents on the left were gagged. The Cadets got to the newspapers; they were only slightly affected by the persecutions of the counter-revolution. Punitive expeditions were not sent against them. Their houses were not razed to the ground. Their children were not raped by Cossacks. The Wittes and Durnovos did not apply to

them their 'pacification' measures. It was not against them that guns and machine-guns, artillery and infantry, the Navy and the Cossacks were turned. And so the Cadets came into the foreground. The battle of words began. Polemics took the place of revolution; and in this field the Cadets proved to be past-masters and matchless virtuosos. They first and foremost hurled themselves into the fray against the revolution and the revolutionaries; they reviled the socialists and slandered the workers' party. They polemised against opponents who were gagged. They flung accusations against those who could neither answer nor defend themselves. But Russian liberalism was not content with this. Through the mouth of one of its most prominent leaders it declared that the entire heroic liberation movement in Russia was the work of its hands: that the fall of the autocracy stands to its credit. The Cadets insolently claimed the glory for the deeds in which the proletarians had shed their blood. They decked themselves with the shreds of the tattered scarlet banner and proclaimed liberalism the soul of the struggle for liberation, the liberator of the country from tyranny. And although the prisons remained overcrowded, and gallows continued to be erected, the Cadets were loud in self-praise and furiously denounced the turbulent, audacious and reckless revolutionaries."

The author then goes on to describe the legal status of our Duma, the law governing the Council of State and the part the Cadets played during the elections.

"The dear Cadets passionately desired evolution instead of revolution, law and order instead of revolutionary anarchy and civil war." But during the elections the people gave them a revolutionary mandate that was not at all to their liking.

"Like the born diplomats and honest brokers they are, they consoled themselves with the hope of being able to subdue the revolution, revive the stock exchange, soften the rigour of the autocratic regime, reconcile all antagonisms and eliminate all conflicts. They called for peace, but reality brought something different. They came before the electors as 'Constitutional-Democrats', but they were elected as an opposition party, as the sole or chief opposition party. They strove for a compromise, but they were given a revolutionary mandate. They made fine speeches, but they were sent to fight; they were compelled to give a pledge, and they were promised every support, even to the extent of armed struggle.

"Intoxicated with victory, carried away by revolutionary oratory during the election campaign, finding themselves in the midst of revolutionary voters, the Cadets went further than they intended. They did not see that behind their backs a new force had arisen that was pushing them into the fight.

"The Cadets realised too late who had sent them to parliament, who had given them such a categorically imperative mandate, who had im-

posed upon them the role that they dreaded most of all, and which they tried to get out of with all their might. They had been sent by the Russian revolution to clear the road for a further advance, they had been sent by the Russian people who were using the Cadets as a battering-ram to make a new breach in the walls of the autocracy, the main strongholds of which will be captured later, not with the aid of the Cadets, but of the broad masses of the people."

The Cadets were displeased to see revolutionary peasant deputies in the Duma who threatened to spoil their game. They had dreamt of a "*unanimous Cadet Duma*". "Then it would have been possible to shirk the revolutionary tasks somehow, to drown all real action in a flood of beautiful oratory.... It would have been possible to confine themselves to drafting resolutions and Bills and to obtaining—at most—a Cadet Ministry, consolidating a constitutional monarchy, subduing the revolution through minor concessions, dragging out all reforms to infinity, and at last reaching the goal: bourgeois-liberal parliamentarism.... Yes, all this would have been possible, had there been no peasants in the Duma!" And then the author goes on to describe, sometimes in positively rapturous terms, the revolutionary spirit of the peasant deputies in the Duma. "The revolution not only carried Cadets into the Duma, it also created a 'Mountain', a 'Party of the Mountain', which will not agree to compromise. The revolution is represented in the Duma, too."

"Poor Cadets, poor Russian Girondists! They have fallen between the hammer and the anvil, between the bayonets of the government and the revolution of the proletariat and peasantry.

"No wonder the Cadets have now begun shamefully to hide their scarlet trappings. No wonder they are now dropping their highsounding slogans. No wonder they have now begun to talk about respecting the prerogatives of the old authority. The situation is becoming serious. The government is not in a joking mood, and will concede nothing unless it is compelled to. But neither is the revolution, which sent the Cadets to the Duma. It will never forgive the Cadets their treachery. It will have no mercy on the poltroons who pledged themselves to play a revolutionary role and funked it.

"On the one side is absolutism, on the other revolution. What will the Cadets do?"

Thus ends the article with which the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party has expressed its agreement. These "reasonable" German Social-Democrats have put

the "Bolsheviks" frightfully to shame, haven't they? Their opinion of the Cadets is totally different from ours, isn't it? Our slogan—the revolution of the proletariat and peasantry—is nothing like theirs, is it?

Let our readers also consider whether we should find ourselves at odds with such people in our appraisal of a Cadet Ministry.

International revolutionary Social-Democracy in its attitude to absolutism and to the liberal bourgeoisie, is as united today as ever it was!

Vperyod, No. 5, May 31, 1906

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

In *Rech*, No. 86, Mr. P. Milyukov sums up "the first month's work of the Duma".

Speaking generally, writes this worthy author,

> "all that we have cited here in proof of the enormous success of the activities of the Duma during the one month it has been in existence represents an imponderable magnitude."

Nevertheless, the "first month's work of the Duma" has also produced fairly "ponderable" results—at all events in prospect.

> "When *Le Temps* abroad, and *Novoye Vremya* in St. Petersburg, demand a 'Cadet' Ministry, everybody knows what this means."

Perhaps it is going a bit too far, Mr. Milyukov, to say that "everybody knows"; but there is no doubt that today very, very many people already know "what this means". We are compelled to beg of the Cadet gentlemen once again: "That thou doest, do quickly! "Then, Mr. Milyukov, everybody will indeed know "what this means".

Vperyod, No. 5, May 31, 1906

Published according to the *Vperyod* text

LET THE WORKERS DECIDE

The Social-Democratic proletariat of Russia, and particularly of St. Petersburg, is confronted with the extremely important problem of how to conduct the immediate political campaign in relation to the State Duma. It goes without saying that the united Social-Democratic Party can discuss this question of the *immediate* campaign only *within the framework* of the resolution of the Unity Congress.

The St. Petersburg Social-Democratic proletariat has two plans of campaign before it: one in the resolution of the Central Committee, and the other in the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee. These two resolutions* have already been published in *Vperyod* (No. 2),[207] and now we propose to discuss the material difference between them. The main point in the Central Committee's resolution reads: "We will support the Duma in all the steps it takes towards overthrowing the present Ministry and substituting for it a Ministry appointed by the Duma, for we see in such a change favourable conditions for the convocation of a constituent assembly." The resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee says nothing about supporting such a demand; it concentrates on the government's outrageous behaviour, on the impotence of the Duma, on the need for the Trudovik Group to appeal to the people, on the inevitability of a new and joint struggle by the workers and peasants.

Thus the main point at issue is whether or not we should support the steps of the Duma towards the formation of a Cadet Ministry. The Central Committee's resolution is vague on this point, and talks about a "Ministry appointed

* See pp. 481-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

by the Duma". But everybody knows, and the whole liberal-bourgeois press is emphasising it, that what is actually being discussed is the appointment by the supreme authority of a Ministry acceptable to the Duma, that is to say, a Cadet Ministry. And this is the only construction that the broad masses of the working class can put upon the Central Committee's resolution.

Can the Social-Democratic proletariat support the demand that the supreme authority should appoint a Cadet Ministry? No, it cannot. A Cadet Ministry can be appointed only as the result of a *deal* between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie against the socialist workers and the revolutionary peasantry. The Social-Democrats will, of course, take the utmost advantage of the new situation that would be created by such a deal. They will carefully consider their tactics if this deal even temporarily creates better conditions for the struggle for freedom and for socialism. We will do all we can to turn even this counter-revolutionary deal to the advantage of the revolution. But we cannot *support* a deal between the *bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats* concluded *behind the backs of the people*. To call upon the people, or the proletariat, to support such a deal would only be corrupting their minds, concealing from them the truth about the *nature* of this deal, about the *dangers* it involves, and about the fact that the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy want thereby to *make more difficult* the convocation of a constituent assembly.

We must call upon the workers and peasants not to support deals, but to fight. Only serious preparations for a fight can *really* weaken the autocracy; a fight alone can guarantee that *any* step the autocracy or the bourgeoisie take will really benefit the revolution. The Central Committee's resolution *is mistaken*. The class-conscious Social-Democratic workers *cannot* accept it.

Now for the second question. Is it not our duty to accept this resolution in the name of discipline and of submission to the Congress? Read the resolution on the State Duma adopted by the Unity Congress; you will find nothing in it to suggest that we must support the demand for the formation of a Cadet Ministry. It does not contain *a single word* about "supporting" the Duma at all. The following is the

full text of that part of the Congress resolution which *defines* our attitude to the Duma itself: "The Social-Democratic Party must (1) systematically *utilise* all the conflicts that arise between the government and the Duma, as well as in the Duma itself, for the purpose of expanding and deepening the revolutionary movement, and with this end in view it must (a) strive *to expand and intensify these conflicts* to such limits as will enable them to be used as the *starting-point for broad mass movements for the overthrow* of the present political system; (b) strive in every case to link the political tasks of the movement with the social and economic demands of the masses of workers and peasants; (c) by means of extensive agitation among the masses of the people in favour of *revolutionary demands* to be presented to the State Duma—organise *outside pressure upon the Duma* with the object of *revolutionising* it. (2) *Intervene* in such a way as to make these growing conflicts (a) reveal to the masses the inconsistency of all the bourgeois parties in the Duma that claim to express the will of the people, and (b) help the broad masses (the proletariat, the peasantry, and the town petty bourgeoisie) to realise that the *Duma is utterly useless* as a representative body, and that it is necessary to convene a national constituent assembly", etc.

From the passages we have underlined, it is evident that the Central Committee's resolution on supporting the demand for a Cadet Ministry, far from being in harmony with the Congress resolution, actually *contradicts* it. The demand for a Cadet Ministry is *not* a *revolutionary* demand. It serves to *allay* and *obscure* the conflicts with the Duma, and in the Duma; it leaves out the question of the uselessness of the Duma, etc., etc. We will add that the Congress resolution *says nothing* about "supporting" the Duma; it speaks only of "exerting pressure", "utilising" and "intervening".

The inference is obvious. The Central Committee has *absolutely no right* to call upon the Party organisations to accept its resolution in favour of supporting the demand for a Cadet Ministry. It is the *duty* of every Party member to take an absolutely independent and critical stand on this question and to declare for the resolution that in his opinion *more correctly* solves the problem within the framework of the decisions of the Unity Congress. The St. Petersburg

worker Social-Democrats know that the whole Party organisation is now built on a *democratic* basis. This means that *all* the Party members take part in the election of officials, committee members, and so forth, that *all* the Party members discuss and *decide* questions concerning the political campaigns of the proletariat, and that all the Party members *determine* the line of tactics of the Party organisations.

We are sure that this will be the attitude of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic proletariat on the present issue: that it will discuss it earnestly and thoroughly, from every angle and decide for itself *whether or not the demand for a Cadet Ministry should be supported.*

The St. Petersburg workers will not allow themselves to be diverted from their *right*, from their Social-Democratic and Party *duty* by any sophistry, that is to say, by any obviously fallacious arguments. We will very briefly mention these sophistries. L. Martov in *Kuryer* (No. 13) says: in the name of discipline, do not disorganise the Central Committee's political campaign. This is sophistry. Discipline does not demand that a Party member should blindly subscribe to all the resolutions drafted by the Central Committee. There is no rule anywhere that compels a Party organisation to forego its right to have an opinion of its own and to become a mere *subscriber* to the Central Committee's resolutions. L. Martov says: the Mensheviks submitted in the case of the boycott, now it is for you to submit. This is sophistry. *We all* submitted to the decisions of the Congress. *Not one of us* called for opposition to participation in the Duma elections and to the formation of a Social-Democratic parliamentary group. Conforming with the decision of the Congress, we submitted, we gave up the boycott. But we have a right and duty to oppose, *within the framework of the Congress decisions*, support for a Cadet Ministry, which *no Congress has decreed*. L. Martov evades the whole issue with awful words and insinuations about disorganisers: but he does not say a word about whether the St. Petersburg Committee resolution contradicts the Congress decision. He says nothing about the rights of the *opposition*, that is, about the right of *any* Party organisation, within the bounds of the will of the Congress, to ques-

tion the tactics of the Central Committee and to correct its deviations and mistakes. Therefore we will calmly reply to Martov that those are disorganisers who violate the legitimate rights of the Party organisations.

We will calmly point to the fact that even Mensheviks (see Comrade Vlasov's[208] letter to the editor elsewhere in this issue) disagree with the proposal to support a Cadet Ministry. Even Comrade Ryanshev, in *Kuryer*, No. 13, calls upon "*the Workers' and Trudovik Groups*" to "fight with all their might" against the Cadets' Freedom of Assembly Bill, that is to say, he proposes *purely Bolshevik* tactics, which *preclude* support for a Ministry consisting of these same Cadets.

When the Vyborg District Committee proposes that a general city conference be called for which the delegates are to be elected "irrespective of faction, i.e., *without any discussion*"—without discussing the point at issue!!—the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic workers can, of course, only laugh at them for their proposal. Class-conscious workers will never decide an important question *without discussion*. Neither complaints about "sharp language" in discussion, nor L. Martov's wailings about certain harsh words that have offended him, nor threats of a split uttered by him, or anybody else, will prevent the workers from settling the question *by themselves*. To threaten a split, to provoke a split, is a trick unworthy of a Social-Democrat, and can only give pleasure to the bourgeoisie (see *Duma*, No. 29). The workers will *by a majority* vote decide whether or not a Cadet Ministry should be supported. And they will see to it that nobody, not even the Central Committee, *dares to thwart the decisions they arrive at* absolutely freely, independently and legitimately, *on the basis* of the decisions of the Unity Congress.

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June 1, 1906

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"DON'T GAZE UP, GAZE DOWN!"

This is what Mr. I. Zhilkin says in today's issue of the Left-Cadet *Nasha Zhizn*. He sadly notes the "glow of self-satisfaction" on the faces of the Cadets. He is moved to protest by Mr. Milyukov's delighted statement that "the Cadets are dissociating themselves from the extreme Left". He scoffs at the "unusual political wisdom" of the Cadets, who admit that the situation is "hopeless" and at the same time talk boastfully about boldly steering the ship of state into the fairway.

Let us examine these reflections, for they concern the fundamental question in the present political situation. We think it particularly important to emphasise that events *are compelling* even those who totally disagree with the views of the Left Social-Democrats, and are most vehemently opposing us, to appraise the situation correctly.

According to rumours emanating from the Russian reactionaries' club in Paris, "all wavering in Peterhof has ceased. Goremykin has been given a free hand", i.e., freedom to make short work of the Duma. And *Nasha Zhizn*, which does not share the Bolsheviks' proclivity to paint everything in gloomy colours, says: "We have every reason to believe that these rumours are trustworthy...." "The fight is becoming more intense.... He who raises the sword shall perish by the sword," says the leading article in this newspaper in conclusion. And Mr. I. Zhilkin writes: "Are there many people in Russia who believe in a peaceful, victorious outcome of parliamentary work? One must be a romantic, a visionary, an idealist, to be carried away by such rosy dreams." And in the next column Mr. V. Khizhnyakov writes: "We cannot avoid revolutionary storms—this must be

admitted. The Duma is powerless to turn the movement to the peaceful path, for it lacks the power to improve the conditions of life of the people, and without such a power there is no other road but that of revolution. One is already conscious of an ever-growing feeling of discontent, of a rapidly waning faith in the almighty power of the Duma and giving way to despair [lack of faith in the Duma, like lack of faith in God, is by no means an indication of "despair"]. The atmosphere is gradually becoming electrified: sometimes we hear the distant roll of thunder; it will not be very long, perhaps, before the storm bursts."

This is said by people whose opinion we particularly value because of their preconceived hostility to revolutionary Social-Democracy. Events have *compelled* these people to repeat the very propositions on which we have always insisted, and for which the liberal bourgeoisie has always denounced, abused and reviled us, inventing a heap of scandal, lies and slander about the "Bolsheviks".

"Don't gaze up, gaze down!" This means that in view of the objective historical conditions, which do not depend upon our will, the parliamentary struggle *cannot* become the *main* form of the liberation movement in Russia at the present time. Needless to say, it is not a matter of "repudiating" this form of struggle, not a matter of rejecting it. The fact is that, owing to the course of events, the *main* and decisive struggle is advancing in another arena. The liberal bourgeoisie has on innumerable occasions slanderously stated that we Bolsheviks "are recklessly pushing the people towards extreme measures" (*Rech*, No. 88). But, gentlemen, was it really we who "pushed" Zhilkin, Khizhnyakov and the leader-writer of *Nasha Zhizn*? Was it really we who "pushed" the Kursk and Poltava soldiers, the Kiev, Saratov and other peasants?

We have "pushed" and roused those whose faces were always "glowing with self-satisfaction". We have said that the form of the struggle for liberation does not depend upon our will, that we must soberly and fearlessly look in the face of reality, which precludes the "path" that even *Nasha Zhizn* now admits is closed. We have said that socialists cannot and must not sacrifice the fundamental interests of democracy and of socialism for the sake of momentary

successes; that it is their duty to tell the masses the bitter truth that the Cadets are unreliable, that the Duma is powerless and that revolutionary storms are inevitable. If, having been enchanted by the oratory of the Cadets at election meetings, the masses do not understand us today, and if, carried away with joy in the first days of the first Russian parliament, they do not understand us tomorrow, the day after tomorrow they will be convinced that we are right. Events will make them see that the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party is not tempted by tawdry successes, that it calls upon them firmly and consistently to "gaze" in the very direction where the struggle is inevitably developing that will decide the fate of genuine (and not Cadet) people's freedom.

Our revolution is the great Russian revolution precisely because it has roused vast masses of the people to participation in making history. Class contradictions among these masses are still far from having revealed themselves in full measure. Political parties are only just taking shape. Therefore it is not within our power either to direct the masses or restrain them to any great extent. But we can, after studying the actual situation and the relations between classes, foresee the inevitable trend of their historic activities, the main forms of their movement. We must spread our socialist knowledge among the masses as widely as possible, undaunted by the fact that truth is often very bitter, and not easily discernible beneath the tinsel of fashionable political labels or gaudy political institutions: and not allowing ourselves to be enchanted by beautiful fiction. We shall do our duty if we do everything to enlighten the masses and prepare them for forms of the movement which, though imperceptible to the superficial observer, nevertheless, inexorably follow from the whole economic and political situation in the country. We shall fail in our duty if we only gave "up", and miss what is going on, growing, approaching and impending below.

Written on June 1 (14), 1906

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Published according to the newspaper text

THE REACTION IS TAKING TO ARMS

The Social-Democratic press has long been pointing out that the vaunted "constitutionalism" in Russia is baseless and ephemeral. So long as the old authority remains and controls the whole vast machinery of state administration, it is useless talking seriously about the importance of popular representation and about satisfying the urgent needs of the vast masses of the people. No sooner had the State Duma begun its sittings—and liberal-bourgeois oratory about peaceful, constitutional evolution burst forth in a particularly turbulent flood—than there began an increasing number of attacks on peaceful demonstrators, cases of setting fire to halls where public meetings were proceeding, and lastly, downright pogroms—all organised by government agents.

Meanwhile the peasant movement is growing. Strikes among the workers are becoming more embittered, more frequent and more extensive. Unrest is growing among the most backward military units, the infantry in the provinces, and among the Cossacks.

Far too much inflammable material has accumulated in Russian social life. The struggle which ages of unprecedented violence, torment, torture, robbery and exploitation have paved the way for has become too widespread and acute. This struggle between the people and the old authority cannot be confined within the limits of a struggle of the Duma for a particular Ministry. Even the most downtrodden and ignorant "subjects" can no longer be restrained from proclaiming the demands of awakening human and civic dignity. The old authority, which has always made the laws

itself, which in fighting for its existence is resorting to the last, most desperate, savage and furious methods, cannot be restrained by appeals to abide by the law.

The pogrom in Belostok is a particularly striking indication that the government has taken to arms against the people. The old, but ever new story of Russian pogroms!—ever, until the people achieve victory, until the old authorities are completely swept away. Here are a few excerpts from a telegram received from a Belostok elector, Tsirin: "A *deliberately-organised* anti-Jewish pogrom has started." "In spite of rumours that have been circulated, *not a single order has been received* from the Ministry all day today!" "Vigorous agitation for the pogrom has been carried on for the past two weeks. In the streets, particularly at night, leaflets were distributed calling for the massacre, not only of Jews, but also of intellectuals. *The police simply turned a blind eye to all this*."

The old familiar picture! The police organises the pogrom beforehand. The police instigates it: leaflets are printed in government printing offices calling for a massacre of the Jews. When the pogrom begins, the police is inactive. The troops quietly look on at the exploits of the Black Hundreds. But later this very police goes through the farce of prosecution and trial of the pogromists. The investigations and trials conducted by the officials of the old authority always end in the same way: the cases drag on, none of the pogromists are found guilty, sometimes even the battered and mutilated Jews and intellectuals are dragged before the court, months pass—and the old, but ever new story is forgotten, until the next pogrom. Vile instigation, bribery, and fuddling with drink of the scum of our cursed capitalist "civilisation", the brutal massacre of unarmed by armed people, and farcical trials conducted by the culprits themselves! And yet there are those who, seeing these phenomena of Russian social life, think, and say, that somebody or other is "recklessly" calling upon the people to resort to "extreme measures"! One must be, not reckless, but a poltroon, politically corrupt, to say such things in the face of events like the burning of the People's House at Vologda (at the time of the opening of the Duma) or the pogrom in Belostok (after the Duma had been in session a month).

A single event like this will have more effect upon the people than millions of appeals. And to talk about "reckless" appeals is just as hopelessly pedantic and as much a sin of a deadened civic conscience, as to condemn the wild cry for revenge that is going up from the battlefields of Vologda and Belostok.

The Duma did the right thing by immediately discussing the interpellation on the Belostok pogrom, and sending some of its members to Belostok to investigate on the spot. But in reading this interpellation, and comparing it with the speeches of members of the Duma and the commonly-known facts about pogroms, one has a deep feeling of dissatisfaction, of indignation at the irresolute terms in which the interpellation is worded.

Judge for yourselves. The authors of the interpellation say: "The inhabitants *fear* that the local authorities and malicious agitators may try to make out the victims themselves to be responsible for the calamity that has befallen them." "...False information on these lines is being circulated." Yes, the downtrodden and tormented Jewish population is indeed apprehensive of this, and has every reason to be. This is true. But it is *not the whole truth*, gentlemen, members of the Duma, and authors of the interpellation! You, the people's deputies, who have not yet been assaulted and tormented, know perfectly well that this is not the whole truth. You know that the downtrodden inhabitants will *not dare* to name those who are *really responsible* for the pogrom. *You must name them*. That is what you are people's deputies for. That is why you enjoy—even under Russian law—*complete* freedom of speech in the Duma. Then don't stand *between* the reaction and the people, at a time when the armed reaction is strangling, massacring, and mutilating unarmed people. Take your stand *openly and entirely* on the side of the people. Don't confine yourselves to conveying the fear of the townspeople that the vile instigators of the pogroms will say it is the murdered victims who are to blame. *Indict the culprits in unequivocal terms*—it is your direct *duty* to the people. Don't ask the government whether measures are being taken to protect the Jews and to prevent pogroms, but ask how long the government intends to shield the real culprits, who are mem-

bers of the government. Ask the government whether it thinks that the people will long be in error as to who is really responsible for the pogroms. Indict the government openly and publicly; call upon the people to organise a militia and self-defence as the *only* means of protection against pogroms.

This is not in keeping with "parliamentary practice", you will say. Are you not ashamed to advance such an argument *even* at a time like this? Don't you realise that the people will condemn you if, even at a time like this you do not give up playing at parliaments and do not dare to say straightforwardly, openly and loudly what *you really know and think*?

That you know the truth about the pogroms is evident from speeches delivered by members of the Duma. The Cadet Nabokov said: "We know that in many cases the administration has not succeeded in allaying the suspicion that the simultaneous outbreak of the pogroms is the result either of the Black-Hundred organisations operating *with the knowledge of the local authorities*, or, at best, of the latter's systematic inaction."

If you *know* that this is so, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, you should have said so in your interpellation. You should have written: We *know* such-and-such facts and therefore ask questions about them. And if you know what happens "at best", it is *unseemly* for people's deputies to keep silent about what happens at *worst*, about the deliberate organisation of pogroms by the police on orders from St. Petersburg.

"Belostok is not an exceptional case," rightly said Levin. "It is one of the consequences of the system that you want to combat." Quite right, citizen Levin! But while in newspapers we can only speak of the "system", you in the Duma ought to speak out more plainly and sharply.

"Pogroms are part of a whole system. In the October days ... the government ... found no other means of combating the liberation movement.... You know how that chapter of history ended. Now the same thing is being repeated.... This system is *perfidiously* prepared and thought out, and is being carried out with *equal perfidy*. In many cases we know very well who organises these pogroms; we

know very well that leaflets *are sent out by the gendarmerie departments*."

Once again, quite right, citizen Levin! And therefore you should have said in your interpellation: does the government think that the Duma is not aware of the commonly-known fact that the gendarmes and police send out those leaflets?

Deputy Ryzhkov bluntly stated that the allegation that pogroms are due to racial enmity was a *lie*, and that the allegation that they were due to the impotence of the authorities was a malicious invention. Deputy Ryzhkov listed a number of facts which proved that there had been "collaboration" between the police, the pogromists and the Cossacks. "I live in a big industrial district," he said, "and I know that the pogrom in Lugansk, for example, did not assume ghastly dimensions *only because* [mark this, gentlemen: *only* because] the *unarmed workers* drove back the pogromists with their bare fists, at the risk of being shot by the police."

In *Rech*, this part of the report of the debate in the Duma is headed "The Government Is Indicted". This is a good heading, but it belongs into the *text of* the Duma *interpellation*, not into a newspaper report. Either draft these interpellations in such a way as to make them a passionate indictment of the government before the people, or in a way that they may arouse ironical taunts and jeers at the crying discrepancy between the monstrous facts and the bureaucratic evasions is bureaucratically-restrained interpellations. Only by adopting the first-mentioned method will the Duma teach the reactionaries not to jeer at it. As it is, the reactionaries are jeering, quite openly and frankly. Read today's *Novoye Vremya*. These lackeys of the pogromists are chuckling and making merry: "One cannot help observing with particular satisfaction [!!] the haste with which the Duma interpellated the Minister on the anti-Jewish pogrom in Belostok." You see: the pogromists are particularly pleased—the flunkey blurts out the truth. The reactionaries are pleased with the Belostok pogrom, and with the fact that they can now abusively call the Duma the "Jewish" Duma. The reactionaries jeer and say: "If, as was stated in the Duma today, we must pardon the riots

against property made by the peasants in the Russian gubernias, then we must also pardon the pogroms against Jewish property in the Western territory."

You see, gentlemen of the Duma, the reactionaries are more outspoken than you are. Their language is stronger than your Duma language. The reactionaries are not afraid to fight. They are not afraid to associate the Duma with the peasants' struggle for freedom. *Then don't you be afraid to associate the reactionary government with the pogromists!*

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Published according to the newspaper text

RESOLUTION (III) OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON THE QUESTION OF A DUMA MINISTRY[209]

Whereas:

(1) The demand for the appointment at the present time of a responsible Ministry representing the majority in the State Duma is mistaken and ambiguous, for:

(a) the appointment of such a Ministry would not really signify the transfer of power from the autocracy to a popular representative body;

(b) in essence, it would be a deal between the liberal bourgeoisie and the autocracy, concluded at the expense of the people and behind its back;

(c) in view of the present alignment of real political force, the proletariat has no guarantee that this deal will give it real security in waging its class struggle (at all events, not real enough to compensate for the material harm that will be caused to the development of proletarian class-consciousness by the active support of a bourgeois deal transacted in a period of revolutionary upswing).

(2) In the light of the foregoing, the demand for the appointment of a responsible Duma Ministry can only serve to strengthen constitutional illusions and corrupt the revolutionary consciousness of the people, by creating hopes that power will be peacefully transferred to the people, and by obscuring the fundamental tasks of the struggle for freedom;—

Therefore, this meeting resolves:

(1) that the proletariat cannot at present support the demand for the appointment of a Duma Ministry;

(2) that the proletariat supports the idea of forming an Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the revolutionary elements in the Duma, for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of the local free organisations of the people.

Vperyod, No. 10, June 6, 1906

Published according to the *Vperyod* text

NOTES

[1] "*Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers Deputies*"—an article appraising the Soviets for the first time as an organ of insurrection and the rudiments of a new revolutionary power. It was written by Lenin early in November 1905 in Stockholm, where he stayed for a while on his way back to Russia from exile. He contributed the article to *Novaya Zhizn* which, however, did not publish it. The manuscript was not discovered until the autumn of 1940. p. 17

[2] *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905, in St. Petersburg. Lenin became the editor of the paper upon his return to Russia early in November 1905. The paper was the virtual Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky were closely associated with the paper, and Maxim Gorky contributed articles and appreciable funds.

The paper had a circulation of up to 80,000 though it was constantly persecuted, 15 issues out of 27 being confiscated and destroyed. It was closed by the government after issue No. 27; issue No. 28, which was the last, appeared illegally. p. 19

[3] *Socialist-Revolutionary Party*—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles (Socialist-Revolutionary Union, Socialist-Revolutionary Party, etc.). The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the magazine *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05) became its official organs. The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not see the class distinctions between the proletarian and the small proprietor. They glossed over the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and rejected the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to patch up "the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terrorism, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries advocated as the basic method of struggle against the autocracy, did much harm to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries envisaged the abolition of private landownership and transfer of

the land to the village communities on the basis of the "labour principle", "equalised" land tenure, and the development of co-operatives. There was nothing socialist in this programme, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries described as a programme for "socialising the land".

The Bolshevik Party exposed the Socialist-Revolutionaries' attempts to pose as socialists; it waged a stubborn struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries to gain influence over the peasantry, and revealed the harmful effect which their tactics of individual terrorism had on the working-class movement. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks concluded temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against tsarism.

In analysing the Socialist-Revolutionary programme, Lenin showed that if commodity production and private farming on commonly-owned land were preserved, the rule of capital could not be eliminated nor the labouring peasantry delivered from exploitation and ruin. He also showed that co-operatives functioning under the capitalist system could not save the small peasant, since they served to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time Lenin pointed out that the demand for equalised land tenure, while not socialist, was historically progressive, revolutionary-democratic in character, being directed against reactionary landlordism.

The fact that the peasantry did not constitute a homogeneous class accounted for the political and ideological instability of and organisational confusion among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and for their constant wavering between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There was a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party as early as the period of the first Russian revolution. Its Right wing formed the legal Labour Popular-Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Cadets; the Left wing became the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction the Socialist-Revolutionary Party experienced a complete ideological and organizational break-up, and the First World War saw most Socialist-Revolutionaries adopt social-chauvinist views.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets formed the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, which included leaders of their party, Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of landlordism, and indeed, stood for its maintenance. Socialist-Revolutionary ministers of the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized landed estates. Late in November 1917 the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries founded an independent party. To retain their influence among the peasant masses, they recognised Soviet power in form and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon began to fight against Soviet power.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Socialist-Revolutionaries carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activities, vigorously supported the interventionists

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE ONLINE

and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against Soviet statesmen and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War, they continued their activities against the Soviet state within the country and among whiteguard émigrés. p. 22

[4] The reference is to the all-Russian political strike in October 1905. p. 24

[5] *The Union of Unions*—a political organisation of the liberal-bourgeois intelligentsia. It was founded in May 1905 at the first congress of 14 associations of lawyers, writers, doctors, engineers, teachers, etc. The congress demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly by universal suffrage. In July 1905 the Union declared for boycotting the Bulygin Duma; but before long it abandoned that stand, and decided to take part in the Duma elections. By the end of 1906 the Union had fallen apart. p. 24

[6] *On January 9, 1905*, by order of the tsar, the troops fired on a peaceful demonstration of St. Petersburg unarmed workers who marched with their wives and children to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar describing their intolerable conditions and utter lack of rights. This massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January 9 marked the beginning of the 1905-07 revolution. p. 28

[7] *All-Russian Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation founded in 1905. Its programme and tactics were elaborated at its first and second congresses, held in Moscow in August and November 1905. The Union demanded political freedom and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly. It adopted the tactics of boycotting the First State Duma. Its agrarian programme provided for the abolition of private landownership and for transfer of the lands belonging to monasteries, the Church, the Crown and the government to the peasants without compensation. The Union pursued a half-way and erratic policy; while demanding abolition of the landed estates, it agreed to partial compensation of the landlords. An object of police reprisals from the first, it had ceased to exist by the end of 1906. p. 28

[8] "*The Reorganisation of the Party*"—Lenin's first article published in *Novaya Zhizn*. He wrote it upon his return to Russia from exile, and it served as a basis for the resolution "The Reorganisation of the Party" adopted by the Tammerfors Conference in December 1905. p. 29

[9] The "*Independents*"—members of the Independent Social Labour Party, an organisation of *agents-provocateurs* founded in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1905 on instructions from the tsarist government, with the direct assistance of the secret police. The party, which was Zubatovist in type, sought to divert the workers

from the revolutionary struggle. Its programme, published in the magazine *Russky Rabochy* (*The Russian Worker*), No. 4, on December 15 (28), 1905, called for combating Social-Democracy. By the beginning of 1908 the party had ceased to exist, having failed among the masses of the workers. p. 29

[10] The appeal "*To All Party Organisations and All Social-Democratic Workers*", subheaded "On the Occasion of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", was published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 8, on November 10 (23), 1905. p. 29

[11] This refers to the new, opportunist *Iskra*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks, aided by Plekhanov, took *Iskra* into their own hands. From November 1903 on, beginning with its issue No. 52, *Iskra* became a Menshevik mouthpiece. It existed till October 1905. p. 30

[12] *Vendée*—a department in western France, where the backward peasantry began a counter-revolutionary uprising against the republic at the end of the eighteenth century, during the French bourgeois revolution. The uprising was led by the Catholic clergy, the nobility and émigré royalists, and had the support of England.

Vendée had become a synonym for reactionary rebellion and hotbed of counter-revolution. p. 36

[13] Lenin's article "*The Proletariat and the Peasantry*" was reprinted by the Sumy group of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905 as an appendix to the "Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. p. 40

[14] *The Emancipation of Labour group*—the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov in 1883, and did much to spread Marxism in Russia. p. 40

[15] *Izvestia Soveta Rabochikh Deputatov* (*Bulletin of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies*)—an official newspaper of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. It appeared from October 17 (30) to December 14 (27) 1905. Being in effect an information bulletin, it had no permanent staff and was printed by the workers themselves in the printing-works of various bourgeois papers. Altogether ten issues were brought out. Issue No. 11 was seized by the police while being printed. p. 44

[16] *Guchkov, A. I.* (1862-1936)—a monarchist representative of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. p. 45

[17] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. founded by decision of the Third Party Congress. On April 27 (May 10), 1905, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party appointed Lenin editor-in-chief of *Proletary*. The weekly appeared in Geneva from May 14 (27)

to November 12 (25) 1905. Twenty-six issues were published in all. The weekly continued the line of the old Leninist *Iskra*, and of the Bolshevik paper *Vperyod*.

Lenin contributed about 90 articles and short items to *Proletary*. His articles determined the political line of the weekly, its ideological content and Bolshevik course. Lenin did a tremendous amount of work as the leader and editor of the weekly. He edited the material to be published, lending it the utmost fidelity to principle, a Party spirit, and precision and clarity in discussing important theoretical problems and elucidating questions of the revolutionary movement.

The editorial board was constantly assisted by V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky. N. K. Krupskaya, V. M. Velichkina and V. A. Karpinsky had a big share in the editorial work. The weekly was closely linked with the working-class movement in Russia. It carried articles and other items by workers directly engaged In the revolutionary movement. V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, S. I. Gusev and A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova arranged for the collection of articles in Russia and their dispatch to Geneva. N. K. Krupskaya and L. A. Fotieva were in charge of the weekly's correspondence with Party organisations and readers in Russia.

Proletary was prompt to react to all major events in the Russian and international working-class movement. It fought relentlessly against the Mensheviks and other opportunist revisionist elements.

The weekly did much to propagate the decisions of the Third Party Congress and played a prominent role in the organisational and ideological unification of the Bolsheviks. It was the only Russian Social-Democratic paper that consistently upheld revolutionary Marxism and dealt with all the principal issues of the revolution developing in Russia. By giving full information on the events of 1905, it roused the broad masses of the working people to fight for the victory of the revolution.

Proletary had great influence over the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia where some of Lenin's articles were reprinted from it by Bolshevik papers and circulated in leaflet form.

Proletary ceased to appear shortly after Lenin had left for Russia early in November 1905. Its last two Issues (Nos. 25 and 26) were published under the editorship of V. V. Vorovsky. The several articles Lenin had written for those issues appeared when he had left Geneva. p. 45

[18] *Oblomov*—a landlord the chief character in a novel of the same name by the Russian writer I. A. Goncharov. Oblomov was the personification of routine, stagnation, and incapacity for action. p. 46

[19] At the meeting of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies held on November 13 (26) 1905 Lenin spoke of measures to counteract the lock-out organised by the capitalists in reply to the eight hour day which the workers had introduced by their own decision. He moved a resolution on the basis of which the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet on November 14 (27) took a decision on measures against the lock-out. Lenin stressed the sig-

nificance of that decision in the article "The Provocation That Failed" (see pp. 52-53 of this volume). p. 50

[20] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local self-government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. The powers of the Zemstvos, which were headed by the nobility, were limited to purely local economic matters (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the governors and the Ministry of the Interior, which could overrule any decision that did not suit the government. p. 53

[21] *The Congress of Zemstvos and municipal leaders* sat in Moscow from November 6-13 (19-26), 1905. It declared against the convocation of a constituent assembly and expressed the hope that the Duma would play the role of queller of peasant unrest by slightly increasing peasant allotments. p. 53

[22] In the latter half of October 1905 Kronstadt was the scene of meetings of protest over the tsar's Manifesto, issued on October 17 (30) of that year. The Bolsheviks who addressed the meetings exposed the tsar's attempt to deceive the people. In view of the rapid growth of revolutionary sentiment among the masses, the Kronstadt Social-Democratic organisation planned an armed uprising for the end of the month. But events took a spontaneous turn. On October 24 (November 6) a meeting of sailors demanded better food, higher pay, shorter service and a treatment fit for human beings; it also put forward political demands: a democratic republic, universal suffrage, freedom of speech, assembly and association, inviolability of the person, abolition of the social estates, and so on. The sailors' demands were backed by the soldiers. On October 26 (November 8) the struggle developed into an armed uprising. But the insurgents were poorly organised for lack of firm leadership and a plan of action.

The authorities, which ordered troops from St. Petersburg, proclaimed martial law early on October 28 (November 10) and took the offensive. The uprising was crushed. Many of the arrested insurgents were faced with the death sentence, penal sevitude or imprisonment. The St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issued a leaflet "To the Soldiers and Sailors" revealing the truth about the events of October 26-27 (November 8-9). At the call of the Bolsheviks, the workers of St. Petersburg and other cities stood up for the Kronstadt sailors and soldiers. On November 2 (15), the proletariat of St. Petersburg called a general strike. Frightened by the masses' revolutionary action, the government announced that the insurgents would be tried in civil and not in military court. The court sentenced the defendants to disciplinary punishment or imprisonment, and some of them to penal servitude.

The Kronstadt insurrection was a result of the influence exerted on soldiers and sailors by the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants throughout Russia and by the Bolsheviks' activity in the Army and Navy. p. 54

[23] On October 17, 1905, at the height of the all-Russian political strike, the tsar issued a Manifesto promising "civil liberties" and a "legislative" Duma. A manoeuvre designed to gain time, split the revolutionary forces, wreck the strike and put down the revolution, the Manifesto was a fraud, and was never carried into practice. p. 54

[24] *Rus* (*Russia*)—a liberal-bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg intermittently from December 1903 to June 1908. It changed title twice—to *Molva* (*Hearsay*) and *Dvadtsaty Vek* (*The Twentieth Century*). p. 54

[25] This refers to the part which the troops of Tsar Nicholas I took In suppressing the revolutionary national-liberation movement in West-European countries. In 1848, the tsar moved his troops into Rumania, Poland, the Baltic Provinces and Right-Bank Ukraine, and granted the Emperor of Austria a loan of six million rubles to suppress the national-liberation movement in Italy. In 1849, tsarist troops helped in putting down the Hungarian revolution. p. 54

[26] *The great strike of post and telegraph employees* lasted from November 15 (28) to December 15 (28), 1905. It was provoked by the authorities' prohibition to form a union of post and telegraph employees and the discharge of a number of employees who had taken part in organising the union. The All-Russian Congress of the Post and Telegraph Union, which opened in Moscow on November 15 (28), resolved to send Premier Witte a telegram insisting on the readmission of the discharged employees. The dead-line it set for a reply was 1800 hours of the same day, November 15 (28). As the government had sent no answer by the appointed time, the Congress circulated a telegram ordering a strike. The strike involved the whole of Russia. p. 58

[27] *Nasha Zhizn* (*Our Life*)—a daily paper close to the Left wing of the Cadet Party. It appeared, in St. Petersburg intermittently from November 6 (19), 1904 to July 11 (24), 1906. p. 60

[28] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 33-45. p. 60

[29] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership included representatives of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries from among the landlords, and bourgeois intellectuals. Among the more prominent Cadet leaders were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. The Cadets called themselves the "party of people's freedom" to mislead the working masses. In reality they never demanded anything beyond a constitutional monarchy. Their main task they considered to be the right against the revolutionary

movement. They tried to persuade the tsar and the feudal landlords to share power with them.

During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest. At the time of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, they tried to save the monarchy. In the bourgeois Provisional Government, in which they played the key role, they pursued a counter-revolutionary policy, opposed to the interests of the people but favourable to the U.S., British and French imperialists. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became rabid enemies of Soviet power and participated in all armed counter-revolutionary actions and the campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards had been defeated, the Cadets fled abroad, where they continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity. p. 63

[30] *Manilovism*—a term derived from the name of the landlord Manilov one of the characters in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Manilov is a typical philistine, sugary sentimentalist and empty visionary. p. 65

[31] The article "*The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule*" was published as a separate leaflet by the Committee of the United Social-Democratic Organisations of Nikolayev on December 14 (27), 1905, and reprinted in *Zabaikalsky Rabochy* (*The Trans-Baikal Worker*), No. 2, the paper of the Chita Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., on December 18 (31), 1905. p. 66

[32] *Slovo* (*The Word*)—a dally published in St. Petersburg from 1906 to 1909. A paper of the Right-wing Zemstvo, it was first (November 1905 to July 1908) a mouthpiece of the Octobrist Party and then became an organ of the constitutional-monarchist party of "peaceful renovators", who were virtually indistinguishable from the Octobrists. p. 67

[33] *The Party of Law and Order*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the landlords and the top ranks of the bureaucracy, founded in the autumn of 1905. It fully supported the tsarist regime, and welcomed the dissolution of the First Duma. During the elections to the Second Duma it formed a bloc with the Black-Hundred Union of True Russians. It fell apart in 1907. p. 72

[34] *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly bourgeois-liberal magazine published abroad from 1902 to 1905, and edited by P. B. Struve. In January 1904 it became the organ of the liberal-monarchist League of Emancipation. Subsequently the *Osvobozhdeniye* group formed the nucleus of the Cadet Party. p. 80

[35] *Radical-Democrats*—members of a petty-bourgeois organisation that arose in November 1905. Their position was intermediate between those of the Cadets and the Mensheviks. They started a newspaper of their own—*Radikal*—but were able to bring out only one

issue. They demanded a democratic republic, even though they were willing to settle for a constitutional monarchy, provided the government was accountable to parliament. Concerning the agrarian question they favoured the expropriation of state, crown, monastery and church lands without compensation, and the expropriation of private holdings for a minimum compensation. Their organisation disintegrated early in 1906, its one-time members joining the semi-Cadet papers *Bez Zaglavia* (*Without Title*) and *Tovarishch* (*Comrade*). p. 80

[36] See Frederick Engels, "Flüchtlings-Literatur", Volksstaat, Nr. 73 vom 22.6.1874. p. 86

[37] *The "Majority" Conference* met in Tammerfors, Finland, from December 12-17 (25-30), 1905, instead of the regular Party Congress which the Central Committee had planned and announced and which could not take place because of revolutionary developments (the railwaymen's strike and the Moscow armed uprising). The Conference was attended by delegates from 26 Bolshevik organisations. Lenin reported on the current situation and the agrarian question. The Conference passed the resolutions on the agrarian question and the reorganisation of the Party drafted by Lenin. It declared for the restoration of Party unity and for the merger of the practical centres of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and of their central organs on the principle of equality, and instructed the Joint Central Committee to convene a unity congress. The Conference also discussed the stand to be taken on the Duma, and resolved to boycott the First Duma. The relevant resolution was drafted by a committee which included Lenin. As the Moscow insurrection had already begun, the Conference hastened to conclude its work on a motion by Lenin, and the delegates went home to take part in the insurrection.

The Conference resolutions were published by the Central Committee in leaflet form and printed in No. 1 of *Molodaya Rossiya* (*Young Russia*) on January 4 (17), 1906 (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1953, Part I, p. 98, Russ. ed.). p. 88

[38] *Cut-off lands* (*otrezki*)—the lands which were "cut off" from the peasants' allotments in favour of the landlords in 1861 when serfdom was abolished in Russia. Subsequently the landlords leased those lands to the peasants on onerous terms. p. 88

[39] *Land redemption payments* were established by the "Regulation Governing Redemption by Peasants Who Have Emerged from Serf Dependence..." adopted on February 19, 1861. The tsarist government compelled the peasants, in return for the allotments assigned to them, to pay redemption to the landlords amounting to several times the real price of the land. When the deal was concluded, the government paid the landlord the purchase price, which was considered a debt owed by the peasant, to be repaid over a period of

49 years. The instalments to be paid annually by the peasants were called land redemption payments. These were an intolerable burden on the peasants and caused their impoverishment and ruin. The peasants formerly belonging to landlords alone paid nearly 2,000 million rubles to the tsarist government whereas the market price of the land that the peasants received did not exceed 544 million rubles. In view of the fact that the adoption of the redemption scheme by the peasants did not take place at once but dragged on until 1883, the redemption payments were not to have ended before 1932. The peasant movement during the first Russian revolution (1905-07), however compelled the tsarist government to abolish the redemption payments as from January 1907. p. 88

[40] Lenin's article "*The Workers' Party and Its Tasks in the Present Situation*" appeared on January 4 (17), 1906, in *Molodaya Rossiya*, a socio-political and literary weekly published legally by Social-Democratic students. The police department immediately took action to arrest the author of the article. The weekly, whose first and only issue carrying Lenin's article appeared in St. Petersburg, was seized and its editor arrested. p. 93

[41] *Dubasov, F. V.*—tsarist reactionary leader who took part in butchering the Russian Revolution of 1905-07; from November 1905 Governor General of Moscow, directed the suppression of the Moscow armed uprising in December 1905. p. 93

[42] The reference is to the heroic insurrection of the Moscow workers against the autocracy in December 1905, the climax of the revolution of 1905-07. For details see Lenin's article "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising" (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 171-79). p. 94

[43] *Bulygin Duma*—the consultative "representative assembly" which the tsarist government intended to convene in 1905. The Bill for its convocation and the regulations governing the elections were drafted by a commission under Minister of the Interior Bulygin and published along with the tsar's Manifesto on August 6 (19) 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. The government was unable to convene the Duma, which was ruled out by the revolution. p. 94

[44] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. At first it was moderately liberal, but in 1876 it became an organ of the reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. It was opposed not only to the revolutionary, but to the bourgeois-liberal movement. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called it a specimen of the venal press. p. 94

[45] The article "*The State Duma and Social-Democratic Tactics*" was written in support of the resolution "On the State Duma", adopted by the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Tammerfors in December 1905. p. 101

[46] *The Law of December 11 (24), 1905*—a law on the elections to the Duma, promulgated by the tsarist government as a certain concession to the workers at the height of the Moscow armed uprising. Unlike the regulations governing the "consultative" Bulygin Duma (August 6, 1905), the new law envisaged the establishment of a "legislative" Duma. It added to the curias established earlier—agricultural (landlords), urban (bourgeoisie) and peasant—a workers' curia, and somewhat extended the composition of the urban electorate, without increasing, however, the total number of electors from the urban curia. The suffrage was not universal, for upwards of two million working men, landless peasants, nomads, servicemen and young people under 25, as well as all women, were disfranchised. Nor was the suffrage equal. The class character of the electoral system found expression in the fact that there was one elector for 2,000 voters from the agricultural curia, 7,000 from the urban, 30,000 from the peasant and 90,000 from the workers' curia, that is, one landlord vote was equated with three votes cast by the urban bourgeoisie, 15 peasant votes and 45 workers' votes. The electors from the workers' curia made up a mere four per cent of the total number. In the case of the workers' curia, only workers in undertakings employing not less than 50 workers were allowed to vote. Undertakings employing from 50 to 1,000 workers sent one delegate. Major undertakings sent one delegate for every 1,000 people. The suffrage was not direct. The electoral system established for the workers was three-stage, and for the peasants four-stage. The ballot was practically not secret. The law ensured an overwhelming predominance of landlords and capitalists in the Duma. Lenin pointed out that the law virtually added nothing new to the procedure of election to the Duma. p. 103

[47] *Durnovo, P. N.* (1844-1915)—one of the most reactionary statesmen of tsarist Russia. In 1905, he was Minister of the Interior and took drastic steps to crush the first Russian revolution. p. 105

[48] Lenin is referring to the "Financial Manifesto" published by the Social-Democratic and liberal press on December 2 (15), 1905, over the signature of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Chief Committee of the All-Russian Peasant Union, and other organisations. The Manifesto stressed the necessity of depriving the tsarist government of budget revenue, and called on the population to refuse paying redemption or any other payments to the Treasury, and to withdraw its deposits from the loan and savings banks and the State Bank.

The Bureau of the Union of Unions, which met on December 4 (17), 1905, resolved to put the question of adherence to the Manifesto on the agenda of the next congress of the Union. But the Fourth Congress of the Union, called in January 1906, did not discuss that item. p. 107

[49] The reference is to the leading article in Narodnaya Svoboda (*People's Freedom*), No. 5, December 20, 1905 (January 2, 1906), written by the Cadet V. M. Hessen. p. 108

[50] The article "*The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party*" appeared in *Partiiniye Izvestia* (*Party News*), No. 1.

Partiiniye Izvestia was the organ of the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. formed after the merger of the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organising Committee by decision of the Tammerfors Conference. It was published illegally in St. Petersburg before the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Its editorial board consisted of equal numbers of editors of the Bolshevik and Menshevik organs (*Proletary* and the new *Iskra* respectively). The Bolsheviks were represented on the board by Lenin, Lunacharsky and others. Two issues appeared—in February and March 1906. Issue No. 2 carried Lenin's article "The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat", signed "A Bolshevik".

The publication of *Partiiniye Izvestia* was discontinued following the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., as the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had begun to publish their separate newspapers. p. 112

[50a] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Diary of a Social-Democrat*)—a nonperiodical organ published by G. Plekhanov. See present edition, Vol. 11, Note 88. p. 113

[51] The reference is to the "Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War. To the Members of the International Working Men's Association in Europe and the United States", September 9, 1870 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 491). p. 113

[52] *Pravo* (*Law*)—a juridical bourgeois-liberal daily published in St. Petersburg from the end of 1898 to 1917. p. 116

[53] *Trepov, D. F.* (1855-1906)—Chief of Police in Moscow from 1896 to 1905. In January 1905 he was appointed Governor General of St. Petersburg, and later became Vice-Minister of the Interior. He inspired Black-Hundred pogroms. p. 118

[54] *The St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was called by the St. Petersburg Committee on February 11 (24), 1906, to decide on the Party's attitude to the State Duma. It was led by Lenin. There were 65 delegates with the right to vote. Delegates to the Conference were elected after the discussion and voting of the tactical platforms of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—one delegate per 30 voting Party members. The Bolsheviks won an impressive majority. The Mensheviks demanded that the votes cast by the Okruzhnoi organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which consisted almost entirely of Bolsheviks, be declared null and void. But the Conference decided to recognise the delegation elected by the Okruzhnoi organisation. It heard a report of the St. Petersburg Committee and passed a resolution moved by Lenin, which recog-

nised the Conference duly representative and valid and its decisions binding. The report on the attitude to the Duma was made by Lenin (it was not recorded in the Conference minutes). At the close of his report Lenin read his draft resolution on the tactics of an active boycott. The Mensheviks moved a resolution of their own. The Conference voted by a majority for an active boycott of the Duma.

To discuss and finally approve the resolution on the tactics of an active boycott, a second city conference of the St. Petersburg organisation was held between late February and early March 1906. It was attended by 62 delegates. Following the debate, in which Lenin took the floor several times, the Conference approved as a basis the resolution proposed by him. The committee that was elected to edit the resolution included Lenin. The Mensheviks refused to participate in the committee and left the Conference. p. 120

[55] *Akim*—the Menshevik L. I. Goldman, a Conference delegate. p. 120

[56] Lenin has in mind the following indication of the workers' ironical attitude to the Duma: in February 1906 workers at the St. Petersburg Mechanical Works made a dummy inscribed "Deputy to State Duma" and paraded it round the premises. p. 124

[57] *Rural superintendent* (*zemsky nachalnik*)—an administrative office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to strengthen the authority of the landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were granted very great powers—not merely administrative, but also judicial—with regard to the peasants. p. 124

[58] *Union of October Seventeenth*, or *Octobrists*—a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and the big landlords using capitalist methods of farming. It arose in November 1905. While accepting in theory the Manifesto of October 17, in which the tsar, frightened by the revolution, promised the people "civil liberties" and a constitution the Octobrists unquestioningly backed the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. Their leaders were A. Guchkov, a big industrialist, and M. Rodzyanko, owner of huge estates. p. 124

[59] *Zubatovism*—the policy of "police socialism", so named after Colonel Zubatov, chief of the Moscow Secret Police on whose initiative legal workers' organisations were formed in 1901-03 to divert the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. Zubatov's activity in this field was supported by V. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior. The Zubatovists sought to direct the working-class movement into the narrow channel of purely economic demands, and suggested to the workers that the government was willing to meet those demands. The first Zubatovist organisation—the Society for Mutual Assistance of Mechanical Industry Workers—was set up in Moscow in May 1901. Similar organisations were founded in Minsk, Odessa, Vilno, Kiev and other cities.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, in exposing the reactionary character of Zubatovism, used legal workers' organisations to draw large sections of the working class into the struggle against the autocracy. The growing revolutionary movement in 1903 compelled the tsarist government to abolish the Zubatovist organisations. p. 124

[60] Speaking at the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (II), held late in February and early in March 1906, Dan, a Menshevik leader, openly declared for the first time that it was permissible to participate in the Duma. He referred to the stand of the Poltava Social-Democratic organisation, which had expressed itself to that effect. Until then, the Mensheviks had formally advanced the half-way slogan: participate in the election of delegates and electors, but not in the Duma elections. p. 125

[61] *United Landtag of 1847*—the joint assembly of the social-estate provincial Landtags, convened by Friedrich Wilhelm IV in Berlin in April 1847 to overcome financial difficulties by obtaining a foreign loan. It opened on April 11, 1847. As the king refused to meet the humblest political demands of the bourgeois majority in the Landtag, the latter refused to guarantee the loan. The king reacted by dissolving the Landtag in June of the same year, which increased oppositionist sentiment in the country and hastened the revolution. p. 125

[62] Lenin wrote the leaflet "*To All Working Men and Women of the City of St. Petersburg and Vicinity*" following the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. on February 11 (24), 1906, in line with its decisions. p. 127

[63] Lenin submitted the *Draft Resolution on the Tactics of Boycott* to the St. Petersburg Conference at its February 11 (24), 1906, session. The original wording of the draft has been lost. The draft was discussed at the Second St. Petersburg Conference at the end of February and beginning of March 1906, and was edited by a specially appointed committee which included Lenin. p. 131

[64] *The Law of February 20, 1906*, and two decrees to the Senate concerning the Duma and the Council of State reduced to nought all the promises made in the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. That law transformed the Council of State from a consultative into a legislative body. The Council of State, half of whose members were appointed while the other half were elected from among the Black-Hundred sections of the nobility, big capitalists and the clergy, was thus legally empowered to approve or reject any decision of the Duma. p. 132

[65] *The All-Russian Union of Teachers and Public Education Personnel* arose in the spring of 1905. The Second Delegates' Congress of the Union, which met on December 26-29, 1905 (January 8-11, 1906), passed a resolution on the attitude to the First Duma. The resolution described the Duma as a further government attempt to de-

ceive the people. The Congress declared against participation in the Duma elections, and stressed the need to reveal the true meaning and significance of the Duma to the population and to make every effort to organise the people for the struggle to bring about the convocation of a constituent assembly. p. 133

[66] *Polish Socialist Party*, or P.P.S. (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)—a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. Led by Pilsudski and his adherents, it carried on separatist, nationalist propaganda among the Polish workers, and strove to distract them from the struggle in common with the Russian workers against the autocracy and capitalism.

Throughout the history of the P.P.S. Left-wing groups arose within the Party under the influence of ordinary workers. Some of them subsequently joined the revolutionary wing of the Polish working-class movement.

In 1906 the P.P.S. split into a *Lewica* (Left-wing) P.P.S. and a Right-wing, chauvinist P.P.S., known as the "revolutionary faction".

Under the Influence of the Bolshevik Party, and also of the S.D.K.P.L. (Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), the *Lewica* P.P.S. gradually adopted consistently revolutionary views.

During the First World War a large section of the *Lewica* P.P.S. took up an internationalist position, and in December 1918 it merged with the S.D.K.P.L. The two merged parties formed the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (the name borne by the Communist Party of Poland till 1925).

Throughout the First World War the Right-wing P.P.S. continued its national-chauvinist policy. In Galicia it formed Polish legions which fought on the side of the Austro-German imperialists. With the rise of the Polish bourgeois state the Right-wing P.P.S. merged in 1919 with those sections of the P.P.S. that found themselves on the Polish territory seized at one time by Germany and Austria, and reassumed the name of P.P.S. Placing itself at the head of the government it helped in transferring state power to the Polish bourgeoisie and then steadily carried on anti-Communist propaganda and backed the policy of aggression against the Soviet Republic, and the policy of annexation and oppression of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Various groups within the Party, which disagreed with that policy, joined the Communist Party of Poland.

After Pilsudski's fascist coup d'état in May 1926 the P.P.S. was in parliamentary opposition in form, but in fact conducted no active struggle against the fascist regime, and continued its anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. In those years the Left within the P.P.S. co-operated with the Polish Communists and in a number of campaigns supported the tactics of united front. During the Second World War the P.P.S. split again. Its reactionary, chauvinist part, which assumed the name of *Wolność*, *Równość*, *Niepodlegtość* (Freedom, Equality, Independence), entered the reactionary Polish "government" in exile (London). The other part,

the Left-wing section of the P.P.S., which named itself the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists (W.P.P.S.), joined the people's struggle against the Hitlerite invaders—under the influence of the Polish Workers' Party (P.W.P.), founded in 1942. It fought for the liberation of Poland from fascist enslavement and took a stand for the establishment of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

In 1944, following the liberation of eastern Poland from German occupation and the formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the W.P.P.S. reassumed the name of P.P.S. and together with the P.W.P. took part in building up a people's democratic Poland. In December 1948, the P.W.P. and the P.P.S. merged into the Polish United Workers' Party (P.U.W.P.). p. 133

[67] *Shipovite-constitutional regime*—a regime of police autocracy slightly restricted by a constitution to be "granted by the tsar". So named after D. N. Shipov, a moderate liberal, one of the leaders of the Zemstvo movement in the 1890s and 1900s, and of the counter-revolutionary Octobrist Party in 1905. Lenin described Shipov's political programme which was adapted to the conditions imposed by the police, as "Zemstvo Zubatovism". p. 135

[68] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 106-17; K. Marx, *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, Hottingen-Zürich, 1885. p. 137

[69] Frederick Engels, "Concerning the History of the League of Communists" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 354). p. 137

[70] Marx and Engels, "Third International Review. From May to October" (see Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 7, Berlin, 1960, S. 416). p. 137

[71] (*Mr.*) *Coupon*—a synonym of capital and the capitalists, used by writers in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. It was coined by the Russian author Gleb Uspensky, who first used it in his sketches entitled *Grave Sins*. p. 139

[72] *Thirty Years' War (1618-48)*—a war that resulted from an aggravation of the antagonisms between various alignments of European states, and took the form of a struggle between Protestants and Catholics. It began with a revolt in Bohemia against the tyranny of the Hapsburg monarchy and the onslaught of Catholic reaction. The states which then entered the war formed two camps. The Pope, the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs and the Catholic princes of Germany, who rallied to Catholicism, opposed the Protestant countries—Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, and a number of German states that had accepted the Reformation. The Protestant countries were backed by the French kings, enemies of the Hapsburgs. Germany became the chief battlefield and object of military plunder and predatory claims. The war which at first was in the nature of resistance to the reactionary forces of feudal-absolutist Europe, developed, particularly from

1635 onwards, into a series of invasions of Germany by rival foreign conquerors. It ended in 1648, with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia, which reaffirmed the political dismemberment of Germany. p. 140

[73] See Frederick Engels "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany" (New York *Daily Tribune*, April 17, 1852-September 18, 1852 and the "Introduction" to Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, pp. 130-34). p. 141

[74] *Kuropatkin, A. N.* (1848-1925)—tsarist general, commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces in the Far East in 1904-05. p. 141

[75] The reference is to Frederick Engels's "Introduction" to Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850. Vorwärts*, which published the "Introduction" in 1895, eliminated, without the author's knowledge, all the more important formulations concerning the class struggle of the proletariat, and thus produced a distorted text. For details of this, see Frederick Engels's letters of April 1 and 3, 1895 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 568-69).

The opportunist leaders of the German Social-Democrats took advantage of the document to justify their policy of renouncing the revolution, rejecting the necessity of insurrection and barricade fighting by the proletariat, and to uphold conciliatory tactics.

The "Introduction" was first published in full in the Soviet Union—see Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1930. Besides, it was included in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38. p. 141

[76] *Brentanoism*—"a liberal-bourgeois doctrine which recognises non-revolutionary 'class' struggle by the proletariat" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 209), and affirms that the working-class problem can be solved within the framework of capitalism, through factory legislation and the association of workers in trade unions. So named after L. Brentano, one of the principal exponents of the *Katheder*-Socialist school in bourgeois political economy. p. 144

[77] *The Bolsheviks' tactical platform for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was drawn up in the latter half of February 1906. All the draft resolutions making up the platform, except the one headed "The Class Tasks of the Proletariat at the Present Stage of the Democratic Revolution", were written by Lenin. The platform was discussed in preliminary form at meetings of Party leaders in Kuokkala, Finland, where Lenin lived for a while.

Early in March the plat form was discussed in Moscow, at a meeting of members of the Moscow Committee, a group of agitators and propagandists, the literary group, the Moscow Bureau of the Central Committee, members of the Okruzhnoi Committee and other Party functionaries, with Lenin participating, and then, in the

middle of March, at a conference in St. Petersburg, with Lenin presiding. On March 20 (April 2), the platform appeared in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, and was also published in leaflet form by the Joint Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Joint Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 147

[78] The reference is to the leaflet "To the Party", issued by the Joint C.C. R.S.D.L.P. in February 1906. It dealt with questions relating to the convocation of the Fourth (Unity) Congress. p. 149

[79] In view of differences over the agrarian question, which became particularly marked on the eve of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Joint Central Committee appointed a special committee including Lenin to present the issue to the Congress. The committee reduced all the different views on the agrarian question that had found expression among the Social-Democrats to four basic types of draft and submitted them to the Congress. Most of the committee members adopted the point of view of Lenin, whose draft was therefore submitted to the Congress as that of the committee majority. The draft was approved together with the tactical platform in March 1906, at the Bolshevik meetings preceding the Congress. p. 149

[80] *The Commercial and Industrial Party*—a counter-revolutionary party of big capitalists, founded in Moscow after the publication of the Manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905. Its founders were G. A. Krestovnikov, V. P. Ryabushinsky and other big capitalists. The party, which proclaimed itself a supporter of the October Manifesto, insisted on the establishment of a strong government authority to put down the revolutionary movement. It opposed the convocation of a constituent assembly, nationalisation of the land, the introduction of an eight-hour working day, and freedom to strike. It formed a bloc with the Octobrists in the elections to the First Duma. It disintegrated at the close of 1906, most of its members joining the Union of October Seventeenth. p. 158

[81] *The Party of Democratic Reforms*—a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie founded early in 1906, during the elections to the First Duma, by elements who considered the Cadet programme too leftist. Among its more prominent leaders were K. K. Arsenyev, I. I. Ivanyukov, M. M. Kovalevsky, V. D. Kuzmin-Karavayev and A. S. Posnikov. Lacking a solid basis as it did, the Party had gone out of existence by the end of 1907. p. 158

[82] The pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party* was written in support of the Bolshevik draft submitted to the Fourth (Unity) Congress on behalf of the majority in the Agrarian Committee of the Joint C.C. R.S.D.L.P. It contains the fundamental ideas which Lenin subsequently expounded in his report on the agrarian question to the Unity Congress. p. 165

[83] *Narodniks*—adherents of a petty-bourgeois trend that arose in the Russian revolutionary movement in the sixties and seventies of

the nineteenth century. They sought the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants. On the other hand, they denied that the development of capitalist relations and the growth of a proletariat in Russia was a law-governed process, and hence regarded the peasantry as the chief revolutionary force. Seeing the village community as the embryo of socialism, they went to the country ("went among the people") and tried to rouse the peasants to the struggle against the autocracy. Taking an erroneous view of the role of the class struggle in historical development, they believed that history was made by heroes passively followed by the masses of the people. In their struggle against tsarism, the Narodniks used the tactics of individual terrorism.

In the 1880s and 1890s, the Narodniks took the path of conciliation with tsarism. At that period they expressed the interests of the kulaks and waged a bitter struggle against Marxism. p. 169

[84] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—a non-periodical literary and political collection published by the Emancipation of Labour group. Its only issue appeared in 1888. p. 170

[85] "*General redistribution*"—a slogan popular among the peasants of tsarist Russia. It expressed their desire for a general redistribution of the land. p. 170

[86] *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper. Founded by Lenin in 1900, it played the decisive role in building the Marxist revolutionary party of the working class in Russia.

It was impossible to publish a revolutionary newspaper in Russia on account of police persecution, and while still in exile in Siberia, Lenin evolved a plan for its publication abroad. When his exile ended (January 1900), Lenin immediately set about putting his plan into effect. In February, in St. Petersburg he negotiated with Vera Zasulich (who had come from abroad illegally, on the participation of the Emancipation of Labour group in the publication of the newspaper. At the end of March and the beginning of April a conference was held—known as the Pskov Conference—with V. I. Lenin, L. Martov, A. N. Potresov, S. I. Radchenko, and the "legal Marxists" P. B. Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky participating, which discussed the draft declaration, drawn up by Lenin, of the editorial board of the all-Russian newspaper (*Iskra*) and the scientific and political magazine (*Zarya*) on the programme and the aims of these publications. During the first half of 1900 Lenin travelled to a number of Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga, Smolensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ufa, Samara, Syzran) and established contact with Social-Democratic groups and individual Social-Democrats, obtaining their support for *Iskra*. In August 1900, when Lenin arrived in Switzerland, he and Potresov conferred with the Emancipation of Labour group on the programme and the aims of the newspaper and the magazine, on possible contributors, and on the editorial board and its location. The conference almost ended in failure (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 333-49), but an agreement was finally reached on all disputed questions.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900; the ensuing issues were published in Munich; from July 1902 the paper was published in London, and from the spring of 1903 in Geneva. Considerable help in getting the newspaper going (the organisation of secret printing-presses, the acquisition of Russian type, etc.) was afforded by the German Social-Democrats Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun, and others; by Julian Marchlewski, a Polish revolutionary residing in Munich at that time, and by Harry Quelch, one of the leaders of the British Social-Democratic Federation.

The editorial board of *Iskra* consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov, and V. I. Zasulich. The first secretary of the board was I. G. Smidovich-Leman; the post was then taken over, from the spring of 1901, by N. K. Krupskaya, who also conducted the correspondence between *Iskra* and the Russian Social-Democratic organisations. *Iskra* concentrated on problems of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and all working people of Russia against the tsarist autocracy, and devoted much space to major international events, above all developments in the working-class movement. Lenin was in actuality editor-in-chief and the leading figure in *Iskra*, to which he contributed articles on all basic questions of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia.

Iskra became the centre unifying Party forces, and gathering and training Party workers. In a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara, and others), groups and committees of the R.S.D.L.P. were organised on Leninist Iskra lines, and a conference of Iskra supporters held in Samara in January 1902 founded the Russian *Iskra* organisation. Iskra organisations sprang up and worked under the direct leadership of Lenin's disciples and comrades-in-arms: N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin, S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, P. A. Krasikov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky, I. I. Radchenko, and others.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin the *Iskra* editorial board drew up a draft programme of the Party (published in *Iskra*, No. 21) and made preparations for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. By the time the Congress was convened most of the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had adopted the Iskra position, approved its programme, organisational plan and tactical line, and recognised the newspaper as their leading organ. A special resolution of the Congress noted Iskra's exceptional role in the struggle to build the Party, and made the newspaper the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

Shortly after the Congress the Mensheviks, backed by Plekhanov, took *Iskra* into their own hands and turned it into an organ fighting against Marxism and the Party, into a platform for the advocacy of opportunism. Beginning with issue No. 52, Iskra ceased to be a militant organ of revolutionary Marxism. p. 171

[87] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political magazine, legally published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* editorial board. Four issues (three books) appeared in all.

Zarya criticised international and Russian revisionism, and defended the theoretical principles of Marxism. It published Lenin's writings: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", "Messrs. the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question" (the first four chapters of *The Agrarian Question and "The Critics of Marx"*), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". p. 171

[88] The *Borba* (*Struggle*) group consisting of D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov and E. L. Gurevich, emerged in Paris in the summer of 1900. It assumed its name in May 1901. Seeking to reconcile the revolutionary and the opportunist trends in Russian Social-Democracy, the group undertook in June 1901 to call in Geneva a conference of representatives of the Social-Democratic organisations abroad—the editorial boards of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, the organisation called "Sotsial-Demokrat", the Foreign Committee of the Bund, and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—and participated in the work of the "unity" congress of the organisations abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. in Zurich on September 21-22 (October 4-5), 1901. In November 1901 the group issued a programmatic "Advertisement of the Publications of the Social-Democratic Borba Group". Its publications—"Materials for the Drafting of a Party Programme" (issues I-III), "Leaflet of the Borba Group", etc.—distorted revolutionary Marxist theory, which they interpreted in a doctrinaire and scholastic spirit, and took a stand against Lenin's principles of Party organisation. In view of its departure from Social-Democratic concepts and tactics, its disruptive actions and its lack of contact with the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the group was not admitted to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and was dissolved by decision of the Congress. p. 172

[89] *X*—pseudonym of the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 172

[90] *Pravda* (*The Truth*)—a Social-Democratic monthly magazine of art, literature and public affairs, published in Moscow between 1904 and 1906, with the Mensheviks as the main contributors. p. 174

[91] The symposium "*The Present Situation*" appeared in Moscow early in 1906. Compiled by the group of writers and lecturers under the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., it expressed chiefly the Bolshevik point of view. It was confiscated shortly after its publication. p. 175

[92] *Mir Bozhy* (*The Wide World*; literally, *God's World*)—a monthly literary and popular-scientific magazine, liberal in trend; it was published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1906. During the first Russian revolution its contributors were Mensheviks. In October 1906 it changed its title to *Sovremenny Mir* (*Contemporary World*). p. 175

[93] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a newspaper founded in 1756. From the 1860s onwards it expressed the ideas of the more

reactionary monarchist landlords and clergymen, and in 1905 it became an important mouthpiece of the Black Hundreds. During the first Russian revolution its editor was V. A. Gringmut, founder of the Black-Hundred 'Russian Monarchist Party". The paper was closed shortly after the October Revolution of 1917. p. 179

[94] *Gringmut, V. A.* (1851-1907)—Russian reactionary journalist, editor of the monarchist newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* from 1897 to 1907. During the revolution of 1905-07 he was one of the founders and leaders of the Black-Hundred "Union of the Russian People". p. 179

[95] *Kutler, N. N.* (1859-1924)—tsarist statesman, member of the Second and Third Dumas, a prominent Cadet. p. 179

[96] The reference is to the democratic electoral system providing for universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. p. 182

[97] *Poshekhonye* (derived from the name of a small town in tsarist Russia)—a synonym for provincial "backwoods", an out-of-the-way corner with barbarous patriarchal customs. The term became current after the appearance of *Old Times in Poshekhonye*, a story by the Russian satirist M. Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 189

[98] *The Shidlovsky Commission*—a government commission appointed by the tsar's decree on January 29 (February 11), 1905, "to enquire without delay into the causes of discontent among the workers in the city of St. Petersburg and its suburbs" in view of the strike movement that had followed the "bloody Sunday", January 9. The Commission was headed by Senator N. V. Shidlovsky, a member of the Council of State, and included officials, chiefs of government factories, and factory owners. It was also to have included workers' delegates elected according to a two-stage system. In connection with the elections to the Commission, the Bolsheviks did much to expose the true aims of the government, which hoped the appointment of the Commission would divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle. When the electors demanded from the government freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly, inviolability of the person, etc., Shidlovsky announced, on February 18 (March 3), 1905, that the demands could not be met. Thereupon most of the electors refused to elect delegates, and addressed an appeal to the workers of St. Petersburg, who supported them by going on strike. On February 20 (March 5), 1905, the Commission was dissolved without having started work. p. 205

[99] The reference is to the tsar's decree of March 8 (21), published on March 11 (24), 1906, during the elections to the First Duma. The decree provided that incitement to boycotting the elections was punishable by four to eight months' imprisonment. p. 206

[100] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, central organ of the Cadet Party. It was published in St. Petersburg from February 23

(March 8), 1906, and its virtual editors were P. N. Milyukov and I. V. Hessen, with M. M. Vinaver, P. D. Dolgorukov, P. B. Struve and others closely collaborating. On July 22 (August 4), 1906, the paper was suspended, and on August 9 (22) resumed publication. It was closed by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued to appear till August 1918 under different titles—*Nasha Rech* (*Our Speech*), *Svobodnaya Rech* (*Free Speech*), *Vek* (*Century*), *Novaya Rech* (*New Speech*) and *Nash Vek* (*Our Century*). p. 207

[101] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily paper published in Moscow from 1863 on by liberal professors of Moscow University and Zemstvo leaders. It represented the interests of liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. In 1905 it became a Right Cadet paper. After the October Revolution it was closed along with other counter-revolutionary newspapers.

Lenin borrowed the data on the electors from the item "The Elections", published in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, No. 76, on March 19 (April 1), 1906. p. 210

[102] Judas Golovlyov—a sanctimonious, hypocritical serf-owner described in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 215

[103] *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (*The Pole Star*)—a weekly magazine of the Right wing of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg in 1905-06 and edited by P. B. Struve. In April and May 1906, the Cadets published *Svoboda i Kultura* (*Freedom and Culture*) instead of *Polyarnaya Zvezda*. p. 216

[104] *The Second Congress of the Constitutional-Democratic* (*Cadet*) *Party* took place in St. Petersburg on January 5-11 (18-24), 1906. On the issue of Party tactics, the Congress resolved to approve "as a declaration of the Party" the report which M. M. Vinaver delivered to the Congress on January 11 (24). The fundamental thesis of the declaration was recognition of the political strike as a peaceful means of fighting against the government. The declaration said that the Party considered the chief field of its activity to be "an organised representative assembly" that is, the Duma. The Congress virtually took a stand for a deal with the government. p. 217

[105] The reference is to the puppets in Saltykov-Shchedrin's tale of that name. Izuverov, the skilful craftsman who made them, said: "They have no wits or deeds or desires. All they have instead is a semblance." p. 218

[106] Under a treaty signed between the tsarist and the French governments in April 1906, the former was granted a loan of 843 million rubles to suppress the revolution in Russia. p. 225

[107] This refers to the article "Revelation of the Circumstances Attending the Events of March 1st", which M. N. Katkov, a reactionary

publicist, contributed to *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, No. 65, on March 6 (18), 1881. p. 229

[108] *Svoboda i Kultura* (*Freedom and Culture*)—a weekly magazine of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. It was published in St. Petersburg instead of *Polyarnaya Zvezda* from April 1 (14) to May 31 (June 13), 1906. Its editor was S. L. Frank, with P. B. Struve as a close associate. Eight issues appeared in all. The publication was suspended due to a sharp drop in circulation. p. 246

[109] *The lady with many good points*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 246

[110] *Bez Zaglavia* (*Without Title*)—a political weekly published in St. Petersburg from January 24 (February 6) to May 14 (27), 1906. Its editor was S. N. Prokopovich, with Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, V. V. Khizhnyakov and others as his associates. The *Bez Zaglavia* group was made up of Russian bourgeois intellectuals with semi-cadet and semi-Menshevik leanings. Under cover of their formal non-partisanship, they advocated bourgeois liberalism and opportunism, and backed the revisionists among the Social-Democrats in Russia and abroad. p. 249

[111] *Yemelyan Pugachev* (1742?-1775)—leader of the war which Russia's peasants waged against feudal tyranny in 1773-75. p. 250

[112] In March 1885, during the Reichstag debate on government subsidies to private business for the establishment of regular steamship services to East Asia, Australia and Africa, a majority of the Social-Democratic Group (the Right wing, which virtually supported Bismarck's colonial policy) voted for an East-Asian and an Australian line. It also promised its support for other lines provided all new ships were built in Germany. It was not until after the Reichstag had rejected this condition that the whole group voted against granting any subsidy. The conduct of the group majority was denounced by Social-Democratic organisations. Engels condemned the opportunist stand of the Reichstag group. p. 251

[113] The "*Youth*" were a petty-bourgeois group that arose in 1890 among the German Social-Democrats. The group consisted chiefly of university students who bad broken off their studies and of young writers (which accounted for the name of the group). It advanced a platform rejecting all Social-Democratic participation in the Reichstag. The Erfurt Congress, held in October 1891, expelled the group from the Party. p. 251

[114] *Bernsteiniad* (*Bernsteinianism*)—an anti-Marxist trend in international Social-Democracy. It arose at the end of the nineteenth century in Germany and was so named after the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein, an opportunist. After Frederick Engels's death Bernstein undertook an open revision of the revolutionary theory of Marx in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism, and

sought to turn the Social-Democratic Party into a petty-bourgeois party advocating social reforms. p. 251

[115] *Severny Golos* (*The Voice of the North*)—a legal daily newspaper of the R.S.D.L.P., published in St. Petersburg from December 6 (19), 1905 onwards and edited jointly by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. It was closed with issue No. 3 on December 8 (21), 1905. *Nash Golos* (*Our Voice*), published once—on December 18 (31), 1905—was its continuation. p. 252

[116] *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*)—a legal Menshevik daily, published in St. Petersburg from November 13 (26) to December 2(15), 1905. Altogether 16 issues were brought out. p. 252

[117] See Frederick Engels, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-49)" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 328-37), and Frederick Engels, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany", VII. "The Frankfort National Assembly , New York *Daily Tribune*, 1852. Articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, June 1-November 7, 1848 (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1959). p. 261

[118] F. Engels, *Die preußische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, Hamburg, 1865; Marx and Engels, "To the Editorial Board of the *Social-Demokrat*" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 201); F. Engels, "Notizen zur Broschüre: *Die preußische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei*" (*Berliner Reform*, Nr. 53, 1865); K. Marx, "Rezension von Engels' Broschüre: *Die preußische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei*" (*Hermann*, März 18, 1865); K. Marx, "Erklärung vom März 18, 1865" (*Berliner Reform*, Nr. 67, 1865). p. 261

[119] *Riman*, *N. R.* (1864-1917)—colonel of the tsarist army who was in command of a punitive expedition on the Moscow-Kazan Railway during the suppression of the Moscow armed uprising in December 1905.

Luzhenovsky, *G. N.* (1870-1906)—one of the organisers of Black-Hundred pogroms in 1905-06, notorious for the cruel suppression of the peasants' revolutionary movement in the Tambov region. He was assassinated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1906. p. 263

[120] *Tovarishch* (*Comrade*)—a daily bourgeois newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 15 (28), 1906, to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908). Closely associated with it were S. N. Prokopovich and Y. D. Kuskova.

Though not the official organ of any party, the paper served as the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets. Its contributors included Mensheviks. p. 271

[121] Bourgeois liberalism, which subsequently grouped itself as a political trend round the magazine *Osvobozhdeniye*, was criticised by Lenin in his article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the

Hannibals of Liberalism", published in *Zarya*, Nos. 2 and 3, in 1901 (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80). The early issues of *Osvobozhdeniye* were criticised in Lenin's articles "The Draft of a New Law on Strikes", "Political Struggle and Political Chicanery" and "Mr. Struve Exposed by His Colleague", published in *Iskra* (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 215, 251 and 352). p. 273

[122] See Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 139-242.) p. 276

[123] *The Girondists*—a bourgeois political group during the French bourgeois revolution. They represented the interests of the bourgeois moderates, and vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution, pursuing a policy of compromise with the monarchy. p. 276

[124] *The Fourth* (*Unity*) *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* took place in Stockholm from April 10-25 (April 23 to May 8), 1906.

The Congress was attended by 112 delegates with the right to vote, who represented 57 local Party organisations and 22 delegates with voice but no vote. Other participants were delegates from various national Social-Democratic parties: three each from the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, one each from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Finnish Labour Party, and also a representative of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Among the Bolshevik delegates were M. V. Frunze, M. I. Kalinin, N. K. Krupskaya, V. I. Lenin, A. V. Lunacharsky, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), S. G. Shaumyan, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and V. V. Vorovsky. The main items on the Congress agenda were the agrarian question, an appraisal of the current situation and the class tasks of the proletariat, the attitude to the Duma, and organisational matters. There was a bitter controversy between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over every item. Lenin made reports and speeches on the agrarian question, the current situation, and tactics regarding the Duma elections, the armed uprising, and other questions.

The preponderance of Mensheviks at the Congress, while slight, determined its character—the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions on a number of questions (the agrarian programme, the attitude to the Duma, etc.). The Congress approved the first clause of the Rules—concerning Party membership—in the wording proposed by Lenin. It admitted the Social-Democratic organisations of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party into the R.S.D.L.P., and predetermined the admission of the Bund.

The Congress elected a Central Committee of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks, and a Menshevik editorial board of the Central Organ.

Lenin analysed the work of the Congress in his pamphlet Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (See pp. 317-82 of this volume). p. 277

[125] Lenin's report on the agrarian question at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party was not recorded in the Congress minutes and has so far not been found. Nor is there in the Congress minutes, edited chiefly by Mensheviks, any record of Lenin's report on the current situation or of his speech in reply to the debate on the attitude to the Duma. His speeches on other questions were not recorded in full in the minutes. p. 279

[126] *John*—the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 279

[127] Lenin is referring to the following passage in Marx's article published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, No. 169, on December 15, 1848: "The whole *French terrorism* was nothing but a *plebeian manner* of settling accounts with the *enemies of the bourgeoisie*, with absolutism, feudalism and philistinism." (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 67.) p. 281

[128] *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*)—a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists, came into being in August 1879 as a result of a split in the Narodnik organisation known as Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom). The Narodnaya Volya was headed by an Executive Committee made up of A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya, A. A. Kwiatkowski and others. While upholding the views of Narodnik utopian socialism, its members began a political struggle, above all with the aim of overthrowing the autocracy and winning political freedom. Their programme envisaged the organisation of a "permanent people's representative assembly elected by universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic freedoms, the transfer of the land to the people, and the elaboration of measures for the transfer of the factories to the workers. "The Narodnaya Volya members made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism," wrote Lenin (present edition Vol. 8, p. 72).

The Narodnaya Volya fought heroically against the tsarist autocracy. However, proceeding from the fallacious theory of "active" heroes and a "passive" crowd, they expected to bring about the reorganisation of society by their own efforts—through individual terrorism, through intimidation and disorganisation of the government—without the participation of the people. After March 1, 1881, when Alexander II was assassinated, the government routed the Narodnaya Volya through cruel reprisals, including executions. Throughout the eighties members of the Narodnaya Volya made fruitless attempts to revive their organisation. In 1886, for example, a group was formed under the leadership of A. I. Ulyanov (a brother of Lenin's) and P. Y. Shevyryov, which shared the traditions of the Narodnaya Volya. In 1887, following an abortive attempt to organise the assassination of Alexander III, the group was discovered, and its more active members were put to death.

Lenin, while criticising the erroneous, utopian programme of the Narodnaya Volya, spoke very highly of the selfless struggle which its members waged against tsarism, as well as of their secrecy techniques and strictly centralised organisation. p. 283

[129] *Kartvelov*—N. G. Chichinadze, a Caucasian Menshevik. p. 285

[130] *Borisov*—S. A. Suvorov, who at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the Bolsheviks. p. 286

[131] Lenin is quoting Karl Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 405). p. 287

[132] *Petrunkevich*, *I. I.*, and *Rodichev*, *F. I.*—landlords, prominent Cadets and Zemstvo officials. p. 287

[133] *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* (*The Russian State*)—a government newspaper published in St. Petersburg from February 1 (14) to May 15 (28), 1906. p. 287

[134] *Ptitsyn*—the Menshevik B. I. Soloveichik. p. 289

[135] *Leonov*—the Menshevik V. O. Levitsky (Tsederbaum). p. 290

[136] *Legitimists*—supporters of the French Bourbons, overthrown in 1830. The Bourbons represented the interests of the big hereditary landowners.

Orleanists—supporters of the Orleans family in France. The family, which came into power in 1830, was backed by the financial aristocracy and the big bourgeoisie. p. 290

[137] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 208. p. 290

[138] *Convention*—the third National Assembly during the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century. It was established as the supreme legislature following the people's uprising on August 10, 1792, which overthrew the monarchy. Elections to the Convention were held in August and September 1792. The deputies formed three groups: the Jacobins, or the Left wing, the Girondists, or the Right wing, and the "Marsh", or the vacillating majority. Under the pressure of the people the Convention on September 21 abolished the royal power, and on September 22 proclaimed France a republic. The activity of the Convention was particularly fruitful under the Jacobin dictatorship (May 31-June 2, 1793-July 27, 1794), when the Girondists were expelled. The Convention completed the abolition of the feudal system; it dealt mercilessly with all counter-revolutionaries and compromisers, and fought against foreign intervention. At the same time it upheld the inviolability of private property.

After Thermidor 9 (July 27, 1794), when a counter-revolutionary coup d'état was accomplished, an after the adoption of the so-

called Constitution of the Year III, the Thermidor Convention was dissolved on October 26, 1795. p. 291

[139] The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks drafted for the Fourth (Unity) Congress their resolutions on the attitude to the Duma. By the time this question had come up for discussion at the Congress both drafts, written prior to the Duma elections, were obsolete, and new drafts were proposed instead. The committee which was set up at the seventh session of the Congress to draft a joint resolution on the Duma and which comprised G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Lenin, F. I. Dan, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov (Fyodorov), A. V. Lunacharsky (Voyinov) and O. A. Yermansky (Rudenko), did not reach unity, and submitted two draft resolutions to the Congress: a Menshevik one, prepared by Plekhanov, Axelrod and Dan and a Bolshevik one, prepared by Lenin, Skvortsov-Stepanov and Lunacharsky. The new Bolshevik draft, written by Lenin, was read by the chairman of the Congress at its sixteenth session, and by Lenin at its seventeenth session, during his co-report on the Duma. It was published in *Volna*, No. 12, after the Congress, on May 9, 1906, with an afterword by Lenin (see p. 401 of this volume). p. 292

[140] Lenin is referring to an incident that occurred at the twenty-first session of the Congress. After the Mensheviks had rejected a Bolshevik amendment to the last clause of the Menshevik draft resolution on the Duma ten Bolshevik delegates, including Lenin, demanded that the amendment be put to a vote by roll-call. Then a Menshevik delegate from the Kharkov organisation accused the Bolsheviks of "collecting agitational material against the authority of the Congress decisions, thereby hampering its work". In reply Lenin, speaking on behalf of the Bolsheviks, pointed out the narrow factionalism shown by the Mensheviks (see p. 308 of this volume). p. 299

[141] *Vorobyov*—the Caucasian Menshevik V. B. Lomtatidze. p. 299

[142] At the Congress, the Bolsheviks described the Menshevik draft resolution on "Armed Uprising" as a resolution "against armed uprising". Lenin also stressed this in his "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." (see p. 368 of this volume). p. 299

[143] *Winter*—L. B. Krasin. p. 299

[144] *Akimov, V. P.* (Makhnovets)—extreme opportunist, one of the ideologists of Economism, who adhered to the Menshevik Right wing. At the twenty-second session of the Congress, he made a special report on armed uprising, in which he openly voiced his opposition to insurrection. p. 300

[145] *The first clause of the Menshevik draft resolution on armed uprising*, discussed by the Congress, read: "Whereas (1) the stupid obstinacy of the Russian Government confronts the people with the

necessity of wresting their rights from it...." It was formulated by Plekhanov. On the drafting committee Plekhanov had insisted that "wresting their rights from it" be substituted for "wresting state power", the phrase given in the original draft. Faced with objections, he had renounced his amendment. But just before the Congress met in session the Menshevik section of the committee submitted the first clause of the resolution as worded by Plekhanov. The amendment drew an emphatic protest from Lenin and the Bolshevik section of the Congress. Plekhanov was compelled to withdraw it p. 300

146 *Muratov's amendment* ("Muratov" was M. Morozov, a delegate from the Samarkand organisation), submitted at the twenty-first session of the Congress, said that in view of the Party's non-participation in the elections, the question of forming a parliamentary Social-Democratic group could be decided "only when the composition of the group of Social-Democrats elected to the Duma was known and they had been recognised by all the workers' organisations in whose areas the elections had taken place" (see *The Fourth* [*Unity*] *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1934, pp. 368-69). The Menshevik majority at the Congress rejected the amendment. p. 302

147 *Stodolin*—the Bolshevik N. N. Nakoryakov. p. 303

148 Lenin wrote the *Appeal* immediately after the Unity Congress of the Party. It was discussed and approved by the conference of Bolshevik delegates held at People's House in Stockholm, and was signed by 26 Bolshevik delegates to the Congress who represented the largest Party organisations. p. 310

149 The merger of the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the R.S.D.L.P. was considered necessary, and proposed more than once, by the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.P. & L.) at its congresses. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), which discussed the question, the S.D.P. & L. did not join the R.S.D.L.P. because of differences over the national question. In January 1906, the Executive Committee of the S.D.P. & L. resumed talks on a merger with the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The talks resulted in the drafting of a treaty which the S.D.P. & L. representative brought to the Fourth (Unity) Congress. After introducing some amendments into the draft, the Congress approved it. p. 310

150 *The Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party* was founded by its First Congress in June 1904. Its Second Congress, which met in June 1905, adopted the Party Programme and passed a decision on the necessity of a merger with the R.S.D.L.P. In 1905, it led the revolutionary actions of the workers and prepared the masses for an armed uprising.

At the Fourth (Unity) Congress, the Party joined the R.S.D.L.P. as a territorial organisation. After the Congress it was renamed the Social-Democracy of the Lettish Territory. p. 310

[151] *The Bund* (*The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia*) was formed by a founding congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilno in 1897; it was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (1898) "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in respect of questions affecting the Jewish proletariat specifically". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1954, Part I, p. 14, Russ. ed.)

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the working-class movement of Russia. Its Fourth Congress, held in April 1901, resolved to alter the organisational relations established by the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The resolution said that the Congress regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federation of national organisations and that the Bund should be treated as a member of that federation.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. had rejected its demand that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party. In 1906, the Bund again entered the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of a resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists persistently supported the opportunist wing of the Party (the "Economists", the Mensheviks, the liquidators) and struggled against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. The Bund countered the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy. During the period of the Stolypin reaction, it adopted a liquidationist position and was active in forming the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) it adopted the position of the social-chauvinists. In 1917, it supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Bund leadership joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with Soviet power. In March 1921, the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and part of its membership joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) according to general procedure. p. 310

[152] During the Congress debate on Clause 7 of the Party's organisational Rules the question of the relations between the Central Committee and the Central Organ gave rise to a controversy. The Mensheviks insisted that the editors of the C.O. be elected by the Congress, with the right to vote when political matters were discussed by the Central Committee. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, insisted that the editorial board of the C.O. be appointed by the Central Committee, which should also have the right to recall the board. The Menshevik majority of the Congress succeeded in carrying its proposal through. In 1907, the Fifth (London) Congress, revising the clause, adopted the Bolshevik wording of it (see

The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, Moscow, 1954, Part I, pp. 170-72, Russ. ed.). p. 314

[153] The pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, (*A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers*) became an object of persecution. The police searched the *Dyelo* printing-works in St. Petersburg, where the pamphlet was being set, and delivered the latter to the St. Petersburg Press Committee. The Committee banned the pamphlet. But the Party succeeded in sending the text to Moscow, where its printing was completed.

In the *Vperyod* edition, the pamphlet had an Appendix including the draft resolutions submitted to the Congress by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, resolutions adopted by the Congress, and other matter. Lenin refers to them more than once in his pamphlet. At the end of the pamphlet there is a brief introduction to the Appendix (see p. 382 of this volume). p. 317

[154] *Revolutionary Ukrainian Party* (R.U.P.)—a petty-bourgeois, nationalist organisation founded early in 1900. In December 1905, it renamed itself the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (U.S.D.L.P.), and decided to join the R.S.D.L.P., provided it was recognised as "the sole representative of the Ukrainian proletariat" within the R.S.D.L.P. The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected the proposal which the U.S.D.L.P. spokesman had made for the immediate discussion of the terms of a merger, and referred the matter to the Central Committee for decision. No agreement was reached on a merger. Subsequently the U.S.D.L.P. found itself in the camp of the bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolution. p. 322

[155] *The Credentials Committee* elected at the first session of the Congress was composed of two Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks and one so-called "neutral", who was in fact a conciliator (he headed the Committee). The Congress approved the terms of reference of the Committee and passed Lenin's draft resolution, which made it a duty of the Committee to submit written reports to the Congress. The work of the Committee and the discussion of its reports at the plenary sessions of the Congress took place in an atmosphere of intense struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Relations became particularly strained at the sixth session of the Congress over the Committee proposal to cancel the credentials of Artamonov (F. A. Sergeyev, or Artyom), a Bolshevik delegate from the Kharkov organisation. The Bolsheviks on the Committee declared that they were leaving the Committee, and then the Congress elected a new Committee made up of Mensheviks and conciliators. p. 324

[156] *The protest of the Tiflis workers against the powers of the Menshevik delegation*, signed by 200 persons, was read at the twentieth session of the Congress. It said that in drawing up the lists of Party members the Tiflis Mensheviks had ignored the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P., and had included chance people in the list. The Men-

sheviks had "discovered" over 3,000 Party members in Tiflis. The worker Social-Democrats of Tiflis maintained in their protest that the city could not be represented at the Congress by as many as 11 delegates. p. 325

[157] The minutes of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., published in 1907, had serious shortcomings—they did not contain records of a number of reports and speeches made at the Congress, specifically by Lenin. p. 326

[158] *Schmidt*—P. P. Rumyantsev, who at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the Bolsheviks. p. 328

[159] The reference is to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 330

[160] *Klyuchevsky*, *V. O.* (1841-1911) and *Yefimenko*, *A. Y.* (1848-1919)—prominent Russian historians. p. 331

[161] *Demyan*—I. A. Teodorovich. p. 332

[162] "*Demyan Hash*"—title of a fable by I. A. Krylov. p. 333

[163] *Kostrov*—N. N. Jordania, Caucasian Menshevik leader. p. 336

[164] *Voyinov*—the Bolshevik A. V. Lunacharsky. p. 340

[165] Lenin is quoting Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 405). p. 345

[166] *Boris Nikolayevich*—the Menshevik B. I. Soloveichik. p. 351

[167] *Nevskaya Gazeta* (*The Neva Newspaper*)—a legal Menshevik paper published in St. Petersburg in May 1906. p. 359

[168] Shipov's slogan "Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo", which Struve supported in his introduction to Finance Minister Witte's memorandum "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo" was criticised by Lenin in the article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80). p. 361

[169] *Trudoviks* (from *trud*, "labour")—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Russian Duma, consisting of peasants and also of Narodnik-minded intellectuals. The Trudovik Group was constituted in April 1906 from the peasant deputies to the First Duma.

The demands of the Trudoviks included the abolition of all restrictions based on the social-estates and on nationality, the democratisation of the Zemstvos and town self-government bodies, and universal suffrage in the elections to the Duma. The Trudovik agrarian programme proceeded from the Narodnik principle of

equalised land tenure: the formation of a national fund made up of state, crown and monastery lands, and also of private estates where they exceeded the established labour norm, with provision for compensation in the case of confiscated private estates. Lenin pointed out that the typical Trudovik is a peasant who "is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his own plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal state for democracy". (See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 229.)

In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, their vacillations being due to the very class nature of the peasants, who are petty proprietors. Since the Trudoviks represented the peasant masses, the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Duma were to arrive at agreements with them on individual issues with a view to waging a joint struggle against the Cadets and the tsarist autocracy.

In 1917, the Trudovik Group merged with the "Popular Socialist" Party, and gave active support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution of 1917, the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 361

[170] *Nazar*—the Bolshevik N. N. Nakoryakov. p. 361

[171] For the Central Committee instructions on the parliamentary group, which were approved by the Unity Congress, see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1953, Part I, pp. 137-332, Russ. ed. p. 362

[172] *Duma*—a daily evening newspaper published by the Right wing of the Cadet Party in St. Petersburg from April 27 (May 10) to June 13 (26), 1909. Its editor was P. B. Struve, and among its contributors were S. A. Kotlyarevsky, P. I. Novgorodtsev, I. I. Petrunkevich, F. I. Rodichev, L. N. Yasnopolsky and other members of the First Duma. p. 362

[173] "*Economism*"—an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, a variety of international opportunism. The newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*) (1897-1902) and the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*) (1899-1902) were organs of the "Economists", whom Lenin called Russian Bernsteinians and whose programme was set forth in the so-called *Credo*, written in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova.

The "Economists" limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the concern of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the

Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could arise out of the spontaneous movement of the workers, denied the necessity of socialist consciousness to be brought into the working-class movement by a Marxist party, and thereby paved the way for bourgeois ideology. The "Economists", who denied the need for a centralised working-class party, favoured a sporadic and amateurish Social-Democratic movement. "Economism" threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and to turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The views of the "Economists" were thoroughly criticised in Lenin's writings "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (directed against *Credo*; written in Siberian exile in 1899, it was signed by 17 exiled Marxists), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the '*Profession de Foi*'", and "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96 and Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin completed the ideological defeat of "Economism" in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). Lenin's *Iskra* played a major part in the struggle against "Economism". p. 363

[174] On October 24, 1905, *Vorwärts* carried in its issue No. 249 a communication of the Central Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party of October 23, 1905, on the changes made in the editorial board of *Vorwärts*. Six editors who belonged to the revisionist trend in the Party had been removed and persons belonging to the Left wing of the Party included in the renewed editorial board. Rosa Luxemburg had been assigned a key role in the paper.

The opportunists launched a campaign in defence of the removed editors, but the Party rank and file approved of and backed the policy of the Executive. p. 373

[175] The *Amsterdam Congress of the Second International* was held from August 14-20 (N. S.), 1904. Its attitude to bourgeois parties was expressed in the resolution "International Rules for Socialist Tactics". The resolution forbade socialists to enter bourgeois governments, and rejected co-operation between socialist and bourgeois parties. p. 373

[176] *Volna* (*The Wave*)—a Bolsheviks daily published legally in St. Petersburg from April 26 (May 9) to May 24 (June 6), 1906. Twenty-five issues appeared in all. p. 383

[177] The legal Bolshevik newspapers published in the spring and summer of 1906—*Volna*, *Vperyod*, and *Ekho* (*The Echo*)—had a section headed "Among newspaper and Periodicals", to which Lenin contributed a number of articles.

In this particular item, Lenin criticises L. Martov's article. p. 400

[178] *Millerandists*—exponents of Millerandism, an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, so named after the French social-reformist

Alexandre Millerand, who in 1899 entered the reactionary bourgeois government of France and backed its anti-popular policy. That move of Millerand's was a striking manifestation of the policy of class co-operation between opportunist Social-Democratic leaders and the bourgeoisie. It indicated those leaders' renunciation of the revolutionary struggle, and constituted a betrayal of the interests of the working classes. Lenin described Millerandism as revisionism and renegacy; he stressed that social-reformists who entered a bourgeois government invariably turned out to be puppets of the capitalists, and a tool which that government used for deceiving the masses. p. 400

[179] This article was written by Lenin as an afterword to the resolution "On the State Duma", which he submitted to the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see pp. 292-93 of this volume) and which *Volna* published in its issue No. 12 on May 9 (22), 1906. p. 401

[180] *Count Heyden's group*—the "Left" wing of the Octobrist group in the First Duma; it included several Right Cadets. At the Duma session on May 5 (18), 1906, during the discussion of the reply to the address from the throne, the Heyden group refused to vote for the text of the reply, couched by the Cadets in constitutional-monarchist terms, for it considered the text too radical, and left the session. Following the dissolution of the Duma the group organised itself into the Party of Peaceful Renovation, which stood close to the Octobrists. Lenin gave a political characterisation of Heyden and his group in the article "In Memory of Count Heyden" (see present edition, Vol. 13.). p. 404

[181] The words in quotation marks are a paraphrase of the closing lines of Lermontov's poem "Meditation" (*Duma* in Russian) (see M. Y. Lermontov, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1934, p. 7). p. 404

[182] Lenin wrote the note "*The Question of Organization*" by way of an editorial afterword to an article of that name dealing with the relations between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in the local Party organisations. p. 406

[183] The *public meeting* was arranged by the Socio-Political Club in Countess Panina's St. Petersburg palace on May 9 (22), 1906, in connection with the Duma's reply to the address from the throne. Attended by some 3,000 people, over half of whom were workers, it was the first mass meeting in Russia to be openly addressed by Lenin, who was introduced as "Karpov". His speech was an answer to two speakers—the "Popular Socialist" Myakotin and the Menshevik Dan (Bartenyev), both of whom advocated a bloc with the Cadets. In conclusion Lenin proposed a resolution that was carried almost unanimously. p. 407

[184] The information supplied by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency on the elections in Tiflis and used by Lenin in his article was inac-

curate. The number of electors elected in Tiflis was not 81 but 80, of whom 71 were Social-Democrats and 9, Cadets. p. 423

[185] The reference is to the election of electors in Kutais. Elections to the First Duma took place later. Kutais Gubernia sent three deputies to the Duma—I. G. Gomarteli, S. D. Japaridze and I. I. Ramishvili, Mensheviks all. p. 423

[186] Lenin is referring to the resolution "Attitude Towards the State Duma", which said: "...wherever elections are still ahead and the R.S.D.L.P. can nominate its candidates without entering into blocs with other parties, it should strive to have its candidates elected to the Duma" (*The Fourth* [*Unity*] *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1959, p. 526). p. 423

[187] The reference is to the disruptive conduct of the Menshevik Armavir Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which violated the Unity Congress decision forbidding blocs with bourgeois parties. During the Duma elections the Armavir Committee issued an appeal proposing to vote for the Social-Democrats, or at least for candidates who were "not more to the right than the Cadets". p. 423

[188] The article was written by Lenin as an afterword "From the Editors" to the appeal of the worker deputies in the Duma, "To All Workers of Russia". The appeal was published together with Lenin's afterword in *Volna*, No. 21, on May 19 (June 5), 1906. p. 434

[189] Lenin has in mind the "Draft of the Fundamental Land Law" prepared by a private conference of Trudovik deputies. Signed by 33 deputies (mostly Trudoviks), the draft was introduced into the Duma on June 6 (19), 1906, and was rejected on June 8 (21). The "Draft of the 33" demanded the immediate and complete abolition of private landownership, it was a supplement to the Trudoviks' agrarian draft demanding equalised land tenure on the principle of labour norms, submitted to the Duma on May 23 (June 5), 1906, and known as the "Draft of the 104". p. 437

[190] *Sorry Goremykins*—representatives of the reactionary-bureaucratic government quarters in tsarist Russia, headed by I. L. Goremykin, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Their mouthpiece was the Black-Hundred paper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*). p. 440

[191] On May 11 (24), 1906, 300 R.S.D.L.P. members of the Moskovsky district in St. Petersburg held a meeting to discuss the results of the Unity Congress. The reports were made by Lenin (no record of his report has been preserved) and the Menshevik Dan. Towards the close of the meeting a controversy broke out between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over whether it was permissible to criticise decisions of the Unity Congress in the press and at public meetings. The Mensheviks, who were doing their utmost to limit the ideological struggle over the Congress decisions, considered criticism permissible only at Party meetings, and proposed a resolution to that

effect. Lenin moved an amendment saying that all the Congress decisions should be discussed not only at Party meetings, but also in the Social-Democratic press and at public meetings. The resolution, including Lenin's amendment, was carried against 39 votes (*Volna*, No. 15, May 12, 1906). In reply to Lenin's amendment the Central Committee, most of whose members were Mensheviks, adopted the resolution which Lenin criticises in his article. p. 442

[192] *Kuryer* (*The Courier*)—a legal Menshevik daily published in St. Petersburg in May and June 1906. p. 444

[193] *Dyelo Naroda* (*People's Cause*)—a legal Socialist-Revolutionary daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in May 1906. p. 444

[194] Lenin is referring to the Cadet "Draft Law on the Press", published in *Rech*, central organ of the Cadets, on May 17-18 (30-31), 1906. The draft envisaged penal servitude for a term of up to eight years for violating the tsarist censorship regulations. p. 446

[195] *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* (*Government Herald*)—a daily newspaper, official organ of the tsarist government; it appeared in St. Petersburg from 1869 to 1917. p. 450

[196] The article "*Kautsky on the State Duma*" appeared in *Vestnik Zhizni* (*Life Herald*), No. 6.

Vestnik Zhizni—a weekly scientific, literary and political magazine, published legally by the Bolsheviks. It appeared in St. Petersburg intermittently from March 30 (April 12), 1906, to September 1907. By November 19 (December 2), 1906, thirteen issues bad been published. In January 1907, the weekly became a monthly, of which seven issues appeared. Contributors to *Vestnik Zhizni* were V. I. Lenin, M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, A. M. Gorky and others. In No. 12 of the magazine, Lenin printed his article "The Russian Radical Is Wise After the Event". p. 452

[197] *Kolokol* (*The Bell*)—a legal Social-Democratic daily published in Poltava, Ukraine, from January 18 (31) to June 8 (21), 1906. Most of its contributors were Mensheviks. p. 460

[198] *Lavrov, P. L.* (1823-1900)—Russian sociologist and publicist noted ideologist of Narodism. p. 466

[199] See Karl Marx's article "The Communism of the Paper *Rheinischer Beobachter*" (Marx and Engels, *On Religion*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 81-86). p. 467

[200] See Frederick Engels, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 328-37); Frederick Engels, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany". VII. "The Frankfort National Assembly": New York

Daily Tribune, 1852; Articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1959). p. 467

[201] See Note 108. p. 472

[202] *Prince Trubetskoi, S. N.* (1862-1905)—a liberal advocating a moderate constitution. In June 1905, he addressed a policy speech to Nicholas II as a member of a Zemstvo deputation sent to the tsar. p. 474

[203] *Prizyv* (*The Call*)—a popular newspaper published in St. Petersburg from January 15 (28) to June 15 (28), 1906. From the end of March onwards its contributors included Bolsheviks. p. 476

[204] *The "Resolution (II) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P."* and the article "*The Slogan of a Duma Ministry*", which is printed next to it and which Lenin wrote as an afterword on behalf of the editorial board of *Vperyod*, were expressive of the struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over the Duma, a struggle which took the form of a conflict between the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

On May 13 (26), 1906, the government rejected the demands of the Cadet Duma stated in its Address. In reply the Duma passed a resolution expressing no confidence in the Ministry and insisting on its resignation. The Menshevik C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. circulated to the Party organisations a resolution proposing to support the Cadet Duma's demand for a Duma—that is a Cadet—Ministry. The resolution was opposed by the St. Petersburg Committee led by Lenin. At its meeting on May 23-24 (June 5-6), 1906, the Committee rejected the Menshevik resolution of the C.C. and carried the resolution proposed by Lenin. Nine Menshevik members of the Committee demanded that the Bolshevik resolution be suspended until the matter was dealt with by the C.C. or an inter-district city conference. This demand of the Mensheviks was likewise rejected by the St. Petersburg Committee. At the same time the Committee resolved to call an inter-district conference, acquaint the districts with the minutes and other records of the conference, and publish in the press Lenin's resolution, which had been carried, and the statement of the nine Menshevik members of the Committee as material to be discussed prior to the forthcoming conference. p. 481

[205] At the fourteenth sitting of the Duma on May 24 (June 6), 1906, the Trudoviks tabled a motion, signed by 35 deputies, for the immediate establishment of local land committees to be elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. The land committees were to carry out work preparatory to an agrarian reform and participate in the discussion of the draft laws on the agrarian question submitted to the Duma. The issue of local committees and redemption payments was "the very pivot of the agrarian question", as Lenin phrased it, for it was an issue of who was to effect the reform, whether the peasants or the landlords.

The Cadets sharply criticised the Trudovik motion, both in the Duma and in the press. On the very next day after the statement of the thirty-five was made public *Rech*, the Cadet central organ, attacked the Trudovik draft, saying that the contemplated committees might shift the solution of the problem to the "left".

The Bolsheviks supported the idea of setting up local committees, which they regarded as one form of organising the masses for a further revolutionary struggle. Lenin wrote: "Workers' governments in the towns, peasant committees in the villages (which at a certain moment will be transformed into bodies elected by universal, etc., suffrage)—such is the only possible form of organisation of the victorious revolution, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is not surprising that the liberals hate these forms of organisation of the classes that are fighting for freedom!" (See present edition, Vol. 13, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907".)
p. 486

[206] In the German text quoted by Lenin, *Vperyod* left out the words *Thron und Allar* (throne and altar) because of censorship.
p. 495

[207] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from May 26 (June 8), 1906 onwards, instead of the newspaper Volna, closed by the government. Lenin played the leading role in the daily. Among the contributors were M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky and A. V. Lunacharsky. The paper was persecuted by the police; it was closed with issue No. 17 on June 14 (27), 1906, and was succeeded by the Bolshevik *Ekho*.

The "Resolution (II) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." appeared in *Vperyod* in abridged form. p. 500

[208] *Vlasov*—A. I. Rykov. p. 504

[209] The resolution was linked with the conflict between the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. over the attitude towards the Duma. Together with Resolution II of the St. Petersburg Committee (see pp. 481-82 of this volume), it constituted the Bolsheviks' tactical platform, on the basis of which a discussion was held and elections took place to the interdistrict conference of the St. Petersburg organisation (the conference met on June 11-12 [24-25], 1906, in Terijoki, Finland, under Lenin's leadership).

Vperyod published the resolution with the following editorial comment: "The editorial board of *Vperyod* fully shares the main propositions of the resolution, and recommends the comrades to propose it at workers' meetings." p. 514

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Chronology

(*November 1905-June 1906*)

1905

Late October-early November	Lenin awaits in Stockholm the papers he requires to return to Russia.
November 2 (15-17)	In Stockholm, Lenin writes his article "Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. *A Letter to the Editor*".
November 5 (18)	Lenin arrives in Helsingfors from Stockholm.
November 7 *or* 8 (20 *or* 21)	Lenin arrives in St. Petersburg.
November 8 *or* 9 (21 *or* 22)	Lenin leads a meeting of the Bolshevik section of the editorial board of *Novaya Zhizn*; the meeting determines the composition of the editorial board and elaborates the programme of the newspaper for the immediate future.
November 9 (22)	Lenin attends a Central Committee meeting, which unanimously adopts the appeal "To All Party Organisations and All Social-Democratic Workers" concerning the convocation of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
November 10 (23)	*Novaya Zhizn*, No. 9, publishes the beginning of the article "The Reorganisation of the Party", the first article written by Lenin upon his return to Russia from exile.
November 12 (25)	In the leading article "The Proletariat and the Peasantry", published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 11, Lenin greets the Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union.
November 13 (26)	Lenin's article "Party Organisation and Party Literature" appears in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 12. At a meeting of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Lenin speaks on measures to counteract the lock-out organised by the capitalists in reply to the eight-hour day established in revolu-

tionary manner by the workers. The resolution he proposes is carried.

November 15 (28) — Lenin's article "The Provocation That Failed" is published as the leader in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 13, which also carries the next instalment of the article "The Reorganisation of the Party".

Lenin writes his article "The Armed Forces and the Revolution". The article is published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 14, on November 16 (29).

November 16 (29) — At the seat of the Free Economic Society, Lenin delivers to a meeting of St. Petersburg Party workers a report entitled "A Criticism of the Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party". The conclusion of Lenin's article "The Reorganisation of the Party" appears in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 14.

November 18 (*December* 1) — Lenin's articles "The Scales Are Wavering" and "Learn from the Enemy" appear in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 16.

November 20 (*December* 3) — Lenin's article "Revolutionary Office Routine and Revolutionary Action", dealing with the question of a constituent assembly, is published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 18.

November 23 (*December* 6) — Lenin's article "The Dying Autocracy and New Organs of Popular Rule" is published as the leader in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 19.

November 24 (*December* 7) — Lenin writes his article "Socialism and Anarchism". The article appears in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 21, on November 25 (December 8).

November 26 and *December* 2 (*December* 9 *and* 15) — Lenin's article "The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism" is carried in *Novaya Zhizn*, Nos. 22 and 27.

November 27 (*December* 10) — Lenin attends a meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., which discusses questions relating to the preparation of an armed uprising, changes in the editorial board of *Novaya Zhizn*, and the publication of the Bolshevik newspaper *Borba* in Moscow.

November — At an enlarged session of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin speaks on the Party's attitude to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

December 3 (16) — Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya take up their legal residence at 15/8 Grechesky Prospekt in St. Pe-

tersburg. Rigid secret police surveillance compels Lenin to go underground several days later.

Lenin's article "Socialism and Religion" is published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 28.
Lenin attends an urgent joint conference of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party and the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies called in view of the closing of *Novaya Zhizn*. The conference also discusses the question of armed uprising.

December 12-17 (15-30)

Lenin leads the First Bolshevik Conference in Tammerfors, Finland. He makes reports on the current situation and the agrarian question. The Conference passes his draft resolutions on the agrarian question and the convocation of a unity congress.
Lenin participates in the committee appointed to draft a resolution on the attitude to be adopted towards the Duma, the resolution is passed by the Conference.

December 22 (*January* 4, 1906

In St. Petersburg Lenin attends a conference of members of the Central Committee and delegates to the Tammerfors Bolshevik Conference. He makes a report on the Bolsheviks' tactical platform with regard to the Duma.

Late 1905 *or early* 1906

Lenin writes an outline of his article on the stages, direction and prospects of the revolution.

1906

Early part of year to middle of March

Lenin participates in the committee appointed by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to draw up an agrarian programme for discussion at the Fourth Party Congress.

January 4 (17)

Lenin's article "The Workers' Party and Its Tasks in the Present Situation" is carried as the leader in *Molodaya Rossiya*, No. 1.

January

Lenin writes an article in support of the Bolshevik tactics of an active boycott of the First Duma. The article, entitled "Should We Boycott the State Duma? The Platform of the 'Majority'", is published in leaflet form in January, both by the Central Committee and by the Joint C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.
Lenin writes his article "The State Duma and Social-Democratic Tactics". The article appears in Feb-

	ruary as part of the pamphlet *The State Duma and Social-Democracy*.
Before February 4 (17)	At a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Moskovskaya Zastava district in St. Petersburg, Lenin delivers his report "On the Elections to the State Duma".
February 7 (20)	Lenin's article "The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party" appears in *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 1.
Before February 11 (24)	Lenin reports on the tactics of an active boycott of the Duma to a meeting of Bolshevik Party functionaries in St. Petersburg.
February 11 (24)	Lenin guides the work of the St. Petersburg City Conference. He makes a report on the attitude to the Duma, and submits his draft resolution on the tactics of boycotting the Duma. The Conference votes by a majority for the boycott.
After February 11 (24)	Lenin writes the appeal "To All Working Men and Women of the City of St. Petersburg and Vicinity". The Joint St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. publishes it in leaflet form.
Late February (*early March*)	Lenin guides the work of The Second St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. He upholds his draft resolution "The Tactics of Boycott", and the Conference carries it.
	In Kuokkala, Finland, Lenin works on the tactical platform of the Bolsheviks—draft resolutions for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
First half of March	Lenin arrives in Moscow to organise the discussion of the draft resolutions prepared for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. He takes part in a conference of the leading group of the Moscow Bolsheviks.
	He attends a meeting of the Zamoskvorechye District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Moscow, and speaks in the debate on the draft resolution concerning the attitude to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.
	He also attends a meeting of the Moscow Regional Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. during the discussion of the question whether the Moscow organisation should participate in the Duma election campaign.
Middle (*end*) *of March*	Lenin leads conferences of the Bolshevik group in St. Petersburg, which discuss the tactical platform.

March 20 (*April* 2)	*Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, publishes Lenin's article "The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat" as the leading article, and "A Tactical Platform for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Draft Resolution for the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", prepared by Lenin.
Second half of March	Lenin writes his pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*. The pamphlet appears in St. Petersburg early in April.
March 24-28 (*April* 6-10)	Lenin writes his pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*. The pamphlet is published in St. Petersburg in April.
March 26 (*April* 8)	Lenin is elected a delegate to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. for the St. Petersburg organisation.
March	Lenin writes a preface to the Russian translation of Karl Kautsky's pamphlet, *Social-Democracy Wiped Out!*
Late March (*early April*)	In St. Petersburg, Lenin leads a conference of the Bolshevik delegates to the Fourth Congress.
Before April 10	Lenin arrives in Stockholm to attend the Fourth Congress. At a private Bolshevik conference, he speaks against the proposal to wreck the Congress in view of the Mensheviks' preponderance at it.
April 10-25 (*April* 23-*May*	The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. meets in Stockholm. Lenin is elected to the presiding committee of the Congress. He takes part in the work of the Congress and of the committee drafting the Rules of the R.S.D.L.P.
First session	Lenin proposes a resolution during the discussion of the terms of reference of the Credentials Committee. The resolution is carried by the Congress.
Third session	Lenin presides. He announces the Congress agenda, speaks in the debate on it, and proposes including in the agenda the item "Appraisal of the Present Situation" and the question of the national organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. His proposal is carried.
Fourth session	Lenin presides. He proposed instructing the Agrarian Committee to prepare reports and appoint reporters.
Fifth session	Lenin makes the report on the agrarian question.

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Seventh session	Lenin presides. He is elected to the committee on the Duma.
Eighth session	Lenin presides while the debate on the agrarian question continues.
Ninth session	Lenin presides. He delivers his speech in reply to the debate on the agrarian question.
Tenth session	Lenin presides. He proposes that the Congress approve all the minutes.
Eleventh session	Lenin presides. He speaks in connection with the voting on the tactical resolution concerning the agrarian question.
Thirteenth session	Lenin makes the report "The Present Situation and the Class Tasks of the Proletariat".
Sixteenth session	Lenin delivers his speech in reply to the debate on "The Present Situation and the Class Tasks of the Proletariat".
Seventeenth session	Lenin is elected to the committee appointed to draft the resolution "The Attitude to the Armed Uprising." He makes a co-report on the attitude to be adopted towards the Duma and reads the draft resolution on that question.
Eighteenth session	Lenin presides. He declares for giving representatives of the national Social-Democratic organisations the floor in the debate on the attitude to the Duma.
Nineteenth session	Lenin makes his speech in reply to the debate on the attitude to the Duma.
Twenty-first session	Lenin presides. He speaks in support of the proposal to postpone discussion of the formation of parliamentary Social-Democratic group until the composition of the group of Social-Democrats elected to the Duma is ascertained.
Twenty-second session	Lenin makes a speech on the armed uprising.
Twenty-fourth session	Lenin presides. On behalf of the Congress he greets the Polish Social-Democratic Party which has joined the R.S.D.L.P.
Twenty-sixth session	Lenin presides. He submits a written statement (expressing his dissenting opinion) on the question of forming a parliamentary Social-Democratic group and proposes a note to the rules for a merger with the Bund.

Twenty-seventh session	Clause 1 of the Rules, concerning Party membership, is carried by the Congress as worded by Lenin.
April 25-26 (*May* 8-9)	Lenin writes "An Appeal to the Party by Delegates to the Unity Congress Who Belonged to the Former 'Bolshevik' Group". The Appeal is signed by the Bolshevik delegates from 26 Party organisations.
Late April (*early May*)	Lenin returns to St. Petersburg by way of Abo, Finland, upon the conclusion of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
May 5 (18)	Lenin's article "The Fight for Freedom and the Fight for Power" is published as the leading article in *Volna*, No. 9.
May 6 (19)	Lenin's article "A New Upswing" is published as the leading article in *Volna*, No. 10.
	Lenin delivers a report on the results of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to a Party meeting in St. Petersburg.
May 9 (22)	*Volna*, No. 12 carries Lenin's articles "The Duma and the People" (leader), "Among Newspapers and Periodicals" and "The Bolshevik Resolution on the State Duma".
	At a public meeting in Countess Panina's Palace Lenin, introduced as "Karpov", delivers a speech on the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. with regard to the Duma. The meeting passes the resolution proposed by Lenin.
May 10 (23)	Lenin reports on the results of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations at the Franco-Russian subdistrict in St. Petersburg.
	Lenin's articles "The Workers' Group in the State Duma" (leader) and "The Question of Organisation' appear in *Volna*, No. 13.
May 11 (24)	At a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Moskovsky district in St. Petersburg, Lenin makes a report on the Fourth (Unity) Congress. He moves an amendment to the resolution proposed at the meeting. His amendment is carried. Lenin's article "The Peasant, or 'Trudovik', Group and the R.S.D.L.P." is published as the leader in *Volna*, No. 14.

May 12 (25)	Lenin's article "The Land Question in the Duma" appears as the leader in *Volna*, No. 15.
May 13 (26)	Lenin's article "Resolution and Revolution" is published in *Volna*, No. 16.
May 14 (27)	*Volna*, No. 17, publishes Lenin's articles "Neither Land nor Freedom" (leader) and "The Social-Democratic Election Victory in Tiflis".
May 18 (31)	Lenin's article "Government, Duma and People" appears as the leader in *Volna*, No. 20.
	Lenin writes his article "The Cadets Are Preventing the Duma from Appealing to the People". The article appears in *Volna*, No. 21, on May 19 (June 1).
May 19 (*June* 1)	Lenin's articles "They Won't Even Bargain!" and "The Manifesto of the Workers' Deputies in the State Duma" appear in *Volna*, No. 21. Lenin writes his articles "The Land Question and the Fight for Freedom" and "The Sorry Goremykins, the Octobrists and the Cadets". The articles appear in *Volna*, No. 22, on May 20 (June 2)..
May 20 (*June* 2)	Lenin's article "Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action" is published in *Volna*, No. 22.
May 21 (*June* 3)	*Volna*, No. 23, carries Lenin's articles "Bad Advice" (leader), criticising Plekhanov's articles in Kuryer, and "Talk and Rumours About the Dissolution of the State Duma".
	At a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Narva district in St. Petersburg, Lenin reports on the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P
May 23 (*June* 5)	Lenin's article "Kautsky on the State Duma" is published in the weekly *Vestnik Zhizni*, No. 6.
	Lenin delivers a lecture on the agrarian question at a workers' meeting in the Sangalsky subdistrict of St. Petersburg. At the request of his audience he also makes a speech on the attitude of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks towards the Duma.
May 24 (*June* 6)	Lenin's article "Cadets, Trudoviks and the Workers' Party" appears as the leader in *Volna*, No. 25.
May 26 (*June* 8)	Lenin's article "How Comrade Plekhanov Argues About Social-Democratic Tactics" appears in *Vperyod*, No. 1. In the same year it is also brought out as a pamphlet by *Vperyod* Publishers.

May 27 (*June* 9)	*Vperyod*, No. 2, publishes "Resolution (II) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Attitude Towards the State Duma", written by Lenin (it was also published in leaflet form by the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in May 1906), and Lenin's article "The Slogan of a Duma Ministry".
	Lenin writes his article "The Present Political Situation". The article is published as the leader in *Vperyod*, No. 3, on May 28 (June 10).
May 30 (*June* 12)	Lenin's article "The Tactics of the Proletariat and the Tasks of the Moment" appears in *Vperyod*, No. 4.
May 31 (*June* 13)	Lenin's articles "The German Social-Democrats on the Cadets" and "Among Newspapers and Periodicals" appear in *Vperyod*, No. 5.
May	Lenin writes his pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers*. The pamphlet appears in June 1906.
June 1 (14)	Lenin's article "Let the Workers Decide" appears in *Vperyod*, No. 6.
	Lenin writes his article "Don't Gaze Up, Gaze Down". The article is published as the leader in *Vperyod*, No. 7, on June 2 (15).
June 3 (16)	Lenin writes his article "The Reaction Is Taking to Arms". The article is carried as the leader in *Vperyod*, No. 9, on June 4 (17).
June 6 (19)	*Vperyod*, No. 10, publishes "Resolution (III) of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Question of a Duma Ministry", drafted by Lenin.

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В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ
Том 10

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

11

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V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 11 contains works written by V. I. Lenin in the period from June 1906 to January 1907. The majority of them are devoted to questions connected with the activities of the Social-Democratic Group in the First State Duma, the dissolution of the Duma and the beginning of the election campaign for the Second Duma.

The articles "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising", "Hands Off!" and "Guerrilla Warfare" are devoted to problems of the organisation and tactics of an armed uprising.

In the articles "The Declaration of Our Group in the Duma", "Who Is for Alliances with the Cadets?", "Yes-Men of the Cadets", "The Political Crisis and the Bankruptcy of Opportunist Tactics", "The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat", Lenin exposes the Menshevik tactics of support for a Cadet Duma and of the slogan of a Duma Cabinet composed of Cadets, gives a political appraisal of the dissolution of the First Duma and formulated the tasks of the Party in this period.

The writings "The Social-Democrats and Electoral Agreements", "A Dissenting Opinion", recorded at the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., "Draft Election Address", "Blocs with the Cadets", "The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections", "'When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool'.... (From Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist)", are devoted to questions concerning the election campaign for the Second Duma.

The articles "An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties of Russia", "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks" and "Philistinism in Revolutionary Circles" are devoted to a class analysis of the Russian political parties.

This edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* includes for the first time the leaflet "Whom to Elect to the State Duma", the note on the "Union of the Bund with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" and the article "The Working-Class Party's Tasks and the Peasantry", which expounds the Bolsheviks' main slogan in the election campaign, for complete independence of the class policy of the proletariat and the impermissibility of blocs with the Cadets.

ON THE EVE[1]

The political situation is becoming clear with amazing speed.

Some months ago it was impossible to say with any certainty whether the State Duma would meet or what it would be like. A few weeks ago it was still unclear, to the broad mass of the people at least, in what field and in what form the next stage of the struggle for freedom would develop. The simple-minded peasants believed in the Duma; they could not admit of the idea that the eloquent requests and statements of all the representatives of the people would have no result. The bourgeois liberals, who were trying to induce the government to make concessions out of "*good will*", believed in the Duma. It would be no exaggeration to say that in a few days their faith was shattered before our eyes, the faith of the mass of the people, all of whose interests nurtured and strengthened this belief. They believed because they wanted to believe, they believed because the immediate political future was still dark, they believed because the political twilight left room for every kind of ambiguity, wavering and depression.

Now everything has again become clear. The foresight of people who were thought to be eccentric pessimists in the period of the elections to the Duma and during the first days of the Duma has been vindicated. The Duma has been sitting only five or six weeks and already people who have been whole-heartedly endeavouring to devise and develop activities in the Duma and around the Duma are frankly and honestly admitting the great fact: "How tired the people are of waiting."

For decades they did not become tired of waiting, but now they have become tired after a few weeks; they were not tired of waiting while they were asleep or vegetating, while the external circumstances of their lives contained nothing directly changing their existence beyond recognition, their mood, their consciousness, their will. They have become tired of waiting after a few weeks, now that the thirst for action has awakened in them with incredible rapidity, and the most eloquent and sympathetic words, even from such a lofty platform as the Duma, have begun to seem dreary, boring and uninteresting. The workers have become tired of waiting—the wave of strikes has begun to mount higher and higher. The peasants have become tired of waiting; no persecutions and tortures, exceeding the horrors of the medieval Inquisition, can stop their struggle for the land, for freedom. The sailors in Kronstadt and Sevastopol have become tired of waiting, as well as the infantrymen in Kursk, Poltava, Tula and Moscow, the guardsmen in Krasnoye Selo, and even the Cossacks. All now see where and how a new great struggle is flaring up, all realise its inevitability, all sense the absolute need for the actions of the proletariat and peasantry to be staunch, steadfast and well-prepared, and that these actions should be simultaneous and co-ordinated. They feel that it is necessary to wait for this.... We are on the eve of great historical events, we are on the eve of the second great stage of the Russian revolution. The Social-Democrats, who consciously express the class struggle of the proletariat, will stand at their posts to a man, and will perform their duty to the end.

Rabotnik, No. 1,
June 8, 1906
Signed: *N. Lenin*

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the *Rabotnik* text

WAVERING ABOVE, DETERMINATION BELOW

It is quite evident that we are now passing through one of the most important periods of the revolution. Signs of a revival of the broad, mass movement against the old order have been visible for a long time. Now this revival is reaching its climax. The Duma elections and the first week of the sessions and activities of the opposition Duma acted as a "farthing dip" which ignited the conflagration throughout the country. The quantity of inflammatory material was still so vast, and the atmosphere was still so "heated", that no precautionary measures could be of any avail.

And now it is becoming absolutely obvious to everyone that the conflagration has really spread throughout the country. The rising has spread to quite new strata, both of the proletariat—including even those who only six months ago provided recruits for the Black Hundreds—and, particularly, of the peasantry. The army, which is connected with the most backward sections of the peasantry, and whose ranks are carefully combed so as to get rid of, destroy and suppress all that is fresh and virile—even the army has proved to be almost entirely engulfed in the flames. News of "revolts" and outbreaks among the armed forces is flying in from all sides, like sparks from a great fire.

Newspaper reporters who have some connection with the bureaucracy report that the Minister of War has uttered a warning against dissolving the Duma, for in that ease he could not rely upon the army.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder the government is wavering. It is true nevertheless that, although wavering, the government is preparing very definitely to

crush the revolution by bloodshed. Provocation is increasing. A war to the death has been declared on the free press. The Left newspapers "are being confiscated in defiance of all laws". Kronstadt is inundated with special troops. The pogrom in Belostok marked the opening of counter-revolutionary operations, and armed operations at that. The government is wavering; warning voices are heard from its ranks, voices recommending a deal with the Cadets. But this wavering, this "pause for reflection", is not causing the government for a moment to forget the old, customary, and well-tried policy of naked violence.

Lassalle said that reactionaries are business-like people. Our reactionaries are proving that this is true. They are reflecting, weighing things up, wavering, in doubt as to whether to start a general offensive on the new line (i.e., by dissolving the Duma) at once, or not. But they *are preparing* for an offensive, and are not pausing in this "business" for a single moment. From the point of view of robbers around whose necks the noose is being drawn ever tighter, they are reasoning correctly. Shall we yield to the Cadets, who promise a "strong government", or take reprisals by fire and sword? Their decision today is: we need be in no hurry to adopt the first alternative, *that* can be done at any time in the future; but in any case we must prepare to adopt the second alternative. No doubt many of them also reason in the following way: let us first try the second alternative and choose the most opportune moment for it. We can yield to the Cadets at the last moment, when we are absolutely convinced that it is impossible to restore *everything* by wholesale bloodshed!

As robbers, they are reasoning quite correctly. Obviously, they will not surrender without a desperate and ruthless fight. Meanwhile, of course, they are preparing a line of retreat—in case things turn out badly—in the shape of a deal with the Cadets, an alliance with them on the platform of the "strong government" about which Mr. Struve so opportunely reminds them. The reactionaries are preparing for a stern and decisive battle, and they regard a deal with the Cadets as a minor result of an unsuccessful battle.

The proletariat must weigh up the tasks of the revolution soberly and squarely. As regards handling big problems, it

is no less "business-like" than the reactionaries. It must concentrate all its attention, all its cares and all its efforts on the decisive battle inevitable tomorrow or the day after—and regard a deal between the government and the Cadets as a by-product of one of the possible stages of the revolution. The proletariat has nothing to fear from such a deal; both the Trepovs and the moderate liberals will come to grief over it. But the proletariat must not under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, support such a deal, support the demand for a responsible Cabinet representing the majority in the Duma. We need not now *prevent* this deal; but we shall not support it. We shall pursue *our own* road. We shall continue to be the party of the advanced class, which will *not* issue to the masses *a single* ambiguous slogan, which will not, directly or indirectly, have any truck whatever with any of the sordid dealings of the bourgeoisie, and which will be able to protect the interests of the revolution under all circumstances, whatever the outcome of the struggle.

A compromise between the government and the Duma is by no means impossible as one of the *specific* episodes of the revolution. The Social-Democrats must neither advocate, support nor "shatter" such a compromise at the present time. They must concentrate all their attention, and the attention of the masses, on the main and essential thing and not on secondary and side issues. They will take the utmost advantage of every compromise between the bourgeoisie and the old regime, of all the wavering above. But they will consistently warn the working class and the peasantry against the "friendship" of the Cadets. To the wavering above they must oppose invincible determination below and, not yielding to provocation, must firmly and persistently gather their forces for the decisive moment.

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UNITY!

The Social-Democratic Group in the State Duma is on the eve of taking action. Undoubtedly, this group can now render the cause of the working-class movement and of the revolution a great service by its bold and consistent utterance, by proclaiming with unmistakable clarity the demands and slogans of *consistent* democracy and of the *proletarian* class struggle for socialism. Now that the question of Social-Democratic action in the Duma has been decided by the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, there can be no two opinions among Social-Democrats about this. And we think that our Caucasian comrades were quite right to sign the notorious "solemn pledge" of the members of the State Duma[2] and to state in the press in this connection that "we are signing this in order to be able to fulfil the mission with which the people have entrusted us, and we emphasise that the only political obligations we recognise are obligations to the people".

The more important the actions of our representatives in the State Duma become for the Party, the more carefully must we weigh the principles of Social-Democratic tactics at the present time. It must be admitted that the course of political events, which has become exceptionally rapid in the past few weeks, throws considerable light on questions which only yesterday were still unclear; it helps us clearly and precisely to define our position, and removes many of the disagreements between the Right and Left wings of our Party.

In this connection we are particularly pleased to emphasise the arguments of former Menshevik comrades in today's issue of *Kuryer*.[3] True, the leading article, "Duma

'Laws'", starts with a somewhat ambiguous protest against describing the drafting of laws for the Duma as useless chatter; but it turns out that the comrades had good reason for putting the word "laws" in inverted commas. They support—and they are a thousand times right in doing so—the drafting of laws that will not be laws in the ordinary sense, but "declarations" that "proclaim the right of the people to freedom", "proclaim the abolition of the old barriers".

Perhaps it would be more correct to call such "laws", not laws, but appeals to the people. But it would be unreasonable to stress disagreements on terminology when agreement prevails on the main issue. And on this, agreement is actually complete. "It is absolutely absurd and *harmful*," writes *Kuryer*, "to submit to the Duma Bills carefully drawn up in minutest detail, with scores and hundreds of paragraphs, remarks and so forth" (all italics ours). Quite so. Such activities, customarily called "constructive" are certainly *harmful*. They are harmful "because instead of presenting striking contrasts that everyone can see, such Bills *hopelessly confuse* the mind of the public with a welter of clauses and paragraphs".

This is quite true. The mind of the public is indeed *hopelessly confused* with the welter of "constructive" legislative project-mongering. This project-mongering obscures, blunts and corrupts the mind of the public, for "in any case, these laws will never be put into operation. Before that can be done, *power must be wrested* from the hands of those who now hold it. And this power can be wrested from those hands *only* by a popular movement that will put in the place of the Duma itself a *far more powerful and democratic institution*, which will not be obliged to reckon with the 'laws' drawn up by the Duma." This statement shifting public attention to the absolute necessity of wresting power and of establishing a "far more powerful" institution that will not reckon with the laws drawn up by the Cadet Duma, very correctly appraises the fundamental tasks of the revolutionary proletariat and the requirements of the present situation.

In this same article, the comrades of *Kuryer* brilliantly trounce the Cadets for failing to understand these tasks. The Cadets draft their Bills "like real legislators, forgetting

that *they have not even a farthing's worth* of real legislative power". "They draft their 'Bills' as if the courts tomorrow will have to try citizens according to the new Cadet laws."

Kuryer tells the Cadets that their position is disgraceful. There is only one conclusion to be drawn from this thrice correct admonition, and that conclusion suggests itself. Revolutionary Social-Democrats cannot and must not support the demand for the appointment of a responsible Cabinet representing the majority in the Duma! For such a Cabinet will be a Cadet Cabinet, and on *the very morrow* of its appointment it will have to draw up penalties for abuses of freedom. At the present time, when the Star Chamber[4] is still the power in the land, such a Cabinet can only serve as a liberal screen for the old regime. At the present time, such a Cabinet would only serve as a new cloak to conceal these same pogrom-mongers for a time! We should, of course, very soon expose this disguise. We shall take the utmost advantage of the new situation when it arises, when not only the old regime, but the Cadets, too, are entangled in this new cloak and are overwhelmed by the tide. But we, the party of the proletariat, must not, directly or indirectly, avowedly or tacitly, assume the slightest responsibility for this attempt to disguise the old regime. We must not issue to the masses the slogan of supporting the demand for the formation of a responsible Cabinet representing the majority in the Duma. Whatever our intentions, owing to the objective conditions of the present political situation such a slogan will inevitably mean that the party of the proletariat will have to bear part of the responsibility for this disguise, for this deal between the bourgeoisie and the old regime. Such a slogan will indirectly imply approval of the Cadet "Bills" that are so excellently criticised in *Kuryer*; for indeed it cannot be denied that there is a connection between the Cadets' plan to punish abuses of freedom and their plan to obtain, in the shape of a Cabinet, a modicum of power for applying these penalties; to obtain a modicum of power *from* the old regime, *for* the strengthening of the old regime, *by means of a deal* with the old regime, in the shape of a screen shielding it from the onslaught of the people *against* it.

The workers' party needs no such slogan. It will be able to carry on all its propaganda and agitation activities among the masses and build up wide organisations far better, far more integrally, systematically and boldly without such a slogan, by countering the effrontery of the pogrom-mongers and the "Bills" of the Cadets by means of our Social-Democratic "decrees", "proclamations" and appeals to the people through the medium of the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma (and, under certain conditions, of the Trudoviks acting in conjunction with it), and lastly, by issuing those "calls to the people to form a popular militia, which alone will be capable of protecting their lives and honour"—the calls that we recommended in *Vperyod*,[5] No. 9,* which are recommended by *Volkszeitung*,[6] the organ of the Bund, and of which *Kuryer* quite rightly approves.

Let us have unity, comrades! The unity of the political actions of the proletariat is growing with irresistible force under the pressure of the whole revolutionary atmosphere. Let us not hinder this unity by introducing unnecessary and controversial slogans into our tactics. Let us take advantage of the present opportunity to secure complete agreement among all Social-Democrats at this moment, which will perhaps prove to be a supreme moment in the great Russian revolution!

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 510-11.—*Ed.*

THE DUMA AND THE PEOPLE

The speech delivered by Comrade Ramishvili, the Social-Democratic Deputy in the State Duma, contains some very true observations that correctly define Social-Democratic tactics. The speaker not only denounced the government of pogrom-mongers with the vigour of a genuine representative of the proletariat, he not only branded the representatives of the government as "enemies of the people"—and the new attempt of the Cadet Chairman of the Duma to restrict freedom of speech evoked the legitimate protest of the extreme Left—but in addition, in concluding his speech, he raised the general question of the relation between the Duma and the people.

This is what the Social-Democratic Deputy said on this question:

> "I conclude by stating that we are backed by the people. Outside something is going on that is entirely different from what we are doing here in this Chamber. The atmosphere outside is entirely different. Here it is much milder; here a more *peaceful* mood prevails. In a month from now, perhaps, *we ourselves will be deciding our affairs*.... The facts of life speak *much more loudly* about what is going on around us than we do here. I say that we are standing between the government and the people. The Duma is a *dangerous spot*. To go to the Left or to the Right means *conciliation with someone*, or a rupture with someone.... You must not forget that the *people themselves will obtain* what the Duma cannot obtain owing to its *wavering and lack of determination*. I say that the people are in a different mood from that which prevails here...."

We have italicised the particularly important passages in this speech. The speaker quite rightly said that the facts of life speak *much more loudly* than the Duma does; that the atmosphere outside is not as "*peaceful*", and that "*the*

people are in a different mood". That is undoubtedly true. And the deduction that follows from this truth is that those who say that the people must support the Duma are wrong. The people are already ahead of the Duma, are speaking louder, are less peacefully inclined, *are fighting more vigorously*. Hence, the only correct definition of the task of the Social-Democrats is: to explain to the widest possible mass of the people that the Duma only *timidly and inadequately* expresses the demands of the people. *Only* such a formulation of Social-Democratic tactics relieves the party of the proletariat of responsibility for the instability of the Cadets. Only such a formulation, which fully allows for the degree of development of the political consciousness, determination and preparedness of the peasant masses, adequately conforms to the great tasks of the present moment, a moment concerning which the elected representatives of the Social-Democratic proletariat bluntly say: "In a month from now, perhaps, we ourselves will be deciding our affairs." To be able to *decide* them, however, we must at once completely dissociate ourselves from all either dishonest or unwise attempts to seek a "peaceful" solution.

Comrade Ramishvili was quite right when he declared from the rostrum of the Duma: "The Duma is a dangerous spot." Why? Because it displays "wavering and lack of determination". And at a time when, in a month from now, perhaps, the people themselves will have to decide their affairs, wavering and lack of determination is positively criminal. Whoever displays these qualities *at such a time will inevitably* find himself in an extremely false position, no matter how sincere his intentions may have been. It does not depend on our will that at such a moment all the economic and political conditions surrounding us inevitably give rise to a decisive struggle between the people and the old regime. Whoever wavers in face of this impending struggle will, indeed, have to choose between the alternative of "*conciliation with someone or a rupture with someone*". This is exactly the position that the Cadets are in. The liberal bourgeoisie is reaping what it has been sowing for years by its double-faced and vacillating policy, and by its desertions from revolution to counter-revolution. Conciliation with the old regime means a rupture with the fighting people.

A rupture with the old regime is what would be essential for conciliation with the fighting people.

The majority in the Duma has been doing everything to make its position clear in this inexorable choice. Every step this Cadet, and sometimes even worse than Cadet, majority takes in its policy is in preparation for a rupture with the fighting people, preparation for conciliation with the old regime. These steps are small ones, we shall be told. But they are real steps in real politics, we shall reply. These steps conform to all the fundamental class interests of the liberal bourgeoisie. And the *Cadets*' demand for a Duma Cabinet appointed by the old regime bears precisely this "peaceful" character.

We shall never tire of repeating that it would be stupid and harmful for the workers' party to support this demand. Stupid, because the only thing that is really weakening the old regime is the struggle of the people, who are going further than the timid Duma. Harmful, because it will sow deception and confusion in the minds of the people. Yesterday we pointed out that the comrades of *Kuryer* were right in stating that the Bills drafted by the Cadets were stupid and harmful.* Today it is to be regretted that these same comrades are advocating support for a Duma Cabinet, that is to say, a Cabinet that will carry through these stupid and harmful Bills!

Perhaps we shall examine these vacillations of *Kuryer* in greater detail another time. For the time being, it will be sufficient to point to them; the very fact that there is wavering at an important moment like the present shows that the position of the waverers is extremely precarious.

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* See pp. 20-23 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE FIGHT FOR POWER AND THE "FIGHT" FOR SOPS

It is common knowledge that already in its programme the Social-Democratic Party expressed the unshakable conviction that really to satisfy the urgent needs of the mass of the people *all power must be in the hands of the people*. If the mass of the people do not have the *entire* state power in their hands, if any organ of power not elected by the people, not liable to dismissal, and not entirely dependent on the people, is allowed to remain, it will be *impossible* really to satisfy the urgent and universally admitted needs of the people.

The Social-Democratic Party has always exerted every effort to spread this indisputable truth among the proletariat and among the whole people. The real, that is, the mass struggle for freedom has always passed, and always will pass, through the most varied and often unexpected stages. It cannot be otherwise owing to the enormous difficulties of the struggle, the complexity of its tasks and the changes taking place in the ranks of the fighters. In guiding the proletarian struggle at every stage in its development and under all circumstances, the Social-Democratic Party, as the conscious champion of the aspirations of the working class, must constantly bear in mind the general and fundamental interests of this struggle as a whole. Social-Democracy teaches us not to forget the general interests of the working class for the sake of particular interests; not to allow the specific features of the individual stages of the struggle to cause us to forget the fundamental aims of the struggle as a whole.

This is how the revolutionary Social-Democrats have always conceived their tasks in the present Russian revolution; and this conception alone is in accordance with the position and tasks of the proletariat as the advanced class. On the other hand, in conformity with the specific class interests of the bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie has always formulated its tasks in the struggle for political freedom quite differently. The bourgeoisie needs political freedom, but it is afraid to allow the people to have full power, because the proletariat, developed and united in the course of the struggle, would use this power of the people against the bourgeoisie. Hence, while striving for political freedom, the bourgeoisie nevertheless wants to retain a number of survivals from the old regime (the standing army, a non-elected bureaucracy, and so forth).

The proletariat's struggle for political freedom is *revolutionary*, because its object is to secure complete democracy. The bourgeoisie's struggle for freedom is *opportunist*, because its object is to obtain sops, to divide power between the autocracy and the propertied classes.

This fundamental difference between the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the opportunist struggle of the bourgeoisie can be traced through the whole history of our revolution. The proletariat is fighting, the bourgeoisie is stealing its way into power. The proletariat is shattering the autocracy by its struggle; the bourgeoisie clutches at the sops thrown to it by the enfeebled autocracy. Before the whole people the proletariat holds on high the standard of struggle; the bourgeoisie raises the flag of minor concessions, deals and haggling.

The proletariat takes advantage of every breach, every weakening of the regime, every concession and sop in order to wage a more extensive, more determined, more intense and more mass struggle; the bourgeoisie uses them to cause the struggle gradually to calm down, weaken and die out, to curtail its aims and moderate its forms.

Let us review some of the stages of our struggle for freedom. The bourgeoisie "fights" to compel the government to show confidence in the Zemstvo[7] ("Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo") and in the people (at the beginning of the present decade). The proletariat unfurls the banner of

the struggle to overthrow the autocracy. The government proclaims an era of "confidence"[8] (Svyatopolk-Mirsky). The bourgeoisie pours out a flood of speeches at banquets; the proletariat forces new breaches in the citadel of tyranny, dying in the streets on the 9th of January,[9] and starting a huge strike movement.

The summer of 1905. The bourgeoisie sends a deputation to plead for liberties. In the autumn the Bulygin Duma[10] is granted. The bourgeoisie is moved to tears of gratitude. A general cry goes up: to the Duma! The opportunist Social-Democrats waver. The proletariat continues to fight. A strike wave such as the world has never seen before spreads over the whole country and sweeps away the Duma. The proletariat seizes freedom and defends it with its blood against the encroachments of the autocracy.

In the first battle the proletariat is defeated. The bourgeoisie spurns the vanquished and slavishly clutches at the Duma. The proletariat gathers its forces for a fresh onslaught. It continues proudly to hold on high the banner of the struggle for complete democracy. But the onslaught could not be accomplished before the convocation of the Duma. The bourgeoisie once again grovels, throws overboard the slogan of a constituent assembly, froths at the mouth against "actions" and advocates conciliation, coming to terms, and the appointment by the supreme authority of a Cadet Cabinet.

The proletariat takes advantage of the new situation just as it did of the period of "confidence" in 1904, and of October 17, 1905.[11] It performs its revolutionary duty and does all in its power to sweep away the Witte Duma[12] as it swept away the Bulygin Duma. But it is unsuccessful, owing to the treachery of the bourgeoisie, and the inadequate organisation and mobilisation of the working class and peasantry. The proletariat continues the fight, *utilising* all the "Duma" conflicts and the conflicts around the Duma as points of departure for a wider and more determined mass movement.

A new struggle is developing. No one denies this. The proletarians, the peasants, the urban poor, the soldiers, etc., are rising in much greater masses than before. No one denies that this will be a struggle outside the Duma. Owing to the objective conditions of the present situation, it will

be a struggle directly aimed at the destruction of the old regime. To what extent it will be destroyed, no one can foretell. But the proletariat, as the advanced class, is striving with greater determination than ever for complete victory in this struggle, for the complete abolition of the old regime.

And the proletariat remains consistent, rejecting the opportunist slogans of the bourgeoisie which have misled a certain section of the Social-Democrats. It is not true to say that the appointment of a Cadet Cabinet means "wresting power" from the hands of the camarilla. That is a bourgeois lie. As a matter of fact the appointment of such a Cabinet at the present time will be a new liberal screen for the camarilla. It is not true to say that the appointment of a Cadet Cabinet will transform the fictitious constitution into a real one. That is a bourgeois lie. As a matter of fact such a Cabinet will merely enable the autocracy to cover itself with a new cloak of pseudo-constitutionalism. It is not true to say that the demand for a Cadet Cabinet is being taken up by the whole people. That is a bourgeois lie. As a matter of fact it is only being demanded by the Cadet Duma. The fact that non-Cadets are echoing it is due only to a misunderstanding, for they think it means much more than it actually does. The demands of the *whole people* are in fact much more drastic than the demands of the Cadet Duma. Lastly, it is also not true to say that "supporting" the demand for a Cadet Cabinet (or, what amounts to the same thing, supporting a Cadet Cabinet) with the aid of resolutions, instructions to deputies, and so forth, means actually fighting the old regime. That is a bourgeois lie. For the proletariat, such "support" would simply mean abandoning the struggle, handing over the cause of freedom to the wavering liberals.

The proletariat is fighting, and will continue to fight, to destroy the old regime. Towards this end it will direct all its propaganda and agitation, and all its efforts to organise and mobilise the masses. If it fails to destroy the old regime completely, it will take advantage even of its partial destruction. But it will never advocate partial destruction, depict this in rosy colours, or call upon the people to support it. Real support in a genuine struggle is given to those

who strive for the maximum (achieving something less in the event of failure) and not to those who opportunistically curtail the aims of the struggle *before the fight*.

Those who are not dazzled by flashy phrases will easily see that the people will *actually* fight, not for a Cadet Cabinet, but to abolish the old regime. It is in the interests of the bureaucracy to *diminish* the real scope of this struggle. It is in the interests of the proletariat to *expand* and intensify it.

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THE DECLARATION OF OUR GROUP IN THE DUMA[13]

No Social-Democrat can have any doubt now that in the present situation the pronouncements of our Party members in the Duma could be of great value to the cause of the proletariat and of the whole people.

We welcomed the election victories of our Caucasian comrades.* We regard it as our duty to note their successes in the Duma and to criticise—in a business-like way—their mistakes.

As one of their successes we consider Comrade Ramishvili's speech on the "danger" and "peacefulness" of the Duma. Another success was his resolution on the Belostok pogrom[14]; yet another his excellent criticism of the Cadets' Public Meetings Bill and the correct formulation of the question of Cadet project-mongering in general. We hope to discuss these successes with our readers in greater detail another time.

As one of the mistakes we consider the silence of our Social-Democrats in the Duma when Aladyin "swallowed" Nabokov's mutilation of the resolution on the food question.[15] The Social-Democrats ought to have protested and moved their own resolution. Another mistake was Comrade Gomarteli's speech in reply to the hypocrite Fedorovsky in which he, a Social-Democrat, admitted that it was undesirable for the army to be involved in politics. This is a big mistake, but it can still be remedied. Lastly, we also consider as a mistake the declaration recently adopted by the Group in the Duma. This cannot be remedied. We must now

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 423-25.—*Ed.*

examine this mistake, not in a carping spirit—our comrades' task in the Duma is a difficult one, and mistakes are inevitable at first but in the interests of the political education of the whole Party and of the whole proletariat.

The members of our Social-Democratic Group in the Duma had received another draft declaration from the camp of the former Bolsheviks. The following is this draft, slightly abbreviated (in our country, newspapers do not enjoy the same freedom of speech as deputies in the Duma):

"Through the medium of our Group, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the party of the class-conscious proletariat of all the nations inhabiting our state, addresses the whole people from the platform of the State Duma.

"Our Party is one of the contingents of the international army of the Social-Democratic proletariat. All over the world, the organised proletariat that is conscious of its class interests has risen for the struggle. It is fighting to throw off the yoke of capital. It is striving to secure the complete emancipation of all toilers from the yoke of tyranny, poverty, oppression and unemployment. Its object is to attain the socialist system of society, which will abolish all division of the people into exploiters and exploited. The Social-Democrats call upon all the toilers and the exploited to join their ranks, not only the wage-workers, but also small proprietors, if they are conscious of their common interests with the proletariat, if they are seeking salvation, not by consolidating individual small production, but by fighting jointly with the working class for the complete overthrow of bourgeois rule. And by its united and steadfast struggle the international socialist proletariat will achieve its goal.

"In Russia, however, the struggle now going on is not for socialism, but for political freedom. The great Russian revolution is in full swing. The yoke of autocracy is preventing the development of the country. The tyranny of irresponsible officials and the barbarous exploitation of the mass of the peasantry by the landlords has roused the anger of the whole people. The proletariat has been in the vanguard of the people's fight. By its heroic strike in October it compelled the enemy to recognise freedom. By its heroic insurrection in December it prevented all further procrastination in convening

the assembly of the representatives of the people. In spite of the autocracy's gerrymandering electoral law, its massacre, torture and imprisonment of the finest fighters for freedom, the State Duma, after all, turned out to be hostile to the autocracy.

"The people are now on the eve of another great struggle. The autocracy jeers at the assembly of the people's representatives and scoffs at its demands. The anger of the workers, peasants and soldiers is steadily rising. The outcome of the great Russian revolution will be determined by the conduct of the various classes in society.

"In the democratic revolution that Russia is now passing through, the liberal bourgeoisie, represented in the State Duma by the very influential Constitutional-Democratic Party, is inevitably endeavouring to restrict as far as possible the rights of the propertyless classes, and of the proletariat in particular, in order to hinder them in their struggle for complete, and not only political, emancipation. This aim of the liberal bourgeoisie, just as inevitably, results in its inconsistency and irresoluteness in the struggle for freedom, its wavering between the desire to lean on the people and its fear of the people's revolutionary initiative. In the interests of freedom, and of socialism, we shall most relentlessly combat these waverings. We shall most strongly resist every attempt, no matter by whom, to obscure the irreconcilable antagonism between the interests of the people and the old order, and between the interests of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie. And we shall exert all our efforts to combat attempts to retard the popular movement by means of fraudulent paper concessions and the lie of conciliation between the reactionary robbers and the revolutionary, i.e., the only true and consistent, democrats. In particular, the touchstone of this consistency for us will be the desire and readiness to organise a free, really popular, mass movement, unhindered by police barriers, for an extensive struggle outside the Duma to effect political and economic emancipation.

"We regard the peasantry as the chief of the potential allies of the proletariat in the work of consummating the struggle for freedom. We whole-heartedly support to the very end the peasants' struggle against semi-feudal landlord-

ism and against the Asiatic political system in Russia. While rejecting the utopian idea that equal land tenure is possible under capitalism, and not permitting any attempt to obscure the difference in the interests of the proletarians and small proprietors, we shall advocate the confiscation of all crown, church, monastery and *all landed* estates. We shall strenuously oppose the *redemption payments*—the noose that the liberal bourgeoisie wants to put round the necks of the poor peasants. We shall warn the peasants against surrendering the land to the police-bourgeois authorities, local or central, until the victory of the revolution is achieved, and until a really democratic state has been fully attained. When a democratic state has been fully established, we shall advocate the transfer of all the land to the local self-governing bodies. We shall very strongly warn the peasants against allowing the land question to be settled by undemocratic local committees, such as the bureaucratic and landlord committees proposed by the Constitutional-Democratic Party.

"Throughout the course of the revolution we shall steadfastly support the struggle of the workers for an eight-hour day, higher wages, abolition of fines, in short, for all the demands of our Party's minimum programme. We regard the alliance between the proletariat and the broad masses of the urban and rural poor as a guarantee of the further victory of the revolution. The State Duma is useless for achieving and consolidating this victory. Only a national constituent assembly—convened by revolutionary means and elected by a universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot of all citizens, irrespective of sex, creed or nationality, and endowed with complete state power—only such an assembly can bring about complete freedom. It alone can establish in Russia ... substitute the armed nation for the standing army, abolish the bureaucracy that is neither elected by or responsible to the people, and introduce complete and unrestricted political freedom.

"That is the aim that we shall steadily pursue in the present revolution. That is the aim that the State Duma too must serve. It must help the people to organise and fully and thoroughly to understand the necessity for overthrowing the ... regime. It must explain to the people how

powerless is the present 'assembly of the people's representatives' and what a miserable role it is playing as a new screen for the old autocracy. The Duma must not engage in political project-mongering, or in drafting stillborn 'Bills', but must appeal to the people, ruthlessly tell it the whole truth, ruthlessly, expose before it all the crimes that are committed by the gang ... government of Russia, and call upon it to wage a consistent, steadfast, persistent and co-ordinated struggle. And if the State Duma as a whole is unable or hesitates to undertake this duty, we will perform it in alliance with the genuinely revolutionary groups or individual members of the Duma.

"The victory of the people is not far distant. The cause of freedom is in reliable hands. The proletariat is at its post, mustering its forces, proudly spurning the efforts of wretched provocateurs to provoke it to fight single-handed, and uniting and rallying around itself the millions and tens of millions of the oppressed and exploited *living in eternal toil and eternal poverty*.

"And however weak and small our Group in the State Duma may be, we know that behind it and with it are fighting millions of proletarians, the vanguard of all the toiling and exploited masses. In this fight the proletariat will be victorious. It will raze to the ground the monstrous edifice built by the autocracy that is torturing Russia."

Were our comrades in the Duma right in rejecting this draft?

From the formal point of view, they were. According to the Rules, they must be guided by the Central Committee, not by "outsiders".

They were also right from the factional point of view, for this draft emanated from the "other" camp (if we reckon according to the former factions).

But what about the Party point of view? Were they right in rejecting the suggestion that it was desirable to formulate more clearly the socialist aims and the international character of the Party; that it was desirable to point to the movement outside the Duma; that it was necessary to make clear to the people the differences between the parties in the Duma; that it was necessary to draw a sharp distinction between proletarian and petty-bourgeois doctrines; that it

was important for the workers' party to protect the peasants *from* the Cadets; and that our immediate demands should be more clearly and fully formulated?

Were our comrades, or our Central Committee, right in saying in their declaration: "make the Duma an organ of the popular movement" instead of using the formula endorsed by the Congress: make the Duma an *instrument of the revolution*?

Were they right in taking on all the points enumerated above an obvious *step to the Right* of the resolutions and decisions of the Unity Congress of our Party?

Let all the organisations, and all the members, of our Party carefully consider these questions.

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"WHAT THOU DOEST, DO QUICKLY"

Today, two newspapers that do not belong to the sensational boulevard press, namely, *Nasha Zhizn* and *Mysl*,[16] publish the important news that the Goremykin Cabinet has at last decided to resign. The new Cabinet is expected to be made up as follows: Yermolov—Prime Minister; Urusov—Minister of the Interior; Herzenstein—Finance; Timiryazev—Commerce; Stakhovich—Agriculture; Kuzmin-Karavayev—Justice; Nabokov—Foreign Affairs. It is believed that Heyden will "take" Education and that the Ministry of Railways will be taken by the present Minister, or by Shukhtan, the Chief of the Nikolayevskaya Railway.

Thus, we have the old bureaucrats in alliance with the Octobrists and Right Cadets, mainly ex-officials, that is to say, former bureaucrats (Urusov was formerly Deputy Minister of the Interior, Kuzmin-Karavayev a general, and Nabokov a gentleman-in-waiting).

Both the above-mentioned newspapers also report that lively negotiations have been taking place recently between the "Centre Party" in the Council of State[17] (i.e., the gang of bureaucrats who are a cross between the Black Hundreds and the "law and order" people[18]) and the Cadets.

Let us assume that all this is true. We *must* assume that it is true until the opposite is proved; for the source of information is fairly reliable, and the fact follows logically from all preceding events.

Well, whose views are proved to be right by this Cabinet, or these negotiations between the Cadets and the pogrom-mongers? Our readers will recall that at the meeting in the Panina Palace on May 9,[19] the Social-Narodnik, Mr. Myakotin, answering a Social-Democrat, protested that it was not fair to accuse the Cadets of desiring to *make a deal* with the pogrom-mongers. They will also recall that our

Right-wing Social-Democrats, headed by Plekhanov, loudly declared that all talk about treachery and making deals was groundless and premature.

Negotiations mark the beginning of a deal, said the Social-Democrat in reply to Mr. Myakotin. A deal marks the completion of negotiations.* Well, the fact that negotiations have been going on is now confirmed. The deal is well on the way.

But what has become of the promised complete amnesty, guarantee of liberties, and the abolition of the Council of State? Were *these questions* discussed during the negotiations between the Cadets and the pogrom-mongers? The newspapers are silent on this point. And we all know that the knights of "people's freedom" have *never categorically stipulated* that these measures should be guaranteed *before* a Cadet Cabinet is formed. It is the minor things, which are done behind the backs of the people, which provide portfolios and soft jobs, that have been put in the forefront. What is vital for the people has been shifted into the background. The Cadets will "fight" for an amnesty and for freedom when they are in the Cabinet—this is the answer that will be used to silence the simpletons who have been spreading among the people the slogan of supporting a "responsible" Cabinet. But this Cabinet will be responsible as before to the laws, which remain the old, pogrom laws, and also to the Star Chamber, or camarilla, that appointed it. And by a "fight" for an amnesty and for freedom, the Cadets have meant in the past, and will continue to mean: negotiations between the Rodichevs and Nabokovs, the Nabokovs and Urusovs, the Urusovs and Goremykins and the Goremykins and Trepovs.

But it's an ill-wind that blows nobody any good. The Cabinet of pogrom-mongers, Octobrists and Cadets will soon make things move; that is to say, it will drive the Cadets towards political bankruptcy, it will help the people to cast off one more harmful illusion, and accelerate the progress of political events towards a revolutionary denouement.

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 408.—*Ed.*

USEFUL POLEMICS

More than half of the Goremykin government's long communication on "measures for improving the conditions of life of the peasantry" is devoted to polemics against the views of the peasants and the talk ("rumours", as the Goremykins contemptuously call it) that is going on among the people. These polemics are extremely useful. The Goremykin government is debating with the "Russian peasantry". It declares that the views the peasants hold are "mistaken", and tries to prove to them that their demands and plans are "primarily opposed to the interests of the peasants themselves".

Now it is exceedingly praiseworthy, gentlemen of the Goremykin government, that you should try the art of gentle persuasion! You should have tried this long ago. It really would have been far better had you dealt with the peasants by argument rather than by means of the birch, the knout, bullets and rifle butts. Almost all newspapers would publish a government communication. The village priests, the Zemstvo officials, the rural district elders and the police officials would read it to the peasants. The peasants would ponder over it. They would be taught sense by the government, how to understand their real interests. And after thinking it over, and having been taught something by the government, they would decide by a majority vote who was right. How nice it would be if this were so! But how atrocious it is when, with one hand, the Goremykins and their myrmidons flog, torture and murder the peasants, and with the other, they run down their throats "communications" to teach them to understand their own interests! Peasant newspapers are being suppressed; peasant delegates and members of the Peasant Union[20] are languishing in jail, or in

Siberia; the villages are inundated with troops, as if they were enemy territory—and the Goremykin government hands the flogged and tortured peasants a communication to the effect that they are being flogged and tortured for their own good!

This is a useful communication! It will have a splendid effect on the peasants. The government has undertaken a little of the work of the Trudovik, or Peasant, Group in the Duma. This Group ought to appeal to the people, to tell them about the demands the peasant deputies in the Duma are making for land for the peasants, and what the government says in answer to these demands. The Trudovik Group has not yet done this. The government has come to its aid. Our government is so clever! It has itself published a communication to the whole people and has told them what the peasants demand.

Even in the most out-of-the-way villages, even in villages where they have never heard about the Peasant Union and about the peasant deputies in the Duma (if there are such villages—probably there are; ours is such a wild country), even there, the local priest, or village elder, will read the government's communication. The peasants will gather round, listen quietly, and then disperse. And afterwards they will gather again, with no officials present, and begin to talk. They will discuss the government's assurance that it and the bureaucrats are not protecting the interests of the landlords. They will chuckle and say: "Oh no, they wouldn't dream of such a thing!" They will discuss the statement that voluntary sale of the land by the landlords, particularly if it is done through the medium of the government officials, will be far more advantageous to the peasants than compulsory alienation (perhaps even without redemption payment). They will chuckle and say: "What fools we have been not to have realised up to now that it is far better for us to obey the landlords and the bureaucrats than to decide all matters for ourselves."

But perhaps the peasants will not only chuckle? Perhaps they will reflect over something else, and not only with laughter, but with rage? Perhaps they will decide for themselves not only where truth lies, but how to attain it?...

Our government is so clever!

Incidentally, Mr. Muromtsev, the Cadet Chairman of the State Duma, tells us not to use the word: government. It is wrong, if you please. The Duma, too, is part of the government. We must say: the Cabinet. Then we shall conclude just like "gentlemen" do: the Duma is the legislature, and the Cabinet the executive; the Duma is part of the government.

Kind Mr. Muromtsev! Kind Cadets! They have so painstakingly studied the German books on state law that they know them by heart. They know the business better than Goremykin, who in his communication *does not say a word about the Duma*, but refers all the time to the *government*. Who is right, Goremykin or Muromtsev? What should we say: Cabinet or Government?

Goremykin is right. His refinement ... humph! humph! ... his subtle mind ... caused him inadvertently to speak the truth. The Muromtsevs, being professors and pundits, utter conventional lies.

The peasants will learn something from Goremykin, not from Muromtsev. They will want to settle accounts with the government, not with the Cabinet. And they will be right.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

FAMINE RELIEF AND THE TACTICS OF THE DUMA

Today's newspapers report that a joint meeting of the Budget and Food committees of the State Duma was held on Wednesday, June 21. The meeting discussed the proposal of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance to appropriate 50 million rubles for famine relief. "The Committee resolved to recommend that the State Duma assign 15 million rubles for immediate needs, the sum to be taken from current expenditure, and to request the Cabinet to submit its views on the question of reducing the estimated current expenditure by that amount. The Cabinet's proposal that an internal loan of 50 million rubles be issued was rejected" (*Rech*,[21] June 22).

The question of appropriating funds for famine relief is an extremely important one. Every intelligent citizen should watch the progress of this question through all its stages with unremitting attention.

First of all we will remind the reader that the question that originally arose in the State Duma was the following: Would it be right to grant money to the government of pogrom-mongers, or should the Duma itself take the whole business of famine relief into its own hands? At first, Deputy Aladyin spoke in favour of the correct, i.e., the latter, solution. He proposed that committees of the Duma be elected, that members of the Duma be sent to the affected areas, that recourse should be made to "free institutions", and the money and the whole business of famine relief concentrated in their hands. Not a kopek for the Gurkos and Durnovos!—said Aladyin, amidst applause from the Left benches of the

Duma and cries of: Hear, hear! As we know, Aladyin did not keep to this correct position. He soared very high, but eventually settled on the perch in the Cadet hencoop. The Social-Democratic deputies made a mistake in not expressing their views by strong speeches on this question. The Duma adopted the Cadet formula of a motion to proceed to the next business.

Thus, the fundamental question of principle was settled on Cadet, landlord, liberal lines. The Duma refused to become the instrument of the revolution in this matter. The Duma feared the people, dreaded an appeal to the people. In principle, the Duma agreed to leave the business of famine relief in the hands of the Gurkos and the pogrom-mongering Ministers. Thus, the Cadet Duma has shown that it only wants to exercise pressure on the pogrom-mongers with the help of the people, and not to fight on the side of the people against the pogrom-mongers; that it only wants to curb the pogrom-mongers a little, but not to remove them altogether.

The question has entered a second stage. How will the Cadets exercise pressure on the pogrom-mongers now? Haggling has begun between the Committee of the Duma and the Ministers. At the meeting of the Committee on June 21 the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance were present. The Duma that would have no dealings with the people and with "free institutions", that refused to negotiate with the latter, began to negotiate with these Ministers. "Not a kopek for the Right Honourable Ministers"—that was merely a rhetorical flourish. Negotiations with the Right Honourable Ministers have become a fact. The Ministers asked for permission to float a loan. The Committee of the Duma refused. They demanded that the money be taken from this year's Budget, i.e., that certain *harmful* expenditure be reduced so as to provide the necessary sum for famine relief. By this tactical device, this flanking movement, the Duma is seizing a particle of right to control the State Budget. The Budget was adopted without the consent of the representatives of the people; but now a revision of the Budget with a view to reducing harmful expenditure and obtaining funds for useful expenditure is being secured in a roundabout way.

Such is the second stage of the question. The Cadets, that is, the party of the liberal landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie, want to control the organs of the old regime; they want to influence them, to clean them and paint them up; to substitute the Nabokovs for the Stolypins. But they don't want to replace *all* these organs and institutions of the old, police, feudal regime by *free institutions* of the people, by officials freely elected by the whole people. How is the money for famine relief to be obtained? Who is to be entrusted with the expenditure of these millions? Three main answers to these questions are offered by the three main political forces of the present period. The government of police pogrom-mongers answers: Obtain the money by floating a new loan, so as not to encroach on our police-pogrom Budget. We, the police and pogrom-mongers, will spend the money. The working class, and all the politically conscious peasants, answer: Let the people themselves collect the money and spend it themselves through the medium of "free institutions" really elected by the whole people and really without any connection with the dirty police. These free institutions must be used for developing a broad mass movement to transfer all power in the state, and the whole "Treasury", to the people. The liberal landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie ("Cadets") answer: We don't want any "free institutions", we are afraid of them. The people would go "too far". Much better to remain with the old pogrom-mongers, and just clean and scrub them a bit. Take the money from their Budget by cutting down harmful expenditure. Entrust the expenditure of the money to this government of pogrom-mongers, but try to bring them under our, that is, the liberal landlords' control.

The answers are clear. So are the positions of the government, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The only question is, whom will the peasants follow?

The liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets, are wavering between the government and the people. The position of the waverers is ambiguous. It is easy to say: Take the money from the current Budget by cutting down harmful expenditure! But the money is needed at once, and this operation requires the *consent* of the Council of State and the head of the state. Hence, the Cadets must be counting on obtaining

the voluntary consent of the higher officials and the camarilla. What are the Cadets' calculations based on? *On the possibility of a deal over the composition of the next Cabinet.*

We must look reality straight in the face. It is useless playing the hypocrite. It is useless playing hide-and-seek. The necessity of assigning money for famine relief is being used as a counter in the haggling that is, going between the Cadets and the pogrom-mongers' government, between the Cadets and the camarilla. The Cadets, in effect, say to the pogrom-mongers: If you gentlemen give way to us and appoint Muromtsev as Prime Minister instead of Yermolov, we will give way to you and grant you 15 and perhaps all 50 millions for famine relief, without any "dangerous" (for you pogrom-mongers as well as us landlords) recourse to "free institutions" of the people.

That is the true significance of the present events in the Duma. That is the true significance of Mr. Yeshchin's article in today's issue of the Cadet newspaper *Rech*, which the leading article in that paper commends, with slight reservations, and in which the author argues that the Duma should grant the pogrom-mongers' government money, but "fence this grant round with all the conditions that the Duma can reasonably demand".

The political situation is clear. Our Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma are now faced with a very serious task. Firstly, they must launch a major attack against the Cadets when the Budget and Food Committee's report comes up for discussion. They must demand recourse to "free institutions" of the people. They must open the eyes of the peasants to the reason why the Cadets, among whom there are so many landlords, are afraid of the people who need *all* the land—without *any* redemption payment—and complete freedom. They must insist on a vote being taken on their resolution on this question, so that the party of the proletariat may be ensured of the sympathy of all the toiling masses, and so that the wavering and cowardice of the liberal landlords may be clearly and publicly exposed.

Secondly, when the Cadets defeat the proposal to have recourse to free institutions, the Social-Democrats must launch a second attack from our next fortified line. They must demand an explanation why the Committee (the joint

Budget and Food Committee) has not published *all* the details of their negotiations with the Right Honourable gentlemen the Ministers of the Interior and of Finance. They must be well prepared for a far more thorough and resolute criticism of the whole Budget than that made by the Cadets in the Committee. Voices will then be heard from the rostrum of the Duma relentlessly exposing the double game the Cadets are playing, exposing all the "secrets" of the Russian Budget of the police pogrom-mongers—a Budget which squanders tens and hundreds of millions on assistance for landlords and capitalists, on military adventures, on "relief" for spies and gendarmes, on rewarding all the high-placed heroes of the Manchurian tragedy,[22] and on maintaining a horde of thieving officials who tyrannise over the people. Voices will be heard from the rostrum of the Duma proving that *harmful* expenditure amounts to much more than 15 or 50 millions.

The Cadets only want to exercise a little pressure on the government. The pogrom-mongers will be the first to be called to account by the Social-Democrats; but the Cadets, too, will have to answer for their attempt to gloss over the profound antagonism between the camarilla and the people.

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NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE CABINET

Yesterday we published newspaper reports about the contemplated formation of a Cabinet consisting of Yermolov, Urusov, Nabokov, Heyden and others.* Commenting on this list today, *Rech* says: "Evidently, the compilers of this list included members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party only tentatively; actually, the Constitutional-Democratic Party will take no part in a Cabinet of this character."

That is all very well, gentlemen of the Cadet Party! But how does *Rech* know that the Constitutional-Democratic Party will take no part in such a Cabinet?

The reader will ask: What do you mean by "how does *Rech* know"? Is not *Rech* the chief organ of the Cadets? Quite right. But in putting that question we wanted to suggest that it is *unbecoming*, in the highest degree unbecoming, for a party like the Constitutional-Democratic Party, which has held congresses legally, predominates in the State Duma, and is a wealthy, "enlightened" and liberal-minded party, to play hide-and-seek. Is it not high time it was said that *Rech* is the official and chief organ of that party? Is it not high time that the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party were published? One of two things, gentlemen: *Either* your party has not officially discussed the question of the kind of Cabinet it will "take part in". In that case you should say so plainly. In that case, *Rech* should speak on its own behalf, and not on behalf of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, that is: "*We are sure* that the Constitutional-Democratic Party will not take part", etc.

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* See pp. 38-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Or your party has officially discussed this question. In that case you should publish the minutes of that discussion, otherwise your silence proves that you are conducting secret negotiations behind the backs of the people.

"Today a more homogeneous list is being discussed," says *Rech* further, quoting only the names of Yermolov, Timiryazev, Heyden and Stakhovich, that is to say, bureaucrats and Octobrists, but no Cadets. Thus, *negotiations have taken place*. The Cadets were asked—perhaps through the medium of the "Centre Party" in the Council of State—will you take part in such a Cabinet? The Cadets answered: No, we will not.

Is that what happened, gentlemen? Have there been negotiations, or not? Did you state *your* terms, or not? Did your terms refer exclusively to the appointment of definite persons to the Cabinet, or did they also stipulate a complete amnesty, guaranteed liberties, abolition of the Council of State, and universal suffrage?

Until the Constitutional-Democratic Party officially gives full and absolutely precise answers to these questions we shall not tire of repeating to the people: Citizens, beware! Members of the party of "people's freedom" are conducting "unofficial" negotiations behind the backs of the people with a view to selling the people's freedom at a bargain price.

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

In *Golos Truda*,[23] Comrade N. Rakhmetov discusses "the political tasks of Russian Social-Democrats". Four columns of this article are taken up by arguments to prove that

> "it is not to the advantage of the proletariat, as one of the classes that are active in Russia today, to leave the Duma to its own resources. That would mean that the proletariat would strike itself off from the list of vital political forces, and the only result would be that the proletariat would fail to utilise the Russian bourgeois revolution to the extent it could do."

"It is enough to formulate the question in this way," says N. Rakhmetov, "to see that there can only be one answer to it." Quite true, Comrade Rakhmetov. The unfortunate thing, however, is that this is not a "formulation of the question", but a threadbare platitude.

The "question" has never been formulated *in this way*. It is quite evident, however, that Comrade Rakhmetov knows *how* it has been—and is now—formulated, for from the above quoted tirade he very surprisingly draws the following conclusion:

> "It is the proletariat's duty—to itself as well as to the whole country—not only to refrain from being passively neutral in the struggle between the Duma and the autocracy, but boldly and resolutely to *take the side of the Duma against the government in this struggle*."

Now this is where the "question" does arise. And Comrade Rakhmetov realises it, for he foresees that

"the newspaper *Svetoch** will probably be very sceptical about such tactics. That newspaper writes: 'The only flaw in this flawless dialectical plan of a "revolution through the Duma" is that it leaves out of account the mundane, prosaic fact that the present Duma consists, in the main, of bourgeois elements who dread revolution and, consequently, are hostile to it.' Arguments like these may serve as a splendid illustration of how a Social-Democrat should never argue under any circumstances. A Social-Democrat ought to know that the political tactics of the proletariat are not dictated by the *moods* of other social groups, but by the objective historical process that *compels* these groups to *act* in a certain way. A Social-Democrat ought to know and take into account what the classes with which he has to deal are *compelled* to do. If he formulates the question in this way he will be convinced of the following: by expressing readiness to render the Duma revolutionary support against tsarism, the proletariat will *thereby* compel the Duma to become more revolutionary in its actions. Politically, one must be very immature indeed not to understand this simple 'truth'."

What a queer argument! According to Comrade Rakhmetov, even though our bourgeoisie is counter-revolutionary, it can be compelled to become revolutionary.

For this purpose, it appears, "the Duma must be surrounded with a naming circle of revolutionary pressure". The Duma will then be confronted with the "question": "either be consumed in the flames or merge with them"; "the question of life or death".

We are very much afraid that Comrade Rakhmetov will get a severe gruelling from Comrade Plekhanov for his metaphysical "formulation of the question", for his inability to formulate a most important political question dialectically. How often the former Mensheviks, and Comrade Plekhanov, have protested against this "either—or" method of formulating political questions! Why necessarily "either be consumed in the flames or merge with them"? Does Comrade Rakhmetov really think that the Herzenstein and Nabokov faction has no other alternative? Why, for example, should they not, in alliance with the more "decent" bureaucrats, attempt to break through this "flaming circle of revolutionary pressure"?

We, for example, think that if the victoriously rising tide of revolution compels the leading elements of the Cadet

* The organ of the Moscow Social-Democrats, recently suppressed by the government.[24]

Party to do anything at all, it will be to try this third way out, i.e., simply to make a deal with the bureaucrats.

It is quite probable that the "party of people's freedom" in its present shape may be "consumed" in this attempt; but when will comrades like Rakhmetov understand, at last, that all the noise and fuss the Cadets have been making about people's freedom has been simply a stepping stone to ministerial portfolios and not to the "struggle against tsarism", which comrades like Rakhmetov are so unsuccessfully trying to foist upon them. And speaking generally, the masters of the Duma—for the time being—are the Cadet Centre; and you want to surround *this* Duma "with a flaming circle of revolutionary pressure". That is all very well; it is certainly important and necessary. But should not all those who are "pressing" constantly be warned that they will inevitably ... press the present masters of the Duma into the arms of the bureaucrats? Shouldn't they, Comrade Rakhmetov?

Ekho, No. 2,
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WHO IS FOR ALLIANCES WITH THE CADETS?

It sometimes happens that experienced and cautious statesmen, who appreciate their responsibility for every important political step they take, send out in advance young and somewhat incautious tyros to reconnoitre, as it were. "No use to waste a clever lad,"[25] they say to themselves, anticipating that the young men will blurt out some minor secret or other; which will serve as a feeler.

Comrade N. Rakhmetov, writing in *Golos Truda*, gives one the impression of just such a tyro fulfilling this intended mission. But that is exactly why, from a certain angle, Comrade Rakhmetov's very trivial article—we poked fun at it yesterday*—undoubtedly acquires political importance. If an influential organ of our Right-wing Social-Democrats like *Golos Truda* publishes, without a single editorial comment, an article calling upon the Social-Democrats to ally themselves with the Cadets it shows that our Party is suffering from some serious malady. No matter how much cautious, experienced and shrewd men may try to conceal its symptoms, the malady shows itself in spite of them. To keep silent about it would be a great crime.

The fundamental mistake of the opportunist Social-Democrats lies in their failure to understand what the decisive victory of the bourgeois revolution means. Our Russian opportunists who, like all opportunists, belittle the theory of revolutionary Marxism and the role of the proletariat as the vanguard, constantly labour under the illusion that the liberal bourgeoisie must inevitably be the "boss" in the bourgeois revolution. They totally fail to understand the

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* See pp. 50-52 of this volume.—*Ed.*

historical role of, say, the Convention in the great French Revolution as the dictatorship of the lower strata of society, those of the proletariat and the petty-bourgeoisie. They totally fail to understand the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry as the only possible social bulwark of a fully victorious Russian bourgeois revolution.

In essence, opportunism means sacrificing the long-term and permanent interests of the proletariat for flashy and temporary interests. In the period of the bourgeois revolution, the opportunist Social-Democrat forgets the importance of the revolutionary wing of the bourgeois democrats and pays slavish homage to the successes of the non-revolutionary wing of these bourgeois democrats. He loses sight of the essential difference between the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Constitutional-Democratic Party, Party of Democratic Reforms,[26] etc.) and the revolutionary, particularly, the peasant, bourgeois democrats. We have drawn the attention of our Right-wing comrades to this difference hundreds if not thousands of times. The Bolshevik draft resolution for the Congress* very clearly stated that the liberal bourgeoisie is trying to make a deal with the old regime, is wavering between revolution and reaction, is afraid of the people, and afraid of the free and all-sided development of their activities; and that all this is not due to chance, but to its fundamental interests. We said that we must utilise the democratic phrases uttered by this bourgeoisie, and utilise the timid steps it takes; but we must not for a moment forget its "compromising" and treacherous strivings. The peasant democrats, on the other hand, owing to the objective conditions in which the mass of the peasants find themselves, are compelled to act in a revolutionary manner, in spite of the fact that they are not fully politically conscious. The fundamental interests of *these* bourgeois democrats are not at present impelling them to seek a deal, but are compelling them to fight determinedly against the old regime. To avoid sacrificing the fundamental interests of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution a sharp distinction must be drawn between the liberal, or

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 158.—*Ed.*

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ЭХО

№ 3. Суббота, 24 іюня 1906 г. № 3.

ОТКРЫТА ПОДПИСКА

„ЭХО“.

Каждое объявленіе

Вопросы дня

Государственная Дума

Front page of *Ekho*, No. 3, June 24, 1906, with Lenin's leading article "Who Is for alliances with the Cadets?"

Reduced

First page of *Kala*, No. 3, June 24, 1906 with Lenin's leading article "Who Is for Alliance with the Cadets?"

Reduced

"Cadet", bourgeois democrats, and the peasant, or revolutionary, bourgeois democrats.

It is this that the opportunist Social-Democrats do not wish to understand, although events have brilliantly confirmed the correctness of this distinction and continue to do so. In the Duma, too, the peasant democrats become a distinct group by being compelled to draw closer to the revolution, and to strive to free themselves from the yoke of the Cadets. The Cadets and Octobrists versus the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats—such is the alignment that has *already taken place* both on the question of instituting elected local land committees, and on the question of the Cadets' attempt to "curb" freedom of assembly.

The comrades of the Right wing of Social-Democracy are blind to these facts. Dazzled by the immediate situation, they are inclined to identify the party that at present predominates in the Duma, i.e., the Constitutional-Democratic Party, with the bourgeois democrats in general. N. Rakhmetov is particularly naïve in repeating this old mistake of the Mensheviks. While the "old hands" artfully get round the unpleasant deductions that must be drawn from wrong premises, the tyros chatter and blurt out the truth. If the Constitutional-Democrats represent the genuine bourgeois democrats in general (and not merely the worst strata of the bourgeoisie, and small upper strata at that) then, naturally, the necessary fighting alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeois democrats must be an alliance with the Cadets. The proletariat can, and must, be in the forefront of the fight for the victory of the bourgeois revolution, while strictly preserving its class independence. But *without* the bourgeois democrats it cannot carry through this revolution to the end. With whom, then, should it "march separately, but strike together"? With the liberal democrats, or with the peasant democrats?

With the liberals, with the Cadets, twitters Rakhmetov. Why hesitate? The Cadets are on top; they are more conspicuous; they are flashy and glib! With the Cadets, of course, with the Cadets! "It is much easier for the Cadets to twist and turn," says Rakhmetov, "when they are surrounded by a solid wall of hostility than it would be if they were approached with an offer of a *political coalition*,

... Much more can be achieved by the pressure of public opinion on the Cadets (by sending to the Duma resolutions, instructions, petitions and demands, organising protest meetings, *negotiations between the Workers' Group and the Cadets*) than by senseless, and therefore useless, rowdyism, to put it strongly" (our italics).

Here then is a completely formulated deduction, for which Rakhmetov fully deserves a testimonial bearing the inscription: "From the grateful Bolsheviks". Political alliances with the Cadets, negotiations between Social-Democrats and Cadets—what a clear and precise slogan! All we have to do now is to spread this Menshevik slogan as widely as possible throughout the workers' party and put to the workers the question: *Who is for alliances with the Cadets?* Whoever knows anything of the proletariat will have no doubt about what the answer will be.

The same issue of *Golos Truda* contains what is substantially a correct warning by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. against Social-Democrats merging with the Trudoviks. But *Golos Truda* has rendered the Central Committee of our Party a disservice by converting this warning into a cloak for advocacy of an alliance between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets! Nothing could be more calculated to discredit the Social-Democrats than this action of combining a—substantially correct, we repeat—warning *against* Social-Democrats *merging* with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, with the advocacy of an *alliance* between the Social-Democrats and the opportunist bourgeoisie!

And what moment have our Mensheviks chosen to advocate such an alliance? The moment when the alliance between the revolutionary and opportunist bourgeoisie, between the Trudoviks and the Cadets, is *breaking down*. A very appropriate moment, indeed, for our good Rakhmetov to choose for launching his crusade! The very moment that the Trudoviks—with the help of the Social-Democrats be it said—are beginning to break away from the Cadets, to throw off their yoke, to vote against them and to rally against the "alliance" between the Cadets and the Octobrists. And people like Rakhmetov have the presumption to talk pompously about revolutionising the Duma, when, as a matter of fact, they are helping the Cadets to degrade the Duma.

Remember this, gentlemen, alliances and negotiations with the Cadets are the worst way of exercising pressure on them. In practice, it will mean blunting the independent struggle of the Social-Democrats, and not Social-Democratic pressure on the Cadets. It is those who relentlessly expose every false step of the Cadets that are helping to revolutionise the Duma and are "exercising pressure" on the Cadets. Refusal to support these false steps exerts far more pressure on the Cadet Duma than any negotiations with the Cadets with a view to supporting them. The Workers' Group refused to vote for the reply to the address from the throne: the Cadets had emasculated it. The Workers' Group has refused to support the Cadets; thereby it has discredited them in the eyes of the people and has shifted morally the focus of public attention from the Cadets to the "Left" core of the Duma. By ruthlessly denouncing the half-heartedness of the *Cadet* Duma we are revolutionising the Duma and—what is more important—the people who believe in the Duma. We thereby, in effect, issue a call to throw off the Cadet yoke, to act more boldly, determinedly and consistently. We thereby also cause a cleavage among the Cadets and make their ranks waver under the joint assault of the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks.

We are carrying out the policy of the proletariat as the vanguard fighter in the revolution and not as an appendage of the most timid and pitiful upper ranks of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Ekho, No. 3,
June 24, 1906

Published according to
the *Ekho* text

THE CADET DUMA GRANTS MONEY TO THE POGROM-MONGERS' GOVERNMENT

The inevitable has happened. From now on, the Budget of the autocratic government of pogrom-mongers will contain a small item that has been *approved* by the "people's"—if you please—representatives. It's the first step that's difficult, as the French say; or as we say in Russia: the first glass must be forced down, the second trickles down, and all the others glide down in a merry stream. The Cadets have swallowed the first glass in company with the henchmen of the autocracy.

Let us carefully trace the course of this historical event. The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Finance asked the Duma to grant 50 million rubles for famine relief. "*Legally*", the Ministers could not obtain this money, could not take control of the relief campaign, without the consent of the Duma. The Ministers did not ask the Duma who is to be in charge of this campaign: "*Legally*", it must in any case be in the hands of the pogrom-mongers' government. Nor did the Ministers indicate in their proposal how the money is to be obtained. They merely said: "To allow the Minister of Finance to procure." It was only in the Committee that the Ministers proposed that a loan be floated to provide the money. Yesterday, however, the Minister of Finance bluntly stated in the Duma: "It is within the competence of the State Duma to authorise procurements, but the manner of procurement [we are quoting from *Rech* and take no responsibility for the style]* is determined by the supreme

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed* .

power." Thus, all that the Ministers had to obtain from the Duma was an assignment in general, but they were less concerned about the sources.

Two main solutions of the problem, which we indicated the other day,* were at once put forward in the Duma. The Cadets proposed that a sum of 15 million rubles be assigned with the proviso that an account of its expenditure be submitted to the Duma, and that the amount be taken out of the "anticipated savings" in the 1906 Budget. That, and nothing more. But the Minister of Finance very coolly said in reply to the Cadets: "If the State Duma decides to grant 15 million rubles, the Ministry of Finance will release that sum ... but will release it *not from anticipated savings* but from other secured items of expenditure." After making the expenditure, the Minister "will come to the State Duma and say: You compelled us to make an expenditure for which we found no surpluses."

Thus, the matter is as clear as daylight. The Minister simply spat in the face of the Cadet Duma: We shall use your permission to take 15 million rubles, he said in effect, but as for your decision about "savings", it is just empty words. The Minister did not hesitate to say that there would be no savings. He did not hesitate to say that he was quite willing to obtain money by assignment of the Duma, but he snapped his fingers at its advice about "savings".

What role did the Cadet Duma *actually* play in this business? The role of a *witness* called by the police to approve its expenditure of money filched from the people. "Legally", the signature of witnesses is required for the appropriation of money. The police demanded the signature. The Cadet Duma gave it. That is all the police wanted. The fact that the witnesses kicked a bit, did not worry them in the least.

But it was the *Cadet* Duma that played the part of police witnesses. The Social-Democratic deputies took up an entirely different and correct position. They spoke on the lines that we suggested the other day. "I declare, gentlemen," said Comrade Ramishvili in his excellent speech, "that if we grant the government a farthing, even that farthing will never reach the people." In their resolution, which we pub-

* See pp. 43-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

lished yesterday, the Social-Democrats quite rightly said that no money should be given to the autocratic government, that the State Duma ought to set up *its own* relief committee, send its members to the affected areas and invite the co-operation of "free public organisations". The Social-Democrats turned their resolution into a revolutionary appeal to the people which branded the government as "the real culprit responsible for the famine", squandering the people's money on waging war against the people. The Social-Democrats demanded the *cessation* of expenditure on the gendarmerie, the political police, the rural mounted police, and so forth; they demanded a *reduction* in the salaries and pensions of high-placed drones and an *audit* of the cash balance and accounts of the Treasury. They also quite rightly demanded that the revenues from crown, church and monastery lands be used for famine relief. The Social-Democrats openly indicted the old regime as a whole, and all its organs, and also criticised the whole Budget.

How did the Duma vote? The Cadets won, of course. According to the unanimous statements of a number of newspapers, the Trudoviks voted with the Social-Democrats (*untortunately*, a roll-call vote was not taken). The political alignment is becoming more and more distinct. The Octobrists and Cadets are in favour of coming to terms with the old regime. The Social-Democrats and Trudoviks are strongly opposed to this. The vigorous and united action of the Social-Democrats not only won over the peasants, but even caused a slight split among the Cadets. Not only the Left Galetsky, but even the Right Kuzmin-Karavayev was ashamed of playing the role of police witness. It was the Cadets, and the Cadets alone, who put the shameful signature of the "people's representatives" to the assignment of money to the pogrom-mongers.

This signature of the Cadet Duma is of enormous importance in principle. Naïve people and short-sighted politicians often say: The accusation that the Cadets are traitors and want to make a deal with the bureaucrats is groundless and premature. But this assignment of money to the pogrom-mongers' government is just such a deal—and strictly speaking, not the first. Look at the miserable shifts the Cadets resort to in their attempts to justify themselves.

This is a compromise, yells *Nasha Zhizn*, but it is justified by the temporary circumstances. Of course, gentlemen, all compromises between the bourgeoisie and the police autocracy have always been attributed to temporary circumstances.

But the peasants need immediate relief! Have not the peasant deputies betrayed the peasants? What do you think, gentlemen of the Cadet Party? The peasant deputies voted against the grant because they know better than you do where the money would go after passing through police hands. Why could not the State Duma take this matter in its own hands?

That is utopian, impracticable; we must reckon with the available organisation until it is changed by law—is the unanimous cry of the Heydens, Kokovtsovs, Milyukovs, and even the Bernsteinians of *Nasha Zhizn*. Yes, gentlemen, the bourgeoisie always regards the abolition of all the organs of the old regime as utopian because it wants to use these organs against the proletariat and against the revolutionary peasantry. In a police-ridden class state there will always be an endless amount of "urgent" expenditure. Once they have been engaged officials must be maintained; contracts that have been concluded must be paid for, and so on and so forth. There will always be an "available organisation" (namely, the police-bureaucratic organisation) which it is "impossible" to change at one stroke, without the consent of the Council of State, *and so on and so forth*.

Such excuses will always be found. These are the excuses that the liberal bourgeoisie hands out to credulous people in every country. These excuses are the natural screen with which the bourgeoisie tries to cover up its betrayal of the cause of the people's freedom.

The proletariat will always fight this hypocritical game. It will call upon the people to fight against all the organs and institutions of the old regime; to fight through the medium of the free organisations of the working class and the revolutionary peasantry.

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YES-MEN OF THE CADETS

Yesterday we published the main resolutions adopted by the Fifth Congress of the Polish Social-Democratic Party.[27] The Polish comrades—25,000-30,000 strong, now affiliated to our Party—expressed their emphatic opposition to the Central Committee's tactics in relation to the State Duma. Condemning these tactics as a whole, they did not deem it necessary to dwell on the individual mistakes that inevitably follow from these wrong tactics, such as the notorious support for a Cadet Cabinet. But it goes without saying—and those who were present at the Polish Congress know this perfectly well—that the Polish Social-Democrats are absolutely opposed to this "support". The Conference representing all the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats also emphatically rejected support for a Cadet Cabinet[28]; and the Regional Conference representing the Social-Democrats of the Central Moscow District, too, pronounced against it.[29]

The St. Petersburg Conference represented about 4,000 Party members, and the Moscow Regional Conference about 14,000. Thus, about 20,000 members of the Party, that is, the major half of the membership (at the last congress 31,000-33,000 members were represented) *have condemned the Central Committee's tactics on the question of supporting a Duma Cabinet*. The majority of the Party membership is opposed to this policy. Our Party Cabinet, that is to say, the Central Committee of our Party, no longer expresses the Party's opinion. Its elementary political duty now is to expedite the convening of an immediate extraordinary congress. If it fails to do that it will become a clique, clinging to power in the Party on pretexts for delay and excuses of a *formal* nature, in spite of the expressed opinion of the Party

on the *substance* of the issue. At all events, the Party will now be able to secure the convocation of a congress.

The Mensheviks continue to advocate the tactics of supporting a Duma, *i.e.*, *a Cadet* Cabinet, tactics that have been condemned by the majority of the Party membership (although, as the discussion in St. Petersburg has shown, a number of Mensheviks have now taken up an independent position and have turned away from opportunism). Let us, once again, examine the current arguments of the Right-wing Social-Democrats.

We are told that to secure the appointment of a Duma Cabinet means "wresting power from the hands of the camarilla", means "making the executive power responsible to the representative assembly of the people"; that it is "the transition from a pseudo-constitutional system to a real constitution" (*Golos Truda*, No. 5).

That is a *downright lie*. The Duma, i.e., Cadet, Cabinet will be appointed (if the Cadets' demand is conceded) *by the camarilla*. But can the appointment of liberal Cabinet Ministers by the camarilla be called "wresting power". Appointing Ministers at its own discretion, the camarilla can dismiss them at any time. The camarilla does not surrender power, but *pretends to share power*; the camarilla *tests* the liberal flunkeys to see whether they suit it or not. The shrewd members of the camarilla, like Pobedonostsev and Trepov, for example (judging by certain newspaper reports), frankly argue in this way: the best thing for us would be to appoint liberal Ministers. By so doing we should not only pacify the Cadets (i.e., the majority in the Duma) but also the pro-Cadet Social-Democrats. And it is much easier to get rid of undesirable Ministers than to get rid of the Duma, let us say. We shall gain time, shuffle the cards, create utter chaos, mutual distrust and bickering over ministerial portfolios in the Right wing, i.e., the major half, of the Duma, stir up trouble, and lead the Cadets by the nose as we did on the question of famine relief. On that question we compelled them "voluntarily" to play the role of police witnesses. Similarly, in their ministerial office we shall compel them to play the role of police flunkeys.

Whoever is at all familiar with the history of the Russian Cadets, and of the "Cadets" in other countries, knows that

the camarilla has always succeeded in leading the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie by the nose. The only way to prevent this is to develop the *independent* political consciousness of the proletarians and revolutionary peasants. And it is just the Right Social-Democrats who are now obscuring and muddling this consciousness. To keep the political consciousness of the revolutionary classes absolutely clear, and to preserve their complete fighting independence, we Social-Democrats must leave it entirely to the Cadets to grovel at the feet of the camarilla for the sake of ministerial jobs. To involve the proletariat in this business would be to betray the interests of the proletariat and the interests of the revolution.

If the camarilla were to appoint Cadets as Ministers it would make "the executive power responsible to the representative assembly of the people" (*Golos Truda*).

That is a downright lie. When Cadet professors say it—well, God will forgive them. But it is unpardonable for a Social-Democrat to repeat it. The executive power, most worthy yes-men, is not responsible to "the representative assembly of the people", but to the *legislative power*. Please remember this. Now let us explain the matter further. In whose hands is the legislative power in Russia today? 1) The supreme authority; 2) the Council of State; 3) the State Duma.

Do you understand your mistake now? The Cadet Ministers will be responsible to the Duma, to the Council of State and to the camarilla. To try to make out that they will be responsible only to the Duma means *lying* to the people.

To proceed. What will be the position of Ministers who are responsible to the most diverse institutions? A false one. The Ministers will be obliged to *observe and uphold* all the existing laws until they are repealed by all the three legislative bodies enumerated above. It is not surprising, therefore, that eloquent Cadets like Rodichev, are gesticulating in the Duma and declaiming that they are—the shield of the dynasty. The Cadets know what's what. The Right Social-Democrats, however, try to sing in harmony with them, but they don't understand what they are doing.

Why has the Cabinet become the focal point of the Cadets' campaign? Why are they not shouting equally zealously, frequently and loudly: Down with the Council of State!

Down with *the laws* that are preventing the representative assembly of the people from becoming the legislative power!? Why are they conducting *a thousand times smaller campaign* for a general amnesty, for complete freedom and for universal suffrage than they are conducting for ministerial jobs? Have you thought about this? No, you have not. The Cadets are knocking at the back door in the first place because they *don't want* complete freedom (recall their Public Meetings Bill); they *don't want* the complete abolition of the Council of State (remember the Upper Chamber in *their* programme), to which they will *also* be responsible, and *to the same extent* as to the Duma, *and so forth*. The Cadets do not want to demand that the government should *first* grant a general amnesty, *first* abolish the Council of State, *first* introduce complete freedom, *first* grant universal, etc. suffrage, and only *then* appoint them as Cabinet Ministers. Why don't the Cadets want to do this? Because they know what's what; but the yes-men of the Cadets do not.

The Cadets say: When we become Ministers then *we* will *fight* for all these liberties! It can't be done at once, you know. And their yes-men believe them, and do their best ....

The Cadets know that the Cabinet Minister will be responsible to the old, police, Russian laws; responsible to the Duma, to the camarilla and to the Council of State. And so the Minister will say in the suavest tones: I would only be too glad; I am with you heart and soul; but, you see, "the others" don't agree; and the Council of State is still a bit stubborn, you know. Have patience, gentlemen. I am a Cadet, and nobody can touch the conscience of the camarilla, or of the Council of State, better than the Cadets, I assure you.

Remember this, my dear yes-men; to combat the treacherous tactics of the Cadets what is required is not to echo the Cadets, but to preserve complete independence, that is to say, to *warn* the proletariat and the peasants not to trust the Cadets, not to repeat the Cadet slogans. Your tactics are *hindering* the independent struggle of the working class and revolutionary peasantry. You are selling our revolutionary birthright for a mess of Cadet reformist pottage.

There is no need for us to explain in such detail the *third lie*, viz., that the appointment of Cadet Ministers by the

camarilla marks a "decisive change", the transition to a "real constitution". Our readers themselves will understand that the fact that Trepov appoints Rodichev as a Cabinet Minister does not even change the *written* constitution. To speak of a change of the *real* constitution as the result of such an appointment is to allow your tongue to run away with you.

In our next issue we shall examine another current argument, namely: "After all, a Cadet Cabinet will be better. We have nothing else to choose from. We must support what is better." We shall see whether this is a sound Social-Democratic argument.

Ekho, No. 5,
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the *Ekho* text

ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE DUMA CABINET

"We must choose"—this is the argument the opportunists have always used to justify themselves, and they are using it now. Big things cannot be achieved at one stroke. We must fight for small but achievable things. How do we know whether they are achievable? They are achievable if the majority of the political parties, or of the most "influential" politicians, agree with them. The larger the number of politicians who agree with some tiny improvement, the easier it is to achieve it. We must not be utopians and strive after big things. We must be practical politicians; we must join in the demand for small things, and these small things *will facilitate the fight* for the big ones. We regard the small things as the *surest stage* in the struggle for big things.

That is how all the opportunists, all the reformists, argue; unlike the revolutionaries. That is how the Right-wing Social-Democrats argue about a Duma Cabinet. The demand for a constituent assembly is a big demand. It cannot be achieved immediately. By no means everyone is consciously in favour of this demand.* But the *whole* State Duma, that is to say, the vast majority of politicians—*that is to say* "the whole people"—is in favour of a Duma Cabinet. *We must choose*—between the existing evil and a *very small* rectification of it, because the largest number of those who are in general dissatisfied with the existing evil are in favour of this "very small" rectification. And by achieving the small thing, we shall facilitate our struggle for the big one.

We repeat: this is the fundamental, the typical argument of all opportunists all over the world. To what con-

* Only the minority in the Duma supports this demand.

clusion does this argument inevitably lead? To the conclusion that we need no revolutionary programme, no revolutionary party, and no revolutionary tactics. What we need are *reforms*, nothing more. We do not need a revolutionary Social-Democratic Party. What we need is a party of democratic and socialist reforms. Indeed, is it not clear that there will *always* be people who admit that the existing state of affairs is unsatisfactory? Of course, always. Is it not also clear that the *largest* number of discontented people will *always* be in favour of the *smallest* rectification of this unsatisfactory situation? Of course, always. Consequently, it is our duty, the duty of advanced and "class-conscious" people, *always* to support the *smallest* demands for the rectification of an evil. This is the surest and most practical policy to pursue; and all talk about "fundamental" demands, and so forth, is merely the talk of "utopians", merely "revolutionary phrase-mongering". *We must choose*—and we must always choose between the existing evil and the most moderate of the schemes in vogue for its rectification.

That is exactly how the German opportunist Social-Democrats argued. They said, in effect: There is a social-liberal trend which demands the repeal of the anti-socialist laws, a reduction of the working day, insurance against illness, and so on. A fairly large section of the bourgeoisie supports these demands. Do not repel it by tactless conduct, offer it a friendly hand, support it, and then you will be practical politicians, you will achieve small, but real benefits for the working class, and the only thing that will suffer from your tactics will be the empty words about "revolution". You cannot make a revolution now, in any case. *One must choose* between reaction and reform, between the Bismarck policy and the "social empire" policy.

The French ministerial socialists argued exactly like the Bernsteinians.[30] They said in effect: *We must choose* between reaction and the bourgeois radicals, who promise a number of practical reforms. We must support these radicals, support their Cabinets; phrases about social revoluti on are merely the chatter of "Blanquists", "anarchists", "utopians", and so forth.

What is the main flaw in all these opportunist arguments? It is that *in fact* they substitute the bourgeois theory

of "united", "social" progress for the socialist theory of the class struggle as the only *real* driving force of history. According to the theory of socialism, i.e., of Marxism (non-Marxist socialism is not worth serious discussion nowadays), the real driving force of history is the revolutionary class struggle; reforms are a subsidiary product of this struggle, subsidiary because they express unsuccessful attempts to weaken, to blunt this struggle, etc. According to the theory of bourgeois philosophers, the driving force of progress is the unity of all elements in society who realise the imperfections" of certain of its institutions. The first theory is materialist; the second is idealist. The first is revolutionary; the second is reformist. The first serves as the basis for the tactics of the proletariat in modern capitalist countries. The second serves as the basis of the tactics of the bourgeoisie.

A logical deduction from the second theory is the tactics of ordinary bourgeois progressives: always and everywhere support "what is better"; choose between reaction and the extreme Right of the forces that are opposed to reaction. A logical deduction from the first theory is that the advanced class must pursue independent revolutionary tactics. We shall never reduce our tasks to that of supporting the slogans of the reformist bourgeoisie that are most in vogue. We pursue an independent policy and put forward *only* such reforms as are *undoubtedly* favourable to the interests of the revolutionary struggle, that *undoubtedly* enhance the independence, class-consciousness and fighting efficiency of the proletariat. Only by such tactics can reforms from above, which are always half-hearted, always hypocritical, and always conceal some bourgeois or police snare, be made *innocuous*.

More than that. Only by such tactics can real progress be achieved in the matter of important reforms. This may sound paradoxical, but its truth is confirmed by the whole history of the international Social-Democratic movement. Reformist tactics are the *least* likely to secure real reforms, The most effective way to secure real reforms is to pursue the tactics of the revolutionary class struggle. *Actually*, reforms are won as a result of the revolutionary class struggle, as a result of its independence, mass force and steadfast-

ness. Reforms are *always* false, ambiguous and permeated with the spirit of Zubatovism[31]; they are real only in proportion to the intensity of the class struggle. By merging our slogans with those of the reformist bourgeoisie we *weaken* the cause of revolution *and*, *consequently*, *the cause of reform as well*, because we thereby diminish the independence, fortitude and strength of the revolutionary classes.

Some readers may ask: Why repeat these elementary principles of international revolutionary Social-Democracy? Our answer is: Because *Golos Truda* and many Menshevik comrades tend to forget them.

A Duma, or Cadet, Cabinet is just such a false, ambiguous and Zubatov reform. To forget the real significance of such a reform, as an attempt on the part of the Cadets to strike a bargain with the autocracy, means substituting the liberal-bourgeois philosophy of progress for Marxism. By supporting *such* a reform, by including it among *our* slogans, we *dim* the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat and *weaken* its independence and fighting capacity. By upholding our old revolutionary slogans *in their entirety*, we *strengthen* the actual struggle, and thereby increase the probability of reforms and the *possibility of turning them* to the advantage of the revolution, and not of reaction. All that is false and hypocritical in these reforms we leave to the Cadets; all that is of positive value in them we *utilise* ourselves. Only by such tactics shall we be able to take advantage of the attempts of the Trepovs and Nabokovs to trip each other up so as to throw both these worthy acrobats into the pit. Only if we pursue such tactics will history say about us what Bismarck said about the German Social-Democrats: "If there were no Social-Democrats there would have been no social reform." Had there not been a *revolutionary* proletariat there would have been no October 17. Had there been no December,[32] attempts to prevent the convocation of the Duma would not have been defeated. We shall have another December, which will determine the future progress of the revolution....

Postscript. This article had already been written when we read the leading article in *Golos Truda*, No. 6. Our comrades are mending their ways. They now propose that *before* accepting their portfolios, the Duma Cabinet should

demand and secure the abolition of martial law in all parts of the country, the abolition of secret police, a general amnesty, and the restoration of all liberties. Very good, comrades. Ask the Central Committee to insert these terms in its resolution on the Duma Cabinet. In fact, do it yourselves, and then it will read: *before* supporting a Duma, or Cadet, Cabinet, we must demand and secure that the Duma, or Cadets, take the path of revolution. *Before* supporting the Cadets we must demand and secure that the Cadets cease to be Cadets.

Ekho, No. 6,
June 28, 1906

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AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Yesterday we showed that Trepov had no reason to fall out with the Cadets solely because he is on principle opposed to compulsory alienation of land for the benefit of the peasants, once the Cadets agree to the peasants being made to pay a round sum for the alienated land "at a fair valuation". Today, *Slovo*[33] says:

> "Agrarian reform is the corner-stone of all the rumours about the formation of a new Cabinet representing the Duma majority. According to the rumours that have reached us from other sources, *the basis on which an agreement may be reached on the question of forming a Duma Cabinet is—the floating of a new loan.*
>
> "The purpose of the loan is primarily to solve the urgent land question. It has been estimated that to solve this problem without having to resort to the undesirable principle of compulsory alienation, two thousand million rubles will be needed. The other half of the loan is to be placed at the absolute disposal of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy for the purpose of increasing the fighting efficiency of the Army and Navy."

Thus, everything is going smoothly: for two thousand million to compensate the expropriated landlords and others plus two thousand million to be placed at the absolute disposal of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy, Trepov is willing to put the Cadets in power, and let his principles go hang. It is not a high price he asks, is it, gentlemen of the Cadet Party?

* * *

Nasha Zhizn is very much disturbed at the idea of a new congress of our Party. It is trying to make out that this new congress will be some sort of disaster, a symptom of

some incurable sickness of the Party. "What, another congress!"—it cries in horror. Yes, another congress—as the inevitable way out of the situation in the Party, when the Central Committee and its directives are out of harmony with the opinion of the whole Party. The Party has now been reorganised on democratic lines, and we would ask the democrats of *Nasha Zhizn* how the organised opinion of a democratic party can be expressed if not through a congress. In their newspaper these gentlemen quote the figures published in *Ekho*[34] showing the number of organisations and Party members that have expressed opposition to the Central Committee's policy; and yet they are horror-struck at the idea of a congress.

No, the idea of a new congress is not disastrous; it is a symptom of the Party's vitality, a symptom of the strength of public opinion in the Party. It is a sign that the Party is finding a simple and easy way out of the situation that circumstances have created. And we are sure that nobody in the Party, least of all our responsible Cabinet—the Central Committee—will regard a congress as a disaster. For the Party, the convocation of a congress is now a necessity; for the Central Committee it is an obligation; for the Cadets and their yes-men, perhaps, it may be unpleasant. But what can one do! We know that whichever side is victorious at the congress, the congress will be very unpleasant for the bourgeoisie.

* * *

The following is printed in *Golos Truda* (No. 7):

"*Editorial note*. We have received a letter from Comrade K. P—v[35] concerning the article by Comrade N. Rakhmetov. We deem it necessary to state that we do not fully share some of Rakhmetov's views, and in particular we totally disagree with his opinion about 'a political coalition' with the Cadets.

"We allowed Comrade Rakhmetov the right freely to express his views. We ourselves stand by the Amsterdam Resolution,[36] and we have made this sufficiently clear and definite in leading articles on the most diverse topics of current politics from the very first day the Constitutional-Democratic Party appeared in the political arena."

We do not know what Comrade K. P—v actually wrote to the editors of *Golos Truda*; but the perplexing thought that

involuntarily rises in one's mind is: Did the editors need this letter to enable them to "understand" N. Rakhmetov's article? If they did understand it without Comrade K. P—v's assistance and did not agree with N. Rakhmetov, how is it that they publish leading articles on matters of principle without indicating that they disagree with them? Moreover, the length of the article—interesting indeed only because of its slashing style and its "extreme" deductions and slogans—must have misled a fairly large number of readers who concluded that the author was in close touch with leading circles in the Party. Nevertheless, our feeling of perplexity is to some extent mingled with a feeling of satisfaction. True, it has taken *Golos Truda* a week to dissociate itself from N. Rakhmetov; but better late than never.

Ekho, No. 7,
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THE UNSOUND ARGUMENTS OF THE "NON-PARTY" BOYCOTTERS

In a leading article the other day *Mysl* argued that the Trudovik Group in the State Duma must not be "split" by the formation of party groups. The boycott of the Duma, it says, made it a foregone conclusion that the extreme parties would not have their groups in the Duma. The Trudovik Group will be far more useful as a non-party organisation working in conjunction with its local, non-party "supporting groups".

This argument is utterly false. Non-party revolutionism is a necessary and an inevitable phenomenon in the period of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolshevik Social-Democrats have repeatedly emphasised this. Parties are the result and the political expression of highly developed class antagonisms. The characteristic feature of a bourgeois revolution is that these antagonisms are undeveloped. The growth and expansion of the non-party revolutionary-democratic element is therefore inevitable in such a revolution.

The Social-Democrats, as the representatives of the class-conscious proletariat, cannot pledge themselves not to participate in the activities of the various non-party revolutionary associations. Such for example, were the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Peasant Union, and to some extent the Teachers' Union, Railwaymen's Union, etc. We must regard participation in the activities of such associations as a temporary fighting alliance between the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Only if we look at it in this light can we avoid injury to the vital and fundamental interests of the proletariat, vindicate the absolutely independent socialist point of view of the Marxists, and form

independent Social-Democratic Party organisations wherever there is the slightest opportunity for doing so.

To regard the formation of such independent Social Democratic organisations as "splitting" the non-party revolutionary organisations is to display, firstly, a purely bourgeois outlook, and secondly, insincerity or shallow thinking in one's claim to be non-party. Only bourgeois ideologists can regard the organisation of socialists in a separate party as a "split". Only those who are insincere, i.e., those who have inward qualms about their own *concealed* bias for a party, or those who have not given sufficient thought to the question, can regard the formation of *party* organisations as the "splitting" of the non-party organisations. It is illogical, gentlemen. To be *non*-party means being neutral towards the different parties (within the limits of the general aims of revolutionary democracy). The condemnation of adherence to a party that is expressed in the word "split", is a departure from neutrality and from being non-party and shows obvious bias for a party. You are either hypocrites, or you cannot think logically, gentlemen. In point of fact your outcry against splits and in favour of non-party organisation is intended to cover up your qualms about *your own* bias for a party. A genuinely non-party advocate of, let us say, a constituent assembly would not regard it as a split if some of those who held the same view formed an independent party, while continuing fully to subscribe to this demand.

Thus, let non-party revolutionaries develop non-party revolutionary organisations. Good luck to them! But let them stop shouting so much about the party revolutionaries who, they allege, are "splitting" the non-party revolutionaries.

Now about the boycott. We are convinced that the boycott was not a blunder. In the concrete historical situation that prevailed at the beginning of 1906 it was necessary and correct. After sweeping away the Bulygin Duma, and after December, it was the duty of the Social-Democrats to continue with equal vigour to hold aloft the banner of struggle for a constituent assembly and to exert *all* efforts to sweep away the Witte Duma too. We performed our revolutionary duty. And despite all calumnies and the belated repentance

of some people, the boycott did a great deal to sustain the revolutionary spirit and Social-Democratic consciousness of the workers. The best criteria of this are: 1) the fact that the rank-and-file workers supported it; 2) the brilliant way in which it was carried out in the particularly oppressed border regions; 3) the fact that the government issued a special law against the boycott.[37]

The opinion that the boycott was mistaken and useless is wrong and short-sighted. It was useful not only from the moral and political, but also from the immediate and practical point of view. It diverted all the attention and efforts of the government to the struggle against the boycotters. It put the government in a ludicrous and idiotic position that was much to our advantage. The government was compelled to fight *for* the convocation of the Duma and as a consequence, it could pay very little attention to the composition of the Duma. The boycott was, to use a military term, a frontal attack, or a feint frontal attack, without which it would have been *impossible* to outflank the enemy. This is exactly what happened. We revolutionaries made a feint frontal attack, of which the government was mortally afraid, so much so that it passed an incredibly idiotic law. Meanwhile, the liberal bourgeoisie and the non-party revolutionaries took advantage of this frontal attack, which drew the main forces of the enemy to the centre, to start a flanking movement. They got into the enemy's rear and stealthily made their way into the Duma, penetrating the enemy camp in disguise.

Everybody behaves after his own kind. The proletariat fights; the bourgeoisie uses stealth.

Now, too, we put the political responsibility for the Duma that was convened by the camarilla, that is subordinated to the camarilla, and is haggling with the camarilla, *entirely* upon the Cadets. It was our bounden duty to do this because of the dual nature of the composition and activities of the Duma; it has something that we must support, and something that we must strenuously combat. Only bourgeois politicians can forget, or refuse to see, this duality. Only bourgeois politicians can stubbornly ignore the role of the Duma as the instrument of a counter-revolutionary deal between the autocracy and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoi-

sie against the proletariat and peasantry. Whether this deal will succeed even temporarily, and what its consequences may be, no one can tell at present. In the last analysis, this will depend on the strength, organisation and political consciousness of the popular movement outside the Duma. That the representatives of the class that is *capable* of making such a deal predominate in the Duma, that negotiations for it are now in progress, and that the first, tentative steps towards it are being taken, are *facts*. No "denials" by the Cadets, nor the silence of the Mensheviks can conceal them.

If that is so—and it certainly is—then it is clear that the interests of the proletarian class struggle imperatively demanded that the proletariat should maintain complete political independence. It had to act differently from the liberal bourgeoisie, which is ready to snatch eagerly at any sop that is thrown to it. It had to warn the people with all the energy at its command against the trap that was being contrived by the camarilla. It had to do all in its power to prevent the convocation of a sham, Cadet, "representative assembly of the people". All this it tried to achieve by means of the boycott.

That is why the arguments of those Right-wing Social-Democrats who, to the amusement of the bourgeoisie, are now repudiating the boycott and denouncing their *own* conduct in the recent past are extremely trivial and amazingly unhistorical. For after all the Mensheviks, too, *were boycotters*; only they wanted to boycott the Duma at a different stage. It is enough to recall *two* historical facts, to forget which would be unpardonable for a Social-Democrat who attaches any value to his past. The *first* fact: the leaflet of the Joint Central Committee of our Party, which consisted of an equal number of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, plainly stated that both sides agreed with the idea of a boycott and disagreed only about the stage at which it should be carried out. The *second* fact: not a single Menshevik in any Menshevik publication advocated going into the Duma; and even Comrade Plekhanov, who is so "resolute", did not dare to do so. For a Social-Democrat to repudiate the boycott is tantamount to distorting the recent history of the Party.

But does the fact that we boycotted the Duma *necessarily* mean that we must not form our Party Group in the Duma?

Not at all. The boycotters who, like *Mysl*, think so, are mistaken. We were obliged to do—and did—everything in our power to prevent the convocation of a sham representative body. That is so. But since it has been convened in spite of all our efforts, we cannot shirk the task of utilising it. Only bourgeois politicians who care nothing for the revolutionary struggle, and for the struggle for the complete success of the revolution; can see anything illogical in this. Let us recall the example of Liebknecht, who denounced, flayed and spurned the German Reichstag in 1869, but went into the Reichstag after 1870. Liebknecht fully appreciated the importance of the revolutionary struggle for a revolutionary and not a treacherously bourgeois representative assembly of the people. He did not cravenly repudiate his past actions. He quite rightly said: I did all I could to fight against such a Reichstag, to fight for the best possible result. The result turned out to be the worst. I shall be able to make use even of this worst result without betraying my revolutionary traditions.

Thus, the boycott cannot be used to deduce that we must refrain from utilising the Duma, or from forming our Party Group in it. The issue is an entirely different one, namely, that we must exercise the greatest caution (and *this* is the issue that the Bolsheviks raised at the Unity Congress, as anyone can see by reading their draft resolution*). We must consider whether we can utilise the Duma *now* by working inside it; whether we have Social-Democrats who are suitable for this work, and whether the external conditions are favourable for it.

We think that the answer to these questions is in the affirmative. We have had occasion to point out minor mistakes our Duma deputies have made, but on the whole they have adopted a correct position. An alignment *has arisen* in the Duma actually *corresponding* to the revolutionary situation; the Octobrists and the Cadets on the right, the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks (or more correctly, the best of the Trudoviks), on the left. We can and must utilise this alignment to warn the people against the dangerous side of the Cadet Duma, so as to develop a revolutionary

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 292-93.—*Ed.*

movement not restricted to the Duma, to Duma tactics, to Duma aims, etc. In view of this alignment we shall—if we manage things properly—also utilise the non-party revolutionary democrats, and at the same time come forward definitely and determinedly as a Social-Democratic, proletarian party.

Ekho, No. 9,
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THE BOURGEOISIE'S CENSURES AND THE PROLETARIAT'S CALL FOR ACTION

The debate in the State Duma on the reports of the Belostok pogrom is drawing to a close. The government's crimes have been disclosed with the fullest and in some cases, one might say, with pedantic accuracy. The unanimity of the State Duma in condemning the vile conduct of the local *and central* authorities seemed to have been complete. People who are capable of saying that the Duma "combines the struggle of classes into one struggle" might have exulted over such unanimity.

But as soon as matters reached the stage of *practical* conclusions in regard to the measures necessary to *combat* the vile crimes of the gang of pogrom-mongers, this sham and superficial unanimity was at once scattered like dust. It at once became apparent that however much the "struggle of classes is combined into one struggle" the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are pursuing *essentially* different aims in their struggle for emancipation. The bourgeoisie wants to "censure" the government so as to be able to set to work itself to *subdue* the revolution. The proletariat wants to *call* upon the people to wage a revolutionary struggle.

This difference was clearly revealed in the two resolutions that were proposed in connection with the Belostok pogrom. The formula of the bourgeoisie (the Constitutional-Democratic Party): 1) trounces the government; 2) demands the resignation of the Cabinet; and 3) emphasises that "the government is conscious of its *powerlessness* to combat the revolution". The bourgeoisie wants a *strong* government *to combat the revolution*.

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The formula of the proletariat (the Social-Democratic Party) is different. It: 1) trounces the government—it is to this "unanimity" of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie that simpletons in politics usually confine their attention; 2) declares that "the *only* way to protect the lives and property of citizens *is by arming the people itself*"; 3) "calls upon the *people* to take the protection of their lives and property *into their own hands*", and to "*resist* national persecution".

These two different formulas clearly reveal the difference in the *interests* of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie wants to extinguish the revolution. The proletariat wants to arm the revolution. The bourgeoisie is longing to impeach the bureaucrats. The proletariat is appealing to the justice of the people ("these criminals and *their protectors* will not elude the justice of the people"—as is stated in the motion of our Social-Democratic Group in the Duma). The bourgeoisie is appealing only to *the Ministers*, appealing to them to *yield*. The proletariat is appealing to *the people*, calling them to arm and *resist*.

Our comrades in the Duma have struck the right note on this question. We hope that they will continue to counterpose the declarations of the revolutionary proletariat to the phrase-mongering of the opportunist bourgeoisie as clearly, distinctly and relentlessly as they have done on this occasion.

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THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE

All the newspapers continue to teem with reports about the movement among the armed forces. It is difficult to calculate now in how many regiments, or military units, there have been unrest and revolts during the two months of the Duma's "work". In regard to military affairs, too, the notorious peaceful parliamentary activity which naïve, not always naïve, by the way, bourgeois politicians have invented, has resulted in methods of struggle and forms of the movement that are by no means peaceful, and by no means parliamentary.

In publishing facts and reports about the movement among the armed forces, our liberal-bourgeois press usually uses this material only for the purpose of intimidating the government. The Cadet newspapers usually argue as follows: the conflagration is spreading. Look out, beware, gentlemen, members of the Cabinet. Yield to us before it is too late. And the Cabinet Ministers retaliate (through the medium of *Novoye Vremya* and other servile newspapers) by trying to intimidate the Cadets. They say: Look, gentlemen, the conflagration is spreading. Come to an understanding with us before it is too late. Both the Cadets and the government regard the movement among the armed forces as proof of the necessity of taking immediate measures to extinguish the revolution. Their short-sighted outlook, which is largely prompted by their selfish interests, prevents them from seeing that this movement is a most important index of the *real* character of our revolution, of its *real* aims. Both the Cadets and the government are each pursuing their own selfish interests in the question of the army. The pogrom-mongers need the army as an instrument for pogroms. The liberal

bourgeoisie needs it to protect the bourgeois monarchy from the "excessive" encroachments and demands of the peasants, and particularly of the workers. The vulgar, hypocritical and false doctrine that "the army must be kept out of politics" is particularly convenient for concealing the true designs of the bourgeoisie in this field.

But look at the character of the unrest in the armed forces, at the demands the soldiers are making. Try to regard the soldiers who risk being shot for "insubordination" as human beings who have their own, independent interests, as part of the people, as men who are expressing the urgent needs of certain classes in our society. You will see that these soldiers—who stand closest to the politically least developed peasantry, who are drilled, downtrodden and browbeaten by the officers—that these "dumb brutes" *are going immeasurably further* in their demands than the Cadet programmes!

The Cadets, and the Cadet Duma, like to claim that they are voicing the demands of the people. Many simpletons believe this. But look at the facts. Look at the demands the broad masses of the people are actually making, at the struggle they are actually waging, and you will see that the Cadets and the Cadet Duma are *curtailing* and distorting the demands of the people.

Look at the facts. The men of the Preobrazhensky Regiment put forward the demand: support the Trudovik Group in the struggle for land and freedom. Please note: not support the Duma, but support the Trudovik Group; the Group which the Cadets accused of "grossly insulting" the State Duma by introducing the Land Bill of the 33 deputies, which proposed to abolish the private ownership of land![38] Obviously, the soldiers are going much further than the Cadets. These ''dumb brutes" want *more* than the enlightened bourgeoisie....

An infantry regiment in St. Petersburg demanded the following "... we soldiers must be allowed to elect our deputies to the State Duma to voice our soldiers' needs." The soldiers do not want to keep out of politics. The soldiers do not agree with the Cadets. The soldiers are advancing a demand that obviously amounts to the abolition of the caste army, of the army that is isolated from the people, and its replacement by an army of free and equal citizens. Now

this is exactly the same thing as the abolition of the standing army and the arming of the people.

The soldiers in the Warsaw Area are demanding a constituent assembly. They are demanding freedom of assembly and of association *for soldiers* "without the consent or presence of officers". They are demanding that "military service be performed in the soldiers' native districts", the right to wear civilian dress when off duty, and the right to *elect soldiers' representatives* to supervise the soldiers' mess and to act as judges to try offences committed by soldiers.

Does this in any way resemble the Cadets' conception of army reform? Or does it come very close to the institution of a national and fully democratic militia?

The soldiers are voicing the real demands of the people, demands that are common to the overwhelming majority of the people, far better than those gentlemen, the enlightened bourgeoisie. The character and the main features of the movement among the armed forces express far more accurately the essence of the main and fundamental forms of the struggle for emancipation under present conditions than the tactics of the Cadets. The movement of the workers and peasants confirms this even more strongly. Our duty is not to attempt to squeeze this movement into the narrow-limits of paltry Cadet politics, not to degrade it by adapting it to fit paltry Cadet slogans, but to support, expand and develop it in the spirit of genuine, consistent, determined and militant democracy.

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the *Ekho* text

AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Those gentlemen, the Cadets, continue innocently to "fail to understand". And perhaps the one who most stubbornly of all persists in "failing to understand" is Mr. Izgoyev. In a tone of injured innocence he expresses his indignation at "Messrs. the Bolsheviks" on account of their attacks against the Cadets.

> "The party of 'people's freedom' will never deceive anybody. Nobody has a right to demand of it more than is indicated in the programme and tactics that have been approved by party congresses. The programme and tactics contain no mention of an armed uprising or the overthrow of the monarchy. The Bolsheviks must reckon with the party that actually exists, and it is somewhat strange that they should be angry with people who tell them the truth, and who refuse to act as they dictate."

But, Mr. Izgoyev, we *are* "reckoning with the party that actually exists". Do you continue to "fail to understand"? But the matter is so simple: for a bourgeois party, the *programme* of the "party of people's freedom" is not at all bad. Please note that we are saying this quite seriously.

There (*in the programme*, Mr. Izgoyev!) one finds, for example, the demand for free speech, freedom of assembly, and quite a number of good things. But this has not prevented the Cadets from drafting repressive Bills *against* free speech, *against* freedom of assembly, and against the other good things.

Well, now about tactics....

True, party congresses have approved of the tactics of "with a shield, or on a shield"; "death with glory, or death with shame". But outside of congresses, in actual politics, the Cadets' tactics smack of something entirely different.

You are opposed to an armed uprising? You have a perfect right to be, gentlemen. But you claim that you are in favour of *inflexible*, *relentless opposition*; you claim that you want power to be transferred to the people under a monarch who will reign, but not govern. Why then are you *haggling* for ministerial portfolios? So you see, Mr. Izgoyev; we *are* "reckoning with the party that actually exists", and not with one that merely exists on paper. If you were *really* fighting on the lines laid down by your programme and tactics, which have been "approved by party congresses", we would talk to you in entirely different terms.

Mr. Izgoyev's article contains many other curiosities. But speaking generally, it is the literary property of Comrade A. L—y[39] and we do not intend to encroach upon it.

Ekho, No. 10,
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ORGANISATION OF THE MASSES AND CHOICE OF THE MOMENT FOR STRUGGLE[40]

In this issue we publish an article by Comrade Khrustalev on the question of whether it is now opportune to form Soviets of Workers' Deputies. Needless to say, the author's name is a guarantee of his intimate knowledge of the subject. All St. Petersburg workers are aware of this. They are also aware that at this particular moment the proletariat in the capital is very keenly interested in the question whether a Soviet of Workers' Deputies should be formed.

Under these circumstances, Comrade Khrustalev's polemic against the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party assumes immense importance.

We cannot agree with Comrade Khrustalev. He is quite wrong in defending the idea of Soviets of Workers' Deputies in general, and their historical role at the end of 1905, against the St. Petersburg Committee, as it were. He is wrong in refusing to place December to the Soviet's account. We would do so without hesitation; but we, of course, would place it on the "asset" and not on the "liability" side. In our opinion, the greatest merit of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and the one that is still far from being fully appreciated, is the militant role they played.

But the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was a *special type* of fighting organisation; and platitudes about the utility of organisation will not help in the least to throw light on the question of the utility of forming this *special type* of organisation at the *present* moment. "The Soviet was the revolutionary parliament of the revolutionary proletariat," writes Comrade Khrustalev. Quite right. It is this role, which is by no means confined to the technique of fighting,

that is characteristic of the Soviet. Its functions as the organiser of trade unions, as the initiator of inquiries, as a Conciliation Board, and so forth, were quite subsidiary and secondary. One can easily conceive of these functions being fulfilled without a Soviet. But one can hardly conceive of a general strike without a mass, non-party, strike committee. The Soviet was called into being by the requirements of the *direct* mass struggle, and as an organ of that struggle. That is a fact. It is this fact alone that explains the *special type* of role and the actual significance of the Soviet. And it is to this fact that the word "militant" in the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee refers.

No one would dream of setting up a Soviet of Workers' Deputies to institute inquiries, to form trade unions, and so forth. *Forming Soviets means forming organs of the direct mass struggle of the proletariat.* These cannot be formed at any time; whereas trade unions and political parties are *always and absolutely* necessary. They can and should be formed under all circumstances. It is a profound mistake, therefore, to answer the St. Petersburg Committee by referring to the importance of organisation in general. For the same reason it is also a mistake to refer to the fact that all Social-Democrats support the idea of forming peasant land committees. These committees are being proposed *in connection* with the country-wide discussion of the agrarian reform, *in connection* with the agrarian movement that is already growing.

But these committees also may lead to "premature" action!—says Comrade Khrustalev ironically. The whole point, however, is that at the present time there is an important difference between peasant actions and workers' actions. A broad peasant action *cannot* be "premature" at the present time; but a broad workers' action may be very much so. The reason for this is clear. In political development the working class is *ahead of* the peasantry; and the peasantry has *not yet caught up with* the working class in preparedness for nation-wide revolutionary action. It has been catching up with the working class since December, and to a large extent as a result of December (no matter what timid pedants may say who are prone to underestimate the importance of December, or even to repudiate December),

It will catch up with the working class *still faster* with the aid of local land committees. It is certainly useful to urge on the rearguard that did not succeed in coming to the assistance of the vanguard in the previous battle; and there is nothing risky in that. But it is very risky to urge on the vanguard which did not get the assistance of the rearguard in the previous battle; and we must think very carefully before doing so.

Now it is this peculiar political situation that, in our opinion, Comrade Khrustalev has not taken into account. He is a thousand times right in his appraisal of the merits and importance of Soviets in general. But he is wrong in his estimate of the present situation and of the relation between peasant actions and workers' actions. He has apparently forgotten another proposal made by the St. Petersburg Committee in another resolution, viz., to support the idea of forming an Executive Committee representing the Left groups in the Duma for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of the free organisations of the people.* Such a committee could determine more accurately the degree of readiness and determination of the peasantry as a whole, and consequently put the question of forming Soviets of Workers' Deputies on a practical basis. In other words: the St. Petersburg Committee is now aiming at something more: not only to form militant organisations of the proletariat, but also to *co-ordinate* them with the militant organisations of the peasantry, etc. The St. Petersburg Committee is *postponing* the formation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies at the present time, not because it fails to appreciate their enormous importance, but because it is making allowance for another, new *condition for success* that is now coming very much to the fore, namely, joint action of the revolutionary peasants and workers. Thus, the St. Petersburg Committee is not committing itself, and is not determining the tactics of the future beforehand. The St. Petersburg Committee is at *this moment* advising the vanguard: Do not go into battle, but first of all send a delegation to the rearguard; tomorrow the rearguard will have drawn up closer, and the as-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 515.—*Ed.*

sault on the enemy will be more vigorous; tomorrow we shall be in a position to issue a more timely slogan for action.

To conclude. Speaking generally, Comrade Khrustalev has advanced very convincing arguments in favour of forming Soviets. He has appraised their general importance excellently. His main purpose was to combat those who belittle the role of the Soviets, and the importance of revolutionary actions in general. In this Comrade Khrustalev was quite right. There are not a few "belittlers" of this sort, and they are not only to be found among the Cadets. But Comrade Khrustalev, lacking permanent and close contacts with the proletariat—owing to the efforts of the hangmen and pogrom-mongers—has not fully appreciated the *present situation* and the *present* "disposition" of the revolutionary forces. *Today*, the vanguard must concentrate attention not on immediate action, but on consolidating and extending the closest contacts with the rearguard and with all the other units.

Ekho, No. 11,
July 4, 1906

Published according to
the *Ekho* text

AMONG NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Our observations in *Ekho*, No. 9, on the historical role of the boycott and on the significance of non-party revolutionary organisations* have evoked characteristic replies from the extreme Right and the extreme Left wing of the bourgeois democrats.

As was to be expected, *Mysl* was offended by our use of the term "bourgeois democrats" and angrily evades the main issue. It writes:

> "*Ekho* even finds 'bourgeois democrats' in the 'Soviets of Workers' Deputies', which are purely proletarian class organisations.... One can hardly go further than that."

You radical gentlemen must remember that most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies did not remain "purely proletarian". They very often accepted delegates from soldiers, sailors, office employees and peasants. Would it not be better to tell us *candidly* why you don't like the term "bourgeois democrats" instead of avoiding disagreements by quibbling?

Rech is quite beside itself with rage. In their opening remarks against us the Cadets handle us with kid gloves, as it were, "not desiring to say anything offensive". What perfect gentlemen! But towards the end these Cadets swear like ... like troopers. Our appraisal of the boycott is dubbed "clownish, or impenetrable stupidity". Oh, what gentlemen these Cadets are!

Rech writes:

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* See pp. 77-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"At all events, let us place on record that *the object* of the Bolshevik tactics was to fight for the convocation of the Duma. And the *object* of all this beating the breast and shouting about the necessity of a boycott was to mislead the government."

Stop joking, gentlemen! You know perfectly well that our idea was quite different. The object of the boycott was to sweep away the Witte Duma, just as the Bulygin Duma was swept away. Although it failed to achieve *its own*, i.e., its direct and immediate object, the boycott nevertheless was *indirectly* of advantage in that, among other things, it distracted the attention of the government. In this case, too, as always, revolutionary tactics were the best means of developing the class-consciousness and fighting efficiency of the proletariat, and of indirectly ensuring the achievement of half-hearted reforms in the event of failure to achieve complete victory.

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July 4, 1906

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A BOLD ASSAULT AND A TIMID DEFENCE

It has long been known that the reactionaries are bold and that the liberals are cowards.

New confirmation of this ancient truth is provided by the Cadets' draft of the State Duma's appeal to the people on the question of the land. Unfortunately, the Trudoviks' draft is no better than that of the Cadets. This time the Trudoviks are quite helplessly trailing behind the liberal bourgeoisie. But there are the Social-Democrats in the Duma; will they not come to the rescue?

Recall how this question of the State Duma appealing to the people arose. In its reply to the address from the throne the State Duma expressed itself in favour of the compulsory alienation of the private estates for the benefit of the peasantry. The Goremykin Cabinet concisely, clearly and with magnificent firmness and determination answered: "*Impermissible*."

But the Cabinet did not confine itself to this gruff, police-official refusal. No, the Cabinet Ministers have learned something from the revolution. The Cabinet Ministers do not intend to confine their duties to making formal replies to formal questions of the Duma. The reactionaries are not formalists, they are practical men. They know that the real power is not the Duma, but the people. They want to carry their propaganda *to the people*. Without wasting precious time, they forthwith drew up an *appeal to the people*. It was this government communication (of June 20) that suggested the idea of the Duma appealing to the people. The government showed the way, the Duma trailed behind the government, as it was incapable of being the first to take a course worthy of a genuine representative assembly of the people.

How was the government's communication framed? Like a real fighting manifesto of the reactionary monarchist party. Oh, the reactionaries are not bashful in the least! They know how to write in militant terms. In their "communication" they plainly speak in the name of the *government*. Indeed, why should they stand on ceremony? The liberal professors claim that we are living under a constitutional system and that the Duma is also a part of the government. Let the professors chatter! Let them amuse the people with their constitutional antics! We reactionaries are practical men. We know that, *in fact*, we are the government. We say so plainly. As for the quibbles and formalism of these liberal pedants, we don't care a fig for them. We say plainly and openly: peasants, you don't know what is good for you. Compulsory alienation is no good to you; and we, the government, *will not allow* it. All the peasant talk about the land is lies and deception. It is the government that takes most care of the peasants. Even now it is ready to offer them sops. But the peasants have got to understand that they cannot expect improvements to come from "sedition and violence"; they can be obtained only by "peaceful labour" (they should have added: for the landlords) and as a result of the constant care our autocratic government takes of the peasants.

Such was the gist of the government's communication. It is an actual declaration of war on the revolution. It is an actual manifesto of the reactionary autocracy saying to the people: We shall tolerate no nonsense! We shall crush you!

And now the Cadets, and the Trudoviks who this time are in complete captivity to them, have set about answering the government's challenge. The draft replies of the Cadets and the Trudoviks have been published today. What a miserable, truly pitiful impression these two drafts create!

The reactionary camarilla does not hesitate to break the law and to declare that what is formally only *a small part* of the government is the real and *entire* government. The Cadets and Trudoviks like Shchedrin's sapient gudgeons,[41] take shelter in the reeds of the law. They are hitting us with lawlessness, say these snivelling "people's", if you please, representatives, but we are defending ourselves with the law! The Duma, acting in accordance with the law,

expresses itself in favour of compulsory alienation. According to the law "no proposal of the government can come into force" without the consent of the Duma. We, in accordance with the law, have appointed a committee, a big one, of 99 members[42].... This committee is drafting "a carefully considered and properly framed law".... Let the people "peacefully and quietly await the conclusion of the work of promulgating this law" (the Trudoviks deleted this utterly, indecently abject concluding sentence! Their consciences pricked them. But they inserted instead a statement about organising "local land institutions", *treacherously remaining silent* about the fact that the Duma, in other words, its Cadet majority, avowedly wants these institutions to be *landlord and bureaucratic* organisations).

For shame, gentlemen, representatives of the people! It is disgraceful for you to pretend that you do not understand what every Russian muzhik even in the remotest village now understands, namely, that in Russia today there is a wide gulf between laws on paper and the facts of life; that it is *impossible* for the transfer of all the land to the peasants and complete freedom for all the people to be achieved by the peaceful means of allegedly-constitutional and strictly legal efforts. If you lack the courage to write as firmly as the camarilla, and to utter your revolutionary truth as candidly, in answer to its reactionary *truth*, you should not have undertaken to reply to the Cabinet. The laws governing the Duma do not provide for an appeal to the people. That being so, oh wise men of the law, keep to your "interpellations" and do not meddle in a field where you have neither the courage, nor the straightforwardness, nor the ability to compete with the reactionaries, who are practical men and know how to fight!

And if you do draw up an appeal to the people you must write the truth, the whole truth, the bitter and unvarnished truth. You must say to the people:

Peasants! The Cabinet has issued its appeal to you. The Cabinet Ministers do not want to give you either land or freedom. The Cabinet Ministers brazenly speak in the name of the whole government; they speak against the Duma, although on paper the Duma is supposed to be part of the government.

Peasants! The Cabinet Ministers are in actual fact the autocratic government of Russia. They don't care a fig for your people's representatives in the Duma; they jeer at them and delay everything by their police-lawyer quibbling. They mock at the demands of the people and, as if nothing had happened, continue their policy of murder, violence, plunder and pogroms.

Peasants! You must know that the Duma is powerless to give you land and freedom. The Duma is tied hand and foot by the laws of the police government. You must secure that the representatives of the people have full power, all the power of the state, in their hands. Do you want land and freedom? If you do, then secure the convocation of a national constituent assembly, secure the complete abolition of the old regime all over the country, secure complete freedom of elections!

Peasants! Know that you will never be free unless you free yourselves. The workers understood this, and by their struggles compelled the government to yield the concessions of October 17. And you, too, must understand it. Only when you do so will you be a revolutionary people, that is, a people that knows what it must fight for, a people that knows how to fight, a people that knows how to vanquish its oppressors. Utilise your deputies in the Duma, those who represent you in the Duma; unite more closely and solidly all over Russia and prepare for a great struggle. Without a fight you will get neither land nor freedom. Without a fight you will have ruinous redemption payments forcibly foisted upon you; you will have foisted upon you land committees consisting of landlords and bureaucrats who will deceive and rob you as they did in 1861.[43]

Peasants! We are doing all we can for you in the Duma. But you must complete the job yourselves if you really want conditions in Russia to be different from what they are now, even though there is a Duma.

* * *

But it would be ridiculous to propose such an appeal in the Duma.

But would it? Is it not more ridiculous to write "appeals to the people" in the stilted language of the hidebound Rus-

sian lawyers that the Cadets and (to their shame be it said) the Trudoviks use? Do the people exist for the Duma, or does the Duma exist for the people? Is freedom to exist for the Duma, or is the Duma to serve the cause of freedom?

* * *

Let the Cadets' appeal, the Trudoviks' appeal and our appeal be read at any peasant meeting! We will hear what the peasants say in answer to the question: Who is right?

Ekho, No. 12,
July 5, 1906

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THE PARTIES IN THE DUMA AND THE PEOPLE

Yesterday's debate in the Duma on the appeal to the people provides extremely valuable material for the political education of the broad masses.

The question of appealing to the people proved to be such a vital one that the intrinsic nature of the different political parties was revealed with a clarity that left nothing to be desired. On this question the Duma found itself as if in a vice between the reactionary autocracy ("the government's communication") and the revolutionary people, whose struggle outside the Duma forced itself, one might say, through every chink and crevice of the Taurida Palace.[44] From the moment it opened, the debate irresistibly swung over from formalities and details to the very core of the question.

Why appeal to the people? This is the question that eminently confronted the Duma. It coloured the whole debate. It raised the whole debate to the plane on which we formulated the question in yesterday's leading article,* i.e., the issue became: To reply to the fighting statement of the Cabinet with a fighting statement of the Duma? To make no reply at all? Or to try to smooth out differences and soften the acuteness of the issue, an acuteness created by life itself.

The battle was opened by the Right wing in the Duma. The Right-wing Cadet Petrazhitsky, tried to secure the adjournment of the debate. Naturally the Octobrists supported this Right-wing Cadet. It became obvious that the counter-revolution was afraid of the Duma appealing to the people.

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* See pp. 96-100 of this volume.—*Ed.*

By its definite stand the reaction helped to rally the whole Left wing of the Duma. The proposal to adjourn the debate was defeated. The debate itself very distinctly revealed the three main trends in the Duma. The "Rights" (the Octobrists and a section of the Cadets) were in favour of "pacifying" the peasant movement and therefore *opposed* to any appeal. The "Centre" (the Cadets and probably the majority of the non-party deputies) were in favour of "pacifying" the peasant movement and were therefore *in favour* of issuing a *pacifying* appeal. The "Left" trend (the Trudoviks, evidently only a section of them, and the Social-Democrats) were in favour of explaining to the people that they *cannot* "wait peacefully and passively", and were therefore in favour of a *revolutionary* and not a "pacifying" appeal.

The views of this last trend were most vividly expressed by the Trudovik Zhilkin, the Polish deputy Lednitsky and the Social-Democrat Ramishvili. "The people are clinging to their last, almost childish, hopes," said Zhilkin. "I am not speaking about peace, order and tranquillity; I am speaking about the organised struggle against the old regime.... Did the State Duma come into being as the result of peace and tranquillity?" And, recalling the October struggle, the speaker, amidst the applause of the Left, exclaimed: "It is due to these 'disorders' that we are here today." "In this general sense," rightly said the speaker, "the committee's draft of the appeal to the people is very unsatisfactory" (but he should have added: the Trudoviks' draft is also unsatisfactory for it does not contain the ideas and theses that Zhilkin outlined in his speech). "We must emphasise and at the end express the idea that not peace and tranquillity, but unrest in the good and grand sense of the term can organise the masses...."

Lednitsky even employed one of the sharpest expressions that we employed yesterday, and said that the proposed appeal was "*pitiful*". And Ramishvili, protesting "against calling upon the people to wait peacefully and quietly for a solution of the problem", declared: "*The revolutionary path is the only true path*" (we are quoting from the report in *Nasha Zhizn*). He also urged that the Duma should say that the land must be transferred *without redemption payments*.

Most of the Cadet and non-party" speakers were in favour of a 'pacifying' appeal; they condemned the taking of revolutionary steps (Kotlyarevsky answering Lednitsky) and argued that an appeal was useful "from the point of view of the landowners" (the Cadet Yakushkin).

The Black Hundred Volkonsky, backed by Skirmunt and the Right Cadet Petrazhitsky, argued that the appeal was "dangerous" and likely to ignite the flames of revolution; and he referred to the *law* in accordance with which the Land Bill had to be passed by the Duma, then sent to the Council of State, etc., etc., etc.

The trends were excellently delineated. Once again it was revealed that the Cadets are vacillating between reaction and revolution; between the old regime and the people. Once again events have proved how short-sighted and stupid are the tactics of "supporting the Cadets", tactics which can only weaken the revolutionary position of the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary democrats in the Duma. Once again events have proved that by acting independently the Social-Democrats can win over to their side a section of the Trudoviks and to some extent even split the Cadets.

The political situation itself is irresistibly determining the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party. In spite of the efforts of the Right-wing Social-Democrats, up to now there has *not resulted* any support of the Cadets, but what has resulted, fortunately, is an independent policy of the proletariat backed by a section of the peasant deputies. The outcome has not been the artificial division, invented by the opportunists: the Rights versus the combined Cadets, Trudoviks and Social-Democrats. The outcome has been a *revolutionary* division: the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks against the Rights, with the Cadets swaying like reeds.

Unfortunately our Social-Democratic deputies did not take full advantage of the extremely favourable situation. During the general debate they should certainly have introduced *their own* Social-Democratic draft of an appeal to the people. Only in that case would their policy have been definitively and completely the *independent* policy of the representatives of the *class* party of the proletariat, as the *vanguard* of the revolution. Only in that case would the correct ideas expressed by Ramishvili, Zhilkin and Lednitsky not

have been submerged in the debate, but would have been combined, fixed and formulated in a clear and resolute platform of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

We can only express the wish that our Social-Democratic Group in the Duma will learn the lessons of the groupings that are more and more often occurring in the Duma, and more resolutely pursue an absolutely independent proletarian policy; that when the draft appeal is discussed paragraph by paragraph they will at least to some extent rectify matters by proposing their own independent amendments couched in consistently revolutionary terms.

A Social-Democratic draft of an appeal to the people, even if it remains only a draft read in the Duma, will have an extremely valuable effect in uniting and developing the revolutionary struggle, and will win over to the side of Social-Democracy the finest elements of the revolutionary peasantry.

Ekho, No. 13,
July 6, 1906

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CONSPIRACIES OF REACTION AND THREATS OF THE POGROM-MONGERS

The newspaper *Rossiya*[45] is subsidised by the pogrom-mongers' government as a vehicle for the views of this government.

In connection with the Duma's draft appeal to the people this government newspaper is adopting a very threatening tone. It wants to intimidate the Duma by showing that the proposed course of action is illegal as well as "irrational", "revolutionary", etc. Today the Cadet *Rech* has completely changed front and is pronouncing against the appeal, obviously frightened by the threats emanating from the press that cringes before the government.

And there are threats in abundance. *Rossiya* today writes as follows on the subject of a Cadet Cabinet: "If it had been suggested to Vladimir Krasnoye Solnyshko that the administration of Rus should be entrusted to Solovei the Robber as a way of ensuring order, he would probably have proposed a simpler way—by putting an end to Solovei the Robber with the help of Ilya Muromets.[46] *That, as is well known, proved effective.*"

This Ilya Muromets who is preparing to "put an end" to the revolution in Russia turns out to be no other than the *international army of counter-revolution*. In an article "The Foreign Powers and the Situation in Russia" (*Rossiya*, No. 170) the government newspaper, not from naivety but with the same aim of intimidation, *expounds* the problem of active intervention by foreign powers in Russian internal affairs.

This exposition of the government sheet is highly instructive and useful. The international counter-revolution is

paying close attention to Russia, is rallying and preparing forces against her "in case of need". The imperial German Government," writes *Rossiya*, "is fully aware of this situation [viz., that "the present state of affairs in Russia is primarily the result of the influence of revolutionary elements abroad"] and, consequently, it has taken a number of appropriate measures which will not fail to have the desired results."

These measures consist in preparing the armed forces of Germany, together with Austria, for an invasion of Russia if the cause of freedom triumphs or is about to triumph. The Berlin Government has already communicated with the Austrian Government on this matter. Both of them have recognised that "under certain conditions active intervention in the internal affairs of Russia with the aim of surpressing or limiting this [i.e., the revolutionary] movement might be desirable and useful". At the same time it was established that intervention required a direct and clearly expressed wish on the part of the Russian Government.

Three army corps have been concentrated in Austria, in Galicia, and on the Russian frontier, where it is feared that there is a possibility also of the spread of an agrarian movement of the Russian type. On June 26, the Governor of Galicia, who is also a Russian landlord even issued a proclamation warning the population that all disturbances would be suppressed with the utmost severity.

Hence there can be no doubt about the conspiracy of the international counter-revolution. The Russian Government is calling on the aid of foreign troops against the Russian people. Negotiations about this have been conducted and will be conducted, and they have already led to a quite definite agreement.

Let the workers and peasants know then that the government is betraying the country in order to ensure the rule of the gang of pogrom-mongers. So it was and so it always will be. History teaches us that the ruling classes have always been ready to sacrifice everything, absolutely everything: religion, liberty and homeland, if it was a question of crushing a revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Russian pogrom-mongering rulers too will act in the same way and that they are already preparing to do so.

But the workers and peasants should not be afraid of such action. The Russian Government has its international reserve: the reactionary governments of Germany, Austria and other countries. But we too have our powerful international reserve: the socialist proletariat of Europe, organised in the three million-strong party in Germany, in the powerful parties of all the European countries. We welcome the appeal of our government to the international reserve of reaction: such an appeal will, in the first place, open the eyes of the most ignorant people in Russia and do us a valuable service by destroying faith in the monarchy, and, in the second place, such an appeal will better than anything else extend the basis and field of action of the Russian revolution by converting it into a world revolution.

All right, Mr. Trepov & Co.! Open fire! Call on your Austrian and German regiments against the Russian peasants and workers! We are for an extension of the struggle, we are for an international revolution!

* * *

But in appraising the *general* significance of the international conspiracy the petty, *partial* aims of the Russian pogrom-mongers should not be overlooked. We have already pointed out that the articles in *Rossiya* were not due to naivety. *Mysl* is mistaken in thinking so. It is not "naivety", not "cynicism", and not "garrulity". It is a calculated *threat to the Cadets*. The pogrom-mongers' government is afraid of a Duma manifesto to the people and *threatens the Cadets*: "Don't dare to do it! If you do, I shall dissolve the Duma and call on the Austrian and German regiments! I have already made preparations."

The Cadet simpletons have already shown the white feather and basely turned back, as today's *Rech* has shown. It suffices to threaten the Cadets—and the Cadets are ready to retreat....

The proletariat is not frightened by the wretched threats of the pogrom-mongers' government. The proletariat maintains its *independent* fighting position and does not allow itself to be scared by the bogey of a frightened Cadet.

Once more: Open fire, Mr. Trepov! Extend the revolutionary field of battle! The international proletariat will not be found wanting!

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT [47]

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Moscow

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT[47]

Written in mid-July 1906

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Published according to the pamphlet text

The dissolution of the Duma confronts the workers' party with a number of questions of very great importance. Let us note the foremost of these: (1) the general estimate of this political event in the course of our revolution; (2) the definition of the content of the further struggle and of the slogans under which it must be carried on; (3) the definition of the form of this future struggle; (4) the choice of the moment for the struggle, or, more correctly, an appraisal of the conditions that could help in the correct choice of the moment.

We shall deal briefly with these questions.

I

The dissolution of the Duma has most strikingly and clearly confirmed the views of those who warned against being obsessed with the external "constitutional" aspect of the Duma and, if one may so express it, with the constitutional surface of Russian politics during the second quarter of 1906. Experience has now exposed the hollowness of the "mighty words" so volubly uttered by our Cadets (and Cadetophiles) before the Duma, about the Duma and in connection with the Duma.

Note this interesting fact: the Duma has been dissolved *on strictly constitutional grounds*. It has not been "dispersed". There has been no infringement of the law. On the contrary, it has been done strictly in accordance with the law, as under any "constitutional monarchy". The supreme power has dissolved the Chamber on the basis of the "constitution". On the basis of such-and-such an article, the present "Chamber" has been dissolved, *and by the same ukase* (rejoice,

you legalists!) new elections, or the date of convening a new Duma, have been authorised.

But this is the very thing that has at once exposed the illusory character of the Russian constitution, the fictitious nature of our native parliamentarism, which the Left-wing Social-Democrats so persistently pointed out throughout the first half of 1906. And now this special character of the Russian constitution has been admitted, not by "narrow-minded and fanatical" "Bolsheviks", but by the most peaceful liberal legalists, and they have admitted it *by their conduct*. The Cadets have admitted it by replying to the dissolution of the Duma by a mass "flight abroad", to Vyborg, and by a manifesto which violates the law[48]; they have admitted it by replying through articles in the very moderate *Rech*, which is forced to admit that *in fact* it is a matter of the restoration of the autocracy, and that Suvorin inadvertently blurted out the truth when he wrote that it was hardly likely he would live to see another Duma.[49] All the hopes of the Cadets have suddenly switched from "constitution" to revolution, and all this happened as the result of a single, strictly constitutional act of the supreme power. And only yesterday the Cadets boasted in the Duma that they were the "shield of the dynasty" and supporters of strict constitutionalism.

The logic of life is stronger than the logic of textbooks on constitutional law. Revolution teaches.

Everything the "Bolshevik" Social-Democrats have written about the Cadet victories has been brilliantly confirmed. (Cf. the pamphlet, *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*, by N. Lenin.*) All the bias and short-sightedness of the Cadets have become obvious. Constitutional illusions—that "bogey" the raising of which was the mark of the die-hard Bolsheviks—are now seen by all to be nothing but illusions, a phantom, a mirage.

"There is no Duma!" *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[50] and *Grazhdanin*[51] cry out in a wild frenzy of delight. "There is no constitution!" sadly repeat the Cadets, those subtle connoisseurs of our constitution, who used to quote it so cleverly,

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276.—*Ed.*

to gloat so much over its clauses. The Social-Democrats will neither exult (we made some use even of the Duma) nor lose heart. The people has gained—they will say—by losing one of its illusions.

Yes, in the person of the Cadet Party, the whole of the Russian people is being taught a lesson, learning it not from books, but from its own revolution, one which it itself is making. We said on one occasion that in the person of the Cadets the people is ridding itself of its first illusions of bourgeois emancipation, and that in the person of the Trudoviks it is freeing itself of its last illusions of bourgeois emancipation.* The Cadets dreamed of emancipation from serfdom, tyranny, arrogance, Asiatic despotism, autocracy, *without* the overthrow of the old regime. The limited aspirations of the Cadets have already suffered bankruptcy. The Trudoviks dream of freeing the masses from poverty, from the exploitation of man by man, *without* destroying the commodity economy; they will yet suffer bankruptcy, and in the very near future too, if our revolution leads to the complete victory of our revolutionary peasants.

The rapid rise of the Cadet Party, their intoxicating victories at the elections, their triumph in the Cadet Duma, their sudden collapse from a single stroke of the pen of the "beloved monarch" (who, one might say, spat in Rodichev's face while the latter was assuring him of his love)—all these are events of serious political significance; they all mark stages in the revolutionary development of the *people*. In 1906, the people, i.e., the broad mass of the population, had not yet, as a mass, grown up so far as to be consciously revolutionary. The consciousness that the autocracy was intolerable had become general, and so too had the consciousness of the worthlessness of the government of bureaucrats and of the need for a representative assembly of the people. But the people could not yet realise and appreciate that a representative assembly of the people *with power* was incompatible with the continued existence of the old regime. For this, it turned out, a special

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 459.—*Ed.*

experience was still needed, the experience of the Cadet Duma.

During its short span of life, the Cadet Duma *vividly* demonstrated to the people the difference between a representative assembly of the people *without power* and one *with power*. Our slogan, a constituent assembly (i.e., a representative assembly of the people *with full power*), has been proved to be a thousand times right, but life, i.e., the revolution, has brought us towards it by a longer and more complex road than we were able to foresee.

Cast a general glance at the main stages of the great Russian revolution and you will see how, *through experience*, the people, step by step, approached the slogan of a constituent assembly. First we have the period of "confidence" at the end of 1904. The liberals are in raptures. They occupy the entire foreground. Some not very steadfast Social-Democrats even speak of the two main forces of the moment: the liberals and the government. But the *people* become imbued with the idea of "confidence". On January 9 the people "confidently" go to the Winter Palace. The period of "confidence" brings to the front a *third* force, the proletariat, and lays the basis for the people's utter *lack of confidence* in the autocratic government. The period of "confidence" ends by the people refusing to believe the government's *talk* about "confidence".

The next stage. The Bulygin Duma is promised. Confidence is confirmed by action. Representatives of the people are being convened. The liberals are in raptures and call for participation in the elections. The liberal professors, as befits these "ideological" lackeys of the bourgeoisie, call upon the students to go on with their studies and not to meddle with revolution. Some not very steadfast Social-Democrats succumb to the arguments of the liberals. The people appear on the scene. By the October strike the proletariat sweeps away the Bulygin Duma and seizes liberty, gaining the Manifesto, which is quite constitutional in form and content. The people learn by experience that it is not enough to obtain a promise of liberty, one must also *have the strength to seize* liberty.

Next. In December the government annuls the liberties. The proletariat rises. The first uprising is defeated. But the

stubborn and desperate armed fighting in the streets of Moscow makes the summoning of the Duma unavoidable. The boycott organised by the proletariat fails. The proletariat proves to be too weak to overthrow the Witte Duma. The Cadets fill its benches. The representative assembly of the people is an accomplished fact. The Cadets are in raptures. There is no limit to their cries of delight. The proletariat waits sceptically.

The Duma begins its work. The people make ten times more use of the slight extension of liberties than the Cadets. In spirit and determination the Cadet Duma is at once found to be *lagging behind* the people. The period of the Cadet Duma (May and June 1906) proves to be a period of the greatest successes for the parties to the *Left* of the Cadets: the Trudoviks outstrip the Cadets in the Duma; at public meetings the Cadets are censured for their timidity; the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary press gains ground; the revolutionary peasant movement grows stronger; there is unrest in the army; the proletariat, which had been exhausted by the December events, recovers. The period of Cadet constitutionalism proves to be the period, not of a Cadet and not of a constitutional movement, but of a revolutionary movement.

This movement *compels* the government to dissolve the Duma. Experience proves that the Cadets are merely "froth". Their strength is derived from the strength of the revolution. And to the revolution the government retaliates by the essentially revolutionary (though in form constitutional) act of dissolving the Duma.

The people are becoming convinced *by experience* that a representative assembly of the people is *naught* if it does not have full power, if it is convened by the old regime, if the old regime remains intact side by side with it. The objective course of events is now bringing to the fore, not the question of how laws, or the constitution, are to be worded, but the question of *power*, of real power. All laws and all deputies are *naught* if they possess no power. That is what the Cadet Duma *has taught* the people. Let us then sing praises to the eternal memory of the deceased, and take full advantage of the lesson it has taught.

II

We are thus brought face to face with the second question, viz., the objective, historically dictated content of the impending struggle, and the slogans which we must provide for it.

Here, too, the not very steadfast Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks, have vacillated. Their first slogan was: fight *for the resumption of the Duma sessions* for the purpose of convening a constituent assembly. The St. Petersburg Committee protested against this. The absurdity of this slogan is too obvious. It is not even opportunism, it is sheer nonsense. The Central Committee made a step forward with the slogan: *fight against the government in defence of the Duma for the purpose of convening a constituent assembly*. This, of course, is better. It is not far removed from the slogan: fight *for the overthrow* of the autocratic government in order to convene a constituent assembly in a revolutionary way. The dissolution of the Duma undoubtedly provides the grounds for a nation-wide struggle for a representative assembly of the people *with power*; in this sense the slogan "in defence of the Duma" is not entirely unacceptable. But the whole point is that *in this sense* this slogan is already implied by our acceptance of the dissolution of the Duma as the *grounds* for a struggle. Without the special interpretation of it in *this* sense (i.e., in the sense just mentioned) the formula "in defence of the Duma" remains obscure and is liable to create misunderstanding and to bring us back to the somewhat obsolete past, to the *Cadet* Duma. In short, this formula gives rise to a number of incorrect and harmful "retrograde" ideas. What is correct in it is wholly and entirely embodied in the *reasons* for our decision to fight, in the *explanation* of why the dissolution of the Duma is considered a sufficiently important ground for fighting.

Under no circumstances should a Marxist forget that the slogan of the *immediately* impending struggle cannot be deduced simply and directly from the *general* slogan of a certain programme. It is not sufficient to refer to our programme (see last part: The Overthrow of the Autocracy and the Constituent Assembly, etc.) in order to determine the

slogan of the struggle that is immediately impending *now*, in the summer or autumn of 1906. For this we must take into account the *concrete* historical situation, we must trace the whole development and the whole consecutive progress of the revolution; our tasks must be deduced not only from the principles of the programme, but also from the *preceding* steps and stages of the movement. Only such an analysis will be a truly historical analysis, obligatory for a dialectical materialist.

And precisely such an analysis shows us that the objective political situation has now *brought to the fore* the question, not whether a representative assembly of the people *exists*, but whether this representative assembly *has power*.

The objective cause of the downfall of the Cadet Duma was not that it was unable to express the needs of the people, but that it was unable to cope with the *revolutionary* task of the struggle for *power*. The Cadet Duma imagined that it was a constitutional organ, but it *was* in fact a revolutionary organ (the Cadets abused us for regarding the Duma as a stage or an instrument of the revolution, but experience has fully confirmed *our view*). The Cadet Duma imagined that it was an organ of struggle against the *Cabinet*, but it was in fact an organ of struggle for the *overthrow* of the entire old regime. That is what happened in fact, because that is what the actual economic situation demanded. And for *this* struggle an organ like the Cadet Duma *proved* "useless".

The thought that is now being hammered into the head of even the most ignorant muzhik is: the Duma is of no use; no Duma is of any use *if the people do not have power*. But how to get power? By *overthrowing* the old regime and establishing a new one, popular, free and elected. *Either* overthrow the old regime, *or* admit that the aims of the revolution in the scope set by the peasantry and the proletariat cannot be realised.

That is how *life itself* has put the question. That is how 1906 has put it. And that is how it has been put by the dissolution of the Cadet Duma.

We cannot, of course, guarantee that the revolution will solve this problem at one stroke, that the struggle will be

an easy and simple one, that victory is completely and absolutely assured. No one can ever give any such guarantees on the eve of the struggle. A slogan is not a guarantee of simple and easy victory. A slogan is an indication of the aim that must be achieved in order to fulfil *certain* tasks. In the past, such an immediate task was the creation (or convocation) in general of a representative assembly of the people. Now the task is to secure *power* for such a representative assembly. This means removing, destroying, *overthrowing* the old regime, overthrowing the autocratic government.

Unless this task is *fully* carried out, the popular representative assembly *cannot* have full power; hence, too, there cannot be adequate guarantees that the new popular representative assembly will not share the fate of the Cadet Duma.

The objective state of affairs at the present time is bringing to the fore a fight, not for a popular representative assembly, but for the creation of conditions under which it will be impossible to disperse or dissolve it, impossible to reduce it to a farce, as Trepov & Co. did the Cadet Duma.

III

The form which the coming struggle will probably take is determined partly by its content and partly by the preceding forms of the revolutionary struggle of the people and of the counter-revolutionary struggle of the autocracy.

As regards the content of the struggle, we have already shown that after two years of revolution it now centres on the overthrow of the old regime. The complete achievement of this aim is possible only by means of an armed uprising of the whole people.

As regards the preceding forms of the struggle, the "last word" of the mass popular movement in Russia is a general strike and an uprising. The last quarter of 1905 could not but leave ineradicable traces in the mind and mood of the proletariat, the peasantry, the politically-conscious sections of the army, and the democratic sections of the various professional associations of intellectuals. It is quite

natural, therefore, that after the dissolution of the Duma, the first thought to enter the minds of the broad mass of those capable of fighting was: the general strike. No one seemed to entertain any doubt that the reply to the dissolution of the Duma *must* inevitably be an all-Russian strike.

The universal acceptance of this opinion was of definite value. Nearly everywhere the revolutionary organisations deliberately and systematically *restrained* the workers from spontaneous and limited outbreaks. Reports to this effect are coming in from all parts of Russia. The experience of October-December has undoubtedly helped to concentrate everyone's attention to a much greater degree than before on *general and simultaneous* action. Furthermore, another very characteristic fact must be noted: judging from the reports from some of the big centres of the working-class movement, e.g., St. Petersburg, the workers have not only quickly and easily appreciated the need for general and simultaneous action, but have firmly insisted on *militant* and determined action. The ill-advised idea of a *demonstration* (one-day or three-day) strike against the dissolution of the Duma suggested by several St. Petersburg Mensheviks met with the most determined opposition of the workers. The true class instinct and experience of those who had more than once waged a serious struggle at once suggested to them that the issue now required far more than a demonstration. We shall not demonstrate, said the workers. We shall start a desperate, determined fight when the moment for general action arrives. Judging from the available information, this was the general opinion of the St. Petersburg workers. They understood that partial actions, and demonstrations in particular, would be ridiculous after all that Russia has gone through since 1901 (the year in which the widespread demonstration movement began); that the intensification of the political crisis makes it impossible to "start from the beginning" again; that organising peaceful demonstrations would merely play into the hands of the government, which had "tasted blood" with great satisfaction in December. Peaceful demonstrations would exhaust the proletariat to no purpose and would merely provide exercise for the police and soldiers in seizing and shooting unarmed people. They would

merely somewhat confirm Stolypin's boast that he had achieved victory over the revolution, for he had dissolved the Duma without thereby intensifying the anti-government movement. Now everyone regards this as an empty boast, for everyone knows and feels that the fight is still ahead. At that time a "demonstration" would have been construed as a struggle, it would have been converted into a (hopeless) struggle, and the cessation of the demonstration would have been proclaimed throughout the world as another defeat.

The idea of a demonstration strike was only worthy of our Ledru-Rollins[52] of the Cadet Party, who overrated parliamentarism as short-sightedly as Ledru-Rollin did in 1849. The proletariat rejected this idea at once, and it did well to reject it. The workers, who have always stood face to face with the revolutionary struggle, appreciated more correctly than certain intellectuals both the enemy's readiness to fight and the need for resolute militant action.

Unfortunately, in our Party, owing to the predominance of the Right wing among Russian Social-Democrats at the present time, the question of militant action has been neglected. The Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democrats was carried away by the Cadet victories; it was unable to appreciate the revolutionary significance of the present situation and shirked the task of drawing all the conclusions from the experience of October-December. But the necessity of using this experience confronted the Party much sooner and much more sharply than many devotees of parliamentarism had expected. The confusion displayed by the central institutions of our Party at the critical moment was the inevitable outcome of this state of affairs.

The combination of a mass political strike with an armed uprising is again dictated by the whole situation. At the same time, the weak aspects of a strike as an independent means of struggle stand out in bold relief. Everyone is convinced that an extremely important condition for the success of a political strike is suddenness, the possibility of catching the government unawares. This is now impossible. The government learned in December how to combat strikes, and at the present moment it is very well prepared

for such a fight. Everyone points out the extreme importance of the railways during a general strike. If the railways stop running—the strike has every chance of becoming general. If the railways are not brought to a complete standstill—the strike will almost certainly not be general. But it is particularly difficult for the railwaymen to strike: punitive trains stand in full readiness and armed troop detachments are scattered all along the line, at the stations, sometimes even in the trains. A strike under such conditions may mean—in the majority of cases it must mean—a direct and immediate collision with the armed forces. The engine-driver, the telegraphist, the switchman, will instantly be faced with the dilemma: either to be shot on the spot (Golutvino, Lubertsy and other stations on the Russian railway system have not won revolutionary fame all over Russia for nothing) or to remain at work and break the strike.

Of course, we have a right to expect great heroism from very many railway workers and employees, who have proved their devotion to the cause of liberty by *deeds*. Of course, we are far from denying the possibility of a railway strike and its chances of success. But we have no right to hide from ourselves the *real* difficulties of the task; to remain silent about such difficulties would be the very worst policy. If we face realities, if we do not bury our heads in the sand, it will be clear that a strike must *inevitably* and immediately develop into an armed uprising. A railway strike is an uprising; this cannot be disputed after what happened in December. And without a railway strike, the railway telegraph will not stop working, the conveyance of letters by rail will not be interrupted, and, consequently, a post and telegraph strike of serious dimensions will also be impossible.

Thus, the inexorable logic of the situation that has developed since December 1905 proves the subordinate significance of a strike in relation to an uprising. Whether we like it or not, and in spite of all "directives", the acute revolutionary situation is bound to convert a demonstration into a strike, a protest into a fight, a strike into an uprising. Of course, an uprising, an armed mass struggle, can flare up only if it is actively supported by one or another section of the army. Therefore, a strike of the troops, their refusal

to shoot at the people, can undoubtedly, in certain cases, lead to the victory of a merely peaceful strike. But it is scarcely necessary to prove that such cases would be but single episodes in an exceptionally successful uprising, and that there is only one way of making such episodes more frequent and likely: successful preparation for an uprising, energy and strength in the first insurgent actions, demoralisation of the troops by extremely daring attacks or by the desertion of a large section of the army, etc.

In short, in the situation now created by the dissolution of the Duma, there can be no doubt that an active fight must lead directly and immediately to an uprising. Perhaps the situation will change; in that case this conclusion will have to be revised; but for the time being it is absolutely indisputable. Therefore, to call for an all-Russian strike without calling for an uprising, without explaining its inseparable connection with an uprising, would be folly bordering on crime. Therefore, in our work of agitation, all efforts must be concentrated on explaining the connection between the two forms of the struggle, on preparing the conditions that will enable three streams of the struggle—a workers' outbreak, a peasant uprising and an army "revolt"—to merge into a single torrent. These *three forms* of a really popular, i.e., *mass*, active movement, infinitely remote from a mere conspiracy, of an *uprising*, overthrowing the autocracy, were quite definitely seen long ago, last summer at the time of the famous mutiny of the *Potemkin*.[53] The success of an all-Russian uprising probably depends most of all on the fusion of these three streams. No doubt such grounds for a struggle as the dissolution of the Duma will greatly assist this fusion, because the most backward section of the peasants (and, consequently, of our army, which mainly consists of peasants) had set great hopes on the Duma.

Hence the conclusion: to take the greatest possible advantage of the dissolution of the Duma as the grounds for concentrated agitation and for a call for a national uprising; to explain the connection between a political strike and an uprising; to direct all efforts towards achieving unity and joint action on the part of the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors in an active, armed struggle.

Finally, when speaking of the form of the movement, special mention must be made of the peasant struggle. Here the connection between a strike and an uprising is particularly clear. It is also clear that here the purpose of an uprising must be, not only the complete destruction, or removal, of all local authorities and their replacement by new authorities elected by the people (the common aim of every uprising, whether in the towns, in the countryside, in the army, etc.), but also the *expulsion of the landlords and the seizure* of their lands. The peasants must undoubtedly aim at the *actual* abolition of landlordism even before the question is decided by a national constituent assembly. There is no need to say much about this, because no one, probably, could imagine a peasant uprising without the peasants settling accounts with the landlords and seizing their lands. Obviously, the more conscious and organised such an uprising is, the fewer will be the instances of destruction of buildings, property, livestock, etc. From a military point of view, for the achievement of certain military aims, destruction—e.g., the burning of buildings and sometimes of property—is quite legitimate and essential in certain cases. Only pedants (or traitors to the people) can bewail the fact that the peasants always resort to such methods. Nevertheless, we need not conceal from ourselves that the destruction of property is sometimes only the result of lack of organisation, of inability to *take* and retain the property of the enemy instead of destroying it—or the result of *weakness*, when one of the belligerent sides *wreaks vengeance* on the enemy because it is not strong enough to *destroy* or crush him. Of course, in our work of agitation we must, on the one hand, do all we can to explain to the peasants that it is absolutely legitimate and necessary to wage a *pitiless* struggle against the enemy, even to the extent of destroying his property; on the other hand, we must show that on the degree of organisation depends the possibility of a much more rational and advantageous outcome of the struggle: destroying the enemy (the landlords and bureaucrats, especially the police) and transferring all property to the people, or to the peasants, intact (or with the least possible damage).

IV

The question of the form of the struggle is closely bound up with the question of *organisation* for the struggle.

In this respect, too, the great historical experience of October-December 1905 has left indelible traces on the revolutionary movement of today. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar bodies (Peasants' Committees, Railwaymen's Committees, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) enjoy tremendous and fully deserved prestige. It would not be easy at present to find a Social-Democrat, or a revolutionary belonging to some other party or trend, who would not be in favour of such organisations in general, or who would not recommend their formation at the present moment in particular.

It seems to me there is no difference of opinion, or at least no serious difference of opinion, on this point. Hence there is no need to dwell on this particular question.

But there is one aspect to which we must devote particular attention, because it is most often ignored. I refer to the fact that the role played by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies (for the sake of brevity we shall speak of them as the *type* of all organisations of this kind) in the great October and December days surrounded them with something like a halo, so that sometimes they are treated almost as a fetish. People imagine that those organs are "necessary and sufficient" for a mass revolutionary movement at all times and in all circumstances. Hence the uncritical attitude towards the choice of the moment for the creation of such bodies, towards the question of what the real conditions are for the success of their activities.

The experience of October-December has provided very instructive guidance on this point. Soviets of Workers' Deputies are *organs of direct mass struggle*. They originated as organs of the *strike* struggle. By force of circumstances they very quickly became the organs of the *general revolutionary* struggle against the government. The course of events and the transition from a strike to an uprising *irresistibly* transformed them *into organs of an uprising*. That

this was precisely the role that quite a number of "soviets" and "committees" played in December, is an absolutely indisputable fact. Events have proved in the most striking and convincing manner that the strength and importance of such organs in time of militant action depend *entirely* upon the strength and success of the uprising.

It was not some theory, not appeals on the part of someone, or tactics invented by someone, not party doctrine, but the force of circumstances that led these non-party mass organs to realise the need for an uprising and transformed them into organs of an uprising.

At the present time, too, to establish such organs means creating organs of an uprising; to call for their establishment means calling for an uprising. To forget this, or to veil it from the eyes of the broad mass of the people, would be the most unpardonable short-sightedness and the worst of policies.

If that is so—and undoubtedly it is—the conclusion to be drawn is also clear: "soviets" and similar mass institutions are in themselves *insufficient* for organising an uprising. They are necessary for welding the masses together, for creating unity in the struggle, for handing on the party slogans (or slogans advanced by agreement between parties) of political leadership, for awakening the interest of the masses, for rousing and attracting them. But they are not sufficient for organising the *immediate fighting forces*, for *organising an uprising* in the narrowest sense of the word.

A slight illustration. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies have often been called parliaments of the working class. But no worker would agree to *his* parliament being convened only for it to be handed over to the police. All workers would admit the need immediately to *organise forces*, to set up a *military* organisation composed of detachments of armed workers to protect their "parliament".

Now that the government has thoroughly learned by experience what "soviets" lead to and what sort of institutions they are, now that it has armed itself from head to foot and is waiting for such institutions to be formed so as to attack the enemy before he has time to reflect and develop his

activities, it is especially necessary for us to explain in our work of agitation the need for a sober view of things, the need for a *military organisation* alongside the organisation of soviets, for defending the latter, for carrying out an uprising, without which the soviets or any elected representatives of the masses will remain powerless.

These "military organisations", if one may call them so, must strive to rally the masses not through the medium of elected persons, but directly by rallying the masses that are immediately taking part in street fighting and civil war. The nuclei of such organisations should be very small, voluntary units of ten, five, perhaps even three persons. We must with the utmost vigour make it known that a battle is approaching in which it will be the duty of *every* honest citizen to be ready to sacrifice himself and fight against the oppressors of the people. Less formality, less red tape, more simplicity in organisation, which must be as mobile and as flexible as possible. All those who wish to take the side of liberty must at once unite by forming fighting groups of five—voluntary units of persons working in the same trade or the same factory, or of people connected by ties of comradeship, or by Party ties, or, finally, simply by residence (those living in the same village, or in the same house or flat in a town). There must be both party and non-party units of this kind, bound together by the single, immediate revolutionary task: an uprising against the government. Such units must be formed without fail on the widest possible scale even before arms are obtained, *irrespective* of whether arms can be obtained or not.

No Party organisation will "arm" the masses. On the contrary, the organisation of the masses into light, mobile, small fighting units will, when things begin to move, render a very great service in regard to procuring arms.

Volunteer fighting units, composed of "*druzhinniki*", if we adopt the name made so honourable by the great December days in Moscow, will be of tremendous value at the moment of the outbreak. A "*druzhina*", or volunteer squad, that can shoot will be able to disarm a policeman, or suddenly attack a patrol and thus procure arms. A volunteer squad

which cannot shoot, or which has not procured arms, will assist in building barricades, reconnoitring, organising liaisons, setting ambushes for the enemy, setting fire to houses occupied by the enemy, occupying rooms to serve as bases for the insurgents—in short, thousands of the most diverse functions can be performed by voluntary units of persons who are determined to fight to the last gasp, who know the locality well, who are most closely connected with the population.

Let an appeal be made at every factory, in every trade union and in every village for the formation of such volunteer fighting squads. People who are well known to each other will form them in advance. People who do not know each other will form squads of five and ten on the day of the fight, or on the eve of the fight, on the spot where fighting takes place, if the idea of forming such units is spread widely among the masses and actually adopted by them.

At the present time, when the dissolution of the Duma has stirred up many new sections of the population, one frequently hears the most revolutionary responses and declarations from ordinary representatives of the least organised sections of the common people in the towns, even of those who on the surface appear to be most "Black-Hundred" in character. Let us then make sure that they are all informed of the decision of the vanguard of the workers and peasants to begin the fight for land and liberty in the very near future, that they are all made aware of the necessity of forming volunteer fighting squads, that they are all convinced of the inevitability of an uprising and of its popular character. If we achieve this—and it is not at all utopian—we shall have in every large town, not hundreds of *druzhinniki*, as in Moscow in December, but thousands upon thousands of them. And then *no machine-guns will be able to stand up to us*, as people used to say in Moscow when arguing that the fighting squads there were not sufficiently of a mass character and were not sufficiently close to the people in type and composition.

Thus: organisation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, of Peasants' Committees and of similar bodies everywhere, together with the most widespread propaganda and agita-

tion for the necessity of a simultaneous uprising, for the immediate preparation of forces for this, and for organising volunteer squads of "*druzhinniki*" on a mass scale.

* * *

P. S. This chapter was already written when we learned of a new "turn" in the slogans of our Central Committee: for the Duma as an *organ for convening* the constituent assembly.

The question of organisation, therefore, includes the additional question of organising a provisional revolutionary government, for that in point of fact is what a body really capable of convening a constituent assembly would be. But we must not forget, as our Cadetophiles are fond of doing, that a provisional government is primarily the *organ of an uprising*. Does the late Duma wish to become the organ of an uprising? Do the Cadets wish to be the organ of an uprising? By all means, gentlemen! In the *struggle* we welcome all allies among the bourgeois democrats. Even if your alliance—excuse me for saying so—were the same thing for us as the alliance with France is for Russia (i.e., a source of funds), even then we should be very pleased; we are practical politicians, gentlemen. But if your Cadet participation in an uprising is merely an empty dream of the Mensheviks, we shall merely say: How petty and trifling your dreams are, Menshevik comrades! But take care you do not die of "unrequited love" for the Cadets, who will be unable to return your passion....

The theoretical aspect of the question of a provisional government has been discussed more than once. The possibility of Social-Democrats taking part in a provisional government has been proved. Of greater interest now, however, is the *practical* aspect *provided* by the events of October-December. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc., were *in fact* the embryos of a provisional government; power would *inevitably* have passed to them had the uprising been victorious. The centre of attention must now be shifted to studying these embryonic organs of a new government that history has brought into being, to studying the conditions for their

work and *their success*. This is of more vital importance and more interesting at the present time than speculation "in general" about a provisional revolutionary government.

V

It remains for us to consider the question of the moment to be chosen for an uprising. The tender affection of the Right-wing Social-Democrats for the Cadet Duma caused them to demand immediate action. This idea ended in a complete fiasco. The attitude adopted by the mass of the working class and of the urban population in general has shown that the gravity of the situation is appreciated or apprehended. A real fight is expected, not for the Duma, of course, but for the *overthrow* of the old regime. The delay is due to the general mood prevailing, to the desire to prepare for a really decisive and desperate struggle, the desire to achieve co-ordinated action.

It is possible, and perhaps most probable, that the new struggle will break out just as spontaneously and unexpectedly as the previous ones did, as a result of a rise in temper and of one of the inevitable explosions. If things take that turn, if such a course of development proves inevitable, we shall not have to decide the question of the time for action; our task then will consist in greatly intensifying our work of agitation and organisation on the lines already indicated.

It is possible, however, that events may require that we, the leaders, appoint the time for action. In that case, we should advise that an all-Russian action, strike and uprising, be timed for the end of summer or the beginning of autumn, towards the middle or end of August. The important thing would be to take advantage of the building season in the towns and the end of summer work in the fields. If we could secure agreement among *all* the influential revolutionary organisations and unions as to the time for action, there would be a real possibility of carrying it out at the time fixed. The simultaneous beginning of the struggle over the whole of Russia would be a great advantage. Even if the government got wind of the time fixed for the strike,

that would in all probability not be fatal; a strike is not a plot, or a military attack that depends upon surprise. The troops all over Russia would probably be most of all demoralised if they were kept week after week with the thought of the inevitable outbreak of the struggle preying on their minds, if they were kept under arms, and if agitation were carried on with increasing vigour by all organisations side by side with the mass of "non-party" revolutionaries. Influential members of the Duma among the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks could also help to make simultaneous action successful.

Isolated and absolutely useless outbreaks, like "revolts" of soldiers and hopeless peasant risings could, perhaps, be restrained if the whole of revolutionary Russia were convinced that this great universal fight is inevitable.

We repeat, however, that this is possible only if complete agreement is reached among *all* the influential organisations. Otherwise, only the old way of the spontaneous rise of temper will be left open.

VI

To sum up briefly.

The dissolution of the Duma marks a complete turn towards autocracy. The possibility of simultaneous action all over Russia is increasing. The probability of all partial uprisings merging into one is increasing. The inevitability of a political strike and of an uprising as a fight for power is felt as never before by large sections of the population. What we have to do is to develop the widest possible agitation in favour of an all-Russian uprising, to explain its political and organisational tasks, to exert every effort to make everyone realise that it is inevitable, to make all the people see the possibility of a general onslaught so that they undertake not a "riot" or a "demonstration", not mere strikes and wrecking of property, but a fight for power, a fight with the aim of overthrowing the government.

The whole situation favours the fulfilment of this task. The proletariat is preparing to put itself at the head of the

struggle. A responsible and difficult, but a great and thankful task confronts the revolutionary Social-Democrats: to assist the working class as the advanced detachment of an all-Russian uprising.

This uprising will overthrow the autocracy and will create a representative assembly of the people with real power, i.e., a constituent assembly.

P.S. This article was written *before* the Sveaborg mutiny[54] began.

DISPATCH OF A DELEGATION TO SVEABORG

RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

In view of the special reports received from Sveaborgs[55] concerning the extremely acute situation in this town and the possibility of an immediate outbreak, the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:

1) to send immediately to Sveaborg a delegation consisting of comrades NNNN;

2) to instruct this delegation to take all measures required for a thorough examination of the situation on the spot;

3) to instruct it to influence local members of the Party, revolutionaries and the population so as to secure a postponement of action, provided this is possible without excessive sacrifice on the part of the population through arrests by the government of persons already marked out for that purpose;

4) to instruct the delegation, in case it is quite impossible to stop an outbreak, to take the most active part in leading the movement, i.e., to help the masses who have joined the struggle to organise independently, to disarm and wipe out the reaction, to undertake decisive offensive action after suitable preparation, and to come forward with correct and really revolutionary slogans, capable of rallying the whole people.

Written July 16 (29), 1906

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ПРОЛЕТАРІЙ

Цѣна 5 коп. Москва. № 1.

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦІАЛЬ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Понедѣльникъ, 21-го августа 1906 г.

ОРГАНЪ МОСКОВСКАГО И С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКАГО КОМИТЕТОВЪ Р. С.-Д. Р. П.

Передъ бурей.

[illegible]

Front page of *Proletary*, No. 1, August 21, 1906. Lenin's articles "Before the Storm", "The Boycott" and others were published in this issue.

Reduced

Front page of *Proletary*, No 1, August 21, 1906.
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were published in this issue

Reduced

BEFORE THE STORM

A month has passed since the State Duma was dissolved. The first wave of armed uprisings and of strikes in an attempt to support the insurgents, has passed. In some places the zeal of the authorities, who have been employing "emergency" and "special emergency" measures for the defence of the government against the people, is beginning to subside. The significance of the past stage of the revolution is becoming more and more apparent. A new wave is drawing nearer and nearer.

The Russian revolution is proceeding along a hard and difficult road. Every upsurge, every partial success is followed by defeat, bloodshed and outrage committed by the autocracy against the champions of freedom. But after every "defeat" the movement spreads, the struggle becomes more intense, ever larger masses of people are drawn into the fight, more classes and groups of people participate in it. Every onslaught of the revolution, every step forward in organising the militant democrats is followed by a positively frantic attack by the reaction, by another step taken in organising the Black-Hundred elements of the people, and by the increased arrogance of the counter-revolution, desperately fighting for its very existence. But in spite of all these efforts, the forces of reaction are steadily declining. More and more workers, peasants and soldiers, who only yesterday were indifferent, or even sided with the Black Hundreds, are now passing over to the side of the revolution. One by one, the illusions and prejudices which made the Russian people confiding, patient, simple-minded, obedient, all-enduring and all-forgiving, are being destroyed.

Many wounds have been inflicted on the autocracy, but it has yet not been killed. The autocracy is swathed in bandages, but it is still holding out, it is still creaking along, and is even becoming more ferocious as its life-blood oozes away. The revolutionary classes of the people, headed by the proletariat, take advantage of every lull to gather new forces, to strike fresh blows at the enemy, so as to root out at last the accursed canker of Asiatic tyranny and serfdom which is poisoning Russia.

There is no surer means of overcoming faint-heartedness and of refuting all narrow, one-sided, petty and cowardly views on the future of our revolution than by casting a general glance at its past. The history of the Russian revolution is still a short one, but it has sufficiently demonstrated and proved to us that the strength of the revolutionary classes and the wealth of their historical, creative power are far greater than they seem to be in times of calm. Every rising wave of the revolution has revealed an unobtrusive and relatively silent accumulation of forces for the fulfilment of the new and loftier task, and every time the short-sighted and timid appraisals of political slogans have been refuted by an outburst of these accumulated forces.

Three main stages of our revolution have become clearly discernible. The first stage was the period of "confidence", the period of mass pleadings, petitions and declarations about the need for a constitution. The second stage was the period of constitutional manifestoes, acts and laws. The third stage was the beginning of the realisation of constitutionalism, the period of the State Duma. At first the tsar was begged to grant a constitution. Later on the solemn recognition of a constitution was forcibly wrested from the tsar. Now... now, after the dissolution of the Duma, experience teaches us that a constitution bestowed by the tsar, acknowledged by the laws of the tsar, and carried out by the tsarist officials, is not worth a brass farthing.

In each of these periods we see the forefront at first occupied by the liberal bourgeoisie, noisy, bragging, full of narrow, petty-bourgeois prejudices and conceit, cocksure of its "right of inheritance" patronisingly teaching its "younger brother" the ways of peaceful struggle, of loyal opposition, of harmonising the freedom of the people with

the tsarist regime. And on every occasion this liberal bourgeoisie succeeded in confusing some Social-Democrats (of the Right wing), in securing their acceptance of its political slogans and subjecting them to its political leadership. But in reality, obscured by the hullabaloo of the liberals' political game, the revolutionary forces among the masses grew and matured. In reality, the *solution* of the political problem which history had brought to the forefront was undertaken each time by the proletarians, who attracted the advanced peasants to their side and came out into the streets, cast aside all old laws and conventions and gave the world new forms and methods of direct revolutionary struggle, and combined means of waging it.

Recall January 9. To everyone's surprise the heroic action of the workers put an end to the period of the tsar's "confidence" in the people and the people's "confidence" in the tsar! At one stroke they raised the whole movement to a new and higher plane! And yet, on the surface, January 9 was a complete defeat. Thousands of proletarians killed and wounded, an orgy of repression, the dark cloud of the Trepov regime hanging over Russia.

The liberals again came to the fore. They organised brilliant congresses, spectacular deputations to the tsar. They clutched with both hands at the sop that was thrown to them, the Bulygin Duma. They already began to growl at the revolution like dogs who have spied a choice titbit, and appealed to the students to go on with their studies and not to meddle in politics. And the faint-hearted among the adherents of the revolution began to say: Let us go into the Duma; after the *Potemkin* affair an armed uprising is hopeless; now that peace has been concluded, militant, mass action is improbable.

The real solution of the next historical problem was again supplied only by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. The Manifesto granting a constitution was wrung from the tsar by the all-Russian strike in October. The spirit of the peasants and the soldiers revived, and they turned towards liberty and light in the wake of the workers. Short weeks of liberty followed, succeeded by weeks of pogroms, Black-Hundred brutality, a terrible sharpening of the struggle, unprecedentedly bloody reprisals against all who had

taken up arms in defence of the liberties wrested from the tsar.

The movement was once again raised to a higher stage and yet, on the surface, the proletariat again seemed to have suffered utter defeat. Frantic repression, overcrowded prisons, endless executions, the despicable howling of the liberals dissociating themselves from the uprising and the revolution.

The loyal liberal philistines are again in the forefront. They make capital out of the last remaining prejudices of the peasants, who trust the tsar. They assert that the victory of democracy at the elections will cause the walls of Jericho to fall. They are predominant in the Duma and again begin to behave like well-fed watchdogs towards "beggars"—the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry.

The dissolution of the Duma marks the end of the hegemony of the liberals, which was holding back and degrading the revolution. The peasants have learned more from the Duma than anyone. Their gain is that they are now losing their most baneful illusions. And the whole people is emerging from the experience of the Duma different from what it was before. As a result of the suffering caused by the failure of the representative body on which so many had placed all their hopes, the people now more definitely appreciate the task ahead. The Duma has enabled them to gauge the forces more precisely; it has concentrated at least some of the elements of the popular movement, it has shown in reality how the different parties act, it has revealed much more vividly to ever wider masses of the people the political character of the liberal bourgeoisie and of the peasantry.

The Cadets were unmasked, the Trudoviks were consolidated—such are some of the most important gains of the Duma period. The pseudo-democracy of the Cadets was branded in the Duma itself scores of times, and that by men who were prepared to trust them. The Russian muzhik has ceased to be a political sphinx. In spite of all distortions of the freedom of election, he has managed to assert himself and has created a new political type, the Trudovik. Henceforth, in addition to the signatures of organisations and parties which were built up in the course of decades, revolutionary manifestoes[56] will bear the signature of the Trudo-

vik Group, which was formed in the course of a few weeks. The ranks of revolutionary democracy have been reinforced by a new organisation, which, of course, shares a good many of the illusions that are characteristic of the small producer, but which in the present revolution undoubtedly expresses the trend toward a ruthless mass struggle against Asiatic despotism and feudal landlordism.

The revolutionary classes are emerging from the experience of the Duma more united, more closely bound to one another, more capable of undertaking a general onslaught. Another wound has been inflicted on the autocracy. It has become still more isolated. It is still more helpless in the face of the problems which it is quite incapable of solving. And starvation and unemployment are becoming more acute. Peasant revolts are breaking out more and more frequently.

Sveaborg and Kronstadt[57] have revealed the spirit of the army and navy. The uprisings have been suppressed, but the uprising lives, is spreading and gaining strength. Many Black-Hundred elements joined the strike that was called in support of the insurgents. The advanced workers stopped this strike, and they were right to do so, because the strike began to develop into a demonstration, whereas the task was to organise a great and decisive struggle.

The advanced workers were right in their estimate of the situation. They quickly rectified the false strategical move and husbanded their forces for the coming battle. They instinctively understood the inevitability of a strike as part of an uprising and the harmfulness of a strike as a demonstration.

All evidence goes to show that temper is rising. An explosion is inevitable and may be near at hand. The executions in Sveaborg and Kronstadt, the reprisals against the peasants, the persecution of the Trudovik members of the Duma—all this serves only to intensify hatred, to spread determination and concentrated readiness for battle. More audacity, comrades! More confidence in the strength of the revolutionary classes, especially the proletariat, enriched as they now are by new experience; more independent initiative! All the signs indicate that we are on the eve of a great struggle. All efforts must be directed towards making it simultaneous, concentrated, full of that heroism of the masses

which has marked all the great stages of the great Russian revolution. Let the liberals cravenly hint at this coming struggle solely for the purpose of threatening the government, let these narrow-minded philistines concentrate the whole force of their "mind and sentiments" on the expectation of a new election—the proletariat is preparing for the struggle; it is unitedly and boldly marching to meet the storm, eager to plunge into the thick of the fight. We have had enough of the hegemony of the cowardly Cadets, those "stupid penguins" who "timidly hide their fat bodies behind the rocks".

"Let the storm rage louder!"[58]

Proletary, No. 1,
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THE BOYCOTT

The Left-wing Social-Democrats must reconsider the question of boycotting the State Duma. It should be borne in mind that we have always presented this question concretely, and in connection with a definite political situation. For instance, *Proletary* (Geneva)[59] wrote that "it would be ridiculous to renounce utilising even the Bulygin Duma"*—if it could come into being. And in referring to the Witte Duma in the pamphlet *Social-Democracy and the State Duma* (by N. Lenin and F. Dan), N. Lenin wrote: "We must by all means carefully reconsider the question of tactics.... The situation has changed" at the time of the Bulygin Duma (see p. 2 of the pamphlet cited).**

The principal difference between revolutionary Social-Democracy and opportunist Social-Democracy on the question of boycott is as follows: the opportunists in all circumstances confine themselves to applying the stereotyped method copied from a specific period in the history of German socialism. We must utilise representative institutions; the Duma is a representative institution; therefore boycott is anarchism, and we must go into the Duma. All the arguments used by our Mensheviks, and especially by Plekhanov, on this topic, could be reduced to this childishly simple syllogism. The Menshevik resolution on the importance of representative institutions in a revolutionary period (see *Partiiniye Izvestia*,[60] No. 2) strikingly reveals the stereotyped and anti-historical nature of their argument.

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* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 182.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., Vol. 10, pp. 104-05.—*Ed.*

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, lay chief emphasis on the necessity of carefully appraising the concrete political situation. It is impossible to cope with the tasks of the revolutionary epoch in Russia by copying in a biased manner one of the recent German stereotyped patterns, forgetting the lessons of 1847-48. The progress of our revolution will be altogether incomprehensible if we confine ourselves to making bare contrasts between "anarchist" boycott and Social-Democratic participation in elections. Learn from the history of the Russian revolution, gentlemen!

This history has *proved* that the tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma were the only correct tactics at that time, and were entirely justified by events. Whoever forgets this and argues about boycott without taking the lessons of the Bulygin Duma into account (as the Mensheviks always do) is certifying his own mental poverty, his inability to explain and take into account one of the most important and eventful periods of the Russian revolution. The tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma were based on a correct appraisal of the temper of the revolutionary proletariat and of the objective features of the situation, which made an immediate general outbreak inevitable.

Let us pass to the *second* lesson of history—to the Witte, Cadet Duma. Nowadays we often hear Social-Democratic intellectuals making repentant speeches about the boycott of that Duma. The fact that it did assemble and undoubtedly rendered indirect service to the revolution is considered to be sufficient reason for penitently confessing that the boycott of the Witte Duma had been a mistake.

Such a view, however, is extremely biased and short-sighted. It fails to take into consideration a number of very important facts of the period prior to the Witte Duma, the period of its existence and the period after its dissolution. Remember that the electoral law for that Duma was promulgated on December 11,[61] at a time when the insurgents were waging an armed fight for a constituent assembly. Remember that *even the Menshevik* "*Nachalo*" wrote at the time: "The proletariat will *also* sweep away the Witte Duma, just as it swept away the Bulygin Duma." Under such circumstances the proletariat could not and should not have

surrendered to the tsar without a fight the power to convene the first representative assembly in Russia. The proletariat had to fight against the autocracy being strengthened by a loan on the security of the Witte Duma. The proletariat had to combat the constitutional illusions which, in the spring of 1906, formed the *entire* basis of the election campaign of the Cadets and the elections among the peasantry. At that time, when the importance of the Duma was being immeasurably exaggerated, the only means of combating such illusions was the boycott. The degree to which the *spread* of constitutional illusions was connected with participation in the election campaign and in the elections in the spring of 1906 is strikingly revealed by the attitude adopted by our Mensheviks. Suffice it to recall that, in spite of the warnings of the Bolsheviks, in the resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party the Duma was referred to as a "*power*"! Another instance: with complete self-assurance, Plekhanov wrote: "The government will *fall* into the abyss when it dissolves the Duma." In reply to him it was said at that time: we must prepare to *push* the enemy into the abyss and not, like the Cadets, place hopes on its "falling" into the abyss by itself. And how soon the words then uttered were proved correct!*

It was the duty of the proletariat to exert every effort to preserve the independence of its tactics in our revolution, namely: together with the politically conscious peasantry against the vacillating and treacherous liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. But it was *impossible* to employ these tactics during the elections to the Witte Duma owing to a number of circumstances, both objective and subjective, which, in the vast majority of localities in Russia, would have made participation in the elections tantamount to the workers' party tacitly supporting the Cadets. The proletariat could not and should not have adopted half-hearted and artificially concocted tactics, prompted by "cunning" and confusion, of elections for an unknown purpose, of elections to the Duma, but not for the Duma. And yet it is a historical fact, which cannot be abolished by the silence, subterfuges and evasions of the Mensheviks, that *not one*

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 476.—*Ed.*

of them, not even Plekhanov, *dared* advocate in the press that we should go into the Duma. It is a fact that *not a single* call was issued in the press to go into the Duma. It is a fact that the Mensheviks themselves, in the leaflet issued by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., officially recognised the boycott and confined the dispute *only* to the question of the stage at which the boycott was to be adopted. It is a fact that the Mensheviks laid emphasis, not on the elections *to the Duma*, but on the elections *as such*, and even on the process of electing as a means of organising *for* an uprising and *for* sweeping away the Duma. Events proved, however, that it was impossible to carry on mass agitation during the elections, and that the Duma alone provided certain opportunities for carrying on agitation among the masses.

Whoever really makes an effort to consider and weigh all these complicated facts, both objective and subjective, will see that the Caucasus was only an exception which proved the general rule. He will see that contrite speeches and explaining away the boycott as a piece of "youthful impetuousness" reveal an extremely narrow, superficial and short-sighted estimate of events.

The dissolution of the Duma has now clearly demonstrated that in the conditions prevailing in the spring of 1906 the boycott, on the whole, was the right tactics and advantageous. Under the conditions which *then* prevailed, *only* by means of the boycott could the Social-Democrats fulfil their duty of giving the people the necessary warning against the tsar's constitution and supplying the necessary criticism of the chicanery of the Cadets during the elections; and both (warning and criticism) were strikingly confirmed by the dissolution of the Duma.

Here is a small instance to illustrate the above. In the spring of 1906, Mr. Vodovozov, who is half-Cadet and half-Menshevik, was whole-heartedly in favour of participating in the elections and supporting the Cadets. Yesterday (August 11) he wrote in *Tovarishch*[62] that the Cadets "wanted to be a parliamentary party in a country that has no parliament and a constitutional party in a country that has no constitution"; that "the whole character of the Cadet Party has been determined by the fundamental contradiction be-

tween a radical programme and quite non-radical tactics".

The Bolsheviks could not desire a greater triumph than this admission on the part of a Left Cadet or Right-wing Plekhanovite.

However, while absolutely rejecting faint-hearted and short-sighted speeches of repentance, as well as the silly explanation of the boycott as "youthful impetuousness", we do not by any means reject the *new* lessons of the Cadet Duma. It would be pedantic obstinacy to be afraid of frankly admitting these new lessons and taking them into account. History has shown that when the Duma assembles opportunities arise for carrying on useful agitation both from within the Duma and around it; that the tactics of joining forces with the revolutionary peasantry against the Cadets can be applied in the Duma. This may seem paradoxical, but such, undoubtedly, is the irony of history: it was the Cadet Duma that clearly demonstrated to the masses the correctness of what we might briefly describe as "anti-Cadet" tactics. History has ruthlessly confuted all constitutional illusions and all "faith in the Duma"; but history has undoubtedly proved that that institution is of some, although modest, use to the revolution as a platform for agitation, for exposing the true "inner nature" of the political parties, etc.

Hence the conclusion: it would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to realities. The time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be boycottists. We shall not refuse to go into the Second Duma when (or "if") it is convened. We shall not refuse to utilise this arena, but we shall not exaggerate its modest importance; on the contrary, guided by the experience already provided by history, we shall entirely subordinate the struggle we wage in the Duma to another form of struggle, namely, strikes, uprisings, etc. We shall convene the Fifth Party Congress; there we shall resolve that *in the event of elections taking place*, it will be necessary to enter into an electoral agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviks (unless the Fifth Party Congress is convened it will be impossible to conduct a united election campaign; and "blocs with other parties" are absolutely prohibited by the decision of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the Cadets.

This conclusion, however, does not by any means reveal the whole complexity of the task that confronts us. We deliberately emphasised the words "*in the event of* elections taking place", etc. We do not know yet whether the Second Duma will be convened, when the elections will take place, what the electoral laws will be like, or what the situation will be at that time. Hence our conclusion suffers from being extremely general: we need it to enable us to sum up past experience, to take note of the lessons of the past, to put the forthcoming questions of tactics on a proper basis; but it is totally inadequate for solving the concrete problems of immediate tactics.

Only Cadets and the "Cadet-like" people of all sorts can be satisfied with such a conclusion at the present time, can create a "slogan" for themselves out of the yearnings for a new Duma and try to persuade the government of the desirability of convening it as quickly as possible, etc. Only conscious or unconscious traitors to the revolution would *at the present time* exert all efforts to divert the inevitable new rise of temper and excitement into the channel of an election and not into that of a fight waged by means of a general strike and uprising.

This brings us to the crux of the question of present-day Social-Democratic tactics. The issue now is not whether we should take part in the elections. To say "yes" or "no" in this case means saying nothing at all about the fundamental problem of the moment. Outwardly, the political situation in August 1906 is similar to that in August 1905, but enormous progress has been made during this period: the forces that are fighting on the respective sides, the forms of the struggle, and the time required for carrying out this or that strategic move—if we may so express it—have all become more exactly defined.

The government's plan is clear. It was absolutely right in its calculations when it fixed the date of the convocation of the Duma and did not fix—*contrary to the law*—the date of the elections. The government does not want to tie its hands or show its cards. Firstly, it is gaining time in which to consider an amendment of the electoral law. Secondly—and this is the most important—it is keeping the date of the elections in reserve until the character and intensity of

the new rise of temper can be fully gauged. The government wishes to fix the date of the elections at the particular time (and perhaps in the particular form, i.e., the form of elections) when it *can split and paralyse the incipient uprising*. The government's reasoning is correct: if things remain quiet, perhaps we shall not convene the Duma at all, or revert to the Bulygin laws. If, however, a strong movement arises, then we can try to split it by fixing a date for the elections for the time being and in this way entice certain cowards and simpletons away from the direct revolutionary struggle.

Liberal blockheads (see *Tovarishch* and *Rech*) so utterly fail to understand the situation that they are of their own accord crawling into the net set by the government. They are trying with might and main "to prove" the need for the Duma and the *desirability* of diverting the rising tide into the channel of an election. But even they cannot deny that the question of what form the impending struggle will assume is still an open one. Today's issue of *Rech* (August 12) admits: "What the peasants will say in the autumn ... is still unknown." ... "It will be difficult to make any general forecasts until September-October, when the temper of the peasantry is definitely revealed."

The liberal bourgeois remain true to their nature. They do not want to assist actively in choosing the form of the struggle and in moulding the temper of the peasants one way or another, nor are they capable of doing so. The interests of the bourgeoisie demand that the old regime be not overthrown, but merely weakened, and that a liberal Cabinet be formed.

The interests of the proletariat demand the complete overthrow of the old, tsarist regime and the convocation of a constituent assembly with full power. Its interests demand the most active intervention in moulding the temper of the peasants, in choosing the most resolute forms of struggle as well as the best moment for it. On no account must we withdraw, or obscure, the slogan: convocation of a constituent assembly by revolutionary means, i.e., through the medium of a provisional revolutionary government. We must concentrate all efforts on explaining the conditions for an uprising: that it must be combined with the strike movement;

that all the revolutionary forces must be rallied and prepared for it, etc. We must resolutely take the path that was indicated in the well-known manifestoes: "To the Army and Navy" and "To All the Peasants", which were signed by the "bloc" of all revolutionary organisations, including the Trudovik Group. Lastly, we must take special care that the government does not under any circumstances succeed in splitting, stopping, or weakening the incipient uprising by ordering elections. In this respect the lessons of the Cadet Duma must be absolutely binding for us, viz., the lessons that the Duma campaign is a subordinate and secondary form of struggle, and that, owing to the objective conditions of the moment, direct revolutionary actions by the broad mass of the people still remain the principal form of struggle.

Of course, subordinating the Duma campaign to the main struggle, assigning a secondary role to this campaign for the contingency of an unfavourable outcome of the battle, or postponing the battle until experience of the Second Duma is obtained—such tactics may, if you like, be described as the old boycott tactics. On formal grounds this description might be justified, because, apart from the work of agitation and propaganda, which is always obligatory, "preparation for elections" consists of minute technical arrangements, which can very rarely be made a long time before the elections. We do not want to argue about words; in substance these tactics are the logical *development* of the old tactics, but not a *repetition* of them; they are a deduction drawn from the last boycott, but not the last boycott itself.

To sum up. We must take into account the experience of the Cadet Duma and spread its lessons among the masses. We must prove to them that the Duma is "useless", that a constituent assembly is essential, that the Cadets are wavering; we must demand that the Trudoviks throw off the yoke of the Cadets, and we must support the former against the latter. We must recognise at once the need for an electoral agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks in the event of new elections taking place. We must exert all our efforts to counteract the government's plan to split the uprising by ordering elections. Advocating their tried revolutionary slogans with greater energy than ever, Social-

Democrats must exert every effort to unite all the revolutionary elements and classes more closely, to convert the upsurge that is probable in the near future into an armed uprising of the whole people against the tsarist government.

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THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE BANKRUPTCY OF OPPORTUNIST TACTICS

I

The dissolution of the Duma undoubtedly marked a grave political crisis in the course of the Russian revolution. Like every crisis, it at once extremely intensified all political antagonisms, revealed the influences underlying many events and definitely set before the people tasks which hitherto had been only looming, but had not yet penetrated the minds of the broad masses. Like every crisis that comes as the climax of a whole period of preceding development, the dissolution of the Duma inevitably served as a touchstone for testing and verifying the various trends of opinion on tactics. On the one hand, this crisis brings to a close a certain cycle of development and thus enables us clearly to determine whether the general appraisal of this development is right or wrong. On the other hand, it compels us to give immediate answers to a number of problems which rapidly become urgent, and these answers are often verified on the spot, so to speak, by the rapid course of events.

The dissolution of the Duma proved to be such a "touchstone" for the "*two tactics*" which have long been noticeable in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. During the "Duma period" we argued about these two tactics more or less calmly, as the political situation did not call for immediate and important political decisions. The dissolution of the Duma called for such decisions at once. The "two tactics" were put *to the test* by the political crisis. The results of this test must be closely studied.

II

The Central Committee of our Party is in the hands of the Right-wing Social-Democrats. Prompt, precise and clear answers to the new tactical problems were required of them. What were their answers?

To the main question concerning the general character of the impending struggle, the Central Committee answered by proclaiming the following slogans: at the outset "For the resumption of the Duma sessions." The Cadets took up this slogan (see *Rech* and the interview with Mr. Kedrin in the newspaper *Oko*[63]). The Social-Democratic Party rejected it. The Bolshevik members of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party protested. The Central Committee discarded the first slogan and proclaimed another in its place: "In defence of the Duma against the camarilla, for the purpose of convening a constituent assembly." Finally, this second slogan evolved into a third and last slogan: "For the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly." In spite of the protests of the Left-wing Social-Democrats, the Central Committee stuck to that slogan. On the question of slogans—utter confusion.

Another question What form of struggle should be recommended? The Central Committee was primarily in favour of demonstration strikes. It wanted to call for an immediate strike, but found no support among any of the revolutionary parties and organisations. It then signed manifestoes calling for an uprising (the manifestoes: "To the Army and Navy" and "To All the Russian Peasants"). But after taking a step forward from the demonstration strike to the strike for an *uprising*, it took a hasty step backward and called for "partial mass expressions of protest".

The third fundamental question: Who shall be our ally in the struggle? Which sections of bourgeois democracy can we depend upon, or which can we treat with preferably? With what parties or organisations should we seek an understanding? The Central Committee, as we have already seen, trimmed both its slogans and the forms of struggle recommended by it to suit the "Duma as a whole", to suit the Cadets. But "drive nature out through the door and it will

fly in through the window"! The Central Committee was *compelled* to sign manifestoes to the army, to the peasantry and "To the Whole People" in conjunction *only* with the revolutionary organisations, in conjunction *only* with the "*Trudoviks*" (from the wreckage of the Duma). In its *arguments* on tactics, the Central Committee, like all the Mensheviks, draws a line of demarcation between the Cadets and the Octobrists: "they"—are the Right, "we"—the Left ("we" and the Cadets). In its tactical *calls to action*, in its fighting manifestoes, the Central Committee draws a line of demarcation between the Cadets and the Trudoviks; the Cadets are placed either on the Right or among the neutrals in the struggle. It *turns out* then, that "we" means "we" and the Trudoviks, but without the Cadets. It turns out, then, that "we" are an information and co-ordination bureau for *all* the revolutionary organisations, including the "Committee of the Trudovik Group", but without the Cadets. So it is a case of "a burning desire but a bitter fate". The Social-Democrats of the Right have a burning desire to go hand in hand with the Cadets, but their fate is a bitter one, for the Cadets repudiate the fighting agreements that the course of events dictates.

Such, in its main features, is the factual history of Menshevik tactics after the dissolution of the Duma. This history is recorded in a small number of documents. Read the "Letters" (Nos. 4 and 5) of the Central Committee to the Party organisations, and the manifestoes "To the Army and Navy" (signed by the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma and by the Committee of the Trudovik Group); "To All the Russian Peasants" (signed by the Committee of the Trudovik Group, the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma, and the All-Russian Peasant Union, by the Central Committees of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Social-Democratic Party, the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union, and the All-Russian Teachers' Union); "To the Whole People" (the same organisations, minus the three unions, but plus the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund); and lastly, read the protest of the three members of the Central Committee (published "for Party members only"[64]) and you will have all the material on the opportunist tactics of Social-Democrats since the dissolution of the Duma.

What is the sum and substance of this factual, external history of the Menshevik tactical directives? The sum and substance is clear: vacillation between the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Indeed, what do the vacillations of the Central Committee on the question of the slogan amount to? To vacillation between the legal constitutional method as the exclusive sole method (the slogan: "Resumption of the Duma sessions"), and recognition, or admission, of the revolutionary method (the "constituent assembly" slogan *toned down* by invariable association with the Duma). This is vacillation between the Cadets (who fully accept, and *have accepted*, the "resumption of sessions" slogan) and the revolutionary peasantry (the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Peasant Union, the Railwaymen's and Teachers' unions, who in conjunction with the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party signed the call for an uprising in favour of a constituent assembly). Our Central Committee, or our opportunist Social-Democrats, are only a little to the left of the Cadets, and much to the right of the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Such is the sum and substance of the vacillations of the Central Committee on the question of slogans, the form of struggle and the alignment of the political parties.

Throughout the Duma period, disagreement on tactics between the Right- and the Left-wing Social-Democrats became more and more marked, and centred more and more around the main question of the line of demarcation in the ranks of the bourgeois democrats, or the question of whom we should ally ourselves with. The Right-wing Social-Democrats directed all their efforts towards forming an alliance with the Cadets (support of the Duma as a whole, support of the demand for a Duma Cabinet). The revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, directed their tactics towards winning over from the Cadets the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, towards liberating these elements from the yoke of the Cadets and uniting them with the proletariat for militant aims. The dissolution of the Duma was the upshot of the Duma period. And what happened? The Right-wing Social-Democrats were *forced* to abandon the Cadets and join the revolutionary democrats. The only things of a

Cadet nature that have remained are a few frills to their slogans. The circumstances compelled them to draw the line of demarcation exactly where the Left-wing Social-Democrats have always said it should be drawn. The inconsistency of the Central Committee's slogans, their futility, became glaringly obvious.

III

Let us now examine the arguments of the Central Committee. They are set out most fully in its fourth "letter to the Party organisations" (this letter is neither dated nor numbered, but the next letter is called the fifth). This letter is a truly remarkable specimen of opportunist thought: it deserves to be published over and over again and included in socialist readers and textbooks, as an object-lesson of how Social-Democrats should *not* discuss tactics.

The kernel of this letter is its analysis of a question which the authors themselves formulate as follows: "Into whose hands can power now pass?" And it goes on to say:

"Who at the present time is, or can be, *in the eyes* of the nation numbering 140,000,000, the natural successor to state power wrested from the tsarist government?... For when the popular movement for winning state power starts, the people must have a *clear idea in their minds* of who is to take the place of the overthrown government.... In every given period of the movement some association or organisation must, in the people's *mind*, play such a role."

We have underlined the places in the argument we have quoted which at once reveal their total fallacy. On the question of *winning* power, the Central Committee at once adopts the petty-bourgeois idealist and not the proletarian materialist point of view. It deduces "natural succession" to power from the most widespread "idea" ("in the eyes" of the people), and not from the realities of the struggle. It fails to understand that the "natural successor" will not be the one who, in somebody's "*mind*", "plays such a role", but the one who will really *overthrow* the government, who will really *win* power, who will be *victorious* in the struggle. The issue will not be decided by the "mind of the people", but

by the *strength* of the respective *classes* and elements of society.

Thus, the Central Committee immediately flies off at a tangent from the point at issue. Instead of examining the realities of the struggle, how it has been and is being waged, it starts speculating, in the worst idealist manner, about "mind" and the "idea" of who is "to take the place of the overthrown", and not about who *does the overthrowing and will achieve it*. To arrive at these opportunist conclusions it was necessary to discard the whole Marxist method, a method that demands a study of the question: which interests of which classes demand that the government be *overthrown*, and which —demand that its power be limited; which material conditions *give rise* to a revolutionary struggle ("overthrow") and which—give rise to efforts to arrange a constitutional cohabitation of the overthrown with the overthrowers. If the Central Committee had not forgotten the ABC of Marxism, it might have considered, if only on the basis of the experience of the Russian revolution, which of the classes in our country are *forced* by the very course of events, often irrespective of their "mind" (and even in spite of their monarchist minds) to *overthrow* the governmental institutions which stand in their way. The history of the *workers' and peasants'* movement in twentieth-century Russia should have provided our Central Committee with enough examples of the partial and local *overthrow* of governmental institutions to enable them to conceive of the general and complete overthrow of the central government in a Marxist manner, and not *à la* Ledru-Rollin.

Having taken the wrong path, the Central Committee goes further and further astray in its arguments on this subject. It begins to enumerate all the possible and probable combinations in the composition of the "provisional revolutionary government".

The Central Committee declares that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and likewise an Executive Committee composed of the Trudovik and Social-Democratic groups in the Duma, are unsuitable. The former would not receive the backing of the "hundred million peasants"; the latter would not receive the backing of "any considerable section of the urban petty bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie, soldiers,

Cossacks, officers, etc. It would be a very dangerous error, however, to think that a new state power could be established against the wish of all these elements."

We suggest that the reader compare the first part of these arguments with the Bolshevik draft resolution on the provisional government (see *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, March 20, 1906, reprinted in Lenin's *Report on the Congress*, p. 92*).[65] This draft resolution precisely enumerates the organisations which *actually* played the role of organs of revolutionary power during the December uprising. In addition to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, it mentions, of course, the soldiers', railwaymen's and *peasants*' committees, and the elected rural bodies in the Caucasus and the Baltic Provinces. Thus, history has already provided an answer to the problem which the Central Committee is now so helplessly trying to solve. History has already shown which classes and which elements of the population *take part* in an uprising and *create* the organs for it. The opportunist Social-Democrats, however, not only forget (or fail to understand) the recent past of the revolution, but do not understand in general what a provisional revolutionary government is. Only a little reflection is needed to realise that such a government is the organ of an uprising (and not only the result of an uprising, as is mistakenly assumed in the Menshevik draft resolution on the provisional government—see the same *Report*, p. 91, or *Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2).

Further, the second part of the above-quoted argument is even more fallacious. It is based on the usual method of the opportunists: the attempt to prove that the most moderate slogan is the most reasonable one on the grounds that it serves to unite the largest number of social elements. Bernstein said: Social revolution is supported only by a section of the proletariat, whereas social reform is supported by many social-liberal elements. Do not be misled by the idea that socialism can be established against their wishes! It is better to become a party of democratic socialist reforms! The Mensheviks say: Only the proletariat and the revolutionary section of the petty bourgeoisie (primarily the peasants) are in favour of a real victory of our revolution. But "both

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 277-382.—*Ed.*

the middle bourgeoisie and the army officers, etc." are in favour of the limitation of the old monarchy as proposed by the liberals. Let us, therefore, call a deal between the liberals and the tsar a victory of the revolution, and, instead of a really revolutionary government as the organ of an uprising, let us have the Duma!

No, comrades. There are things in political arithmetic a bit more complicated than simply adding up *all* the "opposition" elements. The addition of a vacillating and treacherous opposition to the actually fighting revolutionary elements does not always produce a plus, more often it proves to be a minus. Those whose interests *compel* them to strive for the limitation of the monarchy and to fear its downfall can never create a bold and vigorous organ of an uprising. To try in advance to fashion the future organ of an uprising to fit these Cadet elements would be the same as trying to fashion the social revolution in Europe to fit a Naumann or a Clemenceau.

What a comical contradiction our opportunists have landed themselves in! They want an alliance with the middle bourgeoisie and the army officers, in short, with the elements of the Cadet Party. But in that case they must entirely discard the "constituent assembly" slogan, for the Cadets are discarding it. To proclaim the "constituent assembly" slogan, which is unpalatable to the middle bourgeoisie and the army officers, and at the same time to try to attract them by foisting an ultra-revolutionary role on a moderate and loyal Duma (to overthrow the government and become a provisional revolutionary government!)—such are the depths of absurdity to which our Central Committee has descended.

Incidentally, as regards absurdities, the Central Committee's letter contains even choicer gems. How do you like this one? "If, indeed, it is impossible, at the present moment, to put forward any other body than the Soviet of Workers' Deputies as the instrument of power, then we can say in advance that the victory over the government in a *struggle for power* (and such a victory necessarily presupposes the participation of the army in the fight) would lead to nothing short of a *military dictatorship* of the army which had passed over 'to the side of the people'." (The italics are in the original.)

Just ponder over this monstrous tirade: if the Soviets

of Workers' Deputies were to *defeat* the government with the aid of a section of the army, the army's passing over "to the side of the people"* would lead to military dictatorship!! I doubt whether such attempts to intimidate us with the prospect of a victorious outcome of the struggle could be found even in Cadet literature. I doubt whether even Mr. Struve went quite so far, in *Osvobozhdeniye*,[66] in the summer of 1905, and in *Polyarnaya Zvezda*,[67] in the spring of 1906, when he fulminated against the idea of an armed uprising as being akin to the idea of a military dictatorship. If the Central Committee had examined at least the ordinary demands of the soldiers and sailors during their innumerable "revolts" of the past year, it would have seen that these demands amount *in fact* to a demand that the caste-ridden army be converted into a people's army, i.e., a militia. The soldiers and sailors were not always able to formulate the substance of their demands; indeed, in most cases they were unable to do so. But can anyone doubt that military service in the soldier's home district and the right to hold meetings, etc., is equivalent to the establishment of a militia? Has the Central Committee lost its elementary revolutionary instinct to such an extent that it no longer sees the difference between the aristocratic revolutionary spirit of the Decembrists[68]—the *raznochintsi*'s[69] revolutionary spirit of the army officers in the Narodnaya Volya[70]—and the profoundly democratic, proletarian and peasant revolutionary spirit of the soldiers and sailors in twentieth-century Russia? Has it never been struck by the fundamental difference between the revolutionary spirit of the army officers in the days of the Narodnaya Volya, when almost complete apathy reigned in the ranks of the soldiers, and the reactionary spirit of the army officers today, when there is a mighty movement precisely among rank-and-file soldiers? Anyone who thinks that if the present-day Russian soldier or sailor goes over to the side of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the fight against the government it can serve as the transition to a military dictatorship—who thinks that this can be counteracted by winning over the army officers by means of the moderate slogan "for

* The inverted commas evidently express the irony of our Central Committee!

the Duma"—must either have lost all sense of reality, or have gone even more to the right than Struve & Co.! The Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party wants to combat the strivings of the Russian soldiers toward a military dictatorship by winning over the officers: this is what the opportunists have brought us to!

The Central Committee tries to bolster up its hopeless case with the further argument that there is no need for us to invent a new government, as we have the Duma or, at any rate, remnants of it. These remnants "can declare themselves the State Duma", while the "popular mind, unversed in the subtleties of a written constitution, regarded and still regards the State Duma as the organ of power.... If the troops, refusing to obey the tsarist government, could enter the service of the new government, that new government would be the State Duma."

Splendid! If tomorrow the "popular mind" should regard another legal institution as "the government", we must undertake to spread this prejudice. A fine understanding of the duties of a revolutionary party, indeed! Do try to understand at last, dear comrades, that power must be taken by force, by fighting, by an uprising. Are the Cadets prepared to go so far? If so, they are welcome; we will reject no ally in this struggle. But if they are not prepared, if they are even afraid to make a *direct call* for an uprising (this, after all, is, if sincerely meant, the first step to real action, and of all the members of the Duma only the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks have taken it)—then all this talk about the Duma being an "organ of power which will convene a constituent assembly" is nothing but pernicious Manilovism[71] and a deception of the people.

If the political atmosphere had been different the remnants of the Duma would have acted differently, says the Central Committee in justification of the Cadets, who were scared even by the Vyborg Manifesto. Yes, it is true, they would have acted differently. What conclusion should be drawn from this? That we must strive to create that *different* atmosphere. By what means? By rousing the elements that are capable of fighting to revolutionary consciousness, by raising their consciousness to a level higher than that of the Cadets, higher than the level of Cadet slogans. But

you *justify* the timidity of the Cadets with the plea that the atmosphere is non-revolutionary, and at the same time you make the atmosphere *less revolutionary* by substituting Cadet slogans for revolutionary ones!

IV

The Central Committee's practical conclusion in its famous fourth letter is as follows: "Local mass expressions of protest must be organised at once, everywhere." Their object is described literally as follows: "To create an atmosphere of preparation for the impending decisive struggle." ... Not to prepare for the impending decisive struggle, but to create an atmosphere of preparation!...

Our Party has already condemned and rejected this slogan of the Central Committee with rare unanimity. The Central Committee's campaign for "partial mass expressions of protest" has *already* failed. The absurdity of demonstrating, of organising protests, in a situation in which civil war has attained unprecedented intensity, is too obvious. The resolutions adopted by a large number of Party committees and conferences[72] published in this issue show clearly enough what indignation has been roused by this slogan, as well as by the Central Committee's whole policy since the dissolution of the Duma. We shall not, therefore, waste any more words on refuting a slogan that has already been refuted by facts and rejected by the Party. We need only note, firstly, the significance in principle of the Central Committee's mistake, and, secondly, its awkward attempts in letter No. 5 to extricate itself from the impossible situation in which it found itself.

From the point of view of principle, the Central Committee's mistake lies in its utter failure to understand the difference between a demonstration strike and a strike for an uprising. This is altogether unpardonable after the experience of December. It can only be explained if we take into account that in none of its letters has the Central Committee made any direct reference to an armed uprising. To evade any direct raising of the question of an uprising—such is the long-standing and constant striving of our opportunists,

a striving that inevitably follows from their whole position. This striving explains why the Central Committee talks so persistently only about demonstration strikes, and says nothing about strikes for an uprising.

Having taken up such a position, the Central Committee could not avoid lagging behind all the other revolutionary organisations and parties. It could be said that *everyone* except the opportunist Social-Democrats has realised that the question of an uprising is bound to be raised. As was to be expected, the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union has paid special attention to this question. (See its resolution and the report of the Bureau printed in this issue.[73]) It is clearly evident from a number of manifestoes signed by several revolutionary organisations (including the afore-mentioned manifestoes "To the Army and Navy", "To All the Russian Peasants", etc.). Our Central Committee seems to have signed these documents against its will, contrary to its convictions!

Indeed, it is utterly impossible to sign these appeals and yet fail to see the difference between demonstration strikes and strikes for an uprising. The Central Committee's inconsistency, its likeness to a weathercock, is glaring: in its own declarations (letters No. 4 and No. 5) it does not say a word about an uprising; but when it collaborates with other revolutionary organisations it signs manifestoes calling for an uprising! When left to itself, our Central Committee inevitably lapses into a Cadet policy and expends all its energy devising slogans that would be acceptable or would seem to be acceptable to the Cadets. When marching in line with other revolutionary organisations, it "pulls itself together", becomes ashamed of its Cadet slogans and behaves properly.

This is the first time that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party finds itself in such an undignified position. For the first time it is being publicly led by others. For the first time it is in the rear. Our duty, the duty of all members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, is at all costs and as soon as possible to make sure that it is the first and *last* time.

The inability to understand the causes of the failure of the (last) July strike is wholly due to the above-mentioned mistake on a matter of principle. Anyone may make a mistake

in fixing the *moment* for the struggle. We do not at all blame the Central Committee *for that*. But to mistake the *character* of an action, despite the warnings of a number of organisations in conjunction with which the Central Committee signed the calls for an uprising, that is unpardonable.

In its letter No. 5, the Central Committee embarks on a petty and trivial polemic against the Socialist-Revolutionaries (merely trying to prove that the representative of the Trudoviks argued more consistently than the Socialist-Revolutionaries. What is the use of all this? Who is interested in it?), and expresses surprise that it was the advanced, class-conscious workers who failed to respond to the July strike call. The backward workers responded to that call, but the advanced workers did not! So the Central Committee is indignant, angry, almost abusive!

And yet, if the Central Committee had not taken up a fundamentally wrong position, had not disagreed *in principle* with the vanguard of the proletariat, it would have understood quite easily why this happened. The backward workers might not yet have known the difference between a demonstration strike and a strike for an *uprising*, but the advanced workers knew the difference very well. When there was some hope of being able to support the uprising in Sveaborg and Kronstadt—and there was such a moment—the declaration of a national strike was natural. But this, of course, would have been (*and was*) a strike, not with the object of protesting against the dissolution of the Duma (as the Central Committee imagined), but with the object of supporting the insurgents, of *extending* the uprising.

In a day or two, however, it became definitely clear that the uprising in Sveaborg and Kronstadt had been suppressed *on this occasion*. A strike in support of the insurgents was out of place, and the progressive workers had all the time been *opposed* to protest strikes and demonstration strikes. They had been saying all along in the clearest and most emphatic language (and only our Central Committee contrived not to know, or not to understand it) that they would go into a general decisive battle, but on no account take part in a strike for the sake of a demonstration.

The failure of the July strike thus knocked the bottom, as it were, out of the tactics of the opportunist Social-Demo-

crats. The idea of a demonstration strike fell through, utterly and entirely. The slogan of "partial mass expressions of protest" suffered the same fate.

But to anyone with the slightest knowledge of the mood of the workers in the main centres of Russia, to anyone who has watched what is now going on among the peasantry, it is quite clear that the idea of the strike for an uprising and the slogan of preparing for an uprising, far from losing their importance or clarity, are, on the contrary, everywhere maturing and gaining strength.

V

Let us now sum up our brief analysis of the Menshevik tactics during the critical days after the dissolution of the Duma.

Throughout the Duma period the Mensheviks advocated support of the Duma as a whole, support of the Cadets (under the guise of supporting the demand for the appointment of a Duma Cabinet). The Bolsheviks did their utmost to split the Trudoviks from the Cadets, and supported the idea of forming "an Executive Committee of the Left groups in the Duma".

Whose tactics have proved right now, after the dissolution of the Duma? In conjunction with the Cadets, it was found possible to issue only the timid Vyborg Manifesto. The Cadets *as a party* did not support it; they did not participate in party agitation in support of it, nor did they pursue any further activities on *those* lines. Even our Mensheviks at once admitted that this Manifesto was inadequate. The timid Vyborg Manifesto was followed by others, bolder and more definite. The amalgamation of some of the individual ex-members of the Duma was followed by the amalgamation of the "committees" of *two* Duma groups, which signed a number of manifestoes and took part in a number of revolutionary conferences, and *agreed to a war council* of the revolution.

What were these two groups which, as groups, as collective bodies, survived the débâcle of the Duma, which did not lose their heads because the "constitutional" ground had slipped from under their feet?

They were the Social-Democrats and the *Trudoviks*. The "Executive Committee of the Left groups", advocated by the Bolsheviks, who supported the *idea* of forming a committee of that kind, has *come into being*. The Trudovik Group *begot* a new *revolutionary* organisation which has *new* ties with the peasantry; as for the Cadets, they are now politically dead, just as the Bolsheviks predicted, emphasising that "maggots are found near corpses, not near living people".*

The fighting agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., has now become a *fact*, documented by the above-mentioned leaflets. We lost, and lost a great deal, of course, only because we started *late* in the day, because we had not thought matters out earlier, had not prepared the ground gradually, as the Bolsheviks recommended long ago, in their draft resolution at the Unity Congress.

Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt—which may be translated approximately as follows: the wise politician keeps ahead of events, the unwise is led by them. The Bolsheviks have been insisting for months past, if not for a whole year, that fighting agreements with the revolutionary democrats *were inevitable*; they have been insisting on the importance of a fighting alliance between the proletariat and the advanced peasantry in particular. The dissolution of the Duma *compelled* us to adopt such a course; but the Mensheviks, as we have already shown in our analysis of all the episodes of the Central Committee's tactics, turned out to be unprepared, were "led" to it against their will and contrary to their convictions by the "unexpected" turn of events.

Take the question of an uprising. The Mensheviks did everything to "burke" it. At the Unity Congress they even passed a resolution *against* an armed uprising. Even now they say *nothing* about an uprising in "letters" No. 4 and No. 5, which the Central Committee wrote without the bidding of other revolutionary organisations. But when it writes anything *jointly* with them, and at their bidding, we read direct and resolute calls for an uprising. Then the slogans, too, are revolutionary. Then not a word is said about resum-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 264.—*Ed.*

ing the sessions of the Duma, or even about convening a constituent assembly through the medium of the Duma. On the contrary, we read the following (the manifesto "To the Whole People"): "*Not an impotent* Duma, but a constituent assembly with full power, on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage, this is the goal the people must strive to achieve. *Not the tsar's Ministers, but a power backed by the revolutionary people* must convene this assembly" (our italics). This is the emphatic language our Central Committee uses when in the company of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries, such as the Committee of the Trudovik Group and the Polish Socialist Party!

Lastly, take the question of a provisional revolutionary government. For eighteen months our Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov, have been arguing that Social-Democrats cannot participate in such a government jointly with bourgeois revolutionaries, and that it is Blanquism, Jacobinism, and all the other mortal sins to issue a slogan in favour of establishing a provisional revolutionary government.

And what happened? The Duma was dissolved, and the Central Committee was compelled to raise *this very* question of a provisional revolutionary government and of how it is to be constituted. Its complete unpreparedness for the question is apparent: it does not even understand that a provisional revolutionary government is *the organ of an uprising*. The Central Committee proposes that the remnants of the Duma, i.e., the Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks and some of the Cadets, be proclaimed a provisional revolutionary government. But look, comrades, see what all this amounts to: *You are in fact inviting the socialists to take part in a provisional revolutionary government jointly with bourgeois revolutionaries!* And you do this in spite of the fact that in the company of the Trudoviks and Left Cadets the Social-Democrats will form a *negligible minority*! Alas, alas! The doctrinaire talk about it being *wrong* for Social-Democrats to participate in a provisional government jointly with bourgeois revolutionaries evaporates at the first contact with reality. All the far-fetched arguments used to justify this wrong decision with the aid of false references to Marx vanish like smoke. Moreover, in addition to the bourgeois *revolutionaries* (the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the

Polish Socialist Party, sections of the Peasant, Railwaymen's and Teachers' unions), our "strict" pseudo-Marxists intend, by fair means or foul, to drag into the future provisional government the bourgeois *compromisers* (the Cadets)!

Well, it is hard to imagine a more complete fiasco for opportunist tactics than that suffered by our Central Committee after the dissolution of the Duma. We must pull our Party out of this mire before it is too late.

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THE EVENTS OF THE DAY

"Bloody Day" in Warsaw and other towns of Poland,[74] the attempt on the life of Stolypin and the assassination of Min[75] have all roused universal interest in the question of "guerrilla actions"—we use the term which has become current among Party members and legitimised by the resolution of the Unity Congress.

The editorial board proposes to publish in the near future an article, or series of articles, dealing as comprehensively as possible with this extremely important question.* In the meantime, so as not to leave our readers in ignorance of our views, we shall make the following brief remarks, which in subsequent articles will be developed in detail and more precisely formulated.

First remark. Going to extremes is always bad, and there can be no doubt in the mind of any socialist that the sentiments of the masses must be taken into account when organising guerrilla actions. Therefore, we think that it is absolutely necessary to take into account the opinion of the Bund (evidently in agreement with the Polish Social-Democrats), which is familiar with the conditions of work in Warsaw and the sentiments of the masses in that city, namely, the opinion that the Polish Socialist Party "went too far". Whether it did so or not is a question of fact which we are not competent to decide. It is never advisable to go too far, but it would be wrong to conclude that because there have been individual cases of "going to extremes" a certain form of struggle is no good.

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* See pp. 213-23 of this volume.—*Ed.*

On the whole, we consider that the intensification of guerrilla warfare in Russia after the dissolution of the Duma is a gain. A ruthless guerrilla war of extermination against the government's perpetrators of violence appears to us to be timely and expedient.

Second remark. The Central Committee of our Party is certainly mistaken, and seriously mistaken, when it says in its footnote to the fourth "letter" (to the Party organisations): "it goes without saying that the Party, as heretofore, repudiates so-called guerrilla militant actions."

This is incorrect. We abide by the decisions of the Congress, but *under no circumstances* shall we submit to decisions of the Central Committee which *violate* the decisions of the Congress. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine carefully the resolution of the Unity Congress entitled: "On Guerrilla Actions" will see without any difficulty that our Party *repudiates* one form of guerrilla action, *recognises* another, and *recommends* a third.

It entirely repudiates the expropriation of private property. It *does not repudiate* the expropriation of government funds, but hedges it round with *particularly strict* conditions ("if organs of revolutionary power are formed in the given locality", *etc*.).

Further, the resolution of the Congress *recognises* guerrilla actions *without* expropriation of property, i.e., *recognises* "*terror*", recognises *guerrilla* actions for the purpose of killing the enemy. This recognition is clearly and unambiguously expressed in the very first words of the resolution, following the preamble:

"The Congress resolves: (1) recognising that *parallel with* [our italics throughout] the preparation of the revolutionary forces for the coming uprising, the basis of which is the organisation of the masses of the working class, *an active struggle* against *government terror and the violence of the Black Hundreds will be inevitable*, it is necessary..." (then follows the prohibition of stealing, the expropriation of private funds, etc.).

Our excerpt from the *decision of the Congress* is perfectly clear. "Parallel with" work among the masses it recognises "active struggle" against the perpetrators of violence, which

undoubtedly means killing them by means of "guerrilla actions".

The only restrictions that the resolution places on *this* second form of guerrilla action (the killing of perpetrators of violence) are the following: "to *avoid* the violation of the personal property of *peaceful* citizens *except* [listen!] in those cases when it is an *unintentional* result of the struggle against the government *or* when, as for instance in building barricades, it is called for by the exigencies of the immediate struggle."

Thus, when the *immediate struggle* requires it, the violation of private property is permissible, e.g., the seizure of vehicles, etc., for barricades. When there is *no* immediate struggle, the Congress instructs us *to avoid* disturbing the personal safety of "peaceful" citizens; but the Congress at once points to an *exception*: it does *not blame* participants in guerrilla actions for "unintentional" disturbance of personal safety resulting from the struggle against the government.

Lastly, the Congress definitely *recommends* to the Party a certain form of guerrilla action, by resolving without qualifications or restrictions that: "arms and military supplies that belong to the government *must be seized whenever* an opportunity presents itself."

For instance: policemen carry arms that belong to the government. "The opportunity presents itself...."

Third remark. We advise all the numerous fighting groups of our Party to cease their inactivity and undertake a number of guerrilla actions in strict conformity with the decision of the Congress, i.e., without any expropriation of property, with the least possible "disturbance of the personal safety" of peaceful citizens, but with the *utmost* disturbance of the personal safety of spies, *active* members of the Black Hundreds, army, navy and police officers, *and so on*, *and so forth*. As for "arms" and "military supplies that belong to the government", they "must be seized *whenever* an opportunity presents itself".

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A "LABOUR CONGRESS"

The newspaper *Tovarishch* publishes a note saying that Comrade Axelrod is campaigning for a "labour congress".[76] We, too, have information that the Mensheviks are in fact conducting such a campaign. We think that open discussion of such questions is a Party duty. Or is a campaign for an *open* labour congress conducted by the most prominent Mensheviks to be *concealed* from the Party? If Axelrod has no opportunity of setting out his views in print, we can offer him the columns of our newspaper.

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LESSONS OF THE MOSCOW UPRISING

The publication of the book *Moscow in December 1905* (Moscow, 1906) could not have been more timely. It is an urgent task of the workers' party to assimilate the lessons of the December uprising. Unfortunately, this book is like a barrel of honey spoilt by a spoonful of tar: most interesting material—despite its incompleteness—and incredibly slovenly, incredibly trite conclusions. We shall deal with these conclusions on another occasion*; at present we shall turn our attention to the burning political question of the day, to the lessons of the Moscow uprising.

The principal forms of the December movement in Moscow were the peaceful strike and demonstrations, and these were the only forms of struggle in which the vast majority of the workers took an active part. Yet, the December action in Moscow vividly demonstrated that the general strike, as an independent and predominant form of struggle, is out of date, that the movement is breaking out of these narrow bounds with elemental and irresistible force and giving rise to the highest form of struggle—an uprising.

In calling the strike, all the revolutionary parties, all the Moscow unions recognised and even intuitively felt that it must inevitably grow into an uprising. On December 6 the Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolved to "strive to transform the strike into an armed uprising". As a matter of fact, however, none of the organisations were prepared for this. Even the Joint Council of Volunteer Fighting Squads[77] spoke (*on December 9!*) of an uprising as of something remote and it is quite evident that it had no hand in or control of

* See pp. 189-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the street fighting that took place. The organisations *failed to keep pace* with the growth and range of the movement.

The strike was growing into an uprising, primarily as a result of the pressure of the objective conditions created after October. A general strike could no longer take the government unawares: it had already organised the forces of counter-revolution, and they were ready for military action. The whole course of the Russian revolution after October, and the sequence of events in Moscow in the December days, strikingly confirmed one of Marx's profound propositions: revolution progresses by giving rise to a strong and united counter-revolution, i.e., it compels the enemy to resort to more and more extreme measures of defence and in this way devises ever more powerful means of attack.[78]

December 7 and 8: a peaceful strike, peaceful mass demonstrations. Evening of the 8th: the siege of the Aquarium.[79] The morning of the 9th: the crowd in Strastnaya Square is attacked by the dragoons. Evening: the Fiedler building[80] is raided. Temper rises. The unorganised street crowds, quite spontaneously and hesitatingly, set up the first barricades.

The 10th: artillery fire is opened on the barricades and the crowds in the streets. Barricades are set up more deliberately, and no longer in isolated cases, but on a really mass scale. The whole population is in the streets; all the main centres of the city are covered by a network of barricades. For several days the volunteer fighting units wage a stubborn guerrilla battle against the troops, which exhausts the troops and compels Dubasov[81] to beg for reinforcements. Only on December 15 did the superiority of the government forces become complete, and on December 17 the Semyonovsky Regiment[82] crushed Presnya District, the last stronghold of the uprising.

From a strike and demonstrations to isolated barricades. From isolated barricades to the mass erection of barricades and street fighting against the troops. Over the heads of the organisations, the mass proletarian struggle developed from a strike to an uprising. This is the greatest historic gain the Russian revolution achieved in December 1905; and like all preceding gains it was purchased at the price of enormous sacrifices. The movement was raised from a

general political strike to a higher stage. It compelled the reaction to go *to the limit* in its resistance, and so brought vastly nearer the moment when the revolution will also go to the limit in applying the means of attack. The reaction *cannot* go further than the shelling of barricades, buildings and crowds. But the revolution can go very much further than the Moscow volunteer fighting units, it can go very, very much further in breadth and depth. And the revolution has advanced far since December. The base of the revolutionary crisis has become immeasurably broader—the blade must now be sharpened to a keener edge.

The proletariat sensed sooner than its leaders the change in the objective conditions of the struggle and the need for a transition from the strike to an uprising. As is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory. A peaceful strike and demonstrations immediately ceased to satisfy the workers; they asked: What is to be done next? And they demanded more resolute action. The instructions to set up barricades reached the districts exceedingly late, when barricades were already being erected in the centre of the city. The workers set to work in large numbers, but *even this did not satisfy them*; they wanted to know: what is to be done next?—they demanded active measures. In December, we, the leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, were like a commander-in-chief who has deployed his troops in such an absurd way that most of them took no active part in the battle. The masses of the workers demanded, but failed to receive, instructions for resolute mass action.

Thus, nothing could be more short-sighted than Plekhanov's view, seized upon by all the opportunists, that the strike was untimely and should not have been started, and that "they should not have taken to arms". On the contrary, we should have taken to arms more resolutely, energetically and aggressively; we should have explained to the masses that it was impossible to confine things to a peaceful strike and that a fearless and relentless armed fight was necessary. And now we must at last openly and publicly admit that political strikes are inadequate; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talk about

"preliminary stages", or to befog it in any way. We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses the necessity of a desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.

Such is the first lesson of the December events. Another lesson concerns the character of the uprising, the methods by which it is conducted, and the conditions which lead to the troops coming over to the side of the people. An extremely biased view on this latter point prevails in the Right wing of our Party. It is alleged that there is no possibility of fighting modern troops; the troops must become revolutionary. Of course, unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle. That we must work among the troops goes without saying. But we must not imagine that they will come over to our side at one stroke, as a result of persuasion or their own convictions. The Moscow uprising clearly demonstrated how stereotyped and lifeless this view is. As a matter of fact, the wavering of the troops, which is inevitable in every truly popular movement, leads to a real *fight for the troops* whenever the revolutionary struggle becomes acute. The Moscow uprising was precisely an example of the desperate, frantic struggle for the troops that takes place between the reaction and the revolution. Dubasov himself declared that of the fifteen thousand men of the Moscow garrison, only five thousand were reliable. The government restrained the waverers by the most diverse and desperate measures: they appealed to them, flattered them, bribed them, presented them with watches, money, etc.; they doped them with vodka, they lied to them, threatened them, confined them to barracks and disarmed them, and those who were suspected of being least reliable were removed by treachery and violence. And we must have the courage to confess, openly and unreservedly, that in this respect we lagged behind the government. We failed to utilise the forces at our disposal for such an active, bold, resourceful and aggressive fight for the wavering troops as that which the government waged and won. We have carried on work in the army and we will redouble our efforts in the future ideologically to "win over" the troops. But we shall prove to be miserable

pedants if we forget that at a time of uprising there must also be a physical struggle for the troops.

In the December days, the Moscow proletariat taught us magnificent lessons in ideologically "winning over" the troops, as, for example, on December 8 in Strastnaya Square, when the crowd surrounded the Cossacks, mingled and fraternised with them, and persuaded them to turn back. Or on December 10, in Presnya District, when two working girls, carrying a red flag in a crowd of 10,000 people, rushed out to meet the Cossacks crying: "Kill us! We will not surrender the flag alive!" And the Cossacks were disconcerted and galloped away, amidst the shouts from the crowd: "Hurrah for the Cossacks!" These examples of courage and heroism should be impressed forever on the mind of the proletariat.

But here are examples of how we lagged behind Dubasov. On December 9, soldiers were marching down Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street singing the *Marseillaise*, on their way to join the insurgents. The workers sent delegates to meet them. Malakhov himself galloped at breakneck speed towards them. The workers were too late, Malakhov reached them first. He delivered a passionate speech, caused the soldiers to waver, surrounded them with dragoons, marched them off to barracks and locked them in. Malakhov reached the soldiers in time and we did not, although within two days 150,000 people had risen at our call, and these could and should have organised the patrolling of the streets. Malakhov surrounded the soldiers with dragoons, whereas we failed to surround the Malakhovs with bomb-throwers. We could and should have done this; and long ago the Social-Democratic press (the old *Iskra*[83]) pointed out that ruthless extermination of civil and military chiefs was our duty during an uprising. What took place in Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street was apparently repeated in its main features in front of the Nesvizhskiye Barracks and the Krutitskiye Barracks, and also when the workers attempted to "withdraw" the Ekaterinoslav Regiment, and when delegates were sent to the sappers in Alexandrov, and when the Rostov artillery on its way to Moscow was turned back, and when the sappers were disarmed in Kolomna, and so on. During the uprising we proved unequal to our task in the fight for the wavering troops.

The December events confirmed another of Marx's profound propositions, which the opportunists have forgotten, namely, that insurrection is an art and that the principal rule of this art is the waging of a desperately bold and irrevocably determined *offensive*.[84] We have not sufficiently assimilated this truth. We ourselves have not sufficiently learned, nor have we taught the masses, this art, this rule to attack at all costs. We must make up for this omission with all our energy. It is not enough to take sides on the question of political slogans; it is also necessary to take sides on the question of an armed uprising. Those who are opposed to it, those who do not prepare for it, must be ruthlessly dismissed from the ranks of the supporters of the revolution, sent packing to its enemies, to the traitors or cowards; for the day is approaching when the force of events and the conditions of the struggle will compel us to distinguish between enemies and friends according to this principle. It is not passivity that we should preach, not mere "waiting" until the troops "come over". No! We must proclaim from the housetops the need for a bold offensive and armed attack, the necessity at such times of exterminating the persons in command of the enemy, and of a most energetic fight for the wavering troops.

The third great lesson taught by Moscow concerns the tactics and organisation of the forces for an uprising. Military tactics depend on the level of military technique. This plain truth Engels demonstrated and brought home to all Marxists.[85] Military technique today is not what it was in the middle of the nineteenth century. It would be folly to contend against artillery in crowds and defend barricades with revolvers. Kautsky was right when he wrote that it is high time now, after Moscow, to review Engels's conclusions, and that Moscow had inaugurated "*new barricade tactics*".[86] These tactics are the tactics of guerrilla warfare. The organisation required for such tactics is that of mobile and exceedingly small units, units of ten, three or even two persons. We often meet Social-Democrats now who scoff whenever units of five or three are mentioned. But scoffing is only a cheap way of ignoring the *new* question of tactics and organisation raised by street fighting under the conditions imposed by modern military technique. Study carefully the story

of the Moscow uprising, gentlemen, and you will understand what connection exists between "units of five" and the question of "new barricade tactics".

Moscow advanced these tactics, but failed to develop them far enough, to apply them to any considerable extent, to a really mass extent. There were too few volunteer fighting squads, the slogan of bold attack was not issued to the masses of the workers and they did not apply it; the guerrilla detachments were too uniform in character, their arms and methods were inadequate, their ability to lead the crowd was almost undeveloped. We must make up for all this and we shall do so by learning from the experience of Moscow, by spreading this experience among the masses and by stimulating their creative efforts to develop it still further. And the guerrilla warfare and mass terror that have been taking place throughout Russia practically without a break since December, will undoubtedly help the masses to learn the correct tactics of an uprising. Social-Democracy must recognise this mass terror and incorporate it into its tactics, organising and controlling it of course, subordinating it to the interests and conditions of the working-class movement and the general revolutionary struggle, while eliminating and ruthlessly lopping off the "hooligan" perversion of this guerrilla warfare which was so splendidly and ruthlessly dealt with by our Moscow comrades during the uprising and by the Letts during the days of the famous Lettish republics.[87]

There have been new advances in military technique in the very recent period. The Japanese War produced the hand grenade. The small-arms factories have placed automatic rifles on the market. Both these weapons are already being successfully used in the Russian revolution, but to a degree that is far from adequate. We can and must take advantage of improvements in technique, teach the workers' detachments to make bombs in large quantities, help them and our fighting squads to obtain supplies of explosives, fuses and automatic rilles. If the mass of the workers takes part in uprisings in the towns, if mass attacks are launched on the enemy, if a determined and skilful fight is waged for the troops, who after the Duma, after Sveaborg and Kronstadt are wavering more than ever—and if we ensure participation

of the rural areas in the general struggle—victory will be ours in the next all-Russian armed uprising.

Let us, then, develop our work more extensively and set our tasks more boldly, while mastering the lessons of the great days of the Russian revolution. The basis of our work is a correct estimate of class interests and of the requirements of the nation's development at the present juncture. We are rallying, and shall continue to rally, an increasing section of the proletariat, the peasantry and the army under the slogan of overthrowing the tsarist regime and convening a constituent assembly by a revolutionary government. As hitherto, the basis and chief content of our work is to develop the political understanding of the masses. But let us not forget that, in addition to this general, constant and fundamental task, times like the present in Russia impose other, particular and special tasks. Let us not become pedants and philistines, let us not evade these special tasks of the moment, these special tasks of the given forms of struggle, by meaningless references to our permanent duties, which remain unchanged at all times and in all circumstances.

Let us remember that a great mass struggle is approaching. It will be an armed uprising. It must, as far as possible, be simultaneous. The masses must know that they are entering upon an armed, bloody and desperate struggle. Contempt for death must become widespread among them and will ensure victory. The onslaught on the enemy must be pressed with the greatest vigour; attack, not defence, must be the slogan of the masses; the ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task; the organisation of the struggle will become mobile and flexible; the wavering elements among the troops will be drawn into active participation. And in this momentous struggle, the party of the class-conscious proletariat must discharge its duty to the full.

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VACILLATING TACTICS

We have received No. 6 of Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*[88]—twelve small pages published in Geneva. We were agreeably surprised to find that this time, for once, the Russian liberal-bourgeois press refrained from praising Plekhanov. The dissolution of the Duma must have dispelled Comrade Plekhanov's optimism, we thought, when we found the liberal press reporting the appearance of this issue without the usual sympathetic quotations.

Indeed, in No. 6 of his *Dnevnik* Comrade Plekhanov abandons the position of extreme Right-wing Menshevism which he occupied (with Comrade Rakhmetov) at the time of the Duma. He completely dissociates himself from the attempts of the Mensheviks to *weaken* the revolutionary slogan "for a constituent assembly" by adding: "through the Duma", "for the Duma", etc. Plekhanov rightly argues that the only slogan possible is that for convening a constituent assembly, and he justly criticises the Vyborg Manifesto for its omission of this slogan. Plekhanov also completely dissociates himself from the Menshevik aim of connecting "action" with the Duma at all costs, even if it be a partial instead of a general action, even if it be an immediate and unprepared action instead of a later and more mature one. And lastly, this time Plekhanov not only refrains from adapting the slogans of Social-Democracy to those of the Cadets or from identifying the latter with the slogans of bourgeois democracy in general, but, on the contrary, straightforwardly and openly criticises the lukewarmness of the Cadets (small wonder the Cadet newspapers are now silent about Plekhanov!) and draws a very forcible contrast between *them* and the "toiling" peasantry.

This is all very gratifying to us. Only it is a pity that Plekhanov is still evasive and vacillating on a number of tactical points.

Plekhanov justly criticises the authors of the Vyborg Manifesto for "restricting" themselves to an appeal not to pay taxes or furnish recruits for the army, and for striving to keep within the law. They should have said, says Plekhanov, "Prepare, for the time is approaching." They should have issued the slogan of a constituent assembly.

But refusal to pay taxes, etc., is a *means* of waging the struggle. The convocation of a constituent assembly is the immediate *object* of the struggle. In reproaching the Cadets for wanting to restrict themselves only to one means, he should have *pointed* to other means and analysed the conditions under which they can be applied, their significance, etc. To evade this question, as Plekhanov did, with the remark "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof", is wrong. The Social-Democratic Party must guide the proletariat not only in presenting the right slogans, but also in choosing the most effective and expedient *means* of struggle. The Russian revolution has already given us much evidence showing that as the objects of the struggle become wider and as the numbers participating in the struggle increase, there is a corresponding change in the means and methods of struggle, which become more drastic and aggressive. Particularly at a moment like the present, it is our duty not to remain silent on this question, but to make a careful study of various means of struggle, such as: the political strike, the armed uprising, etc. These are burning issues; and the advanced workers are rightly demanding an answer to these questions from us.

Analysing the relation between the interests of the various classes and the demand for a constituent assembly, Plekhanov distinguishes *three* classes. (1) As regards the proletariat, he states that its class interests entirely coincide with the interests of the nation as a whole. (2) As regards the "toiling peasantry", he notes the possibility that, under certain circumstances, their interests might diverge from those of the nation as a whole; but he emphasises that "their class interests" demand the convocation of a constituent assembly. (3) As regards "those strata which are represented by the

Constitutional-Democratic Party", Plekhanov admits that their "class interests" will make them mistrustful of the convocation of a constituent assembly; that this will prove that they are "reconciled" to the actions of Stolypin & Co., that they are afraid of losing the big landed estates without compensation, etc. And Plekhanov states that he "does not propose to prophesy" whether among the Cadets class interests will outweigh the interests of the nation, or vice versa.

Prophecies refer to the future, but the repudiation of the constituent assembly slogan and of the revolutionary struggle for it by the Cadets is a fact of the present. To hush it up is not only futile but harmful. But if it is not hushed up, then obviously it should be admitted that: "The proletariat *together with* the politically conscious toiling peasantry *are opposed* to the unreliable and vacillating Cadets." Plekhanov has now come very close to this tactical line, which logically follows from his present formulation of the question.

He writes: "All the parties which are taking part in this movement [the struggle for a constituent assembly] should immediately come to an agreement for mutual assistance." Quite right! Which parties are these? Those to the *Left* of the Cadets, and which should be called the parties of the *revolutionary* bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democrats (for the constituent assembly slogan is a *revolutionary* slogan, in contrast to the oppositional and "*loyal*" slogan of the Cadets: "A new Duma as soon as possible"). Thus, *a fighting agreement between the party of the proletariat and the parties of the revolutionary democrats*.

That is just what we have always insisted on. It only remains for us to express the wish that Plekhanov will henceforth consistently carry out this policy. And carrying it out *consistently* means making this fighting agreement *conditional* not only on the recognition of the *revolutionary*-democratic slogan (a constituent assembly), but also on the recognition of the revolutionary means of struggle for which our movement has already matured, and which it will inevitably have to apply to fighting for a constituent assembly, in other words, the recognition of a *people's uprising*. Further, to make the constituent assembly slogan really clear and not merely to repeat it, we must raise the question of a

provisional revolutionary government. By failing to raise this question Plekhanov fails to delimit properly the interests of the "toiling" peasantry and the class interests of "those strata which are represented by the Cadet Party". By failing to raise this question Plekhanov leaves a yawning gap in our propaganda and agitation, for every agitator will be asked: Who, in the opinion of the workers' party, is to convene the constituent assembly?

As we have already stated, Plekhanov quite groundlessly evades the question of an uprising as well as the question of the means of struggle in general. He writes: "At the present time an uprising could only be an outbreak of popular indignation, only a riot, which would easily be suppressed by the authorities; but what we want is not riots or outbreaks; we want a victorious revolution."

This is just as if Nogi, in August 1905, had said: "What we want is *not* an attack on Port Arthur, *but* the capture of Port Arthur." Untimely attacks may be contrasted to timely attacks, ill-prepared to well-prepared attacks; but attacks in general cannot be contrasted to "capturing" a fortress. That would be a mistake. It would be an evasion of the question of the means of capturing the fortress. And it is precisely this mistake Comrade Plekhanov makes.

Either he is not saying all he thinks, or he himself is not clear about the question.

The difference between a demonstration strike and a strike for an uprising is clear. The difference between "partial mass expressions of protest" and a general, all-Russian action is clear. So is the difference between partial and local risings and a general, all-Russian uprising, supported by *all* the revolutionary parties and elements. If you call demonstrations, partial protests, partial risings—"outbreaks", people will understand what you mean, and your protests against "*putsches*" will be perfectly justified.

But to say: "we want *not* outbreaks, *but* a victorious revolution", means to say nothing. Even worse, it is a platitude made to sound significant. It is a resounding but meaningless phrase intended to *befuddle* the reader. It would be very difficult to find two sane revolutionaries who would *not agree* that we want "not outbreaks, but a victorious revolution". But neither would it be very easy to find two sane

revolutionaries who would *agree* as to *what particular* means of struggle at what particular *moment* would be, not an "outbreak", but a real *step towards* a victorious revolution. Plekhanov does not make much progress by looking wise and repeating things which nobody has any doubt about and evading the really difficult part of the problem.

In conclusion, we must add that Plekhanov naturally has a passing "thrust" at the Bolsheviks: they are "Blanquists", because they boycott the Duma, and "frivolous", because, he alleges, they were unaware (until enlightened by Comrade Plekhanov in No. 6 of his *Dnevnik*) that it was necessary to increase activities among the troops. We think it sufficient just to mention these thrusts; they are not worth answering. If Comrade Plekhanov imagines that by his *present* tactics he is strengthening the Menshevik wing in our Party and weakening the Bolsheviks, we have no objection to leaving him in this state of blissful delusion.

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THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AND THE COMING STRUGGLE

About eighteen months ago one of the humorous periodicals published by the German Social-Democrats contained a cartoon strip of Nicholas II. The tsar was depicted in military uniform and laughing. He was teasing a shaggy peasant with a crust of bread, now putting it almost into his mouth, now snatching it away. The face of the shaggy peasant now shone with a smile of satisfaction, now frowned with vexation as the bread was snatched away just as he snapped at it. The lettering on this crust of bread was "constitution". The last "scene" however, shows that the peasant, after a desperate effort to bite off a morsel of bread, had bitten off the head of Nicholas Romanov.

This was a very apt cartoon. For some years, in fact, the autocracy has been "teasing" the Russian people with a constitution, a constitution that was just on the point of being "almost completely" granted, only to be withdrawn and replaced the next moment by the same old tyranny, the same police system of abuses and iniquities in a much worse form. How long is it since we had almost the most democratic "parliament" in the world? How long is it since the whole press was discussing the question of a Cadet Cabinet as an immediate and real possibility? It is hard to believe that this was only two or three months ago. A couple of ukases, manifestoes and ordinances, and the old autocracy is again reigning supreme, the gang of universally condemned, discredited and publicly execrated embezzlers, hangmen and pogrom-mongers are hard at it again, heaping indignities upon the people, wrecking, robbing, beating, gagging, poisoning the air with the unbearable stench of serfdom.

From the standpoint of the development of the revolutionary struggle of the people, these rapid changes from short "days of freedom" to long months of rabid reaction are due to the equilibrium which has set in between the conflicting forces since last autumn. The autocracy is *no longer* strong enough to rule the people, the people are *not yet* strong enough to shake off this pogrom-mongering government. So the two conflicting forces stand facing each other like rival armies, now resting from the struggle for a time in order to recuperate, now hurling themselves anew into the battle against the hated enemy.

The publicists of the Cadet press and the *Novoye Vremya* press[89] are essentially alike in their *moralising* estimate of these vacillations. Both condemn and deplore the vacillation, indecision and wavering of the government, and exhort it to be "firm"—one lot demanding firmness in repression, the other demanding firmness in establishing the promised constitution. None of them has any conception of the class struggle that is changing the actual alignment of social forces.

As this struggle develops, class-consciousness and solidarity will inevitably grow in the ranks of the revolution and in the ranks of reaction, and sharper and more ruthless forms of struggle will inevitably be adopted. Nothing could be more effective than these rapid transitions from "days of freedom" to "months of shooting" in diminishing the ranks of the passive and indifferent, in drawing new strata and elements into the struggle, in developing the class-consciousness of the masses by throwing into vivid relief first one and then another aspect of the autocracy through the various experiments which have been made throughout Russia. The quicker and the sharper these transitions occur, the sooner will matters come to a head owing to the inevitable preponderance of the social forces on the side of freedom.

The class-conscious workers can therefore view quite unperturbed the astoundingly rapid "progress" of the autocracy on the path of repression. Keep it up, Messrs. Romanov, Trepov, Ignatyev and Stolypin! The more zealously you keep to that path, the sooner will you exhaust your last reserves. Do you threaten us with a military dictatorship, to put the whole of Russia under martial law? But it

is certainly the revolution that stands to gain most of all from such martial law. A military dictatorship and martial law will necessitate the mobilisation of increasing masses of troops, but the repeated mobilisations of the most "reliable" troops—the Cossacks—have already caused greatly increased discontent in the ruined Cossack villages and have increased the "unreliability" of these troops. Martial law costs money, and the autocracy's finances are already in a desperate condition. Martial law leads to increased agitation among the soldiers and teaches the population to be undaunted even by the most "frightful" forms of repression; Poland and the Baltic Provinces are eloquent proof of this.

We said that the reaction is "threatening" us with a military dictatorship. This, strictly speaking, is incorrect, for now, after the introduction of military courts[90] in nearly all the provinces, including the "border regions", i.e., in 82 out of the 87 provinces in the Empire, it is ridiculous to speak of a military dictatorship as a matter of the future. It is already present, and a change in name, the use of a more "frightful" word ("dictatorship" instead of "special emergency measures"), the appointment of a single dictator *cannot* add one jot to the system of wholesale arrests, deportations without trial, punitive expeditions, searching people in the street and shooting by order of army officers. A military and police dictatorship already reigns in Russia. These measures of repression have gone so far that revolutionaries who have been accustomed to such "treatment" ever since the days of Plehve, suffer from them relatively little; the brunt of them falls on the "peaceful" population, whom the Stolypins are agitating with most commendable success.

The measures of repression carried out in the winter followed a real revolutionary uprising with which the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie had no sympathy, and yet it was these measures that produced an all-opposition Duma from which the revolutionary elements benefited most. The measures of repression in the autumn follow upon a phase of legal "constitutionalism". It cannot be that they will result *only* in a more radical Duma.

The gang of pogrom-mongers feels that repression is futile and is desperately looking for support. On the one hand, the attempts to come to terms with the Octobrists

have failed; on the other, Pobedonostsev & Co. are preparing to make a clean sweep of all "constitutions". On the one hand, the universities are being re-opened and the venal press is clamouring for a strong liberal policy. On the other hand, even the congress of the Cadet Party is prohibited (how Stolypin & Co. are helping those Cadets!), and the press is being persecuted worse than under Durnovo. On the one hand—military courts; on the other—a broadly conceived attempt to come to terms with the rural bourgeoisie.[91]

The government feels that its only salvation lies in strengthening the rural, muzhik bourgeoisie in the village communes as a bulwark against the mass of the peasantry. But instead of approaching this objective with considered and cautious steps, as Guchkov & Co. would have done, instead of stealing up to it in a skilful and subtle way, as the Cadets are doing, the police Derzhimordas[92] go about it so crudely, stupidly and clumsily that it is more than probable that their whole "campaign" will end in a fiasco. The peasant bourgeois element is numerically weak, but economically it is very strong in the countryside. Provision of land from landlords, as well as other land, by redemption payments in accordance with the Cadet agrarian reform would have given some slight satisfaction to the *whole* of the peasantry and would have admirably achieved the aim towards which the autocracy is "pushing forward" clumsily, namely: it would have enormously strengthened the peasant bourgeoisie and made it a bulwark of "order".

The Romanovs, Trepovs, Ignatyevs and Stolypins, however, are too dense to see this. In the Duma they brusquely refused to give land to the peasants and now they are putting up crown and state lands *for sale* through the officials. Whether this will actually induce the influential sections of the rural bourgeoisie to take the side of the *present* government is a big question, for the pack of officials will procrastinate, rob and take bribes as the Romanovs and their gang have always done. That the masses of the peasantry will get "heated up" more than ever when they hear about the sale of crown and state lands is beyond doubt. In very many cases these sales will mean that the peasants will have to pay *more*, for rent will be converted into redemption payments. And to compel the peasants to pay more for their

land is the best thing the government could think of doing to facilitate our agitation against the government. It is an excellent way to exasperate the peasants more than ever and to swing them over to *our* slogan: absolute refusal to make *any* payments for the land, the *whole* of which must go to the peasants after the victory of the revolution.

The government's ineptitude in its flirtation with the peasant bourgeoisie is due partly to the stupidity characteristic of every police government, and partly to extreme shortage of funds. The finances are in a very bad way. Bankruptcy threatens. Foreign countries are refusing to lend money. The internal loan is not being taken up. It has to be forcibly and *secretly* raised from the capital of the savings-banks, *secretly* because the savings-banks depositors would be least of all disposed to buy government bonds now. The autocracy's lackeys are beginning to sense the inevitability of the collapse of the gold currency and of unlimited issue of paper currency.

Keep it up, Stolypin & Co.! You are doing good work for us! You are rousing the population better than we ourselves could do it. You have gone to the limit with your measures of repression, thus demonstrating to all that the militant, revolutionary onslaught, too, must go to the limit.

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HANDS OFF!

The book *Moscow in December 1905* deals with events of tremendous importance in the history of the Russian revolution. As regards the positive conclusions to be drawn from the Moscow uprising, we gave them in general outline in our last issue.* Here we shall dwell on those aspects of this important, but badly executed, piece of work which have special reference to the Social-Democrats in Moscow.

The "compilers" of this book state in their preface that they used material supplied by Social-Democratic organisations, which, however, "as such have no connection with this work". It goes without saying that it is extremely irregular for Social-Democratic organisations to supply such information to persons who are not responsible to these organisations. The organisations of the workers' party have now undoubtedly been put in an awkward position by the slovenly treatment of their materials and by the choice assortment of banalities with which these have been "ornamented". *All* the Moscow Social-Democratic organisations, and primarily, of course, their leading body—the Moscow Committee—must, in our opinion, consider this matter and take measures to prevent a recurrence of such irregularities.

Here is one of the many instances of how the anonymous authors of the book "treat" the material supplied to them by the Social-Democratic organisations. The authors deal with the role of the revolutionary organisations in the Moscow events, and, in particular, with the Manifesto of the Combat Organisation of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published on De-

* See pp. 171-78 of this volume.—*Ed.*

cember 11, in No. 5 of *Izvestia Sovetov Rabochikh Deputatov*.[93] Without giving any coherent account of the contents and character of this document, the authors give rein to their profundity by the following criticism. They quote No. 5: "The fighting is at its height. For many hours a number of sanguinary battles were fought in the streets of Moscow between the people in revolt and the tsar's troops", and they "criticise" as follows: "We know that there were only minor skirmishes between troops and a few fighting squads in the streets of Moscow." And with mock passion they cry out against this "substitution [*sic*!] of the action of handfuls of armed men for mass struggle", and exclaim: "Where did the masses come in, how could they display activity?" etc., etc.

What is this?? Can these efforts to appear profound by such methods of "criticism" be called a scientific analysis?? Just think: in a serious historical work, in a special chapter devoted to the part played by the revolutionary organisations, the authors try to find fault with the fact that on December ***11***, i.e., a few days *before* the crisis, when *new* methods of struggle were just beginning to be applied, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies dared to speak of "a people in revolt"! Perhaps it should have spoken of "a few fighting squads" in a profoundly condescending tone and not have called on the people and the masses to assist in the fight that was beginning? What term but cheap can we apply to these doctrinaire efforts to be "clever", these verbal quibbles, when you find these very same "compilers" in *a number* of passages in their book referring to the people as a whole, the "whole population" turning out on the streets? Do try to understand, you pitiful creatures, that to be a member of a revolutionary organisation in Moscow on December 11, and yet *not to speak* of the people in revolt could only mean that the one who kept silent was a member of the Black Hundreds or a soulless pedant like Pollack in Leonid Andreyev's *To the Stars*.[94]

Let us proceed. As regards the Manifesto issued by the Combat Organisation and published in the same issue of *Izvestia* (No. 5), the compilers say with a sneer: "Squads of three or four persons, in the opinion of the authors of the manifesto, were to present [!] the people with a capital

city freed from centuries of oppression." "The Combat Organisation decided that there was no need for the masses to act."

Let us turn to the Manifesto. The compilers of this book do *not* print it *in full*; they only give excerpts from it. But even in the excerpts chosen by these "investigators" we read a *direct* call of the Combat Organisation: "*Organise as many of these squads as possible.*" Thus, the idea of "presenting" something to the people, the idea that "there was *no need* for the masses to act", is imputed to those who from the very first day of the armed struggle called upon "as many workers as possible" to join the fighting squads....

What is this? Literary slovenliness or hack literature?

The authors make no attempt whatever to analyse the connection between military organisation and military technique, the functions and interrelation of the direct armed fight and the auxiliary struggle. They shut their eyes to the past, they forget that both general strikes and demonstrations in Russia began with a very small, even insignificant number of participants, judged by present-day standards. Of a serious historical approach there is not a hint—nothing but truly nauseating attacks. The Manifesto of the Combat Organisation is quoted on page 145 in fragments, in order to distort its meaning; only further on (page 154) is it mentioned in passing that the Manifesto contains an instruction to "spare the lives of infantrymen", i.e., *directly reckons* with the psychology of the masses, making a clear distinction between Black-Hundred troops and wavering troops. But the Manifesto of the Octobrists, which had no bearing whatever on the study of the Moscow uprising, is printed *in full*!

Social-Democratic organisations have entrusted information to persons who print the Manifesto of the Octobrists in full, yet tear fragments out of the manifestoes of the Combat Organisation of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies for banal exercises in commonplace witticisms....

Let us pass on to the conclusions drawn by the compilers: "The proletariat, as a mass, did not go into action" (p. 245). "The Moscow proletariat did not go into action either on December 9-10 ... or on the following days. This does credit to its intelligence and discipline" (p. 244).

Do you hear, comrade workers: it is suggested that it is to your "credit" that the masses did not fight enough!! The fact that the masses of the workers took an inadequate part in the active, aggressive struggle is, if you please, a point in their favour. And the fact that the masses of the workers forged ahead of their leaders and proceeded to build barricades on a large scale, that they were constantly pressing their leaders to call for more drastic action, must no doubt be held against them....

"The events in Moscow," say the compilers, "prove that in the present historical period, in which militarism has been developed to an enormous degree, a necessary condition for the victory of the people in revolt is that a considerable part of the army should actively go over to the side of the insurgent population, or that the masses of the soldiers should categorically refuse to use arms against the people...."

Our wiseacres failed to understand or even to notice the struggle that went on to win over the vacillating troops. Evidently they think that an uprising is possible without having to fight the Black-Hundred section of the troops, without an active struggle on the part of the revolutionary people, which throws the ranks of the army into confusion. They have adopted the standpoint of the Cadets, who are ready to welcome the "going over" of the troops, but who declare that an armed uprising or propaganda for it is "criminal folly"....

... "But such action on the part of the troops is conceivable only towards the end [*sic*!] of a revolution, which moreover must involve the whole of the people. The December uprising of the proletariat, which enjoyed only the passive [?] sympathy of the mass of the bourgeois population, *its actions in pursuit of its own slogans* [our italics], could not [!] find support in the army, and therefore the 'attempt to convert the general strike into an armed uprising' could not be crowned with success and must be regarded as a historical blunder."

Let this be a lesson to you, workers of Moscow! Don't fight for "your own slogans"!...

It is hard to imagine how people could sink to such depths of pedantry, to such Cadet-like poverty of thought, to drawing such banal conclusions from serious historical material.

Let the Moscow Social-Democrats express their indignation to the authors of this book and call on all Party members and revolutionaries to collect materials for a worthy account and serious criticism of the December uprising. Let all its mistakes and shortcomings be ruthlessly exposed for the instruction of the fighting proletariat. But to the Cadets and the literary hacks the party of the proletariat must say, "Hands off!"

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THE GUERRILLA ACTION OF THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY[95]

Our Unity Congress undoubtedly rejected all "expropriations", so that on this score the Polish Socialist Party's references to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party are quite irrelevant. Nor is there any doubt that in organising the "action" of August 2 (15) the Polish Socialist Party failed to consider either its expediency, the temper of the masses, or the conditions of the working-class movement. Obviously, all these factors must be taken into account, and this is emphasised in a special paragraph of the Bolshevik draft resolution on guerrilla actions. In our opinion, however, it is the Polish Socialist Party's *distortion* of guerrilla tactics that deserves condemnation, not these "tactics" as such. Our Polish Social-Democratic comrades would certainly have approved of such guerrilla action as the wrecking of the Black-Hundred "Tver" inn[96] by the St. Petersburg workers last year.

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UNION OF THE BUND WITH THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

The Seventh Congress of the Bund, the organisation of the Jewish Social-Democratic workers of Russia, has recently taken place. According to the reports of this Congress, the total number of members of the Bund amounts to 33,000 in 257 organisations. Representation at the Congress was organised on a democratic basis, with one delegate for each 300 members of the Party. About 23,000 members took part in the elections and they sent to the Congress 68 delegates with the right to speak and vote.

The chief question that the Congress had to decide was that of the union of the Bund with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As is known, the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. pronounced in favour of unification and laid down the conditions for it. The Seventh Congress of the Bund has now accepted these conditions. Union with the R.S.D.L.P. was adopted by 48 votes against 20. Thus, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has at last become a truly all-Russian and united organisation. The membership of our Party is now *over 100,000*: 31,000 were represented at the Unity Congress, and then there are about 26,000 Polish Social-Democrats, about 14,000 Lettish and 33,000 Jewish Social-Democrats.

Representatives of the Central Committee of the Bund joined the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The rather difficult work of unifying the local organisations of the Bund and those of the R.S.D.L.P. now lies ahead.

The second question discussed at the Bund Congress was that of the present political situation. In a detailed resolu-

tion, adopted by a large majority of votes, the Seventh Congress of the Bund accepted *the convocation of a constituent assembly* as a tactical slogan, and rejected all reservations tending to weaken this slogan, such as "through the, Duma", etc. Boycott of the Duma was rejected conditionally, that is to say, the necessity of taking part in the elections was recognised provided that the party of the proletariat was in a position to carry out an independent election campaign.

The third question was that of "guerrilla actions", without any division of them into "expropriations" and terrorist acts. By an overwhelming majority, a resolution *against* guerrilla actions was adopted.

The last question concerned the organisation of the Bund. Organisational rules were adopted.

We limit ourselves to this short note for the time being; we hope in the near future to acquaint our readers more fully with the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Bund.

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SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY MENSHEVIKS

As early as the beginning of 1905 the Social-Democrats pointed out that the draft programme of the S.-R. (Socialist-Revolutionary) Party marked a definite turn "from Narodism[97] to Marxism".* It was obvious that the party making this turn was bound to undergo internal disintegration.

The ideological and political disintegration of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party is now a fact. The *Minutes of the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*, published in book form in Paris this year, clearly indicate all the lines of this disintegration. The current political literature of the "Maximalists" and of the representatives of the nascent "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party" has conclusively revealed the full extent of this disintegration.

The two big splits which occurred in the ranks of Social-Democracy—the split between the "Economists"[98] and the old Iskrists in 1900-03, and the split between the "Mensheviks" and "Bolsheviks" in 1903-06—were the result of an acute struggle between two trends characteristic of the whole international socialist movement, viz., the opportunist trend and the revolutionary trend, in their peculiar forms corresponding to particular stages of the Russian revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party, however, at the very first attempt at anything like a public statement testifying to its having a real party character, split up into *three trends*: (1) the Left—the "Maximalists"; (2) the Centre—the S-R.'s of the old type; and (3) the Right—the opportunists (otherwise called "Legalists", "Toilers' Popular Socialists", etc.) with whom we shall deal in the present article. The

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* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 83-89.—*Ed.*

contours of all three trends can be clearly seen from the *Minutes of the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*. We have now a vivid literary expression of the trends which have broken away (or are breaking away?) from the "Centre". The Maximalists have published *Straight to the Goal* and a detailed programmatic pamphlet by Mr. Tag—in,[99] entitled: *Principles of Labour Theory*. The opportunist Socialist-Revolutionaries have expressed their views, carried almost to their logical conclusion, in the writings of Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. Mr. Chernov, the representative of the "Centre", was quite right in his article in *Mysl* (or maybe *Golos*, *Dyelo Naroda*,[100] etc.) in calling the Maximalists "vulgar socialists", but, if we are not mistaken, he has said nothing in the press so far about the opportunist Socialist-Revolutionaries. The concubinage of the Socialist-Revolutionary "marsh" and the Socialist-Revolutionary "extreme Right" in these newspapers was not without effect.

The division of the supporters of the "labour principle", the admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, into three trends is an important political event in the history of Russian petty-bourgeois radicalism. Marxists must pay full attention to this event, for it throws a sidelight on the trend of the maturing political thought of the awakening Russian peasantry.

The main contradiction in the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is their oscillation between Narodism and Marxism. Marxism demands that a clear distinction be made between the maximum programme and the minimum programme. The maximum programme is the socialist transformation of society, which is *impossible* without the abolition of commodity production. The minimum programme proposes reforms that are possible even within the limits of commodity production. Confusion of the two inevitably leads to all sorts of petty-bourgeois and opportunist, or anarchist, perversions of proletarian socialism and inevitably *obscures* the objects of the social revolution to be achieved through the conquest of political power by the proletariat.

From the standpoint of the old Russian Narodism, of the principles of Lavrov, V. V., Mikhailovsky & Co., the distinction between the maximum programme and the minimum programme is superfluous and incomprehensible, for

the theory of Narodism denies that the laws and categories of commodity production can be applied to Russian peasant economy. The more or less consistent disciples of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky (as well as of V. V. and Nikolai—on[101] who are undeservedly forgotten, for present-day Narodniks *have no other* source of *economic* ideas) were inevitably bound to be *hostile* to this Marxist division of the programme into a maximum and a minimum. And the very first attempt of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to transform their circles into a party revealed the strength and trend of this hostility. The supporters of the revolutionary trends in Narodism asked: Why demand only the socialisation of the land? We demand the socialisation of the mills and factories too! Down with the minimum programme! We are Maximalists! Down with the theory of commodity production!

Actually, this Maximalist trend almost coincides with anarchism, as one would expect.

The supporters of the opportunist trends in Narodism, the Narodniks of the eighties, raised another cry: What earthly use is a maximum programme, or proletarian dictatorship? Socialism is a remote prospect! Why frighten the masses away with a name like "Socialist-Revolutionaries"? Why demand a "republic"? What's the use of an illegal party? Down with the whole lot! Down with the maximum programme! Down with the "dangerous" clauses of the minimum programme! Instead of a programme, let us have a "platform" of an open, legal, non-republican "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party"!*

Against either of these tendencies the S.-R. Centrists, the old members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, have *no other* defence than to invoke the laws of commodity production and *virtually* to adopt the standpoint of Marxism. The accusations levelled at the S.-R. Centre by the Right and the Left at the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, namely that the S.-R. Centre was Marxist, that it wanted to compete with the Social-Democrats, to start out from Social-Democratic principles, were therefore

* See particularly Mr. Peshekhonov's articles in the July and August issues of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*,[102] and also newspaper reports on the formation of the "Toilers' Popular Socialist Party", and on the meetings of its organising committee, or St. Petersburg Committee, etc.

quite justified. This Centre's transition to Social-Democracy is now simply a matter of time. And the sooner the revolutionary parties can exist quite openly, the sooner that time will come. No prejudices against Marxist "dogmatism" can withstand the inexorable logic of events.

The brief existence of the Cadet Duma coincided with the first appearance of representatives of the peasant masses in the general Russian political arena. It was inevitable that the Socialist-Revolutionaries should seek an understanding with these representatives and try to organise them politically on the-basis of *their* Socialist-Revolutionary programme. It turned out that the Social-Democrats had, in a comparatively short time, formed a Social-Democratic *Party* Group in the Duma. The S.-R.'s, on the other hand, were never able to act except behind the backs of the Trudoviks. In political solidarity the small producer at once proved to be far inferior to the working class. Moreover, even behind the backs of the Trudoviks the Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to carry through a *united* political campaign. On the land question, which is the basic question for the peasantry, the split between the opportunists and the Centrist S.-R.'s was soon revealed. In the arena of "parliamentary" action, the former gained the victory among the representatives of the masses: they rallied 104 Trudoviks for the opportunist Land Bill,[103] whereas only 33 Trudoviks (out of the same 104) subsequently supported the Land Bill that corresponded to the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

This split, which occurred in an open political action in the sight of the whole people, inevitably led to the systematisation of the disagreements which had caused it. Mr. Peshekhonov, one of the leaders of the S.-R. opportunists, went further than anyone else in this systematisation. Here are his views, his "outlines and scope of the platform"... of the peasant Cadets:

"The revolutionary demands must conform to and be commensurate with the revolutionary forces" (p. 194, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, No. 8). Therefore "the line of land and liberty" must not be "carried too far". Instead of the maximum and minimum programme of "the two socialist parties, the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries", the petty

bourgeois needs a united "*platform*" to serve as "a plan of campaign, not for a long period (right until socialism), but only for the immediate future". The rest of the road to the final goal is a "*remote prospect*" (p. 196). Therefore, the *republic must be deleted* from this "platform": "We must reckon with the psychological factor.... The monarchist idea is too deeply rooted in the popular mind.... A thousand years have not passed in vain.... This psychology of the broad masses must be reckoned with.... The question of the republic calls for extreme caution" (198). The same with the national question. "Here, too, we must reckon with the psychology of the people, formed by its thousand years' history".... "Therefore, we deem it necessary to go to the masses, not with the slogan of independence for nationalities [and not their self-determination—adds the author elsewhere], but with the demand that arises in actual life, namely, the demand for their autonomy." In short, Mr. Peshekhonov bluntly puts the question: "Can we win complete freedom?" And he bluntly answers: "*No*."

Next he puts the question: "Can we take the whole of the land?" And he also answers: "*No*." Caution, caution, caution, gentlemen! The peasant deputies in the Duma said to Mr. Peshekhonov: "We were sent here to get land, not to give it up." At present the peasants want neither the socialisation (equal division) nor the nationalisation of the land. They are afraid of both. They only want *additional* land. "It would therefore be more expedient not to push the 'land' line to its logical conclusion in the platform" (p. 206.). "I think it is even dangerous at the present time to raise the question of general equalisation" (p. 205). "Allotment land and privately-owned land not exceeding the labour norm must be left in the possession of the present owners" in conformity with the Land Bill introduced by the 104, and the transfer of the whole land to the nation must be postponed—also, evidently, as a "remote prospect".

Caution, moderation and scrupulousness must be exercised in choosing the means of struggle as well as the method of organisation. An armed uprising? "I [Peshekhonov] tirelessly pray: May this bitter cup pass us by! ... It would be only too deplorable if anyone were to regard an uprising not as an unfortunate possibility, but as a fatal necessity....

It is dangerous ... to make use of it carelessly ... the whole movement might come to grief" (No. 7, pp. 177-78). The main task of the moment is to organise "the forces of the people". "I scarcely believe that this task can be carried out at all satisfactorily by our two existing socialist parties. It is time to realise that a secret organisation cannot embrace the masses. The Cadet Party has also declared itself bankrupt in this matter. Evidently, this must be undertaken by someone else, and for this purpose, I believe, we need a legal socialist party." (No. 7, pp. 179-80.)

As the reader will see, it cannot be denied that Mr. Peshekhonov's views are consistent, harmonious and rounded off. This champion of the monarchy, this political trickster, who justifies the knout on the grounds that it has a thousand years of history behind it, has not left much of the official programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. And if the "real" S.-R.'s* could all through the Duma period cleverly conceal *such* differences of opinion, if in order to conceal them they could even collaborate on the same newspapers, it only proves how far *political hypocrisy* can go.

What is the socio-economic class basis of S.-R. opportunism? The fact that Peshekhonov & Co. *are trying to adapt themselves to the interests of the thrifty muzhik*, are adulterating socialism to suit his interests.

Take the main question, the land. Mr. Peshekhonov twice repeats with relish the words of the peasant-Trudoviks which pleased him so immensely: "We were sent here to get land, not to give it up." Indeed, those words are very significant. But they utterly refute the petty-bourgeois illusions of Narodism, and confirm all the propositions of the Marxists. These words clearly prove that the proprietary instincts of the average muzhik are *already awakening*. And only those who are absolutely ignorant of political economy and West-European history can be unaware of the fact that the more political liberty and democracy extends, the stronger these instincts grow and develop.

What conclusion should a person to whom socialism is not just an empty phrase have drawn from the words of this shrewd, thrifty muzhik, chosen by the "masses"? Obviously,

* In spite of all their grandiloquent revolutionary phrases.

the conclusion that such a class of small proprietors *cannot* be the vehicle for socialism; that socialists can and must support the small proprietor class in its struggle against the landlords *solely* because this struggle has a bourgeois-democratic significance and can have bourgeois-democratic results; that it is the *duty* of a socialist not to obscure but to *expose* the antagonism of interests between the working masses as a whole and these small proprietors, who want to strengthen and consolidate *their own* economic position, and who will be hostile to any idea of "giving up" the land or anything else to the mass of the propertyless and destitute. "We want to get land, not give it up!" Can anything better express petty-bourgeois proprietary instincts and aspirations?

From this a Social-Democrat draws the following conclusion: we must support these small proprietors in their struggle against the landlords and the autocracy because of the revolutionary bourgeois-democratic character of this struggle. If they win, the conditions of the whole people will be improved, but this will be an improvement and development of the *capitalist* system. Therefore, we must not pander to the proprietary *or owning* instincts of this class, but, on the contrary, *at once* begin to combat these instincts and explain their significance to the proletariat, warning the proletariat and organising it in an independent party. Our agrarian programme is: to help the small proprietors to cast off the serf-owners by revolutionary means; to point out to them the conditions for achieving nationalisation of the land as the best agrarian system that is possible under capitalism, and to lay bare the great difference between the interests of the proletarian and those of the small proprietor.

The small shopkeeper's socialism involves a different conclusion: we must "reckon" with the psychology of the "masses" (the masses of small proprietors, not the propertyless masses); we must bow servilely to the proprietor's desire to "get" something from the landlord, but not to "give up" anything to the proletarian; to please the small proprietor we must relegate socialism to the dim "remote future"; we must *recognise* the desire of the petty proprietor to *consolidate* his own economic position—in short, we must

describe as "socialism" subservience to the narrow egotism of the small proprietors and truckling to their prejudices.

Monarchist sentiments are a prejudice. Perhaps you think that it is the duty of socialists to combat prejudices? You are mistaken; "toilers' socialism" must adapt itself to prejudices.

Perhaps you think that the antiquity and "stability" (??) of the monarchist prejudice call for a specially ruthless struggle against it? You are mistaken. "Toilers' socialism" deduces from the antiquity of the knout merely that it must be treated with "extreme caution".

True, Mr. Peshekhonov, in fighting—or pretending to fight—the Cadets, repeats all the Cadet arguments in favour of the monarchy. Well, what harm is there in that? Do you still not know that a bourgeois radical fights a bourgeois liberal *only* for the purpose of taking his place and not for the purpose of replacing his programme by a substantially different programme? Have you forgotten the history of the French type of Trudovik socialists, that is, the radical socialists, who "fought" the French Cadets, only to act in exactly the same way as the latter when they themselves became Cabinet Ministers? Do you not see that there is no more difference between Mr. Peshekhonov and Mr. Struve than there is between Bobchinsky and Dobchinsky?[104]

Mr. Peshekhonov guesses, perhaps, that there is some *material* connection between the desire "to get land, *not to give it up*", and the *monarchy*. In order "not to give it up" you must *protect* it. And the monarchy is nothing but the hired police protection of those who do not want "to give up" against those who are *capable* of taking.* The Cadets need a monarchy to protect the big bourgeoisie. The "Trudovik socialists" need a monarchy to protect the thrifty muzhiks.

It is obvious that this outlook of the "Trudovik socialists" inevitably leads to a pedantic and trite attitude to an uprising ("an unfortunate possibility"; compare this with Mr.

* Another instrument for the police protection of proprietors is called the *standing army*. Peshekhonov writes: "The democratic republic implies ... *perhaps*, the substitution of the armed nation for the standing army" (No. 8 p. 197). Please, gentlemen admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, will you *candidly* explain what this magnificent "perhaps" means?

Struve's articles in *Osvobozhdeniye*, in the summer of 1905 about the "mad and criminal advocacy of an uprising"). Hence, the lofty contempt for "secret organisations" and the yearnings, *in August 1906*, for a "*legal socialist* party". To the objective historical conditions which make an uprising *inevitable*, which compel the ignorant masses, in spite of all their prejudices, to wage a struggle precisely against the monarchy in defence of their own vital interests, and which convert all Manilov yearnings for "a legal socialist party" into grist for the mill of Ushakov[105] & Co.—to these objective conditions Peshekhonov & Co. do not give a thought. The admirers of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky are obliged to reckon with the psychology of the downtrodden masses and not with the objective conditions which are *transforming* the psychology of the *militant* masses.

To sum up. We know now what it means to be a Toilers' Popular Socialist. "Toilers"' means pandering to the interests of small proprietors who want "to get, but not to give up". "Popular" means pandering to the monarchist prejudices of the people, to the chauvinistic fear lest certain nationalities should secede from Russia. "Socialist" means declaring socialism to be a remote prospect and replacing what political tricksters consider a narrow, doctrinaire and irksome programme by a wide, free, flexible, mobile, light, thinly-clad and even stark-naked "platform". Long live the "Toilers' Popular Socialists"!

Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. are the first swallows of incipient social reaction among the Russian peasantry. The good god has sent the Peshekhonovs down from heaven as living proof of the Marxist proposition regarding the dual nature of every small producer. A peasant is endowed both with reason and with prejudice; he possesses the revolutionary qualities of a person who is exploited, and the reactionary aspirations of the small proprietor anxious "to get, but not to give up". Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. are the ideological expression of the reactionary aspects of the small peasant proprietor. Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. are contemplators of the "*rear*" aspect of the Russian muzhik. They are doing in

the realm of *ideas* what the Gurkos and Stishinskys are doing in a *coarse*, *material way*, bribing the peasant bourgeois with the sale of crown and state lands.

Whether such palliatives will perceptibly weaken the inevitable impact between the masses and their exploiters in a sharp struggle is still a big question. It is still a big question whether the traditional peasant prejudices, fostered by all sorts of opportunists, will be sufficient to outweigh the good sense of the poor peasantry that is being awakened in the flames of revolution. In any case, the Social-Democrats will perform their duty of developing and refining the *revolutionary* consciousness of the peasantry.

Let Mr. Peshekhonov & Co. serve as a warning to the Right-wing Social-Democrats. When criticising the Toilers' Popular Socialists we might, sometimes, have said to certain Menshevik Social-Democrats: *mutato nomine de te fabula narratur* (the fable is about you, only the name is changed). We, too, have in our ranks people who yearn for a legal party, who are ready to substitute a platform for a programme, to sink to the level of the masses. We have Plekhanov, who delivered his famous verdict on the December rising: "They should not have taken to arms." We have Malishevsky, a contributor to the *Otkliki Sovremennosti*,[106] who attempted (although not in *Otkliki Sovremennosti*) to delete the republic from our programme. It would be very useful for these people to take a good look at the Peshekhonovs in all their "pristine beauty".

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A NEW COUP D'ÉTAT IN PREPARATION

Guchkov's letter to Trubetskoi[107] long engaged, and to some extent is still engaging, the attention of our political press, if such a term may be applied to the reptile press,[108] and to the few surviving liberal newspapers. This letter really has a certain significance. It marks a big stride in the development of the counter-revolutionary trend among wide sections of the Russian big bourgeoisie. For these sections, the political strike in October was already a decisive turning-point. After October 17 the big bourgeois at once cried: "Enough!" Therefore, a singular and very characteristic feature of the Russian revolution is the fact that the date of the Constitutional Manifesto was used as the name of their party by the elements of the big bourgeoisie who took the side of the tsarist government, which began to adapt the new constitution to the autocratic regime. October is the date of the only partial victory the revolution in Russia has gained so far. Octobrists is the name adopted by the counter-revolutionary party of the big bourgeoisie.

This contradiction clearly reveals the class antagonisms in the Russian revolution. The explanation of it is provided by the Marxist view of the present revolution in Russia. It is a bourgeois revolution. At all events, it is clearing the ground for a wider and more rapid development of capitalism. To regard a full triumph of the revolutionary peasantry in its struggle for land as a victory for the "labour principle", as a transition to "socialisation", is a sheer petty-bourgeois illusion. But the inevitable clearing of the ground for capitalism may proceed along two main lines. Feudal Russia can be transformed into bourgeois Russia if conditions are created that provide the mass of the peasantry and prole-

tariat with the maximum welfare conceivable under capitalism. This transformation is also possible if conditions are created which mainly ensure the interests of the propertied classes, the landlords and capitalists. So far our revolution is following the second line. If it fails to gain another big victory there can be no doubt that the counter-revolutionary bourgeois Octobrists will be the legal executors of the Russian revolution, just as the Junker Bismarck became the legal executor of the half-hearted German Revolution of 1848.

Mr. Guchkov is no simpleton. He is already anticipating the pleasure of taking the reins of government in his hands after the final defeat of the revolution, and of combining business-like, *geschäftmacher*, bourgeois "liberalism" with ruthless military and police measures of repression against the discontented "lower classes". Like a practical, non-idealistic, bourgeois businessman, Mr. Guchkov has grasped the actual political situation better than many philosophers and phrase-mongers among our bourgeois intelligentsia (*l'ignorance est moins eloignée de la verité que le préjugé!*—ignorance is less removed from truth than prejudice). Mr. Guchkov brings the bourgeois ideals of the Cadets down to earth. Especially notable in this connection is the following passage in his letter which has not been appreciated by our slavish press:

"There is no doubt now," writes Guchkov to Trubetskoi, "that the triumph of the revolution, or even a new intensification of the revolutionary crisis, will put an end to our young political liberty and the remnants of our civilisation and prosperity."

This is a remarkably correct and remarkably apt estimation of the present political situation from the point of view of the interests of the capitalist and landlord. Mr. Guchkov takes the bull by the horns. The issue in the present political situation is indeed whether we are in for a *new intensification of the revolutionary crisis*. We thank you for your candour, Mr. Guchkov! We quite realise that the bourgeois professors and diplomats on *Rech* dislike your determination, straightforwardness, quickness and aggressiveness, your—pardon the vulgar expression—capacity for "dropping bricks", but we socialists are delighted by it. It just suits us.

Thus, anyone who wishes to be serious about the present political situation must first take a clear stand on the question of a *new intensification of the revolutionary crisis*. That is exactly what Mr. Guchkov is doing. His whole letter says: "I am against it." I subordinate everything to the task of combating this intensification, to the task of suppressing everything that is conducive to it. The reason is clear. A new intensification of the revolutionary crisis contains the threat of *the triumph of the revolution*, which, in turn, will threaten the "remnants" ... of the landed estates of Messrs. Guchkov, Romanov, Stolypin and the rest of the gang of pogrommongers, the "remnants" of bourgeois privileges which can serve as a protection against the further struggles of the proletariat, in short, the "remnants of *our* [Guchkov's, Romanov's, Stolypin's] prosperity".

Mr. Guchkov argues correctly, far more correctly and consistently than the Cadets who are now howling against him, who, through their spokesmen, the Vinogradovs, Struves, Izgoyevs, Berdayevs and Milyukovs, have hundreds of times bewailed the impending end of "liberty and civilisation" and the triumph of "spontaneous insanity".

Nor would it harm revolutionaries to take a lesson from the reactionaries in the logical presentation of the question of the present political situation, *that is to say*, of "a new intensification of the revolutionary crisis". Such an intensification will inevitably imply mass action on a still wider scale than before, enriched with the experience of the great year of the great Russian revolution. And the experience of that year, from the October strike through the December insurrection, the peaceful Duma and its dissolution, leads to an aggressive, all-Russian, armed uprising, with strikes as an auxiliary and subsidiary means of struggle.

The government has shaped its entire policy to meet this universally expected, new intensification of the revolutionary crisis. There is no doubt that it has deliberately refrained from fixing the date for the new Duma elections in order to have its hands free, in order, if the popular struggle becomes very acute, to try to split it up by suddenly appointing the elections. Nor is there any doubt that this is the angle from which it is carefully studying the question whether to summon a new Duma and whether the *old electoral*

law should remain in force. Social-Democrats have less right than anyone to treat this question lightly.

The government is in a dilemma: Should it try to summon the Duma again on the basis of the existing electoral law, while increasing repression, exercising pressure on the electors and organising Black-Hundred gangs, or should it amend the electoral law *before* the Second Duma is convened, so as to ensure a Duma "capable of working", i.e., a Black-Hundred Duma? Reaction among the landlord class, the victories of the Black-Hundred landlords in the Zemstvo, the obvious growth of discontent among the people—all these prompt the government to repeal the present electoral law at once, to limit the franchise in the sense of reverting from the Witte Duma to the Bulygin Duma, if not something worse, or simply to call together the elected representatives of the Zemstvos in the Second Duma. Our reptile press is already dropping hints about some such plans in "higher quarters", i.e., the Court set, and are preparing the ground by arguing that the autocracy has the "right" to promulgate a new electoral law without consulting the Duma.

Let us consider which of these "lines" of government policy is the more probable. Constitutional "legality", political caution and loyalty favour preservation of the electoral law of December 11. As you see, these are all "idealistic" considerations which the Romanovs and Pobedonostsevs are accustomed to despise. Besides, it is ridiculous to think that men covered from head to foot with blood and mud, fighting their last desperate battle to maintain their slaveowners' rights, would be influenced by such considerations. It is ridiculous to think that the tsar and his gang would have any qualms about "legality" when they had no qualms about promulgating the Law of December 11, the Law of February 20,[109] etc., and are not in the least disturbed by the present downright mockery of the "law". No, these arguments are too flimsy.

The opinion of Europe? The need of a loan? This need is very urgent. And European capital will lend money only on the guarantee of "order". What kind of "order", however, is immaterial to capital—it would even prefer the order that prevails in the graveyard. But a second Cadet Duma (or, which God forbid, a still more radical one!) threatens further

financial disclosures, further "disorder"! No, precisely from the point of view of obtaining a loan in Europe it would pay the government best to annul the present electoral law so as to ensure the election of a Black-Hundred Duma which will sanction any and all loans.

Of course, we must not forget that, actually, profound economic and political causes make an agreement between the autocracy and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie *necessary*. The failure of the first attempt to come to terms through the medium of the First Duma is by no means proof, and cannot be a proof, that all such attempts will fail—and very many such attempts will still be made. But an agreement through a Cadet Duma must not now be regarded (and the autocracy cannot regard it) as being very likely.

Revolutionaries learn from the experience of revolution; but so does the autocracy, and very attentively. Everyone can see that there is practically no hope of a Duma more to the right under the present electoral law. The Second Duma is to be summoned at the end of the winter, just when it is usual for starvation, unemployment and want to become particularly acute among the masses. The parties to the left of the Cadets will now undoubtedly be far less disposed than formerly to be guided by the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie; they will be far more capable of undertaking independent, decisive and energetic political action. No! We must harbour no illusions, we must not imagine the enemy to be altogether lacking in brains, perspicacity or discretion. We need have no doubt that after the experience of the Cadet Duma the "heroes of thought and action" in this Black-Hundred government are exerting themselves to the utmost to prevent a repetition of it.

The government has seen that the dissolution of the Duma did not result in an immediate widespread uprising of the whole people. The coup d'état which had been prepared silently and secretly was very much to the liking of the "higher quarters". They have been immensely impressed by what seems to them to have been a bold and successful attack on the revolution. They cannot help contemplating now another attack of the same kind made *beforehand*, to prevent a "new intensification of the revolutionary crisis". The tsar's courtiers are military men. They fully appreciate the advan-

tage of taking the offensive, of taking the initiative in military operations. Fear an uprising? But it is inevitable, one way or another—workers' strikes, mutiny in the armed forces and peasant revolts have been *proving* this for a whole year. A second Cadet Duma would create a situation for an uprising still more favourable for the people: the final bankruptcy of the policy of "military-court liberalism", the fact that the people are sick and tired of the repressions, etc., etc. If a "new intensification of the revolutionary crisis" is inevitable, then *we* must attack first—that is what Ignatyev is thinking, what he must be thinking. And he will attack—on the eve of the elections the tsar will annul the electoral law of December 11 and promulgate a new law which will *guarantee* a Duma of Black-Hundred elements.

We do not claim to be prophets able to foresee all the possible outcomes of the present highly complicated political situation. Social-Democrats, however, must carefully weigh up the trends of all the forces that are operating in politics in order wisely to decide their own tactics. If they do that they will arrive at the following inexorable conclusion: Workers! Be prepared for the promulgation by the government of a Black-Hundred electoral law by the time of the elections! Peasants! Beware, the government is planning to change the electoral system so that peasant deputies, Trudoviks, *cannot* be elected to the Duma!

We must not let the government catch us unawares. We must conduct the most vigorous agitation among the masses to explain the danger that is threatening—we must shatter their naïve faith in the permanence of the electoral law as a "constitutional" institution—we must destroy constitutional illusions—we must recall the examples of the European revolutions with their frequent alterations of the electoral laws—we must spare no effort to spread the conviction that the crisis now maturing is not a parliamentary or constitutional crisis, but a revolutionary crisis, which force alone will decide, and which only a victorious armed uprising will resolve.

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GUERRILLA WARFARE

The question of guerrilla action is one that greatly interests our Party and the mass of the workers. We have dealt with this question in passing several times, and now we propose to give the more complete statement of our views we have promised.

I

Let us begin from the beginning. What are the fundamental demands which every Marxist should make of an examination of the question of forms of struggle? In the first place, Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism by not binding the movement to any one particular form of struggle. It recognises the most varied forms of struggle; and it does not "concoct" them, but only generalises, organises, gives conscious expression to those forms of struggle of the revolutionary classes which arise of themselves in the course of the movement. Absolutely hostile to all abstract formulas and to all doctrinaire recipes, Marxism demands an attentive attitude to the *mass* struggle in progress, which, as the movement develops, as the class-consciousness of the masses grows, as economic and political crises become acute, continually gives rise to new and more varied methods of defence and attack. Marxism, therefore, positively does not reject any form of struggle. Under no circumstances does Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment only, recognising as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, *inevitably* arise as the given social situation changes. In this respect Marxism *learns*, if we may

so express it, from mass practice, and makes no claim whatever to *teach* the masses forms of struggle invented by "systematisers" in the seclusion of their studies. We know—said Kautsky, for instance, when examining the forms of social revolution—that the coming crisis will introduce new forms of struggle that we are now unable to foresee.

In the second place, Marxism demands an absolutely *historical* examination of the question of the forms of struggle. To treat this question apart from the concrete historical situation betrays a failure to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism. At different stages of economic evolution, depending on differences in political, national-cultural, living and other conditions, different forms of struggle come to the fore and become the principal forms of struggle; and in connection with this, the secondary, auxiliary forms of struggle undergo change in their turn. To attempt to answer yes or no to the question whether any particular means of struggle should be used, without making a detailed examination of the concrete situation of the given movement at the given stage of its development, means completely to abandon the Marxist position.

These are the two principal theoretical propositions by which we must be guided. The history of Marxism in Western Europe provides an infinite number of examples corroborating what has been said. European Social-Democracy at the present time regards parliamentarism and the trade union movement as the principal forms of struggle; it recognised insurrection in the past, and is quite prepared to recognise it, should conditions change, in the future—despite the opinion of bourgeois liberals like the Russian Cadets and the *Bezzaglavtsi*.[110] Social-Democracy in the seventies rejected the general strike as a social panacea, as a means of overthrowing the bourgeoisie at one stroke by non-political means—but Social-Democracy fully recognises the mass political strike (especially after the experience of Russia in 1905) as *one* of the methods of struggle essential under *certain* conditions. Social-Democracy recognised street barricade fighting in the forties, rejected it for definite reasons at the end of the nineteenth century, and expressed complete readiness to revise the latter view and to admit the expedi-

ency of barricade fighting after the experience of Moscow, which, in the words of K. Kautsky, initiated new tactics of barricade fighting.

II

Having established the general Marxist propositions, let us turn to the Russian revolution. Let us recall the historical development of the forms of struggle it produced. First there were the economic strikes of workers (1896-1900), then the political demonstrations of workers and students (1901-02), peasant revolts (1902), the beginning of mass political strikes variously combined with demonstrations (Rostov 1902, the strikes in the summer of 1903, January 9, 1905), the all-Russian political strike accompanied by local cases of barricade fighting (October 1905), mass barricade fighting and armed uprising (1905, December), the peaceful parliamentary struggle (April-June 1906), partial military revolts (June 1905-July 1906) and partial peasant revolts (autumn 1905-autumn 1906).

Such is the state of affairs in the autumn of 1906 as concerns forms of struggle in general. The "retaliatory" form of struggle adopted by the autocracy is the Black-Hundred pogrom, from Kishinev in the spring of 1903 to Sedlets in the autumn of 1906. All through this period the organisation of Black-Hundred pogroms and the beating up of Jews, students, revolutionaries and class-conscious workers continued to progress and perfect itself, combining the violence of Black-Hundred troops with the violence of hired ruffians, going as far as the use of artillery in villages and towns and merging with punitive expeditions, punitive trains and so forth.

Such is the principal background of the picture. Against this background there stands out—unquestionably as something partial, secondary and auxiliary—the phenomenon to the study and assessment of which the present article is devoted. What is this phenomenon? What are its forms? What are its causes? When did it arise and how far has it spread ? What is its significance in the general course of the revolution? What is its relation to the struggle of the working class organised and led by Social-Democracy? Such

are the questions which we must now proceed to examine after having sketched the general background of the picture.

The phenomenon in which we are interested is the *armed* struggle. It is conducted by individuals and by small groups. Some belong to revolutionary organisations, while others (the *majority* in certain parts of Russia) do not belong to any revolutionary organisation. Armed struggle pursues two *different* aims, which must be *strictly* distinguished: in the first place, this struggle aims at assassinating individuals, chiefs and subordinates in the army and police; in the second place, it aims at the confiscation of monetary funds both from the government and from private persons. The confiscated funds go partly into the treasury of the Party, partly for the special purpose of arming and preparing for an uprising, and partly for the maintenance of persons engaged in the struggle we are describing. The big expropriations (such as the Caucasian, involving over 200,000 rubles, and the Moscow, involving 875,000 rubles) went in fact first and foremost to revolutionary parties—small expropriations go mostly, and sometimes entirely, to the maintenance of the "expropriators". This form of struggle undoubtedly became widely developed and extensive only in 1906, i.e., after the December uprising. The intensification of the political crisis to the point of an armed struggle and, in particular, the intensification of poverty, hunger and unemployment in town and country, was one of the important causes of the struggle we are describing. This form of struggle was adopted as the preferable and even *exclusive* form of social struggle by the vagabond elements of the population, the lumpen proletariat and anarchist groups. Declaration of martial law, mobilisation of fresh troops, Black-Hundred pogroms (Sedlets), and military courts must be regarded as the "retaliatory" form of struggle adopted by the autocracy.

III

The usual appraisal of the struggle we are describing is that it is anarchism, Blanquism, the old terrorism, the acts of individuals isolated from the masses, which demoralise the workers, repel wide strata of the population, dis-

organise the movement and injure the revolution. Examples in support of this appraisal can easily be found in the events reported every day in the newspapers.

But are such examples convincing? In order to test this, let us take a locality where the form of struggle we are examining is *most* developed—the Lettish Territory. This is the way *Novoye Vremya* (in its issues of September 9 and 12) complains of the activities of the Lettish Social-Democrats. The Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party (a section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) regularly issues its paper in 30,000 copies. The announcement columns publish lists of spies whom it is the duty of every decent person to exterminate. People who assist the police are proclaimed "enemies of the revolution", liable to execution and, moreover, to confiscation of property. The public is instructed to give money to the Social-Democratic Party only against signed and stamped receipt. In the Party's latest report, showing a total income of 48,000 rubles for the year, there figures a sum of 5,600 rubles contributed by the Libau branch for arms which was obtained by expropriation. Naturally, *Novoye Vremya* rages and fumes against this "revolutionary law", against this "terror government".

Nobody will be so bold as to call these activities of the Lettish Social-Democrats anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism. But why? Because here we have a *clear* connection between the new form of struggle and the uprising which broke out in December and which is again brewing. This connection is not so perceptible in the case of Russia as a whole, but it exists. The fact that "guerrilla" warfare became widespread precisely after December, and its connection with the accentuation not only of the economic crisis but also of the political crisis is beyond dispute. The old Russian terrorism was an affair of the intellectual conspirator; today as a general rule guerrilla warfare is waged by the worker combatant, or simply by the unemployed worker. Blanquism and anarchism easily occur to the minds of people who have a weakness for stereotype; but under the circumstances of an uprising, which are so apparent in the Lettish Territory, the inappropriateness of such trite labels is only too obvious.

The example of the Letts clearly demonstrates how incorrect, unscientific and unhistorical is the practice so very

common among us of analysing guerrilla warfare without reference to the circumstances of an uprising. These circumstances must be borne in mind, we must reflect on the peculiar features of an intermediate period between big acts of insurrection, we must realise what forms of struggle inevitably arise under such circumstances, and not try to shirk the issue by a collection of words learned by rote, such as are used equally by the Cadets and the *Novoye Vremya*-ites: anarchism, robbery, hooliganism!

It is said that guerrilla acts disorganise our work. Let us apply this argument to the situation that has existed since December 1905, to the period of Black-Hundred pogroms and martial law. What disorganises the movement more in *such* a period: the absence of resistance or organised guerrilla warfare? Compare the centre of Russia with her western borders, with Poland and the Lettish Territory. It is unquestionable that guerrilla warfare is far more widespread and far more developed in the western border regions. And it is equally unquestionable that the revolutionary movement in general, and the Social-Democratic movement in particular, are *more disorganised* in central Russia than in the western border regions. Of course, it would not enter our heads to conclude from this that the Polish and Lettish Social-Democratic movements are less disorganised *thanks* to guerrilla warfare. No. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that guerrilla warfare is not to blame for the state of disorganisation of the Social-Democratic working-class movement in Russia in 1906.

Allusion is often made in this respect to the peculiarities of national conditions. But this allusion very clearly betrays the weakness of the current argument. If it is a matter of national conditions then it is not a matter of anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism—sins that are common to Russia as a whole and even to the Russians especially—but of something else. Analyse this something else *concretely*, gentlemen! You will then find that national oppression or antagonism explain nothing, because they have always existed in the western border regions, whereas guerrilla warfare has been engendered only by the present historical period. There are many places where there is national oppression and antagonism, but no guerrilla struggle, which sometimes develops

where there is no national oppression whatever. A concrete analysis of the question will show that it is not a matter of national oppression, but of conditions of insurrection. Guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the "big engagements" in the civil war.

It is not guerrilla actions which disorganise the movement, but the weakness of a party which is incapable of taking such actions *under its control*. That is why the anathemas which we Russians usually hurl against guerrilla actions go hand in hand with secret, casual, unorganised guerrilla actions which really do disorganise the Party. Being incapable of understanding what historical conditions give rise to this struggle, we are incapable of neutralising its deleterious aspects. Yet the struggle is going on. It is engendered by powerful economic and political causes. It is not in our power to eliminate these causes or to eliminate this struggle. Our complaints against guerrilla warfare are complaints against our Party weakness in the matter of an uprising.

What we have said about disorganisation also applies to demoralisation. It is not guerrilla warfare which demoralises, but *unorganised*, irregular, non-party guerrilla acts. We shall not rid ourselves one least bit of this *most unquestionable* demoralisation by condemning and cursing guerrilla actions, for condemnation and curses are absolutely incapable of putting a stop to a phenomenon which has been engendered by profound economic and political causes. It may be objected that if we are incapable of putting a stop to an abnormal and demoralising phenomenon, this is no reason why the *Party* should adopt abnormal and demoralising methods of struggle. But such an objection would be a purely bourgeois-liberal and not a Marxist objection, because a Marxist cannot regard civil war, or guerrilla warfare, which is one of its forms, as abnormal and demoralising *in general*. A Marxist bases himself on the class struggle, and not social peace. In certain periods of acute economic and political crises the class struggle ripens into a direct civil war, i.e., into an armed struggle between two sections of the people. In such periods a Marxist is *obliged* to take the stand of

civil war. Any moral condemnation of civil war would be absolutely impermissible from the standpoint of Marxism.

In a period of civil war the ideal party of the proletariat is a *fighting party*. This is absolutely incontrovertible. We are quite prepared to grant that it is possible to argue and prove the *inexpediency* from the standpoint of civil war of particular forms of civil war at any particular moment. We fully admit criticism of diverse forms of civil war from the standpoint of *military expediency* and absolutely agree that in *this* question it is the Social-Democratic practical workers in each particular locality who must have the final say. But we absolutely demand in the name of the principles of Marxism that an analysis of the conditions of civil war should not be evaded by hackneyed and stereotyped talk about anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism, and that senseless methods of guerrilla activity adopted by some organisation or other of the Polish Socialist Party at some moment or other should not be used as a bogey when discussing the question of the participation of the Social-Democratic Party as such in guerrilla warfare in general.

The argument that guerrilla warfare disorganises the movement must be regarded critically. *Every* new form of struggle, accompanied as it is by new dangers and new sacrifices, inevitably "disorganises" organisations which are unprepared for this new form of struggle. Our old propagandist circles were disorganised by recourse to methods of agitation. Our committees were subsequently disorganised by recourse to demonstrations. Every military action in any war to a certain extent disorganises the ranks of the fighters. But this does not mean that one must not fight. It means that one must *learn* to fight. That is all.

When I see Social-Democrats proudly and smugly declaring "we are not anarchists, thieves, robbers, we are superior to all this, we reject guerrilla warfare",—I ask myself: Do these people realise what they are saying? Armed clashes and conflicts between the Black-Hundred government and the population are taking place all over the country. This is an absolutely inevitable phenomenon at the present stage of development of the revolution. The population is spontane-

ously and in an unorganised way—and for that very reason often in unfortunate and *undesirable* forms—reacting to this phenomenon also by armed conflicts and attacks. I can understand us refraining from Party leadership of *this* spontaneous struggle in a particular place or at a particular time because of the weakness and unpreparedness of our organisation. I realise that this question must be settled by the local practical workers, and that the remoulding of weak and unprepared organisations is no easy matter. But when I see a Social-Democratic theoretician or publicist not displaying regret over this unpreparedness, but rather a proud smugness and a self-exalted tendency to repeat phrases learned by rote in early youth about anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism, I am hurt by this degradation of the most revolutionary doctrine in the world.

It is said that guerrilla warfare brings the class-conscious proletarians into close association with degraded, drunken riff-raff. That is true. But it only means that the party of the proletariat can never regard guerrilla warfare as the only, or even as the chief, method of struggle; it means that this method must be subordinated to other methods, that it must be commensurate with the chief methods of warfare, and must be ennobled by the enlightening and organising influence of socialism. And without this *latter* condition, *all*, positively all, methods of struggle in bourgeois society bring the proletariat into close association with the various non-proletarian strata above and below it and, if left to the spontaneous course of events, become frayed, corrupted and prostituted. Strikes, if left to the spontaneous course of events, become corrupted into "alliances"—agreements between the workers and the masters *against* the consumers. Parliament becomes corrupted into a brothel, where a gang of bourgeois politicians barter wholesale and retail "national freedom", "liberalism", "democracy", republicanism, anticlericalism, socialism and all other wares in demand. A newspaper becomes corrupted into a public pimp, into a means of corrupting the masses, of pandering to the low instincts of the mob, and so on and so forth. Social-Democracy knows of no universal methods of struggle, such as would shut off the proletariat by a Chinese wall from the strata standing slightly above or slightly below it. At different

periods Social-Democracy applies different methods, *always* qualifying the choice of them by *strictly* defined ideological and organisational conditions.*

IV

The forms of struggle in the Russian revolution are distinguished by their colossal variety compared with the bourgeois revolutions in Europe. Kautsky partly foretold this in 1902 when he said that the future revolution (with the exception *perhaps* of Russia, he added) might be not so much a struggle of the people against the government as a struggle between two sections of the people. In Russia we undoubtedly see a wider development of this *latter* struggle than in the bourgeois revolutions in the West. The enemies of our revolution among the people are few in number, but as the struggle grows more acute they become more and more organised and receive the support of the reactionary strata of the bourgeoisie. It is therefore absolutely natural and inevitable that in *such* a period, a period of nation-wide political strikes, an *uprising* cannot assume the old form of individual acts restricted to a very short time and to a very small area. It is absolutely natural and inevitable that the uprising should assume the higher and more complex form of a

* The Bolshevik Social-Democrats are often accused of a frivolous passion for guerrilla actions. It would therefore not be amiss to recall that in the draft resolution on guerrilla actions (*Partiiniye Izvestia*, No. 2, and Lenin's report on the Congress), *the section* of the Bolsheviks who defend guerrilla actions suggested the following conditions for their recognition: "expropriations" of private property were not to he permitted under any circumstances; "expropriations" of government property were not to be recommended but only *allowed*, provided that they *were controlled by the Party* and their proceeds used *for the needs of an uprising*. Guerrilla acts in the form of terrorism were to be *recommended* against brutal government officials and *active* members of the Black Hundreds, but on condition that 1) the sentiments of the masses be taken into account, 2) the conditions of the working-class movement in the given locality be reckoned with, and 3) care be taken that the forces of the proletariat should not be frittered away. The practical difference between this draft and the resolution which was adopted at the Unity Congress lies *exclusively* in the fact that "expropriations" of government property are not allowed.

prolonged civil war embracing the whole country, i.e., an armed struggle between two sections of the people. Such a war cannot be conceived otherwise than as a series of a few big engagements at comparatively long intervals and a large number of small encounters during these intervals. That being so—and it is undoubtedly so—the Social-Democrats must absolutely make it their duty to create organisations best adapted to lead the masses in these big engagements and, as far as possible, in these small encounters as well. In a period when the class struggle has become accentuated to the point of civil war, Social-Democrats must make it their duty not only to participate but also to play the leading role in *this civil war*. The Social-Democrats must train and prepare their organisations to be really able to act as a *belligerent side* which does not miss a single opportunity of inflicting damage on the enemy's forces.

This is a difficult task, there is no denying. It cannot be accomplished at once. Just as the whole people are being retrained and are learning to fight in the course of the civil war, so our organisations must be trained, must be reconstructed in conformity with the lessons of experience to be equal to this task.

We have not the slightest intention of foisting on practical workers any artificial form of struggle, or even of deciding from our armchair what part any particular form of guerrilla warfare should play in the general course of the civil war in Russia. We are far from the thought of regarding a concrete assessment of particular guerrilla actions as indicative of a *trend* in Social-Democracy. But we do regard it as our duty to help as far as possible to arrive at a correct *theoretical* assessment of the new forms of struggle engendered by practical life. We do regard it as our duty relentlessly to combat stereotypes and prejudices which hamper the class-conscious workers in correctly presenting a new and difficult problem and in correctly approaching its solution.

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THE QUESTION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE[111]

We consider this resolution sound in principle and note its agreement with the points we developed in our article "Guerrilla Warfare". We would suggest only a few minor amendments and additions to the text of the resolution. In Point 3 of the preamble we would say: "the revolution not being strong enough *at the present time*", etc. In the resolution proper we would add repudiation of "expropriations" in agreement with the decision of the Congress, and then a statement to the effect that guerrilla actions must conform to the temper of the broad masses and the conditions of the working-class movement. It is clear, however, that our Moscow comrades take this for granted.

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AN ATTEMPT AT A CLASSIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF RUSSIA

As we know, the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party evaded the task of making a class analysis of the political parties in Russia and of defining the proletarian attitude to these parties. Its general endorsement of the Amsterdam Resolution was nothing more than a form of evasion. And yet the revolution more and more insistently demands that we apply the Marxist method and Marxist theory to throw light on the profound and highly interesting process of the formation of parties, which for obvious reasons is more rapid and intense in Russia than anywhere else.

This process, of course, has not come to an end by a long, long way, and has not yet produced fully stable results. But such a process can *never* come to an end in capitalist society, and its results can become "stable" only if the revolution, as the drastic demolition of the whole of the old political superstructure, reaches a state of stagnation. Therefore we cannot under any circumstances postpone our analysis of the bourgeois parties, the more so, because the period of the October liberties, on the one hand, and the period of the First Duma, on the other, have undoubtedly already produced *important* results which must not be ignored. The open revolutionary struggle by means of strikes, uprisings, etc., and the new election campaign will demand from our Party a clear and precise definition of its attitude to the various parties, and this is possible only on the basis of a scientific, i.e., a class analysis.

Let us start with the enumeration of the more or less important political parties (or, perhaps, *types** of parties) in their order from "Right" to "Left". 1) The Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, etc.; 2) the Party of Law and Order; 3) the Octobrists; 4) the Party of Peaceful Renovation; 5) the Party of Democratic Reforms; 6) the Cadets; 7) the free-thinkers, the radicals, the *Bezzaglavtsi*, etc.; 8) the Toilers' Popular Socialists; 9) the Socialist-Revolutionaries; 10) the Maximalists; 11) the Social-Democrats—Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. We do not count the anarchists, for it would be too risky to call them (and, perhaps, the Maximalists) a political party.

In this motley series of parties, we can clearly distinguish *five* main *types*: 1) the Black Hundreds; 2) the Octobrists; 3) the Cadets; 4) the Trudoviks, and 5) the Social-Democrats. The soundness of this classification is proved by the analysis of the class nature of each particular party.

There can be no doubt about the need to single out the Social-Democratic Party as a distinct type. It is a type common to the whole of Europe. In Russia it is the only *workers*' party, the party of the *proletariat*, both in composition and in its strictly consistent proletarian point of view.

Further, it is equally obvious that the *Trudoviks* must also be singled out as a distinct type. They include: the Toilers' Popular Socialist Party, the Socialist-Revolutionaries proper, and, lastly, the Maximalists. They all base their theoretical standpoint on the "labour principle". They all strive to unite and merge the proletarians with the small producers in a single "toilers' group". They strive mainly for the support of the peasantry. The State Duma, where the majority of the peasant deputies formed a separate "Trudovik Group", proved in fact that the abovementioned trends have succeeded (more or less) in actually

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* We say *types* of parties, firstly, because it is impossible to keep track of all the small divisions, nor are they important (e.g., the difference between, say, the Progressive Industrial Party, or the Disc,[112] and the Party of Law and Order is quite negligible); secondly, it would be wrong to take into account only those parties which have formally appeared in the political arena and to ignore clearly defined political trends. A very slight change in the political atmosphere would suffice to convert these trends into regular *parties* within a few weeks.

laying the foundation of a political organisation of the peasants.

True, the political parties of this type have a far less definite and finished form than that of the Social-Democratic Party. Nominally, the Party of the Maximalists does not exist, although their split from the Socialist-Revolutionaries is an accomplished fact, certified by their independent actions, both literary and terrorist. In the State Duma, the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not form their own group, but acted behind the backs of a *section* of the Trudoviks. The Toilers' Popular Socialist Party, likewise, is still only about to be born, although its literary activity is already conducted not only in alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries proper, but sometimes quite independently of them. Its leaders in the Duma also acted partly in unison with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and partly independently of them. The *Minutes of the First Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party* (Paris 1906) also show the Toilers' Popular Socialists as a distinct "*group*", which behaves independently of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In short, we find in this camp: (1) a secret party (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) quite incapable of creating anything like a stable, mass organisation, and incapable of acting independently under its own flag, whether in the State Duma or in the literature of the period of liberties; (2) a *nascent* legal party (the Toilers' Popular Socialists) which acted as a group at the Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (December 1905), but which hitherto has been unable even to begin the formation of a mass organisation and which in its literature and in the State Duma acts mostly in alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The fact that after two periods of relative freedom (the "October" and the "Duma" periods) the Trudoviks still remain a politically amorphous body cannot, of course, be attributed to chance. Undoubtedly, this to some extent is due to the fact that the petty bourgeoisie (especially in the rural districts) is less capable of organising than the proletariat. Undoubtedly, the ideological confusion of the Trudoviks also reflects the extremely precarious position of the small producer in present-day society: the extreme Right wing of the Trudoviks (the Toilers' Popular Socialist Party,

led by Peshekhonov & Co.) differs very little from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both republicanism and the demand for all the land; the extreme Left of the Trudoviks, the Maximalists, differs very little from the anarchists.

These two extremes indicate the amplitude, so to speak, of the political oscillations of the toiling petty bourgeoisie. That the petty bourgeoisie should display such instability is quite explicable from the economic point of view. Undoubtedly, the immediate future of the Russian revolution will increase rather than diminish this instability. But, while noting and explaining this instability, we must not lose sight of the enormous political importance of the parties of the Trudovik type. Real political liberty will strengthen *these parties most of all*, because in the absence of political liberty their ability to organise is less than that of the bourgeoisie, and also less than that of the proletariat. On the other hand, in a predominantly petty-bourgeois and peasant country like Russia, the formation of ideologically vacillating and politically unstable but exceedingly large petty-bourgeois or "Trudovik" parties is inevitable.

In a country like Russia, the outcome of the bourgeois revolution depends most of all on the political conduct of the small producers. That the big bourgeoisie will betray the revolution is beyond doubt (they have already betrayed it two-thirds). After October and December, no further proof is required that, as far as the Russian workers are concerned, the proletariat will be the most reliable fighter. The petty bourgeoisie, however, is the variable quantity which will determine the outcome. Social-Democrats must therefore watch very carefully its present political oscillations between abject Cadet loyalty and bold, ruthless, revolutionary struggle; and not only watch that process, of course, but as far as possible bring proletarian influence to bear upon it.

To proceed. Undoubtedly, the Cadets must be singled out as a separate type. The Party of Democratic Reforms to the right of them, and the free-thinkers, radicals, etc., to the left, are not more than quite insignificant offshoots. In the present political period the Cadets are an independent political type. What distinguishes them from the Trudo-

viks is clear. The typical Trudovik is a politically conscious peasant. He is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his *own* plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal State and for democracy. His ideal is to abolish exploitation; but he conceives this abolition in a petty-bourgeois fashion, and therefore, *in fact*, his strivings are converted into a struggle, not against all exploitation, but only against the exploitation practised by the landlords and the big financiers. The Cadet, however, is a typical bourgeois intellectual and sometimes even a liberal landlord. To compromise with the monarchy, to put a stop to the revolution is his main striving. Totally incapable of fighting, the Cadet is a typical stockbroker. His ideal is to perpetuate bourgeois exploitation in respectable, civilised, parliamentary forms. His political strength lies in the amalgamation of an enormous mass of bourgeois intellectuals, who are indispensable in every capitalist society, but, of course, absolutely incapable of seriously influencing a real change of the social system in this society.

The typical Octobrist is not a bourgeois intellectual, but a big bourgeois. He is not the ideologist of bourgeois society, he is its real master. Being directly interested in capitalist exploitation, he has a contempt for all theories, despises the intelligentsia, and, unlike the Cadets, repudiates all claims to "democracy". He is a bourgeois businessman. Like the Cadet, he is also striving for a deal with the monarchy, but his idea of such a deal is not some particular political system, or parliamentarism, but an agreement between a few persons, or chiefs, with the Court camarilla with a view to directly subordinating the clumsy, dull-witted and Asiatically corrupt Russian officials to the ruling bourgeoisie. An Octobrist is a Cadet who applies his bourgeois theories in business. A Cadet is an Octobrist who, when not busy robbing the workers and peasants, dreams of an ideal bourgeois society. The Octobrist has still to learn something of parliamentary etiquette and of political hypocrisy coupled with flirting with democracy. The Cadet has still to learn something of the art of bourgeois business trickery—and

then they will undoubtedly and inevitably merge, quite irrespective of whether this fusion will be brought about at the present time and by the present "Peaceful Renovators".

But let us not discuss the future. Our business is to learn to understand the present. With full power remaining in the hands of the scoundrelly Court gang, it is quite natural that the mere utterance of democratic phrases by the Cadets and their "parliamentary" opposition were *in fact* of greater service to the elements on their left. It is also natural that the Octobrist, who is directly hostile to these elements, angrily turned away from the Cadets and supported (in the elections to the First Duma) the government Black Hundreds.

The Black Hundreds are the last type of our political parties. Unlike Guchkov & Co., they do not want the "Constitution of October 17th", but the preservation and formal restoration of the autocracy. It is in their interests to perpetuate the filth, ignorance and corruption that flourish under the sceptre of the adored monarch. They are united by the frantic struggle for the privileges of the Court camarilla, for the opportunity, as of old, to rob, oppress and muzzle the whole of Russia. Their determination to defend the present tsar's government at all costs very often unites them with the Octobrists, and that is why it is so difficult to tell of some members of the Party of Law and Order where the Black Hundred begins and where the Octobrist ends.

Thus, the Russian revolution has in an extremely short period revealed the major types of political parties that correspond to all the main classes of Russian society. We have a party of the class-conscious socialist proletariat; parties of the radical, or radically inclined, petty bourgeoisie, mainly of the rural petty bourgeoisie, i.e., of the peasantry; liberal-bourgeois parties; and reactionary bourgeois parties. The political formations fail to correspond to the economic, class divisions only in that the two last-named groups correspond not to two, but to three groups of political parties: the Cadets, the Octobrists, and the Black Hundreds. This discrepancy, however, is fully explained by the transient peculiarities of the present situation, when the revolutionary struggle has become extraordinarily acute, when it is very difficult to separate defence of the autocracy

from out-and-out defence of the monarchy, when the economic classification (for progressive and for reactionary capitalism) naturally cuts across the political classification (for or against the present government). However, the kinship between the Cadets and the Octobrists is too obvious, and hardly any one can deny that the formation of a big, "business", liberal-bourgeois party is inevitable.

To sum up: the process of formation of political parties in Russia strikingly confirms the soundness of the theory of Marxism.

P.S. This article was written before the split in the Union of October Seventeenth. Shipov's resignation and the forthcoming formation of a moderate liberal party (the Left Octobrists, the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and the Right Cadets) now definitely promise to reduce all the Russian political parties to the four main types that we see in every capitalist country.

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NOTES ON *SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT*, No. 1[113]

The article "Guerrilla Actions" in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1 (*publication* of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.), which has just reached us, is the best possible confirmation of what we said in *Proletary*, No. 5,[114] about the stereotyped and non-historical character of the current philistine arguments on this subject.* The author fulminates against banditry, anarchism, Blanquism, Tkachevism,[115] highway robbery ("road robbers", as the bad translation from the German reads) in exactly the same way as the liberals. The liberals are true to themselves when they repudiate as "anarchy" *all* armed struggle against the government. A Social-Democrat who, in words, does not reject such struggle, but who in fact does not examine the question *from this point of view*, has virtually gone over to the standpoint of liberalism. The following is a characteristic example. "Insofar as the revolutionary parties countenance anarchy, they turn the embitterment of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes against themselves and so play into the hands of reaction." Thus, either countenance *anarchic* armed struggle or repudiate armed struggle altogether! There is no other way, according to the writer. He *does not admit the possibility* of organised, planned, ideological, politically educative armed struggle. What a poor choice he is faced with!

"Experience has already put an end to one of the forms of revolutionary guerrilla action, viz., the expropriation of private and government property." But this is a sheer falsehood, comrade! It is impossible that you should be unaware of *Menshevik* organisations which *after* the Unity

* See pp. 213-23 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Congress have participated, directly or indirectly, in government expropriations, in "*utilising*" *plunder*, etc. It is a very bad thing when a Social-Democrat's words do not accord with his deeds. It leads to hypocrisy. It is due either to a bad conscience (an explanation that we reject) or to an ill-considered, illogical theory.

Comrade Axelrod makes an angry reply in *Sotsial-Demokrat* to our note in *Proletary*, No. 1.* One and a half columns of small print are devoted to expressions of bewilderment, exclamations, assurances and reproaches addressed to us because we described his agitation for a labour congress as "concealed" from the Party. Axelrod is quite unable to understand what this means. And at the same time, he says himself: "In the near future I shall *utilise* it (the opportunity that I have) to bring the question of a labour congress *into the arena of political discussion*" (our italics). Well, that should have been done long ago! You should have *begun* by "bringing the question into the arena of *political* discussion", and not into that of circle whispering. Then your agitation would have been correct from a party point of view, frank and worthy of the revolutionary class. Then the bourgeois press would not have been able to cause confusion among Social-Democrats and lower their prestige by publishing sensational reports of this circle whispering and giving rise to thousands of misconceptions. It is highly regrettable that even now, in his belated and extremely prolix "letter to the editors", Axelrod *evades* the essence of the question, saying *not a word* about what congress he is proposing, and when, on what basis, who is to convene it and what precisely is its purpose. Axelrod passes over all this with phrases like the following: the work of preparing for the congress will have an invigorating effect on Social-Democracy "to the extent that this work is imbued with really Social-Democratic content, i.e., to the extent that circle interests and factional considerations are replaced by socio-political problems and tasks that are most immediately connected with the vital interests of the working class".

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* See p. 170 of this volume.—*Ed.*

For pity's sake, comrade! This is indeed sheer emptiness clothed in high-sounding words. The preparation for the congress will invigorate Social-Democracy to the extent that it will be really Social-Democratic! How new and how wise! "Factional considerations" must be replaced by socio-political problems and tasks,—but it is just different conceptions of these problem and tasks that have divided the Party into factions! It is a real cock-and-bull story.

And at Axelrod's side Plekhanov utters gross and banal insinuations about the motives of the struggle for a Party congress and equally gross eulogies of Axelrod's "happy idea" of convening a labour congress "*as soon as possible*". Yes, yes... What indeed could be a happier idea than that real Social-Democratic work will invigorate Social-Democracy?

In an editorial article of *Sotsial-Demokrat* we read: "Now, as after the Second Congress, the two groups (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) are probably of equal strength numerically", and a little lower down we read for the second time: "Now, as after the Second Congress, the two groups are equally influential in the Party." The writer's idea is clear. In an editorial of the official "publication of the Central Committee", it acquires considerable significance. The party of the working class ought to know precisely what its "groups" consist of and how strong they are. What is the basis of the opinion about their equality?

There are only two alternatives: either the writer has in mind only the Russian section of the Party (plus the Caucasus) or he adds the Poles, Letts and the Bund. On the first interpretation, the writer is admitting a vast increase in the strength of the "Majority" at the expense of the "Minority" since the Fourth (Unity) Congress, for at this Congress there were represented about 13,000 Bolsheviks and 18,000 Mensheviks. But this interpretation is improbable for it is already more than a month since all the national Social-Democratic parties were amalgamated with the R.S.D.L.P. Hence it is necessary to adopt the second interpretation. In that case it becomes obvious that the writer allocates the Poles and Letts to the Bolsheviks and the *Bund to the Mensheviks*. According to the data of the last congresses of the

national Social-Democratic parties, the Poles and Letts number about 40,000 and the Bund has a membership of about 33,000; thus we actually obtain approximately equal numbers for each group.

The question arises, however, whether it is correct to allocate the Bund to the Mensheviks. Of course, if the Central Committee says so, we must believe it. But it is essential to be clear about the significance of such an alignment. In the sphere of tactics, it is not confirmed by the latest resolutions of the Bund taken in their entirety. Consequently, the explanation must be sought in the *organisational* position of the Bund. It is evident that the Central Committee's publication considers as a *real* fact the circumstance that the Bund is not demanding an extraordinary congress. Whoever really wants to change the Party's policy as a whole, i.e., the policy of the Central Committee, is bound to demand a congress; anyone who does not demand this does not seriously want a change—such is the essence of this line of thought.

This reasoning is irrefutable and we regard it as our duty to assist all the organisations of our Party to obtain a clear idea of it and correctly appraise it. As a matter of fact, in a democratic organisation neutrality is almost impossible and abstention is often equivalent to action. The result of this "action" is clearly evident. The Central Committee's publication propagates the most confused ideas about a "labour congress" and definitely and consistently adopts a Menshevik position in regard to tactics. The consequences that this threatens for the whole Party in the event of an election campaign or new calls for action have been sufficiently demonstrated by the "slogans" of the Central Committee during the Duma session and after its dissolution. By its present "abstention", the Bund has actually made itself an accessory to the Menshevik tactics and policy of the Central Committee.

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THE RUSSIAN RADICAL IS WISE AFTER THE EVENT

Tovarishch of September 20 publishes an extremely instructive "conversation" between a Cadet and a certain more Left politician (a Trudovik?) who expresses the point of view of Mr. V. V. Kh—ov,[116] a contributor to that paper. This is how the radical takes the Cadet to task:

"Is it not the other way round?" he asks the Cadet, who was declaiming that only confidence in one's rights can make one strong. "Is it not strength that makes one confident in the inviolability of right?" "The activities of your Party ... I regard as political quixotry.... You have been bolstering up fictions." "Your constitutional illusions are to blame.... All that you said, and your way of saying it, created undue confidence in the power of the Duma. And this has certainly not facilitated the accumulation of social forces.... I always wished when I heard your speeches, in and outside the Duma, that you would stop treating the Duma as a constitutional body and regard it merely as an organ of the public will that was in conflict with another will.... The situation demanded most of all the organisation of our forces.... The Duma should have exerted every effort to create for itself the apparatus that the law had not given it.... You are exposing your Achilles' heel—constitutional illusions.... I always had occasion to be convinced of one thing alone, and that is, how deeply constitutional fictions have eaten into your Party.... I am scolding [you, the Cadets] because you had ceased to feel that you were one of the combatants, and were acting, so to speak, as liquidators of the strug-

gle. You proposed in a casual way what in other countries materialised as a result of a struggle between the rival forces."

An instructive statement, is it not? Only it is a pity that our valiant Bernsteinian "picked" a rather stupid Cadet to trounce in "conversation". There are some who are a bit smarter. There are some who closely watch Menshevik literature, particularly the writings of Plekhanov. Such a Cadet would have answered his opponent differently.

He would have said: My dear Radical! *Qui prouve trop, ne prouve rien*. He who proves too much, proves nothing. And you are undoubtedly proving *far too much* from the point of view of your own case. Did you not support us in the Duma elections and fight the boycotters? Now these elections put you under certain *obligations*. The keynote of these elections was *entirely* what you now call "constitutional illusions" (fie, fie, have you been reading Bolshevik literature?). Why, I could show you, my dear Radical, a nice passage—and more than one—in your own paper *Tovarishch* where you (not necessarily you personally, but your Party colleagues) assured the credulous Russian philistine that bad Cabinet Ministers would have to resign if the party of "people's freedom" won the elections. What's that? You don't remember, my dear Radical? But we remember it very well. You could not take part in elections, my dear Sir, unless you promised to be loyal, unless you swore to use only constitutional methods of struggle. As for us, the party of people's freedom, we make promises solely in order to carry them out, and for no other reason!

You say we had too much faith in the power of the Duma, that this did not help us to accumulate "our own" forces? But for God's sake read Plekhanov, whom you certainly regard as an authority. After all, it is you, your colleagues, and not the Cadets, who are fond of stating in private conversation that they are really quite Social-Democrats in all respects and would have declared themselves such if ... if the Social-Democrats as a whole had entirely adopted Plekhanov's standpoint. And was it not Plekhanov who said at the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party that only anarchists can shout about constitutional illusions? Did not Plekhanov move a resolution in which

the Duma was not only referred to as a *power*—and this title was confirmed by the Unity Congress of the Social-Democrats!!—but as a power "created by the tsar himself and sanctioned by law"? Did not Plekhanov himself write in the esteemed organ of the Mensheviks—and you gentlemen of *Nasha Zhizn* have always praised these tendencies of the Mensheviks!—that constructive work in the Duma has the most agitational effect? And you applauded Plekhanov; in the press you admired his "courage" (yes, that is exactly how you expressed it) in combating "Blanquism"! You have not managed, literally, to wear out your shoes since that happened, and yet you yourselves are already repeating these deplorable Blanquist fallacies!!

If the Cadet had defended himself like this, his defence would have been an attack, and the radical would have been utterly discomfited....

By his present guerrilla attack on constitutional illusions this radical reminds us of the hero of the popular epic who greeted a funeral procession with the cry: "Many happy returns of the day." Just think: when was the struggle against constitutional illusions a vital and urgent necessity? Obviously, when they were flourishing and could, and in fact did, cause *widespread* harm by tempting the "small fry". In other words, when the masses might have imagined, and *could not but imagine*, that there was a constitution, whereas there was none at all. This was exactly the situation during the elections to the First Duma and while the Duma was sitting, i.e., from March to June 1906. It was then that constitutional illusions caused *widespread* harm. At that time, however, only the Bolshevik Social-Democrats systematically combated them, swimming against the stream. At that time Kh—ov and other contributors to "*Nasha Zhizn*" *fostered* these illusions, "warring" with the Bolsheviks, and scolding them for their sharp criticism of the Cadets.

Now, the Duma is dissolved. The Cadets are defeated. No one even imagines that there is such a thing as a constitution. Now even not very noble animals may kick the Cadets ("I scold them"—see the "conversation") and curse constitutional illusions at every fifth word. Ah, my dear Radicals! Your action comes too late!

The case of Kh—ov & Co. provides an illuminating example of how people who regard themselves as enlightened politicians, and even as free-thinkers or radicals, drift with the tide, helpless and without convictions, flabby and powerless. From March to June 1906 they fostered constitutional illusions, calling the Duma a power, trailing behind the Cadets, turning up their noses disdainfully at ruthless criticism of this, then fashionable, party. In September 1906 they "scold" the Cadets and "war" against constitutional illusions without realising that they are lagging behind again, that this is not enough now, and that what is needed is a direct call for a definite (determined by the preceding course of historical development) form of revolutionary struggle.

It would be well if the example of these gentlemen taught the Russian intelligentsia, which so prolifically produces such jelly-fish, to realise how harmful opportunism is. Very often this word is wrongly regarded as "merely a term of abuse" and no attempt is made to grasp its meaning. The opportunist does not betray his party, he does not act as a traitor, he does not desert it. He continues to serve it sincerely and zealously. But his typical and characteristic trait is that he yields to the mood of the moment, he is unable to resist what is fashionable, he is politically short-sighted and spineless. Opportunism means sacrificing the permanent and essential interests of the party to momentary, transient and minor interests. A slight revival of industry, a relative improvement in trade and a slight revival of bourgeois liberalism, and the opportunist begins to shout: Don't frighten the bourgeoisie away, don't fight shy of it, drop your "phrase-mongering" about social revolution! The Duma has assembled, a police-constitutional "spring" is in the air—and lo! the opportunist is already calling the Duma a power, hastening to curse the "fatal" boycott and hurrying forward with the slogan: support the demand for a Duma, i.e., a Cadet, Cabinet. As soon as the tide turns, the opportunist, just as sincerely, and just as inopportunely, begins to "scold" the Cadets and demolish constitutional illusions.

If such moods characteristic of the intelligentsia prevail it will be impossible to adopt a consistent policy worthy of

a genuinely revolutionary class and to pursue it steadfastly through all minor deviations and waverings so as to prepare for a selflessly bold and determined battle with the enemy. That is why the class-conscious proletariat must be critical of the intelligentsia which is coming over to its side and must learn to wage a ruthless struggle against opportunism in politics.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE RESULTS OF THE CADET CONGRESS

We have already made it clear more than once that the autocracy's struggle against the proletarian and peasant revolution inevitably hits the liberal opposition too. Once the proletariat is silent, the pogrom-mongers' government will certainly not miss the opportunity to strangle the Cadets as well. It is now engaged in throttling the Peaceful Renovators. At present it is looking none too kindly even on the Octobrists. And if—thanks to the military courts—even the crack of Brownings, the bursting of bombs and the classical command: "Hands up!" cease for a while, it will be no guarantee, of course, that the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators will, at last, reach their longed for peaceful haven of legal, constitutional struggle.

One might have thought that the tide of frantic reaction would have swept the leaders of the liberal opposition far to the left. The dissolution of the Duma has completely undermined constitutional illusions. There is not a member on the staff of *Tovarishch* or *Stolichnaya Pochta*[117] who could fail to see that now. The suppression of the Cadet press (the whole of the provincial and a considerable part of the metropolitan press), the banning of the congress, the refusal to legalise the party, the prosecution of all the signatories of the Vyborg Manifesto, should, one would think, have forced the Cadets to abandon the policy of organising public opinion and to adopt, at last, the policy of organising the social forces. Furthermore, one would think that if the Cadet leaders lack the heroic determination proudly to go underground, the whole following would there and then abandon such leaders.

The Cadet Congress has shown these calculations to be wrong. For the time being, at any rate. The Congress has sanctioned, though reluctantly, the policy of "marking time" or, more precisely, "don't move", proposed by the Central Committee. The Congress adopted a resolution on organising the social forces, but this was a purely platonic resolution, committing no one to anything, not even giving any indication of the purpose for which such forces could and should be organised. The Congress passed—by a relatively slight majority, it is true—the celebrated Point 4 of the resolution on tactics, which proclaims the party's passive resistance to the passive resistance that is growing spontaneously among the masses of the people and is recommended by the Vyborg Manifesto. The Congress closed as the congress of the single and indivisible "party of people's freedom".

Nor, undoubtedly, could it have been different. The hour has not yet struck for a split in the Cadet Party. While class contradictions have already irrevocably driven large sections of the big bourgeoisie into the camp of open counter-revolution, they have not yet caused sufficient disintegration in the wide sections of the middle and petty bourgeoisie who voted for the Cadets at the elections. So far, there are no objective signs that the lower middle class in the provinces has been infected with that bourgeois dread of revolution which has already possessed the "gallows humanists" of the Guchkov type.

But this disintegration is progressing rapidly. And the Cadet leaders themselves are not sure, of course, whether their motley "people's freedom" *bloc* will stand the test of the social and political struggle, which is growing more and more acute.

The Russian revolution is certainly bound to reach that fatal boundary line, beyond which the break-up of this bloc will be absolutely inevitable. That line will be reached and crossed when the vortex of proletarian and *peasant* uprising irrevocably draws into itself the broadest strata of the petty bourgeoisie and part of the *middle* urban bourgeoisie. Then, but only then, all that will actually remain of the huge Cadet bloc will be the propertied middle bourgeoisie, who were surely destined at their birth to share, in the long run, Mr. Guchkov's bourgeois fears. Then the spectre

of national revolution which is still so potent at the present time, and which is preventing many people from properly appraising the truly gigantic constructive role of the class contradictions in the Russian revolution, will vanish. When this boundary line is reached, a huge political party basing itself on the organisation of public *opinion* will be a hopeless anachronism; while all the elements of the real mass movement, both on the left and on the right, will assign to force, naked physical force, that great, not only destructive but also constructive role, without which, of course, the real consummation of revolution is inconceivable. But where physical force comes into its sovereign rights there is no place for Cadet bourgeois hegemony. The whole history of our struggle bears witness to that fact; one need not be a prophet to predict for certain that the same thing will happen if we experience a new upsurge of the revolution. The Cadet is a "legitimate" participant in the division of the spoils of the revolution—but he is no more than that.

That is why, objectively, those Cadet leaders were right who proposed that the Vyborg Manifesto be regarded simply as a mistake committed in the heat of the moment since it *directly* calls for the adoption of the tactics of passive resistance. For considering the intensity of the struggle today there cannot be any mass passive resistance that will not immediately develop into an active offensive. Mr. Struve is quite right when he says that such a civilised method of struggle (as opposed, if you please, to the purely revolutionary, aggressive method) is appropriate only against a civilised, constitutional government. Who will doubt for a moment that the Stolypin gang will send out its punitive expeditions at the very first signs of a mass refusal to pay taxes, or a mass refusal to assign recruits for the army? Who will then stop the population from defending itself, from passing to an active armed offensive?

And the Vyborg Manifesto, even at the very moment it was being signed, in its purely Cadet interpretation, was at best only a threat to the government that this would happen, and not a practical slogan. In this case, the Milyukovs and Struves are really not to blame for the political simplicity of those provincial Cadets who mistook this manifesto for a practical slogan. The fate of the manifesto in the prov-

inces bears witness to this. The intimidated press spoke very little and very obscurely about this fate, but what it did say proves, we think, that the party of "people's freedom", as a party, has worked hard to apply the principle of passive resistance proclaimed by that manifesto to the manifesto itself. That being the case, the Congress could only endorse this standpoint of the Cadets. The minority of the Congress, which at first was inclined to make some fuss over this endorsement, finally surrendered and remained in the party.

On the other hand, we get news every day from the interior of the country that the idea of passive resistance has found a response among the mass of the people. Non-payment of taxes, refusal to assign recruits, and boycott of the authorities are beginning to become really practical slogans. No one is shutting his eyes to the enormous organisational defects of this growing movement. No one will deny that a certain amount of chaos is inevitable. But out of this chaos will come order, the order of revolution, which is the highest stage of chaotic, spontaneous popular outbreaks. The hatred of the masses who are today seething under the tremendous pressure of the military-court constitution cannot but break out, and here and there is actually breaking out in explosions of open armed struggle. We do not have the data enabling us to predict for certain that when the time comes for calling up recruits and collecting taxes an uprising of the whole people will break out, even if only in the form of purely passive resistance, but that there will be manifestations of such a struggle is inevitable. And the Cadets are stepping aside in good time. "Our conscience does not allow us to endorse this dangerous opinion"—declared the Cadet Congress through Madame Tyrkova, a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

But this invocation of conscience in no way alters the case. Even if approaching events indicated with mathematical certainty the early triumph of a popular revolution, the attitude of the leading circles of the Cadets would be no different. This is proved by the whole past history of the Cadet Party, and the negotiations with the pogrom-mongers for portfolios in the Cabinet marked the culminating point of this history; objectively, they were far more characteristic of it than the Vyborg Manifesto. One of the most authorita-

tive representatives of the Party, Professor Gredeskul, testifies to this in the most definite manner (*Rech*, No. 180): "We have lived with our people," he says. "We have shared their stormy impulses." But that was the time of "boisterous, impetuous youth"; now we have reached the age of "persistent and persevering maturity". And the palladium of this maturity is the election campaign, with a platform in the shape of the Duma's reply to the address from the throne.

The Cadet Party has never shared the "stormy impulses" of the people, and never could do so; the learned professor orated like this merely by way of a rhetorical flourish. Nor has the Cadet Party, as represented by its Congress, moved to the right. It remains where it was. It intends, as hitherto, to take part in the present revolutionary crisis only insofar as it may degenerate into a *purely parliamentary* crisis.

We can only welcome the clear and explicit terms in which the Congress framed its resolutions to that effect. Of course, it will greatly disappoint those who regarded the Vyborg Manifesto as an indication that the Cadets were "beginning to turn to the left" and as a striking sign that the Russian revolution was acquiring a nation-wide character.

By declaring that it conceives the revolution only as a parliamentary struggle, the Congress has put squarely before the broad democratic masses the question of an open struggle for power. The whole course of the Russian revolution indicates that the answer of these democratic masses to that question will differ from that of the Cadets. And Social-Democrats must prepare for the moment when that answer is forthcoming so that the urban and rural poor will find in the Social-Democratic Party their natural leader in the period of revolution.

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PHILISTINISM IN REVOLUTIONARY CIRCLES

Periods of counter-revolution are-marked, among other things, by the spread of counter-revolutionary ideas, not only in a crude and direct form, but also in a more subtle form, namely, the growth of philistine sentiments among the revolutionary parties. Comrade Martov, in his latest pamphlet, *Political Parties in Russia*, applies the term revolutionary parties both to the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. We hope to return some other time to this interesting pamphlet of Martov's, in which he criticises the Cadets with a candour and precision unusual in Menshevik literature, but, at the same time, gives a completely false, non-Marxist classification of our political parties and repeats the fundamental error of Menshevism by classing parties of the Octobrist type with the "Centrist" parties.

But this is by the way. We are interested just now in certain other novel features of Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary publications and intend to note the most striking expressions, or rather reflections, of counter-revolutionary moods in these circles. After the defeat of the December uprising, the most conspicuous expression of counter-revolutionary sentiment among the democrats was the about-face of the Cadets, who threw overboard the constituent assembly slogan and, in the columns of *Polyarnaya Zvezda* and similar publications, abused and vilified the participants in and ideologists of the armed uprising. After the dissolution of the Duma and the failure of the popular movements in July, a novelty in counter-revolutionary sentiment among the democrats was the definite secession of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the formation of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist" Party. After the first and

major upsurge of October-December, the Cadets dropped out of the ranks of militant, fighting democrats. After the second, smaller upsurge of May-June, the Popular Socialists began to drop out.

In *Proletary*, No. 4, we outlined the main ideological and political features of these Popular Socialists.* Since then they have managed to come out quite officially; they have published the programme of their "Trudovik (Popular Socialist)" Party—changing the Socialist-Revolutionary programme from a revolutionary into an opportunist, petty-bourgeois and legal programme, and have published the names of the members of the organising committee of the new party. True, among the seventeen members of this organising committee (Messrs. Annensky, Yelpatyevsky, Myakotin, Peshekhonov and others) there is only *one* ex-member of the Duma from the "Trudovik Group", Mr. Kryukov, a high-school teacher and publicist. The founders of the new Toilers' Party do not include a single big name from the *real* "Trudoviks"! It is not surprising that some people call the Popular Socialists pretender Trudoviks. It is not surprising that news of other Trudovik parties has already appeared in the press. *Tovarishch* reported that Mr. Sedelnikov, who, of course, is a much more prominent "Trudovik" and much better known to the public for his activities in the Duma than the quite obscure Mr. Kryukov, is forming a *Popular Trudovik* Party. At a large meeting reported in *Tovarishch*, Mr. Sedelnikov frankly and openly defended his ideas, making no claim to be a socialist and raising the standard of a "democratic monarchy". According to the same report, the directness and frankness of this Trudovik from the ranks of the people roused the great ire of the Trudovik journalist, Mr. Myakotin, who, in replying, championed the views of the Popular Socialists.

The details of this family quarrel do not interest us. The only important thing for us to note is the various expressions of opportunist trends among former Socialist-Revolutionaries and certain "Trudoviks". In this respect, Mr. Peshekhonov is making more "progress" than anybody (among the S.-R.'s there are much bolder "progressive innovators" than

* See pp. 197-206 of this volume.—*Ed.*

among us). In the September issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* he goes further and further on his way from the revolutionaries to the Cadets. He tries to erase the difference between the revolutionary "take" and the Cadet "receive". After "proving" in August that it is impossible to take either full freedom or all the land, he now "proves" that it is impossible "to take freedom from below". *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*, or, as we say in Russia, the first glass must be forced down, the second trickles down, and all the others glide down in a merry stream. In the columns of a legally published periodical, this neo-Cadet [publicist] rails against the idea of an armed uprising, the idea of a provisional revolutionary government, without calling things by their name, of course, and without quoting in full the manifesto of the revolutionary parties which he is "refuting". He distorts and vulgarises in the free press the ideas of those who in the illegal press upheld the idea of an uprising, the idea of a provisional revolutionary government. Indeed, the Popular Socialists have not legalised their party for nothing! It can be taken for granted that they have legalised it not to defend the idea of an uprising, but to condemn it!

An important novelty as regards the reflection of counter-revolutionary moods in Social-Democratic literature has been the publication of the Moscow weekly *Nashe Dyelo*.[118] The Cadet press has already deafened everyone with its trumpeting about this new and important "progress" of the Mensheviks: they are "progressing", as we knew, from the revolutionaries to the Cadets. *Rech* published a special welcoming article; *Tovarishch* delightedly repeated the main ideas contained in *Nashe Dyelo*; *Rech* repeated the opinions of *Tovarishch*; *Tovarishch* confirmed its own views by quoting *Rech*; in short, the enlightened company of the educated betrayers of the Russian revolution are in an extraordinary state of rapturous excitement. *Rech* has even heard from some source that *Nashe Dyelo* is edited by the prominent Mensheviks, Messrs. Maslov, Cherevanin, Groman and Valentinov.

We do not know whether *Rech*'s information is correct, although it usually makes great claims to being well-informed about all Menshevik affairs. But we do know Cherevanin's leading article in *Nashe Dyelo*, No. 1. It is worthwhile quoting the passage which so delighted the Cadets,

"It would be an absurdity and folly for the proletariat to try, as some propose, to fight in league with the peasantry against the government and the bourgeoisie for a national constituent assembly with full power" (p. 4). "We must insist on the convocation of a new Duma." The Cabinet must be formed from the Duma majority. "With the peasantry completely unorganised, and terribly ignorant as they are at present, it is difficult to expect more" (p. 6). As you see, this is frank ... angelically frank. Comrade Cherevanin has gone much further to the right, while remaining in the ranks of a revolutionary party, than Mr. Peshekhonov, who has formed a new "legal party". Mr. Peshekhonov has *not yet* abandoned the constituent assembly slogan and is *still* criticising the demand for a Duma Cabinet as inadequate.

Not wishing to insult the intelligence of our readers, we will not, of course, attempt to prove the fallacy of Cherevanin's position. His name has already become a by-word among all Social-Democrats, irrespective of faction. But we do invite our readers to reflect most earnestly on the reasons for this incredibly easy conversion of a prominent and responsible Menshevik into a liberal. It is not difficult to condemn and reject a glaringly obvious "extreme", "excess", of opportunism. It is much more important to lay bare the source of these mistakes which cause Social-Democrats to blush with shame. We invite our readers to reflect on whether there is really any greater difference between Cherevanin and our Central Committee than there is between Sedelnikov and Peshekhonov.

The underlying motives of the whole of this "quartet" are the same. People of a philistine, petty-bourgeois type are weary of the revolution. A little, drab, beggarly but peaceful legality is preferable to the stormy alternations of revolutionary outbursts and counter-revolutionary frenzy. Inside the revolutionary parties this tendency is expressed in a desire to reform these parties. Let the philistine become the main nucleus of the party: "the party must be a *mass* party". Down with illegality, down with secrecy, which hinders constitutional "progress"! The old revolutionary parties must be legalised. And this necessitates a radical reform of their programmes in two main directions: political and economic. We must drop the demand for a republic and the con-

fiscation of the land, we must discard our clearly defined uncompromisingly sharp and tangible exposition of the socialist goal and represent socialism as a "remote prospect" as Mr. Peshekhonov has expressed it with such inimitable grace.

It is these strivings that the different representatives of our "quartet" express on different grounds and in different forms. Sedelnikov's democratic monarchy; the "progress" from the Trudovik to the Cadet in the "Popular Socialist" Party; Cherevanin's rejection of the revolutionary struggle for a constituent assembly; Axelrod's and Plekhanov's labour congress; our Central Committee's slogan "for the Duma"; the arguments in No. 1 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published by this same Central Committee, about the conservatism of secret organisation and underground activities, and the progressiveness of going over to the "nation-wide bourgeois revolution—all these are manifestations of a single fundamental striving, all form a single current of the philistinism that is showing itself among the revolutionary parties.

From the point of view of legalising the Party, of "bringing it closer" to the masses, of reaching agreement with the Cadets, of association with the nation-wide bourgeois revolution, Cherevanin *quite logically* proclaimed the struggle for a constituent assembly an "absurdity and folly". We have already pointed out in *Proletary*, No. 1,* that our Central Committee glaringly contradicts itself by advocating in its famous "Letters to Party Organisations" (Nos. 4 and 5) an alliance with the middle bourgeoisie, the officers, etc., and at the same time putting forward the slogan of a constituent assembly, which is *unacceptable* to them. In this respect Cherevanin argues more consistently and more correctly, or more honestly and frankly, than the Peshekhonovs or our Central Committee. The latter's *Sotsial-Demokrat* is either trying to be cunning or it displays a striking lack of thought when, on the one hand, it fulminates against "roads which lead the proletariat away from the nation-wide movement", "dooming it to political isolation", and, on the other hand, it upholds the constituent assembly slogan and says: "it is necessary to prepare for an uprising".

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* See pp. 150-66 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Take the labour congress. Recently (October 6) the Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* at last blurted out the secret of this congress. According to the report of this newspaper, the following is what was said by "one of the veteran Social-Democratic leaders, who raised the question of a labour congress", in a lecture delivered by him a few days ago: "They [the members of the "labour congress"] can adopt the entire programme of Social-Democracy with, perhaps, a few alterations, and then the Party will emerge from its underground existence." The position is quite clear. The veteran leaders are ashamed to say openly that they want the programme of the Party changed so that it can go over to a legal position. Well, suppose we say: get rid of the republic, the constituent assembly and mention of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, add that the Party wages a struggle only by legal means (as was said in the programme of the German Social-Democrats prior to the Anti-Socialist Law[119]), etc. "*Then the Party will emerge from its underground existence*"—so the "veteran leaders" imagine—then the passage will be accomplished from "conservative" illegality, revolutionism and underground existence to "progressive" constitutional legality. Such is the bashfully concealed essence of the labour congress. A labour congress is the chloroform which the veteran leaders prescribe for the "conservative" Social-Democrats, in order to be able to perform on them the painless operation carried out by the Peshekhonovs on the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The only difference is that the Peshekhonovs are practical businessmen and know where they are going, whereas it would be unjust to say that of our veteran leaders. They do not understand that in the present political situation a labour congress is just idle talk; when this situation changes in the direction of a revolutionary upswing, a labour congress will by no means bring with it the triumph of philistinely tranquil legality, if at that time the expansion of the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party will not have made a labour congress superfluous; and if the present situation changes in the direction of a complete and lasting victory of reaction, a labour congress will then be able to *cut down* the Social-Democratic programme to an extent that will horrify even Axelrod.

That the Cadet press gives its utmost support to the idea of a labour congress is quite understandable for it has a flair for seizing on the philistine and opportunist tendencies of this scheme. It is not for nothing that Mr. Portugalov—a Cadet who considers himself a non-party socialist—is delighted by the "wise position" of Axelrod, seizes on his contemptuous words about the Party as a "circle organisation" (a "circle" with 100,000-150,000 members; i.e., on the European scale, with one to one-and-a-half million votes at elections!) and asks with an air of importance: "Is the class for the party or the party for the class?" Let us answer this wise question by another addressed to the bourgeois writers: is the head for the stomach or the stomach for the head?

Finally, let us take the arguments of the Central Committee's *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The same Mr. Portugalov accurately seized on their essence when he quoted a passage no less worthy of renown than the statements of Cherevanin. "It [the Menshevik trend] attempted to meet halfway the inevitable conversion of the underground revolutionary struggle of the intelligentsia, who base themselves on the leading sections of the proletariat, into a national bourgeois revolution." Mr. Portugalov comments: "Not so long ago such threats [?misprint? such ideas?] were invariably declared a heresy of 'bourgeois-democratic' origin. Now 'bourgeois democrats' have nothing to add to these remarks."

Mr. Portugalov is right. It is not only in the recent past that the argument of the leader writer in *Sotsial-Demokrat* was declared the fruit of bourgeois-democratic ideas, it is declared to be such now and will be so declared in the future. Just reflect, indeed, on this argument. It is possible for an underground struggle to be converted into an open one, for a struggle of the intelligentsia to be converted into a people's or mass struggle, for the struggle of the leading sections of the class to be converted into one of the entire class, but the conversion of an underground revolutionary struggle into a national bourgeois revolution is sheer gibberish. The real significance of this argument is the substitution of the standpoint of bourgeois democracy for the standpoint of the proletariat.

"Two years of civil war have brought about a national revolution in our country. That is a fact,..." says the leader

writer of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. It is not a fact, but a phrase. The civil war in Russia, if we take this term seriously, has not been going on for two years. In September 1904 there was no civil war. To stretch the concept of civil war out of all proportion will only be to the advantage of those who ignore the *special* tasks of the workers' party in a period of *real* civil war. The Russian revolution was much more national before October 17, 1905, than it is today. It is sufficient to point to the desertion of the landlords to the reactionary camp. It is sufficient to recall the formation of counter-revolutionary parties of the "Octobrist" type, and the unquestionable accentuation of counter-revolutionary characteristics among the Cadets in the summer of 1906, as compared with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League in the summer of 1905. A year ago the *Osvobozhdeniye* people did not and could not talk about stopping the revolution; Struve took the side of the revolution. Now the Cadets say openly that their aim is to stop the revolution.

What, then, does this conversion of the underground revolutionary struggle into a national bourgeois revolution amount to in practice? To ignoring, or obscuring, the class contradictions which have already been revealed by the course of the Russian revolution. To converting the proletariat from a fighting vanguard, pursuing an *independent* revolutionary policy, into an appendage of that faction of the bourgeois democrats which is most in the limelight, which lays most claim to represent "national" aspirations. Hence it is clear why the bourgeois liberal had to say: We have nothing to add to this, we quite agree, we are striving for the conversion of the proletarian struggle into a national struggle. To convert it into a nation-wide struggle (or, what is the same thing, a national revolution) means to take what is common to the Cadet and other parties more to the left and declare it to be binding, cutting out everything else as "dooming the proletariat to political isolation". In other words, subscribe to the demands of the Cadets, for any other demands will not be "national". Hence, naturally, the slogans of half-hearted Social-Democratic opportunism: "for the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly", or for the Duma as a "lever for winning a constituent assembly" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1). Hence the motto

of consistent Social-Democratic opportunism: it would be an absurdity and folly to fight for a constituent assembly, for the demand for a constituent assembly "dooms the proletariat to political isolation", exceeds the bounds of a "national bourgeois revolution", etc.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats must argue differently, Instead of uttering phrases about "a national bourgeois revolution", which are too general and too easily lend themselves to bourgeois distortion, we must analyse the concrete position of definite classes and parties at various moments in the revolution. In 1900 and 1901 the old *Iskra* and *Zarya*[120] quite rightly spoke of Social-Democracy as the carrier of the ideas of national emancipation, as the fighting vanguard which endeavoured to win over to its side all elements, including even liberal Marshals of the Nobility. This was true at that time, for, as yet, there was nothing, absolutely nothing in the policy of the government that could satisfy even the mildest bourgeois liberalism. The Russian general strike in October proved that this was true; for the proletarian struggle then became the centre of attraction for all sorts of bourgeois liberals, even the very mildest.

After October 17 things changed, they had to change. The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Comrade Martov is wrong to call it a "liberal-democratic" bourgeoisie) had to rise in defence of the monarchy and landlordism, to do so directly (Octobrists) or indirectly (Cadets), for the further victories of the revolution were becoming a serious and immediate menace to these charming institutions. Those who forget that with the progress of revolution and the growth of its tasks a change takes place in the composition of the classes and elements of the people capable of taking part in the struggle for the achievement of these aims fall into grievous error. Through the bourgeois revolution the proletariat marches to socialism. Therefore, in the course of the bourgeois revolution it must raise and enlist for the revolutionary struggle more and more revolutionary strata of the people. In 1901 the proletariat roused the Zemstvo liberals. Now, because of the objective conditions, its main task is to rouse, educate and mobilise for the struggle the revolutionary peasantry, to deliver them from the ideological and political tutelage not only of the Cadets pure and simple,

but of the Trudoviks of the Peshekhonov type. If the revolution can triumph it will do so *only* as a result of an alliance between the proletariat and the really revolutionary, not the opportunist, peasantry. Therefore, if we seriously say that we stand for revolution (and not only for a constitution), if we are seriously speaking of a "new revolutionary upsurge", we must strenuously combat all attempts to discard the constituent assembly slogan, or to weaken it by linking it with the Duma (the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly, or the Duma as a lever for winning a constituent assembly, etc.), or by trimming down the tasks of the proletariat to the limits of a Cadet or alleged national bourgeois revolution. Of the mass of the peasantry, only the well-to-do and middle peasants will inevitably become opportunist and, later, even reactionary. But these constitute the minority of the peasantry. The poor peasantry together with the proletariat constitute the overwhelming majority of the people, the nation. *This* majority *can* triumph, and will triumph completely, in the bourgeois revolution, *i.e.*, *can win complete freedom and all the land* and attain the highest level of prosperity possible for workers and peasants in capitalist society. You can, if you will, call such a revolution of the majority of the nation a national bourgeois revolution, but anyone can see that the ordinary meaning of these words is quite different, that their actual meaning at the present time is a Cadet meaning.

We are "conservative" Social-Democrats in the sense that we stand for the old revolutionary tactics. "The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability" (*Two Tactics*).* This was written in the summer of 1905. Now the stakes are higher, the task is harder, the impending battle will be sharper. We must paralyse the instability of the whole bourgeoisie, including the intellectualist and the peasant bourgeoisie. We must rally to the proletariat the poor peasantry, which is capable of waging a determined revolutionary struggle. Not our own desires but objective conditions *will set* before the "new revolution-

* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 100.—*Ed.*

ary upsurge" *precisely these* lofty tasks. The class-conscious proletariat must do its duty to the very end.

P. S. This article had already been sent to the press when we read Comrade Martov's letter to *Tovarishch*. L. Martov dissociates himself from Cherevanin on the question of forming a bloc with the Cadets. Very good. But it is astonishing and extremely deplorable that L. Martov *does not dissociate himself* from Cherevanin's discovery: "the absurdity and folly of fighting for a constituent assembly", although he *must have known* of this discovery from *Tovarishch*, No. 73, which he quotes. Has Martov, too, already "progressed" as far as Cherevanin?

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MARTOV'S AND CHEREVANIN'S PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE BOURGEOIS PRESS[121]

TELLING HOW CERTAIN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS RESORT TO BOURGEOIS, CADET NEWSPAPERS, LIKE *TOVARISHCH*, AND, THROUGH *TOVARISHCH* TO THE *NOVY PUT*,[122] IN ORDER TO SPREAD FALSE REPORTS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY. REFUTATION. ESTIMATION. CONCLUSIONS.

LIES SPREAD BY L. MARTOV THROUGH THE COLUMNS OF THE BOURGEOIS PRESS

The bourgeois Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* of October 1 (No. 85) *reprints* without comment the following passage from another Cadet paper *Novy Put*: "We [*Novy Put*] cannot but admit that in insisting on a permanent bloc with the extreme Lefts (as we learn from Mr. Martov's letter) they [the Bolsheviks] are more logical than Mr. Martov."

Thus, *Novy Put* refers directly to L. Martov in confirmation of its false report about the Bolsheviks.

It is necessary to establish the facts.

In No. 1 of the "Bolshevik" *Proletary* the following was said in an article entitled "The Boycott" (p. 3). "We shall convene the Fifth Party Congress; there we shall resolve that in the event of elections taking place, it will be necessary to enter into an electoral agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviks (unless the Fifth Party Congress is convened it will be impossible to conduct a united election campaign; and 'blocs with other parties' are absolutely prohibited by the decision of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the Cadets."*

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* See p. 145 of this volume.—*Ed.*

This is *all*, to our knowledge, that has been said so far in Social-Democratic literature on the attitude of the Bolsheviks to electoral agreements. Clearly, *Novy Put* has been misled by L. Martov. Firstly, far from insisting on such a thing, the Bolsheviks have *never* even mentioned "a permanent bloc with the extreme Lefts". Secondly, as regards *all* "blocs" *whatsoever*, the Bolsheviks have demanded that the existing decision be *revised* at the next Congress. This fact is wrongfully suppressed by those who *dread* the next Congress of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. And it is also wrongfully suppressed by the bourgeois newspapers, which falsely report to their readers, or create the false impression, that the Social-Democrats do *not* formally prohibit *all* blocs.

Thirdly: L. Martov, writing for the bourgeois newspapers, deliberately, or through inadvertence or ignorance, conveys to the public, through the medium of the Cadet paper *Tovarishch*, the idea that the Bolsheviks sanction electoral agreements *at the lowest* stage of the election too i.e., in conducting agitation *among the masses*, whereas he, L. Martov, regards as expedient only "partial agreements at the highest stages of our multi-stage electoral system".

L. Martov *has no facts* to support this assertion. L. Martov is spreading a *lie* through the columns of the bourgeois press, for the Bolsheviks proposed an agreement *only* for the highest stages, *only* with the Trudoviks, only for a few weeks and *only with the consent of the Fifth Congress*.

To spread this *lie*, which can easily reach the masses in view of the notorious tendency of Cadet newspapers to sympathise with the Mensheviks and sympathetically reprint any slander they choose to utter against the Bolsheviks, L. Martov used an "*abbreviated*" version of the views of *Proletary*. Although these views are fully expressed in the space of the five printed lines quoted in full above, L. Martov found it necessary, none the less, to *abbreviate* them and, moreover, *render them in his own words*. The reader will see that Martov's abridged version is tantamount to a *sheer distortion*.

In the five lines in *Proletary* the subject is mentioned in passing. No specific reference is made there to either the

highest or lowest stages of the elections. It may be objected, therefore, that I, too, have no grounds for asserting that these five lines do not refer to agreements at the first stage. But such an objection can be made only by one who desires to quibble over a word and to distort the obvious meaning of someone's argument.

Undoubtedly, a five-line statement of the question leaves many gaps; but does the general trend of the article, and its whole content, warrant a wider rather than narrower interpretation of the omissions (as regards agreements)?

In any case, even the "letter" of the quotation (unless "abbreviated" *à la* Martov) is undoubtedly opposed to a wider interpretation, because anyone with the slightest experience of elections will understand that an agreement at the *first* stage *cannot* be limited to "a few weeks" but must necessarily be for *months*. Suffice it to say that *already*, in St. Petersburg, the parties are being mentioned which are seeking an election bloc with the Cadets; and *already* the approximate distribution of Duma seats for the city of St. Petersburg between the Cadets and these parties is reported. It is said that the elections will probably take place on December 17. Two months before that date, the people who really desire first-stage agreements are already beginning to come to terms, directly or through intermediaries. Take into account also the duration of the actual elections, add the time necessary for a *party* decision on this question, the time necessary for sending *party* directives from the centre to every part of Russia—and you will see that agreements between parties for the first stage of the elections will take *months*, while a "few weeks" will only just suffice for a final-stage agreement, i.e., the distribution of seats after the contest, based on a calculation of the forces revealed by the direct vote of the electors.

Finally, since I have been compelled to make a statement in the press on this question, I think it would be improper to refrain from stating my own personal opinion. In the present political situation I would advocate the following at the Fifth Congress: no blocs or agreements whatever between the Social-Democrats and any other parties to be tolerated at the lowest stage of the elections. We must appear

before the masses at election time absolutely independently. At the highest stages agreements with the Trudoviks may be permitted exclusively for the proportional distribution of seats and on the condition that we "*make*" the non-party Trudoviks party men, counterposing the opportunists among them and the semi-Cadets (Popular Socialists, "Popular Socialist Party", etc.) to the revolutionary bourgeois democrats,

MARTOV AND CHEREVANIN

In *Tovarishch*, L. Martov has refuted Cherevanin, who spoke of an agreement with the Cadets. In the same *Tovarishch*, Cherevanin now explains the "misunderstanding". According to these explanations, Cherevanin did not really say definitely in No. 1 of *Nashe Dyelo* whether he advocates agreements at the lowest or the highest stages. In substance, however, he declares in favour of *permitting* agreements also *at the lowest stages in the rural districts as well as in the towns*. Cherevanin does not say with which parties agreements may be made. He (and apparently Martov, too) sees no difference between the revolutionary and the opportunist bourgeoisie, between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Cadets, between the Trudoviks of the type of the "33" in the Duma and the Trudoviks of the "Popular-Socialist" type, etc. Moreover, Cherevanin would even allow *voting*, *without an agreement*, *for bourgeois candidates at the lowest stages of the elections!*

Thus, Cherevanin's position becomes perfectly clear. This not only prominent (as attested by the bourgeois press) but also highly responsible Menshevik, who, moreover, is the head of the weekly *Nashe Dyelo*, approves of all kinds of blocs and is even in favour of Social-Democrats voting for bourgeois candidates. Hence, the Bolsheviks were absolutely right when they said that the Mensheviks are trying to convert the working class into an appendage of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and to degrade the role of the Social-Democrats to that of yes-men of the Cadets.

Let no one be mistaken now about the true meaning of the usual Menshevik slogan: for the *Duma*, as an organ, or lever, or instrument, etc., of the revolution. In order to support

the revolution, the Mensheviks are supporting the "Duma" as such. And in order to support the Duma as such, they are prepared to vote, even without an agreement, for the candidates of the Cadet Party, which wants to put a stop to the revolution!

Remember the French Socialists like Millerand, Viviani and Briand, who are now, under Clemenceau's leadership, serenely governing arch-bourgeois France, sending troops against strikers, etc. In order to support socialism, they called for support of the republic in general, the republic as such. In order to support the republic, they voted, with and without agreements, for commonplace bourgeois politicians, for the opportunists. Thus, slowly but surely, they themselves were converted into commonplace supporters of bourgeois oppression.

Cherevanin and his like have now come out on the main road, the beaten track!

What about Martov? He is opposed to agreements at the lowest stages. He has repudiated Cherevanin. This is very gratifying. Only ... only just see *how* he did it. Every sensible politician subordinates his electoral tactics to his general political tactics. Thanks to the kind services of the Cadet papers, Cherevanin's tactics are now manifest to all. "It would be an absurdity and folly for the proletariat to try, as some propose, to fight in league with the peasantry against the government and the bourgeoisie for a national constituent assembly with full power:" This famous dictum of Cherevanin's *was cited* in the same number of *Tovarishch* which evoked L. Martov's "reply". Yet, while repudiating Cherevanin's electoral tactics, Martov said *not a word* against this underlying principle of Cherevanin's political tactics as a *whole*.

Who is the more consistent of these two? Whose is the firmer stand? For the Duma or for the revolution? For the Duma as such means: for the Cadets, which means: against the constituent assembly. For the revolution means: only for a certain part of the Duma on certain conditions, which means: against the Cadets, which means: at the present time it would be an absurdity and folly to abandon, or even to tone down, the demand for a constituent assembly.

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND BOURGEOIS NEWSPAPERS

Is it permissible for a Social-Democrat to contribute to bourgeois newspapers?

Certainly not. Theoretical considerations, political etiquette and the practice of the European Social-Democrats are all against it. As is well known, this question came up for discussion at a recent congress of the German Social-Democrats.[123] We know that our German comrades *severely condemn* the idea of Social-Democrats contributing to the bourgeois press and resolutely fight for the principle that the party of the revolutionary proletariat shall tolerate no blocs or agreements in this field either, but maintain its independence; that journalist members of the workers' party should be organised and controlled, not only in name but *in deed*; in other words, should be party men in the strict sense of the term.

Have we any right to depart from these rules here in Russia?

Some might retort: there is an exception to every rule. That is quite true. It would be wrong to condemn a person in banishment for writing to any newspaper. It is *sometimes* hard to condemn a Social-Democrat who is working in a minor department of a bourgeois newspaper to earn a living. One can justify the publication of an urgent and business-like refutation, etc., etc.

But see what will happen here. Under the pretext of refuting "misunderstandings" caused by the *Social-Democratic* "*Nashe Dyelo*", L. Martov writes almost two columns in a Cadet newspaper, calmly expounding the views of some Social-Democrats, arguing against other Social-Democrats and misrepresenting the views of Social-Democrats he disagrees with, without caring in the least what pleasure his literary "bloc" with the Cadets gives to all the enemies of the proletariat. The Cadet newspapers seize on L. Martov's article in the Cadet press, give it wide publicity, add a thing or two of their own to the lie which he has put into circulation about the revolutionary Social-Democrats, pat him on the back (see *Rech*), and so on and so forth. Cherevanin is tempted. If Martov could write to *Tovarishch* to refute Cherevanin's "misunderstandings" and bring in thousands of other things

at the same time, why should not Cherevanin also write to *Tovarishch* to refute L. Martov's "misunderstandings"? And, while he is about it, why not take advantage of the opportunity to start in the Cadet press (after all, it would be improper to do so in the Social-Democratic press!) a discussion on the question whether socialists should vote for bourgeois candidates even without an agreement?*

And so a special feature has been inaugurated in Cadet newspapers: a family-literary correspondence between Social-Democratic opportunists. Since its subject is the permissibility of blocs with the Cadets, and even of voting for the Cadets, the Cadets readily give shelter to the homeless "progressive" Social-Democrats who are departing from the "conservative" rules of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

The Menshevik literary bigwigs dwell in two abodes. In the respectable quarter they talk to fine gentlemen about blocs with the Cadets and incidentally retail anecdotes about the revolutionary Social-Democrats. In the grimy quarter, in some workers' newspaper or Social-Democratic periodical, or a leaflet, they offer the workers a "non-party labour congress" and enlighten them on the absurdity and folly of fighting for a constituent assembly. Let the workers be patient and wait a little: when the Social-Democratic discussion in the Cadet *Tovarishch* on blocs between socialists and the bourgeoisie comes to an end, the workers, too, will learn something.... And so, following the homely rule of one of Turgenev's characters,[124] our advocates of a labour congress write letter after letter to *Tovarishch*, murmuring the while: our Party is a party of the intelligentsia....

Will not the Social-Democratic workers intervene to put a stop to this outrage? Is it a matter of indifference to the members of our Party?

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* F. Dan has migrated to *Tovarishch* even without the object of refuting "misunderstandings", but merely for company's sake.

ON CONVENING AN EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS[125]

Both issues of the Central Committee's *Sotsial-Demokrat* contain articles by Plekhanov and Martov against the calling of an extraordinary congress. These articles are written in such an angry and excited tone, are so saturated with bitterness, irritation, personal insinuations and suspicion that they immediately recall the atmosphere of the worst period of émigré squabbles. By publishing these and *only* these articles on the Congress in *its own* journal, the Central Committee of our Party puts itself in a very unseemly position. Just imagine: the responsible ministry of a democratically organised working-class party is absolutely beside itself and loses all self-control because there is agitation for another congress! Why, it is simply indecent, comrades. By raging and fuming against agitation for the revision of *your* mandates and *your* tactics you are strongly condemning yourselves. If any one in favour of a congress took pleasure in being malicious he could wish for nothing better than to have the articles of Plekhanov and Martov reprinted and widely distributed!

But why is opposition to a congress expressed in the name of the Central Committee by people who can only talk in an injured, almost sobbing tone? Because the two main facts which made agitation for another congress inevitable are too clear and simple. One of these facts concerns the composition of the Party, the other concerns its tactics.

At the time of the Unity Congress our Party membership consisted of 13,000 Bolsheviks and 18,000 Mensheviks. The Central Committee, and the Central Organ even more so, express the opinion of the 18,000. Now 14,000 Letts,

26,00 Poles and 33,000 Bundists have joined the Party.* The leading article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, unequivocally admits in two places that at the present time both factions in the Party are about equal in size. This opinion is evidently arrived at by classifying the Poles and Letts as Bolsheviks and the Bundists as Mensheviks. Let us assume that it is correct to classify the Bund as Menshevik. But even then it is an obvious and a crying anomaly that the Menshevik Central Committee should represent the *whole* of our Party (the Central Committee consists of seven Mensheviks, three Bolsheviks, one Lett and two Bundists; one Pole has the rights of a member of the Central Organ; moreover, on all political questions another five Mensheviks, the editors of the Central Organ, have the right to speak and vote).

As regards tactics—during the five or six months that have elapsed since the last Congress the Party has passed through two important periods in our revolution: the period of the Duma and the "Cabinet of the dissolution of the Duma". The Duma tactics of our Central Committee amounted to supporting the (Cadet) Duma as a whole. These tactics reached their apogee in the slogan supporting the demand for the appointment of a Duma (i.e., Cadet) Cabinet. The majority of the Party rejected these tactics and this slogan; that is a fact. During the Duma period the Social-Democratic Party *combated* the tactics of *its own* Central Committee. Comment on this fact and discussion of its implications are superfluous.

Further, after the dissolution of the Duma, the Central Committee declared in favour of organising partial mass expressions of protest. The general tactical slogan became: for the Duma as an organ of power which will convene the constituent assembly. Again, it is an indisputable historical fact that the vast majority of the Party membership accepted neither this particular slogan nor the general tactics of the Central Committee. Yet anyone who carefully reads

* *Tovarishch* of October 11 gives new figures alleged to have been obtained from the Central Committee, but which, however, do not in the main alter the relative proportions. According to these figures our Party now has about 150,000 members: 33,000 of them are Bolsheviks 43,000 Mensheviks; 13,000 Letts; 28,000 Poles, and 33,000 members of the Bund.

No. 1 and No. 2 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* cannot fail to see that these general tactics are there defended, justified and substantiated (for the Duma as a lever for convening a constituent assembly; the Cadets as the urban bourgeoisie which is progressive in comparison with the peasantry, and so forth) .

Hence it is clear that if there is a new Duma campaign the Party will have to fight against the Central Committee's Duma slogans; and if revolutionary actions take place in the near future, the forces will be split and the struggle will be disorganised, because the Central Committee does not represent the will of the majority of the Party membership. Hence, any delay in convening the next Party Congress not only at present directly contravenes the whole spirit and meaning of the democratic organisation of the Party, but will also prove a most dangerous obstacle in the forthcoming Duma and general revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

P. S. Nos. 3 to 5 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which have come out since this article was written, confirm all that we say even more strongly. It transpires that on the question of electoral agreements there is a complete split among the Mensheviks, and their Central Committee is oscillating between Martov and Cherevanin. Martov has publicly refuted Cherevanin Plekhanov went off to write for a Cadet newspaper in order to support Cherevanin. The leading article in No. 4 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* proves that the Central Committee is already preparing once again, in opposition to the Party, to advance its slogans of supporting the Duma as a whole and of supporting the demand for the appointment of a Duma Cabinet.

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HOW HISTORY IS WRITTEN...

This is an old story: the boycott of the State Duma. A Menshevik comrade writing in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 3 ("Situation or Position?") tells it in the following way:

> "When history presented us with the plan of the Bulygin Duma, we, acting upon our general principles, recommended the organisation of parallel unofficial elections to a People's Duma, in opposition to the Bulygin Duma, to which we had no access. But when, after the December uprising, we were faced...."

Stop, my dear historian, one moment! That you skip over the events between the Bulygin plan and the December uprising is a small matter, merely a chronological leap. But to do likewise with your tactics and "principles" is another thing; this leap is—to say the least—diplomatic. Did you recommend *only* "unofficial elections"? Did you treat the Bulygin Duma *only* as an institution to which you "had no access"? And so, for the sake of your People's Duma you intended to boycott the Bulygin Duma? Or ignore it? But did you not at that time wage war on certain boycottists? Did you not insist that an active part should be taken in the "Bulygin" election campaign which was expected at that time? Did you not demand that the Party should support the Left liberals at the elections, etc.? How is it that you have forgotten all that?

"But when, after the December uprising, we were faced...." Stop, you have omitted another small point. Russia boycotted the Bulygin Duma, but up to now there is still no People's Duma.... Well, have you admitted that your tactics in those days were mistaken? No, your answer to the boycottists was that your tactics in regard to the Bulygin Duma were correct, only the revolution prevented them from being

seen in all their glory.... Now, having recalled *all this*, continue your story.

"But when, after the December uprising, we were faced with the convocation of the new Witte Duma, we recommended participation in the primary stages of the elections, counting upon two possibilities: either the very fact of our participation would evoke a revolutionary upsurge that would sweep away the Witte Duma...."

Stop, my dear historian, stop, what has come over you? "The fact of our participation *would evoke* a revolutionary upsurge...." No, really, you must be joking! You have always accused the Bolsheviks of naïvely exaggerating our strength—and to think that you should speak seriously of a revolutionary upsurge—and what an upsurge: one "that would sweep away", etc.—which could be *evoked* by the "fact of our participation". No, of course, not seriously.

And so: "... either the very fact of our participation would evoke a revolutionary upsurge that would sweep away the Witte Duma and call into being a representative institution more advantageous to us; or the revolutionary upsurge would not come immediately, in which case, not only would we be able to go into the Duma, but, the very state of affairs would compel us to do so, as was the case in Lefortovo District of Moscow."

Excuse me, but, if I remember rightly, you never said a word about this "or" at the time.

True, we did not—our historian replies.

"True, in the pamphlet published by the joint editorial board we said that we did not recommend participation in the elections directly to the Duma. But we did it, we tied our hands beforehand, only for the sake of a compromise, in the hope of arriving at some agreement with the boycottists for working out uniform tactics. This was 'opportunism' on our part—we deliberately adapted ourselves to the obsolete, short-sighted views of our boycottist comrades, and this we sincerely repent."

So that's it! You were saying one thing and thinking another. And you said it to the proletariat and the whole revolutionary people.... You "repent" it! But don't you know the saying: "Caught lying once, who will trust you again?" What if your "repentance" is also caused by your "adapting" yourselves to somebody's "obsolete" or "short-sighted" views? Where is the limit to such "opportunism", to

such "compromises"? What should be our attitude to any of your slogans when you yourselves admit that your slogan on one of the most important tactical questions was not put forward sincerely? Why, anyone might well believe, after this, that you call yourselves Social-Democrats only for the sake of "adapting" yourselves "to the obsolete and short-sighted views" of the revolutionary proletariat.

Well, I must say something in your defence. In the heat of controversy you have cruelly wronged yourselves. You were sincere boycottists at the third stage of the elections, just as we were sincere boycottists at all stages of the elections. But we were *boycottists* all together. *Nebst gefangen, nebst gehangen*—"caught together, hanged together". You want to "hang" us now for having been boycottists. But in that case, my dear comrades, you will have to hang yourselves as well: you have been caught at the same game. "But we have repented," you declare. Well, that mitigates your offence. But it does not acquit you, or exempt you from punishment. Well, not hanging, but how about a good flogging, for instance? Is that what you are after?

As for ourselves—we have not repented. We said and still say: boycott or non-boycott is a question not of principle, but of expediency. The boycott of the First Duma was expedient. It gave the mass of the people a vivid, concrete, proletarian appraisal of the Duma as an institution incapable of solving the fundamental problems of the revolution. The dissolution of the Duma and all that followed it have confirmed this appraisal; the mass of the people clearly perceives that here, too, the proletariat proved to be their natural leader in the revolution, warning them beforehand of the sterility of constitutional illusions! The boycott diverted the attention and the forces of the government, and thus contributed to the victory of the bourgeois opposition at the elections. The boycott united the broad proletarian masses in a single act of revolutionary protest. Its agitational and organisational effect was enormous.

The boycott performed a great service—but its work is *already* done. A proper appraisal of the Duma was given, a telling blow was struck at parliamentary illusions—there is no need to do it over again. At the present time a boycott will not divert the forces of the government—the latter has

certainly learned the lesson of the past elections. The work of agitation and organisation can be performed just as well by taking part in elections as by boycotting them—unless the electoral law is changed very much for the worse. If it is, then, perhaps, we may have to resort to the boycott again. But we may not have time to bother with Duma elections at all if big revolutionary battles begin again.

Thus, boycotting remains a question of expediency. The only point is that *for the time being* we do not see sufficient grounds for a boycott.

Whoever feels guilty, let him repent; but in doing so, let him strew ashes on his *own head* and let him rend *his own* garments, not other people's. And one should not distort history and commit libel in a fit of repentance—not even against oneself.

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POSTSCRIPT TO THE ARTICLE: "THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN"

The above-mentioned article was already written when G. V. Plekhanov's "Open Letter to Class-Conscious Workers" appeared in the newspaper *Tovarishch*. In that letter Plekhanov, "manoeuvring" between the Left wing of the bourgeoisie and the Right wing of the Social-Democrats, finally breaks both with the principles of international revolutionary Social-Democracy and with the decisions of the Unity Congress of our Party. The Party Congress formally forbade all blocs whatsoever with bourgeois parties. The class-conscious, organised proletarian at his Party meetings calls all blocs with the bourgeoisie "betrayal of the cause of the proletariat"; in his article in *Tovarishch* and in his letter to the Party organisations, L. Martov, adopting the Bolshevik, i.e., the consistent revolutionary standpoint, emphatically expresses his opposition to all blocs at the first stage of the elections. "On the first question ["blocs" or electoral pacts]," writes Martov, "I would recommend that we insist, *in conformity with the resolution of the Congress*, *upon complete independence* during our participation *in the first stage* of the elections, i.e., at the stage when we come before the masses." Plekhanov regards this method of presenting the question as "misconceived hostility to compromise". "Where we cannot be sure of the victory of our candidate," writes Plekhanov, "*it is our duty to enter into an agreement with other parties who wish to fight against our old regime*."* While thus sanctioning agreements

* Plekhanov's italics.

with bourgeois parties in spite of the decision of the Congress, Plekhanov, however, displays his "political sagacity" by foreseeing cases when we should not enter into such agreements. He writes: "Where there is no doubt that we shall succeed in *getting our candidate elected** we can and must act *independently* of the other parties." What a wonderful piece of "political sagacity"! Where we are sure of getting our candidate elected ourselves we must do it ourselves. Where we are not sure, we must apply for assistance ... to those "who wish to fight against the old regime", or else help these "wishers" to get their candidate elected. And where those "who wish to fight" are sure of getting their candidates elected themselves, what do you think, O contributor to the Cadet press, Plekhanov, will they be so anxious to conclude an agreement with us? Indeed, if we are talking about agreements, every political infant is aware that they are required only in cases where a party is not sure of getting its candidates elected by its own unaided efforts. We, however, are opposed to all agreements even under such circumstances. But G. V. Plekhanov, like a true knight of freedom, sounds the tocsin in the Cadet *Tovarishch* and calls together all those "who wish to fight".... Come, all ye "wishers"! The proletariat is fighting, you—"wish" to fight! Excellent.... If that is not enough for a proletarian, he must assuredly be an "enemy of freedom".

Thus, the leader of the Mensheviks, the darling of the Cadets, forgetting all that he said after the dissolution of the Duma, is little by little, step by step, sinking to the level of ... Cherevanin.... With his usual "swiftness, dash and unerring eye" Plekhanov is rushing to the extreme right of our Right wing. Martov is left far behind; *Sotsial-Demokrat* can hardly keep pace with its ideological leader. And the organ of the Central Committee, after a long-winded argument about the class character of our election campaign, proposes an intricate system of agreements, building a ladder by which Social-Democrats should descend to the level of the Cadets. At first, suggests *Sotsial-Demokrat*, independent, i.e., class action where we have chances of success; where there are no chances of success, we must combine with

* Plekhanov's italics.

the bourgeois parties which "are striving with us for the convocation of a constituent assembly"; if these parties do not want the constituent assembly—so much the worse (this is the third, last, anti-class and anti-democratic step)—we shall combine with them nevertheless. How the Central Committee, which was elected by the Congress to carry out the decisions of the Congress, contrives to act in violation of these decisions is a secret known only to itself. The fact remains that at the present moment we are witnessing the very disgraceful (for Social-Democracy) spectacle of "the crab crawling backwards" and the "swan straining skyward" on the editorial board of the leading, central organ, when on a question of such import to us as electoral tactics there is neither unity of thought nor unity of action, not only in the Party as a whole, but even in the "leading" faction in that Party. What country and what Socialist Party, except, perhaps, the most opportunist, would tolerate such political depravity? And the remarkable fact is that it is these crabs, pikes and swans, these two squabblers Martov and Plekhanov, who are conducting a desperate campaign against the convocation of an extraordinary congress of the Party, one which we now need more than ever.

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND ELECTORAL AGREEMENTS[126]

Written towards the end of October 1906
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The election campaign for the Second Duma is now a subject of great interest in the workers' party. Special attention is being devoted to the question of "blocs", i.e., permanent or temporary electoral agreements between the Social-Democrats and other parties. The bourgeois, Cadet press—*Rech*, *Tovarishch*, *Novy Put*, *Oko*, etc.—are doing their utmost to convince the workers of the need for a "bloc" (an electoral agreement) between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Some Menshevik Social-Democrats are also advocating such blocs (Cherevanin in *Nashe Dyelo* and *Tovarishch*), others are opposed to them (Martov in *Tovarishch*). The Bolshevik Social-Democrats are opposed to such blocs, and agree only to partial agreements at the higher stages of the election campaign on the distribution of seats in proportion to the polling strength of the revolutionary and opposition parties at the primary ballot.

We shall try to state briefly the case for this last standpoint.

I

Social-Democrats regard parliamentarism (participation in representative assemblies) as one of the means of enlightening and educating the proletariat and organising it in an independent class party; as one of the methods of the political struggle for the emancipation of the workers. This Marxist standpoint radically distinguishes Social-Democracy from bourgeois democracy, on the one hand, and from anarchism on the other. Bourgeois liberals and radicals regard parliamentarism as the "natural" and the only normal and legitimate method of conducting state affairs in general,

and they repudiate the class struggle and the class character of modern parliamentarism. The bourgeoisie exerts every effort, by every possible means and on every possible occasion, to put blinkers on the eyes of the workers to prevent them from seeing that parliamentarism is an instrument of bourgeois oppression, to prevent them from realising the historically limited importance of parliamentarism. The anarchists are also unable to appreciate the historically defined importance of parliamentarism and entirely renounce this method of struggle. That is why the Social-Democrats in Russia strenuously combat both anarchism and the efforts of the bourgeoisie to *stop* the revolution as soon as possible by coming to terms with the old regime on a parliamentary basis. They subordinate their parliamentary activities entirely and absolutely to the general interests of the working-class movement and to the special tasks of the proletariat in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Hence it follows, firstly, that the participation of the Social-Democrats in the Duma campaign is of a quite different nature from that of other parties. Unlike them, we do not regard this campaign as an end in itself or even as being of cardinal importance. Unlike them, we subordinate this campaign to the interests of the class struggle. Unlike them, the slogan we put forward in this campaign is not parliamentarism for the sake of parliamentary reforms, but the revolutionary struggle for a constituent assembly. Moreover, we wage this struggle in its highest forms, which have arisen from the historical development of the forms of struggle during the last few years.*

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* We shall not here touch on the question of boycott, as this does not come within the scope of this pamphlet. We shall only remark that this question cannot be properly appraised apart from the *concrete* historical situation. The boycott of the Bulygin Duma was *successful*. The boycott of the Witte Duma was necessary and *correct*. The revolutionary Social-Democrats must be *the first* to take the line of the most resolute, the most direct struggle, and must be *the last* to adopt more circuitous methods of struggle. The Stolypin Duma cannot be boycotted in the old way, and it would be wrong to do so after the experience of the First Duma.

II

What conclusion follows from the foregoing in regard to electoral agreements? First of all, that our basic, main task is to develop the class-consciousness and independent class organisation of the proletariat, as the only class that remains revolutionary to the end, as the only possible leader of a victorious bourgeois-democratic revolution. Therefore, class independence throughout the election and Duma campaigns is our most important general task. This does not exclude other, partial tasks, but the latter must always be subordinate to and in conformity with it. This general premise, which is confirmed by the theory of Marxism and the whole experience of the international Social-Democratic movement, must be our point of departure.

The special tasks of the proletariat in the Russian revolution may seem at once to controvert this general premise on the following grounds: the big bourgeoisie has already betrayed the revolution through the Octobrists, or has made it its aim to put a stop to the revolution by means of a constitution (the Cadets); the victory of the revolution is possible only if the proletariat is supported by the most progressive and politically conscious section of the peasantry, whose objective position impels it to fight and not to compromise, to carry through and not to curb the revolution. Hence, some may conclude, the Social-Democrats must enter into agreements with the democratic peasantry for the whole duration of the elections.

But such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the absolutely correct premise that the complete victory of our revolution is possible only in the form of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It has yet to be proved that a bloc with the democratic peasantry for the whole duration of the elections is possible and advantageous from the point of view of present party relationships (the democratic-peasantry in our country is now represented not by one, but by various parties) and from the point of view of the present electoral system. It has yet to be proved that by forming a bloc with this or that party we shall express and uphold the interests of the truly revolutionary sections of the peasantry better than by preserving

the complete independence of our Party in criticising *such-and-such* democratic peasant parties, and in *counterposing* some elements of the democratic peasantry to others. The premise that the proletariat is closest to the revolutionary peasantry in the present revolution undoubtedly leads to the general political "line" of Social-Democracy: together with the democratic peasantry against the treacherous big-bourgeois "democrats" (the Cadets). But whether it leads to the formation *at the present time* of an election bloc with the Popular Socialists (Popular Socialist Party), or the Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot be decided without an analysis of the features which distinguish *these* parties from each other and from the Cadets, without an analysis of the *present* electoral system with its numerous stages. Only one thing follows from it, directly and *absolutely*: under no circumstances can we during our election campaign confine ourselves to baldly and abstractly counterposing the proletariat to the bourgeois democrats in general. On the contrary, we must devote our whole attention to drawing a precise distinction, based on the *historical facts* of our revolution, between the liberal-monarchist and the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie, or, to put it more concretely, to the distinction between the Cadets, Popular Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Only by drawing such a distinction shall we be able to determine most correctly who our closest "allies" are. But, firstly, we shall not forget that the Social-Democrats must watch *every* ally from the bourgeois democrats as they would an enemy. Secondly, we shall examine very carefully to see which is most advantageous: to tie our hands in a *general* bloc with some Popular Socialists (for instance), or to preserve complete independence so as to be quite free at the decisive moment to split the non-party "Trudoviks" into opportunists (P.S.'s) and revolutionaries (S.-R.'s), to *counterpose* the latter to the former, etc.

Thus, the argument about the proletarian-peasant character of our revolution does not entitle us to conclude that we must enter into agreements with this or that democratic peasant party at this or that stage of the elections to the Second Duma. It is not even a sufficient argument for limiting the class independence of the proletariat during the elections, let alone for renouncing this independence.

III

In order to come nearer to the solution of our problem we must, firstly, examine the fundamental party groupings in the elections to the Second Duma and, secondly, examine the specific features of the present electoral system.

Electoral agreements are concluded between parties. What are the main types of parties that will contest the elections? The Black Hundreds will no doubt unite even more closely than during the elections to the First Duma. The Octobrists and the Party of Peaceful Renovation will join either the Black Hundreds or the Cadets, or, more probably, will oscillate between the two. In any case, to regard the Octobrists as a "party of the Centre" (as L. Martov does in his latest pamphlet, *Political Parties in Russia*) is a fundamental error: in the *actual* struggle which must finally decide the outcome of our revolution, the *Cadets* form the *Centre*. The Cadets are an organised party that is going into the elections independently and, moreover, is intoxicated with its success at the First Duma elections. But the discipline of this party is not of the strictest and its solidarity not of the strongest. The Left-wing Cadets are disgruntled about the defeat at Helsingfors[127] and are protesting. Some of them (Mr. Alexinsky in Moscow, recently) are going over to the Popular Socialists. In the First Duma there were some "exceptionally rare" Cadets who even gave their signatures to the Bill of the "33" for the abolition of all private ownership of land (Badamshin, Zubchenko and Lozhkin). Hence, to split off at least a small section from this "Centre" and bring it towards the Left is not a hopeless proposition. The Cadets are only too conscious of their weakness among the mass of the people (quite recently even the Cadet *Tovarishch* had to admit this), and they would readily agree to a bloc with the Lefts. It is not for nothing that the Cadet newspapers have with such tender joy opened their columns to the Social-Democrats Martov and Cherevanin to discuss the question of a bloc between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. We, of course, will never forget, and will tell it to the masses during the election campaign, that the Cadets failed to keep their promises in the First Duma, that they obstructed the Trudoviks, played at making constitutions, etc., etc., going

to the extent of keeping silent about the "four points",[128] the Draconian Bills, and so forth.

Next come the "Trudoviks". The parties of this type, namely the petty-bourgeois and predominantly peasant parties, are divided into the *non-party* "Trudovik Group" (which held a congress recently), the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the Polish Socialist Party, etc., correspond more or less to the Socialist-Revolutionaries). The only more or less consistent and determined revolutionaries and republicans among them are the S.-R.'s. The Popular Socialists are much worse opportunists than our Mensheviks; strictly speaking, they are semi-Cadets. The non-party "Trudovik Group" has, perhaps, more influence among the peasantry than the others; but the strength of its democratic convictions is difficult to determine, although it is undoubtedly far more Left than the Cadets, and evidently belongs to the camp of revolutionary democracy.

The Social-Democratic Party is the only party which, in spite of internal dissensions, will enter the elections as a thoroughly disciplined body, which has a fully definite and strictly class basis, and which has united all the Social-Democratic parties of all the nationalities in Russia.

But how are we to enter into a general bloc with the Trudoviks, considering the *composition* of this type of party, as outlined above? What sureties have we for the *non-party* Trudoviks? Is a bloc possible between party and non-party people? How do we know that Alexinsky & Co. will not, tomorrow, turn from the Popular Socialists back to the Cadets?

It is clear that a *real* party agreement with the Trudoviks is *impossible*. It is clear that we must not under any circumstances help to unite the opportunist Popular Socialists with the revolutionary S.-R.'s; on the contrary, we must split them and counterpose one to the other. It is clear that the existence of a non-party Trudovik Group makes it more to our advantage in all respects to preserve complete independence in order to exert a really revolutionary influence upon them than to tie our hands and blur the distinctions between the monarchists and the republicans, etc. It is *absolutely impermissible* for Social-Democrats to blur these distinctions; and for this reason alone it is necessary to reject blocs alto-

gether, once the *present* grouping of parties unites the non-party Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Can they really unite, and are they doing so? They certainly can unite, for they have the same petty-bourgeois class basis. They were, in fact, united in the First Duma, in the press during the October period, in the press of the Duma period, and in the ballots among the students (*si licet parva componere magnis*—if the small may be compared with the great). A minor symptom, but a characteristic one when connected with others, is the fact that in the ballots of the "autonomous" students there were often three conflicting lists: the Cadets, the bloc of the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Polish Socialist Party, and, lastly, the Social-Democrats.

From the point of view of the proletariat, clarity as regards the class grouping of the parties is of supreme importance; and the advantage of independently influencing the non-party Trudoviks (or those who are oscillating between the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries) is obvious compared with attempts by the Party to reach an agreement with the non-party people. The facts relating to the *parties* compel the following conclusion: no agreements whatsoever at the lower stage, when agitation is carried on among the masses; at the higher stages all efforts must be directed towards defeating the Cadets during the distribution of seats by means of a partial agreement between the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks, and towards defeating the Popular Socialists by means of a partial agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The objection will be raised: while you incorrigibly utopian Bolsheviks are dreaming of defeating the Cadets, you will all be defeated by the Black Hundreds, because you will *split the vote*! The Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks and the Cadets together would rout the Black Hundreds for certain; but by acting separately, you may present the common enemy with an easy victory. Let us assume that the Black Hundreds get 26 per cent of the votes, the Trudoviks and Cadets 25 per cent each, and the Social-Democrats 24 per cent. The Black Hundreds will get in unless the Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks and the Cadets form a bloc.

This objection is often taken seriously, and so we must carefully analyse it. But in order to analyse it, we must examine the *given*, i.e., the present electoral system in Russia.

IV

Our Duma elections are not direct, but multiple-stage elections. In multiple-stage elections the splitting of votes is dangerous only at the lower stage. It is only when the primary voters go to the poll that the division of the votes is an unknown quantity; it is only in our agitation among the masses that we have to work "in the dark". At the higher stages, when the elected representatives vote, the general engagement is over; all that remains is to distribute the seats by partial agreements among the parties, which *know* the exact number of their candidates and their votes.

The lowest stage in the elections is the election of electors in the cities, the election of representatives—one per ten households—in the villages, and the election of delegates to the workers' curia.

In the cities, in every electoral area (ward, etc.), we face a great mass of voters. There is, undoubtedly, a danger of splitting the vote. It cannot be denied that in the cities Black-Hundred electors may be elected in some places *exclusively* because of the absence of a "bloc of the Lefts", exclusively because, let us say, the Social-Democrats may divert part of the votes from the Cadets. It will be recalled that in Moscow Guchkov received something like 900 votes, and the Cadets about 1,400. If a Social-Democrat had taken 501 votes from the Cadet, Guchkov would have won. And there is no doubt that the general public will take this simple calculation into account; they will be afraid of splitting the vote, and because of that will be inclined to cast their votes only for the most moderate of the opposition candidates. We shall have what is called in England a "three-cornered" fight, when the urban petty bourgeoisie are afraid to vote for a socialist candidate because it would take votes from the liberal and thus allow the conservative to win.

How can this danger be averted? There is only one way: to conclude an agreement at the lower stage, that is, put up

a *joint list* of electors in which the number of candidates of each party is determined by a definite agreement of the parties *before the contest*. All the parties entering into the agreement call upon the electorate to vote for this joint list.

Let us examine the arguments for and against this method.

The arguments for are as follows: agitation can be conducted upon strictly party lines. Let the Social-Democrats criticise the Cadets before the masses as much as they like, but let them add: yet they are better than the Black Hundreds, and therefore we have agreed upon a joint list.

The arguments against are as follows: a joint list would be in crying contradiction to the whole independent class policy of the Social-Democratic Party. By recommending a joint list of Cadets and Social-Democrats to the masses we would be bound to cause hopeless confusion of class and political divisions. We would undermine the principles and the general revolutionary significance of our campaign for the sake of gaining a seat in the Duma for a liberal! We would be subordinating class policy to parliamentarism instead of subordinating parliamentarism to class policy. We would deprive ourselves of the opportunity to gain an estimate of *our* forces. We would lose what is lasting and durable in all elections—the development of the class-consciousness and solidarity of the socialist proletariat. We would gain what is transient, relative and untrue—superiority of the Cadet over the Octobrist.

Why should we jeopardise our consistent work of socialist education? Because of the danger of Black-Hundred candidates? But all the cities in Russia combined have only 35 of the 524 seats in the Duma (St. Petersburg 6, Moscow 4, Warsaw and Tashkent 2 each, the other 21 cities 1 each). This means that the cities by themselves cannot under any circumstances materially affect the composition of the Duma. Besides, we cannot confine ourselves to the merely formal consideration of the arithmetical possibility of splitting the votes. We must ascertain whether there is any great political probability of this happening. An analysis shows that the Black Hundreds obtained a very small minority even in the elections to the First Duma, that cases like the "Guchkov" case mentioned above were exceptional. According to statistics in *Vestnik Kadetskoi Partii*[129] (No. 7, April 19,

1906), in 20 cities, which sent 28 deputies to the Duma—out of 1,761 electors 1,468 were Cadets, 32 Progressists, 25 non-party, 128 Octobrists, 32 of the Commercial and Industrial Party, and 76 of the Right, i.e., total Rights 236, less than 15 per cent. In ten cities *not a single* elector of the Rights was returned; in three cities not more than ten electors (out of eighty) of the Rights were returned in each of them. Is it reasonable, under such circumstances, to give up the struggle for our own class candidates because of an exaggerated fear of the Black Hundreds? Would not such a policy, even from a narrow, practical point of view, betray short-sightedness, not to speak of instability of principles?

And what about a bloc with the Trudoviks against the Cadets? we shall be asked. But we have already pointed out the special features of the party relations among the Trudoviks, which make such a bloc undesirable and *inexpedient*. In the cities, where the working-class population is mostly concentrated, we must never, *except in case of extreme necessity*, refrain from putting up absolutely independent Social-Democratic candidates. And there is no such urgent necessity. A few Cadets or Trudoviks more or less (especially of the Popular-Socialist type!) are of no serious political importance, for the Duma itself can, at best, play only a subsidiary, secondary role. It is the peasantry, the gubernia assemblies of electors, that are of decisive political importance in determining the results of the Duma elections, and not the cities.* In the gubernia assemblies of electors, however, we shall achieve our general political alliance with the Trudoviks against the Cadets far better and more cer-

* The small towns, of course, also affect the composition of the gubernia electoral assemblies, through the town conferences. Here too, the Cadets and the Progressists have had a great majority of votes: for instance, out of 571 electors elected by town conferences 424 were Cadets and Progressists and 147 of the Right (*Vestnik Kadetskoi Partii*, No. 5, March 28, 1906). The figures for the separate towns fluctuate very considerably, of course. Under such circumstances we could probably, in very many cases, have put up an independent fight against the Cadets without fearing any accidental splitting of the votes, and without making ourselves dependent upon any non-Social-Democratic party. As for blocs at the lowest stage of elections in the workers' curia, probably not a single Social-Democrat will speak of them seriously. Complete independence of the Social-Democrats is particularly necessary among the working-class masses.

tainly, without in the least infringing our strict principles, than at the lower stage of the elections in the countryside. We shall now discuss the elections in the countryside.

V

In the big cities, as is well known, there were cases where the state of organisation of the political parties swept away one stage of the elections. By law the elections consisted of two stages. In practice, however, the elections sometimes proved to be direct, or almost direct, as the electorate definitely knew the character of the contending parties, and in some cases they even knew the *persons* whom a given party intended to send into the Duma. In the countryside, on the contrary, there are so many stages, the electorate is so scattered, and the obstacles to open party action are so great that the elections to the First Duma were, and those to the Second Duma will be, conducted very much "under a cloak". In other words, very often, and even in the majority of cases, party propagandists will speak to the electors on parties in general, *deliberately* mentioning no names out of fear of the police. The radical and revolutionary peasants (and not only peasants) will deliberately screen themselves behind the title "non-party". At the election of one delegate per ten households it is knowledge of the person as such, personal confidence in this or that candidate, sympathy with *his* Social-Democratic speeches that will decide the issue. Here the number of Social-Democrats backed by a *local* Party organisation will be very small. But the number of Social-Democrats who win the sympathies of the local rural population may prove to be much larger than might be expected from the number of local Party units in those districts.

Petty-bourgeois romanticists like the Popular Socialists, who are dreaming of a legal Socialist Party under the existing order, do not understand how confidence in and sympathy with the underground party are growing because of its consistent, uncompromising, militant spirit and the elusiveness of its organisation, which influences the masses not through Party men alone. A real revolutionary illegal party, steeled

in battle, accustomed to the Plehves, and undismayed by the stern measures of the Stolypins, may, in the period of civil war, be capable of influencing the masses to a greater extent than any legal party which, with "callow simplicity", takes a "strictly constitutional path".

The Social-Democrats who are members of the Party, and Social-Democrats who do not belong to it, will have good chances of success at the elections of the one-per-ten-household representatives and the delegates. A bloc with the Trudoviks, or a joint list, is not at all important for success at this stage of the election in the countryside. On the one hand, the electoral units are quite small there, and on the other, real party Trudoviks, or such as at all resemble them, will be quite rare. The strict Party spirit of the Social-Democrats, their unconditional submission to the Party which has been able to exist illegally for many years and has reached a membership of 100,000 to 150,000 of all nationalities, the only Party on the extreme Left which formed a Party Group in the First Duma—this Party spirit will be a powerful recommendation and guarantee for all those who are not afraid of a resolute struggle and wish for it whole-heartedly, but do not altogether trust their own strength, are afraid of taking the initiative and are afraid to come out openly. We must utilise this advantage of being a strict, "illegal" party to the utmost, and we have nothing to gain by weakening it even slightly by any kind of permanent bloc. The only other resolute and determinedly revolutionary party likely to compete with us are the Socialist-Revolutionaries. But a bloc with them on a really party basis at the *first* stage of the rural elections would be possible only as an exception: one has only to picture to oneself clearly what the actual election conditions are like in the countryside to become convinced of this.* Insofar as the non-party revolutionary peasants will be active, while deliberately refraining from associating with any one party, it will be more to our advantage in all respects to influence them in

* It was certainly no accident that the Socialist-Revolutionaries could not come forward as a party in the First Duma; could not rather than would not. The Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Duma, as well as those in the University, thought it more advantageous to hide behind the *non-party* Trudoviks, or to enter into a bloc with them.

the sense we desire along strictly party lines. The non-party character of the association, of the agitation, need not hamper the party Social-Democrat, for the revolutionary peasants will never wish to exclude him; and his participation in a non-party revolutionary association is especially sanctioned by the resolution of the Unity Congress on supporting the peasant movement. Thus, while preserving and upholding our Party principle, utilising fully its enormous moral and political advantages, we can at the same time fully adapt ourselves to the task of working among the non-party revolutionary peasants, in the non-party revolutionary associations, circles and meetings, of working with the aid of our non-party revolutionary connections, and so forth. Instead of forming a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have succeeded in organising only a very small fraction of the revolutionary peasantry—a bloc that would restrict and cramp our strict Party principle—we shall make wider and freer use of our Party position and of all the advantages of working among the non-party "Trudoviks".

The conclusion to be drawn is that at the lower stages of the election campaign in the countryside, that is, at the election of the one-per-ten-household representatives and of the delegates (sometimes the election of the delegates will, in practice, probably be tantamount to a *first* stage election), there is no need for us to enter into *any* electoral agreements. The percentage of men with definite political views who are suitable as candidates for the office of one-per-ten-household representatives, or delegates, is so small that the Social-Democrats who have gained the confidence and respect of the peasants (and without this condition no serious candidature is conceivable) have every chance, almost *to a man*, of being elected as one-per-ten-household representatives and delegates, without having to enter into any agreement with other parties.

As for the assemblies of delegates, there we shall be able to base our policy upon the exact results of the primary election contests which have decided the whole matter in advance. Here we can and must enter into—not blocs, of course, not close and permanent agreements—but partial agreements on the distribution of seats. Here, and even more so in the assemblies of electors for the election of the Duma dep-

uties, we must, in conjunction with the Trudoviks, defeat the Cadets, and in conjunction with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, defeat the Popular Socialists, etc.

VI

Thus, an examination of the actual electoral system shows that blocs at the lower stages of the elections are particularly undesirable in the cities, and are not essential. In the countryside, at the lower stages (i.e., at the election of the one-per-ten-household representatives and of the delegates), blocs are both undesirable and quite unnecessary. The uyezd assemblies of delegates and the gubernia assemblies of electors are of decisive political importance. Here, i.e., at the higher stages, partial agreements are necessary and possible without undesirable infringement of party principle; for the contest before the masses has ended, and there is no need to advocate before the masses directly or indirectly (or even by assumption) a non-party policy; neither is there the least danger of obscuring the strictly independent class policy of the proletariat.*

Now let us examine, first from the formal, arithmetical point of view, so to speak, what forms these partial electoral agreements will assume at the higher stages.

We shall take approximate percentages, i.e., the distribution of electors (and delegates, who are included in what follows) according to party, per hundred electors. To succeed in an assembly of electors a candidate must obtain at least 51 votes out of every 100. This indicates that the general tactical rule of the Social-Democratic electors must be: to

* It is interesting to note that experience of the distinction between agreements at a lower stage and those at higher stages is to be found, too, in the practice of the international Social-Democratic movement. In France, the election of Senators takes place in two stages: the voters elect departmental electors, who, in their turn, elect the Senators. The revolutionary French Social-Democrats, the Guesdists, have never permitted any agreements or joint lists at the lower stage, but have permitted partial agreements at the higher stage, i.e. for the distribution of seats in the assemblies of the departmental electors. The opportunists, however, the Jaurèsists, entered into agreements even at the lower stage.

try to win over a sufficient number of bourgeois-democratic electors who sympathise with Social-Democracy, or such as most deserve support, in order jointly with them to defeat the rest and thus secure the election of in part Social-Democratic and in part the *best* bourgeois-democratic electors.*

We shall illustrate this rule by simple examples. Let us assume that out of 100 electors, 49 are Black Hundreds, 40 are Cadets and 11 are Social-Democrats. A partial agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets is necessary in order to secure the election in full of a joint list of Duma candidates, on the basis, of course, of a proportional distribution of Duma seats according to the number of electors (i.e., in this case, one-fifth of the Duma seats from the whole gubernia, say, two out of ten, would go to the Social-Democrats, and four-fifths, or eight out of ten, would go to the Cadets). If there are 49 Cadets, 40 Trudoviks and 11 Social-Democrats, we must try to reach an agreement with the Trudoviks so as to defeat the Cadets and to win one-fifth of the seats for ourselves and four-fifths for the Trudoviks. In such a case we would have a splendid opportunity to test the consistency and steadfastness of the democratic convictions of the Trudoviks: would they agree to turn away from the Cadets entirely and defeat them in conjunction with the electors of the workers' party, or would they rather choose to "save" this or that Cadet or, perhaps, even prefer a bloc with the Cadets to one with the Social-Democrats? Here we can, and must, demonstrate and prove to the whole people to what extent particular petty-bourgeois elements are gravitating towards the monarchist bourgeoisie or towards the revolutionary proletariat.

In the last example the Trudoviks stand to gain an obvious advantage by forming a bloc with the Social-Democrats and not with the Cadets, for in the former case they

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* For the sake of simplicity, we are assuming a purely and exclusively party distribution of electors. In practice, of course, we shall meet with many non-party electors. The task of the Social-Democratic electors will be to try as far as possible to ascertain the political character of all, especially of the bourgeois-democratic electors, and to form a "Left majority" consisting of the Social-Democrats and the bourgeois candidates most desirable for the Social-Democrats. The main criteria for distinguishing between party trends we shall discuss later.

would obtain four-fifths of the total number of seats, whereas in the latter case they would obtain only four-ninths. Still more interesting would be the reverse case: 11 Cadets, 40 Trudoviks and 49 Social-Democrats. In such a case the prospect of an obvious advantage would impel the Trudoviks to enter into a bloc with the Cadets: in that case "we" shall get more seats in the Duma, they will say. But loyalty to the principles of democracy and to the interests of the real working masses would certainly call for a bloc with the Social-Democrats, even at the cost of some seats in the Duma. The representatives of the proletariat must carefully take all such cases into account and explain to the electors and to the whole people (the results of agreements in the assemblies of delegates and electors must be publicly announced) the significance from the point of view of *principle* of this election arithmetic.

Further, in the last example we see a case where both the prospect of obvious advantage and considerations of principle are inducements to the Social-Democrats to split the Trudoviks. If among them there are, say, two fully party Socialist-Revolutionaries, we must exert every effort to win them to our side and with 51 votes defeat all the Cadets and all the rest of the *less revolutionary* Trudoviks. If among the Trudoviks there are two Socialist-Revolutionaries and 38 Popular Socialists, we shall have an opportunity to test the loyalty of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the interests of democracy and to the interests of the working masses. We would say: vote for the republican democrats and against the Popular Socialists, who tolerate the monarchy; vote for the confiscation of the landlords' land and against the Popular Socialists, who tolerate redemption payments; vote for those who are for arming the whole people and against the Popular Socialists, who accept a standing army. And then we would see whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries would prefer—the Social-Cadets* or the Social-Democrats.

* This is what *Soznatelnaya Rossiya*[130] called the Popular Socialists. Incidentally, the first and second issues of this publication have given us great satisfaction. Chernov, Vadimov and others *brilliantly* criticise both Peshekhonov and Tag—in. Particularly good is the refutation of Tag—in's arguments from the point of view of the theory of commodity production, developing through capitalism into socialism.

This brings us to the question of the significance of this election arithmetic from the point of view of political principle. Our duty here is to oppose seat-hunting and to put forward an absolutely firm and consistent defence of the standpoint of the socialist proletariat and of the interests of the complete victory of our bourgeois-democratic revolution. Under no circumstances, and in no way, should our Social-Democratic delegates and electors keep silent about our *socialist* aims, our strictly class position as a *proletarian* party. But a mere repetition of the word "class" is not sufficient to indicate the role of the proletariat as the vanguard in the *present* revolution. Expounding our socialist doctrine and the general theory of Marxism is not sufficient to prove the leading role of the proletariat. This requires, in addition, the ability to show *in practice*, in analysing the burning questions of the *present* revolution, that the members of the workers' party are more consistent, more unerring, more determined and more skilful than all others in defending the interests of *this* revolution, the cause of its *complete* victory. This is no easy task, and the fundamental and chief duty of every Social-Democrat who is entering the election campaign is to prepare for it.

To determine the differences between the parties and shades of parties at the assemblies of delegates and of electors (as well as throughout the election campaign—that goes without saying) will be a small, but useful practical task. In this matter, incidentally, the course of events will settle many controversial questions which are agitating the members of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Right wing of the Party, from the extreme opportunists of *Nashe Dyelo* to the moderate opportunists of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, are doing their utmost to obliterate and distort the difference between the Trudoviks and the Cadets, evidently failing to notice a new and very important phenomenon, namely, the division of the Trudoviks into Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and those who are gravitating to the one or the other. Of course, the history of the First Duma and its dissolution already provided documentary evidence making the drawing of a distinction between the Cadets and the Trudoviks absolutely imperative and proving that the latter are more consistently and staunchly democratic than the

former. The election campaign to the Second Duma must prove and show this even more graphically, more exactly, more fully, and more widely. As we have tried to show by examples, the election campaign *itself will teach* the Social-Democrats to *distinguish* correctly between the various bourgeois-democratic parties and will refute, or, more correctly, sweep aside, the deeply mistaken opinion that the Cadets are the chief or, at any rate, important representatives of our bourgeois democracy in general.

Let us point out, too, that in the election campaign in general, and in concluding electoral agreements at the higher stages, the Social-Democrats must speak simply and clearly, in a language comprehensible to the masses, absolutely discarding the heavy artillery of erudite terms, foreign words and stock slogans, definitions and conclusion which are as yet unfamiliar and unintelligible to the masses. Without flamboyant phrases, without rhetoric, but with facts and figures, they must be able to *explain* the questions of socialism and of the present Russian revolution.

Two fundamental questions of this revolution, the questions of freedom and of land, will inevitably arise here. Upon these fundamental questions which are agitating the vast mass of the people we must concentrate both purely socialist propaganda—the difference between the standpoint of the small proprietor and that of the proletariat—and the distinction between the parties fighting for influence over the people. The Black Hundreds, right up to the Octobrists inclusively, are against freedom, against giving the land to the people. They want to *stop* the revolution by *force*, bribery and deceit. The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, the Cadets, are *also* striving to *stop* the revolution, but by means of a number of concessions. They *do not want* to give the people either complete freedom, or all the land. They want to *preserve* landlordism by means of redemption payments and local land committees not elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The Trudoviks, i.e., the petty bourgeoisie, especially the rural petty bourgeoisie, are striving to secure all the land and complete freedom, but are pursuing this aim hesitatingly, not consciously, timidly, vacillating between the opportunism of the Social-Cadets (the Popular Socialists)—who justify the he-

gemony of the liberal bourgeoisie over the peasantry and elevate it to a theory—and utopian equality, alleged to be possible under commodity production. Social-Democracy must consistently uphold the standpoint of the proletariat and purge the *revolutionary* consciousness of the peasantry of Popular-Socialist opportunism and of utopianism, which obscure the really urgent tasks of the *present* revolution. Only when its *complete* victory is attained can the working class, and the whole people, *really*, quickly, boldly, freely and widely *set to work* to solve the fundamental problem of the whole of civilised mankind: the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

We shall also deal carefully with the question of the *means* of struggle in the election campaign and in the conclusion of partial agreements with other parties. We shall explain what a constituent assembly is, and why the Cadets fear it. We shall ask the liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets, what measures they intend to advocate and *put into practice independently* to make it impossible for anyone to treat the people's representatives in the way the deputies of the "first enrolment" were "treated". We shall remind the Cadets of their vile and treacherous attitude towards the October-*December* forms of struggle last year, and make it known to the widest possible sections of the people. We shall ask every candidate whether he intends to *subordinate* all his activities in the Duma entirely to the interests of the struggle *outside the Duma* and the interests of wide popular movement for land and freedom. We must take advantage of the election campaign to *organise the revolution*, i.e., to organise the proletariat and the *really* revolutionary elements of bourgeois democracy.

Such is the *positive* content which we must try to impart to the whole election campaign and, in particular, to the matter of entering into partial agreements with other parties.

VII

To sum up.

In their general election tactics the Social-Democrats must take as their starting-point the complete independence of the class party of the revolutionary proletariat.

This general principle may be departed from only in cases of extreme necessity and under specially limited conditions.

The specific features of the Russian electoral system and the political groupings among the overwhelming mass of the population, the peasantry, do not give rise to this extreme necessity at the lower stages of the election campaign, i.e., during the election of electors in the big cities and of the one-per-ten-household representatives and delegates in the countryside. It does not arise in the big cities because here the importance of the elections is *not at all* determined by the number of deputies to be sent into the Duma, but by the opportunities for the Social-Democrats to address the widest and most concentrated sections of the population, which are the "most Social-Democratic" in virtue of their whole position.

In the countryside, the fact that the masses are politically undeveloped and amorphous, the sparse and scattered nature of the population, and the external conditions of the elections especially provoke the development of non-party (and non-party revolutionary) organisations, associations, circles, assemblies, opinions and strivings. Under these circumstances, blocs are quite unnecessary at the lower stages. Strict adherence to Party principle in all respects is the most correct and most expedient policy for Social-Democrats.

Thus, the general proposition that an alliance between the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry is necessary leads us to the conclusion that the only agreements that are necessary are partial agreements (such as agreements with the Trudoviks against the Cadets) at the higher stages of the electoral system, i.e., in the assemblies of delegates and electors. The special features of the political divisions among the Trudoviks also recommend this solution of the problem.

In all these partial agreements the Social-Democrats must strictly distinguish between the different bourgeois-democratic parties and the various shades among them according to the degree of consistency and steadfastness of their democratic convictions.

The ideological and political content of the election campaign and of the partial agreements will lie in explaining

the theory of socialism and the independent slogans of the Social-Democrats in the present revolution, both in regard to the aims of this revolution and the ways and means of achieving them.

This pamphlet was written before *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 5, had appeared. Prior to the issue of this number our Party had every reason to hope that the Central Committee of our Party would absolutely disapprove of first-stage agreements with bourgeois parties, agreements which should be impermissible for socialists. We could not help thinking so, for such an influential Menshevik as Comrade L. Martov had *emphatically* expressed his opposition to *all* agreements at the first stage, writing not only in *Tovarishch*, but also in a letter sent out from the Central Committee to the organisations (written by Martov) on the question of preparing for the election campaign.

It now turns out that our Central Committee has gone over to Cherevanin or, at least, has wavered. The leading article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 5, *sanctions* blocs *at the first stage*, without even indicating precisely with which bourgeois parties. Today's (October 31) letter from Plekhanov, who for the purpose of defending a bloc with the Cadets has migrated to the Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*, makes it clear to all whose influence it was that caused the Central Committee to waver. And Plekhanov, as usual, with the air of an oracle, delivers the most banal platitudes, entirely evading the class aims of the socialist proletariat (perhaps out of politeness to the bourgeois newspaper which has given him shelter), and does not even attempt to touch on concrete facts and arguments.

Will this "peremptory command" from Geneva be sufficient to cause the Central Committee to slip from Martov ... to Cherevanin?

Will the decision of the Unity Congress, which prohibited all agreements with bourgeois parties, be nullified by the Central Committee that was elected at that Congress?

The united election campaign of the Social-Democrats is threatened with serious danger.

The socialist workers' party is threatened with the danger of first-stage agreements with the bourgeois parties, which will demoralise the Party and prove fatal to the class independence of the proletariat.

Let all revolutionary Social-Democrats rally and declare relentless war upon opportunist confusion and vacillation!

A DISSENTING OPINION RECORDED AT THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY BY THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATES FROM POLAND, THE LETTISH TERRITORY, ST. PETERSBURG, MOSCOW, THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL REGION AND THE VOLGA AREA[131]

The tactics of boycotting the State Duma, which helped the mass of the people to form a correct opinion of the impotence and lack of independence of that institution, found complete justification in the farcical legislative activities of the State Duma and in its dissolution.

But the counter-revolutionary behaviour of the bourgeoisie and the compromising tactics of the Russian liberals prevented the immediate success of the boycott and compelled the proletariat to take up the struggle against the landlord and bourgeois counter-revolution also on the basis of the Duma campaign.

The Social-Democrats must wage this struggle outside the Duma and in the Duma itself in order to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat, to further expose to the whole people the harmfulness of constitutional illusions, and to develop the revolution.

In view of this state of affairs, and for the purposes mentioned above, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party must take a most energetic part in the present Duma campaign.

The principal objects of the Social-Democratic election and Duma campaigns are: firstly, to explain to the people the uselessness of the Duma as a means of satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry. Secondly, to explain to the people the impossibility of achieving political liberty by parliamentary methods as long as the real power remains in the hands of the tsar's government, and to explain the necessity of an armed uprising, of a provisional revolutionary government and of a constituent assembly elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Thirdly, to criticise the First Duma and reveal the bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and especially to show how dangerous and fatal it would be for the cause of the revolution if the liberal-monarchist Cadet Party were to play the predominant and leading role in the liberation movement.

As the class party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party must remain absolutely independent throughout the election and Duma campaigns, and here, too, must under no circumstances merge its slogans or tactics with those of any other opposition or revolutionary party.

Therefore, at the first stage of the election campaign, i.e., before the masses, it must as a general rule come out absolutely independently and put forward only its own Party candidates.

Exceptions to this rule are permissible only in cases of extreme necessity and only in relation to parties that fully accept the main slogans of our immediate political struggle, i.e., those which recognise the necessity of an armed uprising and are fighting for a democratic republic. Such agreements, however, may only extend to the nomination of a joint list of candidates, without in any way restricting the independence of the political agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats.

In the workers' curia the Social-Democratic Party must come out absolutely independently and refrain from entering into agreements with any other party.

At the higher stages of the election, i.e., at the assemblies of electors in the towns and of delegates and electors in the countryside, partial agreements may be entered into exclusively for the purpose of distributing seats proportionately

to the number of votes cast for the parties entering the agreement. In this connection, the Social-Democratic Party distinguishes the following main types of bourgeois parties according to the consistency and determination of their democratic views: (a) the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialist Party and similar republican parties,* (b) the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks of a similar type;** (c) the Cadets.

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* Perhaps the Zionist socialists also come under this category.[132]

** Perhaps including certain Jewish democrats. We are not competent to judge of these matters without having the opinion of the Jewish Social-Democrats.

DRAFT ELECTION ADDRESS

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! The Duma elections are approaching. The Social-Democratic Party, the party of the working class, calls upon you all to take part in the elections and so help to rally the forces that are really capable of fighting for freedom.

In our revolution the mass of the people are fighting against the rule of the government officials and the police, the landlords and the capitalists, and first and foremost against the autocratic tsarist government. The masses are fighting for land and liberty, for the overthrow of the gang of pogrom-mongers and executioners, who reply to the demands of millions and scores of millions of people by bribery, deception, brutal violence, imprisonment and military courts.

By their strike in October 1905, the workers of all Russia wrung from the tsar a promise of liberty and of a Duma with legislative powers. The tsarist government broke these promises. The electoral law curtailed the rights of the peasants and workers for the benefit of the landlords and capitalists. The powers of the Duma itself were reduced almost to nil But even that is not the main thing. The main thing is that all these liberties and rights remained a dead letter, for real authority, real power remained as before wholly in the hands of the tsarist government. No Duma can or will give the people land and liberty as long as real power remains in the hands of the pogrom-mongers and throttlers of liberty.

This is why the revolutionary workers, together with the majority of the conscious fighters for liberty in other sections of the population, boycotted the Duma. The boycott of the Duma was an attempt to take the convocation of the people's representatives out of the hands of the pogrom-mongers. The Boycott of the Duma was a warning to the people not to believe in scraps of paper; it was a call to fight for

real power. The boycott failed, because the liberal bourgeoisie betrayed the cause of liberty. The Cadets—the party of "people's" freedom, that party of liberal landlords and "enlightened" bourgeois windbags—turned their backs on the heroic struggle of the proletariat, described as folly the risings of the peasantry and of the best units of the armed forces, and took part in the elections organised by the pogrom-mongers. Thanks to the treachery of the Cadet bourgeoisie, the whole people must reckon for a time with laws and elections which the pogrom-mongers have organised, which the pogrom-mongers have falsified and which the pogrom-mongers have converted into a mockery of the people.

In taking part in the elections now, however, we can and must open the eyes of the people to the necessity of a struggle for power, to the futility of the Cadets' playing at constitutions. Citizens of all Russia! Reflect on the lessons that the First Duma has taught us!

The fighters for liberty and for land for the peasants were killed, exiled or imprisoned. The Cadets had a majority in the Duma. These liberal bourgeois were afraid of the struggle, were afraid of the people, were content to make speeches and present petitions; they appealed to the people to wait patiently; they endeavoured to make an agreement, to strike a bargain with the pogrom-mongers' government. And the tsar, perceiving that he was dealing with cringing bourgeois and not with men of fighting spirit, sent them packing for making objectionable speeches.

Workers, peasants and all toilers! Do not forget this great lesson! Remember that in the autumn of 1905, when the revolutionary workers were at the head of the struggling people, when the workers' strike and the workers' uprising were reinforced by risings of peasants and politically-conscious soldiers, the government made concessions. But when, in the spring and summer of 1906, the people were headed by the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, the Cadets, the party of vacillation between the power of the people and the power of the pogrom-mongers, then instead of obtaining concessions the deputies were booted out of the Duma by the police and the Duma was dissolved.

The dissolution of the Duma has clearly revealed to everyone how futile and fruitless are Cadet petitions, and how

necessary it is to support the struggle of the proletariat. By its strike in October the working class extorted a promise of freedom. Now it is mobilising its forces in order, by means of an uprising of the whole people, to wrest real freedom from the hands of the enemy, to overthrow the tsarist government, to establish a republic, to secure that all state authorities without exception are elected, and to convene through a provisional revolutionary government a national constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The liberty for which the working class is fighting is liberty for the whole people, not merely for the nobility and the rich. The workers need liberty in order to launch a wide struggle for the complete emancipation of labour from the tyranny of capital, for the abolition of all exploitation of man by man, for a socialist system of society. As long as the rule of capital remains, no equality, not even equality of tenure for small peasant proprietors on the common land of the people, will save the people from poverty, unemployment and oppression. Only the solidarity of all the workers, supported by the mass of the working people, can overthrow the yoke of capital, which is weighing so heavily on the workers of all countries. In socialist society, liberty and equality will no longer be a sham; the working people will no longer be divided by working in small, isolated, private enterprises; the wealth accumulated by common labour will serve the mass of the people and not oppress them; the rule of the workers will abolish all oppression of one nation, religion or sex by another.

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! Make use of the elections to strengthen the real champions of liberty and socialism, to open the eyes of all to the real aims and the true character of the various parties!

Besides the Social-Democrats, three main groups of parties are taking part in the elections: the Black Hundreds, the Cadets, and the Trudoviks.

The Black Hundreds are the parties supporting the government. They stand for an autocratic monarchy, police rule and the perpetuation of landlordism. They are: the Monarchist Party, the Union of the Russian People, the Party of Law and Order, the Commercial and Industrial Party, the

Union of October Seventeenth and the Party of Peaceful Renovation. These are all open enemies of the people, direct champions of the pogrom-mongers' government, the government which dissolved the Duma, the government of military courts.

The Cadets (Constitutional-Democrats, or the "party of people's freedom") are the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The liberal bourgeoisie are oscillating between the people and the pogrom-mongers' government. In words they oppose the government, but in fact what they fear most is the struggle of the people; they want to come to terms with the monarchy, i.e., with the pogrom-mongers, against the people. In the Duma the Cadets proposed repressive laws against the press and against public meetings. In the Duma the Cadets were opposed to referring the land question to local committees elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The Cadets are liberal landlords, who are afraid that the peasants might settle the land question in their own way. Those who do not want the police regime to be able to disperse the people's deputies, those who do not want the peasants to have to bear land redemption payments as ruinous as those of 1861, must see to it that the Second Duma will not be a Cadet Duma like the First.

The Trudoviks are parties and groups which express the interests and views of the small proprietors, mainly the small peasants. The most timid of these parties is the Toilers' Popular Socialist Party; it is little better than the Cadets. Then follows the Duma "Trudovik Group", the best members of which, such as Onipko, assisted in the popular uprising after the dissolution of the Duma. The most revolutionary of the Trudovik parties is the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Trudoviks are inclined resolutely—sometimes even to the point of an uprising—to uphold the interests of the peasant masses in their struggle for land and liberty, but in their activities they are by no means always able to shake off the influence of the liberal bourgeois and bourgeois views. The small proprietor stands at the parting of the ways in the great world-wide struggle between labour and capital. He has either to try to "get on in the world" in bourgeois fashion and become a master himself, or to try

to help the proletariat overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie. We, the Social-Democrats, will use the elections to tell the peasant masses and all friends of the peasantry that the only way by which the peasants will be able to get land and liberty is not through petitions, but by fighting, not by relying on the tsar and the promises of the liberal bourgeoisie, but by relying on the power of a united struggle shoulder to shoulder with the working class.

The Social-Democratic Party is the party of the class-conscious, militant proletariat. It has no faith in any promises of the bourgeoisie; it seeks salvation from poverty and want not through the consolidation of small production, but through the united struggle of all the working people for socialism.

Comrade workers, and all of you who are employees of capital! You have all seen that when the government deprived you of the beginnings of liberty the bourgeoisie proceeded to deprive the workers of all their gains, to increase hours and cut wages again, to increase fines, to tighten the screw generally, to harass or dismiss class-conscious workers. Only by the triumph of liberty can the workers and office employees safeguard what they have won from the bourgeoisie, and secure an eight-hour day, higher wages, and tolerable conditions of life. And only by a united, concerted, supremely heroic struggle at the head of the mass of the working people can the working class win real liberty for the whole people.

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! Vote for the candidates of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! It is a party that is fighting for complete freedom, for a republic, for the election of government officials by the people. It is fighting against all national oppression. It is fighting for *all* the land to be given to the peasantry *without compensation*. It is supporting all the demands of the politically conscious sailors and soldiers by fighting to secure the abolition of the standing army and the substitution for it of the armed nation.

Comrade workers, and all citizens of Russia! Vote for the candidates of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

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BLOCS WITH THE CADETS

At the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks, with the aid of the Bundists, secured the adoption of a resolution permitting blocs with the Cadets. The Cadet press is jubilant, and is spreading the happy tidings to all ends of the earth, gently pushing the Mensheviks one step lower, one step further to the right. Elsewhere the reader will find the decisions of the conference, the dissenting opinion of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and their draft election address.* Here we shall attempt to outline the general and fundamental political significance of blocs with the Cadets.

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 6, provides good material for such an outline, especially the editorial entitled "A Bloc of the Extreme Left". We shall begin with one of the most characteristic passages in the article:

"We are told," writes *Sotsial-Demokrat*, "that the Mensheviks, who had set out to push the whole Duma on to the revolutionary path, abandoned their position after the dissolution of the Duma and formed a bloc with the revolutionary parties and groups, which was expressed, firstly, in the issue of two joint manifestoes—to the army and to the peasantry—and, secondly, in the formation of a committee for co-ordinating action in view of the forthcoming strike. This reference to precedent is based on a great misunderstanding. In the instance quoted, our Party concluded with the other revolutionary parties and groups *not a political* bloc, but a *fighting* agreement, which we have always considered expedient and necessary."

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* See pp. 299-301 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The italics are those of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

...Not a *political* bloc, but a *fighting* agreement.... For the love of God, Menshevik comrades! This is not only nonsensical, it is positively illiterate. One of two things: either you mean by a bloc only parliamentary agreements, or you mean other agreements besides parliamentary agreements. If the first is the case—then a bloc is a fighting agreement for a parliamentary fight. If the second is the case—then a fighting agreement is a political bloc, because a "fight" without a political purpose is not a fight, but merely a brawl.

Comrades of the Central Committee! Watch your editors! You really must, because they are making us feel ashamed of Social-Democracy.

But perhaps this rigmarole presented to the reader in the organ of the Central Committee is simply a slip of the pen, an awkward expression?

Not at all. The *Sotsial-Demokrat*'s mistake was not the "howler" it committed; on the contrary, the howler arose out of the fundamental mistake that lies at the bottom of its whole argument and whole position. The meaningless combination of words "*not* a political bloc *but* a fighting agreement"* is not fortuitous; it followed necessarily and inevitably from the basic "meaninglessness" of Menshevism, namely, its failure to understand that the parliamentary fight in Russia today is entirely subordinate, and most directly so, to the conditions and character of the fight outside of parliament. In other words: this one logical blunder expresses the Mensheviks' general failure to understand the role and importance of the Duma in the present revolutionary situation.

We, of course, do not intend to copy the methods of the Mensheviks, and of their leader Plekhanov, in their polemics against us on the question of "fighting" and "politics". We shall not reproach them, leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, for being capable of entering into a *non-political* fighting agreement.

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* And, as luck would have it, we now have the curios situation that the Mensheviks, who have always reproached us with contrasting "fighting" to "politics", have *themselves* based *their entire argument* on this meaningless contrast.

We call attention to the following question: *Why* did our Mensheviks, after the dissolution of the Duma, have to form a bloc *only with the revolutionary* parties and groups? Certainly not because this had been advocated for a long time (purely out of hatred for the Mensheviks) by some anarcho-Blanquist named Lenin. Objective conditions *compelled* the Mensheviks, in spite of all their theories, to form precisely such a revolutionary anti-Cadet bloc. Whether the Mensheviks wanted it or not, and *whether they realised it or not*, the objective conditions were such that the dialectical development of the peaceful parliamentary fight in the First Duma converted it, *in the course of a few days*, into one that was altogether unpeaceful and non-parliamentary. The informal *political bloc* of which the Mensheviks were not aware (because of the Cadet blinkers on their eyes)—a bloc expressed in common aspirations, common immediate political efforts and common methods of struggle for immediate political aims—this unintentional "political bloc" was *by the force of circumstances* transformed into a "fighting agreement". And our wiseacres were so dumbfounded by this unexpected turn of events, unforeseen in Plekhanov's letters of the period of the First Duma,[133] that they exclaimed: "This is *not* a political bloc, *but* a fighting agreement!"

The reason why your policy is no good at all, dear comrades, is that you have in mind agreements for *that* "fight" which is unreal, fictitious and of no decisive importance, and overlook the conditions of *that* "fight" which is being irresistibly brought to the fore by the whole course of the Russian revolution; the fight which arises even from conditions that at first sight seem to be the most peaceful, parliamentary and constitutional imaginable, and even from such conditions as those which the Rodichevs of the Duma exalted in their speeches about the dearly-beloved, blameless monarch.

You are committing the very error of which you groundlessly accuse the Bolsheviks. Your policy is not a fighting policy. Your fight is not a genuine political fight, but a sham constitutional fight; it is parliamentary cretinism. For the "fight" which circumstances may make necessary tomorrow you have *one* line of agreements; for "politics" you have *another* line of agreements. That is why you are no good either

for "fights" or for "politics", but only for the role of yes-men of the Cadets.

There is considerable controversy in our Party at the present time as to the meaning of the word "blocs". Some say that a bloc means a joint list of candidates; others deny this and say that it means a common platform. All these disputes are silly and scholastic. It does not make the slightest difference whether the narrower or the wider agreements are called blocs. The central issue is not whether wide or narrow agreements are permissible. Whoever thinks so is immersing himself in petty and trivial parliamentary technique and forgetting the *political substance* of that technique. The central issue is: *on what lines* should the socialist proletariat enter into agreements with the bourgeoisie, which, generally speaking, are inevitable in the course of a bourgeois revolution. The Bolsheviks may differ among themselves in regard to details, e.g., whether electoral agreements are necessary with this or that party of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, but that is not the central issue between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The central issue remains the same: should the socialist proletariat in a bourgeois revolution follow in the wake of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, or should it march in front of the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie.

The article "A Bloc of the Extreme Left" gives numerous instances of how the ideas of the Mensheviks are side-tracked from the political essence of the disagreement to petty trifles. The author of the article himself describes (p. 2, col. 3) both a common platform and a joint list as bloc tactics. At the same time he asserts that we are advocating a "bloc" with the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, while the Mensheviks advocate, not a bloc, but only "partial agreements" with the Cadets. But this is childishness, my dear comrades, and not argument!

Compare the Menshevik resolution adopted by the All-Russian Conference with the Bolshevik resolution. The latter imposes stricter conditions for agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries than the former does for agreements with the Cadets. This is indisputable, for, in the first place, the Bolsheviks permit agreements only with parties which are fighting for a republic and which recognise the necessity

of an armed uprising, whereas the Mensheviks permit agreements with "democratic opposition parties" generally. Thus, the Bolsheviks defined the term "revolutionary bourgeoisie" by means of clear *political* characteristics, whereas the Mensheviks, instead of a *political* definition, presented merely a *technical parliamentary* catchword. A republic and an armed uprising are definite political categories. Opposition is a purely parliamentary term. This term is so vague that it can include the Octobrists, and the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and, in fact, all who are dissatisfied with the government. True, the addition of the word "democratic" introduces a political element, but it is indefinite. It is supposed to refer to the Cadets but this is exactly where it is wrong. To apply the term "democratic" to a *monarchist* party, to a party which accepts an Upper Chamber, proposed repressive laws against public meetings and the press and deleted from the reply to the address from the throne the demand for direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot, to a party which opposed the formation of land committees elected by the whole people—means *deceiving the people*. This is a very strong expression, but it is just. The Mensheviks are deceiving the people about the democracy of the Cadets.

Secondly, the Bolsheviks permit agreements with the bourgeois republicans only as an "exception". The Mensheviks do not demand that blocs with the Cadets should be only an exception.

Thirdly, the Bolsheviks absolutely forbid agreements in the workers' curia ("*with any other party*"). The Mensheviks *permit blocs in the workers' curia as well*, for they only forbid agreements with groups and parties which "do not adopt the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle". This is no accident, for at the Conference there were some Mensheviks with proletarian class intuition, who opposed this stupid formula, but they were defeated by the Menshevik majority. The outcome was something very indefinite and nebulous, leaving plenty of scope for all sorts of adventurist moves. Moreover, the outcome was an idea that is altogether reprehensible for a Marxist, namely, that a party other than a Social-Democratic Party *may* be recognised as "adopting the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle".

After this, how can one describe as other than childish, to say the least, the attempts to prove that the Bolsheviks permit a *closer bloc* with the republican bourgeoisie, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, than the Mensheviks permit with the monarchist bourgeoisie, i.e., the Cadets??

The absolutely false argument about closer or less close blocs serves to obscure the political question: *with whom and for what purpose* are blocs permissible. Take the "Draft Election Platform" published in No. 6 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. This document is one of a mass of documents defining Menshevik policy which are proof of the existence of an *ideological* bloc between the Mensheviks and the Cadets. The resolution of the conference on the "amendments" required to this draft election platform clearly demonstrates this. Just think: a conference of Social-Democrats had to remind its Central Committee that it must not omit the slogan of a republic from an illegal publication; that it must not confine itself to vague platitudes about petitions and struggle, but must accurately name and characterise the different parties from the proletarian standpoint; that it must point to the need for an uprising and emphasise the class character of Social-Democracy! Only some deep-seated abnormality, some fundamental error in the views held by the Central Committee could have made it necessary to remind the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party that it must emphasise the class character of the Party in its *first* election manifesto.

We do not know yet whether practical agreements with the Cadets will be concluded, or what their scope will be; but an ideological agreement, an ideological bloc, already exists: in the draft election platform the difference between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie is glossed over.* The Bolshevik draft

* This is not the first time the Mensheviks have made this mistake. They made the same mistake in the famous Duma declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. They accused the Bolsheviks of Socialist-Revolutionary tendencies, while they themselves obliterated the differences between the views of the Social-Democrats and those of the Trudoviks to such an extent that the Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers of the Duma period called the Duma declaration of the Social-Democrats a plagiary of Socialist-Revolutionary ideas! In our counter-draft of the Duma dec-

election address, on the contrary, not only points out this difference, but also the difference between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the class of small proprietors.

It is these principles and ideas that must be brought to the fore in the question of election blocs. It is useless for the Mensheviks to attempt to justify themselves by saying: we shall be independent throughout the election campaign, which we shall in no way curtail, and we shall put our candidates in the Cadets' list only at the last minute!

That is not true. We are sure, of course, that the best of the Mensheviks sincerely desire it. But it is not their desires that count, however—it is the objective conditions of the present political struggle. And these conditions are such that *every step* the Mensheviks take in their election campaign is *already tainted* by Cadetism, is already marked by obscuring the Social-Democratic point of view. We have demonstrated this by the example of the draft election platform and shall now do so by a number of other documents and arguments.

The Mensheviks' main argument is the Black-Hundred danger. The first and fundamental flaw in this argument is that the Black-Hundred danger cannot be combated by Cadet tactics and a Cadet policy. The essence of this policy lies in *reconciliation* with tsarism, *that is*, with the Black-Hundred danger. The first Duma sufficiently demonstrated that the Cadets do not combat the Black-Hundred danger, but make incredibly despicable speeches about the innocence and blamelessness of the monarch, *the known leader of the Black Hundreds*. Therefore, by helping to elect Cadets to the Duma, the Mensheviks are not only failing to combat the Black-Hundred danger, but are hoodwinking the people, are obscuring the real significance of the Black-Hundred danger. Combating the Black-Hundred danger by helping to elect the Cadets to the Duma is like combating pogroms by means of the speech delivered by the lackey Rodichev: "It is presumption to hold the monarch responsible for the pogrom."

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laration,[134] on the contrary, the difference between us and the petty bourgeois was clearly shown.

The second flaw in this stock argument is that it means that the Social-Democrats tacitly surrender hegemony in the democratic struggle to the Cadets. In the event of a split vote that secures the victory of a Black Hundred, why should *we* be blamed for not having voted for the Cadet, and not the *Cadets* for not having voted for us?

"We are in a minority," answer the Mensheviks, in a spirit of Christian humility. "The Cadets are more numerous. You cannot expect the Cadets to declare themselves revolutionaries."

Yes! But that is no reason why Social-Democrats should declare themselves Cadets. The Social-Democrats have not had, and could not have had, a majority over the bourgeois democrats anywhere in the world where the outcome of the bourgeois revolution was indecisive. But *everywhere*, in all countries, the *first* independent entry of the Social-Democrats in an election campaign has been met by the howling and barking of the liberals, *accusing the socialists of wanting to let the Black Hundreds in*.

We are therefore quite undisturbed by the usual Menshevik cries that the Bolsheviks are letting the Black Hundreds in. *All* liberals have shouted this to *all* socialists. By refusing to fight the Cadets you are leaving under the ideological influence of the Cadets masses of proletarians and semiproletarians who are capable of following the lead of the Social-Democrats.* Now or later, unless you cease to be socialists, you will have to fight independently, in spite of the Black-Hundred danger. And it is easier and more necessary to take the right step now than it will be later on. In the elections to the Third Duma (if it is convoked after the Second Duma) it will be even more difficult for you to dissolve the bloc with the Cadets, you will be still more entangled in unnatural relations with the betrayers of the revolution. But the *real* Black-Hundred danger, we repeat, lies not in the Black Hundreds obtaining seats in the Duma, but in pogroms and military courts; and you are making it more dif-

* The Cadets themselves are beginning to acknowledge that in the elections they are threatened by a *danger from the Left* (the exact words used by *Rech* in a report on the St. Petersburg Gubernia). By their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the Mensheviks by the nose in order to avert the danger from the Left!!

ficult for the people to fight this real danger by putting Cadet blinkers on their eyes.

The third flaw in this stock argument is its inaccurate appraisal of the Duma and its role. In that delightful article "A Bloc of the Extreme Left", the Mensheviks had to acknowledge, contrary to all the assertions they usually make, that the central issue lies not in technical agreements, but in the radical political difference between two tactics.

In this article we read the following:

> "The tactics of a 'bloc' are consciously or unconsciously directed towards the formation in the next Duma of a compact revolutionary minority of a faded Social-Democratic hue, a minority that would wage systematic war on the Duma majority as well as on the government, and, at a certain moment, would overthrow the Duma and proclaim itself a provisional government. The tactics of partial agreements are directed towards making use, as far as possible, of the Duma as a whole, i.e., the Duma majority, for the purpose of fighting the autocratic regime while retaining all the time in the Duma the extreme position of an independent Social-Democratic Group."

As regards the "faded hue" we have already shown that it is the Mensheviks who are to blame for this—by their conduct in the elections in the workers' curia, by their wider latitude for blocs, and by their ideological substitution of Cadetism for Social-Democracy. As for "proclaiming" a provisional government, the Mensheviks' assertion is equally ridiculous, for they forget that it is not a matter of proclaiming, but of the whole course and of the success of the *uprising*. A provisional government which is not the organ of an uprising is an empty phrase, or a senseless adventure.

But on the central issue, the Mensheviks inadvertently blurted out the real truth in the above-quoted passage. Indeed, the whole thing boils down to this: *shall we or shall we not sacrifice the independence* of the Social-Democratic election campaign for the sake of a "solid" liberal Duma ("the Duma as a whole")? And indeed, the most important thing for the Bolsheviks is complete independence in the election campaign and the completely (not semi-Cadet) Social-Democratic character of our policy and of our Duma Group. But for the Mensheviks the most important thing is a solid Cadet Duma with a large number of Social-Democrats elected as semi-Cadets! Two types of Duma: 200 Black Hundreds, 280 Cadets and 20 Social-Democrats; or 400

Cadets and 100 Social-Democrats. We prefer the first type, and we think it is childish to imagine that the elimination of the Black Hundreds from the Duma means the elimination of the Black-Hundred danger.

Everywhere we have a single policy: in the election fight, in the fight in the Duma, and in the fight in the streets—the policy of the armed struggle. Everywhere our policy is: the Social-Democrats with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against the Cadet traitors. The Mensheviks, however, wage their "Duma" fight in alliance with the Cadets (support for the Duma as a whole and a Cadet Cabinet); but in the event of an uprising they will change their policy and conclude "*not* a political bloc, *but* a fighting agreement". Therefore, the Bolshevik was quite right who remarked at the conference: "By supporting blocs with the Cadets, the Bundists have smuggled in support for a Cadet Cabinet."

The above quotation excellently confirms the fact that blocs with the Cadets convert into empty phrases all the fine words in the Menshevik resolution on slogans in the election campaign. For example: "to organise the forces of the revolution in the Duma" (is it not rather to organise an appendage to the Cadets by disorganising the actual forces of the revolution?); "to expose the impotence of the Duma" (is it not rather to conceal from the masses the impotence of the Cadets?); "to explain to the masses that hopes of a peaceful issue of the struggle are illusory" (is it not rather to strengthen among the masses the influence of the Cadet Party, which is fostering illusions?).

And the Cadet press has perfectly understood the *political* significance of Menshevik-Cadet blocs. We said above: either in the rear of the liberals or in front of the revolutionaries. In support of this we shall cite our political press.

Can you find any serious or mass confirmation of the assertion that the Bolsheviks are following in the wake of the bourgeois revolutionaries and are dependent on them? It is ridiculous even to speak of such a thing. The whole Russian press clearly shows, and all the enemies of the revolutionaries admit, that it is the Bolsheviks who are pursuing an independent political line, and are winning over various groups and the best elements of the bourgeois revolutionaries.

But what about the bourgeois opportunists? They own a press ten times larger than that of the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries put together. And they are pursuing an independent political line, converting the Mensheviks and Popular Socialists into mere yes-men.

The *whole* Cadet press quotes *only* those parts of the Menshevik resolutions which refer to blocs; it *omits* "the impotence of the Duma", "the organisation of the forces of the revolution in the Duma", and other things. The Cadets not only omit these things, they *openly rail against* them, now talking about the "phrase-mongering" or the "inconsistency" of the Mensheviks, now about the "inconsistency of the Menshevik slogans", and at another time about "the baneful influence of the Bolsheviks over the Mensheviks".

What does this mean? It means that, whether we like it or not, and in spite of the wishes of the better sort of Mensheviks, political life absorbs their *Cadet deeds* and rejects their *revolutionary phrases.*

The Cadet coolly accepts the help of the Mensheviks, slaps Plekhanov on the back for his advocacy of blocs, and at the same time shouts contemptuously and rudely, like a merchant who has grown fat on ill-gotten gains: Not enough, Menshevik gentlemen! There must also be an ideological understanding! (See the article in *Tovarishch* on Plekhanov's letter.) Not enough, Menshevik gentlemen, you must also stop your polemic, or at any rate change its tone! (See the leading article in the *Left*-Cadet *Vek* on the resolutions of our Conference.) Not to mention *Rech*, which simply snubbed the Mensheviks who are yearning for the Cadets by bluntly declaring: "We shall go into the Duma to *legislate*", not to make a revolution!

Poor Mensheviks, poor Plekhanov! Their love letters to the Cadets were read with pleasure, but so far they are not being admitted further than the antechamber.

Read Plekhanov's letter in the bourgeois-Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*. How joyfully he was greeted by Mr. Prokopovich and Madame Kuskova, the very people whom Plekhanov, in 1900, drove out of the Social-Democratic Party for attempting its bourgeois corruption. Now Plekhanov has accepted the tactics of the famous *Credo*[135] of Prokopovich and Kuskova; and these followers of Bernstein are impudently

blowing kisses to him and shouting: We *bourgeois democrats* have always said this!

And in order to be admitted to the antechamber of the Cadets, Plekhanov had publicly to *withdraw the statements he made but yesterday*.

Here are the facts.

In *Dnevnik*, No. 6, of July 1906, after the dissolution of the Duma, Plekhanov wrote that the parties that are *participating* in the movement must come to an understanding. To be able to strike together, they must *first come to an agreement*. "The *parties* hostile to our old regime must ... come to an agreement about what is to be the main idea in this propaganda. After the dissolution of the Duma the only idea that can serve this purpose is the idea of a constituent assembly...."

... "*Only*" the idea of a constituent assembly. Such was Plekhanov's plan for a political bloc and for a fighting agreement in July 1906.

Five months later, in November 1906, Plekhanov changes his policy on agreements. Why? Has there been any change since then in the relations between the parties which demand a constituent assembly and those which do not?

It is generally admitted that since then the Cadets have shifted still further to the right. And Plekhanov *goes* to the Cadet press but says *nothing* about the constituent assembly; for it is forbidden to speak about this in liberal antechambers.

Is it not clear that this Social-Democrat has slipped?

But this is not all. In the same No. 6 of *Dnevnik*, Plekhanov referred *directly* to the Cadets. *At that time* (that was such a long time ago!) Plekhanov explained the selfish class character of the Cadets' distrust towards the idea of a constituent assembly. Plekhanov at that time wrote about the Cadets literally as follows:

"Whoever renounces the propaganda of this idea [a constituent assembly] on whatever pretext will clearly indicate that he is not really seeking a worthy answer to the actions of Stolypin & Co., that he, though reluctantly, *is becoming reconciled to these actions*, that he is rebelling against them *only in words*, *only for the sake of appearances*" (italics ours).

Having now gone over to a Cadet newspaper, Plekhanov began his advocacy of an election bloc by establishing an ideological bloc. In the Cadet newspaper Plekhanov did not want to tell the people that the Cadets are *becoming reconciled* to the Stolypin gang, that they are rebelling *only for the sake of appearances*.

Why did Plekhanov not want to repeat in November 1906 what he said in July 1906?

This, then, is what "technical" blocs with the Cadets mean, and that is why we are waging a relentless struggle against Social-Democrats who sanction such blocs.

Is not your joy premature, gentlemen of the Cadet Party? Social-Democrats will vote in the elections without blocs in the Caucasus, in the Urals, in Poland, in the Lettish Territory, in the Moscow Central Region, and probably in St. Petersburg.

No blocs with the Cadets! No conciliation with those who are becoming reconciled to the Stolypin gang!

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PARTY DISCIPLINE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PRO-CADET SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The sanction of blocs with the Cadets is the finishing touch that definitely marks the Mensheviks as the opportunist wing of the workers' party. We are waging a ruthless ideological struggle against the formation of blocs with the Cadets, and this struggle must be developed to the widest possible extent. This will do more than anything to educate and unite the masses of the revolutionary proletariat, whom our *independent* (really, and not merely in name, i.e., without blocs with the Cadets) election campaign will provide with fresh material for the development of their class-consciousness.

The question is how to combine this ruthless ideological struggle with proletarian party discipline. This question must be put squarely and fully explained at once, so that there may be *no* misunderstanding and no vacillation in the practical policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Let us first consider the theoretical aspect of this question, and then the practical aspect which is of immediate interest to everybody.

We have more than once already enunciated our theoretical views on the importance of discipline and on how this concept is to be understood in the party of the working class. We defined it as: *unity of action*, *freedom of discussion and criticism*. Only such discipline is worthy of the democratic party of the advanced class. The strength of the working class lies in organisation. Unless the masses are organised, the proletariat is nothing. Organised—it is everything. Organisation means unity of action, unity in practical operations. But every action is valuable, of course, only because

and insofar as it serves to push things forward and not backward, insofar as it serves to unite the proletariat ideologically, to elevate, and not degrade, corrupt or weaken it. Organisation not based on principle is meaningless, and the practice converts the workers into a miserable appendage of the bourgeoisie in power. Therefore, the proletariat does not recognise unity of action without freedom to discuss and criticise. Therefore, class-conscious workers must never forget that serious violations of principle occur which make the severance of all organisational relations imperative.

To prevent some literary hack from misinterpreting what I say, I shall pass at once from the general to the concrete formulation of the question. Does the sanction by Social-Democrats of blocs with the Cadets necessitate a complete severance of organisational relations, i.e., a split? We think *not*, and all Bolsheviks think the same way. In the first place, the Mensheviks are only just setting their feet, unsteadily and uncertainly, on the path of practical opportunism *en grand*. The ink is not yet dry on Martov's repudiation of Cherevanin for sanctioning blocs with the Cadets; he wrote it before the Cadet password had been given from Geneva.[136] Secondly—and this is far more important—the objective conditions of the proletarian struggle in Russia today irresistibly provoke *definite* and decisive steps. Whether the tide of revolution rises very high (as we expected) or completely subsides (as some Social-Democrats think it will, though they are afraid to say so), in *either* case the tactics of blocs with the Cadets will inevitably be scattered to the winds, and that in the not very distant future. Therefore, our *duty* at the present time is to avoid intellectualist hysteria and preserve Party unity, trusting to the staunchness and sound class instinct of the revolutionary proletariat. Thirdly and lastly, in the present election campaign, the decision of the Mensheviks and the Central Committee in favour of blocs is not binding in practice on the local organisations, and does not commit the Party as a whole to these shameful tactics of blocs with the Cadets.

Now for the concrete formulation of the question. To what extent are the resolutions of the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—and the directives

of the Central Committee—binding? And to what extent are the local organisations of the Party autonomous?

These questions would undoubtedly have caused endless disputes in our Party had the conference itself not settled them. All the delegates at the conference agreed that its decisions were *not binding* and committed nobody in any way, for a conference is an advisory, not a deciding body. Its delegates were not democratically elected, but were chosen by the Central Committee from local organisations selected by it, and in a number which it specified. *For this reason*, at the conference, the Bolsheviks, Letts and Poles did not waste time tinkering with the Menshevik resolution on blocs, nor did they work out a compromise (such as recognising the boycott as correct and *at the same time* sanctioning blocs with the monarchist bourgeoisie!), but simply *put forward in opposition* their own platform, their own slogans, their own tactics in the election campaign. In so doing the Bolsheviks took the course that was absolutely necessary at an advisory conference, which was to serve not as a substitute for a congress, but to prepare for it—not to settle the issue, but to bring it out more clearly and precisely—not to conceal, not to gloss over the struggle within the Party, but to direct it, to make it more integral and more centred around principles.

To proceed. The decisions of the conference become (with certain modifications) directives of the Central Committee. Directives of the Central Committee are binding on the whole Party. Within what limits are they binding in regard to this particular question?

Obviously, within the limits of the decisions of the Congress and within the limits of the autonomy of the local Party organisations that is recognised by the Congress. The question of these limits might also have given rise to endless and insoluble controversy (for the resolution of the Unity Congress forbids all blocs with bourgeois parties in the election campaign), had not the conference adopted, *by common consent of the Mensheviks*, *the Bolsheviks and the members of the Central Committee*, one of its least elastic resolutions. The absence of factional divisions in the voting on *this* resolution is an important guarantee of the unity and fighting efficiency of the workers' party.

Here is the text of this resolution:

"The conference expresses its conviction that within the framework of a single organisation all its members are obliged to carry out all decisions concerning the election campaign adopted by the competent bodies of the local organisations within the limits of the *general* directives of the Central Committee; *the Central Committee may forbid local organisations to put forward lists that are not purely Social-Democratic, but it must not compel them to put forward lists that are not purely Social Democratic.*"

The passage we have underlined obviates interminable disputes and, one may hope, will obviate undesirable and dangerous friction. The general directives of the Central Committee cannot go beyond the limits of recognising that blocs with the Cadets are *permissible*. All the Social-Democrats, irrespective of faction, declared at the time that, after all, blocs with the Cadets are not very seemly, for we all authorised the Central Committee to forbid them, but we did not authorise it to prescribe them.

The conclusion is clear. There are two platforms before the Party. One—supported by 18 conference delegates, the Mensheviks and the Bundists; the other—supported by 14 delegates, the Bolsheviks, the Poles and the Letts. The competent bodies of the local organisations are free to choose either of these platforms, to alter and supplement them, or substitute new ones. *After* the competent bodies have decided, *all* of us, as members of the Party, must *act as one man*. A Bolshevik in Odessa must cast into the ballot box a ballot paper bearing a Cadet's name even if it sickens him. And a Menshevik in Moscow must cast into the ballot box a ballot paper bearing only the names of Social-Democrats, even if his soul is yearning for the Cadets.

But the elections are not taking place tomorrow. Let all the revolutionary Social-Democrats rally still closer and launch the widest and most relentless ideological struggle against blocs with the Cadets, blocs that will hinder the revolution, weaken the proletarian class struggle, and corrupt the civic consciousness of the masses!

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HOW THE ARMAVIR SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ARE CONDUCTING THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN

At the elections to the First Duma the Armavir Social-Democrats formed blocs with the Cadets. *Volna*[137] commented on this at the time and severely criticised them. The Central Committee of our Party also wrote to Armavir, admonishing the local comrades for acting contrary to the instructions of the Unity Congress.

Our Armavir comrades must now have gained some practical experience of what blocs with the Cadets mean. At all events, in their latest party literature, they not only refrain from advocating blocs with the Cadets, but speak *the whole plain truth* about the Cadets. We will not quarrel with the literary style of the Armavir publications—that would be mean and petty. We shall only quote the most striking passages which indicate the tactics of the Armavirians.

We have before us No. 1 of *Armavirsky Proletary*, published by the Armavir Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, dated October 1906, and issued in 5,000 copies.

In the leading article we read the following:

> "Let the Cadets, merchants, government officials, landlords and liberals dance to the tune of the government, the proletariat will not take the line of submission and reconciliation."

The next article, a special appeal to get ready for the elections, states:

> "Close your ranks, vote, capture the Duma! Too long have the lordly Cadets sat in the plush seats of the Taurida Palace. It is high time the toil-hardened hands of the workers drove out these chatterers and parasites!

"Make haste to secure your proletarian place in the Duma, to convert it from a Cadet talking-shop into a revolutionary field of battle against the slayer of the people, the accursed autocracy."

In a leaflet: "To the Electors", dated November 1906 and issued in 3,000 copies, the Armavir Committee writes:

"The people have realised that only by force and power can they take that which the dying autocracy will not yield voluntarily and which the impotent Cadet Duma failed to give them.... Let us make this Duma an instrument of our revolution, let us, through our deputies, install the power of the people in the Taurida Palace, let us kindle in the new Duma, by the hands of our deputies, the blazing fire of revolution and fan it with the stormy breath of the whole of proletarian and revolutionary Russia. Into the new Duma, into the new Duma!!

"...Comrades and citizens! Our future Duma will not be a Black-Hundred Duma, nor will it be a Cadet Duma—it will be a proletarian and peasant Duma—our Duma, with full power."

I repeat that it would be petty to quarrel with the style or the details of these appeals.

The important thing is their spirit. The important thing is the independent policy of the Armavir Social-Democrats, who have been through the purgatory of blocs with windbags and parasites.

So much for your hopes in the Social-Democrats, gentlemen of *Rech*, *Tovarishch*, *Vek* and *Russkiye Vedomosti*[138]! So much for the "danger from the Left" mentioned in *Rech* the other day!

Into the struggle then, all revolutionary Social-Democrats! Into the struggle against blocs with the Cadets! The Menshevik comrades will, like the Armavirians, go through the purgatory of blocs with the bourgeois opportunists and return to revolutionary Social-Democracy.

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WHOM TO ELECT TO THE STATE DUMA[139]

CITIZENS! SEE TO IT THAT THE WHOLE PEOPLE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS WHAT THE CHIEF PARTIES ARE THAT ARE FIGHTING IN THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG AND WHAT EACH OF THEM STRIVES FOR!

WHAT ARE THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES?

The Black Hundreds

They are—the Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, the Party of Law and Order, the Union of October Seventeenth, the Commercial and Industrial Party, the Party of Peaceful Renovation.

The Cadets

They are—the party of "people's" freedom or Constitutional-"Democratic" (in reality liberal-monarchist) Party, the Party of "Democratic" Reforms, the radicals, etc.

The Social-Democrats

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. It is the party of the class-conscious-workers of all the nationalities of Russia, of Russians, Letts, Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, Tatars, etc.

WHOSE INTERESTS DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES DEFEND?

The Black Hundreds defend the present tsarist government, they stand for the landlords, for the government officials for the

The Cadets defend the interests of the liberal bourgeois, the liberal landlords, merchants and capitalists. The Cadets are a

The Social-Democrats are the party of the working class, defending the interests of all the working and exploited people.

power of the police, for military courts, for pogroms.	party of bourgeois lawyers, journalists, professors and such like.	

WHAT DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES STRIVE FOR?

The Black Hundreds strive for the preservation of the old autocracy, the lack of rights of the people, the unlimited rule over it of the landlords, officials and police.	The Cadets strive for the transfer of power into the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie. The monarchy, by preserving the police and military regime, is to safeguard the capitalists' right to rob the workers and peasants.	The Social-Democrats strive for the transfer of all power into the hands of the people, i.e., a democratic republic. The Social-Democrats need complete freedom in order to fight for socialism, for the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

WHAT KIND OF FREEDOM DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES WANT TO GIVE THE PEOPLE?

The Black Hundreds do not give the people any freedom, any power. All power is for the tsarist government. The rights of the people are: to pay taxes, to toil for the rich, to rot in gaol.	The Cadets want the kind of "people's freedom" which will be subordinated, firstly, to the Upper Chamber, i.e., to the landlords and capitalists; secondly, to the monarchy, i.e., the tsar with the irresponsible police and armed forces. One-third of the power to the people, one-third to the capitalists and one-third to the tsar.	The Social-Democrats want complete freedom and all power for the people, all officials to be elected, the soldiers to be freed from barrack servitude, and the organisation of a free, people's militia.

HOW DO THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES REGARD THE PEASANTS' DEMAND FOR LAND?

The Black Hundreds defend the interests of the feudal landlords. No land for the peasants. Only the rich to be allowed to buy land from the landlords by voluntary agreement.

The Cadets want to preserve the landlord system of agriculture by means of concessions. They propose redemption payments by the peasants which already once before in 1861 ruined the peasants. The Cadets do not agree that the land question should be settled by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The Social-Democrats want to abolish our landlord system of agriculture. All land must be transferred to the peasants absolutely, without redemption payments. The land question must be settled by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

WHAT CAN THE THREE CHIEF PARTIES ACHIEVE IF THEIR WHOLE STRUGGLE IS SUCCESSFUL?

The Black Hundreds, using every possible means of struggle, can cause the people to be finally ruined and all Russia subjected to the savagery of military courts and pogroms.

The Cadets, using only "peaceful" means of struggle, can cause the pogrom-mongers' government to buy off the big bourgeoisie and the rich in the countryside at the cost of petty concessions, while it will chase out the liberal chatterboxes for insufficiently servile

The Social-Demo crats, using every possible means of struggle, including an uprising, can, with the aid of the politically conscious peasantry and urban poor, win complete freedom and all the land for the peasants. And with freedom, and with the help of the class-conscious

speeches about the beloved, blameless, inviolable, constitutional monarch.	workers of all Europe, the Russian Social - Democrats can advance with rapid strides to socialism.

CITIZENS! VOTE AT THE ELECTIONS FOR CANDIDATES OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY!

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE TRUDOVIK PARTIES

Citizens! Anyone who wants to take an intelligent part in the elections to the State Duma must first of all clearly understand the difference between the three main parties. The *Black Hundreds* stand for pogroms and the violence of the tsarist government. The *Cadets* stand for the interests of the liberal landlords and capitalists. The *Social-Democrats* stand for the interests of the working class and all the working and exploited people.

Anyone who wants to uphold intelligently the interests of the working class and all working people must know which party is really able most consistently and resolutely to defend these interests.

WHICH PARTIES CLAIM TO DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS AND ALL WORKING PEOPLE?

The party of the working class, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, based on the standpoint of the class struggle of the proletariat.	Trudovik parties, i.e., parties based on the standpoint of the small proprietor:	
	The Socialist-Revolutionary Party	The Trudovik (Poplar Socialist) Party and the non-party Trudoviks.

WHOSE INTERESTS DO THESE PARTIES ACTUALLY DEFEND?

The interests of the proletarians, whose conditions of life deprive them of all hope of becoming proprietors and cause them to strive for completely changing the whole basis of the capitalist social system.

The interests of the petty proprietors, who struggle against capitalist oppression, but who, owing to the very conditions of their life, strive to become proprietors, to strengthen their petty economy and to enrich themselves by means of trade and hiring labour.

HOW STEADFAST ARE THESE PARTIES IN THE GREAT WORLD-WIDE STRUGGLE OF LABOUR AGAINST CAPITAL?

The Social-Democrats cannot allow of any reconciliation of labour and capital. They organise the wage-workers for a ruthless struggle against capital, for the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and for the building of socialist society.

The toilers' parties dream of abolishing the rule of capital but, owing to the conditions of life of the petty proprietor, they inevitably waver between fighting jointly with the wage-workers against capital and striving to reconcile workers and capitalists by the conversion of all the working people into petty proprietors, with equal division of land, or guaranteed credit, and so on.

WHAT CAN THESE PARTIES ACHIEVE BY COMPLETELY FULFILLING THEIR ULTIMATE AIMS?

The conquest of potical power by the proletariat and the conversion of capitalist into social, large-scale, socialist production.

The equal distribution of land among petty proprietors and small peasants, in which case there will inevitably be a struggle between them again, giving rise to a division into rich and poor, workers and capitalists.

WHAT KIND OF FREEDOM FOR THE PEOPLE ARE THESE PARTIES TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN THE PRESENT REVOLUTION?

Complete freedom and full power for the people, i.e., a democratic republic, officials to be subject to election, the replacement of the standing army by universal arming of the people.	Complete freedom and full power for the people, i.e., a democratic republic, officials to be subject to election, the replacement of the standing army by universal arming of the people.	A combination of democracy, i.e., full power of the people, with the monarchy, i.e., with the power of the tsar, police and officials. This is just as senseless a desire and just as treacherous a policy as that of the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THESE PARTIES TO THE PEASANTS' DEMAND FOR LAND?

The Social-Democrats demand the transfer of all the landlords' land to the peasants without any redemption payments.	The Socialist Revolutionaries demand the transfer of all the landlords' land to the peasants without any redemption payments.	The Trudoviks demand the transfer of all the landlords' land to the peasants, but they allow redemption payments, which will ruin the peasants, so that this is just as treacherous a policy as that of the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

CITIZENS! VOTE AT THE ELECTIONS FOR CANDIDATES OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY!

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THE NEW SENATE INTERPRETATION

When political strife assumes open forms to any extent, it is remarkable how quickly and vividly events put every tactical step to the test. Even before many of the delegates of the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party have had time to return to their localities and report to their Party organisations, a totally new light has been thrown on the vexed question of blocs with the Cadets, which is now the central political question of the day.

At the Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party it never occurred to any delegate that the Social-Democrats could even slightly weaken, or modify in any way, their independent tactical slogans in the election campaign. Formally, the corner-stone of the resolution submitted by the Central Committee and adopted by 18 votes to 14 (the Bolsheviks, Poles and Letts) was the complete independence of the platform and slogans of the R.S.D.L.P. Alliances of any permanence with other parties on the basis of any "relaxation" whatsoever of our political platform were absolutely prohibited. And the whole controversy between the Right and Left wings of the Social-Democratic Party revolved around the questions: "Are the Right-wing Social-Democrats adhering to this principle in actual practice? Are they not violating it by sanctioning blocs with the Cadets? Is not the distinction between 'technical' and ideological agreements artificial, fictitious and merely a verbal one?"

But... apparently, in our Party too, i.e., in its actual "constitution", there is an institution of the nature of a Senate; by means of Senate interpretations, there is a possibility of Party "laws", decisions of official Party bodies, being

turned into their very opposite. The new Senate interpretation of the decisions of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party came, as might have been expected, from Geneva. It was published in the Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* in the form of "An Open Answer"[140] (just like Lassalle!) by G. Plekhanov to a reader of that paper "who does not consider himself either a bourgeois or a Social-Democrat". Our Party quasi-Lassalle hurries to the assistance of the reader of a newspaper which is virtually the organ of the renegades of Social-Democracy.

The reader of *Tovarishch* asked G. Plekhanov, among other things, "what, in his opinion, could serve as a joint election platform of the Left and extreme Left parties". G. Plekhanov answered: "To this question there can be no other answer than: *a Duma with full power*."

"There can be no other answer".... These words of our quasi-Lassalle are probably fated to become "historic", at least in the Gogol sense of the term. Plekhanov condescended once to listen to a report in which it was stated that there was a certain Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, that some sort of an All-Russian Conference of that Party was being convened, and that both the Central Committee and that Conference were drawing up a reply to questions which are of interest not only to Madame Kuskova and Mr. Prokopovich, Plekhanov's present colleagues, but also to the socialist workers of Russia. Not in the least disturbed by this, G. Plekhanov proclaims: "*There can be no other* answer than mine." And these high and mighty words are published in a Cadet newspaper at a time when the whole reading public of Russia already knows of *another* answer, given by *all* the representatives both of the regional bodies and of the central body of the whole Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Verily, this is a "history" of the sort that Nozdrev[141] was so often the hero of.

However, let us get to the point of this unique and inimitable answer of our inimitable G. Plekhanov.

First of all we note that he cannot even conceive of the possibility of agreements at the first stage without a joint election platform. We Bolsheviks find this opinion greatly to our liking. By this admission, Plekhanov has done the

Mensheviks a disservice. We have repeatedly pointed out, at the Conference, in controversy with the Mensheviks and Bundists, and also in No. 8 of *Proletary*,* that agreements at the first stage will inevitably affect our Party position in coming before the masses and that consequently, whatever our desires and plans may be, such agreements will inevitably acquire the colouring of a certain ideological *rapprochement*, and will in some measure obscure, diminish and blunt the political independence of the Social-Democratic Party. G. Plekhanov, with his characteristic adroitness and party tact, has confirmed our charges against the Mensheviks. In fact, he has gone even further than our accusation by advocating a *joint platform*, i.e., a definite *ideological* bloc with the Cadets.

It turns out that not only in the Russian state, but also in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Senate interpretations discredit those for whose benefit they are issued.

Further, let the reader ponder over the direct meaning of Plekhanov's "Cadet-Social-Democratic" slogan: "a Duma with full power"—irrespective of the attitude of the different parties towards it. The words "a Duma with full power" signify a demand for full power for the Duma. Which Duma? Evidently, the one to which Russian citizens will now elect deputies on the basis of the Law of December 11 and the Senate interpretations. For *this* Duma, G. Plekhanov proposes to demand full power. Evidently, he is convinced that this Duma will not be a Black-Hundred Duma, for he could not demand full power for a Black-Hundred Duma. To issue the slogan of "a Duma with full power" and at the same time to shout about the serious danger of a Black-Hundred Duma, is to defeat one's own case. It is tantamount to confirming the opinion of the Bolsheviks that there is really no serious danger of a Black-Hundred Duma being elected, and that the Cadets are either inventing or in some cases exaggerating this danger for their own selfish ends, namely, to shake the faith of the workers and of all revolutionary democrats in their own strength, to free the Cadet Party of the "*danger from the Left*" which is really threatening it. *Rech* itself, the official organ of the Cadets, has acknowledged *that* danger

* See p. 312 of this volume.—*Ed.*

in the report of the Cadets on the progress of the election campaign in St. Petersburg Gubernia.

Let us pass on to the real political meaning of Plekhanov's slogan. Its inventor is in raptures over it. "This general formula," he writes, "exactly expresses in algebraic form the political task that is most urgent today for the Lefts and the extreme Lefts", while allowing them to preserve all their other demands absolutely intact. "The Cadets' conception of a Duma with full power cannot be the same as that of the Social-Democrats. But both need a Duma with full power. Therefore, both must fight for it."

It is clear from these words that Plekhanov is fully aware that this slogan is bound to be understood differently by the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The slogan is the same, "common" to both, but the Cadets' "conception" of this slogan *cannot* be the same as that of the Social-Democrats.

In that case, what is the purpose of a common slogan? What is the use of submitting slogans and platforms to the masses at all?

Is it only for the sake of appearances, to cover up something that should not be explained to the masses, to perform behind the backs of the people a parliamentary manoeuvre that promises all sorts of advantages? Or is it to raise the class-consciousness of the masses and really explain to them their present political tasks?

Everyone knows that bourgeois politicians always come forward with all sorts of slogans, programmes, and platforms to deceive the people. Bourgeois politicians always, especially before elections, call themselves liberals, progressives, democrats and even "radical socialists" *solely for the purpose* of catching votes and deceiving the people. This is a universal phenomenon in all capitalist countries. That is why Marx and Engels even referred to bourgeois deputies as people "*die das Volk vertreten und zertreten*", i.e., who represent and repress the people through their parliamentary powers.[142]

And here we have the "veteran" Russian Social-Democrat, the founder of Social-Democracy, proposing a platform for the first general Party election campaign which it is known will be interpreted by the Cadets in one way and by the Social-Democrats in another! What does it all mean?

If the Cadets and the Social-Democrats cannot have the same conception of a Duma with full power, neither can the broad masses of the people, for the Cadets and the Social-Democrats represent the interests of certain classes, their strivings and prejudices. Evidently, Plekhanov regards the Cadets' conception of a Duma with full power as wrong, and all wrong conceptions of political aims are harmful to the people. Consequently, Plekhanov is advancing a slogan in a form that is *known* to be harmful to the people, for it leaves a wrong conception unexplained and concealed. To put it simply and bluntly, this means deceiving the workers and the whole people for the sake of an appearance of unity between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats.

What is wrong with the Cadets' conception of a Duma with full power? Plekhanov does not say. This silence proves, firstly, that Plekhanov is using the election campaign (the presentation of an election platform is a step in the election campaign) not to clarify the minds of the people but to obscure them. Secondly, it takes away all meaning from Plekhanov's conclusion that "both the Cadets and the Social-Democrats need a Duma with full power". This is sheer nonsense concealed by verbal trickery: two different parties need the same thing, which each conceives of differently! Which means that it is not the same thing: the first comer will convict Plekhanov here of a logical blunder. We might as well symbolise both an autocratic monarchy and a democratic republic with the letter "*a*" and say that different parties are free to substitute different arithmetical values in this general algebraic formula. That would be typical Plekhanov logic, or rather Plekhanov sophistry.

As a matter of fact, Plekhanov utters a *downright falsehood* when he says that both the Cadets and the Social-Democrats need a Duma with full power or, what is more, a popular representative assembly with full power, which he discusses all through the second part of his article. A popular representative assembly with full power is a constituent assembly; moreover it is a constituent assembly not side by side with the monarch, but *after the overthrow* of the tsarist government. If Plekhanov has forgotten this simple truth, we advise him to read the Programme of the Russian Social-

Democratic Labour Party, especially the last paragraph, which deals with this very point.

The Cadets do not need such a popular representative assembly with really full power; it would be dangerous for them and fatal to the interests they represent. It would exclude the monarchy, so dear to their hearts and valuable for their bourgeois pockets. It would deprive them of their hope of redemption payments for the landlords' lands. All this is so true that *even* Plekhanov, in No. 6 of his *Dnevnik*, speaks of the Cadet's selfish class distrust of the idea of a constituent assembly and says that, fearing a constituent assembly, the Cadets are *making peace* with the Stolypin gang.

We already quoted these passages from Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*, No. 6, in No. 8 of *Proletary*,* and pointed out that Plekhanov must now withdraw the statements he made but yesterday. His phrase "the Cadets also need a Duma with full power" is just such a *withdrawal* of his own words.

Plekhanov's main *falsehood* logically and inevitably leads to a number of others. It is *false* to say that a "popular representative assembly with full power is in itself a preliminary condition for the achievement of all the other ... demands of all the progressive parties", that "without it, not one of these demands will be achieved", that the struggle of the Lefts and extreme Lefts will begin only when "it [the popular representative assembly with full power] becomes a fact". A popular representative assembly with full power is the culmination of the revolution, its final and complete victory. But the Cadets want to halt the revolution, to put a stop to it by small concessions, and they say so openly. By trying to make the workers and the whole people believe that the Cadets are capable of fighting for the complete victory of the revolution, Plekhanov is thrice deceiving the masses of the people.

"So far we have only a Mr. Stolypin with full power," writes Plekhanov. We do not know whether this is a slip of the pen, or another example of false Cadet language ("a Duma with full power = a tsarist Duma with Ministers

* See p. 318 of this volume.—*Ed.*

appointed by the tsar from the Duma majority"), or a ruse to escape the censor. Far from having full power, Stolypin is just an insignificant lackey of the tsar and of the tsar's Black-Hundred Court gang. If the pogrom disclosures in the Duma have not convinced Plekhanov of this, let him read what the liberal newspapers say about the all-powerful influence of the Union of the Russian People.

"Now," says Plekhanov, "the Left and the extreme Left parties must join forces against those who do not want a popular representative assembly with full power, or, perhaps, any popular representative assembly at all."

Consequently, they must oppose the Cadets, who *do not want* a popular representative assembly with full power.

Plekhanov scored nicely against himself when, ostensibly combating doctrinairism, he set us an example of the worst Jesuitical doctrinairism. From the standpoint of their group, the Bolsheviks could rejoice at his performance, for a stronger blow at Menshevik tactics could hardly be imagined. As members of the united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, however, we feel ashamed of it.

The official organ of the Cadets, *Rech*, answered Plekhanov in a way that will, perhaps, cure even the tamest Social-Democrats of their opportunist illusions. Its first reply, a leading article in issue No. 226, of November 25, consists entirely of mockery over Plekhanov's proffered hand, and it is the mockery of a liberal who has not forgotten the attacks that Plekhanov and his *Iskra* colleagues made on the opportunism of the liberals. "In this case too," says the Cadet organ, jeering at Plekhanov, "Mr. Plekhanov is making highly commendable and praiseworthy efforts to move his colleagues a little to the Right of the most Right positions they occupy." Nevertheless ... we must object.

The Cadet's objections are the type of answer that a factory owner would give to a worker who has come to beg something of him after dissociating himself from his fellow-workers who are making a joint demand backed by a strike. You come to me asking for a favour? Good. But what use are you to me if your unreasonable colleagues do not follow your example? What use are you to me if you do not go all the way? A Duma with full power? Well, well! Do you think I am going to discredit myself in the eyes of the people who

stand for law and order? You must say: a Cabinet consisting of members of the Duma majority. Then we shall agree to a joint platform with the Social-Democrats!

Such is the gist of the reply in *Rech*, which is studded with subtle ridicule both of Plekhanov's naïve "algebra" and of the fact that he, in November 1904, was a member of the leading body of the Social-Democrats (Plekhanov was then a member of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and chairman of the Supreme "Council" of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party), the body which rejected the "famous Paris agreement"[143] with the bourgeois democrats. At that time we had an "algebraic symbol", namely, "a democratic regime", says *Rech*, ironically. By that we meant a constitutional monarchy. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who agreed to the pact, meant a democratic republic. You refused then, Mr. G. V. Plekhanov. Have you now grown wiser? We Cadets commend you for it, but if you want to *talk business*, you must go farther to the right.

And *Rech* openly admits that the Cadets were also leading the people by the nose with the slogan of a "constituent assembly". We Cadets wanted a constituent assembly "*with the preservation of the prerogatives of the monarch*", and not a republican constituent assembly. It was to our advantage to attract the sympathies of the masses by means of this deception, but now it is more important for us to win the sympathy of the tsarist gang. Therefore, away with this "dangerous", "ambiguous" and "hopeless" slogan of "a Duma with full power", which "panders to pernicious revolutionary illusions". We demand that the Social-Democrats stick to their former, Central Committee slogan: support for a Cabinet consisting of members of the Duma majority, "*with all the consequences*" that follow from it. And these consequences are, not to weaken, but to *strengthen* (*sic!*) the Cadet majority in the Duma.

In the next issue of the *Rech* the editorial specially explains to the tsar's Black-Hundred gang (ostensibly explaining the question to Plekhanov) that the Cadets *do not need* a Duma "with full power". To proclaim the Duma as having full power means a coup d'état. The Cadets will never agree, to that. "We Cadets are not at all striving for a Duma with full power, nor are we obliged to do so." "Has Mr. Plekhanov,

in spite of his usual perspicacity, failed to learn" this lesson "from the course of events"?

Yes, the Cadets' jeer at Plekhanov's usual perspicacity hit the nail on the head. The whole course of events of the Russian revolution has failed to teach Plekhanov to understand the Cadets. He has received a well-merited punishment in that the Cadets have scornfully rejected the hand proffered by a Social-Democrat acting independently of his Party and contrary to its wishes.

The reply *Rech* gave to Plekhanov is also of general political importance. The Cadets are swiftly moving to the Right. They do not hesitate to say that they will come to terms with the Black-Hundred monarchy and destroy "pernicious revolutionary illusions".

The workers of the whole of Russia will, we feel sure, turn this lesson to good account. Instead of entering into blocs with the Cadets they will wage an independent election campaign, win over the revolutionary bourgeoisie and sweep aside into the slough of political treachery the whole gang of bourgeois politicians who are deceiving the people with phrase-mongering about "political freedom".

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THE CRISIS OF MENSHEVISM

The advocacy of a non-party labour congress and blocs with the Cadets is undoubtedly a sign of something in the nature of a crisis in the tactics of the Mensheviks. Being opposed on principle to all their tactics in general, we, of course, could not ourselves decide whether this crisis had ripened sufficiently to break out on the surface, so to speak. Comrade Y. Larin has come to our assistance in his latest and most instructive pamphlet: *A Broad Labour Party and a Labour Congress* (Moscow, 1906, book depot of *Novy Mir* Publishers).

Comrade Y. Larin often speaks in the name of the majority of the Mensheviks. He styles himself—and with full right—a responsible representative of Menshevism. He has worked both in the South and in the most "Menshevik" district of St. Petersburg, Vyborg District. He was a delegate to the Unity Congress. He was a regular contributor to *Golos Truda* and *Otkliki Sovremennosti*. All these facts are extremely important in forming an opinion of the pamphlet, the value of which lies in the author's veracity, but not in his logic; in the information he supplies, but not in his arguments.

I

A Marxist must base his arguments on tactics on an analysis of the objective course of the revolution. The Bolsheviks, as we know, made an attempt to do so in the resolution on the present situation which they submitted to the Unity Congress.[144] The Mensheviks withdrew their own resolution on this subject. Comrade Larin evidently feels that such

questions must not be shelved and he makes an attempt to trace the course of our bourgeois revolution.

He divides it into two periods. The first, covering the whole of 1905, is the period of the open mass movement. The second, starting with 1906, is the period of agonisingly slow preparation for the "actual triumph of the cause of liberty", "the realisation of the aspirations of the people". In this period of preparation the countryside is the decisive factor; because its aid was not forthcoming the "disunited cities were crushed". We are experiencing "an internal, outwardly passive-seeming, growth of the revolution".

"What is called the agrarian movement—the constant ferment which does not develop into widespread attempts at an active offensive, the minor struggles with the local authorities and landlords, the suspension of tax payments, punitive expeditions—all this constitutes the course most advantageous to the peasantry, not from the point of view of economising forces, perhaps, which is doubtful, but from the point of view of results. Without completely exhausting the rural population, bringing it, on the whole, more alleviation than defeats, it is seriously sapping the foundations of the old regime and creating conditions that must inevitably compel it to capitulate, or fall, at the first serious test, when the time comes." And the author points out that in two or three years' time there will be a change in the personnel of the police force and the army, which will be replenished with recruits from the discontented rural population; "our sons will be among the soldiers", as a peasant told the author.

Comrade Larin draws two conclusions. (1) In our country "unrest in the countryside cannot subside. The Austrian 1848 cannot be repeated here." (2) "The Russian revolution is not taking the course of an armed uprising of the people in the real sense of the term, like the American or Polish revolutions."

Let us consider these conclusions. The author's grounds for the first are too sketchy and his formulation of it too inexact. But in substance, he is not far from the truth. The outcome of our revolution will actually depend most of all on the steadfastness in struggle of the millions of peasants.

Our big bourgeoisie is far more afraid of revolution than of reaction. The proletariat, by itself, is not strong enough to win. The urban poor do not represent any independent interests, they are not an independent force compared with the proletariat and peasantry. The rural population has the decisive role, not in the sense of leading the struggle (this is out of the question), but in the sense of being able to ensure victory.

If Comrade Larin had properly thought out his conclusion and had linked it up with the whole course of development of Social-Democratic ideas on our bourgeois revolution, he would have found himself confronted with an old proposition of the Bolshevism that he hates so much: the victorious outcome of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is possible only in the form of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. In effect, Larin has arrived at the same point of view. The only thing that prevents him from admitting it openly is that Menshevik quality which he himself castigates, namely: hesitant and timid thinking. One need only compare Larin's arguments on this subject with those of the Central Committee's *Sotsial-Demokrat* to be convinced that Larin has come close to the Bolsheviks on this question. *Sotsial-Demokrat* went to the length of saying that the Cadets are the urban, non-Estate, progressive bourgeoisie, while the Trudoviks are the rural, Estate, non-progressive bourgeoisie! *Sotsial-Demokrat* failed to notice the landlords and counter-revolutionary bourgeois among the Cadets, failed to notice the non-Estate, urban democrats (the lower strata of the urban poor) among the Trudoviks!

To proceed. Larin says that unrest in the countryside cannot subside. Has he proved it? No. He has entirely left out of account the role of the peasant bourgeoisie, which is being systematically bribed by the government. He has given little thought also to the fact that the "alleviations" obtained by the peasantry (lower rents, "curtailment" of the rights and powers of the landlords and the police, etc.) are *intensifying* the break-up of the rural population into the counter-revolutionary rich and a mass of poor. Such sweeping generalisations must not be made with such scanty evidence. They sound trite.

But can the proposition that "unrest in the countryside cannot subside" be proved? Yes and no. Yes—in the sense that one can make a thorough analysis of probable developments. No—in the sense that one cannot be absolutely certain of these developments in the present bourgeois revolution. One cannot weigh with apothecary's scales the equilibrium between the new forces of counter-revolution and revolution which are growing and becoming interwoven in the countryside. *Experience alone* will completely reveal this. Revolution, in the narrow sense of the term, is an acute struggle, and only in the course of the struggle and in its outcome is the real strength of all the interests, aspirations and potentialities displayed and fully recognised.

The task of the advanced class in the revolution is to ascertain correctly the *trend* of the struggle, to make the most of *all* opportunities, *all* chances of victory. This class must be the *first* to take the direct revolutionary path and the *last* to abandon it for more "prosaic", more "circuitous" paths. Comrade Larin has failed to understand this truth, although he argues at great length and (as we shall see below) not at all cleverly about spontaneous outbursts and planned action.

Let us pass to his second conclusion—concerning an armed uprising. Here Larin is even more guilty of timid thinking. His thoughts slavishly follow the old models: the North American and Polish uprisings. Apart from these, he refuses to recognise any uprising "in the real sense of the term". He even says that our revolution is not proceeding on the lines of a "formal" (!) and "regular" (!!) armed uprising.

How curious: a Menshevik who won his spurs in a fight against formalism is now talking about a formal armed uprising! If your thoughts are so crushed by the formal and the regular, you have only yourself to blame, Comrade Larin. The Bolsheviks have always taken a different view of the matter. Long before the uprising, at the Third Congress, i.e., in the spring of 1905, they emphasised in a special resolution the *connection between the mass strike and an uprising*."[145] The Mensheviks prefer to ignore this. It is in vain. The resolution of the Third Congress is actual proof

that we foresaw as closely as was possible the specific features of the people's struggle at the end of 1905. And we did not by any means conceive the uprising as being of "the type" of North America or Poland, where a mass strike would have been out of the question.

Then, after December, we pointed out (in our draft resolution for the Unity Congress[146]) the change in the relation of the strike to the uprising, the role of the peasantry and the army, the inadequacy of local outbreaks in the armed forces and the necessity of reaching an agreement with the revolutionary-democratic elements among the troops.

And events proved once again, in the course of the Duma period, the inevitability of an uprising in the Russian struggle for emancipation.

Larin's arguments about a formal uprising display an ignorance of the history of the present revolution, or a disregard for this history and its specific forms of insurrection, that is most unbecoming for a Social-Democrat. Larin's thesis! "The Russian revolution is not taking the course of an uprising" shows contempt for the facts, for *both* periods of civil liberties in Russia (the October and the Duma periods) were in fact marked by a "course" of *uprisings*, not of the American or Polish type, of course, but one characteristic of twentieth-century Russia. By arguing "in general" about historical examples of uprisings in countries where rural or urban elements predominated, about America and Poland, and refusing to make the least attempt to study or even note the specific features of the uprising in Russia, Larin repeats the cardinal error of the "hesitant and timid" thinking of the Mensheviks.

Look deeper into his structure of "passive" revolution. Undoubtedly, there may be long periods of preparation for a new upsurge, a new onslaught, or new forms of struggle. But don't be doctrinaire, gentlemen; consider what this "constant ferment" in the countryside means *in addition to* the "minor struggles", the "punitive expeditions" and the *change* in the personnel of the police force and troops! Why, you do not understand what you yourselves are saying. The situation you describe is nothing more nor less than protracted *guerrilla warfare*, interspersed with a series of *outbursts of revolt in the army* of increasing magnitude and unity,

You keep on using angry and abusive language about the "guerrilla fighters", "anarchists", "anarcho-Blanquist-Bolsheviks", and so forth, yet you yourselves depict the revolution as the Bolsheviks do! Change in the personnel of the army, its remanning with "recruits from the discontented rural population". What does this mean? Can this "discontent" of the rural population clothed in sailors' jackets and soldiers' uniforms fail to come to the surface? Can it fail to manifest itself when there is "constant ferment" in the soldiers' native villages, when "minor struggles" on one side and "punitive expeditions" on the other are raging in the country? And can we, in this period of Black-Hundred pogroms, government violence and police outrages, conceive of *any other* manifestation of this discontent among the soldiers than military revolts?

While repeating Cadet phrases ("our revolution is not taking the course of an uprising"; this phrase was put into circulation by the *Cadets* at the end of 1905; see Milyukov's *Narodnaya Svoboda*[147]), you at the same time show that a new uprising is inevitable; "the regime will collapse at the first serious test". Do you think that a serious test of the regime is possible in a broad, heterogeneous, complex, popular movement without a preliminary series of less important, partial tests; that a general strike is possible without a series of local strikes; that a general uprising is possible without a series of sporadic, minor, non-general uprisings?

If recruits from the discontented rural population are increasing in the armed forces, and if the revolution as a whole is advancing, then insurrection is inevitable in the form of *extremely bitter* struggle against the Black-Hundred troops (for the Black Hundreds are also organising and training themselves, do not forget this! Do not forget that there are social elements which foster Black-Hundred mentality!), a struggle both of the people and of a section of the armed forces. So it is necessary to get ready, to prepare the masses and to prepare ourselves, for a more systematic, united and aggressive uprising—that is the conclusion that follows from Larin's premises, from his Cadet fairy-tale about passive (??) revolution. Larin admits that the Mensheviks "put the blame for their own melancholy and despondency on the course of the Russian revolution" (p. 58). Exactly!

Passivity is the quality of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, not of the revolution. Those are passive who admit that the army is being filled with recruits from the discontented rural population, that constant ferment and minor struggles are inevitable, and yet, with the complacency of Ivan Fyodorovich Shponka,[148] console the workers' party with the statement: "the Russian revolution is not taking the course of an uprising".

But what about the "minor struggles"? You, my dear Larin, think that they are the "course most advantageous to the peasantry from the point of view of results"? You maintain this opinion in spite of the punitive expeditions, and even include the latter in the most advantageous course? But have you given even the slightest thought to what distinguishes this minor struggle from guerrilla warfare? Nothing, esteemed Comrade Larin.

In your preoccupation with the ill-chosen examples of America and Poland you have overlooked the specific forms of struggle engendered by the Russian uprising, which is more protracted, more stubborn and has longer intervals between big battles than uprisings of the old type.

Comrade Larin has become completely confused, and his conclusions are all at sixes and sevens. If there are grounds for revolution in the countryside, if the revolution is expanding and drawing in new forces, if the army is being filled with discontented peasants, and if continual ferment and minor struggles persist in the countryside, then the Bolsheviks are right in their fight against shelving the question of an uprising. We do not advocate an uprising at all times and under all circumstances. But we do demand that the thoughts of a Social-Democrat should not be hesitant and timid. If you admit that the *conditions* for an uprising exist, then recognise the uprising itself and the special tasks that confront the Party in connection with it.

To call minor struggles "*the most advantageous course*", i.e., the most advantageous form of the struggle of the people in a specific period of our revolution, and at the same time to refuse to admit that the Party of the advanced class is confronted by *active* tasks which arise out of this "most advantageous course", reveals either inability to think or dishonest thinking.

II

A "theory of passivity" is the term that might be applied to Larin's arguments about a "passive" revolution that is preparing the "collapse of the old regime at the first serious test". And this "theory of passivity", a natural product of timid thinking, has left its mark on the whole pamphlet of our penitent Menshevik. He asks: Why, considering its enormous ideological influence, is our Party so weak organisationally? It is not, he replies, because our Party is a party of intellectuals. This old, "bureaucratic" (Larin's expression) explanation of the Mensheviks is quite worthless. Because, objectively, in the present period there has been no need for a different kind of party, and the objective conditions for a different kind of party have not existed. Because for a "policy of spontaneous outbursts", such as the policy of the proletariat was at the beginning of the revolution, no party was needed. All that was needed was a "technical apparatus to serve the spontaneous movement" and "spontaneous moods", to conduct propaganda and agitational work in the intervals between revolutionary outbursts. This was not a party in the European sense, but "a narrow—120,000 out of nine million—association of young working-class conspirators"; few married men; the majority of the workers who are ready for public activities are outside the Party.

Now the period of spontaneous outbursts is passing away. Calculation is taking the place of mere temperament. In place of the "policy of spontaneous outbursts", a "policy of planned action" is arising. Now we need "a party of the European type", a "party of objectively planned, political action". In place of an "apparatus-party" we need a "vanguard-party", "that would be the rallying point for all those suitable for active political life that the working class can produce from its ranks". This is the transition to a "European party based on calculated action". The "sound realism of European Social-Democracy" is taking the place of "official Menshevism with its half-hearted and hesitating measures, its despondency and failure to understand its own position". "Its voice has been making itself quite audible for some time now through Plekhanov and Axelrod—strictly speaking the only Europeans in our 'barbarian' environment...." And, of

course, the substitution of Europeanism for barbarism promises success in place of failure. "Wherever spontaneity prevails, mistakes in judgement and failures in practice are inevitable." "Where there is spontaneity, there is utopianism; where there is utopianism, there is failure."

In these arguments of Larin's we see again the glaring discrepancy between the tiny kernel of a correct, although not new, idea, and the enormous husk of sheer reactionary incomprehension. A spoonful of honey in a barrel of tar.

It is an unquestionable and indisputable fact that as capitalism develops, as experience of bourgeois revolution or revolutions, and also of abortive socialist revolutions, accumulates, the working class of all countries grows, develops, learns, becomes trained and organised. In other words: it advances from spontaneity to planned action, from being guided merely by mood to guidance by the objective position of all classes, from outbursts to sustained struggle. All this is true. It is as old as the hills, and is as applicable to Russia of the twentieth century as to England of the seventeenth century, to France of the thirties of the nineteenth century, and to Germany at the close of the nineteenth century.

But the trouble with Larin is that he is quite incapable of digesting the materials which our revolution provides the Social-Democrat. Like a child with a new toy, he is entirely taken up with contrasting the outbursts of Russian barbarism with European planned activity. Uttering a truism that applies to all periods in general, he does not understand that his naïve application of this truism to a period of direct revolutionary struggle becomes with him a *renegade* attitude towards the revolution. This would be tragicomical, if it were not that Larin's sincerity left no shadow of doubt that he is *unconsciously* echoing the renegades of the revolution.

Spontaneous outbursts of barbarians, planned activity of the Europeans.... This is a purely Cadet formula and a Cadet idea, the idea of the traitors to the Russian revolution, who go into raptures over "constitutionalism" like Muromtsev, who declared: "The Duma is part of the government", or the lackey Rodichev, who exclaimed: "It is presumption to hold the monarch responsible for the pogrom." The Cadets have created a whole literature written by renegades (the

Izgoyevs, Struves, Prokopoviches, Portugalovs, *et tutti quanti*) who have reviled the *folly of spontaneity*, i.e., revolution. The liberal bourgeois, like the famous animal in the fable, is simply unable to lift his eyes and understand that it is only due to the "outbursts" of the people that we still possess even a shadow of liberty.

And Larin, naïvely uncritical, trails behind the liberals. Larin does not understand that there are two sides to the question he raises: (1) the contrast between a spontaneous struggle and a planned struggle of the same dimensions and forms, (2) the contrast between a revolutionary (in the narrow sense) period and a counter-revolutionary or "only constitutional" period. Larin's logic is atrocious. He contrasts a spontaneous political strike not to a planned political strike, but to planned participation in, let us say, the Bulygin Duma. He contrasts a spontaneous uprising not to a planned uprising, but to planned trade union activity. Consequently, his Marxist analysis is converted into a flat and philistine apotheosis of counter-revolution.

European Social-Democracy is the "party of objectively planned political activity", prattles Larin ecstatically. Oh, child! He does not notice that he is going into raptures over the particularly limited field of "*activity*" to which the Europeans were compelled to confine themselves in a period when there was no directly revolutionary struggle. He does not notice that he is going into raptures over the planned nature of a struggle waged *within legal limits* and decrying the spontaneity of a struggle *for the power and authority* which determine the limits of what is "legal". He compares the spontaneous uprising of the Russians in December 1905, not with the "planned" uprisings of the Germans in 1849 and of the French in 1871, but with the planned growth of the German trade unions. He compares the spontaneous and unsuccessful general strike of the Russians in December 1905, not with the "planned" *and unsuccessful* general strike of the Belgians in 1902,[149] but with the planned speeches of Bebel or Vandervelde in the Reichstag.

That is why Larin fails to understand the historic progress of the mass struggle of the proletariat signalised by the strike in October 1905 and the uprising in December 1905. Whereas the *retrogression* of the Russian revolution (*temporary*, on

his *own* admission) expressed in the necessity of preparatory activity *within the limits of the law* (trade unions, elections, etc.) he elevates into *progress* from spontaneous to planned activity, from moods to calculation, etc.

That is why, in place of the moral drawn by a revolutionary Marxist (that instead of a spontaneous political strike we must have a planned political strike, instead of a spontaneous uprising we must have a planned uprising), we find the moral drawn by a renegade-Cadet (instead of the "folly of spontaneity"—strikes and uprisings—we must have systematic submission to the Stolypin laws and a planned deal with the Black-Hundred monarchy).

No, Comrade Larin, if you had mastered the spirit of Marxism, and not merely its language, you would know the difference between revolutionary dialectical materialism and the opportunism of "objective" historians. Recall, for instance, what Marx said about Proudhon. A Marxist does not renounce the struggle within the limits of the law, peaceful parliamentarism and "planned" compliance with the limits of historical activity set by the Bismarcks and the Bennigsens, the Stolypins and the Milyukovs. But a Marxist, while utilising *every field*, even a reactionary one, for the fight for the revolution, does not stoop to glorifying reaction, does not forget to fight for *the best possible field of activity*. Therefore, the Marxist is the *first* to foresee the approach of a revolutionary period, and already begins to rouse the people and to sound the tocsin while the philistines are still wrapt in the slavish slumber of loyal subjects. The Marxist is therefore the *first* to take the path of direct revolutionary struggle, marching straight to battle and exposing the illusions of conciliation cherished by all kinds of social and political vacillators. Therefore, the Marxist is the *last* to leave the path of directly revolutionary struggle, he leaves it only when all possibilities have been exhausted, when there is not a *shadow* of hope for a shorter way, when the basis for an appeal to prepare for mass strikes, an uprising, etc., is obviously disappearing. Therefore, a Marxist treats with contempt the innumerable renegades of the revolution who shout to him: We are more "progressive" than you, we were the first to renounce the revolution! We were the first to "submit" to the monarchist constitution!

One of two things, Comrade Larin. Do you believe that there is already no basis for an uprising or for revolution in the narrow sense of the word? If you do, say so openly and prove it in the Marxist way, by an economic analysis, by an appraisal of the political strivings of the various classes, by an analysis of the significance of the different ideological trends. You have proved it? In that case, we declare that all talk about an uprising is mere phrase-mongering. In that case we shall say: what we *had* was not a great revolution, but a great bark without a bite. Workers! the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasants) have betrayed and forsaken you. But, on the basis *they* have created in spite of *our* efforts, we shall work persistently, patiently, and consistently for a *socialist* revolution, which will not be so half-hearted and wretched, so rich in words and poor in deeds as the bourgeois revolution!

Or do you really believe what you say, Comrade Larin? Do you believe that the tide of revolution is rising, that the minor struggles and the sullen discontent will in a matter of two or three years create a new discontented army and a new "serious test"; that "unrest in the countryside cannot subside"? If so, then you must admit that the "outbursts" express the strength of the people's anger, and not the strength of backward barbarism—that it is our duty to transform a spontaneous uprising into a planned uprising, and to work persistently and stubbornly for many months, perhaps years, to bring this about, and not to renounce an uprising, as all the Judases are doing.

Your present position, however, Comrade Larin, is precisely one of "melancholy and despondency", of "hesitant and timid thinking", of putting the blame for your own passivity on our revolution.

This, and this alone, is implied by your jubilant declaration that the boycott was a mistake. It is a short-sighted and vulgar jubilation. If it is "progressive" to renounce the boycott, then the most progressive people of all are the Right-wing Cadets of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, who fought against the boycott of the Bulygin Duma and called on the students "to go on with their studies and not meddle with rebellion". We do not envy this renegade progressiveness. We think that to say that it was a "mistake" to boycott the Witte

Duma (which three or four months before its convocation nobody believed would be convened) and to *be silent* about the mistake of those who called for participation in the Bulygin Duma, means substituting for the materialism of a revolutionary fighter the "objectivism" of a professor who is cringing to reaction. We think that the position of those who were the *last* to enter the Duma, to take the roundabout way, after trying really *everything* on the direct path of struggle, is better than that of those who were the first to call for entering the Bulygin Duma on the eve of the popular uprising which swept it away.

This Cadet phrase about the boycott having been a mistake is particularly unpardonable in Larin's case since he *truthfully* relates that the Mensheviks "*invented all kinds of shrewd and cunning tricks, ranging from the elective principle and the Zemstvo campaign to uniting the Party by participating in the elections with the object of boycotting the Duma*" (57). The Mensheviks called upon the workers to elect members to the Duma, although they themselves did not believe that it was right to go into the Duma. Were not the tactics of those more correct, who, not believing this, boycotted the Duma; who declared that to call the Duma a "power" (as the Mensheviks called it in their resolution at the Unity Congress, before Muromtsev did so) meant deceiving the people; who entered the Duma only after the bourgeoisie had deserted the direct path of boycott and compelled us to take a circuitous route, though not for the same purpose, and not in the same way, as the Cadets?

III

The contrast which Larin draws between an apparatus-party and a vanguard-party, or, in other words, between a party of fighters against the police and a party of class-conscious political fighters, seems profound and permeated with the "pure proletarian" spirit. In actual fact, however, it is the very same intellectualist opportunism as the analogous contrast drawn in 1899-1901 by the supporters of *Rabochaya Mysl* and the Akimovites.[150]

On the one hand, when there are objective conditions for a direct revolutionary onslaught by the masses, the

Party's *supreme* political task is "to serve the spontaneous movement". To contrast *such* revolutionary work with "politics" is to reduce politics to chicanery. It means exalting political action in the Duma above the political action of the masses in October and December; in other words, it means abandoning the proletarian revolutionary standpoint for that of intellectualist opportunism.

Every form of struggle requires a corresponding technique and a corresponding apparatus. When objective conditions make the parliamentary struggle the principal form of struggle, the features of the apparatus for parliamentary struggle inevitably become more marked in the Party. When, on the other hand, objective conditions give rise to a struggle of the masses in the form of mass political strikes and uprisings, the party of the proletariat *must* have an "apparatus" to "serve" *these* forms of struggle, and, of course, this must be a special "apparatus", not resembling the parliamentary one. An organised party of the proletariat which admitted that the conditions existed for popular uprisings and yet failed to set up the necessary apparatus would be a party of intellectualist chatterboxes; the workers would abandon it and go over to anarchism, bourgeois revolutionism, etc.

On the other hand, the composition of the politically guiding vanguard of every class, the proletariat included, also depends both on the position of this class and on the principal form of its struggle. Larin complains, for example, that young workers predominate in our Party, that we have few married workers, and that they leave the Party. This complaint of a Russian opportunist reminds me of a passage in one of Engels's works (I think it is in *The Housing Question*, *Zur Wohnungsfrage*). Retorting to some fatuous bourgeois professor, a German Cadet, Engels wrote: is it not natural that youth should predominate in our Party, the revolutionary party? We are the party of the future, and the future belongs to the youth. We are a party of innovators, and it is always the youth that most eagerly follows the innovators. We are a party that is waging a self-sacrificing struggle against the old rottenness, and youth is always the first to undertake a self-sacrificing struggle.

No, let us leave it to the Cadets to collect the "tired" old men of thirty, revolutionaries who have "grown wise", and

renegades from Social-Democracy. We shall always be a party of the youth of the advanced class!

Larin himself blurts out a frank admission why he regrets the loss of the married men who are tired of the struggle. If we were to collect a good number of these tired men into the Party, that would make it "somewhat sluggish, putting a brake on political adventures" (p. 18).

Now, that's better, good Larin! Why dissemble and deceive yourself. What you want is not a vanguard-party, but a *rearguard-party*, so that it will be rather more sluggish. You should have said so frankly.

"...Putting a brake on political adventures...." Revolutions have been defeated in Europe too; there were the June day of 1848 and the May days of 1871; but there has never been a Social-Democrat or a Communist who thought it proper to declare the action of the masses in a revolution to be an "adventure". This became possible when among revolutionary Marxists there were enrolled (not for long, we hope) spineless, craven Russian philistines, called the "intelligentsia", if you please, who have no confidence in themselves and become despondent at every turn of events towards reaction.

"...Putting a brake on adventures!" If that is so, then the first *adventurer* is Larin himself; for he calls "minor struggles" the course *most advantageous* to the revolution; he is trying to *make the masses believe* that the tide of *revolution is rising*, that in two or three years the army will be filled with discontented peasants, and that the "old regime will collapse" at "the first serious test"!

But Larin is an adventurer in another, much worse and pettier sense. He advocates a labour congress and a "non-party party" (his expression!). Instead of the Social-Democratic Party he wants an "All-Russian Labour Party"—"labour", because it must include the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialist Party, the Byelorussian Hromada,[151] etc.

Larin is an admirer of Axelrod. But he has done him a disservice. He has so exalted Axelrod's "youthful energy", his "true party courage" in fighting for a labour congress, he has embraced him so fervently, that ... he has smothered him in his embraces! Axelrod's nebulous "idea" of a labour

congress has been killed by a naïve and truthful, practical party worker who has gone and blurted out everything that should have been concealed for successful advocacy of a labour congress. A labour congress means "taking down the signboard" (p. 20 in Larin's pamphlet, for whom Social-Democracy is a mere signboard); it means *merging with the Socialist-Revolutionaries* and the trade unions.

Quite right, Comrade Larin! Thank you at least for speaking the truth! The labour congress really does mean all that. It would lead to that even against the wish of its conveners. And it is just for that reason that a labour congress now would be a petty opportunist adventure. Petty—for there is no broad idea underlying it, nothing but the weariness of intellectuals who are tired of the persistent struggle for Marxism. Opportunist—for the same reason, and also because thousands of petty bourgeois of far from settled opinions would be admitted into the labour party. An adventure—for under present conditions such an attempt will bring about, not peace or constructive work, or collaboration between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats—to whom Larin kindly assigns the role of "propagandist societies within a broad party" (p. 40)—but only endless aggravation of strife, dissension, splits, ideological confusion, and actual disorganisation.

It is one thing to predict that the Socialist-Revolutionary "Centre" *must* come over to the Social-Democrats when the Popular Socialists and Maximalists drop out*; it is a different thing to climb after an apple which is only in process of ripening, but is not yet ripe. You will either break your neck, my dear sir, or upset your stomach with sour fruit.

Larin bases his arguments on "Belgium", as did, in 1899, R. M. (the editor of *Rabochaya Mysl*) and Mr. Prokopovich (when he was going through the "spontaneous outbursts" of a Social-Democrat and had not yet "grown wise" sufficiently to become a "systematically acting" Cadet). Larin's booklet has a neat appendix in the shape of a neat translation of the Rules of the Belgian Labour Party! But our good La-

* See pp. 199-200 of this volume.—*Ed.*

rin forgot to "translate" to Russia the industrial conditions and history of Belgium. *After* a series of bourgeois revolutions, *after* decades of struggle against Proudhon's petty-bourgeois quasi-socialism, and *with* the enormous development of industrial capitalism, possibly the highest in the world, the labour congress and the labour party in Belgium marked a transition from non-proletarian socialism to proletarian socialism. In Russia, at the height of a bourgeois revolution, which is *inevitably* breeding petty-bourgeois ideas and petty-bourgeois ideologists, and with growing "Trudovik" trends among closely related sections of the peasantry and the proletariat, with a *Social-Democratic* Labour Party that has a history of nearly one decade, a labour congress is a badly conceived invention, and fusion with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (who knows, there may be 30,000 of them, or perhaps (60,000, says Larin artlessly) is an intellectual's whimsy.

Yes, history can be ironic! For years the Mensheviks have been trumpeting about the close connection between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. And now the Bolsheviks reject a labour congress *precisely because* it would obscure the difference in the points of view of the proletarians and the small proprietors (see the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee[152] in *Proletary*, No. 3). And the *Mensheviks* stand for *merging with the Socialist-Revolutionaries* in connection with the advocacy of a labour congress. This is unique!

"I do not want to dissolve the party in the class," pleads Larin. "I only want to unite the vanguard, 900,000 out of nine million" (pp. 17 and 49).

Let us take the official factory returns for 1903. The total number of factory workers was 1,640,406. Of these, 797,997 were in factories employing over 500 workers each, and 1,261,363 in factories employing over 100 workers each. The number of workers in the largest factories (800,000) is only a little smaller than the figure Larin gives for the workers' party united with the Socialist-Revolutionaries!

Thus, although we already have from 150,000 to 170,000 members in our Social-Democratic Party, and notwithstanding the 800,000 workers employed in large factories, the workers of big mining enterprises (not included in this total)

and the multitude of purely proletarian elements employed in trade, agriculture, transport, etc., Larin has no hope that we in Russia can soon win for Social-Democracy 900,000 *proletarians* as Party members?? Monstrous, but true.

But Larin's lack of faith is only another example of the intellectual's timid thinking.

We are quite sure that this object can be attained. As a counterblast to the adventure of a "labour congress" and a "non-party party" we put forward the slogan: for a fivefold and tenfold *increase* of our *Social-Democratic Party*, only let it consist mainly and *almost exclusively* of purely proletarian elements, and let it be achieved solely under the banner of revolutionary Marxism.*

Now, after a year of the great revolution, when all sorts of parties are growing by leaps and bounds, the proletariat is becoming an independent party more rapidly than ever. The Duma elections will assist this process (if we do not enter into opportunist blocs with the Cadets, of course). The treachery of the bourgeoisie in general, and of the petty bourgeoisie in particular (the *Popular Socialists*), will strengthen the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party.

We shall reach Larin's "ideal" (900,000 Party members), and even exceed it, by hard work on the present lines, and not by adventures. It is certainly necessary now to enlarge the Party with the aid of *proletarian* elements. It is abnormal that we should have only 6,000 Party members in St. Petersburg (in St. Petersburg Gubernia there are 81,000 workers in factories employing 500 workers and over; in all, 150,000 workers); that in the Central Industrial Region we should have only 20,000 Party members (377,000 workers in factories employing 500 and over; in all, 562,000 workers).

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* It would be unwise to take the trade unions into the Party, as Larin proposes. This would only restrict the working-class movement and narrow its base. We shall always be able to unite a far greater number of workers for the struggle against the employers than for support of Social-Democratic policy. Therefore (in spite of Larin's *wrong* assertion that the Bolsheviks have declared against non-party trade unions), we stand for non-party trade unions, as the author of the "Jacobin" (Jacobin—in the opinion of the opportunists) pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* advocated *as far back as 1902*. (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.—*Ed.*)

We must *learn* to recruit* five times and ten times as many workers for the Party in such centres. In this respect Larin is certainly quite right. But we must not fall a prey to intellectualist cowardice or intellectualist hysteria. We shall achieve our aim by following our own *Social-Democratic* path, without plunging into adventures.

IV

The only "gratifying feature" in Comrade Larin's pamphlet is his fervent protest against blocs with the Cadets. In another article in this issue the reader will find detailed quotations on this subject, with a description of all the vacillations of Menshevism on this important question.

What interests us here, however, is the general description of Menshevism given by such an "authoritative" witness as the Menshevik Larin. It is in reference to blocs with the Cadets that he protests against "*vulgarised*, *bureaucratic*, *Menshevism*". "Bureaucratic Menshevism", he writes, is capable of desiring a "suicidal alliance with the opponents of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois camp". We do not know whether Larin will be able to show more determination than Martov in defending his views against Plekhanov. However, Larin rebels against "formal" and "bureaucratic" Menshevism on other matters besides blocs with the Cadets. For example, he says of Menshevism, that "everything obsolescent acquires a bureaucratic stamp"!! (p. 65). Menshevism is becoming outlived, making way for "European realism". "Hence the eternal melancholy, half-heartedness and hesitancy of Menshevism" (p. 62). Concerning the talk about a labour congress he writes: "All this talk bears the impress of a certain reticence, timid thinking, perhaps mere hesitation to utter aloud the thoughts that have matured within" (p. 6), etc.

* We say "learn to recruit", for the number of Social-Democratic workers in such centres is undoubtedly many times the number of Party members. We suffer from routine, we must fight against it. We must learn to form, where necessary, *lose Organisationen*—looser, broader and more accessible *proletarian* organisations. Our slogan is: *for a larger Social-Democratic Labour* Party, against a non-party labour congress and a non-party party!

We already know the underlying basis of this crisis of Menshevism, why it has degenerated into bureaucratism*: it is the petty-bourgeois intellectual's lack of confidence in the possibility of further revolutionary struggle, his fear to admit that the revolution is over, that the reaction has won a decisive victory. "Menshevism was only an instinctive, semi-spontaneous yearning for a party," says Larin. We say: Menshevism is the spontaneous yearning of the intellectual for a truncated constitution and peaceful legality. Menshevism is an allegedly objective apologia for reaction, emanating from the revolutionary camp.

From the very beginning, as early as in the Geneva newspaper *Vperyod*[153] (January-March 1905) and in the pamphlet *Two Tactics*** (July 1905), the Bolsheviks presented the question in a totally different way. Being perfectly clear about the contradictory nature of the interests and tasks of the various classes in the bourgeois revolution, they stated openly at the time: It is quite possible that the Russian revolution will end in an abortive constitution. As the supporters and ideologists of the revolutionary proletariat, we shall do our duty to the last—we shall keep to our revolutionary slogans despite the treachery and baseness of the liberals, despite the vacillation, timidity and hesitancy displayed by the petty bourgeois—we shall make the utmost use of *all* revolutionary possibilities—we shall take pride in the fact that

* Another instance of the irony of history! Ever since 1903 the Mensheviks have been shouting about the "formalism" and "bureaucratism" of the Bolsheviks. Since then they have always been in possession of the "bureaucratic" and "formal" prerogatives of the Party as a whole. And now a *Menshevik* confirms that Menshevism has degenerated into *bureaucratism*. The Bolsheviks could not have wished for a better rehabilitation of themselves. Larin is not looking for the bureaucratism of Menshevism where in fact it is rooted. The source of this bureaucratism is that opportunism which under the guise of "Europeanism" is being instilled into the Mensheviks by Axelrod and Plekhanov. There is no trace of "Europeanism" in the reflected ideology and habits of the Swiss petty bourgeois. Petty-bourgeois Switzerland is the servants' hall of the real Europe, the Europe of revolutionary traditions and intense class struggle of the broad masses. Bureaucratism was fully revealed in Plekhanov's presentation of the question of a labour congress (a labour congress versus a Party congress), against which Larin is so fervently and sincerely protesting.

** See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

we were the *first* to take the path of an uprising and will be the *last* to abandon it, if this path in fact becomes, impossible. At the present moment we are far from admitting that all the revolutionary possibilities and prospects have been exhausted. We openly and straightforwardly advocate an uprising, and stubborn, persistent and long preparation for it.

And when we realise that the revolution is over, we shall say so openly and straightforwardly. We shall then, in full view of the whole people, delete from our platform all our direct revolutionary slogans (such as the constituent assembly). We shall not deceive ourselves and others by Jesuitical sophistries (such as Plekhanov's "a Duma with full power" *for the Cadets*).* We shall not justify reaction and call reactionary constitutionalism a basis for sound realism. We shall say and prove to the proletariat that the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the vacillation of the small proprietors have killed the bourgeois revolution, and that the proletariat itself will now prepare for and carry out a new, socialist revolution. And therefore, the revolution having subsided, i.e., the bourgeoisie having utterly betrayed it, we shall under no circumstances agree to any blocs—not only with the opportunist, but even with the revolutionary bourgeoisie—for the decline of the revolution would convert bourgeois revolutionism into empty phrase-mongering.

That is why we are not in the least perturbed by the angry words which Larin hurls at us in such abundance, when he shouts that Bolshevism is approaching a crisis, that it is played out, that we have always trailed behind the Mensheviks, etc. All these pinpricks only evoke a condescending smile.

Individuals have left and will leave the Bolsheviks, but there *cannot be any crisis* in our trend. The fact is that right from the very beginning we declared (see *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back***): we are not creating a special "Bolshevik" trend, always and everywhere we merely uphold the point of view of *revolutionary Social-Democracy*. And right up to the social revolution there will inevitably always be an

* See p. 333 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 201-423.—*Ed.*

opportunist wing and a revolutionary wing of Social-Democracy.

A cursory glance at the history of "Bolshevism" is sufficient to convince anyone of that.

1903-04. The Mensheviks advocate democracy in organisation. The Bolsheviks call this intellectualist phrase-mongering, as long as the Party does not come out openly. In the Geneva pamphlet (1905), the Menshevik who signed himself "*A Worker*"[154] *admits* that in fact there was no democracy among the Mensheviks. The Menshevik Larin *admits* that their "talk about the elective principle" was "sheer invention", an attempt to "deceive history", and that, in fact, in the Menshevik "St. Petersburg group there was no elective principle even as late as the autumn of 1905" (p. 62). And immediately after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks were the *first* to announce, in *Novaya Zhizn*,[155] the *actual* introduction of democracy in the Party.*

End of 1904. The Zemstvo campaign. The Mensheviks trail behind the liberals. The Bolsheviks (in spite of the frequently circulated fable to the contrary) do not reject "good demonstrations" before the Zemstvo councillors, but they reject the "poor arguments of the intellectuals,** who said that there were *two* contending forces in the arena (the tsar and the liberals), and that demonstrations before the Zemstvo councillors were a higher type of demonstration. Now the Menshevik Larin admits that the Zemstvo campaign was sheer invention" (p. 62), that it was a "shrewd and cunning trick" (p. 57).

Beginning of 1905. The Bolsheviks openly and straightforwardly raise the question of an uprising and of preparing for it. In a resolution adopted at the Third Congress they predict *the combination of the strike with an uprising*. The Mensheviks are evasive and try to wriggle out of the tasks of an uprising; they talk about arming the masses with the fervid desire to arm themselves.

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 29-39.—*Ed.*

** The Geneva *Vperyod*, No. 1, (January 1905), contained a *feuilleton* which criticised the "plan of a Zemstvo campaign"; it was entitled "Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals". (See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 29-34.—*Ed.*)

August-September 1905. The Mensheviks (Parvus in the new *Iskra*) call for participation in the Bulygin Duma. The Bolsheviks call for an active boycott of this Duma, for direct advocacy of an uprising.

October-December 1905. The popular struggle in the form of strikes and insurrection sweeps away the Bulygin Duma. The Menshevik Larin admits in a written declaration at the Unity Congress that when the tide of the revolution was at its height the Mensheviks acted like Bolsheviks. In the rudimentary bodies of the provisional government we, the Social-Democrats, sat side by side with the revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Beginning of 1906. The Mensheviks are despondent. They have no faith in the Duma and no faith in the revolution. They appeal for participation in the Duma elections in order to boycott the Duma (*Larin*, p. 57). The Bolsheviks do their duty as revolutionaries, do their utmost to achieve the boycott of the Second Duma, in which *nobody* in revolutionary circles had any confidence.

May-June 1906. The Duma campaign. The boycott has failed owing to the treachery of the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks conduct their revolutionary work on new, though worse ground. During the Duma period the whole people see still more clearly the difference between our tactics, the tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and opportunism: criticism of the Cadets in the Duma, the struggle to free the Trudoviks from Cadet influence, criticism of parliamentary illusions, advocacy of a revolutionary *rapprochement* among the Left groups in the Duma.

July 1906. The dissolution of the Duma. The Mensheviks lose their heads, declare for an immediate demonstration strike and partial actions. The Bolsheviks protest. *Larin, referring to this, says nothing about the protest of the three members of the Central Committee which was published for Party members only*. What Larin says about this incident is not true. The Bolsheviks point out the futility of a demonstration, and advocate an uprising *at a later date*.* The Mensheviks, in conjunction with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, sign appeals for an uprising.

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* See pp. 128-30 of this volume.—*Ed*.

End of 1906. The Bolsheviks realise that the treachery of the bourgeoisie makes it necessary to take a circuitous path and go into the Duma. Down with all blocs! Above all, down with blocs with the Cadets! The Mensheviks are in favour of blocs.

No, Comrade Larin, we have no need to be ashamed of this course of the struggle between the revolutionary and the opportunist wing of Russian Social-Democracy!

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THE PROLETARIAT AND ITS ALLY IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Such is the heading Karl Kautsky gave to the last chapter of his article "The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution", published in the latest numbers of *Neue Zeit*.[156] As in the case of other works of Kautsky's, a Russian translation of this article will undoubtedly soon be published. This is an article that all Social-Democrats should certainly read, not because a *German* theoretician of Marxism can be expected to supply answers to the current problems of *our* tactics (the Russian Social-Democrats would not be worth much if they waited for such answers from afar), but because Kautsky gives us a remarkably logical analysis of the *underlying principles* of the whole tactics of the Social-Democrats in the Russian bourgeois revolution. To all members of our Party, to all class-conscious workers, overburdened with the humdrum tasks of everyday work, stunned with the hackneyed banalities of unscrupulous bourgeois-liberal scribblers, such works by thoughtful, well-informed and experienced Social-Democrats are especially valuable, for they help us to rise above everyday matters, to get an insight into the fundamental questions of the tactics of the proletariat, and to obtain a clearer idea of the theoretical tendencies and the actual mode of thought of the various trends in the Social-Democratic movement.

Kautsky's latest article is particularly important in this respect, for it enables us to compare the *character* of the questions put by Plekhanov to Kautsky (among other foreign socialists) with Kautsky's *method* of answering some of these questions.

Plekhanov, whom the Cadet Melgunov, in today's *Tovarishch* (December 10), aptly called the "*former* leader and theoretician of Russian Social-Democracy", asked Kautsky; (1) What is the "general character" of the Russian revolution: bourgeois or socialist? (2) What should be the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the bourgeois democrats? and (3) What tactics should the Social-Democrats adopt in the Duma elections.

The leader of the Russian opportunists was angling for Kautsky's approval of blocs with the Cadets. The leader of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats guessed that the questioner was trying to suggest his reply on a point not directly mentioned in the questions, and preferred to answer Plekhanov with a dispassionate, circumstantial, propagandist *explanation* of how a Marxist should *formulate* questions concerning bourgeois revolution and bourgeois democracy in general. Let us examine Kautsky's explanation closely.

It would be superficial to regard the Russian revolution merely as a movement for the overthrow of absolutism. It must be regarded as the awakening of the mass of the people to independent political activity. Such is Kautsky's main premise.

This means the following. It would be a superficial analysis of the tasks of the Social-Democratic movement that merely pointed to the attainment of political liberty (the overthrow of absolutism) and to the "common" character of this task for various classes. It is necessary to examine the position of the *masses*, their objective conditions of life, the different classes among them, the *real nature* of the liberty for which they are *in fact* striving. We must not deduce from a common phraseology that there are common interests, nor must we conclude from "political liberty" *in general* that there must be a joint struggle of different classes. On the contrary, by a precise analysis of the position and interests of the various classes, we must ascertain how far, and in what respects, their fight for freedom, their aspirations for freedom, are identical, or coincide (or whether they coincide at all). We must reason, not like the Cadets, not like the liberals, not like Prokopovich & Co., but like *Marxists*.

Next. If our point of departure is the interests of the masses, then the crux of the Russian revolution is the *agrar-*

ian question. We must judge of the defeat or victory of the revolution not from government violence and the manifestations of "reaction" (which engages all the attention of many of our Cadet-like Social-Democrats), but from the position of the masses in their struggle for land.

Agriculture is the basis of the national economy of Russia. Agriculture is declining, the peasants are ruined. Even liberals (Kautsky quotes the Cadets Petrunkevich and Manuilov) realise this. Kautsky, however, is not content with pointing to the unanimity of the liberals and the socialists on *this* point. He does not let this lead him to the Cadet conclusion: "Therefore, the Social-Democrats should support the Cadets." He at once proceeds to analyse the *class interests* concerned, and shows that the liberals will *inevitably* be half-hearted in regard to the agrarian question. While admitting the decline of agriculture in general, they fail to understand the capitalist character of agriculture and the resulting problem of the special causes which retard this capitalist, and not some other, evolution.

And Kautsky minutely analyses one of these special causes, namely, the shortage of capital in Russia. Foreign capital plays a particularly important part in our country. This retards the capitalist development of agriculture. Kautsky's conclusion is: "The decline of agriculture, alongside the growing strength of the industrial proletariat, is the plain cause of the present Russian revolution."

You see: Kautsky makes a careful and conscientious study of the specific character of the bourgeois revolution in Russia and does not evade it as the Cadets and the Cadet-like Social-Democrats do by doctrinaire references to the "general character" of every bourgeois revolution.

Next, Kautsky analyses the solution of the agrarian question. Here, too, he is not content with the stock liberal phrase: You see, even the Cadet Duma is in favour of land for the peasants (see the writings of Plekhanov). No. He shows that the mere increase in size of holdings is no good to the peasants unless they obtain enormous financial assistance. The autocracy is incapable of really helping the peasantry. And the liberals? They demand redemption payments. But such compensation can only ruin the peasants. "*Confiscation* of the large estates" (Kautsky's italics) is the only way by which

the peasant's landholding can be substantially increased without imposing new burdens upon him. But the liberals are most emphatically opposed to confiscation.

This argument of Kautsky's is worth considering in detail. Anyone at all familiar with the party shadings in the revolutionary circles of Russia knows that on this question of redemption payments the opportunists of *both* revolutionary parties have not only been contaminated with the liberal view, but have also distorted what Kautsky says in this connection. Our Mensheviks, at the Unity Congress and at a number of meetings in St. Petersburg (e.g., Dan in his reports on the Congress to the St. Petersburg workers in the summer), criticised as wrong that clause of the agrarian programme which was adopted with the support of the Bolsheviks, who categorically insisted on the substitution of "confiscation" for "alienation" (see Maslov's original draft). Our Mensheviks said this was wrong, that only vulgar revolutionaries could insist on confiscation, that for the social revolution it was unimportant whether there was compensation or not, and in this connection they referred to Kautsky's pamphlet *The Social Revolution*, in which, with reference to the socialist revolution in general, Kautsky explains that compensation is permissible. And the Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks, and the semi-Cadet Popular Socialists, have used exactly the same arguments to defend their turn towards liberalism on the question of compensation (in one of the issues of *Narodno-Sotsialisticheskoye Obozreniye*[157]), and they, too, cited Kautsky.

Kautsky is probably unaware of the behaviour of the Mensheviks on this question, or of the significance of the policy pursued by the Popular Socialists and their group. But in his *formulation* of the question of compensation in the Russian revolution he has again given all our opportunists an excellent lesson on how one should not argue. It is wrong to draw a conclusion about compensation *in Russia in 1905-06* from *general* premises about the relation between compensation and confiscation in various revolutions, or in the socialist revolution in general. One must proceed the other way round. One must ascertain which classes in Russia gave rise to the special features of our formulation of the question of compensation and deduce the political signifi-

cance of this question in this revolution from the interests of these classes, and only then decide whether the views held by the different parties are right or wrong.

It is quite obvious that, as a result of taking this course,. Kautsky did not *blur* the difference between the liberals and the revolutionaries on the question of compensation (as the Plekhanovites and Popular Socialists always do), but revealed the *depth* of this difference. Plekhanov, in putting his questions to Kautsky, concealed the difference between the "opposition" and "revolutionary" movements by avoiding concrete questions. Kautsky swept Plekhanov's concealment aside, brought the important question of compensation into the light of day, and showed Plekhanov that not only the Black Hundreds, *but the liberals as well*, are "in their own way" fighting against the revolutionary movement of the peasants.

Kautsky writes: "Without the abolition of the standing army, and of naval armament construction, without the confiscation of the entire property of the royal family and of the monasteries, without state bankruptcy, without the confiscation of the big monopolies, insofar as they are still in private hands, the railways, oilfields, mines, iron and steel works, etc., it will be impossible to obtain the enormous sums necessary to extricate Russian agriculture from its terrible plight."

Recall the customary Menshevik talk about the utopian and visionary ideas of the Bolsheviks; for instance, Plekhanov's speeches at the Congress on the subject of the demand that cardinal agrarian demands should be linked with cardinal political issues (abolition of the standing army, election of officials by the people, etc.). Plekhanov scoffed at the idea of abolishing the standing army and of the people electing government officials! Plekhanov's "*Sovremennaya Zhizn*"[158] *approves* the line of *Nashe Dyelo*, calling political opportunism "political materialism" (??), counterposing it to "revolutionary romanticism".

It turns out that the circumspect Kautsky *goes much further* than the most extreme Bolshevik and makes far more "utopian" and "romantic" (from the opportunist standpoint) demands *in connection with the agrarian question*!

Kautsky demands not only the confiscation of the landlords' estates, not only the abolition of the standing army, but also *the confiscation of big capitalist monopolies*!

And Kautsky quite logically observes immediately after the above-quoted passage: "It is clear, however, that the liberals are frightened by such gigantic tasks, such radical changes in existing property relations. Basically, they want no more than to continue the present policy without encroaching on the basis for the exploitation of Russia by foreign capital. They are firmly in favour of a standing army, which alone, in their opinion, can maintain order and *save their property*...."

Plekhanov protests that he has not been treated fairly. He only asked Kautsky's opinion on the question of supporting the opposition parties in the Duma elections, and he was given a reply on a different subject! Duma elections and—the abolition of the standing army! What a freak of anarchist fancy, what revolutionary romanticism instead of the "political materialism" demanded by the opportunist!

But Kautsky continues his "tactless" criticism of the liberals in answer to the question about the Duma elections. He accuses them of wanting to go on extorting billions of rubles from the Russian people for armaments and interest on loans. "They [the liberals] imagine that the establishment of a Duma will suffice to conjure billions of rubles out of the ground." "Liberalism is just as incapable [of satisfying the Russian peasants] as tsarism." Kautsky devotes a special chapter to explaining the attitude of liberalism to Social-Democracy. He points out that in Russia there are no bourgeois democrats of the old type, among whom the urban petty bourgeoisie occupied a primary place. In Russia, unlike the West, the urban petty bourgeoisie "will never be a reliable support of the revolutionary parties".

"In Russia the firm backbone of a bourgeois democracy is absent." Kautsky draws this conclusion both from an analysis of the special position of the urban petty bourgeoisie and from the consideration that the class antagonism between the capitalists and the proletariat is now far more developed in Russia than it was in the period of bourgeois revolutions of the "old type". This conclusion is of enormous importance. It forms the very kernel of Kautsky's "amend-

ment" to Plekhanov's formulation of the question, an amendment which is virtually a radically different formulation.

In his questions Plekhanov employs the *old types* of bourgeois democracy, and nothing more. He uses a hackneyed term, quite forgetting to determine on the basis of *Russian* data the *degree* of democracy, and its *stability*, etc. possessed by the *different strata* that are now coming forward in Russia as bourgeois democrats. It is Kautsky's merit that he pointed to this basic omission of Plekhanov's and proceeded to explain to him in a practical manner the *method* which must be applied in order to reach a real understanding of bourgeois democracy in Russia. And through Kautsky's skilful analysis the outlines of the *vital* social forces of Russia begin to emerge from the old, hackneyed formula: the urban petty bourgeoisie; the landlord class, with its penny-worth of liberalism and pounds-worth of support of the counter-revolutionary Black Hundreds; the capitalists, with their mortal dread of the proletariat; and, finally, the peasantry.

The nebulous question of the attitude to be adopted towards "bourgeois democracy" (of the type found in France in the forties of the last century?) has disappeared. The fog has been dispelled. It was this fog that our Prokopoviches, Kuskovas, Izgoyevs, Struves and other liberals used to cloud the vision of the people, and Plekhanov is now playing into their hands. In place of the fog of old stereotyped formulas, a genuine Marxist analysis has shown us the quite special relationships of the democracy of the various strata and elements of the Russian bourgeoisie.

By means of this analysis Kautsky determines that peculiar relation between Russian liberalism and the revolutionary character of the peasants, which the Cadets deliberately conceal, and to which many Social-Democrats are blind! "The more the peasants become revolutionary, the more do the big landowners become reactionary, the more does liberalism cease to find in them the support it previously had, *the more unstable become the liberal parties*, and the more the *liberal professors and lawyers* in the towns shift *to the right*, so as not to lose all connection with their previous mainstay." This process "is only accelerating the bankruptcy of liberalism".

Only after laying bare the roots of this *bankruptcy of liberalism* in the present Russian revolution does Kautsky proceed to give a direct answer to Plekhanov's questions. Before answering the question whether we should support the "opposition", we must understand (Kautsky explains) the class foundations and the class nature of this "opposition" (or Russian liberalism), and in what relation the development of the revolution and of the revolutionary classes stands to the position and interests of liberalism. In elucidating *this* at the outset, Kautsky proceeds, *firstly*, to reveal the bankruptcy of liberalism, and only *then* to explain to the reader the question that interests Plekhanov: Should we support the opposition in the Duma elections? It is not surprising that Kautsky had no need to answer two-thirds of Plekhanov's questions....

Although Kautsky's answers do not satisfy Plekhanov, they will help the rank-and-file Russian Social-Democrats to think properly.

(1) Is the revolution in Russia a bourgeois or a socialist revolution?

That is not the way to put the question, says Kautsky. That is the old stereotyped way of putting it. Of course the Russian revolution is not a socialist revolution. The socialist dictatorship of the proletariat (its "undivided sway") is out of the question. But neither is it a bourgeois revolution, for "*the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia*". "Wherever the proletariat comes out independently, the bourgeoisie ceases to be a revolutionary class."

And Kautsky declares with a vehemence even greater than the "tactlessness" the Bolsheviks usually display towards the liberals, that our bourgeoisie fears revolution more than reaction; that it hates absolutism because it engenders revolution; that it wants political freedom *in order to stop* the revolution! (And Plekhanov, in his questions, naïvely identified the struggle of the opposition against the old order with the struggle against the government's attempts to crush the revolutionary movement!)

This first answer of Kautsky's is a brilliant vindication of the *fundamental principles* of Bolshevik tactics. Beginning with the Geneva newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, and con-

tinuing with the pamphlet *Two Tactics*, the Russian Bolsheviks have *always* regarded as the main issue in their struggle against the Mensheviks the Right-wing Social-Democrats' distortion of the concept: "bourgeois revolution". We have said hundreds of times, and have backed our statements with innumerable declarations by the Mensheviks, that to interpret the category "bourgeois revolution" in the sense of recognising the leadership and guiding role of the bourgeoisie in the Russian revolution is to vulgarise Marxism. A bourgeois revolution *in spite* of the instability of the bourgeoisie, by *paralysing* the instability of the bourgeoisie—that is how the Bolsheviks formulated the fundamental task of the Social-Democrats in the revolution.

Kautsky's analysis satisfies us completely. He has fully confirmed our contention that we are defending the position of revolutionary Social-Democracy against opportunism, and not creating any "peculiar" Bolshevik trend, and this confirmation is the more valuable for having been given by expounding *the essence of the matter*, and not by a mere staff officer's "endorsement" of this or that group.

(2) Kautsky not only considers it "*quite possible*" that "*in the course of the revolution victory will fall to the lot of the Social-Democratic Party*", but declares also that it is the duty of the Social-Democrats "*to inspire their supporters with this confidence in victory*, for it is impossible to fight successfully if one renounces victory beforehand".

This conclusion of Kautsky's is a second brilliant vindication of Bolshevik tactics. Anyone who is at all familiar with the publications of the two trends in the Social-Democratic movement must know that the Mensheviks have *most strenuously* disputed the possibility and expediency of a Social-Democratic victory in the present Russian revolution. As far back as the spring of 1905, the Mensheviks at their conference (which Plekhanov, Axelrod and others attended) adopted a resolution saying that the Social-Democratic Party must *not* strive to win power. And since then this idea that the Social-Democrats cannot strive for the *victory* of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois revolution has run like a *red* (or black?) thread through the *whole* literature and the *whole policy* of Menshevism.

This policy is opportunism. The *victory* of Social-Democracy in the present Russian revolution is *quite possible*. It is our duty to inspire all adherents of the workers' party with confidence in *this* victory; it is impossible to fight successfully if one renounces victory beforehand.

These simple and obvious truths, which have been obscured by Plekhanov's sophistry and scholasticism, must be pondered over and mastered by the whole of our Party.

(3) To imagine that "all the classes and parties which are striving for political freedom have simply to work together in order to achieve it", means "*seeing only the political surface of events*."

This is the third vindication of Bolshevism. A mere reference to the fact that the Cadets "are fighting for freedom in their own way" is not enough to justify joint action with them. This is the ABC of Marxism, which Plekhanov, Axelrod and their admirers have temporarily obscured.

(4) Which class can help the Social-Democratic proletariat to achieve victory in the present revolution, can support the proletariat and determine the limits of the immediately realisable changes? In Kautsky's opinion, this class is the *peasantry. Only* this class has "*stable*, *common economic interests* with the proletariat throughout the *whole* period of the revolution". "The common interests of the industrial proletariat and the peasants are the basis of the revolutionary strength of Russian Social-Democracy and of the possibility of its victory; but at the same time these common interests determine the limits within which this victory can be utilised".

This means: not the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, but the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In other words, Kautsky has formulated the old premise underlying the whole tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, as distinguished from both the opportunists and the "enthusiasts". Marx said that every genuine and complete victory of a revolution can only be a dictatorship,[159] having in mind, of course, the dictatorship (i.e., unrestricted power) of the masses over the few, and not vice versa. But the important thing for us, of course, is not any particular formulation of their tactics by the Bol-

sheviks, but the *essence* of these tactics, which Kautsky has *entirely* endorsed.

Anyone who wants to think like a Marxist and not like a Cadet about the role of the proletariat in our revolution, and about its possible and necessary "ally", must come round to the views of revolutionary and not opportunist Social-Democracy on the principles of proletarian tactics.

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CONCERNING AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE ORGAN OF THE BUND

As our journal is illegal, we are unable to follow at all regularly the Social-Democratic newspapers that are published in Russia in languages other than Russian. And yet, unless close and constant contact is maintained between the Social-Democrats of all nationalities in Russia, our Party cannot become a real All-Russian Party.

Therefore, we earnestly request all comrades who know Lettish, Finnish, Polish, Yiddish, Armenian, Georgian or other languages, and who receive Social-Democratic newspapers in these languages, to help us to keep Russian readers informed about the state of the Social-Democratic movement and the views of the non-Russian Social-Democrats on tactics. This assistance could take the form, not only of reviews of Social-Democratic literature on a particular question (like the articles in *Proletary* on the controversy between the Polish Social-Democrats and the Polish Socialist Party, and on the Lettish view of guerrilla warfare), but also of translations of articles, or even of outstanding passages from an article.

Recently, a comrade sent us a translation of an article entitled "A Platform for the Election Campaign", signed "M" and published in *Volkszeitung*, the organ of the Bund, No. 208 (November 16). We have no means of judging to what extent that article expresses the unanimous view of the editors, but in any case it reflects certain trends among Jewish Social-Democrats. Russian Social-Democrats, too, who are familiar only with the Bolshevik and Menshevik method of treating a question, need to be aware of these trends. Here is the translation of this article:

"The energy and influence that our Party will be able to exert in the elections will depend above all on the clarity and definiteness of our position and slogans. We are faced with important political and

social questions, and it is our task to formulate them so clearly and definitely that only one answer will be possible, namely, ours. If our position is not definite enough, even the most perfect organisation will be of no avail. The importance of our platform in the election campaign depends entirely on the clarity of our position.

"The Seventh Congress of the Bund laid down the main lines of our tactics as follows: the dissolution of the Duma has clearly proved to wide sections of the population that it is impossible to obtain land and liberty by peaceful means, and that the only solution is an armed uprising. This does not mean that the elections to the new Duma imply a change from revolutionary tactics to peaceful and constitutional tactics, since in the elections it is *realised* that revolutionary tactics are *necessary*; the electors will demand that their deputies convert the Duma into a revolutionary instrument of the mass of the people. Our task in the elections is to make this principle clear to the voters, and this principle requires that the elections themselves be made an arena for mobilising the revolutionary masses of the people.

"While the Duma was in session, and still more so since the dissolution of the Duma, the country made great strides in developing its political consciousness, thanks to which the revolutionary parties count on success at the elections. At the first elections the petty-bourgeois voters voted for the Cadets, thus expressing their ardent protest against the atrocities of the government. Not having yet discarded their constitutional illusions, these voters felt sure that the Cadets would secure land and liberty for them. The Duma tactics have shattered these illusions and have convinced them that land and liberty can be gained only by fighting, not by peaceful means. The voters are now faced with the question of how to fight, and who is capable of fighting: the Cadets with their diplomatic parliamentarism, and, at best, with their weapon of 'passive resistance', or the revolutionary parties with their militant tactics? Obviously, when the voters are faced with the question of how to attain real freedom, they realise that only the revolutionary and not the constitutional parties are capable of fighting.

"The Cadets have realised this and are trying their utmost to ignore all the lessons that events have taught them; they are trying to drag the political consciousness of the country back to what it was on the eve of the first elections. 'Not a step forward,' is their cry. 'Forget all the lessons of history. The object of the new elections,' they, say, 'is to recreate the political conditions under which the First Duma functioned. The people must return to the Duma the former Duma majority, and thus give rise to a political situation in the country in which the only way out will be a responsible Cabinet from the Duma majority' (*Rech*, No. 189). 'If Russia needs a real constitution and a genuine popular representative assembly,' says *Rech*, No. 196, 'then the people will return to the Duma representatives who will repeat what the First Duma stated in its reply to the address from the throne and who will set to work to do what the First Duma was prevented from doing.' The question cannot fail to arise as to what will happen if the Second Duma also is 'prevented' from doing what the First Duma intended to do. To this the Constitutional-Democrats reply that 'the government

will have to yield to the firm, peacefully and lawfully expressed will of the electorate' (*Rech*, No. 195). The Cadets know very well that their strength rests on constitutional illusions, and that is why they are doing their utmost to instil into the minds of the voters the idea that prevailed on the eve of the first elections, and to imbue them with faith in the omnipotent power of the 'firm, peacefully and lawfully expressed will of the electorate'. The strength of the revolutionary parties does not lie in the voters' belief in the omnipotent power of the 'firm, peacefully and lawfully expressed will of the electorate', but, on the contrary, in their disbelief in that power, in their clear realisation of the necessity of a revolutionary struggle.

"Our task, therefore, as far as the voters are concerned, is categorically to ask them whether they want the majority in the future Duma to be the same as the previous one, with its flexible tactics that are incapable of achieving anything. Do they want the future Duma merely to 'repeat' what the first one said, or should it go beyond idle talk and adopt more efficacious methods of struggle? Should the new Duma 'recreate the political situation' of June and July, which led to nothing, or should it take a step towards real victory for the people?

"This question must serve as our platform in the election campaign. We must surround the Cadet Party with an atmosphere of the most profound disbelief in their ability to secure land and liberty. We must energetically and ruthlessly criticise passive resistance—the method of struggle they invented in Helsingfors—and reveal to the people the impotence and inconsistency of their methods of struggle.

"Only if this necessary condition is observed will the Second Duma be a step in advance of the First Duma."

Reading this article carefully we see that it fairly accurately reflects the views of the Bund delegation at the last All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As we know, on the one hand, this delegation voted with the Mensheviks to sanction blocs with the Cadets, but on the other hand, it voted with the Bolsheviks for drastic amendments to the Central Committee's "draft election platform" (the addition of the slogan of a republic, of a reference to an uprising, and of an exact characterisation of the parties, and an amendment giving a more precise explanation of the class nature of the Social-Democratic Party, etc.: see the resolution of the Conference on "amendments" to the platform in *Proletary*, No. 8[160]).

The article by Comrade M. given above *seems* to be such a Bolshevik article because we see here only the left hand of the Bund; the right hand is hidden in articles advocating blocs with the Cadets.

At all events, the Bundists' idea of blocs with the Cadets

is not that of the Mensheviks. Their case is an exceptionally good illustration of the famous saying: *Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem* ("if two do the same thing, it is no longer the same thing"). There is a certain difference between the two, and this difference cannot fail to affect their ways of doing the same thing, their methods, the results of their "doing the same thing", etc. The Mensheviks' idea of blocs with the Cadets and the Bundists' idea of them are not the same. For the Mensheviks, blocs with the Cadets are fully in accord with their general tactics; in the case of the Bundists, they are not. As a result, we get articles like the one we have quoted, which clearly reveal the inconsistency, the lack of steadfastness, of the Bundists, who took part in the boycott yesterday and today justify the boycott of the Witte Duma, while at the same time sanctioning blocs with the Cadets. In the case of the Mensheviks, blocs with the Cadets naturally and spontaneously assume the character of ideological blocs. In the case of the Bundists, these blocs are intended to be only "technical" blocs.

But politics have their own objective logic, irrespective of what persons or parties plan in advance. The Bundist proposes that the bloc should be only a technical one, but the political forces of the whole country dispose that the bloc turns out to be an ideological one. After the jubilation with which the Cadets received the Menshevik decision of the Conference, after Plekhanov's famous Herostratian letter in *Tovarishch* about "a Duma with full power", there is scarcely need to prove the point.

Consider carefully the assertion of the author of the article that "the Cadets know very well that their strength rests on constitutional illusions, and that is why they are doing their utmost to instil [these illusions] into the minds of the voters".

"The strength of the Cadets rests on constitutional illusions".... Is this true; and what does it really mean? If it is not true, if the strength of the Cadets rests on the fact that they are the foremost representatives of bourgeois democracy in the Russian bourgeois revolution, then the general tactical line of Menshevism, or of the Right wing of Social-Democracy, is correct. If it is true, if the strength of the Cadets rests not on the strength of bourgeois democracy, but

on the strength of the *illusions* of the people, then the general tactical line of Bolshevism, or of the Left wing of Social-Democracy, is correct.

In a bourgeois revolution the Social-Democrats cannot but support bourgeois democracy: such is the main premise of Plekhanov and his like; and from this premise they draw the *direct and immediate* conclusion of the need to support the Cadets. But we say: The premise is right, but the conclusion is worthless, for we have still to ascertain which parties or trends at the present moment represent the *force* of bourgeois democracy that is really *capable of fighting*. The Cadets, the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are all "bourgeois democrats" from the Marxist standpoint, i.e., the only scientific analysis. The "force" of the Cadets is not the fighting force of the bourgeois masses (the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie), it is not the economic and money force of the landlord class (the Black Hundreds) or the capitalist class (the Octobrists): it is the "force" of the bourgeois intelligentsia, which is not an *independent* economic class and therefore is not an *independent* political force; consequently, it is a *usurped* "force", depending on the influence of the bourgeois intelligentsia over other classes which have not yet worked out a clear, independent political ideology of their own, which summit to the ideological leadership of the bourgeois intelligentsia; it is primarily the "force" of those *erroneous opinions* concerning the nature of democracy and the methods of fighting for it which the bourgeois intelligentsia is propagating and cultivating among the bourgeois masses.

To deny this means childishly allowing oneself to be beguiled by the resounding words: "the party of people's freedom"; it means closing one's eyes to the generally known fact that the Cadets have neither the masses nor a decisive number of landlord and capitalist elements behind them.

To admit it means admitting that the *task of the day* for the workers' party is to combat the influence of the Cadets over the people—not because we have been dreaming of a bourgeois revolution without bourgeois democracy (an absurdity imputed to us by the Social-Democrats of the Right) but because the Cadets are *preventing the real force* of bourgeois democracy from developing and asserting itself.

Only a minority of the landlords of Russia (the great majority are Black Hundreds) and a minority of the capitalists (the great majority are Octobrists) belong to the Cadet Party. It has the majority, the mass, of the bourgeois intelligentsia only. Hence the spectacular politics of the Cadets, so enticing to political infants and politically impotent dotards, their din and clamour, their jubilation over cheap victories, their predominance in the liberal press, in bourgeois science, etc. Hence, too, the *sham* nature of this party, which corrupts the people with its treacherous propaganda for a compromise with the monarchy, yet in fact lacks the power to achieve any such compromise.

The Cadets are not bourgeois democracy, but the incarnation of the betrayal of democracy by the bourgeoisie—just as the French radical socialists, for instance, or the German social-liberals, are not intellectual socialists, but the incarnation of the betrayal of socialism by the intellectuals. Therefore, supporting bourgeois democracy means exposing the sham of the Cadets' quasi-democracy.

Therefore, the Plekhanovites are causing immense harm to the revolution and to the cause of the working class with their perpetual cry: we must fight reaction, not the Cadets!

Dear comrades! Your failure to grasp the point lies in your failure to understand the *significance* of our struggle against the Cadets. What is the kernel and essence of this struggle? Is it that the Cadets are "bourgeois"? Of course not. It is that the Cadets are mere chatterers about democracy traitors to militant democracy.

To proceed: Have the Cadets any influence on the mass of the people, on the bourgeois-democratic mass of the people? Of course, they have, and very extensive influence too with numerous newspapers, and so forth. Now judge for yourselves: Can we call upon the bourgeois-democratic mass of the people to fight reaction *if we do not unmask* their present ideological leaders, who are *damaging* the cause of bourgeois democracy? Impossible, dear comrades.

Fighting reaction means, first of all, liberating the masses from reaction ideologically. But the strong and tenacious ideological influence of "reaction" on the masses is not Black-Hundred, but *Cadet influence*. This is not a paradox. The Black Hundreds are undisguised, crude enemies, who can

burn, kill and cause havoc, but cannot convince even the ignorant muzhik, whereas the Cadets *convince* both the muzhiks and the urban petty bourgeoisie. And what do they convince them of? That the monarch is not responsible, that it is possible to win freedom by peaceful means (i.e., by leaving power in the hands of the monarchy), that a land-purchase scheme concocted by the landlords is the method of transferring land to the peasants most advantageous for them, etc., etc.

That is why you cannot convince either the simple-minded peasant or the simple-minded petty bourgeois that it is necessary to wage a serious struggle unless you undermine the influence on them of Cadet phrases and Cadet ideology. And anyone who says: "we must fight reaction, *not* the Cadets" fails to understand the *ideological* tasks of the struggle, sees the essence of struggle, not in convincing the masses, but in physical action, understanding the word struggle in the vulgar sense: "strike" at the reactionaries, but don't "strike" at the Cadets.

Of course, for the time being we shall strike by force of arms, not at the Cadets, or even at the Octobrists, but *only* at the government and its direct servants—and after we have beaten them, the Cadet will, for a fee, stick up for republican democracy just as today (for a professorial salary, or a lawyer's fee) he is sticking up for monarchist democracy. But, in order to gain a real victory over reaction we must free the masses from the ideological influence of the Cadets, who are giving them false notions of the aims and nature of the fight against reaction.

Let us return to the Bundists. Can they really fail to see now that the "technical" blocs with the Cadets which *they* sanction have in fact *already become* a mighty instrument for strengthening belief in the Cadets (and not for creating an atmosphere of disbelief) among the mass of the people? Only the blind can fail to see this. The ideological bloc of all the Menshevik Social-Democrats, including the Bundists, with the Cadets is an accomplished fact, and articles like that written by Comrade M. are well-meaning, but simple-minded, platonic dreams.

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THE GOVERNMENT'S FALSIFICATION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The tsarist government steadily continues its "work" to falsify the Duma. Warning the credulous Russian public not to be carried away by constitutionalism, we wrote, even before these falsifications began (see *Proletary*, No. 5, September 30,1906), that a new coup d'état was in preparation, namely, that the electoral law of December 11, 1905, was to be amended *before* the elections to the Second Duma. At that time we wrote: "Nor is there any doubt that the government is carefully studying" the question "whether the old electoral law should remain in force".*

Yes, the tsar's government has been studying this question and, perhaps, has already even completed its study. It has preferred to amend the electoral law by means of Senate interpretations.[161] Now it is taking further steps in the direction of restricting freedom of agitation (if freedom in Russia can be *further* restricted) and faking the elections. The other day an *order* was promulgated prohibiting the issue of election forms to unregistered parties.[162] Newspapers are being more and more summarily suppressed. Arrests are becoming more and more frequent. Premises are being raided and searched with the most transparent object of obtaining the names of electors and influential voters, in order to "remove" them. In short, the election campaign is in full swing, as the witticism of Russian citizens puts it.

How far the government will go with its military-court methods of falsifying the Duma, no one can tell. Why not arrest the electors both on election day and *after the elec-*

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* See pp. 209-10 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tions? The law—that stupid word still has currency in Russia!—speaks of the immunity of members of the Duma, but there is not a word in it about the immunity of electors. Our press pointed this out even during the elections to the First Duma. The Black-Hundred tsarist gang thought that "Witte missed his chance" on that occasion; but in fact the government was still too weak after the December uprising to go on and capture the revolution's next line of defence. Now the counter-revolution has gathered strength, and is doing the right thing, from its point of view, in breaking the constitution (which only naïve Cadets could believe in). The reactionaries are not liberal Balalaikins.[163] They are men of action. They see, and know from experience, that the tiniest bit of freedom in Russia inevitably leads to an upsurge of the revolution. They are therefore *compelled* to go farther and farther, to do more and more violence to the October Constitution, to tighten still further the political safety valve that once was half open.

It takes the infinite obtuseness of a Russian Cadet, or of a non-party progressive intellectual, to cry out, on that account, about the government's folly and urge it to return to the path of constitutionalism. The government *cannot act otherwise* in protecting the tsarist regime and landlordism from the concealed, subdued, but unquelled pressure from below. And we say to the government: All right, put your dampers on, tighten the half-opened valves. While they were somewhat open the fresh draught increased the heat in the boiler. When you close the valves there may be an explosion of the very kind we most desire. Our business is to make the utmost use among the masses of Stolypin's splendid propaganda, of his splendid explanations of the "nature of the constitution".

But here we see the deep gulf that separates the tactics of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie from the tactics of the socialist proletariat. The Social-Democrats advocate a struggle, and explain to the people with the aid of a thousand and one lessons from history that a struggle is inevitable; they are preparing for it and retaliate to the intensification of reaction with intensified revolutionary agitation. The liberals cannot advocate a struggle, because they are afraid of it. They respond to the intensification of reaction

by whining about a constitution, thus corrupting people's minds, and by intensified opportunism. The methods of the liberals were aptly and graphically hit off by the Trudovik Sedelnikov at a meeting on May 9 in the Panina Palace. When a liberal is abused, he says: Thank God they didn't beat me. When he is beaten, he thanks God they didn't kill him. When he is killed, he will thank God that his immortal soul has been delivered from its mortal clay.

When Stolypin's Black-Hundred gang cried out against the Cadets and launched a campaign against their revolutionary tendencies, the Cadets began to howl: "It is not true, we are not revolutionaries, we are respectable people! Down with the Vyborg Manifesto, down with blocs with the Lefts, down with the slogan of 'a Duma with full power' advocated by the most Right-wing of the Right Social-Democrats, Plekhanov; down with pernicious revolutionary illusions! We are going into the Duma to legislate." When the Black-Hundred gang announced that the Cadets, as an unregistered party, would not be issued election forms, the Cadets cried out: "That puts a different complexion on the question of agreements!" (See the leading article in *Rech*, December 13). That "increases the importance of the only registered party of the opposition, the Party of Peaceful Renovation". "When entering into agreements this must be taken into consideration!" And when the Cadet elector who has managed to creep into the Peaceful Renovation list is hauled off to the police station—the Cadets will thank God that we have not been completely deprived of the constitution. Our knights of the law will then say: The only absolutely safe party is that of the Octobrists; and have we not always said that we take our stand on the Manifesto of October 17?

What do the Menshevik comrades think about this? Should we not hasten to call a new Party conference and sanction agreements with the Peaceful Renovators and, perhaps, even with the Octobrists? After all, they, too, want "semi-liberty", as the extremely embarrassed Plekhanov argues today (December 14) in the newspaper of the ex-Social-Democrats!

It is not by accident that the question of the Peaceful Renovators has cropped up among the Cadets. It had been raised before, prior to the order concerning the issue of

election forms. Even the Left Cadets on *Tovarishch* (the "almost socialists", as some jesters call them) in their issue of December 5 included the Peaceful Renovators among the progressive parties, counting six progressive parties in all (the Cadets, the Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists, the Party of Democratic Reforms and the Party of Peaceful Renovation). In the same issue of *Tovarishch* the ex-Social-Democrats poured their wrath on the poster about the three *main* parties published as a supplement to *Proletary*, No. 8.* It is "political dishonesty", cried Plekhanov's friends—to relegate Heyden to the Black Hundreds!

We are very glad that we have compelled the renegade Social-Democrats to defend this former Octobrist, who after the dissolution of the Duma, protested against the Vyborg Manifesto and negotiated with Stolypin about the Cabinet.

But you gentlemen, collaborators of Plekhanov, should have been more adroit in your defence of him! It is common knowledge that in the first elections the Octobrists (including Heyden and Shipov) formed a bloc with the Black Hundreds. You are prepared to forget this because the party has changed its name? And yet on that very page (4) of *Tovarishch*, December 5, we read that there is a trend in the Union of October Seventeenth which is in favour of an agreement with the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and that this trend even predominates in the St. Petersburg branch of the Union. And a little lower down we read that "the Central Board of the United Russian People" sanctions blocs with the Octobrists, and for that reason *Tovarishch* refuses to recognise the Octobrists as constitutionalists.

Isn't that fine? We refuse to call the Octobrists constitutionalists because the Black Hundreds sanction blocs with them. But we call the Peaceful Renovators progressives, despite the fact that the Octobrists sanction blocs with them.

Oh, those sapient gudgeons of our notorious progressive "intelligentsia"!

The intellectualist radicals' defence of the Peaceful Renovators, the turn taken by the central organ of the Cadet Party towards peaceful renovation immediately after the

* See pp. 326-31 of this volume.—*Ed.*

order on election forms was issued, are typical examples of liberal tactics. If the government takes one step to the right, we take two steps to the right! Lo and behold—again we are legal and peaceful, tactful and loyal; we shall manage without election forms, we are always ready to adapt ourselves in conformity with infamy![164]

The liberal bourgeoisie think that this is realist politics. They are proud of this grovelling realism (to use the admirable expression of a certain Social-Democrat), they consider it the height of political tact and wise diplomatic tactics. In actual fact, these are not only the most stupid and treacherous, but the most sterile tactics imaginable; it was by pursuing these tactics that the German Cadets—from the Frankfort windbags to Bismarck's bootlicking national liberals[165]—for more than half a century after the bourgeois revolution consolidated the state power in the hands of the Junkers (the Black-Hundred landlords, the Dorrers, Bulatsels and Purishkeviches—to name their Russian counterparts) and in the hands of "military despotism embellished with parliamentary forms".[166]

It is time our Mensheviks, who are so enamoured of this policy of the Cadets and are imitating it, understood that the only realist politics, realist in the good and not vulgar sense of the word, are the politics of revolutionary Marxism. We must retaliate to the tricks and manoeuvres of the reactionaries not by adapting ourselves to the Right, but by intensifying and spreading our revolutionary propaganda among the proletarian masses, by developing the spirit of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary class organisations. In this way, and only in this way, will you strengthen the power of the only fighters against reaction, in spite of all the latter's tricks and manoeuvres. Retaliating to the Black-Hundred tricks of the government by adapting your tactics to the Right you break up and weaken the only force that is capable of fighting, the force of the revolutionary classes, you obscure their revolutionary consciousness with the tinsel of tricky political "manoeuvres".

At first the Mensheviks were opposed to agreements with the Cadets. Martov condemned agreements. Y. Larin indignantly rejected them. Even Nich. I—sky disapproved of them. Influenced by the Senate interpretations (by our re-

actionary senates in Geneva and in St. Petersburg) Martov & Co. adapted themselves to the Right. They are in favour of blocs with the Cadets, but not with any one further to the Right than the Cadets—heaven forbid! With the "opposition democratic parties" (the resolution of the All-Russian Conference, proposed by the Central Committee and adopted by 18 votes to 14), but no further to the Right!

But now the Cadets are turning to the Peaceful Renovators. And are you, Menshevik comrades, going to do the same? In answer to the Senate interpretations—blocs with the Cadets; in answer to the withdrawal of election forms—blocs with the Peaceful Renovators? What will your answer be when they start arresting the electors??

You have already abandoned real revolutionary propaganda among the masses. You are no longer combating illusions about peaceful evolution and those who are spreading these illusions—the Cadets. All you are concerned about is the Black-Hundred danger. But your "subtle manoeuvres" of joint election lists with the Cadets are built on sand. You are impoverishing the real content of revolutionary Social-Democratic work among the masses, but the gains from this political trickery will not accrue to you, perhaps not even to the Cadets—perhaps not even to the Peaceful Renovators, but to the Octobrists! You reply to the falsification of the Duma by falsifying revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics —but in this way you will neither improve the Duma, nor strengthen socialism, nor advance the cause of revolution.

Unprincipled practical politics are the most unpractical politics.

The working class must reply to the falsification of the Duma not by relaxing but by intensifying its revolutionary agitation, by dissociating itself in its election campaign from these wretched traitors, the Cadets.

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKING CLASS

After the dissolution of the Duma the government was able to hold the indignation of the country in check only by means of military terror. The special and emergency security regulations, endless arrests, military courts, punitive expeditions—all these taken together cannot be called anything but military terror.

The government used this military suppression of the movement for freedom as a test of its own strength. If we are strong enough—we shall not convene the Duma at all, and at once satisfy the desires of the Union of the Russian People and similar "truly Russian" Black-Hundred parties. If we are not strong enough—we shall convene it once more, we shall try to modify the electoral law, try to ensure a Black-Hundred Duma, or to tame a Cadet Duma. That is how the government reasoned.

The military strength of ruthless repression has only sufficed, so far at least, to enable the government, by means of Senate interpretations and in violation of the law, to deprive thousands and tens of thousands of workers' poor peasants and railwaymen of the right to vote. The government's financial difficulties have increased enormously. It has failed, so far, to obtain a loan. Inevitable bankruptcy is staring it in the face. There is not a single party in the country it can rely on, and it is oscillating between the hooligan gangs (the true Russians) and the Octobrists. It has been unable to reach full agreement even with the Octobrists.

Such are the conditions in which the election campaign for the Second Duma is being inaugurated. The ordinary man in the street is cowed. He has been intimidated by the military

courts. He is under the spell of the government's boast that the Duma will be docile. He yields to this mood and is ready to forgive the Cadets all their mistakes, to throw overboard all that the First Duma taught him and vote for the Cadets if only the Black Hundreds are kept out.

That the ordinary man in the street should behave in this way is natural. He is never guided by a definite world-outlook, by principles of integral party tactics. He always swims with the stream, blindly obeying the mood of the moment. He cannot reason in any other way than by contrasting the most moderate of all the opposition parties to the Black Hundreds. He is incapable of thinking for himself over the experience of the First Duma.

But what is natural for the ordinary man in the street is unpardonable for a party man, and altogether reprehensible for a Social-Democrat. Listen to the arguments of those Social-Democrats who are calling on the socialist workers *to vote for the Cadets* (it makes no difference whether it is only for Cadets in constituencies where the Social-Democrats have refrained from putting up their own candidates, or for Cadets and Social-Democrats where there is a joint list). Instead of arguments you will hear only one refrain, a cry of terror and despair: Don't let the Black Hundreds in! Vote for the Cadets! Draw up joint lists with the Cadets!

A Social-Democrat; a member of the worker's party, cannot stoop to such philistine behaviour. He must clearly understand that actual social forces are engaged in the struggle, the real significance of the Duma in general, and of the Cadet Party, which predominated in the First Duma, in particular. Whoever argues about the present policy of the proletariat without thinking over all these questions will never arrive at anything like correct conclusions.

What is the issue in the present struggle in Russia? It is a fight for freedom, i.e., a fight for state power to be in the hands of the representatives of the people and not in the hands of the old government. It is a fight for land for the peasants. The government is opposing these strivings with all its might, fighting to retain its power, its land (for the richest landlords are among the most aristocratic and most highly placed persons in the state). Opposed to the government are the workers and the mass of the poor peasantry,

№ 1. ЕЖЕНЕДѢЛЬНИКЪ № 1.

ТЕРНІИ ТРУДА

24 декабря 1906 года.

КОНТОРА и РЕДАКЦІЯ: Николаевская ул., кв. 34.
Пріемъ по дѣламъ редакціи по средамъ и субботамъ отъ 3 до 5 час. дня.

Политическое положеніе и задачи рабочаго класса.

Послѣ разгона Думы правительство сдерживало возмущеніе страны только посредствомъ военнаго террора. Усиленныя и чрезвычайныя охраны, аресты безъ конца, военно-полевые суды, карательныя экспедиціи, все это, вмѣстѣ взятое, нельзя назвать иначе, какъ военнымъ терроромъ.

Правительство испытывало свою силу на этомъ военномъ подавленіи освободительнаго движенія. Хватитъ силы,—вновь не созовемъ Думы, сразу удовлетворимъ желанія союза русскаго народа и тому подобныхъ «истинно-русскихъ» партій черносотенцевъ. Не хватитъ силы,—созовемъ еще разъ, попытаемся передѣлать избирательный законъ, попытаемся обезпечить черносотенную Думу или укротить кадетскую Думу. Такъ разсуждало правительство.

Военной силы безпощаднаго подавленія хватило до сихъ поръ по крайней мѣрѣ, только на то, чтобы посредствомъ сенатскихъ разъясненій отнять, вопреки закону, избирательное право у тысячъ и десятковъ тысячъ рабочихъ, нижнихъ крестьянъ, желѣзнодорожниковъ. Финансовыя затрудненія правительства чрезвычайно усиливались. Займа пока не удается добыть. Грозитъ неминуемое банкротство. Внутри страны правительство не можетъ опереться ни на одну партію, колеблясь между шайками хулигановъ (истинно-русскіе люди) и октябристами. Вполнѣ сдѣться оно не могло даже и съ октябристами.

При такихъ условіяхъ начинается избирательная кампанія во вторую Думу. Обыватель запуганъ. На него угнетающе повліяли военно-полевые суды. Онъ находится подъ впечатлѣніемъ правительственнаго хвастовства, что Дума будетъ послушной. Онъ поддается настроенію и готовъ простить всѣ ошибки кадетамъ, готовъ выбросить за бортъ все то, чему научила его первая Дума и голосовать за кадета, лишь бы не прошелъ черносотенецъ.

Со стороны обывателя такое поведеніе понятно. Обыватель никогда не руководится твердымъ міросозерцаніемъ, принципами цѣльной партійной тактики. Онъ всегда плыветъ по теченію, слѣпо отдаваясь настроенію. Онъ не можетъ разсуждать иначе, какъ противопоставляя черной сотнѣ самую скромную изъ оппозиціонныхъ партій. Онъ не въ состояніи самостоятельно обдумать опытъ первой Думы.

Но то, что естественно для обывателя, непростительно для партійнаго человѣка и совсѣмъ уже неприлично для соціалдемократа. Присмотритесь, въ самомъ дѣлѣ, къ доводамъ тѣхъ соціалдемократовъ, которые зовутъ соціалистовъ-рабочихъ голосовать за кадетовъ (все равно, за однихъ ли только кадетовъ тѣмъ, гдѣ соціалдемократы отказались вовсе выставлять своего кандидата, или за кадета вмѣстѣ съ соціалдемократомъ, гдѣ есть общій списокъ). Вмѣсто доводовъ вы услышите одинъ только припѣвъ, одинъ крикъ страха и отчаянія: какъ бы не прошли черносотенцы! голосуйте всѣ за кадетовъ! составляйте общіе списки съ кадетами!

Соціалдемократъ, членъ рабочей партіи, не можетъ опускаться до такой обывательщины. Онъ долженъ дать себѣ ясный отчетъ въ томъ, какія дѣйствительныя общественныя силы ведутъ борьбу, какое дѣйствительное значеніе имѣетъ Дума вообще и господствовавшая въ первой Думѣ партія кадетовъ въ особенности. Кто разсуждаетъ о современной политикѣ пролетаріата, не обдумавъ всѣхъ этихъ вопросовъ, тотъ никогда не можетъ прійти къ сколько-нибудь вѣрнымъ выводамъ.

За что идетъ теперь борьба въ Россіи? За свободу т. е. за власть народныхъ представителей въ государствѣ, а не стараго правительства. За землю для крестьянъ. Правительство всѣми силами борется противъ этихъ стремленій, отстаиваетъ свою власть, свою землю (ибо самые богатые помѣщики принадлежатъ къ числу самыхъ знатныхъ и наиболѣе высокопоставленныхъ лицъ въ государствѣ). Правительство имѣетъ противъ себя рабочихъ и массу крестьянской бѣдноты, а также, разумѣется, и городской бѣдноты, о которой не къ чему говорить отдѣльно, ибо у нея нѣтъ особыхъ интересовъ въ отличіе отъ основныхъ интересовъ пролетаріата и крестьянства.

Какъ относятся къ борьбѣ высшіе классы, помѣщики и буржуазія? Сказала, до 17-го октября, большая часть ихъ были либеральны, т. е. сочувствовали свободѣ, даже помогали такъ или иначе борьбѣ рабочихъ. Буржуазія была недовольна самодержавнымъ порядкомъ управленія и требовала себѣ тоже

Front page of the weekly *Ternii Truda*, № 1, December 24, 1906, which carried Lenin's leading article "The Political Situation and the Tasks of the Working Class".

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and also, of course, the urban poor, about whom there is no need to speak separately since they have no special interests that differ from the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the peasantry.

What is the attitude of the upper classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, to this struggle? At first—until October 17, a great number of them were liberals, i.e., they sympathised with the cause of liberty, and in one way or another even helped the workers in their struggle. The bourgeoisie was dissatisfied with the autocratic system of government and demanded a voice in state affairs. The bourgeoisie called itself democratic, i.e., claimed to stand for the people's freedom, in order to obtain the people's backing for its aspirations. But after October 17 the bourgeoisie was satisfied with what it had received, i.e., participation of the landlords and capitalists in state affairs and the promises of freedom made by the old regime, which remained intact. The bourgeoisie was frightened by the independent struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry, and proclaimed: "We have had enough of revolution!"

Before October 17 there was one all-inclusive liberal-bourgeois party of the Zemstvo people, who assembled at their famous semi-legal congresses and published abroad the journal *Osvobozhdeniye*. After October 17 the participants in these Zemstvo congresses split: the capitalist businessmen and the bigger landlords, or landlords who conducted their estates on feudal lines, joined the Octobrist Party, i.e., openly went over to the government. The other section, mainly lawyers, professors and other bourgeois intellectuals, formed the Cadet Party (the Constitutional-Democrats). This party also turned against the revolution; it, too, was frightened by the workers' struggle; it, too, proclaimed: "Enough!" But it wanted, as it wants now, to stop the struggle by more subtle means, by small concessions to the people, land for the peasants with compensation, etc. The Cadet Party promised that if its members were elected to the Duma it would give the people liberty and the peasants land. The Social-Democrats realised that the Cadets were deceiving the people and therefore boycotted the Duma. But the ignorant peasants and the cowed ordinary citizens nevertheless elected the Cadets to the Duma. Instead of fighting for lib-

erty when they got into the Duma, the Cadets began to appeal to the people to keep calm, while they themselves strove to obtain appointments as the tsar's Ministers. The Duma was dissolved because speeches were delivered there that displeased the powers that be, because the Social-Democrats and the bolder deputies addressed the people from the Duma tribune, calling on them to fight.

Even the blindest or the most ignorant people must now realise what the Cadet Party really is. It is not a party of the champions of the people; it is a party of bourgeois petitioners, middlemen and hucksters. The workers and intelligent peasants will be able to achieve their aims only when the masses cease to believe in the Cadet Party, when the masses realise the necessity of an independent struggle. Therefore, to vote for the Cadets, or advocate voting for the Cadets, means misleading the masses, undermining their solidarity and hindering them in preparing for the struggle.

The class-conscious workers are now confronted by quite a different task. They must combat philistine confusion and lack of principles with consistent, steadfast, co-ordinated socialist propaganda during the election campaign.

The immediate task of the class-conscious workers is to explain to the proletarian masses and to all the progressive peasants the real nature of the struggle, the actual position of the various classes in this struggle.

The workers have progressed more than any other class in the course of our revolution. They are now coming over *en masse* to the Social-Democrats. More intense and more extensive work must, of course, be carried on among them; but here the road has been well explored. Work among the peasants is much more important and much more difficult. The peasants are a class of small proprietors. That class is far less favourably situated in regard to the struggle for liberty and the struggle for socialism than the workers. The peasants are not united by working in big enterprises; on the contrary, they are disunited by their small individual farming. Unlike the workers, the peasants do not see before them an open, obvious, single enemy in the person of the capitalist. The peasants themselves are to a certain extent masters and proprietors. That is why they always trail behind the bourgeoisie and try to imitate it. Their ambition is

to develop and consolidate their small property, and not to fight in a common struggle with the working class against the capitalist class.

That is why the mass of the poor peasants have always and in every country proved to be less persistent in their struggle for liberty and for socialism than the workers. That is why, in this country, the peasant deputies in the Duma, the Trudoviks, have so far not succeeded, in spite of all the lessons of Cadet treachery, in casting off the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, its views, its prejudices and its political methods—methods which are supposed to be cunning and subtle, to consist of fine "manoeuvres", whereas in fact they are stupid, futile and disgraceful for every genuine fighter.

Class-conscious workers! Take advantage of the election campaign to open the eyes of the people! Do not yield to the persuasions of these well-meaning but feeble and irresolute people who are urging you to put up joint lists with the Cadets, and to obscure the minds of the masses by means of joint slogans with the Cadets. Do not believe the stock cries and warnings about the Black-Hundred danger. The real and fundamental danger that confronts the Russian revolution is the immaturity of the peasant masses, their lack of staunchness in the struggle, their failure to understand the shallowness and treachery of bourgeois liberalism. Fight against that danger, tell the whole truth openly to the mass of the people. In that way you will draw them away from the Cadet windbags and gain their support for the Social-Democrats. Only in this way will you be able to combat the real Black-Hundred danger. No Senate interpretations, no executions, no arrests can prevent the people from carrying on *such* work, the work of raising the civic and class consciousness of the masses to a higher level, of organising them to fight for their own and not liberal-bourgeois aims in the struggle.

Published December 24, 1906
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Published according to
the *Ternii Truda* text

THE WORKING-CLASS PARTY'S TASKS AND THE PEASANTRY[167]

The Volga Region is one of the big centres of the peasant movement. The particularly urgent task confronting the workers' party there is: to carry out the independent class policy of the proletariat, while constantly explaining to the peasant masses that they can win land and liberty only by breaking with their customary leaders from among the liberal landlord-Cadets, only by joining with the revolutionary proletariat.

It is to this task, too, that the election campaign of the workers' party should be wholly subordinated. For this very reason, blocs with the Cadets—which in general are impermissible because of the whole position in principle of the Social-Democratic Party as the party leading the class struggle of the proletariat—are particularly harmful in the Volga Region. To show this more clearly, let us take the example of a peasant deputy to the First Duma from the Volga Region. This deputy is Mr. I. Zhilkin, a Trudovik elected from Saratov Gubernia.

Trudovik Zhilkin is now writing in the St. Petersburg Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* and defending blocs with the Cadets. But see *how* he defends such blocs. In *Tovarishch* of December 17 he describes the elections to the First Duma in Saratov Gubernia. The peasants elected their own people, instinctively—with the true instinct of the working and exploited people—distrusting the liberal landlord and bourgeois lawyer. In the gubernia, when all the electors had gathered for the election of the Duma deputies, the peasants comprised about two-fifths of the total.



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Предлагаемая редакция прав недостаточна слабо и крайнейшая задача. Прошу прислать несколько экземпляров, если напечатаете.

Задачи работы партии в крестьянстве.

Ноябрьские — одни из крупных кирпичей крестьянского движения. В Ноябрьских перед работой партией поставлены настоящие внутренние задачи: беспощадная классовая борьба пролетариата, подготовка крестьянской массы, что она может добиться земли и свободы только вместе с своим естественным союзником из трудящихся интеллигентов — кадетов, только прикрытая к революционному пролетариату.

Именно этой задачи была вполне понята и выдвинута настоящая работой партии. Именно внутренние этого ~~[illegible]~~ особенно вредно в Ноябрьских дня с кадетами, недопустимо вовсе в виду всей принципиальной позиции с.-д., как партии ведущей классовую борьбу пролета-

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(Let us recall that the total number of electors in Saratov Gubernia was 150. Of these, 64 were from the peasants, 51 from the landowners and 35 from the townsfolk. Mr. Zhilkin gives the number as 152 electors, perhaps adding the workers' curia.)

The peasant electors in the gubernia came up against "prominent" Cadets like Mr. N. N. Lvov, "attached to the Central Committee of the Cadet Party". Among the electors from the uyezd towns some people proved to be more to the left than the Cadets. And very rapidly, almost of itself, a Left bloc was formed, an "Alliance of the Working People", the germ of the future Trudovik Group in the Duma.

Haggling with the Cadets for seats in the Duma began. The Cadets demanded two-thirds of the seats for the Constitutional-Democrats, the "working people" demanded the same for themselves. No agreement was reached. The Cadets did not believe in the strength and solidarity of the alliance of the working people. At the last election meeting, however, it turned out that the candidates of the alliance obtained *from 78 to 89 votes* out of the total of 152. "The chief candidates of the Cadets obtained from 50 to 67."

Then the Cadets surrendered. They agreed to their party being in the minority in the Duma. "The committee of the alliance of the working people agreed to secure the election of two candidates under the Cadet flag: N. N. Lvov and S. A. Kotlyarevsky. "And it was typical," writes Mr. Zhilkin, "that these candidates who had only obtained 59 and 67 votes at the election meeting, received 111 votes at the poll."

Yes, this is very, very typical. Only unfortunately Trudovik Zhilkin does not understand the *significance* of the facts he reports.

Just think: the Left Alliance of the Working People, disposing of 78-89 votes out of 152, i.e., *the majority*, secured the election of N. N. Lvov to the Duma. And so Mr. Zhilkin, the Trudovik, defends blocs with the Cadets.

Do you know, workers and peasants, what sort of a man N. N. Lvov is? He is a landlord, one of the founders of the "*Osvobozhdeniye* League", i.e., one of the founders of the Cadet Party. For seven years he served as a Marshal of the Nobility. In the Duma he belonged to the most Right-wing Cadets. In other words, he not only opposed the Social-

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Democratic worker deputies and the Trudoviks, but even found that the whole Cadet Party was too far to the left! He found that the Cadet Draconian laws on assembly and the press were too liberal and the ruinous compensation payment which the Cadet landlords proposed for the peasants was a reform too generous to the peasants. The Cadets wanted to sell land to the peasants at a just valuation, this just valuation to he arrived at by a body with an equal number of representatives of the peasants and the landlords and with the addition of representatives of the government. One peasant, one landlord, one police official—was this not a truly beautiful example of Cadet justice! But to the landlord Mr. Lvov it seemed altogether too liberal. Apparently he would have liked more police officials on the local land committees.

Consequently Mr. Lvov delivered speeches in the Duma *against* the peasants' demand for land. During the period of the Duma Mr. Lvov hastened to make his way by the backstairs to the powers that be in order to haggle over ministerial seats for the liberal landlords in return for "curbing" the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats in the Duma. That's the sort of man he is, this liberal landlord Lvov, elected to the Duma by the Trudoviks. And after the dissolution of the Duma landlord Lvov had talks with Stolypin about entering the Stolypin Cabinet!!

In order to talk more freely with Stolypin, Lvov left the Cadets and formed the Party of Peaceful Plunder. *The Cadets are now entering into a bloc with this party.* The newspaper *Tovarishch*, for which Mr. Zhilkin writes, calls it a progressive and not a Black-Hundred party!

What is important for us is that Lvov was a Cadet when he entered the Duma. What is important is that the Cadet landlord betrayed the peasants in the most vile fashion, fighting against their demands in the Duma and even after the dissolution of the Duma haggling for a ministerial seat with people who were responsible for shooting and flogging masses of peasants.

That is the sort of Cadet landlords the Trudoviks elected to the Duma!

Let us suppose that *at that time* Mr. Zhilkin and the other Trudoviks did not know what kind of an animal this Lvov

was. Let us suppose that Mr. Zhilkin & Co. *made a mistake*. One cannot be condemned for making a mistake.

Very well. But is it possible that at the present time Mr. Zhilkin does not know how the Cadet landlords like Lvov have gone over from "people's freedom" to the Stolypin military-court Cabinet? Mr. Zhilkin does know this; *nevertheless* he advises the Trudoviks and Social-Democratic workers to enter into a bloc with the party of the liberal landlords and bourgeois lawyers, with the Party of the Cadets.

Lvov is an example of the Cadet traitor, an example of the liberal landlord party.

Zhilkin is an example of the unintelligent and vacillating Trudovik who trails in the wake of the "liberal" landlords, incapable of opening the eyes of the peasants, incapable of gaining a victory even when in the majority, incapable of rallying the peasants to independent struggle.

Let all the class-conscious workers, all the Social-Democrats of the Volga Region, use the example of Lvov and Zhilkin to teach the people.

Workers! Do you want to help elect to the Duma Cadets like the landlord Lvov, who one day delivers orations on people's freedom and the next day goes over to the side of Stolypin?

If you do not want this, reject all blocs with the Cadets, with this party of "liberal" landlords. Call upon the peasants to support the Social-Democratic Labour Party and not the Party of the Constitutional-Democrats.

Peasants! Do you want once more to elect to the Duma "liberal" landlords like the Cadet Lvov, who prior to the Duma promised you a land flowing with milk and honey, but when in the Duma proposed a just valuation of the landlords' land by officials appointed by the landlords' government? Do you want to entrust defence of peasant demands to the liberal landlords and bourgeois lawyers?

If you do not want this, vote for the Social-Democrats, i.e., for the workers' party. Nowhere in the world has the Social-Democratic Labour Party betrayed the interests of the ruined, impoverished, toiling and exploited peasantry. Throughout the world the liberal bourgeoisie has deceived

the peasants fighting for land and liberty just as the Cadets like Lvov are deceiving them in this country.

There is not and cannot be any other remedy against the wobbling of the Trudoviks than a strong, class-conscious workers' party that never departs from the class standpoint. The peasants can win land and liberty only by marching hand-in-hand with the class-conscious workers.

December 28, 1906

First published January 21, 1935 in the newspaper *Volzhskaya Kommuno*, No. 19
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF W. LIEBKNECHT'S PAMPHLET: *NO COMPROMISES, NO ELECTORAL AGREEMENTS*

Liebknecht's pamphlet, the translation of which is now offered to the Russian reader, is of special interest at the present time, on the eve of the elections to the Second Duma, when the question of electoral agreements has aroused keen interest in the workers' party and among the liberal bourgeoisie.

We shall not dwell here on the general importance of Liebknecht's pamphlet. The reader will have to consult Franz Mehring's history of the German Social-Democratic movement and a number of other works by our German comrades to obtain a clear idea of its importance and to understand correctly certain passages in it which are liable to misinterpretation if divorced from the situation at the time they were written.

The important thing for us here is to note Liebknecht's *method* of reasoning, to show how he *approached* the question of agreements, so as to help the Russian reader to make his own approach to the solution of the question that interests us, viz., that of blocs with the Cadets.

Liebknecht does not in the least deny that agreements with the bourgeois opposition parties are "useful" both from the standpoint of obtaining "seats in parliament" and from the standpoint of enlisting an "ally" (a supposed ally) against the common enemy—reaction. But the true political acumen and the staunch Social-Democratism of this veteran German socialist are revealed by the fact that he *does not limit*

himself to these considerations. He examines the question whether the "ally" is not an enemy in disguise whom it would he particularly dangerous to admit to our ranks; whether and in what way he actually fights against the common enemy; whether agreements, while being useful as a means of obtaining a larger number of seats in parliament, are not detrimental to the more permanent and more profound aims of the proletarian party.

Let us take at least the three questions I have indicated, and see whether an advocate of agreements between the Russian Social-Democrats and the Cadets like Plekhanov, for instance, *understands* their implications. We shall see that Plekhanov's presentation of the question of agreements is extremely narrow. The Cadets want to fight reaction, therefore ... agreements with the Cadets! Beyond this Plekhanov does not go; he thinks it would be doctrinaire to go any further into the question. Small wonder that a Social-Democrat so forgetful of the requirements of Social-Democratic policy should find himself in the company of and in collaboration with renegade Social-Democrats like Prokopovich and the other publicists of *Tovarishch*. Small wonder that even the Mensheviks, who share the principles of this Social-Democrat, either maintain an embarrassed silence, not daring to say aloud what they think of Plekhanov, and repudiating him at workers' meetings, or simply laugh at him, like the Bundists in *Volkszeitung* and *Nasha Tribuna*.[168]

Liebknecht teaches us that a Social-Democrat must be able to expose the dangerous aspects of every ally in the bourgeois camp and not conceal them. Our Mensheviks, however, cry out that we must fight not the Cadets but the Black-Hundred danger! It would be useful for these people to ponder over the following words of Liebknecht: "The stupid and cruel outrages perpetrated by the police politicians, the encroachments of the Anti-Socialist Law, the Draconian law, the law against parties that advocate revolution, may evoke feelings of contempt and pity; but the enemy who proffers us his hand for an electoral agreement and worms his way into our ranks as a friend and brother is the enemy, *the only enemy we have to fear*."

You see, Liebknecht, too, takes police outrages and Black-Hundred laws into account. Nevertheless, he tells the work-

ers boldly: it is not this enemy that we must fear, but an electoral agreement with a false friend. Why did Liebknecht think so? Because he always regarded the strength of fighters as real strength only when it is the strength of *class-conscious* masses of workers. The class-consciousness of the masses is not corrupted by violence and Draconian laws; it is corrupted by the *false friends* of the workers, the liberal bourgeois, who *divert* the masses from the real struggle with empty phrases about a struggle. Our Mensheviks and Plekhanov fail to understand that the fight against the Cadets is a fight to free the minds of the working masses from false Cadet ideas and prejudices about combining popular freedom with the old regime.

Liebknecht laid so much emphasis on the point that false friends are more dangerous than open enemies that he said: "The introduction of a new Anti-Socialist Law would be a lesser evil than the obscuring of class antagonisms and party boundary lines by electoral agreements."

Translate this sentence of Liebknecht's into terms of Russian politics at the end of 1906: "A Black-Hundred Duma would be a lesser evil than the obscuring of class antagonisms and party boundary lines by electoral agreements with the Cadets." If Liebknecht had said this, what a howl would have been raised against him by those who have deserted socialism for the liberals and are now writing for *Tovarishch* and similar newspapers! How often have we heard the Bolsheviks "condemned" at workers' meetings and in the columns of the Menshevik press for expressing ideas similar to those for which Liebknecht was attacked (see p. 54 of the pamphlet). But the Bolsheviks will be as little intimidated by these howls and condemnations as Liebknecht was. Only bad Social-Democrats can make light of the harm done to the working masses by the liberal betrayers of the cause of the people's liberty who ingratiate themselves with them by means of electoral agreements.

Apropos of this treachery of the liberals. Our opportunists, Plekhanov among them, cry: It is tactless in our country, and at the present time, to say that liberalism is treacherous. Plekhanov has even written a whole pamphlet to teach the tactless socialist workers to be polite to the Cadets. But Liebknecht's pamphlet clearly shows that

Plekhanov's ideas are second-hand and that his phrases have already been worn threadbare by the German bourgeois liberals. It transpires that the "trump card" that Plekhanov has been playing against the revolutionary Social-Democrats is *the very same* childish fable about the shepherd and the wolf that the German opportunists used to frighten Liebknecht with. The argument runs: people will get so accustomed to hearing you shout "wolf, wolf!" that when the wolf does come no one will believe you. Liebknecht had an apt answer for the present Plekhanov's numerous kindred spirits in Germany: "In any case, the interests of the Party are not worse protected by cautious men than by scoffers."

Let us take the second question: Are our bourgeois liberals, i.e., the Cadets, really fighting against the Black-Hundred danger and if so, how? Plekhanov is unable either to formulate that question or to answer it by a careful analysis of Cadet policy in revolutionary Russia. Plekhanov, in violation of the elementary principles of Marxism, deduces the concrete relations between the Russian Social-Democrats and the Cadets from the "general concept" bourgeois revolution, instead of studying the actual specific features of the Russian bourgeois revolution in order to obtain a general conception of the mutual relations between the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry in contemporary Russia.

Liebknecht teaches us to reason differently. When he was told that the bourgeois liberals were fighting reaction, he replied by carefully analysing *the manner* in which they were fighting. And he showed—in the present pamphlet and in many other writings—that the German liberals (just like our Cadets) were "betraying liberty", that they were coming to an understanding with the "Junkers [the landlords] and the clergy", that they had proved incapable of being revolutionary in a revolutionary epoch.

Liebknecht says: "As soon as the proletariat begins to come forward as a class distinct from the bourgeoisie and in its interests hostile to the bourgeoisie, *the latter ceases to be democratic*."

But our opportunists, as if in mockery of the truth, call the Cadets democrats (even in the resolutions of Social-Democratic Party conferences) in spite of the fact that the Cadets repudiate democracy in their programme, recognise

the principle of an Upper Chamber, etc., and in spite of the fact that in the State Duma they proposed Draconian laws against the holding of meetings and opposed the formation, without permission from above, of local land committees on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot!

Liebknecht quite rightly condemned the practice of using the word "revolution" as a shibboleth. When he spoke of revolution, he really meant it; he analysed all questions and all steps in tactics, not only from the point of view of the interests of the moment, but also from the point of view of the vital interests of the revolution as a whole. Liebknecht, like the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats, had had to experience the painful transitions from direct revolutionary struggle to a miserable, abominable and vile Black-Hundred constitution. Liebknecht knew how to adapt himself to these painful transitions, he knew how to work for the proletariat even in the most adverse circumstances. But he did not rejoice at passing from the fight against an infamous constitution to work under this constitution, he did not jeer at those who had done *everything* to prevent the *emergence* of such a "constitution". By "caution" Liebknecht did not mean kicking the revolution as soon as it begins to decline (even though temporarily) and adjusting oneself as soon as possible to a truncated constitution. No. By "caution" this veteran of the revolutionary movement meant that a proletarian leader must be the last to "adjust" himself to the conditions created by the temporary defeats of the revolution; that he must not do so until long after the bourgeois poltroons and cowards have done so. Liebknecht says: "Practical politics forced us to adjust ourselves to the institutions of the society in which we live; but every step we took in the direction of adjusting ourselves to the present social order was hard for us, and we took it *only with great hesitation*. This called forth no little ridicule from various quarters. *But he who fears to tread on this inclined plane is in any case a more reliable comrade than he who jeers at our hesitation*."

Remember these golden words, worker comrades who boycotted the Witte Duma. Remember them especially when miserable pedants jeer at you for having boycotted the Duma, forgetting that it was under the flag of the boycott of the

Bulygin Duma that the first (and so far the only, but we are sure not the last) popular movement against institutions *of that type* flared up. Let the Cadet traitors be proud of having been the first voluntarily to crawl on their bellies under the laws of the counter-revolution. Class-conscious proletarians will be proud that they kept their colours flying and the open battle going longer than all the rest, that they fell only under heavy blows in the midst of the fray, and that they, longer than all the rest, continued their efforts and called upon the people to rise again and rush forward to a man, and crush the enemy.

* * *

Finally, let us take the third and last question. Will not electoral agreements be prejudicial to what we hold most dear: "the purity of the principles" of Social-Democracy? Alas! This question has already been answered by the realities of Russian political life in facts which make class-conscious workers blush with shame.

The Mensheviks assured us in their resolutions, vowed and swore at meetings that they would go no further than technical agreements, that they would continue the ideological struggle against the Cadets, that not for the world would they swerve a hairbreadth from their Social-Democratic principles, from their purely proletarian slogans.

And what was the outcome? No less a person than Plekhanov went knocking at the door of the Cadet press so as to offer the people a "middle" slogan, neither Cadet nor Social-Democratic, but agreeable to all and offensive to none: "a Duma with full power". What does it matter if this slogan is a downright deception of the people, that it throws dust in their eyes—so long as there is an agreement with the liberal landlords! But the Cadets have dismissed Plekhanov with contempt; and the Social-Democrats have turned away from him, some with embarrassment, others with indignation. Now he is alone, venting his spleen by railing against the Bolsheviks for their "Blanquism", against the writers on *Tovarishch* for their "lack of modesty", against the Mensheviks for their lack of diplomacy, against everybody but himself! Poor Plekhanov! How cruelly the candid,

plain, proud and outspoken words of Liebknecht's on the harmfulness in principle of agreements have proved justified in his case!

And "Comrade" Vasilyev (who has also peeped at the revolution from the Swiss kitchen window) proposes in *Tovarishch* (December 17), with a direct reference to Plekhanov, that we should simply dissolve the Social-Democratic Party and temporarily—only temporarily!—merge with the liberals. Yes, well might Liebknecht say that in the German Party, too, there was hardly any one who wanted to deviate "from Party principles". But it is not a matter of what one wants, but of what the *force of circumstances* drives the Party to for committing a false step. Plekhanov, too, had the best of intentions: peace and good will with the Cadets against the Black-Hundred danger; but the outcome was an infamy and disgrace for the Social-Democrats.

Worker comrades, read Wilhelm Liebknecht's pamphlet very carefully and be more critical of those who advise you to enter into agreements with the Cadets, which would be fatal to the proletariat and to the cause of liberty.

N. Lenin

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PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF K. KAUTSKY'S PAMPHLET: *THE DRIVING FORCES AND PROSPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION*

The progressive workers of Russia have long known K. Kautsky as *their* writer, who is not only able to substantiate and expound the theoretical teaching of revolutionary Marxism, but also to apply it intelligently, with a thorough analysis of the facts, to the complex and knotty problems of the Russian revolution. And now, when the attention of the Social-Democrats is sometimes almost entirely taken up with the pointless prattle of the liberal Petrushkas[169] and of their conscious and unconscious echoers, when for many people petty "parliamentary" technicalities overshadow the fundamental questions of the proletarian class struggle, and when despondency often gets the better even of decent people and impairs their intellectual and political faculties—now it is trebly important for all Social-Democrats in Russia to pay close attention to Kautsky's opinion on the fundamental problems of the Russian revolution. And not so much to heed Kautsky's opinion as to reflect on the way he presents the question—for Kautsky is not so light-minded as to hold forth on specific questions of Russian tactics with which he is but slightly familiar; and not so ignorant of Russian affairs as to dismiss them with commonplace remarks or uncritical repetition of the latest fashionable pronouncements.

Kautsky answers the questions which Plekhanov addressed to a number of foreign socialists. And in answering these questions—or rather, in selecting from these badly formulated questions the points that *can* be usefully discussed among socialists in all countries—Kautsky begins with a modest reservation. "In regard to the *Russian* comrades, on matters that concern Russia, I feel that I am in the position of a *pupil*." This is not the mock modesty of a Social-

Democratic "general" who begins with the mincing manners of a petty bourgeois and ends with the haughtiness of a Bourbon. Not at all. Kautsky, *in fact*, confined himself to answering *only* those questions by analysing which he could *help* thinking Social-Democrats in Russia to work out for themselves the problems connected with the concrete tasks and slogans of the day. Kautsky refused to be a general who issues commands: "Right turn!" or "Left turn!" He preferred to adopt the position of a comrade standing at a distance, but a thoughtful comrade, indicating where we ourselves should seek for a solution of our problems.

Plekhanov asked Kautsky: 1) What is the "general character" of the Russian revolution: bourgeois or socialist? 2) What should be the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the bourgeois democrats? 3) Whether the Social-Democratic Party should support the opposition parties in the Duma elections.

At first sight these questions would seem to have been chosen with great "finesse", but as the saying goes: "If a thing is too fine, it breaks." In fact, any more or less competent and observant person will at once see the fine ... *subterfuge* in these questions. A subterfuge, firstly, because they are fine specimens of the metaphysics against which Plekhanov is fond of declaiming so pompously, although he is unable to keep it out of his own arguments on concrete historical questions. Secondly, because the person questioned is artfully driven into a small and exceedingly narrow enclosure. Only those who are entirely, one may even say virginally, innocent in questions of politics can fail to notice that Plekhanov deliberately starts out remote from the subject and gently but firmly pushes the person he is questioning into the position of justifying ... blocs with the Cadets!

To drive a simple-minded interlocutor into justifying blocs with a certain party, without naming that party; to talk of a revolutionary movement and not distinguish the revolutionary from the oppositional bourgeois democracy; to hint that the bourgeoisie is "fighting" *in its own way*, i.e., different from the proletariat's way, and not say plainly and clearly what the difference really is; to try to catch the interlocutor like a young jackdaw with the bait of the Amsterdam Resolution so as to *conceal* from the foreigner

the real points at issue among the Russian Social-Democrats; to deduce concrete rules concerning definite tactics in a definite case, in regard to the attitude to be adopted towards the various parties of the bourgeois democrats, from a general *phrase* about the "general character" of the revolution, instead of deducing this "general character of the Russian revolution" from a precise analysis of the concrete data on the interests and position of the different classes in the Russian revolution—is not all this a subterfuge? Is it not open mockery of Marx's dialectical materialism?

Either "yea, yea—nay, nay, and whatsoever is more than these comes from the evil one." Either a bourgeois revolution or a socialist revolution; the rest can be "deduced" from the main "solution" by means of simple syllogisms.

It is Kautsky's great merit that in answering such questions he at once grasps the point and goes to the root of the mistake contained in the very way they were formulated. Kautsky *virtually* answers Plekhanov's questions *by rejecting* Plekhanov's formulation of them! Kautsky answers Plekhanov by *correcting* Plekhanov's formulation of the question. And the more gently and carefully he corrects the initiator of the questionnaire the more deadly is his criticism of his formulation of the question. Kautsky writes: "We should do well to realise that we are moving towards totally new situations and problems, for which none of the old patterns are suitable."

This exactly hits the mark in relation to Plekhanov's question: Is our revolution bourgeois or socialist in its general character? This is the old pattern, says Kautsky. The question cannot be put in that way, it is not the Marxist way. The revolution in Russia is not a bourgeois revolution, for the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia. And the revolution in Russia is not a socialist revolution, for it *cannot possibly* result in the *sole* rule or dictatorship of the proletariat. The Social-Democrats can achieve victory in the Russian revolution and *must* strive to do so. But victory in the present revolution cannot be the victory of the proletariat alone, without the aid of other classes. Which class then, owing to the objective conditions of the present revolution, is the ally of the proletariat? *The peasantry*: "stable, common

interests during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle exists only between the proletariat and the peasantry."

These propositions of Kautsky's are a brilliant confirmation of the tactics of the revolutionary wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, i.e., the tactics of the Bolsheviks. And this confirmation is the more valuable because Kautsky, putting aside the concrete and practical questions, concentrated all his attention on a systematic exposition of the *general principles* of socialist tactics in our revolution. He shows that Plekhanov's threadbare method of argument: "the revolution is a bourgeois revolution, therefore we must support the bourgeoisie", has nothing in common with Marxism. He thus recognises the main error of our Social-Democratic opportunism, i.e., Menshevism, which the Bolsheviks have been combating ever since the beginning of 1905.

Further, Kautsky's analysis, which proceeds not from general phrases but from an analysis of the position and interests of definite classes, confirms the conclusion which the yes-men of the Cadets in our ranks considered "tactless", namely: that the bourgeoisie in Russia fears revolution more than reaction; that it hates absolutism because it engenders revolution; that it wants political freedom in order to stop the revolution. Compare this with the naïve faith in the Cadets professed by our Plekhanov, who, in his questions, has imperceptibly identified the struggle of the opposition against the old order with the struggle against the government's attempts to crush the revolutionary movement! Unlike the Mensheviks with their stereotyped views, Kautsky reveals the revolutionary and non-revolutionary elements of "bourgeois democracy", reveals the bankruptcy of liberalism, and shows that as the peasants become more independent and more politically conscious, the liberals will inevitably and rapidly turn to the right. A bourgeois revolution, brought about by the proletariat and the peasantry in spite of the instability of the bourgeoisie—this fundamental principle of Bolshevik tactics is wholly confirmed by Kautsky.

Kautsky shows that in the course of the revolution it is quite possible that victory will fall to the lot of the Social-Democratic Party, and that that Party *must* inspire its adherents with confidence in victory. Kautsky's conclusions completely confound the Menshevik fear of a Social-

Democratic victory in the present revolution. Plekhanov's ridiculous efforts to "fit" the tasks of our revolution "into the Amsterdam Resolution" seem particularly comical when compared with Kautsky's clear and lucid proposition: "It is impossible to fight successfully if one renounces victory beforehand."

The fundamental difference between Kautsky's *methods* and those of Plekhanov, the leader of our present opportunists, is even more striking when the former states: to imagine that "all the classes and parties which are striving for political freedom have simply to work together in order to achieve it," means "*seeing only the political surface of events*". This sounds as though Kautsky were directly referring to that small band of Social-Democrats who have deserted to the liberals: Portugalov, Prokopovich, Kuskova, Bogucharsky, Izgoyev, Struve and others, who are committing the very error Kautsky points to (and are dragging Plekhanov with them in the process). The fact that Kautsky is unacquainted with the writings of these gentry only enhances the significance of his *theoretical* conclusion.

Needless to say, Kautsky *fully* agrees with the fundamental thesis of *all* Russian Social-Democrats, that the peasant movement is *non-socialist*; that socialism cannot arise from small peasant production, etc. It would be very edifying for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are fond of asserting that they "also agree with Marx", to ponder over these words of Kautsky's.

In conclusion just a few words about "authorities". Marxists cannot adopt the usual standpoint of the intellectual radical, with his pseudo-revolutionary abstraction: "no authorities".

No. The working class, which all over the world is waging a hard and persistent struggle for complete emancipation, needs authorities, but, of course, only in the way that young workers need the experience of veteran *fighters* against oppression and exploitation, of those who have organised many strikes, have taken part in a number of revolutions, who are wise in revolutionary traditions, and have a broad political outlook. The proletarians of every country need the authority of the world-wide struggle of the proletariat. We need the authority of the theoreticians of international Social-

Democracy to enable us properly to understand the programme and tactics of our Party. But, of course, this authority has nothing in common with the official authorities in bourgeois science and police politics. It is the authority of the experience gained in the more diversified struggle waged in the ranks of the same world socialist army. And important though this authority is in widening the horizon of the fighters, it would be impermissible in the workers' party to claim that the practical and concrete questions of its immediate policy can be solved by those standing a long way off. The collective spirit of the progressive class-conscious workers immediately engaged in the struggle in each country will always remain the highest authority on all such questions.

Such is our view on the authoritativeness of the opinions held by Kautsky and by Plekhanov. The theoretical works of the latter—mainly his criticism of the Narodniks and the opportunists—remain a lasting asset for Social-Democracy all over Russia, and no "factionalism" will blind any man who possesses the least bit of "physical brain power" to such an extent as to make him forget or deny the importance of this asset. But as a political leader of the Russian Social-Democrats in the Russian bourgeois revolution, as a tactician, Plekhanov has proved to be beneath criticism. In this sphere he has displayed an opportunism a hundred times more harmful to the Russian Social-Democratic workers than Bernstein's opportunism is to the German workers. And this Cadet-like policy advocated by Plekhanov, who has returned to the fold of Prokopovich & Co. whom he, in 1899-1900, expelled from the Social-Democratic Party, we must most ruthlessly combat.

That this tactical opportunism of Plekhanov's is an utter negation of the fundamentals of the Marxist method is best shown by Kautsky's *line of argument* traced in the essay here presented to the reader.

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES AND OF THE WORKERS' PARTY TO THE DUMA ELECTIONS

The papers are full of news about the preparations for the elections. Almost every day we are informed either of a new government "interpretation" striking out of the voters' list one more category of unreliable citizens, or of new persecutions, prohibitions of meetings, suppression of newspapers and the arrest of suspected electors or candidates. The Black Hundreds have raised their heads, whooping and hooting more insolently than ever.

The parties that are objectionable to the government are also preparing for the elections. These parties are confident, and justly confident, that the *mass* of the voters will have their say, will take advantage of the elections to express their true convictions in spite of all the tricks, pinpricks and restrictions, great and small, that are directed against the voters. This confidence is based on the fact that the most ferocious persecutions, the most intolerable pinpricks will at most eliminate hundreds, thousands, let us say, tens of thousands of voters throughout Russia. But this will not alter the sentiments and the attitude of the masses towards the government. Ten or twenty thousand voters can be struck off the list in St. Petersburg, say, but this will only cause the 150,000 voters in the capital to withdraw into their shells, as it were, to lie low for a time. They will not disappear, however, and their mass sentiment will not change; if it does change, it will not, of course, be in favour of the government. Therefore, unless the electoral law is radically amended, unless all remnants of electoral legality are finally trampled upon (and they can still be further trampled upon by means of systematic arrests of electors: one may

expect the very worst from Stolypin!)—there is still no doubt that the mood of the masses will decide the elections, and the decision will certainly not be in favour of the government and its Black Hundreds.

And all non-supporters of the government are placing their hopes in the masses of the voters. But if you examine carefully what this hope in the masses really amounts to, what *the attitude* of the various parties is towards the masses—you will observe a vast difference between the bourgeois parties and the party of the proletariat.

The Cadets are at the head of the liberal-bourgeois parties. During the elections to the First Duma they shamefully betrayed the struggle, they refused to take part in the boycott; they themselves went tamely to the elections and drew the raw masses after them. Now they are placing their hopes on the inertness of these masses, and on the restrictions which have been imposed on agitation and on the Left parties in the conduct of their election campaign. The Cadet's hope in the masses is hope in the immaturity and servitude of the masses. He argues as follows: the masses will not understand our programme and tactics, they will not go beyond a peaceful and legal, the most peaceful and timid protest—not because they do not wish to, but because they will not be allowed to. They will vote for us, for the Lefts have no newspapers, no meetings, no leaflets, no security against arbitrary arrest and persecution. So thinks the Cadet. And he proudly raises his eyes to heaven and says: I thank thee Lord that I am not as one of those "extremists"! I am not a revolutionary; I shall be able to adjust myself most obediently and abjectly to any measures; I shall even get my election forms* from the Peaceful Renovators.

Hence, the whole of the Cadets' election campaign is directed to frightening the masses with the Black-Hundred danger and the danger from the extreme Left parties, to adapting themselves to the philistinism, cowardice and flabbiness of the petty bourgeois and to persuading him that the Cadets are the safest, the most modest, the most moderate and the most well-behaved of people. Every day the Cadet papers ask their readers: Are you afraid, philistine? Rely

* See p. 385 of this volume.—*Ed.*

on us! We are not going to frighten you, we are opposed to violence, we are obedient to the government, rely on us and we shall do everything for you "as far as possible"! And behind the backs of the frightened philistines the Cadets resort to every trick to assure the government of their loyalty, to assure the Lefts of their love of liberty, to assure the Peaceful Renovators of their affinity with their party and their election forms.

No enlightenment of the masses, no agitation to rouse the masses, no exposition of consistent democratic slogans—only a haggling for seats behind the backs of the frightened philistines—such is the election campaign of all the parties of the liberal bourgeoisie, from the non-party people (of *Tovarishch*) to the Party of Democratic Reforms.

The attitude of the workers' party towards the masses is exactly the reverse. The important thing for us is not to get seats in the Duma by means of compromises; on the contrary, those seats are important only because and insofar as they can serve to develop the *political consciousness* of the masses, to *raise* them to a higher political level, to *organise* them, not for the sake of philistine happiness, not for the sake of "tranquillity", "order" and "peaceful [bourgeois] bliss", but for the *struggle*, the struggle for the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation and all oppression. Only for this purpose, and only to the extent that they help us to achieve it, are seats in the Duma and the *whole* election campaign important for us. The workers' party places all its hopes on the masses; on the masses who are not frightened, not passively submissive and who do not humbly bear the yoke, but who are politically conscious, demanding and militant. The workers' party must treat with contempt the usual liberal method of frightening the philistine with the bogey of the Black-Hundred danger. The whole task of the Social-Democrats is to make the masses *conscious* of the real danger, of the actual aims in the struggle of these forces whose strength lies not in the Duma, which find full expression not in Duma debates, and which will settle the question of Russia's future outside the Duma.

The workers' party therefore warns the masses against the clandestine election tricks of the Cadet bourgeoisie, against its stultifying cry: Entrust to us, lawyers, professors

and enlightened landlords, the task of combating the Black-Hundred danger!

The workers' party tells the masses: trust only your socialist consciousness and your socialist organisation. To surrender priority in the struggle and the right to lead it to the liberal bourgeoisie is tantamount to selling the cause of liberty for grandiloquent phrases, for the tawdry brilliance of fashionable and gaudy signboards. No Black-Hundred danger in the Duma can be as harmful as the corruption of the minds of the masses who are blindly following the liberal bourgeoisie, its slogans, its candidates and its policy.

Among the masses to whom the workers' party is appealing, the strongest numerically are the peasants and various sections of the petty bourgeoisie. They are more determined than the Cadets, more honest and a thousand times more capable of fighting, but in politics they are too often led by the Cadet windbags. Even now they are wavering between the militant proletariat and the compromising bourgeoisie.

The advocates of blocs with the Cadets are not only doing harm to the proletariat and to the whole cause of liberty. They are prejudicing the development of political consciousness among the urban and rural poor. They are not performing their immediate duty, which is to free these people from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie. Look at the Trudoviks, the "Popular Socialists" and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. They, too, are wavering, and are also mainly occupied with plans for deals with the Cadets. The leaders of the Trudoviks, having failed to form a party of their own, are multiplying their Duma mistakes tenfold by appealing to the masses to vote for the Cadets (Anikin—through newspaper reporters, Zhilkin—in *Tovarishch*, etc.). This is downright treachery to the cause of the peasants' struggle, downright betrayal of the peasants to the liberal landlords, who would rob the peasants by means of a "fair" compensation as thoroughly as their forefathers did in 1861. And as for the "Popular Socialists", even the Cadets are laughing at them and calling them "second reserve Cadets" (Milyukov in *Rech*). Their leaders (Annensky and others) also appeal for blocs with the Cadets. Their tiny party (which according to *Tovarishch*, a paper which is favourably disposed to them, is weaker even than the party of peaceful plunder, and which

has only about 2,000 members throughout Russia!) is a mere appendage of the Cadets. The position of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is also ambiguous: both in the October period and in the period of the First Duma they concealed the fact that they had split with the Popular Socialists; they continued to collaborate with them and jointly published the same newspapers. Today, they are not conducting any open and independent struggle, are not sufficiently broadly, openly and sharply attacking the "second reserve Cadets", are not supplying the masses with adequate data for criticising that party, and are not making any appraisal in principle of the whole election campaign and all electoral agreements in general.

It is the great historical duty of the workers' party to help to create an *independent* political party of the working class. Those who advocate blocs with the Cadets hinder the fulfilment of this duty.

Another great duty that confronts the workers' party is to free the masses of the ruined, poverty-stricken and doomed urban petty bourgeoisie and peasantry from the influence of the ideas and prejudices of the liberal bourgeoisie. The fulfilment of this duty is also being hindered by those who advocate blocs with the Cadets. They are not divorcing the peasants from the liberals, but are strengthening this unnatural alliance, which is fatal to the cause of liberty and to the cause of the proletariat. They are not warning the peasant masses against the liberals' backstairs politics (or rather, political intrigue for the distribution of seats in the Duma), but are sanctioning this intrigue by taking part in it.

Down with all blocs! The workers' party must conduct its election campaign independently, not only in words, but in deeds. It must provide the whole people, and the masses of the proletariat in particular, with a model of courageous and consistent criticism based on principle. Only in that way shall we succeed in rallying the masses for effective participation in the struggle for freedom and not in the sham liberalism of the Cadet betrayers of freedom.

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PLEKHANOV AND VASILYEV

The attitude of the Menshevik Social-Democratic press towards Plekhanov's well-known Herostratian articles in *Tovarishch* deserves the attention of the whole party of the working class. The most prominent representative of the Menshevik trend, the leader of the Mensheviks, as all the liberal newspapers openly and constantly call him, is publicly proposing a *joint platform* for the Social-Democrats and Cadets.

And the Mensheviks are silent!

One would think that they had no newspapers, magazines, leaflets, institutions, collegiums, not a single Party organisation. One would think that they were not in the least concerned by what *their* leader says about *their* policy in the hearing of all Russia....

But we are all perfectly aware that the Mensheviks possess both organisations—even such influential ones as the Central Committee—and organs of every type. Their silence, therefore, is only another proof of the utter falsity of their position. The Bundists alone stand out among the mass of the Mensheviks. They have protested against the slogan of "a Duma with full power" in their *Volkszeitung*, which unfortunately is almost unknown among the Russians. They have poured ridicule on Plekhanov in their *Nasha Tribuna*, published in the Russian language. They have thus proved, at any rate, that they have the courage of their convictions, the courage to recognise in deed and not only in words their own Party organisation, whose *obligation* it is openly and straightforwardly to express its opinion on all political questions, and to place its political duty to the proletariat above

all considerations of personal sympathy, friendship and respect of persons....*

What a disgraceful thing to happen in a workers' party! The trend which predominates in the Party and controls the Central Committee does not dare to mention the mistakes of one of its members. At all meetings, at all debates at which workers are present, at all discussions with the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks solemnly avow that they disagree with Plekhanov. But they are silent about it in their press: not a single *official* declaration from any Party unit. What is this? Repudiation in secret and confirmation by official silence? Abuse the master ... behind his back and be silent in his presence. Such things are done only by ... well, gentlemen, we'll leave you to guess who does such things.

But to the workers and the whole Party membership we say: You cannot trust political leaders who disappear, bag and baggage, at the first surprise attack from whatever quarter. They are not to be trusted. Whenever any final decision is to be taken, all these "leaders" will act *not* as they say but as some third person *says for them*.

By the way, the behaviour of Plekhanov and the Mensheviks in the present incident is a good illustration of the current talk about the "intellectualist" character of our Party. Yes, it is true that the non-proletarian intelligentsia has far too much influence on the proletariat in our Party. If that were not the case, would the proletarian party tolerate

* We have just received an extract from the Georgian Social-Democratic organ of the Tiflis *Mensheviks*, "*Tsin*" ("*Forward*"), of December 8. The Tiflis Mensheviks emphatically challenge Plekhanov's views and declare that his arguments in favour of the slogan: "a Duma with full power" are erroneous, that the Social-Democrats *cannot* take this slogan to mean a constituent assembly. The slogan of "a Duma with full power", they write, "would mean the curtailing of our programme". Further on they argue that this slogan is also unacceptable to the Cadets, and that in general a joint platform for the Social-Democrats and Cadets is quite out of the question. A joint platform means, "clipping the wings of our Party's independence, blurring the differences between the views of the Social-Democrats and those of the bourgeois parties".

You are right, Tiflis Menshevik comrades! We note with satisfaction that in spite of the Central Committee and the majority of Russian Mensheviks, the Bundists and the Caucasians have not swerved from their duty to state plainly that Plekhanov's view and his whole statement are wrong.

Plekhanov's antics and the Mensheviks' attitude towards them even for a week? How clearly this reveals the true nature of the talk about a *non-party* labour congress. If only our Party were superseded by a legal labour (simply labour, not Social-Democratic) party, as Larin and the publicists of *Nashe Dyelo* and *Sovremennaya Zhizn* desire, there would be a wide field for actions like Plekhanov's. Write for any newspapers you please, enter into any literary or political blocs with anyone you please, propose your *own* slogans in your own name, completely ignoring any Party organisation! Complete freedom for intellectualist individualism, while the mass of non-party workers remains an amorphous mass. Is this not the ideal of the old Prokopovich *Credo* (for which Plekhanov and I, in 1899-1900, attacked Prokopovich and drove him and all his fraternity out of the Social-Democratic Party)? The *Credo*—that quintessence of Social-Democratic opportunism—advocated non-political, non-party labour unions for the economic struggle, and political struggle through liberal channels. Blocs with the Cadets and a non-party labour congress are nothing but a 1906-07 edition of the *Credo* of 1899.

Plekhanov's articles in *Tovarishch* are simply Larin's proposal put into practice: free propagandist societies for all and sundry "socialists"—if they can be called socialists—against a background of non-party labour organisations. *In actual fact*, Plekhanov wrote in *Tovarishch* not as a member of the Party, not as a member of one of the Party organisations. This is a fact which cannot be explained away by any sophistry; and no "hushing up" of this fact by the Menshevik Central Committee can save a certain faction in our Party. In fact, Plekhanov wrote exactly as Larin wrote, as a *non-party* socialist in a non-party "socialist" organ; and he put forward a non-party, *non*-socialist and even *anti*-socialist proposal.

Vasilyev has followed in Plekhanov's footsteps. Switzerland, owing to its freedom from the traditions of the Russian revolutionary proletariat, is supplying us with more and more "advanced" opportunists.

Vasilyev is a prominent Menshevik. He has worked with Mensheviks; not with Mensheviks casually met in some remote provincial town, but with the-most prominent and most

responsible Mensheviks. Hence, the Mensheviks *have no right* to treat Vasilyev with disdain.

And Vasilyev directly refers to Plekhanov. More than that, he refers to him *in support* of his own case. He calls Plekhanov's disgraceful (for the Social-Democratic Party) article in the Cadet press proposing a joint platform with the Cadets "a courageous call". He "regrets" that "there are no Plekhanovs in the other parties".

Vasilyev displays much zeal but little intelligence. He wanted to praise Plekhanov, and in praise of him he blurted out: "Unfortunately there are no Plekha*novs* in the other parties." This is matchless! Good Vasilyev was the first to use the word "Plekha*novs*" as a *generic* term for politicians who act on their own account, and independently of their party. From now on people will probably begin to speak of "*the Plekhanovs* in the *Vasilyev* sense of the word...."

Slapping "the Plekhanovs" on the back, the Vasilyevs dot the i's and cross the t's. In 1899, the authors of the *Credo*, Prokopovich & Co., spoke of a pure labour movement free from the germs of revolution. The Vasilyevs talk of a revolution which must give birth to a "constitution" and nothing more, and give birth to it *without* the aid of midwives, without revolutionaries. *No* midwives, no revolutionaries, no revolutionary people—such is Vasilyev's slogan.

Shchedrin once poured classic ridicule on the France that was shooting the Communards, the France of the bankers who were cringing before the Russian tyrants. He called her a republic without republicans.[170] It is time a new Shchedrin was born to ridicule Vasilyev and the Mensheviks, who are advocating revolution with the slogan of "no" revolutionaries, "no" revolution.

Are we right in interpreting Vasilyev's "pronouncement" *in this way*? Are we right in putting him on a par with the Mensheviks?

Of course, we are! Vasilyev's whole article, all his ideas, all his proposals are imbued with the "plan" to facilitate the birth of a constitution by killing the revolution. To "temporarily relinquish" all programmes, to merge all Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and suchlike with the Cadets in one liberal party, to unite them all for the struggle for a "political constitution" "without the simulta-

neous solution of economic programmes" (this is exactly what the letter says—"without solution of programmes". The Swiss advisers of the Russian proletariat are not always able to express themselves in good Russian)—does not all this evince a desire to save the constitution by renouncing the revolution?

A revolution in the real, serious sense is *inconceivable* without "solution of economic programmes". A revolution can only be made by the masses, actuated by profound *economic* needs. The fall of absolutism in Russia, its *real* fall, would *inevitably* mean an *economic* revolution. Only those who are virginally innocent of socialism can fail to understand this. To abandon economic programme means abandoning the fundamental economic causes of revolution, abandoning the economic interests which impel the masses of downtrodden, cowed, ignorant people to wage a great and unprecedentedly selfless struggle. It means abandoning the masses, leaving only a gang of intellectual spouters, and substituting liberal spouting for socialist policy.

"What benefit was it to the peasants that their cause was espoused by the Duma that was dissolved mainly on account of the agrarian question?" Does not this argument entitle Vasilyev to have a monument erected to him in his lifetime for socialist opportunism unsurpassed in the world?

And is this not (we now pass to the second of the two questions raised above) a Menshevik argument?

Ride in the same compartment with the Cadets as far as Tver without disturbing each other, says Plekhanov. Ride with the Cadets to the Duma, allying ourselves with a non-revolutionary party (for a time! "for a short time!" says Vasilyev, supplementing the Menshevik formula) for revolutionary objects—say the Mensheviks. Ride together as far as a Cadet Cabinet, said our Central Committee recently.

Yes, let's ride, agrees Vasilyev, "*without jostling or frightening each other*". "Now, at this moment, it [the struggle of classes and groups] is fatal and criminal."

To wage the class struggle is criminal; to jeopardise the constitution by revolutionary demands (such as: a Duma with full power, a constituent assembly, etc.) is criminal. However much the Mensheviks may repudiate Vasilyev (they have not done so yet, by the by) they will never be able to

obliterate the fact that it is *this idea* that underlies blocs with the Cadets, support for the demand for a Duma Cabinet, and all these joint trips as far as Tver, etc., etc.

Vasilyev, of course, is unique. But even unique phenomena of nature occur only in a definite environment and spring only from definite conditions. Vasilyev, of course, is the Mont Blanc of opportunism. But one does not find Mont Blancs in the steppes. They exist only among Alpine peaks. Vasilyevs can only appear in company with the "Plekhanovs", Cherevanins, and *tutti quanti* down to Prokopovich.

And thanks to "the Plekhanovs in the Vasilyev sense" Mr. Struve is able to say, as he did at a meeting in Solyanoi Gorodok on December 27 (*Tovarishch* of December 28) that "all the present opponents of the Cadets will in the near future become Cadets themselves. *Tovarishch* is already being called a Cadet paper. The Popular Socialists are being called Social-Cadets, the Mensheviks—semi-Cadets. Many people regard G. V. Plekhanov as a Cadet, and indeed, many of his present utterances can be welcomed by the Cadets. It is a pity only that he did not say these things when the Cadets stood alone. The Bolsheviks alone may prove incorrigible, hence their fate will be to end up in a museum of history."

Thank you for the compliment, clumsy Mr. Struve! Yes, we shall end up in the museum of history that is called "the history of the revolution in Russia". Our Bolshevik slogans, the Bolshevik boycott of the Bulygin Duma, the Bolshevik calls for a mass strike and uprising (as early as the Third Congress) will be *inseparably and forever* associated with the October Revolution in Russia. And we shall use our place in this *museum* even during long years or (if it comes to the worst) decades of reaction to teach the proletariat to hate the treacherous Octobrist-Cadet bourgeoisie, to despise intellectualist phrases and petty-bourgeois sentimentality. We shall use our place in this *museum* under all political conditions, even the worst, to preach relentless class struggle to the workers, to teach them how to prepare for a *new* revolution—one that will be more independent of the half-hearted and flabby bourgeoisie, and closer to the socialist revolution of the proletariat.

And your place in the museum, worthy Mr. Struve, will be the place assigned to those who rejoice and make fine speeches when counter-revolution triumphs. You will always be able to rejoice at such times over the fact that the revolutionaries have fallen in battle and the stage is occupied by the liberals, who lay down voluntarily, lay down at the enemy's feet, so as to "crawl into infamy".

If, contrary to our expectations, the revolution is not destined to rise again and wrest power from the tsar and his gang, you will long remain the hero of the counter-revolution. We will have *a* "place in the museum", but a good place—that of the *October struggle of the people*. If, however, the revolution rises again, as we believe it will, every trace of the miserable Cadets will disappear within a week, and the struggle of the masses of the proletariat and the ruined peasantry will once again go forward under Bolshevik slogans. Under the hegemony of the Cadets, the revolution can only lie in the dust. It can be victorious only under the hegemony of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats.

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THE WORKERS' PARTY ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG

The St. Petersburg organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has held its third (in the past year) general conference.[171] The first conference, February 1906, decided the question whether or not to participate in the elections to the Witte Duma. The second, June 1906, decided the question whether the demand for a Duma Cabinet should be supported. The third, January 1907, decided the question of the Second Duma election campaign.

The bourgeois parties settle big political questions from case to case by a simple ruling of one or other party "authority", which secretly concocts various political nostrums for the people. Only the workers' Social-Democratic Party actually practises democracy in organisation, in spite of the enormous difficulties—and even heavy sacrifices—which this entails for an illegal party. Only the workers' Social-Democratic Party weighs the importance in *principle* of every major political step before it decides to take it. It does not strive for ephemeral success, but subordinates its practical policy to the ultimate goal—the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation. Only the workers' party, when marching to battle, demands from all its members a well-considered, straight and clear answer to the question whether a certain step should be taken and how it should be taken.

The last conference of the St. Petersburg organisation, too, was based on the democratic representation of all the members of the Party. Moreover, the delegates had to be elected on the basis of a canvass of opinion of all the electors

on the question of agreements with the Cadets. Without an intelligent answer to this topical question of tactics, the democratic procedure of electing delegates to the conference would have been idle play, unworthy of the proletariat.

Here is the resolution adopted by the Conference:

In view of the fact: (1) that it is absolutely obligatory for the Social-Democratic Party, as the class party of the proletariat, to conduct its election campaign independently in all cases where no special and exceptional circumstances are present; (2) that hitherto the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, headed by the St. Petersburg Committee, have been conducting an entirely independent election campaign, influencing all sections of the working population, both those who adopt a consistent proletarian standpoint and those who have not fully mastered it; (3) that at the present time, two weeks before the elections, it is already evident that in St. Petersburg the chances of the parties on the right are very slight, while those of the Cadets are considered (mainly owing to tradition) to be strong, so that it is particularly imperative for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to exert every effort to break the hegemony of the Cadets in the metropolis, on which the attention of the whole of Russia is concentrated; (4) that large sections of the poorer working people in the city who do not yet adhere to the proletarian standpoint, and whose vote can influence the result of the elections in the city curia, are vacillating between the desire to vote to the Left of the Cadets, i.e., to free themselves from the leadership of the treacherous liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, and the desire to secure at least a few Trudovik deputies in the Duma by entering into a bloc with the Cadets; (5) that the wavering Trudovik parties reveal a desire to sanction a bloc with the Cadets on condition of obtaining one, or at any rate not more than two out of the six seats in the metropolis, on the grounds that the Social-Democrats refuse under any circumstances to enter into an agreement with the non-Social-Democratic sections of the urban poor against the liberal bourgeoisie—the Conference resolves: (1) immediately to inform the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Committee of the Trudovik Group that the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. is prepared to enter into an agreement with them on condition that they enter into no agreements whatsoever with the Cadets; (2) the terms of the agreement to be complete independence of the contracting parties as regards slogans, programmes and tactics generally. The six seats in the Duma to be distributed as follows: two seats for the workers' curia, two for the Social-Democrats, one for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and one for the Trudoviks; (3) the Conference authorises its executive body to conduct the negotiations; (4) that in St. Petersburg Gubernia local agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks are permitted on the same principles.

Note: In regard to the P.S. Party (the Trudovik or Popular Socialist Party) it is resolved: in view of that party's evasive position on the fundamental questions of the struggle outside the Duma, the Conference sanctions agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks provided that they have no agreement with the P.S. Party.

Three main points stand out in examining this resolution: firstly, categorical renunciation of all agreements with the Cadets; secondly, inflexible determination of the Social-Democrats to put forward its independent lists under all circumstances; and, thirdly, sanction of agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks.

To reject agreements with the Cadets was the plain duty of the workers' party. As soon as the election meetings began in St. Petersburg it at once became clear to all that the revolutionary Social-Democrats were right when they said: our liberals have been humbugging ignorant people who have no definite principles with their cries about the Black-Hundred danger in order to avert the real danger threatening them from the left. The petty police tricks of the government, cheating the poor voters out of their votes with the aid of Senate interpretations have failed to change the mood of the mass of the voters (whether there will be 100, 120 or 150 thousand voters, makes no difference). And this mood of the masses is being clearly manifested at meetings as a mood that is to the left of the Cadets.

Of course, the Black-Hundred danger may not lie in the mass of the electorate voting Black Hundred, but in the arrest of Left voters and electors by the Black-Hundred police. There are persistent rumours that the present relative "freedom" (in Russia if a person is allowed to breathe it is called freedom!) of election meetings is a trap laid by the government, which intends to arrest prominent speakers and electors. But it is quite easy to understand that to combat *this* Black-Hundred danger we need, not blocs with the Cadets, but the preparedness of the masses to engage in a struggle that will go beyond the bounds of so-called parliamentarism.

Secondly, the Conference decided, as was to be expected, that in the metropolis the Social-Democrats will conduct

their campaign independently under any circumstances. They may offer to enter into an agreement with another party in one form or another; but we were prepared for complete independence before, and are ready for it now. Taking the election campaign as a whole, an agreement under such circumstances will in fact be an exception; the independence of the Social-Democrats will be the rule.

Thirdly, the Conference offered to enter into an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks on condition that they kept aloof from the Cadets and the pro-Cadet Popular Socialists, and on the further condition that the workers' curia is given two seats and that the four remaining seats are divided equally.

This proposal is based on the principle of discriminating between parties according to their attitude towards the struggle outside the Duma, which tomorrow may become an immediate question. By making their pacts with other parties conditional upon the observance of certain principles the Social-Democrats provide ammunition for mass agitation and propaganda on the true character of the various parties. The Social-Democrats take into account the peculiarities of the situation in St. Petersburg, where the mass of the "Trudovik-inclined" urban petty bourgeoisie are led in tow by the Cadets. Under such conditions we cannot neglect the task of breaking this hegemony of the Cadets, of helping the working people to take a *step forward*—a small step, it is true, but one of unquestionable political importance—a step towards a more determined struggle, towards clearer political ideas, towards more definite class-consciousness.

And *this* result we shall achieve by our agitation, by our whole procedure in conducting the election campaign; and we shall achieve it whatever the answer of the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries to our offer may be. There is no need for us to go into all sorts of calculations to ascertain the probability of an affirmative or a negative answer. Our attention must not be concentrated on this. The important thing for us is the fundamental policy of the proletariat, which remains unchanged in the face of various specific possibilities: to the deceptive illusions of peaceful struggle and constitutional toys we counterpose a clear analysis of the

tasks of the struggle outside the Duma, a struggle that the course of events is bringing ever nearer. We say to the petty-bourgeois sections of the urban and rural working people: there is only one thing that can prevent the instability and vacillation of the small proprietors, and that is an independent class party of the revolutionary proletariat.

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE DUMA ELECTIONS[172]

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE DUMA ELECTIONS[172]

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG

The conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation adopted a resolution not to enter into a bloc with the Cadets, but to propose an agreement with the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks made a number of protests on formal grounds and, being in a minority, walked out of the conference.

The liberal newspapers have already made a lot of noise about this event. They predict a split in the Social-Democratic Party, and hasten to draw a number of political conclusions. In view of this it is extremely important for every class-conscious worker to understand what is really taking place in the Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg and what attitude to adopt towards this.

We propose, therefore, to examine the main questions that arise in connection with this event, namely: (1) the composition of the conference; (2) the immediate reason why the Mensheviks walked out of the conference—the attempt of the Central Committee to divide the conference into two parts, one for the city and one for the gubernia; and (3) *the significance of the whole event*, especially in view of the election campaign now proceeding in St. Petersburg.

I

THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE WAS CONVENED, AND ITS COMPOSITION

The object of the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation was to adopt a final decision on the most important political question of the day, namely: whether or not to

enter into agreements with the Cadets at the first stage of the Duma elections.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is organised on democratic lines. This means that all the affairs of the Party are conducted, either directly, or through representatives, by all the members of the Party, all of whom without exception have equal rights; moreover, all officials, all leading bodies, and all institutions of the Party are subject to election, are responsible to their constituents, and are subject to recall. The affairs of the St. Petersburg organisation are managed by an elected body, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The supreme body of the St. Petersburg organisation, in view of the impossibility of bringing together all the members of the Party (about 6,000), is the *conference of representatives* of the organisation. To this conference *all* members of the organisation have a right to send representatives: one delegate for a definite number of Party members; one delegate for every 50 members, for instance, the ratio that was adopted for the last conference. These representatives must be *elected* by all the members of the Party, and a decision adopted by the representatives is supreme and final for the whole of the local organisation.

But this is not all. In order that the settlement of a question may be really democratic, it is not enough to call together the elected representatives of the organisation. It is necessary that *all* the members of the organisation, in electing their representatives, should at the same time *independently*, *and each for himself*, express their opinion on the point at issue before the whole organisation. Democratically organised parties and unions cannot, on principle, dispense with such a canvass of the opinion of every member without exception, in the most important cases at any rate, and especially when it is a question of a political action in which the *masses* act independently, e.g., a strike, elections, the boycott of some important local institution, etc.

Why is it considered insufficient to send representatives in such cases? Why must there be a canvass of the opinion of *all* members of the Party or what is called a "referendum"? Because the success of mass actions requires the conscious and voluntary participation of every individual worker.

A strike cannot be conducted with the necessary solidarity, voting at elections will not be conducted intelligently, unless *every worker* consciously and voluntarily decides for himself the question: to strike or not to strike? to vote or not to vote for the Cadets? It is impossible to decide all political questions by canvassing the opinion of all members of the Party: this would involve endless, tiresome and fruitless voting. But the most important questions, and especially those which are directly connected with some definite action by the *masses themselves*, must, for the sake of democracy, be settled, not only by sending representatives, but also by canvassing the opinion of all members of the Party.

That is why the St. Petersburg Committee resolved that the election of delegates to the conference should take place only *after* the members of the Party had discussed the question of whether to enter into agreements with the Cadets, only *after* all members of the Party had voted on that question. An election is an affair in which the masses take a direct part. Socialists consider that the political consciousness of the masses is the main force. Consequently, *every* member of the Party must express his considered opinion on the question whether or not to vote for the Cadets at the elections. Only after this question has been openly discussed by all the Party members assembled is it possible for each one to adopt an intelligent and firm decision one way or the other. Only on the basis of such a decision can the election of representatives to the conference be, not the result of clannishness, friendship or force of habit ("We will elect *our* Nikolai Nikolayevich or Ivan Ivanovich!"), but the result of the considered decision of the "rank and file" *themselves* (i.e., of *all* the members of the Party) as to their own political conduct.*

* Some say that the election of a representative can take place on the basis of knowing the representative's *views*, even without a vote being taken on the question at issue. But this is true only as regards the *totality* of the views held by that representative. It cannot apply when a special question affecting the action of the masses themselves is involved. The refusal to vote on a platform (for blocs with the Cadets or against them) would under such circumstances, imply that the voter's views were vague, that he was irresolute, that he was not quite in agreement with his representative.

The elections to the Duma, i.e., the primary and main voting for delegates or electors, will be carried out, not through representatives, but by every voter individually. Consequently, if we want to be socialists in deeds and not only in words, socialists organised in a really *democratic workers*' party, then we must see to it that *every worker* is clear on the question of whether to vote for the Cadets or not. To entrust representation to Ivan Ivanovich, who is an acquaintance of ours, or to Sidor Sidorovich who is a decent fellow, is not enough; the *essence* of the question at issue must be *intelligently* examined by the "rank and file". Only when that is done will the democratic decision be the considered democratic decision of the *masses* and not only the decision of representatives elected because "we know them".

The St. Petersburg Committee is the elected leader of the *whole* Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Gubernia. To lead the *membership* in a matter like the Duma elections, it was obliged (if it recognised democracy not in words only) to seek the conscious participation of the *whole membership* in the elections. And in order that the participation of the whole membership in the elections might be conscious and united, it was necessary that not only representatives of the Party, but that every member of the Party should give a definite answer to his St. Petersburg Committee on the question: Does he or does he not stand for agreements with the Cadets?

Such is the significance of the "debate", that is, of the *discussion* that took place on the controversial question itself before the election of representatives. At every meeting of Party members, before proceeding to elect representatives to the conference, there had first to be a *discussion* of the controversial political question. The opinion had to be heard of a representative of the St. Petersburg Committee, i.e., of the leading legal body, and also of those who represented other views. After the discussion *all* the Party members voted whether or not they were in favour of agreements with the Cadets. The votes were counted by a committee of scrutineers, consisting of representatives of both sides (if there were two sides on this question in the Party unit). Only by this procedure could the St. Petersburg Committee ascertain

the *considered* opinion of the *whole* Party membership, and consequently, be in a position to lead the masses, not blindly, but on the basis of their full understanding of the question.

This explanation was necessary because at the conference disputes arose regarding the "discussion" and the canvass of opinion of all the members of the Party.

That these disputes were uncalled for is the more obvious to Party members for the reason that the Central Committee's own letter of November 10 regarding the settlement of the question (whether to enter into agreements) by the local organisations definitely recommends "*preliminary discussion*" of the question by all members of the Party.

Let us now consider the composition of the conference itself. At first, all the representatives elected by the respective organisations were admitted without a verification of the elections (i.e., without verification of "credentials"). There were in all 71 representatives, or delegates, of whom 40 were Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks, distributed as follows (by districts).

	Bolshevik	*Menshevik*	*Total*
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	7	6	13
Vyborg	2	5	7
City	5	7	12
Railway	1	2	3
Lettish	2	—	2
Moscow	4	5	9
Narva	—	—	—
Neva	2	1	3
Okruzhnoi	9	2	11
Artisans (shop assistants)	4	1	5
Petersburg	3	2	5
Estonian	—	—	—
Military organisation	1	—	1
Total	40	31	71

Two Estonian delegates (both Bolsheviks) and one Lettish delegate (Menshevik) were absent. Had they been present, there would have been 42 Bolsheviks and 32 Mensheviks.

Hence it is clear that the Bolsheviks were in the majority *from the outset*, before the credentials were verified. Consequently, all talk about the Bolsheviks having an "artificial" majority falls to the ground. Complaints that the Bolsheviks did not endorse all the credentials have now been inserted by the Mensheviks even in the bourgeois press. They forgot to inform that press, however, that the Bolsheviks had a majority *even before* the verification of credentials!

To make the question of who had the majority at the conference even clearer and to settle it once and for all, let us take, not the number of credentials, but the *total number of votes cast by members of the Party*.

We shall then get the following figures:

	For the Bolsheviks	*For the Mensheviks*
Unchallenged votes . . .	1,848*	787
Challenged votes	300	946
Total votes . .	2,148	1,733

Thus, in all, about 4,000 (3,881) Party members voted. The Bolshevik majority is *over 400*.

Thus, it is beyond doubt that even if *all* the challenged votes were regarded as being in order, the Bolsheviks would still have had a large majority. Consequently, the disputes over the validity or invalidity of certain votes had nothing to do with the question of the Bolshevik majority; the dispute was over the question of how to carry out to the full the principle of democratic representation.

Why did the Bolsheviks cancel some of the credentials? Because the *challenged* credentials could not be recognised as being in order. And irregular credentials cannot be placed on the same footing with regular and unchallenged credentials.

* This figure includes 185 votes which the conference decided were quite in order. If these are not counted, the number of unchallenged votes will be 1,663.

Which credentials were challenged? Those that were not regularly issued; for example, those that were not certified by a committee of scrutineers, those issued without discussion before the voting, or without voting on "platforms" (i.e., where they failed to ask *all* the voters whether or not they were in favour of agreements with the Cadets). Irregular credentials cannot be regarded as having been democratically issued.

Now the question arises, what was to be done with the challenged credentials? It was impossible to examine each case separately. This would have entailed sitting an extra day, and the conference was *pressed for time*. It was scarcely able to get through the business by the date on which the workers *had* to go to elect the delegates (January 7).

There was only one way out: to raise the "basis of representation" for *all the challenged* credentials, i.e., to count them at the rate of one representative for every 75 votes instead of one for every 50. This method was adopted for three reasons: (1) it did away with arbitrariness and mutual irritation in estimating individual challenged credentials; (2) it put the challenged credentials on both sides on the same footing; (3) it was based on a decision taken by the St. Petersburg Committee long before the conference—namely: the St. Petersburg Committee had decided, in cases where it was quite impossible to conduct democratic elections to a conference (e.g., where it was impossible to call meetings owing to police restrictions), to admit representatives who were elected not quite democratically, but in such cases to *raise* the basis of representation, i.e., to allow, not one delegate per 50 members, but one per 75, per 100, and so on.

Now take the number of challenged and unchallenged votes. If we take the unchallenged votes, counting one delegate per 50 votes, we get 37 Bolsheviks and 16 Mensheviks. If we take the challenged votes, counting one delegate per 75 votes, we get 4 Bolsheviks and 12 Mensheviks. The total is 41 Bolsheviks (plus one from the military organisation, where democratic elections were impossible) and 28 Mensheviks.

The 70 credentials finally endorsed were distributed by districts as follows:

	Bolshevik	*Menshevik*	*Total*
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	7	6	13
Vyborg	2	4	6
City	5	7	12
Railway	1	2	3
Lettish	2	1	3
Moscow	4	4	8
Narva	—	—	—
Neva	2	1	3
Okruzhnoi	9	1	10
Artisans (shop assistants)	4	—	4
Petersburg	3	2	5
Estonian	2	—	2
Military organisation	1	—	1
Total	42	28	70

Hence it is plain that complaints about the composition of the conference are quite groundless. Of course, if you shout to an uninformed public about the rejection of the credentials of this person and about the disqualification of that person, you may for a moment create an impression, if the public does not consider the matter carefully. But this is mere wrangling, not controversy.

One need only examine all the facts relating to the composition of the conference to see clearly that there was *nothing* arbitrary in raising the basis of representation for *all* the challenged votes. After all, it was not by mere chance that 2,635 votes were entirely unchallenged and only 1,246 were challenged! And it cannot be seriously maintained that the *bulk* of the challenged votes were challenged at random without any grounds whatever!

Only think, for instance, what it means to vote "without a platform", as the Mensheviks have done so often (which is the very reason why nearly 1,000 of their votes were challenged). It means that not *all* the members of the Party are asked whether they are in favour of agreements with the Cadets or against them. The election of delegates takes place without such a canvass of opinion, or without a platform. It means that the conference has no means of knowing *exactly* the opinion of the Party members! It means that the *membership itself* is not consulted on a controversial question (involving the action of the rank and file). Can irregularities be avoided under such circumstances?

Can a *sincere* advocate of democracy in organisation defend such a method of voting? Democracy does not mean that the masses must trust their individual representatives because they know them; it means that the masses themselves must vote intelligently on the substance of the very important questions at issue.

Finally, complaints about the composition of the conference must be regarded as groundless for the additional reason that *a number* of similar conferences have been held in St. Petersburg recently. A year ago there was a conference on the question of the boycott. The Bolsheviks obtained a majority. In the period of the First Duma there was a conference on the question of supporting the demand for a Duma (i.e., Cadet) Cabinet. The Bolsheviks obtained a majority.

Is it not ridiculous to say now that the Bolshevik majority on the question of electoral agreements with the Cadets could be an accidental one?

II

THE QUESTION OF DIVIDING THE CONFERENCE

The Central Committee of the Party, in which the Mensheviks predominate, demanded that the St. Petersburg Conference should divide into two: a City Conference and a Gubernia Conference. The Mensheviks try to justify their walking out of the conference on the grounds that this demand was not complied with.

Let us see whether this demand was in keeping with the Party Rules, whether it was binding on the conference, and whether it was practicable.

The Rules of our Party very definitely establish the democratic organisation of the Party. The whole organisation is built from below upwards, on an elective basis. The Party Rules declare that the local organisations are independent (autonomous) in their local activities. According to the Rules, the Central Committee co-ordinates and directs all the work of the Party. Hence it is clear that it has no right to interfere in determining the *composition* of local organisations. Since the organisation is built from below upwards, interference in its composition from above would

be a flagrant breach of democracy and of the Party Rules. Let us assume that an organisation, for one reason or another, combines heterogeneous sections, for instance, a city and a gubernia. Under a democratic system, this combination cannot be maintained (or prescribed) by orders from above. Consequently, it can be broken up only if this is desired from below: the city can separate from the gubernia, and no one can forbid it to do so. The gubernia can separate from the city, and no one can forbid it to do so. If no at all large, or at all distinct, part of an organisation has expressed a desire to separate, it means that the Central Committee has been unable to *convince* a *single* influential part of the organisation that separation is necessary! That being the case, to force a division from above is a mockery of democracy, a mockery of the Party Rules. It signifies nothing more nor less than an attempt on the part of the Central Committee to abuse its powers, i.e., to use them, not in the interests of Party unity, but in the interests of one section of the Party (the Mensheviks)—to use its powers to distort the will and the decisions of the local workers.

The Central Committee was so conscious of the fact that its demand was unwarranted that in its *written general* order it expressed itself very guardedly. In it the Central Committee *recommends* all Party organisations "*as far as possible*" (this is the literal expression!) to adapt their boundaries to accord with the boundaries of the electoral districts. There can be no question of such advice being binding; *and nobody claimed that it was*. That the Central Committee had some special object in view in regard to St. Petersburg is evident from the fact that it made no such demand for a division of the conference *in any other city in Russia*. For instance, in *Wilno*, the city conference embraces Social-Democrats representing enterprises situated *outside the city boundaries*, i.e., in *another* electoral district. The Central Committee did not even think of raising the question of dividing the Wilno Conference!

In Odessa also there was a joint conference, although there, too, some of the factories that were represented are situated outside the city police area. In fact, can one mention a single large city where the organisation corresponds to the police division into city and part of the gubernia?

Can anyone seriously claim that in the big cities, in the centres of the Social-Democratic workers' movement, the *suburbs* where the biggest factories are sometimes situated, the *most proletarian* "*suburbs*" should be separated? This is such a gross mockery of common sense that only those who are most unscrupulously seeking a pretext for a split could seize upon it.

We have only to look at the districts of St. Petersburg to see that the demand to divide the conference was impracticable. To divide an organisation in general, or a conference in particular, into two parts, one for the city and one for the gubernia, it is necessary either to know the address of every member of the Party, or have ready-made Party units, branches and districts organised on a *territorial* basis, i.e., districts formed according to the place of residence of Party members, or the situation of factories in the various *police* districts.

But we see that in St. Petersburg (as probably in most cities in Russia) the districts, sub-districts and lower Party units are organised, not only on a territorial (local) basis but *also on an occupational* basis (according to the trade and occupation of the workers, and of the population in general) and on a *national* basis (different nationalities, different languages).

For instance, in St. Petersburg there is a *railway* district. This district is organised on an occupational basis. How could it be divided into a city section and a gubernia section? According to the place of residence of every individual railwayman: St. Petersburg, Kolpino, and other stations? Or according to the location of the railway trains, which, unfortunately for our Central Committee, have a habit of moving from place to place, from the "city" of St. Petersburg into the "gubernia", and even into other gubernias?

Try to divide the *Lettish* district! And then there is the Estonian district and the military organisation.

Even the territorial districts cannot be divided. The workers at the conference said so themselves. A worker from Moscow District got up and said: I know factories in our district which are not far from the city boundaries. At the end of the day's work you can see at a glance that part of the workers make for the "city" and others for the "guber-

nia". How are we going to divide them? And the workers simply laughed at the Central Committee's proposal.

Only very naïve people can fail to see the underlying purpose of the whole business. Only very naïve people can say still, we ought to have tried to divide, "*approximately*", "*as far as possible*".

If it were done approximately, it would, to some extent, have been an *arbitrary* division, for it would have been *impossible* to divide the Lettish, railway and other districts exactly. But every arbitrary decision would have evoked new, interminable protests and complaints; it would have called forth new orders from the Central Committee, and would have provided any number of new pretexts for splits. Look at the list of districts (given above) and you will see that some people might have declared that only four districts are purely and indubitably city districts: the Vasilyevsky Ostrov, City, Vyborg and Petersburg districts. Why only these? Because *there the Mensheviks would have had a majority*. On what grounds could such an arbitrary decision be justified?

And how could the Central Committee justify its arbitrary conduct in not even thinking of dividing Wilno, yet demanding that St. Petersburg should be divided? If you protest against arbitrary action, who will finally settle your dispute? Why, this very same Central Committee....

Even the most naïve people will now understand that the complaints about the composition of the conference and about its refusal to divide are simply a blind. The sum and substance of the matter is that the Mensheviks decided not to submit to the majority of the St. Petersburg organisation and to bring about a split on the eve of the elections in order to desert the socialist workers for the Cadets.

III

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MENSHEVIK WALK-OUT AT THE CONFERENCE?

Some readers may think that the conclusion we have drawn is too drastic. We, however, think that it is unworthy of a socialist to conceal or blur the truth concerning a serious

political matter. We must call a spade a spade. We must expose all subterfuges and pretences, so that the mass of the workers may clearly understand what is going on. Only bourgeois parties regard elections as a game played behind the scenes and a division of the spoils. A workers' party, however, must first of all help the people clearly to understand the relations between the parties, to understand their own interests and the objects of the struggle, to understand what is going on behind the scenes.

We have seen that the complaints about the composition of the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, about its refusal to divide, were mere evasions. We know that the real issue is a simple one. The Mensheviks wanted an agreement with the Cadets at all costs. The Mensheviks knew that the majority of the members of the St. Petersburg organisation did not share that view. At the All-Russian Conference the Mensheviks decided to abide by the decision of the local organisation in each locality. Now they have *broken their promise* and are trying to achieve their objects by means of a *split*.

Today (January 13) the 31 Mensheviks who walked out of the conference have already declared in the St. Petersburg newspapers that they have made proposals for a bloc to the Cadets and to all the Trudovik parties; not only to the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks (with whom the conference offered to make an agreement), but also to the "Popular Socialists".

So the matter is perfectly clear. The class-conscious proletariat has decided to conduct an independent election campaign. The petty bourgeoisie (including the Trudoviks) is vacillating, rushing from one side to another; it is quite capable of preferring a deal with the Cadets to a struggle based on principles. The Mensheviks are the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party. At the very last moment, on the flimsiest pretexts, they are abandoning the revolutionary proletariat and going over to the Cadets.

That this conclusion is right is best confirmed by the Cadet newspapers. No one will suspect the Cadets of being in sympathy with the views of the St. Petersburg, i.e., the Bolshevik Social-Democrats!

Look at *Rech*, the central organ of the Cadet Party, Everybody knows perfectly well that *Rech*, in unison with *Tovarishch*, has been constantly egging the Mensheviks on to a split, and seeking every opportunity to praise them, carefully distinguishing them from the Bolsheviks. As soon as it became known that the Mensheviks had walked out of the Social-Democratic conference, *Rech* (January 11) published an editorial entitled: "The Social-Democratic Conference and Agreements". This article openly *applauds* the "determination" of the Mensheviks and *welcomes the split* which they have initiated. This article openly declares that "*outside the bloc of the revolutionary parties in the narrow sense of the word*" (i.e., the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats and those to whom they have made proposals for an agreement, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group) there remain *the Mensheviks and the Popular Socialists* (the most moderate and semi-Cadet of all the petty-bourgeois Trudovik parties).

And the Cadets say outright that they are prepared to "*resume*" negotiations with "both these moderate socialist parties". They say outright that "the differentiation [division] which has taken place among the socialist parties promises to bring the ideas of the moderate socialists on Duma tactics somewhat closer to our own [i.e., Cadet] ideas on this subject".

Coming from the leading Cadet newspaper, this statement is extremely important. The Cadets not only appreciate the practical results of the Menshevik change of front. They see clearly that the split engineered by the Mensheviks is of fundamental significance, i.e., that this split in fact will change the attitude of the Mensheviks towards the fundamental concepts of the political struggle and the tasks of the working class. The Cadets understand perfectly well that the Mensheviks have veered, not only towards accepting agreements in practice, but also towards the fundamental views of the bourgeoisie; that they have departed from the proletarian policy and have approached the bourgeois policy. *Rech* plainly states that the *moderate socialists* (that is to say, the Mensheviks) are approaching the Cadet tactics, are actually recognising Cadet priority and leadership. Although they do not yet know whether the Socialist-Revolu-

tionaries and the Trudoviks will accept the proposal of the Social-Democratic conference, the Cadets are *already* reckoning with a very definite alignment of political forces: the liberal bourgeoisie will lead the moderate petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois section of the proletariat; the revolutionary proletariat will act independently, and draw with it, at best (best for us, worst for the Cadets) only a part of the petty bourgeoisie.

This is how the Cadets depict the situation. And it cannot be denied that in this respect the Cadets are quite right. As the sun is reflected in a drop of water, so the small episode in St. Petersburg reflects the constant relationship between the policies of the liberal bourgeoisie, the working class and the petty bourgeoisie that inevitably characterises all capitalist countries. Everywhere and at all times the liberal bourgeoisie tries to bribe the uneducated masses with sops in order to divert them from revolutionary Social-Democracy. The Cadets are beginning to apply in Russia the "English" bourgeois method of fighting the proletariat, i.e., not by violence, but by bribing, flattering, dividing and cajoling the "moderates", by making them Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, electors, etc.

The meaning of the phrase in the Cadet *Rech* about "resumption" of negotiations is also clear enough. When the Social-Democrats were united and the revolutionary Social-Democrats were predominant among them, the negotiations were broken off. Now that "both the moderate socialist parties" have broken away from the revolution, the Cadets declare: "negotiations may be resumed".

If the reader is not quite clear as to what these words mean in practice, we will explain them to him. The Cadets offered two seats (out of six) to the Lefts, namely: one seat to the workers' curia and one to the socialists generally. The negotiations were broken off. Now the Cadets are inviting the "moderate socialists" again: "Come back, Mr. Customer, perhaps we can come to terms. We will give one seat to the Mensheviks and another to the 'Popular Socialists', or, in a fit of generosity, we will even give you three seats."

That is what the Cadets mean by "resumption" of negotiations: we made no concessions to the *Lefts*; but we are willing to make concessions to the *moderate Lefts*!

Persons who are naïve or politically inexperienced may shake their heads, express doubt, sympathise, etc., as much as they like; it will not alter matters. After all, it is not *how* a certain result was obtained that is important, it is the result itself that is important (i.e., for the Cadets it is not important, but for the masses of the workers who wish to adopt an *intelligent* attitude towards politics, it is very important).

We do not know exactly how the negotiations between the Mensheviks and the Cadets were conducted—whether in writing, or by word of mouth, or by mere hints. It is possible that prominent moderate Mensheviks simply *hinted* to the Cadet leaders that a split was likely among the Social-Democrats, hinted that they would agree to agreements *on a district basis*. And the Cadets, of course, were quick to take the hint: "they" will split the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, and we will include "them" in the district election list! "They" will help us, and we will help "them". Is this deal less effective, business-like and definite than if "they" had gone straight to Kutler, Milyukov or Nabokov and said in plain words: We will split the St. Petersburg Conference of the Social-Democratic Party for you, and you will help us to get elected on some district list?

It is a fact that *this is precisely* the policy that is pursued by the bourgeois liberals and the opportunist Social-Democrats in *all* constitutional countries. The Russian workers must *learn to understand* this policy if they do not want to be led by the nose. Chernyshevsky said in his day: "Those who are afraid of soiling their hands had better keep away from politics."[173] Those who take part in the elections and are afraid of soiling their hands in turning up the muck of bourgeois politics had better get out. Kid-gloved simpletons only do harm in politics by their fear of facing facts.

Another statement in the bourgeois press that fully confirms *our* estimate of the split is that made by Madame Kuskova in *Tovarishch* (January 10). She, too, welcomes the Mensheviks, incites them to bring about an irrevocable split, advises them not to "compromise" with the Bolsheviks, and promises them the assistance of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group.

To understand Madame Kuskova's article, one must know who she is. We will say who she is, as the majority of the workers do not know her.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was founded in 1898. In 1899 Madame Kuskova and M. Prokopovich were members of the Party, to be exact, members of the section abroad, which was led by Plekhanov, *at that time* a revolutionary Social-Democrat. Madame Kuskova, however, was then, as now, an opportunist; she advocated petty-bourgeois views in the Social-Democratic movement and championed Bernsteinism, which, in the final analysis, means subordinating the working class to the policy of the liberals. Madame Kuskova expressed her views most clearly in the celebrated *Credo* (which means a symbol of faith, a programme, an exposition of world-outlook). This *Credo* said the following: "The workers must conduct the economic struggle, and the liberals the political struggle." The *Rabocheye Dyelo* people (as the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement were then called) were substantially inclined to take the same view. Plekhanov declared a war to the knife against these views (in which he was assisted by the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats), and on this issue *split* the section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party abroad. He wrote a pamphlet entitled *Vademecum* (a *Guide* for the *Rabocheye Dyelo* people), in opposition to the opportunists, especially Madame Kuskova.

Madame Kuskova was expelled from the Social-Democratic Party. With Prokopovich, she went over to the liberals, the Cadets. Later on she left the Cadets as well, and became a "non-party" writer for the "non-party" Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*.

Madame Kuskova is not an isolated case. She is a *typical* specimen of the petty-bourgeois intellectual, who imports opportunism into the workers' party and wanders from the Social-Democrats to the Cadets, from the Cadets to the Mensheviks, and so forth.

These are the people who are beating the drum and cheering in honour of the split that the Mensheviks are causing among the Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg.

These are the people to whom the workers who follow the Mensheviks are handing over the cause of the proletariat.

IV

THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG

How do matters stand now with the elections in St. Petersburg?

It is clear now that there will be three main lists at the elections: the Black-Hundred list, the Cadet list, and the Social-Democratic list.

The first will be supported by the Octobrists; the second, probably, by the Mensheviks and the Popular Socialists; the third, perhaps, by the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, although it is quite possible that these vacillating parties, which have not given a definite answer, so far, will also follow the Cadets (partly owing to the split among the Social-Democrats).

Is there a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, i.e., a danger of the Black Hundreds winning the elections? The Mensheviks, who are now going over from the socialists to the Cadets, say that there is.

They are telling a downright lie.

Even in the Cadet *Rech*, that cautious, diplomatic newspaper, which protects the interests of the liberals in every detail, even in *Rech* we read in an article by Mr. Vergezhsky that at the election meetings the Octobrists are entirely in the background and that the voters are wavering between the Cadets and the socialists.

All the information we get about the election meetings and about the impression created by the Lidval case,[174] the trial of the murderers of Herzenstein,[175] the exposures of Black-Hundred outrages, etc., clearly shows that the Right parties enjoy no respect among the voters.

Those who still talk about a Black-Hundred danger in the elections are deceiving themselves and deceiving the masses of the workers. It is now obvious that the cry about the Black-Hundred danger is a Cadet attempt to gain the support of the ignorant masses.

The Black-Hundred danger does not lie in a Black-Hundred vote, but in the possibility that the government will resort to violence, in the possible arrest of electors, etc. The remedy for *this* danger is not agreements with the Ca-

dets, but the development of the revolutionary consciousness and the revolutionary determination of the masses. And it is the Cadets who more than anyone else are hindering the development of this consciousness and this determination.

The really important fight in St. Petersburg is that between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The Trudovik parties have proved their weakness by following the most moderate and semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist Party", and also by the fact that they are not displaying any independence or firmness at all.

If the Mensheviks had not betrayed the socialists on the eve of the elections, there is no doubt that the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries would have *accepted our* terms. There is no doubt that the *bulk* of the voters, who in St. Petersburg, as everywhere, are poor people, would have followed the socialists and the Trudoviks, not the Cadets. The elections in St. Petersburg would then have had the significance of a major battle, which would clearly and definitely have put before the whole of Russia the *fundamental* questions of the future of the Russian revolution.*

The treachery of the Mensheviks makes our election campaign more difficult, but this *increases the importance* in principle of *an independent Social-Democratic campaign*. The proletariat does not have, and cannot have, any other means of combating the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie than that of developing the class-consciousness and solidarity of the masses, of training them through *experience* of political development.

While the Trudoviks are wavering and the Mensheviks are haggling, we must throw all our energies into independ-

* An interesting event in this connection was the meeting of voters held in Kolomna the other day. The "Trudovik" Vodovozov (who, apparently, became a Trudovik only for the purpose of harnessing the Trudoviks to the Cadets) proposed and secured the adoption of a resolution in favour of giving the Cadets two seats out of six in a general bloc of Left parties. What simplicity! Before one can offer the smaller share of seats, one must *win* first, Mr. Vodovozov, and not trail behind the Cadets! But even *such* a meeting, with *such* a "chorus leader", showed by the way it voted that the masses are inclined more to the Left than the Cadets. We are obliged to put before these masses the alternative: either for the liberal bourgeoisie, or for the revolutionary proletariat.

ent agitation. Let everyone know that the Social-Democrats are putting forward their own list without fail, under all circumstances. And let all the poor sections of voters know that the choice before them is between the Cadets and the socialists.

The voters must ponder over this choice. At all events this reflection will-help very much to develop the political *consciousness* of the masses, which is of far greater importance than obtaining a seat for X or Y from the Cadets. If the masses of the urban poor are taken in once more by the promises of the Cadets, if they are carried away once more by the clamour of liberal phrase-mongering and liberal promises of "peaceful" progress and "peaceful" legislation by Gurko, and Kutler and Milyukov—events will soon shatter their last illusions.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats must tell the masses the whole truth and unswervingly pursue their own path. All those who cherish the real gains achieved in the Russian revolution by proletarian struggle, all who possess the instinct of those who work and are exploited, will follow the party of the proletariat. And the correctness of this party's views will become clearer and clearer to the masses with every new stage in the development of the Russian revolution.

POSTSCRIPT

The leading article in *Rech* of January 14 further confirms what we have said above concerning the significance of the Menshevik desertion from the socialists to the side of the bourgeoisie. *Rech* is jubilant at the fulfilment of its prediction, at the fact that the Mensheviks are breaking away in St. Petersburg and setting up their own organisation. "That is exactly what happened," says the newspaper, referring to what it had said in previous issues. "A section of the Social-Democratic Party, not the most influential, but the one that is most inclined to parliamentary activity, has fallen in with our proposals."

Yes, it is true. The Mensheviks *have fallen in with* the desire of the liberal bourgeoisie to split off the opportunist section of the workers' party and to subordinate it to the leadership of the Cadets. We have seen above that *Rech* has already separated the Mensheviks and the Popular Socialists from the revolutionary parties, calling them "moderate socialists". Now *Rech* has gone a step further. It says that the Popular Socialists, too, will probably prefer a bloc with the Cadets. It states: "The Mensheviks have definitely fallen in with the proposal to form a *general opposition bloc*." "It must be admitted that the possibility of an opposition bloc of the Cadets, Mensheviks and Popular Socialists has become considerably greater since the Bolsheviks rejected the proposal."

Thus, the Cadets themselves have now admitted that there are three blocs, or at any rate three main political forces, in the elections: the government bloc, the opposition bloc and the revolutionary bloc. This division is quite correct. We note that force of circumstances is compelling the

Cadets to recognise what we have long and persistently pointed out. We also note that *so far* the only ones in the revolutionary "bloc" who are resolute and determined are the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The other elements, and in particular the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie (the "Socialist-Revolutionaries"), are still wavering.

The significance in principle of the Menshevik desertion to the Cadets is becoming more and more apparent. The fine words of the Menshevik election platforms and of the statements of principle in their resolutions (for instance, at the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference), the declarations that they would shatter the illusions about the peaceful method, that they were advising the voters to send fighters to the Duma and not petitioners, and so on and so forth—all these words have turned out to be *mere words*. Actually, the Mensheviks have allowed themselves to be dragged along by the Cadets, by *Cadet* policy. Actually, the Mensheviks *have found themselves* in the "opposition bloc", in other words, they have become a mere appendage of the Cadets.

More than that, the leading article in *Rech* of January 14 reveals also *the price* the Cadets intend to pay the Mensheviks for supporting them and joining the opposition bloc. This price is one seat in the Duma, *to be taken from the workers' curia*. Listen:

"Since this [i.e., the formation of an opposition bloc of the Cadets, Mensheviks and Popular Socialists] has reduced the number of claimants for the Duma seats, it may be possible, by a new arrangement, to accept the proposal of the party of people's freedom and content ourselves with two seats out of the six. Now, of course, it will in all probability be necessary to amend this proposal somewhat. *After the decision of the conference, the seat that was intended for the person elected by the workers' curia can obviously no longer be given to a Bolshevik worker*. In view of the new composition of the bloc *the Mensheviks might legitimately regard that seat as theirs*. The other seat out of the two ceded by the party of people's freedom would in that case go to the Popular-Socialist bloc."

A fine stroke of business! We can congratulate the Cadets on their bargain! For the same two "ceded" seats they acquire all the petty-bourgeois parties, as well as the petty-

bourgeois section of the workers' party—and that *at the expense of the workers*!

The workers are to lose their right to a representative from the workers' curia *because* the Mensheviks have deserted the Social-Democrats and have become a moderate socialist party (in the estimation of *Rech*), have joined the opposition bloc. The workers of St. Petersburg are to lose the right allowed them by the Cadets of disposing of their seat as they please *because* the Mensheviks instead of following the revolutionary Social-Democrats, have followed the Cadets. For their "little deal" with the Cadets the Mensheviks receive a "small concession", not at the expense of the Cadets, but at the expense of the workers.... What a magnificent specimen of bourgeois concessions to "the people"! The bourgeoisie is prepared to give seats to the champions of "the people", providing these champions go over to the bourgeoisie....

The delegates and electors in the workers' curia will undoubtedly see now what *advantages*, in practice as well as in principle, they will derive from an agreement with the Cadets. It is clear, is it not, that the Cadets have offered (not given, but offered) one seat to the workers' curia out of sincere sympathy with real freedom really for the people, and not because they want to entice the ignorant, needy masses to the side of the bourgeoisie?

"WHEN YOU HEAR THE JUDGEMENT OF A FOOL...."[176]

FROM THE NOTES OF A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PUBLICIST

St. Petersburg, January 15, 1907

The bourgeois press is now gossiping and cackling over the resolutions of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference. The liberals, from the pompous official organ *Rech* to the gutter rag *Segodnya*, are united in a general chorus of jubilation over the split caused by the Mensheviks, of triumph at the return of these prodigal sons of "society" to the fold of the "opposition bloc", at their emancipation from "revolutionary illusions".

Social-Democrats who are really on the side of the revolutionary proletariat would do well to ask: "But who are the judges?"

Let us take what is perhaps the best of these judges, *Rodnaya Zemlya*, of January 15. The trend of this newspaper is undoubtedly more Left than that of the Cadets. Judging from all the facts, it may be called a Trudovik trend. As documentary confirmation of this political estimate we may point out that Mr. Tan[177] is a contributor to that newspaper. Mr. Tan's name is in the published list of members of the organising committee of the "Trudovik (Popular Socialist) Party".

And so, the judges are the Trudoviks.

They condemn the Bolsheviks, and, like the Cadets, approve the plan of the Mensheviks. They disagree with the Cadets only in that they object to the latter getting more than two or three seats in the general bloc of all the Left parties.

Such is the verdict. Let us examine the grounds.

"The controversy undoubtedly centres on the question whether there is or is not a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg."

That is not true. If you take it upon yourselves to judge the Bolshevik Social-Democrats in a leading article of a political newspaper, it is your *duty* to know what you are judging. In that leading article you yourselves say: "The controversy that has now flared up over the resolutions of the [Social-Democratic] conference is undoubtedly one of public interest." People who express the wish publicly to participate in a controversy of general interest and at once betray their ignorance of the "centre" of the controversy run the risk of having a none too flattering appellation hurled at them....

The revolutionary Social-Democrats have repeatedly explained and insisted in all their numerous political declarations that the so-called Black-Hundred danger *cannot* be regarded as the "centre" of the controversy over election tactics.

Why not? Because the tactics of the workers' party during the elections must be only the *application* to a particular case of the *general principles* of the socialist tactics of the proletariat. Elections are only one of the fields, and by no means the most important, most essential one (particularly in a revolutionary period), in which the socialist proletariat wages the struggle for liberty and for the abolition of all exploitation. In addition to the one waged with the aid of ballot papers, there is another type of struggle, which *inevitably* flares up in times of revolution. This other struggle is apt to be forgotten by intellectuals who imagine that they are men of education, whose sympathies for liberty lie no deeper than the tips of their tongues. And it is apt to be forgotten by the small proprietors, who stand aloof from the bitter, everyday struggle against capital and its henchmen. But the proletarian does not forget about it.

Therefore, for the class-conscious proletarian, election tactics can only be an adaptation of his general tactics to a particular struggle, namely, the election struggle; under no circumstances does this imply a change in the principles of his tactics, or the shifting of the "centre" of these tactics

The basis of socialist tactics in time of revolution consists in the progressive class, the proletariat, marching at the head of the people's revolution (the revolution that is now taking place in Russia is a bourgeois revolution in the sense that the attainment of complete freedom and all the land for the people will not rid us in the least of the rule of the bourgeoisie; obviously, the fact that the revolution has this socio-economic character does not prevent it from being a people's revolution). The progressive class must therefore consistently expose to the masses the falsity of all hopes of negotiations and agreements with the old regime in general, and of agreements between landlords and peasants over the land question in particular. The progressive class must pursue its independent line of undeviating struggle, supporting only those who are really fighting, and only to the extent that they fight.

Such are the basic principles of socialist tactics, which dictate to the workers' party class independence as the rule, and collaboration and agreements only with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, and only as an exception.

The liberals do not understand these principles of Social-Democratic tactics. The idea of class struggle is foreign to them; the idea of contrasting a people's revolution to deals and negotiations is repugnant to them. But in principle *all* Social-Democrats, Bolsheviks and even Mensheviks, accept these tactics. The Trudoviks, who undertake to edit a political organ without knowing the ABC of the contemporary tactical problems of socialism, can read about this even in the election platform of the Social-Democratic Party—the platform of the Mensheviks, who predominate in the Central Committee.

"Citizens," states this platform, "you should elect to the Duma people who not only want liberty for Russia, but are anxious to help the people's revolution to achieve it.... The majority in the First Duma, led by the party of 'people's freedom', hoped to obtain liberty and land by means of peaceful negotiations with the government.... Citizens! Elect fighters for the revolution, who, shoulder to shoulder with you, will continue the great cause that was initiated in January, October and December last year (1905)."

The "centre of the controversy", which our Trudoviks have totally failed to grasp, is whether agreements with the Cadets can be sanctioned *in principle from this point of view*. The St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference answered this question in the negative, as the 14 delegates of the All-Russian Conference (of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) had done before them. No agreements can be tolerated with a party which is bargaining and parleying with the old regime. The Cadets cannot be our allies in the "people's revolution". Their admission to the ranks of the "fighters for the revolution" would not strengthen but weaken these fighters, whose work is being hindered by the Cadets, who are now openly opposing the struggle and *all* revolutionary slogans.

In failing to see the *principle* underlying the attitude of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats towards the Cadets, our judges have failed to notice the "elephant".

These Trudoviks are entirely under the ideological influence of the bourgeois liberals. The elections have overshadowed everything for them; election results have overshadowed the task of enlightening the *masses* in the course of the election campaign. They have no idea how important it is for a Social-Democrat to carry on perfectly clear, definite and unambiguous election agitation if he is to remain true to his principles, loyal to his revolutionary standpoint in spite of all efforts to tempt him with the prospect of a seat in the Duma, or to frighten him with the prospect of not winning a single seat in the capital. Absorbed in the liberals' scrapping, the Trudoviks have forgotten all principles, they have forgotten all the fundamental objects of the revolution. They see nothing, understand nothing, care for nothing, and only keep on muttering: "one seat, two seats, three seats"!

...''The controversy ... centres on ... whether there is a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg.''...

So you reduce the Black-Hundred danger to the danger of a Black-Hundred victory in elections faked by the government! Cannot you understand, gentlemen, that by putting the question *in this way*, you are admitting that the government is already victorious, and that the cause of liberty,

which you prate about so much, is already lost? You yourselves do not see, and you are preventing the masses of the people from seeing, *the real* Black-Hundred danger, which is manifested not in the voting, but in the definition of the conditions of voting (the Senate interpretations and the impending repeal of the electoral law of December 11), in the nullification of the results of voting (the dissolution of the Duma). You are entirely adopting the vulgar liberal point of view and are concentrating your minds—and the minds of the mass of the people whom you are misleading—on a struggle within the limits of a fake law which is being still further faked. You fail to see the Black-Hundred danger in the form of the possible arrest of all the electors. You throw away that which depends on you, and wholly on you, which is at any rate a lasting and substantial asset to the revolution, namely: the development of the revolutionary spirit of the masses by consistent agitation. On the other hand, what you are chasing after depends not on you, but on the artifices of Stolypin, on a new Senate interpretation, on further violations of the electoral law by the police. Consequently, you are fighting the "Black-Hundred danger" in exactly the same way as the French bourgeois republicans are fighting the monarchist danger; namely, by strengthening monarchist institutions and the monarchist constitution within the republic. For, by instilling into the minds of the people the idea that the Black-Hundred danger is the danger of an increased Black-Hundred vote, you are perpetuating the ignorance of the most backward masses as to the real source and real nature of the Black-Hundred danger.

But let us proceed. Let us assume that there will be no further Senate interpretations concerning the elections and the electors. Let us take the question of the parties that may win the elections in St. Petersburg under the existing electoral system.

The Trudoviks cannot deny that the parties of the Right have been seriously compromised; that the Union of October Seventeenth is suffering defeat after defeat, each more ignominious than the last; that "of late the Octobrists have completely subsided, stunned by heavy blows from the Left"; that "the public has swung to the Left".

But ... Shchedrin long ago translated this "but" of the Russian liberals into intelligible language: "ears will never grow higher than foreheads, never!"—*but* "technical difficulties", "literature is not being delivered", "they won't give us ballot papers", "police restrictions"....

There you have the psychology of the Russian intellectual: in words he is a bold radical, in deeds he is a contemptible little government official.

The remedy for police restrictions is supposed to lie in blocs with the Cadets! Why not blocs with the Octobrists, who "*want*" a constitution, and are sure of not being subjected to "restrictions"? Truly Russian political logic: electoral agreements to combat the failure of the post-office to deliver literature, to combat the refusal to issue ballot papers.... What are you combating, gentlemen?

The "laws" which sanction the outrageous conduct of the police, which declare certain parties to be "illegal" and deprive them of ballot papers. How are you combating them?

Why, of course, by means of an agreement with a party which will either obtain ballot papers from the Peaceful Renovators, or come to terms with Stolypin before the Duma opens, or else will also be left without ballot papers!

The Russian government official (a radical at twenty, a liberal at thirty, and simply an official at forty) is accustomed to play the liberal when at home and make threatening gestures where nobody can see him. He thinks the election campaign should be-fought along these same lines. Influence the masses? Nonsense, the post-office refuses to deliver our literature.

Publish and distribute literature without the "post-office" and similar institutions?

Nonsense! These are obsolete, revolutionary illusions, which are not in accord with "broad" constitutional activity. Broad constitutional activity consists in acting so as to fool the authorities; "they" will look for me among the Social-Democrats, or among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but I shall hide in the Cadet list so well that they will not find me. The government will look for me as a revolutionary, but I shall fool both the government and the revolutionaries; I shall go over to the "opposition bloc". You see what a clever fellow I am!

But will it not turn out, Oh worthy politician, that you will be fooling also the masses, who will no longer be able to distinguish you from the "opposition" of the obsequious liberals?

Nonsense! What do the masses matter? ... Well, we'll give the workers' curia a seat.... And then, from a certain point of view, we are all in favour of freedom ... the revolution has become a national cause ... the Cadets, too, are ready to fight in their own way....

The question arises, have our Trudoviks any political ideas, besides ideas relating to the *police*? They have. Their idea is that we must adapt ourselves not to the energetic and active voter, but to the stay-at-home, the cowed or sleepy voter. Listen to the arguments of a "Left" newspaper:

> "The temper that prevails at meetings is no criterion of the temper of the whole mass of voters.... Not more than one-tenth of the voters go to meetings; of course, these are the most energetic, lively and active people."

Truly a sufficient reason for trailing in the wake of the least energetic, the most lifeless and inactive Cadet voters! The tragedy of the Russian radical is that for decades he has been yearning for meetings, for liberty, burning with passion (in words) for liberty; and when he goes to a meeting and finds that its temper is more radical than his own, he begins to sigh: "it is hard to judge", "not more than one-tenth", "one must be a bit more cautious, gentlemen!" He is just like Turgenev's ardent hero who ran away from Asya, and about whom Chernyshevsky wrote "A Russian at a Rendezvous".[178]

Oh, you, who call yourselves supporters of the toiling masses! It's not for you to go to a rendezvous with the revolution. Stay at home; really, it will be quieter there; and you need have no dealings with these dangerous "most energetic, lively and active people". Stay-at-home philistines are more your type!

Perhaps this simple example will help you to grasp the "centre of the controversy" over agreements with the Cadets?

It is, my dear sir, that we want to shake up the philistine and make a citizen of him. And to do that we must

compel him *to choose* between the philistine policy of the Cadets who are prostrating themselves before the (pshaw! pshaw!) "constitution", and the revolutionary policy of the socialist proletariat.

A "bloc of all the Left parties" means *submerging* the "one-tenth, the most energetic, lively and active people", in the mass of the apathetic, stolid and somnolent. It means *subordinating* those who are willing to fight (and are capable of carrying the *masses* with them at the decisive moment) to those who prefer to play the same despicable game of loyalty that the Cadets played in the First Duma, and, like the Cadet Lvov, prefer to haggle with Stolypin and basely go over to the latter.

The reaction is attacking us, it has already withdrawn a good third of what was gained in October, and is threatening to withdraw the other two-thirds. But you pose as men of law and order and defend yourselves by appealing to philistine mentality: no attacks; no revolution; we are going into the Duma to legislate; we confine ourselves to *defence*; we abide by the law!

When will you understand that to keep on the defensive is in itself an admission of moral defeat? In fact, you are people who have suffered moral defeat. All you are fit for is to vote for the Cadets.

"*Compel* the philistine to choose", we said. Yes, *compel*. No socialist party in the world could wrest the masses from the influence of the liberal or radical bourgeois parties, which base themselves on the mentality of the philistine, without giving them a jolt, without meeting with some resistance, without taking the risk involved in the *first* experiment to decide who is *really* defending liberty, we or the Cadets.

If there is an agreement with the Cadets, the philistine has *no need* to worry about this. The radical windbag politicians and Social-Democratic opportunists have already thought the matter out for him at their rendezvous with the Cadets. The philistine has shifted to the Left (not as a result of our efforts, not as a result of our *Party* propaganda, but as a result of Stolypin's zeal)—that's enough for us. And since he has shifted to the Left, he will be for a "bloc of all the Lefts"! And it will be the *whole* mass of philistines, not

merely the restive—pardon—active one-tenth of the people. We should adapt our meetings and our whole policy to suit the cowardly philistine—*that is what a bloc with the Cadets means in practice.*

But we said: We need not only leaflets and platforms, resolutions and speeches, but we must carry out our whole policy, and election campaign in such a way as to *draw a sharp contrast* between the cowardly philistine and the staunch fighter. And this can be done *only* by contrasting *two different* lists: the Cadet list and the Social-Democratic list. In the metropolis, whose newspapers circulate all over Russia, where the headquarters of all the political parties are located, which leads the country ideologically and politically, it is a thousand times more important to give an example, not of a policy of philistine equanimity, but of a policy worthy of the October fighters who wrested a little freedom from the authorities, a policy worthy of the proletariat.

Our talk about the necessity of recognising the mistakes of the "peace-loving" Cadet Duma, and of taking a step forward, will remain idle talk unless we *ourselves* take a *step forward* in combating the philistine Oblomov[179] idea of "a bloc of all the Left parties". Our calls to go *forward* will ring false and will fail to fire the hearts of the fighters among the people if we ourselves, the "guides", the "leaders", *mark time* in the capital in full view of all the peoples of Russia, arm in arm with these same Cadets, on the basis of an "*amicable*" distribution of seats, in friendly fashion, all together, all for the same cause, all for liberty.... What is the use of reviving old quarrels? What harm if the Menshevik Ivan Ivanovich did call the Cadet Ivan Nikiforovich a goose?[180]

"Not more than one-tenth of the voters go to meetings." ... Very well, Mr. Radical. We will take your word for it for once; we will concede this point to you, because—because your argument is so clumsy.

One-tenth of the voters makes 13,000 out of 130,000 for the whole of St. Petersburg. These 13,000, the most energetic, lively and active voters, are more to the Left than the Cadets. Let us ask ourselves: Can anyone of sound mind and judgement assert that the energetic people who attend meetings *do not lead* a certain number of the less energetic, stay-at-home voters? Everyone will realise that such an assertion

would be *wrong*; that in a city with a population of a million and a half there are thousands of agencies and channels, apart from newspapers and meetings, through which the mood of the advanced elements is communicated to the masses. Everyone will understand—and all elections in all countries confirm it—that every energetic voter who attends meetings is backed by not one but several stay-at-home voters.

At the last elections, of the total of 150,000 voters in St. Petersburg, 60,000 went to the poll. Of these, about 40,000 voted for the Cadets, and about 20,000 in the whole of St. Petersburg voted for the Rights. We have heard from our Mr. Radical himself, who does not wish to be an "optimist" (Heaven forbid! our radicals want to be "steady respectable people" ... like the German radicals of the eighteen forties).... We have heard from him that the Octobrists have become quiescent, and we know *from facts* of their utter defeat. Now we hear of 13,000 energetic voters who are more to the Left than the Cadets. Remember that this proportion varies considerably in the different districts. Remember the number of votes that are usually behind every voter who goes to meetings.

It will be clear to you then that the danger of a Black-Hundred vote in St. Petersburg, meaning the danger of the Rights being elected to the Duma as a result of a split in the Cadet and socialist vote, is *a preposterous fable*. For the Rights to be elected to the Duma in St. Petersburg, the votes in the *majority* of the districts would not merely have to be split, but split in such a way that *both* the Cadets *and* the socialists would each have fewer votes than the Black-Hundred list. That is an obvious absurdity.

Therefore, we say plainly: if the Black-Hundred danger does not manifest itself in *violations* of the "constitution" (and it is the estimate of *this* prospect that is the crux of the difference between the tactics of the Cadets and that of the socialists), then a split in the Cadet and socialist vote *cannot possibly* result in a victory for the Rights in St. Petersburg.

The cry about the danger of a Black-Hundred *victory* in the elections in St. Petersburg is a *deception of the people* spread by the Cadets, the "radicals' and the opportunists

of every brand, and serves the interests of *philistinism* in politics. *In practice*, the fable about *this* Black-Hundred danger is in the interests of the Cadets, whom it helps to protect against *the danger from the Left*. It serves to *dull* the senses of the masses, for it does not require them, when they cast their vote, to distinguish between the "legislating" bourgeois Cadet and the socialist who is leading the people into battle.

Therefore, when the general chorus of liberals, Trudoviks and opportunist Social-Democrats howl at us: You are isolated!—we answer calmly: We are very glad to have isolated ourselves from a fraud. We are very glad to have isolated ourselves from a dirty business. For to come before a mass of 130,000 voters in St. Petersburg, after January 9, 1905, and after October 1905, in order to help to elect Kutler, Nabokov, Struve & Co. to the Duma is certainly a dirty business.

We predict to the Trudoviks and to the opportunist Social-Democrats who are rejoicing in anticipation that the Cadets will get them and not the Bolsheviks into the Duma—we predict that if the Second Duma is a Cadet Duma, the Trudoviks and opportunist Social-Democrats will be *ashamed* of having helped to elect the Cadets. They will now be *directly* responsible for it. And the Cadets in the Second Duma will move so far to the right (this is evident from their general behaviour and from all the political literature they have issued during the past year) that even the extreme opportunists will be obliged to expose them. In the First Duma, the Cadet Lvov went over to the Peaceful Renovators and justified the Black-Hundred dissolution of the Duma. In the Second Duma (unless history brings us a radical change that will wipe out all petty deals with the Cadets, and all the Cadets themselves), in the Second Duma the Cadets of the Lvov type will show their true colours not at the end, but at the beginning.

Well then, gentlemen, take the seats in the Duma that the Cadets are offering you! We do not envy you. We shall undertake to warn the mass of the workers and of the petty bourgeoisie in the capital. We shall undertake to make them realise—not only by speeches, but also by means of the elections themselves—the *gulf* that divides the Cadets from the socialists.

Every man to his trade—though "there are hosts of people who would like to mix these two trades, we are not of their number."[181]

"And they," says the leading article in *Rodnaya Zemlya*, speaking of the Bolsheviks, "will now be even more isolated than ever; for those former boycottists, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are now not only taking part in the elections, but are even in favour of a bloc with the Cadets."

This is new and interesting. We have already observed, on a former occasion, that on this question of electoral agreements the Socialist-Revolutionaries are not behaving like a political party, but like an intellectualist clique, for we heard of no open political action of their *organisations* on this question. And now, assuming that the newspaper for which Mr. Tan writes is not telling a downright lie and is not repeating an unverified rumour, we shall draw this further conclusion—namely: in the matter of electoral agreements the Socialist-Revolutionaries are guilty of *political dishonesty*, or, at any rate, are displaying vacillation that amounts to a political danger.

Everyone knows that the Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation rejected a bloc with the Cadets and offered to enter into an electoral agreement with the Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries *against the Cadets*. Our resolution was published in all the newspapers.

Negotiations between the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the appropriate bodies of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group *have already taken place*. Differences arose over our exclusion of the Popular Socialists and over the distribution of seats. If, *nevertheless*, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who *began* negotiations with us *after* we had declared that we had definitely decided to give battle to the Cadets in St. Petersburg, have *begun*, or are *continuing*, negotiations with the Cadets for a bloc, then obviously, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are guilty of *political dishonesty*.

We openly declare: We are going to fight the Cadets. Who is on our side?

But the Socialist-Revolutionaries are negotiating *both* with us *and* with the Cadets!

We repeat: We do not know whether the leading article in *Rodnaya Zemlya* told the truth or not. We cannot altogether ignore a direct statement made by an organ to which Mr. Tan, a member of the Organising Committee of the Popular Socialist Party, is a contributor. We have learned about the bloc between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Popular Socialists from the press and from the communications made by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in their negotiations with us (although we are ignorant of the terms of this bloc and of its real nature; in this connection also something is going on behind the scenes).

Our duty, therefore, is to raise this question publicly and openly, so that *all* may know of the behaviour of a certain political party. Hitherto, in this country, the alignment of parties has been determined only by their programmes and literature—but these, after all, are only words. The First Duma provided an opportunity of judging *some* parties by their *actions*. Now we must make use of the *elections*, too, and we shall use them for fully enlightening the masses as to the *real* nature of the parties.

That the Socialist-Revolutionaries are *hiding* something in their relations with the Popular Socialists is now a political fact. That the Socialist-Revolutionaries are now actually trailing in the wake of the opportunist party that has split off from them is also a fact. Hence, in regard to revolutionary independence and determination the Socialist-Revolutionaries are really much worse than they seem to be. And if they agree to enter into a bloc with the Cadets—and to gain a seat not for themselves, but for the Popular Socialists—we shall have excellent agitational material with which to explain to the workers of St. Petersburg the Marxist thesis of the utter instability and deceptive exterior of the petty-bourgeois (even if revolutionary) parties.

We not only think that it is a matter of honour for a Social-Democrat to "isolate" himself from *such* parties, but we think it is the only well-calculated policy to pursue. But our calculation is made not from the point of view of seats in the Duma, but from the point of view of the working-class movement *as a whole*, from the point of view of the fundamental interests of socialism.

But let us return to *Rodnaya Zemlya*. The following passage shows how frivolous that newspaper can be.

> "Generally speaking, the decisions of the Bolshevik Conference appear to have been adopted hastily and rashly. After all, in what respect are the Trudoviks better than the Popular Socialists?"

This "after all" is a real gem. The author is such an ignoramus in politics that he does not even realise that he is walking about naked, like an Australian savage. And these are the educated politicians of the petty bourgeoisie!

Well, there is nothing for it but to perform the "thankless task" of the publicist: to go over old ground and teach the ABC.

The Trudoviks, i.e., the *Committee* of the Trudovik Group, which was approached by the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference, and the Popular Socialists, originated from the Trudovik Group in the First Duma. This Trudovik Group had two wings: one opportunist, the other revolutionary. The difference between them was most clearly revealed in the *two* Land Bills introduced by the Trudovik Group: the Bill of the 104, and the Bill of the 33.

Common to both Bills is that (1) they are in favour of transferring the land from the landlords to the peasants; (2) they are thoroughly permeated with the spirit of petty-bourgeois utopianism, the utopia of "equalising" small proprietors (in some respects, at least) in a society based on commodity production.

The difference between these Bills is that the first is permeated with the small proprietor's *fear* of being too radical, of drawing too large a mass of poor people into the movement. This "spirit" of the Bill of the 104 was admirably expressed by one of its authors, one of the leaders of the Popular Socialists, Mr. Peshekhonov, in referring to the declaration of the "thrifty muzhiks" in the Duma: "We were sent here to get land, not to give it up." This means that in addition to the utopia of petty-bourgeois equalitarianism *this* wing of the Trudoviks clearly expresses the *selfish* interests of the *more well-to-do* section of the peasantry, who are afraid lest they might have to "give up" something (on the assumption that there will be general "equalisation", as socialism is conceived by the petty bourgeois). Take from the

landlord, but give nothing to the proletarian, such is the motto of the party of the thrifty muzhiks.

On the other hand, the Bill of the 33 proposes the immediate and complete abolition of private property in land. It also contains the "equalitarian" utopia, and to the same degree, but it does not express the fear of having to "give up". This is the utopia, not of the opportunist but of the revolutionary petty bourgeois; not of the thrifty muzhik, but of the ruined muzhik. It is not a dream of profiting from the landlord to the detriment of the proletarian, it is a dream of making everybody, including the proletarians, happy by equalisation. It expresses, not the fear of drawing the broadest and poorest masses into the movement, but the desire to draw them into the struggle (the desire is there, but the ability or understanding how to do so is lacking).*

After the Duma this difference in the two trends among the Trudoviks led to the formation of two distinct political organisations: the Committee of the Trudovik Group, and the Popular Socialist Party. The former has earned an honourable place in the history of the Russian revolution by its July manifestoes. So far as public knowledge goes, it has not yet forfeited its good reputation, has never renounced its manifestoes or joined the chorus of moaners, grousers and renegades.

The second organisation took advantage of the period of the dissolution of the Duma to legalise itself under the Stolypin regime, to "berate" the above-mentioned manifestoes in the legal press, where it was shielded from criticism from the Left, to advise the people "for the time being" not to come into conflict with certain institutions of the old regime, and so forth. The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation was, if anything, rather mild in its criticism of this party when it spoke of its "evasive position on the fundamental questions of the struggle outside the Duma".

Thus, the political *facts* so far are that the petty-bourgeois or Trudovik parties have clearly split into the parties of

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* Of these and many other petty-bourgeois revolutionaries we might say what an anarchist poet said about us: "Together we'll destroy, but not construct."[182]

the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group) and a party of the opportunist petty bourgeoisie (the Popular Socialists). Since for Social-Democrats the election campaign is a means for politically educating the masses, here too, by distinguishing two Trudovik parties from a third, we have *compelled* the ordinary man in the street to *ponder* over the reasons for this distinction. And after thinking it out and realising what it is all about he will make an *intelligent* choice.

In conclusion we must note that the naïve and ignorant leader-writer of *Rodnaya Zemlya* indulges also in amusing sophistries to support his case. It would not be amiss to analyse one of these sophistries, which is of a kind that just suits philistines:

"The Bolsheviks are wrong even if there is no Black-Hundred danger. For, in that case, there is no need for a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks, and the Socialist-Democratic Party could with great benefit to the purity of its class content come out in the elections quite independently."

See what clever fellows we are, thinks this radical—we can even judge of the purity of class content!

Yes, the modern newspaper hack "can" make judgements about anything, but he lacks knowledge and understanding. It is not true to say that the need to preserve the purity of a class position precludes all agreements. To think so is to reduce the ideas of Marxism to absurdity, to make a caricature of them. And it is equally untrue to say that there is no need for a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries if there is no Black-Hundred danger.

Complete independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in the election campaign is the general rule. But every live, mass party must allow certain exceptions, but only within reasonable and strictly defined limits. In the epoch of the bourgeois revolution *all* Social-Democrats sanctioned political agreements with the *revolutionary* bourgeoisie, when they worked together in the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Soldiers', Railwaymen's, etc., Deputies, and when they signed the famous manifesto of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies (December 1905) or the July manifestoes (July

1906). The leader-writer of *Rodnaya Zemlya* is evidently ignorant of the most generally known facts about the parts played by the various parties in the Russian revolution. The revolutionary Social-Democrats reject unprincipled agreements, they reject harmful and unnecessary agreements, but they would never think of tying their hands altogether and under all circumstances. That would be childish. The platform of the 14 delegates at the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference is documentary proof of that.

To proceed. The "necessity" of an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks in St. Petersburg arises from the *Cadet* danger. Had the author of the leading article in *Rodnaya Zemlya* been familiar with the subject which he undertook to discuss, he would have known that even among the Social-Democrats who support agreements with the Cadets there are highly influential bodies (the Bund, for example) which recognise the need for a bloc with the revolutionary bourgeoisie in case of a Cadet danger, when there is no Black-Hundred danger. In St. Petersburg, it would be possible not only to conduct an election campaign in the spirit of revolutionary and socialist education of the masses (we Social-Democrats will achieve this in any case), but to *defeat* the Cadets, if the Menshevik Social-Democrats did not betray us, and if *all* the revolutionary Trudoviks followed *all* the socialists. And Since we are conducting an election campaign, we have no right to miss any opportunity of achieving victory, as long as there is no violation of the principles of socialist tactics.

That the *only* important fight being waged in St. Petersburg is that between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats is *proved* by the election meetings (the same holds good for Moscow, and we may add that the results of *all* straw votes, such as that instituted by the newspaper *Vek*, or by the Shop Assistants' Union "Unity and Strength", have also confirmed this thesis).[183]

That an agreement with the Cadets means the ideological and political hegemony of the Cadets over their allies is borne out by the whole political press and by the whole character of the negotiations. The Cadets dictate the terms. The Cadets publicly lay down the *significance* of the agreements (recall their comments on the Mensheviks and the Pop-

ular Socialists: "the moderate socialist parties", "the opposition bloc"). The Cadets are asked to agree to an equal distribution of seats as a maximum concession.

It is equally beyond doubt that an agreement between the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary-democratic parties means the hegemony of the Social-Democrats over the petty bourgeoisie. The Social-Democratic press has given an open, clear and all-round exposition of *all* its views, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group have made no independent statement whatever on the question of agreements. The keynote is set by the Social-Democrats. The modification of their socialist views, of their class standpoint, is quite out of the question. When it comes to distributing the seats no one will think of offering them the smaller share. Their campaign in the workers' curia is proceeding quite independently, and is proving their preponderance.

Under such circumstances it would be simply absurd to be afraid to lead our revolutionary petty-bourgeois allies into battle against the Cadets. Under such circumstances we could even draw the Popular Socialists with us if the occasion required it. The principles of our Party would not suffer from this in the least: the political line would remain the same and the struggle against the leading party of the liberal-bourgeois conciliators would be waged with no less vigour. No sensible person would say that we were following the Popular Socialists (in conceding to them, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group, two seats out of six). On the contrary, it would be proof that the Social-Democrats were conducting a *really* independent campaign, and that we had *deprived* the Cadets of one of their appendages. Is it not obvious that if the semi-Cadets came on our list, their mobilisation against the Cadets would not merely not prejudice, but would, on the contrary, facilitate the task of fighting the latter?

The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation acted rightly in declaring *openly* and publicly its hostility towards the Popular Socialists. It was our duty to warn the revolutionary Trudoviks against *such* a pseudo-Trudovik party. If the revolutionary Trudoviks are

dependent on the Popular Socialist Party, which is formally an entirely independent party, let them say so publicly. It is most important for us to drag this fact into the light of day, to make them admit it, and to draw *all* the conclusions that follow from it in our agitation among the mass of the workers, among the whole people.

Whether we get Trudoviks of a better or worse quality as our allies in the fight against the Cadets in St. Petersburg, is a question that we shall decide in a purely practical way. We have formulated our principles. *In any case* we shall go into the fight independently. We have openly disclaimed responsibility for the least reliable Trudoviks and placed this responsibility on others.

* * *

The Left Cadets on *Tovarishch* tried to ridicule the Bolsheviks when the latter declared, as early as November, that three main parties were contending against each other in St. Petersburg: the Black Hundreds, the Cadets, and the Social-Democrats.

Rira bien qui rira le dernier (he who laughs last laughs best).

Our forecast has been proved correct.

There will be *three* lists for the Duma elections in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet and the Social-Democratic.

Citizens, make your choice!

Published in pamphlet form
in January 1907
by the *Novaya Duma* Publishers

Published according to
the pamphlet text

NOTES

[1] Lenin's article "*On the Eve*" was telegraphed to the editorial office of the newspaper *Rabotnik*.

Rabotnik (*The Worker*)—a legal Bolshevik newspaper published in Kiev. Two issues appeared: June 8 (21) and June 9 (22), 1906. The first issue was confiscated. After the second issue the newspaper was closed down. p. 15

[2] The "*solemn pledge*" included in Article 13 of the Statute on the Duma had to be signed by all members of the State Duma. It contained an undertaking on the part of the deputies to fulfil the obligations imposed on them while "remaining faithful" to the tsar. The Caucasian Social-Democratic deputies to the First State Duma, after signing the "solemn pledge", published in the press the statement quoted by V. I. Lenin. (See *Kuryer*, No. 20, June 8 (21), 1906.) p. 20

[3] *Kuryer* (*The Courier*)—a legal Menshevik daily newspaper issued in St. Petersburg in May-June 1906. p. 20

[4] The "*Star Chamber*" was the name given to the special high court in England for political and religious matters which was abolished by the English Revolution of the seventeenth century.

In the period 1905-07 in Russia the name "Star Chamber" was applied to the Court clique of reactionary dignitaries representing the upper ranks of the feudal landlords and bureaucrats. p. 22

[5] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from May 26 (June 8), 1906, in place of the newspaper *Volna* (*The Wave*), which had been closed down by the government. The leading part in the newspaper was taken by V. I. Lenin. Contributors included M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky and A. V. Lunacharsky. The newspaper was subjected to police persecution; with No. 17 of June 14 (27), 1906, it was closed down. The Bolshevik newspaper *Ekho* appeared in its place. p. 23

[6] *Volkszeitung*—a daily newspaper in Yiddish, the organ of the Bund, published in Wilno from February 19 (March 4), 1906 to August 19 (September 1), 1907. p. 23

[7] *Zemstvos*—the so-called local self-government bodies, dominated by the nobility, set up in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. Their competence was confined to purely local economic and welfare matters (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.), and they functioned under the control of the provincial governors and the Minister of the Interior, who could invalidate any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 28

[8] The *era of "confidence"* of the government towards society was proclaimed in the autumn of 1904 by Svyatopolk-Mirsky, Minister of the Interior. In connection with the growing revolutionary movement the tsarist government, counting on deceiving the people and winning over the liberal bourgeoisie, made some minor concessions—a slight relaxation of the censorship, a partial amnesty and permission for congresses of Zemstvo officials. The liberals welcomed this "new" policy, as they regarded it, of the government. At their banquets they spoke of the constitution and of the necessity of their approach to power. The Mensheviks placed great hopes in this "banquet campaign"; they put forward a plan for influencing the liberal bourgeoisie so that the liberals should put political demands to the tsarist government in the name of the people. The Bolsheviks vigorously opposed the Menshevik plan. They pointed out that to place one's hopes in the liberal bourgeoisie meant trailing in the rear of the bourgeois movement and they called on the workers to head the struggle of all the militant revolutionary forces against the autocracy. The Bolsheviks exposed the hypocrisy of the government's policy and its talk of a period of "confidence". Lenin wrote in autumn 1904: "...While it has been flirting with the Zemstvos and has granted them some paltry concessions, the government has not, in actual fact, conceded anything whatever to the people; it may still well revert to (or rather continue) its reactionary course as has happened in Russia tens and hundreds of times after a momentary flash of liberalism from one autocrat or another" (present edition, Vol. 7, p. 504). On December 12 (25), 1904, Nicholas II signed a ukase which emphasised the "inviolability of the fundamental laws of the Empire" and demanded severe punishment "for all arbitrary acts". Although the ukase contained vague promises of some extension of the rights of rural and urban institutions it entirely avoided the question of a constitution for Russia. This ukase, which Lenin called a "slap in the face for the liberals" showed that the government had decided to put an end to the era of "confidence". p. 29

[9] *January 9, 1905*—the day on which St. Petersburg workers with their wives and children marched towards the Winter Palace

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to present a petition to the tsar describing their intolerable lot and complete lack of rights. By order of the tsar this peaceful demonstration of unarmed workers was fired on by the troops. This cold-blooded massacre started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia, under the slogan of "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January 9 marked the beginning of the revolution of 1905-07. p. 29

[10] The *Bulygin Duma*—an advisory "representative institution" which the tsarist government intended to convene in 1905. The Bill for the establishment of a State Duma with advisory powers and the Regulations on elections to the Duma were drafted by a commission presided over by D. L. Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, and made public together with the tsar's Manifesto of August 6 (19), 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the government did not succeed in convening it. It was swept away under the impact of the revolution. p. 29

[11] This refers to the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, issued at a time when the all-Russian political general strike was at its height. The tsar's Manifesto, which promised "civil liberties" and a "legislative" Duma, was a political manoeuvre of the autocracy aimed at gaining time, splitting the revolutionary forces, breaking the strike and crushing the revolution. Its promises were a deception of the masses and were never carried out. p. 29

[12] The *Witte Duma*—the First State Duma, convened on April 27 (May 10), 1905, on a franchise drawn up by the Prime Minister S. Y. Witte. On July 8 (21), 1906, this Duma was dissolved by the tsarist government. p. 29

[13] This article was written in connection with the declaration of the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma made by S. Djaparidze on June 16 (29), 1906, during the debate on the Public Meetings Bill. In drawing up the declaration the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma rejected the Bolshevik draft written by Lenin (this draft with some abbreviations is quoted by Lenin in this article) and adopted the draft declaration approved by the Menshevik Central Committee. p. 32

[14] This refers to the speech of I. I. Ramishvili putting forward the resolution of the Social-Democratic Group in the debate at the 24th session of the Duma on June 9 (22) on the anti-Jewish pogroms and police excesses in Vologda, Kalyazin, Tsaritsyn and other places in Russia. Dealing particularly with the pogrom in Belostok, Ramishvili said in his speech that this butchery was engineered by the Ministry of the Interior and the government generally. The resolution put forward by the Social-Democratic Duma Group demanded that the entire personnel of the higher administration should be put on trial for the crimes committed.

Later, on June 29 (July 12), 1906, at the 35th Duma session, the Social-Democratic Group put forward a resolution specially devoted to the Belostok pogrom (the draft resolution was moved by S. Djaparidze). p. 32

[15] At the Duma session on June 12 (25), the Minister of the Interior Stolypin made a statement in reply to the interrogation of the Duma concerning the measures adopted by the government for combating famine. Speaking in the debate, the Trudovik Aladyin insisted that the government "should not be given a kopek". The Cadet Nabokov, however, in his own name and in the name of Aladyin, succeeded in securing the adoption of a Cadet formula for passing to the next business. The Social-Democratic deputies did not protest and did not move their resolution. Lenin deals in detail with this question in the articles: "Famine Relief and the Tactics of the Duma", "The Cadet Duma Grants Money to the Pogrom-Mongers' Government" (see pp. 43-47 and pp. 60-63 of this volume). p. 32

[16] *Nasha Zhizn* (*Our Life*)—a daily newspaper close to the Left wing of the Cadet Party issued in St. Petersburg, with interruptions, from November 6 (19), 1904 to July 11 (24), 1906.

Mysl (*Thought*)—a legal daily newspaper of the S.-R.'s issued in St. Petersburg in June-July 1906. p. 38

[17] The *Council of State*—one of the supreme state bodies in pre-revolutionary Russia. It was set up in 1810 according to the plan of M. M. Speransky as a legislative and advisory body, the members of which were appointed and confirmed in office by the tsar. By the Law of February 20 (March 5), 1906, the Council of State was reorganised and given the right to confirm or reject Bills after they had been debated in the State Duma. But the right of altering basic legislation and promulgating a number of particularly important laws rested with the tsar.

From 1906 half the members of the Council of State consisted of elected representatives of the nobility, clergy and big bourgeoisie, the other half consisting of dignitaries appointed by the tsar. Consequently the Council of State was an extremely reactionary institution which rejected even the moderate legislation adopted by the State Duma. p. 38

[18] "*Law and order*" *people*—representatives of the Party of "Law and Order", a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrialists, trading bourgeoisie, landlords and top section of the bureaucracy. The Party was founded in the autumn of 1905 and took final shape after the publication of the Manifesto of October 17. Using the watchword of "law and order" as a disguise, the Party in fact came out strongly in defence of the tsarist regime. It welcomed the dissolution of the First State Duma; during the elections to the Second Duma it made a bloc with the Black Hundreds of the "Union of True-Russian People", proposing that the Octobrists too should

enter this bloc. In 1907 the Party broke up; part of its members went over to the Octobrists and part joined the overt Black Hundreds. p. 38

[19] A mass meeting organised in St. Petersburg by the socio-political club was held in Countess Panina's Palace on May 9 (22), 1906 in connection with the work of the Duma and its reply to the tsar's address from the throne.

The meeting was attended by about 3,000 persons, half of whom were workers. Lenin, under the name of Karpov, spoke in opposition to the "Popular Socialist" Myakotin and the Menshevik F. Dan, who defended a bloc with the Cadets. The resolution moved by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 409) was adopted by the meeting almost unanimously. A report of Lenin's speech was printed in the Bolshevik newspaper *Volna* and in the Menshevik *Nevskaya Gazeta* (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 407-08). p. 38

[20] The *All-Russian Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation which arose in 1905. It demanded political liberty and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly; it supported the tactics of boycotting the First State Duma. The agrarian programme of the Union included demands for the abolition of private ownership of the land and for the transfer of monastery, church, crown and state lands to the peasants without redemption payments. The Union was half-hearted and wavering in its policy. While demanding the abolition of landlord ownership of land, it agreed to partial compensation of the landlords. From the very beginning of its activities the Peasant Union was subjected to police persecution. The Union ceased to exist by 1907. p. 40

[21] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Cadets; it was published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 43

[22] This refers to the tsarist generals responsible for the defeat of the Russian army in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. p. 47

[23] *Golos Truda* (*Voice of Labour*)—a Menshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in June-July 1906. p. 50

[24] *Svetoch* (*Torch*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in Moscow from May 11 (24) to May 31 (June 13), 1906. Seventeen issues appeared. Contributors included I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, M. N. Pokrovsky, and others. The newspaper was closed down by order of the Moscow Central Court. p. 51

[25] Lenin quotes the first line of the Russian soldiers' song which mocked incapable Russian generals (General Réad among them) during the Crimean War:

"No use to waste a clever lad
You just send along Réad..."

The author of the song was Lev Tolstoi, then an officer in the field. p. 53

[26] *Party of Democratic Reforms—P.D.R.*—one of the political groupings of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, formed in 1903 during the elections to the First State Duma. It occupied a position to the right of the Cadet Party, being in fact an insignificant offshoot of the latter. p. 54

[27] *The Fifth Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania* was held June 5-12 (18-25), 1906 in Zakopane (Galicia), attended by 52 delegates with the right to speak and vote and 8 consultative delegates. Among the delegates was V. V. Vorovsky representing the editorial board of the newspaper *Vperyod*. The report of the Executive Committee of the Party was delivered by F. E. Dzerzhinsky (at the Congress he used the name Frankovsky). The main resolutions of the Congress were printed in *Ekho*, No. 4 of June 25 (July 8), 1906. p. 64

[28] *The Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party* was held in Terioki (Finland) on June 11-12 (24-25), 1906. It was convened by the St. Petersburg Committee for formulating the tactics of the St. Petersburg proletariat towards the State Duma. The elections at the Conference were preceded by a discussion of two tactical platforms: the Menshevik resolution of the Central Committee supporting the slogan of a Duma Cabinet and the Bolshevik resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 481-82).

The Conference was attended by about 80 delegates, who represented some 4,000 members of the Party. Lenin delivered a report on behalf of the St. Petersburg Committee. He was opposed by Dan, who defended the standpoint of the Central Committee. A resolution approving the line of the St. Petersburg Committee was adopted by a majority of votes.

The resolution adopted on Lenin's report on Party unity pointed out that the Central Committee expressed only the opinion of a minority of the Party and put forward the demand that a new Party congress should be convened to decide the situation created in the Party. The Conference decided to establish a permanent liaison between the St. Petersburg Party organisation and the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma. p. 64

[29] *The Moscow Regional Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* (Conference of the Northern Committees) took place in the first half of June 1906. It was attended by representatives of the committees of Moscow, Moscow District, Vologda, Yaroslavl, Kineshma, Kostroma, Vladimir District, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Borisoglebsk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Orel, Kozlov, and the Social-Democratic group of the

town of Shuya. The Conference represented 14,000 organised workers.

The Conference condemned the tactics of the Menshevik Central Committee, which had expressed support for the demand for a Duma Cabinet and adopted the following resolution: "The Northern Union declares that it is not in agreement with the platform of the Central Committee since it does not consider this platform to be in accord with the directives of the Party Congress, and it proposes that support be given to the extreme Left in the Duma" (*Ekho*, No. 3, June 24, 1906). The Conference proposed that the extreme Left in the Duma should appeal to the people through a manifesto in which it would "explain all the weakness of the Duma, and its total inability to achieve anything, and call upon the people to prepare for independent action" (ibid.).

p. 64

[30] *Bernsteinians*—representatives of an anti-Marxist opportunist trend in international Social-Democracy. The trend arose at the close of the nineteenth century in Germany and was named after Eduard Bernstein, the most open exponent of revisionism.

p. 70

[31] *Zubatovism*—the policy of "police socialism" named after Zubatov colonel of gendarmerie and chief of the Moscow Secret Police. In 1901-03 on his initiative legal workers' organisations were set up intended to divert the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. Zubatov's activity had the support of B. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior. The Zubatovists attempted to direct the working-class movement towards the achievement of purely economic aims and make the workers believe that the government was ready to satisfy their demands. The first Zubatov organisation was set up in Moscow in May 1901 under the title "Society for Mutual Aid of Workers in the Engineering Industry". Others were established in Minsk, Odessa, Wilno, Kiev and other towns.

The reactionary character of Zubatovism was unmasked by the revolutionary Social-Democrats who made use of legal workers' organisations to draw wide sections of the working class into the struggle against the autocracy. Owing to the rise of the revolutionary movement in 1903 the tsarist government was compelled to put an end to the Zubatov organisations. p. 72

[32] For further details see pp. 171-78 of this volume. p. 72

[33] *Slovo* (*The Word*)—a bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in 1904-09. From November 1905 until July 1906 it was the organ of the Octobrists, but later in 1906 it became the organ of the constitutional monarchist Party of "Peaceful Renovation", which Lenin called the "Party of Peaceful Plunder".

p. 74

[34] *Ekho* (*The Echo*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from June 22 (July 5) to July 7 (20), 1906 in place of *Vperyod*, which had been suppressed by the government. Fourteen issues appeared. The actual editor was Lenin and articles by him were printed in each issue. Lenin took a direct part in the work of the section entitled "Among Newspapers and Periodicals".

Repressive measures were taken against almost every issue of *Ekho*. On the eve of the dissolution of the First State Duma the newspaper was closed down. p. 75

[35] *K. P—v* is K. A. Popov. p. 75

[36] The "*Amsterdam Resolution*" on "international rules for socialist tactics" was passed by the Congress of the Second International held in Amsterdam on August 14-20, 1904. The resolution forbade socialists to take part in bourgeois governments and rejected collaboration of socialist parties with bourgeois parties. p. 75

[37] This refers to the tsar's ukase of March 8 (21), 1905, published on March 11 (24), 1906, by which those convicted of campaigning for a boycott of the elections were liable to 4-6 months' imprisonment. p. 79

[38] *Land Bill of the 33 Deputies*. This "Basic Land Bill" signed by 33 deputies, mostly Trudoviks, was put forward at the session of the First State Duma on June 6 (19), 1906. In contrast to the Bill of the "104", the Bill of the 33 advanced as its main demand immediate and complete abolition of private ownership of the land. The Duma rejected the Bill on June 8 (21).

Further details of the Trudovik Land Bills are given on pp. 469-70 of this volume. p. 86

[39] *A. L—y* is A. V. Lunacharsky, who in *Ekho*, No. 8, wrote a reply to the article by Izgoyev directed against Lenin's article "Yes-Men of the Cadets". p. 89

[40] In June 1906 the Socialist-Revolutionaries began a campaign for reviving the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The Mensheviks supported this idea, the Bolsheviks opposed it. On June 21 (July 4), 1906, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution which, after pointing out the militant significance of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, noted that its re-establishment was untimely and exposed the provocative nature of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' agitation. This resolution (published in *Ekho*, No. 5, July 27, 1906) was widely discussed at meetings and was approved by the overwhelming major-

ity of the workers. The Menshevik G. S. Khrustalev-Nosar, who had been president of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies in October-November 1905, opposed the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee and defended the S.-R.'s campaign.
p. 90

[41] *Sapient gudgeon*—the representation of a cowardly philistine in a story by the Russian satirist M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin.
p. 97

[42] This refers to the *Agrarian Committee of the First State Duma* set up to draft a Bill on the land question. On June 6 (19), 1906, at the 22nd session of the Duma, 91 members of the Committee were chosen (the Cadets predominating among them, with 41 persons). Afterwards, in accordance with a decision that was adopted, the Committee was supplemented by a further eight members (3 from the Caucasus, 3 from Siberia and 2 from Central Asia). The chairman of the Agrarian Committee was a Cadet, A. A. Mukhanov.
p. 98

[43] This refers to the "Peasant Reform" which abolished serfdom in Russia in 1861. The Reform was made necessary by the entire course of Russia's economic development and by the growth of a mass movement among the peasantry against feudal exploitation. It was a bourgeois reform carried out by the serf-owning landlords. Landlordism was preserved. The peasant could receive an allotment of land only according to the quota established by law (and with the agreement of the landlord), and had to make a redemption payment for it. Approximate estimates show that after the Reform, the nobility possessed 71,500,000 dessiatines of land and the peasants 33,700,000 dessiatines. The Reform enabled the landlords to cut off and appropriate one-fifth or even two-fifths of the lands formerly cultivated by the peasants. The landlords remained in possession of the best parts of the peasants' allotments (the "cut-off lands", woods, meadows, watering places, grazing-grounds, and so on), without which the peasants could not engage in independent farming.

The peasants' redemption payments for their allotments of land amounted in fact to direct spoliation of the peasants by the landlords and the tsarist government. The period during which the peasants made their redemption payments to the tsarist government was fixed at 49 years with interest at 6 per cent. The arrears of redemption payments due increased from year to year. Redemption payments made to the tsarist government merely by peasants formerly under landlords amounted to 1,900 million rubles, whereas the market price of the land which passed into the hands of the peasants did not exceed 544 million rubles. In actual fact the peasants were made to pay hundreds of millions of rubles for their land, which led to the ruin of the peasant farms and mass impoverishment of the peasants.

V. I. Lenin called the "Peasant Reform" of 1861 the first mass act of violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture—the landlords were "clearing the estates" for capitalism. For material on the 1861 Reform see V. I. Lenin's "The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Downfall of Serfdom", "The Jubilee", "The 'Peasant Reform' and Proletarian-Peasant Revolution" (*Collected Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 17). p. 99

[44] *The Taurida Palace* was the building in which the sessions of the State Duma were held. p. 101

[45] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a daily newspaper of a reactionary Black-Hundred type published in St. Petersburg from November 1905 to April 1914. From 1906 it was the organ of the Ministry of the Interior. The newspaper was subsidised from the secret ("reptilian") government fund put at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior. Lenin called *Rossiya* a "venal police newspaper". p. 105

[46] This refers to the heroes of a Russian saga: the Kiev Prince Vladimir Krasnoye Solnyshko (Bright Sun), whose historical prototype was the Grand Prince Vladimir Svyatoslavich (died 1015), the forest bandit Solovei the Robber and the epic hero "peasant son" Ilya Muromets, who vanquished Solovei the Robber. p. 105

[47] The pamphlet *The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, written by Lenin before the start of the Sveaborg uprising, was published only after the uprising. On August 12 (25), 1906 in Moscow an order for confiscation of the pamphlet was issued and court proceedings were taken against the author. Nevertheless, the pamphlet had a wide distribution not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in the provinces. p. 109

[48] Lenin is referring to the appeal of members of the First State Duma known as the "Vyborg Manifesto". The appeal was adopted on July 9-10 (22-23), 1906, at a meeting in Vyborg attended by about 200 deputies, mostly Cadets, after the dissolution of the First Duma. The appeal called on the people to offer "passive resistance" to the government, to refuse to pay taxes or provide recruits until the tsar had ordered new elections to the Duma. In September 1906 the Congress of the Cadet Party openly declared the use of "passive resistance" to be "virtually unrealisable". p. 112

[49] *Suvorin, A. S.*—editor of the reactionary newspaper *Novoye Vremya* from 1876 to 1912. p. 112

[50] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a newspaper founded in 1756; beginning with the 1860s, it expressed the views of the most reactionary sections of the landlords and clergy; from 1905 onwards it was one of the chief organs of the Black Hun-

dreds. It was closed down shortly after the October Revolution of 1917. p. 112

[51] *Grazhdanin* (*Citizen*)—a reactionary magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1872 to 1914. From the eighties of the last century it was the organ of the extreme monarchists and was edited by Prince Meshchersky and financed by the government. It had a small circulation, but it was influential in bureaucratic circles. p. 112

[52] *Ledru-Rollin* (1807-74)—French politician, representative of the petty-bourgeois democrats. p. 120

[53] *The mutiny on the armoured cruiser Potemkin* broke out on June 14 (27), 1905. The crew brought the warship to the port of Odessa, where a general strike was in progress. However, the favourable conditions that had arisen for joint action by the Odessa workers and the sailors of the *Potemkin* were not utilised. Numerous arrests of its members had weakened the Odessa Bolshevik organisation and it lacked unity. The Mensheviks were against an armed uprising and held the workers and sailors back from action. The tsarist government ordered the entire Black Sea Fleet to crush the rising on the *Potemkin*, but the crews refused to open fire on the cruiser and the commanders were compelled to withdraw the squadron. After eleven days of cruising in the Black Sea the crew of the *Potemkin* were forced by shortage of food and coal to take their vessel to a Rumanian port and surrender to the authorities there. Most of the sailors remained abroad. Those who returned to Russia were arrested and court-martialled.

The *Potemkin* mutiny was unsuccessful, but the fact that the crew of a big naval vessel had joined the revolution marked an important stage in the development of the struggle against the autocracy. In his appraisal of its significance, Lenin called it "the attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 562). p. 122

[54] *The uprising in the Sveaborg fortress* (near Helsingfors), which began during the night of July 17-18 (30-31), 1906, broke out spontaneously and prematurely, being to a large extent provoked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. On receiving information about the situation in Sveaborg and the possibility of an armed uprising, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. decided on the urgent dispatch of a delegation to Sveaborg with instructions to secure a postponement of the action or, if this could not be achieved, to take the most active part in leading the uprising. The text of the decision was written by V. I. Lenin (see p. 132 of this volume). Finding it impossible to prevent spontaneous action, the Bolsheviks headed the uprising. Its leaders were members of the military organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.—Lieutenants A. P. Yemelyanov and Y. L. Kokhansky. Seven out of 10 artillery companies took an active part in the uprising.

The insurgents put forward the slogans of overthrow of the autocracy, freedom or the people, the transfer of land to the peasants. The working class in Finland took action in support; a general strike began on July 18 (31) in Helsingfors and subsequently spread to other towns. The uprising continued for three days, but the general lack of preparation for action had its effect and on July 20 (August 2), after the fortress had been subjected to a naval bombardment, the Sveaborg uprising was crushed. Its participants were handed over for court-martial, forty-three men were executed and some hundreds sent to penal servitude or imprisoned.

p. 131

[55] For conspirative reasons the name of the town (Sveaborg) was indicated in Lenin's manuscript by a dash. p. 132

[56] Lenin is referring to the manifestoes printed in July 1906 after the dissolution of the First Duma: "To the Army and Navy", "Manifesto to All the Russian Peasants", "To the Whole People". These manifestoes stressed the need for an armed uprising.

p. 138

[57] This refers to the uprisings in Sveaborg (see Note 54) and Kronstadt.

The uprising of sailors and soldiers in Kronstadt began on July 19 (August 1), 1906, after news had been received of the uprising in Sveaborg. In the spring and summer of 1906, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, preparations had gone forward for an armed uprising of workers, soldiers and sailors in Kronstadt. These preparations, however, were considerably complicated by the arrest on July 9 (22) of the large part of the military and workers' organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. Nevertheless, with the support of the St. Petersburg Committee and its representative, D. Z. Manuilsky, the Bolsheviks continued to make preparations for an armed uprising, at the same time rebuffing the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had provoked a premature uprising. When the spontaneous Sveaborg uprising broke out the preparations for an armed uprising in Kronstadt had not been completed, but in view of the events in Sveaborg the uprising in Kronstadt had to be begun prematurely. It was headed by the Bolsheviks who tried to make the action as organised as possible. At a signal agreed upon, the struggle was started almost simultaneously by minelayers, sappers and soldiers of the electric-mine company and sailors of the First and Second Naval Divisions; they were joined by part of the armed workers. The government, however, had received information from provocateurs of the time fixed for the uprising and had prepared in advance for the fight. The disorganising activity of the Socialist-Revolutionaries also prevented the uprising from taking a successful course. Towards the morning of July 20 (August 2) the uprising was quelled.

On July 20 (August 2) the St. Petersburg Committee took the decision to carry out a political general strike in support of

the Kronstadt and Sveaborg risings, but on the following day news of the suppression of the uprising was received and the decision was rescinded.

The tsarist government savagely punished the insurgents. More than 2,500 of the participants in the Kronstadt uprising were arrested. Courts-martial sentenced 36 men to death; 130 were sent to penal servitude, 316 were imprisoned and 935 transferred to corrective battalions. p. 139

[58] Lenin quotes words from Maxim Gorky's *Song of the Stormy Petrel*. p. 140

[59] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, official organ of the R.S.D.L.P., founded in accordance with a resolution of the Third Congress of the Party. Lenin was appointed editor-in-chief by a decision of a plenary session of the Party's Central Committee, on April 27 (May 10), 1905.

Proletary was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) till November 12 (25), 1905, a total of twenty-six issues being brought out. Active in the work of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky. *Proletary* continued the policy of the old, Leninist *Iskra*, and maintained full continuity with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

Lenin wrote more than 50 articles and items for *Proletary*, his articles being reprinted in local Bolshevik periodicals, and also published in the form of leaflets.

Publication of *Proletary* was discontinued shortly after Lenin's departure for Russia in November 1905, the last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26) being edited by V. V. Vorovsky. p. 141

[60] *Partiiniye Izvestia* (*Party News*)—a newspaper, the organ of the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which was published illegally in St. Petersburg on the eve of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Two issues were brought out: those of February 7 (20) and March 20 (April 2), 1906. The editorial board was composed on an equal basis of editors of the Bolshevik organ (*Proletary*) and the Menshevik organ (the new *Iskra*). The Bolshevik members of the editorial board included Lenin, Lunacharsky and others.

Lenin's articles "The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party", "The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat" were printed in *Partiiniye Izvestia* over the signature "Bolshevik" (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 112-19, 135-45). After the Congress, publication of the newspaper was discontinued. p. 141

[61] *The Law of December 11* (*24*), *1905*, was the law on elections to the State Duma. By it the voters were divided into four curias: agricultural (landlords), urban (bourgeoisie), peasant and workers'. One landlord vote was made equivalent in value to three votes of urban bourgeois representatives, 15 peasant votes or 45 workers'

votes. The law ensured the huge preponderance of the clique of landlords and capitalists in the Duma. p. 142

[62] *Tovarishch* (*The Comrade*)—a bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 1906 to January 1908. Formally, it was not the organ of any party, but in effect it was an organ of the Left Cadets. Mensheviks also contributed to the newspaper. p. 144

[63] *Oko* (*The Eye*)—a liberal-bourgeois daily newspaper of a Cadet tendency published in St. Petersburg from August 6 (19) to October 31 (November 13), 1906, instead of the previous successively published newspapers *Rus*, *Molva* (*Hearsay*) and *Dvadtsaty Vek* (*The Twentieth Century*). p. 151

[64] Lenin is referring to the statement of the Bolshevik section of the Central Committee of July 20 (August 2), 1906, printed as a separate leaflet entitled "Statement of Three Central Committee Members in the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." and in the pamphlet "Did the Party Have a Central Committee in 1906-07?" p. 152

[65] Lenin is referring to the second paragraph of the Bolshevik draft resolution to the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on "The Provisional Revolutionary Government and Local Organs of Revolutionary Authority" (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 154-56). p. 156

[66] *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly magazine of the bourgeois liberals, published abroad from 1902 to 1905 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. From January 1904 it was the organ of the liberal-monarchist "League of Emancipation". Later the Osvobozhdeniye group formed the nucleus of the Cadet Party—the chief bourgeois party in Russia. p. 158

[67] *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (*The Pole Star*)—a weekly magazine, organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party, which was published in St. Petersburg in 1905-06 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. p. 158

[68] *Decembrists*—Russian revolutionaries of the nobility, fighters against serfdom and the autocracy, who made an abortive armed uprising in December 1825. p. 158

[69] *The raznochintsi* (i.e., "men of different estates") were the Russian commoner-intellectuals, drawn from the small townsfolk, the clergy, the merchant classes, the peasantry, as distinct from those drawn from the nobility. p. 158

[70] *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*)—the secret political organisation of the terrorist Narodniks formed in August 1879 after the split in the organisation Zemlya i Volya. It was headed by an Executive Committee consisting of A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, Vera Figner, Sophia Perovskaya, A. A. Kvyatkovsky, and others.

While still adhering to the Narodnik utopian-socialist ideas, the members of Narodnaya Volya nevertheless embarked on a political struggle, regarding the overthrow of the autocracy and the achievement of political freedom as a major aim. Its programme envisaged a "permanent popular representative body" elected by universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of the land to the people, and measures to put the factories in the hands of the workers. "The Narodnaya Volya members," Lenin wrote, "made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 72).

Narodnaya Volya fought heroically against the tsarist autocracy. But, starting out from the erroneous theory of "active" heroes and a "passive" mass, it expected to achieve the remaking of society without the participation of the people, by its own efforts, through individual terrorism that would intimidate and disorganise the government. After the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the government was able, by savage reprisals, death sentences, and acts of provocation, to crush it out of existence.

Repeated attempts to revive the organisation during the eighties ended in failure. Thus, in 1886 a group in the Narodnaya Volya tradition was formed by A. I. Ulyanov (elder brother of Lenin) and P. Y. Shevyryov, but after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III in 1887, the group was uncovered and its active members executed.

While criticising Narodnaya Volya's erroneous, utopian programme, Lenin expressed great respect for its members' selfless struggle against tsarism. p. 158

[71] *Manilovism*—from the name of the landlord Manilov in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, who was the embodiment of philistinism, smug complacency and futile day-dreaming. p. 159

[72] This refers to the resolutions of the Kursk, Kaluga and Moscow district committees of the R.S.D.L.P., the Regional Bureau of the Central District and the Kostroma Party Conference held on July 25 (August 7), 1906. p. 160

[73] This refers to the railwaymen's conference convened in August 1906 on the question of a general strike in connection with the dissolution of the First State Duma.

The conference was attended by delegates of workers and employees of 23 railways and representatives of the Central Bu-

reau of the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union, the Trudovik Group, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Bund, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and others. The resolution adopted by the conference pointed out: "The impending general strike will be an offensive of the popular forces that must wrest power from the hands of the autocratic government". p. 161

[74] The "*bloody day*" was August 2 (15), 1906, when attacks on the police were carried out in Warsaw, Lodz, Radom, Plotsk and other Polish towns. The action was organised by the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) (see Lenin's note on "The Guerrilla Action of the Polish Socialist Party" in this volume, p. 194). p. 167

[75] The attempt on the life of Stolypin was carried out by Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists on August 12 (25), 1906.

General Min, who was in charge of the suppression of the December armed uprising in Moscow, was killed by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party on August 13 (26), 1906. p. 167

[76] The idea of convening a "labour congress", which was advanced by P. B. Axelrod and supported by other Mensheviks, consisted in gathering together at a congress representatives of various workers' organisations to provide the basis of a legal "broad labour party" which would include Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists. In practice this would have meant the liquidation of the R.S.D.L.P. and its replacement by a non-party organisation. The Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. emphatically condemned the Menshevik idea of a "labour congress" and recognised that the campaign for it was harmful to the development of proletarian class-consciousness. Together with the Bolsheviks, the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats combated the idea of a "labour congress".

For criticism of the Menshevik idea of a "labour congress" in Lenin's works see "Philistinism in Revolutionary Circles", "The Crisis of Menshevism", "Intellectualist Warriors Against Domination by the Intelligentsia", "Angry Embarrassment (*The Question of the Labour Congress*)" (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 246-56, 341-64 and Vol. 12, pp. 316-19, 320-32). p. 170

[77] *The Joint Council of Volunteer Fighting Squads* was formed in Moscow at the end of October 1905. It was created at the outset for the practical struggle against the Black Hundreds but it was kept in existence during the December uprising. It included representatives of the volunteer squads of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Moscow group of Social-Democrats, the Moscow committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and also of the volunteer squads bearing the names "Free District", "University", "Typographical" and "Caucasian". The S.-R.-Menshevik majority

of the Joint Council was responsible for disorganising its activity; during the days of the December armed uprising it lagged behind the revolutionary events and was incapable of acting as the operational general staff of the uprising. p. 171

[78] Lenin cites the proposition put forward by Marx in his *Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 139). p. 172

[79] During the evening of December 8 (21), 1905, soldiers and police cordoned off the "Aquarium" garden (at the Sadovo-Triumfalnaya Square) where a crowded meeting was being held in the theatre. Thanks to the selfless efforts of the workers' volunteer squads guarding the meeting, bloodshed was avoided; those who possessed arms were enabled to escape through a broken fence, but the other participants in the meeting who went out through the gate were searched, beaten up and in many cases arrested. p. 172

[80] The Fiedler school building (at Chistiye Prudy) was regularly used for party meetings. During the evening of December 9 (22), 1905, when a meeting was being held there, it was surrounded by troops. The participants in the meeting, mostly members of volunteer squads, refused to surrender and barricaded themselves in the building. The troops opened fire using artillery and machine-guns. During the destruction of the building more than 30 persons were killed or wounded; 120 were arrested. p. 172

[81] *Dubasov, F. V.* (1845-1912)—Governor-General of Moscow in 1905-06, who directed the suppression of the armed uprising of the Moscow workers in December 1905. p. 172

[82] *Semenovtsy*—soldiers of the Semenovsky Guards Regiment who were sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow in December 1905 to suppress the uprising of the Moscow workers. p. 172

[83] *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist revolutionary newspaper. It was founded by Lenin in 1900, and it played a decisive part in building the Marxist revolutionary party of the Russian working class. After the Party, at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, had split into a revolutionary (Bolshevik) wing and an opportunist (Menshevik) wing, *Iskra* passed into the hands of the Mensheviks and became known as the "*new*" *Iskra* in contrast to Lenin's *old Iskra*. p. 175

[84] This refers to Engels's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany, 1848* (*New York Daily Tribune*, 18.IX.1852) which was published in 1851-52 as a series of articles in the newspaper *New York Daily Tribune* over the signature of Marx, who originally intended to write them but, being preoccupied with his economic researches, handed over the task to Engels. In writing the articles En-

gels constantly consulted Marx, who also read them through, before they were sent to the press. Not until 1913, as a result of the publication of the correspondence between Marx and Engels, did it become known that the work had been written by Engels. p. 176

[85] Engels expounded this proposition on a number of occasions in his works, notably in *Anti-Dühring*. p. 176

[86] Lenin deals with this in more detail in his work "The Russian Revolution and the Tasks of the Proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 141-42). p. 176

[87] In December 1905 various Lettish towns were seized by armed detachments of insurgent workers, agricultural labourers and peasants. Guerrilla war against the tsarist troops began. In January 1906 the uprising in Latvia was suppressed by punitive expeditions under tsarist generals. p. 177

[88] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Diary of a Social-Democrat*)—a non-periodical organ published by Plekhanov in Geneva from March 1905 to April 1912. In all sixteen issues were brought out, at considerable intervals. Publication was resumed in Petrograd in 1916, but only one issue appeared. p. 179

[89] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. Under various editors it repeatedly changed its political trend. Moderately liberal at the outset, after 1876 under the editorship of A. S. Suvorin it became the organ of reactionary circles of the nobility and the bureaucracy. Following 1905 it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917 it supported the counter-revolutionary policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and rabidly vilified the Bolsheviks. The newspaper was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* the acme of venality in the press. He wrote: "*Novoye Vremya*-ism became an expression equivalent to the concepts: apostasy, renegacy, toadyism" (*Collected Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 18). p. 185

[90] The military courts were established by a Council of Ministers decree of August 19 (September 1), 1906, for combating the revolutionary movement. They were introduced by the Governor-General, the head of the administration or persons vested with equivalent authority in localities declared to be under a state of siege or under special emergency regulations. The military court consisted of a chairman and four members from army or naval officers and was endowed with wide powers. The decree on military courts gave the authorities the right to hand over an accused to the court "applying punishments in suitable cases according to war-time laws". (*Legislation of the Transition Period*, *1901-06*. St. Peters-

burg, 1907, p. 621.) The court sat in private and its sentence came into force immediately and had to be put into effect without delay. p. 186

[91] Lenin is referring to two ukases of the tsarist government: that of August 12 (25), 1906, on the sale of part of the crown land (belonging to the tsarist family), and that of August 27 (September 9), 1906, on the sale of state land through the Peasant Bank. p. 187

[92] *Derzhimorda*—the name of a policeman in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*, which became used as a general designation for an insolent, boorish bully and oppressor. p. 187

[93] This refers to the newspaper *Izvestia Sovetov Rabochikh Deputatov* (*Bulletin of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies*), published daily from December 7 (20) to 12 (25), 1905, during the general strike and armed uprising in Moscow. This newspaper, like the *Izvestia* of the St. Petersburg Soviet, was printed in defiance of the authorities, under the protection of volunteer squads at various printing presses of Sytin, Mamontov, Kushnerev, Chicherin. About 5,000-10,000 copies of each issue were printed. On December 12 (25) the last, sixth issue of *Izvestia* appeared. p. 190

[94] *Andreyev, Leonid Nikolayevich* (1871-1919)—a Russian writer, author of the play *To the Stars* written in 1905. p. 190

[95] "*The Guerrilla Action of the Polish Socialist Party*" is a note of Lenin's to the article "From Poland" published in *Proletary*, No. 3, September 8 (21), 1906. p. 194

[96] "*Tver*"—the name of an inn at the Nevskaya Zastava in St. Petersburg which was a meeting place of the Black Hundreds. p. 194

[97] *Narodism* (from the word *narod*—people)—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement, which arose in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. The Narodniks stood for the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landlords' lands to the peasantry. At the same time, they denied that capitalist relations and a proletariat were bound to develop in Russia, and they therefore considered the peasantry to be the main revolutionary force. They regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. With the object of rousing the peasantry to struggle against the autocracy, the Narodniks went to the countryside ("among the people"). The Narodniks started out from an erroneous view of the role of the class struggle in historical development, considering that history is made by heroes who are followed passively by the mass of the people. In their struggle against tsarism the Narodniks used the tactics of individual terrorism.

In the eighties and nineties the Narodniks began to reconcile themselves to tsarism; they expressed the interests of the kulaks and carried on a relentless struggle against Marxism. p. 197

[98] *Economism*—an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international opportunism; its organs were the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*), 1897-1902, and the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*), 1899-1902. The programme of the Economists, whom Lenin called Russian Bernsteinians, was embodied in the so-called *Credo*, written in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova.

The Economists restricted the tasks of the working class to the economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the workers' party, which, they considered, should merely observe the spontaneous development of the movement and register events. In their glorifying of "spontaneity" they belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, declaring that a socialist ideology could arise from the spontaneous workers' movement. By denying the need to imbue the workers' movement with socialist consciousness through the Marxist Party they cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. They defended isolation and amateurishness in the Social-Democratic movement and opposed the creation of a centralised working-class party. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the revolutionary class path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

Lenin made an extensive criticism of the views of the Economists in his works: "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (which was directed against the *Credo* and was written during his exile in Siberia in 1899, where it was adopted and signed by seventeen exiled Marxists), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the '*Profession de Foi*'", "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96, Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin achieved the ideological rout of Economism in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). A major part in the fight against Economism was played by Lenin's *Iskra*. p. 197

[99] *Tag—in*—a pseudonym of the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalist A. G. Troitsky. p. 198

[100] *Golos* (*The Voice*)—a daily newspaper of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in St. Petersburg in April-June 1906.

Dyelo Naroda (*People's Cause*)—a daily newspaper of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in St. Petersburg in May 1906. p. 198

[101] *V. V.* (pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov) and *Nikolai—on* (pseudonym of N. F. Danielson) were ideologists of the liberal Narodniks in the eighties and nineties of the last century. p. 199

[102] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early 1890s it became the organ of the liberal Narodniks. From 1906 it was, in effect, the organ of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist" Party. p. 199

[103] *Agrarian Programme of the "104"*—the "Draft of Fundamental Principles" of the land law put forward in the First Duma over the signatures of 104 peasant deputies on May 23 (June 5), 1906. The draft put forward demands for: establishment of a nationwide stock of distributable land formed from state, crown and monastery lands, as well as privately-owned lands, if the estates exceeded the established labour norm; the right to hold land to be given only to those who actually till it. Compensation was envisaged for alienation of privately-owned land. The implementation of the land reform was to be in the hands of local peasant committees elected on a completely democratic basis. For Lenin's account of this plan see p. 469 in the present volume. p. 200

[104] *Bobchinsky and Dobchinsky*—characters in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*. p. 204

[105] *Ushakov*—one of Zubatov's agents; in the autumn of 1905 he organised the "Independent Social Workers' Party" and published *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*) with government money. This party of "independents" tried to combat the Social-Democrats, but met with no success among the workers. p. 205

[106] *Otkliki Sovremennosti* (*Contemporary Reactions*)—a Menshevik magazine which was published legally in St. Petersburg from March to June 1906. Five issues appeared. p. 206

[107] This refers to A. I. Guchkov's letter, "Reply to Count Y. N. Trubetskoi", published in the newspaper *Russkiye Vedomosti*, No. 224, on September 10 (23), 1906.

On August 24 (September 6), 1906, the tsarist government published a statement on the establishment of military courts and openly proclaimed its programme to be the abolition of all concessions won through the revolutionary upsurge in October-December 1905. In an interview in *Novoye Vremya* the leader of the Octobrists, Guchkov, approved both the establishment of military courts and the entire counter-revolutionary programme of the government. Guchkov's unreserved agreement with the government's policy caused dissatisfaction among some representatives of the bourgeoisie. In particular, Count Trubetskoi, one of the organisers of the Party of "Peaceful Renovation" wrote a letter to Guchkov asking him whether he belonged to the party of "peaceful" or "military" renovation. Guchkov's letter in reply, to which Lenin refers, fully confirmed his agreement with the government's policy and approved the dissolution of the First State Duma. p. 207

[108] "*Reptiles*" was the name given to the venal press organs in the pay of the tsarist government and grovelling before it.
p. 207

[109] On February 20 (March 5), 1906 a law and two ukases to the Senate on the State Duma and Council of State were published. By this law the tsarist government virtually annulled its Manifesto of October 17.

According to the new law the Council of State, half of which was appointed by the supreme power and the other half elected from Black-Hundred sections of the nobility, big capitalists and clergy, was converted from a consultative into a legislative body. The Council of State could veto any decision of the Duma.
p. 210

[110] *Bezzaglavtsi*—a semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik group of the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia (S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, V. V. Portugalov, V. V. Khizhnyakov, and others), formed in the period of the incipient decline of the 1905-07 revolution. The group derived its name from the political weekly magazine *Bez Zaglavia* (*Without a Title*) published in St. Petersburg in January-May 1906 under the editorship of Prokopovich; later the *Bezzaglavtsi* were grouped around the Left-Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch* (*Comrade*). Under cover of their formal non-partisanship, the *Bezzaglavtsi* propagated the ideas of bourgeois liberalism and opportunism and supported the revisionists of Russian and international Social-Democracy. p. 214

[111] This note was printed in the form of a comment "from the editorial board" on the resolution of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on guerrilla warfare. The Moscow Committee adopted the resolution in September 1906. Point 3 of the preamble of the resolution pointed out that "the revolution, while not being powerful enough to smash the regime by a simultaneous action of the people is, however, strong enough not to remain passive and is spontaneously passing to guerrilla attacks against the enemy, which are especially to be expected in the villages where recruitment is beginning". p. 224

[112] "*Disc*"—the "Democratic Union of Constitutionalists", a counter-revolutionary organisation which arose in the autumn of 1905; it united representatives from the big nobility, conservative sections of the industrial bourgeoisie and the upper bureaucracy. At the end of 1905 the *Disc* was merged in the Octobrist Party.
p. 226

[113] *Sotsial-Demokrat*—an illegal newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., published in St. Petersburg from September 17 (30) to November 18 (December 1), 1906; it was virtually a Menshevik organ since at that time the Central Committee was in the hands of the Mensheviks. p. 232

[114] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal newspaper founded by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party; it was published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909, under the editorship of Lenin. *Proletary* carried the title of organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Committees and, for a time, also of the Moscow District, Perm, Kursk and Kazan committees. It was in fact the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. In all 50 issues appeared, the first 20 were published in Finland. Between February 13 (26) and December 1 (14), 1908, *Proletary* was published in Geneva, and after January 8 (21), 1909, in Paris.

More than 100 articles and items by Lenin were published in *Proletary*. During the years of Stolypin reaction it played a prominent role in holding together and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations. At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 the "conciliators" secured the adoption of a decision to close down *Proletary*. p. 232

[115] *Tkachevism*—a trend in revolutionary Narodism that was close to Blanquism, called after its ideologist P. N. Tkachev (1844-85). The Tkachevists considered political struggle to be a necessary prerequisite of revolution, but underestimated the decisive role of the masses. In the opinion of Tkachev, the revolutionary minority should seize political power, establish a new state and put through revolutionary changes in the interests of the people who have only to make use of the ready-made results.

F. Engels criticised the petty-bourgeois revolutionism of Tkachev in his article "Emigrant Literature". p. 232

[116] *V. V. Kh—ov* is V. V. Khizhnyakov. p. 236

[117] *Stolichnaya Pochta* (*Metropolitan Post*)—a Left-Cadet daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to February 1908. p. 241

[118] *Nashe Dyelo* (*Our Cause*)—a weekly magazine of the Mensheviks, published in Moscow from September to November 1906; in all ten issues appeared. N. Valentinov (N. V. Volsky), P. P. Maslov, N. Cherevanin (F. A. Lipkin) and other Mensheviks were frequent contributors to the magazine. It was in favour of agreements with the Cadets at the elections to the Second Duma, and advocated the idea of a "labour congress".

In January-February 1907, in place of *Nashe Dyelo* the magazine *Dyelo Zhizni* (*Life's Cause*) appeared. p. 248

[119] *The Anti-Socialist Law* in Germany was promulgated by the Bismarck Government in 1878. Under this law all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, all mass working-class organisations, and the working-class press were prohibited. The best part of German Social-Democracy, centred round A. Bebel and W. Liebknecht, carried out considerable work under illegal conditions and the

Party's influence among the working masses not only did not decrease, but actually increased. At the elections to the Reichstag in 1890, the Social-Democrats obtained almost one and a half million votes. In the same year the government was compelled to repeal the Anti-Socialist Law. p. 251

[120] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist theoretical and political magazine published legally in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* editorial board. Four issues (three books) of *Zarya* appeared: No. 1 in April 1901 (it actually appeared on March 10 [23]); Nos. 2 and 3 in December 1901, and No. 4 in August 1902. p. 254

[121] The pamphlet *Martov's and Cherevanin's Pronouncements in the Bourgeois Press* was published in St. Petersburg in October 1906. In 1912, the Press Committee banned the pamphlet and the St. Petersburg Court of Justice decreed that it should be destroyed; by that time the pamphlet was already out of print. p. 257

[122] *Novy Put* (*New Path*)—a daily newspaper of a Left-Cadet trend published in Moscow from August to November 1906. p. 257

[123] V. I. Lenin has in mind the Dresden Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held September 13-20, 1906. The Congress adopted a resolution prohibiting party members from contributing to the bourgeois press. p. 262

[124] This refers to Turgenev's poem *A Rule of Life* (from the cycle *Poems in Prose*), whose character ascribes his own shortcomings to his opponent. p. 263

[125] In August 1906 after the failure of the strike decided on by the Central Committee during the Sveaborg uprising, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution on the need to convene an extraordinary Party congress. The St. Petersburg Committee decided to inform the local organisations of this resolution, asking them to express their opinion on the matter.

A number of the largest organisations pronounced in favour of convening a congress, including the Moscow and St. Petersburg committees, the Executive Committees of the Polish and Lithuanian Social-Democrats, the Regional Bureau of the Social-Democratic organisations of Central Russia, and the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democrats. The Urals, Nizhny-Novgorod, Bryansk, Minsk, Kurgan and other committees were also in favour of a congress. The All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November decided to convene the congress on March 15 (28), 1907. p. 264

[126] The pamphlet *The Social-Democrats and Electoral Agreements* was printed in November 1906 by the *Vperyod* Publishers in St.

Petersburg. Five years later, in 1912, the Press Committee banned the pamphlet and the Court of Justice confirmed this. On January 30 (February 12), 1912, the remaining copies were destroyed at the printing press of the city authorities. p. 275

[127] Lenin is referring to the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Cadet Party, held September 24-28 (October 7-11), 1906, in Helsingfors. In the debate on tactics the Central Committee of that Party moved a resolution rejecting the "passive resistance" proclaimed in the Vyborg Manifesto (see Note 48). The Left Cadets (mainly representatives of provincial organisations of the Party) moved their own resolution, in which "passive resistance" was acknowledged to be the immediate task of the Party. By a majority of votes the Congress adopted the Central Committee's resolution which called for the Vyborg Manifesto not to be put into effect. p. 281

[128] The "*four points*"—a term applied to the democratic electoral system embracing four demands: universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. p. 282

[129] *Vestnik Partii Narodnoi Svobody* (*Herald of the Party of People's Freedom*)—a weekly magazine, the organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg at intervals from February 22 (March 7), 1906. It was closed down after the 1917 October Revolution. p. 285

[130] *Soznatelnaya Rossiya* (*Class-Conscious Russia*)—a Socialist-Revolutionary symposium published in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1906. From the third issue it appeared with the subtitle "Symposium on Present-Day Themes". p. 292

[131] *The Second Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* ("First All-Russian") was held in Tammerfors November 3-7 (16-20), 1906 attended by 32 delegates.

The conference heard four reports on the question of the election campaign for the Second State Duma. Lenin spoke in support of the Bolshevik platform and against a bloc with the Cadets. Mensheviks and Bundists defended a bloc with Cadets. By a majority of 18 votes to 14, the conference adopted a Menshevik resolution. As a counter to this resolution Lenin put forward a "Dissenting Opinion", a Bolshevik platform signed by 14 delegates (6 Bolsheviks, 5 Polish and 3 Lettish Social-Democrats).

On November 6, Lenin spoke at the conference criticising the Menshevik draft election platform presented by the Central Committee for confirmation by the conference (the draft was published on November 3 (16) in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 6). The conference adopted a resolution for introducing amendments into the draft election platform. On the same day Lenin spoke in the debate on the convocation of an extraordinary Party congress and insisted on the cam-

paign for a "labour congress" being discussed as a question of violation of Party discipline.

While confirming the resolution on "Unity of the Election Campaign in the Localities", the conference adopted an amendment of Lenin's. The text of the resolution and Lenin's amendment to it are given in his article "Party Discipline and the Fight Against the Pro-Cadet Social-Democrats" (see p. 323 of this volume). The conference instructed the Central Committee to publish in the report of the conference all draft resolutions and dissenting opinions. The Menshevik Central Committee, however, published only the conference resolutions, omitting the dissenting opinion of the Bolsheviks (see *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 7).

A criticism of the work of the conference was given by Lenin (in addition to the above-mentioned article) in his article "Blocs with the Cadets" (see pp. 307-19 of this volume). p. 299

[132] *Zionist socialists* ("Zionist-Socialist Workers' Party")—a petty-bourgeois Jewish nationalist organisation founded in 1904 in Odessa. p. 301

[133] This refers to G. V. Plekhanov's "Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness", which defined Menshevik tactics in regard to the State Duma. p. 309

[134] The Bolshevik draft of the Duma declaration was written by Lenin; he quotes it in the article "Concerning the Declaration of Our Duma Group" (see pp. 33-36 of this volume). p. 313

[135] See pp. 448-49 of this volume. p. 317

[136] This refers to Plekhanov's letter (see pp. 271-73 of this volume). p. 321

[137] *Volna* (*The Wave*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from April 26 (May 9) to May 24 (June 6), 1906; 25 issues appeared. Beginning with No. 9 of May 5 (18), 1906 (after the Fourth Congress had ended and Lenin had arrived from Stockholm), the newspaper was in fact edited by Lenin. More than 20 articles by Lenin were printed in it. V. V. Vorovsky and M. S. Olminsky took part in the work of the editorial board. *Volna* was subjected to police persecution on numerous occasions. It was closed down by the tsarist government and the legal Bolshevik paper *Vperyod* began to appear in its place. p. 324

[138] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards by liberal professors of Moscow University and Zemstvo leaders; it expressed the interests of the liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. From 1905 it was the organ of the Right-wing Cadets; it was closed down after the 1917 October Revolution. p. 325

[139] The leaflet "*Whom to Elect to the State Duma*" was written prior to the elections to the Second Duma. In the article "The Government's Falsification of the Duma and the Tasks of the Social-Democrats", Lenin called this leaflet a poster "about the three chief parties" which took part in the Duma elections. The leaflet was printed in Vyborg by the editorial board of *Proletary* as a supplement to No. 8; it appeared in three editions (one in full and two abridged) in St. Petersburg in 1906. In the abridged form it was also published by the Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kostroma and Kharkov committees of the R.S.D.L.P., by the Ob group of the R.S.D.L.P., the Central Committee of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Territory and the Central Committee of the Latvian Social-Democrats. p. 326

[140] Lenin ironically compares Plekhanov's opportunist "Open Answer to a Reader of *Tovarishch*" with F. Lassalle's "Offenes Antwortschreiben an das Zentralkomitee zur Berufung eines Allgemeinen Deutschen Arbeiter-Kongresses zu Leipzig" (1863). p. 333

[141] *Nozdrev*—a notorious braggart and cheat in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 333

[142] See Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 520). p. 335

[143] The "*famous Paris agreement*"—an agreement on "basic principles and demands" in the struggle against the autocracy adopted in November 1904 at the Paris Conference attended by delegates from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Polish Socialist Party, Georgian Bourgeois Nationalist Party of Socialist-Federalists ("Sakartvelo"), and others. The conference of delegates of the R.S.D.L.P. and national Social-Democratic organisations convened by the Council of the R.S.D.L.P. refused to take part in the Paris Conference. p. 339

[144] Draft resolution of the Bolsheviks for the Unity Congress "The Present Stage of the Democratic Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 150-54). p. 341

[145] See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 373-74. p. 344

[146] This refers to the draft resolution for the Unity Congress on an armed uprising (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 151-53). p. 345

[147] *Narodnaya Svoboda* (*People's Freedom*)—a newspaper, organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg in December 1905. p. 346

[148] *Ivan Fyodorovich Shponka*—hero of Gogol's story *Ivan Fyodorovich Shponka and his Aunt*, whom the author depicts as a narrow-minded, complacent person interested in nothing. p. 347

[149] The *Belgian general strike* was declared in April 1902 in support of the demand for universal suffrage raised in the Belgian Parliament by representatives of the Labour, Liberal and Democratic Parties. More than 300,000 workers took part in the strike; demonstrations by workers occurred throughout the country. But after Parliament had rejected the electoral reform bill and troops had fired on demonstrators, the opportunist Labour Party leadership (Vandervelde and others) capitulated and, under pressure from their "allies" in the liberal-bourgeois camp, called off the general strike. The defeat of the Belgian working class in April 1902 was a lesson to the international labour movement. "The socialist proletariat," wrote *Iskra* in No. 21 of June 1, 1902, "will see the practical results that follow from opportunist tactics which sacrifice revolutionary principles in the hope of quick successes. The proletariat will have yet another proof that it will not be able to achieve its aim by any of the methods of political pressure used against the enemy unless it is prepared to carry these methods to their logical conclusion." p. 350

[150] *Rabochaya Mysl*—an Economist group which published the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*). It appeared from October 1897 to December 1902, edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others.

The group advocated frankly opportunist views. It opposed the political struggle of the working class and restricted the tasks of the working-class movement to "the interests of the moment", to demands for individual partial reforms, chiefly of an economic nature. Glorifying "spontaneity" in the working-class movement, it opposed the creation of an independent proletarian party and belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, maintaining that socialist ideology could grow out of the spontaneous movement.

The views of the *Rabochaya Mysl* group, as a Russian variety of international opportunism, were criticised by Lenin in the article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", in the book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85 and Vol. 5, pp. 347-465), and also in his *Iskra* articles.

Akimovites—supporters of one of the representatives of "Economism", the extreme opportunist V. P. Akimov (Makhnovets). p. 353

[151] The *Byelorussian Socialist Hromada*—a title assumed by a petty-bourgeois, nationalist organisation of the Narodnik type which arose in 1902. p. 355

[152] Lenin is referring to the resolution on a labour congress adopted at a meeting of workers from various districts of St. Petersburg in the beginning of September 1906. The meeting was convened by the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 357

[153] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen numbers appeared. The newspaper's organiser, editor and guiding spirit was V. I. Lenin. Other members of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky, and A. V. Lunacharsky.

The outstanding part played by *Vperyod* in combating Menshevism, re-establishing the Party principles and formulating and elucidating the issues posed by the rising revolution was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress, which recorded a vote of thanks to the editorial board. p. 360

[154] Lenin is referring to the pamphlet *Workers and Intellectuals in Our Organisations*, which appeared under the pseudonym "Rabochy" ("Worker") in Geneva in 1904 with a preface by P. B. Axelrod. The author of the pamphlet opposed Lenin's organisational plan for building the Party but was compelled to admit that the "democratism" of the Mensheviks amounted actually to a struggle for leading positions in the Party. A detailed characterisation of the pamphlet was given by Lenin in his article "Fine Words Butter No Parsnips". "The pamphlet shows admirably how the knights of the 'fine phrase' are exposed by their own followers," wrote Lenin. (See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 58.) p. 362

[155] *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published in St. Petersburg as a daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. On his return to St. Petersburg from emigration in early November Lenin took over the editorship. *Novaya Zhizn* was actually the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Closely associated with the paper were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and others. Maxim Gorky contributed many articles and gave the paper considerable financial assistance.

Lenin's first article "The Reorganisation of the Party" appeared in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 9, November 10 (23), 1905. Then, over a dozen other articles of V. I. Lenin's were printed. The newspaper attained a daily circulation of about 80,000. It suffered continual persecution, 15 issues out of 27 were confiscated and destroyed. After No. 27 of December 2 (15), *Novaya Zhizn* was closed down by the government. The last issue, No. 28, appeared illegally. p. 362

[156] *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—a magazine of German Social-Democrats, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. From the second half of the nineties onwards, after the death of F. Engels, the magazine regularly printed articles by revisionists. During the imperialist world war of 1914-18, it occupied a centrist, Kautskian position and supported the social-chauvinists. p. 365

[157] *Narodno-Sotsialisticheskoye Obozreniye* (*Popular-Socialist Review*—organ of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist" Party, published in St. Petersburg in 1906-07. p. 368

[158] *Sovremennaya Zhizn* (*Contemporary Life*)—a Menshevik magazine published in Moscow from April 1906 to March 1907. p. 369

[159] Lenin is referring to Marx's article "Krisis und Konterrevolution" printed in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on September 14, 1848. p. 374

[160] This refers to the resolution of the Second Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. ("First All-Russian"), "Amendment to the Draft Election platform proposed by the Central Committee" (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Russ. ed. Part I, 1954, pp. 142-43). p. 378

[161] This refers to the interpretations of Law of December 11 (24), 1905 on elections to the State Duma published by the Governing Senate prior to the elections to the Second Duma. These Senate interpretations supplementing the law took away electoral rights from further groups of workers, peasants and representatives of the non-Russian nationalities. V. I. Lenin called them "excellent Stolypin interpretations of the 'essence of the constitution'". p. 383

[162] This refers to the instruction of the Ministry of the Interior published on December 12 (25), 1906, according to which urban and Zemstvo authorities were to issue election forms "only to managers or boards of those societies and unions pursuing political aims and their branches, which are entered on the register", i.e., legalised by the government. Thus, under the new interpretation only the Black-Hundred parties were to receive election forms. p. 383

[163] *Balalaikin*—a character in M. Y. Saltykov-Shcherdin's *A Modern Idyll*, a liberal windbag, adventurist and liar. p. 384

[164] The words "in conformity with infamy" are taken from the story *The Liberal* by the Russian satirist M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 387

[165] This refers to the deputies of the Frankfort Parliament, the National Assembly, convened in Germany in May 1848 after the March revolution. The majority of them were members of the liberal bourgeoisie who engaged in fruitless talk about a draft constitution while in fact leaving power in the hands of the king.

National liberals—a political party in Germany which separated from the party of Prussian progressists in 1866, it represented the interests of the counter-revolutionary big industrial bourgeoisie. p. 387

[166] Lenin is quoting from Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 33). p. 387

[167] The article "*The Working-Class Party's Tasks and the Peasantry*" was written for the Samara legal Bolshevik newspaper *Samarskaya Luka* (*Samara River-bend*). Lenin sent the manuscript of the article from St. Petersburg to the address of the editorial board of the newspaper in Samara, but it was intercepted by the gendarmerie. The manuscript was only found in 1929 among the archives of the Samara provincial gendarmerie. p. 396

[168] *Nasha Tribuna* (*Our Tribune*)—a weekly paper of the Bund published in Wilno from December 1906 to March 1907. Twelve numbers appeared. p. 402

[169] *Petrushka*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, a serf valet who read books by spelling out each word without delving into their meaning. He was solely interested in the mechanical process of reading. p. 408

[170] Lenin is referring to N. Shchedrin's sketches *From Abroad* printed in the January issue of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (*Fatherland Notes*) for 1881. p. 422

[171] The conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which discussed the question of election tactics during the elections to the Second State Duma, was held on January 6 (19), 1907. Lenin delivered a report on electoral agreements during the elections. An account of his speech was printed in No. 12 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* on January 25 (February 7), 1907.

After the discussion of the report the conference confirmed the resolution ("A Dissenting Opinion") of 14 delegates at the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin gave a detailed analysis of the work of the St. Petersburg Conference and of the conditions under which it was convened in the pamphlets: *The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections*, "*When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool....*", (From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist) (see pp. 431-55, 456-74 of this volume). p. 426

[172] The pamphlet *The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections* was printed in January 1907 by the *Novaya Duma* Publishers in St. Petersburg at the print-shop of the *Dyelo* association, which simultaneously printed Lenin's pamphlet "*When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool....*" (From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist). In 1912 both pamphlets were prohibited by the government. p. 431

[173] *Chernyshevsky, N. G.* (1828-89)—the great Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher and writer.

Lenin is referring to Chernyshevsky's work *Carey*'s *Letters on Political Economy to the President of the United States of America*. p. 448

[174] *Lidval case*—the case of E. Lidval, big businessman and speculator, and V. I. Gurko—Deputy Minister of the Interior. With Gurko's assistance Lidval made a deal with the government to supply during October-December 1906, 10,000,000 poods of rye to the famine-stricken provinces of Russia. Lidval received a large sum of government funds from Gurko as advance payment but by mid-December 1906 had brought up to the railways less than one-tenth of the total amount of grain. The discovery of the embezzlement of government funds and speculation on the famine became common knowledge and the government was forced to bring the matter to the courts. But the case never came to trial and the only result for Gurko was that he was removed from his post. *Lidval case* helped to expose the anti-popular policy of the tsarist government, and to bring about the failure of the Right-wing parties in the elections to the Second State Duma. p. 450

[175] Lenin is referring to the tsarist government's farcical trial of the murderers of M. Y. Herzenstein, a Cadet member of the First State Duma (killed by Black-Hundred agents in Finland on July 18 (31), 1906). In spite of the fact that wide circles of the public knew who were responsible for the murder, the tsarist government did everything to prevent the murderers from being convicted. The investigation was deliberately dragged out the trial was several times postponed and finally, on April 3 (16), 1907, the case was dropped. p. 450

[176] The pamphlet "*When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool....*" (From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist) was printed in St. Petersburg in January 1907 by the *Novaya Duma* Publishers at the legal Bolshevik print-shop *Dyelo*. Soon after, the police confiscated almost every copy. In 1912 the tsarist government banned the pamphlet. p. 456

[177] *Tan* (pseudonym of V. G. Bogoraz)—one of the organisers of the semi-Cadet "Popular Socialist Party". p. 456

[178] In the article "A Russian at a Rendezvous", written on the basis of Turgenev's story, *Asya*, Chernyshevsky branded the ineffectiveness, and divorce between words and deeds, of the Russian intelligentsia. p. 462

[179] *Oblomov*—a Russian landlord, the central character in I. A. Goncharov's novel of that name. The name Oblomov has become synonymous with routine, stagnation and inertia. p. 464

[180] *Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich*—characters in Gogol's *Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich*. p. 464

[181] Lenin quotes the words of Chatsky, the main character in Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 467

[182] Lenin quotes the final line of V. Y. Bryusov's poem *To Near Ones*. p. 470

[183] Lenin is referring to the attempt of the Left-Cadet newspaper *Vek* (*Century*) to collect data on the sentiments of the electors. In its issue No. 5, January 9 (22), 1907, the newspaper published preliminary results of the voting by its readers: 765 persons voted for the Cadets and 407 for the Social-Democrats. The other parties received a negligible number of votes. p. 472

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*June 1906-January 1907*)

1906

June 6 (19)	Lenin, under the name of Karpov, delivers the report and reply to the debate on the agrarian question at the All-Russian Teachers' Congress in St. Petersburg.
June 8 (21)	Lenin's article "On the Eve", telegraphed from St. Petersburg to Kiev, is published in No. 1 of the Kiev Bolshevik newspaper *Rabotnik*.
	Lenin writes the article "Wavering Above, Determination Below", which is published in No. 13 of the newspaper *Vperyod*, June 9 (22), as a leading article.
June 9 (22)	Lenin writes the article "Unity!", which is published as a leading article in No. 14 of the newspaper *Vperyod*, June 10 (23).
June 10 (23)	Lenin writes the article "The Duma and the People", which is published as a leading article in No. 15 of the newspaper *Vperyod*, June 11 (24).
First half of June	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Social-Democratic organisation of the Baltic factory, criticising the Mensheviks, who had given their support to the Cadet slogan of a "responsible Duma Cabinet".
June 11-12 (24-25)	Lenin travels to Terioki (Finland) to take part in the work of the inter-district conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.
	Lenin presides at the conference. He moves that the conference should begin its work by discussing the question of tactics, and his motion is adopted. Lenin makes reports on "Tactics of the Party in Regard to the Duma" and on "Unity of the Party".
June, before 14 (27)	Lenin draws up the draft declaration of the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma. The draft is pub-

lished on June 22 (July 5) in No. 1 of the newspaper *Ekho*.

June 14 (27) — Lenin's article "The Fight for Power and the 'Fight' for Sops" is published as a leading article in No. 17 of the newspaper *Vperyod*.

June 22 (July 5) — Lenin's articles "The Declaration of Our Group in the Duma", "What Thou Doest, Do Quickly" and "Useful Polemics" are published in No. 1 of the newspaper *Ekho*.

Lenin writes the articles "Famine Relief and the Tactics of the Duma" and "Negotiations about the Cabinet", which are published in No. 2 of the newspaper *Ekho*, June 23 (July 6).

June 23 (July 6) — Lenin writes the article "Who Is for Alliances with the Cadets?", which is published as a leading article in No. 3 of the newspaper *Ekho*, June 24 (July 7).

June 24 (July 7) — Lenin writes the article "The Cadet Duma Grants Money to the Pogrom-Mongers' Government", which is published as a leading article in No. 4 of the newspaper *Ekho*, June 25 (July 8).

June 25 (July 8) — Lenin delivers the report and reply to the debate on the agrarian question at the meeting of workers organised by the St. Petersburg District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

June 26 (July 9) — Lenin writes the article "Yes-Men of the Cadets", which is published as a leading article in No. 5 of the newspaper *Ekho*, June 27 (July 10).

June 28 (July 11) — Lenin's article "Once Again about the Duma Cabinet" is published in No. 6 of the newspaper *Ekho* (as a leading article).

Lenin presides at a meeting of Social-Democratic Workers of the Narva District in St. Petersburg, and makes a report on the agrarian question. The meeting adopts a resolution moved by Lenin approving the decisions of the St. Petersburg inter-district conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

End of June (beginning of July) — Lenin takes part in a meeting of leading Bolshevik Party workers in St. Petersburg, at which the question of the tactics of the Party is discussed.

July 1 (14) — Lenin's articles "The Unsound Arguments of the 'Non-Party' Boycotters" and "The Bourgeoi-

sie's Censures and the Proletariat's Call for Action" are published in No. 9 of the newspaper *Ekho*.

July 2 (15) — Lenin's article "The Army and the People" is published as a leading article in No. 10 of the newspaper *Ekho*.

Beginning of July — Lenin speaks at a meeting of workers of the Shapshal Tobacco Factory in St. Petersburg; he supports the initiative of the workers for a strike in answer to the refusal of the administration to meet their economic demands.

July 4 (17) — Lenin's articles "Organisation of the Masses and Choice of the Moment for Struggle" and "Among Newspapers and Periodicals" are published in No. 11 of the newspaper *Ekho*.

July 5 (18) — Lenin's article "A Bold Assault and a Timid Defence" is published as a leading article in No. 12 of the newspaper *Ekho*.

Lenin writes the article "The Parties in the Duma and the People", published as a leading article in No. 13 of the newspaper *Ekho*, July 6 (19).

July 6 (19) — Lenin writes the article "Conspiracies of Reaction and Threats of the Pogrom-Mongers", published as a leading article in *Ekho*, No. 14, July 7 (20).

July 7 (20) — Lenin, under the name of Karpov, speaks at a meeting of Party workers of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., delivering a report and putting forward a draft resolution on the tactics of the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma.

July 9 or 10 (22 or 23) — In Kuokkala (Finland), Lenin confers with Party workers on the tasks of the Party in connection with the dissolution of the Duma.

Between July 13 and 17 (26 and 30) — Lenin writes the pamphlet *The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat*.

July 16 (29) — Lenin writes the draft of the resolution of the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the dispatch of a delegation to Sveaborg to lead the uprising.

July 20 (August 2) — Lenin gives directives to the Bolshevik members of the St. Petersburg Committee on carrying out a strike in support of the Kronstadt uprising.

First half of August	During a stay of two weeks in Vyborg Lenin guides the work of preparing and issuing No. 1 of the newspaper *Proletary*.
August 12 (26)	Lenin writes the article "The Boycott".
August 21 (September 3)	Lenin's articles "Before the Storm" (leading article), "The Boycott", "The Political Crisis and the Bankruptcy of Opportunist Tactics" and "The Events of the Day" are published in No. 1 of the newspaper *Proletary*.
August 27 (September 9)	Lenin presides at a Party meeting in Terioki and delivers a speech against the Menshevik slogan of a "labour congress" and insists on the need to convene the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The meeting unanimously adopts the resolution moved by Lenin.
August 29 (September 11)	Lenin's articles "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising" and "Vacillating Tactics" are published in *Proletary*, No. 2.
Summer	Lenin writes "Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy" in regard to A. Bogdanov's book *Empirio-monism* (Part III).
End of summer	Lenin moves to the summer residence "Vasa" in Kuokkala (Finland).
September 8 (21)	Lenin's articles "The Government's Policy and the Coming Struggle" (leading article) and "Hands Off!" are published in *Proletary*, No. 3.
First half of September	Lenin writes his note on "Union of the Bund with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party".
September 19 (October 2)	Lenin's article "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks" is published in *Proletary*, No. 4.
September 30 (October 13)	Lenin's articles "A New Coup d'État in Preparation" (leading article), "Guerrilla Warfare" and "An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties of Russia" are published in *Proletary*, No. 5.
Beginning of October	Lenin writes "Notes on *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1".
October, later than 13 (26)	Lenin writes the pamphlet *Martov's and Cherevanin's Pronouncements in the Bourgeois Press*. The pamphlet was issued by *Proletarskoye Dyelo* Publishers in October 1906.

October 18 (31) Lenin's article "The Russian Radical is Wise after the Event" is published in the magazine *Vestnik Zhizni*, No. 12.

October 29 (November 11) Lenin's articles "The Results of the Cadet Congress" (leading article) and "Philistinism in Revolutionary Circles" are published in *Proletary*, No. 6.

October 31 (November 13) Lenin finishes his pamphlet *The Social-Democrats and Electoral Agreements*.

November 3 (16) Lenin is elected to the presidium at the Second Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. ("First All-Russian") in Tammerfors.

Lenin speaks on the question of the conference agenda.

Lenin moves that the question how the union with the Bund is proceeding in the local Party organisations should be discussed.

November 4 (17) Lenin delivers the report and reply to the debate at the conference on the question of electoral agreements during elections to the Duma; he puts forward a "Dissenting Opinion" on the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Duma campaign (the "Dissenting Opinion" was signed by 14 conference delegates).

November 6 (19) Lenin speaks at the conference, criticising the Menshevik draft electoral platform proposed by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin speaks during the debate in favour of convening an extraordinary Party Congress.

November 7 (20) Lenin insists that the conference should discuss the question of the campaign for a "labour congress" as a question of violation of Party discipline. Lenin's amendment to the resolution on "Unity of the Election Campaign in the Localities" is adopted by the conference.

November 10 (23) Lenin's articles "On Convening an Extraordinary Party Congress", "How History is Written...", and "Postscript to the Article 'The Social-Democrats and the Election Campaign'" are published in *Proletary*, No. 7.

November before 16 (29) Lenin gives directives (orally and in a special letter) to the organisers of the convocation of the first Bolshevik conference of military and combat organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. in Tammerfors.

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November 22 (December 5)	Lenin converses with participants in the first conference of military and combat organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. concerning the results of the conference.
November 23 (December 6)	Lenin's articles "Draft Election Address" (leading article), "Blocs with the Cadets", "Party Discipline and the Fight against the Pro-Cadet Social-Democrats" and "How the Armavir Social-Democrats Are Conducting Their Election Campaign" are published in *Proletary*, No. 8. The leaflet written by Lenin "Whom to Elect to the State Duma" is published as a supplement to *Proletary*, No. 8.
Between November 15, 1906, and January 15, 1907	Lenin delivers a lecture to the workers of the Semyannikovsky sub-district of Neva District on the subject of the "Electoral Agreements in the West and in Russia".
December 7 (20)	Lenin's articles "The New Senate Interpretation" (leading article) and "The Crisis of Menshevism" are published in *Proletary*, No. 9.
December 10 (23)	Lenin writes the article "The Proletariat and Its Ally in the Russian Revolution", published in *Proletary*, No. 10, December 20, 1906 (January 2, 1907).
December 14 (27)	Lenin writes the article "The Government's Falsification of the Duma and the Tasks of the Social-Democrats", published in *Proletary*, No. 10, December 20, 1906 (January 2, 1907).
December 20 (January 2, 1907)	Lenin's article "Concerning an Article Published in the Organ of the Bund" is published in *Proletary*, No. 10.
December 2 (January 6 9, 1907)	Lenin's article "The Political Situation and the Tasks of the Working Class" is published as a leading article in No. 1 of the Bolshevik weekly *Ternii Truda*.
December after 27 (January 9, 1907)	Lenin writes the preface to the Russian translation of W. Liebknecht's pamphlet *No Compromiser, No Electoral Agreements*.
December 28 (January 10, 1907)	Lenin writes the article "The Working-Class Party's Tasks and the Peasantry" and sends it from St. Petersburg to the editorial board of the newspaper *Samarskaya Luka* in Samara.

December 31 (January 13, 1907)	Lenin's article "The Attitude of the Bourgeois Parties and of the Workers' Party to the Duma Elections" is published as a leading article in No. 2 of the weekly *Ternii Truda*.
December	Lenin edits the Russian translation of K. Kautsky's pamphlet *The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution* and writes a preface to the pamphlet.

1907

January 6 (19)	Lenin takes part in the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation as a delegate from the Obvodny and Sapozhny sub-districts of Moscow District. Lenin is elected to the presidium of the conference. Lenin makes a report on electoral agreements at the forthcoming Duma elections.
January 7 (20)	Lenin's article "Plekhanov and Vasilyev" is published in *Proletary*, No. 11.
January 14 (27)	Lenin's article "The Workers' Party Election Campaign in St. Petersburg" is published as a leading article in No. 1 of the Bolshevik weekly *Prostiye Rechi*.
January 13-14 (26-27)	Lenin writes the pamphlet *The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections*.
January 15 (28)	Lenin writes the pamphlet "*When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool....*" (From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist).

В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ
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На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

12

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PREFACE

Volume Twelve contains Lenin's writings for the period January-June 1907.

A number of the works included in this volume deal with the revolutionary tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. at the time of the Second State Duma election campaign—the defence of the Left bloc and the struggle against the Menshevik policy of collaboration with the Constitutional-Democrats (the Cadets). Among these writings are: "The Social-Democratic Election Campaign in St. Petersburg", "How To Vote in the St. Petersburg Elections (Who Benefits from the Fables About the Black-Hundred Danger?)", "The Second Duma and the Second Revolutionary Wave", "On the Tactics of Opportunism", "The Bolsheviks and the Petty Bourgeoisie", "The Elections to the Duma and the Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats", "The Imminent Dissolution of the Duma and Questions of Tactics", and others.

There are also documents and articles by Lenin on preparations for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the reports and speeches he made at the Congress—"Draft Resolutions for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", the articles "The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy", "Report to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the St. Petersburg Split and the Institution of the Party Tribunal Ensuing Therefrom", "Speech on the Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties", and other speeches.

Lenin's "Report to the Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation on the Question of the Duma Campaign and Duma Tactics", and the articles "What the Splitters Have To Say About the Coming Split", "Reorganisation and the End of the Split in St. Petersburg", provide a picture of his

struggle for an ideological consolidation of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. on Bolshevik principles.

Lenin's "Preface to the Russian Translation of Karl Marx's Letters to Dr. Kugelmann" and his "Preface to the Russian Translation of *Letters by Johannes Becker*, *Joseph Dietzgen*, *Frederick Engels*, *Karl Marx*, *and Others to Friedrich Sorge and Others*", show the theoretical and political significance of the Marx and Engels correspondence, part of which was first published in a Russian translation in 1907.

This volume also contains two of Lenin's articles on the agrarian question—"Draft for a Speech on the Agrarian Question in the Second State Duma" and "The Agrarian Question and the Forces of the Revolution".

The articles "On the Report of the Moscow District of St. Petersburg Concerning the Elections to the Second Duma", "A Note on the Resolution of the Estonian Social-Democrats", "The First Important Step", to be found in this volume, are included in V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works* for the first time. In the last-named article Lenin criticises the opportunist behaviour of the Menshevik deputies to the Second Duma.

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG[1]

St. Petersburg, January 18, 1907.

The election campaign in St. Petersburg is in full swing. The decisive moment is approaching: in the first place, the next few days will reveal the final grouping of the parties in the elections—who is allied with whom, and who is against whom. Secondly, the elections themselves are now very near.

The elections in the capital are of immense importance. The eyes of all Russia are now turned towards St. Petersburg. Here, the pulse of political life beats faster and the government makes itself felt more than elsewhere. Here are the headquarters of all the parties, the leading newspapers of all trends and shades, and the best public speakers at election meetings.

We can already say definitely and emphatically—St. Petersburg has passed the test. The election campaign in St. Petersburg has already provided an amazing abundance of political-educational material, and *day by day* continues providing more. This material must be assiduously studied. It must be systematically collected, and serve to bring out in the greatest possible relief the *class* basis of the various parties. And this live, direct knowledge, which interests and agitates everybody, must be carried to the broadest possible strata of workers and to the most remote rural areas.

We will try to begin collecting this material, in the form of a synopsis, of course. Let the reader look back and ponder over the whole course of the election campaign in St.

Petersburg, so as to obtain a true and consistent picture of the role played by the Social-Democrats, and not allow himself to be carried away by the minor events of the day and the kaleidoscope of loud-mouthed political chicanery.

The first stage. The Social-Democrats make the theoretical preparations for the elections. The most prominent representatives of the Right and the Left wings express their views. At first the Mensheviks do nothing but vacillate: (i) Cherevanin is for agreements with the Cadets.[2] (2) The Cadet press is jubilant and spreads the glad tidings to all corners of Russia. (3) Martov protests in *Tovarishch*,[3] favouring a *purely* Social-Democratic election list, and reproaching the Bolsheviks (*Proletary*,[4] No. 1) even for their *general* recognition of the possibility of agreements with the Trudoviks[5] against the Cadets. (4) The Bolsheviks come out in favour of a *purely* Social-Democratic election list, but do not exclude agreements with the revolutionary democrats. (5) In the bourgeois press Plekhanov advocates blocs with the Cadets. (6) Vacillation among the Mensheviks: Larin wrathfully condemns blocs with the Cadets as a disgrace to Social-Democracy, Nik. I—sky[6] admits the possibility of blocs with the Cadets, but prefers a bloc with the Trudoviks against the Cadets. (7) Martov and all the Mensheviks describe an arc of 180°, and swing over to Plekhanov.

The All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party[7] registers two definite trends: the Mensheviks and the Bundists[8] are in favour of blocs with the Cadets; the Bolsheviks, Poles and Letts are unreservedly against such blocs, but admit the possibility of agreements with the revolutionary democrats.

The second stage. The idea of a bloc with the Cadets is developed in the press. Plekhanov goes so far as to speak of "a Duma with full powers", thus threatening to reduce Menshevism to an absurdity. Wishing to bring the Mensheviks and the Cadets closer together, he achieves the very opposite (owing to his utter failure to understand the political situation) he widens the rift between them. On the one hand, the Cadet Party solemnly and officially rejects the idea of "a Duma with full powers" as a revolutionary illusion, and jeers at Plekhanov. It is quite clear that the

Cadets want and demand an *ideological* bloc, the subordination of the Lefts to Cadet leadership, to compromising, anti-revolutionary Cadet tactics. On the other hand, Plekhanov's excess of zeal causes confusion in the ranks of the Mensheviks: both the Bundists and the Caucasian Mensheviks have made a public condemnation, in the press, of Plekhanov's pronouncements. Confused and perplexed, the Central Committee, where the Mensheviks have a majority, remains silent. Plekhanov is isolated and is silent, too.

The third stage. The beginning of mass action. Election meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg. A gust of fresh air from the street penetrates into the musty atmosphere of intellectualist political chicanery. The mythical nature of the Black-Hundred[9] danger at once becomes apparent; the street supports the Bolshevik contention that, by their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the opportunists by the nose in order to avert the danger threatening them from the Left. The struggle at election meetings in St. Petersburg and Moscow is, *in substance*, a struggle between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, mainly the Bolshevik Social-Democrats. The Cadets try to drag *everybody*—the street, the crowd, the masses—*to the Right*; they oppose revolutionary demands, and, under the guise of following the path of "peaceful parliamentarianism", have high praise for a deal with the reactionaries. The Bolshevik Social-Democrats call the masses to the Left, and expose the fraudulent, selfish, class character of the fairy-tales about peaceful methods. The Mensheviks fade into the background (on the admission of the very Cadet press which is so enamoured of them); they timidly criticise the Cadets, not in a manner befitting socialists but like Left Cadets, and they talk just as timidly about the need for an agreement with the Cadets.

The fourth stage. The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation[10] takes place. At this Conference, which has been elected by all the members of the Social-Democratic Party on the basis of discussions (i.e., the general opinion on the question of agreements with the Cadets was solicited), the Bolsheviks are in absolute preponderance irrespective of whether votes challenged by either side are counted, uncounted, or counted at a special

quota. The Mensheviks walk out of the Conference and launch splitting tactics. Formally, they try to screen their conduct by means of ridiculous and miserable hair-splitting on points of organisation (they allege that the Bolshevik endorsement of credentials is irregular, although the Bolsheviks preponderate, no matter *how* the credentials are counted; secondly, that the Conference has refused to divide into two sections, a city section and gubernia* section, although the Central Committee has no right to demand this according to the rules, and has not demanded it of Wilno, Odessa, or any other cities).

Actually, the reason why the Mensheviks are creating a split is obvious to everyone: the opportunist Social-Democrats are deserting the proletariat for the liberal bourgeoisie, deserting the workers' Social-Democratic organisations for amorphous, non-party election groups.

The Conference pays absolutely no attention to the Menshevik walk-out and carries on with *its own* work. In St. Petersburg there are disputes even among the Bolsheviks; the so-called pure Bolsheviks would have no agreements with any other party whatsoever. The so-called dissenters are in favour of an agreement with revolutionary democracy, with the Trudoviks, in order to smash the hegemony of the Cadets over the unenlightened working-class masses in the capital of Russia. In certain cases, these disputes between the "purists" and the "dissenters" become acute, but actually all the Bolsheviks realise full well that this disagreement does not divide them on questions of principle but merely serves to stimulate a thorough and business-like discussion of all chances and prospects in the elections.

The socialist proletariat cannot refuse the non-socialist petty-bourgeois masses permission *to follow its leadership* in order that it may emancipate them from the influence of the Cadets. After a thorough discussion the Conference passes a resolution to offer the Socialist-Revolutionaries[11]

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* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of those was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

and the Committee of the Trudovik Group agreements on the following basis: two places to the worker curia, two to the Social-Democrats, and two to the Trudoviks.

In St. Petersburg this was the only correct and the only possible decision; the task of defeating the Cadets could not be neglected; there would be no Black-Hundred danger if there were two Left election lists; but there could be if the Lefts were split still further, and it would be impossible to rally the masses of voters. The Conference's offer left the preponderance of the Social-Democrats intact; it consolidated the ideological and political hegemony of Social-Democracy in all the purity of its principles.

As for the Popular Socialist Party, the Conference decided to exclude it from the bloc as a semi-Cadet party, evasive on fundamental issues of the struggle outside the Duma. It is well known that after the Duma was dissolved this party separated from the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and began to preach caution and moderation, in the legal press.

It goes without saying that revolutionary Social-Democracy *had to demand* that the Socialist-Revolutionaries adopt a *definite* attitude towards such a party, and either insist on its exclusion (this would probably have been quite feasible if the Mensheviks had not deserted the socialists for the Cadets at the decisive moment), or at least to disclaim all responsibility for *such* "Trudoviks".

The fifth stage. The split caused by the Mensheviks raises the hopes of the *whole* liberal bourgeoisie. The whole Cadet press is jubilant—jubilant over the "isolation" of the hated Bolsheviks, and the "courageous" way in which the Mensheviks went over from the revolution to the "opposition bloc". *Rech*,[12] the author of this latter expression, has outspokenly given the Mensheviks and Popular Socialists the title of "*moderate socialist parties*". Indeed, the impression is created that the Cadets will win over the whole of the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., all the Trudoviks, including the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the whole petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party, i.e., the Mensheviks.

The Bolsheviks calmly continue their independent activities. We are glad, they say, to isolate ourselves from this dirty business, from the treachery and vacillation of the

petty bourgeoisie. We shall not subordinate our tactics to seat-hunting. We declare: *in any case* there will be three election lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

The sixth stage. The elections in the worker curia and the exposure of the duplicity of the Trudoviks.

In the worker curia the Social-Democrats win, but the Socialist-Revolutionaries obtain a much larger share of the votes than we expected. It turns out that it was *mainly Mensheviks* that the *Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated in the worker curia*. We are informed that in Vyborg District, the Menshevik stronghold, *more* Socialist-Revolutionaries have been elected than Social-Democrats!

Our country, therefore, bears out a phenomenon that has long been observed in other countries. Opportunism in Social-Democracy is so repulsive to the working masses that they swing over to the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The highly unstable and vacillating policy of the Mensheviks immensely weakens Social-Democracy and plays into the hands of the Cadets in the urban curia, and of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the worker curia.

It is only *revolutionary* Social-Democracy that can meet the needs of the proletarian masses and *permanently* alienate them from *all* petty-bourgeois parties.

On the other hand, however, the events also reveal Trudovik duplicity. In the worker curia they (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) defeat us by routing the Mensheviks, who favour a bloc with the Cadets. At the same time they are playing a most unprincipled game in the election campaign. They make no party declarations, publish no independent organisational decisions, conduct no open discussion on the question of blocs with the Cadets. One would think that they were deliberately blowing out all the candles—like people who need the dark for their dark deeds.

It is said that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists. No one knows the terms or the character of that bloc. It is all guess-work. *It is said* (cf. *Rodnaya Zemlya* of January 15; this is the newspaper that Mr. Tan[13] writes for) that the Socialist-Revolutionaries are in favour of a bloc with the Cadets. No one knows the truth. It is all guess work. The same confusion

is revealed at election meetings: one Socialist-Revolutionary, jointly with the Popular Socialists, advocates a bloc with the Cadets; another gets a resolution carried against a bloc with the Cadets and for a bloc of all the Lefts against the Cadets.

The utter instability and duplicity of the *entire* petty bourgeoisie, including its most revolutionary section, is now *clearly* demonstrated to the masses. Were it not for the petty-bourgeois opportunists in our own Social-Democratic ranks, we should have an excellent opportunity of explaining to *all* the workers why *only* the Social-Democrats are capable of defending their interests honestly and consistently.

It is on that basis that the Bolsheviks are carrying on their agitation. The Bolsheviks are unswervingly pursuing their own line. In St. Petersburg there *are sure to be* Cadet and Social-Democratic election lists. Our decision *does not depend* on the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie: if they respond to our call and follow the proletariat against the liberals, so much the better for them. If not, so much the worse for them; *in any case* we shall pursue the Social-Democratic path.

The seventh stage. *Disintegration*. The Cadets get themselves mixed up in negotiations with the Black Hundreds. The petty-bourgeois opportunists get themselves mixed up in negotiations with the Cadets. The Bolsheviks unswervingly pursue their own line.

The newspapers report: (1) that Mr. Stolypin has granted an audience to Mr. Milyukov; (2) that, according to reports in the foreign press, the government is willing to legalise the Cadet Party on condition that it forms no blocs with the Lefts.

A ray of light is thrown on the backstage machinations of the liberal traitors. The Cadets are *afraid* to reject the offer of the Black Hundreds, for the latter threaten to dissolve the Duma.

That is *the real reason* why the Cadets, to the horror of the petty bourgeois opportunists, have suddenly become so "adamant" on the question of agreements.

The Cadets are obdurate. More than two seats for all the Lefts? Never! In issue after issue the Cadet *Rech*

explains very distinctly and didactically that it is willing *to lead* the moderate socialists (two seats out of six) *in order to combat* "revolutionary illusions", *to combat revolution*. March with the revolution? Never!

The opportunists are in despair. The tone of the articles in *Tovarishch* against *Rech* grows positively hysterical. Mr. Bogucharsky, the renegade Social-Democrat, twists and turns, exhorting *Rech*, and, jointly with other writers on *Tovarishch*, urges it to consider what it is doing, etc. The recent joint jubilation of *Rech* and *Tovarishch* over the isolation of the Bolsheviks and the submission of the moderate socialists to the liberals now gives way to angry recriminations and a free fight. On January 7, St. Petersburg learned of the decision of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference. Today is January 18. But so far the Cadets and the opportunists have *not* decided *anything*. The tone of *Rech* today is particularly uncompromising towards *Tovarishch*, and the tone of *Tovarishch* today is particularly sharp and perplexed in its remarks against *Rech*.

The Bolsheviks are unswervingly pursuing their own line. There will be three election lists in St. Petersburg. Where the petty bourgeoisie will find themselves is their business: the revolutionary proletariat will do its duty in any case.

What the eighth stage will be we do not know. This, in the final analysis, depends on the negotiations, on the relations between the Cadets and the Black-Hundred government. If they "come to terms" on the immediate legalisation of the Cadets, or on some other point, the petty bourgeoisie will be isolated. If, *for the time being*, the Cadets and the Black Hundreds fail to come to terms, the Cadets may even concede three seats to the petty bourgeoisie. The Social-Democrats will not allow this to determine their policy.

The course of events in the St. Petersburg election campaign provides us with a miniature but excellent picture of the relations between the Black Hundreds, the Cadets and the revolutionary proletariat. And this course of events strikingly confirms the old, tested and uncompromising tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats.

A straight policy is the best policy. A policy based on principles is the most practical policy. Such a policy *alone*

can really win Social-Democracy the lasting sympathy and confidence of the masses. It alone can free the workers' party from responsibility for the negotiations between Stolypin and Milyukov, and between Milyukov and Annensky, Dan or Chernov.

Henceforth, this responsibility must *forever* be borne by the opportunist Social-Democrats and the "Trudovik parties".

It is not surprising that the vacillating Mensheviks are trying to save themselves by resorting to hypocrisy. We are in favour either of a struggle against the Black-Hundred danger or of *purely* Social-Democratic election lists, say the Social-Democrats who left the Conference (if we are to believe today's newspapers). This is an amusing subterfuge, which only very simple-minded people can believe! It has been proved that there is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg if there are *two* Left election lists. But what if there are three? Are the Mensheviks anxious to try *this*?! No, they are simply clutching at anything, for the course of events has forced them to the wall: they must either desert to the Cadets and submit entirely to their ideological and political hegemony, or follow the Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic election list to which the Trudoviks may be admitted.

In St. Petersburg such an election list would probably defeat both the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. And having chosen a correct line from the very outset, revolutionary Social-Democrats will unswervingly pursue it, undaunted by the possibility of temporary defeats in the event of the petty bourgeoisie deserting to the liberals—drawing new strength and determination from the vacillation and indecision of the opportunists.

There will be three election lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic!

Citizens, make your choice!

Prostiye Rechi, No. 2,
January 21, 1907

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to the text in *Prostiye Rechi*

DESCENDING RUNG BY RUNG

The St. Petersburg elections provide a wealth of instructive material for a *true* study of the character of the various parties, and the class tendencies, or class significance, of their policies.

In this respect two facts are of greatest interest: the negotiations between the Cadets and Stolypin, the leader of the Black-Hundred government, and the negotiations between the petty-bourgeois parties and the liberal landlords, the Cadets.

So far we know very little about the negotiations between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds: the audience granted by Stolypin to Milyukov, attempts to legalise the Cadet Party, for which the Cadets are to pay by abstaining from entering into blocs with the Lefts. *These* negotiations are being carried on very secretly, and their exposure is a matter of the future.

The other negotiations are to a certain extent public. The role the opportunist Social-Democrats are playing in them is particularly clear.

Why did they break away from the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation?

So as to make a deal with the Cadets.

But the Cadets will not agree to a deal with the Mensheviks *alone*.

And so, the Mensheviks are entering into a bloc with all the petty-bourgeois parties, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks, and the Popular Socialists.

The opportunists who have broken away from Social-Democracy are going over to the petty bourgeoisie!

What are the terms of this bloc?

They are: to enter into a *joint* agreement with the Cadets to secure for the Left bloc three Duma seats out of the six.

We know that the agreement between the Mensheviks and the petty-bourgeois parties has been made in writing—at any rate, a joint resolution has been adopted. Apparently, the new allies do not want to inform the public about it, or are in no hurry to do so.

We also know that *Comrade Dan took part* in the negotiations on the formation of this bloc, although *he had not been authorised to do so* either by the group of breakaway St. Petersburg Social-Democrats (31), *or by any other party organisation*.

We could not even dream of better confirmation than that provided by the course of political events, of our constant assertion that the Mensheviks are the *opportunist*, *petty-bourgeois* section of the workers' party, and that they are as unprincipled and vacillating as the petty bourgeoisie in general.

Just think what the Mensheviks are doing. Did they not proclaim from the housetops that they were protecting the class purity of Social-Democracy against the Bolsheviks, who, they alleged, were leaning towards the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries?

And now events are unmasking them. The Bolsheviks are openly urging the petty bourgeoisie to follow the proletariat *against* the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Mensheviks refuse, and *secretly* (for no one knows the terms of the bloc, and no one has authorised Comrade Dan) *enter* into a bloc with *all* the petty-bourgeois groups, including the extreme Right wing (the Popular Socialists), in order jointly to surrender those workers who are under their influence *to the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie*!

All the petty-bourgeois parties, *including the Mensheviks* (it is not for nothing that *Rech* has already registered them as part of the "opposition bloc" which has abandoned the revolution, and has classified the Popular Socialists and the Mensheviks among the "moderate socialist parties"), prefer bargaining with the liberals to fighting in the ranks of the proletariat.

Let all class-conscious workers in St. Petersburg consider very carefully whither the Mensheviks are leading the workers' party!

What, may it be asked, is the result of the negotiations between the petty bourgeoisie and the liberals?

So far, all we know from today's papers (January 19) is that a meeting took place in St. Petersburg yesterday of representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudovik Group, the Popular Socialists and the *Mensheviks* (i.e., the entire new petty-bourgeois bloc), and the *Cadets*. According to this report, the Cadets have definitely refused to cede three seats to the "Left bloc". But the "Left" bloc has refused to accept two seats.

Rech says in this connection: "The representatives of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats did not attend *the conference*." That is true. We do not associate with the petty bourgeoisie to betray the workers' party to the liberals!

What will happen next? No one knows. Probably, the petty-bourgeois bloc and the Cadets will go on with their barginning.

It is reported, however, that there is a workers' committee in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which emphatically condemns blocs with the Cadets. What truth there is in this, we do not know, for *the Socialist-Revolutionaries are deliberately concealing from the public* both the terms of their agreement with the Popular Socialists (no one even knows when and by whom, exactly, this agreement was concluded!) and the trends in their own party on the question of blocs with the Cadets.

Today (January 19), *Rech* has published a resolution adopted by the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which confirms the rumour that the *workers*' section of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party is not in favour of blocs with the Cadets. The *Rech* report reads as follows:

"The St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, having entered into an agreement [which? when? on what terms?]* with the Trudovik and Popular

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Socialist groups, has decided to submit to both sections of the Social-Democratic Party—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—a proposal that the socialist [?] groups enter into an agreement for the purpose of conducting the pre[?]-election campaign in the most purposeful manner; and in the event of no agreement being reached with the two sections, to enter into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. In concluding this joint socialist agreement, the representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionaries must insist [?!?] on the impermissibility of agreements with the Cadets, and on the independent action of the socialist alliance.

"If, however, the majority of the groups [?] consider that a technical [!?] agreement with the Cadets is more expedient than independent action, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party will submit [!] to the decision of the majority [the majority of *other* parties!], but will make it an absolute condition of the agreement that all the seats to which the socialist groups will be entitled shall be ceded exclusively to the worker curia."

A prize of 1,000,000 rubles might well be offered to anyone who could make anything out of this rigmarole! Insist on the *impermissibility* of agreements with the Cadets after having provisionally formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists who are wholeheartedly in favour of the Cadets! Demand from the Cadets three seats for the worker curia *exclusively* and at the same time take part in a "conference" with the Cadets jointly with the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks, who *do not* make such a demand! Boast of independence as a party as distinct from "groups" and at the same time *submit* to the "majority", i.e., to the three groups (Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Mensheviks)! O wise Oedipus, solve this riddle!

And the workers representing the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (in the Moscow District of St. Petersburg) *approve* this petty-bourgeois eyewash, which conceals the betrayal of their interests to the liberals! But these workers add: "We express our deep indignation with the Menshevik faction of the Social-Democratic Party for its obstructionist behaviour towards other socialist groups and parties."

O simple-minded Socialist-Revolutionary proletarians!

If you are indignant with the Mensheviks, why are you not indignant with the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party? Both are dragging you under the wing of the liberals.

The underlying cause of this dissension within the petty-bourgeois bloc is quite clear. There is a danger of a rupture with the Cadets. *The Popular Socialists and the Mensheviks are, perhaps, not averse to accepting* two seats from the Cadets and to betraying the rest of the petty bourgeoisie, just as the Mensheviks betrayed the proletariat!

That's what's behind it all!

From rung to rung downwards. Betray the workers' party and join the petty-bourgeois bloc. Betray the petty-bourgeois democratic bloc and join the Cadets! Go, and good riddance!

At the audience granted to him by Stolypin, Milyukov said: "May it please Your Excellency to note that I have split the revolution and have torn the moderates away from it. Haven't I earned a tip, Your Grace?"... Stolypin: "Well, yes, I will petition for your legalisation. I'll tell you what, Pavel Nikolayevich, you split that working-class rabble gently, and I will do it with a club. And so ... between the two of us... Let's shake hands on it, Pavel Nikolayevich!"

Written on January 19
(February 1), 1907

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Published according
to the newspaper text

THE PROTEST OF THE THIRTY-ONE MENSHEVIKS

We have just received a pamphlet entitled *Why We Were Compelled To Leave the Conference* (*Declaration Submitted to the Central Committee by 31 Members of the Conference*).

In it the Mensheviks do not say *a single word* about the principles involved! Their defection from the workers' party to the petty-bourgeois bloc (the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks, and the Popular Socialists), and thence to the Cadets, is evidently of no interest to the proletariat. These protestants have no desire to discuss the real point at issue, but deal *only* with formalities.

Let us examine their formal arguments. There are three of them: (1) The history of the St. Petersburg Committee and its undemocratic organisation; (2) the irregularities in the Conference's endorsement of credentials; (3) the refusal of the Conference to divide into two parts, one for the city and one for the gubernia.

On the first point we should like to ask: what has the St. Petersburg Committee to do with it? *Special* elections were held for the Conference, were they not?

Essentially the Mensheviks are telling *atrocious lies* about the history of the St. Petersburg Committee and its alleged undemocratic organisation. It is worth noting as a curiosity, for instance, that the Latvian District (the inclusion of which the Mensheviks complain about), was included *before* the Unity Congress, that is, when there was an *equal* number of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on the St. Petersburg Committee. More than six months ago, therefore, the Mensheviks themselves *voluntarily* agreed that it was correct to include the Letts. Or take another instance:

the Mensheviks complain that the St. Petersburg Committee had allowed the co-optation of a certain number of members. They forget to add that it was the *Mensheviks themselves* that had carried out the co-optation. These instances enable one to judge the fairness of this belated criticism of the way the St. Petersburg Committee was formed.

Their second argument is that the Conference, if you please, committed irregularities in endorsing the credentials. The Mensheviks refuse to recognise the shop-assistants' votes, and *claim* that the following distribution of votes is the only correct one: Bolshevik—1,560, plus 180 in favour of the platform of the revolutionary bloc—total, 1,740. Menshevik—1,589. Or credentials, counting those left over: Bolshevik—35; Menshevik—32 (see p. 8 of the Menshevik pamphlet).

It remains for us only to emphasise that *even in the opinion of our severest critics* the Bolsheviks had, *and were bound to have*, *preponderance* at the Conference.

Everybody knows, comrades, that the "dissenters" (the platform of the revolutionary bloc) were also Bolsheviks. And since you yourselves admit that the Bolsheviks would have had 35 credentials against 32 *even if* the endorsement of the credentials depended on the Mensheviks, why make all this fuss?

You yourselves are compelled to admit that the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation is a Bolshevik body.

But let us see *how* the Mensheviks criticise the way in which the credentials were verified at the Conference.

They do not want to consider the votes of the shop-assistants at all. Why? "On the pretext that it was impossible to hold meetings," says the pamphlet, "the leading body of the shop-assistants, after an attempt to take a referendum of its members, which resulted in only 100 votes being cast, was authorised by the St. Petersburg Committee to elect five representatives, allowing, no one knows why, one per 60 members, there being 313 organised shop-assistants"... (p. 4).

The difficulty of organising a meeting of shop-assistants is common knowledge. On what grounds is this called a "pretext"? On what grounds are 313 *organised* shop-assistants (i.e., Party members) to be kept out? Do you not

admit yourselves that *an attempt was made to take a referendum*, i.e., that the leading body took steps to get all the members of the Party to express their opinion?

And by reducing the rate of representation from one per 50 to one per 60, the St. Petersburg Committee admitted that the representation was not entirely democratic.

Moscow District: among the challenged votes the Mensheviks recognise 185 Bolshevik votes. But under the heading "Reasons for Challenging", the authors of the pamphlet *themselves* write literally the following: "*Challenged tentatively, in case the Bolsheviks refuse to endorse similar elections in another district.*"

Isn't that good? The Mensheviks challenged the Bolshevik credentials *tentatively*, in case...!! In summing up they *themselves* state that "the number of votes that should really have been disqualified" was 115, and not 300; *i.e.*, *they themselves admit* that 185 *should have been endorsed*!

Thus, the Menshevik methods consist in challenging "tentatively" votes that really should be endorsed!

And such people have the insolence to talk about irregular representation at the Conference....

The Mensheviks themselves count the number of *incontestable* votes as 1,376 for the *Bolsheviks* and 795 for the *Mensheviks*. And that means, my dear comrades, that even by adopting the unheard-of and original method of "tentative challenging" you *were unable* to challenge the bulk of the Bolshevik votes!

Of the 789 Menshevik votes challenged by the Bolsheviks (according to the pamphlet) the 234 votes of the Vyborg District are of special importance. Under the heading: "Reasons for Challenging" we read: "The elections were not carried out on the basis of platforms, although discussions were held." The fact that discussions were held does not prove in the least that *the voters themselves* spoke in favour of blocs with the Cadets, so that the Conference was right in refusing to assign to the partisans of a bloc with the Cadets *those votes* that were not directly and unambiguously in favour of it: The Conference reduced the representation for these 234 votes.

Further, the Bolsheviks challenged the 370 votes of the Franco-Russian Subdistrict (City District). Under the

heading: "Reasons for Challenging" we read: "Without platforms—100, and the remainder (270)—by two-stage elections with discussions."

You see, the votes of the shop-assistants ought to have been disqualified despite the "attempt to take a referendum". All the Menshevik votes ought to have been endorsed, despite the *two-stage elections*, which in fact did not in the least differ from the method by which the shop-assistants elected their representatives! No, Menshevik comrades; your defence of the Menshevik credentials is very weak!

As regards dividing the Conference, the Mensheviks refer to it very briefly: "Although this proposal was perfectly *rational*", the Conference rejected it (p. 5). But on the very next page the secret of its "rationality" is indiscreetly revealed: "Within the precincts of the city the Mensheviks had an overwhelming majority" (?!) (if the votes were counted in the Menshevik fashion, i.e., if all the shop-assistants' votes were eliminated and all the Franco-Russian and Vyborg votes were included!).

So that's the game! Division was rational because it would have given the Mensheviks a fictitious majority. Simple, is it not? Why, then, comrades, did you forget to mention what "rational" division you propose for the *Railway* District, for instance, and why the Central Committee did not think it *rational* to propose that the conferences at *Wilno*, Odessa, etc., be divided?

The Menshevik protests over formalities are empty and trivial quibbling. What is serious is their decision to desert to the Cadets. But the 31 protestants are absolutely silent about that.

Proletary, No. 12,
January 25, 1907

Published according
to the *Proletary* text

THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS AND THE HYPOCRISY OF THE THIRTY-ONE MENSHEVIKS

The newspaper *Tovarishch* has today (January 20) published lengthy excerpts from the manifesto of the thirty-one Mensheviks who seceded from the socialist organisation on the eve of the St. Petersburg elections.

First of all, let us briefly recall the *actual* history of what the Menshevik seceders from the Social-Democrats have done since they walked out of the Conference.

(1) After breaking away from the Social-Democrat workers, they *entered into a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie* (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks *and the Popular Socialists*) in order jointly to bargain with the Cadets for seats. The written agreement under which the seceding Social-Democrats joined the petty-bourgeois bloc *was concealed from the workers* and from the public.
However we still have hopes that this agreement will eventually be published, and the secret revealed.

(2) As a constituent part of the petty-bourgeois bloc (incorrectly styled the "Left bloc" by the newspapers), the breakaway Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets for three places out of the six for this bloc. The Cadets offered two seats. They could not come to terms. The meeting between the petty-bourgeois "conference" (this expression is not ours—we borrow it from the newspapers) and the Cadets was held on *January 18*. Both *Rech* and *Tovarishch* reported it. *Rech* announces today that no agreement was reached (although we must, of course, be prepared to hear that negotiations are still being conducted behind the scenes).

So far the Mensheviks have made no announcement in the press concerning their *operation* for the sale of workers' votes to the Cadets.

They will probably report to the petty-bourgeois bloc, part of which they formed during the negotiations, and not to the workers' party!

They probably do not like to say *why Comrade Dan* took part in the negotiations, although he had been authorised to do so neither by the group of thirty-one nor by any other Party organisation.

Such are the *deeds* of the thirty-one Mensheviks.

What are their *words?*

Their first argument is that, having denied that there is a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, the Bolsheviks had no right to declare in favour of an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks, as that runs counter to the decisions of the All-Russian Conference, which demand independent action on the part of the Social-Democrats in the absence of a Black-Hundred danger.

This argument is false from beginning to end.

The thirty-one breakaway Mensheviks are deceiving the reading public. *No* Party body *has ever laid* an official ban on agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks in the absence of a Black-Hundred danger. Such an agreement has been concluded in Moscow, for instance, and the Central Committee has not challenged it.

But that is not all. The extent to which the thirty-one Mensheviks are distorting the truth when they invoke the decision of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference can be seen from the following. It is common knowledge that the decisions of this (advisory) Conference were carried by the votes of the Mensheviks and the *Bundists* against those of the Bolsheviks, the Poles and the Letts. And *these very Bundists* who were instrumental in getting the decision of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference passed, have *officially* sanctioned blocs with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and with revolutionary democrats in general, where there is no Black-Hundred danger, but where there is a *Cadet danger*. The Central Committee of the Bund has adopted a *decision* to that effect, and no one has protested against it. It was reported in *Nasha Tribuna*, the

Russian organ of the Bund, and all Russian Social-Democrats who are able to read know it.

The thirty-one Mensheviks are deceiving the workers and the entire reading public.

We have also explained that the All-Russian Social-Democratic Conference authorised the Central Committee everywhere *to exclude* non-Social-Democrats from the Social-Democratic election list, i.e., to demand absolutely independent action on the part of the Social-Democrats. So far the Central Committee has *nowhere* exercised this right, thus, in effect, recognising the autonomy of the Bund and of all other organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Further, the thirty-one Mensheviks are displeased because the Conference excluded the Popular Socialists (P.S., or Social Narodniks) from the Trudovik bloc. The thirty-one Mensheviks write: "It is common knowledge that these three parties [the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks; the latter are not a party] formed a tight bloc in St. Petersburg long ago and are acting jointly."

That is another untruth. First, it has never been officially declared anywhere that such a bloc has been formed and that its terms are really of a nature that would make it a "tight bloc". There have been only the *vaguest* newspaper reports, and they cannot be relied upon where important affairs are concerned and official relations between parties exist. Secondly, the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Committee of the Trudovik Group, who were approached by the Social-Democratic Conference, *started* negotiations *without the Popular Socialists* proves that the bloc of the three Trudovik parties and groups was not a particularly "tight" one. A bloc which does not prevent any of its constituent parts from conducting negotiations independently of the other cannot be called a tight bloc. *We have so far received no official* answer from the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the demand that we consent to an agreement with the Popular Socialists too. Thirdly, *Tovarishch* publishes, on the same page as the communication of the thirty-one Mensheviks, the "January 16 resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Socialist

Revolutionary Party". A note to this resolution reads as follows: "*The withdrawal from the agreement* [that is, the agreement between the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists] *of the Popular Socialist Group will not dissolve the agreement. The withdrawal of any other socialist group or party, however, will dissolve that agreement.*"

Thus, the facts prove that the thirty-one Mensheviks were *not speaking the truth* when they called the Trudovik bloc a tight bloc.

The Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats was *right* in rejecting the Popular Socialists. Firstly, it was right in principle, for there is no doubt that the Popular Socialist Party stands more to the Right, is more unreliable and closer to the Cadets, than any other Trudovik party. Secondly, it was right from the standpoint of practical politics, for it made a correct *forecast* of that line of division between the Trudovik parties which inevitably revealed itself *in the course of the political campaign*. It is now clear to all that, had the Trudoviks *nevertheless* succeeded in foisting the Popular Socialists on us (it would, of course, be ridiculous to fear the inclusion of the Popular Socialists in the Trudovik bloc if that could ensure victory over the Cadets in St. Petersburg), the *responsibility* for the unreliable Trudoviks would have rested *entirely* with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and not with the Social-Democrats. The workers' party took care to let all workers and all citizens *know* the real difference between the more reliable and the less reliable Trudoviks; it took care that responsibility for the bad Trudoviks should rest with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, not with the party of the proletariat.

What conclusion should be drawn from all this fuss over the Popular Socialists?

The conclusion is that the Mensheviks behaved in an *unprincipled* manner in joining a petty-bourgeois bloc *without any discrimination*, and proved incapable of doing what Social-Democrats are in duty bound to do in an election campaign, namely, to teach the masses to draw strict and proper distinctions between parties. The Mensheviks hastened to take their place in a *single* petty-bourgeois bloc

with the Popular Socialists, in other words, with a semi-Cadet group!

The Bolsheviks were consistent in matters of principle. They started with an open resolution, published everywhere in the name of an official Social-Democratic body, *informing* all and sundry of the Popular Socialist Party's unreliability. The Bolsheviks have now achieved the result that the more revolutionary Trudoviks (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) have *themselves* declared that the Popular Socialists may leave the Trudovik bloc without leading to its dissolution!

The Bolsheviks have *achieved* the separation of the revolutionary Trudoviks from the opportunist Trudoviks. The Mensheviks are immersed right up to their ears in an opportunist petty-bourgeois bloc.

The Bolsheviks have openly and publicly called upon the Trudoviks to join them in battle against the Cadets, and have already achieved undoubted political results, although they have not as yet entered into any bloc with anybody. Secretly from the workers, and discarding all principles, the Mensheviks have crawled into a petty-bourgeois bloc so as to haggle with the Cadets.

From this the workers can judge *whither* the Mensheviks are *really* leading them.

The third and last argument of the thirty-one Mensheviks is that an agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks in St. Petersburg would not diminish the Black-Hundred danger, but *increase* it. This assertion is so absurd, or so hypocritical, that we shall quote the Menshevik argument in full:

> "A joint Social-Democratic and Narodnik election list will be popular enough to divert many votes from the Cadets, but not popular enough to achieve victory throughout St. Petersburg, especially if, in the eyes of the average voter, the blame for the non-conclusion of an agreement between all the revolutionary and opposition parties lies with the Social-Democrats and their allies. In that case, a considerable diversion of votes from the Cadets will benefit the united Black Hundreds, who will defeat both the Cadet and the Left election lists."

This whole argument is a piece of sheer hypocrisy intended to screen the bargaining for seats that is going on between the Mensheviks and the Cadets.

Indeed, just think what the Mensheviks are saying: an agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks will increase the Black-Hundred danger, for it will divert *many* votes from the Cadets! Very well, my dear comrades! But when, in your opinion, is the danger of a Black-Hundred victory greatest—when all the non-Black-Hundred votes are split between *two* election lists or when they are split between *three*? Let us assume that the Black Hundreds have 1,000 votes and the rest 2,100. When is the danger of a Black-Hundred victory greatest: when these 2,100 votes are split between *two* lists, or when they are split between *three*?

The thirty-one Mensheviks can apply to any schoolboy to help them solve this brain-racking problem.

But we shall proceed. The thirty-one Mensheviks are not only talking rank nonsense when they profess not to understand that if the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks come to an agreement there will be only two anti-Black-Hundred lists in St. Petersburg, while if there is no such agreement, there may be three. But that is not all.

In addition, the thirty-one Mensheviks are so ignorant of the history of the first elections that they do not know the relative proportion of Black-Hundred and Cadet votes in the St. Petersburg elections to the First Duma. We did not take 1,000 votes for the Black Hundreds and 2,100 for the rest at random. *This example was typical of nine out of the twelve districts of St. Petersburg* in the First Duma elections!

In these nine districts, which together returned 114 electors out of 160, the *lowest* Cadet vote was **more than twice as high** as the *highest* vote cast for the Black Hundreds, or the so-called Right bloc.

What does this show?

It shows that if there are *two* "Left" (i.e., non-Black-Hundred) election lists in St. Petersburg, *no conceivable* division of votes between the Lefts can give the victory to the Black Hundreds.

Since the thirty-one Mensheviks are apparently weak in elementary arithmetic, let us explain it to them: let them try to divide 2,100 into two parts in such a way that 1,000 Black-Hundred votes will defeat both these parts.

Let the Mensheviks rack their brains over this problem, as well as over the problem of whether three lists instead of two will increase or diminish the Black-Hundred danger.

There are no grounds whatever for supposing that the Black Hundreds will be stronger in this year's St. Petersburg elections than they were in last year's. No right-minded politician would venture to make such an assertion. It is clear to everybody that the Black Hundreds are completely discredited after the disclosures of the Lidval case, the assassination of Herzenstein,[14] etc. It is common knowledge that news of Left victories in the elections is now coming in from all parts of Russia.

Under such circumstances, the cries about the Black-Hundred danger are the result either of absolute ignorance or of *hypocrisy*. And it is those who *conceal* their real aims and act behind the scenes that must play the hypocrite. The Mensheviks are raising an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger *in order to divert* the workers' attention from the game they, the Mensheviks, are playing, or did play recently, *by joining the petty-bourgeois bloc* and bargaining with the Cadets.

If *two* Left lists are put up, *no* split in the votes can give the victory to the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg, unless the latter obtain a higher vote than they did at the last elections—and everything goes to indicate that their vote will not increase, but will decrease.

Thus, it was by no means for the purpose of combating the Black-Hundred danger that the Mensheviks joined the petty-bourgeois bloc and bargained with the Cadets—this is a childish fable that can deceive only those who are absolutely ignorant or hopelessly stupid.

The Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma, in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets—such is the simple explanation of all these peregrinations from the Social-Democrats to the petty-bourgeois bloc and from the petty-bourgeois bloc to the Cadets.

None but the very naïve can fail to see the purpose behind the Mensheviks' actions, which they are trying to

conceal by raising an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger.

While they were in the petty-bourgeois bloc, the Mensheviks insisted on *three* seats in the Duma so as to make sure of one seat *for themselves*. If the Cadets had conceded only two seats, the Mensheviks might not have obtained even one. The Cadets directly offered one seat to the Narodniks (Popular Socialists), but dared not take the other from the worker curia. And it is not yet certain who will win in the worker curia.

That is why the Mensheviks *concealed from the public* on what authority Comrade Dan was acting, on what terms they joined the petty-bourgeois bloc, what exactly was discussed at the "conference" of the petty-bourgeois bloc with the Cadets, *etc.*, *etc.* After such behaviour on the part of the Mensheviks, we still do not and cannot know where they will turn now that the Cadets have rejected them. Will the Popular Socialists combine with the Mensheviks to wheedle two seats out of the Cadets *at the expense* of the worker curia (an *editorial* in *Rech* spoke of the possibility of such a decision); or will the Mensheviks decide on independent Social-Democratic lists, i.e., to have *three* Left lists in St. Petersburg instead of two? Or will they return to the Social-Democratic Labour Party and to its decision, following their luckless visits to the drawing-rooms of the petty bourgeoisie and the ante-chamber of the Cadets?

If the Mensheviks were really guided by fear of the Black-Hundred danger, and not by a craving to gain a seat in the Duma from the Cadets, *could they possibly have broken with the Cadets* over the number of the seats?

When a socialist really believes in a Black-Hundred danger and is sincerely combating it—he votes for the liberals without any bargaining, and does not break off negotiations if two seats instead of three are offered him. For instance, it may happen that at a second ballot in Europe a Black-Hundred danger arises when the liberal obtains, say, 8,000 votes, the Black-Hundred representative or reactionary, 10,000, and the socialist 3,000. If a socialist believes that the Black-Hundred danger is a real danger to the working class, he will vote for the liberal. We have no second ballot in Russia, but we may get a situation

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analogous to a second ballot in the second stage of the elections. If out of 174 electors, say, 86 are of the Black Hundreds, 84 Cadets and 4 socialists, the socialists *must* cast their votes for the Cadet candidate, and so far not a single member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has questioned this.

The Mensheviks assert that they fear a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, and yet they break with the Cadets over the question of two seats or three!

This is sheer hypocrisy, calculated to screen how the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party is haggling over a miserable seat in the Duma, begged from the Cadets.

Equally hypocritical is the talk the Mensheviks *now* indulge in about an *independent* Social-Democratic campaign in St. Petersburg, without the Trudoviks. For example: *Tovarishch* has published the following report of a speech delivered by Mr. Levitsky, a Menshevik, at a meeting in the Nemetti Theatre on January 19: "The Social-Democrats sacrificed their independence in the election campaign only in order to avert the Black-Hundred danger. Since they have failed in their object, the Social-Democrats must at least attempt to develop broad agitation, and the speaker, therefore, declared in favour of independent action by the Social-Democrats."

Assuming this Levitsky is sound in mind and judgement, is he not, may we ask, a hypocrite? *Since they have failed* "to avert the Black-Hundred danger" by putting up *one* joint list for all the Lefts, including the Cadets, Levitsky wants *three Left lists*—Cadet, Social-Democratic and Trudovik!

What is this but the floundering of an opportunist who feels that the ground has slipped from under his feet, who thinks he can make us forget that the day before yesterday the Mensheviks were in a petty-bourgeois bloc, and yesterday were bargaining with the Cadets!

The Mensheviks betrayed the workers, went over to the Cadets; and now that their shady deal has failed, ,they want to clear themselves *by merely talking* about independent Social-Democratic action! But this is just empty talk, mere eyewash; even if there were three Left lists in St. Petersburg, the Black Hundreds could win only in the event

of the Left vote being split; and the Mensheviks themselves have *strengthened* the position of the petty-bourgeois bloc by renouncing the proletarian party and *entering* the bloc to bargain with the Cadets *together* with that bloc.

Indeed, the Mensheviks have plenty to "clear themselves" of now—such is the discredit they have brought upon themselves by their entire conduct in the St. Petersburg election campaign. Indeed, the only thing the Mensheviks can now do is to indulge in empty and sonorous phrases, for they themselves do not seriously believe that a purely Social-Democratic list can be put up in St. Petersburg at the present time.

And we most emphatically warn the Bolsheviks not to trust these sonorous and hypocritical phrases.

The Bolsheviks have nothing to "clear themselves" of, nothing to repent of. Our political line, which at first was ridiculed by all the bourgeois press in the capital, is now being magnificently and strikingly justified by the entire course of events. The absurdity of the Black-Hundred danger tale is becoming clear. The Cadet danger is becoming obvious. The policy of the Cadets, whose leader is being (or has been?) received in audience by Stolypin, is now being exposed.

The Bolsheviks did not enter a petty-bourgeois bloc behind the back of the workers' party. They did not strengthen that bloc by sanctioning the participation of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party along with the Trudoviks. The Bolsheviks have not taken a single step or uttered a single word that the petty-bourgeois parties can interpret as a renunciation of independent action by the Social-Democrats.

While Milyukov was grovelling at Stolypin's feet and Mensheviks and Trudoviks of *all* shades were grovelling at Milyukov's feet—the Bolsheviks alone stood firm, *never for a moment* ceasing to do what Levitsky and his like have now remembered to do because they have quarrelled with the Cadets.

Therefore, we must not under any circumstances do the stupid thing which the dismayed and hypocritical Mensheviks are prattling about; we must not reject a revolutionary

bloc and petty-bourgeois support for the socialists *against* the Cadets.

It was because the Bolsheviks took the right course at once, without hesitation, that the instability of the Trudoviks and the firmness of the workers' party (except for its opportunist appendage, of course) has now become clear *to all*. It has become really clear that the Social-Democratic proletariat is going its own *independent* way, *directing* all the other elements against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals, *freeing* all the petty-bourgeois parties and trends from the influence of Cadet ideology and Cadet policy, and publicly *assessing* the degree of reliability and suitability of the revolutionary and the opportunist groups among the Trudoviks.

And to be afraid to lead all the Trudoviks now, when they have tasted the bitterness of Cadet benevolence and are prepared to fight the Cadets, would be unpardonable childishness and a manifestation of political spinelessness.

The thirty-one Mensheviks who have entangled themselves in the bargaining with the Cadets are now compelled to admit, in spite of themselves, that "a joint Social-Democratic and Trudovik list will be *popular enough to divert many* votes from the Cadets...". Yes, that is exactly how it is! And that is exactly why we *cannot* neglect the task of undermining the hegemony of the Cadets *in the capital*, towards which the eyes of all Russia are turned.

If we capture half the Cadet vote in several districts *plus one extra vote*, *we shall win*, for we shall have all the advantage of the split between the Black-Hundred bourgeoisie and the liberal conciliatory bourgeoisie (there is no danger in this, for in nine districts the Cadets have *more* than twice as many votes as the Black Hundreds).

It is becoming clearer every day that the Mensheviks took the wrong political course when they raised an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger. It is becoming clear that the delegates and electors stand *more to the Left* this year than they did last year. Instead of acting as the ludicrous and shameful accomplices of the liberal landlords (which cannot be justified by the plea of a Black-Hundred danger, for none exists), a useful and responsible role awaits us; to exercise the *hegemony* of the proletariat over the demo-

cratic petty bourgeoisie in the struggle to *prevent* subordination of the unenlightened masses to the leadership of the *liberals*.

The first elections to the Duma resulted in a Cadet victory, and these liberal bourgeois are exerting every effort to consolidate and perpetuate a hegemony that rests on the stultification of the masses, on their failure to think independently and to pursue an independent policy.

It is our bounden duty to bend every effort to rally around ourselves, particularly in St. Petersburg, *all those* who are capable of fighting the Black Hundreds and the Cadets—to rally them for the aims of the people's revolution, for independent action by the vast masses of the people.

And we shall do this without sacrificing an iota of the ideological independence of *our* Social-Democratic agitation, without retreating in the least from our socialist aims but giving them *full* expression, and without for a moment ceasing to expose the vacillation and treachery of the petty bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats alone stand firmly and resolutely on the positions of the struggle for freedom and the struggle for socialism.

Written on January 20
(February 2), 1907

Published as a separate pamphlet
in 1907
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text of the pamphlet

HOW TO VOTE IN THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

IS THERE A DANGER OF THE BLACK HUNDREDS WINNING THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS?

The State Duma elections in the City of St. Petersburg are to take place shortly. The city voters, who number about 130,000, will have to elect 160 electors for the entire city. These 160 electors, together with the 14 electors from the workers, will elect 6 deputies to the Duma.

Who should be elected to the Duma?

Three main parties are contesting the elections in St. Petersburg: the Black Hundreds (the Right parties), the Cadets (the so-called people's freedom party), and the Social-Democrats.

The smaller parties and trends (Trudoviks, non-party people, Popular Socialists, radicals, etc.) may join partly the Cadet election list, and partly the Social-Democratic list. This has not yet been definitely decided.

At all events, there is no doubt that there will be *three* election lists in St. Petersburg—the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

All voters must, therefore, clearly realise whom they are sending to the Duma:

the *Black Hundreds*, i.e., the Right parties, who are for a government based on military courts, for pogroms and violence?

the *Cadets*, i.e., the liberal bourgeoisie, who go to the Duma to legislate, i.e., to compromise with the Gurkos, who actually enjoy both the right to legislate and the right to dissolve the Duma if it incurs their displeasure?

or the *Social-Democrats*, i.e., the party of the working class, which, at the head of the whole people, is fighting

for full freedom and socialism, for the emancipation of all working people from exploitation and oppression?

Let every voter know that he must choose between these *three* parties. He must decide whom to vote for: the champions of police tyranny and violence; the liberal capitalists, who through the Kutlers are bargaining with Gurkos; or for the champions of the interests of the working class and of all working people?

Citizens and voters! You are told that the Cadets and the Social-Democrats may enter into an election agreement, that they may put up a joint election list.

This is not true. Let everybody know that whatever happens there will be *three* lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet and the Social-Democratic.

You are told that if the Cadets and the Social-Democrats put up separate lists, they may split the vote and thus help the Black Hundreds to win.

This is not true. We are going to prove to you that even in the *worst possible* case of a split vote, i.e., even if the votes are *evenly* divided between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats in *all* election wards of St. Petersburg—even in that case a Black-Hundred victory in St. Petersburg is *impossible*.

It is common knowledge that during the elections to the First Duma there were *two* principal lists of candidates in St. Petersburg: the Cadet and the Black-Hundred (or the so-called bloc, or coalition, of the Right parties). The Cadets were victorious in *all* the districts of St. Petersburg.

Now there will be *three* lists: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet and the Social-Democratic. That means that the Social-Democrats expect to win part of the Cadet votes and also to win the support of those who did not vote in the elections to the First Duma.

You are told that this split of the Cadet and Social-Democratic vote may help the Black Hundreds to win, for the Cadets and the Social-Democrats together would be stronger than the Black Hundreds, whereas separately they may prove weaker, i.e., be defeated.

To see whether this is possible, let us take the figures of the votes cast in *all* the wards of St. Petersburg in the elections to the First Duma. Let us see how the votes were

Еженедѣльникъ

ЗРѢНІЕ

Цѣна 5 коп.

Какъ голосовать на выборахъ въ Петербургѣ.—Рабочій съѣздъ и буржуазная демократія. — Вопросы дня. — Въ рабочей куріи.—Предвыборныя собранія.

№ 1. С.-Петербургъ. Четвергъ, 25 Января. № 1.

First page of the newspaper *Zreniye*, No. 1, 1907

Reduced

First page of the newspaper Zvezda, No. 1, 1907
Reduced

distributed between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds in the various wards. We will take the least favourable case in each ward, i.e., the *lowest* vote cast for a Cadet (for different candidates received a different number of votes) and the *highest* vote cast for a Black-Hundred candidate.

We will *halve* the *lowest* Cadet vote, on the assumption that the Social-Democrat will divert exactly half the votes (this is the least favourable to us, and the most favourable to the Black Hundreds).

Let us now compare this *half* of the *lowest* Cadet vote with the *highest* vote cast for a Black-Hundred candidate in each ward. We will get the following figures:

Voting in St. Petersburg in the Elections to the First Duma

Wards	**Lowest Cadet** vote	One half of that number	**Highest Right** vote	Number of electors
Admiralty	1,395	697	668	5
Alexander-Nevsky	2,929	1,464	1,214	16
Kazan	2,135	1,067	985	9
Narva	3,486	1,743	1,486	18
Vyborg	1,853	926	652	6
Petersburg	4,788	2,394	1,729	16
Kolomna	2,141	1,070	969	9
Moscow	4,937	2,468	2,174	20
Spassky	4,873	2,436	2,320	15
Liteiny	3,414	1,707	2,097	15
Rozhdestvensky	3,241	1,620	2,066	14
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	3,540	1,770	2,250	17

These figures show clearly that even in the most unfavourable case of a split in the Cadet vote, the Black Hundreds would have been successful in the 1906 elections *in only three* wards out of the *twelve*. They would have had only *46* electors out of 174 (160 from the city and 14 from the workers). This means that the Black Hundreds *could not* have been elected to the Duma at the first elections even if the Cadet vote had been split equally between the Cadet and the Social-Democratic candidates in *all* wards.

Thus, those who are trying to scare the voters with the possibility of a Black-Hundred victory if the Cadets and Social-Democrats split the vote, **are deceiving the people**.

The Black Hundreds *cannot* win as a result of a vote split between the Cadets and Social-Democrats.

The Cadets are deliberately spreading false rumours of a "Black-Hundred danger" so as to deter the voters from voting for the *socialists*.

Citizens and voters! Do not believe the yarns about the Black Hundreds winning if the votes are divided between the Cadets and Social-Democrats. Vote freely and boldly according to your convictions—for the Black Hundreds, for the bourgeois liberals, or for the socialists.

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But perhaps the Cadets, who are spreading false rumours about a "Black-Hundred danger" through the newspapers *Rech*, *Tovarishch*, *Sevodnya*, *Rodnaya Zemlya*, *Rus*, *Strana*,[15] and many others, will try to advance some other arguments, try some other subterfuges.

Let us consider all possible arguments.

Perhaps the Cadet vote will be split between three and not two lists? In that case will not the Black Hundreds win in all the wards and be elected to the Duma?

No. The Cadet vote cannot be split between three lists, for there will be *only* three lists in St. Petersburg. Apart from the Black Hundreds, the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, there is *not a single* party of any importance that is putting up an independent list.

All parties in Russia have their representatives in St. Petersburg. All parties and trends *have already announced* their positions in the elections. Not a single party, except for the three main parties mentioned above, not one little group, *even thinks* of contesting the elections independently. All the smaller parties, *all the trends*, *except the three main ones*, are wavering *only between these three election lists*. *All* progressive parties and groups which sympathise with freedom are wavering *only* between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats.

Not one of the *Trudovik* parties, neither the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Committee of the Trudovik Group, nor the Popular Socialists, has expressed the desire to put up an independent list. On the contrary, *all these Trudovik*

parties are negotiating to join either the Cadet or the Social-Democratic list.

Hence, those who say that the Cadet vote may be split between three lists **are deceiving the people**. In St. Petersburg there will be only three main lists: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

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A second possible argument: it is said that as a result of the Senate interpretations[16] the number of voters, especially those of the poor classes, has been reduced, and that therefore the Cadets may not poll as many votes as they did in the elections to the First Duma.

That is not true. In the First Duma elections the total number of voters in St. Petersburg was about 150,000; it is now about 130,000. The number who voted last year was no more than 60,000 to 70,000. Hence, there is no reason to fear a change in the temper and views of the bulk of the voters. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the *majority* of the 130,000 voters in St. Petersburg belong to the *needy strata of the population*, who might prefer a capitalist to a worker only owing to misunderstanding, ignorance or prejudice. If all socialists do their duty and carry on agitation to enlighten the city population, they will certainly be able to count on winning not ten thousand, but several tens of thousands of the 130,000 voters.

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A third possible argument: it is said that the Black Hundreds may get a bigger vote this year, and that we cannot judge from last year's figures.

That is not true. From all the newspaper reports, all the meetings and the information available about the state of the various parties, we see that the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg are not stronger, but probably much weaker than they were last year. The people have become politically more conscious; the Octobrists[17] are howled down at every meeting; and the dissolution of the Duma, the

government's policy of violence and the Gurko-Lidval policy are completely alienating voters from the government. At the first elections the Black Hundreds were still able to crow; but they subsided altogether, as soon as election time began to draw near.

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A fourth possible argument: it is said that the government has refused to issue election forms to the Left parties, is not permitting them to hold meetings, publish newspapers, etc., and that, therefore, it is safer and surer for all the Lefts to combine in one election list with the Cadets.

That is not true. The fact that the government is resorting to violence, is breaking the law and encroaching on the freedom of elections, can only stiffen the backs of the mass of voters. We Social-Democrats do not lose, but gain in the eyes of the voters from the fact that the police, with increasing frequency, are closing down meetings because of our speeches. As for fighting the government for its breaking the law—how would an agreement with the Cadets help in this? It would hinder, not help things, for the Cadet Party is the most cowardly of all opposition parties, the one most given to treachery. Is it possible to combat infringement of the law by Cabinet Ministers jointly with a party of which the ex-Minister Kutler, a recent colleague of Witte and Durnovo, is a member? On the contrary, it is because the Kutlers are very much closer to the Durnovos and Stolypins than to the masses of workers and shop-assistants that we, in the interests of the fight for freedom, must remain independent of the Cadet Party, the party of the Kutlers.

Let us assume that the government has decided to seize, to arrest, the Left electors. Will an agreement with the Cadets be of any avail? Or should the socialists rely on the Cadet Kutler petitioning the Cabinet Ministers Stolypin and Gurko, his recent colleagues, on behalf of the revolutionaries?

The newspapers recently reported that Stolypin is granting an audience to Mr. Milyukov, the Cadet leader, to dis-

cuss the legalisation of the Cadet Party.* Are the socialists to rely on the Cadet gentlemen "petitioning" for the legalisation of the Trudovik, the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Social-Democratic parties?

A socialist with a conscience and a sense of shame will never appear in a joint list with the Kutlers and the Milyukovs.

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Can the Social-Democrats win in the St. Petersburg elections?

Taking advantage of the government's ban on Social-Democratic newspapers, the Cadet newspapers are dinning into their readers' ears that a Social-Democratic victory at the elections is inconceivable without the aid of the Cadets.

That is not true. It is *quite possible* for the Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg to gain a victory over the Black Hundreds and the Cadets.

The Cadets pretend not to see this, deliberately forgetting that a split vote may be to the advantage of *any* party, and not the Black Hundreds alone. The Black Hundreds may win three wards out of twelve if the vote is split equally between the Cadets and Social-Democrats.

The Social-Democrats may win twelve election wards out of twelve if the vote is split between the Cadets and Black Hundreds.

To convince oneself of this, one need only consider the figures quoted above. They show that, by *polling in each ward one vote more than half the Cadet total* (polled at the last elections) it is possible *to win in the whole of St. Petersburg*.

For this we must have *not less than 14,274 votes* in the nine "safe" wards of St. Petersburg (which does not include the three where the Black Hundreds may win).

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* At an election meeting at the Tenishev School on January 22 Mr. Vodovozov stated that Mr. Milyukov had been to see Stolypin and had come to terms with him, and that the people's freedom party is responsible for its leaders. Without denying this fact, Mr. Gredeskul declared that if Mr. Milyukov had been to see Stolypin, it was in the interest of the country and the party.

And is it really impossible for the Social-Democrats to poll *15,000 to 20,000* votes in St. Petersburg?

In St. Petersburg enfranchised shop-assistants and clerks alone number 30,000 to 50,000. *Golos Prikazchika*,[18] the shop-assistants trade union paper, was conducted on Social-Democratic lines. If all socialists were to unite for agitation among shop-assistants, and were to agree to include the Trudoviks in their list, these shop and office employees alone could ensure victory for a joint Social-Democratic and Trudovik election list.

Moreover, there are a very large number of poor tenants, fully capable of understanding that the socialists will defend their interests better than the liberal houseowners and landlords, the rich lawyers and the government officials, the Petrunkeviches, Rodichevs, Vinavers, and Kutlers.

Look at the election meetings in St. Petersburg. Even the Cadet newspapers, whose accounts of these meetings are atrociously distorted to favour the Cadets, are compelled to admit that the real contest lies between the Cadets and the socialists, and not between the Rights and the Lefts. St. Petersburg election meetings are incontrovertible *proof* that the *Social-Democrats*, particularly in alliance with the Trudoviks, are *stronger than the Cadets* in St. Petersburg.

How many voters will attend election meetings? Cautious people estimate not more than one-tenth of the total number of voters will. Let us accept even this figure, which is the lowest estimate. That gives us 13,000 voters. Further, we may take it for granted that every voter who has attended meetings will take along with him to the polling-booth at least two others who have not attended any meetings. Judging from all facts and observations, 20,000 of the 39,000 voters will be for the Social-Democrats in alliance with the Trudoviks.

Therefore, these figures, too, show that a victory of the Social-Democrats over the Cadets and the Black Hundreds in St. Petersburg is *quite possible*.

All St. Petersburg voters should know *that it depends entirely on them* whether the Cadets or the Social-Democrats win.

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The socialists are conducting their election campaign in St. Petersburg primarily and mainly for the purpose of enlightening and rallying the masses. The socialists are striving to make clear to the masses the tasks now confronting the people in their struggle for freedom. The liberals, however, are not bothering about anything but seats in the Duma, and do not care whether the voters have any clear and definite ideas.

The liberals, i.e., the Cadets, and the vacillators who follow in their train, sometimes take a vote at election meetings, at some of which they succeed in winning overwhelming majorities for resolutions calling for an agreement among all the Lefts, on the understanding that two seats out of the six should go to the Cadets.

Those who propose such resolutions and those who vote for them show that they fail to realise the situation in the St. Petersburg elections. There will not and cannot be an agreement of "all the Lefts" in St. Petersburg. There will be three election lists in St. Petersburg: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

Moreover, it is ridiculous even to vote for the Cadets getting two seats out of the six. Those who *really* want such an outcome must understand that it *cannot* be effected by a deal with the Cadets. It can be done only by voting *for the Social-Democrats*.

In fact, the result that some people desire (six seats for the Lefts, of which two go to the Cadets) can be achieved only if the Social-Democrats gain a partial victory in St. Petersburg. Let us assume, for example, that the Social-Democrats win only in four constituencies, say, in the Spassky, Moscow, Petersburg and Vyborg wards. They would then have 60 electors, and with the worker curia, 74 electors. The Black Hundreds (we take the most unfavourable and most unlikely case) will have 46 electors (Liteiny, Rozhdestvensky and Vasilyevsky Ostrov wards). The Cadets will then have the remaining 54 electors. *This is the way* we could really secure the election of Left Duma deputies for St. Petersburg, with a preponderance of those standing Left of the Cadets. It *cannot* be achieved by

bargaining with the Cadets, as certain unintelligent and vacillating people are doing.

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Let us briefly recapitulate the conclusions we have drawn. Only three main parties are contesting the St. Petersburg elections, and electors will have *three* lists before them: the Black-Hundred, the Cadet, and the Social-Democratic.

The danger of a Black-Hundred victory in St. Petersburg is an absurd fabrication.

Even if the Cadet vote is split least favourably between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, a Black-Hundred victory is impossible.

The fable of the "Black-Hundred danger" in St. Petersburg is deliberately fostered by the Cadets to avert the real danger threatening *them* in the form of a socialist victory.

The Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and several small groups have not yet made up their minds whether to follow the Cadets or the Social-Democrats.

In St. Petersburg it is quite possible for the Social-Democrats to win complete victory over the Black Hundreds and the Cadets.

Voters must vote in accordance with their convictions and sympathies, and not out of fear of a fictitious Black-Hundred danger.

Are you for the government, the liberal bourgeoisie, or the Social-Democrats?

Citizens, make your choice!

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THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF OPPORTUNISM

On January 6 a St. Petersburg general conference was held. The conference was to decide whether or not there were to be agreements in the capital with the Cadets.

Notwithstanding Plekhanov's appeals to "worker comrades", published in *Tovarishch*; notwithstanding Madame E. Kuskova's hysterical articles; notwithstanding Plekhanov's threat to list the workers among the "enemies of freedom" if they insist on maintaining an independent Social-Democratic position, and notwithstanding the Cadets' more or less alluring promises, the organised and class-conscious proletariat of St. Petersburg proved so politically mature that, after the discussions and the voting, the majority declared against agreements of any kind with the Cadets. It was clear that the conference, elected by organised workers after discussions and voting in accordance with platforms,* would declare itself to the same effect.

Space prevents us from dealing in *Proletary* with the proceedings of the conference in detail; besides, considerable literature has been published on this subject. It is important to note here, however, that our opportunists have gone so far in their policy of bourgeois compromise that they cannot accept the conference's decision. It was obvious from the very outset of the conference that, supported by the Central Committee, the St. Petersburg Mensheviks would not submit to the conference decision. The

* Except in the Menshevik Vyborg District and Franco-Russian Subdistrict, where the platforms were not voted on.

friends of the Cadets were only seeking for a pretext to break with revolutionary social-Democracy. A pretext had to be found, no matter what kind it would be. As the question of the credentials failed to provide this pretext, the Mensheviks took advantage of the *recommendation* of the Central Committee that questions of election tactics be decided by the electoral units directly concerned, and walked out of the conference on the issue of dividing the conference into two parts, one especially for the city and one for the suburbs. They wanted to substitute the territorial administrative units of the police for Party organisational units. If the Mensheviks' advice had been taken, we should not only have had to keep the suburban districts out of the conference, but we should also have had to split up hitherto *integral* districts, such as the Neva, Moscow and Narva districts, and reorganise the Party to suit the authorities, not the Party.

It was also obvious that, whichever way the question of dividing the conference was decided, the majority would declare against agreements with the Cadets. The Mensheviks walked out and, to the delight of the entire bourgeois press, decided to conduct an independent campaign in St. Petersburg, wage a struggle against their own Party comrades, split the St. Petersburg proletariat for the sake of an agreement with the bourgeois and monarchist party—the "people's freedom" party.

The bourgeois press has every reason to rejoice! The gutter newspaper *Sevodnya* has solemnly declared in a special leading article that, by taking this decision, the Mensheviks have *saved Russia*; and *Rech*, the official organ of the Cadets, has promised to reward the Mensheviks by ceding one seat in the worker curia to a "Menshevik", but under no circumstances to a "Bolshevik".

The first result of Menshevik independent action is that the bourgeoisie has begun to dictate its will to the worker curia.

Continuing its proceedings after the Mensheviks had walked out, the conference decided that, since there is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, and in order to undermine the hegemony of the Cadets and free the democratic petty bourgeoisie from their influence, an agreement should be entered into, on definite terms, with

the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks for the distribution of seats (two to the worker curia, two to the Social-Democrats, one to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and one to the Trudoviks).

The bourgeois press is jubilant: the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries have formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists, which is gravitating to the Cadets; the Mensheviks have broken away—the Bolsheviks are isolated! Revolutionary tactics are condemned, "peaceful methods" are triumphant, hurrah for an agreement with the monarchy, and down with the method of popular mass struggle!

Having split the Social-Democrats and enfeebled the proletariat, the hydra of revolution, the Cadets shamelessly strike a bargain—with Mr. Stolypin. The newspapers report that the prime minister has granted Milyukov an audience to take place in a day or two, and that the prime minister's condition for the legalisation of the Cadet Party is—no blocs with the Left. The Cadets are willing to concede to the entire "Left"—actually, to the *petty-bourgeois*—bloc (the Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, and Mensheviks) only two out of the six seats in St. Petersburg. To pacify the gallery the Cadets are *prepared* to throw two seats to the importunate petty-bourgeois bloc. As they are certain the Left bloc will not accept this, the Cadets are negotiating with Stolypin, the head of the Black Hundreds.

The scene changes. The election campaign begins. Election meetings are being held. The Mensheviks, who very, very rarely speak at these meetings, blather timidly about agreements with the Cadets. The Bolsheviks, who speak at all meetings, call upon proletarians and semi-proletarians to join a united workers' party—the Social-Democratic Party; they call upon all revolutionary and democratic voters to form a united revolutionary bloc against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. The Cadets are shouted down, while the Bolsheviks are applauded. The democrats in the city—the workers and the petty bourgeoisie—are swinging towards the Left and shaking off the Cadet yoke.

The scene changes: the "compromisers" are in a tearing rage. It is with foaming mouth that they speak of the Bol-

sheviks. Down with the Bolsheviks! In moving unity *Novoye Vremya*[19] and *Tovarishch*, the Octobrists and the Cadets, the Vodovozovs and the Gromans launch a crusade against the red spectre of Bolshevism. If Bolshevism ever needed justification for its revolutionary and class tactics, it has now found it in the fury with which it is being attacked by the entire bourgeois press. If the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats, sincerely striving to carry out their slogans, needed an object lesson, they are getting it now in the contempt with which they have been treated by the big and middle bourgeoisie, in the policy of compromise (with the government) which the Cadets are pursuing behind the backs of the people.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats say to all democrats among the urban and rural poor, only in alliance with the proletariat, only by throwing off the tutelage of the Cadets, only in a determined and consistent struggle against the autocracy will you find salvation. If you are mature enough for this, you will follow the proletariat. If not, you will remain under the tutelage of the Cadets; and, whatever the upshot of the election campaign, whatever the result of your bargaining among yourselves for seats, the proletariat will continue to pursue its own class revolutionary road.

Menshevism is now undergoing a severe test. The election campaign has become the corner-stone of its opportunist tactics. Part of the Social-Democrats have fallen under the hegemony of the bourgeois ideologists. Bourgeois ideologists are jeering scathingly at the Mensheviks, whom they call "moderate socialists" (the term *Rech* uses), who can always be depended on. Their friends from the Right do not take them into consideration ... they only count on the loyal service to the Cadets. A section of Social-Democrats have sunk so low that the liberal bourgeoisie regard them merely as subservient tools, and the revolutionary-minded proletariat prefers to vote for the Socialist-Revolutionaries (as was the case in the elections of delegates in the Menshevik stronghold—the Vyborg District) rather than vote for *such* Social-Democrats.

The crisis of opportunism is approaching. Menshevism is being dealt a decisive blow by the agreement with the

"compromisers". The Vasilyevs, Malishevskys and Larins have paved the way to ... the cemetery. Confusion and mutual expulsion reign in the ranks of the Mensheviks. Martov is expelling the Vasilyevs and the Malishevskys from the Party. Let the workers expel the very spirit of Menshevism from the Party!

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THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN ST. PETERSBURG

The elections of workers' delegates are an extremely important event in the political life of Russia and in the history of our labour movement, an event that has not yet been properly appreciated.

For the first time *all* parties with any standing among the proletariat have come *before the masses* of the workers, not with general programmes or slogans, but with a definite practical question: *to the candidates of which party* will the masses of the workers entrust the defence of their interests? As everyone knows, the system of elections in the worker curia is, of course, far removed from proper democratic representation. Nevertheless, the masses of the workers are making themselves heard in the elections. And the broad masses of the workers are witnessing *a struggle between parties*, that is, between *definite* political parties, *for the first time* in Russia.

Elections of workers' delegates have already taken place in many parts of the country; but nothing like complete and exact information on the struggle of the parties in these elections is as yet available. The newspapers give only the most general, approximate, and *superficial* conclusions. Unless our Party officials, and especially the advanced workers themselves, undertake the necessary and extremely important task of *studying* the course and the results of the elections in the worker curia, we can definitely say that we shall lose extremely valuable and necessary material for the future development of Party work and Party agitation.

The general impression produced by the elections in the worker curia in Russia is unanimously summed up by all newspapers as follows: complete victory for the extreme Lefts, primarily the Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries coming second.

The elections have fully borne out the fundamental thesis of Social-Democracy: as a class, the proletariat is revolutionary. The proletarian *masses* are Social-Democratic in their aspirations and sympathies. The proletariat is the most revolutionary class in Russia.

All the talk about the Social-Democratic Party in Russia not being a workers' party has in fact been *refuted* by the elections. Only liberals who are deliberately lying, or opportunists who indulge in idle words can now doubt the *mass proletarian character* of the Social-Democratic Party in Russia.

Before passing from general to particular conclusions, we must make the reservation that *nothing* like complete data is *yet available*. However, we consider it not only possible, but absolutely necessary *to suggest* a number of further conclusions, not with the idea of claiming to have exhausted the question, but for the purpose of *submitting it*, *as a question of vast importance*, for the consideration of *all* comrades, evoking an exchange of ideas, the collection of material, etc.

The striking thing revealed by the first newspaper reports is the difference between Russia proper and Poland, which is much more advanced economically, culturally and politically. In Russia, in St. Petersburg and Moscow, at any rate, there are *no* frankly bourgeois parties that enjoy even limited support among the proletariat. The Social-Democrats preponderate absolutely; considerably less influence is exercised by extreme Left bourgeois democrats who regard themselves as socialists, namely, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. There are no Cadets among the workers, or at any rate, a very insignificant number of them.

In Poland there is a frankly bourgeois party that stands to the Right of the Cadets, and has played a conspicuous part in the elections—the *Narodowci* (*Narodowi-Demokraci*—National-Democrats).[20] This fact cannot be attributed to police and military persecution. The Polish bourgeoisie,

which skilfully plays upon the national oppression of all Poles and the religious persecution of all Catholics, seeks and finds some support among the masses, and, of course, among the Polish peasantry.

It is, however, self-evident that it would be absurd to deduce from this difference that there is some exceptional advantage intrinsic in Russian backwardness. This is not the case. The explanation is much simpler: it is due to historical and economic, and not to national, differences. There are in Russia immeasurably more survivals of serfdom among the masses of the people, in the rural districts, in the agrarian system—hence the more primitive, more direct revolutionary sentiments among the peasantry and among the working class, which is closely connected with the peasantry. This revolutionary sentiment undoubtedly expresses a general democratic (which in essence means bourgeois-democratic) protest, rather than proletarian class-consciousness. And then, our bourgeoisie is less developed, less class-conscious, less skilled in political struggle. It neglects activities among the proletariat not so much because it could not win a certain section away from us, but because it stands in less need of popular support (than in Europe and Poland). For the time being, it can rely on privilege, bribery, and brute force. The time will come, however, when in this country, too, all sorts of people of bourgeois origin will preach such abominations as nationalism, something in the nature of Christian democracy, anti-Semitism and so on, to the masses of the workers.

Let us now pass on to Russia proper. First of all, there is the noteworthy difference between St. Petersburg and Moscow. In Moscow the Social-Democrats gained a complete victory over the Socialist-Revolutionaries. According to some reports, not yet fully verified it is true, about 200 Social-Democratic delegates were elected, as against a mere 20 Socialist-Revolutionary delegates!

In St. Petersburg the reverse is the case: everyone is astonished at the *unexpectedly* high percentage of Socialist-Revolutionary delegates. Of course, the Social-Democrats predominate over the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but not overwhelmingly. The proportion of Socialist-Revolutionaries is estimated at 33 per cent or even (though this

is hardly correct) at 40 per cent. Whichever figure we take for the time being until the detailed returns are available, we can understand why rank-and-file Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg feel that *they have been beaten* in the worker curia. Even if one-third of the delegates are Socialist-Revolutionaries, that is *actually* a defeat for the Social-Democrats in the capital—a defeat in comparison with what we have seen in the rest of Russia, and with what all of us, as Social-Democrats, regard as normal and essential.

This is a fact of tremendous importance.... In St. Petersburg the extreme Left bourgeois democrats deprived the socialists of their *overwhelming* preponderance in the worker curia. It is our duty to give this fact the closest attention. *All* Social-Democrats must set to work to study this phenomenon carefully and find the correct explanation for it.

The general impression of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, who are amazed by the results of the elections of January 7 and 14, can be summed up as follows: (1) it was at the *biggest* factories, the strongholds of the most class-conscious, the most revolutionary proletariat, that Socialist-Revolutionaries inflicted the most telling defeat on the Social-Democrats; (2) the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated *mostly* and in the main the *Menshevik Social-Democrats*. Where a Socialist-Revolutionary candidate opposed a Bolshevik Social-Democratic candidate, the Social-Democrats were far more often, *in most cases in fact*, victorious.

The supreme significance of both these conclusions is obvious. We must therefore take good care that these are not mere impressions but *conclusions* drawn from exact and verified data that can leave no room for two interpretations. It is, of course, extremely unlikely, almost impossible even, that the consensus of opinion of active Social-Democrats in the most diverse districts of St. Petersburg is mistaken. Of course, it would be ridiculous pedantry to expect revolutionaries who are at present overwhelmed with election work to compile exact and accurate statistics; nevertheless, the principal data, the main facts and figures *can and must* be collected, for they will be essential in *all* our Social-Democratic work in St. Petersburg for a long time to come.

Below we deal with this question in greater detail (see the article: "The Struggle Between the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg"). We shall here confine ourselves to an appraisal of the political significance of this *relative* defeat of Social-Democracy at the elections in the St. Petersburg worker curia.

First of all, it must be noted that the numerical preponderance of Social-Democratic delegates is obviously an indication of the greater *number of factories* in which the Social-Democrats have organisational groups. More detailed information will probably confirm what the Social-Democrats observed in the days of freedom in October, namely, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries carry on no effective, prolonged and serious organisational work among the proletariat, but just grab at any opportunity that may crop up and push resolutions through at meetings when feeling runs high, taking advantage of any moment of excitement to win votes through frothy and flashy "revolutionary" phrases and speeches.

This element of the Socialist-Revolutionary victory will, in all probability, be noted by every conscientious investigator as a feature of the recent elections in the worker curia in St. Petersburg. The whole point here, in the final analysis, is that a "revolutionary" petty-bourgeois party is incapable of steady and consistent proletarian activities; at the slightest change in the workers' temper, it completely disappears from the working-class suburbs. Only at certain moments is it able to exploit the as yet insufficient political education of the masses, "captivating" them with their ostensibly broad presentation of questions (actually nebulous, intellectualist flummery), playing on their undeveloped class-consciousness, demagogically utilising the traditional "back-to-the-land" urge in cases where rural connections still exist, and so on and so forth.

Naturally, the bourgeois character of the revolution leads to the working-class districts being "raided" from time to time by hordes of radical and truly revolutionary bourgeois youths who have no class backing and who, whenever there are signs of a new upsurge or a new onslaught of the revolution, turn instinctively to the proletariat as

the only mass that is engaged in a serious *fight* for freedom. Socialist-Revolutionary speakers at workers' meetings are a kind of stormy petrel indicating that the proletariat is in fine fettle, has recuperated somewhat, and is regaining strength after former defeats, that something is beginning to ferment among proletarians, something deep and widespread, which will make them grapple again with the old order.

A comparison of the October and "Duma" periods with that of the present elections, and a simple statistical assessment of the number of permanent Socialist-Revolutionary organisational groups would undoubtedly show the truth of this explanation.

But it would, of course, be very foolish *to confine ourselves* to this explanation, and shut our eyes to the fact that it was at the largest factories, where the workers are most class-conscious and experienced in battle, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries *defeated* the Social-Democrats. Fortunately, we already know that, in fact, the extreme Left bourgeois democrats defeated not Social-Democracy, but the *opportunist vulgarisation* of Social-Democracy.

The revolutionary bourgeois democrats shirked battle with revolutionary Social-Democrats and, in fact, defeated only those who trail along in the wake of the non-revolutionary bourgeoisie, those *who advocate blocs with the Cadets*. This is most clearly corroborated by the evidence of Social-Democratic Party workers on the character of the speeches delivered by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and by facts on the Socialist-Revolutionaries' "victory" over the Mensheviks.

The St. Petersburg elections took place on January 7 and 14. On January 7 the workers of St. Petersburg learned that the thirty-one Mensheviks had broken away from the Social-Democratic Conference in order to bargain with the Cadets for seats in the Duma. For the whole following week the St. Petersburg bourgeois press exulted and rejoiced, praising the Mensheviks, inviting them to be seated next to the Cadets, and applauding their renunciation of the revolution, their joining the "*opposition bloc*", "the moderate-socialist parties", etc., etc.

The rout of the Mensheviks in the big factories is the first warning *the proletarian masses* have given the vacillating opportunist intellectuals!

The Mensheviks have turned towards the Cadets—the *proletariat of St. Petersburg have turned away from the Mensheviks*.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries took advantage of the split among the Social-Democrats, took advantage of the workers' indignation at the Cadet-like Mensheviks, and did so with brazen alacrity. In the working-class suburbs they attacked the Social-Democrats for forming blocs with the Cadets (without saying anything about the Bolsheviks and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.), but in the city *they themselves were bargaining with the Cadets*! It is now clear why they have been so carefully concealing from the public their views and their resolutions on blocs with the Cadets, and their blocs with the Popular Socialists, *and so on and so forth*.* They commit all the sins of Menshevism *clandestinely*, but when they confront the workers they reap applause and win votes by castigating Menshevism.

The organiser of the Semyannikov Subdistrict League of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, whose report we quote below, writes in that report on the elections, at the huge Semyannikov Works, as follows: despite the Bolsheviks' protests, the Mensheviks nominated Comrade X.[21] "At an election meeting at the works, a Socialist-Revolutionary intellectual spoke and severely criticised Comrade X's Menshevik arguments in favour of an agreement with the Cadets, and, as the workers said, Comrade X 'was in the soup'." In the eyes of the masses the defeat of the Mensheviks was complete. "*When the masses learned*," we read in the same report, "that the Social-Democratic candidates were in favour of an agreement with the Cadets and that those candidates were Mensheviks, *they said then and there* [at the works] *that they would not vote for the Mensheviks*."

This makes it quite clear why, during the election of delegates for the Social-Democratic conference, the Mensheviks were opposed to voting in accordance with platforms, i.e., were opposed to a *direct* vote of the masses themselves on the question of blocs with the Cadets!

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* They published the resolution of their St. Petersburg Committee *after* the elections in the worker curia.

"At the Nevsky Stearin Works, in the Menshevik factory subdistrict, a worker, N. M., who had been nominated as a delegate, declared bluntly: 'Now that I have heard that the Social-Democrats are in favour of an agreement with the Cadets, I am going over to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.' *And he did go over, and was elected delegate!!*"

Such is the shameful state to which Social-Democracy has been brought by these miserable opportunists, who are capable of breaking away from the workers' party on the eve of the elections, in order to haggle with the Cadets for seats.

The only conclusion to be drawn from this by a Social-Democrat who values the honour and good name of the proletarian party is that ruthless war must be waged on Menshevism in St. Petersburg. We must open the eyes of the workers to the people whose Cadet policy is driving the workers away from socialism and towards the revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have captured the biggest factories from the Mensheviks. We must recapture them from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. We must send new agitators and fresh revolutionary Social-Democratic literature to the biggest factories and explain to the workers that they have fallen out of the hands of the Cadet-loving Mensheviks into the hands of *Cadet-loving* Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The whole course of the St. Petersburg election campaign, all the facts of the endless vacillations of the Mensheviks, of their efforts to enter a counter-revolutionary bloc with the Cadets (after they broke away from the workers' party), and of their bargaining, *jointly with the Socialist-Revolutionaries*, with the Cadets for seats, give us a wealth of ammunition with which to fight *both the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries* at the big factories in St. Petersburg.

The big factories must and will become strongholds of revolutionary Social-Democracy, inaccessible to opportunists and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries alike.

Prostiye Rechi, No. 3,
January 30, 1907
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Prostiye Rechi*

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN S.D.'s AND S.R.'s IN THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN ST. PETERSBURG

The important success achieved by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the elections in the worker curia has evoked despondency in many Social-Democrats. But it is a fact of the greatest significance, revealing the serious mistake made by the Social-Democrats and therefore deserving thorough investigation. We must not give way to despondency and distress, but study the recent elections to get at the causes of our comparative reverse and ensure the proper organisation of Social-Democratic activities among the workers in future.

Excellent material for a study of the elections of worker delegates is provided by the "Report of the Semyannikov Subdistrict League of the Neva District", St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which covers the period from November 15, 1906 to January 15, 1907.

We will not quote this Report in full, but cite only *the exact figures* on the struggle of the Menshevik and Bolshevik Social-Democrats against the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the election of delegates in *twenty-three factories* in one of the largest (and historically one of the most *important*) working-class suburbs of St. Petersburg.

We give these figures separately for each factory, so that every competent Party official can verify and correct our data, and we indicate where the candidates were Bolsheviks and where they were Mensheviks. The biggest fac-

tories, i.e., those which elected more than one delegate, are italicised.

Factories where Bolshevik candidates were nominated	Number of delegates elected		
	S.D.	S.D. sympathisers	S.R.
Russo-American Engineering Works	1	—	—
Armature Works	1	—	—
Offenbacher	1	—	—
Uppenek	1	—	—
Railway Sleeper Impregnation Works	1	—	—
Former Onufriyev Works	1	—	—
Rafter Works	—	1	—
Pahl	2	—	1
Vienna	1	—	—
Atlas	1	—	—
Alexandrovsky Railway Car Shops	1	—	—
Iron Foundry	—	—	1
Total for 12 factories	11	1	2

Factories where Menshevik candidates were nominated	Number of delegates elected		
	S.D.	S.D. sympathisers	S.R.
Semyannikov Works	—	—	5
Maxwell	1	—	1
Thornton	1	—	—
Gromov	1	—	—
Nauman	1	—	—
Grapp	1	—	—
Alexeyev	1	—	—
Nevsky Stearin Works	—	—	1
Vargunin	—	—	1
Obukhov	—	—	4
Playing-Card Factory	one (unspecified)		
Total for 11 factories	6	—	12
	and one (unspecified)		
Total for 23 factories	17	1	14
	and one (unspecified)		

These figures show first of all that, on the whole, the *Social-Democrats have defeated* the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Social-Democrats secured the election of 18 delegates

(if we include the Social-Democratic sympathiser among the Social-Democrats), while only 14 Socialist-Revolutionaries were elected.

Further, these figures show: (1) that at the largest factories, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were, on the whole, victorious; (2) that, in general, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Menshevik Social-Democrats; (3) that, on the whole, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats defeated the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Indeed, if we take the four biggest factories, i.e., those which elected more than one delegate each, we get the following: total number of delegates elected (i.e., by 14,000 workers)—14, of whom *11 were Socialist-Revolutionaries and three Social-Democrats*. At the other 18 smaller factories, *15 Social-Democrats and 3 Socialist-Revolutionaries* were elected. We have no information as to the total number of workers at these factories; it may exceed 18,000, for factories employing less than 2,000 workers elect only one delegate; but it may also be less than 18,000, since all factories employing 50 or more workers elect one delegate each.

Consequently, our general conclusion on the victory of the Social-Democrats over the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Neva District must be revised: at the biggest factories the *Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Social-Democrats*. Figures on the number of delegates elected are not sufficient to enable us to draw a precise conclusion: we must have the figures for *each factory*; and, moreover, we must have data on the number of workers employed and the number that voted at each of them.

Further, the facts quoted above clearly show that *the Mensheviks are entirely to blame for the victory of the Socialist-Revolutionaries*. The Mensheviks lost 12 seats to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 12 out of 18, whereas the Bolsheviks lost only 2 (out of 14).

At the Bolshevik factories (counting as Bolshevik, not merely those where Bolsheviks are, *in general*, employed, but where Bolshevik candidates were put up in opposition to the Socialist-Revolutionaries), the Socialist-Revolutionaries were undoubtedly routed, in particular at the largest factory, Pahl's, where the Bolsheviks secured the

election of two delegates out of three. Since we have no information as to where the Socialist-Revolutionaries put up candidates, and, consequently, it is very probable that they were defeated at the Russo-American Engineering Works, at the Alexandrovsky Railway Car Shops, the Atlas Works, etc., the conclusion to be drawn is that, *on the whole*, *the Bolsheviks defeated the Socialist-Revolutionaries*.

At the Menshevik factories, on the contrary, the Social-Democrats were defeated: the Socialist-Revolutionaries won 12 seats, the Social-Democrats only 6. There is no doubt that, *in the eyes of the proletarian masses*, *the Socialist-Revolutionaries are on the whole defeating the Mensheviks*.

We do not know exactly how far the conclusions drawn from the facts about the Neva District can be applied to the whole of St. Petersburg. However, judging by the fact that "all Social-Democratic St. Petersburg" is talking about the unexpected victories of the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the big factories, and that the total number of Social-Democratic delegates is evidently very much larger than that of the Socialist-Revolutionary delegates, we may take it that the facts about the Neva District are more or less typical. It is reported that at the Baltic Works in the Vasilyevsky Ostrov District, which is a *Menshevik* stronghold, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Mensheviks by an enormous majority: they obtained as many as 1,600 votes, and the Mensheviks less than 100. On the other hand, at the big Tubing Works in the same district, the Socialist-Revolutionaries also got about 1,600 votes, but the Bolsheviks got about 1,500. Here, one of the ballot boxes was broken, and the Bolsheviks have *challenged* the elections; they have declared them irregular, and have demanded their annulment. Or take another report. At the Franco-Russian Works, from which the swaggering Menshevik intellectuals "*brought*" 370 *exclusively Menshevik* votes to the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference, *a Bolshevik and a Socialist-Revolutionary* were elected delegates. In the Vyborg District, that Menshevik stronghold, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Menshevik Social-Democrats, and so on and so forth.

To be able to verify all these reports and obtain exact data, it is *absolutely necessary immediately*, while the elec-

tions are still fresh in our minds, to collect particulars about *all* factories which elected delegates. Local Social-Democratic Party officials can easily collect and record the figures for each particular factory. A summary of these figures is *essential* to us Social-Democrats, to enable us conscientiously to examine the results of the elections so as not to gloss cravenly over our mistakes and shortcomings, but subject them to Party criticism and exert all our efforts to eliminate them.

We cannot conduct consistent Social-Democratic work in St. Petersburg unless we pay close attention to the way in which the *masses of the workers* have voted for the candidates of the various parties. For the bourgeois parties it is important only to win so many seats. For us it is important for the masses themselves *to understand* the tenets and tactics of *Social-Democracy* as distinct from all petty-bourgeois parties, even though they may call themselves revolutionary, socialist parties. We must therefore strive to obtain exact and complete data on the voting at the elections in the St. Petersburg worker curia.

We therefore earnestly appeal to all local district and subdistrict Social-Democratic officials in St. Petersburg to furnish us with exact data on the following: (1) district; (2) name of factory; (3) number of workers employed; (4) number of persons who voted; (5) the political trend represented by the contending candidates: Socialist-Revolutionary, Bolshevik, Menshevik, or other parties; (6) number of votes cast for *each* candidate. A summary of this data will serve as a solid basis on which to judge the various aspects of Social-Democratic work and our possible gains or losses in the next elections.

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HOW TO VOTE IN THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

WHO BENEFITS FROM THE FABLES ABOUT THE BLACK-HUNDRED DANGER?

Long ago, revolutionary Social-Democrats pointed out that the fables about the Black-Hundred danger have been deliberately invented and circulated by the Cadets to stave off the *danger from the Left*.

No attention was paid to the Social-Democrats. The liberal press has been howling in chorus about the Black-Hundred danger. The petty-bourgeois radicals, the Narodniks,[22] naïvely copied the liberals. The opportunist Social-Democrats also fell into line with the liberals, and in some cases (e.g., in St. Petersburg) stooped to downright blacklegging against the proletariat.

But what do the elections show?

Everyone now sees that there has been a *leftward* swing in the mood of the voters. The Black Hundreds have suffered a much heavier defeat at the elections than they did last year. The revolutionary Social-Democrats have *proved to be right*. The Black-Hundred danger in the elections is a *fable* circulated by the Cadets, who are bargaining with Stolypin behind the backs of the people. It is well known that in St. Petersburg Mr. Vodovozov, who last year voted for the Cadets, has now renounced them, and has publicly exposed Milyukov's visit to Stolypin. Milyukov has had to admit the fact. But he is still *concealing* from the people the terms on which Stolypin is prepared to legalise the Cadets!

In their newspapers the Cadets are now straining every nerve to convince Stolypin of their moderation, their modesty, their loyalty, their independence of the "Lefts" and their readiness to fight them.

An advantageous and convenient policy, is it not? To curry favour with Stolypin and his friends, i.e., the Black Hundreds, by renouncing the Lefts, by fighting the Lefts in the press, at meetings, in the elections. And to curry favour with the Lefts, or rather, with simpletons and blacklegs among the Lefts, by vociferating about the Black-Hundred danger, with the call: Vote for the Cadets so as not to split the vote!

That is exactly the policy the Cadets have pursued in Moscow. On the very day of the elections, Mr. Kokoshkin, former member of the Duma and one of the most prominent Cadets, wrote in *Russkiye Vedomosti*[23]:

> "It Is obvious to everyone that the Left bloc cannot win the votes of those non-party elements who are vacillating between the Octobrists and the Cadets; it cannot capture a single vote from the Union of October Seventeenth. But it can capture votes from the people's freedom party, and *thereby contribute to the triumph of reaction*, *and this will be the only practical result* of its activities, if successful."

Mr. Kokoshkin wrote that in the morning of election day. And the elections showed that Mr. Kokoshkin was telling *a foul lie*. The result of the Left bloc's activities showed that it was impossible for the Rights to have achieved a *triumph* in Moscow, *no matter how many votes we captured from the Cadets*!

The Moscow elections have *proved* that the fable about the Black-Hundred danger is *a Cadet lie*, which can henceforth be repeated only by deliberate blacklegs among the Lefts.

Take the votes, district by district. We give them in full in this issue in our article "Preliminary Returns of the Moscow Elections". These figures show that *in 14 districts out of 16** the votes polled by the Octobrists were *less than half* the combined Cadet and Left vote. Consequently, *in 14 districts* the Lefts could not, by their independent action, "*contribute to the triumph of reaction*".

Mr. Kokoshkin *lied*, slandered the Left bloc, when he called it an abettor of reaction!

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* There are 17 election wards in Moscow. Complete figures for the Pyatnitsky (17th) District are not yet available. Here the Cadets obtained at least 1,488 votes, the Octobrists, probably about 600, and the Left bloc, probably about 250.

Mr. Kokoshkin tried *to scare* the voters with his *falsehood* about the Black-Hundred danger, in order to deter them from voting for the Left bloc.

Mr. Kokoshkin, like the St. Petersburg Cadets, *is afraid* to put the *real issue* even before voters with property qualification; he is afraid to ask even them whether, *on principle*, the voters sympathise with a party that parleys with Stolypin, or with the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks. The Kokoshkins, like the St. Petersburg Cadets, are not speculating on the intelligence of the voters, *but on the terror of the petty bourgeois*, who is hypnotised by the wailing of the servile liberal press about the Black-Hundred danger.

And the Moscow elections were indeed elections by *tertified petty bourgeois*. Here is confirmation of this from a source that surely no one will suspect of sympathy with the "Bolsheviks".

Birzheviye Vedomosti[24] of January 29 published a report from its special correspondent on how "Moscow Is Electing Electors". This is what this correspondent writes:

> "After leaving the line, the voters withdraw a good distance away and compare notes.
>
> "'Well, I suppose you voted for Gringmut,' a contractor asks one of his foremen.
>
> "'Oh, no, Sergei Petrovich, we are for the Cadets,' answers the foreman, a tubby little fellow.
>
> "'Why not for the Left bloc?' inquires the contractor.
>
> "'Too risky, that would split the vote,' answers the foreman."

So that is why the mass of ordinary townspeople voted for the Cadets in Moscow! The ordinary townsman voted against the Lefts *not because he felt any antipathy against them*, but because it was "too risky, *that would split the vote*," i.e., because *he believed the Cadet liars*, who took advantage of their monopoly of the liberal daily press to fool the ordinary townsman.

The elections of January 28 in Moscow show that four election lists could not split the vote *in such a way as to create the danger of a Black-Hundred victory*!

In Moscow the Cadets hoodwinked the frightened townspeople. The St. Petersburg voters should know of this;

they must not let themselves be caught a second time by the Cadets, who are bargaining with Stolypin!

We also draw the attention of our readers to a comparison of the figures (for 9 districts of Moscow—unfortunately fuller information is unavailable) for 1906 and 1907. It is common knowledge that all Cadet henchmen and blacklegs among the Lefts are clamouring about the Senate interpretations as proof that the 1906 figures are *nothing to go by*, that we must expect something worse in the 1907 elections, and that there is now a Black-Hundred danger.

But what has Moscow proved? In 1906, in 9 districts, 13,220 votes were cast for the Cadets, 5,669 for the Rights (Octobrists) plus 690 (for the monarchists), in all 6,359 (perhaps even *somewhat more*, for, as can be seen from the figures we quote, there are no returns for the monarchist vote in several of these 9 districts).

In 1907, in the same districts, 14,133 votes were cast against the Black Hundreds (11,451 for the Cadets and 2,682 for the Lefts), while 5,902 votes were cast for the Black Hundreds (4,412 for the Octobrists and 1,490 for the monarchists).

Thus, despite the Senate interpretations, *the total vote* in 1907 is even slightly higher than it was in 1906 (20,025 as compared with 19,579). The anti-Black-Hundred vote is *higher* than in 1906 (14,133 as compared with 13,220); the Black-Hundred vote is *lower* than in 1906 (5,902 as compared with 6,359).

The *facts* from Moscow prove that the 1906 figures *can* be taken for comparison, for the 1907 figures show an *improvement*.

And what do the St. Petersburg figures for 1906 show? They show that in 9 districts electing 114 electors, the *highest* Black-Hundred vote in 1906 was *less than half of the lowest Cadet vote*.*

Thus, a split in the anti-Black-Hundred vote between the Cadets and the Lefts *cannot result in a* **victory** *for the Rights in St. Petersburg*.

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* The figures are given *in full* in *Zreniye*, No. 1. (See p. 49 of this volume.—*Ed.*) We are reproducing them in this issue to make them known to *all* St. Petersburg voters.

Even the elections of electors by urban voters in St. Petersburg *Uyezd*,* which took place on January 29, show that the Black-Hundred danger is a Cadet falsehood. Even among these voters, who had the greatest difficulty in obtaining voting forms and going to the polling-booth, the Black Hundreds got *so few* votes that they could not have won, *no matter how the vote was split*. The Cadets received at least 1,099 votes, the *Social-Democrats* 603, the Octobrists 652, and the Union of the Russian People[25] *20*. The Rights *could not* have been elected, no matter how many votes we captured from the Cadets! We therefore declare most emphatically that those people in St. Petersburg who are now calling upon the electorate to vote for the Cadets, to refrain from splitting the vote because of the Black-Hundred danger, *are deliberately lying and deceiving the voters*. Those who are not participating in the elections in St. Petersburg, even in a single ward, because of the Black-Hundred danger, *are deliberately lying* and deceiving the voters to cover up their *blacklegging against the Left bloc*.

In St. Petersburg, as in Moscow, there is no Black-Hundred danger, but there is a Cadet danger. There is the danger that the ignorant and terrified petty bourgeois will vote for the Cadets, not out of any antipathy against the Left bloc, towards the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks, but out of fear of splitting the vote, a fear inspired by the lies of the Cadet press.

All those who want *intelligent* voting in St. Petersburg must combat *this* "danger".

There is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg, there is only a Cadet danger. Therefore it will be unpardonable blacklegging against the Lefts *to abstain* from voting in those three districts (Vasilyevsky Ostrov, Rozhdestvensky and Liteiny) where (judging by the 1906 figures) a victory of the Black Hundreds is possible if the vote is split. These three districts elect 46 electors out of the total of 174 (160 for the urban, 14 for the worker curia). Consequently, *these districts cannot affect the result of the elections*. But they may *greatly* affect the victory of the Lefts or the

* See footnote to p. 18.—*Ed*.

Cadets. Let us assume that the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks are successful in four districts: Spassky, Moscow, Petersburg and Vyborg (we have taken these districts at random). The Lefts will then have 74 electors (60 from the city and 14 from the workers). If the Cadets are successful in *all* the other districts, they will have 100 electors *and get all their candidates into the Duma*! If, however, the Black Hundreds are elected in the three districts mentioned above (46 electors), the Cadets will have only 54, and they will be *obliged* to combine with the Lefts and get *two seats out of the six in the Duma*.

That means that whoever abstains from voting in the three "Black-Hundred" districts of St. Petersburg is *secretly helping the Cadets* and is blacklegging against the Left bloc!

Citizens and voters! Give no credence to the deceivers who talk to you about the danger of splitting the vote in St. Petersburg. Give no credence to their false tales of a Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg.

There is no Black-Hundred danger in St. Petersburg. The Rights cannot win in St. Petersburg as a result of a division of the votes between Cadets and Lefts.

Do not vote out of fear of a "danger" invented by the Cadet liars (who run to Stolypin by the back door); vote as your conscience and your convictions guide you.

Will you vote for the liberal bourgeoisie, who want to saddle the peasants with ruinous land-compensation payments, betray the peasants into the hands of the liberal landlords, and are secretly bargaining with Stolypin and carrying on negotiations with the Black Hundreds?

Or will you vote for the Social-Democratic Labour Party, for the party of the proletariat supported by all Trudovik parties?

Citizens, vote for the Left bloc!

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE MOSCOW ELECTIONS—PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The liberal newspapers and those serving the liberals are still vociferating about the Black-Hundred danger in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

To show how utterly *false* these outcries and phrases are, we give here tables of the results of the Moscow elections so far published in the St. Petersburg press.

For the purpose of comparison we also quote from the newspaper *Nasha Zhizn*[26] for March 28, 1906, the results of the 1906 elections in Moscow.

The significance of the figures for the two years, which prove and prove again how *utterly false* are the fables about the "Black-Hundred danger", is dealt with elsewhere.

Number of votes polled in Moscow in 1907:

Moscow Election Ward	Const.-Dem.	Octobrists	Monarchists	Left Bloc
Arbat	1,348	514	154	214
Basmannaya	934	462	113	155
City	643	266	107	61
Lefortovo	938	631	244	190
Myasnitskaya	1,331	551	191	191
Prechistenka	1,183	538	161	175
Presnya	1,196	550	187	458
Rogozhskaya	1,565	963	267	286
Serpukhovskaya	469	189	69	101
Sretenka	1,239	403	106	303
Sushchevsky	2,061	700	398	841
Khamovniki	1,011	647	197	297
Yakimanka	1,153	552	171	241
Tverskaya	1,730	680	189	313
Yauza	1,117	299	75	162
Meshchanskaya	1,839	838	262	689
Total, 16 wards	19,757	8,783	2,891	4,677

Moscow Election Ward	Const.-Dem.	Octobrists	Monarchists	Left Bloc
In 1906				
Arbat	1,269	700	?	—
Sushchevsky	2,867	930	193	—
Presnya	1,662	646	150	—
Prechistenka	1,810	734	?	—
Tverskaya	1,810	850	174	—
City	571	362	50	—
Sretenka	1,368	640	40	—
Yauza	600	300	?	—
Basmannaya	1,263	507	83	—
Total, 9 wards	13,220	5,669	690	—
Same 9 wards in 1907	11,451	4,412	1,490	2,682

Thus, the Moscow elections prove that the stories about the Black-Hundred danger are *false*. We remind the reader once again that the election figures for St. Petersburg in 1906 *prove the same thing*:

Voting in St. Petersburg in the Elections to the First Duma

Ward	Lowest Cadet Vote	One Half of That Number	Highest Right Vote	Number of Electors
Admiralty	1,395	697	668	— 5
Alexander-Nevsky	2,929	1,464	1,214	—16
Kazan	2,135	1,067	985	— 9
Narva	3,486	1,743	1,486	—18
Vyborg	1,853	926	652	— 6
Petersburg	4,788	2,394	1,729	—16
Kolomna	2,141	1,070	969	— 9
Moscow	4,937	2,468	2,174	—20
Spassky	4,873	2,436	2,320	—15
Liteiny	3,414	1,707	2,097	+15[27]
Rozhdestvensky	3,241	1,620	2,066	+14
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	3,640	1,770	2,250	+17

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A POLITICAL LIDVALIAD

The *Telegraf*[28] for January 26 reports the following episode at a meeting held on January 24 in the Civil Engineers' Hall.

"V. V. Vodovozov appears on the platform and reminds the meeting of the incident in the Nemetti Theatre: 'I asked there whether it was true that Milyukov was conducting negotiations with Stolypin behind the backs of the voters. I was answered by shouts: "Lies", "Calumny", and Prof. Gredeskul answered that Milyukov was an honest man, in whom the party had implicit confidence. I have not the least doubt about Milyukov's personal integrity, but such negotiations did take place. Milyukov himself does not deny it. Today in *Rech* he writes that he discussed with Stolypin the legalisation of the people's freedom party, but that the terms were unacceptable. *But Milyukov is concealing these terms. If they are abominable they ought to be made public, they ought to be publicly condemned ... pilloried!*'

"'I close the meeting!' announces a police inspector.

"The public make for the exit, shouting and whistling. The organisers of the meeting sharply reproach Vodovozov, and the police inspector sends a couple of constables to the platform, in case of emergencies."

Mr. Vodovozov deserves thanks and appreciation, not sharp reproaches, for his attempts *to expose* Milyukov's negotiations with Stolypin. Only *philistines* who fail to understand their duties as *citizens*, or those who are anxious *to conceal* from the people the intrigues of the Cadets, can reproach a politician for such action. We really do not know in which of these categories to place the organisers of the meeting, at which the principal speaker was Nabokov, a Cadet.

The question of the negotiations between Milyukov and Stolypin is of tremendous importance. Those who are inclined to treat this question lightly, to brush it aside as

a minor scandal of no significance, are a thousand times wrong. Those who *fear* a scandal fail to recognise it as their civic duty to expose *political Lidvaliads*.

And the negotiations between Milyukov and Stolypin are indeed a little bit of political Lidvaliad, in which criminal embezzlement and fraud are replaced by the *politically dishonest and criminal* haggling of a party that has misappropriated the great words, "the people's freedom".

We have already pointed out in the newspaper *Trud*[29] that Milyukov *is concealing* Stolypin's terms" *from the people*. He does not say whether there was one audience or several, and when they took place. Nor does he say whether Stolypin invited him, or whether he requested an audience. And lastly, he does not say whether the St. Petersburg Committee and the Central Committee of the Cadets have taken any decision on the matter, and whether anything has been communicated to the provinces about it.

It is not difficult to see that a full assessment of Cadet Zubatovism[30] depends on these facts. Only *shameful* things are *concealed* from the people. Mr. Vodovozov is right: *they must be made public*. And it is Mr. Vodovozov's *duty* to continue his disclosures, if he wishes those citizens who understand their political duties to regard him as an honest, consistent and sterling politician, and not a journalist in search of sensation. In cases of *infamy* in public affairs, it is the *duty* of a citizen *to compel* those who are concealing the infamy to speak.

Anyone who knows *anything* of these villanies and wants to do his duty as a citizen must *compel* the Milyukovs to take him to court for libel, and *there* expose the Cadet leader, who, in the thick of the people's election fight against the old regime, pays back-door visits to a leader of the old regime, behind the backs of the people!

We publicly address the following questions to Mr. Milyukov and the Cadet Party:

(1) When did Milyukov (*and his friends*?) have his audience or audiences with Stolypin?

(2) Did Stolypin invite Milyukov? Did Milyukov at the time *know anything* about the "abominable" (to use Mr. Vodovozov's expression) terms which Stolypin wanted to discuss with him?

(3) When did the St. Petersburg Committee and the Central Committee of the Cadets (or the two committees jointly) meet to discuss Stolypin's *proposals*? Did they not decide to take *certain steps* towards meeting these proposals? Was *anything* about this communicated to the provinces?

(4) What connection is there between Milyukov's audience with Stolypin and *certain other steps* taken by these two worthies to meet each other half way, and the *character* of the Cadets' behaviour at the "conference" with the petty-bourgeois bloc on January 18?

We shall return, probably more than once, to these disclosures about the "audience" granted to a Cadet by a reactionary. With all the documents in our hands that an outsider can procure, we shall yet prove that these negotiations between the Cadets and the Black Hundreds *caused the failure* of the bloc of "Lefts" and Cadets which many people desired, and which we have always opposed.

For the time being we say:

Let Mr. Milyukov and the Cadet Party be advised that *not only* Vodovozov, but very many other people will exert all their efforts *to expose this political Lidvaliad*!

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THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN ST. PETERSBURG

Although the gathering of exact data on the elections in the worker curia is making slow progress (the Bolsheviks have issued and circulated a printed questionnaire), the general character of the elections has nevertheless been made clear.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have no doubt gained more than we expected. This is admitted even by the Mensheviks (*Nash Mir*,[31] No. 1). In the gubernia worker curia they secured the election of 4 electors out of 10. In the city worker curia they were defeated by the Social-Democrats, who secured the election of all 14 electors, but the Socialist-Revolutionary candidates polled a high vote (110-135 for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 145-159 for the Social-Democrats, out of a total of 269 votes).

To proceed. Nobody denies that the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated us in the biggest factories.

The Mensheviks do deny the *following* fact, the most vital for an understanding of the causes of our failures, namely, *that the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated mainly Mensheviks*.

In a special article published in No. 1 of *Nash Mir*, on the elections in the worker curia, they *say nothing* about this, but while hypocritically complaining that the Social-Democrats had been weakened by factional strife, they slurred over the fact that it was the Mensheviks who have brought this factional struggle *to the point of a split*, and their tactics to a degree of "Cadetism" that *antagonised* the advanced workers.

But even the data so far collected go more and more *to confirm* our original conclusion (in *Proletary*, No. 12), namely, that it was *Mensheviks** who were defeated by Socialist-Revolutionaries.

For the Neva District, this is borne out by the figures for the various factories, published in *Proletary*, No. 12. The bald statement to the contrary in *Nash Mir*, No. 1, is simply ridiculous

For the Moscow District, it is confirmed by the report in the present issue.[32]

For the Vyborg District, the Mensheviks themselves (*Nash Mir*, No. 1) give the following figures: for the *urban* section of the district (Mensheviks) 17 Social-Democrats, 12 Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 2 unspecified. For the *gubernia* section of the district, where only Bolsheviks were working—7 Social-Democrats and not a single Socialist-Revolutionary.

Though not conclusive proof, these figures on the whole *fully bear out* our contention that it was the Mensheviks who were defeated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. *Nash Mir*'s attempt to argue that the Socialist-Revolutionaries were completely inactive in the gubernia section of the Vyborg District, and that "consequently there was no competition", is obviously unsound. In the first place, the question arises—why were the Socialist-Revolutionaries inactive in this particular suburb of St. Petersburg, although they were active in others? Was it not due to the fact that the "competition" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries had been eliminated beforehand by all our preliminary work? Secondly, the Mensheviks do not tell us exactly who the candidates were. Nor do they give us the figures for each factory. Thirdly, we know from the newspapers that it was at the *election meetings in this very* Vyborg District that the Socialist-Revolutionaries castigated the Mensheviks for their "Cadetism".

Thus, *Rech* for January 24 reports a meeting held on January 21 in the Nobel Hall (No. 11 Neustadt St.). According to *Rech*, Gurvich, a Social-Democrat, spoke and reproached the extreme Left parties for boycotting the Duma

* See p. 65 of this volume.—*Ed.*

PROPERTY OF MARXISTS INTERNET ARCHIVE NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

(*Rech* uses italics to describe this service rendered the Cadets at a Left meeting!). Gurvich accused the Narodniks of "*petty haggling*" that killed the bloc with the Cadets. Replying to Gurvich, Narodnik Bickermann said that "*the previous speaker's statement about petty haggling is slander*". Narodnik Smirnov argued that the Menshevik Gurvich "in no way differs from a Cadet". Smirnov referred to the fact that Gurvich had been publicly "*praised*" by the Cadet Gredeskul.

Such is the *Rech* report. It shows that it was for the Mensheviks' attitude to the Cadets that they were castigated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In the Neva, Moscow and Vyborg districts, the Socialist-Revolutionaries' success was particularly striking. It is these districts that help us to understand the cause of that success: the opportunist Social-Democrats are discrediting Social-Democracy in the eyes of the advanced proletariat.

But if the action of the Right Social-Democrats cost us four places out of ten in the gubernia worker curia, we made up for it in the city worker curia.

As will be seen from what follows, -we made up for it by *the fact* that we displayed the tactics of revolutionary, not opportunist, Social-Democracy for all delegates to see.

The total number of workers' delegates for the city was 272. Of these, 147, i.e., more than half, were Social-Democrats or their sympathisers. The rest were partly definite Socialist-Revolutionaries (54), partly indefinite (55), non-party (6), one *Right* and 9 Trudoviks, the "Lefts" (two of them Cadets), and so on.

The St. Petersburg Committee carried on vigorous activity among the delegates. The question discussed was one of universal interest, the question of tactics in the St. Petersburg elections, with or against the Cadets? Representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. explained to the delegates the position of revolutionary Social-Democracy, while the Mensheviks spoke in defence of their own tactics.

On January 28, the *decisive* meeting of the delegates of all parties was held. Some 200 to 250 people were present. A resolution was carried, with only 10 or 12 voting against,

fully endorsing *the tactics of the Bolsheviks*, demanding support *for the Left bloc*, *and definitely opposing the Mensheviks* and their "*covert*" support of the Cadets.

Here is the text of the resolution:

"Whereas

"(1) the success of the Left election lists, which have already been put forward by the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks and Popular Socialists in opposition to the Black-Hundred and Cadet lists in the urban curia is of extreme political importance;

"(2) such success is possible only if all the Left parties unanimously support the Left lists;

"this meeting of workers' delegates from various factories calls on all Left parties to support the joint Left lists and under no circumstances to put up separate lists, or support the Cadets, even covertly, in any district of St. Petersburg.

"In conformity with the opinion of the masses, this meeting of delegates expresses the wish that our Menshevik Social-Democratic comrades should enter into agreement with the Lefts and contribute to the success of the Left lists in the St. Petersburg elections."

Thus, in the *city* of St. Petersburg, which the Mensheviks wanted to separate from the gubernia, representatives of the *entire* proletariat *have condemned Menshevik tactics*!

It was clear at the Social-Democratic conference that the majority of the St. Petersburg workers sympathised with Bolshevik tactics and this has now been *proved conclusively* by the delegates' decision.

On January 28, representatives of the masses of the workers called for the last time on the Mensheviks to abandon their tactics of "*covertly*" supporting the Cadets, their *blackleg* tactics against the Left bloc.

But even after that, the Mensheviks refused to submit to the will of the proletariat. On February 1, *Rech* published excerpts from their manifesto, in which they put spokes in the wheel of the Left bloc. *On January 29*, *late at night*, the non-party Progressists of the Kolomna District *tore up* their written agreement with the Mensheviks, after *all* the representatives of the Left bloc had explained to the Progressists that the Menshevik terms ("a free hand" for the electors, in other words, freedom to desert to the Cadets!) were untenable.

On January 30 a meeting was held of workers' delegates belonging to the R.S.D.L.P. or sympathising with it. The

majority of these delegates, ninety-eight persons, were present. Comrade V., representative of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., proposed that they examine the question of future Social-Democratic electors submitting to the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee in electing members of the State Duma. He pointed out that under normal circumstances this question would not have given rise to any doubts or differences, since the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee are, of course, binding on all members of the St. Petersburg organisation. But at present a considerable section of the organisation, the majority of the Mensheviks, has broken away and announced that the Menshevik electors reserve freedom of action for themselves. The representative of the St. Petersburg Committee pointed out that if the workers' electors were to follow this recommendation of the unofficial, seceding section of the organisation, it would mean that the split already begun by the Mensheviks would be made final and would be a contravention of the decision adopted at the general meeting of delegates by an overwhelming majority to support the Left bloc in the election campaign. Comrades M. and A., Menshevik members of the St. Petersburg Committee, objected to this, and insisted that the workers' electors must only reckon with the opinions of the delegates. By an overwhelming majority the following resolution, proposed on behalf of the St. Petersburg Committee, was passed: "This meeting considers that submission to the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee is obligatory for electors during the elections."

The Mensheviks vigorously *opposed* this resolution. The most prominent and *responsible* Mensheviks did not hesitate to oppose the St. Petersburg Committee even at a moment like this—on the eve of the elections. They moved an "amendment" to substitute the words "St. Petersburg Organisation" for St. Petersburg Committee.

But the workers immediately saw through the Menshevik tactics, intended to split the Party in the interests of the Cadets. They shouted to the Menshevik speakers "Sit down!" The amendment, which was a covert justification of the split, was *rejected* by an overwhelming majority.

The meeting then proceeded with the nomination of R.S.D.L.P. candidates for electors. The St. Petersburg Committee submitted a list of 14 candidates, whom it recommended from a list of 21 nominated by the district meetings of delegates. The motion to accept this list as a basis for discussion, was carried by an overwhelming majority, despite objections from the Mensheviks, who said this was "governmental pressure". Comrade V., representative of the St. Petersburg Committee, explained that this was not "governmental pressure", that the St. Petersburg Committee has authority only to the extent that it enjoys the confidence of the organised Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg, and that, in submitting the list of recommendations, it was only doing its duty as the organisation's guiding body. All the nominees were discussed, and one of the candidates, on the proposal of the representative of the St. Petersburg Committee, was withdrawn and replaced by another. Then they were put to the vote, which resulted in the entire list proposed by the St. Petersburg Committee being approved by a considerable majority.

The St. Petersburg Committee's list was published in all newspapers on the eve of the elections.

The elections of February 1 resulted in a victory for the united Social-Democrats. *The St. Petersburg Committee's list was elected in toto*. All fourteen electors are Social-Democrats!

Of these fourteen—*eight* are Bolsheviks, four are Mensheviks (strictly speaking, one is a syndicalist, not a Menshevik), and two are non-factional Social-Democrats *who are in favour of the Left bloc*.

In the city worker curia, the Bolsheviks made up for the losses sustained by the Social-Democrats in the gubernia worker curia.

Let *Rech* now rave to its heart's content (see the article in the issue of February 3), and say that the Bolsheviks did not give the Socialist-Revolutionaries even a proportionate minority.

We never promised the Socialist-Revolutionaries proportional representation—and no one has shown what the proportion is, for no figures on the voting are avail-

able. We are the first to have *begun* collecting these figures.

We have left ourselves a *free hand* to fight all the other parties in the worker curia.

Thanks to action by the *revolutionary* Social-Democrats, out of the total number of workers' electors for St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Gubernia, only 4 are Socialist-Revolutionaries and 20 are Social-Democrats.

At the next elections we shall win all the places for Social-Democracy.

Proletary, No. 13,
February 11, 1907

Published according
to the *Proletary* text

ON THE REPORT OF THE MOSCOW DISTRICT OF ST. PETERSBURG CONCERNING THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND DUMA

We call our readers' attention to the fact that the data on the elections of delegates by the St. Petersburg workers expose, to an ever greater extent, *the way in which* the Mensheviks got themselves votes for the Social-Democratic conference. From the Franco-Russian Subdistrict, for example, they "brought" **370** Menshevik votes to the conference. Here the Bolsheviks did not count on a single valid Party vote. But what happened then? The delegate from the Franco-Russian Factory was a *Bolshevik*, who has now been chosen as elector!

And that is where an unexpected exposure of the Mensheviks came from.

To continue: the Menshevik weekly *Nash Mir* (No. 1, January 28) had the temerity to say of the Moscow District that "in the Bolshevik Neva and Moscow districts, exclusively Socialist-Revolutionaries were elected as delegates" (p. 14). It has already been shown in *Proletary*, No. 12 that this is *a patent untruth* as far as the Neva District is concerned, for there it was precisely the Mensheviks who were so thoroughly defeated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Let us turn to the Moscow District. The Mensheviks consider this a Bolshevik district *now* that they have to find somebody to blame for the defeat other than themselves! But the Mensheviks must not forget that this time their words can be *verified*! We can take the *official* statement made to the Central Committee by the thirty-one Mensheviks on their reasons for leaving the conference (the

printed pamphlet we analysed in *Proletary*, No. 12*). Among the thirty-one signatures we find "*five from the Moscow District*".

But the conference approved the mandates of four Bolsheviks and four Mensheviks from the Moscow District.

Instructive, is it not?

When Menshevik votes have to be mustered for the conference they count *five* Mensheviks against three or four Bolsheviks. *In that case* the Mensheviks want to be in the majority!

But when they want to shift the political responsibility on to somebody else they declare that the Moscow District is a "Bolshevik district"....

The Bolsheviks counted 185 votes for the Moscow District, and the Mensheviks, in that same pamphlet, admitted that they had challenged these votes only "tentatively", that actually *the votes should have been confirmed* (p. 7 of the same pamphlet).

The Mensheviks counted their votes for the Moscow District as 48+98+97, altogether 243. Of these, 195 were challenged, although the Mensheviks themselves insisted at the time (p. 7 of the pamphlet) that **all 243** votes should be confirmed!

The Mensheviks, therefore, considered themselves to have a very substantial majority in Moscow District—243 votes against 185. ... *Nash Mir* has, indeed, acted *very* injudiciously: its own words serve to prove that the Mensheviks acted *dishonestly* at the conference.

In conclusion we would remind the comrade who sent us the report on the Moscow District that it is extremely important to have *complete* figures, for each factory separately, on the election of delegates and on the number of votes polled by the different candidates.

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* See pp. 29-32 of this volume.—*Ed.*

SOME FIGURES ON THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKER CURIA IN SOUTH RUSSIA

Our appeal to all Russian Social-Democrats to organise the collection of exact figures on the elections in the worker curia has not been futile. We have already received replies to 93 of the questionnaires we distributed among the St. Petersburg comrades. These 93 questionnaires were distributed by districts as follows: Peterburgskaya Storona, 7; Vasilyevsky Ostrov, 22; Vyborg, 18; Moscow, 18; City, 28. We ask comrades to expedite the dispatch of the remaining forms to help make our information complete, particularly for the big factories. We shall then publish the full figures.

From the provinces we have the returns for six factories in Ekaterinoslav Gubernia. We give these in tabulated form to show the comrades what kind of information the Party needs and what conclusions we should draw from the experience of the first Party elections in the worker curia.

Name of factory	Number of workers	Number of delegates	Party affiliation of delegate elected	Number of votes cast	Number of votes cast for:				
					S.D. Bolsh.	S.D. Mensh.	S.R.	Non-Party	Right
Esau Works	350	1	S.D. Mensh.	130	—	112	15	—	3
Locomotive Repair Shop.	2,700	2	S.D. Mensh.	800	—	650	—	—	—
Locomotive Depot .	700	1	S.D.	230	230		—	—	—
Nail Factory	700	1	S.D. Bolsh.	250	250	—	—	—	—
Pipe-Rolling Works .	850	1	S.D. Mensh.	200	—	195	—	—	5
Bryansk Rolling Mill	4,350	4	S.R.	1,100	—	300	800	—	—
Total, 6 factories . .	9,650	10	6 S.D. 4 S.R.	2,710	250 230	1,257 1,737	815	—	8

Of course, we do not know how typical these figures are, and to what extent the conclusions to be drawn from them can be applied to the whole of Ekaterinoslav Gubernia. In order to draw final conclusions we must obtain complete data.

For the time being there are two points we can mention. The percentage of workers taking part in the elections is not high. Evidently, Social-Democratic activity is not thorough enough and does not reach the masses in their entirety. On the whole, less than one-third of the total number of workers took part in the elections. The lowest percentage is at the Tubing Works—200 out of 850, i.e., less than one-fourth. The highest is at the Esau Works: 130 out of 350, i.e., more than one third.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries competed with us at two factories: Esau and Bryansk. At the latter, *the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeated the Mensheviks*! The biggest factory elected *four Socialist-Revolutionary* delegates.

Thus, the preliminary figures for the South (very incomplete, it is true) confirm the conclusion we drew about the North: *the Socialist-Revolutionaries are beating the Mensheviks*, for the edification of the opportunists, it might seem, or else to teach a lesson to people who with unpardonable thoughtlessness brush aside revolutionary bourgeois democracy and hanker after liberal-monarchist bourgeois democracy!

The Socialist-Revolutionaries account for 40 per cent, i.e., two-fifths, of the total number of delegates (10). But the number of votes cast for the Socialist-Revolutionaries was *less than one-third* of the total—815 out of 2,710. It is worth noting that, despite their victory at the biggest factory, the proportion of votes obtained by the Socialist-Revolutionaries was smaller than the proportion of delegates. This shows how groundless and unsupported were the assertions of St. Petersburg Socialist-Revolutionaries that their share of votes must have been larger than that indicated by their share of delegates. Such assertions must not be made without documentary statistical evidence of the number of votes cast at each factory.

We hope that comrades all over Russia will continue to collect information along the lines indicated, so that the Party as a whole may form a clear and definite idea of the results of its campaign, and learn to understand the causes of its relative failures.

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to the *Proletary* text

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

The election campaign in St. Petersburg is drawing to a close. The elections are only three days away, and by the time the reader sees these lines the results of the voting in St. Petersburg will be known.

One might think it useless to discuss the significance of the St. Petersburg elections until they are over. But that is not so. The election campaign in St. Petersburg has such a long history and has provided such an abundance of unusually instructive political material that its significance is already quite clear. Whatever the outcome of the elections, there can be no doubt that the St. Petersburg campaign of 1906-07 already constitutes an important, independent stage in the history of the Russian revolution.

The St. Petersburg election campaign has been a definite gain for the revolution, first, because it has brought out the relations between the political parties and revealed the frame of mind (and, consequently, the interests and the entire political situation) of the different classes, and then it has served in a big, public, mass event, as a *practical* test of the various answers given to the *fundamental* questions of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

The main events in the St. Petersburg election campaign occurred with the speed of a whirlwind. And in this whirlwind, when immediate *action* was necessary at all costs, the true nature and character of the various parties and trends revealed themselves as never before. No formal ties or party

traditions were able to withstand this whirlwind organisations broke asunder, promises were broken, decisions and positions were changed, and every day brought momentous news. The clashes between the different parties and trends were unusually sharp; polemics, sharp enough even in ordinary times, developed into a *mêlée*. This is not due to the fact that Russians have no self-restraint, or that they have been warped by illegal conditions, or that we are ill-bred—only philistines can bring forward such explanations.

No, the sharpness of these clashes, the fury of the struggle, was due to the *depth* of class differences, to the *antagonism* of the social and political trends which events brought to the surface with unexpected rapidity, and which demanded immediate "steps" from all, brought them all into collision, and compelled each to defend in struggle, *auskämpfen*, his proper place and his real line of policy.

All parties have their headquarters in St. Petersburg, the hub of political life in Russia. The press is not of local, but of national significance. It was therefore inevitable that the struggle of the parties in the St. Petersburg election campaign should become an extremely important symptom, a portent and prototype of many future battles and events, parliamentary and non-parliamentary, in the Russian revolution.

At first the question at issue was the seemingly petty, secondary, "technical" question of an agreement between all the opposition and revolutionary parties against the Black-Hundred danger. But this "simple" question actually concealed the fundamental political questions of: (1) the attitude of the government towards the liberals, the Cadets; (2) the real political trend of the Cadets; (3) the hegemony of the Cadets in the Russian liberation movement; (4) the political trends of the petty-bourgeois Trudovik parties; (5) the mutual class interests and political affinity of the moderate Popular Socialists and the revolutionary Socialist-Revolutionaries; (6) the petty-bourgeois or opportunist section of the Social-Democratic Labour Party; (7) the hegemony of the proletariat in the liberation movement; (8) the significance of the visible and open, and of the invisible and concealed elements and "potentialities" of the

revolutionary petty-bourgeois democratic movement in Russia.

And this abundance of political questions was raised and settled by events, by the course of the election campaign itself. These questions were raised against the will of many parties and without their being aware of them—and they were settled "violently" even to the extent of breaking all traditions—and the outcome was a surprise to the vast majority of the politicians taking part in the campaign.

"The Bolsheviks scraped through by a fluke," says the philistine, shaking his head over all these surprises. "It was just a stroke of luck."

Such talk reminds me of a passage in the recently published letters of Engels to Sorge. On March 7, 1884, Engels wrote to Sorge:

"A fortnight ago, my nephew from Barmen, an independent Conservative, came to visit me. I said to him: 'We have reached such a pitch in Germany that we can simply fold our arms and make our enemies do our work. Whether you repeal the Anti-Socialist Law, extend it, tighten it up or modify it—will make no difference, whatever you do, you will play into our hands. 'Yes,' he replied, 'circumstances are working wonderfully in your favour.' 'Well, of course,' I replied, 'they would not if we had not correctly defined them forty years ago and had we not acted accordingly.' My nephew made no reply."[33]

The Bolsheviks cannot speak of forty years, of course—we are comparing something small with something very big—but we can speak of months and years of Social-Democratic tactics in the bourgeois revolution defined in advance. The Bolsheviks did indeed *fold their arms* during the most important and decisive moments in the election campaign in St. Petersburg—and *circumstances worked for us*. All our enemies, from the formidable and ruthless enemy Stolypin, to the revisionists, "enemies" with cardboard swords, *worked for us*.

At the beginning of the election campaign in St. Petersburg the whole opposition, all the Lefts, were opposed to the Bolsheviks. Everything possible or conceivable was done against us. *Yet everything turned out as we said.*

Why? Because long before (as long ago as "Two Tactics",* 1905, in Geneva) we gave a far more correct assessment of the government's attitude towards the liberals and the attitude of the petty-bourgeois democrats towards the proletariat.

What *killed* the bloc that was almost arranged between the Cadets and all the "Lefts" *except the Bolsheviks*? The negotiations between Milyukov and Stolypin. Stolypin beckoned—and the Cadet turned his back on the people to fawn like a puppy on his Black-Hundred master.

Was this chance? No, it was *necessity*, because the fundamental interests of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie compel them to abandon the revolutionary struggle conducted together with the people at every decisive moment, and seek a compromise with reaction.

What was the cause of the *absolute instability* and spinelessness of all the petty-bourgeois (Narodnik and Trudovik) parties and of the Mensheviks, the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party? Why did they waver and vacillate, dash from Right to Left, follow in the wake of the Cadets, and hold them so dear?

Not because of the personal qualities of the individual but because the petty bourgeois is inevitably inclined to follow in the footsteps of the liberal, to drag along behind him, because the petty bourgeois has no faith in himself, is unable to endure temporary "isolation", is unable to face the baying of the bourgeois hounds without fear and trembling, has no faith in the independent revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the proletariat and peasants, shirks the role of leader in the bourgeois revolution, renounces his own slogans, and adapts and accommodates himself to the Milyukovs....

And the Milyukovs accommodate themselves to Stolypin!

The Bolsheviks determined their policy themselves, and in advance, unfurled *their own* banner, the banner of the revolutionary proletariat, before the people.

Down with hypocritical fables about a Black-Hundred danger, about "fighting" by paying calls on Stolypin! Those who really want freedom for the people and victory

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* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

for the revolution—let them follow us, both against the Black-Hundred gang and the Cadet hucksters.

We will fight *independently*, *under all circumstances*. We are not afraid to "isolate" ourselves from your cheap and nasty, petty and miserable tricks and transactions.

With the proletariat for the revolution—or with the liberals for negotiations with Stolypin—voters, make your choice! Make your choice, Messrs. Narodniks! And you too, Menshevik comrades!

And having determined *our* line, *we sat back*, and waited for the outcome of the scrimmage that had begun. On January 6 our conference unfurled *our* banner. Until January 18 Milyukov grovelled at Stolypin's feet while the Mensheviks, Narodniks and non-party people, grovelled at Milyukov's feet.

They all got themselves in a tangle. They were all playing at diplomacy, and wrangled and quarrelled among themselves to such an extent that they *could not* march together.

We did not play at diplomacy, and *denounced them all* for the sake of a clear and open declaration of the principles of revolutionary proletarian struggle.

And all who were *capable of fighting* followed us. The Left bloc became a fact. The hegemony of the revolutionary proletariat became a fact. *The proletariat* led *all* the Trudoviks and a large part of the Mensheviks, even intellectuals.

The banner of *the proletariat* has been raised at the St. Petersburg elections. And whatever the outcome of the first serious elections in Russia in which all parties have participated—the banner of the independent proletariat, which is pursuing its own line, has already been raised. It will be held high in the parliamentary struggle and in *all other* forms of struggle that will lead to the victory of the revolution.

By the strength of its own independence, consistency and firmness, the socialist proletariat must win over the masses of oppressed and downtrodden peasants, the masses of wavering, vacillating and unstable petty-bourgeois democrats, and alienate them from the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, thus gaining control over the bourgeoisie, and,

at the head of a popular mass movement, crush the hated autocracy—such is the task of the socialist proletariat in the bourgeois revolution.

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PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF KARL MARX'S LETTERS TO Dr. KUGELMANN

Our purpose in issuing as a separate pamphlet the full collection of Marx's letters to Kugelmann published in the German Social-Democratic weekly, *Neue Zeit*, is to acquaint the Russian public more closely with Marx and Marxism. As was to be expected, a good deal of space in Marx's correspondence is devoted to personal matters. This is exceedingly valuable material for the biographer. But for the general public, and for the Russian working class in particular, those passages in the letters which contain theoretical and political material are infinitely more important. In the revolutionary period we are now passing through, it is particularly instructive for us to make a careful study of this material, which reveals Marx as a man who responded directly to all questions of the labour movement and world politics. The editors of *Neue Zeit* are quite right in saying that "we are elevated by an acquaintance with the personality of men whose thoughts and wills took shape in the period of great upheavals". Such an acquaintance is doubly necessary to the Russian socialist in 1907, for it provides a wealth of very valuable material indicating the direct tasks confronting socialists in every revolution through which a country passes. Russia is experiencing a "great upheaval" at this very moment. In the present Russian revolution the Social-Democrat should more and more frequently pattern his policy after that of Marx in the comparatively stormy sixties.

We shall, therefore, permit ourselves to make only brief mention of those passages in Marx's correspondence that are of particular importance from the theoretical standpoint,

and shall deal in greater detail with his revolutionary policy as a representative of the proletariat.

Of outstanding interest as a contribution to a fuller and more profound understanding of Marxism is the letter of July 11, 1868 (p. 42, et seq.).[34] In the form of a polemic against the vulgar economists, Marx in this letter very clearly expounds *his* conception of what is called the "labour" theory of value. Those very objections to Marx's theory of value which naturally arise in the minds of the least trained readers of *Capital* and for this reason are most eagerly seized upon by the common or garden representatives of "professorial" bourgeois "science", are here analysed by Marx briefly, simply, and with remarkable lucidity. Marx here shows the road he took and the road to be taken towards elucidation of the law of value. He teaches us his *method*, using the most common objections as illustrations. He makes clear the connection between such a purely (it would seem) theoretical and abstract question as the theory of value and "the interest of the ruling classes", which must be "*to perpetuate confusion*". It is only to be hoped that everyone who begins to study Marx and read *Capital* will read and re-read this letter when studying the first and most difficult chapters of that book.

Other passages in the letters that are very interesting from the theoretical standpoint are those in which Marx passes judgement on various writers. When you read these opinions of Marx—vividly written, full of passion and revealing a profound interest in all the great ideological trends and in an analysis of them—you realise that you are listening to the words of a great thinker. Apart from the remarks on Dietzgen, made in passing, the comments on the Proudhonists (p. 17)[35] deserve particular attention from the reader. The "brilliant" young bourgeois intellectuals who dash "into the thick of the proletariat" at times of social upheaval, and are incapable of acquiring the standpoint of the working class or of carrying on persistent and serious work among the "rank and file" of the proletarian organizations, are depicted with remarkable vividness in a few strokes of the pen.

Take the comment on Dühring (p. 35),[36] which, as it were, anticipates the contents of the famous *Anti-Dühring*

written by Engels (in conjunction with Marx) nine years later. There is a Russian translation of this book by Zederbaum which, unfortunately, is not only guilty of omissions but is simply a poor translation, with mistakes. Here, too, we have the comment on Thünen, which likewise touches on Ricardo's theory of rent. Marx had already, in 1868, emphatically rejected "Ricardo's errors", which he finally refuted in Volume III of *Capital*, published in 1894, but which to this very day are repeated by the revisionists—from our ultra-bourgeois and even "Black-Hundred" Mr. Bulgakov to the "almost orthodox" Maslov.

Interesting, too, is the comment on Büchner, with an appraisal of vulgar materialism and of the "superficial nonsense" copied from Lange (the usual source of "professorial" bourgeois philosophy!) (p. 48).[37]

Let us pass to Marx's revolutionary policy. There is among Social-Democrats in Russia a surprisingly widespread philistine conception of Marxism, according to which a revolutionary period, with its specific forms of struggle and its special proletarian tasks, is almost an anomaly, while a "constitution" and an "extreme opposition" are the rule. In no other country in the world at this moment is there such a profound revolutionary crisis as in Russia—and in no other country are there "Marxists" (belittlers and vulgarisers of Marxism) who take up such a sceptical and philistine attitude towards the revolution. From the fact that the revolution is bourgeois in content they draw the shallow conclusion that the bourgeoisie is *the driving force* of the revolution, that the tasks of the proletariat in this revolution are of an ancillary, not independent, character and that proletarian leadership of the revolution is impossible!

How excellently Marx, in his letters to Kugelmann, exposes this shallow interpretation of Marxism. Here is a letter dated April 6, 1866. At that time Marx had finished his principal work. He had given his final judgement on the German Revolution of 1848 fourteen years before this letter was written. He had himself, in 1850, renounced his socialist illusions that a socialist revolution was impending in 1848. And in 1866, when only just beginning to observe the growth of new political crises, he writes:

"Will our philistines [he is referring to the German bourgeois liberals] at last realise that without a revolution which removes the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns ... there must finally come another Thirty Years' War...!" (pp. 13-14).[38]

There is not a shadow of illusion here that the impending revolution (it took place from above, not from below as Marx had expected) would remove the bourgeoisie and capitalism, but a most clear and precise statement that it would remove only the Prussian and Austrian monarchies. And what faith in this bourgeois revolution! What revolutionary passion of a proletarian fighter who realises the vast significance the bourgeois revolution has for the progress of the socialist movement!

Noting "a very interestingly social movement three years later, on the eve of the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire in France, Marx says in *a positive outburst of enthusiasm* that "the Parisians are making a regular study of their recent revolutionary past, in order to prepare themselves for the business of the impending new revolution". And describing the struggle of classes revealed in this study of the past, Marx concludes (p. 56): "And so the whole historical witches' cauldron is bubbling. When will *our country* [Germany] be so far."[39]

Such is the lesson to be learned from Marx by the Russian Marxist intellectuals, who are debilitated by scepticism, dulled by pedantry, have a penchant for penitent speeches, rapidly tire of the revolution, and yearn, as for a holiday, for the interment of the revolution and its replacement by constitutional prose. From the theoretician and leader of the proletarians they should learn faith in the revolution, the ability to call on the working class to fight for its immediate revolutionary aims to the last, and a firmness of spirit which admits of no faint-hearted whimpering following temporary setbacks of the revolution.

The pedants of Marxism think that this is all ethical twaddle, romanticism, and lack of a sense of reality! No, gentlemen, this is the combination of revolutionary theory and revolutionary policy, without which Marxism becomes Brentanoism,[40] Struvism[41] and Sombartism.[42] The Marxian doctrine has fused the theory and practice of the class

struggle into one inseparable whole. And he is no Marxist who takes a theory that soberly states the objective situation and distorts it into a justification of the existing order and even goes to the length of trying to adapt himself as quickly as possible to every temporary decline in the revolution, to discard "revolutionary illusions" as quickly as possible, and to turn to "realistic" tinkering.

In times that were most peaceful, seemingly "idyllic as Marx expressed it, and "wretchedly stagnant" (as *Neue Zeit* put it), Marx was able to sense the approach of revolution and *to rouse* the proletariat to a consciousness of its advanced revolutionary tasks. Our Russian intellectuals, who vulgarise Marx in a philistine manner, in the most revolutionary times teach the proletariat a policy of passivity, of submissively "drifting with the current", of timidly supporting the most unstable elements of the fashionable liberal party!

Marx's assessment of the Commune crowns the letters to Kugelmann. And this assessment is particularly valuable when compared with the methods of the Russian Right-wing Social-Democrats. Plekhanov, who after December 1905 faintheartedly exclaimed: "They should not have taken up arms", had the modesty to compare himself to Marx. Marx, says he, also put the brakes on the revolution in 1870.

Yes, Marx *also* put the brakes on the revolution. But see what a gulf lies between Plekhanov and Marx, in Plekhanov's own comparison!

In November 1905, a month before the first revolutionary wave in Russia had reached its climax, Plekhanov, far from emphatically warning the proletariat, spoke directly of the necessity *to learn to use arms and to arm*. Yet, when the struggle flared up a month later, Plekhanov, without making the slightest attempt to analyse its significance, its role in the general course of events and its connection with previous forms of struggle, hastened to play the part of a penitent intellectual and exclaimed: "They should not have taken up arms."

In September 1870, *six months before* the Commune, Marx gave a direct warning to the French workers: insurrection would be *an act of desperate folly*, he said in the well-known Address of the International.[43] He exposed

in advance the nationalistic illusions of the possibility of a movement in the spirit of 1792. He was able to say, *not after the event*, but many months before: "Don't take up arms."

And how did he behave when this *hopeless* cause, as he himself had called it in September, began to take practical shape in March 1871? Did he use it (as Plekhanov did the December events) to "take a dig" at his enemies, the Proudhonists and Blanquists who were leading the Commune? Did he begin to scold like a schoolmistress, and say: "I told you so, I warned you; this is what comes of your romanticism, your revolutionary ravings"? Did he preach to the Communards, as Plekhanov did to the December fighters, the sermon of the smug philistine: "You should not have taken up arms"?

No. On April 12, 1871, Marx writes an *enthusiastic* letter to Kugelmann—a letter which we would like to see hung in the home of every Russian Social-Democrat and of every literate Russian worker.

In September 1870 Marx had called the insurrection an act of desperate folly; but in April 1871, when he saw the mass movement of the people, he watched it with the keen attention of a participant in great events marking a step forward in the historic revolutionary movement.

This is an *attempt*, he says, to smash the bureaucratic military machine, and not simply to transfer it to different hands. And he has words of the highest praise for the "*heroic*" Paris workers led by the Proudhonists and Blanquists. "What elasticity," he writes, "what historical initiative, what a capacity for sacrifice in these Parisians! ... [p. 88]. History has no like example of a like greatness."

The *historical initiative* of the masses was what Marx prized above everything else. Ah, if only our Russian Social-Democrats would learn from Marx how to appreciate the *historical initiative* of the Russian workers and peasants in October and December 1905!

Compare the homage paid to the *historical initiative* of the masses by a profound thinker, who foresaw failure six months ahead—and the lifeless, soulless, pedantic: "They should not have taken up arms"! Are these not as far apart as heaven and earth?

And like *a participant* in the mass struggle, to which he reacted with all his characteristic ardour and passion, Marx, then living in exile in London, set to work to criticise the *immediate steps* of the "recklessly brave" Parisians who were "*ready to storm heaven*".

Ah, how our present "realist" wiseacres among the Marxists, who in 1906-07 are deriding revolutionary romanticism in Russian would have sneered at Marx at the time! How people would have scoffed at *a materialist*, *an economist*, an enemy of utopias, who pays homage to an "attempt" to storm *heaven*! What tears, condescending smiles or commiseration these "men in mufflers"[44] would have bestowed upon him for his rebel tendencies, utopianism, etc., etc., and for his appreciation of a heaven-storming movement!

But Marx was not inspired with the wisdom of the small fry who are afraid to discuss the *technique* of the higher forms of revolutionary struggle. It is precisely the *technical* problems of the insurrection that he discussed. Defence or attack?—he asked, as if the military operations were taking place just outside London. And he decided that it must certainly be attack: "*They should have marched at once on Versailles...*".

This was written in April 1871, a few weeks before the great and bloody May....

"They should have marched at once on Versailles"—the insurgents should, those who had begun the "act of desperate folly" (September 1870) of storming heaven.

"They should not have taken up arms" in December 1905 in order to oppose by force the first attempts to take away the liberties that had been won....

Yes, Plekhanov had good reason to compare himself to Marx!

"Second mistake," Marx said, continuing his *technical* criticism: "The Central Committee" (the *military command*—note this—the reference is to the Central Committee of the National Guard) "surrendered its power *too soon...*".

Marx knew how to warn the *leaders* against a premature rising. But his attitude towards the heaven-storming *proletariat* was that of a practical advisor, of a participant in the *struggle* of the masses, who were raising the *whole*

movement to *a higher level* in spite of the false theories and mistakes of Blanqui and Proudhon.

"However that may be," he wrote, "the present rising in Paris—even if it be crushed by the wolves, swine, and vile curs of the old society—is the most glorious deed of our Party since the June insurrection...."[45]

And, without concealing from the proletariat *a single* mistake of the Commune, Marx dedicated to this *heroic deed* a work which *to this very day* serves as the best guide in the fight for "heaven" and as a frightful bugbear to the liberal and radical "*swine*".

Plekhanov dedicated to the December events a "work" which has become practically the bible of the Cadets.

Yes, Plekhanov had good reason to compare himself to Marx.

Kugelmann apparently replied to Marx expressing certain doubts, referring to the hopelessness of the struggle and to realism as opposed to romanticism—at any rate, he compared the Commune, an *insurrection*, to the peaceful demonstration in Paris on June 13, 1849.

Marx immediately (April 17, 1871) severely lectured Kugelmann.

"*World history*," he wrote, "*would indeed be very easy to make, if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances.*"

In September 1870, Marx called the insurrection an act of desperate folly. But, when the *masses* rose, Marx wanted to march with them, to learn with them in the process of the struggle, and not to give them bureaucratic admonitions. He realised that to attempt in advance to calculate the chances *with complete accuracy* would be quackery or hopeless pedantry. What he valued *above everything else* was that the working class heroically and self-sacrificingly took the initiative in *making* world history. Marx regarded world history from the standpoint of those who *make* it without being in a position to calculate the chances *infallibly* beforehand, and not from the standpoint of an intellectual philistine who moralises: "It was easy to foresee ... they should not have taken up...".

Marx was also able to appreciate that there are moments in history when a desperate struggle of the *masses*, even

for a hopeless cause, is *essential* for the further schooling of these masses and their training for the *next* struggle.

Such a *statement* of the question is quite incomprehensible and even alien in principle to our present-day quasi-Marxists, who like to take the name of Marx in vain, to borrow only his estimate of the past, and not his ability to make the future. Plekhanov did not even think of it when be set out after December 1905 "*to put the brakes on*".

But it is precisely this question that Marx raised, without in the least forgetting that he himself in September 1870 regarded insurrection as an act of desperate folly.

"...The bourgeois *canaille* of Versailles," he wrote, "...presented the Parisians with the alternative of either taking up the fight or succumbing without a struggle. The *demoralisation of the working class* in the latter case would have been a *far greater* misfortune than the succumbing of any number of 'leaders'."[46]

And with this we shall conclude our brief review of the lessons in a policy worthy of the proletariat which Marx teaches in his letters to Kugelmann.

The working class of Russia has already proved once, and will prove again more than once, that it is capable of "storming heaven".

February 5, 1907

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THE SECOND DUMA AND THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY WAVE

St. Petersburg, February 7, 1907.

Events are moving at a pace which can only be called revolutionary. Four days ago, in discussing the election campaign in St. Petersburg, we wrote that the political alignment was already clear: revolutionary Social-Democracy alone had independently, resolutely, and proudly unfurled the banner of relentless struggle against the violence of reaction and the hypocrisy of the liberals. The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party) were wavering, turning now to the liberals, now to the revolutionary Social-Democrats.

In St. Petersburg the elections to the Duma take place today. Their results cannot affect the alignment of social forces we have already indicated. And yesterday's elections, which have accounted for 217 of the 524 members, i.e., more than two-fifths, are a clear indication of the political composition of the Second Duma, a clear indication of the political situation which is developing before our eyes.

According to *Rech*, which, of course, is inclined to paint a picture favourable to the Cadets, the 205 members already elected to the Duma are distributed as follows: Rights, 37; National-Autonomists,[47] 24; Cadets, 48; Progressists and non-party, 16; non-party Lefts, 40; Narodniks, 20 (13 Trudoviks, 6 Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 1 Popular Socialist); and 20 Social-Democrats.

We have before us a Duma that is undoubtedly more Left than the previous one. If the rest of the elections yield similar results we shall have the following round figures

for 500 members of the Duma: Rights, 90; Nationalists, 50; Cadets, 125; Progressists, 35; non-party Lefts, 100; Narodniks, 50; Social-Democrats, 50. It goes without saying that this is only an approximate estimate made for the sake of illustration, but there can hardly be any doubt of the correctness of these totals.

The Rights constitute one-fifth; the moderate liberals (the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, including the Nationalists, Cadets, and some, if not all, Progressists)—two-fifths; the Lefts—two-fifths (non-party, one-fifth, and Narodniks and Social-Democrats sharing equally the other fifth)—such is the make-up of the Second Duma as it appears to us on the basis of the preliminary returns.

What does this mean?

The most savage and shameless tyranny of the Black-Hundred government, which is the most reactionary in Europe. The most reactionary election law in all Europe. The most revolutionary popular representative body in Europe in the most backward country!

This glaring contradiction clearly reveals the fundamental contradiction in the whole of contemporary Russian life, reveals to the full the revolutionary character of the present day.

Two revolutionary years have elapsed since the great day of January 9, 1905. We have experienced long and painful periods of savage reaction. We have experienced brief "bright intervals" of liberty. We have experienced two great popular outbreaks of strikes and armed struggle. We have experienced one Duma and two general elections, which definitely determined the alignment of parties and caused an extremely sharp alignment among the population, which until recently had no conception of political parties whatsoever.

During these two years, we have grown out of our faith—naïve in some and crudely selfish in others—in the unity of the liberation movement, and have cast off many illusions of peaceful constitutional methods; we have gained experience in mass forms of struggle and have reached a point where we must employ the most stern and extreme method of struggle conceivable—that of the armed struggle of one part of the population against the other. The bour-

geoisie and the landlords have become fierce and brutal. The man in the street is weary. The Russian intellectual is limp and despondent. The party of liberal windbags and liberal traitors, the Cadets, has raised its head, hoping to make capital out of the prevailing weariness born of the revolution, and claiming as its hegemony what is really its readiness, like Famusov,[48] to go to the utmost limits of obsequiousness.

But below, deep down among the proletarian masses and among the mass of the destitute, starving peasantry, the revolution has made headway, quietly and imperceptibly undermining the foundations, rousing the most somnolent with the thunder of civil war, galvanising the most lethargic with the rapid changes from "liberties" to bestial tyranny, from calm to parliamentary excitement, elections, mass meetings, and feverish "union" activity.

As a result we have a new, even more Left Duma, and in prospect we have a new, even more formidable and more unmistakable *revolutionary* crisis.

Even the blind must now see that it is a revolutionary and not a constitutional crisis that lies ahead of us. There can be no doubt about that. The days of the Russian constitution are numbered. A new clash is inexorably approaching—either the revolutionary people will be victorious, or the Second Duma will disappear as ingloriously as the First, followed by the repeal of the election law and a return to the Black-Hundred absolutism *sans phrases*.

How petty our recent "theoretical" controversies have suddenly become in the glaring light of the rising sun of revolution! Are not the plaints of the miserable, frightened and faint-hearted intellectuals about the Black-Hundred danger in the elections ridiculous? Have not events brilliantly confirmed what we said *in November* (*Proletary*, No. 8): "By their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the Mensheviks by the nose in order to avert the danger from the Left"?*

Revolution is a good teacher. It forces back on to the revolutionary track those who are continually going astray either from weakness of character or weakness of intellect.

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* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 314.—*Ed.*

The Mensheviks wanted blocs with the Cadets, unity in the "opposition", the opportunity to "utilise the Duma as a whole". They did everything possible (and impossible too, to the extent of splitting the Party, as was the case in St. Petersburg) to create an all-liberal Duma.

Nothing came of it. The revolution is stronger than opportunists of little faith think. Under the hegemony of the Cadets, the revolution can only lie prone in the dust—it can triumph only under the hegemony of the Bolshevik Social-Democrats.

The Duma is turning out to be exactly as we depicted it in our polemic with the Mensheviks in *Proletary*, No. 8 (November 1906). It is a Duma of sharp extremes, a Duma in which the moderate and cautious mean has been swept away by the revolutionary torrent, a Duma of Krushevans[49] and of the revolutionary people. The Bolshevik Social-Democrats will raise their banner in this Duma and say to the masses of the petty-bourgeois democrats what they said to them during the St. Petersburg elections: make your choice between Cadet haggling with the Stolypins, and joint struggle in the ranks of the people! We, the proletariat of all Russia, are marching to that struggle. All who want freedom for the people, and land for the peasants follow us!

The Cadets already feel that the wind has changed, that the political barometer is falling rapidly. It is not surprising that the Milyukovs have lost their nerve and, casting off all shame, have started howling—in the street—about "red rags" (in the sanctums of the Stolypins these creatures have always secretly abused the "red rag"). It is not surprising that today's *Rech* (February 7) refers to the "jumps" in the political barometer, to the government's vacillation "between the resignation of the Cabinet and some kind of pronunciamento, action by the Black Hundreds and the military, the very date of which has been fixed for the 14th". And the desolated soul of the Russian liberal wails and sighs: What, again a "policy of spontaneous reflexes...".

Yes, miserable heroes of miserably stagnant times! Revolution *again*! We gladly welcome the approaching wave of the people's spontaneous wrath. But we shall do all in

our power to make this new struggle as little spontaneous and as conscious, consistent, and steadfast as possible.

The government set all the wheels of its machine in motion long ago: violence, pogroms, barbarous atrocities, deception and stultification. And now all these wheels have come loose; everything has been tried, even the shelling of villages and towns The popular forces are not exhausted; on the contrary, they are now forming more and more widely, powerfully, openly and boldly. A Black-Hundred autocracy and—a Left Duma. The situation is undoubtedly a revolutionary one, and a struggle in the most acute form is undoubtedly inevitable.

But it is precisely because of its inevitability that we must not force the pace, spur or goad it on. Leave that to the Krushevans and Stolypins. Our task is *to reveal* the truth to the proletariat and the peasantry clearly, directly and with unsparing candour, to open their eyes to the significance of the coming storm, to help them to meet the enemy in organised fashion, with the calmness of men marching to death, like soldiers in the trenches facing the foe, and ready at the first shots to dash into the attack.

"Shoot first, Messrs. Bourgeois!" said Engels to the German capitalists in 1894.[50] And we say: "Shoot first, Krushevans and Stolypins, Orlovs and Romanovs!" Our task is to help the working class and the peasantry *to crush* the Black-Hundred autocracy when it hurls itself upon us of its own accord.

Therefore—no premature *calls* for an insurrection! No solemn manifestos to the people. No pronunciamentos, no "proclamations". The storm is bearing down on us of its own accord. There is no need of sabre-rattling.

We must get our weapons ready—in the literal and in the figurative sense. First of all, and above all, we must train a solid army of the proletariat, conscious of its purpose and strong in resolve. We must increase tenfold our work of agitation and organisation among the peasants—among those who are starving in the villages and among those who last autumn sent their sons to serve in the army, sons who experienced the great year of revolution. We must tear down all the ideological blinds and screens concealing the revolution, put an end to all doubts and vac-

illation. We must say simply and calmly, in the plainest and most popular form, as loudly and distinctly as possible: a struggle is inevitable. The proletariat will accept battle. The proletariat will sacrifice everything, will throw all its forces into the fight for freedom. Let the ruined peasantry, let the soldiers and sailors know that the fate of Russian freedom is about to be decided.

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Published according
to the *Proletary* text

THE ELECTION RESULTS IN ST. PETERSBURG

St. Petersburg, February 9, 1907.

The Cadets have won the St. Petersburg elections. They have secured the election of 151 electors in 11 districts. The Left bloc has won in one district only—the Vyborg District—and has secured the election of 9 electors out of 160.

The outstanding features of the elections in St. Petersburg are: an increase in the percentage of those voting in nearly all districts, and the weakening of the Rights. The Cadets are at the top of the list, with 28,798 votes (counting the maximum numbers of votes cast for their candidates). The Left bloc takes second place, with 16,703 votes; the Octobrists come third, with 16,613 votes, the monarchists fourth with 5,270 votes.

This, when compared with Moscow, is a big step forward. One district has been won. The Lefts have advanced from third to second place in the list. In Moscow, the votes cast for the Left bloc amounted to 13 per cent. The St. Petersburg figure was nearly twice as high, i.e., 25 per cent.

This, of course, was partly due to somewhat more extensive agitation, and to the political influence of the Duma general elections, which were far more favourable to the Left than had been expected. In Moscow not a single daily newspaper published lists of the Left bloc electors. In St. Petersburg several papers did so: it is said that *Tovarishch* has even increased its circulation very considerably since it "swung to the Left". In Moscow there were no information bureaus to help Left voters to fill in their ballot papers. In St. Petersburg there were. In Moscow most of the petty-bourgeois townspeople believed the Cadet fable about the Black-Hundred danger. In St. Petersburg there were

already unmistakable signs that this credulity of the petty bourgeoisie and the opportunists had been shaken.

Here are the returns for each ward, taking in each case the maximum number of votes for the candidates on the respective election lists (figures taken from *Rech*).

Wards in the City of St. Petersburg	Highest vote for:				Difference between Cadet and Left votes	Number of votes we had to gain from Cadets to win
	Cadets	Left bloc	Octobrists	Monarchists		
Spassky	3,397	1,644	1,514	624	—1,753	877
Narva	2,377	1,643	1,326	307	— 734	368
Liteiny	2,776	919	2,153	667	—1,857	929
Kolomna.	1,318	1,122	1,068	236	— 196	99
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	2,313	1,949	2,102	418	— 364	183
Rozhdestvensky .	2,784	1,325	1,195	537	—1,459	730
Kazan	1,749	589	998	201	—1,160	581
Admiralty	955	246	725	196	— 709	355
Moscow	4,100	1,702	2,233	706	—2,398	1,200
Alexander-Nevsky	2,735	1,421	799	588	—1,314	658
Petersburg. . . .	3,282	2,754	1,851	541	— 528	265
Vyborg	1,012	1,389	649	249	+ 377	—
Total . . .	28,798	16,703	16,613	5,270		Total for five not hopeless wards 1,573

These returns enable us to draw a number of interesting conclusions.

First of all, about the "Black-Hundred danger". The elections have proved that it was non-existent. Our repeated declarations and warnings, reiterated by all Bolshevik publications, including *Ternii Truda*[51] and *Zreniye*,[52] have been *fully confirmed*.

The Black Hundreds *could not* have won in St. Petersburg, *no matter how* the votes had split between the Cadets and the Lefts!

Moreover, even if the Octobrists and the monarchists had joined forces (an impossibility, especially in St.

Petersburg, where the German Octobrists in the Vasilyevsky Ostrov District were on the point of quarrelling even with the Union of October Seventeenth), the Black Hundreds could not have *won* in St. Petersburg! This will be obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to make a very simple calculation from the figures given above. The total Cadet and Left vote (45,500) is *more than twice* the total Octobrist and monarchist vote (22,000). No conceivable distribution of votes among these four election lists, no "measures" taken by the Rights, could have created a Black-Hundred danger.

The petty bourgeoisie—the Narodniks and the opportunist Social-Democrats—who caught up the Cadets' outcry about the Black-Hundred danger, were *deceiving the people*. We said so before the elections. The elections *have proved* that we were right.

The spinelessness and political short-sightedness, characteristic of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and philistines have revealed themselves in practice in St. Petersburg. Though not nearly to the same extent as in Moscow, the St. Petersburg elections were, nevertheless, elections by *philistines*, *scared and deceived by the Cadets*. All the election literature published in St. Petersburg, from *Rech* to *Tovarishch*, which latter faint-heartedly defended the Left bloc (apologising for its Left sympathies?), teems with evidence that the Cadets and their henchmen scared the man in the street with a phantom of their own invention—the possibility of a Black-Hundred danger arising out of the voting.

The Cadets strove to ward off the danger threatening them from the Left, with an outcry about the Black-Hundred danger, while they themselves waited on Stolypin, and promised that they would be reasonable, become more loyal, and keep away from the Lefts. Stolypin himself has admitted, according to today's *Tovarishch* (February 9), that he *knows* something about this Cadet swing to the Right!

Further, the St. Petersburg election results enable us to answer the question—what have we gained from these elections? Has our straightforward anti-Cadet propaganda succeeded in rousing *new* sections of hitherto indifferent voters and drawing them into political life? To what ex-

tent have we *alienated* the petty bourgeoisie from the liberals in whose wake they followed, and won them over to the proletariat?

To enable us to judge, let us first of all compare the Cadet and the Left votes (the maximum, as before) in 1906 and in 1907.

Number of Votes (Maximum)

Wards in the City of St. Petersburg	1906	1907			Difference between last and first columns
	Cadets	Cadets	Lefts	Together	
Spassky	5,009	3,397	1,644	5,041	+ 32
Narva	3,578	2,377	1,643	4,020	+ 442
Liteiny	3,767	2,776	919	3,695	— 72
Kolomna	2,243	1,318	1,122	2,440	+ 197
Vasilyevsky Ostrov	3,777	2,313	1,949	4,262	+ 485
Rozhdestvensky	3,393	2,784	1,325	4,109	+ 716
Kazan	2,242	1,749	589	2,338	+ 96
Admiralty	1,553	955	246	1,201	— 352
Moscow	5,124	4,100	1,702	5,802	+ 678
Alexander-Nevsky	2,991	2,735	1,421	4,156	+ 1,165
Petersburg	4,946	3,282	2,754	6,036	+ 1,090
Vyborg	1,988	1,012	1,389	2,401	+ 413
Total	40,611	28.798	16,703	45,501	+ 4,890

These figures very clearly reveal the proportion of votes cast in 1906 and 1907 for the opposition and for the revolution. Of the seventeen thousand votes we polled (in round figures), we captured about *twelve thousand* from the Cadets and attracted *five thousand* from the hitherto indifferent (partly boycotting) masses.

What strikes one at once is the difference between the "hopeless" districts, i.e., those where, apparently, we could not have won in 1907, whatever effort we had made, and the districts that were not hopeless. The principle "hopeless" districts, for instance, were the Admiralty and the Liteiny. Here, the preponderance of Cadet votes over ours is enormous. What is it due to?

The reason is obvious. The population of the first district consists of government officials; that of the second consists of the big bourgeoisie (this was pointed out *before* the elections by *Ternii Truda*). The Social-Democrats, supported by the Trudoviks, could not have won where there is no trade and industrial proletariat, where there is a preponderance of civil servants. Even the number of voters who went to the polls in these districts declined—no interest was displayed! In these districts the *only* thing we did was capture about one-fourth of the Cadet votes for the Left bloc.

At the other extreme there are the districts that are not hopeless, where the Social-Democrats, supported by the Trudoviks, roused a *mass* of new elements, and roused the urban poor from their apathy and somnolence, to political life. These are the Alexander-Nevsky and Petersburg wards. Here the gain in the *anti*-Black-Hundred vote, i.e., the Cadets and Lefts combined, is *over one thousand* in each district. Here *most* of the Left votes are *new* votes, not votes captured from the Cadets. The voice of struggle, the voice of the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks has awakened those whom the unctuous voice of the Cadets could not rouse.

In the Petersburg Ward we had only to capture **265** votes from the Cadets for victory to have been ours. Clearly, 265 added to 2,754 would have made victory quite possible. And it is also clear that the urban poor in these districts, by no means of the proletarian type—shop-assistants, cab drivers and small householders—*rose* in favour of the Lefts. It is obvious that the appeal issued by the Social-Democrats and supported by the Trudoviks was not made in vain, that a formidable number of the inhabitants of these districts are capable of going further than the Cadets, to the Left of the Cadets.

In the Alexander-Nevsky Ward the struggle was incomparably more difficult. To win there we would have had to capture 658 votes from the Cadets. Six hundred and fifty-eight in addition to 1,421 is rather a big figure, but still it is *less than half*. We have no right to regard as hopeless those districts in which we could have been victorious had we obtained fifty per cent more votes than we actually did.

The Kolomna Ward could easily have been won: all we had to do was to capture 99 votes from the Cadets. In the Vasilyevsky Ostrov Ward, where the three main lists—Cadet, Octobrist and Left—each polled about an equal number of votes, we could have won if we had captured 183 votes from the Cadets. In the Narva Ward we could have won if, we had captured 368 votes from the Cadets.

To sum up: the Left bloc in St. Petersburg *undoubtedly* won over to its side the shop-assistants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, *roused* a section of them to political life for the first time, and *captured* a very considerable section of them from the Cadets.

The hopeless and despondent opinion that Social-Democratic ideas are unintelligible to trade and industrial office employees in the intermediary stage when the Trudoviks support the socialists, has been *fully refuted* by the St. Petersburg elections. If we want to and set about it properly, we *can* rouse for the political *struggle* hundreds and thousands of the urban poor in every district in the capital. We *can* win, in every district, hundreds of shop-assistants, clerks, etc., from the party of the bourgeois liberals who are bargaining with Stolypin. If we work tirelessly in that direction, the influence of the treacherous Cadets over the urban poor *will be broken*. The Cadets will not survive another election struggle against the Left bloc in St. Petersburg! They will be completely routed under the present electoral law, if they go into battle again after months of "Stolypin" agitation and Milyukov haggling!

Indeed, it is obvious that even in the present elections the Left bloc needed very little more to achieve a victory. The only hopeless districts were the Admiralty, Liteiny, Spassky, Rozhdestvensky, Kazan and Moscow. In these six districts we needed *over fifty per cent more* votes than we received in order to win, and this was hardly conceivable, however strenuously we might have conducted election agitation, distributed literature, etc. (or, rather, it was conceivable, but not under Stolypin's military-court manner of conducting free elections!). The first two of these districts were socially inaccessible to the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks. The other four were acces-

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sible, but our activities among the trade and industrial office employees in those districts were still far too feeble.

We captured one of the remaining six districts the first time we contested it as a Left bloc. In four we were from 99 to 368 votes short of capturing them from the Cadets. In one we were 658 votes short. We had only to capture **1,573** *votes* from the Cadets, in these five districts, and the Left bloc would have been victorious, *would have won the whole of St. Petersburg*!

It is doubtful whether anyone will venture to say that it would have been too much for the Social-Democrats to capture 1,573 votes in five districts if they had worked unitedly, if the opportunists, who were bargaining with the Cadets, had not procrastinated so long in forming the Left bloc, or if the *breakaway Mensheviks had not acted as blacklegs against the Left bloc*.

What is a blackleg? A blackleg is a man connected with the fighting proletariat, who tries to trip it up when it is engaged in the collective struggle.

Does this definition fit the breakaway Mensheviks? Of course it does, for they subverted the unity of the Social-Democratic organisation in St. Petersburg, sowed discord in the ranks of the fighters, deserted to the Cadets at the height of the battle, and lastly, *deliberately obstructed* us even after the Left bloc was formed. Suffice it to recall that the Left bloc was formed on January 25, and on January 28, the breakaway Mensheviks issued, in *Tovarishch*, an appeal to the voters in five districts to abstain from voting! On February 1 the same Mensheviks (*Rech*) published an appeal, in which they tried to frighten petty bourgeoisie with the bogey of the Black-Hundred danger!

That is not all. In today's *Rech*, page 3, there is a report on the elections in the *Petersburg* District, in which we read that one of the ballot papers was marked: "*I abstain from voting. A Menshevik*."

Let the reader give thought to the significance of this!

On January 28 the Mensheviks published, in *Tovarishch*, the resolutions of the executive body of the breakaway section. In Point VI of these resolutions, the *Petersburg* District was *excluded* from the list of districts where the Black-Hundred danger was supposed to have existed.

Point VI stated expressly that an agreement with the Lefts was expedient in the Petersburg District. Point III stated expressly that even if no agreement was reached with the Lefts the Mensheviks called upon the voters to vote for the Lefts in those districts where there was no "obvious" Black-Hundred danger. *And yet* a "Menshevik" *abstained* from voting in the Petersburg District!! Then what did the breakaway Mensheviks do in other districts?

After this, how can anybody fail to recognise the *fact* that it was blacklegging by a section of the Mensheviks that *prevented* the victory of the Left bloc in the St. Petersburg elections, where there was no Black-Hundred danger at all?

Let the proletariat learn from the vacillations and treachery of the petty bourgeoisie. We shall always be the first to unfurl *our* flag boldly and resolutely. We shall always urge the petty bourgeoisie to throw off the tutelage of the liberals and come over to the side of the proletariat. And these tactics—the only revolutionary, proletarian tactics in a bourgeois revolution—will bring us victory at every revival of the mass political struggle.

Saratov, Nizhni-Novgorod—the first victory; Moscow, St. Petersburg—the first attack. Enough, gentlemen of the Cadet Party! The deception of the urban poor by the liberal landlords and the bourgeois lawyers is coming to an end. Let the Stolypins and the Milyukovs sneer at the "red rag". The Social-Democrats are standing at their post, keeping the red flag flying in the sight of all toilers and all the exploited.

Proletary, No. 13,
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REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION ON THE QUESTION OF THE DUMA CAMPAIGN AND DUMA TACTICS[53]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

The speaker pointed out that the question of Duma tactics was undoubtedly the central policy question at that time, and was therefore the main point around which the congress campaign would revolve. Two of the questions that the Central Committee had included in its proposed congress agenda, as reported in the newspapers, were brought into the foreground—that of immediate political tasks and that of the State Duma.

The first question, he said, had been formulated very vaguely. The Mensheviks may have taken it to mean support for a Cadet ministry, but did not care to say so openly. At all events they had shown a noticeable desire to shelve once again the *fundamental* questions of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution, just as they had done at the Fourth (Unity) Congress. By that time, experience too had taught them that if these questions were evaded the Social-Democrats would have no consistent party tactics of any sort. It would be sufficient to recall that the Central Committee's tactics on the question of supporting the Duma (i.e., Cadet) ministry (June 1906) failed to receive the backing, not only of the Party in general, but of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma in particular. After the dissolution of the Duma, the famous "partial mass expressions of protest", proposed by the Central Committee, had shared the same fate. The attitude towards

the Cadets in the elections was then so uncertain in the Party that among the most influential and responsible Mensheviks—a special opinion was expressed—by Cherevanin before the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November (1906), and by Plekhanov (not to mention Vasilyev) after it.

Such being the situation, it was the duty of revolutionary Social-Democrats to take advantage of full representation at the Fifth Party Congress, where the Poles, Letts and Bundists would be represented for the first time, in order to raise fundamental questions of the tactics of Social-Democracy in the Russian bourgeois revolution. It would be no use discussing "immediate political tasks" without first clearing up the basic questions—the tasks of the proletariat in our revolution in general, whether objective conditions existed for the further development of the revolution, the alignment of classes and parties at the time and, especially, the class character of the Cadet Party. Unless these questions were settled—and that would be facilitated by the wealth of experience gained from the First Duma and the elections to the Second—it would be impossible to find a principled and intelligent solution to the problem of the Cadet ministry, that of the tactics to be pursued in the event of the dissolution of the Second Duma, etc., etc.

The speaker therefore went on to cover these questions briefly. The economic conditions of the masses of the population offered clear evidence that the fundamental aims of the revolution had not been accomplished; an objective basis for immediate mass movements existed. This was reflected, in politics, in an intensification of the conflict between the autocracy, which was then coming to an understanding with the organised Black-Hundred landlords, and the masses—not only of the proletariat but also of the rural poor (after the worker curia, the peasant curia had yielded the *largest* percentage of Left electors!), and the urban poor (Cadet hegemony over the petty-bourgeois urban democrats had undoubtedly been seriously shaken by the elections to the Second Duma). It therefore followed that a revolutionary, and not a constitutional crisis was approaching, and that the struggle inside the Duma was, owing

to objective conditions, again engendering a struggle outside the Duma, the transition to which would be accelerated if the activities of the Social-Democrats and bourgeois democrats inside the Duma were successful. It was the task of the proletariat, as leader in the democratic revolution, to develop the revolutionary consciousness, determination and organisation of the masses, and to free the petty bourgeoisie from the leadership of the liberals. Support for a liberal ministry, ostensibly responsible to the Duma but actually dependent on the Black-Hundred tsarist gang, was out of the question. The possibility of utilising such a ministry (supposing it proved a reality and not an empty promise to fool the Cadets, like Stolypin's promise to legalise the Cadets, made in January 1907 to keep the Cadets from entering into blocs with the Lefts) would depend entirely on the strength of the *revolutionary* classes, their political consciousness and solidarity.

As far as the class character of the various parties was concerned, the past year had been universally marked by the rightward swing of the upper classes and the leftward swing of the lower classes. The Centre was growing weaker and being eroded by the flood of advancing revolutionary development. The Black Hundreds bad gained strength and were better organised; they had established close relations with one of the strongest economic class forces of old Russia—the feudal landlords. The Octobrists were still the party of the counter-revolutionary big bourgeoisie. The Cadets had made a sweeping swing to the Right. It was becoming more and more evident that their mainstay was the liberal (middle) landlords, the middle bourgeoisie and the top bourgeois intelligentsia. They carried the urban poor with them by force of tradition, deceiving them with loud-sounding phrases about "the people's freedom". The elections to the Second Duma had proved directly that the Lefts, even under most adverse conditions, had to a very large extent captured the "lower section" of urban democrats from the Cadets, at the very first onslaught.

The Cadets had shifted to the Right, towards the Octobrists. The democratic petty bourgeoisie in the towns, and still more in the country, had gained greater strength and had gone more to the Left than the rest. The speaker

recalled that up to the spring of 1906 this petty bourgeoisie had had no extensive political experience of legal party organisation. Considerable experience had now been gained—beginning with that of the Trudoviks in the First Duma to that of the unexpectedly large number of "Lefts" and "Trudoviks" elected to the Second Duma.

The Bolshevik view that the Russian revolution could not be achieved by the liberals but only by the proletariat, if it succeeded in winning the peasant masses to its side, had been remarkably well confirmed by the experience of 1906 and 1907.

The Duma tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy emerged logically from these premises. Social-Democrats would have to regard the Duma as one of the instruments of the revolution and resolutely, openly and clearly unfurl their consistent, proletarian revolutionary banner in full view of the masses. They would have to engage in agitation, propaganda, and organisation to develop the revolution and explain to the masses that another great struggle outside the Duma would be inevitable. The Cadet phrases about "blowing up the Duma" were a vile provocation on the part of a liberal who had secret talks with Stolypin. Don't "blow up" the Duma, don't allow the Duma to be dissolved—these phrases meant "do nothing that would be too unpleasant for Stolypin & Co.". The Social-Democrats would have to expose the provocative nature of this police-like Cadet catchword and show that even in the First Duma the conduct of the Social-Democratic Party (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike) had made all artificial revolutionary "paths", "proclamations", etc., impossible. The Cadets knew this and in true *Novoye Vremya* style were substituting "blowing-up" tactics for the tactics of developing a mass, people's revolution.

The Social-Democrats in the Duma would have to do the same as they had done in the St. Petersburg elections—unfurl their revolutionary banner, compel the vacillating petty bourgeoisie to choose between them and the Cadets, and consent, in periods of decisive action, to partial agreements in particular cases with those petty-bourgeois democrats who would follow them against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. After explaining the significance of the

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"Left bloc" in the Duma and the conditions under which it should be formed, the speaker voiced a strong warning against regarding it as a permanent agreement that would in any way tie the hands of the Social-Democrats, or as a long-term agreement concluded against future contingencies. There would have been no Left bloc in the St. Petersburg elections if the Social-Democrats there had bound themselves by a permanent agreement or even by a provisional agreement with the Narodniks, all of whom, even the "revolutionary" Socialist-Revolutionaries, had gone with the Mensheviks to the Cadets to sell out democracy! Only by pursuing a firm and independent policy, and not by diplomacy and petty bargaining, could the Social-Democrats secure, where necessary, the co-operation of those elements of the democratic bourgeoisie that are really capable of fighting.

CONCLUDING SPEECH

The speaker opposed this in his concluding speech.[54] On the one hand, even during the most militant actions the Social-Democrats would absolutely have to remain a free and independent party with its own organisation even in the "joint" Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, etc. On the other hand, they could not commit the error of the Mensheviks, whose conception of a "political bloc" was something opposed to a "fighting alliance", because all agreements are permissible only within the limits of a certain *political* line. Of course, in opposing the Cadets on a given question, the Social-Democrats in the Duma *could not* reject agreements with the Lefts, if the latter followed the Social-Democrats on that question and if such an agreement were essential to gain a parliamentary victory over the Cadets (e.g., to amend a law, to delete some particularly objectionable passage from an address, declaration or decision, etc.). But it would be folly and a crime for Social-Democrats to tie their hands by means of anything like permanent and restricting agreements with anyone.

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DRAFT RESOLUTIONS FOR THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[55]

Written on February 15-18
(February 28-March 3), 1907

Published in *Proletary*,
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1. THE PRESENT STAGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Whereas:

1. the economic crisis which Russia is now experiencing shows no signs of early abatement, and in its protracted course is continuing to create unemployment on an enormous scale in the towns and starvation in the villages;

2. as a result of this, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the landlords and the peasantry, and also between the government-bribed peasant bourgeoisie and the poor villagers, is becoming more acute;

3. the political history of Russia during the past year, from the First Duma to the new elections, reveals a rapid increase of political consciousness in all classes, which is reflected in the enormous strengthening of the extreme parties, in the dissipation of constitutional illusions and in the weakening of the "Centre", i.e., the liberal-bourgeois Cadet Party, which is striving to halt the revolution by offering concessions acceptable to the Black-Hundred landlords and the autocracy;

4. the policy of the Constitutional-Democratic Party directed towards the achievement of this purpose will release only a minimum of the productive forces of bourgeois society, will not in any way satisfy the elementary needs of the proletariat and of the mass of the peasantry, and will necessitate the constant forcible suppression of these masses;

This conference declares:

1. that the political crisis that is developing before our eyes is not a constitutional but a revolutionary crisis leading to a direct struggle of the proletarian and the peasant masses against the autocracy;

2. that the forthcoming Duma campaign must therefore be regarded merely as one of the episodes in the people's revolutionary struggle for power, and must be utilised as such;

3. that, as the party of the advanced class, the Social-Democratic Party cannot under any circumstances at present support the Cadet policy in general or a Cadet ministry in particular. The Social-Democrats must bend every effort to expose the treacherous nature of this policy to the masses; they must explain to them the revolutionary tasks confronting them; they must show the masses that only when they attain a high level of political consciousness and are strongly organised can possible concessions by the autocracy be converted from an instrument of deception and corruption into an instrument for the further development of the revolution.

2. THE ATTITUDE TO THE BOURGEOIS PARTIES

Whereas:

1. the Social-Democrats are now faced with the particularly urgent task of defining the class character of the various non-proletarian parties, of assessing present class relations, and, accordingly, of defining their attitude towards other parties;

2. the Social-Democrats have always recognised the necessity of supporting every opposition and revolutionary movement against the present social and political order in Russia;

3. it is the duty of Social-Democrats to do all in their power to enable the proletariat to act as the leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution;

This conference declares:

1. that the Black-Hundred parties (the Union of the Russian People, the monarchists, the Council of the United Nobility,[56] etc.) are coming out more and more resolutely and definitely as the class organisation of the feudal-minded landowners, and are with increasing arrogance robbing the people of their revolutionary gains, thereby causing an inevitable intensification of the revolutionary struggle; the Social-Democratic Party must expose the close link

between these parties and tsarism and the interests of big feudal landownership, and explain to the masses that an uncompromising struggle must be waged for the complete abolition of these relics of barbarism;

2. that such parties as the Union of October Seventeenth, the Commercial and Industrial Party, and to a certain extent the Party of Peaceful Renovation, etc., are class organisations of a section of the landowners and particularly of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which have not yet definitely come to terms with the autocratic bureaucracy on the division of power under a thoroughly undemocratic constitution of some sort based on a property qualification, but which have gone over entirely to the side of the counter-revolution and are manifestly supporting the government*; the Social-Democratic Party [while taking advantage of the conflicts between these parties and the Black-Hundred autocracy to develop the revolution] must [at the same time] carry on a most relentless struggle against these parties;

3. that the parties of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, and their principal party, the Cadets, have now definitely turned away from the revolution, and are seeking to halt it by coming to terms with the counter-revolution; that the economic basis of these parties is provided by a section of the middle landlords and the middle bourgeoisie, especially the bourgeois intelligentsia, while a section of the urban and rural petty-bourgeois democrats still follow these parties merely by force of tradition and because they are deliberately deceived by the liberals; that the ideal of these parties does not go beyond a bourgeois society of law and order, protected from the encroachments of the proletariat by a monarchy, police, a two-chamber parliamentary system, a standing army and so forth; the Social-Democrats must use the activities of these parties for the political education of the people, counteract their hypo-

* Wording proposed by the minority: "...of the bourgeoisie which have entirely gone over to the side of the counter-revolution, are manifestly supporting the government, and whose object is to secure a thoroughly undemocratic constitution based on a property qualification."

critically democratic phraseology by consistent proletarian democracy, expose the constitutional illusions which they are spreading, and ruthlessly fight against their leadership of the democratic petty bourgeoisie;

4. that the Narodnik or Trudovik parties (the Popular Socialists, the Trudovik Group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries) come more or less close to expressing the interests and viewpoint of the broad masses of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, wavering between submission to the leadership of the liberals and a determined struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state; these parties hide their essentially bourgeois-democratic aims behind a more or less vague socialist ideology; the Social-Democrats must persistently expose their pseudo-socialist character and combat their efforts to obliterate the class distinction between the proletarian and the small proprietor; at the same time they must exert every effort to free these parties from the influence and leadership of the liberals, and compel them to choose between the policy of the Cadets and that of the revolutionary proletariat and thus compel them to side with the Social-Democrats against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets;

5. the joint action ensuing herefrom must preclude all possibility of deviation from the Social-Democratic programme and tactics, and must serve only for the purpose of making a united and simultaneous onslaught against reaction and against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie.

Note: The words in square brackets are those deleted by the minority, which proposed the amended wording quoted above.

3. THE CLASS TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Whereas:

1. the democratic revolution in Russia is heading for a new upswing; the big capitalist and landlord class is taking the side of counter-revolution, while new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, following the example of the proletariat, are coming over to the revolution;

2. the class interests of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution are such that conditions must be created for the most successful struggle for socialism against the propertied classes;

3. the only possible way to create and secure these conditions is to carry the democratic revolution to its completion, i.e., to win a democratic republic, the complete sovereignty of the people and the minimum of social and economic gains necessary for the proletariat (the eight-hour day and other demands of the Social-Democratic minimum programme);

4. only the proletariat can bring the democratic revolution to its consummation, the condition being that the proletariat, as the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, leads the mass of the peasantry, and imparts political consciousness to its struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state;

5. the role of leader in the democratic revolution provides the proletariat with the greatest opportunity to improve its social and economic position, develop its class-consciousness in every way, and pursue its class activities not only in the economic, but also in the wide political sphere;

This conference declares:

1. that the main task of the proletariat at the present moment of history is to consummate the democratic revolution in Russia;

2. that any belittling of this task will inevitably have the result of converting the working class from the leader of the people's revolution, carrying with it the mass of the democratic peasantry, into a passive participant of the revolution, trailing behind the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie;

3. that all organisations of the Party must guide the activities of the proletariat in carrying out this task, without for a moment losing sight of the independent socialist aims of the proletariat.

4. THE TACTICS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN THE STATE DUMA

1. The correctness of the tactics of boycotting the State Duma, which helped the masses to make a proper appraisal of the impotence and lack of independence of this institution, was fully confirmed by the farcical legislative activities of the First State Duma and by its dissolution;

2. however, the counter-revolutionary behaviour of the bourgeoisie and the compromising tactics of the Russian liberals prevented the immediate success of the boycott and compelled the proletariat to accept battle with the landlord and bourgeois counter-revolution, using the arena of the Duma campaign as well;

3. the Social-Democrats must wage this struggle, outside the Duma and within the Duma, to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat, strengthen and expand its organisation, further expose constitutional illusions in the eyes of the people, and promote the development of the revolution;

4. the Social-Democrats' immediate political tasks in the forthcoming Duma campaign are: (1) to make clear to the people the complete unfitness of the Duma as a means of realising the demands of the proletariat and of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially of the peasantry; (2) to make clear to the people the impossibility of achieving political freedom by parliamentary means as long as real power remains in the hands of the tsarist government; to make clear the necessity of insurrection, of a provisional revolutionary government, and of a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage and a secret ballot;

5. to carry out its fundamental socialist, as well as immediate political, tasks, the Social-Democratic Party, as the class party of the proletariat, must remain absolutely independent, must form a Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and should under no circumstances merge its slogans or tactics with those of any other oppositional or revolutionary party;

6. with particular reference to the activities of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in the Duma, the following

questions, which are being raised by the whole course of political life at the present moment, must be clarified:

(1) as one of our Party organisations, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma should see its primary function in carrying on work of criticism, propaganda, agitation and organisation. This, and not immediate "legislative." objectives, should be the purpose of the bills the Social-Democratic group will introduce in the Duma, particularly on such questions as improving the standard of living, securing freedom for the class struggle of the proletariat, overthrowing the feudal yoke of the landlords in the rural districts, giving aid to the starving peasants, combating unemployment, releasing the sailors and soldiers from the slave conditions at army barracks, etc.;

(2) the tsarist government will certainly not surrender its positions until the decisive victory of the revolutionary people has been achieved and, consequently, a conflict between the Duma and the government is inevitable whatever tactics the Duma pursues, other than treacherous sacrifice of the people's interests to the Black Hundreds; the Social-Democratic group and the Social-Democratic Party, taking into consideration only the course of the revolutionary crisis that is developing outside of the Duma as a consequence of objective conditions, must, therefore, neither promote premature conflicts nor artificially avert or postpone a conflict by modifying their slogans, for this would only discredit the Social-Democrats in the eyes of the masses and cut them off from the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat;

(3) exposing the bourgeois nature of all the non-proletarian parties and opposing all their Duma bills, etc., with their own, the Social-Democrats must constantly fight against Cadet leadership in the movement for freedom, and compel the democratic petty bourgeoisie to choose between the hypocritical democracy of the Cadets and the consistent democracy of the proletariat.

5. THE INTENSIFICATION OF MASS DESTITUTION AND OF THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE

Whereas:

1. a number of facts testify to the extreme intensification of destitution among the proletariat and also of its economic struggle (the lock-out in Poland, the movement among the workers, of St. Petersburg and Ivanovo-Voznesensk against the high cost of living, the extensive strike movement in the Moscow industrial area, the urgent calls of the trade union organisations to prepare for an intense struggle, etc.);

2. all signs go to show that these various manifestations of the economic struggle are accumulating to such an extent that there is every reason to expect mass, economic action all over the country, involving far larger sections of the proletariat than before;

3. the whole history of the Russian revolution shows that all the powerful upsurges of the revolutionary movement began only on the basis of such mass economic movements;

This conference declares:

1. that all Party organisations must pay most serious attention to these circumstances, collect fuller information about them, and that this question should be put on the agenda of the Fifth Party Congress;

2. that the greatest possible number of Party members must be concentrated on economic agitation among the masses;

3. that this economic movement must be regarded as the main source and foundation of the entire revolutionary crisis that is developing in Russia.

6. NON-PARTY WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS AND THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST TREND AMONG THE PROLETARIAT

Whereas:

1. in connection with Comrade Axelrod's agitation for a non-Party labour congress, a trend (represented by Larin, Shcheglo, El, Ivanovsky, Mirov, and the Odessa publica-

tion *Osvobozhdeniye Truda*) has appeared in the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P., the aim of which is to destroy the Social-Democratic Labour Party and to set up in its place a non-party political organisation of the proletariat;

2. besides this, outside of and actually against the Party, anarcho-syndicalist agitation is being carried on among the proletariat, using this same slogan of a non-party labour congress and non-party organisations (*Soyuznoye Dyelo* and its group in Moscow, the anarchist press in Odessa, etc.);

3. notwithstanding the resolution passed by the Novemher All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., a series of disruptive actions has been observed in our Party, with the object of setting up non-party organisations;

4. on the other hand, the R.S.D.L.P. has never ronounced its intention of utilising certain non-party organisations, such as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, in periods of more or less intense revolutionary upheaval, to extend Social-Democratic influence among the working class and to strengthen the Social-Democratic labour movement (see the September resolutions of the St. Petersburg Committee and the Moscow Committee on the labour congress, in *Proletary*, Nos. 3 and 4[57]);

5. the incipient revival creates the opportunity to organise or utilise non-party representative working-class institutions, such as Soviets of Workers' Deputies, Soviets of Workers' Delegates, etc., for the purpose of developing the Social-Democratic movement; at the same time the Social-Democratic Party organisations must bear in mind that if Social-Democratic activities among the proletarian masses are properly, effectively and widely organised, such institutions may actually become superfluous;

This conference declares:

1. that a most determined ideological struggle must be waged against the anarcho-syndicalist movement among the proletariat and against Axelrod's and Larin's ideas in the Social-Democratic Party;

2. that a most determined struggle must be waged against all disruptive and demagogic attempts to weaken the R.S.D.L.P. from within or to utilise it for the purpose of

substituting non-party political, proletarian organisations for the Social-Democratic Party;

3. that Social-Democratic Party organisations may, in case of necessity, participate in inter-party Soviets of Workers' Delegates, Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and in congresses of representatives of these organisations, and may organise such institutions, provided this is done on strict Party lines for the purpose of developing and strengthening the Social-Democratic Labour Party;

4. that for the purpose of extending and strengthening the influence of the Social-Democratic party among the broad masses of the proletariat, it is essential, on the one hand, to increase efforts to organise trade unions and conduct Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation within them, and, on the other hand, to draw still larger sections of the working class into the activities of all types of Party organisations.

TACTICS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

INTERVIEW GRANTED TO A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF *L'HUMANITÉ*[58] ON FEBRUARY 17 (MARCH 2), 1907

The last Congress of Russian Social-Democracy, held in Stockholm in April 1906, decided that the Social-Democrats should not conclude any election agreements with bourgeois parties. This principle was immediately applied in the elections to the First Duma in Siberia and the Caucasus. Would it be equally valid for the Second Duma? The Bolsheviks said "Yes", the Mensheviks said "No". The Bolsheviks demanded an extraordinary congress to decide the question. At the beginning of November, only a conference was held, at which all Party organisations were represented. The Mensheviks, jointly with the Bund, supported a proposal on an agreement with the Cadets in the forthcoming elections. The Bolsheviks, jointly with the Letts and Poles, condemned such an agreement. The proposal of the former obtained 18 votes, that of the latter, 14 votes. The conference decided that local organisations must state their own views on the question. "Let it be in St. Petersburg as elsewhere", the Bolsheviks deliberately told the Mensheviks.

Two things must be understood: on the one hand, the Mensheviks, notwithstanding their name, have a majority in the Central Committee of the Party—in other words they are the masters of its general policy; on the other hand, the Bolsheviks have a majority in the St. Petersburg and Moscow Gubernia Committees. To have the two metropolitan cities against it, is a difficult and humiliating situa-

tion for the Central Committee. This explains the attempt on the part of the Central Committee to put through a Menshevik policy in St. Petersburg and Moscow at any cost. For the elections in St. Petersburg the Central Committee took the risk of infringing local autonomy by provoking a split as soon as an excuse was found.

The St. Petersburg organisation has not yet held the gubernia conference that was envisaged by the All-Russian Conference in November. For a long time the liberal newspapers have been conducting a lively discussion of election tactics. They were afraid that the socialists would act without them and muster the masses, without them and against them, around the banner of the revolution. They fulminated against the Bolsheviks, persistently qualifying them as "sectarians, dogmatists, Blanquists, anarchists, etc.", but they wanted to conduct the election campaign jointly with the other revolutionary parties, and put up a joint election list with them. They have the biggest St. Petersburg newspapers, so it was easy for them to make themselves heard. The Bolsheviks had only their illegal newspaper *Proletary* at their disposal, which is published abroad and appears only twice monthly.

In secret and through their underground connections, the Menshevik Central Committee informed the Cadets that the Social-Democrats' tactics depended on their committee alone, and not on the Bolshevik Gubernia Committee. This was revealed at an informatory conference held early in January and attended by representatives of the Cadets, the Popular Socialists, the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats. All were in favour of a joint election list. All—except the delegate from the Gubernia Committee who announced, after the conference, that the committee would take a decision only some days later. Then the delegate from the Central Committee intervened. "It would be better," he stated, "if the agreement were not concluded by the organisation as a whole but by each election ward separately [there are 12 such wards in St. Petersburg]."

"But this is the first I hear of such a proposal!" the delegate from the Gubernia Committee replied. "Is this the plan of the Central Committee?"

"No, it is my own idea," answered the delegate from the Central Committee.

To one who understands, half a word is enough. The Cadets understood. *Rech* (official organ of the Cadet Party), *Tovarishch* (organ of the Left Cadets, something like the Millerand-Socialists), and *Strana* (organ of the Party of Democratic Reform[59]) all announced that the Mensheviks constitute the reasonable part, the model part, the decent part of Social-Democracy. The Bolsheviks represent barbarism. They prevent socialism from becoming civilised and parliamentary. But it has been announced in the presence of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets, that the Bolsheviks would act separately.

The St. Petersburg Conference that was to decide the question of election tactics was held on January 6. It was attended by 39 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks. The latter at first challenged the correctness of the credentials. Though they dared not claim a majority, this did, however, serve them as a pretext for walking out of the Conference. Their second pretext: they demanded, in accordance with the proposal of the Central Committee of January 4, that the organisation divide into two parts for a decision on the question of election tactics—that there should be separate conferences for St. Petersburg City and St. Petersburg Gubernia. To anybody who knows the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, based partly on place of residence, partly on the national principle (the Lettish and the Estonian sections) or on the principle of employment (the military and the railwaymen's sections), this was not only a contravention of the organisation's autonomy, but even, in certain respects, contrary to common sense. The Conference, therefore, declared itself against this proposal, which did not in any way accord with its principles and, moreover, had been put to it as imperative.

The thirty-one delegates walked out of the Conference, and the Central Committee announced that the minority was relieved of the necessity of submitting to the decision of the majority. This was not merely a challenge, but the Central Committee's announcement of a split.

The thirty-one organised their own separate committee and participated in the negotiations that the Cadets were

conducting with the Left bloc of Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries. However, the appearance of a new actor on the stage upset the deal. On January 4, *Novoye Vremya* published an article by the Octobrist Stolypin, brother of the minister. "If the Cadets had the courage to make a complete break with the revolutionary groups and take a firm stand on constitutional ground, their party would be legalised," he wrote. A few days later (January 15), Milyukov called on Minister Stolypin, and two days after his visit all Cadet newspapers reported that the Cadets had broken off negotiations with the Left. But this game brought the Cadets no advantage; they had only seriously but unnecessarily compromised themselves. They were unable to accept Stolypin's conditions.

As for the Mensheviks, they compromised themselves at the same time, no less seriously and just as unnecessarily. At first, despite Milyukov's visit to Stolypin, they continued their talks with the Cadets and with the Left groups. It was only on January 18 that the Conference took place at which the split occurred and at which they were unable to come to an agreement on the distribution of seats for the deputies. Furthermore in that same period, *Rech* wrote that in order to alienate the Bolsheviks the Cadets were giving the Mensheviks the seat that had been promised the worker curia, and the Mensheviks did nothing by way of protest against this extraordinary method of trafficking in workers' votes. Far from it! The Central Committee continued bargaining with the Cadets, which meant consenting to their terms. It was this fact that aroused the workers' indignation! It was this selfsame fact that made me write my pamphlet "The Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks",* for which the latter want to arraign me before a Party tribunal.

After the Conference of January 6, at which the split occurred, the Bolsheviks declared: "If the Lefts, including the Mensheviks, conclude an alliance with the Cadets, we shall wage the struggle alone. If the negotiations end in a breakdown, we, in our turn, will propose the terms of an

* See pp. 33-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

agreement, and the acceptance of these terms will mean for them the acceptance of the principle of proletarian hegemony."

The negotiations between the Lefts and the Cadets ended in a breakdown (the Conference of January 18); this was our first victory. We proposed terms for a Left bloc that would not enter into a deal with the Cadet Party; these terms were accepted on January 25 by all except the Mensheviks. This was the second victory. Of the six places in St. Petersburg, we proposed two for the worker curia, two for the Social-Democrats, and two for the other parties. And it was obvious that the worker curia would elect two Social-Democrats. Fifteen days still remained to election day, but something happened then that the Cadets had not expected—in addition to the Black-Hundred list, the Octobrist list, and the Cadet list, there appeared the election list of a Left bloc including neither Cadets nor Mensheviks.

At their previous conferences with the Left parties, the Cadets had offered the Lefts two seats, while the Lefts had claimed three. When the Cadets saw that our Left bloc had been formed against them, they took fright and entered in their list only three candidates from their party. Of the other three places they offered one to Professor Kovalevsky (Party of Democratic Reform), the second to the priest Petrov (a very popular demagogue, a Christian Democrat) and the third to the workers. They made this last concession, incidentally, in order to prevent a storm of indignation among the people.

The Cadets won the elections, but it must be stressed that the Left bloc polled 25 per cent of the total number of votes in St. Petersburg and that they were victorious in the Vyborg District. In many districts the Cadets won by a very small majority. In five districts it would have been enough to gain a further 1,000 votes to ensure a victory for the Left bloc; in Kolomna District the Lefts were short of only 99 votes. The Mensheviks, therefore, prevented a victory of the Left parties in St. Petersburg; nevertheless, the revolutionary Left is, in general, stronger in the Second Duma than it was in the First.

The experiment we have conducted has been highly instructive. First, we see that the St. Petersburg workers

persist in remaining Bolsheviks, stoutly determined to defend the autonomy of their organisation against encroachment by the Central Committee. Then, we now know what we ought to think of the Black-Hundred danger, an argument that was dragged out into the open to justify an agreement with the Cadets during the first stage of the elections. This is nothing but an invention to deceive the socialist parties and protect the Cadets from the Left danger. For, indeed, "the real danger to the Cadets is from the Left", as *Rech* was once forced to admit. "Whoever votes for the Left makes it possible for the Rights to break through," the Cadet newspapers hammered away at us for weeks. This slogan provided them with a means of planting doubt among the wavering. By their bold campaign they brought about a situation in which the Left bloc obtained fewer votes (13 per cent) in Moscow than in St. Petersburg, because we had no newspaper of our own in Moscow. But they could not prevent the revelation of the incontestable truth—the Black-Hundred danger was a lie and a pretext. There were four election lists in Moscow just as there were in St. Petersburg; neither in St. Petersburg nor in Moscow did the alliance of the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists bring the Rights victory. We are in possession of figures that can be quoted in case of necessity.

The Mensheviks are thus at liberty to adhere to the Cadets and serve them. We shall not follow them. Neither will the people follow them. The Cadets' behaviour has been such that the masses are swinging more and more to the Left. If Milyukov imagines that by speaking of our "adventurous policy" and classifying our banner as a "red rag" he will deprive us of followers, we can only invite him to continue talking such nonsense, for it is to our advantage. The Cadet-like Mensheviks would be wise to give thought to the fact that at those St. Petersburg factories where the workers were formerly Bolsheviks, Bolsheviks were again elected, but that at those factories where the workers were formerly Mensheviks and where propaganda was conducted mainly by Mensheviks—*the Socialist-Revolutionaries were victorious*! The Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves must have been amazed at the number of votes they received. How grateful they should be for Menshevik

opportunism! As far as we are concerned, such results can only fortify our conviction that today, more than ever, our duty and the guarantee of our success lie in joint work, not with the liberal bourgeoisie, who want to put an end to the revolution, but with the democratic peasantry, against the baseness and treachery of the bourgeoisie, who are day by day becoming more and more counter-revolutionary. The best policy is, once again and always, the frankly revolutionary policy, the bitter, completely independent struggle under the proletarian banner which by degrees is gathering around our party the countless masses of democratic peasants together with worker-proletarians.

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THE OPENING OF THE SECOND STATE DUMA[60]

St. Petersburg, February 20, 1907.

The Second Duma meets today. The conditions it has been convened in, the conditions, internal and external, during the elections, and the conditions it will function in—all these are different from that they were for the First Duma. Obviously, it would be a mistake to expect a simple repetition of events. On the other hand, however, one essential feature is discernible in all the changes that have taken place in the past year of constant political ups and downs, namely that, on the whole, the movement has risen to a higher plane, that for all its zigzag path it is persistently pressing ahead.

In brief, this essential feature may be described as follows: a shift to the Right at the top, a shift to the Left at the bottom, and an accentuation of the political extremes—and not only political, but also and above all social and economic extremes. It is particularly characteristic of the events immediately preceding the opening of the Second Duma that the seemingly unruffled surface of political life has concealed a quiet, inconspicuous, but deep-going process in the growth of understanding among the masses, both in the working class and among the broadest sections of the peasantry.

Though there has been little change in the constitution bolstered by military courts in the past year, the political migration of the classes has been tremendous. Take the Black Hundreds. At first they consisted mainly of a gang of scoundrels in police service, with a small following recruited from the most ignorant and deluded sections of the common people, often deliberately befuddled with drink. Today the reactionary parties are headed by the Council of the United Nobility. The feudal-minded landlords have

closed their ranks and have become thoroughly "aware of themselves" in the course of the revolution. The reactionary parties are becoming the class organisation of those who will defend to the death the blessings most threatened by the present revolution: the huge landed estates—that feudal survival—the privileges of the highest estate, the opportunities they have to influence affairs of state through personal connections with the *camarilla*, etc.

Take the Cadets. Of the frankly and patently bourgeois parties this party was considered unquestionably the most "progressive". How far to the Right it has shifted! There is no longer any of last year's vacillation between reaction and the struggle of the people. This has yielded to frank hatred for this struggle, a cynically outspoken ambition to put a stop to the revolution, to settle down quietly, come to terms with reaction and begin to build the cosy little nest—cosy for the landlord of capitalist inclinations and for the manufacturer—of a monarchist constitution, a narrow, mercenary, class constitution, one of ruthless severity towards the masses of the people.

It is now no longer possible to repeat the error so many people used to slip into when they said that the Cadets stand to the Left of the Centre—that the line of demarcation between the parties of freedom and the parties of reaction lies to the Right of the Cadets. The Cadets are the Centre, and this Centre is ever more openly working for a deal with the Right. As a result of the political realignment of classes, the Cadets now find their support in the landlord whose estate is being run along capitalist lines, and in the broad section of the bourgeoisie. The democratic, petty-bourgeois sections of the population, however, are patently drawing away from the Cadets, following them only by force of habit, from tradition, and at times simply because they have been deceived.

In the countryside the main battle of the present revolution—the fight against feudal survivals and landed proprietorship—is even fiercer and more clear-cut. The Cadets' non-democratic nature reveals itself much more glaringly to the peasant than to the urban petty bourgeois. And the peasant has turned his back on the Cadet with even greater finality. It was the peasant electors, I would say,

more than any others, who ousted the Cadets from the gubernia electoral assemblies.

The antagonism between peasant and landlord—the most deep-rooted and most typical form of the antagonism between the people's freedom and feudal survivals in the bourgeois revolution—is not in the forefront in the towns. The urban proletarian has already come to realise another and much more profound conflict of interests, and this has given rise to a socialist movement. Taken as a whole, the worker curias all over Russia, have returned almost exclusively Social-Democratic electors, with only a scattering of Socialist-Revolutionaries and an altogether negligible number of electors from other parties. But even among the urban petty-bourgeois democrats the shift of the lower stratum to the Left, away from the Cadets, is unmistakable. According to figures published in *Rech* by a Cadet statistician, Mr. Smirnov, in 22 cities, with 153,000 voters voting on four election lists, the monarchists received 17,000 votes, the Octobrists 34,000, the *Left bloc* 41,000, and the Cadets 74,000. So enormous was the number of votes wrested from the Cadets in the very first election contest—despite the tremendous power of the Cadet daily press, the legal status of the Cadet organisation, the Cadet falsehood about the danger of a Black-Hundred victory and despite the illegal status of the Lefts—that there can be no doubt about the turn taken by the shop-assistants, petty clerks, petty civil servants and poorer householders. The Cadets will not be able to stand up to another such battle. Urban democracy has abandoned them for the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats.

The whole of the proletariat has mobilised, and the great mass of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, are mobilising against the Black-Hundred Council of the United Nobility and against the liberal bourgeoisie, who have funked completely and turned tail on the revolution.

The political realignment of classes is so profound so far-reaching, and so mighty that no military courts, no Senate interpretations, no tricks of the reactionaries, no spate of Cadet falsehood monopolising the columns of the entire daily press—in fact, nothing at all has been able

to prevent this realignment from being reflected in the Duma. The Second Duma demonstrates the intensification of the profound, conscious, and increasingly organised mass struggle between the various classes.

The task of the moment is to understand this basic fact, and to be able to connect the various sections of the Duma with this mighty support from below. It is not to the top, not to the government, that we must look, but to the depths, to the people. It is not to the petty technical details of Duma procedure that we must devote our attention; it is not vulgar considerations of how best to lie low, of how to keep quiet in order to prevent the Duma from being dissolved, in order not to anger Stolypin and Co.—it is not these vulgar Cadet considerations that must interest the democrat. All his attention, all the strength of his spirit, must be directed towards strengthening the transmission belt which connects the big wheel that has begun to revolve energetically down below with the little wheel up above.

Now, more than ever before, it is the duty of the Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the most advanced class, to rise boldly to full stature, to speak out independently, resolutely and courageously. If it is to further the socialist and purely class aims of the proletariat, this Party must show it is the vanguard of the entire democratic movement. True, we must dissociate ourselves from all petty-bourgeois groups and strata—but not for the purpose of secluding ourselves in supposedly splendid isolation (which would really mean assisting the liberal bourgeois, trailing along in their wake), but for the purpose of ridding ourselves of all vacillation, of all half-heartedness, for the purpose of becoming the *leader* of the democratic peasantry.

The primary task of the Social-Democrats entering the Second Duma is to wrest away from the liberals those democratic elements that are still under their sway; to become the leader of those democrats; to teach them to seek support in the people and join ranks with the masses down below; to unfurl *our own* banner before the whole of the working class and before the entire impoverished and famine-stricken peasant masses.

Novy Luch, No. 1,
February 20, 1907

Published according
to the text in *Novy Luch*

THE SECOND DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT[61]

Workers, comrades!

The day set for the opening of the Second State Duma has arrived. The class-conscious proletariat never believed that freedom for the people and land for the peasants could be attained by sending petitioners to the tsar, ruler of the gang of Black-Hundred cutthroats. The class-conscious proletariat boycotted the Duma to warn the backward peasant masses, who believed in the Duma. And the story of the First Duma—the government's mockery of its proposals and its eventual dissolution—has shown that the class-conscious proletariat was right, has shown that liberty cannot be attained by peaceful means, under laws promulgated by the tsar and enforced by the Black Hundreds.

The Social-Democrats advised the people to send fighters to the Second Duma, not petitioners. The people's faith in peaceful methods has been shattered. That is evident from the fact that the Cadet Party, the party of liberals, which advocated peaceful methods, suffered a crushing defeat in the elections. This party of liberal landlords and bourgeois lawyers, which is desirous of reconciling the Black-Hundred autocracy with popular freedom, is entering the Second Duma with depleted forces. The Black Hundreds have gained in strength, and now have several dozen deputies in the Duma. Much greater, however, is the gain of the Lefts, i.e., of those who stand more or less resolutely and consistently for revolutionary struggle as opposed to peaceful methods.

Россійская Соціалдемократическая Рабочая Партія.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

РАБОЧІЙ

Газета Охтенск. и Самсон. подрайоновъ Выборгскаго района.

№ 2. | пятница, 23 Февраля 1907г. | Цена 1 к.

Товарищи-рабочіе!

День созыва второй Госуд. Думы настаетъ. Сознательный пролетаріатъ никогда не вѣрилъ въ то, чтобы можно было добиться воли народу, земли крестьянству путемъ посылки ходатаевъ къ царю, управляющему шайкой черносотенныхъ насильниковъ. Сознательный пролетаріатъ бойкотировалъ Думу, чтобы предупредить темныя крестьянскія массы, которыя вѣрили въ Думу. И опытъ съ первой Думой, издѣвка правительства надъ ея предложеніями, ея разгонъ показали, что сознательный пролетаріатъ былъ правъ.— показали, что мирнымъ путемъ, на почвѣ законовъ царемъ изданныхъ и черносотенцами оберегаемыхъ, нельзя добиться свободы.

Во вторую Думу соціалдемократіи совѣтовала народу посылать не ходатаевъ а борцовъ. Вѣра въ мирный путь подорвана у народа. Это видно изъ того, что партіи либераловъ, проповѣдующія мирный путь, кадеты, потерпѣли крушеніе на выборахъ. Эта партія либеральныхъ помѣщиковъ и буржуазныхъ адвокатовъ, пытающаяся примирить черносотенное самодержавіе съ народной свободой, входитъ во вторую Думу ослабленной. Усилились черносотенцы, которые провели нѣсколько десятковъ депутатовъ. Но еще гораздо болѣе усилились лѣвые, т. е. тѣ, кто болѣе или менѣе рѣшительно и послѣдовательно стоятъ не за мирный путь, а за революціонную борьбу.

Вторая Дума—лѣвѣе первой Думы. Во второй Думѣ гораздо больше соціалдемократовъ и больше революціонныхъ демократовъ (с.-р. и часть трудовиковъ). Первая Дума была Думой надеждъ на мирный путь. Вторая Дума —Дума острой борьбы между черносотеннымъ царскимъ правительствомъ и представителями массы, массы пролетаріевъ, сознательно добивающихся свободы ради борьбы за соціализмъ, — массы крестьянства, стихійно подымающагося противъ крѣпостниковъ помѣщиковъ.

Выборы новой Думы показали, что не смотря на всѣ преслѣдованія и запреты растетъ и крѣпнетъ революціонное сознаніе въ широкихъ народныхъ массахъ. Близится и мая революціонная волна, новый революціонный бой народа за свободу.

Этотъ бой будетъ данъ не въ Думѣ. Этотъ бой рѣшитъ возстаніе пролетаріата, крестьянства и сознательной части войска. Этотъ бой надвигается на насъ всѣмъ ходомъ событій, всѣмъ ходомъ столкновеній лѣвой части Думы съ правительствомъ и кадетами.

Будьте же готовы, рабочіе, къ серьезнымъ событіямъ. Не тратьте своихъ силъ понапрасну. Намъ не надо ускорять развязки: пусть царь и его черносотенные слуги нападаютъ первые. Имъ придется нападать на народъ, разгонять Думу, отмѣнить избирательный законъ, начинать рядъ насилій, чтобы разделаться съ новой Думой.

Пусть насильники начинаютъ. Пролетаріатъ долженъ стойко, твердо, выдержанно готовить болѣе и болѣе широкія массы народа къ великому, отчаянному бою за свободу. Товарищи-рабочіе! Мы пережили первыя великія схватки революціи. 9-ое января 1905г., октябрьскую стачку, декабрьское возстаніе. Мы будемъ вновь собирать новыя силы для новаго еще болѣе грознаго, рѣшительнаго выступленія когда разгорится костеръ лѣвой Думы во всероссійскій пожаръ. Нужно всѣ силы собрать и сосредоточить для грядущаго рѣшительнаго сраженія.

Помните, товарищи, что вторая Дума неизбѣжно ведетъ къ борьбѣ, къ возстанію. Не растрачивайте своихъ силъ на пустяки.

Да здравствуетъ всенародное возстаніе за свободу!

Да здравствуетъ революція!

Да здравствуетъ международная революціонная соціалдемократія!

Н. Ленинъ.

ПИСЬМА РАБОЧИХЪ

Заводъ Крейтона.

(Окончаніе.)

Къ сожалѣнію, фильтровка въ кустарной мастерской лозунгу уравнялась. Литература тутъ игнорируется, особенно газетная, и пропагандѣ мѣшаетъ нужникъ по кличкѣ «старый хрычъ». Организованныхъ въ этой мастерской только одинъ человѣкъ. Мастеръ, очарованный наблюдаетъ провокатора Ушакова, который отрадываетъ свою фамилію собственнымъ повѣрителямъ.

Передъ выборами по городской куріи черносотенцы и кадетами раскидывали и бюллетени въ большомъ количествѣ получается абонентъ квартировъ-инженеровъ, которые, принесъ изъ на заводъ, клеятъ подъ потолокъ и затѣмъ вывѣшиваютъ на показъ съ подписью: «Кадетскій бюллетень дыхъ достойный уважения».

First page of the newdpaper *Rabochy*, No. 2, 1907
Reduced

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

РАБОТЧІЙ

Газета бѣдняковъ, и батраковъ, Выборгскаго района.

№ 3. | понѣдѣльникъ, 23 Февраля 1907г. | 1 коп.

Товарищи-рабочіе!

Для самаго этого дня выпуска Самодѣятельной газеты нашли не обычно. Не то, что этотъ день есть какой нибудь праздникъ, или какой нибудь юбилей, но дѣло въ томъ, что сегодняшній день, есть первый день, когда мы можемъ открыто, не боясь преслѣдованія, сказать, что мы имѣемъ свою газету, что мы можемъ свободно

The Second Duma is more Left than was the First. Its deputies include many more Social-Democrats, and a greater number of revolutionary democrats (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and a section of the Trudoviks). The First Duma was a Duma of hopes for peaceful development. The Second Duma will be the scene of a sharp struggle between the Black-Hundred tsarist government and the representatives of the masses: the masses of proletarians, who are consciously striving for liberty in order to facilitate the fight for socialism, and the masses of the peasants, who are rising spontaneously against the feudal-minded landlords.

The elections to the new Duma have shown that despite all persecution and bans, revolutionary consciousness is spreading and gaining force among the masses of the people. A new revolutionary wave is approaching, a new revolutionary battle of the people for freedom.

This battle will not be fought in the Duma. It will be decided by an uprising of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the class-conscious sections of the armed forces. It is a battle that is being brought closer to us by the entire course of events, by the entire course of the clashes between the Left section of the Duma, and the government and the Cadets.

Be prepared, then, workers, for events of great moment. Do not waste your strength to no purpose. There is no need for us to hasten the denouement: let the tsar and his Black-Hundred lackeys begin the attack. If they want to get rid of the new Duma, they will have to attack the people, dissolve the Duma, revoke the election law, and launch a new series of repressions.

Let the oppressors begin. The proletariat must keep firmly, steadily, consistently to its task of preparing ever broader masses of the people for the great and desperate fight for freedom. Comrade workers! We have come through the first great encounters in the revolution: January 9, 1905, the October strike, and the December uprising. We shall gather our forces anew for still another advance, even more formidable and resolute than the last, when the name of the Left Duma shall flare up into a nation-wide conflagration. We must gather and concentrate all our forces for the decisive battle that is impending.

Remember, comrades, that the Second Duma must inevitably lead to battle, to insurrection. Do not waste your strength on trifles.

Long live the rising of all the people for freedom!

Long live the revolution!

Long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Written on February 20 (March 5), 1907

Published on February 23, 1907 in *Rabochy*, No. 2
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the newspaper text

THE FIRST IMPORTANT STEP

St. Petersburg, February 21, 1907.

Yesterday we expressed the hope that the Mensheviks, who have fine words to say in *Russkaya Zhizn*[62] on the independence of Social-Democracy, would pursue a correct policy.

On the evening of the day before yesterday a Cadet meeting was held that shattered all those hopes....

This is what happened.

After lunch on February 19, the Social-Democratic Duma group held a meeting. It was proposed that they should attend a private conference arranged by the Cadets. Some of the deputies objected strenuously. They said that it was a disgrace for working-class deputies to go to liberal bourgeois who were bargaining with Stolypin, and that the Social-Democrats should pursue a proletarian and not a Cadet policy, should not lead the peasants to the liberal landowner, and should not assist the formation of a *Cadet* "Left" bloc. The Mensheviks got their own decision adopted.

On the evening of February 19, a meeting of some 300 members of the Duma "opposition" was held at Dolgorukov's apartment. It was attended by Cadets, Narodowci (Polish Black-Hundred bourgeois nationalists), all the Lefts—Trudoviks, S.R.'s and ... Social-Democrats. Some of the Social-Democrat deputies did not go to the Cadets.

What happened at the meeting at the Cadet's apartment?

At this meeting all the Lefts, all democrats, petty bourgeois (Narodniks, Trudoviks, S.R.'s) and all Cadet-like Social-Democrats *signed the Cadet proposals*. According to *Tovarishch*, the Mensheviks made the formal proviso that their decision was not final, they would still have to

consult the group. According to *Rech* (the Cadet central newspaper) however, *nobody* made any proviso at all.

And so, there were Social-Democrats who, like faithful servants of the liberals, accepted their entire plan, gave the majority of seats in the presidium (two out of three) to the Cadets, and agreed to the Trudoviks taking the third place, *thus tying up the Trudoviks with the Cadets*, and agreed to refrain from explaining to the people what political significance the selection of the presidium has, or why it is *obligatory* for every conscientious citizen to decide that question from the standpoint of party alignment, and not by private arrangement behind the scenes.

Can such conduct be justified by the fear that a Black-Hundred presidium would be elected in the Duma? No. In Comrade P. Orlovsky's article of yesterday, we demonstrated that the Black Hundreds *could not* win, *whatever the division* of votes between the Cadets and the Lefts.

The Menshevik policy is *actually* determined, not by the danger of a Black-Hundred victory, but by the desire to render service to the liberals.

What must the policy of the Social-Democrats be?

Either abstain, and, as socialists, stand aside from the liberals, who betray liberty and exploit the people, or give the lead to the democratic petty bourgeoisie that is capable of struggle, both against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals.

The former policy is obligatory for socialists when there is no longer any substantial difference between *any* of the bourgeois parties from the standpoint of the struggle for democracy. That is what happens in Europe. There is no revolution. All the bourgeois parties have lost the ability to struggle for democracy, and are struggling only for the petty, selfish interests of big *or small proprietors*. Under such circumstances, Social-Democracy *alone* defends the interests of democracy, and in so doing persistently unfolds its own socialist views to the masses.

The latter policy is obligatory when the conditions of a bourgeois-democratic revolution obtain, when, in addition to the working class, there are certain bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata capable of struggle for the democracy that is essential to the proletariat.

In present-day Russia the second policy is obligatory. Without ever forgetting their socialist agitation and propaganda, and the organisation of the proletarians into a class, Social-Democrats must, *jointly* with the democratic petty bourgeoisie, *crush* both the Black Hundreds and the *liberals*, as the situation may demand.

That is because the liberals (Cadets, Polish Narodowci (?), the Party of Democratic Reform, etc., etc.) have already turned emphatically away from the revolution and have entered into a deal with the autocracy against the people's freedom they talk so falsely about. It has now even transpired that last year the Cadets *helped the government* obtain *2,000 million* from France to spend on summary military courts and shootings; Clemenceau said outright to the Cadets that there would be no loan if the Cadet Party came out officially against it. The Cadets refused to oppose the loan for fear of losing their position as *the government party* of the morrow! Russia was shot down, not only by Trepov's machine-guns, but by the Franco-Cadet millions.

It is impermissible for revolutionary Social-Democrats to support the hegemony of the Cadets. It is, however, not enough for them to have spoken against going to the Cadet meeting on February 19. They must demand, categorically and unconditionally, that the group break with the Cadet-like policy and come out forthrightly and openly in the Duma with an independent policy of the proletariat.

On the question of the presidium, the Social-Democrats should have said: we do not want our own presidium. We support the *whole* list of Lefts or Trudoviks *against the Cadets*, that is, we support all three candidates for the presidium, against the Cadet candidates, and will abstain if the Trudoviks follow in the wake of the Cadets, despite our warnings. In any case it would be essential to put up a candidate from the Lefts even though there would be no chance of his being elected; at the first voting, the number of votes given for him would show what forces the Social-Democrats could rely on in the event of a struggle against the Cadets. And if it should turn out that he obtained more votes than the Cadet, even if it were less than the absoute majority required for election, the voting would show

the people clearly that this is not a Cadet Duma, and that the Cadet *is not everything* in the Duma.

The election of the presidium is not a mere bagatelle. It is the first step, after which others will follow. The die is cast.

There must be either a Cadet-like policy which would mean turning the Social-Democrats into an appendage to the liberals;

or there must be the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy, in which case we should not begin by kowtowing to the Cadets, but by openly unfurling *our own* banner. Then we would not go to the Cadets. Then we would call on the petty bourgeoisie, and especially on the peasant democracy, to do battle against both the Black Hundreds and the liberals.

Novy Luch, No. 2,
February 21, 1907

Published according
to the text in *Novy Luch*

PETTY-BOURGEOIS TACTICS

The newspaper *Tovarishch* of February 21 carries excerpts from the decisions adopted at the recent extraordinary congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. These decisions are devoted to the tactics to be adopted in the Duma.

A lot might and should be said about these decisions. We cannot deal here with the fundamental error of these and all other decisions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries—their failure to analyse the different parties from the class point of view. No tactics worthy of the name can be elaborated without such an analysis. We shall frequently have occasion to return to this subject when we compare the decisions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the platform of the revolutionary Social-Democrats (the resolutions adopted at a conference of representatives from several Bolshevik organisations, which met from February 15 to February 18*; they are to be published within the next few days.**

Nor shall we go into the somewhat excessive emphasis which the Socialist-Revolutionaries place on the elementary truth that the revolutionaries have no desire at all to "create extraneous [?], unessential conflicts", to "hasten the dissolution of the Duma", and the like. That is a mere detail.

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* Today's *Sovremennaya Rech*[63] (February 22), on page 3, correctly reports the composition of this conference, and prints *an excerpt* of one of the *six* resolutions it adopted. Readers should bear in mind that there are several inaccuracies even in this excerpt.

** See pp. 133-44 of this volume.—*Ed.*

From the point of view of the immediate tasks of the day, the following decision is the kernel of the Socialist-Revolutionary tactics:

"4. The Congress is of the opinion that strict party alignments within the Duma, with each group acting on its own in isolated fashion, and bitter strife among the groups, might completely paralyse the activity of the opposition majority, and thus discredit, in the minds of the working classes, the very idea of popular representation. The Congress therefore considers it essential that the party deputies exert every effort to organise the most constant and co-ordinated action on the part of all the socialist and extreme Left party groups; particularly in questions of the fight against the Rights in the Duma and against the government, for liberties and political rights for the people, it is essential to strive in each individual case for the most co-ordinated actions on the part of the revolutionary and socialist section of the Duma in conjunction with the opposition. Moreover, all these co-ordinated actions, both long-term and partial, must be conducted along lines which do not conflict in any way with the fundamental principles of the party programme and tactics."

What a splendid exposition of the fundamental principles of petty-bourgeois tactics! What a splendid demonstration of their flimsiness!

"Long-term [!] and partial co-ordinated actions", "the most constant [!] and co-ordinated".... How empty these words are in the absence of any attempt to explain just what *community of interests* of just what *classes* lie at the root of all this "co-ordination"! We revolutionary Social-Democrats favour joint actions by the party of the proletariat and the parties of the democratic petty bourgeoisie against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadets, as the party of treacherous liberalism. The Socialist-Revolutionaries are so far from understanding this class foundation of the Russian revolution that, on the one hand, they talk about co-ordination of the socialist and extreme Left groups *in general*, i.e., about concealing the contradictions between the proletarian and the small producer; and, on the other hand, they talk about co-ordinated action by the revolutionary and socialist section of the Duma with the *opposition*, against the Black Hundreds.

No, gentlemen, we shall not even discuss permanent agreements, or co-ordinated action in general. You must first agree with us on the policy of fighting both the Black

Hundreds and the Cadets—agree *in deed*. That is our ultimatum. That is our line of policy in the democratic revolution. We shall declare *in regard to any question* arising in the present revolution, as we declared during the St. Petersburg elections—the proletariat goes unhesitatingly into battle both against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadets. As long as the petty bourgeois vacillate, as long as they follow the Cadets—unrelenting war against the petty bourgeois. You have abandoned your Cadets? You agree to oppose the Cadets? If that is actually so, if that is not a mere paper declaration but something you prove in action, then, and only then, will the Social-Democrats fight together with you in *democratic* action.

But the most remarkable thing, I should say, is the beginning of the resolution just quoted. Just think of it: "strict party alignments within the Duma", "bitter strife among the groups"* may "discredit, in the minds of the working classes, the very idea of popular representation". Veritable Socialist-Revolutionary "Plekhanovs", in the Vasilyev sense of the word!**

No, gentlemen. The principle of class struggle is the very foundation of all Social-Democratic teachings and of all Social-Democratic policy. The proletarians, the peasants, and the townspeople are not such babes in arms that the idea of representation can be dimmed in their minds by bitter disputes, or by the acute struggle between the classes. Our job is not to be sugary to them, but, on the contrary, *to teach* them, *from the Duma platform*, to distinguish clearly between the parties and to understand their *class* roots, which the sly bourgeoisie keep buried deep underground.

PROMARX COMMUNIST NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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* *Rech* of February 22 carried a special article, immediately following its editorial, on the resolutions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Citing *precisely this* passage on the harmfulness of "strict party alignments", the organ of the liberal bourgeoisie declares: "Thus we have an *absolutely correct* definition of *the point of departure of the new tactics*." Precisely! The tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are *correct* from the point of view of the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie in general, and of its deal with the reactionaries in particular!

** See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 424.—*Ed.*

That is just what is so *criminal* about the Menshevik policy in the Duma—they will not, or cannot, tell the people from the Duma platform the whole truth about the class nature of the various parties; about the Milyukovs' secret haggling with the Stolypins, about the fundamental difference between the democratic aims of the peasant and those of the liberal, between the socialist aims of the peasant and those of the proletarian.

But the world holds other things besides this policy of the Mensheviks, inaugurated by their silent voting at the dictates of the Cadets.

This complete failure to understand the class roots of the "oppositional" liberalism that is secretly trading away freedom and democracy to the Stolypin gang, underlies the opportunist tactics pursued by the petty bourgeois (the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the petty-bourgeois wing of the workers' party—the Mensheviks.

The fight against the Black Hundreds is just a blind, a specious pretext. *In actual fact* these petty-bourgeois tactics are applied on occasions when there is *no possibility whatsoever* of a Black-Hundred victory. Such was the case, for example, in the St. Petersburg elections and in the election of the chairman of the Duma. The real essence of petty-bourgeois tactics is this: both the Trudoviks (the Socialist-Revolutionaries are fictitiously independent; in actual fact they are bound up with the Trudoviks, are simply the Left wing of that group. This was proved by the St. Petersburg elections; it is being proved once more by the present party alignments inside the Second Duma)—both the Trudoviks and the Mensheviks give support to the leadership of the Cadets. Not only in Russia, but all over Europe as well, the liberals have long kept the democratic petty bourgeoisie in tow, for it is too disunited, too undeveloped, too irresolute to act independently—and too much of the proprietor in inclination to follow the proletariat. That is the Achilles heel of petty-bourgeois policy—its inability and incapacity to cast off the ideological and political hegemony of the liberal bourgeois. It is no mere chance that the petty bourgeois tag along behind the Cadets; it is a result of the basic economic features in any

capitalist society. The Social-Democrats' fundamental task—one that is absolutely alien to the Menshevik mind—lies, therefore, in an unflagging effort to break down the hegemony of the liberals over the democrats, an unflagging effort to liberate the petty-bourgeois masses from Cadet tutelage and bring them under the influence and leadership of Social-Democracy.

The Trudovik proposes "constant and co-ordinated actions". No, thank you! We refuse to have dealings with people who yearn for the Cadets as the drunkard yearns for his glass, with people who for months begged for admittance into a bloc with the Cadets in the St. Petersburg elections, flocked like sheep to the Cadet meeting on February 19, and gave their votes to a Cadet, to a trader in democracy?* No, thank you!

Written on February 22 (March 7), 1907

Published in *Novy Luch*, No. 4, on February 23, 1907

Published according to the newspaper text

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* See pp. 161-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

WHAT THE SPLITTERS HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE COMING SPLIT

Russkaya Zhizn has raised a ridiculous outcry over the attitude of *Novy Luch* towards the Social-Democratic Duma group. (The article "Even Here!" in No. 45.)

It is ridiculous because *Russkaya Zhizn* chose to avoid the issue instead of attempting to give at least some sort of pertinent answer to our criticism of the group's conduct.

We declared that our group should not under any circumstances have voted for the Cadet candidate for the chairmanship.

We declared that, in its official capacity, our Duma group should not under any circumstances have attended private meetings called by the Cadets and the Polish Narodowci.

We declared, finally, that the Duma group's conduct may lead to a split, for it follows a line contrary to the spirit and the letter of the decisions of the Party's Stockholm Congress.

Lastly, we called upon the Bolshevik section of our Duma group to wage a most ruthless struggle against the opportunism of the majority of the group, and to hold steadfastly to the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the group.

We have written a great deal on this subject; we have published several articles on the conduct of the Duma group in connection with the presidium, examining the question from every angle.

Russkaya Zhizn raises no objection whatever to the actual issue involved; it does not make a single serious

attempt to defend the tactical line of the Mensheviks, who are actually in control of the Duma group.

We were entitled to expect, and did expect, some attempt on the part of *Russkaya Zhizn* to show that its tactical line is in full harmony with the decisions of the Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., that this line is one that should bring about the hegemony of our Duma group over the entire Left wing in the Duma.

But nothing of the sort has occurred. Instead of this we get a stream of sorry talk, of ridiculous complaints that *Novy Luch* is badgering the Social-Democratic Duma group, that *Novy Luch* is spurring the Bolsheviks in the Duma group towards an immediate split.

Instead of an answer on the point at issue, we get the hypocritical exhortation: "*Novy Luch* should speak more clearly. It should dot all its i's. And it should recall the counsel of the gospel: 'That thou doest, do quickly.'"

Comrades! Your brashness is truly superb! Your outcries about a split engineered by the Bolsheviks are the very acme of truth and sincerity.

The only organisation of our Party in which there is a split at present—and a very bad split—is the St. Petersburg organisation. Who split this organisation? The Mensheviks split it, did so against the will of the organised workers and to the gratification of the Cadets, motivating their action by a Black-Hundred danger which proved non-existent in St. Petersburg. And despite this fact, the Mensheviks stubbornly refuse, to this very day, to restore the unity of the St. Petersburg organisation—stubbornly persist in their efforts to deepen and widen the split.

The Bolsheviks fought with might and main against election agreements with the Cadets being regarded as permissible. But agreements were recognised as permissible at the November Party Conference. At this conference the Bolsheviks bound themselves to abide by the decisions of the local organisations, and in every case where the local organisations deemed it necessary to enter into election agreements with the Cadets, the Bolsheviks kept their promise, as a "sacred and inviolable" duty to the Party. The Mensheviks undertook the same obligation; but when they found that the organised workers of St. Petersburg would

not agree to follow them in the Cadet leading strings, they split the organisation.

And now they wail about a split! As to the challenge presented to us by *Russkaya Zhizn*, we can find no difficulty at all in answering it. We have always dotted our i's, and anyone who has eyes to see with can see the dots.

The unity of the Party is most dear to us. But the purity of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy is dearer still. We submit, as we have always done, to the will of the majority at the Parry's Stockholm Congress. We consider it imperative to carry out all its decisions. But we demand that these decisions be carried out by the central, leading organs of the Party. And the opportunist vacillations of the Mensheviks, all their attempts to propitiate the Cadets by abandoning the line laid down by the Congress, have met, and will always meet, with our merciless criticism and unyielding resistance. That is our right and our duty. We shall never give up that right, never fail in that duty. And if a split does take place, it will only show that the Mensheviks themselves have trampled underfoot the decisions they themselves passed at the Stockholm Congress. There cannot and will not be a split of any other kind. And such a split can signify only one thing: the final transformation of the Mensheviks into vassals of the Cadets.

"The scarlet banner of the proletariat has faltered in the hands of the Social-Democratic Duma group," we wrote two days ago.

The Cadets demand that this banner be dipped to them. The day when the Mensheviks agree to this incredible infamy will be the day of the split; for on that day the Mensheviks will cease to be a part of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Novy Luch, No. 5,
on February 24, 1907

Published according
to the newspaper text

ON THE TACTICS OF OPPORTUNISM

Plekhanov has broken the silence that was his only wise tactics after his renowned proposal of a common slogan—a Duma with full powers—for the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Plekhanov has come out in *Russkaya Zhizn* with a new attempt to impel our Party towards the Cadets, an attempt to impose on the Party the slogan of support for a "responsible ministry"—a slogan already rejected by the Party in the period of the First Duma.

Let us examine Plekhanov's arguments.

First of all we must note that, in the zeal of his campaign against the Bolsheviks, Plekhanov resorts to an *absolute untruth* as to their views. Namely, he very definitely ascribes to us the desire to "smash through", the desire and aspiration to do battle "right away".

For our readers to see how wrong Plekhanov is, we shall cite an official Bolshevik publication dated *February 11*:

"...A struggle ... is undoubtedly inevitable. But it is precisely because of its inevitability that we must not force the pace, spur or goad it on. Leave that to the Krushevans and Stolypins. Our task is *to reveal* the truth to the proletariat and the peasantry clearly, directly and with unsparing candour, to open their eyes to the significance of the coming storm, to help them to meet the enemy in organised fashion with ... calmness.... 'Shoot first, Messrs. Bourgeois!' said Engels to the German capitalists in 1894. And we say: 'Shoot first, Krushevans!'... Therefore—no premature *calls*."*

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* See p. 117 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The ease with which our esteemed Plekhanov performs the duties of "critic" is really wonderful. *No premature calls*, the Bolshevik organisations declare a week and a half before the opening of the Duma. The Bolsheviks want to do battle "*right away*", Plekhanov declares in an article which appeared on February 23; they want to "smash through".

Of course, that is the simplest, the cheapest, the easiest method of crushing the Bolsheviks: first impute *an absurd idea* to them, and then raise a fuss and fulminate ("excessive zeal", "stupidity", "worse than treachery", and so on, and so forth). But Plekhanov should not forget that when he slanders the Bolsheviks he is not slandering the dead—that the Bolsheviks can make it clear to all the world, by *simply referring* to an official document, how false Plekhanov's statements are. That will put Plekhanov out of countenance. And then Plekhanov will begin to understand that he cannot get away scot-free with statements about the Bolsheviks such as *only Novoye Vremya* has hitherto been in the habit of making about revolutionaries.

Let us proceed to the substance of the question Plekhanov raises, the question of whether the workers' party should support the slogan of "a responsible ministry". Plekhanov defends this slogan as follows:

> "One of the two: either the swiftly growing forces of revolution *already* surpass the forces of the government, in which case the demand for a responsible ministry can and should serve as the signal for the decisive conflict against reaction.
>
> "Or the forces of revolution *do not yet* surpass the government's forces of resistance, so that the decisive conflict is *not* yet in order; but the demand should be supported in that case, too, for it is a splendid means of education, of developing the political understanding of the people, and thus preparing them for a victorious fight, in the future.
>
> "Thus, in either case the Social-Democratic deputies *must not fail to take up this demand*, in the interests of the people and in the interests of the revolution."

A very edifying argument. Let us start with the first part. Thus, we assume, with Plekhanov, that the forces of revolution already surpass those of the government. If that were so, the demand for a responsible ministry would be, first, superfluous, secondly, harmful and, thirdly, the liberals would not support it.

1. It would be superfluous because in any case such a "signal for the decisive conflict" is a *roundabout* signal, not a direct one. This "signal" does not express the definite idea of a really *decisive* battle against the reactionary forces; on the contrary, it expresses the idea of a concession such as the reactionaries might themselves voluntarily concede. We do not deny that, generally speaking, it may be right under certain special conditions to issue signals, not for a decisive battle, but for a minor-preliminary skirmish—even a demonstration—which has all the appearances of a battle. But that is another question. In the conditions which Plekhanov has *assumed* (that the forces of *revolution* already surpass, etc.), a roundabout signal would obviously be superfluous.

2. "The forces of revolution already surpass the forces of reaction".... What does that imply? Does it include *awareness* on the part of the forces of revolution? Plekhanov will probably agree that it does. A people unaware of their revolutionary tasks cannot be strong enough to triumph over reaction in the decisive conflict. Further: does the demand we are examining, *correctly* express the aims of the revolution in the fight against the reactionaries? No, it does not; for in the first place, a responsible ministry does not by any means signify the transfer of power into the hands of the people, or even the transfer of power into the hands of the liberals, but is, in essence, a deal, or an attempt at a deal, between the reactionaries and the liberals; and in the second place, in view of the objective conditions, even the *actual* transfer of *power* to the liberals *cannot* bring about the realisation of the fundamental demands of the revolution. This idea is expressed clearly in the passage Plekhanov quotes from the article in *Symposium No. 1*[64] but he has not even attempted to touch upon the actual substance of the idea.

The question now arises: how would the *decisive* (Plekhanov's condition) conflict with reaction be affected by a slogan in which the demands of the revolution (the *forces* of which *already* surpass—Plekhanov's condition!—the forces of reaction) are *incorrectly* expressed? Obviously, its effect would undoubtedly be *harmful*. This slogan *dulls* the consciousness of the masses that are advancing to the

decisive conflict. If we launched this slogan, we would actually be calling for a *decisive* battle, but pointing to a battle *objective* that *can decide nothing*—you shout about shooting a cow, but aim at a crow.

It can *never* be exactly determined *before* the battle whose forces "already surpass" those opposed to them. Only a pedant could dream of such a thing. The concept of "forces *surpassing* the forces of the enemy" implies that the fighters are *fully conscious* of their tasks. Plekhanov is *causing direct harm* to the revolution when he speaks of the "decisiveness" of the conflict and at the same time *dulls* this consciousness. That is really "worse than treachery", my dear critic! With "forces" sufficient for a victory over reaction, the "leader" calls on his troops to fight for a *deal* with the reactionaries.... Plekhanov jokingly compares himself to the Roman general who executed his son for prematurely starting the battle. A pretty jest. Now, if I were the "son", at a time when the *decisive* conflict was at hand, when "the forces of revolution *already surpassed* those of the government", I would *shoot* (or, in the Roman days, stab) the "*daddy*" who advanced the slogan of a deal with the reactionaries—would do so without the slightest compunction, calmly leaving it to future Mommsens to investigate whether my action was the killing of a traitor, the execution of a traitor, or whether it was an act of criminal insubordination.

3. In arguing against the slogan of "a responsible ministry" in the days of the First Duma, we adduced only the two arguments cited above. We must now add a third: *the liberals themselves* would withdraw the demand for a responsible ministry if this demand *could possibly* become, *directly or in roundabout fashion*, a signal for the decisive battle between "revolution" and reaction.

Why do we now have to add this argument? For the reason that the liberals (including the Cadets) have shifted far to the Right since the First Duma, and have come out *decisively* against the revolution. For the reason that Golovin, who is supported by bad Social-Democrats for his liberalism, came out in his very first speech not as a liberal, not as a Cadet, but as an *Octobrist*.

If Plekhanov has so much fallen behind affairs in Russia as to be ignorant of this, his article is, of course, deserving of clemency. But even aside from such mistakes, the whole gist of his arguments is fundamentally wrong.

Let us proceed to the second case. The forces of revolution *do not yet* surpass the forces of reaction, and the decisive conflict is *not yet* in order. In that case, says Plekhanov, the importance of this slogan is in its influence on the development of the political consciousness of the people. That is true. But in that case—and here Plekhanov is a thousand times wrong—a slogan of this kind will *corrupt*, not enlighten, the minds of the people; it will *confuse*, not revolutionise—*demoralise*, not educate. This is so clear that we need not bother to develop the idea—at any rate, until our next talk with the most esteemed Plekhanov.

And so, no matter how you put it, it's still the same. Whether the forces of revolution have matured or not, Plekhanov's slogan cannot be considered "mature" food for the minds of the Social-Democratic proletariat. This slogan sacrifices the *fundamental interests* of democracy and of our revolution—the enlightenment of the masses as to the aims of a real *people*'s fight for *real* power—sacrifices these interests to temporary, casual, unessential, muddled *liberal* slogans, aims and interests.

And it is just such sacrifice of the fundamental interests of the proletariat to the half-hearted, muddled aims of liberalism that makes up the essence of *opportunism* in tactics.

A few words in conclusion. In his article Plekhanov tries to bait us on the subject of the boycott. We shall discuss this with him in more detail when he deigns to go over from baiting, to a contest on the actual issues. Meanwhile, we might note this: the son of the Roman general, Plekhanov sarcastically declares, did gain the victory in his premature battle, whereas the Bolsheviks, so far, have nothing but defeats to their credit.

You have a bad memory, Comrade Plekhanov. I suggest that you recall the *Bulygin* Duma.[65] Remember how Parvus and the new *Iskra*,[66] *which you supported*, *opposed* the boycott at the time. The Bolsheviks were for the boycott.

The development of the revolution brought *complete victory* for Bolshevism; and in the October and November days only Trotsky's exuberances distinguished the Mensheviks.

Thus it was, *and thus it will be*, my dear Comrade Plekhanov. When the revolution is on the decline, the pedants who, after the event, arrogate to themselves the role of "Roman generals" come onto the stage with their lamentations. When the revolution is on the upswing, things happen as *the revolutionary Social-Democrats* desire, compare them as you may to "impatient youths".

Written on February 23 (March 8), 1907

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Published according to the newspaper text

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

An article bearing the above title, published in *Noviye Sily*,[67] provides a suitable occasion for giving certain explanations.

The newspaper expresses dissatisfaction at our "hackneyed" division of the bourgeoisie into petty, revolutionary and liberal. There is no doubt, says this organ of the Trudoviks, repeating the usual Menshevik argument, that many petty-bourgeois people voted for the Cadets.

Many petty bourgeois, it is true, did vote for the Cadets. But the class character of a party cannot be judged from the fact that certain elements, among others, voted for it at a *given moment*. Undoubtedly many German petty bourgeois vote for the Social-Democrats and many workers for the German "Centre". *Noviye Sily*, however, probably realises that it cannot be concluded from this fact that the "hackneyed" division of the working classes into petty bourgeoisie and proletariat is wrong.

The entire history of the Cadet Party, and the latest elections in particular, have shown clearly that the landowner who runs a capitalist estate, the middle bourgeois, and the bourgeois intellectual constitute the *class* basis of the party. The majority of the people, i.e., extensive sections of the urban petty bourgeoisie, as well as the peasantry, have no interest in a party that fears any independent action by the masses, and opposes such action, that defends land redemption payments and carries on a struggle against local agrarian committees using the four-point electoral system[68] as a pretext, etc. This alone accounts for the rapid *retreat* of the petty bourgeoisie from the Cadets at the recent election. The peasantry, as we know,

completely rejected the Cadets, and were mainly responsible for their defeat at gubernia electoral meetings. As we said in *Novy Luch*, No. 1,* the urban petty bourgeoisie had already cast 41,000 votes for the Left bloc, as compared with 74,000 votes for the Cadets, and this despite the fact that the Left had no daily press, etc.

The Cadets are a party of the liberal bourgeoisie. The economic position of that class makes it *afraid* of a peasant victory and of working-class solidarity. This accounts for the inevitable, and by no means fortuitous, tendency of the Cadets to turn the more rapidly to the Right, to turn towards a deal with reaction, the more rapidly the popular masses turn to the Left. After the dissolution of the Duma, it was an economic necessity, not fortuity, that made the proletariat, the peasantry, and the impoverished urban petty bourgeoisie turn terrifically Left and become revolutionised, and made the Cadets turn terrifically Right. Only the petty bourgeois or the political philistine could regret this, or try to change or stop the process.

We Social-Democrats have a different task—that of accelerating the liberation of the masses from the sway of the Cadets. This sway is maintained by tradition, by old ties and by the influence of the liberals, by their economic domination of the petty bourgeoisie, their role as a bourgeois intelligentsia, as liberal civil servants, etc. The sooner the masses realise what *their own* interests are, the sooner will they understand the hostility of the liberals to the mass movement, the sooner will they alienate themselves politically from the liberals and enter various democratic, revolutionary organisations, unions, parties, etc. In particular, the peasantry, who in Russia constitute eight- or nine-tenths of the petty bourgeoisie, are struggling primarily for land. The liberal landlord (and there are still such in Russia—the landowner curia elected 24.4 per cent of the Cadets and those more to the Left at the last elections) is *against* the peasant in the struggle, and the liberal civil servant, the bourgeois intellectual is very close to the liberal landlord. That is why the peasantry are now more determinedly and more speedily emancipating them-

* See p. 154 of this volume.—*Ed.*

selves from the influence of the Cadets than the urban petty bourgeoisie are. The victory of the peasantry in the struggle for land is the real economic basis for the victory of the bourgeois revolution in Russia. The liberals (including the Cadets) are *opposed* to the victory of the peasantry; they defend land redemption payments, i.e., the conversion of part of the peasantry into *Grossbauern*, and part into *Knechte* under a landlord of the *Prussian* type. For this reason the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is *impossible* in Russia without the emancipation of the peasantry from the political sway of the liberals. The victory of the peasantry *abolishes* landed proprietorship, and gives the fullest scope to the development of the productive forces on purely capitalist lines. The victory of the liberals *preserves* landed proprietorship, only superficially cleansing it of its feudal aspects, and leads to the *least* speedy and *least* free development of capitalism, to the development of the Prussian, we might say, type of capitalism, not the American.

Noviye Sily does not understand this economic, class basis of the Russian revolution when it says that in its social-economic demands the petty bourgeoisie are closer to the liberals, and in their political demands closer to the proletarians, and that the "centre of gravity of the revolution" is shifting to "politics". *Noviye Sily*'s arguments are a mass of confusion. The petty bourgeois, the peasant included, is naturally closer to the liberal than to the proletarian; he is closer as a *proprietor*, as a petty producer. It would, therefore, be politically ridiculous and, from the standpoint of socialism, downright reactionary, to unite the petty bourgeoisie and the proletarians in one party (as the Socialist-Revolutionaries would like to do). However, in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, the struggle is by no means on account of the antagonism between masters and workers (as it will be in the socialist revolution) but on account of the antagonism between peasant and landlord: "the revolution's centre of gravity" is shifting towards this, the *economic* struggle, and certainly not towards the "political" struggle.

But even if our revolution is bourgeois in its economic content (this cannot be doubted), the conclusion must not

be drawn from it that the leading role in our revolution is played by the bourgeoisie, that the bourgeoisie is its motive force. Such a conclusion, usual with Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, is a vulgarisation of Marxism, a caricature of Marxism. The leader of the bourgeois revolution may be either the liberal landlord together with the factory-owner, merchant, lawyer, etc., or the proletariat together with the peasant masses. In both cases the bourgeois character of the revolution remains, but its scope, the degree of its advantage to the proletariat, the degree of its advantage to socialism (*that is*, to the rapid development of the productive forces, first and foremost) are *completely different* in the two cases.

From this, the Bolsheviks deduce the *basic* tactics of the socialist proletariat in the bourgeois revolution—to carry with them the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasant petty bourgeoisie, draw them away from the liberals, paralyse the instability of the liberal bourgeoisie, and develop the struggle of the *masses* for the complete *abolition* of all traces of serfdom, including landed proprietorship.

The question of the Duma presidium was a partial question of the general tactics of the Social-Democrats in the bourgeois revolution. The Social-Democrats had *to wrest* the Trudoviks *away* from the Cadets, either by voting for the Trudoviks or by demonstratively abstaining from voting and giving a reason for the abstention. *Noviye Sily* now admits that it was a *mistake* for the Left to take part in a conference with the Cadets. This is a valuable admission. *Noviye Sily*, however, is sadly mistaken in thinking that "it was a mistake of practical expediency and not of principle". This opinion, as we have shown, arises out of a misunderstanding of the fundamentals, principles and tactics of the socialist proletariat in the bourgeois revolution.

It is only from this point of view that a correct answer can be found to those particular questions that are giving *Noviye Sily* a headache.

How "to guarantee that the petty bourgeoisie, recognised by *Novy Luch* as allies, will not turn away from the Left and defect to the Constitutional-Democratic camp"? It is because this cannot be guaranteed that we are *against*

any permanent agreement with the Trudoviks. Our line is "march separately but *strike together*" at both the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. That is what we did during the St. Petersburg elections, and that is what we shall always do.

Noviye Sily's objection is that part of the petty bourgeoisie might be drawn away from the Cadets. Of course they might, just as we took away part of the Cadet *Tovarishch* at the St. Petersburg elections. To achieve this, we Social-Democrats must go firmly along our own, revolutionary road, paying no attention to what the Cadet's Marya Alexevna[69] may say.

Legislative work "must inevitably be placed in the hands of the Constitutional-Democrats". Nothing of the sort. The Cadets, as leaders of the liberal "Centre" in the Duma, have a majority over the Black-Hundred group, without our support. We must therefore table our own Social-Democratic bills, not liberal and not petty-bourgeois, bills that are written in revolutionary language, not in official jargon, *and must put them to the vote*. Let the Black Hundreds and the Cadets turn them down. We shall then go over to a ruthless criticism of the Cadet bill and regularly submit amendments. When the amendments end we shall abstain from voting on the Cadet bill as a whole, leaving the Cadets to defeat the Black Hundreds, thereby taking no responsibility on ourselves before the people for the poverty and worthlessness of Cadet pseudo-democracy.

Novy Luch, No. 6,
February 25, 1907
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Novy Luch*

THE IMMINENT DISSOLUTION OF THE DUMA AND QUESTIONS OF TACTICS

St. Petersburg, February 27, 1907.

The papers are full of news, rumours and surmises about the imminent dissolution of the Duma.

Is it probable? If we examine the objective state of affairs, we shall have to form the conclusion that it is more than probable. The convocation of the Duma was, for the government, a necessity born of compulsion. They had to make one more attempt, accompanied by the greatest possible repressive measures, to convene a popular representative body in order to come to terms with the bourgeoisie. The experiment is an obvious failure. Military courts and all the other niceties of the Stolypin constitution have rendered extraordinary aid to revolutionary agitation among masses until now unaffected, and have produced a Left Duma from out of the depths of the peasant masses. The Cadets, the Centre party of the Russian revolution, have lost ground as compared with the First Duma. The Cadets have undoubtedly swung to the right, but with such a Duma at such a time the government are completely unable to come to terms with them. The Cadets could merge with the Octobrists, and they are moving steadily in that direction: suffice it to name Mr. Struve and Mr. Golovin. But the specific feature of the present situation is precisely this—there is no Cadet-Octobrist majority in the Duma. The entire "Centre" has been hopelessly crushed by the sharpened struggle of the extremes: the monarchist Right, and the Left wing of the Duma. This latter part constitutes two-fifths of the deputies. Its role in the Duma

is tremendous. Its prestige among the masses of the people is very high. Its growing ties with those masses cannot be sundered by any half-measures. Necessity dictates that the government dissolve the Duma: they are unable to extricate themselves from the situation now obtaining, without resorting to force. The "legality" of this situation only deepens the crisis, since its true power among the masses of the people must be greater than that expressed "legally", i.e., that which has been passed through dozens and hundreds of police screens.

The dissolution of the Duma is more than likely: it is inevitable because what we are experiencing is actually a revolutionary, not merely a constitutional crisis. And it is specifically because of this that it would be dangerous, ridiculous and pitiful politics to hide one's head under one's wing and attempt to make excuses for the inevitable consequences of the present political situation or to attempt, by means of words and phrases, to obscure the clear, weaken the acute, and conceal the obvious.

The Cadets are pursuing a policy of this kind. Mr. Izgoyev, writing in today's *Rech*, says: "It is *almost* beyond our power to save the Duma." This is almost correct. "In three or four months' time, when the Duma will have acquired prestige in the country by its legislative activities, the situation might be different." This is not only correct but obvious. And the government, too, can see the obvious.

But Mr. Izgoyev is afraid of unvarnished truth and begins to twist and turn: "But will it be granted these three or four months? It is a vicious circle from which there is no way out. The way out is not in the street, 'organised' or 'unorganised'; there would be a way out if people inspired by real patriotism were in power...".

Naturally! They have hypnotised themselves with their own empty verbosity, have driven themselves into a blind alley of honeyed phrases, and now they are weeping, wailing and sorrowing.... This is truly an example of a perplexed, tearful and impotent philistine!

Let the reader not imagine that Izgoyev's speeches are the chance mouthings of a casual Cadet writer. Oh, no. They are a summary of the policy officially *laid down* by the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the *leading* party,

which has got its man elected chairman. In that same *Rech* we read: "After lengthy debates at the evening meeting on February 25 of the people's freedom parliamentary group on the attitude to be adopted towards the government's declaration, it was decided to maintain silence, expressing neither confidence nor distrust, and to go over to the examination of current problems. Should the Right parties introduce, for provocative purposes, a formulation expressing confidence in th e ministry, it was decided to vote against it. In the event of the extreme Left (the Social-Democrats) proposing a vote of no confidence, the people's freedom party decided to table its own proposal to proceed with current business. There is, incidentally, a hope that a preliminary agreement by the entire opposition will be achieved on this question, to which the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks are already inclined to consent." Let us add that our Social-Democratic group in the Duma has, according to *Russkaya Zhizn*, decided to "act fully independently", a decision that meets with our warm approval.

Honestly, the Cadet policy is something inimitable. It would be incautious to vote "no confidence". The Duma must be saved. But to say "we do not express confidence"—that is permissible. That is this but a political "man in a muffler"? Are these not philistines who, faced by the approach of an inevitable storm, cover their eyes with their nightcaps and reiterate: "We are cautious ... we are saving...". You are saving your philistine nightcap, and nothing more, esteemed knights of the "people's freedom"!

And what could be more ridiculous than calling the resolution of the Rights expressing confidence in the ministry "a provocation"? It is the legitimate right of every member of the Duma, the natural answer of a people's representative to the ministry's question, "This is our programme. Does the Duma wish to work with us in this spirit?" The writing of this nonsense can only be explained as complete confusion among the Cadets. No, gentlemen, a nightcap cannot protect you against counter-revolution. The right to dissolve the Duma is a super-"legal" right according to that constitution which the pitiful liberals so foolishly praised and so treacherously persuaded the people to take

seriously. We cannot get away from the fact that the ministry will ask the Duma whether it wishes to carry out some programme or another. And the answer: "We do not express confidence", will still be a superb and quite sufficiently "constitutional" excuse to dissolve the Duma; even without the help of the Kovalevskys, dozens of "constitutional precedents" can be found for the dissolution of parliament for refusing the government much less important things than ... than ... than military courts and punitive expeditions.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this? The conclusion is that it is foolish to play at constitutions when there aren't any. It is foolish to close one's eyes and remain silent about the fact that the days of even the present Russian "near-constitution" are numbered, that the annulment of the franchise and the return to complete absolutism are *inevitable*.

What is to be done? *Aussprechen was ist*—to admit the truth. The government are undoubtedly compelled to dissolve the Duma. It is to the government's advantage that the Duma should disband itself in silence, should obediently play the constitutional comedy and not open the eyes of the people to the *inevitability* of a coup d'état. And the cowardly Cadets, with their superb, inimitable "historical" formula: "maintain *silence*", the Cadets who, instead of "a vote of no confidence" say "we do not express confidence", are only helping the government elect a *silent* coup d'état.

Real champions of liberty, real representatives of the people, should act differently. They should realise that the continued existence of the Duma does not at all depend on politeness, caution, care, diplomacy, tact, taciturnity or other Molchalin-like virtues.[70] They should tell the people, simply and clearly, *from the rostrum of the Duma*, *the whole truth*, including the reason why the dissolution of the Duma, a coup d'état, and a return to pure absolutism are inevitable. The government *need* silence on this. The people *need* to know it. The representatives of the people—while they still are representatives of the people!—should say this from the rostrum of the Duma.

The position is quite clear. There is no other way: either infamous silence, obediently offering the neck, or a calm

but firm statement to the people that the first act of the Black Hundreds' coup d'état is being carried out.

Only the struggle of the people can prevent that. And the people must know the whole truth.

We hope that the Social-Democrats in the Duma will tell them that truth.

Proletary, No. 14,
March 4, 1907

Published according
to the *Proletary* text

CADETS AND TRUDOVIKS[71]

In *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 49, Comrade D. Koltsov repeats the usual Menshevik argument in favour of the policy of support for the Cadets. But he does it so forthrightly and naïvely that there really is nothing left to do but thank him for reducing an erroneous theory to the absurd.

"With whom have the Social-Democrats the greater number of points of contact," he asks in his article "The Cadets and Bourgeois Democracy", "with urban or rural democracy? From whom can Social-Democracy the sooner expect support in its struggle against cultural, religious, national and other prejudices? Who will the sooner support all measures likely to liberate the productive forces? It is only necessary to raise these questions, which are basic in Social-Democratic policy, for the answer to be clear of itself. Everything in the *Communist Manifesto* concerning the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie remains as true in the twentieth century as it was in the nineteenth, as true for Russia as it was for England, ... etc. As far as rural democracy is concerned, it will in many cases defend old, outworn modes of production and social organisation, despite its revolutionary gallop.... When the Bolsheviks speak about the Cadets they forget the urban democracy that stands behind them; on the contrary, for them the Socialist-Revolutionary and Trudovik parliamentary group is the embodiment of the entire peasantry. This means that they cannot see the wood for the trees, cannot see the social interests of the broad masses of the people behind parliamentary representation."

From the bottom of our heart we welcome this Menshevik turn to the study of the *fundamental* principles of our disagreement on tactics. It is high time.

And so the Cadets are *the progressive urban bourgeoisie* and the Trudoviks *the backward rural bourgeoisie*. This is what your "Marxism" amounts to.

If this is true, why do you not say so openly and directly to the whole Party? Why do you not announce, clearly and distinctly, in a draft resolution for the Party congress, that, in the name of the *Communist Manifesto*, the R.S.D.L.P. is *duty bound* to support the Cadets *against the Trudoviks*?

We should be very glad if you were to make this statement. We have been demanding it of you for a long time; we did so long before the Unity Congress, when we *defined* the class composition of the Constitutional-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the draft resolution on our attitude to the bourgeois parties, and invited you to give *your definition*.

How did you answer this challenge?

You evaded it. In your draft resolution for the Unity Congress there is no attempt to express the idea that the Constitutional-Democrats are the progressive urban democracy, and the Trudoviks (Peasant Union, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.) the backward rural democracy. In *your* resolution for the Unity Congress on the attitude to the bourgeois parties there is only a repetition of the Amsterdam resolution,[72] a repetition that is peculiar on account of its indecisiveness.

Today we *repeat* the challenge. We have again raised the question of the Marxist definition of the class basis of the various bourgeois parties in Russia. We have published the appropriate draft resolution.

And we are certain that you will *again refuse to accept the challenge*. We are certain that you will not risk writing, in the draft of the official Menshevik resolution, that the Cadets are the progressive urban bourgeoisie and that they, *to a greater extent than the Trudoviks*, promote a policy of the free development of the productive forces, etc., etc.

Here is how matters stand:

The main economic problem in the present bourgeois revolution in Russia is that of the peasants' struggle for land. This is a struggle inevitably brought about by the desperate position of the peasantry, the many survivals of serfdom in the Russian countryside, etc. The struggle

impels the peasant masses towards a decisive democratisation of political relations (for without the democratic reorganisation of the state the peasants cannot overcome the feudal-minded landlords) and towards the abolition of landed proprietorship.

For this very reason the Social-Democrats include *confiscation* of the landed estates in their programme. It is only the extreme opportunists among Social-Democrats who are not in sympathy with this programme and defend the substitution of the word "alienation" for "confiscation", although *they are afraid to present such a draft openly.*

The Cadets are a party of the liberal bourgeoisie, liberal landowners and bourgeois intelligentsia. If D. Koltsov has any doubts about the landowner colouring of the Cadets, we can point to two facts: (1) the composition of the Cadet group in the First Duma. Refer to Borodin's[73] book, Comrade Koltsov, and you will see how many landlords there were there; (2) the Cadets' draft agrarian programme is, in effect, a plan of *the capitalist landlord*. Land redemption payments, conversion of the peasant into a *Knecht*, and the formation of local land commissions of equal numbers of landlords and peasants with chairmen appointed by the government—all this shows as clearly as can be that Cadet policy in the agrarian question is one of retaining landed proprietorship by *cleansing* it of some of its feudal traits, and by the peasant's ruination through redemption payments and his shackling by government officials. In this way the economic significance of Cadet agrarian politics amounts to *a deceleration* of the development of the productive forces.

The confiscation of landed estates and the complete victory of peasant democracy would, on the contrary, mean the *most rapid* development of the productive forces possible under capitalism.

In our draft resolutions for the Fifth Congress we give *direct* expression to *this* assessment of the *economic* significance of Cadet policy. Once more: please express your "Marxist theory" as clearly as this, Comrade D. Koltsov!

A comparison of the Cadet and Trudovik agrarian projects and their attitude to questions of political democracy (the law on assembly in the First Duma, the attitude to the various types of organisation for local agricultural com-

mittees, the programmes of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the Trudovik Group in the First Duma, and so on, and so forth), shows that the Cadets are a party of liberals, striving, and forced to strive, *to halt* the revolution by reconciling liberty with the old authorities (to the detriment of liberty) and the landlord with the peasant (to the detriment of the peasant). The Trudovik parties (the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries) are the urban and, particularly, the rural (i.e., peasant) petty bourgeois democracy, *forced* to strive for the further development of the revolution.

The victory of the revolution in Russia is possible only if the proletariat carries with it the democratic peasantry both against the old order and against the liberals.

This postulate, which determines the *fundamentals* of the Bolshevik tactics as a whole, was excellently confirmed by the entire experience of the First Duma and the post-Duma period. Only by reducing our disputes to *fundamentals* shall we transform them from squabbles into the solution of the basic problems of the bourgeois revolution in Russia.

We therefore welcome the frankness and directness of Comrade Koltsov, and repeat our challenge: let the Mensheviks try to formulate *these* ideas concerning the Cadets and the Trudoviks, and express them clearly and unequivocally.

Rabochaya Molva, No. 1,
March 1, 1907
Signed: *N. L—n*

Published according to the text
in *Rabochaya Molva*

APROPOS OF STOLYPIN'S DECLARATION[74]

DRAFT MANIFESTO

The deputies to the State Duma who are members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, announce the following to the people and propose that the Duma do likewise:

Through its prime minister, Mr. Stolypin, the government has announced to the people's representatives that it intends to continue the policy pursued since the dissolution of the First Duma. The government does not wish to consider the will of the people's representatives. It demands that the people's representatives should reconcile themselves to this policy, help develop and perfect this government policy, and apply it more precisely and fully.

What does this government policy consist in?

It consists in protecting the interests of a handful of big landowners, courtiers and dignitaries, protecting their right to exploit and oppress the people. Neither land nor freedom!—this is what the government has announced to the people through its mouthpiece Stolypin.

The peasantry can expect nothing from the government but the defence of the landowners and a ruthlessly savage struggle against the peasants' striving for enlightenment, liberty and improved conditions, for the transfer of the land to the peasants, and for liberation from irksome bondage, a life of hardship and gradual extinction from famine. From the government the peasants must expect the continuation of that same violence that has taken thousands and tens of thousands of the best people away from the peasantry, people who have been incarcerated in prisons, banished, or killed in the valiant struggle against the law-

lessness of government officials and oppression by the landowners. To bribe a tiny minority of village bloodsuckers and kulaks with petty hand-outs, to help them plunder the ruined countryside of whatever is left, as a reward for their aid to the autocratic government—such is the policy Stolypin and his ministry intend to pursue.

The workers can expect nothing of this government but violence and oppression. As before, the workers will have their hands bound in their struggle to improve their condition. As before, the workers' unions will be banned; as before, workers' newspapers will be persecuted. As before, the big manufacturers will obtain help and support from the government in every step they take to keep the workers down. The workers must not expect aid from the government in the dire want caused by unemployment, but must expect that want to grow and become more acute. Government help to the working class consists in laws drawn up at conferences of manufacturers and police officials. The workers of Russia long ago discovered the true value of this governmental "solicitude" for the working class.

The soldiers and sailors who spilled their blood in the war with Japan, a war undertaken by the government in the predatory interests of a handful of courtiers, the soldiers and sailors who spilled their blood at home in the struggle to make life easier, to rid themselves of the penal servitude of barrack life that the soldier might feel himself a human being, not a beast—the soldiers and sailors can expect nothing of the government but a continuation of the former violence and oppression and the same rough treatment, and a crust of stale bread as a reward for pacifying and subduing their brothers, the workers and peasants who are fighting for their freedom, fighting for land for the peasants.

The government announcement has shown clearly that the government wants war, not peace, with the people. There is one thing this announcement does not say and which must be said to the people by those deputies they sent to the Duma and who remain faithful to the people's interests—the government does not say that its announcement signifies an irrevocable and inevitable decision to dissolve the Second Duma without even giving it an opportunity to

express the will of the people, to express the needs of the peasants, workers and soldiers, of all working people, and to express anything the people included in the mandates they gave the deputies when they sent them to the Duma.

The Social-Democratic Labour Party has always told the people that the Duma is powerless to give them freedom and land. Those deputies to the Duma who defend the interests of the working class and the peasantry are prepared to devote all their efforts to further those interests, to help the people by announcing the truth in the Duma, by explaining to the many millions of people scattered throughout Russia how harmful is the anti-popular policy pursued by the government, what evil plans against the people the government is elaborating, and which laws and measures it refuses to grant the people.

But Duma deputies and an entire Duma capable of helping the people are meaningless without the people. If Russia has obtained even tiny liberties for a short period, if Russia has been granted popular representation even if only for a brief period, this is only because it has been won by the struggle of the people, the selfless struggle for liberty by the working class, the peasantry, the soldiers and the sailors.

The government has once again declared war on the people. It has taken a road leading to the dissolution of the Second Duma, to the annulment of the present franchise, to the reversion to the old order of the old Russian autocracy.

The deputies of the working class proclaim this to the entire people.

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THE ELECTIONS TO THE DUMA AND THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The Duma election results demonstrate the physiognomy and strength of the various classes.

The franchise in Russia is *neither direct nor equal*. In the first place, the peasants elect one delegate per ten households; these, in turn, elect a peasant delegate from among their number; the delegates so elected then elect a peasant elector and the latter, together with electors from other social-estates, elect the deputies to the Duma. The system is the same for the landowner, urban and worker curias, the number of electors from each curia being fixed by law in the interests and to the advantage of the upper classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, not only the revolutionary parties, but the opposition parties as well are subjected to the most barbarous, the most illegal police oppression, then there is the complete absence of freedom of the press and assembly, arbitrary arrests and banishment, as well as the military courts operating in the greater part of Russia, and the state of emergency connected with them.

How, then, under such circumstances, could the new Duma have turned out more oppositional and more revolutionary than the First?

To find an answer to this question, we must first of all examine the figures published in the Cadet *Rech* on the distribution of the electors according to party, in connection with the party political composition of the Second Duma; these figures cover about nine-tenths of all the electors in European Russia (Poland, the Caucasus, Siberia, etc., being excluded). Let us take the five chief po-

litical groups, since more detailed information on electors' political leanings is not available. The first group consists of the *Rights*. To this group belong those known as the Black Hundreds (the monarchists, the Union of the Russian People, etc.), who champion a return to complete autocracy in its purest form, favour unbridled military terror against revolutionaries, and instigate assassinations (like that of Duma Deputy Herzenstein), pogroms, etc. Further, this group includes the so-called *Octobrists* (this is the name given in Russia to the party of the big industrialists), who joined the counter-revolution immediately after the tsar's manifesto of October 17, 1905, and who now support the government in every possible way. This party frequently forms election blocs with the monarchists.

The second group consists of those *belonging to no party*. We shall see later that many electors and deputies, especially those of the peasantry, hid behind this name in order to escape repressions for their revolutionary convictions.

The *liberals* form the third group. The liberal parties are headed by the Constitutional-Democrats (known as the Cadet Party), or "people's freedom" party. This party constitutes the Centre in the Russian revolution; it stands between the landlords and the peasants. The bourgeoisie tries to reconcile these two classes. The assessment of this party of the liberal bourgeoisie—the Cadets—is a most important point of difference between the two trends within Russian Social-Democracy.

For opportunist reasons and not because of their political convictions, the Polish Black Hundreds are on the side of the Russian liberals in the Duma; this is the party of "National-Democrats" who in Poland use every means, including informing, lock-outs and assassination, to struggle against the revolutionary proletariat.

The fourth group is the *Progressists*. This is not the name of a party, but, like the term "non-party" is a meaningless conventional term whose primary purpose is to serve as a screen against police persecution.

Lastly, the fifth group is the *Lefts*. To this group belong the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the Popular Socialists (approximately the equivalent of

the French Radical Socialists) and those known as the *Trudoviks**—a still completely amorphous peasant democratic organisation. In their class character, the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries are petty bourgeois and peasant democrats. Sometimes electors from some revolutionary groups attempted to hide under the general name of "Lefts" during the election campaign, in order the better to escape police persecution.

The *Rech* figures will now show the correctness of the conclusions we have drawn concerning the social composition of the parties.

As can be seen from the *tables* (on pages 199 and 200), *the big cities* constitute a special group—St. Petersburg elects 6 deputies, Moscow 4, Warsaw and Tashkent 2 each, the remainder 1 each, a total of 27 deputies for 17 cities. The remaining deputies to the Duma are elected at joint meetings of electors of all four curias for each gubernia; but in addition to this the peasant electors elect one deputy from the peasant curia for each gubernia. Thus we get three groups of deputies—from the gubernia electoral meeting, from the peasant curia and from the big cities.

A few dozen electors from the progressive or Left bloc could be ascribed to the various party groups only on the basis of estimates; on the whole, however, these figures provide the fullest and most reliable material for an understanding of the class structure of the various Russian parties.

The *worker curia* even in the provinces, and, needless to say, particularly in the big cities, voted almost exclusively Left, 96.5 per cent to be exact. Out of the 140 Left electors from the worker curia 84 were Social-Democrats, 52 were unspecified Lefts (but mostly Social-Democrats), and four were Socialist-Revolutionaries. Despite the false assertions of the liberals who want to depict it as a party of revolutionary intellectuals, the Russian Social-Democratic Party is, therefore, a real *working-class* party. In St.

* In the German press this party is often called the "labour group", which seems to point to kinship with the working class. In actual fact there is not even this verbal relationship between them in Russian. It is, therefore, better to leave the word "Trudoviks" untranslated, using it to mean petty-bourgeois, specifically peasant, democrats.

Number of Electors

Parties	Fifty-One Gubernias of European Russia										Big Cites	
	Landowner		Urban		Peasant		Worker		Total			
	Electors	per cent	Electors	per cent	Electors	per cent	Electors	per cent	Electors	per cent	Electors	per cent
Rights	1,224	70.9	182	13.9	764	33.8	—	—	2,170	40.0	346	20.7
Non-party	81	4.7	27	2.1	248	11.0	2	1.4	358	6.6	—	—
Liberals	154	8.9	504	38.7	103	4.6	—	—	761	14.0	940	56.4
Progressists . . .	185	10.7	280	21.5	561	24.9	3	2.1	1,029	18.9	55	3.3
Lefts	82	4.8	311	23.8	582	25.7	140	96.5	1,115	20.5	327	19.6
Totals . . .	1,726	100	1,304	100	2,258	100	145	100	5,433	100	1,668	100

Number of Duma Deputies

Parties	51 Gubernias of European Russia						Poland		Caucasus		Siberia and Eastern Gubernias		Entire Russian Empire	
	From the Gubernias		From Peasant Curias		From Big Cites									
	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent	Deputies	per cent
Rights	85	25.7	4	7.5	5	18.5	1	2.7	2	7.1	—	—	97	19.8
Non-party	18	5.4	3	5.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	7.1	22	4.5
Liberals	82	24.8	10	18.9	17	63.0	32	86.5	9	32.2	6	42.9	156	31.8
Progressists . . .	20	6.0	10	18.9	—	—	3	8.1	2	7.1	—	—	35	7.1
Lefts	126	38.1	26	49.0	5	18.5	1	2.7	15	53.6	7	50.0	180	36.8
Totals	331	100	53	100	27	100	37	100	28	100	14	100	490	100

Petersburg—both the city and the gubernia—of the twenty-four electors chosen by the worker curia twenty were Social-Democrats and four Socialist-Revolutionaries; in Moscow—both the city and the gubernia—only Social-Democrats were elected—thirty-five, etc.

In the *peasant* curia we immediately see an astonishing disproportion; 33.8 per cent of the peasant electors belong to the Right, whereas of the *Duma deputies* elected by those same electors from the peasant curia only 7.5 per cent were Rights. Obviously the peasant electors only *called* themselves Rights to avoid government repressions. The Russian press has recorded this phenomenon in more than a hundred cases, and the election statistics now provide full confirmation of it.

The peasant curia cannot be judged by what the electors call themselves, but exclusively by the party which their *deputies* consider themselves as belonging to. We see that, *following upon the worker curia*, the peasant curia *forms the group that is most Left*. The peasants elected only 7.5 per cent Rights and *67.95 per cent standing Left of the liberals*! The greater part of the Russian peasantry are *revolutionary* in temper—such is the lesson to be drawn from the elections to the Second Duma. This is a fact of great importance because it shows that the revolution in Russia has not come to an end by a long way. Until the peasant's demands have been met, or, at least, until he has calmed down, the revolution *must* continue. Of course, the peasant's revolutionary temper has nothing in common with Social-Democracy; the peasant is a bourgeois-democratic revolutionary, and by no means a socialist. He is not struggling for the transfer of all means of production into the hands of society, but for the confiscation of the landlord's land by the peasantry.

The bourgeois-democratic, revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry finds its typical party-political expression in the Trudoviks', and in the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Popular Socialist parties. Out of the fifty-three Duma deputies from the peasant curia, twenty-four belong to the peasant democrats (ten Lefts, ten Trudoviks and four Socialist-Revolutionaries), and, furthermore, of the ten Progressists and three non-party deputies elected by the peas-

ants the majority undoubtedly belong to the Trudoviks. We say "undoubtedly" because the Trudoviks have been ruthlessly persecuted since the First Duma, and the peasants are wary enough not to call themselves Trudoviks, although *in actual fact* they *vote* together with the Trudoviks in the Duma. For example, the most important bill introduced in the First Duma by the Trudoviks was the Agrarian Bill, known as the "Draft of the 104" (the essence of this Bill was the immediate nationalisation of the landlords' land, the future nationalisation of peasant allotments and equalitarian land tenure). This Bill is an outstanding product of peasant political thought on one of the most important problems of peasant life. It was endorsed by seventy Trudoviks and by twenty-five peasants who described themselves as non-party, or gave no answer to the question on their party membership!

Thus the "Trudovik" Group in Russia is undoubtedly a rural, peasant democratic party. It comprises parties that are revolutionary not in the socialist, but in the bourgeois-democratic sense of the word.

A distinction must be made between the big cities and the smaller towns in the *urban curia*. The political contradictions between the different classes are not so clearly marked in the smaller towns, where there are no large masses of proletarians (who form a special worker curia) and the Rights are weaker. In the big cities there are no non-party electors at all, and the number of indeterminate "Progressists" is insignificant; but here the Right is stronger and the Left weaker. The reason is a simple one; in the big cities the proletariat constitutes a separate curia, which is not included in our table of electors.* The petty bourgeoisie are less numerous than in the smaller towns. Big industry predominates, and is represented partly by the Rights and partly by the liberals.

* There are no data for this, and so the figures on electors from the worker curia have been removed from the table. We have precise figures on only 37 worker electors. *All of them*, *without exception*, *belong to the Left*. According to the law, the total number of worker-electors for the whole of Russia is 208. We have more precise data concerning 145 of them, which, together with the above mentioned 37 electors from the worker curia in the big cities makes 182, i.e., nine-tenths of the total number of worker-electors.

The figures on the composition of the electors show convincingly that the basis of the liberal parties (mainly, therefore, the Cadets) is the urban, primarily the big industrial bourgeoisie. The swing to the Right of this bourgeoisie, which is frightened by the independent action and strength of the proletariat, becomes particularly clear when we compare the larger cities and the smaller towns. The urban (i.e., bourgeois) curia is permeated with Left elements to a much greater degree in the latter.

The basic differences amongst Russian Social-Democrats are closely connected with this last problem. One wing (the Minority, or "Mensheviks") regard the Cadets and liberals as being the progressive urban bourgeoisie as compared with the backward rural petty bourgeoisie (Trudoviks). It follows from this that the bourgeoisie is recognised as the motive force of the revolution, and a policy of support for the Cadets is proclaimed. The other wing (the Majority, or "Bolsheviks") regards the liberals as representatives of big industry, who are striving to put an end to the revolution as quickly as possible for fear of the proletariat, and are entering into a compromise with the reactionaries. This wing regards the Trudoviks as revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats, and is of the opinion that they are inclined to adopt a radical position on a land question of such importance to the peasantry, the question of the confiscation of the landed estates. This accounts for the tactics of the Bolsheviks. They reject support for the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, i.e., the Cadets, and do their utmost to get the democratic petty bourgeoisie away from the influence of the liberals; they want to draw the peasant and the urban petty bourgeois away from the liberals and muster them behind the proletariat, behind the vanguard, for the revolutionary struggle. In its social-economic content, the Russian revolution is a bourgeois revolution; its motive force, however, is not the liberal bourgeoisie but the proletariat and the democratic peasantry. The victory of the revolution can only be achieved by a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

If we want to know exactly whether the alliance between the liberals and the urban petty bourgeoisie is a stable one, we shall be interested in the statistics on the *number*

of votes cast in the cities for the party blocs. According to Smirnov's statistics for 22 big cities, 17,000 votes were cast for the monarchists, 34,500 for the Octobrists, 74,000 for the Cadets and 41,000 for the Left bloc.*

During the elections to the Second Duma a fierce struggle was waged between the two wings of Social-Democracy, between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, on the question of whether to enter into a bloc with the Cadets or with the Trudoviks against the Cadets. In Moscow the supporters of the Bolsheviks were stronger; a Left bloc was formed there, with the Mensheviks taking part in it. In St. Petersburg the Bolsheviks were also stronger, and a Left bloc was formed there as well, but the Mensheviks did not take part and withdrew from the organisation. A split occurred and still continues. The Mensheviks referred to the Black-Hundred danger, i.e., they feared a victory of the Black Hundreds at the elections because of the votes of the Lefts and the liberals being split. The Bolsheviks declared that this danger was an invention of the liberals, whose one purpose was to attract petty-bourgeois and proletarian democracy under the wing of bourgeois liberals. The figures show that the total number of votes cast for the Lefts and the Cadets was more than double the combined votes cast for the Octobrists and the monarchists.** A split vote for the opposition, therefore, could not have helped the victory of the Right.

These figures, covering more than 200,000 urban voters, and data on the general composition of the Second Duma, show that the real political meaning of the blocs of So-

PROMARX LUMACH NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* By "Left bloc" we mean the election bloc of the Social-Democrats and the petty-bourgeois democratic parties (primarily the Trudoviks, using that name in its widest sense and recognising the Socialist-Revolutionaries as the Left wing of the group). This was a bloc directed against both the Rights and the liberals.

** According to the estimates of that same Mr. Smirnov, in sixteen cities where 72,000 people went to the polls and where there were two (or three) election lists instead of four, the opposition obtained 58.7% and the Rights 21% of the votes. Here, too, the first figure is more than double the second. Here, too, the danger from the Black Hundreds was a deceptive bogey invented by the liberals, who talked a lot about the danger from the Right although they actually feared the "*Left danger*" (an expression which we borrow from the Cadet newspaper *Rech*).

cial-Democrats and Cadets is by no means the avoidance of the Black-Hundred danger (this opinion, even if it were sincere, is, in general, a false one); the blocs were meant to thwart the independent policy of the working class and subordinate that class to the hegemony of the liberals.

The essence of the dispute between the two wings of the Russian Social-Democratic Party is in deciding whether to recognise the hegemony of the liberals or whether to strive for the hegemony of the working class in the bourgeois revolution.

The fact that in twenty-two cities the Left, on the first agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks against the Cadets and despite the unprecedented difficulties with which their agitation was faced, obtained 41,000 votes, i.e., received more votes than the Octobrists, and over half as many as the liberals,—this fact is proof enough for the Bolsheviks that the democratic petty bourgeoisie in the cities follow the Cadets more from force of habit and because of the intrigues of the liberals than because of the hostility of these strata to the revolution.

Now let us examine the last curia, that of the landowners. Here we find a clearly expressed preponderance of Rights—70.9 per cent of the electors are Rights. It is absolutely inevitable that, under the impact of the peasant struggle for land, the big landed proprietor should turn away from the revolution and towards counter-revolution.

If we now compare the composition of the electoral groups at the gubernia election meetings with the composition of the Duma from the standpoint of the political tinge of the deputies elected at those meetings, we shall see that Progressist is, to a considerable extent, only a name concealing the Lefts. There were 20.5% Lefts and 18.9% Progressists among the electors. Of the deputies, 38% belong to the Lefts! The Rights have only 25.7% deputies while they had 40% of the electors; but if we subtract electors from the peasantry from this figure (we have already shown that only agents of the Russian Government who falsified the information on the election could regard them as Rights), then we get 2,170—764=1,406 belonging to the Right electors, i.e., 25.8%. And so the two results coincide. The liberal electors, apparently, concealed themselves

partly under the name of "non-party" and partly under the name of "Progressist", and the peasants, even under the name of "Rights".

A comparison with the non-Russian parts of Russia, with Poland and the Caucasus, provides fresh proof that the real motive force of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is not the bourgeoisie. In Poland there is no revolutionary peasant movement, no urban bourgeois opposition and there are practically no liberals. The revolutionary proletariat is opposed by a reactionary bloc composed of the big and the petty bourgeoisie. There, the National-Democrats were therefore victorious. In the Caucasus the revolutionary peasant movement is very strong, the strength of the liberals is almost equal to that in Russia, but the Lefts are the strongest party there: the percentage of Lefts in the Duma (53.6%) is approximately the same as the percentage of deputies from the peasant curia (49%). Only the workers and the revolutionary democratic peasantry can complete the bourgeois revolution. There is no agrarian problem in the Russian sense in highly developed capitalist Poland, and there is no revolutionary struggle on the part of the peasantry to confiscate the landed estates. The revolution, therefore, has no sound basis in Poland outside the proletariat. The class contradictions there are getting closer to the West-European type. We meet with the opposite in the Caucasus.

Here let us mention the fact that, according to *Rech* estimates, the 180 Lefts are distributed among the various parties in the following way: 68 Lefts, 9 Popular Socialists (the Right wing of the Trudoviks), 28 Socialist-Revolutionaries and 46 Social-Democrats.... Actually the last-named now number 65. The liberals try to minimise the number of Social-Democrats as far as possible.

These groups may be divided into two strata according to their class structure: the urban and, particularly, the rural democratic petty bourgeoisie have 134 deputies, and the proletariat, 46 deputies.

In general, we see that in Russia the class structure of the various parties is expressed with unusual clarity. The big landed proprietors belong to the Black Hundreds, the monarchists and the Octobrists. The big industrialists

are represented by the Octobrists and the liberals. Landowners in Russia are divided, according to the system of farming, into those that run their farms in a semi-feudal manner, employing the animals and implements of the peasants (the peasants are in bondage to the landlord), and those who now run their farms in the modern, capitalist manner. There are more than a few liberals among the latter. The urban petty bourgeoisie are represented by the liberals and the Trudoviks. The peasant petty bourgeoisie are represented by the Trudoviks, especially the Left wing of the group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The proletariat has its representative in the Social-Democrats. With an obvious lag in the capitalist development of Russia, this clear-cut division into party groups according to the class structure of society is only to be explained by the stormy revolutionary mood of an epoch in which parties are formed more quickly and class-consciousness grows and takes shape infinitely more quickly than in an epoch of stagnation or of so-called peaceful progress.

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THE PLATFORM OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

I

The Party congress, as we know, is to be convened in a few weeks from now. We must most energetically set about preparations for the congress, get down to a discussion of the basic tactical problems on which the Party must take decisions at the congress.

The Central Committee of our Party has already outlined an agenda for the Congress, which has been announced in the press. The chief items on the agenda are: (1) The Immediate Political Tasks and (2) The State Duma. As far as the second item is concerned, its necessity is obvious and cannot give rise to objections. In our opinion, the first item is also essential, but should be worded somewhat differently, or, rather, should have its content somewhat changed.

For a general Party discussion on the tasks of the congress and the tactical problems it has to solve to begin immediately, a conference of representatives of the two metropolitan organisations of our Party and the editorial board of *Proletary* drew up, on the eve of the convocation of the Second Duma, the draft resolutions printed below.* We intend to give an outline of *how* the conference understood its tasks, *why* it gave first place to draft resolutions on certain questions, and *what basic ideas* were included in those resolutions.

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* See pp. 133-44 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Item One: The Immediate Political Tasks.

In our opinion the question must not be presented to a congress of the R.S.D.L.P. *in this way* in the times we are living through. This is a revolutionary epoch. All Social-Democrats, irrespective of the groups they belong to, are agreed on this. The correctness of our postulate will be borne out by a glance at that part of the resolution adopted by the Mensheviks and the Bundists at the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1906, which deals with *principles*.

In a revolutionary epoch *it is impermissible* to limit oneself to defining *immediate* political tasks, impermissible for two reasons. Firstly, in such epochs the *basic* tasks of the Social-Democratic movement are given first place, and they must be analysed in detail, not as is customary in times of "peaceful" and petty constitutional development. In the second place, *it is impermissible* to define the *immediate* political tasks, because a revolution is marked precisely by the possibility and inevitability of sharp changes, sudden turns, unexpected situations, and violent outbursts. To appreciate this, one has only to mention the possible and probable dissolution of the Left Duma and changes in the election law in the spirit of the Black Hundreds.

It was all very well for the Austrians, for instance, to define their "immediate" task as the struggle for universal suffrage, when there was every indication that the more or less peaceful epoch of uninterrupted and consistent constitutional development would continue. In our country, do not even the Mensheviks speak in the above resolution of the impossibility of a *peaceful* path, of the need to elect fighters to the Duma, and not petitioners? Do they not recognise the struggle for a constituent assembly? Try to imagine a European country with a settled constitutional system likely to endure for some time, in which such slogans as "constitutional assembly", the antithesis of "petitioner" and "fighter" in the Duma could find currency, and you will realise that the "immediate" tasks *cannot* be defined as they now are in the West. The more successful the work of the Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats in the Duma, the more probable will be an

outburst of struggle outside the Duma which will confront us with immediate tasks of a special kind.

No. It is not so much the immediate tasks as the proletariat's *basic* tasks at the present moment of the bourgeois revolution that have to-be discussed at the Party congress. If this is not done, we shall find ourselves in the position of helpless people who lose themselves at every turn taken by events (as happened a number of times in 1906). In any case the "immediate" tasks cannot be defined, just as nobody can say whether the Second Duma and the Election Law of December 11, 1905,[75] will last a week, a month or six months. So far, the basic tasks of the Social-Democratic proletariat in our revolution have not yet been elaborated by our Party as a whole. And without such an elaboration no mature, principled policy is possible, and no pursuit of the definition of "immediate" tasks can be successful.

The Unity Congress did not adopt a resolution with an appraisal of the present moment or a definition of the proletariat's tasks in the revolution, although the necessary drafts *were* presented by both trends in the Social-Democratic Party, and the question of the appraisal of the situation stood on the agenda and was *discussed* at the congress. Consequently, the importance of these questions was recognised by *everybody*, though the majority at the Stockholm Congress considered that *at that time* they had not been made sufficiently clear. An analysis of these questions must be resumed. We must examine: firstly, the nature of the present revolutionary situation from the standpoint of the general tendencies of social, economic and political development; secondly, the political grouping of classes (and parties) in Russia today; thirdly, the basic tasks of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in *this* situation and with *this* political grouping of the social forces.

We do not, of course, close our eyes to the fact that some Mensheviks (and perhaps the Central Committee) understood the question of the immediate political tasks to be simply one of supporting the demand for a Duma, i.e., a Cadet, ministry.

Plekhanov, with his customary—of course, highly praiseworthy—impetuosity in pushing the Mensheviks fur-

ther to the Right, has already risen in defence of this demand in *Russkaya Zhizn* (February 23).

We believe that this is an important but *subordinate* question, which Marxists cannot pose separately, without an assessment of the present situation in our revolution, without an assessment of the class content of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and its entire political role today. To reduce this question to pure politicising, to the "principle" of the ministry's responsibility to the Chamber in a constitutional system in general, would mean wholly abandoning the point of view of the class struggle and going over to the point of view of the liberal.

For this reason, our conference linked the question of the Cadet ministry with the assessment of the present situation in the revolution.

In the appropriate resolution we, first and foremost, begin, in the preamble, with the question which all Marxists recognise as basic, that of the economic crisis and the economic condition of the masses. The conference adopted the formula: "the crisis shows no signs of early abatement". This formula is probably far too cautious. But it is, of course, important for the Social-Democratic Party to establish indisputable facts, note the basic features, and leave a scholarly elaboration of it to Party literature.

We affirm that on account of the crisis (point two of the preamble) there has been a sharpening of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (an undoubted fact, and the manifestations of this sharpening are common knowledge), and also a sharpening of the social struggle in the countryside. There are, in the countryside, no outstanding events that make themselves prominent, like lock-outs, but such government measures as the November agrarian laws[76] ("bribery of the peasant bourgeoisie") prove that the struggle is growing sharper, that the landlords are compelled to devote their efforts to splitting the peasantry in order to weaken the pressure exerted by the peasantry as a whole.

What these efforts will ultimately lead to we do not know. All "uncompleted" (Marx's expression) bourgeois revolutions "ended" with the defection of the well-to-do peasantry to the side of law and order. In any case, Social-

Democracy must do everything possible to develop the political consciousness of the widest strata of the peasantry, and make clear to them the class struggle that is going on in the countryside.

Further, the third point states the basic fact in the political history of Russia for the past year—the "rightward" swing of the upper and the "leftward" swing of the lower classes. We thought that, particularly in a revolutionary epoch, Social-Democracy should, at its congresses, *sum up* the periods of social development, *applying* its own Marxist methods of analysis to them and *teaching* other classes to glance back and view political events from the standpoint of *principle*, not from the standpoint of the interests of the moment or the achievements of a few days in the way the bourgeoisie do—the bourgeoisie actually despise all theory and are afraid of any class analysis of recent history.

The strengthening of the extremes means the weakening of the Centre. The Centre—that is the Cadets, not the Octobrists as some Social-Democrats (Martov among them) erroneously thought. What is the *objective* historical task of that party? That is a question the Marxists must answer if they want to remain true to their theory. The resolution answers: "*to halt* the revolution by offering concessions *acceptable* [since the Constitutional-Democrats favour a voluntary agreement] to the Black-Hundred landlords and the autocracy". In Karl Kautsky's well-known book *The Social Revolution* it was made perfectly clear that reform differs from revolution in that it preserves the power of the oppressor class which suppresses the insurrection of the oppressed by means of concessions *that are acceptable* to the oppressors and do not *destroy* their power.

The liberal bourgeoisie's objective task in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is precisely that—to preserve the monarchy and the landlord class at the cost of "reasonable" concessions.

Is this task a feasible one? That depends on circumstances. The Marxist cannot admit that it is absolutely infeasible. But *such* an outcome of the bourgeois revolution signifies: (1) a minimum of freedom for the development of the productive forces of bourgeois society (the economic

progress of Russia would undoubtedly be more rapid if landed proprietorship were abolished by the revolution than if it were reformed as planned by the Cadets); (2) the basic needs of the popular masses would not be met and (3) it would be necessary to suppress those masses *by force*. The Cadets' "peaceful" constitutional development *cannot be effected* except by the suppression of the masses. This is something we must never forget, something we must make the masses fully conscious of. The Cadet "social peace" is peace for the land and factory owner, the "*peace*" of a *suppressed* peasants' and workers' insurrection.

Repressions by Stolypin's military courts and the Cadet "reforms" are the two hands of one and the same oppressor.

II

Eight days have elapsed since our first article on this subject was published, and a number of important events in political life have confirmed the truth of what we then said, and have cast the glaring light of an "accomplished *fact*" (or one that is still being accomplished?) on the urgent questions dealt with.

The Cadet swing to the Right has already made itself felt in the Duma. The Rodichevs' support of Stolypin in preaching moderation, caution, legality, tranquillity, and not arousing the people, and Stolypin's support for Rodichev, his famous "all-round" support, are now fact.[77]

This fact has fully borne out the correctness of our analysis of the present political situation, an analysis made in the draft resolutions compiled between February 15 and 18, *before* the opening of the Second Duma. We refused to accept the Central Committee's proposal and to discuss "immediate political tasks". We showed that such a proposal was absolutely groundless in a revolutionary epoch, and we substituted the question of the fundamentals of socialist policy in the bourgeois revolution for the question of a policy for the moment.

And a week of revolutionary development has followed the pattern we anticipated.

On the last occasion, we examined the preamble to our draft resolution. The central feature of that part of the draft was a statement to the effect that the weakened party of the "Centre", that is, the bourgeois-liberal Constitutional-Democratic Party, was striving to halt the revolution by means of concessions acceptable to the Black-Hundred landowners and the autocracy.

It was only yesterday, as it were, that Plekhanov and his Right-wing following in the R.S.D.L.P. asserted that this Bolshevik idea, which we persistently defended throughout 1906 (and even earlier, ever since 1905, ever since the publication of the pamphlet *Two Tactics*), was a semi-fantastic surmise born of rebel views on the role of our bourgeoisie, or that it was to say the least an untimely warning, etc.

Today *everyone* can see that we were right. The "striving" of the Cadets is *beginning* to materialise, and even a newspaper like *Tovarishch*, which probably more than any other hates Bolshevism for its ruthless exposure of the Cadets, said, with reference to the rumours,* refuted by *Rech*, of negotiations between the Cadets and the Black-Hundred government, that "there is no smoke without fire".

We can only welcome this revival of "Bolshevik week" in *Tovarishch*. We can only mention that *history has confirmed the correctness of all our warnings and slogans*; history has exposed the thoughtlessness (thoughtlessness at best) of those "democrats"—and, unfortunately, of some Social-Democrats—who would not accept our criticism of the Cadets.

Who said, at the time of the First Duma, that the Cadets were bargaining with the government behind the backs of

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* These lines had already been written when we read the following in the *Rech* leading article for March 13: "When the exact details of the notorious negotiations between the Cadets and the government in June of last year are published, the country will learn that if the Cadets can be reproached for anything in connection with these negotiations behind the 'backs of the people', it is for that obstinacy of which *Rossiya*[78] speaks." Of course, "when they are published"! But so far the Cadets, despite the challenges that have been made, have not published "exact details" of the negotiations in June 1906, or those of January 1907 (January 15—Milyukov's visit to Stolypin), or those of March 1907. Nevertheless the negotiations *behind the backs of the people are a fact*.

the people? The Bolsheviks did. And then it turned out that a personage like Trepov was in favour of a Cadet ministry.

Who conducted the most energetic campaign of all for the exposure of Milyukov's visit to Stolypin on January 15 at the height of the election struggle (allegedly a struggle) of the party of so-called people's freedom against the government? The Bolsheviks did.

Who, at the election meetings in St. Petersburg and during the first days of the Second Duma (see *Novy Luch*), recalled that in 1906 the loan of 2,000 million francs was actually a gift made to Dubasov & Co., with the indirect aid of the Constitutional-Democrats, who rejected Clemenceau's formal proposal to come out openly, in the name of the party, against that loan? The Bolsheviks did.

Who, *on the eve of* the Second Duma, made the exposure of the "*treacherous nature* of Constitutional-Democratic policy" the corner-stone of their policy of consistent (i.e., proletarian) democracy? The Bolsheviks did.

All talk of supporting the demand for a Duma ministry or a responsible ministry, or the demand to subordinate executive to legislative power, etc., was blown away like down by the first breeze that blew. Plekhanov's dream of making this slogan the signal for a decisive battle, or the means of educating the masses, proved to be the dream of a well-meaning philistine. Probably no one would now dare give such slogans serious support. Experience has shown—or, rather, is beginning to show—that the issue involved is by no means the "principle" of a fuller or more consistent implementation of "constitutional fundamentals", but the fact of *a deal made between the Cadets and the reactionaries*. Experience has shown that those were right who behind the liberal exterior of an allegedly progressive general principle, recognised and demonstrated the narrow class interests of the frightened liberal who gave pleasant names to disgusting and filthy things.

The correctness of the conclusions of our first resolution has, therefore, been confirmed much sooner than we could have expected, and confirmed much more satisfactorily—by history and not by logic, by deeds and not by words, by the events of the revolution and not by the edicts of the Social-Democrats.

First conclusion: "the political crisis that is developing before our eyes is not a constitutional but a revolutionary crisis leading to a direct struggle of the proletarian and the peasant masses against the autocracy."

Second conclusion, proceeding directly from the first: "the forthcoming Duma campaign must therefore be regarded merely as one of the episodes in the people's revolutionary struggle for power, and must be utilised as such."

What is the essential difference between a constitutional and a revolutionary crisis? The difference is that the former may be resolved on the basis of existing fundamental laws and institutions of the state, while the latter requires the smashing of those laws and feudal institutions. Until now, the idea expressed in our conclusions has been shared by all Russian Social-Democrats, irrespective of group.

It is only recently that there has been a growth of that tendency among the Mensheviks which inclines to the opposite view, to the view that all thought of a revolutionary struggle should be abandoned, that we should stop at the present "constitution", and use it as ground to work on. Here are some noteworthy points from the draft resolution on the attitude to the State Duma compiled by "Comrades Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Negorev and others, with a group of practicians participating"; it was published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47* (and also as a separate leaflet):

"...(2) the task of the direct struggle for power that is becoming the central feature of the Russian revolution, is, under the existing alignment of social forces [?], reduced [?] mainly to the question [?] of the struggle for [?] popular representation;

"...(3) the elections to the Second Duma, by revealing a considerable number of consistent [?l supporters of the revolution, have shown that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for this [?] struggle for power...."

No matter how muddled and evasive the wording of these points may be, the trend is clearly visible—instead of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the

* February 24, 1907.

peasantry for power, *reduce* the tasks of the workers' party to that of the *liberal* struggle for the *existing* popular representation or on the basis of it. We must wait and see whether all Mensheviks, at the present moment or at the Fifth Congress, really accept this presentation of the question.

In any case, the rightward swing of the Cadets and Stolypin's "all-round" approval of them will soon compel the Right wing in our Party to make an issue of the question: either continue the policy of support for the Cadets and thereby irrevocably enter on the path of opportunism, or discontinue all support of the Cadets and accept the policy of the socialist independence of the proletariat and of the struggle for the liberation of the democratic petty bourgeoisie from the influence and hegemony of the Cadets.

The third conclusion drawn by our resolution is that, "as the party of the advanced class, the Social-Democratic Party cannot under any circumstances at present support the Cadet policy in general or a Cadet ministry in particular. The Social-Democrats must bend every effort to expose the treacherous nature of this policy to the masses; they must explain to them the revolutionary tasks confronting them; they must show the masses that only when they attain a high level of political consciousness and are strongly organised can possible concessions by the autocracy be converted from an instrument of deception and corruption into an instrument for the further development of the revolution."

We do not altogether deny the possibility of partial concessions, and do not say that we shall not take advantage of them. The text of the resolution does not leave any doubt on this score. It is also possible that a Cadet ministry will in some way or another come under the heading of "concessions by the autocracy". But the party of the working class, while not rejecting this "payment on account" (Engels's expression),[79] must under no circumstances forget the other particularly important aspect of the matter, which is often lost sight of by the liberals and opportunists—the role of "concessions" as *an instrument of deception and corruption*.

If the Social-Democrat does not want to turn into a bourgeois reformist, he must never forget this aspect of the matter. The Mensheviks unpardonably forget it when, in the aforementioned resolution, they say "...Social-Democracy will support *all efforts* of the Duma to subordinate executive power to itself...". "Efforts of the Duma" means the efforts of the majority in the Duma. The Duma majority may, as experience has shown, be formed from Rights and Constitutional-Democrats *against* the Lefts. "The efforts" of such a majority could *subordinate* "executive power" to itself *in such a way* as to worsen the condition of the people, or deceive them outright.

Let us hope that the Mensheviks are merely over-enthusiastic in this respect: that they will not support *all* the efforts of the majority in the present Duma in this field. It is typical, of course, that prominent leaders of Menshevism *could* have accepted such a formulation.

The Cadets' swing to the Right actually compels *all* Social-Democrats, irrespective of group allegiance, to adopt the policy of refusing to support the Cadets, to adopt the policy of exposing their treachery, the policy of an independent and consistent revolutionary party of the working class.

Proletary, Nos. 14 and 15, March 4 and 25, 1907

Published according to the *Proletary* text

HOW NOT TO WRITE RESOLUTIONS[80]

Written on March 19 (April 1), 1907

Published in 1907 in the collection
Questions of Tactics, Second Issue.
Novaya Duma Publishers, St. Petersburg
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in the collection

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One must thank the Menshevik comrades for publishing in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47 (February 24), the first draft of a resolution (prepared by Comrades Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Negorev and others, with a group of practicians participating). (It has also been published as a separate leaflet.) To prepare seriously for the Party congress, we must publish draft resolutions beforehand, and analyse them in detail.

The resolution deals with the attitude to the State Duma.

Point 1:

> "At the present moment after seven months' rule of the most unbridled dictatorship that has failed to meet with organised counteraction on the part of the terrorised masses, the activity of the State Duma, by arousing the interest of those masses in the political life of the country, can and must facilitate their mobilisation and the development of their political activity."

What do they mean by this? That it is better with a Duma than without one? Or is this an approach to the idea that the "Duma must be preserved"? It seems that this is actually the authors' idea. Only it is not expressed, but merely hinted at. Resolutions cannot be compiled of hints.

Point 2:

> "The task of the direct struggle for power that is rising to [probably a misprint*—it should read "is becoming"] the central feature of the Russian revolution, is, under the existing alignment of social forces, reduced mainly to the question of the struggle for popular representation."

It was not for nothing that this point won praise from *Rech* (the leading article of February 27: "for Russian

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* The two words are somewhat similar in Russian, one having the prefix *voz-* and the other the prefix *vy-*.—*Tr*.

Social-Democracy this is a tremendous step forward... the success of political consciousness"). And it is, indeed, really a monstrous point.

How can the task of the struggle for power be reduced to the *question* of the "struggle for popular representation"?! What is meant by "the struggle *for* popular representation"? What is this "existing alignment of social forces"? The previous point has only just said that the "seven months' rule of the most unbridled dictatorship has failed to meet with organised counteraction on the part of the terrorised masses". Surely the absence of the organised resistance of the masses during those seven months, accompanied by an obvious and extensive swing of the masses to the Left which was made clear by the elections at the end of the seven months, can tell us something about the "alignment of social forces".

This is some sort of almost unbelievable confusion in political thinking.

The alignment of social forces has obviously changed during the past half-year in the sense that the "Centre", the liberals, have weakened; the extremes, the Black Hundreds and the "Lefts" have grown stronger and more virile. The elections to the Second Duma proved this irrefutably. There is, therefore a *more revolutionary* alignment of social forces in consequence of the sharpening of political contradictions (*and economic contradictions*, *too—lock-outs*, *hunger strikes*, *etc.*). By what miracle could our Mensheviks draw the opposite conclusion that made them weaken the revolutionary tasks ("the struggle for power") and bring them down to the level of mere liberal tasks ("the struggle for popular representation")?

"An unbridled dictatorship" and a Left Duma—obviously the *opposite* conclusion is to be drawn from this; the liberal task of struggling on the basis of popular representation, or for the preservation of that representation, is a petty-bourgeois utopia because, by force of objective circumstances, such a task *cannot be carried out* without "a direct struggle for power".

Menshevik political thinking moves forward crabwise.

The conclusion to be drawn from the second point is this: the Mensheviks have abandoned the revolutionary

Social-Democratic position for the liberal position. The "nebulosity" of the conclusion of the second point ("the struggle for popular representation") *actually* expresses the idea of the liberal bourgeoisie who pretend that it is not they who are "terrorised" by the revolution but "the masses of the people who are terrorised", and use this as an excuse to reject the revolutionary struggle ("the direct struggle for power") in favour of the allegedly legal struggle ("the struggle for popular representation"). Stolypin will probably soon teach the Mensheviks the meaning of "the struggle for popular representation" under "the existing alignment of social forces!"

Point 3:

> "The elections to the Second Duma, by revealing a considerable number of consistent supporters of the revolution, have shown that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for this struggle for power."

What is this? What does it mean? In Point 2 the substitution of the struggle for representation for the struggle for power was deduced from the existing alignment of social forces, and now a growing consciousness among the masses of the necessity for "*this*" struggle for power is deduced from the election results!

This, comrades, is muddled. It should be rewritten as something like the following. Point Two—"The elections to the Second Duma showed that among the masses of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for a direct struggle for power." Point Three—"The striving of the liberal bourgeoisie to limit its political activity to a struggle on the basis of the present popular representation, therefore, expresses the hopeless stupidity of our liberals on the ideological side, and, on the material side, their striving (impracticable at the present moment) to halt the revolution by making a deal with reaction." If, in addition to this, our Marxists were to try and define, in Point 1, the economic causes that brought about this sharpening of political extremes among the people, they could have made something coherent out of it.

And then, what is meant by "consistent supporters of the revolution"? Apparently, what is meant here is petty-bourgeois democrats, mainly peasant democrats, i.e., the

Trudoviks (in the broad sense, including the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries), since the Second Duma differs from the First precisely in this respect. But, in the first place, this again is a hint, and resolutions are not compiled of hints. And, secondly, *it is all untrue*, comrades! For calling the Trudoviks "consistent supporters of the revolution" we ought formally to accuse you of *Socialist-Revolutionary heresy. Only* the proletariat can be the consistent (in the strict sense of the word) supporter of the bourgeois revolution, because the class of small, producers, small proprietors, must *inevitably vacillate* between the proprietary urge and the revolutionary urge—for instance, the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the St. Petersburg elections wavered between the urge to sell themselves to the Cadets and the urge to give battle to the Cadets.

You will therefore agree with us, comrades, that we must express ourselves more cautiously—approximately in the way the Bolshevik resolution is worded (see *Novy Luch*, February 27):*

> "... the Trudovik parties ... come *more or less close* to expressing the interests and viewpoint of the broad masses of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, *wavering* between submission to the leadership of the liberals [the elections in St. Petersburg, the election of a Cadet as Chairman of the Duma] and a determined struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state...."

Incidentally, we must mention that in this resolution, Comrade Koltsov (with other Mensheviks) places the Trudoviks among the consistent supporters of the revolution, but in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 49, that same Koltsov places them among the rural democrats, which, *as distinct from the urban democrats* (i.e., from the Cadets) "will in many cases defend old, outworn modes of production and social organisation". That doesn't sound very coherent, comrades!

Point 4:

> "The presence of such consistent supporters of the revolution in the Duma, arousing and strengthening the confidence of the masses in that institution, makes it more easily possible for it to become the real centre of the people's struggle for liberty and power."

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* See pp. 137-38 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The conclusion is a "pleasant" one, say what you will. But again the logic is lame. With this point the Mensheviks conclude the preamble to their resolution. *On this question* they do not utter a single word more in the resolution. And so the conclusion is a lame one.

If the "consistent supporters of the revolution" do not constitute a majority in the Duma, but only "a considerable number" (as is said—and rightly so—in Point 3), it is clear that there are also opponents of the revolution and *inconsistent* supporters of the revolution. That means that there is the "*possibility*" of the Duma as a whole "becoming a real centre" of *inconsistent* democratic politics and not of "the people's struggle for liberty and power".

In such a case one of two things would happen: (1) either the confidence of the masses in that institution would not be aroused and strengthened, but would be reduced and weakened, or (2) the political consciousness of the masses would be corrupted on account of their mistaking the policy of inconsistent supporters of the revolution for a consistent democratic policy.

From this it is perfectly clear that a conclusion, for some reason or other omitted by them, follows *inevitably* from the premises *put forward by the Mensheviks*—the party of the proletariat, of the consistent supporter of the revolution, must work persistently to ensure that those who are not fully consistent supporters of the revolution (the Trudoviks, for instance) should follow the working class *against* the inconsistent supporters of the revolution, particularly against the *notorious* supporters of *stopping* the revolution (the Cadets, for instance).

As a result of the absence of this conclusion in the Mensheviks' draft they are quite unable to be consistent. It amounts to this: *inasmuch* as there are a considerable number of "consistent supporters of the revolution" in the Duma, votes should be given to ... those who are known to be in favour of halting the revolution!

This doesn't sound very good, does it, comrades?

The concluding part of the resolution (taking it point by point) is as follows:

"Social-Democracy, while exposing the illusory conception that the State Duma is really a legislative body, explains to the masses,

on the one hand, the real nature of the Duma, which is actually an advisory body, and, on the other the possibility and necessity of using that body, despite its imperfections, to serve the purpose of a further struggle for popular power, and participates in the legislative work of the Duma, being guided by the following principles:..."

This is a *weaker* expression of the idea that was *more strongly* expressed in the Fourth (Unity) Congress resolution in the part which speaks of "converting" the Duma into an "instrument of the revolution", of making the masses conscious of the "utter insuitability" of the Duma, etc.

"I. (a) Social-Democracy criticises, from the standpoint of the interests of the urban and rural proletariat and from that of consistent democratism, the proposals and bills of all non-proletarian parties, and puts forward its own demands and proposals in opposition to them; in this field it connects immediate political tasks with the social and economic needs of the proletarian masses and with the requirements of the working-class movement in all its forms.

"*Note*. Whenever circumstances demand it, Social-Democracy supports, as a lesser evil, those bills of other parties which, if put into force, could become all instrument in the hands of the masses for use in the revolutionary struggle to attain real democratic liberty...."

This note expresses the idea of the necessity for Social-Democrats to participate in *bourgeois-reformist* work in the Duma. Is it not too early for this, comrades? Have you yourselves not said that the concept of the Duma as a real legislative body is an illusory one? You want to support *those* bourgeois bills that could be of benefit to the further struggle *if they were put into force*.

Think over this condition—"if they were put into force". The purpose of your support is to facilitate the implementation of the "lesser evil". But it is not the Duma that implements it, but the Duma plus the Council of State[81] plus the supreme authority! This means that there is *absolutely no* guarantee that by giving your support you are facilitating the implementation of the "lesser evil". And by supporting the "lesser evil", by voting for it, you are taking *upon yourselves*, upon the proletarian party, some small part of the responsibility for half-way bourgeois reformism, for what is, in essence, the Duma's work of *sham* legislation, which you yourselves admit to be sham legislation!

For what reason should you extend this risky "support"? There *is* the risk that it will cause a *direct* enfeeblement of that *revolutionary* consciousness of the masses to which you are yourselves appealing—and its *practical* value is "illusory"!

You are not writing a resolution on reformist work *in general* (in which case it would be necessary to say merely that Social-Democracy does not renounce it); you are writing about the *Second Duma*. You have already said that there are a considerable number of "consistent supporters of the revolution" in *this* Duma. You therefore have in mind a Duma with a party composition that is *already defined*. That is a fact. You know that in the present Duma there are not only "*consistent** supporters of the revolution" but also "inconsistent supporters of reforms"—not only Lefts and Trudoviks but also Cadets, these last-named *in themselves* being stronger than the Rights (Cadets and their allies, the Narodowci among them, being about 150 against 100 Rights). With this situation in the Duma, *there is no need* for you to support the "lesser evil" for the sake of its implementation; it is quite enough for you *to abstain* in the struggle between the reactionaries and the "inconsistent supporters of reforms". The practical result (as far as the implementation of laws is concerned) will be the same, but as far as the ideological and political aspect is concerned, your undoubted gain will be the integrity, purity, consistency and conviction of your position as a party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Is this a circumstance that revolutionary Social-Democracy can afford to ignore?

The Mensheviks are looking upward instead of looking downward. They are looking more to the feasibility of the "lesser evil" by means of a deal between the "inconsistent supporters of reforms" and the reactionaries (for such is the real meaning of the implementation of bills) than to the development of political consciousness and of potentialities for struggle in the "consistent supporters of the revolution", of whom, according to their own words, "there

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* I ask the reader to bear in mind the necessity for the correction to this word I made earlier in the article.

are a considerable number" in the Duma. The Mensheviks themselves are looking, and *are teaching the people to look*, for an agreement between the Cadets and the autocracy (the implementation of the "lesser evil", of reforms), and not to the possibility of turning the attention of the more or less "consistent supporters of the revolution" *to the masses*. This is a liberal, not a proletarian policy. This means that in word you are announcing the illusory nature of the Duma's legislative powers, and in deed are strengthening the people's faith in legislative reforms through the Duma and weakening their faith in revolutionary struggle.

Be more consistent and more honest, Menshevik comrades. If you are convinced that the revolution is over, if absence of faith in the revolution results from this conviction of yours (perhaps arrived at along scientific lines?), then there is no need to talk of revolution, then you must reduce *your* immediate aims to the struggle for reforms.

If you believe what you say, if you really believe that "a considerable number" of deputies to the Second Duma are "consistent supporters of the revolution", you should give *priority*, not to support (support that is useless in practice and harmful ideologically) for reforms, but to raising the level of the revolutionary consciousness of those supporters, to consolidating their revolutionary organisation and determination under the direct pressure of the proletariat.

Otherwise you would arrive at the height of illogicality and confusion; *in the name* of the development of the *revolution*, a working-class party does not, *by a single word*, define its tasks in respect of the more or less "consistent supporters of the revolution", but instead devotes a special note to the task of supporting the "lesser evil", the inconsistent supporters of *reforms*!

The "note" should be rewritten something like this: "In view of the fact that there are a considerable number of more or less consistent supporters of the revolution in the Duma, the Social-Democrats in the Duma must, when discussing those bills which the inconsistent supporters of reforms wish to implement, pay critical attention chiefly to the half-and-half nature and unreliability of those bills, to the agreement therein contained between the liberals

and the reactionaries, and to explaining to the more or less consistent supporters of the revolution the necessity for a decisive and ruthless revolutionary struggle. During the voting on those bills which constitute the lesser evil, the Social-Democrats abstain from voting and leave the liberals themselves to 'conquer' reaction on paper and to answer to the people for the implementation of 'liberal' reforms under the autocracy."

"...(b) The Social-Democrats make use of the discussion on various bills and on the state budget in order to expose, not only the negative sides of the existing regime, but also all the class contradictions of bourgeois society...."

An excellent aim. In order to expose the class contradictions of bourgeois society, the parties must be associated with classes. We must struggle against the "non-party", "single opposition" spirit in the Duma, and ruthlessly *expose* the narrow class character of, for instance, the Cadets, who claim *more than anybody to conceal* "class contradictions" by the catchword of "people's freedom".

We would like the Mensheviks not only to speak of exposing the class contradictions of bourgeois society (and "*not only*" of the infamy of the autocracy), *but also to do that*....

"...(c) On the question of the budget the Social-Democrats are guided by the principle: 'not a kopek for a non-responsible government'...."

A good principle, which would be really excellent if, instead of "non-responsible" some *other* word were used indicating, not the government's responsibility to the Duma (a fiction under the present "constitution"), but its "responsibility" to the supreme authority (this is not fiction but *reality*, since the people have no actual power, and the Mensheviks themselves speak of the impending "struggle for power").

It should read: "not a kopek for the government until all power is vested in the people".

"II. The Social-Democrats make use of the right to interpellation in order to expose to the people the true nature of the present government and the fact that all its actions are contradictory to the interests of the people; to explain the condition of the working class

is town and countryside, and the conditions of that class's struggle for the improvement of its political and economic position; to throw light on the role played, in respect of the working class, by the government and its agents and by the propertied classes and the political parties that represent them...."

A very good point. Only it is a pity that till now (March 19) our Social-Democrats in the Duma have made little use of the right to interpellation.

"...III. By maintaining the closest contact with the working-class masses in the course of this work, and striving, through their legislative activities, to give expression to the organised working-class movement, the Social-Democrats foster organisation of the workers, and of the masses of the people in general, to support the Duma in its struggle against the old regime and to create conditions enabling the Duma to carry its activities beyond the bounds of the fundamental laws that hamper it...."

First: one cannot speak of the "legislative" activities of the Social-Democrats. One should say "Duma activities".

Secondly; the slogan—"support" the Duma in its struggle against the old regime"—does not in any way accord with the premises of the resolution, and is incorrect in essence.

The preamble to the resolution speaks of the revolutionary struggle *for power* and of the presence in the Duma of "a considerable number of consistent supporters of the revolution".

Why is the perfectly clear, revolutionary category of "struggle for power" changed here to a diffuse "struggle against the old regime", that is, to an expression that actually includes the *reformist* struggle? Should not the motives in the preamble be changed so that, in place of an "illusory" struggle for power, "the task of struggling for reforms" should be advanced?

Why should you speak here of *the masses* giving support to "the Duma" and not to the "consistent supporters of the revolution"? It appears that the Mensheviks call on the masses to support the *inconsistent* supporters of reforms! It doesn't sound very good, does it, comrades?

Lastly, the words about supporting the "Duma" in its struggle against the old regime *in effect* engender *completely incorrect* ideas. To support the Duma means to support the *majority* in the Duma. The majority is the *Cadets* plus

the Trudoviks. Which means that you, by implication, i.e., without saying so directly, are providing *a characteristic* for the Cadets—they "are struggling against the old regime".

This characteristic is untrue and incomplete. Such things are not said by dropping half a hint. They have to be stated clearly and directly. The Cadets are *not* "struggling against the old regime", but are trying *to reform that old regime*, to renew it, by coming to *an agreement*, as is now perfectly clear and obvious, with the old authorities.

Saying nothing about this in the resolution, keeping it in the shade, means lapsing from the proletarian into the liberal point of view.

"...IV. By this activity of theirs the Social-Democrats aid the development of the popular movement aimed at winning a constituent assembly, and will support, as a stage in this struggle of the people, all the efforts of the State Duma to subordinate the executive power to itself, in this way clearing the soil for the transfer of all state power into the hands of the people...."

This is the most important point in the resolution, and it contains the notorious slogan of a "Duma", or "responsible" ministry. This point must be examined from the standpoint of its wording and of its meaning.

The point is worded in and extremely peculiar way. The Mensheviks must know that this is one of the most important questions. And they must know that this slogan has once *already been proposed* by the Central Committee of our Party—at the time of the First Duma—and that at that time *the Party did not accept the slogan*. This is so perfectly true that not even the Social-Democratic group in the *First* Duma—consisting, as we know, *exclusively* of Mensheviks and having as its leader such an outstanding Menshevik as Comrade Jordania—even that group did not accept the slogan of a "responsible ministry", and *did not once* include it in any Duma speech!

It would seem that this is more than enough for a particularly attentive attitude to the question. But instead we have before us the most carelessly worded point in a resolution, on the whole, insufficiently considered.

Why has this new, far more hazy formulation been selected instead of a *clear-cut* slogan of a "responsible

ministry" (Plekhanov in *Russkaya Zhizn*) or a "ministry of the Duma majority" (the resolution of the C.C. in the period of the First Duma)? Is this only a rephrasing of that same "responsible ministry", or is it something different? Let us examine these questions.

How could the Duma subordinate executive power to itself? Either legally, on the basis of the present (or a slightly changed) monarchist constitution, or illegally, "carrying its activities beyond the bounds of the fundamental laws that hamper it", overthrowing the old power, turning itself into a revolutionary convention, into a provisional government, etc. The first possibility is precisely that which is usually expressed by the words "a Duma, or responsible, ministry". The second possibility means active participation on the part of the "Duma" (i.e., the majority in the Duma) in the direct revolutionary struggle for power. There can be no other way of subordinating executive power to the Duma, and there is no sense in here raising the particular question of how the different ways could be interwoven; we are not confronted with the academic, scientific question of what situations are, in general, possible, but with the practical political question of what the Social-Democrats should, and should not, support in the Duma.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious. The new wording seems to have been deliberately planned *to conceal* the essence of the point at issue, the real will of the congress, of which the resolution should be an expression. The slogan of a "responsible ministry" has been and still is the cause of sharp disputes between Social-Democrats. Support for revolutionary Duma measures has not only never given rise to sharp disputes, but has probably never led to any differences among Social-Democrats. What should be said about people who have proposed a resolution that *glosses over* differences by uniting the disputed and the indisputable in one general, diffuse formulation? What is to be said about people who have proposed that a decision of the congress should be recorded in words that do not decide anything but enable some readers to understand these words as meaning revolutionary measures by the Duma, "beyond the bounds", etc., and others to under-

stand by them a deal concluded between Milyukov and Stolypin on the Cadets joining the ministry?

The politest thing that can be said about people who act in this way is that they are retreating, casting a veil over the once openly expressed and clear-cut programme of support for a Cadet ministry.

In future, therefore, we shall disregard this muddled wording, which hopelessly confuses the issue. We shall speak only of *the essence* of the question, that of supporting the demand for a "responsible" (or a Cadet—which is the same thing) ministry.

How does the resolution motivate this necessity to support the demand for a Duma or responsible ministry? By the statement that "it is a stage in the people's struggle for a constituent assembly", that it is "a basis for the transfer of all power into the hands of the people". This is the *whole* of the motive. We shall answer it with a brief summary of our arguments against Social-Democracy supporting the demand for a Duma ministry.

(1) It is absolutely impermissible for a Marxist to confine himself to the abstract juridical contraposition of a "responsible" to a "non-responsible" ministry, a "Duma" ministry to an autocratic ministry, etc., in the way Plekhanov does in *Russkaya Zhizn* and in the way the Mensheviks have always done in their analysis of this question. It is a liberal-idealist, not proletarian-materialist, argument.

The class significance of the measures under discussion must be studied. If this is done, it will be understood that their content is a bargain, or an attempt at a bargain, between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie to put an end to the revolution. That is precisely the objective economic significance of a Duma ministry. The Bolsheviks, therefore, had every right and reason to say that a Duma, or responsible, ministry is in actual fact a Cadet ministry. The Mensheviks were angry and shouted about trickery, juggling, etc. But they were angry because they did not want *to understand* the Bolshevik arguments, which *reduced* the juridical fiction (a Duma ministry would be "responsible" to the monarch rather than to the Duma, to the liberal landlords rather than to the people!) to its class basis. And no matter how angry Comrade Martov may get, no

matter how vehemently he may argue that even now the Duma is not a Cadet Duma, he cannot by a jot lessen the indisputable conclusion: *in essence*, the case is *precisely* one of a Cadet ministry, since that bourgeois liberal party is the *gist* of the matter. A possible coalition Duma ministry (Cadets, plus Octobrists, plus "non-party", plus, even, any kind of "Trudovik" or alleged "Left", etc.) would not in any way change the essence of the matter. To evade the essence of the matter in the way the Mensheviks and Plekhanov do means to evade Marxism.

Support for the demand for a Duma, or "responsible", ministry is, at bottom, support for Cadet policy in general and a Cadet ministry in particular (as was said in the first Bolshevik draft resolution for the Fifth Congress). Whoever is afraid to admit this is thereby admitting the weakness of his position, the weakness of the arguments in favour of Social-Democratic support for the Cadets in general.

We have always maintained, and still maintain, that the Social-Democrats cannot support a deal between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, a deal that aims at putting an end to the revolution.

(2) The Mensheviks always regard a Duma ministry as a step for the better, as something that will make the further struggle for the revolution easier, and the resolution under discussion clearly expresses this idea. But in this the Mensheviks are making a mistake, are being one-sided. A Marxist cannot guarantee the full victory of the present bourgeois revolution in Russia; to do so would be bourgeois-democratic idealism and utopianism. Our task is to strive for the full victory of the revolution, but we have no right to forget that there have been in the past, and there still can be, unfinished, half-and-half bourgeois revolutions.

The Mensheviks word their resolution as though a Duma ministry were an *essential* stage in the struggle for a constituent assembly, etc., etc. *This is quite untrue*. A Marxist *has no right* to examine a Duma ministry from this angle *alone*, ignoring the objective possibility of two types of economic development in Russia. A bourgeois-democratic coup is inevitable in Russia. But it is possible if the landlord system of economy is retained and gradually changed into a Junker-capitalist (Stolypin's and liberal agrarian

reform); it is also possible if the landlord system of economy is abolished and the land handed over to the peasantry (the peasant revolution, supported by the Social-Democratic agrarian programme).

The Marxist must examine the Cadet ministry from both angles and not from one alone—as a possible stage in the *struggle* for a constituent assembly, and as a possible stage in *the liquidation of the bourgeois revolution*. It is the intention of the Cadets and of Stolypin that the ministry *should* play the latter role; objective conditions are such that it *can* play both the latter and the *former role*.*

By forgetting the possibility (and the danger) of the liberals cutting short and stopping the bourgeois revolution, the Mensheviks are lapsing from the viewpoint of the class struggle of the proletariat into that of liberals, who paint the monarchy, land redemption payments, two chambers, the cessation of the revolution, etc., in such bright colours.

(3) Going over from the economic, class aspect of the question to the state, juridical aspect, it must be said that the Mensheviks regard a Duma ministry as a step towards parliamentarianism, as a reform that perfects the constitutional system and facilitates its use by the proletariat for its class struggle. This, again, is a one-sided point of view, one that sees only what pleases the eye. In the act of appointing ministers from the Duma majority (which is precisely what the Cadets wanted in the First Duma) one very significant feature of the reform is absent—there is no *legislative* recognition of certain *general* changes in the constitution. The act is to a certain extent individual, even personal. It depends on bargains, negotiations and conditions *behind the scenes*. No wonder *Rech now* (March 1907!) admits that in June 1906, there were negotiations between the Constitutional-Democrats and the government that are *still not* (!) subject to publication. Even the Cadet *Tovarishch*, which sings the Cadet tune, admitted the im-

* We make the *very best* assumption for Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, i.e., that the Cadets will put forward the demand for a Duma ministry. It is more probable that *they will not do so*. Then Plekhanov (and the Mensheviks) will be as ridiculous on account of his "support" for a slogan the liberals have not advanced, as he was with his Duma with full powers".

permissibility of this game of hide and seek. And it is not surprising that (according to newspaper reports) Pobedonostsev could propose this measure—appoint liberal, Cadet ministers and then dissolve the Duma and replace the ministry! This would not be an abolition of the reform, or a change in the law—it would be a fully "constitutional act" by the monarch. By supporting the Cadet desire for a Duma ministry the Mensheviks were, against their own wishes and their own conscience, *in fact* supporting negotiations and deals behind the scenes, behind the backs of the people.

In so doing, the Mensheviks did not and could not obtain any "commitments" from the Cadets. They *gave* them support, on credit, and brought confusion and corruption into the consciousness of the working class.

(4) Let us make another concession to the Mensheviks. Let us imagine the best possible case, i.e., that the act of appointing the Duma ministers is not only a personal act, is not merely done for show, to deceive the people, but is the first step in real constitutional reform, *which actually does improve* the proletariat's conditions of struggle.

Even so the Social-Democrats cannot be justified in coming out with a slogan supporting the demand for a Duma ministry.

You say that it is a stage on the way towards improvement, that it provides the ground for the future struggle? Let us suppose that it is. But would not universal, *but indirect*, suffrage also be a *probable* stage on the way towards improvement? Then why not announce that Social-Democrats support the demand for universal, *but indirect*, suffrage, as a "stage" in the struggle for the "tetrad formula", as "ground for the transition" to that formula? Not only would the Cadets be with us in this, but even the Party of Democratic Reform[82] and part of the Octobrists! An "all-national" stage towards the people's struggle for a constituent assembly—that is what Social-Democratic support for universal suffrage, *but indirect and not by secret ballot*, would mean!

In principle, there is absolutely no difference between supporting the demand for a Duma ministry and supporting the demand for universal suffrage that is indirect and not by secret ballot.

To justify the issue of the slogan of a "responsible ministry" by saying that it is a stage towards the better, etc., means failure to understand the fundamentals of the attitude of Social-Democracy to bourgeois reformism.

Every reform is a reform (and not a reactionary and not a conservative measure) only insofar as it constitutes a certain step, a "stage", for the better. But *every* reform in capitalist society has a *double* character. A reform is a concession made by the ruling classes *in order* to stem, weaken, or conceal the revolutionary struggle, in order to split the forces and energy of the revolutionary classes, to befog their consciousness, etc.

Therefore, revolutionary Social-Democracy, while by no means renouncing the use of reforms for the purpose of developing the revolutionary class struggle ("we accept payments on account"—*wir nehmen auch Abschlagszahlung*, said Frederick Engels[83]), will under no circumstances make half-way bourgeois-reformist slogans "their own".*

To do so would be acting exactly as Bernstein would (Plekhanov will *have* to rehabilitate Bernstein in order to defend his present policy! No wonder Bernstein's periodical, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, has such high praise for Plekhanov!); it would mean turning Social-Democracy into "*a democratic-socialist party of reform*" (Bernstein's notorious statement in his *Premises of Socialism*).

Social-Democracy regards reforms, and makes use of them, as *a by-product* of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat.

And now we come to the last of our arguments against the slogan under discussion:

(5) In what way can Social-Democracy *actually* bring nearer the implementation of all kinds of reform in general, constitutional reforms in Russia in particular, and especially a Duma ministry with results beneficial to the proletariat? Can it do so by making the slogans of the bourgeois reformists "its own", or by decisively refusing to make such slogans "its own" and by continuing unswervingly to conduct the

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* Plekhanov in *Russkaya Zhizn*: "...*Social-Democratic deputies must make the above demand* ["a responsible ministry"] *their own* in the interests of the people, in the interests of the revolution...."

revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat under the banner of complete, uncurtailed slogans? It is not difficult to answer this question.

By making bourgeois-reformist slogans that are always half-baked, always curtailed and always two-faced "our own", we are actually not strengthening but weakening the probability, possibility and proximity of the implementation of the reform. The real force giving rise to reforms is the force of the revolutionary proletariat, of its consciousness, solidarity and unwavering determination in the struggle.

These are the qualities of the *mass* movement that we weaken and paralyse by giving our bourgeois-reformist slogans to the masses. The usual bourgeois sophistry says that by conceding something from our revolutionary demands and slogans (for instance, by demanding a "Duma ministry" instead of "sovereignty of the people", or a constituent assembly as a "stage", etc.), we are making it *more* probable that this lesser measure will be *implemented*, since both the proletariat and part of the bourgeoisie will be in favour of it.

International Social-Democracy says that this is bourgeois sophistry because we thereby lessen the probability of a reform being implemented; because, in trying to win the sympathies of the bourgeoisie, which continually makes concessions against its will, we are lessening the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, are blunting and corrupting that consciousness. We are adapting ourselves to the bourgeoisie, to *its* deal with the monarchy, and thereby harming the development of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In consequence of all this, the reforms are either non-existent on account of these tactics or they are an unadulterated deception. The only *sound* basis for reforms, the one serious guarantee that they will not be fictitious, will be used for the benefit of the people, is the independent revolutionary struggle of the proletariat that *does not lower the level* of its slogans.

Since June 1906, the Mensheviks have been offering the masses a slogan in support of the demand for a Duma ministry. By so doing, they weaken and blunt the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, reduce the scope of agi-

tation, decrease the probability of this reform being implemented and the possibility of its being used.

We must increase revolutionary agitation among the masses; we must give wider scope to our full-fledged, uncurtailed slogans; we must develop them clearly—*in this way* we shall at best bring nearer the full victory of the revolution, and at worst we shall capture some half-concessions (such as a Duma ministry, universal, but indirect, suffrage, etc.) and give ourselves the possibility of turning them into a weapon of the revolution. Reforms are *a by-product* of the class struggle of the revolutionary proletariat. To make it "our own" business to obtain this by-product would mean lapsing into liberal bourgeois reformism.

* * *

The last point of the resolution:

"V. Regarding activities in the Duma as one of the forms of class struggle, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma retains complete independence, in each individual case entering into agreement with those parties that are interested in the struggle against the old regime for the triumph of political liberty, for aggressive action with those parties and groups whose aims at a given moment coincide with the aims of the proletariat, and for defensive action intended to preserve popular representation itself and its rights."

The second part of this is as bad and outlandish as the first part (as far as the word "entering") is good.

What is this ridiculous differentiation between "aggressive" and "defensive" action? Are our Mensheviks not recalling the language of *Russkiye Vedomosti* in the nineties of the last century, when the liberals tried to prove that liberalism in Russia does the "protecting" and that reaction is "aggressive"? Just imagine: instead of the "old" division of political action into revolutionary and reformist, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, Marxists are offering us a new classification—"defensive" action "protects" what we have, "aggressive" action goes farther! Have you got a shred of conscience, Menshevik comrades? To what extent must one lose all feeling for the revolutionary class struggle before one can fail to notice the *vulgar* flavour of this differentiation between the "aggressive" and the "defensive"!

And how amusingly, like an object in a distorting mirror, does this helpless formulation reflect the *bitter* truth (bitter for the Mensheviks) that they will not openly admit! The Mensheviks are in the habit of talking about parties in general, and are afraid to name them or clearly delineate them; they are in the habit of casting the veil of generic names over them—"oppositional-democratic parties"—over Cadets and Lefts alike. Now they feel that a change is coming. They feel that the *liberals* are now actually capable of doing nothing more than *protect* (by means of genuflexion, in the same way as *Russkiye Vedomosti* "protected" the Zemstvos[84] in the eighties!) the existing Duma and the existing (pardon the word) "constitution" of ours. The Mensheviks feel that the liberal bourgeoisie cannot and does not want *to go farther* (be "aggressive"—since such nasty terms exist!). And the Mensheviks have displayed this vague consciousness of the true in amusing and extremely confused wording that means literally that the Social-Democrats are capable, *at some time*, of entering into an agreement for action "whose aims" *do not* coincide with the aims of the proletariat!

This final chord of the Menshevik resolution, this amusing fear of telling *the truth* openly and clearly—i.e., that the liberal bourgeoisie, the Constitutional-Democrats, have completely ceased to help the revolution—magnificently expresses the whole spirit of the resolution under consideration.

INSTEAD OF AN AFTERWORD

The above lines had been written when I received the resolution passed by the February (1907) Conference of the League of the Estonian Area of the R.S.D.L.P.[85]

Two Menshevik comrades, M. and A., spoke (presumably from the Central Committee) at this conference. During the discussion on the question of the State Duma they apparently tabled *that very resolution* that I have analysed above. It will be extremely instructive to see *what amendments* the Estonian Social-Democrat comrades made to this resolution. Here is the resolution in full, as passed by the conference:

ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE STATE DUMA

"The State Duma has neither the authority nor the force to satisfy the needs of the people because power is still in the hands of the enemies of the people, the tsarist autocracy, the bureaucracy and a handful of landlords. The Social-Democrats, therefore, must ruthlessly destroy the illusory hopes of the present State Duma having legislative powers, and make it clear to the people that only an authoritative all-national constituent assembly, freely elected by the people after the tsarist autocracy has been overthrown, will be capable of meeting the people's demands.

"For the purpose of developing the class-consciousness of the proletariat, for the political education of the masses of the people, for the development and organisation of the revolutionary forces, Social-Democracy must make use even of this impotent, helpless State Duma. In view of this, Social-Democracy participates in the activities of the State Duma on the following terms:

"I. Proceeding from the interests of the urban and rural proletariat and from the principles of consistent democratism, Social-Democracy criticises all proposals and bills submitted by the government and the bourgeois parties and also the state budget, and opposes them with its own demands and bills, and in so doing proceeds always from the demands and needs of broad masses of the people and by such activity exposes the effeteness of the existing system and the class contradictions of bourgeois society.

"II. Social-Democracy uses the right of interpellation in order to lay bare the essence and nature of the present government and to show the people that all the latter's activity is contrary to the interests of the people, in order to make clear the underprivileged position of the working class and throw light on the role played by the government and the ruling classes and by the parties they support, in respect of the working class. Among other things, Social-Democracy must struggle against the Cadet Party, with its compromises and treachery, and unmask its half heartedness and hypocritical democratism in order to liberate the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie from its leadership and influence and compel them to follow the proletariat.

"III. In the State Duma, Social-Democracy, as the party of the working class, must always act independently. Social-Democracy must conclude no permanent agreements or pacts that might hamper its freedom of action with other revolutionary or opposition parties in the Duma. In individual cases, when the aims and measures of other parties coincide with those of Social-Democracy, the latter can and must enter into negotiations with other parties on those measures.

"IV. Insofar as the people cannot come to any agreements with the present feudal-minded government, and insofar as only an authoritative constituent assembly would be in a position to meet the people's demands and needs, the conference is of the opinion that the struggle for a ministry responsible to the present impotent Duma is not the task of the proletariat. The proletariat must fight under

the flag of a constituent assembly and not under that of a responsible ministry.

"V. While conducting this struggle, the Social-Democratic group in the State Duma must bind itself by the closest ties to the proletarian and other masses outside the Duma and, by assisting these masses to organise, must build up a revolutionary army for the overthrow of the autocracy."

No comment is required. In my article I have tried to show how resolutions like the one I have dealt with should not be written. In their resolution the Estonian revolutionary Social-Democrats have shown how unsuitable resolutions should be amended.

A NOTE ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE ESTONIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[86]

Our correspondent has also sent us the *Rules of the League of the Estonian Area of the R.S.D.L.P.*, adopted at the conference. We are unable to print them owing to lack of space.

We call our readers' attention to the resolution on the Duma. It is quite obvious that the resolution of the Mensheviks, published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47, served as the basis for it; the influence exerted by the Mensheviks M. and A. was *confined to this*. The Estonian Social-Democrats have recast all the *militant parts* of the resolution in a *fine Bolshevik* spirit (especially the part about the Cadets and the "responsible ministry"). An excellent example of "amendments" to Menshevik resolutions!

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THE TERMS OF THE DEAL

St. Petersburg, March 21, 1907.

The situation has undergone considerable change since the leading article in *Proletary*, No. 14,* was written three weeks ago. The government and the Cadets, the Black-Hundred autocracy and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie have taken a step towards one another, and are preparing to join hands and strangle the revolution by their joint efforts and, instead of land and freedom, hand out miserly doles to the people, condemning them to an existence of semi-starvation and semi-slavery. Let us examine more closely the situation now obtaining.

Two questions lie as heavy as a stone on the heart of the Black-Hundred autocracy—the budget, and the agrarian question. There can be no credits unless the budget is approved by the Duma. There can be no hope of even a brief period of calm unless the open ulcer of the land question is hidden, at least for the time being. The government will not dare dissolve the Duma without a budget and an agrarian law the latter has approved. The government is *afraid* to dissolve the Duma and, at the same time, is vociferating about dissolution and is putting into motion the entire Black-Hundred machinery of the Union of the Russian People so as to scare the timid and incline the wavering to compliance. It wants to try and drag concessions out of the Duma by gagging it with the threat of dissolution. Well, then it will see what is to be done with the disgraced, befouled and filth-bespattered "lofty" assembly. This explains the request to approve the budget and the

* See pp. 184-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*

assurances that the Minister of Finance does not even dream of requesting the State Duma to sanction a loan. This explains the correct tone of Mr. Vasilchikov's speeches to the effect that the government "will preserve the inviolability of those boundaries at which the interests of individuals, different groups and different social-estates meet" but, at the same time, "recognises its duty to extend that preservation only insofar as the boundaries mentioned coincide with the general interests of the state. *Wherever the boundaries do not coincide with those interests they must be shifted*". In these words, especially those we have stressed, there is undoubtedly a scarcely perceptible nod of the head in the direction of the Cadets, a slight hint at the possibility of Cadet "compulsory alienation".

How do the Cadets respond to all these scarcely perceptible advances? Oh, they are bending all their efforts to make the imperceptible perceptible, to make open and stated in full that which is hidden behind mysterious hints and reservations. They are therefore making incomparably more advances to the government, are opening up their hearts, although, with their customary caution, they are holding out their hands timidly and only half-way, in order to take hold of Mr. Stolypin's forefinger, condescendingly held out to them. In its March 18 issue, *Rech*, the Cadets' mouthpiece, proclaimed to the whole world that the "party of people's freedom" is concluding preparation of a new agrarian bill which will make this party "the best-armed for a *business-like* discussion of the land question", and that "the new presentation of the question has paid greater attention to what is generally known as the real alignment of forces". At the next day's session of the Duma, Deputy Kutler pronounced a truly "business-like" speech, in which he somewhat (though far from fully) raised the veil that has so far modestly covered the "realism" and "business-like character" of this new outcome of the Cadet Party's legislative efforts. In the present case, as far as can be understood, business-like realism boils down to, first of all, giving the peasants in many localities, instead of the "subsistence standard"* of land, a much smaller amount—

* See Note 98.—*Tr.*

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"as much as is available", as Mr. Kutler very indefinitely puts it. Apparently it works out this way—that many millions of dessiatines of landowners' property may remain unalienated even under "compulsory alienation". This means "shifting the boundaries somewhat", as Mr. Vasilchikov puts it. The second feature typifying the "realism" of the new bill is outlined by Mr. Kutler in the following terms: "the lands that are to be transferred to the peasants" must "be made the absolute property of the peasants" so that "these lands will not under any circumstances be taken from them in the future", they will be "transferred to the peasants for their use in perpetuity and not temporarily", and in so doing it will be necessary "to limit only the right of alienation and of mortgage". All this again comes very close to the "intention" of the government, proclaimed through its mouthpiece, Mr. Vasilchikov, "to extend the advantages, accruing from the principles of property, to that tremendous area of peasant-owned land that has so far been deprived of those advantages". And, lastly, the third sign of the "business-like nature" of the new Cadet agrarian bill deserves special attention: formerly it was assumed that compensation for the land would be met by the Treasury, but now "a certain part of the expenses that occur as a result of the land reform must be met by the peasants themselves, to the extent of about one half". And in what way does this differ from the contribution of one half of the land redemption payments to be met by the peasants that was established by the government for 1906? The concord, in principle, between the Cadet agrarian bill and the "designs" of the government therefore becomes fairly obvious. The fact that the Cadet compulsory alienation of the land is pure fiction makes it still less open to doubt; who will do the "compelling" in the Cadet land committees when they will consist half of peasants and half of landlords, with government officials "reconciling" their interests? A clean deal! Not for nothing did the *Rech* commentator on Duma affairs say on March 20, with reference to Mr. Vasilchikov's speech: "this presentation of the question means that things are being tackled in business-like fashion". This is, indeed, the highest praise from the lips of the Cadets of today!

As far as the budget is concerned, the conciliatory stand taken by the Cadets towards the Black-Hundred autocracy is outlined with sufficient clarity in an editorial in that same March 20 issue of *Rech*. The rumour that "the party of people's freedom proposes rejecting the budget as a whole" is called "a patent lie", and the assurance is given that the "people's representatives will probably approve, with certain changes, the budget for 1907" and, lastly—listen to this, gentlemen!—it is asserted that "if the Duma is given proof that the Minister of Finance is prepared to go halfway in extending its rights [within the bounds of the "fundamental laws", of course—see above in the same article], this may engender among its members greater confidence in the government", and, indeed, "if the Duma had grounds for trusting the Minister of Finance it could agree to a formula that would be tantamount *to permission to borrow as much as is needed*" (our italics). This is a gem that worthily concludes the long list of disgraceful concessions, all this retailing of people's freedom—it had to be retail selling so that, in the end, the people's freedom could be sold wholesale.

Anyone with the patience to follow up all the details of this shameful deal between the Black Hundreds and the liberal bourgeoisie, insofar as they have become clear at the present moment, can no longer be in doubt—the counter-revolutionary forces are being organised to deal a final, mortal blow at the great emancipation movement, to crush strong and bold fighters and to deceive and remove the naïve, the timid and the vacillating. The Rights, the Polish *Kolo*[87] and the Cadets are uniting in one body to deal that blow. The government is scaring the Cadets and the Trudoviks with the howling of the Black Hundreds—set at them by the government itself—who demand the dissolution of the Duma and the abolition of the "foul constitution". The Cadets are scaring the Trudoviks by reference to those same howls and by alleging that Stolypin intends to dissolve the Duma immediately. The Black-Hundred autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie need all these threats and fears the better to come to an agreement behind the backs of the people, so that, having amicably shared the spoils, they may plunder the people. Trudoviks

of all shades—do not allow yourselves to be tricked! Stand guard over the interests of the people! Prevent this filthy deal between the Cadets and the government! Social-Democrat comrades! We are certain you will understand the situation, that you will stand at the head of all revolutionary elements in the Duma, that you will open the eyes of the Trudoviks to the shameful treachery of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. We are sure that from the rostrum of the Duma you will loudly and boldly expose this treachery to the whole people.

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THE MENSHEVIK TACTICAL PLATFORM

"*The Tactical Platform for the Coming Congress*, prepared by Martov, Dan, Starover, Martynov and others, with the participation of a group of Menshevik practicians" has been issued as a separate leaflet.

The relation between this platform and the resolution on the State Duma, drawn up by the same Menshevik leaders and published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 47, is not yet known. The leaflet we are speaking of does not say a single word as to whether it is proposed to work out in greater detail the tactical opinions expressed in it, in the form of draft resolutions, precisely on which questions, etc. This lack of clarity is regrettable because the "Tactical Platform" itself is worded very diffusely and indefinitely. To show this we are giving in full the last three theses of the platform; these outline the "current tasks of Social-Democracy in the immediate future"; we shall begin with the third thesis.

"...(3) The development of the independent political and organisational activities of the working-class masses on the basis of the defence of their interests as a class of wage-workers. Assistance by Party groups for the organisations that are being built up among wide sections of the proletariat on the basis of the struggle to satisfy their immediate trade, political and cultural needs, on the basis of struggle to retain and extend the concessions they have wrested from the old system."

Could you possibly imagine anything more diffuse, vague and empty? Is this a "tactical platform" for the 1907 congress, or is it an excerpt from a popular article on the tasks of the working class in general?

As we know, the agenda for the congress includes items on trades unions, a labour congress and councils of dele-

gates—these are all concrete questions of today, of the present stage of development of the working-class movement. And we are treated to platitudes and empty phrases about "independent activities", as though there were a deliberate desire *to conceal their ideas* concerning the questions that have been presented by reality and by the Party! This is not a platform, comrades, but *a pro forma statement*. There already exists considerable Party literature on such questions as a labour congress, ranging from articles in the Party's official paper *Sotsial-Demokrat*[88] to a number of pamphlets. A platform is drawn up to provide an answer that is to the point, and not to evade the issue.

"...(2) A determined ideological struggle against all attempts to limit the class independence of the proletariat, against inculcation of reactionary petty-bourgeois illusions in proletarian consciousness and against all tendencies leading to the substitution of anarchic terror and adventurous plotting for the organised class struggle."

Wrathfully put. Clearly the authors wanted to give vent to their ire. That, of course, is their right, and we would be the last to complain of sharpness in a polemic. Polemise as trenchantly as you like, only say plainly what you mean. Your second point, however, says absolutely nothing definite. It "is aimed", as one may guess, at the Bolsheviks, but it *misses the mark* on account of its diffuse wording. All Bolsheviks would, of course, agree to subscribe in full to the condemnation of *anarchic* terror, "adventurous plotting", "reactionary petty-bourgeois illusions" and "attempts to limit class independence".

Let us give the Menshevik comrades some good advice. If you want to engage in sharper polemics with the Bolsheviks, comrades, and want to "wound" them more seriously, then please compile resolutions that will be *unacceptable* to us. You must *open* all the parentheses and not cast a new veil over questions presented long ago! Take an example from us: our draft resolution on non-party political organisations says *outright* that we are against *certain definite* proposals of Axelrod's, against *certain definite* trends expressed in certain literary works by members of the Party. Whatever you may blame us for in our draft resolution, it will certainly not be for lack of clarity, or for avoiding the *substance* of the dispute,

"...(1) The awakening of the political initiative of the proletarian masses by the organisation of their planned intervention in political life in all its manifestations.

"In pursuance of this, Social-Democracy, while calling on the proletariat to support all progressive classes in their joint struggle against reaction rejects all lasting alliances with any part of the non-proletarian classes, and, wherever sections of these classes differ among themselves, supports in each individual case those actions that are in conformity with social progress. Social-Democracy directs its revolutionary criticism both against the counter-revolutionary strivings of the liberal bourgeoisie and against the utopian and reactionary prejudices of agrarian petty-bourgeois socialism."

We deliberately left this point until last, it alone, relatively speaking, having some content, since it *touches* on the fundamental principles of the differences between the Bolshevik and Menshevik tactics. But then, again, it only "touches upon" them, again far too much padding and not enough concrete material! The first two sentences are truisms that might well have been discussed in the press in 1894-95, but it is really awkward to speak of such things in 1907. And even these truisms are worded very carelessly, for instance, Social-Democracy rejects all "alliances" in general with other classes, and not only "lasting" ones.

The third sentence is the only one dealing with fundamentals of tactics. Only here the veil is at least raised sufficiently to reveal the outlines of the concrete phenomena of our times.

Here Social-Democracy is contrasted to: (1) the counter-revolutionary *strivings* of the liberal bourgeoisie; (2) the utopian and reactionary *prejudices* of agrarian petty-bourgeois socialism. The instruction offered to the Party consists in criticism of them both *in equal measure*.

Let us examine these two comparisons and the significance of this instruction.

It is not quite clear what the comrades mean by the "counter-revolutionary strivings of the *liberal* bourgeoisie". It would have been proper to speak of the liberal bourgeoisie, without any further definition, in 1897 but not in 1907. The Menshevik comrades are astonishingly belated; we now have political *parties* in Russia that have revealed themselves in the First Duma, and partly in the Second! What sort of "tactical platform" is this that still *does not even notice* these definite parties in Russia?

It is difficult to believe that the Octobrists are referred to as liberal bourgeois. The comrades obviously have a party of the *Constitutional-Democrat* type in mind (the Party of Democratic Reform, perhaps the Party of Peaceful Renovation, as a phenomenon of the same type). We are convinced of this also by the use of the word "strivings", because we do not see any strivings in the spirit of counter-revolution on the part of the Octobrists—their entire policy has now become counter-revolutionary.

And so the matter is one of Cadet *counter-revolutionary* "*strivings*", i.e., that the Cadets are *already beginning* to conduct *practical* politics in a *counter-revolutionary* spirit.

This fact is undoubtedly true. A frank and definite admission of it would undoubtedly bring closer together the two now hostile trends in Russian Social-Democracy. The need for a "revolutionary criticism of such strivings is also beyond dispute.

To continue. The reactionary *strivings* of the liberals are contrasted with the reactionary "*prejudices* of agrarian petty-bourgeois socialism".

We are completely at a loss. How can *classes* (liberal bourgeoisie) be compared and contrasted with *theories* (socialism), or *practical politics* (strivings) with *views* (prejudices)?? This is illogical in the highest degree. In a *tactical platform*, if it is to hold together, the contrasting should be of (1) one class with another—for example, the liberal bourgeoisie with the democratic (or reactionary?) peasantry; (2) one policy with another—for example, counter-revolutionary with revolutionary; (3) one set of theories, views and prejudices with another. This is so absolutely obvious, so extremely elementary, that one cannot but wonder whether this lack of logic in the Mensheviks is accidental, or whether lack of logical clarity reflects unclear political thinking.

It is beyond doubt that the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists is full of utopian and reactionary prejudices. This, of course, has to be said when these parties are being assessed, as it was said by the Bolsheviks in their draft resolutions for the Fourth and Fifth congresses. By repeating this

indubitable concept in such an illogical combination, the Mensheviks were apparently seizing on the first argument that came their way, in order to justify their *policy* of support for the Cadets. Actually they could not avoid giving a motive for this policy and attempting to justify it in the text of the platform under examination. The liberal bourgeoisie's attitude to the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution has now been *touched upon* by the Mensheviks. This is great progress, of course. After the experience of the First and (partly) the Second Duma, one can no longer limit oneself to merely referring to the notorious "Black-Hundred danger" fiction as an argument in defence of election agreements with the Constitutional-Democrats, voting for a Cadet chairman, and supporting Cadet slogans. The general question, already presented by the Bolsheviks in the pamphlet *Two Tactics* (July 1905)* *must be* raised—the question of the attitude of the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry to the Russian revolution. What is it that the Mensheviks now say, in substance, on this question?

> "Urban bourgeois democrats in Russia have not subordinated the entire economy to themselves and are, therefore, not capable of independent revolutionary initiative, as was the case in bourgeois revolutions in previous centuries; at the same time the peasantry, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the small producers, are only just beginning to emerge from the economic and social conditions of pre-bourgeois production, and are, therefore, still less suited for the role of an independent leader of the revolution."

This is the *sole* attempt to base the Menshevik policy towards the liberals and the peasantry on an *economic analysis*! "The peasantry are *still less* suitable than the urban bourgeois democrats..."—and these words "still less" are supposed *to justify* the policy of supporting the Cadets.

Why "still less"? Because the peasantry "are only just beginning to emerge from the economic and social conditions of pre-bourgeois production". A motive that is obviously unsatisfactory. If the peasantry are "only just beginning to emerge" it is "*the survivals of the feudal system that are a heavy burden borne directly by the peasantry*" which prevent them from emerging. These words are from the first

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140—*Ed.*

paragraph of our Party's agrarian programme. The circumstance that the heavy burden of the survivals of serfdom is borne directly by the peasants makes a *more profound*, extensive and acute revolutionary movement against the existing system necessary and inevitable among the peasantry than among the liberal bourgeoisie. There can be no question of either the liberal bourgeoisie or the peasantry being suitable *leaders* of the revolution*; the relative ability of the liberals and the peasants to display "independent revolutionary initiative", or, to be more exact, independently to participate in the *further development* of the revolution has been assessed *quite incorrectly* by the Mensheviks.

The Menshevik point of view on the political role of the peasantry contradicts those basic postulates of our agrarian programme that are agreed upon by the *whole* party, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike.

First: as we have said "the survivals of the feudal system are a heavy burden borne directly by the peasantry". Consequently, in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, the peasantry *must be* more revolutionary than the liberal bourgeoisie, because the strength, durability, viability and acuteness of the revolutionary movement depend on the force of the oppressive conditions of the old order, of that which has outlived itself.

Secondly: in our agrarian programme we demand "the confiscation of private landed properties". We do not demand anything of the sort, anything that even remotely

* Generally speaking, we heartily welcome the fact that in their platform the Mensheviks have *raised* the question of the proletariat's role as *the leader* of the revolution. It is extremely desirable that this question should be discussed at the congress and a resolution adopted on it. The Mensheviks give a feeble explanation of the peasantry being unsuitable as leader of the revolution. It is not because the peasantry are only "just beginning to emerge" from serfdom, but because the main conditions of *petty production* (in agriculture and industry) compel the petty producer *to vacillate* between "order" and "property" on the one hand, and the struggle against the old order on the other. In the same way, the Mensheviks have missed the main reason for the liberal bourgeoisie being unreliable—fear of the proletariat the need to rely on the old order's instruments of power to defend themselves against the "encroachments of the proletariat", as the Bolshevik resolution says.

approximates such a radical *economic* measure, for the liberal bourgeoisie. Why? Because no objective conditions exist that would call forth a struggle among the liberal bourgeoisie for the *confiscation* of a very considerable part of the property that is "legitimate" from the standpoint of the old order. We all *recognise* the existence of these objective conditions among the peasantry, because the Marxists do not demand confiscation out of sheer love for ultra-revolutionary measures, but because they are conscious of the hopeless position of the peasant masses. The incomparably greater depth of the peasantry's bourgeois-democratic revolutionary spirit follows inevitably from this premise in our agrarian programme.

Thirdly: our agrarian programme speaks of "support for the revolutionary acts by the peasantry up to and including the confiscation of the landlords' lands". This is a clear recognition of the need for a definite attitude to the direct revolutionary struggle of the peasants, to "acts" of a mass character that cover a huge area and involve a tremendous section of the country's population. Nothing similar to these *revolutionary acts* is to be found among the *urban* bourgeoisie, not only among the "liberal", i.e., the middle and some of the big bourgeoisie, but also among the democratic petty bourgeoisie. The Social-Democratic Labour Party has never promised, and could never have promised, any "support" for any sort of "confiscation" plans made by the urban bourgeoisie. From this, it can be seen how *erroneous* is the usual Menshevik argument about the "progressive urban" and "backward rural" bourgeoisie, an argument that *is hinted at* in the platform under review. The argument is based on a misunderstanding of our programme's fundamental ideas on the question of the struggle against the survivals of serfdom, a struggle that constitutes the economic content of the bourgeois revolution in Russia.

Fourthly: the political history of Russia for the past year, especially the First Duma and the elections to the Second Duma, has shown clearly that the peasantry, despite all their lack of development, their lack of unity, etc., were able to lay down *immediately* the beginnings of the formation of *political* parties (the "Trudovik" Group, etc.) that are undoubtedly *more democratic* than the liberal-

bourgeois parties (the Constitutional-Democrats among them). This is borne out by a comparison of the Constitutional-Democrats' bill on the agrarian question with that of the "104", or a comparison of the attitude of the Cadets and the Trudoviks towards freedom of assembly and the composition of local land committees, or a comparison of the Cadet press, which is calming the people and quenching the revolutionary, movement with the water of constitutional phrases, and the Trudovik press (*Izvestia Krestyanskikh Deputatov*,[89] etc.), which *is revolutionising*, in the democratic sense, *fresh sections* of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie.

In short, however we approach the question, it must be recognised that the Mensheviks' comparative assessment of the liberals and the Trudoviks is *absolutely wrong*.

The source of this error is a failure to understand the bourgeois revolution that is taking place in Russia's agriculture. This revolution may have two forms—either the retention of landed proprietorship by ridding it of its feudal features and of the bondage of peasant labourers, or the abolition of landed proprietorship through confiscation of that property and transfer of the land to the peasants (in the form of nationalisation, division, "municipalisation", etc., etc.).*

A bourgeois revolution in Russian agriculture is inevitable. And that revolution will remain bourgeois (contrary to the teachings of the Narodniks) even in the second case. However, the revolution may occur either in the first or the second form, depending on whether the democratic revolution is victorious or whether it remains unfinished—whether the peasant masses or the liberal landlords and factory owners will decide the course and outcome of the revolution.

A bourgeois revolution for the purpose of preserving landed proprietorship is being carried out by Stolypin and

* I draw readers' attention in particular to the fact that I have deliberately avoided touching on the disputed questions of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme (division, nationalisation, municipalisation), and have taken only that which has been formally adopted by the Party Congress, and which does not, in effect, give rise to disputes or group divisions among Social-Democrats.

the liberals (the Constitutional-Democratic Party)—by Stolypin in the crudest Asiatic forms that are well able to fan the flames of struggle in the countryside and stimulate the revolution. The liberals are afraid of this and, as they do not wish to risk everything, are in favour of concessions, but of such concessions as would *preserve* landed proprietorship; it is sufficient to recall compensation for the land and, most important of all, the formation of local land committees from landlords and peasants *in equal number*, with *agents of the government* as chairmen! Local land committees of such composition mean preservation of landlord *domination*. Compensation payments for the land mean the strengthening of the peasant bourgeoisie and the enslavement of the peasant proletariat. It is this basic, *economic* solidarity between the Stolypin agrarian reform and that of the Cadets that the Mensheviks fail to understand.

Stolypin and the Cadets disagree on *the extent* of the concessions and on the method (crude or with finesse) of conducting the reform. Stolypin and the Cadets are both for the *reform*, that is, they are for the preservation of landlord *domination* through *concessions to the peasants*.

The proletariat and the peasantry are for the *revolution*, for the *abolition* not only of landlord domination but of *all* landed proprietorship.

We can put an end to the revolution by means of insignificant concessions made by the landlords, says Stolypin.

We can put an end to the revolution only by means of more substantial concessions made by the landlords, say the liberals (the Cadets included).

We want to carry the revolution through to the end, and abolish landed proprietorship, say the peasants and workers.

To deny that the agrarian programmes are thus related means to deny our own agrarian programme, which speaks of "the confiscation of privately-owned land" and "support for the revolutionary acts by the peasantry up to and including the confiscation of the landlords' lands".

To recognise this relationship is to recognise the tactical line of Social-Democracy—the proletariat must carry the democratic peasantry with it, against the autocracy and against the liberals.

It is, therefore, no accident that the Mensheviks are wavering in all their tactics; they are inevitably doomed to vacillation as long as they recognise the present agrarian programme. Some of them would like to change the word "confiscation" for "alienation", thereby *quite consistently* expressing the next stage in opportunism, since they realise the *necessity* to make their Cadet policy conform to the Cadet formulation of the agrarian programme.

This, however, has not yet taken place. It is something that influential Menshevik leaders do not even risk proposing in advance, openly and directly. For them, vacillation in policy is the inevitable outcome.

They have to conduct a policy of support for the Cadets, without daring to announce it openly! Support for the demand for a "Duma ministry", and blocs with the Cadets on account of a fictitious Black-Hundred danger, and voting for a Cadet chairman in the Duma—all these are only individual manifestations of the policy of support for the Cadets, the policy of subordinating the proletariat to the hegemony of the liberals.

But the Mensheviks do not risk defending this policy openly. And the false position they occupy compels them, against their will and consciousness, to "invent" fictitious arguments, such as the "Black-Hundred danger" at the elections, or the fiction that a "Duma ministry" is not a half-way pseudo-reform concealing an attempt at a deal between the Black-Hundred camarilla and the Cadets, or that by taking our 60 or 70 votes away from Golovin (who obtained 356 against 102) we "risked" sinking the Cadets, etc., etc.

This false position compels them *to paint* the Cadets *in bright colours*. They avoid giving this party a *direct* characteristic in accordance with its class composition and its class *backing*. They avoid an assessment of Russian bourgeois parties by the congress. Instead of "liberal bourgeoisie" they speak of "urban bourgeois democracy".

This *absolutely incorrect* description of the Cadets* is defended by one argument, very plausible at first sight—

* The platform under discussion *does not say* outright that the Cadets are a party of urban bourgeois democrats, but this is the sense

the election statistics show it is from the big towns that the majority of Cadet electors come. This argument is groundless: in the first place, the elections to the Second Duma in the twenty-two big towns where, *according to Rech*, there was a Left bloc gave the Cadets 74,000 votes and the Lefts 41,000. And so, despite the Lefts' amazing weakness in legal propaganda (the complete absence of a daily press, the complete absence of open offices, etc.), the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats won more than a third of the votes from the Cadets! Consequently the Constitutional-Democrats represent the *upper stratum* of the urban bourgeoisie, i.e., the liberal bourgeoisie in particular, and not urban "*democrats*" in general. Secondly: for a long time the liberal bourgeoisie of all countries carried with them numerous elements from the lower strata of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, but that did not by any means make them a *democratic* party, a party of the *masses*. The struggle between the socialists and the liberals for *democratic* leadership of the mass of the impoverished urban petty bourgeoisie is a long and difficult one. To declare forthwith that the Cadets are "urban democrats" is to *reject* that struggle, to reject the cause of *the proletariat*, and to hand it over to the liberals. Thirdly, to deny that the liberal *landowners* constitute yet another of the *class supports* of the Cadet Party means distorting generally known political and economic facts—both the composition of the Cadet group in the Duma and, especially, the close connection between the bourgeois intelligentsia, lawyers, etc., and the landowners, and the dependence of the former on the latter. The Cadet agrarian policy *is* the policy of the liberal landowner. The fewer the liberals among the landowners, the more rapidly does the Cadet agrarian policy turn into the pious wishes for "social peace" expressed by the impotent bourgeois intellectual. The Cadets do not

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of the whole text and of all the conclusions. The "explanations" of the Menshevik press are identical. What has remained unsaid in the platform only stresses again and again how very essential it is to place before the congress the question of the class content of the various bourgeois parties and our attitude to them. There can be no consistent tactics unless this is done.

turn "democratic" by continuing to dream of conciliation and an amicable agreement between the Octobrist landowner and the Trudovik peasant.*

* * *

The fundamental error in determining the relations between the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry runs like a scarlet thread through the entire Menshevik "tactical platform". Here is another of their formulations of this erroneous idea:

> "The proletariat, left entirely to itself and insufficiently supported [!!] by urban democrats, was inclined [after the October-December period] to minimise the progressive role that, in general, falls to the lot of those democrats in the present revolution, and, in conformity with this, adopted a one-sided, hostile stand towards it.... In consequence of this incorrect understanding by the proletariat of the historic role of the urban bourgeoisie, the proletariat has begun one-sidedly to place all its revolutionary hopes on the movement of the peasantry which is appearing on the stage of history."

This is a wonderful passage that deserves to go down in history as a description of the "self-forgetfulness" of part of Russian Social-Democrats in 1907.

This is, in effect, an avowal of contrition made by Social-Democrats to the liberals—neither more nor less! Just think of it—at the time of the Second Duma, when there is a clearly expressed sharpening of political extremes between the Black Hundreds and the Left wing; of the

* It will be remembered that the Right-wing Cadets, Mr. Struve among them, proposed electing the Octobrist Kapustin and the Trudovik Berezin vice-chairmen of the Second Duma. I am ready to call this plan a "masterly" manifestation of liberal "wit". And this is how matters actually stand *objectively*: it is the *historic mission* of the Cadet to reconcile the Octobrist landowner with the Trudovik peasant. The Left-wing Cadets did not want a demonstration of this because of their fear of the Lefts. This is, however, an indisputable fact. The objective state of affairs makes it the historic mission of the Cadets to put an end to the revolution through the reconciliation of the Octobrist landowners and the Trudovik peasants. And vice versa—the Russian revolution can remain uncompleted, not brought to its final stage, only if it were found possible jointly "to satisfy" the basic economic interests of both the Octobrist landlords and the Trudovik peasants.

Duma, when there is a revolutionary crisis, the maturing of which nobody will risk denying, when there is an obvious swing to the Right of the weakened liberal "Centre" (Cadats), when the liberals have been shouldered aside by the democratic peasants at the elections—Social-Democrats are to be found who *publicly repent* to the *liberals* of their "one-sided hostility" to them, repent of *minimising* their progressive role! What is this, eh? Is it a tactical platform, carefully thought out and weighed prior to the congress by eminent leaders of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, or the whining of petty-bourgeois intellectuals who are getting nostalgic in the proletarian surroundings so uncongenial to them?

"The proletariat, adopted a one-sided, hostile stand towards urban democracy...." What was this expressed in? Let us go over the political events of the last year in our minds. In the boycott? But that was, firstly, prior to the Unity Congress, and the authors of the platform are reviewing events that followed it. And, secondly, what have "urban democrats" to do with it? No, apparently the boycott is not meant. It must be the question of support for the demand for a Duma ministry and of blocs with the Cadets. Here, of course, the *proletariat* displayed a hostile attitude towards the *Cadets* but not by any means towards urban democracy.

And who, within the Party, gave expression to this hostile attitude of the *proletariat*? The Bolsheviks....

The authors of the platform have accidentally told a great truth—in their war against support for the "Duma" ministry demand and against blocs with the Cadets, the Bolsheviks were expressing the policy of the *proletariat*. This is true. It is only the petty-bourgeois section of the workers' party that dreams of softening the hostile attitude to the liberals.

...The proletariat is "insufficiently supported by urban democrats...".

First: here the error in confusing the liberals (Cadets) with urban democracy stands out with particular clarity. According to *Rech* figures, there was a "Left election bloc" in twenty-two cities—these also including Menshevik organisations. In these cities the proletariat was undoubt-

edly supported to a considerable extent by *urban democrats*, against the Cadets (41,000 votes for the Left bloc, 74,000 for the Cadets). The conclusion to be drawn from this is certainly not in favour of the Mensheviks; the proletariat can and must attract to its side urban (and rural) petty-bourgeois democrats, against the liberal bourgeoisie.

Secondly: when the Mensheviks speak of *insufficient* liberal *support* for the proletariat, do they understand the *value* of liberal support for the proletariat? Their platform is being written in 1907, and not altogether outside of time and space, no matter how much they try to give it the least concrete and most aerial character. Between 1902 and 1904 and even 1905, until the month of October, both Mr. Struve and the liberals in general frequently announced their support for the proletariat, and actually did give their support in the onslaught on the autocracy.

But after October 1905? The Mensheviks cannot but know that *in December and after December* the liberals turned their backs on the proletariat and ceased giving support to its revolutionary struggle.

We may well ask: By whom and towards whom was a one-sided hostility displayed?

By the proletariat towards the liberals?

Or by the liberals towards the proletariat and towards the revolution?

Or by the Mensheviks towards the tactics of the proletarian class struggle?

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When the Mensheviks go so far as to speak of "one-sided hostility", they are contraposing, as clearly as possible, two views on the Russian revolution after October 1905. The liberal view—the view of the Russian followers of those German Treitschkes[90] who announced that 1848 was "a year of madness"—is that the proletariat assumed a one-sided, hostile stand towards liberalism, towards constitutional legality, towards the monarchist constitution, towards compensation for the land, etc.

The view of the *proletariat*—similar to the view of all European socialists on European bourgeois revolutions—

is that the liberal bourgeoisie assumed a one-sided, hostile stand towards the revolution, towards freedom, towards democracy, etc.

The Mensheviks are trying to divert the working-class party from the second view to the first.

The working-class party will parry every such attempt on the part of the Mensheviks by trying to divert the Mensheviks from the working-class party to the liberals.

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We do not by any means wish to say that the Mensheviks are, in general, trying to turn the working-class party into an appendage to the liberals. The difference between the opportunists inside the workers' party and the liberals outside its ranks is this: the former continue to serve their party sincerely but in so doing adopt an unstable and incorrect tactical stand that *leads* to the political subordination of the proletariat to liberalism.

The "unfortunate" quality possessed by this stand is that the Mensheviks, in their desire to attack the Bolsheviks, actually attack the proletariat and the proletarian attitude to the revolution. This happens each time the attacks of the Mensheviks are really grounded in principle, i.e., when they deal with the reasons for the two different sets of tactics. Attacks that are not grounded in principle are another matter; they have only to be briefly mentioned for the reader to be confronted by the question: Is this a platform we have before us or a polemical article by a liberal?

We read in the "platform", for example, that the "proletarian masses [*sic*!] are inclined to believe in the forthcoming political miracle of a sudden [!!] insurrection that will come about irrespective [!!] of the internal development of the proletariat itself and with one blow [!!] will replace the autocracy by the political rule of the working classes".

Up to now only the liberal newspapers have attributed *such* things in *such* a form to the "proletarian masses". What made the Mensheviks speak about an uprising at all,

is something we cannot understand. But such talk of an uprising in a tactical platform that does not contain another word about an uprising except the sentence quoted cannot but evoke the question: instead of "Menshevik platform", should we not say hereafter "liberal platform"?

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Facsimile of the first page of Lenin's manuscript "Draft for a Speech on the Agrarian Question in the Second State Duma", 1907

DRAFT FOR A SPEECH ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE SECOND STATE DUMA[91]

Gentlemen, a number of speakers have addressed the Duma and outlined the basic views of the different parties on the question of the land. It is time to start summing up. It is time to give ourselves clear-cut and precise answers to the quex land question such a difficult one? What are the basic views of all the main parties whose representatives have spoken in the Duma? In what do the various parties differ decisively and irrevocably on the land question?

Four principal views on the agrarian question have been laid before the house by representatives of the four main parties or party trends. Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky outlined the views of the Rights, using that word to mean jointly the Octobrists, monarchists, etc. Deputy Kutler outlined the views of the Cadets, the so-called "people's freedom party". Deputy Karavayev outlined the views of the Trudoviks. Further details were added by Deputies Zimin, Kolokolnikov, Baskin and Tikhvinsky, who, in essence, are in agreement with Karavayev. Lastly my comrade Tsereteli outlined the views of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Minister Vasilchikov, the government representative, gave us the government's view which, as I shall show later in my speech, boils down to a reconciliation of the views of the Rights and those of the Cadets.

Let us see what the views of these four political trends on the agrarian question consist in. I shall take them in the same order as that in which they spoke in the Duma, i.e., I will begin with the Rights.

The basic view of Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky is that of all the so-called "monarchist" parties and of all Octobrists, the view of the majority of Russian landowners. Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky expressed it superbly in the words: "And so, gentlemen, *abandon the idea of increasing the area of peasant-owned land*, other than in exceptional cases where the land is really overcrowded" (I quote from the report in the newspaper *Tovarishch*, which is the fullest, since the verbatim reports have not yet been published).

This was well said; it was straightforward, clear and simple. *Abandon the idea* of increasing the peasants' land—this is the real view of *all* the Right parties, from the Union of the Russian People to the Octobrists. And we are well aware that this is the view of them mass of Russian landowners and those of other nations inhabiting Russia.

Why do the landlords advise the peasants *to abandon the idea* of extending the peasant-owned land? Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky provides the explanation—it is because landlord farming is better organised, more "cultured" than peasant farming. The peasants, he says, are "dull, backward and ignorant". The peasants cannot, if you please, get along without the guidance of the landlords. "As the priest is, so is his parish," was the way Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky wittily put it. Apparently he firmly believes that the landlord will always be *the priest* and the peasants will always be *the sheep of his flock* and allow themselves *to be shorn*.

But will it always be so, Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky? Will it always be so, Messrs. Landlords? May you not be mistaken in this. Is it not because they were too "backward and ignorant" that the peasants have, until now, remained "the sheep in the flock"? Today, however, we see that the peasants are becoming *politically conscious*. The peasant deputies to the Duma are not attaching themselves to the "Rights" but to the Trudoviks and Social-Democrats. Speeches like that made by Svyatopolk-Mirsky will help the most backward peasants understand where the truth lies, and whether it is possible for them to support those parties that advise the peasants *to abandon the idea* of extending peasant-owned lands?

For that reason I welcome from the bottom of my heart the speech made by Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky and also the future speeches on that question that will be made by all speakers from the Right benches. Continue in the same vein, gentlemen! You are helping us splendidly to open the eyes of the most backward peasants!

They say that landlord farming is more cultured than peasant farming ... that the peasants cannot get along without the landlord's guidance.

But I will tell you that the whole history of landed proprietorship and landlord farming in Russia, all the data on landlord farming prove that the "*guidance*" of the landlords has always meant and today still means the unbridled coercion of the peasants, the endless denigration of peasant men and women, the most unconscionable and shameless exploitation (that word means "plunder" in Russian) of peasant labour, exploitation never seen anywhere else in the world. Such oppression and abuse, such poverty as that endured by the Russian peasant, is not to be found, not only in Western Europe, but even in Turkey.

My comrade Tsereteli has already spoken of the way in which inhabited estates were handed out to the favourites and hangers-on of court "circles". I want to focus your attention on the question of *farming* touched upon by Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who spoke of the vaunted "culture" of the landlords.

Does that deputy know what the peasants call "*labour service*" *or* "*squirism*"? Or what *labour-service farming* is called in the science of economics?

The farming of a landed estate by labour service is the direct descendant, the direct survival, of the *serf-owning*, corvée farming of the landlords. What was the essence of the serf system of farming? The peasants obtained an *allotment* from the landlord to feed their own families, and in return had to work three days (and sometimes more) on the land of the proprietor. Instead of paying the worker in money as is now the case everywhere in the towns, the landlords paid *in land*. The peasant was barely able to subsist from the allotment he received from the landlord. And for this bare ration the peasant and all his family had to till the landlord's land, using the peasant's own horses

and the peasant's own implements or "stock". Such is the essence of serf farming—a beggarly allotment of land instead of payment for labour; the tilling of the landlord's land, using the peasant's labour and the peasant's implements; the compulsory labour of the peasant under threat of the landlord's cudgel. Under this system of farming the peasant himself had to become *a serf*, because without *coercion* nobody in possession of an allotment would have worked for the landlord. And what serfdom meant to the peasants—that they themselves know far too much about; it is too firmly fixed in their memories.

Serfdom is *considered* to have been abolished. In actual fact, however, the landlords retain so much power (thanks to the lands they have acquired by plunder) that today they still keep the peasant in serf dependence—*by means of labour service*. Labour service is the serfdom of today. When, in his speech on the government declaration, my comrade Tsereteli spoke of the serf-owning nature of landed proprietorship and of the entire existing state power in Russia, one of the newspapers that fawns on the government—the paper is called *Novoye Vremya*—raised an outcry about Deputy Tsereteli having spoken a lie. But that is not so; the deputy of the Social-Democratic Labour Party was speaking the truth. Only an ignoramus or a mercenary ink-slinger could deny that labour service is a direct survival of serfdom, and that landlord farming in our country is kept going by labour service.

What, in essence, is labour service? It boils down to this: the landlord's land is not tilled with the landlord's implements and not by hired labourers, but with the implements of the peasant who is *in bondage to* his landlord neighbour. And the peasant has to go into bondage because the landlord cut off the best lands for himself, planted the peasant on sandy wasteland and pushed him on to a beggarly allotment. The landlords took so much land for themselves that it is not only impossible for the peasant to run a farm but there is not even room "for a chicken to run around in".

The gubernia committees of landlords, in 1861, and the landlords who were civil mediators (apparently they were called "civil" because they were civil to the landlords)[92]

emancipated the peasants in such a way that *one-fifth* of the peasants' land was cut off by the landlords! They *emancipated* the peasants in such a way that the peasant was forced to pay *treble the price* for the allotment that remained in his possession after this plunder! It is no secret to anybody that according to the "*land redemption*" scheme of 1861 the peasant was compelled to pay *much more than* the land was worth. It is no secret to anybody that the peasant was at that time forced *to redeem* not only the peasant land but also *the peasant's emancipation*. It is no secret to anybody that the "philanthropy" of the *state* redemption scheme consisted in the Treasury filching *more* money from the peasant for the land (in the form of redemption payments) *than it gave to the landlord*! This was a fraternal alliance between the landlord and the "liberal" civil servant to rob the peasant. If Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky has forgotten all this, the peasant, *for sure*, has not forgotten it. If Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky does not know this, then let him read what Professor Janson wrote *thirty years ago* in his *Essay on the Statistical Investigation of Peasant Allotments and Payments* and which has been repeated a thousand times since then in all our literature on economic statistics.

The peasant was "emancipated" in *such a way* in 1861 that he ran straight into the landlord's *noose*. The peasant is so downtrodden on account of the land seized by the landlords that he must either die of starvation or give himself into bondage.

And in the twentieth century the "free" Russian peasant is still forced to give himself into bondage to his landlord neighbour *in exactly the same way* as the "smerdi" (as the peasants were called in *Russkaya Pravda*[93]) gave themselves into bondage in the eleventh century and "registered themselves" as belonging to the landlords!

Words have changed, laws have been promulgated and repealed, centuries have elapsed, but things remain essentially the same as they were. Labour service is the bonded dependence of a peasant who is forced to till his landlord neighbour's soil with his own implements. Labour-service farming is the same renovated, refurbished and reshaped *serf* farming.

In order to make my meaning clear, I will cite an example from the countless number that fills our literature on peasant and landlord farming. There is a very extensive publication, issued by the Department of Agriculture, that deals with the early nineties and is based on data *obtained from farmers* concerning the landlord farming system in Russia (*Agricultural and Statistical Data Obtained from Farmers*. Published by the Department of Agriculture, Issue V, St. Petersburg, 1892). These data were analysed by Mr. S. A. Korolenko (not to be confused with V. G. Korolenko); that Mr. S. A. Korolenko was no progressive writer but a reactionary civil servant. In his book of analysis, you may read, on page 118:

"In the south of Yelets Uyezd (Orel Gubernia), side by side with the work of labourers employed by the year, a substantial part of the land on big landlord estates is tilled by peasants in payment for land which they rent. *Former serfs* [note that, Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky] *continue* to rent land *from their former landlords* and, in payment for it, till the landlords' land. Such villages are *still* called [mark this!] the '*corvée*' of such-and-such a landlord."

This was written in the nineties of the last century, *thirty years* after what was called the "emancipation" of the peasants. *Thirty years* after 1861, the same "*corvée*" existed, the same cultivation of the land of the *former* landlords with the implements of the peasant!

Perhaps the objection will be raised that this is an individual case. But anyone who is acquainted with landlord farming in the central black-earth belt of Russia, anyone who has the slightest acquaintance with Russian economic literature, will have to admit that this is no exception, but *the general rule*. In the *Russian* gubernias proper, where the *true Russian* landlords are in the majority (not for nothing are they so dear to the hearts of the *true Russian* people on the Right benches!) *labour-service farming predominates* to this day.

I can refer you, for instance, to a well-known scientific work, the book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, compiled by a number of scholars. The book appeared in *1897*. It shows the preponderance of *labour-service* farming in the following gubernias: Ufa, Simbirsk, Samara, Tam-

bov, Penza, Orel, Kursk, Ryazan, Tula, Kazan, Nizhni-Novgorod, Pskov, Novgorod, Kostroma, Tver, Vladimir, and Chernigov, i.e., in 17 *Russian* gubernias.

The preponderance of labour-service farming—what does that mean?

It means that the landlord's land is cultivated with the same peasant implements, by the labour of the poverty-stricken, ruined and enslaved peasant. And here you have that "culture" of which Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky spoke, and of which all those who defend the landlords' interests speak. The landlords, of course, possess better cattle, which live better in the master's sheds than the peasant does in his own cottage. The landlord, of course, gets a better harvest because the landlords' committees as long ago as 1861 took good care to cut the best lands off from the peasant holdings and register them in the landlords' names. One can speak of the "culture" of the Russian landlords' farms only by way of ridicule. On a large number of estates there is no landlord farming *whatsoever*; the same peasant system of farming is carried on, the land is ploughed by the peasant's sorry nag and tilled with the peasant's old and unsuitable implements. In no European country does serf farming still survive on big landed estates and latifundia, carried on with the aid of bonded peasants—in no other country, except Russia.

Landlord "culture" is the preservation of landlord serf-ownership. Landlord culture is usury perpetrated against the impoverished peasant, who is fleeced and enslaved for a dessiatine of land, for pasture, for water for his cattle, for firewood, for a pood of flour loaned to the hungry muzhik in winter at extortionate interest, for a ruble begged by the peasant's family....

And those gentlemen on the Right benches talk about the Jews exploiting the peasants, about Jewish usury! But thousands of Jewish merchants would not skin the Russian muzhik in the way the true Russian, Christian landlords do! The interest claimed by the worst usurer is not to be compared with that claimed by the true Russian landlord, who hires a muzhik in winter for summer work or who forces him to pay for a dessiatine of land in labour, money, eggs, chickens, and God alone knows what else!

That may seem like a joke, but it is a bitter joke that is too close to the truth. Here is an *actual* example of what a peasant pays for *one* dessiatine of land (the example is taken from Karyshev's well-known book on peasant rentings): for one dessiatine of land the peasant must cultivate one and a half dessiatines, bring the landlord ten eggs and a hen and in addition provide one day's female labour (see p. 348 of Karyshev's book).[94]

What is that? "Culture", or the most shameless feudal exploitation?

Those who want to make Russia and Europe believe that our peasants are hostile to culture are telling a blatant lie, are slandering the peasants. They are not speaking the truth! The Russian peasants are struggling for freedom, against *feudal* exploitation. The peasant movement is spreading ever more widely, ever more boldly, and the struggle of the peasants against the landlords has been the sharpest *precisely* in the *true Russian* gubernias, where *true Russian* serfdom, *true Russian* labour service, bondage and abuse of the impoverished and debt-ridden peasantry is strongest and most deep-rooted!

Labour service is not preserved by force of law—by law the peasant is "free" to die of starvation!—it is maintained by force of the peasant's *economic dependence*. No laws, no prohibitions, no "supervision" or "tutelage" can do anything whatsoever against labour service and bondage. There is only one way to get rid of this ulcer on the body of the Russian people—*the abolition of landed proprietorship*, because in the overwhelming majority of cases it is still *serf* proprietorship, the source and the mainstay of *feudal* exploitation.

All and any talk of "aid" for the peasants, of "improving" their condition, of "helping" them acquire land and other similar speechifying that the landlords and civil servants are so fond of, all this boils down to hollow pretexts and subterfuges, as long as it evades *the principal question*—whether or not to preserve landed proprietorship.

That is the kernel of the whole issue. And I must give special warning to the peasants and the peasant deputies—evasion of *the real substance* of the issue must not be allowed. You must trust in no promises no fine words, until the

most important thing has been made clear—will the landed estates remain the property of the landlords or will they pass into the peasants' hands? *If they remain the property of the landlords, labour service and bondage will remain.* Constant hunger and want for millions of peasants will also remain. The torment of gradual extinction from starvation—that is what the retention of landed proprietorship means for the peasants.

To show what the real nature of the agrarian question is, we must recall some of the chief figures on the distribution of landed property in Russia. The latest statistical data available on land ownership in Russia refer *to the year 1905*. The Central Statistical Committee gathered them in the course of a special investigation, the full results of which have not yet been published. However, the chief results are known to us from the newspapers. European Russia is considered to have an area of about 400 million dessiatines. Of the 395.5 million on which preliminary data are available, 155 million belong to the state, the imperial family,[95] the church and church institutions, 102 million belong to private persons, and 138.5 million are peasant allotments.

At first glance it might seem that the state has the greatest share so that the question is not one of landlords' lands.

This is a frequently occurring mistake that should be eliminated once and for all. It is true that the state owns 138 million dessiatines, *but almost all that land* is in the northern gubernias—Archangel, Vologda and Olonets, in places where *farming is impossible*. The government itself, according to the precise figures of the statisticians (I refer you, for example, to Mr. Prokopovich and his book *The Agrarian Question in Figures*) could not find more than slightly over seven million dessiatines of state lands that could be given to the peasants.

One cannot, therefore, speak seriously of state-owned lands. Nor need one speak about peasant migration to Siberia. This question has been made clear enough by the Trudovik speaker in the Duma. If the landlord gentlemen really believe in the advantages of migration to Siberia, let them go to Siberia themselves! The peasants would most likely agree to that.... But they would probably regard

as sheer mockery the proposal that the neediness of the peasants should be remedied with Siberia.

In respect of the Russian gubernias, and the central black-earth gubernias in particular, where the peasants are the most needy, the matter is *precisely one of the landlords' lands* and no others. And Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky is wasting his time talking about "exceptional cases where the land is really overcrowded".

Overcrowding on the land is the rule and not the exception in central Russia. And the peasants are overcrowded because the landlord gentlemen have accommodated themselves far too spaciously, because they give themselves too much room to move. "Peasant overcrowding" is the result of the seizure of land masses by the landlords.

"Land hunger" for the peasant means "land surfeit" for the landlord.

Here, gentlemen, are the plain and simple figures. Peasant land allotments total 138.5 million dessiatines. Privately-owned land amounts to 102 million dessiatines. How much of this last amount belongs to *big* estate owners?

Seventy-nine and a half million dessiatines belong to owners possessing *more than 50 dessiatines each*.

And how many owners does this huge area of land belong to? *Less than 135,000* (the exact figure is 133,898).

Think well over these figures: 135,000 people out of a hundred odd million inhabitants of *European* Russia own *almost eighty million* dessiatines of land!!

And side by side with this, twelve and a quarter million peasant family allotments total 138.5 million dessiatines.

The average per big landowner, per (for simplicity's sake we'll say) landlord, is *594 dessiatines*.

The average per peasant household is *eleven and one-third dessiatines*.

And this is what Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and others of his ilk call "*exceptional cases of overcrowding on the land*". How can there be anything but *universal* "overcrowding" of the peasants when a handful of rich people numbering 135,000 have 600 dessiatines each and millions of peasants have 11 dessiatines per farm? How can there be anything but peasant "land hunger" when there is such a tremen-

dously excessive *surfeit of land* in the hands of the landlords?

Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky advised us "*to abandon the idea*" of increasing the amount of land owned by the peasants. But no, the working class will not abandon that idea. The peasants will not abandon that idea. Millions and tens of millions of people *cannot* give up that idea, or *abandon the struggle* to achieve their goal.

The figures I have quoted show clearly what that struggle is about. Landlords, with an *average* of 600 dessiatines per estate, are struggling for their wealth, for their incomes that probably total more than 500 million rubles a year. The biggest landlords are often the highest officers of the state as well. Our state, as my comrade Tsereteli has already in all justice said, protects the interests of *a handful of landlords* and not the interests of the people. No wonder the majority of the landlords and the whole government are struggling furiously against the demands of the peasants. History does not know any cases of the ruling and oppressing classes voluntarily relinquishing their right to rule and to oppress, their right to huge incomes from enslaved peasants and workers.

The peasants are struggling to free themselves from bondage, from labour service, from feudal exploitation. The peasants are struggling for an opportunity to live just a little bit like human being. And the working class gives *full* support to the peasants against the landlords, given its support in the interests of the workers themselves, who also bear the burden of landlord oppression; it gives its support in the interests of our entire social development that is being held back because of landlord oppression.

In order to show you, gentlemen, what the peasantry can and *must* achieve by their struggle, I will make a small calculation.

"The time has come to have recourse to the eloquence of figures," Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture, has said, "facts and reality, rather than to words, to make this question clear." I Am in the fullest agreement with the minister. Yes, yes, gentlemen, that is how it is—more figures, more figures on *the extent of l-a-n-d-l-o-r-d* owner-

ship of land and on the sizes of the allotments owned by the peasants. I have already quoted figures showing *how much* "surplus" land the landlords own. Now I will give the figures on the extent of the *peasant* need for land. On the average, as I have said, each peasant household owns eleven and one-third dessiatines of allotment land. But this *average* figure *conceals* the peasants' need for land, because most peasants possess an allotment of land that is *below the average*, and an insignificant minority have more than the average.

Out of twelve and a quarter million peasant households, 860,000 (in round figures) have allotments amounting to *less than five dessiatines per household*. Three million, three hundred and twenty thousand have *from five to eight dessiatines*. Four million, eight hundred and ten thousand have *from eight to twenty dessiatines*. Only one million, one hundred thousand households have *from twenty to fifty dessiatines* and only a quarter of a million have *more than fifty dessiatines* (these last-named probably do not have more than seventy-five dessiatines per household on the average).

Let us assume that 79.5 million dessiatines of landlords' land is used to extend peasant holdings. Let us assume that the peasant—in the words of the Reverend Tikhvinsky, a supporter of the Peasant Union—does not want to *denude* the landlord of his land and will leave *fifty dessiatines* to each landlord. This is probably too high a figure for such "cultured" gentlemen as our landlords, but, for the time being, we can take this figure as an example. Deducting fifty dessiatines for each of the 135,000 landlords would leave *seventy-two* million dessiatines that could be freed for the *peasants*. There is no reason to deduct the forests from this figure (as some writers do, for example Mr. Prokopovich, whose figures I have used several times) because forest land also produces an income which cannot possibly be left in the hands of a small group of landlords.

To this seventy-two million add the cultivable state lands (about 7.3 million dessiatines), *all* the lands of *the imperial family* (7.9 million dessiatines), the church and monastery lands (2.7 million dessiatines), and you will get a

total *of about ninety million dessiatines.** This total amount is sufficient *to expand* the *aggregate* land owned by the poorest peasant households to *no less than sixteen dessiatines per household.*

Do you realise what that means, gentlemen?

That would be a tremendous step forward, that would deliver millions of peasants from starvation; that would raise the living standard of tens of millions of peasants and workers, would give them greater opportunities to live more or less like human beings, in the way more or less cultured citizens of a "cultured" state live, and not in the way the dying race of modern Russian peasantry is living. That would not, of course, deliver all the working people from all forms of poverty and oppression (for that it would be necessary to transform capitalist into socialist society) but it would go a very long way towards making easier their struggle for such deliverance. *Over six* million peasant households, *more than half* of the total number of peasants, possess, as I have said, *less than eight dessiatines per household.* The land they own would be *more than doubled, almost trebled.*

This means that half the peasantry, always impoverished, hungry, and undercutting the price of the labour of the workers in the towns, at the factories—half the peasants *would be able to feel that they are human beings*!

Can Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, or others of his ilk, seriously advise millions of workers and peasants *to abandon the idea* of a way out of an unbearable, desperate situation, a way out that is quite possible, practicable and near at hand?

But it is not only a matter of the land owned by the greater part of the poor peasant households possibly being *almost trebled* at the expense of the landlords' *surfeit of land.* In addition to these *six* million poor households, there are *almost five* (to be exact, 4.8) *million* peasant households owning from *eight to twenty dessiatines.* There is no doubt that no less than three out of the five million live in poverty on their beggarly allotments. These *three mil-*

* An exact calculation (in case of questions) is given at the end of Notebook 3.[96]

lion households, too, could raise their holdings *to sixteen dessiatines per household*, i.e., increase the holding *by a half*, and some could even *double it*.

On the whole, it works out that *nine million households* out of a total of 12.25 million could *greatly* improve their condition (and improve *the condition of the workers*, whom they would *stop undercutting*!) at the expense of the land of the *landlord gentlemen*, who have too great an *excess* of land and who are too accustomed to *the serf system of farming*!

This is what we are told by the figures on the relative dimensions of *large-scale landlord* ownership and *insufficient peasant* holdings. I am very much afraid these *facts and figures* will not be to the liking of that lover of facts and figures, Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture. Did he not say to us in his speech, immediately after expressing a desire to use figures:

"...In connection with this, one cannot but express the apprehension that *those hopes* which *many people place* in the implementation of such reforms [i.e., extensive land reforms] will, *when confronted with the figures*, lose all chance of being realised...."

Your apprehension is groundless, Mr. Minister of Agriculture! It is precisely *confrontation with the figures* that *should give* the peasants' hopes of deliverance from labour service and feudal exploitation *every chance* of being realised *in their entirety*! And no matter how unpleasant these *figures* may be for Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture, or for Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and other landlords, *these figures cannot be refuted*!

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I shall now proceed to the objections that may be raised against the peasants' demands. And, strange as it may seem at first glance, in analysing the objections to the peasants' demands I must *in the main* deal with the arguments of Mr. Kutler, representative of the so-called "people's freedom" party.

The necessity for this does not arise out of any *desire* on my part to argue with Mr. Kutler. Nothing of the sort.

I should be very glad if those who champion the peasants' struggle for land had *to argue* against the "Rights" *only*. Throughout his speech, however, Mr. Kutler *objected*, in substance, to the peasants' demands as put forward by the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks: he objected both directly (for instance, he disputed the proposal made by my comrade Tsereteli on behalf of the entire Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) and *indirectly* by pointing out to the Trudoviks the need to curtail, need to limit their demands.

Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky did not actually expect to convince anybody. In particular, he was far from expecting that he could convince the peasants. He was not trying to convince, but was *expressing his will*, or, more correctly, the will of most landlords. In simple and direct terms, the "speech" made by Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky boils down to *no* increase *whatsoever* in the amount of land owned by the peasants.

Deputy Kutler, on the contrary, was all the time using his powers of persuasion, *trying to convince* mainly the peasants to renounce that which he declared to be impracticable and excessive in the Trudovik draft, and which, in the draft of our Social-Democratic Party was not only impracticable but even "the greatest injustice", to use the words in which he expressed himself, concerning the proposal made by the representative of Social-Democracy.

I shall now analyse Deputy Kutler's objections and the main basis for those views on the agrarian question, those drafts for agrarian reforms, that are defended by the so-called "people's freedom" party.

Let us begin with what Deputy Kutler, in his argument against my Party comrade, called "the greatest injustice". "It seems to me," said the representative of the Cadet Party, "that the abolition of private property in land would be the greatest injustice, as long as the other forms of property, real and personal estate, still remain!..." And then farther: "Since nobody proposes to abolish property in general, it is essential that the existence of property in land be in every way recognised."

That is the line of argument followed by Deputy Kutler, who "refuted" Social-Democrat Tsereteli by stating

that "other property [other than landed property] was also acquired in a manner that was, perhaps, even less praiseworthy". The more I think over Deputy Kutler's argument, the more I find it—how shall I express it mildly?—strange. "It would be unjust to abolish property in land if other forms of property are not abolished...."

But, gentlemen, kindly remember your own postulates, your own words and plans! You yourselves proceed from the fact that *certain* forms of landed property are "unjust", and so unjust that they require a special law on the ways and means of abolishing them.

So what does this actually amount to? To saying that it is "the greatest injustice" to abolish *one form* of injustice without abolishing others?? That is what Mr. Kutler's words amount to. This is the first time I have been confronted by a liberal, and such a moderate, sober, bureaucratically-schooled liberal at that, who proclaims the principle of "*everything or nothing*"! For, indeed, Mr. Kutler's argument is based entirely on the principle of "everything or nothing". I, as a revolutionary Social-Democrat, must positively declare against such a method of argument....

Imagine, gentlemen, that I have to remove two heaps of rubbish from my yard. I have only one cart. And no more than one heap can be removed on one cart. What should I do? Should I refuse altogether to clean out my yard on the grounds that it would be the greatest injustice to remove one heap of rubbish because they cannot both be removed at the same time?

I permit myself to believe that anyone who *really* wants to clean out his yard *completely*, who sincerely strives for cleanliness and not for dirt; for light and not for darkness, will have a different argument. If we really cannot remove both heaps at the same time, let us first remove the one that can be got at and loaded on to the cart immediately, and then empty the cart, return home and set to work on the other heap. That's all there is to it, Mr. Kutler! Just that and nothing more!

To begin with, the Russian people have to carry away on their cart all that rubbish that is known as feudal, landed proprietorship, and then come back with the empty cart to

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a cleaner yard, and begin loading the second heap, begin clearing out the rubbish of capitalist exploitation!

Do you agree to that, Mr. Kutler, if you are a real opponent of all sorts of rubbish? Let us write it into a resolution for the State Duma, using your own words: "recognising, jointly with Deputy Kutler, that capitalist property is no more praiseworthy than feudal landlord property, the State Duma resolves to deliver Russia first from the latter in order later to tackle the former".

If Mr. Kutler does not support this proposal of mine I shall be left with the firm conviction that, in sending us from feudal property to capitalist property, the "people's freedom" party is merely sending us from Pontius to Pilate,[97] as the saying goes, or, to put it more simply, is seeking evasion, saving itself by flight from a clear statement of the question. We have never heard that the "people's freedom" party wants to struggle for socialism (and is not *the struggle against capitalist property a struggle for socialism*?). But we have heard a lot, a very great deal, about that party wanting to struggle for freedom, for the people's rights. But now, when the question on the order of the day is not one of the immediate introduction of socialism but of the immediate introduction of *freedom*, and freedom from *serfdom*, Mr. Kutler suddenly refers us to questions of socialism! Mr. Kutler declares the abolition of landed proprietorship based on labour service and bondage to be "the greatest injustice"—and this for the reason, *exclusively* for the reason, that he has remembered the injustice of capitalist property.... Have it as you will—it is rather strange.

I have believed until now that Mr. Kutler is not a socialist. Now I have become convinced that he is not a democrat at all, that he is no champion of people's freedom—of real freedom, not people's freedom in inverted commas. Nobody in the world will agree to call or consider democrats those people who, in an epoch of struggle for freedom, qualify as "the greatest injustice" the abolition of that which is destroying freedom, which is oppressing and suppressing freedom....

Mr. Kutler's other objection was not directed against the Social-Democrat but against the Trudovik. "It seems

to me," said Mr. Kutler, "that it may be possible to imagine the political conditions under which the land nationalisation bill [he is referring to the project of the Trudovik Group; Mr. Kutler described it inaccurately but that is not the important thing at the moment] might become law, but I cannot imagine there being, in the near future, political conditions under which such a law could actually be implemented."

Again, an astonishingly strange argument, but not in any way strange from the standpoint of socialism (nothing of the sort!) or even from the standpoint of the "right to land" or any other "Trudovik" principle—no, it is strange from the point of view of that very same "people's freedom" we hear so much about from Mr. Kutler's party.

Mr. Kutler has all the time been trying to convince the Trudoviks that their bill is "impracticable", that they are wasting their time by pursuing the aim of "radically reforming existing land relations", and so on and so forth. We now see clearly that Mr. Kutler sees this *impracticability* as due to nothing else but *the political conditions* of the present day and the immediate future!!

You will excuse me, gentlemen, but this is really some sort of fog, some unpardonable confusion of concepts. It is because we discuss and propose *changes* to better bad conditions that we here call ourselves representatives of the people and are considered members of a legislative assembly. And in the thick of a discussion on the question of changing one of the very worst conditions, the objection is raised: "impracticable ... either now ... or in the near future ... political conditions".

One of the two, Mr. Kutler—either the Duma is itself *a political condition*, in which case it is unworthy of a democrat to adapt himself, to readjust himself to whatever curtailments may arise out of *other* "political conditions", or else the Duma is not a "political condition" but merely an ordinary office that has to take into consideration what may or may not please those more highly placed—and in the latter case we have no reason for posing as representatives of the people.

If we are representatives of the people, we must say what the people are thinking and what they want, and not that

which is agreeable to the higher-ups or some sort of "political conditions". If we are government officials, then I am perhaps prepared to understand that we shall declare in advance that anything is "impracticable" which the powers that be have given us to understand is not to their liking.

..."*Political* conditions..."! What does that mean? It means: military courts, an augmented secret police, lawlessness and lack of civil rights, the Council of State and other equally sweet *in-sti-tu-tions* of the Russian Empire. Does Mr. Kutler want to adapt his agrarian reform to *what is practicable under military courts*, augmented secret police and the Council of State? I should not be at all surprised if Mr. Kutler were to be rewarded for that, not with the sympathy of the people, of course, but with a medal for his servility!

Mr. Kutler *is able to imagine* the political conditions under which the bill to nationalise the land could become law.... Of course he can! A man who calls himself a democrat *has been unable to imagine* democratic political conditions.... But the task of a democrat who is counted among the representatives of the people is not only to give *himself* a picture of all kinds of good and bad things, but to give the *people* truly popular projects, declarations and expositions.

Mr. Kutler should not think of suggesting that I propose departing from the law or infringing it in the Duma.... I am not proposing anything of the sort! There is no law that prohibits speaking in the Duma about democracy and tabling really democratic agrarian bills. My colleague Tsereteli did not infringe any law when he introduced the declaration of the Social-Democratic group, which speaks of "the alienation of land without compensation", and about *a democratic state*.

Mr. Kutler's arguments in their entirety boil down to this—since ours is not a democratic state there is no need for us to present democratic land bills! No matter how you twist and turn Mr. Kutler's arguments, you will not find a grain of *any other* idea, of *any other* content, in them. Since our state serves the interests of the landowners we must not (*representatives of the people must not*!) include anything

displeasing to the landowners in our agrarian bills.... O no, Mr. Kutler, that is not democracy, that is not people's freedom—it is something very, very far removed from freedom and not very far removed from servility.

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Now let us look at what Mr. Kutler actually did say about his party's land bill.

In speaking of land, Mr. Kutler first raised objections to the Trudoviks on the question of the "subsistence standard" and on the question of whether land suffices. Mr. Kutler took the "1861 standard" which, he said, is lower than the subsistence standard and informed the Chamber that "*according to his approximate calculation*" (the Duma had not heard a word about this calculation and knows absolutely nothing about it!) even for the 1861 standard another 30 million dessiatines would be required.

I would remind you, gentlemen, that Deputy Kutler spoke *after* Karavayev, representative of the Trudovik Group, and raised the objection specifically to him. But Deputy Karavayev stated in the Duma, *directly and explicitly*, and then made it known to the public in a special letter to the newspaper *Tovarishch* (March 21), that *up to 70 million dessiatines* would be required to raise peasant holdings to the subsistence standard. He also said that the total of the state, crown, church and privately-owned lands comes to that figure.

Deputy Karavayev did not indicate the source from which he made his calculation and did not acquaint the Duma with the method employed to arrive at this figure. My calculation, based on a source that I can name exactly and which is, furthermore, the very latest official publication of the Central Statistical Committee, gives a figure that is *higher than 70 million dessiatines*. Of the privately-owned lands alone, *72* million dessiatines are available to the peasants, while the crown, state, church and other lands provide more than 10 million and up to 20 million dessiatines.

In any case, the fact remains—in raising objections to Deputy Karavayev, Deputy Kutler tried to prove that there *is not sufficient* land to help the peasants, but *could not*

prove it since he gave *unsubstantiated*, and, as I have shown, *untrue* figures.

In general I must warn you, gentlemen, against abuse of the concepts "labour standard"[98] and "subsistence standard". Our Social-Democratic Labour Party takes the much more correct line of avoiding all these "standards". "Standards" introduce something of officialdom, of red tape, into a vital and militant political question. These "standards" confuse people and *hide* the real nature of the issue. To transfer the dispute to these "standards" or even to discuss them *at the present moment* is truly a case of dividing up the skin before the bear is killed and, furthermore, dividing that skin up verbally in a gathering of people who will probably *not* divide up the skin *at all* when we kill the bear.

Don't you worry, gentlemen! The peasants will divide up the land themselves once it falls into their hands. The peasants can easily divide it; the thing is to get hold of it. They will not ask anybody how to divide it, nor will they allow *anybody* to interfere with their division of the land.

All these speeches about how to divide the land are sheer empty talk. We are *a political body*, not a surveyor's office or a boundary commission. We have to help the people solve *an economic and political problem*; we have to help the peasantry in their struggle against the landlords, against a class that lives by feudal exploitation. And this vital, urgent problem is *befogged* by chatter about "standards".

Why befogged? Because, instead of the *real* question of whether or not 7-2 million dessiatines should be taken from the landowners for the peasantry, the *extraneous* question of "farming standards" is being discussed, a question that in the final analysis is by no means important. This facilitates evasion of the issue and makes it easy to avoid a real answer. Disputes on subsistence, on labour, or any other standards you like, only serve to confuse the *basic issue*: should we take 72 million dessiatines of the landlords' land for the peasants, or not?

Attempts are being made to show whether there is sufficient or insufficient land for one standard or another.

What is this demonstrating for, gentlemen? Why these empty speeches, why this muddy water in which it is easy for some people to fish? Is it not clear enough that there is

no use arguing about that which does not exist, and that the peasants do not want any sort of imaginary land, but *the land of the neighbouring landlord* that they are already familiar with? It is not about "standards" that we have to talk, but about *landlords'* land, not about any of your standards and whether any of them is sufficient, but about *how much* landlords' land there is. Everything else is nothing but evasion, excuses and even attempts to throw dust in the peasants' eyes.

Deputy Kutler, for instance, avoided the real point at issue. Trudovik Karavayev at least went straight to the point: *70 million dessiatines*. And how did Deputy Kutler answer *that*? He did not answer *that point*. He confused the issue with his "standards", i.e., he simply avoided giving an answer to the question of *whether he and his party agree to hand over all the landlords' land to the peasants*.

Deputy Kutler took advantage of Deputy Karavayev's error in not having raised the question clearly and sharply enough, and *avoided the point at issue*. That, gentlemen, is the hub of our problem. Whoever *does not agree* to hand over literally *all* the landlords' land to the peasants (remember, I made the proviso that each landowner be left with 50 dessiatines so that nobody would be ruined!) *does not stand for the peasants and does not really want to help the peasants*. For if you allow the question of *all* the landlords' land to be befogged or shelved, *the whole issue is in doubt*. The question then arises—*who* will determine *the share* of the landlords' land that is to be given to the peasants?

Who will decide it ? Out of 79 million, 9 million is a "share" and so is 70 million. Who will decide it *if we do not*, *if the State Duma does not decide it clearly and with determination*?

It was not without reason that Deputy Kutler kept quiet on this question. Deputy Kutler toyed with the words "compulsory alienation".

Don't allow yourselves to be fascinated by words, gentlemen! Don't fall under the spell of a pretty turn of phrase! Yet to the bottom of things!

When I hear the expression "compulsory alienation", I always ask myself: *who is compelling whom*? If millions of peasants compel a handful of landlords to submit to the interests of the nation, that is very good. If a handful of

landlords compel millions of peasants to subordinate their lives to the selfish interests of that handful, that is very bad.

That is the *insignificant* question that Deputy Kutler managed to evade! With his arguments about "impracticability" and "political conditions" he, *in actual fact*, was even calling on the people *to reconcile themselves* to their subordination to a handful of landlords.

Deputy Kutler spoke immediately after my comrade Tsereteli. Tsereteli, in the declaration of our Social-Democratic group, made *two* definite statements that provide a clear solution to precisely this problem, the main, fundamental problem. The first statement—the transfer of the land to a *democratic* state. "Democratic" means that which expresses the interests of the masses of the people, not of a handful of the privileged. We must tell the people, clearly and forthrightly, that *without* a democratic state, without political liberty, without a fully authoritative representation of the people, there *cannot* possibly be *any* land reform to the advantage of the peasants.

The second statement—the need for a *preliminary* discussion of the land question in equally democratic *local committees*.

How did Deputy Kutler answer that? *He did not*. Silence is a poor answer, Mr. Kutler. You kept silent *precisely* on the question of whether the peasants will compel the landlords to make concessions to the people's interests, or whether the landlords will compel the peasants to put a fresh noose of more ruinous compensation round their necks.

You cannot be allowed to ignore such a question.

In addition to the Social-Democrat, the Popular Socialists (Deputy Baskin) and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Deputy Kolokolnikov) spoke in the Duma on the subject of local committees. The local committees have been spoken of in the press for a long time, they were also spoken of in the First Duma. That is something we must not forget, gentlemen. We must make quite clear to ourselves and to the people why so much has been said on this question and what its present significance is.

The First State Duma discussed the question of local land committees at its fifteenth session, May 26, 1906. The question was raised by members of the Trudovik Group, who

presented a written statement signed by thirty-five members of the Duma (including two Social-Democrats, I. Savelyev and I. Shuvalov). The statement was first read at the fourteenth session of the Duma on May 24, 1906 (see page 589 of the Verbatim Report of Sessions of the First State Duma); the statement was then printed and discussed two days later. I will read you the *most important* parts of the statement in full.

"...It is necessary to set up local committees immediately; they should be elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by secret ballot, for the needful preparatory work, such as—the elaboration of subsistence and labour standards of land tenure as applicable to local conditions, the determination of the amount of cultivable land and the amount of it that is rented, tilled with the farmer's own or with other's implements, etc. In view of the need to adapt the land law as fully as possible to the multiplicity of local conditions, it is advisable for the committees to take an active part in the general discussion on *the very fundamentals of the land reform*, detailed in the various bills submitted to the Duma...." The Trudoviks therefore proposed the *immediate* election of a commission and the immediate elaboration of the necessary bill.

How was this proposal greeted by the various parties? The Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats gave it *unanimous* support in their periodicals. The so-called "people's freedom" party spoke categorically in its chief organ *Rech*, *on May 25*, *1906* (i.e., the day after the first reading of the Trudovik bill in the Duma), *against the Trudovik bill*. *Rech* said *straight out* that it feared that such land committees might "*shift the solution of the agrarian problem to the Left*".*

"We shall try, insofar as it depends on us," wrote *Rech*, "to preserve the *official* and specifically business character of the local land committees. And for the same reason, we believe that to choose the committees by universal suffrage would mean to prepare them, not for the peaceful solution of the land question on the spot, but for something very different. The guidance of the general direction to be taken by the re-

* See newspaper *Vperyod*,[99] No. 1 for May 26, 1906, leading article—"The Cadets Are Betraying the Peasants", signed: *G. Al—sky*.

form must remain in the hands of the state; representatives of state power, therefore, must have their places in the local committees, if not for purposes of making decisions, at least for the purpose of exercising control over the decisions of local bodies. Then, again within the general fundamentals of the reform, *there must be represented in the local committees*, *as for as possible on an equal footing*, *those conflicting interests* that can be reconciled without contravening the state significance of the reform in question, and without converting it into an act of unilateral violence that might end in the complete failure of the whole matter."

This is quite clear and definite.

The "people's freedom" party gives an estimate of the proposed measure *in substance*, and opposes it. The party does not want local committees elected by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot, but committees in which a handful of landlords and thousands and tens of thousands of peasants would have **equal** representation. *Representatives of state power* should participate for reasons of "control".

Let the peasant deputies give good thought to this statement. Let them realise the essence of the matter, and explain it to the peasants.

Try to get a picture, gentlemen, of what it really means. In the local committees landlords and peasants are represented *on an equal footing*, and there is *a representative of the government to exercise control*, to "reconcile" them. That means one-third of the votes for the peasants, one-third for the landlords, and one-third for government representatives. And the highest state dignitaries, all those who have control over state affairs, are themselves among *the wealthiest landowners*! In this way the landlords will "exercise control over" both the peasants and the landlords! *Landowners* will "*reconcile*" peasants and landowners!

Oh yes, there would no doubt be "compulsory alienation"—*compulsory* alienation of the peasants' money and labour by the *landlords*, in exactly the same way as the landlords' gubernia committees in 1861 cut off one-fifth of the peasants' land and imposed a price for the land that was double its real value.

An agrarian reform *of this type* would mean nothing more than *selling* to the peasants, *at exorbitant prices*, the worst

lands and those that the landlords do not need, in order to place the peasants in *still greater* bondage. "Compulsory alienation" *of this sort is far worse than a voluntary agreement* between landlord and peasant, because one half of the votes would go to the peasants and the other half to the landlords in the case of a *voluntary* agreement. According to the Cadet idea of compulsory alienation the peasants would have *one-third* of the votes and the landlords *two-thirds*—one-third because they are landlords and another third because they are government officials!

Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, the great Russian writer and one of Russia's first socialists, who was brutally persecuted by the government till his dying day, wrote the following about the "emancipation" of the peasants and the *land redemption payments* of 1861 of accursed memory: it would have been better for the peasants and landlords to come to a voluntary agreement than to be "emancipated and pay redemption fees for the land" through the gubernia landlords' committees.* In the case of a voluntary agreement on the purchase of land it *would not have been possible* to extract as much from the peasants as has been extracted by means of the *government's* "reconciliation" of peasants and landlords.

The great Russian socialist proved to be right. Today, forty-six years after the famous "emancipation with redemption payments", we know the results of that *redemption operation*. The market price of the land that went to the peasants was *648,000,000* rubles, and the peasants were forced to pay *867,000,000* rubles, *219,000,000* rubles *more* than the land was worth. For half a century the peasants have suffered, have languished in hunger, and have died on those land allotments, weighted down by such payments, oppressed by the government's "reconciliation" of peasants and landlords—until the peasantry has been reduced to its present intolerable condition.

The Russian liberals want to repeat this sort of "*reconciliation*" of peasants and landlords. Beware, peasants! The workers' Social-Democratic Party warns you—decades of

* It would be a good thing to find the exact quotation; I think it is from "Letters Unaddressed", and elsewhere.[100]

new torment, hunger, bondage, degradation and abuse are what you will inflict on the people if you agree to this sort of "reconciliation".

The question of local committees and redemption payments constitutes the keypoint of the agrarian problem. Every care must be taken to ensure that here *there should be no* obscurity, that nothing should be left unsaid, and that there is no beating about the bush, and no provisos.

When this question was discussed in the First State Duma on May 26, 1906, Cadets *Kokoshkin* and *Kotlyarevsky*, who spoke against the Trudoviks, confined themselves to provisos and beating about the bush. They kept harping on the fact that the Duma could not immediately *decree* such committees, although nobody had proposed any such decrees! They said that the question was bound up with a reform of the election law and local self-government, that is, they simply delayed the important and simple matter of setting up local *committees* to help the Duma solve the agrarian problem. They spoke of the "distortion of the course of legislation", of the danger of creating "eighty or ninety local Dumas" and said that "actually there was no need to set up such bodies as local committees", etc., etc.

All there are nothing but excuses, gentlemen, one long evasion of a question that the Duma must *decide* clearly and definitely: will a democratic government have to solve the agrarian problem, or should the present government? Should the peasants, i.e., the majority of the population, predominate in the local land committees, or should the landlords? Should a handful of landlords submit to the millions of the people, or should millions of working people submit to a handful of landlords?

And don't try to tell me that the Duma is impotent, helpless and without the necessary powers. I know all that very well. I would willingly agree to repeat that and underscore it in any Duma resolution, statement or declaration. The rights of the Duma, however, do not enter into the present question, for none of us has even thought of making the slightest suggestion that would contravene the law on the rights of the Duma. The matter in hand is this—the Duma must clearly, definitely and, most important of all,

correctly express the real interests of the people, must tell them the truth about the solution of the agrarian problem, and must open the eyes of the peasantry so that they recognise the snags lying in the way of a solution to the land problem.

The will of the Duma, of course, is still not law, that I am well aware of! But let anybody who likes do the job of limiting the Duma's will or gagging it—*except the Duma itself*! And the Duma's decision, of course, will meet with every known type of counteraction, but that will never be a justification for those who beforehand begin to twist and turn, bow and scrape, adapt themselves to the will of others, and make the decision of the people's representatives fit in with the wishes of just anybody.

In the final analysis, it is not the Duma, of course, that will *decide* the agrarian question, and the decisive act in the peasants' struggle for land will not be fought out in the Duma. If we really wish to be *representatives of the people*, and not liberal civil servants; if we really want to serve the interests of the people and the interests of liberty, we *can* and *must help* the people by explaining the question, by formulating it *clearly*, by telling them the *whole* truth with no equivocation and no beating about the bush.

To be of real help to the people, the Duma decision must give the clearest possible answer to the *three basic* aspects of the land problem that I set forth in my speech, and which Deputy Kutler evaded and confused.

Question number one—that of the 79,000,000 dessiatines of landlords' land and of the need to transfer no less than 70,000,000 of them to the peasants.

Question number two—*compensation*. The land reform will be of some real advantage to the peasants only if they obtain it *without paying compensation*. Compensation would be a fresh *noose* around the neck of the peasant and would be an unbearably heavy *burden* on the whole of Russia's future development.

Question number three—that of the democratic state system that is necessary to implement the agrarian reform, including, in particular, *local land committees*, *elected by universal*, *direct*, *equal and secret ballot*. Without it the land reform will mean compelling the peasant masses to enter

into bondage to the landlords, and not compelling a handful of landlords to meet the urgent demands of the whole people.

I said at the beginning of my speech that Mr. Vasilchikov, the Minister of Agriculture, *was reconciling* the "Rights" and the "Cadets". Now that I have made clear the significance of the question of 70,000,000 dessiatines of landlords' land, of compensation and, *most important of all*, of the composition of the local land committees, it will be sufficient for me to quote *one* passage from the minister's speech:

"Taking this stand," said the minister, referring to the "inviolability of the boundaries" of landed property and the "shifting" of them only "in the interests of the state"—"taking this stand, *and admitting the possibility of the* **compulsory** *shifting of boundaries in certain cases*, we believe that we are not shaking ... the basic principles of private property...."

Have you given *proper consideration* to these significant words of the minister's, gentlemen? They are worth pondering over.... You must ponder over them.... Mr. Kutler fully convinced the minister that there is nothing *inconvenient* for the landlords in the word "*compulsory*".... Why not? *Because it is the landlords themselves who will do the compelling!*

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I hope, gentlemen, that I have succeeded in making clear our Social-Democratic attitude to the "Right" parties and to the liberal Centre (the Cadets) in respect of the agrarian question. I must now deal with one important difference between the views of the Social-Democrats and those of the Trudoviks in the broad sense of that word, i.e., all the parties that base themselves on the "labour principle" which includes the Popular Socialists, the Trudoviks in the narrow sense of the word, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

From what I have already said, it can be seen that the Social-Democratic Labour Party gives its full support to the peasant masses in their struggle against the landlords for land, and for emancipation from feudal exploitation. There are not, there cannot be, more reliable allies for the peasantry in this struggle, than the proletariat, which has

made the greatest number of sacrifices to the cause of winning light and liberty for Russia. The peasantry have not, and cannot have, any other means of ensuring the satisfaction of their just demands than that of joining the class-conscious proletariat, which is struggling under the red banner of international Social-Democracy. Everywhere in Europe liberal parties have betrayed the peasantry and have sacrificed their interests to those of the landlords; and as I showed by my analysis of the liberal, Cadet programme, the same thing is happening here in Russia.

In previous parts of my speech, I have frequently touched on the differences in the views of the Trudovik Group and those of the Social-Democrats on the agrarian question. Now I must examine one of the principal views of the Trudovik Group.

For this purpose, I shall permit myself to take the speech made by the Reverend Tikhvinsky. Gentlemen! The Social-Democrats do not share the views of the Christian religion. We believe that the *real* social, cultural and political significance and content of Christianity is *more truly* expressed by views and aspirations of such members of the clergy as Bishop Eulogius, than by those of such as the Reverend Tikhvinsky. That is why, on the basis of our scientific, materialist philosophy to which all prejudice is alien, on the basis of the general aims of our struggle for the freedom and happiness of all working people, we Social-Democrats have a negative attitude towards the doctrines of Christianity. But, having said that, I consider it my duty to add, frankly and openly, that the Social-Democrats are fighting for complete freedom of conscience, and have every respect for any sincere conviction in matters of faith, provided that conviction is not implemented by force or deception. I consider it all the more my duty to stress this point since I am going to speak of my differences with the *Reverend* Tikhvinsky—a peasant deputy who deserves all respect for his sincere loyalty to the interests of the peasants, the interests of the people, which he defends fearlessly and with determination.

Deputy Tikhvinsky supports the land bill of the Trudovik Group; it is based on *equalitarian principles* of land tenure. In support of this bill, Deputy Tikhvinsky said:

"This is the way the peasants, the way the working people look at the land: the land is God's, and the labouring peasant has as much right to it as each one of us has the right to water and air. It would be strange if anyone were to start selling, buying or trading in water and air—and it seems just as strange to us that anyone should trade in, sell or buy land. The Peasant Union and the Trudovik Group wish to apply the principle—all the land to the working people. With regard to compensation for the land—how the above is to be effected, by means of compensation or by simple alienation without compensation, is a question that does not interest the labouring peasantry...."

That is what Deputy Tikhvinsky said in the name of the Peasant Union and the Trudovik Group.

The error, the profound error, of the Trudoviks is their *not* being interested in the question of compensation and that of *ways of implementing* the land reform, although whether or not the peasantry will achieve liberation from landlord oppression *actually* depends on this question. They are interested in the question of the sale and purchase of land and in that of the equal rights of all to land, although that question *has no serious significance* in the struggle for the real emancipation of the peasantry from the oppression of the landlords.

Deputy Tikhvinsky defends the point of view that land must not be bought or sold, and that all working people have an equal right to the land.

I am well aware that this viewpoint springs from the most noble motives, from an ardent protest against monopoly, against the privileges of rich idlers, against the exploitation of man by man, that it arises out of the aspiration to achieve the liberation of all working people from every kind of oppression and exploitation.

It is for this ideal, the ideal of socialism, that the Social-Democratic Labour Party is struggling. It is, however, an ideal that cannot be achieved by the equalitarian use of land by small proprietors, in the way Deputy Tikhvinsky and his fellow-thinkers dream of.

Deputy Tikhvinsky is prepared to fight honestly, sincerely and with determination—and, I hope, to fight to the end—against the power of the landlords. But he has forgotten another, still more burdensome, still more oppressive

power over the working people of today, *the power of capital*, *the power of money*.

Deputy Tikhvinsky has said that the sale of land, water and air seems strange to the peasant. I realise that people who have lived all their lives, or almost all their lives in the countryside, should acquire such views. But just take a look at modern capitalist society, at the big cities, at the railways, coal and iron mines and factories. You will see how the wealthy have seized the air and the water and the land. You will see how tens and hundreds of thousands of workers are condemned to deprivation of fresh air, to work underground, to life in cellars and to the use of water polluted by the neighbouring factory. You will see how fantastically the price of land goes up in the cities, and how the worker is exploited, not only by the factory owners, but also by house owners who, as everybody knows, get much more out of apartments, rooms, corners of rooms and slums inhabited by workers than out of apartments for the wealthy. And, indeed, what is the sale and purchase of water, air and land when the whole of present-day society is based on the purchase and sale of *labour-power*, i.e., *on the wage slavery* of millions of people!

Just consider it: can you imagine equalitarian land tenure or prohibiting the sale and purchase of land as long as the power of money, the power of capital, continues to exist? Can the Russian people be delivered from oppression and exploitation if the right of every citizen to an equal-sized piece of land is recognised, when, at the same time, a handful of people own tens of thousands and millions of rubles each, and the mass of the people remain poor? No, gentlemen. As long as the power of capital lasts, no *equality* between landowners will be possible, and any sort of ban on the purchase and sale of land will be impossible, ridiculous and absurd. Everything, not merely the land, but human labour, the human being himself, conscience, love, science—everything must *inevitably be for sale* as long as *the power of capital* lasts.

In saying this, I have absolutely no desire to weaken the peasants' struggle for land, or belittle its significance, its importance or its urgency. I do not intend anything of the sort. I have said, and I repeat, that this struggle is a just and necessary one, that the peasant, in his own interests, and in

the interests of the proletariat, and in the interests of social development as a whole, *must* throw off the feudal oppression of the landlords.

Class-conscious workers wish to strengthen the peasants' struggle for land, not weaken it. Socialists do not strive to check this struggle, but *to carry it further*, and for this purpose shake off all naïve faith in the possibility of putting petty proprietors on an equal footing, or of banning the sale and purchase of land, as long as exchange, money and the power of capital exist.

Worker Social-Democrats give their full support to the peasants against the landlords. But it is not petty ownership, even if it is equalitarian, that can save mankind from the poverty of the masses, from exploitation and from the oppression of man by man. What is needed for that is a struggle for the destruction of capitalist society, and its replacement by large-scale socialist production. This struggle is now being conducted by millions of class-conscious Social-Democrat workers in all countries of the world. It is only by joining in this struggle that the peasantry can, having got rid of their first enemy, the feudal landlord, conduct a successful struggle against the second and more terrible enemy, the power of capital!

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FINE WORDS–FOUL DEEDS

The agrarian debates in the State Duma are highly instructive. The speeches of the leaders of the various parties must be gone into in greater detail, and a thorough insight obtained into their content.

Without doubt, the attitude to landed proprietorship is the gist of the agrarian question. The peasants are fighting against landed proprietorship, trying to obtain land for themselves. What is the attitude of the various parties to this struggle?

The Social-Democrats have put forward the direct and open demand for *alienation without compensation*. In his speech, Tsereteli, a Social-Democratic representative, forcibly revealed the falseness of the defence of landed property "rights", explained that it originated as plunder, showed up the boundless hypocrisy of the speeches on private property as an inalienable right, and refuted the Prime Minister, who by "state interests" understood, *not the interests of the people*, *but the interests of that handful of landlords with whom the state authorities are closely linked.*

Add to this the proposal made by Comrade Tsereteli at the end of his speech to relegate the question to local land committees (elected, of course, by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot) for examination, and you will get a complete and definite picture of the proletarian position on the land question. The right of the landlords to land is denied. The method of the reform is clearly defined—local committees, which means the domination of peasant interests over those of the landlords. Alienation without compensation means the full defence of the interests of the peasants, and an implacable struggle against the class avarice of the landlords.

Now let us turn to the Trudoviks. Karavayev did not put forward with full clarity and definiteness the principle of "alienation without compensation". The representative of the peasants was less determined in presenting the people's demands to the landlords than was the representative of the workers. The demand to hand the question over to local committees was not put clearly; no protest was made against the scheme of the liberals (the Cadets) to relegate the discussion on this acute question to a commission, so as to keep it farther away from the people, farther from the light of publicity, farther from free criticism. Despite all these shortcomings in the Trudovik's speech, as compared with that of the Social-Democrat, we have to admit that the Trudovik defended the cause of the peasants against the landlords. The Trudovik opened the eyes of the people to the miserable condition of the peasantry. He disputed the arguments put forward by Yermolov and other defenders of the landlord class, who tried to deny the need to extend peasant holdings. He defined the minimum needs of the peasantry at 70,000,000 dessiatines of land, and explained that there are more than 70,000,000 dessiatines of landlord, crown and other lands available to meet the needs of the peasants. The tenor of the Trudovik speech was—we repeat, despite the shortcomings we have stressed—an appeal to the people, an effort to open the eyes of the people....

Let us take Cadet Kutler's speech. An entirely different picture immediately unfolds before us. We feel that we have moved from the camp of the fully consistent (Social-Democrat) or somewhat vacillating (Trudovik) defenders of the peasants *against* the landlords, into *the camp of the landlords*, who realise the inevitability of "concessions" but are bending every effort to make the concessions *as small as possible*.

Kutler spoke of his "agreement" with the Trudoviks, of his "sympathy" for the Trudoviks, *only* to sugar the pill of *immediate* curtailments, cuts, abridgements, which; he says, must be made in the Trudoviks' draft Kutler's speech was, indeed, full of arguments *against* the Social-Democrats and against the Trudoviks.

To give weight to our words, let us analyse Kutler's speech step by step.

Introduction. A curtsey to the Trudoviks. The Cadet agrees with the basic idea, he warmly sympathises, *but... but* ... the draft of the Trudovik Group "is not confined to the *simple* and obvious aim of *alleviating* peasant land-hunger. It goes farther, it attempts *to re-create radically* all existing land-law relations" (all quotations from the report in *Tovarishch*).

And so we get "sympathy" for the muzhik *in word*, *curtailment* of the muzhik's demands *in deed*. The word is for the muzhik, the deed for the landlord.

And on top of this, Kutler assures the Duma that the Trudovik does not confine himself to a *simple and obvious* aim! Think of it, reader: the Trudovik speaks forthrightly *of 70,000,000 dessiatines of land*. They have to be transferred from the landlords to the peasants. And that is not "simple", that is not "obvious"!!

For "clarity" you have to speak about the labour standard, about the subsistence standard, about the allotment standard of 1861. And Mr. Kutler talks and talks and talks. He fills his listeners' heads with a spate of words on all those worthless questions in order to draw the conclusion: "in my opinion ... there are 30,000,000 dessiatines lacking" to bring the peasant allotments up to the 1861 standard, and that standard is still below the subsistence standard. That is all. That is all he has to say on the extent of the need, and its satisfaction.

But is this an answer to the *70,000,000* dessiatines? You are simply prevaricating, worthy knight of "the people's freedom", and telling us old wives' tales! Should 70,000,000 dessiatines of land go to the peasants, or not? Yes or no?

And, to disclose the nature of these evasions still more clearly, we shall add to the Trudovik's reference the summarised figures of the *latest* land statistics. Investigations undertaken in 1905 show a total of 101,700,000 dessiatines of land in private hands. Of these, 15,800,000 belong to various associations; 3,200,000 dessiatines belong to owners of plots not bigger than 20 dessiatines; 3,300,000 dessiatines belong to owners of plots between 20 and 50 dessiatines: *79,400,000 dessiatines* belong to owners of *more than 50 dessiatines* each. These latter number altogether 133,898. The *average* area belonging to each of them, therefore, is

594 dessiatines. Suppose, we were to leave each of these gentlemen 50 dessiatines. That would make 6,900,000 dessiatines. Deduct 6,900,000 from 79,400,000 dessiatines and we get *72,500,000 dessiatines of available landlords' land, to say nothing of crown, state, church, monastery and other lands*.

We see that the Trudovik still did not correctly define the amount of land that the peasantry could and should receive, although his figure of 70,000,000 dessiatines was close to the truth.

So please take the trouble to give a simple and clear answer, my Cadet gentlemen: should *70,000,000 dessiatines* of land be transferred from the landlords to the peasants? Yes or no?

Instead of giving a direct answer, the former minister and present liberal hypocrite wriggles like the devil at mass, and exclaims pathetically:

"Is not that right [the right to land according to the Trudovik draft] a right to enter premises in which all the places are occupied?"

Very nice, isn't it? The question *of the 70,000,000 dessiatines* is bypassed. The liberal gentleman answers the peasants—*the premises are occupied*.

Having dealt summarily with the *unpleasant* question of the 70,000,000 dessiatines (ignorant fellows, those muzhiks! bothering us with their 70,000,000), Kutler began to raise objection to the Trudoviks in respect of the "practical feasibility" of land nationalisation.

All that is merely malicious tittle-tattle, because if the 70,000,000 dessiatines are left to the landlords there will be *nothing to nationalise*! But Mr. Kutler speaks only *to conceal his thoughts*.

What is the nature of his objection to the nationalisation of the land?

> "It seems to me that it may be possible to imagine the political conditions under which the land nationalisation bill might become law, but I cannot imagine there being, in the near future, political conditions under which such a law could actually be implemented."

Weighty and convincing. The liberal civil servant, who has been kowtowing all his life, *cannot imagine* political conditions under which legislative power would belong

to representatives of the people. It is usually the case—our dear liberal is hinting—for power over the people to belong to a handful of landlords.

Yes, that's how it is. That's how matters stand in Russia. We are, however, talking about the struggle for people's freedom. The question under discussion is precisely that of *how to change* the economic and "political conditions" of landlord rule. And you *object* by making reference to power now being in the hands of the landlords, and by stating that backs have to be bent lower:

> "It is groundless and unjust to complicate the simple and indisputably valuable task of helping the peasant population...."

You've got to know your own limits!

And Mr. Kutler talks on and on, saying that instead of the "unfeasible" nationalisation, all that is necessary is "to extend peasant land tenure".

When it was a question of the *extension* of peasant *landownership* (and not *land tenure*, sir!) by 70,000,000 dessiatines of *landlords*' land—then Kutler went over to the question of "nationalisation". And from the question of "nationalisation" he went back to that of "extension".... It may happen, he thinks, that they won't remember *the 70,000,000 dessiatines*!

Mr. Kutler is an out-and-out defender of private property in land. He declares that its abolition would be "the greatest injustice".

> "Since nobody proposes to abolish property in general, it is essential that the existence of property in land be in every way recognised."

Since we cannot take two steps forward *this very day*, then "it is essential" to refuse to take a simple step forward! Such is the logic of the liberal. Such is the logic of landlord avarice.

It might at first sight seem that the one point in Mr. Kutler's speech that touched on the defence of peasant and not landlord interests was the recognition of *compulsory alienation* of privately-owned land.

But anyone who trusted *the sound* of those words would be making a serious mistake. Compulsory alienation of the

landlords' land would then and only then be of benefit to the peasants if *the landlords were compelled* to hand over a great deal of land to *the peasants*, and to hand it over cheaply. And what if *the landlords compel the peasants* to pay dearly for miserable patches of land?

The words "compulsory alienation" mean precisely nothing if there is no *actual* guarantee that the landlords will not swindle the peasants.

Not only does Mr. Kutler fail to propose a *single one* of those guarantees but, on the contrary, his whole speech, his whole Cadet position, *precludes them*. The Cadets do not want action outside the Duma. They frankly call for local committees with an *undemocratic composition*—representatives from the peasants and landlords in equal numbers, with a government chairman! That means nothing but the landlords coercing the peasants.

Add to this that the valuation of the land will be made by those same *landlord* committees, that the Cadets are already today (see the end of Kutler's speech) foisting *one half* of the payment for the land on the peasants (the *peasants will also* pay the other half in the form of increased taxation!) and you will see that the Cadets' *fine words conceal foul deeds*.

The Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks-spoke in the Duma for the peasants, the Rights and the Cadets for the landlords. That is a fact, and no evasions or fine phrases will cover it up.

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THE DUMA AND THE APPROVAL OF THE BUDGET

Approval of the budget by the Duma is a question of extremely serious political significance. According to the letter of the law, the Duma's rights are insignificant, and the government is not bound by the Duma's consent to its actions. In fact, however, the government does in certain measure depend on the Duma's approval of the budget; everybody admits this, it is particularly stressed by the liberal bourgeoisie—the Cadets—who are inclined to substitute flamboyant phrases about that dependence for a definition of the modest bounds of that modest dependence. The government needs money, a loan is essential. And it will either be unable at all to float a loan without the Duma's direct or indirect consent, or, if it is able to do so, it will be with great difficulty and on such adverse terms that the situation will be considerably worsened.

Under such conditions, it is quite obvious that the Duma's discussion of the budget and voting on it will have double political significance. In the first place, the Duma must open the eyes of the people to all the methods employed in that organised robbery, that systematic, unconscionable plunder of national property by a handful of landlords, civil servants and all kinds of parasites, plunder which is called "the state economy" of Russia. To explain this from the Duma rostrum is to help the people in their struggle for "people's freedom" that the Balalaikins[101] of Russian liberalism chatter so much about. Whatever fate has in store for the Duma and whatever the immediate steps and "intentions" of the government may be—in any case, only

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Reduced

the political consciousness and good organisation of the masses of the people will, *in the final analysis*, decide the outcome of the struggle for freedom. He who does not realise this has no right to call himself a democrat.

Secondly, ruthless and *open* criticism of the budget and consistently democratic voting on it are of importance to Europe and European capital, even to the wide strata of European middle and petty bourgeoisie who lend money to the Russian Government of the Stolypins. Bankers and other magnates of international capital lend money to Messrs. Stolypin & Co. to get profit out of it, in the same way as any other usurer "risks" his money. If they are not certain that the money lent will be safe and the proper interest received, no love of "law and order" ("Russia" is a welcome example of graveyard law and order for a European bourgeoisie scared by the proletariat) would compel the Rothschilds, Mendelsohns and others to open their purses. Whether the European financial magnates' faith in the durability and solvency of the firm of Stolypin & Co. will be strengthened or weakened, depends to a great extent on the Duma. Even the bankers would not be in a position to loan thousands of millions if the majority of the European bourgeoisie had no faith in the Russian Government. And these bourgeois masses are being systematically deceived by venal bourgeois newspapers throughout the world, which have been bribed by the bankers and the Russian Government. The bribing of widely-circulating European newspapers in favour of the Russian loan is a "normal" phenomenon. Even Jaurès was offered 200,000 francs to withdraw from a campaign against the Russian loan; such is the high value our government places on the "public opinion" of even those strata of the French petty bourgeoisie that are capable of sympathising with socialism.

The petty-bourgeois masses of Europe have only the smallest possibility of *ascertaining* the true state of Russian finances, the real extent of the Russian Government's solvency—it would be more accurate to say they have scant means of arriving at the truth. The *entire* European public will *immediately* learn of the discussion and *decisions* of the Duma, so that in this respect the voice of the Duma is of tremendous significance. Nobody else could do so much to

deprive Stolypin & Co. of European financial support as the Duma can.

The duty of the "oppositional" Duma proceeds automatically from this. *Only* the Social-Democrats have done their duty. It is admitted by the semi-Cadet *Tovarishch* that the Social-Democrats, in Deputy Alexinsky's budget speech, posed the question in a more principled manner than anybody else. And, contrary to the opinion of the semi-Cadet *Tovarishch*, the Social-Democrats acted correctly by introducing a clear, direct, and well-defined declaration on the impermissibility of *Social-Democrats* approving such a budget as that of Russia. There could be added to the declaration an exposition of the socialist view of the budget of a bourgeois class state.

Only the extreme Left Narodniks, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, supported the Social-Democrats. The peasant democratic mass, the Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, wavered as usual between the liberal party and the proletariat; the petty property-owner is drawn to the bourgeoisie although the unbearable burden of feudal and fiscal "pressure" forces him to the side of the fighting working class.

As long as the Trudoviks support them, the liberals continue to rule the Duma. When the socialists point out the treacherous role of the Cadets on the budget question, they answer with poor jokes or phrases in the *Novoye Vremya*, Menshikov[102] manner, such as Struve's exclamation about the spectacular gesture of the Social-Democrats, etc.

But neither their jokes, their prevarication nor their pompous phrases will enable them to get away from the fact that, *both* tasks for the *democrats*, indicated by us above, have been trampled in the mud by bourgeois liberalism.

As we have often had occasion to explain, the liberals' betrayal of the revolution is not merely a private arrangement, not treachery on the part of individuals, but the policy of a class, a policy of self-interested reconciliation with reaction, and of support, direct and indirect, for that reaction. And this is precisely the policy that the Cadets are pursuing on the budget question. Instead of explaining the truth to the people, they are *distracting* the attention of the people, and are putting into the foreground their civil service "men in mufflers", such as Kutler. Instead of explain-

ing the truth to Europe, they are strengthening the position of the government; they are mouthing trivialities instead of criticism and thereby refusing to confirm for the benefit of Europe the fact of Stolypin & Co.'s bankruptcy.

Formerly the Cadets conducted this cowardly, miserable philistine policy in secret. During the Second Duma election campaign in St. Petersburg, the Social-Democrats explained to public meetings that in the spring of 1906 the Cadets had *assisted* the government in borrowing 2,000 million francs to finance shootings, military courts and punitive expeditions. Clemenceau told the Cadets that he would raise a campaign against the loan if the Cadet Party would formally announce that the loan was unacceptable to the Russian people. The Cadets *refused to do so*, thus helping in the acquisition of funds for the counter-revolution. They say nothing about that matter. But in the Duma today the secrets are out. They are openly carrying on the same indescribably despicable business in the Duma.

It is high time to expose it, in all its details, from the Duma rostrum, and to tell the people the whole truth.

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THE CUCKOO PRAISES THE ROOSTER*

The Cadets praise *Novoye Vremya*. The *Novoye Vremya* crew praise the Cadets. The "people's freedom" party is pleased with the minister's concluding speech on the budget. This party, which is always pleased with all ministers, is now pleased with the consent of the Cadets, as leaders of the Duma "Centre", to approve the budget of the Duma-dissolving ministry.

"If it were necessary to prove that the general discussion on the budget in the State Duma had not been fruitless," *Rech* (March 28) pompously opens its editorial, "the finance minister's concluding speech would be a most brilliant proof of it."

What is that brilliant proof?

The proof is—"not a shadow had remained" of the minister's former "arrogantly didactic and irritably ironical tone".... The minister's reply was correct in form, and in content it revealed "*a tribute of respect* for the power of Duma criticism"; the minister mollified the Duma with the assurance that it had greater rights than it had seemed to have; he paid compliments to the "people's freedom" party, compliments which "the overwhelming majority of the Duma deserved for its subsequent voting" (for agreeing to send the budget to a commission).

Yes, indeed, these are the Cadets' brilliant proofs of the "*non-fruitlessness*" of the Duma debates. The fruit does not consist in the faintest trace of serious improvement in the real state of affairs. Nor is it that the masses of the people

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* From the table by Ivan Krylov (1769-1844). The English equivalent is, roughly, a mutual admiration society.—*Ed.*

have learned something and understood certain aims concealed behind the constitutional tinsel. Nothing of the sort. The fruit consists in the minister having become more decent, more obliging; he is more obliging to those who, in the name of "the people's representation", consent to all sort of compromises.

The liberals consent to prostitute the people's representation to underpin the foundations of Black-Hundred rule. On *these* terms, the government of Stolypin & Co. consents not to dissolve the Duma (*for the time being*...). Both sides are filled with joy and mutual admiration.

Today's *Novoye Vremya*, while missing no opportunity to revile the Cadets for the "Jewish" composition of the commission on religious faiths, at the same time publishes a long dissertation by its Duma reporter on the reasons for its being inadvisable to dissolve the Duma. "Even from the standpoint of the extreme Right, it would be inexpedient and harmful to dissolve the Duma at the present moment." The election law cannot be changed without a coup d'état, and if a new Duma is elected in accordance with the existing election law it is possible that "we may lose the present Centre of the Second State Duma". According to the *Novoye Vremya* reporter, that Centre "begins at the Octobrists and stretches through the Party of Peaceful Renovation, the non-party deputies, the Poles and Cadets, as far as the Trudoviks". "Undoubtedly the present Centre holds a strictly constitutional-monarchist viewpoint and has, up to now, made every effort to engage in organic work. *In any case we shall be deprived of that Centre* [if the Second Duma is dissolved]. *We shall be deprived*, *therefore*, *of a budget approved by the Duma*, for I assume it to be beyond all measure of doubt that the budget introduced by the ministry—with a few *insignificant* [mark this!] changes—will be adopted by the Second Duma."

That is what *Novoye Vremya* says. The argument is extraordinarily clear. It is an excellent exposition of the point of view of *the extreme Rights*, who at the same time *now wish to save the Duma*.

In the upper circles of the ruling oligarchy there is a struggle between two tendencies—one that wants the Duma dissolved and the other that would preserve it for the time

being. The first of these policies is one that *Novoye Vremya* has long since evolved, explained, defended and, from time to time—or rather at all times—still continues to defend. The ruling oligarchy, however, has another policy. There will always be time to dissolve the Duma, and if it approves the budget it may be easier to obtain a loan, And so it is more advantageous to wait. The threat of dissolution remains, and "we" shall keep the pressure of this threat constantly on the Cadets, which will force them, in a way obvious to everybody, to shift to the Right.

The latter policy is undoubtedly more subtle, and better from the standpoint of the reactionary landlords' interests. The former policy is crude, coarse and hasty. The latter is better planned because the dissolution is "held in reserve", while *the liberals are being used by the government*. For the Duma to approve the budget is almost equivalent to consenting to endorse a bill of exchange for a bankrupt. It is more expedient to get *both* the bill *extended* for a further term *and* the Duma dissolved, than to dissolve the Duma at once without attempting to get the bill extended.

Apart from the approval of the budget there may, of course, be other similar bills of exchange. Have not the Cadets, from the landlords' standpoint, already *improved* their agrarian bill? Let that bill pass through the Duma; then let it go to the Council of State for consideration and *further improvement*. If "we" dissolve the Duma at that moment, we shall have *two*, and not one, *endorsed* bills of exchange. "We" shall possibly be able to obtain from Europe, not one thousand, but two thousand million. One thousand million in the event of the State Duma approving the budget, i.e., *on the basis* of "a state economy that *has passed* through the fire of a strictly constitutional test". The other thousand million in the event of a "great agrarian reform *passing* through the fire of the strictly constitutional creative activities of popular representative body".

The Council of State will make *slight* corrections to the Cadet agrarian bill, a bill that is already overflowing with the most diffuse phrases that define nothing. *In actual fact* everything depends on the composition of the local land committees. The Cadets are *against* the election of these committees by universal, direct, equal and secret ballot,

The Cadets favour *equal* representation of landlords and peasants, with control by the government. The government and the landlords do not risk anything in adopting *the basic idea* of this superb liberal bill, for *such* committees, with the benevolent co-operation of the Council of State, Stolypin & Co., will no doubt, will most certainly, turn "compulsory alienation" of the landlords' land into compulsory enslavement of the muzhik by means of new and ruinous compensation payments for the sand, swamps and tree-stumps set aside for them.

Such is the real significance of the government policy and the policy of the Cadets. By their treachery the liberals are helping the landlords put through a smart deal. If the peasants—the "Trudoviks"—continue to follow in the wake of the liberals, despite the warnings of the Social-Democrats, the muzhik will inevitably be fooled by the landlord with the help of the liberal lawyers.

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INTELLECTUALIST WARRIORS AGAINST DOMINATION BY THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Issue No. 13 of *Narodnaya Duma*[103] published an endlessly long resolution on mass workers' organisations and a labour congress; the resolution is a draft for the forthcoming congress, compiled by a group of publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical activities. The names of the publicists are not mentioned, and in this it differs from other Menshevik resolutions (on the State Duma and the "tactical platform"). And so it is not known whether this lapse is accidental or whether it indicates a different grouping of the Mensheviks on the given question. We recall that such a fervent Menshevik and champion of the labour congress as El stated that "only part of the Mensheviks have a more or less sympathetic attitude to the labour congress" (p. 82 of the collection *The All-Russian Labour Congress. For the Current Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*).

But let us go over to the contents of the resolution. It falls into two parts—A and B. In the preamble to the first part there are endless platitudes on the benefit of the organisation and uniting of the mass of the workers. "For the sake of importance", as Bazarov[104] said, organisation is converted into *self-organisation*. It is true that this word does not actually express anything or contain any definite idea, but it is nevertheless a favourite with the champions of the labour congress! There is no need to explain that this "self-organisation" is only an intellectualist device to cover up the dearth of real organisational ideas—it would never have entered the head of a worker to invent "self-organisation"....

The preamble criticises Social-Democracy for the "dominant and determining role played in it by the intelligentsia

as compared to its proletarian elements". An interesting criticism. We shall not, for the time being, analyse its real socio-historical significance—that would lead to too great digression from the present subject. We merely ask—comrades "publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical activities", why not begin with yourselves? Why does not the physician heal himself? That which you call "the dominant and determining role of the intelligentsia" is apparent in every sentence of your resolution! Why *should not your* "intelligentsia" begin by withdrawing and allowing the "proletarian elements" to draft the resolution? What guarantee is there that in the "self-organisations" projected by you, by the "*publicists* and Mensheviks engaged in practical activities", the phenomenon will not be repeated?

Larin, El and many other champions of the labour congress, give Social-Democracy a "dressing-down" for *forcing* resolutions *through*. And to drive such criticism home, *the publicists* "force through" long new, boring and cloying periods on "self-organisation".... What a picture!

The resolution notes the "ideological and *political* influence" of the Russian Social-Democratic Party (i.e., the R.S.D.L.P., or has a broader term been *deliberately* used to include Prokopovich, Kuskova, Posse and others?) on the advanced strata of the proletariat, and speaks of the desirability of "*uniting the forces*" of Russian Social-Democracy "with *the politically conscious elements of the proletariat*" (A, Point 6).

Try for once *to think over* the words you use to compile your phrases, comrades! Can there be a "politically conscious" proletarian who is *not a Social-Democrat*? If there cannot be, then your words boil down to empty tautology, to turgid and pretentious trivialities. Then you should speak of extending the R.S.D.L.P. to include real Social-Democrats who have not yet joined its ranks.

If there can be, then you are calling the proletarian Socialist-Revolutionary a politically conscious proletarian. It would be ridiculous to deny his "*political* consciousness"! And so what follows is that, under cover of grandiloquent words about the "self-organisation" and "independence" of a *class* party, you are *actually* preaching the *disorganisation* of the proletariat by inducting *non-proletarian* ideologists, by

confusing real independence (Social-Democracy) with non-independence, with dependence on bourgeois ideology and bourgeois politics (Socialist-Revolutionaries).

You were making for one destination, but reached another....[105]

This is just like the old intellectual Economists of the 1895-1901 period, who foisted on the workers their narrowness, their uncertainty, their cowardice, their scurrying about under the flag of "self-organisation", the "pure working-class" movement, etc.![106]

The conclusion drawn by Part A: "The congress recognises the Russian Social-Democracy's most important current task to be work done hand in hand with the advanced elements of the working-class masses [which means *also* hand in hand with *worker Socialist-Revolutionaries* and not *against* them?] for the consolidation of the latter in an independent organisation, no matter how politically modest the character it bears, or may be compelled to bear, by force of circumstances of time and place."

What is there in this that is definite, concrete, or goes beyond the bounds of intellectualist *plaints*. What is it all about? Nobody knows.

Let us take consumers' societies. They undoubtedly express *consolidation* of the workers. Their character is *politically modest* enough. Are they "*independent*" organisations? That depends on the point of view. To the Social-Democrats, workers' associations art really independent when they are imbued with the *Social-Democratic* spirit, and not only imbued with the "spirit", but are also tactically and politically connected with Social-Democracy—either by entering the Social-Democratic Party or by *affiliation* to it.

On the contrary, the syndicalists, the *Bez Zaglaviya* group,[107] Posse's[108] supporters, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the "non-party [*bourgeois*] Progressists", call only those workers' associations *independent* that *do not enter* the Social-Democratic Party and are *not affiliated* to it, are not linked up with Social-Democracy, and with Social-Democracy alone, in their actual politics, in their tactics.

This difference in the two points of view has not been invented by us. It is generally recognised that these two points of view exist, that they are mutually *exclusive*, and

that they are in conflict everywhere and on every occasion when workers are for any reason "associated". They are irreconcilable points of view, because, to the Social-Democrat, "non-partisanship" (in tactics and in politics in general) is only a screen and is, therefore, a particularly harmful way of *subordinating* the workers to *bourgeois* ideology and bourgeois politics.

The outcome: In its conclusion the resolution said absolutely nothing on the essence of the matter. At best its conclusion is hollow phrase-mongering. At worst, it is harmful phrase-mongering, misleading to the proletariat, overshadowing the *ABC of Social-Democratic* truth, opening wide the door to any declassed bourgeois, such as those who have for a long time been doing considerable damage to the *Social-Democratic* working-class movement in all European countries.

How should the resolution be corrected?

The empty phrases should be discarded. It should be said simply that Social-Democracy must support the organisation of various workers' associations, for example, consumers' societies, with due and constant regard for every workers' association serving as a centre *precisely of Social-Democratic* propaganda, agitation and organisation.

That would, indeed, be a "politically modest" but *business-like* and *Social-Democratic* resolution. And you, gentlemen, you intellectualist warriors against the "dominant and determining role of the intelligentsia", you have put forward not the proletarian cause, but intellectualist phrase-mongering.

We shall deal with the second part (B) of the resolution next time.

Nashe Ekho, No. 5,
March 30, 1907

Printed according
to the text in *Nashe Ekho*

ANGRY EMBARRASSMENT

THE QUESTION OF THE LABOUR CONGRESS

The second part (B) of the resolution under examination* deals with the question of the labour congress.

The Mensheviks have written so much and said so much on this question that it would not be a bad thing to get a resolution that really summed up matters and removed all misunderstanding and differences in explaining the idea, a resolution that gave a clear and definite Party directive. Suffice it to say that the latest list of Russian literature on the labour congress (the above-mentioned pamphlet *The All-Russian Labour Congress*) names fifteen pamphlets and journals that treat the subject in a Menshevik light.

Let us see what this "discussion" has yielded.

Point One of the preamble:

> "Mass workers' organisations, coming into being and growing on the soil only of trade union, local [?] and group [?] needs and requirements in general [?], if not under the influence of proletarian Social-Democratic parties or organisations, have, when left to themselves, a direct tendency to narrow the mental and political horizons of the working-class masses to the narrow sphere of trade and, in general, of the particular interests and day-to-day requirements of separate strata or groups of the proletariat."

What *mass* organisations can grow on the soil of *group* needs, the Lord alone knows. By group, something small is always meant, something diametrically opposed to the mass. The authors of the resolution string words together without thinking of concrete, definite content.

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* See the analysis of the first part in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 5.[109] (See pp. 316-19 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

What then does this mean—mass organisations on the soil of *local* needs? What sort of organisation the authors have in mind is again not clear. If they are talking about such organisations as consumers' societies, co-operatives, etc., their distinctive feature is certainly not their *local* character. The Mensheviks' love of platitudinous phrases, their evasion of the *concrete* exposition of a question, is a purely intellectualist trait. It is at root alien to the proletariat, and harmful from the standpoint of the proletariat.

In their literal meaning the words "*mass* workers' organisations on the soil of *local* needs and requirements" include *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*. This is a type of mass workers' organisation well known in Russia in a revolutionary epoch. We may say in all truth that an article on the labour congress, and on mass working-class organisations in general, rarely manages without mention of that type of organisation. As if ridiculing the demand for a precise and concrete exposition of definite ideas and slogans, the resolution *does not say a word* about Soviets of Workers' Deputies, *not a word* about Soviets of Workers' Delegates, etc.

But what we are being offered is some sort of incomplete *criticism* of some sort of *local* mass organisations, criticism that does not touch on the question of their *positive* significance, the conditions under which they function, etc.

Furthermore, no matter how you may correct, piece by piece, this monstrously clumsy first point of the preamble, there will still remain the general, fundamental error. Not only trade union, not only local, not only group, but also mass *political* organisations that are not local "have a tendency to narrow the political horizon of the workers", if they are not "under the influence of proletarian Social-Democratic parties".

It was the authors' idea that the first point of the preamble should explain the transition to "the all-Russian labour congress"; local, trade union and other organisations, they wanted to say, narrow the horizon, but *now* we have the all-Russian labour congress, etc. The highly-respected "writers and Mensheviks engaged in practical work" have, however, lost all touch with logic, because the influence of Social-Democracy, or the absence of such influence, is possible in *both* cases! Instead of a comparison we get confusion....

Point Two of the preamble:

"The idea of convening an all-Russian labour congress for the purpose of initiating the political association of Russian workers, an idea that has met with sympathy in working-class circles, will introduce an element of unity into the organisational activities of the working-class masses, and will bring into the foreground of their field of vision the common interests of the working class and its tasks in the present Russian revolution."

In the first place, is it true that the notorious "idea" has met with sympathy in working-class circles? Point Five of the preamble to the same resolution says that "the urge of the workers themselves towards its [the labour congress] convocation *has not yet been manifested* by any serious practical steps on their part by way of preparation for it".

Here the truth has slipped out. We have a heap of *intellectualist* writings about the labour congress, and no serious practical steps on the part of the *workers themselves*. The attempt to blame this intellectualist invention on to the workers is a failure.

Let us go on. What is the labour congress? Its aim is to "initiate the political association of Russian workers".

And so the R.S.D.L.P. has not initiated such an association, nor did the Rostov demonstration of 1902, or the October strikes of 1903, or January 9, 1905, or the October strike in 1905 initiate it! Up to now we have had some history, now we have none! Association has only been "initiated" by Axelrod & Co. having thought up a labour congress. Can you beat that?

What is meant by a "*political*" association of the workers? If the authors have not invented some new terminology specially for the present resolution, it means *association around a definite political programme and tactics*. Around which specifically? Surely our intellectuals must know that all over the world there have been *political associations* of the workers under the banner of *bourgeois politics*. Perhaps this does not apply to Holy Russia? Perhaps in Holy Russia any political association of workers is automatically a Social-Democratic association?

The poor authors of the resolution are floundering so helplessly because they *have not dared* say straight out what

idea really underlies the labour congress, an idea that has long been postulated by its more sincere or younger and more hot-headed champions. The idea is that the labour congress is to be a *non-party* labour congress. Would it, after all, have been worth while talking about a *party* labour congress?

Our Mensheviks, however, were afraid to tell the *truth* openly and forthrightly—"a non-party, political association of workers...".

The end of this point reads: the idea of calling the congress "will introduce an element of unity into the organisational activities of the working-class masses, and will bring into the foreground of their field of vision the common interests of the working class and its tasks...". First organisational activities and then *tasks*, i.e., programme and tactics! Don't you think you should argue the other way round, comrades "publicists and Mensheviks engaged in practical work"? Think it over—can you *unify* organisational activities if there is no *unified* conception of the interests and tasks of the class? When you have thought it over, you will see that you cannot.

Different parties have a *different* understanding of the common interests of the working class and its tasks in the present revolution. Even in the single R.S.D.L.P. these tasks are differently understood by the Mensheviks, by Trotsky's supporters, and by the Bolsheviks. Think it over, comrades: how can these differences *not affect* the labour congress? how can they *not come out* there? how can they not be complicated by differences with the anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, etc., etc.? Can the "idea of convening a labour congress" or its convocation *eliminate* those differences?

And so the promise made by the authors of the resolution that "the idea of convening a labour congress will introduce an element of *unity*, etc." is either the innocent dreaming of a very young intellectual who is carried away by the latest book he has read, or else demagogy, i.e., the luring of the masses by promises that cannot be fulfilled.

You are wrong, comrades. It is the real struggle that unites. It is the development of parties, their continued struggle inside parliament and outside of it that unites, it is the gen-

eral strike, etc., that unites. But the experiment of convening a non-party congress will not introduce any real unity, or establish uniformity in the understanding of "interests and tasks".

It can, of course, be said that the struggle of different parties at the labour congress would lead to a wider field of action for the Social-Democrats and to their victory. If that is the way you look at the labour congress, you should say so straight out, and not promise the milk and honey of "an element of unity". If you do not say this in straightforward fashion, you run the risk of workers, misled and blinded by promises, coming to the congress for *the unification of politics* and actually finding gigantic, *irreconcilable* differences in politics, finding that the immediate unity of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, etc., is *impossible*, and then *going away disappointed*, going away cursing the intellectuals who have deceived them, cursing "politics" in general, cursing socialism in general. The inevitable outcome of such disappointment will be the cry, "Down with politics! Down with socialism! They disunite and do not unite the workers!" Some sort of primitive forms of pure trade-unionism or naïve syndicalism will gain strength from this.

Social-Democracy, of course, will *in the end* overcome everything; it will withstand all tests, and will unite all workers. Is that, however, an argument in favour of a policy of adventurous risk?

Point Three of the preamble:

"By introducing into the disunited organisational attempts of the socially active [what loud-sounding words they use!] masses of the proletariat such a unifying concrete aim as the convention of a general labour congress [no longer an all-Russian but a general congress! i.e., general party or non-party? Don't be afraid, comrades!], propaganda and agitation in favour of the convention will, in its turn, give a strong impetus to the urge of those strata towards self-organisation [i.e., that means *without the influence of Social-Democracy*, doesn't it? otherwise it would not be self-organisation], and will increase their activity in that direction."

That is known as running from Pontius to Pilate. Point Two: the labour congress will introduce an element of unity. Point Three: unity for the concrete aim of a labour congress will give an impetus to self-organisation. What is this self-organisation for? For the labour congress. What is the labour congress for? For self-organisation. What is this super-literary resolution against the rule of the intelligentsia for? For the self-satisfaction of the intelligentsia.

Point Four:

"In view of the growing popularity of the idea of the labour congress in working-class circles, a passive and, in particular, a hostile attitude on the part of parties [?? a misprint? the Social-Democratic Party?] towards attempts to put it into effect would open up the widest vistas for unprincipled adventurers to lead the workers onto a false path, and would force them into the embraces of demagogues."

An exceptionally irate point. Its content speaks of angry embarrassment. They themselves are not certain whom they should attack, so they are directing their fire against their own ranks.

I take the fifth, the latest issue of *Otgoloski*.[110] E. Charsky writes against Y. Larin: Y. Larin "has suddenly discovered an organisational panacea" ... "an unexpected recipe" ... "a muddle".... "Y. Larin does not notice that he is proposing, by a 'conscious' act, to perpetuate the sporadic nature of the revolution, which is directly hostile to the cause of the class unification of the working masses. And it is in the interests of the labour congress that all this is being done...". "In any case, we have before us very favourable soil for all sorts of 'land demagogy'.... The conclusion of Comrade Larin's confused thinking."

That would seem to be enough. Larin is accused by the *Mensheviks* of both demagogy and adventurism, since "recipe", "panacea" and similar compliments denote precisely adventurism.

So they were aiming at one, and hit another. Verily, his own received him not. And please note further, that if the authors of the resolution qualify Larin as adventurist and demagogue, El & Co. *go further than Larin*. El writes frankly

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

(*All-Russian Labour Congress*, Moscow, 1907) that there are *two tendencies* on the labour congress question, and that *they*, the Moscow Mensheviks, agree neither with the St. Petersburg Mensheviks (p. 10) nor with Larin. The St. Petersburg Mensheviks want a congress only of the working-class vanguard, and that is simply "a variation of a party congress" (pp. 10-11). In St. Petersburg, Larin "is considered a heretic and conniver" (p. 10). Larin wants an "all-Russian labour party". The Moscow Mensheviks want *an all-Russian workers' union*.

We may well ask: if Larin has received such "handling" from *Otgoloski*, how are we to qualify El, Ahmet Ts., Arkhangelsky, Solomin & Co.? It turns out that both Larin and the Moscow Mensheviks come under the irate fourth point!

But if you are angry, comrades, and your resolution condemns the "*false path*", it is at least your duty to show where the *true path* lies. Otherwise your angry embarrassment will become quite ridiculous. However, after rejecting both the "all-Russian workers' union" and "the all-Russian labour party" you *do not say a single word* about the practical purposes for which *you* want a labour congress!

Demagogues and adventurers are capable of convening a labour congress for false purposes. *Therefore* we Social-Democrats must show a sympathetic attitude towards the labour congress, setting that congress *no aims at all*.... In all truth, that Menshevik resolution is a real collection of all manner of incongruities.

Point Five:

"on the other hand, questions of the tasks of the labour congress, and of ways and means of preparing it, are still little explained in Social-Democratic circles [but they have been explained sufficiently for Larin and the Moscow Mensheviks *to have indicated clearly* the tasks of the congress and the ways and means. It's no use hiding your head under your wing, comrades from St. Petersburg. That won't make the ducklings hatched by Axelrod come out of the puddle on to dry land!], that the urge of the workers themselves towards its convocation has not yet been manifested by any serious practical steps on their part by way of preparation for it, and that the congress will only be a real and not a

sham expression of the collective will of the politically conscious strata of the proletariat and serve the cause of their class unity in the event of its convocation being prepared by their own independent organisational activity with the increased planned co-operation of the Party."

That is called descending from the sublime to the ridiculous. Larin and the young Moscow Mensheviks were just beginning to display "independent activity" when the St. Petersburg Mensheviks shouted: Hold on! You are not yet the one who expresses the collective will! You have not yet done enough explaining! The convocation of the (*non-party*) congress has still not been prepared by greater co-operation from the *Party*!

Poor Comrades El, Ahmet Ts. & Co.! They were getting along so well, with such attractive youthful verve; they published two whole collections of articles on the labour congress, analysed the problem from all angles, explained its "general-political" and its organisational significance, the attitude to the Duma, the attitude to the Party, and the attitude to the "petty-bourgeois elemental force"—when suddenly Axelrod's help brought such a change about!

We are afraid that if, until now, Larin alone revolted (remember: "heretic and conniver") against *hidebound Menshevism*,* the revolt will now develop into an *insurrection*.... Axelrod promised independent action and a genuinely labour congress against the rule of the intelligentsia—and now the St. Petersburg publicists are taking decisions and *explaining* that this independent action must be understood as being permitted by that selfsame much maligned "intellectualist" party!

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It is not to be wondered at that the conclusions drawn from such a preamble should be of the strangest:

"Proceeding from all these premises, the R.S.D.L.P. congress proposes to workers and intellectuals [really? how kind that is on the part of the fighters against "domination" by the intelligentsia!] to engage [but not in the

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 359-60.—*Ed*.

way Larin and Ahmet did!] in an all-round discussion of questions relating to the programme and tasks of the labour congress, to propaganda, agitational and organisational work for its preparation, and to ways and means of convening it.

"The Party congress at the same time considers it the duty of Party institutions to render every support to propaganda, agitational and organisational attempts at preparing the labour congress; it considers hostile agitation against such attempts to be impermissible in principle, since such hostility strives to preserve and strengthen the obsolete Party regime in Russian Social-Democracy that is no longer compatible with the present level of development, the demands of the proletarian elements grouped inside and around the Party, and the demands of the revolution."

What can you call that if not angry embarrassment? What can you do but laugh at such a resolution?

The Party congress forbids the defence of *the obsolete Party regime*, which regime the congress itself confirms!

The Party congress *does not propose any* reform of the obsolete regime, it even *postpones* the notorious "labour congress" (for the purpose of an inconceivable "political association") and at the same time *makes it a duty to support* "*attempts*"!

This is genuine, impotent, intellectualist grumbling; I am not satisfied with the present obsolete Party regime; I do not want to preserve and strengthen it! Excellent. You don't want to preserve it, so propose definite changes and we shall willingly discuss them. Please be kind enough to say what sort of labour congress you think desirable. This has not yet been made clear—the urge has not been manifested—the convocation has not been prepared. We must *get down to a discussion*. Excellent. It really is not worth while writing resolutions about "*getting down to a discussion*", my dear comrades, since we have already been discussing for *too* long a time. But a workers' party is not a club for the exercise of intellectualist "discussions"—it is a fighting proletarian organisation. Discussions are all right in their way, but we have to live and act. In which sort of *party organisation* is it permitted to live and act? in the old kind? Don't you dare defend the former obsolete

organisation; don't you dare preserve and strengthen it! Excellent, etc.

It is a tale without an end. The intellectual is peeved and angry at his own irresoluteness, his own embarrassment.

Such is "hidebound Menshevism's" last word.

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While wandering all round it, the Menshevik publicists have safely avoided the issue that has become urgent enough to be raised in practice and in literature—an independent Social-Democratic workers' party, or its *replacement* by (variant: its subordination to) a non-party political organisation of the proletariat?

Our Bolshevik resolution poses the question openly and gives a *direct* and definite answer to it. It is useless to evade the issue, no matter whether you do so because of embarrassment or because of well-meaning "reconciliation". It is useless to evade the issue because the *substitution* has been proposed, and work *to effect that substitution* is going on. The intellectualist Menshevik hens have hatched out ducklings. The ducklings have swum away. The hens *must* choose—on water or on land? The answer they have given (that answer could be accurately translated as: neither on water nor on land but *in the mud*) is no answer; it is postponement, procrastination.

Axelrod could not hold Larin back. Larin could not hold back El, Ahmet Ts. & Co. This latter company cannot hold back the anarcho-syndicalists.

On water or on land, gentlemen?

We want to keep on dry land. We can prophesy for you, that the greater the zeal, the greater your determination in crawling through the mud, the sooner will you return to dry land.

"To extend and strengthen the influence of the Social-Democratic party among the broad masses of the proletariat" we do not propose replacing Social-Democracy by "a labour party" of the non-partisan type, or "an all-Russian workers' union" that is above all parties, or a labour congress for unknown aims, but something simple and modest, something to which all project-mongering is alien—"efforts must be

increased, on the one hand, to organise trade unions and conduct Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation within them, and, on the other hand, to draw still larger sections of the working class into the activities of all types of Party organisations" (the final point of the Bolshevik resolution).

This has become too "obsolete", *too boring*, for our blasé intellectuals. Let them get on with their projects; we shall go with the workers, even at the "labour congress" (if it is held), and will show them *in practice* the correctness of our forecasts and—and then we shall return with the disappointed workers (or rather those who have become disappointed in certain intellectualist leaders) to "obsolete" work in trade unions and in Party organisations of all types.

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How is this "labour congress" tendency in our Party to be explained? Here we can only briefly mention three reasons that are, in our opinion, fundamental: (1) intellectualist-philistine weariness with the revolution; (2) a peculiarity of Russian Social-Democratic opportunism that is developing historically towards subordinating the "purely working-class" movement to the influence of the bourgeoisie; (3) the undigested traditions of the October revolution in Russia.

Re Point One. *Some* of the labour congress champions reveal weariness with the revolution, and a desire, at all costs, to legalise the Party and discard anything like a republic, the dictatorship of the proletariat and so on. A legal labour congress is a convenient means of attaining this. Hence (and also to some extent for the second reason) the sympathy of the Popular Socialists, the *Bez Zaglaviya* Bernsteinians (from *Tovarishch*, etc.) and the Cadets for such a congress.

Re Point Two. Take the first historical form adopted by Russian Social-Democratic opportunism. The beginning of a mass working-class movement (the second half of the nineties of the last century) gave rise to this opportunism in the shape of *Economism* and *Struvism*. *At that time*, Plekhanov and Axelrod *and all the old Iskra supporters* explained the connection between them time and again. The famous *Credo* by Prokopovich and Kuskova (1899-1900) expressed

this connection very clearly—let the intelligentsia and the liberals conduct the political struggle, and the workers the economic struggle. The political working-class party is an invention of the revolutionary intellectual.

In this classic *Credo* there is a clear expression of the historical, class meaning of the intellectualist infatuation with a "purely working-class" movement. Its meaning is the subordination of the working class (for the sake of (purely working-class" tasks) to *bourgeois* politics and *bourgeois* ideology. This "infatuation" of the intellectuals expressed the capitalist tendency to subordinate immature workers to the liberals.

Today, at a higher stage of development, we see *the same thing again*. Blocs with the Cadets, in general, the policy of supporting the Cadets, and a non-party labour congress are two sides of the same medal, connected in the same way as liberalism and the purely working-class movement are connected in the *Credo*. *In effect*, the non-party labour congress expresses the same capitalist tendency to *weaken* the class independence of the proletariat and *subordinate* that class to the bourgeoisie. This tendency is clearly displayed in the plans to replace Social-Democracy with a *non-party* workers' organisation, or its *subordination* to the latter.

Hence the sympathy of the Popular Socialists, the *Bez Zaglaviya* group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and others, for the idea of a "labour congress".

Re Point Three. The Russian bourgeois revolution has created a specific type of mass organisation of the proletariat that does not resemble the usual European organisations (trade unions or Social-Democratic parties). These organisations are the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

By schematically developing similar institutions into a system (as Trotsky has done), or sympathising in general with the revolutionary enthusiasm of the proletariat and being infatuated with the "fashionable" phrase "revolutionary syndicalism" (as some Moscow supporters of the labour congress are), it is easy to approach the idea of a labour congress in the revolutionary and not in the opportunist way.

That, however, is an uncritical attitude to great and glorious revolutionary traditions.

The Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar institutions were *actually* organs of the insurrection. Their strength and their success depended entirely on the strength and success of the insurrection. Only when the insurrection developed, was their inception no mere bagatelle, but a great exploit of the proletariat. In the event of a new upsurge of the struggle, in the event of its transition to *that phase*, such institutions, of course, are inevitable and desirable. But their historical development must not consist in a schematic development of local Soviets of Workers' Deputies up to an all-Russian labour congress, but in the conversion of embryonic organs of revolutionary power (for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies were such) into central organs of victorious revolutionary power, into a revolutionary provisional government. Soviets of Workers' Deputies and their unification are essential for the victory of the insurrection. A victorious insurrection will inevitably create *other* kinds of organs.

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Russian Social-Democracy, of course, should not forswear participation in a labour congress because the revolution is developing in a highly zigzag fashion and may produce the most varied and unusual situations. It is, however, one thing to study attentively the conditions of the revolution as it ebbs and flows and to attempt to use those conditions, and quite another to engage in confused or anti-Social-Democratic project-mongering.

Written in April 1907

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in the collection

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION

The newspaper *Trudovoi Narod*, organ of the Trudoviks and members of the Peasant Union, has defined the alignment of forces in the Duma on the land question, that "life or death question" for the peasantry.

"The Trudoviks (100), Popular Socialists (14), and Socialist-Revolutionaries (34), 148 in all, may act together on the land question, to uphold the interests of the working people. Assuming that the Social-Democrats (64) will join them on many points of that question, *the total will be 212*.

"All these will be opposed by the Constitutional-Democrats (91), the Polish Kolo (46), Independents (52), Octobrists and Moderates (32), *221 in all*.

"Thus there is a preponderance of votes against. And we have counted neither the Moslems (30) nor the Cossacks (17); it is likely that, at the very best, one half will side with the Left, and the other half with the Right. In any case there are more votes against the Trudoviks' land law than for it."

The enumeration omits the monarchists (22), but their inclusion only bears out the inference drawn by the Trudoviks.

This conclusion is of interest in two respects: firstly, it throws light on the fundamental question of the alignment of social forces in the present Russian revolution, and secondly, it helps to clarify the significance, for the liberation movement, of the Duma and the struggle in the Duma.

All Social-Democrats are convinced that, in its social and economic content, the present revolution is a *bourgeois* revolution. This means that it is proceeding on the basis of capitalist production relations, and will inevitably

result in a further development of those same production relations. To put it more simply, the entire economy of society will still *remain* under the domination of the market, of money, even when there is the broadest *freedom* and the peasants have won a complete victory in their struggle for the *land*. The struggle for land and freedom is a struggle for the conditions of existence of bourgeois society, for the rule of *capital* will remain in the most democratic republic, irrespective of how the transfer of "all the land to the people" is effected.

Such a view may seem strange to anyone unfamiliar with Marx's theory. Yet it is not hard to see that it is the correct view—one need but recall the great French Revolution and its outcome, the history of the "free lands" in America, and so on.

The Social-Democrats by no means wish to minimise the tasks of the present revolution, or to belittle its significance, by calling it a bourgeois revolution. On the contrary. The struggle of the working class against the capitalist class cannot develop on a wide enough scale and end in victory until the older historical enemies of the proletariat are overthrown.

Hence, the principal task of the proletariat at present is to win the broadest freedom and bring about the most complete destruction of landlord (feudal) landed proprietorship. Only by doing this, only by completely smashing the old, semi-feudal society through democratic action, can the proletariat rise to full stature as an independent class, lay full emphasis on its specific (i.e., socialist) tasks, as distinct from the democratic tasks common to "all the oppressed", and secure for itself the most favourable conditions for an unrestricted, sweeping, and intensified struggle for socialism. If the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement stops half-way, if it is not carried through, the proletariat will have to spend a great deal more of its forces on general democratic (i.e., bourgeois-democratic) tasks than on its own class, proletarian, i.e., socialist, tasks.

But can the socialist proletariat accomplish the bourgeois revolution independently and as the guiding force? Does not the very concept "bourgeois revolution" imply that it can be accomplished only by the bourgeoisie?

The Mensheviks often fall into this error, although, as a viewpoint, it is a caricature of Marxism. A liberation movement that is bourgeois in social and economic content is not such because of its motive forces. The motive force may be, not the bourgeoisie, but the proletariat and the peasantry. Why is this possible? Because the proletariat and the peasantry suffer even more than the bourgeoisie from the survivals of serfdom, because they are in greater need of freedom and the abolition of landlord oppression. For the bourgeoisie, on the contrary, complete victory constitutes a danger, since the proletariat will make use of full freedom against the bourgeoisie, and the fuller that freedom and the more completely the power of the landlords has been destroyed, the easier will it be for the proletariat to do so.

Hence the bourgeoisie strives to put an end to the bourgeois revolution half-way from its destination, when freedom has been only half-won, by a deal with the old authorities and the landlords. This striving is grounded in the class interests of the bourgeoisie. It was manifested so clearly in the German bourgeois revolution of 1848 that the Communist Marx spearheaded proletarian policy against the "compromising" (the expression is Marx's) liberal bourgeoisie.[111]

Our Russian bourgeoisie is still more cowardly, and our proletariat far more class-conscious and better organised than was the German proletariat in 1848. In our country the full victory of the bourgeois-democratic movement is possible only despite the "compromising" liberal bourgeoisie, only in the event of the mass of the democratic peasantry following the proletariat in the struggle for full freedom and all the land.

The Second Duma offers still more striking confirmation of this view. Even the peasants have now realised that the liberal bourgeoisie, the Constitutional-Democrats, belong to the Right, and the peasants and the workers to the Left, True, the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries constantly vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and as often as not are *in reality* political *hangers-on* of the liberals (the voting for Golovin, the "tactics of silence", agreement to refer the budget to a commission, etc., etc.[112]). This vacillation is not accidental. It springs from the class nature of the petty bourgeoisie,

Why must the Constitutional-Democrats be included among the Rights in a question as pressing as that of the land? Because the Constitutional-Democrat agrarian policy is essentially a *landlord* policy. The "compulsory alienation" advocated by the Constitutional-Democrats actually means *the landlords compelling the peasants to pay ruinous* compensation, for in fact both the amount of these payments and rates of taxation *are determined by the landlords*; the landlords and officials will constitute the majority in the local land committees (in the First Duma the Constitutional-Democrats were opposed to the election of these committees by universal ballot), and in the central all-Russian legislature the landlords will be predominant through the Council of State, etc. Cadet "liberalism" is the liberalism of the bourgeois lawyer who *reconciles* the peasant with the landlord, and does that *to the advantage of the landlord*.*

Take the second question. The Constitutional-Democrats and the Rights constitute a majority in the Duma. "*What is the way out?*" asks *Trudovoi Narod*. The answer is simple: the "way out" is to rise above Duma discussions which lead nowhere.

This would be necessary even if the Left had a majority in the Duma, for the Duma is powerless, and the Council of State would, in the interests of the landlords, "*improve*" *any* project passed by the Duma. And it is necessary now—not from any subjective party viewpoint, but in the objective historical sense; *unless this is done*, the land question can be settled *only* in favour of the landlords.

Nashe Ekho, No. 7,
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* In view of what *Rech* said about the landlord affiliation of the Constitutional-Democrats being only a platform catchword, we must add this: we estimated 79 unmistakable Constitutional-Democrats from the well-known book *Members of the Second State Duma* (St. Petersburg, 1907), *of these 20 are landlords*. We can name *Tuchkov*, *Boguslavsky*, *Biglov*, Bakunin, *Rodichev*, *Bogdanov*, Salazkin, *Tatarinov*, *Stakhovich*, *Ikonnikov*, *Savelyev*, *Dolgorukov*, *Chelnokov*, *Golovin*, both *Pereleshins*, *Volotsky*, Iordansky, Chernosvitov. The underlined are Marshals of the Nobility,[113] Rural Superintendents[114] or chairmen of Zemstvo Boards.[115]

AN ANAEMIC DUMA OR AN ANAEMIC PETTY BOURGEOISIE

A gradual increase is taking place in the number of daily periodicals with a stand more Left than that of the Cadets. The voice of the Left section of the Duma, the section between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, is becoming more audible.

The latest addition is the daily press of the Popular Socialists. Their newspaper, *Obshchestvennoye Dyelo* (Sunday, April 1) immediately adopted a highly characteristic and noteworthy tone of plaint, regret and repentance.

What do they complain of? They complain that the Duma is "anaemic" (i.e., in plain Russian, bloodless and spineless).

What do they regret? The lengthy supremacy of the slogan "Save the Duma".

What do they repent of? Of their support for Cadet tactics.

It is true that this repentance is far from being real, sincere and full—it is not, as the saying goes, fully confessed and half redressed. The repentance of the Popular Socialists is so insincere that in their first, or repentance, issue they reply to us with a malicious statement to the effect that we, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats, "solve differences by calling our opponent ignorant, pitiful", etc., and that we are "*inaccurate in our facts*" in ascribing "entry on to the path of conciliation" to our opponent.

We should not, of course, have taken up our readers' time with this question of the sincerity of the Narodnik repentance had it not become very intimately and directly connected with questions that have a decisive importance in

assessing the Second Duma as a whole—more than that, in assessing the entire Russian revolution.

The Narodniks are three groups in the Duma united on a number of basic questions and conducting a more or less united common policy. These groups in some way or another reflect the interests and views of a vast mass of the Russian people.

The majority of this category of deputies are peasants, and it can scarcely be disputed that the peasant masses have most precisely expressed their needs (and their prejudices) through this category of Duma deputies, and through no other. It follows, therefore, that the policy of the Narodniks in the Duma is connected with the question of the policy of the peasant masses, without whose participation there can be no talk of victory for the emancipation movement.

The Popular Socialists are stating an obvious and disgraceful falsehood to the effect that the Social-Democrats solve differences by vilification or by falsely ascribing conciliation to the Trudoviks (i.e., the Narodniks). This is untrue, gentlemen, because the Social-Democrats, *from the very outset* of the Second Duma's activities, and quite independently of the Narodniks and the struggle against them, *had already produced* that assessment of the notorious slogan "Save the Duma" towards which you are now hobbling.

"'Save the Duma!'" wrote our colleague N. R.,[116] on *February 21*, "is the cry that is constantly escaping the lips of the bourgeois electors and is being repeated in the bourgeois press, and not only the Cadet press but also such 'Left' periodicals as *Tovarishch*.... The secret of the Duma's salvation has long been revealed by the Black-Hundred and Octobrist press and by the government. The Duma can easily be saved if it is 'able to function' and is 'obedient to the law', i.e., if it slavishly prostrates itself to the government, and does not venture anything more than timid requests and degrading petitions. The Duma can easily be saved if it betrays the cause of national emancipation and sacrifices that cause to the Black-Hundred gang. The Duma, therefore, can only be saved if power remains in the old hands. That must be clear to everybody; that must not be forgotten. But can the Duma possibly be saved when treachery is the price to be paid? Social-Democracy answers that question clearly and loudly: Never! The proletariat and the peasantry have no use for a treacherous Duma. Not without reason did the Moscow peasantry declare in their mandate to their deputy: 'Let them dissolve you, but do not betray the will of the people'. If the Duma is to be mainly concerned with avoiding irritation of the government, it will lose the confidence of

the people and will not fulfil the tasks it has been charged with—to assist as far as possible in organising the masses of the people for victory over reaction and for the triumph of the emancipation movement.... only the strong are feared. And respect too is only for the strong. Hysterical cries of 'Save the Duma' are unworthy of a free people and its elected representatives."

This was written *the day after* the Second Duma was opened. And, it would seem, it is written clearly enough.

The Narodniks who, in their literature, in their general politics and in the Duma, represent the interests of various strata of the petty bourgeoisie, petty proprietors (in the towns and, especially, in the countryside—i.e., the peasantry), have now begun to understand that the Social-Democrats were speaking the truth. Events have *proved the correctness* of our policy.

But in order "not to come too late", in order not to become a politician who is wise after the event, learning from events is not enough. You must *understand* the course taken by events, understand the *basic* relations between classes, which *determine* the policies of the various parties and of the entire Duma.

"Save the Duma" is a Cadet slogan that gives expression to Cadet policy. What is it, in essence? It means an agreement with the reactionaries against the people's demands. How is this agreement expressed? By submitting to those institutions and those limits of activity that are fixed by the reactionaries. By turning the demands of liberty and the demands of the people into miserable, pitiful, false "reforms" that *are kept within* those limits. Why do the Social-Democrats call this liberal policy treacherous? Because the defeat of all unsuccessful bourgeois revolutions has always been possible only because the liberals have come to an agreement with the reactionaries, i.e., because of their *actually* going over from people's freedom to reaction. Liberal reformism during the revolution is a betrayal of people's freedom. It is brought about not by accident, but by the class interests of the bourgeoisie and part of the landlords, who *fear* the people, especially the working class.

The slogan "Save the Duma" is of importance because it is a clear expression of the *general* line of this treacherous policy. Individual manifestations of it are: the tactics of

silence in response to the declaration, the curtailment of the tasks set the food and unemployment commissions, the curtailment of speeches in the Duma, the replacement of the Duma by commissions, the relegation of the budget to a commission, etc.

As representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the Narodniks *have supported*, *and are still supporting*, this Cadet policy. The Narodniks voted for Golovin instead of abstaining from voting. The Narodniks participated in the pitiful "tactics of silence", and so did both the Popular Socialists *and the Socialist-Revolutionaries*. Only under the repeated pressure of the Social-Democrats did the Narodniks *begin to draw away* from the Constitutional-Democrats. But even now the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries are wavering in all their policies, for *they do not understand the task* of the struggle against the Cadets and of their exposure from the Duma platform.

This wavering is due to *the anaemic state of the petty bourgeoisie*.

This "anaemia" of the petty bourgeoisie, partially due to its weariness from the revolution and partially to its wavering and unstable (social) character, is the chief cause of the "anaemic state of the Duma". And so we say to the Narodniks—it's no use blaming the mirror if your looks are no good.

Don't be anaemic in your politics, break off your connections with the Cadets; stick determinedly to the proletariat; leave it to the liberals *to save* the Duma, and you yourselves openly, boldly and firmly *save* the interests and traditions of the emancipation movement—then your repentance will indeed mean "half redressing"!

Written on April 2 (15), 1907

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Published according to the newspaper text

BANALITY TRIUMPHANT, OR S.R.'s APE THE CADETS

Yesterday we said that the Narodniks seemed to have come to their senses after the Duma had been in existence for a month and had begun—I would not say to "understand", but at least to sense, the ignominy of the notorious Cadet slogan, "Save the Duma!" We showed in that article that the Cadet slogan is no accident but the expression of a policy determined by the profound class interests of the bourgeoisie and the landlords.*

Today the leading Cadet newspaper *Rech* (April 3) devotes its editorial to that problem. "The sharp protests made during the past few days by the Left newspapers against the tactics of 'saving the Duma' are a rather alarming symptom," says the Cadet leading article.

That is how matters stand. We are glad the Cadets have also noticed that the Narodniks repent the "saving of the Duma". That means that the observations we made yesterday were not wrong, that there really is *a movement* among the petty bourgeoisie from the liberal landlords towards the working class. Good luck to them!

The "save the Duma" tactics are praised by the Cadet *Rech* in terms that deserve to be preserved in perpetuity as a gem of banality. Just listen to this: "If the Duma lives on, is it not the consciously produced fruit of *your* [the opposition's] efforts? It is the first tangible result of the intervention of your will in events. This *absence* of facts is in

* See pp. 337-40 of this volume.—*Ed.*

itself a fact of tremendous importance; it is your implementation of a plan you have prepared and put into force."

It is a pity Shchedrin did not live until the "great" Russian revolution. He would no doubt have added a fresh chapter to *The Golovlyov Family* in which he would have depicted Judas Golovlyov comforting the flogged, humiliated, hungry and enslaved muzhik in the following words: "You expect improvement? You are disappointed at the lack of change in a way of life based on hunger, the birch, the knout, and shooting down of the people? You complain of the 'absence of facts'? You ingrate! Is not the absence of facts in itself a fact of the utmost importance? Is it not the conscious result of the intervention of your will that the Lidvals still rule as before, that the muzhiks submit calmly to being flogged, instead of harbouring harmful dreams of the 'poetry of struggle'?"

It is hard to hate the Black Hundreds; feelings have died in the same way as they die, it is said, in war-time after a long series of battles, after the long experience of shooting at people and spending a long time among bursting shells and whistling bullets. War is war—and an open, universal and *customary* war is going on against the Black Hundreds.

This Judas Golovlyov of a Cadet, however, is capable of inspiring the most burning feeling of hatred and contempt. The "liberal" landlord and bourgeois advocate is listened to; even the peasants listen to him. He really does throw dust in the eyes of the people and stupefy them!...

You *cannot* fight against the Krushevans with words, with the pen. You have to fight against them in another way. To fight against counter-revolution with the pen, with words, would mean, first and foremost, to expose those disgusting hypocrites who, in the name of "people's freedom", in the name of "democracy", laud political stagnation, the silence of the people, the humiliation of the citizen turned philistine, and "the absence of facts". You must fight against those liberal landlords and bourgeois advocates, who are fully satisfied that the people are silent and they themselves are able, fearlessly and with impunity, to play at "statesmen" and to apply the balm of appeasement to those who "tactlessly" express indignation at the rule of counter-revolution.

Can one possibly fail to reply in the most scathing terms to speeches such as the following?

> "The day when debates in the Taurida Palace will seem as much an inevitable item of the day's proceedings as lunch in the afternoon and theatre in the evening, when the day's programme will not interest all collectively, but will have special interest for different groups [!!], when debates on general policy will become an exception and exercises in abstract rhetoric will actually be impossible on account of the absence of an audience—that day may be welcomed as the day of the final triumph of representative rule in Russia."

There's a Judas Golovlyov for you! The day when those who have been flogged lose consciousness and are silent instead of engaging in "debates", when the landlords will be as certain of their old power (*strengthened* by "liberal" reforms) as the liberal Judases are of their lunch in the afternoon and their theatre in the evening, that day will be the day of the final triumph of "people's freedom". The day when reaction is finally triumphant will be the day of the final triumph of the constitution....

That is the way it was with all betrayals by the bourgeoisie in Europe. *That is the way it will be* ... but will it be like that in Russia, gentlemen?

The Judases try to clear themselves by showing that even among the parties of the Left there have been, and still are, supporters of "salvation". Fortunately, this time it is not the Social-Democrat who is among those misled by the Judases, but the Socialist-Revolutionary. The Cadets quote passages from the Tammerfors speech of some Socialist-Revolutionary, who called for "collaboration" with the Cadets, and disputed the timeliness or need to fight against them.

We do not know of that speech, or whether *Rech* is quoting accurately.

But we do know the *resolution* of the last congress of Socialist-Revolutionaries—not some individual speech—and that resolution *really does express* the stultification of the petty bourgeois who has been stupefied by the liberal Judas.

This resolution was printed in the official organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries[117] (issue No. 6, March 8, 1907), and it turns out that the old passages from it, those dating back to February, are correctly quoted by the newspapers.

There it actually says in black and white: "The Congress [of the S.R.'s] is of the opinion that strict party alignments within the Duma, with each group acting on its own in isolated fashion, and bitter strife among the groups, might completely paralyse the activity of the opposition majority, and thus discredit, in the minds of the working classes, the very idea of popular representation". At that time (February 22) *Rech* praised that banality. At that time, too (February 23), we threw some light on it, and showed the petty-bourgeois origin and treacherous liberal significance of such a congress resolution.*

Whether some Socialist-Revolutionary leader will be killed politically by the Judas kiss is of no interest to us. But *the Cadet resolution* of the S.R. congress must be a thousand times exposed to the workers so as to warn wavering Social-Democrats and to break any connection between the proletariat and the supposedly revolutionary S.R.'s.

Written on April 3 (16), 1907

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* See pp. 165-69 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP AND APRIL 3 IN THE DUMA

We have to return once again to the incident that was enacted in the State Duma in connection with question asked regarding the killings and tortures in Riga Prison and with the arraignment of seventy-four people before a military court. This has to be done, we say, because, amongst other things, *Narodnaya Duma* has for some reason or other seen fit to obscure the real meaning of the events and thereby to aggravate that extremely unfavourable impression created by the conduct of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma an this question.

It is true that *Narodnaya Duma* also speaks of this first question day in the Duma by saying that the first attempt was a failure; it is true that *Narodnaya Duma* points out, apropos of this, that "the Duma groups are still poorly adapted to parliamentary procedure", but that is not what matters. It is our opinion that the Social-Democratic group has revealed, not *parliamentary* but purely *political* inexperience in this matter. It is no misfortune that the Social-Democratic group sometimes gets caught in some "formal trap" (*Narodnaya Duma*'s words or another; the misfortune is that it sometimes quite unnecessarily surrenders its positions and does not carry a well-commenced struggle to the end, does not *consolidate* victory behind it when there is every possibility of so doing.

Such was the case when a reply was made to the government declaration, and the Social-Democratic group, for no reason at all, surrendered a good half of its victory ... to Mr. Stolypin; this is what happened on April 3, in connection with the question asked about the Riga horrors.

The Cadets are against questions that have to be answered without notice.[118] That is only natural; an urgent question, especially one on such a matter as that of the government using military courts in their war against the people, always contains elements of a "demonstrative act", of pressure brought to bear on the ministers. An urgent question on such a matter is undoubtedly one of those "facts", one of those "acts" on the part of the Duma that do not come under the heading of "lunch in the afternoon" or "theatre in the evening", to which the servile *Rech* is so anxious to liken the Duma itself. Is it possible that this poison, produced by Cadet decomposition, can affect the Left in the Duma, including even the Social-Democratic group? We are unwilling to admit this, yet....

"No *urgent* question is needed," Mr. Rodichev whines servilely from the rostrum. "An urgent question in the present instance might wound the ministers' pride."

We are not in the least surprised at such speeches on the lips of a Cadet Mirabeau, who so painstakingly plays his role of representative of the *tas de blagueurs** in the Duma.

Deputy Djaparidze (Social-Democrat) gave a splendid answer to Rodichev. "It is our duty," he reminded the Cadet flunkeys, "to say our word when the hand of the executioner is raised over his victim."

Then Kuzmin-Karavayev took the floor and read a telegram he had received from the local satrap in Riga, Meller-Zakomelsky—that same Meller-Zakomelsky whose name Siberian mothers still use to scare their children with. The telegram was most insolent, and full of crude jibes: "...in Riga there has been no reason to arraign either 74, or 70 or even 4 people; so far there is nobody to save".

Deputy Alexinsky opposed to this telegram another, received from progressive Riga electors, which said that the arraignment before a military court was being arranged.

Deputy Alexinsky, who insisted with good reason on the urgency of the question, was followed by the Trudovik and the Socialist-Revolutionary groups, which supported the demand of urgency.

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* Gang of chatterboxes.

Then *the Cadets began to withdraw*. Pergament did not even put forward an argument, but *requested* the Duma Left not to insist on urgency, offering *on behalf of the Questions Commission* to put this question through the commission within twenty-four hours. Only, he begged, don't insist on a reply from the floor.

Bulgakov, the unctuous mystic, then spoke and, to achieve the same rejection of urgency, asked that no party passion be brought into the question. Mr. Bulgakov would have done well first to explain to his party colleagues that in such matters servility is permissible to an even lesser degree than in others, and will *naturally* arouse party passions to the *paroxysms* nobody desires.

After Bulgakov came Kiesewetter, bringing another step towards the Left, another minor concession. Kiesewetter proposed passing the question on to the commission so that it could be handled "*out of turn*".

Delarov of the Popular Socialists spoke in favour of urgency.

In other words, the entire Left was against the Cadets with a unanimity rare in the Duma. It became clearer that the issue would be a political one, and that the struggle begun against Cadet servility would have to be carried through to its conclusion. Read A. Stolypin's "Notes" in *Novoye Vremya* for April 4. How he showers praises on the Cadet Party! How he attacks his allies, the "Rights", to make them realise, at long last, that in such cases they must not speak so sharply, or scare the Cadets from the path of conciliation they are now following! "Sincerity and seriousness", be pleased to note, were heard by Mr. Stolypin "in the speeches of the Cadets" on that day!

And then, when the Social-Democratic group already had victory within its grasp, Tsereteli got up and said that the group withdrew its motion of urgency. Why? What were the motives? There was absolutely no reason to suppose that a question passed on to a commission would be more effective than a question answered from the floor. And, of course, nobody will risk saying that it would.

Tsereteli had no grounds whatsoever for his statement. It amounts to lambasting oneself in the fullest sense of the word. The day of April 3 does not stand to the credit of the

Social-Democratic group. And, we repeat, this is not a case of *parliamentary* inexperience. It is a case of that political flaccidity, that indecisiveness of the Social-Democratic group, which has made itself felt on several previous occasions, and has prevented the group from becoming the real leader of the entire Duma Left. We must not close our eyes to this, but must strive to get rid of it!

Written on April 4 (17), 1907

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Published according to the newspaper text

THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

I

An article with the above title in yesterday's *Narodnaya Duma* is an example of a calm, clear, simple exposition of the real differences in principle among the Social-Democrats. It is as pleasant and useful to conduct a dispute on such a basis, as it is unpleasant and impossible to answer the hysterics of *Privet*[119] or *Otgoloski*.

To get down to business. Differences have arisen over the appraisal of the Cadets and the Narodniks. With regard to the Cadets, according to the perfectly correct opinion of *Narodnaya Duma*, the differences boil down to the question of *whom they represent*. "The middle and petty, mainly urban, bourgeoisie," answers *Narodnaya Duma*. "The economic basis of these parties is provided by a section of the middle landlords and the middle bourgeoisie, especially the bourgeois intelligentsia, while a section of the urban and rural petty-bourgeois democrats still follow these parties merely by force of tradition and because they are deliberately deceived by the liberals."*

Clearly the Mensheviks are more optimistic in their assessment of the Cadets than we are. They gloss over or deny their links with the landlords, while we stress them. They stress their links with the urban democratic petty bourgeoisie, while we consider those links extremely weak.

As far as the landlords are concerned, *Narodnaya Duma* says that our statement in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 7, is naïve—the statement in which we estimated twenty landlords, not in the *past* (that was a mistake on the part of *Narodnaya*

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* See p. 137 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Duma) but in the *present* Cadet group in the Duma.* There are millionaires and high-ranking officials even among the Social-Democrats, says *Narodnaya Duma* ironically.

Feeble irony! Everybody realises that the Singers, Aronses and Nalivkins are instances of individuals going over from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. But, gentlemen, would you seriously insist that twenty landlords (out of the seventy-nine members forming the Constitutional-Democratic group, i.e., *a quarter*) are individual followers of sixty bourgeois intellectuals, and not vice versa? Will you insist that it is the landlords who are conducting a liberal-intellectualist policy and not the liberal intellectuals who are conducting the policy of the landlords? Your joke about Singer and Comrade Nalivkin—that was nothing more than a nice little joke to cover up a hopeless position.

The composition of the Cadet Duma group, of course, is not the main proof, but merely a symptom. The main proof lies, first of all, in the history of landlord liberalism in Russia (as *Narodnaya Duma* admits); secondly—and this is the main thing—it lies in an analysis of the *present-day* policy of the Constitutional-Democrats. "The Cadet agrarian policy is *essentially* [note this] a landlord policy" (*Nashe Ekho*, No. 7). "Cadet 'liberalism' is the liberalism of the bourgeois lawyer who reconciles the peasant with the landlord, and does that to the advantage of the landlord" (ibid.).**

Narodnaya Duma has no answer to this argument.

To continue. How do they demonstrate the class links between the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the urban democratic petty bourgeoisie? By using election statistics—the towns return mostly Cadets, that is a fact. But it is no proof. In the first place, our election law gives preference to the *non-democratic* strata of the urban bourgeoisie. Everybody knows that the popular assemblies express *more precisely* the views and temper "of the *democratic* petty bourgeoisie of the towns". Secondly, the Cadets are stronger and the Lefts weaker in the urban curias of the big cities than in those of the small towns. This is shown by the statistics on electors. Hence it follows that the Cadets represent,

* See p. 336 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*

not the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but the liberal middle bourgeoisie. The bigger the town, the sharper the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the stronger the Cadets in the urban (bourgeois) curia, as compared with the Lefts. Thirdly, in twenty-two big cities where there was a Left bloc, the Rights obtained 17,000 votes, the Octobrists 34,000, the Cadets, 74,000, and the Lefts 41,000 votes. It was possible *at one go* to deprive the Cadets of such a large number of votes, only because they are *not* democrats. Everywhere, all over the world, liberal lawyers have deceived the democratic petty bourgeoisie, and have been exposed by the socialists.

"Is it true," asked *Narodnaya Duma*, "that our middle and petty bourgeoisie are already interested in the suppression of the revolution so as to break down the forces of the proletariat, which constitute a direct threat to them?" And itself answers: "It is definitely not true."

These words provide a *definitely untrue* expression of *our* views. This, comrades, means polemics without principles. You know very well that we distinguish between the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets and that of the Octobrists; that we do not include *the petty bourgeoisie* in our accusation of counter-revolutionariness; that we believe that the Cadet landlords fear not only the workers, but the peasants as well. You are distorting, not objecting.

The next argument by *Narodnaya Duma* actually is an objection. The Cadets become more moderate and more reactionary as the revolution declines, and not as it rises, i.e., not because of their counter-revolutionary nature but because of their weakness. The Cadets' tactics, says *Narodnaya Duma* in italics "are *not the tactics of counter-revolutionary strength but the tactics of revolutionary impotence*".

It thus appears that the Cadets are revolutionaries too, hut only impotent revolutionaries. A monstrous conclusion to draw. To arrive at this howling incongruity, they had to argue from a radically erroneous premise. That error is the denial of the landlord character of the Cadets (in Russia the *landlord* is counter-revolutionary either in the Black-Hundred and Octobrist manner, or in the Cadet manner) and the denial of the fact that bourgeois *intellectuals* predominate among the Cadets. If we rectify these two errors,

we get the correct conclusion: *the tactics of the Constitutional-Democrats are the tactics of landlord counter-revolution and bourgeois-intellectual impotence*. The landlords are a counter-revolutionary force. So are the big bourgeoisie. The bourgeois intellectual and the liberal government official are their cowardly servants, who hide their servility to counter-revolution behind a mask of "democratic" hypocrisy.

It is not true that the Cadets "shifted to the Right" only with the decline, not with the upsurge, of the revolution. Remember *Nachalo*,[120] comrades from *Narodnaya Duma*. Remember articles in the spirit of "Witte Is the Agent of the Bourse, Struve Is the Agent of Witte". Those were excellent articles! And those were excellent times—we did not then disagree with the Mensheviks in our assessment of the Cadets.... To provide a correct picture of the Cadets' attitude to the upsurge, or upsurges, of the revolution, we must say—*when the revolution shows itself in the streets, the Cadet shows himself in the minister's ante-chamber*.

Struve went to Witte in November 1905. Somebody from the Cadets visited somebody from the Black Hundreds in June 1906. Milyukov went to Stolypin on January 15, 1907. As it was, so will it be....

* * *

Giving an economic basis for its views on the Cadets, *Narodnaya Duma* concludes:

"Owing to the Russia's poor urban development and the dominant influence of big enterprises in urban industry, our urban middle and petty bourgeoisie has too small an influence on the general economic life of the country to feel itself the independent political force that those classes in England and France at one time felt themselves to be...." Very good and perfectly correct. Only it *does not* apply *to the Cadets*. And, furthermore, thereby disappears that allegedly Marxist counterposing of "big urban progressive" and "petty rural backward" bourgeoisie that has often been used in an attempt to justify Menshevik tactics.... "They cannot make the proletariat their tool because the proletariat is already fighting under its own Social-Democratic banner...."

Very true! "This is the source of all its wavering, of all its indecisiveness, in the struggle against the autocratic semi-feudal system...." Again very true, but it does not apply to the Cadets, it applies to the *Trudovik* parties and groups who find their support not only in the rural but in the urban petty bourgeoisie!

"This relative weakness of urban bourgeois democracy also explains the fact that as soon as our bourgeois democrats begin shifting to the Left they immediately lose the urban soil under their feet and become entangled in the peasant-Narodnik swamp...."

True, a thousand times true! We did not even dare dream of such complete confirmation of Bolshevik tactics on the part of *Narodnaya Duma*. "As soon as our bourgeois democrats begin shifting to the Left, they become Narodniks." That is exactly how it is—*Left* bourgeois democrats *are* Narodniks. The Cadets only pretend to be democrats; actually they are not democrats at all. Therefore, insofar as the proletariat have to carry on the bourgeois revolution in the company of bourgeois democracy, they are so far fated to act in a political "bloc" in the broad sense of the term, that including not only electoral and not only parliamentary agreements, but also joint action without any agreement *with the Left*, that is, the Narodnik, petty bourgeoisie, against the Black Hundreds and against the Cadets!

Quod erat demonstrandum.

Next time we will talk to *Narodnaya Duma* specifically about the Narodniks.

II*

If we recognise that the "Narodniks are the Left neighbours of the Cadets", that they "constantly waver between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats", this must inevitably lead to a recognition of the Bolshevik policy—compel the Narodniks to take the side of Social-Democracy, against the Black Hundreds and against the Constitutional-Democrats.

The Mensheviks are trying to weaken the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from their admissions, or to avoid

* Since the government has suppressed *Narodnaya Duma* we shall, as far as possible, eliminate direct polemics with that paper, and deal with Marxism's assessment of Narodism in principle.

it by reference to the fact that the peasantry, while being "*more revolutionary and more democratic*" than the liberals, are, at the same time, "imbued with reactionary social utopias" and are striving to "turn back the wheel of history in the sphere of economy".

This argument, common enough in our Social-Democratic literature, contains a big error from the standpoint of logic and of economic history. Here yards are compared with pounds, the reactionary nature of peasant ideas about the socialist revolution is compared with the reactionary nature of liberal politics in the bourgeois revolution.

If the peasants undoubtedly favour reactionary utopias in respect of the tasks of socialism, the liberal bourgeoisie, in respect of *those same* tasks, favours reactionary excesses similar to those of June 1848 or May 1871.

If, in the *present*, i.e., the bourgeois, revolution, the peasants and their ideologists, the Narodniks, conduct a reactionary policy as compared with the liberals, a Marxist would never recognise the Narodniks as being more to the Left, more revolutionary and more democratic than the liberals.

Obviously there is something wrong here.

Compare the agrarian policy of the liberals with that of the Narodniks. Does it contain features that are at present economically reactionary? In both parties the urge to limit mobilisation of land ownership is reactionary. The bureaucratic nature of the Cadet agrarian policy (landlord-*bureaucratic* land committees) makes its reactionary nature much more dangerous *in practice* and immediately. And so, on this point the comparison does not favour the liberals.

"Equalitarianism" in land tenure.... The idea of the equality of small producers is reactionary because it is an attempt to seek in the past and not in the future the solution of the tasks of the socialist revolution. The proletariat does not bring with itself the socialism of equality for petty proprietors, but the socialism of large-scale socialised production. But that same idea of equality is the fullest, most consistent and most decisive expression of bourgeois-democratic tasks. Those Marxists who have forgotten this are advised to turn to Volume I of Marx's *Capital* or to Engels's *Anti-Dühring*. The idea of equality most completely

expresses the struggle against all the survivals of the serf-owning system, the struggle for the broadest and purest development of commodity production.

Our people frequently forget this when they speak of the reactionary nature of Narodnik "equalitarian" agrarian projects.

It is not only ideologically that equality expresses the most complete implementation of the conditions of free capitalism and commodity production. Materially too, in the sphere of the economic relations of an agriculture emerging from the state of serfdom, the equality of petty producers is a condition for the broadest, most complete, free and rapid development of capitalist agriculture.

This development has been proceeding in Russia for a long time. It has been accelerated by the revolution. The only question is—will it follow, say, the Prussian type (the retention of landlord farming with the *Knecht* in bondage and paying "according to a just estimate" for a starvation minimum of land), or the American type (the abolition of landlord farming and the transfer of all the land to the farmers).

That is the basic problem of our entire bourgeois-democratic revolution, the question that will decide its defeat or victory.

The Social-Democrats demand the transfer of all the land to the peasants without compensation, i.e., they struggle determinedly for the second type of capitalist development, the type that is advantageous to the people. In the peasants' struggle against the feudal-minded landlords, the idea of equality is the strongest ideological impetus in the struggle for land—and the establishment of equality between petty producers is the most complete abolition of all and every survival of serfdom. The idea of equality, therefore, is the most revolutionary idea for the peasant movement, not only because it stimulates the political struggle, but also because it stimulates the economic purging of agriculture of serfdom's survivals.

Insofar as the Narodniks hold the opinion that equality may be maintained on a basis of commodity production and that that equality may be an element of the development to socialism, their views are erroneous and their socialism

reactionary. That is something every Marxist should know and remember. The Marxist, however, would be unfaithful to his historical analysis of the specific tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution if he were to forget that this very idea of equality and the many different equalitarian plans are the fullest possible expression of the tasks of the bourgeois revolution, *not* the socialist, and that they express the tasks, not of the struggle against capitalism, but of the struggle against the rule of the landlords and bureaucracy.

One alternative is evolution of the Prussian type—the serf-owning landlord becomes a Junker; the landlords' power in the state is consolidated for a decade; monarchy: "military despotism, embellished in parliamentary forms" instead of democracy; the greatest inequality among the rural and non-rural population. The second alternative is evolution of the American type—the abolition of landlord farming; the peasant becomes a free farmer; popular government; the bourgeois-democratic political system; the greatest equality among the rural population as the starting point of, and a condition for, free capitalism.

Such are the historical alternatives that are coloured by the hypocrisy of the Cadets (who would lead the country along the first path) and the socially reactionary utopianism of the Narodniks (who would lead the country along the second path).

It is obvious that the proletariat must devote all its efforts to supporting the latter path. Only by so doing will the labouring classes speedily get rid of the last bourgeois illusions—for the socialism of equality is the last bourgeois illusion of the petty proprietor. Only in that case will the masses of the people, learning from reality and not from books, speedily gain practical experience of the impotence of all types of equalitarian plans, impotence in face of the power of capital. Only in that case will the proletariat speedily shake off "Trudovik" (i.e., petty-bourgeois) traditions, rid itself of the bourgeois-democratic tasks that inevitably devolve upon it now, and devote itself *entirely* to its own, truly class (i.e., socialist) tasks.

It is only failure to understand the relationship between bourgeois-democratic and socialist tasks that leads some

Social-Democrats to fear the consummation of the bourgeois revolution.

Only failure to understand the tasks and essential nature of the bourgeois revolution can give rise to arguments like the following: "It [our revolution] has not, in the final analysis, been engendered by the interests of the peasants, but [??] by the interests of developing bourgeois society", or, "this revolution is bourgeois and, *therefore* [!!??] it cannot proceed under a peasant banner and peasant leadership" (*Narodnaya Duma*, No. 21, April 4). From this it seems that peasant farming in Russia does not rest on a bourgeois basis, but on some other! The interests of the peasant masses are precisely the interests of the most complete, rapid and extensive "development of bourgeois society", a development of the "American" and not the "Prussian" type. It is exactly for this reason that the bourgeois revolution *may proceed* "under peasant leadership" (more correctly: under proletarian leadership, if the peasants, wavering between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, in general *follow* the Social-Democrats). The bourgeois revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie can only be an unconsummated revolution (i.e., strictly speaking, not revolution but reform). It can be a real revolution only under the leadership of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Nashe Ekho, Nos. 11 and 12, April 5 and 7, 1907

Published according to the text in *Nashe Ekho*

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PREFACE
TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF
LETTERS BY JOHANNES BECKER, JOSEPH DIETZGEN, FREDERICK ENGELS, KARL MARX, AND OTHERS TO FRIEDRICH SORGE AND OTHERS

Written on April 6 (19), 1907

Published in 1907 in the book
Letters by Johannes Becker, Joseph Dietzgen, Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, and Others to Friedrich Sorge and Others.
Published by P. G. Dauge,
St. Petersburg
Signed: *N. Lenin*

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The collection of letters by Marx, Engels, Dietzgen, Becker and other leaders of the international working-class movement in the last century, here presented to the Russian public, is an indispensable complement to our advanced Marxist literature.

We shall not here dwell in detail on the importance of these letters for the history of socialism and for a comprehensive treatment of the activities of Marx and Engels. This aspect of the matter requires no explanation. We shall only remark that an understanding of the letters published calls for acquaintance with the principal works on the history of the International (see Jaeckh, *The International*, Russian translation in the *Znaniye* edition), and also the history of the German and the American working-class movements (see Franz Mehring, *History of German Social-Democracy*, and Morris Hillquit, *History of Socialism in the United States*), etc.

Nor do we intend here to attempt to give a general outline of the contents of this correspondence or an appreciation of the various historical periods to which it relates. Mehring has done this extremely well in his article, *Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel* (*Neue Zeit*, 25. Jahrg., Nr. 1 und 2),* which will probably be appended to the present translation by the publisher, or else will be issued as a separate Russian publication.

Of particular interest to Russian socialists in the present revolutionary period are the lessons which the militant proletariat must draw from an acquaintance with the intimate aspects of the activities of Marx and Engels in the

* "The Sorge Correspondence", *Neue Zeit*, 25th year, Nos. 1 and 2.—*Ed*.

course of nearly thirty years (1867-95). It is, therefore, not surprising that the first attempts made in our Social-Democratic literature to acquaint readers with the letters from Marx and Engels to Sorge were also linked up with the "burning" issues of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution (Plekhanov's *Sovremennaya Zhizn* and the Menshevik *Otkliki*[121]). And we intend to draw our readers' attention particularly to an appreciation of those passages in the published correspondence that are specially important from the viewpoint of the present tasks of the workers' party in Russia.

In their letters, Marx and Engels deal most frequently with the pressing problems of the British, American and German working-class movements. This is natural, because they were Germans who at that time lived in England and corresponded with their American comrade. Marx expressed himself much more frequently and in much greater detail on the French working-class movement, and particularly the Paris Commune, in the letters he wrote to the German Social-Democrat Kugelmann.*

It is highly instructive to compare what Marx and Engels said of the British, American and German working-class movements. Such comparison acquires all the greater importance when we remember that Germany on the one hand, and Britain and America on the other, represent different stages of capitalist development and different forms of domination of the bourgeoisie, as a class, over the entire political life of those countries. From the scientific point of view, we have here a sample of materialist dialectics, the ability to bring to the forefront and stress the various points, the various aspects of the problem, in application to the specific features of different political and economic conditions. From the point of view of the practical policy and tactics of the workers' party, we have here a sample of the way in which the creators of the *Communist Manifesto* defined the tasks of the fighting proletariat in accordance with the different stages of the national working-class movements in the different countries.

FROM MARX TO MAO & NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See *Letters of Karl Marx to Dr. Kugelmann*, Russian translation edited by N. Lenin, with a foreword by the editor. St. Petersburg, 1907. (See pp. 104-12 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

What Marx and Engels criticise most sharply in British and American socialism is its isolation from the working-class movement. The burden of all their numerous comments on the Social-Democratic Federation in Britain and on the American socialists is the accusation that they have reduced Marxism to a dogma, to "rigid [*starre*] orthodoxy", that they consider it "a credo and not *a guide to action*",[122] that they are incapable of adapting themselves to the theoretically helpless, but living and powerful mass working-class movement that is marching alongside them. "Had we from 1864 to 1873 insisted on working together only with those who openly adopted our platform," Engels exclaimed in his letter of January 27, 1887, "where should we be today?"[123] And in the preceding letter (December 28, 1886), he wrote, with reference to the influence of Henry George's ideas on the American working class:

> "A million or two of working men's votes next November for a bona fide working men's party is worth infinitely more at present than a hundred thousand votes for a doctrinally perfect platform."

These are very interesting passages. There are Social-Democrats in our country who have hastened to utilise them in defence of the idea of a "labour congress" or something in the nature of Larin's "broad labour party". Why not in defence of a "Left bloc"? we would ask these precipitate "utilisers" of Engels. The letters the quotations are taken from refer to a time when American workers voted at the elections for Henry George. Mrs. Wischnewetzky—an American woman married to a Russian and translator of Engels's works—had asked him, as may be seen from Engels's reply, to give a thorough criticism of Henry George. Engels wrote (December 28, 1886) that *the time had not yet arrived* for that, the main thing being that the workers' party should begin to organise itself, even if not on an entirely pure programme. Later on, the workers would themselves come to understand what was amiss, "would learn from their own mistakes", but "any thing that might delay or prevent that national consolidation of the workingmen's party—on no matter what platform—I should consider a great mistake...".[124]

It goes without saying that Engels had a perfect understanding, and frequently spoke, of the absurdity and *reaction-*

ary character of Henry George's ideas, from the *socialist* point of view. The Sorge correspondence contains a most interesting letter from Karl Marx dated June 20, 1881, in which he characterised Henry George as an ideologist of *the radical bourgeoisie*. "Theoretically the man is utterly backward" (*total arrière*), wrote Marx.[125] Yet Engels was not afraid to join with this *socialist reactionary* in the elections, so long as there were people who could tell the masses of "the consequences of their own mistakes" (Engels, in the letter dated November 29, 1886).[126]

Regarding the Knights of Labour, an organisation of American workers existing at that time, Engels wrote in the same letter: "The weakest [literally: rottenest, *faulste*] side of the Knights of Labor was their *political neutrality*.... The first great step, of importance for every country newly entering into the movement, is always the constitution of the workers as an independent political party, no matter how, so long as it is a distinct workers' party."[127]

It is obvious that from this nothing at all can be deduced in defence of a leap *from* Social-Democracy to a non-party labour congress, etc. But whoever would escape Engels's accusation of reducing Marxism to a "dogma", "orthodoxy", "sectarianism", etc., must conclude from it that a joint election campaign with radical "social-reactionaries" is sometimes permissible.

But what is more interesting, of course, is to dwell not so much on these American-Russian parallels (we had to refer to them so as to reply to our opponents), as on the *fundamental* features of the British and American working-class movements. These features are: the absence of any big, nation-wide, *democratic* tasks facing the proletariat; the proletariat's complete subordination to bourgeois politics; the sectarian isolation of groups, of mere handfuls of socialists, from the proletariat; not the slightest socialist success among the working masses at the elections, etc. Whoever forgets these fundamental conditions and sets out to draw broad conclusions from "American-Russian parallels", displays the greatest superficiality.

If Engels laid so much stress on the workers' economic organisations in these conditions, it was because the most firmly established democratic systems were under discus-

sion, and these confronted the proletariat with purely socialist tasks.

Engels stressed the importance of an independent workers' party, even with a poor programme, because he was speaking of countries where there had formerly been not even a hint of the workers' political independence and where, in politics, the workers mostly dragged along behind the bourgeoisie, and still do.

It would be making mock of Marx's historical method to attempt to apply conclusions drawn from such arguments to countries or historical situations where the proletariat has formed its party prior to the liberal bourgeoisie forming theirs, where the tradition of voting for bourgeois politicians is absolutely unknown to the proletariat, and where the immediate tasks are not socialist but bourgeois-democratic.

Our idea will become even clearer to the reader if we compare Engels's opinions on the British and American movements with his opinions on the German movement.

Such opinions, of the greatest interest, abound in the published correspondence too. And running like a scarlet thread through all these opinions is something vastly different—a warning against the "Right wing" of the workers' party, a merciless (sometimes—as with Marx in 1877-79—a *furious*) war against *opportunism* in Social-Democracy.

Let us first corroborate this by quoting from the letters, and then proceed to an appraisal of this fact.

First of all, we must here note the opinions expressed by Marx on Höchberg and Co. In his article *Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel*, Franz Mehring attempts to tone down Marx's attacks—as well as Engels's later attacks—against the opportunists and, in our opinion, rather overdoes it. As regards Höchberg and Co., in particular, Mehring insists on his view that Marx's judgement of Lassalle and the Lassalleans was wrong. But, we repeat, what interests us here is not an historical assessment of whether Marx's attacks against particular socialists were correct or exaggerated, but Marx's assessment *in principle*, of definite *trends* in socialism in general.

While complaining about the German Social-Democrats' compromises with the Lassalleans and Dühring (letter of October 19, 1877), Marx also condemns the compromise

"with a whole gang of half-mature students and superwise diploma'd doctors [in German "doctor" is an academic degree corresponding to our "candidate" or "university graduate, class I"], who want to give socialism a 'higher, idealistic' orientation, that is to say, to replace its materialistic basis (which demands serious objective study from anyone who tries to use it) by modern mythology with its goddesses of Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Dr. Höchberg, who publishes the *Zukunft*, is a representative of this tendency, and has 'bought his way' into the Party—with the 'noblest' intentions, I assume, but I do not give a damn for 'intentions'. Anything more miserable than his programme of the *Zukunft* has seldom seen the light of day with more 'modest presumption'." (Letter No. 70.)[128]

In another letter, written almost two years later (September 19, 1879), Marx rebutted the gossip that Engels and he stood behind *J. Most*, and gave Sorge a detailed account of his attitude towards the opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party. *Zukunft* was run by Höchberg, Schramm and Eduard Bernstein. Marx and Engels *refused* to have anything to do with such a publication, and when the question was raised of establishing a new Party organ with the participation of this same Höchberg and with his financial assistance, Marx and Engels first demanded the acceptance of their nominee, Hirsch, as editor-in-chief, to exercise control over this "mixture of doctors, students and *Katheder*-Socialists"[129] and then addressed a circular letter directly to Bebel, Liebknecht and other leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, warning them that they would openly combat "such a vulgarisation [*Verluderung—an even stronger* word in German] of Party and theory", if the Höchberg, Schramm and Bernstein trend did not change.

This was the period in the German Social-Democratic Party which Mehring described in his *History* as "A Year of Confusion" ("*Ein Jahr der Verwirrung*"). After the Anti-Socialist Law, the Party did not at once find the right path, first swinging over to the anarchism of Most and the opportunism of Höchberg and Co. "These people," Marx wrote of the latter, "nonentities in theory and useless in practice, want to draw the teeth of socialism (which they have fixed up in accordance with the university recipes) and partic-

ularly of the Social-Democratic Party, to enlighten the workers or, as they put it, to imbue them with 'elements of education' from their confused half-knowledge, and above all to make the Party respectable in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie. They are just wretched counter-revolutionary windbags."[130]

The result of Marx's "furious" attack was that the opportunists retreated and—made themselves scarce. In a letter dated November 19, 1879, Marx announced that Höchberg had been removed from the editorial committee and that all the influential leaders of the Party—Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, etc.[131]—had *repudiated* his ideas. *Sozial-Demokrat*, the Social-Democratic Party organ, began to appear under the editorship of Vollmar, who at that time belonged to the revolutionary wing of the Party. A year later (November 5, 1880), Marx related that he and Engels constantly fought the "miserable" way in which *Sozial-Demokrat* was being conducted, and often expressed their opinion *sharply* ("*wobei's oft scharf hergeht*"). Liebknecht visited Marx in 1880 and promised that there would be an "improvement" *in all respects*.[132]

Peace was restored, and the war never came out into the open. Höchberg withdrew, and Bernstein became a revolutionary Social-Democrat—at least until the death of Engels in 1895.

On June 20, 1882, Engels wrote to Sorge and spoke of this struggle as being a thing of the past: "In general, things in Germany are going splendidly. It is true that the literary gentlemen in the Party tried to cause a reactionary ... swing, but they failed miserably. The abuse to which the Social-Democratic workers are being everywhere subjected has made them still more revolutionary than they were three years ago.... These people [the Party literary people] wanted at all costs to beg and secure the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law by mildness and meekness, fawning and humility, because it has made short shrift of their literary earnings. As soon as the law is repealed ... the split will apparently become an open one, and the Vierecks and Höchbergs will form a separate Right wing, where they can, from time to time, be treated with, until they finally land on their backsides. We announced this immediately

after the adoption of the Anti-Socialist Law, when Höchberg and Schramm published in the *Yearbook* what was a most infamous judgement of the work of the Party and demanded more cultivated ["*jebildetes*" instead of *gebildetes*—Engels is alluding to the Berlin accent of the German writers], refined and elegant behaviour of the Party."[133]

This forecast of Bernsteinism, made in 1882, was strikingly confirmed in 1898 and subsequent years.

And after that, and particularly after Marx's death, Engels, it may be said without exaggeration, was untiring in his efforts to straighten out what was being distorted by the German opportunists.

The end of 1884. The "petty-bourgeois prejudices" of the German Social-Democratic Reichstag deputies, who had voted for the steamship subsidy ("*Dampfersubvention*", see Mehring's *History*), were condemned. Engels informed Sorge that he had to correspond a great deal on this subject (letter of December 31, 1884).[134]

1885. Giving his opinion of the whole affair of the "*Dampfersubvention*", Engels wrote (June 3) that "it almost came to a split". The "philistinism" of the Social-Democratic deputies was "*colossal*". "A petty-bourgeois socialist parliamentary group is inevitable in a country like Germany," said Engels.[135]

1887. Engels replied to Sorge, who had written to him, that the Party was disgracing itself by electing such deputies as Viereck (a Social-Democrat of the Höchberg type Engels excused himself, saying that there was nothing to be done, the workers' Party could not find good deputies for the Reichstag. "The gentlemen of the Right wing know that they are being tolerated only because of the Anti-Socialist Law, and that they will be thrown out of the Party the very day the Party again secures freedom of action." And, in general, it was preferable that "the Party should be better than its parliamentary heroes, than the other way round" (March 3, 1887). Liebknecht is a conciliator—Engels complained—he always uses phrases to gloss over differences. But when it comes to a split, he will be with us at the decisive moment.[136]

1889. Two international Social-Democratic congresses in Paris. The opportunists (headed by the French Possibi-

lists[137]) split away from the revolutionary Social-Democrats. Engels (who was then sixty-eight years old) flung himself into the fight with the ardour of youth. A number of letters (from January 12 to July 20, 1889) were devoted to the fight against the opportunists. Not only they, but also the Germans—Liebknecht, Bebel and others—were flagellated for their conciliatory attitude.

The Possibilists had sold themselves to the French Government, Engels wrote on January 12, 1889. And he accused the members of the British Social-Democratic Federation (S.D.F.) of having allied themselves with the Possibilists.[138] "The writing and running about in connection with this damned congress leave me no time for anything else" (May 11, 1889). The Possibilists are busy, but our people are asleep, Engels wrote angrily. Now even Auer and Schippel are demanding that we attend the Possibilist congress. But "at last" this opened Liebknecht's eyes. Engels, together with Bernstein, wrote pamphlets (they were signed by Bernstein but Engels called them "our pamphlets") against the opportunists.[139]

"With the exception of the S.D.F., the Possibilists have not a single socialist organisation on their side in the whole of Europe. [June 8, 1889.] They are consequently falling back on the non-socialist trade unions" (this for the information of those who advocate a broad labour party, a labour congress, etc., in our country!). "From America they will get one *Knight of Labor*." The adversary was the same as in the fight against the Bakuninists[140]: "only with this difference that the banner of the anarchists has been replaced by the banner of the Possibilists: the selling of principles to the bourgeoisie for small-scale concessions, especially in return for well-paid jobs for the leaders (on the city councils, labour exchanges, etc.)." Brousse (the leader of the Possibilists) and Hyndman (the leader of the S.D.F. which had joined with the Possibilists) attacked "authoritarian Marxism" and wanted to form the "nucleus of a new International".

"You can have no idea of the naïveté of the Germans. It has cost me tremendous effort to explain even to Bebel what it all really meant" (June 8, 1889).[141] And when the two congresses met, when the revolutionary Social-Demo-

crats outnumbered the Possibilists (*who had united with the trade-unionists*, the S.D.F., a section of the Austrians, etc.), Engels was jubilant (July 17, 1889).[142] He was glad that the conciliatory plans and proposals of Liebknecht and others had failed (July 20, 1889). "It serves our sentimental conciliatory brethren right that, for all their amicableness, they received a good kick in their tenderest spot. This may cure them for some time."[143]

...Mehring was right when he said (*Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel*) that Marx and Engels did not have much idea of "good manners": "If they did not think long over every blow they dealt, neither did they whimper over every blow they received." "If they think their needle pricks can pierce my old, thick and well-tanned hide, they are mistaken,"[144] Engels once wrote. And they assumed that others possessed the imperviousness they had themselves acquired, Mehring said of Marx and Engels.

1893. The chastisement of the Fabians, which suggests itself when passing judgement on the Bernsteinians (for did not Bernstein "evolve" his opportunism in England making use of the experience of the Fabians?). "The Fabians here in London are a band of careerists who have understanding enough to realise the inevitability of the social revolution, but who could not possibly entrust this gigantic task to the raw proletariat alone, and are therefore kind enough to set themselves at the head. Fear of the revolution is their fundamental principle. They are the 'educated' *par excellence*. Their socialism is municipal socialism; not the nation but the community is to become the owner of the means of production, at any rate for the time being. This socialism of theirs is then presented as an extreme but inevitable consequence of bourgeois liberalism; hence their tactics, not of decisively opposing the Liberals as adversaries but of pushing them on towards socialist conclusions and therefore of intriguing with them, of permeating liberalism with socialism—not of putting up socialist candidates against the Liberals but of fastening them on to the Liberals, forcing them upon the Liberals, or swindling them into taking them. They do not of course realise that in doing this they are either lied to and themselves deceived or else are lying about socialism.

"With great industry they have published, amid all sorts of rubbish, some good propagandist writing as well, this in fact being the best the English have produced in this field. But as soon as they get on to their specific tactics of hushing up the class struggle, it all turns putrid. Hence their fanatical hatred of Marx and all of us—because of the class struggle.

"These people have of course many bourgeois followers and therefore money...."[145]

HOW THE CLASSICS ESTIMATED INTELLECTUALIST OPPORTUNISM IN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

1894. The Peasant Question. "On the Continent," Engels wrote on November 10, 1894, "success is developing the appetite for more success, and catching the peasant, in the literal sense of the word, is becoming the fashion. First the French, in Nantes, declare through Lafargue not only ... that it is not our business to hasten ... the ruin of the small peasants, which capitalism is seeing to for us, but they add that we must directly protect the small peasant against taxation, usury, and landlords. But we cannot co-operate in this, first because it is stupid and second because it is impossible. Next, however, Vollmar comes along in Frankfort and wants to bribe the *peasantry as a whole*, though the peasant he has to deal with in Upper Bavaria is not the debt-ridden small peasant of the Rhineland, but the middle and even the big peasant, who exploits male and female farmhands, and sells cattle and grain in quantity. And that cannot be done without giving up the whole principle."[146]

1894, December 4. "...The Bavarians, who have become very, very opportunistic and have almost turned into an ordinary people's party (that is to say, the majority of leaders and many of those who have recently joined the Party), voted in the Bavarian Diet for the budget as a whole; and Vollmar in particular has started an agitation among the peasants with the object of winning the Upper Bavarian big peasants—people who own 25 to 80 acres of land (10 to 30 hectares) and who therefore cannot manage without wage-labourers—instead of winning their farmhands."[147]

We thus see that for more than ten years Marx and Engels systematically and unswervingly fought opportunism in the German Social-Democratic Party, and attacked intellectualist philistinism and the petty-bourgeois outlook in socialism. This is an extremely important fact. The general public know that German Social-Democracy is regarded as a model of Marxist proletarian policy and tactics, but they do not know what constant warfare the founders of Marxism had to wage against the "Right wing" (Engels's expression) of that Party. And it is no accident that soon after Engels's death this concealed war became an open one. This was an inevitable result of the decades of historical development of German Social-Democracy.

And now we very clearly perceive the two lines of Engels's (and Marx's) recommendations, directions, corrections, threats and exhortations. The most insistent of their appeals to the British and American socialists was to merge with the working-class movement and eradicate the narrow and hidebound sectarian spirit from their organisations. They were most insistent in teaching the German Social-Democrats to beware of succumbing to philistinism, "parliamentary idiocy" (Marx's expression in the letter of September 19, 1879),[148] and petty-bourgeois intellectualist opportunism.

Is it not typical that our Social-Democratic gossips should have begun cackling about the recommendations of the first kind while remaining silent, holding their tongues, about the second? Is not *such* one-sidedness in appraising the letters of Marx and Engels the best indication of a certain Russian Social-Democratic ... "one-sidedness"?

At the present moment, when the international working-class movement is displaying symptoms of profound ferment and vacillation, when the extremes of opportunism, "parliamentary idiocy" and philistine reformism have evoked the other extremes of revolutionary syndicalism—the general line of Marx's and Engels's "corrections" to British and American and to German socialism acquires exceptional importance.

In countries where there are *no* Social-Democratic workers' parties, *no* Social-Democratic members of parliament, and *no* systematic and steadfast Social-Democratic policy either

at elections or in the press, etc.—in such countries, Marx and Engels taught the socialists to rid themselves *at all cost* of narrow sectarianism, and *to join* with the working-class movement so as *to shake up* the proletariat *politically*. For in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the proletariat displayed *almost no* political independence either in Britain or America. In these countries—where bourgeois-democratic historical tasks were almost entirely non-existent—the political arena was *completely* held by a triumphant and self-satisfied bourgeoisie, unequalled anywhere in the world in the art of deceiving, corrupting and bribing the workers.

To think that these recommendations, made by Marx and Engels to the British and American working-class movements, can be simply and directly applied to Russian conditions is to use Marxism not in order to achieve clarity on its *method*, not in order *to study* the concrete historical features of the working-class movement in definite countries, but in order to pay off petty, factional, and intellectualist scores.

On the other hand, in a country where the bourgeois-democratic revolution was still unconsummated, where "military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms" (Marx's expression in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*)[149] prevailed, and still does, where the proletariat had long ago been drawn into politics and was pursuing a Social-Democratic policy—in such a country what Marx and Engels most of all feared was parliamentary vulgarisation and philistine derogation of the tasks and scope of the working-class movement.

It is all the more our duty to emphasise and give prominence to *this* side of Marxism, in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, because in our country a vast, "brilliant" and rich liberal-bourgeois press is vociferously trumpeting to the proletariat the "exemplary" loyalty, parliamentary legality, the modesty and moderation of the neighbouring German working-class movement.

This mercenary lie of the bourgeois betrayers of the Russian revolution is not due to accident or to the personal depravity of certain past or future ministers in the Cadet

camp. It stems from the profound economic interests of the Russian liberal landlords and liberal bourgeois. And in combating this lie, this "stupefying of the masses" ("*Massenverdummung*"—Engels's expression in his letter of November 29, 1886),[150] the letters of Marx and Engels should serve as an indispensable weapon for all Russian socialists.

The mercenary lie of the liberal bourgeois holds up to the people the exemplary "modesty" of the German Social-Democrats. The leaders of these Social-Democrats, the founders of the theory of Marxism, tell us:

"The revolutionary language and action of the French have made the hypocrisy of Viereck and Co. [the opportunist Social-Democrats in the German Reichstag Social-Democratic group] sound quite feeble" (this was said in reference to the formation of a labour group in the French Chamber and to the Decazeville strike, which split the French Radicals from the French proletariat[151]). "Only Liebknecht and Bebel spoke in the last Socialist debate and both of them spoke well. We can with this debate once more show ourselves in decent society, which was by no means the case with all of them. In general it is a good thing that the Germans' leadership of the international socialist movement, particularly after they sent so many philistines to the Reichstag (which, it is true, was unavoidable), is being challenged. *In Germany everything becomes philistine in peaceful times*; and therefore the sting of French competition is *absolutely necessary*...." (Letter of April 29, 1886.)[152]

These are the lessons to be learnt most thoroughly by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which is predominantly under the ideological influence of German Social-Democracy.

These lessons are taught us not by any particular passage in the correspondence of the greatest men of the nineteenth century but by the whole spirit and substance of their comradely and frank criticism of the international experience of the proletariat, a criticism to which diplomacy and petty considerations were alien.

How far all the letters of Marx and Engels were indeed imbued with this spirit may also be seen from the following relatively specific but extremely typical passages.[153]

In 1889 a young and fresh movement of untrained and unskilled labourers (gasworkers, dockers, etc.) arose in Britain, a movement marked by a new and revolutionary spirit. Engels was delighted with it. He referred exultingly to the part played by Tussy, Marx's daughter, who conducted agitation among these workers. "... The most repulsive thing here," he says, writing from London on December 7, 1889, "is the bourgeois 'respectability' which has grown deep into the bones of the workers. The division of society into innumerable strata, each recognised without question, each with its own pride but also its inborn respect for its 'betters' and 'superiors', is so old and firmly established that the bourgeois still find it fairly easy to get their bait accepted. I am not at all sure, for instance, that John Burns is not secretly prouder of his popularity with Cardinal Manning, the Lord Mayor, and the bourgeoisie in general than of his popularity with his own class. And Champion—an ex-lieutenant—intrigued years ago with bourgeois and especially with conservative elements, preached socialism at the parsons' Church Congress, etc. And even Tom Mann, whom I regard as the best of the lot, is fond of mentioning that he will be lunching with the Lord Mayor. If one compares this with the French, one realises what a revolution is good for after all."[154]

No comment is needed.

Another example. In 1891 there was danger of a European war. Engels corresponded on the subject with Bebel, and they agreed that in the event of Russia attacking Germany, the German socialists must desperately fight the Russians and any allies of the Russians. "If Germany is crushed, then we shall be too, while at best the struggle will be such a violent one that Germany will only be able to maintain herself by revolutionary means, so that very possibly we shall be forced to take the helm and stage a 1793." (Letter of October 24, 1891.)[155]

Let this be noted by those opportunists who shouted from the house-tops that "Jacobin" prospects for the Russian workers' party in 1905 were un-Social-Democratic! Engels squarely suggested to Bebel the possibility of the Social-Democrats having to participate in a provisional government.

Holding such views on the tasks of Social-Democratic workers' parties, Marx and Engels naturally possessed the most fervent faith in a Russian revolution and its great world significance. We see this ardent expectation of a revolution in Russia, in this correspondence, over a period of nearly twenty years.

Take Marx's letter of September 27, 1877. He is quite enthusiastic about the Eastern crisis[156]: "Russia has long been standing on the threshold of an upheaval, all the elements of it are prepared.... The gallant Turks have hastened the explosion by years with the thrashing they have inflicted.... The upheaval will begin *secundum artem* [according to the rules of the art] with some *playing at constitutionalism*, *et puis il y aura un beau tapage* [and then there will be a fine row]. If Mother Nature is not particularly unfavourable towards us, we shall yet live to see the fun!"[157] (Marx was then fifty-nine years old).

Mother Nature did not—and could not very well—permit Marx to live "to see the fun". But he *foretold* the "playing at constitutionalism", and it is as though his words were written yesterday in relation to the First and Second Russian Dumas. And we know that the warning to the people against "playing at constitutionalism" was the "living soul" of the boycott tactics so detested by the liberals and opportunists....

Or take Marx's letter of November 5, 1880. He was delighted with the success of *Capital* in Russia, and took the part of the members of the Narodnaya Volya organisation against the newly-arisen General Redistribution group.[158] Marx correctly perceived the anarchistic elements in their views. Not knowing and having then no opportunity of knowing the future evolution of the General-Redistribution Narodniks into Social-Democrats, Marx attacked them with all his trenchant sarcasm:

> "These gentlemen are against all political-revolutionary action. Russia is to make a somersault into the anarchist-communist-atheist millennium! Meanwhile, they are preparing for this leap with the most tedious doctrinairism whose so-called *principes courent la rue depuis le feu Bakounine*."[159]

We can gather from this how Marx would have appreciated the significance for Russia of 1905 and the succeeding

years of *Social-Democracy*'s "political-revolutionary action".*

There is a letter by Engels dated April 6, 1887: "On the other hand, it seems as if a crisis is impending in Russia. The recent attentates rather upset the apple-cart...." A letter of April 9, 1887, says the same thing.... "The army is full of discontented, conspiring officers. [Engels at that time was impressed by the revolutionary struggle of the Narodnaya Volya organisation; he set his hopes on the officers, and did not yet see the revolutionary spirit of the Russian soldiers and sailors, which was manifested so magnificently eighteen years later....] I do not think things will last another year; and once it [the revolution] breaks out [*losgeht*] in Russia, then hurrah![161]

A letter of April 23, 1887: "In Germany there is persecution after persecution [of socialists]. It looks as if Bismarck wants to have everything ready, so that the moment the revolution breaks out [*losgeschlagen werden*] in Russia, which is now only a question of months, Germany could immediately follow her example."[162]

The months proved to be very, very long ones. No doubt, philistines will be found who, knitting their brows and wrinkling their foreheads, will sternly condemn Engels's "revolutionism", or will indulgently laugh at the old utopias of the old revolutionary exile.

Yes, Marx and Engels made many and frequent mistakes in determining the proximity of revolution, in their hopes in the victory of revolution (e.g., in 1848 in Germany), in their faith in the imminence of a German "republic" ("to die for the republic", wrote Engels of that period, recalling his sentiments as a participant in the military campaign for a Reich constitution in 1848-49[163]). They were mistaken in 1871 when they were engaged in "raising revolt in Southern France, for which they [Becker writes "we", referring to himself and his closest friends: letter No. 14 of July 21,

* Incidentally, if my memory does not deceive me, Plekhanov or V. I. Zasulich told me in 1900-03 about the existence of a letter from Engels to Plekhanov concerning *Our Differences* and the character of the impending revolution in Russia. It would be interesting to know exactly whether there was such a letter, whether it still exists, and whether the time has come to publish it.[160]

1871] sacrificed and risked all that was humanly possible...". The same letter says: "If we had had more means in March and April we would have roused the whole of Southern France and would have saved the Commune in Paris" (p. 29). But *such* errors—the errors of the giants of revolutionary thought, who sought to raise, and did raise, the proletariat of the whole world above the level of petty, commonplace and trivial tasks—are a thousand times more noble and magnificent and *historically more valuable and true* than the trite wisdom of official liberalism, which lauds shouts, appeals and holds forth about the vanity of revolutionary vanities, the futility of the revolutionary struggle and the charms of counter-revolutionary "constitutional" fantasies....

The Russian working class will win their freedom and give an impetus to Europe by their revolutionary action, full though it be of errors—and let the philistines pride themselves on the infallibility of their revolutionary inaction.

April, 6, 1907

THE DUMA AND THE RUSSIAN LIBERALS

St. Petersburg, April 10.

The mood of what is known as Russian "society" is one of depression, dismay and perplexity. The article by F. Malover[164] who made an extremely apt choice of a pseudonym—in the Sunday issue of *Tovarishch* (April 8) is an instructive and typical manifestion because it correctly reflects that mood.

Mr. Malover's article is called "The Duma and Society". By society is here understood, in accordance with the old Russian use of the word, a handful of liberal government officials, bourgeois intellectuals, bored rentiers and similar haughty, self-satisfied, and idle members of the public, who fancy themselves the salt of the earth, proudly call themselves the "intelligentsia", create "public opinion", etc., etc.

It seems to Mr. Malover that "the campaign against the Duma, to be observed during the past few days in the columns of the Left press, is extremely risky". That is the main idea behind the article. Mr. Malover's argument is a reference to the mood of society. Society is fatigued, "waves aside" politics, does not protest against abuses, and reads "light" novels in the libraries or buys them in the shops. "The environment is flaccid" ... "for the Duma to revive, the country must revive." "The Duma could, of course, at any moment die an heroic death, but, judging by rumours in circulation, this would only be to the advantage of its involuntary godmothers. And what would the people gain from that, other than a new election law?"

We have quoted these passages because they are *typical* of most Russian liberals and all the intellectual backrooms of liberalism.

Note that in the final sentence the word "people" has slipped in in place of "society"! Mr. Malover, sly even towards himself (as are all intellectualists of little faith), has falsified his own argument and has tried to make it appear that it is the notorious "society" that really determines the "support from without" or the attitude of the *masses*. Despite the skilfulness of the counterfeit, it has not passed: and he has had to substitute "the people" for "society". And all the dust that the members of "society" have accumulated in stuffy and fusty chambers so carefully screened off and protected from the street, flies up in a cloud immediately the door leading to the "street" is opened. The-dry-as-dust sophistry that they fancy is "intellectual" and "well-educated" is laid bare for all to see.

Thesis: the campaign of the *Lefts* against the Duma is risky.

Proof: *society* is fatigued and waves politics aside, preferring light novels.

Conclusion: the *people* would gain nothing from the heroic death of the Duma.

Political slogan: "nobody now has any doubts, it would seem, that the political struggle of the immediate future can only be for the consolidation and extension of the rights of the Duma as the one [!] weapon still in the hands of the people [!], with which to struggle against the government".

The logic of counter-revolutionary hypocrites cloaked in the noble mantle of scepticism and satiated indifference is truly incomparable, is it not?

Thesis: we, "society", are sitting in the mud. You, the Lefts, want to try and clean up the mud. Leave it alone, the mud does not bother us.

Proof: we are weary of attempts (not made by us) to clean up the mud. Our ideas about cleaning up are indecisive.

Conclusion: it is risky to touch the mud.

The arguments of the Malovers are of great significance for, we repeat, they truly reflect the mood that, in the final analysis, springs from the struggle of the classes in the Russian revolution. The fatigue of the bourgeoisie and its yearning for "light" literature constitute a phenomenon that is not accidental, but inevitable. The grouping of the population by parties—that was the most important lesson

and the revolution's most important political acquisition at the time of the elections to the Second Duma—tellingly revealed, on a nation-wide scale; the turn to the Right taken by broad sections of the landlords and bourgeoisie. "Society" and "the intelligentsia" are simply a miserable, pitiful, basely cowardly appendage to the upper ten thousand.

The greater part of the bourgeois intelligentsia live with, and are fed by, those who have drawn away from politics. Only a few intellectuals enter the propaganda circles of the workers' party, those who from experience know the "*ravenous hunger*" of the masses of the people for political books, newspapers and socialist knowledge. But of course such intellectuals, even if they do not go to an heroic death, lead the really heroic life of hard work of the poorly-paid, half-starved, constantly fatigued "rank-and-file Party worker" who is overworked beyond all belief. *Such* intellectuals find reward in getting away from the dung-heap of "society" and in not having to think of the indifference of *their* audience to social and political problems. And, indeed, an "intellectual" who cannot find himself an audience that is not indifferent to those problems as much resembles a "democrat" or an intellectual in the best sense of the word, as a woman who sells herself by marrying for money resembles a loving wife. Both are variations of officially respectable and perfectly legal prostitution.

The Left parties are really Left, and deserve that name, only insofar as they express the interests and reflect the psychology, *not* of "society", *not* of a bunch of whining intellectualist trash, but the lower strata of the people, the proletariat and a certain section of the petty bourgeois masses, both urban and rural. The Left parties are those whose audiences are *never* indifferent to social and political problems any more than a hungry man can be indifferent to the problem of a crust of bread. "The campaign against the Duma" of those Left parties is a reflection of a definite tendency among the lower strata of the people, it is an echo of a certain—what shall we call it?—mass irritation with the self-satisfied Narcissuses who are infatuated with the dung-heaps about them.

One such Narcissus—Mr. Malover—writes: "The psychology of the masses of the people, in the period we are

living in is an absolutely unknown quantity, and nobody can be sure that these masses will react to the dissolution of the Second Duma differently from the way they reacted to the dissolution of the First Duma."

In what way does this differ from the psychology of an honest woman in bourgeois society who says: "Nobody can say for sure that it is not for love I am marrying the one who pays me most"?

And your own feelings, madame, will they not serve to make anybody sure of it? And you, Malover & Co., do you not feel yourselves to be particles of the "masses of the people"? Do you not feel yourselves participants (and not mere onlookers)? Are you not conscious of being makers of the general mood, of being those who make for progress?

The bourgeoisie "cannot say for sure" that the proletariat will go forward from defeat to victory. The proletariat *is sure* that the bourgeoisie will distinguish itself by identical baseness both in the defeats and in the victories of the people in the struggle for freedom.

Let Social-Democrats who are given to vacillation and doubt learn from the examples of the Malovers, learn to understand the *reactionary* nature today, not only of talk about the "one-sided hostile" stand taken by the Social-Democrats towards the liberals, but also of talk about a "nation-wide" revolution (headed by the Malovers!?).

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FRANZ MEHRING ON THE SECOND DUMA

In a recent issue of *Die Neue Zeit*,* journal of the German Social-Democrats, there appeared a leading article bearing the usual mark of its usual leader writer, Franz Mehring. The author notes that in the usual discussion on the budget the Social-Democratic speakers, Singer and David, took advantage of the opportunity to prove how steadfastly Social-Democracy, supposedly defeated at the last elections, is defending its proletarian position. The German liberals, on the contrary, those who at the last elections had joined forces with the government against the clerical Centre and against the Social-Democrats, found themselves in the pitiful position of humiliated allies of reaction. "The liberal bourgeoisie," says Mehring, "are playing the role of an obedient slave [the German *Dirne* actually means "prostitute"] of the Ost-Elbe Junkers, for the sake of pitiful doles given by the latter."

We quote these sharply-spoken words verbatim, to give our readers a clear picture of the difference in tone and content between the Social-Democratic presentation of the question of the liberals in Germany and the presentation that is frequently to be met with in the Russian Cadet newspapers. It will be remembered that those papers sang a quite different tune in respect of the outcome of the German elections, spoke of the mistakes of the Social-Democrats who, it was said, had ignored bourgeois democracy and adopted "a one-sided hostile position" towards it, etc.

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* No. 23 (25. Jahrg., Bd. 1) (*New Times*, No. 23. 25th year, Vol. 1.—*Ed.*), March 6, 1907.

All this is *en passant*. What we are interested in here is not Mehring's assessment of German liberalism, but his assessment of the Russian Duma and *Russian liberalism*, whose slogans ("Save the Duma", conduct "positive work") he analyses with wonderful clarity and aptness.

Here is a complete translation of the second part of the article.

GERMAN LIBERALISM AND THE RUSSIAN DUMA

"...To understand the immeasurable insignificance of those debates* it is worth while glancing back some sixty years to the United Landtag in Berlin, when the bourgeoisie first girded their loins for the parliamentary struggle. Even in those days the bourgeoisie did not cut a heroic figure. Karl Marx pictured it thus: '...without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below, egoistic towards both sides and conscious of its egoism, revolutionary in relation to the conservatives and conservative in relation to the revolutionists, distrustful of its own mottoes, phrases instead of ideas, intimidated by the world storm, exploiting the world storm; no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect; common because it lacked originality, original in its commonness; dickering with its own desires, without initiative, without faith in itself, without faith in the people, without a world-historical calling; an execrable old man, who saw himself doomed to guide and deflect the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests—sans eyes, sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything.'[165]

"Despite all that, however, the bourgeoisie of that day was able to keep the purse under its thumb and withhold the incomes of the King and the Junkers until its own rights were ensured; it preferred to be subjected to the disfavour of the King rather than surrender its birthright to help the royal bankrupt.

"Compared with the present-day free-thinkers, the liberals of the United Landtag were much more far-sighted. They laughed at the chatter about 'positive work' and pre-

* The budget debates in the Reichstag.

ferred to hold up a matter so important to the welfare of the country as the building of the eastern railway rather than renounce their constitutional rights.

"There is all the greater reason for recalling those times, since the end of the budget debate in the Reichstag coincided with the opening of the Second Russian Duma. There is no doubt that the parliamentary history of the Russian revolution has so far more closely resembled that of the Prussian revolution of 1848 than that of the French revolution of 1789; the history of the First Duma in many respects strikingly resembles that of the notorious 'assembly of conciliators' that at one time held its sessions in a Berlin theatre, resembles it even in respect of the ineffective appeal not to pay taxes, issued by the Constitutional-Democratic majority after the dissolution, an appeal that disappeared into thin air. And in Prussia, too, the new Landtag convened by the government bore a more marked oppositional tinge, like the present Russian Duma, and was then dispersed a month later by armed force. There is no lack of voices prophesying a similar fate for the new Russian Duma. The over-wise liberals come out with the excellent advice: save the Duma, and win the confidence of the people by 'positive work'. As understood by those who give it this is about the most foolish advice that could have been offered the new Duma.

"History does not approve of repetition and the new Duma is a product of a revolution that differs greatly from the second Prussian Parliament. It was elected under such pressure that, by comparison, the infamy and baseness of the 'imperial falsehood league' could well be called mild. The Left is no longer dominated by the Constitutional-Democrats in the present Duma, but has been strengthened by a powerful socialist group. Nor is it easy to dissolve the Duma now. Tsarism would not have engaged in that process of exerting pressure at the elections, as wearisome as it was disgusting, if the question of the dissolution of the Duma had depended entirely on the tsarist government. For its creditors, tsarism needs a popular representation that can save it from bankruptcy, and it would, furthermore, have been impossible, even if things had not been so bad, to elaborate a more pitiful electoral system and exercise still more brutal pressure at the elections.

"In that respect Prussian reaction held another big trump card in 1849; by annulling universal suffrage and introducing the three-class system of elections, it obtained the so-called popular representation that did not offer any effective resistance and was nevertheless something in the nature of a guarantee to the creditors.

"The Russian revolution has shown, through the elections to the new Duma, that it has much wider and deeper scope than the German revolution then had. It is also quite certain that the revolution has not elected the new Duma by chance, but has every intention of making use of it. But the revolution would be betraying itself if it were to listen to the wise counsels of the German liberals, and tried to obtain the confidence of the people by 'positive work' as those liberals understood it; if the revolution were to act in that way it would be taking the same road of lamentation and disgrace that German liberalism has been following for the past sixty years. That which this amazing hero regards as 'positive work' would only lead to the new Duma helping tsarism extricate itself from the clutch of its financial troubles, and would receive in return a pitiful dole in the shape of such 'reforms' as the ministry of a Stolypin can hatch.

"We shall make clear the concept of 'positive work' by an historical example. When the National Assembly effected the emancipation of the French peasantry in a single summer night in 1789, the mercenary genius and adventurer Mirabeau, constitutional democracy's most celebrated hero, baptised the event with the catchword 'disgusting orgy', but in our opinion it was 'positive work'. The emancipation of the Prussian peasants, on the contrary, which dragged along at a snail's pace for sixty years—from 1807 to 1865—during which an infinite number of peasant lives were brutally and ruthlessly sacrificed, was what our liberals call 'positive work' and proclaim from the house-tops. In our opinion, that was a 'disgusting orgy'.

"And so, if the new Duma wants to fulfil its historic task it must undoubtedly engage in 'positive work'. On this issue there is a gratifying unanimity. The only question is: what sort of 'positive work' is it to be? For our part, we hope that the Duma will prove to be a weapon of the Russia revolution that gave it birth."

* * *

This article of Mehring's, whether we like it or not, gives rise to some thinking about the present trends in Russian Social-Democracy.

In the first place, we cannot help noting that the author compares the Russian revolution of 1905 and the following years, to the German revolution of 1848-49, and the First Duma, to the famous "assembly of conciliators". This last expression comes from Marx. That is what he called the German liberals of that day in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.[166] This appellation has gone down in history as a model of proletarian thinking in its assessment of a bourgeois revolution.

Marx gave the name of "conciliators" to the German liberals of the revolutionary epoch, because bourgeois-liberal political tactics were at that time based on the "theory of conciliation", the conciliation of the Crown with the people, of the old authorities with the forces of the revolution. These tactics expressed the class interests of the German bourgeoisie in the German bourgeois revolution; the bourgeoisie were afraid to carry on the revolution to its consummation; they feared the independence of the proletariat, feared the full victory of the peasantry over their medieval exploiters, the landlords, whose farming still retained many feudal features. The class interests of the bourgeoisie forced them to come to terms with reaction ("conciliation") against the revolution, and the liberal intellectuals who founded the "theory of conciliation" used it to cover up their apostasy from the revolution.

The excellent passage quoted by Mehring shows how Marx lashed out at bourgeois conciliation in a revolutionary epoch. Anybody who is familiar with Mehring's edition of the writings of Marx and Engels in the forties, especially the articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, knows, of course, that very many *similar* passages could be quoted.

Let those who, like Plekhanov, attempt by reference to Marx to justify the tactics of the Right wing of the Social-Democrats in the Russian bourgeois revolution give this some thought! The arguments of such people are based on ill-chosen quotations; they take generalisations on support

for the big bourgeoisie against the reactionary petty bourgeoisie and apply them uncritically to the Russian Cadets and the Russian revolution.

Mehring provides such people with a good lesson anybody who wants Marx's advice on the tasks of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution should take *precisely* his statements concerning the epoch of the German bourgeois revolution. It is not for nothing that our Mensheviks so timidly avoid those statements. In them we see the most complete and most clear expression of that ruthless struggle against the bourgeois *conciliators* that our Russian Bolsheviks are conducting in the Russian revolution.

At the time of the German bourgeois revolution Marx considered the basic tasks of the proletariat to be—carrying on the revolution to its consummation, the winning of the leading role by the proletariat, the exposure of the bourgeois conciliators' treachery and the capture of the masses of the people, especially the peasantry,* from the influence of the bourgeoisie. This is an historic fact that can be ignored or evaded only by those who take Marx's name in vain.

Mehring's assessment of "positive work" and "disgusting orgy" has an intimate, inseverable connection with this.

This parallel of his is such a well-aimed thrust at the Russian liberals, the Cadets, who are now engaged in the Second Duma in approving the budget of the military-court-backed autocracy, that Mehring's words would only be weakened if anything of substance were added to them.

We counterpose Mehring's presentation of the question to that of the Right wing of the German Social-Democrats. Readers will, of course, know that Mehring and the entire editorial board of *Die Neue Zeit* are on the side of revolutionary Social-Democracy. The opposite or opportunist stand is held by the Bernsteinians. Their chief press organ is *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. In the last issue of that journal (April 1907) there is an article by Mr. Roman Streltzow entitled "The Second Russian Parliament". The article is overflowing with wrathful mouthings against the Bolsheviks, whom the author, apparently for greater venom, calls

* "The German bourgeoisie will betray *their natural allies*, *the peasantry*," said Marx in 1848, in assessing the role of the peasantry in the bourgeois revolution.[167]

"Leninians". How conscientious this Streltzow is in keeping the German public informed, can be seen from the fact that he quotes the sharpest passages from Lenin's pamphlets written at the time of the St. Petersburg elections, but *keeps silence* about the treacherous *split* arranged by the Mensheviks, the split which caused the struggle.

But all this is *en passant*. What is important to us is the way the question is presented in principle by the Bernsteinian. The Mensheviks, *especially Plekhanov*, come in for praise as *the realist wing* of Russian Social-Democracy. *Vorwärts*, central organ of German Social-Democracy, has been reprimanded by the "realist" for a sentence to the effect that the people have not sent advocates (*Fürsprecher*) but leading fighters (*Vorkämpfer*) to the Second Duma—"*Vorwärts* apparently has the same rosy view of the present situation in Russia as the Leninians" (p. 295 of the abovementioned issue).* The author's conclusion is clear and definite. "Therefore," he writes, in concluding his article "saving the Duma [*Erhaltung der Duma*] is so far the purpose of the opposition taken as a whole." Further—the socialists must not "waste their forces in a completely useless struggle against the Cadets" (p. 296, ibid.)

We will leave it to our readers to make the comparison between Mehring's way of thinking about the "disgusting orgy" and the Streltzows' way of thinking about the "Save the Duma" slogan.

Such a comparison is well capable of replacing commentaries on the Bolshevik and Menshevik policies in the present Duma—commentaries on the Bolshevik and Menshevik draft resolutions on the attitude to the State Duma.

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Signed: *K. T.*

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to the text in the collection

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* Incidentally, it may be worth while adding that we are, in any case, profoundly and heartily grateful to Mr. Streltzow for his effort to denigrate the Bolsheviks in the eyes of German Social-Democracy. Mr. Streltzow does this so well that we could not wish for a better ally for the propagation of Bolshevism among German Social-Democrats. Keep it up, Mr. Streltzow!

LARIN AND KHRUSTALEV[168]

The first issue of the Menshevik newspaper *Narodnaya Gazeta* (April 10) contained an article by Comrade G. Khrustalev on the labour congress; it was an aggressive, extremely interesting, and excellent article (from the Bolshevik point of view). We say it was excellent because in his writings the Menshevik Khrustalev is as helpful—if not more helpful—*to us* as the Menshevik Larin. We are equally grateful to both of them, and shall therefore analyse their ideas by comparing them with each other.

You will recall what Y. Larin was advocating in his pamphlet *A Broad Labour Party and a Labour Congress*. A broad labour party, as conceived by Larin, should embrace something like 900,000 of the 9,000,000-strong Russian proletariat. The "signboard" has to come down—the party must not be Social-Democratic. The Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries must merge. The new party must be, in point of fact, a "non-partisan party" (Larin's own words). The Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries must play the role of "propaganda bodies within a broad party".

Larin's plan, as anybody-can see, is perfectly clear-cut, and his idea for a labour congress is distinguished by the absence of anything left unsaid or of the vagueness that Axelrod's plan abounds in. For this clarity of thought we Bolsheviks have given praise to the guileless Comrade Larin, and compared it to the vagueness of "hidebound Menshevism" (Larin's words). At the same time we say that Larin's plan is an opportunist adventure, because merging with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and a "non-partisan party" cannot lead to anything but confusion in the

minds of the workers and difficulties for the Social-Democratic organisation.

Now let the reader weigh Comrade Khrustalev's plan attentively. He says straight out: "The party should not itself undertake the work of calling the congress." "Initiative in convening it should come from the trade unions and special committees formed to convene the congress."

How should these committees be formed?

Comrade Khrustalev does not give a direct answer to this question. The following passage, however, contains an answer that is clear enough, even if indirect.

"What composition of the congress is anticipated? Will any qualifications be established?" he asks, and gives this answer. "Since we are trying to broaden the organisation, we are by that token against any restrictions. At the congress there will be a place for every elected representative of the workers. Trade unions, consumers' associations, workers' funds, workers' mutual benefit societies, factory committees, committees set up specifically for the organisation of the congress, deputies elected from factories where there are no factory committees—all these should be represented at the all-Russian labour congress. Such will be its composition."

That is perfectly clear. "Against any restrictions"—let anybody come who is in any way elected by workers. The author does not tell us where *to draw a line between* "workers" and all sorts of office employees (commercial, postal, telegraph, railway, etc., employees), and peasants belonging to our Social-Democratic organisations and to "consumers' societies". From his point of view, this is, probably, a mere technical detail; "against any restrictions"! so why restrict the petty-bourgeois element?

But let us continue. Comrade Khrustalev has given us a clear definition of the composition of the congress. He has also made himself clear on the purposes of the congress. "In all cases," he writes, "the labour congress committees and the local Social-Democratic organisations will exist side by side."

"...The first organisational unit is the factory committee. In their activities, the factory committees, elective and accountable to their electors, embrace broad strata of the proletariat through their participation in all aspects of factory life, from the settlement of conflicts between labour and capital, the planned leadership of economic strikes, finding work, etc., up to and including the organisation of funds, clubs, lectures, and libraries.

"The factory committees of one town or one industrial centre constitute the labour congress committee. Its purpose includes the leadership, extension and deepening of the trade union and co-operative movement, the organisation of aid for the unemployed, bringing pressure to bear on the municipal authorities to organise public works, agitation against rising food prices, relations with the Duma commission on aid for the unemployed, *discussion*, *on the spot*, *of all parliamentary bills affecting the interests of the working class* [author's italics]; in the event of a reform of local self-government—the conduct of an election campaign, etc.

"The labour congress is only the guiding and directing body of the whole movement. Such is approximately the general plan. Events will, of course, lead to the introduction of amendments."

That is perfectly clear. Non-party factory committees. Non-party labour congress committees. A non-party labour congress. "Through these committees and with them as a medium, says Comrade Khrustalev, "the party will obtain a powerful means of influencing the entire working class."

In what way does this differ from Larin's plan, may we ask? *It is exactly the same plan* expressed in slightly different words. In practice it is exactly the same reduction of Social-Democracy to "a propaganda body within a broad party", because Comrade Khrustalev's "plan" has, *in point of fact*, *left no other role* to Social-Democracy. In exactly the same way as Larin, he leaves the political activity of the working class to a "non-partisan labour party", since "*the discussion of all bills*", "*the conduct of an election campaign*, *etc.*", *all* come under the heading of political activity of the working class.

Larin is only more truthful and frank than Khrustalev, but actually they both propose and pursue the aim of "destroying the Social-Democratic Labour Party and setting up in its place a non-party political organisation of the proletariat". This is precisely what is said in the first point of that Bolshevik resolution on non-party labour organisations that aroused Comrade Khrustalev's ire and led him to call us prosecuting counsel, etc.

Comrade Khrustalev is also angry because he feels it necessary to evade the question bluntly presented in our resolution: who should lead the struggle of the proletariat, the *Social-Democratic* party or a "*non-party* political organisation of the proletariat"? Who should be the "guiding and directing body" in bringing pressure to bear on the munic-

ipal authorities, in relations with the Duma commission (Comrade Khrustalev said nothing about *the Social-Democratic group in the Duma*! Was that accidental or was it a "providential slip of the tongue" on the part of a man who has a vague feeling that the non-party "labour congress committees" would enter into relations with the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks indiscriminately?), in discussing bills, in conducting an election campaign, *etc.*?

There was nothing left for Comrade Khrustalev to do but display his anger when this question was put to him, since it would have been awkward for him to admit that the proletariat's political activities should be guided by non-party "committees". "Who of the Social-Democrats," he asks wrathfully, "has conducted, or is now conducting, agitation for the convening of an anti-party congress? The opponents will be unable to give a single name." Do not get so angry, Comrade Khrustalev, we *have indicated* a number of names in the first point of our resolution and we could now add to them *the name of Comrade G. Khrustalev*. Actually Comrade Khrustalev, like Larin, is agitating for *a broad Trudovik party*.* We say a Trudovik party, not a workers' party, because (1) neither Larin nor Khrustalev excludes Trudovik, i.e., petty-bourgeois, democracy from the composition of non-party political organisation (delegates to the labour congress, for example, from "consumers' associations"; or the motto "against all restrictions") and (2) the non-partisanship of a workers' political organisation would inevitably mean the merging of the Social-Democratic and Trudovik points of view.

Comrade Khrustalev writes: "The organisations built up by Zubatov and Gapon[169] rapidly got rid of their police flavour and conducted a purely class policy." They got rid of that *because of* the politically conscious participation of the organised *Social-Democratic* party that would never agree to handing over the political leadership of proletarians to non-party organisations. It would seem that

* This expression is used by Comrade C. Lindov who gave reasons for and proved its accuracy in his article "Labour Congress", published in the collection *Questions of Tactics*.

Comrade Khrustalev draws a distinction between "purely class" politics and *Social-Democratic* politics. We should very much like him to explain this idea *candidly*.

"There will be a labour congress," Comrade Khrustalev enjoins us, "and the Social-Democrats will participate in it." Of course we shall, if there is a congress. We participated in the Zubatov and Gapon workers' movements in order to fight for Social-Democracy. We shall participate in the Trudovik labour congress in order to fight for Social-Democracy against the Trudoviks and Trudovik *non-party* ideas. This argument is not to the advantage of the old Gapon trend, or of the new non-party spirit.

Comrade Khrustalev appeals to "Bolshevik workers", and in so doing tries to set them at loggerheads with the Bolsheviks, who have been agitating against the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. We do not intend to make any answer to that sally. We refer to Trotsky, who is "non-group". Let Comrade Khrustalev read his book *In Defence of the Party*; let him open it at the article entitled, § 2, "Mr. Prokopovich's Malignant Impartiality", *page 82*. When Comrade Khrustalev has read that article he will be ashamed of having hidden factional sallies behind a non-factional labour congress.

In two words we shall show politically conscious workers that the leading role of *non-party* committees in the *politics* of the proletariat (the election campaign, etc.) is a purely intellectualist whimsicality that would lead to *excessive* squabbling and bickering and, after the squabbling and bickering, back to Social-Democracy".

In conclusion let us again thank Comrade Khrustalev for the clarity and completeness of his propaganda for the labour congress. Larin and Khrustalev are the Bolsheviks' best allies against Axelrod.

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REORGANISATION AND THE END OF THE SPLIT IN ST. PETERSBURG

Readers will already have learned from the legal daily press that the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., so long since contemplated by the majority of local Party members, has now been completed. A specially elected conference of all members of the local organisation gathered on March 25, 1907,[170] discussed the St. Petersburg Committee's reorganisation plan (published in *Proletary*, No. 15) and the Mensheviks' counter-plan (published in *Russkaya Zhizn*, No. 51), and adopted the St. Petersburg Committee's plan with some insignificant amendments.

In essence these organisational rules boil down to adherence to consistent democratic centralism. The highest body in the organisation is the *conference*, elected by direct ballot by all members of the Party (there are two-stage elections only in cases of insuperable difficulties) with a fixed rate of representation (the first conference was attended by delegates elected at the rate of one per fifty Party members). The conference is a standing institution. It meets not less than twice a month and is the supreme body of the organisation. It is re-elected twice a year.

The conference elects the St. Petersburg Committee *from among all Party members*, and not only from those working in some particular district of the local organisation.

This type of organisation eliminates any disproportion in the representation of the districts and—this is the main thing—instead of the unwieldy, multi-stage, undemocratic system of electing the St. Petersburg Committee from representatives of the districts, real unity of all Party members

is created, since they are united by a single guiding conference. The composition of the conference makes possible and inevitable the participation of the majority of outstanding workers in the guidance of all the affairs of the entire local organisation.

The conference has already put the new type of organisation into effect, has declared itself a standing institution, elected a new St. Petersburg Committee of nineteen comrades, and held two meetings (or rather, it has gathered twice for a meeting) for the solution of all current problems.

To characterise the Menshevik plan for reorganisation that the conference rejected, we shall mention one circumstance, the most important one. That plan also envisaged a similar conference at the head of the organisation (calling it a council). According to that plan, however, the St. Petersburg Committee, the executive body of the conference, is eliminated altogether! "The city council," says the Menshevik plan, "is divided into a number of commissions (propaganda, agitation, literature, trade union, financial, etc.) for the conduct of current business." And "the representation of the organisation in other parties, and relations with the central institutions of our Party are entrusted to a presidium" of five members elected by the council.

One may easily imagine how effective an organisation would be if its *current affairs* were conducted by separate commissions and not by a single executive body of the conference! In this case democratic *centralism* is turned into a fiction; in point of fact this is a step towards Larin's famous plan to reduce the role of the Social-Democratic Party to that of *a propaganda body* among working-class masses united as little as possible in a single organisation. It goes without saying that this Menshevik plan was immediately rejected. It now remains for us to ask its authors to acquaint us with the experience gained by *Menshevik* committees or organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. functioning on such principles.

To continue. It is extremely important to note that the new conference of the St. Petersburg organisation *has put an end to the St. Petersburg split*. It is known that the Mensheviks brought about the split in St. Petersburg during the elections to the Second Duma, by leaving (for allegedly

formal reasons) the conference held on January 6, 1907, the conference that decided the question of the R.S.D.L.P. election campaign in St. Petersburg. The elections to the new conference that first met on March 25 were conducted under the *direct* control of a *special* commission appointed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. *specifically* for that purpose, which included a Central Committee member from the Lettish Social-Democrats. The conference held on March 25 (and still functioning, since, as we have said, it declared itself a standing institution) is, therefore, the *first* Social-Democratic conference in St. Petersburg for the past year, constituted *without the slightest dispute* on the correctness of the representation, the legality and number of mandates, etc.

Such a fact has hitherto *never been known* in St. Petersburg, with its most severe struggle between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Both the boycott conference (February 1906)[171] and the conference on the question of supporting the demand for a "Duma" ministry (June 1906)[172] gave the Bolsheviks the victory, but both had to begin with disputes over the correctness of the representation.

It will, therefore, be highly instructive to make use of these *undisputed* data, undisputed for the first time, on the strength of the two sections of Social-Democracy in St. Petersburg, to make clear to ourselves the real causes and real significance of the split, now over and done with, that occurred before the St. Petersburg elections. It will be remembered that the Mensheviks justified the split on formal grounds—first, incorrect representation at the conference on January 6 (the Bolsheviks were accused of exaggerating the number of votes, especially those of the shop-assistants, and of the unlawful annulment of Menshevik mandates); and secondly, the refusal of the conference to accede to the Central Committee's demand to divide into an urban and a gubernia conference.

In preceding issues of *Proletary* it has already been explained with sufficient clarity that the second "justification" actually boils down to *the participation* of the Central Committee (its Menshevik part) in engineering the St. Petersburg split. This will be easily understood by members of our Party in other cities as well, for they know full well that

the Central Committee has *nowhere* demanded the division of city conferences into urban and gubernia, *nor could it have done so*. The Central Committee needed this demand in St. Petersburg in the form of an ultimatum *in order to split* the St. Petersburg organisation and help the breakaway Mensheviks to begin (or continue) negotiations with the Cadets.

The first of these "justifications" of the split, however, remains quite vague and debatable to all members of our Party except those in St. Petersburg. They are not in a position to judge the correctness of the representation at the January 6 conference, or the actual relation of Bolshevik and Menshevik forces in St. Petersburg. It is beyond the power of the Social-Democratic press to give documentary proofs of this because only a special commission could collect and analyse the documents. Thanks, however, to the verified and undisputed figures of the representation at the March 25 conference, we are able to show all our Party how much truth there was in the Menshevik justification of the split in St. Petersburg prior to the elections. For this purpose it is only necessary *to compare the figures*, *by districts*, of the number of Social-Democrats voting for the Bolsheviks and for the Mensheviks at the elections to the January 6 conference and to the March 25 conference.

The data on the voting at the elections to the March 25 conference are *unquestionable*; they have been verified by a Central Committee commission and accepted by both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

To have *indisputable* data on the voting at the elections to the January 6 conference, *we shall take the Menshevik figures*. When the thirty-one. Mensheviks walked out of the conference on January 6, they issued a special statement in the form of a pamphlet entitled "Why Were We Compelled to Leave the Conference? (Statement by Thirty-One Mensheviks, Submitted to the Central Committee)". We discussed this pamphlet in *Proletary*, No. 12.* We shall now take the "figures on the composition of the electors to the Conference of St. Petersburg Organisation" (the January 6 conference) *printed* on pages seven and eight of that pamphlet.

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* See pp. 29-32 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Here *the number of those voting* for the Bolsheviks* and for the Mensheviks are given for each of the eleven districts, all votes, furthermore, being subdivided into undisputed and disputed, and the latter into those disputed by the Bolsheviks and those disputed by the Mensheviks.

There is no need for us to give all the details of these subdivisions. In the notes, we shall deal specifically with *all* the amendments introduced by the Mensheviks. For purposes of comparison, we shall take the *total* "number of votes" cast for the Bolsheviks and for the Mensheviks, in other words, we shall add the undisputed to the disputed votes and, by comparing these figures with the number of votes cast for the March 25 conference, every Party member will be able to see for himself *what* was incorrect in the elections to the January 6 conference, and *who was responsible* for the incorrectness.

In the pamphlet of the thirty-one Mensheviks there are no tabulated figures for the twelfth, shop-assistants', district of the St. Petersburg organisation. In the text (page 4) they said that the Central Committee had given the 313 organised shop-assistants the right to elect five representatives, allowing not one per fifty members (the usual rate), but one per sixty members, in view of the undemocratic nature of the elections. On these grounds, the Mensheviks refused to recognise the shop-assistants' votes *altogether*. Since one of the five representatives was a Menshevik and four were Bolsheviks, we shall assume sixty-three votes for the Mensheviks and two hundred and fifty for the Bolsheviks.

Next, we shall divide the twelve St. Petersburg districts of the Social-Democratic organisation into six undisputed and six disputed. The latter include those districts in which *more than half* the votes cast for the Bolsheviks or Mensheviks *were disputed* by either the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks at the conference. The districts concerned are: Vyborg (of the 256 Menshevik votes, 234 were challenged by the Bolsheviks as questionable), City (of the 459 Menshevik votes, 370 disputed by the Bolsheviks), Moscow (of

* These figures are again subdivided into Bolshevik and dissident votes ("platform of the revolutionary bloc"). Both are Bolsheviks, who argued among themselves whether there should be a Left bloc or a purely Social-Democratic election list.

the 248 Menshevik votes, 97 disputed by the Bolsheviks, 107 by the Mensheviks; 185 Bolshevik votes disputed,* *all* by Mensheviks), Railway (of 21 Bolshevik votes, 5 disputed; of 154 Menshevik votes 107 disputed); Estonian (all the 100 Bolshevik votes disputed by the Mensheviks), and shop-assistants (313 votes *challenged in their entirety* by the Mensheviks, who declared that these votes, and these alone, had not been cast at all; it was alleged that the leadership and not the members of the organisation had voted).

The undisputed districts were Vasilyevsky Ostrov, Narva, Okruzhnoi, Latvian (in these four districts all votes were undisputed), Neva (of 150 *Bolshevik* votes, 15 were disputed; of 40 *Menshevik* votes, 4 were disputed) and Petersburg (of 120 votes for the *Menshevik*, 22 were disputed).

The data on the number of votes cast in each district gives us the following table:

	St. Petersburg Organisation, R.S.D.L.P.	Conference of January 6 Votes cast *for*:			Conference of March 25 Votes cast *for*:		
	Districts	B-vik	M-vik	Total	B-vik	M-vik	Total
Undisputed District	Vasilyevsky Ostrov	329	339	668	798	435	1,233
	Petersburg	161	120	281	528	254	782
	Narva	24	6	30	202	231	433
	Neva	150	40	190	585	173	758
	Okruzhnoi	451	63	514	737	—	737
	Latvian	117	47	164	100	—	100
	Total	1,232	615	1,847	2,950	1,093	4,043
Disputed District	Vyborg	97	256	353	155	267	422
	City	220	459	679	701	558	1,259
	Moscow	185	248	433	331	83	414
	Railway	21	154	175	29	105	134
	Estonian	100	—	100	150	—	150
	Shop-Assistants	250	63	313	300	50	350
	Total	873	1,180	2,053	1,666	1,063	2,729
	Grand Total	2,105	1,795	3,900	4,616	2,156	6,772

* In all cases, by disputed votes are meant those that the other side considered not entirely correct, unverified, exaggerated, but not altogether fictitious. At the January 6 conference, the Bolsheviks decided to decrease the rate of representation for *all* disputed votes, allotting *them* one delegate per 75 members instead of one delegate per fifty members.

The following conclusions may be drawn from these data.

(1) St. Petersburg Social-Democratic workers displayed much greater interest in the reform of the St. Petersburg organisation (the purpose of the March 25 conference) than in the Duma elections in the urban curia (the purpose of the January 6 conference).

The number of members of the Social-Democratic organisation *could not* have changed very considerably in the course of two and a half months. The harsh conditions in which meetings were held and votes counted were no better, but probably worse in March than before, in our police-ridden country (there were no university meetings; persecution of the workers had increased).

The number of *voting* members of the Social-Democratic organisation increased by more than half, more than sixty-six per cent (from 3,900 to 6,772).

(2) The preponderance of Bolsheviks over Mensheviks was *incomparably greater* when a greater number of votes were cast than it had been with a smaller number of votes. On January 6 the Mensheviks obtained 1,795 votes out of 3,960, or 46 per cent; on March 25 they obtained 2,156 out of 6,772, or 32 per cent.

(3) In the undisputed districts (the first six) a greater number of votes were cast for both *Bolsheviks* and *Mensheviks* (the increase in the number of votes cast for the former being much greater). *In the disputed districts* (*the following six*) *the number of votes cast for the Bolsheviks increased and the number cast for the Mensheviks decreased.*

The number of votes cast for the *Bolsheviks* increased from 873 to 1,666. The number cast for the *Mensheviks* fell from 1,180 to 1,063. The preponderance of the Mensheviks in the disputed districts *proved non-existent.*

This fact settles the question of which side was to blame for the split.

The second election, which confirmed the results of the first and was verified by the Central Committee's special commission, showed that in the disputed districts the number of votes claimed by the Bolsheviks was actually *less* than the real number, while that claimed by the Mensheviks was *greater* than the real number!

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The Mensheviks stated, verbally and in print, that the Bolsheviks had exaggerated the number of votes in the disputed districts. The Bolsheviks accused the Mensheviks of the same thing. The second election produced a greater number of votes for the Bolsheviks and fewer for the Mensheviks. Is it possible to imagine more convincing and more decisive proof that the Bolsheviks were right?

This conclusion cannot be refuted either by reference to the fortuitous nature of the data taken by districts, or by saying that on January 6 we lumped the disputed and undisputed votes. The first objection falls to the ground because we did not take separate districts but *groups* of districts, and compared six districts with six, specifically to preclude *any* references to fortuity. The data for individual districts (the Moscow District, for instance!) would be ten times more favourable to us.

The second objection falls to the ground because we deliberately took the *Menshevik* figures as our basis, and the Mensheviks made insignificant corrections to them. In the opinion of the thirty-one, as expressed in their pamphlet (page 7) only the following votes "should actually not be confirmed"—15 of the 150 Bolshevik votes in the Neva District and all the Estonian Bolshevik votes; 107 out of the 248 Menshevik votes in the Moscow District, and 41 out of 154 Menshevik votes in the Railway District, which amounts to only 115 Bolshevik and 143 Menshevik votes. The shop-assistants' votes (the entire 313) were all rejected by the Mensheviks. It is easy to see that these amendments do not affect our conclusions.

The March 25 conference, the elections to which were verified by a special commission appointed by the Central Committee and recognised by all as indisputable, *has proved* that, in the dispute over representation at the January 6 conference, the Bolsheviks, whose preponderance proved very substantial, were right; the preponderance of the Mensheviks was completely disproved. An attempt to object to our argument may, of course, be made by reference to the fact that the March 25 conference took place after the election campaign and, therefore, reflected the shift of Social-Democratic workers over to the side of the Bolsheviks on this question, a shift that occurred after Jan-

uary 6, 1907. Such an objection will naturally not weaken, but rather strengthen (although in a somewhat different way), the responsibility of the Mensheviks for the split over the elections.

Responsibility for the St. Petersburg split over the elections to the Second Duma *rests entirely on the Mensheviks*. We have always maintained this to be so, and we undertook to prove it to the Party as a whole.

We have now submitted our final proofs.

Written in April 1907

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Published according to the newspaper text

ON THE QUESTION OF A NATION-WIDE REVOLUTION

In a certain sense of the word, it is only a nation-wide revolution that can be victorious. This is true in the sense that the unity of the overwhelming majority of the population in the struggle for the demands of that revolution is essential for victory to be won. This overwhelming majority must consist either entirely of one class, or of different classes that have certain aims in common. It is also true, of course, that the present Russian revolution can be victorious only if it is nation-wide *in that specific sense* of the word that the conscious participation of the overwhelming majority of the population in the struggle is essential for victory to be won.

That, however, is the limit of the conventional truthfulness of the catchword of a "nation-wide" revolution. No further conclusions can be drawn from this concept, which is nothing but a truism (only an overwhelming majority can be victorious over an organised and dominant minority). For this reason it is fundamentally incorrect and profoundly un-Marxist to apply it as a general formula, as a model, a criterion of tactics. The concept of a "nation-wide revolution" should tell the Marxist of the need for a precise analysis of those varied interests of *different* classes that coincide in certain definite, limited common aims. Under no circumstances must this concept serve *to conceal* or overshadow the study of the class struggle in the course of any revolution. Such use of the concept of "nation-wide revolution" amounts to a complete rejection of Marxism and a return to the vulgar phraseology of the petty-bourgeois democrats or petty-bourgeois socialists.

This truth is frequently forgotten by our Social-Democratic Right wing. Still more frequently do they forget that *class relations in a revolution change with the progress of that revolution*. All real revolutionary progress means drawing broader masses into the movement; consequently—a greater consciousness of class interests; consequently—more clearly-defined political, party groupings and more precise outlines of the class physiognomy of the various parties; consequently—greater replacement of general, abstract, unclear political and economic demands that are vague in their abstractness, by the *varying* concrete, clearly-defined demands of the different classes.

For instance, the Russian bourgeois revolution, like any other bourgeois revolution, inevitably begins under the common slogans of "political liberty" and "popular interests"; only in the course of the struggle, the concrete meaning of those slogans becomes clear to the masses and to the different classes, only to the extent that a practical attempt is made to implement that "liberty", to give a *definite* content even to such a hollow-sounding word as "democracy". Prior to the bourgeois revolution, and at its onset, all speak in the name of democracy—the proletariat and the peasantry together with urban petty-bourgeois elements, and the liberal bourgeoisie together with the liberal landlords. It is only in the course of the class struggle, only in the course of a more or less lengthy historical development of the revolution, that the different understanding of this "democracy" by the different classes is revealed. And what is more, the deep gulf between the interests of the different classes is revealed in their demands for *different* economic and political measures, in the name of one and the same "democracy".

Only in the course of the struggle, only as the revolution develops, is it revealed that one "democratic" class or stratum does not want to go, or cannot go, as far as another, that while "common" (allegedly common) objectives are being achieved, fierce skirmishes develop around the *method* by which they are to be achieved, for example, on the degree, extent or consistency of freedom and power of the people, or the manner in which land is to be transferred to the peasantry, etc.

We have had to recall all these forgotten truths so as to enable the reader to understand the dispute that recently took place between two newspapers. This is what one of them, *Narodnaya Gazeta*, wrote against the other, *Nashe Ekho*.

"'The grouping of the population by party,' wrote *Nashe Ekho*, 'that important political lesson and the revolution's most important political acquisition at the time of the elections to the Second Duma, showed clearly by nation-wide facts that broad strata of the landlords and bourgeoisie are swinging to the Right.' Quite true. But the mood and the mandates which the 'Left' deputies—Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks, and Popular Socialists—have brought with them from their localities also 'showed clearly' on a nation-wide scale that the 'people' are at present steeped in Cadet 'constitutional illusions' to a considerable degree, that the 'people' place excessive hopes on the independent activities of the Duma, that they are excessively concerned with 'saving' the Duma. That is the obvious fact that the *Nashe Ekho* writers failed to notice. They did notice *whom* the people sent to the Duma, but not *what* they were sent there *for*. But in that case, will *Nashe Ekho* not agree that, in proposing that the proletariat ignore 'nation-wide' tasks, it is proposing that it isolate itself, not only from bourgeois 'society', but also from the petty-bourgeois 'people'?"

This is an extremely instructive and noteworthy tirade, which conceals three major opportunist errors; first, the results of the elections are contrasted with the mood of the deputies, which is substituting the deputies' mood for that of the people, and reverting from the more profound, extensive and basic to the shallower, narrower and derivative.* Secondly, the question of a firm and sustained political line and tactics for the proletariat is replaced by the question of an assessment of some "mood" or another. Thirdly—and *this is most important*—for the sake of the vulgarly democratic fetish of a "nation-wide revolution", the proletariat is scared with the bogey of "*isolation*" from the "petty bourgeois people".

We shall deal with the first two errors as briefly as possible. The elections affected the masses, and showed, not only their fleeting mood but their *profound interests*. It is alto-

* As far as "mandates" are concerned we reject that argument completely. Who makes a count of revolutionary and opportunist instructions and mandates? Who does not know how many newspapers have been suppressed for publishing revolutionary instruction?

gether unworthy of Marxists to revert from class interests (expressed by the party grouping at the elections) to a fleeting mood. The mood of the deputies may be one of gloom, while the economic interests of the masses may call forth a mass struggle. An assessment of "mood", therefore, may be necessary to determine *the moment* for some action, step, appeal, etc., but certainly not to determine proletarian *tactics*. To argue differently would mean replacing sustained proletarian tactics by unprincipled dependence on "mood". And all the time, the point at issue was that of *a line* and had nothing to do with a "moment". Whether or not the proletariat has at present recovered (and *Narodnaya Gazeta* does not think so) is of importance in deciding *the "moment" for action*, but not in determining the tactical *line of action* of the working class.

The third error is the most profound and the most important—the fear of "isolating" the Social-Democrats or the proletariat (which is the same thing) from the petty-bourgeois people. That is really a most improper fear.

Social-Democracy *must* isolate itself from the petty-bourgeois people inasmuch as the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks and Popular Socialists are really trailing along in the wake of the Constitutional-Democrats—and that is happening—and indeed has happened very frequently beginning with the voting for Golovin, and continuing with the famous tactics of sepulchral silence, etc. For there must be one of two things; either the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie is, in general, an indication of the shaky nature of the petty bourgeois, and the difficult and arduous development of the revolution, but does not signify that it has ended or that its forces are exhausted (which is our opinion). Then, by isolating itself from all and every vacillation and wavering in petty-bourgeois people, the Social-Democratic proletariat *educates* them for the struggle, trains them in preparation for the struggle and develops their political consciousness, determination, firmness, etc. Or else, the wavering of the petty-bourgeois people means the finale of the present bourgeois revolution (we believe such a view to be *wrong*, and none of the Social-Democrats have directly and openly defended it, although extreme Right-wing Social-Democrats are undoubtedly inclined to do so). Then,

again, the Social-Democratic proletariat *must also* isolate itself from the wavering (or treachery) of the petty bourgeoisie, in order to educate the working-class masses in class-consciousness, and prepare them for a more planned, firm and decisive participation in the next revolution.

In both cases and in all cases, the Social-Democratic proletariat must isolate itself from the petty-bourgeois people, *which is steeped in Cadet illusions*, and do so unconditionally. The proletariat must in all cases pursue the firm, sustained policy of a truly revolutionary class, without allowing itself to be flustered by any reactionary or philistine cock-and-bull stories, whether these are about nation-wide tasks in general, or about a nation-wide revolution.

It is possible that, given a certain combination of forces or a concurrence of unfavourable conditions, the overwhelming part of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata may be infected, for the time being, with servility, slavishness or cowardice. That would be "nation-wide" cowardice, and the Social-Democratic proletariat *isolates* itself from it in the interests of the working-class movement as a whole.

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to the *Proletary* text

APROPOS OF THE MINUTES OF THE NOVEMBER MILITARY AND COMBAT CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[173]

No. 20 of *Narodnaya Duma* (April 3, 1907) carried the following item: "The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. has addressed the following letter to Party organisations. 'A few days ago a booklet was published under the title of *Minutes of the First Conference of Military and Combat Organisations*.* To prevent all possible misunderstanding, the Central Committee deems it essential to make the following explanations on this matter. (1) The conference was called by representatives of a number of military and combat organisations, not only without the consent of the Central Committee but even in spite of its vehement protest, that body being of the opinion that the unification of combat organisations in any form whatsoever would be impermissible. (2) The Technical Group at the Central Committee was not given the consent of that body for participation in the "conference", and the member of the group who went so far as to participate has been soundly reprimanded by the Central Committee for doing so without its knowledge. To this must be added that the military organisations of the Baltic Area took part in the conference contrary to a deci-

* The real title, *abridged* by the Central Committee, reads: "...organisations *of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, (Conference) held in November 1906" (St. Petersburg, 1907. Price 60 kopeks. 168 pp. +IV).

sion of the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Area.'"

The reader will see from this that our Central Committee is very angry and anxious to denigrate a certain conference in the eyes of the Party, and to conceal the point at issue behind a list of formal discrepancies.

We advise all Party members to acquaint themselves with the exceedingly interesting *Minutes of the Military and Combat Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.* so as to convince themselves of the amusing nature of the Central Committee's wrath and dissatisfaction. We, for our part, deem it essential to give at least a brief assessment of this book (and of the "conflict" arising out of it).

Let us begin with the formal aspect of the matter mentioned in the Central Committee's wrathful statement. The conference was called despite its protest, for the Central Committee was "of the opinion that the unification of combat organisations in any form whatsoever would be impermissible". This is very wrathful, but illogical to the point of incoherence. If it does not, in general, regard *the conference* as a "form of unification", then it completely misses the target. If a meeting ("conference") of combat organisations is *also* impermissible as a "form of unification", then we ask ourselves in perplexity—how can representatives of *Party* organisations be forbidden *to confer* so long as they are Party organisations that have not been dissolved either by the Party Congress or the Central Committee? Apparently the Central Committee is afraid to express its real idea (the desire to dissolve all combat organisations), and is therefore wrathful in an amusing manner. Would it really not have been natural to expect objections *in substance* to *certain steps or decisions* taken by the conference instead of the outcry: "The meeting is not permitted"? This outcry is meant to prevent the presentation of the problem as it really stands?—that is a thought that occurs to one of its own accord.

Let us now look into the history of the way the conference of military and combat organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. was convened. Last autumn there was a conflict on this issue between the St. Petersburg military organisation and the Central Committee. The former called the conference of

military and *combat organisations*, and in doing so referred to "the right to call conferences *granted* to local organisations by Party Rules".* The Central Committee opposed the initiative of the St. Petersburg military organisation, and was against allowing combat organisations to attend. It so turned out that *two* conferences were held: (1) the *October* conference of military organisations *only*, at which representatives of the Central Committee were present; (2) the *November* Conference of military and *combat* organisations without the participation of a Central Committee representative (although the Central Committee *appointed* one of its members to attend *that* conference as well). Representatives of *eight* military organisations participated in the *October* conference. The November conference was attended by *eleven* military and *eight* combat organisations. Representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and other Party officials attended *both* conferences in a consultative capacity.

The resolutions of the *October* conference were published by the Central Committee in the above-mentioned pamphlet (*Brief Extract*). The resolutions of the *November* conference were published in *Proletary*, No. 9, and were later included in the publication *Minutes*, issued as a separate booklet. The Central Committee's protest, with which we opened this article, refers to the *November* conference.

It stands to reason that the fact of there having been two conferences should be condemned. That is undoubtedly an undesirable event in a single party. Leaving the formal aspect aside, we pose the question of the *substance* of the conflict that was responsible for *two* conferences; was the participation of combat organisations in the conference useful or harmful? We read in the resolution of the October conference: "...there is an urgent need for the Party to call a conference devoted specifically to military organisations, to discuss the question of preparing the troops to participate in the armed struggle of the people, a conference that has nothing to gain from the participation of representatives of

* See the Central Committee's publication *Brief Extract from the Minutes of the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Conducting Activities Among the Troops*, a pamphlet of thirteen pages issued by the Central Committee Press.

combat groups" (page 4 of the Central Committee's pamphlet). That was all. Those were the motives in their entirety.

The incorrectness of these motives is palpable. Let us assume that everything bad that can be said against combat organisations is true. But it is a fact that they did participate in former attempts at an insurrection. For that reason alone it would be useful and even necessary to consult them. It would be useful *to make* their *harmful* tendencies *known* to the Party, and *expose* such-and-such activities of theirs at a conference attended by them. The Central Committee and *every* member of the conference could and should have done this. The decisions of the conference were *not in any way* binding upon anybody, and were certainly not obligatory either for the Central Committee or for the local committees. Under such conditions, *fear* of a joint meeting is simply ridiculous.

And if the Central Committee now forthrightly condemns a conference with representatives of combat organisations participating, *without condemning* any one of the resolutions of the conference with equal forthrightness, that must mean that the conference *disproved* the Central Committee's assumptions!

To deal immediately with the decisions of the conference, let us take, for instance, its resolution on *the tasks of combat organisations*. Here we read: "The Conference of Military and Combat Organisations recognises the main tasks of combat organisations to be (1) dissemination of a correct conception of an armed uprising and explanation of the concrete conditions under which an armed uprising may arise, proceed, and be successfully consummated, because even among Party officials there exist the vaguest and most incorrect conceptions of an armed uprising;. (2) the technical preparation of everything necessary for the successful conduct of an armed uprising; (3) the organisation, for bold action, of cadres of politically conscious workers, grouped around the R.S.D.L.P.; (4) assistance in the organisation, for combat purposes, of the revolutionary-democratic sections of the population, and in strengthening the fighting leadership of Social-Democracy among those sections."

Thus, the main task of the combat organisations is declared to be, first and foremost, "*the dissemination of a correct*

conception of an armed uprising". This idea is repeated in much sharper form in the resolution on the role of military and combat organisations during an armed uprising: "the role of the combat organisations is to develop a correct conception of the armed uprising among the masses of the people".

And so our Menshevik Central Committee considers a conference *on this* to be impermissible? Or was it anxious to hide behind the bureaucratic screen—"no collective activities are permissible, or even a conference"—*in order* to rid itself of the unpleasant duty of giving the Party a *definite* explanation of *which* of the tasks of the combat organisations it considers correct, and which incorrect?

The fact of the matter is that a truly pharisaic attitude to the combat organisations is prevalent among the Mensheviks; they have nothing against taking advantage of any of the "results" of the activities of *non*-Party combat organisations, but they spread old wives' tales about *Party* combat organisations that enable them *to evade altogether* the question of methods of disseminating among the masses the correct conception of the armed uprising, etc.

Among such tales there is, for example, the one now current that the combat groups (following in the wake of the Bolsheviks) exaggerate the significance of the *technique* of insurrection.

Excellent, gentlemen! You accuse us of exaggerating the significance of "technique", do you? Would you care to read two resolutions—those of the Menshevik (October) and the Bolshevik (November) military Social-Democratic conferences—to get at the truth of the matter?

On work among officers. Resolution of the Menshevik (October) conference:

> "The conference recognises that revolutionary propaganda among officers is an important task both because the work of the Social-Democratic military-revolutionary organisation among officers can greatly facilitate our work among the troops in peace-time, and also because at the time of an armed uprising revolutionary officers can serve as the technical leaders of the insurrection. The conference, therefore, recommends to the military-revolutionary organisation that it devote great attention to work among officers, striving as far as possible to convert them into politically conscious supporters of the Social-Democratic Party" (p. 13 of the Central Committee's pamphlet).

The resolution of the Bolshevik (November) conference:

"Whereas: (1) the class, social composition of the corps of officers and their interests as a professional military caste compel them to strive for the retention of the regular army and the under-privileged position of the people; (2) in view of this, the officers, as a body, play a reactionary part in the present bourgeois-democratic revolution; (3) the existing oppositionally-minded groups of officers do not play an active part and (4) at the same time it is possible that individual officers may come over to our Party and they may, in view of their specialised knowledge and special military training, render considerable services during an uprising of the army and its defection to the side of the people, and also in technical preparations for an armed uprising,

"the conference of military and combat organisations recognises: (1) that they cannot build up an independent Social-Democratic military organisation among the officers; (2) that it is essential to use the existing oppositionally-minded groups of officers for purposes of information and in order to draw into our Party military and combat organisations individuals who can serve as instructors and practical leaders" (*Minutes*, p. 132).

The Mensheviks *do not say a word about the class* composition of the corps of officers, or about its role during *the whole course* of the bourgeois revolution. The *central feature* of the Bolshevik resolution is an assessment of both the one and the other. That is the first point. The Mensheviks have *nothing but technique*, since *all* proof of the "*importance*" of work among the officers is reduced to nothing but the fact that such work" could facilitate" our activities among the troops (provide us with quarters? or with legal cover?) and could then provide technical leaders. The Bolsheviks give *subordinate* place to technique, as services rendered by "individual officers", and give prominence to proof that the workers' party cannot build up an "*independent Social-Democratic organisation*" among the officers. That is the second point. The ideas of the Mensheviks—petty-bourgeois in nature because they fear to show the class connections between the corps of officers and the bourgeoisie—are complemented by the timidity of the conclusion drawn—"*as far as possible* convert them into politically conscious *supporters* of the Social-Democratic Party". The Bolsheviks give a frank proletarian assessment of a stratum that is, *on the whole*, reactionary, and this leads to a decisive conclusion: use oppositionally-minded officers "for purposes of information" and draw only

"individual officers" into *our Party* military and combat organisations. That is the third point.

After that, it may well be asked what else but old wives' tales can one call the Menshevik chatter about the exaggeration of the significance of technique by the Bolsheviks in general, and the Bolshevik combat groups in particular? As we have seen, this chatter has actually served, on the one hand, to cover up the narrow Menshevik view concerning the corps of officers, and, on the other hand, the purely intellectualist, *opportunist* fear of assessing the bourgeois class character of the composition of the corps of officers and of introducing into the work among the troops the idea of the class difference between the mass of "rank-and-file" soldiers drawn from the peasants and workers, and the handful of sons of the aristocracy or of the bourgeoisie, who worm themselves into the aristocracy through military service.

It was not only the Menshevik participants in the tiny October conference who displayed this "technical" and petty-bourgeois opportunist view of the corps of officers. We find that our Menshevik Central Committee shares this view; we have only to recall the famous *fourth* letter to organisations (the period when the Duma was dissolved) where the slogan "for the Duma" as an organ of power that could convene a constituent assembly, was justified by an effort at adaptation to the interests and level of political consciousness "of the middle bourgeoisie and *corps of officers*". In that letter, the Central Committee went so far as to say that *the victory* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the struggle for power would lead only to the military dictatorship of the army that had gone over to the side of the people! For, you see, without the "liberal" officers, the troops would not be able, even jointly with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, to ensure anything else but a military dictatorship!

This petty-bourgeois view with regard to the corps of officers is also displayed by Plekhanov, the ideological leader of the Mensheviks. Throughout 1906 we saw the efforts he made to accuse the Bolsheviks of exaggerating the significance of the technical tasks of the uprising. What aspect of the uprising did our esteemed Comrade Plekhanov write about during that time? Was it about the insurrection's

roots in the masses, or the role of the peasant and proletarian elements in the insurrection? Nothing of the sort. All that time Comrade Plekhanov wrote *only* about *one* letter from one *liberal* officer, in *Dnevnik*, No. 7 (August 1906),[174] whom he with the greatest politeness "corrected" for his bourgeois views on the "men" and on the "tranquil" nature of the period of Witte's Ministry, etc. "I even think," wrote Comrade Plekhanov, "that only [note that "only"!] the participation of officers in the military organisations will put an end to these *outbreaks* [of soldiers and sailors] that are an unplanned and unproductive waste of energy needed by the revolution." You see the strength behind it—*only* the participation of officers will put an end to the outbreaks! Without the officers there will be no end to the "*unplanned*" waste of energy by the foolish muzhik. And when the Bolshevik combat groups meet in conference and wish to give the Social-Democratic Party a modest piece of advice—let the *main* task of the combat organisations be that of imparting military knowledge to the *masses*, of teaching them to understand the course of the insurrection and the conditions for its *planned* conduct—then the Pharisees of hidebound Menshevism begin to shout. What a narrowly technical conception of "planning"! What an "impermissible" conference of combat groups, contrary to the will of the Central Committee!

But enough of the Pharisees—let us get back to the minutes. In *one* place we found, not "modest advice" to the Social-Democratic Party, but pretentious and clumsy project-mongering. That was in the report made by Comrade Izarov[175] on the role of the Party during the armed uprising. Here Comrade Izarov really did go to absurd extremes, such as the division of Party organisations into three main types—military, combat and proletarian! He even went so far as to offer "plans" to form "military-combat councils" with *an equal number* of delegates from the three types of organisation (p. 95), etc. It goes without saying that we Bolsheviks *will always* hold aloof *in the most decisive manner* from *such* "*combatism*". The unconditionally dominant character and deciding voice belong to the general proletarian organisation; the *complete* subordination of all military and combat organisations to it, the *necessity* to base those same com-

bat organisations *entirely* on cadres of workers who are Social-Democratic *Party members* (or, perhaps, even *replace the combat organisation by a Party militia*)—to us there is no shadow of doubt in all this.

But if Comrade Izarov's absurd excesses are brought against us for factional purposes, we would ask such "critics" to remember that the *Bolshevik military and combat conference did not accept Izarov's extremes*. The best refutation of the calumnies directed against our combat groups is the fact that they *themselves* at their own conference, simply pushed Izarov's project-mongering aside. In order that *their* voice on the question of the role of the Social-Democratic Party in an insurrection *should not* be regarded as pretentious imposition or dictating, etc., they *themselves* turned their conference on this point into *a private meeting* (see *Proletary*, No. 9, and *Minutes*, p. 116). It was only at this private meeting that they passed a resolution without a suggestion of project-mongering *à la* Izarov, but with only a point about "ensuring the closest connection and co-operation between general-proletarian, military and combat organisations". In addition, the resolution on the tasks of military organisations *particularly* stresses "*the subordination of all the work*" to "the political leadership of general-proletarian organisations" (*Proletary*, No. 9, *Minutes*, p. 137). If the Bolshevik combat organisations alone were able to correct Izarov, one may well realise that the Central Committee had good reason for apprehension when confronted with a general meeting of the military and combat organisations of the whole Party.

Space does not permit us to deal in such detail with other aspects of the work of the conference. We must mention that *almost half* of this thick book is devoted to work among the troops (pp. 10-49) and former attempts at an armed uprising (pp. 53-59, 64-79). This is very valuable material, and all politically conscious Social-Democratic workers will thank the military and combat conference for its initiative in gathering and preparing this material. We note the report made by Comrade Varin[176] "on former attempts at an armed uprising"; in this report prominence is given to a study of the armed uprising *as a specific form of the mass movement*, a special form of the class struggle of the prole-

tariat. Stress is laid on the historic moment when the struggle between certain classes is sharpened to the extreme, as a condition for the uprising. The role of various classes is examined—the dependence of the movement among the troops upon the alignment of social forces, the indivisibility of the political and military aspects of the uprising, the significance of "broad democratic organisations of the masses of the people" as a prerequisite for a provisional revolutionary government, etc. The *study* of such problems is, of course, rather more difficult than the writing of "tactical platforms" containing Cadet phrases about "faith of the proletarian masses in the miracle of a spontaneous insurrection" (see the "Tactical Platform" of Martov & Co.).

Lastly, let us note the discussion on current affairs, with the splendid speech by Comrade Ilyan[177] who, *in November 1906*, *at the military and combat* conference, proved able to express a view on the *Second* Duma that has been fully confirmed by events. "I shall permit myself to touch upon the Duma," he said. "We shall have a composition that will differ completely from that of the past Duma. What we shall have is mobilised revolution and mobilised reaction. Particularly in view of its expectations not having been fulfilled, the peasantry will send a more revolutionary element than it did to the First Duma. No doubt the proletariat will do the same.... Our trouble is that some Social-Democrats are striving to fill up the Duma with some sort of intermediate stratum of liberals" (p. 84 of the *Minutes*).

At the *combat* conference they were better able to assess *politics* than were Plekhanov and the Menshevik Central Committee in November 1906.

It goes without saying that in a newspaper article we cannot deal fully with the contents of the *Minutes*. We shall conclude by giving readers our earnest advice *to study* them—advice to those Social-Democrats who are capable of discussing questions of an insurrection without any liberal sniggering.

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REPORT TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON THE ST. PETERSBURG SPLIT AND THE INSTITUTION OF THE PARTY TRIBUNAL ENSUING THEREFROM[178]

As you will have learned from bourgeois newspapers (*Tovarishch*, et al.), the Central Committee of our Party has instituted a Party tribunal to examine my activities, specifically, my pamphlet *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*,* which appeared at the time of the split in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation during the elections to the Second Duma.

The tribunal has been constituted of three members representing me, three from the thirty-one Mensheviks, and three members of a Presidium nominated by the central committees of the Latvian and Polish Social-Democratic parties and the Bund. I have submitted to that tribunal a counter-charge of impermissible conduct against the thirty-one Mensheviks and against Comrade *Dan* (a member of the editorial board of the Central Organ and, through the Central Organ, a member of the Central Committee). The counter-indictment was supported on the one hand by a meeting of 234 St. Petersburg Bolshevik members of the Party (their resolution, together with their report giving a résumé of the whole matter, was published in *Proletary*, No. 13), and on the other hand by the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference (minus the seceding Mensheviks). The resolution of this conference was published in *Proletary*, No. 14.[179]

* See pp. 33-44 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In its capacity of an institution set up by the Central Committee, the tribunal did not consider itself justified in indicting the thirty-one Mensheviks and Comrade Dan, and turned to the same Central Committee for a definition of its competency on the question of the counter-indictment. At a special session the Central Committee again examined this question, and confirmed that the present tribunal had been instituted exclusively for the examination of Lenin's case and that the arraignment of other persons before the tribunal depended entirely on the Central Committee, which, of course, deemed it its duty to arraign before the tribunal all persons against whom the present tribunal would formulate a charge of impermissible conduct. The composition of the new tribunal was again left entirely to the discretion of that same Central Committee.

Thus we get a tangle of glaring incongruities and contradictions. The Menshevik Central Committee is playing the role of an institution that brings up for trial and also determines both the composition of the tribunal and its competency. A counter-indictment has been submitted against the leader of the Menshevik section of the Central Committee. The very same persons, it seems, appoint the tribunal, are themselves prosecutors and also decide the question of what to do with a counter-indictment *against themselves*!

Obviously such arrangements are not capable of inspiring respect for the Party. Only the Party Congress can unravel this tangle of incongruities. I therefore appeal to the Congress with a request: grant the tribunal full judicial powers directly from the Congress; make the tribunal in every way independent of the Central Committee, which (its Menshevik section) is clearly interested in the case; grant the tribunal the right to examine the case in all its aspects, without any restrictions and to indict any Party members and any Party institutions, not excluding the Menshevik section of the Central Committee, etc.

For an explanation of the case to members of the R.S.D.L.P. Congress, I append (1) the full text of my speech for the defence (or for the prosecution of the Menshevik section of the Central Committee) that I delivered at the first session of the tribunal. (The tribunal held only two sessions and

examined only three of several dozen witnesses. The tribunal was interrupted by the Congress.) (2) A brief summary of the real history of the St. Petersburg split.

I. SPEECH FOR THE DEFENCE (OR FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE MENSHEVIK SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE) DELIVERED AT THE PARTY TRIBUNAL

Comrade judges, the Central Committee has charged me with *having made a statement* (in the press) *impermissible in a Party member*. That is what is said in the decision of the Central Committee instituting the Party tribunal. I shall begin directly with the substance of the matter: I shall read out in full the "declaration" which the Central Committee "submits for consideration by the tribunal".

"The Central Committee declares that the pamphlet, *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*, signed by Comrade Lenin directly charges the thirty-one members of the St. Petersburg organisation with having entered into negotiations with the Cadet Party 'for the purpose of selling workers' votes to the Cadets', and the Mensheviks with having 'bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets'.

"The Central Committee declares that the appearance of such an accusation in the press, particularly on the eve of the elections, was certain to cause confusion in the ranks of the proletariat, cast suspicion upon the political integrity of Party members, and will be utilised by the enemies of the proletariat in their struggle against Social-Democracy.

"Being of the opinion that such a statement is impermissible in a Party member, the Central Committee submits Lenin's conduct to consideration by a Party tribunal."

Such is the full text of the indictment. First of all I will observe that there is an important *error* of fact, which I shall ask the tribunal to correct on the basis of the *text* of the pamphlet incriminating me. Specifically: in the pamphlet it is stated plainly and definitely that I accuse *not only* the thirty-one Mensheviks, *but also Comrade Dan*, *i.e.*, *a member* of the Central Committee.

In drawing up its decision the Central Committee *must have known* that Comrade Dan is a member of the Central Committee (he may even have taken part in the discussions of the question, or in the decision to indict me for accusing

him), and that I accuse not only the thirty-one, but Dan as well. It appears, therefore, that the Central Committee *deliberately* excluded *its own member* from the number whom I accused. Here, in addition to the error of fact, the indictment contains something worse, something intolerable, and I shall later make a detailed appraisal of *this* aspect of the case, and shall try to explain *precisely this aspect*, using all of the material that comes before the tribunal in the course of the trial.

I now pass on to the substance of the charge.

The Central Committee quotes two passages from my pamphlet, and I must analyse each of them as fully as possible. I am aware, of course, that the question at issue is the *whole* of the above-mentioned pamphlet, and not merely these passages. But, following the example of the Central Committee, I take these as the main and principal parts.

The first passage is taken from the very beginning of the pamphlet. I shall take the liberty of reading a whole page to show the context of this passage.

"The newspaper *Tovarishch* has today (January 20) published"—I want to remind you that this took place *five* days before the formation of the Left bloc in St. Petersburg and *sixteen days* before the elections to the State Duma in the city of St. Petersburg—"lengthy excerpts from the manifesto of the thirty-one Mensheviks who seceded from the socialist organisation on the eve of the St. Petersburg elections."*

I emphasise that the very first sentence in the pamphlet brings to the fore the fundamental fact of *the split* in St. Petersburg on the eve of the elections. I lay stress on this circumstance, because I shall have to refer to its importance many times later on.

I continue the quotation:

"First of all, let us briefly recall the actual history of what the Menshevik seceders from the Social-Democrats have done since they walked out of the Conference...." A few days before the pamphlet we are now discussing appeared, I published another pamphlet entitled *Social-Democracy and the St. Petersburg Elections* and also a pamphlet

* See p. 33 of this volume.—*Ed.*

When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool (*From the Notes of a Social-Democrat Publicist*).* Almost the whole issue of the latter pamphlet was confiscated by the police. Only a few copies were saved, and I am referring to it so that the tribunal may study the picture of the events of the time in their entirety, and not in fragments.

"(1) After breaking away from the Social-Democrat workers they entered into a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists) in order jointly to bargain with the Cadets for seats. The written agreement under which the seceding Social-Democrats joined the petty-bourgeois bloc *was concealed from the workers* and from the public.

"However, we still had hopes that this agreement would eventually be published, and the secret revealed."

I draw the attention of the tribunal to the fact that in the pamphlet in which I accuse Dan and the thirty-one Mensheviks, I emphasise from the very beginning that the written agreement was concealed from the workers.

Let us proceed:

"(2) As a constituent part of the petty-bourgeois bloc (incorrectly styled the 'Left bloc' by the newspapers), the breakaway Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets for three places out of the six for this bloc. The Cadets offered two seats. They could not come to terms. The meeting between the petty-bourgeois 'conference' (this expression is not ours—we borrow it from the newspapers) and the Cadets was held on *January 18*. Both *Rech* and *Tovarishch* reported it. *Rech* announces today that no agreement was reached (although we must, of course, be prepared to hear that negotiations are still being conducted behind the scenes).

"So far the Mensheviks have made no announcement in the press concerning their '*operation*' for the sale of workers' votes to the Cadets."

That is the position regarding the first passage. I wrote these words against the Mensheviks on the very day that *I for the first time* learned from the newspapers that the attempt of the Mensheviks and the Narodniks to form a bloc with the Cadets *against* the majority of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation had failed; but I at once made the reservation that I could not regard the agreement as having been *finally* abandoned and that it was necessary to be prepared *for the worst*—the continuation of

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 431-55 and pp. 456-74.—*Ed.*

the negotiations "*behind the scenes*". Why did I consider then (and I still think that the view I then held was correct) that it was necessary to be prepared for the worst? Because it was a wrong step to conceal from the public a written agreement between the Mensheviks and the petty-bourgeois bloc, a step unworthy of a socialist and inevitably giving rise *to the worst suspicions*.

What was meant by the "sale" of workers' votes to the Cadets? Some jokers told me that they understood me to have said sale *for money*. This jest is not devoid of wit. But a literate person who read in earnest the whole of the pamphlet, and not disjointed passages from it, would, of course, see at once from the context, from all the preceding and subsequent passages, that what is referred to is a sale *not for money*, *but for seats in the Duma*. The "bargaining" and "sale" imply, of course, a barter of political and not economic equivalents, of seats for votes, not of money for votes.

The question arises: was it worth while bothering with such a clear and obvious circumstance?

I am profoundly convinced that it was, for this point brings us squarely to the elucidation of the question presented by the Central Committee—of statements that are permissible and impermissible in the press.

If the passage in the pamphlet we are examining had read: the thirty-one were selling workers' votes to the Cadets for money—that would have been imputing shameful and criminal acts to an opponent. Anyone making such an imputation would deserve to be tried, and certainly not for "carrying confusion into the ranks of the proletariat", but for *libel*. That is perfectly clear.

On the other hand, if the passage in question had stated: the thirty-one spoke in favour of *adding* workers' votes to Cadet votes on the condition that the Social-Democrats were assured seats in the Duma that would be an example of loyal and properly conducted polemics, permissible in Party members.

What is the difference between *this* last-quoted wording and the one I chose? The difference is in the tone, that tone which makes the whole music. Exactly. The wording is calculated to evoke in the reader hatred, aversion and con-

tempt for people who commit such deeds. Such wording is calculated not to convince, but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct the mistake of the opponent, but to destroy him, to wipe his organisation off the face of the earth. This wording is indeed of such a nature as to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent and indeed, as contrasted with the wording that convinces and corrects, it "carries confusion into the ranks of the proletariat".

I may be asked: well, do you admit that such wording is *impermissible*? I shall answer, Yes, certainly, *but only with the following little proviso*—impermissible in members of a *united* party. This proviso represents the crux of the matter. The accusation which the Central Committee advances against me is wrong. I shall say more, it is dishonest, precisely because *the Central Committee remains silent* about the fact that at the time the pamphlet was written a united party *did not exist* in the organisation from which it emanated (not formally, but in essence), and whose aims it served. It is dishonest to advance a charge of publishing statements in the press "impermissible in a Party member" at a time when *a split* has taken place in the Party.

A split means a rupture of all organisational ties between the two party groups concerned; it shifts a conflict of ideas from within the bounds of a single organisation to somewhere outside it, from correcting and convincing comrades to destroying their organisation, to inciting the masses of the workers (and the masses of the people generally) to oppose the breakaway organisation.

What is impermissible in members of a united party is permissible and obligatory for sections of a party that has been split. It is wrong to write about Party comrades in a language that systematically spreads among the working masses hatred, aversion, contempt, etc., for those who hold other opinions. But *one may and must write* in that strain about an organisation that has seceded.

Why must one? Because when a split has taken place it is one's duty *to wrest* the masses from the leadership of the seceding section. I am told—you carried confusion into the ranks of the proletariat. My answer is—I purposely and deliberately carried confusion into the ranks of that section

of the St. Petersburg proletariat which followed the Mensheviks who seceded on the eve of the elections, *and I shall always* act in that way *whenever a split occurs*.

By my sharp and discourteous attacks on the Mensheviks on the eve of the St. Petersburg elections, I actually succeeded in causing that section of the proletariat *which trusts and follows the Mensheviks* to waver. That was my aim. That was my duty as a member of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation which was conducting a campaign for a Left bloc; because, *after the split*, *it was necessary*, in order to conduct that campaign, to rout the ranks of the Mensheviks who were leading the proletariat in the footsteps of the Cadets; *it was necessary* to carry confusion into their ranks; it was necessary to arouse among the masses hatred! aversion and contempt for these people who had *ceased* to be members of a united party, had become political enemies, and were trying to put a spoke in the wheel of our Social-Democratic organisation in its election campaign. Against *such* political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition or development of a split *shall always conduct*—a struggle of *extermination*.

If, after the split which the Mensheviks engineered in St. Petersburg, we had not carried confusion into the ranks of that section of the proletariat which *followed the lead of the Mensheviks*, we should not have been able to carry on our Left bloc election campaign. My only regret is that, being away from St. Petersburg, I did *not sufficiently* contribute to this cause of *wresting* the masses from the influence of the breakaway Mensheviks; for given a more zealous and rapid execution of this task, the Left bloc would have gained a victory in St. Petersburg. The statistics of the election results prove this.

The basic logical (and, of course, not only logical) error in the indictment is that the question of the split is craftily evaded, the fact of the split is hushed up, and attempts are made to apply demands, legitimate from the standpoint of party unity, to conditions in which there is *no* unity, *no* united party, and what is more—I shall prove this later on—when absence of unity and of a united party lies at the door of the accusing Central Committee itself, which organised and covered up the split.

If anyone were to use what is permissible in an internal Party struggle as a measure of struggle based on a split, a struggle directed against the Party from without or (in case of a local split) against the given Party organisation, he would have to be regarded either as being childishly naïve or a hypocrite. From the organisational point of view, a split signifies a rupture of *all* organisational ties, i.e., the transition from a struggle to convince comrades within the organisation, to a struggle *to destroy* the hostile organisation, destroy its influence over the masses of the proletariat. From the psychological standpoint it is perfectly obvious that the severance of all organisational ties between comrades *already* signifies *an extreme degree* of mutual bitterness and hostility, which has grown into hatred.

Moreover, in the St. Petersburg split there were two special circumstances which intensified the sharpness and the ruthlessness of the struggle tenfold.

The first circumstance was the role of the Party's Central Committee. According to Party Rules, its duty is to unite, and any local split should lead, not to a struggle on the basis of that split, but to a complaint being lodged with the Central Committee, or, more broadly speaking, to an appeal to the Central Committee for help in getting unity restored. *In reality*, on the eve of the elections in St. Petersburg, the Central Committee acted as the initiator of and participant in the split. It is precisely this circumstance, worked out in detail and supported by documentary evidence in the preamble to the decision of the Conference to present a counter-indictment, that compels us to regard the St. Petersburg split as a *dishonest* split. I shall refer to this separately later on, and I shall insist that the tribunal take up the questions which follow from the juridical nature of this indictment presented by the accused against the accuser.

The second circumstance is the election campaign in St. Petersburg at the time of the split. If a split occurs at a time when there is no immediate, open, mass political action, or when the Party generally is not engaged in some political action, it may not always be necessary to wage an *immediate* and merciless war of extermination. But if such mass action is in progress—elections, for instance—and if it is necessary

at all costs immediately to intervene in the elections and conduct them in one way or another, a split must immediately and unfailingly call forth a war of extermination, a war to determine *who* is to conduct the elections—the local Social-Democratic organisation or the group that has seceded from it. Given such a split, it is impossible even for a moment to postpone the task of wresting the masses from the influence of the secessionists, of smashing their organisation, and of politically nullifying them. It is only thanks to the ruthless force of the Bolshevik onslaught against the Mensheviks *after* the latter had seceded on January 6, that we achieved an election campaign in the capital that was relatively united, conducted more or less on Party lines, and bore at least some semblance to a Social-Democratic campaign.

They say—fight, but not with a poisoned weapon. This is a very fine and striking expression, to be sure. But it is either a fine platitude or else it expresses in a vague and nebulous fashion the very same idea of a struggle, one that sows in the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for the opponents—of a struggle that is impermissible in a united party, but inevitable and necessary when a split has occurred, because of the very nature of the split, i.e., the idea I set forth in the beginning of my speech. However much you twist this sentence or metaphor, you will not be able to squeeze a grain of real sense out of it besides this very difference between the loyal and properly conducted method of fighting by means of argument within the organisation, and the method of fighting by means of a split, i.e., by destroying the enemy organisation, by rousing among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for this organisation. It is the dishonest splits that are poisoned weapons and not the war of extermination which results from a split that has already taken place.

Are there any limits to a permissible struggle stemming from a split? No Party standards set limits to such a struggle, nor can there be such limits, for a split implies that the Party has ceased to exist. It is ridiculous even to think it possible to fight by Party methods, by means of Party decisions, etc., against the methods of struggle that arise out of a split in the Party. The limits of a struggle stemming from a split are not Party limits, but general political limits,

or rather general civil limits, the limits set by criminal law and nothing else. If you have broken away from me, you cannot demand more of me than you demand of the Cadet, the Socialist-Revolutionary, or any man in the street, etc.

I shall further illustrate my idea with a graphic example. The next issue of *Proletary* will contain a report on the elections in the city of Kovno, sent by a local correspondent. The correspondent is very much dissatisfied with the bloc concluded by the Bund with the *Dostizhentsi*,[180] against the Lithuanian Social-Democrats, and sharply criticises the Bund. What sort of criticism is permissible for members of a united party? The dissatisfaction should have been expressed somewhat as follows: the Bundists acted incorrectly by forming a bloc with the Jewish bourgeoisie against the socialists of another nation; this behaviour reveals the influence of petty-bourgeois nationalist ideas, etc. As long as we belong to the same party as the Bund, a pamphlet directed against them and distributed in large quantities on the eve of an election and describing the Bundists as traitors to the proletariat would be absolutely impermissible. But *what if* the case of 1903 were repeated—generally speaking, history does not repeat itself, and I am only taking a hypothetical case—and the Bund secedes from the Party. Could anyone then seriously raise the question of the impermissibility of pamphlets calculated to instil in the Bundist working masses hatred, aversion and contempt for their leaders, and describing these leaders as bourgeois in disguise, as those who had sold themselves to the Jewish bourgeoisie and were trying to get their men into the Duma with the latter's assistance, etc.? Anyone who made such a complaint would be ridiculed to his face—do not cause splits, do not use the "poisoned weapon" of a split; but if you do, then do not complain if he who raises the poisoned sword perishes by the poisoned sword!

After all that has been said above, there is no need to dwell at length on the second passage quoted. It reads: 'The Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma, in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets—such is the simple explanation of all these peregrinations from the Social-Democrats to the petty-bour-

geois bloc and from the petty-bourgeois bloc to the Cadets."* If you analyse this passage formally, and superficially, from the standpoint of a *united* party, you will certainly say—in referring to Party members you should have said "conducting negotiations" and not "bargaining", "to secure the election of" instead of "get", a "Social-Democrat deputy" instead of "their man", and so on. But would such an "analysis" of the quotation, or such an "opinion" of the method of expression, evoke anything but a smile? Is it not clear that the use of the most offensive and contemptuous mode of expression, which puts everything in the worst light, not in the best, is a method of fighting that stems from a split, of fighting *for the extermination* of the organisation which *disrupts* the political campaign of the local Social-Democratic proletariat? To complain about the offensive, insulting, and insidious character of the expressions used would be the same as if a *strike-breaker* were to complain of the bitterness displayed towards him by strikers. To discuss complaints or accusations on this plane would be the same as if we were to condemn the word "strike-breaker" as being impermissible, without going into *the essence* of the question of whether the behaviour of the person concerned was actually that of a strike-breaker or not.

There are different kinds of splits. I have repeatedly used the expression a "dishonest" split. I shall now dwell on this aspect of the case. The Central Committee states in its indictment that I cast suspicion on the political integrity of Party members. This is put too mildly and is wrongly applied to the above quotations. I not only "cast suspicion on the political integrity" of the thirty-one and Dan; by the whole content of my election pamphlets I *accuse* them of causing a *politically dishonest* split, or one that is *dishonest from a Party standpoint*. And I insist on this accusation. All attempts to shift the weight of this accusation from the general, basic and fundamental question of the organisers of the split, to petty, particular and subsidiary questions will be of no avail.

Every split is a great crime against the Party, for it destroys the Party, and breaks Party ties. But there are dif-

* See p. 39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ferent kinds of splits. The expression "dishonest split" which I have used on several occasions, cannot be applied to every split. I shall quote an example to illustrate this.

Let us assume that two trends have long been contending in the Party, one of which, let us say, is in favour of supporting the policy of the Cadets, and the other is opposed to this. A big political event occurs which accentuates the Cadet tendencies and brings nearer a deal between them and reaction. Those in favour of supporting the Cadets break with those who are opposed to such support. Such a split, like any other split, will inevitably give rise to a very acute and bitter struggle, which will rouse hatred, etc.; but we cannot regard such a split as being dishonest, for there is nothing else behind such a split than the sharpening of differences on matters of principle.

Now imagine another kind of split. Let us assume that the two trends in the Party have agreed to apply varying tactics in various localities. If this general agreement is broken in one of the localities, broken in a secret, underhand fashion, by behaving treacherously towards comrades—then everyone will certainly agree that such a split is a *dishonest* split.

In St. Petersburg, the Mensheviks engineered precisely such a split on the eve of the elections. At the All-Russian Conference both trends solemnly promised, in the first place, to submit to the local tactics of the local organisations during the elections. The St. Petersburg Mensheviks were the only ones in the whole of Russia who broke that promise. That is dishonest. It is treachery to the Party.

Secondly, instead of uniting the Party, the Central Committee pursued a factional policy to such a degree that it positively assisted the Menshevik split, and Dan, a member of the Central Committee, took a most active part in this. That is dishonest. It is tantamount to using against the Party the power delegated by the Party. It is tantamount to driving a poisoned knife stealthily into the back of the Party, while professing to be a defender of Party unity.

These are the *two* main facts which have compelled me to describe the thirty-one and Dan as being politically dishonest. The *whole* of my pamphlet is imbued with the spirit of contempt for such people.

And I have upheld my accusation before this tribunal, I have directed all my efforts to making the tribunal proceedings reveal to the judges all the attendant circumstances of the St. Petersburg split, enabling them to decide with complete conviction the question of whether this split was an honest split or not, whether "poisoned weapons" were used by those who engineered the split or by those who waged a ruthless war of extermination against the organisers of the split.

If this question is cleared up in full, *to its very depth and core*, if it is cleared up by the delegates of the national Social-Democratic parties, who for the first time have become *really* affiliated with the R.S.D.L.P., it may have enormous effect in establishing real Party relations in our Party instead of a thinly disguised split.

The subject of the present trial is not of a formal or strictly juridical nature. Surely the crux of the matter is not whether, in a united party, one should write, bargain or conduct negotiations, elect or place deputies, sell votes for seats or give votes on condition of obtaining seats, etc.; such a conception of the question can, of course, only call forth a smile.

The crux of the matter is whether we attach any real value to the unity of our Party, or whether we are to become reconciled to splits, write about them, and cover up these ulcers with formal subterfuges. Comrade judges, your judgement will determine, and determine, perhaps, to no small degree, whether the St. Petersburg split will be the last one, the really final echo of a bygone general Party split, or ... whether it will be the beginning of a new split and, consequently, of a new, general struggle with poisoned weapons.

Your judgement will determine whether the shaken unity of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will be weakened or strengthened.

II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE REAL HISTORY OF THE ST. PETERSBURG SPLIT

At the November (1906) conference of the R.S.D.L.P. it was unanimously decided that everybody would submit to the decisions of *local* Social-Democratic organisations in election matters.

At that same conference Lenin stated: "Let there be no contravention of the St. Petersburg Committee decision by the Vyborg District either" (report of the Menshevik section of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation), thereby giving warning, as it were, of the mutuality of the commitment.

A special article in *Proletary*, No. 8 (November 1906), called on Bolsheviks sharply to criticise blocs with the Constitutional-Democrats, but to remain *subordinated* to the local organisations.

Also in November 1906, Comrade Dan, a member of the Central Committee, participated "*entirely in a personal capacity*" (as he stated at the tribunal) in a meeting arranged by Engineer Fedorovich, at which were present Milyukov and Nabokov (leaders of the Cadet Central and St. Petersburg Committees), one leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Peshekhonov (leader of the Popular Socialists). They spoke about the elections, but (according to Comrade Dan) *not those in St. Petersburg*. Comrade Dan did not find it necessary to report this meeting either to the Central Committee or to the St. Petersburg Committee.

In December 1906, Comrade Dan appeared at an informative meeting on the election question, attended by representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., as well as of the Constitutional-Democrats, Popular Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Dan stated that he represented the Central Committee, but was expressing his "*own personal views*" on the desirability of *agreements, according to district*, in St. Petersburg.

At a meeting of the Central Committee on January 4, 1907, a decision was taken to demand, in the form of an ultimatum, that the conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation *divide into an urban and a gubernia conference*. The Bolshevik members of the Central Committee (Maximov, Zimin, and Stroyev)[181] submitted a protest against this step, which actually amounted to the Central Committee splitting the St. Petersburg organisation.

The conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, which decided the question of the elections, was held on January 6, 1907. There were 39 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks present. The Mensheviks walked out of the

conference for two formal reasons—(1) because they considered the mandates incorrectly distributed and (2) because the conference refused to split into urban and gubernia conferences as demanded by the Central Committee.

To assess the value of these reasons for the split, I cite three facts—(1) at the January 6 conference 42 mandates for the Bolsheviks and 28 for the Mensheviks were confirmed. In the pamphlet *issued by the Mensheviks* they stated that 35 mandates for the Bolsheviks and 32 for the Mensheviks should have been recognised, *that is*, *they admitted* the preponderance of Bolsheviks; (2) because of the split the next conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation was elected under the supervision of a control commission especially appointed by the Central Committee. The elections to the March 25 conference produced 92 Bolsheviks and 41 Mensheviks. The new elections confirmed a still greater preponderance of Bolsheviks; (3) the Central Committee did not demand the division of the conference in any other city in Russia, be it Wilno, Odessa, or Baku This demand in the form of an ultimatum was unlawful and directed, for patently factional reasons, only against St. Petersburg.

After walking out of the conference, the Mensheviks elected their own executive body and began issuing their own pamphlets (with the participation of Central Committee Menshevik members, Comrade Dan among them) and conducted an independent election campaign. Without the Bolsheviks they entered into agreements with the Narodnik parties (Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks) for a joint agreement with the Constitutional-Democrats.

The bourgeois press in St. Petersburg (*Rech*, *Strana*, *Tovarishch* and others) gave hearty praise to the Mensheviks for the split, styled them "a moderate socialist party", called for a bold struggle against the Bolsheviks, were jubilant over the isolation of these "Blanquists", etc. The Bolsheviks who, on January 6, had proposed to the Narodniks a bloc *against* the Constitutional-Democrats, took no part in any of the negotiations.

On January 14, a *Rech* editorial promised the Mensheviks *a seat from the worker curia* in the event of the bloc being successful against the Bolsheviks.

At a meeting held on January 17, the Mensheviks decided to place all seats obtained by them at the disposal of the worker curia. *Tovarishch* wrote about this on January 19.

On January 15, Milyukov was received in audience by Stolypin, after which the Constitutional-Democrats shifted clearly to the Right.

On January 18, there was a conference of Mensheviks, Narodniks and Cadets. The Cadets offered two seats, but three were demanded of them. A break with the Cadets.

On January 20, *Tovarishch* published extracts from a Menshevik pamphlet directed against the Bolsheviks and undermining their election campaign. That same day I wrote the pamphlet *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*, which appeared some three days later.

On January 25, a Left bloc was set up in St. Petersburg. On January 28, there was a meeting of delegates elected (January 7 and 14) by the factories for the worker curia of the *city* of St. Petersburg. Between 200 and 250 out of the 271 were present. The majority, against ten or twelve, adopted a resolution *in favour of the Left bloc*. The resolution made a special appeal to the Mensheviks "*not to give support to the Cadets even in covert form*".

The Mensheviks, who on January 17 had promised to give "their" places to the worker curia, not only gave no heed to the voice of a meeting of *all* delegates, but straightaway called it "a Socialist-Revolutionary-Bolshevik witches' sabbath".

On January 30 a meeting of *Social-Democratic* delegates was held. The candidates of the St. Petersburg Committee were nominated as electors.

On January 29 the Left bloc called on non-party progressive voters in the Kolomna Ward to tear up their *written* agreement with the Mensheviks, because in that agreement (as well as in the *printed* Menshevik pamphlet) there was the proviso: "*Menshevik electors do not consider themselves bound by the conditions of the Narodnik-Bolshevik bloc insofar as the distribution of deputies' seats is concerned*" (Point II, Subsection 3). This proviso is an obvious attempt to leave open for themselves an opportunity to vote *with the Cadets against the Left bloc* at the second stage of the elections.

On February 7, the elections were held in St. Petersburg. The Black-Hundred danger was completely disproved. The Cadets obtained 28,798 votes, the Left bloc—16,703, the Octobrists—16,613 and the monarchists—5,270. The Left bloc had only to capture *1,573* votes from the Cadets in five wards to have been victorious throughout St. Petersburg. In the *Kolomna* Ward the Left bloc obtained only 196 votes less than the Cadets.

Such is a brief list of the facts. It is clear from them that, *in point of fact*, the election campaign in St. Petersburg was disrupted by the Mensheviks. In point of fact, the conspiracy to effect a split was begun *as early as November*, and was begun by *member of the Central Committee Dan*. In point of fact, it was precisely Dan, plus the Menshevik members of *the Central Committee*, who in St. Petersburg *effected* the split contrary to the wishes of the majority of the local organisation....

Published as a separate pamphlet
in April 1907
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text of the pamphlet

THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[182]

APRIL 30-MAY 19 (MAY 13-JUNE 1), 1907

First published in the book
The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1907), Unabridged Minutes, Paris, 1909

Published according to the manuscript, verified with the book

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1

SPEECH DURING THE DISCUSSION ON THE CONGRESS AGENDA MAY 2 (15)

From the discussion on this question it has become quite clear that major differences of opinion on tactics divide the various trends within the Social-Democratic Party. Who would have thought that, under such circumstances, the proposal would be made to remove all questions of principle from the Congress agenda? And what sophistic arguments were indulged in here in defence of removing these questions of principle—allegedly for the sake of being practical and business-like!

Let me remind you that the R.S.D.L.P. was long ago confronted with the question of the tasks of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This question was discussed as far back as the beginning of 1905, before the revolution, both at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., that is, of its Bolshevik section, and at the Geneva Conference of the Mensheviks, which was held simultaneously. At the time, the Mensheviks themselves placed questions involving general principles on the agenda of their congress.

At the time, they themselves discussed the principles underlying the tactics of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, and adopted studied decisions on this score. The fact that it is now proposed to throw out such questions is the result of a sense of despondency, and we must fight against this frame of mind, not succumb to it!

Mention was made of the experience of the West-European Social-Democratic parties and their business-like congresses. But I must tell you that at their congresses the Germans

frequently discussed questions that were more abstract and more theoretical than those dealing with an appraisal of the revolution taking place in our country, and the tasks of the proletariat in this revolution. We must not take from the experience of other parties things that bring us down to the level of some period of everyday routine. We must take that which brings us up to the level of general questions, of the tasks of the entire revolutionary struggle of the entire proletariat. We must learn from the best examples, and not from the worst.

We are told—"Serious tactical questions cannot be decided by the majority vote of a dozen". What is this but sophistry? What is this but a helpless shift from adherence to principle to lack of principle?

A solution of the problem is never achieved through voting. For several years now we have been deciding questions of the Marxist appraisal of our revolution. For several years now we have been putting our theoretical views and general tactical decisions to the acid test of experience of our revolution. And we are now being told that it is not yet time to sum up this Party activity! It is not right, they say, to decide on the fundamental principles underlying our tactics; instead it is necessary to follow in the wake of events, making decisions from occasion to occasion....

Just recall the Stockholm Congress. At that congress the Mensheviks, who had gained the upper hand, withdrew their own resolution appraising the given period, withdrew their own resolution on the attitude towards the bourgeois parties. What was the outcome? It led to the Central Committee having no grounds of principle for the solution of problems confronting it; it led to the Central Committee being at a loss for a whole year, with no policy whatever. One day it was in favour of a constituent assembly, the next day it hurriedly advocated a Duma ministry, and the following day "the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent assembly"; now it was a Duma with full legislative authority, then blocs with the Cadets.... Is this what you call a consistent proletarian policy? (*Applause from the Centre and from the Bolshevik benches.*)

We are told: "For the sake of peace in the Party, for the sake of practical work let us avoid general questions".

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This is sophistry. Such questions must not be evaded; such evasion will not result in peace, but only in blinder and hence more irate and less fruitful party strife.

Such questions cannot be evaded. They force their way into everything. Recall Plekhanov's words at the opening of the congress: ... Since our revolution was bourgeois, he reasoned, we had to make particular haste to attract allies from among the bourgeoisie. I maintain that the principles underlying this line of reasoning are erroneous. I maintain that unless you analyse these principles you are condemning the Party to endless practical mistakes.

In this same speech Plekhanov stated that opportunism was feeble in the Russian Social-Democratic Party. This may be so if one considers the works of Plekhanov himself feeble! (*Applause from the Bolshevik benches.*) But I am of the opinion that opportunism manifests itself in our Party in the very fact that, at the first really general Party congress, the desire is expressed that general questions concerning the principles underlying our tactics in the bourgeois revolution should be removed from the agenda. We must not remove theoretical questions from the agenda, but raise all the practical work of our Party to the level of theoretical clarification of the tasks of a workers' party. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks.*)

2

SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MAY 4 (17)

I should have liked to speak solely on the political aspect of the question. But Comrade Abramovich's last speech compels me to deal briefly with his remarks. When Comrade Abramovich spoke about the "besieged" Menshevik Central Committee, I thought to myself: "Poor Mensheviks! Again they are in a state of siege. They are 'besieged' not only when they are in the minority, but even when they are in the majority!"

Are there not certain inner reasons stemming from the very nature of Menshevik policy, which impel the Mensheviks to complain eternally about being besieged by the proletarian party?

What are the facts adduced by Comrade Abramovich regarding the siege of the Menshevik Central Committee? There were three—the agitation for an extraordinary congress, the conference of military and combat organisations, and finally "other organisational questions", as Comrade Abramovich put it.

Let us examine these three facts.

Agitation for an extraordinary congress became widespread when it emerged that the Central Committee was indisputably running counter to the will of the majority of the Party. Let me remind you that this was after the Central Committee had launched a slogan calling for support of a responsible ministry. At that time, the Bund had not joined our Party, but the Poles and the Latvians had. Both the former and the latter quite definitely rejected the policy

of the C.C. Hence, it is an absolutely indisputable fact that the C.C. was at the time at variance with the vast majority of the Party. Who, then, was besieging whom—was it the majority of the Party that besieged the Party C.C. when it demanded that the latter render an account of its activities to the congress? Or was it the C.C. that besieged the Party by going counter to it? Call to mind how far Plekhanov went at the time. His letter against the congress was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, official publication of the C.C. In this letter Plekhanov reacted to the call for a congress with suspicions concerning the motives behind the agitation, and tirades about the workers' mites. Give this thought: was it not Plekhanov who was wrong to permit himself to do such things against the majority of the Party, which was demanding a congress?

I will say only this—after the decision of the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the agitation for an extraordinary congress ceased.

The second fact—the conference of military and combat organisations. There were two conferences. This, of course, is unfortunate, but it is strange to see in this anything like a "siege" of the C.C. Would it not have been better to explain what was wrong with the decisions of the conference which took place independently of the C.C., rather than to dismiss the matter by complaining about a siege? Let me remind you that representatives of the Moscow and St. Petersburg committees were present at *both* conferences—hence no Party group as such was linked up with either conference. The resolutions of the Bolshevik conference of military and combat organisations, published in November 1906, have not so far encountered any serious criticism.

The third fact—"other organisational questions". Just what does this mean? Concretely, what is included in this. Is it the St. Petersburg split at the time of the elections, engineered by the Mensheviks with the help of the C.C.? But it would be simply ridiculous to speak about a siege of the C.C. in this connection.

I shall now proceed to the political aspect of the question. Our main task is to examine how the C.C. guided the class struggle of the proletariat, how it applied in practice the tactics adopted at the Unity Congress.

The first slogan which the Central Committee offered the Party was that of support for the demand for a "Duma" or "responsible" ministry. Comrade Martov has stated to us here that this slogan was put out for the purpose of extending and intensifying the conflict between the Duma and the government.

Is that the case? What should the proletarian extension and intensification of the conflict consist in? It should, of course, consist in pointing out the real field of struggle and clashes giving rise to the conflict—the field of the class struggle in general, and, in this particular case, the struggle of the people against the old regime. To extend and intensify the Duma conflict, we ourselves should have understood and explained to the people that the Duma conflict was simply an incomplete and distorted reflection of the conflict between the people and the old regime, that the struggle in the Duma was a faint echo of the revolutionary struggle outside the Duma. To extend and intensify the conflict, we should have raised political consciousness and political demands from the level of Duma slogans to the level of those calling for a general revolutionary struggle. The C.C. acted in the opposite way. It blunted and narrowed down the slogans calling for a revolutionary struggle to the dimensions of those calling for a Duma ministry. It did not call on the people to fight for power, even though this struggle stemmed from the entire objective situation, but to struggle for a deal between the liberals and the government. Whether deliberately or not, the C.C. called upon the Party to adopt the slogans of the parliamentary "peaceful" path at a time when actually objective conditions demanded a revolutionary struggle outside of parliament. Actually there was no serious social movement whatever for a "responsible ministry", nor could there have been one. Even the Menshevik Social-Democratic group in the Duma (the First Duma) did not adopt this slogan of the C.C. (*Martov*: "That's not true!") Yes, it is true, Comrade Martov, and a simple reference to the resolution of the C.C. and to the verbatim reports of the First Duma will show that it is true.

Irrespective of the desires and motives of the C.C., its slogan was actually an adaptation to liberal policy. And this adaptation could not have yielded any results, because

liberal policy did not reflect the genuine social movement of the time but was merely a dream of halting the revolution, although it has by no means halted yet. The course of events showed that this entire business with the "responsible ministry" was an attack with ineffective weapons.

The second slogan of the C.C. dates back to the period of the July strike. We must not blame the C.C. for the failure of the strike at the time. It is not to the discredit, but rather to the credit, of a central committee like that of the Mensheviks that it on that occasion nevertheless went to meet the revolution half-way. It is not the fault of the C.C. that, from its St. Petersburg purview, it did not know the sentiments of the proletariat throughout Russia. Nor can we declare it to be a mistake for us to have been confident of an uprising at the time, and to have expected it. The uprising actually took place, and our preliminary slogans, our policy prior to the uprising, were among the elements which made for the success or failure of this uprising.

The mistake of the Central Committee was, as I see it, in endeavouring, once the revolutionary struggle reached the stage of an uprising, to confine that struggle to non-revolutionary or curtailed revolutionary slogans. This was reflected in the C.C. slogan—"Partial mass expressions of protest". This was reflected still more vividly in the slogan—"For the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent assembly". The issue of such lifeless slogans was tantamount to adapting proletarian policy to the policy of the liberal bourgeoisie. And once again events showed how utterly vain and impotent were the attempts to effect such an adaptation. Complaints and whining about the helplessness of the workers' party are frequently heard among us. But let me tell you that you are helpless precisely because you dull the edge of your slogans. (*Applause from the Bolshevik benches.*)

To proceed. Let us examine the question of the bloc with the Cadets during the elections to the Second Duma. In his report on behalf of the C.C. Martov washed his hands of this question with amazingly complacent formalism. You see, he says, the C.C. agreed that blocs are permissi-

ble, and in strict accordance with the C.C. directive blocs were permitted! (*Laughter.*) It would not be at all amiss if, in a political report of the C.C., one were to base oneself not on the formal legitimacy of a decision but on the essential correctness of the given policy as tested in practice. We Bolsheviks constantly asserted that the notorious Black-Hundred danger was nothing but liberal defence against the danger from the Left, and that if we were guided in our policy by fear of the Black-Hundred danger, we should actually be rising to the liberal bait. The election results showed that we were right. In a number of cities the election returns refuted the tales of the liberals and Mensheviks. (*Voices*: "What about Kiev, Poland, and Wilno!") I haven't the time to go into individual localities, but I shall deal with the political results in general. Statistician Smirnov calculated the election returns for 22 cities as follows: 41,000 for the Left bloc; 74,000 for the Cadets; 34,500 for the Octobrists, and 17,000 for the monarchists. Of the 72,000 votes cast in 16 other cities, 58.7 per cent went to the opposition and 21 per cent went to the reactionaries. The elections revealed the fictitiousness of the Black-Hundred danger, while the policy of the "permissibility" of blocs with the Cadets, allegedly by way of exception, *proved* to be a policy of proletarian dependence on the liberal bourgeoisie.

Let me tell you that you should not scorn theoretical disputes, or contemptuously dismiss differences in opinion as factional inventions. Our old disputes, our theoretical, and especially our tactical, differences are constantly being converted, in the course of the revolution, into the most downright practical differences. It is impossible to take a single step in practical politics without coming up against the very same fundamental problems underlying an appraisal of the bourgeois revolution, the relations between the Cadets and Trudoviks, and so forth. Practical experience does not erase differences of opinion; it sharpens and vitalises them. And it was not by chance that such prominent Mensheviks as Plekhanov reduced to the absurd the policy of blocs with the Cadets. In advancing his celebrated "Duma with full powers", Plekhanov advocated a common slogan for the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie. Plekhanov only

reflects more saliently and more forcibly than others the quintessence, the basic tendency, of the entire Menshevik policy—replacing the independent line of the working class with adaptation to the liberal bourgeoisie. The bankruptcy of our C.C. was primarily and above all the bankruptcy of this policy of opportunism. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre.*)

3

SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DUMA GROUP MAY 8 (21)

I should like once again to bring the discussion back to an appraisal, from the standpoint of principle, of the policy of the Duma group. Comrade Tsereteli stated: "Even though we may have made blunders, we were not guilty of political vacillation". I believe that it would be absolutely wrong to blame a young Duma group, which is only just beginning to function, for its mistakes. But the fact of the matter is that there was *vacillation* in the very policy of the group. And we must frankly admit this vacillation, and make it our business to get rid of it, not for the purpose of condemning individuals, but in order to educate the proletarian party as a whole.

Comrade Tsereteli referred to the history of Europe. "The year '48," he said, "not only taught us that the conditions for socialism were not yet ripe, but also that it is impossible to fight for freedom without some sort of alliance with bourgeois democracy." Comrade Tsereteli's argument is revisionism of the first water. On the contrary, both the revolution of 1848 and subsequent historical experience have taught international Social-Democracy the very opposite, namely, that bourgeois democracy takes its stand more and more against the proletariat, that the fight for freedom is waged consistently only where it is led by the proletariat. The year 1848 does not teach us to make alliances with bourgeois democrats, but rather the need to free the least developed sections of the masses from the influence of bourgeois democracy, which is incapable of fighting even for

democracy. When Comrade Tsereteli referred to the experience of 1848 in the spirit of Bernsteinism, he was demonstrating the very revisionism that Plekhanov had without good reason assured us was weak in our Party. Comrade Tsereteli's statement about the food relief commission was also typical of his wavering on matters of principle. "We have not sufficiently stressed the *legality* of our proposal to investigate the case on the spot," stated Tsereteli. "We were distracted by general discussions and missed the chance to convince others with arguments on the legality of our plan. The next time we shall correct this error."

This presentation of the question throws vivid light on the whole shakiness of our group's position. Just imagine—people are saddened by the insufficiency of their reasoning in favour of legality! Can they really not see that the point at issue is not one of reasons for or references to legality, or "*convincing*" the Cadets or anyone else? Surely it must be clear to them that *by the very nature of things*, the government could not and would not have allowed investigation on the spot, since it saw in it (and justly so) a direct appeal to the masses.

No matter how many references to legality we might make, it would not change the essence of things. And instead of looking down—convincing the masses of the people, showing them the truth—Tsereteli looks up, desiring to convince the liberals, to attract them with legality.... That is real bourgeois parliamentarianism. And the fruitlessness of such petty, miserly, wretched playing at politics strikes one immediately, for it is clear that neither the Mensheviks nor the Cadets can budge Stolypin from his policy, by any parliamentary ruses. Isolation from the masses is a self-evident fact; advantages to be derived from legal persuasion of the Stolypins and the Cadets are but idle dreams of an idle intellectual.

I see the same vain opportunist efforts in the negotiations with the Narodowci; reference to Bebel as a defence of them is most feeble. Bebel, they say, stated: If the cause requires it, we will have dealings with the devil's own grandmother. Bebel was right, comrades: *if the cause requires it*, then, of course, you may have dealings even with the devil's grandmother. But can you tell me for what *cause* your

dealings with the Narodowci were necessary? For none whatever. The advantages of such relations are nil. And so it seems that what Bebel said was correct, but you understand him incorrectly.

All this going to the Narodowci, votes for Golovin, attempts to delete the demand for confiscation are simply component parts of a single incorrect line. They are not manifestations of inexperience, but manifestations of *political vacillation*. And from this point of view inviting Mr. Prokopovich was likewise no trifle. We have been told here that Mr. Prokopovich is not present and that without him we cannot condemn his action. This is merely sending us from Pontius to Pilate. At the St. Petersburg conference we were told that we should put it off until the congress, that we could not get to the bottom of it without a congress. Now at the congress we are told that we cannot do anything without Prokopovich—let us put it off and refer it to the St. Petersburg organisation. That is sophistry.

Prokopovich is a man of letters whose works are known to everyone. He is the type of bourgeois intellectual who has penetrated into our Party with definite, opportunist aims. His joining the Party in the Railway District was sheer hypocrisy. It was a screen for work *in the Duma milieu*. And our C.C. is to blame for his having used such a screen. Our Duma group is to blame for having made it easy for liberal writers collaborating with *Tovarishch*, who do not work in the Party and who are hostile in principle to the Party, to enter our Party by the back door, making use of the Duma.

Cherevanin has here defended the policy of the Duma group; granted the Cadets are backward at present, that they are reactionary at present, he says. But that is not for ever. There is no need to regard it as permanent. The Cadets are no good in a period of decline, but they may be of use during a period of upsurge when they will rapidly swing to the Left.

This is the usual Menshevik line of reasoning, only expressed with particular directness and sharpness. As a result, its falsity becomes more obvious. Take two major landmarks of the revolution—October 1905, when the peak was reached, and the spring of 1907, the period of greatest

decline. Were the Cadets of any use to democracy in 1905? No. The Mensheviks themselves admitted this in *Nachalo*. Witte is an agent of the stock exchange, and Struve is Witte's agent—that is what the Mensheviks wrote at the time, and correctly so. At that time the Mensheviks agreed with us that we should not support the Cadets, but expose them and lower their prestige among the democrats.

Now, in the spring of 1907, once again you are all beginning to agree with us that the Cadets are worthless democrats: And so it seems that the Cadets are no good either in the period of upsurge or in the period of decline. Any historian would call the interval between these periods a period of wavering, when even a section of the Social-Democratic movement veered towards a petty-bourgeois policy, when that section, vainly endeavouring to "support" the Cadets, brought nothing but harm to the workers' party, and in the end realised its mistake.

A few words about Trotsky. He spoke on behalf of the "Centre", and expressed the views of the Bund. He fulminated against us for introducing our "unacceptable" resolution. He threatened an outright split, the withdrawal of the Duma group, which is supposedly offended by our resolution. I emphasise these words. I urge you to reread our resolution attentively.

Is it not monstrous to see something offensive in a calm acknowledgement of mistakes, unaccompanied by any sharply expressed censure, to speak of a split in connection with it? Does this not show the sickness in our Party, a fear of admitting mistakes, a fear of criticising the Duma group?

The very possibility that the question can be presented in this way shows that there is something non-partisan in our Party. This non-partisan something is the Duma group's relations with the Party. The Duma group must be more of a Party group, must have closer connections with the Party, must be more subordinate to all proletarian work. Then wailings about insults and threats of a split will disappear.

When Trotsky stated: "Your unacceptable resolution prevents your right ideas being put into effect," I called out to him: "Give us *your* resolution!" Trotsky replied: "No, first withdraw yours."

A fine position indeed for the "Centre" to take, isn't it? Because of our (in Trotsky's opinion) mistake ("tactlessness"), he punishes the whole Party, depriving it of his "tactful" exposition of the very same principles! Why did you not get your resolution passed, we shall be asked in the localities. Because the Centre took umbrage at it, and in a huff refused to set forth its own principles! (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre.*) That is a position based not on principle, but on the Centre's lack of principle.

We came to the Congress with two tactical lines which have long been known to the Party. It would be stupid and unworthy of a workers' party to cover up differences of opinion and conceal them. We must compare the two points of view more clearly. We must express them in their application to all questions of our policy. We must sum up our Party experience clearly. Only in this way shall we be doing our duty and put an end to vacillation in the policy of the proletariat. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre.*)

4

STATEMENT OF FACT, MAY 10 (23)

Comrade Martov, quoting from the interview I gave *L'Humanité* (signed Étienne Avenard),* has interpreted several passages incorrectly.

The interview said that the C.C. (its Menshevik part, of course) *secretly and stealthily* gave information to the Cadets. This statement of mine has now been confirmed by the discussions at the Congress. It has transpired at this Congress that, as far back as *November* 1906, Dan went *privately* to Milyukov and "took tea" with him, Nabokov, and leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Popular Socialists. Dan did not consider it necessary to report this either to the C.C. or to the St. Petersburg Committee.

It was this meeting with the Cadets, which was not reported either to the C.C. or to the St. Petersburg Committee, that constituted secretly and stealthily giving information to the Cadets.

Further, the interview states that the Mensheviks did not reject the Cadets' disgraceful proposal to give the workers' seats to the Mensheviks in exchange for Menshevik assistance to the Cadets. Comrade Martov points out that the Mensheviks rejected this *verbally*. I assert that the Mensheviks' *deeds* contradicted their verbal rejection; (1) verbally the Mensheviks promised to give all the seats to the worker curia. Actually, when *all* the workers' delegates, in a body, called on the Mensheviks (by a majority of 220-230 votes against 10-20) to abandon their "covert support" of the Cadets, the Mensheviks *refused to obey them*;

* See pp. 145-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

(2) after January 25, after the conclusion of the Left bloc, the Mensheviks stated *in print* the condition on which they would assist it—freedom of action for the Menshevik electors at the second stage of the elections. Objectively, this condition could mean only one thing—their readiness to support the Cadets against the Social-Democrats at the second stage.

N. Lenin

5

STATEMENT OF MAY 11 (24)[183]

The bureau was right (*Voice*: "Of course it was!") when it explained that it was impermissible to revoke yesterday's decision. In order to revoke it, there must be a special decision of the Congress with regard to the permissibility of putting such a proposal to the vote. In the present case no one proposed revoking yesterday's decision. It still remains in force. Is deferment permissible? Abramovich lost sight of the most important thing, namely, that the question of tabling the decision was the result of new circumstances (the motive given by the Latvians), which arose after yesterday's voting on the directives. This is the new motive which Abramovich failed to take into account. Hence Werner's proposal is formally correct.

6

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES MAY 12 (25)

The question of our attitude to the bourgeois parties is the nub of the differences in matters of principle that have long divided Russian Social-Democracy into two camps. Even before the first major successes of the revolution, or even before the revolution—if it is permissible to express oneself in this way about the first half of 1905—two distinct points of view on this question already existed. The disputes were over the appraisal of the bourgeois revolution in Russia. The two trends in the Social-Democracy agreed that this revolution was a bourgeois revolution. But they parted company in their understanding of this category, and in their appraisal of the practical and political conclusions to be drawn from it. One wing of the Social-Democracy—the Mensheviks—interpreted this concept to mean that the bourgeoisie was the motive force in the bourgeois revolution, and that the proletariat could occupy only the position of the "extreme opposition". The proletariat could not undertake the task of conducting the revolution independently or of leading it. These differences of opinion stood out in particularly high relief during the disputes on the question of a provisional government (to be more exact, whether the Social-Democrats should participate in a provisional government)—disputes which raged in 1905. The Mensheviks denied that the Social-Democrats could be permitted to participate in a provisional revolutionary government, primarily because they considered the bourgeoisie the motive force or leader in the

bourgeois revolution. This view found most clear expression in the resolution of the Caucasian Mensheviks (1905),[184] approved by the new *Iskra*. This resolution stated forthright that Social-Democratic participation in a provisional government might frighten the bourgeoisie away, and thereby *reduce the scope of the revolution*. We have here a clear admission that the proletariat cannot and should not go further than the bourgeoisie in the bourgeois revolution.

The Bolsheviks held the opposite view. They maintained unequivocally that in its social and economic content our revolution was a bourgeois revolution. This means that the aims of the revolution that is now taking place in Russia do not exceed the bounds of bourgeois society. Even the fullest possible victory of the present revolution—in other words, the achievement of the most democratic republic possible, and the confiscation of all landed estates by the peasantry—would not in any way affect the foundations of the bourgeois social system. Private ownership of the means of production (or private farming on the land, irrespective of its juridical owner) and commodity economy will remain. The contradictions of capitalist society—and the most important of them is the contradiction between wage-labour and capital—will not only remain, but become even more acute and profound, developing in a more extensive and purer form.

All this should be absolutely beyond doubt to any Marxist. But from this it does not at all follow that the bourgeoisie is the motive force or leader in the revolution. Such a conclusion would be a vulgarisation of Marxism, would be a failure to understand the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The fact of the matter is that our revolution is taking place at a time when the proletariat has already begun to recognise itself as a distinct class and to unite in an independent, class organisation. Under such circumstances the proletariat makes use of all the achievements of democracy, makes use of every step towards freedom, to strengthen its class organisation *against* the bourgeoisie. Hence the inevitable endeavour of the bourgeoisie to smooth off the sharp corners of the revolution, not to allow it to reach its culmination, not to

give the proletariat the opportunity of carrying on its class struggle unhampered. The antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat forces the bourgeoisie to strive to preserve certain instruments and institutions of the old regime in order to use them *against* the proletariat.

At the very best, therefore, the bourgeoisie, in the period of greatest revolutionary upsurge, still constitutes an element that wavers between revolution and reaction (and does not do so fortuitously, but of necessity, by force of its economic interests). Hence the bourgeoisie cannot be the leader in our revolution.

The major distinguishing feature of this revolution is the acuteness of the agrarian question. It is much more acute in Russia than in any other country in similar conditions. The so-called peasant reform of 1861 was carried out so inconsistently and so undemocratically that the principal foundations of feudal landlord domination remained unshaken. For this reason, the agrarian question, that is, the struggle of the peasants against the landowners for the land, proved one of the touchstones of the present revolution. This struggle for the land inevitably forces enormous masses of the peasantry into the democratic revolution, for only democracy can give them land by giving them supremacy in the state. The victory of the peasantry presupposes the complete destruction of landlordism.

Such an alignment of social forces inevitably leads to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie can be neither the motive force nor the leader in the revolution. Only the proletariat is capable of consummating the revolution, that is, of achieving a complete victory. But this victory can be achieved only provided the proletariat succeeds in getting a large section of the peasantry to follow its lead. The victory of the present revolution in Russia is possible only as the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The correctness of this presentation of the question, which dates back to the beginning of 1905—I am referring to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in the spring of 1905—found full confirmation in events at all the most important stages of the Russian revolution. Our theoretical conclusions were confirmed in practice in the course of the revo-

lutionary struggle. In October 1905, at the very height of the revolution, the proletariat was at the head, the bourgeoisie wavered and vacillated, and the peasantry wrecked the landed estates. In all the embryonic organs of revolutionary power (the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Soviets of Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) representatives of the proletariat were the main participants, followed by the most advanced of the insurgent peasantry. At the time of the First Duma, the peasants immediately formed a democratic "Trudovik" group, which was more to the Left, in other words, more revolutionary, than the liberals—the Cadets. In the elections to the Second Duma, the peasants defeated the liberals outright. The proletariat marched ahead, the peasantry more or less resolutely following it against the autocracy and against the vacillating liberals.

I shall now pass to the draft resolutions we have before us. The difference in points of view I have described is fully reflected in the antithesis between the Bolshevik and Menshevik resolutions. The Bolshevik draft is based on a definition of the *class* content of the principal *types* of bourgeois parties. We drew up our resolution in the same way for the Unity Congress in Stockholm. There we noted three principal types of bourgeois parties: the Octobrists, the liberals and the peasant democrats (at that time they were not yet fully delineated, and the word "Trudovik" did not exist in the Russian political vocabulary). Our resolution of today retains that same structure. It is simply a modification of the Stockholm resolution. The course of events has confirmed its basic postulates to such an extent that only very small changes were required for due consideration to be paid to experience acquired in the First and Second Dumas.

The Menshevik resolution for the Unity Congress gave no analysis whatever either of types of parties or their class content. The resolution states helplessly that "bourgeois-democratic parties are only just forming in Russia and therefore have not yet had the time to acquire the character of stable parties", and that "at the present historical moment in Russia there are no parties in existence that could simultaneously blend within themselves a consistent democracy and a revolutionary character". Is this not a helpless declaration? Is this not a deviation from Marxist

tasks? Outside the ranks of the proletariat there will never be absolute stability of parties or fully "consistent" democracy. It is, however, our duty to lay bare the class roots of all parties that appear on the historical scene. And our resolution shows that this is something quite feasible. The three types of parties outlined in this resolution have proved sufficiently "stable" throughout a whole year of revolution, as I have already shown by the example of the First and Second Dumas.

What *has* proved unstable is the views of the Mensheviks. Their present resolution is a tremendous step backward in comparison with their draft of last year. Let us examine this resolution, which was published in *Narodnaya Duma*, No. 12 (March 24, 1907). The preamble to this resolution points first to a "number of tasks common" to the proletariat and to bourgeois democracy; secondly, it says that the proletariat must "combine its activities with those of other social classes and groups"; thirdly, it says that in a country where the peasantry predominates and urban democracy is weak, the proletariat "by its own movement impels forward" ... "the entire bourgeois democracy of the country"; fourthly, "that the democratic movement of the country has not yet found its ultimate expression in the present grouping of bourgeois parties", which reflects the "realism" and unpreparedness to fight on the part of the urban bourgeoisie at one extreme, and at the other, peasant "illusions of petty-bourgeois revolutionism and agrarian utopias". Such is the preamble. Now let us look at the conclusions; the first conclusion is that, while pursuing an independent policy, the proletariat must fight both against the opportunism and constitutional illusions of the one, and the revolutionary illusions and reactionary economic projects of the other. The second conclusion is that it is necessary to "combine our activities with the activities of the other parties".

A resolution like this does not answer any one of the questions that every Marxist is obliged to ask himself, if he wants to define the attitude of the workers' party to the bourgeois parties. What are these general questions? First of all, it is necessary to define the class nature of the parties. Then it is necessary to make clear to oneself the basic alignment of the various classes in the present revolution in general,

that is, in what relation the interests of these classes stand to the continuation or development of the revolution. Further, it is necessary to pass over from classes in general to the present-day role of the various parties, or various groups of parties. Finally, it is necessary to furnish practical directives concerning the policy of the workers' party on this question.

There is nothing of this in the Menshevik resolution. It is simply an evasion of these questions, evasion by means of general phrase-mongering about "combining" the policy of the proletariat with the policy of the bourgeoisie. Not a word is said about how to "combine", and with precisely which bourgeois-democratic parties. This is a resolution about parties, but without parties. This is a resolution to define our attitude, which does nothing to define our attitude towards the various parties. It is impossible to take such a resolution as a guide, for it provides the greatest freedom to "combine" anything you like and in any way you like. Such a resolution does not restrict anyone; it is a most "liberal" resolution in the fullest sense of that word. It can be interpreted backwards and forwards. But of Marxism—not a grain. The fundamental propositions of Marxism have been so thoroughly forgotten here that any Left Cadet could have subscribed to such a resolution. Take its main points—"tasks in common" for the proletariat and bourgeois democracy—is that not the very thing the entire liberal press is vociferating about?... The need to "combine"—the very thing the Cadets are demanding.... The struggle against opportunism on the Right and revolutionism on the Left—but that is the pet slogan of the Left Cadets, who say they want to sit between the Trudoviks and bourgeois liberals! This is not the position of a workers' panty distinct from and independent of bourgeois democracy; it is the position of a liberal who wants to occupy the "centre" *in the midst* of the bourgeois democrats.

Let us examine the gist of the Mensheviks' proposition: by its own movement the proletariat "impels forward" "the entire bourgeois democracy of the country". Is this true? Absolutely not. Just recall the major events in our revolution. Take the Bulygin Duma. In reply to the tsar's appeal to take the legal path, to adopt his, the tsar's, conditions

for convening the first popular representative body, the proletariat answered with a resolute refusal. The proletariat called on the people to wipe out this institution, to prevent its birth. The proletariat called on all the revolutionary classes to fight for better conditions for the convocation of a popular representative body. This in no way ruled out the question of utilising even bad institutions if they actually came into being despite all our efforts. This was a fight against allowing the implementation of worse conditions for convening a popular representative body. In appraising the boycott, the logical and historical mistake is often made of confusing the fight *on the basis* of the given institution, with the fight *against* the establishment of that institution.

What reply did the liberal bourgeoisie make to the proletariat's appeal? It replied with a general outcry against the boycott. It invited us to the Bulygin Duma. The liberal professors urged the students to go on with their studies, instead of organising strikes. In reply to the proletariat's appeal to fight, the bourgeoisie answered by fighting against the proletariat. As far back as that, the antagonism between these classes, even in a democratic revolution, manifested itself fully and definitely. The bourgeoisie wanted to narrow the scope of the proletariat's struggle, to prevent it going beyond the bounds of the convocation of the Bulygin Duma.

Professor Vinogradov, the shining light of liberal science, wrote just at that time: "It would be the good fortune of Russia if our revolution proceeded along the road of 1848-49, and its misfortune if it proceeded along the road taken by the revolution of 1789-93." What this "democrat" called good fortune was the road of an unconsummated revolution, the road of a defeated uprising! If our revolution were to deal as ruthlessly with its enemies as the French revolution did in 1793, then, according to this "liberal", it would be necessary to call upon the Prussian drill sergeant to re-establish law and order. The Mensheviks say that our bourgeoisie are "unprepared to fight". Actually, however, the bourgeoisie were *prepared* to fight, prepared to fight *against* the proletariat, to fight against the "excessive" victories of the revolution.

To proceed. Take October to December 1905. There is no need to prove that during this period of the high tide of our revolution, the bourgeoisie displayed "preparedness

to fight" against the proletariat. This was fully acknowledged by the Menshevik press of that day. The bourgeoisie, including the Cadets, tried in every way to denigrate the revolution, to picture it as blind and savage anarchy. The bourgeoisie not only failed to support the organs of insurrection set up by the people—all the various Soviets of Workers' Deputies, Soviets of Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc.—but it feared these institutions and fought against them. Call to mind Struve, who termed these institutions a degrading spectacle. In them the bourgeoisie saw a revolution that had gone too far ahead. The liberal bourgeoisie wanted to divert the energy of the popular revolutionary struggle into the narrow channel of police-controlled constitutional reaction.

There is no need to dwell at length on the behaviour of the liberals in the First and the Second Dumas. Even the Mensheviks acknowledged that, in the First Duma, the Cadets *hindered* the revolutionary policy of the Social-Democrats and, to some extent, of the Trudoviks, that they hampered their activity. And in the Second Duma the Cadets openly joined up with the Black Hundreds, gave outright support to the government.

To say at present that the movement of the proletariat "impels the entire bourgeois democracy of the country forward" means scorning facts. To maintain silence at the present time about the counter-revolutionary nature of our bourgeoisie means departing entirely from the Marxist point of view, means completely forgetting the viewpoint of the class struggle.

In their resolution, the Mensheviks speak of the "realism" of the urban bourgeois classes. Strange terminology this, which betrays them, against their will. We are accustomed to seeing a special meaning attached to the word realism, among the Right-wing Social-Democrats. For instance, Plekhanov's *Sovremennaya Zhizn* contrasted the "realism" of the Right Social-Democrats with the "revolutionary romanticism" of the Left, Social-Democrats. What then does the Menshevik resolution have in view when it speaks of realism? It appears that the resolution praises the bourgeoisie for its moderation and punctiliousness!

These arguments of the Mensheviks about the "realism" of the bourgeoisie, about its "unpreparedness" to fight—

taken in conjunction with the open declaration of their tactical platform on the "one-sided hostility" of the Social-Democrats towards the liberals—speak of one thing, and of one thing only. In point of fact, it all means that the independent policy of the workers' party is replaced by a policy of dependence on the liberal bourgeoisie. And this, the substance of Menshevism, is not something that we have invented or have drawn solely from their theoretical arguments—it has manifested itself in all the major steps of their policy throughout the past year. Take the "responsible ministry", blocs with the Cadets, voting for Golovin, etc. This is what has actually constituted the policy of dependence on the liberals.

And what do the Mensheviks say about peasant democracy? The resolution puts the "realism" of the bourgeoisie and the "agrarian utopias" of the peasantry on a par, offsetting the one by the other as being of equal significance or at any rate wholly analogous. We must fight, say the Mensheviks, equally against the opportunism of the bourgeoisie and against the utopianism, the "petty-bourgeois revolutionism", of the peasantry. This is typical of the Menshevik line of reasoning. And it is worth while dwelling on this, for it is radically wrong. From it inevitably ensue a number of mistaken conclusions in practical policy. This criticism of peasant utopias harbours a lack of understanding of the proletariat's task—to urge the peasantry onward to complete victory in the democratic revolution.

Just look carefully at what is behind the agrarian utopias of the peasantry in the present revolution. What is their main utopia? Undoubtedly, it is the idea of equalitarianism, the conviction that the abolition of the private property in land and the equal division of the land (or of land tenure) are able to destroy the roots of want, poverty, unemployment and exploitation.

No one disputes the fact that, from the point of view of *socialism*, this is a utopia, a utopia of the petty bourgeois. From the point of view of socialism, this is a reactionary prejudice, for proletarian socialism sees its ideal, not in the equality of small proprietors, but in large-scale socialised production. But do not forget that what we are now appraising is the significance of the peasants' ideals, not in the

socialist movement, but in the present, bourgeois-democratic revolution. Can we say that it is utopian or reactionary in the *present* revolution for all the land to be taken away from the landlords and be handed over to, or divided up equally among, the peasants?! No! Not only is this non-reactionary, but, on the contrary, it reflects most conclusively and most consistently the desire for the most thorough abolition of the entire old regime, of all the remnants of serfdom. The idea that "equality" can exist under commodity production and even serve as a foundation for semi-socialism is utopian. The peasants' desire to take the land away from the landlords at once and divide it up on an equalitarian basis is not utopian, but revolutionary in the fullest, strictest, scientific meaning of the word. Such confiscation and such division would lay the foundation for the speediest, broadest and freest development of capitalism.

Speaking objectively, from the point of view not of our desires, but of the present economic development of Russia, the basic question of our revolution is whether it will secure the development of capitalism through the peasants' complete victory over the landowners or through the landowners' victory over the peasants. A bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia's economy is absolutely inevitable. No power on earth can hinder it. But this revolution is possible in either of two ways: in the Prussian, if one might say so, or in the American way. This means the following; the landlords may win, may foist compensation payments or other petty concessions on the peasants, may unite with a handful of the wealthy, pauperise the masses, and convert their own farms into Junker-type, capitalist, farms. Such a revolution will be bourgeois-democratic but it will be to the least advantage of the peasants—to their least advantage from the angle of the rapidity of capitalist development. Or, on the contrary, the complete victory of the peasant uprising, the confiscation of all landed estates and their equal division will signify the most rapid development of capitalism, the form of bourgeois-democratic revolution most advantageous to the peasants.

Nor is this most advantageous to the peasants alone. It is just as advantageous to the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat knows that there is, and there can

be, no path leading to socialism otherwise than through a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Hence the more incomplete and irresolute this revolution, the longer and the more heavily will general democratic tasks, and not socialist, not purely class, proletarian tasks, weigh upon the proletariat. The more complete the victory of the peasantry, the sooner will the proletariat stand out as a distinct class, and the more clearly will it put forward its purely socialist tasks and aims.

From this, you see that the peasants' ideas on equality, reactionary and utopian from the standpoint of socialism, are revolutionary from the standpoint of bourgeois democracy. That is why the equating of the liberals' reactionary nature in the present revolution and the reactionary utopianism of the peasants in their ideas of the socialist revolution is a glaring logical and historical error. To put on a par the liberals' endeavours to cut the present revolution off short at compensation for land, a constitutional monarchy, at the level of the Cadet agrarian programme, etc., and the peasants' attempts at utopian idealisation, in a reactionary spirit, of their endeavours to crush the landlords immediately, to confiscate all the land, to divide it all up—to attempt to equate these things is to abandon completely, not only the standpoint of the proletariat, but also the standpoint of a consistent revolutionary democrat. To write a resolution on the struggle against liberal opportunism and muzhik revolutionism in the present revolution is to write a resolution that is not Social-Democratic. This is not a Social-Democrat writing, but an intellectual who sits between the liberal and the muzhik in the camp of bourgeois democracy.

I cannot deal here in as great detail as I should on the famous tactical platform of the Mensheviks with their much vaunted slogan of struggle against the "one-sided hostility of the proletariat towards liberalism". The non-Marxist and non-proletarian nature of such a slogan is more than obvious.

In conclusion, I shall deal with a frequent objection that is raised against us. In the majority of cases, we are told, "your" Trudoviks follow the Cadets against us. That is true, but it is no objection against our point of view and our resolution, since we have quite definitely and outspokenly admitted it.

The Trudoviks are definitely not fully consistent democrats. The Trudoviks (including the Socialist-Revolutionaries) undoubtedly vacillate between the liberals and the revolutionary proletariat. We have said this, and it had to be said. Such vacillation is by no means fortuitous. It is an inevitable consequence of the very nature of the economic condition of the small producer. On the one hand, he is oppressed and subject to exploitation. He is unconsciously impelled into the fight against this position, into the fight for democracy, for the ideas of abolishing exploitation. On the other hand, he is *a petty proprietor*. In the peasant lives the instinct of a proprietor—if not of today, then of tomorrow. It is the proprietor's, the owner's instinct that repels the peasant from the proletariat, engendering in him an aspiration to become someone in the world, to become a bourgeois, to hem himself in against all society on his own plot of land, on his own dung-heap, as Marx irately remarked.[185]

Vacillation in the peasantry and the peasant democratic parties is inevitable. And the Social-Democratic Party, therefore, must not for a moment be embarrassed at the fear of isolating itself from such vacillation. Every time the Trudoviks display lack of courage, and drag along in the wake of the liberals, we must fearlessly and quite firmly oppose the Trudoviks, expose and castigate their petty-bourgeois inconsistency and flaccidit.

Our revolution is passing through difficult times. We need all the will-power, all the endurance and fortitude of the organised proletarian party, in order to be capable of resisting sentiments of distrust, despondency, indifference, and denial of the struggle. The petty bourgeoisie will always and inevitably succumb most easily to such sentiments, display irresolution, betray the revolutionary path, whine and repent. And in all such cases, the workers' party will isolate itself from the vacillating petty-bourgeois democrats. In all such cases we must be able to unmask the irresolute democrats openly, even from the Duma platform. "Peasants!" we must say in the Duma in such circumstances, "peasants! You should know that your representatives are betraying you by following in the wake of the liberal landlords. Your Duma deputies are betraying the cause of the peasantry to

the liberal windbags and advocates." Let the peasants know—we must demonstrate this to them by facts—that *only* the workers' party is the genuinely reliable and thoroughly faithful defender of the interests, not only of socialism but also of democracy, not only of all working and exploited people, but also of the entire peasant masses, who are fighting against feudal exploitation.

If we pursue this policy persistently and undeviatingly, we shall derive from our revolution enormous material for the class development of the proletariat; we shall achieve this under all circumstances, whatever vicissitudes may be in store for us, whatever setbacks for the revolution (under particularly unfavourable circumstances) may fall to our lot. A firm proletarian policy will give the entire working class such a wealth of ideas, such clarity of understanding and such endurance in the struggle that no one on earth will be able to win them away from Social-Democracy. Even if the revolution suffers defeat, the proletariat will learn, first and foremost, to understand the economic class foundations of both the liberal and the democratic parties; then it will learn to hate the bourgeoisie's treacheries and to despise the petty bourgeoisie's infirmity of purpose and its vacillations.

And it is only with such a fund of knowledge, with such habits of thinking, that the proletariat will be able to approach the new, the socialist revolution more unitedly and more boldly. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and the Centre.*)

7

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE REPORT ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES MAY 14 (27)

I shall begin with the question of the stand taken by the Polish delegation, which has been touched on here. The Polish comrades were accused—particularly by the Bundists—of being inconsistent in agreeing to our resolution, having themselves declared it unsatisfactory at the commission. Such accusations are founded on a very simple subterfuge—an evasion of *the substance* of those questions that confront the Congress on the given item of the agenda. Those who do not want to evade any discussion on the substance of the question will easily see that we Bolsheviks have always seen eye to eye with the Poles on two fundamental questions. First of all we agree on the fact that, for the sake of its socialist tasks, the proletariat must categorically retain its class individuality with respect to all the other (bourgeois) parties, however revolutionary they may be, however democratic the republic they advocate. Secondly, we agree that it is the right and duty of the workers' party to assume leadership of the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, including the peasant parties, not only in the struggle against the autocracy, but also against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie.

In the resolution on the report of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, which the Polish comrades have presented to the Congress, these ideas and propositions are expressed with the utmost clarity. The resolution speaks forthrightly of the need for Social-Democracy to preserve its class character distinct from all other parties, down to the Socialist

Revolutionaries. It speaks openly of the possibility and necessity of joint action by the Social-Democrats and the Trudovik groups against the liberals. This is what we in Russia call a Left bloc, or a Left bloc policy.

From this it is clear that we are united with the Poles by genuine solidarity on the fundamental points in the question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties. To deny this or to speak of the contradictory behaviour of the Poles would be to evade a straightforward presentation of differences of opinion in principle.

The socialist aims of the proletariat keep it distinct from all parties, even the most revolutionary and republican; then there is the proletariat's leadership in the struggle of all revolutionary democrats in the present revolution—can it be denied that these are the fundamental and guiding ideas in both the Polish and Bolshevik resolutions?

A few words about Trotsky. I have no time to dwell here on our differences with him. I shall only note that in his book *In Defence of the Party* Trotsky expressed, in print, his solidarity with Kautsky, who wrote about the economic community of interests between the proletariat and the peasantry in the present revolution in Russia. Trotsky acknowledged the permissibility and usefulness of a Left bloc against the liberal bourgeoisie. These facts are sufficient for me to acknowledge that Trotsky has come closer to our views. Quite apart from the question of "uninterrupted revolution", we have here solidarity on fundamental points in the question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties.

Comrade Lieber has most energetically accused me of excluding even the Trudoviks from the bourgeois-democratic allies of the proletariat. Lieber has again been carried away by phrases, and has paid insufficient attention to the substance of the dispute. I did not speak of excluding joint action with the Trudoviks, but of the need to cut ourselves off from the Trudoviks' *vacillation*. We must not fear to "isolate" ourselves from them when they are inclined to drag along in the wake of the Cadets. We must ruthlessly expose the Trudoviks when they fail to take the consistent stand of revolutionary democrats. One of two things, Comrade Lieber—either the workers' party will pursue a genuinely

independent proletarian policy, in which case we allow of joint action with part of the bourgeoisie only when *it*, this section, accepts *our* policy, and not vice versa; or our talk about the independence of the proletariat's class struggle remains nothing but idle talk.

Like Lieber, Plekhanov too evaded the substance of the dispute, only in another way. Plekhanov spoke about Rosa Luxemburg, picturing her as a Madonna reclining on clouds. What could be finer! Elegant, gallant and effective polemics.... But I would nevertheless like to ask Plekhanov: Madonna or not,—but what do you think about *the substance* of the question? (*Applause from the Centre and the Bolsheviks.*) After all, it is a pretty bad thing to have to resort to a Madonna in order to avoid analysing the point at issue. Madonna or not—what must our attitude be towards "a Duma with full powers"? What is this? Does this resemble Marxism, does it resemble the independent policy of the proletariat?

"Agreements from occasion to occasion", both Lieber and Plekhanov reiterate to us in all sorts of ways. An extremely convenient formula this, but utterly lacking in principle. It is absolutely devoid of content. After all, comrades, we too permit of agreements with the Trudoviks under certain conditions and *also only* from occasion to occasion, absolutely from occasion to occasion. We shall willingly include these words in our resolution as well.

But that is not the question. The question is *what* joint actions are permissible from occasion to occasion, with whom, and for what purposes! Both Plekhanov, with his gallant witticisms, and Lieber with his empty pathetics, have slurred over and obscured these significant questions. And this question is not a theoretical one, but an extremely vital and practical issue. We have seen from experience what the famous agreements from occasion to occasion, the famous "technical" agreements, mean among the Mensheviks! They mean a policy of the dependence of the working class on the liberals, and nothing else. "From occasion to occasion" is a poor cloak for this opportunist policy.

Plekhanov quoted passages from the works of Marx, on the need to support the bourgeoisie. It is a pity that he did not quote from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. A pity that

he forgot how Marx "supported" the liberals during the period when the bourgeois revolution in Germany was at its height. Nor is it necessary to go so far to prove something that is indisputable. The old *Iskra*, too, frequently spoke of the necessity for the Social-Democratic Labour Party to support the liberals—even the Marshals of the Nobility. In the period preceding the bourgeois revolution, when Social-Democracy still had to rouse the people to political life, this was quite legitimate. Today, when various classes have already appeared on the scene, when, on the one hand, a peasant revolutionary movement has revealed itself, and there have been liberal betrayals on the other—today there can be no question of our supporting the liberals. We are all agreed that the Social-Democrats must now demand the confiscation of landed estates. And what is the attitude of the liberals towards this?

Plekhanov said: all classes that are in the least progressive must become tools in the hands of the proletariat. I do not doubt that this is Plekhanov's desire. But I assert that in practice the Menshevik policy leads; not to this, but to something quite different. In every case during the past year, when the Mensheviks were supposedly supporting the Cadets, the Mensheviks themselves were actually tools in the hands of the Cadets. The same was true of the support for the demand for a Duma ministry and at the time of the election blocs with the Cadets. Experience has shown that in these cases the proletariat proved to be the tool, despite the "desires" of Plekhanov and other Mensheviks. This is quite apart from the "Duma with full powers" and the voting for Golovin.

We must realise in all seriousness that the liberal bourgeoisie has entered upon the counter-revolutionary path, and we must struggle against them. Only then will the policy of the workers' party become an independent revolutionary policy, not one in word alone. Only then shall we systematically exert our influence on both the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, who are hesitating between liberalism and revolutionary struggle.

There was no point to the complaint made here about the incorrectness of our thesis on the liberals' deception of the petty bourgeoisie. Not only our revolution, but the expe-

rience of other countries, too, has shown that it is by deceit that liberalism maintains its influence in many sections of the population. It is our plain duty to fight to free those sections from the influence of the liberals. In the course of decades the German Social-Democratic Party has fought to destroy—and has destroyed, in Berlin, for instance—the liberals' influence on broad sections of the population. We can and must achieve the same, and deprive the Cadets of their democratic adherents.

Let me give you an example of what the Menshevik policy of supporting the Cadets has led to. In the Menshevik newspaper *Russkaya Zhizn* of February 22, 1907 (No. 45), an unsigned, that is, an editorial, article said the following about Golovin's election and his speech: "The Chairman of the State Duma has undertaken a great and responsible task—to say such words as will embody the principal demands and needs of our 140 million people.... Not for a moment could Mr. Golovin rise above the level of a member of the Cadet Party, and become the exponent of the will of the entire Duma". Don't you see how edifying this is? The Mensheviks derive the responsible task of the liberal—to speak on behalf of the "people"—simply from their having supported him with their votes. This is just handing over ideological and political leadership to liberalism. This is complete abandonment of the class point of view. And I say: if under a Left bloc any Social-Democrat would dream of writing about the responsible task of a Trudovik to reflect the needs of "labour", I would whole-heartedly support the most resolute censure of such a Social-Democrat. The Mensheviks have here an ideological bloc with the Cadets, and we must permit no such blocs with anyone, even with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Incidentally, Martynov stated that we are descending to such a bloc when we speak of all the land and full freedom. This is not true. Let me remind you of the Menshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat*. In the draft electoral platform compiled by the C.C., published in that paper, we encounter the very same slogans of land and freedom! Martynov's words are mere hole-picking.

In conclusion I would like to say a few words in regard to the Polish comrades. A precise characterisation of the petty-

bourgeois parties may have seemed needless to some of them. Perhaps the more acute class struggle in Poland makes it unnecessary. But to Russian Social-Democrats it is indispensable. An exact indication of the class nature of the Trudovik parties is most necessary as a guide for all our propaganda and agitation. It is only on the basis of a class analysis of these parties that we can quite definitely place before the working class our tactical tasks—the socialist class distinction of the proletariat, and the struggle under its leadership both against the autocracy and the treacherous bourgeoisie. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks and the Centre.*)

8

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE POLISH DRAFT RESOLUTION ON BOURGEOIS PARTIES MAY 15 (28)

From the preceding speech you could see how just Comrade Popov's remarks were about the fruitlessness of the present discussion. You have yourselves seen how thoroughly unprincipled Lieber's speech was. I should merely like to remind you that, in our abortive commission, *four Mensheviks*, *one member of the Bund*, *and two Poles* voted *against* us and the Latvians on the question of adopting the *Polish* draft as a basis for the resolution.

Thus the Polish draft was taken as a basis in the commission by those people who in principle were *farthest* removed from the Poles. They did this in order to introduce into the draft amendments in a Menshevik spirit—in order to render the resolution unacceptable to its authors! Lieber himself voted with the Mensheviks both in this case (*Lieber*: "That is not true!") and in voting on the permissibility of blocs with the Cadets. After this his pathetic speeches about principles are simply ridiculous.

I quite understand the Poles' trying to get their draft adopted as a basis. To them our resolution seemed to go into unnecessary details. They wanted to limit themselves to the two basic principles which truly unite us—(1) the class distinction of the proletariat from *all* bourgeois parties, in everything that concerns socialism; (2) the combination of joint action by Social-Democracy and petty-bourgeois democracy against liberal treachery. Both these ideas run like a scarlet thread through the Bolshevik draft as well.

But the brevity of the Polish draft left too much room for Menshevik juggling. Their amendments compelled even the authors to vote against their own draft as a whole. And at the same time, neither the Mensheviks nor the Bund members undertook to defend the Polish draft they had thus "amended". The result was the collapse of the work of the entire commission.

There is now one thing left for all of us in general, and the Polish comrades in particular, to do—to endeavour to have the Bolshevik draft accepted as a basis. If unacceptable amendments are made to the latter too, then we shall have to acknowledge that the Congress is incompetent. It is, however, possible that on the basis of this draft, which gives a precise analysis of all the fundamental types of parties, we shall be able to reach a decision sufficiently definite in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

The objection is raised against our draft that it describes parties in too great detail. Parties, they say, can break up, realign themselves—and then the entire resolution will be useless.

This objection is quite groundless. It is not small groups or even individual parties that we describe in our resolution, but large groups of parties. These groups are so large that rapid changes in their mutual relations are far less possible than a complete change from revolutionary decline to upsurge or vice versa. Take these groups and examine them. A reactionary and a more or less progressive bourgeoisie are unvarying types in *all* capitalist countries. We have added only two more to these two unvarying types: the Octobrists (intermediate between the Black Hundreds and the liberals) and the Trudovik groups. Can *these* types change rapidly? They cannot, unless our revolution takes so radical a turn that we shall, in any way, be obliged to radically reconsider, not only our Congress resolutions, but even our Programme.

Give thought to our *programme* demand for the confiscation of all landed estates. In no other country could the Social-Democrats ever support the confiscatory aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. That would be a fraud in an *ordinary* capitalist country. But in our country, it is essential

in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. We can, therefore, be sure that fundamental questions in the appraisal of the Trudovik parties will not have to be revised any sooner than our programme demand for confiscation.

Let me furthermore point out that to avoid all misunderstanding and false interpretation of the Left bloc, we have given a precise definition of *the content* of the Trudovik parties' struggle. Actually they are not fighting against exploitation in general (as it seems to them), and certainly not against capitalist exploitation (in the way their ideologists assert); they are fighting *only* against the feudal state and landlordism. And an exact description of this true content of the struggle will at once put an end to all false conceptions of possible joint action by the workers' party and the peasantry in the struggle for socialism, in the struggle against capitalism.

In our resolution we also speak clearly of the "pseudo-socialist nature" of the Trudovik parties, and call for a resolute struggle against any glossing over of the class conflict between petty proprietors and the proletariat. We call for an exposure of the hazy socialist ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. This is something that must be said about petty-bourgeois parties, but it is *all* that need be said. The Mensheviks are profoundly mistaken when they add to this the struggle against the revolutionism and the utopianism of the peasantry in the present revolution, which is what follows from their resolution. *Objectively* such an idea amounts to a call to fight against *the confiscation* of landed estates, and does so because the most influential and widespread ideological and political trends of liberalism declare that confiscation is revolutionism, utopianism, and so forth. It is not accidental, but inevitable, that during the past year the Mensheviks have wandered from such principles towards a renunciation in practice of support for confiscation.

We must not allow things to go so far, comrades! In one of his speeches Dan said jokingly: "We have poor critics if they criticise us mostly for what we have not done. We only wanted to renounce confiscation, but we have *not* renounced it!"

To this I should like to reply—if you had done so we would not now be a united party. We must not let things go so far as such renunciations. If we permit even the shadow of an idea of such a policy we shall be shaking all the revolutionary foundations of the independent class struggle of the proletariat in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. (*Applause from the Bolsheviks*, *Poles and Latvians*.)

9

OBJECTIONS TO TROTSKY'S AMENDMENTS TO THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES, ADOPTED BY THE CONGRESS MAY 15-16 (28-29)[186]

I

Two points are important here. They must not be deleted. The first point indicates the economically more progressive strata of the bourgeoisie. This is essential. Even more essential is the point on the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the bourgeois parties there are an increasing number of bourgeois intellectuals who are attempting to reconcile the feudal-minded landlords with the toiling peasantry, and who stand for the preservation of all sorts of remnants and survivals of the autocracy.

II

It must be agreed that Trotsky's amendment is not Menshevik, that it expresses the "very same", that is, Bolshevik, idea. But Trotsky has expressed this idea in a way that is scarcely better. When we say "simultaneously" we are expressing the *general* character of present-day politics. This general character is undoubtedly of such a nature that conditions force us to come out simultaneously both against Stolypin and against the Cadets. The same is true with regard to the treacherous *policy* of the Cadets. Trotsky's insertion is redundant, for we are not fishing for unique cases in the resolution, but are laying down the *basic* line of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois Russian revolution.

10

OBJECTIONS TO MARTOV'S AMENDMENTS TO THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TO BOURGEOIS PARTIES MAY 16 (29)[187]

I

Everyone realises that Martov's amendment is highly important. "Technical agreements" is an extremely elastic conception. It seems that under "technical", a "Duma with full powers" is also included. If Martov thinks that our agreements with the Trudoviks are anything but technical, he is mistaken. Our resolution does not say that technical agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie are impermissible. There should be no place for sanctions or interdictions in a resolution; it should indicate an ideological political line. If, however, you are dissatisfied with this absence of interdiction and introduce your notes about "sanction", you are thereby destroying the entire spirit, the entire sense, behind our resolution. And if such an amendment were accepted, we could do nothing but withdraw our resolution.

II

When Martov goes so far as to say that we are refusing to introduce into our resolution any mention of our antagonism towards the revolutionary Narodniks, he is by this open and glaring untruth defeating his own purpose and showing that his own amendment is pure invention. No, it is not we who are refusing to light against the pseudo-socialist nature

of the Narodniks, but you Menshevik comrades, who have refused to support *revolutionary* democracy, and prefer the *liberals* (the Cadets). The majority of the Narodnik groups (Popular Socialists and Trudoviks) have not only failed to adhere in any special way to the terrorism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but, on the contrary, have erred on the side of pliancy in dealing with the liberals. The genuine revolutionism of *all* Narodniks is expressed in the endeavour *to destroy* landlordism. *In this* alone do the liberals see "adventurous gambles and utopianism". Martov is, *in point of fact*, helping the liberals.

11

OBJECTIONS TO MARTYNOV'S AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES MAY 16 (29)

I

Martynov's amendment is another attempt to introduce the Menshevik view that the peasants are more reactionary (or may be more reactionary) in the present revolution than the Cadets, since the Mensheviks do not say a single word about the reactionary nature of the Cadets. Martynov's argument is all mixed up—the dualism is not due to the peasants' wavering between revolution and reaction but to their wavering between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The Mensheviks will inevitably and unavoidably include their favourite idea of the reactionary nature of the confiscation of landed estates and the progressiveness of compensation in the anarchist tendencies of which Martynov speaks. "Anarchist tendencies" in the peasants is a liberal landlord phrase. As to the subjugation of the proletarian movement to the peasant movement—it is ridiculous to speak of this after having declared the reverse, and expressed it scores of times in resolutions.

II

Our acceptance of Martynov's amendment would undoubtedly make a laughing-stock of Social-Democracy. At the beginning of the resolution, we spoke about a decisive struggle

against the feudal state. Now we must draw a political conclusion from this social-economic proposition. Our task is to win that section of the bourgeoisie whose economic position impels it into struggle (the peasantry) away from the influence of the section of the bourgeoisie that is incapable of joining this decisive struggle (from the influence of the liberal landlords, the Cadets). It is in order to confuse a clear political conclusion that Martynov proposes that what is said at the beginning be repeated at the end.

12

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FORMED TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION ON THE STATE DUMA

MAY 18 (31)

Our commission has not come to any agreement. Six voted for the Bolshevik draft and six against. Five voted for the Menshevik draft and five against. One abstained. I must now briefly defend our Bolshevik draft to you, since the Polish Social-Democrats and the Latvians are in agreement with it.

We proceeded from the proposition that everything already stated in the resolution on the bourgeois parties must be deleted from the resolution on the State Duma, since the Duma struggle is only a part, and not the principal part, of our struggle against the bourgeois parties and the autocracy.

In the present resolution we speak only of what our policy in the Duma must be. As to an assessment of how we managed to get into the Duma, we deleted this part of the resolution—the point on the boycott—for the following reasons. It seems to me personally, and to all the Bolsheviks, that in view of the stand taken by all the liberal press we should have given an appraisal of how we got into the Duma. In opposition to the entire liberal bourgeoisie, the workers' party must declare that, for the time being, we must reckon with such an ugly institution because of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. But the Latvian comrades were opposed to this point, and in order not to hinder the rapid completion of our work (and we must hurry if we are to end the Congress tomorrow as we decided) we withdrew this point. What the Congress wants is clear in any case, and lack of time makes it impossible to conduct debates on matters of principle.

I shall dwell on the basic ideas expressed in our resolution. In essence, all this is a repetition of what was said in our draft resolution at the Stockholm Congress. The first point stresses the complete uselessness of the Duma as such. This is a necessary idea, for extremely broad sections of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in general still place the most naïve hopes on the Duma. It is our plain duty to dispel these naïve illusions, which are sustained by the liberals for their own selfish class ends.

The second part of the first point speaks of the uselessness of the parliamentary path in general, and about explaining the inevitability of an open struggle of the masses. Here we give an explanation of our positive views on ways of getting out of the present situation. We absolutely must emphasise it, and clearly repeat our revolutionary slogans, since wavering and vacillation, even among the Social-Democrats, is no rare thing in such a question. Let everyone know that Social-Democracy sticks to its old, revolutionary path.

The second point is devoted to an explanation of the relation between direct "legislative" activity in the Duma, and agitation, criticism, propaganda, organisation. The workers' party regards the connection between work within and without the Duma very differently from the way the liberal bourgeoisie regards it. It is necessary to stress this radical difference of views. On the one hand, there are the bourgeois politicians, enraptured by their parliamentary games behind the backs of the people. On the other hand, there is a contingent of the organised proletariat that has been sent into the enemy camp and is carrying on work closely *connected with* the struggle of the proletariat *as a whole*. For us there is only one, single and indivisible, workers' movement—the class struggle of the proletariat. All its separate, partial forms, including the parliamentary struggle, must be fully subordinated to it. For us it is the extra-Duma struggle of the proletariat that is decisive. It would not be sufficient for us to say that we take into account the economic interests and needs of the masses, etc. Such phrases (in the spirit of the old Menshevik resolution) are hazy and can be subscribed to by any liberal. Every liberal is ready to chatter about the economic needs of the people

in general. But no liberal would be willing to subordinate Duma activity to *the class struggle*; it is, however, precisely this view that we Social-Democrats must express with the utmost clarity. It is only by reason of this principle that we really distinguish ourselves from all possible varieties of bourgeois democracy.

It is sometimes pointed out (especially by the members of the Bund—alleged conciliators) that it is also necessary to note the contrary—the links between the extra-Duma Social-Democratic struggle and the work of the Social-Democratic Duma group. I maintain that this is false, and can only serve to sow the most harmful parliamentary illusions. The part must conform to the whole, and not vice versa. The Duma may temporarily serve as an arena of the class struggle as a whole, but only if that whole is never lost sight of, and if the revolutionary tasks of the class struggle are not concealed.

The next point in our resolution is devoted to the liberal policy in the Duma. The slogan of this policy—"save the Duma"—merely serves to conceal the liberals' alliance with the Black Hundreds. We must frankly tell the people this, and explain it to them. The liberal slogan systematically corrupts the political and class consciousness of the masses. It is our duty to wage a ruthless struggle against this liberal haziness. By tearing the mask from liberalism, by showing that, behind the talk about democracy, there lurks voting hand in glove with the Black Hundreds, we shall be wresting the remnants of democracy from the bourgeois betrayers of freedom.

What must guide us in determining our Duma policy? Leaving aside all thought of engendering conflicts for their own sake, our resolution gives a positive definition of "timeliness" in the Social-Democratic sense of the word—we must take into account the revolutionary crisis developing outside the Duma, by force of objective circumstances.

The last point is devoted to the famous "responsible ministry". It was not fortuitous, but inevitable, that the liberal bourgeoisie should advance this slogan to utilise the period of lull in its own interests, and weaken the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. This slogan was supported by the Mensheviks both in the First and Second

Dumas, and during the period of the Second Duma Plekhanov said forthright in the Menshevik newspaper that the Social-Democrats should *make* this demand "*their own*". Hence this slogan played a very definite role in the history of our revolution. It is absolutely essential for the workers' party to define its attitude towards the slogan. We must not be guided by the fact that the liberals are not advancing this slogan at the moment: they have temporarily withdrawn it for opportunist reasons, but actually they are striving even more earnestly to come to terms with tsarism. And the slogan "a Duma ministry" most graphically expresses this innate tendency of liberalism towards a deal with tsarism.

We do not and cannot deny that a Duma ministry may prove a stage in the revolution, or that circumstances may force us to utilise it. That is not the point. The Social-Democrats utilise reforms as a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat, but it is not our business to mobilise the people for half-hearted reforms that are not feasible without a revolutionary struggle. The Social-Democrats must expose all the inconsistency of such slogans even from the purely democratic point of view. The Social-Democrats must explain to the proletariat the conditions for its *victory*, and not link up its policy in advance with the possibility of an incomplete victory, the possibility of a partial defeat—yet such are the conditions for the problematic establishment of a "Duma ministry".

Let the liberals give democracy away for a few pennies and throw away the whole for the sake of banal and feeble, paltry dreams of doles. Social-Democracy must rouse among the people consciousness of integral democratic tasks, and imbue the proletariat with a clear understanding of revolutionary aims. We must enlighten the minds of the masses of workers and develop their readiness to struggle, not befog their minds by toning down contradictions, by toning down the aims of the struggle. (*Applause.*)

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

13

REMARKS DURING THE DISCUSSION ON THE RE-VOTING ON THOSE ELECTED TO THE C.C. MAY 19 (JUNE 1)[188]

I

We must vote again. Lieber is wrong. His entire line of argument is ridiculous sophistry. After all, who is to decide on this lottery? We are to! We constitute the final session of the Congress. There can be no compromise. This is a congress, not a meeting of factions. You say that we have been empowered to decide only technical and formal questions, yet we have only just adopted a political resolution on a loan.

II

It was intended to intimidate you with terrifying words about the seizure of power. But after all we are empowered to elect candidates to the C.C. at this meeting. (*Stir.*) Keep calm, comrades; anyway, you won't shout me down! We are accused of wanting to take advantage of a single vote. I am of the opinion that this can and should be done. What we are deciding here is a political question, a matter of principle. To let this question be decided by lottery—by blind chance—would be nothing but gambling. We cannot condemn the Party to a year of gambling. I warn you that if—given an equal vote—our Party decides this question by drawing lots, the responsibility will rest with you. That is why this assembly must vote again.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOURGEOIS PARTIES

The question of the attitude of Social-Democracy towards bourgeois parties is one of those known as "general" or "theoretical" questions, i.e., such that are not directly connected with any definite practical task confronting the Party at a given moment. At the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Mensheviks and the Bundists conducted a fierce struggle against the inclusion of such questions in the agenda, and they were, unfortunately, supported in this by Trotsky, who does not belong to either side. The opportunist wing of our Party, like that of other Social-Democratic parties, defended a "business-like" or "practical" agenda for the Congress. They shied away from "broad and general" questions. They forgot that in the final analysis broad, principled politics are the only real, practical politics. They forgot that anybody who tackles partial problems without having previously settled general problems, will inevitably and at every step "come up against" those general problems without himself realising it. To come up against them blindly in every individual case means to doom one's politics to the worst vacillation and lack of principle.

The Bolsheviks had insisted on including quite a number of "general questions" in the Congress agenda, but succeeded in getting only one passed with the aid of the Poles and the Latvians—the question of the attitude to bourgeois parties. This question not only took first place among the Congress questions of principle but also among all work in general. It turned out that way, and it had to turn out that way, because the real source of almost all differences, certainly all differences of substance, of all disagreements on questions of the practical politics of the proletariat in the Russian

revolution, was a different assessment of our attitude to non-proletarian parties. Since the very beginning of the Russian revolution there have appeared two basic views among Social-Democrats on the nature of the revolution and the role of the proletariat in it. Anyone who attempts to analyse the tactical differences in the R.S.D.L.P. without going into the difference of these basic views will get hopelessly entangled in trivialities and partial problems.

I

The two trends in Russian Social-Democracy on the question of an assessment of our revolution and the tasks of the proletariat in it, had become perfectly clear at the very beginning of 1905, and in the spring of that year were given full, precise and formal expression, recognised by the organisations concerned, at the Bolshevik Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London and the Menshevik Conference held simultaneously in Geneva. Both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks discussed and adopted resolutions that people who have forgotten the history of their Party or their section of it, or who desire to avoid an analysis of the real sources of disagreements on matters of principle, are now too inclined to ignore. In the view of the Bolsheviks the proletariat has had laid upon it the active task of pursuing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its consummation and of being its leader. This is only possible if the proletariat is able to carry with it the masses of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, in the struggle against the autocracy and the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie. The inevitability of bourgeois treachery was deduced by the Bolsheviks even then, before the open activities of the Constitutional-Democrats, the chief liberal party; the deduction was based on the class interests of the bourgeoisie and their fear of the proletarian movement.*

The Mensheviks were inclined to the view that the bourgeoisie are the motive force and that they determine the

* The full victory of the revolution said the Bolsheviks, is possible only as a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

scope of the bourgeois revolution. The proletariat cannot lead the bourgeois revolution, but must fulfil only the role of the extreme opposition, and not strive to win power. The Mensheviks rejected in the most determined manner the idea of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

At that time, in May 1905 (just two years ago), the differences were of a purely theoretical and abstract character because no immediate practical task then confronted our Party. It is therefore particularly interesting—for the instruction of those people who are so fond of deleting abstract questions from congress agendas and substituting "business-like" practical questions—to trace *the way in which* these differences later made their appearance in practical work.

The Bolsheviks asserted that the Mensheviks' views would actually lead to the slogans of the revolutionary proletariat degenerating to the slogans and tactics of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. In 1905 the Mensheviks tried their hardest to prove that they alone defended the true proletarian policy and that the Bolsheviks were dissolving the working-class movement in bourgeois democracy. That the Mensheviks themselves had a most sincere desire for an independent proletarian policy can be seen from the following highly instructive tirade in one of the resolutions of that time, adopted at the Menshevik Conference in May 1905. "Social-Democracy," says the resolution, "will continue to oppose hypocritical friends of the people, oppose all those political parties that raise a liberal and democratic banner and refuse to give real support to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat." Despite all these well-meant intentions, the incorrect tactical theories of the Mensheviks led, in actual fact, to their sacrificing proletarian independence for the liberalism of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

Let us recall on what practical questions of politics the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks have differed among themselves during these two years of revolution. The Bulygin Duma of autumn 1905: the Bolsheviks were for the boycott, the Mensheviks for participation. The Witte Duma—the same again. Policy in the First Duma (summer 1906): the Mensheviks were in favour of the slogan of "a responsible ministry"—the Bolsheviks were against it and in favour of

an executive committee of the Lefts, i.e., the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks. The dissolution of the Duma (July 1906): the Mensheviks brought forward the slogan "for the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent assembly"; the Bolsheviks rejected that liberal distortion of a revolutionary slogan. The elections to the Second Duma (end of 1906, beginning of 1907): the Mensheviks were for "technical blocs" with the Constitutional-Democrats (and Plekhanov was for a political bloc with the platform of "a Duma with full powers"). The Bolsheviks were against blocs with the Constitutional-Democrats and in favour of an independent campaign, allowing the possibility of a Left bloc. Compare these important facts from the history of Social-Democratic tactics during the past two years, with the basic differences on matters of principle outlined above. You will immediately see that the general theoretical analysis of the Bolsheviks *has been confirmed* by the two years of revolution. Social-Democracy was compelled to go against treacherous liberalism, *was compelled* "to strike together" with the Trudoviks and the Narodniks; the Second Duma definitely established this preponderance, by a majority vote. The Menshevik good intentions to expose, as hypocritical friends of the people, all those who refused to support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat paved the road to the hell of *political* blocs with the liberals, up to and including the acceptance of their slogans.

On the basis of a theoretical analysis, the Bolsheviks forecast in 1905 that the pivot of Social-Democratic tactics in the bourgeois revolution is the question of the treachery of liberalism and the democratic capacity of the peasantry. All *subsequent* practical differences on the policy of the workers' party have revolved precisely around this pivot. The Menshevik policy of dependence on the liberals actually has developed historically from the false basis of their tactics.

Prior to the Stockholm Unity Congress in 1906, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks put forward two substantially different resolutions on bourgeois parties. The Bolshevik resolution in its entirety was imbued with the basic idea of the treachery of liberalism and of a revolutionary-demo-

cratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, merely providing fresh illustrations to this idea in the form of the facts and events of the post-October period (the split between the Octobrists and the Cadets; the formation of the Peasant Union and radical associations of intellectuals, etc.). The Bolsheviks analysed the class content of the basic types of bourgeois parties and filled out, so to say, the skeleton of their old abstract scheme, with concrete data. In their resolution for the Stockholm Congress, the Mensheviks refused to analyse the class content of various parties, on the grounds of their "instability". This meant actually evading an answer on the substance of the matter. This evasion was clearly demonstrated when the Mensheviks, who had gained a victory at the Stockholm Congress, themselves withdrew their resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties in Russia. In the spring of 1905, a Menshevik resolution proposed exposing, as hypocritical friends of the people, all liberals and democrats who refused to support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. In the spring of 1906, it was the Bolsheviks and not the Mensheviks who, in a resolution, spoke of the *hypocrisy* of a definite liberal party, the Constitutional-Democrats to be precise, while the Mensheviks preferred to leave the question open. At the London Congress, in the spring of 1907, the Mensheviks revealed themselves still more completely; the old demand that the liberals and democrats support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat was completely abandoned. The Menshevik resolution (see the draft in *Narodnaya Duma*, 1907, No. 12—*an extremely important document*) openly and frankly advocates "*combining*" the activities—in plainer words, making them agree—of the proletariat with those of bourgeois democracy in general!

Down the ladder, rung by rung. The socialist's good intentions and bad theory in 1905. No theory and no intentions in 1905. No theory and an openly opportunist policy in 1907. "The combining" of Social-Democratic and liberal-bourgeois policy—such is Menshevism's last word. And it could have been no other, after blocs with the Cadets, voting for Golovin, private meetings with Cadets, the attempt to remove the confiscation of landed estates from our list of imperative demands, and other gems of Menshevik policy.

At the London Congress, Menshevik policy in respect of liberalism suffered its fullest defeat. The Mensheviks did not risk submitting their first resolution as printed in *Narodnaya Duma* (No. 12). They withdrew it without even submitting it to the commission in which all five Party groups were represented by fifteen members (four Bolsheviks, four Mensheviks, two Poles, two Latvians and three from the Bund). Probably the slogan of "combining", the concord of socialist policy with that of the liberals repelled, not only the Bundists, but even many Mensheviks. The Mensheviks appeared in the commission after having "cleaned themselves up a little"; they wrote a new resolution, and deleted "combining" altogether. Instead of "combining" they inserted "use of other parties by the proletariat for its own ends", the recognition of the establishment of a republic, etc., as a political aim of the proletariat. But nothing could help them. It was far too obvious to everybody that they had deliberately dressed up in this bright raiment as a cover for the same policy of "combining". The practical conclusion to be drawn from the resolution was the same—"enter into agreements with those parties [with both the liberals and the Narodniks] in definite, individual cases". Of the fifteen members of the commission only four—i.e., only the Mensheviks!—consented to accept such a resolution as a basis for discussion. There could not have been a fuller defeat for Menshevik policy as such. The Bolshevik resolution was taken as a basis at the Congress and then adopted in its totality after some insignificant amendments, by 158-163 votes against a little over a hundred (106 in one case), with from ten to twenty abstaining. Before we proceed with an analysis of the basic ideas of this resolution and the significance of the amendments proposed by the Mensheviks, we must mention another episode, not without interest, which took place when the resolution was under discussion in the commission.

Not two, but three draft resolutions were submitted to the commission—the Bolshevik, the Menshevik and the Polish drafts. The Poles agreed with the Bolsheviks in their basic ideas but rejected our type of resolution with an analysis of each separate group of parties. The Poles thought this a mere literary exercise, and considered our

resolution too cumbersome. They constructed their draft as a brief formulation of two general principles of proletarian policy in respect of bourgeois parties—(1) the class individuality of the proletariat, as distinct from *all* other parties, for the purpose of its socialist aims, no matter how revolutionary and how determinedly republican those other parties may be; (2) alliance with the Trudovik parties against the autocracy and against the treachery of liberalism.

It cannot be disputed that these two significant ideas in the Polish resolution cover the point at issue splendidly. Nor can it be disputed that the plan to give a brief, definite directive for the proletariat of all nationalities in Russia, without a "sociological" discussion of the different types of parties, is an attractive one. Experience nevertheless showed that the Congress would not have been able to arrive at a full, clear and definite solution to the problem on the basis of the Polish resolution. In order to refute Menshevism, it was necessary to determine, in great detail, the positive view of Social-Democracy in respect of the different parties; otherwise there would have been room for vagueness.

The Mensheviks and the Bundists immediately seized on the Polish resolution while it was still in the commission, in order to take advantage of the opportunity provided by such vagueness. The commission accepted the Polish resolution as a basis, by seven votes (four Mensheviks, two Poles and one Bundist) against seven (four Bolsheviks, two Latvians and one Bundist; the fifteenth member of the commission abstained or was absent). The commission then began tacking on to the Polish resolution such "amendments" that it was distorted beyond all recognition. Even an amendment on the permissibility of "technical" agreements with the liberals was accepted. Naturally the Poles withdrew their draft after it had been mutilated by the Mensheviks. It turned out that, besides the Poles, neither the Mensheviks nor the Bundists would consent to submit *such* a draft to the Congress. All the commission's work was wasted, and the Congress had to vote on the Bolshevik draft that had been accepted as a basis for a resolution.

It may now be asked: what is the significance, in principle, of the Congress having accepted the Bolshevik draft as a basis for a resolution? What were the basic points in prole-

tarian tactics that mobilised the Congress for this draft and led it to reject the Menshevik draft?

If we read the two drafts attentively we can quite easily pick out two such basic points. First, the Bolshevik resolution really effects a socialist criticism of the non-proletarian parties. Secondly, the resolution gives a precise definition of proletarian tactics in the present revolution, giving a perfectly clear and concrete content to the concept of "leader" in the revolution, and showing with whom we can and must "strike together", and at whom and under what circumstances to strike.

The basic fault of the Menshevik resolution is that it provides neither the one nor the other, and by its emptiness opens wide the doors to opportunism, i.e., in the final analysis, to Social-Democratic politics being replaced by liberal politics. Just take a glance at the Mensheviks' socialist criticism of the non-proletarian parties. Their criticism amounts to this: "the socio-economic conditions and historic situation in which this [i.e., our] revolution is proceeding hamper the development of the bourgeois-democratic movement, at one pole engendering indecision in the struggle and the illusions of a constitutional, peaceful abolition of the old order, and at the other pole—the illusion of petty-bourgeois revolutionism and agrarian utopias".

First of all, we have before us a resolution on parties, which does not name the parties. Secondly, we have before us a resolution that does not give an analysis of the class content of the different "poles" of bourgeois democracy. Thirdly, this resolution does not even hint at a definition of what the attitude of the various classes to "our revolution" should be. Summing up all these shortcomings we must say that the Marxist *theory of the class struggle* has *disappeared* from the resolution.

It is not the fundamental interests of the various classes of capitalist society that engender the different types of bourgeois parties; it is not class interests that give rise to peaceful illusions or "conciliatory tendencies" in some and "revolutionism" in others. Definitely not! It is some sort of unknown socio-economic conditions and an historical situation that *hamper the development of the bourgeois-democratic movement in general*. And so the conciliatory tendency of

capital and the revolutionism of the muzhik do not arise out of the position of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in a capitalist society that is emancipating itself from feudalism, but out of some sort of conditions, out of the situation in all "our revolution" in general. The next point even says that "these negative tendencies, hindering the development of the revolution", come more strongly "to the fore at the present moment of a temporary lull".

That is not a Marxist, but a liberal theory, seeking the roots of different social tendencies *outside* the interests of the different classes. This is a Left-Cadet, not a socialist resolution; the extremism of both poles is condemned, the opportunism of the Cadets and the revolutionism of the Narodniks are condemned and thereby *something in between* the two is actually praised. One cannot help wondering whether we are not confronted with *Popular Socialists*, who seek the golden mean between the Cadets and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

If our Mensheviks had not departed from the Marxist theory of the class struggle, they would have realised that the different class positions of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the struggle against the "old order" explain the different types of parties—liberal on the one hand, and Narodnik on the other. All these parties, groups and political organisations, which differ in much or in little and have arisen in such abundance in the course of the Russian revolution, always and inevitably gravitate to one of these two types (with the exception of the reactionary parties and the party of the proletariat)—this is beyond all doubt and needs no proof. If we limit ourselves to indicating the "two poles" in a single bourgeois-democratic movement, we offer nothing but platitudes. Always and in everything, two extremes, two "poles" are to be seen. In any social movement of any extent there are always the "poles" and there is always a more or less "golden" mean. To characterise bourgeois democracy *in this way* is to reduce the Marxist postulate to an empty phrase instead of applying it to an analysis of the *class* roots of the *types* of party *in Russia*. The Mensheviks do not offer a socialist criticism of the bourgeois parties, because giving the name bourgeois-democratic to all oppositional, non-proletarian parties does not at all

imply socialist criticism. If you do not show the interests of which classes and which particular interests are dominant at the moment in determining the nature of the various parties and their politics, you are not really applying Marxism and have, *in fact*, rejected the theory of the class struggle. Therefore, the term "bourgeois-democratic", as you use it, is nothing but a platonic declaration of respect for Marxism, since your use of the term is not accompanied by the association of such-and-such a type of liberalism or democracy with such-and-such self-interests of definite strata of the bourgeoisie. No wonder our liberals, beginning with the Party of Democratic Reform and the Cadets and ending with the non-party *Bez Zaglaviya* group from *Tovarishch*, seeing that the Mensheviks apply Marxism in *such a way*, enthusiastically seize on the "idea" of the harmfulness of extremes of opportunism and revolutionism in democracy—seize on it because it is not an idea at all, but a banal platitude. It is, of course, not the *term* "bourgeois democracy" that scares the liberal. What scares him is an exposure, before the people, of what material interests of precisely which wealthy classes liberal programmes and phrases boil down to. That, and not the term "bourgeois democracy", is the gist of the matter. Not he who persistently uses the term "bourgeois democracy" to protect himself, as though he were crossing himself, is applying the theory of the class struggle, but he who shows, in practice, how the bourgeois character of a party manifests itself.

If the concept "bourgeois democracy" implies only condemnation of the extremes of both opportunism and revolutionism, then it is a concept that degrades Marxist theory to the level of banal liberal phraseology. The liberal, we repeat, does not fear such use of the concept, for it is deeds that he fears, not *words*. He may consent to accept a term that is, to him, unpleasant and "reeking of Marxism". But neither the liberal, nor the "intellectual" from *Tovarishch*, who apes the Bernsteinians, will agree to accept the view that he, the Cadet, expresses the interests of the bourgeois who is selling out the revolution to someone or other. It is precisely because in their application of Marxism the Mensheviks reduce that theory to an empty and meaningless phrase committing them to nothing, that the *Bez Zaglaviya*

group, the Prokopoviches and Kuskovas, the Cadets and others, seize with both hands at the idea of supporting Menshevism. Menshevik Marxism is Marxism recut to the measurements of bourgeois liberalism.

And so the first basic fault of the Mensheviks' stand on the present question lies in their failure to offer a real socialist criticism of the non-proletarian parties. In point of fact, Menshevism departs from Marx's theory of the class struggle. The London Congress has put an end to this distortion of Social-Democratic policy and theory. The second basic fault is that Menshevism does not actually recognise the independent policy of the proletariat in the present revolution, and does not offer the proletariat any definite tactics. Avoid extremes of opportunism and revolutionism—such is one of the commandments of Menshevism as taken from their resolution. From time to time, conclude agreements with the liberals and democrats—that is another of their commandments. Combine your politics (make it agree) with those of the liberals and democrats—that is the third commandment expressed in *Narodnaya Duma* and the Menshevik resolution of the time. Delete from here all mention of the third commandment; add desires and demands—"proletarian politics must be independent", add the demand for a republic (as the Mensheviks did at the London Congress)—by these means you will in no way get rid of the second basic fault of Menshevism. The independence of proletarian politics is not determined by writing the word "independent" in the right places, and not by including mention of a republic; it is determined only *by a precise definition of a path that is really independent*. And that is what the Mensheviks do not offer.

The objective alignment of classes and social forces being as it is, we are actually confronted with a struggle between two tendencies—liberalism is striving to stop the revolution, and the proletariat—to carry it on to its culmination. If the proletariat is unaware of this tendency of liberalism, if the proletariat is unaware of its task to engage in a direct struggle against liberalism, if it does not struggle to liberate the democratic peasantry from the influence of liberalism, then the politics of the proletariat *are not actually independent*. It is precisely these non-independent politics that the

Mensheviks are legalising; for that is the significance of admitting the possibility of agreements from occasion to occasion, without defining *the line* of those agreements, without defining the line of demarcation that divides the two tactics in our revolution. "Agreements from occasion to occasion" is a formula that actually serves to conceal the bloc with the Cadets, the "Duma with full powers" and the responsible ministry, in other words, the entire policy of making the workers' party dependent on liberalism. In the present historical situation there can be no question of an independent policy for the workers' party, if that party does not set itself the direct task of struggling to carry the revolution through to its consummation, if it does not struggle, not only against the autocracy, but also against liberalism, for influence over the democratic peasantry. The historical situation in the bourgeois revolution in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century is such that any other policy on the part of Social-Democracy would actually mean its subordination to the politics of the liberals.

The London Congress's adoption of the Bolshevik resolution on non-proletarian parties means that the workers' party decisively rejects all deviations from the class struggle, and recognises, in point of fact, the socialist criticism of non-proletarian parties and the independent revolutionary tasks of the proletariat in the present revolution.

The rejection of the Menshevik amendments to the resolution adds further weight to this.

II

When the Bolshevik draft, was accepted by the Congress as the basis for the resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties, a shower of amendments came pouring from the Mensheviks and the Bundists. In several statements of protest submitted to the Bureau of the Congress, the total number of such amendments was estimated at 70 or more. I shall not waste time discussing all the ins and outs of the struggle to stop this obstruction, which left Akimov's famous twenty-two amendments at the Second Congress

far behind, nor shall I list the mass of absolutely empty and trivial amendments. I shall mention only *five* amendments that are highly significant in principle. Here they are in the order in which they were discussed at the Congress.

Point Three of the preamble of our resolution speaks directly of the task of the proletariat as filling "the role of leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution". The Mensheviks proposed an amendment—change the word "leader" for "vanguard", "advanced contingent" or the words "main motive force". All those amendments were rejected. Repeat as often as you will that the proletariat must retain its class independence—the Bolsheviks have nothing against that. But *to weaken* the words on the role of *leader* in the revolution would mean opening the doors to opportunism. The proletariat could be the "main motive force" in a curtailed, landlord-bourgeois revolution. It is possible to be the main motive force of the victory of another class without being able to defend the interests of your own class. Revolutionary Social-Democracy, if it is to remain true to itself, has no right to confine itself to that. It must help the proletariat to rise from the passive role of main motive force to the active role of leader—to rise from the dependent position of a fighter for curtailed freedom to the most independent position of a fighter for complete freedom, a freedom that is to the advantage of the working class. The basic difference in the tactics of the opportunist and the revolutionary tactics of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois revolution is, one might say, that the former is reconciled to the role of the proletariat as the main motive force, while the latter is directed towards giving the proletariat the role of leader and by no means that of a mere "motive force".

The expression "advanced contingent" would also weaken the recognition of the task of the proletariat as that of leading the other democratic classes, or could, at least, be interpreted in that way.

The second amendment—remove from the third point of the resolution proper (the characteristic of the liberal parties) the reference to the democratic petty bourgeoisie being *deceived* by the liberals. The Mensheviks said that it was necessary to remove or change it in the name of

Marxism, for, they said, it is unworthy of materialists to explain by "deceptions" the social composition of parties. The sophistry of this argument had too bad a smell for the Congress to fall for it. To deny, in the name of Marxism, the role of deception in the politics of the bourgeoisie would be the same as denying all forms of violence in the name of the "economic factor". Only the Davids, Vollmars and similar pillars of opportunism understand Marxism in this way. In particular, to deny or attempt to lessen the part played by deception in the Cadets' present policy towards the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie in Russia would be attempting to make liberalism more attractive, and distorting the facts for its benefit. That is because the Cadets' direct deception of the electors from among the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie is the most indisputable of facts. It is wrong to speak of parties deceiving their electors, in cases when the interests of a class engender certain theoretical illusions, i.e., deceptive concepts (for instance, when the interests of the peasantry engender illusive expectations of endless benefits following the expropriation of the landlords). It is necessary to speak openly, for all to hear, of the deception of certain strata of the people by their parliamentary representatives when those representatives sacrifice the direct interests of those strata to their exploiters (the peasants are betrayed to the landlords, etc.). The German bourgeoisie have betrayed the peasants, wrote Marx in 1848. If, in 1907, we in Russia do not risk saying the same about our bourgeoisie and about our Cadets, if we cannot prove this to the masses, we shall be trampling the great banner of Social-Democracy in the mud.

The third amendment—to recognise, as an addendum to that selfsame third point, the permissibility of "technical agreements" with the Cadets. This amendment was rejected, with the Congress delegates voting by name. We announced that if it was accepted we should be compelled to withdraw our resolution as a whole; we had the right to do this if amendments distorted the basic idea of the resolution. We do not say anything about specifically forbidding all agreements with the Cadets, we announced. The point at issue is not one of forbidding or permitting specific cases, but of a general political line. One who wants in good faith to apply

the Congress resolution will not enter into election agreements with the Cadets or put out common slogans with them, although a case of joint voting in the Duma may possibly occur. It would, in general, be useless to try to "ensnare" with any sort of wording those who do not conscientiously fulfil the resolution of the Congress. Our whole Party knows well enough from experience what our Mensheviks understand by "technical agreements" with the liberals.

The fourth amendment—an addendum to Point Four indicating the necessity to struggle against the agrarian utopianism and revolutionism of the Narodniks; this was submitted several times by the Mensheviks, with constant changes of individual words in its text or of the place in the resolution to which it should belong. All those amendments were rejected by the Congress. The debate on these amendments was undoubtedly on matters of principle. The Mensheviks again tried at this point to introduce under the Marxist flag something most hostile to Marxism. There is no doubt that Marxism rejects the agrarian utopianism of the Narodniks and the methods of petty-bourgeois revolutionism. If that is so, argued the Mensheviks, then say it here, in this resolution. "Excuse us, dear comrades," we answered, "everything here is said as it should be. Your addendum, irrespective of your will and knowledge, acquires here the significance of a sally against the *confiscation* of landed estates. We have not forgotten that this confiscation has been called "utopianism" and "revolutionism" by all the liberals and also by many non-party Social-Democrats, such as the Prokopoviches and Kuskovas, and by several (fortunately, not many) party Social-Democrats, who proposed that the Duma group and the Central Committee should not make an ultimatum of their insistence on confiscation.

A resolution must be written in unmistakable language. It must consider all existing political tendencies in actual politics, and not the good intentions of some section or another of Social-Democracy (always allowing that the intentions are of the best). In our resolution we have recognised, forthrightly and definitely, the "*pseudo*-socialism" of the Narodniks. We have called their "socialist" ideology simply "*vague*", and have declared it absolutely imperative for Social-Democracy to fight against their concealment of the

class antithesis between the proletariat and the petty proprietors. Everything has been said in these words, which condemn the really utopian element in Narodism, condemn petty-bourgeois "extra-class" revolutionism. Moreover, our resolution does not merely condemn or refute; it also states what is positive in these parties. "The struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state", is the way we define the positive content. And he is not a Marxist who forgets this on account of the struggle against the vagueness of petty-bourgeois socialism. This real content has much greater significance in the present revolution than the Narodniks' vague dreaming of the morrow. It is on account of this actual struggle that liberal and proletarian politics now differ radically. The liberals consider the complete abolition of landed proprietorship and the feudal state to be *utopian and empty revolutionism*; such a *débâcle* is *not to the advantage* of the bourgeoisie, and dangerous to it. In the real politics of our times it is this self-interest of the bourgeoisie as a class, and nothing but that self-interest, that finds expression in attacks on the utopianism and revolutionism of the Narodniks. Proletarian politics, on the contrary, separate utopianism, revolutionism and the general *vagueness* of "equalitarian" dreams of non-class socialism, from the *reality* of the decisive struggle against the landlords and serf-owners. That which the liberals consider a harmful utopia, we consider to be the vital interest of the proletariat at the present moment—the complete abolition of landed proprietorship and the feudal state. On these grounds we must now pursue the most intense, immediate and practical struggle against liberalism, a struggle to emancipate the democratic peasantry from its influence.

The amendments under discussion have reflected one of the most widespread errors of Menshevism—the equating of the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie in the present revolution (that is, reactionary in the struggle against the landlords and the autocracy) with the reactionary nature of the peasantry (which is reactionary from the viewpoint, not of the struggle against the landlords and the autocracy, but of the struggle against capital, i.e., it is reactionary, not in respect of the tasks of the present, bourgeois revolution, but in respect of the future, socialist revolution).

This radical Menshevik error was rejected by the Congress. The practical significance of this error is very great because it conceals a policy that allows equally joint action by the proletariat with the liberals and with peasant democracy.

The last Menshevik amendment of any interest also refers to Point Four, to its end. The Mensheviks proposed removing from this point reference to the struggle against the Cadets ("... side with the Social-Democrats against the Black Hundreds *and the Constitutional-Democrats*"). To give this amendment, which is quite unacceptable to the present Congress, a *semblance* of something acceptable, they proposed replacing the words objectionable to them by an indication that the democratic revolution must be carried through to its consummation. This was an original attempt at sweetening the pill, an attempt to carry through a *policy* unacceptable to the Bolsheviks (not to struggle directly against the Cadets) under cover of a *slogan* particularly acceptable to the Bolsheviks. Your flag and our cargo—that is what the Mensheviks, like the true opportunist politicians they are, were actually saying by their proposal.

The Mensheviks' innocent stratagem was, of course, immediately exposed, amid laughter from the Bolshevik benches (in the London church we actually sat on benches so that the expression is not figurative). And then came truly Homeric laughter and a thunder of ironic applause from those same benches when one of the Poles, after the defeat of the Menshevik amendment, proposed another—to retain the words about *the struggle* against the Cadets, and at the same time add recognition of a struggle to carry through the revolution to its consummation. The Congress, of course, accepted that amendment. The Mensheviks particularly deserved ironic applause for voting in favour of it (*noblesse oblige*!) after L. Martov had called down thunder and lightning upon us in *Otgoloski* (No. 5) for the allegedly bourgeois-republican idea of carrying through the revolution to its consummation.

The Mensheviks' unsuccessful ruse rendered us very good service, because on account of this amendment the Congress understood the very important idea in another of our resolutions which had not been presented to the Congress—the resolution on the class tasks of the proletariat.

III

There is no need to record the present attitude to the Cadets, said a prominent Menshevik (Martynov, I believe) at the Congress, who wanted, one might say to enable the Mensheviks to turn their flight into an orderly retreat. The Cadets are not worth anything at the moment; all right, but do not record it for they may yet be worth something.

These words are an unfortunate formulation of a very significant Menshevik idea, which it is worth while dealing with to conclude our analysis of the question of the attitude to bourgeois parties. The wording is unfortunate because the resolution defining the class roots of present counter-revolutionary policy does not preclude the possibility of using everything that can be of "value". The important thing is the idea that, if the Cadets do not today justify the confidence of the Mensheviks, there was a time when they did.

This idea is fallacious. The Cadets have never justified Menshevik confidence in them. To convince ourselves of this, we have only to take the greatest upsurge of our revolution, the period between October and December 1905, and compare it to the present period, probably the period of greatest decline. Neither at the time of the greatest upsurge nor at the time of the greatest decline did the Cadets justify the confidence of the Mensheviks; they did not confirm the correctness of Menshevik tactics but disproved it by their behaviour. In the period of upsurge the Mensheviks themselves engaged in an active struggle against the liberals (recall *Nachalo*), and at present the totality of voting in the Second Duma speaks most clearly in favour of a "Left bloc" policy, and against the policy of support for the Cadets.

The future historian of Social-Democracy in Russia will have to call the period between the greatest upsurge and the greatest decline of our revolution an epoch of vacillation. At that time, Social-Democracy, as personified by the Mensheviks, wavered in the direction of liberalism. The year of disputes (end of 1904-end of 1905) was the historical preparation of disputed questions and of a general assessment of them. A year and a half of revolution (end of 1905-mid

1907) was the practical test of those disputed questions in the realm of practical politics. In practice, this test demonstrated the complete fiasco of the policy of support for liberalism; this test led to the recognition of the one and only revolutionary policy of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution—the struggle to carry the revolution through to its consummation, winning over the democratic peasantry to the proletariat, against the treachery of liberalism.

It would be risky to say that the London Congress has put an end to that period of Social-Democratic hankering after liberalism. However, a serious step has, in any case, been taken towards putting an end to it.

P. S. The bourgeois press is making excessive use of the forced silence of the Social-Democrats and the "semi-legality" of the London Congress, to malign the Bolsheviks as though they were dead. It stands to reason that without a daily newspaper we cannot think of keeping pace with the non-party *Tovarishch*, in which the former Social-Democrat, A. Brahm, and also Mr. Yuri Pereyaslavsky and *tutti quanti* are performing a real cancan; thank goodness there were no minutes, and they can lie with impunity. These articles by the Brahms, Pereyaslavskys & Co., contain nothing but the usual spitefulness of non-party bourgeois intellectuals, so that mere mention of these articles is enough for them to be treated with the contempt they deserve. The interview with Mr. Struve is another matter; it was reported in *Birzheviye Vedomosti* and, I believe, has not yet been refuted. Besides contempt it deserves a scientific study of that—er—specimen. His gravitation towards the Octobrists and his hatred of the Letts are a truly classic expression of the innate tendencies of liberalism. Mr. Struve admits the truth of the old rumours that he voted for the Octobrist during the election to the bureau (of the Duma) and that he, in general, conducted negotiations and took part in conferences with the Octobrists. He favours unification with the Octobrists! Thank you, Mr. Struve, for your splendid confirmation of what was said last autumn in *Proletary* (No. 5—"An Attempt at a Classification of the Political Parties

of Russia")* about the Octobrists and the Cadets! Mr. Struve senses the impotence of the bourgeois *intelligentsia* and wants to shift liberalism's centre of gravity closer to the *propertied classes*. An agreement with the Crown will not come off with liberals of the Cadet type—so down with the Cadets, let it come off at least with "liberals" of the Octobrist type. That is consistent. And it is to our advantage, for it brings clarity and definiteness into the situation. A new landlord Duma; a new election law that separates, splendidly and with all desirable precision, the reliable landlords and bourgeois tycoons from the unreliable peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and workers. A new trend in liberalism; Mr. Struve's war against "the adventurous politics of the Lefts" with their "*exploitation of the dark social instincts of the undeveloped peasant masses*" ("social instincts" is illiterate but is all the clearer in its illiteracy. Mr. Struve's writing will apparently be the more illiterate and clearer, the closer that gentleman approaches to the Union of the Russian People, which already stands quite close to him).

This was by no means fortuitous. As an intellectualist party, bourgeois liberalism is impotent. It is impotent outside the struggle against the revolutionary ("dark social instincts") peasantry. Liberalism is impotent outside a close alliance with the moneybags, with the mass of the landlords and factory owners, ... *with the Octobrists*. There's no getting away from the truth. We said to the Cadets long ago: "That thou doest, do quickly." Those in favour of an agreement with the Grown—go to the Octobrists, to the Stolypins, to the Union of the Russian People.

Those in favour of the people—follow the Social-Democrats, who alone have conducted and are now conducting a ruthless struggle against liberalism's influence over the Trudoviks.

There were some people who thought that precisely the Mensheviks' policy was capable of splitting the Cadets. A naïve illusion! *Only* the Left-bloc policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy has and will split the Cadets. *Only* that policy will accelerate the inevitable demarcation—bour-

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 225-31.—*Ed*.

geois liberals to the Octobrists, bourgeois democrats to the Trudoviks. In future as heretofore, Social-Democracy will compel these latter to choose between consistent proletarian democracy and liberalism.

Go boldly onward, politicians *à la* Struve!

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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NOTES

[1] "*The Social-Democratic Election Campaign in St. Petersburg*" was published in the newspaper *Prostiye Rechi*, No. 2.

Prostiye Rechi (*Simple Words*) was a legal Bolshevik weekly published in St. Petersburg in 1907, Lenin being one of its closest collaborators. Only three issues appeared—No. 1 on January 14 (27), No. 2 on January 21 (February 3) and No. 3 on January 30 (February 12), after which it was suppressed by the tsarist government. In addition to the above article, published in the second issue the newspaper's third issue carried two other articles by Lenin—"The Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg" and "The Struggle Between S.D.'s and S.R.'s in the Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg".

The election campaign was conducted under the election law of December 11 (24), 1905. The law was promulgated by the tsarist government when the insurrection of the workers was at its height; it made some slight extensions to the franchise provided by the law governing the elections to the Bulygin Duma promulgated on August 6 (19), 1905. Even under the new election law, however, a very large part of the population of Russia was disfranchised—all women, the workers in small enterprises, the peasants of Poland and Siberia and many others.

The elections to the Duma were indirect and had several stages. They were conducted separately for various groups of the population known as curias—they were the landowner, urban, peasant and worker curias.

The elections in the landowner and urban curias were in two stages: the urban population (workers excluded) and uyezd congresses of landowners elected their representatives to gubernia congresses which, in turn, elected deputies to the Duma.

The elections in the worker curia were in three stages: the workers elected representatives at their factories, these representatives elected electors, and the electors elected the deputies. Factories employing from 50 to 1,000 workers elected one representative; bigger enterprises sent one representative for every thousand workers; factories employing fewer than 50 workers did not take part in the elections.

The four-stage system introduced for the peasants was the following: every ten households sent a representative to the village meeting, the village meetings sent one representative each to the

volost meeting, a congress of representatives from the volost meetings elected an elector who attended the gubernia election meeting.

Thus the election law of December 11 (24), 1905 allowed for one elector to every 2,000 voters in the landowner curia, one to each 7,000 in the urban curia, one to 30,000 in the peasant curia and one to 90,000 in the worker curia, i.e., the vote of a landlord was equal to three voles by the urban bourgeoisie, 15 peasant votes and 45 workers votes. The electors from the worker curias constituted only 4 per cent of the electors who elected deputies to the State Duma.

As Lenin pointed out, this law ensured an overwhelming majority of landowners and capitalists in the Duma and was the crudest distortion of popular representation. p. 15

[2] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership including representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries and bourgeois intellectuals. Some prominent members of the party were: P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingarev, P. B. Struve, and F. I. Rodichev. To win over the masses of the working people the Cadets adopted the deceptive title of people's freedom party although actually they did not go beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered the struggle against the revolutionary movement their main task, and were anxious to share state power with the tsar and the feudal landlords. During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest. At the time of the bourgeois democratic revolution of February 1917, they tried to save the monarchy; they held leading positions in the bourgeois Provisional Government, in which they pursued a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people but favourable to the U.S., British and French imperialists. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power and participated in all armed counter-revolutionary actions and in the campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards were defeated, the Cadets fled abroad, where they continued their anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary activities. p. 16

[3] *Tovarishch* (*The Comrade*)—a bourgeois daily paper published in St. Petersburg from March 1906 to January 1908. It was not the official organ of any particular party but was the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets. Mensheviks also contributed to this paper. p. 16

[4] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper edited by Lenin; it was published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 until November 28 (December 11), 1909, a total of fifty issues having appeared. Active participants in the editorial work were M. F. Vladimirsky, V. V. Vorovsky, I. F. Dubrovinsky, A. V. Luna-

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charsky; the technical side of publication was in the hands of A. G. Schlichter, E. S. Schlichter and others. The first twenty issues of the paper were edited and set up in Vyborg (matrices were sent to St. Petersburg and the paper was printed there; for purposes of concealment the newspaper was date-lined Moscow). Later, in view of growing difficulties in the way of publishing an illegal newspaper in Russia, the St. Petersburg and Moscow Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. decided that publication of the newspaper should be organised abroad. Nos. 21 to 40 were published in Geneva and Nos. 41 to 50 in Paris.

Nos. 1 and 2 of *Proletary* appeared as the organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; Nos. 3 and 4 as the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg and Moscow District Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; Nos. 5 to 11 as the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow District, Perm and Kursk Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; Nos. 12 to 20 as the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow District, Perm, Kursk and Kazan Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; from No. 21 onwards (from the time it moved abroad) it appeared as the organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.

Actually, *Proletary* was the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. The main editorial work was done by Lenin, with most issues carrying articles by him (over a hundred in all) on the most important questions of the revolutionary struggle of the working class. The newspaper gave prominence to questions of tactics and general politics; it published reports on the activities of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the decisions of conferences and plenary meetings of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., letters from the C.C. on various questions of Party work, and other documents. No. 46 published a supplement containing a notice of the extended meeting of the Editorial Board of *Proletary* held in Paris between June 8 and June 17 (21-30), 1909, and also the resolutions of that meeting. The newspaper maintained close contact with local Party organisations.

During the years of the Stolypin reaction, the newspaper played an important part in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations, in the struggle against the liquidators, and all other opportunists. At the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910, the Mensheviks succeeded, with the aid of the conciliators, in passing a resolution to close the newspaper *Proletary* under the pretence of fighting factionalism. p. 16

[5] *Trudoviks* (Trudovik Group)—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats, peasants and Narodnik intellectuals in the Russian State Dumas. The Group was formed in April 1906 from among the peasant deputies to the First Duma.

The Trudoviks put forward demands for the abolition of all social-estate and national restrictions, the democratisation of the Zemstvos and urban self-government bodies, and universal suffrage in the elections to the State Duma. The Trudovik agrarian programme was based on the Narodnik principles of equalitarian land

tenure—the establishment of a national land fund from government, crown, and monasterial lands to which were to be added privately owned land, if its area exceeded the labour standard (i.e., the amount that could be tilled by its owners without outside help); they recognised compensation for the landed estates that were to be confiscated. Lenin said that the typical Trudovik is a peasant who "is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his own plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal state and for democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 229).

The Trudoviks in the State Duma, because of the class nature of the peasant petty proprietors, wavered between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. However since the Trudoviks represented the masses of the peasantry, the Bolsheviks in the Duma followed the tactics of agreement with them on certain questions in the common struggle against the tsarist autocracy and the Cadets. In 1917 the Trudovik Group merged with the Popular Socialist Party and gave active support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution the Trudoviks went over to the side of bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 16

6 *Nik. I—sky*—N. I. Iordansky. p. 16

7 *The Second* (*First All-Russian*) *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Tammerfors on November 3-7 (16-20), 1906. It was attended by 32 delegates with a deciding vote—11 from the Mensheviks, 7 from the Bund, 6 from the Bolsheviks, 5 from the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, and 3 from the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area. Members of the Central Committee and the editors of the Central Organ attended with consultative votes.

The Conference adopted the following agenda: (1) the election campaign; (2) the Party Congress; (3) the labour congress; (4) the struggle against the Black Hundreds and pogroms; (5) partisan action during revolution.

By engineering the representation of a number of fictitious organisations, the Menshevik C.C. ensured the Mensheviks a majority which enabled them to foist several Menshevik resolutions in the Conference. The Bolshevik line at the Conference was defended by 14 delegates from St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Volga side and the Polish and Latvian Social-Democrats. Four reports were delivered on the election campaign to the Second State Duma. Lenin and A. Varsky (A. S. Varshavsky), a representative of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, defended the Bolshevik tactics against blocs with the Cadets. The Menshevik tactics of blocs with the Cadets were defended by I. Martov and the Bundist R. A. Abramovich.

After a discussion on the reports, the Conference adopted the Menshevik resolution on "Tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Election Campaign", which allowed for blocs with the Cadets and was voted for by 18 delegates (Mensheviks and Bundists) and against by 14 delegates. In opposition to this opportunist resolution, Lenin ta-

bled a Special Proviso on behalf of the 14 delegates—the Bolshevik platform for the election campaign, which stressed the categorical necessity for the organisational and ideological independence of the working-class party. The Special Proviso allowed for the possibility of temporary agreements only with the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries as representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy. Lenin criticised the Menshevik draft election programme submitted by the Central Committee for approval by the Conference, and moved a number of amendments to it. Under pressure from the Bolsheviks the Conference adopted a resolution introducing a number of amendments to the draft election platform.

The Conference adopted a resolution on "Unity of Local Organisations in the Election Campaign" with Lenin's amendments, preventing the Menshevik Central Committee from pursuing its policy of blocs with the Cadets in local Party organisations.

Lenin insisted on the need for an extraordinary Party congress, and the Conference decided to call a regular congress not later than March 15 (28), 1907. Despite the demand of the Bolsheviks that the question of a "labour congress" be discussed, since they regarded agitation for the convocation of such a congress as a breach of Party discipline, the Conference did not discuss the question but confined itself to passing a compromise resolution on "The Limits of the Agitation for a Labour Congress".

Owing to lack of time the question of the struggle against the Black Hundreds and against pogroms, and that of partisan action were not discussed. The Conference instructed the Central Committee to publish all the draft resolutions and special provisos in a brief Report of the Conference. The Menshevik Central Committee, however, published only the resolutions of the Conference in its organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and omitted the Special Proviso of the Bolsheviks.

Lenin analysed and criticised the work of the Conference in his "Blocs with the Cadets", and "Party Discipline and the Fight Against the Pro-Cadet Social-Democrats" (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 307-19, 320-23). p. 16

8 *The Bund* (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia) was organised in 1897 at an inaugural congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Wilno. In the main, it was an alliance of semi-proletarian elements from among the Jewish artisans of the western regions of Russia. At the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1898), the Bund joined the Party as an autonomous organisation, independent only in regard to questions specially concerning the Jewish proletariat.

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the Russian working-class movement. In April 1901, the Bund's Fourth Congress voted for changing organisational relations with the R.S.D.L.P. established at the First Congress, stating in its resolution that it regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federative association of national organisations which the Bund should join as a unit in the federation.

Following the rejection by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. of the Bund's demand that it be regarded as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party, rejoining in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists were consistent supporters of the opportunist wing (the Economists, Mensheviks, and liquidators), and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. In opposition to the Bolshevik demand for the right of nations to self-determination, the Bund put forward a demand for cultural and national autonomy.

The Bund adopted a liquidators' stand during the period of the Stolypin reaction, and took an active part in forming the anti-Party August bloc. During the First World War (1914-18), the Bundists took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917, the Bund supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution, its leadership joining forces with the counter-revolution in the Civil War and during the foreign military intervention. Among the rank and file, however, a swing towards co-operation with Soviet power was to be observed. In March 1921, the Bund went into voluntary liquidation and part of its membership joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on a general basis. p. 16

9 *Black Hundreds*—gangs of monarchists organised by the tsarist police to fight against the revolutionary movement. The Black Hundreds assassinated revolutionaries, attacked the progressive intelligentsia and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 17

10 *The City and Gubernia Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.* met on January 6 (19), 1907, to decide questions of agreements in the elections to the Second State Duma. The Conference was attended by 70 delegates (39 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks). Realising that the Conference would reject the tactics of blocs with the Cadets, the Mensheviks withdrew from the Conference. The Bolshevik delegates heard Lenin's report on the subject and decided that agreements with the Cadets were impermissible in principle, and harmful politically. p. 17

11 *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.'s)—a petty-bourgeois party that took shape in Russia at the end of 1901 and early in 1902, through the merging of a number of Narodnik groups and study circles (the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries and others). Its official publications were the newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05). The S.R.'s did not draw a line of demarcation between the proletariat and petty proprietors, glossed over the class differentiation and contradictions within the peasantry and denied the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of Narodnik ideas and revolutionism;

they tried, to use Lenin's expression, "to patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terror that the S.R.'s preached as a method of struggle against the autocracy was highly detrimental to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The S.R. agrarian programme envisaged the abolition of private property in land and its transfer to the communes, the introduction of "the labour standard" and "equalitarianism" in land tenure, they also favoured the development of co-operation. The S.R.'s called this programme the "socialisation of the land" but in fact it contained nothing that was socialist. In his analysis of the S.R. agrarian programme, Lenin said that the retention of commodity production and private farming on commonly-owned land would not do away with the rule of capital, and would not free the working peasantry from exploitation and ruin; co-operation under capitalism could not be a means of saving the small peasant, because it served only to increase the wealth of the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time, Lenin said, the demand for equalitarian land tenure, though not socialist, bore a progressive, revolutionary-democratic character, since it was directed against reactionary landlordism.

The Party exposed the attempts of the S.R.'s to don the cloak of socialism, carried on a stubborn struggle against them for influence over the peasantry, and exposed the harm of individual terror to the working-class movement. Nevertheless the Bolsheviks entered into temporary agreements with the S.R.'s, under certain conditions, for the struggle against tsarism.

The S.R.'s were not a homogeneous class party and this conditioned their political and ideological instability, organisational fragmentation, and constant wavering between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As early as the first Russian revolution, the Right wing of the S.R.'s broke away and formed the Trudovik Popular Socialist Party, close to the Cadets in its views; the Left wing, too, broke away to form the semi-anarchist Union of Maximalists. In the period of the Stolypin reaction the S.R. Party underwent a complete ideological and organisational collapse. During the First World War the majority of the S.R.'s adopted a social-chauvinist stand.

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, the S.R.'s, in company with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and landlords, leaders of the party (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) being members of that government. The S.R.'s refused to support the peasant demand for the abolition of landed estates, and came out in favour of the retention of landlordism; the S.R. ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against peasants who had seized landed estates.

At the end of November 1917, the Left wing of the party organised an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and in an effort to retain their influence among the peasant masses,

formally recognised Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. Very soon, however, they took the path of struggle against Soviet power.

In the period of foreign armed intervention and civil war, the S.R.'s conducted counter-revolutionary, subversive activities, supported the interventionists and whiteguards, took part in counter-revolutionary conspiracies, and organised terrorist acts against the leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the Civil War the S.R.'s continued their hostile acts against the Soviet state both in the country and abroad, among the whiteguard émigrés. p. 18

12 *Rech* (*Speech*)—official organ of the Cadet Party, published daily in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906. The newspaper was closed down by order of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued to appear under various other names—*Nasha Rech* (*Our Speech*), *Svobodnaya Rech* (*Free Speech*), *Vek* (*The Century*), *Novaya Rech* (*New Speech*), *Nash Vek* (*Our Century*)—until August 1918. p. 19

13 *Rodnaya Zemlya* (*Native Land*)—a weekly newspaper occupying a position close to that of the Trudoviks; published in St. Petersburg from January till April 1907.

Tan—pseudonym of V. G. Bogoraz, journalist, one of the organisers of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party. p. 20

14 *Lidval case*—E. Lidval was a large-scale speculator who supplied food for the famine-stricken gubernias in 1906; he was Deputy to V. I. Gurko, Minister of the Interior. The exposure of his embezzlement of government funds and speculation on the famine forced the tsarist government to indict him. The guilty, however, were not punished.

The assassination of Herzenstein, a Cadet deputy to the First State Duma, was the work of the Black Hundreds; it occurred in Finland on July 18 (31), 1906. p. 39

15 *Sevodnya* (*Today*)—a liberal-bourgeois evening newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1906 to 1908.

Rus (*Russia*)—a liberal-bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1903 to 1908 with intervals and under different names—*Rus* (*Russia*), *Molva* (*Hearsay*), *Dvadtsaty Vek* (*The Twentieth Century*).

Strana (*The Country*)—a liberal-bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in 1906 and 1907. p. 50

16 *Senate interpretations*—instructions on and interpretations of the State Duma election law of December 11 (24), 1905, published by the Senate. The interpretations of the Senate deprived various groups of the population—some of the workers, peasants and non-Russians—of their franchise. p. 51

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[17] *Octobrists*—members of the Union of October Seventeenth, a party formed in Russia after the publication of the tsar's manifesto on October 17, 1905. This was a counter-revolutionary party representing and defending the interests of the big bourgeoisie, and landowners engaged in capitalist farming. It was headed by the prominent industrialist and Moscow house-owner A. I. Guchkov, and the big landowner M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists gave full support to the domestic and foreign policy of the tsarist government. p. 51

[18] *Golos Prikazchika* (*Shop-Assistant's Voice*)—a weekly newspaper published in St. Petersburg from April to October 1906. p. 54

[19] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. It began as a moderate liberal paper but by the end of the seventies of the nineteenth century had become the organ of reactionary circles of the nobility and the bureaucracy. The newspaper waged a struggle, not only against the revolutionary but also against the bourgeois-liberal movement. From 1905 onwards it was one of the organs of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* a "specimen of the venal press". p. 60

[20] *Narodowci* (*Narodowi-Democract*—National-Democrats)—the counter-revolutionary nationalist party of the Polish bourgeoisie, formed in 1897. During the 1905-07 revolution the Narodowci became the main Polish counter-revolutionary party, the "Polish Black Hundreds" (Lenin). p. 63

[21] *Comrade X*—V. G. Chirkin, who in 1907 supported the Mensheviks. p. 68

[22] *Narodism*—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement that grew up in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century and comprised mainly progressive intellectuals from the lower social-estates. With the objective of rousing the peasantry to struggle against absolutism, the revolutionary youth "went among the people", to the village, gaining there, however, no support. The Narodniks held to the view that capitalism in Russia was a fortuitous phenomenon with no prospect of development, and that for this reason there would be no growth and development of a Russian proletariat. The Narodniks considered the peasantry to be the main revolutionary force and regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. The Narodniks proceeded from an erroneous view of the role of the class struggle in historical development, maintaining that history is made by heroes, by outstanding personalities, who are followed passively by the popular masses. p. 75

[23] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily newspaper expressing the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia, and

published in Moscow from 1863. It was the organ of the Right Cadets from 1905 onwards. It was closed down after the October revolution of 1917 in company with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 76

[24] *Birzheviye Vedomosti* (*Stock-Exchange Recorder*)—a bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1880. The name of this paper became proverbial; it was used as a synonym for lack of principle and corruption of the bourgeois press. It was closed down at the end of October 1917. p. 77

[25] *Union of the Russian People*—an extremely reactionary, Black-Hundred organisation of monarchists, formed in October 1905 in St. Petersburg to struggle against the revolutionary movement. The Union was an alliance of reactionary landowners, big house owners, merchants, police officials, clergy, urban petty bourgeoisie, kulaks, declassed and criminal elements. It was headed by V. A. Bobrinsky, A. I. Dubrovin, P. A. Krushevan, N. Y. Markov the Second, V. M. Purishkevich, and others. Its organs were the newspapers *Russkoye Znamya* (*Russian Banner*), *Obyedineniye* (*Unity*) and *Groza* (*The Storm*). Branches of the Union were opened in many Russian cities.

The Union defended the immutability of tsarist autocracy, the retention of semi-feudal landlord farming, and the privileges of the nobility. Its programme watchword was the monarchist-nationalist slogan of the days of serfdom—"the orthodox faith, the autocracy, the nation". Its chief method of struggle against the revolution was pogroms and assassinations. Acting with the connivance and help of the police, members of the Union openly beat up or assassinated revolutionary workers and representatives of the democratic intelligentsia, broke up and fired on meetings, organised anti-Jewish pogroms, and engaged in a fanatical persecution of all non-Russians.

After the dissolution of the Second Duma, the Union split into two organisations—the Chamber of the Archangel Michael, and the Union of the Russian People proper; the former, headed by Purishkevich, favoured using the Third Duma for counter-revolutionary purposes; the latter, under Dubrovin, employed the tactics of open terror. The two Black-Hundred organisations were abolished at the time of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917. After the October Socialist Revolution former members of these organisations played an active part in counter-revolutionary insurrections and conspiracies against Soviet power. p. 79

[26] *Nasha Zhizn* (*Our Life*)—a liberal daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from November 6 (19), 1904 to July 11 (24), 1906, with some intervals. p. 81

[27] The plus signs in this table indicate the number of electors that could have gone to the Black Hundreds in the event of votes at the

election having been divided between the Cadets and the Left bloc. p. 82

[28] *Telegraf* (*Telegraph*)—a liberal-bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in January and February 1907. p. 83

[29] *Trud* (*Labour*)—a Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in 1907. No copies of this newspaper have yet been found. p. 84

[30] *Zubatovism*—the policy of "police socialism"; the organisation in 1901-03, on the initiative of Colonel of Gendarmes Zubatov, head of the Moscow secret police, of legal workers' organisations for the purpose of diverting the workers from the political struggle against tsarism. Zubatov's activities in founding the legal workers' organisations were supported by V. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior. The Zubatov movement tried to keep the working-class movement within the bounds of economic demands and to inculcate in the workers the idea that the government was about to accede to those demands. The first Zubatov organisation was formed in Moscow in May 1901, with the title of "Mutual Aid Society for Workers in Machine Industry". Zubatov organisations were also founded in Minsk, Odessa, Wilno, Kiev, and other towns.

In a resolution on "The Trade Union Struggle", the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. described Zubatovism as the policy of "the systematic betrayal of the interests of the working class for the benefit of the capitalists" and recognised the desirability of Party organisations, for purposes of the struggle against Zubatovism, supporting and directing strikes begun by legal workers' organisations.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats exposed the reactionary nature of Zubatovism, but used the legal workers' organisations to draw broad sections of the working class into the struggle against the autocracy. In 1905 Lenin wrote: "And now the Zubatov movement is outgrowing its bounds. Initiated by the police in the interests of the police, in the interests of supporting the autocracy and demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, this movement is turning against the autocracy and is becoming an outbreak of the proletarian class struggle" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 90).

Under pressure from the growing revolutionary movement the tsarist government was compelled in 1803 to abolish the Zubatov organisations. p. 84

[31] *Nash Mir* (*Our World*)—a Menshevik weekly journal published in St. Petersburg in January and February 1907. p. 86

[32] *The report in the present issue* was on the elections to the Second Duma in the Moscow District of St. Petersburg published in *Proletary*, No. 13. The report described the elections at the

Rechkin Factory where the workers elected a Socialist-Revolutionary only because they did not want a Menshevik. p. 87

[33] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, Stuttgart, 1921, S. 193. p. 100

[34] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 250-53. p. 105

[35] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 222-23. p. 105

[36] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 240. p. 105

[37] Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, Moscow, 1934, p. 80. p. 106

[38] Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, Moscow, 1934, p. 35. p. 107

[39] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 263-64. p. 107

[40] *Brentanoism*—"a bourgeois liberal teaching recognising the non-revolutionary 'class' struggle of the proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 28, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky"); it preached the possibility of solving the workers' problems within the framework of capitalism through factory legislation and the organisation of the workers in trade unions. It took its name from the German bourgeois economist, Lujo Brentano (1844-1931). p. 107

[41] *Struvism or "legal Marxism"*—a liberal bourgeois distortion of Marxism that emerged as an independent socio-political trend in the nineties of the nineteenth century among Russian liberal bourgeois intellectuals.

By that time Marxism had become fairly widespread in Russia and bourgeois intellectuals began preaching their own views under cover of Marxism in legal newspapers and magazines; for this reason they were called "legal Marxists".

The legal Marxists criticised the Narodniks for their defence of petty production and tried to use Marxism in this struggle, but the kind of Marxism they wanted was one purged of all its revolutionary content. Attempting to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie, they discarded Marxism's most important feature—the theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. P. Struve, leader of the legal Marxists, lauded capitalism and, instead of a revolutionary struggle against the capitalist system, called for "a recognition of our backwardness" and proposed "learning from capitalism". The legal Marxists revised almost all the basic postulates

of Marxism and adopted the viewpoint of bourgeois objectivism, the viewpoint of Kantianism, and subjective idealism.

Lenin recognised the liberal bourgeois nature of legal Marxism earlier than anybody else did. In his article "On the So-Called Market Question" Lenin, as far back as 1893, criticised the views of the legal Marxists, then a new trend, at the time he exposed the views of the liberal Narodniks. The legal Marxists were the first hidden enemies the Russian Marxists came up against. They called themselves followers of Marx but actually deprived Marxism of its revolutionary content. In their struggle against the Narodniks, however, the Russian revolutionary Marxists entered into temporary agreements with the legal Marxists and published their own articles in journals edited by legal Marxists. At the same time, in his article "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book", Lenin severely criticised legal Marxism, calling it the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature, and exposed the "legal Marxists" as the ideologists of the liberal bourgeoisie. Lenin's characterisation of the "legal Marxists" was later confirmed in full—they became prominent Cadets and, later, fanatical whiteguards.

Lenin's determined struggle against the "legal Marxists" in Russia was also a struggle against international revisionism, and was an example of ideological irreconcilability with distortions of the Marxist theory. p. 107

[42] *Sombartism*—liberal bourgeois trend named after Werner Sombart (1863-1941), a vulgar bourgeois economist, one of the ideologists of liberalism in Germany. Sombart, Lenin wrote, has "substituted Brentanoism for Marxism by employing Marxian terminology, by quoting some of Marx's statements and by assuming a Marxist disguise" (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 260). p. 107

[43] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 491-98. p. 108

[44] *The Man in a Muffler*—the central character in a story of that name by Anton Chekhov—a limited, philistine type who fears all initiative and everything new. p. 110

[45] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 318-19. p. 111

[46] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 320. p. 112

[47] *National-Autonomists*—the name given by Lenin to the Polish deputies in the Second State Duma. p. 113

[48] *Famusov*—a character in A. S. Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 115

[49] *P. A. Krushevan*—one of the leaders of the Black-Hundred Union of the Russian People. p. 116

[50] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 136-37. p. 117

[51] *Ternii Truda* (*Thorns of Labour*)—a Bolshevik legal weekly published in St. Petersburg from December 24, 1906 (January 6, 1907) to January 6 (19), 1907. Lenin was an active collaborator. All the issues were confiscated by the police and further publication was prohibited by the St. Petersburg City Court. p. 120

[52] *Zreniye* (*Vision*)—a Bolshevik legal weekly published in St. Petersburg during the Second Duma election campaign in 1907, with Lenin participating. Only two issues appeared, containing four articles by Lenin. Both were confiscated by order of the St. Petersburg Press Committee, and publication of the paper was prohibited by the St. Petersburg City Court. p. 120

[53] *The Conference of St. Petersburg* (*City and Regional*) *Organisations* took place in February 1901. It was attended by Bolsheviks only, 27 with the right to vote, and 14 with consultative voice. The Conference adopted the following agenda: (1) the forthcoming elections to the State Duma in St. Petersburg and in the worker curia; (2) the Duma campaign and the Duma tactics of Social-Democracy; (3) the campaign for a congress, i.e., preparations for a Party congress; (4) the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg organisation; (5) the tribunal to examine the case of N. Lenin (the occasion when Lenin was arraigned before the Party tribunal by the Menshevik C.C. for his pamphlet "The Elections in St. Petersburg and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks"); (6) the attitude to the breakaway Mensheviks; (7) agitational literature in St. Petersburg.

The Conference discussed the first point and nominated two candidates for election as deputies to the State Duma and elected a commission to draw up instructions for workers' delegates, electors and deputies.

Lenin delivered a report on the second point, which was approved, as were the fundamental principles for the structure of the St. Petersburg organisation as elaborated by the St. Petersburg Committee.

On the question of Lenin's arraignment before the Party tribunal by the Menshevik C.C., the Conference gave full support to Lenin, recognised the guilt of the Mensheviks in engineering the split in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation on the eve of the elections to the Second State Duma, and condemned the schismatist activities of F. I. Dan, Menshevik member of the C.C. The Conference decided to set up a commission to control the Party press and send representatives of the St. Petersburg Party organisation to the editorial boards of *Proletary* and *Vperyod*. The Con-

ference elected delegates to a meeting of a number of Bolshevik organisations, called to elaborate a platform for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 127

[54] In the discussion on Lenin's report to the Conference the question had been raised of limiting the agreement between Social-Democracy and revolutionary democracy to purely combat questions (insurrection, strikes); it was asked whether in such cases a single common revolutionary organisation would not be necessary. p. 131

[55] "*Draft Resolutions for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*" were published in *Proletary*, No. 14 (March 4, 1907), with the following introduction from the editors: "A meeting of representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee, the Moscow Committee, the Moscow Regional Committee, the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region and the *Proletary* Editorial Board took place between February 15 and February 18 and drew up the following draft resolutions for the Congress, to serve as material for a Party discussion and preparation for the Congress on some of the most important tactical questions". The minutes of this meeting have not survived.

The "Draft Resolutions" were printed (abridged) in the legal Bolshevik newspaper *Novy Luch* (*New Ray*), Nos. 6 and 7, on February 5 and 27 and also in the Bolshevik symposium *Questions of Tactics* (Second Issue) which appeared in April 1907. They were also reprinted by the Moscow Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. in abridged form and with some editorial changes. p. 133

[56] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of feudal landowners established in May 1906 at the First Congress of Representatives of Gubernia Assemblies of the Nobility that existed until October 1917. The purpose of the organisation was the defence of the autocracy, the big landed estates and the privileges of the nobility. Lenin called it a "council of united serf-owners". The Council of the United Nobility was in reality a semi-governmental organisation that dictated to the government legislative measures for the protection of its feudal interests. A large number of the Council's members belonged to the Council of State and the leading centres of the Black Hundreds. p. 136

[57] A meeting of workers from the various St. Petersburg districts was held in September 1906 to discuss the question of a labour congress. By a majority of 74 votes to 11, a resolution was adopted condemning the Menshevik idea of a labour congress. The resolution pointed out that agitation for a non-party labour congress "would lead to the concealment of the difference between party and class, would mean lowering Social-Democratic consciousness to the level of the less developed strata of the proletariat" and "could only do harm to the proletarian cause". The resolution was published in *Proletary*, No. 3, on September 8, 1906.

In September of the same year, a second regular conference was held of Social-Democratic organisations in Central Russia. The conference was attended by representatives of the Moscow, Moscow Regional, Kostroma, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Bryansk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tver, Sormovo, Smolensk, Yaroslavl, Orel, Yelets, Tver Regional organisation, Vologda, Tambov, and also of the Central Committee and the *Proletary* Editorial Board. Among other things the conference discussed the question of a labour congress, a report on the matter being delivered by a representative of the *Proletary* Board. The conference adopted a resolution recognising agitation for a non-party labour congress as "harmful demagogy, distracting class-conscious workers from the task of consolidating and strengthening their Social-Democratic Party". p. 143

58 The daily newspaper *L'Humanité* was founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party. In 1905 the newspaper welcomed the beginning of the revolution in Russia and expressed the solidarity of the French people with the "Russian nation that was creating its own 1789". The editors of the newspaper organised collections for the benefit of the Russian revolution. During the First World War (1914-18) the newspaper fell into the hands of the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party, and adopted a chauvinist position.

In 1918 the newspaper was taken over by Marcel Cachin, a prominent leader of the French and international working-class movement, who became its political director. In the period 1918-20 *L'Humanité* opposed the imperialist policy of the French Government which sent its armed forces against the Soviet Republic. From December 1920, after the split in the French Socialist Party and the formation of the French Communist Party, the newspaper became the Central Organ of the Communists. At the beginning of the Second World War, in August 1939, the newspaper was banned by the French Government and went underground. During the Nazi occupation of France (1940-44) the newspaper was published illegally and played a tremendous role in the struggle for the liberation of France from the fascist invaders.

In the post-war period the newspaper has conducted a constant struggle to strengthen the national independence of the country, for the unity of working-class action, for the strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples, for democracy and social progress. p. 145

59 *The Party of Democratic Reform*—a liberal-monarchist bourgeois party founded at the beginning of 1906 during the elections to the First Duma, from elements who found the Cadet programme too Left. The party had ceased to exist by the end of 1907. p. 147

60 "*The Opening of the Second State Duma*" was published on February 20, 1907, as the leading article in the first issue of *Novy Luch*.

Novy Luch (*New Ray*)—a Bolshevik daily political and literary newspaper published legally in St. Petersburg from February 20 to

February 27 (March 5-12), 1907, under Lenin's editorship. The newspaper dealt with the political life of the country and the working-class movement; it sharply criticised the opportunist policy of the Mensheviks, exposed the counter-revolutionary character of the liberal bourgeoisie and the indecisiveness and wavering of the petty-bourgeois parties. Almost all issues of *Novy Luch* contained articles by Lenin. The Bolshevik draft resolutions for the Fifth congress of the Party were published in Nos. 6 and 7 of *Novy Luch* on February 25 and 27, 1907.

After the appearance of No. 7, the newspaper was suppressed by the tsarist government and legal action taken against its publishers. p. 152

[61] "*The Second Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat*" was published on February 23, 1907, in the newspaper *Rabochy*, No. 2.

Rabochy (*The Worker*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, organ of the district organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Vyborg and Petersburg Districts of St. Petersburg. The newspaper was published from February 13 (26), 1907, by decision of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. as a mass popular organ. From April 1907 the combat organisation of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. participated in the publication of the paper. Lenin, Y. M. Yaroslavsky and other Bolsheviks were contributors. At the beginning of June 1907 its press was confiscated by the police and publication ceased. p. 156

[62] *Russkaya Zhizn* (*Russian Life*)—a Left-Cadet legal daily, published in St. Petersburg from January 1 (14), 1907. On February 14 (27), from its thirty-eighth issue, the newspaper was taken over by the Mensheviks; its contributors included P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, V. I. Zasulich, L. Martov, G. V. Plekhanov. The newspaper was banned on March 2 (15). p. 161

[63] *Sovremennaya Rech* (*The Modern Word*)—a liberal bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from January to May 1907; it supported the Cadets. p. 165

[64] *Symposium No. 1*—a Bolshevik collection of articles summing up the history of the First Duma and analysing the prospects for the Second Duma; it was published by *Novaya Duma* in 1907. Lenin's articles from the Bolshevik newspapers *Volna*, *Vperyod* and *Ekho* were reprinted in the *Symposium*—"The Workers' Group in the State Duma", "The Manifesto of the Workers' Deputies in the State Duma", "Unity", "The Declaration of Our Group in the Duma", "The Parties in the Duma and the People", and others. p. 175

[65] *The Bulygin Duma*—a consultative State Duma to be convened according to a law drafted by A. G. Bulygin, Minister of the Interior. On August 6 (19), 1905, the tsar's manifesto, the law instituting the State Duma and instructions for elections to it were published. The right to participate in the elections to the Duma

was granted only to landlords, big capitalists and a small number of peasant householders. The peasants were to have only 51 of the 412 seats established by the law. The majority of the population—workers, poor peasants, agricultural labourers and the democratic intelligentsia were not granted the franchise; all women, men serving in the army and navy, students, men under twenty-five and a number of the oppressed nationalities of Russia were also denied franchise. The State Duma had no legislative powers and was permitted only to discuss certain questions as an advisory body to the tsar. In his description of the Bulygin Duma, Lenin said that it was "the most barefaced mockery of 'popular representation'" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 194).

The Bolsheviks appealed to workers and peasants to organise an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma and concentrated their agitational campaign on the slogans—insurrection, a revolutionary army and a provisional revolutionary government. The Mensheviks considered that participation in the Duma was possible, and called for co-operation with the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks made use of the Duma boycott campaign to mobilise all the revolutionary forces, conduct mass political strikes, and prepare an armed uprising. The elections to the Bulygin Duma were not held, and the government was unable to convene the Duma, which was swept away by the growing revolutionary upsurge and the all-Russian October political strike in 1905.

For further information on the Bulygin Duma see Lenin's articles: "The Constitutional Market-Place", "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and Insurrection", "Oneness of the Tsar and the People and of the People and the Tsar", "In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie or in the Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry". p. 177

66 *New Iskra*—the Menshevik *Iskra* (*Spark*). At the Second Congress of the Party an editorial board for *Iskra*, as the Central Organ of the Party, was appointed, consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov and Martov. In violation of the Congress decision, the Menshevik Martov refused to be a member of the Editorial Board without the old Menshevik editors (P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich), who had not been elected by the Second Congress; issues No. 46 to No. 51 inclusively were edited by Lenin and Plekhanov. After that Plekhanov went over to the Menshevik stand and demanded that the old Menshevik editors, rejected by the Congress, be reinstated. Lenin could not agree to this and left the Editorial Board on October 19 (November 1), 1903; he was co-opted into the Central Committee of the Party and from there continued his struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. Issue No. 52 of *Iskra* was edited by Plekhanov alone and on November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, acting alone and in contravention of the will of the Second Congress, co-opted the former editors—Axelrod, Potresov and Zasulich—into the Editorial Board of *Iskra*. From its fifty-second issue *Iskra* ceased to be a fighting organ of revolutionary Marxism, and became an instrument of struggle against Marxism

and against the Party, an organ that preached opportunism. The newspaper *Iskra* ceased publication in October 1905. p. 177

[67] *Noviye Sily* (*New Forces*)—a daily Trudovik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from February 16 (March 1), 1907; nine issues appeared. The newspaper was banned on February 27 (March 12), 1907.

The article "The Bolsheviks and the 'Petty Bourgeoisie'", referred to here, appeared unsigned in *Noviye Sily*, No. 7, on February 23 (March 8), 1907. p. 179

[68] *The four-point electoral system*—an abbreviation (a single word in the Russian original) for the democratic electoral system with its four demands—universal, equal, direct and secret balloting. p. 179

[69] *Marya Alexevna* (Princess Maria Alexeyevna)—a character from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 183

[70] *Molchalin-like virtues*—sycophancy and toadyism. Molchalin is a character from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 187

[71] "*Cadets and Trudoviks*" was published on March 1, 1907 in *Rabochaya Molva* (*Worker's Word*), No. 1, a Bolshevik legal political and literary newspaper, publication of which was begun in St. Petersburg. On the day the first issue appeared it was confiscated and its publication forbidden. p. 189

[72] *Amsterdam resolution*—Lenin refers here to "The International Rulings as to Socialist Action" adopted by the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International in August 1904.

The Amsterdam International Socialist Congress of the Second International was held from August 14 to August 20, 1904. The Congress agenda contained the following points: (1) the international rulings as to socialist action; (2) colonial policy; (3) the general strike; (4) social policy and the insurance of workers; (5) trusts and unemployment, and others.

The attitude to bourgeois parties was expressed in the resolution on "The International Rulings as to Socialist Action" which forbade socialists to participate in bourgeois governments, and condemned "all efforts to gloss over the existence of class contradictions in order to make a rapprochement with bourgeois parties easier". Although it marked a step forward, the Congress resolution was only half-hearted, and as a whole was a further concession to opportunism. The Congress did not raise the question of the development of a mass general strike into an armed uprising, and did not oppose the Right opportunists, who justified the colonial policy of the imperialist states. In word the Congress condemned revisionism but did not, in its resolution, declare a break with opportunism, and was silent on the question of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. p. 190

[73] *Borodin's book—The State Duma in Figures*, by N. A. Borodin, Deputy to the First State Duma, St. Petersburg, 1906. According to Borodin's figures, of the 153 Cadets in the First Duma, 92 were of the nobility. Of these, 3 owned landed estates between 5,000 and 10,000 dessiatines, 8 owned estates from 2,000 to 5,000 dessiatines; 8 owned estates from 1,000 to 2,000 dessiatines and 30 owned estates from 500 to 1,000 dessiatines. Thus about one-third of the Cadet deputies were big landowners. p. 191

[74] "*Apropos of Stolypin's Declaration*" was the draft of a manifesto by the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma, in reply to the government declaration made by P. A. Stolypin, President of the Council of Ministers, on March 6 (19), 1907.

The Social-Democratic group decided to reply at its tenth session to the statement of the government. The following announcement of this was made in the Bolshevik newspaper *Novy Luch*, No. 7, on February 27, 1907: "At a meeting held on February 26, the question of the action to be taken by the Social-Democratic group on Stolypin's declaration was discussed. After Stolypin's declaration it was decided to take separate action, its form not being decided in advance. In the event of the group's proposal not being accepted, it was decided to support the proposals of revolutionary and oppositional parties".

The draft manifesto, drawn up by Lenin, came up for a preliminary discussion at a meeting of the Social-Democratic Duma group on February 28 (March 13), 1907, and was rejected by the Mensheviks, who were in the majority. To reply to the statement read in the Duma by Stolypin, I. G. Tsereteli, leader of the Social-Democratic Duma group, read the declaration adapted by the Menshevik majority of the group. This declaration was couched in semi-liberal tones, and was a step backward even in comparison with the statement made by the Social-Democratic group in the First Duma. Nothing at all was said of the socialist aims of the proletariat, nor was the demand for a constituent assembly included; the demand for the confiscation of all land was toned down to a formula acceptable even to the feudal landowners—"solution of the land question". p. 193

[75] See Note 1. p. 210

[76] *The November agrarian laws* were drawn up by Stolypin and promulgated by the tsarist government in November 1906. On November 9 (22), 1906, a decree was published on "Some Amendments to Existing Laws on Peasant Landownership and Land Tenure", which, after its passage through the Duma and the Council of State became known as the law of June 14, 1910; on November 15 (28), 1906, a decree was issued on "The Granting of Loans by the Peasant Land Bank on the Security of Allotment Lands". These laws gave the peasants the right to convert their allotment land into private property and the right to leave the commune with a plot of land or a separate farmstead. Peasants leaving the commune could

obtain a loan from the bank to acquire land. The purpose of the Stolypin laws was to create a class of kulak farmers as a bulwark of the autocracy in the countryside, to preserve the landed estates and break up the communes by force.

Stolypin's agrarian policy accelerated the capitalist evolution of agriculture by the most painful, "Prussian" method, retaining the power, property and privileges of the semi-feudal landowners; it increased the expropriation by force of the peasant masses and accelerated the formation of a peasant bourgeoisie able to buy up the lands of the poor peasants at a nominal price.

Lenin said that Stolypin's agrarian legislation in 1906 (and the law published on June 14 [27], 1910) was the second step (the Reform of 1861 was the first) towards turning the feudal autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy. "Stolypin has granted the old regime and the old feudal system of land tenure 'a new lease of life' by opening the last valve that could be opened without confiscating all the landed estates," wrote Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 18, "The Last Valve"). Although the government conducted extensive propaganda for the peasants to leave the communes, only about two and a half million peasant families in European Russia did so in the nine years from 1907 to 1915. First and foremost it was the rural bourgeoisie who took advantage of the right to leave the communes and thereby improve their farms. Some of the poor peasants also left the communes in order to sell their allotments and leave the land for ever. The petty peasant farms, weighed down by want, still remained beggarly and backward.

Stolypin's agrarian policy did not remove the chief contradiction—that between the peasantry and the landowners—but led to the even greater ruin of the masses of the peasantry and the sharpening of class contradictions between the kulaks and the village poor. p. 211

[77] At the sitting of the Second State Duma on March 7 (20), 1907, when the question of aid for the famine-stricken was being discussed, the Social-Democratic group, supported by the S.R.'s, the Popular Socialists and part of the Trudoviks, tabled a proposal to set up a Duma Food Commission to go thoroughly into government actions to help the famine-stricken in the 1905-07 period and to examine the way in which funds had been spent. The Social-Democratic group proposed that the question be studied not only from the reports, but by investigation on the spot.

The Cadet Deputy Rodichev spoke against the proposal of the Social-Democratic group and moved that the commission's competency be limited to an examination of ministerial report in St. Petersburg, "within the framework of the law", stating as the motive for his proposal that it was essential to "preserve the authority of the Duma" and not desirable to arouse the people. Rodichev's speech was fully approved by the government. Stolypin said that "the government is in complete agreement with Rodichev's proposal". p. 213

[78] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—the daily official newspaper of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it was controlled by the police and the Black Hundreds published in St. Petersburg from 1900 to 1914. p. 214

[79] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 553. p. 217

[80] "*How Not To Write Resolutions*" was published in the second issue of the symposium *Questions of Tactics*.

These pamphlets were published by the Bolsheviks in April 1907 in St. Petersburg at the *Novaya Duma* Publishing House. Lenin was an active collaborator in their publication as part of the preparations for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Two issues appeared.

The second issue of the *Questions of Tactics* was sequestered by the St. Petersburg Press Committee. p. 219

[81] *Council of State*—one of the highest state bodies in pre-revolutionary Russia. It was founded in 1810 by M. M. Speransky as an advisory legislative body whose members were appointed or approved by the tsar. By the law of February 20 (March 5), 1906, the Council of State was reconstituted and granted the formal rights of an "upper legislative chamber" which examined and approved bills after they had been discussed in the State Duma. The right to amend basic laws and promulgate a number of especially important laws was, however, retained by the tsar.

From 1906 onwards half of the Council of State consisted of elected members from the nobility, the clergy and the big bourgeoisie, and the other half of high-ranking government officials was appointed by the tsar. On account of this composition the Council of State was an extremely-reactionary body which rejected even the moderate bills passed by the State Duma. p. 226

[82] See Note 59. p. 236

[83] This quotation is taken from Engels's letter to F. Turati on "The Future Italian Revolution and the Socialist Party" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 553). p. 237

[84] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies formed in the central provinces of tsarist Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility and their powers were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the Provincial Governors and by the Ministry of the Interior, which could rescind any decisions of which the government disapproved. p. 240

[85] *The League of the Estonian Area of the R.S.D.L.P.* held in conference in the second half of February 1907. It was attended by

18 delegates with the right to vote from the Social-Democratic organisations in the towns of Revel and Narva and the Estonian rural Social-Democratic organisations. There were also three delegates from St. Petersburg and Riga with the right to vote on questions of propaganda and agitation in the Estonian language.

The conference adopted resolutions on: military organisations and combat groups, the agrarian question, the trade unions, the attitude to other local parties, the attitude to the State Duma, and the Rules of the League or the Estonian Area of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 240

[86] "*A Note on the Resolution of the Estonian Social-Democrats*" was published in *Proletary*, No 15, on March 25, 1907, under the heading "Editorial Notes", in connection with a letter to the editor on "The Conference of the Estonian Social-Democrats". p. 243

[87] *Polish Kolo* (*Circle*)—an alliance of Polish deputies to the State Dumas. In the First and Second Dumas the *Narodowci*, members of the reactionary party of Polish landlords and bourgeoisie, formed the core of this alliance. In all the main questions of Duma tactics, the Kolo supported the Octobrists. p. 247

[88] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. published illegally in St. Petersburg from September 17 (30) to November 18 (December 1), 1906, only seven issues appeared. The Editorial Board, elected at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., consisted entirely of Mensheviks (F. I. Dan, L. Martov, A. S. Martynov, P. P. Maslov, and A. N. Potresov). In point of fact the newspaper was the factional organ of the Mensheviks. p. 250

[89] *Izvestia Krestyanskikh Deputatov* (*Peasant Deputies' News*)—organ of the Trudovik Group in the First State Duma, appeared daily in St. Petersburg in May 1906. p. 256

[90] *Treitschke*, *Heinrich* (1834-1896)—German historian and journalist, ideologist and propagandist of Prussianism, chauvinism, and racism. p. 262

[91] This draft speech was written for the Social-Democratic Deputy C. A. Alexinsky, to be read during the Duma discussion on the agrarian question. In his speech on April 5 (18), 1907, Alexinsky only made partial use of the draft. p. 267

[92] *Civil mediators*—an office introduced by the tsarist government at the time of the Peasant Reform of 1861. The civil mediators were appointed by the governor from among the local nobility on the recommendation of the Assembly of the Nobility, and were approved by the Senate; they were empowered to examine and settle disputes between landlords and peasants arising out or the implementation of the "Regulations" on the emancipation of the peasants,

their real function being to protect the interests of the landlords. Their chief duty was to draw up "title deeds" defining the exact dimensions of the peasant allotments of land and also the obligations of the peasants towards the landlords, the civil mediators also supervised rural self-government. They approved the officials elected to the rural councils, had the right to inflict punishment on the peasants, arrest and fine them, and also to annul such decisions of peasant meetings that were not to the liking of the landlords.

The institution of civil mediators was representative exclusively of the social-estate of the nobility and aided the tsarist government in implementing the plunder of the peasants, in favour of the landlords, by the Reform of 1861. p. 270

[93] *Russkaya Pravda* (*Russian Law*)—the first written codification of laws and princes' decrees (eleventh-twelfth centuries). Its statutes protected the lives and property of the feudal lord and were indicative of the bitter class struggle between peasants in feudal bondage and their exploiters. p. 271

[94] The article referred to is N. Karyshev's "Peasant Non-Allotment Rentings" published in Volume Two of the book *Results of an Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data* (Derpt, 1892). p. 274

[95] In pre-revolutionary Russia, the landed estates belonging to the imperial family were administered by a Ministry of the Court and Crown Lands. p. 275

[96] This calculation was not found in Lenin's manuscript. p. 279

[97] This Russian expression means "to one and the same thing (or person)". p. 283

[98] The *labour standard* was the measure of the amount of land each peasant household should receive under an equalitarian system of land distribution. This utopian ideal had a long history in Russia and was strongly supported by the various Narodnik groups and parties that emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century after the emancipation of the serfs. The "labour standard" implied the allotment to each peasant household of the maximum amount of land its members could farm without employing hired labour. It was proposed in opposition to the "standard of 1861", i.e., the amount of land actually allotted to the peasants at the time of the Reform which in many cases was far from sufficient even to feed the peasant and his family so that he had to seek "outside employments" (for details of this feature of Russian peasant life see Volume Three of this edition "The Development of Capitalism in Russia"). The third standard mentioned in this article is the "subsistence standard", i.e., the minimum amount of land that would feed the peasant and his family. Needless to say this standard was far below the "labour standard". p. 287

[99] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from May 26 (June 8), 1906, in place of *Volna*, which had been suppressed by the government, and in continuation of *Volna*. Lenin played a leading role in the publication of the paper; other active collaborators were M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky, and A. V. Lunacharsky. The newspaper carried fifteen articles by Lenin.

Vperyod was subjected to constant persecution; ten of the seventeen issues were sequestered. The Bolsheviks countered police persecution by making preparations to issue their legal newspaper under another name in the event of its being closed down. On June 2 (15) a notice was printed in *Vperyod* to the effect that the daily workers' newspaper *Ekho* would shortly begin publication in St. Petersburg. This notice was printed in each issue until the paper was banned. The publication of *Vperyod* ceased on June 14 (27), 1906, by order of the St. Petersburg City Court, and *Ekho* began to appear in its stead. p. 290

[100] Lenin is referring to a passage in N. G. Chernyshevsky's novel *Prologue*, where the hero, Volgin, replies to the statement that there is a tremendous difference between the Progressists and the landowners' party. "No," he says, "not tremendous, but insignificant. It would be tremendous if the peasants obtained the land without redemption payments. There is a difference between taking a thing from a man and leaving it with him but if you take payment from him it is all the same. The only difference between the plan of the landlords' party and that of the Progressists is that the former is simpler and shorter. That is why it is even better. Less red tape and, in all probability, less of a burden on the peasants. Those peasants who have money will buy land. As to those who have none—there's no use compelling them to buy it. It will only ruin them. Redemption is nothing but purchase". Lenin quotes this passage in his "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats" (see present edition, Vol. 1, p. 281). p. 292

[101] *Balalaikin*—a character in M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *Modern Idyll*; a loud-mouthed liberal adventurer and liar. p. 306

[102] *Menshikov*—a reactionary journalist collaborator of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*). p. 310

[103] *Narodnaya Duma* (*People's Duma*)—a Menshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg in March and April 1907 in place of *Russkaya Zhizn*, which had been suppressed by the authorities. Twenty-one issues appeared. p. 316

[104] *Bazarov*—one of the chief characters in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. p. 316

[105] Lenin is quoting Sophia in Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 318

[106] *Economism*—an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century; it was a variation of international opportunism. The newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*), 1897-1902, and the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*), 1899-1902, were Economist publications. The programme of the Economists, whom Lenin called "Russian Bernsteinians", was contained in the *Credo* written by E. D. Kuskova in 1899.

The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to the economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely be the observer of the spontaneous process of the movement and the registrar of events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could arise out of the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instil socialist consciousness in the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists opposed the need to create a centralised working-class party; as a trend, Economism threatened to divert the workers from the class revolutionary path and make them a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

Lenin very thoroughly criticised the views of the Economists in a number of articles—"A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (which he wrote while in exile in Siberia in 1899; it was directed against the *Credo* and was signed by seventeen exiled Social-Democrats), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy"; "Apropos of the *Profession de foi*" (see present edition, Vol. 4); "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 5). Lenin put the finishing touches to his ideological rout of Economism in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5). Lenin's newspaper *Iskra* played an important part in the struggle against the Economists. p. 318

[107] *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*) *group*—a semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik group of Russian bourgeois intellectuals (S. N. Prokopovich, E. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, V. V. Portugalov, V. V. Khizhnyakov, and others) that took shape when the Russian revolution of 1905-07 began to decline. The group took its name from a political weekly, *Bez Zaglaviya*, published in St. Petersburg from January to May 1906 with Prokopovich as its editor. The same people later were grouped around the Left-Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*. Hiding behind a formal non-party screen, the *Bez Zaglaviya* group propagated the ideas of liberalism and opportunism, they supported revisionism in Russian and international Social-Democracy. p. 318

[108] *Posse, V. A.*—a bourgeois journalist and public man who, in 1906 and 1907, proposed the establishment of workers' co-operatives in Russia independent of the Social-Democratic Party. p. 318

[109] *Nashe Ekho* (*Our Echo*)—a Bolshevik legal daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 25 to April 10 (April 7 to 23), 1907. The newspaper was edited by Lenin and was a continuation of *Novy Luch*, which had been suppressed on February 27 (March 12), 1907. There were articles by Lenin in almost every issue. Among other contributors were V. V. Vorovsky and M. S. Olminsky. In all, fourteen issues of the paper appeared. On April 9 (22), 1907, the City Governor of St. Petersburg, on the basis of the state-of-emergency laws, prohibited its publication. The fourteenth number, the last, appeared after the ban. p. 320

[110] *Otgoloski* (*Echoes*)—Menshevik pamphlets (collections of articles) published in St. Petersburg in 1907. p. 325

[111] Lenin is referring to Marx's article "The Bourgeoisie and Counter-Revolution". (Marx-Engels-Lenin, *Zur deutschen Geschichte*, Bd. II, 1. Halbband, 1. Aufl., Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1954, S. 302.) p. 335

[112] Lenin is referring to the Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, and S.R.'s having voted for F. A. Golovin, the Cadet candidate for the post of Chairman of the Second State Duma. By "tactics of silence" Lenin means the Trudoviks' attitude to the government declaration, announced by Stolypin in the Duma on March 6 (19), 1907. The Social-Democratic group proposed criticising the government, but the Trudoviks answered that they had decided to greet the declaration with "the silence of the grave" and that they had already reached agreement with the majority of the oppositional groups on this question, in particular with the Cadets. When the budget was discussed in the Duma, the Trudoviks voted together with the Cadets to refer the budget to the Duma Budget Commission. p. 335

[113] *Marshal of the Nobility*—the representative of the nobility of a gubernia or uyezd in tsarist Russia. He was elected by the Assembly of the Nobility for the gubernia or uyezd, and was in charge of all the affairs of the nobility. He occupied an influential position and took the chair at meetings of the Zemstvo. p. 336

[114] *Rural Superintendent*—the administrative post introduced in 1899 by the tsarist government, in order to strengthen the landlords' power over the peasants. These officials were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were given tremendous powers, both administrative and juridical, to deal with the peasants. The powers included the right to arrest peasants and administer corporal punishment. p. 333

[115] *Zemstvo Boards*—the executive bodies of the Zemstvos, the local self-government institutions in pre-revolutionary Russia. The Zemstvos had jurisdiction over the purely local affairs of the rural population (road building, hospitals, schools, etc.). The landlords dominated in the Zemstvos. p. 336

[116] *N. R.*—N. A. Rozhkov, historian, a Social-Democrat who sided with the Bolsheviks in 1907. p. 338

[117] *The official organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries* was *Partiiniye Izvestia* (*Party News*) published from October 1906 to May 1907. p. 343

[118] *Urgent question*. In Russian Duma procedure questions were not usually put directly to a minister or submitted for debate without having first been examined by a commission. The Duma itself, however, could decide that a question was "urgent" and should be the subject of an immediate debate. As the reader can see from this article, the debate on whether a question was sufficiently urgent for a debate could obstruct any real discussion of it and ensure its relegation to a commission. From this it follows that no question raised by a small minority in the Duma could ever be voted "urgent" and discussion on it permitted. p. 346

[119] *Privet* (*Greetings*)—a Menshevik weekly published in St. Petersburg in March 1907; two issues appeared. p. 349

[120] *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*)—a legal Menshevik weekly published in St. Petersburg in November and December 1905. p. 352

[121] *Sovremennaya Zhizn* (*Contemporary Life*)—a Menshevik journal published in Moscow from April 1906 to March 1907.
Otkliki (*Comments*)—Menshevik symposia published in St. Petersburg in 1906 and 1907; three of them appeared. p. 362

[122] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 469. p. 363

[123] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 476-77. p. 363

[124] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 474-75. p. 363

[125] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 415. p. 364

[126] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 471. p. 364

[127] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 470.
The Knights of Labour—The Noble Order of the Knights of Labour was an American working-class organisation founded in Philadelphia in 1869 by Uriah Smith Stephens, a tailor. Until

1881 the Knights of Labour was a secret organisation which united craft unions of various categories of skilled and unskilled workers irrespective of nationality. In 1874 non-workers were admitted to the organisation on the condition that their number did not exceed a quarter of the total membership (it was forbidden to accept lawyers, bankers, persons living entirely or partly from the production or sale of spirituous liquors, professional gamblers and stock market speculators). In 1884 the organisation had 70,000 members and by 1886 the number had increased to 700,000. The chief purpose of the Order was the education of workers and the defence of their interests through workers' solidarity. The leadership of the Order constrained their members to refrain from the political struggle; they opposed the formation of a workers' party, opposed the day-by-day economic struggle against the factory owners, but favoured collaboration with the employers and the settlement of disputes by arbitration and peaceful agreements. Even in the eighties, when the working-class movement had acquired strength and many strikes ended in victory for the workers, the leaders of the Knights of Labour retained their old position. They considered co-operation to be the one means of fighting all the evils of capitalism.

In 1886 the leaders of the Knights of Labour opposed the nationwide general strike of workers for the eight-hour day and although many rank-and-file members of the Order participated in the strike the leadership succeeded in breaking it by forbidding participation. The contradictions between the majority of the membership and the opportunist leaders grew more acute; after 1886 the Knights of Labour began to lose its influence among the masses and by the end of the nineties had ceased to exist.

Despite the treacherous policy of its leaders, the Noble Order of the Knights of Labour, especially in the early period of its existence, played an important role in the working-class movement of the U.S.A. p. 364

[128] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 375-76. p. 366

[129] *Katheder-Socialists* or *Katheder-reformers*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois political economy in the 1870s and 1880s who, under the guise of socialism, advocated bourgeois-liberal reformism from university chairs (*Katheder* in German). The fear aroused among the exploiting classes by the spread of Marxism and the growth of the working-class movement, as well as the efforts of bourgeois ideologists to find fresh means of keeping the working people in subjugation, brought *Katheder*-Socialism into being.

The *Katheder*-Socialists, among whom were Adolf Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, Lorenz Brentano, and Werner Sombart, asserted that the bourgeois state is above classes; that it can reconcile mutually hostile classes, and that it can gradually introduce socialism", without affecting the interests of the capitalists, while giving every possible consideration to the demands of the working

people. They suggested the legalisation of police-regulated wage-labour and the revival of the medieval guilds. Marx and Engels exposed *Katheder*-Socialism, showing how essentially reactionary it was. Lenin called the *Katheder*-Socialists the bedbugs of "police-bourgeois university science" who hated Marx's revolutionary teachings. In Russia the views of the *Katheder*-Socialists were disseminated by the "legal Marxists". p. 366

[130] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 396. p. 367

[131] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, Stuttgart, 1921, S. 164-65. p. 367

[132] Ibid., S. 169. p. 367

[133] Ibid., S. 183-84.
Yearbook of Social Science and Social Politics—published in Zurich in 1879 by the German reformist Social-Democrat K. Höchberg. p. 368

[134] There was a difference of opinion among the Social-Democratic deputies to the German Reichstag on the question of the steamship subsidies. At the end of 1884 Chancellor Bismarck demanded, in the interests of the German policy of colonial expansion, that the Reichstag institute a subsidy for shipping companies to organise regular shipping lines to East Asia, Australia and Africa. The Left Wing of the Social-Democratic group, headed by Bebel and Liebknecht, rejected the steamship subsidy, but the Right wing—Auer, Dietz and others, who constituted the majority—spoke in favour of granting the shipping companies a subsidy even before the official debates in the Reichstag. During the Reichstag discussion in March 1885, the Right wing of the Social-Democratic group voted in favour of opening shipping lines to East Asia and Australia; they based their agreement with Bismarck's plan on the acceptance of some of their conditions, in particular the demand that the new ships should be built in German shipyards. It was only when the Reichstag rejected this demand that the whole Social-Democratic group voted against the government plan. The conduct of the majority of the group was sharply criticised in the newspaper *Sozial-Demokrat* and by Social-Democratic organisations. The differences were so sharp that almost caused a split in the party and Engels subjected the opportunist position of the Right wing of the Social-Democratic group to scathing criticism! (See Marx and Engels, *Briefe an Bebel*, S. 384, 392, *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 203; Marx and Engels, *Briefe über "Das Kapital"*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1953, S. 294.) p. 368

[135] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 203-04. p. 368

[136] Ibid., S. 256. p. 368

[137] *Possibilists* (Brousse, Benoit Malon, and others)—a petty-bourgeois trend in the French socialist movement that distracted workers from revolutionary methods of struggle. In 1882, after the split in the French Workers' Party at the Sainte Etienne Congress, the Possibilists organised the Workers' Social-Revolutionary Party; they rejected the revolutionary programme and revolutionary tactics of the proletariat, ignored the socialist aims of the working-class movement and proposed limiting the workers' struggle to the "possible"—hence the name of the party. The Possibilists were influential mainly in the economically more backward regions of France and among the less developed sections of the working class. p. 369

[138] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 307. p. 369

[139] Ibid., S. 311. p. 369

[140] *Bakuninists*—adherents of an anarchist trend hostile to Marxism. Named after its founder, Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876). The basic postulate of Bakuninism was the negation of the state as such, including the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bakuninists held that the revolution was to take the form of immediate popular revolts directed by a secret revolutionary society, made up of "outstanding" individuals. The theory and the tactics of the Bakuninists were severely condemned by Marx and Engels. Lenin described Bakuninism as the world outlook "of the petty bourgeois who despairs of his salvation". Bakuninism was one of the ideological sources of Narodism (see Note 22). p. 369

[141] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 486-87. p. 369

[142] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 316. p. 370

[143] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 319. p. 370

[144] *Die Neue Zeit*, 1907, 25. Jhrg., Erster Band, S. 13. p. 370

[145] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 537. p. 371

[146] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 557. p. 371

[147] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 415. p. 371

[148] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 397. p. 372

[149] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 33. p. 373

[150] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 471. p. 374

[151] *Decazeville strike*—a strike of French coal-miners at Decazeville in January 1886 which was put down by government troops. Bourgeois members of the Chamber of Deputies, including Radicals, approved the government's repressive measures. Working-class deputies left the Radical Party and formed an independent workers' group in the Chamber. p. 374

[152] V. I. Lenin, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1959, p. 162. p. 374

[153] The remaining part of the "Introduction" (from the words "In 1889 a young, fresh movement ...") was published in the Bolshevik newspaper *Nashe Ekho*, No. 13, on April 8, 1907, with the following introductory paragraph:

"Correspondence between Marx and Engels and their friend and comrade-in-arms Sorge, who lives in America, is shortly to be published by P. Dauge. In view of the interest aroused by this publication we have taken the liberty of reprinting here that part of the introduction to the Russian translation of the book which deals with the attitude of Marx and Engels to the revolution they expected to take place in Russia. We shall begin with two typical passages by Engels on the significance of the French revolution and on the possible revolution in Germany." p. 374

[154] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 491. p. 375

[155] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 371. p. 375

[156] By "*the Eastern crisis*" Marx meant the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. p. 376

[157] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 376. p. 376

[158] *Narodnaya Volya* (*The People's Will*) *organisation*—a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists which took shape in August 1879 following a split in the Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty) secret society. The organisation was headed by an Executive Committee which included among its members A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov; M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya and A. A. Kvyatkovsky. The members of the Narodnaya Volya organisation continued to uphold utopian Narodnik socialism but at the same time entered the political struggle, considering the overthrow of the autocracy and the achievement of political liberty to be the most important tasks. Their programme envisaged "permanent popular representation (i.e., parliament) established on the basis of universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of the land to the

people and the elaboration of measures for the transfer of the factories to the workers. "Narodnaya Volya", wrote Lenin, "made a step forward by going over to the political struggle, but they did not succeed in linking it up with socialism."

The Narodnaya Volya group conducted an heroic struggle against the autocracy, but it was based on the erroneous theory of "active" heroes and the "passive" mass; they expected to achieve the transformation of society without the participation of the people, using only their own forces, by means of individual terror, and the intimidation and disorganisation of the government.

After March 1, 1881 (the assassination of Alexander II), the government crushed the Narodnaya Volya organisation by savage persecution, executions and acts of provocation. Repeated attempts were made to revive the Narodnaya Volya during the eighties, but all proved fruitless. In 1886, for example, a group was formed under the leadership of A. I. Ulyanov (brother of V. I. Lenin) and P. Y. Shevyrev, which adopted the traditions of the Narodnaya Volya. The group was uncovered after the unsuccessful attempt on the life of Alexander III in 1887, and its active members were executed.

Lenin criticised the erroneous utopian programme of the Narodnaya Volya but held in very high esteem the self-sacrificing struggle of its members against tsarism. He had a very high opinion of their technique of underground work and their strictly centralised organisation.

General Redistribution (G. V. Plekhanov, M. R. Popov, P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. V. Stefanovich; V. I. Zasulich, O. V. Aptekman, V. N. Ignatov, and later, A. P. Bulanov, and others)—an organisation that demanded in its programme the basic platform of the old Zemlya i Volya organisation, the equalitarian redistribution of all land among those who till it. Plekhanov, Deutsch, Zasulich, Stefanovich, and others went abroad in 1880 and there, as well as in Russia, issued the journal *Chorny Peredel* (*General Redistribution*) and the newspaper *Zerno* (*Corn*). Some of the General Redistribution group later went over to Marxism (Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Deutsch, and Ignatov) and founded the first Russian Marxist organisation—the Emancipation of Labour group—in 1883; after March 1, 1881, the remainder of the group joined forces with the Narodnaya Volya. p. 376

[159] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 405.

The French passage reads: "*principles* have been hawked about the street ever since the time of the late Bakunin". p. 376

[160] Engels wrote about the pamphlet "Our Differences" and about the forthcoming revolution in Russia in a letter to V. I. Zasulich dated April 23, 1885. The letter was first published in 1925 in the symposium "The Emancipation of Labour Group", No. 3. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 458-61.) p. 377

[161] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge*, S. 260. p. 377

[162] Ibid., S. 262. p. 377

[163] Marx-Engels-Lenin, *Zur deutschen Geschichte*, Bd. II, 1. Halbband, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1954, S. 525. p. 377

[164] *Malover*—pseudonym of the Cadet V. Portugalov. The Russian word "malover" means "one of little faith". p. 379

[165] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 69. p. 384

[166] *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (*New Rhenish Gazette*) was published in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849, Marx and Engels being the chief collaborators, the former the editor-in-chief. The newspaper ceased to exist after the publication of No. 301, owing to persecution by the reactionaries. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 328-37.)

"*Assembly of conciliators*" was the name Marx gave to the Frankfurt parliament convened in Germany in May 1848. (See Marx-Engels-Lenin, *Zur deutschen Geschichte*, S. 302.) p. 387

[167] *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, Nos. 234 and 235, March 1 and 2, 1849; Marx-Engels-Lenin, *Zur deutschen Geschichte*, Bd. II, S. 307. p. 388

[168] The article "*Larin and Khrustalev*" was first published in the newspaper *Trud* (*Labour*).

Trud—a Bolshevik weekly literary and political newspaper. Only one issue appeared on April 15 (28), 1907. The following day the publication of the paper was forbidden by the St. Petersburg City Governor. p. 390

[169] *Zubato*—see Note 30.

Gapon—a priest of the Orthodox Church and agent of the tsarist secret police who founded the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers, an organisation of the Zubatov type. On January 9, 1905, Gapon, taking advantage of the growing unrest, provoked the workers into demonstrating before the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg for the purpose of handing a petition to the tsar. By order of Nicholas II, troops shot down the unarmed people. This act destroyed the naïve faith of workers throughout the country in the tsar and served as the starting-point of the first Russian revolution. The political consciousness of the proletariat was aroused and a wave of protest strikes swept all Russia. p. 393

[170] The Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. was held in Terioki (Finland) on March 25 (April 7) and was attended by 133 delegates (92 Bolsheviks and 41 Mensheviks), over a hundred of the delegates being workers. The election of delegates to the Conference lasted over a month and was conducted under the supervision of a special Central Committee commission. Almost

all members of the organisation participated in the election. Lenin took the chair at the Conference and also spoke on the question of the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg Party organisation and on questions of the organisational work of the St. Petersburg Committee.

The Conference discussed the following items: the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.; the representation of the St. Petersburg organisation in the Social-Democratic Duma group; the impermissibility of Social-Democrats writing for the bourgeois press; May Day and the tactics of Social-Democracy. An overwhelming majority voted in favour of the reorganisation plan drawn up by the Bolsheviks. The chief point in the plan was the recognition of the Conference as a standing body that met periodically as the legislative body of the local organisation and which elected its executive body, the St. Petersburg Committee, to function as directed by the Conference. A new St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was elected. Lenin was elected to maintain contact between the St. Petersburg Committee and the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The Conference roundly condemned any sort of collaboration with the bourgeois press by Social-Democrats.

The Conference put an end to the split that had existed in the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. since the January conference in 1907.

The second session of the Conference was also held in Terioki on April 8 (21), 1907. The items on the agenda were: the celebration of May Day; the campaign of meetings; the council of delegates, the election of delegates to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.; the report of Duma Deputy Alexinsky; organisational questions; the co-operative movement; the struggle against the Black Hundreds; unemployment. Lack of time prevented a discussion on the first three questions.

The Conference passed a decision to celebrate May Day by a one-day general strike and meetings; it was also decided that a council be organised of delegates for St. Petersburg City and Gubernia, for which purpose all delegates be called together immediately by districts. On the question of electing delegates to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. it was decided that the St. Petersburg Committee be left to work out the technique of the elections at the second stage, and that the Conference should confine itself to electing a mandate commission of seven members from among those present. The Conference discussed Alexinsky's report and appointed a commission to draw up a resolution on it. The Conference also adopted a number of decisions on organisational questions.

Lenin took part in the discussion on Alexinsky's report. He also recommended that the St. Petersburg delegation to the Fifth Congress table a proposal to call representatives of the combat groups to the Congress in connection with the question of their reorganisation. p. 395

[171] *The boycott conference*—the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. called by the St. Petersburg Committee to decide the question of the attitude to the State Duma, sixty-five delegates with the right to vote were present. Lenin played a leading role in the Conference. Delegates were elected on a basis of one delegate per thirty voting Party members after discussing and voting on the tactical platforms of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the former obtaining a substantial majority. The Mensheviks demanded that the votes of the regional organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., almost all Bolshevik, be considered invalid. In the course of the discussion on the regional organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin made a number of remarks and interpolations. The Conference approved the representation of the regional organisation, and then heard the report of the St. Petersburg Committee, and adopted Lenin's resolution recognising the obligatory nature of its decisions. Lenin made a report on the attitude towards the State Duma (it has not been found among the secretary's notes taken at the meeting). At the end of his report, Lenin read out a resolution on the tactics of an active boycott. The Menshevik resolution was read by Martov. The Conference approved the tactics of an active boycott of the Duma by a majority of 36 to 29 votes, but did not have time to adopt the whole resolution with motives for the tactics of an active boycott.

A Second City Conference was called at the end of February, and sat for the first few days of March to discuss and finally approve the tactics for an active boycott of the Duma; 62 delegates attended. The Conference discussed Lenin's resolution and then Martov's; the Mensheviks submitted an additional resolution from Okhta District. After a long and bitter struggle, the Conference adopted by a majority of 35 votes to 24, with one delegate abstaining, the resolution submitted by Lenin as the basis of its resolution on the tactics of an active boycott of the Duma. The Conference elected a commission, with Lenin as one of its members, to put the resolution into final shape. The Mensheviks refused to participate in the commission and walked out of the Conference.

p. 397

[172] The June inter-district conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. was attended by more than forty Bolsheviks and about thirty Mensheviks; the resolutions proposed by the Bolsheviks were adopted.

p. 397

[173] This refers to the First Conference of Military and Combat Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held between November 16 and 22 (November 29-December 5), 1906, in Tammerfors (Finland). The Conference was called on the initiative of the St. Petersburg and Moscow organisations, and also of the Bolshevik section of the Central Committee. Lenin approved the Conference and took part in the preparations for it. He wrote a letter to the conference delegates in which he warned them against rash decisions that de-

viated from the principles of the Bolshevik line. Lenin's letter was read to the Conference.

The Conference was attended by 19 delegates with a vote and 8 with consultative voice, representing 11 military and 8 combat organisations, including representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. committees in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Military organisations in St. Petersburg, Kronstadt, Riga, Moscow, Finland, Sevastopol, Libau, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kaluga, Voronezh, and Kazan were represented, as were the combat organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Saratov, and the Urals. In addition, the Conference was attended by representatives of the Technical Bureau of the Central Committee, the Southern Technical Bureau and the revolutionary section of Finnish Social-Democrats. Among the delegates were Y. M. Yaroslavsky, R. S. Zemlyachka, I. A. Sammer (Lyubich, Ostapchenko), I. Kh. Lalayants, and M. N. Lyadov.

The Conference discussed the following questions: (1) report of the organising bureau; (2) reports of delegates; (3) on past attempts at insurrection; (4) assessment of the situation obtaining; (5) the nature of an armed uprising; (6) the tasks of the military and combat organisations; (7) the nature of the work of military organisations; (8) the attitude to combat organisations of other parties and of non-party people; (9) the establishment of military and combat centres in connection with the organisation of an armed uprising; (10) the attitude of military and combat organisations to general-proletarian organisations; (11) report to the Party Congress; (12) rates of representation at the Congress; (13) the Central organ and literature; (14) the attitude to the Conference of military organisations convened by the Central Committee; (15) elections.

The Conference adopted a number of resolutions—on the situation obtaining; on the role of the Party in an armed uprising (this resolution was adopted unanimously at a private session as representing only the opinion of Party members present at the Conference); tasks of the military organisations; tasks of the combat groups; on the attitude to combat organisations of other parties and those composed of non-party people; on the role of the military and combat organisations in an insurrection; on work among officers; on expropriations; on the attitude to the Conference convened by the Central Committee; on the report to the Congress; on the rate of representation at the Congress; on the provisional bureau of military and combat organisations; on the literary organ and publishing; on local and regional literature; on the establishment of an all-Russian military and combat organisation; on the absence of a representative from the Central Committee. The Conference elected a Provisional Bureau to convene an all-Russian military conference which existed for only two months.

The resolutions of the Conference were published in *Proletary*, No. 9, on December 7, 1906 and the minutes were published in St. Petersburg in 1907. p. 409

[174] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*A Social-Democrat's Diary*)—a journal published irregularly by Plekhanov in Geneva from March

1905 to April 1912, with long intervals between issues. Sixteen issues appeared. Publication was resumed in St. Petersburg, but only one issue appeared. In the first eight issues (1905-06) Plekhanov pursued an extreme-Right Menshevik opportunist policy, defending a bloc between Social-Democrats and the liberal bourgeoisie, denying the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry and condemning the December armed uprising. In the period 1909-12, Plekhanov came out in defence of Party underground organisations against the Menshevik liquidators (issues 9 to 16 of the *Dnevnik*). On basic tactical questions, however, he retained his Menshevik views. In issue No. 1 of the *Dnevnik* for 1916, Plekhanov's social-chauvinist views were clearly expressed.

Lenin criticised Plekhanov sharply for his opportunism and deviation from revolutionary Marxism. p. 416

[175] *Izarov*—I. Kh. Lalayants. p. 416

[176] *Varin*—V. Y. Fridolin, who supported the Bolsheviks in 1907. p. 417

[177] *Ilyan*—Y. M. Yaroslavsky. p. 418

[178] This was published in pamphlet form in April 1907 in the *Proletary* press in Vyborg; it bore the instruction on the cover "For Delegates to the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Only". The first and last parts of the pamphlet were written in April 1907; "Speech for the Defence (or for the Prosecution of the Menshevik Section of the Central Committee) Delivered at the Party Tribunal" was written by Lenin in February and read at the first session of the tribunal at the end of March 1907. p. 419

[179] The conference referred to was a meeting of 234 Bolsheviks of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. working in various districts of that city; it passed the following resolution on the conduct of the Mensheviks in St. Petersburg at the time of the campaign for the elections to the Second State Duma and on the Party tribunal set up on the initiative of the Menshevik Central Committee:

"1. The Menshevik comrades were wholly to blame for the split in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation at the time of the election campaign.

"2. The negotiations between the Menshevik group and the Cadets before the split and after were, in effect, impermissible bargaining for seats in the Duma, bargaining that took place against the wishes of the Social-Democratic proletariat in St. Petersburg.

"3. Particularly impermissible were the activities of Comrade Dan, who played a most active part throughout the split and in the negotiations with the Cadets, for the conduct of which he was not authorised by any Party organisation.

"4. The conduct of the group of Mensheviks after their rupture with the Cadets, and particularly after the conclusion of the agreement between the Left parties in St. Petersburg—the demonstrative protests against that agreement and the appeal to electors in some St. Petersburg districts not to support it, the obstruction in compiling the Left election lists, etc.—this conduct as a whole is direct subversion of the proletarian and common Party cause to the advantage of the Cadets.

"The meeting therefore expresses the wish that the Bolshevik section of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation that remained after the Mensheviks had quit the Conference should participate in the Party tribunal organised on the initiative of the Central Committee and submit a counter-indictment of politically impermissible conduct against the group of Mensheviks and against Comrade Dan.

"The meeting proposes to all Party workers, to counteract the campaign launched by the Central Committee against N. Lenin by informing broad sections of the St. Petersburg proletariat of the course taken by the Social-Democratic election campaign and the role played by the Menshevik group" (*Proletary*, No. 13, February 11, 1907).

The Conference of the St. Petersburg (City and Regional) Organisation, held in February 1907, confirmed the resolution passed by the meeting of 234 Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg, and added a fifth point to it: "The Conference supports the substance of the accusation made in N. Lenin's pamphlet (*The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*) and, therefore, considers that it has the right to attend the tribunal as a contending Party. In putting forward its counter-indictment against Comrade Dan and the thirty-one Mensheviks, the Conference instructs its representatives at the tribunal to hand it to the judges examining Lenin's case" (*Proletary*, No, 14, March 4, 1907).

Similar resolutions were passed at meetings of district committees and by the meeting of the Okruzhnoi District of St. Petersburg. p. 419

[180] *Dostizhentsi* (from *dostizheniye*—attainment)—members of the League for the Attainment of Full Rights for the Jewish People in Russia. The League was organised in 1905 at a meeting of Jewish "public" men in Wilno. It was made up of Cadet and Zionist elements; the leader of the League was M. M. Vinaver. The "dostizhentsi" put forward demands for bourgeois civil liberties, the annulment of laws imposing restrictions on Jews, and the granting of the same rights to Jews as to the remainder of the population. The League played scarcely any political role; its activities, even in the period of greatest revolutionary upsurge, were confined to the organisation of petitions and protests. On all questions the League adopted the Cadet position. By the end of 1907 it had ceased to exist. p. 429

[181] *Maximov-Malinovsky*—better known by his pseudonym of A. A. Bogdanov.

Zimin—L. B. Krasin
Stroyev—pseudonym of V. A. Desnitsky p. 433

[182] *The Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*—held in London between April 30 and May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907. The Congress was attended by 336 delegates with a vote and with consultative voice; of these 105 were Bolsheviks, 97 were Mensheviks, 57 were Bund members, 44 were Polish Social-Democrats, 29 were Latvian Social-Democrats and 4 were "non-factional". The Bolsheviks were supported by the Poles and Latvians and had a stable majority at the Congress.

The Congress discussed: (1) the report of the Central Committee; (2) the report of the Duma group and its organisation; (3) the attitude to bourgeois parties; (4) the State Duma; (5) the labour congress and non-party labour organisations; (6) trade unions and the Party; (7) partisan actions; (8) unemployment the economic crisis and lock-outs; (9) organisational questions; (10) the International Congress at Stuttgart (May 1, militarism); (11) work in the army; (12) miscellaneous. The most important point on the agenda was Lenin's report on the attitude towards bourgeois parties. Bolshevik resolutions were adopted on all questions of principle. The Central Committee elected by the Congress consisted of 5 Bolsheviks, 4 Mensheviks, 1 Latvian and 2 Polish Social-Democrats. Alternate members of the C.C. were also elected: 10 Bolsheviks, 7 Mensheviks, 3 Polish and 2 Latvian Social-Democrats.

The Congress ended in the complete victory of Bolshevism over the opportunist wing of the Party, the Mensheviks. For further material on the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. see Lenin's article "The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties" (see present volume, pp. 489-509). p. 437

[183] Lenin made this statement at the twentieth session of the Congress when the resolution on the report of the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma was approved. A commission had been appointed to draw up the resolution; it consisted of ten members, two representatives from each group at the Congress. Four draft resolutions were submitted to the commission—from the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Polish Social-Democrats and the Bund. The commission did not accept any of the proposals submitted, or examine any draft as a whole but discussed the questions of: (1) whether the resolution should contain political instructions for the group; (2) whether all the errors of the group should be listed; (3) the question of trusting the group. A resolution was then drawn up by the commission but was not approved by a majority. At its nineteenth session (May 10 [23]) the Congress, therefore, again discussed the same questions. The Bolshevik proposal to include instructions to the group in the resolution was rejected because the Latvian Social-Democrats voted against it. The next day, May 11 (24), at the twentieth session, Werner (T. P. Kalnin), representative of the Latvian Social-Democrats, tabled a motion that the discussion of the resolution on the Duma group be postponed until

the question of the attitude to bourgeois parties and that of the State Duma had been discussed. In justification of his proposal he said that part of the Latvian delegation had voted against the directives to the group at the nineteenth session because these directives would not be clear to them until the questions of bourgeois parties and the State Duma had been discussed.

The presidium of the Congress submitted this question to the Congress for discussion, considering that Werner's proposal would not change the decision on the directives that had been adopted on the previous day. Lenin supported the Latvian Social-Democrats. The Mensheviks and the Bund members spoke not only against Werner's proposal but against his presentation of the question.

The Congress, however, decided by a majority of 149 against 144, with three abstaining, the delegates voting by name, that it would be necessary to give directives to the group after the discussion on the attitude to bourgeois parties and on the State Duma. p. 455

[184] Lenin deals in detail with the resolution of the Caucasian Mensheviks in his "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 92-104). p. 457

[185] Marx-Engels, *Beschlüsse gegen Hermann Kriege, den Redacteur des "Volkstribun"*, MEGA, Bd. V, S. 10. p. 467

[186] At the twenty-seventh session of the Congress, when the Bolshevik resolution on the attitude towards bourgeois parties was being discussed, Trotsky proposed the removal from the resolution of the characterisation of the social basis of the liberal-monarchist parties and of the most important of them, the Cadets. The proposal was rejected after Lenin's speech. p. 479

[187] Amendments to the resolution on the attitude towards bourgeois parties proposed by the Mensheviks Martov and Martynov were rejected by the Congress. p. 480

[188] It was decided at the Congress to elect a Central Committee of 15 members—12 at the Congress and 3 to be delegated by national organisations after the Congress. The counting of the votes in the elections to the Central Committee was made at a meeting with a curtailed number of delegates—one representative to every four delegates. Seventy-five delegates attended this meeting—22 Bolsheviks, 21 Mensheviks, 14 Bund members, 11 Poles and 7 Latvians. In the voting for the candidates, 9 obtained a majority of votes and 5 obtained an equal number of votes each. The Bolsheviks proposed taking a new vote, but the Mensheviks proposed that the 5 candidates draw lots. The Bolshevik proposal was adopted. p. 488

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Chronology
(*January-June 1907*)

1907

January-April	Lenin lives at Kokkala (Finland).
January 18 (31)	Lenin writes "The Social-Democratic Election Campaign in St. Petersburg"; published in *Prostiye Rechi*, No. 2, January 21 (February 3).
January 19 (February 1)	Lenin writes "Descending Rung by Rung"; published in *Proletary*, No. 12, January 25 (February 7).
January 19-20 (February 1-2)	Lenin writes "The Protest of the Thirty-One Mensheviks"; published in *Proletary*, No. 12, January 25 (February 7).
January 20 (February 2)	Lenin writes the pamphlet "The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks", published in St. Petersburg by the *Novaya Duma* Publishers.
January 25 (February 7)	Lenin's article "How To Vote in the St. Petersburg Elections (Is There a Danger of the Black Hundreds Winning the St. Petersburg Elections?)" published in the newspaper *Zreniye*, No. 1.
	Lenin's article "The St. Petersburg Elections and the Crisis of Opportunism" published as the leading article in *Proletary*, No. 12.
End of January	Lenin arraigned before the Party tribunal by the Central Committee (the majority of which were Mensheviks) for his pamphlet "The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks".
January 30 (February 12)	Lenin writes his "The Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg" and "The Struggle Between S.D.'s and S.R.'s in the Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg"; published in *Prostiye Rechi*, No. 3.

February 4 (17)	Lenin's "How To Vote in the St. Petersburg Elections (Who Benefits from the Fables About the Black-Hundred Danger?)", "The Moscow Elections—Preliminary Results", and "A Political Lidvaliad" published in *Zreniye*, No. 2.
	Lenin writes his "The Significance of the St. Petersburg Elections"; published in *Proletary* No. 13, February 11 (24).
February 5 (18)	Lenin writes his preface to the Russian translation of Karl Marx's *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, edited by Lenin and published in St. Petersburg in 1907.
February 7 (20)	Lenin writes the leading article for *Proletary* No. 13, "The Second Duma and the Second Revolutionary Wave".
February 9 (22)	Lenin writes his "The Election Results in St. Petersburg"; published in *Proletary*, No. 13.
Beginning of February	Lenin writes his "Speech for the Defence (or for the Prosecution of the Menshevik Section of the Central Committee)" for the Party tribunal.
February 11 (24)	Lenin's articles "The Results of the Elections in the Worker Curia in St. Petersburg", "Some Figures on the Elections in the Worker Curia in South Russia", "On the Report of the Moscow District of St. Petersburg Concerning the Elections to the Second Duma" published in *Proletary*, No. 13.
Between February 8 and 15 (21 and 28)	Lenin reads a report on the Duma campaign and the Duma tactics of the Social-Democrats at the third session of the Conference of the St. Petersburg (City and Regional) Organisation.
February 15-18 (February 28-March 3)	Lenin writes the draft resolutions for the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
	Lenin conducts the meeting of representatives of the St. Petersburg and Moscow Regional Committees, the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region and the Editorial Board of the newspaper Proletary at which Lenin's draft resolutions are discussed and approved.
February 17 (March 2)	Lenin grants an interview to a *L'Humanité* correspondent on the tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. in the election campaign.

February 20 (March 5)	Lenin writes his article "The Opening of the Second State Duma"; published as the leading article in the newspaper *Novy Luch*, No. 1.
	Lenin writes "The Second Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat"; published as the leading article in the newspaper *Rabochy*, No. 2, February 23 (March 8).
February 21 (March 6)	Lenin writes "The First Important Step"; published in the newspaper *Novy Luch*, No. 2.
February 22 (March 7)	Lenin writes the article "Petty-Bourgeois Tactics" for the newspaper *Novy Luch*, No. 4; published on February 23 (March 8).
February 23 (March 8)	Lenin writes the articles "What the Splitters Have to Say About the Coming Split" and "On the Tactics of Opportunism"; published in *Novy Luch*, No. 5, February 24 (March 9).
February 25 (March 10)	Lenin's article "The Bolsheviks and the Petty Bourgeoisie" published as the leading article of *Novy Luch*, No. 6.
February 27 (March 12)	Lenin writes the leading article for *Proletary* No. 14, published on March 4 (17), "The Imminent Dissolution of the Duma and Questions of Tactics".
Between February 27 and March 1 (March 12 and 14)	Lenin writes "Cadets and Trudoviks" for the newspaper *Rabochaya Molva*, No. 1.
February 28 (March 13)	Lenin's draft manifesto "Apropos of Stolypin's Declaration" discussed at a meeting of the Social-Democratic Duma group.
End of February	Lenin writes his article "The Elections to the Duma and the Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats"; published in the German Social-Democratic journal *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*), No. 26 March 27 (N. S.).
	Lenin writes the first part of his "The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy"; published in *Proletary*, No. 14, March 4 (17).
March 12 (25)	Lenin writes the second part of "The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy", published in *Proletary*, No. 15, March 25 (April 7),

March 19 (*April 1*)	Lenin writes his article "How Not To Write Resolutions"; published in the Bolshevik symposium *Questions of Tactics*.
March 21 (*April 3*)	Lenin writes his article "The Terms of the Deal"; published as the leading article in *Proletary*, No. 15, March 25 (April 7).
Between March 21 and 25 (*April 3-7*)	Lenin writes a draft speech on the agrarian question to be delivered in the Duma by a Social-Democrat deputy.
March 25 (*April 7*)	Lenin presides at the first session of the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Terioki (Finland) and takes part in the discussion on the plan for the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg Committee and on questions concerning the organisational work of the St. Petersburg Committee. Lenin was elected delegate from the Conference for liaison with Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma.
	Lenin's article "Fine Words—Foul Deeds" published in the newspaper *Nashe Ekho*, No. 1.
March 27 (*April 9*)	Lenin's article "The Duma and the Approval of the Budget" published as the leading article in the newspaper *Nashe Ekho*, No. 2.
March 28 (*April 10*)	Lenin writes the article "The Cuckoo Praises the Rooster", published as the leading article of *Nashe Ekho*, No. 4, March 29 (April 11).
March 30 (*April 12*)	Lenin's article "Intellectualist Warriors Against Domination by the Intelligentsia" published in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 5.
End of March	Lenin delivers his speech for the defence (or for the prosecution of the Menshevik section of the Central Committee) at the first session of the Party tribunal, in which he exposes the breakaway activities of the Mensheviks in the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.
March	Lenin reports on the current situation and on the tasks of the Party at an instructional conference of Bolsheviks leaving to organise the election of delegates to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in various localities.
April 1 (*14*)	Lenin's article "The Agrarian Question and the Forces of the Revolution" published in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 7.

April 2 (15) Lenin writes his article "An Anaemic Duma or an Anaemic Petty Bourgeoisie"; published as the leading article in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 8, April 3 (16).

April 3 (16) Lenin writes "Banality Triumphant or S.R.'s Ape the Cadets" as the leading article for *Nashe Ekho*, No. 9; published on April 4 (17).

April 4 (17) Lenin writes "The Social-Democratic Group and April 3 in the Duma"; published in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 10, April 5 (18).

April 5-6 (18-19) Lenin writes "The Strength and Weakness of the Russian Revolution"; published in *Nashe Ekho*, Nos. 10 and 12.

April 6 (19) Lenin writes the "Preface to the Russian Translation of *Letters by Johannes Becker, Joseph Dietzgen, Frederick Engels, Karl Marx and Others to Friedrich Sorge and Others*".

April 8 (21) Lenin takes part in the discussion on the report on the activities of the Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma at the second session of the Conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation.

April 10 (23) Lenin writes "The Duma and the Russian Liberals"; published as the leading article in *Nashe Ekho*, No. 14.

April 15 (28) Lenin's "Larin and Khrustalev" published in the newspaper *Trud*, No. 1.

April Lenin's articles "The Menshevik Tactical Platform", "Angry Embarrassment (The Question of the Labour Congress)" and "Franz Mehring on the Second Duma" published in the symposium *Questions of Tactics*.

Lenin's pamphlet "Report to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the St. Petersburg Split and the Institution of the Party Tribunal Ensuing Therefrom" published.

Lenin is elected delegate to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and receives a mandate to represent the Verkhne-Kamskaya (Urals) organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin participates in the meeting of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks at Terioki at which questions of the forthcoming Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. are discussed; he speaks against Axelrod's proposal to convene a "labour congress".

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

End of April	Lenin leaves for Copenhagen where the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. is to open. He speaks at a meeting of Bolshevik delegates on the question of the combat groups.
	Lenin leaves for London where the sessions of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. are to be held.
April 30-May 17 (May 13-June 1)	Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin plays a leading part in the work of the Congress.
April 30 (May 13)	Opening of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London. Lenin is elected to the Presidium.
May 1 (13)	Lenin speaks at the second session of the Congress in the discussion of the draft Congress Standing Orders.
	Lenin speaks at the third session of the Congress, against the termination of the discussion on the agenda.
May 2 (14)	Lenin speaks at the fourth session of the Congress in favour of placing on the agenda questions of the general principles of basic Party tactics in the bourgeois revolution.
	Lenin speaks at the fifth session of the Congress on the method of voting by name.
	Lenin's articles "Reorganisation and the End of the Split in St. Petersburg", "On the Question of a Nation-Wide Revolution", and "Apropos of the Minutes of the November Military and Combat Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" published in *Proletary*, No. 16.
May 3 (16)	Lenin presides at the sixth and seventh sessions of the Congress.
May 4 (17)	Lenin participates in the discussion at the eighth session of the Congress of the report on the activities of the Central Committee and criticises the opportunist tactics of the Mensheviks.
May 6 (18)	Lenin speaks on a point of order at the eleventh session of the Congress.

May 8 (*21*) Lenin presides at the fourteenth and fifteenth sessions of the Congress.

Lenin takes part in the discussion on the report of the Duma group and criticises its political errors.

May 9 (*22*) At the sixteenth session of the Congress Lenin is elected to the commission to compile a draft resolution on the report of the Duma group.

May 10 (*23*) Lenin's declaration of protest against Martov's distortion of the interview granted by Lenin to the *L'Humanité* correspondent is read at the eighteenth session of the Congress.

May 11 (*24*) Lenin speaks at the twentieth session of the Congress on the way in which the resolution on the report of the Duma group is to be voted on.

May 12 (*25*) Lenin makes a report on the attitude to bourgeois parties at the twenty-second session of the Congress.

May 14 (*27*) Lenin delivers the concluding speech in the discussion on the report on the attitude to bourgeois parties, at the twenty-fourth session of the Congress.

Lenin reports on the work of the commission to compile a resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties.

May 15 (*28*) Lenin speaks at the twenty-sixth session of the Congress in the discussion on the draft resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties submitted by the Polish delegates.

Lenin speaks against the amendments proposed by Lieber and Trotsky to the Bolshevik resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties.

Lenin presides at the twenty-seventh session of the Congress.

Lenin speaks against the amendments proposed by Broches and Trotsky to the resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties.

Lenin speaks against Martov's amendment to the resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties at

May 16 (*29*) the twenty-eighth session of the Congress.

Lenin speaks against amendments tabled by Trotsky, Martov, and Martynov to the resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties at the twenty-ninth session of the Congress.

The Congress adopts the resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties as written by Lenin.

May 18 (31) — In the name of the commission to compile a resolution on the State Duma, Lenin speaks at the thirty-third session of the Congress.

May 19 (June 1) — Lenin presides at the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the Congress.

Lenin proposes relegating to the Central Committee the decision on the representative of the Party on the International Socialist Bureau. The proposal is accepted by the Congress.

Lenin speaks against the Menshevik proposal to call the Congress "The London First Congress of the United Party" and in favour of calling it the Fifth Congress.

Lenin tables a proposal on the procedure for nominating candidates to the Central Committee by the various sections.

Lenin proposes re-voting on those candidates for election to the Central Committee who have received an equal number of votes.

Lenin speaks in the discussion in favour of authorising a smaller number of delegates to the session of the Congress that is to conduct the re-voting on those candidates for election to the Central Committee who have obtained an equal number of votes. Lenin's proposal is accepted.

Lenin is elected to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Second half of May — At the end of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. a meeting of Bolsheviks elects a Bolshevik Centre, headed by Lenin.

May 21-25 (June 3-7) — Lenin is present at the Second Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area in London.

Lenin makes a brief report on the tasks of the proletariat at the present moment in the bourgeois revolution; he tables a draft resolution on that question.

Beginning of June

Lenin returns from the Congress to Kokkala.

Lenin speaks at Terioki on the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to workers from St. Petersburg.

In view of increasing police persecution Lenin moves from Kokkala to Stirsudden (Finland).

Lenin writes his article "The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties".

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 12

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

13

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Издание четвертое

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ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume Thirteen contains works written by Lenin between June 1907 and April 1908.

The articles "Against Boycott", "Notes of a Publicist", "Revolution and Counter-Revolution", "The Third Duma", "Political Notes", and "The New Agrarian Policy" are devoted to an analysis and appraisal of the political situation in Russia after the defeat of the first revolution and to defining the tasks of the Party organisations during the period of reaction. In these articles, as well as in the speeches delivered at the St. Petersburg and All-Russian conferences of the R.S.D.L.P., which are published in this volume, Lenin also formulated the aims of the Duma tactics of the Bolsheviks at that new stage.

The volume includes such important works of Lenin on the agrarian question as *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* (Chapters X-XII) and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*.

Included in the volume is the Preface to the first, three-volume collection of Lenin's writings, entitled *Twelve Years*, which was not published in full owing to persecution by the censorship. The Preface is a short review of the history of Lenin's struggle for revolutionary Marxism against liberalism and opportunism.

The volume contains the article "Trade-Union Neutrality" in which Lenin criticises the opportunism of Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, who attempted to make the labour movement in Russia take the path of trade-unionism.

Two articles under the same title "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" reflect the struggle waged

by Lenin and the Bolsheviks against opportunism in the international labour movement. The articles expose the deviations of the German Social-Democrats from the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

For the first time in any collection of Lenin's works, this volume contains the draft resolution of the Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. ("Second All-Russian") on the question of participation in the elections to the Third Duma, "Outline of a Draft Resolution on the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions", the note "On Plekhanov's Article", and "Statement of the Editors of *Proletary*".

In the "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov (A. V. Lunacharsky) on the Attitude of the Party Towards the Trade Unions", also included for the first time in Lenin's *Collected Works*, Lenin opposes the slogan of "neutrality" of the trade unions and urges the necessity of close alignment of the trade unions with the Party with a view to developing the socialist consciousness of the proletariat and educating the latter in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

AGAINST BOYCOTT

NOTES OF A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PUBLICIST[1]

Written on June 26 (July 9), 1907

Published in 1907 in the pamphlet *Concerning the Boycott of the Third Duma*, Moscow
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the pamphlet text

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The recent Teachers' Congress,[2] which the majority was influenced by the Socialist-Revolutionaries,[3] adopted a resolution calling for a boycott of the Third Duma. The resolution was adopted with the direct participation of a prominent representative of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Social-Democratic teachers and the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. abstained from voting, as they considered that this question should be decided by a Party congress or conference, and not by a non-Party professional and political association.

The question of boycotting the Third Duma thus arises as a current question of revolutionary tactics. Judging by the speech of its spokesman at the Congress, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had already decided that question, although we do not yet have any official decisions of the Party or any literary documents from among its members. Among the Social-Democrats this question has been raised and is being debated.

What arguments do the Socialist-Revolutionaries use to support their decision? The resolution of the Teachers' Congress speaks, in effect, about the utter uselessness of the Third Duma, about the reactionary and counter-revolutionary nature of the government that effected the coup d'état of June 3,[4] about the new electoral law being weighted in favour of the landlords, etc., etc.* The case is presented

* Here is the text of this resolution: "Whereas: (1) the new electoral law on the basis of which the Third Duma is being convened deprives the working masses of that modest share of electoral rights which they had hitherto enjoyed and the winning of which bad cost them so dear; (2) this law glaringly and grossly falsifies the will of the people for the benefit of the most reactionary and privileged strata of the population; (3) the Third Duma, by the manner of its election

in such a manner as if the ultra-reactionary nature of the Third Duma by itself makes such a method of struggle or such a slogan as the boycott necessary and legitimate. The impropriety of such an argument is absolutely clear to any Social-Democrat, since there is no attempt here whatever to examine the historical conditions of the boycott's applicability. The Social-Democrat who takes a Marxist stand draws his conclusions about the boycott not from the degree of reactionariness of one or another institution, but from the existence of those special conditions of struggle that, as the experience of the Russian revolution has now shown, make it possible to apply the specific method known as boycott. If anyone were to start discussing the boycott without taking into consideration the two years' experience of our revolution, without studying that experience, we would have to say of him that he had forgotten a lot and learned nothing. In dealing with the question of boycott we shall start with an attempt to analyse that experience.

I

The most important experience of our revolution in making use of the boycott was, undoubtedly, the boycott of the Bulygin Duma.[5] What is more, that boycott was crowned with complete and immediate success. Therefore, our first task should be to examine the historical conditions under which the boycott of the Bulygin Duma took place.

Two circumstances at once become apparent when examining this question. First, the boycott of the Bulygin Duma was a fight to prevent our revolution from going over (even temporarily) to the path of a monarchist constitution.

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and by its make-up, is the product of a reactionary coup; (4) the government will take advantage of the participation of the popular masses in the Duma elections in order to interpret that participation as a popular sanction of the coup d'état—the Fourth Delegate Congress of the All-Russian Union of Teachers and Educational Workers resolves: (1) that it shall have no dealings whatever with the Third Duma or any of its bodies; (2) that it shall take no part as an organisation, either directly or indirectly, in the elections; (3) that it shall, as an organisation, disseminate the view on the Third State Duma and the elections to it as expressed in the present resolution."

Secondly, this boycott took place under conditions of a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid upswing of the revolution.

Let us examine the first circumstance. All boycott is a struggle, not within the framework of a given institution, but against its emergence, or, to put it more broadly, against it becoming operative. Therefore, those who, like Plekhanov and many other Mensheviks, opposed the boycott on the general grounds that it was necessary for a Marxist to make use of representative institutions, thereby only revealed absurd doctrinairism. To argue like that meant evading the real issue by repeating self-evident truths. Unquestionably, a Marxist should make use of representative institutions. Does that imply that a Marxist cannot, under certain conditions, stand for a struggle not within the framework of a given institution but against that institution being brought into existence? No, it does not, because this general argument applies only to those cases where there is no room for a struggle to prevent such an institution from coming into being. The boycott is a controversial question precisely because it is a question of whether there is room for a struggle to prevent the emergence of such institutions. *By their* arguments against the boycott Plekhanov and Co. showed that they failed to understand what the question was about.

Further. If all boycott is a struggle not within the framework of a given institution, but to prevent it from coming into existence, then the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, apart from everything else, was a struggle to prevent a whole system of institutions of a monarchist-constitutional type from coming into existence. The year 1905 clearly showed the possibility of direct mass struggle in the shape of general strikes (the strike wave after the Ninth of January[6]) and mutinies (*Potemkin*[7]). The direct revolutionary struggle of the masses was, therefore, a fact. No less a fact, on the other hand, was the law of August 6, which attempted to switch the movement from the revolutionary (in the most direct and narrow sense of the word) path to the path of a monarchist constitution. It was objectively inevitable that these paths should come into conflict with each other. There was to be, so to speak, *a choice of paths*

for the immediate development of the revolution, a choice that was to be determined, of course, not by the will of one or another group, but by the relative strength of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary classes. And this strength could only be gauged and tested in the struggle. The slogan of boycotting the Bulygin Duma was, therefore, a slogan of the struggle for the *path* of direct revolutionary struggle and against the constitutional-monarchist path. Even on the latter path, of course, a struggle was possible, and not only possible but inevitable. Even on the basis of a monarchist constitution it was possible to continue the revolution and prepare for its new upswing; even on the basis of a monarchist constitution it was possible and obligatory for the Social-Democrats to carry on the struggle. This truism, which Axelrod and Plekhanov tried so hard and irrelevantly to prove in 1905, remains true. But the issue raised by history was a different one: Axelrod and Plekhanov were arguing "beside the point", or in other words, they side-stepped the issue which events put to the conflicting forces by introducing a question taken from the latest edition of the German Social-Democratic textbook. The impending *struggle for the choice of a path of struggle* was historically inevitable in the immediate future. The alternatives were these: was the old authority to convene Russia's first representative institution and thereby for a time (perhaps a very brief, perhaps a fairly long time) switch the revolution to the monarchist-constitutional path, or were the people by a direct assault to sweep away—at the worst, to shake—the old regime, prevent it from switching the revolution to the monarchist-constitutional path and guarantee (also for a more or less lengthy period) the path of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses? That was the issue historically confronting the revolutionary classes of Russia in the autumn of 1905 which Axelrod and Plekhanov at the time failed to notice. The Social-Democrats' advocacy of active boycott was itself a way of raising the issue, a way of consciously raising it by the party of the proletariat, a slogan of the struggle *for the choice of a path of struggle.*

The advocates of active boycott, the Bolsheviks, correctly interpreted the question objectively posed by his-

tory. The October-December struggle of 1905 was really a struggle for the choice of a path of struggle. This struggle was waged with varying fortune: at first the revolutionary people got the upper hand, wrested from the old regime a chance to immediately switch the revolution on to monarchist-constitutional lines and set up *representative institutions* of a purely revolutionary type—Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc., in place of the representative institutions of the police-liberal type. The October-December period was one of maximum freedom, maximum independent activity of the masses, maximum breadth and momentum of the workers' movement on ground cleared of monarchist-constitutional institutions, laws and snags by the assault of the people, on a ground of "interregnum", when the old authority was *already* undermined, and the new revolutionary power of the people (the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) was *not yet* strong enough to completely replace it. The December struggle decided the question in a different direction: the old regime won by repulsing the assault of the people and holding its positions. But, of course, at that time there were no grounds as yet for considering this a decisive victory. The December uprising of 1905 had its continuation in a number of sporadic and partial mutinies and strikes in the summer of 1906. The slogan of boycott of the Witte Duma[8] was a slogan of struggle for the concentration and generalisation of these uprisings.

Thus, the first conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the experience of the Russian revolution in boycotting the Bulygin Duma is that, in the objective guise of the boycott, history placed on the order of the day a struggle for the form of the immediate path of development, a struggle over whether the old authority or the new self-established people's power would be called upon to convene Russia's first representative assembly, a struggle for a directly revolutionary path or (for a time) for the path of a monarchist constitution.

In this connection there arises a question, which has often cropped up in the literature, and which constantly crops up when this subject is discussed, namely, that of the simplicity, clarity, and "directness" of the boycott

slogan, as well as the question of a straight or zigzag path of development. The direct overthrow or, at the worst, the weakening and undermining of the old regime, the direct establishment of new government agencies by the people—all this, undoubtedly, is the most *direct* path, the most advantageous as far as the people are concerned, but one that requires the maximum force. Given an overwhelming preponderance of force it is possible to win by a direct frontal attack. Lacking this, one may have to resort to roundabout ways, to marking time, to zigzags, retreats, etc., etc. Of course, the path of a monarchist constitution does not, by any means, exclude revolution, the elements of which are prepared and developed by this path *as well* in an indirect manner, but this path is a longer, more zigzag one.

Running through all Menshevik literature, especially that of 1905 (up to October), is the accusation that the Bolsheviks are "bigoted" and also exhortations to them on the need for taking into consideration the zigzag path of history. In this feature of Menshevik literature we have another specimen of the kind of reasoning which tells us that horses eat oats and that the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea, reasoning which befogs the essence of a disputable question by reiterating what is indisputable. That history usually follows a zigzag path and that a Marxist should be able to make allowance for the most complicated and fantastic zigzags of history is indisputable. But this reiteration of the indisputable has nothing to do with the question of what a Marxist should do when that same history confronts the contending forces with the choice of a straight or a zigzag path. To dismiss the matter at such moments, or at such periods, when this happens by arguing about the usual zigzag course of history is to take after the "man in the muffler"[9] and become absorbed in contemplation of the truth that horses eat oats. As it happens, revolutionary periods are mainly such periods in history when the clash of contending social forces, in a comparatively short space of time, decides the question of the country's choice of a direct or a zigzag path of development for a comparatively very long time. The need for reckoning with the zigzag path does not in the least do away with the fact that

Marxists should be able to explain to the masses during the decisive moments of their history that the direct path is preferable, should be able to help the masses in the struggle for the choice of the direct path, to advance slogans for that struggle, and so on. And only hopeless philistines and the most obtuse pedants, after the decisive historical battles which determined the zigzag path instead of the direct one *were over*, could sneer at those who had fought to the end for the direct path. It would be like the sneers of German police-minded official historians such as Treitschke at the revolutionary slogans and the revolutionary directness of Marx in 1848.

Marxism's attitude towards the zigzag path of history is essentially the same as its attitude towards compromise. Every zigzag turn in history is a compromise, a compromise between the old, which is no longer strong enough to completely negate the new, and the new, which is not yet strong enough to completely overthrow the old. Marxism does not altogether reject compromises. Marxism considers it necessary to make use of them, but that does not in the least prevent Marxism, as a living and operating historical force, from fighting energetically against compromises. Not to understand this seeming contradiction is not to know the rudiments of Marxism.

Engels once expressed the Marxist attitude to compromises very vividly, clearly, and concisely in an article on the manifesto of the Blanquist fugitives of the Commune (1874).* These Blanquists wrote in their manifesto that they accepted no compromises whatever. Engels ridiculed this manifesto. It was not, he said, a question of rejecting compromises *to which circumstances condemn us* (or to which circumstances compel us—I must beg the reader's pardon for being obliged to quote from memory, as I am unable to check with the original text). It was a question of clearly realising the true revolutionary aims of the proletariat and of being able to pursue them through all and every circumstances, zigzags, and compromises.[10]

* This article was included in the German volume of collected articles *Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat"*. The title of the Russian translation is *Articles from "Volksstaat"*, published by *Znaniye*.

Only from this angle can we appreciate the simplicity, directness, and clarity of the boycott as a slogan appealing to the masses. All these virtues of the slogan are good not in themselves, but only in so far as the conditions of struggle for the choice of a direct or zigzag path of development are present in the objective situation in which the slogan is used. During the period of the Bulygin Duma this slogan was the correct and the only revolutionary slogan of the workers' party not because it was the simplest, most forthright, and clearest, but because the historical conditions at the time set the workers' party the task of taking part in the struggle for a simple and direct revolutionary path against the zigzag path of the monarchist constitution.

The question arises, by what criterion are we to judge whether those special historical conditions existed at the time? What is that distinctive feature in the objective state of affairs which made a simple, forthright, and clear slogan not a mere phrase but the only slogan that fitted the actual struggle? We shall take up this question now.

II

Looking back at a struggle that is already over (at least, in its direct and immediate form), there is nothing easier, of course, than to assess the total result of the different, contradictory signs and symptoms of the epoch. The outcome of the struggle settles everything at once and removes all doubts in a very simple way. But what we have to do now is to determine such symptoms as would help us grasp the state of affairs *prior to* the struggle, since we wish to apply the lessons of historical experience to the Third Duma. We have already pointed out above that the condition for the success of the boycott of 1905 was a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid upswing of the revolution. We must now examine, in the first place, what bearing a specially powerful upswing of the struggle has on the boycott, and, secondly, what the characteristic and distinctive features of a specially powerful upswing are.

Boycott, as we have already stated, is a struggle not within the framework of a given institution, but against

its emergence. Any given institution can be derived only from the already existing, i.e., the old, regime. Consequently, the boycott is a means of struggle aimed directly at overthrowing the old regime, or, at the worst, i.e., when the assault is not strong enough for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be unable to set up that institution, unable to make it operate.* Consequently, to be successful the boycott requires a direct struggle against the old regime, an uprising against it and mass disobedience to it in a large number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the conditions for preparing an uprising). Boycott is a refusal to recognise the old regime, a refusal, of course, not in words, but in deeds, i.e., it is something that finds expression not only in cries or the slogans of organisations, but in a definite movement of the *mass of the people*, who systematically defy the laws of the old regime, systematically set up new institutions, which, though unlawful, actually exist, and so on and so forth. The connection between boycott and the broad revolutionary upswing is thus obvious: boycott is the most decisive means of struggle, which rejects not the form of organisation of the given institution, but its very existence. Boycott is a declaration of open war against the old regime, a direct attack upon it. Unless there is a broad revolutionary upswing, unless there is mass unrest which overflows, as it were, the bounds of the old legality, there can be no question of the boycott succeeding.

Passing to the question of the nature and symptoms of the upswing of the autumn of 1905 we shall easily see that what was happening at the time was an incessant mass *offensive* of the revolution, which systematically attacked and held the enemy in check. Repression expanded the movement instead of reducing it. In the wake of January 9 came a gigantic strike wave, the barricades in Lodz, the

* Reference everywhere in the text is to active boycott, that is, not just a refusal to take part in the institutions of the old regime, but an attack upon this regime. Readers who are not familiar with Social-Democratic literature of the period of the Bulygin Duma boycott should be reminded that the Social-Democrats spoke openly at the time about *active* boycott, sharply contrasting it to passive boycott, and even linking it with an armed uprising.

mutiny of the *Potemkin*. In the sphere of the press, the unions, and education the legal bounds prescribed by the old regime were everywhere systematically broken, and by no means by the "revolutionaries" alone, but by the man-in-the-street, for the old authority was really weakened, was really letting the reins slip from its senile hands. A singularly striking and unerring indication of the force of the upswing (from the point of view of the revolutionary organisations) was the fact that the slogans of the revolutionaries not only evoked a response but actually *lagged* behind the march of events. January 9 and the mass strikes that followed it, and the *Potemkin* were all events which were in advance of the direct appeals of the revolutionaries. *In 1905*, *there was no appeal* of theirs which the masses would have met passively, by silence, or by abandoning the struggle. The boycott under such conditions was a natural *supplement* to the electrically charged atmosphere. That slogan did not "invent" anything at the time, it merely formulated accurately and truly the upswing which was going steadily forward towards a direct assault. On the contrary, the "inventors" were our Mensheviks, who kept aloof from the revolutionary upswing, fell for the empty promise of the tsar in the shape of the manifesto or the law of August 6 and seriously believed in the *promised* change over to a constitutional monarchy. The Mensheviks (and Parvus) at that time based their tactics not on the fact of the sweeping, powerful, and rapid revolutionary upswing, but on the tsar's promise of a change to a constitutional monarchy! No wonder such tactics turned out to be ridiculous and abject opportunism. No wonder that in all the Menshevik arguments about the boycott an analysis of the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, i.e., the revolution's greatest experience of the boycott, is now carefully discarded. But it is not enough to recognise this mistake of the Mensheviks, perhaps their biggest mistake in revolutionary tactics. One must clearly realise that the source of this mistake was failure to understand the *objective* state of affairs, which made the revolutionary upswing a reality and the change to a constitutional monarchy an empty police promise. The Mensheviks were wrong not because they approached the question in a mood devoid of subjective revolutionary

spirit, but because the ideas of these pseudo-revolutionaries fell short of the objectively revolutionary situation. It is easy to confuse these reasons for the Mensheviks' mistakes, but it is impermissible for a Marxist to confuse them.

III

The connection between the boycott and the historical conditions characteristic of a definite period of the Russian revolution should be examined from still another angle. What was the political content of the Social-Democratic boycott campaign of the autumn of 1905 and the spring of 1906? Its content did not, of course, consist in repeating the word boycott or calling on the people not to take part in the elections. Nor was its content confined to appeals for a direct assault that ignored the roundabout and zigzag paths proposed by the autocracy. In addition to and not even alongside this theme, but rather at the centre of the whole boycott campaign, was the *fight against constitutional illusions*. This fight was, in truth, the living spirit of the boycott. Recall the speeches of the boycottists and their whole agitation, look at the principal resolutions of the boycottists and you will see how true this is.

The Mensheviks were never able to understand this aspect of the boycott. They always believed that to fight constitutional illusions in a period of nascent constitutionalism was nonsense, absurdity, "anarchism". This point of view of the Mensheviks was also forcibly expressed in their speeches at the Stockholm Congress,[11] especially—I remember—in the speeches of Plekhanov, not to mention Menshevik literature.

At first sight the position of the Mensheviks on this question would really seem to be as impregnable as that of a man who smugly instructs his friends that horses eat oats. In a period of nascent constitutionalism to proclaim a fight against constitutional illusions! Is it not anarchism? Is it not gibberish?

The vulgarisation of this question effected by means of a specious allusion to the plain common sense of such arguments is based on the fact that the special period of

the Russian revolution is passed over in silence, that *the boycott of the Bulygin Duma is forgotten*, and that the concrete stages of the course taken by our revolution are replaced by a general designation of the whole of our revolution, both past and future, as a revolution that begets constitutionalism. This is a specimen of the violation of the method of dialectical materialism by people, who, like Plekhanov, spoke about this method with the utmost eloquence.

Yes, our bourgeois revolution as a whole, like every bourgeois revolution, is, in the long run, a process of building up a constitutional system and nothing more. That is the truth. It is a useful truth for exposing the quasi-socialist pretensions of one or another bourgeois-democratic programme, theory, tactics, and so forth. But would you be able to derive any benefit from this truth on the question as to *what kind* of constitutionalism the workers' party is to lead the country to in the epoch of bourgeois revolution? Or on the question as to *how exactly* the workers' party should fight for a definite (and, precisely, a republican) constitutionalism during definite periods of the revolution? You would not. This favourite truth of Axelrod's and Plekhanov's would no more enlighten you on these questions than the conviction that a horse eats oats would enable you to choose a suitable animal and ride it.

The fight against constitutional illusions, the Bolsheviks said in 1905 and at the beginning of 1906, should become the slogan of the moment, because it was at that period that the objective state of affairs faced the struggling social forces with having to decide the issue whether the straight path of direct revolutionary struggle and of representative institutions created directly by the revolution on the basis of complete democratism, or the roundabout zigzag path of a monarchist constitution and police-"constitutional" (in inverted commas!) institutions of the "Duma" type would triumph in the immediate future.

Did the objective state of affairs really raise this issue, or was it "invented" by the Bolsheviks because of their theoretical mischievousness? That question has now been answered by the history of the Russian revolution.

The October struggle of 1905 was indeed a struggle to prevent the revolution from being switched to monarchist-constitutional lines. The October-December period was indeed a period which saw the realisation of a proletarian, truly democratic, broad, bold, and free constitutionalism that really expressed the will of the people as opposed to the pseudo-constitutionalism of the Dubasov and Stolypin[12] constitution. The revolutionary struggle for a truly democratic constitutionalism (that is, one built on ground completely cleared of the old regime and all the abominations associated with it) called for the most determined fight against the police-monarchist constitution being used as a bait for the people. This simple thing the Social-Democratic opponents of the boycott absolutely failed to understand.

Two phases in the development of the Russian revolution now stand out before us in all their clarity: the phase of upswing (1905) and the phase of decline (1906-07). The phase of maximum development of the people's activity, of free and broad organisations of all classes of the population, the phase of maximum freedom of the press and maximum ignoring by the people of the old authority, its institutions and commands—and all this without any constitutionalism bureaucratically endorsed and expressed in formal rules and regulations. And after that the phase of least development and steady decline of popular activity, organisation, freedom of the press, etc., under a (God forgive us!) "constitution" concocted, sanctioned, and safeguarded by the Dubasovs and Stolypins.

Now, when everything *behind* looks so plain and clear, you would hardly find a single pedant who would dare to deny the legitimacy and necessity of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to prevent events from taking a constitutional-monarchist turn, the legitimacy and necessity of the fight against constitutional illusions.

Now you will hardly find a sensible historian worthy of the name who would not divide the course of the Russian revolution between 1905 and the autumn of 1907 into these two periods: the "anti-constitutional" period (if I may be allowed that expression) of upswing and the period of "constitutional" decline, the period of conquest and achievement of freedom by the people without police (mon-

archist) constitutionalism and the period of oppression and suppression of popular freedom by means of the monarchist "constitution".

Now the period of constitutional illusions, the period of the First and Second Dumas is quite clear to us, and it is no longer difficult to grasp the importance of the fight which the revolutionary Social-Democrats waged *at that time* against constitutional illusions. But *at that time*, in 1905 and the beginning of 1906, neither the liberals in the bourgeois camp nor the Mensheviks in the proletarian camp understood this.

Yet the period of the First and Second Dumas was in every sense and all respects a period of constitutional illusions. The solemn pledge that "no law shall become effective without the approval of the Duma" was not violated at that period. Thus, the constitution existed on paper, never ceasing to warm the cockles of all the slavish hearts of the Russian Cadets.[13] Both Dubasov and Stolypin at that period put the Russian constitution to the test of practice, tried it and verified it in an effort to adjust and fit it to the old autocracy. They, Dubasov and Stolypin, appeared to be the most powerful men of the time, and they worked hard to make the "illusion" a reality. The illusion proved to be an illusion. History has fully endorsed the correctness of the slogan of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. But it was not only the Dubasovs and Stolypins who tried to put the "constitution" into effect, it was not only the servile Cadets who praised it to the skies and like flunkeys (*à la* Mr. Rodichev in the First Duma) exerted themselves to prove that the monarch was blameless and that it would be presumptuous to hold him responsible for the pogroms. No. During this period the broad masses of the people as well undoubtedly still believed to a greater or lesser extent in the "constitution", believed in the Duma despite the warnings of the Social-Democrats.

The period of constitutional illusions in the Russian revolution may be said to have been a period of nationwide infatuation with a bourgeois fetish, just as whole nations in Western Europe sometimes become infatuated with the fetish of bourgeois nationalism, anti-semitism, chauvinism, etc. It is to the credit of the Social-Democrats

that they alone were not taken in by the bourgeois hoax, that they alone in the epoch of constitutional illusions always kept unfurled the banner of struggle against constitutional illusions.

Why then, the question now arises, was the boycott a specific means of struggle against constitutional illusions?

There is a feature about the boycott which, at first sight, involuntarily repels every Marxist. Boycott of elections is a renunciation of parliamentarism, something that looks very much like passive rejection, abstention, evasion. So Parvus regarded it (he only had German models to go by) when, in the autumn of 1905, he stormed and raged, angrily but unsuccessfully, attempting to prove that active boycott was all the same a bad thing because it was *still a boycott*.... And so also is it regarded by Martov, who to this day has learned nothing from the revolution and is more and more turning into a liberal. By his last article in *Tovarishch*[14] he has shown that he is unable even to raise the problem in a way that befits a revolutionary Social-Democrat.

But this most objectionable, so to speak, feature of the boycott as far as a Marxist is concerned is fully explained by the specific features of the period that gave rise to such a method of struggle. The First monarchist Duma, the Bulygin Duma, was a bait designed to draw the people away from the revolution. The bait was a dummy clothed in a dress of constitutionalism. One and all were tempted to swallow the bait. Some through selfish class interests, others through ignorance, were inclined to snatch at the dummy of the Bulygin Duma, and later at that of the Witte Duma. Everyone was enthusiastic, everyone sincerely believed in it. Participation in the elections was not just a matter-of-fact, simple performance of one's usual civic duties: It was the solemn inauguration of a monarchist constitution. It was a turn from the direct revolutionary path to the monarchist-constitutional path.

The Social-Democrats *were bound* at such a time to unfurl their banner of protest and warning with the utmost vigour, with the utmost demonstrativeness. And that meant refusing to take part, abstaining oneself and holding the

people back, issuing a call for an assault on the old regime *instead of* working within the framework of an institution set up by that regime. The nation-wide enthusiasm for the bourgeois-police fetish of a "constitutional" monarchy demanded of the Social-Democrats, as the party of the proletariat, an equally nation-wide demonstration of their views protesting against and exposing this fetish, demanded a fight with the utmost vigour against the establishment of institutions that embodied that fetishism.

There you have the full historical justification not only for the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, which met with immediate success, but for the boycott of the Witte Duma, which, *to all appearances*, was a failure. We now see why it was only an *apparent* failure, why the Social-Democrats had to maintain their protest against the constitutional-monarchist turn of our revolution *to the very last*. This turn *in fact* proved to be a turn *into a blind alley*. The illusions about a monarchist constitution proved to be merely a prelude or a signboard, an adornment, diverting attention from preparations for the annulment of this "constitution" by the old regime....

We said that the Social-Democrats had to maintain their protest against the suppression of liberty by means of the "constitution" to the very last. What do we mean by "to the very last"? We mean until the institution *against* which the Social-Democrats were fighting had become an accomplished fact *despite* the Social-Democrats, until the monarchist-constitutional turn of the Russian revolution, which inevitably meant (*for a certain time*) the decline of the revolution, the defeat of the revolution, had become an accomplished fact despite the Social-Democrats. The period of constitutional illusions was an attempt at *compromise*. We fought and had to fight against it with all our might. We had to go into the Second Duma, we had to reckon with compromise once the circumstances *forced* it upon us against our will, despite our efforts, and at the cost of the defeat of our struggle. For how long we have to reckon with it is another matter, of course.

What inference is to be drawn from all this as regards the boycott of the *Third* Duma? Is it, perhaps, that the boycott, which is necessary at the beginning of the period

of constitutional illusions, is also necessary at the end of this period? That would be a "bright idea" in the vein of "analogical sociology" and not a serious conclusion. Boycott *cannot* now have the *same* meaning that it had at the beginning of the Russian revolution. Today we can neither warn the people against constitutional illusions nor fight to prevent the revolution from being turned into the constitutional-monarchist blind alley. Boycott cannot have its former vital spark. If there should be a boycott, it will in any case have a *different* significance, it will be filled in any case with a *different* political content.

Moreover, our analysis of the historical peculiarity of the boycott provides one consideration against a boycott of the Third Duma. In the period at the beginning of the constitutional turn the attention of the whole nation was inevitably focused on the Duma. By means of the boycott we fought and were bound to fight against this focusing of attention on the trend towards the blind alley, to fight against an infatuation that was due to ignorance, unenlightenment, weakness, or selfish counter-revolutionary activity. Today not only any nation-wide, but even any at all widespread enthusiasm for the Duma in general or for the Third Duma in particular is completely ruled out. There is no need for any boycott here.

IV

And so the conditions for the applicability of a boycott should be sought, undoubtedly, in the objective state of affairs at the given moment. Comparing, from this point of view, the autumn of 1907 with that of 1905, we cannot help coming to the conclusion that we have no grounds *today* for proclaiming a boycott. From the standpoint of the relation between the direct revolutionary path and the constitutional-monarchist "zigzag", from the standpoint of mass upswing, and from the standpoint of the specific aims of the fight against constitutional illusions, the present state of affairs differs sharply from that of two years ago.

At that time the monarchist-constitutional turn of history was nothing more than a police promise. Now it is

a fact. Not to acknowledge this fact would be a ridiculous fear of the truth. And it would be a mistake to infer from the acknowledgement of this fact that the Russian revolution is over. No, there are no grounds whatever for drawing such a conclusion. A Marxist is bound to fight for the direct revolutionary path of development when such a fight is prescribed by the objective state of affairs, but this, we repeat, does not mean that we do not have to reckon with the zigzag turn which has in fact already taken definite shape. In this respect the course of the Russian revolution has already become quite definite. At the beginning of the revolution we see a line of short, but extraordinarily broad and amazingly rapid upswing. Next we have a line of extremely slow but steady decline, beginning with the December uprising of 1905. First a period of direct revolutionary struggle by the masses, then a period of monarchist-constitutional turn.

Does this mean that this latter turn is a final one? That the revolution is over and a "constitutional" period has set in? That there are no grounds either for expecting a new upswing or for *preparing* for it? That the republican character of our programme must be scrapped?

Not at all. Only liberal vulgarians like our Cadets, who are ready to use any argument to justify servility and toadyism, can draw such conclusions. No, it only means that in upholding, at all points, the *whole* of our programme and *all* our revolutionary views, we must bring our direct appeals into line with the objective state of affairs at the given moment. While proclaiming the inevitability of revolution, while systematically and steadily accumulating inflammatory material in every way, while, for this purpose, carefully guarding the revolutionary traditions of our revolution's best epoch, cultivating them and purging them of liberal parasites, we nevertheless do not refuse to do the humdrum daily work on the humdrum monarchist-constitutional turn. That is all. We must work for a new, broad upswing, but we have no ground whatever for butting in blindly with the slogan of boycott.

As we have said, the only boycott that can have any meaning in Russia at the present time is *active* boycott. This implies not passively avoiding participation in the

elections, but ignoring the elections for the sake of the aim of a direct assault. The boycott, in this sense, inevitably amounts to a *call* for the most energetic and decisive offensive. Does such a broad and general upswing exist at the present moment, an upswing without which such a call would be meaningless? Of course not.

Generally speaking, as far as "calls" are concerned, the difference in this respect between the present state of affairs and that of the autumn of 1905 is a very striking one. At that time, as we have already pointed out, there were no calls throughout the previous year to which the masses would not have responded. The impetus of the mass offensive took place in advance of the calls of the organisations. Now we are at a period of a lull in the revolution when *a whole series of calls* systematically *met with no response among the masses*. That is what happened with the call to sweep away the Witte Duma (at the beginning of 1906), with the call for an uprising after the dissolution of the First Duma (in the summer of 1906), *with the call for struggle* in answer to the dissolution of the Second Duma and the coup d'état of June 3, 1907. Take the leaflet of our Central Committee on these last acts.[15] You will find there a direct call to struggle in the form possible under local conditions (demonstrations, strikes, and an open struggle against the armed force of absolutism). It was a verbal appeal. The mutinies of June 1907 in Kiev and the Black Sea Fleet were calls through action. Neither of these calls evoked a mass response. If the most striking and direct manifestations of reactionary assault upon the revolution—the dissolution of the two Dumas and the coup d'état—evoked no upswing at the time, what ground is there for immediately repeating the call in the form of proclaiming a boycott? Is it not clear that the objective state of affairs is such that the "proclamation" is in danger of being just an empty shout? When the struggle is on, when it is spreading, growing, coming up from all sides, then such a "proclamation" is legitimate and necessary; then it is the duty of the revolutionary proletariat to sound such a war-cry. But it is impossible to invent that struggle or to call it into being merely by a war-cry. And when a whole series of fighting calls, tested by us on more direct occasions, has proved to be una-

vailing, it is only natural that we should seek to have serious grounds for "proclaiming" a slogan which is meaningless unless the conditions exist which make fighting calls feasible.

If anyone wants to persuade the *Social-Democratic* proletariat that the slogan of boycott is a correct one, he must not allow himself to be carried away by the mere sound of words that in their time played a great and glorious revolutionary role. He must weigh the objective conditions for applying such a slogan and realise that to launch it assumes indirectly the existence of conditions making for a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid revolutionary upswing. But in periods such as we are now living in, in periods of a temporary lull in the revolution, such a condition can in no circumstances be indirectly assumed. It must be directly and distinctly realised and made clear both to oneself and to the whole working class. Otherwise one runs the risk of finding oneself in the position of a person who uses big words without understanding their true meaning or who hesitates to speak plainly and call a spade a spade.

V

The boycott is one of the finest revolutionary traditions of the most eventful and heroic period of the Russian revolution. We said above that it is one of our tasks to carefully guard these traditions in general, to cultivate them, and to purge them of liberal (and opportunist) parasites. We must dwell a little on the analysis of this task in order correctly to define what it implies and to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstandings that might easily arise.

Marxism differs from all other socialist theories in the remarkable way it combines complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius, and revolutionary initiative of the masses—and also, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations, and parties that are able to discover and achieve contact with one or another class. A high apprais-

al of the revolutionary periods in the development of humanity follows logically from the totality of Marx's views on history. It is in such periods that the numerous contradictions which slowly accumulate during periods of so-called peaceful development become resolved. It is in such periods that the direct role of the different classes in determining the forms of social life is manifested with the greatest force, and that the foundations are laid for the political "superstructure", which then persists for a long time on the basis of the new relations of production. And, unlike the theoreticians of the liberal bourgeoisie, Marx did not regard these periods as deviations from the "normal" path, as manifestations of "social disease", as the deplorable results of excesses and mistakes, but as the most vital, the most important, essential, and decisive moments in the history of human societies. In the activities of Marx and Engels themselves, the period of their participation in the mass revolutionary struggle of 1848-49 stands out as the central point. This was their point of departure when determining the future pattern of the workers' movement and democracy in different countries. It was to this point that they always returned in order to determine the essential nature of the different classes and their tendencies in the most striking and purest form. It was from the standpoint of the revolutionary period of that time that they always judged the later, lesser, political formations and organisations, political aims and political conflicts. No wonder the ideological leaders of liberalism, men like Sombart, whole-heartedly hate this feature of Marx's activities and writings and ascribe it to the "bitterness of an exile". It is indeed typical of the bugs of police-ridden bourgeois university science to ascribe an inseparable component of Marx's and Engels's revolutionary outlook to personal bitterness, to the personal hardships of life in exile!

In one of his letters, I think it was to Kugelmann, Marx in passing threw out a highly characteristic remark, which is particularly interesting in the light of the question we are discussing. He says that the reaction in Germany had almost succeeded in blotting out the memory and traditions of the revolutionary epoch of 1848 from the minds of the people.[16] Here we have the aims of reaction and the aims

of the party of the proletariat in relation to the revolutionary traditions of a given country strikingly contrasted. The aim of reaction is to blot out these traditions, to represent the revolution as "elemental madness"—Struve's translation of the German *das tolle Jahr* ("the mad year"—the term applied by the German police-minded bourgeois historians, and even more widely by German university-professorial historiography, to the year 1848). The aim of reaction is to make the people forget the forms of struggle, the forms of organisation, and the ideas and slogans which the revolutionary period begot in such profusion and variety. Just as those obtuse eulogists of English philistinism, the Webbs, try to represent Chartism, the revolutionary period of the English labour movement, as pure childishness, as "sowing wild oats", as a piece of naïveté unworthy of serious attention, as an accidental and abnormal deviation, so too the German bourgeois historians treat the year 1848 in Germany. Such also is the attitude of the reactionaries to the Great French Revolution, which, by the fierce hatred it still inspires, demonstrates to this day the vitality and force of its influence on humanity. And in the same way our heroes of counter-revolution, particularly "democrats" of yesterday like Struve, Milyukov, Kiesewetter, and *tutti quanti* vie with one another in scurrilously slandering the revolutionary traditions of the Russian revolution. Although it is barely two years since the direct mass struggle of the proletariat won that particle of freedom which sends the liberal lackeys of the old regime into such raptures, a vast trend calling itself *liberal* (!!) has already arisen in our publicist literature. This trend is fostered by the Cadet press and is wholly devoted to depicting our revolution, revolutionary methods of struggle, revolutionary slogans, and revolutionary traditions as something base, primitive, naïve, elemental, mad, etc. ... even criminal ... from Milyukov to Kamyshansky *il n'y a qu'un pas*!* On the other hand, the successes of reaction, which first drove the people from the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies into the Dubasov-Stolypin Dumas, and is now

* There is only one step.—*Ed.*

driving it into the Octobrist Duma, are depicted by the heroes of Russian liberalism as "the process of growth of *constitutional* consciousness in Russia".

It is undoubtedly the duty of Russian Social-Democrats to study our revolution most carefully and thoroughly, to acquaint the masses with its forms of struggle, forms of organisation, etc., to strengthen the revolutionary traditions among the people, to convince the masses that improvements of any importance and permanence can be achieved solely and exclusively through revolutionary struggle, and to systematically expose the utter baseness of those smug liberals who pollute the social atmosphere with the miasma of "constitutional" servility, treachery, and Molchalinism. In the history of the struggle for liberty a single day of the October strike or of the December uprising is a hundred times more significant than months of Cadet flunkey speeches in the Duma on the subject of the blameless monarch and constitutional monarchy. We must see to it—for if we do not no one else will—that the people know much more thoroughly and in more detail those spirited, eventful, and momentous days than those months of "constitutional" asphyxia and Balalaikin-Molchalin[17] prosperity so zealously announced to the world by our liberal-party and non-party "democratic" (ugh! ugh!) press with the amiable acquiescence of Stolypin and his retinue of gendarme censors.

There is no doubt that, in many cases, sympathy for the boycott is created precisely by these praiseworthy efforts of revolutionaries to foster tradition of the finest period of the revolutionary past, to light up the cheerless slough of the drab workaday present by a spark of bold, open, and resolute struggle. But it is just because we cherish this concern for revolutionary traditions that we must vigorously protest against the view that by using one of the slogans of a particular historical period the essential conditions of that period can be restored. It is one thing to preserve the traditions of the revolution, to know how to use them for constant propaganda and agitation and for acquainting the masses with the conditions of a direct and aggressive struggle against the old regime, but quite another thing to repeat a slogan divorced from the sum total of the

conditions which gave rise to it and which ensured its success and to apply it to essentially different conditions.

Marx himself, who so highly valued revolutionary traditions and unsparingly castigated a renegade or philistine attitude towards them, at the same time demanded that revolutionaries should be able to *think*, should be able to *analyse* the conditions under which old methods of struggle could be used, and not simply to repeat certain slogans. The "national" traditions of 1792 in France will perhaps forever remain a *model* of certain revolutionary methods of struggle; but this did not prevent Marx in 1870 in the famous Address of the International from warning the French proletariat against the mistake of applying those traditions to the conditions of a different period.[18]

This holds good for Russia as well. We must study the conditions for the application of the boycott; we must instil in the masses the idea that the boycott is a quite legitimate and sometimes essential method at moments when the revolution is on the upswing (whatever the pedants who take the name of Marx in vain may say). But whether revolution is really on the upswing—and this is the fundamental condition for proclaiming a boycott—is a question which one must be able to raise independently and to decide on the basis of a serious analysis of the facts. It is our duty to prepare the way for such an upswing, as far as it lies within our power, and not to reject the boycott at the proper moment; but to regard the boycott slogan as being generally applicable to every bad or very bad representative institution would be an absolute mistake.

Take the reasoning that was used to defend and support the boycott in the "days of freedom", and you will see at once that it is impossible simply to apply such arguments to present-day conditions.

When advocating the boycott in 1905 and the beginning of 1906 we said that participation in the elections would tend to lower the temper, to surrender the position to the enemy, to lead the revolutionary people astray, to make it easier for tsarism to come to an agreement with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and so on. What was the fundamental premise underlying these arguments, a premise not always specified but always assumed as something

which *in those days* was self-evident. This premise was the rich revolutionary energy of the masses, which sought and found *direct* outlets apart from any "constitutional" channels. This premise was the continuous *offensive* of the revolution against reaction, an offensive which it would have been criminal to weaken by occupying and defending a position that was deliberately yielded up by the enemy in order to weaken the general assault. Try to repeat these arguments *apart from* the conditions of this fundamental premise and you will immediately feel that all your "music" is off-key, that your fundamental tone is false.

It would be just as hopeless to attempt to justify the boycott by drawing a distinction between the Second and the Third Dumas. To regard the difference between the Cadets (who in the Second Duma completely betrayed the people to the Black Hundreds[19]) and the Octobrists[20] as a serious and fundamental difference, to attach any real significance to the notorious "constitution" which was torn up by the coup d'état of June 3, is something that in general corresponds much more to the spirit of vulgar democracy than that of revolutionary Social-Democracy. We have always said, maintained, and repeated that the "constitution" of the First and Second Dumas was only an illusion, that the Cadets' talk was only a blind to screen their Octobrist nature, and that the Duma was a totally unsuitable instrument for satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the peasantry. For us June 3, 1907 is a natural and inevitable result of the defeat of December 1905. We were never "captivated" by the charms of the "Duma" constitution, and so we cannot be greatly disappointed by the transition from reaction embellished and glossed over by Rodichev's phrase-mongering to naked, open, and crude reaction. The latter may even be a more effective means of sobering the ranting liberal simpletons or the sections of the population they have led astray....

Compare the Menshevik Stockholm resolution with the Bolshevik London resolution on the State Duma. You will find that the former is pompous, wordy, full of high-flown phrases about the significance of the Duma and puffed up by a sense of the grandeur of work in the Duma. The latter is simple, concise, sober, and modest. The first resolution

is imbued with a spirit of philistine jubilation over the marriage of Social-Democracy and constitutionalism ("the new power from the midst of the people", and so on and so forth in this same spirit of official falsehood). The second resolution can be paraphrased approximately as follows: since the accursed counter-revolution has driven us into this accursed pigsty, we shall work there too for the benefit of the revolution, without whining, but also without boasting.

By defending the Duma against boycott when we were still in the period of direct revolutionary struggle, the Mensheviks, so to speak, gave their pledge to the people that the Duma would be something in the nature of a weapon of revolution. And they completely failed to honour this pledge. But if we Bolsheviks gave any pledge at all, it was only by our assurance that the Duma was the spawn of counter-revolution and that no real good could be expected from it. Our view has been borne out splendidly so far, and it can safely be said that it will be borne out by future events as well. Unless the October-December strategy is "corrected" and repeated on the basis of the new data, there will never be freedom in Russia.

Therefore, when I am told that the Third Duma cannot be utilised as the Second Duma was, that the masses cannot be made to understand that it is necessary to take part in it, I would reply: if by "utilise" is meant some Menshevik bombast about it being a weapon of the revolution, etc., then it certainly cannot. But then even the first two Dumas proved in fact to be only steps to the Octobrist Duma, yet we utilised them for the simple and modest* purpose (propaganda and agitation, criticism and explaining to the masses what is taking place) for which we shall always

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* Cf. the article in *Proletary* (Geneva), 1905,[21] "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 179-87.—*Ed.*) where it was pointed out that we do not renounce the use of the Duma generally, but that we are *now* dealing with another issue confronting us, namely, that of fighting for a direct revolutionary path. See also the article in *Proletary* (Russian issue), 1906,[22] No. 1, "The Boycott" (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 141-49.—*Ed.*), where stress is laid on the *modest* extent of the benefits to be derived from work in the Duma.

contrive to utilise even the worst representative institutions. A speech in the Duma will not cause any "revolution", and propaganda *in connection with the Duma* is not distinguished by any particular merits; but the advantage that Social-Democracy can derive from the one and the other is not less, and sometimes even greater, than that derived from a printed speech or a speech delivered at some other gathering.

And we must explain to the masses our participation in the Octobrist Duma just as simply. Owing to the defeat of December 1905 and the failure of the attempts of 1906-07 to "repair" this defeat, reaction inevitably drove us and *will continue to drive* us constantly into worse and worse quasi-constitutional institutions. Always and everywhere we shall uphold our convictions and advocate our views, always insisting that no good can be expected as long as the old regime remains, as long as it is not wholly eradicated. We shall prepare the conditions for a new upswing, and until it takes place, and in order that it may take place, we shall work still harder and not launch slogans which have meaning only when the revolution is on the upswing.

It would be just as wrong to regard the boycott as a *line of tactics* counterposing the proletariat and part of the revolutionary bourgeois democracy to liberalism and reaction. The boycott is not a line of tactics, but a special means of struggle suitable under special conditions. To confuse Bolshevism with "boycottism" would be as bad as confusing it with "boyevism".[22a] The difference between the Bolshevik and Menshevik *lines of tactics* is now quite clear and has taken shape in the fundamentally different resolutions adopted in the spring of 1905 at the Bolshevik Third Congress in London and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva. There was no talk then either of boycott or of "boyevism", nor could there have been. As everyone knows, our *line of tactics* differed essentially from the Menshevik line both in the elections to the Second Duma, when we were not boycottists, and in the Second Duma itself. The *lines of tactics* diverge in every field of the struggle whatever its means and methods may be, without any special methods of struggle peculiar to either line being created. And

if a boycott of the Third Duma were to be justified or caused by the collapse of *revolutionary* expectations in regard to *the First or the Second Dumas*, by the collapse of a "lawful", "strong", "stable", and "genuine" constitution, it would be Menshevism of the worst kind.

VI

We have left an examination of the strongest and the only Marxist arguments in favour of a boycott to the last. Active boycott has no meaning apart from a broad revolutionary upswing. Granted. But a broad upswing evolves from one that is not broad. Signs of a certain upswing are in evidence. The boycott slogan ought to be launched by us, since that slogan supports, develops, and expands the incipient upswing.

Such, in my opinion, is the *basic* argument which, in a more or less clear form, determines the tendency towards boycott among Social-Democrats. Moreover, the comrades who stand closest to direct proletarian work proceed not from any argumentation "constructed" according to a certain type, but from a sum total of impressions derived from their contact with the working-class masses.

One of the few questions on which so far it seems there are not, or were not, disagreements between the two factions of the Social-Democrats, is that of the reason for the protracted lull in the development of our revolution. "The proletariat has not recovered"—that is the reason. Indeed, the brunt of the October-December struggle was borne by the proletariat *alone*. The proletariat alone fought in a systematic, organised, and unremitting way for the whole nation. No wonder that in a country with the smallest percentage of proletarian population (by European standards), the proletariat should have found itself utterly exhausted by such a struggle. Besides, ever since December the combined forces of governmental and bourgeois reaction have been striking their hardest all the time at the proletariat. Police persecutions and executions have decimated the ranks of the proletariat in the course of eighteen months, while systematic lock-outs, beginning with

the "punitive" closing down of state-owned factories and ending with capitalist conspiracies against the workers, have increased poverty among the mass of the working class to an unprecedented extent. And now, some Social-Democratic functionaries say, there are signs of a rising challenge among the masses, a mustering of strength by the proletariat. This rather vague and indefinite impression is supported by a stronger argument, namely, indubitable evidence of a business revival in certain branches of industry. The growing demand for workers should inevitably intensify the strike movement. The workers will be bound to attempt to make up for at least some of the tremendous losses they sustained in the period of repression and lock-outs. Finally, the third and most powerful argument is the one that points not to a problematical or generally expected strike movement, but to a single great strike already decided upon by the workers' organisations. At the beginning of 1907, the representatives of 10,000 textile workers discussed their position and outlined steps for strengthening the trade unions in that industry. The delegates have met again, this time representing 20,000 workers, and they resolved to call a *general strike* of the textile workers in July 1907. This movement may involve up to 400,000 workers. It originates in the Moscow region, i.e., the biggest centre of the labour movement in Russia and the biggest trade and industrial centre. It is in Moscow, and only in Moscow, that the mass workers' movement is most likely to develop into a wide popular movement of decisive political importance. As for the textile workers, they are the worst paid and least developed element of the total of the working class, who participated least of all in previous movements and who have the closest connections with the peasantry. The initiative of such workers may be an indication that the movement will embrace much wider strata of the proletariat than before. As regards the connection between the strike movement and the revolutionary upswing of the masses, this has already been demonstrated repeatedly in the history of the Russian revolution.

It is the bounden duty of the Social-Democrats to concentrate supreme attention and special efforts on this move-

ment. Work in this field should certainly be given precedence over the elections to the Octobrist Duma. The masses should be made to see the necessity of converting this strike movement into a general and broad attack on the autocracy. That is just what the boycott slogan means—a shifting of attention from the Duma to the direct mass struggle. The boycott slogan means imbuing the new movement with a political and revolutionary content.

Such, roughly, is the train of thought which has led certain Social-Democrats to the conviction that the Third Duma must be boycotted. This argument in favour of the boycott is undoubtedly a Marxist one, and has nothing in common with the bare repetition of a slogan dissociated from specific historical conditions.

But strong as this argument is, it is not enough, in my opinion, to make us accept the boycott slogan *straightaway*. This argument emphasises what no Russian Social-Democrat who ponders the lessons of our revolution should have any doubts about, namely, that we cannot renounce boycott, that we must be prepared to put that slogan forward at the proper time, and that our way of stating the boycott issue has nothing in common with the liberal, wretchedly philistine way—to keep clear of it or not to keep clear of it?*—which is devoid of all revolutionary content.

Let us take it for granted that everything the Social-Democratic adherents of the boycott say about the changed temper of the workers, about the industrial revival, and about the July strike of the textile workers is wholly in accord with the facts.

What follows from all this? We have before us the beginning of a partial upswing of revolutionary import.**

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* See *Tovarishch* for a specimen of *liberal* argumentation by L. Martov, a former contributor to Social-Democratic publications and now a contributor to liberal newspapers.

** Some hold that the textile strike is a movement of a new type which sets the trade-union movement apart from the revolutionary movement. But we pass over this view, first because to read a pessimistic meaning into all symptoms of phenomena of a complex type is generally a dangerous practice which often muddles many Social-Democrats who are not quite "firm in the saddle". Secondly, if the textile strike was found to have these characteristics we Social-Democrats would have to fight against them in the most energetic man-

Must we make every effort to support and develop it, and try to convert it into a general revolutionary upswing, and then into a movement of an aggressive type? Undoubtedly. There can be no two opinions about this among the Social-Democrats (except, perhaps, those contributing to *Tovarishch*). But do we need the boycott slogan for developing the movement *at this very moment*, at the beginning of this partial upswing, before it has definitely passed into a general upswing? Is this slogan capable of promoting the movement today? This is a different question, one which, in our opinion, would have to be answered in the negative.

A general upswing can and should be developed from a partial upswing by direct and immediate arguments and slogans without any relation to the Third Duma. The entire course of events after December fully confirms the Social-Democratic view on the role of the monarchist constitution, on the necessity of direct struggle. Citizens, we shall say, if you do not want to see the cause of democracy in Russia going steadily faster and faster downhill as it did after December 1905 during the hegemony of the Cadet gentlemen over the democratic movement, then support the incipient workers' movement, support the direct mass struggle. Without it there can be no guarantee of freedom in Russia.

Agitation of this type would undoubtedly be a perfectly consistent revolutionary-Social-Democratic agitation. Would we necessarily have to add to it: Don't believe in the Third Duma, citizens, and look at us, Social-Democrats, who are boycotting it as proof of our protest!

Such an addition under prevailing conditions is not only unnecessary, but sounds rather odd, sounds almost like mockery. In any case, no one believes in the Third Duma, i.e., among the strata of the population that are capable of sustaining the democratic movement there is not and cannot be any of that enthusiasm for the constitutional institution of the Third Duma that undoubtedly existed among the public at large for the *First* Duma, for the *first* attempts in Russia to set up any kind of institutions provided they were *constitutional*.

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ner. Consequently, in the event of the success of our struggle the question would be just as we have stated it.

Widespread public interest in 1905 and the beginning of 1906 was focused on the *first* representative institution, even though it was based on a monarchist constitution. That is a fact. That is what the Social-Democrats had to fight against and show up as clearly as possible.

Not so today. It is not enthusiasm for the *first* "parliament" that forms a characteristic feature of the moment, not belief in the Duma, but *unbelief in an upswing*.

Under these conditions we shall not be strengthening the movement by prematurely putting forward the boycott slogan, we shall not be paralysing the real obstacles to that movement. Moreover, by doing so we even risk weakening the force of our agitation, for the boycott is a slogan associated with an upswing that has taken definite shape, but the trouble now is that wide circles of the population do not believe in the upswing, do not see its strength.

We must first of all see to it that the strength of this upswing is demonstrated *in actual fact*, and we shall always have time afterwards to put forward the slogan which indirectly expresses that strength. Even so it is a question whether a revolutionary movement of an aggressive character requires a special slogan *diverting* attention from ... the *Third Duma*. Possibly not. In order to pass by something that is important and really capable of rousing the enthusiasm of the inexperienced crowd who have never seen a parliament before, it may be necessary to *boycott* the thing that should be passed by. But in order to pass by an institution that is absolutely incapable of rousing the enthusiasm of the democratic or semi-democratic crowd of today it is not necessary to proclaim a boycott. The crux of the matter now is not in a boycott, but in direct and immediate efforts to convert the partial upswing into a general upswing, the trade-union movement into a revolutionary movement, the defence against lock-outs into an offensive against reaction.

VII

To sum up. The boycott slogan was the product of a special historical period. In 1905 and the beginning of 1906, the objective state of affairs confronted the contending

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social forces with the immediate choice between the path of direct revolution or that of a turn to a monarchist constitution. The purpose of the campaign for a boycott was mainly to combat constitutional illusions. The success of the boycott depended on a sweeping, universal, rapid, and powerful upswing of the revolution.

In all these respects the state of affairs now, towards the autumn of 1907, does not call for such a slogan and does not justify it.

While continuing our day-to-day work of preparing for the elections, and while not refusing beforehand to take part in representative institutions, however reactionary, we must direct all our propaganda and agitation towards explaining to the people the connection between the December defeat and the whole subsequent decline of liberty and desecration of the constitution. We must instil in the masses the firm conviction that unless there is a direct mass struggle such desecration will inevitably continue and grow worse.

While not renouncing the use of the boycott slogan at times of rising revolution, when the need for such a slogan may seriously arise, we must at the present moment exert every effort in an endeavour by our direct and immediate influence to convert one or another upswing of the working-class movement into a sweeping, universal, revolutionary, and aggressive movement against reaction as a whole, against its foundations.

June 26, 1907

IN MEMORY OF COUNT HEYDEN

WHAT ARE OUR NON-PARTY "DEMOCRATS" TEACHING THE PEOPLE?[23]

"The progressive press was unanimous in expressing its profound condolence over the heavy loss sustained by Russia in the death of Count P. A. Heyden. The fine personality of Pyotr Alexandrovich attracted all decent people irrespective of party or trend. A rare and happy lot!" There follows a lengthy quotation from the Right Cadet *Russkiye Vedomosti*[24] containing a sentimental effusion on the life and activities of that "wonderful man" by Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, one of that Dolgorukov breed whose spokesmen bluntly confessed the roots of their democracy: better come to terms with the peasants peacefully than wait until they seize the land themselves!... "We deeply share the feelings of grief evoked by the death of Count Heyden in all who are accustomed to value the *man* irrespective of the party guise in which he may be invested. And the late Heyden was above all a *man*."

So writes the newspaper *Tovarishch*, No. 296, Tuesday, June 19, 1907.

The journalists of *Tovarishch* are not only the most ardent democrats of our legal press, but also consider themselves socialists—critical socialists, of course. They are the nearest thing to Social-Democrats; and the Mensheviks—Plekhanov, Martov, Smirnov, Pereyaslavsky, Dan, etc., etc.—are offered the most cordial hospitality in a paper whose columns are adorned with the signatures of Prokopovich, Kuskova, Portugalov, and other "former Marxists". In a word, there is not the slightest doubt that the journalists of *Tovarishch* are the most "Left" spokesmen of our

"enlightened", "democratic", etc., society, to which narrow illegal activities are alien.

And when you come across lines like those quoted above it is difficult to refrain from exclaiming to these gentlemen: How fortunate it is that we, the Bolsheviks, obviously did not belong to *Tovarishch*'s circle of *decent people*!

Gentlemen, "decent people" of Russian enlightened democracy, you are drugging the minds of the Russian people and infecting them with the miasma of toadyism and servility a hundred times worse than those notorious members of the Black Hundred—Purishkevich, Krushevan, and Dubrovin, against whom you are waging such a zealous, such a liberal, such a cheap, such a, for you, profitable, and safe war. You shrug your shoulders and turn to all the "decent people" of your society with a scornful smile at the idea of such "absurd paradoxes"? Yes, we know perfectly well that nothing on earth can shake you out of your vulgar liberal complacency. And that is why we rejoice that we have succeeded in all our activities in setting up a solid wall between ourselves and the circle of decent people of Russian educated society.

Can one give any instance of the Black Hundreds having corrupted and misled any considerable section of the population? One cannot.

Neither their press nor their league, neither their meetings nor the elections to the First and Second Dumas could provide any such instances. The outrages and atrocities of the Black Hundreds, in which the police and the soldiery take part, enrage the people. The frauds, dirty tricks, and bribes of the Black Hundreds arouse hatred and contempt. With the help of government funds the Black Hundreds organise gangs and bands of drunkards who can act only with the permission and at the instigation of the police. In all this there is not a trace of any dangerous ideological influence on any considerable sections of the population.

On the other hand, it is just as unquestionable that such an influence is exerted by our legal, liberal, and "democratic" press. The elections to the First and Second Dumas, meetings, associations, and educational affairs all go to prove this. And *Tovarishch*'s utterance in connection with

the death of Heyden clearly shows what kind of ideological influence this is.

"...A heavy loss ... fine personality ... happy lot ... was above all a *man*."

Count Heyden, the landlord, magnanimously played the liberal prior to the October revolution.[25] After the first victory of the people on October 17, 1905, he immediately, without the slightest hesitation, went over to the counter-revolutionary camp, to the Octobrist Party, the party of the landlords and big capitalists, who were incensed with the peasants and democracy. In the First Duma this noble character defended the government, and after the dissolution of the First Duma negotiated, but without reaching agreement, for a place in the Ministry. Such are the principal stages in the career of this typical counter-revolutionary landlord.

And along come well-dressed, enlightened, and educated gentlemen, mouthing phrases about liberalism, democracy, and socialism, and making speeches of sympathy for the cause of liberty, the cause of the peasants' struggle against the landlords for land—gentlemen who possess a virtual monopoly of the legal opposition in the press, in the associations, and at meetings and elections—and, lifting up their eyes to heaven, preach to the people: "Rare and happy lot!... The late Count was above all a *man*."

Yes, Heyden was not only a man; he was also a citizen, able to understand the common interests of his class and to defend those interests very skilfully. And you, gentlemen, the enlightened democrats, you are just tearful simpletons, concealing under a cloak of liberal idiocy your inability to be anything but cultured lackeys of this landlord class.

There is no need to fear the landlords' influence on the people. They will never succeed in fooling any considerable number of workers or even peasants for any lengthy period. But the influence of the *intelligentsia*, who take no direct part in exploitation, who have been trained to use general phrases and concepts, who seize on every "good" idea and who sometimes from sincere stupidity elevate their inter-class position to a *principle* of non-class parties and non-

class politics—the influence of this bourgeois intelligentsia on the people is dangerous. Here, and here alone, do we find a contamination of the masses that is capable of doing real harm and that calls for the utmost exertion of all the forces of socialism to counteract this poison.

"Heyden was an educated, cultured, humane, and tolerant man"—ecstatically exclaim the liberal and democratic droolers, imagining that they have raised themselves above all "partisanship" to the standpoint "common to all mankind".

You are mistaken, most worthy sirs. This is not a standpoint common to all mankind but a common servile standpoint. The slave who is aware of his slavish condition and fights it is a revolutionary. The slave who is not aware of his slavish condition and vegetates in silent, unenlightened, and wordless slavery, is just a slave. The slave who drools when smugly describing the delights of slavish existence and who goes into ecstasies over his good and kind master is a grovelling boor. And you, gentlemen of *Tovarishch*, are just such boors. With disgusting complacency you wax sentimental over the fact that a counter-revolutionary landlord, who supported the counter-revolutionary government, was an educated and humane man. You do not realise that instead of turning the slave into a revolutionary you are turning slaves into grovellers. All your talk about freedom and democracy is sheer claptrap, parrot phrases, fashionable twaddle, or hypocrisy. It is just a painted signboard. And you yourselves are whited sepulchres. You are mean-spirited boors, and your education, culture, and enlightenment are only a species of thoroughgoing prostitution. For you are selling your souls, and you are selling them not through need, but for "love of the thing".

Heyden was a convinced constitutionalist, you say sentimentally. You are lying, or else you have been completely hoodwinked by the Heydens. Publicly, before the people, to call a man a convinced constitutionalist when that man is known to have founded a party which supported the government of Witte, Dubasov, Goremykin, and Stolypin, is like calling a cardinal a convinced opponent of the pope. Instead of giving the people a correct idea of the constitution you, the democrats, treat the con-

stitution in your writings as something in the nature of salmon mayonnaise. For there can be no doubt that for the counter-revolutionary landlord the constitution is a sort of salmon mayonnaise, a means of perfecting the method of plundering and subjugating the muzhik and the masses of the people. If Heyden was a convinced constitutionalist, then Dubasov and Stolypin as well were convinced constitutionalists, for *in practice* Heyden supported *their* policy. Dubasov and Stolypin could not have been what they were and could not have pursued their policy without the support of the Octobrists, Heyden among them. By what tokens then, O ye sage democrats from among "decent" people, are we to judge the political physiognomy of a man (a "constitutionalist") by his speeches, by the fact that he beats his breast and sheds crocodile tears? Or by his actual deeds in the social arena?

What is characteristic and typical of Heyden's political activities? Is it that he could not reach agreement with Stolypin about joining the Ministry after the dissolution of the First Duma? Or is it that after such an act he *proceeded* to negotiate with Stolypin at all? Is it that formerly, at one time or another, he uttered some kind of liberal phrases? Or is it that he became an Octobrist (=a counter-revolutionary) immediately after October 17? In calling Heyden a convinced constitutionalist, you teach the people that the former is characteristic and typical. And that means that you are senselessly repeating fragments of democratic slogans without understanding the *rudiments* of democracy.

For democracy—remember this, you decent gentlemen and members of respectable society—means fighting against that very domination over the country by counter-revolutionary landlords which Mr. Heyden upheld and of which he was the embodiment throughout his political career.

Heyden was an educated man—say our drawing-room democrats sentimentally. Yes, we have admitted this, and we willingly admit that he was better educated and *cleverer* (which does not always go together with education) than the democrats themselves, for he better understood the interests of his *own* class and his *own* counter-revolutionary social movement than you, gentlemen of *Tovarishch*, un-

derstand the interests of the movement for emancipation. The educated counter-revolutionary landlord knew how to defend the interests of his class subtly and artfully; he skilfully covered up the selfish strivings and rapacious appetites of the semi-feudal landlords with a veil of noble words and outward gentlemanliness; he insisted (to Stolypin) on the protection of these interests by the most civilised forms of class domination. Heyden and his like brought all their "education" to the altar of the interests of the *landlords*. To a real democrat, and not a "respectable" boor from the Russian radical salons, this might have served as an excellent subject for a journalist who wanted to show the *prostitution* of education in modern society.

When the "democrat" prates about education, he wants to create in the reader's mind an impression of superior knowledge, a broad outlook, and an ennobled mind and heart. For the Heydens education is a thin veneer, training, a "coaching" in gentlemanly ways of performing the meanest and dirtiest political deals. For all Heyden's Octobrism, all his "peaceful renovationism",[26] all his negotiations with Stolypin after the dissolution of the First Duma were in fact the carrying-out of the meanest and dirtiest political business, arranging how most reliably, craftily, and artfully, how most solidly within and least noticeably without to defend the *rights* of the aristocratic Russian nobility to the blood and sweat of the millions of "muzhiks", who have always and incessantly been robbed by these Heydens, before 1861, during 1861, after 1861, and after 1905.

In their time Nekrasov and Saltykov taught Russian society to see through the outward gloss and varnish of the feudal landlord's education the predatory interests that lay beneath it; they taught it to hate the hypocrisy and callousness of such types. Yet the modern Russian intellectual, who imagines himself to be the guardian of the democratic heritage, and who belongs to the Cadet Party* or to the Cadet yes-men, teaches the people grovelling servility and delights in his impartiality as a non-party dem-

* The Cadets have shown themselves a hundred times more servile in their appreciation of Heyden than the gentlemen of *Tovarishch*. We took the latter as a specimen of the "democracy" of the "decent people" of Russian "society".

ocrat. A spectacle almost more revolting than that offered by the feats of Dubasov and Stolypin....

"Heyden was a 'man'"—exclaims the drawing-room democrat with enthusiasm. "Heyden was humane."

This sentimentalising over Heyden's humaneness reminds us not only of Nekrasov and Saltykov, but also of Turgenev in his *A Hunter's Sketches*. Here we find depicted a civilised educated landlord, a cultured man with a European polish well versed in the social graces. The landlord is treating his guest with wine and conversing on lofty themes. "Why hasn't the wine been warmed?"—he asks the lackey. The lackey turns pale and does not answer. The landlord rings, and when the servant enters, he says, without raising his voice, "About Fyodor ... make the necessary arrangements."

Here you have an example of Heyden-like "humaneness", or humaneness *à la* Heyden. Turgenev's landlord[27] is "humane" too, ... so humane, compared with Saltychikha,[28] for instance, that he does not go to the stables in person to see that it has been arranged for Fyodor to be flogged. He is so humane that he does not see to it that the birch with which Fyodor is to be flogged has been soaked in salt water. He would never think of hitting or scolding a lackey, could this landlord; he only "arranges things" from a distance, like the educated man he is, in a gentle and humane manner, without noise, without fuss, without making a "public scene"....

Heyden's humaneness was of exactly the same kind. He himself did not join the Luzhenovskys and Filonovs in flogging and maltreating the peasants. He did not join the Rennenkampfs and Meller-Zakomelskys in their punitive expeditions.[29] He did not join Dubasov in his Moscow shootings. So humane was he that he refrained from such actions, leaving all the "arrangements" to these heroes of the national "stable" and controlling from his peaceful and cultured study the political party which supported the government of the Dubasovs and whose leaders drank the health of the conqueror of Moscow, Dubasov.... Was it not indeed humane to send the Dubasovs "to arrange about Fyodor" instead of going to the stables himself? To the old women who run the political department of our liberal and

democratic press, this is a model of humaneness. "He had a heart of gold, he wouldn't hurt a fly!" "A rare and happy lot"—to support the Dubasovs, to enjoy the fruits of the vengeance wreaked by the Dubasovs, and not to be held responsible for the Dubasovs.

The drawing-room democrat considers it the height of democracy to sigh over the fact that we are not being governed by the Heydens (for it never enters the head of this drawing-room simpleton that there is a "natural" division of labour between the Heydens and the Dubasovs). Listen to this:

> "...and how sad that he [Heyden]* has died now, when he would have been most useful. He would now have fought the extreme Right, revealing the finest aspects of his soul and defending constitutional principles with all the energy and fertility of mind natural to him." (*Tovarishch*, No. 299, Friday, June 22, "In Memory of Count Heyden", a letter from Pskov Gubernia.)

How sad that the educated and humane Heyden, the peaceful renovator, is not here to cloak with his constitutional phrase-mongering the nakedness of the Third, Octobrist Duma, the nakedness of the autocracy which is destroying the Duma! It is the aim of the "democratic" journalist not to tear off the false cloak, not to show up to the people their oppressor enemies in all their nakedness, but to regret the absence of the experienced hypocrites who adorn the ranks of the Octobrists.... *Was ist der Philister*? *Ein hohler Darm*, *voll Furcht und Hoffnung*, *dass Gott erbarm!* What is a philistine? A hollow gut, full of fear and hope that God will have mercy![30] What is the Russian liberal-democratic philistine of the Cadet and near-Cadet camp? A hollow gut, full of fear and hope that the counter-revolutionary landlord will have mercy!

June 1907

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Signed: *N. L.*

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

THESES OF A REPORT MADE AT THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE OF JULY 8 ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY TO THE THIRD DUMA[31]

1. The boycott of the Duma, as the experience of the Russian revolution has shown, is the only correct decision on the part of the revolutionary Social-Democrats under such historical conditions as make it a really active boycott, i.e., one that represents the force of a broad and universal revolutionary upswing moving directly towards a straightforward assault on the old regime (consequently, towards an armed uprising). The boycott fulfils a great historical task when it serves as a warning by the proletariat to the whole people against blind petty-bourgeois infatuation with constitutional illusions and with the first quasi-constitutional institutions granted by the old regime.

2. To regard the boycott as an effective means in itself, apart from a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid upswing of the revolution and a direct assault of the whole people aimed at overthrowing the old regime, apart from the aims of the struggle against popular enthusiasm for the granted constitution, is to act under the influence of feeling rather than of reason.

3. Therefore, to proclaim a boycott of the Duma on the grounds that the electoral law favourable to the Cadets has been superceded by one favourable to the Octobrists on the grounds that a frankly Octobrist Duma is taking the place of the Second Duma, which spoke in a Cadet way and acted in an Octobrist way and in which the Social-Democrats took part not without benefit to the cause of the rev-Olution—to proclaim a boycott on such grounds would mean not only substituting revolutionary excitability for

steady revolutionary work, but revealing that the Social-Democrats themselves are a victim of the worst illusions in regard to the Cadet Duma and the Cadet constitution.

4. The focal point of all the propaganda of the revolutionary Social-Democrats should be to explain to the people that the coup d'état of June 3, 1907 was a direct and absolutely inevitable result of the defeat of the December uprising of 1905. The lesson of the second period of the Russian revolution, that of 1906 and 1907, is that the same systematic offensive of reaction and retreat of the revolution that took place throughout that period, is inevitable so long as a belief in the constitution prevails, so long as quasi-constitutional methods of struggle prevail, so long as the proletariat has not mustered its strength and recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in order to rise in incomparably broader masses for a more decisive and aggressive revolutionary assault aimed at the overthrow of the tsarist regime.

5. The strike movement that is now flaring up in the Moscow industrial area and is beginning to spread to other regions of Russia should be regarded as the most important guarantee of a possible revolutionary upswing in the near future. Therefore, the Social-Democrats should do their utmost not only to support and develop the economic struggle of the proletariat, but to convert this movement, which so far is only a trade-union movement, into a broad revolutionary upswing and direct struggle of the working-class masses against the armed force of tsarism. Only when the efforts of the Social-Democrats in this direction have been crowned with success, only on the basis of an aggressive revolutionary movement that has already come into existence, can the boycott slogan acquire serious importance in its inseparable connection with a direct appeal to the masses for an armed uprising, for the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the replacement of the latter by a provisional revolutionary government, for the convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

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THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ("SECOND ALL-RUSSIAN")[32]

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE THIRD DUMA

Whereas,

(1) active boycott, as the experience of the Russian revolution has shown, is correct tactics on the part of the Social-Democrats only under conditions of a sweeping, universal, and rapid upswing of the revolution, developing into an armed uprising, and only in connection with the ideological aims of the struggle against constitutional illusions arising from the convocation of the first representative assembly by the old regime;

(2) in the absence of these conditions correct tactics on the part of the revolutionary Social-Democrats calls for participation in the elections, as was the case with the Second Duma, even if all the conditions of a revolutionary period are present;

(3) the Social-Democrats, who have always pointed out the essentially Octobrist nature of the. Cadet Party and the impermanence of the Cadet electoral law (11-XII-1905) under the autocracy, have no reasons whatever for changing their tactics because this law has been replaced by an Octobrist electoral law;

(4) the strike movement which is now developing in the central industrial region of Russia, while being a most important guarantee of a possible revolutionary upswing in the near future, at the same time calls for sustained efforts towards converting the movement, which so far is only a trade-union one, into a political and directly revolutionary movement linked with an armed uprising,

the Conference resolves:

(a) to take part in the elections to the Third Duma too;

(b) to explain to the masses the connection of the coup d'état of 3-VI-1907 with the defeat of the December uprising of 1905, as well as with the betrayals by the liberal bourgeoisie, while at the same time showing the inadequacy of trade-union struggle alone and striving to convert the trade-union strike movement into a political and direct revolutionary struggle of the masses for the overthrow of the tsarist government by means of an uprising;

(c) to explain to the masses that the boycott of the Duma is not by itself capable of raising the working-class movement and the revolutionary struggle to a higher level, and that the tactics of boycott could be appropriate only provided our efforts to convert the trade-union upswing into a revolutionary assault were successful.

2

OUTLINE OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS

The Conference considers it the duty of all members of the Party energetically to carry out the London Congress resolution on the trade unions, all local conditions being taken into consideration when effecting organisational contacts between the trade unions and the Social-Democratic Party or when the latter's leadership is accepted by the former, and always, under all conditions, paying primary attention that the Social-Democrats in the trade unions should not confine themselves to passive accommodation to a "neutral" platform—a favourite practice of all shades of bourgeois-democratic trends (Cadets, non-party Progressists,[33] Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.,)—but should steadfastly uphold the Social-Democratic views in their entirety and should steadfastly promote acceptance by the trade unions of the Social-Democrats' ideological leadership and the establishment of permanent and effective organisational contacts with the trade unions.

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NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

After the dissolution of the Second Duma despondency, penitence, and apostasy became the outstanding features of political literature. Beginning with Mr. Struve, continuing with *Tovarishch*, and ending with a number of writers supporting the Social-Democratic movement we witness a renunciation of the revolution, of its traditions, and its methods of struggle, an effort in one way or another to steer a course more to the right. To illustrate what some Social-Democrats are now saying and writing, we shall take the first articles of theirs we come across in the current periodical press—one by Mr. Nevedomsky in *Obrazovaniye*,[34] No. 7, and one by Mr. Vl. Gorn in *Tovarishch*, No. 348.

Mr. M. Nevedomsky begins his article with a scathing criticism of the Cadets in the Second Duma and a vehement defence of the Left-bloc tactics and behaviour of the Social-Democrats. He ends his article, however, as follows:

"Speaking in the indicative mood, I will only say one thing, which should be obvious to every Social-Democrat, namely, at our present stage of political evolution, the activity of the socialist parties, in the long run, after all merely paves the way for the bourgeois parties and prepares for their temporary triumph.

"The upshot, in the imperative mood, is this: that whatever this 'mimetic' ('one minute a brunette, the next a blonde') Cadet Party may be, it is for the time being the only opposition party, and the activities of the socialist party have to be co-ordinated with its activities. This is dictated by the principle of economy of strength."... "On the whole, speaking without irony [Mr. Nevedomsky had to make this reservation because he cannot write without conceits and extravagances which mislead both the readers and the author himself], this phrase of Milyukov's quite correctly defines, in their essential features, the relations between the parties ... [this refers to the following phrase of Milyukov's: 'The threat of in-

tervention by the people may be put into effect only when the ground has been prepared for that intervention—and that is the object which all those who consider the powers of the Duma inadequate for the performance of its tremendous tasks should work towards;' let the Lefts prepare the ground and build up the movement—Mr. Nevedomsky rightly interprets this phrase—'while the Cadets and the Duma would take account of that work'].... 'Coming from the mouth of a spokesman of the accounting party that may not be devoid of cynicism, but when the question is formulated in that way by Plekhanov, for example, it is merely an exact and realistic definition of the line of conduct for the Social-Democrats and the method by which they are to utilise the forces of the liberal opposition.'"

We are willing to assume that Plekhanov experiences a certain sense of ... well, to put it mildly, embarrassment, when such gentlemen as these kindly pat him on the back. But by his Cadet slogans, such as a single platform for Social-Democrats and Cadets or the safeguarding of the Duma, Plekhanov undoubtedly gave people the right to use his words in just that way.

Now listen to Mr. Vl. Gorn.

"Clearly, in order to defeat it [the anti-democratic coalition of the landowners and big bourgeois created by the electoral law of June 3] two conditions are necessary. First, all democratic sections, including the proletariat, should act together to contrapose one coalition to the other, and, secondly, the struggle should be waged *not by devising the most decisive slogans with a view to splitting off elements that are not revolutionary enough and forcing the movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority* [Mr. Gorn's italics], but by a real concrete fight, in which the masses themselves are drawn in, against the concrete measures of the anti-democratic coalition. To create a democratic coalition we do not need a merger, but only an agreement covering ways and the immediate aims of the struggle. And such agreements—if the conscious representatives of the masses—the parties—will adopt the basis of achieving real changes in the conditions of social life and not merely a propaganda standpoint—are quite possible."

Is it not clear from these excerpts that both our heroes of fashionable Cadet phrase-mongering are, in substance, saying one and the same thing? Mr. Gorn is merely a bit more outspoken and has shown his hand a bit more, but he differs from Mr. Nevedomsky no more than Mr. Struve does from Mr. Nabokov or Mr. Maklakov.

Politics has its inner logic. How many times has it been pointed out that *technical* agreements between the Social-

Democrats and the liberals are possible without leading in any way to a *political bloc*, which has always been rejected by all Party Social-Democrats (we say nothing of the non-Party Social-Democrats or those people who play a double game, saying one thing within the Party and another in the "free" non-Party press). And life has invariably upset these fine statements and good intentions, for under cover of "technical" agreements ideas of a political bloc have steadily forced their way to the top. In a petty-bourgeois country, during a period of bourgeois revolution, where there are a lot of petty-bourgeois intellectuals in the workers' party, the tendency towards political subordination of the proletariat to the liberals has a very real basis. And it is this tendency, rooted in the objective state of affairs, that proves to be the sum and substance of all quasi-socialist political chicanery on the subject of coalitions with the Cadets. Mr. Gorn, with the naïveté of an intellectual whose language only is Social-Democratic, but whose whole mind, whole ideological background, and entire "marrow" are purely liberal or philistine, simply advocates a political bloc, a "*democratic coalition*"—neither more nor less.

It is highly characteristic that Mr. Gorn *was obliged* to make a reservation: "we do not need a merger"! In doing so he merely betrayed the remnants of a guilty socialist conscience. For in saying: "we do not need a merger, but only an agreement", he as good as gave a description of this "agreement", a definition of its *content*, which reveals with the utmost clarity his Social-Democratic apostasy. It is not a question of a word, of whether the thing is called a "merger" or an "agreement". It is a question of what the actual content of this "*conjunction*" is. It is a question of *what price* you are offering the Social-Democratic Labour Party to become the kept woman of liberalism.

The price is clearly defined. It is:

(1) To abandon the propaganda standpoint.

(2) To refrain from "devising" decisive slogans.

(3) To cease splitting off the elements that are not revolutionary enough.

(4) To refrain from "forcing" the movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority.

I would give a prize to anyone who was capable of formulating a clearer and more precise programme of downright and utterly vile apostasy. The only difference between Mr. Struve and Mr. Gorn is that Mr. Struve sees his way clearly and to a certain extent determines his own steps "independently", while Mr. Gorn is simply held in leading strings by his Cadet mentors.

—To abandon the propaganda standpoint—that is what the Cadets in the Second Duma were all the time telling the people to do. This means not to develop the political consciousness and *demandingness* of the working-class masses and the peasantry, but to diminish both the one and the other, to quell and suppress them, to advocate social peace.

—Not to devise decisive slogans—means to do what the Cadets have done, namely, to give up the advocacy of slogans that the Social-Democrats had put forward long before the revolution.

—Not to split off elements that are not revolutionary enough—means abandoning all public criticism of Cadet hypocrisy, lies, and reactionary views, it means taking Mr. Struve to one's bosom.

—Not to force a movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority—means, in effect, rejecting all revolutionary methods of struggle. For it is absolutely indisputable that those who participated in the revolutionary movement throughout 1905 were the *avowedly revolutionary minority*: it was because the masses who were fighting were in a minority—they were nonetheless masses for being in a minority—that they did not achieve full success in their struggle. But all the successes which the emancipation movement in Russia did achieve, all the gains it did make, were *wholly and without exception* the result of this struggle of the masses *alone*, who were in a minority. That in the first place. Secondly, what the liberals and their yes-men call "forced movements", was the *only* movement in which the masses (although on this first occasion, unfortunately, in a minority) took part independently and not through deputies—the only movement which *was not afraid of* the people, which expressed the interests of the masses, and which had the support (as was proved by the elections to

the First and especially to the Second Dumas) of the vast masses who did not take part directly in the revolutionary struggle.

In speaking about "forcing the movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority", Mr. Gorn is guilty of a very widespread exaggeration of a purely Burenin type. When Burenin's newspaper[35] warred with Alexinsky during the period of the Second Duma, it always tried to make out that its hostility towards him was due not to his fight for political freedom, but to the fact that he wanted freedom in order to ... smash windows, climb lampposts, and so on. The same Black-Hundred preparations are made by the publicist of *Tovarishch*. He tries to make out that the only thing that prevents an agreement between the socialists and the liberals is not that the socialists have always stood and will continue to stand for the development of the revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary activity of the masses in general, but the fact that the socialists are *forcing*, that is precipitating, artificially whipping up the movement, that they are fomenting movements which are *avowedly* hopeless.

Our reply to these tricks will be brief. The whole socialist press, Menshevik as well as Bolshevik, during the period of both the First and Second Dumas condemned the "forcing" of the movement in any way.... It is not on account of the forcing of the movement that the Cadets fought the Social-Democrats during both the First and the Second Dumas, but because the Social-Democrats *develop* the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, their readiness to put forward demands, and *expose* the reactionary nature of the Cadets and the mirage of constitutional illusions. These well-known historical facts cannot be disposed of by any newspaper acrobatics. As regards the form of Mr. Gorn's statement, it is highly characteristic of our times, when "educated society" turns away from the revolution and seizes upon pornography. A person who considers himself a Social-Democrat betakes himself to a non-Party newspaper in order to address the public at large in the manner of *Novoye Vremya* on the subject of the workers' party "forcing" the movement of the "avowed" minority! Renegade moods among us create also renegade morals.

* * *

Now let us examine the question from another angle. The views of the Nevedomskys and Gorns, which arouse such disgust when put forward by quasi-Social-Democrats, are, beyond question, the highly typical and natural views of wide circles of our bourgeois intelligentsia, liberal-minded "society", disaffected civil servants, etc. It is not enough to describe these views as an expression of the politically spineless, flabby, and wavering petty bourgeoisie. They must be explained also from the standpoint of the existing state of affairs in the development of our revolution.

Why is it that certain circles of the petty bourgeoisie develop such views just now, on the eve of the Third Duma? Because these circles, who meekly change their convictions with every shift in government policy, believe in the Octobrist Duma, i.e., they consider its mission practicable and hasten to adjust themselves to the "Octobrist reforms", hasten to find theoretical reasons justifying their accommodation to Octobrism.

The mission of the Octobrist Duma, as envisaged by the government, is to consummate the revolution with a direct deal between the old regime and the landlords and biggest bourgeoisie on the basis of a definite minimum of constitutional reforms. Speaking in the abstract, there is nothing absolutely impossible in this, since in Western Europe a number of bourgeois revolutions are being consummated by the consolidation of "Octobrist" constitutional systems. The only question is whether Octobrist "reforms" capable of stopping the revolution are possible in present-day Russia. Are not these Octobrist "reforms", owing to the deep roots of our revolution, doomed to the same failure as the Cadet "reforms"? Will not the Octobrist Duma be as brief an episode as the Cadet Dumas were, an episode on the road towards re-establishing the rule of the Black Hundreds and the autocracy?

We lived through a period of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses (1905), which resulted in certain gains of freedom. Then we experienced a period of suspension of this struggle (1906 and half of 1907). This period gave reaction

a number of victories and not a single victory to the revolution, which lost the gains of the first period. The second period was a Cadet period, one of constitutional illusions. The masses still believed, more or less, in "parliamentarism" under the autocracy, and the autocracy, realising the danger of pure Black-Hundred domination, sought to come to terms with the Cadets, experimented, *tried on* various types of constitutional costumes, tested what measure of reforms the "masters" of Russia, the biggest landlords, were capable of adopting. The experiment of the Cadet constitution ended in failure, although the Cadets in the Second Duma behaved in a perfectly Octobrist manner and not only refrained from attacking the government or stirring up the masses against it, but systematically soothed the masses, combating the "Left", i.e., the parties of the proletariat and the peasantry and openly and vigorously supporting the existing government (the budget, etc.). The experiment of the Cadet constitution failed, in short, not because the Cadets or the government lacked good will, but because the objective contradictions of the Russian revolution proved to be *too deep-seated*. These contradictions *proved to be* so profound, that the Cadet bridge was unable to span the gulf. The experiment showed that even with the mass struggle completely suppressed for a time, even with the old regime having a completely free hand in rigging the elections, etc., the peasant masses (and in a bourgeois revolution the outcome depends most of all on the peasantry) made demands which *no* art of diplomacy on the part of the Cadet go-betweens was able to adjust to the domination of the privileged landlords. If Mr. Struve now bears malice against the Trudoviks[36] (not to mention the Social-Democrats), and if *Rech*[37] wages a regular campaign against them this is no accident, no mere annoyance on the part of a bourgeois advocate whose services have been rejected by the muzhik. It is an inevitable political step in the evolution of the Cadets: they failed to reconcile the landlords with the Trudoviks, *consequently* (for the bourgeois intelligentsia this is the *only possible* conclusion) what is necessary is not to rally still broader masses against the landlords, but to *lower* the demands of the Trudoviks, to *make*

more concessions to the landlords, to "discard revolutionary utopias", as Struve and the *Rech* say, or to stop inventing decisive slogans and forcing the movement, as Mr. Gorn, the new servant of the Cadets, says.

The government *accommodates* itself to the landlords by placing the elections entirely in their hands and virtually depriving the peasantry of the suffrage. The Cadets accommodate themselves to the landlords by attacking the Trudoviks for their revolutionariness and uncompromising attitude. The non-party politicians, like the contributors to *Tovarishch* in general and Mr. Gorn in particular, accommodate themselves to the landlords by calling upon the proletariat and the peasantry to "harmonise" ("co-ordinate", as Mr. Nevedomsky puts it) their policy with that of the Cadets, to enter into a "democratic coalition" with the Cadets, to renounce "decisive slogans", and so on and so forth.

The government is acting systematically. Step by step it is taking away what has been gained by the "forced movement" and what has been left defenceless during the lull in that movement. Step by step it is trying to find out what "reforms" the landlords could be induced to agree to. Could not the Cadets have done this? Is it owing to interference from the Lefts that the Cadets could not, despite their sincere desire and vain efforts? In that case, the franchise of the "Lefts" will have to be curtailed and the decision placed in the hands of the Octobrists: only if *this experiment*, *too*, should fail, will it be necessary to place ourselves entirely in the power of the "Council of the United Nobility".[38]

There is sense, method, and logic in the actions of the government. It is the logic of the landlord's class interests. These interests have to be protected; after all, the bourgeois development of Russia has to be safeguarded too.

To carry out these plans the government requires that the interests and movement of the *masses* should be *forcibly* suppressed, that they should be deprived of the suffrage and handed over to the tender mercies of the 130,000. Whether it will succeed in carrying out these plans no one can say at present. This question will be answered only by *struggle*.

We Social-Democrats are answering this question *by our* struggle. And the Cadets are answering it *by struggle ... against the Left*. The Cadets are fighting *for the government*'s solution of this question: they did this systematically in the Second Duma in the parliamentary field. Now, too, they are doing it systematically by their ideological struggle against the Social-Democrats, and the Trudoviks.

Of course, to the ordinary Russian intellectual, as well as to any half-educated petty bourgeois, this sounds paradoxical; the Cadets, who call themselves democrats and make liberal speeches, fight for the government solution of the question! It is so obviously incongruous! If they are democrats, then the place for them is the "democratic coalition"! This is such an obvious conclusion for political simpletons, whom even two years of the Russian revolution have not taught to seek the true basis of both the government's measures and the liberals' spate of talk in the *struggle of the different classes*. We have any amount of "Marxists" from the intellectual camp who profess the principles of the class struggle while in reality they use purely liberal arguments when talking about the Cadets, about the role of the Duma, and about the boycott! And how many more Cadet votings for the budget will these political simpletons need before they can digest what has long been a familiar sight in Europe, namely, that of a liberal making speeches against the government and supporting it on every important issue.

The replacement of the Second Duma by the Third is the replacement of the Cadet, who acts in the Octobrist manner, by the Octobrist who acts with the help of the Cadet. Predominant in the .Second Duma was the party of the bourgeois intellectuals; who called themselves democrats where the people were concerned and supported the government where the bourgeoisie was concerned. Predominant in the Third Duma will be the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, who hire the bourgeois intellectuals for a make-believe opposition and for business services. This simple truth is borne out by the whole political behaviour of the Cadet Party and by the Second Duma in particular. Even the man in the street has now begun to grasp this simple truth: we shall refer to such a witness as Mr. Zhilkin, whom

it would be absurd to suspect of Bolshevik sympathies or of prejudiced and uncompromising hostility towards the Cadets.

In today's issue of *Tovarishch* (No. 351), Mr. Zhilkin conveys the impressions of a "cheerful" (*sic*! Mr. Zhilkin understands "cheerfulness" in much the same way as Gorn or Nevedomsky) provincial in the following words:

> "The Octobrist landlords I spoke to argue as follows: 'It's all right to vote for the Cadets. The good thing about them is that they are tractable. In the First Duma they wanted too much. In the Second they backed down. They even made cuts in their programme. In the Third they'll give way still more. I daresay they'll come to some arrangement. Besides, to tell the truth, there isn't any Octobrist whose election we could ensure.
>
> "'Let the Cadets get elected. The difference between us isn't very great. They are sure to go to the right in the Third Duma.... We're friendly with the Octobrists out of necessity.... What public speakers or big men do they have?'"

Those who judge of parties by their names, programmes, promises, and speeches, or are content with crude Bernsteinised "Marxism", which consists in reiterating the axiom about support for bourgeois democracy in a bourgeois revolution, may cherish hopes in regard to a democratic coalition of the Lefts and the Cadets in the Third Duma. But those with the slightest revolutionary flair and thoughtful attitude towards the lessons of our revolution, or those who are really guided by the principle of the class struggle and judge of parties by their class character, will not be in the least surprised to find that the party of bourgeois intellectuals is fit only to perform flunkey services for the party of the big bourgeois. The Gorns and Nevedomskys are capable of believing that the Cadets' differences with the democrats are an exception, and their differences with the Octobrists a rule. It is exactly the other way round. The Cadets are true kin to the Octobrists by their very class nature. Cadet democracy is sheer window-dressing, a temporary reflection of the democracy of the masses, or a downright hoax, which the Russian Bernsteinians and petty bourgeois, especially those from the newspaper *Tovarishch*, fall for.

And so, if you view the matter from this angle, if you grasp the true historical role of the Cadet—that bourgeois

intellectual, who helps the landlord to satisfy the muzhik with a beggarly reform—the whole infinite wisdom of the Gorn and Nevedomsky gentry, who advise the proletariat to *harmonise* their activity with that of the Cadets, will stand revealed to you! The picture of the Octobrist "reforms", which we are promised, is quite clear. The landlord "sets up" the muzhik, sets him up in such a manner that the population cannot be induced to accept the reforms without punitive expeditions, without floggings of the peasants and shootings of the workers. The Cadet professor registers opposition: he proves, from the standpoint of the modern science of law, the necessity of constitutionally enforcing the regulations governing punitive expeditions, while blaming the police for being over-zealous. The Cadet lawyer registers opposition: he argues that, according to the law, sixty strokes per man should be given and not 200, and that money should be assigned to the government for birch rods, while stipulating that the law should be observed. The Cadet physician is prepared to count the pulse of the victim of flogging and write a research about the necessity of reducing the upper limit of strokes by half.

Was not the Cadet opposition in the Second Duma of just this kind? And is it not clear that for the sake of such an opposition the Octobrist landlord will not only elect a Cadet to the Duma, but will agree to pay him a professorial or some other kind of salary?

A democratic coalition of socialists and Cadets in the Second Duma, after the Second Duma, or during the Third Duma would in fact, by virtue of the objective state of affairs, only mean turning the workers' party into a blind and wretched adjunct of the liberals, complete betrayal by the socialists of the interests of the proletariat and the interests of the revolution. Very likely, the Nevedomskys and Gorns do not realise what they are doing. With such people convictions are very often not more deeply seated than the tip of their tongues. In effect, their endeavours amount to putting an end to the independent party of the working class, putting an end to Social-Democracy. The Social-Democrats, who understand the tasks confronting them, should put an end to these gentlemen. Unfortunately, among us the concept of bourgeois revolution

is still interpreted in a one-sided manner. We overlook, for example, the fact that this revolution should show the proletariat—and it alone can be the first to show the proletariat—what the bourgeoisie of a *given* country is *in actual fact*, what the *national* peculiarities of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie are in the given *national* bourgeois revolution. The real, definitive, and mass separation of the proletariat as a class, in opposition to all the bourgeois parties, can only occur when the history of *its own* country reveals to the proletariat *the entire character* of the bourgeoisie as a class, as a political unit—the entire character of the petty bourgeoisie as a section, as a definite ideological and political unit revealing itself in some open, broadly political activities. We must incessantly explain to the proletariat the theoretical truths about the nature of the class interests of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in capitalist society. These truths, however, will be driven home to really broad masses of the proletariat only when these classes will have visible, tangible experience of the behaviour of the parties of one class or another, when the clear realisation of their class nature is supplemented by the immediate reaction of the proletarian mind to the whole character of the bourgeois parties. Nowhere else in the world, probably, has the bourgeoisie revealed in the bourgeois revolution such reactionary brutality, such a close alliance with the old regime, such "freedom" from anything remotely resembling sincere sympathy towards culture, towards progress, towards the preservation of human dignity, as it has with us—so let our proletariat derive from the Russian bourgeois revolution a triple hatred of the bourgeoisie and a determination to fight it. Nowhere else in the world, probably, did the petty bourgeoisie, beginning with the "Popular Socialists"[39] and the Trudoviks and ending with the intellectuals who have wormed themselves into the Social-Democratic movement, display such cowardice and spinelessness in the struggle, such a shameful epidemic of renegade moods, such toadyism towards the heroes of bourgeois fashion or reactionary outrages—so let our proletariat derive from our bourgeois revolution a triple contempt for petty-bourgeois flabbiness and vacillation. No matter how our revolution

may develop, no matter what severe trials our proletariat may at times have to go through, this hatred and this contempt will help it to close its ranks and rid itself of worthless offshoots of alien classes; it will increase its forces and steel it for dealing the blows with which it will overwhelm the whole of bourgeois society when the time comes.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTTGART[40]

A feature of the International Socialist Congress held in Stuttgart this August was its large and representative composition: the total of 886 delegates came from all the five continents. Besides providing an impressive demonstration of international unity in the proletarian struggle, the Congress played an outstanding part in defining the tactics of the socialist parties. It adopted general resolutions on a number of questions, the decision of which had hitherto been left solely to the discretion of the individual socialist parties. And the fact that more and more problems require uniform, principled decisions in different countries is striking proof that socialism is being welded into a single international force.

The full text of the Stuttgart resolutions will be, found elsewhere in this issue.[41] We shall deal briefly with each of them in order to bring out the chief controversial points and the character of the debate at the Congress.

This is not the first time the colonial question has figured at international congresses. Up till now their decisions have always been an unqualified condemnation of bourgeois colonial policy as a policy of plunder and violence. This time, however, the Congress Commission was so composed that opportunist elements, headed by Van Kol of Holland, predominated in it. A sentence was inserted in the draft resolution to the effect that the Congress did not in principle condemn all colonial policy, for under socialism colonial policy could play a civilising role. The minority in the Commission (Ledebour of Germany, the Polish and Russian Social-Democrats, and many others)

vigorously protested against any such idea being entertained. The matter was referred to Congress, where the forces of the two trends were found to be so nearly equal that there was an extremely heated debate.

The opportunists rallied behind Van Kol. Speaking for the majority of the German delegation Bernstein and David urged acceptance of a "socialist colonial policy" and fulminated against the radicals for their barren, negative attitude, their failure to appreciate the importance of reforms, their lack of a practical colonial programme, etc. Incidentally, they were opposed by Kautsky, who felt compelled to ask the Congress to pronounce *against* the majority of the German delegation. He rightly pointed out that there was no question of rejecting the struggle for reforms; that was explicitly stated in other sections of the resolution, which had evoked no dispute. The point at issue was whether we should make concessions to the modern regime of bourgeois plunder and violence. The Congress was to discuss present-day colonial policy, which was based on the downright enslavement of primitive populations. The bourgeoisie was actually introducing slavery in the colonies and subjecting the native populations to unprecedented outrages and acts of violence, "civilising" them by the spread of liquor and syphilis. And in that situation socialists were expected to utter evasive phrases about the possibility of accepting colonial policy in principle! That would be an outright desertion to the bourgeois point of view. It would be a decisive step towards subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois ideology, to bourgeois imperialism, which is now arrogantly raising its head.

The Congress defeated the Commission's motion by 128 votes to 108 with ten abstentions (Switzerland). It should be noted that at Stuttgart, for the first time, each nation was allotted a definite number of votes, varying from twenty (for the big nations, Russia included) to two (Luxembourg). The combined vote of the small nations, which either do not pursue a colonial policy, or which suffer from it, outweighed the vote of nations where even the proletariat has been somewhat inflicted with the lust of conquest.

This vote on the colonial question is of very great importance. First, it strikingly showed up socialist oppor-

tunism, which succumbs to bourgeois blandishments. Secondly, it revealed a negative feature in the European labour movement, one that can do no little harm to the proletarian cause, and for that reason should receive serious attention. Marx frequently quoted a very significant saying of Sismondi. The proletarians of the ancient world, this saying runs, lived at the expense of society; modern society lives at the expense of the proletarians.[42]

The non-propertied, but non-working, class is incapable of overthrowing the exploiters. Only the proletarian class, which maintains the whole of society, can bring about the social revolution. However, as a result of the extensive colonial policy, the European proletarian *partly* finds himself in a position when it is *not* his labour, but the labour of the practically enslaved natives in the colonies, that maintains the whole of society. The British bourgeoisie, for example, derives more profit from the many millions of the population of India and other colonies than from the British workers. In certain countries this provides the material and economic basis for infecting the proletariat with colonial chauvinism. Of course, this may be only a temporary phenomenon, but the evil must nonetheless be clearly realised and its causes understood in order to be able to rally the proletariat of all countries for the struggle against such opportunism. This struggle is bound to be victorious, since the "privileged" nations are a diminishing faction of the capitalist nations.

There were practically no differences at the Congress on the question of women's suffrage. The only one who tried to make out a case for a socialist campaign in favour of a limited women's suffrage (qualified as opposed to universal suffrage) was a woman delegate from the extremely opportunist British Fabian Society. No one supported her. Her motives were simple enough: British bourgeois ladies hope to obtain the franchise for themselves, without its extension to women workers in Britain.

The First International Socialist Women's Conference was held concurrently with the Congress in the same building. Both at this Conference and in the Congress Commission there was an interesting dispute between the German and Austrian Social-Democrats on the draft resolution. In

their campaign for universal suffrage the Austrians tended to play down the demand for equal rights of men and women; on practical grounds they placed the main emphasis on male suffrage. Clara Zetkin and other German Social-Democrats rightly pointed out to the Austrians that they were acting incorrectly, and that by failing to press the demand that the vote be granted to women as well as men, they were weakening the mass movement. The concluding words of the Stuttgart resolution ("the demand for universal suffrage should be put forward *simultaneously* for both men and women") undoubtedly relate to this episode of excessive "practicalism" in the history of the Austrian labour movement.

The resolution on the relations between the socialist parties and the trade unions is of especial importance to us Russians. The Stockholm R.S.D.L.P. Congress went on record for *non-Party* unions, thus endorsing the neutrality standpoint, which has always been upheld by our non-Party democrats, Bernsteinians and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The London Congress, on the other hand, put forward a different principle, namely, closer alignment of the unions with the Party, even including, under certain conditions, their recognition as Party unions. At Stuttgart in the Social-Democratic subsection of the Russian section (the socialists of each country form a separate section at international congresses) opinion was divided on this issue (there was no split on other issues). Plekhanov upheld the neutrality principle. Voinov,[43] a Bolshevik, defended the anti-neutralist viewpoint of the London Congress and of the Belgian resolution (published in the Congress materials with de Brouckère's report, which will soon appear in Russian). Clara Zetkin rightly remarked in her journal *Die Gleichheit*[44] that Plekhanov's arguments for neutrality were just as lame as those of the French. And the Stuttgart resolution—as Kautsky rightly observed and as anyone who takes the trouble to read it carefully will see—puts an end to recognition of the "neutrality" principle. There is not a word in it about neutrality or non-party principles. On the contrary, it definitely recognises the need for closer and stronger connections between the unions and the socialist parties.

The resolution of the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress on the trade unions has thus been placed on a firm theoretical basis in the form of the Stuttgart resolution. The Stuttgart resolution lays down the general principle that in every country the unions must be brought into permanent and close contact with the socialist party. The London resolution says that in Russia this should take the form, under favourable conditions, of party unions, and party members must work towards that goal.

We note that the harmful aspects of the neutrality principle were revealed in Stuttgart by the fact that the trade-union half of the German delegation were the most adamant supporters of opportunist views. That is why in Essen, for example, the Germans were against Van Kol (the trade unions were not represented in Essen, which was a Congress solely of the Party), while in Stuttgart they supported him. By playing into the hands of the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement the advocacy of neutrality in Germany has *actually* had harmful results. This is a fact that should not be overlooked, especially in Russia, where the bourgeois-democratic counsellors of the proletariat, who urge it to keep the trade-union movement "neutral", are so numerous.

A few words about the resolution on emigration and immigration. Here, too, in the Commission there was an attempt to defend narrow, craft interests, to ban the immigration of workers from backward countries (coolies—from China, etc.). This is the same spirit of aristocratism that one finds among workers in some of the "civilised" countries, who derive certain advantages from their privileged position, and are, therefore, inclined to forget the need for international class solidarity. But no one at the Congress defended this craft and petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness. The resolution fully meets the demands of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

We pass now to the last, and perhaps the most important, resolution of the Congress—that on anti-militarism. The notorious Hervé, who has made such a noise in France and Europe, advocated a semi-anarchist view by naïvely suggesting that every war be "answered" by a strike and an uprising. He did not understand, on the one hand, that

war is a necessary product of capitalism, and that the proletariat cannot renounce participation in revolutionary wars, for such wars are possible, and have indeed occurred in capitalist societies. He did not understand, on the other hand, that the possibility of "answering" a war depends on the nature of the crisis created by that war. The choice of the means of struggle depends on these conditions; moreover, the struggle must consist (and here we have the third misconception, or shallow thinking of Hervéism) not simply in replacing war by peace, but in replacing capitalism by socialism. The essential thing is not merely to prevent war, but to utilise the crisis created by war in order to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. However, underlying all these semi-anarchist absurdities of Hervéism there was one sound and practical purpose: to spur the socialist movement so that it will not be restricted to parliamentary methods of struggle alone, so that the masses will realise the need for revolutionary action in connection with the crises which war inevitably involves, so that, lastly, a more lively understanding of international labour solidarity and of the falsity of bourgeois patriotism will be spread among the masses.

Bebel's resolution (moved by the Germans and coinciding in all essentials with Guesde's resolution) had one shortcoming—it failed to indicate the active tasks of the proletariat. This made it possible to read Bebel's orthodox propositions through opportunist spectacles, and Vollmar was quick to turn this possibility into a reality.

That is why Rosa Luxemburg and the Russian Social-Democratic delegates moved their amendments to Bebel's resolution. These amendments (1) stated that militarism is the chief weapon of class oppression; (2) pointed out the need for propaganda among the youth; (3) stressed that Social-Democrats should not only try to prevent war from breaking out or to secure the speediest termination of wars that have already begun, but should utilise the crisis created by the war to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

The subcommission (elected by the Anti-Militarism Commission) incorporated all these amendments in Bebel's resolution. In addition, Jaurès made this happy suggestion: instead of enumerating the methods of struggle

(strikes, uprisings) the resolution should cite historical examples of proletarian action against war, from the demonstrations in Europe to the revolution in Russia. The result of all this redrafting was a resolution which, it is true, is unduly long, but is rich in thought and precisely formulates the tasks of the proletariat. It combines the stringency of orthodox—i.e., the only scientific Marxist analysis with recommendations for the most resolute and revolutionary action by the workers' parties. This resolution cannot be interpreted *à la* Vollmar, nor can it be fitted into the narrow framework of naïve Hervéism.

On the whole, the Stuttgart Congress brought into sharp contrast the opportunist and revolutionary wings of the international Social-Democratic movement on a number of cardinal issues and decided these issues in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism. Its resolutions and the report of the debates should become a handbook for every propagandist. The work done at Stuttgart will greatly promote the unity of tactics and unity of revolutionary struggle of the proletarians of all countries.

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and beginning of September 1907

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THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTTGART[45]

The recent Congress in Stuttgart was the twelfth congress of the proletarian International. The first five congresses belong to the period of the First International (1866-72), which was guided by Marx, who, as Bebel aptly observed, tried to achieve international unity of the militant proletariat from above. This attempt could not be successful until the national socialist parties were consolidated and strengthened, but the activities of the First International rendered great services to the labour movement of all countries and left lasting traces.

The Second International was inaugurated at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1889. At the subsequent congresses in Brussels (1891), Zurich (1893), London (1896), Paris (1900), and Amsterdam (1904), this new International, resting on strong national parties, was finally consolidated. In Stuttgart there were 884 delegates from 25 nations of Europe, Asia (Japan and some from India), America, Australia, and Africa (one delegate from South Africa).

The great importance of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart lies in the fact that it marked the final consolidation of the Second International and the transformation of international congresses into business-like meetings which exercise very considerable influence on the nature and direction of socialist activities throughout the world. Formally, the decisions of the International congresses are not binding on the individual nations, but their moral significance is such that the non-observance of decisions is, in fact, an exception which is rarer than

Cover of *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, *1908* containing Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart". Lenin's personal copy
Reduced

Cover of *Kalendar dlya rabochikh*, 1908 containing Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart". Lenin's personal copy

Reduced

the non-observance by the individual parties of the decisions of their own congresses. The Amsterdam Congress succeeded in uniting the French socialists, and its resolution against ministerialism[46] really expressed the will of the class-conscious proletariat of the whole world and determined the policy of the working-class parties.

The Stuttgart Congress made a big stride forward in the same direction, and on a number of important issues proved to be the supreme body determining the political line of socialism. The Stuttgart Congress, more firmly even than the Amsterdam Congress, laid this line down in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to opportunism. *Die Gleichheit*, the organ of the German Social-Democratic women workers, edited by Clara Zetkin, justly observed in this connection:

"On all questions the various deviations of certain socialist parties towards opportunism were corrected in a revolutionary sense with the co-operation of the socialists of all countries."

The remarkable and sad feature in this connection was that German Social-Democracy, which hitherto had always upheld the revolutionary standpoint in Marxism, proved to be unstable, or took an opportunist stand. The Stuttgart Congress confirmed a profound observation which Engels once made concerning the German labour movement. On April 29, 1886, Engels wrote to Sorge, a veteran of the First International:

"In general it is a good thing that the leadership of the Germans is being challenged, especially after they have elected so many philistine elements (which is unavoidable, it is true). In Germany everything becomes philistine in calm times; the sting of French competition is thus absolutely necessary. And it will not be lacking."[47]

The sting of French competition was not lacking at Stuttgart, and this sting proved to be really necessary, for the Germans displayed a good deal of philistinism. It is especially important for the Russian Social-Democrats to bear this in mind, for our liberals (and not only the liberals) are trying their hardest to represent the least creditable features of German Social-Democracy as a model worthy of imitation. The most thoughtful and outstanding

minds among the German Social-Democrats have noted this fact themselves and, casting aside all false shame, have definitely pointed to it as a warning.

"In Amsterdam," writes Clara Zetkin's journal, "the revolutionary *leit-motiv* of all the debates in the parliament of the world proletariat was the Dresden resolution; in Stuttgart a jarring opportunist note was struck by Vollmar's speeches in the Commission on Militarism, by Päplow's speeches in the Emigration Commission, and by David's [and, we would add, Bernstein's] speeches in the Colonial Commission. On this occasion, in most of the commissions and on most issues, the representatives of Germany were leaders of opportunism." And K. Kautsky, in appraising the Stuttgart Congress, writes: "...the leading role which German Social-Democracy has actually played in the Second International up to now was not in evidence on this occasion."

Let us now examine individual questions that were discussed at the Congress. The differences of opinion on the colonial question could not be ironed out in the Commission. The dispute between the opportunists and the revolutionaries was settled by the Congress itself, settled in favour of the revolutionaries by a majority of 127 votes against 108, with 10 abstentions. Incidentally, let us note the gratifying fact that the socialists of Russia *all* voted unanimously on *all* questions in a revolutionary spirit. (Russia had 20 votes of which 10 were given to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party without the Poles, 7 to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 3 to the representatives of the trade unions. Poland had 10 votes: the Polish Social-Democrats—4, and the Polish Socialist Party and the non-Russian parts of Poland—6. Finally the two representatives of Finland had 8 votes.)

On the colonial question an opportunist majority was formed in the Commission, and the following monstrous phrase appeared in the draft resolution: "The Congress does not in principle and for all time reject all colonial policy, which, under a socialist regime, may have a civilising effect." In reality this proposition was tantamount to a direct retreat towards bourgeois policy and a bourgeois world outlook that justifies colonial wars and atrocities.

It was a retreat towards Roosevelt, said one of the American delegates. The attempts to justify this retreat by the tasks of a "socialist colonial policy" and of constructive reform work in the colonies were unfortunate in the extreme. Socialism has never refused to advocate reforms in the colonies as well; but this can have nothing in common with weakening our stand in principle against conquests, subjugation of other nations, violence, and plunder, which constitute "colonial policy". The minimum programme of all the socialist parties applies both to the home countries and the colonies. The very concept "socialist colonial policy" is a hopeless muddle. The Congress quite rightly deleted the above-quoted words from the resolution and substituted for them a condemnation of colonial policy that was sharper than that contained in former resolutions.

The resolution on the attitude of the socialist parties towards the trade unions is of particularly great importance for us Russians. In our country this question is on the order of the day. The Stockholm Congress settled it in favour of *non-Party* trade unions, i.e., it confirmed the position of our *neutralists*, headed by Plekhanov. The London Congress took a step towards *Party* trade unions as *opposed to* neutrality. As is known, the London resolution gave rise to a violent dispute and dissatisfaction in some of the trade unions and especially in the bourgeois-democratic press.

In Stuttgart the actual issue at stake was this: neutrality of the trade unions or their still closer alignment with the Party? And, as the reader may gather from the resolution, the International Socialist Congress went on record for closer alignment of the unions with the Party. There is nothing in the resolution to suggest that the trade unions should be neutral or non-party. Kautsky, who in the German Social-Democratic Party advocated alignment of the unions with the Party as opposed to the neutrality advocated by Bebel, was therefore fully entitled to announce to the Leipzig workers in his report on the Stuttgart Congress (*Vorwärts*,[48] 1907, No. 209, *Beilage*):

"The resolution of the Stuttgart Congress says all that we need. *It puts an end to neutrality for ever.*"

Clara Zetkin writes;

"In principle, no one [in Stuttgart] any longer disputed the basic historical tendency of the proletarian class struggle to link the political with the economic struggle, to unite the political and economic organisations as closely as possible into a single socialist working-class force. Only the representative of the Russian Social-Democrats, Comrade Plekhanov [she should have said the representative of the Mensheviks, who delegated him to the Commission as an advocate of "neutrality"] and the majority of the French delegation attempted, by rather unconvincing arguments, to justify a certain limitation of this principle on the plea that special conditions prevailed in their countries. The overwhelming majority of the Congress favoured a resolute policy of unity between Social-Democracy and the trade unions."

It should be mentioned that Plekhanov's unconvincing (as Zetkin rightly considered it) argument went the rounds of the Russian legally published papers in this form. In the Commission of the Stuttgart Congress Plekhanov referred to the fact that "there are eleven revolutionary parties in Russia"; "which one of them should the trade unions unite with?" (We are quoting from *Vorwärts*, No. 196, 1. *Beilage*.) This reference of Plekhanov's is wrong both in fact and in principle. Actually no more than two parties in every nationality of Russia are contending for influence over the socialist proletariat: the Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Social-Democrats[49] and the Polish Socialist Party,[50] the Lettish Social-Democrats and the Lettish Socialist-Revolutionaries (known as the Lettish Social-Democratic League), the Armenian Social-Democrats and the Dashnaktsutyuns,[51] etc. The Russian delegation in Stuttgart also at once divided into two sections. The figure eleven is quite arbitrary and misleads the workers. From standpoint of principle Plekhanov is wrong because the struggle between proletarian and petty-bourgeois socialism in Russia is inevitable everywhere, including the trade unions. The British delegates, for example, never thought of opposing the resolution, although they, too, have two contending socialist parties—the Social-Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party.

That the idea of neutrality, which was rejected in Stuttgart, has already caused no little harm to the labour movement is clearly borne out by the example of Germany. There, neutrality has been advocated and applied more than anywhere else. As a result, the trade unions of Germany have deviated so obviously towards opportunism that this deviation was openly admitted even by Kautsky, who is so cautious on this question. In his report to the Leipzig workers he bluntly stated that the "conservatism" displayed by the German delegation in Stuttgart "becomes understandable if we bear in mind the composition of this delegation. Half of it consisted of representatives of the trade unions, and thus the "Right wing" of the Party appeared to have more strength than it actually has in the Party."

The resolution of the Stuttgart Congress should undoubtedly hasten a decisive break of Russian Social-Democracy with the idea of neutrality so beloved by our liberals. While observing the necessary caution and gradualness, and without taking any impetuous or tactless steps, we must work steadily in the trade unions towards bringing them closer and closer to the Social-Democratic Party.

Further, on the question of emigration and immigration, a clear difference of opinion arose between the opportunists and the revolutionaries in the Commission of the Stuttgart Congress. The opportunists cherished the idea of *limiting* the right of migration of backward, undeveloped workers—especially the Japanese and the Chinese. In the minds of these opportunists the spirit of narrow craft isolation, of trade-union exclusiveness, outweighed the consciousness of socialist tasks: the work of educating and organising those strata of the proletariat which have not yet been drawn into the labour movement. The Congress rejected everything that smacked of this spirit. Even in the Commission there were only a few solitary votes in favour of limiting freedom of migration, and recognition of the solidarity of the workers of all countries in the class struggle is the keynote of the resolution adopted by the International Congress.

The resolution on women's suffrage was also adopted unanimously. Only one Englishwoman from the semi-bourgeois Fabian Society defended the admissibility of a

struggle not for full women's suffrage but for one limited to those possessing property. The Congress rejected this unconditionally and declared in favour of women workers campaigning for the franchise, not in conjunction with the bourgeois supporters of women's rights, but in conjunction with the class parties of the proletariat. The Congress recognised that in the campaign for women's suffrage it was necessary to uphold fully the principles of socialism and equal rights for men and women without distorting those principles for the sake of expediency.

In this connection an interesting difference of opinion arose in the Commission. The Austrians (Viktor Adler, Adelheid Popp) justified their tactics in the struggle for universal manhood suffrage: for the sake of winning this suffrage, they thought it expedient in their campaign not to put the demand for women's suffrage, too, in the foreground. The German Social-Democrats, and especially Clara Zetkin, had protested against this when the Austrians were campaigning for universal suffrage. Zetkin declared in the press that they should not under any circumstances have neglected the demand for women's suffrage, that the Austrians had opportunistically sacrificed principle to expediency, and that they would not have narrowed the scope of their agitation, but would have widened it and increased the force of the popular movement had they fought for women's suffrage with the same energy. In the Commission Zetkin was supported whole-heartedly by another prominent German woman Social-Democrat, Zietz . Adler's amendment, which indirectly justified the Austrian tactics, was *rejected* by 12 votes to 9 (this amendment stated only that there should be no abatement of the struggle for a suffrage that would really extend to all citizens, instead of stating that the struggle for the suffrage should always include the demand for equal rights for men and women). The point of view of the Commission and of the Congress may be most accurately expressed in the following words of the abovementioned Zietz in her speech at the International Socialist Women's Conference (this Conference took place in Stuttgart at the same time as the Congress):

"In principle we must demand all that we consider to be correct," said Zietz, "and only when our strength is in

adequate for more, do we accept what we are able to get. That has always been the tactics of Social-Democracy. The more modest our demands the more modest will the government be in its concessions....” This controversy between the Austrian and German women Social-Democrats will enable the reader to see how severely the best Marxists treat the slightest deviation from the principles of consistent revolutionary tactics.

The last day of the Congress was devoted to the question of militarism in which everyone took the greatest interest. The notorious Hervé tried to defend a very untenable position. He was unable to link up war with the capitalist regime in general, and anti-militarist agitation with the entire work of socialism. Hervé’s plan of “answering” any war by strike action or an uprising betrayed a complete failure to understand that the employment of one or other means of struggle depends on the objective conditions of the particular crisis, economic or political, precipitated by the war, and not on any previous decision that revolutionaries may have made.

But although Hervé did reveal frivolity, superficiality, and infatuation with rhetorical phrases, it would be extremely short-sighted to counter him merely by a dogmatic statement of the general truths of socialism. Vollmar in particular fell into this error (from which Bebel and Guesde were not entirely free). With the extraordinary conceit of a man infatuated with stereotyped parliamentarism, he attacked Hervé without noticing that his own narrow-mindedness and thick-skinned opportunism *make* one admit the living spark in Hervéism, *despite* the theoretically absurd and nonsensical way in which Hervé himself presents the question. It does happen sometimes that at a new turning-point of a movement, theoretical absurdities conceal some practical truth. And it was this aspect of the question, the appeal not to prize only parliamentary methods of struggle, the appeal to act in accordance with the new conditions of a future war and future crises, that was stressed by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, especially by Rosa Luxemburg in her speech. Together with the Russian Social-Democratic delegates (Lenin and Martov—who here spoke in full harmony) Rosa Luxemburg

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

proposed amendments to Bebel's resolution, and these amendments emphasised the need for agitation among the youth, the necessity of taking advantage of the crisis created by war for the purpose of hastening the downfall of the bourgeoisie, the necessity of bearing in mind the inevitable change of methods and means of struggle as the class struggle sharpens and the political situation alters. In the end Bebel's dogmatically one-sided, dead resolution, which was open to a Vollmarian interpretation, became transformed into an altogether different resolution. All the theoretical truths were repeated in it for the benefit of the Hervéists, who are capable of letting anti-militarism make them forget socialism. But these truths serve as an introduction not to a justification of parliamentary cretinism, not to the sanction of peaceful methods alone, not to the worship of the present relatively peaceful and quiet situation, but to the acceptance of all methods of struggle, to the appraisal of the experience of the revolution in Russia, to the development of the active creative side of the movement.

This most outstanding, most important feature of the Congress resolution on anti-militarism has been very aptly caught in Zetkin's journal, to which we have already referred more than once.

"Here too," Zetkin says of the anti-militarist resolution, "the revolutionary energy [*Tatkraft*] and courageous faith of the working class in its fighting capacity won in the end, winning, on the one hand, over the pessimistic gospel of impotence and the hidebound tendency to stick to old, exclusively parliamentary methods of struggle, and, on the other hand, over the banal anti-militarist sport of the French semi-anarchists of the Hervé type. The resolution, which was finally carried unanimously both by the Commission and by nearly 900 delegates of all countries, expresses in vigorous terms the gigantic upswing of the revolutionary labour movement since the last International Congress; the resolution puts forward as a principle that proletarian tactics should be flexible, capable of developing, and *sharpening* [*Zuspitzung*] in proportion as conditions ripen for that purpose."

Hervéism has been rejected, but rejected not in favour of opportunism, not from the point of view of dogmatism

and passivity. The vital urge towards more and more resolute and new methods of struggle is fully recognised by the international proletariat and linked up with the intensification of all the economic contradictions, with all the conditions of the crises engendered by capitalism.

Not the empty Hervéist threat, but the clear realisation that the social revolution is inevitable, the firm determination to fight to the end, the readiness to adopt the most revolutionary methods of struggle—that is the significance of the resolution of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart on the question of militarism.

The army of the proletariat is gaining strength in all countries. Its class-consciousness, unity, and determination are growing by leaps and bounds. And capitalism is effectively ensuring more frequent crises, which this army will take advantage of to destroy capitalism.

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Signed: *N. L.*

Published according
to the text in *Kalendar*

PREFACE TO THE COLLECTION *TWELVE YEARS*[52]

The volume of collected articles and pamphlets here offered to the reader covers the period from 1895 through 1905. The theme of these writings is the programmatic, tactical, and organisational problems of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, problems which are being posed and dealt with all the time in the struggle against the Right wing of the Marxist trend in Russia.

At first the struggle was fought on purely theoretical ground against Mr. Struve, the chief spokesman of our legal Marxism of the nineties. The close of 1894 and the beginning of 1895 saw an abrupt change in our legal press. Marxist views found their way into it for the first time, presented not only by leaders of the Emancipation of Labour group[53] living abroad, but also by Social-Democrats in Russia. This literary revival and the heated controversy between the Marxists and the old Narodnik leaders, who (N. K. Mikhailovsky, for instance) had up till then held practically undivided sway in our progressive literature, were the prelude to an upswing in the mass labour movement in Russia. These literary activities of the Russian Marxists were the direct forerunners of active proletarian struggle, of the famous St. Petersburg strikes of 1896, which ushered in an era of steadily mounting workers' movement—the most potent factor in the whole of our revolution.

The Social-Democrats in those days wrote under conditions which compelled them to use Aesopian language and confine themselves to the most general principles, which were farthest removed from practical activity and politics.

Вл. Ильинъ.

За 12 лѣтъ

СОБРАНІЕ СТАТЕЙ.

Томъ первый.

Два направленія
въ русскомъ марксизмѣ
и русской соціалдемократіи.

С.-ПЕТЕРБУРГЪ.
Типографія В. Безобразовъ и К°. В. О., Большой пр., д. № 61.
1908.

The cover of the collection of Lenin's writings
Twelve Years
Reduced

The cover of the collection of Lenin's writings
Twelve Years
Reduced

This did much to unite the heterogenous elements of the Marxist movement in the fight against the Narodniks. Besides the Russian Social-Democrats abroad and at home this fight was waged also by men like Struve, Bulgakov, Tugan-Baranovsky, Berdyayev, and others. They were bourgeois democrats for whom the break with Narodism signified transition from petty-bourgeois (or peasant) socialism to bourgeois liberalism, and not to proletarian socialism as was the case with us.

The history of the Russian revolution in general, the history of the Cadet Party in particular, and especially the evolution of Mr. Struve (to the verge of Octobrism) have now made this truth self-evident, made it current small coin for our publicists. But in 1894-95, this truth had to be demonstrated on the basis of relatively minor deviations by one or another writer from Marxism; at that time the coin had still to be minted. That is why, in now printing the full text of my article against Mr. Struve ("The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book", over the signature of K. Tulin in the symposium *Material on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*, published in St. Petersburg in 1895 and destroyed by the censor*), I pursue a triple purpose. First, since the reading public is familiar with Mr. Struve's book and the Narodnik articles of 1894-95 against the Marxists, it is important to give a criticism of Mr. Struve's viewpoint. Secondly, in order to reply to repeated accusations of alliance with these gentry, and in order to appraise the very significant political career of Mr. Struve himself, it is important to cite the warning to Mr. Struve made by a revolutionary Social-Democrat *simultaneously* with our general statements against the Narodniks. Thirdly, the old, and in many respects outdated, polemic with Struve is important as an instructive example, one that shows the practical and political value of irreconcilable theoretical polemics Revolutionary Social-Democrats have been accused times without number of an excessive penchant for such polemics with the "Economists", the Bernsteinians, and the Mensheviks. Today, too, these accusations

* See present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.—*Ed.*

are being bandied about by the "conciliators" inside the Social-Democratic Party and the "sympathising" semi-socialists outside it. An excessive penchant for polemics and splits, we are all too often told, is typical of the Russians in general, of the Social-Democrats in particular and of the Bolsheviks especially. But the fact is all too often overlooked that the excessive penchant for skipping from socialism to liberalism is engendered by the conditions prevailing in the capitalist countries in general, the conditions of the bourgeois revolution in Russia in particular, and the conditions of the life and work of our intellectuals especially. From that standpoint it is well worth taking a look at the events of ten years ago, the theoretical differences with "Struveism" which then began to take shape, and the minor (minor at first glance) divergencies that led to a complete political demarcation between the parties and to an irreconcilable struggle in parliament, in the press, at public meetings, etc.

The article against Mr. Struve, I should add, is based on a paper I read in the autumn of 1894 to a small circle of Marxists of that time. The group of Social-Democrats then active in St. Petersburg, and who a year later founded the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, was represented in this circle by St., R., and myself. The legal Marxist writers were represented by P. B. Struve, A. N. Potresov, and K.[54] The subject of my paper was "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". As will be seen from the title, the polemic with Struve here was incomparably sharper and more definite (in its Social-Democratic conclusions) than in the article published in the spring of 1895. The latter was toned down partly for censorship reasons and partly for the sake of an "alliance" with the legal Marxists for joint struggle against Narodism. That the "leftward jolt" which the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats then gave Mr. Struve has not remained altogether without result is clearly shown by Mr. Struve's article in the police-destroyed symposium of 1895, and by several of his articles in *Novoye Slovo*[55] (1897).

Moreover, in reading the 1895 article against Mr. Struve it should be borne in mind that in many respects it is a

synopsis of subsequent economic studies (notably *The Development of Capitalism**). Lastly, I should draw the reader's attention to the concluding pages of this article, which emphasise the *positive* (from the Marxist standpoint) features and aspects of Narodism as a revolutionary-democratic trend in a country that was on the threshold of bourgeois revolution. This was a theoretical formulation of the propositions which twelve or thirteen years later were to find their practical and political expression in the "Left bloc" at the elections to the Second Duma and in the "Left-bloc" tactics. That section of the Mensheviks which opposed the idea of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, maintaining that a Left bloc was absolutely impermissible, had on this issue gone back on the very old and very important tradition of the revolutionary Social-Democrats—a tradition vigorously upheld by *Zarya*[56] and the old *Iskra*.[57] It stands to reason that the conditional and limited permissibility of "Left-bloc" tactics follows inevitably from the same fundamental theoretical Marxist views on Narodism.

The article against Struve (1894-95) is followed by *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*,** written towards the close of 1897 on the basis of the experience of Social-Democratic activities in St. Petersburg in 1895. It presents in a positive form the views which in other articles and pamphlets in this volume are expressed in the form of polemics with the Social-Democratic Right wing. The various prefaces to the *Tasks* are reprinted here in order to show the connection between these activities and the various periods of our Party's development (for instance, Axelrod's preface emphasises the pamphlet's connection with the struggle against "Economism", and the 1902 preface stresses the evolution of the Narodnaya Volya and Narodnoye Pravo members[58]).

The article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism"*** was published abroad in *Zarya* in 1901. It dissolves, so to speak, Social-Democratic asso-

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 21-632.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80.—*Ed.*

ciation with Struve as a political leader. In 1895, we warned him and cautiously dissociated ourselves from him as an ally. In 1901, we declared war on him as a liberal who was incapable of championing even purely democratic demands with any consistency.

In 1895, several years before the Bernsteinism[59] in the West and before the complete break with Marxism on the part of quite a few "advanced" writers in Russia, I pointed out that Mr. Struve was an unreliable Marxist with whom Social-Democrats should have no truck. In 1901, several years before the Cadet Party emerged in the Russian revolution, and before the political fiasco of this party in the First and Second Dumas, I pointed out the very features of Russian bourgeois liberalism which were to be fully revealed in the mass political actions of 1905-07. The article "Hannibals of Liberalism" criticised the false reasoning of one liberal, but is now almost fully applicable to the policy of the biggest liberal party in our revolution. As for those who are inclined to believe that we Bolsheviks went back on the old Social-Democratic policy in regard to liberalism when we ruthlessly combated constitutional illusions and fought the Cadet Party in 1905-07—the article "Hannibals of Liberalism" will show them their mistake. The Bolsheviks remained true to the traditions of revolutionary Social-Democracy and did not succumb to the bourgeois intoxication to which the liberals gave their support during the "constitutional zigzag" and which temporarily misled the Right-wing members of our Party.

The next pamphlet, *What Is To Be Done?*, was published abroad early in 1902.* It is a criticism of the Right wing, which was no longer a literary trend but existed within the Social-Democratic organisation. The first Social-Democratic congress was held in 1898. It founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, represented by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, which incorporated the Emancipation of Labour group. The central Party bodies, however, were suppressed by the police and could not be re-established. There was, in fact, no united

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 317-529.—*Ed.*

party: unity was still only an idea, a directive. The infatuation with the strike movement and economic struggles gave rise to a peculiar form of Social-Democratic opportunism, known as "Economism". When the *Iskra* group began to function abroad *at the very end* of 1900, the split over this issue was already an accomplished fact. In the *spring* of 1900, Plekhanov resigned from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and set up an organisation of his own—*Sotsial-Demokrat*.

Officially, *Iskra* began its work independently of the two groups, but for all practical purposes it sided with Plekhanov's group against the Union. An attempt to merge the two (at the Congress of the Union and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* in Zurich, June 1901) failed. *What Is To Be Done?* gives a systematic account of the reasons for the divergence of views and of the nature of *Iskra* tactics and organisational activity.

What Is To Be Done? is frequently mentioned by the Mensheviks, the present opponents of the Bolsheviks, as well as by writers belonging to the bourgeois-liberal camp (Cadets, Bezzaglavtsi[60] in the newspaper *Tovarishch*, etc.). I have, therefore, decided to reprint the pamphlet here, slightly abridged, omitting only the details of organisational relations and minor polemical remarks. Concerning the essential content of this pamphlet it is necessary to draw the attention of the modern reader to the following.

The basic mistake made by those who now criticise *What Is To Be Done?* is to treat the pamphlet apart from its connection with the concrete historical situation of a definite, and now long past, period in the development of our Party. This mistake was strikingly demonstrated, for instance, by Parvus (not to mention numerous Mensheviks), who, many years after the pamphlet appeared, wrote about its incorrect or exaggerated ideas on the subject of an organisation of professional revolutionaries.

Today these statements look ridiculous, as if their authors want to dismiss a whole period in the development of our Party, to dismiss gains which, in their time, had to be fought for, but which have long ago been consolidated and have served their purpose.

To maintain today that *Iskra* exaggerated (*in 1901 and 1902!*) the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries, is like reproaching the Japanese, *after* the Russo-Japanese War, for having exaggerated the strength of Russia's armed forces, for having prior to the war exaggerated the need to prepare for fighting these forces. To win victory the Japanese had to marshal all their forces against the probable maximum of Russian forces. Unfortunately, many of those who judge our Party are outsiders, who do not know the subject, who do not realise that *today* the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries has *already* scored a complete victory. That victory would have been impossible if this idea had not been pushed to the *forefront* at the time, if we had not "exaggerated" so as to drive it home to people who were trying to prevent it from being realised.

What Is To Be Done? is a *summary* of *Iskra* tactics and *Iskra* organisational policy in 1901 and 1902. Precisely a "*summary*", no more and no less. That will be clear to anyone who takes the trouble to go through the file of *Iskra* for 1901 and 1902.* But to pass judgement on that summary without knowing *Iskra*'s struggle against the then *dominant* trend of Economism, without understanding that struggle, is sheer idle talk. *Iskra* fought for an organisation of professional revolutionaries. It fought with especial vigour in 1901 and 1902, vanquished Economism, the then dominant trend, and finally *created* this organisation in 1903. It preserved it in face of the subsequent split in the Iskrist ranks and all the convulsions of the period of storm and stress; it preserved it throughout the Russian revolution; it preserved it intact from 1901-02 to 1907.

And now, when the fight for this organisation has long been won, when the seed has ripened, and the harvest gathered, people come along and tell us: "You exaggerated the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries!" Is this not ridiculous?

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* Volume 3 of this publication will contain the most important *Iskra* articles for these years.[61]

Take the whole pre-revolutionary period and the first two and a half years of the revolution (1905-07). Compare our Social-Democratic Party during this whole period with the other parties in respect of unity, organisation, and continuity of policy. You will have to admit that *in this* respect our Party is *unquestionably* superior to *all* the others—the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc. Before the revolution it drew up a programme which was formally accepted by all Social-Democrats, and when changes were made in it there was no split over the programme. From 1903 to 1907 (formally from 1905 to 1906), the Social-Democratic Party, despite the split in its ranks, gave the public the fullest information on the inner-party situation (minutes of the Second General Congress, the Third Bolshevik, and the Fourth General, or Stockholm, congresses). Despite the split, the Social-Democratic Party earlier than any of the other parties was able to take advantage of the temporary spell of freedom to build a legal organisation with an ideal democratic structure, an electoral system, and representation at congresses according to the number of organised members. You will not find this, even today, either in the Socialist-Revolutionary or the Cadet parties, though the latter is practically legal, is the best organised bourgeois party, and has incomparably greater funds, scope for using the press, and opportunities for legal activities than our Party. And take the elections to the Second Duma, in which all parties participated—did they not clearly show the superior organisational unity of our Party and Duma group?

The question arises, who accomplished, who brought into being this superior unity, solidarity, and stability of our Party? It was accomplished by the organisation of professional revolutionaries, to the building of which *Iskra* made the greatest contribution. Anyone who knows our Party's history well, anyone who has had a hand in building the Party, has but to glance at the delegate list of any of the groups at, say, the London Congress, in order to be convinced of this and notice at once that it is a list of the old membership, the central core that had worked hardest of all to build up the Party and make it what it is. Basically, of course, their success was due to the fact that

the working class, whose best representatives built the Social-Democratic Party, for objective economic reasons possesses a greater capacity for organisation than any other class in capitalist society. Without this condition an organisation of professional revolutionaries would be nothing more than a plaything, an adventure, a mere signboard. *What Is To Be Done?* repeatedly emphasises this, pointing out that the organisation it advocates has no meaning apart from its connection with the "genuine re-olutionary class that is spontaneously rising to struggle". But the objective maximum ability of the proletariat to unite in a class is realised through living people, and only through definite forms of organisation. In the historical conditions that prevailed in Russia in 1900-05, *no* organisation other than *Iskra could have* created the Social-Democratic Labour Party we now have. The professional revolutionary has played his part in the history of Russian proletarian socialism. No power on earth can now undo this work, which has outgrown the narrow framework of the "circles" of 1902-05. Nor can the significance of the gains already won be shaken by belated complaints that the militant tasks of the movement were exaggerated by those who at that time had to fight to ensure the correct way of accomplishing these tasks.

I have just referred to the narrow framework of the circles of the old *Iskra* period (beginning with issue No. 51, at the close of 1903, *Iskra* turned to Menshevism, proclaiming that "a gulf separates the old and the new *Iskra*"—Trotsky's words in a pamphlet approved by the Menshevik *Iskra* editors). This circle spirit has to be briefly explained to the present-day reader. The pamphlets *What Is To Be Done?* and *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back** published in this collection present to the reader a heated, at times bitter and destructive, controversy within the *circles abroad*. Undoubtedly, this struggle has many unattractive features. Undoubtedly, it is something that could only be possible in a young and immature workers' movement in the country in question. Undoubtedly, the present leaders of the present workers' movement in Russia will have to

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 201-423.—*Ed.*

break with many of the circle traditions, forget and discard many of the trivial features of circle activity and circle squabbles, so as to concentrate on the tasks of Social-Democracy in the present period. Only the broadening of the Party by enlisting *proletarian* elements can, in conjunction with open mass activity, eradicate all the residue of the circle spirit which has been inherited from the past and is unsuited to our present tasks. And the transition to a democratically organised workers' party, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks in *Novaya Zhizn*[62] in November 1905,* i.e., as soon as the conditions appeared for legal activity—this transition was virtually an irrevocable break with the old circle ways that had outlived their day.

Yes, "that had had outlived their day", for it is not enough to condemn the old circle spirit; its significance in the special circumstances of the past period must be understood. The circles were necessary in their day and played a positive role. In an autocratic state, especially in the situation created by the whole history of the *Russian* revolutionary movement, the socialist workers' party *could not* develop except from these circles. And the circles, i.e., close-knit, exclusive groups uniting a very small number of people and nearly always based on personal friendship, were a necessary stage in the development of socialism and the workers' movement in Russia. As the movement grew, it was confronted with the task of uniting these circles, forming strong links between them, and establishing continuity. This called for a firm base of operations "beyond the reach" of the autocracy—i.e., *abroad*. The circles abroad, therefore, came into being through necessity. There was no contact between them; they had no authority over them in the shape of the Party in Russia, and it was inevitable that they should differ in their understanding of the movement's main tasks at the given stage, that is, an understanding of *how exactly* to set up a base of operations and in what way they could help to build the Party as a whole. A struggle between the circles was, therefore, inevitable. Today, in retrospect, we can clearly see which of the circles was really in a posi-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 29-39.—*Ed.*

tion to act as a base of operations. But at that time, when the various circles were just beginning their work, no one could say that and the controversy could be resolved only through struggle. Parvus, I remember, subsequently blamed the old *Iskra* for waging a destructive circle war and advocated after the event a conciliatory policy. That is an easy thing to say after the event, and to say it reveals a failure to understand the conditions then prevailing. For one thing, there was no criterion by which to judge the strength or *importance* of one or another circle. The importance of many of them, which are no forgotten, was exaggerated, but in their time they wanted through struggle to assert their right to existence. Secondly, the differences among the circles were over the *direction* the work was to take, work which at the time as new to them. I noted at the time (in *What Is To Be Done?*) that these seemingly minor differences were actually of immense importance, since at the beginning of this new work, at the beginning of the Social-Democratic movement, the definition of the general nature of the work and movement would very substantially affect propaganda, agitation, and organisation. All subsequent disputes between the Social-Democrats concerned the direction of the Party's political activity on specific issues. But at that time the controversy was over the most general principles and the fundamental aims of *all* Social-Democratic policy generally.

The circles played their part and are now, of course, obsolete. But they became obsolete only because the struggle that they waged posed the key problems of the Social-Democratic movement in the sharpest possible manner and solved them in an irreconcilable revolutionary spirit, thereby creating a firm basis for broad party activity.

Of particular questions raised in the literary discussion over *What Is To Be Done?* I shall comment on only two. Writing in *Iskra* in 1904, soon after the appearance of *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, Plekhanov declared that he differed from me in principle on the question of spontaneity and political consciousness. I did not reply either to that declaration (except for a brief note in the

Geneva newspaper *Vperyod*[63]),* or to the numerous repetitions of it in Menshevik literature. I did not reply because Plekhanov's criticism was obviously mere cavilling, based on phrases torn out of context, on particular expressions which I had not quite adroitly or precisely formulated. Moreover, he ignored the general content and the whole spirit of my pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* which appeared in March 1902. The draft Party programme (framed by Plekhanov and amended by the *Iskra* editors) appeared in June or July 1902. Its formulation of the relation between spontaneity and political consciousness was agreed upon by all the *Iskra* editors (my disputes with Plekhanov over the programme, which took place in the editorial board, were not on this point, but on the question of small production being ousted by large-scale production, concerning which I called for a more precise formula than Plekhanov's, and on the difference in the standpoint of the proletariat or of the labouring classes generally; on this point I insisted on a narrower definition of the purely proletarian character of the Party).

Consequently, there could be no question of any difference in principle between the draft Party programme and *What Is To Be Done?* on this issue. At the Second Congress (August 1903) Martynov, who was then an Economist, challenged our views on spontaneity and political consciousness as set forth in the programme. He was opposed by all the Iskrists, as I emphasise in *One Step Forward*. Hence it is clear that the controversy was essentially between the Iskrists and the Economists, who attacked *what was common* both to *What Is To Be Done?* and the programme drafts. Nor at the Second Congress did I have any intention of elevating my own formulations, as given in *What Is To Be Done?*, to programmatic level, constituting special principles. On the contrary, the expression I used—and it has since been frequently quoted—was that the Economists had gone to one extreme. *What Is To Be Done?*, I said, straightens out what had been twisted by the Economists (cf. minutes of the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903, Geneva, 1904). I emphasised that just because we were

* See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 245.—*Ed.*

so vigorously straightening out whatever had been twisted our line of action would always be the straightest.*

The meaning of these words is clear enough: *What Is To Be Done?* is a controversial correction of Economist distortions and it would be wrong to regard the pamphlet in any other light. It should be added that Plekhanov's article against the pamphlet was *not* reprinted in the new *Iskra* collection (*Two Years*), and for that reason I do not here deal with Plekhanov's arguments, but merely explain the issue involved to the present-day reader, who may come across references to it in very many Menshevik publications.

My second comment concerns the question of economic struggle and the trade unions. My views on this subject have been frequently misrepresented in the literature, and I must, therefore, emphasise that many pages in *What Is To Be Done?* are devoted to explaining the *immense* importance of economic struggle and the trade unions. In particular, I advocated *neutrality* of the trade unions, and have *not altered* that view in the pamphlets or newspaper article's written since then, despite the numerous assertions by my opponents. Only the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress and the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress led me to conclude that trade-union neutrality is not defensible as a *principle*. The only correct principle is the closest possible alignment of the unions with the Party. Our policy must be to bring the unions closer to the Party and link them with it. That policy should be pursued perseveringly and persistently in all our propaganda, agitation, and organising activity, without trying to obtain mere "recognition" of our views and without expelling from the trade unions those of a different opinion.

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The pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* was published in Geneva in the summer of 1904. It reviews the first stage of the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolshe-

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 489.—*Ed.*

viks, which began at the Second Congress (August 1903). I have cut this pamphlet down by half, since minor details of the organisational struggle, especially points concerning the personal composition of the Party centres, cannot possibly be of any interest to the present-day reader and, in fact, are best forgotten. But what is important, I think, is the analysis of the controversy over tactical and other conceptions at the Second Congress, and the polemic with the Mensheviks on matters of organisation. Both are essential for an understanding of Menshevism and Bolshevism as trends which have left their mark upon all the activities of the workers' party in our revolution.

Of the discussions at the Second Congress of the Social-Democratic Party, I will mention the debate on the agrarian programme. Events have clearly demonstrated that our programme at the time (return of the cut-off lands[64]) was much too limited and *underestimated* the strength of the revolutionary-democratic peasant movement—I shall deal with this in greater detail in Volume 2 of the present publication.* Here it is important to emphasise that *even this excessively limited* agrarian programme was at that time considered *too broad* by the Social-Democratic Right wing. Martynov and other Economists opposed it on the grounds that it went too far! This shows the great practical importance of the whole struggle that the old *Iskra* waged against Economism, against attempts to narrow down and belittle the character of Social-Democratic policy:

At that time (the first half of 1904) our differences with the Mensheviks were restricted to organisational issues. I described the Menshevik attitude as "opportunism in questions of organisation". Objecting to this P. B. Axelrod wrote to Kautsky: "My feeble mind just cannot grasp this thing called 'opportunism in questions of organisation' which is now being brought to the fore as something independent and having no direct connection with programmatic and tactical views." (Letter of June 6, 1904, reprinted in the new-*Iskra* collection *Two Years*, Part II, p. 149.)

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* See pp. 256-58 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The direct connection of opportunism in organisational views with that in tactical views has been sufficiently demonstrated by the whole record of Menshevism in 1905-07. As for this "incomprehensible thing", "opportunism in questions of organisation", practical experience has borne out my appraisal more brilliantly than I could ever have expected. It suffices to say that even the *Menshevik* Cherevanin now has to admit (see his pamphlet on the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress of 1907) that Axelrod's organisational plans (the much-talked-of "labour congress", etc.) could only lead to splits that would ruin the proletarian cause. What is more, the same Cherevanin tells us in this pamphlet that in London Plekhanov had to contend with "*organisational anarchism*" within the Menshevik faction. And so it was not for nothing that I fought "opportunism in questions of organisation" in 1904, seeing that in 1907 both Cherevanin and Plekhanov have had to recognise the "organisational anarchism" of influential Mensheviks.

From organisational opportunism the Mensheviks passed to tactical opportunism. The pamphlet, *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan** (published in Geneva towards the end of 1904, in November or December if I am not mistaken) marks their first step in that direction. One frequently finds statements in current writings that the dispute over the Zemstvo campaign was due to the fact that the Bolsheviks saw no value at all in organising demonstrations before the Zemstvo people. The reader will see that this was not the case at all. The differences were due to the Mensheviks insisting that we should not cause *panic* among the liberals, and, still more to the fact that, after the Rostov strike of 1902, the summer strikes and barricades of 1903, and on the eve of January 9, 1905, the Mensheviks extolled the idea of demonstrations before the Zemstvo people[65] as the *highest type* of demonstration. Our attitude to this Menshevik "Zemstvo campaign plan" was expressed in the heading of an article on the subject in the Bolshevik paper *Vperyod*, No. 1 (Geneva, January 1905):

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* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516.—*Ed.*

"Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals."*

The last pamphlet included in this collection, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, appeared in Geneva in the summer of 1905.** It is a systematic statement of the *fundamental* tactical differences with the Mensheviks. These differences were fully formulated in the resolutions of the Third (spring) R.S.D.L.P. (Bolshevik) Congress in London and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva which established the *basic* divergence between the Bolshevik and Menshevik appraisals of our bourgeois revolution as a whole from the standpoint of the proletariat's tasks. The Bolsheviks claimed for the proletariat the role of *leader* in the democratic revolution. The Mensheviks reduced its role to that of an "extreme opposition". The Bolsheviks gave a positive definition of the class character and class significance of the revolution, maintaining that a victorious revolution implied a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". The Mensheviks always interpreted the bourgeois revolution so incorrectly as to result in their acceptance of a position in which the role of the proletariat would be subordinate to and dependent on the bourgeoisie.

How these differences of principle were reflected in practical activities is well known. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Bulygin Duma; the Mensheviks vacillated. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Witte Duma; the Mensheviks vacillated, appealing to the people to vote, but not for the Duma. The Mensheviks supported a Cadet Ministry and Cadet policy in the First Duma, while the Bolsheviks, parallel with propaganda in favour of an "executive committee of the Left",[66] resolutely exposed constitutional illusions and Cadet counter-revolutionism. Further, the Bolsheviks worked for a Left bloc in the Second Duma elections, while the Mensheviks called for a bloc with the Cadets, and so on and so forth.

Now it seems that the "Cadet period" in the Russian revolution (the expression is from the pamphlet *The Vic-*

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* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 29-34.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

ory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party, March 1906)* has come to an end. The counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets has been fully exposed. The Cadets themselves are beginning to admit that they had been combating the revolution all along, and Mr. Struve frankly reveals the inner thoughts of Cadet liberalism. The more attentively the class-conscious proletariat now looks back on this Cadet period, on the whole of this "constitutional zigzag", the more clearly will it see that the Bolsheviks correctly appraised before hand both this period and the essence of the Cadet Party, and that the Mensheviks were in fact pursuing a wrong policy, one that, objectively, was tantamount to throwing over independent proletarian policy in favour of subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois liberalism.

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In casting a retrospective glance at the struggle of the two trends in Russian Marxism and Social-Democracy during the last twelve years (1895-1907), one cannot avoid the conclusion that "legal Marxism", "Economism", and "Menshevism" are diverse forms of one and the same historical tendency. The "legal Marxism" of Mr. Struve (1894) and those like him was a *reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature*. "Economism", as a distinct trend in Social-Democratic activities in 1897 and subsequent years, virtually implemented the programme set forth in the *bourgeois-liberal* "*Credo*": economic struggle for the workers, political struggle for the liberals. Menshevism is not only a literary trend, not only a tendency in Social-Democratic activity, but a close-knit faction, which during the first period of the Russian revolution (1905-07) pursued its own distinct policy—a policy which *in practice subordinated the proletariat to bourgeois liberalism*.**

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276.—*Ed.*

** An analysis of the struggle of the various trends and shades of opinion at the Second Party Congress (cf. *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, 1904) will show beyond all doubt the direct and close ties between the Economism of 1897 and subsequent years and Menshevism the link between Economism in the Social-Democratic movement and the "legal Marxism" or "Struveism" of 1895-97 was

In all capitalist countries the proletariat is inevitably connected by a thousand transitional links with its neighbour on the right, the petty bourgeoisie. In all workers' parties there inevitably emerges a more or less clearly delineated Right wing which, in its views, tactics, and organisational "line", reflects the opportunist tendencies of the petty bourgeoisie. In such a petty-bourgeois country as Russia, in the era of bourgeois revolution, in the formative period of the young Social-Democratic Labour Party, these tendencies were bound to manifest themselves much more sharply, definitely, and clearly than anywhere else in Europe. Familiarity with the various forms in which this tendency is displayed in the Russian Social-Democratic movement in different periods of its development is necessary in order to strengthen revolutionary Marxism and steel the Russian working class in its struggle for emancipation.

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demonstrated by me in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). Legal Marxism-Economism-Menshevism are linked not only ideologically, but also by their direct historical continuity.

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

In October 1905, Russia was at the peak of the revolutionary upsurge. The proletariat swept away the Bulygin Duma and drew the mass of the people into an open struggle against the autocracy. In October 1907, we are apparently at the lowest ebb of the open mass struggle. But the period of decline that set in after the defeat of December 1905 brought with it not only a flowering of constitutional illusions, but a complete shattering of these illusions. After the dissolution of the two Dumas and the coup d'état of June 3, the Third Duma, which is to be convened, clearly puts an end to the period of belief in peaceful cohabitation between the autocracy and popular representation and ushers in a new epoch in the development of the revolution.

At a moment like the present, a comparison between the revolution and counter-revolution in Russia, between the period of revolutionary onslaught (1905) and that of counter-revolutionary playing with a constitution (1906 and 1907) suggests itself as a matter of course. Such a comparison is implicit in any attempt to define a political line for the immediate future. Contrasting "errors of the revolution" or "revolutionary illusions" with "positive constitutional work" is the keynote of present-day political literature. The Cadets shout about it at their pre-election meetings. The liberal press chants, howls, and rants about it. We have here Mr. Struve, vehemently and spitefully venting his annoyance on the revolutionaries because hopes of a "compromise" have totally collapsed. We have here Milyukov, who, for all his mincing manners and Jesuitism, has been forced by events to arrive at the clear, accurate and—above all—truthful statement: "the enemies are on the left". We have here publicists in the vein of *Tovarishch*, such as Kuskova, Smirnov, Plekhanov, Gorn, Yordansky, Cherevanin, and others who denounce the October-December struggle as folly, and more or less openly

advocate a "democratic" coalition with the Cadets. The real Cadet elements in this turbid stream express the counter-revolutionary interests of the bourgeoisie and the boundless servility of intellectualist philistinism. As for the elements which have not yet sunk quite to the level of Struve, their dominant feature is *failure to understand* the connection between revolution and counter-revolution in Russia, an inability to see everything we have experienced as an integral social movement developing in accordance with its own inner logic.

The period of revolutionary onslaught demonstrated *in action* the class composition of Russia's population and the attitude of the different classes towards the old autocracy. Events have now taught everyone, even people who are utter strangers to Marxism, to reckon the chronology of the revolution from January 9, 1905, that is, from the first *consciously* political movement of the *masses* belonging to a single definite *class*. When the Social-Democrats, from an analysis of Russia's economic realities, deduced the leading role, the hegemony of the proletariat in our revolution, this seemed to be a bookish infatuation of theoreticians. The revolution confirmed our theory, because it is the only truly revolutionary theory. The proletariat actually took the lead in the revolution all the time. The Social-Democrats actually proved to be the ideological vanguard of the proletariat. The struggle of the masses developed under the leadership of the proletariat with remarkable speed, much faster than many revolutionaries had expected. In the course of a single year it rose to the most decisive forms of revolutionary onslaught that history has ever known—to mass strikes and armed uprisings. The organisation of the proletarian masses went forward with astonishing speed in the course of the struggle itself. Other sections of the population, comprising the fighting ranks of the revolutionary people, followed the proletariat's lead and began to organise. The semi-proletarian mass of various kinds of non-manual workers began to organise, followed by the peasant democracy, the professional intelligentsia, and so on. The period of proletarian victories was a period of growth in mass organisation unprecedented in Russian history and vast even by European standards.

The proletariat at that time won for itself a number of improvements in working conditions. The peasant mass won a "reduction" in the arbitrary power of the landlords and lower prices for the lease and sale of land. All Russia won a considerable degree of freedom of assembly, speech, and association, and made the autocracy publicly renounce its old practices and recognise the constitution.

All that the liberation movement in Russia has won up to now was won entirely and exclusively by the revolutionary struggle of the masses headed by the proletariat.

The turning-point in the struggle began with the defeat of the December uprising. Step by step the counter-revolution passed to the offensive as the mass struggle weakened. During the period of the First Duma this struggle was still formidably manifest in the intensification of the peasant movement, in widespread attacks upon the nests of the semi-feudal landlords, and in a number of revolts among the soldiers. The reaction attacked slowly at that time, not daring to carry out a coup d'état straightaway. Only after the suppression of the Sveaborg and Kronstadt revolts of July 1906 did it act more boldly, when it introduced the regime of military tribunals, began piecemeal to deprive the population of their franchise (the Senate interpretations[67]), and finally, surrounded the Second Duma completely with a police siege and overthrew the whole notorious constitution. All self-established free organisations of the masses were replaced at that time by "legal struggle" within the framework of the police constitution as interpreted by the Dubasovs and Stolypins. The supremacy of the Social-Democrats gave place to the supremacy of the Cadets, who predominated in both Dumas. The period of decline in the movement of the masses was a period of peak development for the Party of the Cadets. It exploited this decline by coming forward as the "champion" of the constitution. It upheld faith in this constitution among the people with all its might and preached the need to keep strictly to "parliamentary" struggle.

The bankruptcy of the "Cadet constitution" is the bankruptcy of Cadet tactics and Cadet hegemony in the emancipatory struggle. The selfish class character of all the talk by our liberals about "revolutionary illusions" and the

"errors of the revolution" becomes patently obvious when we compare the two periods of the revolution. The proletarian mass struggle won gains for the whole people. The liberal leadership of the movement produced nothing but defeats. The revolutionary onslaught of the proletariat steadily raised the political consciousness of the masses and their organisation. It set increasingly higher aims before them, stimulated their independent participation in political life, and taught them how to fight. The hegemony of the liberals during the period of the two Dumas lowered the political consciousness of the masses, demoralised their revolutionary organisation, and dulled their comprehension of democratic aims.

The liberal leaders of the First and Second Dumas gave the people a splendid demonstration of slavish legal "struggle", as a result of which the autocratic advocates of serfdom swept away the constitutional paradise of the liberal windbags with a stroke of the pen and ridiculed the subtle diplomacy of the visitors to ministerial ante-rooms. The liberals have not a single gain to show throughout the Russian revolution, not a single success, not a single attempt, at all democratic, to organise the forces of the people in the struggle for freedom.

Until October 1905, the liberals sometimes maintained a benevolent neutrality towards the revolutionary struggle of the masses, but already at that time they had begun to oppose it, sending a deputation to the tsar with abject speeches and supporting the Bulygin Duma not out of thoughtlessness, but out of sheer hostility to the revolution. After October 1905, all that the liberals did was to shamefully betray the cause of the people's freedom.

In November 1905, they sent Mr. Struve to have an intimate talk with Mr. Witte. In the spring of 1906, they undermined the revolutionary boycott, and by refusing to speak out openly against the loan for Europe to hear, helped the government to obtain millions of rubles for the conquest of Russia. In the summer of 1906, they carried on backdoor haggling with Trepov[68] over ministerial portfolios and fought the "Left", i.e., the revolution, in the First Duma. January 1907 saw them running again to the police authorities (Milyukov's call on Stolypin). In the spring

of 1907, they *supported* the government in the Second Duma. The revolution exposed the liberals very quickly and showed them in their true counter-revolutionary colours.

In *this* respect the period of constitutional hopes served a very useful purpose as far as the people were concerned. The experience of the First and Second Dumas has not only made them realise how utterly contemptible is the role that liberalism plays in our revolution. It has also, in actual fact, quashed the attempt at leadership of the democratic movement by a party which only political infants or senile dotards can regard as being really constitutionally "*democratic*".

In 1905 and the beginning of 1906, the class composition of the bourgeois democrats in Russia was not yet clear to everyone. Hopes that the autocracy could be combined with actual representation of more or less broad masses of the people existed not only among the ignorant and downtrodden inhabitants of various out-of-the-way places. Such hopes were not absent even in ruling spheres of the autocracy. Why did the electoral law in both the Bulygin and the Witte Dumas grant a considerable degree of representation to the peasantry? Because belief in the monarchist sentiments of the countryside still persisted. "The muzhik will help us out"—this exclamation of an official newspaper in the spring of 1906 expressed the government's reliance on the conservatism of the peasant mass. In those days the Cadets were not only not aware of the antagonism between the democracy of the peasants and bourgeois liberalism but even feared the backwardness of the peasants and desired only one thing—that the Duma should help to convert the conservative or indifferent peasant into a liberal. In the spring of 1906, Mr. Struve expressed an ambitious wish when he wrote, "the peasant in the Duma will be a Cadet". In the summer of 1907, the same Mr. Struve raised the banner of struggle against the Trudovik or Left parties which he regarded as the main obstacle to an agreement between bourgeois liberalism and the autocracy. In the course of eighteen months the slogan of a struggle for the political enlightenment of the peasants was changed by the liberals to a slogan of struggle against a "too" politically educated and demanding peasantry!

This change of slogans expresses as plainly as can be the complete bankruptcy of liberalism in the Russian revolution. The class antagonism between the mass of the democratic rural population and the semi-feudal landlords proved to be immeasurably deeper than the cowardly and dull-witted Cadets imagined. That is why their attempt to take the lead in the struggle for democracy failed so quickly and irrevocably. That is why their whole "line" aimed at reconciling the petty-bourgeois democratic mass of the people with the Octobrist and Black-Hundred landlords was a fiasco. A great, though negative, gain of the counter-revolutionary period of the two Dumas was this bankruptcy of the treacherous "champions" of the "people's freedom". The class struggle going on below threw these heroes of ministerial ante-rooms overboard, turned them from claimants to leadership into *ordinary lackeys of Octobrism* slightly touched up with constitutional varnish.

He who still fails to see this bankruptcy of the liberals, who have undergone a practical test of their worth as champions of democracy, or at least as fighters in the democratic ranks, has understood absolutely nothing of the political history of the two Dumas. Among these people the meaningless reiteration of a memorised formula about supporting bourgeois democracy becomes counter-revolutionary snivelling. The Social-Democrats should have no regrets at the shattering of constitutional illusions. They should say what Marx said about counter-revolution in Germany: the people gained by the loss of its illusions.[69] Bourgeois democracy in Russia gained by the loss of worthless leaders and weak-kneed allies. So much the better for the political development of this democracy.

It remains for the party of the proletariat to see to it that the valuable political lessons of our revolution and counter-revolution should be more deeply pondered over and more firmly grasped by the broad masses. The period of onslaught on the autocracy saw the deployment of the forces of the proletariat and taught it the fundamentals of revolutionary tactics; it showed the conditions for the success of the direct struggle of the masses, which alone was able to achieve improvements of any importance. The long period during which the proletarian forces were prepared,

trained, and organised preceded those actions of hundreds of thousands of workers which dealt a mortal blow to the old autocracy in Russia. The sustained and imperceptible work of guiding all the manifestations of the proletarian class struggle, the work of building a strong and seasoned party preceded the outbreak of the truly mass struggle and provided the conditions necessary for turning that outbreak into a revolution. And now the proletariat, as the people's fighting vanguard, must strengthen its organisation, scrape off all the green mould of intellectualist opportunism, and gather its forces for a similar sustained and stubborn effort. The tasks which history and the objective position of the broad masses have posed before the Russian revolution have not been solved. Elements of a new, national political crisis have not been eliminated, but, on the contrary, have grown deeper and wider. The advent of this crisis will place the proletariat once more at the head of the movement of the whole people. The workers' Social-Democratic Party should be prepared for this role. And the soil, fertilised by the events of 1905 and subsequent years, will yield a harvest tenfold richer. If a party of several thousand class-conscious advanced members of the working class could rally a million proletarians behind it at the end of 1905, then today, when our Party has tens of thousands of Social-Democrats tried and tested in the revolution, who have become still more closely linked with the mass of the workers during the struggle itself, it will rally tens of millions behind it and crush the enemy.

Both the socialist and the democratic tasks of the working-class movement in Russia have been focused much more sharply and brought to the fore more urgently under the impact of revolutionary events. The struggle against the bourgeoisie is rising to a higher stage. The capitalists are uniting in national associations, are leaguing themselves more closely with the government, and are resorting more often to extreme methods of economic struggle, including mass lock-outs, in order to "curb" the proletariat. But only moribund classes are afraid of persecutions. The more rapidly the capitalists achieve successes the more rapidly does the proletariat grow in numbers and unity. The economic development of both Russia and the whole world is a

guarantee of the proletariat's invincibility. The bourgeoisie first began to take shape as a class, as a united and conscious political force during our revolution. All the more effectively will the workers organise into a united class all over Russia. And the wider the gulf between the world of capital and the world of labour, the clearer will be the socialist consciousness of the workers. Socialist agitation among the proletariat, enriched by the experience of the revolution, will become more definite. The political organisation of the bourgeoisie is the best stimulus to the definitive shaping of a socialist workers' party.

The aims of this party in the struggle for democracy can henceforth be considered controversial only among the "sympathising" intellectuals, who are making ready to go over to the liberals. For the mass of the workers these aims have been made tangibly clear in the fire of revolution. The proletariat knows from experience that the peasant masses are the basis and the only basis of bourgeois democracy as a historical force in Russia. On a national scale the proletariat has already acted as leader of this mass in the struggle against the semi-feudal landlords and the autocracy and no power can now deflect the workers' party from its right path. The role of the liberal Party of the Cadets, who, under the flag of democracy, guided the peasantry under the wing of Octobrism, is now played out, and the Social-Democrats, in spite of individual whiners, will continue their work of explaining this bankruptcy of the liberals to the masses, explaining that bourgeois democrats cannot do what they want to do unless they disentangle themselves once for all from their alliance with the lackeys of Octobrism.

No one at this stage can tell what forms bourgeois democracy in Russia will assume in the future. Possibly, the bankruptcy of the Cadets may lead to the formation of a peasant democratic party, a truly mass party, and not an organisation of terrorists such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries have been and still are. It is also possible that the objective difficulties of achieving political unity among the petty bourgeoisie will prevent such a party from being formed and, for a long time to come, will keep the peasant democracy in its present state as a loose, amorphous, jelly-like Trudovik mass. In either case our line is one: to hammer

out the democratic forces by merciless criticism of all vacillations, by uncompromising struggle against the democrats joining the liberals, who have proved their counter-revolutionariness.

The farther reaction goes, the more violent does the Black-Hundred landlord become; the more control he gets over the autocracy, the slower will be Russia's economic progress and her emancipation from the survivals of serfdom. And that means, all the stronger and wider will class-conscious and militant democracy develop among the masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. All the stronger will be the mass resistance to the famines, tyrannies, and outrages to which the peasantry is doomed by the Octobrists. The Social-Democrats will see to it that, when the democratic struggle inevitably breaks out with new force, the band of liberal careerists called the Cadet Party does not once again divide the democratic ranks and spread discord among them. Either with the people or against the people, that is the alternative that the Social-Democrats have long put to all claimants to the role of "democratic" leaders in the revolution. Up to now not all Social-Democrats have been able to pursue this line consistently; some of them even believed the liberals' promises, others closed their eyes to the liberals' flirting with the counter-revolution. Now we already have the educational experience of the first two Dumas.

The revolution has taught the proletariat to wage a mass struggle. The revolution has shown that the proletariat is able to lead the peasant masses in the struggle for democracy. The revolution has united the purely proletarian party still more closely by casting out petty-bourgeois elements from it. The counter-revolution has taught the petty-bourgeois democrats to give up seeking for leaders and allies among the liberals, who are mortally afraid of the mass struggle. On the basis of these lessons of history we can boldly say to the government of the Black-Hundred landlords: continue along the same line, Mr. Stolypin and Co.! We shall reap the fruits of what you are sowing!

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THE THIRD DUMA

The government is garnering the results of the infamous crime which it committed against the people on June 3. The grotesque electoral law which, for the benefit of a handful of landlords and capitalists, completely distorts the will not only of the nation as a whole, but even of the enfranchised minority, has yielded the fruits that tsarism hankered for. At the time of writing this article 432 out of 442 deputies have been returned to the Duma, leaving another 10 to be elected. The results of the elections can, therefore, be considered sufficiently clear. According to a fairly accurate estimate the members elected are 18 Social-Democrats, 13 others of the Left, 46 Cadets, 55 members of groups standing close to them, 92 Octobrists, 21 members of groups belonging to allied trends, 171 members of various Right-wing trends, including 32 members of the Union of the Russian People,[70] and 16 non-party deputies.

Thus, not counting an insignificant number of non-party deputies, all the others may be divided into four groups: the extreme Left, constituting a little over 7 per cent, the Left (Cadet) Centre 23 per cent, the Right (Octobrist) Centre 25.1 per cent, and the Right 40 per cent; the non-party deputies are a little less than 4 per cent.

None of these groups by itself has an absolute majority. Does this result fully meet the wishes and expectations of those who inspired and drafted the new electoral law? We believe that this question should be answered in the affirmative, and that the new Russian "parliament", from the point of view of the ruling groups supporting the tsar-

ist autocracy, is a *chambre introuvable** in the full sense of that word.

The point is that with us, as in every country that has an autocratic or semi-autocratic regime, there are really two governments: an official one—a Ministry, and another one behind the scenes—the court camarilla. This latter always and everywhere is backed by the most reactionary sections of society, by the feudal—in our country Black-Hundred—nobility, which draws its economic strength from large-scale landownership with the semi-serf economy this involves. Effete, depraved, and degenerate this social group presents a striking example of the most revolting parasitism. To what depths of depravity this degeneration can descend is borne out by the scandalous Moltke v. Harden trial in Berlin, which revealed what a filthy cesspool the influential camarilla at the court of the semi-autocratic German Emperor Wilhelm II really was. It is no secret that with us in Russia similar abominations in corresponding circles are no exception. The mass of the Right in the Third Duma—at least the overwhelming majority if not all of them—will defend the interests of precisely this social canker, these whited sepulchres, bequeathed to us from the dismal past. The preservation of a feudal economy, of aristocratic privileges and the regime of the autocracy and nobility is a matter of life and death to these mastodons and ichthyosauri, for to call them "*zubri*"[71] is to pay them a compliment.

By using their all-powerful influence at court, the mastodons and ichthyosauri usually try their utmost to take full monopoly of possession of the official government as well—the Ministry. Usually a considerable part of the Ministry consists of their henchmen. Very often, however, the majority of the Ministry, as regards its composition does not fully meet the requirements of the camarilla. The antediluvian predator, the predator of the feudal era, finds a competitor here in the shape of a predator of the epoch of primary accumulation—one just as coarse, greedy, and parasitic, but having a certain cultural veneer and, most important of all, desirous also of seizing a sizable share

* Second to none, as Louis XVIII in 1815 called the reactionary French Chamber of Deputies.

of the official pie in the shape of guarantees, subsidies, concessions, protective tariffs, etc. This section of the landowning and industrial bourgeoisie, which is typical of the era of primary accumulation, finds its expression in Octobrism and the trends associated with it. It has many interests in common with the Black Hundreds *sans phrases*—economic parasitism and privileges, as well as jingoism, are as essential from the Octobrist as from the Black-Hundred point of view.

Thus we have a Black-Hundred-Octobrist majority in the Third Duma reaching the imposing figure of 284 deputies out of 432, that is, 65.7 per cent, or over two-thirds of the total number.

This is a stronghold that enables the government in its agrarian policy to help the ruined landlords to get rid of their lands by profitably fleecing the land-poor peasants, to turn labour legislation into an instrument for the gross exploitation of the proletariat by capital, and to ensure that financial policy keeps the main burden of taxation on the shoulders of the masses. It is a stronghold of protectionism and militarism. No one can deny the counter-revolutionary nature of the Octobrist-Black-Hundred majority.

But the main point is that this is not the only majority in the Third Duma. There is another majority.

The Black Hundreds are a dependable ally of the Octobrists, just as the court camarilla is an ally of the Ministry in defending tsarism. But just as the court camarilla displays an inherent urge not so much towards an alliance with the Ministry as towards dominating it, so do the Black Hundreds yearn for a dictatorship over the Octobrists, try to boss them and keep them under.

The interests of capitalism, grossly predatory and parasitic as it is, cannot be reconciled with the undivided sway of feudal landownership. Both of these kindred social groups are trying to seize the lion's share of the pie, and that accounts for their inevitable differences on questions of local self-government and the central organisation of state power. The Black Hundreds in the Zemstvos and municipal councils want to keep things as they are, but in the centre what they want is "down with the accursed constitution". The Octobrists want to increase their influence both in the

Zemstvos and municipal councils, but in the centre there has to be a "constitution", even if a docktailed one that is fictitious as far as the masses are concerned.

Not for nothing does *Russkoye Znamya*[72] revile the Octobrists, while *Golos Moskvy*,[73] in turn, finds that there are more members of the Right in the Third Duma than are needed.

Thus, the objective course of events compels the Octobrists to seek allies in this respect. They could have found them long ago in the Left (Cadet) Centre, which has long been declaring its unhypocritical devotion to the constitution, but the trouble is that the young Russian bourgeoisie of the period of capitalist accumulation now represented by the Cadets has preserved from the past some very inconvenient friends and certain unpleasant traditions. It was found, however, that traditions in the political sphere could easily be dispensed with: the Cadets had declared themselves monarchists long ago, even before the First Duma; they had tacitly refused to form a responsible ministry in the Second Duma; and Cadet schemes for various "freedoms" are hedged in with so many stumbling-blocks, barbed wire entanglements, and pitfalls that there is every hope of further progress in this respect. The Cadets' attitude towards uprisings and strikes had always been one of reproach—at first in a mild, then in a melancholy way; after December 1905 the reproach became half disdain, and after the dissolution of the First Duma flat rejection and condemnation. Diplomacy, deals, bargaining with the powers that be—that is the basis of Cadet tactics. As to inconvenient friends, they have long been called simply "neighbours" and recently have been publicly declared to be "enemies".

An agreement, then, is possible, and so we have another majority, a counter-revolutionary one again—the Octobrist-Cadet majority. To be sure, it is somewhat less than half the number of deputies elected so far—214 out of 432—but, first, some if not all of the non-party deputies will undoubtedly join it, and, secondly, there is every reason to believe that it will increase during the further elections, since the towns and most of the gubernia electoral conferences in which elections have not yet taken place will re-

turn an overwhelming majority of either Octobrists or Cadets.

The government considers itself master of the situation. The liberal bourgeoisie apparently takes this to be a fact. In these circumstances the deal is bound, more than ever before, to bear the stamp of a most disgusting and treacherous compromise, to be more exact—the surrender of all liberal positions that have the slightest democratic tinge. Obviously, no local governing or central legislative bodies can be at all democratically constituted by means of such a deal without a new mass movement. An Octobrist-Cadet majority is not able to give us that. And can we expect any at all tolerable solution of the agrarian question or any alleviation of the workers' situation from a Black-Hundred-Octobrist majority, from the savage landlords in league with the capitalist robbers? The only answer to that question can be a bitter laugh.

The position is clear: *our "chambre introuvable"* is *incapable of accomplishing the objective tasks of the revolution even in the most distorted form*. It cannot even partly heal the gaping wounds inflicted upon Russia by the old regime—it can only cover up those wounds with wretched, sour, fictitious reforms.

The election results only confirm our firm belief that *Russia cannot emerge from her present crisis in a peaceful way*.

Under these conditions the immediate tasks confronting Social-Democrats at the present time are quite clear. Making the triumph of socialism its ultimate aim, being convinced that political freedom is necessary to achieve that aim, and bearing in mind the circumstance that this freedom at the present time cannot be achieved in a peaceful way, without open mass actions, Social-Democracy is obliged now, as before, to put democratic and revolutionary tasks on the immediate order of the day, without for a moment, of course, abandoning either propaganda of socialism or defence of proletarian class interests in the narrow sense of the word. Representing as it does the most advanced, most revolutionary class in modern society—the proletariat, which in the Russian revolution has proved by deeds its fitness for the role of leader in the mass struggle—

Social-Democracy is obliged to do everything it possibly can to retain that role for the proletariat in the approaching new phase of the revolutionary struggle, a phase characterised more than ever before by a preponderance of political consciousness over spontaneity. To achieve that end *Social-Democracy must strive with all its might for hegemony over the democratic masses and for developing revolutionary energy among them.*

Such a striving brings the party of the proletariat into sharp conflict with the other class political organisations, for whom, by virtue of the group interests which they represent, a democratic revolution is hateful and dangerous not only for its own sake but especially in view of the hegemony of the proletariat in it, a hegemony fraught with the danger of socialism.

It is perfectly clear and beyond doubt that both the Duma majorities—the Black-Hundred-Octobrist and the Octobrist-Cadet—with the alternate backing of which the Stolypin government hopes to balance itself, that both these majorities, each in its own way—on different issues—will be counter-revolutionary. There can be no question of any *struggle* with the Ministry on the part of one or the other of these majorities or even of their separate elements—a struggle in any way systematic or regular. Only separate temporary conflicts are possible. Such conflicts are possible first of all between the Black-Hundred elements of the first-named majority and the government. It should not be forgotten, however, that these conflicts cannot be deep-seated, and the government, without abandoning its counter-revolutionary basis, can quite comfortably and easily emerge the victor in these conflicts through the backing of the second majority. With the best will in the world, revolutionary Social-Democracy and, together with it, all the other revolutionary-minded elements of the Third Duma cannot use these conflicts in the interests of the revolution other than for purely propaganda purposes; there can be no question whatever of "supporting" any of the conflicting sides, because such support, in itself, would be a counter-revolutionary act.

Somewhat greater and better use, perhaps, could be made of possible conflicts between various elements of the

second majority—between the Cadets, on the one hand, and the Octobrists and the government, on the other. But here, too, the position is such that, owing to objective conditions no less than to subjective moods and intentions, these conflicts will be both superficial and transient, merely a means by which political hucksters will find it easier to make deals on terms outwardly more decorous but in essence opposed to the interests of democracy. Consequently, while not refraining from utilising even such superficial and infrequent conflicts, *Social-Democracy must wage a stubborn struggle for democratic and revolutionary aims not only against the government, the Black Hundreds, and the Octobrists, but also against the Cadets.*

These are the principal *aims* which Social-Democracy must set itself in the Third Duma. Obviously, these aims are the same as those that confronted the party of the proletariat in the Second Duma. They have been quite clearly formulated in the first paragraph of the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma. This paragraph reads:

"The immediate political aims of Social-Democracy in the Duma are: (a) to explain to the people the utter uselessness of the Duma as a means of achieving the demands of the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry; (b) to explain to the people the impossibility of achieving political freedom by parliamentary means as long as real power remains in the hands of the tsarist government, and to explain the inevitability of an open struggle of the masses against the armed forces of absolutism, a struggle aimed at securing complete victory, namely, the assumption of power by the masses and the convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot."

This resolution, particularly in its concluding words, formulates also the very important *special* task of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma, a task which the Social-Democratic deputies must fulfil in order to expose the full infamy of the crime committed on June 3. They must expose this crime, of course, not from the liberal standpoint of a formal breach of the constitution, but as a gross and brazen violation of the interests of the broad masses of the people, as a shameless and outrageous falsification

of popular representation. Hence the need for *explaining to the broad masses the utter failure of the Third Duma to meet the interests and demands of the people, and consequently for wide and vigorous propaganda of the idea of a constituent assembly with full power based on universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.*

The London resolution also defines very clearly the nature of Social-Democratic activities in the State Duma in the following terms: "The critical, propagandist, agitational, and organisational role of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma should be brought to the fore", "the general character of the Duma struggle should be subordinated to the entire struggle of the proletariat outside the Duma, it being particularly important in this connection to make use of mass economic struggle and to serve the interests of that struggle." It is perfectly obvious what a close, inseparable connection there is between such Duma activities and the aims, which, as stated above, Social-Democracy should set itself in the Duma at the present moment. Peaceful legislative work by the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma under conditions which make mass movements highly probable would not only be inadvisable, would not only be absurd quixotry, but a downright betrayal of proletarian interests. It is bound to lead Social-Democracy to "a whittling down of its slogans, which can only discredit it in the eyes of the masses and divorce it from the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat". The spokesmen of the proletariat in the Duma could commit no greater crime than this.

The critical activity of Social-Democracy should be expanded to the full and pointed as sharply as possible, all the more as there will be an abundance of material for this in the Third Duma. The Social-Democrats in the Duma must completely expose the class nature of both the government's and the liberals' measures and proposals that will be passed through the Duma. Moreover, in full keeping with the Congress resolution, particular attention must be given to those measures and proposals which affect the economic interests of the broad masses; this applies to the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc. On all these issues Social-Democracy must counter the govern-

mental and liberal standpoints with its own socialist and democratic demands; these issues are the most sensitive nerve of public life and at the same time the most sensitive spot of the government and of those social groups upon which the two Duma majorities rest.

The Social-Democrats in the Duma will carry out all these agitational, propaganda, and organisational tasks not only by their speeches from the Duma rostrum but also by introducing Bills and making interpellations to the government. There is one important difficulty here, however: to introduce a Bill or to make an interpellation the signatures of no less than *thirty* deputies are required.

The Third Duma does not and will not have thirty Social-Democrats. That is indubitable. Hence the Social-Democrats *alone*, without the assistance of other groups, can neither introduce a Bill nor make interpellations. Undoubtedly, this makes matters difficult and complicated.

We have in mind, of course, Bills and questions of a consistently democratic character. Can Social-Democracy in this respect count on assistance from the Constitutional-Democratic Party? Certainly not. Can the Cadets, who are now fully prepared for undisguised compromise on terms which leave nothing of their programmatic demands, skimpy though they are and reduced to a bare minimum by various reservations and exceptions—can the Cadets be expected to annoy the government by democratic interpellations? We all remember that already in the Second Duma the speeches of the Cadet orators in making interpellations became very colourless and often turned into infantile prattle or polite and even deferential inquiries made with a slight bow. And now, when the Duma's "effectiveness" in the matter of weaving strong and reliable nets for the people, nets that would enmesh them like chains, has become the talk of the town. Their Excellencies, the ministers, can sleep in peace: they will seldom be bothered by the Cadets—after all, they have to legislate!—and even if they are bothered, it will be with due observance of all the rules of politeness. Not for nothing did Milyukov at his election meetings promise to "guard the flame". And is Milyukov the only one? Does not Dan's unconditional rejection of the "down-with-the-Duma" slogan signify the

same guarding of the flame? And is not Plekhanov advising Social-Democracy to follow the same policy of "politeness" when he talks about "supporting the liberal bourgeoisie", whose "struggle" amounts to nothing more than curtsies and low bows'?

There can be no question of the Cadets seconding the legislative proposals of the Social-Democrats, for these Bills will have a pronounced propaganda character, will express to the full consistently democratic demands, and that, of course, will cause as much irritation among the Cadets as among the Octobrists and even the Black Hundreds.

And so the Cadets will have to be left out of the account in this respect too. In the matter of making interpellations and presenting Bills the Social-Democrats can count only on the support of groups to the]eft of the Cadets. Apparently, together with the Social-Democrats, they will number up to thirty deputies, thus providing the full technical possibility of displaying initiative in this direction. It is not, of course, a question of any bloc, but only of those "joint actions", which, in the words of the London Congress resolution, "must exclude any possibility of deviations from the Social-Democratic programme and tactics and serve only the purpose of a general onslaught both against reaction and the treacherous tactics of the liberal bourgeoisie".

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ON PLEKHANOV'S ARTICLE[74]

In his article in *Tovarishch* of October 20 Plekhanov continues his campaign of lies and scoffing at the discipline of the Social-Democratic Party. Here are some specimens of these lies. "*Tovarishch*, as everyone knows, was an organ of the Left bloc," says Plekhanov in reply to the accusation that he had become a regular collaborator of Prokopovich, Kuskova & Co. It is a lie. First, *Tovarishch* never was an organ of the Left bloc. The latter could not have had a common organ. Secondly, the Bolsheviks never conducted any political campaign in *Tovarishch*, never came out against fellow-members of the Social-Democratic Party in such a newspaper. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks, having formed a Left bloc, *split Tovarishch* and *drove out* of it (only for a week, it is true) those who stood for the Cadets. And Plekhanov *is dragging* both the proletariat and the petty-bourgeois democrats towards flunkeyism before the Cadets. The Bolsheviks, without participating in *Tovarishch*, shifted it to the left. Plekhanov participates and drags it to the right. It need hardly be said that his reference to a Left bloc is not a happy one!

Plekhanov thus side-steps the question of his being accepted by a bourgeois newspaper to write things agreeable to the bourgeoisie and gives still greater pleasure to the liberals by scoffing at the discipline of the workers' party. I am not obliged to obey when I am asked to betray principles, he exclaims.

This is an anarchist platitude, my dear sir, because the principles of the *Party* are watched over between congresses and interpreted by the Central Committee. You are entitled to refuse to obey if the Central Committee vio-

lates the will of the Congress, the Party Rules, etc. In the present case, however, not a single person has even attempted to contend that the Central Committee violated the will of the Congress by its directives in regard to the elections. Consequently, Plekhanov is simply using the phrase about "betrayal of principles" to cover up his own *betrayal of the Party*.

Lastly, Plekhanov tries to attack the St. Petersburg Committee by saying that it itself refused to obey the Central Committee during the elections to the Second Duma. We answer: first, the St. Petersburg Committee refused to carry out the demand to divide the organisation, i.e., it rejected interference in its autonomy, *which is guaranteed by the Party Rules*. Secondly, during the elections to the Second Duma the Mensheviks *split* the organisation; this aspect of the conflict is passed over in silence by Plekhanov in the bourgeois newspaper! Plekhanov's arguments amount to only one thing: during the elections to the Second Duma the Mensheviks split the St. Petersburg part of the Party, consequently, I have a right now to split the whole Party! Such is Plekhanov's logic, such are Plekhanov's actions. Let everyone bear in mind that *Plekhanov is a splitter*. Only he is afraid to call a spade a spade.

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CONFERENCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[75]

FROM A NEWSPAPER REPORT

1

REPORT ON THE THIRD STATE DUMA

The speaker first of all described the composition of the Third Duma. The government, by a simple rule-of-thumb method, so fashioned the electoral law of June 3 that the Duma was found to have *two possible majorities*: The Octobrist-Black-Hundred and the Octobrist-Cadet majorities. Both are certainly counter-revolutionary. In pursuing its reactionary policy the government will rely now on one and now on the other of these majorities, at the same time trying to screen the autocratic and feudal nature of its actions by talk about paper "reforms". The Cadets, for their part, while in fact pursuing a treacherous policy of counter-revolution, will in words claim to be a party of truly democratic opposition.

A deal between the Cadets and the Octobrists in the Duma is inevitable, and the first steps towards it—as the speaker proved by a number of quotations from Cadet and Octobrist Party newspapers, by a number of facts about the activities of these parties and by reports from the recent Cadet Party Congress—have already been taken. In the Third Duma the Cadet policy of a deal with the old regime is assuming clearer shape than it has had hitherto and no one will be left in doubt as to its true nature.

Neither of the Duma majorities, however, is objectively in a position to meet the vital economic and political

demands of any wide mass of the proletariat, peasantry, and urban democracy. The needs of these sections of the people will, as hitherto, be voiced primarily by the Social-Democrats. The make-up and activity of the Third Duma promise to provide the Social-Democrats with abundant and excellent propaganda material, which should be used against the Black-Hundred government, the avowedly feudal-minded landlords, Octobrists, and Cadets. As before, the task of Social-Democracy is to popularise among the widest mass of the people the idea of a national constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, etc. There can be no question, therefore, of supporting the "Left" Octobrists or Cadets in the Duma. Few though they are in the Third Duma, the Social-Democrats should pursue an independent, socialist, and consistently democratic policy by making use of the Duma rostrum, the right of interpellation, etc. Some agreements are permissible with the group of Left deputies (especially in view of the need to have thirty signatures for making interpellations?, but with no others, and they must be agreements that do not conflict with the programme or tactics of Social-Democracy. With that end in view an Information Bureau should be organised which would be binding upon no one, but would merely enable the Social-Democrats to influence the Left deputies.

Voices can already be heard in the Social-Democratic ranks, the speaker went on, calling for support of the "Left" Octobrists (in the election of the presiding committee, for instance), for the organisation of an Information Bureau with the Cadets, and for the so-called "guarding" of our Duma group. The talk about supporting the Octobrists, which comes from the Mensheviks, testifies as plainly as could be to the utter failure of the Menshevik tactics. When the Duma was dominated by the Cadets the Mensheviks clamoured for support for the Cadets. Stolypin had only to alter the electoral law in favour of the Octobrists for the Mensheviks to show themselves ready to support the Octobrists. Where will this path lead the Mensheviks in the end?

The speaker regarded an Information Bureau with the Cadets as impermissible, because it would mean informing one's avowed enemies.

On the question of "guarding" the Duma group the speaker said that it was true that the group should be guarded. But for what purpose? Only in order that it should hold high the banner of Social-Democracy in the Duma, and that it should wage an irreconcilable struggle in the Duma against the counter-revolutionaries of all shades and descriptions, beginning with the Union people and ending with the Cadets. But on no account in order that it should support the "Left" Octobrists and Cadets. If its existence depended upon its having to support these groups, that is, support a deal with the Stolypin autocracy, then it would be better for it to end its existence honourably, explaining to the whole people why it was expelled from the Duma, should such expulsion follow.

In his concluding remarks Lenin dealt chiefly with the principal mistake of Menshevism—the idea of a "national opposition". The Russian bourgeoisie was never revolutionary in the proper sense of the word, and for a quite understandable reason: owing to the position which the working class occupies in Russia and owing to the role of the working class in the revolution. After examining all the other arguments of the Mensheviks he moved the resolution published in *Proletary*, No. 19.

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2

RESOLUTION ON THE THIRD STATE DUMA

Considering it obligatory for the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma to be guided by the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma, as well as by the resolution on the non-proletarian parties,

the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., in elaboration of these resolutions, considers it necessary to state the following:

1. Two majorities have already taken shape in the Third Duma: the Black-Hundred-Octobrist and the Octobrist-Cadet majorities. The first is counter-revolutionary and stands particularly for increased repression and the protection of landlord privileges, going to the length of striving for complete restoration of the autocracy. The second majority, too, is definitely counter-revolutionary, but inclined to cover up its struggle against the revolution with certain illusory bureaucratic "reforms".

2. Such a situation in the Duma is exceedingly favourable to a double political game being played by both the government and the Cadets. The government, while intensifying repression and continuing its "conquest" of Russia by military force, seeks to pose as a supporter of constitutional reforms. The Cadets, while actually voting with the counter-revolutionary Octobrists, seek to pose not only as an opposition but as spokesmen of democracy. In these circumstances the Social-Democrats have a particular responsibility for ruthlessly exposing this game, laying bare before the people both the oppression of the Black-Hundred landlords and the government on the one hand, and the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets, on the other. Direct or indirect support for the Cadets by the Social-Democrats (whether in the form of voting for the Right-

wing Cadets or the "Left" Octobrists in the presiding committee, or in the form of an Information Bureau with the participation of the Cadets, or by adapting our actions to their policy, etc.) would now directly harm the cause of class education of the mass of the workers and the cause of the revolution.

3. While upholding their socialist aims in full and criticising from this standpoint all the bourgeois parties, not excepting the most democratic and "Trudovik" of them, the Social-Democrats in their propaganda, should give prominence to the task of making it clear to the broad masses that the Third Duma fails completely to meet the interests and demands of the people, and in this connection [they should conduct] widespread and vigorous propaganda for the idea of a constituent assembly based on universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

4. One of the principal tasks of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma is to expose the class nature of the government's and the liberals' proposals with special attention to questions affecting the economic interests of the broad masses (the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc.)—the more so as the composition of the Third Duma promises exceptionally abundant material for the propaganda activities of the Social-Democrats.

5. In particular, the Social-Democrats in the Duma should use the right to make interpellations, for which purpose they should co-operate with other groups to the left of the Cadets without in any way retreating from the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy and without entering into any kind of blocs.

To avoid a repetition of the mistakes made by the Social-Democrats in the Second Duma, the Social-Democratic group should immediately propose to the Left, and only to the Left, deputies of the Duma (i.e., those capable of fighting the Cadets) the formation of an Information Bureau which would not bind its participants but would enable the workers' deputies to exert systematic influence upon the democratic elements in the spirit of Social-Democratic policy.

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3

REPORT ON THE PARTICIPATION OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN THE BOURGEOIS PRESS

Comrade Lenin's second report concerned the question of Social-Democratic participation in the bourgeois press. The speaker set forth the point of view of the two wings of international Social-Democracy on this score and particularly the views of the orthodox members and of the revisionists in the German Social-Democratic Party. The orthodoxes at the Dresden Parteitag[76] agreed to the formula that it was permissible to participate in the press that was not hostile to Social-Democracy, on the grounds that in practice this was tantamount to a complete ban, since in present-day developed capitalist society there were no bourgeois newspapers that were not hostile to Social-Democracy.

The speaker took the stand that *political* participation in the bourgeois press, especially the supposedly non-party press, is absolutely inadmissible. Such newspapers as *Tovarishch*, by their hypocritically disguised fight against Social-Democracy, cause it much greater harm than the bourgeois party newspapers which are frankly hostile to Social-Democracy. This is best illustrated by the contributions to *Tovarishch* made by Plekhanov, Martov, Gorn, Kogan, etc. All their utterances are directed against the Party, and in actual fact it was not the Social-Democratic comrades who made use of the bourgeois newspaper *Tovarishch*, but this newspaper that made use of these comrades against the hateful R.S.D.L.P. Not a single article by a Social-Democrat has so far appeared which the editors of *Tovarishch* would not have approved of.

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THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ("THIRD ALL-RUSSIAN")[77]

FROM A NEWSPAPER REPORT

1

REPORT ON THE TACTICS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA

Comrade Lenin proceeded from the premise that the objective aims of the Russian revolution have not been achieved and that the period of reaction which has set in imposes upon the proletariat the task of defending the cause of democracy and the cause of the revolution more firmly than ever in face of the widespread vacillation. Hence the view that the Duma should be used for the purposes of the revolution, should be used mainly for promulgating the Party's political and socialist views and not for legislative "reforms", which, in any case, would mean supporting the counter-revolution and curtailing democracy in every way.

In the words of Comrade Lenin, the "crux" of the Duma question must lie in an explanation of the following three points: (a) what is the class composition of the Duma? (b) what should be and will be the attitude of the Duma centres towards the revolution and democracy? (c) what is the significance of Duma activity for the progress of the Russian revolution?

On the first question, on the basis of an analysis of the Duma composition (according to data on the party affiliations of the deputies), Lenin stressed that the views of the famous so-called "opposition" could secure endorsement in the Third Duma only on one condition, that no less than 87 Octobrists co-operated with the Cadets and the Left.

Cadets and the Left were short of 87 votes for obtaining a majority in the voting on a Bill. Consequently, effective legislative activity in the Duma was possible only if the bulk of the Octobrists participated in it. What this kind of legislative activity would lead to and what disgrace Social-Democracy would incur by such a link-up with the Octobrists were all too obvious. This was not a matter of abstract principle. Speaking abstractly, one could and sometimes should support the representatives of the big bourgeoisie. But in this case it was necessary to consider the concrete conditions of development of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie had long embarked on the path of struggle against the revolution and of compromises with the autocracy. The recent Cadet congress had finally stripped off all the fig-leaves with which the Milyukovs and Co. had been covering themselves, and was an important political event inasmuch as the Cadets had declared with cynical frankness that they were going into the Octobrist-Black-Hundred Duma to legislate and that they would fight the "enemies on the Left". Thus, two possible majorities in the Duma—the Octobrist-Black-Hundred and the Cadet-Octobrist—and both, in different ways, would work towards tightening the screw of reaction: the first, by trying to restore the autocracy, the second, by making deals with the government and introducing illusory reforms that disguise the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Social-Democracy could not lend its support to legislative reforms, as this would be tantamount to supporting the *government*, Octobrist, party. The way of "reforms" on the present political basis and with the present balance of forces would not mean improving the condition of the masses, or expanding freedom, but bureaucratically regulating the non-freedom and enslavement of the masses. Such, for example, were the Stolypin agrarian reforms under Article 87.[78] They were progressive in clearing the way for capitalism, but it was the kind of progress that no Social-Democrat could bring himself to support. The Mensheviks were harping on one string, namely, the class interests of the bourgeoisie are *bound to* clash with those of the autocracy! But there was not a grain of historic truth in this vulgar would-

be Marxism. Did not Napoleon III and Bismarck succeed for a time in appeasing the appetites of the big bourgeoisie? Did they not, by their "reforms", tighten the noose round the neck of the working people for years to come? What grounds then were there for believing that the Russian government, in its deal with the bourgeoisie, was likely to agree to any other kind of reforms?

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2

RESOLUTION ON THE TACTICS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA

In pursuance of the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma and on non-proletarian parties, the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. deems it necessary, in elaboration of these resolutions, to state the following:

(1) In the Third Duma, which is the outcome of the coup d'état of June 3, there are two possible majorities: that of the Black-Hundreds-Octobrists and that of the Octobrists-Cadets. The first, expressing chiefly the interests of the semi-feudal landlords, is counter-revolutionary and stands mainly for protecting landlord interests and increased repression going to the length of striving for complete restoration of the autocracy. The second majority, expressing chiefly the interests of the big bourgeoisie, is likewise definitely counter-revolutionary, but inclined to cover up its struggle against the revolution with certain illusory bureaucratic reforms;

(2) such a situation in the Duma is extremely favourable to a double political game being played by both the government and the Cadets. The government, while intensifying repression and continuing its "conquest" of Russia by military force, seeks to pose as a supporter of constitutional reforms. The Cadets, while actually voting with the counter-revolutionary Octobrists, seek to pose not only as an opposition, but as spokesmen of democracy. Under these conditions the Social-Democrats have a particular responsibility for ruthlessly exposing this game, laying bare before the people both the oppression of the Black-Hundred landlords and the government and the counter-revolutionary

policy of the Cadets. Direct or indirect support for the Cadets by the Social-Democrats—whether in the form of an Information Bureau with the participation of the Cadets or by adapting our actions to their policy, etc.—would now directly harm the cause of class education of the mass of the workers and the cause of the revolution;

(3) while upholding their socialist aims and criticising all the bourgeois parties from this standpoint, the Social-Democrats, in their propaganda, should give prominence to the task of making it clear to the broad masses that the Third Duma fails completely to meet the interests and demands of the people, and in this connection conduct widespread and vigorous propaganda for the idea of a constituent assembly based on universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot;

(4) one of the principal tasks of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma is to expose the class nature of the government's and the liberals' proposals and to systematically oppose to them the demands of the Social-Democratic minimum programme without any whittling-down, with special attention to questions affecting the economic interests of the broad masses (the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc.)—the more so as the composition of the Third Duma promises exceptionally abundant material for the propaganda activities of Social-Democrats;

(5) the Social-Democratic group should take special care that no outward coincidence between Social-Democratic voting and the voting of the Black-Hundred-Octobrist or Octobrist-Cadet blocs should be used in the sense of supporting one bloc or the other;

(6) the Social-Democrats in the Duma should introduce Bills and use their right to make interpellations, for which purpose they should co-operate with other groups to the left of the Cadets without in any way retreating from the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy and without entering into any kind of blocs. The Social-Democratic group should immediately propose to the Left deputies of the Duma the formation of an Information Bureau which would not bind its participants but would enable the workers' deputies to exert systematic influence upon democratic elements in the spirit of Social-Democratic policy;

(7) among the first concrete steps of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma the Conference deems it necessary to place special emphasis on the need: (1) to come forward with a special declaration; (2) to make an interpellation concerning the coup d'état of June 3; (3) to raise in the Duma, in the most advisable form, the question of the trial of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma.

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THE PREPARATION OF A "DISGUSTING ORGY"

In assessing the tasks of the Social-Democrats in the Second Russian Duma and the aspirations of the Russian liberals, Franz Mehring, the well-known German Marxist, wrote that German Liberalism has for the last sixty years been following a wretched and shameful path under cover of the slogan: "positive work". When the National Assembly, on a single night in the summer of 1789, achieved the emancipation of the French peasants, that brilliantly venal adventurer Mirabeau, the incomparable hero of constitutional democracy, described the event by the picturesque expression "a disgusting orgy". In our (Social-Democratic) opinion, however, this was positive work. On the contrary, the emancipation of the Prussian peasants, which dragged on at a snail's pace for sixty years, from 1807 to 1865, and took cruel and ruthless toll of countless peasant lives, was, from the point of view of our liberals, "positive work", which they proclaim from the house-tops. In our opinion it was a "disgusting orgy".*

Thus Mehring wrote. We cannot but recall his words today, when the Third Duma is opening, when the Octobrists want to start a disgusting orgy in real earnest, when the Cadets are ready to take part in it with servile zeal, when even among the Social-Democrats there are (to our shame) Plekhanovites who are prepared to assist in this orgy. Let us take a closer look at all these preparations.

The eve of the Third Duma was marked by a spate of meetings of the different parties on the question of Duma tactics. The Octobrists at their Moscow conference drew up a draft programme for the parliamentary group of the Union of October Seventeenth, and their spokesman, Mr. Plevako, raised the "banner of the Russian Liberal-Constitutional Party" at a banquet in Moscow. The Cadets completed their

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* See present edition, Vol. 12, p. 386.—*Ed.*

Fifth so-called "Party" Congress in three or four days. The Left-wing Cadets were utterly defeated and thrown out of the Cadets' Central Committee (which consists of 38 members, who completely control the "party"). The Right-wing Cadets obtained complete freedom of action—in the spirit of the "report on tactics in the Third Duma", that remarkable, "historical" justification of the "disgusting orgy". The Social-Democrats started to discuss Third Duma tactics in the Central Committee and at the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.

The parliamentary programme of the Octobrists is notable for its frank *admission* of the counter-revolutionary policy which the Cadets virtually pursued in the Second Duma behind a screen of phrases and excuses. For instance, the Octobrists openly declare that revision of the fundamental laws and the electoral law is "untimely" on the grounds that it is first of all necessary to "lull and abolish the war of passions and class interests" by introducing "a number of pressing reforms". The Cadets did not say this, but they acted in just this way in the Second Duma. Another example. The Octobrists stand "for drawing the widest possible circle of people into participation in self-government", while at the same time "ensuring proper representation" of the nobility. This outspoken counter-revolutionism is more honest than the Cadets' policy of promising universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot while in reality fiercely opposing election of the local land committees by such means both in the First and in the Second Dumas and proposing that these committees should consist of peasants and landlords in equal numbers, that is, the same idea of "ensuring representation of the nobility". Yet another example. The Octobrists openly reject the compulsory alienation of the landlords' land. The Cadets "accept" it, but accept it in such a way that they vote in the Second Duma with the Right against the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats on the question of winding up the agrarian debate with a general formula accepting compulsory alienation.

On terms consolidating the "victories" of the counter-revolution the Octobrists are prepared to promise all kinds of liberal reforms. These include "extension of the Duma's

budgetary rights" (this is not a joke!), "extension of its rights of supervision over the legality of the government's actions", measures guaranteeing the independence of the courts, "removal of constraints on workers' economic organisations and on economic strikes" ("which do not prejudice state and public interests"), "strengthening the bases of lawful civil liberties", and so on and so forth. The Octobrist governing party is as lavish of "liberal" phrases as the government of Mr. Stolypin itself.

How did the Cadets put the question of their attitude towards the Octobrists at their congress? The handful of Left Cadets was found to consist of blusterers who were unable even to pose the question intelligently, while the mass of the Right-wing knights of disguised Octobrism rallied strongly to smother the truth in the meanest fashion. The impotence of the Left Cadets is best illustrated by their draft resolution. Its first point recommends the Cadets "to adopt a stand of sharp opposition without aligning themselves with the Octobrists, who are hostile to it (to the Party of Constitutional-Democrats) both in spirit and in programme". The second point calls on the Cadets "not to withhold support from Bills that lead the country along the path of liberation and democratic reforms, no matter from what source they originate". This is a joke, because Bills capable of obtaining a majority in the Third Duma *cannot* originate from any other source than the Octobrists! The Left Cadet gentlemen fully deserve their defeat, for they behaved like wretched cowards or fools, who are incapable of saying clearly and bluntly that it is a disgrace to intend to legislate in such a Duma, that voting with the Octobrists means supporting the counter-revolution. Some individuals among the Left Cadets, apparently, understood the state of affairs, but being drawing-room democrats, they showed their cowardice at the congress. At any rate, Mr. Zhilkin in *Tovarishch* mentions a *private* speech by the Cadet Safonov, in which the latter said: "The Cadet group, in my opinion, should now take the stand of the Trudovik group in the First Duma. Opposition, strong speeches—and nothing more. Yet *those people intend to legislate*. I wonder how? By friendship, by an *alliance with the Octobrists*? What a strange tendency

towards the Right. The whole country is Left, and we are going Right" (*Tovarishch*, No. 407). Apparently, Mr. Safonov has lucid intervals of shame and conscience ... but only privately!

On the other hand, Mr. Milyukov and his gang revealed themselves in all, their old glory as shameless and unprincipled careerists. In the adopted resolution they gloss over the issue in order to fool the public at large, in the way that the liberal heroes of parliamentary prostitution have always fooled the people. In the congress resolutions ("theses") *there is not a word about the Octobrists*! This is incredible, but it is a fact. The crux of the Cadets' congress was the question of the Constitutional-Democrats voting with the Octobrists. All the debates centred around this question. But that is just what the art of the bourgeois politicians consists in—to *fool* the masses, to *conceal* their parliamentary hocus-pocus. The "theses on tactics" adopted by the Congress of the Constitutional-Democrats on October 26 are a classical document, showing, in the first place, how the Cadets coalesce with the Octobrists, and, secondly, how resolutions designed to hoodwink the masses are written by the liberals. This document should be compared with the "parliamentary programme" of the "Union of October Seventeenth". This document should be compared with the "report on tactics" which Milyukov delivered at the Congress of the Constitutional-Democrats (*Rech* No. 255). The following are the most important passages of this report:

"Placed in opposition, the party, however [precisely—however!], will not play the role of an irresponsible minority, in the sense in which it itself used this term to describe the conduct of the extreme Left in the Duma" [translated from parliamentary into simple and frank language, this means: please, Octobrist gentlemen, give us a place, we are only an opposition in name!]. "It will not regard the Duma as a means for preparing actions outside the Duma, but as a supreme organ of state, possessing a share of the supreme authority as precisely defined by law" [are not the Octobrists, who bluntly declare the revision of the fundamental laws to be untimely, more honest?]. "The party is going into the Third Duma, as into the first

two, with the firm intention of taking an active part in its legislative work. The party always considered this kind of activity to be the chief and basic activity, in contrast to both the agitational aims of the Left and the conspiratorial activity of the Right." As for "conspiracy", gentlemen, that is another lie, for in *both* Dumas you *conspired* with the ministers or the ministers' lackeys. As for the disavowal of agitation, this is a complete and irrevocable disavowal of *democracy*.

To legislate in the Third Duma it is necessary either way, directly or indirectly, to unite with the Octobrists and take one's stand unequivocally with the counter-revolution and with the defence of its victories. The Cadets try to pass this obvious thing over in silence. They let the cat out of the bag, however, in another passage of the report: "The use of the legislative initiative should be made dependent on a preliminary elucidation of the *practicability* of the party projects". The practicability depends on the Octobrists. To elucidate it means having recourse to the Octobrists by the backstairs. To make one's initiative depend on this elucidation means to curtail one's own projects *for the benefit of* the Octobrists, it means making one's own policy dependent on that of the Octobrists.

There is no middle way, gentlemen. Either a party of real opposition, in which case—an irresponsible minority. Or a party of active counter-revolutionary legislation, in which case—servility to the Octobrists . The Cadets chose the latter, and as a reward for this the Black-Hundred Duma is said to be electing the Right-wing Cadet Maklakov to the presidium! Maklakov deserves it.

But how are we to account for the Social-Democrats who are capable, even today, of talking about support for the Cadets? Such Social-Democrats are the product of intellectualist philistinism, the philistinism of Russian life as a whole. Such Social-Democrats have been bred by Plekhanov's vulgarisation of Marxism. At the conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation it became clear that the Mensheviks, following in the wake of the Right Duma, are going still farther to the right. They are prepared to support the Octobrists, i.e., the *government* party! Then why should not the Social-Democrats vote for

Khomyakov, who is better than Bobrinsky? It is a question of expediency! Why not vote for Bobrinsky if the choice is only between him and Purishkevich? Why not support the Octobrists against the Black Hundreds, since Marx taught us to support the bourgeoisie against the feudal squirearchy?[79]

Yes, one is ashamed to admit the fact, but it is a sin to conceal it, that Plekhanov has led his Mensheviks to heap infinite disgrace upon Social-Democracy. Like a true "man in the muffler", he kept repeating the same old words about "support for the bourgeoisie", and by his *mechanical repetition* obscured all understanding of the special tasks and special conditions of the proletariat's struggle in the revolution and the struggle against the counter-revolution. In Marx the whole analysis of revolutionary epochs turns on the struggle of genuine democrats and particularly of the proletariat against constitutional illusions, against the treachery of liberalism, against counter-revolution. Plekhanov recognises Marx—but it is a counterfeit of Marx in the manner of Struve. Let Plekhanov now reap what he has sown!

The counter-revolutionary nature of liberalism in the Russian revolution was proved by the whole course of events prior to October 17 and especially after October 17. The Third Duma will make even the blind see. The alignment of the Cadets with the Octobrists is a political fact, and no excuses and subterfuges can disguise it. Let the newspaper of the dull-witted Bernsteinians, *Tovarishch*, confine itself to impotent whining in this connection, intermingling this whining with pushing the Cadets towards the Octobrists, with political pimping. The Social-Democrats have to understand the class reasons for the counter-revolutionary nature of Russian liberalism. The Social-Democrats must ruthlessly expose in the Duma all the approaches made to the Octobrists by the Cadets, all the baseness of so-called democratic liberalism. The workers' party will dismiss with contempt all considerations about "guarding the flame" and will unfurl the banner of socialism and the banner of the revolution!

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BUT WHO ARE THE JUDGES?

Malicious chuckling over the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the R.S.D.L.P, in general and over the sharp struggle at the London Congress in particular has become a regular feature of the bourgeois press. No one thinks of studying the differences of opinion, of analysing the two tendencies, of acquainting the reading public with the history of the split and with the nature of the differences between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. The publicists of *Rech* and *Tovarishch*—the Vergezhskys, the E. K.'s, the Pereyaslavskys, and other *penny-a-liners** simply fasten on all kinds of rumours, serve up "piquant" details of "scandals" for blasé society gossips, and go out of their way to addle people's minds with trashy anecdotes about our struggle.

This genre of vulgar scoffing is being taken up, too, by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The editorial in *Znamya Truda*,[80] No. 6, drags out Cherevanin's story about the incident of hysteria at the London Congress, sniggers at the expenditure of "tens of thousands", and smacks its lips at "the pretty picture of the internal state of Russian Social-Democracy at the present moment". With the liberals such introductions are preliminaries to lauding the opportunists *à la* Plekhanov; with the Socialist-Revolutionaries they are the preliminaries to a severe criticism of them (the Socialist-Revolutionaries are repeating *now* the arguments of the revolutionary Social-Democrats against a labour congress! They have bethought themselves!). But both of them gloat over the hard struggle in the Social-Democratic ranks.

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* Lenin gives this word in English.—*Tr.*

We shall say a few words about the liberal heroes of this crusade before we deal in detail with the Socialist-Revolutionary heroes of "the struggle against opportunism".

The liberals sneer at the struggle within Social-Democracy in order to cover up their systematic *deception* of the public in regard to the Cadet Party. It is a thoroughgoing deception, and the struggle among the Cadets themselves and their negotiations with the authorities are systematically concealed. Everyone knows that the Left Cadets rebuke the Right. Everyone knows that Milyukov, Struve & Co. called at the ante-rooms of the Stolypins. But the exact facts are kept hidden. Differences have been glossed over and not a word has been said of the disputes of the Struve gentry with the Left Cadets. There are no records of the proceedings of the Cadet congresses. The liberals issue no figures of their party membership either as a whole or by organisations. The tendency of the different committees is unknown. Nothing but darkness, nothing but the official lies of *Rech*, nothing but attempts to fool democracy by those on conversational terms with ministers—that is what the party of Constitutional-Democrats is. Lawyers and professors, who make their career by parliamentarism, hypocritically condemn the underground struggle and praise open activity by parties while actually flouting the democratic principle of publicity and concealing from the public the different political tendencies within their party. It needs the short-sightedness of a Plekhanov, who goes down on his knees before Milyukov, not to be able to see this gross dirty deception of democracy by the Cadets, a deception touched up with a gloss of culture.

And what about the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Are they doing their duty as honest *democrats* (we do not say as socialists, for that cannot be said of them), the duty of giving the people a *clear and truthful* account of the struggle of the different political tendencies among those who seek to lead the people?

Let us examine the facts.

The December Congress of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1905 was the first and only one to publish minutes of the proceedings. Mr. Tuchkin, a delegate of the Central Organ, exclaims: "The Social-Democrats were at

one time convinced, apparently quite sincerely, that the advent of political liberties would spell political death to our party.... The epoch of liberties has proved the reverse" (p. 28 of the supplement to the Minutes). You don't really mean that, Mr. Tuchkin, do you? Is that what the epoch of liberties proved? Is that what the actual policy of the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries proved in 1905? In 1906? In 1907?

Let us turn to the facts.

In the minutes of the Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (*December* 1905, published in *1906!*) we read that after October 17 a writers' group, which had a voice but no vote at this Congress, "*urged the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to organise a legal party*" (p. 49 of the Minutes, further quotations are from the same source). The Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries "*was asked to set up not a legal organisation of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, but a special parallel Popular Socialist Party*" (51). The Central Committee refused and referred the question to the Congress. The Congress *rejected* the motion of the Popular Socialists by a majority of all against one with seven abstentions (66). "Is it conceivable to be in two parallel parties?" cried Mr. Tuchkin, beating his breast (p. 61). And Mr. Shevich hinted at the Popular Socialists' kinship with the liberals, so that the Popular Socialist Mr. Rozhdestvensky *began to lose his equanimity* (p. 59) and avowed that "no one has the right" to call them "*semi-liberals*" (59).*

Such are the facts. In 1905, the Socialist-Revolutionaries *broke with* the "semi-liberal" Popular Socialists. But did they?

In 1905, a powerful means for the party openly to influence the masses was the press. During the October "days of liberty" the Socialist-Revolutionaries ran a newspaper *in a bloc with the Popular Socialists*, prior to the December Congress, it is true. *Formally* the Socialist-Revolutionaries

* Mr. Shevich retreated somewhat in face of this *resentment* on the part of a Popular Socialist who had lost his equanimity and "corrected himself"—p. 63—saying, "*by way of personal* [!!] *explanation*": "I had no intention of suggesting that the speaker was a member of the liberal party".

are right on this point. In reality, during the period of the greatest liberties, the period of most direct influence upon the masses, they *concealed* from the public the existence of two different tendencies within the party. The differences of opinion were as great as those within the Social-Democratic ranks, but the Social-Democrats tried to clarify them, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried diplomatically to conceal them. Such are the facts of 1905.

Now take 1906. The First-Duma period of "small liberties". The socialist newspapers are revived. *The Socialist-Revolutionaries are again in a bloc with the Popular Socialists and they have a joint newspaper*. No wonder the break with the "semi-liberals" at the congress was a diplomatic one: if you like—a break, or if you like—no break! The proposal was rejected, the idea of "being in two parallel parties" was ridiculed, and ... and they went on sitting side by side in two parties, reverently exclaiming: We thank thee, O Lord, that we are not as those Social-Democrats who fight one another! Such are the facts. Both periods of the free press in Russia were marked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries aligning themselves with the Popular Socialists and concealing from democracy by deception ("diplomacy") the two profoundly divergent tendencies within their party.

Now take 1907. After the First Duma the Popular Socialists formally organised their own party. That was inevitable, since in the First Duma, in the first address of the parties to the peasant electors *all over* Russia, the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries came forward with *different* agrarian plans (the Bills of the 104 and the 33). The Popular Socialists *defeated* the Socialist-Revolutionaries by securing three times as many signatures of the Trudovik deputies to their plan, to their agrarian programme. And this programme, as the Socialist-Revolutionary Vikhlyaev admitted (*Nasha Mysl*, Collection, No. 1, St. Petersburg, 1907, article: "The Popular Socialist Party and the Agrarian Question") "*similarly*" with the law of November 9, 1906, "arrives at negation of the basic principle of communal land tenure". This programme legalises "*the manifestations of selfish individualism*" (p. 89 of Mr. Vikhlyaev's article), "*pollutes the broad ideological stream with*

individualist mud" (p. 91 of the same article), and embarks upon "*the path of encouraging individualist and egoistic tendencies among the masses*" (ibid., p. 93).

Clear enough, it would seem? The *overwhelming* majority of peasant deputies displayed bourgeois individualism. The S.R.'s first address to the peasant electors of all Russia strikingly confirmed the theory of the Social-Democrats by virtually converting the S.R.'s into the extreme Left wing of the petty-bourgeois democrats.

But, perhaps the S.R.'s, after the Popular Socialists had separated from them and won the Trudovik group over to their programme, definitely dissociated themselves from them? They did not. The elections to the Second Duma in St. Petersburg proved the reverse. Blocs with the Cadets were then the greatest manifestation of socialist opportunism. The Black-Hundred danger was a fiction *covering up* the policy of truckling to the liberals. The Cadet press revealed this very clearly by stressing the "moderation" of the Mensheviks and Popular Socialists. How did the S.R.'s behave? Our "revolutionaries" formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks; the terms of this bloc were concealed from the public. *Our revolutionaries trailed after the Cadets* just like the Mensheviks. The S.R. spokesmen proposed a bloc to the Cadets (the meeting of January 18, 1907. See N. Lenin's pamphlet *When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool* ... , St. Petersburg, January 15, 1907,* in which it is established that the S.R.'s behaved in a *politically dishonest* manner in the question of agreements by negotiating simultaneously with the Social-Democrats, who had declared war on the Cadets on January 7, 1907, and *with the Cadets*). The S.R.'s found themselves in the Left bloc *against* their will, owing to the Cadets' refusal.

Thus, after a complete break with the Popular Socialists the S.R.'s *in actual fact* pursued the policy of the Popular Socialists and Mensheviks, i.e., the opportunists. Their "advantage" consists in concealing from the public the motives of this policy and the currents within their party.

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* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 456-74.—*Ed.*

The extraordinary Congress of the S.R. Party in February 1907 not only failed to raise this question of blocs with the Cadets, not only failed to assess the significance of such a policy, but, on the contrary, *confirmed* it! We would remind the reader of G. A. Gershuni's speech at that Congress, which at that time *Rech* lauded in exactly the same way as it always lauds Plekhanov. Gershuni said that he adhered to his "old opinion: the Cadets so far are not our enemies" (p. 11 of the pamphlet: "Speech by G. A. Gershuni at the Extraordinary Congress of the S.R. Party", 1907, pp. 1-15, with the party motto of the S.R.'s: "In struggle you will win your rights"). Gershuni warned against mutual struggle within the opposition: "Will not the people lose faith in the very possibility of government by means of a popular representative assembly" (ibid.). Obviously, it was in the spirit of this Cadet-lover that the Congress of the S.R.'s adopted a resolution, which stated, among other things:

> "The Congress holds that a sharp party alignment of groups within the Duma, with isolated action by each separate group and acute inter-group struggle, could completely paralyse the activities of the oppositional majority and thereby discredit the very idea of popular representation in the eyes of the working classes" (*Partiiniye Izvestia* of the S.R. Party, No. 6, March 8, 1907).

This is the sheerest opportunism, worse than our Menshevism. Gershuni in a slightly more clumsy way made the Congress repeat *Plekhanovism*. And the entire activity of the S.R. Duma group reflected this spirit of Cadet tactics of concern for the unity of the national opposition. The *only* difference between the Social-Democrat Plekhanov and the Socialist-Revolutionary Gershuni is that the former is a member of a party that does not cover up such decadence, but exposes and fights against it, while the latter is a member of a party in which all tactical principles and theoretical views are muddled and hidden from the eyes of the public by a thick screen of parochial diplomacy. "Not to wash one's dirty linen in public" is a thing the S.R.'s are adept at. The trouble is they have *nothing* to show in public but dirty linen. They could not tell the whole truth about their relations with the Popular Socialists in 1905, 1906, or 1907. They cannot disclose how a *party*—not a circle, but a party—

can one day adopt an ultra-opportunist resolution by 67 votes to 1, and the next day exhaust themselves shouting "revolutionary" cries.

No, gentlemen "judges", we do not envy you your formal right to rejoice at the sharp struggle and splits within the ranks of Social-Democracy. No doubt, there is much in this struggle that is to be deplored. Without a doubt, there is much in these splits that is disastrous to the cause of socialism. Nevertheless, not for a single minute would we care to barter this heavy truth for your "light" lie. Our Party's serious illness is the growing pains of a *mass* party. For there can be no mass party, no party of a class, without full clarity of essential shadings, without an open struggle between various tendencies, without informing the *masses* as to which leaders and which organisations of the Party are pursuing this or that line. Without this, a party worthy of the name cannot be built, and we are *building* it. We have succeeded in putting the views of our two currents truthfully, clearly, and distinctly before everyone. Personal bitterness, factional squabbles and strife, scandals, and splits—all these are trivial in comparison with the fact that the experience of *two tactics* is actually teaching a lesson to the proletarian masses, is actually teaching a lesson to everyone who is capable of taking an intelligent interest in politics. Our quarrels and splits will be forgotten. Our tactical principles, sharpened and tempered, will go down as cornerstones in the history of the working-class movement and socialism in Russia. Years will pass, perhaps decades, and the influence of one or the other tendency will be traced in a hundred practical questions of different kinds. Both the working class of Russia and the whole people *know* whom they are dealing with in the case of Bolshevism or Menshevism.

Do they know the Cadets? The entire history of the Cadet Party is one of sheer political jugglery that keeps silent about what matters most and whose one and everlasting concern is to keep the truth hidden at all costs.

Do they know the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Will the S.R.'s tomorrow again enter into a bloc with the Social-Cadets? Are they not in that bloc today? Do they dissociate themselves from the "individualist mud" of the Tru-

doviks or are they filling their party more and more with this mud? Do they still adhere to the theory of unity of the national opposition? Did they adopt that theory only yesterday? Will they abandon it tomorrow for a few weeks? No one knows. The S.R.'s themselves do not know it, because the entire history of their party is one of systematically and continuously obscuring, confusing, and glossing over their differences by means of words, phrases and still more phrases.

Why is that? It is not because the S.R.'s are bourgeois careerists like the Cadets. No, their sincerity, as a circle, *cannot* be doubted. Their trouble is that it is impossible for them to create a mass party, impossible for them to become the party of a *class*. The objective position is such that they have to be merely a *wing* of peasant democracy, an unindependent, unequal appendage, a "subgroup" of the Trudoviks, and not a self-contained whole. The period of storm and stress did not help the S.R.'s to rise to their full stature. It threw them into the clutching arms of the Popular Socialists, a clutch so strong that not even a split can unlock them. The period of the counter-revolutionary war did not strengthen their connection with definite social strata—it merely gave rise to new waverings and vacillations (which the S.R.'s are now trying hard to conceal) about the socialist nature of the muzhik. And today, on reading the passionate articles of *Znamya Truda* about the heroes of S.R. terrorism, one cannot help saying to oneself: your terrorism, gentlemen, is not the outcome of your revolutionism. Your revolutionism is confined to terrorism.

No, these judges are far from being able to judge Social-Democracy!

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PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET BY VOINOV (A. V. LUNACHARSKY) ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTY TOWARDS THE TRADE UNIONS[81]

Comrade Voinov's pamphlet on the attitude of the socialist party of the proletariat towards the trade unions is open to a good deal of misconstruction. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the author, in the ardour of his fight against a narrow and incorrect conception of Marxism, against an unwillingness to take into consideration the new needs of the working-class movement and take a broader and more profound view of the matter, often expresses himself in too general terms. He attacks orthodoxy—true, orthodoxy-in inverted commas, i.e., pseudo-orthodoxy—or German Social-Democracy in general, when, as a matter of fact, his criticism is aimed only at the vulgarisers of orthodoxy, only at the opportunist wing of Social-Democracy. Secondly, the author writes for the Russian public, but hardly takes into consideration the various shadings in the formulation under Russian conditions of the questions he examines. Comrade Voinov's point of view is very far removed from the views of the Russian syndicalists, Mensheviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The inattentive or unconscientious reader, however, can easily cavil at one or another phrase or idea of the writer, seeing that the latter had before his eyes chiefly Frenchmen and Italians and did not undertake the task of dissociating himself from all kinds of Russian muddleheads.

As an example of the latter we would mention the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In *Znamya Truda*, No. 5, they declare with their usual presumption: "The Socialist Internation-

al approved the point of view on the trade-union movement which we [!] have always [!] maintained." Let us take the *Collected Articles*, No. 1 (1907), published by *Nasha Mysl*. Mr. Victor Chernov takes Kautsky to task, but *is silent* about the Mannheim resolution and Kautsky's struggle against the opportunist neutralists! Kautsky's article, which the S.R. hack writer attacks, was written on the eve of Mannheim.[82] In Mannheim Kautsky opposed the neutralists. The Mannheim resolution "makes a considerable breach in trade-union neutrality" (Kautsky's expression in an article on the Mannheim Congress published in *Die Neue Zeit*[83] for October 6, 1906). And now, *in 1907*, along comes a critic, who poses as a revolutionary and calls Kautsky "a great dogmatist and inquisitor of Marxism", accusing him—quite in unison with the opportunist neutralists!—of tendentiously belittling the role of the trade unions, of a desire to "subordinate" them to the party, and so on. If we add to this that the S.R.'s always stood for non-Party trade unions, and that *Znamya Truda*, No. 2 for July 12, 1907 carried an editorial saying that "party propaganda has its place *outside* the union", we shall get a full picture of the S.R.'s revolutionism.

When Kautsky combated opportunist neutralism and further developed and deepened the theory of Marxism, moving the trade unions leftwards, these gentlemen fell upon him, repeating the catchwords of the opportunists and continuing on the sly to advocate non-partisanship of the trade unions. When *the same Kautsky* moved the trade unions still further leftwards by amending Beer's resolution at Stuttgart and laying stress in this resolution on the socialist tasks of the trade unions, the gentlemen of the S.R. fraternity started shouting: the Socialist International has endorsed our point of view!

The question arises, are such methods worthy of members of the Socialist International? Does not such criticism testify to presumption and lack of principle?

A specimen of such presumption among the Social-Democrats is the former revolutionary Plekhanov, who is deeply respected by the liberals. In a preface to the pamphlet *We And They* he declares with inimitable, incomparable-complacency that the Stuttgart resolution (on the trade

unions) *with my amendment* deprives the London resolution (that of the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.) of its significance. Probably many readers, upon reading this declaration of our magnificent Narcissus, will believe that the struggle at Stuttgart was fought precisely over this amendment of Plekhanov's and that generally speaking this amendment had some serious significance.

In reality, this amendment ("unity of the economic struggle should always be borne in mind") had no serious significance whatever. It even had no bearing on the essence of the questions *in dispute* at Stuttgart, on the essence of the differences of opinion in international socialism.

As a matter of fact, Plekhanov's raptures over "his" amendment have a very vulgar significance—*to mislead* the reader by drawing his attention away from the *really* disputable questions of the trade-union movement and to *conceal* the defeat of the idea of neutralism in Stuttgart.

The Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906), at which the Mensheviks won the day, adhered to the point of view of trade-union neutrality. The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. took a different stand and proclaimed the necessity of working towards partisanship of the unions. The Stuttgart International Congress adopted a resolution, which "*puts an end to neutrality once and for all*", as Kautsky rightly expressed it.* Plekhanov went into the Commission of the Stuttgart Congress to defend neutrality, as described in detail by Voinov. And Clara Zetkin wrote in *Die Gleichheit*, the mouthpiece of the women's labour movement of Germany, that "Plekhanov *attempted by rather unconvincing arguments* to justify a certain limitation of this principle"** (i.e., the principle of close alignment of the unions with the Party).

Thus, the principle of neutrality which Plekhanov advocated was a failure. His arguments were considered "unconvincing" by the German revolutionary Social-Democrats.

* *Vorwärts*, 1907 No. 209, *Beilage*, Kautsky's report to the Leipzig workers on the Congress in Stuttgart. See *Kalendar dlya vsekh, 1908*, *Zerno* Publishers, p. 173, my article on the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart. (See pp. 87-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

** See *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, p. 173, as well as the collected articles of *Zarnitsy* (St. Petersburg, 1907), which gives a complete translation of this article from *Die Gleichheit*.

And he, self-admiringly, declares: "my" amendment was adopted and the resolution of the London Congress loses its significance....

Yes, yes, but, on the other hand, the Nozdrev presumption[84] of a socialist respected by the liberals apparently does not lose any of its significance.

Comrade Voinov is wrong, I believe, in saying that the German orthodox socialists consider the idea of storming harmful and that orthodoxy "had all but adopted the whole spirit of the new Economism". This cannot be said of Kautsky, and Comrade Voinov himself admits the correctness of Kautsky's views. While blaming the Germans for "saying too little about the role of the trade union as organisers of socialist production", Comrade Voinov mentions elsewhere the opinion of Liebknecht senior, who recognised this role in the most emphatic terms. Another mistake of Comrade Voinov was to believe Plekhanov when the latter said that Bebel *deliberately* omitted mention of the Russian revolution in his speech of welcome, and that Bebel *did not want* to speak about Russia. These words of Plekhanov's were simply crude buffoonery on the part of a socialist who is deeply respected by the liberals and should not for a moment have been taken seriously, should not have evoked even the possibility of believing that there was an iota of truth in them. For my part I can testify that during Bebel's speech, Van Kol, a representative of the socialist Right wing who sat next to me in the Bureau, listened to Bebel specially to see whether he would mention Russia. And as soon as Bebel had finished, Van Kol turned to me with a look of surprise; he did not doubt (nor did a single serious member of the Congress) that Bebel had forgotten Russia *accidentally*. The best and most experienced speakers sometimes make slips. For Comrade Voinov to call this forgetfulness on the part of the veteran Bebel "characteristic", is, in my opinion, most unfair. It is also profoundly unfair to speak in general about the "*present-day*" opportunistic Bebel. There are no grounds for such a generalisation.

To avoid misunderstandings, however, let me say at once that if anyone tried to use these expressions of Com-

rade Voinov's against the revolutionary German Social-Democrats, this would be seizing dishonestly on particular words. Comrade Voinov has abundantly proved by his *whole* pamphlet that he is on the side of the German revolutionary Marxists (like Kautsky), that he is working *together with them* to get rid of old prejudices, opportunist cliches, and short-sighted complacency. That is why even in Stuttgart, I lined up with Comrade Voinov on all essentials and agree with him how regarding the entire character of his revolutionary criticism. He is absolutely right in saying that we must now learn from the Germans and profit by their experience. Only ignoramuses, who have still learned nothing from the Germans and therefore do not know the ABC, can infer from this a "divergence" within revolutionary Social-Democracy. We must criticise the mistakes of the German leaders fearlessly and openly if we wish to be true to the spirit of Marx and help the Russian socialists to be equal to the present-day tasks of the workers' movement. Bebel was undoubtedly mistaken at Essen as well when he defended Noske, when he upheld the division of wars into defensive and offensive, when he attacked the *method* of struggle of the "radicals" against Van Kol, when he denied (with Singer) the failure and fallacy of the German delegation's tactics at Stuttgart. We should not conceal these mistakes, but should use them as an example to teach the Russian Social-Democrats how to avoid them and live up to the more rigorous requirements of revolutionary Marxism. And let not the Russian anarchist and syndicalist small fry, the liberals, and S.R.'s crow over our criticism of Bebel. We shall tell these gentlemen: "Eagles sometimes fly lower than hens, but hens can never fly as high as eagles!"

A little over two years ago Mr. Struve, who at that time defended the revolution, wrote about the necessity of open revolutionary action and maintained that the revolution must assume power—this Mr. Struve wrote in *Osvobozhdeniye*,[85] No. 71 (published abroad): "In comparison with the revolutionism of Mr. Lenin and his associates the revolutionism of the West-European Social-Democracy of

Bebel, and even of Kautsky, is opportunism". I answered Mr. Struve at the time: "When and where did I ever claim to have created any sort of special trend in international Social-Democracy not identical with the trend of Bebel and Kautsky?" (*Two Tactics*, p. 50 of the Russian edition).*

In the summer of 1907 in a pamphlet on the question of boycott of the Third Duma, I had to point out that it would be basically wrong to identify Bolshevism with boycottism or boyevism.

Now, on the question of the trade unions, equally strong emphasis should be placed on the fact that Bolshevism applies the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy in all fields of struggle, in all spheres of activity. What distinguishes Bolshevism from Menshevism is not that the former "repudiates" work in the trade unions or the co-operative societies, etc., but that the former *takes a different line* in the work of propaganda, agitation, and organisation of the working class. Today activity in the trade unions undoubtedly assumes tremendous importance. In contrast to the neutralism of the Mensheviks we must conduct this activity on the lines of closer alignment of the unions with the Party, of the development of socialist consciousness and an understanding of the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat. In Western Europe revolutionary syndicalism in many countries was a direct and inevitable result of opportunism, reformism, and parliamentary cretinism. In our country, too, the first steps of "Duma activity" increased opportunism to a tremendous extent and reduced the Mensheviks to servility before the Cadets. Plekhanov, for example, in his everyday political work, virtually *merged* with the Prokopovich and Kuskova gentry. In 1900, he denounced them for Bernsteinism, for contemplating only the "posterior" of the Russian proletariat (*Vademecum* for the editorial staff of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, Geneva, 1900). In 1906-07, the first ballot papers threw Plekhanov into the arms of these gentlemen, who are now contemplating the "posterior" of Russian liberalism. Syndicalism cannot help developing on Russian soil as a reaction against this shameful conduct of "distinguished" Social-Democrats.

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* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 66.—*Ed.*

Comrade Voinov, therefore, is quite correct in taking the line of calling upon the Russian Social-Democrats to learn *from* the example of opportunism and *from* the example of syndicalism. Revolutionary work in the trade unions, shifting the emphasis from parliamentary trickery to the education of the proletariat, to rallying the purely class organisations, to the struggle outside parliament, to ability to use (and to prepare the masses for the possibility of successfully using) the general strike, as well as the "December forms of struggle",[86] in the Russian revolution—all this comes very strongly into prominence as the task of the Bolshevik trend. And the experience of the Russian revolution immensely facilitates this task for us, provides a wealth of practical guidance and historical data making it possible to appraise in the most concrete way the new methods of struggle, the mass strike, and the use of direct force. These methods of struggle are least of all "new" to the Russian Bolsheviks, the Russian proletariat. They are "new" to the opportunists, who are doing their utmost to erase from the minds of the workers in the West the memory of the Commune, and from the minds of the workers in Russia the memory of December 1905. To strengthen these memories, to make a scientific study of that great experience,* to spread its lessons among the masses and the realisation of its inevitable repetition on a new scale—this task of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Russia opens up before us prospects infinitely richer than the one-sided "anti-opportunism" and "anti-parliamentarism" of the syndicalists.

Against syndicalism, as a special trend, Comrade Voinov levels four accusations (p. 19 onwards of his pamphlet), which show up its falsity with striking clearness: (1) the

* It is natural that the Cadets should be eagerly studying the history of the two Dumas. It is natural that they should regard the platitudes and betrayals of Rodichev-Kutlerov liberalism as gems of creation. It is natural that they should falsify history by drawing a veil of silence over their negotiations with the reaction, etc. It is unnatural for the Social-Democrats not to eagerly study October-December 1905, if only because each day of that period meant a hundred times more to the destinies of all the peoples of Russia and the working class in particular than Rodichev's "loyal" phrases in the Duma.

"anarchistic looseness of the organisation"; (2) keeping the workers keyed up instead of creating a firm "stronghold of class organisation"; (3) the petty-bourgeois-individualistic features of its ideal and of the Proudhon theory; (4) a stupid "aversion to politics".

There are here not a few points of resemblance to the old "Economism" among the Russian Social-Democrats. Hence I am not so optimistic as Comrade Voinov in regard to a "reconciliation" with revolutionary Social-Democracy on the part of those Economists who have gone over to syndicalism. I also think that Comrade Voinov's proposals for a "General Labour Council as a superarbiter, with the participation in it of Socialist-Revolutionaries, are quite unpractical. This is mixing up the "music of the future" with the organisational forms of the present. But I am not in the least afraid of Comrade Voinov's perspective, namely: "subordination of political organisations to a class social organisation" ... "*only when* [I am still quoting Comrade Voinov, stressing the important words] ... *all trade-unionists will have become socialists*". The class instinct of the proletarian mass has *already* begun to be manifested in Russia with full force. This class instinct already provides tremendous guarantees both against the petty-bourgeois woolliness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and against the Mensheviks' servility to the Cadets. We can already boldly assert that the mass *workers*' organisation in Russia (if it were to be created and in so far as it is for a minute created, if only by elections, strikes, demonstrations, etc.) is *sure* to be closer to Bolshevism, to revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Comrade Voinov rightly regards the "labour congress" adventure as a "frivolous" affair. We shall work hard in the trade unions, we shall work in all fields to spread the revolutionary theory of Marxism among the proletariat and to build up a "stronghold" of *class* organisation. The rest will come of itself.

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE "CRITICS OF MARX"[87]

Written in the autumn of 1907

First published in 1908;
Chapters X-XI in the miscellany: Vl. Ilyin,
The Agrarian Question, Part I,
St. Petersburg,
and Chapter XII
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X

THE "WORK" OF THE GERMAN BULGAKOV, E. DAVID

Ed. David's book, *Socialism and Agriculture*, is an exceptionally clumsy and cumbrous summary of all the erroneous methods and arguments which we have seen in the works of Bulgakov, Hertz, and Chernov. We could, therefore, completely ignore David; but since his "work" is undoubtedly at the present time the principal work of revisionism on the agrarian question, we think it necessary once again to show how the revisionist fraternity write learned treatises.

To the question of machinery in agriculture David devotes the whole of Chapter IV of his book (pp. 115-93 of the Russian translation), apart from numerous references to the same subject in other chapters. The politico-economic essence of the matter is completely submerged in hundreds of *technicalities* which the author examines in minute detail. Machinery does not play the same role in agriculture as in industry; in agriculture there is no central motor; most of the machines are only temporarily employed; some machines make no saving in production costs, and so on and so forth. David regards such conclusions (see pp. 190-93, the question of machinery summed up) as a refutation of Marxist theory! But this merely obscures the question instead of clarifying it. That agriculture is backward compared with manufacturing industry is not open to the slightest doubt. This backwardness requires no proof. By examining, point by point, the various ways in which that backwardness is displayed, by piling example upon example and case upon case, David merely pushes into the background the actual subject of the research, namely: is the use

of machines of a capitalist character? Is the increased use of machines due to the growth of capitalist agriculture?

David utterly fails to understand how the question should be presented by a Marxist. David's standpoint is essentially that of the petty bourgeois, who consoles himself with the relatively slow progress of capitalism and is afraid to look at social evolution as a whole. Thus, on the question of agricultural machinery, David quotes Bensing, quotes him innumerable times[88] (pp. 125, 135, 180, 182, 184, 186, 189, 506, and others of the Russian translation). David can positively be said to exasperate the reader by passing from detail to detail without sifting his material, without coherence, without a reasoned presentation of the question, without aim. Consequently, David provides no *summing up* of Bensing's conclusions. What I said in 1901 in opposition to Mr. Bulgakov fully applies to David.* First, a summary of Bensing's conclusions shows the indisputable advantage which farms using machines have over those that do not use them. None of the "corrections" to Bensing in minor details, with which David has stuffed his book, can alter this conclusion. *David passes over this general conclusion in silence* in exactly *the same way as Mr. Bulgakov did!* Secondly, while quoting Bensing without end, without reason, without coherence, David, like Mr. Bulgakov, *failed to note* Bensing's bourgeois views concerning machinery in both industry and agriculture. In short, David does not even understand the socio-economic aspect of the question. He is unable to generalise and connect the factual data showing the superiority of large-scale over small-scale production. As a result, nothing remains but the reactionary lamentations of the petty bourgeois who places his hopes in technical backwardness, in the slow development of capitalism. In the matter of theory, the Right-wing Cadet and "Christian" renegade Mr. Bulgakov is quite on a level with the opportunist Social-Democrat David.

David fails, hopelessly fails to understand the socio-economic aspect of other questions as well. Take his fundamental thesis, his pet idea, the "kingpin" of the whole

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 133-34.—*Ed.*

work: the viability of *small-scale production* in agriculture and its superiority to large-scale production. Ask David: What is small-scale production?

On page 29, footnote, you will find a neat answer: "Wherever we refer to *small-scale production* we mean the economic category which functions without regular outside assistance and without an auxiliary occupation." Though clumsily expressed and poorly translated by Mr. Grossman, this is more or less clear. After that we have a right to expect David to outline the conditions of small-scale (*in area*) farming *from the standpoint* of the employment of hired labour, or the sale of the latter by the farmer.

Nothing of the kind.

Nothing brings out David's bourgeois nature so strongly as his complete disregard of the question of the employment of hired labour by "small" farmers and of the conversion of the latter into wage-labourers. Complete disregard—that is literally true. Statistical data on this are to be found in German statistics; Kautsky quotes them briefly in his *Agrarian Question* (I have quoted them in detail*). David knows those statistics, but he does not analyse them. He gives a mass of references to separate monographs, but *completely ignores* the data they contain on this question. In short, this is a case of a petty bourgeois completely *passing over in silence* the question of the "farm-hands" employed by the thrifty muzhik.

Here are examples:

On page 109 we read: "On the whole, in market gardening as in agriculture, small-scale production flourishes."

You look for proof. *All* you are given is the following:

"According to the industrial statistics** for 1895, out of 32,540 orchards and vegetable gardens 13,247=40 per cent were of an area less than 20 ares; 8,257=25 per cent ranged from 20 to 50 ares; 5,707=14 per cent from 50 ares to one hectare; 3,397=10 per cent ranged in area from 1

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 194-95.—*Ed.*

** Evidently, this is the way Mr. Grossman, the editor of the translation, translated the word *Betriebsstatistik*. That's the trouble with Russian translations! It should have been translated: "statistics of agricultural enterprises".

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to 2 hectares, and only 1,932=6 per cent occupied an area of 2 hectares and over."

That is all. And this is supposed to prove that small-scale production is flourishing in market gardening. This is supposed to be a scientific work by a man well versed in agronomics. If it is, then we do not know what charlatanry in science is.

Only 6 per cent have an area of 2 hectares and over, says David. In the very same statistics from which he takes those figures there are figures showing the *amount of land* which these 6 per cent occupy. *David ignores those figures*. He ignores them because they demolish his theory. "But more than half of this area (51.39 per cent)," I wrote concerning those very figures,* "is concentrated in the hands of 1,932 proprietors, or 5.94 per cent of all the market gardeners." Of these 1,932 market gardeners 1,441 have vegetable gardens ranging from two to five hectares, making an average of 2.76 hectares per farm and *total land* amounting to an average of 109.6 hectares per farm; 491 farmers have vegetable gardens of five hectares or more, making an average of 16.54 hectares per farm, and *total land* amounting to an average of 134.7 hectares per farm (ibid.).

Thus, *only* 6 per cent of the market gardeners concentrate in their hands 51.39 per cent of the total market garden land. They are big capitalists for whom vegetable gardens are *supplementary* to capitalist agriculture (farms of 100 to 135 hectares). Consequently, market gardening is enormously concentrated capitalistically. But David has the ... temerity to assert that "small-scale production is flourishing", i.e., production not using hired labour. As to what size farms in market gardening require hired labourers *he gives no information*.

That is how the scholarly David handles statistics. An example of the way in which he handles monographs is provided by Hecht,[89] the same notorious Hecht quoted by Bulgakov, Hertz, and Chernov.** In his "work" David paraphrases Hecht for the space of two pages (pp. 394-95). But *how* does he paraphrase him? *Not a word about hired*

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 215.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 162-67.—*Ed.*

labour. Not a word about the fact that Hecht embellishes the "*settled state*" of the factory worker who has a plot of land, lumping together workers and well-to-do peasants. Not a word about the fact that while a small number of well-to-do peasants are "flourishing", the conditions of the bulk of the peasants are such that they even have to sell their milk and use cheaper margarine as a substitute.

David not only says nothing about this; he even declares that "Hecht quotes extremely interesting data on the high living standards of these peasants" (p. 395). A grosser example of bourgeois apologetics is difficult to imagine.

Incidentally, about Hecht's statement that the peasants sell their milk in order to buy cheaper margarine. One would think that this is a generally known fact among economists. As far back as 1847, Marx in *The Poverty of Philosophy* referred to the deterioration of the people's diet under capitalism.[90] In Russia, ever since the time of Engelhardt[91] (the 1870s), this fact has been noted very many times by all who have made a more or less conscientious study of the progress of capitalism in dairy farming. The "scholarly" David failed to notice this. He even sneers when socialists point to it.

On pages 427-28 of David's book we read scoffing remarks about Kautsky, who says that the amalgamated dairies, which promote the sale of milk by the peasants, cause a deterioration in the latter's diet. To enable the reader to judge the German Narodnik David at his true worth we shall quote his own words:

> "...All other people are in the habit, when receiving a larger income, of using some part of it for the benefit of their stomachs. It is only human nature that a man should want to eat something better, if only he has a little money to enable him to do so. It is, therefore, very strange that the peasant who, as is generally admitted, is getting more money than before for his milk and pigs, thanks to the co-operative, should behave differently from other mortals," and so on and so forth.

This buffoonery of a reactionary petty bourgeois is not worth answering, of course. It is sufficient to exhibit him to the reading public; it is sufficient to drag him into the light of day from under the heap of disconnected agronomic quotations scattered through five hundred and fifty pages.

It is sufficient to note that even the bourgeois apologist Hecht, *quoted by David*, admits *as a fact* the deterioration in diet as a consequence of the substitution of cheap margarine for marketed milk. This applies to South Germany, the region where small-peasant farming predominates. Concerning another region, East Prussia, we have the very similar statement of Klawki* that the small peasants "consume very little butter and whole milk".

David's bourgeois apologetics can be traced in absolutely all the questions he deals with. Thus, he extols the dairy co-operatives of Germany and Denmark in over a score of pages (413-35 and others). He also quotes statistics ... but only on the numerical growth of the co-operatives! He *does not quote* the German statistics showing the concentration of "co-operative" dairy farming in the hands of big capitalist farms.** The Davids have a blind eye for such data in the statistics they handle!

"The Danish peasants organised in co-operatives," says David, "have even excelled the privately owned farms of the big landed proprietors." Then follows an example: a quotation from the 46th Report of a test laboratory to the effect that the butter produced by the co-operatives is of better quality than that manufactured by the landlord. And David continues:

> "Such results have been achieved by peasants who at one time on their small farms, produced only inferior grades of butter for which they obtained only half the price paid for that of the big proprietors. Moreover, *by and large*, *we are dealing here with middle and small peasants* [David's italics]. In 1898, there were in Denmark 179,740 cow-sheds of which only 7,544 or 4 per cent contained 30 or more cows each; 49,371 or 27.82 per cent, each contained from 10 to 29 cows, 122,589 or 68.97 per cent contained less than 10 cows each. More than half of these cow-sheds, namely, 70,218, comprising 39.85 per cent of the total, contained only from 1 to 3 cows each, i.e., they belonged to quite small farms. That the great majority of these small farms belong to co-operative organisations is shown by the fact that in 1900 the milk of approximately 900,000 cows out of Denmark's 1,110,000 milch cows was delivered to dairy co-operatives" (p. 424).

Thus argues the scholarly David. He avoids quoting precise data on the distribution of the cows among the farms

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 176-77.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 216.—*Ed.*

in the various groups; that is distasteful to him, But even the fragmentary figures he does quote show that he completely distorts the reality. By comparing the total number of cows with the distribution of cow-sheds according to the number of cattle in them we get the following picture, which, *though an approximate one*,* undoubtedly, on the whole, corresponds to the reality:

Denmark	Number of farms (thousands)	Number of cows in them (thousands)	Number of cows per farm
Farms with 1 to 3 cows	70	100	1.43
" " 4 to 9 "	52	250	4.81
" " 10 to 29 "	49	550	11.22
" " 30 or more "	8	200	25.00
Total	179	1,100	6.14

From these figures it is seen, first, that the concentration of dairy farming in Denmark is *very high*. 750,000 cows out of 1,100,000, i.e., *over two-thirds of the total*, belong to the *big farms*—57,000 out of 179,000, i.e., less than a third of the total number of farmers. Since each of these farms has ten or more cows, they certainly do not dispense with hired labour. Thus, David "failed to notice" that the size of the farms which keep livestock is by no means small here; Danish farms must not be judged by area of land. David "failed to notice" that here, as everywhere and always in capitalist agriculture, a vast number of

* These figures are approximate, first, because the number of cows is given for 1900, while the number of farms is given for 1898; secondly, because we had to determine the number of cows in each group approximately, since David does not give exact figures. We have put the big farms share lower than it actually is: 7,544 farms have 30 or more cows each. Thus, even if we take the minimum, i.e., 30 cows per farm, we get 7,544 x 30=226,320 cows. We have taken a *smaller* figure, otherwise the size of the small farms would approach too closely to the minimum and not to the maximum limits of the groups.

small farms account for an insignificant share of the total production. The small farmers number 70,000, i.e., nearly 40 per cent; but they own one-eleventh of the total number of cows.

Secondly, the figures quoted show that both in Denmark and in Germany *the benefits of co-operation* are enjoyed *mainly by the capitalists*. If out of 1,100,000 cows the milk of 900,000 is delivered to the dairy co-operatives, it follows that 200,000 cows remain *outside* the "beneficial" scope of co-operative marketing. These are mainly the cows of the smallest farmers, for we have seen from the figures for Germany that of the farms up to two hectares, only 0.3 per cent of the total belong to dairy co-operatives, but of the farms of 100 hectares and over, 35.1 per cent belong to such co-operatives. Consequently, all this leads us to assume that the small farmers (70,000 owning 100,000 cows) least enjoy the benefits of co-operative marketing.

The example of Denmark completely refutes David, since it proves that not the small, and not the medium, but the big farms predominate in the production of dairy produce.

To put some life into these lifeless figures and tables and show the class character of bourgeois agriculture (which the obtuse petty bourgeois David totally ignores) we shall quote an outstanding fact from the history of the working-class movement in Denmark. In 1902, the Danish shipowners reduced the wages of the stokers, who answered by going on strike. The union to which all the dock workers belonged supported the stokers and also ceased work. But ... they were unable to make the strike a general one, to extend it to all the ports of Denmark. "Port Esbjerg [on the west coast of Denmark, important for trade with England], which plays such a great part in the export of Danish agricultural produce, could not be drawn into the strike because the Danish agricultural co-operatives declared that they would immediately send the required number of their members to work on loading the ships, that the Danish peasants would not allow a stoppage in the export of their produce."*

Thus, the Danish co-operatives took the side of the ship-

* Emil Helms, *Die socialdemokratische und gewerkschaftliche Bewegung in Dänemark*, Leipzig, 1907, S. 138.

owners against the workers and made the strike a failure. It is quite understandable, of course, that capitalist farmers, owning ten and more cows each, should support their fellow-capitalists against the workers. What is not understandable is that writers like David, who gloss over the class struggle, call themselves socialists.

On the question of combining farming with technical-crop industries (sugar refining, distilling, etc.) David makes *the very same* mistake as Mr. Bulgakov. Like the Russian professor, the German "learned" opportunist *simply copied* the tables given in the German enquiry, without stopping to think what these tables refer to! Kautsky asserts that sugar production is an example of agricultural *large-scale* industry. To refute this David, like Bulgakov, quotes figures showing that there are more small farms connected with technical-crop industries than big ones (pages 406, 407, and 410 of David's book). The learned statistician forgot that, in general, there are more small farms than big ones. Instead of showing what percentage of the farms in each group is combined with technical industries he copied a table giving the percentage of such farms in each group in relation to the total number of farms. I have already dealt in detail with this mistake made by Mr. Bulgakov.* It only remains for me to point out that the equally scientifically conscientious Ed. David equally failed to take the trouble to glance at the figures *showing what share of the land* under sugar beet is in the hands of capitalists.

What a comical degree of soul affinity exists between the German opportunist and the Russian liberal professor can be seen from the fact that not only do they both handle statistics with the same carelessness and lack of skill, but both quote Marx with the same carelessness. Like Bulgakov David recognises the "law of diminishing returns". True, he tries to expound it with special limitations, to surround it with special conditions, but that does not improve matters in the least. For example, on page 476, David says that "this law does not at all concern the change of productivity in the transition from one scientific-technical stage

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 209-10.—*Ed.*

of agriculture to another. It concerns exclusively the change of productivity at one and the same scientific-technical stage." This is exactly the *limitation* of the notorious law that I mentioned when opposing Mr. Bulgakov,* and I at once added that this makes the "law" "so relative that it *cannot be called* a law, *or even a cardinal specific feature of agriculture*".

Nevertheless, David continues to elevate this law to a specific feature of agriculture. The result is a hopeless muddle, for if "scientific-technical" conditions remain unchanged, additional investments of capital are extremely restricted in industry too.

"The backwardness of agriculture," says David in the concluding chapter, "is due, in the first place, to the *conservatism of organic nature*, which finds expression in the law of diminishing returns" (501). This conclusion throws overboard the very thesis that has just been put forward, namely, that the "law" does not apply to transitions to a higher technical stage! "The conservatism of organic nature" is simply a verbal subterfuge of reactionary philistinism which is incapable of understanding the *social* conditions that hinder particularly the development of agriculture. David shows that he does not understand that among those *social* conditions are, first, the survivals of feudalism in agriculture, the inequality of rights of agricultural labourers, and so on and so forth; and secondly, *ground rent*, which inflates prices and *embodies* high rents in the *price of land*.

"We think," writes David, "that German agriculture today could not produce the total quantity of grain required ... at the level of productivity which, thanks to overseas production, is considered normal from the standpoint of world economy. The law of diminishing returns does not permit an unlimited increase in the quantity of products on a limited area of land without a diminution in productivity" (519)—the last sentence is in italics in David's book.

Take a look, if you please, at this economist! He declares that the "law" of diminishing returns deals *exclusively* with

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 108-09.—*Ed.*

the change of productivity at one and the same scientific-technical stage (476). Yet he draws the conclusion: "the law does not permit an 'unlimited' increase in the quantity of products!" (519). Why, then, does it follow that German agriculture *could not be raised* to the next "scientific-technical stage" if this were not prevented by the private ownership of the land, by inflated rent, by the lack of rights, the downtrodden state, and degradation of the agricultural labourer, by the barbarous medieval privileges of the Junkers?

The bourgeois apologist naturally tries to ignore the social and historical causes of the backwardness of agriculture and throws the blame on the "conservatism of organic nature" and on the "law of diminishing returns". That notorious law contains nothing but apologetics and obtuseness.

To cover up his shameful retreat to the old prejudices of bourgeois political economy David, exactly like Bulgakov, presents us with a falsified quotation from Marx. David quotes *the same page* of Volume III of *Capital* (III. B., II. Teil, S. 277) which Mr. Bulgakov quotes! (See page 481 of David's book and our previous criticism of Mr. Bulgakov.*)

What I have said about the *scientific conscientiousness* of Mr. Bulgakov applies *wholly* to David as well. Mr. Bulgakov garbled a passage from Marx. David confined himself to quoting the first words of the same passage: "Concerning decreasing productiveness of the soil with successive investments of capital, see Liebig" (*Das Kapital*, III. B., II. Teil, S. 277)[92] Like Bulgakov, David distorted Marx, making it appear to the reader that this is the only reference by Marx. Actually, we repeat, anyone who has read Volume III of *Capital* (and the second part of Volume II of *Theorien über den Mehrwert*[93]) knows that the opposite is the case. Marx points out *dozens of times* that he regards cases of *diminished* productivity of additional investments of capital as being quite as legitimate and quite as possible as cases of *increased* productivity of additional investments of capital.

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 116-19.—*Ed.*

In a footnote on page 481 David promises in the future to examine the connection between this law and rent, and also "to examine critically Marx's attempt to develop and extend the theory of rent, while rejecting the basis given by Malthus and Ricardo".

We venture to predict that David's critical examination will be a repetition of bourgeois prejudices *à la* Mr. Bulgakov, or ... *à la* Comrade Maslov.

Let us now examine another radically erroneous thesis of David's. To refute his apologetics or his distortion of statistics is a very thankless task. On the question we are now about to deal with we have some new data which enable us to contrast a *factual* picture of reality with the theories of present-day philistinism.

XI

LIVESTOCK IN SMALL AND LARGE FARMS

The "critics" or Bernsteinians in the agrarian question, when defending small-scale production, very often refer to the following circumstance. Small farmers keep far more cattle on a given unit of land than big farmers. Consequently, they say, the small farmers manure their land better. Their farms are on a technically higher level, for manure plays a decisive role in modern agriculture, and the manure obtained from cattle kept on the farm is far superior to any artificial fertilisers.

Ed. David in his book *Socialism and Agriculture* attaches decisive significance to this argument (pp. 326, 526, and 527 of the Russian translation). He writes in italics: "manure is the soul of agriculture" (p. 308), and makes this truism the main basis of his defence of small-scale farming. He quotes German statistics showing that the small farms keep far more cattle per unit of land than the big ones. David is convinced that these figures definitely decide in his favour the question of the advantages of large-scale or small-scale production in agriculture.

Let us examine this theory and the manurial soul of agriculture more closely.

The main argument advanced by David and his numerous adherents among the bourgeois economists is a statistical one. They compare the number of cattle (per unit of land) on different-sized farms, it being tacitly assumed that identical quantities are compared, i.e., that an equal number of cattle of a particular kind represents an equal agricultural value, so to speak, on both big and small farms. It is assumed that an equal number of cattle provides an equal quantity of manure, that the cattle on big and small farms have more or less the same qualities, and so forth.

Obviously, the cogency of the argument in question depends entirely upon whether this usually tacit assumption is correct. Is this postulate correct? If we pass from the bare and rough, indiscriminate statistics to an analysis of the socio-economic conditions of small-scale and large-scale agricultural production as a whole we shall find at once that that postulate takes for granted the very thing that has still to be proved. Marxism affirms that the conditions under which cattle are kept (and also, as we have seen, the tending of the land and the conditions of the agricultural worker) are *worse* in small-scale than in large-scale farming. Bourgeois political economy asserts the opposite, and the Bernsteinians repeat this assertion, namely, that thanks to the *diligence* of the small farmer, cattle are kept under far better conditions on a small farm than on a big one. To find data which would throw light on *this* question requires quite different statistics from those with which David operates. It requires a statistical study not of the number of cattle on different-sized farms, but of their quality. Such a study exists in German economic literature, and perhaps more than one. It is highly characteristic that David, who filled his book with a mass of irrelevant quotations from all kinds of works on agronomics, completely ignored the attempts to be found in the literature to reveal the internal conditions of small-scale and large-scale farming by means of detailed research. We shall acquaint the reader with one of those researches undeservedly ignored by David.

Drechsler, a well-known German writer on agricultural questions, published the results of a monographic "agricul-

tural statistical investigation", which, he rightly said, "for the accuracy of its results is surely without equal". In the Province of Hanover, 25 settlements were investigated (22 villages and three landlord estates), and data showing not only the amount of land and number of cattle, *but also the quality of the cattle* were collected separately for each farm. To determine the quality of the cattle a particularly accurate method was adopted: the *live weight** of each animal was ascertained in kilogrammes "on the basis of the most careful possible appraisal of the individual animals—an appraisal made by experts". Data were obtained giving the live weight of each type of animal on different-sized farms. The investigation was carried out twice: the first in 1875, the second in 1884. The figures were published by Drechsler** in rough form for each of three estates and for three groups of villages, the peasant farms in the villages being divided into seven groups according to the amount of land (over 50 hectares; 25 to 53; 12.5 to 25; 7.5 to 12.5; 2.5 to 7.5; 1.25 to 2.5, and up to 1.25 hectares). Considering that Drechsler's figures relate to eleven different types of animals, the reader will realise how complicated all these tables are. To obtain summarised figures which will enable us to draw general and basic conclusions, we shall divide *all* the farms into *five* main groups: (a) big estates; (b) peasant farms having over 25 hectares of lands; (c) 7.5 to 25 hectares; (d) 2.5 to 7.5 hectares; and (e) less than 2.5 hectares.

The number of farms in these groups and the amount of land in them in 1875 and in 1884 were as follows:

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* David is well aware of this method, employed by agronomists, of ascertaining the live weight of animals. On page 367 he tells us in detail the live weight of *different breeds* of beef and dairy cattle, draught animals, etc. He copies these data from the agronomists. It never occurs to him that what matters to an economist in general, and to a socialist in particular, is not the difference in the breeds of cattle, but the difference *in the conditions under which they are kept* in small and large farms, in "peasant" and in capitalist farming.

** For 1875 in *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, Band XXIV, S. 112 ("Bäuerliche Zustände", B. III), and for 1884 in *Thiel's landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*, Band XV (1886).

	1875			1884		
	Number of farms	Amount of land	Land per farm	Number of farms	Amount of land	Land per farm
	(Hectares)					
(a) Estates	3	689	229	3	766	255
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	51	1,949	38	58	2,449	42
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	274	3,540	13	248	3,135	12
(d) " 5.5 to 7.5 "	442	1,895	4.3	407	1,774	4.3
(e) " up to 2.5 "	1,449	1,279	0.88	1,109	1,027	0.9
Total	2,219	9,352	4.2	1,825	9,151	5.0

To explain these figures we shall deal first of all with the economic types of the different-sized farms. Drechsler considers that all the farms of 7.5 hectares and over employ hired labour. Thus, we get (in 1875) 325 peasant farms employing workers. All the farmers having up to 2.5 hectares have to hire themselves out. Of the farmers having 2.5 to 7.5 hectares (average=4.3 ha) half, according to Drechsler's calculations, do not employ labour, while the other half have to provide hired labourers. Thus, of the total peasant farms, 325 are capitalist farms, 221 are small "Trudovik" farms (as our Narodniks would call them) which do not employ labour nor provide hired labourers, and 1,670 are semi-proletarian, which provide hired labourers.

Unfortunately, Drechsler's grouping differs from that of the general German statistics, which regard as middle peasants those having from 5 to 20 hectares. Nevertheless, it remains an undoubted fact that the majority of these middle peasants do not dispense with hired workers. The "middle peasants" in Germany are small capitalists. The peasants who do not hire labour and do not hire themselves out constitute an insignificant minority: 221 out of 2,216, i.e., one-tenth.

Thus, the groups of farms which we have selected according to their economic type are characterised as follows: (a) big capitalist; (b) middle capitalist ("*Grossbauer*"); (c) small capitalist; (d) small peasant; and (e) semi-proletarian.

The total number of farms and the total amount of land they occupied diminished between 1875 and 1884. This decrease mainly applied to the small farms: the number of farms occupying up to 2.5 hectares dropped from 1,449 to 1,109, i.e., by 340, or nearly one-fourth. On the other hand, the number of the biggest farms (over 25 hectares) increased from 54 to 61, and the amount of land they occupied increased from 2,638 to 3,215 hectares, i.e., by 577 hectares. Consequently, the general improvement in farming and the raising of agricultural standards in the given area, about which Drechsler goes into raptures, signify the concentration of agriculture in the hands of a *diminishing* number of owners: "Progress" has pushed out of agriculture nearly 400 farmers out of 2,219 (by 1884 there remained 1,825), and raised the average amount of land per farm among the remainder from 4.2 to 5 hectares. In one locality capitalism concentrates the given branch of agriculture and pushes a number of small farmers into the ranks of the proletariat. In another locality the growth of commercial farming creates a number of new small farms (for example dairy farming in suburban villages and in entire countries which export their produce, such as Denmark). In still other localities the splitting up of the medium farms increases the number of small farms. Indiscriminate statistics conceal all these processes, for the study of which detailed investigations must be made.

The progress of agriculture in the locality described found particular expression in the improvement of livestock rearing, although the total head of livestock diminished. In 1875, there were 7,208 head of livestock (in terms of cattle); in 1884 there were 6,993. Going by the gross statistics, this decrease in the total number of livestock would be a sign of decline in livestock breeding. Actually, there was an improvement in the quality of the stock, so that, if we take not the number of animals, but their total "live weight", we shall get 2,556,872 kilogrammes in 1875 and 2,696,107 kilogrammes in 1884.

Capitalist progress in livestock rearing shows itself not only, sometimes even not so much, in an increase in numbers as in an improvement in quality, in the replacement of inferior by better cattle, increase in fodder, etc.

Average Number of Livestock per Farm

	1875			1884		
	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total
	(In terms of cattle)					
(a) Estates	150	69	174	110	41	151
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	13.2	11.0	24.2	13.7	10.5	24.2
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	5.4	3.8	9.2	4.9	4.2	9.1
(d) " 5.5 to 7.5 "	2.2	1.4	3.6	2.2	1.8	4.0
(e) " up to 2.5 "	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.4	0.7	1.1
Total	1.7	1.5	3.2	2.0	1.8	3.8

On the biggest farms the number of cattle diminished. In the smallest the number grew, and the smaller the farm the more rapid was the increase. This seems to show progress in small-scale and regression in large-scale production, that is, confirmation of David's theory, does it not?

But we have only to take the figures of the *average weight* of the cattle for this illusion to be dispelled.

	Average weight per animal (kilogrammes)					
	1875			1884		
	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total
(a) Estates	562	499	537	617	624	619
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	439	300	376	486	349	427
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	409	281	356	432	322	382
(d) " 5.5 to 7.5 "	379	270	337	404	287	352
(e) " up to 2.5 "	350	243	280	373	261	301
Average	412	256	354	446	316	385

* The various other types of livestock are expressed in terms of cattle according to the usual standards. For one year, and for one of the eleven types of animals, the number given is approximate: the figures refer only to weight, not to the number of cattle.

The first conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that the bigger the farm the better the quality of the cattle. The difference in this respect between the capitalist farms and the small-peasant, or semi-proletarian, farms is enormous. For example, in 1884, this difference between the biggest and smallest farms was over *one hundred per cent*: the average weight of the average animal on the big capitalist farms was 619 kilogrammes; on the semi-proletarian farms it was 301 kilogrammes, i.e., less than half! One can judge from this how superficial are the arguments of David and those who think like him when they assume that the quality of the cattle is the same on large and small farms.

We have already mentioned above that cattle are generally kept worse in small farms. Now we have factual confirmation of this. The figures for live weight give us a very accurate idea of *all* the conditions under which the cattle are kept: feeding, housing, work, care—all this is summarised, so to speak, in the results which found statistical expression in Drechsler's monograph. It turns out that for all the "diligence" displayed by the small farmer in care for his cattle—a diligence extolled by our Mr. V. V.[94] and by the German David—he is unable even approximately to match the advantages of large-scale production, which yields products of a quality twice as good. Capitalism condemns the small peasant to eternal drudgery, to a wasteful expenditure of labour, for with insufficient means, insufficient fodder, poor quality cattle, poor housing, and so forth, the most careful tending is a sheer waste of labour. In its appraisal bourgeois political economy puts in the forefront not this ruin and oppression of the peasant by capitalism, but the "diligence" of the toiler (toiling for the *benefit of capital* under the worst conditions of exploitation).

The second conclusion to be drawn from the figures quoted above is that the quality of cattle improved during the ten years both on the average and in all the categories of farms. But as a result of this general improvement, the difference in the conditions of livestock rearing in the large and small farms became not less, but *more* glaring. The general improvement widened rather than narrowed the gulf between the large and small farms, for in this process

of improvement large-scale farming outstrips small-scale farming. Here is a comparison of the average weight of the average animal by groups in 1875 and in 1884.

	Average weight of average animal in kilogrammes		Increase	Per cent increase
	1875	1884		
(a) Estates	537	619	+82	+15.2
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	376	427	+51	+13.6
(c) " " 7.5 to 25 ha	356	382	+26	+7.3
(d) " " 5.5 to 7.5 "	337	352	+15	+4.4
(e) " " up to 2.5 "	280	301	+21	+7.5
Average	354	385	+31	+8.7

The improvement is greatest on the big capitalist farms, then come the medium-sized capitalist farms; it is entirely negligible on the small peasant farms and very inconsiderable in the rest. Like the great majority of agronomists who write on problems of agricultural economics, Drechsler noted only the technical aspect of the matter. In the fifth conclusion he draws from the comparison between 1875 and 1884 he says: "A very considerable improvement in the keeping of livestock* has taken place: a reduction in the number of cattle and an improvement in quality; the average live weight per animal increased considerably in each of the three groups of villages.** That shows that the marked improvement in cattle rearing, feeding, and tending of cattle was *more or less general* (*ziemlich allgemein*)."

* Drechsler speaks here of all cattle except draught animals (called *Nutzvieh*). Further we quote figures on draught animals separately. The general conclusion remains the same whatever type or type groups of animals we take.

** Drechsler divides the 22 villages into three groups according to geographical location and other farming conditions. We have taken only the summarised data in order not to overburden this article with figures. The conclusions remain the same whatever groups of villages we take.

The words "more or less general", which we have underlined, show precisely that the author ignored the socio-economic aspect of the question; "more" applies to the big farms, "less" to the small ones. Drechsler overlooked this, because he paid attention only to the figures concerning the groups of villages and not groups of farms of different types.

Let us now pass to the figures on draught animals, which throw light on farming conditions in the narrow sense of the term "agriculture". In regard to the number of draught animals the farms under review are characterised by the following figures:

	Average number of draught animals per farm	
	1875	1884
(a) Estates	27	44
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	4.7	5.5
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	2.1	2.4
(d) " 5.5 to 7.5 "	1.3	1.5
(e) " up to 2.5 "	0.07	0.16
Average	0.7	1.0

Thus, the overwhelming majority of the semi-proletarian farms (up to 2.5 hectares; in 1884, they numbered 1,109 out of 1,825) had no draught animals at all. They cannot even be regarded as agricultural farms in the real sense of the term. In any case, as regards the use of draught animals, there can be no comparison between the big farms and those farms of which 93 or 84 per cent employ no draught animals at all. If, however, we compare the big capitalist farms with the small peasant farms in this respect, we shall find that the former (group a) have 132 draught animals to 766 hectares of land, and the latter (group d) 632 to 1,774 hectares (1884), i.e., the former has one draught animal to approximately *six* hectares, and the latter one to approximately *three* hectares. Obviously, the small farms spend twice as

much on the keeping of draught animals. Small-scale production implies dispersion of the technical means of farming and a squandering of labour as a result of this dispersion.

This dispersion is partly due to the fact that the small farmers are obliged to use draught animals of an *inferior quality*, that is, to use cows as draught animals. The percentage of cows in relation to the total number of *draught* animals was as follows:

	1875	1884
(a) Estates	—	—
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	—	2.5%
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	6.3%	11.4%
(d) " 5.5 to 7.5 "	60.7%	64.9%
(e) " up to 2.5 "	67.7%	77.9%
Average	27.0%	33.4%

From this it is clearly evident that the use of cows in field work is increasing, and that cows are the principal draught animals on the semi-proletarian and small-peasant farms. David is inclined to regard this as progress in exactly the same way as Drechsler, who takes entirely the bourgeois standpoint. In his conclusions Drechsler writes: "A large number of the small farms have gone over to the use of cows as draught animals, which is *more expedient for them*." It is "more expedient" for the small farmers because it is *cheaper*. And it is cheaper because inferior draught animals are substituted for better ones. The progress of the small peasants which rouses the admiration of the Drechslers and Davids is quite on a par with the progress of the vanishing hand weavers, who are going over to worse and worse materials, waste products of the mills.

The average weight of draught cows in 1884 was 381 kilogrammes,* that of draught horses being 482 kilogrammes,

* The average weight of cows not employed for field work was 421 kilogrammes.

and oxen 553 kilogrammes. The latter type of draught animal, the strongest, accounted in 1884 for more than half of the total draught animals of the big capitalist farmers, for about a fourth of those of the medium and small capitalists, for less than a fifth of those of the small peasants, and for less than a tenth of those of the semi-proletarian farmers. Consequently, the bigger the farm the higher the quality of the draught animals. The average weight of an average draught animal was as follows:

	1875	1884
(a) Estates	554	598
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	542	537
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	488	482
(d) " 5.5 to 7.5 "	404	409
(e) " up to 2.5 "	377	378
Average	464	460

Consequently, on the whole, the draught animals have *deteriorated*. Actually, in the large capitalist farms we see a considerable improvement; in all the others there was either no change, or a deterioration. As regards the quality of draught animals, the difference between large-scale and small-scale production also *increased* between 1875 and 1884. The use of cows as draught animals by the small farmers has become general practice in Germany.* Our figures show with documentary accuracy that this practice denotes a deterioration of the conditions of agricultural production, the increasing poverty of the peasantry.

To complete our survey of the data in Drechsler's monograph, we shall quote an estimate of the number and weight of all animals per unit of land area, i.e., the estimate which

* Concerning this see above, Chapter VIII, "General Statistics of German Agriculture". (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 194-205. —*Ed.*)

David made on the basis of the general statistics of German agriculture:

	Per hectare of land there were			
	Total number of livestock (in terms of cattle)		Weight of total livestock in kilogrammes	
	1875	1884	1875	1884
(a) Estates	0.77	0.59	408	367
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	0.63	0.57	238	244
(c) " " 7.5 to 25 ha	0.71	0.72	254	277
(d) " " 5.5 to 7.5 "	0.85	0.94	288	328
(e) " " up to 2.5 "	1.02	1.18	286	355
Average	0.77	0.76	273	294

The figures of the number of livestock per hectare of land are the figures to which David confines himself. In our example, as in German agriculture as a whole, these figures show a *reduction* in the number of livestock per unit of land area in the big farms. In 1884, for example, the semi-proletarian farms had exactly twice as many cattle per hectare as the big capitalist farms (1.18 as against 0.59). But we are already aware that this estimate seeks to compare the incomparable. The actual relationship between the farms is shown by the figures for weight of livestock: in this respect, too, large-scale production is in a better position than small-scale, for it has the *maximum* of livestock in weight per unit of land area, and consequently, also the *maximum* of manure. Thus, David's conclusion that, on the whole, the small farms are better supplied with manure is the very opposite of the truth. Moreover, it must be borne in mind, first, that our figures do not cover artificial fertilisers, which only well-to-do farmers can afford to buy; and secondly, that comparing the amount of livestock by weight puts cattle and smaller animals on the same level, for example, 45,625 kilogrammes—the weight of 68 head of cattle in the big farms and 45,097 kilogrammes—the weight of 1,786 *goats* in the small farms (1884). Actually,

the advantage the big farms enjoy as regards supplies of manure is greater than that shown in our figures.*

Summary: by means of the phrase "manure is the soul of agriculture", David evaded socio-economic relations in livestock farming in particular and presented the matter in an utterly false light.

Large-scale production in capitalist agriculture has a tremendous advantage over small-scale production as regards the quality of livestock in general, and of draught animals in particular, as regards the conditions under which the livestock is kept, its improvement, and its utilisation for providing manure.

XII

THE "IDEAL COUNTRY" FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE OPPONENTS OF MARXISM ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION**

Agrarian relations and the agrarian system in Denmark are especially interesting for the economist. We have already seen*** that Ed. David, the principal representative of revisionism in contemporary literature on the agrarian question, strongly stresses the example of the Danish agricultural unions and Danish (supposedly) "small peasant" farming. Heinrich Pudor, whose work Ed. David uses, calls Denmark "the ideal country of agricultural co-operation".**** In Russia, too, the exponents of liberal and Na-

* Let us recall the statement made by Klawki, quoted above (Chapter VI) (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 171.—*Ed.*). "The small farmers have inferior manure, their straw is shorter, it is largely used as fodder (which also means that the feed is inferior), and less straw is used for bedding."

** This article is a chapter (XII) of the author's book *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* included in his recently published book *The Agrarian Question*, Part I (St. Petersburg, 1908). Only accidental delay in delivering this chapter prevented it from being included in the above-mentioned book. Hence, all the references given in the portion now published are to that book.

*** Vl. Ilyin, *The Agrarian Question*, Part 1, article "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", Chapters X and XI. (See pp. 171-194 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

**** Dr. Heinrich Pudor, *Das landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaftwesen im Auslande*, I. B. S. V, Leipzig, 1904. Pudor is a violent opponent of Marxism.

rodnik views no less frequently resort to Denmark as their "trump card" against Marxism in support of the theory of the vitality of small-scale production in agriculture—take, for example, the speech of the liberal Hertzenstein in the First Duma and that of the Narodnik Karavayev in the Second Duma.

Compared with other European countries, "small-peasant" farming is indeed most widespread in Denmark; and agriculture, which has managed to adapt itself to the new requirements and conditions of the market, is most prosperous there. If "prosperity" is possible for small-scale farming in countries with commodity production, then, of course, of all European countries, Denmark is most favourably situated in that respect. A close study of the agrarian system in Denmark is, therefore, doubly interesting. We shall see from the example of a whole country what methods are employed by the revisionists in the agrarian question, and what the main features of the capitalist agrarian system really are in the "ideal" capitalist country.

Denmark's agricultural statistics are compiled on the model of those of other European countries. In some respects, however, they give more detailed information and more elaborate figures, which enable one to study aspects of the question that usually remain in the shade. Let us start with the general data on the distribution of farms by groups according to area. We shall calculate the "hartkorn", the customary measure of land in Denmark, in terms of hectares, counting 10 hectares to one hartkorn, as indicated in the Danish agricultural statistics.*

Danish agricultural statistics give information on the distribution of farms for the years 1873, 1885, and 1895. All the farms are divided into 11 groups, as follows: owning no land; up to 0.3 hectares (to be more precise: up to $^1/_{32}$ of a hartkorn); 0.3 to 2.5 ha; 2.5 to 10 ha; 10 to 20 ha; 20 to 40 ha; 40 to 80 ha; 80 to 120 ha; 120 to 200 ha; 200 to 300 ha; 300 ha and over. To avoid the attention of the reader

* "*Danmarks Statistik. Statistik Aarbog*", 8-*de aargang*, 1903, p. 31, footnote. All the following statistics apply to Denmark proper, without Bornholm.

being excessively dispersed, we shall combine these groups into six larger groups.

The main conclusion to be drawn first of all from these data—one which bourgeois political economists and the revisionists who follow in their footsteps usually lose sight of—is that the bulk of the land in Denmark is owned by farmers engaged in capitalist agriculture. There can be no doubt that not only farmers owning 120 hectares and over run their farms with the aid of hired labour, but also those owning 40 hectares or more. These two higher groups accounted for only 11 per cent of the total number of farms in 1895, but they owned 62 per cent, or more than three-fifths of the total land. The basis of Danish agriculture is large-scale and medium *capitalist* agriculture. All the talk about a "peasant country" and "small-scale farming" is sheer bourgeois apologetics, a distortion of the facts by various titled and untitled ideologists of capital.

It should be mentioned in this connection that in Denmark, as in other European countries where the capitalist system of agriculture is fully established, the share of the higher capitalist groups in the whole national economy changes only slightly in the course of time. In 1873, 13.2 per cent of the capitalist farms occupied 63.9 per cent of all the land; in 1885, 11.5 per cent of the farms occupied 62.3 per cent of the land. This stability of large-scale farming must always be borne in mind when comparing the data for different years; for it is often possible to notice in the literature that the *main* features of the given socio-economic system are glossed over by means of such comparisons concerning changes *in details*.

As in other European countries, the mass of small farms in Denmark account for an insignificant part of the total agricultural production. In 1895, the number of farms with areas of up to 10 hectares accounted for 72.2 per cent of the total number of farms, but they occupied only 11.2 per cent of the land. In the main, this ratio was the same in 1885 and in 1873. Often the small farms belong to semi-proletarians—as we have seen, the German statistics bore this out fully in regard to farms of up to two hectares, and partly also in regard to farms of up to five hectares. Later

	1873				1885				1895			
	Number of farms	Per cent	Hectares	Per cent	Number of farms	Per cent	Hectares	Per cent	Number of farms	Per cent	Hectares	Per cent
Owning no land	31,253	13.3	—	—	35,329	13.6	—	—	32,946	12.4	—	—
Up to 2.5 ha	65,490	27.9	54,340	1.5	82,487	31.8	62,260	1.7	92,656	34.8	63,490	1.8
2.5 to 10 ”	65,672	27.9	333,760	9.1	67,773	26.2	345,060	9.5	66,491	25.0	341,020	9.4
10 to 40 ”	41,671	17.7	928,310	25.5	43,740	16.9	966,850	26.5	44,557	16.8	981,070	26.8
40 to 120 ”	29,288	12.5	1,809,590	49.6	27,938	10.8	1,722,820	47.1	27,301	10.3	1,691,950	46.4
120 ha and over	1,856	0.7	522,410	14.3	1,953	0.7	551,530	15.2	2,031	0.7	568,220	15.6
Total	235,230	100.0	3,648,410	100.0	259,220	100.0	3,648,520	100.0	265,982	100.0	3,645,750	100.0

on, when quoting figures of livestock owned by the farms in the various groups, we shall see that there can be no question of any really independent and more or less stable agriculture as far as the bulk of these notorious representatives of "small-scale farming" are concerned. 47.2 per cent, i.e., nearly half of the farms are proletarian or semi-proletarian (those owning no land and those owning up to 2.5 hectares); 25 per cent, i.e., a further quarter of the farms (2.5 to 10 hectares), belong to needy small peasants—such is the *basis* of the "prosperity" of agricultural capitalism in Denmark. Of course, land area statistics can give us only a general idea in total figures of a country with highly developed commercial livestock farming. As the reader will see, however, the figures of livestock, which we examine in detail below, only *strengthen* the conclusions that have been drawn.

Now let us see what changes took place in Denmark between 1873 and 1895 in the distribution of land as between big and small farms. What strikes us immediately here is the typically capitalist increase at the extremes, and the diminution in the proportion of medium farms. Taking the number of agricultural farms (not counting farms without land), the proportion of the smallest farms, those up to 2.5 hectares, *increased* 27.9 per cent in 1873, 31.8 per cent in 1885, and 34.8 per cent in 1895. The proportion *diminished* in *all* the medium groups, and *only* in the highest group, 120 hectares and over, did it remain unchanged (0.7 per cent). The percentage of the total land occupied by the largest farms, 120 hectares and over, *increased*, being 14.3 per cent, 15.2 per cent, and 15.6 per cent in the respective years; there was also an *increase*, but not to the same extent, among the medium peasant farms (those from 10 to 40 hectares: 25.5 per cent, 26.5 per cent, and 26.8 per cent for the respective years), while the total number of farms in this group diminished. There is an irregular *increase* in the farms of 2.5 to 10 hectares (9.1 per cent, 9.5 per cent, and 9.4 per cent for the respective years) and a *steady increase* in the smallest farms (1.5 per cent, 1.7 per cent, and 1.8 per cent). As a result, we have a very clearly marked tendency towards growth of the biggest and smallest farms. To obtain a clearer idea of this phenomenon we

must take the average area of farms according to groups for the respective years. Here are the figures:

Groups of farms	Average area of farms (hectares)		
	1873	1885	1895
Up to 2.5 ha	0.83	0.75	0.68
2.5 to 10 "	5.08	5.09	5.13
10 to 40 "	22.28	22.08	22.01
40 to 120 "	61.00	61.66	61.97
120 ha and over	281.40	282.30	279.80
Average	15.50	14.07	13.70

From these statistics we see that in the majority of groups the area of farms is extremely stable. The fluctuations are insignificant, being one to two per cent (for example: 279.8 to 282.3 hectares, or 22.01 to 22.28 hectares, etc.). The *only* exception is seen in the smallest farms, which are undoubtedly *splitting up*: a decrease in the average area of those farms (up to 2.5 hectares) by ten per cent between 1873 and 1885 (from 0.83 hectares to 0.75 hectares) and also between 1885 and 1895. The general increase in the total number of farms in Denmark is proceeding with almost no change in the total area of land (between 1885 and 1895 there was even a slight decrease in the total area of land). The increase in the main affects the smallest farms. Thus, between 1873 and 1895 the total number of farms increased by 30,752, while the number of farms up to 2.5 hectares increased by 27,166. Clearly, this decrease in the average area of all farms in Denmark (15.5 hectares in 1873, 14.1 in 1885, and 13.7 in 1895) really signifies *nothing more than the splitting-up of the smallest* farms.

The phenomenon we have noted becomes still more striking when we take the smaller divisions of groups. In the preface to the Danish agricultural statistics for 1895 (*Danmarks Statistik*, *etc. Danmarks Jordbrug*, 4-de Raekke,

Nr. 9, litra C)* the compilers show the following changes in the number of farms according to groups:

Groups of farms	Per cent increase or decrease	
	1885 to 1895	1873 to 1885
300 ha and over	+ 4.2	+ 5.0
200 to 300 ha	0	+ 6.1
120 to 200 ”	+ 5.2	+ 5.1
80 to 120 ”	− 1.5	− 2.1
40 to 80 ”	− 2.4	− 5.0
20 to 40 ”	+ 1.0	+ 3.6
10 to 20 ”	+ 2.8	+ 6.5
2.5 to 10 ”	− 1.9	+ 3.2
0.3 to 2.5 ”	+ 2.1	+ 17.8
0 to 0.3 ”	+25.1	+37.9

Thus, the increase takes place in dwarf farms, which are either farms devoted to the cultivation of special crops or *wage workers*' “farms”.

This conclusion is worth noting, because apologist professorial “science” is inclined to deduce from the decrease in the average area of all farms that small-scale production is beating large-scale production in agriculture. Actually we see progress in the largest-scale agriculture, stability in the sizes of farms in all groups except the very smallest, and the *splitting-up* of the farms in this last group. This splitting-up must be ascribed to the decline and impoverishment of small-scale farming: another possible explanation, namely, the transition from agriculture in the narrow sense of the word to livestock farming, cannot be applied to all the smallest farms, for this transition is taking place in *all* groups, as we shall see in a moment. For the purpose of judging the scale on which farming is conducted in a country like Denmark, statistics on livestock farming are far more important than statistics on farm areas, because farming on different scales can be conducted on the same area of land when livestock and dairy farming are developing at a particularly fast rate.

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* *Danish Statistics*, *etc.*, *Danish Agriculture*, 4th series, No. 9, Letter C.—*Ed.*

It is well known that it is just this phenomenon that is observed in Denmark. The "prosperity" of Danish agriculture is due mainly to the rapid successes of commercial livestock rearing and the export of dairy produce, meat, eggs, etc., to Britain. Here we meet with the solemn statement by Pudor that Denmark "*owes the colossal development of her dairy farming to the decentralisation of her cattle-breeding and livestock farming*" (loc. cit., p. 48, Pudor's italics). It is not surprising that a man like Pudor, an out-and-out huckster in his whole system of views, who totally fails to understand the contradictions of capitalism, should take the liberty of distorting facts in this way. It is highly characteristic, however, that the petty bourgeois David, who, by some misunderstanding, passes as a socialist, uncritically trails along in his wake!

As a matter of fact, Denmark serves as a striking example of the *concentration* of livestock farming in a capitalist country. That Pudor arrived at the opposite conclusion is due only to his crass ignorance and to the fact that he distorted the *scraps* of statistics which he quotes in his pamphlet. Pudor quotes, and David slavishly repeats after him, figures showing the distribution of the total number of livestock farms in Denmark according to the number of animals per farm. According to Pudor, 39.85 per cent of the total number of farms *having livestock* have only from one to three animals each; 29.12 per cent have from four to nine animals each, etc. Hence, Pudor concludes, most of the farms are "small"; "decentralisation", etc.

In the first place Pudor quotes the *wrong* figures. This has to be noted, because Pudor boastfully declares that in his book one may find all the "latest" figures; and the revisionists "refute Marxism" by referring to ignorant bourgeois scribblers. Secondly, and this is most important, the *method* of argument employed by the Pudors and Davids is too often repeated by our Cadets and Narodniks for us to refrain from dealing with it. Following *such* a method of argument we should inevitably come to the conclusion that *industry* in the most advanced capitalist countries is becoming "decentralised"; for *everywhere and always* the percentage of very small and small establishments is highest, and the percentage of large establishments is in

significant. The Pudors and the Davids forget a "trifle": the concentration of by far the greater part of total production in large enterprises which constitute only a small percentage of the total number of enterprises.

The actual distribution of the total cattle in Denmark according to the last census, taken on July 15, 1898, is shown in the following table.*

Farms having	Number of farms	Per cent	Total cattle	Per cent
1 head of cattle	18,376	10.2	18,376	1.0
2 " " "	27,394	15.2	54,788	3.1
3 " " "	22,522	12.5	67,566	3.9
4 to 5 " " "	27,561	15.5	121,721	7.0
6 to 9 " " "	26,022	14.4	188,533	10.8
10 to 14 " " "	20,375	11.3	242,690	13.9
15 to 29 " " "	30,460	16.9	615,507	35.3
30 to 49 " " "	5,650	3.1	202,683	11.6
50 to 99 " " "	1,498	0.8	99,131	5.7
100 to 199 " " "	588	0.3	81,417	4.7
200 head of cattle and over	195	0.1	52,385	3.0
Total	180,641	100.0	1,744,797	100.0

We see from this what role in the total livestock farming in Denmark is played by the numerous small farms and the few big farms, and what the famous "decentralisation" of production in the "ideal country" really amounts to. Small farms having one to three head of cattle number 68,292, or 37.9 per cent of the total; they have 140,730 head, i.e., only 8 per cent of the total. An almost equal number, 133,802, or 7.7 per cent, is owned by 783 big farmers comprising 0.4 per cent of the total number of farmers. Those in the first group have on an average a little over two head of cattle each, i.e., an obviously inadequate number with which to carry on commercial livestock farming; dairy and meat

* *Danmarks Statistik. Statistik Tabelvaerk.* Femte Raekke, litra C, Nr. 2. Kreaturholdet d. 15 juli 1898. København, 1901.

products can only be sold by cutting down household consumption (let us recall well-known facts: butter is sold and cheaper margarine is purchased for home use, etc.). Those in the second group have on an average 171 head of cattle each. They are the biggest capitalist farmers, "manufacturers" of milk and meat; "leaders" of technical progress and of all sorts of agricultural associations, about which petty-bourgeois admirers of "social peace" wax so enthusiastic.

If we add together the small and medium farmers we shall get a total of 121,875 farmers, or two-thirds of the total (67.5 per cent), who own up to nine head of cattle each. They own 450,984 head of cattle, or one-fourth of the total (25.8 per cent). An almost equal number, i.e., 435,616 (25 per cent) is owned by farmers having 30 and more head of cattle each. Those farmers number 7,931, or 4.3 per cent of the total. "Decentralisation" indeed!

By combining the small divisions of Danish statistics given above into three large groups we get the following:

Farms having	Number of farms	Per cent	Number of cattle	Per cent	Average per farm
1 to 3 head of cattle	68,292	37.9	140,730	8.0	2.1
4 to 9 " " "	53,583	29.6	310,254	17.8	5.8
10 head and over	58,766	32.5	1,293,813	74.2	22.0
Total	180,641	100.0	1,744,797	100.0	9.7

Thus, *three-fourths* of the total livestock farming in Denmark is concentrated in the hands of 58,766 farmers, that is, less than *one-third* of the total number of farmers. This one-third enjoys the lion's share of all the "prosperity" of capitalism in Danish agriculture. It should be borne in mind that this high percentage of well-to-do peasants and rich capitalists (32.5 per cent, or nearly one-third) is obtained by an artificial method of calculation which eliminates *all farmers who own no livestock*. Actually, the per-

centage is much lower. According to the census of 1895, as we have seen, the total number of farmers in Denmark is 265,982; and the livestock census of July 15, 1898, puts the total number of farmers at 278,673. In relation to this actual total number of farmers, the 58,766 well-to-do and rich farmers represent only 21.1 per cent, i.e., *only one-fifth*. The number of "farmers" who own no land is 12.4 per cent of the total number of farmers in Denmark (1895: 32,946 out of 265,982), while the farmers who own no livestock* represent 35.1 per cent of *the total number of farmers in Denmark*, *i.e.*, *more than one-third* (1898: 98,032 out of 278,673). One call judge from this the "socialism" of gentlemen of the David type who fail to see that the capitalist prosperity of Danish agriculture is based on the *mass*

Agriculture and Livestock Farming in Denmark

Groups of farms	Number of farms	Per cent	Hectares	Per cent	Horses	Per cent	Cows
Owning no land	13,435	4.8	–	–	1,970	0.5	3,707
Amount of land unknown	45,896	16.5	?	?	28,909	6.4	28,072
Up to 2.5 ha	80,582	28.9	55,272	1.5	24,540	5.5	66,171
2.5 to 10 "	63,420	22.8	323,430	8.9	54,900	12.2	175,182
10 to 40 "	45,519	16.3	984,983	27.0	133,793	29.8	303,244
40 to 120 "	27,620	9.9	1,692,285	46.4	168,410	37.5	361,669
120 ha and over	2,201	0.8	588,318	16.2	36,807	8.1	129,220
Total	278,673	100.0	3,644,288	100.0	449,329	100.0	1,067,265

Note: The figures for 1898 differ from those for 1895 in regard to the distribution of farms according to the amount of land. This may be due both to changes in time and to somewhat different methods of collecting information. But the general relation between the groups remains the same. The census of 1895 takes into account

* To be more precise, farmers who own no cattle, for unfortunately the Danish statistics do not give the number of farmers who own no

proletarianisation of the rural population, on the fact that the *mass* of the "farmers" are deprived of the means of production.

We shall now pass to the figures characterising agriculture and livestock farming in Denmark as a whole. The census of July 15, 1898 gives detailed information on the number of livestock of the various groups of farmers owning certain amounts of land. The number of these groups in the Danish statistics is particularly large (14 groups: with no land; with up to 1/32 of a hartkorn; 1/32 to 1/16; 1/16 to 1/8; 1/8 to 1/4; 1/4 to 1/2; 1/2 to 1; 1 to 2; 2 to 4; 4 to 8; 8 to 12; 12 to 20; 20 to 30; 30 and over); but we have reduced them to 6 large groups, as we did with the preceding figures.

According to the Census of July 15, 1898

Per cent	Total cattle	Per cent	Sheep	Per cent	Pigs	Per cent	Poultry	Per cent
0.3	4,633	0.3	8,943	0.8	8,865	0.8	220,147	2.5
2.6	42,150	2.4	42,987	4.0	42,699	3.7	780,585	8.9
6.2	88,720	5.1	99,705	9.3	94,656	8.1	1,649,452	18.8
16.4	247,618	14.2	187,460	17.5	191,291	16.4	1,871,242	21.4
28.5	515,832	29.6	383,950	35.7	308,863	26.4	1,957,726	22.3
33.9	639,563	36.6	310,686	28.9	409,294	35.0	1,998,595	22.8
12.1	206,281	11.8	40,682	3.8	112,825	9.6	289,155	3.3
100.0	1,744,797	100.0	1,074,413	100.0	1,168,493	100.0	8,766,902	100.0

45,860 hectares of undistributed land in addition to 3,645,750 hectares of distributed land. The group of farms with "amount of land unknown" (1898) consists largely of the lower groups, which is proved by the number of livestock.

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animals whatever. From these statistics we only learn the number of owners of each type of animal. But undoubtedly, cattle form the principal basis of livestock farming in Denmark.

From these figures we see first of all how great is the concentration of livestock farming *as a whole* in Denmark. Big capitalist farmers owning over 40 hectares of land constitute only *one-tenth* of the total number of farmers (10.7 per cent); but they concentrate in their hands *more than three-fifths* of all the land (62.6 per cent) and *nearly half* of all the livestock: 45.6 per cent of all the horses, 48.4 per cent of all the cattle, 32.7 per cent of all the sheep, and 44.6 per cent of all the pigs.

If to these capitalist farmers we add the well-to-do peasants, i.e., those owning from 10 to 40 hectares, we shall get a little over a quarter of the total number of farmers (27.0 per cent) who concentrate in their hands nine-tenths of all the land, three-fourths of all the horses, four-fifths of all the cattle, seven-tenths of all the pigs, and nearly half of all the poultry. The great bulk of the "farmers", nearly three-fourths (73 per cent), own less than 10 hectares of land each and, on the whole, represent the proletarianised and semi-proletarianised mass, which plays an insignificant part in the sum total of the country's agricultural and livestock economy.

As far as the distribution of the various types of animals is concerned, sheep and pig breeding deserve special attention. The first is a declining branch of livestock farming, unprofitable for the majority of European countries at the present time owing to market conditions and overseas competition. The state of the international market calls for other forms of livestock farming to take the place of sheep farming. On the other hand, pig breeding is a particularly profitable and rapidly developing branch of livestock farming for meat in Europe. Statistics show that sheep farming is also declining in Denmark, whereas pig breeding is increasing very rapidly. From 1861 to 1898, the number of sheep in Denmark dropped from 1,700,000 to 1,100,000. The number of cattle increased from 1,100,000 to 1,700,000. The number of pigs increased from 300,000 to 1,200,000, i.e., almost a fourfold increase.

Comparing the distribution of sheep and pigs among the small and big farms we thus clearly see in the former the maximum of routine, the least adaptability to the require-

ments of the market, and slowness in readjusting the farm to the new conditions. The big capitalist farms (40 to 120 hectares, 120 hectares and over) cut down unprofitable sheep farming most (28.9 per cent and 3.8 per cent of sheep, as against 33-37 per cent and 8-12 per cent of other types of livestock). The small farms were less adaptable: they still keep a larger number of sheep; for example, farms up to 2.5 hectares have 9.3 per cent of the total number of sheep, as against 6-5 per cent of the other types of livestock. They possess 8.1 per cent of the pigs—a *smaller* proportion than of sheep. The capitalists have 35 and 9.6 per cent, i.e., a *larger* share than of sheep. Capitalist agriculture is much better able to adapt itself to the requirements of the international market. In regard to the peasant, we still have to say, in the words of Marx: the peasant turns merchant and industrialist without the conditions enabling him to become a real merchant and industrialist.[95] The market *demands* of *every* farmer, as an absolute necessity, submission to the new conditions and speedy adjustment to them. But this speedy adjustment is impossible without *capital*. Thus, under capitalism small-scale farming is condemned to the utmost of routine and backwardness and the least adaptability to the market.

To envisage more concretely the real economic features of this needy mass and of the small wealthy minority, we shall quote figures of the average amount of land and livestock on the farms of the various groups. It is natural for bourgeois political economy (and for the revisionist gentry) to gloss over capitalist contradictions; socialist political economy must ascertain the difference in *types* of farms and standard of living between the prosperous capitalist farmers and the needy small farmers. See table, page 208.

These figures clearly show that all three lower groups, comprising half the total number of farms, belong to *poor* peasants. "Farmers" owning no horses and no cows predominate. Only in the group with land up to 2.5 hectares is there one *whole* head of cattle, one sheep, and one pig per farm. Obviously, there can be no question of this *half* of the total number of farms making any profit out of dairy and meat livestock farming. For this half, the prosperity of Danish agriculture means dependence upon the big

Average per Farm

Groups of farms	Hectares	Horses	Cows	Total cattle	Sheep	Pigs	Poultry
Owning no land	–	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.7	16.4
Amount of land unknown	?	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	17.0
Up to 2.5 ha	0.6	0.3	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.2	20.4
2.5 to 10 ”	5.1	0.9	2.7	3.9	2.9	3.0	29.5
10 to 40 ”	21.6	2.9	6.6	11.3	8.4	6.8	43.0
40 to 120 ”	61.3	6.1	13.8	23.1	11.2	14.9	72.4
120 ha and over	267.3	16.7	58.7	93.7	18.5	51.2	131.3
Average	13.1	1.6	3.8	6.3	3.9	4.2	31.5

farmers, the necessity of seeking “auxiliary employment”, i.e., of selling their labour power in one way or another, perpetual poverty and semi-ruined farms.

Of course, this conclusion holds good only for the whole *mass* of those poorest farms. We have already shown with the aid of German, French, and Russian agricultural statistics that even among the farms having a small amount of land there are big livestock owners, tobacco growers, and so forth. The differentiation is deeper than can be imagined from the returns of Danish statistics. But this differentiation, by singling out in each group an insignificant minority of farms growing special crops, only *emphasises* the poverty and want of the *majority* of the farmers in the poorest groups.

Further, it is also evident from the figures quoted that even the group of small peasants owning from 2.5 hectares to 10 hectares cannot be regarded as being at all secure and economically well established. Let us recall the fact that in this group there are 63,000 farms, or 22.8 per cent of the total, and that the average is 0.9 horses per farm. The horseless farmers probably use their cows for draught, thus worsening the conditions of both agricultural farming (shallower ploughing) and livestock farming (weakening the cattle). The average number of cows in this group is

2.7 per farm. Even if the household consumption of milk and meat products is reduced—and such a reduction is itself a direct sign of bitter need—this number of cows could provide only a very small quantity of products for sale. The share such farms with an average of 2.7 cows and 3 pigs per household enjoy in the "prosperity" of the "national" sale of milk and meat to Britain *can only be* very insignificant. With farms of this size, commercial agriculture and livestock farming mean, partly, selling what is necessary for the family, poorer diet, increased poverty, and partly, selling in very small quantities, i.e., under the most disadvantageous conditions, and the impossibility of having money put by to meet inevitable extra expenses. And the natural economy of the small peasant under the conditions prevailing in modern capitalist countries is doomed to stagnation, to a slow painful death; it certainly cannot prosper. The whole "trick" of bourgeois and revisionist political economy lies in not making a separate study of the conditions of this particular type of small farm, which is below the "average" (the "average" Danish farmer has 1.6 horses and 3.8 cows), and which represents the *overwhelming majority* of the total number of farms. Not only is this type of farm not specially studied; it is glossed over by references exclusively to "average" figures, to the general increase in "production" and "sales", and by saying nothing about the fact that only the well-to-do farms, which represent the small minority, *can* sell profitably.

It is only among the farmers having from 10 to 40 hectares that we see a sufficient number of livestock to create the *possibility* of "prosperity". But these farms represent only 16 per cent of the total. And it is questionable whether they manage entirely without hired labour, since they have on an average 21.6 hectares of land per farm. In view of the high degree of intensive farming in Denmark, farms of such dimensions probably cannot be carried on without the assistance of farm-hands or day-labourers. Unfortunately, both Danish statisticians and the majority of those who write about Danish agriculture adhere entirely to the bourgeois point of view and do not explore the question of hired labour, the size of farms requiring its employment, and so forth. From the Danish census of occupations of 1901

we learn only that in the group of "day-labourers", etc., there are 60,000 men and 56,000 women, i.e., 116,000 out of a total of 972,000 of the rural population distributed according to occupation. As to whether these tens of thousands of wage-workers (and in addition to them small peasants do "by work" for hire) are employed exclusively by the 30,000 big capitalist farmers (27,620 owning from 40 to 120 hectares and 2,201 owning over 120 hectares each), or whether some of them are also employed by the well-to-do peasants owning from 10 to 40 hectares, we have no information.

Of the two highest groups, the upper Thirty Thousand of Danish agriculture, there is little to say: the capitalist character of their agriculture and livestock farming is graphically illustrated by the figures quoted at the beginning.

Finally, the last data of general interest touched upon and partly analysed in Danish agricultural statistics are those relating to the question whether the development of livestock farming, that main foundation of the "prosperity" of the "ideal country", is accompanied by a process of decentralisation or concentration. The statistics for 1898, already quoted by us, provide extremely interesting data compared with those for 1893; and for one type of livestock, the most important, it is true, namely, total cattle, we can also make a comparison between the figures for 1876 and 1898.

Between 1893 and 1898 the branch of livestock farming which made most progress in Denmark was pig breeding. In this period the number of pigs increased from 829,000 to 1,168,000, or by 40 per cent, while the number of horses increased only from 410,000 to 449,000, of cattle from 1,696,000 to 1,744,000, and the number of sheep even diminished. Who reaped the main benefits of this tremendous progress of the Danish farmers, united in innumerable co-operative societies? The compilers of the 1898 statistics answer this by comparing the returns for 1893 and 1898. All the pig-owners are divided into four groups: big owners having 50 and more pigs; medium-big owners with from 15 to 49; medium-small owners with from 4 to 14; and small owners with from 1 to 3 pigs. The compilers give the following figures for these four groups:

Groups of farms	1893		1898		Per cent increase or decrease		Per cent distribution of total pigs	
	Number of		Number of					
	Farms	Pigs	Farms	Pigs	Farms	Pigs	1893	1898
50 head and over	844	79,230	1,487	135,999	76.2	71.7	9.6	11.6
15 to 49	20,602	350,277	30,852	554,979	48.2	58.4	42.3	47.5
4 to 14	38,357	211,868	50,668	282,642	32.1	33.4	25.5	24.2
1 to 3	108,820	187,756	108,544	194,873	0.3	3.8	22.6	16.7
Total	168,623	829,131	191,551	1,168,493	13.6	40.9	100.0	100.0

These figures clearly show that a rapid *concentration* of livestock farming is taking place. The larger the farm, the more it gained from the "progress" of livestock farming. The big farms increased their number of livestock by 71.7 per cent; the medium-big farms increased theirs by 58.4 per cent; the medium-small farms by 33.4 per cent; and the small farms only by 3.8 per cent. The increase in wealth occurred mainly among the small "upper" minority. The total increase of pigs during the five years was 339,000; of these 261,000, or, *more than three-fourths*, were accounted for by the big and medium-big farms, numbering 32,000 (out of a total of 266,000-277,000 farms!). Small-scale production in livestock farming of this type is being *ousted* by large-scale production: during the five years there was an *increase* in the share of the big farms (from 9.6 per cent to 11.6 per cent) and that of the medium-big farms (from 42.3 per cent to 47.5 per cent); whereas that of the medium-small farms *diminished* (from 25.5 per cent to 24.2 per cent), and that of the small farms diminished still more (from 22.6 per cent to 16.7 per cent).

If instead of the bare figures of *area* we could get statistics of agricultural farming expressing the scale of production as precisely as the figures of the number of livestock

express* the scale of livestock farming, there is no doubt that here as well we would see the process of *concentration* which the bourgeois professors and opportunists deny.

Still more interesting are the corresponding figures of total cattle. We can supplement the comparison of the figures of 1893 and 1898 made by the compilers of the 1898 statistics with the returns of the census of July 17, 1876. (*Danmarks Statistik. Statistik Tabelvaerk*, 4-de Raekke, litra C, Nr. 1. Kreaturholdet d. 17 juli, 1876, København, 1878.) Here are the figures for the three years.

These figures, covering a longer period of time and a more important type of livestock, illustrate the process of *capitalist concentration* as graphically as those previously quoted. The growth of livestock farming in Denmark indicates the progress *almost exclusively* of large-scale capitalist farming. The total livestock increase between 1876 and 1898 was 424,000 head. Of these, 76,000 belonged to farms having 50 head and more, and 303,000 to farms having from 15 to 49 head each, i.e., these upper 38,000 farms gained 379,000 head, or *nearly nine-tenths of the total increase*. No more striking picture of capitalist concentration could be imagined.

The total number of cattle-owning farms increased between 1876 and 1898 by 12,645 (180,641-167,996), or by 7.5 per cent. The total population of Denmark increased between 1880 and 1901 (i.e., during a slightly shorter period of time) from 1,969,039 to 2,449,540,** i.e., by 24.4 per cent. Clearly, the relative number of "haves", i.e., owners of livestock, *diminished*. The *smaller* part of the population belongs to the class of property-owners. The number of smallest owners (one to three head of livestock) steadily diminished. The number of medium-small owners (with 4 to 14 head) increased very slowly (+12.5 per cent between 1876 and 1893, +2.5 per cent between 1893 and

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* We showed above, according to Drechsler's figures, that the livestock in the big farms are bigger. Here too, therefore, the overall statistics minimize the degree of concentration.

** In 1880, the urban population constituted 28 per cent, and in 1901, 38 per cent.

Groups of farms	1876		1893		1898		Per cent increase or decrease				Per cent distribution of total cattle		
	Number of		Number of		Number of		1876 to 1893		1893 to 1898				
							Number of		Number of				
	Farms	Cattle	Farms	Cattle	Farms	Cattle	Farms	Cattle	Farms	Cattle	1876	1893	1898
50 head and over	1,634	156,728	2,209	221,667	2,281	232,933	35.2	41.4	3.3	5.1	11.8	13.0	13.4
15 to 49	24,096	514,678	35,200	793,474	36,110	818,190	46.1	54.1	2.6	3.1	39.0	46.8	46.8
4 to 14	64,110	504,193	72,173	539,301	73,958	552,944	12.5	6.9	2.5	2.5	38.2	31.8	31.7
1 to 3	78,156	144,930	70,218	141,748	68,292	140,730	10.2	2.2	2.7	0.7	11.0	8.4	8.1
Total	167,996	1,320,529	179,800	1,396,190	180,641	1,744,797	7.0	28.4	0.5	2.9	100.0	100.0	100.0

1898) and lagged behind the increase of the population. A real and rapid increase is observed only in large-scale capitalist livestock farming. Between 1876 and 1893 the medium-big farms increased more rapidly than the big farms; but between 1893 and 1898, the biggest farms increased more rapidly.

Taking the figures for 1876 and 1898 for the group of biggest farms, i.e., owners of 200 or more head of cattle, we find that in 1876 they numbered 79 (0.05 per cent of the total number of livestock owners) with 18,970 head of cattle (1.4 per cent of the total); while in 1898, there were twice as many, viz., 195 (0.1 per cent of the total) with 52,385 head of cattle (3.0 per cent of the total). The number of the biggest farmers more than doubled and their output nearly trebled.

The ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production proceeded steadily between 1876 and 1898. The share of the small farms in the total number of cattle continually diminished: from 11.0 per cent in 1876 to 8.4 per cent in 1893, and to 8.1 per cent in 1898. The share of the medium farms also continually diminished, although somewhat more slowly (38.2—31.8—31.7 per cent). The share of the medium-big farms increased from 39.0 per cent in 1876 to 46.8 per cent in 1893, but remained at the same level between 1893 and 1898. Only the share of the biggest farms steadily increased, pushing aside all the other categories (11.8—13.0—13.4 per cent).

The more favourable the conditions for livestock farming, the more rapid is the development and progress of commercial livestock farming, and the more intense is the process of capitalist concentration. For example, in the Copenhagen district, which had a population of 234,000 in 1880 and 378,000 in 1901, dairy and meat products were, of course, the most marketable items. The farmers in that district were richer in cattle than all the other farmers in Denmark, both in 1876 and in 1898, having on an average 8.5 and 11.6 head of cattle each, compared with an average of 7.9 and 9.7 for the whole country. And in this district, in which the conditions are most favourable for the development of livestock farming, we see the process of concentration is most intense.

The following are the figures for this district for 1876 and 1898, according to the groups which we adopted above:

	1876		1898	
	Number of farms	Number of cattle	Number of farms	Number of cattle
50 head and over	44	4,488	86	9,059
15 to 49	1,045	22,119	1,545	35,579
4 to 14	2,011	16,896	1,900	14,559
1 to 3	2,514	4,468	1,890	3,767
Total	5,614	47,971	5,421	62,964

During the 22 years even the absolute number of owners diminished! Livestock wealth was concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of farmers. Both the small and the middle farmers after 22 years proved to be *fewer* and to have *fewer* livestock. The medium-big farmers increased their possessions by fifty per cent (from 22,000 to 35,000). The big farmers *more than doubled* their possessions. Of the biggest farmers, owning 200 and more head of cattle, there were in 1876 *two* who owned 437 head; in 1898, however, there were 10 who owned 2,896 head of cattle.

The concern which the Pudors, Davids, and other voluntary or involuntary servants of capital show for improved marketing conditions, the development of farmers' associations, and technical progress in livestock farming and agriculture can have only one purpose: to bring about throughout the country and in all branches of agriculture conditions like those in the Copenhagen district, i.e., particularly rapid concentration of production in the hands of the capitalists and the expropriation, proletarianisation of the population, a reduction of the proportion of property-owners to the total population, an increase in the proportion of those whom capitalism is forcing out of the country into the towns, etc.

To sum up: the "ideal country" from the standpoint of the opponents of Marxism on the agrarian question very clearly reveals (despite the socio-economic statistics being still at a low level and lacking analysis) the capitalist agrarian system, the sharply expressed capitalist contradictions in agriculture and livestock farming, the growing concentration of agricultural production, the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production, and the proletarianisation and impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of the rural population.

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAM OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1905-07[96]

Written in November-December 1907

First published in 1908
(confiscated); published in 1917
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The two years of revolution, from the autumn of 1905 to the autumn of 1907, have furnished a vast amount of experience of historical value concerning the peasant movement in Russia and the character and significance of the peasants' struggle for land. Decades of so-called "peaceful" evolution (i.e., when millions of people peacefully allow themselves to be fleeced by the upper ten thousand) can never furnish such a wealth of material for explaining the inner workings of our social system as has been furnished in these two years both by the direct struggle of the peasant masses against the landlords and by the demands of the peasants, expressed with at least some degree of freedom, at assemblies of representatives of the people. Therefore, the revision of the agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democrats in the light of the experience of these two years is absolutely necessary, particularly in view of the fact that the present agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was adopted at the Stockholm Congress in April 1906, i.e., on the eve of the first public appearance of representatives of the peasantry from all over Russia with a peasant agrarian programme, in opposition to the programme of the government and to that of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The revision of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme must be based on the latest data on landed property in Russia in order to ascertain with the utmost precision what actually is the economic background of all the agrarian programmes of our epoch, and what precisely are the issues in the great historic struggle. This economic basis of the real struggle must be compared with the ideological-political reflection of this basis that is found in the programmes, declarations, demands, and theories of the

spokesmen of the different classes. This is the course, and the only course, that a Marxist should take, unlike the petty-bourgeois socialist who proceeds from "abstract" justice, from the theory of the "labour principle", etc., and unlike the liberal bureaucrat who, in connection with every reform, covers up his defence of the interests of the exploiters by arguments about whether the reform is practicable and about the "state" point of view.

CHAPTER I

THE ECONOMIC BASIS AND NATURE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

1. LANDOWNERSHIP IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

The *Landed Property Statistics for 1905*, published by the Central Statistical Committee in 1907, enables us to ascertain precisely the comparative size of the peasant and landlord holdings in the fifty gubernias in European Russia. First of all we will give the general data. The whole territory of European Russia (50 gubernias) is given (see census of January 28, 1897) as 4,230,500 square versts, i.e., 440,800,000 dessiatins. The landed property statistics for 1905 register a total of 395,200,000 dessiatins under the following three main headings:

	Million dessiatins
A. Privately owned land	101.7
B. Allotment land[97]	138.8
C. Land owned by state, church, and various institutions	154.7
Total land in European Russia	395.2

From these general figures it is necessary to deduct, first of all, state lands situated in the far north and consisting partly of tundra and partly of such forest land as cannot be expected to be used for agriculture in the near future. There are 107,900,000 dessiatins of such land in the "north-

ern region" (in the Arkhangelsk, Olonets and Vologda gubernias). Of course, by deducting all these lands we considerably overestimate the area of land unsuitable for agriculture. It suffices to point out that such a cautious statistician as Mr. A. A. Kaufman calculates that in the Vologda and Olonets gubernias 25,700,000 dessiatins of forest land (with over 25 per cent of forest) could be utilised for additional allotment to the peasants.* However, since we are dealing with general data about the land area, without giving separate figures for forest land, it will be more correct to take a more cautious estimate of the land area suitable for agriculture. After deducting 107,900,000 dessiatins, there will be left 287,300,000 dessiatins, or in round figures, 280,000;000 dessiatins, leaving out a portion of urban land (the total of which is 2,000,000 dessiatins) and a portion of the state lands in the Vyatka and Perm gubernias (the total area of state land in these two gubernias is 16,300,000 dessiatins).

Thus, the *aggregate* amount of land suitable for agriculture in European Russia is distributed as follows:

A. Privately owned land	101.7	million	dessiatins
B. Allotment land	138.8	"	"
C. State land and land owned by various institutions	39.5	"	"
Total land in European Russia	280.0	"	"

Now we must give separate figures for small and large (particularly very large) holdings in order to obtain a concrete idea of the conditions of the peasant struggle for land in the Russian revolution. Such figures, however, are incomplete. Of the 138,800,000 dessiatins of peasant allotment land 136,900,000 dessiatins are classified according to size of holdings. Of the 101,700,000 dessiatins of privately owned land, 85,900,000 dessiatins are so classified; the remaining 15,800,000 dessiatins are recorded as belonging to "societies and associations". Examining the latter we find that 11,300,000 dessiatins are owned by peasant

* *The Agrarian Question*, a collection of articles published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. II, Moscow, 1907, p. 305.

societies and associations, which means that on the whole they are small holdings, unfortunately not classified according to size. Further, 3,700,000 dessiatins belong to "industrial and commercial, manufacturing and other" associations, of which there are 1,042. Of these, 272 own more than 1,000 dessiatins each, the total for the 272 being 3,600,000 dessiatins. These are, evidently, landlord latifundia. The bulk of this land is concentrated in Perm Gubernia, where *nine* such associations own 1,448,902 dessiatins! It is known that the Urals factories own many thousand dessiatins of land—a direct survival in bourgeois Russia of the feudal, seigniorial latifundia.

We therefore single out 3,600,000 dessiatins from the land owned by societies and associations as the biggest landed estates. The remainder has not been classified, but generally it consists of small holdings.

Out of the 39,500,000 dessiatins of state and other lands, only the crown lands[98] (5,100,000 dessiatins) lend themselves to classification according to size. These, too, are very large semi-medieval landed estates. We thus get a total area of land, both classified and not classified according to size of holdings, as follows:

	Land classified	Land not classified
	according to size of holdings (millions dessiatins)	
A. Privately owned land	89.5*	12.2
B. Allotment land	136.9	1.9
C. State land and land owned by various institutions	5.1	34.4
Total	231.5	48.5
Grand total	280.0	

Let us now classify the allotment land according to size of holdings. By rearranging the data obtained from our source of information into somewhat larger groups, we get:

* 85,900,000 dessiatins of privately owned land plus 3,600,000 dessiatins of latifundia owned by industrial and commercial associations and societies.

Allotment Land

Groups of households	Number of households	Total area of land (dess.)	Average dessiatins per household
Up to 5 dess. inclusive	2,857,650	9,030,333	3.1
5 to 8 " "	3,317,601	21,706,550	6.5
Total up to 8 dess. incl.	6,175,251	30,736,883	4.9
8 to 15 " "	3,932,485	42,182,923	10.7
15 to 30 " "	1,551,904	31,271,922	20.1
Over 30 " "	617,715	32,695,510	52.9
Total in European Russia	12,277,355	136,887,238	11.1

From these data it is evident that more than half of the households (6,200,000 out of 12,300,000) have up to 8 dessiatins each, i.e., in general and on the average, an area of land that is absolutely insufficient to support a family. Ten million one hundred thousand households possess up to 15 dessiatins each (making a total of 72,900,000 dessiatins), i.e., over four-fifths of the total number of households are, at the present level of peasant agricultural technique, on the brink of semi-starvation. Middle and well-to-do households—according to amount of land owned—number only 2,200,000 out of 12,300,000, owning altogether 63,900,000 dessiatins out of 136,900,000 dessiatins. Only households having more than 30 dessiatins each can be regarded as rich; of these there are only 600,000, i.e., one-twentieth of the total number of households. They possess nearly one-fourth of the total land area: 32,700,000 out of 136,900,000 dessiatins. To give an idea as to which categories of peasants constitute this group of rich households, we shall point out that first place among them is held by the Cossacks. In the over-30-dessiatins-per-household group, the Cossack households number 266,929 having a total of 14,426,403 dessiatins, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the Cossacks (in European Russia: 278,650 households having a total of 14,689,498 dessiatins of land, i.e., an average of 52.7 dessiatins per household).

The only data available for the whole of Russia enabling us to judge how all the peasant households are approximate-

ly classified according to scale of farming and not according to area of allotments, are those about the number of horses owned. According to the last army horse censuses of 1888-91, the peasant households in 48 gubernias of European Russia are classified as follows:

		Households
Poor	Without horses	2,765,970
	Owning 1 horse	2,885,192
Middle	” 2 horses	2,240,574
	” 3 ”	1,070,250
Well-to-do	” 4 ” or more	1,154,674
Total		10,116,660

Broadly speaking, this means that over one-half are poor (5,600,000 out of 10,100,000), about one-third are middle households (3,300,000 with 2 or 3 horses), and slightly over one-tenth are well-to-do (1,100,000 out of 10,100,000).

Let us now examine the distribution of individual private landed property. The statistics do not give a clear enough idea of the smallest holdings, but they give extremely detailed data on the biggest latifundia.

Groups of holdings	Individual Private Landed Property in European Russia		
	Number of holdings	Total area of land (dess.)	Average dess. per holding
10 dess. and less	409,864	1,625,226	3.9
10-50 dess incl.	209,119	4,891,031	23.4
50-500 ” ”	106,065	17,326,495	163.3
500-2,000 ” ”	21,748	20,590,708	947
2,000-10,000 ” ”	5,386	20,602,109	3,825
Over 10,000 ” ”	699	20,798,504	29,754
Total over 500 dess.	27,833	61,991,321	2,227
Grand total for European Russia	752,881	85,834,073	114

We see here, first, the enormous preponderance of large landownership: 619,000 small holders (up to 50 dessiatins) own only 6,500,000 dessiatins. Secondly, we see vast latifundia: 699 owners have almost 30,000 dessiatins each!

28,000 owners have a total of 62,000,000 dessiatins, i.e., 2,227 dessiatins each. The overwhelming majority of these latifundia are owned by the nobility, namely, 18,102 estates (out of 27,833) and 44,471,994 dessiatins of land, i.e., over 70 per cent of the entire latifundia area. The medieval character of landlordism is very strikingly revealed by these data.

2. WHAT IS THE STRUGGLE ABOUT?

Ten million peasant households own 73,000,000 dessiatins of land, whereas 28,000 noble and upstart landlords own 62,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the arena on which the peasants' struggle for the land is developing. On such a main background amazing technical backwardness, the neglected state of agriculture, an oppressed and downtrodden state of the mass of peasantry and an endless variety of forms of feudal, corvée exploitation are inevitable. Not to wander too far afield we must confine ourselves to mentioning briefly these commonly known facts, which have been described at great length in the extensive literature on peasant agriculture. The size of the landholdings outlined by us in no way corresponds to the scale of farming. In the purely Russian gubernias large-scale capitalist farming definitely drops into the background. Small-scale farming preponderates on large latifundia, comprising various forms of tenant farming based on servitude and bondage, labour service (corvée) farming, "winter hiring",[99] bondage for cattle trespassing on the landlords' pastures, bondage for the cut-off lands, and so on without end. The mass of the peasants, crushed by feudal exploitation, are being ruined and some of them let their allotments to "thrifty" farmers. The small minority of well-to-do peasants develops into a peasant bourgeoisie, rents land for capitalist farming and exploits hundreds of thousands of farm-hands and day-labourers.

Bearing in mind all these facts, which have been fully established by Russian economic science, we must distinguish, in regard to the present struggle of the peasants for the land, *four basic groups* of landholdings: (1) a mass of peasant farms crushed by the feudal latifundia and directly

interested in the expropriation of these latifundia, an expropriation from which they stand to gain directly more than anyone else; (2) a small minority of middle peasants already possessing an approximately average amount of land, sufficient to conduct farming in a tolerable way; (3) a small minority of well-to-do peasants who are becoming transformed into a peasant bourgeoisie and who are connected by a number of intermediate stages with farming conducted on capitalist lines, and (4) feudal latifundia far exceeding in dimensions the capitalist farms of the present period in Russia and deriving their revenues chiefly from the exploitation of the peasants by means of bondage and the labour-rent system.

Of course, the available data on landed property enable us to distinguish these basic groups only very approximately and sketchily. Nevertheless, we are obliged to distinguish them if we are to present a complete picture of the struggle for land in the Russian revolution. And we can safely say in advance that partial corrections of the figures, partial shifting of the boundary line between one group and another, *cannot* substantially alter the general picture. It is not partial corrections that are important; what is important is that a clear contrast be made between small landownership, which is striving for more land, and the feudal latifundia, which monopolise an enormous amount of land. The chief falsity of both the government's (Stolypin's) and the liberals' (the Cadets') economics lies in the fact that they conceal, or obscure, this clear contrast.

Let us assume the following sizes of landholdings for the four groups mentioned: (1) up to 15 dessiatins; (2) 15 to 20 dessiatins; (3) 20 to 500 dessiatins, and (4) over 500 dessiatins per holding. Of course, in order to present a complete picture of the struggle for land, we must, in each of these groups, combine the peasants' allotments with the private holdings. In our source of information the latter category is divided into groups: up to 10 dessiatins, and from 10 to 20 dessiatins, so that a group up to 15 dessiatins can be singled out only approximately. Any inaccuracy that may arise from this approximate calculation and from the round figures that we give, will be quite negligible (as

the reader will soon see) and will not affect the conclusions to be drawn.

Here is a table showing the present distribution of land among these groups in European Russia:

Group	Number of holdings (millions)	Total area of land (million dessiatins.)	Average dess. per holding
(a) Ruined peasantry, crushed by feudal exploitation	10.5	75.0	7.0
(b) Middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
(c) Peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership	1.5	70.0	46.7
(d) Feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Not classified according to holdings	—	50	—
*Grand total**	13.03	280.0	21.4

Such are the relations which give rise to the peasants' struggle for land. Such is the *starting*-point of the peasants' struggle (7-15 dessiatins per household plus renting on terms of bondage, etc.) against the very big landlords (2,333 dessiatins per estate). What is the objective tendency, the *ultimate* point of this struggle? Obviously, it is the abolition of large feudalist estates and the transfer of the land

* As already mentioned, this table is given in round figures. Here are the exact figures: allotment land: (a) 10,100,000 holdings and 72,900,000 dessiatins; (b) 874,000 holdings and 15,000,000 dessiatins. Private landed property up to 10 dessiatins, 410,000 holdings and 1,600,000 dessiatins; 10-20 dessiatins, 106,000 holdings and 1,600,000 dessiatins. Sum total a+b of both categories of land: 11,500,000 holdings and 91,200,000 dessiatins. For group (c) the exact figures are 1,500,000 holdings and 69,500,000 dessiatins. For group (d): 27,833 holdings and 61,990,000 dessiatins of land. To the latter are added as already mentioned, 5,100,000 dessiatins of crown lands and 3,600,000 dessiatins owned by the very large industrial and commercial associations. The exact figure of land not classified according to holdings was given above as 48,500,000 dessiatins. From this the reader may see that all our approximate calculations and round figures involve quite negligible numerical changes and cannot affect our conclusions in the least.

(according to certain principles) to the peasants. This objective tendency inevitably arises from the predominance of small-scale *cultivation*, which is held in bondage by the feudal latifundia. To depict this tendency in the same graphic way in which we depicted the starting-point of the struggle, i.e., the present state of affairs, we must take the *best conceivable* eventuality, i.e., we must assume that all the feudalist latifundia, as well as all land not classified according to holdings, have passed into the hands of the ruined peasantry. It is this best eventuality which *all* the participants in the present agrarian struggle envisage more or less distinctly: the government talks about "allotting" land to the "needy", the liberal official (or Cadet) talks about supplementary allotments to those who have little land, the peasant Trudovik talks about increasing holdings to the "subsistence" or "labour" "norm", and the Social-Democrat, differing on the question of the form of land tenure, generally accepts the proposal of the Narodniks about allotting land to the poorest peasants. (In the Second Duma, 47th sitting, May 26, 1907, Tsereteli accepted the figure of the value of the 57,000,000 dessiatins of land to be alienated as given by the Narodnik Karavayev, namely, 6,500,000,000 rubles, of which the poorest peasants having up to 5 dessiatins account for 2,500,000,000 rubles. See Stenographic Record, p. 1221.) In short, however much the landlords, the officials, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the proletariat may differ in their view of the aims and terms of the reform, they all outline the same tendency, namely, the transfer of the large landed estates to the most needy peasants. With the fundamental differences of opinion among the classes concerning the extent and terms of such a transfer we shall deal separately elsewhere. At present we shall supplement our outline of the starting-point of the struggle with a similar outline of its possible ultimate point. We have already shown what the situation is *now*. We shall show what it may be *then*. Let us assume that 30,000 landlords will retain 100 dessiatins each, i.e., a total of 3,000,000 dessiatins, while the remaining 67,000,000 dessiatins and 50,000,000 dessiatins of unclassified land will be transferred to 10,500,000 poor households. We shall then get the following:

	Now			Then		
	Number of holdings (mill.)	Total area of land (mill. dess.)	Average dess. per holding	Number of holdings (mill.)	Total area of land (mill. dess.)	Average dess. per holding
(a) Small ruined peasants	10.5	75	7.0	—	—	—
(b) Middle peasants	1.0	15	15.0	11.5	207	18.0
(c) Wealthy peasants and bourgeoisie	1.5	70	46.7	1.53	73	47.7
(d) Feudal landlords	0.03	70	2,333.0	—	—	—
Total	13.03	230	17.6	13.03	280	21.4
Unclassified land	—	50	—	—	—	—
Grand total	13.03	280	21.4	—	—	—

Such is the economic basis of the struggle for land in the Russian revolution. Such is the starting-point of this struggle and its tendency, i.e., its ultimate point, its result in the best eventuality (from the standpoint of those engaged in the struggle).

Before proceeding to examine this economic basis and its ideological (and ideological-political) cloak, let us dwell on possible misunderstandings and objections as welI.

First, it may be said that my picture presupposes the *division* of the land, whereas I have not yet examined the question of municipalisation, division, nationalisation, or socialisation.

That would be a misunderstanding. My picture leaves out altogether the *terms* of landownership; it does not deal at all with the *terms* of the transfer of the land to the peasants (whether in ownership or in one or another form of tenure). I have taken only the *transfer of the land in general* to the small peasants and there can be no doubt whatever that this is the trend of our agrarian struggle. The small peasants are fighting, fighting to have the land transferred *to themselves*. Small (bourgeois) cultivation is fighting large-scale (feudal) landownership.* At best, the revolution can have *no other* result than the one I have drawn.

* What I have put in brackets is either ignored or denied by the petty-bourgeois ideology of the Narodniks. I shall deal with this later on.

Secondly, it may be said that I had no right to assume that all the confiscated lands (or expropriated lands, for I have not yet said anything about the terms of expropriation) will be transferred to the peasants with little land. It may be said that owing to economic necessity the lands *must* be transferred to the wealthier peasants. But such an objection would be a misunderstanding. To demonstrate the bourgeois character of the revolution, I must take the *best* eventuality from the standpoint of the Narodniks, I must *assume* the achievement of the aim set themselves by those who are fighting. I must take an aspect that most closely approaches the so-called General Redistribution[100] and not the further consequences of the agrarian revolution. If the masses win the struggle, they will take the fruits of the victory for themselves. To whom these fruits will ultimately go is another matter.

Thirdly, it may be said that I have assumed an unusually favourable result for the poor peasantry (that the whole of the poor peasantry will be transformed into middle peasants with holdings up to *18* dessiatins per household) by *overestimating* the extent of the unoccupied land area. It may be said that I should have discounted *forests*, which, it is said, cannot be allotted to the peasants. Such objections may, and even inevitably will, be raised by the economists in the government and Cadet camp, but they will be wrong. First, one must be a bureaucrat who all his life grovels to the semi-feudal landlord to imagine that the peasants will not be able to manage forest land properly and derive an income from it for *themselves* and not for the landlords. The standpoint of the police official and of the Russian liberal is: how to provide the muzhik with an allotment? The standpoint of the class-conscious worker is: how to free the muzhik from feudal landlordism? How to break up the feudal latifundia? Secondly I have left out the *whole* of the northern region (the Arkhangelsk, Vologda, and Olonets gubernias), as well as parts of the Vyatka and Perm gubernias, i.e., areas in which it is difficult to imagine that the agricultural exploitation of land covered by forests is likely in the near future. Thirdly, a special calculation of the forest areas would greatly complicate the matter without much altering the results. For instance,

Mr. Kaufman, who is a Cadet, and, consequently, is very *cautious* when dealing with landlord estates, calculates that land with over 25 per cent of forest might go to cover the shortage of land, and he thus obtains an area of 101,700,000 dessiatins for 44 gubernias. For 47 gubernias I have estimated a land area of approximately 101,000,000 dessiatins, i.e., 67,000,000 out of the 70,000,000 dessiatins of the feudal latifundia, and 34,000,000 dessiatins owned by the state and by various institutions. Assuming that all landed estates of over 100 dessiatins are to be expropriated, these lands will be increased by another nine or ten million dessiatins.*

3. THE CADET WRITERS OBSCURE THE NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE

The data given here on the role of the large landlord estates in the struggle for land in Russia must be amplified in one respect: A characteristic feature of the agrarian programmes of our bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in them the question as to *which* class is the most powerful opponent of the peasantry, and *which holdings* form the bulk of the expropriable lands are obscured by arguments about "norms". They (both the Cadets and the Trudoviks) talk mainly about how much land the peasants need according to this or that "norm", instead of dealing with the more concrete and vital question: how much land *is available* for expropriation? The first day of presenting the question obscures the class struggle, conceals the *essence*

* The alienation limit of 500 dessiatins, which I have taken in the text, is purely hypothetical. If this limit is taken as 100 dessiatins, which is also purely hypothetical, the picture of the change will be as follows:

Now			Then		
	Households (millions)	Total area of land (million dessiatins)		Households (millions)	Total area of land (million dessiatins)	Dess. per household
(a)	10.5	75	(a)	—	—	
(b)	1.0	15	(b)	11.5	217	18.8
(c)	1.4	50	(c)	1.53	63	41.1
(d)	0.13	90	(d)	—	—	—
	13.03	230 + 50		13.03	280	21.4

The main conclusions about the character and essence of the change are identical in either case.

of the matter by hollow pretensions to a "state" point of view. The second places the chief emphasis on the class struggle, on the class interests of a definite landowning stratum which largely represents feudal tendencies.

We shall revert to the question of "norms" elsewhere. Here we want to mention one "happy" exception among the Trudoviks, and one typical Cadet writer.

In the Second Duma, the Popular Socialist Delarov referred to the percentage of landowners who would be affected by the alienation of land (47th sitting, May 26, 1907). Delarov spoke of *alienation* (compulsory), without raising the question of confiscation, and apparently accepted *the same norm* of alienation which I have taken hypothetically in my table, namely, 500 dessiatins. Unfortunately, in the stenographic records of the Second Duma this particular passage in Delarov's speech (p. 1217) is distorted, unless Mr. Delarov himself made a mistake. The record says that compulsory alienation would affect 32 per cent of the private estates and 96 per cent of their total area of land; the rest, 68 per cent of the landowners, it is claimed, have only 4 per cent of the private land. Actually, the figure should be not 32 per cent, but 3.7 per cent, because 27,833 out of 752,881 landowners constitute 3.7 per cent, whereas the area of land affected—62,000,000 dessiatins out of a total of 85,800,000 dessiatins—amounts to 72.3 per cent. It is not clear whether this was a slip on Mr. Delarov's part, or whether he got hold of the wrong figures. At all events, of the numerous speakers in the Duma, he, if we are not mistaken, was the only one who *approached* the real issue of the struggle in the most direct and concrete way.

A Cadet writer whose "works" one must mention when dealing with this question is Mr. S. Prokopovich. True, he is, strictly speaking, a member of the *Bez Zaglaviya* group, who, like the majority of the contributors to the bourgeois newspaper *Tovarishch*, at one moment poses as a Cadet and at another as a Menshevik Social-Democrat. He is a typical representative of the handful of consistent Bernsteinians among the Russian bourgeois intellectuals who waver between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, who (in most cases) join no party, and in the liberal press

pursue a line slightly to the right of Plekhanov. Mr. Prokopovich must be mentioned here because he was one of the first to quote in the press figures from the 1905 landed property statistics, and in so doing actually adopted the *Cadet* position on agrarian reform. In two articles which he wrote for *Tovarishch* (No. 214 of March 13, 1907, and No. 238 of April 10, 1907), Mr. Prokopovich argues against General Zolotaryov, the compiler of the official statistics, who tries to prove that the government can tackle the land reform quite easily without any compulsory alienation, and that 5 dessiatins per household are quite sufficient for the peasant to conduct his husbandry! Mr. Prokopovich is *more liberal*: he puts the figure *at 8 dessiatins per household*. He repeatedly makes the reservation, however, that this amount of land is "quite inadequate", that this is a "very modest" calculation, and so forth; nevertheless, he accepts this figure in order to determine the "degree of the land shortage" (the title of the first of Mr. Prokopovich's articles mentioned above). He explains that he takes this figure "*to avoid unnecessary disputes*"—presumably with the Zolotaryovs. Calculating thus the number of "obviously land poor" peasant households at one half the total, Mr. Prokopovich correctly estimates that in order to bring the peasants' holdings up to 8 dessiatins, 18,600,000 dessiatins will be required, and since the government's total land reserve is alleged to be not more than 9,000,000 dessiatins, "it will be impossible to avoid compulsory alienation".

Both in his calculations and in his arguments, this Menshevik-minded Cadet, or Cadet-minded Menshevik, admirably expresses the spirit and meaning of the liberal agrarian programme. The questions of the semi-feudal latifundia, and of latifundia in general, is quite glossed over. Mr. Prokopovich quoted the figures only for private holdings of more than 50 dessiatins. Thus, the actual issue of this struggle is obscured. The class interests of a handful, literally a handful, of landlords are concealed behind a veil. Instead of an exposure of those interests, we are given the "state point of view": the state lands "*will not suffice*". Hence, if they did suffice, Mr. Prokopovich, to judge from his argument, would be quite willing to leave the feudal latifundia intact....

The peasant's allotment scale that he takes (8 dessiatins) is a starvation scale. The amount of land to be "compulsorily alienated" from the landlords that he allows for is insignificant (18−9=9 million dessiatins out of 62,000,000 in estates of over 500 dessiatins!). To carry out *that kind* of "compulsory alienation", the *landlords* will have to use compulsion on the peasants, as in 1861!

Whether he meant to or not, wittingly or unwittingly, Mr. Prokopovich has *correctly* expressed the *landlord* nature of the Cadet agrarian programme. But the Cadets are cautious and sly: they prefer *to say nothing at all* about *how much* land they are inclined to expropriate from the landlords.

4. THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL CLOAKS

We have seen that the essence of the revolution now in progress amounts to the break-up of the feudal latifundia and to the creation of a free and (as far as this is possible under present circumstances) well-to-do peasantry capable not only of toiling in misery on the land, but of developing the productive forces and promoting the progress of agriculture. This revolution does not and cannot in any way affect the system of small *production* in agriculture, the domination of the *market* over the producer and, consequently, the domination also of *commodity production*, since the struggle for the *redistribution* of the land cannot alter the relations of production in the farming of this land. And we have seen that a feature of this struggle is the strong development of small-scale farming on the feudal latifundia.

The ideological cloak of the struggle now in progress is furnished by the theories of the Narodniks. The fact that in the First and Second Dumas the peasant representatives from all over Russia openly came out with agrarian programmes has definitely proved that the theories and programmes of the Narodniks do indeed constitute the ideological cloak of the peasants' struggle for land.

We have shown that the basic and chief component of the distributable land for which the peasants are fighting

are the big feudal estates. We have taken a very high norm of expropriation—500 dessiatins. But it can easily be seen that our conclusions hold good however much this norm is reduced, let us say to 100 or to 50 dessiatins. Let us divide group (c)—20-500 dessiatins, into three subgroups: (aa) 20-50 dessiatins, (bb) 50-100, and (cc) 100-500, and see what the size of the peasant allotments and private holdings is within these subdivisions:

Subdivisions	Allotment Land: Number of holdings	Allotment Land: Total area of land (dessiatins)	Allotment Land: Average per holding	Private Land: Number of holdings	Private Land: Total area of land (dessiatins)	Private Land: Average per holding (dessiatins)	Total in European Russia: Number of holdings	Total in European Russia: Total area of land (dessiatins)	Total in European Russia: Average per holding (dessiatins)
20-50 dess.	1,062,504	30,898,147	29.1	103,237	3,301,004	32.0	1,165,741	34,199,151	29.3
50-100 ”	191,898	12,259,171	63.9	44,877	3,229,858	71.9	236,775	15,489,029	65.4
100-500 ”	40,658	5,762,276	141.7	61,188	14,096,637	230.4	101,846	19,858,913	194.9

Hence it follows, first, that the confiscation of estates of over 100 dessiatins will increase the distributable land, as already stated above, by nine to ten million dessiatins, whereas the confiscation of estates of over 50 dessiatins, as assumed by Chizhevsky, a member of the First Duma, will increase this land by eighteen and a half million dessiatins. Consequently, in this case also, the feudal latifundia will form the *basis* of the distributable land area. That is the crux of the present-day agrarian problem. Moreover, the connection that exists between these big estates and the higher bureaucracy is also quite well known: G. A. Alexinsky in the Second Duma quoted Mr. Rubakin's data on the size of the estates owned by higher officials in Russia. Secondly, it is seen from these data that even after deducting the peasant allotments *and the estates of over 100 dessiatins*, the size of the bigger allotments (and the small estates) still varies considerably. The revolution already finds the peasants differentiated in regard to size

of holdings, and still more in the amount of capital, number of livestock, the quantity and quality of implements, etc. That the differentiation in the sphere of non-allotment property, so to speak, is far more considerable than in the sphere of allotment landownership has been sufficiently proved in our economic literature.

What, then, is the significance of the Narodnik theories, which more or less accurately reflect the views of the peasants on their struggle for land? The substance of these Narodnik theories is contained in two "principles": the "labour principle" and "equalisation". The petty-bourgeois nature of those principles is so manifest and has been so often and so fully demonstrated in Marxist literature that there is no need to dwell on it here. It is important, however, to note a feature of these "principles" that has not yet been properly appreciated by Russian Social-Democrats. In a vague form those principles *do* express something real and *progressive* at the present historical moment. Namely, they express the struggle for the break-up of the feudal latifundia.

Look at the outline given above of the evolution of our agrarian system from the present stage to the "ultimate point" of the present, bourgeois revolution. You will clearly see that the future "then" is distinguished from the present "now" by an incomparably greater "equalisation" in ownership, that the *new* distribution of the land conforms far more to the "labour principle". And that is not accidental. It cannot be otherwise in a peasant country, the bourgeois development of which emancipates it from serfdom. In such a country, the break-up of the feudal latifundia is undoubtedly a condition for the development of capitalism. But as long as small-scale farming predominates in agriculture, the break-up of the feudal latifundia inevitably implies greater "equalisation" in landownership. In breaking up the medieval latifundia, capitalism *begins* with a more "equalised" landownership, and *out of that* creates large-scale farming on a new basis, on the basis of wage-labour, machinery and superior agricultural technique, and not on the basis of labour rent and bondage.

The mistake all the Narodniks make is that by confining themselves to the narrow outlook of the small husbandman,

they fail to perceive the bourgeois nature of the social relations into which the peasant enters on coming out of the fetters of serfdom. They convert the "labour principle" of *petty-bourgeois* agriculture and "equalisation", which are their slogans for breaking up the *feudal* latifundia, into something absolute, self-sufficing, into something implying a special, non-bourgeois order.

The mistake some Marxists make is that, while criticising the Narodnik *theory*, they overlook its historically real and historically legitimate *content in the struggle against serfdom*. They criticise, and rightly criticise, the "labour principle" and "equalisation" as backward, reactionary petty-bourgeois *socialism*; but they forget that these theories express progressive, revolutionary petty-bourgeois *democracy*, that they serve as the banner of the most determined struggle against the old, feudal Russia. The idea of equality is the most revolutionary idea in the struggle against the old system of absolutism in general, and against the old system of feudal landlordism in particular. The idea of *equality* is legitimate and progressive for the petty-bourgeois peasant insofar as it expresses the struggle against feudal, serf inequality. The idea of "equalised" landownership is legitimate and progressive insofar as it expresses the aspirations of ten million peasants, with allotments of seven dessiatins and ruined by the landlords, for a *division** of the 2,300-dessiatin feudal latifundia. And in the present historical situation that idea *really* expresses such strivings, it gives an impetus towards consistent *bourgeois* revolution, while mistakenly clothing this in vague, *quasi-socialist* phraseology. He would be a poor Marxist indeed who, while criticising the falsity of a socialist disguise for bourgeois slogans, failed to appreciate their historically progressive significance as the most decisive *bourgeois* slogans in the struggle *against serfdom*. The real content of the revolution which the Narodnik regards as "socialisation" will be that it will most consist-

* We speak here of division not as private property, but for economic use. Such a division is possible—and, with the predominance of small farming, inevitable for some time—both under municipalisation and under nationalisation.

ently clear the way for capitalism, will most resolutely eradicate serfdom. The outline which I have drawn above indicates precisely the maximum to be achieved in the abolition of serfdom and the maximum of "equalisation" to be attained thereby. The Narodnik imagines that this "equalisation" eliminates the bourgeois element, whereas, in reality, it *expresses* the aspirations of the most radical bourgeoisie. And whatever else there is in "equalisation" over and above that is nothing but ideological *smoke*, a petty-bourgeois illusion.

The short-sighted and unhistorical judgement of some Russian Marxists on the significance of Narodnik theories in the Russian bourgeois revolution is to be explained by the fact that they have not reflected on the significance of the "confiscation" of the landlord estates which the Narodniks advocate. One has only to visualise clearly the economic basis of this revolution under the present conditions of landownership in our country in order to grasp not only the illusory nature of the Narodnik theories, but also the truth of the struggle, restricted to a definite historical task, the truth of the struggle against serfdom, which represents the real content of those illusory theories.

5. TWO TYPES OF BOURGEOIS AGRARIAN EVOLUTION

To proceed. We have shown that the Narodnik theories, while absurd and reactionary from the standpoint of the struggle for socialism against the bourgeoisie, turn out to be "rational" (in the sense of being a specific historic task) and progressive in the bourgeois struggle against serfdom. The question now arises: when we say that serfdom must inevitably die out in Russian landownership and in the whole social system in Russia, when we say that a bourgeois-democratic agrarian revolution is inevitable, does that mean that this can take place only in one definite form? Or is it possible in various forms?

That question is of cardinal importance for arriving at correct views on our revolution and on the Social-Democratic agrarian programme. And solve this question we must, starting out from the data given above concerning the economic basis of the revolution.

The pivot of the struggle is the feudal latifundia which are the most conspicuous embodiment and the strongest mainstay of the survivals of serfdom in Russia. The development of commodity production and capitalism will certainly and inevitably put an end to those survivals. In *that* respect Russia has *only one* path before her, that of bourgeois development.

But there may be two forms of that development. The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord latifundia, i.e., either by reform or by revolution. Bourgeois development may proceed by having big landlord economies at the head, which will gradually become more and more bourgeois and gradually substitute bourgeois for feudal methods of exploitation. It may also proceed by having small peasant economies at the head, which in a revolutionary way, will remove the "excrescence" of the feudal latifundia from the social organism and then freely develop without them along the path of capitalist economy.

Those two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development we would call the Prussian path and the American path, respectively. In the first case feudal landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy, which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of *Grossbauern* ("big peasants") arises. In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it is broken up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer. In the first case the main content of the evolution is transformation of feudal bondage into servitude and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal landlords—Junkers. In the second case the main background is transformation of the patriarchal peasant into a bourgeois farmer.

In the economic history of Russia both these types of evolution are clearly in evidence. Take the epoch of the fall of serfdom. A struggle went on between the landlords and the peasants over the method of carrying out the reform.

Both stood for conditions of bourgeois economic development (without being aware of it), but the former wanted a development that would preserve to the utmost the landlord economies, the landlord revenues, and the landlord (bondage) methods of exploitation. The latter wanted a development that would secure for the peasants the greatest degree of prosperity possible with the existing level of agriculture, the abolition of the landlord latifundia, the abolition of all serf and bondage methods of exploitation, and the expansion of free peasant landownership. Needless to say, in the second case the development of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces would have been wider and *more rapid* than by peasant reform, carried out in the landlords' way.* Only caricature Marxists, as the Narodniks, the opponents of Marxism, tried to depict them, could have believed that the divorcement of the peasantry from the land in 1861 guaranteed the development of capitalism. On the contrary, it would have been a guarantee—and so in fact it turned out to be—a guarantee of *bondage*, i.e., semi-serf tenant farming and labour rent, i.e., corvée economy, which exceedingly retarded the development of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces in Russian agriculture. The conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords was not a struggle waged by "people's production" or the "labour principle" against the bour-

* In the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (May-June 1900), I wrote on this subject as follows: "...The more the land the peasants received when they were emancipated, and the lower the price they paid for it, the faster, wider, and freer would have been the development of capitalism in Russia the higher would have been the standard of living of the population, the wider would have, been the home market, the faster would have been the introduction of machinery into production; the more, in a word, would the economic development of Russia have resembled that of America. I shall confine myself to indicating two circumstances which, in my opinion, confirm the correctness of the latter view: (1) land-poverty and the burden of taxation have led to the development over a very considerable area of Russia of the labour-service system of private-landowner farming, i.e., a direct survival of serfdom, and not at all to the development of capitalism; (2) it is in our border regions, where serfdom was either entirely unknown, or was feeblest, and where the peasants suffer least from land shortage, labour-service, and the burden of taxation, that there has been the greatest development of capitalism in agriculture." (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 624-25.—*Ed.*)

geoisie (as our Narodniks have imagined it to be)—it was a struggle for the American type of bourgeois development as against the Prussian type of bourgeois development.

And in those localities of Russia where no serfdom had existed, where agriculture was undertaken entirely, or chiefly, by free peasants (for example, in the steppes of the Trans-Volga area, Novorossia, and the Northern Caucasus, which were colonised after the Reform), the growth of the productive forces and the development of capitalism proceeded far more rapidly than in the central provinces which were burdened by survivals of serfdom.*

While Russia's agricultural centre and agricultural borderlands show us, as it were, the spatial or geographical distribution of the localities in which one or the other type of agrarian evolution prevails, the fundamental features of both types of evolution are also clearly evident in *all* those localities where landlord and peasant farming exist side by side. A cardinal mistake of the Narodnik economists was that they believed that landlord farming was the only source of agrarian capitalism, while they regarded peasant farming from the point of view of "people's production" and the "labour principle" (that is the view taken even now by the Trudoviks, the "Popular Socialists", and the Socialist-Revolutionaries). We know that this is wrong. Landlord economy evolves in a capitalist way and gradually replaces the labour rent system by "free wage-labour", the three-field system by intensive cultivation, and the obsolete peasant implements by the improved machinery employed on the big private farms. Peasant farming *also evolves in a capitalist way* and gives rise to a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat. The better the condition of the "village commune" and the greater the prosperity of the peasantry in general, the *more rapid* is the process of differentiation among the peasantry into the antagonistic

* I have dealt in detail with the importance of the borderlands of Russia as colonisation lands during the development of capitalism in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. (St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 185, 444, et al.) Second edition issued, St. Petersburg, 1908. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 257, 562, 591-96.—*Ed.*) The question of the importance of the borderlands in regard to the Social-Democratic agrarian programme will be dealt with separately later on.

classes of capitalist agriculture. Consequently, we see two streams of agrarian evolution everywhere. The conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords which runs like a scarlet thread through the whole history of post-Reform Russia and constitutes the most important economic basis of our revolution, is a struggle for one or the other type of bourgeois agrarian evolution.

Only by clearly understanding the difference between these two types and the bourgeois character of *both*, can we correctly explain the agrarian question in the Russian revolution and grasp the class significance of the various agrarian programmes put forward by the different parties.* The pivot of the struggle, we repeat, is the feudal latifundia. The capitalist evolution of these is beyond all dispute, but it is possible in two forms: either they will be abolished, eliminated in a revolutionary manner by peasant farmers, or they will be gradually transformed into Junker estates (and correspondingly, the enthralled muzhik will be transformed into an enthralled *Knecht*).

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* The amount of confusion that reigns at times in the minds of Russian Social-Democrats about the two paths of bourgeois agrarian evolution in Russia is demonstrated by P Maslov. In *Obrazovaniye* (No. 3, 1907), he outlines two paths: (1) "capitalism in process of development" and (2) "a useless struggle against economic development". "The first path", if you please, "leads the working class and the whole of society towards socialism; the second path pushes [!] the working class into the arms [!] of the bourgeoisie, into a struggle between big and small proprietors, into a struggle from which the working class has nothing to gain but defeat" (p. 92). In the first place, the "second path" is an empty phrase, a dream and not a path, it is a false ideology, and not a real possibility of development. Secondly, Maslov fails to see that Stolypin and the bourgeoisie are also leading the peasantry along the capitalist road; consequently, the real struggle is not about capitalism as such, but about the type of capitalist development. Thirdly, it is sheer nonsense to talk as if there can be a path in Russia which will not "push" the working class under the domination of the bourgeoisie.... Fourthly, it is equally nonsensical to allege that there can be a "path" on which there will be no struggle between small and big proprietors. Fifthly, by the use of terms descriptive of general European categories (big and small proprietors), Maslov obscures the historical peculiarity of Russia which is of great significance in the present revolution: the struggle between petty-bourgeois and big feudal proprietors.

6. TWO LINES OF AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES IN THE REVOLUTION

If we now compare the agrarian programmes put forward by the different classes in the course of the revolution with the economic basis outlined above, we shall at once perceive two lines in these programmes, corresponding to the two types of agrarian evolution which we have indicated.

Let us take the Stolypin programme, which is supported by the Right landlords and the Octobrists. It is avowedly a landlords' programme. But can it be said that it is reactionary in the economic sense, i.e., that it precludes, or seeks to preclude, the development of capitalism, to prevent a bourgeois agrarian evolution? Not at all. On the contrary, the famous agrarian legislation introduced by Stolypin under Article 87 is permeated through and through with the purely bourgeois spirit. There can be no doubt that it follows the line of capitalist evolution, facilitates and pushes forward that evolution, hastens the expropriation of the peasantry, the break-up of the village commune, and the creation of a peasant bourgeoisie. Without a doubt, that legislation is progressive in the scientific-economic sense.

But does that mean that Social-Democrats should "support" it? It does not. Only vulgar Marxism can reason in that way, a Marxism whose seeds Plekhanov and the Mensheviks are so persistently sowing when they sing, shout, plead, and proclaim: we must support the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the old order of things. No. To facilitate the development of the productive forces (this highest criterion of social progress) we must support not bourgeois evolution of the landlord type, but bourgeois evolution of the peasant type. The former implies the utmost preservation of bondage and serfdom (remodelled on bourgeois lines), the least rapid development of the productive forces, and the retarded development of capitalism; it implies infinitely greater misery and suffering, exploitation and oppression for the broad mass of the peasantry and, consequently, also for the proletariat. The second type implies the most rapid development of the productive forces and

the best possible (under commodity production) conditions of existence for the mass of the peasantry. The tactics of Social-Democracy in the Russian bourgeois revolution are determined not by the task of supporting the liberal bourgeoisie, as the opportunists think, but by the task of supporting the fighting peasantry.

Let us take the programme of the liberal bourgeoisie, i.e., the Cadet programme. True to the motto: "at your service" (i.e., at the service of the landlords), they proposed one programme in the First Duma and another in the Second. They can change their programme as easily and imperceptibly as all the European unprincipled bourgeois careerists do. In the First Duma the revolution appeared to be strong, and so the liberal programme borrowed from it a bit of nationalisation (the "state land available for distribution"). In the Second Duma the counter-revolution appeared to be strong, and so the liberal programme threw the state land available for distribution overboard, swung round to the Stolypin idea of stable peasant property, strengthened and enlarged the scope of exemptions from the general rule of compulsory alienation of the landlords' land. But we note this two-faced attitude of the liberals only in passing. The important thing to note here is something else, viz., the principle which is *common to both "faces"* of the liberal agrarian programme. That common principle consists of: (1) redemption payments; (2) preservation of the landlords' estates; (3) preservation of the landlords' privileges when carrying out the reform.

Redemption payment is tribute imposed upon social development, tribute paid to the owners of the feudal latifundia. Redemption payment is the realisation, ensured by bureaucratic, police measures, of the feudal methods of exploitation in the shape of the bourgeois "universal equivalent". Further, preservation of the landlords' estates is seen *in one or another* degree in both Cadet programmes, no matter how the bourgeois politicians may try to conceal that fact from the people. The third point—the preservation of the landlords' privileges when carrying out the reform—is quite definitely expressed in the Cadets' attitude to the election of local land committees on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret bal-

lot. We cannot here go into details* which concern another part of our argument. All we need do here is to define the line of the Cadet agrarian programme. And in this connection we must say that the question of the composition of the local land committees is of *cardinal* importance. Only political infants could be taken in by the sound of the Cadet slogan of "*compulsory* alienation". The question is, who will compel whom? Will the landlords compel the peasants (to pay an exorbitant price for inferior land), or will the peasants compel the landlords? The Cadet talk "about equal representation of the conflicting interests" and about the undesirability of "one-sided violence" reveals as clear as clear can be the essence of the matter, namely, that the Cadet idea of compulsory alienation means that the landlords will compel the peasants!

The Cadet agrarian programme follows the line of Stolypin progress, i.e., landlord bourgeois progress. That is a fact. Failure to appreciate this fact is the fundamental mistake made by those Social-Democrats who, like some of

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* See the records of the First Duma, 14th sitting, May 24, 1906, which show that the Cadets Kokoshkin and Kotlyarevsky, hand in hand with the (then) Octobrist Heyden, resorted to the basest sophistry to repudiate the idea of local land committees. In the Second Duma: the evasions by the Cadet Savelyev (16th sitting, March 26, 1907) and the open opposition to the idea of local committees by the Cadet Tatarinov (24th sitting, April 9, 1907, p. 1783 of Stenographic Record). The newspaper *Rech*, No. 82, for May 25, 1906, contained a noteworthy leading article which is reprinted in Milyukov's *A Year of Struggle*, No. 117, pp. 457-59. Here is the decisive passage from this Octobrist in disguise: "We believe that setting up these committees on the basis of universal suffrage would mean preparing them not for the peaceful solution of the land problem in the local areas, but for something entirely different. Control of the general direction of the reform ought to be left in the hands of the state.... The local commissions should consist as equally as possible [*sic*!] of representatives of the conflicting interests which can be reconciled without impairing the state importance of the proposed reform, and without turning it into an act of one-sided violence"... (p. 459). In the Cadet *Agrarian Question*, Vol. II, Mr. Kutler published the text of his Bill which *ensures* to the landlords, plus the officials, *preponderance* over the peasants in *all* the principal, Gubernia and uyezd land commissions and committees (pp. 640-41), while Mr. A. Chuprov—a "liberal"—defends on principle the same despicable plan of the landlords to swindle the peasants (p. 33).

the Mensheviks, regard the Cadet agrarian policy as being more progressive than the Narodnik policy.

As for the spokesmen of the peasantry, i.e., the Trudoviks, the Social-Narodniks, and partly the Socialist-Revolutionaries, we find that, *in spite of* considerable vacillation and wavering, they, in both Dumas, adopted a very clear line of defending the interests of the peasantry *against* the landlords. For instance, vacillation is observed in the programme of the Trudoviks on the question of redemption payments, but, in the first place, they frequently interpret that as something in the nature of public relief for disabled landlords*; secondly, in the records of the Second Duma one can find a number of exceedingly characteristic speeches by *peasants repudiating* redemption payments and proclaiming the slogan: all the land to all the people.** On the question of the local land committees—this all-important question as to who will compel whom—the peasant deputies are the originators and supporters of the idea of having them elected by universal suffrage.

We are not, for the time being, dealing with the content of the agrarian programmes of the Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the one hand, and the Social-Democrats, on the other. We must first of all note the incontrovertible fact that the agrarian programmes of *all* the parties and classes which came out openly in the Russian revolution can be clearly divided into *two* basic types, corresponding to the two types of bourgeois agrarian evolution. The dividing line between the "Right" and "Left" agrarian programmes does not run between the Octobrists

* See *Sbornik "Izvestii Krestyanskikh Deputatov" i "Trudovoi Rossii"* (*The Symposium of "Peasant Deputies' News" and "Toiling Russia"*), St. Petersburg, 1906, a collection of *newspaper* articles by the Trudoviks in the First Duma; for instance, the article entitled "Grants, Not Redemption Payments" (pp. 44-49), et al.

** See the speech made by the *Right-wing* peasant deputy Petrochenko in the Second Duma (22nd sitting, April 5, 1907): Kutler, he said, proposed good conditions.... "Of course, being a wealthy man he has named a high figure, and we, poor peasants, cannot pay such a price" (p. 1616). Thus, the *Right-wing* peasant is *more* to the *left* than the bourgeois politician who is playing at being a liberal. See also the speech of the *non-party* peasant deputy Semyonov (April 12, 1907), which breathes the spirit of the spontaneous revolutionary struggle of the peasants, and many other speeches.

and the Cadets, as is frequently and mistakenly assumed by the Mensheviks (who allow themselves to be taken in by the sound of "constitutional-democratic" words and substitute analysis of the respective titles of the parties for a class analysis). The dividing line runs between the Cadets and the Trudoviks. That line is determined by *the interests of the two principal classes* in Russian society which are fighting for the land, viz., the landlords and the peasantry. The Cadets stand for the preservation of landlordism and for a civilised, European, but *landlord* bourgeois evolution of agriculture. The Trudoviks (and the Social-Democratic workers' deputies), i.e., the representatives of the peasantry and the representatives of the proletariat, advocate a *peasant* bourgeois evolution of agriculture.

A strict distinction must be drawn between the ideological cloak of the agrarian programmes, their different political details, etc., and the economic basis of those programmes. The present difficulty does not lie in understanding the bourgeois character of the agrarian demands and programmes of both the landlords *and the peasants*: that was already explained by the Marxists before the revolution, and the revolution has confirmed the correctness of their explanation. The difficulty lies in understanding fully the basis of the struggle between the two classes *within the framework* of bourgeois society and bourgeois evolution. The fact that this struggle is a normal social phenomenon will not be understood unless it is seen as part and parcel of the objective tendencies of the economic development of capitalist Russia.

Now, having shown the connection between the two types of agrarian programmes in the Russian revolution and the two types of bourgeois agrarian evolution, we must pass on to the examination of a new, extremely important aspect of the question.

7. RUSSIA'S LAND AREA. THE QUESTION OF THE COLONISATION

We have pointed out above that on the question of capitalism in Russia the economic analysis compels us to distinguish between the central agricultural provinces with

their plentiful survivals of serfdom, and the borderlands where those survivals are absent, or weak, and which bear the features of free-peasant capitalist evolution.

What do we mean by the borderlands? Obviously, lands which are unpopulated, or sparsely populated, and which have not been completely drawn into agriculture. And we must now pass from European Russia to the whole of the Russian Empire in order to form an exact idea of these "borderlands" and of their economic significance.

In the pamphlet written by Prokopovich and Mertvago, *How Much Land There Is in Russia and How We Use It* (Moscow, 1907), the latter of those authors tries to summarise all the statistical data available in our literature on the amount of land in the *whole* of Russia and the economic use to which the known amount of land is put. For the sake of clarity, we shall quote Mr. Mertvago's figures in the form of a table, and add the statistics of the population according to the census of 1897.

These figures plainly show how vast is the land area of Russia and how little we know about the borderlands and their economic importance. Of course, it would be absolutely wrong to regard those lands at the present time, and in their present state, as being suitable for satisfying the land needs of the Russian peasantry. All calculations of that kind, frequently made by reactionary writers,* are of no scientific value whatever. In this respect Mr. A. A. Kaufman is quite right when he ridicules the search for vacant lands for colonisation on the basis of statistics of square versts. Undoubtedly he is also right when he points out how little land is suitable for colonisation in the borderlands of Russia at the present time, and how wrong it is

* Also by reactionary deputies. In the Second Duma the Octobrist Teterevenkov cited from Shcherbina's investigations figures of 65,000,000 dessiatins of land in the steppe region, and further figures of the amount of land in the Altai territory—39,000,000 dessiatins—to prove that there is no need for compulsory alienation in European Russia. Here is an example of a bourgeois joining hands with the feudal landlord for joint "progress" in the Stolypin spirit. (See Stenographic Record, Second Duma, 39th sitting, May 16, 1907, pp. 658-61.)

	Land area of the whole of Russia								Population according to census of 1897	
	Total land area		Of which		Of which					
	Square versts (thousands)	Dessiatins (millions)	No Data available	Registered land areas	Arable land	Meadows	Forests	Total	Total (thousands)	Average per sq verst
			Millions of dessiatins		Millions of dessiatins					
10 gubernias of the Kingdom of Poland	111.6	11.6	—	11.6	7.4	0.9	2.5	10.8	9,402.2	84.3
38 gubernias west of the Volga	1,755.6	183.0	—	183.0	93.6	18.7	34.0	146.3	—	—
12 gubernias north and east of the Volga	2,474.9	258.0	—	258.0	22.3	7.1	132.0	161.4	—	—
Total for 50 gubernias of European Russia	4,230.5	441.0	—	441.0	115.9	25.8	166.0	307.7	93,442.9	22.1
Caucasus	411.7	42.9	22.1	20.8	6.5	2.2	2.5	11.2	9,289.4	22.6
Siberia	10,966.1	1,142.6	639.7	502.9	4.3	3.9	121.0	129.2	5,758.8	0.5
Central Asia	3,141.6	327.3	157.4	169.9	0.9	1.6	8.0	10.5	7,746.7	2.5
Total for Asiatic Russia	14,519.4	1,512.8	819.2	693.6	11.7	7.7	131.5	150.9	—	—
Total for Russian Empire*	18,861.5	1,965.4	819.2	1,146.2	135.0	34.4	300.0	469.4	125,640.0	6.7

* Exclusive of Finland

to presume that the land hunger of the Russian peasantry can be satisfied by migration.*

These correct arguments of Mr. Kaufman, the liberal, contain, nevertheless, a very serious mistake. Mr. Kaufman argues in this way: "Considering the type of people who now migrate, their present degree of prosperity, and their present cultural level" (p. 129 of the book mentioned), the amount of land available for satisfying the needs of the Russian peasants by means of migration is absolutely insufficient. Consequently, he concludes in defence of the Cadet agrarian programme, compulsory alienation of private land in European Russia is essential.

That is the usual argument of our liberal and liberal-Narodnik economists. It is so constructed as to lead to the conclusion that if there were sufficient land suitable for migration, the feudal latifundia could be left intact! The Cadets and other politicians of the same kind are thoroughly permeated with the ideas of the well-meaning official; they claim to stand above classes and above the class struggle. The feudal latifundia must be done away with not because they imply the feudal exploitation and bondage of millions of the population and retard the development of the productive forces, but because millions of families cannot be immediately packed off to, say, Siberia or Turkestan! The stress is laid not upon the feudal class character of the latifundia in Russia, but upon the possibility of reconciling the classes, of satisfying the peasant without injuring the landlord; in short, upon the possibility of bringing about the notorious "social peace".

The arguments of Mr. Kaufman and his innumerable followers among the Russian intelligentsia have to be turned upside down to be put right. *Since* the Russian peasant is crushed by the feudal latifundia, *for that reason* both the free settlement of the population over the territory of Russia and the rational economic use of the bulk of her borderlands are incredibly retarded. *Since* the feudal lati-

* *The Agrarian Question*, published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. 1, article by Mr. Kaufman: "Migration and Its Role in the Agrarian Programme". See also the work by the same author: *Migration and Colonisation*, St. Petersburg, 1905.

fundia are keeping the Russian peasantry in a downtrodden state, and perpetuate, through the labour-service system and bondage, the most backward forms and methods of land cultivation, *for that reason* both the technical progress and the mental development of the mass of the peasants are hindered, as also their activity, initiative, and education, which are essential for the economic utilisation of a far larger area of the Russian land reserves than is utilised today. For the feudal latifundia and the predominance of bondage in agriculture imply also a corresponding political superstructure—the predominance of the Black-Hundred landlord in the state, the disfranchisement of the population, the prevalence of Gurko-Lidval methods of administration,[101] and so on and so forth.

That the feudal latifundia in central agricultural Russia are having a disastrous effect upon the whole social system, upon social development as a whole, upon the entire condition of agriculture, and upon the whole standard of living of the masses of the peasantry, is a matter of common knowledge. I only have to refer here to the vast Russian economic literature which has proved the prevalence in Central Russia of labour-service, bondage, rack rent, "winter hiring", and other charming aspects of medievalism.*

The fall of serfdom created conditions which (as I pointed out in detail in *The Development of Capitalism*) caused the population to *flee* from those haunts of the last descendants of the serf-owners. The population fled from the central agricultural area to the industrial gubernias, to the capitals, and to the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia, and settled in hitherto uninhabited lands. In the pamphlet I have mentioned, Mr. Mertvago quite truly remarks, by the way, that the conception of what sort of land is unsuitable for agriculture is liable to undergo rapid change.

"'The Taurida steppes,'" he writes, "'owing to the climate and the scarcity of water, will *always* be one of the poorest and least suitable regions for cultivation.' That

* See *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapter III, on the transition from corvée to capitalist economy and the spread of the labour-service system. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 191-251.—*Ed.*)

was the opinion expressed in 1845 by such authoritative observers of nature as Academicians Beer and Helmersen. At that time the population of Taurida Gubernia, a half of what it is now, produced 1,800,000 chetverts of grain of all kinds.... Now, after a lapse of 60 years, the population has doubled, and in 1903, it produced 17,600,000 chetverts, i.e., nearly ten times as much" (p. 24).

That is true not only of Taurida Gubernia, but of a number of other gubernias in the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia. The southern steppes, and also the gubernias on the left bank of the Volga, which in the sixties and seventies lagged behind the central black-earth gubernias in the output of grain, *outstripped* those provinces in the eighties (*The Development of Capitalism*, p. 186).* Between 1863 and 1897 the population of the whole of European Russia increased by 53 per cent—48 per cent in the case of the rural and 97 per cent in the case of the urban population—whereas in Novorossia, the Lower Volga, and eastern gubernias, the population increased during the same period by 92 per cent—87 per cent increase in the rural population and 134 per cent increase in the urban population (ibid., p. 446).**

"We have no doubt," Mr. Mertvago continues, "that the present bureaucratic estimate of the economic importance of our land reserves is not less mistaken than that of Beer and Helmersen concerning Taurida Gubernia in 1845" (ibid.).

That is correct. But Mr. Mertvago fails to see the *source* of Beer's mistakes, and of the mistakes of all bureaucratic estimates. The source of those mistakes is that while taking into consideration the given level of technique and culture, no allowance is made for the advance of this level. Beer and Helmersen did not foresee the technical changes that became possible *after the fall of serfdom*. And there cannot be the least doubt now that a tremendous increase in the productive forces, a tremendous rise in the technical and cultural level will inevitably *follow the break-up of the feudal latifundia in European Russia.*

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* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 257.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 563-65.—*Ed.*

This aspect of the matter is overlooked by many students of the agrarian problem in Russia. The prerequisite for the wide utilisation of the vast Russian lands available for colonisation is the creation in European Russia of a really free peasantry, completely liberated from the oppression of feudal relations. A considerable portion of these lands is unsuitable at the present time, not so much because of the *natural* properties of this or that borderland, but because of the *social* conditions of agriculture in Russia proper, which doom technical methods to stagnation and the population to a rightless status, downtroddenness, ignorance, and helplessness.

It is this exceedingly important aspect of the matter that Mr. Kaufman overlooks when he declares: "I say in advance: I do not know whether it will be possible to settle one, three, or ten million on those lands" (ibid., p. 128). He goes on to point out that the term unsuitable land is only relative: "The alkali soils, far from being absolutely hopeless, can, with the application of certain technical methods, be made very fertile" (ibid., p. 129). In Turkestan, with a population density of 3.6 to the square verst, "vast areas are still uninhabited" (ibid., p. 137). "The soil of many of the 'hungry deserts' of Turkestan consists of the famous Central Asiatic loess which becomes highly fertile if sufficiently irrigated.... The existence of irrigable lands is a question that is not even worth while discussing: it is sufficient to cross the country in any direction to see the ruins of numerous villages and towns, abandoned centuries ago, frequently surrounded for scores of square versts by networks of ancient irrigation canals and ditches. The total area of loess desert awaiting irrigation undoubtedly amounts to many millions of dessiatins" (ibid., p. 137).

All these millions of dessiatins in Turkestan, as well as in many other parts of Russia, are "awaiting" not only irrigation and reclamation of every kind. They are also "awaiting" the emancipation of the Russian agricultural population from the survivals of serfdom, from the yoke of the nobility's latifundia, and from the Black-Hundred dictatorship in the state.

It is idle to speculate on the actual amount of land in Russia that could be converted from "unsuitable" into suit-

able land. But it is necessary clearly to appreciate the fact, which is demonstrated by the whole economic history of Russia, and which is an outstanding feature of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, viz., that Russia possesses a gigantic amount of land available for colonisation, which will be rendered accessible to the population and accessible to culture, not only by every technical advance of agriculture, but also by every advance in the emancipation of the Russian peasantry from the yoke of serfdom.

This forms the economic basis for the bourgeois evolution of Russian agriculture on the American model. In the countries of Western Europe, which our Marxists so often draw upon for thoughtless and stereotyped comparisons, all the land was already occupied in the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The only new thing brought about by every technical advance in agriculture was that it became possible to invest more labour and capital in the land. In Russia, the bourgeois-democratic revolution is taking place under conditions in which every technical advance in agriculture, and every advance in the development of real liberty for the population, not only creates the possibility for additional investment of labour and capital in old lands, but also the possibility for utilising "boundless" tracts of adjacent new lands.

8. SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC DEDUCTIONS OF CHAPTER I

Let us sum up the economic deductions which are to serve as an introduction to the re-examination of the question of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme.

We have seen that the "pivot" of the agrarian struggle in our revolution is the feudal latifundia. The peasants' struggle for the land is, first and foremost, a struggle for the abolition of these latifundia. Their abolition and their complete transfer to the peasantry undoubtedly coincide with the line of the capitalist evolution of Russian agriculture. Such a path of this evolution would mean the most rapid development of productive forces, the best conditions of labour for the mass of the population, and the most rapid development of capitalism, with the conversion of

the free peasants into farmers. But another path of bourgeois evolution of agriculture is possible, viz., the preservation of the landlord farms and latifundia and their slow conversion from farms based on serfdom and bondage into Junker farms. It is these two types of possible bourgeois evolution that form the basis of the two types of agrarian programmes proposed by different classes in the Russian revolution. Moreover, a special feature of Russia, a feature that is one of the economic foundations for the possibility of the "American" evolution, is the existence of vast lands available for colonisation. While entirely unsuitable for emancipating the Russian peasantry from the yoke of serfdom in European Russia, these lands will become more extensive and more accessible in proportion to the freedom enjoyed by the peasantry in Russia proper, and to the scope of development of the productive forces.

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CHAPTER II

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND THEIR TEST IN THE FIRST REVOLUTION

Let us pass to an examination of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme. I outlined the chief historical stages in the evolution of the views of Russian Social-Democrats on the agrarian question in the first section of the pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*.* We must explain more fully the nature of the mistake contained in the previous agrarian programmes of Russian Social-Democracy, i.e., in the programmes of 1885 and 1903.

1. WHAT WAS THE MISTAKE IN THE PREVIOUS AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY?

In the draft issued by the Emancipation of Labour group in 1885, the agrarian programme was outlined as follows: "A radical revision of our agrarian relations, i.e., of the terms on which the land is to be redeemed and allotted to the peasant communities. The right to refuse their allot-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 169-74.—*Ed.*

ments and to leave the commune to be granted to those peasants who may find it advantageous to do so, etc."

That is all. The error of that programme is not that its principles or partial demands were wrong. No. Its principles are correct, while the only partial demand it puts forward (the right to refuse allotments) is so incontestable that it has now been carried out by Stolypin's peculiar legislation. The error of that programme is its abstract character, the absence of any concrete view of the subject. Properly speaking, it is not a programme, but a Marxist declaration in the most general terms. Of course, it would be absurd to put the blame for this mistake on the authors of the programme, who for the first time laid down certain principles long before the formation of a workers' party. On the contrary, it should be particularly emphasised that in that programme the inevitability of a "radical revision" of the Peasant Reform was recognised twenty years before the Russian revolution.

Theoretically that programme should have been developed by clarifying the economic basis of our agrarian programme, the facts upon which the demand for a *radical* revision, as distinct from a non-radical, reformist revision can and should be based, and finally, by concretely defining the nature of this revision from the standpoint of the proletariat (which differs essentially from the general radical standpoint). Practically the programme should have been developed by taking into account the *experience* of the peasant movement. Without the experience of a mass—indeed, more than that—of a nation-wide peasant movement, the programme of the Social-Democratic Labour Party *could not* become concrete; for it would have been too difficult, if not impossible, on the basis of theoretical reasoning alone, to define the degree to which capitalist disintegration had taken place among our peasantry, and to what extent the latter was capable of bringing about a revolutionary-democratic change.

In 1903, when the Second Congress of our Party adopted the first agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., we did not yet have such experience as would enable us to judge the character, breadth, and depth of the peasant movement. The peasant risings in South Russia in the spring of 1902 remained

sporadic outbursts. One can therefore understand the restraint shown by the Social-Democrats in drafting the agrarian programme: it is not the proletariat's business to "devise" such a programme for bourgeois society, and the extent to which the peasant movement against the survivals of serfdom, a movement worthy of proletarian support, was likely to develop was still unknown.

The 1903 programme attempts to define concretely the nature and terms of the "revision" about which the Social-Democrats in 1885 spoke only in a general way. That attempt—in the main item of the programme, dealing with the cut-off lands—was based upon a tentative distinction between lands which serve for exploitation by means of serfdom and bondage ("lands 'cut off' in 1861") and lands which are exploited in a capitalist manner. Such a tentative distinction was quite fallacious, because, in practice, the peasant mass movement could not be directed against particular categories of landlord estates, but only against landlordism in general. The programme of 1903 *raised* a question which had not yet been raised in 1885, namely, the question of the conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords at the moment of the revision of agrarian relations, which all Social-Democrats regarded as inevitable. But the solution given to this question in the programme of 1903 is not correct, for, instead of contraposing the consistently peasant to the consistently Junker method of carrying out the bourgeois revolution, the programme artificially sets up something intermediate. Here, too, we must make allowance for the fact that the absence of an open mass movement at that time made it impossible to solve this question on the basis of precise data, and not on the basis of phrases, or innocent wishes, or petty-bourgeois utopias, as the Socialist-Revolutionaries did. No one could say in advance with certainty to what extent disintegration among the peasantry had progressed as a result of the partial transition of the landlords from the labour-service system to wage-labour. No one could estimate how large was the stratum of agricultural labourers which had arisen after the Reform of 1861 and to what extent their interests had become separated from those of the ruined peasant masses.

At all events, the fundamental mistake in the agrarian programme of 1903 was the absence of a clear idea of the issue around which the agrarian struggle could and should develop in the process of the bourgeois revolution in Russia—a clear idea of the *types* of capitalist agrarian evolution that were objectively possible as the result of the victory of one or other of the social forces engaged in this struggle.

2. THE PRESENT AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The present agrarian programme of the Social-Democratic Party, which was adopted at the Stockholm Congress, marks a great step forward in comparison with the preceding one in one important respect, viz., by recognising confiscation of the landlords'* estates, the Social-Democratic Party resolutely took the path of recognising the *peasant* agrarian revolution. The words in the programme: "...supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including the confiscation of the landlords' estates", quite definitely express that idea. In the course of the discussion at the Stockholm Congress, one of the reporters, Plekhanov, who together with John[102] sponsored that programme, spoke frankly about the necessity of ceasing to be afraid of a "*peasant agrarian revolution*". (See Plekhanov's report. Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, Moscow, 1907, p. 42.)

One would have thought that this admission—that our bourgeois revolution in the sphere of agrarian relations must be regarded as a "*peasant* agrarian revolution"—would have put an end to the major differences of opinion among Social-Democrats on the question of the agrarian programme. Actually, however, differences arose over the question whether Social-Democrats should support division of the landlords' estates among the peasants as private property, or municipalisation of the landlords' estates, or nationalisation of all the land. First of all, therefore, we must definitely establish the fact, all too often forgotten by Social-Democrats, that these questions can be correctly answered

* The text of the programme (Point 4) speaks of *privately owned* lands. The resolution appended to the programme (the second part of the agrarian programme) speaks of confiscation of the *landlords*' estates.

only from the standpoint of the *peasant* agrarian revolution in Russia. Of course, it is not a question of Social-Democracy refraining from independently defining the interests of the proletariat, as a separate class, in this peasant revolution. No. It is a question of having a clear idea of the character and significance of the peasant agrarian revolution as one of the forms of the bourgeois revolution in general. We cannot "invent" any particular reform "project". We must study the objective conditions of the peasant agrarian revolution in capitalistically developing Russia; on the basis of this objective analysis, we must separate the erroneous ideology of the different classes from the real content of the economic changes, and determine what, on the basis of those real economic changes, is required for the development of the productive forces and for the proletarian class struggle.

The present agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. recognises (in a special form) the conversion of the confiscated lands into public property (nationalisation of forests, waters and lands for colonisation, and municipalisation of privately owned lands), at any rate in the event of the "victorious development of the revolution". In the event of "unfavourable conditions", the principle of *dividing* the landlords' lands among the peasants as private property is adopted. In all cases, the property rights of the peasants and small landowners generally to their present holdings are recognised. Consequently, the programme provides for a *dual* system of land tenure in a renovated bourgeois Russia: private ownership of land, and (at least in the event of the victorious development of the revolution) public ownership in the form of municipalisation and nationalisation.

How did the authors of the programme account for this duality? First of all, and above all, by the interests and demands of the peasantry, by the fear of drifting apart from the peasantry, the fear of setting the peasantry against the proletariat and against the revolution. By advancing *such* an argument the authors and the supporters of the programme took the stand of recognising the *peasant* agrarian revolution, the stand of proletarian support for definite peasant demands. And that argument was advanced by the most influential supporters of the programme, headed

by Comrade John! To become convinced of this, it is sufficient to glance at the Minutes of the Stockholm Congress.

That argument was directly and categorically advanced by Comrade John in his report. "If the revolution," he said, "were to lead to an attempt to nationalise the peasants' allotments, or to nationalise the lands confiscated from the landlords, as Comrade Lenin suggests, such a measure would lead to a counter-revolutionary movement, not only in the borderlands, but also in the central part of the country. We would have not one Vendée,[103] but a general revolt of the peasantry against attempts by the state to interfere with the peasants' *own* [John's italics] allotments, against attempts to nationalise the latter." (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 40.)

That seems clear, does it not? The nationalisation of the peasants' *own* lands would lead to a general revolt of the peasantry! That is the reason why Comrade X's original municipalisation scheme, which had proposed to transfer to the Zemstvos *not only* the private lands, but "if possible" all the lands (quoted by me in the pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party**), was replaced by Maslov's municipalisation scheme, which proposed *to exempt* the peasants' lands. Indeed, how could they ignore the fact, discovered after 1903, about the inevitable peasant revolt against attempts at complete nationalisation? How could they refrain from adopting the standpoint of another noted Menshevik, Kostrov,[104] who exclaimed in Stockholm:

"To go to the peasants with it [nationalisation] means antagonising them. The peasant movement will go on apart from or against us, and we shall find ourselves thrown overboard in the revolution. Nationalisation deprives Social-Democracy of its strength, isolates it from the peasantry and thus also deprives the revolution of its strength" (p. 88).

One cannot deny the force of that argument. To try to nationalise the peasants' *own* land against their wishes in a peasant agrarian revolution! Since the Stockholm Congress believed John and Kostrov, it is not surprising that it rejected that idea.

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 172.—*Ed.*

But was not the Congress wrong in believing them?

In view of the importance of the question of an all-Russian Vendée against nationalisation, a brief reference to history will not be out of place.

3. THE CHIEF ARGUMENT OF THE MUNICIPALISERS TESTED BY EVENTS

The above-quoted categorical assertions of John and Kostrov were made in April 1906, i.e., on the eve of the First Duma. I argued (see my pamphlet *Revision*, etc.*) that the peasantry was in favour of nationalisation, but I was told that the decisions of the congresses of the Peasant Union[105] did not prove anything, that they were inspired by the ideologists of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, that the masses of the peasants would never support such demands.

Since then this question has been documentarily answered by the First and Second Dumas. The representatives of the peasantry from all parts of Russia spoke in the First and particularly in the Second Duma. No one, with the possible exception of the publicists of *Rossiya*[106] and *Novoye Vremya*, could deny that the political and economic demands of the peasant *masses* found expression in both those Dumas. One would have thought that the idea of nationalising the peasants' lands should be finally buried now, after the independent declarations made by the peasant deputies in the presence of the other parties. One would have thought that the supporters of John and Kostrov could easily have got the peasant deputies to raise an outcry in the Duma against nationalisation. One would have thought that Social-Democracy, led by the Mensheviks, should really have "isolated" from the revolution the advocates of nationalisation who are rousing an all-Russian counter-revolutionary Vendée.

As a matter of fact, something different happened. In the First Duma it was Stishinsky and Gurko who showed concern for the peasants' *own* (John's italics) lands. In both Dumas it was the extreme Right-wingers who, jointly

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp, 165-95.—*Ed.*

with the spokesmen of the government, defended private ownership of the land and were opposed to any form of public ownership of land, whether by municipalisation, nationalisation, or socialisation. In both Dumas it was the peasant deputies from all parts of Russia who declared for *nationalisation*.

Comrade Maslov wrote in 1905: "Nationalisation of the land as a means of solving [?] the agrarian problem in Russia at the present time cannot be accepted, first of all [note this "first of all"] because it is hopelessly utopian. Nationalisation of the land presupposes the transfer of *all* the land to the state. But will the peasants, and particularly the homestead peasants, voluntarily agree to transfer their land to anyone?" (P. Maslov, *A Critique of Agrarian Programmes*, Moscow, 1905, p. 20.)

Thus, in 1905, nationalisation was "first of all" hopelessly utopian because the peasants would not agree to it.

In 1907, in March, the same Maslov wrote: "All the Narodnik groups [the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries] are advocating nationalisation of the land in one form or another." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 100.)

There's your new Vendée! There's your all-Russian revolt of the peasants against nationalisation!

But instead of pondering over the ridiculous position in which the people who spoke and wrote about a peasant Vendée against nationalisation now find themselves, in the light of the experience of the two Dumas, instead of trying to explain the mistake which he made in 1905, P. Maslov behaved like Ivan the Forgetful. He preferred to *forget* the words I have just quoted, and the speeches at the Stockholm Congress! Moreover, with the same lightheartedness with which he, in 1905, asserted that *the peasants would not agree*, he now asserts the *opposite*. Listen:

..."The Narodniks, reflecting the interests and hopes of the small proprietors [listen to this!], had to declare in favour of nationalisation" (ibid.).

There you have a sample of the scientific scrupulousness of our municipalisers! In solving a difficult problem *before* the elected representatives of the peasants from the whole of Russia made their political declarations, the

municipalisers, *on behalf of* the small proprietors, asserted one thing; and *after* those declarations in the two Dumas they assert, on behalf of the very same "small proprietors", the very opposite.

It should be mentioned, as a particular curiosity, that Maslov explains this tendency towards nationalisation on the part of the Russian peasants as being due not to any special conditions of the peasant agrarian revolution, but to the *general characteristics* of the small proprietor in capitalist society. That is incredible, but it is a fact:

"The small proprietor," Maslov announces, "is most of all afraid of the competition and domination of the big proprietor, of the domination of capital".... You are mixing things up, Mr. Maslov. To put the big (*feudal*) landowner on a par with the owner of capital means repeating the prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie. The peasant is fighting so energetically against the feudal latifundia precisely because at the present historical moment he represents the free, capitalist evolution of agriculture.

> ..."Being unable to contend with capital in the economic field, the small proprietor puts his faith in government authority, which should come to the aid of the small proprietor against the big one.... The reason the Russian peasant has hoped for centuries to be protected from the landlords and government officials by the central authority, the reason Napoleon in France relying for support on the peasants, was able to crush the Republic was the hope the peasants entertained of receiving aid from the central authority." (*Obrazovaniye*, p. 100.)

How magnificently Pyotr Maslov argues! In the first place, what has nationalisation of the land to do with the fact that at the present historical moment the Russian peasant is displaying the same characteristics as the French peasant under Napoleon? The French peasant under Napoleon was not and could not be in favour of nationalisation. You are rather incoherent, Mr. Maslov!

Secondly, what has the struggle against capital to do with it? We are comparing peasant ownership of land with the nationalisation of all the land, including that of the peasants. The French peasant under Napoleon clung fanatically to the small property as a barrier against capital, but the Russian peasant.... Once again, my dear fellow,

where is the connection between the beginning and the end of your argument?

Thirdly, in speaking about the hopes placed in government authority, Maslov makes it appear that the peasants do not understand the harmfulness of bureaucracy, do not understand the importance of local self-government, whereas he, the progressive Pyotr Maslov, does appreciate all this. This criticism of the Narodniks is much too simplified. A reference to the famous Land Bill (the Bill of the 104), which the Trudoviks introduced in the First and Second Dumas, will suffice to show the falsity of Maslov's argument (or hint?). The facts show, *on the contrary*, that the principles of local self-government and of hostility towards a bureaucratic solution of the land problem are *more clearly* expressed in the Trudovik Bill than in the programme of the Social-Democrats written according to Maslov! In our programme we speak only about "democratic principles" in electing local bodies, whereas the Trudovik Bill (Clause 16) distinctly and directly provides for the election of local self-governing bodies on the basis of "universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot". Moreover, the Bill provides for local land committees—which, as is known, the Social-Democrats support—to be elected in the same way, and which are to organise the discussion on the land reform and make preparations for carrying it out (Clauses 17-20). The bureaucratic method of carrying out the agrarian reform was advocated by the *Cadets*, and not by the Trudoviks, by the liberal bourgeoisie, and not by the peasants. Why did Maslov have to distort these well-known facts?

Fourthly, in his remarkable "explanation" of why the small proprietors "had to declare in favour of nationalisation", Maslov lays stress on the peasants' hope of receiving protection from the *central* authority. That is the point of distinction between municipalisation and nationalisation: in the one case there are local authorities, in the other case, the central authority. That is Maslov's pet idea, the economic and political implications of which we shall deal with in greater detail further on. Here we will point out that Maslov is *dodging* the question put to him by the history of our revolution, namely, why the peasants *are*

not afraid of the nationalisation of *their own* land. That is the crux of the question!

But that is not all. A particularly piquant feature of Maslov's attempt to explain the class roots of the Trudovik policy of nationalisation as against municipalisation is the following: Maslov *conceals from his readers* the fact that on the question of the actual disposal of the land the Narodniks were *also in favour of local self-governing bodies*! Maslov's talk about the peasants placing their "hopes" in the *central* authority is mere intellectualist tittle-tattle about the peasants. Read Clause 16 of the Land Bill that the Trudoviks introduced in both Dumas. Here is the text of this clause:

> "The management of the national land fund must be entrusted to local self-governing bodies, elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, which shall act independently within the limits laid down by the law."

Compare this with the corresponding demand made in our programme: "...The R.S.D.L.P. demands: ... (4) the confiscation of privately owned lands, except small holdings, which shall be placed at the disposal of large local self-governing bodies (comprising urban and rural districts, as per Point 3) to be elected on democratic principles"....

What is the difference here from the point of view of the comparative rights of central and local authorities? In what way does "management" differ from "disposal"?

Why, in speaking about the attitude of the Trudoviks towards nationalisation, did Maslov have to conceal from his readers—and perhaps from himself too—the contents of this Clause 16? Because it *completely* shatters the whole of his absurd "municipalisation" theory.

Examine the arguments in favour of this municipalisation that Maslov advanced before the Stockholm Congress, read the Minutes of that Congress; you will find innumerable allusions to the impossibility of suppressing nationalities, of oppressing the borderlands, of ignoring the differences of local interests, etc., etc. Even prior to the Stockholm Congress, I had pointed out to Maslov (see *Revision*, *etc.*, p. 18*) that *all* arguments of this kind are a "sheer mis-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 182.—*Ed.*

understanding" because our programme—I said—already recognised the right of self-determination of nationalities as well as *wide* local *and regional* self-government. Consequently, from *that* aspect, there was no need, nor was it possible, to devise any additional "guarantees" against excessive centralisation, bureaucracy, and regulation, because that would be either devoid of content or would be interpreted in an anti-proletarian, federalist spirit.

The Trudoviks have demonstrated to the municipalisers that I was right.

Maslov must admit now that *all* the groups that voice the interests and the point of view of the peasantry have declared in favour of nationalisation *in a form* that will ensure the rights and powers of the local self-governing bodies no less than in Maslov's programme! The law defining the powers of the local self-governing bodies is to be passed by the central parliament. Maslov does not say that, but such ostrich-like tactics will be of no avail, because no other procedure is conceivable.

The words "placed at the *disposal*" introduce the utmost confusion. Nobody knows who are to be the *owners** of the lands confiscated from the landlords! That being the case, the owner can *only* be the state. What does "disposal" consist of? What are to be its limits, forms, and conditions? That, too, will have to be determined by the *central* parliament. That is self-evident, and, moreover, in our Party's programme special mention is made of "forests of national importance" and of "lands available for colonisation". Obviously, only the central state authority is in a position *to single out* the "forests of national importance" from the general mass of forest land, and, the "lands available for colonisation" from the total land area.

In short, the Maslov programme, which, in a particularly distorted form, has now become the programme of our Party, is *quite absurd* in comparison with the Trudovik pro-

* At the Stockholm Congress the Mensheviks *rejected* an amendment to substitute for the words "placed at the disposal", the words "made the private property" (Minutes, p. 152). Only in the *resolution on tactics* is it said, "in possession", in the event of the "victorious development of the revolution", but it does not define more precisely what that means.

gramme. No wonder Maslov found it necessary, in talking about nationalisation, to drag in even the Napoleonic peasant in order to conceal from the public the absurd position we have put ourselves in before the representatives of bourgeois democracy by our muddled "municipalisation"!

The only difference between the two—a real essential difference—is the attitude towards the peasants' allotment lands. Maslov singled these out only because he was afraid of a "Vendée". And it turned out that the peasant deputies who were sent to the First and Second Dumas laughed at the fears of the tail-ist Social-Democrats and declared in favour of the nationalisation of *their own* lands!

The municipalisers should now *oppose* the Trudovik peasants and *urge* them not to nationalise their lands. The irony of history has brought the arguments of Maslov, John, Kostrov, and Co. tumbling down upon their own heads.

4. THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE PEASANTRY

We shall try to analyse the question (as to why all the political groups which reflect the interests and hopes of the small proprietors should have spoken in favour of nationalisation) in regard to which P. Maslov flounders so helplessly.

First of all, let us see to what extent the Land Bill of the 104, i.e., of the Trudoviks in the First and Second Dumas, really expresses the demands of the peasantry of the whole of Russia. That it does is borne out by the nature of the representation in both Dumas, as well as by the nature of the political struggle on the agrarian question which developed in the "parliamentary" arena among the spokesmen of the different classes. The idea of landownership in general, and of peasant ownership in particular, far from being pushed into the background in the Duma, was, on the contrary, constantly brought to the fore by certain parties. The idea was supported by the government, in the shape of Stishinsky, Gurko, and all the ministers, as well as all the official press, addressing especially the peasant deputies. The political parties of the Right, too, beginning with the "famous" Svyatopolk-Mirsky in the Second Duma,

kept dinning into the peasants' ears about the blessings of peasant proprietorship. The actual alignment of forces on this question has been depicted by such a wealth of data that there can be no doubt as to its correctness (from the standpoint of class interests). The Cadet Party in the First Duma, when the liberals regarded the revolutionary people as a force and tried to woo them, was also swept along by the general current in the direction of land nationalisation. As is known, the Cadet Land Bill introduced in the First Duma contained a clause about a "state land reserve" to include all alienated land and from which land would be granted on long-term leases. Of course, the Cadets in the First Duma did not put that demand forward on any grounds of principle—it would be ridiculous to speak of the Cadet Party having principles. No. That demand of the liberals sprang up as a feeble echo of the demands of the peasant masses. Already in the First Duma the peasant deputies at once began to form a separate political group, and the Land Bill of the "104" served as the chief and basic platform of the whole of the Russian peasantry, which came forward as a conscious social force. The speeches of the peasant deputies in the First and Second Dumas and the articles in the Trudovik papers (*Izvestia Krestyanskikh Deputatov*, *Trudovaya Rossiya*) showed that the Bill of the 104 faithfully expressed the interests and hopes of the peasants. That Bill must, therefore, be dealt with in somewhat greater detail.

It is interesting, by the way, to look at the composition of the group of deputies who signed the Bill. In the First Duma it was signed by 70 Trudoviks, 17 non-party deputies, 8 peasants who supplied no information as to their party affiliation, 5 Cadets,* 3 Social-Democrats,** and 1 Lithuanian Autonomist. In the Second Duma the Bill of the "104" had 99 signatures, and after deducting duplicates, 91 signatures, namely, 79 Trudoviks, 4 Popular Socialists, 2 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2 deputies from the Cossack

* G. Zubchenko, T. Volkov, M. Gerasimov, all peasants; S. Lozhkin, a physician, and Afanasyev, a priest.

** Antonov, a worker from Perm Gubernia, Yershov, a worker from Kazan Gubernia, and V. Churyukov, a worker from Moscow Gubernia.

group, 2 non-party deputies, 1 deputy more to the left than the Cadets (Peterson), and 1 Cadet (Odnokozov, a peasant). There was a preponderance of peasants among the signatories (no fewer than 54 out of 91 in the Second Duma, and no fewer than 52 out of 104 in the First). It is interesting that P. Maslov's *special* expectations regarding the homestead peasants (referred to above*) who, he said, could not agree to nationalisation, were also completely defeated by the attitude of the peasant deputies in both Dumas. For instance, in Podolsk Gubernia nearly all the peasants are *homestead* peasants (in 1905 there were 457,134 homestead peasants and only 1,630 members of village communes); nevertheless, 13 Podolsk deputies (mainly peasant farmers) signed the Land Bill of the "104" in the First Duma, and 10 in the Second Duma! Among other gubernias with homestead landownership we will mention Vilna, Kovno, Kiev, Poltava, Bessarabia, and Volhynia, deputies from which signed the Land Bill of the "104". The distinction between village commune members and homestead peasants as regards land nationalisation may appear important and material only to those who share Narodnik prejudices and those prejudices, by the way, were dealt a hard blow when the peasant deputies of the whole of Russia first came forward with a land programme. As a matter of fact, the demand for the nationalisation of the land is called forth not by any specific form of landownership, not by the "communal habits and instincts" of the peasants, but by the general conditions of the whole system of small peasant landownership (both communal and homestead) which is crushed by the feudal latifundia.

Among the deputies in the First and Second Dumas who sponsored the nationalisation Bill of the 104 we see representatives from all parts of Russia, not only from the central agricultural and the industrial non-black-earth gubernias, not only from the northern (Arkhangelsk and Vologda—in the Second Duma), eastern and southern borderlands (Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Kuban, Taurida, and Stavropol gubernias and regions), but also from the gubernias of Little Russia, the South-west, North-west,

* See pp. 261-62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Poland (Suvalki) and Siberia (Tobolsk). Obviously, the plight of the small peasant under the oppression of feudal landlordism, which is most forcefully and clearly demonstrated in the purely Russian agricultural centre, is felt throughout Russia, and causes the small farmers everywhere to support the struggle for the nationalisation of the land.

The nature of that struggle bears all the earmarks of petty-bourgeois individualism. In this respect special stress must be laid on the fact, all too frequently ignored in our socialist press, that the greatest blow to the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was struck by the very first entry of the peasants into the open, all-Russian political arena with an independent land programme. The Socialist-Revolutionary Land Socialisation Bill (the Bill of the "33" in the First Duma) was supported by a *minority* of progressive peasant deputies. The great *majority* were found on the side of the Land Bill of the *104*, drafted by the *Popular Socialists*; whose programme the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves describe as *individualistic*.

For instance, in the Socialist-Revolutionary *Collection of Articles* (published by *Nasha Mysl*, St. Petersburg, 1907, No. 1) we find an article by P. Vikhlyaev entitled "The Popular Socialist Party and the Agrarian Question". The writer criticises the Popular Socialist Peshekhonov, and quotes the latter's statement that "the Bill of the 104 reflected our [the P.S.] standpoint on the way in which the land may be taken" (p. 81 of the *Collection*). The Socialist-Revolutionaries declare bluntly that the Bill of the 104" leads to the negation of the root principle of communal land tenure"—"*in the same way*" (*sic*!) as Stolypin's agrarian legislation, the law of November 9, 1906, does. (Ibid., p. 86; we shall show presently how the Socialist-Revolutionaries were prevented by their own prejudices from appraising the real economic difference between the two ways, i.e., the Stolypin way and the Trudovik way.) The Socialist-Revolutionaries regard Peshekhonov's programmatic views as "the manifestation of selfish individualism" (p. 89), "the pollution of the wide ideological stream with the mud of individualism" (p. 91), and "the encouragement of individualistic and selfish tendencies among the masses of the people" (ibid., p. 93).

All this is true. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries are wrong in believing that "strong" words can obscure the fact that the crux of the matter is not the opportunism of Peshekhonov and Co., but the individualism of the *small farmer*. The point is not that the Peshekhonovs are polluting the ideological stream of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but that *the majority of the progressive peasant deputies* have revealed the real economic content of Narodism, the real aspirations of the small farmers. What the Land Bills of the 104 in the First and Second Dumas* revealed was the bankruptcy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in face of the representatives of the broad, really all-Russian, peasant masses.

While declaring in favour of nationalisation of the land, the Trudoviks very clearly reveal in their Bill the "selfish and individualistic" aspirations of the small farmers. They propose to leave the allotments and the small private holdings in the possession of their present owners (Clause 3 of the Land Bill of the 104), provided legislative measures are taken to ensure that they "gradually become the property of the whole nation". Translated into the language of real economic relations, it means just this: we take as our starting-point the interests of the real *owners*, of the real, not the nominal, tillers of the soil, but we want their economic activity to develop quite freely on nationalised**

* From the Stenographic Records of the Second Duma it appears that the Socialist-Revolutionary Mushenko introduced a Land Bill signed by 105 deputies. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain a copy of that Bill. Among the Duma materials I had at my disposal there was only the Trudovik Bill of the 104 that was introduced in the Second Duma too. The existence of the Socialist-Revolutionary Bill of the 105 in addition to the two Trudovik Bills of the 104 (introduced in the First and Second Dumas) merely indicates, at best, that certain peasants wavered between the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but it does not disprove what I have said above.

** Incidentally, A. Finn-Yenotayevsky, in disputing the earnestness and consciousness of the nationalisation aspirations of the Peasant Union and of the peasantry in general, quoted the statement of V. Groman that the delegates to the peasants congresses "do not anticipate having to make any payment for the land", and that they have no idea that differential rent must revert to society as a whole. (A. Finn, *The Agrarian Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 69.) Clauses 7 and 14 of the Bill of the 104 prove that this view is *erroneous*. In

land. Clause 9 of the Bill, which states that "priority is to be given to the local population before outsiders, and to the agricultural population before the non-agricultural", shows once more that the interests of the small proprietors come first with the Trudoviks. An "equal right to the land" is a mere phrase; state loans and grants "to persons without sufficient means to acquire the necessary agricultural equipment" (Clause 15 of the Land Bill of the 104) are pious wishes; those who will really and inevitably gain will be the ones who *can become* strong proprietors now, who can be transformed from enslaved tillers of the soil into free and well-to-do farmers. Of course, it is in the interests of the proletariat to support such measures as will most of all help agriculture in Russia to pass from the hands of feudal landlords and enslaved tillers of the soil, who are crushed by ignorance, poverty, and routine, into the hands of free farmers. And the Bill of the "104" is nothing but a platform of the struggle to turn the well-to-do section of the enslaved peasantry into free farmers.

5. MEDIEVAL LANDOWNERSHIP AND THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION

The question now arises whether there are material grounds in the economic conditions of the agrarian, bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia compelling the small proprietors to demand the nationalisation of the land, or whether this demand as well is merely a phrase, merely the pious wish of the ignorant muzhik, the vain dream of the patriarchal tiller of the soil.

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those clauses provision is made by the Trudoviks both for payment for the land (a land tax rising in accordance with the size of the allotment) and for the reversion of differential rent to the state ("limiting the right to appropriate the increase in the value" of the land, "insofar as it is not due to their, the owners', labour and *capital*—[N.B.! the Trudoviks are not opposed to capital!]—but to social conditions"). It is true that in regard to urban and other lands, Clause 7 provides that: "until such property passes to the whole nation" the rights of occupiers, etc, shall be limited. But that is probably a slip of the pen, for otherwise it would mean that the Trudoviks take the rent from the proprietors and return it to the occupiers, the tenants of nationalised land!

To answer this question we must first try to envisage, more concretely the conditions of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture, and then compare those conditions with the *two paths* of capitalist agrarian evolution that are possible in Russia, as we have outlined above.

The conditions of the bourgeois revolution in agriculture from the standpoint of agrarian relations have been very strikingly dealt with by Marx in the last volume of *Theories of Surplus Value* (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 2. Teil, Stuttgart, 1905).

After examining the views of Rodbertus, exposing the great limitations of the theory of this Pomeranian landlord, and enumerating in detail every single manifestation of his stupidity (II, 1. Teil, S. 256-58, *erster Blödsinn—sechster Blödsinn des Herrn Rodbertus**), Marx turns to Ricardo's theory of rent (II, 2. Teil, § 3b, "The Historical Conditions of Ricardo's Theory").[107]

Speaking of Ricardo and Anderson, Marx says: "Both start out from the view, regarded as very strange on the Continent: (1) that no landed property exists as an obstacle to any investment of capital in the land; (2) that there the tillers pass from better to worse soils. For Ricardo this premise is absolute—leaving out of account interruptions in development through the reaction of science and industry; for Anderson it is relative, since the worse soil is again transformed into better; (3) that capital, the mass of capital requisite for application to agriculture, is always available.

"Now, as far as points 1 and 2 are concerned, it must appear very peculiar to those on the Continent that in the country where, according to their notions, feudal landed property has been most strongly preserved, economists start out from the idea that landed property does not exist. Anderson does so as well as Ricardo. The explanation is as follows:

"*first*, the peculiarity of the English law of enclosures' [i.e., the law relating to the enclosure of the common lands] which has absolutely no analogy with the continental division of common land.

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* Vol. II, Part I, pp. 256-58, first nonsense—sixth nonsense of Herr Rodbertus.—*Ed.*

"*secondly*, nowhere in the world has capitalist production, since Henry VII, dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture and so adequately moulded its conditions and made them subject to itself. England is in this respect the most revolutionary country in the world. All historically inherited relations—not only the position of the villages, but the very villages themselves, not only the habitations of the agricultural population, but this population itself, not only the ancient economic centres, but the very economy itself—have been ruthlessly swept away where they were in contradiction to the conditions of capitalist production in agriculture, or did not correspond to those conditions. The German, for example, finds economic relations determined by the traditional common land relations [*Feldmarken*], the position of economic centres, and particular conglomerations of the population. The Englishman finds that the historical conditions of agriculture have been progressively created by capital since the fifteenth century. The technical expression customary in the United Kingdom, the 'clearing of estates', does not occur in any continental country. But what does this 'clearing of estates' mean? It means that, without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted for example from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production, instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition, are historically *fashioned* in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, *no landed property exists*; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income. A Pomeranian landowner, his mind full of his ancestral [*angestammten*] common lands, economic centres, and the agricultural collegium, etc., is quite likely, therefore, to hold up his hands in horror at Ricardo's 'unhistorical' views on the development of agricultural relations. That only shows that he naïvely confuses Pomeranian and English conditions. But it cannot be said that Ricardo, who here starts out from English conditions, is just as narrow in his view as the

Pomeranian landowner who thinks within the limits of Pomeranian conditions. The English conditions are the only ones in which modern landed property, i.e., landed property *modified* by capitalist production, has developed adequately (in ideal perfection). Here the English theory is the classical one for the modern, i.e., capitalist mode of production. The Pomeranian theory, on the other hand, judges the developed relations according to a historically lower (inadequate) form, which has not taken full shape" (S. 5-7).

That is a remarkably profound argument by Marx. Have our "municipalisers" ever pondered over it?

In Volume III of *Capital* (2. Teil, S. 156) Marx had already pointed out that the form of landed property with which the incipient capitalist mode of production is confronted *does not suit* capitalism. Capitalism *creates for itself* the required forms of agrarian relationships out of the old forms, out of feudal landed property, peasants' commune property, clan property, etc.[108] In that chapter, Marx compares the *different methods* by which capital creates the required forms of landed property. In Germany the reshaping of the medieval forms of landed property proceeded in a reformative way, so to speak. It adapted itself to routine, to tradition, to the feudal estates that were slowly converted into Junker estates, to the routine of indolent peasants* who were undergoing the difficult transition from corvée to the condition of the *Knecht* and *Grossbauer*. In England this reshaping proceeded in a revolutionary, violent way; but the violence was practised for the benefit of the landlords, it was practised on the masses of the peasants, who were taxed to exhaustion, driven from the villages, evicted, and who died out, or emigrated. In America this reshaping went on in a violent way as regards the slave farms in the Southern States. There violence was applied against the slaveowning landlords. Their estates were broken up, and the large feudal estates were

* See *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 1. Teil, S. 280; the condition for the capitalist mode of production in agriculture is "the substitution of a businessman [*Geschäftsmann*] to the indolent peasant".[109]

transformed into small bourgeois farms.* As regards the mass of "unappropriated" American lands, this role of creating the new agrarian relationships to suit the new mode of production (i.e., capitalism) was played by the "American General Redistribution", by the Anti-Rent movement (*Anti-Rent-Bewegung*) of the forties, the Homestead Act,[110] etc. When, in 1846, Hermann Kriege, a German Communist, advocated the equal redistribution of the land in America, Marx ridiculed the Socialist-Revolutionary prejudices and the petty-bourgeois theory of this quasi-socialism, but he *appreciated* the historical importance of the American movement *against landed property*,** as a movement which in a progressive way expressed the interests of the development of the productive forces and the interests of capitalism in America.

6. WHY HAD THE SMALL PROPRIETORS IN RUSSIA TO DECLARE IN FAVOUR OF NATIONALISATION?

Look from this angle at the agrarian evolution of Russia since the second half of the nineteenth century.

What was our "great" Peasant Reform, the "cutting off" of the peasants lands, the removal of the peasants to the "poor lands", the enforcement of the new land regulations

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* See Kautsky's *Agrarian Question* (p. 132 et seq. of the German text) concerning the growth of the small farms in the American South as a result of the abolition of slavery.

** *Vperyod*, 1905, No. 15 (Geneva, April 7/20), article "Marx on the American 'General Redistribution'". (See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 323-29.—*Ed.*) (Second volume of Mehring's *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*.) "We fully recognise," wrote Marx in 1846, "the historical justification of the movement of the American National Reformers. We know that this movement strives for a result which, true, would give a temporary impetus to the industrialism of modern bourgeois society, but which, as a product of the proletarian movement, and as an attack on landed property in general, especially under the prevailing American conditions, must inevitably lead, by its own consequences, to communism. Kriege, who with the German Communists in New York joined the Anti-Rent-Bewegung (movement), clothes this simple fact in bombastic phrases, without entering into the content of the movement."[111]

by military force, shootings, and floggings? It was the first act of mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture. It was the "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the landlords.

What is Stolypin's agrarian legislation under Article 87, that encouragement of the kulaks to plunder the village communes, that breaking-up of the old agrarian relationships for the benefit of a handful of well-to-do proprietors at the price of the rapid ruin of the masses? It was the second big step in mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of capitalism. It was the second "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the *landlords*.

And what does the Trudovik nationalisation of the land stand for in the Russian revolution?

It stands for "*clearing of estates*" *for capitalism by the peasantry*.

The main source of all the well-meant foolishness of our municipalisers is precisely their failure to understand the *economic* basis of the bourgeois agrarian revolution in Russia in its two possible types, i.e., the landlord-bourgeois revolution, and the peasant-bourgeois revolution. Without a "clearing" of the medieval agrarian relationships and regulations, partly feudal and partly Asiatic, *there can be no* bourgeois revolution in agriculture, because capital *must*—through economic necessity—create for itself *new* agrarian relationships, adapted to the new conditions of free commercial agriculture. That "clearing" of the medieval lumber in the sphere of agrarian relations in general, and of the old system of landownership first and foremost, must chiefly affect the landlords' estates and peasant allotments, since both kinds of landed property are now, in their present form, adapted to the labour-service system, to the corvée heritage, to bondage, and not to a free capitalistically developing economy. Stolypin's "clearing" undoubtedly follows the line of the progressive capitalist development of Russia; but it is adapted solely to the interests of the landlords: let the rich peasants pay the "Peasant" (read: Landlord) Bank an exorbitant price for the land; in return we shall give them freedom to plunder the village communes, to forcibly expropriate the masses, to round off their plots, to evict the poor peasants, to under-

mine the very foundations of the life of entire villages, and, at any price, in spite of everything, setting at naught the life and husbandry of any number of "old established" allotment peasants, to set up new *otrub*[111a] holdings, as the basis for new capitalist agriculture. There is unquestionable economic sense in that line; it *faithfully* expresses the *real* course of development as it should be *under the rule* of landlords who are being transformed into Junkers.

What is the other line, the peasant line? Either it is economically impossible—in which case all talk about the peasants confiscating the landlords' estates, about the peasant agrarian revolution, etc., is either humbug or an empty dream. Or it is economically possible—provided one element of bourgeois society is victorious over the other element of bourgeois society—in which case we must form a clear idea of, and clearly show to the people, the concrete conditions for that development, the conditions under which the peasants can reshape the old agrarian relations on a new, capitalist basis.

Here there naturally arises the thought that this peasant line is precisely the *division* of the landlords' estates among the peasants for their private property. Very well. But if this division is to correspond to the really new, capitalist conditions of agriculture, it must be carried out in a new way and not in the old way. The division must be based not on the old allotment land distributed among the peasants a hundred years ago at the will of the landlords' bailiffs or of the officials of Asiatic despotism, but on the needs of free, commercial agriculture. To meet the requirements of capitalism, the division must be a division among *free farmers*, not among "indolent" peasants, the great majority of whom run their economies by routine and tradition in conformity with patriarchal, not with capitalist conditions. A division according to the old standards, i.e., in conformity with the old forms of landownership based on peasant allotments, will not be the *clearing* of the old landownership, but its *perpetuation*; not clearing the way for capitalism, but rather *encumbering* it with a mass of unadapted and unadaptable "indolents" who cannot become free farmers. To be progressive, the division must be based on a *new* sorting process among the peasant cultivators,

which will sift the farmers from the useless lumber. And this new sorting out is nationalisation of the land, i.e., the total abolition of private landownership, complete freedom to till the land, the unhampered transformation of the old peasantry into free farmers.

Picture to yourselves the present system of peasant farming and the character of the old peasant landownership based on allotments. "Although united by the village commune into tiny administrative, fiscal, and land-holding associations, the peasants are split up by a mass of diverse divisions into grades, into categories according to size of allotment, amount of payments, etc. Let us take, for example, the Zemstvo statistical returns for Saratov Gubernia; there the peasants are divided into the following grades: gift-land peasants, owners, full owners, state peasants, state peasants with communal holdings, state peasants with quarter holdings, state peasants that formerly belonged to landlords, crown-land peasants, state-land tenants and landless peasants, owners who were formerly landlords' peasants, peasants whose farmsteads have been redeemed, owners who are former crown-land peasants, colonist freeholders, settlers, gift-land peasants who formerly belonged to landlords, owners who are former state peasants, manumitted, those who do not pay quit-rent, free tillers, temporarily-bound, former factory-bound peasants, etc.; further there are registered peasants, migrant, etc.[112] All these grades differ in the history of their agrarian relations, in size of allotments, amount of payments, etc., etc. And within the grades there are innumerable differences of a similar kind: sometimes even the peasants of one and the same village are divided into two quite distinct categories: 'Mr. X's former peasants' and 'Mrs. Y's former peasants'. All this diversity was natural and necessary in the Middle Ages."* If the *new* division of the landlords' estates were carried out in conformity with this feudal system of landownership—whether by levelling to a uniform rate, i.e., equal division, or by fixing some kind of ratio between

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* *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapters V, IX, "Some Remarks on the Pre-Capitalist Economy of Our Countryside". (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 381-82.—*Ed.*)

the new and the old, or in some other way—not only would it not guarantee that the new plots would meet the requirements of capitalist agriculture, but, on the contrary, it would *perpetuate* the obvious *lack of conformity*. Such a division would *impede* social evolution, would tie the new to the old instead of liberating the new *from* the old. Real liberation call *only* be achieved by nationalising the land, thus *creating the conditions for the rise* of free farmers, for the *development* of free farming without connection with the old, without any relation to medieval landownership in the form of peasant allotments.

Capitalist evolution on the medieval peasant allotments proceeded in post-Reform Russia in such a way that the progressive economic elements *freed themselves* from the determining influence of the allotments. On the one hand, proletarians emerged, who rented out their allotments, abandoned them, or let the land go to waste. On the other hand, *peasant owners* emerged, who purchased or rented land, built up a *new* economy out of *various fragments* of the old, medieval system of landownership. The land that is now cultivated by a more or less well-to-do Russian peasant, i.e., by one who, given a favourable outcome of the revolution, is really capable of becoming a free farmer, consists partly of his own allotment, partly of an allotment he has rented from a neighbour who is a village-commune member, partly, perhaps, of land rented on long-term lease from the state, land leased annually from the landlord, land purchased from the bank, and so forth. Capitalism requires the abolition of *all* these distinctions of category; it requires that all economy on the land be organised exclusively in accordance with the new conditions and demands of the market, the demands of agriculture. Nationalisation of the land fulfils this requirement by the revolutionary peasant method; at one stroke it completely divests the people of *all* the rotten rags of *all* forms of medieval landownership. There must be neither landlord ***nor allotment*** ownership, there must be only the new, free landownership—such is the slogan of the radical peasant. And that slogan expresses in the most faithful, in the most consistent and categorical manner the interests of capitalism (which the radical peasant in his simplicity tries to ward off by

making the sign of the cross), and expresses the need for the utmost development of the land's productive forces under commodity production.

One may judge from this how clever Pyotr Maslov is in thinking that the *only* difference between his agrarian programme and the peasant programme of the Trudoviks is the *perpetuation* of the old, medieval, allotment ownership! The peasant allotment land is a ghetto in which the peasantry is suffocating and from which it is straining to escape to free* land. Yet in spite of the peasants' demands for free, i.e., nationalised, land, Pyotr Maslov seeks to perpetuate this ghetto, to perpetuate the old system; he would subject the best lands, confiscated from the landlords and converted to public use, to the conditions of the old system of landownership and the old methods of farming. *In deeds*, the Trudovik peasant is a most determined bourgeois revolutionary, but in words he is a petty-bourgeois utopian who imagines that a "General Redistribution" is the starting-point of harmony and fraternity,** and not of capitalist farming. Pyotr Maslov is, in deeds, a reactionary who, fearing the Vendée of a future counter-revolution, seeks to consolidate the present anti-revolutionary elements of the old forms of landownership and to perpetuate the peasant ghetto, while in words he thoughtlessly repeats mechanically learnt phrases about bourgeois progress. What the real conditions are for real free-bourgeois progress and not for the Stolypin-bourgeois progress of Russian agriculture, Maslov and Co. absolutely fail to understand.

The difference between the vulgar Marxism of Pyotr Maslov and the methods of research that Marx really used

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* The "Socialist-Revolutionary" Mr. Mushenko, the most consistent exponent of the view of his party in the Second Duma bluntly declared: "*We raise the banner of the liberation of the land*" (47th sitting, May 26, 1907, p. 1174). One must be blind to fail to perceive not only the essential *capitalist* nature of this supposedly "socialist" banner (Pyotr Maslov sees this too), but also the progressive economic nature of *such* an agrarian revolution compared with the Stolypin-Cadet revolution (this Pyotr Maslov *does not* see).

** Cf. the naïve expression of this bourgeois-revolutionary point of view in the speech of the "Popular Socialist" Volk-Karachevsky about "equality, fraternity, and liberty". (Second Duma, 16th sitting, March 26, 1907, pp. 1077-80.)

can be seen most clearly in the latter's attitude towards the petty-bourgeois utopias of the Narodniks (including the Socialist-Revolutionaries). In 1846, Marx ruthlessly exposed the petty-bourgeois character of the American Socialist-Revolutionary Hermann Kriege, who proposed a veritable General Redistribution for America and called it "communism". Marx's dialectical and revolutionary criticism swept away the husks of petty-bourgeois doctrine and *picked out* the sound kernel of the "attacks on landed property" and of the "Anti-Rent movement". Our vulgar Marxists, however, in criticising "equalised redistribution", "socialisation of the land", and "equal right to the land", *confine themselves* to repudiating the doctrine, and thus reveal their own obtuse doctrinairism, which prevents them from seeing the vital life of the peasant revolution beneath the lifeless doctrine of Narodnik theory. Maslov and the Mensheviks have carried this obtuse doctrinairism—expressed in our "municipalisation" programme, which perpetuates the most backward and medieval form of land ownership—to such lengths that in the Second Duma the following truly disgraceful things could be uttered in the name of the Social-Democratic Party: ..."While on the question of the method of land alienation we [Social-Democrats] stand much nearer to these [Narodnik] groups than to the People's Freedom group, on the question of the forms of land tenure we stand farther away from them" (47th sitting, May 26, 1907, p. 1230 of Stenographic Record).

Indeed, in the peasant agrarian revolution the Mensheviks stand farther away from revolutionary peasant nationalisation, and closer to liberal-landlord preservation of allotment (and not only allotment) ownership. The preservation of allotment ownership is the preservation of downtroddenness, backwardness, and bondage. It is natural for a liberal landlord, who dreams of redemption payments, to stand up for allotment ownership* ... with the preservation

* Incidentally, the Mensheviks (including Comrade Tsereteli, whose speech I have quoted) are deeply mistaken in believing that the Cadets are at all consistent in their defence of *free* peasant ownership. They are *not*. Mr. Kutler, on behalf of the Cadet Party, spoke

of a goodly share of landlord ownership! But the Social-Democrat, led astray by the "municipalisers", does not understand that the sound of words vanishes but the deed remains. The sound of the words about equality, socialisation, etc., will vanish, because there *cannot* be equalisation under commodity production. But the *deed* will remain, i.e., the greatest break with the feudal past that can possibly be achieved under capitalism, the break with medieval allotment ownership and with all routine and tradition. When people say "nothing will come of equalised redistribution", the Marxist ought to understand that this "nothing" relates *exclusively* to the socialist aims, exclusively to the fact that this is not going to abolish capitalism. But from attempts to bring about such a redistribution, even from the very idea of such a redistribution, *very much* will come that will be of advantage to the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

For that revolution may take place either with the predominance of the landlords over the peasants—and that requires the preservation of the old form of ownership and the Stolypin reform of it exclusively by the power of the ruble; or it will take place as a result of the victory of the peasantry over the landlords—and that, in view of the objective conditions of capitalist economy, is impossible without the abolition of all forms of medieval landownership, both landlord and peasant. The choice is between the Stolypin agrarian reform and peasant revolutionary nationalisation. *Only* these solutions are economically real. Anything intermediate, from Menshevik municipalisation to Cadet redemption payments, is petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness, a stupid distortion of theory, a poor invention.

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in the Second Duma in favour of ownership (as distinct from the Cadet Bill on state land reserve introduced in the First Duma) but at the same time he added: "*The Party proposes only* [!] *to limit their* [*the peasants*'] *right to alienate*, *and right to mortgage*, i.e., to prevent the selling and buying of land on a large scale in future" (12th sitting, March 19, 1907, p. 740 of Stenographic Record). That is the *archreactionary* programme of a *bureaucrat* disguised as a liberal.

7. THE PEASANT'S AND THE NARODNIKS ON THE NATIONALISATION OF ALLOTMENT LAND

That the abolition of allotment ownership is a condition for the creation of free peasant farming in conformity with the new capitalist conditions is quite clearly realised by the peasants themselves. Mr. Groman, in his detailed and accurate description of the discussion at the peasant congresses,* cites the following remarkable opinion expressed by a peasant:

> "During the discussion on redemption payment, one delegate, without meeting with any real opposition, said: 'It has been said that alienation without compensation would hit many peasants who had purchased land with their hard-earned money. There are few such peasants, and they have little land, *and they will get land in any case when it is distributed*'. That explains the readiness to relinquish property rights both in allotment and purchased land."

A little further on (p. 20) Mr. Groman repeats this as the general opinion of the peasants.

"*They will get land in any case when it is distributed*"! Is it not perfectly clear what *economic* necessity dictated this argument? The new distribution of all the land, both landlord and allotment land, cannot reduce the holdings of nine-tenths (or rather, ninety-nine hundredths) of the peasantry; there is nothing to fear from it. But the redistribution is necessary because it will enable the real, genuine farmers to arrange their land tenure in accordance with the new conditions, in accordance with the requirements of capitalism (the "dictates of the market" to individual producers), without submitting to the medieval relations which determined the size, location, and distribution of allotment land.

Mr. Peshekhonov, a practical and sober-minded "Popular Socialist" (read: Social-Cadet) who, as we have seen, has managed to adapt himself to the demands of the masses of small proprietors all over Russia, expresses this point of view even more definitely.

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* *Material on the Peasant Question*. (A report of the Delegates' Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union, November 6-10, 1905, with an introduction by V. Groman. *Novy Mir* Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 12.)

"The allotment lands," he writes, "the part of the territory most important from the standpoint of production, are permanently assigned to a certain social-estate, and what is worse, to small groups of that estate, to separate households and villages. The result is that the peasantry, taken as a whole cannot freely settle even within the area of the allotment land.... The population *is not properly distributed to suit the requirements of the market* [note this!].... The ban on the state lands must be lifted, *allotment land must be freed from the fetters of property*, the *fences* around the private estates must be *removed*. The land must be returned to the Russian people, who will then settle upon it in a manner that will suit their economic requirements (A. V. Peshekhonov, *The Agrarian Problem in Connection with the Peasant Movement*, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 83, 86, 88-89. Our italics.)

Is it not clear that the voice of this "Popular Socialist" is the voice of the free farmer who wants to stand up on his own feet? Is it not clear that it is really necessary for the farmer that the "allotment land" should be "freed from the fetters of property" in order that the population may distribute itself in a new way, in order that holdings may be redistributed in a manner to "suit the requirements of the market", i.e., the requirements of *capitalist agriculture*? Mr. Peshekhonov, we repeat, is so sober-minded that he rejects any kind of socialisation, rejects any kind of adaptation to communal law—it is not for nothing that the Socialist-Revolutionaries curse him for an individualist!—he *rejects any prohibition of hired labour on the peasant farm*.

In view of *this* kind of striving of the peasantry for nationalisation, the reactionary nature of support for peasant allotment ownership becomes quite obvious. A. Finn, who in his pamphlet cites some of Mr. Peshekhonov's arguments which we have quoted, criticises him as a Narodnik and tries to prove to him that the development of capitalism out of peasant farming, and within that system of farming, is inevitable (p. 14, et seq. in the pamphlet mentioned). That criticism is unsatisfactory because A. Finn has allowed the general question of the development of capitalism make him overlook the concrete question of the conditions for a freer development of capitalist agriculture on *allotment* land! A. Finn contents himself with merely posing the question of capitalism *in general*, thus scoring an easy victory over Narodism, which was vanquished long ago.

But we are dealing with a more concrete* question, viz., the landlord *versus* the peasant way of "removing the fences" (Mr. Peshekhonov's expression), of "clearing" the land for capitalism.

In winding up the debate on the agrarian question in the Second Duma, Mr. Mushenko, the official spokesman of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, revealed just as definitely as Mr. Peshekhonov the *capitalist* nature of the land nationalisation that the petty-bourgeois socialists choose to call "socialisation", the establishment of "equal right to the land", and so on.

"The population will be properly distributed," Mr. Mushenko said, "only when the land is unfenced, only when the fences imposed by the principle of private ownership of land are removed" (47th sitting, May 26, 1907, p. 1172 of Stenographic Record). Exactly! The "proper" distribution of the population is the very thing the market, capitalism, requires. But the "proper" distribution of "proper" farmers is hindered by both landlord ***and allotment*** ownership.

One more observation on the statements made by delegates of the Peasant Union merits our attention. Mr. Groman writes in the above-mentioned pamphlet:

> "The notorious question of the 'village commune'—that cornerstone of the tenets of the old and new Narodism—was not raised at all and was tacitly rejected: the land must be placed at the disposal of individuals and associations state the resolutions passed at both the First and Second Congresses" (p. 12).

* "What will this Peshekhonov labour economy lead to in the long run?" A. Finn asks, and answers quite rightly: "to capitalism" (p. 19 of his pamphlet). From that unquestionable truth, which it was certainly necessary to explain to a Narodnik he should have taken a *further* step; he should have explained the specific forms of the manifestation of the demands of capitalism under the conditions of a peasant agrarian revolution. Instead, A. Finn took a step *backward*: "The question arises" he writes "why should we go back to the past; why should we go by some roundabout way of our own only in the long run to find ourselves back again on the road we are already travelling? That is useless labour, Mr. Peshekhonov!" (ibid.) No, that is not useless labour and it does not bring us to capitalism "in the long run"; *it is the straightest*, *freest*, *and quickest road to capitalism*. A. Finn did not ponder over the comparative features of the Stolypin capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia and a peasant-revolutionary capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia.

Thus, the peasants have clearly and emphatically declared against the old village commune in favour of free associations and individual land tenure. That this was the real voice of the peasantry as a whole there can be no doubt, since there is *not a hint at the village commune* even in the Land Bill of the Trudovik Group (of the 104). Yet the village commune is an association for the ownership of allotment land!

Stolypin is forcibly abolishing the village commune for the benefit of a handful of rich persons. The peasantry wants to abolish it and replace it by free *associations* and tenure by "individuals" on the *nationalised* allotment land. But Maslov and Co., in the name of bourgeois progress, are challenging the fundamental requirement of this very progress and defending medieval landownership. God save us from that sort of "Marxism"!

8. THE MISTAKE MADE BY M. SHANIN AND OTHER ADVOCATES OF DIVISION

M. Shanin, approaching the question in his pamphlet* from a somewhat different angle, involuntarily provided another argument for the nationalisation which he detests so much. By citing the example of Ireland, by his analysis of the conditions of bourgeois *reform* in the domain of agriculture, M. Shanin has proved only one thing, viz., that the principles of private ownership of the land are incompatible with public or state ownership of the land (but that incompatibility has to be proved also by a general theoretical analysis, of which Shanin did not even think). If he has proved anything else it is that private ownership must be recognised wherever the state carries out any reforms in the sphere of agriculture developing on capitalist lines. But all these arguments of Shanin's are wide of the mark: of course, under the conditions of bourgeois reform *only* private ownership of land is conceivable; of course, the preservation of private ownership of the bulk of the land in the United Kingdom left no other way open for part

* M. Shanin, *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property*, Vilna, 1907.

of it than private ownership. But what has that to do with the "peasant agrarian revolution" in Russia? M. Shanin has pointed out the correct path, if you like, but it is the correct path of a Stolypin agrarian reform, and not of a peasant agrarian revolution.* The difference between the two ways is entirely lost upon M. Shanin, and yet unless this difference is clearly realised, it is ridiculous to talk about a Social-Democratic agrarian programme in the Russian revolution. And when M. Shanin, prompted, of course, by the very best motives, defends confiscation against redemption payments, he loses all sense of historical perspective. He forgets that in bourgeois society confiscation, i.e., expropriation without compensation, is as utterly incompatible with *reform* as land nationalisation. To speak of confiscation while admitting the possibility of a reformist and not a revolutionary solution of the agrarian question is like petitioning Stolypin to abolish landlordism.

Another aspect of Shanin's pamphlet is its heavy emphasis on the *agricultural* character of our agrarian crisis, on the absolute necessity of adopting higher forms of economy, of improving agricultural technique, which is so incredibly backward in Russia, and so forth. Shanin elaborates these correct theses in such an incredibly one-sided fashion, and he so completely ignores the abolition of the feudal latifundia and the changing of agrarian relationships as a condition for that technical revolution, that an utterly

* Shanin's reference to the example of Ireland, showing that private ownership preponderates over renting (and not over the nationalisation of the whole land), is not new either. *In exactly the same way*, the "liberal" Professor A. I. Chuprov cites Ireland to prove that peasant *ownership* of land is preferable. (*The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II, p. 11.) The real nature of this "liberal" and even "Constitutional-*Democrat*" is revealed on page 33 of his article. Here Mr. Chuprov, with incredible brazenness, the brazenness of a liberal that is possible only in Russia, proposes that on *all* the land-surveying commissions the peasants be subordinated to a *majority of landlords*! Five members representing the peasants and five, representing the landlords, with a chairman "appointed by the Zemstvo Assembly", i.e., *by an assembly of landlords*. An allusion to Ireland was also made in the First Duma by the *Right-wing deputy*, Prince Drutsky-Lyubetsky, as proof of the necessity for private ownership of land and as an argument against the Cadet Bill. (Sitting of May 24, 1906, p 626 of Stenographic Record.)

false perspective is drawn. For Stolypin's agrarian reform too leads to technical progress in agriculture, and does so in a correct way from the standpoint of the landlords' interests. The forcible break-up of the village communes by the laws of November 9, 1906, etc., the setting up of *khutors* and the subsidising of *otrubs*, are not a mirage, as frivolous, prattling democratic journalists sometimes declare them to be; they are the realities of economic progress based on the preservation of the power and interests of the landlords. It is an incredibly slow and incredibly painful road for the broad masses of the peasantry and for the proletariat, but it is the only possible road for capitalist Russia *if* the peasant agrarian revolution is not victorious.

Look at the question which Shanin raises from the standpoint of *such* a revolution. Modern agricultural technique demands that *all* the conditions of the ancient, conservative, barbarous, ignorant, and pauper methods of economy on peasant allotments be transformed. The three-field system, the primitive implements, the patriarchal impecuniosity of the tiller, the routine methods of stock-breeding and crass naïve ignorance of the conditions and requirements of the market must all be thrown overboard. Well, then, is such a revolutionising of agriculture possible if the old system of landownership is preserved? The division of the land among the present allotment owners would mean preserving half* of the medieval system of landownership. Division of the land might be progressive if it consolidated *modern* farming, *modern* agricultural methods, and scrapped the old. But division cannot give an impetus to modern agricultural methods if it is based on the old system of allotment ownership. Comrade Borisov,[113] an advocate of division, said in Stockholm: "Our agrarian programme is a programme for the period of developing revolution, the period of the break-up of the old order and the organisation of a new social-political

* I have pointed out above that out of 280,000,000 dessiatins of the land available for distribution in European Russia, one half—138,800,000 dessiatins—consists of allotment land. (See p. 221 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

order. That is its fundamental idea. Social-Democracy must not bind itself by decisions which pledge it to support any particular form of economy. In this struggle of the new social forces against the foundations of the old order, it is necessary to cut the tangled knot with a decisive stroke" (p. 125 of the Minutes). All that is quite true and splendidly stated. And it all speaks in favour of nationalisation, because the latter alone really "breaks up" the old medieval system of landownership, really cuts the tangled knot, and allows full freedom for the new farms to develop on the nationalised land.

The question arises by what criterion are we to determine whether the new system of agriculture has already developed sufficiently to have the division of the land adapted *to it*, and not to have a division that will perpetuate the old obstacles to the new farming? There can be but one criterion, that of practice. No statistics in the world can assess whether the elements of a peasant bourgeoisie in a given country have "hardened" sufficiently to enable the system of landownership to be adapted to the system of farming. This can be assessed *only* by the mass of the farmers themselves. The impossibility of assessing this at the present moment has been *proved* by the fact that the mass of the peasants have come forward in our revolution with a programme of land nationalisation. The small farmer, at all times and throughout the world, becomes so attached to his farm (if it really is *his* farm and not a piece of the landlord's estate let out on labour-service, as is frequently the case in Russia) that his "fanatical" defence of private ownership of the land is inevitable at a certain historical period and for a certain space of time. If *in the present epoch* the mass of the Russian peasants are not displaying the fanaticism of private property owners (a fanaticism which is fostered by all the ruling classes, by all the liberal-bourgeois politicians), but are putting forward a widespread and firmly held demand for the nationalisation of the land, it would be childishness or stupid pedantry to attribute it to the influence of the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[114] or Mr. Chernov's pamphlets. It is due to the fact that the real conditions of life of the small cultivator, of the small farmer in the village, confront him with the economic prob-

lem, not of consolidating the new agriculture, which has already taken shape, by means of dividing the land as private property, but of *clearing* the ground for the creation of a new agriculture (out of the existing elements) upon "free", i.e., nationalised, land. The fanaticism of the private property owner can and should assert itself, in due time, as a demand of the *newly-hatched* free farmer for the assured possession of his farm. Nationalisation of the land had to become the demand of the peasant masses in the Russian revolution as the slogan of farmers who *want to break* the shell of medievalism. Therefore, for Social-Democrats *to preach* division of the land to the mass of the peasants, who are inclined towards nationalisation, and who are only just beginning to enter the conditions for the final "sorting out" that should produce free farmers capable of creating capitalist agriculture, is glaring historical tactlessness, and reveals inability to take stock of the concrete historical situation.

Our Social-Democratic "divisionists"—Comrades Finn, Borisov, and Shanin—are free from the theoretical dualism of the "municipalisers", including the latters' vulgar criticism of Marx's theory of rent (with this we shall deal later on), but they make a mistake of a different kind, a mistake of historical perspective. While taking a generally correct stand in theory (and in this they differ from the "municipalisers"), they repeat the mistake of our cut-off-lands programme of 1903. That mistake was due to the fact that while we correctly defined the *trend* of development, we did not correctly define the *moment* of that development. We assumed that the elements of capitalist agriculture had already taken full shape in Russia, both in landlord farming (minus the cut-off lands and their conditions of bondage—hence the demand that the cut-off lands be returned to the peasants) and in peasant farming, which seemed to have given rise to a strong peasant bourgeoisie and therefore to be incapable of bringing about a "peasant agrarian revolution". The erroneous programme was not the result of "fear" of the peasant agrarian revolution, but of an *over-estimation of the degree* of capitalist development in Russian agriculture. The survivals of serfdom appeared to us then to be a minor detail, whereas capitalist agricul-

ture on the peasant allotments and on the landlords' estates seemed to be quite mature and well-established.

The revolution has exposed that mistake; it has confirmed the trend of development as we had defined it. The Marxist analysis of the classes in Russian society has been so brilliantly confirmed by the whole course of events in general, and by the first two Dumas in particular, *that* non-Marxist socialism has been shattered completely. But the survivals of serfdom in the countryside have proved to be much stronger than we thought: they have given rise to a nation-wide peasant movement and they have made that movement the touchstone of the bourgeois revolution as a whole. Hegemony in the bourgeois liberation movement, which revolutionary Social-Democracy always assigned to the proletariat, had to be defined more precisely as leadership which rallied the *peasantry* behind it. But leading to what? To the bourgeois revolution in its most consistent and decisive form. We rectified the mistake by substituting for the partial aim of combating the *survivals of the old* agrarian system, the aim of combating *the old agrarian system as a whole*. Instead of purging landlord economy, we set the aim of *abolishing* it.

But this correction, made under the impact of the imposing course of events, did not make many of us think out to its logical conclusion our new evaluation of the degree of capitalist development in Russian agriculture. If the demand for the confiscation of all the landlord estates proved to be historically correct—and that undoubtedly was the case—it meant that the wide development of capitalism calls for new agrarian relationships, that the beginnings of capitalism in landlord economy can and must be sacrificed to the wide and free development of capitalism on the basis of renovated small farming. To accept the demand for the confiscation of the landlord estates means admitting the possibility and the necessity of the renovation of small farming under capitalism.

Is that admissible? Is it not a gamble to support small farming under capitalism? Is not the *renovation* of small farming a vain dream? Is it not a demagogic "trap for the peasants", a *Bauernfang*? That, undoubtedly, was what many comrades thought. But they were wrong. The re-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

novation of small farming is possible even under capitalism if the historical aim is to fight the pre-capitalist order. That is the way small farming was renovated in America, where the slave plantations were broken up in a revolutionary manner and the conditions were created for the most rapid and free development of capitalism. In the Russian revolution the struggle for the land is nothing else than a struggle for the renovated path of capitalist development. The consistent slogan of such a renovation is—nationalisation of the land. To exclude allotment land from nationalisation is economically reactionary (we shall deal separately with the politically reactionary aspect of that exclusion). The "divisionists" are *skipping* the historical task of the present revolution; they assume that the objectives of the peasants' mass struggle have already been achieved, whereas that struggle has only just begun. Instead of stimulating the process of renovation, instead of explaining to the peasantry the conditions for consistent renovation, they are already designing a dressing-gown for the appeased, renovated farmer.*

"Everything in good season." Social-Democracy cannot undertake never to support division of the land. In a different historical situation, at a different stage of agrarian evolution, this division may prove unavoidable. But division of the land is an entirely wrong expression of the *aims* of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in 1907.

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* The advocates of division frequently cite the words of Marx: "The free ownership of the self-managing peasant is evidently the most normal form of landed property for small-scale operation.... Ownership of the land is as necessary for full development of this mode of production as ownership of tools is for free development of handicraft production" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 341).[115] From this it merely follows that the complete triumph of free peasant agriculture may call for private ownership. But present-day small-scale farming is not free. State landownership is "an instrument in the hands of the landlord rather than of the peasant, an instrument for extracting labour rent rather than an instrument of free labour of the peasant". The destruction of all forms of feudal landownership and free settlement in all parts of the country are needed for the promotion of free small-scale farming.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF NATIONALISATION AND OF MUNICIPALISATION

A grave fault of almost the whole Social-Democratic press on the question of the agrarian programme in general, and a shortcoming of the debate at the Stockholm Congress in particular, is that practical considerations prevail over theoretical, and political considerations over economic.* Most of us, of course, have an excuse, namely, the conditions of intensive Party work under which we discussed the agrarian problem in the revolution: first, after January 9, 1905, a few months before the outbreak (the spring "Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." of Bolsheviks in London in 1905 and the Conference of the Minority held at the same time in Geneva), and then on the day after the December uprising,[116] and in Stockholm on the eve of the First Duma. But at all events this shortcoming must be corrected now, and an examination of the theoretical aspect of the question of nationalisation and municipalisation is particularly necessary.

* In my pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, which I defended at Stockholm, there are very definite (although brief, as the pamphlet itself is) references to the *theoretical* premises of a Marxist agrarian programme. I pointed out in that pamphlet that "the bare repudiation of nationalisation" would be a "theoretical distortion of Marxism" (p. 16 of the old edition, p. 41 of this edition). (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 181.—*Ed.*) See also my Report on the Stockholm Congress, pp. 27-28 of the old edition (p. 63 of this edition). (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 346.—*Ed.*) "From the strictly scientific point of view, from the point of view of the conditions of development of capitalism in general, we must undoubtedly say—if we do not want to differ from Volume III of *Capital*—that the nationalisation of the land is possible in bourgeois society, that it promotes economic development, facilitates competition and the influx of capital into agriculture, reduces the price of grain, etc." See also the same report, p. 59 (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 378.—*Ed.*): "In spite of their promises, they [the Right wing of Social-Democracy] do not carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture to its 'logical' conclusion, for the only 'logical' (*and economic*) conclusion under capitalism is the nationalisation of the land, which abolishes absolute rent."

1. WHAT IS NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND?

Above we quoted the current formulation of the now generally recognised proposition. "All the Narodnik groups are advocating nationalisation of the land." As a matter of fact, this current formulation is very inexact and there is very little in it that is "generally recognised", if by this we mean a really identical conception of this "nationalisation" among the representatives of the various political trends. The mass of the peasantry demand the land spontaneously, for they are oppressed by the feudal latifundia and do not associate the transfer of the land to the people with any at all definite economic ideas. Among the peasantry there is only a very urgent demand, born, so to speak, from suffering and hardened by long years of oppression—a demand for the revival, strengthening, consolidation, and expansion of small farming; a demand that the latter be made predominant, and nothing more. All that the peasant visualises is the passing of the landlord latifundia into his own hands; in this struggle the peasant clothes his hazy idea of the unity of all peasants, as a mass, in the phrase: ownership of the land by the people. The peasant is guided by the instinct of the property owner, who is hindered by the endless fragmentation of the present forms of medieval landownership and by the impossibility of organising the cultivation of the soil in a manner that fully corresponds to "property owning" requirements if all this motley medieval system of landownership continues. The economic necessity of abolishing landlordism, of ***abolishing also the "fetters" of allotment landownership***—such are the *negative* concepts which exhaust the *peasant* idea of nationalisation. What forms of landownership may eventually be necessary for renovated small farming, which will have digested, so to speak, the landlord latifundia, the peasant does not think about.

The negative aspects of the concept (or hazy ideas of nationalisation undoubtedly also predominate in Narodnik ideology, which expresses the demands and the hopes of the peasantry. The removal of the old obstacles, the clearing out of the landlord, the "unfencing" of the land, the removal of the fetters of allotment ownership, the

strengthening of small farming, the substitution of "equality, fraternity, and liberty" for "inequality" (i.e., the landlord latifundia)—that expresses nine-tenths of Narodnik ideology. Equal right to land, equalised land tenure, socialisation—all these are merely different forms of expression of the same ideas; and all are mainly negative concepts, for the Narodnik cannot conceive the new order as a definite system of social-economic relationships. The Narodnik regards the present agrarian revolution as a transition from serfdom, inequality, and oppression in general, to equality and liberty, and nothing more. That is the typical narrow-mindedness of the bourgeois revolutionary who fails to see the capitalist features of the new society he is creating.

In contrast to the naïve outlook of Narodism, Marxism investigates the new system that is arising. Even with the fullest freedom of peasant farming and with the fullest equality of small proprietors occupying the people's, or no man's, or "God's" land—we have before us a system of commodity production. Small producers are tied and subjected to the market. Out of the exchange of products arises the power of money; the conversion of agricultural produce into money is followed by the conversion of labour-power into money. Commodity production becomes capitalist production. And this theory is not a dogma, but a simple description, a generalisation of what is taking place in Russian peasant farming too. The freer that farming is from land congestion, landlord oppression, the pressure of medieval relations and system of landownership, bondage, and tyranny, the more strongly do capitalist relationships develop within that peasant farming. That is a fact to which the whole of the post-Reform history of Russia undoubtedly testifies

Consequently, the concept of nationalisation of the land, in terms of *economic reality*, is a category of commodity and capitalist society. What is real in this concept is not what the peasants think, or what the Narodniks say, but what arises from the economic relations of present society. Nationalisation of the land under capitalist relations is neither more nor less than the transfer of rent to the state. What is rent in capitalist society? It is not income from the

land in general. It is that part of surplus value which remains after average profit on capital is deducted. Hence, rent presupposes wage-labour in agriculture, the transformation of the cultivator into a capitalist farmer, into an entrepreneur. Nationalisation (in its pure form) assumes that the state receives rent from the agricultural entrepreneur who pays wages to wage-workers and receives average profit on his capital—average for all enterprises, agricultural and non-agricultural, in the given country or group of countries.

Thus, the theoretical concept of nationalisation is inseparably bound up with the theory of rent, i.e., capitalist rent, as the special form of income of a special class (the landowning class) in capitalist society.

Marx's theory distinguishes two forms of rent: differential rent and absolute rent. The first springs from the limited nature of land, its occupation by capitalist economies, quite irrespective of whether private ownership of land exists, or what the form of landownership is. Between the individual farms there are inevitable differences arising out of differences in soil fertility, location in regard to markets, and the productivity of additional investments of capital in the land. Briefly, those differences may be summed up (without, however, forgetting that they spring from different causes) as the differences between better and worse soils. To proceed. The price of production of the agricultural product is determined by the conditions of production not on the average soil, but on the worst soil, because the produce from the best soil alone is insufficient to meet the demand. The difference between the individual price of production and the highest price of production is differential rent. (We remind the reader that by price of production Marx means the capital expended on the production of the product, plus average profit on capital.)

Differential rent inevitably arises in capitalist agriculture even if the private ownership of land is completely abolished. Under the private ownership of land, this rent is appropriated by the landowner, for competition between capitals compels the tenant farmer to be satisfied with the average profit on capital. When the private ownership of land is abolished, that rent will go to the state.

That rent *cannot* be abolished as long as the capitalist mode of production exists.

Absolute rent arises from the private ownership of land. That rent contains an element of monopoly, an element of monopoly price.* Private ownership of land hinders free competition, hinders the levelling of profit, the formation of average profit in agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. And as agriculture is on a lower technical level than industry, as the composition of capital is marked by a larger proportion of variable capital than of constant capital, *the individual value* of the agricultural product is above the average. Hence, by hindering the free levelling of profits in agricultural enterprises on a par with non-agricultural enterprises, the private ownership of land makes it possible to sell the agricultural product not at the highest price of production, but at the still higher individual value of the product (for the price of production is determined by the average profit on capital, while absolute rent prevents the formation of this "average" by monopolistically fixing the individual value at a level higher than the average).

Thus, differential rent is inevitably an inherent feature of every form of capitalist agriculture. Absolute rent is not; it arises only under the private ownership of land, only under the historically** created backwardness of agriculture, a backwardness that becomes fixed by monopoly.

Kautsky compares these two forms of rent, particularly in their bearing on the nationalisation of the land, in the following propositions:

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* In Part 2 of Volume II of *Theories of Surplus Value*, Marx reveals the "essence of different theories of rent": the theory of the monopoly price of agricultural produce and the theory of differential rent. He shows what is true in both those theories, *insofar* as absolute rent contains an element of monopoly. See p. 125 concerning Adam Smith's theory: "it is quite true" that rent is monopoly price, insofar as the private ownership of land prevents the levelling of profit by fixing profit at a level higher than the average.[117]

** See *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. II, Part 1 (German original), p. 259: "In agriculture, manual labour still predominates, while the capitalist mode of production develops industry more quickly than agriculture. However, that is a *historical* distinction which may disappear." (See also p. 275, and Vol. II, Part 2, p. 15.)[118]

"As differential rent, ground rent arises from competition. As absolute rent, it arises from monopoly.... In practice, ground rent does not present itself to us divided in parts; it is impossible to say which part is differential rent and which part is absolute rent. Moreover, it is usually mixed with the interest on capital expended by the landowner: Where the landowner is also the farmer, ground rent appears as a part of agricultural profit.

"Nevertheless, the distinction between the two forms of rent is extremely important.

"Differential rent arises from the capitalist character of production and not from the private ownership of land.

"That rent would continue to exist even under nationalisation of the land, as demanded [in Germany] by the advocates of land reform, who would nevertheless preserve the capitalist mode of agriculture. In that case, however, rent would no longer accrue to private persons, but to the state.

"Absolute rent arises out of the private ownership of land, out of the antagonism of interests between the landowner and the rest of society. *The nationalisation of the land would make possible the abolition of that rent and the reduction of the price of agricultural produce by an amount equal to that rent.* [Our italics.]

"To proceed: the second distinction between differential rent and absolute rent is that the former is not a constituent part affecting the price of agricultural produce, whereas the latter is. The former arises from the price of production; the latter arises from the excess of market price over price of production. The former arises from the surplus, from the super-profit, that is created by the more productive labour on better soil, or on a better located plot. The latter does not arise from the additional income of certain forms of agricultural labour; it is possible only as a *deduction* from the available quantity of values for the benefit of the landowner, a deduction from the mass of surplus value—therefore, it implies either a reduction of profits or a deduction from wages. If the price of foodstuffs rises, and wages rise also, the profit on capital diminishes. If the price of foodstuffs rises without an increase in wages, then the workers suffer the loss. Finally, the following may happen—and this may be regarded as the general rule—the loss caused by absolute rent is borne jointly by the workers and the capitalists."*

Thus, the question of the nationalisation of the land in capitalist society falls into two essentially distinct parts: the question of differential rent, and that of absolute rent. Nationalisation changes the owner of the former, and undermines the very existence of the latter. Hence, on the

* K. Kautsky, *The Agrarian Question*, German original, pp. 79-80.

one hand, nationalisation is a partial reform within the limits of capitalism (a change of owners of a part of surplus value), and, on the other hand, it abolishes the monopoly which hinders the development of capitalism as a whole.

Unless a distinction is made between these two sides, i.e., the nationalisation of differential rent and of absolute rent, it is impossible to understand the economic significance of the question of nationalisation in Russia. This brings us, however, to P. Maslov's repudiation of the theory of absolute rent.

2. PYOTR MASLOV CORRECTS KARL MARX'S ROUGH NOTES[119]

I already had occasion in 1901, in *Zarya* (published abroad), to refer to Maslov's wrong conception of the theory of rent in dealing with his articles in the magazine *Zhizn**[120]

The debates prior to and in Stockholm, as I have already said, were concentrated to an excessive degree on the political aspect of the question. But after Stockholm, M. Olenov, in an article entitled "The Theoretical Principles of the Municipalisation of the Land" (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 1), examined Maslov's book on the agrarian question in Russia and particularly emphasised the incorrectness of Maslov's *economic theory*, which repudiates absolute rent altogether.

Maslov replied to Olenov in an article in *Obrazovaniye*, Nos. 2 and 3. He reproached his opponent for being "impudent", "bumptious", "flippant", etc. As a matter of fact, in the sphere of *Marxist theory*, it is Pyotr Maslov who is impudent and stupidly bumptious, for it is difficult to imagine a greater display of ignorance than the smug "criticism" of Marx by Maslov, who persists in his old mistakes.

"The contradiction between the theory of absolute rent and the whole theory of distribution expounded in Volume III," writes Mr. Maslov, "is so glaring that one can only account for it by the fact that Volume III is a posthumous publication containing also the rough notes of the author." (*The Agrarian Question*, 3rd ed., p. 108, footnote.)

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* See *The Agrarian Question*, Part 1, St. Petersburg, 1908, article "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" footnote to pp. 178-79. (See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 127.—*Ed.*)

Only a person who understands nothing about Marx's theory of rent could write a thing like that. But the patronising condescension with which the incomparable Pyotr Maslov treats the author of those rough notes is truly superb! This "Marxist" is too superior to think it necessary *to familiarise himself* with Marx before trying to teach other people, to study at least the *Theories of Surplus Value*, published in 1905, in which the theory of rent is made so plain that even the Maslovs should be able to grasp it! Here is Maslov's argument against Marx:

> "Absolute rent is said to arise from the low composition of agricultural capital.... As the composition of capital affects neither the price of the product, nor the rate of profit, nor the distribution of surplus value *among* the entrepreneurs in general it cannot create any rent. If the composition of agricultural capital is lower than that of industrial capital, differential rent results from the surplus value obtained in agriculture, but that makes no difference as far as the *formation* of rent is concerned. Consequently, if the 'composition' of capital changed, it would not affect rent in the least. The amount of rent is not in the least determined by the character of its origin, but solely by the above-mentioned difference in the productivity of labour under different conditions" (op. cit., pp. 108-09. Maslov's italics).

It would be interesting to know whether the bourgeois "critics of Marx" ever went to such lengths of frivolity in their refutations. Our incomparable Maslov is completely muddled; and he is muddled even when he *expounds* Marx (incidentally, that is also a habit of Mr. Bulgakov and all other bourgeois assailants of Marxism, who, however, differ from Maslov in that they are more honest, since they do not call themselves Marxists). It is not true to say that according to Marx absolute rent results from the low composition of agricultural capital. Absolute rent arises from the private ownership of land. This private ownership creates a special monopoly having nothing to do with the capitalist mode of production, which can exist on communal as well as on nationalised land.* The non-capitalist monopoly created by the private ownership of land prevents the levelling of profits in those branches of production

* See *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 208, where Marx shows that the landowner is an absolutely superfluous figure in capitalist production; that the purpose of the latter is "fully answered" if the land belongs to the state.[121]

which are sheltered by this monopoly. In order that "the composition of capital shall not affect the rate of profit" (there should be added: the composition of an individual capital, or of the capital of an individual branch of industry; here too Maslov expounds Marx in a muddled way), in order that the *average* rate of profit may be formed, the profits of all the separate enterprises and of all the separate spheres of industry must be *levelled*. The levelling takes place through free competition, through the free investment of capital in all branches of production without distinction. Can that freedom exist where there is non-capitalist monopoly? No, it cannot. The monopoly created by the private ownership of land *hinders* the free investment of capital, hinders free competition, hinders the levelling of the disproportionately high agricultural profit (arising from the low composition of agricultural capital). Maslov's objection reveals an utter lack of understanding, which is particularly obvious when, two pages further on, we come across a reference to ... *brickmaking* (p. 111); here, too, the technical level is low, the organic composition of capital is below the average, as in the case of agriculture, and yet there is no rent!

There cannot be any rent in brickmaking, esteemed "theoretician", because absolute rent arises not from the low composition of agricultural capital, but from the monopoly created by the private ownership of land, which prevents competition from levelling the profits of "low composition" capital. To repudiate absolute rent means repudiating the economic significance of the private ownership of land.

Maslov's second argument against Marx is this:

> "Rent from the 'last' investment of capital, Rodbertus's rent and Marx's absolute rent, will disappear because the tenant can always make the 'last' investment the 'last but one' if it produces anything besides the ordinary profit" (p. 112).

Pyotr Maslov muddles things, "impudently" muddles them.

In the first place, to put Rodbertus on a par with Marx on the question of rent is to display crass ignorance. Rodbertus's theory is based on the assumption that the erroneous calculations of the Pomeranian landlord ("not to

count" the raw product in agriculture!) are obligatory also for the capitalist farmer. There is not a grain of *historism* in Rodbertus' s theory, not a grain of historical reality, for he takes agriculture in general, regardless of time and place, agriculture in any country and in any epoch. Marx takes a special historical period in which capitalism has promoted technical development in industry more quickly than in agriculture; Marx takes *capitalist* agriculture restricted by *non-capitalist* private ownership of land.

Secondly, the reference to the tenant who "can always" make the last investment of capital the last but one shows that our incomparable Pyotr Maslov has failed to understand, not only Marx's absolute rent, *but his differential rent as well*! That is incredible, but it is a fact. During the term of his lease the tenant "can always" appropriate, and *always does appropriate*, **all** rent *if* he "makes the last investment the last but one", if—to put it more simply and (as we shall see in a moment) more correctly he invests fresh capital in the land. During the term of the lease, private ownership of land ceases to exist for the tenant; by paying rent, he has "ransomed himself" from that monopoly and it can no longer hinder him.* That is why, when a fresh investment of capital in his land yields the tenant additional profit *and additional rent*, *it is the tenant*, *not the landowner*, who appropriates that rent. The landowner will begin to appropriate that additional rent only after the tenant's lease has expired, when a new lease is drawn up. What mechanism will then transfer the additional rent from the pocket of the tenant farmer to that of the landowner? The mechanism of free competition, since the fact that the tenant receives not only average profit but also super-profit (=rent) will attract capital to this unusually profitable enterprise. Hence it is clear, on the one hand, why, all other things being equal, a long lease is to the advantage of the tenant and a short lease to the advantage of the landlord. Hence it is clear, on the other hand, why, for example, after the repeal of the Corn Laws, the English

* Had Maslov read the "rough notes" in Volume III at all attentively he could not but have noticed how frequently Marx deals with this.

landlords introduced a clause in their leases compelling the farmers to spend not less than £12 (about 110 rubles) per acre on their farms, instead of £8, as formerly. The landlords thus took into account the progress in socially necessary agricultural technique which took place as a result of the repeal of the Corn Laws.

The question now arises: what form of additional rent does the tenant appropriate during the term of his lease? Is it only absolute rent, or is it also differential rent? It is both. For had Pyotr Maslov taken the trouble to understand Marx before "criticising the rough notes" so amusingly, he would have known that differential rent is obtained not only from different plots of land, but also from different outlays of capital *on the same plot*.*

Thirdly (we apologise to the reader for wearying him with this long list of blunders which Maslov commits in every sentence; but what else can we do if we have to deal with such a "prolific" *Konfusionsrat*—a "muddled counsellor", as the Germans say?)—thirdly, Maslov's argument about the last and last but one investment is based on the notorious "law of diminishing returns". Like the bourgeois economists, Maslov recognises that law (and, to make it look important, even calls this stupid invention a fact). Like the bourgeois economists, Maslov connects that law with the theory of rent, declaring with the audacity of one who is utterly ignorant of theory, that "if it were not for the fact that the productivity of the last outlays of capital diminishes, there would be no such thing as ground rent" (p. 114).

For a criticism of this vulgar bourgeois "law of diminishing returns" we refer the reader to what I said in 1901 in opposition to Mr. Bulgakov.** On *that* question there is *no essential* difference between Bulgakov and Maslov.

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* Marx calls the differential rent obtained from the difference in various plots Differential Rent I; and that obtained from the difference in the productivity of additional outlays of capital on the same plot he calls Differential Rent II. In the "rough notes" in Volume III, that distinction is brought out in scrupulous detail (Part VI, Chapters 39-43) and one must be a "critic of Marx" after the manner of the Bulgakovs "not to notice" it.[122]

** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 107-119.—*Ed.*

To supplement what I said in opposition to Bulgakov I will quote just one more passage from the "rough notes" in Volume III, which reveals the Maslov-Bulgakov criticism in all its splendour.

"Rather than tracing to their origin the real natural causes leading to an exhaustion of the soil, which, incidentally, were unknown to all economists writing on differential rent, owing to the level of agricultural chemistry in their day, the shallow conception was seized upon that any amount of capital cannot be invested in a limited area of land; as the *Westminster Review*, for instance, argued against Richard Jones that all of England cannot be fed through the cultivation of Soho Square"....[123]

This objection is the only argument that Maslov and all other advocates of the "law of diminishing returns" use. If that law did not operate, if succeeding outlays of capital could be as productive as preceding ones, there would then be no need, they argue, to extend the area of cultivation; it would be possible to obtain any quantity of agricultural produce from the smallest of plots by the investment of fresh capital in the land, i.e., it would then be possible for "all of England to be fed through the cultivation of Soho Square", or to "put the agriculture of the whole globe on one dessiatin",* etc. Consequently, Marx analyses the *main* argument in favour of the "law" of diminishing returns. He goes on to say:

... "If this be considered a special disadvantage of agriculture, precisely the opposite is true. It is possible to invest capital here successively with fruitful results, because the soil itself serves as an instrument of production, which is not the case with a factory, or holds only to a limited extent, since it serves only as a foundation, as a place and a space providing a basis of operations. It is true that, compared with scattered handicrafts, large-scale industry may concentrate much production in a small area. Nevertheless, a definite amount of space is always required at any given

* See "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" on the law of diminishing returns. Maslov utters the same nonsense: "The entrepreneur will successively spend all [!] his capital, for example, on one dessiatin if the new outlays will produce the same profit" (p. 107), etc.

level of productivity, and the construction of tall buildings also has its practical limitations. Beyond this any expansion of production also demands an extension of land area. The fixed capital invested in machinery, etc., does not improve through use, but on the contrary, wears out. New inventions may indeed permit some improvement in this respect, but with any given development in productive power, machines will always deteriorate. If productivity is rapidly developed all of the old machinery must be replaced by the more advantageous; in other words, it is lost. The soil, however, if properly treated, improves all the time. The advantage of the soil, permitting successive investments of capital to bring gains without loss of previous investments, implies the possibility of differences in yield from these successive investments of capital." (*Das Kapital*, III. Band, 2. Teil, S. 314.)[124]

Maslov preferred to repeat the threadbare fable of bourgeois economics about the law of diminishing returns rather than ponder over Marx's criticism. And yet Maslov has the audacity, while distorting Marx, to claim here, on these very questions, that he is expounding Marxism!

The degree to which Maslov mutilates the theory of rent from his purely bourgeois point of view of the "natural law" of diminishing returns can be seen from the following tirade, which he gives in italics: "If successive outlays of capital on the same plot of land, leading to intensive farming, were equally productive, the competition of new lands would immediately disappear; for the cost of transport affects the price of grain in addition to the cost of production" (page 107).

Thus, overseas competition can be explained only by means of the law of diminishing returns! Exactly what the bourgeois economists say! But if Maslov was unable to read or incapable of understanding Volume III, then at least he should have familiarised himself with Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question*, or with Parvus's pamphlet on the agricultural crisis. Perhaps the popular explanations given by those Marxists would have enabled Maslov to understand that capitalism *raises* rent and increases the industrial population. And the price of land (=capitalised rent) *keeps* that rent at its inflated level. This applies also to differ-

ential rent, so that we see a second time that Maslov failed to understand anything Marx wrote even about the simplest form of rent.

Bourgeois economics accounts for the "competition of new lands" by the "law of diminishing returns"; for the bourgeois, consciously or unconsciously, ignores the social-historical aspect of the matter. Socialist economics (i.e., Marxism) accounts for overseas competition by the fact that land for which no rent is paid undercuts the excessively high grain prices established by capitalism in the old European countries, which raised ground rent to an incredible degree. The bourgeois economist fails to understand (or conceals from himself and others) that the level of rent fixed by the private ownership of land is an *obstacle* to progress in agriculture, and he therefore throws the blame upon the "natural" obstacle, the "fact" of diminishing returns.

3. IS IT NECESSARY TO REFUTE MARX IN ORDER TO REFUTE THE NARODNIKS?

Pyotr Maslov thinks it is necessary. "Elaborating" his silly "theory", he tells us for our edification in *Obrazovaniye*:

> "If it were not for the 'fact' that the productivity of successive expenditures of labour on the same plot of land diminishes, the idyll which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Narodniks depict could, perhaps, be realised: every peasant would use the patch of land he was entitled to and apply as much labour to it as he liked, and the land would 'reward' him for every 'application' with a corresponding quantity of products" (No. 2, 1907, p. 123).

Thus, if Marx had not been refuted by Pyotr Maslov, the Narodniks would, perhaps, be right! Such are the pearls of wisdom that drop from the lips of our "theoretician". And we, in our simple Marxist way, had thought that the idyll of perpetuating small production is refuted not by the bourgeois-stupid "law of diminishing returns", but by the fact of commodity production, the domination of the market, the advantages of large-scale capitalist farming over small farming, etc. Maslov has changed all this! Maslov has discovered that had it not been for the bourgeois law refuted by Marx, the Narodniks would have been right!

But that is not all. The revisionists, too, would have been right. Here is another argument advanced by our home-grown economist:

"If I am not mistaken, I [Pyotr Maslov] happened to be the first [that's the sort of fellow I am!] to lay special emphasis on the difference between the significance of the cultivation of the soil and of technical progress for the development of farming, and, in particular, for the struggle between large-scale and small production. Whereas the intensification of agriculture and the further expenditure of labour and capital are to an equal extent less productive both in large-scale and in small farming, technical progress, which increases the productivity of labour in agriculture as it does in industry, creates enormous and exceptional advantages for large-scale production. These advantages are determined almost entirely by technical conditions." ... You are muddling things up, my dear man: the advantages of large-scale production in commercial respects are of great importance.

... "On the other hand, cultivation of the soil can usually be applied equally in large-scale and in small farming".... Cultivation of the soil "can" be applied.

Evidently, our sagacious Maslov knows of a type of farming which can be conducted without the cultivation of the soil.... "For example, the substitution of multiple-crop rotation for the three-field system, an increase in the quantity of fertilisers, deeper ploughing, etc., can be equally applied in large-scale and small farming, and equally affect the productivity of labour. But the introduction of reaping-machines, for example, increases the productivity of labour only on the larger farms, because the small strips of grain field can be more conveniently reaped or mown by hand."...

Yes, undoubtedly Maslov was the "first" to succeed in introducing such endless confusion into the question! Just imagine: a steam plough (deeper ploughing) is "cultivation of the soil", a reaping-machine is a "technical implement". Thus, according to the doctrine of our incomparable Maslov, a steam plough is *not* a technical implement; a reaping-machine is *not* the further expenditure of labour and capital. Artificial fertilisers, the steam plough, grass cultivation

are "intensification". The reaping-machine and in general "most agricultural machines" represent "technical progress". Maslov "happened" to invent this nonsense because he had to find some way of wriggling out of the "law of diminishing returns", which technical progress has *refuted*. Bulgakov wriggled out of it by saying: technical progress is temporary, stagnation is constant. Maslov wriggles out of it by inventing a most amusing division of technical progress in agriculture into "intensification" and "technical implements".

What is intensification? It is the further expenditure of labour and capital. A reaping-machine, according to the discovery of our great Maslov, is *not* expenditure of capital. A seed-drill is *not* expenditure of capital! "The substitution of multiple-crop rotation for the three-field system" is *equally* applicable in large-scale and in small farming. That is not true. The introduction of multiple-crop rotation also calls for additional outlays of capital and it is *much more* applicable in large-scale farming. Incidentally, in this connection see the data on German agriculture quoted above ("The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'"*). Russian statistics, too, testify to the same thing. The slightest reflection would reveal to you that it could not be otherwise; that multiple-crop rotation cannot be applied *equally* in small and large-scale farming. Nor can increased quantities of fertilisers be "equally applicable", because big farms (1) have more cattle, which is of the greatest importance in this respect; (2) feed their cattle better and are not so "sparing" of straw, etc.; (3) have better facilities for storing fertilisers; (4) use larger quantities of artificial fertilisers. Maslov, in a really "impudent" way, distorts well-known data on modern agriculture. Finally, deep ploughing *cannot* be *equally* applicable in small and large-scale farming either. It is sufficient to point to two facts: first, the use of steam ploughs is increasing on the large farms (see above-quoted data on Germany; now, probably, electric ploughs too).** Perhaps even Maslov will realise that these cannot be "equally" applicable in large-scale and small farming. In the latter

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 181.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 131.—*Ed.*

it is the employment of *cows* as draught animals that is developing. Just think, great Maslov, *can* this signify that deep ploughing is equally applicable? Secondly, even where large and small farms use the same types of draught animals, the latter are *feebler* on the small farms, and therefore there cannot be equal conditions in regard to deep ploughing.

In short, there is hardly a sentence in all Maslov's vain attempts at "theoretical" thinking which does not reveal an inexhaustible amount of the most incredible confusion and the most astonishing ignorance. But Maslov, unperturbed, concludes:

> "Whoever has clarified for himself the difference between these *two* aspects of the development of agriculture [improvement in cultivation and technical improvement] will easily upset all the arguments of revisionism, and of Narodism in Russia." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 2, p. 125.)

Well, well. Maslov is a non-Narodnik and a non-revisionist *only* because he succeeded in rising above Marx's rough notes to the point of "clarifying" for himself the decrepit prejudices of decrepit bourgeois political economy. It is the old song set to a new tune! Marx *versus* Marx—exclaimed Bernstein and Struve. It is impossible to demolish revisionism without demolishing Marx—announces Maslov.

In conclusion, a characteristic detail. If Marx, who created the theory of absolute rent, is wrong, if rent cannot exist without the "law of diminishing returns", if the Narodniks and revisionists might be right did that law not exist, then, it would seem, Maslov's "*corrections*" to Marxism should serve as the corner-stone of his, Maslov's, "theory". And so they do. But Maslov prefers to conceal them. Recently the German translation of his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, appeared. I was curious to see *in what form* Maslov had presented his incredible theoretical banalities to the European Social-Democrats. I found that he had *not presented them at all*. In facing Europeans, Maslov *kept the "whole" of his theory hidden in his pocket*. He omitted from his book all that he had written in repudiation of absolute rent, the law of diminishing returns, etc. I could not help recalling in this connection

the story about a stranger who was present for the first time at a discussion between ancient philosophers but remained silent all the time. One of the philosophers said to the stranger: "If you are wise, you are behaving foolishly; if you are a fool, you are behaving wisely."

4. IS THE REPUDIATION OF ABSOLUTE RENT CONNECTED WITH THE PROGRAMME OF MUNICIPALISATION?

Puffed up though Maslov may be with the importance of his remarkable discoveries in the sphere of political economic theory, he, evidently, has some doubts whether any such connection exists. At any rate, in the article quoted above (*Obrazovaniye*, No. 2, p. 120) he denies that there is any connection between municipalisation and the "fact" of diminishing returns. That is rather odd: the "law of diminishing returns" is connected with the repudiation of absolute rent, is connected also with the fight against Narodism, but it is not connected with Maslov's agrarian programme! The fallacy of this opinion that there is no connection between general agrarian theory and Maslov's Russian agrarian programme can, however, be easily proved by direct means.

The repudiation of absolute rent is the repudiation of the economic significance of private land ownership under capitalism. Whoever claims that only differential rent exists, inevitably arrives at the conclusion that it makes not the slightest difference to the conditions of capitalist farming and of capitalist development whether the land belongs to the state or to private persons. In both cases, from the standpoint of the theory which repudiates absolute rent, only differential rent exists. Clearly, such a theory *must* lead to the repudiation of the significance of nationalisation as a measure which accelerates the development of capitalism, clears the path for it, etc. For such a view of nationalisation follows from the recognition of two forms of rent: the capitalist form, i.e., the form which cannot be eliminated under capitalism even on nationalised land (differential rent), and the ***non***-capitalist form connected with monopoly, a form which capitalism does not need and which hinders the full development of capitalism (absolute rent).

That is why, proceeding from his "theory", Maslov inevitably arrived at the conclusion that "it makes no difference whether it [ground rent] is called absolute or differential rent" (*Obrazovaniye*, No. 3, p. 103); that the *only* question is whether that rent is to be made over to the local or to the central authorities. But such a view is the result of theoretical ignorance. Quite apart from the question of whom the rent is paid to, and the political purposes for which it will be used, there is the far more fundamental question of the changes in the general conditions of capitalist farming and of capitalist development that are brought about by the abolition of private ownership of land.

Maslov has not even raised this purely economic question; it has not entered his mind, and it could not do so since he repudiates absolute rent. Hence the distorted one-sided, "*politician's*" approach, as I might call it, which reduces the question of confiscating the landlords' estates exclusively to that of who will receive the rent. Hence the distorted *dualism* in the programme based on the anticipation of "the victorious development of the revolution" (the expression used in the resolution on tactics which was added to Maslov's programme at the Stockholm Congress). The *victorious* development of the bourgeois revolution presupposes, first of all, fundamental *economic* changes that will really sweep away all the survivals of feudalism and medieval monopolies. In municipalisation, however, we see a real *agrarian bimetallism*: a combination of the oldest, most antiquated and obsolete, medieval allotment ownership with the absence of private landownership, i.e., with the most advanced, theoretically ideal system of agrarian relations in capitalist society. This agrarian bimetallism is a theoretical absurdity, an impossibility from the purely economic point of view. Here, the combination of private with public ownership of land is a purely mechanical combination "invented" by a man who sees no difference between the very system of capitalist farming under private landownership and without private landownership. The only question such a "theoretician" is concerned with is: how is the rent, "no matter what you call it, absolute or differential", to be shuffled around?

Indeed, in a capitalist country it is impossible to leave half the land (138,000,000 dessiatins out of 280,000,000) in private hands. There are two alternatives. Either private landownership is really needed at a given stage of economic development, really corresponds to the fundamental interests of the capitalist farmer class—in which case it is inevitable everywhere as the *basis* of bourgeois society which has taken shape according to a given type.

Or private landownership is not essential for the given stage of capitalist development, does not follow inevitably from the interests of the farmer class, and even contradicts those interests—in which case the preservation of that obsolete form of ownership is impossible.

The preservation of monopoly in *one* half of the land area under cultivation, the creation of privileges for one category of small farmers, the perpetuation in a free capitalist society of the "*pale of settlement*", which divides landowners from tenants of public land, is an absurdity inseparably bound up with the absurdity of Maslov's economic theory.

Therefore, we must now proceed to examine the *economic* significance of nationalisation, which has been pushed into the background by Maslov and his supporters.*

5. CRITICISM OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERSHIP FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

The erroneous repudiation of absolute rent, of the form in which private landed property is realised in capitalist incomes, led to an important defect in Social-Democratic literature and in the whole of the Social-Democratic position on the agrarian question in the Russian revolution. Instead of taking the criticism of private landownership into their own hands, instead of basing this criticism on an economic analysis, an analysis of definite economic evolution, our Social-Democrats, following Maslov, surrendered this criticism to the Narodniks. The result was an extreme theoretical vulgarisation of Marxism and the dis-

* At Stockholm one of these was Plekhanov. By the irony of history, this supposedly stern guardian of orthodoxy *failed to notice, or did not want to notice*, Maslov's distortion of Marx's economic theory.

tortion of its propagandist tasks in the revolution. The criticism of private landownership in speeches in the Duma, in propaganda and agitational literature, etc., was made *only* from the Narodnik, i.e., from the petty-bourgeois, quasi-socialist, point of view. The Marxists were unable to pick out the real core of this petty-bourgeois ideology, having failed to understand that their task was to introduce the historical element into the examination of the question, and to replace the point of view of the petty bourgeois (the abstract idea of equalisation, justice, etc.) by the point of view of the proletariat on the real roots of the struggle against private ownership of land in developing capitalist society. The Narodnik thinks that repudiation of private landownership is repudiation of capitalism. That is wrong. The repudiation of private landownership expresses the demands for the purest capitalist development. And we have to revive in the minds of Marxists the "forgotten words" of Marx, who criticised private landownership from the point of view of the conditions of capitalist economy.

Marx directed such criticism not only against big landownership, but also against small landownership. The free ownership of land by the small peasant is a necessary concomitant of small production in agriculture under certain historical conditions. A. Finn was quite right in emphasising this in opposition to Maslov. But the recognition of this historical necessity, which has been proved by *experience*, does not relieve the Marxist of the duty of making an all-round appraisal of small landownership. Real freedom of such landownership is inconceivable without the free purchase and sale of land. Private ownership of land implies the necessity of spending capital on purchasing land. On this point Marx, in Volume III of *Capital*, wrote: "One of the specific evils of small-scale agriculture, where it is combined with free landownership, arises from the cultivator's investing capital in the purchase of land" (III, 2, 342). "The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation" (ibid., 341).[125]

"The expenditure of money-capital for the purchase of land, then, is not an investment of agricultural capital. It is a decrease *pro tanto* in the capital which small peasants can employ in their own sphere of production It

reduces *pro tanto* the size of their means of production and thereby narrows the economic basis of reproduction. It subjects the small peasant to the money-lender, since credit proper occurs but rarely in this sphere in general. It is a hindrance to agriculture, even where such purchase takes place in the case of large landed estates. It contradicts in fact the capitalist mode of production, which is on the whole indifferent to whether the landowner is in debt, no matter whether he has inherited or purchased his estate" (344-45).[126]

Thus, both mortgage and usury are, so to speak, forms of capital's *evasion* of the difficulties which private landownership creates for the free penetration of capital into agriculture. In commodity production society it is impossible to conduct economy without capital. The peasant, and his ideologist the Narodnik, cannot help realising this. Hence, the question boils down to whether capital can be freely invested in agriculture directly, or through the medium of the usurer and the credit institutions. The peasant and the Narodnik, who, partly, are not aware of the complete domination of capital in modern society, and, partly, pull the cap of illusions and dreams over their eyes in order to shut out the unpleasant reality, turn their thoughts towards outside financial aid. Clause 15 of the Land Bill of the 104 reads as follows: "Persons receiving land from the national fund and lacking sufficient means to acquire the necessary agricultural equipment must be given state assistance in the form of loans and grants." Without a doubt, such financial assistance would be necessary if Russian agriculture were reorganised by a victorious peasant revolution. Kautsky, in his book *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, quite rightly emphasises this. But what we are discussing now is the social-economic significance of all these "loans and grants", which the Narodnik overlooks. The state can only be an intermediary in transferring the money from the capitalists; but the state itself can obtain this money only from the capitalists. Consequently, even under the best possible organisation of state assistance, the domination of capital is not removed in the least, and the old question remains: what are the possible forms of investment of capital in agriculture?

And that question inevitably leads to the Marxist criticism of the private ownership of land. That form of ownership is a *hindrance* to the free investment of capital in the land. Either complete freedom for this investment—in which case: abolition of private landownership, i.e., the nationalisation of the land; or the preservation of private landownership—in which case: penetration of capital by *roundabout* ways, namely, the mortgaging of land by landlords and peasants, the enslavement of the peasant by the usurer, the renting of land to tenants who own capital.

Marx says: "Here, in small-scale agriculture, the price of land, a form and result of private landownership, appears as a barrier to production itself. In large-scale agriculture, and large estates operating on a capitalist basis, ownership likewise acts as a barrier, because it limits the tenant farmer in his productive investment of capital, which in the final analysis benefits not him, but the landlord." (*Das Kapital*, III. Band, 2. Teil, S. 346-47.)[127]

Consequently, the abolition of private landownership is the maximum that can be done in bourgeois society for the removal of all obstacles to the free investment of capital in agriculture and to the free flow of capital from one branch of production to another. The free, wide, and rapid development of capitalism, complete freedom for the class struggle, the disappearance of all superfluous intermediaries who make agriculture something like the "sweated" industries—that is what nationalisation of the land implies under the capitalist system of production.

6. THE NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND AND "MONEY" RENT

An interesting economic argument against nationalisation was advanced by A. Finn, an advocate of division of the land. Both nationalisation and municipalisation, he says, mean transferring rent to a public body. The question is: what kind of rent? Not capitalist rent, for "usually the peasants do not obtain rent in the capitalist sense from their land" (*The Agrarian Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 77, cf. p. 63), but *pre-capitalist* money rent.

By money rent Marx means the payment by the peasant to the landlord of the whole of the surplus product in the form of money. The original form of the peasant's economic dependence upon the landlord under the pre-capitalist modes of production was labour rent (*Arbeitsrente*), i.e., corvée then came rent in the form of produce, or rent in kind, and finally came money rent. That rent, says A. Finn, "is the most widespread form in our country even today" (p. 63).

Undoubtedly, tenant farming based on servitude and bondage is extremely widespread in Russia, and, according to Marx's theory, the payment which the peasant makes under such a system of tenancy is largely money rent. What power makes it possible to extort *that* rent from the peasantry? The power of the bourgeoisie and of developing capitalism? Not at all. It is the power of the feudal latifundia. Since the latter will be broken up—and that is the starting-point and fundamental condition of the peasant agrarian revolution—there is no reason to speak of "money rent" in the pre-capitalist sense. Hence, the only significance of Finn's argument is that he emphasises once more the absurdity of *separating* the peasant allotment land from the rest of the land in the event of an agrarian revolution; since allotment lands are often surrounded by landlords' lands, and since the *present* conditions of demarcation of the peasant lands from the landlords' lands give rise to bondage, the preservation of this demarcation is *reactionary*. ***Unlike either division of the land or nationalisation, municipalisation preserves this demarcation.***

Of course, the existence of small landed property, or, more correctly, of small farming, introduces certain changes in the general propositions of the theory of capitalist rent, but it does not destroy that theory. For example, Marx points out that absolute rent as such does not usually exist under small farming, which is carried on mainly to meet the needs of the farmer himself (Vol. III, 2. Teil, S. 339, 344).[128] But the more commodity production develops, the more *all* the propositions of economic theory become applicable to peasant farming also, since it has come under the conditions of the capitalist world. It must not be for

gotten that no land nationalisation, no equalised land tenure, will abolish the now fully established fact that the well-to-do peasants in Russia are already farming on capitalist lines. In my *Development of Capitalism* I showed that, according to the statistics of the eighties and nineties of the last century, about one-fifth of the peasant households account for *up to half* of peasant agricultural production and a much larger share of *rented land*; that the farms of these peasants are now commodity-producing farms rather than natural-economy farms, and that, finally, *these* peasants cannot exist without a vast army of farmhands and day-labourers.* Among *these* peasants the elements of *capitalist* rent are taken for granted. *These* peasants express their interests through the mouths of the Peshekhonovs, who "soberly" reject the prohibition of hired labour as well as "socialisation of the land", who soberly champion the point of view of the peasant economic individualism which is asserting itself. If, in the utopias of the Narodniks, we carefully separate the real economic factor from the false ideology, we shall see at once that it is precisely the bourgeois peasantry which stands to gain most from the break-up of the feudal latifundia, irrespective of whether that is carried out by division, nationalisation, or municipalisation. "Loans and grants" from the state, too, are bound to benefit the bourgeois peasantry in the first place. The "peasant agrarian revolution" is nothing but the subordination of the whole system of landownership to the conditions of progress and prosperity of precisely these capitalist farms.

Money rent is the moribund yesterday, which cannot but die out. Capitalist rent is the nascent tomorrow, which cannot but develop under the Stolypin expropriation of the poor peasants ("under Article 87"), as well as under the peasant expropriation of the richest landlords.

7. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS CAN NATIONALISATION BE BROUGHT ABOUT?

The view is often met with among Marxists that nationalisation is feasible only at a high stage of development of capitalism, when it will have fully prepared the con-

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 136-39.—*Ed.*

ditions for "divorcing the landowners from agriculture" (by means of renting and mortgages). It is assumed that large-scale capitalist farming must have *already* established itself before nationalisation of the land, which cuts out rent without affecting the economic organism, can be brought about.*

Is this view correct? Theoretically it cannot be substantiated; it cannot be supported by direct references to Marx; the facts of experience speak against it rather than for it.

Theoretically, nationalisation is the "ideally" pure development of capitalism in agriculture. The question whether such a combination of conditions and such a relation of forces as would permit of nationalisation in capitalist society often occur in history is another matter. But nationalisation is not only an effect of, but also a condition for, the rapid development of capitalism. To think that nationalisation is possible only at a very high stage of development of capitalism in agriculture means, if anything, the repudiation of nationalisation as a measure of *bourgeois* progress; for everywhere the high development of agricultural capitalism has already placed on the order of the day (and will in time inevitably place on the order of the day in other countries) the "socialisation of agricultural production", i.e., the socialist revolution. No measure of bourgeois progress, as a bourgeois measure, is conceivable when the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is very acute. Such a measure is more likely in a "young" bourgeois society, which has not yet developed its strength, has not yet developed its contradictions to the full, and has not yet created a proletariat strong enough to strive directly towards the socialist revolution. And Marx allowed the possibility of, and sometimes directly advocated, the nationalisation of the land, not only in the epoch of the bourgeois revolution in Ger-

* Here Is one of the most exact expressions of this view uttered by Comrade Borisov, an advocate of the division of the land: "...Eventually, it [the demand for the nationalisation of the land] will be put forward by history; it will be put forward when petty-bourgeois farming has degenerated, when capitalism has gained strong positions in agriculture, and when Russia will no longer be a peasant country" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 127).

many in 1848, but also in 1846 for America, which, as he most accurately pointed out at that time, was only *just starting* its "industrial" development. The experience of various capitalist countries gives us no example of the nationalisation of the land in anything like its pure form. We see something similar to it in New Zealand, a young capitalist democracy, where there is no evidence of highly developed agricultural capitalism. Something similar to it existed in America when the government passed the Homestead Act and distributed plots of land to small farmers at a nominal rent.

No. To associate nationalisation with the epoch of highly developed capitalism means repudiating it as a measure of bourgeois progress; and such a repudiation directly contradicts economic theory. It seems to me that in the following argument in *Theories of Surplus Value*, Marx outlines conditions for the achievement of nationalisation *other than* those usually presumed.

After pointing out that the landowner is an absolutely superfluous figure in capitalist production, that the purpose of the latter is "fully answered" if the land belongs to the state, Marx goes on to say:

"That is why in theory the radical bourgeois arrives at the repudiation of private landed property.... In practice, however, he lacks courage, since the attack on one form of property, private property in relation to the conditions of labour, would be very dangerous for the other form. Moreover, the bourgeois has territorialised himself." (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 1. Teil, S. 208.)[129]

Marx does not mention here, as an obstacle to the achievement of nationalisation, the undeveloped state of capitalism in agriculture. He mentions *two* other obstacles, which speak much more strongly in favour of the idea of achieving nationalisation in the epoch of *bourgeois revolution*.

First obstacle: the radical bourgeois *lacks the courage* to attack private landed property owing to the danger of a socialist attack on all private property, i.e., the danger of a socialist revolution.

Second obstacle: "The bourgeois has territorialised himself". Evidently, what Marx has in mind is that the bour-

geois mode of production has already entrenched itself in private landed property, i.e., that this private property has become far more bourgeois than feudal. When the bourgeoisie, as a class, *has already* become bound up with landed property on a broad, predominating scale, *has already* "territorialised itself", "settled on the land", fully subordinated landed property to itself, then a genuine *social* movement of the bourgeoisie in favour of nationalisation is *impossible*. It is impossible for the simple reason that no class ever goes against itself.

Broadly speaking, these two obstacles are removable *only* in the epoch of rising and not of declining capitalism, in the epoch of the *bourgeois* revolution, and not on the eve of the socialist revolution. The view that nationalisation is feasible only at a high stage of development of capitalism cannot be called Marxist. It contradicts both the general premises of Marx's theory and his words as quoted above. It *oversimplifies* the question of the historically concrete conditions under which nationalisation is brought about by such-and-such forces and classes, and reduces it to a schematic and bare abstraction.

The "radical bourgeois" *cannot* be *courageous* in the epoch of strongly developed capitalism. In such an epoch this bourgeoisie, in the mass, is inevitably counter-revolutionary. In such an epoch the almost complete "territorialisation" of the bourgeoisie is already inevitable. In the epoch of bourgeois revolution, however, the *objective* conditions compel the "radical bourgeois" to be courageous; for, in solving the historical problem of the given period, the bourgeoisie, as a class, cannot yet fear the *proletarian* revolution. In the epoch of bourgeois revolution the bourgeoisie has *not yet territorialised itself*: landownership is still too much steeped in feudalism in such an epoch. The phenomenon of the *mass* of the bourgeois farmers fighting against the *principal* forms of landownership and therefore arriving at the practical achievement of the *complete* bourgeois "liberation of the land", i.e., *nationalisation*, becomes possible.

In all these respects the Russian bourgeois revolution finds itself in particularly favourable conditions. Arguing from the purely economic point of view, we must certainly

admit the existence of a maximum of survivals of feudalism in the Russian system of landownership, in both landlord estates and peasant allotments. Under such circumstances,- the contradiction between relatively developed capitalism in industry and the appalling backwardness of the countryside becomes glaring and, owing to objective causes, makes the bourgeois revolution extremely far-reaching and creates conditions for the most rapid agricultural progress. The nationalisation of the land is precisely a condition for the most rapid capitalist progress in our agriculture. We have a "radical bourgeois" in Russia who has not yet "territorialised" himself, who cannot, at present, fear a proletarian "attack". That radical bourgeois is the Russian peasant.

From this point of view the difference between the attitude of the mass of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and that of the mass of Russian peasants towards the nationalisation of the land becomes quite intelligible. The liberal landlord, lawyer, big manufacturer and merchant have all sufficiently "territorialised" themselves. They cannot but fear a proletarian attack. They cannot but prefer the Stolypin-Cadet road. Think what a golden river is now flowing towards the landlords, government officials, lawyers, and merchants in the form of the millions which the "Peasant" Bank is handing out to the terrified landlords! Under the Cadet system of "redemption payments" this golden river would have a slightly different direction, would, perhaps, be slightly less abundant, but it would still consist of hundreds of millions, and would flow into the same hands.

Out of the revolutionary overthrow of *all* the old forms of landownership neither the government official nor the lawyer can derive a single kopek. And the merchants, in the mass, are not far-sighted enough to prefer the future expansion of the home, peasant, market to the immediate possibility of snatching something from the gentry. Only the peasant, who is being driven into his grave by the old Russia, is capable of striving for the complete renovation of the system of landownership.

8. DOES NATIONALISATION MEAN TRANSITION TO DIVISION?

If nationalisation is regarded as a measure most likely to be achieved in the epoch of bourgeois revolution, such a view must inevitably lead to the admission that nationalisation may turn out to be a mere transition to division. The real economic need which compels the mass of the peasantry to strive for nationalisation is the need for the thorough renovation of all the old agrarian relationships, for "clearing" all the land, for readapting it to the new system of farming. That being the case, it is clear that the farmers who have adapted themselves, who have renovated the *whole* system of landownership, may demand that the *new* agrarian system be *consolidated*, i.e., that the holdings they have rented from the state be converted into their property.

Yes, that is indisputable. We arrive at nationalisation not from abstract arguments, but from a concrete calculation of the concrete interests of a concrete epoch. And, of course, it would be ridiculous to regard the mass of small farmers as "idealists"; it would be ridiculous to think that they will stop at division if their interests demand it. Consequently, we must inquire: (1) whether their interests can demand division; (2) under what circumstances; and (3) how this will affect the proletarian agrarian programme.

We have already answered the first question in the affirmative. To the second question no definite reply can yet be given. After the period of revolutionary nationalisation the demand for division may be evoked by the desire to consolidate to the greatest possible degree the new agrarian relations, which meet the requirements of capitalism. It may be evoked by the desire of the *given* owners of land to increase their incomes at the expense of the rest of society. Finally, it may be evoked by the desire to "quieten" (or, plainly speaking, to put down) the proletariat and the semi-proletarian strata, for whom nationalisation of the land will be an element that will "whet the appetite" for the socialisation of the whole of social production. All these three possibilities reduce themselves to a single economic basis, since the consolidation of the new system of capital-

ist landownership of the new farmers automatically creates anti-proletarian sentiments and a striving on the part of these farmers to create new privileges *for themselves* in the shape of right of ownership. Hence, the question reduces itself precisely to this economic consolidation. The constant factor counteracting this will be the development of capitalism, which increases the superiority of large-scale agriculture and demands constant facility for the "consolidation" of small farms into large ones. A temporary factor counteracting it will be the land available for colonisation in Russia: consolidating the new economy means raising the technical level of agriculture. And we have already shown that every step forward in agricultural technique "opens up" for Russia more and more new areas of land available for colonisation.

Our examination of the second question leads to the following deduction: the circumstances under which the new farmers' demands for the division of the land will overcome *all* counteracting influences cannot be predicted with accuracy. Allowance, however, must be made for the fact that capitalist development after the bourgeois revolution will inevitably give rise to such circumstances.

As regards the last question, that concerning the attitude of the workers' party towards the possible demand of the new farmers for the division of the land, a very definite reply can be given. The proletariat can and must support the militant bourgeoisie when the latter wages a really revolutionary struggle against feudalism. But it is not for the proletariat to support the bourgeoisie when the latter is becoming quiescent. If it is certain that a victorious bourgeois revolution in Russia is impossible without the nationalisation of the land, then it is still more certain that a subsequent turn towards the division of the land is impossible without a certain amount of "restoration", without the peasantry (or rather, from the point of view of the presumed relations: farmers) turning towards counter-revolution. The proletariat will uphold the revolutionary tradition against all such strivings and will not assist them.

In any case, it would be a great mistake to think that, in the event of the new farmer class turning towards division of the land, nationalisation would be a transient phe-

nomenon of no serious significance. In any case, it would have tremendous material and moral significance. Material significance, in that nothing is capable of so thoroughly sweeping away the survivals of medievalism in Russia, of so thoroughly renovating the rural districts, which are in a state of Asiatic semi-decay, of so rapidly promoting agricultural progress, as nationalisation. Any other solution of the agrarian question in the revolution would create less favourable starting-points for further economic development.

The moral significance of nationalisation in the revolutionary epoch is that the proletariat helps to strike a blow at "one form of private property" which must inevitably have its repercussions all over the world. The proletariat stands for the most consistent and most determined bourgeois revolution and the most favourable conditions for capitalist development, thereby most effectively counteracting all half-heartedness, flabbiness, spinelessness and passivity—qualities which the bourgeoisie cannot help displaying.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN QUESTIONS OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

As already pointed out, it is considerations of this kind that occupy a disproportionately large place in our Party discussion on the agrarian programme. Our task is to examine these considerations as systematically and briefly as possible and to show the relation between the various political measures (and points of view) and the economic basis of the agrarian revolution.

1. A GUARANTEE AGAINST RESTORATION

In my Report on the Stockholm Congress I dealt with this argument, citing the debate from memory. Now, we have before us the authentic text of the Minutes.

"The key to my position," exclaimed Plekhanov at the Stockholm Congress, "is that I draw attention to the possi-

bility of restoration" (p. 115). Let us examine this key a little more closely. Here is the first reference to it in Plekhanov's first speech:

"Lenin says, 'we shall make nationalisation harmless', but to make nationalisation harmless we must find a guarantee against restoration; and there is not, nor can there be, any such guarantee. Recall the history of France; recall the history of England; in each of these countries, the wide sweep of the revolution was followed by restoration. The same may happen in our country; and our programme must be such that in the event of its application, the harm that may be caused by restoration may be reduced to a minimum. Our programme must eliminate the economic basis of tsarism; but nationalisation of the land effected during the revolutionary period does not eliminate that basis. Therefore, I consider that the demand for nationalisation is an anti-revolutionary demand" (p. 44). What the "economic basis of tsarism" is, Plekhanov tells in the same speech: "The situation in our country was such that the land, together with its cultivators, was held in servitude by the state, and on the basis of that servitude Russian despotism developed. To overthrow despotism, it is necessary to do away with its economic basis. Therefore, I am opposed to nationalisation at present" (p. 44).

First of all, let us examine the *logic* of this argument about *restoration*. First: "there is not, nor can there be, any guarantee against restoration!" Second: "the harm that may be caused by restoration must be reduced to a minimum". That is to say, we *must invent* a guarantee against restoration, although there cannot be any such guarantee! And on the very next page, 45 (in the same speech), Plekhanov finally invents a guarantee: "In the event of restoration," he plainly says, "it [municipalisation] will not surrender the land [listen!] to the political representatives of the old order." Thus, although "there cannot be" any such guarantee, a guarantee against restoration has been found. A very clever conjuring trick, and the Menshevik press is filled with rapture over the conjurer's skill.

When Plekhanov speaks he is brilliant and witty, he crackles, twirls, and sparkles like a Catherine-wheel. The

trouble starts when the speech is taken down verbatim and later subjected to a logical examination.

What is restoration? It is the reversion of state power to the political representatives of the old order. Can there be any guarantee against such a restoration? No, there cannot. *Therefore*, we invent *such* a guarantee: municipalisation, which "will not surrender the land".... But we ask: what obstacles does municipalisation raise to the "surrender of the land"? The only obstacle is the law passed by the revolutionary parliament declaring such and such lands (former landlord estates, etc.) to be the *property* of the Regional Diets. But what is a law? The expression of the will of the classes which have emerged victorious and hold the power of the state.

Can you see now why such a law "will not surrender the land" to "the representatives of the old order" when *the latter* will have recaptured state power?

And after the Stockholm Congress this unmitigated nonsense was preached by Social-Democrats even from the rostrum of the Duma!*

As to the substance of this famous question of "guarantees against restoration", we must make the following observation, Since we can have no guarantees against restoration, to raise that question in connection with the agrarian programme means *diverting* the attention of the audience, *clogging their minds*, and introducing confusion into the discussion. We are not in a position to call forth at our own will a socialist revolution in the West, which is the only absolute guarantee against restoration in Russia. But a relative and conditional "guarantee", i.e., one that would raise the greatest possible *obstacles* to restoration, lies in carrying out the revolution in Russia in the most far-reaching, consistent, and determined manner possible. The more far-reaching the revolution is, the more difficult will it be to restore the old order and the more gains will remain even if restoration does take place. The more deeply the old soil is ploughed up by revolution, the more difficult will it be to restore the old order. In

* Tsereteli's speech on May 26, 1907. Stenographic Record of the Second Duma, p. 1234.

the political sphere, a democratic republic represents a more profound change than democratic local self-government; the former presupposes (and calls forth) greater revolutionary energy, intelligence, and organisation on the part of the large masses of the people; it creates traditions which it will be far more difficult to eradicate. That is why, for instance, present-day Social-Democrats attach so much value to the great fruits of the French Revolution in spite of all the restorations that have taken place, and in this they differ from the Cadets (and from Cadet-minded Social-Democrats?) who prefer democratic Zemstvos under a monarchy as a "guarantee against restoration".

In the economic sphere, nationalisation in a bourgeois agrarian revolution is more far-reaching than anything else, because it breaks up *all* the medieval forms of landownership. *At the present time* the peasant farms his own strip of allotment land, a strip of rented allotment land, a strip of rented landlord's land, and so on. Nationalisation makes it possible to tear down *all* the fences of landownership to the utmost degree, and to "clear" all the land for the *new system of economy* suitable to the requirements of capitalism. Of course, even such a clearing affords no guarantee against a return to the old order; to promise the people such a "guarantee against restoration" would be a swindle. But such a clearing of the old *system of landownership* will enable the new *system of economy* to become so firmly rooted that a return to the old forms of landownership would be extremely difficult, because *no* power on earth *can* arrest the development of capitalism. Under municipalisation, however, a return to the old form of landownership is *easier*, because municipalisation *perpetuates* the "pale of settlement", the boundary that separates medieval landownership from the new, municipalised form. After nationalisation, restoration will have to break up millions of new, capitalist farms in order to restore the old system of landownership. After municipalisation, restoration will not have to break up any farms or to set up any new land boundaries; all it will have to do will be literally to sign a paper *transferring* the lands owned by the municipality X to the noble landlords Y, Z, etc., or to hand over to the landlords the rent from the "municipalised" lands.

We must now pass from Plekhanov's logical error on the question of restoration, from the confusion of political concepts, to the economic essence of restoration. The Minutes of the Stockholm Congress fully confirm the statement made in my Report that Plekhanov impermissibly confuses the restoration which took place in France on the basis of capitalism with the restoration of "our old, semi-Asiatic order". (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 116.) Therefore, there is no need for me to add anything to what I have already said on this question in the Report. I shall only deal with the "elimination of the economic basis of despotism". The following is the most important passage in Plekhanov's speech pertaining to this:

"It is true that the restoration [in France] did not restore the survivals of feudalism; but the equivalent of these survivals in our own country is our old system of feudal attachment of both land and cultivator to the state, our old peculiar nationalisation of the land. It will be all the more easy for our restoration to return to that [*sic*!] nationalisation because you yourselves demand the nationalisation of the land, because you leave that legacy of our old semi-Asiatic order intact" (p. 116).

So, after the restoration, the return to *that*, i.e., semi-Asiatic, nationalisation "will be easier" because Lenin (and the peasantry) are *now* demanding nationalisation. What is this? A historico-materialistic analysis, or a purely rationalistic "wordplay"?* Is it the *word* "nationalisation" or certain *economic changes* that facilitate the restoration of the semi-Asiatic conditions? Had Plekhanov thought this matter over he would have realised that municipalisation and division eliminate *one* basis of the Asiatic order, i.e., medieval landlord ownership, but leave another, i.e., medieval allotment ownership. Consequently, in *essence*, in the *economic essence* of the revolution (and not in virtue of the term by which one might designate it), it is nationalisation that *far more radically* eliminates the *economic* basis of Asiatic despotism. Plekhanov's "conjuring trick" lies in that he described medieval *landownership* with its dependence, its imposts, and its servitude as "peculiar na-

* Comrade Schmidt in Stockholm. Minutes, p. 122.

tionalisation" and skipped the *two* forms of *that* system of landownership: allotments and landlordism. As a result of this juggling with words the real historical question as to what forms of medieval landownership are abolished by one or another agrarian measure is *distorted*. Plekhanov's fireworks display was very crude after all.

Plekhanov's almost incredible muddle on the question of restoration is to be explained by two circumstances. First, in speaking about the "peasant agrarian revolution", Plekhanov completely failed to grasp its peculiar character as *capitalist* evolution. He confuses Narodism, the theory of the possibility of *non-capitalist* evolution, with the Marxist view that *two* types of *capitalist* agrarian evolution are possible. Plekhanov constantly betrays a vague "fear of the peasant revolution" (as I told him in Stockholm; see pp. 106-07 of the Minutes*), a fear that it may turn out to be economically reactionary and lead, not to the American farmer system, but to medieval servitude. Actually, that is economically impossible. Proof—the Peasant Reform and the subsequent course of evolution. In the Peasant Reform the shell of feudalism (both landlord feudalism and "state feudalism", which Plekhanov, followed by Martynov, referred to at Stockholm) was very strong. But economic evolution proved *stronger*, and it filled this feudal shell with a *capitalist* content. Despite the obstacles presented by medieval landownership, both peasant and landlord economy developed, although incredibly slowly, *along the bourgeois path*. If there had been any real grounds for Plekhanov's fears of a return to Asiatic despotism, the system of landownership among the state peasants (up to the eighties) and among the former state peasants (after the eighties) should have turned out to be the purest type of "state feudalism". Actually, it proved to be freer than the landlord system, because feudal exploitation had already become impossible in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There was less bondage and a more rapid development of a peasant bourgeoisie among the state peasants with "large landholdings".** Either a slow and painful

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 283.—*Ed.*

** Of course, our former state peasants can be described as possessing "large landholdings" only in comparison with the former land-

bourgeois evolution of the Prussian, Junker type, or a rapid, free evolution of the American type is possible in Russia now. Anything else is an illusion.

The second reason for the "restoration muddle" in the heads of some of our comrades was the uncertain situation in the spring of 1906. The peasantry, as a mass, had not yet definitely shown itself. It was still possible to assume that the peasant movement and the Peasant Union were not the final expressions of the real aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the peasantry. The autocratic bureaucracy and Witte had not yet finally given up hope that "the muzhik will help us out" (a classic phrase used by Witte's organ *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* in the spring of 1906), i.e., that the peasants would go to the Right. Hence the strong representation allowed to the peasantry under the Law of December 11, 1905. Even at that time many Social-Democrats still thought the autocracy capable of playing some trick with the peasants' idea: "Better all the land be the tsar's than the gentry's". But the two Dumas, the Law of June 3, 1907, and Stolypin's agrarian legislation were enough to open everybody's eyes. To save what it could, the autocracy had to introduce the policy of forcibly breaking up the village communes in favour of private ownership of land, i.e., to base the counter-revolution, not on the peasants' vague talk about nationalisation (the land belongs to the "commune", and so on), but on the *only* possible *economic* basis upon which the power of the landlords could be retained, i.e., *capitalist* evolution on the Prussian model.

The situation has now become quite clear, and it is high time to put away forever the vague fear of "Asiatic" restoration roused by the peasant movement against the private ownership of land.*

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lords' peasants. According to the returns for 1905, the former held an average of 12.5 dessiatins of allotted land per household, whereas the latter held only 6.7 dessiatins.

* I say nothing here about the fact that the bogey of restoration is a political weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, since everything essential on this subject has been said already in my Report. (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 339.—*Ed.*)

2. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AS A BULWARK AGAINST REACTION

...“In the shape of local self-government bodies which will possess the land,” said Plekhanov at Stockholm, “it [municipalisation] will create a bulwark against reaction. And a very powerful bulwark it will be. Take our Cossacks for example” (p. 45). Well, we shall “take our Cossacks” and see what the reference to them is worth. But first of all, let us examine the general grounds for this opinion that local self-government is capable of being a bulwark against reaction. That view has been propounded by our municipalisers on innumerable occasions, and it will be sufficient to quote a passage from John’s speech to supplement Plekhanov’s formula. “What is the difference between nationalisation and municipalisation of the land if we admit that both are feasible and equally bound up with the democratisation of the political system? The difference is that municipalisation is better able to consolidate the gains of the revolution, the democratic system, and will serve as the basis for its further development, whereas nationalisation will merely consolidate the power of the state” (p. 112).

The Mensheviks actually deny the possibility of guarantees against restoration, and in the very same breath produce “guarantees” and “bulwarks” like conjurers doing a trick in front of an audience. Just think a little, gentlemen! How can local self-government be a bulwark against reaction, or consolidate the gains of the revolution? There can be only one bulwark against reaction and one means of consolidating the gains of the revolution, namely, the class-consciousness and organisation of the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. And in a capitalist state which is centralised, not by the arbitrary will of the bureaucracy, but by the inexorable demands of economic development, that organisation must find expression in a single force welded together throughout the state. Without a centralised peasant movement, without a centralised nationwide political struggle of the peasantry led by a centralised proletariat, *there can be no* serious “revolutionary gains” worthy of “consolidation”; there can be no “bulwark against reaction”.

Local self-government that is at all really democratic is *impossible* unless landlord rule is completely overthrown and landlordism is abolished. While admitting this in words, the Mensheviks, with amazing light-mindedness, refuse to consider what it implies in deeds. In deeds, it cannot be attained unless the revolutionary classes conquer political power throughout the state; and one would have thought that two years of revolution would have taught even the most obdurate "man in the muffler" that these classes in Russia can only be the proletariat and the peasantry. To be victorious, the "peasant agrarian revolution" of which you gentlemen speak must, as such, as a peasant revolution, become the central authority throughout the state.

The democratic self-governing bodies can be only *particles* of such a central authority of the democratic peasantry. Only by *combating* the local and regional disunity of the peasantry, only by advocating, preparing, and organising a nation-wide, all-Russian, centralised movement, can real service be rendered to the cause of "peasant agrarian revolution", and not to the encouragement of parochial backwardness and local provincial stupefaction of the peasantry. It is precisely this stupefaction that you, Mr. Plekhanov and Mr. John, are serving when you advocate the preposterous and arch-reactionary idea that local self-government can become a "bulwark against reaction", or that it can "consolidate the gains of the revolution". For the experience of the two years of the Russian revolution has plainly demonstrated that it was precisely this local and regional disunity of the peasant movement (the soldiers! movement is part of the peasant movement) that was most of all responsible for the defeat.

To present a programme of a "peasant agrarian revolution and associate it *only* with the democratisation of local self-government and not of the central government, to hold the former up as a genuine "bulwark" and "consolidation", is in reality nothing but a Cadet *deal with reaction*.* The

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* I have dealt more fully with this in the Report. (See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 337-38.—*Ed.*) Here I shall add an extract from a speech by the Menshevik Novosedsky, which I did not hear (see the Report) at the Congress, but which corroborates this most strikingly.

Cadets lay stress on local "democratic" self-government because they do not want, or dare, to touch upon *more important* questions. The Mensheviks did not realise what a big word they uttered when they admitted that the "peasant agrarian revolution" is the task of the day, and in their political commentary to this agrarian programme they displayed the acme of provincial narrow-mindedness.

Here is a sample of John's reasoning, if you please:

> "Comrade Lenin is afraid that the reaction will wrest the confiscated lands from the local self-government bodies; if that can be said of the lands which may pass into the hands of the state, it cannot possibly be said of municipalised lands. Even the autocratic Russian Government could not take away the land from the local government bodies of Armenia, as that called forth strong resistance on the part of the population" (p. 113).

Superb, is it not? The whole history of the autocracy is one of wholesale grabbing of local, regional, and national lands; and our wiseacres try to reassure the people who are becoming stupefied in their provincial isolation by arguing that "even the autocracy" did not take away the land from the Armenian *churches*, although it had begun to do so, and was in fact prevented from doing so *only* by the all-Russian revolution.... In the centre autocracy, and in the provinces "Armenian lands" which "it dares not take away.... How has so much philistine stupidity penetrated our Social-Democratic movement?

And here are Plekhanov's Cossacks:

> "Take our Cossacks. They behave like downright reactionaries; yet if the [autocratic] government dared to lay hands on their land, they would rise against it to a man. Consequently, the merit of municipalisation lies precisely in that it will prove of use even in the event of restoration (p. 45).

Opposing the amendment to substitute the words "democratic republic" for "democratic state", Novosedsky said: ... "In the event of truly democratic local self-government being established, the programme now adopted may be carried into effect *even with a degree of democratisation of the central government which cannot be described as the highest degree of its democratisation. Even under democratisation of a comparative degree, so to speak, municipalisation will not be harmful, but useful.*" (p. 138. Our italics.) That is as clear as clear can be. A peasant agrarian revolution *without* the overthrow of the autocracy—such is the highly reactionary idea the Mensheviks advocate.

"Consequently", indeed! If the autocracy rose against the defenders of the autocracy, then the defenders of the autocracy would rise against the autocracy. What profundity! Cossack landownership, however, is of use not only in the event of restoration, but also as a means of upholding what must be overthrown before it can be restored. Speaking in opposition to Plekhanov, Schmidt called attention to this interesting aspect of municipalisation. He said:

> "Let me remind you that the autocracy had granted certain privileges to the Cossacks a month ago. Consequently, it is not afraid of municipalisation, for the Cossacks' lands even now are managed in a manner which greatly resembles municipalisation.... It [municipalisation] is going to play a counter-revolutionary role" (pp. 123-24).

Plekhanov became so excited over that speech that he interrupted the speaker (on quite an unimportant point, to ask him whether he was speaking about the Orenburg Cossacks) and tried to upset the standing orders by demanding the floor out of his turn to make a statement. Subsequently he submitted the following written statement:

> "Comrade Schmidt misquoted my reference to the Cossacks. I made no reference to the Orenburg Cossacks at all. I said: look at the Cossacks they are behaving like arch-reactionaries: nevertheless, if the government tried to lay hands on their land, they would rise against it to a man. And so would, more or less, all the regional bodies to whom the confiscated landlords' land would be transferred by the revolution, if any such attempt were made. And such behaviour on their part would be one of the guarantees against reaction in the event of restoration" (p. 127).

It is a brilliant plan, of course, to overthrow the autocracy without touching the autocracy: to take certain regions away from it and leave it to regain them if it can! It is almost as brilliant as the idea of expropriating capitalism through the savings-banks. But that is not the point just now. The point is that regional municipalisation, which "should" play a wonderful role after the victorious revolution, is *now* playing a counter-revolutionary role. And that is the point that Plekhanov evaded!

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

At the present time the Cossack lands represent real municipalisation. Large regions belong to separate Cossack troops—the Orenburg, Don, and others. The Cossacks possess an average of *52 dessiatins per household*, the peasants an average of 11 dessiatins. In addition, the Orenburg Cossacks own 1,000,000 dessiatins of "army lands"; the Don Cossacks, 1,900,000 dessiatins, etc. This "municipalisation" is the breeding-ground of purely feudal relations. This actually existing municipalisation involves the caste and regional isolation of the peasants, who are split up by differences in the size of holdings, amount of taxes paid, and terms of medieval land tenure as a reward for service, and so forth. "Municipalisation" does not assist the general democratic movement, it serves to disintegrate it, to split up into regions and thus weaken what can be victorious only as a centralised force; it serves to alienate one region from another.

And in the Second Duma we find the *Right Cossack* Karaulov speaking in *support of Stolypin* (asserting that Stolypin in his declaration also agreed to the compulsory shifting of land boundaries), *denouncing* nationalisation no less strongly than Plekhanov, *and openly declaring in favour of municipalisation by regions* (18th session, March 29, 1907, Stenographic Record, p. 1366).

The Right-wing Cossack Karaulov grasped the crux of the matter a thousand times more correctly than Maslov and Plekhanov. The division into regions is *a guarantee against revolution*. If the Russian peasantry (with the aid of a centralised, not "regional", proletarian movement) fails to break the bounds of its regional isolation and organise an all-Russian movement, the revolution will *always* be beaten by the representatives of the various privileged regions which the centralised authority of the old regime will use in the struggle as necessity requires.

Municipalisation is a *reactionary* slogan, which idealises the medieval isolation of the regions, and dulls the peasantry's consciousness of the need for a centralised agrarian revolution.

3. THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BOURGEOIS STATE

It is the central state authority that the municipalisers dislike above all else. Before we proceed to examine their arguments, we must first ascertain what nationalisation means from the political and legal standpoint (its economic content we have ascertained above).

Nationalisation is the transfer of all the land to the *ownership* of the state. State ownership means that the state is entitled to draw the rent from the land and to lay down *general* rules governing the possession and use of the land for the whole country. Under nationalisation such general rules certainly include prohibition of any sort of intermediary, i.e., the prohibition of sub-letting, or the transfer of land to anyone except the direct tiller, and so on. Furthermore, if the state in question is really democratic (not in the Menshevik sense *à la* Novosedsky), its ownership of the land does not at all preclude, but, on the contrary, *requires* that the land be placed at the disposal of the local and regional self-governing bodies within the limits of the laws of the country. As I have already pointed out in my pamphlet *Revision, etc.*,* our minimum programme *directly demands* this when it calls for the self-determination of nationalities, for wide regional self-government, and so on. Hence the detailed regulations, corresponding to local differences, the practical allotment, or distribution of land among individuals, associations, etc.—all this *inevitably* passes into the hands of the *local* organs of the state, i.e., to the local self-governing bodies.

Any misunderstandings on this score, if they could arise, would be due either to a failure to understand the difference between the concepts of ownership, possession, disposal and use, or to demagogical flirting with provincialism and federalism.** The basis of the difference between

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 181-83.—*Ed.*

** We see that kind of flirting on the part of Maslov. ... "Perhaps," he writes in an article in *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 104, "in some places, the peasants would agree to share their lands, but the refusal of the peasants in a single large area (e.g., Poland) to share their lands would be enough to make the proposal to nationalise all the land an absurdity." That is a sample of vulgar argumentation in which there is no trace of *thought*, but a mere jumble of words. The "refusal" of

municipalisation and nationalisation is not in the apportionment of rights as between the central and provincial authorities, and still less in the "bureaucracy" of the central authority—only utter ignoramuses can think and talk like that—the essential difference is that under municipalisation, private ownership is retained for one category of land, whereas under nationalisation it is completely abolished. The essential difference lies in the "agrarian bimetallism", which is implied in the first programme, and eliminated in the second.

If, however, you approach the *present* programme from the standpoint of possible *arbitrary action* by the central authority, etc. (a standpoint which the vulgar advocates of municipalisation often fall back upon), you will see that the present programme is confused and vague in the extreme. It suffices to point out that the present programme transfers "to the possession of the democratic state" both the "lands required for colonisation", and "forest and water areas of national importance". Obviously, these terms are very indefinite and provide an abundant source for conflicts. Take, for instance, Mr. Kaufman's latest contribution in Volume II of *The Agrarian Question*, published by the Cadets ("On Norms of Supplementary Allotments"), in which a computation is made of the land reserves available in 44 gubernias for the purpose of additional allotments for the peasants at the highest norms of 1861. The "non-allotment distributable land" is first estimated without forest land and then with forest land (over 25 per cent of forest). Who is to determine which of these forests are of "national importance"? Only the central state authority, of course. Hence, it is in the hands of this central state authority that the Menshevik programme places a gigantic

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an area that occupies an exceptional position cannot alter the general programme, nor make it absurd: some area may also "refuse" to municipalise the land. That is not the point. What is important is the fact that in a united capitalist state, the private ownership of land and nationalisation on a large scale cannot exist side by side as two separate systems. One of them will have to get the upper hand. It is up to the workers' party to advocate the superior system, the one that facilitates the rapid development of the productive forces and freedom to wage the class struggle.

area of 57,000,000 dessiatins in 44 gubernias (according to Kaufman). Who is to determine what the lands available for "colonisation" are? Only the bourgeois central authority, of course. It alone will determine, for instance, whether the 1,500,000 dessiatins of "army lands" of the Orenburg Cossacks, or the 2,000,000 dessiatins of the Don Cossack lands can or cannot serve as "colonisation lands" *for the whole country* (because the Cossacks have 52.7 dessiatins per household). Clearly, the question is not as it is put by Maslov, Plekhanov, and Co. It is not a question of protecting the local regional self-governing bodies from the encroachments of the central government by means of paper resolutions; that cannot be done either with paper, or even with guns; for the trend of capitalist development is towards centralisation, towards the concentration of such a force in the hands of the central bourgeois government as the "regions" *will never be able* to stand up against. The point is that *one and the same class* should have political power both centrally and locally, that democracy should be quite consistently applied in both cases to an absolutely equal *degree*, a degree sufficient to ensure the *complete supremacy* of, let us say, the majority of the population, i.e., the peasantry. That alone can serve as a *real guarantee* against "excessive" encroachments of the centre, against infringements of the "lawful" rights of the regions. All other guarantees invented by the Mensheviks are downright foolishness; they are foolscaps donned by provincial philistines to protect themselves from the power of the central authority which has been concentrated by capitalism. That is exactly the kind of philistine foolishness that Novosedsky is guilty of, as also the whole of the present programme, which *conceives the possibility of* complete democracy in local self-government and a "lower" degree of democracy at the centre. Incomplete democracy means that power at the centre is *not* in the hands of the majority of the population, *not* in the hands of those elements which predominate in the local self-governing bodies; and that means not only the possibility but the *inevitability of conflicts*, out of which, by virtue of the laws of economic development, the *non*-democratic central authority must emerge victorious!

"Municipalisation" from this angle, regarded as a means of "securing" something for the regions against the central authority, is sheer philistine nonsense. If that can be called a "fight" against the centralised bourgeois authority, it is the sort of "fight" that the *anti-Semites* are waging against capitalism, that is, the same extravagant promises, which attract the dull and ignorant masses and *the same economic and political impossibility of fulfilling* these promises.

Take the stock argument of the advocates of municipalisation against nationalisation, namely, nationalisation will strengthen the bourgeois state (or as John so admirably put it: "will strengthen *only* the state power"), and will increase the revenues of the anti-proletarian, bourgeois government; *whereas*—this is exactly what they say—*whereas* municipalisation will yield revenues for the needs of the population, for the needs of the proletariat. This kind of argument makes one blush for Social-Democracy, for it is *sheer anti-Semitic stupidity and anti-Semitic demagogy*. We shall not quote the "small fry" who have been led astray by Plekhanov and Maslov; we shall quote Maslov "himself":

> "Social-Democracy," he instructs the readers of *Obrazovaniye* "always makes its calculations in such a way that its plans and aims will be vindicated even under the worst circumstances.... We must assume that the bourgeois system with all its negative features will predominate in all spheres of social life. Self-government will have the same bourgeois character as the whole state system; the same acute class struggle will go on in it as in the municipalities of Western Europe.
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> "What is the difference, then, between local self-government and the state authority? Why does Social-Democracy seek to transfer the land not to the state, but to the local self-governing bodies?
>
> "To define the functions of the state and of local self-government, let us compare their budgets." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 102.)

Then follows a comparison: in one of the most democratic republics—the United States of America—42 per cent of the budget is spent on the army and navy. The same applies to France, England, etc. The "landlord Zemstvos" in Russia spend 27.5 per cent of their budgets on public health, 17.4 per cent on education, 11.9 per cent on roads.

"This comparison of the respective budgets of the most democratic states with the least democratic local self-governing bodies shows that the former, by their functions, serve the interests of the ruling classes, that the state funds are spent on *means of oppression*, on means of suppressing democracy, on the other hand, we find that the most undemocratic, the very worst type of local self-government is compelled, however badly, to serve democracy, to satisfy local requirements" (p. 103).

"Social-Democrats must not be so naïve as to accept nationalisation of the land on the grounds, for instance, that the revenues from nationalised lands would go towards the maintenance of *republican* troops.... It will be a very naïve reader who believes Olenov when he says that Marx's theory 'permits' the inclusion in the programme only of the demand for the nationalisation of the land, i.e., the expenditure of ground rent [irrespective of whether it is called absolute or differential rent?] on the army and navy, and that this theory does not permit the inclusion of municipalisation of the land, i.e., the expenditure of rent on the needs of the population" (p. 103).

Clear enough, one would think. Nationalisation—for the army and navy; municipalisation—for the needs of the people! A Jew is a capitalist; down with the Jews means down with the capitalists!

Good Maslov fails to see that the high percentage of expenditure on cultural needs in the budgets of local self-governing bodies is a high percentage of secondary items of expenditure. Why is that? Because the jurisdiction and financial powers of local self-governing bodies are determined by the central authority and determined in such a manner that it takes vast sums for the army, etc., and gives only farthings for "culture". Is such a division unavoidable in bourgeois society? Yes, it is; for in bourgeois society the bourgeoisie could not rule if it did not spend vast sums on making its class rule secure and thus leave only farthings for cultural purposes. One must be a Maslov to conceive this brilliant idea: if I declare this *new source of vast sums* to be the property of the Zemstvos, I *get round* the rule of the bourgeoisie! How easy the task of the proletarians would be if they reasoned like Maslov: all we have to do is to demand that the revenues from the railways, post, telegraph, and the liquor monopoly should not be "nationalised", but "municipalised", and all those revenues will be spent not on the army and navy, but for cultural purposes. There is no need whatever to

overthrow the central authority, or to change it radically; all we have to do is simply to secure the "municipalisation" of all the big items of revenue, and the trick is done. Oh, wiseacres!

In Europe, and in every bourgeois country, municipal revenues are those revenues—and let the good Maslov remember this!—which the bourgeois central authority is willing to sacrifice for cultural purposes, *because they are secondary items of revenue*, because it is inconvenient for the central authority to collect them, and because the principal, cardinal, fundamental needs of the bourgeoisie and of its rule have already been met by the *vast sums of revenue*. Therefore, to advise the people to secure new vast sums, hundreds of millions from the municipalised lands, and to make sure the money is spent for cultural purposes by handing it over to the Zemstvos and not to the central authority, is the advice of a charlatan. The bourgeoisie in a bourgeois state can give *nothing but farthings* for real cultural purposes, for it requires the large sums to secure its rule as a class. Why does the central authority appropriate nine-tenths of the revenues from taxes on land, commercial bodies, etc., and allow the Zemstvos to keep only one-tenth? Why does it make it a law that any additional taxes imposed by the Zemstvos shall not exceed a certain low percentage? Because the large sums are needed to ensure the class rule of the bourgeoisie, which by its very bourgeois nature cannot allow more than farthings to be spent for cultural purposes.*

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* A study of R. Kaufmann's highly comprehensive work, *Die Kommunalfinanzen*, 2 Bände, Lpz. 1906, II. Abt., 5. Band des Hand- und Lehrbuches der Staatswissenschaften, begr. von Frankenstein, fortges. von Heckel, will show that the division of local and central state expenditures in England is *more in favour* of the local government bodies than it is in Prussia and France. Thus, in England, 3,000 million marks are expended by the local authorities, and 3,600 million by the central government, in France, the respective figures are 1,100 million as against 2,900 in Prussia, 1,100 and 3,500. Let us now take the *cultural* expenditure, for instance, the expenditure on education in the country most favourably situated (from the standpoint of the advocates of municipalisation), i.e., England. We find that out of the total local expenditure, of £151,600,000 (in 1902-03) £16,500,000 were spent on education, i.e., slightly over one-tenth. The central government, under

The European socialists take this distribution of the large sums and the farthings for granted; they know quite well that it cannot be otherwise in bourgeois society. Taking this distribution for granted, they say: we cannot participate in the central government because it is an instrument of oppression; but we may participate in municipal governments because there the farthings are spent for cultural purposes. But what would these socialists think of a man who advised the workers' party to agitate in favour of the European municipalities being given property rights in the really large revenues, the total rent from local land, the whole revenue from the local post offices, local railways, and so on? They would certainly think that such a man was either crazy or a "Christian Socialist" who had found his way into the ranks of Social-Democracy by mistake.

Those who, in discussing the tasks of the present (i.e., bourgeois) revolution in Russia, argue that, we must not strengthen the central authority of the bourgeois state, reveal a complete inability to think. The Germans may and should argue in that way because they have before them only a Junker-bourgeois Germany; there can be no other Germany until socialism is established. In our country, on the other hand, the whole content of the revolutionary mass struggle at the present stage is whether Russia is to be a Junker-bourgeois state (as Stolypin and the Cadets desire), or a peasant-bourgeois state (as the peasants and the workers desire). One cannot take part in such a revolution without supporting one section of the bourgeoisie, one type of bourgeois evolution, against the other. Owing to objective economic causes, there is not and cannot be any other "choice" for us in this revolution than that between a bourgeois centralised republic of peasant-farmers and a bourgeois centralised monarchy of Junker-landlords. To

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the 1908 Budget (see *Almanach de Gotha*) spent for educational purposes £16,900,000 out of a total of £198,600,000, i.e., less than one-tenth. Army and navy expenditure for the same year amounted to £59,200,000; add to this the expenditure of £28,500,000 on the national debt, £3,800,000 on law courts and police, £1,900,000 on foreign affairs and £19,800,000 on cost of tax collection, and you will see that the bourgeoisie spends only *farthings* on education, and *vast sums* on the maintenance of its rule as a class.

avoid that difficult "choice" by fixing the attention of the masses on the plea: "if only we could make the Zemstvos a little more democratic", is the most vulgar philistinism.

4. THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL AND OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTIONS

A difficult "choice", we said, meaning of course not the subjective choice (which is the more desirable), but the objective outcome of the struggle of the social forces that are deciding the historical issue. Those who say that my agrarian programme, which links the republic with nationalisation, is optimistic, have never thought out what the "difficulty" involved in a favourable outcome for the peasantry really is. Here is Plekhanov's argument on the subject:

"Lenin evades the difficulty of the question by means of optimistic assumptions. That is the usual method of utopian thinking. The anarchists, for instance, say: 'there is no need for any coercive organisation', and when we retort that the absence of coercive organisation would enable individual members of the community to injure the community if they so desired, the anarchists reply: 'that cannot be'. In my opinion, that means evading the difficulty of the question by means of optimistic assumptions. And that is what Lenin does. He raises a whole series of optimistic 'ifs' around the possible consequences of the measure he proposes. To prove this, I shall quote the reproach which Lenin levelled at Maslov. On page 23 of his pamphlet* he says: 'Maslov's draft tacitly assumes a situation in which the demands of our political minimum programme have not been carried out in full, the sovereignty of the people has not been ensured, the standing army has not been abolished, oficials are not elected, and so forth. In other words, it assumes that our democratic revolution, like most of the democratic revolutions in Europe, has not reached its complete fulfilment an that it has been curtailed, distorted, "rolled back", like all the others. Maslov's draft is especially intended for a half-way, inconsistent, incomplete, or curtailed democratic revolution, "made innocuous" by reaction.' Assuming that the reproach Lenin levelled at Maslov is justified, the passage quoted still shows that Lenin's own draft programme will be good only in the event of all his 'ifs' coming true. But if those 'ifs' are not realised the implementation of his draft** will prove harmful. But we have no need of such drafts. Our draft programme must be armed at all points, i.e., ready to meet unfavourable 'ifs'." (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, pp. 44-45.)

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 187.—*Ed.*

** In that case it would not be *my* draft! Plekhanov is illogical!

I have quoted this argument in full because it clearly indicates Plekhanov's mistake. He has completely failed to understand the optimism which scares him. The "optimism" is not in assuming the election of officials by the people, etc., *but in assuming the victory of the peasant agrarian revolution*. The real "difficulty" lies in securing the victory of the *peasant* agrarian revolution in a country which, at least since 1861, has been developing along Junker-bourgeois lines; and since you admit the possibility of this fundamental *economic* difficulty, it is ridiculous to regard the difficulties of political democracy as all but anarchism. It is ridiculous to forget that the scope of the agrarian and of the political changes cannot fail to correspond, that the *economic* revolution presupposes a *corresponding* political superstructure. Plekhanov's cardinal mistake on this question lies in this very failure to understand the root of the "optimism" of *our common*, Menshevik and Bolshevik, agrarian programme.

Indeed, picture to yourselves concretely that a "*peasant agrarian revolution*", involving *confiscation* of the landlords' estates, means in contemporary Russia. There can be no doubt that during the past half-century capitalism has paved the way for itself *through* landlord farming, which now, on the whole, is unquestionably superior to peasant farming, not only as regards yields (which can be partly ascribed to the better quality of the land owned by the landlords), but also as regards the wide use of improved implements and crop rotation (fodder grass cultivation).* There is no doubt that landlord farming is bound by a thousand ties not only to the bureaucracy, but also to the bourgeoisie. Confiscation undermines a great many of the interests of the big bourgeoisie, while the peasant revolution, as Kautsky has rightly pointed out, leads also to the bankruptcy of the state, i.e., it damages the interests not only of the Russian, but of the whole international bourgeoisie. It stands to reason that under such conditions the victory of the peasant revolution, the victory of the petty

* See the new and comprehensive data on the superiority of landlord over peasant farming because of the new extensive cultivation of grass in Kaufman's *The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II.

bourgeoisie over both the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, requires an exceptionally favourable combination of circumstances; it requires what, from the standpoint of the philistine, or of the philistine historian, are very unusual "optimistic" assumptions; it requires tremendous peasant initiative, revolutionary energy, class-consciousness, organisation, and rich *narodnoye tvorchestvo* (the creative activity of the people). All that is beyond dispute, and Plekhanov's philistine jokes at the expense of that last phrase are only a cheap way of dodging a serious* issue. And since commodity production does not unite or centralise the peasants, but disintegrates and disunites them, a *peasant* revolution in a bourgeois country is possible only under the leadership of the proletariat—a fact which is more than ever rousing the opposition of the most powerful bourgeoisie in the world to such a revolution.

Does that mean that Marxists must abandon the idea of a peasant agrarian revolution altogether? No. Such a deduction would be worthy only of those whose philosophy is nothing but a liberal parody of Marxism. What it does mean is only, first, that Marxism cannot link the destiny of socialism in Russia with the outcome of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; second, that Marxism must reckon with the two possibilities in the capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia and clearly show the people the conditions and significance of each possibility, and third, that Marxism must resolutely combat the view that a radical agrarian revolution is possible in Russia without a radical political revolution.

(1) The Socialist-Revolutionaries, in common with all the Narodniks who are at all consistent, fail to understand the bourgeois nature of the peasant revolution and link

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* *Narodnoye tvorchestvo* is *narodvolchestvo*,[129a] Plekhanov said mockingly at Stockholm. It is the sort of criticism with which *The Adventures of Chichikov* is criticised, by making fun of the hero's name: "Chichikov.... Chi ... chi ... how funny!"[130] Only those who think that the mere admission of the possibility of a peasant revolution against the bourgeoisie and the landlords is *narodovolchestvo* can seriously regard as *narodovolchestvo* the idea that it is necessary to rouse the "creative activity of the people", that it is necessary to find new forms of struggle and new ways of organising the peasantry in the Russian revolution.

within the whole of their own quasi-socialism. A favourable outcome of the peasant revolution, in the opinion of the Narodniks, would mean the triumph of Narodnik socialism in Russia. Actually, such an outcome would be the quickest and most decisive bankruptcy of Narodnik (peasant) socialism. The fuller and the more decisive the victory of the peasant revolution, the sooner will the peasantry be converted into free, bourgeois farmers, who will "give the sack" to Narodnik "socialism". On the other hand, an unfavourable outcome would prolong the agony of Narodnik socialism for some time, making it possible to some extent to maintain the illusion that criticism of the landlord-bourgeois variety of capitalism is criticism of capitalism in general.

Social-Democracy, the party of the proletariat, does not in any way link the destiny of socialism with either of the possible outcomes of the bourgeois revolution. Either outcome implies the development of capitalism and the oppression of the proletariat, whether under a landlord monarchy with private ownership of land, or under a farmers' republic, even with the nationalisation of the land. Therefore, only an absolutely independent and purely proletarian party is able to defend the cause of socialism "whatever the situation of democratic agrarian reforms"* may be, as the concluding part of my agrarian programme declares (that part was incorporated in the resolution on tactics of the Stockholm Congress).

(2) But the bourgeois nature of *both* possible outcomes of the agrarian revolution by no means implies that Social-Democrats can be indifferent to the struggle for one or the other outcome. It is undoubtedly in the interests of the working class to give the most vigorous support to the peasant revolution. More than that: it must play the leading part in that revolution. In fighting for a favourable outcome of the revolution we must spread among the masses a very clear understanding of what keeping to the landlord path of agrarian evolution means, what incalculable hardships (arising not from capitalism, but from the inadequate development of capitalism) it has in store for all

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 195.—*Ed.*

the toiling masses. On the other hand, we must also explain the petty-bourgeois nature of the peasant revolution, and the fallacy of placing any "socialist" hopes in it.

Moreover, since we do not link the destiny of socialism with either of the possible outcomes of the bourgeois revolution, our programme cannot be identical for both a favourable and "unfavourable case". When Plekhanov said that we do not need drafts specially providing for both the one and the other case (that is, drafts built upon "ifs"), he said it simply without thinking; for it is precisely from his standpoint, from the standpoint of the probability of the worst outcome, or of the necessity of reckoning with it, that it is particularly necessary to divide the programme into two parts, as I did. It needs to be said that on the present path of landlord-bourgeois development the workers' party stands for such and such measures, while at the same time it helps the peasantry with all its might to abolish landlordism entirely and thus create the possibility for broader and freer conditions of development. I dealt with this aspect of the matter in detail in my Report (the point about rent, the necessity of including that point in the programme in the "worst case"; and its omission in Maslov's draft).* I shall merely add that Plekhanov's mistake is more obvious than ever at the present moment, when the actual conditions for Social-Democratic activity give least grounds for optimistic assumptions. The Third Duma can in no way induce us to give up the struggle for the peasant agrarian revolution; but for a certain space of time we shall have to work on the basis of agrarian relations which entail the most brutal exploitation by the landlords. Plekhanov, who was particularly concerned about the worst case, now finds himself with no programme to meet it.

(3) Since we set ourselves the task of assisting the peasant revolution, we must clearly see the difficulty of the task and realise that the political and agrarian changes must *correspond*. Otherwise we shall get a scientifically unsound and, in practice, reactionary combination of agrarian "optimism" (confiscation plus municipalisation or

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 342-43.—*Ed.*

division) with political "pessimism" (Novosedsky's democratisation "of a comparative degree" at the centre).

The Mensheviks, as if in spite of themselves, accept the peasant revolution, but do not want to give the people a clear and definite picture of it. One can detect in what they say the opinion expressed with such inimitable naïveté by the Menshevik Ptitsyn at Stockholm: "The revolutionary turmoil will pass away, bourgeois life will resume its usual course, and unless a workers' revolution takes place in the West, the bourgeoisie will inevitably come to power in our country. Comrade Lenin will not and cannot deny that" (Minutes, p. 91). Thus, a superficial, abstract conception of the bourgeois revolution has obscured the question of one of its varieties, namely, the peasant revolution! All of this last is mere "turmoil", and the only thing that is real is the "usual course". The philistine point of view and failure to understand what the struggle is about in our bourgeois revolution could hardly be expressed in clearer terms.

The peasantry cannot carry out an agrarian revolution without abolishing the old regime, the standing army and the bureaucracy, because all these are the most reliable mainstays of landlordism, bound to it by thousands of ties. That is why the idea of achieving a peasant revolution by democratising only the local institutions without completely breaking up the central institutions is scientifically unsound. In practice it is reactionary because it plays into the hands of petty-bourgeois obtuseness and petty-bourgeois opportunism, which sees the thing in a very "simple" way: we want the land; as to politics, God will take care of that! The peasant agrees that all the land must be taken; but whether all political power has to be taken as well, whether all political power can be taken, and how it should be taken, are things he does not bother about (or did not bother until the dissolution of two Dumas made him wiser). Hence, the extremely reactionary standpoint of the "peasant Cadet" Mr. Peshekhonov, who already in his *Agrarian Problem* wrote: "Just now it is far more necessary to give a definite answer on the agrarian question than, for instance, of the question of a republic" (p. 114).

And that standpoint of political imbecility (the legacy of the arch-reactionary Mr. V. V.) has, as we know, left its mark on the whole programme and tactics of the "Popular-Socialist" Party. Instead of combating the short-sightedness of the peasant who fails to see the connection between agrarian radicalism and political radicalism, the P.S.'s ("Popular Socialists") *adapt themselves* to that short-sightedness. They believe it is "more practical that way", but in reality it is the very thing which dooms the agrarian programme of the peasantry to utter failure. Needless to say, a radical political revolution is difficult, but so is an agrarian revolution; the latter is impossible apart from the former, and it is the duty of socialists not to conceal this from the peasants, not to throw a veil over it (by using rather vague, semi-Cadet phrases about the "democratic state", as is done in our agrarian programme), but to speak out, to teach the peasants that unless they go the whole way in politics it is no use thinking seriously of confiscating the landlords' land.

It is not the "ifs" that are important here in the programme. The important thing is to point out in it that the agrarian and the political changes must *correspond*. Instead of using the word "if", the same idea can be put differently: "The Party explains that the best method of taking possession of the land in bourgeois society is by abolishing private ownership of land, nationalising the land, and transferring it to the state, and that such a measure can neither be carried out nor bear real fruit without complete democratisation not only of the local institutions, but of the whole structure of the state, including the establishment of a republic, the abolition of the standing army, election of officials by the people, etc."

By failing to include that explanation in our agrarian programme we have given the people the *false* idea that confiscation of the landlords' estates is possible without the complete democratisation of the central government. We have sunk to the level of the opportunist petty bourgeoisie, i.e., the "Popular Socialists"; for in both Dumas it so happened that their programme (the Bill of the 104) as well as ours linked agrarian changes with democratisation *only of the local* institutions. Such a view is philistine

obtuseness, of which the events of June 3, 1907, and the Third Duma should have cured many people, the Social-Democrats above all.

5. A PEASANT REVOLUTION WITHOUT THE CONQUEST OF POWER BY THE PEASANTRY?

The agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy is a proletarian programme in a peasant revolution that is directed against the survivals of serfdom, against all that is medieval in our agrarian system. Theoretically, as we have seen, this thesis is accepted by the Mensheviks as well (Plekhanov's speech at Stockholm). But the Mensheviks have failed to think out that proposition and to perceive its indissoluble connection with the general principles of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian bourgeois revolution. And it is in Plekhanov's writings that this shallow thinking is most clearly revealed.

Every peasant revolution directed against medievalism, when the whole of the social economy is of a capitalist nature, is a bourgeois revolution. But not every bourgeois revolution is a peasant revolution. If, in a country where agriculture is organised on fully capitalist lines, the capitalist farmers, with the aid of the hired labourers, were to carry out an agrarian revolution by abolishing the private ownership of land, for instance, that would be a bourgeois revolution, but by no means a peasant revolution. Or if a revolution took place in a country where the agrarian system had become so integrated with the capitalist economy in general that that system could not be abolished without abolishing capitalism, and if, say, that revolution put the industrial bourgeoisie in power in place of the autocratic bureaucracy—that would be a bourgeois revolution, but by no means a peasant revolution. In other words, there can be a bourgeois country without a peasantry, and there can be a bourgeois revolution in such a country without a peasantry. A bourgeois revolution may take place in a country with a considerable peasant population and yet not be a peasant revolution; that is to say, it is a revolution which does not revolutionise the agrarian relations that especially affect the peasantry, and does not bring the peasantry to the fore as a social force that is at all

active in creating the revolution. Consequently, the general Marxist concept of "bourgeois revolution" contains certain propositions that are definitely applicable to any peasant revolution that takes place in a country of rising capitalism, but that general concept says nothing at all about whether or not a bourgeois revolution in a given country must (in the sense of objective necessity) become a peasant revolution in order to be completely victorious.

The principal source of the error in the tactical line pursued by Plekhanov and his Menshevik followers during the first period of the Russian revolution (i.e., during 1905-07) is their complete failure to understand this correlation between bourgeois revolution in general, and a peasant bourgeois revolution. The furious outcry* usually raised in Menshevik literature over the Bolsheviks' alleged failure to grasp the bourgeois character of the present revolution is merely a screen to cover the Mensheviks' own shallow thinking. As a matter of fact, not a single Social-Democrat of either group, either before or during the revolution, has ever departed from the Marxist views concerning the bourgeois nature of the revolution; only "simplifiers", those who vulgarise disagreements between the groups, could affirm the contrary. But some Marxists, namely, the Right wing, have all the time made shift with a general, abstract, stereotyped conception of the bourgeois revolution, and failed to perceive the *special feature* of the present bourgeois revolution, namely, that it is a peasant revolu ion. It was quite natural and inevitable for that wing of Social-Democracy to fail to understand the source of the counter-revolutionary nature of our bourgeoisie in the Russian revolution, to determine clearly which classes are capable of achieving complete victory in this revolution, and to fall into the view that in a bourgeois revolution the proletariat must support the bourgeoisie, that the bourgeoisie must be the chief actor in the bourgeois revolution, that the sweep of the revolution would be weakened if the bourgeoisie deserted it, and so on and so forth.

* In Plekhanov's *New Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness* (published by Glagolev, St. Petersburg), that outcry is positively comical. There is any amount of furious language, abuse of the Bolsheviks and posturing, but not a grain of thought.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, ever since the beginning of the revolution in the spring and summer of 1905, when the confusion of Bolshevism with boycottism, boyevism, etc., that is now so prevalent among the ignorant or stupid, was still out of the question, clearly pointed to the *source* of our tactical differences by singling out the concept of peasant revolution as one of the varieties of bourgeois revolution, and by defining the victory of the peasant revolution as "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". Since then Bolshevism won its greatest *ideological* victory in international Social-Democracy with the publication of Kautsky's article on the driving forces of the Russian revolution ("The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution", Russian translation edited and with a preface by N. Lenin, published by *Novaya Epokha* Publishers, Moscow, 1907). As is known, at the beginning of the split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in 1903, Kautsky sided with the latter. In 1907, having watched the course of the Russian revolution, on the subject of which he wrote repeatedly, he at once saw the mistake made by Plekhanov, who had sent him his famous questionnaire. In that questionnaire, Plekhanov inquired *only* about the bourgeois nature of the Russian revolution, without specifying the concept of peasant bourgeois revolution, without going beyond general formulas such as "bourgeois democracy", "bourgeois opposition parties". In answering Plekhanov Kautsky rectified that mistake by pointing out that the bourgeoisie was not the driving force of the Russian revolution, that in *that* sense the days of bourgeois revolutions had passed, that "a lasting community of interests during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle exists only between the proletariat and the peasantry" (op. cit., pp. 30-31), and that "it [this lasting community of interests] should be made the basis of the whole of the revolutionary tactics of Russian Social-Democracy" (ibid., p. 31). The *underlying principles* of Bolshevik tactics as *against* those of the Mensheviks are here clearly expressed. Plekhanov is terribly angry about this in his *New Letters, etc*. But his annoyance only makes the impotence of his argument more obvious. The crisis through which we are passing is "a bourgeois crisis for all

that", Plekhanov keeps on repeating and he calls the Bolsheviks "ignoramuses" (p. 127). That abuse is an expression of his impotent rage. Plekhanov has failed to grasp the difference between a peasant bourgeois revolution and a non-peasant bourgeois revolution. By saying that Kautsky "exaggerates the speed of development of our peasant" (p. 131), and that "the difference of opinion between us [between Plekhanov and Kautsky] can only be one of nuances" (p. 131), etc., Plekhanov resorts to the most miserable and cowardly shuffling, for anyone at all capable of thinking can see that the very opposite is the case. It is not a question of "nuances" or of the speed of development, or of the "seizure" of power that Plekhanov shouts about, but of the *basic* view as to which *classes* are capable of being the driving force of the Russian revolution. Voluntarily or involuntarily, Plekhanov and the Mensheviks are *inevitably* falling into a position of opportunist support to the bourgeoisie, for they fail to grasp the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie in a peasant bourgeois revolution. The Bolsheviks from the outset defined the general and the basic class conditions for the victory of this revolution as the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Kautsky arrived at substantially the same view in his article, "The Driving Forces", etc., and he repeated it in the *second* edition of his *Social Revolution*, in which he says: "It [the victory of Russian Social-Democracy in the near future] can only come as the result of a coalition [*einer Koalition*] between the proletariat and the peasantry." (*Die soziale Revolution*, von K. Kautsky, Zweite Auflage. Berlin, 1907, S. 62.) (Space does not permit us to deal with another addition Kautsky made to the second edition, in which he sums up the lessons of December 1905, a summing up which differs *radically* from Menshevism.)

Thus we see that Plekhanov completely evaded the question of the *underlying principles* of the general Social-Democratic tactics in a bourgeois revolution that can be victorious only as a peasant revolution. What I said at Stockholm (April 1906)* about Plekhanov having reduced Menshevism to absurdity by repudiating the conquest of power

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 283.—*Ed.*

by the peasantry in a peasant revolution has been completely borne out in subsequent literature. And that fundamental error in the tactical line was bound to affect the Mensheviks' agrarian programme. As I have repeatedly pointed out above, municipalisation does not in either the economic or the political sphere fully express the conditions of a real victory of the peasant revolution, for the real conquest of power by the proletariat and the peasantry. In the economic sphere, such a victory is incompatible with the perpetuation of the old system of allotment landownership; in the political sphere, it is incompatible with mere regional democracy and incomplete democracy in the central government.

6. IS LAND NATIONALISATION A SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE METHOD?

Comrade John said at Stockholm (p. 111 of the Minutes) that the "draft providing for land municipalisation is more acceptable, because it is more flexible: it takes into account the diversity of economic conditions, and it can be carried out in the process of the revolution itself". I have already pointed out the cardinal defect of municipalisation in this respect: it rivets allotment ownership to the property form. Nationalisation is incomparably more flexible in this respect, because it makes it much easier to organise new farms on the "unfenced" land. Here it is also necessary to refer briefly to other, minor arguments that John raised.

"The division of the land," says John, "would in some places revive the old agrarian relations. In some regions the distribution would be as much as 200 dessiatins per household, so that in the Urals, for instance, we would create a class of new landlords." That is a sample of an argument which denounces its own system! And it was that kind of argument that decided the issue at the Menshevik Congress! It is municipalisation, and it alone, that is guilty of the sin referred to here, for it alone rivets the land to individual regions. It is not the division of land that is to blame, as John thinks, thus falling into a ridiculous logical error, but the provincialism of the municipalisers. In any case, according to the Menshevik programme, the mu-

nicipalised lands in the Urals would remain the "property" of the people of the Urals. That would mean the creation of a *new*, reactionary, Cossack stratum—reactionary because privileged small farmers having ten times more land than all the rest of the farmers could not but resist the peasant revolution, and could not but defend the privileges of private landownership. It only remains for us to assume that on the basis of that same programme, the "democratic state" might declare the tens of millions of dessiatins of Ural forests to be "forests of national importance", or "colonisation lands" (does not the Cadet Kaufman apply that term to the forest land in the Urals, within the 25 per cent limit, which means 21,000,000 dessiatins in the Vyatka, Ufa, and Perm gubernias?), and on that ground become their "owner". Not flexibility, but confusion, pure and simple, is the distinguishing feature of municipalisation.

Now let us see what carrying out municipalisation in the very process of the revolution means. Here we meet with attacks on my "revolutionary peasant committees" as a class institution. "We are for non-class institutions," the Mensheviks argued at Stockholm, playing at liberalism. Cheap liberalism! It did not occur to our Mensheviks that in order to introduce local self-government of a non-class character it is necessary to defeat the privileged class against which the struggle is being waged and to wrest the power from it. It is just "in the very process of the revolution", as John puts it, i.e., in the course of the struggle to drive out the landlords, in the course of those "*revolutionary actions of the peasantry*" that are mentioned also in the Mensheviks' resolution on-tactics, that peasant committees can be set up. The introduction of local self-government of a non-class character is provided for in our political programme; it is bound to be established as the organisation of *administration* after the victory, when the whole of the population will have been compelled to accept the new order. If the words of our programme about "supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including the confiscation of the landlords' lands" is not mere phrase-mongering, then we must think about organising the masses *for those* "actions"! Yet that is entirely overlooked in the Menshevik programme. That programme is so

drawn up as to be easily and wholly converted into a parliamentary Bill, like the Bills proposed by the bourgeois parties, which either (like the Cadets) hate all "actions", or opportunistically shirk the task of systematically assisting and organising such actions (like the Popular Socialists). But a programme built on such lines is unworthy of a workers' party which speaks of a peasant agrarian revolution, a party which pursues the aim not of reassuring the big bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (like the Cadets), not of reassuring the petty bourgeoisie (like the Popular Socialists), but exclusively of developing the consciousness and initiative of the broad masses in the course of their struggle against feudal Russia.

Recall, if only in general outline, the innumerable "revolutionary actions" of the peasantry which took place in Russia in the spring of 1905, in the autumn of 1905, and in the spring of 1906. Do we pledge our support to such actions or not? If not, then our programme would not be telling the truth. If we do, then obviously our programme *fails to give* directives about the organisation of *such* actions. Such actions can be organised only on the spot where the struggle is going on; the organisation can be created only by the masses who are directly taking part in the struggle, i.e., the organisation must definitely be of the peasant committee type. To wait for big, regional self-governing bodies to be set up during such actions would be ridiculous. The extension of the power and influence of the victorious local committees to adjacent villages, uyezds, gubernias, towns, areas, *and to the entire country* is, of course, desirable and essential. There can be no objection to the need for such an extension being indicated in the programme, but that should certainly not be confined to regions, it should embrace the central government as well. That in the first place. Secondly, in that case we must not speak about *local self-governing bodies*, since that term points to the *dependence* of the local governing organisations upon the *structure* of the state. "Local self-government" operates according to the rules laid down by the central authority, and within the limits set by the latter. The organisations of the fighting people of which we are speaking must be quite independent of all the institutions of the old regime, they

must fight for a new state structure, they must serve as the instrument of the full power of the people (or the sovereignty of the people), and as the means for securing it.

In short, from the standpoint of the "very process of the revolution", the Menshevik programme is unsatisfactory in all respects. It reflects the confusion of Menshevik ideas on the question of the provisional government, etc.

7. MUNICIPALISATION OF THE LAND AND MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM

These two terms were made equivalent by the Mensheviks themselves, who secured the adoption of the agrarian programme at Stockholm. We need only mention the names of two prominent Mensheviks, Kostrov and Larin. "Some comrades," said Kostrov at Stockholm, "seem to be hearing about municipal ownership for the first time. Let me remind them that in Western Europe there is a whole political trend [!precisely!] called 'municipal socialism' [England], which advocates the extension of ownership by urban and rural municipalities, and which is also supported by our comrades. Many municipalities own real estate, and that does not contradict our programme. We now have the possibility of acquiring [!] real estate for the municipalities gratis [!!] and we should take advantage of it. Of course, the confiscated land should be municipalised" (p. 88).

The naïve idea about "the possibility of acquiring property gratis" is magnificently expressed here. But in citing the example of this municipal socialism "trend" as a special trend mainly characteristic of England, the speaker did not stop to think why this is an *extremely opportunist* trend. Why did Engels, in his letters to Sorge describing this extreme intellectual opportunism of the English Fabians, emphasise the petty-bourgeois nature of their "municipalisation" schemes?[131]

Larin, in unison with Kostrov, says in his comments on the Menshevik programme: "Perhaps in some areas the people's local self-governing bodies will themselves be able to run these large estates, as the horse tramways or slaughter-houses are run by municipal councils, and then all [!!] the profits obtained from them will be placed at the disposal

of the whole [!] population"*—and not of the local bourgeoisie, my dear Larin?

The philistine illusions of the philistine heroes of West-European municipal socialism are already making themselves felt. The fact that the bourgeoisie is in power is forgotten; so also is the fact that only in towns with a high percentage of *proletarian* population is it possible to obtain for the working people some crumbs of benefit from municipal government! But all this is by the way. The principal fallacy of the "municipal socialism" idea of municipalising the land lies in the following.

The bourgeois intelligentsia of the West, like the English Fabians, elevate municipal socialism to a special "trend" precisely because it dreams of social peace, of class conciliation, and seeks to divert public attention away from the fundamental questions of the economic system as a whole, and of the state *structure* as a whole, to minor questions of local self-*government*. In the sphere of questions in the first category, the class antagonisms stand out most sharply; that is the sphere which, as we have shown, affects the very foundations of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Hence it is in that sphere that the philistine, reactionary utopia of bringing about socialism piecemeal is particularly hopeless. Attention is diverted to the sphere of minor local questions, being directed not to the question of the class rule of the bourgeoisie, nor to the question of the chief instruments of that rule, but to the question of distributing the *crumbs* thrown by the rich bourgeoisie for the "*needs of the population*". Naturally, since attention is focused on such questions as the spending of paltry sums (in comparison with the total surplus value and total state expenditure of the bourgeoisie), which the *bourgeoisie itself is willing* to set aside for public health (Engels pointed out in *The Housing Question* that the bourgeoisie itself is afraid of the spread of epidemic diseases in the towns[132]), or for education (the bourgeoisie must have trained workers able to adapt themselves to a high technical level!), and so on, it is possible, in the sphere of *such minor* questions, to hold

* *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 66.

forth about "social peace", about the harmfulness of the class struggle, and so on. What class struggle can there be if the bourgeoisie itself is spending money on the "needs of the population", on public health, on education? What need is there for a social revolution if it is possible through the local self-governing bodies, gradually, step by step, to extend "collective ownership", and "socialise" production: the horse tramways, the slaughter-houses referred to so relevantly by the worthy Y. Larin?

The philistine opportunism of that "trend" lies in the fact that people forget the *narrow limits* of so-called "municipal socialism" (in reality, municipal capitalism, as the English Social-Democrats properly point out in their controversies with the Fabians). They forget that so long as the bourgeoisie rules as a class it cannot allow any encroachment, even from the "municipal" point of view, upon the real *foundations* of its rule; that if the bourgeoisie allows, tolerates, "municipal socialism", it is because the latter does not touch the *foundations* of its rule, does not interfere with the *important* sources of its wealth, but extends only to the narrow sphere of local-expenditure, which the bourgeoisie itself *allows* the "population" to manage. It does not need more than a slight acquaintance with "municipal socialism" in the West to know that any attempt on the part of *socialist* municipalities to go a little beyond the boundaries of their normal, i.e., minor, petty activities, which give no *substantial* relief to the workers, any attempt to meddle with *capital*, is invariably vetoed in the most emphatic manner by the central authorities of the bourgeois state.

And it is this fundamental mistake, this philistine opportunism of the West-European Fabians, Possibilists, and Bernsteinians that is taken over by our advocates of municipalisation.

"Municipal socialism" means socialism in matters of *local government*. Anything that goes beyond the limits of *local* interests, beyond the limits of state *administration*, i.e., anything that affects the main sources of revenue of the ruling classes and the principal means of securing their rule, anything that affects not the administration of the state, but the *structure* of the state, *thereby* goes beyond

the sphere of "municipal socialism". But our wiseacres evade this acute national issue, this question of the land, which affects the vital interests of the ruling classes in the most direct way, by *relegating* it to the sphere of "local government questions". In the West they municipalise horse trams and slaughter-houses, so why should we not municipalise the best half of all the lands—argues the Russian petty intellectual. That would serve both in the event of restoration and in the event of incomplete democratisation of the central government!

And so we get agrarian socialism in a bourgeois revolution, a socialism of the most petty-bourgeois kind, one that counts on *blunting* the class struggle on *vital* issues by *relegating* the latter to the domain of petty questions affecting only local government. In fact, the question of the disposal of one half of the best land in the country is neither a local question nor a question of administration. It is a question that affects the whole state, a question of the structure, not only of the landlord, but of the bourgeois state. And to try to entice the people with the idea that "municipal socialism" can be developed in agriculture before the socialist revolution is accomplished is to practise the most inadmissible kind of demagogy. Marxism permits nationalisation to be included in the programme of a bourgeois revolution because nationalisation is a bourgeois measure, because absolute rent hinders the development of capitalism; private ownership of the land is a hindrance to capitalism. But to include the municipalisation of the big estates in the programme of the bourgeois revolution, Marxism must be remodelled into Fabian intellectualist opportunism.

It is here that we see the difference between petty-bourgeois and proletarian methods in the bourgeois revolution. The petty bourgeoisie, even the most radical—our Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries included—anticipates that *after* the bourgeois revolution there will be no class struggle, but universal prosperity and peace. Therefore, it "builds its nest" in advance, it introduces plans for petty-bourgeois reforms in the bourgeois revolution, talks about various "norms" and "regulations" with regard to landownership, about strengthening the labour principle and small farming,

etc. The petty-bourgeois method is the method of building up relations making for the greatest possible degree of social peace. The proletarian method is *exclusively* that of clearing the path of all that is medieval, clearing it for the *class struggle*. Therefore, the proletarian can leave it to the small proprietors to discuss "norms" of landownership; the proletarian is interested only in the abolition of the landlord latifundia, the abolition of private ownership of land, that *last* barrier to the class struggle in agriculture. In the bourgeois revolution we are interested not in petty-bourgeois reformism, not in a future "nest" of tranquillised small farmers, but in the conditions for the proletarian struggle against all petty-bourgeois tranquillity on a bourgeois basis.

It is this anti-proletarian spirit that municipalisation introduces into the programme of the *bourgeois* agrarian revolution; for, despite the deeply fallacious opinion of the Mensheviks, municipalisation does not extend and sharpen the class struggle, but, on the contrary, *blunts* it. It blunts it, too, by assuming that local democracy is possible without the complete democratisation of the centre. It also blunts it with the idea of "municipal socialism", because the latter is *conceivable* in bourgeois society only *away from* the high road of the struggle, only in minor, local, unimportant questions on which *even* the bourgeoisie may yield, may reconcile itself to without losing the possibility of preserving its class rule.

The working class must give bourgeois society the purest, most consistent and most thorough-going programme of bourgeois revolution, including the bourgeois nationalisation of the land. The proletariat scornfully rejects petty-bourgeois reformism in the bourgeois revolution; we are interested in freedom for the struggle, not in freedom for philistine bliss.

Naturally, the opportunism of the intelligentsia in the workers' party takes a different line. Instead of the broad revolutionary programme of bourgeois revolution, attention is focused on a petty-bourgeois utopia: to secure local democracy with incomplete democratisation at the centre, to secure for petty reformism a little corner of municipal activity away from great "turmoil", and to evade the extra-

ordinarily acute conflict over the land by following the recipe of the anti-Semites, i.e., by relegating an important national issue to the domain of petty, local questions.

8. SOME EXAMPLES OF THE MUDDLE CAUSED BY MUNICIPALISATION

What confusion the "municipalisation" programme has created in the minds of Social-Democrats and to what a helpless position it has reduced our propagandists and agitators can be seen from the following curious cases.

Y. Larin is undoubtedly a prominent and well-known figure in Menshevik literature. In Stockholm, as can be seen from the Minutes, he took a most active part in securing the adoption of the programme. His pamphlet, *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*, which was included in the series of pamphlets published by *Novy Mir*, is almost an official commentary on the Menshevik programme. And here is what this commentator writes. In the concluding pages of his pamphlet he sums up the question of agrarian reform. He foresees three kinds of outcome of these reforms: (1) additional allotments to the peasants as their private property, subject to compensation—"the most unfavourable outcome for the working class, for the lower strata of the peasantry and for the whole development of the national economy" (p. 103). The second outcome is the best, and the third, although unlikely, is "a paper declaration of compulsory equalised land tenure". One would have thought that we had the right to expect that an advocate of the municipalisation programme would have made municipalisation the second outcome. But no! Listen to this:

"Perhaps all the confiscated land, *or even all the land in general*, will be declared *the property of the state as a whole* and will be turned over to the local self-governing bodies to be distributed *gratis* [??] for the use of all who are actually cultivating it, without, of course, the compulsory introduction throughout the whole of Russia of equalised land tenure, and without prohibiting the employment of hired labour. Such a solution of the problem, as we have seen, best secures the immediate interests of the proletariat as well as the general interests of the socialist movement, and will help to increase the productivity of labour, which is the fundamental, vital question for Russia. Therefore, the Social-Democrats should advocate and carry out an

agrarian reform [?] precisely of that character. It will be achieved when, at the highest point of development of the revolution, the conscious elements of social development are strong" (p. 103. Our italics).

If Y. Larin or other Mensheviks believe this to be an exposition of the municipalisation programme, they are labouring under a tragicomical illusion. The transfer of *all* the land to state ownership is *nationalisation of the land*, and we cannot conceive of the land being disposed of otherwise than through local self-governing bodies acting within the limits of a general state law. To such a programme—not of "reform", of course, but of revolution—I wholeheartedly subscribe, except for the point about distributing the land "gratis" even to those farmers who employ hired labour. To promise such a thing on behalf of bourgeois society is more fitting for an anti-Semite than for a Social-Democrat. No Marxist can assume the possibility of such an outcome within the framework of capitalist development; nor is there any reason for considering it desirable to transfer rent to capitalist farmers. Nevertheless, except for this point, which was probably a slip of the pen, it remains an indubitable fact that in a popular Menshevik pamphlet the *nationalisation of the land* is advocated as the best outcome at the highest point of development of the revolution.

On the question of what is to be done with the privately owned lands, Larin has this to say:

"As regards the privately owned lands occupied by big, efficient capitalist farms, Social-Democrats do not propose the confiscation of such lands for the purpose of dividing them among the small farmers. While the average yield of small peasant farming, either on privately owned or rented land, does not reach 30 poods per dessiatin the average yield of capitalist agriculture in Russia is over 50 poods" (p. 64).

In saying this, Larin in effect throws overboard the idea of a *peasant* agrarian revolution, for his average figures of crop yields appertain to *all* the landlord lands. If we do not believe in the possibility of achieving a wider and more rapid increase in the productivity of labour on small farms after they have been freed from the yoke of serfdom, then all talk about "supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including the confiscation of the land from the landlords", is meaningless. Besides, Larin forgets

that on the question of "the purpose for which Social-Democrats propose the confiscation of capitalist estates", there is the decision of the Stockholm Congress.

It was Comrade Strumilin who, at the Stockholm Congress, moved an amendment to insert after the words: economic development (in the resolution), the following: "insisting, therefore, that the confiscated big capitalist farms should continue to be exploited on capitalist lines in the interests of the whole of the people, and under conditions that best meet the needs of the agricultural proletariat" (p. 157). This amendment was rejected *almost unanimously*, it received only *one* vote (ibid.).

Nevertheless, propaganda is being carried on among the masses that ignores the decision of the Congress! The retention of private ownership of allotment land makes municipalisation such a confusing thing, that commentaries on the programme cannot help running counter to the decision of the Congress.

K. Kautsky, who has been so frequently and unfairly quoted in favour of one or the other programme (unfairly because he has categorically declined to express a definite view on the question and has confined himself to explaining certain general truths), Kautsky, who, curiously enough, was even cited as being in favour of municipalisation, wrote, it turns out, to M. Shanin in April 1906 as follows:

"Evidently, by municipalisation I meant something different from what you, and perhaps Maslov, mean. What I meant was the following: the big landed estates will be confiscated and large-scale agriculture will be continued upon such land, either by the municipalities [!] or by larger organisations, or else the land will be rented out to producers associations. I do not know whether that is possible in Russia or whether it would be acceptable to the peasants. Nor do I say that we should demand it, but *if* the demand is raised by others, I think we could easily agree to it. It would be an interesting experiment."*

* M. Shanin, *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property*, Vilna, 1907, p. 4. M. Shanin rightly expresses doubt whether Kautsky may be counted among the supporters of municipalisation and protests against the Mensheviks' self-advertisement (in the Menshevik *Pravda*,[133] 1906) In regard to Kautsky. Kautsky himself, in a letter published by Maslov, bluntly says: "We may leave it to the peasants to decide the *forms* of property to be adopted on the land confiscated from the big landowners. I would consider it a mistake to impose any

These quotations should suffice to show how those who were, or are, fully in sympathy with the Stockholm programme, are *destroying* it by the way they interpret it. The fault here lies in the hopeless muddle in the programme; in theory it is bound up with the repudiation of Marx's theory of rent, in practice it is an adaptation to the impossible "middle" event of local democracy under a non-democratic central government, and in economics it amounts to introducing petty-bourgeois, quasi-socialist reformism into the programme of the bourgeois revolution.

CHAPTER V

CLASSES AND PARTIES IN THE DEBATE ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE SECOND DUMA

We think it will be useful to approach the question of the workers' party's agrarian programme in the Russian bourgeois revolution from another and somewhat different angle. The analysis of the economic conditions for the revolution and of the political arguments in favour of this or that programme should be supplemented by a picture of the struggle between the different classes and parties that will as far as possible embrace all the interests and place them in direct contrast to one another. Only such a picture can give us an idea of the thing we are discussing (the struggle for the land in the Russian revolution) *as a whole*, excluding the one-sided and accidental character of individual opinions, and testing theoretical conclusions by the practical intuition of the persons concerned. As individuals, any representatives of parties and classes may err, but when they come out in the public arena, before the entire population, the individual errors are inevitably rectified by the corresponding groups or classes that are interested in the struggle. Classes do not err; on the whole, they decide their interests and political aims in conformity

thing on them in that respect" (p. 16, *The Question of the Agrarian Programme*, by Maslov and Kautsky, *Novy Mir* Publishers, Moscow, 1906). This quite definite statement by Kautsky certainly excludes municipalisation of the land, which the Mensheviks, want to impose on the peasants.

with the conditions of the struggle and with the conditions of social evolution.

Excellent material for drawing such a picture is provided by the Stenographic Records of the two Dumas. We shall take the Second Duma because it undoubtedly reflects the struggle of classes in the Russian revolution more fully and with greater maturity: the Second Duma elections were not boycotted by any influential party. The political grouping of the deputies in the Second Duma was much more definite, the various Duma groups were more united and more closely connected with their respective parties. The experience of the First Duma had already provided considerable material which helped all the parties to elaborate a more thought-out policy. For all these reasons it is preferable to take the Second Duma. We shall refer to the debate in the First Duma only in order to supplement, or clarify, statements made in the Second Duma.

To obtain a full and accurate picture of the struggle between the different classes and parties during the debate in the Second Duma we shall have to deal separately with each important and specific Duma group and characterise it with the aid of excerpts from the principal speeches delivered on the chief points of the agrarian question. As it is impossible and unnecessary to quote all the minor speakers, we shall mention only those who contributed something new, or threw noteworthy light on some aspect of the question.

The main groups of Duma deputies that stood out clearly in the debates on the agrarian question were the following: (1) the Rights and the Octobrists—as we shall see, no essential difference between them was shown in the Second Duma; (2) the Cadets; (3) the Right and Octobrist peasants, standing, as we shall see, to the Left of the Cadets; (4) the non-party peasants; (5) the Narodniks, or Trudovik intellectuals, standing somewhat to the Right of (6) the Trudovik peasants; then come (7) the Socialist-Revolutionaries; (8) the "nationals", representing the non-Russian nationalities, and (9) the Social-Democrats. We shall mention the government's position in connection with the Duma group with which the government is essentially in agreement.

1. THE RIGHTS AND THE OCTOBRISTS

The stand taken by the Rights on the agrarian question was undoubtedly best expressed by Count Bobrinsky in the speech he delivered on March 29, 1907 (18th session of the Second Duma). In a dispute with the Left-wing priest Tikhvinsky about the Holy Scriptures and their commandments to obey the powers that be, and recalling "the cleanest and brightest page in Russian history" (1289)*—the emancipation of the serfs (we shall deal with this later on)—the count approached the agrarian question "with open visor". "About 100 or 150 years ago the peasants, nearly everywhere in Western Europe, were as poverty-stricken, degraded, and ignorant as our peasants are today. They had the same village communes as we have in Russia, with division of land per head, that typical survival of the feudal system" (1293). Today, continued the speaker, the peasants in Western Europe are well off. The question is, what miracle transformed "the poverty-stricken, degraded peasant into a prosperous and useful citizen who has respect for himself and for others"? "There can be only one answer: that miracle was performed by individual peasant ownership, the form of ownership that is so detested here, on the Left, but which we, on the Right, will defend with all the strength of our minds, with all the strength of our earnest convictions, for we know that in ownership lie the strength and future of Russia" (1294). "Since the middle of last century agronomic chemistry has made wonderful ... discoveries in plant nutrition, and the peasants abroad—small owners equally [??] with big ones—have succeeded in utilising these scientific discoveries, and by employing artificial fertilisers have achieved a still further increase in crop yield; and today, when our splendid black earth yields only 30 to 35 poods of grain, and sometimes not even enough for seed, the peasants abroad, year after year, get an average yield ranging from 70 to 120 poods, depending on the country and climatic conditions. Here you have the solution of the agrarian problem. This is no dream, no

* Here and elsewhere the figures indicate the pages Stenographic Record.

fantasy. It is an instructive historical example. And the Russian peasant will not follow in the footsteps of Pugachov and Stenka Razin[134] with the cry '*saryn na kichku*!'[135] [Don't be too sure of that, Count!] He will follow the only true road, the road that was taken by all the civilised nations, the road taken by his neighbours in Western Europe, and, lastly, the road taken by our Polish brothers, by the West-Russian peasants, who have already realised how disastrous is the commune and homestead strip system of ownership, and in some places have already begun to introduce the *khutor* system" (1296). Count Bobrinsky goes on to say; and rightly, that "this road was indicated in 1861, when the peasants were freed from serf dependence". He advises the government not to grudge "tens of millions" for the purpose of "creating a well-to-do class of peasant-proprietors". He declares: "This, gentlemen, in general outline, is our agrarian programme. It is not a programme of election and propaganda promises. It is not a programme for breaking up the existing social and juridical norms [it is a programme for forcibly getting rid of millions of peasants]; it is not a programme of dangerous fantasies, it is a quite practicable programme [that is still open to question] and one that has been well-tried [what is true is true]. And it is high time to abandon dreams about some sort of economic exceptionalism of the Russian nation.... But how are we to explain the fact that quite impracticable Bills, like that of the Trudovik Group and that of the Party of People's Freedom, have been introduced in a serious legislative assembly? No parliament in the world has ever heard of all the land being taken over by the state, or of the land being taken from Paul and given to Peter.... The appearance of these Bills is the result of bewilderment" (a fine explanation!).... "And so, Russian peasants, you have to choose between two roads: one road is broad and looks easy—that is the road of usurpation and compulsory alienation, for which calls have been made here. That road is attractive at first, it runs downhill, but it ends in a precipice [for the landlords?], and spells ruin to the peasantry and the entire state. The other road is narrow and thorny, and runs uphill, but it leads to the summits of truth, right, and lasting prosperity" (1299).

As the reader sees, this is the government's programme. This is exactly what Stolypin is accomplishing with his famous agrarian legislation under Article 87. Purishkevich formulated the same programme in his agrarian theses (20th session, April 2, 1907, pp. 1532-33). The same programme was advocated, part by part, by the Octobrists, beginning with Svyatopolk-Mirsky on the first day of the debates on the agrarian question (March 19), and ending with Kapustin ("the peasants need landownership and not land tenure, as is proposed"—24th session, April 9, 1907, p. 1805, speech by Kapustin, applauded by the Right "and part of the Centre").

In the programme of the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists there is not even a hint about defending pre-capitalist forms of farming, as, for example, by vaunting patriarchal agriculture, and so forth. Defence of the village commune, which until quite recently had ardent champions among the higher bureaucracy and the landlords, has given place to bitter hostility towards it. The Black Hundreds fully take the stand of capitalist development and definitely depict a programme that is economically progressive, European; this needs to be specially emphasised, because a vulgar and simplified view of the nature of the reactionary policy of the landlords is very widespread among us. The liberals often depict the Black Hundreds as clowns and fools, but it must be said that this description is far more applicable to the Cadets. Our reactionaries, however, are distinguished by their extremely pronounced class-consciousness. They know perfectly well what they want, where they are going, and on what forces they can count. They do not betray a shadow of half-heartedness or irresolution (at all events in the Second Duma; in the First there was "bewilderment"—among the Bobrinskys!). They are clearly seen to be connected with a very definite class, which is accustomed to command, which *correctly* judges the conditions necessary for preserving its rule in a *capitalist* environment, and brazenly defends its interests even if that entails the rapid extinction, degradation, and eviction of millions of peasants. The Black-Hundred programme is reactionary not because it seeks to perpetuate any pre-capitalist relations or system (in that respect all the par-

ties of the period of the Second Duma already, in essence, take the stand of recognising capitalism, of taking it for granted), but because it stands for the *Junker* type of capitalist development *in order* to strengthen the power and to increase the incomes of the landlords, in order to place the edifice of autocracy upon a new and stronger foundation. There is no contradiction between what these gentlemen say and what they do; our reactionaries, too, are "businessmen", as Lassalle said of the German reactionaries in contrast to the liberals.

What is the attitude of these people towards the idea of nationalising the land? Towards, say, the partial nationalisation with compensation demanded by the Cadets in the First Duma, leaving, like the Mensheviks, private ownership of small holdings and creating a state land reserve out of the rest of the land? Did they not perceive in the nationalisation idea the possibility of strengthening the bureaucracy, of consolidating the central bourgeois government against the proletariat, of restoring "state feudalism" and the "Chinese experiment"?

On the contrary, every hint at nationalisation of the land infuriates them, and they fight it in such a way that one would think they had borrowed their arguments from Plekhanov. Take the nobleman Vetchinin, a Right landlord. "I think," he said at the 39th session on May 16, 1907, "that the question of compulsory alienation must be decided in the negative sense from the point of view of the law. The advocates of that opinion forget that the violation of the rights of private owners is characteristic of states that are at a low stage of social and political development. It is sufficient to recall the Muscovy period, when the tsar often took land away from private owners and later granted it to his favourites and to the monasteries. What did that attitude of the government lead to? The consequences were frightful" (619).

Such was the use made of Plekhanov's "restoration of Muscovy Rus"! Nor is Vetchinin the only one to harp on this string. In the First Duma, the landlord N. Lvov, who was elected as a Cadet and then went over to the Right, and after the dissolution of the First Duma negotiated with Stolypin for a place in the Ministry—that personage

put the question in exactly the same way. "The astonishing thing about the Bill of the 42," he said concerning the Bill that the Cadets introduced in the First Duma, "is that it bears the impress of the same old bureaucratic despotism which seeks to put everything on an equal level" (12th session, May 19, 1906, pp. 479-80). He, quite in the spirit of Maslov, "*stood up for*" the non-Russian nationalities: "How are we to subordinate to it [equalisation] the whole of Russia, including Little Russia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Baltic region?" (479.) "In St. Petersburg," he warned, "you will have to set up a gigantic Land Office ... and maintain a staff of officials in every corner of the country" (480).

These outcries about bureaucracy and serfdom in connection with nationalisation—these outcries of our municipalisers, inappropriately copied from the German model—are the dominant note in all the speeches of the Right. The Octobrist Shidlovsky, for example, opposing compulsory alienation, accuses the Cadets of advocating "attachment to the land" (12th session of the Second Duma, March 19, 1907, p. 752). Shulgin howls about property being inviolate, about compulsory alienation being "the grave of culture and civilisation" (16th session, March 26, 1907, p. 1133). Shulgin refers—he might have been quoting from Plekhanov's *Diary*,[136] though he does not say so—to twelfth-century China, to the deplorable result of the Chinese experiment in nationalisation (p. 1137). Here is Skirmunt in the First Duma: The state will be the owner! "A blessing, an El Dorado for the bureaucracy" (10th session, May 16, 1906, p. 410). Here is the Octobrist Tantsov, exclaiming in the Second Duma: "With far greater justification, these reproaches [about serfdom] can be flung back to the Left and to the Centre. What do these Bills hold out for the peasants in reality if not the prospect of being tied to the land, if not the old serfdom, only in a different form, in which the place of the landlord will be taken by usurers and government officials" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 653).

Of course, the hypocrisy of these outcries about bureaucracy is most glaring, for the excellent idea of setting up local land committees to be elected by universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot was advanced by the very

peasants who are demanding nationalisation. But the Black-Hundred landlords are *compelled* to seize on every possible argument against nationalisation. Their class instinct tells them that nationalisation in twentieth-century Russia is inseparably bound up with a peasant republic. In other countries, where, owing to objective conditions, there cannot be a peasant agrarian revolution, the situation is, of course, different—for example, in Germany, where the Kanitzes call sympathise with plans for nationalisation, where the socialists will not even hear of nationalisation, where the bourgeois movement for nationalisation is limited to intellectualist sectarianism. To combat the peasant revolution the *Rights* had to come before the peasants in the role of champions of *peasant ownership* as against nationalisation. We have seen one example in the case of Bobrinsky. Here is another—Vetchinin: "This question [of nationalising the land] must, of course, be settled in the negative sense, for it finds no sympathy even among the peasants; they want to have land by right of ownership and not by right of tenancy" (39th session, p. 621). Only landlords and cabinet ministers could speak *for* the peasants in *that* manner. This fact is so well known that I regard it as superfluous to quote the speeches of the Gurkos, Stolypins, and other such heroes, who ardently champion private ownership.

The only exception among the Rights is the Terek Cossack Karaulov, whom we have already mentioned.* Agreeing partly also with the Cadet Shingaryov, Karaulov said that the Cossack troops are a "huge agrarian commune" 1363), that "it is better to abolish private ownership of the land" than to abolish the village communes, and he advocated the "extensive municipalisation of the land, to be converted into the property of the respective regions" (1367). At the same time he complained about the pinpricks of the bureaucracy. "We are not the masters of our own property," he said (1368). With the significance of these Cossack sympathies for municipalisation we have already dealt above.

* See p. 336 of this volume.—*Ed.*

2. THE CADETS

Like all the parties, the Cadets came out in their true colours in the Second Duma. They "found themselves" by occupying the Centre and criticising the Rights and the Lefts from the "state point of view". They revealed their counter-revolutionary nature by an obvious turn to the Right. How did they mark that turn on the agrarian question? They marked it by finally throwing overboard the last remnants of the idea of land nationalisation, by completely abandoning the plan for a "state land reserve" and by supporting the idea of making the land the peasants' *property*. Yes, conditions in the Russian revolution have become such that turning to the Right means turning towards the private ownership of land!

Ex-minister Kutler, the Cadet Party's official spokesman on the agrarian question, at once proceeded to criticise the Left (12th session, March 19, 1907). "Since nobody proposes to abolish property in general," exclaimed that worthy colleague of Witte and Durnovo, "it is necessary with all emphasis to recognise the existence of landed property" (737). This argument fully coincides with that of the Black Hundreds. The Black-Hundred spokesman, Krupensky, like the Cadet Kutler, shouted: "If you are going to divide, divide everything" (784).

Like a true bureaucrat, Kutler dealt in particular detail with the question of different norms of "allotment" to the peasants. Not backed by any compact class, this liberal intellectual and bureaucrat playing at liberalism *evades* the question of *how much* land the landlords have and how much *can* be taken. He prefers to talk about "norms" in order, on the pretext of raising the question to the state level, *to obscure the issue*, to conceal the fact that the Cadets propose that landlord economy be *retained*. "Even the government," said Mr. Kutler, "has taken the path of extending peasant land tenure" (734), so there is nothing infeasible about the Cadets' proposal, which is of the same bureaucratic type! By insisting on what is practical and feasible, this Cadet, of course, throws a veil over the fact that his criterion is whether it is possible to secure the landlords' consent, in other words, to adapt his plan

to their interests, *to pander to the Black Hundreds* under the guise of a lofty striving for the conciliation of classes. "I think, gentlemen," said Kutler, "that it is possible to envisage the political conditions under which a Bill for the nationalisation of the land could acquire the force of law, but I cannot envisage in the immediate future the political conditions under which that law could really be put into effect" (733). To put it bluntly, it is possible to envisage the overthrow of the rule of the Black-Hundred landlords, but I cannot envisage that and, therefore, I adapt myself to this rule.

Urging that peasant ownership of land is preferable to the Trudoviks' plan in general, and to "equalised tenure" in particular, Mr. Kutler argued as follows: "If for this purpose [equalising holdings] special officials are appointed, it will mean the introduction of an incredible despotism, an interference in the lives of the people such as we have never known before. Of course, it is proposed to place this matter in the hands of local self-governing bodies, in the hands of persons elected by the people themselves; but can it be taken that the people will be fully guaranteed against the tyranny of these persons, that these persons will always act in the interests of the people, and that the latter will suffer no hardship? I think that the peasants who are present here know that very often their own elected representatives, their volost and village elders, oppress the people as much as the government officials do" (740). Can one conceive of hypocrisy more revolting than that? The Cadets themselves propose the setting up of land committees on which the landlords will predominate (equal representation for landlords and peasants, the chairman to be a government official or a landlord), but the peasants are warned of the danger of despotism and tyranny on the part of those whom they themselves elect! Only shameless political charlatans can argue *like this* against equalised holdings, for they have neither the principles of socialism (adhered to by the Social-Democrats, who maintain that equalisation is impossible, but wholly support the election of local committees), nor the principles of the landlords who maintain that private property is the only salvation (adhered to by the Bobrinskys).

Unlike either the Right or the Left, the plan of the Cadets is characterised not by what they say, but what they keep quiet about, viz., their proposal for the composition of the land committees, which are to *compel* the peasants to accept a "second emancipation", i.e., to take poor plots at an exorbitant price. To obscure the *crux* of the matter, the Cadets in the Second Duma (as in the First) resort to downright chicanery. Take Mr. Shingaryov. He poses as a progressive, repeats the current liberal catchwords against the Right and, as is the fashion, bewails violence and anarchy, for which France "paid with a century of severe upheavals" (1355). But see how he dodges the question of the land-surveying committees:

"On the question of the land-surveying committees," he says, "we were opposed by Deputy Yevreinov.* I do not know [*sic*!!l what his objections are based on; up to now we have not said anything about this [*a lie*!]; I do not know what Bill he is speaking about, or why he talks about not trusting the people. No such Bill has yet been introduced in the State Duma; evidently, his objections are based on a misunderstanding. I wholly associate myself with those deputies on the Left, Uspensky and Volk-Karachevsky, who spoke of provisional rules, of the necessity of setting up local bodies to carry out land surveying on the spot. I think such bodies will be set up, and probably, within the next

* Yevreinov, a Socialist-Revolutionary, had said at the same session (18th session, March 29, 1907): "These [land] committees, according to the assumption of the Party of People's Freedom, are to consist of equal numbers of landowners and peasants, with government officials acting as conciliators, which, of course, will undoubtedly give preponderance to the non-peasants. Why does the party which calls itself the party of the 'people's freedom' distrust committees elected not in a bureaucratic, but in a democratic way? Probably because, if the committees are elected in that way, the vast majority of those elected will be peasants, i.e., representatives of the peasants' interests. That being the case, I ask, does the Party of People's Freedom trust the peasants? It will be remembered that in 1808, in connection with the agrarian reform, the government had this matter transferred to local bodies, to committees. True, those committees consisted of members of the nobility, but the government is not a party of the people's freedom, it is a government that represents the rich and the propertied classes generally. It relies on the nobility and trusts them. The Party of People's Freedom, however, wants to rely on the people, but does not trust the people" (1326).

few days, the Party of People's Freedom will introduce a Bill to that effect and we shall discuss it" (1356).

Now, is that not fraud? Are we really to believe that this person knew nothing about the debates in the First Duma on the question of local committees, or about the article in *Rech* at that time? Could he really have failed to understand Yevreinov's perfectly plain statement?

But he promised to introduce a Bill "within the next few days", you will say. In the first place, a promise to restore what has been obtained by fraudulent means does not cancel the fact of fraud. Secondly, what happened "within the next few days", was this. Mr. Shingaryov spoke on March 29, 1907. On April 9, 1907, the Cadet Tatarinov spoke and said: "I will now, gentlemen, deal with one more question which, I think [he only "thinks"!], is creating considerable controversy, namely, the question that has been raised by all the parties on our Left: the question of local land committees. All these parties urge the necessity of setting up local land committees on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot with the object of settling the land question in the localities. We quite categorically expressed our opposition to such committees last year, and we categorically express it now" (1783).

Thus, on the *extremely important* question of the *actual* terms of the Cadet proposal for "compulsory alienation", two Cadets say different things, swing from one side to another under the blows of the Left parties which bring to light what the Cadets wanted to keep secret! First, Mr. Shingaryov says: "I do not know"; then: "I agree with the Left"; and then: "a Bill within the next few days". Mr. Tatarinov says: "Now, as before, we are categorically opposed". And he adds arguments to the effect that the Duma must not be split up into a thousand Dumas, that the settlement of the agrarian question must not be postponed until political reforms are carried out, until universal, etc., suffrage is introduced. But that is just another evasion. The point at issue is not the moment when a particular measure is to be carried out: the Left members of the Second Duma could have no doubts whatever on that score. The point is: what are the Cadets' *real plans*? Who is to compel whom in their scheme for "compulsory alienation"? Are the landlords to

compel the peasants, or are the peasants to compel the landlords? This question can be answered only by the composition of the land committees. The Cadets' view of what this composition should be was set forth in Milyukov's leading article in *Rech*, in Kutler's Bill, and in Chuprov's article (quoted above)*; but *in the Duma*, *the Cadets kept silent about it*, they did not answer the question bluntly put by Yevreinov.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that this conduct of the party's representatives in parliament is nothing more than *deception of the people by the liberals*. Scarcely anybody is deceived by the Bobrinskys and Stolypins; but very many of those who do not want to analyse, or who are incapable of understanding, the real meaning of political slogans and phrases are deceived by the Cadets.

Thus, the Cadets are opposed to any form of socialised land tenure in any form,** they are opposed to alienation without compensation, opposed to local land committees in which the peasants will predominate, opposed to revolution in general and to a peasant agrarian revolution in particular. Light is thrown on their manoeuvring between the Left and Right (to betray the peasants to the landlords) by their attitude towards the Peasant "Reform" of 1861. The Left, as we shall see later on, speak of it with disgust and indignation as of a noose put round the peasants' necks by the landlords. The Cadets are at one with the Right in their affection for this reform.

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* See p. 245 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the debate in the First Duma on the question of sending the Land Bill of the 33 (for the abolition of the private ownership of land) to committee. The Cadets (Petrunkevich, Mukhanov, Shakhovskoi, Frenkel Ovchinnikov, Dolgorukov, and Kokoshkin) fiercely opposed the sending of *such* a Bill to committee, and in this they were fully supported by Heyden. Their reasons were a disgrace to any self-respecting liberal—they were simply police excuses used by lackeys of the reactionary government. To refer the Bill to committee, said Mr. Petrunkevich, means recognising that, to a certain degree, the standpoint of such a Bill is "possible". Mr. Zhilkin put the Cadet to shame (23rd session, June 8, 1906) by saying that he would send to committee both this Bill and the Bill of the extreme Right. But the Cadets and the Right defeated the motion to send the Bill to committee by 140 votes to 78!

Count Bobrinsky said: "Dirt has been thrown here at the cleanest and brightest page in Russian history.... The emancipation of the peasants is a matter beyond all reproach ... the great and glorious day, February 19, 1861" (March 29, pp. 1289, 1299).

Kutler said: "the great Reform of 1861 ... the government, in the person of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, is renouncing Russian history, renouncing its best and brightest pages" (May 26, pp. 1198-99).

This appraisal of compulsory alienation as it was actually carried out throws more light on the Cadet agrarian programme than all their Bill and speeches, the object of which was to conceal their thoughts. If people regard the dispossession of the peasants of their land by the landlords, triple redemption payments for poor plots, and the implementation of the charters[137] by brute military force as the brightest page, then it becomes obvious that what they are after is a "second emancipation", a second enthralment of the peasants by means of redemption payments. Bobrinsky and Kutler are at one in their estimation of the Reform of 1861. But Bobrinsky's estimation directly and truly expresses the rightly understood interests of the landlords—and therefore it clarifies the class-consciousness of the broad masses. Praise from the Bobrinskys means that the landlords got the best of it. Kutler's estimation, expressing the poverty of intellect of a petty official who all his life has cringed to the landlords, is sheer hypocrisy and befogs the consciousness of the masses.

In this connection, one more aspect of the Cadets' policy on the agrarian question must be noted. All the Left deputies openly side with the peasants as 'a fighting force, explain the need for a struggle, and show the landlord character of the government. The Cadets, together with the Right deputies, take the "state point of view" and repudiate the class struggle.

Kutler declares that there is no need "radically to reconstruct agrarian relations" (732). Savelyev warns against "touching a mass of interests" and says: "The principle of completely rejecting ownership would scarcely be expedient, and its application may give rise to very big and grave complications, particularly if we bear in mind that

the big owners with over 50 dessiatins have very much land, namely, 79,440,000 dessiatins" (March 26, 1907, p. 1088—the peasant points to the latifundia to prove the necessity of doing away with them; the liberal does so to prove that it is necessary to cringe). Shingaryov thinks it would be "an immense disaster" if the people themselves took the land (1355). Rodichev warbles: "We do not foment class enmity. We would like to forget the past" (632, May 16, 1907). Kapustin follows suit: "Our task is to sow everywhere peace and justice and not to sow and foment class enmity" (1810, April 9). Krupensky is indignant at the speech of the Socialist-Revolutionary Zimin because it was "full of hatred towards the propertied classes" (783, March 19). In short, in condemning the class struggle, the Cadets and the Rights are at one. But the Rights know what they are doing. The preaching of class struggle cannot but be harmful and dangerous to the class against which the struggle is directed. The Rights are faithfully guarding the interests of the feudal landlords. And what of the Cadets? They are *waging a struggle*—they say they are waging a struggle!—they want to "compel" the landlords who are in power, and yet they condemn the class struggle! Did the bourgeoisie that really fought instead of acting as lackeys of the landlords behave in that way, for instance in France? Did not that bourgeoisie call upon the people to fight; did it not foment class enmity? Did it not create a theory of the class struggle?

3. THE RIGHT PEASANTS

Actual Right peasants are to be found in the Second Duma only by way of exception—Remenchik (Minsk Gubernia) is one, perhaps the only one, who will not hear of any village communes or "land funds" and stoutly defends private ownership (in the First Duma there were many Polish and West-Russian peasants who stood for ownership). But even Remenchik is in favour of alienation "at a fair price" (648), i.e., he in effect turns out to be a Cadet. We place the other "Right peasants" in the Second Duma in a special group because they are-undoubtedly more Left than the Cadets. Take Petrochenko (Vitebsk Gubernia). He begins by saying that he "will defend tsar and country unto death"

(1614). The Rights applaud. But then he passes on to the question of "land hunger". "You can hold all the debates you like," he says, "but you will never create another world. Therefore you will have to give us this land. One speaker said here that our peasants are backward and ignorant and, therefore, it is useless giving them a lot of land, because it won't be any good to them all the same. To be sure, the land has not been of much good to us up to now, that is to those who have not had any. As for our being ignorant, well, all we are asking for is some land in order, in our stupidity, to grub about in. Personally, I don't think it's dignified for a nobleman to busy himself with the land. It has been said here that private landed property must not be touched because it is against the law. Of course, I agree that the law must be upheld, but to do away with land hunger a law must be passed to make all that lawful. And so that nobody should have any grievance, Deputy Kutler proposed that good terms be offered. Of course, being a wealthy man, he has named a high figure, and we, poor peasants, cannot pay such a price. As for how we should live—in communes, on separate holdings, or on *khutors*—I, for my part, think that everybody should be allowed to live as he finds convenient" (1616).

There is a wide gulf between this Right peasant and the Russian liberal. The former vows devotion to the old regime, but actually he is out to get land, he is fighting the landlords and will not agree to pay the amount of compensation the Cadets propose. The latter says that he is fighting for the people's freedom, but actually he is engineering a second enthralment of the peasants by the landlords and the old regime. The latter can move only to the Right, from the First Duma to the Second, from the Second to the Third. The former, finding that there is no hope of the landlords "giving up" the land, will move the other way. The "Right" peasant will, perhaps, be found going our way more than the "liberal", "democratic" Cadet....

Take the peasant Shimansky (Minsk Gubernia). "I have come here to defend our faith, tsar, and country and to demand land ... not by robbery, of course, but in a peaceful way, at a fair value.... Therefore, in the name of all the peasants I call upon the landlord members of the Duma to

come on to this rostrum and say that they are willing to cede land to the peasants at a fair valuation, and then our peasants will, of course, say thank you, and I think our Father the Tsar, will also say thank you. As for those landlords who refuse to do this, I propose that the Duma impose a progressive tax on their land, and undoubtedly they too will yield in time, because they will learn that they have bitten off more than they can chew" (1617).

By compulsory alienation and fair valuation this Right peasant means something entirely different from what the Cadets have in mind. The Cadets are deceiving not only the Left peasants but *also the Right*. What the Right peasants' attitude towards the Cadet plans for setting up the land committees (according to Kutler, or according to Chuprov: see *The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II) would have been, had they studied them, is evident from the following proposal made by the peasant Melnik (Octobrist, Minsk Gubernia). "I consider it a duty," he said, "that 60 per cent of the members of the committee [agrarian] should be peasants who have practical acquaintance with want [!] and are familiar with the conditions of the peasant class, and not peasants who, perhaps, are peasants only in name. This is a question of the peasants' welfare and of the poor people generally, and has no political significance whatever. People must be chosen who can settle the question practically and not politically for the good of the people" (1285). These Right peasants will go a long way to the Left when the counter-revolution reveals to them the political significance of "the questions that concern the welfare of the poor people"!

To show how infinitely wide apart are the representatives of the monarchist peasantry and the representatives of the monarchist bourgeoisie, I shall quote passages from the speech delivered by the "Progressist" Rev. Tikhvinsky, who sometimes spoke in the name of the Peasant Union and Trudovik Group. "Our peasants, in the mass, love the tsar," he said. "How I wish I had the cap of invisibility and could fly on a magic carpet to the foot of the throne and say: Sire, your chief enemy, the chief enemy of the people, is the irresponsible ministry.... All that the toiling peasantry demands is the strict application of the principle: 'All

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the land to all the people.' ... [on the question of redemption payments:] ... Have no fear, gentlemen of the Right, you can rely on our people not to treat you unfairly." (*Voices from the Right*: "Thank you! Thank you!") "I now address myself to the spokesman from the Party of People's Freedom. He says that the programme of the Party of People's Freedom is close to that of the peasantry and of the Trudovik Group. No, gentlemen, it is remote from that programme. We heard the speaker say: 'Our Bill may be less just, but it is more practical'. Gentlemen, justice is sacrificed to practical expediency!" (789.)

In political outlook, this deputy is on the level of a Cadet. But what a difference there is between his rural simplicity and the "business men" of the bar, the bureaucracy, and liberal journalism!

4. THE NON-PARTY PEASANTS

The non-party peasants are of special interest as the spokesmen of the least politically conscious and least organised rural masses. We shall, therefore, quote passages from the speeches of all the non-party peasants,* especially as there are not many of them: Sakhno, Semyonov, Moroz, and Afanasyev.

"Gentlemen, people's representatives," said Sakhno (Kiev Gubernia), "it is difficult for peasants' deputies to get up on this rostrum and oppose the rich landed gentry. At the present time the peasants are living very poorly because they have no land.... The peasant has a lot to put up with at the hands of the landlord; he suffers because the landlord sorely oppresses him.... Why can a landlord own a lot of land, while the peasant has only the kingdom of heaven?... And so, gentlemen, when the peasants sent me here they instructed me to champion their needs, to demand land and freedom for them, to demand that all state, crown, private, and monastery lands be compulsorily alienated without compensation.... I want you to know, gentlemen, people's representatives, that a hungry man cannot keep quiet when he sees that, in spite of his suffering, the government is

* In determining the group or party to which the deputies in the Second Duma belong we have consulted the official publication of the State Duma: list of deputies according to parties and groups. Some deputies passed from one party to another, but it is impossible to keep track of these changes from newspaper reports. Moreover, to consult different sources on this matter would only cause confusion.

on the side of the landed gentry. He cannot help demanding land even if it is against the law; want compels him to demand it. A hungry man is capable of anything, for want makes him reckless, being hungry and poor" (1482-86).

Just as artless, and just as powerful in its simplicity was the speech of the non-party peasant Semyonov (Podolsk Gubernia, peasant deputy):

..."Bitter is the lot of those peasants who have been suffering for ages without land. For two hundred years they have been waiting for fortune to drop from the skies, but it has not come. Fortune is in the pockets of the big landed gentry who obtained this land together with our grandfathers and fathers; but the earth is the Lord's, not the landlords'.... I know perfectly well that the land belongs to the whole of the working people who till the land.... Deputy Purishkevich says: 'Revolution! Help!' What does that mean? Yes, if the land is taken from them by compulsory alienation, they will be the revolution, but not we, we shall all be fighters, the kindest of people.... Have we got 150 dessiatins like the priest? And what about the monasteries and the churches? What do they want it for? No, gentlemen, it is time to stop collecting treasure and keeping it in your pockets, it is time to live reasonably. The country will understand gentlemen, I understand perfectly, we are honest citizens, we do not engage in politics, as one of the preceding speakers said.... They [the landlords] only go about and grow fat on our sweat and blood. We shall not forget them, we shall do them no harm, we shall even give them land. If you figure it out, we shall get 16 dessiatins per household, but the big landed gentry will still have 50 dessiatins each.... Thousands, millions of people are suffering, but the gentry are feasting.... When it comes to military service we know what happens: if a man falls sick they say: 'He has land at home'. But where is his home? He has no home! He has a home only in the roster which says where he was born, where he is registered, what his religion is—but he has no land. Now I say: the people asked me to demand that the church, monastary, state, and crown lands, and the land compulsorily alienated from the landlords, should be handed over to the working people who will till the land, and it should be handed over locally: they will know what to do. I tell you that the people sent me here to demand land and freedom and all civil liberties; and we shall live, and we shall not point and say, these are gentry and those are peasants; we shall all be human, and each will be a gentleman in his place" (1930-34).

When one reads this speech of a peasant who "does not engage in politics" it becomes palpably clear that the implementation not only of Stolypin's but also of the Cadets' agrarian programme requires decades of systematic violence against the peasant masses, of systematic flogging, exter-

mination by torture, imprisonment, and exile of all peasants who think and try to act freely. Stolypin is aware of this and is acting accordingly. The Cadets, with the obtuseness characteristic of liberal bureaucrats and professors, are either unaware of it or else hypocritically conceal it, "shamefacedly remain silent" about it, just as they do about the punitive expeditions of 1861 and of subsequent years. If this systematic and unchecked violence is shattered by some internal or external obstacle, the honest non-party peasant who "does not engage in politics" will convert Russia into a peasant republic.

The peasant Moroz, in a short speech, simply said: "The land must be taken away from the clergy and the landlords" (1955), and then quoted the Gospel (this is not the first time in history that bourgeois revolutionaries have taken their slogans from the Gospel).... "Unless you bring the priest some bread and a half bottle of vodka he won't baptise a child for you.... And yet they talk about Holy Gospel and read: 'Ask and it shall be given you; knock and it will be opened unto you.' We ask and ask, but it is not given us; and we knock, but still it is not given us. Must we break down the door and take it? Gentlemen, don't wait until the door is broken down; give voluntarily, and then there will be freedom, liberty, and it will be good for you and for us" (1955).

Take the non-party peasant Afanasyev, who appraises Cossack "municipalisation" not from the Cossack point of view, but from that of "almost a newcomer". "In the first place, gentlemen, I must say that I represent the peasants of the Don region, numbering over a million, and yet I was the only one elected. That alone shows that we are almost newcomers there.... I am infinitely surprised: does St. Petersburg feed the countryside? No, on the contrary. In the past I worked in St. Petersburg for twenty odd years, and I noticed even then that it was not St. Petersburg that fed the countryside, but the countryside that fed St. Petersburg. And I notice the same thing now. All this beautiful architecture, all these edifices and buildings, all these fine houses, they are all built by peasants, as they were twenty-five years ago.... Purishkevich gave the example of a Cossack who has over twenty dessiatins of land, and he

is also starving.... Why didn't he tell us where that land is? There is land, there is land in Russia, too, but who owns it? If he knew there is so much land there, but did not say where, it shows that he is an unjust man; but if he didn't know, he should not have started talking about it. And if he really didn't know, then permit me, gentlemen, to tell him where that land is, how much there is of it, and who owns it. If you reckon it up you will find that in the Don Cossack Region there are 753,546 dessiatins used as private stud-farms. I will also mention the Kalmyk stud-farms, what are called nomad camps; they take up in all 165,708 dessiatins. Then there are 1,055,919 dessiatins temporarily leased by rich people. All that land belongs not to the people Purishkevich mentioned, but to kulaks, to the rich, who oppress us; when they get cattle—they skin us of half, we have to pay a ruble per dessiatin, another ruble for the animal we plough with, but we have to feed our children, and the Cossack wives and children as well. That is why we are starving." He went on to say that leaseholders get 2,700 dessiatins each for supplying eight horses "for the cavalry"; the peasants could supply more. "I will tell you that I wanted to convince the government that it was making a great mistake in not doing this. I wrote a letter to *Selsky Vestnik* and asked them to publish it, but they answered that it was not our business to teach the government." Thus, on "municipalised" land transferred to the ownership of a region, the "central undemocratic government" is *de facto* creating new landlords: municipalisation is, as Plekhanov revealed, a guarantee against restoration....

"The government opened the doors wide for us to acquire land through the Peasant Bank—that is the yoke that was put on us in 1861. It wants to make us settle in Siberia ... but would it not be better to send there the man who owns thousands of dessiatins? Look how many people could live off the land he would leave behind!" (*Applause on the Left*; *voices from the Right*: "That's stale, that's stale.") ..."During the Japanese war I led my recruits through those [landlord's] lands that I have mentioned here. It took us over forty-eight hours to get to the assembly place. The men asked me: 'Where are you taking us?' I answered: 'Against Japan.' 'What for?' 'To defend our country.' Being a soldier myself, I felt it was our duty to defend our country, but the men said: 'This is not our country—the land belongs to the Lisetskys, Bezulovs, and Podkopailovs. There is nothing here that is ours!' They said things to me that I have been

unable to wipe out from my heart for more than two years.... Consequently, gentlemen ... to sum up, I must say that as regards all those rights that exist in our Russia, from the princes to the nobles, Cossacks, burghers, not mentioning the word peasant, all must be Russian citizens and have the use of land, all those who till the land, who put their labour into it, who cherish and love it. Work, sweat and benefit from it. But if you do not want to live on the land, if you do not want to till it, if you do not want to put your labour into it, you have no right to benefit from it" (1974) (26th session, 12.IV.1907).

"Not mentioning the word peasant!" That splendid utterance "from the depths of the heart" burst from a peasant who wants to do away with the social estate character of landownership ("all those rights that exist in our Russia"), who wants to abolish the very name of the lowest estate, the peasantry. "Let all be citizens." Equal right to land for the toilers is nothing else than the *farmer*'s point of view applied with the utmost consistency to the land. There must be *no other basis* for the ownership of land (like that "for service" among the Cossacks, etc.), no other reasons, no other relations, except the right of the *farmer* to the land, except the reason that he "cherishes" it, except the relation that he "puts his labour" into it. That must be the point of view of the farmer who stands for free farming on free land, for the removal of everything that is extraneous, obstructive, and obsolete, the removal *of all the old forms of landownership*. Would it not be the stupid application of a thoughtless doctrine if Marxists were to dissuade such a farmer from nationalisation and teach him the benefits of private ownership of allotment land?

In the First Duma, the peasant Merkulov (Kursk Gubernia) expressed the same idea about the nationalisation of peasant allotment land as that which we quoted above from the reports of the congresses of the Peasant Union. "They try to scare us;" said Merkulov, "by saying that the peasants themselves will refuse to part with the patch of land they now possess. To that I say: Who is going to take it from them? Even with complete nationalisation, only that part of the land will be taken which the owner does not cultivate by himself, but with hired labour" (18th session, May 30, 1906, p. 822).

That was said by a peasant who, as he himself admitted, owns 60 dessiatins of land. Of course, the idea of abolish-

ing or of prohibiting wage-labour in capitalist society is childish, but we must scotch wrong ideas at the point where they begin to go wrong, namely, beginning with "socialisation" and the prohibition of wage-labour,* and not with nationalisation.

This same peasant Merkulov opposed the Cadet Bill of the 42, which coincides with municipalisation in that allotment land is to remain private property and landlords' land is to be given out in tenure. This is "a kind of transitional stage from one system to the other" ... "instead of one we have two forms of ownership: private ownership and renting, i.e., two forms of landownership that not only do not hang together, but are the very opposite of each other" (823).

5. THE NARODNIK INTELLECTUALS

In the speeches of the Narodnik intellectuals, particularly those of the Popular Socialists, i.e., the Narodnik opportunists, two currents must be noted: on the one hand, sincere defence of the interests of the peasant masses—in that respect their speeches, for understandable reasons, are much less impressive than those of the peasants who "do not engage in politics"; on the other hand, a certain Cadet savour, a touch of intellectualist philistinism, an attempt to adopt the state point of view. It goes without saying that, *in contrast to the peasants*, their commitment to a *doctrine* is evident: they are fighting not on account of directly felt needs and hardships, but to vindicate a certain theory, a system of views which distorts the real issue of the struggle.

"Land for the toilers," proclaims Mr. Karavayev in his first speech, and he characterises Stolypin's agrarian legislation under Article 87 as "the destruction of the village commune", as pursuing a "political aim"; namely, "the formation of a special class of rural bourgeois".

"We know that these peasants are really the major props of reaction, a reliable prop of the bureaucracy; but in counting on this, the government has made a grave mistake: besides this there will be

* There is no need for us to "scotch" this wrong idea, for the "sober minded" Trudoviks, headed by the "sober-minded" Peshekhonovs, have *already scotched it*.

the peasant proletariat; I do not know which is better, a peasant proletariat, or the present land-hungry peasantry which if certain measures were taken, could obtain a sufficient amount of land" (722).

This smacks of the reactionary Narodism of Mr. V. V.: "Better" for whom? For the state? For the landlord state, or for the bourgeois 'state? And why is the proletariat not "better"? Because the land-hungry peasantry "could obtain", i.e., could more easily be appeased, more easily brought into the camp of order than the proletariat? That is what *it amounts to*, according to Mr. Karavayev: it is as if he were offering Stolypin and Co. a more reliable "guarantee" *against* a social revolution!

If Mr. Karavayev were right in essentials, the Marxists could not support the confiscation of the landlords' land in Russia. But Mr. Karavayev is wrong, because the Stolypin "way", by slowing down the development of capitalism—in comparison with the peasant revolution—is creating more paupers than proletarians. Karavayev himself said, and rightly, that the Stolypin policy was enriching (not the new, bourgeois elements, not the capitalist farmers, but) the *present* landlords, half of whose economies were run on feudal lines. In 1895, the price of land sold through the "Peasant" Bank was 51 rubles per dessiatin; but in 1906, the price was 126 rubles. (Karavayev at the 47th session, May 26, 1907, p. 1189.) And Mr. Karavayev's party colleagues, Volk-Karachevsky and Delarov, brought out even more vividly the significance of those figures. Delarov showed that "up to 1905, during the twenty odd years of its existence, the Peasant Bank bought up only 7,500,000 dessiatins"; but between November 3, 1905 and April 1, 1907, it bought up 3,800,000 dessiatins. The price of land was 80 rubles per dessiatin in 1900, 108 rubles in 1902, rising to 109 rubles in 1903, before the agrarian movement, and before the Russian revolution. Now it is 126 rubles. "While the whole of Russia was suffering heavy loss as a consequence of the Russian revolution, the Russian big landowners were *amassing fortunes*. During that period they pocketed over 60,000,000 rubles of the people's money" (1220—counting 109 rubles as a "fair" price). But Mr. Volk-Karachevsky reckons far more correctly in refusing to regard any price as "fair", simply noting that after November

3, 1905, the government paid out to the landlords 52,000,000 rubles on account of land purchased by peasants, and 242,000,000 rubles on its own account; in all, "295,000,000 *rubles of the people's money were paid to the landed nobility*" (1080. All italics ours). This, of course, is only a fraction of what Junker-bourgeois agrarian evolution is costing Russia; such is the *tribute* imposed on the growing productive forces for the benefit of the feudal landlords and the bureaucracy! The Cadets too want to preserve this tribute to the landlords for the liberation of Russia's development (redemption payments). The bourgeois farmers' republic, on the other hand, would be compelled to use those sums for developing the productive forces of agriculture under the new system.*

Lastly, we must certainly place to the credit of the Narodnik intellectuals the fact that, unlike the Bobrinskys and Kutlers, they are aware of the fraud that was perpetrated on the people in 1861 and call that notorious reform not the great reform, but one "carried out in the interests of the landlords" (Karavayev, 1193). Reality, justly observed Mr. Karavayev concerning the post-Reform period, "has exceeded the gloomiest forecasts" of those who championed the interests of the peasantry in 1861.

On the question of peasant *ownership* of the land, Mr. Karavayev openly challenged the government's concern for it by putting the question to the peasants: "Gentlemen, peasant deputies, you are the representatives of the people. Your life is the peasants' life, your mind is their mind. When you were leaving, did your constituents complain that they

* See Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question* in Russia on the necessity of spending enormous amounts of capital for the promotion of peasant agriculture. Here the "municipalisers" may protest that the bourgeois republic will spend money on the republic's armed forces, whereas the democratic Zemstvo ... will have the money taken away from it by the undemocratic central government, most highly esteemed municipalisers! Besides, the very rise of such a Zemstvo is impossible under an undemocratic central government; this is but the pious wish of a petty bourgeois. The only true comparison is that between a bourgeois republic (which spends more than other states on the development of productive forces: North America, for example), and a bourgeois monarchy (which for decades pays *tribute* to the Junkers: Germany, for example).

were uncertain about the ownership of land? Did they make it your first duty in the Duma, your first demand: 'Mind you ensure private ownership of the land, otherwise you will not be carrying out our mandate'? No. You will say that you were not given such a mandate" (1185).

Far from repudiating that statement, the peasant deputies confirmed it by the entire content of their speeches. And that, of course, was not because the Russian peasant is devoted to the "village commune", is an "opponent of private ownership", but because economic conditions *now* dictate to him the task of abolishing all the old forms of landownership in order to create a new system of economy.

To the debit side of the account of the Narodnik intellectuals we must place their loudly voiced arguments about "norms" of peasant landownership. "I think everybody will agree that in order to settle the agrarian question properly," declared Mr. Karavayev, "the following data are needed: first, the amount of land necessary for subsistence, the subsistence norm; and the amount necessary to absorb all the labour of the household, the labour norm. We must know exactly how much land the peasants possess; that will enable us to calculate how much they are short of. Then we must know how much land can be given" (1186).

We emphatically disagree with that opinion. And we assert *on the basis of the statements made by the peasants in the Duma* that it contains an element of intellectualist bureaucracy that is *alien to the peasants*. The peasants do not talk about "norms". Norms are a bureaucratic invention, a hang-over of the feudal Reform of 1861 of accursed memory. Guided by their true class instinct, the peasants place the weight of emphasis on the abolition of landlordism and not on "norms". It is not a question of how much land is "needed". "You will not create another world", as the above-mentioned non-party peasant so aptly expressed it. It is a question of doing away with the *oppressive* feudal latifundia, which ought to be done away with even if the "norms" are reached without it. The Narodnik intellectual slips into this position: if the "norm" is reached, then, perhaps, there will be no need to touch the landlords. The peasants' line of reasoning is different: "peasants, *throw them off your backs*" (meaning the landlords), said the peasant Pyanykh

(S.R.) in the Second Duma (16th session, March 26, 1907, p. 1101). The landlords must be thrown off not because there are not enough "norms" to go round, but because the farmer does not want to be burdened with donkeys and leeches. There is a "big difference" between these two arguments.

The peasant does not talk about norms, but with remarkable practical intuition he "takes the bull by the horns". The question is: *Who* is to fix the norms? This was excellently put by the clergyman Poyarkov in the First Duma. "It is proposed to fix a norm of land per head," he said. "*Who is to fix this norm*? If it is to be fixed by the peasants themselves, then, of course, they will not neglect their own interests; but if the landlords as well as the peasants are to do so, then it is a question as to who will gain the upper hand in working out the norm" (12th session, May 19, 1906, p. 488).

That exactly hits the mark in regard to all the talk about norms.

In the case of the Cadets it is not mere talk, but downright *betrayal* of the peasants to the landlords. And that kindly village priest Mr. Poyarkov, who has evidently seen liberal landlords in action in his part of the countryside, instinctively perceived where the falsity lay.

"Another thing people are afraid of," said the same Poyarkov, "is that there will be a multitude of officials. The peasants will distribute the land themselves!" (488-89.) That is the crux of the matter. "Norms" do, indeed, smack of officialdom. It is different when the peasant speaks: We shall distribute the land on the spot. Hence the idea of setting up local land committees, which expresses the true interests of the peasantry in the revolution and naturally rouses the hatred of the liberal scoundrels.* Under *such* a plan of *nationalisation* all that is left to the state is to

* Workers' governments in the towns, peasant committees in the villages (which at a certain moment will be transformed into bodies elected by universal, etc., suffrage)—such is the only possible form of organisation of the victorious revolution, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is not surprising that the liberals hate these forms of organisation of the classes that are fighting for freedom!

determine what lands can serve for *colonisation* or may require special intervention ("forests and waters of national importance", as our present programme puts it), i.e., *all that is left is what even* the "municipalisers" *deem necessary to put in the hands of the "democratic state*" (they should have said: republic).

Comparing the talk about norms with the economic facts, we see at once that the peasants are men of deeds, whereas the Narodnik intellectuals are men of words. The "labour" norm would be of *real* importance if attempts were made to prohibit hired labour. The majority of the peasants have turned down these attempts, and the Popular Socialists have admitted that they are impracticable. That being the case, the question of "norms?" does not arise, and there remains division among a given number of farmers. The "subsistence" norm is a poverty norm, and in capitalist society the peasants will always flee from such a "norm" to the towns (we shall deal with this separately later on). Here too, then, it is not at all a matter of a "norm" (which, moreover, changes with every change in the crop and technical methods), but a matter of dividing the land among a given number of farmers, of "sorting out" the real farmers who are capable of "cherishing" the land (with both labour and capital) from the inefficient farmers who must not be retained in agriculture—and to attempt to retain them in it would be reactionary.

As a curiosity, showing what the Narodnik *theories* lead to, we shall quote Mr. Karavayev's reference to *Denmark*. Europe, you see, "was handicapped by private ownership", whereas our village communes "help to solve the problem of co-operation". "In this respect, Denmark provides a splendid example." It is indeed a *splendid* example that tells against the Narodniks. In Denmark we see the most typical *bourgeois* peasantry, which concentrates both dairy cattle (see *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*, Chapter X*) and the land. Of the total number of crop farms in Denmark, 68.3 per cent occupy up to 1 hartkorn, i.e., up to about 9 dessiatins each. They account for 11.1 per cent of all the land. At the other pole are 12.6 per cent

* See pp. 171-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the farms with 4 hartkorns and over (*36 dessiatins and over*) each; they account for 62 per cent of all the land. (N. S., *Agrarian Programmes*, *Novy Mir* Publishers, p. 7.) Comment is superfluous.

It is interesting to note that in the First Duma Denmark was put forward as a trump card by the liberal Herzenstein, to which the Right deputies (in both Dumas) retorted: in Denmark there is peasant *ownership*. We need nationalisation in our country in order to create freedom for the old farms to reorganise "on Danish lines" on the "unfenced" land. As for converting tenancy into ownership, there will be no obstacle to that if the peasants themselves demand it, *in such a matter* the entire bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy will always support the peasantry. What is more, under nationalisation the development of capitalism (a development "on Danish lines") will be *more rapid* as a consequence of the abolition of private ownership of land.

6. THE TRUDOVIK PEASANTS (NARODNIKS)

The Trudovik peasants and the Socialist-Revolutionary peasants *do not differ* essentially from the non-party peasants. A comparison of their speeches clearly reveals the same needs, the same demands, and the same outlook. The party peasants are merely more politically conscious, they express themselves more clearly, and grasp more fully the connection between the different aspects of the question.

The best speech of all, perhaps, was that of the peasant Kiselyov, a Trudovik, at the 26th session of the Second Duma (April 12, 1907). In contrast to the "state point of view" of the liberal petty bureaucrat, he emphasised the fact that "our government's entire domestic policy, which is *actually* controlled by the landlords, is directed to keeping the land in the possession of its present owners" (1943). The speaker showed that that was the reason why the people were kept "in abysmal ignorance", and then he went on to deal with the speech delivered by the Octobrist, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky. "You have, of course, not forgotten the horrible things he said: 'Abandon all idea of increasing the area of peasant landownership. Preserve and support the private owners. Without landlords, our backward and

ignorant peasant mass would be a flock without a shepherd'. Fellow-peasants, need anything be added to this to make you understand what these gentlemen, our benefactors, are hankering after? Is it not clear to you that they are still longing and sighing for serfdom? No, shepherd gentlemen, enough.... The only thing I would like is that the words of the noble Rurikovich[138] should be well remembered by the whole backward peasantry of Russia, by the whole of the land of Russia; that these words should burn within the heart of every peasant and light up more brightly than the sun the gulf that lies between us and these uninvited benefactors. Enough, shepherd gentlemen.... Enough. What we need is not shepherds, but leaders; and we shall find them without you, and with them we shall find the road to light and truth, the road to the promised land" (1947).

The Trudovik has exactly the same standpoint as the revolutionary bourgeois who is under the delusion that the nationalisation of the land will bring him to the "promised land", but who is fighting devotedly for the *present* revolution and detests the idea of limiting its scope: "The Party of People's Freedom rejects the just settlement of the agrarian question.... Gentlemen, representatives of the people, can a legislative institution like the State Duma, in its actions, sacrifice justice to expediency? Can you pass laws knowing in advance that they are unjust?... Are the unjust laws our bureaucracy has bestowed upon us not enough that we ourselves should make still more?... You know perfectly well that, for reasons of expediency—the need to pacify Russia—punitive expeditions have been sent out and the whole of Russia has been proclaimed in a state of emergency; for reasons of expediency summary military tribunals have been instituted. But tell me please, who among us goes into raptures over this expediency? Have you not all been cursing it? Do not ask, as some here have done: 'What is justice?' [The speaker is evidently referring to the Cadet landlord Tatarinov who, at the 24th session, on April 9, said: "Justice, gentlemen, is a rather relative term," "justice is an ideal towards which we are all striving, but this ideal remains" (for the Cadet) "only an ideal, and whether it will be possible to achieve it is still an open question for me." 1779.] Man is justice. When a

man is born—it is just that he should live, and to live it is just that he should have the opportunity to earn his bread by his labour."...

You see: this ideologist of the peasantry adopts the typical standpoint of the French eighteenth-century enlightener. He does not understand the historical limitedness, the historically-determined content of *his* justice. But for the sake of this abstract justice he *wants to*, and the class he represents *is able to completely sweep away* all the vestiges of medievalism. That is the *real* historical content of the demand that justice must not be sacrificed to "expediency". It means: no concessions to medievalism, to the landlords, to the old regime. It is the language of the members of the Convention. For the liberal Tatarinov, however, the "ideal" of bourgeois freedom "remains only an ideal", for which he does not fight in earnest, does not sacrifice everything for its realisation, but makes a deal with the landlords. The Kiselyovs can lead the people to a victorious bourgeois revolution, the Tatarinovs can only betray them.

...“For the sake of expediency, the Party of People's Freedom proposes that no right to land be created. It is afraid that such a right will draw masses of people from the towns into the countryside, and in that case each will get very little. I would like, first of all, to ask: What is the right to land? The right to land is the right to work, the right to bread, the right to live—it is the inalienable right of every man. How can we deprive anybody of that right? The Party of People's Freedom says that if all citizens are granted that right, and if the land is divided among them, each will get very little. But a right and the exercise of that right in practice are by no means the same thing. Every one of you here has the right to live in, say, Chukhloma, but you live here; on the other hand, those who live in Chukhloma have the same right to live in St. Petersburg, but they stick in their lair. Therefore, the fear that to grant the right to land to all those who are willing to till it will draw masses of people away from the towns is totally groundless. Only those who have not broken their ties with the countryside, only those who have left the countryside recently, will leave the towns.... The people who have assured means of livelihood in the towns will not go into the countryside.... I think that only the complete and irrevocable abolition of private ownership of the land ... etc.... only such a solution can be regarded as satisfactory (1950).

This tirade, so typical of the Trudovik, raises an interesting question: Is there any difference between *such* speeches

about the right to work and the speeches about the right to work delivered by the French petty-bourgeois democrats of 1848? Both are certainly declamations of a bourgeois democrat *vaguely* expressing the real historical content of the struggle. The declamations of the Trudovik, however, *vaguely* express the actual *aims of the bourgeois* revolution which objective conditions make possible (i.e., make possible a peasant agrarian revolution in twentieth-century Russia), whereas the declamations of the French *Kleinbürger** in 1848 vaguely expressed the aims of the *socialist* revolution, which was impossible in France in the middle of the last century. In other words: the right to work demanded by the French workers in the middle of the nineteenth century expressed a desire to remodel the *whole* of small production on the lines of co-operation, socialism, and so forth, and that was *economically* impossible. The right to work demanded by the Russian peasants in the twentieth century expresses the desire to remodel small *agricultural* production on *nationalised* land, and that is *economically* quite possible. The twentieth century Russian peasants' "right to work" has a real bourgeois content in addition to its unsound socialistic theory. The right to work demanded by the French petty bourgeois and worker in the middle of the nineteenth century contained *nothing* but an unsound socialistic theory. That is the difference that many of our Marxists overlook.

But the Trudovik himself reveals the *real* content of his theory: *not everybody* will go on the land, although everybody "has an equal right". Clearly, *only farmers* will go on the land, or establish themselves there. Doing away with private ownership of the land means doing away with all obstacles to the *farmers* establishing themselves on the land.

It is not surprising that Kiselyov, imbued with deep faith in the peasant revolution and with a desire to serve it, speaks scornfully about the Cadets, about their wish to alienate not all, but only a part of the land, to make the peasants pay for the land, to transfer the matter to "unnamed land institutions", in short, about "the plucked bird which the Party of People's Freedom is offering the peas-

* *Kleinbürger*—petty bourgeois.—*Ed.*

ants" (1950-51). Neither is it surprising that Struve and those like him were *bound* to hate the Trudoviks, especially after the Second Duma: the Cadets' plans cannot succeed as long as the Russian peasant remains a Trudovik. But when the Russian peasant ceases to be a Trudovik, the difference between the Cadet and the Octobrist will completely disappear!

We shall briefly mention the other speakers. The peasant Nechitailo says: "The people who have drunk the blood and sucked the brains of the peasants call them ignorant" (779). Golovin interrupted: The landlord can insult the peasant, but the peasant insulting the landlord?... "These lands that belong to the people—we are told: buy them. Are we foreigners, who have arrived from England, France, and so forth? This is our country, why should we have to buy our own land? We have already paid for it ten times over with blood, sweat, and money" (780).

Here is what the peasant Kirnosov (Saratov Gubernia) says: "Nowadays we talk of nothing but the land; again we are told: it is sacred, inviolable. In my opinion it cannot be inviolable; *if the people wish it*, *nothing can be inviolable*.* (*A voice from the Right*: "Oh-ho!") Yes, oh-ho! (*Applause on the Left*.) Gentlemen of the nobility, do you think we do not know when you used us as stakes in your card games; when you bartered us for dogs? We do. It was all your sacred, inviolable property.... You stole the land from us.... The peasants who sent me here said this: The land is ours. We have come here not to buy it, but to take it" (1144).**

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* A characteristic expression by a simple peasant of the revolutionary idea of the sovereignty of the people. In our revolution there is no bourgeoisie other than the peasantry to carry out this demand of the proletarian programme.

** The Trudovik peasant Nazarenko (Kharkov Gubernia) said in the First Duma: "If you want to judge how the peasant looks on the land, I will tell you that to us peasants land is as essential as its mother's breast is to an infant. That is the only standpoint from which we regard the land. You probably know that not so very long ago the gentry compelled our mothers to suckle pups. The same is happening now. The only difference now is that it is not the mothers who bore us who are suckling the gentry's pups, but the mother that feeds us—the land" (495).

Here is what the peasant Vasyutin (Kharkov Gubernia) says: "We see here in the person of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers not the minister of the whole country, but the minister of 130,000 landlords. Ninety million peasants are nothing to him.... You [addressing the Right] are exploiters, you lease your land out at exorbitant rents and skin the peasants alive.... Know that if the government fails to meet the people's needs, the people will not ask for your consent, they will take the land.... I am a Ukrainian [he relates that Catherine made Potemkin a gift of a little estate of 27,000 dessiatins with 2,000 serfs].... Formerly land was sold at 25 to 50 rubles per dessiatin, but now the rent is 15 to 30 rubles per dessiatin, and the rent of hayland is 35 to 50 rubles. I call that fleecery. (*A voice from the Right*: "What? Fleecery?" *Laughter*.) Yes, don't get excited (*applause on the Left*); I call it skinning the peasants alive" (643, 39th session, May 16).

The Trudovik peasants and the peasant intellectuals have in common a vivid recollection of serfdom. They are all united by burning hatred for the landlords and the landlord state. They are all animated with an intense revolutionary passion. Some spontaneously exert their efforts to "throw them off our backs", without thinking of the future system they are to create. Others paint that future in utopian colours. But all of them detest compromise with the old Russia, all are fighting to shatter to bits accursed medievalism.

Comparing the speeches of the revolutionary peasants in the Second Duma with those of the revolutionary workers, one is struck by the following difference. The former are imbued with a far more spontaneous revolutionary spirit, a passionate desire to destroy the landlord regime immediately, and immediately to create a new system. The peasant is eager to fling himself upon the enemy at once and to strangle him. Among the workers this revolutionary spirit is more abstract, aimed, as it were, at a remoter goal. This difference is quite understandable and legitimate. The peasant is making *his*, bourgeois, revolution now, at this moment, and does not see its inherent contradictions, he is not even aware that there are such contradictions. The Social-Democratic worker does see them and because he

sets himself aims of world socialism, *cannot* make the fate of the working-class movement hinge on the outcome of a bourgeois revolution. Only we must not conclude from this that the worker must support the liberals in the bourgeois revolution. The conclusion to be drawn from it is that, while merging *with no other* class, the worker must *with all his energy* help the peasant to carry through this bourgeois revolution to the end.

7. THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

The speeches of the Socialist-Revolutionary intellectuals (we dealt with the S.R. peasants above when dealing with the Trudoviks) are full of the same scathing criticism of the Cadets and bitter enmity towards the landlords. Not to repeat what we have said above, we shall merely point out a *new* feature that this group of deputies possesses. Unlike the Popular Socialists who, instead of the ideal of socialism, are inclined to paint the ideal of ... Denmark, and unlike the peasants, who are strangers to all doctrine and directly express the sentiments of the oppressed person who just as directly idealises emancipation from the existing form of exploitation, the Socialist-Revolutionaries introduce into their speeches the doctrine of *their own* "socialism". Thus, Uspensky and Sagatelyan (a member of "Dashnaktsutyun"—which stands very close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the "young ones" of which even belong to the S. R. Party) raise the question of the *village commune*. The latter speaker rather naïvely observes: "It must be noted with regret that in developing the wide theory of nationalisation of the land, no special emphasis is laid on the living, surviving institution, on the basis of which alone progress can be made.... The safeguard against all these horrors [the horrors of Europe, the destruction of small farming, etc.] is the village commune" (1122).

The "regret" of this worthy knight of the village commune will be understood if we bear in mind that he was the *twenty-sixth* speaker on the agrarian question.

He was preceded by not less than fourteen Left members, Trudoviks, and others, and "no special emphasis was laid on this living, surviving institution" by any one of them!

There is reason for "regret" when one sees among the peasants in the Duma the same indifference towards the village commune as was displayed by the congresses of the Peasant Union. Sagatelyan and Uspensky took up the cause of the village commune like true sectarians in the midst of the peasant revolution, which does not want to hear of the *old* agrarian associations. "I sense a certain danger to the village commune," mourned Sagatelyan (1123). Now is just the time at which the village commune must be saved at all costs" (1124). "This form [i.e., the village commune] may develop into a world movement, capable of offering a solution to all economic problems" (1126). Apparently, Mr. Sagatelyan gave vent to all these arguments about the village commune "sadly and irrelevantly". And his colleague Uspensky, criticising Stolypin's legislation against the village communes, expressed the desire that "the mobilisation of landed property be reduced to the utmost limits, to the last degree" (1115).

This Narodnik's wish is undoubtedly reactionary. Curiously enough, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, in whose names this wish was expressed in the Duma, advocates the abolition of private ownership of land, without realising that this involves the *utmost* mobilisation of the land, that it creates the freest and easiest conditions for the land to pass from farmer to farmer, the freest and easiest conditions for the penetration of capital into agriculture! Confusing private ownership of land with the domination of capital in agriculture is a characteristic mistake of the bourgeois land nationalisers (including Henry George, and many others). In their endeavour to "reduce mobilisation", the Socialist-Revolutionaries are at one with the Cadets, whose representative Kutler openly stated in his speech: "The Party of People's Freedom proposes to limit their [the peasants'] rights only in respect of alienation and mortgage, i.e., to prevent, in the future, the wide development of the sale and purchase of land" (12th session, March 19, 1907, p. 740).

The Cadets link this reactionary aim with methods of solving the agrarian problem (domination of the landlords and the bureaucracy) that make possible stupid bureaucratic restriction and red-tape that will help to enthral the peas-

ants. The Socialist-Revolutionaries link the reactionary aim with measures that preclude the possibility of bureaucratic restraints (local land committees elected on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage). In the case of the former, what is reactionary is their entire (bureaucratic-landlord) policy in the bourgeois revolution. In the case of the latter, what is reactionary is their petty-bourgeois "socialism", which they mistakenly want to force upon the consistent bourgeois revolution.

On the question of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' economic theories, it is interesting to note the arguments of their Duma representatives about the influence of agrarian reforms upon the development of industry. The naïve point of view of bourgeois revolutionaries, barely concealed by a veneer of Narodnik doctrine, stands out very strikingly. Take, for example, the Socialist-Revolutionary Kabakov (Perm Gubernia), known in the Urals as the organiser of the Peasant Union, as "the President of the Alapayevsk Republic",[139] and also as "Pugachov".* In the purely peasant manner he bases the peasants' right to the land on the grounds, among other things, that the peasants have never refused to defend Russia against her enemies (1953). "Why allot the land?" he exclaims. "We bluntly declare that the land must be the common property of the toiling peasantry, and the peasants will be able to divide the land among themselves in the local areas without the interference of any government officials, who, we have long known, have never been of any use to the peasantry" (1954). "In our region, the Urals, entire factories have come to a standstill because there is no sale for sheet iron, yet in Russia all the peasants' huts have straw-thatched roofs. Those huts should have been roofed with sheet iron long ago.... There is a market, but there are no buyers. Who constitute the mass of buyers in our country? The hundred million toiling peasants—that is the foundation of the mass of buyers" (1952).

Yes, that correctly expresses the conditions for real capitalist production in the Urals in place of the age-old,

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* See *List of Members of the Second State Duma*, privately published by an anonymous author, St. Petersburg, 1907.

semi-feudal stagnation of "possessional" production.[139a] Neither the Stolypin nor the Cadet agrarian policy can bring about any appreciable improvement in the conditions of life of the *masses*, and unless these conditions are improved, really "free" industry will not develop in the Urals. Only a peasant revolution could quickly transform wooden Russia into iron Russia. The Socialist-Revolutionary peasant has a truer and broader conception of the conditions necessary for the development of capitalism than have the sworn servants of capital.

Another Socialist-Revolutionary, the peasant Khvorostukhin (Saratov Gubernia), said: "Yes, gentlemen, of course, many spokesmen of the Party of People's Freedom have accused the Trudovik Group of wanting to transfer the land to those who wish to till it. They say that then a lot of people will leave the towns, and this will make things worse. But I think, gentlemen, that only those who have nothing to do will leave the towns, but those who have work are used to work, and since they have work they will not leave the towns. Indeed, why should land be given to those who do not want to cultivate it?"... (774.) Is it not obvious that this "S.R." does not in the least want universal, equalised land tenure, but the creation of free and equal farming on free land?... "It is necessary, at all costs, to release economic freedom for the whole people, particularly for the people who have suffered and starved for so many years" (777).

Do not think that this *correct* formulation of the *real* content of S.R.-ism ("release economic freedom") is due *only* to the clumsy, peasant way of expression. It is more than that. The S.R. leader Mushenko, an intellectual, who replied to the debate on the agrarian question on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, was far more naïve in expressing his economic views than the peasants Kabakov and Khvorostukhin.

"We say," declared Mushenko, "that proper resettlement, proper dispersion, will be possible only when the land is unfenced, when all the barriers erected by the principle of private ownership of the land are removed. Further, the Minister spoke about the increase in the population of our country.... It turned out that for this increase alone [1,600,000] about 3,500,000 dessiatins of land will be needed. He says: Thus, if you have equalised the land, where will you get land

for such an increase in the population? But I ask: Where, in what state [*sic*!] is the whole increase in the population absorbed in agriculture? *The law that regulates the distribution of the population according to social-estates*, *according to occupations*, *operates in the reverse direction* [our italics]. If a state, if a country is not degenerating, but is developing industrially, it shows that on the foundation of agriculture, which is satisfying the elementary needs in food and raw materials, more and more economic storeys are being erected. Demand grows, new industrial products appear, new branches of industry spring up; the manufacturing industry attracts larger and larger numbers of workers. The urban population grows faster than the agricultural and absorbs the major part of the population increase. It sometimes happens, gentlemen, that the agricultural population diminishes not only relatively, but oven absolutely. If this [!] process is slow in our country, it is because there is nothing on which to build those new economic storeys. Peasant economy is too shaky a foundation; the market for industry is too small. Create a healthy, numerous, and vigorous agricultural population by putting the land at the disposal of the people, and you will see what a demand there will be for industrial products, and what a mass of workers will be needed for the factories and mills in the towns" (1173).

Now, isn't he delightful, this "Socialist-Revolutionary" who calls the programme for the development of capitalism a programme for the socialisation of the land? He has no inkling that the law of the more rapid increase in the urban population is exclusively a law of the *capitalist* mode of production. It never occurs to him that this "law" does not and cannot operate otherwise than through the disintegration of the peasantry into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, through the "sorting out" among the cultivators, i.e., the ousting of the "pauper" by the "real farmer". The economic harmony which this S.R. depicts on the basis of a capitalist law is pathetically naïve. But it is not the harmony preached by the vulgar bourgeois economist who wants to conceal the struggle between labour and capital. It is the harmony of the unconscious bourgeois revolutionary who wants to make a clean sweep of the survivals of autocracy, serfdom, medievalism.

The *victorious* bourgeois revolution of which our present agrarian programme dreams cannot proceed except by means of *such* a bourgeois revolutionary. And the class-conscious worker must *support him* for the sake of social development, without allowing himself for a moment to be taken in by the childish prattle of the Narodnik "economists"

8. THE "NATIONALS"

Among the representatives of the non-Russian nationalities in the Duma who spoke on the agrarian question were Poles, Byelorussians, Letts and Ests, Lithuanians, Tatars, Armenians, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, and Ukrainians. Here is how they expounded their points of view.

The National-Democrat[140] Dmowski said in the Second Duma "on behalf of the Poles—the representatives of the Kingdom of Poland and of the adjacent western part of the country" (742): "Although our agrarian relations are already in the stage of transition to West-European relations, nevertheless, the agrarian question exists for us too, and land hunger is the curse of our life. One of the chief points of our social programme is: increase in the area of peasant landownership" (743).

> "The big agrarian disturbances that occurred in the Kingdom of Poland in the form of the seizure of landlord estates were confined to the eastern areas, namely, Wlodawa Uyezd, where the peasants were told that they, as members of the Orthodox Church, would receive allotments of landlords' land. Those disturbances occurred only among the population belonging to the Orthodox Church" (745).
>
> ..."Here [in the Kingdom of Poland] agrarian affairs, like all other social reforms, ... can be settled in conformity with the requirements of life only by an assembly of representatives of the region—only by an autonomous Sejm" (747).

This speech by a Polish National-Democrat provoked violent attacks against the Polish landlords on the part of the Right Byelorussian peasants (Gavrilchik, Minsk Gubernia, Szymánski, and Grudziński); and Bishop Eulogius, of course, seized the opportunity to deliver a jesuitical police-minded speech in the spirit of the Russian politicians of 1863 about the Polish landlords oppressing the Russian peasants (26th session, April 12).

"What a simple plan!" answered the National-Democrat Grabski (32nd session, May 3). "The peasants will receive land; the Russian landlords will keep their estates; the peasants, as in the good old days, will support the old regime, and the Poles will be duly punished for raising the question of a Polish Sejm" (62). And the speaker, vehemently exposing the shameless demagogy of the Russian Government; demanded that "the settlement of the agrarian reform in our region be transferred to a Polish Sejm" (75).

To this we will add that the above-mentioned peasants demanded additional allotments *with right of ownership* (see, for example, p. 1811). In the First Duma, too, the Polish and Western peasants, in demanding land, spoke in favour of private ownership. "I am a peasant with little land from Lublin Gubernia," said Nakonieczny on June 1, 1906. "Compulsory alienation is needed in Poland as well. One dessiatin forever is better than five dessiatins for an indefinite period" (881-82). The same was said by Poniatowski (Volhynia Gubernia) in the name of the Western Region (May 19, p. 501), and by Trasun from Vitebsk Gubernia (418, May 16, 1906). Girnius (Suvalki Gubernia) opposed the idea of an imperial stock of distributable land and demanded local distributable lands (June 1, 1906, p. 879). During the same debate, Count Tysczkiewiez stated that he regarded the idea of forming a national stock of distributable land as "impracticable and risky" (874). Stecki also spoke (May 24, 1906, pp. 613-14) in favour of private ownership as against renting.

A speaker from the Baltic Region in the Second Duma was Juraszewski (Courland Gubernia), who demanded the abolition of the feudal privileges of the big landowners (May 16, 1907, p. 670) and the alienation of all landlords' land over and above a definite norm. "While admitting that present-day agriculture in the Baltic Region developed on the principle of private ownership, or hereditary lease, that was practised there, one must come to the conclusion, however, that for the future regulation of agricultural relations it is necessary immediately to introduce in the Baltic Region local self-government on broad democratic lines which could correctly solve this problem" (672).

The representative of Estland Gubernia, the Progressist Jurine, introduced a separate Bill for this gubernia (47th session, May 26, 1907, p. 1210). He spoke in favour of a "compromise" (1213), in favour of "hereditary or perpetual leasing" (1214). "The one who cultivates the land, who makes the best use of it, shall have possession of the land" (ibid.). While demanding compulsory alienation for this purpose, he rejects confiscation of the land (1215). In the First Duma, Cakste (Courland Gubernia) demanded the

transfer to the peasants of church (parish) land as well as landlords' land (4th session, May 4, 1906, p. 195). Tenison (Livland Gubernia) agreed to vote for the address, i.e., for compulsory alienation, and expressed the opinion that "all the supporters of the individualisation of the land" (ibid., p. 209) could do this. Kreuzberg (Courland Gubernia), on behalf of the Courland peasants, demanded the "expropriation of the latifundia" and the allotment of land to peasants with little or no land, and, of course, "with right of ownership" (12th session, May 19, 1906, p. 500). Rütli (Livland Gubernia) demanded compulsory alienation, etc. "As regards converting the land into a state stock of distributable land," he said, "our peasants are fully aware that this is a new form of serfdom. Therefore, we must defend small peasant farming and productivity of labour, and protect them from the encroachments of capitalism. Thus, if we convert the land into a state stock of distributable land we shall create capitalism on the largest scale" (497, ibid.). Ozolinš (Livland Gubernia), on behalf of the Lettish peasants, spoke in favour of compulsory alienation and private ownership; he was emphatically opposed to the creation of a reserve of state distributable land and was in favour only of local, regional distributable lands (13th session, May 23, 1906, p. 564).

Leonas, "representative of Suvalki Gubernia, namely, of the Lithuanian nationality" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 654), spoke in favour of the plan proposed by the Constitutional-Democratic Party, to which he belongs. Bulat, another Lithuanian autonomist from the same gubernia, associated himself with the Trudoviks, but proposed that a decision on the question of redemption payments and so forth, be postponed until the matter was discussed by the local land committees (p. 651, ibid.). Povilius (Kovno Gubernia), in the name of the "Duma group of Lithuanian Social-Democrats" (ibid., p. 681, supplement) put forward this group's precisely-formulated agrarian programme, which coincides with our R.S.D.L.P. programme, *with this difference*, however, that "the local distributable land *within the borders of Lithuania*" is to be placed at the disposal of "the Lithuanian organ of autonomous self-government" (ibid., Point 2).

On behalf of the Moslem group in the Second Duma Khan Khoisky (Elisavetpol Gubernia) said: 'We Moslems, who number over 20,000,000 in the total population of the Russian state, are following the debate on the agrarian question with the same keen interest and are looking forward to its satisfactory settlement with the same impatience" (20th session, April 2, 1907, p. 1499). In the name of the Moslem group the speaker agreed with Kutler and supported compulsory alienation based on a fair valuation (1502). "But to whom are these alienated lands to go? On this matter the Moslem group is of the opinion that the alienated lands should form not a state stock, but regional stocks of distributable land, each within the borders of the given region" (1503). Deputy Mediev (Taurida Gubernia), the "representative of the Crimean Tatars", in an ardent revolutionary speech, demanded "land and liberty". "The longer the debate goes on the clearer we hear the demand of the people that the land must go to those who till it" (24th session, April 9, 1907, p. 1789). The speaker showed "how sacred landed property was established in our border regions" (1792), how the land of the Bashkirs was plundered, how ministers, councillors of state, and chiefs of the gendarmerie received tracts ranging from two to six thousand dessiatins. He cited the mandate of his "Tatar brethren", complaining of the way the wakf lands[141] were plundered. He also quoted the answer, dated December 15, 1906, which the Governor-General of Turkestan gave a certain Tatar to the effect that only persons of the Christian faith could settle on state land. "Do not those documents smell of decay, of the Arakcheyev regime[142] of the last century?" (1794.)

The spokesman for the Caucasian peasants—besides our Party Social-Democrats, whom we shall speak of later on—was the above-mentioned Sagatelyan (Erivan Gubernia) who shares the Socialist-Revolutionary standpoint. Ter-Avetikyants (Elisavetpol Gubernia), another representative of the "Dashnaktsutyun" Party, spoke in the same strain: "The land must belong to the toilers, i.e., the working people, and to nobody else, on the basis of village commune ownership" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 644). "On behalf of all the Caucasian peasants I declare ... at the de-

cisive moment, all the Caucasian peasants will go hand in hand with their elder brothers—the Russian peasants—and win for themselves land and liberty" (646). Eldarkhanov "on behalf of his constituents—the natives of the Terek Region—requests that plunder of the natural wealth be stopped pending the settlement of the agrarian question" (32nd session, May 3, 1907, p. 78). It was the government that was stealing the land, taking the best part of the highland zone, robbing the land of the Kumyk people and laying claim to its minerals (this must have been before the Stockholm lectures of Plekhanov and John on municipalised land being out of the reach of the undemocratic state power).

Speaking on behalf of the Bashkirs, Deputy Khasanov (Ufa Gubernia) mentioned the stealing by the government of two million dessiatins of land, and demanded that this land "be taken back" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 641). Deputy Syrtlanov from Ufa made the same demand in the First Duma (20th session, June 2, 1906, p. 923). The spokesman for the Kirghiz-Kaisak people in the Second Duma was Deputy Karatayev (Urals Region) who said: "We Kirghiz-Kaisaks ... deeply understand and sympathise with the land hunger of our brother-peasants, we are ready and willing to make room for them" (39th session, p. 673), but "there is very little surplus land", and "re-settlement at the present time entails the eviction of the Kirghiz-Kaisak people".... "The Kirghiz are evicted not from the land, but from their dwellings" (675). "The Kirghiz-Kaisaks always sympathise with all the opposition groups" (675).

The spokesman for the Ukrainian group in the Second Duma was the Cossack Saiko, from Poltava Gubernia. Speaking on March 29, 1907, he quoted the Cossack song: "Hey, Tsarina Catherina, look what you have done! Boundless steppe and happyland to the landlords you have flung. Hey, Tsarina Catherina, pity us and give us land, happy land and shady woods...", and supported the Trudoviks, demanding only that the words "national stock of distributable land" in § 2 of the Bill of the 104 be amended to "regional national [*sic*!] stock of distributable land to serve as the beginning of socialist organisation". "The Ukrainian,

group is of the opinion that the greatest injustice in the world is the private ownership of the land" (1318).

In the First Duma, Deputy Chizhevsky from Poltava said: "As an ardent advocate of the autonomy idea, as an ardent advocate of Ukrainian autonomy in particular, I should very much like the agrarian question to be settled by my people, by individual autonomous bodies, in that autonomous system of our state that I regard as the ideal" (14th session, May 24, 1906, p. 618). At the same time, this Ukrainian autonomist deems state distributable lands to be absolutely essential, and he clarifies an issue which our "municipalisers" have muddled up. "We must firmly and positively establish the principle," said Chizhevsky, "that the state distributable lands must be managed exclusively by local self-governing Zemstvo or autonomous bodies when these are set up. It may be asked: What sense is there in the term 'state distributable lands' if in every particular case they will be managed by local government bodies? I think there is very much sense.... First of all ... part of the state lands should be at the disposal of the central government ... our state colonisation lands.... Secondly, the sense of establishing a state stock of distributable land, and the sense of calling it such, is this: although the local bodies will be free to dispose of that land in their respective areas, they will be able to do so only within certain limits" (620). This petty-bourgeois autonomist understands the significance of state power in a society centralised by economic development far better than our Menshevik Social-Democrats.

By the way, in dealing with Chizhevsky's speech, we cannot leave unmentioned his criticism of "norms". "Labour norm is an empty sound," he says bluntly, pointing out the diversity of agricultural conditions, and on the same grounds he also rejects the "subsistence" norm. "I think land should be allotted to the peasants not according to a norm, but according to the amount of land available.... The peasants should be given all that can be given in the particular locality,"—for example, in Poltava Gubernia "land should be taken away from all the landowners, who should be left with an average of 50 dessiatins each at the most" (621). Is it surprising that the Cadets chatter about norms in order to conceal their plans regarding the actual

amount of land to be alienated? Although criticising the Cadets, Chizhevsky does not yet realise this.*

The conclusion to be drawn from our review of the Duma speeches on the agrarian question delivered by the "nationals" is obvious. Those speeches fully confirm what I said in opposition to Maslov in the pamphlet *Revision*, *etc.*, on p. 18 (first edition)** on the question of the relation between municipalisation and the rights of the nationalities, namely, that it is a *political* question, which is *fully dealt with* in the political section of our programme, and is dragged into the agrarian programme merely because of philistine provincialism.

In Stockholm, the Mensheviks worked with comical zeal to "purge municipalisation of nationalisation" (the words of the Menshevik Novosedsky, Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 146). "Some historical regions, such as Poland and Lithuania," said Novosedsky, "coincide with national territories, and the transfer of land to these regions may serve as the basis for the successful development of nationalist-federalist tendencies, which will again, in effect, transform municipalisation into nationalisation piecemeal." And so Novosedsky and Dan proposed and secured the adoption of an amendment: for the words, "self-governing large *regional* organisations" in Maslov's draft substitute the words: "large *local* self-governing bodies that will unite urban and rural districts".

An ingenious way of "purging municipalisation of nationalisation", I must say. To substitute one word for another

* Chizhevsky also brings out very strikingly the thesis of the unconsciously bourgeois Trudoviks, with which we are already familiar, namely, growth of industry and a *decrease* in the movement to the land in the event of a consistent peasant revolution. "The peasants in our district, the very electors who sent us here, have made, for example, the following calculation: 'If we were a little richer and if each of our families could spend five or six rubles on sugar every year, several sugar refineries would arise in each of the uyezds where it is possible to grow sugar beet, in addition to those that are already there'. Naturally, if those refineries were to arise, what a mass of hands would be required for intensified farming! The output of the sugar refineries would increase," etc. (622). That is precisely the programme of "American" farming and of the "American" development of capitalism in Russia.

** See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 182.—*Ed.*

—is it not obvious that this will automatically lead to the reshuffling of the "historical regions"?

No, gentlemen, no substitution of words will help you to rid municipalisation of its inherent "nationalist-federalist" nonsense. The Second Duma showed that what the "municipalisation" idea did *in fact was only to promote* the nationalist tendencies of various groups of the bourgeoisie. *It was these groups alone*, not counting the Right Cossack Karaulov, that "took upon themselves" the protection of various "territorial" and "regional" distributable lands. In so doing these nationals *threw out the agrarian* content of provincialisation (for actually Maslov "gives" the land to provinces and not to "municipalities", so the word provincialisation is more exact): nothing is to be decided beforehand, *everything*—the question of redemption payment, the question of ownership, and so forth—is to be left to the autonomous Sejms, or to regional, etc., self-governing bodies. The result is the fullest confirmation of my statement that "just the same, the law transferring the Transcaucasian lands to the Zemstvo will have to be passed by a constituent assembly in St. Petersburg, because, surely, Maslov does not want to give any region freedom to retain landlordism" (*Revision*, *etc.*, p. 18).*

Thus, events have confirmed that to argue the case for municipalisation on the basis of the nationalities' agreement or disagreement is a poor argument. The municipalisation in our programme turns out to be in conflict with the definitely expressed opinion of very diverse nationalities.

Events have confirmed, in fact, that municipalisation serves not as a guide for the mass, nation-wide peasant movement, but as a means of breaking this movement up into provincial and national streams. The *only* thing that *life* absorbed from Maslov's *idea* of regional stocks of distributable land is national-autonomist "regionalism".

The "nationals" stand somewhat aloof from *our* agrarian question. Many non-Russian nationalities have no independent peasant movement at the heart of the revolution, such as we have. It is quite natural, therefore, that in their

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 182-83.—*Ed.*

programmes the "nationals" often keep somewhat aloof from the *Russian* agrarian question, as much as to say: it has nothing to do with us, we have our own problem. For the nationalist bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie such a standpoint is inevitable.

For the proletariat, however, such a standpoint is impermissible; but it is precisely into this impermissible bourgeois nationalism that our programme *actually* falls. Just as the "nationals", at best, only associate themselves with the all-Russian movement, without the intention of strengthening it tenfold by uniting and concentrating the movement, so the Mensheviks draft a programme which *associates itself* with the peasant revolution instead of presenting a programme to guide the revolution, to unite it, and advance it. Municipalisation is not a slogan of the peasant revolution, but an artificial plan of petty-bourgeois reformism added on from outside in a backwater of the revolution.

The Social-Democratic proletariat cannot alter its programme in order to win the "agreement" of this or that nationality. Our task is to unite and concentrate the movement by advocating the best path, the best agrarian system possible in bourgeois society, by combating the force of tradition, prejudice, and conservative provincialism. "Disagreement" with the socialisation of the land on the part of the small peasants cannot alter our programme of the socialist revolution; it can only cause us to prefer action *by example*. The same applies to the nationalisation of the land in a bourgeois revolution. No "disagreement" with it on the part of a nationality or several nationalities can make us alter the doctrine that it is in the interest of the entire people that they should be freed to the utmost extent from medieval landownership and that private ownership of the land should be abolished. The "disagreement" of considerable sections of the toiling masses of this or that nationality will make us prefer influence by example to every other form of influence. The nationalisation of the land available for colonisation, the nationalisation of forest land, the nationalisation of all the land in central Russia, cannot exist for long side by side with private ownership of the land in some other part of the country (once the unification

of this country is due to the really main current of economic evolution). One or the other system must gain the upper hand. Experience will decide that. Our task is to explain to the people what conditions are most favourable for the proletariat and for the toiling masses in a capitalistically developing country.

9. THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

Of the eight Social-Democratic speeches on the agrarian question in the Second Duma only two contained a *defence* of municipalisation and not merely a reference to it. One was that of Ozol, and the other the second speech of Tsereteli. The rest of the speeches consisted mainly, almost exclusively, of attacks on landlordism in general, and of explanations of the political aspect of the agrarian question. Highly characteristic in this respect was the artless speech delivered by the Right peasant Petrochenko (22nd session, April 5, 1907), which expressed the general impression made on a rural deputy by the spokesmen of the different parties. "I will not waste your time by going over what has been said here; permit me to put it in simple words. Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky made a long speech here. Evidently, that speech was meant to prepare us for something. Briefly, it amounts to this: you have no right to take the land which belongs to me, or which I possess, and I will not give it up. In answer to this Deputy Kutler said: 'Those times have gone, you must give it up, do so and you will be paid for it'. Deputy Dmowski says: 'Do what you like with the land, but we must have autonomy, without fail'. At the same time Deputy Karavayev says: 'We need both, but throw everything in one heap and later on we'll share it out'. Tsereteli says: 'No, gentlemen, we cannot share it out because the old government still exists and it will not permit it. Better for us to try to seize power and then we can share out as we please'" (p. 1615).

Thus, this peasant grasped what he found to be the only distinction between the speech of the Social-Democrat and that of the Trudovik, namely, that the former explained the necessity of fighting for power in the state, of "seizing power". He failed to grasp the other distinctions—they

did not seem important to him! In his first speech Tsereteli did, indeed, expose the fact that "our bureaucratic aristocracy is also a landed aristocracy" (725). The speaker showed that "for several centuries the state authority handed out into private ownership land that belonged to the whole state, land that was the property of the whole people" (724). The statement he made at the end of his speech on behalf of the Social-Democratic group, which was a recapitulation of our agrarian programme, was not backed by any argument, and was not contrasted to the programmes of the other "Left" parties. We are saying this not in order to blame anybody; on the contrary, we think that Tsereteli's first speech, a short, lucid speech which concentrated on explaining the class character of the landlord government, was a very good one. We are saying this in order to explain why the Right peasant (and probably all the peasants) failed to see the specifically Social-Democratic features of our programme.

The second Social-Democratic speech on the agrarian question was delivered at the next "agrarian session" of the Duma (16th session, March 26, 1907) by a worker Fomichov (Taurida Gubernia), who often used the words: "we peasants". Fomichov made a stinging retort to Svyatopolk-Mirsky, whose famous phrase that the peasants without the landlords are "a flock without a shepherd" did more to stir up the peasant deputies than a number of other Left speeches. "Deputy Kutler, in a lengthy speech, expounded the idea of compulsory alienation, but with compensation. We, the representatives of the peasants, cannot agree to compensation because it will be another noose round the necks of the peasants" (1113). Fomichov ended up by demanding that "all the land be handed over to the working people on the terms proposed by Deputy Tsereteli" (1114).

The next speech was delivered by Izmailov, also a worker, who was elected by the peasant curia in Novgorod Gubernia (18th session, March 29, 1907). He replied to the peasant Bogatov, his fellow-deputy from Novgorod, who, in the name of the Novgorod peasants, had agreed to compensation. Izmailov indignantly opposed compensation. He spoke of the terms of the "emancipation" of the Novgorod peasants who, out of ten million dessiatins of arable land,

had received two million dessiatins, and out of six million dessiatins of forest land had received only one million dessiatins. He described the poverty of the peasants who have been reduced to such a state that not only "have they used the fences round their huts for decades to heat their stoves", but "saw off the corners of their own huts"; "out of big old huts they build small ones in order, when rebuilding, to save a log or two for firewood" (1344). "In face of these conditions, under which our peasants live, the gentlemen on the Right sigh for culture. In their opinion, culture has been killed by the muzhik, you see. But can a cold and hungry peasant think of culture? Instead of land they want to offer him this culture; but I don't trust them here either, I think they, too, will be glad to sell their land, only they will bargain to make the peasant pay dearly for it. That's why they agree. In my opinion—and the peasants particularly should know this—it is not a question of the land, gentlemen. I think I shall not be mistaken in saying that there is something else behind this land, some other kind of power, which the feudal nobility are afraid to hand over to the people, are afraid to lose together with the land. I mean political power, gentlemen. They are willing to give up the land, and they will do so, but in such a way that we remain their slaves as of old. If we fall into debt we shall never free ourselves from the power of the feudal landlords" (1345). It is difficult to imagine anything more striking and apt than this exposure by a worker of the essence of the Cadets' plans!

The Social-Democrat Serov, during the 20th session, April 2, 1907, mainly criticised the views of the Cadets, as the "representatives of capital" (1492), "representatives of capitalist landownership". He quoted detailed figures showing what redemption meant in 1861 and rejected the "elastic principle" of a fair valuation. Serov, from the Marxist standpoint, gave a faultlessly correct answer to Kutler's argument that it was impossible to confiscate the land without confiscating capital. "We do not at all put forward the argument that the land is nobody's, that the land is not the creation of human hands" (1497). "Having achieved self-consciousness, the proletariat, represented here by the Social-Democratic Party, rejects all forms of exploitation,

both feudal and bourgeois. As far as the proletariat is concerned, the question which of these two forms of exploitation is more just does not exist; the question always before it is: are the historical conditions ripe for emancipation from exploitation?" (1499.) "According to the calculations of the statisticians, if the land is confiscated, up to 500,000,000 rubles, representing the unearned incomes of the landlords, will pass to the people. The peasants will, of course, use this income to improve their farms, to expand production, and to increase consumption" (1498).

At the 22nd session of the Duma (April 5, 1907), speeches on the agrarian question were delivered by Anikin and Alexinsky. The former stressed the connection between "the higher bureaucracy and big landownership" and argued that the struggle for freedom could not be separated from the struggle for land. The latter, in a lengthy speech, explained the feudal character of the labour-service system of farming that predominates in Russia. The speaker thus expounded the basis of the Marxist view of the peasants' struggle against landlordism, and then showed the dual role played by the village commune (a "survival of olden times" and an "apparatus for influencing the landlords' estates"), and the purpose of the laws of November 9 and 15, 1906 (to align the kulaks with the landlords as a "mainstay"). The speaker gave figures showing that "the peasants' land hunger means the nobility's land surfeit" and explained that the Cadets' scheme for "compulsory" alienation meant "coercing the people for the benefit of the landlords" (1635). Alexinsky quoted the "Cadet organ *Rech*" (1639), which had admitted the Cadet truth that it wanted the landlords to predominate on the proposed land committees. The Cadet Tatarinov, who spoke at the next session but one after Alexinsky, was thus driven into a corner, as we have already seen.

Ozol's speech at the 39th session (May 16, 1907) is an example of the arguments, unworthy of Marxists, to which some of our Social-Democrats have been driven by Maslov's famous "criticism" of Marx's theory of rent and by his corresponding distortion of the concept of nationalisation of the land. Ozol argued against the S.R.'s as follows: Their "Bill is hopeless, in my opinion, for it proposes to

abolish private ownership of the means of production, in this case of the land, while preserving private ownership of factory buildings, and not only of factory buildings, but also of the dwellings and structures. On page 2 of the Bill we read that all the buildings erected on the land, and exploited on capitalist lines, are to remain private property; but every private owner will say: Be so good as to pay all the expenses for the nationalised lands, for paving the streets, and so forth, and I will receive rent from these houses. This is not nationalisation, but simply an easier means of receiving capitalist income in the most developed capitalist form" (667).

So there it is, this Maslovism! First, it repeats the banal argument of the Rights and the Cadets that it is impossible to abolish feudal exploitation without affecting bourgeois exploitation as well. Secondly, it reveals amazing ignorance of political economy: the "rent" from urban houses, etc., *contains* the lion's share *of ground rent*. Thirdly, our "Marxist", following Maslov, entirely forgets about (or denies?) absolute rent. Fourthly, it appears as though a *Marxist* rejects the desirability of "the most developed capitalist form" advocated by a Socialist-Revolutionary! Pearls of Maslov's municipalisation....

Tsereteli, in a lengthy concluding speech (47th session, May 26, 1907), defended municipalisation more thoughtfully, of course, than Ozol did; but it was Tsereteli's painstaking, thoughtful, and lucid defence that most glaringly revealed the utter fallacy of the municipalisers' chief arguments.

Tsereteli's criticism of the Right deputies at the beginning of his speech was quite correct from the political angle. His remarks about the charlatans of liberalism, who were trying to scare the people with the bogey of upheavals like the French Revolution, were magnificent. "He [Shingaryov] forgets that it was after the confiscation of the landlords' estates and because of it that France was regenerated for a new and vigorous life" (1228). Quite correct too was Tsereteli's chief slogan: "the complete abolition of landlordism and the complete liquidation of the landlord bureaucratic regime" (1224). But as soon as he proceeded to deal with the Cadets, the erroneous position of Menshevism,

made itself felt. "The principle of compulsory alienation of the land," said Tsereteli, "is, objectively, the principle of the movement for liberation, but not all those who stand for this principle are aware of, or want to admit, all the necessary implications of this principle" (1225). That is the fundamental view of Menshevism, namely, that the "watershed" of the major political divisions in our revolution runs right of the Cadets and not left, as we believe. That this view is wrong is abundantly made clear by Tsereteli's lucid formula, for after the experience of 1861 it is beyond dispute that compulsory alienation is possible together with the predominance of the landlords' interests, with the preservation of their *rule*, with the imposition of a new form of bondage. Still more fallacious was Tsereteli's statement that "on the question of the forms of land tenure, we [Social-Democrats] are farther removed from them" (the Narodniks) than from the Cadets (1230). The speaker then went on to criticise labour and subsistence "norms". In this he was a thousand times right, but the stand taken by the Cadets *on this question* is *not a bit better* than that of the Trudoviks, for the Cadets misuse "norms" far more. That is not all. The fuss the Cadets are making about the stupid "norms" is a result of their bureaucratic outlook and of their tendency *to betray* the peasants. As for the peasants, "norms" were brought to them from outside by the Narodnik intellectuals; and we have seen above, from the example of the deputies in the First Duma, Chizhevsky and Poyarkov, how trenchantly the practical people from the rural districts criticise all "norms". Had the Social-Democrats explained *this* to the peasant deputies, had they moved an amendment to the Trudovik Bill repudiating norms, had they theoretically explained the significance of nationalisation, which has nothing in common with "norms", they, the Social-Democrats, would have become the leaders of the peasant revolution as against the liberals. The stand taken by Menshevism, however, is that of subordinating the proletariat to liberal influence. It was particularly strange to say in the Second Duma that we Social-Democrats are farther removed from the Narodniks, since the Cadets declared ***in favour*** of restricting the sale and mortgaging of land!

Proceeding to criticise nationalisation, Tsereteli adduced three arguments: (1) "an army of officials", (2) "gross injustice to the small nationalities", (3) "in the event of restoration" "a weapon would be placed in the hands of the enemy of the people" (1232). That is a conscientious exposition of the views of those who secured the adoption of our Party programme, and as a Party man, Tsereteli had to expound those views. We have shown above how untenable those views are and how superficial this exclusively political criticism is.

In support of municipalisation Tsereteli adduced six arguments: (1) under municipalisation "the actual expenditure of these resources [i.e., rent] to meet the people's [!] needs will be ensured" (*sic*! p. 1233)—an optimistic assertion; (2) "the municipalities will strive to improve the conditions of the unemployed"—as, for example, in democratic and decentralised America (?); (3) "the municipalities can take over these [big] farms and organise model farms", and (4) "during an agrarian crisis ... will lease land free of charge to landless, propertyless peasants" (*sic*! p. 1234). This is demagogy worse than that of the S.R.'s; it is a programme of petty-bourgeois socialism in a bourgeois revolution. (5) "A bulwark of democracy"—like Cossack local self-government; (6) "the alienation of allotment land ... may give rise to a frightful counter-revolutionary movement"—probably against the will of all the peasants who declared for nationalisation.

Sum and substance of the speeches of the Social-Democrats in the Second Duma: leading role on the question of compensation and of the connection between landlordism and the present state power, and an agrarian programme that slips into Cadetism, betraying failure to understand the economic and political conditions of the peasant revolution.

Sum and substance of the entire debate on the agrarian question in the Second Duma: the Right landlords displayed the clearest understanding of their class interests, the most distinct conception of both the economic and political conditions needed for the preservation of their class rule in bourgeois Russia. In effect, the liberals aligned themselves with these landlords and sought to betray the

peasants to them by the most despicable and hypocritical methods. The Narodnik intellectuals introduced in the peasant programmes a touch of bureaucracy and philistine moralising. The peasants, in the most vigorous and forthright manner, expressed the spontaneous revolutionariness of their struggle against all the survivals of medievalism, and against all forms of medieval landownership, although they lacked a sufficiently clear conception of the political conditions of this struggle and naïvely idealised the "promised land" of bourgeois freedom. The bourgeois nationals aligned themselves with the peasants' struggle more or less timidly, being greatly imbued with the narrow views and prejudices that are engendered by the insularity of the small nationalities. The Social-Democrats resolutely championed the cause of the peasant revolution and explained the class character of the present state power, but they were unable to lead the peasant revolution consistently owing to the erroneous character of the Party's agrarian programme.

CONCLUSION

The agrarian question is the basis of the bourgeois revolution in Russia and determines the specific national character of this revolution.

The essence of this question is the struggle of the peasantry to abolish landlordism and the survivals of serfdom in the agricultural system of Russia, and, consequently, also in all her social and political institutions.

Ten and a half million peasant households in European Russia own 75,000,000 dessiatins of land. Thirty thousand, chiefly noble, but partly also upstart, landlords each own over 500 dessiatins—altogether 70,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the picture. Such are the main reasons for the predominance of feudal landlords in the agricultural system of Russia and, consequently, in the Russian state generally, and in the whole of Russian life. The owners of the latifundia are feudal landlords in the economic sense of the term: the basis of their landownership was created by the history of serfdom, by the history of land-grabbing by the nobility through the centuries. The basis of their present methods of farming is the labour-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

service system, i.e., a direct survival of the corvée, cultivation of the land with the implements of the peasants and by the virtual enslavement of the small tillers in an endless variety of ways: winter hiring, annual leases, half-share métayage, leases based on labour rent, bondage for debt, bondage for cut-off lands, for the use of forests, meadows, water, and so on and so forth, *ad infinitum*. Capitalist development in Russia has made such strides during the last half-century that the preservation of serfdom in agriculture has become *absolutely* impossible, and its abolition has assumed the forms of a violent crisis, of a nation-wide revolution. But the abolition of serfdom in a bourgeois country is possible in two ways.

Serfdom may be abolished by the feudal-landlord economies slowly evolving into Junker-bourgeois economies, by the mass of the peasants being turned into landless husbandmen and *Knechts*, by forcibly keeping the masses down to a pauper standard of living, by the rise of small groups of *Grossbauern*, of rich bourgeois peasants, who inevitably spring up under capitalism from among the peasantry. That is the path that the Black-Hundred landlords, and Stolypin, their minister, have chosen. They have realised that the path for the development of Russia *cannot* be cleared unless the rusty medieval forms of landownership are forcibly broken up. And they have boldly set out to break them up *in the interests of the landlords*. They have thrown overboard the sympathy for the semi-feudal village commune which until recently was widespread among the bureaucracy and the landlords. They have evaded all the "constitutional" laws in order to break up the village communes by force. They have given the kulaks *carte blanche* to rob the peasant masses, to break up the old system of landownership, to ruin thousands of peasant farms; they have handed over the medieval village to be "sacked and plundered" by the possessors of money. They *cannot* act otherwise if they are to preserve their class rule, for they have realised the necessity of adapting themselves to capitalist development and not fighting against it. And in order to preserve their rule they can find no other allies *against* the mass of the peasants than the "upstarts", the Razuvayevs and Kolupayevs.[143] They have no alternative but to shout to these

Kolupayevs: *Enrichissez-vous*!—enrich yourselves! We shall make it possible for you to gain a hundred rubles for every ruble, if you will help us to save the basis of our rule under the new conditions. That path of development, if it is to be pursued successfully, calls for wholesale, systematic, unbridled *violence* against the peasant masses and against the proletariat. And the landlord counter-revolution is hastening to organise that violence all along the line.

The other path of development we have called the American path of development of capitalism, in contrast to the former, the Prussian path. It, too, involves the forcible break-up of the old system of landownership; only the obtuse philistines of Russian liberalism can dream of the possibility of a painless, peaceful outcome of the exceedingly acute crisis in Russia.

But this essential and inevitable break-up may be carried out in the interests of the peasant masses and not of the landlord gang. A mass of free farmers may serve as a basis for the development of capitalism without any landlord economy whatsoever, since, *taken as a whole*, the latter form of economy is economically reactionary, whereas the elements of free farming have been *created* among the peasantry by the preceding economic history of the country. Capitalist development along such a path *should* proceed far more broadly, freely, and swiftly owing to the tremendous growth of the home market and of the rise in the standard of living, the energy, initiative, and culture of the *entire* population. And Russia's vast lands available for colonisation, the utilisation of which is greatly hampered by the feudal oppression of the mass of the peasantry in Russia proper, as well as by the feudal-bureaucratic handling of the agrarian policy—these lands will provide the economic foundation for a huge expansion of agriculture and for increased production in both depth and breadth.

Such a path of development requires not only the abolition of landlordism. For the rule of the feudal landlords through the centuries has left its imprint on *all* forms of landownership in the country, on the peasant allotments as well as upon the holdings of the settlers in the relatively free borderlands: the whole colonisation policy of the autocracy is permeated with the Asiatic interference of a hide-

bound bureaucracy, which hindered the settlers from establishing themselves freely, introduced terrible confusion into the new agrarian relationships, and infected the border regions with the poison of the feudal bureaucracy of central Russia.* Not only is landlordism in Russia medieval, but so also is the peasant allotment system. The latter is incredibly complicated. It splits the peasantry up into thousands of small units, medieval groups, social categories. It reflects the age-old history of arrogant interference in the peasants' agrarian relationships both by the central government and the local authorities. It drives the peasants, as into a ghetto, into petty medieval associations of a fiscal, tax-levying nature, into associations for the ownership of allotment land, i.e., into the village communes. And Russia's economic development is *in actual fact* tearing the peasantry out of this medieval environment—on the one hand, by causing allotments to be rented out and abandoned, and, on the other hand, by creating a system of farming by the free farmers of the future (or by the future *Grossbauern* of a Junker Russia) *out of the fragments* of the most diverse forms of landownership: privately owned allotments, rented allotments, purchased property, land rented from the landlord, land rented from the state, and so on.

In order to establish *really* free farming in Russia, it is necessary to "unfence" *all* the land, landlord as well as allotment land. The *whole* system of medieval landownership must be broken up and all lands must be made equal for free farmers upon a free soil. The greatest possible facilities must he created for the exchange of holdings, for the free choice of settlements, for rounding off holdings, for the creation of new, free associations, instead of the rusty, tax-levying village communes. The whole land must be "cleared" of all medieval lumber.

The expression of this economic necessity is the nationalisation of the land, the abolition of private ownership of the land, and the transfer of *all* the land to the state,

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* Mr. A. Kaufman, in his *Migration and Colonisation* (St. Petersburg, 1905), gives an outline of the history of Russian colonisation policy. Like a good "liberal", he is excessively deferent to the feudal landlord bureaucracy.

which will mark a complete break with the feudal relations in the countryside. It is this economic necessity that has turned the *mass* of Russian peasants into supporters of land nationalisation. The mass of small owner cultivators declared in favour of nationalisation at the congresses of the Peasant Union in 1905, in the First Duma in 1906, and in the Second Duma in 1907, i.e., during the whole of the first period of the revolution. They did so not because the "village commune" had imbued them with certain special "rudiments", certain special, non-bourgeois "labour principles". On the contrary, they did so because life required of them that they should seek *emancipation* from the medieval village commune and from the medieval allotment system. They did so not because they wanted or were able to build a socialist agriculture, but because they have been wanting and have been able to build a really bourgeois small-scale farming, i.e., farming freed as much as possible from *all* the traditions of serfdom.

Thus, it was neither chance nor the influence of this or that doctrine (as some short-sighted people think) that determined this peculiar attitude towards private ownership of the land on the part of the classes that are fighting in the Russian revolution. This peculiar attitude is to be explained by the conditions of the development of capitalism in Russia and by the requirements of capitalism at this stage of its development. All the Black-Hundred landlords, all the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie (including the Octobrists *and the Cadets*) stand for private ownership of the land. The whole of the peasantry and the proletariat are opposed to the private ownership of the land. The reformative path of creating a Junker-bourgeois Russia presupposes the preservation of the foundations of the old system of landownership and their slow adaptation to capitalism, which would be painful for the mass of the population. The revolutionary path of really overthrowing the old order inevitably requires, as its economic basis, the destruction of all the old forms of landownership, together with all the old political institutions of Russia. The experience of the first period of the Russian revolution has conclusively proved that it can be victorious only as a peasant agrarian revolution, and that the latter cannot

completely fulfil its historical mission unless the land is nationalised.

Social-Democracy, as the party of the international proletariat, the party which has set itself world-wide socialist aims, cannot, of course, identify itself with any epoch of any bourgeois revolution, nor can it tie its destiny to this or that outcome of this or that bourgeois revolution. Whatever the outcome, we must remain an independent, purely proletarian party, which steadfastly leads the working masses to their great socialist goal. We cannot, therefore, undertake to guarantee that any of the gains of the bourgeois revolution will be permanent, because impermanence and inherent contradiction are immanent features of *all* the gains of the bourgeois revolution as such. The "invention" of "guarantees against restoration" can only be the fruit of shallow thinking. We have but one task: to rally the proletariat for the socialist revolution, to support every fight against the old order in the most resolute way, to fight for the best possible conditions for the proletariat in the developing bourgeois society. From this it inevitably follows that our Social-Democratic programme in the Russian bourgeois revolution can *only* be nationalisation of the land. Like every other *part* of our programme, we must connect it with definite forms and a definite stage of political reform, because the scope of the political revolution and that of the agrarian revolution cannot but be the same. Like every other part of our programme, we must keep it strictly free from petty-bourgeois illusions, from intellectualist-bureaucratic chatter about "norms", from reactionary talk about strengthening the village communes, or about equalised land tenure. The interests of the proletariat do not demand that a special slogan, a special "plan" or "system" shall be invented for this or that bourgeois revolution, they only demand that the objective conditions for this revolution shall be *consistently* expressed and that these objective, economically unavoidable conditions be stripped of illusions and utopias. Nationalisation of the land is not only the sole means for completely eliminating medievalism in agriculture, but also the best form of agrarian relationships conceivable under capitalism.

Three circumstances have temporarily deflected the

Russian Social-Democrats from this correct agrarian programme. First, P. Maslov, the initiator of "municipalisation" in Russia, "revised" the theory of Marx, repudiated the theory of absolute rent, and revived the semi-decayed bourgeois doctrines about the law of diminishing returns, its connection with the theory of rent, etc. To repudiate absolute rent is to deny that private landownership has any economic significance under capitalism, and, consequently, this inevitably led to the distortion of Marxist views on nationalisation. Secondly, not having before them visible evidence that the peasant revolution had *begun*, Russian Social-Democrats could not but regard its possibility with caution, because the possible victory of the revolution requires a number of especially favourable conditions and an especially favourable development of revolutionary consciousness, energy, and initiative on the part of the masses. Having no *experience* to go on, and holding that it is impossible to invent *bourgeois* movements, the Russian Marxists naturally could not, *before the revolution*, present a correct agrarian programme. But even *after* the revolution had begun, they committed the following mistake: instead of *applying* the theory of Marx to the special conditions prevailing in Russia (Marx and Engels always taught that their theory was not a dogma, but a *guide to action*), they uncritically repeated the conclusions drawn from the application of Marx's theory to foreign conditions, to a *different* epoch. The German Social-Democrats, for instance, have quite naturally abandoned all the old programmes of Marx containing the demand for the nationalisation of the land, because Germany has taken final shape as a Junker-bourgeois country, and all movements there based on the bourgeois order have become completely obsolete, and there is not, nor can there be, any people's movement for nationalisation. The preponderance of Junker-bourgeois elements has *actually transformed* the plans for nationalisation into a plaything, or even into an instrument of the Junkers for robbing the masses. The Germans are right in refusing even to talk about nationalisation. But to apply this conclusion to Russia (as is done in effect by those of our Mensheviks who do not see the connection between municipalisation and Maslov's revision of the theory of

Marx) is to reveal an inability to think of the tasks each Social-Democratic party has to perform in special periods of its historical development.

Thirdly, the municipalisation programme obviously reflects the erroneous tactical line of Menshevism in the Russian bourgeois revolution, namely, a failure to understand that only "an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry"* can ensure the victory of this revolution, a failure to understand the leading role the proletariat plays in the bourgeois revolution, a striving to push the proletariat aside, to adapt it to a half-way outcome of the revolution, to convert it from a leader into an auxiliary (actually into a drudge and servant) of the liberal bourgeoisie. "Never enthusing, adaptation using, forward then slowly, ye workers so lowly"—these words of Nartsis Tuporylov[144] against the "Economists" (=the first opportunists in the R.S.D.L.P.), fully express the *spirit* of our present agrarian programme.

Combating the "enthusiasm" of petty-bourgeois socialism should lead not to the contraction, but to the expansion of the scope of the revolution and its aims as determined by the proletariat. It is not "regionalism" that we should encourage, no matter how strong it may be among the backward strata of the petty bourgeoisie or the privileged peasantry (Cossacks), not the exclusiveness of various nationalities—no, we should make the peasantry see how important unity is if victory is to be achieved, we should advance slogans that will widen the movement, not narrow it, and that will place the responsibility for the *incomplete* bourgeois revolution on the backwardness of the bourgeoisie and not on the lack of understanding of the proletariat. We should not "adapt" our programme to "local" democracy; we should not invent a rural "municipal socialism", which is absurd and impossible under an undemocratic central government, we should not adjust petty-bourgeois socialist reformism to the bourgeois revolution, but concentrate the attention of the masses on the actual conditions for the victory of the revolution as a bourgeois revolution, on the

* That is how Kautsky expressed it in the *second* edition of his pamphlet *Social Revolution*.



The last page of Lenin's manuscript
The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907.
November-December 1907
Reduced

need for achieving not only local, but "central" democracy, i.e., the democratisation of the central government of the state—and not merely democracy in general, but the absolutely fullest, highest forms of democracy, for otherwise the peasant agrarian revolution in Russia will become *utopian* in the scientific sense of the term.

And let it not be thought that at the present moment of history, when the Black-Hundred die-hards are howling and raging in the Third Duma, when the *nec plus ultra* of rampant counter-revolution has been reached and reaction is perpetrating savage acts of political vengeance upon the revolutionaries in general and the Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma in particular—let it not be thought that this moment is "unsuitable" for "broad" agrarian programmes. Such a thought would be akin to the backsliding, despondency, disintegration, and decadence which have spread among wide sections of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals who belong to the Social-Democratic Party, or sympathise with this Party in Russia. The proletariat can only gain by having this rubbish swept clean out of the ranks of the workers' party. Yes, the more savagely reaction rages, the more does it actually retard the inevitable economic development, the more successfully does it prepare the wider upsurge of the democratic movement. And we must take advantage of the temporary lulls in mass action in order critically to study the experience of the great revolution, verify this experience, purge it of dross, and pass it on to the masses as a guide for the impending struggle.

November-December 1907

POSTSCRIPT[145]

The present work was written at the end of 1907. It was printed in St. Petersburg in 1908, but was seized and destroyed by the tsarist censor. Only one copy was saved, but the end of it was missing (after page 269 of that edition). This has now been added.

At the present time the revolution poses the agrarian question in Russia in an immeasurably broader, deeper, and sharper form than it did in 1905-07. Knowledge of the history of our Party programme in the first revolution will, I hope, contribute to a more correct understanding of the aims of the present revolution.

It is particularly necessary to emphasise the following. The war has caused such untold calamities to the belligerent countries and has at the same time accelerated the development of capitalism to such a tremendous degree, converting monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism, that *neither* the proletariat *nor* the revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats *can* keep within the limits of capitalism.

Life has already overstepped those limits and has placed on the order of the day the regulation of production and distribution on a national scale, universal labour service, compulsory syndication (uniting in unions), etc.

Under these circumstances, the question of the nationalisation of the land must inevitably be presented in a new way in the agrarian programme, namely: nationalisation of the land is not only "the last word" of the bourgeois revolution, but also *a step towards socialism*. The calamities due to the war cannot be combated unless such steps are taken.

The proletariat, leading the poorest section of the peasantry, is compelled, on the one hand, to shift the weight of emphasis from the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies to the Soviets of Agricultural Workers' Deputies, and on the other hand, to demand the nationalisation of farm implements in the landlords' estates and also the conversion of those estates into model farms under the control of these latter Soviets.

I cannot, of course, deal with these extremely important questions in greater detail here; I must refer the readers who are interested in them to the current Bolshevik literature and to my pamphlets: *Letters on Tactics* and *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution* (*Draft of a Platform for the Proletarian Party*).

September 28, 1917 *The Author*

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THE DEBATE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE DUMA'S BUDGETARY POWERS[146]

The question of extending the budgetary powers of the Duma was debated at three sessions held on January 12 15, and 17. The Cadet Party brought in a Bill for that purpose signed by forty Duma members. Representatives of all the parties spoke on the subject and the Minister of Finance made two long speeches on behalf of the government. A representative of the Social-Democratic Labour Party also spoke. And the debate concluded with the *unanimous* (so says *Stolichnaya Pochta*[147] for January 18) adoption of the *Octobrists*' motion that the Bill for the extension of the Duma's budgetary powers be referred to committee "*without going into the extent of these changes*", i.e., the changes to the Rules of March 8, which considerably restricted the budgetary powers of the Duma.

How could such a strange thing happen? How could the Third Duma, a parliament of Black-Hundred die-hards, *unanimously* adopt a motion of the Octobrists, which virtually falls in with the government's wishes and was presented *after* the first speech of the Minister of Finance, who anticipated just such an outcome. In substance, the Cadets' Bill is unacceptable; on particular points—why not modify the law. So declared the Black-Hundred Minister. And the Octobrists worded their proposal accordingly, stressing the fact that they *did not go into the extent of those changes in the law*.

That the Octobrists saw eye to eye with the Black-Hundred Minister is not surprising. Nor, to anyone familiar with the nature of the Constitutional-Democratic Party,

was it surprising that the Cadets withdrew their wording (in which, of course, nothing was mentioned about their *not going into* the extent of the changes which they themselves had outlined!). But that the Social-Democrats could be a party to this kind of *unanimity* is incredible, and we should like to believe that *Stolichnaya Pochta* did not tell the truth, and that the Social-Democrats did not vote for the Octobrists' motion.

However, there is a more important issue here than the question whether the Social-Democrats voted for or against the Octobrists. And that is the question of the *mistake* undoubtedly committed by the Social-Democratic deputy Pokrovsky 2nd. It is to this mistake and to the real political significance of the debate of January 12, 15, and 17, that we wish to draw the attention of our readers.

The Russian Duma has no budgetary powers, for "*by law*" the rejection of a budget does not prevent it from being put into execution. That law, promulgated by the counter-revolutionary government after the defeat of the December uprising (February 20, 1906, the notorious "Fundamental Laws"), makes a *mockery* of popular representation at the hands of the Black Hundreds, the tsar, and landlords. And the "Rules" of March 8, 1906, further *emphasise* this mockery by imposing a multitude of petty restraints on an *examination* of the budget in the Duma and by even laying it down (Article 9) that "during the discussion of the draft state budget, items of revenue and expenditure which have been inserted in the draft on the basis of existing laws, civil lists, and schedules, as well as royal commands issued by way of supreme governance, cannot be excluded *or modified*". Is this not a mockery? Nothing that conforms to the laws, to the civil lists, to schedules, or simply to the royal *commands*, can be *modified*! Is it not ridiculous, after this, to talk about the budgetary powers of the Russian Duma?

The question now arises—what *were* the tasks of the bourgeois democrats, if they are really fighting for freedom, in the face of such a situation? What were the tasks of the workers' party?—in *this* article we are speaking only of the tasks of parliamentary struggle and of the parliamentary representatives of the respective parties.

Obviously, the question of the Duma's budgetary powers *had* to be raised in the Duma *in order to make quite clear* to both the Russian people and to Europe the Black-Hundred contemptuous attitude of tsarism and to show the *complete powerlessness* of the Duma. The immediate practical object of such clarification (not to mention the basic task of *every* democrat—that of revealing the truth to the people, making them see the light) was further determined by the question of the loan. The Black-Hundred government of the tsar could not have held out after December 1905, and could not hold out even now, without the *help of world capital of the international bourgeoisie* in the shape of loans. And the world bourgeoisie is giving billions in loans to an obviously bankrupt tsar, not only because it is lured, like all moneylenders, by the prospect of big profits, but because it realises its own vested interest in the victory of the old regime over the revolution in Russia, for it is the proletariat that is marching at the head of this revolution.

Thus, the *only* object of raising and debating this question in the Duma could be that of exposing the whole truth. Practical reform activity could *not*, at this time and in this situation, be the aim of a *democrat*, because, first, the impossibility of reforms on the basis of the existing Fundamental Laws of the Duma's budgetary powers is obvious, and secondly, it would be absurd, in a Duma composed of Black-Hundred die-hards and Moscow merchants, to propose that *its* powers, the powers of such a Duma, should be extended. The Russian Cadets (whom only ignoramuses or simpletons can regard as democrats) did not grasp this task, of course, in raising the issue, they *forthwith placed it* on a false basis—that of a *partial* reform. We do not, of course, deny the possibility and necessity of a democrat or a Social-Democrat sometimes raising the question of a partial reform. But in such a Duma as the Third Duma, at such a moment as the present, on such a question as budgetary powers, already hopelessly crippled by *inviolable* Fundamental Laws, this was absurd. The Cadets could raise the question as a matter of partial reform—we are willing to concede them even that—but democrats could not treat this question *in the way* that the Cadets have done.

They stressed the so-called *business* aspect of the matter, the *inconvenience* of the Rules of March 8, their disadvantage even to the government, and the story of the way various idiotic laws against the Duma were drafted in the idiotic government offices of Bulygin, Witte, and others of that gang. The *spirit* of the Cadets' presentation of the issue is most saliently conveyed in the following words of Mr. Shingaryov: "In the Bill we have introduced there are no encroachments [on the prerogatives of the monarch], no ulterior motives [!!] whatever. All it seeks to do is done *for the sake of convenience of the Duma's work*, for the sake of its dignity, for the sake of completing the work *we have been called upon to do*" (our italics; p. 1263 of the official Stenographic Record of the session of January 15, 1908).

Such a person *befogs* people's minds instead of enlightening them, because what he says is nonsense and a barefaced lie. We cannot alter this inescapable conclusion, even if this Mr. Shingaryov and his whole fraternity of Cadet politicians sincerely believed in the "value" of their "diplomacy". A democrat should reveal to the people the *gulf* that lies between the powers of parliament and the prerogatives of the monarch, and not deaden the public mind, not distort *the political struggle* by reducing it *to an office-routine correction* of the laws. In *thus* presenting the issue, the Cadets show *in fact* that they are rivals of the tsar's bureaucrats and the Octobrists, and not champions of freedom, not even freedom for the big bourgeoisie. Only bureaucrats vulgarly flirting with liberalism, and not representatives of *a parliamentary opposition*, can talk *like that*.

The speech by the representative of the Social-Democrats, Pokrovsky 2nd, we gladly acknowledge, reveals a quite *different* spirit, presenting the issue in a *fundamentally* different way. The Social-Democrat stated bluntly and clearly that he considered popular representation in the Third Duma *falsified* (we are quoting *Stolichnaya Pochta* for January 18, since the verbatim reports of this session are not yet available). He stressed not minor points, not the official derivation of the law, but the ruined and oppressed state of the masses, of the vast millions of the people. He rightly declared that "one cannot speak of the budgetary powers of the Duma without irony", that we were demanding not

only the right to recast the whole budget (Kokovtsev, a government official with a lucrative post, argued in the Duma mainly against Shingaryov and Adzhemov, government officials without lucrative posts, over the question whether "recasting" was permissible and to what *extent*), but to "remodel the whole financial system" and "reject the government's budget". He concluded with a no less correct and, for a member of the workers' party, obligatory demand for "full power of the people". On all these points Pokrovsky conscientiously and correctly upheld the Social-Democratic point of view.

But in doing so, he committed an unfortunate mistake—judging by newspaper reports, the *whole* Social-Democratic group committed that mistake in giving such instructions to its spokesman. Pokrovsky declared: "*We support the proposal of the 40 because it tends towards an extension of the budgetary powers of a popular representative assembly.*"

What was the object of this declaration of support for a proposal that was plainly lacking in principle, that was plainly inadequate, plainly signed by unprincipled people who were incapable of showing the slightest firmness—a proposal that was plainly and for all practical purposes worthless? This was not support for the militant bourgeoisie (a formula which many people like to use to justify their political spinelessness), but support for the *wavering* liberal-Octobrist bourgeoisie. That this was so, was proved immediately by the *facts*. The Cadets themselves proved it by *withdrawing* their proposal and *joining with* the Octobrists in the motion to have the Bill "referred to committee *without going into the extent of the changes in the law*" (!). For the hundredth and thousandth time "support" given to the Cadets led to those who supported them being deceived. For the hundredth and thousandth time the *facts* have revealed how shoddy and impermissible are the tactics of supporting liberal, Cadet proposals that follow *the line*, etc.*

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* The "Bezgolovy"[147a] newspaper *Stolichnaya Pochta*, through the mouth of a Mr. Saturin, announces that "the opposition, very sensibly [!] voted for it [for the Octobrist motion]. As a result the amendment [that is, the motion to abstain from determining the extent of the changes] was adopted unanimously" (January 18, p. 4, "From the As-

If the Cadets, instead of joining with the Octobrists, had *put to the vote* a declaration stating clearly and precisely that the Duma was powerless in financial matters, that popular representation was falsified, that the country had been ruined by the autocracy and a financial debacle was unavoidable, and that under such circumstances the democratic representatives would not give their support to any loans—that would have been an honest act on the part of the bourgeois democrats, an act of struggle and not an act of dull-witted flunkeyism. It would have been our duty to support such an act, while not forgetting to stipulate our own independent Social-Democratic objectives. Such an act would have contributed to the enlightenment of the people and the exposure of the autocracy.

The defeat of such a declaration in the Duma and the violent opposition such a proposal would have raised among the Black Hundreds would have been a historical service rendered by the democrats and probably a new phase in the struggle for freedom. But now the Cadets have once again *proved bankrupt*. Social-Democratic comrades in the Duma, protect the honour of the socialist workers' party! Do not allow yourselves to suffer failure by giving support to such liberalism!

One violent member of the Right in the Duma departed from the Octobrists' tactics, which aimed at glossing over differences and coaxing the Cadets into an agreement. The Black-Hundred Kovalenko bluntly declared in the Duma on January 12 that he was against introducing the Cadets' Bill in the Committee (p. 1192 of Stenographic Record). But apparently he voted, did this hero, with the Octobrists; he was brave only in words. He *admirably* illustrated the *real* state of affairs by referring in his speech to the following example as proof of the need for emergency measures: "Take, for instance, the insurrection in Moscow, the dispatch of punitive detachments. Could the government have had

sembly Hall"). Long live the unanimity between the Russian "Bezgolovy" liberals and the Octobrists and ministers of the Black-Hundred tsar!

time to follow the ordinary course?”... (p. 1193). It is a pity that Social-Democrats do not *catch* these sparks of truth that come from the Black Hundreds. You are right, deputy colleague—he should have been told. There is no place here for the ordinary course. Let us drop hypocrisy and admit that we are living through not “an ordinary course”, but *civil war*; that the government is not ruling, but fighting, that the state of things in Russia is one of barely restrained insurrection. That would be the truth, and it would do the people good to be reminded of it more often!

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 1,
February 1908

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POSTSCRIPT TO THE ARTICLE "THE DEBATE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE DUMA'S BUDGETARY POWERS"

At the present time the Duma has started discussing the budget. The bloc of reactionaries with the betrayers of the people's freedom forming the pseudo-opposition showed its face during the very first day of the debates. We find the same picture in the legal press—the *Novoye Vremya* people hail the unity of *all*, except the "Left fanatics" (read: the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks...). *Nasha Gazeta*[148] of the "Bezgolovy" fraternity goes into ecstasies. It was a "business" day that "made up" for "the drawback of having the budget scrutinised by separate estimates"....

The "opposition" trails in the wake of overt reaction. It is just here that responsibility and the honourable role of true representatives of the plundered people devolves upon the deputies of the working class and democracy. Unfortunately, the first budgetary speeches of our Duma comrades are very lame and deeply mistaken. In the next issue of *Proletary* we shall deal in detail with these mistakes and indicate what we believe to be the necessary line of action for Social-Democrats in the budgetary debates and voting.[149]

Proletary, No. 27,
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POLITICAL NOTES

The chauvinists are hard at work. Rumours are increasingly being spread that the Japanese are arming, that they have concentrated 600 battalions in Manchuria for an attack on Russia. Turkey is reported to be vigorously arming with the intention of declaring war on Russia in the spring of this year. It is said that a revolt is being prepared in the Caucasus with the object of seceding from Russia (all that is lacking is a clamour about the plans of the Poles!). Feeling, against Finland is being worked up by tales that she is arming. A bitter campaign is being conducted against Austria over the building of a railway in Bosnia. The attacks of the Russian press on Germany, which is alleged to be inciting Turkey against Russia, are becoming more violent. The campaign is being conducted not only in the Russian but also in the French press, whose bribery by the Russian Government was recently so opportunely mentioned in the Duma by a Social-Democrat.

The serious bourgeois press of the West declines to regard this campaign as a figment of the imagination of newspapermen or the speculation of sensation-mongers. Obviously, "ruling circles"—meaning the Black-Hundred tsarist government, or a secret court cabal like the notorious "Star Chamber"—have given a very definite cue; some systematic "line" is being pursued, some "new course" has been adopted. The foreign press traces a direct connection between this chauvinistic campaign and the fact that the doors of the Duma Committee of State Defence have been closed to all members of the Duma not belonging to that Committee, i.e., not only to the revolutionary parties but also to the Cadets; it is even said that the Russian Government, as a

crowning token of its contempt for "constitutionalism", intends to apply for credits for frontier military reinforcements not to the whole Duma, but only to the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Committee.

Here are some quotations from European newspapers, newspapers which are anything but socialist and which can not be suspected of optimism with regard to the Russian revolution:

"The German victories over France (in 1870), as Bismarck once remarked, fired the ambition of the Russian military, and they too reached out for martial laurels. For political, religious, and historical reasons, Turkey seemed a most suitable object for this purpose (the war with Turkey of 1877-78). Evidently, the same views are held today by certain Russian circles who have forgotten the lessons of the Japanese war and who do not understand the true needs of the country. As there are no more 'brothers' to be liberated in the Balkans, they have to devise other methods of influencing Russian public opinion. And these methods, to tell the truth, are even more clumsy than the others: it is being made out that Russia is surrounded by internal and external enemies.

"Russia's ruling circles seek to bolster up their position by the old methods of forcibly suppressing the internal movement for emancipation and diverting public attention from the deplorable internal situation by arousing nationalist sentiments and stirring up diplomatic conflicts, of which nobody knows what the outcome will be."

What is the significance of this new chauvinistic line in the policy of the counter-revolutionary autocracy? After Tsushima and Mukden, only people from under whose feet the ground is definitely slipping can embark on such a policy. Notwithstanding all the efforts that have been made, the experience of two years of reaction *has not created* any reliable support within the country for the Black-Hundred autocracy, nor any new class elements capable of rejuvenating the autocracy *economically*. And *without this* no atrocities, no frenzy of the counter-revolution can save the present political system in Russia.

Stolypin, the Black-Hundred landlords, and the Octobrists all understand that unless they create new class supports for themselves they cannot remain in power. Hence their policy of utterly ruining the peasants and forcibly breaking up the village communes in order to clear the way

for capitalism in agriculture *at all costs*. The Russian liberals, the most learned, the most educated, and the most "humane" of them—like the professors of *Russkiye Vedomosti*—prove to be incomparably more stupid in this respect than the Stolypins. "It would not be surprising," says the editorial in the February 1st issue of this newspaper, "if in deciding, for instance, the fate of the November provisional regulations, the formerly Slavophile advocates of the village commune support the attempt of the Ministry to destroy the village communes by assigning land to individual householders as their private property.... It may even be assumed that the defensive aims common to the conservative majority in the Duma and to the Ministry will suggest to both measures even more aggressive than the famous ukases of 1906.... We get an amazing picture: the conservative government, with the support of representatives of the conservative parties, are preparing to carry out a radical reform of agrarian relations—which are the least amenable to drastic changes—and are deciding upon so radical a measure from abstract considerations about the preferability of one form of ownership to another."

Wake up, mister professor! Shake off the archive dust of old-fashioned Narodism; look at what two years of revolution have done. Stolypin defeated you not only by physical force, but also because he correctly understood the most practical need of economic development, namely, the forcible break-up of the old form of landownership. The great "advance" which has already been irrevocably effected by the revolution consists in the fact that formerly the Black-Hundred autocracy *could* base itself on medieval forms of landownership, whereas now it is *compelled*, wholly and irrevocably compelled, to work for their destruction with feverish speed. For it has understood that *without the break-up* of the old agrarian order *there can be no escape* from the contradiction which most profoundly of all explains the Russian revolution, namely, the most backward system of landownership and the most ignorant peasantry on the one hand, and the most advanced industrial and finance capitalism on the other!

So you are for the Stolypin agrarian legislation? the Narodniks will ask us in horror.

Oh, no. Calm yourselves! We are unreservedly opposed to *all* the forms of the old landownership in Russia—both landlordism and peasant allotment ownership. We are unreservedly in favour of a forcible break-up of this rotten and decaying antiquity which is poisoning everything new. We are in favour of bourgeois *nationalisation* of the land, as the only consistent slogan of the bourgeois revolution, and as the only practical measure that will direct the spearhead of the historically necessary break-up against the landlords by contributing towards the emergence of free farmers from among the mass of the peasantry.

A feature of the Russian bourgeois revolution is that a revolutionary policy on the key issue of the revolution—the agrarian question—is being pursued by the Black Hundreds and by the peasants together with the workers. The liberal lawyers and professors, on the other hand, are advocating something that is absolutely lifeless, absurd, and utopian—namely, a reconciliation of the two antithetical and mutually exclusive methods of *breaking up* what is obsolescent; a reconciliation, moreover, which will mean no break-up at all. Either a victory for the peasant revolt and the complete break-up of the old landowning system in favour of a peasantry that has been remoulded by the revolution—in other words, confiscation of the landed estates and a republic; or a Stolypin break-up which also remoulds—in fact, remoulds and adapts the old landowning system to capitalist relationships—but wholly in the interests of the landlords and at the price of the utter ruin of the peasant masses, their forcible ejection from the countryside, the eviction, starvation, and the extermination of the flower of the peasant youth with the help of jails, exile, shooting, and torture. For a minority to enforce such a policy against the majority would not be easy, but economically it is not impossible. We must help the people to realise this. But the attempt by means of a neat reform, peacefully and without violence, to escape from that utterly tangled skein of medieval contradictions, which has been created by centuries of Russian history, is the stupidest dream of hidebound "men in mufflers". Economic necessity will certainly call for, and will certainly bring about a most "drastic change" in Russia's agrarian system. The historical question is whether

it will be carried out by the landlords, led by the tsar and Stolypin, or by the peasant masses, led by the proletariat.

"Union of the opposition"—such is the topic of the day in the Russian political press. Stolypin's police-minded *Rossiya* is jubilant: "Union?—that means the Cadets too are revolutionaries! At the Cadets, at 'em!" The Cadet *Rech*, thoroughly imbued with the desire of the loyal government official to prove that the Constitutional-Democrats can be no less moderate than the Octobrists, primly purses its lips, pours forth a flood of "moral" indignation at the unscrupulous attempts to accuse it of being revolutionary, and declares: We, of course, would welcome the union of the opposition, but that union must be a movement "*from Left to Right*" (editorial of February 2). "We have had experience of political mistakes and disillusionments. When an opposition unites, it naturally unites on the minimum programme of the most moderate of the parties which form it."

This programme is perfectly clear: the hegemony of bourgeois liberalism—those are my terms, say the Cadets, just as Falloux in 1871 said to Thiers, when the latter appealed to him for support: The monarchy—those are my terms.

Stolichnaya Pochta realised that it is shameful, disgraceful to say such things outright, and it therefore "does not agree" with *Rech* and confines itself to vague hints at the "pre-October mood" (the accursed censorship prevents a clearly stated political programme!) and, in substance, calls for a deal. *Rech*, it as much as says, wants to lead, and the revolutionaries want to lead (the new union), but what about me—am I not entitled to a commission for acting as an honest broker?

"Union"—we warmly sympathise with that slogan, especially when there is a hint—although only a hint!—of "pre-October moods". Only, history does not repeat itself, my dear political intriguers! And no power on earth can erase from the minds of the various classes the lessons that were taught by the "history of the three years". Those lessons are exceedingly rich both in positive content (the forms, nature, and conditions of the victory of the *mass* struggle of the workers and peasants in 1905) and in negative content

(the failure of the two Dumas, in other words, the shattering of constitutional illusions and of Cadet hegemony).

Anyone who wants systematically to study, ponder over, understand, and teach the masses *these* lessons is welcome to do so—we are wholly in favour of "union", union for a relentless struggle against the renegades of the revolution. You don't like that? Well, then our paths diverge.

The old "pre-October" slogan ("constituent assembly") is a good one and (we hope that this will not rouse the ire of M-d-m of the *Our Thought* symposium[150]) we shall not discard it. But it is inadequate. It is too formal. It contains no recognition of the acute practical issues that life is raising. We shall reinforce it with the great lesson of the three great years. Our "minimum programme", "our programme of union", is simple and clear: (1) confiscation of all landlords' estates; (2) a republic. The *kind* of constituent assembly we need is one that can achieve this.

The history of the two Dumas, the Cadet Dumas, showed with striking clarity that the real struggle of social forces—the struggle which was not always a conscious one, which did not always break into the open, but which always exercised a decisive influence upon every big political issue and which always swept away like dust the conjuring tricks of the naïve and knavishly astute "constitutionalist" ignoramuses—was waged wholly and completely for the sake of the two above-mentioned "objects". Not abstract theories, but the real experience of the struggle of our popular masses under the real conditions of Russia's landlord autocracy, has demonstrated to us in practice the inevitability of precisely these slogans. To those who are capable of grasping them we propose that we "march separately" but "strike together", strike at the enemy who is devastating Russia and killing off thousands of her finest people.

"With such a programme of union you will remain isolated." That is not true.

Read the speeches of the non-party peasants in the first two Dumas, and you will see that our programme of union only formulates their wishes, their needs, and the elementarily necessary conclusions to be drawn from these needs. Against those who do not understand these needs—from the Cadets to Peshekhonov (he too has preached "union" in

Moscow, as we are informed from there)—we shall wage war in the name of "union".

It will be a stubborn war. We knew how to work during the long years preceding the revolution. Not for nothing do they say we are as hard as rock. The Social-Democrats have built a proletarian party which will not be disheartened by the failure of the first armed onslaught, will not lose its head, nor be carried away by adventures. That party is marching to socialism, without tying itself or its future to the outcome of any particular period of bourgeois revolutions. That is precisely why it is also free of the weaker aspects of bourgeois revolution. And this proletarian party is marching to victory.

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STATEMENT OF THE EDITORS OF *PROLETARY*

In *Neue Zeit*, No. 20, in the foreword by an unknown translator of A. Bogdanov's article on Ernst Mach, we read the following: "Russian Social-Democracy, unfortunately, reveals a strong tendency to making this or that attitude towards Mach a question of factional division within the party. Grave tactical differences of opinion between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks are aggravated by a controversy on a question, which, in our opinion, has no bearing whatever on these differences, namely, whether Marxism, from the point of view of theory, is compatible with the teaching of Spinoza and Holbach, or of Mach and Avenarius."

In this connection the Editorial Board of *Proletary*, as the ideological spokesman of the Bolshevik trend, deems it necessary to state the following. Actually, this philosophical controversy is not a factional one and, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, should not be so; any attempt to represent these differences of opinion as factional is radically erroneous. Both factions contain adherents of the two philosophical trends.

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A LETTER TO A. M. GORKY

25.II.1908

Dear A. M.,

I did not answer your letter immediately because, strange as it may seem at first glance, we had quite a serious fight on the editorial board with Al. Al.[151] over your article, or rather in a certain connection with it. Ahem, ahem... I spoke *not in that place* and not on that subject which you thought!

It happened like this.

The book, *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*,[152] has considerably sharpened the old differences among the Bolsheviks on questions of philosophy. I do not consider myself sufficiently competent on these questions to rush into print. But I have always followed our *Party* debates on philosophy very closely, beginning with Plekhanov's struggle against Mikhailovsky and Co. in the late eighties and up to 1895, then his struggle against the Kantians from 1898 onwards (here I not only followed it, but participated in it to some extent, as a member of the *Zarya* editorial board since 1900), and, finally, his struggle against the empirio-critics and Co.

I have been following Bogdanov's writings on philosophy since his energeticist book, *The Historical View of Nature*, which I studied during my stay in Siberia. For Bogdanov, this position was merely a transition to other philosophical views. I became personally acquainted with him in 1904, when we immediately gave each other presents—I, my *Steps*,[153] he, one of his *current* philosophical works.[154] And I at once (in the spring or the early summer of 1904) wrote to him in Paris from Geneva that his writings strongly convinced

me that his views were wrong and as strongly convinced me that those of Plekhanov were correct.

When we worked together, Plekhanov and I often discussed Bogdanov. Plekhanov explained the fallacy of Bogdanov's views to me, but he did not think the deviation a terribly serious one. I remember perfectly well that in the summer of 1903 Plekhanov and I, as representatives of the *Zarya* editorial board, had a conversation in Geneva with a delegate from the editors of the symposium *Outlines of a Realistic World Outlook*,[155] at which we *agreed* to contribute—I, on the agrarian question, Plekhanov *on anti-Machist philosophy*. Plekhanov made it *a condition* of his collaboration that he would write against Mach, a condition that the symposium delegate readily accepted. Plekhanov at that time regarded Bogdanov as an ally in the fight against revisionism, but an ally who erred in following Ostwald and, later on, Mach.

In the summer and autumn of 1904, Bogdanov and I reached a complete agreement, as *Bolsheviks*, and formed the tacit bloc, which tacitly ruled out philosophy as a neutral field, that existed all through the revolution and enabled us in that revolution to carry out together the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy (=Bolshevism), which, I am profoundly convinced, were the only correct tactics.

There was little opportunity to engage in philosophy in the heat of the revolution. Bogdanov wrote another piece in prison at the beginning of 1906—the third issue of *Empirio-monism*, I believe. He presented it to me in the summer of 1906, and I sat down to study it. After reading it I was furious. It became clearer to me than ever that he was on an absolutely wrong track, not the Marxist track. I thereupon wrote him a "declaration of love", a letter on philosophy taking up three notebooks. I explained to him that I was just *an ordinary Marxist* in philosophy, but that it was precisely his lucid, popular, and splendidly written works that had finally convinced me that he was essentially wrong and that Plekhanov was right. I showed these notebooks to some friends (including Lunacharsky) and thought of publishing them under the title "Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy", but I never got round to it. I am sorry now that I did not have them published at the moment.

I wrote to St. Petersburg the other day to have these notebooks hunted out and forwarded to me.[156]

Now the *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* have appeared. I have read all the articles except Suvorov's (I am reading it now), and every article made me furiously indignant. No, no, this is not Marxism! Our empirio-critics, empirio-monists, and empirio-symbolists are floundering in a bog. To try to persuade the reader that "belief" in the reality of the external world is "mysticism" (Bazarov); to confuse in the most disgraceful manner materialism with Kantianism (Bazarov and Bogdanov); to preach a variety of agnosticism (empirio-criticism) and idealism (empirio-monism); to teach the workers "religious atheism" and "worship" of the higher human potentialities (Lunacharsky); to declare Engels's teaching on dialectics to be mysticism (Berman); to draw from the stinking well of some French "positivists" or other, of agnostics or metaphysicians, the devil take them, with their "symbolic theory of cognition" (Yushkevich)! No, really, it's too much. To be sure, we ordinary Marxists are not well up in philosophy, but why insult us by serving this stuff up to us as the philosophy of Marxism! I would rather let myself be drawn and quartered than consent to collaborate in an organ or body that preaches such things.

I felt a renewed interest in my "Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy" and I began to write them,[157] but to Al. Al., in the process of reading the *Studies*, I gave my impressions bluntly and sharply, of course.

But what has your article got to do with it, you will ask? It has this to do with it: just at a time when these differences of opinion among the Bolsheviks threaten to become particularly acute, you are obviously beginning to expound the views of one trend in your article for *Proletary*. I do not know, of course, what you would have made of it, taken as a whole. Besides, I believe that an artist can glean much that is useful to him from philosophy of all kinds. Finally, I absolutely agree with the view that in matters that concern the art of writing you are the best judge, and that in deriving *this* kind of views both from your artistic experience *and from philosophy*, *even if idealistic philosophy*, you can arrive at conclusions that will be of tremendous benefit to the workers' party. All that is true; nevertheless *Proletary*

PROLETARIAN ROMANS NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION



The first page of V. I. Lenin's
letter to A. M. Gorky dated February 25, 1908
Reduced

The first page of V. I. Lenin's letter to A. M. Gorky date February 26, 1908 Reduced

must remain absolutely neutral towards all our divergencies in philosophy and not give the reader *the slightest grounds* for associating the Bolsheviks, as a trend, as a tactical line of the revolutionary wing of the Russian Social-Democrats, with empirio-criticism or empirio-monism.

When, after reading and re-reading your article, I told A. A. that I was against its publication, he grew as black as a thundercloud. The threat of a split was in the air. Yesterday our editorial trio held a special meeting to discuss the matter. A stupid trick on the part of *Neue Zeit* came unexpectedly to our rescue. In its issue No. 20, an unknown translator published Bogdanov's article on Mach, and blurted out in a foreword that the differences between Plekhanov and Bogdanov had a tendency, among Russian Social-Democracy, to become a *factional* disagreement between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The fool, whether man or woman, who wrote this foreword succeeded in uniting us. We agreed at once that an announcement of our neutrality was now essential in the very next issue of *Proletary*. This was perfectly in keeping with my own frame of mind after the appearance of the *Studies*. A statement was drawn up, unanimously endorsed, and tomorrow it will appear in issue No. 21 of *Proletary*, which will be forwarded to you.*

As regards your article, it was decided to postpone the matter, explain the situation to you in letters from each of *Proletary*'s three editors, and hasten my and Bogdanov's trip to see you.

And so you will be receiving a letter also from Al. Al. and from the third editor,[158] about whom I wrote you previously.

I consider it necessary to give you my opinion quite frankly. Some sort of fight among the Bolsheviks on the question of philosophy I regard now as quite unavoidable. It would be stupid, however, to split on this. We formed a bloc in order to secure the adoption of definite tactics in the workers' party. We have been pursuing these tactics up to now *without disagreement* (the only difference of opinion was on the boycott of the Third Duma, but that, first, was never so sharp among us as to lead to even a hint of a split, and,

* See p. 447 of this volume.—*Ed.*

secondly, it never corresponded to the disagreement between the materialists and the Machists, for the Machist Bazarov, for example, was with me in opposing the boycott and wrote a long article on this in *Proletary*).

To hinder the application of the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the workers' party for the sake of disputes on the question of materialism or Machism, would be, in my opinion, unpardonable folly. We ought to fight over philosophy in such a way that *Proletary* and the Bolsheviks, as a faction of the *party*, *would not be affected by it*. And that is quite possible.

And you, I think, ought to help in this. You can help by contributing to *Proletary* on neutral questions (that is, unconnected with philosophy) of literary criticism, publicism, belles lettres, and so on. As for your article, if you wish to prevent a split and help to localise the new fight—you should rewrite it, and everything that even indirectly bears on Bogdanov's philosophy should be placed somewhere else. You have other mediums, thank God, besides *Proletary*. Everything that is not connected with Bogdanov's philosophy—and the *bulk* of your article is not connected with it—you could set out in a series of articles for *Proletary*. Any other attitude on your part, that is, a refusal to rewrite the article or to collaborate with *Proletary* would, in my opinion, unavoidably tend to aggravate the conflict among the Bolsheviks, make it difficult to localise the new fight, and weaken the vital cause, so essential practically and politically, of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Russia.

That is my opinion. I have told you all my thoughts and am now looking forward to your reply.

We intended to go to you today, but find that we have to postpone our visit for not less than a week, perhaps two or three weeks.

With very best regards,
Yours, *N. Lenin*

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THE NEW AGRARIAN POLICY

On Wednesday, February 13, Nicholas II received 307 deputies of the Third Duma. The tsar's amiable conversation with the Black-Hundred reactionaries Bobrinsky and Chelyshev was a comic aspect of the new ceremonial kiss of the autocracy and its gang of allies. Far more serious was the statement by Nicholas that the Duma was shortly to pass new agrarian laws, and that all thought of compulsory alienation must be dismissed, since he, Nicholas II, would never sanction such a law. "The tsar's speech," reports the correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "had a depressing effect on the peasants."

To be sure, the agitational value of this "agrarian statement" made by the tsar himself is very important, and we can but congratulate the talented agitator. But, apart from its agitational significance, this ominous thrust at compulsory alienation is highly important as conclusive proof that the landlord monarchy has embarked on a new agrarian policy.

The famous extra-Duma ukases under Article 87 of November 9, 1906, and successive dates, ushered in the era of this new agrarian policy of the tsarist government. Stolypin confirmed it in the Second Duma; the Right and the Octobrist deputies approved it; the Cadets (frightened by rumours picked up in lobbies of the camarilla that the Duma was going to be dissolved) refrained from denouncing it openly. Now, in the Third Duma, the Land Committee has recently accepted the basic thesis of the law of November 9, 1906, and has gone a step further by recognising the proprie-

tary rights of the peasants to their holdings in all village communes which had not carried out any reallotment in the course of twenty-four years. At the reception given on February 13, the head of feudal-landlord Russia gave his public blessing to that policy with the added threat, obviously for the benefit of the non-party peasants, that he would sanction no law for compulsory alienation in favour of the peasantry.

The fact that the government of the tsar, of the landlords, and of the big bourgeoisie (the Octobrists) has definitely given its support to the new agrarian policy is of tremendous historical importance. The destinies of the bourgeois revolution in Russia—not only the present revolution, but possible future democratic revolutions as well—depend *most of all* on the success or failure of this policy.

Wherein lies the essence of this change? It lies in the fact that up to now the sanctity of the old, medieval allotment landownership by the peasants and their "primordial" village communes had its most ardent supporters in the master classes of reactionary Russia. The serf-owning landlords, being the ruling class in pre-Reform Russia, the politically predominating class throughout the nineteenth century, pursued, by and large, a policy of *preserving* the old communal system of peasant landownership.

The development of capitalism completely undermined this system by the twentieth century. The old village commune with its social estate basis, the attachment of the peasant to the soil, the routinism of the semi-feudal countryside came into the sharpest conflict with the new economic conditions. The dialectics of history were such that the peasantry, who in other countries with a more or less well-ordered (from the point of view of the requirements of capitalism) agrarian system are a pillar of the regime, came forward in Russia during the revolution with the most destructive demands, including the confiscation of the landlords' estates and the nationalisation of the land (the Trudoviks in the First and Second Dumas).

These radical demands, which were even tinctured with the ideas of petty-bourgeois socialism, were by no means the result of muzhik "socialism", but were due to the economic necessity of cutting the tangled knot of feudal land

ownership, of clearing the way for the free farmer (the agricultural entrepreneur) on land freed from all medieval partitions.*

Capitalism has already irrevocably sapped all the foundations of the old agrarian system in Russia. It can make no further progress unless it breaks up that system, and it certainly and inevitably will break it up; no power on earth can prevent this. But this system can be broken up in the landlord way or the peasant way, to clear the path for landlord or peasant capitalism. The landlord way of breaking up the old order involves the forcible destruction of the village commune and the accelerated ruination and extermination of the mass of impoverished owners for the benefit of a handful of kulaks. The peasant way involves the confiscation of the landlords' land, and the transfer of all the land to free proprietors from among the peasantry (the Narodniks' "equal right to the land" means, in effect, the *farmers*' right to the land with the destruction of all medieval partitions).

The government of the counter-revolution understood this position. Stolypin had a correct grasp of the matter: unless the old system of landownership was broken up Russia could not develop economically. Stolypin and the landlords boldly took the revolutionary path, ruthlessly breaking up the old order, handing over the peasant masses as a whole to the mercy of the landlords and kulaks.

The liberals and petty-bourgeois democrats, beginning with the semi-Octobrist "Meons"[160] followed by the *Russkiye Vedomosti* people, and ending with Mr. Peshekhonov of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, are now raising a big outcry about the destruction of the village communes by the government, which they *accuse* of revolutionism! Never has the betwixt and between position of the bourgeois liberals in the Russian revolution stood out so sharply. No, gentlemen, whining over the destruction of the ancient foundations will not mend matters. Three years of revolution have shattered illusions

* The views here set forth are closely bound up with the criticism of our Party programme. In issue No. 21 of *Proletary* this criticism was touched on as a private opinion; in subsequent issues the question will be dealt with in detail.[159]

of conciliation and compromise. The question is clear. Either a bold call for a peasant revolution, even including a republic, and the thorough ideological and organisational preparation of *such* a revolution in alliance with the proletariat. Or useless whining, political and ideological impotence in face of the Stolypin-landlord-Octobrist attack on the village commune.

Make your choice—those who still have left in them a particle of civic courage and sympathy for the peasant masses! The proletariat has already made its choice, and the Social-Democratic Labour Party, now more firmly than ever before, will explain, propagate, spread among the masses the slogan of a peasant uprising in alliance with the proletariat as the *only* possible means of thwarting the Stolypin method of "renovating" Russia.

We will not say that this method is impracticable—it has been tested more than once in Europe on a smaller scale—but we shall make it clear to the people that it can be realised only by endless acts of violence of the minority over the majority in the course of decades and by the mass extermination of the progressive peasantry. We shall not devote ourselves to patching up Stolypin's revolutionary projects, or attempting to improve them, weaken their effect, and so on. We shall respond by intensifying our agitation among the masses, especially among those sections of the proletariat that have ties with the peasantry. The peasant deputies—even though sifted through a number of police sieves, even though elected by landlords, even though intimidated by the Duma die-hards—have quite recently shown what their true strivings are. A group of non-party peasants, some of them from the *Right wing*, have declared, as we know from the newspapers, for compulsory alienation of the land and for local land institutions elected *by the whole population*! No wonder one Cadet stated in the Land Committee that a Right-wing peasant was more Left than the Cadets. Yes, on the agrarian question the stand of the "Right" peasants in all three Dumas has been more Left than the Cadets', thereby proving that the monarchism of the muzhik is naïveté that is dying out, in contrast to the monarchism of the liberal businessmen, who are monarchists through class calculation.

The tsar of the feudal-minded gentry shouted at the non-party peasants that he would not stand for compulsory alienation. Let the working class in reply shout to the millions of "non-party" peasants that it calls them to the mass struggle for the overthrow of tsarism and for the confiscation of the landlords' lands.

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February 19 (March 3), 1908

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TRADE-UNION NEUTRALITY[161]

In the previous issue of *Proletary* we published the resolution of our Party Central Committee on trade unions.[162] In reporting the resolution, *Nash Vek*[163] added that it had been adopted unanimously in the C.C., as the Mensheviks voted for it in view of the concessions it contains compared with the original Bolshevik draft. If this report is true (the defunct *Nash Vek* was in general exceptionally well informed about everything relating to Menshevism), it only remains for us to heartily welcome the big step towards united Social-Democratic activity in such an important field as the trade unions. The concessions referred to by *Nash Vek* are quite insignificant, and do not in the least affect the basic principles of the Bolshevik draft (which, incidentally, was published in *Proletary*, No. 17, October 20, 1907, along with a lengthy article in support of it, entitled "The Trade Unions and the Social-Democratic Party").

Our whole Party, consequently, has now recognised that work in the trade unions must be conducted not in the spirit of trade-union neutrality but in the spirit of the closest possible relations between them and the Social-Democratic Party. It is also recognised that the partisanship of the trade unions must be achieved exclusively by S.D. work within the unions, that the S.D.'s must form solid Party units in the unions, and that illegal unions should be formed since legal ones are impossible.

There can be no doubt that Stuttgart has been strongly instrumental in bringing the two factions of our Party closer together on the question of the nature of our work in the trade unions. The Stuttgart Congress resolution, as Kautsky pointed out in his report to the Leipzig workers,

puts an end to recognising the principle of neutrality. The high degree to which class contradictions have developed, their aggravation latterly in all countries, the long experience of Germany (where the policy of neutrality strengthened opportunism in the trade unions without preventing the appearance of special Christian and Liberal unions), and the widening of that special area of proletarian struggle which requires joint and concerted action by both the unions and the political party (the mass strike and the armed uprising in the Russian revolution, as the prototype of likely forms of the proletarian revolution in the West)—all these things have cut the ground from under the neutrality theory.

Among the proletarian parties the question of neutrality is unlikely now to evoke any serious controversy. The case is different with the non-proletarian quasi-socialist parties like our Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are in fact the extreme Left wing of the revolutionary bourgeois party of intellectuals and progressive peasants.

It is highly characteristic that in our country the only people to defend the *idea* of neutrality after Stuttgart have been the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Plekhanov. And they have done so very unsuccessfully.

In the last issue of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party organ, *Znamya Truda* (No. 8, December 1907), we find two articles devoted to the trade-union movement. In those articles the S.R.'s attempt primarily to ridicule the statement of the Social-Democratic newspaper, *Vperyod*,[164] that the Stuttgart resolution settled the question of the Party's attitude to the trade unions along the same lines as the London resolution, namely, in the Bolshevik spirit. Our answer is that in the very same issue of *Znamya Truda* the S.R.'s themselves cited *facts* which prove such an assessment to be absolutely correct.

"It was at that time, too," writes *Znamya Truda*, referring to the autumn of 1905, "and it is a characteristic fact, that the three Russian socialist factions: the Menshevik Social-Democrats, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats, and the S.R.'s, first met face to face to state their views on the trade-union movement. The Moscow Bureau, which was instructed to select from its midst a central bureau for convening a congress (of trade unions), organised a big meeting of worker

trade-unionists at the Olympia Theatre.* The Mensheviks put forward a classically Marxist, strictly orthodox delimitation between the aim of the Party and that of the trade unions. 'The task of the S.D. Party is to establish the socialist system and abolish capitalist relations; the task of the trade unions is to improve working conditions within the framework of the capitalist system, so as to secure for labour advantageous conditions for the sale of its labour-power'; the conclusion drawn was that the trade unions are non-partisan, and that they embrace 'all workers of a given occupation'.**

"The Bolsheviks argued that at the present time there could not be a strict separation of politics from occupation, and hence drew the conclusion that 'there must be close unity between the Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions, which it must lead'. Finally, the S.R.'s demanded that the unions be strictly non-partisan, in order to avoid a split in the ranks of the proletariat, but rejected any narrowing down of the tasks and activities of the trade unions to a limited sphere, formulating this task as an all-out struggle against capital, and therefore as both an economic and a political struggle."

That is how *Znamya Truda* itself describes the *facts*! And only a person who is blind or totally incapable of thinking can deny that of these three viewpoints it is the one that speaks of close unity between the Social-Democratic Party and the unions that "is confirmed by the Stuttgart resolution, which recommends close ties between the Party and the trade unions".***

To confuse this perfectly clear issue, the S.R.'s in the most diverting manner, mixed up the independence of the

* The meeting was attended by about fifteen hundred people. See the report in *Bulleten Muzeya Sodeistviya Trudu*, No. 2, November 26, 1905 (quoted by *Znamya Truda*).

** It should be said, however, that the Mensheviks' idea of this "non-partisanship" was a rather peculiar one. Thus, their spokesman illustrated his points in the following way: "A correct answer to the question of partisanship has been given in the Moscow Printers' Union, which proposes that comrades join the S.D. Party as individuals." (Note by *Znamya Truda*.)

*** What the Mensheviks put forward in November 1905 was not orthodox but *vulgar* views on neutrality. Let the S.R. gentlemen remember that!

trade unions in the economic struggle with their non-party character. "The Stuttgart Congress," they write, "definitely stood also for the independence (the non-partisanship) of the unions, i.e., rejected the viewpoint of both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks." This conclusion is drawn from the following words in the Stuttgart resolution: "Each of the two organisations [the Party and the trade union] has its own sphere, determined by its nature, and within which it must act quite independently. At the same time, however, there is an ever expanding sphere," and so on, as quoted above. Yet we find wags who *mixed up* this demand for the "independence" of the trade unions in the "sphere determined by their nature" with the question of the non-partisanship of the unions or their close alignment with the Party in the political sphere and in dealing with the tasks of the socialist revolution!

In this way our S.R.'s completely suppressed the fundamental issue of the appraisal of the "neutrality" theory, a theory that in fact serves to strengthen the influence of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. In place of this fundamental issue, they preferred to speak only of the specifically Russian situation where there are several socialist parties, and did so in such a way as to throw a *false* light on what happened at Stuttgart. "One cannot argue that the Stuttgart resolution is hazy," writes *Znamya Truda*, "for Mr. Plekhanov removed all haziness and doubt when he addressed the International Congress as the Party's official representative; and so far no statement has been issued by the Central S.D. Committee that 'such a statement by Comrade Plekhanov disorganises the ranks of the united party...'."

Gentlemen of the S.R. Party! You are entitled, of course, to speak ironically about our C.C. having called Plekhanov to order. You are entitled to think that one can respect, say, a party which officially *does not condemn* Mr. Gershuni's pro-Cadet conduct. But why tell a plain untruth? Plekhanov *was not* the representative of the S.D. Party at the Stuttgart Congress, but only one of its 33 delegates. And what he represented was the views not of the S.D. Party but of the present Menshevik opposition to that Party and to its London decisions. The S.R.'s cannot but be aware of this, which means they are telling a *deliberate* untruth.

"...In the committee that examined the question of the relations between the trade unions and the political party, he [Plekhanov] literally said the following: 'There are 11 revolutionary organisations in Russia; with which of them should the trade unions align themselves?... Introducing political differences into the trade unions in Russia would be harmful'. In answer to this the members of the committee *all unanimously* declared that the Congress resolution must not be interpreted in that way, that they 'do not by any means oblige the trade unions and their members to join the S.D. Party', that they, as stated in the resolution, demand their 'complete independence'" (*Znamya Truda*'s italics).

You are mixing things up, gentlemen of *Znamya Truda*! In the committee a *Belgian* comrade asked whether it could be made obligatory for trade-union members to join the Social-Democratic Party, and *everyone* answered that it could not. Plekhanov, on the other hand, proposed an amendment to the resolution, saying: "Unity of the trade-union organisation, however, should not be lost sight of". This amendment was adopted, but not unanimously (Comrade Voinov, who represented the views of the R.S.D.L.P., voted for the amendment, and in our opinion was right in doing so). That was how matters stood.

Social-Democrats should never lose sight of unity of the trade-union organisation. That is quite right. But this applies also to the S.R.'s, whom we invite to ponder over this "unity of the trade-union organisation" when the latter announces its close ties with Social-Democracy! Nobody ever dreamt of "obliging" trade-union members to join the S.D. Party; fear made the S.R.'s imagine that. And to suggest that the Stuttgart Congress prohibited trade unions from declaring their close ties with the Social-Democratic Party or from establishing *such* ties in reality, in actual life, is a cock-and-bull story.

"The Russian S.D.'s," writes *Znamya Truda*, "are conducting a strenuous and unremitting campaign to win the trade unions and subordinate them to their Party leadership. The Bolsheviks are doing this frankly and openly ... the Mensheviks have chosen a more roundabout way..." Correct, gentlemen of the S.R. Party! For the sake of the prestige of the workers' International you are entitled to demand of us that we conduct this campaign in a tactful and restrained way, "not losing sight of the unity of the trade-union organisa-

tion". We readily admit this, and demand the same admission from you, but we shall not give up our campaign!

But then Plekhanov said that it was harmful to introduce political differences into the unions.... Yes, Plekhanov did say that stupid thing, and the S.R. gentlemen, naturally, were bound to pounce on it, as they always pounce on everything least worthy of imitation. However, we should not be guided by Plekhanov's words, but by the Congress resolution, which *cannot* be implemented without "introducing political differences". Here is a little example. The Congress resolution says that the trade unions should not be guided by "the theory of the harmony of interests between labour and capital". We Social-Democrats assert that the agrarian programme, which calls for equalised distribution of the land in a bourgeois society, is based on the theory of the harmony of interests between labour and capital.* We shall always declare our opposition to such a difference (or even a difference with monarchist-minded workers) being made the grounds for breaking the unity of a strike, etc., but we shall always "introduce this difference" into the workers' ranks in general, and into *all* workers' unions in particular.

Plekhanov's reference to eleven parties is just as foolish. First, Russia is not the only country where there are various socialist parties. Secondly, Russia has only two rival socialist parties of any importance—the S.D. and the S.R. parties, for it is quite ridiculous to lump together all the parties of the nationalities. Thirdly, the question of uniting the really socialist parties is quite a special one; by dragging it in Plekhanov confuses the issue. We must always and everywhere stand for the alignment of the unions with the socialist party of the working class, but the question as to which party in any given country, among any given nationality, is really socialist and really the party of the working class, is a special question, which is decided not by resolutions of international congresses, but by the outcome of the struggle between the national parties.

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* Even some S.R.'s realise this now, and have thus taken a definite step towards Marxism. See the very interesting new book by Firsov and Jacoby, which we shall soon discuss in detail with readers of *Proletary*.[165]

How erroneous Comrade Plekhanov's arguments on this subject are is shown in a most striking manner by his article in *Sovremenny Mir*,[166] No. 12, 1907. On page 55 Plekhanov quotes a statement by Lunacharsky that trade-union neutrality is supported by the German revisionists. Plekhanov answers this statement as follows: "The revisionists say that the unions must be neutral, but understand by this that the unions must be used to fight orthodox Marxism." And Plekhanov concludes: "The elimination of trade-union neutrality will not help matters at all. Even if we make the unions closely and formally dependent on the Party, and revisionist 'ideology' triumphs in the Party, the elimination of trade-union neutrality will merely be a fresh victory for 'the critics of Marx'."

This argument is a typical example of Plekhanov's usual method of dodging the issue and suppressing the essence of the dispute. If revisionist ideology really does triumph in the Party, then it will not be a socialist party of the working class. It is not at all a question of how the party takes shape, and what struggle and what splits occur in the process. It is a question of the fact that a socialist party and trade unions exist in every capitalist country, and it is our job to define the basic relations between them. The class interests of the bourgeoisie inevitably give rise to a striving to confine the unions to petty and narrow activity within the framework of the existing social order, to keep them away from any contact with socialism; and the neutrality theory is the ideological cover for these strivings of the bourgeoisie. In one way or another, the revisionists within the S.D. parties will always clear a way for themselves in capitalist society.

Of course, at the outset of the workers' political and trade-union movements in Europe it was possible to uphold trade-union neutrality as a means of widening the original field of proletarian struggle during the period when it was comparatively undeveloped and when the bourgeoisie exerted no systematic influence on the unions. At the present time it is quite indefensible, from the point of view of international Social-Democracy, to uphold trade-union neutrality. One can only smile when reading Plekhanov's assurances that "even today, Marx would be in favour of trade-union neutrality in Germany", especially when that kind of argu-

ment is based on a one-sided interpretation of a single "quotation" from Marx, while ignoring the sum and substance of Marx's statements and the whole spirit of his teachings.

"I stand for neutrality, understood in Bebel's and not the revisionist sense," writes Plekhanov. To talk like that means to swear by Bebel and still get stuck in the mud. Needless to say, Bebel is such a great authority in the international proletarian movement, such an experienced practical leader, a socialist so keenly alive to the requirements of the revolutionary struggle, that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred he climbed out of the mud himself when he happened to slip into it, and he dragged out those who were willing to follow his lead. Bebel was wrong when he joined Vollmar in defending the agrarian programme of the revisionists in Breslau (in 1895), when he insisted (in Essen) on making a distinction in principle between defensive and offensive wars, and when he was ready to elevate trade-union "neutrality" to the level of a principle. We readily believe that if Plekhanov gets stuck in the mud only in Bebel's company, it will not happen to him often or for long. But we still think that Bebel should not be imitated when Bebel is wrong.

It is said—and Plekhanov makes a special point of it—that neutrality is necessary in order to unite all the workers who are beginning to see the need for improving their material conditions. But those who say this forget that the present stage of development of class contradictions inevitably introduces "political differences" even into the question of how this improvement is to be secured within the bounds of contemporary society. The theory of the neutrality of the trade unions as opposed to the theory of the need for close ties between them and revolutionary Social-Democracy, inevitably leads to preference being given to methods of securing this improvement that involve a blunting of the proletarian class struggle. A striking example of this (which, incidentally, is connected with the appraisal of one of the most interesting episodes in the modern labour movement) is to be found in *the very same* issue of *Sovremenny Mir* in which Plekhanov advocates neutrality. Side by side with Plekhanov, we find here Mr. E. P., extolling Richard Bell, the well-known English railwaymen's leader, who ended a dispute between the workers and the railway company by a

compromise. Bell is described as the "soul of the whole railwaymen's movement". "There is not the slightest doubt," E. P. writes, "that thanks to his calm, well-considered, and consistent tactics, Bell has won the complete confidence of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the members of which are ready to follow his lead without hesitation" (*Sovremenny Mir*, No. 12, page 75). This point of view is not accidental, but is essentially connected with the neutrality theory, which puts in the forefront unity of the workers for the improvement of their conditions, and not unity for a struggle that could promote the cause of proletarian emancipation.

But this point of view is not at all in accord with the views of the British socialists, who would probably be very much surprised to learn that the eulogisers of Bell write, without objection being raised, in the same journal as prominent Mensheviks like Plekhanov, Iordansky, and Co.

Justice, the British Social-Democratic newspaper, in a leading article on November 16, commented as follows on Bell's agreement with the railway companies: "We cannot but agree with the almost universal trade-union condemnation which has been pronounced upon this so-called treaty of peace ... it absolutely destroys the very reason of existence of the union.... This preposterous agreement ... cannot be binding on the men, and the latter will do well to at once repudiate it." And in its next issue, that of November 23, Burnett, in an article entitled "Sold Again!", wrote the following about this agreement: "Three weeks ago the A.S.R.S. was one of the most powerful trade unions in the country; today it is reduced to the level of a mere benefit society.... All these changes have taken place not because the railwaymen have fought and lost, but because their leaders have deliberately or stupidly sold them to the railway bosses ere the fight began." And the editor added that a similar letter had been received from "a Midland Railway Company's wage-slave".

But perhaps this is the "ardour" of "too revolutionary" Social-Democrats? No. *The Labour Leader*, organ of the moderate Independent Labour Party, which does not even want to call itself socialist, in its issue of November 15 published a letter from a trade-unionist railwayman in which, replying to the praise lavished on Bell by the entire capitalist press (from the radical *Reynolds News* to the Conserva-

tive *Times*), he stated that the settlement made by Bell was the "most contemptible one that has ever occurred in the history of Trade Unionism", and described Richard Bell as the "Marshal Bazaine of the trade-union movement". In the same issue another railwayman demands that "Mr. Bell ... should be called upon to explain" the nefarious settlement by which "the railwaymen ... are condemned to seven years' penal servitude...". And the editor of this moderate organ, in a leading article of the same issue, describes the settlement as "the Sedan of the British Trade-Union movement". "Never has such an opportunity presented itself for a national manifestation of the power of organised labour." Among the workers there prevailed "unprecedented enthusiasm" and a desire to fight. The article concludes with a scathing comparison between the dire needs of the workers and the triumph of "Mr. Lloyd George [the Cabinet Minister who played the role of lackey to the capitalists] and Mr. Bell hastening to prepare banquets".

Only the extreme opportunists, the Fabians, members of a purely intellectualist organisation, *approved* the settlement; so that even *The New Age*, which sympathises with the Fabians, blushed for shame and was obliged to admit that while the Conservative bourgeois *Times* has published the Manifesto of the Fabian Society's Executive Committee in full, apart from these gentlemen "no socialist organisation, no trade union, and no prominent labour leader" (December 7th issue, p. 101) had declared in favour of the settlement.

Here you have a specimen of the application of the neutrality theory by Plekhanov's colleague, Mr. E. P. The question was one not of "political differences" but of improving the workers' conditions in existing society. The entire British bourgeoisie, the Fabians, and Mr. E. P. declared for "improvement" at the price of renouncing the struggle and submitting to the tender mercies of capital; all the socialists and trade-unionist workers were for a collective struggle of the workers. Will Plekhanov now continue to advocate "neutrality", instead of a close alignment of the trade unions with the socialist party?

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THE HAPPENING TO THE KING OF PORTUGAL

The bourgeois press, even of the most liberal and "democratic" trend, needs must point a Black-Hundred moral when discussing the assassination of the Portuguese adventurer.

Take, for example, the special correspondent of one of Europe's best bourgeois-democratic newspapers—the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. He begins his story with a semi-humorous account of the way the flock of correspondents, as if descending on their prey, made a rush for Lisbon as soon as the sensational news was received. "I shared a sleeping compartment with a well-known London journalist," writes this gentleman, "who began to boast of his experience. He had already been to Belgrade on the same errand and could consider himself 'a special correspondent for cases of regicide'."

Indeed, the happening to the king of Portugal is a truly "occupational accident" of kings.

Small wonder that we have professional correspondents specialising in the description of their Majesties' professional "misadventures" .

But however strong the element of cheap and vulgar sensationalism is with such correspondents, the truth has a way of asserting itself. "A merchant residing in the busiest shopping district" told the *Frankfurter Zeitung* correspondent the following: "As soon as I learned what had happened I hung out a mourning flag. But very soon customers and acquaintances started coming in and asking whether I had gone out of my mind and was determined to ruin my custom. Do you mean to say that no one has any feeling of compassion, I asked. My dear sir, you wouldn't believe what kind of answers I received! And so I removed the mourning flag."

Commenting on this, the liberal correspondent writes:

"A people as innately good-natured and friendly as the Portuguese are, must have gone through a harsh school to learn to hate so implacably even in the grave. And if this is true—as it undoubtedly is, and by keeping silent about it I would be distorting historical truth—if not only such mute demonstrations pronounce judgement on the crowned victim, if at every turn you hear words of abuse, even from 'law-abiding people', levelled at the victim of assassination, you naturally find yourself wanting to study the rare combination of circumstances which has made the psychology of a people so abnormal. For a people which does not concede to death its ancient and sacred right of atoning for all earthly sins, must be either morally degenerate already, or there must exist conditions engendering an unfathomable feeling of hatred, which clouds the clear eye of fair judgement."

O, liberal hypocrites! Why do you not brand as moral degenerates those French scholars and writers, who even to this day hate and virulently abuse not only the leading personalities of the 1871 Commune but even those of 1793? Not only the fighters of the proletarian revolution, but even those of the bourgeois revolution? Because the "democratic" lackeys of the *modern* bourgeoisie regard it as "normal" and "moral" that the people should "good-naturedly" endure every possible indignity, outrage, and atrocity at the hands of crowned adventurers.

Otherwise, continues the correspondent (i.e., otherwise than as a result of exceptional conditions), "one could not understand the fact that already today one monarchist newspaper speaks about innocent victims from among the people with almost greater sorrow than it does about the king, and we already see quite clearly how legends are beginning to form that will invest the assassins with a halo of glory. Whereas in almost all cases of assassination the political parties hasten to dissociate themselves from the assassins, the Portuguese Republicans are frankly proud of the fact that the 'martyrs and heroes of February 1st' came from their ranks...".

The bourgeois democrat, in his excessive zeal, goes to the length of being ready to describe as a "revolutionary legend" the respect which Portuguese citizens pay to the men who sacrificed themselves in order to remove a king who had made a mockery of the constitution!

The correspondent of another bourgeois newspaper, the Milan *Corriere della Sera*, reports the severe censorship imposed in Portugal after the assassination. Telegrams are not passed. Ministers and kings are not characterised by that "good nature" which appeals so strongly to the honest bourgeois in the case of the mass of the people! In war, as in war—rightly argue the Portuguese adventurers who have taken the place of the assassinated king. Communication has become almost as difficult as in war. Reports have to be sent by a roundabout route, first by post to Paris (perhaps to some private address), and thence transmitted to Milan "Not even in Russia," writes the correspondent on February 7, "during the most violent revolutionary periods, did the censorship clamp down so hard as it now does in Portugal."

"Some Republican newspapers," this correspondent reports on February 9 (New Style), "write today [the day of the king's funeral] in terms which I positively dare not repeat in a telegram." In a report dated February 8, which arrived after that of the 9th, the comment of the newspaper *Pays* on the funeral arrangements is quoted:

> "The mortal remains of two monarchs were borne past—the useless ashes of a wrecked monarchy, which had been sustained by treachery and privileges, and whose crimes have smirched two centuries of our history."

"This is a Republican newspaper, of course," the correspondent adds, "but is not the appearance of an article thus worded on the day of the king's funeral an eloquent fact?"

For our part, we will merely add that we regret one thing—that the Republican movement in Portugal did not settle accounts with all the adventurers in a sufficiently resolute and open manner. We regret that in the happening to the king of Portugal there is still clearly visible the element of conspiratorial, i.e., impotent, terror, one that essentially fails to achieve its purpose and falls short of that genuine popular, truly regenerative terror for which the Great French Revolution became famous. Possibly the republican movement in Portugal will mount still higher. The sympathy of the socialist proletariat will always be on the side of the Republicans against the monarchy. But what they have suc-

ceeded in doing so far in Portugal is only *to frighten* the monarchy by the assassination of two monarchs, but not *to destroy* it.

The socialists in all European parliaments have expressed, to the best of their ability, their sympathy with the Portuguese people and the Portuguese Republicans, their loathing for the ruling classes, whose spokesmen condemned the assassination of the adventurer and expressed their sympathy towards his successors. Some socialists openly declared their views in parliament, others walked out during the expressions of sympathy towards the "sufferer"—the monarchy. Vandervelde in the Belgian parliament chose a "middle" way—the worst way—by squeezing out of himself a phrase to the effect that he honoured "all the dead", meaning both the king and those who had killed him. We trust that Vandervelde will be a solitary exception among the socialists of the world.

Republican tradition has weakened considerably among the socialists of Europe. This is understandable and to some extent justifiable, inasmuch as the imminence of the *socialist* revolution diminishes the practical importance of the struggle for a bourgeois republic. Often, however, the slackening of republican propaganda signifies, not vigour in the striving for the complete victory of the proletariat, but a weak consciousness of the proletariat's revolutionary aims in general. Not without reason did Engels, in criticising the Erfurt Draft Programme in 1891, impress upon the German workers with the greatest possible emphasis the importance of the struggle for a republic, and the possibility of such a struggle becoming the order of the day in Germany as well.[167]

With us in Russia the struggle for a republic is a matter of immediate practical significance. Only the most contemptible petty-bourgeois opportunists like the Popular Socialists or the "S. D." Malishevsky (see *Proletary*, No. 7, in regard to him) could draw from the experience of the Russian revolution the conclusion that in Russia the struggle for the republic is relegated to the background. On the contrary, the experience of our revolution has proved that the struggle for the abolition of the monarchy is inseparably bound up in Russia with the peasants' struggle for the land,

with the whole people's struggle for freedom. The experience of our counter-revolution has shown that a struggle for freedom which does not affect the monarchy is no struggle at all, but petty-bourgeois cowardice and flabbiness or downright deception of the people by the careerists of bourgeois parliamentarism.

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LESSONS OF THE COMMUNE[168]

After the coup d'état, which marked the end of the revolution of 1848, France fell under the yoke of the Napoleonic regime for a period of 18 years. This regime brought upon the country not only economic ruin but national humiliation. In rising against the old regime the proletariat undertook two tasks—one of them national and the other of a class character—the liberation of France from the German invasion and the socialist emancipation of the workers from capitalism. This union of two tasks forms a unique feature of the Commune.

The bourgeoisie had formed a "government of national defence" and the proletariat had to fight for national independence under its leadership. Actually, it was a government of "national betrayal" which saw its mission in fighting the Paris proletariat. But the proletariat, blinded by patriotic illusions, did not perceive this. The patriotic idea had its origin in the Great Revolution of the eighteenth century; it swayed the minds of the socialists of the Commune; and Blanqui, for example, undoubtedly a revolutionary and an ardent supporter of socialism, could find no better title for his newspaper than the bourgeois cry: "*The country is in danger!*"

Combining contradictory tasks—patriotism and socialism—was the fatal mistake of the French socialists. In the Manifesto of the International, issued in September 1870, Marx had warned the French proletariat against being misled by a false national idea[169]; profound changes had taken place since the Great Revolution, class antagonisms had sharpened, and whereas at that time the struggle against the whole of European reaction united the entire revolution-

ary nation, now the proletariat could no longer combine its interests with the interests of other classes hostile to it; let the bourgeoisie bear the responsibility for the national humiliation—the task of the proletariat was to fight for the socialist emancipation of labour from the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

And indeed the true nature of bourgeois "patriotism" was not long in revealing itself. Having concluded an ignominious peace with the Prussians, the Versailles government proceeded to its immediate task—it launched an attack to wrest the arms that terrified it from the hands of the Paris proletariat. The workers replied by proclaiming the Commune and civil war.

Although the socialist proletariat was split up into numerous sects, the Commune was a splendid example of the unanimity with which the proletariat was able to accomplish the democratic tasks which the bourgeoisie could only proclaim. Without any particularly complex legislation, in a simple, straightforward manner, the proletariat, which had seized power, carried out the democratisation of the social system, abolished the bureaucracy, and made all official posts elective.

But two mistakes destroyed the fruits of the splendid victory. The proletariat stopped half-way: instead of setting about "expropriating the expropriators", it allowed itself to be led astray by dreams of establishing a higher justice in the country united by a common national task; such institutions as the banks, for example, were not taken over, and Proudhonist theories about a "just exchange", etc., still prevailed among the socialists. The second mistake was excessive magnanimity on the part of the proletariat: instead of destroying its enemies it sought to exert moral influence on them; it underestimated the significance of direct military operations in civil war, and instead of launching a resolute offensive against Versailles that would have crowned its victory in Paris, it tarried and gave the Versailles government time to gather the dark forces and prepare for the bloodsoaked week of May.

But despite all its mistakes the Commune was a superb example of the great proletarian movement of the nineteenth century. Marx set a high value on the historic significance

of the Commune—if, during the treacherous attempt by the Versailles gang to seize the arms of the Paris proletariat, the workers had allowed themselves to be disarmed without a fight, the disastrous effect of the demoralisation, that this weakness would have caused in the proletarian movement, would have been far, far greater than the losses suffered by the working class in the battle to defend its arms.[170] The sacrifices of the Commune, heavy as they were, are made up for by its significance for the general struggle of the proletariat: it stirred the socialist movement throughout Europe, it demonstrated the strength of civil war, it dispelled patriotic illusions, and destroyed the naïve belief in any efforts of the bourgeoisie for common national aims. The Commune taught the European proletariat to pose concretely the tasks of the socialist revolution.

The lesson learnt by the proletariat will not be forgotten. The working class will make use of it, as it has already done in Russia during the December uprising.

The period that preceded the Russian revolution and prepared it bears a certain resemblance to the period of the Napoleonic yoke in France. In Russia, too, the autocratic clique has brought upon the country economic ruin and national humiliation. But the outbreak of revolution was held back for a long time, since social development had not yet created the conditions for a mass movement and, notwithstanding all the courage displayed, the isolated actions against the government in the pre-revolutionary period broke against the apathy of the masses. Only the Social-Democrats, by strenuous and systematic work, educated the masses to the level of the higher forms of struggle—mass actions and armed civil war.

The Social-Democrats were able to shatter the "common national" and "patriotic" delusions of the young proletariat and later, when the Manifesto of October 17th[171] had been wrested from the tsar due to their direct intervention, the proletariat began vigorous preparation for the next, inevitable phase of the revolution—the armed uprising. Having shed "common national" illusions, it concentrated its class forces in its own mass organisations—the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc. And notwithstanding all the differences in the aims and tasks of the Russian revolution,

compared with the French revolution of 1871, the Russian proletariat had to resort to the same method of struggle as that first used by the Paris Commune—civil war. Mindful of the lessons of the Commune, it knew that the proletariat should not ignore peaceful methods of struggle—they serve its ordinary, day-to-day interests, they are necessary in periods of preparation for revolution—but it must never forget that in certain conditions the class struggle assumes the form of armed conflict and civil war; there are times when the interests of the proletariat call for ruthless extermination of its enemies in open armed clashes. This was first demonstrated by the French proletariat in the Commune and brilliantly confirmed by the Russian proletariat in the December uprising.

And although these magnificent uprisings of the working class were crushed, there will be another uprising, in face of which the forces of the enemies of the proletariat will prove ineffective, and from which the socialist proletariat will emerge completely victorious.

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A POLICE-PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATION MADE TO ORDER

The Duma's "big parliamentary day" of February 27 has evoked a touchingly unanimous appreciation from our bourgeois parties. All are pleased, all are elated and deeply moved, from the Black Hundreds and *Novoye Vremya* to the Cadets and *Stolichnaya Pochta*, which managed "on the eve of death", to write (in its issue for February 28):

"The general impression [of the Duma session of February 27] was a very good one."... "For the first time in Russian socio-political life the government has openly given its views to the country on questions of foreign policy."...

We too are prepared to admit that the big parliamentary day has very strikingly, if not "for the first time", revealed the deep unanimity of the Black Hundreds, the government, the liberals, and the "democrats" of the *Stolichnaya Pochta* brand, a unanimity on the cardinal questions of "socio-political life". Therefore, all attentive examination of the stand taken that day and in connection with that day by all the parties seems to us absolutely necessary.

The leader of the Octobrist government party is Mr. Guchkov. He addresses "a request to the government spokesmen" to explain the true state of affairs in the Far East. He explains from the eminence of the Duma rostrum the importance of cutting down expenditure—50,000 rubles per annum, say, to the Ambassador in Tokio instead of 60,000. We are making reforms, so don't laugh! He says that disturbing reports about Far-Eastern policy and the threat of war with Japan "have found their way into the press". Naturally, the leader of the capitalists says nothing about the Russian press being muzzled—why should he? Freedom of the press can be left as

an item in the programme. That is essential for a "European party. But as to actually *fighting* against the gagging of the press, openly exposing the notorious venality of the influential organs of the Russian press—it would he ludicrous to expect that of Mr. Guchkov or of Mr. Milyukov. On the other hand, Mr. Guchkov did tell the truth about the connection between domestic and foreign policy, that is, he blurted out the true motives for the comic scene which the Duma enacted on February 27.

"The fact," he announced, "that we are moving swiftly towards pacification and tranquillisation should show our opponents that the attempts by Russia to defend her interests will this time definitely succeed." The Black Hundreds and Octobrists applaud. Of course! They, if anybody, understood only too well from the very beginning that the crux of the question under discussion and of the government's solemn declaration made through the medium of Mr. Izvolsky lay in proclaiming the counter-revolutionary policy of our Muravyov-hangmen[171a] to be a matter of pacification and tranquillisation. Europe and the whole world had to be shown that the "external enemy" was confronted by a "united Russia", which was pacifying and tranquillising a handful of rebels (a mere hundred million or so of peasants and workers!) to ensure the success of the "attempts to defend her interests".

Yes, Mr. Guchkov managed to say what he wanted to say, what the combined landlords and capitalists wanted him to say.

Professor Kapustin, a "Left" Octobrist, the hope of the Cadets and mainstay of the advocates of peace between society and the authorities, hastened to follow in the footsteps of Guchkov, whose policy he seasoned with unctuous liberal hypocrisy. "God grant that the fame [the Duma's] of our saving public money becomes widespread." Fifty thousand a year for an ambassador—is that not a saving of a clear ten thousand rubles? Is that not a "splendid example" which will be "set by our highest dignitaries, who are alive to the grave and distressing moment which Russia is living through"?... "We are faced with the prospect of drastic reforms in the most diverse spheres of our country's life, and large funds are needed for that purpose."

Judas Golovlyov[172] falls far short in comparison with this parliamentarian! A professor at the Duma rostrum going into raptures over the splendid example set by the highest dignitaries.... But why talk of an Octobrist when the liberals and bourgeois democrats are not far removed from this toadyism.

Let us pass to the speech made by Mr. Izvolsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. All he needed, of course, was a peg of the kind which Kapustin so obligingly offered. And the Minister dilated on the need for retrenchment—or for revising the staff lists in order to help ambassadors "who have no independent means". Izvolsky stressed that he was speaking with the permission of Nicholas II, and sang praises to "the strength, intelligence, and patriotism of the Russian people", who would "exert all their energies, both material and spiritual, for consolidating Russia's present Asiatic possessions and developing them to the utmost".

The Minister said what the camarilla told him to say. Then Mr. Milyukov, the leader of the opposition, spoke. He declared straightaway: "The Party of People's Freedom, represented by the Duma group present here, has listened to the words of the Foreign Minister with profound satisfaction, and considers it its duty to applaud his first public statement made before the country's representative assembly clarifying questions concerning Russian foreign policy. Without a doubt, at the present moment ... the Russian Government needs ... to have the backing of Russian public opinion for its views."

Indeed, there is no doubt about that at all. For their intentions the government of the counter-revolution needs the backing of what abroad could be taken for (or be passed off as) Russian public opinion. This is particularly necessary in order to receive a loan, without which the whole Stolypin policy of tsarism, planned with a view to long-range measures of systematic and mass violence against the people, is faced with the threat of bankruptcy and ruin.

Mr. Milyukov quite understood the true significance of this ceremonial entrance of Izvolsky, Guchkov, and Co. This entrance was arranged by the Black-Hundred gang of Nicholas II. Every little detail of this police-patriotic demonstration was planned in advance. The Duma puppets

enacted a comedy, dancing to the tune of the autocratic camarilla, for without the support of the West-European bourgeoisie Nicholas II could not hold out. The *entire* Russian bourgeoisie, *Left* as well as Right, had to be made to formally express its confidence in the government, in its "peaceful policy", its stability, its intentions and ability to pacify and tranquillise. It was necessary as the blank endorsement of a bill. For that purpose, Mr. Izvolsky was brought into play as being most "pleasing" to the Cadets; for that purpose all that impudent hypocrisy was organised about the saving of public money, about reforms, and the government's "public" statement "clarifying" its foreign policy, although it was clear to one and all that it clarified nothing and that there was no intention that it should clarify anything.

As for the liberal opposition, they dutifully fulfilled the role of puppets in the hands of the Black-Hundred-police monarchy. At a time when an explicit statement of the truth by the Duma bourgeois minority would undoubtedly have played an important role and have prevented (or hindered) the government from borrowing thousands of millions for new punitive expeditions, gallows, prisons, and intensified security measures, the party of the Cadets "prostrated themselves" before the adored monarch in an effort to ingratiate themselves. Mr. Milyukov curried favour by trying to prove his patriotism. He posed as an expert on foreign policy, on the basis of having obtained information in some antechamber about Izvolsky's liberal views. Mr. Milyukov deliberately endorsed the bill by solemnly "applauding" the tsarist minister on behalf of the whole Cadet Party, knowing full well that on the very next day all the European newspapers would declare, as if under orders: The Duma has unanimously (not counting the Social-Democrats) expressed confidence in the government, has approved its foreign policy....

In three years Russian liberalism has gone through an evolution which, in Germany, took over thirty years, and in France over a hundred—an evolution from adherents of freedom to spineless and contemptible henchmen of absolutism. The specific weapon of struggle which the bourgeoisie possesses—the possibility of putting pressure on the purse, of withholding funds, of upsetting the "delicate"

approaches for new loans—this weapon could have been used by the Cadets many times during the Russian revolution. And on each occasion, in the spring of 1908 just as in the spring of 1906, they surrendered their weapon to the enemy, licking the hand of the pogrom-makers and swearing loyalty to them.

Mr. Struve took care in good time to put this practice on a firm theoretical basis. In the magazine *Russkaya Mysl*, which should really be called *Black-Hundred Mysl*,[173] Mr. Struve already advocates the idea of a "Great Russia", the idea of bourgeois nationalism; he attacks "the intelligentsia's hostility to the state", for the thousandth time striking out at "Russian revolutionism", "Marxism", "renegades", the "class struggle", and "banal radicalism".

We can only rejoice at this evolution in the ideology of Russian liberalism, for in fact it has *already shown itself* in the Russian revolution to be exactly what Mr. Struve has been trying systematically, wholeheartedly, deliberately and "philosophically" to make it. The elaboration of a consistent counter-revolutionary *ideology* is the key when there is a fully developed class that has acted in a counter-revolutionary manner at crucial periods in the country's life. The ideology conforming to the class position and the class policy of the bourgeoisie will help all and everyone to discard their last vestiges of faith in the "democratism" of the Cadets. And it will do good to discard them. They need to be discarded to enable us to make progress in regard to the really mass struggle for the democratisation of Russia. Mr. Struve wants a frankly counter-revolutionary liberalism. We want it, too, because this "frankness" of liberalism will best of all enlighten both the democratic peasantry and the socialist proletariat.

Reverting to the Duma session of February 27, it should be said that the only honest and proud word of a democrat came from a *Social-Democrat*. Deputy Chkheidze took the floor and declared that the Social-Democratic group would vote *against* the Bill. He started to give the reasons, but after his first words: "Our diplomacy in the West has always been a bulwark of reaction and served the interests of ..." the Chairman stopped the mouth of the workers' deputy. "The instructions allow a member to give his reasons for

voting," muttered the Cadets. "Besides reasons there is such a thing as form," answered the bandit who calls himself Chairman of the Third Duma.

He was right from his point of view: who cares about instructions when the successful staging of the police-sponsored, patriotic demonstration was at stake.

The workers' deputy stood isolated on this question. This is all the more to his credit. The proletariat should show, and it will show, that it is capable of defending the behests of the democratic revolution despite all the treacheries of liberalism and the waverings of the petty bourgeoisie.

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DECEPTION OF THE PEOPLE BY THE LIBERALS

At the last, London, congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party the question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties was discussed and a resolution adopted on the subject. Controversy was particularly aroused at the Congress by the passage in this resolution which speaks of *deception* of the people by the liberals.* The Social-Democrats of the Right wing of our Party thought this passage to be highly incorrect. They even declared that it was not Marxist to speak in the resolution about the liberals' "deception" of the people, i.e., to account for certain sections of the population joining a given party (in this case the Cadet Party) not by the class interests of these sections, but by the "immoral" political practices of one or another group of parliamentarians, lawyers, journalists, and so on.

As a matter of fact, these specious arguments, arrayed in ostensibly Marxist garb, concealed a policy of weakening the class independence of the proletariat and subordinating it (in effect) to the liberal bourgeoisie. For these gentlemen do not seriously defend the interests of the democratic petty bourgeoisie who follow the Cadets, but *betray* them by their policy of intrigues and deals with the government, with the Octobrists, with the "historic authority" of the tsarist autocracy.

Extremely interesting material throwing new light on this question—one of the fundamental questions of Social-Democratic tactics in all capitalist countries—is afforded by the present struggle for universal suffrage in the Prussian Landtag (Diet). German Social-Democracy raised the banner of that struggle. The proletariat of Berlin, followed by all

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* See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 501-02.—*Ed.*

the large cities of Germany, came out into the street, organised imposing demonstrations of tens of thousands of people and inaugurated a broad mass movement, which already, at its very outset, has led to violent acts on the part of the constitutional authorities, to the use of military force and the beating up of the, unarmed masses. Struggle grows out of struggle! The leaders of the revolutionary proletariat met these acts of violence proudly and bravely. But here the question came up of the attitude towards the democratic (and liberal) bourgeoisie in the struggle for the franchise. The debates on this question between the German revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists (revisionists, as they are called in Germany) bear a remarkably close resemblance to our own disputes on the subject of the deception of the people by the liberals.

The central organ of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party, Vorwärts, published a leading article, the gist and substance of which is clearly expressed in its heading: "The Struggle for the Franchise Is a Class Struggle!" As was to be expected, this article was received by the opportunists as a challenge, although it set forth in a positive form only established Social-Democratic axioms. The gauntlet was taken up. Comrade Südekum, a well-known worker in the field of municipal socialism, launched an aggressive campaign against this "sectarians' tactic", against the "isolation of the proletariat", against "Social-Democratic support of the Black Hundreds" (the Germans use the milder term—reactionaries). For to a German opportunist too the introduction of the class struggle into a cause common to both the proletariat and the liberals means supporting the reactionaries! "The introduction of universal suffrage in Prussia instead of the present three-class system is not the concern of any single class", wrote Südekum. This, he said, was the affair of "the urban population against the agrarians, of democracy against the bureaucracy, of the peasantry against the landlord, of Western Prussia against Eastern Prussia" (i.e., the industrially and capitalistically advanced part of the country against the economically backward part). "What has to be done now is to unite on this point all the friends of the reform, whatever the other issues which may divide them."

The reader sees that these are all very familiar arguments, that here, too, the garb is strictly and orthodoxly "Marxist", inclusive of the reference to the economic position and interests of definite elements of bourgeois democracy (the "urban democracy", the peasantry, etc.). There is hardly any need to add that the German liberal-bourgeois press has been harping systematically on this note for decades, accusing Social-Democracy of sectarianism, of supporting the reactionaries, and of inability to isolate the reactionaries.

What *arguments* did the German revolutionary Social-Democrats use to refute this reasoning. We shall list their chief arguments so as to enable the reader—viewing German affairs as a "bystander", "without anger or bias"—to judge whether the predominant part is played here by references to special conditions of place and time or to general principles of Marxism.

Yes, our freethinkers "demand" universal suffrage in their programmes, said *Vorwärts*. Yes, they have become more than usually zealous in making grandiloquent speeches about it today. But are they *fighting* for reform? Do we not see, on the contrary, that the truly popular movement, the street demonstrations, the broad agitation among the masses, the unrest of the masses, evoke in them ill-concealed fear, aversion, and at best, in rare cases, indifference?

We must distinguish between the programmes of the bourgeois parties, between the banquet and parliamentary speeches of the liberal careerists and their actual participation in the real struggle of the people. Bourgeois politicians, one and all, in all parliamentary countries, have always paid lip-service to democracy while betraying it.

Yes, "*within* the Centre and the Party of freethinkers [the Liberal Party] there are *undoubtedly* elements who are interested in universal and equal suffrage", said *Vorwärts*. But it is not these elements that lead the bourgeois parties, not the petty artisans, not the semi-proletariat, not the semi-ruined peasants. They follow the lead of the liberal bourgeois, who try to keep them away from the struggle by making compromises with reaction behind their backs, by corrupting their class-consciousness and not really defending their interests.

To draw these elements into the struggle for universal suffrage it is necessary to arouse their class-consciousness, to win them away from the vacillating bourgeois parties. "Within the Liberal [freethinking] Party they, the elements interested in universal suffrage, form an impotent minority, which is forever being fed with promises and then always *duped* once again, and whose political energy is completely paralysed. If, however, the freethinkers and the Centre are really to be forced to make concessions to democracy owing to the threat of losing votes, then it is the class struggle, which weakens the bourgeois parties, that is the only means of pushing the reluctant bourgeoisie to the Left."

For the political facts long ago proved that reaction is less hateful to the freethinkers than Social-Democracy. "We must therefore not only ruthlessly castigate the sins of all the bourgeois parties, but above all make it clear that the betrayals of the freethinkers and the Centre on the question of the franchise are a necessary consequence of the class character of these parties."

In the immediate future the question whether our Cadets are capable of "fighting" for the democratic demands put forward in their programme, or whether they are putting them forward merely to betray to the Octobrists the petty bourgeois and peasants who are following the liberals' lead, will confront the Russian Social-Democrats again and again, as it repeatedly did before in the course of the revolution. Therefore some people in our Party would do well to ponder these arguments of *Vorwärts*.

P.S. This article was sent to press before we read *Rech*, issue No. 52 (of March 1), containing an article by Mr. K. D., the Berlin correspondent of this newspaper, entitled "The Crisis of German Liberalism". The writer handles the controversy of *Vorwärts* with Südekum in the customary tone and with the customary methods used by our liberal falsifiers. He makes no attempt to give the line of reasoning of the parties concerned or exact quotations. He simply declares: "The official *Vorwärts* promptly throws mud at the heretic, and in a leading article, extremely unappetising on account of its offensive and blustering tone, accuses him of ignorance and unpardonable forgetfulness of party tenets." We leave it to the reader to judge whether Südekum himself will

fund such a defence of him by the Cadets "appetising" or not. But such is the fate of the revisionists in any country—they are given generous support and heartfelt "recognition" of their efforts by the bourgeoisie. An alliance between the Südekums and the Struve gentry—could anything more "appetising" be thought of to confirm the correctness of our position?

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AN ESTIMATE OF MARX BY INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM

One of Turgenev's characters thus adapted a verse of the great German poet:

Wer den Feind will versteh'n,
Muss im Feindes Lande geh'n

that is, "To know your enemy you must go into the enemy's country" to get first-hand knowledge of his customs, manners ways of thinking and acting.

Marxists would do well to cast a glance at the comments made on the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Marx by influential political organs in various countries, especially the liberal and "democratic" bourgeois newspapers, which combine the possibility of influencing the masses of readers with the right to speak on behalf of official, titular professorial scholarship.

We shall begin our review with *Russkiye Vedomosti*. This is the most sedate (and dullest), the most scientific (and farthest removed from real life) of professorial newspapers. Its short article on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Karl Marx's death (No. 51, March 1) is written in a predominantly dry wooden tone—"objectivity", as it is called in the language of professors "ordinary" and "extraordinary". The writer of the article tries to confine himself to facts and trifling facts. As an impartial historian, he is prepared to give Marx his due—at least as far as the past is concerned, a past which is already dead and can be spoken of in a lifeless way. *Russkiye Vedomosti* admits Marx to be a "remarkable figure", a "great man of science", an "outstanding leader of the proletariat", an organiser of the masses. But this recognition ap-

plies to the past: today, says the newspaper, "new paths are really necessary", i.e., new paths for the labour movement and socialism unlike the "old Marxism". What these new paths are, the paper does not say in so many words—that is too live a subject for professors and too "injudicious" a theme for virtuosi in the art of "tactful silence". But broad hints are dropped: "Many of his [Marx's] constructions have been destroyed by scientific analysis and the merciless critique of events. Among scientists there are practically no adherents faithful to his system as a whole; Marx's spiritual child—German Social-Democracy—has deviated a good deal from the revolutionary path which the founders of German socialism had mapped out." As you see, the writer leaves very little unsaid in his desire *to rectify* Marx in the revisionist way.

Another influential paper, *Rech*, the organ of a political party, which plays first fiddle in the concert of Russian liberalism, gives a much more lively appraisal of Marx. The tendency is, of course, the same as in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, but whereas there we saw a preface to a fat volume, here we have political slogans that are the immediate guide for many a speech from the parliamentary rostrum, in dealing with all current events and topics of the day. The article "Karl Marx and Russia" (No. 53, March 2) is written by the notorious renegade Mr. Izgoev, a specimen of those Russian intellectuals, who between the ages of twenty-five and thirty "try to pose as Marxists", between thirty-five and forty play at being liberals, and after that end up as Black Hundreds.

Mr. Izgoev deserted the Social-Democrats for the liberals (as he himself has declared and as that arch-renegade Mr. Struve said of him) just when the revolution, after its first staggering successes, entered a difficult period of a long and hard struggle against the growing counter-revolution. Indeed, Mr. Izgoev is highly typical in this respect. He is splendid at making it clear *who stands to gain* by professorial affectation in appraising Marx, and *whose work* this official "scholarship" is doing. "Marx the tactician of political intrigue," Izgoev thunders, "was a considerable hindrance to Marx the great scientist, and caused him to commit many mistakes." The chief mistake, of course, was that in addition to the correct, reasonable "*evolutionary* Marxism" accepted

by the "majority" (the majority of philistines?) there was born a mischievous, unscientific, fantastic revolutionary Marxism, "adulterated by home-brewed Narodism". What our liberal especially resents is the role of *this* Marxism in the Russian revolution. Would you believe it—they go to the length of talking of a dictatorship of the proletariat to carry out this very same "bourgeois revolution", or even of a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—which is absolutely fantastic in the mouth of Marxists". "No wonder that revolutionary Marxism in the form in which it was adopted in Russia by the Bolsheviks of all shades has completely failed."... "They are having to think of establishing an ordinary 'bourgeois' [the ironical quotation marks are Mr. Izgoev's] constitution."

There you have an ideologically ready-made and politically mature Octobrist, who is quite convinced that it is Marxism and revolutionary tactics that have failed, and not the Cadet tactics of compromise, betrayal, and treachery!

To proceed. From the Russian we shall pass to the German press, which operates in a free atmosphere, face to face with a legal socialist party, and which expresses its views in dozens of daily newspapers. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, one of the wealthiest, most widely read and most "democratic" bourgeois newspapers in Germany, devotes a big leading article to the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marx's death (No. 76, March 16, New Style, evening edition). The German "democrats at once take the bull by the horns. "One can understand the Social-Democratic press having honoured its teacher on this day in numerous articles," we are told. "But Marx has been recognised as a great man even in an influential national liberal paper, although with the usual reservations. Yes, of course, he was great, but he was a great corrupter."

This newspaper, representing the pick of that brand of Black-Hundred ideology known as European liberalism, explains that it does not in the least question Marx's personal honesty; but that his theories have caused incalculable harm. By introducing the conception of determinism and objective law in the sphere of social phenomena, by denying the significance of morality and the relative conditional nature of our knowledge, Marx founded an anti-scientific utopia and a

real "Church" of his sectarian disciples. But his most harmful idea is—the *class* struggle. Herein lies all the evil! Marx treated seriously the old aphorism about *two nations*,* about the existence of two nations within every civilised nation—a nation of "exploiters" and a nation of "exploited" (the newspaper puts these unscientific terms in deadly ironical quotation marks). Marx forgot the clear, obvious truth that is plain to all healthy people, namely, that in social life "the aim is not struggle but agreement". Marx "tore the nation asunder, for he hammered it into the heads of his people that there was nothing in common between them and the rest of the people, that they were deadly enemies".

"What could be more natural," the newspaper asks, "than that Social-Democracy, agreeing as it does with many of the bourgeoisie on a number of practical issues, should seek closer alignment with them? But that does not happen precisely because of Marxist theory. Social-Democracy has condemned itself to isolation. For a time it seemed as though a fundamental change was going to take place in this respect. It was when the revisionists began their campaign. But it turned out to be a mistake, and the difference between the revisionists and ourselves consisted, among other things, in that we understood this mistake while they did not. The revisionists believed, and still believe, that it is possible somehow to keep to Marx and yet become a different party. Vain hopes . Marx has either to be swallowed whole or completely rejected. A half-hearted course is of no use here."...

Quite right, gentlemen of the liberal fold! You do sometimes come out with the truth by accident.

"...So long as Social-Democracy honours Marx it will not be able to rid itself of the idea of the class struggle and of all those other things that make living with it so difficult.... The scientific world is agreed that not one of the politico-economic theories of Marxism has been proved true."...

Well, well, gentlemen. You have admirably expressed the essence of bourgeois science, of bourgeois liberalism, and its entire policy. You have grasped the fact that Marx cannot be swallowed piecemeal. This is something that the Izgoevs and the Russian liberals have not yet understood. But even they will, before long.

And here, in conclusion, is *Journal des Débats*, the conservative organ of the bourgeois republic. In its issue of March

* These two words are given by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

15, it writes, on the occasion of the anniversary, that the socialists, those "wild equalitarians", preach the cult of their great men, that the chief evil of the teachings of Marx, who "hated the bourgeoisie", is the theory of the struggle of *classes*. "He preached to the working classes not temporary conflicts alternating with periods of truce, but a holy war, a war of extermination, of expropriation, a war for the promised land of collectivism... a monstrous utopia."...

The bourgeois papers write well when stung to the quick. Life becomes a more cheerful thing when you see this growing ideological unity among the liberal enemies of the proletariat all over the world, for this unity is one of the guarantees of the unification of the millions of the international proletariat, which will win for itself its promised land, come what may.

Proletary, No. 25,
March (25) 12, 1908

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NOTES

[1] The article "*Against Boycott*" was published at the end of July 1907 in a pamphlet entitled *Concerning the Boycott of the Third Duma*, printed by the illegal Social-Democratic press in St. Petersburg. Its cover bore the fictitious inscription: "Moscow, 1907, Gorizontov Press, 40, Tverskaya". The pamphlet was confiscated in September 1907. p. 15

[2] This refers to the Fourth Delegate Congress of the All-Russian Teachers' Union, held June 19-24 (July 2-7), 1907, in Finland. It was attended by 50 Socialist-Revolutionary, 23 Social-Democrat and 18 non-party delegates, representing nearly two thousand organised teachers of Russia. The following questions were on the agenda: adoption of the Union Rules, elections to the Third Duma, attitude towards other trade unions, attitude towards the modern Zemstvo, boycott of discharged teachers' posts, mutual benefit societies, and other items. The Congress was held in an atmosphere of tense ideological struggle between the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In calling the Teachers' Union a "professional and political" union, Lenin had in mind that under Clause I of the Rules it fought for a free school while at the same time endeavouring to improve the material conditions of the teachers; it was, at one and the same time, a teachers' trade union and a political league of struggle for a free school. p. 17

[3] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.'s)—a petty-bourgeois party formed in Russia at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 through the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles (The "Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries", "Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries", and others). Its official organs were the newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the magazines *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05) and *Znamya Truda* (*Banner of Labour*) (1907-14). The S.R.'s failed to perceive the class distinctions between the proletariat and petty proprietors; they glossed over the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and rejected the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The views of the S.R.'s were an eclectic medley of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to "patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see

present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terrorism which the S.R.'s advocated as the principal method of struggle against the autocracy caused great harm to the revolutionary movement, since it made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the S.R.'s envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land and its transfer to the village communes on the basis of the "labour principle" and "equalised" land tenure, as well as the development of co-operatives of all kinds. The S.R.'s called this programme "socialisation of the land", but there was nothing socialist about it. Lenin's analysis of it showed that the preservation of commodity production and private farming on the common land does not eliminate the domination of capital, does not save the toiling peasants from exploitation and ruin nor can co-operation be a saving remedy for the small peasants under capitalism, since it serves to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time Lenin pointed out that the demand for equalised land tenure while not socialist, was of a historically progressive revolutionary-democratic nature, since it was aimed against reactionary landlordism.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the S.R.'s attempts to masquerade as socialists, waged an unremitting struggle against the S.R.'s for influence on the peasantry, and revealed the harm their tactics of individual terrorism were causing the labour movement. At the same time the Bolsheviks were prepared, on definite terms, to come to temporary agreements with the S.R.'s in the struggle against tsarism.

The heterogeneous class character of the peasantry determined the political and ideological instability and organisational disunity of the S.R. Party, and its members' continual vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Already during the first Russian revolution of 1905-07 its Right wing split away from the party and formed the legal "Trudovik Popular Socialist Party" (Popular Socialists), whose views were close to those of the Constitutional-Democrats; the Left wing organised itself into the semi-anarchist League of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction the S.R. Party was in a state of complete collapse ideologically and organisationally. The First World War found most of the S.R.'s taking a social-chauvinist stand.

After the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, the S.R.'s, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and landlords, and the leaders of the party (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) were members of that government. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasants' demands for the abolition of landlordism and stood for private ownership of the land; the S.R. ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized the landlords' estates.

At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the party founded a separate Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In an endeavour to

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

maintain their influence among the peasant masses, the Left S.R.'s formally recognised the Soviet government and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but very soon turned against the Soviet power.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the S.R.'s engaged in counter-revolutionary subversive activities, zealously supported the interventionists and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state and Communist Party. After the civil war they continued their anti-Soviet activities within the country and as whiteguard émigrés abroad. p. 17

4 *Coup d'état of June 3 (16), 1907*—a counter-revolutionary act by which the government dissolved the Second Duma and altered the electoral law. On the basis of a trumped-up charge framed by the Okhranka (the secret police) against the Social-Democratic members of the Duma, accusing them of being connected with a military organisation and preparing an armed uprising, Stolypin, on June 1, 1907, demanded that these members be banned from taking part in the Duma sittings, sixteen members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma were to be arrested. A committee was set up by the Duma to verify the charge. Without waiting for the results of this committee's investigations, the government, on the night of June 3 (16) had the Social-Democratic group arrested. On June 3 the tsar's manifesto dissolved the Duma and announced modifications in the electoral law, which greatly increased representation of the landlords and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the Duma and considerably reduced the already meagre representation of the workers and peasants. This was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 and the Fundamental Law of 1906 under which no laws could be issued by the government without the approval of the Duma.

Under the new electoral law one elector was elected to the landowners' curia from 230 people, to the urban curia of the first degree from 1,000 people, to the urban curia of the second degree from 15,000 people, to the peasants' curia from 60,000 people, and to the workers' curia from 125,000 people. The landlords and bourgeoisie were able to elect 65 per cent of all the electors, the peasants 22 per cent (formerly 42 per cent), and the workers 2 per cent (formerly 4 per cent). The law deprived the indigenous population of Asiatic Russia and the Turkic peoples of the Astrakhan and Stavropol gubernias of the franchise, and reduced the number of deputies returned by Poland and the Caucasus by half. All persons throughout Russia who did not know the Russian language were deprived of the franchise. The Third Duma elected on the basis of this law, which assembled on November 1, 1907, was a Duma of Black-Hundred and Octobrist deputies.

The coup d'état of June 3 was, in Lenin's words, "a turning-point in the history of our revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 15, "The Straight Road"), which ushered in the period of Stolypin reaction. p. 17

[5] *The Bulygin Duma*—the consultative "representative body" which the tsarist government had promised to convene in 1905. The tsar's manifesto the law providing for the establishment of the Duma, and regulations governing elections to it were promulgated on August 6 (19),1905. It came to be known as the Bulygin Duma because the Bill inaugurating it was drafted on the tsar's instructions by A. G. Bulygin the Minister of the Interior. Electoral rights were granted only to the landlords, the big capitalists, and a small number of peasant householders. The peasants were given only 51 out of the 412 seats established by the law. The majority of the population—the workers, poor peasants, farm-labourers, and democratic intelligentsia—were deprived of the franchise. Women, servicemen, students, persons under twenty-five, and a number of subject nationalities were not allowed to vote. The Duma had no right to pass laws and could merely discuss certain questions in the capacity of a consultative body under the tsar. Lenin described the Bulygin Duma as "the most barefaced mockery of 'popular representation'" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 194).

The Bolsheviks called upon the workers and peasants to actively boycott the Bulygin Duma, and concentrated their agitational campaign around the slogans of an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government. The Mensheviks considered it possible to take part in the elections to the Duma and stood for co-operation with the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Bulygin Duma boycott campaign was used by the Bolsheviks to rally all the revolutionary forces, to organise mass political strikes, and to prepare for an armed uprising. The elections to the Bulygin Duma did not take place, and the government failed to convene it. It was swept away by the mounting wave of revolution and the All-Russian political strike of October 1905. On the subject of the Bulygin Duma, see Lenin's articles "The Constitutional Market-Place", "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and Insurrection", "Oneness of the Tsar and the People, and of the People and the Tsar", "In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie, Or in the Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry?" and others (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 352-56; Vol. 9, pp. 179-87, 191-99, 212-23). p. 18

[6] *The Ninth of January 1905*—"Bloody Sunday", the day on which, by order of the tsar, a peaceful procession of St. Petersburg workers was shot down. The workers were marching to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar.

This cold-blooded massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan of "Down with the Autocracy!". The events of January 9 precipitated the revolution of 1905-07. p. 19

[7] *Potemkin*—armoured cruiser of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the crew of which mutinied on June 14-24, 1905. The revolutionary outbreak on the Potemkin was of great political importance, since

it was the first time that any big tsarist military unit had joined the revolution. p. 19

[8] *The Witte Duma*—Russia's First Duma, convened on April 27 (May 10), 1906 on a franchise drafted by the Prime Minister Witte. Although the electoral law governing elections to the First Duma was anti-democratic, the tsar did not succeed in convening a wholly docile Duma. The majority in the Duma were Cadets, who tried to win the confidence of the peasantry with false promises of reforms, including an agrarian reform.

The tsarist government dissolved the Duma on July 8 (21), 1906. p. 21

[9] *The man in the muffler*—the chief character in Chekhov's story of the same name, typifying the narrow-minded philistine, who fights shy of all innovations and display of initiative. p. 22

[10] See Friedrich Engels, *Flüchtlingsliteratur*, *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat*, Berlin, 1957. p. 23

[11] T*he Fourth* (*Unity*) *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Stockholm, April 10-25 (April 23-May 8), 1906.

It was attended by 112 delegates with the right to vote, representing 57 local organisations, and 22 consultative delegates. In addition, there were representatives from the non-Russian Social-Democratic parties: three each from those of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, and one each from the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Labour Party of Finland, and a representative of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Bolshevik delegates included F. A. Artyom (Sergeyev), M. F. Frunze, M. I. Kalinin, V. I. Lenin, S. G. Shaumyan, and V. V. Vorovsky. The Congress discussed the agrarian question, the current situation and the class tasks of the proletariat, the attitude towards the Duma, and organisational questions. There was a sharp struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks on all issues. Lenin delivered reports and made speeches at the Congress on the agrarian question, on the current situation, on the tactics to be assumed in regard to the elections to the Duma on the armed uprising, and other questions.

The Mensheviks' numerical preponderance at the Congress, though slight, determined the character of the Congress decisions. On a number of questions the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions the agrarian programme, the attitude towards the Duma, etc.). The Congress adopted Lenin's formulation of Paragraph One of the Party Rules. The Congress admitted into the R.S.D.L.P. the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations: the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party and adopted a draft laying down the conditions on which the Bund could join the R.S.D.L.P.

The Central Committee elected at the Congress consisted of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks. Only Mensheviks were elected to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ.

An analysis of the Congress is given in Lenin's pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* (See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 317-82.) p. 27

[12] *Dubasov*—the Governor-General of Moscow who suppressed the Moscow armed uprising in December 1905.

Stolypin—Russian Prime Minister. p. 29

[13] *Cadets*—(abbreviated) members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in October 1905, its membership was made up of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders of the landowning class, and bourgeois intellectuals. Leading personalities of the party were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingarev, P. B. Struve, and F. I. Rodichev, among others. To hoodwink the working people the Cadets called themselves the "Party of People's Freedom". Actually, they did not go beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered it their chief aim to combat the revolutionary movement, and sought to share the power with the tsar and the feudal landlords. During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's aggressive foreign policy. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried their hardest to save the monarchy. They used their key positions in the bourgeois Provisional Government to pursue a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people, but favouring the U.S., British, and French imperialists. After the victory of the October Revolution the Cadets came out as implacable enemies of the Soviet power. They took part in all the counter-revolutionary armed actions and campaigns of the interventionists. Living abroad as émigrés after the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards, the Cadets did not cease their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activities. p. 30

[14] *Tovarishch* (*The Comrade*)—a bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from March 15 (28), 1906 to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908). Though formally not the organ of any particular party it was in fact the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets. Active contributors were S. N. Prokopovich and Y. D. Kuskova. The newspaper also published contributions from Mensheviks. p. 31

[15] *Leaflet of the C.C.*—"Letter to Party Organisations" No. 1 written in connection with the coup d'état of June 3. "The proletariat and its spokesman—revolutionary Social-Democracy," the letter states, "cannot leave the government's act of violence unanswered and unprotested. Social-Democracy does not give up the idea of continuing and developing the revolution." Without calling for immediate action the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. appealed to the Party organisations to "support and go the whole way in developing mass movements as they arise, and in cases where the active and decisive support of the broad masses can be counted on, to immediately take upon themselves the initiative in the movement and notify the C.C. about it". p. 35

[16] See Marx's letter to Kugelmann of March 3. 1869. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 263). p. 37

[17] *Balalaikin*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's *Modern Idyll*; a liberal windbag, adventurer, and humbug, who places his selfish interests above all else.

Molchalin—a character in Griboyedov's play *Wit Works Woe* typifying an unprincipled climber and toady. p. 39

[18] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, 1958, p. 497. p. 40

[19] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to combat the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals, and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 41

[20] *Octobrists*—members of the Octobrist party (or Union of October Seventeenth), founded in Russia after the promulgation of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party representing and defending the interests of the big bourgeoisie and landlords who engaged in capitalist farming. Its leaders were the well-known industrialist and Moscow houseowner A. I. Guchkov and the big landowner M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists unreservedly supported the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. p. 41

[21] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*) (Geneva issue)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, central organ of the R.S.D.L.P., founded in accordance with a resolution of the Third Congress of the Party. By a decision of a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee on April 27 (May 10), 1905, Lenin was appointed Editor-in-Chief of the paper. It was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25), 1905. Altogether twenty-six issues were brought out. *Proletary* followed the line of the old, Lenin *Iskra*, and maintained full continuity of policy with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

Lenin wrote about 90 articles and items for *Proletary*, whose political character, ideological content, and Bolshevik angle they determined. Lenin performed a tremendous job as the paper's manager and editor. V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky regularly took part in the work of the editorial board. Important work was also done by N. K. Krupskaya, V. M. Velichkina, and V. A. Karpinsky. The paper had close ties with the labour movement in Russia, publishing articles and items written by workers who participated directly in the revolutionary movement. The collection of correspondence locally and its delivery to Geneva were organised by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, S. I. Gusev, and A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova. The editors' correspondence with the local Party organisations and readers was handled by N. K. Krupskaya and L. A. Fotieva.

Proletary reacted immediately to all important events in the Russian and international labour movement and waged an irreconcilable struggle against the Mensheviks and other opportunist

revisionist elements. The newspaper carried out a great deal of work in propaganda for the decisions of the Third Congress of the Party and played an important part in organising and ideologically uniting the Bolsheviks. It consistently defended revolutionary Marxism and worked out all the fundamental issues of the revolution which was developing in Russia. By highlighting the events of 1905 Proletary helped to rouse the broad masses of the working people to the struggle for the victory of the revolution.

Proletary exercised great influence on the local Social-Democratic organisations. Some of Lenin's articles in the paper were reprinted in local Bolshevik papers and circulated in leaflet form. Publication of Proletary was discontinued shortly after Lenin's departure for Russia at the beginning of November 1905. The last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26) were edited by V. V. Vorovsky, but for them too Lenin wrote several articles, which were published after his departure from Geneva. p. 42

[22] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*) (Russian issue)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 8 (December 11), 1909 under the editorship of Lenin. Altogether 50 issues were put out. An active part in the work of the Editorial Board was taken by M. F. Vladimirsky, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, and I. F. Dubrovinsky. The technical work was handled by Y. S. Schlichter, A. G. Schlichter, and others. The first twenty issues were prepared for the press and set up in Vyborg (printing from the matrices sent was organised in St. Petersburg; for purposes of secrecy the newspaper carried the statement that it was published in Moscow). Eventually, owing to the extremely difficult conditions created for the publication of an illegal organ in Russia, the Editorial Board of *Proletary*, in accordance with a decision of the St. Petersburg and Moscow committees of the R.S.D.L.P., arranged to have the paper published abroad (Nos. 21-40 were issued in Geneva, and Nos. 41-50 in Paris).

Proletary was in fact the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. The bulk of the work on the Editorial Board was done by Lenin. Most of the issues carried several articles by him. Altogether over 100 articles and items by Lenin on all vital issues of the revolutionary struggle of the working class were published in *Proletary*. The paper devoted a good deal of space to tactical and general political questions, and published reports on the activities of the C.C of the R.S.D.L.P., the decisions of conferences and C.C. plenary meetings, C.C. letters on various questions of Party activity, and a number of other documents. The paper was in close touch with the local Party organisations.

During the years of the Stolypin reaction *Proletary* played an important role in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations and combating the liquidators, otzovists, ultimatists, and god-builders. At the plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee in January 1910 the Mensheviks, with the help of the conciliators, succeeded in obtaining a decision to close down the paper on the pretext of fighting factionalism. p. 42

[22a] *Boyevism*—from the Russian word boyevik, a member of the revolutionary fighting squads, who, during the revolutionary struggle, used the tactics of armed action, helped political prisoners to escape, expropriated state-owned funds for the needs of the revolution, removed spies and *agent provocateurs*, etc. During the revolution of 1905-07 the Bolsheviks had special fighting squads. p. 43

[23] The article "*In Memory of Count Heyden*" was published in the Bolshevik symposium *Voice of Life* (St. Petersburg, 1907) with the following editorial note: "Written in June, immediately after the appearance of *Tovarishch*'s panegyric, this article, owing to circumstances 'beyond the control' of the author, was not published at the time. In now including it in this volume, the editors believe, that it has lost none of its significance today, although the occasion that prompted it is now a matter of the past."

Circumstances "beyond the control" of the author was a term usually applied to obstacles on the part of the police and the censorship. In this case it was to be understood, in addition, that the Bolshevik symposium was the only publication in which Lenin's article could be published at that time. The article was unsigned, but in the table of contents the author's initials "N. L." were given. p. 50

[24] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow since 1863 by liberal professors of Moscow University and Zemstvo personalities; it expressed the views of the liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. In 1905, it became the organ of the Right Cadets. After the October Revolution (1917) it was closed down. p. 50

[25] This refers to the All-Russian political strike in October 1905, when the revolutionary crisis was coming to a head. p. 52

[26] *Peaceful renovationism*—the "Party of Peaceful Renovation" was a counter-revolutionary organisation of the landlords and bourgeoisie. It was formed in 1906, uniting the Left Octobrists and Right Cadets. Lenin called the "Party of Peaceful Renovation" the "Party of Peaceful Plunder". p. 55

[27] This refers to the landlord Penochkin in Turgenev's story *The Village Elder*. p. 56

[28] *Saltychikha* (Darya Ivanovna Saltykova, 1730-1801)—a landowner, famous for her brutal treatment of her serfs. p. 56

[29] *Rennenkampf* and *Meller-Zakomelsky*—tsarist generals, known for their harsh suppression of the revolutionary movement. p. 56

[30] Lenin quotes Goethe's definition of a philistine (Goethe, *Werke*. Neue Ausgabe. Zweiter Band, Berlin, 1893, S. 593). p. 57

[31] *The St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Terijoki (Finland) on July 8 and 14 (21 and 27) 1907. The records of this Conference have been lost. Sixty-one delegates with the right to vote and 21 consultative delegates attended the first session.

Lenin made a report to the Conference on the attitude towards the elections to the Third Duma. The Conference approved Lenin's line against boycott of the Third Duma, which he upheld in his theses and reports. p. 58

[32] *The Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* ("Second All-Russian") was held in Kotka (Finland) on July 21-23 (August 3-5), 1907. Twenty-six delegates attended, nine of them Bolsheviks, five Mensheviks, five polish Social-Democrats, five Bundists, and two Lettish S D.'s. The questions on the agenda were: participation in the elections to the Third Duma, election agreements, and the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions. On the first question three reports were delivered: those of Lenin (against boycott) and Bogdanov (for boycott) on behalf of the Bolsheviks, and that of Dan on behalf of the Mensheviks and the Bund. The Conference adopted Lenin's resolution; on the question of the All-Russian Trade-Union Congress, four draft resolutions were submitted which were handed over to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. as material. One of the drafts was based on the text of a resolution proposed by Lenin. p. 60

[33] *Non-party Progressists*—a political grouping of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, who, in the elections to the Duma and within the Duma itself, sought to unite various elements of the bourgeois and landlord parties and groups under the flag of "non-partisanship".

In the Third Duma the Progressists formed a parliamentary group consisting of representatives of the "Peaceful Renovation" and "Democratic Reforms" parties. Fear of another revolutionary outbreak made them criticise the "extremes" of the tsarist government, whose unyielding policy, in their opinion, provided a basis for Left, revolutionary activities. During the elections to the Fourth Duma in 1912 the Progressists formed a bloc with the Cadets, and by their pretended non-partisanship helped the Cadets to angle for the votes of the "bourgeois June-the-third electors".

In November 1912, the Progressists formed a separate political party with the following programme: a moderate constitution with limited franchise, petty reforms, a responsible ministry, i.e., a government responsible to the Duma, and suppression of the revolutionary movement. Lenin pointed out that in composition and ideology the Progressists were "a cross between the Octobrists and Cadets"; he described the programme of their party as being a national-liberal programme. "It will be a party of the 'real' capitalist bourgeoisie, such as we have in Germany." (See present edition Vol. 18, "The Results of the Elections", "National Liberals".)

During the First World War the Progressive Party became more

active, it demanded a change of military leadership, the gearing of industry to the needs of the front, and a "responsible ministry" in which the Russian bourgeoisie would be represented. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution some of the party's leaders were members of the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Progressive Party waged an active fight against the Soviet power. Among the party's leaders were the well-known Moscow manufacturers P. P. Ryabushinsky and A. I. Konovalov, and the landowner I. N. Yefremov. The Progressists, at different times, published their political organs: *Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik* (*Moscow Weekly*), and the newspapers *Slovo* (*The Word*), *Russkaya Molva* (*Russian Hearsay*), and *Utro Rossii* (*Russia's Dawn*). p. 61

[34] *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*)—a literary, popular-scientific, social and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1909. In 1906-08, the magazine published articles by Bolsheviks. Issue No. 2 for 1906 contained Chapters V-IX of Lenin's book *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 103-222). p. 62

[35] *Burenin's newspaper*—the name given by Lenin to the Black Hundred-monarchist newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*). Burenin, who contributed to the newspaper, hounded the representatives of all progressive trends. p. 66

[36] *Trudoviks* (from *trud*—"labour")—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats, formed in April 1906 from the peasant deputies to the First Duma.

The Trudoviks demanded the abolition of all restrictions based on class or nationality, the democratisation of the Zemstvos and urban self-government bodies, and universal suffrage in the Duma elections. Their agrarian programme was based on the Narodnik principles of "equalised" land tenure; the establishment of a national stock of distributable land, formed from state, crown, and monastery lands, as well as from privately owned lands where they exceeded an established labour standard; compensation being envisaged in the case of alienated private lands. Lenin pointed out in 1906 that the typical Trudovik was a peasant who "Is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his own plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for the land, on the fight against the feudal state and for democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 229).

In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, their vacillations being due to the class nature itself of peasant petty proprietors. Nevertheless, since the Trudoviks represented the peasant masses, the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Duma were to arrive at agreements with them on individual issues with a view to waging a joint struggle against the Cadets and the tsarist autocracy. In 1917, the Trudovik group

merged with the 'Popular Socialist" party and actively supported the bourgeois provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 68

[37] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906, under the actual editorship of P. N. Milyukov and I. V. Hessen and with the close co-operation of M. M. Vinaver, P. D. Dolgorukov, P. B. Struve, and others. The newspaper was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It was eventually reissued (up to August 1918) under various names: *Nasha Rech* (*Our Speech*), *Svobodnaya Rech* (*Free Speech*), *Vek* (*Century*), *Novaya Rech* (*New Speech*), and *Nash Vek* (*Our Century*). p. 68

[38] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of reactionary landlords founded in May 1906 at the First Congress of Delegates of the Gubernia Societies of the Nobility, it existed up to October 1917. The chief aim of this organisation was to defend the autocratic regime, landlordism, and the privileges of the nobility. The Council was headed by Count A. A. Bobrinsky, Prince N. F. Kasatkin-Rostovsky, Count D. A. Olsufyev, V. M. Purishkevich, and others. Lenin called the Council of the United Nobility a "council of united feudalists". The Council virtually became a semi-government body which dictated to the government legislative proposals aimed at defending the interests of the feudalists. During the period of the Third Duma many of its members sat on the Council of State and held key positions in the Black-Hundred organisations. p. 69

[39] *Popular Socialists*—members of the petty-bourgeois Trudovik Popular Socialist Party, which separated from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1906. The P.S.'s stood for partial nationalisation of the land on a redemption basis and the distribution of the land among the peasants according to the "labour standard". They were in favour of a bloc with the Cadets. Lenin called them "Social-Cadets", "petty-bourgeois opportunists", and "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks" who vacillated between the Cadets and the S.R.'s, and he emphasised that this party "differs very little from the Cadets, since it has discarded from its programme both the Republic and the demand for all the land". The party's leaders were A. V. Peshekhonov, N. F. Annensky, V. A. Myakotin, and others . After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 the Popular Socialist Party merged with the Trudoviks and actively supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, in which it was represented. After the October Socialist Revolution the P.S.'s participated in plots and armed acts against the Soviets. The party went out of existence during the period of foreign military intervention and civil war. p. 73

[40] *The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart* (the Seventh Congress of the Second International) was held from August 18 to 24 (new style), 1907. The R.S.D.L.P. was represented at it by 37 delegates. Among the Bolshevik delegates attending the Congress were Lenin, Lunacharsky, and Litvinov. The Congress considered the following questions: 1) Militarism and international conflicts; 2) Relations between the political parties and the trade unions; 3) The colonial question; 4) Immigration and emigration of workers, and 5) Women's suffrage.

The main work of the Congress was in the committees where resolutions were drafted for the plenary sessions. Lenin was on the "Militarism and International Conflicts" Committee. p. 75

[41] The issue of *Proletary* (No. 17) which published this article also contained the resolution of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart. p. 75

[42] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, p. 595. p. 77

[43] *Voinov*—A. V. Lunacharsky. p. 78

[44] *Die Gleichhelt* (*Equality*)—a Social-Democratic fortnightly journal, organ of the German women's movement (later it became the organ of international women's movement) published in Stuttgart from 1890 to 1925 and edited by Clara Zetkin from 1892 to 1917. p. 78

[45] The article "*The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart*" was written by Lenin at the request of *Zerno* Publishers, who had undertaken to issue *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, 1908 (Calendar for All for 1908) in an attempt to use a legal opportunity for publishing illegal literature. Lenin received a prospectus from the publishers together with a list of contributors, including M. S. Olminsky, N. A. Rozhkov, and N. N. Baturin, who wrote articles for the *Kalendar* on the history of the Russian workers' movement, in particular of the Northern League of Russian Workers as well as of the Emancipation of Labour group. The *Kalendar* dealt with the economic and political situation in Russia, the activities of the Second Duma, questions of foreign policy, the activities of the trade unions, the strike movement, and the condition of the peasantry, and gave a chronicle of the revolutionary struggle in Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The *Kalendar* was issued in an edition of 60,000 copies and was distributed at factories and in the army and navy (not counting a few dozen copies which were confiscated by the police). p. 82

[46] *Ministerialism* (Millerandism)—an opportunist trend in West-European socialist parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, given this name after the French socialist A. Millerand, who joined the reactionary bourgeois government of France in 1899 and pursued an imperialist policy in concert with the bourgeoisie. p. 85

[47] *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen von Joh. Philbecker, Jos. Dietzgen, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx und A. an Sorge und Andere*, S. 220. p. 85

[48] *Vorwärts*—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Berlin from 1891 according to a decision of the Halle Congress of the Party as successor to the *Berliner Volksblatt* (founded in 1884), under the name *Vorwärts, Berliner Volksblatt*. Engels used its columns to combat all manifestations of opportunism. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels, the editorial board of the newspaper was in the hands of the Right wing of the Party and regularly published articles by the opportunists. *Vorwärts* gave a tendentious picture of the fight against opportunism and revisionism in the R.S.D.L.P., supporting the Economists and later, after the split in the Party, the Mensheviks. During the years of reaction in Russia it published slanderous articles by Trotsky, while denying Lenin and the Bolsheviks the opportunity to controvert him and give an objective account of the state of affairs within the Party.

During the First World War *Vorwärts* took a social-chauvinist stand. After the Great October Socialist Revolution it conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. It was issued in Berlin until 1933. p. 87

[49] *The Polish Social-Democrats*—members of the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.&L.), the revolutionary party of the Polish working class, founded in 1893 as the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland, and from August, 1900, after the Congress of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, where the Polish Social-Democrats merged with part of the Lithuanian Social-Democrats, it became known as the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. The party rendered a service in that it guided the Polish workers' movement towards an alliance with the Russian workers' movement and opposed nationalism.

During the revolution of 1905-07 the S.D.K.P.&L. fought under slogans that were close to those of the Bolshevik Party and took an uncompromising stand in regard to the liberal bourgeoisie. At that time the S.D.K.P.&L. was guilty of a number of errors: it failed to understand Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution and the leading role of the Party in the democratic revolution, and it underestimated the role of the peasantry as an ally of the working class and the significance of the national-liberation movement. While criticising the erroneous views of the S.D.K.P.&L., Lenin did not overlook the services it had rendered to the revolutionary movement in Poland. He pointed out that the Polish Social-Democrats had "created for the first time a purely proletarian party in Poland and proclaimed the vitally important principle of close union between the Polish and Russian workers in their class struggle" (see present edition, Vol. 20, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination"). At the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906 the S.D.K.P.&L. was admitted to the R.S.D.L.P. in the capacity of a territorial organisation.

The S.D.K.P.&L. hailed the October Socialist Revolution and developed a struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Poland. In December 1918, at the Unity Congress of the S.D.K.P.&L. and the P.P.S. Left wing, the two parties united, forming the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. p. 88

[50] *The Polish Socialist Party* (*P.P.S.—Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) —a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. p. 88

[51] *Dashnaktsutyuns*—members of the nationalist bourgeois party of that name. Founded in the early nineties of the nineteenth century in Turkish Armenia with the aim of liberating the Turkish Armenians from the Sultan's yoke, the party was a bourgeois-democratic conglomerate of representatives of different classes. Besides the bourgeoisie, its membership consisted largely of intellectuals, and included also peasants and workers uninfluenced by Social-Democratic propaganda, and some lumpen-proletarians, who made up the so-called "Zinvori" squads.

On the eve of the 1905-07 revolution the Dashnaktsutyuns transferred their activities to the Caucasus and established close ties with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Left wing of the party, which formed the "Young Dashnaktsutyun" group, joined the S.R. Party in 1907.

The activities of the Dashnaktsutyuns were anti-popular. Their nationalist propaganda did much harm to the cause of the international education of the proletariat and the working masses of Armenia and the whole of Transcaucasia.

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 the Dashnaks supported the policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government; after the October Socialist Revolution they formed a counter-revolutionary bloc with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Musavatists against the Bolsheviks. In 1918-20, the Dashnaks headed the bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolutionary government of Armenia; all their actions helped to convert Armenia into a colony of the foreign imperialists and a base for the Anglo-French interventionist and Russian whiteguards in their fight against the Soviet government. The working people of Armenia, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and with the assistance of the Red Army, overthrew the Dashnak Government in November 1920. With the victory of the Soviets, the Dashnaktsutyun organisations in Transcaucasia were broken up and suppressed. p. 88

[52] In 1907, the *Zerno* Book Publishers, directed by M. S. Kedrov, decided to bring out a three-volume collection of Lenin's works under the general title *Twelve Years*. The original contract for this publication is in the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Only the first volume and part one of the second appeared. The first volume contained: *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve's Book*; *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*; *The Persecutors of the*

Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism; *What Is To Be Done?*; *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*; *The Zemstvo Campaign and Iskra's Plan*; *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. The first volume came off the press in November 1907 (the cover gives the date 1908) and was confiscated soon after its appearance but a large part of the edition was saved, the book continued to circulate illegally.

Volume II was to contain Lenin's writings on the agrarian question. Owing to persecution by the censorship it was decided to drop the title *Twelve Years* and to issue the second volume in two parts: part one to contain the legal works published in 1899 in the symposium *Economic Studies and Essays*; part two the illegal works. Lenin included in the second volume his book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*, which he had just completed. This plan of publication, however, was not realised. Only the first part of Volume II under the title *The Agrarian Question* came out in the beginning of 1908, containing the following writings: *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism, The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of "Handicraft" Industry*, and *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* (Chapters I-XI). Part two of the second volume for which *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* had been set up, was confiscated by the police in the printing-press and destroyed.

Volume III was to contain programmatic and polemical articles which had appeared in the Bolshevik press (*Iskra*, *Vperyod*, *Proletary*, *Novaya Zhizn*, and others). The intensification of repression and censorship persecution against revolutionary literature prevented the publication of the third volume. p. 94

[53] *The Emancipation of Labour group*—the first Russian Marxist group founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Switzerland in 1883. Other members of the group were P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, Vera Zasulich, and V. N. Ignatov.

The Emancipation of Labour group did a great deal for the propaganda of Marxism in Russia. It translated into Russian, published abroad, and distributed in Russia Marx's and Engels's *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx's *Wage-Labour and Capital*, Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, and other works by the founders of Marxism, and also popularised Marxism in its own publications. Their work dealt a severe blow to Narodism, which was the chief ideological obstacle to the spread of Marxism and the development of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. In his *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885), and other writings, Plekhanov criticised the reactionary views of the Narodniks from the Marxist standpoint (their views concerning the non-capitalist path of Russia's development, denial of the leading role of the proletariat in the revolutionary movement, their subjective-idealistic view on the role of the individual in history, etc.). Plekhanov's two drafts of a programme for Russian Social-Democrats (1883 and 1885) published by the Emancipation

of Labour group were an important step towards the building of a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. Plekhanov's book *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) "served to rear a whole generation of Russian Marxists" (Lenin, see present edition, Vol. 16, "The *Vperyod* Faction"). It played a very important role in spreading Marxist views and stating the case for dialectical and historical materialism. The group published and distributed in Russia four volumes of the symposium *Sotsial-Demokrat*, as well as a series of popular pamphlets for the workers.

Engels welcomed the appearance of the Emancipation of Labour group "which sincerely and without reservations accepted the great economic and historical theories of Marx" (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Ausgewählte Briefe*, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1953, S. 455). Plekhanov and Vera Zasulich were personal friends of Engels and corresponded with him for many years. The group established contacts with the international labour movement, and, beginning with the First Congress of the Second International (Paris, 1889) and throughout the whole period of its existence, it represented Russian Social-Democracy at all congresses of the International.

The group played an important part in developing revolutionary consciousness of the Russian working class, although the group had no practical ties with the workers' movement in Russia. Lenin pointed out that the group "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement" (see present edition, Vol. 20, "The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement"). Moreover the members of the group were guilty of serious errors. They overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie and underestimated the revolutionary role of the peasantry as a reserve force of the proletarian revolution. These errors contained the germ of the future Menshevik views adopted by Plekhanov and other members of the group.

On the initiative of the group, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was founded in 1894. The members of the group withdrew from the Union in 1900 and founded the revolutionary organisation Sotsial-Demokrat. Members of the group on the editorial boards of Iskra and Zarya were Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Vera Zasulich. The Emancipation of Labour group announced its dissolution at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1903. p. 94

[54] St. is V. V. Starkov, R. is S. I. Radchenko, K. is R. E. Klasson. p. 98

[55] *Novoye Slovo* (*New Word*)—a monthly scientific, literary, and political magazine, published by liberal Narodniks in St. Petersburg from 1894, and by the "legal Marxists" from the spring of 1897. It published two articles by Lenin, "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" and "About a Certain Newspaper Article". The magazine was closed down by the tsarist authorities in December 1897. p. 98

[56] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist theoretical and political magazine published by the editors of Iskra in 1901-02. The following articles by Lenin were published in it: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx" (under the title of "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". Four issues of the magazine appeared. p. 99

[57] *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. it became the Central Organ of the Party. Lenin's reference to the old *Iskra* applies to issues No. 1 to No. 51 of the paper. After that *Iskra* became the factional organ of the Mensheviks. p. 99

[58] *The Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*) group, whose members were known as Narodovoltsi, came into existence in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1891. Among its original membership were M. S. Olminsky (Alexandrov) N. L. Meshchervakov, Y. M. Alexandrova, A. A. Fedulov, and A. A. Yergin. The group adhered to the Narodnaya Volya programme. Its press issued a number of illegal pamphlets and leaflets, *Worker's Miscellany*, and two issues of *Letuchy Listok* (*The Leaflet*). The group was suppressed by the police in April 1894 but shortly resumed its activities. At that period it was in process of abandoning Narodnaya Volya views for Social-Democracy. The last issue of *Letuchy Listok*, No. 4, which appeared in December 1895, showed clear signs of Social-Democratic influence. The group established contact with the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, printed several of the League's publications (for example, Lenin's *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers*), and made arrangements with the League for the joint publication of the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo*. Arrangements were also made to use the group's press to print Lenin's pamphlet *On Strikes*, which was smuggled out of prison in May 1896 (the manuscript is still missing). This plan did not mature, however, owing to the discovery and suppression of the printing-press by the police and the arrest of members of the group in June 1896, after which the group went out of existence. Eventually some of its members (P. F. Kudelli, N. L. Meshcheryakov, M. S. Olminsky, and others) became active figures in the R.S.D.L.P., the majority, however, joining the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

The *Narodnoye Pravo* (*People's Right*) group, whose members were known as Narodopravtsi, was an illegal organisation of Russian democratic intellectuals founded in the summer of 1893 by the former Narodovoltsi O. V. Aptekman, A. I. Bogdanovich, A. V. Gedeonovsky, M. A. Natanson, N. S. Tyutchev, and others. The Narodopravtsi made it their aim to unite all opposition forces for the fight to win political reforms. The organisation issued two programmatic documents—"The Manifesto" and "An Urgent Issue". It

was suppressed by the tsarist authorities in spring of 1894. For Lenin's assessment of the Narodnoye Pravo as a political party see *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 329-32) and *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 344-45). Most of the Narodopravtsi subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 99

[59] *Bernsteinism*—an opportunist trend in German and international Social-Democracy hostile to Marxism. It arose in the late nineteenth century and received its name from Eduard Bernstein, who was the most outspoken representative of the Right opportunist trend in the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 100

[60] *Bezzaglavtsi*—members of a semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik, group of Russian intellectuals (S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, V. V. Portugalov, V. V. Khizhnyakov, and others), which came into being when the revolution of 1905-07 was beginning to decline. The group's name was derived from the weekly political periodical *Bez Zaglaviya* (literally *Without a Title*) issued in St. Petersburg in January-May 1906 under the editorship of Prokopovich. Later the *Bezzaglavtsi* grouped themselves around the Left-wing Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*. Under the cloak of formal non-partisanship they advocated the ideas of bourgeois liberalism and opportunism and supported the revisionists in Russian and international Social-Democracy. p. 101

[61] "*Volume 3 of this publication*"—meaning the third volume of the collection *Twelve Years*, which was never published. p. 102

[62] *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published in St. Petersburg as a daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. Lenin took over the editorship upon his return to Russia in early November. *Novaya Zhizn* was in fact the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Closely associated with the paper were V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. S. Olminsky, and others. Maxim Gorky actively collaborated and gave the paper great financial aid. The circulation reached 80,000 copies.

The newspaper was constantly persecuted. Of the twenty-seven issues, fifteen were confiscated. Following the appearance of issue No. 27 the paper was closed down by the government. The last issue, No. 28, came out illegally. p. 105

[63] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen numbers were issued. The newspaper's organiser, manager and ideological guide was Lenin. Other members of the Editorial Board were V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, and M. S. Olminsky.

The outstanding role which the newspaper played in combating Menshevism, re-establishing the Party principle, and formulating

and elucidating the tactical issues posed by the rising revolution was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress, which recorded a vote of thanks to the Editorial Board. p. 107

[64] *Cut-off lands* (*otrezki*)—lands which were taken away (cut off) from the peasants by the landlords when serfdom was abolished in Russia. p. 109

[65] *Zemstvo*—so-called local self-government bodies headed by the nobility. Zemstvos were set up in the central gubernias of Russia in 1864. Their powers were restricted to purely local economic affairs (hospitals, roads, statistics, insurance, etc.). They were subordinated to the provincial governors and the Ministry of the Interior, who could overrule any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 110

[66] *Executive Committee of the Left*—the slogan for the formation of such a committee was put forward by the Bolsheviks in order to ensure the independence of the class line pursued by the workers' deputies in the Duma, to guide the activities of the peasant deputies, and keep them free from the influence of the Cadets. The Mensheviks countered this slogan with their slogan of "a national opposition", that is, support of the Cadets by the workers' and peasants' deputies, the Mensheviks classing the Cadets as a Left party, along with the Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Trudoviks.

In July 1906, after the First Duma was dissolved, the Executive Committee of the Left virtually organised itself around the Social-Democratic group of the Duma. On the initiative of the Executive Committee of the Left the following manifestoes were issued: "Manifesto to the Army and Navy" over the signatures of the Committee of the Social-Democratic Duma group and the Committee of the Trudovik group; "Manifesto to All the Russian Peasants" signed also by the All-Russian Peasant Union, the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., the C.C. of the Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the All-Russian Railwaymen's Union and the All-Russian Teachers' Union, "Manifesto to All the People" signed by the above parties (without the three unions) as well as by the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund. The manifestoes rallied the people to the revolutionary struggle against the government and put forward the slogan of a constituent assembly. p. 111

[67] *Senate interpretations*—interpretations of the Law of December 11 (24), 1905 governing elections to the Duma issued by the Senate on the eve of the elections to the Second Duma. By these interpretations the Senate deprived further groups of the population of the franchise. p. 116

[68] *Trepov, D. F*—Governor-General of St. Petersburg, notorious for inspiring Black-Hundred outrages and for his brutal suppression of the revolution of 1905. p. 117

[69] See Karl Marx, "The Prussian Counter-Revolution and the Prussian Judicial Caste" (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 6, S. 138, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959). p. 119

[70] *Union of the Russian People*—an extremely reactionary Black-Hundred organisation of monarchists, founded in St. Petersburg in October 1905 to fight the revolutionary movement. It was a union of reactionary landlords, big houseowners, merchants, police officials, clergymen, middle-class townspeople, kulaks, and declassed and criminal elements. The Union was headed by V. A. Bobrinsky, A I. Dubrovin, P. A. Krushevan, N. Y. Markov 2nd, V. M. Purishkevich, and others. Its press organs were the newspapers *Russkoye Znaniya* (*Russian Banner*), *Obyedineniye* (*Unity*), and *Groza* (*Storm*). The Union had branches in many towns.

It upheld the tsarist autocracy, semi-feudal landlordism, and the privileges of the nobles. It adopted as its programme slogan the old monarchist and nationalist motto of the days of serfdom—"Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationhood". The Union's principal method of struggle against the revolution was pogroms and murder. With the aid and connivance of the police, its members openly and with impunity beat up and murdered revolutionary workers and democratically-minded intellectuals, broke up and shot down meetings, organised anti-Jewish pogroms, and hounded non-Russian nationalities.

After the dissolution of the Second Duma the Union divided into two organisations: the League of Michael the Archangel, headed by Purishkevich, which stood for the Third Duma being used for counter-revolutionary purposes, and the Union of the Russian People proper, headed by Dubrovin, which continued the tactics of open terrorism. Both these reactionary organisations were abolished during the bourgeois-democratic February revolution (1917). After the October Socialist Revolution the former members of these organisations took an active part in counter-revolutionary insurrections and plots against the Soviet government. p. 123

[71] *Zubri* (literally "aurochs") applied in Russian political literature to the extreme Right-wing representatives of reactionary landlordism (die-hards). p. 124

[72] *Russkoye Znamya* (*Russian Banner*)—a Black-Hundred newspaper, organ of the Union of the Russian People, published in St. Petersburg from November 1905 to 1917. p. 126

[73] *Golos Moskvy* (*Voice of Moscow*)—a Moscow daily newspaper, organ of the Octobrist Party, published from December 1906 to June 1915. p. 126

[74] Lenin's comment "On Plekhanov's Article" was published in *Proletary* as an editorial postscript to I. P. Meshkovsky's article "And This Is Called 'Polemics'". p. 133

[75] *The Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Terijoki on October 27 (November 9), 1907. It was attended by 57 delegates with the right to vote and 11 consultative delegates. The agenda consisted of the following items: 1) Report of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the election campaign to the Third Duma; 2) Report on the activities of the Central Committee; 3) The All-Russian Conference; 4) The trial of the Second Duma's Social-Democratic group, 5) Unemployment 6) Re-election of the city conference and other organisational questions.

The report of the St. Petersburg Committee stated that the police used brutal violence against the working-class voters during the elections to the Third Duma, prevented the Social-Democrats from conducting their election campaign, and so on. The report also mentioned the existence in St. Petersburg of an absolutely independent organisation of the Mensheviks, which was kept a secret from the Party.

The report on the activities of the Central Committee pointed out that the latter's efficiency was inadequate owing to the absence of a stable majority. On many important questions (the publication of a Central Organ, endorsement of the resolution on the trade unions, discussion of the Duma group's first steps, etc.) the Central Committee had not been able to arrive at any decisions owing to the disruptive role of the Mensheviks On this item of the agenda the Conference expressed the wish that the representatives of the St. Petersburg organisation at the forthcoming All-Russian Conference should do their utmost to "help the C.C. out of the present impasse and raise its activities to the requisite level" (*Proletary*, No. 20, November 19, 1907).

Lenin delivered reports at the Conference on the preparations for the All-Russian Conference, namely, on the tactics of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma and the participation of Social-Democrats in the bourgeois press. On the questions of S.D. tactics in the Duma the Conference voted for Lenin's resolution by a majority of 37 against 12. Those who voted against it were the Mensheviks, who proposed supporting the "Left" Octobrists in the Third Duma and voting for a "Left" Octobrist in the election to the Duma presidium. The Conference adopted the Bolsheviks' motion that it was inadmissible for Social-Democrats to participate in the bourgeois press. During the discussion of the trial against the S.D. group in the Second Duma, Lenin informed the Conference that he had notified the International Socialist Bureau about the impending trial, and that the Bureau, through the International Parliamentary Union, would raise the question in the British, German, and Belgian parliaments in order to draw the attention of the international working class to this matter. The Conference decided to call a one-day strike of the men and women workers of St. Petersburg and the gubernia on the opening day of the trial against the S.D. group of the Second Duma.

The Conference elected two Bolshevik delegates to the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 135

[76] *Dresden Parteitag*—the Dresden Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party, held September 13-20 (new style), 1903. The Congress adopted an opportunist resolution on the admissibility of S.D. participation in the bourgeois press. p. 140

[77] *The Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* ("*Third All-Russian*") was held in Helsingfors (Helsinki) November 5-12 (18-25), 1907, shortly after the elections to the Third Duma. Twenty-seven delegates attended the Conference: ten Bolsheviks, four Mensheviks, five Polish S.D.'s, five Bundists, and three Lettish S.D.'s.

The agenda of the Conference contained the following questions: the tactics of the S.D. group in the Duma, the question of group centres, and the strengthening of the C.C.'s contacts with the local organisations, and the participation of Social-Democrats in the bourgeois press. The Conference also discussed the question of giving a name to Social-Democratic representation in the Duma. The report on the tactics of the S.D. group in the Third Duma was made by Lenin. His evaluation of the June-the-third regime and the tasks of the Party was challenged by the Mensheviks and the Bundists, who spoke in favour of supporting the Cadets and the "Left" Octobrists in the Duma. By a majority of votes, the Conference adopted the Bolshevik resolution proposed on behalf of the St. Petersburg City Conference. It also adopted the Bolshevik resolution on the inadmissibility of S.D. participation in the bourgeois press, directed against the Menshevik publicists, especially Plekhanov, who had criticised the decisions of the Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the "Second All-Russian") in the Left Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*. The Conference named S.D. representation in the Duma "the Social-Democratic group".

In view of the fact that the Menshevik centre, behind the back of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., was making contacts with the local committees, the Conference outlined measures for strengthening contacts between the C.C. of the Party and the local organisations.

By adopting Leninist decisions on fundamental issues, the Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. equipped the Party with correct, Marxist tactics in the struggle to win the masses during the period of reaction.

The minutes of the Conference have not been found. The proceedings and decisions were extensively reported by the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*, No. 20, November 19, 1907. p. 141

[78] Lenin is referring to the agrarian laws drafted by Stolypin and promulgated by the tsarist government in November 1906. A ukase, "On Amendments to Certain Enactments Regarding Peasant Land Tenure and Ownership", was issued on November 9 (22), 1906; after being passed by the Duma and the Council of State, it became known as the Law of June 14, 1910. Another ukase was issued on November 15 (28), 1906, "On the Issue of Loans by the Peasant Land Bank on Security of Allotment Lands". Under these laws the peasant was given the right to take possession of his allotment as

private property and withdraw from the village commune to his *otrub* or *khutor*. The *otrub* or *khutor* peasant could receive a loan from the Peasant Bank to acquire his property. The object of Stolypin's agrarian reforms was to create a mainstay for the autocracy in the countryside, in the shape of a class of kulaks, while preserving landlord ownership and destroying the village communes. This policy hastened capitalist evolution of agriculture by the most painful, "Prussian" method, while preserving the power, property, and privileges of the semi-feudal landlords; it intensified the forcible expropriation of the bulk of the peasants, and accelerated the development of a peasant bourgeoisie, which was enabled to buy up the allotments of the poor peasants for a song.

Lenin called the Stolypin agrarian legislation of 1906 (and the Law promulgated on June 14 [27], 1910) the second step, after the 1861 Reform, towards converting tsarism into a bourgeois monarchy. "The 'delay' granted to the old order and the old semi-feudal landlordism by Stolypin," wrote Lenin, "opened another, and last, safety valve without expropriating the whole landownership of the landlords" (see present edition, Vol. 18, "The Last Valve"). Despite the government's propaganda drive to encourage the peasants to withdraw from the communes, only some 2,500,000 peasant households withdrew from the communes in European Russia in the nine years 1907-15. Those most interested in this arrangement were the rural bourgeoisie, for it enabled them to build up their farms. Some poor peasants, too, left the communes in order to sell their allotments and have done with village life. The bulk of the small impoverished peasants, however, continued the same old miserable existence on their backward farms.

Stolypin's agrarian policy did not do away with the fundamental antagonism between the peasantry as a whole and the landlords, and led to the still greater impoverishment of the peasant masses and the aggravation of class contradictions between the kulaks and the rural poor. p. 142

[79] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Chapter IV. p. 152

[80] *Znamya Truda* (*Banner of Labour*)—the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in Paris from July 1907 to April 1914. p. 153

[81] *The Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov* (*A. V. Lunacharsky*) *on the Attitude of the Party Towards the Trade Unions* was written by Lenin in November 1907. Lunacharsky's pamphlet was never published. p. 161

[82] This refers to the Mannheim Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held September 23-29 (new style), 1906. The chief item on the agenda was the question of the mass political strike, which the German Social-Democrats, at their Jena Congress in 1905, recognized as the most important method of political struggle.

Mention was made in this connection of the trade unions, which rejected the idea of a mass political strike as being anarchistic. The Mannheim Congress did not openly condemn the opportunist position of the trade unions, but recommended all party members to join trade-union organisations, and trade-union members to join the S.D. Party "in order to infuse the spirit of Social-Democracy into the trade-union movement". p. 162

[83] *Die Neue Zeit*—the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky and subsequently by Heinrich Cunow. Some of the works of Marx and Engels were first published in its columns, among them Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and Engels's *Contribution to the Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891*. Engels regularly helped the editors with suggestions and advice and often criticised them for departures from Marxism. Contributors included August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Paul Lafargue, G. V. Plekhanov, and other leading figures in the German and international labour movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Beginning with the late nineties, after the death of Engels, the *Neue Zeit* made a regular practice of publishing articles by revisionists, notably Bernstein's series "Problems of Socialism", which launched the revisionists' campaign against Marxism. During the First World War the journal adopted a Centrist stand, in effect supporting the social-chauvinists. p. 162

[84] *Nozdrev*—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls*, typifying a bullying landlord and cheat. p. 164

[85] *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly journal published abroad from June 18 (July 1), 1902 to October 5 (18), 1905 under the editorship of P. Struve. It was the organ of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and expounded the ideas of moderate monarchist liberalism. In 1903, the *Osvobozhdeniye* League was formed around the journal, taking definite shape in January 1904 and existing until October 1905. Together with the Zemstvo constitutionalists the Osvobozhdeniye liberals formed the core of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (the Cadets), which was founded in October 1905, and became the chief party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. p. 165

[86] This refers to the armed uprising of the workers against the autocracy in December 1905. p. 167

[87] *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* was written between 1901 and 1907. The first four chapters were published in Zarya, Nos. 2-3, for December 1901, under the title "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question (First Essay)"; the contribution bore the signature of N. Lenin. The chapters were published legally in Odessa

in 1905 by the *Burevestnik* Publishers as a separate pamphlet entitled *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*. This title was retained by the author for subsequent publications of the essay in whole or in part.

Chapters V-IX were first published in February 1906 in the legal magazine *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*), No. 2, where they were given subtitles; Chapters I-IV, published in *Zarya* and in the 1905 edition, had none.

The nine chapters with two additional ones (X and XI) were first published together in 1908 in St. Petersburg in *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, by Vl. Ilyin (V. I. Lenin), Chapters I-IV having subtitles, some editorial changes were made in the text and some notes added.

Chapter XII (the last) was first published in 1908 in the collection *Current Life*.

The first nine chapters are given in Vol. 5, pp. 103-222 of the present edition. Volume 13 contains Chapters X, XI, XII, written in 1907. p. 169

[88] Lenin is referring to the book by Franz Bensing *Der Einfluss der landwirtschaftlichen Maschinen auf Volks- und Privatwirtschaft*, Breslau, 1897. p. 172

[89] Lenin is referring to M. Hecht's book *Drei Dörfer der badischen Hard*, Leipzig, 1895. p. 174

[90] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 68-70. p. 175

[91] Lenin is referring to the letter of the well-known Narodnik publicist A. N. Engelhardt "From the Countryside" published in the journal *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (*Fatherland Notes*). p. 175

[92] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 727. Lenin's references are to Vol. III of the German edition of 1894 and he gives all quotations in his own translation. p. 181

[93] See Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 2. Teil, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959. p. 181

[94] *V. V.*—pseudonym of V. Vorontsov, the ideologist of the liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties of the last century. p. 188

[95] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 791. p. 207

[96] Lenin's book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* was written in November-December 1907. It was included in Part 2, Volume II of the collection of Lenin's works entitled *Twelve Years*, which was to have been published in 1908, but the book was seized at the printers by the police and destroyed. Only one copy was saved with several pages at the end of it missing. The book was first published in 1917

under the title, Vl. Ilyin (N. Lenin), *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1906-1907* (Petrograd. *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers)

The 1917 edition of this book was printed from the mutilated copy, which broke off at the following unfinished sentence: "The reformative path of creating a Junker-bourgeois Russia presupposes the preservation of the foundations of the old system of landownership and their slow" ... (See present volume, p. 425.) To this Lenin added the words: "systematic, and most painful coercion of the mass of the peasantry. The revolutionary path of creating a peasant bourgeois Russia necessarily presupposes the break-up of the, old system of landownership, the abolition of the private ownership of the land."

The present edition is reproduced from the manuscript corrected by Lenin several years after the 1908 edition. p. 217

[97] *Allotment land*—the plots of land allotted to the peasants after the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861; they belonged to the village commune and were periodically reallotted among the peasants for their use. p. 220

[98] *Crown lands*—land made over in 1797 out of the total of state lands to the members of the tsarist household as their private property together with the peasants who worked it; by a ukase of Paul I. The revenue from the exploitation of the crown-land peasants was used for the upkeep of the imperial family (including the Grand dukes, their wives, daughters, etc.). These sums were not included in the state budget and were not subject to control by the state. p. 222

[99] *Winter hiring*—the system practised by the landlords and kulaks of hiring peasants for summer work in the winter, when the peasants were badly in need of money and compelled to accept enslaving terms. p. 225

[100] *General Redistribution*—a slogan expressing the peasants' urge towards a general redistribution of the land and the abolition of landlordism. p. 230

[101] *Gurko-Lidval methods of administration*—this refers to the embezzlement, profiteering, and extortion that reigned among the higher tsarist officials and government contractors. Gurko was Deputy Minister of the Interior; in 1906, he was involved in embezzlement and profiteering in connection with grain consignments for the famine-stricken areas. The contractor for this grain was the swindler and profiteer Lidval. p. 251

[102] *John*—the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 258

[103] *Vendée*—a department in Western France where, during the French bourgeois revolution in the late eighteenth century, a

counter-revolutionary insurrection of the ignorant and reactionary peasantry took place, directed against the Republic. The insurrection was staged by the Catholic clergy, the nobles, and royalist émigrés, and supported by England.

Vendée became a synonym for reactionary revolts and hot-beds of counter-revolution. p. 260

[104] *Kostrov*—Noah Jordania, leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks. p. 260

[105] *The All-Russian Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation founded in 1905. The programme and tactics of the Union were adopted at its first and second congresses held in Moscow in August and November 1905. The Peasant Union demanded political freedom and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly, and adhered to the tactics of boycotting the First Duma. The Union's agrarian programme called for the abolition of private ownership of the land, and the transfer of monastery, crown, and state lands to the peasants without compensation. The Union, however, pursued a half-hearted vacillating policy. While demanding the abolition of landlordism, it agreed to partial compensation for the landlords. From the very beginning of its activities the Union was persecuted by the police. It ceased to exist early in 1907. p. 261

[106] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a police-sponsored, Black-Hundred newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1914. From 1906 it was the official organ of the Ministry of the Interior. p. 261

[107] Rodbertus's views are analysed by Karl Marx in *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 2. Teil, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959, SS. 82-85; Ricardo's theory is analysed in the same book, SS. 229-33. p. 273

[108] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 603. p. 275

[109] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 2. Teil, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959, S. 100. p. 275

[110] *The Homestead Act*—a law passed in the United States in 1862 granting settlers a plot of land up to 160 acres free of charge or at a nominal price. This land became the private property of its holder after five years. p. 276

[111] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 4, S. 8, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959. p. 276

[111a] *Otrub* (*farmstead*)—land allotted to peasants, who, under a law issued by the tsarist Minister Stolypin in 1906, were allowed to withdraw from the village communes. The purpose of this law was to create a mainstay for the autocracy in the countryside in the shape of a kulak class. p. 278

[112] The peasants in Russia, as a class of feudal society, were divided into three major categories 1) privately owned (landlords') peasants.

2) state peasants, and 3) crown-land peasants (belonging to the tsar's family). Each of these categories in turn, was divided into grades and special groups, which differed from one another in origin, forms of land ownership and land tenure, legal and agrarian status, etc. The Peasant Reform of 1861, carried out from above by the tsarist government in the interests of the feudal landlords, kept this diversity of grades intact right up to 1917.

Gift-land peasants—former serfs, chiefly of the southern and south-eastern black-earth gubernias, who at the time of the abolition of serfdom, received from their landlords gift allotments without having to pay compensation. Under the "Regulations" of the Peasant Reform of 1861, the landlord had the right, "by voluntary agreement" with the peasant, to make him a "gift" of a quarter of the "top" or "statutory" allotment due to the peasant (including the cottage plot) on the understanding that all the rest of peasant's land became the property of the landlord. Gift allotment, which strikingly illustrated the predatory nature of the 1861 Reform, was known among the people as "quarter", "orphan", "cat's", or "Gagarin" allotment (the latter from the name of Prince P. P. Gagarin who put forward a draft of the corresponding clauses to the local regulations governing land endowment of the peasants in the Great Russian and Ukrainian gubernias).

There were numerous gift-land peasants in such land-poor black-earth gubernias as Voronezh, Kharkov, Poltava, and Tambov, where the market price of land seized by the landlords was very high. Many peasants received gift allotments in the south-eastern and southern black-earth gubernias of Orenburg, Ufa, Saratov Ekaterinoslav, and Samara, where rentals were much lower than the quit-rents due to the landlord under the "Regulations of February 19". By the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of the growth of the population and the reallotments which this involved, the gift-landers lost practically all their allotments and formed the bulk of the land-poor peasants,

Temporarily-bound peasants—former landlords' peasants who, after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, were obliged to perform various services for the landlords (corvée service or quit-rent payment) in return for the use of allotments. This "temporarily-bound status" continued until the peasants, by agreement with the landlords had purchased their allotments by redemption payments. The landlords were obliged to accept redemption payments which became obligatory only after the Ukase of 1881, by which the "obligatory relation" between the peasant and the landlords had to cease as from January 1, 1883.

Owners—former landlords' peasants who had redeemed their allotments under the "Regulations of February 19, 1861" and thus ceased to be temporarily bound.

Full owner—former landlords' peasant who had redeemed their allotments before the specified date and had the right to own

the land as private property. The full owners were comparatively few and constituted the most well-to-do element in the countryside.

State peasants—a category of peasant who tilled state lands and who, in addition to the poll-tax, paid feudal quit-rent to the state or the leaseholder of state property. They also performed numerous services (road repairs, billeting of soldiers, stage-horse posting, etc.): Under Peter I this category included *odnodvortsi*, *chernososhniye* peasants, half-croppers, Siberian ploughmen of the Northern maritime country, and peoples of the Volga and Ural regions (Tatars, Chuvashes, Mordovians, Udmurts, and Komi). Later other categories were added—"economy" peasants (serfs who passed to the state from the secularised church estates), state peasants of the western territories and Transcaucasia, Ukrainian Cossacks, and others. The forms of land tenure and land ownership among the state peasants were extremely varied, and this condition continued even after the Peasant Reform.

State peasants with communal holdings had no right to own land as private property; they used arable and other lands belonging to the village commune.

State peasants with quarter holdings—descendants of former servicemen in the lower ranks (children of boyars, Cossacks, the *streltsi*, dragoons, soldiers, etc.) who guarded the southern and south-eastern borderlands of the State of Muscovy. The Tsar of Muscovy rewarded their services with an endowment of a *quarter* lot (half a dessiatin) and they settled in single households (hence their name *odnodvortsi*). Communal landownership arose among them in addition to their quarter holdings.

These *odnodvortsi*, being freemen, for a long time held an intermediate position between the nobles and peasants, and had the right to acquire serfs. Under Peter I they were turned into state peasants, and their land became the property of the state. Actually, however, the state peasant's with quarter holdings disposed of their lands as their own private property; in this they differed from the state peasants with communal holdings, who had no right to buy, sell, or bequeath their land.

State peasants who formerly belonged to landlords—a category of state peasants, acquired by the state from private owners or donated to the state, etc. Although regarded as state peasants they enjoyed fewer rights; they were given equal rights in 1859 on the eve of the 1861 Reform, but certain distinctions remained.

Crown-land peasants—a category of peasants who tilled the crown lands. Besides the poll-tax, they paid feudal quit-rent, performed various services, and were subjected to exactions in kind, all of which went for the maintenance of members of the tsarist household. When the crown lands took shape in 1797 the status of the peasants living on these estates was defined as something between state and landlords' peasants. The abolition of serfdom was first applied to the crown-land peasants in 1858, but did not

take full effect until 1863. These peasants received allotments as their private property subject to redemption payments over a period of 49 years. They were provided with land slightly better than the landlords' peasants, but worse than the state peasants.

Free tillers—the category of peasants freed from serfdom under the law of February 20,1803. This law permitted the landlords to decide the terms on which they gave their peasants freedom with land.

Registered peasants—a category of state peasants attached to state-owned and private manufactories for performing auxiliary jobs (wood-chopping, coal handling, ore breaking, haulage, etc.). This practice of attachment assumed wide dimensions in the Urals, Olonets gubernia, and other places in the early eighteenth century. Beginning with the early nineteenth century the registered peasants were gradually freed from factory jobs. They won complete freedom as a result of the Peasant Reform of 1861. p. 279

[113] *Borisov*—S. A. Suvorov. p. 289

[114] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine, published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early nineties it became the organ of the liberal Narodniks. From 1906 it was virtually the organ of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party. p. 290

[115] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 787. p. 293

[116] Lenin is referring to the discussion of the agrarian question at the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Tammerfors December 12-17 (25-30), 1905. The report on this question was made by Lenin. In furtherance of the decision of the Third Congress of the Party, the Conference found it necessary to include in the programme an item calling for support of the peasants' revolutionary measures, including confiscation of all state, church, monastery, crown, and privately owned lands. The Conference drew special attention to the need for an independent organisation of the rural proletariat and for showing the latter that its interests could not be reconciled with those of the rural bourgeoisie. p. 294

[117] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 2. Teil, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959, S. 336. p. 298

[118] Ibid., SS. 84, 96, 236. p. 298

[119] This section was published in the newspaper Proletary, No. 33, July 23 (August 5), 1908. p. 300

[120] *Zhizn* (*Life*)—a monthly magazine, published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901; in 1902, it was published abroad. From 1899 onwards the magazine was the organ of the "legal Marxists". p. 300

[121] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 2. Teil, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959, S. 36. p. 301

[122] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 634-720. p. 304

[123] Ibid., p. 761. p. 305

[124] Ibid., p. 761-62. p. 306

[125] Ibid., p. 787. p. 314

[126] Ibid., p. 790. p. 315

[127] Ibid., p. 792. p. 316

[128] Ibid., p. 785, 789-90. p. 317

[129] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 2. Teil, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1959, S. 36. p. 320

[129a] See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 341. p. 346

[130] The words in inverted commas "Chi ... chi ... etc. ," are a paraphrase of a passage from Chernyshevsky's *Essays on the Gogol Period in Russian Literature*. This passage, ridiculing a controversial trick used by the journalist Senkovsky ("Baron Brambeus") reads as follows: "A witty comment of *Dead Souls* might be written in the following manner: After giving the title of the book, 'The Adventures of Chichikov, or Dead Souls', the commentator might start straight off with: 'The bad dentures of Chi! chi! kov—don't think that I have sneezed, dear reader ... etc., etc.' Some twenty years ago there may have been readers who would think that witty." p. 346

[131] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 537. p. 358

[132] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol, I, 1955, p. 578. p. 359

[133] *Pravda* (*Truth*)—a monthly Menshevik magazine dealing with questions of art, literature, and social activities, published in Moscow in 1904-06. p. 365

[134] *Stepan Razin and Yemelyan Pugachov*—leaders of great peasant revolts in Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. p. 369

[135] *Saryn na kichku* (literally, "to the prow, lubbers!")—a cry said to have been used by Volga freebooters ordering the people on a boarded vessel to lie down in the bows and stay there until the looting was over. p. 369

[136] *Plekhanov's "Diary"—Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Diary of a Social-Democrat*)—a non-periodical organ published at considerable intervals by Plekhanov in Geneva from March 1905 to April 1912.

In all, sixteen issues were brought out. Publication was resumed in Petrograd in 1916, but only one issue appeared. In the first eight issues (1905-06) Plekhanov expounded extremely Right-wing Menshevik and opportunist views, advocated a bloc between Social-Democracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, rejected the idea of an alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry and condemned the December uprising. In 1909-12 (Nos. 9-16) he opposed the Menshevik liquidators, who sought to disband the underground Party organisations. On the basic questions of tactics, however, he took a Menshevik stand. Plekhanov's social-chauvinist views were forcibly expressed in the issue No. 1 published in 1916. p. 372

137 *Charters*—deeds defining the landowning relations of the temporarily-bound peasants and landlords upon the abolition of serfdom in 1861. These charters indicated the amount of land the peasant used before the Reform, and defined the size of the allotment remaining in his hands after the Reform. It also listed the duties the peasant had to perform for the landlord. The charter served as a basis for determining the amount of the peasant's redemption payment. p. 379

138 *Rurikovichi*—offshoots of Rurik, a semi-legendary prince of ancient Russia, from whom many aristocratic families in tsarist Russia claimed descent. The present allusion is to Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky. p. 395

139 *Alapayevsk Republic*—the name which tsarist officials gave to the Alapayevsk Volost in the Verkhnyaya Tura Uyezd, Perm Gubernia. G. I. Kabakov, the Socialist-Revolutionary peasant deputy in the Second Duma whom Lenin mentions, succeeded in organising a Peasant Union in the Alapayevsk Volost in 1905 with as many as 30,000 members. p. 402

139a *Possessional production*—industrial enterprises based on the exploitation of possessional peasants. This category of peasants was introduced by Peter the Great (1721), who allowed serf peasants to be bought for work at the manufactories. These serfs were attached to the enterprise and could not be sold apart from the manufactory.

Possessional ownership was abolished in 1863 following the abolition of serfdom in 1861. p. 403

140 *National-Democrat*—member of the National-Democratic Party, the chief, reactionary, nationalist party of the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie, closely associated with the Catholic Church. The party was founded in 1897, its leaders being R. Dmowski, Z. Balicki, W. Grabski, and others. The N.D.'s put forward the slogans of "class harmony" and "national interests". They tried to win influence over the masses and draw them into the current of their reactionary policy. They preached aggressive nationalism and chauvinism as a means of struggle against the socialist and

general democratic movement among the Polish people, which they attempted to isolate from the Russian revolutionary movement. During the revolution of 1905-07 they sought to make a deal with tsarism to secure Polish autonomy, and openly supported it in its struggle against the revolution by "every means in their power including informing, lock-outs, and assassination". The Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a special resolution emphasising the need "unremittingly and relentlessly to expose the counter-revolutionary Black-Hundred physiognomy and activities of the National-Democrats as the allies of tsarism in its fight against the revolution" (see "*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses*, *Conferences*, *and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 168). During the First World War (1914-18) the N.D.'s unreservedly supported the Entente, counting on the victory of tsarist Russia, the uniting of Polish territories which had been under the heel of Austria and Germany, and the granting of autonomy to Poland within the framework of the Russian empire. The downfall of the tsarist regime impelled the N.D.'s towards a pro-French orientation. Bitter enemies of the October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet state though they were, the N.D.'s, in keeping with their traditional anti-German attitude did not always give whole-hearted support to the adventurist anti-Soviet foreign policy pursued by the Pilsudski clique which ruled Poland beginning from 1926. At the present time various groups of the National-Democratic Party are active among reactionary Polish émigrés. p. 405

[141] *Wakf lands*—lands in areas with a Moslem population, which could not be sold or transferred. The revenue derived from such land was disposed of chiefly by the Moslem clergy. Under the Soviet government the wakf lands became state property. p. 408

[142] *Arakcheyev*, *A. A.*—reactionary tsarist statesman of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He greatly influenced home and foreign policies in the reigns of Paul I and Alexander I. His name stands for an epoch of unlimited police despotism and a brutal military regime. p. 408

[143] *Razuvayev and Kolupayev*—types of capitalist sharks portrayed by Saltykov-Shchedrin, the Russian satirist. p. 422

[144] *Nartsis Tuporylov* (Narcissus Blunt-Snout)—the pseudonym under which Y. O. Martov published his satirical poem "Hymn of the Contemporary Russian Socialist", which appeared in *Zarya*, No. 1, April 1901. p. 428

[145] Lenin wrote this *Postscript* for the 1917 edition of the book. p. 430

[146] *The Debate on the Extension of the Duma's Budgetary Powers* was first published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the

R.S.D.L.P., issue No. 1, February 1908. The article was reprinted in the newspaper Proletary, No. 27, March 26 (April 8) of the same year with a postscript by Lenin (see p. 439 of this volume).

Sotsial-Demokrat—Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., an illegal newspaper, published from February 1908 to January 1917. Issue No. 1 appeared in Russia, but thereafter the paper was published abroad, first in Paris, then in Geneva. The Editorial Board, according to a decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., was made up of representatives of the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, and the Polish Social-Democrats. Over eighty articles and other items of Lenin's were published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. On the paper's Editorial Board Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line. Some of the editors (Kamenev and Zinovyev) took a conciliatory stand towards the liquidators and tried to obstruct Lenin's policy. The Menshevik editors Martov and Dan sabotaged the work of the Editorial Board while at the same time openly defending the liquidators in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising fight against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan retiring from the Editorial Board in June 1911. From December 1911 onwards *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin. p. 432

147 *Stolichnaya Pochta* (*Metropolitan Post*)—a Left-Cadet newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to February 1908. p. 432

147a *Bezgolovy* (*Headless*)—ironically applied by Lenin to the *Bezzaglavtsi*, a group of bourgeois liberals (S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, etc.) formed around the journal *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*). In 1908, the *Bezzaglavtsi* published the newspapers *Stolichnaya Pochta* and *Nasha Gazeta*. p. 436

148 *Nasha Gazeta* (*Our Newspaper*)—a newspaper of a semi-Cadet trend, published in St. Petersburg from 1904 to 1908. p. 439

149 *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*), No. 29, April 16 (29), 1908, published a letter of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the local organisations concerning the work of the Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma. p. 439

150 Lenin is possibly referring to the article "Political Sketches" published in the symposium *Nasha Tribuna* (*Our Tribune*), Book I, Vilna, 1907. The writer of the article—M-d-m (Medem), a prominent Bundist, argued that after the defeat of the revolution of 1905-07 Russian Social-Democracy should drop such revolutionary slogans as that calling for a constituent assembly. p. 445

151 *Al. Al.*—A. A. Bogdanov. p. 448

152 Lenin refers to the collection of articles by V. Bazarov, Berman, A. Lunacharsky, P. Yushkevich, A. Bogdanov, I. Gelfond, and S. Suvorov. p. 448

[153] This refers to Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* which appeared in Geneva in May 1904. p. 448

[154] This refers to A. Bogdanov's book *Empirio-monism*, Moscow, 1904. p. 448

[155] A collection of articles by A. Lunacharsky, V. Bazarov, A. Bogdanov, P. Maslov, A. Finn, V. Shulyatikov, V. Fritche and others, published in St. Petersburg in 1904. The articles by Plekhanov and Lenin did not appear in this book. p. 449

[156] Lenin's *Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy* has not been found. p. 450

[157] At that time Lenin had begun to write his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. p. 450

[158] The *third editor* was I. F. Dubrovinsky. p. 453

[159] Lenin is referring to his article "Political Notes" published in the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 21, February 13 (26), 1908. The question of the Party programme was dealt with more fully in the article "Pyotr Maslov Corrects Karl Marx's Rough Notes" (*Proletary*, No. 33, July 23 [August 5] , 1908). (See present volume, p. 300, Section 2 of Chapter III of *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*.) p. 457

[160] *Meons*—Russian abbreviation for members of the Peaceful Renovation Party. p. 457

[161] Lenin's article "*Trade-Union Neutrality*" was also published in a slightly abbreviated form in the symposium *O Veyaniyakh Vremeni* (*Spirit of the Times*), St. Petersburg, *Tvorchestvo* Publishers and signed Vl. Ilyin. p. 460

[162] The resolution of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. on trade unions was published in *Proletary*, No. 21, February 13 (26), 1908.

Party members were instructed to set up Party groups within trade-union organisations and to work in them under the direction of the local Party centres. Where police persecution made it impossible to organise trade unions or to recreate those that had been broken up, the C.C. proposed that trade-union nuclei and trade unions should be organised illegally. As regards such legal organisations as benefit societies, temperance societies, and others, the resolution of the C.C. instructed the local Party organisations to form within them "well-knit groups of Social-Democrats to conduct Party work among the broadest possible masses of the proletariat". To thwart any attempt on the part of the Mensheviks to interpret this part of the resolution in an opportunist manner, the resolution pointed out the need for making it clear that "the organised activity of the proletariat cannot be limited to such societies alone" and

that the legal existence of trade unions "should not belittle the militant tasks of organising the proletariat in trade unions" (*Proletary*, No. 21. February 13 [26]. 1908, p. 4). p. 460

[163] *Nash Vek* (*Our Century*)—a newspaper, a popular edition of the Left-Cadet organ *Tovarishch*, published in St. Petersburg in 1905-08. p. 460

[164] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—a Bolshevik working-class newspaper directed by Lenin. Published illegally in Vyborg by the Editorial Board of *Proletary* from September 10 (23), 1906 to January 19 (February 1), 1908. Twenty issues appeared. Beginning with issue No. 2 it appeared as the organ of the local committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; No. 2 was the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Moscow District committees; Nos. 3-7 the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow District, Perm, and Kursk committees; Nos. 8-19 the organ of these committees with the addition of the Kazan committee; the last issue, No. 20, gave the Urals Regional Committee in place of the Perm and Kazan committees. p. 461

[165] The book *Revision of the Agrarian Programme and Its Substantiation* by D. Firsov (D . Rosenblum) and M . Yacoby (M . Hendelman) was issued by the *Era* Publishers, Moscow, 1908. The book was confiscated. The analysis of it in *Proletary* promised by Lenin did not appear. p. 465

[166] *Sovremenny Mir* (*Contemporary World*)—a monthly literary, scientific, and political magazine, published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to 1918. The Mensheviks, including Plekhanov, were closely associated with it. During the bloc with the Plekhanovites and at the beginning of 1914 the Bolsheviks contributed to the magazine.

In March 1914, the magazine published Lenin's article "One More Annihilation of Socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 20). During the First World War (1914-18) the magazine became the mouthpiece of the social-chauvinists. p. 466

[167] See Friedrich Engels, *Zur Kritik des sozial-demokratischen Programmentwurfes von 1891*, *Die Neue Zeit*, Jg. XX, 1901, B. II, H. 1. p. 473

[168] The article "*Lessons of the Commune*" published in *Zagranichnaya Gazeta* (*Foreign Gazette*), No. 2, March 23, 1908 is the verbatim report of a speech made by Lenin. The editors of the newspaper introduced the article with the following remark: "An international meeting was held in Geneva on March 18 to commemorate three proletarian anniversaries: the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Marx, the sixtieth anniversary of the March revolution of 1848, and the anniversary of the Paris Commune. Comrade Lenin on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P. spoke at the meeting on the significance of the Commune."

Zagranichnaya Gazeta—a newspaper published by a group of Russian emigrants in Geneva in March-April 1908. p. 475

[169] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, 1958, p. 497. p. 475

[170] For Marx's evaluation of the historical role of the Paris Commune, as a forerunner of the new society, see *The Civil War in France* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, 1958, pp. 473-545) and letters to Kugelmann for April 12 and 17, 1871 (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, pp. 318-20). p. 477

[171] This refers to the Manifesto of October 17th, 1905 in which the tsar, frightened by the revolution, promised the people civic liberties and a constitution. p. 477

[171a] *Muravyov, M. N.* (1796-1866)—a reactionary statesman of tsarist Russia. In the capacity of Governor-General of Vilna, Muravyov crushed the insurrection of 1863 in Poland, Lithuania, and Byelorussia with great cruelty, for which he earned the name of "hangman". p. 480

[172] *Judas Golovlyov*—a type of sanctimonious, hypocritical landlord serf-owner described in Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 481

[173] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly magazine of the liberal bourgeoisie, published in Moscow from 1880 to the middle of 1918. After the revolution of 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. p. 483

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Chronology

(*June 1907-April 1908*)

1907

June, after 22 (July 5)	Lenin writes the article "In Memory of Count Heyden (What Are Our Non-Party 'Democrats' Teaching the People?)" for the symposium *Voice of Life*.
June 25 (July 8)	Lenin is elected by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to represent the Party on the International Socialist Bureau.
June 26 (July 9)	Lenin writes the article "Against Boycott (Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist)". The article was published in a booklet *On the Boycott of the Third Duma*, which came out in August 1907.
June-July	Lenin takes his holiday in Styrsudd (Finland).
July 8 and 14 (21 and 27)	Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the St. Petersburg City Conference held in Terijoki; makes a report on the question of the attitude of Social-Democracy towards the Third Duma. The Conference adopts Lenin's resolution against the boycott of the Third Duma. The theses of Lenin's report are published in leaflet form.
July 16 (29)	By decision of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin is elected a member of the R.S.D.L.P.'s delegation to the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart.
July 21-23 (August 3-5)	Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. ("Second All-Russian") held in Kotka (Finland); makes a report on the question of participation in the elections to the Third Duma. The Conference adopts a resolution proposed by Lenin against boycotting the elections to the Third Duma. Lenin's draft resolution on the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions is handed over to the C.C. as material.

July	Lenin prepares the second edition of his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, to which he makes additions and writes a preface.
August 1 (14)	In a letter to A. M. Gorky Lenin invites him to take part in the proceedings of the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress and notifies Gorky that the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. has granted him a consultative voice.
August 5-10 (18-23)	Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the Stuttgart Congress; he is elected to the committee for drafting a resolution "On Militarism and International Conflicts".
Between August 5 and 10 (18 and 23)	Lenin calls and holds a conference of Left Socialists, delegates of the Stuttgart Congress.
August after 11 (24)	Lenin returns to Kokkala (Finland) from Stuttgart.
August 22 (September 4)	Lenin writes his article "Notes of a Publicist" for the symposium *Voice of Life*, defending Bolshevik tactics in regard to the Third Duma and the Duma parties.
Between August 31 and September 7 (September 13 and 20)	The symposium *Voice of Life* edited by Lenin and containing his articles "In Memory of Count Heyden" and "Notes of a Publicist" appears in St. Petersburg.
August	The C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. elects Lenin Editor-in-Chief of the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
August-September	Lenin writes two articles on the subject of "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart". One of them, a popular article, was written for the Bolshevi publication *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, *1908*.
August-October	Lenin edits the Russian translations of the reports to the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart made by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party and the Italian Socialist Party.
August-December	Lenin prepares for the press a three-volume edition of his works entitled *Twelve Years*.
Beginning of September	Lenin makes a report on the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart to the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

September 7 (20)	Lenin is elected by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and its management committee. The post of Editor-in-Chief of the Central Organ is abolished at this meeting.
September	Lenin writes the preface to Volume I of his collected works *Twelve Years*.
Between October 19 and 26 (November 1 and 8	The symposium *Zarnitsi* (*Summer Lightnings*) edited by Lenin appears in St. Petersburg. *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, 1908 containing Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" appears in St. Petersburg.
October 20 (November 2)	Lenin's articles "Revolution and Counter-Revolution" and "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" are published in the newspaper *Proletary*, issue No. 17.
October 27 (November 9)	Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the Conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. in Terijoki at which he makes reports "On the Third Duma" and "On the participation of Social-Democrats in the bourgeois press". The Conference adopts Lenin's resolution "On the Third Duma".
October 29 (November 11)	Lenin's article "The Third Duma" and the editorial note "On Plekhanov's Article" are published in *Proletary*, No. 18.
Novernber, up to 5th (18th)	Lenin attends the preliminary meeting of the Bolshevik delegates to "The Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.
November 5 (18)	Lenin's articles "The Preparation of a 'Disgusting Orgy'", "But Who Are the Judges?", and "Resolution on the Third State Duma" adopted at the Conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. are published in *Proletary*, No. 19.
November 5-12 (18-25)	Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. ("Third All-Russian") in Helsingfors, makes a report "On the Tactics of the Social-Democratic Group in the Third State Duma". The Conference adopts Lenin's resolution on this question.
November	Lenin writes the "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov (A. V. Lunacharsky) on the Attitude of the Party Towards the Trade Unions".

Autumn 1907	Lenin writes Chapters X-XII of *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*.
Between November 16 and 23 (November 29 and December 6)	The volume of collected works Twelve Years by V. I. Lenin (Vl. Ilyin) appears in St. Petersburg.
November (beginning of December)	*Twelve Years*, the volume of collected works by Lenin is confiscated by the police. Legal proceedings are taken against Lenin. Lenin hides from the police by leaving Kokkala for Aggelby (near Helsingfors).
November-December	Lenin works on his book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907.*
December	Lenin leaves Aggelby for abroad. While waiting for N. K. Krupskaya to join him he spends several days in Stockholm.
December 22 (January 4, 1908)	The St. Petersburg Law Court orders Lenin's book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* to be destroyed.
December 22-24 (January 4-6, 1908)	On his way to Geneva Lenin stops over in Berlin where he meets, Rosa Luxemburg.
December 25 (January 7 1908)	Lenin arrives in Geneva with N. K. Krupskaya. The beginning of Lenin's second period of emigration.
December 1907-February 1908	Lenin is engaged in the work of preparing Proletary for publication in Geneva.

1908

Between January 11 and 18 (24 and 31)	The miscellany of articles *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, by Lenin (Vl. Ilyin) appears in St. Petersburg.
January 20 (February 2)	Lenin writes A. M. Gorky, asking him to send articles or parts of his latest works of fiction for the first issues of the newspaper *Proletary*, which was being prepared for publication abroad.
February 11 (24)	Lenin calls a meeting of the *Proletary* Editorial Board in connection with the report in *Die Neue Zeit* concerning the struggle on questions of philosophy within the R.S.D.L.P. The meeting unan-

imously approves the text of *Proletary*'s editorial statement drawn up by Lenin.

February 12 (25) — In a letter to A. M. Gorky, Lenin urges the necessity of waging an irreconcilable struggle against the Russian Machists (Bogdanov and others).

February 13 (26) — Issue No. 21 of *Proletary* featuring Lenin's article "Political Notes" appears in Geneva.

Between February 15 and 20 (February 28 and March 4) — The Bolshevik Collection Current Life containing Chapter XII of Lenin's book The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx" under the heading "The 'Ideal Country' From the Standpoint of the Opponents of Marxism on the Agrarian Question" is published in St. Petersburg.

Second half of February (beginning of March) — Issue No. 1 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., appears with Lenin's article "The Debate on the Extension of the Duma's Budgetary Powers".

February 19 (March 3) — Lenin's articles "The New Agrarian Policy", "Trade-Union Neutrality", and "The Happening to the King of Portugal" are published in Proletary, No. 22.

Between February 27 and March 6 (March 11 and 19) — The second revised edition of Lenin's book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* appears in St. Petersburg.

February — Lenin begins writing his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

March 5 (18) — Lenin, on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P., delivers a speech on the significance of the Paris Commune at an international meeting in Geneva held in commemoration of three dates—the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marx's death, the sixtieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1848, and Paris Commune Day .

March 12 (25) — Lenin's articles "A Police-Patriotic Demonstration Made to Order", "Deception of the People by the Liberals", and "An Estimate of Marx by International Liberalism" are published in Proletary, No. 25.

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LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

14

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ILLUSTRATION

Cover of the first edition of V. I. Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, 1909 16-17

PREFACE

Volume 14 contains V. I. Lenin's extremely important philosophical work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, written in 1908 and published in 1909, which was the theoretical preparation for the Bolshevik Party.

In this work Lenin gave an all-round criticism of the anti-Marxist views of the Russian Machists and their foreign philosophical teachers. At the same time Lenin's work was a defence of the theoretical basis of Marxism—dialectical and historical materialism—and a materialist generalisation of all that was valuable and essential in the achievements of science, and especially natural science, during the period from the death of Engels to the appearance of Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

This work has become a model of irreconcilable, party struggle against the enemies of dialectical and historical materialism.

The volume includes also Lenin's "Ten Questions to a Lecturer", written in the spring of 1908, which furnished the basis for the public dissociation of the Bolshevik group from the philosophical views of the Machist Bogdanov and his supporters, who had joined the Bolsheviks in 1905.

Lenin's work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* is printed in the present volume in accordance with the first edition of the book (1909) collated with the second edition (1920). In preparing the text account has been taken of the instructions given by Lenin in letters to relatives during the preparation of the book for the press in 1908-09 and in correcting the proofs of the first edition.

TEN QUESTIONS TO A LECTURER[1]

Written in May, before 15 (28), 1908
First published in 1925 in
Lenin Miscellany III

Published according to
the manuscript

1. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the philosophy of Marxism is *dialectical materialism*?
If he does not, why has he not ever analysed Engels' countless statements on this subject?
If he does, why do the Machists call their "revision" of dialectical materialism "the philosophy of Marxism"?

2. Does the lecturer acknowledge Engels' fundamental division of philosophical systems into *idealism* and *materialism*,[2] Engels regarding those intermediate between these two, wavering between them, as the *line* of Hume in modern philosophy, calling this line "agnosticism" and declaring Kantianism to be a variety of agnosticism?

3. Does the lecturer acknowledge that recognition of the external world and the reflection of it in the human mind form the basis of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism?

4. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels' argument concerning the conversion of "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us"?[3]

5. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels' assertion that the "real unity of the world consists in its materiality"? (*Anti-Dühring*, 2nd ed., 1886, p. 28, section 1, par. IV on world schematism.)[4]

6. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels' assertion that "matter without motion is as inconceivable as motion without matter"? (*Anti-Dühring*, 1886, 2nd ed., p. 45, in par. 6 on natural philosophy, cosmogony, physics and chemistry.)[5]

7. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the ideas of causality, necessity, law, etc., are a reflection in the human mind of laws of nature, of the real world? Or was Engels wrong in saying so? (*Anti-Dühring*, S. 20-21, in par. III on

apriorism, and S. 103-04, in par. XI on freedom and necessity.)[6]

8. Does the lecturer know that Mach expressed his agreement with the head of the immanentist school, Schuppe, and even dedicated his last and chief philosophical work[7] to him? How does the lecturer explain this adherence of Mach to the obviously idealist philosophy of Schuppe, a defender of *clericalism* and in general a downright reactionary in philosophy?

9. Why did the lecturer keep silent about "adventure" with his comrade of yesterday (according to the *Studies*), the Menshevik Yushkevich, who has today declared Bogdanov (following in the wake of Rakhmetov) an *idealist*?[8] Is the lecturer aware that Petzoldt in his latest book has classed a number of Mach's disciples *among the idealists*?[9]

10. Does the lecturer confirm the fact that Machism has nothing in common with Bolshevism? And that Lenin has repeatedly protested against Machism?[10] And that the Mensheviks Yushkevich and Valentinov are "pure" empiriocriticists?

ВЛ. ИЛЬИНЪ.

МАТЕРІАЛИЗМЪ
И
ЭМПИРІОКРИТИЦИЗМЪ

критическія замѣтки объ одной реакціонной философіи.

ИЗДАНІЕ „ЗВЕНО“
МОСКВА
1909

Cover of the first edition of V. I. Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, 1909
Reduced

MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

CRITICAL COMMENTS ON A REACTIONARY PHILOSOPHY[11]

Written in February-October 1908;
Supplement to Chapter IV,
Section I—in March 1909

Published in May 1909 in Moscow
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Published according to the text
of the 1909 edition checked
with the 1920 edition

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veritable campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. In the course of less than half a year four books devoted mainly and almost exclusively to attacks on dialectical materialism have made their appearance. These include first and foremost *Studies in* (?—it should have said "against") *the Philosophy of Marxism* (St. Petersburg, 1908), a symposium by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Berman, Helfond, Yushkevich and Suvorov; Yushkevich's *Materialism and Critical Realism*; Berman's *Dialectics in the Light of the Modern Theory of Knowledge* and Valentinov's *The Philosophical Constructions of Marxism*.

All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility toward dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels' dialectics is "mysticism", says Berman. Engels' views have become "antiquated", remarks Bazarov casually, as though it were a self-evident fact. Materialism thus appears to be refuted by our bold warriors, who proudly allude to the "modern theory of knowledge", "recent philosophy" (or "recent positivism"), the "philosophy of modern natural science", or even the "philosophy of natural science of the twentieth century". Supported by all these supposedly recent doctrines, our destroyers of dialectical materialism proceed fearlessly to downright fideism*[12] (clearest of all in the case of Lunacharsky, but by no means in his case alone![13]). Yet when it comes to an explicit definition of their attitude towards Marx and Engels, all their courage and

* *Fideism* is a doctrine which substitutes faith for knowledge, or which generally attaches significance to faith.

all their respect for their own convictions at once disappear. In deed—a complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i.e., of Marxism; in word—endless subterfuges, attempts to evade the essence of the question, to cover their retreat, to put some materialist or other in place of materialism in general, and a determined refusal to make a direct analysis, of the innumerable materialist declarations of Marx and Engels. This is truly "mutiny on one's knees", as it was justly characterised by one Marxist. This is typical philosophical revisionism, for it was only the revisionists who gained a sad notoriety for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism and by their fear, or inability, to "settle accounts" openly, explicitly, resolutely and clearly with the views they had abandoned. When orthodox Marxists had occasion to pronounce against some antiquated views of Marx (for instance, Mehring when he opposed certain historical propositions), it was always done with such precision and thoroughness that no one has ever found anything ambiguous in such literary utterances.

For the rest, there is in the *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism* one phrase which resembles the truth. This is Lunacharsky's phrase: "Perhaps we [i.e., all the collaborators of the *Studies* evidently]* have gone astray, but we are seeking" (p. 161). That the first half of this phrase contains an absolute and the second a relative truth, I shall endeavour to demonstrate circumstantially in the present book. At the moment I would only remark that if our philosophers had spoken not in the name of Marxism but in the name of a few "seeking" Marxists, they would have shown more respect for themselves and for Marxism.

As for myself, I too am a "seeker" in philosophy. Namely, the task I have set myself in these comments is to find out what was the stumbling-block to these people who under the guise of Marxism are offering something incredibly muddled, confused and reactionary.

The Author

September 1908

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

With the exception of a few corrections in the text, the present edition does not differ from the previous one. I hope that, irrespective of the dispute with the Russian "Machists", it will prove useful as an aid to an acquaintance with the philosophy of Marxism, dialectical materialism, as well as with the philosophical conclusions from the recent discoveries in natural science. As for A. A. Bogdanov's latest works, which I have had no opportunity to examine, the appended article by Comrade V. I. Nevsky gives the necessary information.[14] Comrade V. I. Nevsky, not only in his work as a propagandist in general, but also as an active worker in the Party school in particular, has had ample opportunity to convince himself that under the guise of "proletarian culture"[15] A. A. Bogdanov is imparting bourgeois and reactionary views.

N. Lenin

September 2, 1920

IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION

HOW CERTAIN "MARXISTS" IN 1908 AND CERTAIN IDEALISTS IN 1710 REFUTED MATERIALISM

Anyone in the least acquainted with philosophical literature must know that scarcely a single contemporary professor of philosophy (or of theology) can be found who is not directly or indirectly engaged in refuting materialism. They have declared materialism refuted a thousand times, yet are continuing to refute it for the thousand and first time. All our revisionists are engaged in refuting materialism, pretending, however, that actually they are only refuting the materialist Plekhanov, and not the materialist Engels, nor the materialist Feuerbach, nor the materialist views of J. Dietzgen—and, moreover, that they are refuting materialism from the standpoint of "recent" and "modern" positivism, natural science, and so forth. Without citing quotations, which anyone desiring to do so could cull by the hundred from the books above mentioned, I shall refer to those arguments by which materialism is being combated by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Yushkevich, Valentinov, Chernov* and other Machists. I shall use this latter term throughout as a synonym for "empirio-criticists" because it is shorter and simpler and has already acquired rights of citizenship in Russian literature. That Ernst Mach is the most popular representative of empirio-criticism today is universally ac-

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* V. Chernov, *Philosophical and Sociological Studies*, Moscow, 1907. The author is as ardent an adherent of Avenarius and enemy of dialectical materialism as Bazarov and Co.

knowledged in philosophical literature,* while Bogdanov's and Yushkevich's departures from "pure" Machism are of absolutely secondary importance, as will be shown later.

The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable—"things-in-themselves"—matter "outside of experience" and outside of our knowledge. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of "experience" and knowledge. When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the "unknown", nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge? The materialists lapse into "Kantianism" (Plekhanov, by recognising the existence of "things-in-themselves", i.e., things outside of our consciousness); they "double" the world and preach "dualism", for the materialists hold that beyond the appearance there is the thing-in-itself; beyond the immediate sense data there is something else, some fetish, an "idol", an absolute, a source of "metaphysics", a double of religion ("holy matter", as Bazarov says).

Such are the arguments levelled by the Machists against materialism, as repeated and retold in varying keys by the above-mentioned writers.

In order to test whether these arguments are new, and whether they are really directed against only one Russian materialist who "lapsed into Kantianism", we shall give some detailed quotations from the works of an old idealist, George Berkeley. This historical inquiry is all the more necessary in the introduction to our comments since we shall have frequent occasion to refer to Berkeley and his trend in philosophy, for the Machists misrepresent both the relation of Mach to Berkeley and the essence of Berkeley's philosophical line.

The work of Bishop George Berkeley, published in 1710 under the title *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge***, begins with the following argument: "It is

* See, for instance, Dr. Richard Hönigswald, *Ueber die Lehre Hume's von der Realität der Außendinge*, Berlin, 1904, S. 26.

** Vol. I of *Works of George Berkeley*, edited by A. Fraser, Oxford, 1871. There is a Russian translation.

evident to anyone who takes a survey of the *objects* of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination.... By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance.... Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds.... And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing signified by the name *apple*; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things..." (§ 1).

Such is the content of the first section of Berkeley's work. We must remember that Berkeley takes as the basis of his philosophy "hard, soft, heat, cold, colours, tastes, odours", etc. For Berkeley, things are "collections of ideas", this last word designating the aforesaid, let us say, qualities or sensations, and not abstract thoughts.

Berkeley goes on to say that besides these "ideas or objects of knowledge" there exists something that perceives them—"mind, spirit, soul or *myself*" (§ 2). It is self-evident, the philosopher concludes, that "ideas" cannot exist outside of the mind that perceives them. In order to convince ourselves of this it is enough to consider the meaning of the word "exist". "The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it...." That is what Berkeley says in § 3 of his work and thereupon he begins a polemic against the people whom he calls materialists (§§ 18, 19, etc.). "For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived," he says, that is to me perfectly unintelligible." To exist means to be perceived ("Their *esse* is *percipi*," § 3—a dictum of Berkeley's frequently quoted in textbooks on the history of philosophy). "It is indeed an opinion strange-

ly prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding" (§ 4). This opinion is a "manifest contradiction", says Berkeley. "For, what are the afore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?" (§ 4).

The expression "collection of ideas" Berkeley now replaces by what to him is an equivalent expression, *combination of sensations*, and accuses the materialists of a "repugnant" tendency to go still further, of seeking some source of this complex—that is, of this combination of sensations. In § 5 the materialists are accused of trifling with an abstraction, for to divorce the sensation from the object, according to Berkeley, is an empty abstraction. "In truth," he says at the end of § 5, omitted in the second edition, "the object and the sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other." Berkeley goes on: "But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure.... I ask whether those supposed originals, or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or not? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to anyone whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest" (§ 8).

As the reader sees, Bazarov's "arguments" against Plekhanov concerning the problem of whether things can exist outside of us apart from their action on us do not differ in the least from Berkeley's arguments against the materialists whom he does not mention by name. Berkeley considers the notion of the existence of "matter or corporeal substance" (§ 9) such a "contradiction", such an "absurdity" that it is really not worth wasting time exposing it. He says: "But

because the tenet of the existence of Matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious than omit anything that might conduce to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice" (§ 9).

We shall presently see to what ill consequences Berkeley is referring. Let us first finish with his theoretical arguments against the materialists. Denying the "absolute" existence of objects, that is, the existence of things outside human knowledge, Berkeley bluntly defines the viewpoint of his opponents as being that they recognise the thing-in-itself. In § 24 Berkeley writes in italics that the opinion which he is refuting recognises "*the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind*" (op. cit., pp. 167-68). The two fundamental lines of philosophical outlook are here depicted with the straightforwardness, clarity and precision that distinguish the classical philosophers from the inventors of "new" systems in our day. Materialism is the recognition of "objects in themselves", or outside the mind; ideas and sensations are copies or images of those objects. The opposite doctrine (idealism) claims that objects do not exist "without the mind"; objects are "combinations of sensations".

This was written in 1710, fourteen years before the birth of Immanuel Kant, yet our Machists, supposedly on the basis of "recent" philosophy, have made the discovery that the recognition of "things-in-themselves" is a result of the infection or distortion of materialism by Kantianism! The "new" discoveries of the Machists are the product of an astounding ignorance of the history of the basic philosophical trends.

Their next "new" thought consists in this: that the concepts "matter" or "substance" are remnants of old uncritical views. Mach and Avenarius, you see, have advanced philosophical thought, deepened analysis and eliminated these absolutes", "unchangeable entities", etc. If you wish to check such assertions with the original sources, go to Berkeley and you will see that they are pretentious fictions. Berkeley says quite definitely that matter is a "nonentity" (§ 68), that matter is *nothing* (§ 80). "You may," thus Berke-

ley ridicules the materialists, "if so it shall seem good, use the word 'matter' in the same sense as other men use 'nothing'" (op. cit., pp. 196-97). At the beginning, says Berkeley, it was believed that colours, odours, etc., "really exist, but subsequently such views were renounced, and it was seen that they only exist in dependence on our sensations. But this elimination of old erroneous concepts was not completed; a remnant is the concept "substance" (§ 73), which is also a "prejudice" (p. 195), and which was finally exposed by Bishop Berkeley in 1710! In 1908 there are still humorists who seriously believe Avenarius, Petzoldt, Mach and Co., when they maintain that it is only "recent positivism" and "recent natural science" which have at last succeeded in eliminating these "metaphysical" concepts.

These same humorists (Bogdanov among them) assure their readers that it was the new philosophy that explained the error of the "duplication of the world" in the doctrine of the eternally refuted materialists, who speak of some sort of a "reflection" by the human consciousness of things existing outside the consciousness. A mass of sentimental verbiage has been written by the above-named authors about this "duplication". Owing to forgetfulness or ignorance, they failed to add that these new discoveries had already been discovered in 1710. Berkeley says:

"Our knowledge of these [i.e., ideas or things] has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense—the one *intelligible* or in the mind, the other *real* and without the mind" (i.e., outside consciousness). And Berkeley ridicules this "absurd" notion, which admits the possibility of thinking the unthinkable! The source of the "absurdity", of course, follows from our supposing a difference between "things" and "ideas" (§ 87), "the supposition of external objects". This same source—as discovered by Berkeley in 1710 and rediscovered by Bogdanov in 1908—engenders belief in fetishes and idols. The existence of Matter", says Berkeley, "or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend" (§ 94).

Here we arrive at those "ill consequences" derived from the "absurd" doctrine of the existence of an external world which compelled Bishop Berkeley not only to refute this doctrine theoretically, but passionately to persecute its adherents as enemies. "For as we have shown the doctrine of Matter or corporeal Substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion.... How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone is once removed the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists" (§ 92, op. cit., pp. 203-04).

"Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions ["the principle of economy of thought", discovered by Mach in the seventies, philosophy as a conception of the world according to the principle of minimum expenditure of effort"—Avenarius in 1876!] which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge peace, and religion have reason to wish they were" (§ 96).

Frankly and bluntly did Bishop Berkeley argue! In our time these very same thoughts on the "economical" elimination of "matter" from philosophy are enveloped in a much more artful form, and confused by the use of a "new" terminology, so that these thoughts may be taken by naïve people for "recent" philosophy!

But Berkeley was not only candid as to the tendencies of his philosophy, he also endeavoured to cover its idealistic nakedness, to represent it as being free from absurdities and acceptable to "common sense". Instinctively defending himself against the accusation of what would nowadays be called subjective idealism and solipsism, he says that by our philosophy "we are not deprived of any one thing in

nature" (§ 34). Nature remains, and the distinction between realities and chimeras remains, only "they both equally exist in the mind". "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which *philosophers* [Berkeley's italics] call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.... The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety...."

This thought is made still clearer in § 37, where Berkeley replies to the charge that his philosophy destroys corporeal substance: "...if the word *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense, for a *combination* of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like—this we cannot be accused of taking away; but if it be taken in a philosophic sense, for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind—then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination".

Not without good cause did the English philosopher, Fraser, an idealist and adherent of Berkeleianism, who published Berkeley's works and supplied them with his own annotations, designate Berkeley's doctrine by the term "natural realism" (op. cit., p. x). This amusing terminology must by all means be noted, for it in fact expresses Berkeley's intention to counterfeit realism. In our further exposition we shall frequently find "recent" "positivists" repeating the same stratagem or counterfeit in a different form and in a different verbal wrapping. Berkeley does not deny the existence of real things! Berkeley does not go counter to the opinion of all humanity! Berkeley denies "only" the teaching of the philosophers, viz., the theory of knowledge, which seriously and resolutely takes as the foundation of all its reasoning the recognition of the external world and the reflection thereof in the minds of men. Berkeley does not deny natural science, which has always adhered (mostly unconsciously) to this, i.e., the materialist, theory of knowledge. We read in § 59: "We may, from the experience [Berkeley—a

philosophy of "pure experience"]* we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds ... be enabled to pass a right judgement of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which [mark this!] may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said."

Let us regard the external world, nature, as "a combination of sensations" evoked in our mind by a deity. Acknowledge this and give up searching for the "ground" of these sensations outside the mind, outside man, and I will acknowledge within the framework of my idealist theory of knowledge *all* natural science and all the use and certainty of its deductions. It is precisely this framework, and only this framework, that I need for my deductions in favour of "peace and religion". Such is Berkeley's train of thought. It correctly expresses the essence of idealist philosophy and its social significance, and we shall encounter it later when we come to speak of the relation of Machism to natural science.

Let us now consider another recent discovery that was borrowed from Bishop Berkeley in the twentieth century by the recent positivist and critical realist, P. Yushkevich. This discovery is "empirio-symbolism". "Berkeley," says Fraser, "thus reverts to his favourite theory of a Universal Natural Symbolism" (op. cit., p. 190). Did these words not occur in an edition of 1871, one might have suspected the English fideist philosopher Fraser of plagiarising both the modern mathematician and physicist Poincaré and the Russian "Marxist" Yushkevich!

This theory of Berkeley's, which threw Fraser into raptures, is set forth by the Bishop as follows:

"The connexion of ideas [do not forget that for Berkeley ideas and things are identical] does not imply the relation of *cause* and *effect*, but only of a mark or *sign* with the thing *signified*" (§ 65). "Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether

* In his preface Fraser insists that both Berkeley and Locke "appeal exclusively to experience" (p. 117).

inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained ... when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information" (§ 66). Of course, in the opinion of Berkeley and Fraser, it is no other than the deity who informs us by means of these "empirio-symbols". The epistemological significance of *symbolism* in Berkeley's theory, however, consists in this, that it is to replace "the doctrine" which "pretends to explain things by corporeal causes" (§ 66).

We have before us two philosophical trends in the question of causality. One "pretends to explain things by corporeal causes". It is clear that it is connected with the "doctrine of matter" refuted as an "absurdity" by Bishop Berkeley. The other reduces the "notion of cause" to the notion of a "mark or sign" which serves for "our information" (supplied by God). We shall meet these two trends in a twentieth-century garb when we analyse the attitudes of Machism and dialectical materialism to this question.

Further, as regards the question of reality, it ought also to be remarked that Berkeley, refusing as he does to recognise the existence of things outside the mind, tries to find a criterion for distinguishing between the real and the fictitious. In § 36 he says that those "ideas" which the minds of men evoke at pleasure "are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect to others they perceive by sense; which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves about the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have *more reality* in them than the former; by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them...." Elsewhere (§ 84) Berkeley tries to connect the notion of reality with the simultaneous perception of the same sensations by many people. For instance, how shall we resolve the question as to the reality of the transformation of water into wine, of which, let us say, we are being told. "If at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality." And Fraser explains: "Simultaneous perception of the 'same' ... *sense*-ideas, by different persons, as distinguished from purely individual

consciousness of feelings and *fancies*, is here taken as a test of the ... *reality* of the former."

From this it is evident that Berkeley's subjective idealism is not to be interpreted as though it ignored the distinction between individual and collective perception. On the contrary, he attempts on the basis of this distinction to construct a criterion of reality. Deriving "ideas" from the action of a deity upon the human mind, Berkeley thus approaches objective idealism: the world proves to be not my idea but the product of a single supreme spiritual cause that creates both the "laws of nature" and the laws distinguishing "more real" ideas from less real, and so forth.

In another work, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* (1713), where he endeavours to present his views in an especially popular form, Berkeley sets forth the opposition between his doctrine and the materialist doctrine in the following way:

"I assert as well as you [materialists] that, since we are affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves.... But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) third nature..." (op. cit., p. 335).

Fraser comments: this is the gist of the whole question; according to the materialists, sensible phenomena are due to *material substance*, or to some unknown "third nature"; according to Berkeley, to Rational Will; according to Hume and the Positivists, their origin is absolutely unknown, and we can only generalise them inductively, through custom, as facts.

Here the English Berkeleian, Fraser, approaches from his consistent idealist standpoint the same fundamental "lines" in philosophy which were so clearly characterised by the materialist Engels. In his work *Ludwig Feuerbach* Engels divides philosophers into "two great camps"—materialists and idealists. Engels—dealing with theories of the two trends much more developed, varied and rich in content than Fraser dealt with—sees the fundamental distinction between them in the fact that while for the materialists nature is primary and spirit secondary, for the idealists the reverse is the case. In between these two camps Engels

places the adherents of Hume and Kant, who deny the possibility of knowing the world, or at least of knowing it fully, and calls them *agnostics*.[16] In his *Ludwig Feuerbach* Engels applies this term only to the adherents of Hume (those people whom Fraser calls, and who like to call themselves, "positivists"). But in his article "On Historical Materialism", Engels explicitly speaks of the standpoint of "*the neo-Kantian agnostic*",[17] regarding neo-Kantianism[18] as a variety of agnosticism.*

We cannot dwell here on this remarkably correct and profound judgement of Engels' (a judgement which is shamelessly ignored by the Machists). We shall discuss it in detail later on. For the present we shall confine ourselves to pointing to this Marxist terminology and to this meeting of extremes: the views of a consistent materialist and of a consistent idealist on the fundamental philosophical trends. In order to illustrate these trends (with which we shall constantly have to deal in our further exposition) let us briefly note the views of outstanding philosophers of the eighteenth century who pursued a different path from Berkeley.

Here are Hume's arguments. In his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in the chapter XII) on sceptical philosophy, he says: "It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creations are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.... But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce

* Fr. Engels, "Ueber historischen Materialismus", *Neue Zeit*,[19] XI. Jg., Bd. I (1892-93), Nr. 1, S. 18. Translated from the English by Engels himself. The Russian translation in *Historical Materialism* (St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 167) is inaccurate.

any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, 'this house', and 'that tree' are nothing but perceptions in the mind.... By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible), and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us?... How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit ... if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being, or any of his attributes."*

He says the same thing in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (Part IV, Sect. II, "On Scepticism Towards Sensations"): "Our perceptions are our only objects." (P. 281 of the French translation by Renouvier and Pillon, 1878.) By scepticism Hume means refusal to explain sensations as the effects of objects, spirit, etc., refusal to reduce perceptions to the external world, on the one hand, and to a deity or to an unknown spirit, on the other. And the author of the introduction to the French translation of Hume, F. Pillon—a philosopher of a trend akin to Mach (as we shall see below)—justly remarks that for Hume subject and object are re-

* David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Essays and Treatises*, London, 1882, Vol. II, pp. 124-26.

duced to "groups of various perceptions", to "elements of consciousness, to impressions, ideas, etc."; that the only concern should be with the "groupings and combinations of these elements".* The English Humean, Huxley, who coined the apt and correct term "agnosticism", in his book on Hume also emphasises the fact that the latter, regarding "sensations" as the "primary and irreducible states of consciousness", is not entirely consistent on the question how the origin of sensations is to be explained, whether by the effect of objects on man or by the creative power of the mind. "Realism and idealism are equally probable hypotheses" (i.e., for Hume).** Hume does not go beyond sensations. "Thus the colours red and blue, and the odour of a rose, are simple impressions.... A red rose gives us a complex impression, capable of resolution into the simple impressions of red colour, rose-scent, and numerous others" (op. cit., pp. 64-65). Hume admits both the "materialist position" and the "idealist position" (p. 82); the "collection of perceptions" may be generated by the Fichtean "ego" or may be a "signification" and even a "symbol" of a "real something". This is how Huxley interprets Hume.

As for the materialists, here is an opinion of Berkeley given by Diderot, the leader of the Encyclopaedists[20]: "Those philosophers are called *idealists* who, being conscious only of their existence and of the sensations which succeed each other within themselves, do not admit anything else. An extravagant system which, to my thinking, only the blind could have originated; a system which, to the shame of human intelligence and philosophy, is the most difficult to combat, although the most absurd of all."*** And Diderot, who came very close to the standpoint of contemporary materialism (that arguments and syllogisms alone do not suffice to refute idealism, and that here it is not a question for theoretical argument), notes the similarity of the premises both of the idealist Berkeley, and the sensationalist Condillac. In his opinion, Condillac should have undertaken

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* *Psychologie de Hume. Traité de la nature humaine*, *etc.* Trad. par Ch. Renouvier et F. Pillon, Paris, 1878. Introduction, p. x.

** Th. Huxley, *Hume*, London, 1879, p. 74.

*** *Œuvres complètes de Diderot*, éd. par J. Assézat, Paris, 1875, Vol. I, p. 304.

a refutation of Berkeley in order to avoid such absurd conclusions being drawn from the treatment of sensations as the only source of our knowledge.

In the "Conversation Between d'Alembert and Diderot", Diderot states his philosophical position thus: "...Suppose a piano to be endowed with the faculty of sensation and memory, tell me, would it not of its own accord repeat those airs which you have played on its keys? We are instruments endowed with sensation and memory. Our senses are so many keys upon which surrounding nature strikes and which often strike upon themselves. And this is all, in my opinion, that occurs in a piano organised like you and me." D'Alembert retorts that such an instrument would have to possess the faculty of finding food for itself and of reproducing little pianos. Undoubtedly, contends Diderot.—But take an egg. "This is what refutes all the schools of theology and all the temples on earth. What is this egg? A mass that is insensible until the embryo is introduced into it, and when this embryo is introduced, what is it then? An insensible mass, for in its turn, this embryo is only an inert and crude liquid. How does this mass arrive at a different organisation, arrive at sensibility and life? By means of heat. And what produces heat? Motion...." The animal that is hatched from the egg is endowed with all your sensations; it performs all your actions. "Would you maintain with Descartes that this is a simple imitating machine? Little children will laugh at you, and the philosophers will reply that if this be a machine then you too are a machine. If you admit that the difference between these animals and you is only one of organisation, you will prove your common sense and sagacity, you will be right. But from this will follow a conclusion against you; namely, that from inert matter organised in a certain way, impregnated with another bit of inert matter, by heat and motion—sensibility, life, memory, consciousness, emotion, and thought are generated." One of the two, continues Diderot, either admit some "hidden element" in the egg, that penetrates to it in an unknown way at a certain stage of development, an element about which it is unknown whether it occupies space, whether it is material or whether it is created for the purpose—which is contradictory to common sense, and leads to inconsistencies and ab-

surdities; or we must make "a simple supposition which explains everything, namely, that the faculty of sensation is a general property of matter, or a product of its organisation". To d'Alembert's objection that such a supposition implies a quality which in its essence is incompatible with matter, Diderot retorts:

"And how do you know that the faculty of sensation is essentially incompatible with matter, since you do not know the essence of any thing at all, either of matter, or of sensation? Do you understand the nature of motion any better, its existence in a body, its communication from one body to another?" D'Alembert: "Without knowing the nature of sensation, or that of matter, I see that the faculty of sensation is a simple quality, single, indivisible, and incompatible with a divisible subject or substratum (*suppôt*)." Diderot: "Metaphysico-theological nonsense! What, do you not see that all qualities of matter, that all its forms accessible to our senses are in their essence indivisible? There cannot be a larger or a smaller degree of impenetrability. There may be half of a round body, but there is no half of roundness.... Be a physicist and admit the production of an effect when you see it produced, though you may be unable to explain the relation between the cause and the effect. Be logical and do not replace a cause that exists and explains everything by some other cause which it is impossible to conceive, and the connection of which with the effect is even more difficult to conceive, and which engenders an infinite number of difficulties without solving a single one of them." D'Alembert: "And what if I abandon this cause?" Diderot: "There is only one substance in the universe, in men and in animals. A hand-organ is of wood, man of flesh. A finch is of flesh, and a musician is of flesh, but differently organised; but both are of the same origin, of the same formation, have the same functions and the same purpose." D'Alembert: "And what establishes the similarity of sounds between your two pianos?" Diderot: "...The instrument endowed with the faculty of sensation, or the animal, has learned by experience that after a certain sound certain consequences follow outside of it; that other sentient instruments, like itself, or similar animals, approach, recede, demand, offer, wound,

caress;—and all these consequences are associated in its memory and in the memory of other animals with the formation of these sounds. Mark, in intercourse between people there is nothing besides sounds and actions. And to appreciate all the power of my system, mark again that it is faced with that same insurmountable difficulty which Berkeley adduced against the existence of bodies. There was a moment of insanity when the sentient piano imagined that it was the only piano in the world, and that the whole harmony of the universe took place within it.”*

That was written in 1769. And with it we shall conclude our brief historical enquiry. We shall have more than one occasion to meet “the insane piano” and the harmony of the universe occurring within man when we come to analyse “recent positivism”.

For the present we shall confine ourselves to one conclusion: the “recent” Machists have not adduced a single argument against the materialists that had not been adduced by Bishop Berkeley.

Let us mention as a curiosity that one of these Machists, Valentinov, vaguely sensing the falsity of his position, has tried to “cover up the traces” of his kinship with Berkeley and has done so in a rather amusing manner. On page 150 of his book we read: “...When those who, speaking of Mach, are hinting at Berkeley, we ask, which Berkeley do they mean? Do they mean the Berkeley who traditionally regards himself [Valentinov wishes to say who is regarded] as a solipsist, the Berkeley who defends the immediate presence and providence of the deity? Generally speaking [?], do they mean Berkeley, the philosophising bishop, the destroyer of atheism, or Berkeley, the thoughtful analyser? With Berkeley the solipsist and preacher of religious metaphysics Mach indeed has nothing in common.” Valentinov is muddled; he was unable to make clear to himself why he was obliged to defend Berkeley the “thoughtful analyser” and idealist against the materialist Diderot. Diderot drew a clear distinction between the fundamental philosophical trends. Valentinov confuses them, and while doing so very

* *Œuvres complètes de Diderot*, éd. par J. Assézat, Paris, 1875, Vol. II, pp. 114-18.

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amusingly tries to console us: "We would not consider the 'kinship' of Mach to the idealist views of Berkeley a philosophical crime," he says, "even if this actually were the case" (149). To confuse two irreconcilable fundamental trends in philosophy—really, what "crime" is that? But that is what the whole wisdom of Mach and Avenarius amounts to. We shall now proceed to an examination of this wisdom.

CHAPTER ONE

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM. I

1. SENSATIONS AND COMPLEXES OF SENSATIONS

The fundamental premises of the theory of knowledge of Mach and Avenarius are frankly, simply and clearly expounded by them in their first philosophical works. To these works we shall now turn, postponing for later treatment an examination of the corrections and emendations subsequently made by these writers.

"The task of science," Mach wrote in 1872, "can only be: 1. To determine the laws of connection of ideas (Psychology). 2. To discover the laws of connection of sensations (Physics). 3. To explain the laws of connection between sensations and ideas (Psycho-physics)."* This is quite clear.

The subject-matter of physics is the connection between sensations and not between things or bodies, of which our sensations are the image. And in 1883, in his *Mechanics* Mach repeats the same thought: "Sensations are not 'symbols of things'. The 'thing' is rather a mental symbol for a complex of sensations of relative stability. Not the things (bodies) but colours, sounds, pressures, spaces, times (what we usually call sensations) are the real *elements* of the world."**

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* E. Mach, *Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit*. Vortrag, gehalten in der K. Böhm. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften am 15. Nov. 1871, Prag, 1872, S. 57-58.

** E. Mach, *Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt*, 3. Auflage, Leipzig, 1897, S. 473.

About this word "elements", the fruit of twelve years of "reflection", we shall speak later. At present let us note that Mach explicitly states here that things or bodies are complexes of sensations, and that he quite clearly sets up his own philosophical point of view against the opposite theory which holds that sensations are "symbols" of things (it would be more accurate to say images or reflections of things). The latter theory is *philosophical materialism*. For instance, the materialist Frederick Engels—the not unknown collaborator of Marx and a founder of Marxism—constantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental pictures or images (*Gedanken-Abbilder*), and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations. It would seem that this fundamental standpoint of the "philosophy of Marxism" ought to be known to everyone who speaks of it, and especially to anyone who comes out in print *in the name of* this philosophy. But because of the extraordinary confusion which our Machists have introduced, it becomes necessary to repeat what is generally known. We turn to the first section of *Anti-Dühring* and read: "...things and their mental images..."*; or to the first section of the philosophical part, which reads: "But whence does thought obtain these principles [i.e., the fundamental principles of all knowledge]? From itself? No ... these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world... the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation [as Dühring who would be a materialist, but cannot consistently adhere to materialism, holds], but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them; it is not nature and the realm of humanity which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid insofar as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialistic conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring's contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas" (ibid., S. 21).[21] Engels, we repeat, applies this "only materialistic concep-

* Fr. Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*, 5. Auflage, Stuttgart? 1904, S. 6.

tion" everywhere and without exception, relentlessly attacking Dühring for the least deviation from materialism to idealism. Anybody who reads *Anti-Dühring* and *Ludwig Feuerbach* with the slightest care will find scores of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are "symbols" of things, for consistent materialism must here use "image", picture, or reflection instead of "symbol", as we shall show in detail in the proper place. But the question here is not of this or that formulation of materialism, but of the antithesis between materialism and idealism, of the difference between the two fundamental *lines* in philosophy. Are we to proceed from things to sensation and thought? Or are we to proceed from thought and sensation to things? The first line, i.e., the materialist line, is adopted by Engels. The second line, i.e., the idealist line, is adopted by Mach. No evasions, no sophisms (a multitude of which we shall yet encounter) can remove the clear and indisputable fact that Ernst Mach's doctrine that things are complexes of sensations is subjective idealism and a simple rehash of Berkeleianism. If bodies are "complexes of sensations", as Mach says, or "combinations of sensations", as Berkeley said, it inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea. Starting from such a premise it is impossible to arrive at the existence of other people besides oneself: it is the purest solipsism. Much as Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co. may abjure solipsism, they cannot in fact escape solipsism without falling into howling logical absurdities. To make this fundamental element of the philosophy of Machism still clearer, we shall give a few additional quotations from Mach's works. Here is a sample from the *Analysis of Sensations**; (I quote from Kotlyar's Russian translation, published by Skirmunt, Moscow, 1907):

"We see a body with a point S. If we touch S, that is, bring it into contact with our body, we receive a prick. We can see S without feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick we find S on the skin. Thus, the visible point is a permanent nucleus, to which, according to circumstances,

* E. Mach, *Analyse der Empfindungen*, 1885.—*Ed.*

the prick is attached as something accidental. By frequent repetitions of analogous occurrences we finally habituate ourselves to regard *all* properties of bodies as 'effects' which proceed from permanent nuclei and are conveyed to *the self* through the medium of the body; which effects we call *sensations*..." (p. 20).

In other words, people "habituate" themselves to adopt the standpoint of materialism, to regard sensations as the result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our sense-organs. This "habit", so noxious to the philosophical idealists (a habit acquired by all mankind and all natural science!), is not at all to the liking of Mach, and he proceeds to destroy it:

"...Thereby, however, these nuclei are deprived of their entire sensible content and are converted into naked abstract symbols...."

An old song, most worthy Professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley who said that matter is a naked abstract symbol. But it is Ernst Mach, in fact, who goes naked, for if he does not admit that the "sensible content" is an objective reality, existing independently of us, there remains only a "naked abstract" *I*, an *I* infallibly written with a capital letter and italicised, equal to "the insane piano, which imagined that it was the sole existing thing in this world". If the "sensible content" of our sensations is not the external world, then nothing exists save this naked *I* engaged in empty "philosophical" fancies. A stupid and fruitless occupation!

"...It is then correct that the world consists only of our sensations. In which case we have knowledge *only* of sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, and of their interaction, from which alone sensations proceed, turns out to be quite idle and superfluous. Such a view can only appeal to *half-hearted* realism or *half-hearted* criticism."

We have quoted the sixth paragraph of Mach's "anti-metaphysical observations" in full. It is a sheer plagiarism of Berkeley. Not a single idea, not a glimmer of thought, except that "we sense only our sensations". From which there is only one possible inference, namely, that the "world consists only of *my* sensations". The word "our" employed by Mach instead of "my" is employed illegitimately. By this

word alone Mach betrays that "half-heartedness" of which he accuses others. For if the "assumption" of the existence of the external world is "idle", if the assumption that the needle exists independently of me and that an interaction takes place between my body and the point of the needle is really "idle and superfluous", then primarily the "assumption" of the existence of other people is idle and superfluous. Only *I* exist, and all other people, as well as the external world, come under the category of idle "nuclei". Holding this point of view one cannot speak of "*our*" sensations; and when Mach does speak of them, it is only a betrayal of his own manifest half-heartedness. It only proves that his philosophy is a jumble of idle and empty words in which their author himself does not believe.

Here is a particularly graphic example of Mach's half-heartedness and confusion. In § 6 of Chapter XI of the *Analysis of Sensations* we read: "If I imagine that while I am experiencing sensations, I or someone else could observe my brain with all possible physical and chemical means, it would be possible to ascertain with what processes of the organism particular sensations are connected..." (197).

Very good! This means, then, that our sensations are connected with definite processes which take place in the organism in general, and in our brain in particular? Yes, Mach very definitely makes this "assumption"—it would be quite a task not to make it from the standpoint of natural science! But is not this the very "assumption" of those very same "nuclei and their interaction" which our philosopher declared to be idle and superfluous? We are told that bodies are complexes of sensations; to go beyond that, Mach assures us, to regard sensations as a product of the action of bodies upon our sense-organs, is metaphysics, an idle and superfluous assumption, etc., *à la* Berkeley. But the brain is a body. Consequently, the brain also is no more than a complex of sensations. It follows, then, that with the help of a complex of sensations I (and *I* also am nothing but a complex of sensations) sense complexes of sensations. A delightful philosophy! First sensations are declared to be "the real elements of the world"; on this an "original" Berkeleianism is erected—and then the very opposite view is smuggled in, viz., that sensations are connected with

definite processes in the organism. Are not these "processes" connected with metabolic exchange between the "organism" and the external world? Could this metabolism take place if the sensations of the particular organism did not give it an objectively correct idea of this external world?

Mach does not ask himself such embarrassing questions when he mechanically jumbles fragments of Berkeleianism with the views of natural science, which instinctively adheres to the materialist theory of knowledge.... In the same paragraph Mach writes: "It is sometimes also asked whether (inorganic) 'matter' experiences sensation...." This means that there is no doubt that *organic* matter experiences sensation? This means that sensation is not something primary but that it is one of the properties of matter? Mach skips over all the absurdities of Berkeleianism!... "The question," he avers, "is natural enough, if we proceed from the current widespread physical notions, according to which matter is the *immediate* and indisputably given *reality*, out of which everything, inorganic and organic, is constructed...." Let us bear in mind this truly valuable admission of Mach's that the current widespread *physical* notions regard matter as the immediate reality, and that only one variety of this reality (organic matter) possesses the well-defined property of sensation.... Mach continues: "Then, indeed, sensation must suddenly arise somewhere in this structure consisting of matter, or else have previously been present in the foundation. From *our* standpoint the question is a false one. For us matter is not what is primarily given. Rather, what is primarily given are the *elements* (which in a certain familiar relation are designated as sensations)...."

What is primarily given, then, are sensations, although they are "connected" only with definite processes in organic matter! And while uttering such absurdities Mach wants to blame materialism ("the current widespread physical notion") for leaving unanswered the question whence sensation "arises". This is a sample of the "refutation" of materialism by the fideists and their hangers-on. Does any other philosophical standpoint "solve" a problem before enough data for its solution has been collected? Does not Mach himself say in the very same paragraph: "So long as this problem (how far sensation extends in the organic world) has not been solved

even in a single special case, no answer to the question is possible."

The difference between materialism and "Machism" in this particular question thus consists in the following. Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought, sensation as secondary, because in its well-defined form sensation is associated only with the higher forms of matter (organic matter), while "in the foundation of the structure of matter" one can only surmise the existence of a faculty akin to sensation. Such, for example, is the supposition of the well-known German scientist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others, not to speak of Diderot's conjecture mentioned above. Machism holds to the opposite, the idealist point of view, and at once lands into an absurdity: since, in the first place, sensation is taken as primary, in spite of the fact that it is associated only with definite processes in matter organised in a definite way; and since, in the second place, the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is violated by the assumption of the existence of other living beings and, in general, of other "complexes" besides the given great *I*.

The word "element", which many naïve people (as we shall see) take to be some sort of a new discovery, in reality only obscures the question, for it is a meaningless term which creates the false impression that a solution or a step forward has been achieved. This impression is a false one, because there still remains to be investigated and reinvestigated how matter, apparently entirely devoid of sensation, is related to matter which, though composed of the same atoms (or electrons), is yet endowed with a well-defined faculty of sensation. Materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved problem and thereby stimulates the attempt to solve it, to undertake further experimental investigation. Machism, which is a species of muddled idealism, befogs the issue and side-tracks it by means of the futile verbal trick, "element".

Here is a passage from Mach's latest, comprehensive and concluding philosophical work that clearly betrays the falsity of this idealist artifice. In his *Knowledge and Error* we read: "While there is no difficulty in constructing (*auf-*

zubauen) *every physical* experience out of sensations, i.e., *psychical* elements, it is impossible to imagine (*ist keine Möglichkeit abzusehen*) how to represent (*darstellen*) any *psychical* experience out of the elements employed in modern physics, i.e., mass and motion (in their rigidity—*Starrheit*—which is serviceable only for this special science)."*

Of the rigidity of the conceptions of many modern scientists and of their metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of the term, i.e., anti-dialectical) views, Engels speaks repeatedly and very precisely. We shall see later that it was just on this point that Mach went astray, because he did not understand or did not know the relation between relativism and dialectics. But this is not what concerns us here. It is important for us here to note how glaringly Mach's *idealism* emerges, in spite of the confused—ostensibly new—terminology. There is no difficulty, you see, in constructing any physical element out of sensations, i.e., psychical elements! Oh yes, such constructions, of course, are not difficult, for they are purely verbal constructions, empty scholasticism, serving as a loophole for fideism. It is not surprising after this that Mach dedicates his works to the immanentists; it is not surprising that the immanentists, who profess the most reactionary kind of philosophical idealism, welcome Mach with open arms. The "recent positivism" of Ernst Mach was only about two hundred years too late. Berkeley had already sufficiently shown that "out of sensations, i.e., psychical elements", nothing can be "built" except *solipsism*. As regards materialism, to which Mach here, too, counterposes his own views, without frankly and explicitly naming the "enemy", we have already seen in the case of Diderot what the real views of the materialists are. These views do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter or in reducing sensation to the movement of matter, but in recognising sensation as one of the properties of matter in motion. On this question Engels shared the standpoint of Diderot. Engels dissociated himself from the "vulgar" materialists, Vogt, Büchner and Moleschott, for the very reason, among others, that they erred in believing that the brain

* E. Mach, *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, 2. Auflage, 1906, S. 12, Anmerkung.

secretes thought *in the same way* as the liver secretes bile. But Mach, who constantly counterposes his views to materialism, ignores, of course, all the great materialists—Diderot, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels—just as all other official professors of official philosophy do.

In order to characterise Avenarius' earliest and basic view, let us take his first independent philosophical work, *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses. Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der reinen Erfahrung*, which appeared in 1876. Bogdanov in his *Empirio-monism* (Bk. 1, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 9, note) says that "in the development of Mach's views, the starting-point was philosophical idealism, while a realistic tinge was characteristic of Avenarius from the very beginning". Bogdanov said so because he believed what Mach said (see *Analysis of Sensations*, Russian translation, p. 288). Bogdanov should not have believed Mach, and his assertion is diametrically opposed to the truth. On the contrary, Avenarius' idealism emerges so clearly in his work of 1876 that Avenarius himself in 1891 was obliged to admit it. In the introduction to *The Human Concept of the World* Avenarius says: "He who has read my first systematic work, *Philosophie*, *etc.*, will at once presume that I would have attempted to treat the problems of a criticism of pure experience from the 'idealist' standpoint" (*Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, 1891, Vorwort, S. ix), but "the sterility of philosophical idealism compelled me to doubt the correctness of my previous path" (S. x). This idealist starting-point of Avenarius' is universally acknowledged in philosophical literature. Of the French writers I shall refer to Cauwelaert, who says that Avenarius' philosophical standpoint in the *Prolegomena* is "monistic idealism".* Of the German writers, I shall name Rudolf Willy, Avenarius' disciple, who says that "Avenarius in his youth—and particularly in his work of 1876—was totally under the spell (*ganz im Banne*) of so-called epistemological idealism".**

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* F. Van Cauwelaert, "L'empiriocriticisme", *Revue néo-scolastique*,[22] 1907, Feb., p. 51.

** Rudolf Willy, *Gegen die Schulweisheit. Eine Kritik der Philosophie*, München, 1905, S. 170.

And, indeed, it would be ridiculous to deny the idealism in Avenarius' *Prolegomena*, where he explicitly states that "*only sensation can be thought of as the existing*" (pp. 10 and 65 of the second German edition; all italics in quotations are ours). This is how Avenarius himself presents the contents of § 116 of his work. Here is the paragraph in full: "We have recognised that the existing (*das Seiende*) is substance endowed with sensation; substance falls away [it is "more economical", don't you see, there is "a lesser expenditure of effort" in thinking that there is no "substance" and that no external world exists!], sensation remains; we must then regard the existing as sensation, at the basis of which there is nothing which does not possess sensation (*nichts Empfindungsloses*)."

Sensation, then, exists without "substance", i.e., thought exists without the brain! Are there really philosophers capable of defending this brainless philosophy? There are. Professor Richard Avenarius is one of them. And we must pause for a while to consider this defence, difficult though it be for a normal person to take it seriously. Here, in §§ 89 and 90 of this same work, is Avenarius' argument:

"...The proposition that motion produces sensation is based on apparent experience only. This experience, which includes the act of perception, is supposed to consist in the fact that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance (brain) as a result of transmitted motion (excitation) and with the help of other material conditions (e.g., blood). However—apart from the fact that such generation has never itself (*selbst*) been observed—in order to construct the supposed experience, as an experience which is real in all its parts, empirical proof, at least, is required to show that the sensation, which assumedly is caused in a substance by transmitted motion, did not already exist in that substance in one way or another; so that the appearance of sensation cannot be conceived of in any other way than as a creative act on the part of the transmitted motion. Thus only by proving that where a sensation now appears there was none previously, not even a minimal one, would it be possible to establish a fact which, denoting as it does some act of creation, contradicts all the rest of experience and which would radically change all the rest of our conception of

nature (*Naturanschauung*). But such proof is not furnished by any experience, and cannot be furnished by any experience; on the contrary, the notion of a state of a substance totally devoid of sensation which subsequently begins to experience sensation is only a hypothesis. But this hypothesis merely complicates and obscures our understanding instead of simplifying and clarifying it.

"Should the so-called experience, viz., that the sensation *arises* owing to transmitted motion in a substance that begins to perceive from this moment, prove upon closer examination to be only apparent, there is still sufficient material in the remaining content of the experience to denote at least the relative origin of sensation from conditions of motion, namely, to denote that the sensation which is present, although latent or minimal, or for some other reason not manifest to the consciousness, becomes, owing to transmitted motion, released or enhanced or made manifest to the consciousness. However, even this bit of the remaining content of experience is only an appearance. Were we even by an ideal observation to trace the motion proceeding from the moving substance A, transmitted through a series of intermediate centres until it reaches the substance B, which is endowed with sensation, we should at best find that sensation in substance B is developed or becomes enhanced simultaneously with the reception of the incoming motion—but we should not find that this occurred as a *consequence* of the motion...."

We have purposely quoted this refutation of materialism by Avenarius in full, in order that the reader may see to what truly pitiful sophistries "recent" empirio-critical philosophy resorts. We shall compare with the argument of the idealist Avenarius the *materialist* argument of—Bogdanov, if only to punish Bogdanov for his betrayal of materialism!

In long bygone days, fully nine years ago, when Bogdanov was half "a natural-scientific materialist" (that is, an adherent of the materialist theory of knowledge, which the overwhelming majority of contemporary scientists instinctively hold), when he was only half led astray by the muddled Ostwald, he wrote: "From ancient times to the present day, descriptive psychology has adhered to the classification of the facts of consciousness into three categories: the do-

main of sensations and ideas, the domain of emotions and the domain of impulses.... To the first category belong the *images* of phenomena of the outer or inner world, as taken by themselves in consciousness.... Such an image is called a 'sensation' if it is directly produced through the external sense-organs by its corresponding external phenomenon."* And a little farther on he says: "Sensation ... arises in consciousness as a result of a certain impulse from the external environment transmitted by the external sense-organs" (222). And further: "Sensation is the foundation of mental life; it is its immediate connection with the external world" (240). "At each step in the process of sensation a transformation of the energy of external excitation into the fact of consciousness takes place" (133). And even in 1905, when with the gracious assistance of Ostwald and Mach Bogdanov had already abandoned the materialist standpoint in philosophy for the idealist standpoint, he wrote (from forgetfulness!) in his *Empirio-monism*: "As is known, the energy of external excitation, transformed at the nerve-ends into a 'telegraphic' form of nerve current (still insufficiently investigated but devoid of all mysticism), first reaches the neurons that are located in the so-called 'lower' centres—ganglial, cerebro-spinal, subcortical, etc." (Bk. 1, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 118).

For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into the fact of consciousness. This transformation has been, and is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand. The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external world—not an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the "sole entity". Avenarius gave but a slightly changed form to this old sophism, which had been already worn threadbare by Bi-

* A. Bogdanov, *The Fundamental Elements of the Historical Outlook on Nature*, St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 216.

shop Berkeley. Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection we are constantly observing between sensation and matter organised in a definite way, let us therefore acknowledge the existence of sensation alone—that is what the sophism of Avenarius amounts to.

To conclude our description of the fundamental idealist premises of empirio-criticism, we shall briefly refer to the English and French representatives of this philosophical trend. Mach explicitly says of Karl Pearson, the Englishman, that he (Mach) is "in agreement with his epistemological (*erkenntniskritischen*) views on all essential points" (*Mechanics*, ed. previously cited, p. ix). Pearson in turn agrees with Mach.* For Pearson "real things" are "sense-impressions". He declares any recognition of things outside the boundaries of sense-impressions to be metaphysics. Pearson fights materialism with great determination (without knowing either Feuerbach, or Marx and Engels); his arguments do not differ from those analysed above. However, the desire to masquerade as a materialist is so foreign to Pearson (that is a specialty of the Russian Machists), Pearson is so—incautious, that he invents no "new" names for his philosophy and simply declares that his views and those of Mach are "*idealist*" (ibid., p. 326)! He traces his genealogy directly to Berkeley and Hume. The philosophy of Pearson, as we shall repeatedly find, is distinguished from that of Mach by its far greater integrity and consistency.

Mach explicitly declares his solidarity with the French physicists, Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré**. We shall have occasion to deal with the particularly confused and inconsistent philosophical views of these writers in the chapter on the new physics. Here we shall content ourselves with noting that for Poincaré things are "groups of sensations"*** and that a similar view is casually expressed by Duhem.****

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* Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, 2nd ed., London, 1900, p. 326.

** *Analysis of Sensations*, p. 4. Cf. Preface to *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, 2nd ed.

*** Henri Poincaré, *La valeur de la science*, Paris, 1905 (there is a Russian translation), passim.

**** P. Duhem, *La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure*, Paris, 1906. Cf. pp. 6, 10.

We shall now proceed to examine how Mach and Avenarius, having admitted the idealist character of their original views, *corrected* them in their subsequent works.

2. "THE DISCOVERY OF THE WORLD-ELEMENTS"

Such is the title under which Friedrich Adler, lecturer at the University of Zurich, probably the only German author also anxious to supplement Marx with Machism, writes of Mach.* And this naïve university lecturer must be given his due: in his simplicity of heart he does Machism more harm than good. At least, he puts the question point-blank—did Mach really "discover the world-elements"? If so, then, only very backward and ignorant people, of course, can still remain materialists. Or is this discovery a return on the part of Mach to the old philosophical errors?

We saw that Mach in 1872 and Avenarius in 1876 held a purely idealist view; for them the world is our sensation. In 1883 Mach's *Mechanics* appeared, and in the preface to the first edition Mach refers to Avenarius' *Prolegomena*, and greets his ideas as being "very close" (*sehr verwandte*) to his own philosophy. Here are the arguments in the *Mechanics* concerning the elements: "All natural science can only picture and represent (*nachbilden und vorbilden*) complexes of those *elements* which we ordinarily call *sensations*. It is a matter of the connection of these elements.... The connection of A (heat) with B (flame) is a problem of *physics*, that of A and N (nerves) a problem of physiology. Neither exists *separately*; both exist in conjunction. Only temporarily can we neglect either. Even processes that are apparently purely mechanical, are thus always physiological" (op. cit., German ed., S. 499). We find the same in the *Analysis of Sensations*: "Wherever ... the terms 'sensation', 'complex of sensations', are used alongside of or in place of the terms 'element', 'complex of elements', it must be borne in mind that it is *only* in this *connection* [namely,

* Friedrich W. Adler, "Die Entdeckung der Weltelemente (zu E. Machs 70. Geburtstag)", *Der Kampf*,[23] 1908, Nr. 5 (Februar). Translated in *The International Socialist Review*,[24] 1908, No. 10 (April). One of Adler's articles has been translated into Russian in the symposium *Historical Materialism*.

in the connection of A, B, C with K, L, M, that is, in the connection of "complexes which we ordinarily call bodies" with "the complex which we call our body"] and relation, only in this functional dependence that the elements are *sensations*. In another functional dependence they are at the same time physical objects" (Russian translation, pp. 23 and 17). "A colour is a physical object when we consider its dependence, for instance, upon the source of illumination (other colours, temperatures, spaces and so forth). When we, however, consider its *dependence* upon the *retina* (the elements K, L, M), it is a *psychological* object, a *sensation*" (ibid., p. 24).

Thus the discovery of the world-elements amounts to this:

1) all that exists is declared to be sensation,

2) sensations are called elements,

3) elements are divided into the physical and the psychical; the latter is that which depends on the human nerves and the human organism generally; the former does not depend on them;

4) the connection of physical elements and the connection of psychical elements, it is declared, do not exist separately from each other; they exist only in conjunction;

5) it is possible only temporarily to leave one or the other connection out of account;

6) the "new" theory is declared to be free from "one-sidedness."*

Indeed, it is not one-sidedness we have here, but an incoherent jumble of antithetical philosophical points of view. Since you base yourself *only* on sensations you do not correct the "one-sidedness" of your idealism by the term "element", but only confuse the issue and cravenly hide from your own theory. In words, you eliminate the antithesis between the physical and psychical,** between materialism

* Mach says in the *Analysis of Sensations*: "These elements are usually called sensations. But as that term already implies a one-sided theory, we prefer to speak simply of elements" (pp. 27-28).

** "The antithesis between the *self* and the world, sensation or appearance and the thing, then vanishes, and it is solely a matter of the connection of the elements" (ibid., p. 21).

(which regards nature, matter, as primary) and idealism (which regards spirit, mind, sensation as primary); in fact, you promptly restore this antithesis; you restore it surreptitiously, retreating from your own fundamental premise! For, if elements are sensations, you have no right even for a moment to accept the existence of "elements" *independently* of my nerves and my mind. But if you do admit physical objects that are independent of my nerves and my sensations and that cause sensation only by acting upon my retina—you are disgracefully abandoning your "one-sided" idealism and adopting the standpoint of "one-sided" materialism! If colour is a sensation only depending upon the retina (as natural science compels you to admit), then light rays, falling upon the retina, produce the sensation of colour. This means that outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves of a definite length and of a definite velocity, which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour. This is precisely how natural science regards it. It explains the sensations of various colours by the various lengths of light-waves existing outside the human retina, outside man and independently of him. This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on matter organised in a definite way. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way. Such are the views of materialism in general, and of Marx and Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius *secretly* smuggle in materialism by means of the word "element", which *supposedly* frees their theory of the "one-sidedness" of subjective idealism, *supposedly* permits the assumption that the mental is dependent on the retina, nerves and so forth, and the assumption that the physical is independent of the human organism. In fact, of course, the trick with the word "element" is wretched sophistry, for a materialist who reads Mach and Avenarius will immediately ask: what are the "elements"? It would, indeed, be childish to think that one can dispose of the fundamental philosophical trends by inventing a new word. Either the "element" is a *sensation*,

as all empirio-criticists, Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt,* etc., maintain—in which case your philosophy, gentlemen, is *idealism* vainly seeking to hide the nakedness of its solipsism under the cloak of a more "objective" terminology; or the "element" is not a sensation—in which case *absolutely no thought whatever* is attached to the "new" term; it is merely high-sounding trifling.

Take Petzoldt, for instance, the last word in empirio-criticism, as V. Lesevich, the first and most outstanding Russian empirio-criticist, describes him.** Having defined elements as sensations, he says in the second volume of the work mentioned: "In the statement that 'sensations are the elements of the world' one must guard against taking the term 'sensation' as denoting something only subjective and therefore ethereal; transforming the ordinary picture of the world into an illusion (*Verflüchtigendes*)."***

One cannot help harping on a sore point! Petzoldt feels that the world "evaporates" (*verflüchtigt sich*), or becomes transformed into an illusion, when sensations are regarded as world-elements. And the good Petzoldt imagines that he helps matters by the reservation that sensation must not be taken as something only subjective! Is this not ridiculous sophistry? Does it make any difference whether we "take" sensation as sensation or whether we try to stretch the meaning of the term? Does this do away with the fact that sensations in man are connected with normally functioning nerves, retina, brain, etc., that the external world exists independently of our sensations? If you are not trying to evade the issue by a subterfuge, if you are really in earnest in wanting to "guard" against subjectivism and solipsism, you must above all guard against the fundamental idealist premises of your philosophy; you must replace the idealist line of your philosophy (from sensations to the external world) by the materialist line (from

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* Joseph Petzoldt, *Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, Bd. I, Leipzig, 1900, S. 113: "Elements are sensations in the ordinary sense of simple, irreducible perceptions (*Wahrnehmungen*)."

** V. Lesevich, *What Is Scientific* [read: fashionable, professorial, eclectic] *Philosophy*?, St. Petersburg, 1891, pp. 229, 247.

*** Petzoldt, Bd. II, Leipzig, 1904, S. 329.

the external world to sensations), you must abandon that empty and muddled verbal embellishment, "element", and simply say that colour is the result of the action of a physical object on the retina, which is the same as saying that sensation is a result of the action of matter on our sense-organs.

Let us take Avenarius again. The most valuable material on the question of the "elements" is to be found in his last work (and, it might be said, the most important for the comprehension of his philosophy), *Notes on the Concept of the Subject of Psychology*.* The author, by the way, here gives a very "graphic" table (Vol. XVIII, p. 410), the main part of which we reproduce below:

I. Things, or the substantial	Elements complexes of elements: Corporeal things
II. Thoughts, or the mental (*Gedankenhaftes*)	Incorporeal things, recollections and fantasies

Compare this with what Mach says after all his elucidation of the "elements" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 33): "It is not bodies that produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations) that make up bodies." There you have the "discovery of the world-elements" that overcomes the one-sidedness of idealism and materialism! At first we are assured that "elements" = something new, both physical and psychical at the same time; then a little correction is surreptitiously inserted: instead of the crude, materialist differentiation of matter (bodies, things) and the psychical (sensations, recollections, fantasies) we are presented with the doctrine of "recent positivism" regarding elements substantial and elements mental. Adler (Fritz) did not gain very much from "the discovery of the world-elements"!

Bogdanov, arguing against Plekhanov in 1906, wrote: "...I cannot own myself a Machist in philosophy. In the general philosophical conception there is only one thing I borrowed from Mach—the idea of the neutrality of the ele-

* R. Avenarius, "Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie", *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*,[25] Bd. XVIII (1894) und Bd. XIX (1895).

ments of experience in relation to the 'physical' and 'psychical', and the dependence of these characteristics solely on the *connection* of experience." (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. xli.) This is as though a religious man were to say—I cannot own myself a believer in religion, for there is "only one thing" I have borrowed from the believers—the belief in God. This "only one thing" which Bogdanov borrowed from Mach is the *basic error* of Machism, the basic falsity of its entire philosophy. Those deviations of Bogdanov's from empirio-criticism to which he himself attaches great significance are in fact of entirely secondary importance and amount to nothing more than inconsiderable private and individual differences between the various empirio-criticists who are approved by Mach and who approve Mach (we shall speak of this in greater detail later). Hence when Bogdanov was annoyed at being confused with the Machists he only revealed his failure to understand what *radically* distinguishes materialism from what is common to Bogdanov and to all other Machists. How Bogdanov developed, improved or worsened Machism is not important. What is important is that he has abandoned the materialist standpoint and has thereby inevitably condemned himself to confusion and idealist aberrations.

In 1899, as we saw, Bogdanov had the correct standpoint when he wrote: "The image of a man standing before me, directly given to me by vision, is a sensation."* Bogdanov did not trouble to give a criticism of this earlier position of his. He blindly believed Mach and began to repeat after him that the "elements" of experience are neutral in relation to the physical and psychical. "As has been established by recent positivist philosophy," wrote Bogdanov in Book I of *Empirio-monism* (2nd ed., p. 90), "the elements of psychical experience are identical with the elements of experience in general, as they are identical with the elements of physical experience." Or in 1906 (Bk. III, p. xx) "as to 'idealism', can it be called idealism merely on the grounds that the elements of 'physical experience' are regarded as identical with the elements of 'psychical experi-

* *The Fundamental Elements*, *etc.*, p. 216; cf. the quotations cited above.

ence', or with elementary sensations—when this is simply an indubitable fact?"

Here we have the true source of all Bogdanov's philosophical misadventures, a source which he shares with the rest of the Machists. We can and must call it idealism when "the elements of physical experience" (i.e., the physical, the external world, matter) are regarded as identical with sensations, for this is sheer Berkeleianism. There is not a trace here of recent philosophy, or positivist philosophy, or of indubitable fact. It is merely an old, old idealist sophism. And were one to ask Bogdanov how he would prove the "indubitable fact" that the physical is identical with sensations, one would get no other argument save the eternal refrain of the idealists: I am aware only of my sensations; the "testimony of self-consciousness" (*die Aussage des Selbstbewusstseins* of Avenarius in his *Prolegomena*, 2nd German edition, § 93, p. 56); or: "in our experience [which testifies that "we are sentient substance"] sensation is given us with more certainty than is substantiality" (ibid., § 91, p. 55), and so on and so forth. Bogdanov (trusting Mach) accepted a reactionary philosophical trick as an "indubitable fact". For, indeed, not a single fact was or could be cited which would refute the view that sensation is an image of the external world—a view which was shared by Bogdanov in 1899 and which is shared by natural science to this day. In his philosophical aberrations the physicist Mach has completely strayed from the path of "modern science". Regarding this important circumstance, which Bogdanov overlooked, we shall have much to say later.

One of the circumstances which helped Bogdanov to jump so quickly from the materialism of the natural scientists to the muddled idealism of Mach was (apart from the influence of Ostwald) Avenarius' doctrine of the dependent and independent series of experience. Bogdanov himself expounds the matter in Book I of his *Empirio-monism* thus: "Insofar as the data of experience appear *in dependence upon the state of a particular nervous system*, they form the *psychical world* of that particular person; insofar as the data of experience are taken *outside of such a dependence*, we have before us the *physical world*. Avenarius therefore characterises these two realms of experience respectively as

the *dependent series* and the *independent series* of experience" (p. 18).

That is just the whole trouble. This doctrine of the *independent* (i.e., independent of human sensation) "series" is a surreptitious importation of materialism, which is illegitimate, arbitrary, and eclectic from the standpoint of a philosophy that maintains that bodies are complexes of sensations, that sensations are "identical" with physical "elements". For once you have recognised that the source of light and the light-waves exist *independently* of man and the human consciousness, that colour is dependent on the action of these waves upon the retina, you have in fact adopted the materialist standpoint and have *completely destroyed* all the "indubitable facts" of idealism, together with all "the complexes of sensations", the elements discovered by recent positivism, and similar nonsense.

That is just the whole trouble. Bogdanov (like the rest of the Russian Machists) has never seen far into the idealist views originally held by Mach and Avenarius, has never understood their fundamental idealist premises, and has therefore failed to discover the illegitimacy and eclecticism of their subsequent attempts to smuggle in materialism surreptitiously. Yet, just as the initial idealism of Mach and Avenarius is generally acknowledged in philosophical literature, so is it generally acknowledged that subsequently empirio-criticism endeavoured to swing towards materialism. Cauwelaert, the French writer quoted above, asserts that Avenarius' *Prolegomena* is "monistic idealism", *The Critique of Pure Experience** (1888-90) is "absolute realism", while *The Human Concept of the World* (1891) is an attempt "to explain" the change. Let us note that the term realism is here employed as the antithesis of idealism. Following Engels, I use *only* the term materialism in this sense, and consider it the sole correct terminology, especially since the term "realism " has been bedraggled by the positivists and the other muddleheads who oscillate between materialism and idealism. For the present it will suffice to note that Cauwelaert had the indisputable fact in mind that in the *Prolegomena* (1876) sensation, according to Avenarius,

* *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung.—Ed.*

is the only entity, while "substance"—in accordance with the principle of "the economy of thought"!—is eliminated, and that in *The Critique of Pure Experience* the physical is taken as the *independent series*, while the psychical and, consequently, sensations, are taken as the dependent series.

Avenarius' disciple Rudolf Willy likewise admits that Avenarius, who was a "complete" idealist in 1876, subsequently "reconciled" (*Ausgleich*) "naïve realism" (i.e., the instinctive, unconscious materialist standpoint adopted by humanity, which regards the external world as existing independently of our minds) with this teaching (loc. cit.).

Oskar Ewald, the author of the book *Avenarius as the Founder of Empirio-criticism*, says that this philosophy combines contradictory idealist and "realist" (he should have said materialist) elements (not in Mach's sense, but in the human sense of the term element). For example, "the absolute [method of consideration] would perpetuate naïve realism, the relative would declare exclusive idealism as permanent."* Avenarius calls the absolute method of consideration that which corresponds to Mach's connection of "elements" outside our body, and the relative that which corresponds to Mach's connection of "elements" dependent on our body.

But of particular interest to us in this respect is the opinion of Wundt, who himself, like the majority of the abovementioned writers, adheres to the confused idealist standpoint, but who has analysed empirio-criticism perhaps more attentively than all the others. P. Yushkevich has the following to say in this connection: "It is interesting to note that Wundt regards empirio-criticism as the most scientific form of the latest type of materialism,"** i.e., the type of those materialists who regard the spiritual as a function of corporeal processes (and whom—we would add Wundt defines as standing midway between Spinozism[26] and absolute materialism***).

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* Oskar Ewald, *Richard Avenarius als Begründer des Empiriokritizismus*, Berlin, 1905, S. 66.

** P. Yushkevich, *Materialism and Critical Realism*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 15.

*** W. Wundt, "Ueber naiven und kritischen Realismus", *Philosophische Studien*,[27] Bd. XIII, 1897, S. 334.

True, this opinion of Wundt's is extremely interesting. But what is even more "interesting" is Mr. Yushkevich's attitude towards the books and articles on philosophy of which he treats. This is a typical example of the attitude of our Machists to such matters. Gogol's Petrushka[28] used to read and find it interesting that letters always combined to make words. Mr. Yushkevich read Wundt and found it "interesting" that Wundt accused Avenarius of materialism. If Wundt is wrong, why not refute him? If he is right, why not explain the antithesis between materialism and empirio-criticism? Mr. Yushkevich finds what the idealist Wundt says "interesting", but this Machist regards it as a waste of effort to endeavour to go to the root of the matter (probably on the principle of "economy of thought")....

The point is that by informing the reader that Wundt accuses Avenarius of materialism, and by not informing him that Wundt regards some aspects of empirio-criticism as materialism and others as idealism and holds that the connection between the two is artificial, Yushkevich *entirely distorted the matter*. Either this gentleman absolutely does not understand what he reads, or he was prompted by a desire to indulge in false self-praise with the help of Wundt, as if to say: you see, the official professors regard us, too, as materialists, and not at all as muddleheads.

The above-mentioned article by Wundt constitutes a large book (more than 300 pages), devoted to a detailed analysis first of the immanentist school, and then of the empirio-criticists. Why did Wundt connect these two schools? Because he considers them *closely akin*; and this opinion, which is shared by Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the immanentists, is, as we shall see later, entirely correct. Wundt shows in the first part of this article that the immanentists are idealists, subjectivists and adherents of fideism. This, too, as we shall see later, is a perfectly correct opinion, although Wundt expounds it with a superfluous ballast of professorial erudition, with superfluous niceties and reservations, which is to be explained by the fact that Wundt himself is an idealist and fideist. He reproaches the immanentists not because they are idealists and adherents of fideism, but because, in his opinion, they arrive at these great principles by incorrect methods. Fur-

ther, the second and third parts of Wundt's article are devoted to empirio-criticism. There he quite definitely points out that very important theoretical propositions of empirio-criticism (e.g., the interpretation of "experience" and the "principal co-ordination", of which we shall speak later) are *identical* with those held by the immanentists (*die empiriokritische in Uebereinstimmung mit der immanenten Philosophie annimmt*, S. 382). Other theoretical propositions Avenarius borrowed from materialism, and in general empirio-criticism is a "*motley*" (*bunte Mischung*, ibid., S. 57), in which the "various component elements *are entirely heterogeneous*" (*an sich einander völlig heterogen sind*, S. 56).

Among the materialist morsels of the Avenarius-Mach hotchpotch Wundt includes primarily Avenarius' doctrine of the "*independent vital series*". If you start from the "system C" (that is how Avenarius—who was very fond of making erudite play with new terms—designates the human brain or the nervous system in general), and if the mental is for you a function of the brain, then this "system C" is a "metaphysical substance"—says Wundt (ibid., p. 64), and your doctrine is materialism. It should be said that many idealists and all agnostics (Kantians and Humeans included) call the materialists metaphysicians, because it seems to them that to recognise the existence of an external world independent of the human mind is to transcend the bounds of experience. Of this terminology and its utter incorrectness from the point of view of Marxism, we shall speak in its proper place. Here it is important to note that the recognition of the "independent" series by Avenarius (and also by Mach, who expresses the same idea in different words) is, according to the general opinion of philosophers of various parties, i.e., of various trends in philosophy, an *appropriation from materialism*. If you assume that everything that exists is sensation, or that bodies are complexes of sensations, you cannot, without violating all your fundamental premises, all "your" philosophy, arrive at the conclusion that the *physical* exists *independently* of our minds, and that sensation is a *function* of matter organised in a definite way. Mach and Avenarius, in their philosophy, combine fundamental idealist premises with individual materialist deductions for the very reason that their theory is an

example of that "pauper's broth of eclecticism"[29] of which Engels speaks with just contempt.*

This eclecticism is particularly marked in Mach's latest philosophical work, *Knowledge and Error*, 2nd edition, 1906. We have already seen that Mach there declared that "there is no difficulty in constructing every physical element out of sensation, i.e., out of psychical elements", and in the same book we read: "Dependencies outside the boundary U [=*Umgrenzung*, i.e., "the spatial boundary of our body", S. 8] are physics in the broadest sense" (S. 323, § 4). "To obtain those dependencies in a pure state (*rein erhalten*) it is necessary as much as possible to eliminate the influence of the observer of the elements that lie within U" (loc. cit.). Well, well, the titmouse first promised to set the sea on fire ... i.e., to construct physical elements from psychical elements, and then it turns out that physical elements lie beyond the boundary of psychical elements, "which lie within our body"! A remarkable philosophy!

Another example: "A perfect (*vollkommenes*) gas, a perfect liquid, a perfect elastic body, does not exist; the physicist knows that his fictions only approximate to the facts and arbitrarily simplify them; he is aware of the divergence, which cannot be eliminated" (S. 418, § 30).

What divergence (*Abweichung*) is meant here? The divergence of what from what? Of thought (physical theory) from the facts. And what are thoughts, ideas? Ideas are the "tracks of sensations" (S. 9). And what are facts? Facts are "complexes of sensations". And so, the divergence of the tracks of sensations from complexes of sensations cannot be eliminated.

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* The foreword to *Ludwig Feuerbach*, dated February 1888. These words of Engels' refer to German professorial philosophy in general. The Machists who would like to be Marxists, being unable to grasp the significance and meaning of this thought of Engels', sometimes take refuge in a wretched evasion: "Engels did not yet know Mach" (Fritz Adler in *Historical Materialism*, p. 370) . On what is this opinion based? On the fact that Engels does not cite Mach and Avenarius? There are no other grounds, and these grounds are worthless, for Engels does not mention *any* of the eclectics by name, and it is hardly likely that Engels did not know Avenarius, who had been editing a quarterly of "scientific" philosophy ever since 1876.

What does this mean? It means that Mach *forgets* his own theory and, when treating of various problems of physics, speaks plainly, without idealist twists, i.e., materialistically. All the "complexes of sensations" and the entire stock of Berkeleian wisdom vanish. The physicists' theory proves to be a reflection of bodies, liquids, gases existing outside us and independently of us, a reflection which is, of course, approximate; but to call this approximation or simplification "arbitrary" is wrong. *In fact*, sensation is here regarded by Mach just as it is regarded by all science which has not been "purified" by the disciples of Berkeley and Hume, viz., as an *image of the external world*. Mach's own theory is subjective idealism; but when the factor of objectivity is required, Mach unceremoniously inserts into his arguments the premises of the opposite, i.e., the materialist, theory of knowledge. Eduard von Hartmann, a consistent idealist and consistent reactionary in philosophy, *who sympathises with the Machists' fight against materialism*, comes very close to the truth when he says that Mach's philosophical position is a "mixture (*Nichtunterscheidung*) of naïve realism and absolute illusionism".* That is true. The doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations, etc., is absolute illusionism, i.e.., solipsism; for from this standpoint the world is nothing but my illusion. On the other hand, Mach's above-mentioned argument, as well as many other of his fragmentary arguments, is what is known as "naïve realism", i.e., the materialist theory of knowledge unconsciously and instinctively taken over from the scientists.

Avenarius and the professors who follow in his footsteps attempt to disguise this mixture by the theory of the "principal co-ordination". We shall proceed to examine this theory presently, but let us first finish with the charge that Avenarius is a materialist. Mr. Yushkevich, to whom Wundt's opinion which he failed to understand seemed so interesting, was either himself not enough interested to learn, or else did not condescend to inform the reader, how Avenarius' nearest disciples and successors reacted to this

* Eduard von Hartmann, *Die Weltanschauung der modernen Phyik*, Leipzig, 1902, S. 219.

charge. Yet this is necessary to clarify the matter if we are interested in the relation of Marx's philosophy, i.e., materialism, to the philosophy of empirio-criticism. Moreover, if Machism is a muddle, a mixture of materialism and idealism, it is important to know whither this current turned—if we may so express it—after the official idealists began to disown it because of its concessions to materialism.

Wundt was answered, among others, by two of Avenarius' purest and most orthodox disciples, J. Petzoldt and Fr. Carstanjen. Petzoldt, with haughty resentment, repudiated the charge of materialism, which is so degrading to a German professor, and in support referred to—what do you think?—Avenarius' *Prolegomena*, where the concept of substance is supposed to have been annihilated! A convenient theory, indeed, that can be made to embrace both purely idealist works and arbitrarily assumed materialist premises! Avenarius' *Critique of Pure Experience*, of course, does not contradict this teaching, i.e., materialism, writes Petzoldt, but neither does it contradict the directly opposite spiritualist doctrine.* An excellent defence! This is exactly what Engels called "a pauper's broth of eclecticism". Bogdanov, who refuses to own himself a Machist and who wants to be considered a Marxist (*in philosophy*), follows Petzoldt. He asserts that "empirio-criticism is not ... concerned with materialism, or with spiritualism, or with metaphysics in general",** that "truth ... does not lie in the 'golden mean' between the conflicting trends [materialism and spiritualism], but lies outside of both".*** What appeared to Bogdanov to be truth is, as a matter of fact, confusion, a wavering between materialism and idealism.

Carstanjen, rebutting Wundt, said that he absolutely repudiated this "importation (*Unterschiebung*) of a materialist element" "which is utterly foreign to the critique of pure experience".**** "Empirio-criticism is scepticism

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* J. Petzoldt, *Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, Bd. I, S. 351, 352.

** *Empirio-monism*, Bk. I, 2nd ed., p. 21.

*** Ibid., p. 93

**** Fr. Carstanjen, "Der Empiriokritizismus, zugleich eine Erwiderung auf W. Wundts Aufsätze", *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Jahrg. 22 (1898), S. 73 und 213.

κατ' ἐξοχήν (pre-eminently) in relation to the content of the concepts." There is a grain of truth in this insistent emphasis on the neutrality of Machism; the amendment made by Mach and Avenarius to their original idealism amounts to making partial concessions to materialism. Instead of the consistent standpoint of Berkeley—the external world is my sensation—we sometimes get the Humean standpoint —I exclude the question whether or not there is anything beyond my sensations. And this agnostic standpoint inevitably condemns one to vacillate between materialism and idealism.

3. THE PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATION AND "NAÏVE REALISM"

Avenarius expounded his doctrine of the principal co-ordination in *The Human Concept of the World* and in the *Notes*. The second was written later, and in it Avenarius emphasises that he is expounding, it is true in a somewhat altered form, something that is not different from *The Critique of Pure Experience* and *The Human Concept of the World*, but *exactly the same* (*Notes*, 1894, p. 137 in the journal quoted above). The essence of this doctrine is the thesis of "the *indissoluble* (*unauflösliche*) *co-ordination* [i.e., the correlative connection] *of the self* (*des Ich*) *and the environment*" (p. 146). "Expressed philosophically," Avenarius says here, one can say the "*self* and *not-self*". We "*always* find together" (*immer ein Zusammen- vorgefundenes*) the one and the other, the *self* and the environment. "No full description of what we find (*des Vorgefundenem*) can contain an 'environment' without some *self* (*ohne ein Ich*) whose environment it is, even though it be only the *self* that is describing what is found (*das Vorgefundene*)" (S. 146). The *self* is called the *central term* of the co-ordination, the environment the *counter-term* (*Gegenglied*). (See *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, 2. Auflage, 1905, S. 83-84, § 148 ff.)

Avenarius claims that by this doctrine he recognises the full value of what is known as *naïve realism*, that is, the ordinary, non-philosophical, naïve view which is entertained by all people who do not trouble themselves as to whether they themselves exist and whether the environment, the external world, exists. Expressing his solidarity with

Avenarius, Mach also tries to represent himself as a defender of "naïve realism" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 39). The Russian Machists, without exception, believed Mach's and Avenarius' claim that this was indeed a defence of "naïve realism": the *self* is acknowledged, the environment is acknowledged—what more do you want?

In order to decide who actually possesses the greatest degree of *naïveté*, let us proceed from a somewhat remote starting-point. Here is a popular dialogue between a certain philosopher and his reader:

"*Reader*: The existence of a system of things [according to ordinary philosophy] is required and from them only is consciousness to be derived.

"*Author*: Now you are speaking in the spirit of a professional philosopher ... and not according to human common sense and actual consciousness....

"Tell me, and reflect well before you answer: Does a thing appear in you and become present in you and for you otherwise than simultaneously with and through your consciousness of the thing?...

"*Reader*: Upon sufficient reflection, I must grant you this.

"*Author*: Now you are speaking from yourself, from your heart. Take care, therefore, not to jump out of yourself and to apprehend anything otherwise than you are able to apprehend it, as consciousness *and* [philosopher's italics] the thing, as the thing *and* consciousness; or, more precisely, neither the one nor the other, but that which only subsequently becomes resolved into the two, that which is the absolute subjective-objective and objective-subjective."

Here you have the whole essence of the empirio-critical principal co-ordination, the latest defence of "naïve realism" by the latest positivism! The idea of "indissoluble" co-ordination is here stated very clearly and as though it were a genuine defence of the point of view of the common man, undistorted by the subtleties of "the professional philosophers". But, as a matter of fact, this dialogue is taken from the work of a classical representative of *subjective idealism*, Johann Gottlieb *Fichte*, *published in 1801*.*

* Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. Ein Versuch, die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen*, Berlin, 1801, S. 178-80.

There is nothing but a paraphrase of subjective idealism in the teachings of Mach and Avenarius we are examining. Their claim to have risen above materialism and idealism, to have eliminated the opposition between the point of view that proceeds from the thing *to* consciousness and the contrary point of view—is but the empty claim of a renovated Fichteanism. Fichte too imagined that he has "indissolubly" connected the "self" and the "environment", the consciousness and the thing; that he had "solved" the problem by the assertion that a man cannot jump out of himself. In other words, the Berkeleian argument is repeated: I perceive only my sensations, I have no right to assume "objects in themselves" outside of my sensation. The different methods of expression used by Berkeley in 1710, by Fichte in 1801, and by Avenarius in 1891-94 do not in the least change the essence of the matter, viz., the fundamental philosophical line of subjective idealism. The world is my sensation; the non-*self* is "postulated" (is created, produced) by the *self*; the thing is indissolubly connected with the consciousness; the indissoluble co-ordination of the *self* and the environment is the empirio-critical principal co-ordination;—this is all one and the same proposition, the same old trash with a slightly refurbished, or repainted, signboard.

The reference to "naïve realism", supposedly defended by this philosophy, is *sophistry* of the cheapest kind. The "naïve realism" of any healthy person who has not been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophers consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, exist *independently* of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our *self* and of man in general. The same *experience* (not in the Machist sense, but in the human sense of the term) that has produced in us the firm conviction that *independently* of us there exist other people, and not mere complexes of my sensations of high, short, yellow, hard, etc.—this same *experience* produces in us the conviction that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us. Our sensation, our consciousness is only *an image* of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism

deliberately makes the "naïve" belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge.

Is not the foregoing evaluation of the "principal co-ordination" a product of the materialist prejudice against Machism? Not at all. Specialists in philosophy who cannot be accused of partiality towards materialism, who even detest it and who accept one or other of the idealist systems, agree that the principal co-ordination of Avenarius and Co. is subjective idealism. Wundt, for instance, whose interesting opinion was not understood by Mr. Yushkevich, explicitly states that Avenarius' theory, according to which a full description of the given or the found is impossible without some *self*, an observer or describer, is "a false confusion of the content of real experience with reflections about it". Natural science, says Wundt, completely abstracts from every observer. "Such abstraction is possible only because the attribution (*Hinzudenken*) of an experiencing individual to every content of experience, which the empirio-critical philosophy, in agreement with the immanentist philosophy, assumes, is in general an empirically unfounded presumption arising from a false confusion of the content of real experience with reflections about it" (loc. cit., S. 382). For the immanentists (Schuppe, Rehmke, Leclair, Schubert-Soldern), who themselves voice—as we shall see later—their hearty sympathy with Avenarius, proceed from *this very* idea of the "indissoluble" connection between subject and object. And W. Wundt, before analysing Avenarius, demonstrated in detail that the immanentist philosophy is only a "modification" of Berkeleianism, that however much the immanentists may deny their kinship with Berkeley we should not allow verbal differences to conceal from us the "deeper content of these philosophical doctrines", viz., Berkeleianism or Fichteanism.*

The English writer Norman Smith, analysing Avenarius' *Philosophy of Pure Experience*, states this conclusion in an even more straightforward and emphatic form:

"Most readers of Avenarius' *The Human Concept of the World* will probably agree that, however convincing as criti-

* Loc. cit., § C: "The Immanentist Philosophy and Berkeleian Idealism", S. 373 and 375; cf. 386 and 407. "The Unavoidability of Solipsism from This Standpoint", S. 381.

cism [of idealism], it is tantalisingly illusive in its positive teaching. So long as we seek to interpret his theory of experience in the form in which it is avowedly presented, namely, as genuinely realistic, it eludes all clear comprehension: its whole meaning seems to be exhausted in negation of the subjectivism which it overthrows. It is only when we translate Avenarius' technical terms into more familiar language that we discover where the real source of the mystification lies. Avenarius has diverted attention from the defects of his position by directing his main attack against the very weakness [i.e., of the idealist position] which is fatal to his own theory."* "Throughout the whole discussion the vagueness of the term experience stands him in good stead. Sometimes it means experiencing and at other times the experienced, the latter meaning being emphasised when the nature of the *self* is in question. These two meanings of the term experience practically coincide with his important distinction between the absolute and the relative standpoints [I have examined above what significance this distinction has for Avenarius]; and these two points of view are not in his philosophy really reconciled. For when he allows as legitimate the demand that experience be ideally completed in thought [the full description of the environment is ideally completed by thinking of an observing *self*], he makes an admission which he cannot successfully combine with his assertion that nothing exists save in relation to the *self*. The ideal completion of given reality which results from the analysis of material bodies into elements which no human senses can apprehend [here are meant the material elements discovered by natural science, the atoms, electrons, etc., and not the fictitious elements invented by Mach and Avenarius], or from following the earth back to a time when no human being existed upon it, is, strictly, not a completion of experience but only of what is experienced. It completes only one of the two aspects which Avenarius has asserted to be inseparable. It leads us not only to what has not bean experienced but to what can never by any possibility be experienced by beings like ourselves. But here again the

* Norman Smith, "Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience", *Mind*,[30] Vol. XV, 1906, pp. 27-28.

ambiguities of the term experience come to Avenarius' rescue. He argues that thought is as genuine a form of experience as sense-perception, and so in the end falls back on the time-worn argument of subjective idealism, that thought and reality are inseparable, because reality can only be conceived in thought, and thought involves the presence of the thinker. Not, therefore, any original and profound re-establishment of realism, but only the restatement in its crudest form of the familiar position of subjective idealism is the final outcome of Avenarius' positive speculations" (p. 29).

The mystification wrought by Avenarius, who completely duplicates Fichte's error, is here excellently exposed. The much-vaunted elimination of the antithesis between materialism (Norman Smith wrongly calls it realism) and idealism by means of the term "experience" instantly proves to be a myth as soon as we proceed to definite and concrete problems. Such, for instance, is the problem of the existence of the earth *prior* to man, *prior* to any sentient being. We shall presently speak of this point in detail. Here we will note that not only Norman Smith, an opponent of his theory, but also W. Schuppe, the immanentist, who warmly greeted the appearance of *The Human Concept of the World* as *a confirmation of naïve realism*,* unmasks Avenarius and his fictitious "realism". The fact of the matter is that Schuppe *fully* agrees with *such* "realism", i.e., the mystification of materialism dished out by Avenarius. Such "realism", he wrote to Avenarius, I, the immanentist philosopher, who have been slandered as a subjective idealist, have always claimed with as much right as yourself, *hochverehrter Herr Kollege*. "My conception of thought ... excellently harmonises (*verträgt sich vortrefflich*) with your 'theory of pure experience'" (p. 384). "The connection and inseparability of the two terms of the co-ordination" are in fact provided only by the *self* (*das Ich*, the abstract, Fichtean self-consciousness, thought divorced from the brain). "That which you desired to eliminate you have tacitly assumed"—so Schuppe wrote to Avenarius (p. 388). And it

* See W. Schuppe's open letter to R. Avenarius in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Bd. XVII, 1893, S. 364-88.

is difficult to say who more caustically unmasks Avenarius the mystifier—Smith by his straightforward and clear refutation, or Schuppe by his enthusiastic opinion of Avenarius' crowning work. The kiss of Wilhelm Schuppe in philosophy is no better than the kiss of Peter Struve or Menshikov[31] in politics.

O. Ewald, who praises Mach for not succumbing to materialism, speaks of the principal co-ordination in a similar manner: "If one declares the correlation of central term and counter-term to be an epistemological necessity which cannot be avoided, then, even though the word 'empiriocriticism' be inscribed on the signboard in shrieking letters, one is adopting a standpoint that differs in no way from absolute idealism. [The term is incorrect; he should have said subjective idealism, for Hegel's absolute idealism is reconcilable with the existence of the earth, nature, and the physical universe without man, since nature is regarded as the "other being" of the absolute idea.] On the other hand, if we do not hold fast to this co-ordination and if we grant the counter-terms their independence, then the way is at once opened for every metaphysical possibility, especially in the direction of transcendental realism" (op. cit., pp. 56-57).

By metaphysics and transcendental realism, Herr Friedlander, who is disguised under the pseudonym Ewald, means *materialism*. Himself professing one of the varieties of idealism, he fully agrees with the Machists and the Kantians that materialism is metaphysics—"from beginning to end the wildest metaphysics" (p. 134). On the question of the "transcendence" and the metaphysical character of materialism he is in agreement with Bazarov and all our Machists, and of this we shall have more to say later. Here again it is important to note how *in fact* the empty, pseudo-scientific claim to have transcended idealism and materialism vanishes, and how the question arises inexorably and irreconcilably. "To grant the counter-terms their independence" means (if one translates the pretentious language of the affected Avenarius into common parlance) to regard nature, the external world as independent of human consciousness and sensation. And that is materialism. To build a theory of knowledge on the postulate of the indissoluble connection

between the object and human sensation ("complexes of sensations" as identical with bodies; "world-elements" that are identical both psychically and physically; Avenarius' co-ordination, and so forth) is to land inevitably into idealism. Such is the simple and unavoidable truth that with a little attention may be easily detected beneath the piles of affected quasi-erudite terminology of Avenarius, Schuppe, Ewald and the others, which deliberately obscures matters and frightens the general public away from philosophy.

The "reconciliation" of Avenarius' theory with "naïve realism" in the end aroused misgivings even among his own disciples. For instance, R. Willy says that the common assertion that Avenarius came to adopt "naïve realism" should be taken *cum grano salis*. "As a dogma, naïve realism would be nothing but the belief in things-in-themselves existing outside man (*ausserpersönliche*) in their perceptible form."* In other words, the only theory of knowledge that is really created by an actual and not fictitious agreement with "naïve realism" is, according to Willy, materialism! And Willy, of course, rejects materialism. But he is compelled to admit that Avenarius in *The Human Concept of the World* restores the unity of "experience", the unity of the "self" and the environment "by means of a series of complicated and in part extremely artificial auxiliary and intermediary conceptions" (171). *The Human Concept of the World*, being a reaction against the original idealism of Avenarius, "entirely bears the character of a *reconciliation* (*eines Ausgleiches*) between the naïve realism of common sense and the epistemological idealism of school philosophy. But that such a reconciliation could restore the unity and integrity of experience [Willy calls it *Grunderfahrung*, that is, basic experience—another new word!], I would not assert" (170).

A valuable admission! Avenarius' "experience" failed to reconcile idealism and materialism. Willy, it seems, repudiates the *school philosophy* of experience in order to replace it by a philosophy of "basic" experience, which is confusion thrice confounded....

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* R. Willy, *Gegen die Schulweisheit*, S. 170.

4. DID NATURE EXIST PRIOR TO MAN?

We have already seen that this question is a particularly annoying one for the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. Natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that there was no sentient matter, no "complexes of sensations", no *self* that was supposedly "indissolubly" connected with the environment in accordance with Avenarius' doctrine. Matter is primary, and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development. Such is the materialist theory of knowledge, to which natural science instinctively subscribes.

The question arises, have the eminent representatives of empirio-criticism observed this contradiction between their theory and natural science? They have observed it, and they have definitely asked themselves by what arguments this contradiction can be removed. Three attitudes to this question are of particular interest from the point of view of materialism, that of Avenarius himself and those of his disciples J. Petzoldt and R. Willy.

Avenarius tries to eliminate the contradiction to natural science by means of the theory of the "potential" central term in the co-ordination. As we know, co-ordination is the "indissoluble" connection between the *self* and the environment. In order to eliminate the obvious absurdity of this theory the concept of the "potential" central term is introduced. For instance, what about man's development from the embryo? Does the environment (= the "counter-term") exist if the "central term" is represented by an embryo? The embryonic system C—Avenarius replies—is the "potential central term in relation to the future individual environment" (*Notes on the Concept of the Subject of Psychology*, p. 140). The potential central term is never equal to zero, even when there are as yet no parents (*elterliche Bestandteile*), but only "integral parts of the environment" capable of becoming parents (S. 141).

The co-ordination then is indissoluble. It is essential for the empirio-criticist to assert this in order to save the

fundamentals of his philosophy—sensations and their complexes. Man is the central term of this co-ordination. But when there is no man, when he has not yet been born, the central term is nevertheless not equal to zero; it has only become a *potential* central term! It is astonishing that there are people who can take seriously a philosopher who advances such arguments! Even Wundt, who stipulates that he is not an enemy of every form of metaphysics (i.e., of fideism), was compelled to admit "the mystical obscuration of the concept experience" by the word "potential", which destroys co-ordination entirely (op. cit., p. 379).

And, indeed, how can one seriously speak of a co-ordination the indissolubility of which consists in one of its terms being potential?

Is this not mysticism, the very antechamber of fideism? If it is possible to think of a potential central term in relation to a future environment, why not think of it in relation to a *past* environment, that is, *after* man's *death*? You will say that Avenarius did not draw this conclusion from his theory? Granted, but that absurd and reactionary theory became the more cowardly but not any the better for that. Avenarius, in 1894, did not carry this theory to its logical conclusion, or perhaps feared to do so. But R. Schubert-Soldern, as we shall see, resorted in 1896 to *this very theory* to arrive at theological conclusions, which in 1906 earned the *approval* of Mach, who said that Schubert-Soldern was following "*very close paths*" (to Machism) (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 4). Engels was quite right in attacking Dühring, an avowed atheist, for inconsistently *leaving loopholes* for fideism in his philosophy. Engels several times, and very justly, brought this accusation against the materialist Dühring, although the latter had not drawn any theological conclusions, in the seventies at least. Among us, however, there are people who desire to be regarded as Marxists, yet who bring to the masses a philosophy which comes very close to fideism.

"...It might seem," Avenarius wrote in the *Notes*, "that from the empirio-critical standpoint natural science is not entitled to enquire about periods of our present environment which in time preceded the existence of man" (S. 144). Avenarius answers: "The enquirer cannot avoid mentally pro-

jecting himself" (*sich hinzuzudenken*, i.e., imagining oneself to be present). "For"—Avenarius continues—"what the scientist wants (although he may not be clearly aware of it) is essentially only this: how is the earth to be defined prior to the appearance of living beings or man if I were mentally to project myself in the role of an observer —in much the same way as though it were thinkable that we could from our earth follow the history of another star or even of another solar system with the help of perfected instruments."

An object cannot exist independently of our consciousness. "We always mentally project ourselves as the intelligence endeavouring to apprehend the object."

This theory of the necessity of "mentally projecting" the human mind to every object and to nature prior to man is given by me in the first paragraph in the words of the "recent positivist", R. Avenarius, and in the second, in the words of the subjective idealist, J. G. Fichte.* The sophistry of this theory is so manifest that it is embarrassing to analyse it. If we "mentally project" ourselves, our presence will be *imaginary*—but the existence of the earth prior to man is *real*. Man *could not* in practice be an observer, for instance, of the earth in an incandescent state, and to "imagine" his being present at the time is *obscurantism*, exactly as though I were to endeavour to prove the existence of hell by the argument that if I "mentally projected" myself thither as an observer I could observe hell. The "reconciliation" of empirio-criticism and natural science amounts to this, that Avenarius graciously consents to "mentally project" something the possibility of admitting which is *excluded* by natural science. No man at all educated or sound-minded doubts that the earth existed at a time when there *could not* have been any life on it, any sensation or any "central term", and consequently the whole theory of Mach and Avenarius, from which it follows that the earth is a complex of sensations ("bodies are complexes of sensations") or "complexes of elements in which the psychical and physical are identical", or "a counter-term of which

* J. G. Fichte, *Rezension des Aenesidemus*, 1794, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. I, S. 19.

the central term can never be equal to zero", is *philosophical obscurantism*, the carrying of subjective idealism to absurdity.

J. Petzoldt perceived the absurdity of the position into which Avenarius had fallen and felt ashamed. In his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience* (Vol. II) he devotes a whole paragraph (§ 65) "to the question of the reality of earlier (*frühere*) periods of the earth".

"In the teaching of Avenarius," says Petzoldt, "the *self* (*das Ich*) plays a role different from that which it plays with Schuppe [let us note that Petzoldt openly and repeatedly declares: our philosophy was founded by *three* men—Avenarius, Mach and Schuppe], yet it is a role which, perhaps, possesses too much importance for his theory." (Petzoldt was evidently influenced by the fact that Schuppe had unmasked Avenarius by showing that with him too everything rests entirely on the *self*; and Petzoldt wishes to make a correction.) "Avenarius said on one occasion," Petzoldt continues, "that we can think of a region where no human foot has yet trodden, but to be able *to think* [Avenarius' italics] of such an environment there is required what we designate by the term *self* (*Ich-Bezeichnetes*), *whose* [Avenarius' italics] thought it is" (*Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 18. Bd., 1894, S. 146, Anmerkung).

Petzoldt replies:

"The epistemologically important question, however, is not whether we can think of such a region at all, but whether we are entitled to think of it as existing, or as having existed, independently of any individual mind."

What is true, is true. People can think and "mentally project" for themselves any kind of hell and all sorts of devils. Lunacharsky even "mentally projected" for himself—well, to use a mild expression—religious conceptions.[32] But it is precisely the purpose of the theory of knowledge to show the unreal, fantastic and reactionary character of such projections.

"...For that the system C [i.e., the brain] is necessary for thought is obvious both for Avenarius and for the philosophy which is here presented...."

That is not true. Avenarius' theory of 1876 is a theory of thought without brain. And in his theory of 1891-94, as we shall presently see, there is a similar element of idealist nonsense.

"...But is this system C *a condition of existence* [Petzoldt's italics] of, say, the Mesozoic period (*Sekundärzeit*) of the earth?" And Petzoldt, presenting the argument of Avenarius I have already cited, on the subject of what science actually wants and how we can "mentally project" the observer, objects:

"No, we wish to know whether I have the right to think that the earth at that remote epoch existed in the same way as I think of it as having existed yesterday or a minute ago. Or must the existence of the earth be made conditional, as *Willy* claimed, on our right at least to assume that at the given period there coexisted some system C, even though at the lowest stage of its development?" (Of this idea of Willy's we shall speak presently.)

"Avenarius evades Willy's strange conclusion by the argument that the person who puts the question cannot mentally remove himself (*sich wegdenken*, i.e., think himself as absent), nor can he avoid mentally projecting himself (*sich hinzuzudenken*, see Avenarius, *The Human Concept of the World*, 1st German edition, p. 130). But then Avenarius makes the individual *self* of the person who puts the question, or the thought of such a *self*, the condition not only of the act of thought regarding the uninhabitable earth, but also of the justification for believing in the existence of the earth at that time.

"These false paths are easily avoided if we do not ascribe so much theoretical importance to the *self*. The only thing the theory of knowledge should demand of any conceptions of that which is remote in space or time is that it be conceivable and can be uniquely (*eindeutig*) determined; all the rest is a matter for the special sciences" (Vol. II, p. 325).

Petzoldt rechristened the law of causality the law of unique determination and imported into his theory, as we shall see later, the *apriority* of this law. This means that Petzoldt saves himself from Avenarius' subjective idealism and solipsism ("he attributes an exaggerated importance to

the *self*", as the professorial jargon has it) with the help of *Kantian* ideas. The absence of the objective factor in Avenarius' doctrine, the impossibility of reconciling it with the demands of natural science, which declares the earth (object) to have existed long before the appearance of living beings (subject), compelled Petzoldt to resort to causality (unique determination). The earth existed, for its existence prior to man is causally connected with the present existence of the earth. Firstly, where does causality come from? *A priori*, says Petzoldt. Secondly, are not the ideas of hell, devils, and Lunacharsky's "mental projections" also connected by causality? Thirdly, the theory of "complexes of sensations" in any case turns out to be destroyed by Petzoldt. Petzoldt failed to resolve the contradiction he observed in Avenarius, and only entangled himself still more, for only one solution is possible, viz., the recognition that the external world reflected by our mind exists independently of our mind. This materialist solution alone is really compatible with natural science, and it alone eliminates both Petzoldt's and Mach's idealist solution of the question of causality, which we shall speak of separately.

The third empirio-criticist, R. Willy, first raised the question of this difficulty for Avenarius' philosophy in 1896, in an article entitled "Der Empiriokritizismus als einzig wissenschaftlicher Standpunkt" ("Empirio-criticism as the Only Scientific Standpoint"). What about the world prior to man?—Willy asks here,* and at first answers according to Avenarius: "we project ourselves *mentally* into the past." But then he goes on to say that we are not necessarily obliged to regard *experience* as human *experience*. "For we must simply regard the animal kingdom—be it the most insignificant worm—as primitive fellow-men (*Mitmenschen*) if we regard animal life only in connection with general experience" (73-74). Thus, prior to man the earth was the "experience" of a worm, which fulfilled the function of the "central term" in order to save Avenarius' "co-ordination" and Avenarius' philosophy! No wonder Petzoldt tried to dissociate himself from an argument which is not only

* *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Band XX, 1896, S. 72.

the height of absurdity (ideas of the earth corresponding to the theories of geologists are attributed to a worm), but which does not in any way help our philosopher, for the earth existed not only before man but before any living being at all.

Willy returned to the question in 1905. The worm was now set aside.* But Petzoldt's "law of unique determination" could not, of course, satisfy Willy, who regarded it as merely "logical formalism". The author says—will not the question of the world prior to man, as Petzoldt puts it, lead us "back again to the things-in-themselves of common sense?" (i.e., to materialism! How terrible indeed!). What does millions of years without life mean? "Is time perhaps a thing-in-itself? of course not!** Well, that means that things outside men are only impressions, bits of fantasy fabricated by men with the help of a few fragments we find around us. And why not? Need the philosopher fear the stream of life?... And so I say to myself: abandon all erudite system-making and grasp the moment (*ergreife den Augenblick*), the moment you are living in, the moment which alone brings happiness" (177-78).

Well, well! Either materialism or solipsism—this, in spite of his vociferous phrases, is what Willy arrives at when he analyses the question of the existence of nature before man.

To summarise. Three augurs of empirio-criticism have appeared before us and have laboured in the sweat of their brow to reconcile their philosophy with natural science, to patch up the holes of solipsism. Avenarius repeated Fichte's argument and substituted an imaginary world for the real world. Petzoldt withdrew from Fichtean idealism and moved towards Kantian idealism. Willy, having suffered a fiasco with the "worm", threw up the sponge and inadvertently blurted out the truth: either materialism or solipsism, or even the recognition of nothing but the present moment.

It only remains for us to show the reader *how* this problem was understood and treated by our own native Machists.

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* R. Willy, *Gegen die Schulweisheit*, 1905, S. 173-78.

** We shall discuss this point with the Machists later.

Here is Bazarov in the *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism* (p. 11):

"It remains for us now, under the guidance of our faithful *vademecum* [i.e., Plekhanov], to descend into the last and most horrible circle of the solipsist inferno, into that circle where, as Plekhanov assures us, every subjective idealism is menaced with the necessity of conceiving the world as it was contemplated by the ichthyosauruses and archaeopteryxes. 'Let us mentally transport ourselves,' writes Plekhanov, 'to that epoch when only very remote ancestors of man existed on the earth, for instance, to the Mesozoic period. The question arises, what was the status of space, time and causality then? Whose subjective forms were they then? Were they the subjective forms of the ichthyosauruses? And whose intelligence at that time dictated its laws to nature? The intelligence of the archaeopteryx? To these queries the Kantian philosophy can give no answer. And it must be rejected as absolutely incompatible with modern science' (*L. Feuerbach*, p. 117)."

Here Bazarov breaks off the quotation from Plekhanov just before a very important passage—as we shall soon see—namely: "Idealism says that without subject there is no object. The history of the earth shows that the object existed long before the subject appeared, i.e., long before the appearance of organisms possessing a perceptible degree of consciousness.... The history of development reveals the truth of materialism."

Let us continue the quotation from Bazarov:

"...But does Plekhanov's thing-in-itself provide the desired solution? Let us remember that even according to Plekhanov we can have no idea of things as they are in themselves; we know only their manifestations, only the results of their action on our sense-organs. 'Apart from this action they possess no aspect' (*L. Feuerbach*, p. 112). What sense-organs existed in the period of the ichthyosauruses? Evidently, only the sense-organs of the ichthyosauruses and their like. Only the ideas of the ichthyosauruses were then the actual, the real manifestations of things-in-themselves. Hence, according to Plekhanov also, if the paleontologist desires to remain on 'real' ground he must write the story of the Mesozoic period in the light

of the contemplations of the ichthyosaurus. And here, consequently, not a single step forward is made in comparison with solipsism."

Such is the complete argument (the reader must pardon the lengthy quotation—we could not avoid it) of a Machist, an argument worthy of perpetuation as a first-class example of muddle-headedness.

Bazarov imagines that he has caught Plekhanov out. If things-in-themselves, apart from their action on our sense-organs, have no aspect of their own, then in the Mesozoic period they did not exist except as the "aspect" of the sense-organs of the ichthyosaurus. And this is the argument of a materialist! If an "aspect" is the result of the action of "things-in-themselves" on sense-organs, does it follow from this that things *do not exist independently* of sense-organs of one kind or another??

Let us assume for a moment that Bazarov indeed "misunderstood" Plekhanov's words (improbable as such an assumption may seem), that they did appear obscure to him. Be it so. We ask: is Bazarov engaged in a fencing bout with Plekhanov (whom the Machists themselves exalt to the position of the only representative of materialism!), or is he endeavouring to elucidate the problem *of materialism*? If Plekhanov seemed to you obscure or contradictory, and so forth, why did you not turn to other materialists? Is it because you do not know them? But ignorance is no argument.

If Bazarov indeed does not know that the fundamental premise of materialism is the recognition of the external world, of the existence of *things* outside and independent of our mind, this is truly a striking case of crass ignorance. We would remind the reader of Berkeley, who in 1710 rebuked the materialists for their recognition of "objects in themselves" existing independently of our mind and reflected by our mind. Of course, everybody is free to side with Berkeley or anyone else *against* the materialists; that is unquestionable. But it is equally unquestionable that to speak of the materialists and distort or ignore the fundamental premise of *all* materialism is to import preposterous confusion into the problem.

Was Plekhanov right when he said that for idealism there is no object without a subject, while for materialism

the object exists independently of the subject and is reflected more or less adequately in the subject's mind? If this is *wrong*, then any man who has the slightest respect for Marxism should have pointed out *this* error of Plekhanov's, and should have dealt *not* with him, but with someone else, with Marx, Engels, or Feuerbach, on the question of materialism and the existence of nature prior to man. But if this is right, or, at least, if you are unable to find an error here, then your attempt to shuffle the cards and to confuse in the reader's mind the most elementary conception of materialism, as distinguished from idealism, is a literary indecency.

As for the Marxists who are interested in the question *independently* of every little word uttered by Plekhanov, we shall quote the opinion of L. Feuerbach, who, as is known (perhaps *not* to Bazarov?), was a materialist, and through whom Marx and Engels, as is well known, came from the idealism of Hegel to their materialist philosophy. In his rejoinder to R. Haym, Feuerbach wrote:

"Nature, which is not an object of man or mind, is for speculative philosophy, or at least for idealism, a Kantian thing-in-itself [we shall speak later in detail of the fact that our Machists confuse the Kantian thing-in-itself with the materialist thing-in-itself], an abstraction without reality, but it is nature that causes the downfall of idealism. Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (*absolut unmenschliches Wesen*). Idealism may retort: but this nature also is something thought of by you (*von dir gedachte*). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me."*

* L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, herausgegeben von Bolin und Jodl, Band VII, Stuttgart, 1903, S. 510; or Karl Grün, *L. Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass, sowie in seiner philosophischen Charakterentwicklung*, I. Band, Leipzig, 1874, S. 423-35.

That is how Feuerbach regarded materialism and idealism from the standpoint of the existence of nature prior to the appearance of man. Avenarius' sophistry (the "mental projection of the observer") was refuted by Feuerbach, who did not know the "recent positivism" but who thoroughly knew the old idealist sophistries. And Bazarov offers us absolutely nothing new, but merely repeats this sophistry of the idealists: "Had I been there [on earth, prior to man], I would have seen the world so-and-so" (*Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*, p. 29). In other words: if I make an assumption that is obviously absurd and contrary to natural science (that man can be an observer in an epoch before man existed), I shall be able to patch up the breach in my philosophy!

This gives us an idea of the extent of Bazarov's knowledge of the subject or of his literary methods. Bazarov did not even hint at the "difficulty" with which Avenarius, Petzoldt and Willy wrestled; and, moreover, he made such a hash of the whole subject, placed before the reader such an incredible hotchpotch, that there ultimately appears to be no difference between materialism and solipsism! Idealism is represented as "realism", and to materialism is ascribed denial of the existence of things outside of their action on the sense-organs! Truly, either Feuerbach did not know the elementary difference between materialism and idealism, or else Bazarov and Co. have completely altered the elementary truths of philosophy.

Or let us take Valentinov, a philosopher who, naturally, is delighted with Bazarov: 1) "Berkeley is the founder of the correlativist theory of the relativity of subject and object" (148). But this is not Berkeleian idealism, oh, no! This is a "profound analysis". 2) "In the most realistic aspect, irrespective of the forms [!] of their usual idealist interpretation [only interpretation!], the fundamental premises of the theory are formulated by Avenarius" (148). Infants, as we see, are taken in by mystification! 3) "Avenarius' conception of the starting-point of knowledge is that each individual finds himself in a definite environment, in other words, the individual and the environment are given as connected and inseparable [!] terms of one and the same co-ordination" (148). Delightful! This is not idealism—Baza-

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rov and Valentinov have risen above materialism and idealism—this "inseparability" of the subject and object is the most "realist" of all. 4) "Is the reverse assertion correct, namely, that there is no counter-term to which there would be no corresponding central term—an individual? Naturally [!] it is not correct.... In the Archean period the woods were verdant ... yet there was no man" (148). That means that the inseparable *can* be separated! Is that not "natural"? 5) "Yet from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, the question of the object in itself is absurd" (148). Of course! When there were no sentient organisms objects were nevertheless "complexes of elements" *identical* with sensations! 6) "The immanentist school, in the person of Schubert-Soldern and Schuppe, clad these [!] thoughts in an unsuitable form and found itself in the *cul-de-sac* of solipsism" (149). But "these thoughts" themselves, of course, contain no solipsism, and empirio-criticism is not a paraphrase of the reactionary theory of the immanentists, who lie when they declare themselves to be in sympathy with Avenarius!

This, Machist gentlemen, is not philosophy, but an incoherent jumble of words.

5. DOES MAN THINK WITH THE HELP OF THE BRAIN?

Bazarov emphatically answers this question in the affirmative. He writes: "If Plekhanov's thesis that 'consciousness is an internal [?Bazarov] state of matter' be given a more satisfactory form, e.g., that 'every mental process is a function of the cerebral process', then neither Mach nor Avenarius would dispute it" (*Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*, 29).

To the mouse no beast is stronger than the cat. To the Russian Machists there is no materialist stronger than Plekhanov. Was Plekhanov really the *only* one, or the first, to advance the materialist thesis that consciousness is an internal state of matter? And if Bazarov did not like Plekhanov's formulation of materialism, why did he take Plekhanov and not Engels or Feuerbach?

Because the Machists are afraid to admit the truth. They are fighting materialism, but pretend that it is only

Plekhanov they are fighting. A cowardly and unprincipled method.

But let us turn to empirio-criticism. Avenarius "would not dispute" the statement that thought is a function of the brain. These words of Bazarov's contain a direct untruth. Not only does Avenarius *dispute* the materialist thesis, but invents a whole "theory" in order to refute it. "The brain," says Avenarius in *The Human Concept of the World*, "is not the habitation, the seat, the creator, it is not the instrument or organ, the supporter or substratum, etc., of thought" (S. 76—approvingly quoted by Mach in the *Analysis of Sensations*, p. 32). "Thought is not an inhabitant or commander, or the other half or side, etc., nor is it a product or even a physiological function, or a state in general of the brain" (ibid.). And Avenarius expresses himself no less emphatically in his *Notes*: "presentations" are "not functions (physiological, psychical, or psycho-physical) of the brain" (op. cit., § 115, S. 419). Sensations are not "psychical functions of the brain" (§ 116).

Thus, according to Avenarius, the brain is not the organ of thought, and thought is not a function of the brain. Take Engels, and we immediately find directly contrary, frankly materialist formulations. "Thought and consciousness," says Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, "are products of the human brain" (5th German edition, p. 22).[33] This idea is often repeated in that work. In *Ludwig Feuerbach* we have the following exposition of the views of Feuerbach and Engels: "...the material (*stofflich*), sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality", "our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product (*Erzeugnis*) of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. This is, of course, pure materialism" (4th German edition, p. 18). Or p. 4, where he speaks of the reflection of the processes of nature in "the thinking brain",[34] etc., etc.

Avenarius rejects this materialist standpoint and says that "the thinking brain" is a "*fetish of natural science*" (*The Human Concept of the World*, 2nd German edition, p. 70). Hence, Avenarius cherishes no illusions concerning

his absolute disagreement with natural science on this point. He admits, as do Mach and all the immanentists, that natural science holds an instinctive and unconscious materialist point of view. He admits and explicitly declares that *he absolutely differs from the "prevailing psychology"* (*Notes*, p. 150, etc.). This prevailing psychology is guilty of an inadmissible "introjection"—such is the new term contrived by our philosopher—i.e., the insertion of thought into the brain, or of sensations into us. These "two words" (into us—*in uns*), Avenarius goes on to say, contain the assumption (*Annahme*) that empirio-criticism disputes. "This *insertion* (*Hineinverlegung*) of the visible, etc., into man is what we call *introjection*" (§ 45, S. 153).

Introjection deviates "in principle" from the "natural conception of the world" (*natürlicher Weltbegriff*) by substituting "in me" for "before me" (*vor mir*, S. 154), "by turning a component part of the (real) environment into a component part of (ideal) thought" (ibid.). "Out of the *amechanical* [a new word in place of "mental"] which manifests itself freely and clearly in the given [or, in what is found—*im Vorgefundenen*], introjection makes something which mysteriously hides itself [*Latitierendes*, says Avenarius—another new word] in the central nervous system" (ibid.)

Here we have the same *mystification* that we encountered in the famous defence of "naïve realism" by the empirio-criticists and immanentists. Avenarius here acts on the advice of Turgenev's charlatan[35]: denounce most of all those vices which you yourself possess. Avenarius tries to pretend that he is combating idealism: philosophical idealism, you see, is usually deduced from introjection, the external world is converted into sensation, into idea, and so forth, while I defend "naïve realism", the equal reality of everything given, both "*self*" and environment, without inserting the external world into the human brain.

The sophistry here is exactly the same as that which we observed in the case of the famous co-ordination. While distracting the attention of the reader by attacking idealism, Avenarius is in fact defending idealism, albeit in slightly different words: thought is not a function of the

brain; the brain is not the organ of thought; sensations are not a function of the nervous system; oh, no! sensations are—"elements", psychical only in one connection, while in another connection (although the elements are "*identical*") they are physical. With his new and muddled terminology, with his new and pretentious epithets, supposedly expressing a new "theory", Avenarius merely marked time and then returned to his fundamental idealist premise.

And if our Russian Machists (e.g., Bogdanov) failed to notice the "mystification" and discerned a refutation of idealism in the "new" defence of it, we find in the analysis of empirio-criticism given by the professional philosophers a sober estimate of the true nature of Avenarius' ideas, which is laid bare when stripped of its pretentious terminology.

In 1903 Bogdanov wrote ("Authoritative Thinking", an article in the symposium *From the Psychology of Society*, p. 119, et seq.):

"Richard Avenarius presented a most harmonious and complete philosophical picture of the development of the dualism of mind and body. The gist of his 'doctrine of introjection' is the following: [we observe only physical bodies directly, and we infer the experiences of others, i.e., the mind of another person, only by hypothesis].... The hypothesis is complicated by the fact that the experiences of the other person are assumed to be located in his body, are inserted (introjected) into his organism. This is already a superfluous hypothesis and even gives rise to numerous contradictions. Avenarius systematically draws attention to these contradictions by unfolding a series of successive historical factors in the development of dualism and of philosophical idealism. But here we need not follow Avenarius." ... "Introjection serves as an explanation of the dualism of mind and body."

Bogdanov swallowed the bait of professorial philosophy in believing that "introjection" was aimed against idealism. He accepted the evaluation of introjection given by Avenarius himself *at its face value* and failed to notice the *barb* directed against materialism. Introjection denies that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations are a function of man's central nervous system, that is,

it denies the most elementary truth of physiology in order to crush materialism. "Dualism", it turns out, is refuted *idealistically* (notwithstanding all Avenarius' diplomatic rage against idealism), for sensation and thought prove to be not secondary, not a product of matter, but *primary*. Dualism is here refuted by Avenarius only insofar as he "refutes" the existence of the object without the subject, matter without thought, the external world independent of our sensations; that is, it is refuted *idealistically*. The absurd denial of the fact that the visual image of a tree is a function of the retina, the nerves and the brain, was required by Avenarius in order to bolster up his theory of the "indissoluble" connection of the "complete" experience which includes not only the *self* but also the tree, i.e., the environment.

The doctrine of introjection is a muddle; it smuggles in idealistic rubbish and is contradictory to natural science, which inflexibly holds that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations, i.e., the images of the *external world*, exist *within us*, produced by the action of things on our sense-organs. The materialist elimination of the "dualism of mind and body" (i.e., materialist monism) consists in the assertion that the mind does not exist independently of the body, that mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world. The idealist elimination of the "dualism of mind and body" (i.e., idealist monism) consists in the assertion that mind *is not* a function of the body, that, consequently, mind is primary, that the "environment" and the "*self*" exist only in an inseparable connection of one and the same "complexes of elements". Apart from these two diametrically opposed methods of eliminating "the dualism of mind and body", there can be no third method, not counting eclecticism, which is a senseless jumble of materialism and idealism. And it was this jumble of Avenarius' that seemed to Bogdanov and Co. "the truth transcending materialism and idealism".

But the professional philosophers are not as naïve and credulous as the Russian Machists. True, each of these professors-in-ordinary advocates his "*own*" system of refuting materialism, or, at any rate, of "reconciling" ma-

terialism and idealism. But when it comes to a competitor they unceremoniously expose the unconnected fragments of materialism and idealism that are contained in all the various "recent" and "original" systems. And if a few young intellectuals swallowed Avenarius' bait, that old bird Wundt was not to be enticed so easily. The idealist Wundt tore the mask from the poseur Avenarius very unceremoniously *when he praised him for the anti-materialist tendency of the theory of introjection*.

"If empirio-criticism," Wundt wrote, "reproaches vulgar materialism because by such expressions as the brain 'has' thought, or the brain 'produces' thought, it expresses a relation which cannot be established at all by factual observation and description [evidently, for Wundt it is a "fact" that a person thinks without the help of the brain!] ... this reproach, of course, is well founded" (op. cit., S. 47-48).

Well, of course! The idealists will always join the half-hearted Avenarius and Mach in attacking materialism! It is only a pity, Wundt adds, that this theory of introjection "does not stand in any relation to the doctrine of the independent vital series, and was, to all appearances, only tacked on to it as an afterthought and in a rather artificial fashion" (S. 365).

Introjection, says O. Ewald, "is to be regarded as nothing but a fiction of empirio-criticism, which required it in order to shield its own fallacies" (op. cit., 44). "We observe a strange contradiction: on the one hand, the elimination of introjection and the restoration of the natural conception of the world is intended to restore to the world the character of living reality; on the other hand, in the principal co-ordination empirio-criticism leads to a purely idealist theory of an absolute correlation of the counter-term and the central term. Avenarius is thus moving in a circle. He set out to do battle against idealism but laid down his arms before it came to an open fight against it. He wanted to liberate the world of objects from the yoke of the subject, but again bound that world to the subject. What he has actually destroyed by his criticism is a caricature of idealism rather than its genuine epistemological expression" (ibid., 64-65).

"In his [Avenarius'] frequently quoted statement," Norman Smith says, "that the brain is not the seat, organ or supporter of thought, he rejects the only terms which we possess for defining their connection" (op. cit., p. 30).

Nor is it surprising that the theory of introjection approved by Wundt excites the sympathy of the outspoken spiritualist, James Ward,* who wages systematic war on "naturalism and agnosticism", and especially on T. H. Huxley (not because he was an insufficiently outspoken and determined materialist, for which Engels reproached him, but) because his agnosticism served in fact to conceal materialism.

Let us note that Karl Pearson, the English Machist, who avoids all philosophical artifices, and who recognises neither introjection nor co-ordination, nor yet "the discovery of the world-elements", arrives at the inevitable outcome of Machism when it is stripped of such "disguises", namely, pure subjective idealism. Pearson knows no "elements"; "sense-impressions" are his alpha and omega. He never doubts that man thinks with the help of the brain. And the contradiction between this thesis (which alone conforms with science) and the basis of his philosophy remains naked and obvious. Pearson spares no effort in combating the concept of matter as something existing independently of our sense-impressions (*The Grammar of Science*, Chap. VII). Repeating all Berkeley's arguments, Pearson declares that matter is a nonentity. But when he comes to speak of the relation of the brain to thought, Pearson emphatically declares: "From will and consciousness associated with material machinery we can infer nothing whatever as to will and consciousness without that machinery."** He even advances the following thesis as a summary of his investigations in this field: "Consciousness has no meaning beyond nervous systems akin to our own; it is illogical to assert that all matter is conscious [but it is logical to assert that all matter possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection], still more that consciousness or will can exist outside matter" (ibid., p. 75,

* James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 3rd ed., London, 1906, Vol. II, pp. 171-72.

** *The Grammar of Science*, 2nd ed., London, 1900, p. 58.

2nd thesis). Pearson's muddle is glaring! Matter is nothing but groups of sense-impressions. That is his premise, that is his philosophy. Hence, sensation and thought are primary; matter, secondary. No, consciousness without matter does not exist, and apparently not even without a nervous system! That is, consciousness and sensation are secondary. The waters rest on the earth, the earth rests on a whale, and the whale rests on the waters. Mach's "elements" and Avenarius' co-ordination and introjection do not clear up this muddle, all they do is to obscure the matter, to cover up the traces with the help of an erudite philosophical gibberish.

Just such gibberish, and of this a word or two will suffice, is the special terminology of Avenarius, who coined a plenitude of diverse "notals", "securals", "fidentials", etc., etc. Our Russian Machists for the most part shamefacedly avoid this professorial rigmarole, and only now and again bombard the reader (in order to stun him) with an "existential" and such like. But if naïve people take these words for a species of bio-mechanics, the German philosophers, who are themselves lovers of "erudite" words, laugh at Avenarius. To say "notal" (*notus* = known), or to say that this or the other thing is known to me, is absolutely one and the same, says Wundt in the section entitled "Scholastic Character of the Empirio-critical System". And, indeed, it is the purest and most dreary scholasticism. One of Avenarius' most faithful disciples, R. Willy, had the courage to admit it frankly. "Avenarius dreamed of a bio-mechanics, says he, "but an understanding of the life of the brain can be arrived at only by actual discoveries, and is impossible by the way in which Avenarius attempted to arrive at it. Avenarius' bio-mechanics is not based on any new observations whatever; its characteristic feature is purely schematic constructions of concepts, and, indeed, constructions that do not even have the nature of hypotheses that open up new vistas, but rather of mere stereotyped speculations (*blosse Spekulierschablonen*), which, like a wall, conceal our view."*

* R. Willy, *Gegen die Schulweisheit*, S. 169. Of course, the pedant Petzoldt will not make any such admissions. With the smug satisfaction of the philistine he chews the cud of Avenarius' "biological" scholasticism (Vol. I, Chap. II).

The Russian Machists will soon be like fashion-lovers who are moved to ecstasy over a hat which has already been discarded by the bourgeois philosophers of Europe.

6. THE SOLIPSISM OF MACH AND AVENARIUS

We have seen that the starting-point and the fundamental premise of the philosophy of empirio-criticism is subjective idealism. The world is our sensation—this is the fundamental premise, which is obscured but in no wise altered by the word "element" and by the theories of the "independent series", "co-ordination", and "introjection". The absurdity of this philosophy lies in the fact that it leads to solipsism, to admitting only the existence of the philosophising individual. But our Russian Machists assure their readers that to "charge" Mach "with idealism and even solipsism" is "extreme subjectivism". So says Bogdanov in the introduction to the Russian translation of *Analysis of Sensations* (p. xi), and the whole Machist troop repeat it in a great variety of keys.

Having examined the methods used by Mach and Avenarius to disguise their solipsism, we have now to add only one thing: the "extreme subjectivism" of assertion lies entirely with Bogdanov and Co.; for in philosophical literature writers of the most varied trends have long since disclosed the fundamental sin of Machism beneath all its disguises. We shall confine ourselves to a mere *summary* of opinions which sufficiently indicate the "subjective" *ignorance* of our Machists. Let us note in this connection that nearly every professional philosopher sympathises with one or another brand of idealism: in their eyes idealism is not at all a reproach, as it is with us Marxists; but they point out Mach's *actual* philosophical trend and oppose one system of idealism by another system, also idealist, but which seems to them more consistent.

O. Ewald, in the book devoted to an analysis of Avenarius' teachings, writes: "The creator of empirio-criticism condemns himself *volens nolens* to solipsism" (loc. cit., pp. 61-62).

Hans Kleinpeter, a disciple of Mach, with whom Mach in his preface to *Knowledge and Error* explicitly declares

his solidarity, says: "It is precisely Mach who is an example of the compatibility of epistemological idealism with the demands of natural science [for the eclectic everything is "compatible"!], and of the fact that the latter can very well start from solipsism without stopping there" (*Archiv für systematische Philosophie*,[36] Bd. VI, 1900, S. 87).

E. Lucka, analysing Mach's *Analysis of Sensations*, says: "Apart from this ... misunderstanding (*Missverständnis*) Mach adopts the ground of pure idealism.... It is incomprehensible that Mach denies that he is a Berkeleian" (*Kantstudien*,[37] Bd. VIII, 1903, S. 416-17).

W. Jerusalem, a most reactionary Kantian with whom Mach in the above-mentioned preface expresses his solidarity ("a closer kinship" of thought than Mach had previously imagined—*Vorwort zu "Erkenntnis und Irrtum"*, S. x, 1906), says: "Consistent phenomenalism leads to solipsism." And therefore one must borrow a little from Kant! (See *Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik*, 1905, S. 26.)

R. Hönigswald says: "...the immanentists and the empirio-criticists face the alternative of solipsism or metaphysics in the spirit of Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel!" (*Ueber die Lehre Hume's von der Realität der Aussendinge*, 1904, S. 68).

The English physicist Oliver Lodge, in his book denouncing the materialist Haeckel, speaks in passing, as of something generally known, of "solipsists such as Mach and Karl Pearson" (Sir Oliver Lodge, *La vie et la matière*, Paris, 1907, p. 15).

Nature,[38] the organ of the English scientists, through the mouth of the geometrician E. T. Dixon, pronounced a very definite opinion of the Machist Pearson, one worth quoting, not because it is new, but because the Russian Machists have naïvely accepted Mach's philosophical muddle as the "philosophy of natural science" (A. Bogdanov, introduction to *Analysis of Sensations*, p. xii, et seq.).

"The foundation of the whole book," Dixon wrote, "is the proposition that since we cannot directly apprehend anything but sense-impressions, therefore the things we commonly speak of as objective, or external to ourselves, and their variations, are nothing but groups of sense-impressions and sequences of such groups. But Professor Pearson

admits the existence of other consciousness than his own, not only by implication in addressing his book to them, but explicitly in many passages." Pearson infers the existence of the consciousness of others by analogy, by observing the bodily motions of other people; but since the consciousness of others is real, the existence of people outside myself must be granted! "Of course it would be impossible thus to refute a consistent idealist, who maintained that not only external things but all other consciousness were unreal and existed only in his imagination; but to recognise the reality of other consciousness is to recognise the reality of the means by which we become aware of them, which ... is the external aspect of men's bodies." The way out of the difficulty is to recognise the "hypothesis" that to our sense-impressions there corresponds an objective reality outside of us. This hypothesis satisfactorily explains our sense-impressions. "I cannot seriously doubt that Professor Pearson himself believes in them as much as anyone else. Only, if he were to acknowledge it explicitly, he would have to rewrite almost every page of *The Grammar of Science.*"*

Ridicule—that is the response of the thinking scientists to the idealist philosophy over which Mach waxes so enthusiastic.

And here, finally, is the opinion of a German physicist, L. Boltzmann. The Machists will perhaps say, as Friedrich Adler said, that he is a physicist of the old school. But we are concerned *now* not with theories of physics but with a fundamental philosophical problem. Writing against people who "have been carried away by the new epistemological dogmas," Boltzmann says: "Mistrust of conceptions which we can derive only from immediate sense-impressions has led to an extreme which is the direct opposite of former naïve belief. Only sense-impressions are given us, and, therefore, it is said, we have no right to go a step beyond. But to be consistent, one must further ask: are our sense-impressions of yesterday also given? What is immediately given is only the one sense-impression, or only the one thought, namely, the one we are thinking at the present moment.

* *Nature*, July 21, 1892, p. 269.

Hence, to be consistent, one would have to deny not only the existence of other people outside one's *self*, but also all conceptions we ever had in the past."*

This physicist rightly ridicules the supposedly "new" "phenomenalist" standpoint of Mach and Co. as the old absurdity of philosophical subjective idealism.

No, it is those who "failed to note" that solipsism is Mach's fundamental error who are stricken with "subjective" blindness.

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* Ludwig Boltzmann, *Populäre Schriften*, Leipzig, 1905, S. 132. Cf. S. 168, 177, 187, etc.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM. II

1. THE "THING-IN-ITSELF", OR V. CHERNOV REFUTES FREDERICK ENGELS

Our Machists have written so much about the "thing-in-itself" that if all their writings were to be collected it would result in mountains of printed matter. The "thing-in-itself" is a veritable *bête noire* for Bogdanov and Valentinov, Bazarov and Chernov, Berman and Yushkevich. There is no abuse they have not hurled at it, there is no ridicule they have not showered on it. And against whom are they breaking lances because of this luckless "thing-in-itself"? Here a division of the philosophers of Russian Machism according to political parties begins. All the would-be Marxists among the Machists are combating *Plekhanov's* "thing-in-itself"; they accuse Plekhanov of having become entangled and straying into Kantianism, and of having forsaken Engels. (We shall discuss the first accusation in the fourth chapter; the second accusation we shall deal with now.) The Machist Mr. Victor Chernov, a Narodnik and a sworn enemy of Marxism, opens a direct campaign *against Engels* because of the "thing-in-itself".

One is ashamed to confess it, but it would be a sin to conceal the fact that on this occasion open enmity towards Marxism has made Mr. Victor Chernov a *more* principled literary antagonist than our comrades in party and opponents in philosophy.[39] For only a *guilty conscience* (and in addition, perhaps, ignorance of materialism?) could have been

responsible for the fact that the Machist would-be Marxists have diplomatically set Engels aside, have completely ignored Feuerbach and are circling exclusively around Plekhanov. It is indeed circling around one spot, tedious and petty pecking and cavilling at a disciple of Engels, while a frank examination of the views of the teacher himself is cravenly avoided. And since the purpose of the present cursory comments is to disclose the reactionary character of Machism and the correctness of the materialism of Marx and Engels, we shall leave aside the fuss made by the Machist would-be Marxists about Plekhanov and turn directly to Engels, whom the empirio-criticist Mr. V. Chernov refuted. In his *Philosophical and Sociological Studies* (Moscow, 1907—a collection of articles written, with few exceptions, before 1900) the article "Marxism and Transcendental Philosophy" begins straight away with an attempt to counterpose Marx to Engels, accusing the latter of "naïve dogmatic materialism", of "the crudest materialist dogmatism" (pp. 29 and 32). Mr. V. Chernov states that a "sufficient" example of this is Engels' argument against the Kantian thing-in-itself and Hume's philosophical line. We shall begin with this argument.

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Engels declares that the fundamental philosophical trends are materialism and idealism. Materialism regards nature as primary and spirit as secondary; it places being first and thought second. Idealism holds the contrary view. This root distinction between the "two great camps" into which the philosophers of the "various schools" of idealism and materialism are divided Engels takes as the corner-stone, and he directly charges with "confusion" those who use the terms idealism and materialism in any other way.

"The great basic question of all philosophy," Engels says, "especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being", of "spirit and nature". Having divided the philosophers into "two great camps" on this basic question, Engels shows that there is "yet another side" to this basic philosophical question, viz., "in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and

notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?*

"The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question," says Engels, including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists, as, for example, the absolute idealist Hegel, who considered the real world to be the realisation of some eternally existing "absolute idea", while the human spirit, correctly apprehending the real world, apprehends in it and through it the "absolute idea".

"In addition [i.e., to the materialists and the consistent idealists] there is yet a set of different philosophers—those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition, of the world. To them, among the more modern ones, belong Hume and Kant, and they have played a very important role in philosophical development...."[40]

Mr. V. Chernov, quoting these words of Engels', launched into the fray. To the word "Kant" he makes the following annotation:

"In 1888 it was rather strange to term such philosophers as Kant and especially Hume as 'modern'. At that time it was more natural to hear mentioned such names as Cohen, Lange, Riehl, Laas, Liebmann, Göring, etc. But Engels, evidently, was not well versed in 'modern' philosophy" (op. cit., p. 33. note 2).

Mr. V. Chernov is true to himself. In economic and philosophical questions alike he reminds one of Turgenev's Voroshilov[41] in annihilating now the ignorant Kautsky,** now the ignorant Engels by merely referring to "scholarly" names! The only trouble is that all the authorities mentioned by Mr. Chernov are the very *neo-Kantians* whom Engels refers to *on this very same page* of his *Ludwig Feuerbach* as

* Fr. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, *etc.*, 4th Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, pp. 12-13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word *Spiegelbild* literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels "*in a very weakened form*" by speaking in Russian simply of a "reflection" instead of a "mirror reflection". This is mere cavilling. *Spiegelbild* in German is also used simply in the sense of *Abbild* (reflection, image.—*Ed.*).

** V. Ilyin, *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 195. (See Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 151.—*Ed.*)

theoretical *reactionaries*, who were endeavouring to resurrect the corpse of the long since refuted doctrines of Kant and Hume. The good Chernov did not understand that it is just these authoritative (for Machism) muddled professors whom Engels is refuting in his argument!

Having pointed out that Hegel had already presented the "decisive" arguments against Hume and Kant, and that the additions made by Feuerbach are more ingenious than profound, Engels continues:

"The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets (*Schrullen*) is practice, namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian incomprehensible [or ungraspable, *unfassbaren*—this important word is omitted both in Plekhanov's translation and in Mr. V. Chernov's translation] 'thing-in-itself'. The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such 'things-in-themselves' until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the 'thing-in-itself' became a 'thing-for-us', as, for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar" (op. cit., p. 16).[42]

Mr. V. Chernov, quoting this argument, loses his temper altogether and completely annihilates poor Engels. Listen to this: "No neo-Kantian, of course, will be surprised that from coal tar we can produce alizarin 'more cheaply and simply'. But that together with alizarin it is possible to produce from this coal tar just as cheaply a refutation of the 'thing-in-itself'—this will indeed seem a wonderful and unprecedented discovery, and not to the neo-Kantians alone.

"Engels, apparently, having learned that according to Kant the 'thing-in-itself' is unknowable, turned this theorem into its converse and concluded that everything unknown is a thing-in-itself" (p. 33).

Listen, Mr. Machist: lie, but don't overdo it! Why, before the very eyes of the public you are misrepresenting

the very quotation from Engels you have set out to "tear to pieces", without even having grasped the point under discussion!

In the first place, it is not true that Engels "is producing a refutation of the thing-in-itself". Engels said explicitly and clearly that he was refuting the *Kantian ungraspable* (or unknowable) thing-in-itself. Mr. Chernov confuses Engels' materialist view of the existence of things independently of our consciousness. In the second place, if Kant's theorem reads that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, the "c*onverse*" theorem would be: the *unknowable* is the thing-in-itself. Mr. Chernov *replaces* the unknowable by the *unknown*, without realising that by such a substitution he has again confused and distorted the materialist view of Engels!

Mr. V. Chernov is so bewildered by the reactionaries of official philosophy whom he has taken as his mentors that he raises an outcry against Engels *without in the least comprehending* the meaning of the example quoted. Let us try to explain to this representative of Machism what it is all about.

Engels clearly and explicitly states that he is contesting both Hume and Kant. Yet there is no mention whatever in Hume of "unknowable things-in-themselves". What then is there in common between these two philosophers? It is that they both *in principle fence off* the "appearance" from that which appears, the perception from that which is perceived, the thing-for-us from the "thing-in-itself". Furthermore, Hume does not want to hear of the "thing-in-itself", he regards the very thought of it as philosophically inadmissible, as "metaphysics" (as the Humeans and Kantians call it); whereas Kant grants the existence of the "thing-in-itself", but declares it to be "unknowable", fundamentally different from the appearance, belonging to a fundamentally different realm, the realm of the "beyond" (*Jenseits*), inaccessible to knowledge, but revealed to faith.

What is the kernel of Engels' objection? Yesterday we did not know that coal tar contains alizarin. Today we have learned that it does. The question is, did coal tar contain alizarin yesterday?

Of course it did. To doubt it would be to make a mockery of modern science.

And if that is so, three important epistemological conclusions follow:

1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our sensations, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.

2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there cannot be any such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is "beyond" phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume)—all this is the sheerest nonsense, *Schrulle*, crotchet, fantasy.

3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other sphere of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how *knowledge* emerges from *ignorance*, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.

Once we accept the point of view that human knowledge develops from ignorance, we shall find millions of examples of it just as simple as the discovery of alizarin in coal tar, millions of observations not only in the history of science and technology but in the everyday life of each and every one of us that illustrate the transformation of "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us", the appearance of "phenomena" when our sense-organs experience an impact from external objects, the disappearance of "phenomena" when some obstacle prevents the action upon our sense-organs of an object which we know to exist. The sole and unavoidable deduction to be made from this—a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately places at the foundation of its epistemology—is that outside us and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images

of the external world. Mach's converse theory (that bodies are complexes of sensations) is pitiful idealist nonsense. And Mr. Chernov, in his "analysis" of Engels, once more revealed his Voroshilov qualities; Engels' simple example seemed to him "strange and naïve"! He regards only *gelehrte* fictions as genuine philosophy and is unable to distinguish professorial eclecticism from the consistent materialist theory of knowledge.

It is both impossible and unnecessary to analyse Mr. Chernov's other arguments; they all amount to the same pretentious nonsense (like the assertion that for the materialists the atom is the thing-in-itself!). We shall note only the argument which is relevant to our discussion (an argument which has apparently led certain people astray), viz., that Marx supposedly differed from Engels. The question at issue is Marx's *second* Thesis on Feuerbach and Plekhanov's translation of the word *Diesseitigkeit*.

Here is the second Thesis:

"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the 'this-sidedness' of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."[43]

Instead of "prove the this-sidedness of thinking" (a literal translation), Plekhanov has: prove that thinking "does not stop at this side of phenomena". And Mr. V. Chernov cries: "The contradiction between Marx and Engels has been eliminated very simply.... It appears as though Marx, like Engels, asserted the knowability of things-in-themselves and the 'other-sidedness' of thinking" (loc. cit., p. 34, note).

What can be done with a Voroshilov whose every phrase makes confusion worse confounded! It is sheer ignorance, Mr. Victor Chernov, not to know that all materialists assert the knowability of things-in-themselves. It is ignorance, Mr. Victor Chernov, or infinite slovenliness, to skip the *very first* phrase of the Thesis and not to realise that the "objective truth" (*gegenständliche Wahrheit*) of thinking means *nothing else* than the *existence* of objects ("things-in-

themselves") *truly* reflected by thinking. It is sheer illiteracy, Mr. Victor Chernov, to assert that from Plekhanov's paraphrase (Plekhanov gave a paraphrase and not a translation) "it appears as though" Marx defended the *other-sidedness* of thought. Because only the Humeans and the Kantians confine thought to "this side of phenomena". But for all materialists, including those of the seventeenth century whom Bishop Berkeley demolished (see Introduction), "phenomena" are "things-for-us" or *copies* of the "objects in themselves". Of course, Plekhanov's free paraphrase is not obligatory for those who desire to know Marx himself, but it is obligatory to try to understand what Marx meant and not to prance about like a Voroshilov.

It is interesting to note that while among people who call themselves socialists we encounter an unwillingness or inability to grasp the meaning of Marx's "Theses", bourgeois writers, specialists in philosophy, sometimes manifest greater scrupulousness. I know of one such writer who studied the philosophy of Feuerbach and in connection with it Marx's "Theses". That writer is Albert Lévy, who devoted the third chapter of the second part of his book on Feuerbach to an examination of the influence of Feuerbach on Marx.* Without going into the question whether Lévy always interprets Feuerbach correctly, or how he criticises Marx from the ordinary bourgeois standpoint, we shall only quote his opinion of the philosophical content of Marx's famous "Theses". Regarding the first Thesis, Lévy says: "Marx, on the one hand, together with all earlier materialism and with Feuerbach, recognises that there are real and distinct objects outside us corresponding to our ideas of things...."

As the reader sees, it was immediately clear to Albert Lévy that the basic position not only of Marxian materialism but of *every* materialism, of "*all earlier*" materialism, is the recognition of real objects outside us, to which objects our ideas "correspond". This elementary truth, which holds good for *all* materialism in general, is unknown only to the Russian Machists. Lévy continues:

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* Albert Lévy, *La philosophie de Feuerbach et son influence sur la littérature allemande*, Paris, 1904, pp. 249-338, on the influence of Feuerbach on Marx, and pp. 290-98, an examination of the "Theses".

"...On the other hand, Marx expresses regret that materialism had left it to idealism to appreciate the importance of the active forces [i.e., human practice]. It is these active forces which, according to Marx, must be wrested from idealism in order to integrate them into the materialist system; but it will of course be necessary to give these active forces the real and sensible character which idealism cannot grant them. Marx's idea, then, is the following: just as to our ideas there correspond real objects outside us, so to our phenomenal activity there corresponds a real activity outside us, an activity of things. In this sense humanity partakes of the absolute, not only through theoretical knowledge but also through practical activity; thus all human activity acquires a dignity, a nobility, that permits it to advance hand in hand with theory. Revolutionary activity henceforth acquires a metaphysical significance...."

Albert Lévy is a professor. And a proper professor cannot avoid abusing the materialists as being metaphysicians. For the professorial idealists, Humeans and Kantians every kind of materialism is "metaphysics", because beyond the phenomenon (appearance, the thing-for-us) it discerns a reality outside us. A. Lévy is therefore essentially right when he says that in Marx's opinion there corresponds to man's "phenomenal activity" "an activity of things", that is to say, human practice has not only a phenomenal (in the Humean and Kantian sense of the term), but an objectively real significance. The criterion of practice—as we shall show in detail in its proper place (§ 6)—has entirely different meanings for Mach and Marx. "Humanity partakes of the absolute" means that human knowledge reflects absolute truth (see below, § 5); the practice of humanity, by verifying our ideas, corroborates what in those ideas corresponds to absolute truth. A. Lévy continues:

"...Having reached this point, Marx naturally encounters the objections of the critics. He has admitted the existence of things-in-themselves, of which our theory is the human translation; he cannot evade the usual objection: what assurance have you of the accuracy of the translation? What proof have you that the human mind gives you an

objective truth? To this objection Marx replies in his second Thesis" (p. 291).

The reader sees that Lévy does not for a moment doubt that Marx recognised the existence of things-in-themselves!

2. "TRANSCENDENCE", OR V. BAZAROV "REVISES" ENGELS

But while the Russian Machist would-be Marxists diplomatically evaded *one* of the most decisive and definite statements of Engels, they "revised" *another* statement of his in quite the Chernov manner. However tedious and laborious the task of correcting distortions and perversions of the meaning of quotations may be, he who wishes to speak of the Russian Machists cannot avoid it.

Here is Bazarov's revision of Engels.

In the article "On Historical Materialism",* Engels speaks of the English agnostics (philosophers of Hume's trend of thought) as follows:

"...Our agnostic admits that all our knowledge is based upon the information (*Mitteilungen*) imparted to us by our senses...."

Let us note for the benefit of our Machists that the agnostic (Humean) also starts from *sensations* and recognises no other source of knowledge. The agnostic is a pure "*positivist*", be it said for the benefit of the adherents of the "latest positivism"!

"...But, he [the agnostic] adds, how do we know that our senses give us correct representations (*Abbilder*) of the objects we perceive through them? And he proceeds to inform us that, whenever he speaks of objects or their qualities, he does in reality not mean these objects and qualities, of which he cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on his senses...."[44]

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* This article forms the Introduction to the English edition of Engels' *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, and was translated by Engels himself into German in the *Neue Zeit*, XI, 1 (1892-93, No. 1), S. 15, et seq. The only Russian translation, if I am not mistaken, is to be found in the symposium *Historical Materialism*, p. 162, et seq. Bazarov quotes the passage in the *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*, p. 64.

What two lines of philosophical tendency does Engels contrast here? One line is that the senses give us faithful images of things, that we know *the things themselves*, that the outer world acts on our sense-organs. This is materialism—with which the agnostic is not in agreement. What then is the *essence* of the agnostic's line? It is that he *does not go beyond* sensations, that *he stops on this side of phenomena*, refusing to see anything "certain" beyond the boundary of sensations. About *these things themselves* (i.e., about the things-in-themselves, the "objects in themselves", as the materialists whom Berkeley opposed called them), we can know nothing certain—so the agnostic categorically insists. Hence, in the controversy of which Engels speaks the materialist affirms the existence and knowability of things-in-themselves. The agnostic *does not even admit the thought* of things-in-themselves and insists that we can know nothing certain about them.

It may be asked in what way the position of the agnostic as outlined by Engels differs from the position of Mach? In the "new" term "element"? But it is sheer childishness to believe that a nomenclature can change a philosophical line, that sensations when called "elements" cease to be sensations! Or does the difference lie in the "new" idea that the very same elements constitute the physical in one connection and the psychical in another? But did you not observe that Engels' agnostic *also* puts "impressions" in place of the "things themselves"? That means that *in essence* the agnostic too differentiates between physical and psychical "impressions"! Here again the difference is *exclusively* one of nomenclature. When Mach says that objects *are* complexes of sensations, Mach is a Berkeleian; when Mach "corrects" himself, and says that "elements" (sensations) can be physical in one connection and psychical in another, Mach is an agnostic, a Humean. Mach does not go beyond these two *lines* in his philosophy, and it requires extreme naïveté to take this muddlehead at his word and believe that he has actually "transcended" both materialism and idealism.

Engels deliberately mentions no names in his exposition, and criticises not individual representatives of Humism (professional philosophers are very prone to call orig-

inal systems the petty variations one or another of them makes in terminology or argument), but *the whole* Humean line. Engels criticises not particulars but the essence; he examines the *fundamental* wherein *all* Humeans *deviate* from materialism, and his criticism therefore embraces Mill, Huxley and Mach alike. Whether we say (with J. S. Mill) that matter is the permanent possibility of sensation, or (with Ernst Mach) that matter is more or less stable complexes of "elements"—sensations—we remain *within the bounds* of agnosticism, or Humism. Both standpoints, or more correctly both formulations, are *covered* by Engels' exposition of agnosticism: the agnostic does not go beyond sensations and asserts that he *cannot* know anything certain about their source, about their original, etc. And if Mach attributes great importance to his disagreement with Mill on this question, it is because Mach comes under Engels' characterisation of a professor-in-ordinary: *Flohknacker*. Ay, gentlemen, you have only cracked a flea by making petty corrections and by altering terminology instead of abandoning the basic, half-hearted standpoint.

And how does the materialist Engels—at the beginning of the article Engels explicitly and emphatically contrasts his materialism to agnosticism—refute the foregoing arguments?

"...Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation there was action. *Im Anfang war die That*. And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves...."

Thus, the materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice. But let us listen to a little more of Engels (Bazarov at this point ends his quotation from Engels, or rather from Plekhanov, for he deems it unnecessary to deal with Engels himself):

"...And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them" (the Russian translation in *On Historical Materialism* is incorrect). "So long as we take care to train and to use our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity (*Uebereinstimmung*) of our perceptions with the objective (*gegenständlich*) nature of the things perceived. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it.

"But then come the neo-Kantian agnostics and say...."[45]

We shall leave to another time the examination of the arguments of the neo-Kantians. Let us remark here that anybody in the least acquainted with the subject, or even merely attentive, cannot fail to understand that Engels is here expounding the very same materialism against which the Machists are always and everywhere doing battle. And now just watch the methods by which Bazarov revises Engels:

"Here," writes Bazarov in connection with the fragment of the quotation we have given, "Engels is actually attacking Kantian idealism...."

It is not true. Bazarov is muddling things. In the fragment which he quoted, and which is quoted by us more fully, there is *not a syllable either* about Kantianism *or*

about idealism. Had Bazarov really read the whole of Engels' article, he could not have avoided seeing that Engels speaks of neo-Kantianism, and of Kant's whole line, *only in the next* paragraph, just where we broke off our quotation. And had Bazarov attentively read and reflected on the fragment he himself quotes, he could not have avoided seeing that in the arguments of the agnostic which Engels here refutes there is *not a trace* of either idealism or Kantianism; for idealism begins only when the philosopher says that things are our sensations, while Kantianism begins when the philosopher says that the thing-in-itself exists but is unknowable. Bazarov confuses Kantianism with Humism; and he confuses them because, being himself a semi-Berkeleian, semi-Humean of the Machist sect, he does not understand (as will be shown in detail below) the distinction between the Humean and the materialist opposition to Kantianism.

"...But, alas!" continues Bazarov, "his argument is aimed against Plekhanov's philosophy just as much as it is against Kantian philosophy. In the school of Plekhanov-Orthodox, as Bogdanov has already pointed out, there is a fatal misunderstanding regarding consciousness. To Plekhanov, as to all idealists, it seems that everything perceptually given, i.e., cognised, is 'subjective'; that to proceed only from what is factually given means being a solipsist; that real being can be found only beyond the boundaries of everything that is immediately given..."

This is entirely in the spirit of Chernov and his assurances that Liebknecht was a true-Russian Narodnik! If Plekhanov is an idealist who has deserted Engels, then why is it that you, who are supposedly an adherent of Engels, are not a materialist? This is nothing but wretched mystification, Comrade Bazarov! By means of the Machist expression "*immediately given*" you begin to confuse the difference between agnosticism, idealism and materialism. You ought to realise that such expressions as the "immediately given" and the "factually given" are a piece of confusion of the Machists, the immanentists, and the other reactionaries in philosophy, a masquerade, whereby the agnostic (and sometimes, as in Mach's case, the idealist too) disguises himself in the cloak of the materialist. For the materialist the "factually given" is the outer world, the

image of which is our sensations. For the idealist the "factually given" is sensation, and the outer world is declared to be a "complex of sensations". For the agnostic the "immediately given" is also sensation, but the agnostic *does not go on* either to the materialist recognition of the reality of the outer world, or to the idealist recognition of the world as our sensation. Therefore your statement that "real being [according to Plekhanov] can be found only beyond the boundaries of *everything that is immediately given*" is sheer nonsense and inevitably follows from your Machist position. But while you have a perfect right to adopt any position you choose, including a Machist one, you have no right to falsify Engels once you have undertaken to speak of him. And from Engels' words it is perfectly clear that for the materialist real being lies *beyond the bounds of* the "sense-perceptions", impressions and ideas of man, while for the agnostic it is impossible to go *beyond the bounds of* those perceptions. Bazarov believed Mach, Avenarius, and Schuppe when they said that the "immediately" (or factually) given connects the perceiving *self* with the perceived environment in the famous "indissoluble" co-ordination, and endeavours, unobserved by the reader, to impute this nonsense to the materialist Engels!

"...It is as though the foregoing passage from Engels was deliberately written by him in the most popular and accessible form in order to dissipate this idealist misunderstanding...."

Not for nothing was Bazarov a pupil of Avenarius! He continues his mystification: under the guise of combating idealism (of which Engels is not speaking here), he smuggles in the *idealist* "co-ordination". Not bad, Comrade Bazarov!

"...The agnostic asks, how do we know that our subjective senses give us a correct presentation of objects?..."

You are muddling things, Comrade Bazarov! Such nonsense as "*subjective*" senses Engels himself does not speak of, and does not even ascribe to his enemy the agnostic. There are no other senses except human, i.e., "subjective", senses, for we are speaking from the standpoint of man and not of a hobgoblin. You are again starting to impute Machism to Engels, to imply that he says: the agnostic regards senses, or, to be more precise, sensations, as *only* subjective

(which the agnostic does *not* do!), while Avenarius and I have "co-ordinated" the object into an indissoluble connection with the subject. Not bad, Comrade Bazarov!

"...But what do you term 'correct'?—Engels rejoins.—Correct is that which is confirmed by our practice; and consequently, since our sense-perceptions are confirmed by experience, they are not 'subjective', that is, they are not arbitrary, or illusory, but correct and real as such...."

You are muddling things, Comrade Bazarov! You have substituted for the question of the existence of things outside our sensations, perceptions, ideas, the question of the criterion of the correctness of our ideas of "these things themselves", or, more precisely, you are *blocking* the former question by means of the latter. But Engels says explicitly and clearly that what distinguishes him from the agnostic is not only the agnostic's doubt as to whether our images are "correct", but also the agnostic's doubt as to whether we may speak of the *things themselves*, as to whether we may have "certain" knowledge of their existence. Why did Bazarov resort to this juggling? In order to obscure and confuse what is the *basic* question for materialism (and for Engels, as a materialist), the question of the existence of things outside our mind, which by acting on our sense-organs evoke sensations. It is impossible to be a materialist without answering this question in the affirmative; but one can be a materialist and still differ on what constitutes the criterion of the correctness of the images presented by our senses.

And again Bazarov muddles matters when he attributes to Engels, in the dispute with the agnostic, the absurd and ignorant expression that our sense-perceptions are confirmed by "*experience*". Engels did not use and could not have used this word *here*, for Engels *was well aware* that the idealist Berkeley, the agnostic Hume and the materialist Diderot all had recourse to experience.

"...Inside the limits within which we have to do with objects in practice, *perceptions of the object and of its properties coincide with the reality existing outside us*. 'To coincide' is somewhat different from being a 'hieroglyphic' 'They coincide' means that, within the given limits, the sense-perception *is* [Bazarov's italics] the reality existing outside us...."

The end crowns the work. Engels has been treated *à la* Mach, fried and served with a Machist sauce. But take care you do not choke, worthy cooks!

"Sense-perception *is* the reality existing outside us"! This *is* just the fundamental absurdity, the fundamental muddle and falsity of Machism, from which flows all the rest of the balderdash of this philosophy and for which Mach and Avenarius have been embraced by those arrant reactionaries and preachers of priestlore, the immanentists. However much V. Bazarov wriggled, however cunning and diplomatic he was in evading ticklish points, in the end he gave himself away and betrayed his true Machist character! To say that "sense-perception *is* the reality existing outside us" *is to return to Humism*, *or even Berkeleianism*, concealing itself in the fog of "co-ordination". This is either an idealist lie or the subterfuge of the agnostic, Comrade Bazarov, for sense-perception is *not* the reality existing outside us, it is only the *image* of that reality. Are you trying to make capital of the ambiguous Russian word *sovpadat*?* Are you trying to lead the unsophisticated reader to believe that "*to coincide*" here means "to be identical", and not "to correspond"? That means basing one's falsification of Engels *à la* Mach on a perversion of the meaning of a quotation, and nothing more.

Take the German original and you will find there the words *stimmen mit*, which means to correspond with, "to voice with"—the latter translation is literal, for *Stimme* means voice. The words "*stimmen mit*" *cannot* mean "to coincide" in the sense of "*to be* identical". And even for the reader who does not know German but who reads Engels with the least bit of attention, it is perfectly clear, it cannot be otherwise than clear, that Engels throughout his whole argument treats the expression "sense-perception" as the *image* (*Abbild*) of the reality existing outside us, and that therefore the word "coincide" can be used in Russian exclusively in the sense of "correspondence", "concurrence", etc. To attribute to Engels the thought that "sense-perception *is* the reality existing outside us" is such a gem of Machist distortion, such a flagrant attempt to palm off

* *Sovpadat*—to coincide.—*Tr.*

agnosticism and idealism as materialism, that one must admit that Bazarov has broken all records!

One asks, how can sane people having a sound mind and good memory assert that "sense-perception [within what limits is not important] is the reality existing outside us"? The earth is a reality existing outside us. It cannot "coincide" (in the sense of being identical) with our sense-perception, or be in indissoluble co-ordination with it, or be a "complex of elements" in another connection identical with sensation; for the earth existed at a time when there were no men, no sense-organs, no matter organised in that higher form in which the property of matter to possess sensation would be in any way clearly noticeable.

That is just the point, that the tortuous theories of "co-ordination", "introjection", and the newly-discovered world-elements which we analysed in Chapter One serve to cover up this idealist absurdity. Bazarov's formulation, so inadvertently and incautiously thrown off by him, is excellent in that it patently reveals that crying absurdity, which otherwise it would have been necessary to excavate from the piles of erudite, pseudo-scientific, professorial rigmarole.

All praise to you, Comrade Bazarov! We shall erect a monument to you in your lifetime. On one side we shall engrave your dictum, and on the other: "To the Russian Machist who dug the grave of Machism among the Russian Marxists!"

We shall speak separately of two points touched on by Bazarov in the above-mentioned quotation, viz., the criteria of practice of the agnostics (Machists included) and the materialists, and the difference between the theory of reflection (or images) and the theory of symbols (or hieroglyphs). For the present we shall continue to quote a little more from Bazarov:

"...But what is beyond these boundaries? Of this Engels does not say a word. He nowhere manifests a desire to perform that 'transcendence', that stepping beyond the boundaries of the perceptually-given world, which lies at the foundation of Plekhanov's theory of knowledge...."

Beyond what "boundaries"? Does he mean the boundaries of the "co-ordination" of Mach and Avenarius, which supposedly indissolubly merges the *self* with the environment, the subject with the object? The very question put by Bazarov is devoid of meaning. But if he had put the question in an intelligible way, he would have clearly seen that the external world lies "beyond the boundaries" of man's sensations, perceptions and ideas. But the word "transcendence" once more betrays Bazarov. It is a specifically Kantian and Humean "fancy" to erect *in principle* a boundary between the *appearance* and the *thing-in-itself*. To pass from the appearance, or, if you like, from our sensation, perception, etc., to the thing existing outside of perception is a *transcendence*, Kant says; and this *transcendence* is permissible not to knowledge but to faith. Transcendence is not permissible at all, Hume objects. And the Kantians, like the Humeans, call the materialists *transcendental* realists, "metaphysicians", who effect an illegitimate *passage* (in Latin, *transcensus*) from one region to another, fundamentally different, region. In the works of modern professors of philosophy who follow the reactionary line of Kant and Hume you may encounter (take only the names enumerated by Voroshilov-Chernov) endless repetitions made in a thousand keys of these accusations that materialism is "metaphysical" and "transcendent". Bazarov borrowed from the reactionary professors both the word and the line of thought, and flourishes them in the name of "recent positivism"! But the whole point is that the very idea of "transcendence", i.e., of a boundary *in principle* between the appearance and the thing-in-itself, is a nonsensical idea of the agnostics (Humeans and Kantians included) and the idealists. We have already explained this in connection with Engels' example of alizarin, and we shall explain it again in the words of Feuerbach and Joseph Dietzgen. But let us first finish with Bazarov's "revision" of Engels:

"...In one place in his *Anti-Dühring*, Engels says that 'being' outside the realm of perception is an *offene Frage*, i.e., a question, for the answer to which, or even for the asking of which, we have no data."

Bazarov repeats this argument after the German Machist, Friedrich Adler. This last example is perhaps even worse than the "sense-perception" which "is the reality existing

outside us". In his *Anti-Dühring*, p. 31 (5th German edition), Engels says:

"The unity of the world does not consist in its being, although its being is a pre-condition of its unity, as it must certainly first *be*, before it can be *one*. Being, indeed, is always an open question (*offene Frage*) beyond the point where our sphere of observation (*Gesichtskreis*) ends. The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved not by a few juggled phrases, but by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science."[46]

Behold the new hash our cook has prepared. Engels is speaking of being *beyond* the point where our sphere of observation ends, for instance, of the existence of men on Mars. Obviously, such being is indeed an open question. But Bazarov, as though deliberately refraining from giving the full quotation, paraphrases Engels as saying that "*being outside the realm of perception*" is an open question!! This is the sheerest nonsense and Engels is here being saddled with the views of those professors of philosophy whom Bazarov is accustomed to take at their word and whom Dietzgen justly called the graduated flunkeys of clericalism or fideism. Indeed, fideism positively asserts that something does exist "outside the realm of perception". The materialists, in agreement with natural science, emphatically deny this. An intermediate position is held by those professors, Kantians, Humeans (including the Machists), etc., "who have found the truth outside materialism and idealism" and who "compromise", saying: it is an open question. Had Engels ever said anything like this, it would be a shame and disgrace to call oneself a Marxist.

But enough! Half a page of quotation from Bazarov presents such a complete tangle that we are obliged to content ourselves with what has already been said and not to continue following all the waverings of Machist thought.

3. L. FEUERBACH AND J. DIETZGEN ON THE THING-IN-ITSELF

To show how absurd are the assertions of our Machists that the materialists Marx and Engels denied the existence of things-in-themselves (i.e., things outside our sensa-

tions, perceptions, and so forth) and the possibility of their cognition, and that they admitted the existence of a fundamental boundary between the appearance and the thing-in-itself, we shall add a few quotations from Feuerbach. The whole trouble with our Machists is that they set about parroting the words of the reactionary professors on dialectical materialism without knowing anything *either* of dialectics *or* of materialism.

"Modern philosophical spiritualism," says Feuerbach, which calls itself idealism, utters the annihilating, in its own opinion, stricture against materialism that it is dogmatism, viz., that it starts from the sensuous (*sinnlichen*) world as an undisputed (*ausgemacht*) objective truth, and assumes that it is a world in itself (*an sich*), i.e., as existing without us, while in reality the world is only a product of spirit" (*Sämtliche Werke*, X. Band, 1866, S. 185).

That seems clear enough. The world in itself is a world that exists *without us*. This materialism of Feuerbach's, like the materialism of the seventeenth century contested by Bishop Berkeley, consisted in the recognition that "objects in themselves" exist outside our mind. The *an sich* (of itself, or "in itself") of Feuerbach is the direct opposite of the *an sich* of Kant. Let us recall the excerpt from Feuerbach already quoted, where he rebukes Kant because for the latter the "thing-in-itself" is an "abstraction without reality". For Feuerbach the "thing-in-itself" is an "abstraction *with* reality", that is, a world existing outside us, completely knowable and fundamentally not different from "appearance".

Feuerbach very ingeniously and clearly explains how ridiculous it is to postulate a "transcendence" from the world of phenomena to the world in itself, a sort of impassable gulf created by the priests and taken over from them by the professors of philosophy. Here is one of his explanations:

"Of course, the products of fantasy are also products of nature, for the force of fantasy, like all other human forces, is in the last analysis (*zuletzt*) both in its basis and in its origin a force of nature; nevertheless, a human being is a being distinguished from the sun, moon and stars, from stones, animals and plants, in a word, from those beings (*Wesen*) which he designates by the general name: 'na-

ture'; and, consequently, man's ideas (*Bilder*) of the sun, moon and stars and the other beings of nature (*Naturwesen*), although these ideas are products of nature, are yet products *distinct* from their objects in nature" (*Werke*, Band VII, Stuttgart, 1903, S. 516).

The objects of our ideas are distinct from our ideas, the thing-in-itself is distinct from the thing-for-us, for the latter is only a part, or only one aspect, of the former, just as man himself is only a fragment of the nature reflected in his ideas.

"...The taste-nerve is just as much a product of nature as salt is, but it does not follow from this that the taste of salt is directly as such an objective property of salt, that what salt is merely as an object of sensation it also is in itself (*an und für sich*), hence that the sensation of salt on the tongue is a property of salt thought of without sensation (*des ohne Empfindung gedachten Salzes*)...." And several pages earlier: "Saltiness, as a taste, is the subjective expression of an objective property of salt" (ibid., 514).

Sensation is the result of the action of a thing-in-itself, existing objectively outside us, upon our sense-organs—such is Feuerbach's theory. Sensation is a subjective image of the objective world, of the world *an und für sich*.

"...So is man also a being of nature (*Naturwesen*), like sun, star, plant, animal, stone, nevertheless, he is distinct from nature, and, consequently, nature in the head and heart of man is distinct from nature outside the human head and heart."

"...However, this object, viz., man, is the only object in which, according to the statement of the idealists themselves, the requirement of the 'identity of object and subject' is realised; for man is an object whose equality and unity with my being are beyond all possible doubt.... And is not one man for another, even the most intimate, an object of fantasy, of the imagination? Does not each man comprehend another in his own way, after his own mind (*in und nach seinem Sinne*)?... And if even between man and man, between mind and mind, there is a very considerable difference which it is impossible to ignore, how much greater must be the difference between an unthinking, non-human being in itself (*Wesen an sich*), not identical with us, and the

same being as we think of it, perceive it and apprehend it?" (ibid., p. 518).

All the mysterious, sage and subtle distinctions between the appearance and the thing-in-itself are sheer philosophical balderdash. In practice each one of us has observed time without number the simple and obvious transformation of the "thing-in-itself" into phenomenon, into the "thing-for-us". It is precisely this transformation that is cognition. The "doctrine" of Machism that since we know *only* sensations, we cannot know of the *existence* of anything beyond the bounds of sensation, is an old sophistry of idealist and agnostic philosophy served up with a new sauce.

Joseph Dietzgen is a dialectical materialist. We shall show below that his mode of expression is often inexact, that he is often not free from confusion, a fact which has been seized upon by various foolish people (Eugen Dietzgen among them) and of course by our Machists. But they did not take the trouble or were unable to analyse the dominant line of his philosophy and to disengage his materialism from alien elements.

"Let us take the world as the 'thing-in-itself'," says Dietzgen in his *The Nature of the Working of the Human Mind*.* "We shall easily see that the 'world *in itself*' and the world as it *appears* to us, the phenomena of the world, differ from each other only as the whole differs from its parts" (Germ. ed., 1903, p. 65). "A phenomenon differs no more and no less from the thing which produces it than the ten-mile stretch of a road differs from the road itself" (71-72). There is not, nor can there be, any essential difference here, any "transcendence", any "innate disagreement". But a difference there is, to be sure, viz., the passage *beyond the bounds* of sense-perceptions to the *existence* of things outside us.

"We learn by experience (*wir erfahren*)," says Dietzgen in his *Streifzügen eines Sozialisten in das Gebiet der Erkenntnistheorie*, "that each experience is only a part of that which, in the words of Kant, passes beyond the bounds of all experience.... For a consciousness that has become conscious of its own nature, each particle, be it of dust, or of

* J. Dietzgen, *Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit*, 1903.—*Ed.*

stone, or of wood, is something *unknowable in its full extent* (*Unauskenntliches*), i.e., each particle is inexhaustible material for the human faculty of cognition and, consequently, something which passes beyond the bounds of experience" (*Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, 1903, S. 199).

You see: *in the words of Kant*, i.e., adopting—exclusively for purposes of popularisation, for purposes of contrast—Kant's *erroneous*, confusing terminology, Dietzgen recognises the passage "beyond the bounds of experience". This is a good example of what the Machists are grasping at when they pass from materialism to agnosticism: you see, they say, we do not wish to go "beyond the bounds of experience"; for us "sense-perception *is* the reality existing outside us".

"Unhealthy mysticism [Dietzgen says, objecting precisely to such a philosophy] unscientifically separates the absolute truth from the relative truth. It makes of the thing as it appears and the 'thing-in-itself', that is, of the appearance and the verity, two categories which differ *toto coelo* [completely, fundamentally] from each other and are not contained in any common category" (S. 200).

We can now judge the knowledge and ingenuity of the Russian Machist Bogdanov, who does not wish to acknowledge himself a Machist and wishes to be regarded as a Marxist in philosophy.

"A golden mean [between "panpsychism and panmaterialism"] has been adopted by materialists of a more critical shade who have rejected the *absolute* unknowability of the 'thing-in-itself', but at the same time regard it as being *fundamentally* [Bogdanov's italics] different from the 'phenomenon' and, therefore, always only 'dimly discernible' in the phenomenon, outside of experience as far as its content is concerned [that is, presumably, as far as the "elements" are concerned, which are not the same as elements of experience], but yet lying within the bounds of what is called the forms of experience, i.e., time, space and causality. Such is approximately the standpoint of the French materialists of the eighteenth century and among the modern philosophers—Engels and his Russian follower, Beltov[47]" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. II, 2nd ed., 1907, pp. 40-41).

This is a complete muddle. 1) The materialists of the *seventeenth century*, against whom Berkeley argues, hold that "objects in themselves" are absolutely knowable, for our presentations, ideas, are only copies or reflections of those objects, which exist "outside the mind" (see Introduction). 2) *Feuerbach*, and J. Dietzgen after him, vigorously dispute any "fundamental" difference between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon, and Engels disposes of this view by his brief example of the transformation of the "thing-in-itself" into the "thing-for-us". 3) Finally, to maintain that the materialists regard things-in-themselves as "always only dimly discernible in the phenomenon" is sheer nonsense, as we have seen from Engels' refutation of the agnostic. The reason for Bogdanov's distortion of materialism lies in his failure to understand the relation of absolute truth to relative truth (of which we shall speak later). As regards the "outside-of-experience" thing-in-itself and the "elements of experience", these are already the beginnings of the Machist muddle of which we have already said enough.

Parroting the incredible nonsense uttered by the reactionary professors about the materialists, disavowing Engels in 1907, and attempting to "revise" Engels into agnosticism in 1908—such is the philosophy of the "recent positivism" of the Russian Machists!

4. DOES OBJECTIVE TRUTH EXIST?

Bogdanov declares: "As I understand it, Marxism contains a denial of the unconditional objectivity of any truth whatsoever, the denial of all eternal truths" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, pp. iv-v). What is meant by "*unconditional* objectivity"? "Truth for all eternity" is "objective truth in the absolute meaning of the word," says Bogdanov in the same passage, and agrees to recognise "objective truth only within the limits of a given epoch".

Two questions are obviously confused here: 1) Is there such a thing as objective truth, that is, can human ideas have a content that does not depend on a subject, that does not depend either on a human being or on humanity? 2) If so, can human ideas, which give expression to objective truth, express it all at one time, as a whole, unconditionally, absolutely, or only approximately, relatively? This sec-

ond question is a question of the relation of absolute truth to relative truth. Bogdanov replies to the second question clearly, explicitly and definitely by rejecting even the slightest admission of absolute truth and by accusing Engels of *eclecticism* for making such an admission. Of this discovery of eclecticism in Engels by A. Bogdanov we shall speak separately later on. For the present we shall confine ourselves to the first question, which Bogdanov, without saying so explicitly, likewise answers in the negative—for although it is possible to deny the element of relativity* in one or another human idea without denying the existence of objective truth, it is impossible to deny absolute truth without denying the existence of objective truth. "...The criterion of objective truth," writes Bogdanov a little further on (p. ix), "in Beltov's sense, does not exist; truth is an ideological form, an organising form of human experience...." Neither "Beltov's sense"—for it is a question of one of the fundamental philosophical problems and not of Beltov—nor the *criterion* of truth—which must be treated separately, without confusing it with the question of whether objective truth *exists*—has anything to do with the case here. Bogdanov's negative answer to the latter question is clear: if truth is *only* an ideological form, then there can be no truth independent of the subject, of humanity, for neither Bogdanov nor we know any other ideology but human ideology. And Bogdanov's negative answer emerges still more clearly from the second half of his statement: if truth is a form of human experience, then there can be no truth independent of humanity; there can be no objective truth.

Bogdanov's denial of objective truth is agnosticism and subjectivism. The absurdity of this denial is evident even from the single example of a scientific truth quoted above. Natural science leaves no room for doubt that its assertion that the earth existed prior to man is a truth. This is entirely compatible with the materialist theory of knowledge: the existence of the thing reflected independent of the reflector (the independence of the external world from the mind) is the fundamental tenet of materialism. The

* This is probably a slip. Here sense requires the word "absolute". —*Ed.*

assertion made by science that the earth existed prior to man is an objective truth. This proposition of natural science is incompatible with the philosophy of the Machists and with their doctrine of truth: if truth is an organising form of human experience, then the assertion that the earth exists *outside* any human experience cannot be true.

But that is not all. If truth is only an organising form of human experience, then the teachings, say, of Catholicism are also true. For there is not the slightest doubt that Catholicism is an "organising form of human experience". Bogdanov himself senses the crying falsity of his theory and it is extremely interesting to watch how he attempts to extricate himself from the swamp into which he has fallen.

"The basis of objectivity," we read in Book I of *Empirio-monism*, "must lie in the sphere of collective experience. We term those data of experience objective which have the same vital meaning for us and for other people, those data upon which not only we construct our activities without contradiction, but upon which, we are convinced, other people must also base themselves in order to avoid contradiction. The objective character of the physical world consists in the fact that it exists not for me personally, but for everybody [that is not true! It exists *independently* of "everybody"!], and has a definite meaning for everybody, the same, I am convinced, as for me. The objectivity of the physical series is its *universal significance*" (p. 25, Bogdanov's italics). "The objectivity of the physical bodies we encounter in our experience is in the last analysis established by the mutual verification and co-ordination of the utterances of various people. In general, the physical world is socially-co-ordinated, socially-harmonised, in a word, *socially-organised experience*" (p. 36, Bogdanov's italics)

We shall not repeat that this is a fundamentally untrue, idealist definition, that the physical world exists independently of humanity and of human experience, that the physical world existed at a time when no "sociality" and no "organisation" of human experience was possible, and so forth. We shall dwell now on an exposure of the Machist philosophy from another aspect, namely, that objectivity is so defined that religious doctrines, which undoubtedly possess a "universal significance", and so forth, come under the defini-

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tion. But listen to Bogdanov again: "We remind the reader once more that 'objective' experience is by no means the same as 'social' experience.... Social experience is far from being altogether socially organised and always contains various contradictions, so that certain of its parts do not agree with others. Sprites and hobgoblins may exist in the sphere of social experience of a given people or of a given group of people—for example, the peasantry; but they need not therefore be included under socially-organised or objective experience, for they do not harmonise with the rest of collective experience and do not fit in with its organising forms, for example, with the chain of causality" (45).

Of course it is very gratifying that Bogdanov himself "does not include" social experience in regard to sprites and hobgoblins under objective experience. But this well-meant amendment in the spirit of anti-fideism by no means corrects the fundamental error of Bogdanov's whole position. Bogdanov's definition of objectivity and of the physical world completely falls to the ground, since the religious doctrine has "universal significance" to a greater degree than the scientific doctrine; the greater part of mankind cling to the former doctrine to this day. Catholicism has been "socially organised, harmonised and co-ordinated" by centuries of development; it "*fits in*" with the "chain of causality" in the most indisputable manner; for religions did not originate without cause, it is not by accident that they retain their hold over the masses under modern conditions, and it is quite "in the order of things" that professors of philosophy should adapt themselves to them. If this undoubtedly universally significant and undoubtedly highly-organised religious social experience does "not harmonise" with the "experience" of science, it is because there is a radical and fundamental difference between the two, which Bogdanov obliterated when he rejected objective truth. And however much Bogdanov tries to "correct" himself by saying that fideism or clericalism does not harmonise with science, the undeniable fact remains that Bogdanov's denial of objective truth completely "harmonises" with fideism. Contemporary fideism does not at all reject science; all it rejects is the "exaggerated claims" of science, to wit, its claim to objective truth. If objective truth exists (as

the materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the outer world in human "experience", is alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is absolutely refuted. But if there is no objective truth, if truth (including scientific truth) is only an organising form of human experience, then this in itself is an admission of the fundamental premise of clericalism, the door is thrown open for it, and a place is cleared for the "organising forms" of religious experience.

The question arises, does this denial of objective truth belong personally to Bogdanov, who refuses to own himself a Machist, or does it follow from the fundamental teachings of Mach and Avenarius? The latter is the only possible answer to the question. If only sensation exists in the world (Avenarius, in 1876), if bodies are complexes of sensations (Mach, in the *Analysis of Sensations*), then we are obviously confronted with a philosophical subjectivism which inevitably leads to the denial of objective truth. And if sensations are called "elements" which in one connection give rise to the physical and in another to the psychical, this, as we have seen, only confuses but does not reject the fundamental point of departure of empirio-criticism. Avenarius and Mach recognise sensations as the source of our knowledge. Consequently, they adopt the standpoint of empiricism (all knowledge derives from experience) or sensationalism (all knowledge derives from sensations). But this standpoint gives rise to the difference between the fundamental philosophical trends, idealism and materialism, and does not eliminate that difference, no matter in what "new" verbal garb ("elements") the standpoint is clothed. Both the solipsist, that is, the subjective idealist, and the materialist may regard sensations as the source of our knowledge. Both Berkeley and Diderot started from Locke. The first premise of the theory of knowledge undoubtedly is that the sole source of our knowledge is sensation. Having recognised the first premise, Mach confuses the second important premise, i.e., regarding the objective reality that is given to man in his sensations, or that forms the source of man's sensations. Starting from sensations, one may follow the line of subjectivism, which leads to solipsism ("bodies are complexes or combinations of sensations"), or the line of objectivism, which leads to

materialism (sensations are images of objects, of the external world). For the first point of view, i.e., agnosticism, or, pushed a little further, subjective idealism, there can be no objective truth. For the second point of view, i.e., materialism, the recognition of objective truth is essential. This old philosophical question of the two trends, or rather, of the two possible deductions from the premises of empiricism and sensationalism, is not solved by Mach, it is not eliminated or overcome by him, but is *muddled* by verbal trickery with the word "element", and the like. Bogdanov's denial of objective truth is an inevitable consequence of Machism as a whole, and not a deviation from it.

Engels in his *Ludwig Feuerbach* calls Hume and Kant philosophers "who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition, of the world". Engels, therefore, lays stress on what is common both to Hume and Kant, and not on what divides them. Engels states further that "what is decisive in the refutation of this [Humean and Kantian] view has already been said by Hegel" (4th German edition, pp. 15-16).[48] In this connection it seems to me not uninteresting to note that Hegel, declaring *materialism* to be "a consistent system of empiricism", wrote: "For empiricism the external (*das Äusserliche*) in general is the truth, and if then a supersensible too be admitted, nevertheless knowledge of it cannot occur (*soll doch eine Erkenntnis desselben* [*d. h. des Uebersinnlichen*] *nicht stattfinden können*) and one must keep exclusively to what belongs to perception (*das der Wahrnehmung Angehörige*). However, this principle in its realisation (*Durchführung*) produced what was subsequently termed *materialism*. This materialism regards matter, as such, as the truly objective (*das wahrhaft Objektive*).*

All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception. That is true. But the question arises, does *objective reality* "belong to perception", i.e., is it the source of perception? If you answer yes, you are a materialist. If you answer no, you are inconsistent and will inevitably arrive at subjectivism, or agnosticism, irrespec-

* Hegel, "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse", *Werke*, VI. Band (1843), S. 83. Cf, S. 122.

tive of whether you deny the knowability of the thing-in-itself, or the objectivity of time, space and causality (with Kant), or whether you do not even permit the thought of a thing-in-itself (with Hume). The inconsistency of your empiricism, of your philosophy of experience, will in that case lie in the fact that you deny the objective content of experience, the objective truth of knowledge through experience.

Those who hold to the line of Kant or Hume (Mach and Avenarius are among the latter, insofar as they are not pure Berkeleians) call us, the materialists, "metaphysicians" because we recognise objective reality which is given us in experience, because we recognise an objective source of our sensations independent of man. We materialists follow Engels in calling the Kantians and Humeans *agnostics* because they deny objective reality as the source of our sensations. Agnostic is a Greek word: *a* in Greek means "no", *gnosis* "knowledge". The agnostic says: *I do not know* if there is an objective reality which is reflected, imaged by our sensations; I declare there is no way of knowing this (see the words of Engels above quoted setting forth the position of the agnostic). Hence the denial of objective truth by the agnostic, and the tolerance—the philistine, cowardly tolerance—of the dogmas regarding sprites, hobgoblins, Catholic saints, and the like. Mach and Avenarius, pretentiously advancing a "new" terminology, a supposedly "new" point of view, repeat, in fact, although in a confused and muddled way, the reply of the agnostic: on the one hand, bodies are complexes of sensations (pure subjectivism, pure Berkeleianism); on the other hand, if we rechristen our sensations "elements", we may think of them as existing independently of our sense-organs!

The Machists love to declaim that they are philosophers who completely trust the evidence of our sense-organs, who regard the world as actually being what it seems to us to be, full of sounds, colours, etc., whereas to the materialists, they say, the world is dead, devoid of sound and colour, and in its reality different from what it seems to be, and so forth. Such declamations, for example, are indulged in by J. Petzoldt, both in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience* and in his *World Problem from the Positiv-*

ist Standpoint (*Weltproblem von positivistischen Standpunkte aus*), 1906. Petzoldt is parroted by Mr. Victor Chernov, who waxes enthusiastic over the "new" idea. But, in fact, the Machists are subjectivists and agnostics, for they *do not sufficiently* trust the evidence of our sense-organs and are inconsistent in their sensationalism. They do not recognise objective reality, independent of man, as the source of our sensations. They do not regard sensations as a true copy of this objective reality, thereby coming into direct conflict with natural science and throwing the door open for fideism. On the contrary, for the materialist the world is richer, livelier, more varied than it seems, for with each step in the development of science new aspects are discovered. For the materialist, our sensations are images of the sole and ultimate objective reality, ultimate not in the sense that it has already been cognised to the end, but in the sense that there is not and cannot be any other. This view irrevocably closes the door not only to every species of fideism, but also to that professorial scholasticism which, while not recognising an objective reality as the source of our sensations, "deduces" the concept of the objective by means of such artificial verbal constructions as universal significance, socially-organised, and so on and so forth, and which is unable, and frequently unwilling, to separate objective truth from belief in sprites and hobgoblins.

The Machists contemptuously shrug their shoulders at the "antiquated" views of the "dogmatists", the materialists, who still cling to the concept *matter*, which supposedly has been refuted by "recent science" and "recent positivism". We shall speak separately of the new theories of physics on the structure of matter. But it is absolutely unpardonable to confuse, as the Machists do, any particular theory of the structure of matter with the epistemological category, to confuse the problem of the new properties of new aspects of matter (electrons, for example) with the old problem of the theory of knowledge, with the problem of the sources of our knowledge, the existence of objective truth, etc. Mach "discovered the world-elements": red, green, hard, soft, loud, long, etc. We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or

not? This hoary philosophical query is confused by Mach. If you hold that it is not given, you, together with Mach, inevitably sink to subjectivism and agnosticism and deservedly fall into the embrace of the immanentists, i.e., the philosophical Menshikovs. If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is *matter*. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them. Therefore, to say that such a concept can become "antiquated" is *childish talk*, a senseless repetition of the arguments of fashionable *reactionary* philosophy. Could the struggle between materialism and idealism, the struggle between the tendencies or lines of Plato and Democritus in philosophy, the struggle between religion and science, the denial of objective truth and its assertion, the struggle between the adherents of supersensible knowledge and its adversaries, have become antiquated during the two thousand years of the development of philosophy?

Acceptance or rejection of the concept matter is a question of the confidence man places in the evidence of his sense-organs, a question of the source of our knowledge, a question which has been asked and debated from the very inception of philosophy, which may be disguised in a thousand different garbs by professorial clowns, but which can no more become antiquated than the question whether the source of human knowledge is sight and touch, hearing and smell. To regard our sensations as images of the external world, to recognise objective truth, to hold the materialist theory of knowledge—these are all one and the same thing. To illustrate this, I shall only quote from Feuerbach and from two textbooks of philosophy, in order that the reader may judge how elementary this question is.

"How banal," wrote Feuerbach, "to deny that sensation is the evangel, the gospel (*Verkündung*) of an objective saviour."* A strange, a preposterous terminology, as you see, but a perfectly clear philosophical line: sensation reveals

* Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, X. Band, 1866, S. 194-95.

objective truth to man. "My sensation is subjective, but its foundation or cause (*Grund*) is objective" (S. 195). Compare this with the quotation given above where Feuerbach says that materialism starts from the sensuous world as an ultimate (*ausgemachte*) objective truth.

Sensationalism, we read in Frank's dictionary of philosophy*, is a doctrine which deduces all our ideas "from the experience of the senses, reducing knowledge to sensations". There is subjective sensationalism (scepticism and Berkeleianism), moral sensationalism (Epicureanism),[49] and objective sensationalism. "Objective sensationalism is materialism, for matter or bodies are, in the opinion of the materialists, the only objects that can affect our senses (*atteindre nos sens*)."

"If sensationalism," says Schwegler in his history of philosophy,** "asserted that truth or being can be apprehended exclusively by means of the senses, one had only [Schwegler is speaking of philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century in France] to formulate this proposition objectvely and one had the thesis of materialism: only the sensuous exists; there is no other being than material being."

These elementary truths, which have managed to find their way even into the textbooks, have been forgotten by our Machists.

5. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TRUTH, OR THE ECLECTICISM OF ENGELS AS DISCOVERED BY A. BOGDANOV

Bogdanov made his discovery in 1906, in the preface to Book III of his *Empirio-monism*. "Engels in *Anti-Dühring*," writes Bogdanov, "expresses himself *almost* in the same sense in which I have just described the relativity of truth" (p. v)—that is, in the sense of denying all eternal truth, "denying the unconditional objectivity of all truth whatsoever". "Engels is wrong in his indecision, in the fact that in spite of his irony he recognises certain 'eternal truths', wretched though they may be..." (p. viii). "Only inconsist-

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* *Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques*, Paris, 1875.

** Dr. Albert Schwegler, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss*, 15-te Aufl., S. 194.

ency can here permit such eclectic reservations as those of Engels...” (p. ix). Let us cite one instance of Bogdanov’s refutation of Engels’ eclecticism. “Napoleon died on May 5, 1821,” says Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, in the chapter “Eternal Truths”, explaining to Dühring what one who claims to discover eternal truths in the historical sciences has to confine himself to, what “platitudes” (*Plattheiten*) he has to be satisfied with. Bogdanov answers Engels as follows: “What sort of ‘truth’ is that? And what is there ‘eternal’ about it? The recording of a single correlation, which perhaps even has no longer any real significance for our generation, cannot serve as the starting-point for any activity, and leads nowhere” (p. ix). And on page viii: “Can *Plattheiten* be called *Wahrheiten*? Are ‘platitudes’ truths? Truth is a vital organising form of experience; it leads us somewhere in our activity and provides a point of support in the struggle of life.”

It is clear enough from these two quotations that Bogdanov, instead of refuting Engels, makes a mere *declamation*. If you cannot assert that the proposition “Napoleon died on May 5, 1821” is false or inexact, you acknowledge that it is true. If you do not assert that it may be refuted in the future, you acknowledge this truth to be eternal. But to call phrases such as truth is a “vital organising form of experience” an answer, is to palm off a mere *jumble of words* as philosophy. Did the earth have the history which is expounded in geology, or was the earth created in seven days? Is one to be allowed to dodge this question by talking about “vital” (what does that mean?) truth which “leads” somewhere, and the like? Can it be that knowledge of the history of the earth and of the history of humanity “has no real significance”? This is just turgid nonsense, used by Bogdanov to cover his *retreat*. For it is a retreat, when, having taken it upon himself to prove that the admission of eternal truths by Engels is eclecticism, he dodges the issue by a mere noise and clash of words and leaves unrefuted the fact that Napoleon did die on May 5, 1821, and that to regard this *truth* as refutable in the future is absurd.

The example given by Engels is elementary, and anybody without the slightest difficulty can think of scores of similar *truth* that are eternal and absolute and that only insane people can doubt (as Engels says, citing another ex-

ample: "Paris is in France"). Why does Engels speak here of "platitudes"? Because he refutes and ridicules the dogmatic, metaphysical materialist Dühring, who was incapable of applying dialectics to the relation between absolute and relative truth. To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth. And it is this "one way or another" which distinguishes the metaphysical materialist Dühring from the dialectical materialist Engels. On the most complex questions of science in general, and of historical science in particular, Dühring scattered words right and left: ultimate, final and eternal truth. Engels jeered at him. Of course there are eternal truths, Engels said, but it is unwise to use high-sounding words (*gewaltige Worte*) in connection with simple things. If we want to advance materialism, we must drop this trivial play with the words "eternal truth"; we must learn to put, and answer, the question of the relation between absolute and relative truth dialectically. It was on this issue that the fight between Dühring and Engels was waged thirty years ago. And Bogdanov, who has contrived "*not to notice*" Engels' explanation of the problem of absolute and relative truth given *in this very same chapter*, and who has contrived to accuse Engels of "eclecticism" for his admission of a proposition which is a truism for all forms of materialism, only betrays once again his utter ignorance of both materialism and dialectics.

"Now we come to the question," Engels writes in *Anti-Dühring*, in the beginning of the chapter mentioned (Part I, Chap. IX), "whether any, and if so which, products of human knowledge ever can have sovereign validity and an unconditional claim (*Anspruch*) to truth" (5th German edition, p. 79). And Engels answers the question thus:

"The sovereignty of thought is realised in a series of extremely unsovereignly-thinking human beings; the knowledge which has an unconditional claim to truth is realised in a series of relative errors; neither the one nor the other [i.e., neither absolutely true knowledge, nor sovereign thought] can be fully realised except through an unending duration of human existence.

"Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings, all of whom think only limitedly. This is a contradiction which can be resolved only in the course of infinite progress, in what is—at least practically for us—an endless succession of generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is only as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much unlimited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition (*Anlage*), its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual realisation and in reality at each particular moment" (81).*

"It is just the same," Engels continues, "with eternal truths."[50]

This argument is extremely important for the question of *relativism*, i.e., the principle of the relativity of our knowledge, which is stressed by all Machists. The Machists *all* insist that they are relativists, but the Russian Machists, while repeating the words of the Germans, are afraid, or unable to propound the question of the relation of relativism to dialectics clearly and straightforwardly. For Bogdanov (as for all the Machists) recognition of the relativity of our knowledge *excludes* even the least admission of absolute truth. For Engels absolute truth is compounded from relative truths. Bogdanov is a relativist; Engels is a dialectician. Here is another, no less important, argument of Engels from the chapter of *Anti-Dühring* already quoted:

"Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply

* Cf. V. Chernov, loc cit., p. 64, et seq. The Machist Mr. Chernov fully shares the position of Bogdanov, who does not wish to own himself a Machist. The difference is that Bogdanov tries to *gloss over* his disagreement with Engels, to present it as a casual matter, etc., while Chernov feels that it is a question of a struggle against both materialism and dialectics.

the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth" (p. 86).[51] Here follows the example of Boyle's law (the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The "grain of truth" contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth "only approximately".

Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge. "Absolute truth," says J. Dietzgen in his *Streifzügen*, "can be seen, heard, smelt, touched and, of course, also be *known*; but it is not entirely absorbed (*geht nicht auf*) in knowledge" (S. 195). "It goes without saying that a picture does not exhaust its object and the artist remains behind his model.... How can a picture 'coincide' with its model? Approximately it can," (197). "Hence, we can know nature and her parts only relatively; since even a part, though only a relation of nature, possesses nevertheless the nature of the absolute, the nature of nature as a whole (*des Naturganzen an sich*) which cannot be exhausted by knowledge.... How, then, do we know that behind the phenomena of nature, behind the relative truths, there is a universal, unlimited, absolute nature which does not reveal itself to man completely?... Whence this knowledge? It is innate; it is given us with consciousness" (198). This last statement is one of the inexactitudes of Dietzgen's which led Marx, in a letter to Kugelmann, to speak of the confusion in Dietzgen's views.[52] Only by seizing upon such incorrect passages can one speak of a specific philosophy of Dietzgen differing from dialectical materialism. But Dietzgen corrects himself *on the same page*: "When I say that the consciousness of eternal, absolute truth is innate in us,

that it is the one and only *a priori* knowledge, experience nevertheless also confirms this innate consciousness" (198).

From all these statements by Engels and Dietzgen it is clearly seen that for dialectical materialism there is no impassable boundary between relative and absolute truth. Bogdanov entirely failed to grasp this if he could write: "It [the world outlook of the old materialism] sets itself up as the absolute *objective knowledge of the essence of things* [Bogdanov's italics] and is incompatible with the historically conditional nature of all ideologies" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. iv). From the standpoint of modern materialism, i.e., Marxism, the *limits* of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is *unconditional*, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional. The contours of the picture are historically conditional, but the fact that this picture depicts an objectively existing model is unconditional. When and under what circumstances we reached, in our knowledge of the essential nature of things, the discovery of alizarin in coal tar or the discovery of electrons in the atom is historically conditional; but that every such discovery is an advance of "absolutely objective knowledge" is unconditional. In a word, every ideology is historically conditional, but it is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology) there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: it is sufficiently "indefinite" to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but at the same time it is sufficiently "definite" to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.

We are relativists, proclaim Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt. We are relativists, echo Mr. Chernov and certain Russian

Machists, would-be Marxists. Yes, Mr. Chernov and Machist comrades—and therein lies your error. For to make relativism the basis of the theory of knowledge is inevitably to condemn oneself either to absolute scepticism, agnosticism and sophistry, or to subjectivism. Relativism as a basis of the theory of knowledge is not only recognition of the relativity of our knowledge, but also a denial of any objective measure or model existing independently of mankind to which our relative knowledge approximates. From the standpoint of naked relativism one can justify any sophistry; one may regard it as "conditional" whether Napoleon died on May 5, 1821, or not; one may declare the admission, alongside scientific ideology ("convenient" in one respect), of religious ideology (very "convenient" in another respect) to be a mere "convenience" for man or mankind, and so forth.

Dialectics—as Hegel in his time explained—*contains* an element of relativism, of negation, of scepticism, but *is not reducible* to relativism. The materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels certainly does contain relativism, but is not reducible to relativism, that is, it recognises the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense that the limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth are historically conditional.

Bogdanov writes in italics: "*Consistent Marxism does not admit such dogmatism and such static concepts*" as eternal truths. (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. ix.) This is a muddle. If the world is eternally moving and developing matter (as the Marxists think), reflected by the developing human consciousness, what is there "static" here? The point at issue is not the immutable essence of things, or an immutable consciousness, but the *correspondence* between the consciousness which reflects nature and the nature which is reflected by consciousness. In connection with this question, and this question alone, the term "dogmatism" has a specific, characteristic philosophical flavour: it is a favourite word used by the idealists and the agnostics *against* the materialists, as we have already seen in the case of the fairly "old" materialist, Feuerbach. The objections brought against materialism from the standpoint of the celebrated "recent positivism" are just ancient trash.

6: THE CRITERION OF PRACTICE IN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

We have seen that Marx in 1845 and Engels in 1888 and 1892 placed the criterion of practice at the basis of the materialist theory of knowledge.[53] "The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question," says Marx in his second Thesis on Feuerbach. The best refutation of Kantian and Humean agnosticism as well as of other philosophical crotchets (*Schrullen*) is practice, repeats Engels. "The success of our action proves the conformity (*Uebereinstimmung*) of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived," he says in reply to the agnostics.[54]

Compare this with Mach's argument about the criterion of practice: "In the common way of thinking and speaking *appearance*, *illusion*, is usually contrasted with *reality*. A pencil held in front of us in the air is seen as straight; when we dip it slantwise into water we see it as crooked. In the latter case we say that the pencil a*ppears crooked but in reality* it is straight. But what entitles us to declare *one* fact to be the reality, and to degrade *the other* to an appearance?... Our expectation, of course, is deceived when we fall into the natural error of expecting what we are accustomed to although the case is unusual. The facts are not to blame for that. In these cases, to speak of *appearance* may have a practical significance, but not a scientific significance. Similarly, the question which is often asked, whether the world is real or whether we merely dream it, is devoid of all scientific significance. Even the wildest dream is a fact as much as any other" (*Analysis of Sensations*, pp. 18-19).

It is true that not only is the wildest dream a fact, but also the wildest philosophy. It is impossible to doubt this after an acquaintance with the philosophy of Ernst Mach. As the very latest sophist, he confounds the scientific-historical and psychological investigation of human errors, of every "wild dream" of humanity, such as belief in sprites, hobgoblins, and so forth, with the epistemological distinction between truth and "wildness". It is as if an economist were to say that Senior's theory that the whole profit

of the capitalist is obtained from the "last hour" of the worker's labour and Marx's theory are both facts, and that from the standpoint of science there is no point in asking which theory expresses objective truth and which—the prejudice of the bourgeoisie and the venality of its professors. The tanner Joseph Dietzgen regarded the scientific, i.e., the materialist, theory of knowledge as a "universal weapon against religious belief" (*Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, S. 55), but for the professor-in-ordinary Ernst Mach the distinction between the materialist and the subjective-idealist theories of knowledge "is devoid of all scientific significance"! That science is non-partisan in the struggle of materialism against idealism and religion is a favourite idea not only of Mach but of all modern bourgeois professors, who are, as Dietzgen justly expresses it, "graduated flunkeys who stupefy the people by a twisted idealism" (op. cit., S. 53).

And a twisted professorial idealism it is, indeed, when the criterion of practice, which for every one of us distinguishes illusion from reality, is removed by Mach from the realm of science, from the realm of the theory of knowledge. Human practice proves the correctness of the materialist theory of knowledge, said Marx and Engels, who dubbed attempts to solve the fundamental question of epistemology without the aid of practice "scholastic" and "philosophical crotchets". But for Mach practice is one thing and the theory of knowledge something quite different; they can be placed side by side without making the latter conditional on the former. In his last work, *Knowledge and Error*, Mach says: "Knowledge is always a biologically useful (*förderndes*) mental experience" (2nd German edition, p. 115). "Only success can separate knowledge from error" (116). "The concept is a physical working hypothesis" (143). With astonishing naïveté our Russian Machist would-be Marxists regard such phrases of Mach's as proof that he *comes close* to Marxism. But Mach here comes just as close to Marxism as Bismarck to the labour movement, or Bishop Eulogius[55] to democracy. With Mach such propositions *stand side by side* with his idealist theory of knowledge and do not determine the choice of one or another definite line of epistemology. Knowledge can be useful biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of

life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective truth, truth which is independent of man. For the materialist the "success" of human practice proves the correspondence between our ideas and the objective nature of the things we perceive. For the solipsist "success" is everything needed *by me in practice*, which can be regarded separately from the theory of knowledge. If we include the criterion of practice in the foundation of the theory of knowledge we inevitably arrive at materialism, says the Marxist. Let practice be materialist, says Mach, but theory is another matter.

"In practice," Mach writes in the *Analysis of Sensations*, "we can as little do without the idea of the *self* when we perform any act, as we can do without the idea of a body when we grasp at a thing. Physiologically we remain egoists and materialists with the same constancy as we forever see the sun rising again. But theoretically this view cannot be adhered to" (284-85).

Egoism is beside the point here, for egoism is not an epistemological category. The question of the apparent movement of the sun around the earth is also beside the point, for in practice, which serves us as a criterion in the theory of knowledge, we must include also the practice of astronomical observations, discoveries, etc. There remains only Mach 's valuable admission that in their practical life men are entirely and exclusively guided by the materialist theory of knowledge; the attempt to obviate it "theoretically" is characteristic of Mach's *gelehrte* scholastic and twisted idealistic endeavours.

How little of a novelty are these efforts to eliminate practice—as something unsusceptible to epistemological treatment—in order to make room for agnosticism and idealism is shown by the following example from the history of German classical philosophy. Between Kant and Fichte stands G. E. Schulze (known in the history of philosophy as Schulze-Aenesidemus). He openly advocates the sceptical trend in philosophy and calls himself a follower of Hume (and of the ancients Pyrrho and Sextus). He emphatically rejects every thing-in-itself and the possibility of objective knowledge, and emphatically insists that we should not go beyond "experience", beyond sensations, in which connec-

tion he anticipates the following objection from the other camp: "Since the sceptic when he takes part in the affairs of life assumes as indubitable the reality of objective things, behaves accordingly, and thus admits a criterion of truth, his own behaviour is the best and clearest refutation of his scepticism."* "Such proofs," Schulze indignantly retorts, "are only valid for the mob (*Pöbel*)." For "my scepticism does not concern the requirements of practical life, but remains within the bounds of philosophy" (S. 254, 255).

In similar manner, the subjective idealist Fichte also hopes to find room within the bounds of idealistic philosophy for that "realism which is inevitable (*sich aufdringt*) for all of us, and even for the most determined idealist, when it comes to action, i.e., the assumption that objects exist quite independently of us and outside us" (*Werke*, I, 455).

Mach's recent positivism has not travelled far from Schulze and Fichte! Let us note as a curiosity that on this question too for Bazarov there is no one but Plekhanov—there is no beast stronger than the cat. Bazarov ridicules the "*salto vitale* philosophy of Plekhanov" (*Studies*, *etc.*, p. 69), who indeed made the absurd remark that "belief" in the existence of the outer world "is an inevitable *salto vitale*" [vital leap] of philosophy" (*Notes on Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 111). The word "belief" (taken from Hume), although put in quotation marks, discloses a confusion of terms on Plekhanov's part. There can be no question about that. But what has Plekhanov got to do with it? Why did not Bazarov take some other materialist, Feuerbach, for instance? Is it only because he does not know him? But ignorance is no argument. Feuerbach also, like Marx and Engels, makes an impermissible—from the point of view of Schulze, Fichte and Mach—"leap" to practice in the fundamental problems of epistemology. Criticising idealism, Feuerbach explains its essential nature by the following striking quotation from Fichte, which superbly demolishes Machism: "'You assume,' writes Fichte, 'that things are real, that they exist outside

* G. E. Schulze, *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie*, 1792, S. 253.

of you, only because you see them, hear them and touch them. But vision, touch and hearing are only sensations.... You perceive, not the objects, but only your sensations,'" (Feuerbach, *Werke*, X. Band, S. 185). To which Feuerbach replies that a human being is not an abstract *I*, but either a man or woman, and the question whether the world is sensation can be compared to the question: is another human being my sensation, or do our relations in practical life prove the contrary? "The fundamental defect of idealism is precisely that it asks and answers the question of objectivity and subjectivity, of the reality or unreality of the world, only from the standpoint of theory" (ibid., 189). Feuerbach makes the sum-total of human practice the basis of the theory of knowledge. He says that idealists of course also recognise the reality of the *I* and the *Thou* in practical life. For the idealists "this point of view is valid only for practical life and not for speculation. But a speculation which contradicts life, which makes the standpoint of death, of a soul separated from the body, the standpoint of truth, is a dead and false speculation" (192). Before we *perceive*, we breathe; we cannot exist without air, food and drink.

"Does this mean then that we must deal with questions of food and drink when examining the problem of the ideality or reality of the world?—exclaims the indignant idealist. How vile! What an offence against good manners soundly to trounce materialism in the scientific sense from the chair of philosophy and the pulpit of theology, only to practise materialism with all one's heart and soul in the crudest form at the table d'hôte" (195). And Feuerbach exclaims that to identify subjective sensation with the objective world "is to identify pollution with procreation" (198).

A comment not of the politest order, but it hits the mark in the case of those philosophers who teach that sense-perception is the reality existing outside us.

The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, sweeping aside the endless fabrications of professorial scholasticism. Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea *completely*. This criterion too is sufficiently "indefinite"

not to allow human knowledge to become "absolute", but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism. If what our practice confirms is the sole, ultimate and objective truth, then from this must follow the recognition that the only path to this truth is the path of science, which holds the materialist point of view. For instance, Bogdanov is prepared to recognise Marx's theory of the circulation of money as an objective truth only for "our time", and calls it "dogmatism" to attribute to this theory a "super-historically objective" truth (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. vii). This is again a muddle. The correspondence of this theory to practice cannot be altered by any future circumstances, for the same simple reason that makes it an *eternal* truth that Napoleon died on May 5, 1821. But inasmuch as the criterion of practice, i.e., the course of development of *all* capitalist countries in the last few decades, proves only the objective truth of Marx's *whole* social and economic theory in general, and not merely of one or other of its parts, formulations, etc., it is clear that to talk here of the "dogmatism" of the Marxists is to make an unpardonable concession to bourgeois economics. The sole conclusion to be drawn from the opinion held by Marxists that Marx's theory is an objective truth is that by following the *path* of Marxian theory we shall draw closer and closer to objective truth (without ever exhausting it); but by following *any other path* we shall arrive at nothing but confusion and lies.

CHAPTER THREE

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM. III

1. WHAT IS MATTER? WHAT IS EXPERIENCE?

The first of these questions is constantly being hurled by the idealists and agnostics, including the Machists, at the materialists; the second question by the materialists at the Machists. Let us try to make the point at issue clear.

Avenarius says on the subject of matter:

"Within the purified, 'complete experience' there is nothing 'physical'—'matter' in the metaphysical absolute conception—for 'matter' according to this conception is only an abstraction; it would be the total of the counter-terms while abstracting from every central term. Just as in the principal co-ordination, that is, 'complete experience', a counter-term is inconceivable (*undenkbar*) without a central term, so 'matter' in the metaphysical absolute conception is a complete chimera (*Unding*)" (*Notes*, p. 2, in the journal cited, § 119).

In all this gibberish one thing is evident, namely, that Avenarius calls the physical or matter absolute and metaphysics, for, according to his theory of the principal co-ordination (or, in the new way, "complete experience"), the counter-term is inseparable from the central term, the environment from the *self*; the *non-self* is inseparable from the *self* (as J. G. Fichte said). That this theory is disguised subjective idealism we have already shown, and the nature of Avenarius' attacks on "matter" is quite obvious: the idealist denies physical being that is independent of the

mind and therefore rejects the concept elaborated by philosophy for such being. That matter is "physical" (i.e., that which is most familiar and immediately given to man, and the existence of which no one save an inmate of a lunatic asylum can doubt) is not denied by Avenarius; he only insists on the acceptance of "*his*" theory of the indissoluble connection between the environment and the *self*.

Mach expresses the same thought more simply, without philosophical flourishes: "What we call matter is a certain systematic combination of the *elements* (sensations)" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 265). Mach thinks that by this assertion he is effecting a "radical change" in the usual world outlook. In reality this is the old, old subjective idealism, the nakedness of which is concealed by the word "element".

And lastly, the English Machist, Pearson, a rabid antagonist of materialism, says: "Now there can be no scientific objection to our clarifying certain more or less permanent groups of sense-impressions together and terming them matter,—to do so indeed leads us very near to John Stuart Mill's definition of matter as a 'permanent possibility of sensation',—but this definition of matter then leads us entirely away from matter as the thing which moves" (*The Grammar of Science*, 2nd ed., 1900, p. 249). Here there is not even the fig-leaf of the "elements", and the idealist openly stretches out a hand to the agnostic.

As the reader sees, all these arguments of the founders of empirio-criticism entirely and exclusively revolve around the old epistemological question of the relation of thinking to being, of sensation to the physical. It required the extreme naïveté of the Russian Machists to discern anything here that is even remotely related to "recent science", or "recent positivism". All the philosophers mentioned by us, some frankly, others guardedly, replace the fundamental philosophical line of materialism (from being to thinking, from matter to sensation) by the reverse line of idealism. Their denial of matter is the old familiar answer to epistemological problems, which consists in denying the existence of an external, objective source of our sensations, of an objective reality corresponding to our sensations. On the other hand, the recognition of the philosophical line denied by the idealists and agnostics is expressed in the defini-

tions: matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation, and so forth.

Bogdanov, pretending to argue only against Beltov and cravenly ignoring Engels, is indignant at such definitions, which, don't you see, "prove to be simple repetitions" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. xvi) of the "formula" (*of Engels*, our "Marxist" forgets to add) that for one trend in philosophy matter is primary and spirit secondary, while for the other trend the reverse is the case. All the Russian Machists exultantly echo Bogdanov's "refutation"! But the slightest reflection could have shown these people that it is impossible, in the very nature of the case, to give any definition of these two ultimate concepts of epistemology, except an indication which of them is taken as primary. What is meant by giving a "definition"? It means essentially to bring a given concept within a more comprehensive concept. For example, when I give the definition "an ass is an animal", I am bringing the concept "ass" within a more comprehensive concept. The question then is, are there more comprehensive concepts with which the theory of knowledge could operate than those of being and thinking, matter and sensation, physical and mental? No. These are the ultimate, most comprehensive concepts, which epistemology has in point of fact so far not surpassed (apart from changes in *nomenclature*, which are *always* possible). One must be a charlatan or an utter blockhead to demand a "definition" of these two "series" of concepts of ultimate comprehensiveness which would not be a "mere repetition": one or the other must be taken as primary. Take the three abovementioned arguments on matter. What do they all amount to? To this, that these philosophers proceed from the mental, or the *self*, to the physical, or environment, as from the central term to the counter-term—or from sensation to matter, or from sense-perception to matter. Could Avenarius, Mach and Pearson in fact have given any other "definition" of these fundamental concepts, save by indicating the *trend* of their philosophical line? Could they have defined in any other way, in any specific way, what the *self* is, what sensation is, what sense-perception is? One has only to formulate the question clearly to realise what sheer non-

sense the Machists talk when they demand that the materialists give a definition of matter which would not amount to a repetition of the proposition that matter, nature, being, the physical—is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical—is secondary.

One expression of the genius of Marx and Engels was that they despised pedantic playing with new words, erudite terms, and subtle "isms", and said simply and plainly: there is a materialist line and an idealist line in philosophy, and between them there are various shades of agnosticism. The vain attempts to find a "new" point of view in philosophy betray the same poverty of mind that is revealed in similar efforts to create a "new" theory of value, a "new" theory of rent, and so forth.

Of Avenarius, his disciple Carstanjen says that he once expressed himself in private conversation as follows: "I know neither the physical nor the mental, but only some third." To the remark of one writer that the concept of this third was not given by Avenarius, Petzoldt replied: "We know why he could not advance such a concept. The third lacks a counter-concept (*Gegenbegriff*).... The question, what is the third? is illogically put" (*Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, II, 329). Petzoldt understands that an ultimate concept cannot be defined. But he does not understand that the resort to a "third" is a mere subterfuge, for every one of us knows what is physical and what is mental, but none of us knows at present what that "third" is. Avenarius was merely covering up his tracks by this subterfuge, while *in fact* declaring that the *self* is the primary (central term) and nature (environment) the secondary (counter-term).

Of course, even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited field—in this case exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable.

Let us now examine how the word "experience" is used in empirio-critical philosophy. The first paragraph of *The Critique of Pure Experience* expounds the following "assump-

tion": "Any part of our environment stands in relation to human individuals in such a way that, the former having been given, the latter speak of their experience as follows: 'this is experienced', 'this is an experience'; or 'it arose from experience', or 'it depends upon experience'." (Russian translation, p. 1.) Thus experience is defined in terms of these same concepts: the *self* and the environment; while the "doctrine" of their "indissoluble" connection is for the time being tucked out of the way. Further: "The synthetic concept of pure experience"—"namely, experience as declaration which in all its components has only parts of the environment as a premise" (1-2). If we assume that the environment exists independently of "declarations" and "predications" of man, then it becomes possible to interpret experience in a materialist way! "The analytical concept of pure experience"—"namely, as a declaration to which nothing is admixed that would not be in its turn experience and which, therefore, in itself is nothing but experience" (2). Experience is experience. And there are people who take this quasi-erudite rigmarole for true wisdom!

It is essential to add that in the second volume of *The Critique of Pure Experience* Avenarius regards "experience" as a "special case" of the *mental*; that he divides experience into *sachhafte Werte* (thing-values) and *gedankenhafte Werte* (thought-values); that "experience in the broad sense" includes the latter; that "complete experience" is identified with the principal co-ordination (*Bemerkungen*). In short, you pay your money and take your choice. "Experience" embraces both the materialist and the idealist line in philosophy and sanctifies the muddling of them. But while our Machists trustingly accept "pure experience" as pure coin of the realm, in philosophical literature the representatives of the various trends are alike in pointing to Avenarius' abuse of this concept. "What pure experience is," A. Riehl writes, "remains vague with Avenarius, and his explanation that 'pure experience is experience to which nothing is admixed that is not in its turn experience' obviously revolves in a circle" (*Systematische Philosophie*, Leipzig 1907, S. 102). Pure experience for Avenarius, writes Wundt, is at times any kind of fantasy, and at others, a predica-

tion with the character of "corporeality" (*Philosophische Studien*, XIII. Band, S. 92-93). Avenarius *stretches* the concept experience (S. 382). "On the precise definition of the terms experience and pure experience," writes Cauwelaert, "depends the meaning of the whole of this philosophy. Avenarius does not give a precise definition" (*Revue néo-scolastique*, février 1907, p. 61). "The vagueness of the term 'experience' stands him in good stead, and so in the end Avenarius falls back on the time-worn argument of subjective idealism" (under the pretence of combating it), says Norman Smith (*Mind*, Vol. XV, p. 29).

"I openly declare that the inner sense, the soul of my philosophy consists in this that a human being possesses nothing save experience; a human being comes to everything to which he comes only through experience...." A zealous philosopher of pure experience, is he not? The author of these words is the subjective idealist Fichte (*Sonnenklarer Bericht*, *usw*., S. 12). We know from the history of philosophy that the interpretation of the concept "experience" divided the classical materialists from the idealists. Today professorial philosophy of all shades disguises its reactionary nature by declaiming on the subject of "experience". All the immanentists fall back on experience. In the preface to the second edition of his *Knowledge and Error*, Mach praises a book by Professor Wilhelm Jerusalem in which we read: "The acceptance of a divine original being is not contradictory to experience" (*Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik*, S. 222).

One can only be sorry for people who believed Avenarius and Co. that the "obsolete" distinction between materialism and idealism can be surmounted by the word "experience". When Valentinov and Yushkevich accuse Bogdanov, who departed somewhat from pure Machism, of abusing the word "experience", these gentlemen are only betraying their ignorance. Bogdanov is "not guilty" in this case; he *only* slavishly borrowed the muddle of Mach and Avenarius. When Bogdanov says that "consciousness and immediate mental experience are identical concepts" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. II, p. 53) while matter is "not experience" but "the unknown which evokes everything known" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. xiii), he is interpreting experience *idealistically*.

And, of course, he is not the first* nor the last to build petty idealist systems on the word "experience". When he replies to the reactionary philosophers by declaring that attempts to transcend the boundaries of experience lead in fact "only to empty abstractions and contradictory images, all the elements of which have nevertheless been taken from experience" (Bk. I, p. 48), he is drawing a contrast between the empty abstractions of the human mind and that which exists outside of man and independently of his mind, in other words, he is interpreting experience in a materialist way.

Similarly, even Mach, although he makes idealism his starting-point (bodies are complexes of sensations or "elements"), frequently strays into a materialist interpretation of the word "experience". "We must not philosophise out of ourselves (*nicht aus uns herausphilosophieren*), but must take from experience," he says in the *Mechanics* (3rd German edition, 1897, S. 14). Here a contrast is drawn between experience and philosophising out of ourselves, in other words, experience is interpreted as something objective, something given to man from the outside; it is interpreted materialistically. Here is another example: "What we observe in nature is imprinted, although uncomprehended and unanalysed, upon our ideas, which, then, in their most general and strongest (*stärksten*) features imitate (*nachahmen*) the processes of nature. In these experiences we possess a treasure-store (*Schatz*) which is ever to hand..." (op. cit., S. 27). Here nature is taken as primary and sensation and experience as products. Had Mach consistently adhered to this point of view in the fundamental questions of epistemology, he would have spared humanity many foolish idealist "complexes". A third example: "The close connection of thought and experience creates modern natural science. Experience gives rise to a thought. The latter is further elaborated and is again compared with experience", and so on (*Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, S. 200). Mach's special "philos-

* In England Comrade Belfort Bax has been exercising himself in this way for a long time. A French reviewer of his book, *The Roots of Reality*, rather bitingly remarked not so long ago: "Experience is only another word for consciousness"; come out then openly as an idealist! (*Revue de philosophie*,[56] 1907, No. 10, p. 399.)

ophy" is here thrown overboard, and the author instinctively accepts the customary standpoint of natural scientists, who regard experience materialistically.

To summarise: the word "experience", on which the Machists build their systems, has long served as a shield for idealist systems, and now serves Avenarius and Co. for eclectically passing from the idealist position to the materialist position and vice versa. The various "definitions" of this concept are only expressions of those two fundamental lines in philosophy which were so strikingly revealed by Engels.

2. PLEKHANOV'S ERROR CONCERNING THE CONCEPT "EXPERIENCE"

On pages x-xi of his introduction to *L. Feuerbach* (1905 ed.) Plekhanov says:

"A German writer has remarked that for empirio-criticism *experience* is only an object of investigation, and not a means of knowledge. If that is so, then the contrasting of empirio-criticism and materialism loses all meaning, and discussion of the question whether or not empirio-criticism is destined to replace materialism is absolutely vain and idle. "

This is one complete muddle.

Fr. Carstanjen, one of the most "orthodox" followers of Avenarius, says in his article on empirio-criticism (a reply to Wundt), that "for *The Critique of Pure Experience* experience is not a means of knowledge but only an object of investigation".* It follows according to Plekhanov that any contrasting of the views of Fr. Carstanjen and materialism is meaningless!

Fr. Carstanjen is almost literally quoting Avenarius, who in his *Notes* emphatically contrasts his conception of experience as that which is given us, that which we find (*das Vorgefundene*), with the conception of experience as a "means of knowledge" in "the sense of the prevailing theories of knowledge, which essentially are fully metaphysical" (op. cit., S. 401). Petzoldt, following Avenarius, says the

* *Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Jahrg. 22, 1898, S. 45.

same thing in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience* (Bd. I, S. 170). Thus, according to Plekhanov, the contrasting of the views of Carstanjen, Avenarius and Petzoldt to materialism is meaningless! Either Plekhanov has not read Carstanjen and Co. as thoroughly as he should, or he has taken his reference to "a German writer" at fifth hand.

What then does this statement, uttered by some of the most prominent empirio-criticists and not understood by Plekhanov, mean? Carstanjen wishes to say that Avenarius in his *Critique of Pure Experience* takes experience, i.e., all "human predications", as the *object* of investigation. Avenarius does not investigate here, says Carstanjen (op. cit., S. 50), whether these predications are real, or whether they relate, for example, to *ghosts*; he merely arranges, systematises, formally classifies all possible human predications, *both idealist and materialist* (S. 53), without going into the essence of the question. Carstanjen is absolutely right when he characterises *this* point of view as "scepticism par excellence" (S. 213). In this article, by the way, Carstanjen defends his beloved master from the ignominious (for a German professor) charge of materialism levelled against him by Wundt. How can we be materialists, pray?—such is the burden of Carstanjen's objections—when we speak of "experience" we do not mean it in the ordinary current sense, which leads or might lead to materialism, but in the sense that we investigate everything that people "predicate" as experience. Carstanjen and Avenarius regard the view that experience is a means of knowledge as materialist (that, perhaps, is the most common opinion, but nevertheless, untrue, as we have seen in the case of Fichte). Avenarius entrenches himself against the "prevailing" "metaphysics" which persists in regarding the brain as the organ of thought and which ignores the theories of introjection and co-ordination. By the given or the found (*das Vorgefundene*), Avenarius means the indissoluble connection between the *self* and the environment, which leads to a confused idealist interpretation of "experience".

Hence there is no doubt that both the materialist and the idealist, as well as the Humean and the Kantian lines in philosophy may be concealed beneath the word "experi-

ence"; but neither the definition of experience as an object of investigation,* nor its definition as a means of knowledge is decisive in this respect. As for Carstanjen's remarks against Wundt, they have no relation whatever to the question of contrasting empirio-criticism and materialism.

As a curiosity let us note that on this point Bogdanov and Valentinov, in their reply to Plekhanov, revealed no greater knowledge of the subject. Bogdanov declared: "It is not quite clear" (Bk. III, p. xi).—"It is the task of empirio-criticists to examine this formulation and to accept or reject the condition." A very convenient position: I, indeed, am not a Machist and am not therefore obliged to find out in what sense a certain Avenarius or Carstanjen speaks of experience! Bogdanov wants to make use of Machism (and of the Machist confusion regarding "experience"), but he does not want to be held responsible for it.

The "pure" empirio-criticist Valentinov transcribed Plekhanov's remark and publicly danced the cancan; he sneered at Plekhanov for not naming the author and for not explaining what the matter was all about (op. cit., pp. 108-09). But at the same time this empirio-critical philosopher in his answer said *not a single word* on the substance of the matter, although acknowledging that he had read Plekhanov's remark "three times, if not more" (and had apparently not understood anything). Oh, those Machists!

3. CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN NATURE

The question of causality is particularly important in determining the philosophical line of any of the recent "isms", and we must therefore dwell on it in some detail.

Let us begin with an exposition of the materialist theory of knowledge on this point. Feuerbach's views are expounded with particular clarity in his reply to R. Haym already referred to.

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* Plekhanov perhaps thought that Carstanjen had said, "an object of knowledge independent of knowledge", and not an "object of investigation"? This would indeed be materialism. But neither Carstanjen, nor anybody else acquainted with empirio-criticism, said or could have said any such thing.

"'Nature and human reason,' says Haym, 'are for him (Feuerbach) completely divorced, and between them a gulf is formed which cannot be spanned from one side or the other.' Haym bases this reproach mainly on § 48 of my *Essence of Religion* where it is said that 'nature may be conceived only through nature itself, that its necessity is neither human nor logical, neither metaphysical nor mathematical, that nature alone is *that* being to which it is impossible to apply any human measure, although we compare and give names to its phenomena, in order to make them comprehensible to us, and in general apply human expressions and conceptions to them, as for example: order, purpose, law; and are obliged to do so because of the character of our language'. What does this mean? Does it mean that there is no order in nature, so that, for example, autumn may be succeeded by summer, spring by winter, winter by autumn? That there is no purpose, so that, for example, there is no co-ordination between the lungs and the air, between light and the eye, between sound and the ear? That there is no law, so that, for example, the earth may move now in an ellipse, now in a circle, that it may revolve around the sun now in a year, now in a quarter of an hour? What nonsense! What then is meant by this passage? Nothing more than to distinguish between that which belongs to nature and that which belongs to man; it does not assert that there is actually nothing in nature corresponding to the words or ideas of order, purpose, law. All that it does is to deny the identity between thought and being; it denies that they exist in nature exactly as they do in the head or mind of man. Order, purpose, law are words used by man to translate the acts of nature into *his own* language in order that he may understand them. These words are not devoid of meaning or of objective content (*nicht sinn-, d. h. gegenstandlose Worte*); nevertheless, a distinction must be made between the original and the translation. Order, purpose, law in the human sense express something arbitrary.

"From the contingency of order, purpose and law in nature, theism *expressly* infers their arbitrary origin; it infers the existence of a being distinct from nature which brings order, purpose, law into a nature that is in itself (*an sich*) chaotic (*dissolute*) and indifferent to all determi-

nation. The reason of the theists ... is reason contradictory to nature, reason absolutely devoid of understanding of the essence of nature. The reason of the theists splits nature into two beings—one material, and the other formal or spiritual" (*Werke*, VII. Band, 1903, S. 518-20).

Thus Feuerbach recognises objective law in nature and objective causality, which are reflected only with approximate fidelity by human ideas of order, law and so forth. With Feuerbach the recognition of objective law in nature is inseparably connected with the recognition of the objective reality of the external world, of objects, bodies, things, reflected by our mind. Feuerbach's views are consistently materialist. All other views, or rather, any other philosophical line on the question of causality, the denial of objective law, causality and necessity in nature, are justly regarded by Feuerbach as belonging to the fideist trend. For it is, indeed, clear that the subjectivist line on the question of causality, the deduction of the order and necessity of nature not from the external objective world, but from consciousness, reason, logic, and so forth, not only cuts human reason off from nature, not only opposes the former to the latter, but makes nature a *part* of reason, instead of regarding reason as a part of nature. The subjectivist line on the question of causality is philosophical idealism (varieties of which are the theories of causality of both Hume and Kant), i.e., fideism, more or less weakened and diluted. The recognition of objective law in nature and the recognition that this law is reflected with approximate fidelity in the mind of man is materialism.

As regards Engels, he had, if I am not mistaken, no occasion to contrast his materialist view with other trends on the particular question of causality. He had no need to do so, since he had definitely dissociated himself from all the agnostics on the more fundamental question of the objective reality of the external world in general. But to anyone who has read his philosophical works at all attentively it must be clear that Engels does not admit even a shadow of doubt as to the existence of objective law, causality and necessity in nature. We shall confine ourselves to a few examples. In the first section of *Anti-Dühring* Engels says: "In order to understand these details [of the general pic-

ture of the world phenomena], we must detach them from their natural (*natürlich*) or historical connection and examine each one separately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc." (5-6). That this natural connection, the connection between natural phenomena, exists objectively, is obvious. Engels particularly emphasises the dialectical view of cause and effect: "And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa" (8). Hence, the human conception of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a single world process. If we find that the laws of thought correspond with the laws of nature, says Engels, this becomes quite conceivable when we take into account that reason and consciousness are "products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of nature" Of course, "the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature's interconnections (*Naturzusammenhang*) but are in correspondence with them" (22).[57] There is no doubt that there exists a natural, objective interconnection between the phenomena of the world. Engels constantly speaks of the "laws of nature", of the "necessities of nature" (*Naturnotwendigkeiten*), without considering it necessary to explain the generally known propositions of materialism.

In *Ludwig Feuerbach* also we read that "the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought —[are] two sets of laws which are identical in substance but differ in their expression insofar as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents" (38). And Engels reproaches the old natural philosophy for having

replaced "the real but as yet unknown interconnections" (of the phenomena of nature) by "ideal and imaginary ones" (42).[58] Engels' recognition of objective law, causality and necessity in nature is absolutely clear, as is his emphasis on the relative character of our, i.e., man's, approximate reflections of this law in various concepts.

Passing to Joseph Dietzgen, we must first note one of the innumerable distortions committed by our Machists. One of the authors of the *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*, Mr. Helfond, tells us: "The basic points of Dietzgen's world outlook may be summarised in the following propositions: '... (9) The causal dependence which we ascribe to things is in reality not contained in the things themselves'" (248). *This is sheer nonsense*. Mr. Helfond, whose own views represent a veritable hash of materialism and agnosticism, *has outrageously falsified* J. Dietzgen. Of course, we can find plenty of confusion, inexactnesses and errors in Dietzgen, such as gladden the hearts of the Machists and oblige materialists to regard Dietzgen as a philosopher who is not entirely consistent. But to attribute to the materialist J. Dietzgen a direct denial of the materialist view of causality—only a Helfond, only the Russian Machists are capable of that.

"Objective scientific knowledge," says Dietzgen in his *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind* (German edition, 1903), "seeks for causes not by faith or speculation, but by experience and induction, not *a priori*, but *a posteriori*. Natural science looks for causes not outside or behind phenomena, but within or by means of them" (S. 94-95). "Causes are the products of the faculty of thought. They are however, not its pure products, but are produced by it in conjunction with sense material. This sense material gives the causes thus produced their objective existence. Just as we demand that a truth should be the truth of an objective phenomenon, so we demand that a cause should be real, that it should be the cause of an objectively given effect" (S. 98-99). "The cause of a thing is its connection" (S. 100).

It is clear from this that Mr. Helfond has made a statement which is *directly contrary to fact*. The world outlook of materialism expounded by J. Dietzgen recognises that "the causal dependence" *is contained* "in the things them-

selves". It was necessary for the Machist hash that Mr. Helfond should confuse the materialist line with the idealist line on the question of causality.

Let us now proceed to this latter line.

A clear statement of the starting-point of Avenarius' philosophy on this question is to be found in his first work, *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses*. In § 81 we read: "Just as we do not experience (*erfahren*) force as causing motion, so we do not experience the *necessity* for any motion.... All we experience (*erfahren*) is that the one follows the other." This is the Humean standpoint in its purest form: sensation, experience tell us nothing of any necessity. A philosopher who asserts (on the principle of "the economy of thought") that only sensation exists could not come to any other conclusion. "Since the idea of *causality*," we read further, "demands force and necessity or constraint as integral parts of the effect, so it falls together with these latter" (§ 82). "Necessity therefore expresses a particular degree of probability with which the effect is, or may be, expected" (§ 83, thesis).

This is outspoken subjectivism on the question of causality. And if one is to remain at all consistent when not recognising objective reality as the source of our sensations one cannot come to any other conclusion.

Let us turn to Mach. In a special chapter, "Causality and Explanation" (*Wärmelehre*, 2. Auflage, 1900, S. 432-39), we read: "The Humean criticism (of the conception of causality) nevertheless remains valid." Kant and Hume (Mach does not even take account of other philosophers!) solve the problem of causality differently. "We prefer" Hume's solution. "Apart from *logical* necessity [Mach's italics] no other necessity, for instance physical necessity, exists." This is exactly the view which was so vigorously combated by Feuerbach. It never even occurs to Mach to deny his kinship with Hume. Only the Russian Machists could go so far as to assert that Hume's agnosticism could be "combined" with Marx's and Engels' materialism. In Mach's *Mechanics*, we read: "In nature there is neither cause nor effect" (S. 474, 3. Auflage, 1897). "I have repeatedly demonstrated that all forms of the law of causality spring from subjective

motives (*Trieben*) and that there is no necessity for nature to correspond with them" (495).

We must here note that our Russian Machists with amazing naïveté replace the question of the materialist or idealist trend of all arguments of the law of causality by the question of one or another formulation of this law. They believed the German empirio-critical professors that merely to say "functional correlation" was to make a discovery in "recent positivism" and to release one from the "fetishism" of expressions like "necessity", "law", and so forth. This of course is utterly absurd, and Wundt was fully justified in ridiculing such a *change of words* (in the article, quoted above, in *Philosophische Studien*, S. 383, 388), which in fact changes nothing. Mach himself speaks of "all forms" of the law of causality and in his *Knowledge and Error* (2. Auflage, S. 278) makes the self-evident reservation that the concept function can express the "dependence of elements" more precisely only when the possibility is achieved of expressing the results of investigation in *measurable* quantities, which even in sciences like chemistry has only partly been achieved. Apparently, in the opinion of our Machists, who are so credulous as to professorial discoveries, Feuerbach (not to mention Engels) did not know that the concepts order, law, and so forth, can under certain conditions be expressed as a mathematically defined functional relation!

The really important epistemological question that divides the philosophical trends is not the degree of precision attained by our descriptions of causal connections, or whether these descriptions can be expressed in exact mathematical formulas, but whether the source of our knowledge of these connections is objective natural law or properties of our mind, its innate faculty of apprehending certain *a priori* truths, and so forth. This is what irrevocably divides the materialists Feuerbach, Marx and Engels from the agnostics (Humeans) Avenarius and Mach.

In certain parts of his works, Mach, whom it would be a sin to accuse of consistency, frequently "forgets" his agreement with Hume and his own subjectivist theory of causality and argues "simply" as a natural scientist, i.e., from the instinctive materialist standpoint. For instance,

in his *Mechanics*, we read of "the uniformity which nature teaches us to find in its phenomena" (French edition, p. 182). But if we *do find* uniformity in the phenomena of nature this means, does it not, that uniformity exists objectively outside our mind? No. On the question of the uniformity of nature Mach also delivers himself thus: "The power that prompts us to complete in thought facts only partially observed is the power of association. It is greatly strengthened by repetition. It then appears to us to be a power which is independent of our will and of individual facts, a power which directs thoughts *and* [Mach's italics] facts, which keeps them in accord with each other as a *law* governing both. That we consider ourselves capable of making predictions with the help of such a law only [!] proves that there is sufficient uniformity in our environment, but it does not at all prove the *necessity* of the success of our predictions" (*Wärmelehre*, S. 383).

It follows that we may and ought to look for a necessity *apart from* the uniformity of our environment, i.e., of nature! Where to look for it is the secret of idealist philosophy which is afraid to recognise man's perceptive faculty as a simple reflection of nature. In his last work, *Knowledge and Error*, Mach even defines a law of nature as a "limitation of expectation" (2. Auflage, S. 450 ff.)! Solipsism comes into its own.

Let us look at the position of other writers of the same philosophical trend. The Englishman, Karl Pearson, expresses himself with characteristic precision (*The Grammar of Science*, 2nd ed.): "The laws of science are products of the human mind rather than factors of the external world" (p. 36). "Those, whether poets or materialists, who do homage to nature, as the sovereign of man, too often forget that the order and complexity they admire are at least as much a product of man's perceptive and reasoning faculties as are their own memories and thoughts" (185). "The comprehensive character of natural law is due to the ingenuity of the human mind" (ibid.). "*Man is the maker of natural law*," it is stated in Chapter III, § 4. "There is more meaning in the statement that man gives laws to nature than in its converse that nature gives laws to man", although—the worthy professor regretfully admits—the latter (materialist)

view is "unfortunately far too common today" (p. 87). In the fourth chapter, which is devoted to the question of causality, Pearson formulates the following *thesis* (§ 11): "*The necessity lies in the world of conceptions and not in the world of perceptions*." It should be noted that for Pearson perceptions or sense-impressions are *the* reality existing outside us. "In the uniformity with which sequences of perception are repeated (the routine of perceptions) there is also no inherent necessity, but it is a necessary condition for the existence of thinking beings that there should be a routine in the perceptions. The necessity thus lies in the nature of the thinking being and not in the perceptions themselves; thus it is conceivably a product of the perceptive faculty" (p. 139).

Our Machist, with whom Mach "himself" frequently expresses complete solidarity, thus arrives safely and soundly at pure Kantian idealism: it is man who dictates laws to nature and not nature that dictates laws to man! The important thing is not the repetition of Kant's doctrine of apriorism—which does not define the idealist line in philosophy as such, but only a particular formulation of this line—but the fact that reason, mind, consciousness are here primary, and nature secondary. It is not reason that is a part of nature, one of its highest products, the reflection of its processes, but nature that is a part of reason, which thereby is stretched from the ordinary, simple human reason known to us all to an "immoderate", as Dietzgen puts it, mysterious, divine reason. The Kantian-Machist formula, that "man gives laws to nature", is a fideist formula. If our Machists stare wide-eyed on reading Engels' statement that the fundamental characteristic of materialism is the acceptance of nature and not spirit as primary, it only shows how incapable they are of distinguishing the really important philosophical trends from the mock erudition and sage jargon of the professors.

J. Petzoldt, who in his two-volume work analysed and developed Avenarius, may serve as an excellent example of reactionary Machist scholasticism. "Even to this day," says he, "one hundred and fifty years after Hume, substantiality and causality paralyse boldness of thought" (*Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, Bd. 1, S. 31). It goes without saying that the "boldest" of all are the solip-

sists who discovered sensation without organic matter, thought without brain, nature without objective law! "And the last formulation of causality, which we have not yet mentioned, necessity of occurrence, or *necessity in nature*, contains something vague and mystical"—(the idea of "fetishism", "anthropomorphism", etc.) (32, 34). Oh, the poor mystics, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels! They have been talking all the time of necessity in nature, and have even been calling those who hold the Humean position theoretical reactionaries! Petzoldt rises above all "anthropomorphism". He has discovered the great "*law of unique determination*", which eliminates every obscurity, every trace of "fetishism", etc., etc., etc. For example, the parallelogram of forces (S. 35). This cannot be "proven"; it must be accepted as a "fact of experience". It cannot be conceded that a body under identical impulses will move in different ways. "We cannot concede nature such indefiniteness and arbitrariness; we must demand from it definiteness and law" (35). Well, well! We demand of nature obedience to law. The bourgeoisie demands reaction of its professors. "Our thought demands definiteness from nature, and nature always accedes to this demand; we shall even see that in a certain sense it is compelled to accede to it" (36). Why, having received an impulse in the direction of the line AB, does a body move towards C and not towards D or F, etc.?



"Why does nature not choose any of the countless other directions?" (37). Because that would be "multiple determination", and the great empirio-critical discovery of Joseph Petzoldt demands *unique determination*.

The "empirio-criticists" fill scores of pages with such unspeakable nonsense!

"...We have repeatedly indicated that our thesis does not derive its force from a sum of separate experiences, but

that, on the contrary, we demand that nature should recognise its validity (*seine Geltung*). Indeed, even before it becomes a law it is already for us a principle with which we approach reality, a postulate. It is valid, so to speak, *a priori*, independently of all separate experiences. It would, indeed, be unbefitting for a philosophy of pure experience to preach *a priori* truths and thus relapse into the most sterile metaphysics. Its apriorism can only be a logical one, never a psychological or metaphysical one" (40). Well, of course, if we call apriorism logical, then the reactionary nature of the idea disappears and it becomes elevated to the level of "recent positivism"!

There can be no unique determination of psychical phenomena, Petzoldt further teaches us; the role of imagination, the significance of great inventions, etc., here create exceptions, while a law of nature, or a law of spirit, tolerates "no exceptions" (65). We have before us a pure metaphysician, who has not the slightest inkling of the relativity of the difference between the accidental and the necessary.

I may, perhaps, be reminded—continues Petzoldt—of the motivation of historical events or of the development of character in poetry. "If we examine the matter carefully we shall find that there is no such unique determination. There is not a single historical event or a single drama in which we could not imagine the participants acting differently under similar psychical conditions..." (73). "Unique determination is not only absent in the realm of the psychical, but we are also entitled to *demand* its absence from reality [Petzoldt's italics]. Our doctrine is thus elevated to the rank of a *postulate*, i.e., to the rank of a fact which we recognise as a necessary condition of a much earlier experience, as its *logical a priori*" (Petzoldt's italics, S. 76).

And Petzoldt continues to operate with this "logical *a priori*" in both volumes of his *Introduction*, and in the booklet issued in 1906, *The World Problem from the Positivist Standpoint*.* Here is a second instance of a noted empi-

* J. Petzoldt, *Das Weltproblem von positivistischen Standpunkte aus*, Leipzig, 1906, S. 130: "Also from the empirical standpoint there can be a logical *a priori*; causality is the logical *a priori* of the experienced (*erfahrungsmässige*) constancy of our environment."

rio-criticist who has imperceptibly slipped into Kantianism and who serves up the most reactionary doctrines with a slightly different sauce. And this is not fortuitous; for at the very foundations of Mach's and Avenarius' teachings on causality there lies an idealist falsehood, which no high-flown talk of "positivism" can cover up. The distinction between the Humean and the Kantian theories of causality is only a secondary difference of opinion between agnostics who are basically at one, viz., in their denial of objective law in nature, and who thus inevitably condemn themselves to idealist conclusions of one kind or another. A rather more "scrupulous" empirio-criticist than J. Petzoldt, Rudolf Willy, who is ashamed of his kinship with the immanentists, rejects, for example, Petzoldt's whole theory of "unique determination" as leading to nothing but "logical formalism". But does Willy improve his position by disavowing Petzoldt? Not in the least, for he disavows Kantian agnosticism solely for the sake of Humean agnosticism. "We have long known, from the time of Hume," he writes, "that 'necessity' is a purely logical (not a 'transcendental') characteristic (*Merkmal*), or, as I would rather say and have already said, a purely verbal (*sprachlich*) characteristic" (R. Willy, *Gegen die Schulweisheit*, München, 1905, S. 91; cf. S. 173, 175).

The agnostic calls our materialist view of necessity "transcendental", for from the standpoint of Kantian and Humean "school wisdom", which Willy does not reject but only furbishes up, any recognition of objective reality given us in experience is an illegitimate "transcendence".

Among the French writers of the philosophical trend we are analysing, we find Henri Poincaré constantly straying into this same path of agnosticism. Henri Poincaré is an eminent physicist but a poor philosopher, whose errors Yushkevich, of course, declared to be the last word of recent positivism, so "recent" indeed that it even required a new "ism", viz., empirio-symbolism. For Poincaré (with whose views as a whole we shall deal in the chapter on the new physics), the laws of nature are symbols, conventions, which man creates for the sake of "*convenience*". "The only true objective reality is the internal harmony of the world." By "objective", Poincaré means that which is generally

valid, that which is accepted by the majority of men, or by all*; that is to say, in a purely subjectivist manner he destroys objective truth, as do all the Machists. And as regards "harmony", he categorically declares in answer to the question whether it exists *outside of us*—"undoubtedly, no". It is perfectly obvious that the new terms do not in the least change the ancient philosophical position of agnosticism, for the essence of Poincaré's "original" theory amounts to a denial (although he is far from consistent) of objective reality and of objective law in nature. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that in contradistinction to the Russian Machists, who accept new formulations of old errors as the latest discoveries, the German Kantians greeted such views as a conversion to their own views, i.e., to agnosticism, on a fundamental question of philosophy. "The French mathematician Henri Poincaré," we read in the work of the Kantian, Philipp Frank, "holds the point of view that many of the most general laws of theoretical natural science (e.g., the law of inertia, the law of the conservation of energy, etc.), of which it is often difficult to say whether they are of empirical or of *a priori* origin, are, in fact, neither one nor the other, but are purely conventional propositions depending upon human discretion...." "Thus [exults the Kantian] the latest *Naturphilosophie* unexpectedly renews the fundamental idea of critical idealism, namely, that experience merely fills in a framework which man brings with him by his very nature...."**

We quote this example in order to give the reader a clear idea of the degree of naïveté of our Yushkeviches and Co., who take a "theory of symbolism" for something genuinely *new*, whereas philosophers in the least versed in their subject say plainly and explicitly: he has become converted to the standpoint of critical idealism! For the essence of this point of view does not necessarily lie in the repetition of Kant's formulations, but in the recognition of the fundamental idea *common* to both Hume and Kant, viz., the denial of objective law in nature and the deduction of par-

* Henri Poincaré, *La valeur de la science*, Paris, 1905, pp. 7, 9. There is a Russian translation.

** *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*,[59] VI. B., 1907, S. 443, 447.

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ticular "conditions of experience", particular principles, postulates and propositions *from the subject*, from human consciousness, and not from nature. Engels was right when he said that the essential thing is not which of the numerous schools of materialism or idealism a particular philosopher belongs to, but whether he takes nature, the external world, matter in motion, or spirit, reason, consciousness, etc., as primary.

Another characterisation of Machism on this question, in contrast to the other philosophical lines, is given by the expert Kantian, E. Lucka. On the question of causality "Mach entirely agrees with Hume".* "P. Volkmann derives the necessity of thought from the necessity of the processes of nature—a standpoint that, in contradistinction to Mach and in agreement with Kant, recognises the fact of necessity; but contrary to Kant, it seeks the source of necessity not in thought, but in the processes of nature" (424).

Volkmann is a physicist who writes fairly extensively on epistemological questions, and who tends, as do the vast majority of natural scientists, to materialism, albeit an inconsistent, timid and incoherent materialism. The recognition of necessity in nature and the derivation from it of necessity in thought is materialism. The derivation of necessity, causality, law, etc., from thought is idealism. The only inaccuracy in the passage quoted is that a total denial of all necessity is attributed to Mach. We have already seen that this is not true either of Mach or of the empirio-critical trend generally, which, having definitely departed from materialism, inevitably slides into idealism.

It remains for us to say a few words about the Russian Machists in particular. They would like to be Marxists; they have all "read" Engels' decisive demarcation of materialism from the Humean trend; they could not have failed to learn both from Mach himself and from anyone in the least acquainted with his philosophy that Mach and Avenarius follow the line of Hume. Yet they are all careful *not to say a single word* about Humism and materialism on the question

* E. Lucka, "Das Erkenntnisproblem und Machs *Analyse der Empfindungen*", *Kantstudien*, VIII. Bd., S. 409.

of causality! Their confusion is utter. Let us give a few examples. Mr. P. Yushkevich preaches the "new" empirio-symbolism. The "sensations of blue, hard, etc.—these supposed data of pure experience" and "the creations supposedly of pure reason, such as a chimera or a chess game"—all these are "empirio-symbols". (*Studies*, *etc.*, p. 170.) "Knowledge is empirio-symbolic, and as it develops, leads to empirio-symbols of an ever greater degree of symbolisation.... The so-called laws of nature ... are such empirio-symbols..." (ibid.). "The so-called true reality, being in itself, is that infinite [a terribly learned fellow, this Mr. Yushkevich]* ultimate system of symbols to which our knowledge is striving" (188). "The stream of experience ... which lies at the foundation of our knowledge is ... irrational ... illogical" (187, 194). Energy "is just as little a thing, a substance, as time, space, mass and the other fundamental concepts of science: energy is a constancy, an empirio-symbol, like other empirio-symbols that for a time satisfy the fundamental human need of introducing reason, Logos, into the irrational stream of experience" (209).

Clad like a harlequin in a garish motley of shreds of the "latest" terminology, there stands before us a subjective idealist, for whom the external world, nature and its laws are all symbols of our knowledge. The stream of experience is devoid of reason, order and law: our knowledge brings reason into it. The celestial bodies are symbols of human knowledge, and so is the earth. If science teaches us that the earth existed long before it was possible for man and organic matter to have appeared, we, you see, have changed all that! *We* introduce order in the motion of the planets, it is a product of our knowledge. And sensing that human reason is being inflated by such a philosophy into the author and founder of nature, Mr. Yushkevich puts alongside reason the word *Logos*, that is, reason in the abstract, not reason, but Reason, not a function of the human brain, but something existing prior to any brain, something divine. The last word of "recent positivism" is that old formula of fideism which Feuerbach had already exposed.

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* The exclamation is provoked by the fact that Yushkevich here uses the foreign word *infinite* with a Russian ending.—*Tr.*

Let us take A. Bogdanov. In 1899, when he was still a semi-materialist and had only just begun to go astray under the influence of a very great chemist and very muddled philosopher, Wilhelm Ostwald, he wrote: "The universal causal connection of phenomena is the last and best child of human knowledge; it is the universal law, the highest of those laws which, to express it in the words of a philosopher, human reason dictates to nature" (*Fundamental Elements*, *etc.*, p. 41).

Allah alone knows from what source Bogdanov took this reference. But the fact is that "the words of a philosopher" trustingly repeated by the "Marxist"—are the words of *Kant*. An unpleasant event! And all the more unpleasant in that it cannot even be explained by the "mere" influence of Ostwald.

In 1904, having already managed to discard both natural-scientific materialism and Ostwald, Bogdanov wrote: "... Modern positivism regards the law of causality only as a means of cognitively connecting phenomena into a continuous series, only as a form of co-ordinating experience" (*From the Psychology of Society*, p. 207). Bogdanov either did not know, or would not admit, that this modern positivism is agnosticism and that it denies the objective necessity of nature, which existed prior to, and apart from, all "knowledge" and all human beings. He accepted on faith from the German professors what they called "modern positivism". Finally, in 1905, having passed through all the previous stages and the stage of empirio-criticism, and being already in the stage of "empirio-monism", Bogdanov wrote: "Laws do not belong to the sphere of experience ... they are not given in it, but are created by thought as a means of organising experience, of harmoniously co-ordinating it into a symmetrical whole" (*Empirio-monism*, I, 40). "Laws are abstractions of knowledge; and physical laws possess physical properties just as little as psychological laws possess psychical properties" (ibid.).

And so, the law that winter succeeds autumn and the spring winter is not given us in experience but is created by thought as a means of organising, harmonising, co-ordinating ... what with what, Comrade Bogdanov?

"Empirio-monism is possible only because knowledge actively harmonises experience, eliminating its infinite contradictions, creating for it universal organising forms, replacing the primeval chaotic world of elements by a derivative, ordered world of relations" (57). That is not true. The idea that knowledge can "create" universal forms, replace the primeval chaos by order, etc., is the idea of idealist philosophy. The world is matter moving in conformity to law, and our knowledge, being the highest product of nature, is in a position only to *reflect* this conformity to law.

To sum up, our Machists, blindly believing the "recent" reactionary professors; repeat the mistakes of Kantian and Humean agnosticism on the question of causality and fail to notice that these doctrines are in absolute contradiction to Marxism, i.e., materialism, and that they themselves are rolling down an inclined plane towards idealism.

4. THE "PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF THOUGHT" AND THE PROBLEM OF THE "UNITY OF THE WORLD"

"The principle of 'the least expenditure of energy', which Mach, Avenarius and many others made the basis of the theory of knowledge, is ... unquestionably a 'Marxist' tendency in epistemology."

So Bazarov asserts in the *Studies*, *etc.*, page 69.

There is "economy" in Marx, there is "economy" in Mach. But is it indeed "unquestionable" that there is even a shadow of resemblance between the two?

Avenarius' work, *Philosophie als Denken der Welt Gemäss dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses* (1876), as we have seen, applies this "principle" in such a way that in the name of "economy of thought" *sensation alone* is declared to exist. Both causality and "substance" (a word which the professorial gentlemen, "for the sake of importance", prefer to the clearer and more exact word: matter) are declared "eliminated" on the same plea of economy. Thus we get sensation without matter and thought without brain. This utter nonsense is an attempt to smuggle in *subjective idealism* under a new guise. That *such* precisely is the character of this basic work on the celebrated "economy of thought" is, as

we have seen, *generally acknowledged* in philosophical literature. That our Machists did not notice the subjective idealism under the "new" flag is a fact belonging to the realm of curiosities.

In the *Analysis of Sensations* (Russ. trans., p. 49), Mach refers incidentally to his work of 1872 on this question. And this work, as we have seen, propounds the standpoint of *pure* subjectivism and reduces the world to sensations. Thus, both the fundamental works which introduced this famous "principle" into philosophy expound idealism! What is the reason for this? The reason is that if the principle of economy of thought is really made "*the basis of* the theory of knowledge", it can lead to *nothing but* subjective idealism. That it is more "economical" to "think" that only I and my sensations exist is unquestionable, provided we want to introduce such an absurd conception into *epistemology*.

Is it "more economical" to "think" of the atom as indivisible, or as composed of positive and negative electrons? Is it "more economical" to think of the Russian bourgeois revolution as being conducted by the liberals or as being conducted against the liberals? One has only to put the question in order to see the absurdity, the subjectivism of applying the category of "economy of thought" *here*. Human thought is "economical" when it *correctly* reflects objective truth, and the criterion of this correctness is practice, experiment and industry. Only by denying objective reality, i.e., by denying the *foundations* of Marxism, can one seriously speak of economy of thought in the theory of knowledge.

If we turn to Mach's later works, we shall find in them an *interpretation* of the celebrated principle which frequently amounts to its complete denial. For instance, in the *Wärmelehre* Mach returns to his favourite idea of "the economical nature" of science (2nd German edition, S. 366). But he at once adds that we engage in an activity not for the sake of the activity (366; repeated on 391): "the purpose of scientific activity is the fullest ... most tranquil ... picture possible of the world" (366). If this is the case, the "principle of economy" is banished not only from the basis of epistemology, but virtually from epistemology

generally. To say that the purpose of science is to present a true picture of the world (tranquillity is entirely beside the point here) means to repeat the materialist point of view. By saying so, one is admitting the objective reality of the world in relation to our knowledge, of the model in relation to the picture. To talk of *economy* of thought in *such* a connection is merely to use a clumsy and ridiculously pretentious *word* in place of the word "correctness". Mach is muddled here, as usual, and the Machists behold the muddle and worship it!

In *Knowledge and Error*, in the chapter entitled "Examples of Methods of Investigation", we read the following:

"The 'complete and simplest description' (Kirchhoff, 1874), the 'economical presentation of the factual' (Mach, 1872), the 'concordance of thinking and being and the mutual concordance of the processes of thought' (Grassmann, 1844) —all these, with slight variations, express one and the same thought."

Is this not a model of confusion? "Economy of thought", from which Mach in 1872 inferred that sensations *alone* exist (a point of view which he himself subsequently was obliged to acknowledge an idealist one), is declared to be *equivalent* to the purely materialist dictum of the mathematician Grassmann regarding the necessity of co-ordinating thinking and *being*, equivalent to the simplest *description* (of an *objective reality*, the existence of which it never occurred to Kirchhoff to doubt!).

Such an application of the principle of "economy of thought" is simply an example of Mach's curious philosophical waverings. And if such passages are set aside as curiosities or lapses, the idealist character of "the principle of the economy of thought" becomes unquestionable. For example, the Kantian Hönigswald, controverting the philosophy of Mach, *greets* his "principle of economy" as an *approach* to the "Kantian circle of ideas" (Dr. Richard Hönigswald, *Zur Kritik der Machschen Philosophie*, Berlin, 1903, S. 27). And, indeed, if we do not recognise the objective reality given us in our sensations, whence are we to derive the "principle of economy" if not from the subject? Sensations, of course, do not contain any "economy". Hence, thought gives us something which is not contained in sensations! Hence, the

"principle of economy" is not taken from experience (=sensations), but precedes all experience and, like a Kantian category, constitutes a logical condition of experience. Hönigswald quotes the following passage from the *Analysis of Sensations*: "We can from our bodily and spiritual stability infer the stability, the uniqueness of determination and the homogeneity of the processes of nature" (Russian translation, p. 281). And, indeed, the subjective-idealist character of such propositions and the kinship of Mach to Petzoldt, who has gone to the length of apriorism, cannot be doubted.

In connection with the "principle of the economy of thought", the idealist Wundt very aptly characterised Mach as "Kant turned inside out" (*Systematische Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1907, S. 128). Kant has *a priori* and experience, Mach has experience and *a priori*, for Mach's principle of the economy of thought is essentially apriorist (130). The connection (*Verknüpfung*) is either in things, as an "objective law of nature [and this Mach emphatically rejects], or else it is a subjective principle of description" (130). The principle of economy with Mach is subjective and *kommt wie aus der Pistole geschossen*—appears nobody knows whence—as a teleological principle which may have a diversity of meanings (131). As you see, experts in philosophical terminology are not as naïve as our Machists, who are blindly prepared to believe that a "new" term can eliminate the contrast between subjectivism and objectivism, between idealism and materialism.

Finally, let us turn to the English philosopher James Ward, who without circumlocution calls himself a spiritualist monist. He does not controvert Mach, but instead, as we shall see later, utilises the entire Machist trend in physics in his fight against materialism. And he definitely declares that with Mach "the criterion of simplicity ... is in the main subjective, not objective" (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 82).

That the principle of economy of thought as the basis of epistemology could please the German Kantians and English spiritualists will not seem strange after all that has been said above. That people who are desirous of being Marxists should link the political economy of the materialist Marx

with the epistemological economy of Mach is simply ludicrous.

It is appropriate here to say a few words about "the unity of the world". On this question Mr. P. Yushkevich strikingly exemplifies—for the thousandth time perhaps—the abysmal confusion created by our Machists. Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, replies to Dühring, who had deduced the unity of the world from the unity of thought, as follows: "The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved not by a few juggled phrases, but by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science" (S. 31).[60] Mr. Yushkevich cites this passage and retorts: "First of all it is not clear what is meant here by the assertion that 'the unity of the world consists in its materiality'" (op. cit., p. 52).

Charming, is it not? This individual undertakes publicly to prate about the philosophy of Marxism, and then declares that the most elementary propositions of materialism are "not clear" to him! Engels showed, using Dühring as an example, that any philosophy that claims to be consistent can deduce the unity of the world either from thought—in which case it is helpless against spiritualism and fideism (*Anti-Dühring*, S. 30), and its arguments inevitably become mere phrase-juggling—or from the objective reality which exists outside us, which in the theory of knowledge has long gone under the name of matter, and which is studied by natural science. It is useless to speak seriously to all individual to whom such a thing is "not clear", for he says it is "not clear" in order fraudulently to evade giving a genuine answer to Engels' clear materialist proposition. And, doing so, he talks pure Dühringian nonsense about "the cardinal postulate of the fundamental homogeneity and connection of being" (Yushkevich, op. cit., p. 51), about postulates as "propositions" of which "it would not be exact to say that they have been deduced from experience, since scientific experience is possible only because they are made the basis of investigation" (ibid.). This is nothing but twaddle, for if this individual had the slightest respect for the printed word he would detect the *idealist* character in general, and the *Kantian* character in particular of the idea that there can be postulates which are not taken from expe-

rience and without which experience is impossible. A jumble of words culled from diverse books and coupled with the obvious errors of the materialist Dietzgen—such is the "philosophy" of Mr. Yushkevich and his like.

Let us rather examine the arguments on the unity of the world expounded by a serious empirio-criticist, Joseph Petzoldt. Section 29, Vol. II, of his *Introduction* is entitled: "The Tendency to a Uniform (*einheitlich*) Conception of the Realm of Knowledge. The Postulate of the Unique Determination of All That Happens." Here are a few samples of his line of reasoning: "...Only in *unity* can one find that natural end beyond which no thought can go and in which, consequently, thought, if it takes into consideration all the facts of the given sphere, can reach quiescence" (79). "...It is beyond doubt that nature by no means always responds to the demand for *unity*, but it is equally beyond doubt that in many cases it today already satisfies the demand for *quiescence* and it must be held, in accordance with all our previous investigations, that nature in all probability will satisfy this demand in the future in all cases. Hence, it would be more correct to describe the actual soul behaviour as a striving for states of stability rather than as a striving for unity.... The principle of states of stability goes farther and deeper.... Haeckel's proposal to put the kingdom of the protista alongside the plant and animal kingdom is an untenable solution for it creates two new difficulties in place of the former one: while formerly only the boundary between plants and animals was doubtful, now it becomes impossible to demarcate the protista from both plants and animals.... Obviously, such a state is not final (*endgültig*). Such *ambiguity* of concepts must in one way or another be eliminated, if only, should there be no other means, by that of an agreement between the specialists, by a majority vote" (80-81).

Enough, I think? It is evident that the empirio-criticist Petzoldt is *not one whit* better than Dühring. But we must be fair even to an adversary; Petzoldt at least has sufficient scientific integrity to reject materialism as a philosophical trend *decisively* and *irrevocably* in all his works. At least, he does not humiliate himself to the extent of posing as a materialist and declaring that the most elementary distinction between the fundamental philosophical trends is "not clear".

5. SPACE AND TIME

Recognising the existence of objective reality, i.e., matter in motion, independently of our mind, materialism must also inevitably recognise the objective reality of time and space, in contrast above all to Kantianism, which in this question sides with idealism and regards time and space not as objective realities but as forms of human understanding. The basic difference between the two fundamental philosophical lines on this question too is quite clearly recognised by writers of the most diverse trends who are at all consistent thinkers. Let us begin with the materialists.

"Space and time," says Feuerbach, "are not mere forms of phenomena but essential conditions (*Wesensbedingungen*) ... of being" (*Werke*, II, 332). Regarding the sensible world we know through sensations as objective reality, Feuerbach naturally also rejects the phenomenalist (as Mach would call his own conception) or the agnostic (as Engels calls it) conception of space and time. Just as things or bodies are not mere phenomena, not complexes of sensations, but objective realities acting on our senses, so space and time are not mere forms of phenomena, but objectively real forms of being. There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move towards absolute truth and approach nearer and nearer to it. The mutability of human conceptions of space and time no more refutes the objective reality of space and time than the mutability of scientific knowledge of the structure and forms of matter in motion refutes the objective reality of the external world.

Engels, exposing the inconsistent and muddled materialist Dühring, catches him on the very point where he speaks of the change in the *idea* of time (a question beyond controversy for contemporary philosophers of any importance even of the *most diverse* philosophical trends) but *evades* a direct answer to the question: are space and time real or ideal, and are our relative ideas of space and time *approximations* to objectively real forms of being; or are they only products

of the developing, organising, harmonising, etc., human mind? This and this alone is the basic epistemological problem on which the truly fundamental philosophical trends are divided. Engels, in *Anti-Dühring*, says: "We are here not in the least concerned with what ideas change in Herr Dühring's head. The subject at issue is not the *idea* of time, but *real* time, which Herr Dühring cannot rid himself of so cheaply [i.e., by the use of such phrases as the mutability of our conceptions]" (*Anti-Dühring*, 5th German edition, S. 41).[61]

This would seem so clear that even the Yushkeviches should be able to grasp the essence of the matter. Engels sets up against; Dühring the proposition of the *reality*, i.e., objective reality, of time which is generally accepted by and obvious to every materialist, and says that *one cannot escape* a direct affirmation of denial of this proposition merely by talking of the change in the *ideas* of time and space. The point is not that Engels denies the necessity and scientific value of investigations into the change and development of our ideas of time and space, but that we should give a consistent answer to the epistemological question, viz., the question of the source and significance of all human knowledge. Any at all intelligent philosophical idealist—and Engels when he speaks of idealists has in mind the great consistent idealists of classical philosophy—will readily admit the development of our ideas of time and space; he would not cease to be an idealist for thinking, for example, that our developing ideas of time and space are approaching towards the absolute idea of time and space, and so forth. It is impossible to hold consistently to a standpoint in philosophy which is hostile to all forms of fideism and idealism if we do not definitely and resolutely recognise that our developing notions of time and space *reflect* an objectively real time and space; that here, too, as in general, they are approaching objective truth.

"The basic forms of all being," Engels admonishes Dühring, "are space and time, and being out of time is just as gross an absurdity as being out of space" (op. cit.).

Why was it necessary for Engels, in the first half of the quotation, to repeat Feuerbach almost literally and, in the second, to recall the struggle which Feuerbach fought

so successfully against the gross absurdities of theism? Because Dühring, as one sees from this same chapter of Engels', could not make his philosophy hang together without resorting now to the "final cause" of the world, now to the "initial impulse" (which is another expression for the concept; "God", Engels says). Dühring no doubt wanted to be a materialist and atheist no less sincerely than our Machists want to be Marxists, but he *was unable* consistently to develop the philosophical point of view that would really cut the ground from under idealist and theist nonsense. Since he did not recognise, or at least did not recognise clearly and distinctly (for he wavered and was muddled on this question), the objective reality of time and space, it was not accidental but inevitable that Dühring should slide down an inclined plane to "final causes" and "initial impulses", for he had deprived himself of the objective criterion which prevents one going beyond the bounds of time and space. If time and space are *only* concepts, man, who created them, is justified in *going beyond their bounds*, and bourgeois professors are justified in receiving salaries from reactionary governments for defending the legitimacy of going beyond these bounds, for directly or indirectly defending medieval "nonsense".

Engels showed Dühring that denial of the objective reality of time and space is theoretically philosophical confusion, while practically it is capitulation to, or impotence in face of, fideism.

Let us now take a look at the "teachings" of "recent positivism" on this subject. We read in Mach: "Space and time are well-ordered (*wohlgeordnete*) systems of series of sensations" (*Mechanics*, 3rd German edition, p. 498). This is obvious idealist nonsense, such as inevitably follows from the doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations. According to Mach, it is not man with his sensations that exists in space and time, but space and time that exist in man, that depend upon man and are generated by man. He feels that he is falling into idealism, and "resists" by making a host of reservations and, like Dühring, burying the question under lengthy disquisitions (see especially *Knowledge and Error*) on the mutability of our conceptions of space and time, their relativity, and so forth. But this does not save

him, and cannot save him, for one can really overcome the idealist position on this question only by recognising the objective reality of space and time. And this Mach will not do at any price. He constructs his epistemological theory of time and space on the principle of relativism, and that is all. In actual fact, such a construction can lead to nothing but subjective idealism, as we have already made clear when speaking of absolute and relative truth.

Resisting the idealist conclusions which inevitably follow from his premises, Mach argues against Kant and insists that our notion of space is derived from experience (*Knowledge and Error*, 2nd German edition, pp. 350, 385). But if objective reality is *not* given us in experience (as Mach teaches), such an objection to Kant does not in the least destroy the general position of agnosticism in the case *both* of Kant *and* of Mach. If our notion of space is taken from experience *without being* a reflection of objective reality outside us, Mach's theory remains idealistic. The existence of nature *in time*, measured in millions of years, *prior to* the appearance of man and human experience, shows how absurd this idealist theory is.

"In the physiological respect," writes Mach, "time and space are systems of sensations of orientation which together with sense-perceptions determine the discharge (*Auslösung*) of biologically purposive reactions of adaptation. In the physical respect, time and space are interdependencies of physical elements" (ibid., p. 434).

The relativist Mach confines himself to an examination of the *concept* of time in various relations! And like Dühring he gets nowhere. If "elements" are sensations, then the dependence of physical elements upon one another cannot exist outside of man, and could not have existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. If the sensations of time and space can give man a biologically purposive orientation, this can only be so on the condition that these sensations reflect an *objective reality* outside man: man could never have adapted himself biologically to the environment if his sensations had not given him an *objectively correct* idea of it. The theory of space and time is inseparably connected with the answer to the fundamental question of epistemology: are our sensations images of bodies and things, or are bodies

complexes of our sensations? Mach merely blunders about between the two answers.

In modern physics, he says, Newton's idea of absolute time and space prevails (pp. 442-44), of time and space as such. This idea seems "to us" senseless, Mach continues—apparently not suspecting the existence of materialists and of a materialist theory of knowledge. But *in practice*, he claims, this view was *harmless* (*unschädlich*, S. 442) and therefore for a long time escaped criticism.

This naïve remark regarding the harmlessness of the materialist view betrays Mach completely. Firstly, it is not true that for a "long time" the idealists did not criticise this view. Mach simply ignores the struggle between the idealist and materialist theories of knowledge on this question; he evades giving a plain and direct statement of these two views. Secondly, by recognising "the harmlessness" of the materialist views he contests, Mach thereby in fact admits their correctness. For if they were incorrect, how could they have remained harmless throughout the course of centuries? What has become of the criterion of practice with which Mach attempted to flirt? The materialist view of the objective reality of time and space can be "harmless" only because natural science *does not transcend* the bounds of time and space, the bounds of the material world, leaving this occupation to the professors of reactionary philosophy. Such "harmlessness" is equivalent to correctness.

It is Mach's idealist view of space and time that is "harmful", for, in the first place, it opens the door for fideism and, in the second place, it *seduces* Mach himself into drawing reactionary conclusions. For instance, in 1872 Mach wrote that "one does not have to conceive of the chemical elements in a space of three dimensions" (*Erhaltung der Arbeit*, S. 29, repeated on S. 55). To do so would be "to impose an unnecessary restriction upon ourselves. There is no more necessity to think of what is mere thought (*das bloss Gedachte*) spatially, that is to say, in relation to the visible and tangible, than there is to think of it in a definite pitch" (27). "The reason why a satisfactory theory of electricity has not yet been established is perhaps because we have invariably wanted to explain electrical phenomena in terms of molecular processes in a three-dimensional space" (30).

The argument from the standpoint of the straightforward and unmuddled Machism which Mach openly advocated in 1872 is quite indisputable: if molecules, atoms, in a word, chemical elements, cannot be perceived, they are "mere thought" (*das bloss Gedachte*). If so, and if space and time have no objective reality, it is clear that it is not essential to think of atoms *spatially!* Let physics and chemistry "restrict themselves" to a three-dimensional space in which matter moves; for the explanation of electricity, however, we may seek its elements in a space which is *not* three-dimensional!

That our Machists should circumspectly avoid all reference to this absurdity of Mach's, although he repeats it in 1906 (*Knowledge and Error*, 2nd ed., p. 418), is understandable, for otherwise they would have to raise the question of the idealist and materialist views of space point-blank, without evasions and attempts to "reconcile" these antagonistic positions. It is likewise understandable that at that time, in the seventies, when Mach was still entirely unknown and when "orthodox physicists" even refused to publish his articles, one of the chiefs of the immanentist school, Anton von Leclair, should *eagerly* have seized upon *precisely this* argument of Mach's as a noteworthy renunciation of materialism and recognition of idealism! For at that time Leclair had not yet invented, or had not yet borrowed from Schuppe and Schubert-Soldern, or J. Rehmke, the "new" sobriquet, "immanentist school", but *plainly* called himself a *critical idealist*.* This unequivocal advocate of fideism, who openly preached it in his philosophical works, immediately proclaimed Mach a great philosopher because of these statements, a "revolutionary in the best sense of the word" (S. 252); and he was absolutely right. Mach's argument amounts to deserting natural science for fideism. Natural science was seeking, both in 1872 and in 1906, is now seeking, and is discovering—at least *it is groping its way towards*—the atom of electricity, the electron, in three-dimensional space. Science does not doubt that the sub-

* Anton von Leclair, *Der Realismus der modernen Naturwissenschaft im Lichte der von Berkeley und Kant angebahnten Erkenntniskritik*, Prag, 1879.

stance it is investigating exists in three-dimensional space and, hence, that the particles of that substance, although they be so small that we cannot see them, must also "necessarily" exist in this three dimensional space. Since 1872, during the course of three decades of immense, dazzling scientific successes in the problem of the structure of matter, the materialist view of space and time has remained "harmless", i.e., compatible, as heretofore, with natural science, while the contrary view of Mach and Co. was a "harmful" capitulation to the position of fideism.

In his *Mechanics*, Mach defends the mathematicians who are investigating the problem of conceivable spaces with *n* dimensions; he defends them against the charge of drawing "preposterous" conclusions from their investigations. The defence is absolutely and undoubtedly just, but see the *epistemological* position Mach takes up in this defence. Recent mathematics, Mach says, has raised the very important and useful question of a space of *n* dimensions as a conceivable space; nevertheless, only three-dimensional space remains the "real case" (*ein wirklicher Fall*) (3rd German edition, pp. 483-85). In vain, therefore, "many theologians, who experience difficulty in deciding where to place hell", as well as the spiritualists, have sought to take advantage of the fourth dimension (ibid.).

Very good! Mach refuses to join company with the theologians and the spiritualists. But how does he dissociate himself from them in his *theory of knowledge*? By stating that three-dimensional space alone is *real*! But what sort of defence is this against the theologians and their like when you deny objective reality to space and time? Why, it comes to this, that when you have to dissociate yourself from the spiritualists you resort to tacit borrowings from the materialists. For the materialists, by recognising the real world, the matter we perceive, as an *objective* reality, have the right to conclude from this that all human concepts, whatever their purpose, that go beyond the bounds of time and space are *unreal*. But you Machist gentlemen deny the objective validity of "reality" when you combat materialism, yet secretly introduce it again when you have to combat an idealism that is consistent, fearless and frank throughout! If in the *relative* conception of time and space there is

nothing but relativity, if there is no objective reality (i.e., reality independent of man and mankind) reflected by these relative concepts, why should mankind, why should the majority of mankind, not be entitled to conceive of beings outside time and space? If Mach is entitled to seek atoms of electricity, or atoms in general, *outside* three-dimensional space, why should the majority of mankind not be entitled to seek the atoms, or foundations of morality, *outside* three-dimensional space?

"There has never been an accoucheur who has helped a delivery by means of the fourth dimension," Mach goes on to say.

An excellent argument—but only for those who regard the criterion of practice as a confirmation of the *objective* truth and *objective* reality of our perceptual world. If our sensations give us an objectively true image of the external world, existing independently of us, the argument based on the accoucheur, on human practice generally, is valid. But if so, Machism as a philosophical trend is not valid.

"I hope, however," Mach continues, referring to his work of 1872, "that nobody will defend ghost-stories (*die Kosten einer Spukgeschichte bestreiten*) with the help of what I have said and written on this subject."

One cannot hope that Napoleon did not die on May 5, 1821. One cannot hope that Machism will not be used in the service of "ghost-stories" when it has already served and continues to serve the immanentists!

And not only the immanentists, as we shall see later. Philosophical idealism is nothing but a disguised and embellished ghost-story. Look at the French and English representatives of empirio-criticism, who are less pretentious than the German representatives of this philosophical trend. Poincaré says that the concepts space and time are relative and that it follows (for non-materialists "it follows" indeed) that "nature does not impose them upon us, but we impose them upon nature, for we find them convenient" (op. cit., p. 6). Does this not justify the exultation of the German Kantians? Does this not confirm Engels' statement that consistent philosophical doctrines must take either nature or human thought as primary?

The views of the English Machist Karl Pearson are quite definite. He says: "Of time as of space we cannot assert a real existence: it is not in things but in our mode of perceiving them" (op. cit., p. 184). This is idealism, pure and simple. "Like space, it [time] appears to us as one of the plans on which that great sorting-machine, the human perceptive faculty, arranges its material" (ibid.). Pearson's final conclusion, expounded as usual in clear and precise theses, is as follows: "Space and time are not realities of the phenomenal world, but the modes under which we perceive things apart. They are not infinitely large nor infinitely divisible, but are essentially limited by the contents of our perception" (p. 191, summary of Chapter V on Space and Time).

This conscientious and honest opponent of materialism, with whom, we repeat, Mach frequently expresses his complete agreement and who in his turn speaks openly of his agreement with Mach, invents no special signboard for his philosophy, and without the least ambiguity names Hume and Kant as the classics from whom he derives his philosophical trend! (P. 192.)

And while in Russia there are naïve people who believe that Machism has provided a "new" solution of the problem of space and time, in English writings we find that natural scientists, on the one hand, and idealist philosophers, on the other, at once took up a definite position in regard to the Machist Karl Pearson. Here, for example, is the opinion of Lloyd Morgan, a biologist: "Physics as such accepts the phenomenal world as external to, and for its purposes independent of, the mind of the investigator.... He [Professor Pearson] is forced to a position which is largely idealistic...."* "Physics, as a science, is wise, I take it, in dealing with space and time in frankly objective terms, and I think the biologist may still discuss the distribution of organisms in space, and the geologist their distribution in time, without pausing to remind their readers that after all they are only dealing with sense-impressions, and stored sense-impressions, and certain forms of perception.... All this may be true enough, but it is out of place either in physics

* *Natural Science*,[62] Vol. I, 1892, p. 300.

or biology" (p. 304) Lloyd Morgan is a representative of the kind of agnosticism that Engels called "shamefaced materialism", and however "conciliatory" the tendencies of such a philosophy are, nevertheless it proved impossible to reconcile Pearson's views with natural science. With Pearson "the mind is first in space, and then space in it," says another critic.* "There can be no doubt," retorted a defender of Pearson, R. J. Ryle, "that the doctrine as to the nature of space and time which is associated with the name of Kant is the most important positive addition which has been made to the idealistic theory of human knowledge since the days of Bishop Berkeley; and it is one of the noteworthy features of the *Grammar of Science* that here, perhaps for the first time in the writings of English men of science, we find at once a full recognition of the general truth of Kant's doctrine, a short but clear exposition of it...."**

Thus we find that in England the Machists themselves, their opponents among the natural scientists, and their adherents among the professional philosophers *have not even a shadow of doubt* as to the idealistic character of Mach's doctrine of time and space. Only some Russian writers, would-be Marxists, "failed to notice" it.

"Many of Engels' particular views," V. Bazarov, for instance, writes in the *Studies* (p. 67), "as for example, his conception of 'pure' space and time, are now obsolete."

Indeed! The views of the materialist Engels are now obsolete, but the views of the idealist Pearson and the muddled idealist Mach are very modern! The most curious thing of all is that Bazarov does not even doubt that views of space and time, viz., the recognition or denial of their objective reality, can be classed among "*particular views*", in contradistinction to the "*starting-point of the world outlook*" spoken of by this author in his next sentence. Here you have a glaring example of that "eclectic pauper's broth" of which Engels used to speak in reference to German philosophy of the eighties. For to contrast the "starting-point" of Marx's and Engels' materialist world outlook

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* J. M. Bentley, *The Philosophical Review*,[63] Vol. VI, 5, Sept. 1897, p. 523.

** R. J. Ryle, *Natural Science*, Aug. 1892, p. 454.

with their "particular view" of the objective reality of time and space is as utterly nonsensical as if you were to contrast the "starting-point" of Marx's economic theory with his "particular view" of surplus-value. To sever Engels' doctrine of the objective reality of time and space from his doctrine of the transformation of "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us", from his recognition of objective and absolute truth: the objective reality given us in our sensations, and from his recognition of objective law, causality and necessity in nature—is to reduce an integral philosophy to a hotchpotch. Like all the Machists, Bazarov erred in confusing the mutability of human conceptions of time and space, their exclusively relative character, with the immutability of the fact that man and nature exist only in time and space, and that beings outside time and space, as invented by the priests and maintained by the imagination of the ignorant and downtrodden mass of humanity, are disordered fantasies, the artifices of philosophical idealism, rotten products of a rotten social system. The teachings of science on the structure of matter, on the chemical composition of food, on the atom and the electron, may and constantly do become obsolete, but the truth that man is unable to subsist on ideas and to beget children by Platonic love alone never becomes obsolete. And a philosophy that denies the objective reality of time and space is as absurd, as intrinsically rotten and false as is the denial of these latter truths. The artifices of the idealists and the agnostics are, taken as a whole, as hypocritical as the Pharisees' sermons on Platonic love!

In order to illustrate this distinction between the relativity of our concepts of time and space and the *absolute* opposition, within the bounds of epistemology, between the materialist and idealist lines on this question, I shall further quote a characteristic passage from a very old and very pure "empirio-criticist", namely, the Humean Schulze-Aenesidemus, who wrote in 1792:

"If we infer 'things outside us' from ideas and thoughts within us, [then] space and time are something real and actually existing outside us, for the existence of bodies can be conceived only in an existing (*vorhandenen*) space, and the existence of changes only in an existing time" (op. cit., S. 100).

Exactly! While firmly rejecting materialism, and even the slightest concession to materialism, Schulze, a follower of Hume, described in 1792 the relation between the question of space and time and the question of an objective reality outside us just as the materialist Engels described it in 1894 (Engels' last preface to *Anti-Dühring* is dated May 23, 1894). This does not mean that during these hundred years our ideas of time and space have undergone no change, or that a vast amount of new material has not been gathered *on the development* of these ideas (material to which both Voroshilov-Chernov and Voroshilov-Valentinov refer as supposedly refuting Engels). It does mean that the *relation between* materialism and agnosticism, as the fundamental lines in philosophy, could not have changed, in spite of all the "new" names paraded by our Machists.

And Bogdanov too contributes absolutely nothing but "new" names to the old philosophy of idealism and agnosticism. When he repeats the arguments of Hering and Mach on the difference between physiological and geometrical space, or between perceptual and abstract space (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. I, p. 26), he is repeating in full the mistake of Dühring. It is one thing how, with the help of various sense-organs, man perceives space, and how, in the course of a long historical development, abstract ideas of space are derived from these perceptions; it is an entirely different thing whether there is an objective reality independent of mankind which corresponds to these perceptions and conceptions of mankind. This latter question, although it is the only philosophical question, Bogdanov "did not notice" beneath the mass of detailed investigations on the former question, and he was therefore unable clearly to counterpose Engels' materialism to Mach's confusion.

Time, like space, is "a form of social co-ordination of the experiences of different people", the "objectivity" of both lies in their "general significance" (ibid., p. 34).

This is absolutely false. Religion also has general significance as expressing the social co-ordination of the experience of the greater part of humanity. But there is no objective reality that corresponds to the teachings of religion, for example, on the past of the earth and the creation of the world. There *is* an objective reality that *corresponds*

to the teaching of science (although the latter is as relative at every stage in the development of science as every stage in the development of religion is relative) that the earth existed *prior to* any society, *prior to* man, *prior to* organic matter, and that it has existed for a *definite* time and in a *definite* space in relation to the other planets. According to Bogdanov, the various forms of space and time adapt themselves to man's experience and his perceptive faculty. As a matter of fact, just the reverse is true: our "experience" and our knowledge adapt themselves more and more to *objective* space and time, and *reflect* them ever more correctly and profoundly.

6. FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

On pages 140-41 of the *Studies*, A. Lunacharsky quotes the argument given by Engels in *Anti-Dühring* on this question and fully endorses the "remarkably precise and apt" statement of the problem made by Engels in that "wonderful page"* of the work mentioned.

There is, indeed, much that is wonderful here. And even more "wonderful" is the fact that neither Lunacharsky, nor the whole crowd of other Machist would-be Marxists, "noticed" the epistemological significance of Engels' discussion of freedom and necessity. They read it and they copied it, but they could not make head or tail of it.

Engels says: "Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity. 'Necessity is *blind* only *insofar as it is not understood*.' Freedom does not consist in an imaginary independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves—two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but

* Lunacharsky says: "...a wonderful page of religious economics. I say this at the risk of provoking a smile from the non-religious reader". However good your intentions may be, Comrade Lunacharsky, it is not a smile, but disgust that your flirtation with religion provokes.[64]

not in reality. Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. Therefore the *freer* a man's judgement is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the *necessity* with which the content of this judgement will be determined.... Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity (*Naturnotwendigkeiten*)." (5th German edition, pp. 112-13.)[65]

Let us examine the epistemological promises upon which this argument is based.

Firstly, Engels at the very outset of his argument recognises laws of nature, laws of external nature, the necessity of nature—i.e., all that Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co. characterise as "metaphysics". If Lunacharsky had really wanted to reflect on Engels' "wonderful" argument he could not have helped noticing the fundamental difference between the materialist theory of knowledge and agnosticism and idealism, which deny law in nature or declare it to be only "logical", etc., etc.

Secondly, Engels does not attempt to contrive "definitions" of freedom and necessity, the kind of scholastic definitions with which the reactionary professors (like Avenarius) and their disciples (like Bogdanov) are most concerned. Engels takes the knowledge and will of man, on the one hand, and the necessity of nature, on the other, and instead of giving any definitions, simply says that the necessity of nature is primary, and human will and mind secondary. The latter must necessarily and inevitably adapt themselves to the former. Engels regards this as so obvious that he does not waste words explaining his view. It needed the Russian Machists to *complain* of *Engels*' general definition of materialism (that nature is primary and mind secondary; remember Bogdanov's "perplexity" on this point!), and at the same time to regard *one of the particular applications* by Engels of this general and fundamental definition as "wonderful" and "remarkably apt"!

Thirdly, Engels does not doubt the existence of "blind necessity". He admits the existence of a necessity *unknown* to man. This is quite obvious from the passage just quoted. But how, from the standpoint of the Machists, can man *know*

of the existence of something that he *does not know*? How can he know of the existence of an unknown necessity? Is this not "mysticism", "metaphysics", the admission of "fetishes" and "idols", is it not the "Kantian unknowable thing-in-itself"? Had the Machists given the matter any thought they could not have failed to observe the *complete identity* between Engels' argument on the knowability of the objective nature of things and on the transformation of "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us", on the one hand, and his argument on a blind, unknown necessity, on the other. The development of consciousness in each human individual and the development of the collective knowledge of humanity as a whole presents us at every step with examples of the transformation of the unknown "thing-in-itself" into the known "thing-for-us", of the transformation of blind, unknown necessity, "necessity-in-itself", into the known "necessity-for-us". Epistemologically, there is no difference whatover between these two transformations, for the basic point of view in both cases is the same, viz., materialistic, the recognition of the objective reality of the external world and of the laws of external nature, and of the fact that both this world and these laws are fully knowable to man but can never be known to him *with finality*. We do not know the necessity of nature in the phenomena of the weather, and to that extent we are inevitably slaves of the weather. But while we *do not know* this necessity, *we know* that it exists. Whence this knowledge? From the very source whence comes the knowledge that thinks exist outside our mind and independently of it, namely, from the development of our knowledge, which provides millions of examples to every individual of knowledge replacing ignorance when an object acts upon our sense-organs, and conversely of ignorance replacing knowledge when the possibility of such action is eliminated.

Fourthly, in the above-mentioned argument Engels plainly employs the *salto vitale* method in philosophy, that is to say, he makes a *leap* from theory to practice. Not a single one of the learned (and stupid) professors of philosophy, in whose footsteps our Machists follow, would even permit himself to make such a leap, for this would be a disgraceful thing for a devotee of "pure science" to do. For them the

theory of knowledge, which demands the cunning concoction of "definitions", is one thing, while practice is another. For Engels all living human practice permeates the theory of knowledge itself and provides an *objective* criterion of truth. For until we know a law of nature, it, existing and acting independently of and outside our mind, makes us slaves of "blind necessity". But once we come to know this law, which acts (as Marx repeated a thousand times) *independently* of our will and our mind, we become the masters of nature. The mastery of nature manifested in human practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection within the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, and is proof of the fact that this reflection (within the limits of what is revealed by practice) is objective, absolute, eternal truth.

What is the result? Every step in Engels' argument, literally almost every phrase, every proposition, is constructed entirely and exclusively upon the epistemology of dialectical materialism, upon premises which stand out in striking contrast to the Machist nonsense about bodies being complexes of sensations, about "elements", "the coincidence of sense-perceptions with the reality that exists outside us", etc., etc., etc. Without being in the least perturbed by this, the Machists abandon materialism and repeat (*à la* Berman) threadbare banalities about dialectics, and at the same time welcome with open arms *one* of the applications of dialectical materialism! They have taken their philosophy from an eclectic pauper's broth and are continuing to offer this hotchpotch to the reader. They take a bit of agnosticism and a morsel of idealism from Mach, add to it a bit of dialectical materialism from Marx, and call this hash a *development* of Marxism. They imagine that if Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt, and all the other authorities of theirs have not the slightest inkling of how Hegel and Marx solved the problem (of freedom and necessity), this is purely accidental: why, it was simply because they overlooked a certain page in a certain book, and not because these "authorities" were and are utter ignoramuses on the subject of the *real* progress made by philosophy in the nineteenth century, and because they were and are philosophical obscurantists.

Here is the argument of one such obscurantist, the philosophy professor-in-ordinary at the University of Vienna, Ernst Mach:

"The correctness of the position of determinism or indeterminism cannot be demonstrated. Only a perfect science or a demonstrably impossible science could decide this question. It is a matter of the presuppositions which we bring (*man heranbringt*) to the consideration of things, depending upon whether we ascribe to previous successes or failures of the investigation a greater or lesser subjective weight (*subjektives Gewicht*). But during the investigation every thinker is of necessity a theoretical determinist" (*Knowledge and Error*, 2nd German edition, pp. 282-83).

Is this not obscurantism, when pure theory is carefully partitioned off from practice; when determinism is confined to the field of "investigation", while in the field of morality, social activity and all fields other than "investigation" the question is left to a "subjective" estimate? In my workroom, says the learned pedant, I am a determinist; but that the philosopher should seek to obtain an integral conception of the world based on determinism, embracing both theory and practice—of that there is no mention. Mach utters banalities because on the theoretical problem of freedom and necessity he is entirely at sea.

"...Every new discovery discloses the defects of our knowledge, reveals a residue of dependencies hitherto unheeded..." (283). Excellent! And is this "residue" the "thing-in-itself", which our knowledge reflects ever more deeply? Not at all: "...Thus, he also who in theory defends extreme determinism, must nevertheless in practice remain an indeterminist..." (283). And so things have been amicably divided*: theory for the professors, practice for the theologians! Or: objectivism (i.e., "shamefaced" materialism) in theory and the "subjective method in sociology"[66] in practice. No wonder the Russian ideologists of philistinism, the Narodniks, from Lesevich to Chernov, sympathise with this banal philosophy. But it is very sad that would-be Marx-

* Mach in the *Mechanics* says: "Religious opinions are people's *strictly private affair* as long as they do not try to impose them on others and do not apply them to things which belong to another sphere" (French translation, p. 434).

ists have been captivated by such nonsense and are embarrassedly covering up the more absurd of Mach's conclusions.

But on the question of the will Mach is not content with confusion and half-hearted agnosticism: he goes much further. "...Our sensation of hunger," we read in the *Mechanics*, "is not so essentially different from the affinity of sulphuric acid for zinc, and our will is not so very different from the pressure of the stone on its support.... We shall thus find ourselves [that is, if we hold such a view[nearer to nature without it being necessary to resolve ourselves into an incomprehensible nebula of atoms, or to resolve nature into a system of phantoms" (French translation, p. 434). Thus there is no need for materialism ("nebula of atoms" or electrons, i.e., the recognition of the objective reality of the material world), there is no need for an idealism which would recognise the world as "the other being" of spirit; but there is possible an idealism which recognises the world as *will*! We are superior not only to materialism, but also to the idealism of a Hegel; but we are not averse to coquetting with an idealism like Schopenhauer's! Our Machists, who assume an air of injured innocence at every reminder of Mach's kinship to philosophical idealism, preferred to keep silent on this delicate question too. Yet it is difficult to find in philosophical writings an exposition of Mach's views which does not mention his tendency towards *Willensmetaphysik*, i.e., voluntaristic idealism. This was pointed out by J. Baumann,* and in replying to him the Machist Kleinpeter does not take exception to this point, but declares that Mach is, of course, "nearer to Kant and Berkeley than to the metaphysical empiricism prevailing in science" (i.e., instinctive materialism; ibid., Bd. 6, S. 87). This is also pointed out by E. Becher, who remarks that if Mach in some places advocates voluntaristic metaphysics, and in others renounces it, it only testifies to the arbitrariness of his terminology; in fact, Mach's kinship to voluntarist metaphysics is beyond doubt.** Lucka, too, admits

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* *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, 1898, II, Bd. IV, S. 63, article on Mach's philosophical views.

** Erich Becher, "The Philosophical Views of Ernst Mach", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XIV, 5, 1905, pp. 536, 546, 547, 548.

the admixture of this metaphysics (i.e., idealism) to "phenominalism" (i.e., agnosticism).* W. Wundt also points this out.** That Mach is a phenomenalist who is "not averse to voluntaristic idealism" is noted also in Ueberweg-Heinze's textbook on the history of modern philosophy.***

In short, Mach's eclecticism and his tendency to idealism are clear to everyone except perhaps the Russian Machists.

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* E. Lucka, "Das Erkenntnisproblem und Machs *Analyse der Empfindungen*", *Kantstudien*, Bd. VIII, 1903, S. 400.

** *Systematische Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1907, S. 131.

*** *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. IV, 9. Aufl., Berlin, 1903, S. 250.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS AS COMRADES-IN-ARMS AND SUCCESSORS OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

So far we have examined empirio-criticism taken by itself. We must now examine it in its historical development and in its connection and relation with other philosophical trends. First comes the question of the relation of Mach and Avenarius to Kant.

1. THE CRITICISM OF KANTIANISM FROM THE LEFT AND FROM THE RIGHT

Both Mach and Avenarius began their philosophical careers in the seventies, when the fashionable cry in German professorial circles was "Back to Kant!" And, indeed, both founders of empirio-criticism in their philosophical development started from Kant. "His [Kant's] critical idealism," says Mach, "was, as I acknowledge with the deepest gratitude, the starting-point of all my critical thought. But I found it impossible to remain faithful to it. Very soon I began to return to the views of Berkeley ... [and then I arrived at views akin to those of Hume.... And even today I cannot help regarding Berkeley and Hume as far more consistent thinkers than Kant" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 292).

Thus Mach quite definitely admits that having begun with Kant he soon followed the line of Berkeley and Hume. Let us turn to Avenarius.

In his *Prolegomena zu einer "Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"* (1876), Avenarius already in the foreword states that the words "Critique of Pure Experience" are indicative of his attitude towards Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", and "of course, of an antagonistic attitude" towards Kant (1876 ed., p. iv). In what does Avenarius' antagonism to Kant consist? In the fact that Kant, in Avenarius' opinion, had not sufficiently "purified experience". It is with this "purification of experience" that Avenarius deals in his *Prolegomena* (§§ 56, 72 and many other places). Of what does Avenarius "purify" the Kantian doctrine of experience? In the first place, of apriorism. In § 56 he says: "The question as to whether the superfluous '*a priori* conceptions of reason' should and could be eliminated from the content of experience and thereby *pure experience par excellence* established is, as far as I know, raised here, as such, for the first time." We have already seen that Avenarius in this way "purified" Kantianism of the recognition of necessity and causality.

Secondly, he purifies Kantianism of the assumption of substance (§ 95), i.e., the thing-in-itself, which, in Avenarius' opinion, "is not given in the stuff of actual experience but is imported into it by thought".

We shall presently see that Avenarius' definition of his philosophical line entirely coincides with that of Mach, differing only in pretentiousness of formulation. But we must first note that Avenarius is telling a *plain untruth* when he asserts that it was he who in 1876 *for the first time* raised the question of "purifying experience", i.e., of purifying the Kantian doctrine of apriorism and the assumption of the thing-in-itself. As a matter of fact, the development of German classical philosophy immediately after Kant gave rise to a criticism of Kantianism exactly *along the very line* followed by Avenarius. This line is represented in German classical philosophy by Schulze-Aenesidemus, an adherent of Humean agnosticism, and by J. G. Fichte, an adherent of Berkeleianism, i.e., of subjective idealism. In 1792 Schulze-Aenesidemus criticised Kant for *this very* recognition of apriorism (op. cit., S. 56, 141, etc.) and of the thing-in-itself. We sceptics, or followers of Hume, says Schulze, reject the thing-in-itself as being "beyond the bounds of all experience" (S. 57). We reject *objective knowledge* (25);

we deny that space and time really exist outside us (100); we reject the presence in our experience of necessity (112), causality, force, etc. (113). One cannot attribute to them any "reality outside our conceptions" (114). Kant proves apriority "dogmatically", saying that since we cannot think in any other way there is therefore an *a priori* law of thought. "This argument," Schulze replies to Kant, "has long been utilised in philosophy to prove the objective nature of what lies outside our ideas" (141). Arguing thus, we may attribute causality to things-in-themselves (142). "Experience never tells us (*wir erfahren niemals*) that the action on us of objective things produces ideas", and Kant by no means proved that "this something (which lies outside our reason) must be regarded as a thing-in-itself, distinct from our sensation (*Gemüt*). But sensation also may be thought of as the *sole* basis of all our knowledge" (265). The Kantian critique of pure reason "bases its argument on the proposition that every act of cognition begins with the action of objective things on our organs of sensation (*Gemüt*), but it afterwards disputes the truth and reality of this proposition" (266). Kant in no way refuted the idealist Berkeley (268-72).

It is evident from this that the Humean Schulze rejects Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself as an inconsistent concession to materialism, i.e., to the "dogmatic" assertion that in our sensations we are given objective reality, or, in other words, that our ideas are caused by the action of objective things (independent of our mind) on our sense-organs. The agnostic Schulze reproaches the agnostic Kant on the grounds that the latter's assumption of the thing-in-itself contradicts agnosticism and leads to materialism. In the same way, but even more vigorously, Kant is criticised by the subjective idealist Fichte, who maintains that Kant's assumption of the thing-in-itself independent of the *self* is "*realism*" (*Werke*, I, S. 483), and that Kant makes "no clear" distinction between "realism" and "idealism". Fichte sees a crying inconsistency of Kant and the Kantians in the fact that they admit the thing-in-itself as the "basis of objective reality" (480), thus coming into contradiction with critical idealism. "With you," exclaims Fichte, addressing the realist expositors of Kant, "the earth rests on the

great elephant, and the great elephant rests on the earth. Your thing-in-itself, which is only thought, acts on the *self*!" (483).

Thus Avenarius was profoundly mistaken in imagining that he "for the first time" undertook a "purification of the experience" of Kant from apriorism and from the thing-in-itself and that he was thereby giving rise to a "new" trend in philosophy. In reality he was continuing the *old* line of Hume and Berkeley, Schulze-Aenesidemus and J. G. Fichte. Avenarius imagined that he was "purifying experience" in general. In reality he was only *purifying agnosticism of Kantianism*. He fought not against the agnosticism of Kant (agnosticism is a denial of the objective reality given in sensation), but for a *purer agnosticism*, for the elimination of Kant's assumption, which is contradictory to agnosticism, that there is a thing-in-itself, albeit unknowable, noumenal and other-sided, that there is necessity and causality, albeit *a priori*, given in our understanding, and not in objective reality. He fought Kant not from the *left*, as the materialists fought Kant, but from the *right*, as the sceptics and idealists fought Kant. He imagined that he was advancing, but in fact he was retreating to the programme of criticising Kant which Kuno Fischer, speaking of Schulze-Aenesidemus, aptly characterised in the following words: "The critique of pure reason with pure reason [i.e., apriorism] left out is scepticism. The critique of pure reason with the thing-in-itself left out is Berkeleian idealism" (*Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, 1869, Bd. V, S. 115).

This brings us to one of the most curious episodes in our whole "Machiad", in the whole campaign of the Russian Machists against Engels and Marx. The latest discovery by Bogdanov and Bazarov, Yushkevich and Valentinov, trumpeted by them in a thousand different keys, is that Plekhanov makes a "luckless attempt to reconcile Engels with Kant by the aid of a compromise—a thing-in-itself which is just a wee bit knowable" (*Studies*, *etc.*, p. 67 and many other places). This discovery of our Machists discloses a veritable bottomless pit of utter confusion and monstrous misunderstanding both of Kant and of the whole course of development of German classical philosophy.

The principal feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination within one system of heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends. When Kant assumes that something outside us, a thing-in-itself, corresponds to our ideas, he is a materialist. When he declares this thing-in-itself to be unknowable, transcendental, other-sided, he is an idealist. Recognising experience, sensations, as the only source of our knowledge, Kant is directing his philosophy towards sensationalism, and via sensationalism, under certain conditions, towards materialism. Recognising the apriority of space, time, causality, etc., Kant is directing his philosophy towards idealism. Both consistent materialists and consistent idealists (as well as the "pure" agnostics, the Humeans) have mercilessly criticised Kant for this inconsistency. The materialists blamed Kant for his idealism, rejected the idealist features of his system, demonstrated the knowability, the this-sidedness of the thing-in-itself, the absence of a fundamental difference between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon, the need of deducing causality, etc., not from *a priori* laws of thought, but from objective reality. The agnostics and idealists blamed Kant for his assumption of the thing-in-itself as a concession to materialism, "realism" or "naïve realism". The agnostics, moreover, rejected not only the thing-in-itself, but apriorism as well; while the idealists demanded the consistent deduction from pure thought not only of the *a priori* forms of perception, but of the world as a whole (by magnifying human thought to an abstract *Self*, or to an "Absolute Idea", or to a "Universal *Will*", etc., etc.). And here our Machists, "without noticing" that they had taken as their teachers people who had criticised Kant from the standpoint of scepticism and idealism, began to rend their clothes and to cover their heads with ashes at the sight of monstrous people who criticised Kant from a *diametrically opposite point of view*, who rejected the slightest element of agnosticism (scepticism) and idealism in his system, who demonstrated that the thing-in-itself is objectively real, fully knowable and this-sided, that it does not differ fundamentally from appearance, that it become~ transformed into appearance at every step in the

development of the individual consciousness of man and the collective consciousness of mankind. Help!—they cried—this is an illegitimate mixture of materialism and Kantianism!

When I read the assurances of our Machists that they criticise Kant far more consistently and thoroughly than any of the antiquated materialists, it always seems to me as though Purishkevich had joined our company and was shouting: I criticised the Constitutional-Democrats[67] far more consistently and thoroughly than you Marxist gentlemen! There is no question about it, Mr. Purishkevich, politically consistent people can and always will criticise the Constitutional-Democrats from diametrically opposite points of view, but after all it must not be forgotten that you criticised the Constitutional-Democrats for being *excessively* democratic, while we criticised them for being *insufficiently* democratic. The Machists criticise Kant for being too much of a materialist, while we criticise him for not being enough of a materialist. The Machists criticise Kant from the right, we from the left.

The Humean Schulze and the subjective idealist Fichte are examples of the former category of critics in the history of classical German philosophy. As we have already seen, they try to obliterate the "realistic" elements of Kantianism. Just as Schulze and Fichte criticised Kant himself, so the Humean empirio-criticists and the subjective idealist-immanentists criticised the German neo-Kantians of the second half of the nineteenth century. The line of Hume and Berkeley reappeared in a slightly renovated verbal garb. Mach and Avenarius reproached Kant not because his conception of the thing-in-itself is not sufficiently realistic, not sufficiently materialistic, but because he *admits* its existence; not because he refuses to deduce causality and necessity in nature from objective reality, but because he admits any causality and necessity at all (except perhaps purely "logical" necessity). The immanentists were at one with the empirio-criticists, also criticising Kant from the Humean and Berkeleian standpoint. For instance, Leclair in 1879, in the work in which he praised Mach as a remarkable philosopher, reproached Kant for his "inconsistency and connivance at realism" as expressed in the concept of the "*thing-in-*

itself"—that "nominal residuum of vulgar realism" (*Der Realismus der modernen Naturwissenschaft*, *usw*., S. 9). Leclair calls materialism "vulgar realism"—"in order to put it more strongly". "In our opinion," writes Leclair, "all those parts of the Kantian theory which gravitate towards *realismus vulgaris* should be vanquished and eliminated as being inconsistencies and bastard (*zwitterhaft*) products from the idealist point of view" (41). "The inconsistencies and contradictions in the Kantian theory of knowledge [arise from] the amalgamation (*Verquickung*) of idealist criticism with still unvanquished remnants of realistic dogmatism" (170). By realistic dogmatism Leclair means materialism.

Another immanentist, Johannes Rehmke, reproached Kant because he *realistically walled himself off* from Berkeley with the thing-in-itself (Johannes Rehmke, *Die Welt als Wahrnehmung und Begriff*, Berlin, 1880, S. 9). "The philosophical activity of Kant bore an essentially polemical character: with the thing-in-itself he turned against German rationalism [i.e., the old fideism of the eighteenth century], and with pure contemplation against English empiricism" (25). "I would compare the Kantian thing-in-itself with a movable lid placed over a pit: the thing looks so innocent and safe; one steps on it and suddenly falls into ... the '*world-in-itself*'" (27). That is why Kant is not liked by the comrades-in-arms of Mach and Avenarius, the immanentists; they do not like him because in some respects he approaches the "pit" of materialism!

And here are some examples of the criticism of Kant from the left. Feuerbach reproaches Kant not for his "realism", but for his *idealism*, and describes his system as "idealism based on empiricism" (*Werke*, II, 296).

Here is a particularly important remark on Kant by Feuerbach. "Kant says: If we regard—as we should—the objects of our perceptions as mere appearances, we thereby admit that at the bottom of appearances is a thing-in-itself, although we do not know how it is actually constructed, but only know its appearance, i.e., the manner in which our senses are affected (*affiziert*) by this unknown something. Hence, our reason, by the very fact that it accepts appearances, also admits the existence of things-in-themselves;

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and to that extent we can say that to entertain an idea of such entities which lie at the base of appearances, and consequently are but thought entities, is not only permissible, but unavoidable...." Having selected a passage from Kant where the thing-in-itself is regarded merely as a mental thing, a thought entity, and not a real thing, Feuerbach directs his whole criticism against it. "...Therefore," he says, "the objects of the senses [the objects of experience] are for the mind only appearances, and not truth.... Yet the thought entities are not actual objects for the mind! The Kantian philosophy is a contradiction between subject and object, between entity and existence, thinking and being. Entity is left to the mind, existence to the senses. Existence without entity [i.e., the existence of appearances without objective reality] is mere appearance—the sensible things—while entity without existence is mere thought—the thought entities, the *noumena*; they are thought of, but they lack existence—at least for us—and objectivity; they are the things-in-themselves, the true things, but they are not real things.... But what a contradiction, to sever truth from reality, reality from truth!" (*Werke*, II, S. 302-03). Feuerbach reproaches Kant not because he assumes things-in-themselves, but because he does not grant them reality, i.e., objective reality, because he regards them as mere thought, "thought entities", and not as "entities possessing existence", i.e., real and actually existing. Feuerbach rebukes Kant for deviating from materialism.

"The Kantian philosophy is a contradiction," Feuerbach wrote to Bolin on March 26, 1858, "it inevitably leads either to Fichtean idealism or to sensationalism." The former conclusion "belongs to the past", the latter "to the present and the future" (Grün, op. cit., II, 49). We have already seen that Feuerbach advocates objective sensationalism, i.e., materialism. The new turn from Kant to agnosticism and idealism, to Hume and Berkeley, is undoubtedly *reactionary*, even from Feuerbach's standpoint. And his ardent follower, Albrecht Rau, who together with the merits of Feuerbach also adopted his faults, which were overcome by Marx and Engels, criticised Kant wholly in the spirit of his teacher: "The Kantian philosophy is an amphibole [ambiguity]; it is both materialism and idealism, and the key

to its essence lies in its dual nature. As a materialist or an empiricist, Kant cannot help conceding things an existence (*Wesenheit*) outside us. But as an idealist he could not rid himself of the prejudice that the soul is an entity totally different from sensible things. Hence there are real things and a human mind which apprehends those things. But how can the mind approach things totally different from itself? The way out adopted by Kant is as follows: the mind possesses certain *a priori* knowledge, in virtue of which things must appear to it as they do. Hence, the fact that we understand things as we do is a fact of our creation. For the mind which lives within us is nothing but the divine mind, and just as God created the world out of nothing, so the human mind creates out of things something which they are not in themselves. Thus Kant guarantees real things their existence as 'things-in-themselves'. Kant, however, needed the soul, because immortality was for him a moral postulate. The 'thing-in-itself', gentlemen [says Rau, addressing the neo-Kantians in general and the muddle-headed A. Lange in particular, who falsified the *History of Materialism*], is what separates the idealism of Kant from the idealism of Berkeley; it forms a bridge between materialism and idealism. Such is my criticism of the Kantian philosophy, and let those who can refute it...." "For the materialist a distinction between *a priori* knowledge and the 'thing-in-itself' is absolutely superfluous, for since he nowhere breaks the continuity of nature, since he does not regard matter and mind as two fundamentally different things, but as two aspects of one and the same thing, he has no need of any special artifices in order to bring the mind and the thing into conjunction."*

Further, Engels, as we have seen, rebuked Kant for being an agnostic, but not for deviating from consistent agnosticism. Lafargue, Engels' disciple, argued in 1900 against the Kantians (amongst whom at that time was Charles Rappoport) as follows:

"...At the beginning of the nineteenth century our bour-

* Albrecht Rau, *Ludwig Feuerbachs Philosophie, die Naturforschung und die philosophische Kritik der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1882, S. 87-89.

geoisie, having completed its task of revolutionary destruction, began to repudiate its Voltairean and free-thinking philosophy. Catholicism, which the master decorator Chateaubriand painted in romantic colours (*peinturlurait*), was restored to fashion, and Sebastian Mercier imported the idealism of Kant in order to give the *coup de grâce* to the materialism of the Encyclopaedists, the propagandists of which had been guillotined by Robespierre.

"At the end of the nineteenth century, which will go down in history as the bourgeois century, the intellectuals attempted to crush the materialism of Marx and Engels beneath the philosophy of Kant. The reactionary movement started in Germany—without offence to the socialist *integralistes* who would like to ascribe the honour to their chief, Malon. But Malon himself had been to the school of Höchberg, Bernstein and the other disciples of Dühring, who were reforming Marxism in Zurich. [Lafargue is referring to the ideological movement in German socialism in the later seventies.[68]] It is to be expected that Jaurès, Fournière and our intellectuals will also treat us to Kant as soon as they have mastered his terminology.... Rappoport is mistaken when he assures us that for Marx the 'ideal and the real are identical'. In the first place we never employ such metaphysical phraseology. An idea is as real as the object of which it is the reflection in the brain.... To provide a little recreation for the comrades who have to acquaint themselves with bourgeois philosophy, I shall explain the substance of this famous problem which has so much exercised spiritualist minds.

"The workingman who eats sausage and receives a hundred sous a day knows very well that he is robbed by the employer and is nourished by pork meat, that the employer is a robber and that the sausage is pleasant to the taste and nourishing to the body. Not at all, say the bourgeois sophists, whether they are called Pyrrho, Hume or Kant. His opinion is personal, an entirely subjective opinion; he might with equal reason maintain that the employer is his benefactor and that the sausage consists of chopped leather, for he cannot know *things-in-themselves*.

"The question is not properly put, that is the whole trouble.... In order to know an object, man must first verify

whether his senses deceive him or not.... The chemists have gone deeper—they have penetrated into bodies, they have analysed them, decomposed them into their elements, and then performed the reverse procedure, they have recomposed them from their elements. And from the moment that man is able to produce things for his own use from these elements, he may, as Engels says, assert that he knows *the things-in-themselves*. The God of the Christians, if he existed and if he had created the world, could do no more."*

We have taken the liberty of making this long quotation in order to show how Lafargue understood Engels and how he criticised Kant from the left, not for those aspects of Kantianism which distinguish it from Humism, but for those which are common to both Kant and Hume; not for his assumption of the thing-in-itself, but for his inadequately materialist view of it.

And lastly, Karl Kautsky in his *Ethics* also criticises Kant from a standpoint diametrically opposed to that of Humism and Berkeleianism. "That I see green, red and white," he writes, arguing against Kant's epistemology, "is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between things.... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts ... are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty.... If this were really so [if Kant's doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists." (Russian translation, pp. 33-34.)

Thus the *entire school* of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels turned from Kant to the left, to a complete rejection of all idealism and of all agnosticism. But our Machists followed the *reactionary* trend in philosophy, Mach and Avenarius, who criticised Kant from the standpoint of Hume and Berkeley. Of course, it is the sacred right of every citizen, and particularly of every intellectual, to follow any ideologi-

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* Paul Lafargue, "Le matérialisme de Marx et l'idéalisme de Kant", *Le Socialiste*,[69] February 25, 1900.

cal reactionary he likes. But when people who have radically severed relations with the very *foundations of Marxism* in philosophy begin to dodge, confuse matters, hedge and assure us that they "too" are Marxists in philosophy; that they are "almost" in agreement with Marx, and have only slightly "supplemented" him—the spectacle is a far from pleasant one.

2. HOW THE "EMPIRIO-SYMBOLIST" YUSHKEVICH RIDICULED THE "EMPIRIO-CRITICIST" CHERNOV

"It is, of course, amusing," writes Mr. P. Yushkevich, "to see how Mr. Chernov tries to make the agnostic positivist-Comtean and Spencerian, Mikhailovsky, a forerunner of Mach and Avenarius" (op. cit., p. 73).

First of all, what is amusing here is Mr. Yushkevich's astonishing ignorance. Like all Voroshilovs, he conceals this ignorance under a display of erudite words and names. The passage quoted is from a paragraph devoted to the relation between Machism and Marxism. And although he undertakes to treat of this subject, Mr. Yushkevich does not know that for Engels (as for every materialist) the adherents of the Humean line and the adherents of the Kantian line are equally agnostics. Therefore, to contrast agnosticism generally with Machism, when even Mach himself confesses to being a follower of Hume, is simply to prove oneself an ignoramus in philosophy. The phrase "agnostic positivism" is also absurd, for the adherents of Hume in fact call themselves positivists. Mr. Yushkevich; who has taken Petzoldt as his teacher, should have known that Petzoldt definitely regards empirio-criticism as positivism. And finally, to drag in the names of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer is again absurd, for Marxism rejects not what distinguishes one positivist from another, but what they have in common and what makes a philosopher a positivist instead of a materialist.

Our Voroshilov needed this display of words so as to "mesmerise" his reader, to stun him with resounding words, to distract his attention *from the essence of the matter* to empty trifles. And the essence of the matter is the radical difference between materialism and the broad current of positivism, which *includes* Auguste Comte, Herbert Spen-

cer, Mikhailovsky, a number of neo-Kantians, and Mach and Avenarius. The essence of the matter has been very accurately expressed by Engels in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*, where he places *all* the Kantians and Humeans of that period (i.e. the eighties of the last century) in the camp of wretched eclectics, pettifoggers (*Flohknacker*: literally, flea-crackers) and so on.[70] To whom this characterisation can and must apply is a question on which our Voroshilovs did not wish to reflect. And since they are incapable of reflecting, we shall cite one illuminating comparison. Engels, speaking both in 1888 and 1892 of the Kantians and Humeans in general, mentions *no* names.[71] The only reference Engels makes to a book is his reference to the work of Starcke on Feuerbach, which Engels analysed. "Starcke," says Engels, "takes great pains to defend Feuerbach against the attacks and doctrines of the vociferous lecturers who today go by the name of philosophers in Germany. For people who are interested in this afterbirth of German classical philosophy this is a matter of importance; for Starcke himself it may have appeared necessary. We, however, will spare the reader this" (*Ludwig Feuerbach*, S. 25).[72]

Engels wanted to "spare the reader", that is, to save the Social-Democrats from a pleasant acquaintance with the degenerate chatterboxes who call themselves philosophers. And who are the representatives of this "afterbirth"?

We open Starcke's book (C. N. Starcke, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Stuttgart, 1885), and find constant references to the adherents of *Hume and Kant*. Starcke dissociates Feuerbach from these two trends. Starcke quotes in this connection *A. Riehl*, *Windelband* and *A. Lange* (pp. 3, 18-19, 127 et seq., in Starcke).

We open Avenarius' *The Human Concept of the World*, which appeared in 1891, and on page 120 of the first German edition we read: "The final result of our analysis concurs—although not absolutely (*durchgehend*), depending on the various points of view—with that reached by other investigators, for example, *E. Laas*, *E. Mach*, *A. Riehl*, *W. Wundt*. See also *Schopenhauer*."

Whom was our Voroshilov-Yushkevich jeering at?

Avenarius has not the slightest doubt as to his kinship in principle—not in regard to any particular question, but

in regard to the "final result" of empirio-criticism—with the *Kantians* Riehl and Laas and with the *idealist* Wundt. He mentions Mach between the two Kantians. And, indeed, are they not all one company, since Riehl and Laas purified Kant *à la* Hume, and Mach and Avenarius purified Hume *à la* Berkeley?

Is it surprising that Engels wished to "spare" the German workers, to save them from a close acquaintance with this whole company of "flea-cracking" university lecturers?

Engels could spare the German workers, but the Voroshilovs do not spare the Russian reader.

It should be noted that an essentially eclectic combination of Kant and Hume, or Hume and Berkeley, is possible, so to speak, in varying proportions, by laying principal stress now on one, now on another element of the mixture. We saw above, for instance, that only one Machist, H. Kleinpeter, openly admits that he and Mach are solipsists (i.e., consistent Berkeleians). On the other hand, the Humean trend in the views of Mach and Avenarius is emphasised by many of their disciples and followers: Petzoldt, Willy, Pearson, the Russian empirio-criticist Lesevich, the Frenchman Henri Delacroix,* and others. We shall cite one example—an especially eminent scientist who in philosophy also combined Hume with Berkeley, but who emphasised the materialist elements of this mixture. He is T. H. Huxley, the famous English scientist, who gave currency to the term "agnostic" and whom Engels undoubtedly had chiefly and primarily in mind when he spoke of English agnosticism. Engels in 1892 called this type of agnostics "shamefaced materialists".[73] James Ward, the English spiritualist, in his book *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, in which he chiefly attacks the "scientific champion of agnosticism", Huxley (Vol. II, p. 229), bears out Engels' opinion when he says: "In Huxley's case indeed the leaning towards the primacy of the physical side ["series of elements" Mach calls it] is often so pronounced that it can hardly be called parallelism at all. In spite

* *Bibliothèque du congrès international de la philosophie*, Vol. IV. Henri Delacroix, *David Hume et la philosophie critique*. Among the followers of Hume the author includes Avenarius and the Immanentists in Germany, Ch. Renouvier and his school (the "neo-criticists") in France.

of his vehement repudiation of the title of materialist as an affront to his untarnished agnosticism, I know of few recent writers who on occasion better deserve the title" (Vol. II, pp. 30-31). And James Ward quotes the following statements by Huxley in confirmation of his opinion: "'Anyone who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.'" Or: "'It is in itself of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter—each statement has a certain relative truth ["relatively stable complexes of elements," according to Mach]. But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred. For it connects thought with the other phenomena of the universe ... whereas the alternative, or spiritualistic, terminology is utterly barren, and leads to nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas.... Thus there can be little doubt that the further science advances, the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of Nature be represented by materialistic formulae and symbols'" (Vol. I, pp. 17-19).

So argued the "shamefaced materialist" Huxley, who refused to accept materialism, regarding it as "metaphysics" that illegitimately goes beyond "groups of sensations". And this same Huxley wrote: "'If I were obliged to choose between absolute materialism and absolute idealism I should feel compelled to accept the latter alternative.... Our one certainty is the existence of the mental world'" (J. Ward, Vol. II, p. 216).

Huxley's philosophy is as much a mixture of Hume and Berkeley as is Mach's philosophy. But in Huxley's case the Berkeleian streaks are incidental, and agnosticism serves as a fig-leaf for materialism. With Mach the "colouring" of the mixture is a different one, and Ward, the spiritualist, while fiercely combating Huxley, pats Avenarius and Mach affectionately on the back.

3. THE IMMANENTISTS AS COMRADES-IN-ARMS OF MACH AND AVENARIUS

In speaking of empirio-criticism we could not avoid repeatedly mentioning the philosophers of the so-called immanentist school, the principal representatives of which are Schuppe, Leclair, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern. It is now necessary to examine the relation of empirio-criticism to the immanentists and the nature of the philosophy preached by the latter.

In 1902 Mach wrote: "...Today I see that a host of philosophers—positivists, empirio-criticists, adherents of the immanentist philosophy—as well as a very few natural scientists, have all, without knowing anything of each other, entered on new paths which, in spite of their individual differences, converge almost towards one point" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 9). Here we must first note Mach's unusually frank admission that *very few* natural scientists are followers of the supposedly "new", but in truth very old, Humean-Berkeleian philosophy. Secondly, extremely important is Mach's opinion that this "new" philosophy is a broad *current* in which the immanentists are on the same footing as the empirio-criticists and the positivists. "Thus"—repeats Mach in the introduction to the Russian translation of the *Analysis of Sensations* (1906)—"there begins to be a common movement..." (p. 4). "My position [Mach says in another place] is very close to that of the representatives of the immanentist philosophy as well.... I found hardly anything in this book [i.e., Schuppe, *Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik*] with which, with perhaps a slight modification, I would not gladly agree" (46). Mach considers that Schubert-Soldern is also "following very close paths" (4), and as to Wilhelm Schuppe, Mach even *dedicates* to him his latest work, the summary so to speak of his philosophical labours, *Knowledge and Error*.

Avenarius, the other founder of empirio-criticism, wrote in 1894 that he was "gladdened" and "encouraged" by Schuppe's sympathy for empirio-criticism, and that the "differences" between him and Schuppe "exist, perhaps, only temporarily" (*vielleicht nur einstweilen noch bestehend*).* And,

* *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1894, 18. Jahrg., Heft I, S. 29.

finally, J. Petzoldt, whose teachings Lesevich regards as the last word in empirio-criticism, *openly acclaims the trio*—Schuppe, Mach and Avenarius—*as the leaders of the "new" trend* (*Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, Bd. II, 1904, S. 295; *Das Weltproblem*, 1906, S. v und 146). On this point Petzoldt is definitely opposed to Willy (*Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, II, 321), probably the only outstanding Machist who felt ashamed of such a kinship as Schuppe's and who tried to dissociate himself from him fundamentally, for which this disciple was reprimanded by his beloved teacher Avenarius. Avenarius wrote the above-quoted words about Schuppe in a comment on Willy's article against Schuppe, adding that Willy's criticism perhaps "was put more strongly than was really necessary" (*Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 18. Jahrg., 1894, S. 29; which also contains Willy's article against Schuppe).

Having acquainted ourselves with the empirio-criticists' appraisal of the immanentists, let us examine the immanentists' appraisal of the empirio-criticists. We have already mentioned the opinion uttered by Leclair in 1879. Schubert-Soldern in 1882 explicitly expressed his "agreement" "in part with the elder Fichte" (i.e., the distinguished representative of subjective idealism, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose son was as inept in philosophy as was the son of Joseph Dietzgen), and "with Schuppe, Leclair, *Avenarius* and partly with Rehmke", while *Mach* (*Erhaltung der Arbeit*) is cited with particular gusto in opposition to "natural-historical metaphysics"*—the term given to natural-historical materialism by all the reactionary university lecturers and professors in Germany. In 1893, after the appearance of Avenarius' *The Human Concept of the World*, W. Schuppe hailed this work in *An Open Letter to Professor Avenarius* as a "confirmation of the naïve realism" which he (Schuppe) himself advocated. "My conception of thought," Schuppe wrote, "excellently harmonises with your [Avenarius'] pure

* Dr. Richard von Schubert-Soldern, *Ueber Transcendenz des Objekts und Subjekts*, 1882, S. 37 and §5. Cf. also his *Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie*, 1884, S. 3.

experience."* Then, in 1896, Schubert-Soldern, summarising the "methodological trend in philosophy" on which he "bases himself", traces his genealogy from Berkeley and Hume down through *F. A. Lange* ("the real beginning of our trend in Germany dates from Lange"), and then through Laas, Schuppe and Co., *Avenarius* and *Mach*, *Riehl* (among the neo-Kantians), Ch. Renouvier (among the Frenchmen), etc.** Finally, in their programmatic "Introduction" printed in the first issue of the philosophical organ of the immanentists, alongside a declaration of war on materialism and an expression of sympathy with Charles Renouvier, we read: "Even in the camp of the natural scientists themselves voices of individual thinkers are being raised preaching against the growing arrogance of their colleagues, against the unphilosophical spirit which has taken possession of the natural sciences. Thus the physicist Mach.... On all hands fresh forces are stirring and are working to destroy the blind faith in the infallibility of the natural sciences, and once again people are beginning to seek for other paths into the profundities of the mysterious, a better entrance to the house of truth."***

A word or two about Ch. Renouvier. He is the head of the influential and widespread school in France known as the neo-criticists. His theoretical philosophy is a combination of the phenomenalism of Hume and the apriorism of Kant. The thing-in-itself is absolutely rejected. The connection of phenomena, order and law is declared to be *a priori*; law is written with a capital letter and is converted into the basis of religion. The Catholic priests go into raptures over this philosophy. The Machist Willy scornfully refers to Renouvier as a "second apostle Paul", as "an obscurantist of the first water" and as a "casuistic preacher of free will" (*Gegen die Schulweisheit*, S. 129). And it is such co-thinkers of the immanentists who *warmly greet* Mach's philosophy. When his *Mechanics* appeared in a French translation, the

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* *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 17. Jahrg., 1893, S. 384.

** Dr. Richard von Schubert-Soldern, *Das menschliche Glück und die soziale Frage*, 1896, S. v, vi.

*** *Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie*,[74] Bd. I, Berlin, 1896, S. 6, 9.

organ of the neo-criticists—*L'Année philosophique*[75]—edited by Pillon, a collaborator and disciple of Renouvier, wrote: "It is unnecessary to speak of the extent to which, in this criticism of substance, the thing, the thing-in-itself, Mach's positive science agrees with neo-critical idealism" (Vol. XV, 1904, p. 179).

As for the Russian Machists, they are all ashamed of their kinship with the immanentists, and one of course could not expect anything else of people who did not deliberately adopt the path of Struve, Menshikov, and the like. Bazarov alone refers to "certain representatives of the immanentist school" as "realists".* Bogdanov briefly (*and in fact falsely*) declares that "the immanentist school is only an intermediate form between Kantianism and empirio-criticism" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. xxii). V. Chernov writes: "Generally speaking, the immanentists approach positivism in only one aspect of their theory, in other aspects they go far beyond it" (*Philosophical and Sociological Studies*, 37). Valentinov says that "the immanentist school clothed these [Machist] ideas in an unsuitable form and found itself in the blind alley of solipsism" (op. cit., p. 149). As you see, you pay your money and take your choice: constitution and salmon mayonnaise, realism and solipsism. Our Machists are afraid to tell the plain and clear truth about the immanentists.

The fact is that the immanentists are rank reactionaries, open advocates of fideism, unadulterated in their obscurantism. There is *not one* of them who has not *frankly* made his more theoretical works on epistemology lead to a defence of religion and a justification of medievalism of one kind or another. Leclair, in 1879, advocated his philosophy as one that satisfies "all the needs of a religiously inclined mind" (*Der Realismus*, *etc.*, S. 73). J. Rehmke, in 1880, dedicated his "theory of knowledge" to the Protestant pastor Biedermann and closed his book by preaching not a supersensible God, but God as a "real concept" (it was for this reason, pre-

* "Realist" in modern philosophy—certain representatives of the immanentist school which has arisen from Kantianism, the school of Mach-Avenarius, and many other kindred movements—find that there are absolutely no grounds for rejecting the basis of naïve realism" (*Studies*, *etc.*, p. 26).

sumably, that Bazarov ranked "certain" immanentists among the "realists"?), and moreover the "objectivisation of this real concept is left to practical life", while Biedermann's "Christian dogmatism" is declared to be a model of "scientific theology" (J. Rehmke, *Die Welt als Wahrnehmung und Begriff*, Berlin, 1880, S. 312). Schuppe in the *Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie* assures us that though the immanentists deny the transcendental, God and the future life do not come under this concept (*Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie*, II. Band, S. 52). In his *Ethics* he insists on the "connection of the moral law ... with a metaphysical world conception" and condemns the separation of the church from the state as a "senseless phrase" (Dr. Wilhelm Schuppe, *Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie*, Breslau, 1881, S. 181, 325). Schubert-Soldern in his *Foundations of the Theory of Cognition** deduces both the pre-existence of the *self* before the body and the after-existence of the *self* after the body, i.e., the immortality of the soul (op. cit., p. 82), etc. In his *Social Question*,** arguing against Bebel, he defends, together with "social reforms", suffrage based on social-estates, and says that the "Social-Democrats ignore the fact that without the divine gift of unhappiness there could be no happiness" (S. 330), and moreover laments the fact that materialism "prevails" (S. 242): "he who in our time believes in a life beyond, or even in its possibility, is considered a fool" (ibid.).

And German Menshikovs like these, no less obscurantists of the first water than Renouvier, live in lasting concubinage with the empirio-criticists. Their theoretical kinship is incontestable. There is no more Kantianism in the immanentists than in Petzoldt or Pearson. We saw above that they themselves regard themselves as disciples of Hume and Berkeley, an opinion of the immanentists that is generally recognised in philosophical literature. In order to show clearly what epistemological premises these comrades-in-arms of Mach and Avenarius proceed from, we shall quote some fundamental theoretical propositions from the works of the immanentists.

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* Schubert-Soldern, *Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie.—Ed.*
** *Die soziale Frage.—Ed.*

Leclair in 1879 had not yet invented the term "immanent" which really signifies "experiential", "given in experience", and which is just as spurious a label for concealing corruption as the labels of the European bourgeois parties. In his first work, Leclair frankly and explicitly calls himself a "*critical idealist*" (*Der Realismus*, *etc.*, S. 11, 21, 206, etc.). In this work he criticises Kant, as we have already seen, for his concessions to materialism, and clearly indicates his *own* path *away from* Kant to Fichte and Berkeley. Leclair fights materialism in general and *the tendency towards materialism displayed by the majority of natural scientists* in particular as mercilessly as Schuppe, Schubert-Soldern and Rehmke.

"If we return," Leclair says, "to the standpoint of critical idealism, if we do not attribute a transcendental existence [i.e., an existence outside human consciousness] to nature and the processes of nature, then for the subject the aggregate of bodies and his own body, insofar as he can see and feel it, together with all its changes, will be a directly given phenomenon of spatially connected coexistences and successions in time, and the whole explanation of nature will reduce itself to stating the laws of these coexistences and successions" (21).

Back to Kant!—said the reactionary neo-Kantians. Back to Fichte and Berkeley!—is *essentially* what the reactionary immanentists are saying. For Leclair, all that exists consists of "*complexes of sensations*" (S. 38), while certain classes of properties (*Eigenschaften*), which act upon our sense-organs, he designates, for example, by the letter M, and other classes, which act upon other objects of nature, by the letter N (S. 150, etc.). Moreover, Leclair speaks of nature as a "phenomenon of the consciousness" (*Bewusstseinsphänomen*) not of a single person, but of "mankind" (S. 55-56). If we remember that Leclair published his book in Prague, where Mach was professor of physics, and that Leclair cites with rapture only Mach's *Erhaltung der Arbeit*, which appeared in 1872, the question involuntarily arises: ought we not to regard the advocate of fideism and frank idealist Leclair as the true progenitor of the "original" philosophy of Mach.

As for Schuppe, who, according to Leclair,* arrived at the "same results", he, as we have seen, really claims to defend "naïve realism", and in his *Open Letter to Professor Avenarius* bitterly complains of the "current distortion of my [Schuppe's] theory of knowledge into subjective idealism". The true nature of the crude forgery which the immanentist Schuppe calls a defence of realism is quite clear from his rejoinder to Wundt, who did not hesitate to class the immanentists with the Fichteans, the subjective idealists (*Philosophische Studien*, loc. cit., S. 386, 397, 407).

"With me," Schuppe *retorts* to Wundt, "the proposition 'being is consciousness' means that consciousness without the external world is inconceivable, that the latter belongs to the former, i.e., the absolute connection (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of the one with the other, which I have so often asserted and explained and in which the two constitute the primary whole of being."**

One must be extremely naïve not to discern pure subjective idealism in such "realism"! Just think: the external world "belongs to consciousness" and is in *absolute* connection with it! The poor professor was indeed slandered by the "current" practice of ranking him with the subjective idealists! Such a philosophy completely coincides with Avenarius' "principal co-ordination"; no reservations and protests on the part of Chernov and Valentinov can sunder them; both philosophies will be consigned together to the museum of reactionary fabrications of German professordom. As a curiosity once more testifying to Valentinov's lack of judgement, let us note that he calls Schuppe a solipsist (it goes without saying that Schuppe vowed and swore that he was not a solipsist—and wrote special articles to this effect—just as vehemently as did Mach, Petzoldt and Co.), yet is highly delighted with Bazarov's article in the *Studies*! I should like to translate into German Bazarov's dictum that "sense-perception *is* the reality existing outside us" and forward it to some more or less intelligent immanentist. He would embrace and kiss Bazarov as heartily as the Schuppes, Le-

* *Beiträge zu einer monistischen Erkenntnistheorie*, Breslau, 1882, S. 10.

** Wilhelm Schuppe, "Die immanente Philosophie und Wilhelm Wundt", *Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie*, Band II, S. 195.

clairs and Schubert-Solderns embraced Mach and Avenarius. For Bazarov's dictum is the *alpha and omega* of the doctrines of the immanentist school.

And here, lastly, is Schubert-Soldern. "The materialism of natural science", the "metaphysics" of recognising the objective reality of the external world, is the chief enemy of this philosopher (*Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie*, 1884, p. 31 and the whole of Chapter II: "The Metaphysics of Natural Science"). "Natural science abstracts from all relations of consciousness" (S. 52)—that is the chief evil (and that is just what constitutes materialism!). For the individual cannot escape from "sensations and, hence, from a state of consciousness" (S. 33-34). Of course, Schubert-Soldern admitted in 1896, my standpoint is *epistemological solipsism* (*Die soziale Frage*, S. x), but not "metaphysical", not "practical" solipsism. "What is given us immediately is sensations, complexes of constantly changing sensations" (*Ueber Transcendenz des Objekts und Subjekts*, S. 73).

"Marx took the material process of production," says Schubert-Soldern, "as the cause of inner processes and motives, in the same way (and just as falsely) as natural science regards the common [to humanity] external world as the cause of the individual inner worlds" (*Die soziale Frage*, S. xviii). That Marx's historical materialism is connected with natural-scientific materialism and philosophical materialism in general, it does not even occur to this comrade-in-arms of Mach to doubt.

"Many, perhaps the majority, will be of the opinion that from the standpoint of epistemological solipsism no metaphysics is possible, i.e., that metaphysics is always transcendental. Upon more mature reflection I cannot concur with this opinion. Here are my reasons.... The immediate foundation of all that is given is the spiritual (solipsist) connection, the central point of which is the individual *self* (the individual realm of thought) with its body. The rest of the world is inconceivable without this *self*, just as this *self* is inconceivable without the rest of the world With the destruction of the individual *self* the world is also annihilated, which appears impossible—and with the destruction of the rest of the world, nothing remains for my individual *self*, for the latter can be separated from the world

only conceptually, but not in time and space. Therefore my individual *self* must continue to exist after my death also, if the entire world is not to be annihilated with it..." (ibid., p. xxiii).

The "principal co-ordination", "complexes of sensations" and the rest of the Machist banalities render faithful service to the proper people!

"...What is the hereafter (*das Jenseits*) from the solipsist point of view? It is only a possible future experience for me..." (ibid.). "Spiritualism ... would be obliged to prove the existence of the *Jenseits*. But at any rate the materialism of natural science cannot be brought into the field against spiritualism, for this materialism, as we have seen, is only one aspect of the world process within the all-embracing spiritual connection" (= the "principal co-ordination") (S. xxiv).

All this is said in that same philosophical introduction to the *Social Question* (1896) in which Schubert-Soldern *all the time* appears arm in arm with Mach and Avenarius. Only among the handful of Russian Machists does Machism serve exclusively for intellectualist chattering. In its native country its role as a flunkey to fideism is openly proclaimed!

4. IN WHAT DIRECTION IS EMPIRIO-CRITICISM DEVELOPING?

Let us now cast a glance at the development of Machism after Mach and Avenarius. We have seen that their philosophy is a hash, a pot-pourri of contradictory and disconnected epistemological propositions. We must now examine how and whither, i.e., in what direction, this philosophy is developing, for this will help us to settle certain "disputable" questions by referring to indisputable historical facts. And indeed, in view of the eclecticism and incoherence of the initial philosophical premises of the trend we are examining, varying interpretations of it and sterile disputes over particulars and trifles are absolutely inevitable. But empirio-criticism, like every ideological current, is a living thing, which grows and develops, and the fact that it is growing in one direction or another will help us more than long arguments to settle the *basic* question as to what the real essence of this philosophy is. We judge a person not by what

he says or thinks of himself but by his actions. And we must judge philosophers not by the labels they give themselves ("positivism", the philosophy of "pure experience", "monism" or "empirio-monism", the "philosophy of natural science", etc.) but by how they actually settle fundamental theoretical questions, by their associates, by what they are teaching and by what they have taught their disciples and followers.

It is this last question that interests us now. Everything essential was said by Mach and Avenarius more than twenty years ago. It was bound to become clear in the interval *how* these "leaders" were *understood* by those who wanted to understand them, and whom they themselves (at least Mach, who has outlived his colleague) regard as their successors. To be specific, let us take those who themselves claim to be disciples of Mach and Avenarius (or to be their adherents) and whom Mach himself ranks as such. We shall thus obtain a picture of empirio-criticism as a philosophical *current*, and not as a collection of literary oddities.

In Mach's Introduction to the Russian translation of the *Analysis of Sensations*, Hans Cornelius is recommended as a "young investigator" who is following "if not quite the same, at least very close paths" (p. 4). In the text of the *Analysis of Sensations* Mach once again "mentions with pleasure the works" of Cornelius and others, "who have disclosed the kernel of Avenarius' ideas and have developed them further" (p. 48). Let us take Cornelius' *Introduction to the Philosophy** (German edition, 1903) and we find that its author also speaks of his endeavour to follow in the footsteps of Mach and Avenarius (S. viii, 32). We have before us then a *disciple acknowledged by the teacher*. This disciple also begins with sensation's-elements (17, 24), categorically declares that he confines himself to *experience* (S. vi), calls his views "consistent or epistemological empiricism" (335), emphatically condemns the "one-sidedness" of idealism and the "dogmatism" of both the idealists and the materialists (S. 129), vehemently denies the possible "misconception" (123) that his philosophy implies recognition of the world as existing in the mind of man, flirts with naïve realism no

* Cornelius, *Einleitung in die Philosophie.—Ed.*

less skilfully than Avenarius, Schuppe or Bazarov ("Every visual, as well as every other sense-perception, is located where we find it, and only where we find it, that is to say, where the naïve mind, untouched by a false philosophy, localises it"—S. 125)—and this disciple, acknowledged as such by his teacher, arrives at *immortality* and *God*. Materialism—thunders this police sergeant in a professorial chair, I beg your pardon, this disciple of the "recent positivists"—converts man into an automaton. "It need hardly be said that together with the belief in the freedom of our decisions it destroys all considerations of the moral value of our actions and our responsibility for them. Just as little room is left for the idea of the continuation of our life after death" (S. 116). The final note of the book is: Education (of the youth stultified by this man of science, presumably) is necessary not only for action but "above all ... to inculcate veneration (*Ehrfurcht*) not for the transitory values of a fortuitous tradition, but for the imperishable values of duty and beauty, for the divine (*dem Göttlichen*) within us and outside us" (357).

Compare with this Bogdanov's assertion that "there is *absolutely no room*" (Bogdanov's italics) and "there cannot be any room" for the idea of God, freedom of the will and immortality of the soul in Mach's philosophy in view of his denial of every "thing-in-itself" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. xii). While Mach in this same book (p. 293) declares that "there is no Machist philosophy", and recommends not only the immanentists, but also Cornelius, who had disclosed the kernel of Avenarius' ideas! Thus, in the first place, Bogdanov *absolutely does not know* the "Machist philosophy" as a current which not only nestles under the wing of fideism, but which itself goes to the length of fideism. In the second place, Bogdanov *absolutely does not know* the history of philosophy; for to associate a denial of the ideas mentioned above with a denial of every kind of thing-in-itself is to mock at the history of philosophy. Will Bogdanov take it into his head to deny that all consistent followers of Hume, by rejecting every kind of thing-in-itself, *do leave room* for these ideas? Has Bogdanov never heard of the subjective idealists, who reject every kind of thing-in-itself and thereby make room for these ideas? "There can be no room" for

these ideas *solely* in a philosophy that teaches that nothing exists but perceptual being, that the world is matter in motion, that the external world, the physical world familiar to all, is the sole objective reality—i.e., in the philosophy of materialism. And it is for this, precisely for this, that materialism is combated by the immanentists recommended by Mach, by Mach's disciple Cornelius, and by modern professorial philosophy in general.

Our Machists began to repudiate Cornelius only after this indecency had been pointed out to them. Such repudiations are not worth much. Friedrich Adler evidently has not been "warned", and therefore recommends this Cornelius in a socialist journal (*Der Kampf*, 1908, 5, S. 235: "a work that is easy to read and highly to be commended"). Through the medium of Machism, downright philosophical reactionaries and preachers of fideism are palmed off on the workers as teachers!

Petzoldt, without having been warned, detected the falsity in Cornelius: but his method of combating this falsity is a gem. Listen to this: "To assert that the world is idea [as is asserted by the idealists—whom we are combating, no joke!] has sense only when it implies that it is the idea of the predicator, or, if you like, of all predicators, i.e., that its existence depends exclusively upon the thought of that individual or of those individuals; it exists only inasmuch as he thinks about it, and what he does not think of does not exist. We, on the contrary, make the world dependent not upon the thought of an individual or individuals, or, to put it better and clearer, not upon the *act* of thinking, or upon any *actual* thought, but—and exclusively in the logical sense—upon thought in general. The idealist confuses one with the other, and the result is agnostic semi-solipsism, as we observe it in Cornelius" (*Einführung*, II, 317).

Stolypin denied the existence of the *cabinets noirs*![76] Petzoldt annihilates the idealists! It is astonishing only how much this annihilation of idealism resembles a recommendation to the idealists to exercise more skill in concealing their idealism. To say that the world depends upon man's thought is idealist falsity. To say that the world depends upon thought in general is recent positivism, critical realism—in a word, thoroughgoing bourgeois charlatanism!

If Cornelius is an agnostic semi-solipsist, Petzoldt is a solipsist semi-agnostic. You are cracking a flea, gentlemen!

Let us proceed. In the second edition of his *Knowledge and Error*, Mach says: "A systematic exposition [of Mach's views], one to which in all its essentials I can subscribe, is given by Professor Dr. Hans Kleinpeter" (*Die Erkenntnistheorie der Naturforschung der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1905: *The Theory of Knowledge of Modern Natural Science*). Let us take Hans Number Two. This professor is an accredited disseminator of Machism: a pile of articles on Mach's views in philosophical journals, both in German and in English, translations of works recommended by Mach with introductions by Mach—in a word, the right hand of the "teacher". Here are his views: "... All my (outer and inner) experience, all my thoughts and aspirations are given me as a psychical process, as a part of my consciousness" (op. cit., p. 18). "That which we call physical is a construction of psychical elements" (144). "*Subjective conviction, not objective certainty* (*Gewissheit*) *is the only attainable goal of any science*" (9). (The italics are Kleinpeter's, who adds the following remark: "Something similar was already said by Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.") "The assumption that there are other minds is one which can never be confirmed by experience" (42). "I do not know ... whether, in general, there exist other *selves* outside of myself"(43). In § 5, entitled "Activity (Spontaneity) in Consciousness", we read that in an animal as an automaton the succession of ideas is purely mechanical. The same is true of us when we dream. "The quality of our consciousness in its normal state essentially differs from this. It possesses a property which these [the automata] entirely lack, and which it would be very difficult, to say the least, to explain mechanically or automatically: the so-called self-activity of the *self*. Every person can dissever himself from his states of consciousness, he can manipulate them, can make them stand out more clearly or force them into the background, can analyse them, compare various parts, etc. All this is a fact of (immediate) experience. Our *self* is therefore essentially different from the sum-total of the states of consciousness and cannot be put as equivalent to it. Sugar consists of carbon, hydrogen

and oxygen; were we to attribute a soul to it, then by analogy it would have to possess the faculty of directing the movement of the hydrogen, oxygen and carbon particles at will" (29-30). § 4 of the following chapter is headed: "The Act of Cognition—an Act of Will (*Willenshandlung*)." "It must be regarded as definitely established that all my psychical experiences are divisible into two large main groups: compulsory acts and voluntary acts. To the former belong all impressions of the external world" (47). "That it is possible to advance several theories regarding one and the same realm of facts ... is as well known to physicists as it is incompatible with the premises of an absolute theory of knowledge. And this fact is also linked with the volitional character of our thought; it also implies that our volition is not bound by external circumstances" (50).

Now judge how bold Bogdanov was in asserting that in Mach's philosophy "there is absolutely no room for free will", when Mach himself recommends such a person as Kleinpeter! We have already seen that the latter does not attempt to conceal either his own idealism or Mach's. In 1898-99 Kleinpeter wrote: "Hertz proclaims the same subjectivist view [i.e., as Mach] of the nature of our concepts.... If Mach and Hertz [with what justice Kleinpeter here implicates the famous physicist we shall soon see] deserve credit from the standpoint of idealism for having emphasised the subjective origin of *all* our concepts and of the connections between them—and not only of certain individual ones—from the standpoint of empiricism they deserve no less credit for having acknowledged that experience alone, as a court entirely independent of thought, can solve the question of their correctness" (*Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, Bd. V, 1898-99, S. 169-70). In 1900 he wrote that in spite of all the points on which Mach differs from Kant and Berkeley, "they at any rate are more akin to him than the metaphysical empiricism prevailing in natural science [i.e., materialism! The Herr professor avoids calling the devil by name] which is indeed the main target of Mach's attacks" (op. cit., Bd. VI, S. 87). In 1903 he wrote: "The starting-point of Berkeley and Mach is irrefutable.... Mach completed what Kant began" (*Kantstudien*, Bd. VIII, 1903, S. 314, 274).

In the preface to the Russian translation of the *Analysis of Sensations* Mach also mentions T. Ziehen, "who is following, if not the same, at least very close paths". We take Professor Theodor Ziehen's book *The Psychophysiological Theory of Knowledge* (*Psychophysiologische Erkenntnistheorie*, Jena, 1898) and find that the author refers to Mach, Avenarius, Schuppe, and so forth in the very introduction. Here therefore we again have a case of a disciple acknowledged by the teacher. Ziehen's "recent" theory is that only the "mob" is capable of believing that "real objects evoke our sensations" (S. 3), and that "over the portals of the theory of knowledge there can be no other inscription than the words of Berkeley: 'The external objects subsist not by themselves, but exist in our mindst'" (S. 5). "What is given us is sensations and ideas. Both are embraced by the word psychical. Non-psychical is a word devoid of meaning" (S. 100). The laws of nature are relations not of material bodies but of "reduced sensations" (S. 104. This "new" concept—"reduced sensations"—contains all that is original in Ziehen's Berkeleianism!).

Petzoldt repudiated Ziehen as an idealist as far back as 1904 in the second volume of his *Introduction* (pp. 298-301). By 1906 he had already included Cornelius, Kleinpeter, Ziehen and Verworn (*Das Weltproblem*, *etc.*, S. 137, Fussnote) in the list of *idealists or psychomonists*. In the case of all these Herren professors, you see, there is a "misconception" in their interpretation "of the views of Mach and Avenarius" (ibid.).

Poor Mach and Avenarius! Not only were they slandered by their enemies for idealism and "even" (as Bogdanov expresses it) solipsism, but their very friends, disciples and followers, expert professors, also understood their teachers wrongly, in an idealist sense. If empirio-criticism is developing into idealism, that by no means demonstrates the radical falsity of its muddled Berkeleian basic premises. God forbid! It is only a slight "misconception", in the Nozdrev-Petzoldt[77] sense of the term.

The funniest thing of all perhaps is that Petzoldt himself, the guardian of purity and innocence, firstly, "supplemented" Mach and Avenarius with a "logical *a priori*" and, secondly, coupled them with Wilhelm Schuppe, the vehicle of fideism.

Had Petzoldt been acquainted with Mach's English adherents he would have had very considerably to extend the list of Machists who had lapsed (because of a "misconception") into idealism. We have already referred to Karl Pearson, whom Mach praised, as an unadulterated idealist. Here are the opinions of two other "slanderers" who say the same thing of Pearson: "Professor Pearson is merely echoing a doctrine first given clear utterance by the truly great Berkeley" (Howard V. Knox, *Mind*, Vol. VI, 1897, p. 205). "There can be no doubt that Mr. Pearson is an idealist in the strictest sense of the word" (Georges Rodier, *Revue philosophique*,[78] 1888, II, Vol. 26, p. 200). The English idealist, William Clifford, whom Mach regards as "coming very close" to his philosophy (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 8), must be considered a teacher rather than a disciple of Mach, for Clifford's philosophical works appeared in the seventies of the last century. Here the "misconception" is due to Mach himself, who in 1901 "failed to notice" the idealism in Clifford's doctrine that the world is "mind-stuff", a "social object", "highly-organised experience", and so forth.* For a characterisation of the charlatanism of the German Machists, it is sufficient to note that Kleinpeter in 1905 elevated this idealist to the rank of founder of the "epistemology of modern science"!

On page 284 of the *Analysis of Sensations*, Mach mentions the "kindred" (to Buddhism and Machism) American philosopher, Paul Carus. Carus, who calls himself an "admirer and personal friend" of Mach, edits in Chicago *The Monist*, a journal devoted to philosophy, and *The Open Court*,[79] a journal devoted to the propagation of religion. "Science is divine revelation," say the editors of this popular little journal, and they express the opinion that science can bring about a reform of the church that will retain "all that is true and good in religion". Mach is a regular contributor to *The Monist* and publishes in it individual chapters from his latest works. Carus corrects Mach "ever so little" *à la* Kant, and declares that Mach "is an idealist or, as we would

* William Kingdon Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, 3rd ed., London, 1901, Vol. II, pp. 55, 65, 69: "On this point I agree entirely with Berkeley and not with Mr. Spencer" (p. 58), "The object, then, is a set of changes *in* my consciousness, and not anything out of it" (p. 52).

say, a subjectivist". "There are, no doubt, differences between Mach's views and mine", although "I at once recognised in him a kindred spirit".* "Our monism," says Carus, "is not materialistic, not spiritualistic, not agnostic; it merely means consistency ... it takes experience as its basis and employs as method the systematic forms of the relations of experience" (evidently a plagiarism from Bogdanov's *Empirio-monism*!). Carus' motto is: "Not agnosticism, but positive science, not mysticism, but clear thinking, not super-naturalism, not materialism, but a monistic view of the world, not a dogma, but religion, not creed, but faith." And in conformity with this motto Carus preaches a "new theology", a "scientific theology", or theonomy, which denies the literalness of the bible but insists that "all truth is divine and God reveals himself in science as he does in history."** It should be remarked that Kleinpeter, in his book on the theory of knowledge of modern science already referred to, recommends Carus, together with Ostwald, Avenarius and the immanentists (S. 151-52). When Haeckel issued his theses for a Monistic Alliance, Carus vigorously opposed him on the ground, firstly, that Haeckel wrongfully attempts to refute apriorism, which is "quite in keeping with scientific philosophy"; secondly, that Haeckel's doctrine of determinism "excludes the possibility of free will"; thirdly, that Haeckel is mistaken "in emphasising the one-sided view of the naturalist against the traditional conservatism of the churches. Thus he appears as an enemy to the existing churches instead of rejoicing at their higher development into a new and truer interpretation of their dogmas..." (ibid., Vol. XVI, 1906, p. 122). Carus himself admits that "I appear reactionary to many free-thinkers who blame me for not joining their chorus in denouncing all religion as superstition" (355).

It is quite evident that we have here a leader of a gang of American literary rascals who are engaged in doping the people with religious opium. Mach and Kleinpeter joined this gang evidently as the result of a slight "misconception".

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* *The Monist*,[80] Vol. XVI, 1906, July; P. Carus, "Professor Mach's Philosophy", pp. 320, 345, 333. The article is a reply to an article by Kleinpeter which appeared in the same journal.

** Ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 24, et seq., "Theology as a Science", an article by Carus.

5. A. BOGDANOV'S "EMPIRIO-MONISM"

"I personally," writes Bogdanov of himself, "know so far of only one empirio-monist in literature—a certain A. Bogdanov. But I know him very well and can answer for it that his views fully accord with the sacramental formula of the primacy of nature over mind. Namely, he regards all that exists as a continuous chain of development, the lower links of which are lost in the chaos of elements, while the higher links, known to us, represent the *experience of men* [Bogdanov's italics]—psychical and, still higher, physical experience. This experience, and the knowledge arising therefrom, correspond to what is usually called mind" (*Empirio-monism*, III, xii).

What Bogdanov ridicules here as a "sacramental" formula is the well-known proposition of Engels, whom Bogdanov, however, diplomatically avoids mentioning! We do not differ from Engels, oh, no!

But let us examine more carefully Bogdanov's own summary of his famous "empirio-monism" and "substitution". The physical world is called the *experience of men* and it is declared that physical experience is "*higher*" in the chain of development than psychical. But this is utter nonsense! And it is precisely the kind of nonsense that is characteristic of all idealist philosophies. It is simply farcical for Bogdanov to class this "system" as materialism. With me, too, he says, nature is primary and mind secondary. If Engels' definition is to be thus construed, then Hegel is also a materialist, for with him, too, psychical experience (under the title of the Absolute Idea) comes first, then follow, "higher", the physical world, nature, and, lastly, human knowledge, which through nature apprehends the Absolute Idea. Not a single idealist will deny the primacy of nature taken in this sense, for it is not a genuine primacy, since in fact nature is not taken as the *immediately* given, as the starting-point of epistemology. Nature is in fact reached as the result of a long transition, *through abstractions* of the "psychical". It is immaterial what these abstractions are called: whether Absolute Idea, Universal *Self*, World Will, and so on and so forth. These terms distinguish the different *varieties* of idealism, and such varieties exist in countless

numbers. The essence of idealism is that the psychical is taken as the starting-point; from it external nature is deduced, *and only then* is the ordinary human consciousness deduced from nature. Hence, this primary "psychical" always turns out to be a *lifeless abstraction* concealing a diluted theology. For instance, everybody knows what a human *idea* is; but an idea independent of man and prior to man, an idea in the abstract, an Absolute Idea, is a theological invention of the idealist Hegel. Everybody knows what human sensation is; but sensation independent of man, prior to man, is nonsense, a lifeless abstraction, an idealist artifice. And it is precisely to such an idealistic artifice that Bogdanov resorts when he constructs the following ladder.

1) The chaos of "elements" (we know that no other human concept than *sensation* is concealed behind the word "element").

2) The psychical experience of men.

3) The physical experience of men.

4) "The knowledge arising therefrom."

There are no sensations (human) without man. Hence the first rung of this ladder is a lifeless idealist abstraction. As a matter of fact, what we have here is not the usual *human* sensations familiar to all, but fictitious sensations, *nobody's* sensations, sensations *in general*, divine sensations—just as the ordinary human idea became divine with Hegel when it was divorced from man and man's brain.

So away with the first rung!

Away also with the second rung, for the *psychical before* the physical (and Bogdanov places the second rung *before* the third) is something unknown to man or science. The physical world existed before the psychical could have appeared, for the latter is the highest product of the highest forms of organic matter. Bogdanov's second rung is also a lifeless abstraction, it is thought without brain, human reason divorced from man

Only when we throw out the first two rungs, and only then, can we obtain a picture of the world that truly corresponds to natural science and materialism. Namely: 1) the physical world exists *independently* of the mind of man and existed long *prior to* man, *prior to* any "human experience";

2) the psychical, the mind, etc., is the highest product of matter (i.e., the physical), it is a function of that particularly complex fragment of matter called the human brain.

"The realm of substitution," writes Bogdanov, "coincides with the realm of physical phenomena; for the psychical phenomena we need substitute nothing, because they are immediate complexes" (p. xxxix).

And this precisely is idealism; for the psychical, i.e., consciousness, idea, sensation, etc., is taken as the *immediate* and the physical is deduced from it, substituted for it. The world is the *non-ego* created by the *ego*, said Fichte. The world is Absolute Idea, said Hegel. The world is will, said Schopenhauer. The world is concept and idea, says the immanentist Rehmke. Being is consciousness, says the immanentist Schuppe. The physical is a substitution for the psychical, says Bogdanov. One must be blind not to perceive the identical idealist essence under these various verbal cloaks.

"Let us ask ourselves the following question," writes Bogdanov in Book I of *Empirio-monism* (pp. 128-29): "What is a 'living being', for instance, 'man'?" And he answers: "'Man' is primarily a definite complex of 'immediate experiences'. [Mark, "*primarily*"!] *Then*, in the further development of experience, 'man' becomes both for himself and for others a physical body amidst other physical bodies."

Why, this is a sheer "complex" of absurdities, fit only for deducing the immortality of the soul, or the idea of God, and so forth. Man is primarily a complex of immediate experiences and in the course of *further development* becomes a physical body! That means that there are "immediate experiences" *without* a physical body, *prior to* a physical body! What a pity that this magnificent philosophy has not yet found acceptance in our theological seminaries! There its merits would have been fully appreciated.

"...We have admitted that physical nature itself is a *product* [Bogdanov's italics] of complexes of an immediate character (to which psychical co-ordinations also belong), that it is the reflection of such complexes in others, analogous to them, but of the most complex type (in the socially-organised experience of living beings)" (146).

A philosophy which teaches that physical nature itself is a product, is a philosophy of clericalism pure and simple. And its character is in no wise altered by the fact that Bogdanov himself emphatically repudiates all religion. Dühring was also an atheist; he even proposed to prohibit religion in his "socialitarian" order. Nevertheless, Engels was absolutely right in pointing out that Dühring's "system" could not be made to hang together without religion.[81] The same is true of Bogdanov, with the essential difference that the quoted passage is not a chance inconsistency but the very essence of his "empirio-monism" and of all his "substitution". If nature is a product, it is obvious that it can be a product only of something that is greater, richer, broader, mightier than nature, of something that exists; for in order to "produce" nature, it must exist independently of nature. That means that something exists *outside* nature, something which moreover *produces* nature. In plain language this is called God. The idealist philosophers have always sought to change this latter name, to make it more abstract, more vague and at the same time (for the sake of plausibility) to bring it nearer to the "psychical", as an "immediate complex", as the immediately given which requires no proof. Absolute Idea, Universal Spirit, World Will, "*general substitution*" of the psychical for the physical, are different formulations of one and the same idea. Every man knows, and science investigates, idea, mind, will, the psychical, as a function of the normally operating human brain. To divorce this function from matter organised in a definite way, to convert this function into a universal, general abstraction, to "substitute" this abstraction for the whole of physical nature, this is the raving of philosophical idealism and a mockery of science.

Materialism says that the "socially-organised experience of living beings" is a product of physical nature, a result of a long development of the latter, of development from a state of physical nature when no society, organisation, experience, or living beings existed or could have existed. Idealism says that physical nature is a product of this experience of living beings, and in saying this, idealism is equating (if not subordinating) nature to God. For God is undoubtedly a product of the socially-organised experience

of living beings. No matter from what angle you look at it, Bogdanov's philosophy contains nothing but a reactionary muddle.

Bogdanov thinks that to speak of the social organisation of experience is "cognitive socialism" (Bk. III, p. xxxiv). This is insane twaddle. If socialism is thus regarded, the Jesuits are ardent adherents of "cognitive socialism", for the starting-point of their epistemology is divinity as "socially-organised experience". And there can be no doubt that Catholicism is a socially-organised experience; only, it reflects not objective truth (which Bogdanov denies, but which science reflects), but the exploitation of the ignorance of the masses by definite social classes.

But why speak of the Jesuits! We find Bogdanov's "cognitive socialism" in its entirety among the immanentists, so beloved of Mach. Leclair regards nature as the consciousness of "mankind" (*Der Realismus*, *etc.*, S. 55), but not of the individual. The bourgeois philosophers will serve you up any amount of such Fichtean cognitive socialism. Schuppe also emphasises *das generische*, *das gattungsmässige Moment des Bewusstseins* (*Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Bd. XVII, S. 379-80), i.e., the general, the generic factor of consciousness. To think that philosophical idealism vanishes when the consciousness of mankind is substituted for the consciousness of the individual, or the socially-organised experience for the experience of one person, is like thinking that capitalism vanishes when one capitalist is replaced by a joint-stock company.

Our Russian Machists, Yushkevich and Valentinov, echo the materialist Rakhmetov in asserting that Bogdanov is an idealist (at the same time foully abusing Rakhmetov himself). But they were incapable of thinking where this idealism came from. They make out that Bogdanov is an individual and chance phenomenon, an isolated case. This is not true. Bogdanov personally may think that he has invented an "original" system, but one has only to compare him with the above-mentioned disciples of Mach to realise the falsity of such an opinion. The difference between Bogdanov and Cornelius is far less than the difference between Cornelius and Carus. The difference between Bogdanov and Carus is less (as far as their philosophical systems are

concerned, of course, and not the deliberateness of their reactionary implications) than the difference between Carus and Ziehen, and so on. Bogdanov is only one of the manifestations of that "socially-organised experience" which testifies to the growth of Machism into idealism. Bogdanov (we are here, of course, speaking *exclusively* of Bogdanov as a philosopher) could not have made his appearance had the doctrines of his teacher Mach contained no "elements" ... of Berkeleianism. And I cannot imagine a more "terrible vengeance" on Bogdanov than to have his *Empirio-monism* translated, say, into German and presented for review to Leclair and Schubert-Soldern, Cornelius and Kleinpeter, Carus and Pillon (the French collaborator and disciple of Renouvier). The compliments that would be paid by these outright comrades-in-arms and, at times, direct followers of Mach to the "substitution" would be more eloquent than their arguments.

However, it would scarcely be correct to regard Bogdanov's philosophy as a finished and static system. In the nine years from 1899 to 1908, Bogdanov has gone through four stages in his philosophical peregrinations. At the beginning he was a "natural-historical" materialist (i.e., semi-unconsciously and instinctively faithful to the spirit of natural science). His *Fundamental Elements of the Historical Outlook on Nature* bears obvious traces of that stage. The second stage was the "energetics" of Ostwald, which was so fashionable in the latter nineties, a muddled agnosticism which at times stumbled into idealism. From Ostwald (the title-page of Ostwald's *Lectures on Natural Philosophy* bears the inscription: "Dedicated to E. Mach") Bogdanov went over to Mach, that is, he borrowed the fundamental premises of a subjective idealism that is as inconsistent and muddled as Mach's entire philosophy. The fourth stage is an attempt to eliminate some of the contradictions of Machism, and to create a semblance of objective idealism. "The theory of general substitution" shows that Bogdanov has described a curve of almost 180° from his starting position. Is this stage of Bogdanov's philosophy more remote or less remote from dialectical materialism than the previous stages? If Bogdanov remains in one place, then it is, of course, more remote. If he keeps moving along the same curve in

which he has been moving for the last nine years, it is less remote. He now has *only* one serious step to make in order to return once more to materialism, namely, universally to discard his whole universal substitution. For this universal substitution gathers into one Chinese pigtail all the transgressions of half-hearted idealism and all the weaknesses of consistent subjective idealism, just as (*si licet parva componere magnis!*—if it is permissible to compare the great with the small) Hegel's "Absolute Idea" gathered together all the contradictions of Kantian idealism and all the weaknesses of Fichteanism. Feuerbach had to make *only* one serious step in order to return to materialism, namely, universally to discard, absolutely to eliminate, the Absolute Idea, that Hegelian "substitution-of the psychical" for physical nature. Feuerbach cut off the Chinese pigtail of philosophical idealism, in other words, he took nature as the basis without any "substitution" whatever.

We must wait and see whether the Chinese pigtail of Machist idealism will go on growing for much longer.

6. THE "THEORY OF SYMBOLS" (OR HIEROGLYPHS) AND THE CRITICISM OF HELMHOLTZ

As a supplement to what has been said above of the idealists as the comrades-in-arms and successors of empirio-criticism, it will be appropriate to dwell on the character of the Machist criticism of certain philosophical propositions touched upon in our literature. For instance, our Machist would-be Marxists fastened with glee on Plekhanov's "hieroglyphs", that is, on the theory that man's sensations and ideas are not copies of real things and processes of nature, not their images, but conventional signs, symbols, hieroglyphs, and so on.[82] Bazarov ridicules this hieroglyphic materialism; and, it should be stated, *he would be right* in doing so if he rejected hieroglyphic materialism in favour of non-hieroglyphic *materialism*. But Bazarov here again resorts to a sleight-of-hand and palms off his renunciation of materialism as a criticism of "hieroglyphism". Engels speaks neither of symbols nor of hieroglyphs, but of copies, photographs, images, mirror-reflections of things. Instead of pointing out the erroneousness of Plekhanov's

deviation from Engels' formulation of materialism, Bazarov uses Plekhanov's error in order to conceal Engels' truth from the reader.

To make clear both Plekhanov's error and Bazarov's confusion we shall refer to an important advocate of the "theory of symbols" (calling a symbol a hieroglyph changes nothing), Helmholtz, and shall see how he was criticised by the materialists and by the idealists in conjunction with the Machists.

Helmholtz, a scientist of the first magnitude, was as inconsistent in philosophy as are the great majority of natural scientists. He tended toward Kantianism, but in his epistemology he did not adhere consistently even to this standpoint. Here for instance are same passages on the subject of the correspondence of ideas and objects from his *Physiological Optics**: "I have ... designated sensations as merely *symbols* for the relations of the external world and I have denied that they have any similarity or equivalence to what they represent" (French translation, p. 579; German original, p. 442). This is agnosticism, but on the same page further on we read: "Our concepts and ideas are *effects* wrought on our nervous system and our consciousness by the objects that are perceived and apprehended." This is materialism. But Helmholtz is not clear as to the relation between absolute and relative truth, as is evident from his subsequent remarks. For instance, a little further on he says: "I therefore think that there can be no possible meaning in speaking of the truth of our ideas save as a *practical* truth. Our ideas of things *cannot be* anything but symbols, naturally given signs for things, which we learn to use in order to regulate our movements and actions. When we have learned to read these symbols rightly we are in a position with their aid to direct our actions so as to achieve the desired result...." This is not correct. Helmholtz here lapses into subjectivism, into a denial of objective reality and objective truth. And he arrives at a flagrant untruth when he concludes the paragraph with the words: "An idea and the object it represents obviously belong to two entirely different worlds...." Only the Kantians thus divorce idea from reality, consciousness

* Helmholtz, *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik.—Ed.*

from nature. However, a little further on we read: "As to the properties of the objects of the external world, a little reflection will show that all the properties we may attribute to them merely signify the *effects* wrought by them either on our senses or on other natural objects" (French ed., p. 581; German original, p. 445; I translate from the French). Here again Helmholtz reverts to the materialist position. Helmholtz was an inconsistent Kantian, now recognising *a priori* laws of thought, now tending towards the "transcendental reality" of time and space (i.e., to a materialist conception of them); now deriving human sensations from external objects acting on our sense-organs, and now declaring sensations to be only symbols, i.e., certain arbitrary signs divorced from the "entirely different" world of the things signified (cf. Victor Heyfelder, *Ueber den Begriff der Erfahrung bei Helmholtz*, Berlin, 1897).

In a speech delivered in 1878 on "Facts in Perception" ("a noteworthy pronouncement from the realistic camp", as Leclair characterised this speech) Helmholtz expressed his views as follows: "Our sensations are indeed effects wrought by external causes in our organs, and the manner in which such effects manifest themselves, of course, depends very essentially on the nature of the apparatus on which these effects are wrought. Inasmuch as the quality of our sensation informs us of the properties of the external action by which this sensation is produced, the latter can be regarded as its *sign* (*Zeichen*), but not as its *image*. For a certain resemblance to the object imaged is demanded of an image.... But a sign need not resemble that of which it is a sign..." (*Vorträge und Reden*, 1884, Bd. II, S. 226). If sensations are not images of things, but only signs or symbols which have "no resemblance" to them, then Helmholtz's initial materialist premise is undermined; the existence of external objects becomes subject to doubt; for signs or symbols may quite possibly indicate imaginary objects, and everybody is familiar with instances of *such* signs or symbols. Helmholtz, following Kant, attempts to draw something like an absolute boundary between the "phenomenon" and the "thing-in-itself". Helmholtz harbours an insuperable prejudice against straightforward, clear, and open materialism. But a little further on he himself says: "I do not see how one could re-

fute a system even of the most extreme subjective idealism that chose to regard life as a dream. One might declare it to be highly improbable and unsatisfactory—I myself would in this connection subscribe to the severest expressions of repudiation—yet it could be constructed consistently.... The realistic hypothesis, on the contrary, trusts the evidence (*Aussage*) of ordinary self-observation, according to which the changes of perception that follow an action have no psychical connection with the preceding impulse of volition. This hypothesis regards everything that seems to be substantiated by our everyday perception, viz., the material world outside of us, as existing independently of our ideas" (242-43). "Undoubtedly, the realistic hypothesis is the simplest we can construct; it has been tested and verified in an extremely broad field of application; it is sharply defined in its several parts and, therefore, it is in the highest degree useful and fruitful as a basis of action" (243). Helmholtz's agnosticism also resembles "shamefaced materialism", with certain Kantian twists, in distinction to Huxley's Berkeleian twists.

Albrecht Rau, a follower of Feuerbach, therefore vigorously criticises Helmholtz's theory of symbols as an inconsistent deviation from "realism". Helmholtz's basic view, says Rau, is a realistic hypothesis, according to which "we apprehend the objective properties of things with the help of our senses".* The theory of symbols cannot be reconciled with such a view (which, as we have seen, is wholly materialist), for it implies a certain distrust of perception, a distrust of the evidence of our sense-organs. It is beyond doubt I that an image can never wholly compare with the model, but an image is one thing, a symbol, a *conventional sign*, another. The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it "images". "Conventional sign", symbol, hieroglyph are concepts which introduce an entirely unnecessary element of agnosticism. Albrecht Rau, therefore, is perfectly right in saying that Helmholtz's theory of symbols pays tribute to Kantianism. "Had Helmholtz," says Rau, "remained true to his realistic conception, had he consistently adhered to the basic principle that the

* Albrecht Rau, *Empfinden und Denken*, Giessen, 1896, S. 304.

properties of bodies express the relations of bodies to each other and also to us, he obviously would have had no need of the whole theory of symbols; he could then have said, briefly and clearly: the sensations which are produced in us by things are reflections of the nature of those things" (ibid., p. 320).

That is the way a materialist criticises Helmholtz. He rejects Helmholtz's hieroglyphic or symbolic materialism or semi-materialism in favour of Feuerbach's consistent materialism.

The idealist Leclair (a representative of the "immanentist school", so dear to Mach's heart and mind) also accuses Helmholtz of inconsistency, of wavering between materialism and spiritualism. (*Der Realismus*, *etc.*, S. 154.) But for Leclair the theory of symbols is not insufficiently materialistic but too materialistic. Leclair says: "Helmholtz thinks that the perceptions of our consciousness offer sufficient support for the cognition of sequence in time as well as of the identity or difference of transcendental causes. This in Helmholtz's opinion is sufficient for the assumption and cognition of law in the realm of the transcendental" (i.e., in the realm of the objectively real) (p. 33). And Leclair thunders against this "dogmatic prejudice of Helmholtz's". "Berkeley's God," he exclaims, "as the hypothetical cause of the conformity to *natural law* of the ideas in our mind is at least just as capable of satisfying our need of causality as a world of external objects" (34). "A consistent application of the theory of symbols ... can achieve nothing without a generous admixture of vulgar realism" (i.e., materialism) (p. 35).

That is how a "critical idealist" criticised Helmholtz for his materialism in 1879. Twenty years later, in his article "The Fundamental Views of Ernst Mach and Heinrich Hertz on Physics",* Kleinpeter, the disciple of Mach so highly praised by his teacher, refuted in the following way the "antiquated" Helmholtz with the aid of Mach's "recent" philosophy. Let us for the moment leave aside Hertz (who, in fact, was as inconsistent as Helmholtz) and examine Klein-

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* *Archiv für Philosophie*,[83] II, *Systematische Philosophie*, Bd. V, 1899, S. 163-64.

peter's comparison of Mach and Helmholtz. Having quoted a number of passages from the works of both writers, and having particularly stressed Mach's well-known statements to the effect that bodies are mental symbols for complexes of sensations and so on, Kleinpeter says:

"If we follow Helmholtz's line of thought, we shall encounter the following basic postulates:

"1) There exist objects of the external world.

"2) A change in these objects is inconceivable without the action of some cause (which is thought of as real).

"3) 'Cause, according to the original meaning of the word, is the unchangeable residue or being behind the changing phenomena, namely, matter and the law of its action, force.' [Kleinpeter's quotation from Helmholtz.]

"4) It is possible to deduce all phenomena from their causes in a logically strict and unambiguous way.

"5) The achievement of this end is equivalent to the possession of objective truth, the acquisition (*Erlangung*) of which is thus regarded as conceivable" (163).

Rendered indignant by these postulates, by their contradictoriness and the creation of insoluble problems, Kleinpeter remarks that Helmholtz does not hold strictly to these views and sometimes employs "turns of speech which are somewhat suggestive of Mach's purely logical understanding of such words" as matter, force, causality, etc.

"It is not difficult to find the source of our dissatisfaction with Helmholtz, if we recall Mach's fine, clear words. The false understanding of the words mass, force, etc., is the basic weakness of Helmholtz's whole argument. These are only concepts, products of our imagination and not realities existing outside thought. We are not even in a position to know such things. From the observation of our senses we are in general unable, owing to their imperfection, to make even a single uniquely determined conclusion. We can never assert, for instance, that upon reading a certain scale (*durch Ablesen einer Skala*) we shall obtain a definite figure: there are always, within certain limits, an infinite number of possible figures all equally compatible with the facts of observation. And to have knowledge of something real lying outside us—that is for us quite impossible. Let us assume, however, that it were possible, and that we did get to know

reality; in that case we should have no right to apply the laws of logic to it, for they are *our* laws, applicable only to *our* conceptions, to *our* mental products [Kleinpeter's italics]. Between facts there is no logical connection, but only a simple succession; apodictic assertions are here unthinkable. It is therefore incorrect to say that one fact is the cause of another and, consequently, the whole deduction built up by Helmholtz on this conception falls to the ground. Finally, the attainment of objective truth, i.e., truth existing independently of any subject, is impossible, not only because of the nature of our senses, but also because as men (*wir als Menschen*) we can in general have no notion of what exists quite independently of us" (164).

As the reader sees, our disciple of Mach, repeating the favourite phrases of his teacher and of Bogdanov, who does not own himself a Machist, rejects Helmholtz's whole philosophy, rejects it from the idealist standpoint. The theory of symbols is not even especially singled out by the idealist, who regards it as an unimportant and perhaps accidental deviation from materialism. And Helmholtz is chosen by Kleinpeter as a representative of the "traditional views in physics", "views shared to this day by the majority of physicists" (160).

The result we have arrived at is that Plekhanov was guilty of an obvious mistake in his exposition of materialism, but that Bazarov completely muddled the matter, mixed up materialism with idealism and put forward in opposition to the "theory of symbols" or "hieroglyphic materialism" the idealist nonsense that "sense-perception is the reality existing outside us". From the Kantian Helmholtz, just as from Kant himself, the materialists went to the left, the Machists to the right.

7. TWO KINDS OF CRITICISM OF DÜHRING

Let us note another characteristic feature in the Machists' incredible distortion of materialism. Valentinov endeavours to beat the Marxists by comparing them to Büchner, who supposedly has much in common with Plekhanov, although Engels sharply dissociated himself from Büchner. Bogdanov, approaching the same question from another an-

gle, defends, as it were, the "materialism of the natural scientists", which, he says, "is usually spoken of with a certain contempt" (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. x). Both Valentinov and Bogdanov are wretchedly muddled on this question. Marx and Engels always "spoke contemptuously" of bad socialists; but from this it follows that they demanded the teaching of correct socialism, scientific socialism, and not a flight from socialism to bourgeois views. Marx and Engels always condemned *bad* (and, particularly, anti-dialectical) materialism; but they condemned it from the standpoint of a higher, more advanced, dialectical *materialism*, and not from the standpoint of Humism or Berkeleianism. Marx, Engels and Dietzgen would discuss the bad materialists, reason with them and seek to correct their erros. But they would not even discuss the Humeans and Berkeleians, Mach and Avenarius, confining themselves to a single still more contemptuous remark about their trend *as a whole*. Therefore, the endless faces and grimaces made by our Machists over Holbach and Co., Büchner and Co., etc., are absolutely nothing but an attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the public, a cover for the departure of Machism as a whole from the very foundations of materialism in general, and a fear to take up a straightforward and clear position with regard to Engels.

And it would be hard to express oneself more clearly on the French materialism of the eighteenth century and on Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott, than Engels does at the end of Chapter II of his *Ludwig Feuerbach*. It is *impossible* not to understand Engels, unless one deliberately *wishes* to distort him. Marx and I are materialists—says Engels in this chapter, explaining what *fundamentally* distinguishes all schools of materialism from *the whole camp* of the idealists, from all the Kantians and Humeans in general. And Engels *reproaches Feuerbach for a certain pusillanimity*, a certain frivolity of thought, as expressed in his rejection at times of materialism in general because of the mistakes of one or another school of materialists. Feuerbach "should not have confounded the doctrines of these itinerant preaches [Büchner and Co.] with materialism in general,"[84] says Engels (S. 21). Only minds that are spoilt by reading and credulously accepting the doctrines of the German reactionary pro-

fessors could have *misunderstood* the nature of *such* reproaches levelled by Engels at Feuerbach.

Engels says very clearly that Büchner and Co. "by no means overcame the limitations of their teachers", i.e., the materialists of the eighteenth century, that they had not made a single *step forward*. And it is for this, and *this alone*, that Engels took Büchner and Co. to task; not for their materialism, as the ignoramuses think, but because they did not *advance* materialism, because "*they did not in the least make it their business to develop the theory* [of materialism] *any further*". It was for *this alone* that Engels took Büchner and Co. to task. And thereupon *point by point* Engels enumerates *three* fundamental "limitations" (*Beschränktheit*) of the French materialists of the eighteenth century, from which Marx and Engels had emancipated themselves, but from which Büchner and Co. were unable to emancipate themselves. The first limitation was that the views of the old materialists were "mechanical", *in the sense* that they believed in "the exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature" (S. 19). We shall see in the next chapter that failure to understand these words of Engels' caused certain people to succumb to idealism through the new physics. Engels does not reject *mechanical* materialism for the faults attributed to it by physicists of the "recent" idealist (alias Machist) trend. The second limitation was the metaphysical character of the views of the old materialists, meaning the "*anti-dialectical character of their philosophy*". This limitation is fully shared with Büchner and Co. by our Machists, who, as we have seen, entirely failed to understand Engels' application of dialectics to epistemology (for example, absolute and relative truth). The third limitation was the preservation of idealism "up above", in the realm of the social sciences, a non-understanding of historical materialism.

Having enumerated these three "limitations" and explained them with exhaustive clarity (S. 19-21), Engels *then and there* adds that they (Büchner and Co.) did not emerge "*from these limits*" (*über diese Schranken*).

Exclusively for these three things and *exclusively* within these limits, does Engels refute both the materialism of the eighteenth century and the doctrines of Büchner and Co.!

On all other, more elementary, questions of materialism (questions distorted by the Machists) *there is and can be no difference* between Marx and Engels on the one hand and all these old materialists on the other. It was only the Russian Machists who brought confusion into this perfectly clear question, since for their West-European teachers and co-thinkers the radical difference between the line of Mach and Co. and the line of the materialists generally is quite obvious. Our Machists found it necessary to confuse the issue in order to represent their break with Marxism and their desertion to the camp of bourgeois philosophy as "minor corrections"—of Marxism!

Take Dühring. It is hard to imagine anything more contemptuous than the opinion of him expressed by Engels. But *at the same time that Dühring was criticised by Engels*, just see *how he was criticised by Leclair*, who praises Mach's "revolutionising philosophy". Leclair regards Dühring as the "*extreme Left*" of materialism, which "without any evasion declares sensation, as well as every activity of consciousness and intelligence in general, to be the secretion, function, supreme flower, aggregate effect, etc., of the animal organism" (*Der Realismus, etc.*, 1879, S. 23-24).

Is it for this that Engels criticised Dühring? No. In this he was in *full agreement* with Dühring, as he was with every other materialist. He criticised Dühring from the diametrically opposite standpoint, namely, for the inconsistency of his materialism, for his idealist fancies, which left a loophole for fideism.

"Nature itself works both within ideating beings and from without, in order to create the required knowledge of the course of things by systematically producing coherent views." Leclair quotes these words of Dühring's and savagely attacks the materialism of such a point of view, the "crude metaphysics" of this materialism, the "self-deception", etc., etc. (S. 160 and 161-63).

Is it for this that Engels criticised Dühring? No. He ridiculed all pretentious language, but in recognising objective law in nature, reflected by consciousness, *Engels was fully in agreement with Dühring*, as he was with every other materialist.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"Thought is a form of reality higher than the rest.... A fundamental premise is the independence and distinction of the materially real world from the groups of manifestations of consciousness." Leclair quotes these words of Dühring's together with a number of Dühring's attacks on Kant, etc., and for this accuses Dühring of "metaphysics" (S. 218-22), of subscribing to "a metaphysical dogma", etc.

Is it for this that Engels criticised Dühring? No. That the world exists independently of the mind and that every deviation from this truth on the part of the Kantians, Humeans, Berkeleians, and so forth, is false—on this point Engels was fully in agreement with Dühring, as he was with every other materialist. Had Engels seen *from what angle* Leclair, in the spirit of Mach, criticised Dühring, he would have called both these philosophical reactionaries names *a hundred times* more contemptuous than those he called Dühring. To Leclair Dühring was the incarnation of pernicious realism and materialism (cf. also *Beiträge zu einer monistischen Erkenntnistheorie*, 1882, S. 45). In 1878, W. Schuppe, teacher and comrade-in-arms of Mach, accused Dühring of "visionary realism" (*Traumrealismus*)* in revenge for the epithet "visionary idealism" which Dühring had hurled against all idealists. For Engels, *on the contrary*, Dühring was *not a sufficiently* steadfast, clear and consistent materialist.

Marx and Engels, as well as J. Dietzgen, entered the philosophical arena at a time when materialism reigned among the advanced intellectuals in general, and in working-class circles in particular. It is therefore quite natural that they should have devoted their attention not to a repetition of old ideas but to a serious theoretical *development* of materialism, its application to history, in other words, to the *completion* of the edifice of materialist philosophy *up to its summit*. It is quite natural that in the sphere of epistemology they *confined* themselves to correcting Feuerbach's errors, to ridiculing the banalities of the materialist Dühring, to criticising the errors of Büchner (see J. Dietzgen), to emphasising what these most widely known and popular writers

* Dr. Wilhelm Schuppe, *Erkenntnistheoretische Logik*, Bonn, 1878, S. 56.

among the workers *particularly* lacked, namely, dialectics. Marx, Engels and J. Dietzgen did not worry about the elementary truths of materialism, which had been cried by the hucksters in dozens of books, but devoted all their attention to ensuring that these elementary truths should not be vulgarised, should not be over-simplified, should not lead to stagnation of thought ("materialism below, idealism above"), to forgetfulness of the *valuable* fruit of the idealist systems, Hegelian dialectics—that pearl which those farmyard cocks, the Büchners, the Dührings and Co. (as well as Leclair, Mach, Avenarius and so forth), could not pick out from the dungheap of absolute idealism.

If one envisages at all concretely these historical conditions in which the philosophical works of Engels and J. Dietzgen were written, it will be perfectly clear why they were *more concerned to dissociate* themselves from the vulgarisation of the elementary truths of materialism than to *defend* these truths themselves. Marx and Engels were similarly more concerned to dissociate themselves from the vulgarisation of the fundamental demands of political democracy than to defend these demands.

Only disciples of the philosophical reactionaries could have "failed to notice" this circumstance, and could have presented the case to their readers in such a way as to make it appear that Marx and Engels did not know what being a materialist means.

8. HOW COULD J. DIETZGEN HAVE FOUND FAVOUR WITH THE REACTIONARY PHILOSOPHERS?

The previously cited example of Helfond already contains the answer to this question, and we shall not examine the innumerable instances in which J. Dietzgen receives Helfond-like treatment at the hands of our Machists. It is more expedient to quote a number of passages from J. Dietzgen himself in order to bring out his weak points.[85]

"Thought is a function of the brain," says Dietzgen (*Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit*, 1903, S. 52; there is a Russian translation). "Thought is a product of the brain.... My desk, as the content of my thought, is identical with that thought, does not differ from it. But my desk outside

of my head is a separate object quite distinct from it" (53). These perfectly clear materialistic propositions are, however, supplemented by Dietzgen thus: "Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is also sensible, material, i.e., real.... The mind differs no more from the table, light, or sound than these things differ from each other" (54). This is obviously false. That both thought and matter are "real", i.e., exist, is true. But to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism. Basically, this is more an inexact expression of Dietzgen's, who elsewhere correctly says: "Mind and matter at least have this in common, that they exist" (80). "Thinking," says Dietzgen, "is a work of the body.... In order to think I require a substance that can be thought of. This substance is provided in the phenomena of nature and life.... Matter is the boundary of the mind, beyond which the latter cannot pass.... Mind is a product of matter, but matter is more than a product of mind..." (64). The Machists refrain from analysing such materialist arguments of the materialist Dietzgen! They prefer to fasten on passages where he is inexact and muddled. For example, he says that natural scientists can be "idealists only outside their field" (108). Whether this is so, and why it is so, on this the Machists are silent. But a page or so earlier Dietzgen recognises the "positive side of modern idealism" (106) and the "inadequacy of the materialist principle", which should rejoice the Machists. The incorrectly expressed thought of Dietzgen's consists in the fact that the difference between matter and mind is also *relative and not excessive* (107). This is true, but what follows from this is not that materialism as such is inadequate, but that metaphysical, anti-dialectical materialism is inadequate.

"Simple, scientific truth is not based on a person. It has its foundation outside [i.e., of the person], in its material; it is objective truth.... We call ourselves materialists.... Philosophical materialists are distinguished by the fact that they put the corporeal world at the beginning, at the head, and put the idea, or spirit, as the sequel, whereas their opponents, after the manner of religion, derive things from the word ... the material world from the idea" (*Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, 1903, S. 59, 62). The Machists avoid this recognition of objective truth and repetition of *Eng-*

els' definition of materialism. But Dietzgen goes on to say: "We would be equally right in calling ourselves idealists, for our system is based on the total result of philosophy, on the scientific investigation of the idea, on a clear insight into the nature of mind" (63). It is not difficult to seize upon this obviously incorrect phrase in order to deny materialism. Actually, Dietzgen's formulation is more incorrect than his basic thought, which amounts to this, that the old materialism was unable to investigate ideas scientifically (with the aid of historical materialism).

Here are Dietzgen's ideas on the old materialism. "Like our understanding of political economy, our materialism is a scientific, historical conquest. Just as definitely as we distinguish ourselves from the socialists of the past, so we distinguish ourselves from the old materialists. With the latter we have only this in common, that we acknowledge matter to be the premise, or prime base of the idea" (140). This word "only" is significant! It contains the *whole* epistemological foundation of materialism, *as distinguished from* agnosticism, Machism, idealism. But Dietzgen's attention is here concentrated on dissociating himself from vulgar materialism.

But then follows a little further on a passage that is quite incorrect: "The concept matter must be broadened. It embraces all the phenomena of reality, as well as our faculty of conceiving or explaining" (141). This is a muddle which can only lead to confusing materialism and idealism under the guise of "broadening" the former. To seize upon this "broadening" would be to forget the *basis* of Dietzgen's philosophy, the recognition of matter as the primary, "the boundary of the mind". But, as a matter of fact, a few lines further down Dietzgen corrects himself: "The whole governs the part, matter the mind.... In this sense we may love and honour the material world ... as the first cause, as the creator of heaven and earth" (142). That the conception of "matter" must also include thoughts, as Dietzgen repeats in the *Excursions* (op. cit., p. 214), is a muddle, for if such an inclusion is made, the epistemological contrast between mind and matter, idealism and materialism, a contrast upon which Dietzgen himself insists, loses all meaning. That this contrast must not be made "excessive", exaggerated, metaphysical,

is beyond dispute (and it is the great merit of the *dialectical* materialist Dietzgen that he emphasised this). The limits of the absolute necessity and absolute truth of this relative contrast are precisely those limits which define *the trend* of epistemological investigations. To operate beyond these limits with the antithesis of matter and mind, physical and mental, as though they were absolute opposites, would be a great mistake.

Dietzgen, unlike Engels, expresses his thoughts in a vague, unclear, mushy way. But apart from his defects of exposition and individual mistakes, he not unsuccessfully champions the "*materialist theory of knowledge*" (S. 222 and 271), "*dialectical materialism*" (S. 224). "The materialist theory of knowledge then," says Dietzgen, "amounts to the recognition that the human organ of perception radiates no metaphysical light, but is a piece of nature which reflects other pieces of nature" (222-23). "Our perceptive faculty is not a supernatural source of truth, but a mirror-like instrument, which reflects the things of the world, or nature" (243). Our profound Machists avoid an analysis of each individual proposition of Dietzgen's *materialist theory of knowledge*, but seize upon his *deviations* from that theory, upon his vagueness and confusion. J. Dietzgen could find favour with the reactionary philosophers because he occasionally gets muddled. And, it goes without saying, where there is a muddle there you will find Machists.

Marx wrote to Kugelmann on December 5, 1868: "A fairly long time ago he [Dietzgen] sent me a fragment of a manuscript on the 'faculty of thought' which, in spite of a certain confusion and of too frequent repetition, contains much that is excellent and—as the independent product of a working man—admirable" (Russian translation, p 53).[86] Mr. Valentinov quotes this opinion, but *it never dawned on him* to ask *what* Marx regarded as Dietzgen's *confusion*, whether it was that which brings Dietzgen close to Mach, or that which distinguishes Dietzgen from Mach. Mr. Valentinov does not ask this question because he read both Dietzgen and Marx's letters after the manner of Gogol's Petrushka. Yet it is not difficult to find the answer to this question. Marx frequently called his world outlook dialectical materialism, and Engels' "*Anti-Dühring*", *the whole of which Marx read through in*

manuscript, expounds precisely this world outlook. Hence, it should have been clear even to the Valentinovs that Dietzgen's *confusion* could lie only in *his deviation* from a consistent application of dialectics, from consistent *materialism*, in particular from *Anti-Dühring*.

Does it now dawn upon Mr. Valentinov and his brethren that what Marx could call Dietzgen's confusion is *only that which brings Dietzgen close to Mach*, who went from Kant not towards materialism, but towards Berkeley and Hume? Or was it that the materialist Marx called Dietzgen's materialist theory of knowledge confused, yet approved his deviations from materialism, that is, approved what differs from *Anti-Dühring*, which was written with his (Marx's) participation?

Whom are they trying to fool, our Machists, who desire to be regarded as Marxists and at the same time inform the world that "*their*" Mach approved of Dietzgen? Have our heroes failed to guess that Mach could approve in Dietzgen only that which Marx called confusion?

But taken as a whole, J. Dietzgen does not deserve so severe a censure. He is nine-tenths a materialist and never made any claims either to originality or to possessing a special philosophy distinct from materialism. He spoke of Marx frequently, and invariably as the *head of the trend* (*Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, S. 4—an opinion uttered in 1873; on page 95—in 1876—he emphasises that Marx and Engels "possessed the necessary philosophical school", i.e., philosophical education, on page 181—in 1886—he speaks of Marx and Engels as the "acknowledged founders" of the trend). Dietzgen was a Marxist, and Eugene Dietzgen and—alas!—Comrade P. Dauge are rendering him poor service by their invention of "naturmonismus", "Dietzgenism", etc. "Dietzgenism" as distinct from dialectical materialism is *confusion*, a *step* towards reactionary philosophy, an attempt to create a trend not from what is great in Joseph Dietzgen (and in that worker-philosopher, who discovered dialectical materialism in his own way, there is much that is great!) but *from his weak points*.

I shall confine myself to two examples in order to illustrate how Comrade P. Dauge and Eugene Dietzgen are sliding into reactionary philosophy.

In the second edition of the *Akquisit*[87] (p. 273), Dauge writes: "Even bourgeois criticism points out the connection between Dietzgen's philosophy and empirio-criticism and also the immanentist school," and further on, "especially Leclair" (a quotation from a "bourgeois criticism").

That P. Dauge values and esteems J. Dietzgen cannot be doubted. But it also cannot be doubted that he is *defaming* him by citing *without protest* the opinion of a bourgeois scribbler who classes the sworn enemy of fideism and of the professors—the "graduated flunkeys" of the bourgeoisie—with the outspoken preacher of fideism and avowed reactionary, Leclair. It is possible that Dauge repeated another's opinion of the immanentists and of Leclair without himself being familiar with the writings of these reactionaries. But let this serve him as a warning: the road *away from* Marx to the peculiarities of Dietzgen—to Mach—to the immanentists—is a road leading into a morass. To class him not only with Leclair but even with Mach is to lay stress on Dietzgen the muddlehead as distinct from Dietzgen the materialist.

I shall defend Dietzgen against Dauge. I assert that Dietzgen did not deserve the shame of being classed with Leclair. And I can cite a witness, a most authoritative one on such a question, one who is as much a reactionary, as much a fideist and "immanentist" philosopher as Leclair himself, namely, Schubert-Soldern. In 1896 he wrote: "The Social-Democrats willingly lean for support on Hegel with more or less (usually less) justification, only they materialise the Hegelian philosophy; cf. J. Dietzgen.... With Dietzgen, the absolute becomes the universal, and this becomes the thing-in-itself, the absolute subject, whose appearances are its predicates. That he [Dietzgen] thereby makes a pure abstraction the basis of the concrete process, he does not, of course, realise any more than Hegel himself did.... He frequently chaotically lumps together Hegel, Darwin, Haeckel, and natural-scientific materialism" (*Die soziale Frage*, S, xxxiii) Schubert-Soldern is a keener judge of philosophical shades than Mach, who praises everybody indiscriminately, including the Kantian Jerusalem.

Eugene Dietzgen was so simple-minded as to complain to the German public that in Russia the narrow materialists

had "insulted" Joseph Dietzgen, and he *translated* Plekhanov's and Dauge's articles on Joseph Dietzgen into German. (See Joseph Dietzgen, *Erkenntnis und Wahrheit*, Stuttgart, 1908, Appendix). The poor "naturmonist's" complaint rebounded on his own head. Franz Mehring, who may be regarded as knowing something of philosophy and Marxism, wrote in his review that *Plekhanov was essentially right as against Dauge* (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1908, No. 38, 19. Juni, Feuilleton, S. 432). That J. Dietzgen *fell into error* when he *deviated* from Marx and Engels (S. 431) is for Mehring beyond question. Eugene Dietzgen replied to Mehring in a long, plaintive note, in which he went so far as to say that J. Dietzgen might be of service "in reconciling" the "warring brothers, the orthodox and the revisionists" (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1908, No. 44, 31. Juli, S. 652).

Another warning, Comrade Dauge: the road away from Marx to "Dietzgenism" and "Machism" is a *road into the morass*, not for individuals, not for Tom, Dick and Harry, but for the trend.

And do not complain, Machist gentlemen, that I refer to "authorities"; your outcry against the authorities is simply a screen for the fact that for the socialist authorities (Marx, Engels, Lafargue, Mehring, Kautsky) you are substituting bourgeois *authorities* (Mach, Petzoldt, Avenarius and the immanentists). You would do better not to raise the question of "authorities" and "authoritarianism"!

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM

A year ago, in *Die Neue Zeit* (1906-01, No. 52), there appeared an article by Joseph Diner-Dénes entitled "Marxism and the Recent Revolution in the Natural Sciences". The defect of this article is that it ignores the epistemological conclusions which are being drawn from the "new" physics and which are of special interest to us at the present time. But it is precisely this defect which renders the point of view and the conclusions of the author particularly interesting for us. Joseph Diner-Dénes, like the present writer, holds the view of the "rank-and-file Marxist", of whom our Machists speak with such haughty contempt. For instance, Mr. Yushkevich writes that "ordinarily, the average rank-and-file Marxist calls himself a dialectical materialist" (p. 1 of his book). And now this rank-and-file Marxist, in the person of J. Diner-Dénes, has *directly* compared the recent discoveries in science, and especially in physics (X-rays, Becquerel rays, radium, etc.[88]), with Engels' *Anti-Dühring*. To what conclusion has this comparison led him? "In the most varied fields of natural science," writes Diner-Dénes, "new knowledge has been acquired, all of which tends towards that single point which Engels desired to make clear, namely, that in nature 'there are no irreconcilable contradictions', no forcibly fixed boundary-lines and distinctions', and that if contradictions and distinctions are met with in nature, it is because we alone have introduced their rigidity and absoluteness into nature." It was discovered, for instance, that light and electricity

are only manifestations of one and the same force of nature.[89] Each day it becomes more probable that chemical affinity may be reduced to electrical processes. The indestructible and non-disintegrable elements of chemistry, whose number continues to grow as though in derision of the unity of the world, prove to be destructible and disintegrable. The element radium has been converted into the element helium.[90] "Just as all the forces of nature have been reduced to one force, so all substances in nature have been reduced to *one substance*" (Diner-Dénes' italics). Quoting the opinion of one of the writers who regard the atom as only a condensation of the ether,[91] the author exclaims: "How brilliantly does this confirm the statement made by Engels thirty years ago that motion is the mode of existence of matter." "All phenomena of nature are motion, and the differences between them lie only in the fact that we human beings perceive this motion in different forms.... It is as Engels said. Nature, like history, is subject to the dialectical law of motion."

On the other hand, one cannot take up any of the writings of the Machists or about Machism without encountering pretentious references to the new physics, which is said to have refuted materialism, and so on and so forth. Whether these assertions are well founded is another question, but the connection between the new physics, or rather a definite school of the new physics, and Machism and other varieties of modern idealist philosophy is beyond doubt. To analyse Machism and at the same time to ignore this connection—as Plekhanov does[92]—is to scoff at the spirit of dialectical materialism, i.e., to sacrifice the method of Engels to the letter of Engels. Engels says explicitly that "with each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science ["not to speak of the history of mankind"], materialism has to change its form" (*Ludwig Feuerbach*, German edition, p. 19)."[93] Hence, a revision of the "form" of Engels' materialism, a revision of his natural-philosophical propositions, is not only not "revisionism", in the accepted meaning of the term, but, on the contrary, is an essential requirement of Marxism. We criticise the Machists not for making such a revision, but for their *purely revisionist* trick of betraying the *essence* of materialism under the guise of criticising its *form* and of adopting the fundamental propositions of reac-

tionary bourgeois philosophy without making the slightest attempt to deal directly, frankly and definitely with assertions of Engels' which are unquestionably of extreme importance for the given question, as, for example, his assertion that "... motion without matter is unthinkable" (*Anti-Dühring*, p. 50).[94]

It goes without saying that in examining the connection between one of the schools of modern physicists and the rebirth of philosophical idealism, it is far from being our intention to deal with specific physical theories. What interests us exclusively is the epistemological conclusions that follow from certain definite propositions and generally known discoveries. These epistemological conclusions are of themselves so insistent that many physicists are already almost reaching them. What is more, there are already various trends among physicists, and definite schools are beginning to be formed on this basis. Our object, therefore, will be confined to explaining clearly the essence of the difference between these various trends and the relation in which they stand to the fundamental lines of philosophy.

1. THE CRISIS IN MODERN PHYSICS

In his book *Value of Science*,* the famous French physicist Henri Poincaré says that there are "signs of a serious crisis" in physics, and he devotes a special chapter to this crisis (Chap. VIII, cf. p. 171). The crisis is not confined to the fact that "radium, the great revolutionary", is undermining the principle of the conservation of energy. "All the other principles are equally endangered" (180). For instance, Lavoisier's principle, or the principle of the conservation of mass, has been undermined by the electron theory of matter. According to this theory atoms are composed of very minute particles called electrons, which are charged with positive or negative electricity and "are immersed in a medium which we call the ether". The experiments of physicists provide data for calculating the velocity of the electrons and their mass (or the relation of their mass to their electric charge). The velocity proves to be compara-

* H. Poincaré, *Valeur de la science.—Ed.*

ble with the velocity of light (300,000 kilometres per second), attaining, for instance, one-third of the latter. Under such circumstances the twofold mass of the electron has to be taken into account, corresponding to the necessity of overcoming the inertia, firstly, of the electron itself and, secondly, of the ether. The former mass will be the real or mechanical mass of the electron, the latter the "electrodynamic mass which represents the inertia of the ether". And it turns out that the former mass is equal to zero. The entire mass of the electrons, or, at least, of the negative electrons, proves to be totally and exclusively electrodynamic in its origin.[95] Mass disappears. The foundations of mechanics are undermined. Newton's principle, the equality of action and reaction, is undermined, and so on.

We are faced, says Poincaré, with the "ruins" of the old principles of physics, "a general debacle of principles". It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles. Moreover, radium is very rare. But at any rate we have reached a "*period of doubt*". We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this "period of doubt": "it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature"; "whatever is not thought, is pure nothing". These deductions are idealist deductions. The break-down of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré's trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man's consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question. It is dealt with in detail by the French writer on philosophical problems, Abel Rey, in his book *The Physical Theory of the Modern Physicists* (*La théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains*, Paris, F. Alcan, 1907). True, the author himself is a positivist, i.e., a muddlehead and a semi-Machist, but in this case this is even a certain advantage, for he cannot be suspected of a desire to "slander" our Machists' idol. Rey cannot be

trusted when it comes to giving an exact philosophical definition of concepts and of materialism in particular, for Rey too is a professor, and as such is imbued with an utter contempt for the materialists (and distinguishes himself by utter ignorance of the epistemology of materialism). It goes without saying that a Marx or an Engels is absolutely non-existent for such "men of science". But Rey summarises carefully and in general conscientiously the extremely abundant literature on the subject, not only French, but English and German as well (Ostwald and Mach in particular), so that we shall have frequent recourse to his work.

The attention of philosophers in general, says the author, and also of those who, for one reason or another, wish to criticise science in general, has now been particularly attracted towards physics. "In discussing the limits and value of physical knowledge, it is in effect the legitimacy of positive science, the possibility of knowing the object, that is criticised" (pp. i-ii). From the "crisis in modern physics" people hasten to draw sceptical conclusions (p. 14). Now, what is the essence of this crisis? During the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century the physicists agreed among themselves on everything essential. "They believed in a purely mechanical explanation of nature: they assumed that physics is nothing but a more complicated mechanics, namely, a molecular mechanics. They differed only as to the methods used in reducing physics to mechanics and as to the details of the mechanism.... At present the spectacle presented by the physico-chemical sciences seems completely changed. Extreme disagreement has replaced general unanimity, and no longer does it only concern details, but leading and fundamental ideas. While it would be an exaggeration to say that each scientist has his own peculiar tendencies, it must nevertheless be noted that science, and especially physics, has, like art, its numerous schools, the conclusions of which often differ from, and sometimes are directly opposed and hostile to one another....

"From this one may judge the significance and scope of what has been called the crisis in modern physics

"Until the middle of the nineteenth century, traditional physics had assumed that it was sufficient merely to extend physics in order to arrive at a metaphysics of matter. This

physics ascribed to its theories an ontological value. And its theories were all mechanistic. The traditional mechanism [Rey employs this word in the specific sense of a system of ideas which reduces physics to mechanics] thus claimed, over and above the results of experience, a *real* knowledge of the material universe. This was not a hypothetical account of experience; it was a dogma..." (16).

We must here interrupt the worthy "positivist". It is clear that he is describing the materialist philosophy of traditional physics but does not want to call the devil (materialism) by name. Materialism to a Humean must appear to be metaphysics, dogma, a transgression of the bounds of experience, and so forth. Knowing nothing of materialism, the Humean Rey has no conception whatever of dialectics, of the difference between dialectical materialism and metaphysical materialism, in Engels' meaning of the term. Hence, the relation between absolute and relative truth, for example, is absolutely unclear to Rey.

"...The criticisms of traditional mechanism made during the whole of the second half of the nineteenth century weakened the premise of the ontological reality of mechanism. On the basis of these criticisms a philosophical conception of physics was founded which became almost traditional in philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. Science was nothing but a symbolic formula, a method of notation (*repérage*, the creation of signs, marks, symbols), and since the methods of notation varied according to the schools, the conclusion was soon reached that only that was denoted which had been previously designed (*façonné*) by man for notation (for symbolisation). Science became a work of art for dilettantes, a work of art for utilitarians: views which could with legitimacy be generally interpreted as the negation of the possibility of science. A science which is a pure artifice for acting upon nature, a mere utilitarian technique, has no right to call itself science, without perverting the meaning of words. To say that science can be nothing but such an artificial means of action is to disavow science in the proper meaning of the term.

"The collapse of traditional mechanism, or, more precisely, the criticism to which it was subjected, led to the proposition that science itself had also collapsed. From the

impossibility of adhering purely and simply to traditional mechanism it was inferred that science was impossible" (16-17).

And the author asks: "Is the present crisis in physics a temporary and external incident in the evolution of science, or is science itself making an abrupt right-about-face and definitely abandoning the path it has hitherto pursued?..."

"If the physical and chemical sciences, which in history have been essentially emancipators, collapse in a crisis that reduces them to the status of mere technically useful recipes but deprives them of all significance from the standpoint of knowledge of nature, the result must needs be a complete revolution both in the art of logic and the history of ideas. Physics loses all educational value; the spirit of positive science it represents becomes false and dangerous." Science can offer only practical recipes but no real knowledge. "Knowledge of the real must be sought and given by other means.... One must take another road, one must return to subjective intuition, to a mystical sense of reality, in a word, to the mysterious, all that of which one thought it had been deprived" (19).

As a positivist, the author considers such a view wrong and the crisis in physics only temporary. We shall presently see how Rey purifies Mach, Poincaré and Co. of these conclusions. At present we shall confine ourselves to noting the fact of the "crisis" and its significance. From the last words of Rey quoted by us it is quite clear what reactionary elements have taken advantage of and aggravated this crisis. Rey explicitly states in the preface to his work that "the fideist and anti-intellectualist movement of the last years of the nineteenth century" is seeking "to base itself on the general spirit of modern physics" (p. ii). In France, those who put faith above reason are called fideists (from the Latin *fides*, faith). Anti-intellectualism is a doctrine that denies the rights or claims of reason. Hence, in its philosophical aspect, the essence of the "crisis in modern physics" is that the old physics regarded its theories as "real knowledge of the material world", i.e., a reflection of objective reality. The new trend in physics regards theories only as symbols, signs, and marks for practice, i.e., it denies the existence of an objective reality independent of our mind and

reflected by it. If Rey had used correct philosophical terminology, he would have said: the materialist theory of knowledge, instinctively accepted by the earlier physics, has been replaced by an idealist and agnostic theory of knowledge, which, against the wishes of the idealists and agnostics, has been taken advantage of by fideism.

But Rey does not present this replacement, which constitutes the crisis, as though all the modern physicists stand opposed to all the old physicists. No. He shows that in their epistemological trends the modern physicists are divided into three schools: the energeticist or conceptualist school; the mechanistic or neo-mechanistic school, to which the vast majority of physicists still adhere; and in between the two, the critical school. To the first belong Mach and Duhem; to the third, Henri Poincaré; to the second, Kirchhoff, Helmholtz, Thomson (Lord Kelvin), Maxwell—among the older physicists—and Larmor and Lorentz among the modern physicists. What the essence of the *two* basic trends is (for the third is not independent, but intermediate) may be judged from the following words of Rey's:

"Traditional mechanism constructed a system of the material world." Its doctrine of the structure of matter was based on "elements qualitatively homogeneous and identical"; and elements were to be regarded as "immutable, impenetrable", etc. Physics "constructed a *real* edifice out of *real* materials and *real* cement. The physicist possessed *material elements*, *the causes and modes* of their action, and the *real* laws of their action" (33-38). "The changes in this view of physics consist above all in the rejection of the ontological significance of the theories and in an exaggerated emphasis on the phenomenological significance of physics." The conceptualist view operates with "pure abstractions ... and seeks a purely abstract theory which will as far as possible eliminate the hypothesis of matter.... The notion of energy thus becomes the substructure of the new physics. That is why conceptualist physics may most often be called *energeticist* physics", although this designation does not fit, for example, such a representative of conceptualist physics as Mach (p. 46).

Rey's confusion of energetics with Machism is not altogether correct, of course; nor is his assurance that the

neo-mechanistic school as well is approaching a phenomenalist view of physics (p. 48), despite the profundity of its disagreement with the conceptualists. Rey's "new" terminology does not clarify, but rather obscures matters; but we could not avoid it if we were to give the reader an idea of how a "positivist" regards the crisis in physics. Essentially, the opposition of the "new" school to the old views fully coincides, as the reader could convince himself, with Kleinpeter's criticism of Helmholtz quoted above. In his presentation of the views of the various physicists Rey reflects the indefiniteness and vacillation of their philosophical views. The *essence* of the crisis in modern physics consists in the break-down of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism. "Matter has disappeared"—one may thus express the fundamental and characteristic difficulty in relation to many particular questions which has created this crisis. Let us consider this difficulty.

2. "MATTER HAS DISAPPEARED"

Such, literally, is the expression that may be encountered in the descriptions given by modern physicists of recent discoveries. For instance, L. Houllevigue, in his book *The Evolution of the Sciences*, entitles his chapter on the new theories of matter: "Does Matter Exist?" He says: "The atom dematerialises ... matter disappears."* To see how easily fundamental philosophical conclusions are drawn from this by the Machists, let us take Valentinov. He writes: "The statement that the scientific explanation of the world can find a firm foundation '*only* in materialism' is nothing but a fiction, and what is more, an absurd fiction" (p. 67). He quotes as a destroyer of this absurd fiction Augusto Righi, the well-known Italian physicist, who says that the electron theory "is not so much a theory of electricity

* L. Houllevigue, *L'évolution des sciences*, Paris (A. Collin), 1908, pp. 63, 87, 88; cf. his article: "Les idées des physiciens sur la matière", *L'Année psychologique*,[96] 1908.

as of matter; the new system simply puts electricity in the place of matter". (Augusto Righi, *Die moderne Theorie der physikalischen Erscheinungen*, Leipzig, 1905, S. 131. There is a Russian translation.) Having quoted these words (p. 64), Mr. Valentinov exclaims:

"Why does Righi permit himself to commit this offence against sacred matter? Is it perhaps because he is a solipsist, an idealist, a bourgeois criticist, an empirio-monist, or even someone worse?"

This remark, which seems to Mr. Valentinov to annihilate the materialists by its sarcasm, only discloses his virgin innocence on the subject of philosophical materialism. Mr. Valentinov has absolutely failed to understand the *real* connection between philosophical idealism and the "disappearance of matter". *That* "disappearance of matter" of which he speaks, in imitation of the modern physicists, has no relation to the epistemological distinction between materialism and idealism. To make this clear, let us take one of the most consistent and clear of the Machists, Karl Pearson. For him the physical universe consists of groups of sense-impressions. He illustrates "our conceptual model of the physical universe" by the following diagram, explaining, however, that it takes no account of relative sizes (*The Grammar of Science*, p. 282):—



Ether-units	Prime atom	Chemical atom	Molecule (-δ)	Particle (-γ)	Body

In order to simplify his diagram, Karl Pearson entirely omits the question of the relation between ether and electricity, or positive electrons and negative electrons. But that is not important. What is important is that from Pearson's idealist standpoint "bodies" are first regarded as sense-impressions, and then the constitution of these bodies out of

particles, particles out of molecules and so forth affects the changes in the model of the physical world, but in no way affects the question of whether bodies are symbols of sensations, or sensations images of bodies. Materialism and idealism differ in their answers to the question of the *source* of our knowledge and of the relation of knowledge (and of the "mental" in general) to the *physical* world; while the question of the structure of matter, of atoms and electrons, is a question that concerns only this "physical world". When the physicists say "matter disappears" they mean that hitherto science reduced its investigations of the physical world to three ultimate concepts: matter, electricity and ether; now *only* the two latter remain. For it has become possible to reduce matter to electricity; the atom can be explained as resembling an infinitely small solar system, within which negative electrons[97] move around a positive electron[98] with a definite (and, as we have seen, enormously large) velocity. It is consequently possible to reduce the physical world from scores of elements to two or three elements (inasmuch as positive and negative electrons constitute "two essentially distinct kinds of matter", as the physicist Pellat says—Rey, op. cit., pp. 294-95). Hence, natural science leads to the "*unity of matter*" (ibid.)*—such is the real meaning of the statement about the disappearance of matter, its replacement by electricity, etc., which is leading so many people astray. "Matter disappears" means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter disappears and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are likewise disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass,[100] etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For the *sole* "property" of matter with whose recognition philosoph-

* Cf. Oliver Lodge, *Sur les électrons*, Paris, 1906, p. 159: "The electrical theory of matter", the recognition of electricity as the "fundamental substance", is "an approximate accomplishment of that to what the philosophers strove always, that is, the unity of matter"; cf. also Angusto Righi, *Ueber die Struktur der Materie*, Leipzig, 1908; J. J. Thomson, *The Corpuscular Theory of Matter*, London, 1907; P. Langevin, "La physique des électrons", *Revue générale des sciences*,[99] 1905, pp. 257-76.

ical materialism is bound up is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside the mind.

The error of Machism in general, as of the Machist new physics, is that it ignores this basis of philosophical materialism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism. The recognition of immutable elements, "of the immutable essence of things", and so forth, is not materialism, but *metaphysical*, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism. That is why J. Dietzgen emphasised that the "subject-matter of science is endless", that not only the infinite, but the "smallest atom" is immeasurable, unknowable to the end, *inexhaustible*, "for nature in all her parts has no beginning and no end" (*Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, S. 229-30). That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised *mechanical* materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether *and so on* exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the *affirmative*, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies *nothing but* objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it.

But dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another, that from our point of view is apparently irreconcilable with it, and so forth. However bizarre from the standpoint of "common sense" the transformation of imponderable ether into ponderable matter and vice versa may appear, however "strange" may seem the absence of any other kind of mass in the electron save electromagnetic mass, however extraordinary may be the fact that the mechanical laws of motion are confined only to a single sphere of natural phenomena and are subordinated to the more profound laws of electromagnetic phenomena, and so forth—

all this is but another *corroboration* of dialectical materialism. It is mainly because the physicists did not know dialectics that the new physics strayed into idealism. They combated metaphysical (in Engels', and not the positivist, i.e., Humean, sense of the word) materialism and its one-sided "mechanism", and in so doing threw out the baby with the bath-water. Denying the immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known hitherto, they ended by denying matter, i.e., the objective reality of the physical world. Denying the absolute character of some of the most important and basic laws, they ended by denying all objective law in nature and by declaring that a law of nature is a mere convention, "a limitation of expectation", "a logical necessity", and so forth. Insisting on the approximate and relative character of our knowledge, they ended by denying the object independent of the mind, reflected approximately-correctly and relatively-truthfully by the mind. And so on, and so forth, without end.

The opinions expressed by Bogdanov in 1899 regarding "the immutable essence of things", the opinions of Valentinov and Yushkevich regarding "substance", and so forth—are similar fruits of ignorance of dialectics. From Engels' point of view, the only immutability is the reflection by the human mind (when there is a human mind) of an external world existing and developing independently of the mind. No other "immutability", no other "essence", no other "absolute substance", in the sense in which these concepts were depicted by the empty professorial philosophy, exist for Marx and Engels. The "essence" of things, or "substance", is *also* relative; it expresses only the degree of profundity of man's knowledge of objects; and while yesterday the profundity of this knowledge did not go beyond the atom, and today does not go beyond the electron and ether, dialectical materialism insists on the temporary, relative, approximate character of all these *milestones* in the knowledge of nature gained by the progressing science of man. The electron is as *inexhaustible* as the atom, nature is infinite, but it infinitely *exists*. And it is this sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature's *existence* outside the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism.

Let us cite two examples of the way in which the new physics wavers unconsciously and instinctively between dialectical materialism, which remains unknown to the bourgeois scientists, and "phenomenalism", with its inevitable subjectivist (and, subsequently, directly fideist) deductions.

This same Augusto Righi, whom Mr. Valentinov was *unable* to interrogate on the question which interested him about materialism, writes in the introduction to his book: "What the electrons, or electrical atoms, really are remains even now a mystery; but in spite of this, the new theory is perhaps destined in time to achieve no small philosophical significance, since it is arriving at entirely new hypotheses regarding the structure of ponderable matter and is striving to reduce all phenomena of the external world to one common origin.

"For the positivist and utilitarian tendencies of our time such an advantage may be of small consequence, and a theory may serve in the first place only as a means of conveniently ordering and summarising facts and as a guide in the search for further phenomena. But while in former times perhaps too much confidence was placed in the faculties of the human mind, and it was considered too easy to grasp the ultimate causes of all things, there is nowadays a tendency to fall into the opposite error" (op. cit., S. 3).

Why does Righi dissociate himself here from the positivist and utilitarian tendencies? Because, while apparently he has no definite philosophical standpoint, he instinctively clings to the reality of the external world and to the recognition that the new theory is not only a "convenience" (Poincaré), not only an "empirio-symbol" (Yushkevich), not only a "harmonising of experience" (Bogdanov), or whatever else such subjectivist fancies are called, but a further step in the cognition of objective reality. Had this physicist been acquainted with *dialectical* materialism, his opinion of the error which is the opposite of the old metaphysical materialism might perhaps have become the starting-point of a correct philosophy. But these people's whole environment estranges them from Marx and Engels and throws them into the embrace of vulgar official philosophy.

Rey too is entirely unfamiliar with dialectics. But he too is compelled to state that among the modern physicists

there are those who continue the traditions of "mechanism" (i.e., materialism). The path of "mechanism", says he, is pursued not only by Kirchhoff, Hertz, Boltzmann, Maxwell, Helmholtz and Lord Kelvin. "Pure mechanists, and in some respects more mechanist than anybody else, and representing the culmination (*l'aboutissant*) of mechanism, are those who follow Lorentz and Larmor in formulating an electrical theory of matter and who arrive at a denial of the constancy of mass, declaring it to be a function of motion. *They are all mechanists because they take real motion as their starting-point*" (Rey's italics, pp. 290-91).

"...If, for example, the recent hypotheses of Lorentz, Larmor and Langevin were, thanks to certain experimental confirmation, to obtain a sufficiently stable basis for the systematisation of physics, it would be certain that the laws of present-day mechanics are nothing but a corollary of the laws of electromagnetism: they would constitute a special case of the latter within well-defined limits. Constancy of mass and our principle of inertia would be valid only for moderate velocities of bodies, the term 'moderate' being taken in relation to our senses and to the phenomena which constitute our general experience. A general recasting of mechanics would result, and hence also, a general recasting of the systematisation of physics.

"Would this imply the abandonment of mechanism? By no means. The purely mechanist tradition would still be followed, and mechanism would pursue its normal course of development" (295).

"Electronic physics, which should be ranked among the theories of a generally mechanist spirit, tends at present to impose its systematisation on physics. Although the fundamental principles of this electronic physics are not furnished by mechanics but by the experimental data of the theory of electricity, its spirit is mechanistic, because: (1) It uses *figurative* (*figurés*), *material* elements to represent physical properties and their laws; it expresses itself in terms of perception. (2) While it no longer regards physical phenomena as particular cases of mechanical phenomena, it regards mechanical phenomena as particular cases of physical phenomena. The laws of mechanics thus retain their *direct continuity* with the laws of physics, and the concepts of

mechanics remain concepts of the same order as physico-chemical concepts. In traditional mechanism it was motions copied (*calqués*) from *relatively slow* motions, which, since they alone were known and most directly observable, were taken ... as types of all possible motions. *Recent experiments*, on the contrary, show that it is necessary to *extend* our conception of possible motions. Traditional mechanics remains entirely intact, but it now applies only to relatively slow motions.... In relation to large velocities, the laws of motion are different. Matter appears to be reduced to electrical particles, the ultimate elements of the atom.... (3) Motion, displacement in space, remains the only figurative (*figuré*) element of physical theory. (4) Finally, what from the standpoint of the general spirit of physics comes before every other consideration is the fact that the conception of physics, its methods, its theories, and their relation to experience remains *absolutely identical* with the conception of mechanism, with the conception of physics held since the Renaissance" (46-47).

I have given this long quotation from Rey in full because owing to his perpetual anxiety to avoid "materialist metaphysics", it would have been impossible to expound his statements in any other way. But however much both Rey and the physicists of whom he speaks abjure materialism, it is nevertheless beyond question that mechanics was a copy of real motions of moderate velocity, while the new physics is a copy of real motions of enormous velocity. The recognition of theory as a copy, as an approximate copy of objective reality, is materialism. When Rey says that among modern physicists there "is a reaction against the conceptualist [Machist] and energeticist school", and when he includes the physicists of the electron theory among the representatives of this reaction (46), we could desire no better corroboration of the fact that the struggle is essentially between the materialist and the idealist tendencies. But we must not forget that, apart from the general prejudices against materialism common to all educated philistines, the most outstanding theoreticians are handicapped by a complete ignorance of dialectics.

3. IS MOTION WITHOUT MATTER CONCEIVABLE?

The fact that philosophical idealism is attempting to make use of the new physics, or that idealist conclusions are being drawn from the latter, is due not to the discovery of new kinds of substance and force, of matter and motion, but to the fact that an attempt is being made to conceive motion without matter. And it is the essence of this attempt which our Machists fail to examine. They were unwilling to take account of Engels' statement that "motion without matter is *unthinkable*". J. Dietzgen in 1869, in his *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind*, expressed the same idea as Engels, although, it is true, not without his usual muddled attempts to "reconcile" materialism and idealism. Let us leave aside these attempts, which are to a large extent to be explained by the fact that Dietzgen is arguing against Büchner's non-dialectical materialism, and let us examine Dietzgen's own statements on the question under consideration. He says: "They [the idealists] want to have the general without the particular, mind without matter, force without substance, science without experience or materia], the absolute without the relative" (*Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit*, 1903, S. 108). Thus the endeavour to divorce motion from matter, force from substance, Dietzgen associates with idealism, ranking it with the endeavour to divorce thought from the brain. "Liebig," Dietzgen continues, "who is especially fond of straying from his inductive science into the field of speculation, says in the spirit of idealism: 'force cannot be seen'" (109). "The spiritualist or the idealist *believes* in the spiritual, i.e., ghost-like and inexplicable, nature of force" (110). "The antithesis between force and matter is as old as the antithesis between idealism and materialism" (111). "Of course, there is no force without matter, no matter without force; forceless matter and matterless force are absurdities. If idealist natural scientists believe in the immaterial existence of forces, then on this point they are not natural scientists ... but seers of ghosts" (114).

Thus we see that scientists who were prepared to assume that motion is conceivable without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that "on this point" Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is

the connection between philosophical idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from force? Is it not "more economical", indeed, to conceive motion without matter?

Let us imagine a consistent idealist who holds, let us say, that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take "nobody's" sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas, sensations. The question as to *what* moves, the idealist will reject and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. "It moves"—and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more "economical" way of thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view.

The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation. Therefore, to divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the external world—in a word, it is to go over to idealism. The trick which is usually performed in denying matter, in assuming motion without matter, consists in ignoring the relation of matter to thought. The question is presented as though this relation did not exist, but in reality it is introduced surreptitiously; at the beginning of the argument it remains unexpressed, but subsequently crops up more or less imperceptibly.

Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw epistemological conclusions. But has thought remained?—we ask. If not, if with the disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the disappear-

ance of the brain and nervous system ideas and sensations, too, have disappeared—then it follows that everything has disappeared, and your argument as a sample of "thought" (or lack of thought) has disappeared. But if thought has remained—if it is assumed that with the disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not disappear, then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of philosophical idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for the sake of "economy", to conceive of motion without matter, for *tacitly*, by the very fact that they continue their argument, they are acknowledging the existence of thought *after* the disappearance of matter. This means that a very simple, or a very complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very simple one, if it is a case of frank solipsism (*I* exist, and the world is only *my* sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought, ideas and sensations of a living person, a dead abstraction is taken, that is, nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the Absolute Idea, the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate "element", the "psychical", which is substituted for the whole of physical nature, etc., etc. Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism are possible and it is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and to the author of this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for example) what distinguishes it from the rest may appear important. From the standpoint of materialism, however, these distinctions are absolutely unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential is that the attempt to *think* of motion without matter smuggles in *thought* divorced from matter—and that is philosophical idealism.

Therefore, for example, the English Machist Karl Pearson, the clearest and most consistent of the Machists, who is averse to verbal artifices, directly begins the seventh chapter of his book, devoted to "matter", with a section having the characteristic heading "All things move—but only in conception". "It is therefore, for the sphere of perception, idle to ask what moves and why it moves" (*The Grammar of Science*, p. 243).

Therefore, too, in the case of Bogdanov, his philosophical misadventures in fact began before his acquaintance with

Mach. They began from the moment he put his trust in the assertion of the eminent chemist, but poor philosopher, Ostwald, that motion can be thought of without matter. It is all the more fitting to dwell on this long-past episode in Bogdanov's philosophical development since it is impossible when speaking of the connection between philosophical idealism and certain trends in the new physics to ignore Ostwald's "energetics".

"We have already said," wrote Bogdanov in 1899, "that the nineteenth century did not succeed in definitively ridding itself of the problem of 'the immutable essence of things'. This essence, under the name of 'matter', holds an important place even in the world outlook of the foremost thinkers of the century" (*Fundamental Elements of the Historical Outlook on Nature*, p. 38).

We said that this is a muddle. The recognition of the objective reality of the outer world, the recognition of the existence outside our mind of eternally moving and eternally changing matter, is here confused with the recognition of the immutable essence of things. It is hardly possible that Bogdanov in 1899 did not rank Marx and Engels among the "foremost thinkers". But he obviously did not understand dialectical materialism.

"...In the processes of nature two aspects are usually still distinguished: matter and its motion. It cannot be said that the concept matter is distinguished by great clarity. It is not easy to give a satisfactory answer to the question—what is matter? It is defined as the 'cause of sensations' or as the 'permanent possibility of sensation'; but it is evident that matter is here confused with motion...."

It is evident that Bogdanov is arguing incorrectly. Not only does he confuse the materialist recognition of an objective source of sensations (unclearly formulated in the words "cause of sensations") with Mill's agnostic definition of matter as the permanent *possibility* of sensation, but the chief error here is that the author, having come within an ace of the question of the existence or non-existence of an objective source of sensations, abandons this question halfway and jumps to another question, that of the existence or non-existence of matter without motion. The idealist may regard the world as the *movement* of our sensations (even

though "socially organised" and "harmonised" to the highest degree); the materialist regards the world as the movement of an objective source, of an objective model of our sensations. The metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialist may accept the existence of matter without motion (even though temporarily, before "the first impulse.", etc.). The dialectical materialist not only regards motion as an inseparable property of matter, but also rejects the simplified view of motion and so forth.

"...The most exact definition would, perhaps, be the following: 'matter is what moves'; but this is as devoid of content as though one were to say that matter is the subject of a sentence, the predicate of which is 'moves'. The fact, most likely, is that in the epoch of statics men were wont to see something necessarily solid in the role of the subject, an 'object', and such an inconvenient thing for statical thought as 'motion' they were prepared to tolerate only as a predicate, as one of the attributes of 'matter'."

This is something like the charge Akimov brought against the Iskrists, namely, that their programme did not contain the word proletariat in the nominative case![101] Whether we say the world is moving matter, or that the world is material motion, makes no difference whatever.

"...But energy must have a vehicle—say those who believe in matter. Why?—asks Ostwald, and with reason. Must nature necessarily consist of subject and predicate?" (P. 39.)

Ostwald's answer, which so pleased Bogdanov in 1899, is plain sophistry. Must our judgements necessarily consist of electrons and ether?—one might retort to Ostwald. As a matter of fact, the mental elimination from "nature" of matter as the "subject" only implies the tacit admission into *philosophy* of *thought* as the "subject" (i.e., as the primary, the starting-point, independent of matter). Not the subject, but the objective source of sensation is eliminated, and *sensation* becomes the "subject", i.e., philosophy becomes Berkeleian, no matter in what trappings the word "sensation" is afterwards decked. Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word "energy", but this very endeavour only once again goes to prove the futility of such artifices. If energy is motion, you have only shift-

ed the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so forth? And this question proved fatal to the "energeticist" philosophy, that attempt to disguise old epistemological errors by a "new" terminology.

Here are examples of how the energeticist Ostwald got into a muddle. In the preface to his *Lectures on Natural Philosophy** he declares that he regards "as a great gain the simple and natural removal of the old difficulties in the way of uniting the concepts matter and mind by subordinating both to the concept energy". This is not a gain, but a loss, because the question whether epistemological investigation (Ostwald does not clearly realise that he is raising an epistemological and not a chemical issue!) is to be conducted along materialist or idealist lines is not being solved but is being confused by an arbitrary use of the term "energy". Of course, if we "subordinate" both matter and mind to this concept, the *verbal* annihilation of the antithesis is beyond question, but the absurdity of the belief in sprites and hobgoblins, for instance, is not removed by calling it "energetics". On page 394 of Ostwald's *Lectures* we read: "That all external events may be presented as processes between energies can be most simply explained if our mental processes are themselves energetic and impose (*aufprägen*) this property of theirs on all external phenomena." This is pure idealism: it is not our thought that reflects the transformation of energy in the external world, but the external world that reflects a "property" of our mind! The American philosopher Hibben, pointing to this and similar passages in Ostwald's *Lectures*, aptly says that Ostwald here "appears in a Kantian disguise": the explicability of the phenomena of the external world is deduced from the properties of our mind!** "It is obvious therefore," says Hibben, "that if the primary

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* Wilhelm Ostwald, *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, 2. Aufl., Leipzig, 1902, S. viii.

** J. G. Hibben, "The Theory of Energetics and Its Philosophical Bearings", *The Monist*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, April 1903, pp. 329-30.

concept of energy is so defined as to embrace psychical phenomena, we have no longer the simple concept of energy as understood and recognised in scientific circles or even among the *Energetiker* themselves....” The transformation of energy is regarded by science as an objective process independent of the minds of men and of the experience of mankind, that is to say, it is regarded materialistically. And by energy, Ostwald himself in many instances, probably in the vast majority of instances, means *material* motion.

And this accounts for the remarkable phenomenon that Bogdanov, a disciple of Ostwald, having become a disciple of Mach, began to reproach Ostwald not because he does not adhere consistently to a materialistic view of energy, but because he admits the materialistic view of energy (and at times even takes it as his basis). The materialists criticise Ostwald because he lapses into idealism, because he attempts to reconcile materialism and idealism. Bogdanov criticises Ostwald from the *idealist* standpoint. In 1906 he wrote: “...Ostwald’s energetics, hostile to atomism but for the rest closely akin to the old materialism, enlisted my warmest sympathy. I soon noticed, however, an important contradiction in his natural philosophy: although he frequently emphasises the *purely methodological* significance of the concept ‘energy’, in a great number of instances he himself fails to adhere to it. He every now and again converts ‘energy’ from a pure symbol of correlations between the facts of experience into the *substance* of experience, into the ‘world stuff’” (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, pp. xvi-xvii).

Energy is a pure symbol! After this Bogdanov may dispute as much as he pleases with the empirio-symbolist” Yushkevich, with the “pure Machists”, the empirio-criticists, etc.—from the standpoint of the materialist it is a dispute between a man who believes in a yellow devil and a man who believes in a green devil. For the important thing is not the differences between Bogdanov and the other Machists, but what they have in common: the *idealist* interpretation of “experience” and “energy”, the denial of objective reality, adaptation to which constitutes human experience and the copying of which constitutes the only scientific “methodology” and scientific “energetics”.

"It [Ostwald's energetics] is indifferent to the material of the world, it is fully compatible with both the old materialism and panpsychism" (i.e., philosophical idealism?) (p. xvii). And Bogdanov departed *from* muddled energetics *not* by the materialist road *but by the idealist* road.... "When energy is represented as substance it is nothing but the old materialism minus the absolute atoms—materialism with a correction in the sense of the *continuity* of the existing" (ibid.). Yes, Bogdanov left the "old" materialism, i.e., the metaphysical materialism of the natural scientists, not for *dialectical* materialism, which he understood as little in 1906 as he did in 1899, but for idealism and fideism; for no educated representative of modern fideism, no immanentist, no "neo-criticist", and so forth, will object to the "methodological" conception of energy, to its interpretation as a "pure symbol of correlation of the facts of experience". Take Paul Carus, with whose mental make-up we have already become sufficiently acquainted, and you will find that this Machist criticises Ostwald *in the very same way as Bogdanov*: "...Materialism and energetics," writes Carus, "are exactly in the same predicament" (*The Monist*, Vol. XVII, 1907, No. 4, p. 536). "We are very little helped by materialism when we are told that everything is matter, that bodies are matter, and that thoughts are merely a function of matter, and Professor Ostwald's energetics is not a whit better when it tells us that matter is energy, and that the soul too is only a factor of energy" (533).

Ostwald's energetics is a good example of how quickly a "new" terminology becomes fashionable, and how quickly it turns out that a somewhat altered mode of expression can in no way eliminate fundamental philosophical questions and fundamental philosophical trends. Both materialism and idealism can be expressed in terms of "energetics" (more or less consistently, of course) just as they can be expressed in terms of "experience", and the like. Energeticist physics is a source of new idealist attempts to conceive motion without matter—because of the disintegration of particles of matter which hitherto had been accounted non-disintegrable and because of the discovery of hitherto unknown forms of material motion.

4. THE TWO TRENDS IN MODERN PHYSICS, AND ENGLISH SPIRITUALISM

In order to illustrate concretely the philosophical battle raging in present-day literature over the various conclusions drawn from the new physics, we shall let certain of the direct participants in the "fray" speak for themselves, and we shall begin with the English. The physicist Arthur W. Rücker defends one trend—from the standpoint of the natural scientist; the philosopher James Ward another trend—from the standpoint of epistemology.

At the meeting of the British Association held in Glasgow in 1901, A. W. Rücker, the president of the physics section, chose as the subject of his address the question of the value of physical theory and the doubts that have been thrown on the existence of atoms, and of the ether in particular. The speaker referred to the physicists Poincaré and Poynting (an Englishman who shares the views of the symbolists, or Machists), who raised this problem, to the philosopher Ward, and to E. Haeckel's well-known book and attempted to present his own views.*

"The question at issue," said Rücker, "is whether the hypotheses which are at the base of the scientific theories now most generally accepted are to be regarded as accurate descriptions of the constitution of the universe around us, or merely as convenient fictions." (In the terms used in our controversy with Bogdanov, Yushkevich and Co.: are they copies of objective reality, of moving matter, or are they only a "methodology", a "pure symbol", mere "forms of organisation of experience"?) Rücker agrees that in practice there may prove to be no difference between the two theories; the direction of a river can be determined as well by one who examines only the blue streak on a map or diagram as by one who knows that this streak represents a real river. Theory, from the standpoint of a convenient fiction, will be an "aid to memory", a means of "producing order" in our observations in accordance with some artificial system, of "arranging

* The British Association at Glasgow, 1901. Presidential Address by Professor Arthur W. Rücker, in *The Scientific American. Supplement*, 1901, Nos. 1345 and 1346.

our knowledge", reducing it to equations, etc. We can, for instance, confine ourselves to declaring heat to be a form of motion or energy, thus exchanging "a vivid conception of moving atoms for a colourless statement as to heat energy, the real nature of which we do not attempt to define". While fully recognising the possibility of achieving great scientific successes by this method, Rücker "ventures to assert that the exposition of such a system of tactics cannot be regarded as the last word of science in the struggle for the truth". The questions still force themselves upon us: "Can we argue back from the phenomenon displayed by matter to the constitution of matter itself ... whether we have any reason to believe that the sketch which science has already drawn is to some extent a copy, and not a mere diagram of the truth?"

Analysing the problem of the structure of matter, Rücker takes air as an example, saying that it consists of gases and that science resolves "an elementary gas into a mixture of atoms and ether.... There are those who cry 'Halt!' ... molecules and atoms cannot be directly perceived ... and are mere conceptions, which have their uses, but cannot be regarded as realities". Rücker meets this objection by referring to one of numberless instances in the development of science: the rings of Saturn appear to be a continuous mass when observed through a telescope. The mathematicians proved by calculation that this is impossible and spectral analysis corroborated the conclusion reached on the basis of the calculations. Another objection: properties are attributed to atoms and ether such as our senses do not disclose in ordinary matter. Rücker answers this also, referring to such examples as the diffusion of gases and liquids, etc. A number of facts, observations and experiments prove that matter consists of discrete particles or grains. Whether these particles, atoms, are distinct from the surrounding "original medium" or "basic medium" (ether), or whether they are parts of this medium in a particular state, is still an open question, and has no bearing on the theory of the existence of atoms. There is no ground for denying *a priori* the evidence of experiments showing that "quasi-material substances" exist which differ from ordinary matter (atoms and ether). Particular errors are here inevitable, but the aggregate of scien-

tific data leaves no room for doubting the existence of atoms and molecules.

Rücker then refers to the new data on the structure of atoms out of corpuscles (electrons) charged with negative electricity, and he notes the similarities in the results of various experiments and calculations on the size of molecules: the "first approximation" gives a diameter of about 100 millimicrons (millionths of a millimetre). Omitting individual remarks of Rücker's and his criticism of neo-vitalism,[102] we quote his conclusions:

"Those who belittle the ideas which have of late governed the advance of scientific theory too often assume that there is no alternative between the opposing assertions that atoms and the ether are mere figments of the scientific imagination, or that, on the other hand, a mechanical theory of the atoms and of the ether, which is now confessedly imperfect, would, if it could be perfected, give us a full and adequate representation of the underlying realities. For my own part I believe that there is a *via media*." A man in a dark room may discern objects dimly, but if he does not stumble over the furniture and does not walk into a looking-glass instead of through a door, it means that he sees some things correctly. There is no need, therefore, either to renounce the claim to penetrate below the surface of nature, or to claim that we have already fully unveiled the mystery of the world around us. "It may be granted that we have not yet framed a consistent image either of the nature of the atoms or of the ether in which they exist; but I have tried to show that in spite of the tentative nature of some of our theories, in spite of many outstanding difficulties, the atomic theory unifies so many facts, simplifies so much that is complicated, that we have a right to insist—at all events until an equally intelligible rival hypothesis is produced—that the main structure of our theory is true; that atoms are not merely aids to puzzled mathematicians, but physical realities."

That is how Rücker ended his address. The reader will see that the speaker did not deal with epistemology, but as a matter of fact, doubtless in the name of a host of scientists, he was essentially defending an instinctive materialist standpoint. The gist of his position is this: The theory

of physics is a copy (becoming ever more exact) of objective reality. The world is matter in motion, our knowledge of which grows ever more profound. The inaccuracies of Rücker's philosophy are due to an unnecessary defence of the "mechanical" (why not electromagnetic?) theory of ether motions and to a failure to understand the relation between relative and absolute truth. This physicist lacks *only* a knowledge of *dialectical* materialism (if we do not count, of course, those very important social considerations which induce English professors to call themselves "agnostics").

Let us now see how the spiritualist James Ward criticised this philosophy: "Naturalism is not science, and the mechanical theory of Nature, the theory which serves as its foundation, is no science either.... Nevertheless, though Naturalism and the natural sciences, the Mechanical Theory of the Universe and mechanics as a science are logically distinct, yet the two are at first sight very similar and historically are very closely connected. Between the natural sciences and philosophies of the idealist (or spiritualist) type there is indeed no danger of confusion, for all such philosophies necessarily involve criticism of the epistemological assumptions which science unconsciously makes."* True! The natural sciences *unconsciously* assume that their teachings reflect objective reality, and *only* such a philosophy is reconcilable with the natural sciences! "...Not so with Naturalism, which is as innocent of any theory of knowledge as science itself. In fact Naturalism, like Materialism, is only physics treated as metaphysics.... Naturalism is less dogmatic than Materialism, no doubt, owing to its agnostic reservation as to the nature of ultimate reality; but it insists emphatically on the priority of the material aspect of its Unknowable."

The materialist treats physics as metaphysics! A familiar argument. The recognition of an objective reality outside man is termed metaphysics. The spiritualists agree with the Kantians and Humeans in such reproaches against materialism. This is understandable; for without doing away with the *objective* reality of things, bodies and objects

* James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1906, Vol. I, p. 303.

known to everyone, it is impossible to clear the road for "real conceptions" in Rehmke's sense!...

"When the essentially philosophical question, how best to systematise experience as a whole [a plagiarism from Bogdanov, Mr. Ward!], arises, the naturalist ... contends that we must begin from the physical side. Then only are the facts precise, determinate, and rigorously concatenated: every thought that ever stirred the human heart ... can, it holds, be traced to a perfectly definite redistribution of matter and motion.... That propositions of such philosophic generality and scope are legitimate deductions from physical science, few, if any, of our modern physicists are bold enough directly to maintain. But many of them consider that their science itself is attacked by those who seek to lay bare the latent metaphysics, the physical realism, on which the Mechanical Theory of the Universe rests.... The criticism of this theory in the preceding lectures has been so regarded [by Rücker].... In point of fact my criticism [of this "metaphysics", so detested by all the Machists too] rests throughout on the expositions of a school of physicists —if one might call them so—steadily increasing in number and influence, who reject entirely the almost medieval realism.... This realism has remained so long unquestioned, that to challenge it now seems to many to spell scientific anarchy. And yet it surely verges on extravagance to suppose that men like Kirchhoff or Poincaré—to mention only two out of many distinguished names—who do challenge it, are seeking 'to invalidate the methods of science'. ... To distinguish them from the old school, whom we may fairly term physical realists, we might call the new school physical symbolists. The term is not very happy, but it may at least serve to emphasise the one difference between the two which now specially concerns us. The question at issue is very simple. Both schools start, of course, from the same perceptual experiences; both employ an abstract conceptual system, differing in detail but essentially the same; both resort to the same methods of verification. But the one believes that it is getting nearer to the ultimate reality and leaving mere appearances behind it; the other believes that it is only substituting a generalised descriptive scheme that is intellectually manageable, for the complexity of con-

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crete facts.... In either view the value of physics as systematic knowledge *about* [Ward's italics] things is unaffected; its possibilities of future, extension and of practical application are in either case the same. But the speculative difference between the two is immense, and in this respect the question which is right becomes important."

The question is put by this frank and consistent spiritualist with remarkable truth and clarity. Indeed, the difference between the two schools in modern physics is *only* philosophical, only epistemological. Indeed, the basic distinction is *only* that one recognises the "ultimate" (he should have said objective) reality reflected by our theory, while the other denies it, regarding theory as only a systematisation of experience, a system of empirio-symbols, and so on and so forth. The new physics, having found new kinds of matter and new forms of its motion, raised the old philosophical questions because of the collapse of the old physical concepts. And if the people belonging to "intermediate" philosophical trends ("positivists", Humeans, Machists) are unable to put the question at issue distinctly, it remained for the outspoken idealist Ward to tear off all veils.

"...Sir A. W. Rücker ... devoted his Inaugural Address to a defence of physical realism against the symbolic interpretations recently advocated by Professors Poincaré and Poynting and by myself" (pp. 305-06; and in other parts of his book Ward adds to this list the names of Duhem, Pearson and Mach; see Vol. II, pp. 161, 63, 57, 75, 83, etc.).

"...He [Rücker] is constantly talking of 'mental pictures', while constantly protesting that atoms and ether must be more than these. Such procedure practically amounts to saying: In this case I can form no other picture, and therefore the reality must be like it.... He [Rücker] is fair enough to allow the abstract possibility of a different mental picture.... Nay, he allows 'the tentative nature of some of our theories'; he admits 'many outstanding difficulties'. After all, then, he is only defending a working hypothesis, and one, moreover, that has lost greatly in prestige in the last half century. But if the atomic and other theories of the constitution of matter are but working hypotheses, and hypotheses strictly confined to physical phenomena, there is

no justification for a theory which maintains that mechanism is fundamental everywhere and reduces the facts of life and mind to epiphenomena—makes them, that is to say, a degree more phenomenal, a degree less real than matter and motion. Such is the mechanical theory of the universe. Save as he seems unwittingly to countenance that, we have then no quarrel with Sir Arthur Rücker" (pp. 314-15).

It is, of course, sheer nonsense to say that materialism ever maintained that consciousness is "less" real, or necessarily professed a "mechanical", and not an electromagnetic, or some other, immeasurably more complex, picture of the world of *moving matter*. But in a truly tricky manner, much more skilfully than our Machists (i.e., muddled idealists), the outspoken and straightforward idealist Ward *seizes upon* the weak points in "instinctive" natural-scientific materialism, as, for instance, its inability to explain the relation of relative and absolute truth. Ward turns somersaults and declares that since truth is relative, approximate, only "tentative", it cannot reflect reality! But, on the other hand, the question of atoms, etc., as "a working hypothesis" is very correctly put by the spiritualist. Modern, cultured fideism (which Ward directly deduces from his spiritualism) *does not think of demanding* anything more than the declaration that the concepts of natural science are "working hypotheses". We will, sirs, surrender science to you scientists provided you surrender epistemology, philosophy to us—such is the condition for the cohabitation of the theologians and professors in the "advanced" capitalist countries.

Among the other points on which Ward connects his epistemology with the "new" physics must be counted his determined attack on *matter*. What is matter and what is energy?—asks Ward, mocking at the plethora of hypotheses and their contradictoriness. Is it ether or ethers?—or perhaps, some new "perfect fluid", arbitrarily endowed with new and improbable qualities? And Ward's conclusion is: "...we find nothing definite except movement left. Heat is a mode of motion, elasticity is a mode of motion, light and magnetism are modes of motion. Nay, mass itself is, in the end, supposed to be but a mode of motion of a something that is neither solid, nor liquid nor gas, that is neither

itself a body nor an aggregate of bodies, that is not phenomenal and must not be noumenal, a veritable apeiron [a term used by the Greek philosophers signifying: infinite, boundless] on which we can impose our own terms" (Vol. I, p. 140).

The spiritualist is true to himself when he divorces motion from matter. The movement of bodies is transformed in nature into a movement of something that is not a body with a constant mass, into a movement of an unknown charge of an unknown electricity in an unknown ether—this dialectics of *material* transformation, performed in the laboratory and in the factory, serves in the eyes of the idealist (as in the eyes of the public at large, and of the Machists) not as a confirmation of materialist dialectics, but as evidence against materialism: "...The mechanical theory, as a professed explanation of the world, receives its death-blow from the progress of mechanical physics itself" (143). The world is matter in motion, we reply, and the laws of its motion are reflected by mechanics in the case of moderate velocities and by the electromagnetic theory in the case of great velocities. "Extended, solid, indestructible atoms have always been the stronghold of materialistic views of the universe. But, unhappily for such views, the hard, extended atom was not equal to the demands which increasing knowledge made upon it" (144). The destructibility of the atom, its inexhaustibility, the mutability of all forms of matter and of its motion, have always been the stronghold of dialectical materialism. All boundaries in nature are conditional, relative, movable, and express the gradual approximation of our mind towards knowledge of matter. But this does not in any way prove that nature, matter itself, is a symbol, a conventional sign, i.e., the product of our mind. The electron is to the atom as a full stop in this book is to the size of a building 200 feet long, 100 feet broad, and 50 feet high (Lodge); it moves with a velocity as high as 270,000 kilometres per second; its mass is a function of its velocity; it makes 500 trillion revolutions in a second—all this is much more complicated than the old mechanics; but it is, nevertheless, movement of matter in space and time. Human reason has discovered many amazing things in nature and will discover still more, and will there-

by increase its power over nature. But this does not mean that nature is the creation of our mind or of abstract mind, i.e., of Ward's God, Bogdanov's "substitution", etc.

"Rigorously carried out as a theory of the real world, that ideal [i.e., the ideal of "mechanism"] lands us in nihilism: all changes are motions, for motions are the only changes we can understand, and so what moves, to be understood, must itself be motion" (166). "As I have tried to show, and as I believe, the very advance of physics is proving the most effectual cure for this ignorant faith in matter and motion as the inmost substance rather than the most abstract symbols of the sum of existence.... We can never get to God through a mere mechanism" (180).

Well, well, this is exactly in the spirit of the *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*! Mr. Ward, you ought to address yourself to Lunacharsky, Yushkevich, Bazarov and Bogdanov. They are a little more "shamefaced" than you are, but they preach the same doctrine.

5. THE TWO TRENDS IN MODERN PHYSICS, AND GERMAN IDEALISM

In 1896, the well-known Kantian idealist Hermann Cohen, with unusually triumphant exultation, wrote an introduction to the fifth edition of the *History of Materialism* (*Geschichte des Materialismus—Ed.*), the falsified history of materialism written by F. Albert Lange. "Theoretical idealism," exclaimed Cohen (S. xxvi), "has already begun to shake the materialism of the natural scientists, and may need only a little while to defeat it completely." Idealism is permeating (*durchwirkung*) the new physics. "Atomism must give place to dynamism...." "It is a remarkable turn of affairs that research into the chemical problem of substance should have led to a fundamental triumph over the materialist view of matter. Just as Thales performed the first abstraction of the idea of substance, and linked it with speculations on the electron, so the theory of electricity was destined to cause the greatest revolution in the conception of matter and, through the transformation of matter into force, bring about the victory of idealism" (p. xxix).

Hermann Cohen is as clear and definite as James Ward in pointing out the *fundamental* philosophical trends, and does not lose himself (as our Machists do) in petty distinctions between this and that energeticist, symbolist, empirio-criticist, empirio-monist idealism, and so forth. Cohen takes the *fundamental* philosophical trend of the school of physics that is now associated with the names of Mach, Poincaré and others and correctly describes this trend as *idealist*. "The transformation of matter into force" is here for Cohen the most important triumph of idealism, just as it was for the "ghost-seeing" scientists—whom J. Dietzgen exposed in 1869. Electricity is proclaimed a collaborator of idealism because it has destroyed the old theory of the structure of matter, shattered the atom and discovered new forms of material motion, so unlike the old, so totally uninvestigated and unstudied, so unusual and "miraculous", that it makes it possible to smuggle in an interpretation of nature as *non-material* (spiritual, mental, psychical) motion. Yesterday's limit to our knowledge of the infinitesimal particles of matter has disappeared, hence—concludes the idealist philosopher—matter has disappeared (but thought remains). Every physicist and every engineer knows that electricity is (material) motion, but nobody knows clearly *what* is moving, hence—concludes the idealist philosopher—we can dupe the philosophically uneducated with the seductively "economical" proposition: let us *conceive* motion *without matter*....

Hermann Cohen tries to enlist the famous physicist Heinrich Hertz as his ally. Hertz is ours—he is a Kantian, we sometimes find him admitting the *a priori*, he says. Hertz is ours, he is a Machist—contends the Machist Kleinpeter—for in Hertz can be seen "the same subjectivist view of the nature of our concepts as in the case of Mach."* This curious dispute as to *where* Hertz belongs is a good example of how the idealist philosophers seize on the minutest error, the slightest vagueness of expression on the part of famous scientists in order to justify their refurbished defence of fideism. As a matter of fact, Hertz's philosophical pref-

* *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, Bd. V, 1898-99, S. 169-70.

ace to his *Mechanics** displays the usual standpoint of the scientist who has been intimidated by the professorial hue and cry against the "metaphysics" of materialism, but who nevertheless cannot overcome his instinctive conviction of the reality of the external world. This has been acknowledged by Kleinpeter himself, who on the one hand casts to the mass of readers thoroughly false popular pamphlets on the theory of knowledge of *natural science*, in which Mach figures side by side with Hertz, while on the other hand, in specifically philosophical articles, he admits that "Hertz, as opposed to Mach and Pearson, still clings to the prejudice that all physics can be explained in a mechanistic way",** that he retains the concept of the thing-in-itself and "the usual standpoint of the physicists", and that Hertz still adheres to "a picture of the universe in itself", and so on.***

It is interesting to note Hertz's view of energetics. He writes: "If we inquire into the real reason why physics at the present time prefers to express itself in terms of the theory of energy, we may answer that it is because in this way it best avoids talking about things of which it knows very little.... Of course, we are now convinced that ponderable matter consists of atoms; and in certain cases we have fairly definite ideas of the magnitude of these atoms and of their motions. But the form of the atoms, their connection, their motions in most cases, all these are entirely hidden from us.... Hence our conception of atoms is therefore in itself an important and interesting object for further investigations, but is not particularly adapted to serve as a known and secure foundation for mathematical theories" (op. cit., Vol. III, p. 21). Hertz expected that further study of the ether would provide an explanation of the "nature of traditional matter... its inertia and gravitational force" (Vol. I, p. 354).

It is evident from this that the possibility of a non-materialist view of energy did not even occur to Hertz. Energetics served the philosophers as an excuse to desert ma-

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* Heinrich Hertz, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. III, Leipzig, 1894, esp. S. 1, 2, 49.

** *Kantstudien*, VIII. Band, 1903, S. 309.

*** *The Monist*, Vol. XVI, 1906, No. 2, p. 164; an article on Mach's "monism".

terialism for idealism. The scientist regards energetics as a convenient method of expressing the laws of material motion at a period when, if we may so express it, physicists have left the atom but have not yet arrived at the electron. This period is to a large extent not yet at an end; one hypothesis yields place to another; nothing whatever is known of the positive electron; only three months ago (June 22, 1908), Jean Becquerel reported to the French Academy of Sciences that he had succeeded in discovering this "new component part of matter" (*Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Sciences*, p. 1311). How could idealist philosophy refrain from taking advantage of such a favourable circumstance as that "matter" was still only being "sought" by the human mind and was therefore no more than a "symbol", etc.

Another German idealist, one far more reactionary than Cohen, Eduard von Hartmann, devoted a whole book to the world outlook of modern physics (*Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik*, Leipzig, 1902). We are, of course, not interested in the specific arguments of the author in favour of his own variety of idealism. For us it is important only to point out that this idealist, too, notes the same phenomena as Rey, Ward and Cohen. "Modern physics had grown up on a realist basis," says Hartmann, "and it was only the neo-Kantian and agnostic movement of our own time that led it to re-interpret its results in an idealist spirit" (218). According to Hartmann, three epistemological systems constitute the basis of modern physics—hylo-kinetics (from the Greek *hyle* = matter, and *kinesis* = motion—i.e., the recognition of physical phenomena as matter in motion), energetics, and dynamism (i.e., the recognition of force without substance). Of course, the idealist Hartmann favours "dynamism", from which he draws the conclusion that the laws of nature are world-thought, in short, he "substitutes" the psychical for physical nature. But he is forced to admit that hylo-kinetics has the majority of physicists on its side, that it is the system that "is most frequently employed" (190), that its serious defect is "materialism and atheism, which threaten from pure hylo-kinetics" (189). This author quite justly regards energetics as an intermediary system and calls it agnosticism (136). Of course,

it is an "ally of pure dynamism, for it dethrones substance" (pp. vi, 192), but Hartmann dislikes its agnosticism as a form of "Anglomania", which is incompatible with the genuine idealism of a true-German reactionary.

It is highly instructive to see how this irreconcilable partisan idealist (non-partisans in philosophy are just as hopelessly thick-headed as they are in politics) explains to the physicists what it means to follow one epistemological trend or another. "Very few of the physicists who follow this fashion," writes Hartmann in reference to the idealist interpretation of the latest results in physics, "realise the full scope and implications of such an interpretation. They have failed to observe that physics with its specific laws has retained significance only insofar as, despite its idealism, it has adhered to *realistic* basic propositions, viz., the existence of things-in-themselves, their real mutability in time, real causality.... Only by granting these realistic premises (the transcendental validity of causality, time and three-dimensional space), i.e., only on the condition that nature, of whose laws physics speaks, coincides with a ... realm of things-in-themselves, can one speak of natural laws as distinct from psychological laws. Only if natural laws operate in a realm independent of our mind can they serve as an explanation of the fact that the logically necessary effects of our images are always images of the natural-historically necessary effects of the unknown which they reflect or symbolise in our consciousness" (218-19).

Hartmann rightly feels that the idealism of the new physics is indeed a *fashion*, and not a serious philosophical turn away from natural-historical materialism; and he, therefore, correctly explains to the physicists that in order to transform the "fashion" into consistent, integral philosophical idealism it is necessary radically to modify the doctrine of the objective reality of time, space, causality and natural law. We cannot regard only atoms, electrons and ether as mere symbols, as a mere "working hypothesis": time, space, the laws of nature and the whole external world must also be proclaimed a "working hypothesis". Either materialism, or the universal substitution of the psychical for the whole of physical nature; those

anxious to confound the two are legion, but Bogdanov and I are not of their number.

Among the German physicists, Ludwig Boltzmann, who died in 1906, systematically combated the Machist tendency. We have already pointed out that as against those who were "carried away by the new epistemological dogmas" he simply and clearly reduced Machism to solipsism (see above, Chap. I, § 6). Boltzmann, of course, was afraid to call himself a materialist and even explicitly stated that he did not deny the existence of God.* But his theory of knowledge is essentially materialistic, and expresses—as is admitted by S. Günther,** the historian of natural science in the nineteenth century—the views of the majority of scientists. "We know," says Boltzmann, "of the existence of all things solely from the impressions they make on our senses" (op. cit., S. 29). Theory is an "image" (or copy) of nature, of the external world (77). To those who say that matter is only a complex of sense-perceptions, Boltzmann points out that in that case other people are only the sensations of the speaker (168). These "ideologues", as Boltzmann sometimes calls the philosophical idealists, present us with a "subjective picture of the world" (176), whereas the author prefers a "simpler objective picture of the world". "The idealist compares the assertion that matter exists as well as our sensations with the child's opinion that a stone which is beaten experiences pain. The realist compares the assertion that one cannot conceive how the mental can be formed from the material, or even from the play of atoms, with the opinion of an uneducated person who asserts that the distance between the sun and the earth cannot be twenty million miles, for he cannot conceive it" (186). Boltzmann does not renounce the view that the ideal of science is to present mind and volition as "complex actions of particles of matter" (396).

L. Boltzmann frequently polemicised against Ostwald's energetics from the standpoint of a physicist, and argued that Ostwald could neither disprove nor eliminate the for-

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* Ludwig Boltzmann, *Populäre Schriften*, Leipzig, 1905, S. 187.

** Siegmund Günther, *Geschichte der anorganischen Naturwissenschaften im 19. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1901, S. 942 and 941.

mula of kinetic energy (half the mass multiplied by the square of velocity) and that he was revolving in a vicious circle by first deducing energy from mass (by accepting the formula of kinetic energy) and then defining mass as energy (S. 112, 139). This reminds me of Bogdanov's paraphrase of Mach in the third book of his *Empirio-monism*. "In science," writes Bogdanov in reference to Mach's *Mechanics*, "the concept matter is reduced to the coefficient of mass as it appears in the equations of mechanics; upon accurate analysis, however, the coefficient of mass proves to be the reciprocal of the acceleration when two physical complexes—bodies—interact" (p. 146). It is evident that if a certain *body* is taken as a unit, the motion (mechanical) of all other bodies can be expressed as a mere relation of acceleration. But this does not at all mean that "bodies" (i.e., matter) disappear or cease to exist independently of our mind. When the whole world is reduced to the movement of electrons, it will be possible to eliminate the electron from all equations, because it will be everywhere assumed, and the relationship between groups or aggregates of electrons will be reduced to their mutual acceleration, if the forms of motion prove to be as simple as those of mechanics.

Combating the "phenomenalist" physics of Mach and Co., Boltzmann maintained that "those who believe atomism to have been eliminated by differential equations, cannot see the wood for the trees" (144). "If we do not wish to entertain illusions as to the significance of a differential equation ... we cannot doubt that this picture of the world (expressed in differential equations) must again by its nature be all atomic one, i.e., an instruction that the changes in time of a vast number of things arranged in three-dimensional space must be thought of in accordance with definite rules. The things can, of course, be similar or dissimilar, unchangeable or changeable," etc. (146). "If we are perfectly clear," said Boltzmann in an address delivered to the Congress of Scientists held in Munich in 1899, that the phenomenalists under the cloak of differential equations likewise base themselves on atom-like discrete units (*Einzelwesen*) which they have to picture as possessing now certain properties, now others for each group of phenomena, the need for a simplified, uniform atomism will soon again be felt" (223).

The electron theory "is developing into an atomic theory of electricity as a whole" (357). The unity of nature is revealed in the "astonishing analogy" between the differential equations of the various realms of phenomena. "The same equations can be regarded as solving the problems of hydrodynamics and of the theory of potentials. The theory of vortices in fluids and the theory of friction in gases (*Gasreibung*) reveal a most astonishing analogy to the theory of electromagnetism, etc." (1). Those who accept "the theory of universal substitution" cannot escape the question: Who was it that thought of "substituting" physical nature so uniformly?

As if in answer to those who brush aside "the physicist of the old school", Boltzmann relates in detail how certain specialists in "physical chemistry" are adopting an epistemological position contrary to that of Machism. Vaubel, the author of "one of the best" comprehensive works of 1903 (according to Boltzmann), "takes up a sharply hostile attitude towards the so-called phenomenalism so often recommended today" (381). "He tries rather to obtain as concrete and clear an idea as possible of the nature of atoms and molecules and of the forces and agencies acting between them, and this idea he attempts to bring into conformity with the most recent experiments in this field [ions, electrons, radium, Zeeman effect, etc.].... The author strictly adheres to the dualism of matter and energy,* which have this in common that each has a special law of conservation. In regard to matter, the author also holds fast to the dualism between ponderable matter and ether, yet regards the latter as material in the strictest sense" (381). In the second volume of his work (theory of electricity) the author "from the very outset takes the view that electrical phenomena are determined by the interaction and movement of atom-like entities, the electrons" (383).

Hence, we find that what the spiritualist James Ward admitted to be true of England applies also to Germany, namely, that the physicists of the realistic school system-

* Boltzmann wishes to say that the author does not attempt to conceive motion without matter. To speak of dualism here is ridiculous. Philosophical monism and dualism consist in an adherence, consistent or inconsistent, to materialism or idealism.

atise the facts and discoveries of recent years no less successfully than the physicists of the symbolist school and that the essential difference between them consists "*only*" in their epistemological points of view.*

6. THE TWO TRENDS IN MODERN PHYSICS, AND FRENCH FIDEISM

In France, idealist philosophy has seized upon the vacillations of Machist physics with no less determination. We have already seen how the neo-criticists greeted Mach's

* The work of Erich Becher, *Philosophical Premises of the Exact Sciences* (*Philosophische Voraussetzungen der exakten Naturwissenschaften*, Leipzig, 1907), with which I became acquainted only after my book had been completed, confirms what had been said in this paragraph. Holding closest of all to the epistemological point of view of Helmholtz and Boltzmann, that is, to a "shamefaced" and incompletely thought-out materialism, the author devotes his work to a defence and interpretation of the fundamental premises of physics and chemistry. This defence naturally becomes converted into a fight against the fashionable but increasingly-resisted Machist trend in physics (cf. S. 91, etc.). E. Becher correctly characterises this trend as "*subjective positivism*" (S. iii and reduces the central point of his objection to it to a proof of the "hypothesis" of the external world (Chapters II-VII), to a proof of its "existence independently of human perceptions" (*vom Wahrgenommenwerden unabhängige Existenz*). The denial of this "hypothesis" by the Machists frequently leads the latter to *solipsism* (S. 78-82, etc.). "Mach's view that sensations and complexes of sensations, and not the external world" (S. 138), are the only subject-matter of science, Becher calls "sensationalist-monism" (*Empfindungsmonismus*) and classes it with the "purely conscientialistic tendencies". This clumsy and absurd term is constructed from the Latin word *conscientia*—consciousness, and means nothing but philosophical idealism (cf. S. 156). In the last two chapters of the book E. Becher quite skilfully compares the old mechanical theory with the new electrical theory of matter and world-picture (the "kinetico-elastic", as the author puts it, with the "kinetico-electric" conception of nature). The latter theory, based on the electron theory, is a step forward in knowledge of the unity of the world; according to this theory the "elements of the material world are electrical charges" (*Ladungen*, S. 223) . "Every purely kinetic conception of nature knows nothing save a certain number of moving objects, whether they are called electrons or something else. The state of motion of these objects in successive time intervals is determined in a law-governed manner by their position and state of motion in the preceding time interval" (225). The chief defect of Becher's book is his absolute ignorance of dialectical materialism. This ignorance frequently leads him into confusion and absurdity, on which it is impossible to dwell here.

Mechanics and how they immediately discerned the idealist character of the basis of Mach's philosophy. The French Machist, Henri Poincaré, was even more successful in this respect. The most reactionary idealist philosophy, the implications of which were definitely fideistic, immediately seized upon his theory. An adherent of this philosophy, Le Roy, argued as follows: the truths of science are conventional signs, symbols; you have abandoned the absurd, "metaphysical" claims to knowledge of objective reality—well then, be logical and agree with us that science has practical significance only for one sphere of human activity and that religion has *a no less real significance* for another sphere of activity; "symbolic", Machist science has no right to deny theology. H. Poincaré was abashed by these conclusions and in his book *Value of Science* made a special attack on them. But just see *what* epistemological position he was obliged to adopt in order to rid himself of allies of the type of Le Roy. He writes: "M. Le Roy regards the intellect as incurably impotent only in order to give greater place to other sources of knowledge, for instance, the heart, sentiment, instinct and faith" (214-15). "I cannot follow him right to the end," he says. Scientific laws are conventions, symbols, but "if scientific 'recipes' have a value as rules of action, it is because we know that, in general at least, they are successful. But to know this is already to know something; and if so, how can you say that we can know nothing?" (219).

H. Poincaré resorts to the criterion of practice. But he only shifts the question without settling it; for this criterion may be interpreted in a subjective as well as in an objective way. Le Roy also admits this criterion for science and industry; all he denies is that this criterion proves *objective* truth, for such a denial suffices him for admitting the subjective truth of religion along with the subjective truth of science (i.e., as not existing apart from mankind). Poincaré realises that one cannot limit oneself to a reference to practice in arguing against Le Roy, and he passes to the question of the objectivity of science. "What is the criterion of its objectivity? Well, it is exactly the same as the criterion of our belief in external objects. These objects are real inasmuch as the sensations

they evoke in us (*qu'ils nous font éprouver*) appear to us to be united by some sort of indestructible cement and not by an ephemeral accident" (269-70).

The author of such a remark may well be a great *physicist*, but it is absolutely indisputable that only the Voroshilov-Yushkeviches can take him seriously as a philosopher. Materialism is declared to have been destroyed by a "theory" which at the first onslaught of fideism *takes refuge under the wing of materialism*! For it is the purest materialism to say that sensations are evoked in us by real objects and that 'belief" in the objectivity of science is the same as "belief" in the objective existence of external objects.

"...It can be said, for instance, that ether has no less reality than any external body" (270).

What an outcry our Machists would have raised had a materialist said that! How many feeble witticisms would have been uttered at the expense of "ethereal materialism", and so forth. But five pages later the founder of recent empirio-symbolism declares: "Everything that is not thought is pure nothing, since we can think nothing but thought" (276). You are mistaken, M. Poincaré; your works prove that there are people who can only think what is entirely devoid of thought. To this class of people belongs the notorious muddler, Georges Sorel, who maintains that the "first two parts" of Poincaré's book on the value of science are written in the "spirit of Le Roy" and that therefore these two philosophers can be "reconciled" as follows: the attempt to establish an identity between science and the world is an illusion; there is no need to raise the question whether science can have knowledge of nature or not, for it is sufficient that science should correspond with the mechanisms created by us (Georges Sorel, *Les préoccupations métaphysiques des physiciens modernes*, Paris, 1907, pp. 77, 80, 81).

But while it is sufficient merely to mention the "philosophy" of Poincaré and pass on, it is imperative to dwell at some length on the work of A. Rey. We have already pointed out that the two basic trends in modern physics, which Rey calls the "conceptualist" and the "neo-mechanistic", reduce themselves to the difference between the idealist and the materialist epistemologies. We must now see how the positivist Rey solves a problem which is diametrically opposed

to that broached by the spiritualist James Ward and the idealists Cohen and Hartmann, the problem, namely, not of seizing upon the philosophical mistakes of the new physics, its leanings towards idealism, but of rectifying these mistakes and of proving the illegitimacy of the idealist (and fideist) conclusions drawn from the new physics.

A thread that runs through the whole of Rey's work is the recognition of the fact that the new physical theory of the "conceptualists" (Machists) has been seized upon by *fideism* (pp. ii, 17, 220, 362, etc.) and "*philosophical idealism*" (200), scepticism as to the rights of the intellect and the rights of science (210, 220), subjectivism (311), and so forth. Therefore, Rey quite rightly makes an analysis of the "opinions of the physicists of the objective validity of physics" (3) the *centre* of his work.

And what are the results of this analysis?

Let us take the basic concept, the concept of experience Rey assures us that Mach's subjectivist interpretation (for the sake of simplicity and brevity we shall take Mach as the representative of the school which Rey terms conceptualist) is a sheer misunderstanding. It is true that one of the "outstanding new features of the philosophy of the end of the nineteenth century" is that "empiricism, becoming ever subtler and richer in nuances, leads to fideism, to the supremacy of faith—this same empiricism that was once the mighty weapon of scepticism against the assertions of metaphysics. Has not at bottom the real meaning of the word 'experience' been distorted, little by little, by imperceptible nuances? Experience, when returned to the conditions of its existence, to that experimental science which renders it exact and refined, leads us to necessity and to truth" (398). There is no doubt that all Machism, in the broad sense of the term, is nothing but a distortion by means of imperceptible nuances, of the real meaning of the word "experience"! But how does Rey, who accuses only the fideists of distortion, but not Mach himself, correct this distortion? Listen. "Experience is by definition a knowledge of the object. In physical science this definition is more in place than anywhere else.... Experience is that over which our mind has no command, that which our desires, our volition, cannot control, that which is given and which

is not of our own making. Experience is the object that faces (*en face du*) the subject" (314).

Here you have an example of how Rey defends Machism! What penetrating genius Engels revealed when he dubbed the latest type of adherents of philosophical agnosticism and phenomenalism "shamefaced materialists". The positivist and ardent phenomenalist, Rey, is a superb specimen of this type. If experience is "knowledge of the object", if "experience is the object that faces the subject", if experience means that "something external (*quelque chose du dehors*) exists and necessarily exists" (*se pose et en se posant s'impose*—p. 324), this obviously amounts to materialism! Rey's phenomenalism, his ardent and emphatic assertion that nothing exists save sensations, that the objective is that which is generally valid, etc., etc.—all this is only a fig-leaf, an empty verbal covering for materialism, since we are told:

"Objective is that which is given from without, imposed (*imposé*) by experience; it is that which is not of our making, but which is made independently of us and which to a certain extent makes us" (320). Rey defends "conceptualism" by destroying conceptualism! The refutation of the idealist implications of Machism is achieved only by interpreting Machism after the manner of shamefaced materialism. Having himself admitted the distinction between the two trends in modern physics, Rey toils in the sweat of his brow to obliterate all distinctions in the interests of the materialist trend. Rey says of the neo-mechanist school, for instance, that it does not admit the "least doubt, the least uncertainty" as to the objectivity of physics (237): "Here [i.e., on the basis of the doctrines of this school] one feels remote from the detours one was obliged to make from the standpoint of the other theories of physics in order to arrive at the assertion of this objectivity."

But it is just such "detours" of Machism that Rey conceals by casting a veil over them throughout his exposition. The fundamental characteristic of materialism is that it *starts from* the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality reflected by science, whereas idealism needs "detours" in order, in one way or another, to "deduce" objectivity from mind, consciousness, the "psychical". "The neo-mechanist [i.e., the prevailing] school in physics," says

Rey, "*believes in the reality* of physical theory just as humanity *believes in the reality* of the external world" (p. 234, § 22: Thesis). For this school "theory aims at being a copy (*le décalque*) of the object" (235)

True. And this fundamental trait of the "neo-mechanist" school is nothing but the basis of *materialist* epistemology. No attempts of Rey to dissociate himself from the materialists or to assure us that the neo-mechanists are also in essence phenomenalists, etc., can weaken this basic fact. The essence of the difference between the neo-mechanists (materialists who are more or less shamefaced) and the Machists is that the latter *depart* from this theory of knowledge, and departing from it inevitably *fall* into fideism.

Take Rey's attitude to Mach's theory of causality and necessity in nature. Only at first glance, Rey assures us, does it appear that Mach is "approaching scepticism" and "subjectivism" (76); this "ambiguity" (*équivoque*, p. 115) disappears if Mach's teaching is taken as a whole. And Rey takes it as a whole, quotes a series of passages from the *Wärmelehre* and the *Analysis of Sensations*, and specially deals with the chapter on causality in the former book, but *... he takes care not to quote the decisive passage*, *Mach's declaration that there is no physical necessity*, *but only logical necessity*! All that one can say of such a procedure is that it does not interpret Mach but embellishes him, that it obliterates the differences between "neo-mechanism" and Machism. Rey's conclusion is that "Mach adopts the analysis and conclusions of Hume, Mill and all the phenomenalists, according to whom the causal relation has no *substantiality* and is only a habit of thought. He has also adopted the fundamental thesis of phenomenalism, of which the doctrine of causality is only a consequence, namely, that nothing exists save sensations. But he adds, along a purely objectivist line, that science, analysing sensations, discovers in them certain permanent and common elements which, although abstracted from these sensations, have the same reality as the sensations themselves, for they are taken from sensations by means of perceptual observation. And these permanent and common elements, such as energy and its various forms, are the foundation for the systematisation of physics" (117).

This means that Mach accepts Hume's subjective theory of causality and interprets it in an objectivist sense! Rey shirks the issue, defends Mach by referring to his inconsistency, and comes to the conclusion that in the "real" interpretation of experience the latter leads to "necessity". Now, experience is what is given to us from without; and if the necessity of nature and its laws are also given to man from without, from an objectively real nature, then, of course, all difference between Machism and materialism vanishes. Rey defends Machism against the charge of "neo-mechanism" by capitulating to the latter all along the line, retaining the word phenomenalism but not the essence of that trend.

Poincaré, for instance, fully in the spirit of Mach, derives the laws of nature—including even the tri-dimensionality of space—from "convenience". But this does not at all mean "arbitrary", Rey hastens to "correct". Oh no, "convenient" here expresses "*adaptation to the object*" (Rey's italics, p. 196). What a superb differentiation between the two schools and "refutation" of materialism!... "If Poincaré's theory is logically separated by an impassable gulf from the ontological interpretation of the mechanist school [i.e., from the latter's acceptance of theory as a copy of the object] ... if Poincaré's theory lends itself to the support of philosophical idealism, in the scientific sphere at least it agrees very well with the general evolution of the ideas of classical physics and the tendency to regard physics as objective knowledge, as objective as experience, that is, as the sensations from which experience proceeds" (200).

On the one hand, one cannot but recognise; on the other hand, it must be admitted. On the one hand, an impassable gulf divides Poincaré from neo-mechanism, although Poincaré stands *in between* Mach's "conceptualism" and neo-mechanism, while Mach, it would appear, is not separated by any gulf from neo-mechanism. On the other hand, Poincaré is quite compatible with classical physics which, according to Rey himself, completely accepts the standpoint of "mechanism". On the one hand, Poincaré's theory lends itself to the support of philosophical idealism; on the other hand, it is compatible with the objective interpretation of

the word "experience". On the one hand, these bad fideists have distorted the meaning of the word "experience" by imperceptible deviations, by departing from the correct view that "experience is the object"; on the other hand, the objectivity of experience means only that experience is sensation ... with which both Berkeley and Fichte entirely agree!

Rey became muddled because he had set himself the impossible task of "reconciling" the opposition between the materialist and the idealist schools in the new physics. He seeks to tone down the materialism of the neo-mechanist school, attributing to phenomenalism the views of physicists who regard their theory as a copy of the object.* And he seeks to tone down the idealism of the conceptualist school by pruning away the most emphatic declarations of its adherents and interpreting the rest in the spirit of shamefaced materialism. How fictitious, and at the same time laboured, in Rey's disavowal of materialism is shown, for example, by his opinion of the theoretical significance of the differential equation of Maxwell and Hertz. In the

* The "conciliator", A. Rey, not only cast a veil over the formulation of the question by philosophical materialism but also ignored the most clearly expressed materialistic declarations of the French physicists. He did not mention, for example, Alfred Cornu, who died in 1902. That physicist met the Ostwaldian "destruction [or conquest, *Ueberwindung*] of scientific materialism" with a contemptuous remark regarding pretentious journalistic treatment of the question (see *Revue générale des sciences*, 1895, pp. 1030-31). At the international congress of physicists held in Paris in 1900, Cornu said: "...The deeper we penetrate into the knowledge of natural phenomena, the more does the bold Cartesian conception of the mechanism of the universe develop and become more exact, namely, that in the physical world there is nothing save matter and motion. The problem of the unity of physical forces ... has again come to the fore after the great discoveries which marked the end of this century. Also the constant concern of our modern leaders, Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz (to mention only the illustrious dead), was to define nature more accurately and to unravel the properties of this *elusive matter* (*matière subtile*), the receptacle of world energy.... The return to Cartesian ideas is obvious...." (*Rapports presentés au congrès international de physique*, Paris, 1900, t. 4-me, p. 7.) Lucien Poincaré, in his book *Modern Physics*, justly remarks that this Cartesian idea was taken up and developed by the Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century (*La physique moderne*, Paris, 1906, p. 14). But neither this physicist nor A. Cornu knew that the dialectical materialists Marx and Engels had freed this fundamental premise of materialism from the one-sidedness of *mechanical* materialism.

opinion of the Machists, the fact that these physicists limit their theory to a system of equations refutes materialism: there are equations and nothing else—no matter, no objective reality, only symbols. Boltzmann refutes this view, fully aware that he is refuting phenomenalist physics. Rey refutes this view, thinking he is defending phenomenalism! He says: "We could not refuse to class Maxwell and Hertz among the 'mechanists' because they limited themselves to equations similar to the differential equations of Lagrange's dynamics. This does not mean that in the opinion of Maxwell and Hertz we shall be unable to base a mechanical theory of electricity on real elements. Quite the contrary, the fact that we represent electrical phenomena in a theory the form of which is identical with the general form of classical mechanics is proof of the possibility"... (253). The indefiniteness of the present solution of the problem "will diminish in proportion as the *nature* of the quantities, i.e., elements that figure in the equations, is more precisely determined". The fact that one or another form of material motion has not yet been investigated is not regarded by Rey as a reason for denying the materiality of motion. "The homogeneity of matter" (262), not as a postulate, but as a result of experience and of the development of science, "the homogeneity of the object of physics"—this is the condition that makes the application of measurement and mathematical calculations possible.

Here is Rey's estimate of the criterion of practice in the theory of knowledge: "Contrary to the propositions of scepticism, it seems legitimate to say that the practical value of science is derived from its theoretical value" (368).... Rey prefers not to speak of the fact that these propositions of scepticism are unequivocally accepted by Mach, Poincaré and their entire school. "They [the practical value and theoretical value of science] are the two inseparable and strictly parallel aspects of its objective value. To say that a law of nature has practical value ... is fundamentally the same as saying that this law of nature has objectivity. To act on the object implies to modify the object; it implies a reaction on the part of the object that conforms to the expectation or anticipation contained in the proposition in virtue of which we acted on the object. Hence, this expecta-

tion or anticipation contains elements *controlled* by the object and by the action it undergoes.... In these diverse theories there is thus a part of objectivity" (368). This is a thoroughly materialist, and only materialist, theory of knowledge, for other points of view, and Machism in particular, deny that the criterion of practice has objective significance, i.e., significance that does not depend upon man and mankind.

To sum up, Rey approached the question from an angle entirely different from that of Ward, Cohen and Co., but he arrived at the same result, namely, the recognition that the materialist and idealist trends form the basis of the division between the two principal schools in modern physics.

7. A RUSSIAN "IDEALIST PHYSICIST"

Owing to certain unfortunate conditions under which I am obliged to work, I have been almost entirely unable to acquaint myself with the Russian literature on the subject under discussion. I shall confine myself to an exposition of an article that has an important bearing on my theme written by our notorious reactionary philosopher, Mr. Lopatin. The article, entitled "An Idealist Physicist", appeared last year in *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii*,[103] (1907, September-October). A true-Russian philosophical idealist, Mr. Lopatin bears about the same relation to the contemporary European idealists as, for example, the Union of the Russian People[104] does to the reactionary parties of the West. All the more instructive is it, therefore, to see how similar philosophical trends manifest themselves in totally different cultural and social surroundings. Mr. Lopatin's article is, as the French say, an *éloge*—a eulogy—of the Russian physicist, the late N. I. Shishkin (died 1906). Mr. Lopatin was fascinated by the fact that this cultured man, who was much interested in Hertz and the new physics generally, was not only a Right-wing Constitutional-Democrat (p. 339) but a deeply religious man, a devotee of the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, and so on and so forth. However, in spite of the fact that his main line of "endeavour" lies in the borderland between philosophy and the police department, Mr. Lopatin has also furnished certain material for a characterisation of the *epistemological* views of

this idealist physicist. Mr. Lopatin writes: "He was a genuine positivist in his tireless endeavour to give the broadest possible criticism of the methods of investigation, suppositions and facts of science from the standpoint of their suitability as means and material for the construction of an integral and perfected world outlook. In this respect N. I. Shishkin was the very antipode of many of his contemporaries. In previous articles of mine in this periodical, I have frequently endeavoured to explain the heterogeneous and often shaky materials from which the so-called scientific world outlook is made up. They include established facts, more or less bold generalisations, hypotheses that are convenient at the given moment for one or another field of science, and even auxiliary scientific fictions. And all this is elevated to the dignity of incontrovertible objective truths, from the standpoint of which all other ideas and all other beliefs of a philosophical and religious nature must be judged, and everything in them that is not indicated in these truths must be rejected. Our highly talented natural scientist and thinker, Professor V. I. Vernadsky, has shown with exemplary clarity how shallow and out of place are such claims to convert the scientific views of a given historical period into an immobile, dogmatic system obligatory for all. Moreover, it is not only the broad reading public that is guilty of making such a conversion [*footnote by Mr. Lopatin*: "For the broad public a number of popular books have been written, the purpose of which is to foster the conviction that there exists such a scientific catechism providing an answer to all questions. Typical works of this kind are Büchner's *Force and Matter* and Haeckel's *The Riddle of the Universe*"] and not only individual scientists in particular branches of science; what is even more strange is that this sin is frequently committed by the official philosophers, all of whose efforts are at times directed only to proving that they are saying nothing but what has been said before them by representatives of the several sciences, and that they are only saying it in their own language.

"N. I. Shishkin had no trace of prejudiced dogmatism. He was a convinced champion of the mechanical explanation of the phenomena of nature, but for him it was only a meth-

od of investigation..." (341). So, so ... a familiar refrain! "He was far from believing that the mechanical theory reveals the true nature of the phenomena investigated; he regarded it only as the most convenient and fertile method of unifying and explaining them for the purposes of science. For him, therefore, the mechanical conception of nature and the materialist view of nature by no means coincide...." Exactly as in the case of the authors of the *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*! "Quite the contrary, it seemed to him that in questions of higher order, the mechanical theory ought to adopt a very critical, even a conciliatory attitude."

In the language of the Machists this is called "overcoming the obsolete, narrow and one-sided" antithesis between materialism and idealism.... "Questions of the first beginning and ultimate end of things, of the inner nature of our mind, of freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and so forth, cannot in their full breadth of meaning come within its scope since as a method of investigation it is confined within the natural limits of its applicability solely to the facts of physical experience" (342).... The last two lines are an undoubted plagiarism from A. Bogdanov's *Empirio-monism*.

"Light can be regarded"—wrote Shishkin in his article "Psycho-physical Phenomena from the Standpoint of the Mechanical Theory" (*Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii*, Bk. 1, p. 127)—"as matter, as motion, as electricity, as sensation."

There is no doubt that Mr. Lopatin is absolutely right in ranking Shishkin among the positivists and that this physicist belonged entirely to the Machist school of the new physics. By his statement on light, Shishkin means to say that the various methods of regarding light are various methods of "organising experience" (in A. Bogdanov's terminology), all equally legitimate from different points of view, or that they are various "connections of elements" (in Mach's terminology), and that, in any case, the physicists' theory of light is not a copy of objective reality. But Shishkin argues very badly. "Light can be regarded as matter, as motion..." he says. But in nature there is neither matter without motion nor motion without matter.

Shishkin's first "apposition" is meaningless.... "As electricity...." Electricity is a movement of matter, hence Shishkin is wrong here too. The electromagnetic theory of light has shown that light and electricity are forms of motion of one and the same matter (ether).... "As sensation...." Sensation is an image of matter in motion. Save through sensations, we can know nothing either of the forms of matter or of the forms of motion; sensations are evoked by the action of matter in motion upon our sense-organs. That is how science views it. The sensation of red reflects ether vibrations of a frequency of approximately 450 trillions per second. The sensation of blue reflects ether vibrations of a frequency of approximately 620 trillions per second. The vibrations of the ether exist independently of our sensations of light. Our sensations of light depend on the action of the vibrations of the ether on the human organ of vision. Our sensations reflect objective reality, i.e., something that exists independently of humanity and of human sensations. That is how science views it. Shishkin's argument against materialism is the cheapest sophistry.

8. THE ESSENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF "PHYSICAL" IDEALISM

We have seen that the question of the epistemological deductions that can be drawn from the new physics has been raised and is being discussed from the most varied points of view in English, German and French literature. There can be no doubt that we have before us a certain international ideological current, which is not dependent upon any one philosophical system, but which is the result of certain general causes lying outside the sphere of philosophy. The foregoing review of the facts undoubtedly shows that Machism is "connected" with the new physics, but at the same time reveals that the idea of this connection spread by our Machists is *fundamentally incorrect*. As in philosophy, so in physics, our Machists slavishly follow the *fashion*, and are unable from their own, Marxist, standpoint to give a general survey of particular currents and to judge the place they occupy.

A double falsity pervades all the talk about Mach's philosophy being "the philosophy of twentieth-century natural science", "the recent philosophy of the sciences", "recent natural-scientific positivism" and so forth. (Bogdanov in the introduction to *Analysis of Sensations*, pp. iv, xii; cf. also Yushkevich, Valentinov and Co.) Firstly, Machism is ideologically connected with only *one* school in *one* branch of modern natural science. Secondly, and *this is the main point*, what in Machism is connected with this school *is not what distinguishes it from all other trends and systems of idealist philosophy*, *but what it has in common with philosophical idealism in general*. It suffices to cast a glance at the entire ideological current in question *as a whole* in order to leave no shadow of doubt as to the truth of this statement. Take the physicists of this school: the German Mach, the Frenchman Henri Poincaré, the Belgian P. Duhem, the Englishman Karl Pearson. They have much in common: they have the same basis and are following the same direction, as each of them rightly acknowledges. But what they have in common includes neither the doctrine of empirio-criticism in general, nor Mach's doctrine, say, of the "world-elements" in particular. The three latter physicists even know nothing of either of these doctrines. They have "only" one thing in common—philosophical idealism, towards which they all, without exception, *tend* more or less consciously, more or less decisively. Take the philosophers who base themselves on *this school* of the new physics, who try to give it an epistemological basis and to develop it, and you will again find the German immanentists, the disciples of Mach, the French neo-criticists and idealists, the English spiritualists, the Russian Lopatin and, in addition, the one and only empirio-monist, A. Bogdanov. They all have only one thing in common, namely, that they all—more or less consciously, more or less decisively, with an abrupt and precipitate slant towards fideism or with a personal aversion to it (Bogdanov)—are vehicles of philosophical idealism. The fundamental idea of the school of the new physics under discussion is denial of the objective reality given us in sensation and reflected in our theories, doubt as to the existence of such a reality. Here this school departs from *materialism* (inaccurately called realism, neo-mecha-

nism, hylo-kinetism, and not in any appreciable degree consciously developed by the physicists themselves), which by *general acknowledgement* prevails among the physicists —and departs from it as a school of "physical" idealism.

To explain this last term, which sounds very strange, it is necessary to recall an episode in the history of modern philosophy and modern science. In 1866 L. Feuerbach attacked Johannes Müller, the famous founder of modern physiology, and ranked him with the "physiological idealists" (*Werke*, Bd. X, S. 197). The idealism of this physiologist consisted in the fact that when investigating the significance of the mechanism of our sense-organs in relation to sensations, showing, for instance, that the sensation of light is produced as the result of the action of various stimuli on the eye, he was inclined to arrive from this at a denial that our sensations are images of objective reality. This tendency of one school of scientists towards "physiological idealism", i.e., towards an idealist interpretation of certain data of physiology, was very accurately discerned by L. Feuerbach. The "connection" between physiology and philosophical idealism, chiefly of the Kantian kind, was for a long time after that exploited by reactionary philosophy. F. A. Lange made great play with physiology in support of Kantian idealism and in refutation of materialism; while among the immanentists (whom Bogdanov so incorrectly places midway between Mach and Kant), J. Rehmke in 1882 specially campaigned against the alleged confirmation of Kantianism by physiology.* That a number of eminent physiologists at that time *gravitated* towards idealism and Kantianism is as indisputable as that today a number of eminent physicists *gravitate* towards philosophical idealism. "Physical" idealism, i.e., the idealism of a certain school of physicists at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, no more "refutes" materialism, no more establishes the connection between idealism (or empiriocriticism) and natural science, than did the similar efforts of F. A. Lange and the "physiological" idealists. The devia-

* Johannes Rehmke, *Philosophie und Kantianismus*, Eisenach, 1882, S. 15, et seq.

tion towards reactionary philosophy manifested in both cases by one school of natural scientists in one branch of natural science is a temporary deflection, a transitory period of sickness in the history of science, an ailment of growth, mainly caused by the *abrupt break-down* of old established concepts.

The connection between modern "physical" idealism and the crisis of modern physics is, as we have already pointed out, generally acknowledged. "The arguments of sceptical criticism levelled against modern physics"—writes A. Rey, who is referring not so much to the sceptics as to the out spoken adherents of fideism, like Brunetière—"essentially amount to the proverbial argument of all sceptics: the diversity of opinions" (among physicists). But this diversity "cannot be any proof against the objectivity of physics". "In the history of physics, as in history generally, one can distinguish great periods which differ by the form and general aspect of theories.... But as soon as a discovery is made that affects all fields of physics because it establishes some cardinal fact hitherto badly or very partially perceived, the entire aspect of physics is modified; a new period begins. This is what occurred after Newton's discoveries, and after the discoveries of Joule-Mayer and Carnot-Clausius. The same thing, apparently, is taking place since the discovery of radioactivity.... The historian who later sees things from the necessary distance has no difficulty in discerning a steady evolution where contemporaries saw conflicts, contradictions, and divisions into various schools. Apparently, the crisis which physics has undergone in recent years (despite the conclusions drawn from it by philosophical criticism) is no different. It even excellently illustrates the typical crisis of growth (*crise de croissance*) occasioned by the great modern discoveries. The undeniable transformation of physics which will result (could there be evolution or progress without it?) will not perceptibly alter the scientific spirit" (op. cit., pp. 370-72).

Rey the conciliator tries to unite all schools of modern physics against fideism! This is a falsity, well meant, but a falsity nevertheless; for the deviation of the school of Mach-Poincaré-Pearson towards idealism (i.e., refined fide-

ism) is beyond dispute. And the objectivity of physics that is associated with the basis of the "scientific spirit", as distinct from the fideist spirit, and that Rey defends so ardently, is nothing but a "shamefaced" formulation of materialism. The basic materialist spirit of physics, as of all modern science, will overcome all crises, but only by the indispensable replacement of metaphysical materialism by dialectical materialism.

Rey the conciliator very often tries to gloss over the fact that the crisis in modern physics consists in the latter's departure from a direct, resolute and irrevocable recognition of the objective value of its theories. But facts are stronger than all attempts at reconciliation. The mathematicians, writes Rey, "in dealing as a rule with a science, the subject-matter of which, apparently at least, is created by the mind of the scientist, and in which, at any rate, concrete phenomena are not involved in the investigation, have formed too abstract a conception of the science of physics. Attempts have been made to bring it ever closer to mathematics, and a general conception of mathematics has been transposed into a general conception of physics.... This is an invasion of the mathematical spirit into the methods of judging and understanding physics that is denounced by all the experimenters. And is it not to this influence, none the less powerful because at times concealed, that are often due the uncertainty, the wavering of mind regarding the objectivity of physics, and the detours made or the obstacles surmounted in order to demonstrate it?..." (227).

This is excellently said. "Wavering of mind" as to the objectivity of physics—this is the very essence of fashionable "physical" idealism.

"...The abstract fictions of mathematics seem to have interposed a screen between physical reality and the manner in which the mathematicians understand the science of this reality. They vaguely feel the objectivity of physics.... Although they desire above all to be objective when they engage in physics; although they seek to find and retain a foothold in reality, they are still haunted by old habits. So that even in the concepts of energetics, which had to be built more solidly and with fewer hypotheses than the

old mechanism—which sought to copy (*décalquer*) the sensible universe and not to reconstruct it—we are still dealing with the theories of the mathematicians.... They [the mathematicians] have done everything to save objectivity, for they are well aware that without it there can be no physics.... But the complexity or deviousness of their theories nevertheless leaves an uneasy feeling. It is too artificial, too far-fetched, too stilted (*édifié*); the experimenter here does not feel the spontaneous confidence which constant contact with physical reality gives him.... This in effect is what is said by all physicists who are primarily physicists or who are exclusively physicists—and their name is legion; this is what is said by the entire neo-mechanist school.... The crisis in physics lies in the conquest of the realm of physics by the mathematical spirit. The progress of physics on the one hand, and the progress of mathematics on the other, led in the nineteenth century to a close amalgamation between these two sciences.... Theoretical physics became mathematical physics.... Then there began the formal period, that is to say, the period of mathematical physics, purely mathematical; mathematical physics not as a branch of physics so to speak, but as a branch of mathematics cultivated by the mathematicians. In this new phase the mathematician, accustomed to conceptual (purely logical) elements, which furnish the sole subject-matter of his work, and feeling himself cramped by crude, material elements, which he found insufficiently pliable, necessarily always tended to reduce them to abstractions as far as possible, to present them in an entirely non-material and conceptual manner, or even to ignore them altogether. The elements, as real, objective data, as *physical* elements, that is to say, completely disappeared. There remained only formal relations represented by differential equations.... If the mathematician is not the dupe of his constructive work, when he analyses theoretical physics ... he can recover its ties with experience and its objective value, but at a first glance, and to the uninitiated person, we seem faced with an arbitrary development.... The concept, the notion, has everywhere replaced the real element.... Thus, historically, by virtue of the mathematical form assumed by theoretical physics, is explained ... the ailment (*le malaise*), the

crisis of physics, and its apparent withdrawal from objective facts" (228-32).

Such is the first cause of "physical" idealism. The reactionary attempts are engendered by the very progress of science. The great successes achieved by natural science, the approach to elements of matter so homogeneous and simple that their laws of motion can be treated mathematically, caused the mathematicians to overlook matter. "Matter disappears", only equations remain. At a new stage of development and apparently in a new manner, we get the old Kantian idea: reason prescribes laws to nature. Hermann Cohen, who, as we have seen, rejoices over the idealist spirit of the new physics, goes so far as to advocate the introduction of higher mathematics in the schools—in order to imbue high-school students with the spirit of idealism, which is being driven out by our materialistic age (F. A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 5. Auflage, 1896, Bd. II, S. xlix). This, of course, is the ridiculous dream of a reactionary and, in fact, there is and can be nothing here but a temporary infatuation with idealism on the part of a small number of specialists. But what is highly characteristic is the way the drowning man clutches at a straw, the subtle means whereby representatives of the educated bourgeoisie artificially attempt to preserve, or to find a place for, the fideism which is engendered among the masses of the people by their ignorance and their downtrodden condition, and by the senseless barbarity of capitalist contradictions.

The other cause which gave rise to "physical" idealism is the principle of *relativism*, the relativity of our knowledge, a principle which, in a period of abrupt break-down of the old theories, is taking a firm hold upon the physicists, and which, *if the latter are ignorant of dialectics*, inevitably leads to idealism.

This question of the relation between relativism and dialectics plays perhaps the most important part in explaining the theoretical misadventures of Machism. Take Rey, for instance, who like all European positivists has no conception whatever of Marxian dialectics. He employs the word dialectics exclusively in the sense of idealist philosophical speculation. As a result, although he feels that the new physics has gone astray on the question of

relativism, he nevertheless flounders helplessly and attempts to differentiate between moderate and immoderate relativism. Of course, "immoderate relativism logically, if not in practice, borders on actual scepticism" (215), but there is none of this "immoderate" relativism, you see, in Poincaré. Just fancy, one can, like an apothecary, weigh out a little more or a little less relativism and thus have Machism!

As a matter of fact, the only theoretically correct formulation of the question of relativism is given in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, and ignorance of it is *bound* to lead from relativism to philosophical idealism. Incidentally, the failure to understand this fact is enough by itself to render Mr. Berman's absurd book, *Dialectics in the Light of the Modern Theory of Knowledge*, utterly valueless. Mr. Berman repeats the old, old nonsense about dialectics, which he has entirely failed to understand. We have already seen that in the theory of knowledge *all* the Machists, *at every step*, reveal a similar lack of understanding.

All the old truths of physics, including those which were regarded as firmly established and incontestable, prove to be relative truths—*hence*, there can be no objective truth independent of mankind. Such is the argument not only of all the Machists, but of the "physical" idealists in general. That absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; that relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object independent of mankind; that these reflections become more and more faithful; that every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth—all these propositions, which are obvious to anyone who has thought over Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, are for the "modern" theory of knowledge a book with seven seals.

Such works as Duhem's *Theory of Physics*,* or Stallo's,** which Mach particularly recommends, show very clearly that these "physical" idealists attach the most significance

* P. Duhem, *La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure*, Paris, 1906.

** J. B. Stallo, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*, London, 1882. There are French and German translations.

to the proof of the relativity of our knowledge, and that they are in reality vacillating between idealism and dialectical materialism. Both authors, who belong to different periods and who approach the question from different angles (Duhem's speciality is physics, in which field he has worked for twenty years; Stallo is a former orthodox Hegelian who grew ashamed of his book on natural philosophy in the old Hegelian spirit, published in 1848), most energetically combat the atomistic-mechanical conception of nature. They show the narrowness of this conception, the impossibility of accepting it as the limit of our knowledge, the rigidity of many of the ideas of writers who hold this conception. And it is indeed undeniable that the *old* materialism did suffer from such a defect; Engels reproached the earlier materialists for their failure to appreciate the relativity of all scientific theories, for their ignorance of dialectics and for their exaggeration of the mechanical point of view. But Engels (unlike Stallo) was able to discard Hegelian idealism and *to grasp* the great and true kernel of Hegelian dialectics. Engels rejected the old metaphysical materialism for *dialectical* materialism, and not for relativism that sinks into subjectivism. "The mechanical theory," says Stallo, for instance, "in common with metaphysical theories, hypostasises partial, ideal, and, it may be, purely conventional groups of attributes, or single attributes, and treats them as varieties of objective reality" (p. 150). This is true if you do not deny objective reality and combat metaphysics for being anti-dialectical. Stallo does not realise this clearly. He has not understood materialist dialectics and therefore frequently slips, by way of relativism, into subjectivism and idealism.

The same is true of Duhem. With an enormous expenditure of labour, and with the help of a number of interesting and valuable examples from the history of physics, such as one frequently encounters in Mach, he shows that "every law of physics is provisional and relative, because it is approximate" (280). The man is hammering at an open door!—will be the thought of the Marxist when he reads the lengthy disquisitions on this subject. But that is just the trouble with Duhem, Stallo, Mach and Poincaré, that they do not perceive the door opened by dialectical mate-

rialism. Being unable to give a correct formulation of relativism, they slide from the latter into idealism. "A law of physics, properly speaking, is neither true nor false, but approximate"—writes Duhem (p. 274). And this "but" contains the beginning of the falsity, the beginning of the obliteration of the boundary between a scientific theory that approximately *reflects the object*, i.e., approaches objective truth, and an arbitrary, fantastic, purely conventional theory, such as, for example, a religious theory or the theory of the game of chess.

Duhem carries this falsity to the point of declaring that the question whether "material reality" corresponds to perceptual phenomena is *metaphysics* (p. 10). Away with the question of reality! Our concepts and hypotheses are mere signs (p. 26), "arbitrary" (27) constructions, and so forth. There is only one step from this to idealism, to the "physics of the believer", which too M. Pierre Duhem preaches in the Kantian spirit (Rey, p. 162; cf. p. 160). But the good Adler (Fritz)—also a Machist would-be Marxist!—could find nothing cleverer to do than to "correct" Duhem as follows: Duhem, he claims, eliminates the "realities concealed behind phenomena only as objects of theory, but not as *objects of reality*;"* This is the familiar criticism of Kantianism from the standpoint of Hume and Berkeley.

But, of course, there can be no question of any conscious Kantianism on the part of Duhem. He is merely *vacillating*, as is Mach, not knowing on what to base his relativism. In many passages he comes very close to dialectical materialism. He says that we know sound "such as it is in relation to us but not as it is in itself, in the sound-producing bodies. This reality, of which our sensations give us only the external and the veil, is made known to us by the theories of acoustics. They tell us that where our perceptions register only this appearance which we call sound, there really exists a very small and very rapid periodic movement," etc. (p. 7). Bodies are not symbols of sensations, but sensations are symbols (or rather, images) of bodies. "The development of physics gives rise to a constant struggle between nature, which

* Translator's note to the German translation of Duhem, Leipzig, 1903, J. Barth.

does not tire of offering new material, and reason, which does not tire of cognising" (p. 32). Nature is infinite, just as its smallest particle (including the electron) is infinite, but reason just as infinitely transforms "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us". "Thus, the struggle between reality and the laws of physics will continue indefinitely; to every law that physics may formulate, reality will sooner or later oppose a rude refutation in the form of a fact; but, indefatigable, physics will improve, modify, and complicate the refuted law" (290). This would be a quite correct exposition of dialectical materialism if the author firmly held to the existence of this objective reality independent of mankind. "...The theory of physics is not a purely artificial system which is convenient today and unsuitable tomorrow ... it is a classification, which becomes more and more natural, a reflection, which grows clearer and clearer, of the realities that the experimental method cannot contemplate face to face" (p. 445).

In this last phrase the Machist Duhem flirts with Kantian idealism: it is as if the way is being opened for a method other than the "experimental" one, and as if we cannot know the "things-in-themselves" directly, immediately, face to face. But if the theory of physics becomes more and more natural, that means that "nature", reality, "reflected" by this theory, exists independently of our consciousness—and that is precisely the view of dialectical materialism.

In short, the "physical" idealism of today, exactly like the "physiological" idealism of yesterday, merely signifies that one school of natural scientists in one branch of natural science has slid into a reactionary philosophy, being unable to rise directly and at once from metaphysical materialism to dialectical materialism.* This step is being

* The famous chemist, William Ramsay, says: "I have been (requently asked: 'But is not electricity a vibration? How can wireless telegraphy be explained by the passage of little particles or corpuscles?' The answer is: 'Electricity is a *thing*; it *is* [Ramsay's italics] these minute corpuscles, but when they leave an object, a wave, like a wave of light, spreads through the ether, and this wave is used for wireless telegraph'" (William Ramsay, *Essays*, *Biographical and Chemical*, London, 1908 p. 126). Having spoken about the transformation of radium into helium, Ramsay remarks: "At least one so-called element can no longer be regarded as ultimate matter, but is itself undergoing

made, and will be made, by modern physics; but it is advancing towards the only true method and the only true philosophy of natural science not directly, but by zigzags, not consciously, but instinctively, not clearly perceiving its "final goal", but drawing closer to it gropingly, unsteadily, and sometimes even with its back turned to it. Modern physics is in travail; it is giving birth to dialectical materialism. The process of child-birth is painful. And in addition to a living healthy being, there are bound to be produced certain dead products, refuse fit only for the garbage-heap. And the entire school of physical idealism, the entire empirio-critical philosophy, together with empirio-symbolism, empirio-monism, and so on, and so forth, must be regarded as such refuse!

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change into a simpler form of matter" (p. 160). "Now it is almost certain that negative electricity is a particular form of matter; and positive electricity is matter deprived of negative electricity—that is, minus this electric matter" (176). "Now what is electricity? It used to be believed, formerly, that there were two kinds of electricity, one called positive and the other negative. At that time it could not have been possible to answer the question. But recent researches make it probable that what used to be called negative electricity is really a substance. Indeed, the relative weight of its particles has been measured; each is about one seven-hundredth of the mass of an atom of hydrogen.... Atoms of electricity are named 'electrons'" (196). If our Machists who write books and articles on philosophical subjects were capable of thinking, they would understand that the expression "matter disappears", "matter is reduced to electricity", etc., is only an epistemologically helpless expression of the truth that science is able to discover new forms of matter, new forms of material motion, to reduce the old forms to the new forms, and so on.

CHAPTER SIX

EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

The Russian Machists, as we have already seen, are divided into two camps. Mr. V. Chernov and the collaborators of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[105] are downright and consistent opponents of dialectical materialism, both in philosophy and history. The other company of Machists, in whom we are more interested here, are would-be Marxists, who try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels. True, these assurances are for the most part nothing but assurances; not a single Machist would-be Marxist has ever made the slightest attempt to present in any systematic way the real tendencies of the founders of empirio-criticism in the field of the social sciences. We shall dwell briefly on this question, turning first to the statements to be found in writings of the German empirio-criticists and then to those of their Russian disciples.

1. THE EXCURSIONS OF THE GERMAN EMPIRIO-CRITICISTS INTO THE FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In 1895, when R. Avenarius was still alive, there appeared in the philosophical journal edited by him an article by his disciple, F. Blei, entitled "Metaphysics in Political Economy".* All the teachers of empirio-criticism wage war

* *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1895, Bd. XIX, F. Blei, "Die Metaphysik in der National-ökonomie", S. 378-90.

on the "metaphysics" not only of explicit and conscious philosophical materialism, but also of natural science, which instinctively adopts the standpoint of the materialist theory of knowledge. The disciple takes up arms against metaphysics in political economy. The fight is directed against the most varied schools of political economy, but we are interested only in the character of the empirio-critical argument against the school of Marx and Engels. "The purpose of the present investigation," writes Franz Blei, "is to show that all political economy until now, in its endeavour to interpret the phenomena of economic life, operates with metaphysical premises; that it ... 'derives' the 'laws' governing an economy from the 'nature' of the latter, and man is merely something accidental in relation to these 'laws'. ... In all its theories political economy has hitherto rested on metaphysical grounds; all its theories are unbiological, and therefore unscientific and worthless for knowledge.... The theoreticians do not know what they are building their theories on, what the soil is of which these theories are the fruit. They regard themselves as realists operating without any premises whatever, for they are dealing with 'sober' (*nüchterne*), 'practical' and 'tangible' (*sinnfällige*) economic phenomena.... And all have that family resemblance to many trends in physiology which only the same parents—viz., metaphysics and speculation—can transmit to their children, in this case the physiologists and economists. One school of economists analyses the 'phenomena' of 'economy' [Avenarius and his school put ordinary words in quotation marks in order to show that they, the true philosophers, understand the essentially "metaphysical character" of such a vulgar use of words, unrefined by "epistemological analysis"] without placing what they find (*das Gefundene*) in this way into relation with the behaviour of individuals; the physiologists exclude the behaviour of the individual from their investigations as being 'actions of the soul' (*Wirkungen der Seele*), while the economists of this trend declare the behaviour of individuals to be negligible in relation to the 'immanent laws of economy'" (378-79). With Marx, theory established "economic laws" from constructed processes, and these "laws" figured in the initial section (*Initialabschnitt*) of

the dependent vital series, while the economic processes figured in the final section (*Finalabschnitt*).... "Economy" was transformed by the economists into a transcendental category, in which they discovered such "laws" as they wished to discover: the "laws" of "capital" and "labour", "rent", "wages" and "profit". The economists transformed man into a Platonic idea—"capitalist", "worker", etc. Socialism ascribed to the "capitalist" the character of being "greedy for profit", liberalism ascribed to the worker the character of being "grasping"—and both characters were moreover explained by the "operation of the laws of capital" (381-82).

"Marx came to the study of French socialism and political economy with a socialist world outlook, and his aim as regards knowledge was to provide the 'theoretical foundation' for his world outlook in order to 'safeguard' his initial value. He found the law of value in Ricardo ... but the conclusions which the French Socialists drew from Ricardo could not satisfy Marx in his endeavour to 'safeguard' his E-value brought into a vital-difference, i.e., his 'world outlook', for these conclusions had already entered as a component part into the content of his initial value in the form of 'indignation at the robbery of the workers', and so forth. The conclusions were rejected as 'being formally untrue economically' for they are 'simply an application of morality to political economy'. 'But what may be formally untrue economically, may all the same be true from the point of view of world history. If the moral consciousness of the mass declares an economic fact to be unjust, that is a proof that the fact itself has been outlived, that other economic facts have made their appearance, owing to which the former one has become unbearable and untenable. Therefore, a very true economic content may be concealed behind the formal economic incorrectness.'" (From Engels' preface to Karl Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy*.)

Having quoted the above passage from Engels, Blei continues: "In the above quotation the middle section (*Medialabschnitt*) of the dependent series which interests us here is detached [*abgehoben*—a technical term of Avenarius' implying: reached the consciousness, separated off]. After the 'cognition' that an 'economic fact' must be concealed

behind the 'moral consciousness of injustice', comes the final section (*Finalabschnitt*: the theory of Marx is a statement, i.e., an E-value, i.e., a vital-difference which passes through three stages, three sections, initial, middle and final: *Initialabschnitt*, *Medialabschnitt*, *Finalabschnitt*) ... i.e., the 'cognition' of this 'economic fact'. Or, in other words, the task now is to 'find again' the initial value, the 'world outlook', in the 'economic facts' in order to 'safeguard' this initial value.—This definite variation of the dependent series already contains the Marxian metaphysics, regardless of how the 'cognised' appears in the final section (*Finalabschnitt*). 'The socialist world outlook', as the independent E-value, 'absolute truth', is given a basis 'retrospectively' by means of a 'special' theory of knowledge, namely, the economic system of Marx and the materialist theory of history.... By means of the concept of surplus-value the 'subjective' 'truth' in the Marxian world outlook finds its 'objective truth' in the theory of knowledge of the 'economic categories'—the safeguarding of the initial value is completed and metaphysics has retrospectively received its critique of knowledge" (384-86).

The reader is probably indignant with us for quoting at such length this incredibly trivial rigmarole, this quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius. But—*wer den "Feind" will verstehen, muss im Feindes "Lande gehen"*—who would know the *enemy* must go into the *enemy's* territory.[106] And R . Avenarius' philosophical journal is indeed enemy territory for Marxists. And we invite the reader to overcome for a minute his legitimate aversion for the buffoons of bourgeois science and to analyse the argument of Avenarius' disciple and collaborator.

Argument number one: Marx is a "metaphysician" who did not grasp the epistemological "critique of concepts", who did not work out a general theory of knowledge and who simply inserted materialism into his "special theory of knowledge".

This argument contains nothing original to Blei personally. We have already seen scores and hundreds of times that *all* the founders of empirio-criticism and *all* the Russian Machists accuse materialism of "metaphysics", or,

more accurately, they repeat the hackneyed arguments of the Kantians, Humeans and idealists against materialist "metaphysics".

Argument number two: Marxism is as "metaphysical" as natural science (physiology). And here again it is not Blei who is "responsible" for this argument, but Mach and Avenarius; for it was they who declared war on "natural-historical metaphysics", applying that name to the instinctively materialist theory of knowledge to which (on their own admission and according to the judgement of all who are in any way versed in the subject) the vast majority of natural scientists adhere.

Argument number three: Marxism declares that "personality" is a *quantité négligeable*, a cypher, that man is "something accidental", subject to certain "immanent laws of economics", that an analysis *des Gefundenen*, i.e., of what is found, of what is given, etc., is lacking. This argument is a *complete* repetition of the circle of ideas of the empirio-critical "principal co-ordination", i.e., of the *idealist* crotchet in Avenarius' theory. Blei is absolutely right when he says that it is impossible to find the slightest hint of such idealist nonsense in Marx and Engels, and that from the standpoint of this nonsense it is inevitable that Marxism must be rejected *completely*, from the very beginning, from its fundamental philosophical premises.

Argument number four: Marx's theory is "unbiological", it knows nothing of "vital-differences" and suchlike spurious biological terms which constitute the "science" of the reactionary professor, Avenarius. Blei's argument is correct from the standpoint of Machism, for the gulf between Marx's theory and Avenarius' "biological" trivialities is indeed obvious at once. We shall presently see how the Russian Machist would-be Marxists in effect followed in Blei's footsteps.

Argument number five: the partisanship, the partiality of Marx's theory and the preconceived nature of his solution. The empirio-criticists *as a whole*, and not Blei alone, claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fun-

damental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavour to rise *above* them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.

"Argument" number six: ridiculing "objective" truth. Blei at once sensed, and rightly sensed, that historical materialism and Marx's entire economic doctrine are permeated through and through by a recognition of objective truth. And Blei accurately expressed the tendencies of the doctrines of Mach and Avenarius when "from the very threshold", so to speak, he rejected Marxism precisely because of the idea of objective truth, when he at once declared that there was indeed nothing behind the Marxist teaching save the "subjective" views of Marx.

And if our Machists renounce Blei (as they surely will), we shall tell them: You must not blame the mirror for showing a crooked face. Blei is a mirror which *accurately* reflects the tendencies of empirio-criticism, and a renouncement by our Machists would only bear witness to their good intentions—and to their absurd eclectical endeavours to combine Marx and Avenarius.

Let us pass from Blei to Petzoldt. If the former is a mere disciple, the latter is declared by such outstanding empirio-criticists as Lesevich to be a master. While Blei posed the question of Marxism explicitly, Petzoldt—who would not demean himself by dealing with a mere Marx or a mere Engels—sets forth in positive form the views of empirio-criticism on sociology, which enables us to compare them with Marxism.

The second volume of Petzoldt's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience* is entitled "*Auf dem Wege zum Dauernden*" ("Towards Stability"). The author makes the tendency towards stability the basis of his investigation. "The main features of the ultimate (*endgültige*) state of stability of humanity can be inferred in its formal aspect. We thus arrive at the foundations of ethics, aesthetics and the formal theory of knowledge" (S. iii). "Human development bears its goal within itself, it too tends towards a perfect (*vollkommenen*) state of stability" (60). The signs of this are abundant and varied. For instance, are there

many ardent radicals who do not in their old age become "more sensible", more restrained? True, this "premature stability" (S. 62) is characteristic of the philistine. But do not philistines constitute the "compact majority" (S. 62).

Our philosopher's conclusion, which he gives in italics, is this: "The most essential feature of all the aims of our reasoning and creative activity is stability" (72). The explanation is: "Many cannot bear to see a key lying obliquely on the table, still less a picture hanging crooked on the wall.... And such people are not necessarily pedants.... It is only that they have *a feeling that something is not in order*" (72, Petzoldt's italics). In a word, the "tendency to stability is a striving for an extreme, by its nature ultimate, state" (73). All this is taken from the fifth chapter of Volume II entitled "The Psychical Tendency to Stability". The proofs of this tendency are all very weighty. For instance: "The striving for an extreme, a highest, in the original spatial sense, is pursued by the majority of mountain climbers. It is not always the desire for a spacious view or joy in the physical exercise of climbing in fresh air and wide nature that urges them towards the peaks, but also the instinct which is deeply ingrained in every organic being to persist in an adopted path of activity until a natural aim has been achieved" (73). Another example: the amount of money people will pay to secure a complete collection of postage stamps! "It makes one's head swim to examine the price-list of a dealer in postage stamps.... And yet nothing is more natural and comprehensible than this urge for stability" (74).

The philosophically untutored can have no conception of the breadth of the principles of stability and of economy of thought. Petzoldt develops his "theory" in detail for the profane. "Sympathy is an expression of the immediate need for a state of stability," states § 28. "Sympathy is not a repetition, a duplication of the observed suffering, but suffering on account of this suffering.... The greatest emphasis must be placed on the immediacy of sympathy. If we admit this we thereby admit that the welfare of others can concern a man just as immediately and fundamentally as his own welfare, and we thus at the same time reject every utilitarian and eudaemonic foundation of ethics. Thanks to

its longing for stability and peace, human nature is not fundamentally evil, but anxious to help....

"The immediacy of sympathy is frequently manifested in the immediacy of help. The rescuer will often fling himself without thought to save a drowning man. He cannot bear the sight of a person struggling with death; he forgets his other obligations and perhaps risks his own life and the life of his near ones in order to save the useless life of some degraded drunkard; in other words, under certain circumstances sympathy can drive one to actions that are morally unjustifiable."

And scores and hundreds of pages of empirio-critical philosophy are filled with such unspeakable platitudes!

Morality is deduced from the concept of the "moral state of stability". (The second section of Volume II: "Stable States of the Soul", Chapter 1, "On Ethical Stable States".) "The state of stability, according to the concept of it, contains no conditions of change in any of its components. From this it at once follows that it can contain no possibility of *war*" (202). "Economic and social equality follows from the concept of the final (*endgültig*), stable state" (213). This "state of stability" is derived not from religion but from "science". The "majority" cannot bring it about, as the socialists suppose, nor can the power of the socialists "help humanity" (207). Oh, no!—it is "free development" that will lead to the ideal. Are not, indeed, the profits of capital decreasing and are not wages constantly increasing? (223). All the assertions about "wage slavery" are untrue (229). A slave's leg could be broken with impunity—but now? No, "moral progress" is beyond doubt; look at the university settlements in England, at the Salvation Army (230), at the German "ethical societies". In the name of "aesthetic stability" (Chapter II, Section 2) "romanticism" is rejected. But romanticism includes also all forms of inordinate extension of the *ego*, idealism, metaphysics, occultism, solipsism, egoism, the "forcible coercion of the minority by the majority" and the "social-democratic ideal of the organisation of all labour by the state" (240-41).*

* It is in the same spirit that Mach expresses himself in favour of the bureaucratic socialism of Popper and Menger, which guarantees

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The infinite stupidity of the philistine, smugly retailing the most hackneyed rubbish under cover of a new "empirio-critical" systematisation and terminology—that is what the sociological excursions of Blei, Petzoldt and Mach amount to. A pretentious cloak of verbal artifices, clumsy devices of syllogistics, subtle scholasticism—in short, as in epistemology, so in sociology, the same reactionary content under the same flamboyant signboard.

Let us now turn to the Russian Machists.

2. HOW BOGDANOV CORRECTS AND "DEVELOPS" MARX

In his article "The Development of Life in Nature and Society" (1902, see *From the Psychology of Society*, p. 35, et seq.), Bogdanov quotes the well-known passage from the preface to *Zur Kritik*,[107] where the "great sociologist", i.e., Marx, expounds the basis of historical materialism. Having quoted Marx's words, Bogdanov declares that the "old formulation of historical monism, without ceasing to be basically true, no longer fully satisfies us" (37). The author wishes, therefore, to correct the theory, or to develop it, *starting from the basis of the theory itself*. The author's chief conclusion is as follows:

"We have shown that social forms belong to the comprehensive *genus*—biological adaptations. But we have not thereby defined the province of social forms; for a definition, not only the *genus*, but also the *species* must be established.... In their struggle for existence men can unite only with the help of *consciousness*: without consciousness there can be no intercourse. Hence, *social life in all its manifestations is a consciously psychical life*.... Sociality is inseparable from consciousness. *Social being and social consciousness are*, *in the exact meaning of these terms*, *identical*" (50, 51, Bogdanov's italics).

That this conclusion has nothing in common with Marxism has been pointed out by Orthodox (*Philosophical Essays*,

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the "freedom of the individual", whereas, he says, the doctrine of the Social-Democrats, which "compares unfavourably" with this socialism, threatens a "slavery even more universal and more oppressive than that of a monarchical or oligarchical state". See *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, 2. Auflage, 1906, S. 80-81.

St. Petersburg, 1906, p 183, and preceding). But Bogdanov responded simply by abuse, picking upon an *error* in quotation: instead of "in the exact meaning of these terms", Orthodox had quoted "in the full meaning of these terms". This error was indeed committed, and the author had every right to correct it; but to raise a cry of "mutilation", "substitution", and so forth (*Empirio-monism*, Bk. III, p. xliv), is simply to *obscure* the essence of the point at issue by wretched words. Whatever "exact" meaning Bogdanov may have invented for the terms "social being" and "social consciousness", there can be no doubt that the statement we have quoted is *not correct*. Social being and social consciousness are not identical, just as being in general and consciousness in general are not identical. From the fact that in their intercourse men act as conscious beings, it *does not follow* at all that social consciousness is identical with social being. In all social formations of any complexity—and in the capitalist social formation in particular—people in their intercourse are *not conscious* of what kind of social relations are being formed, in accordance with what laws they develop, etc. For instance, a peasant when he sells his grain enters into "intercourse" with the world producers of grain in the world market, but he is not conscious of it; nor is he conscious of the kind of social relations that are formed on the basis of exchange. Social consciousness *reflects* social being—that is Marx's teaching. A reflection may be an approximately true copy of the reflected, but to speak of identity is absurd. Consciousness in general *reflects* being—that is a general thesis of *all* materialism. It is impossible not to see its direct and *inseparable* connection with the thesis of historical materialism: social consciousness *reflects* social being.

Bogdanov's attempt to correct and develop Marx unnoticeably "in the spirit of his basis" is an obvious distortion of this *materialist* basis in the spirit of *idealism*. It would be ludicrous to deny it. Let us recall Bazarov's exposition of empirio-criticism (not empirio-monism, oh no!—there is such a wide, wide difference between these "systems"!): "sense-perception *is* the reality existing outside us". This is plain idealism, a plain theory of the identity of consciousness and being. Recall, further, the formulation of W. Schup-

pe, the immanentist (who swore and vowed as fervently as Bazarov and Co. that he was not an idealist, and who with no less vigour than Bogdanov insisted on the very "exact" meaning of his terms): "being is consciousness". Now compare with this the *refutation* of Marx's historical materialism by the immanentist Schubert-Soldern: "Every material process of production is always an act of consciousness on the part of its observer.... In its epistemological aspect, it is not the external process of production that is the *primary* (*prius*), but the subject or subjects; in other words, even the purely material process of production does not lead (us) out of the general connection of consciousness (*Bewusstseinszusammenhang*)." (See *Das menschliche Glück und die soziale Frage*, S. 293, 295-96).

Bogdanov may curse the materialists as much as he likes for "mutilating his thoughts", but no curses will alter the simple and plain fact. The correction of Marx's theory and the development of Marx supposedly in the spirit of Marx by the "empirio-monist" Bogdanov differ *in no essential respect* from the refutation of Marx by the idealist and epistemological solipsist Schubert-Soldern. Bogdanov assures us that he is not an idealist. Schubert-Soldern assures us that he is a realist (Bazarov even believed him). In our time a philosopher has to declare himself a "realist" and an "enemy of idealism". It is about time you Machist gentlemen understood this.

The immanentists, the empirio-criticists and the empirio-monists all argue over particulars, over details, over the formulation of *idealism*, whereas we *from the very outset* reject all the principles of their philosophy common to this trinity. Let Bogdanov, accepting in the best sense and with the best of intentions *all the conclusions* of Marx, preach the "identity" of social being and social consciousness; we shall say: Bogdanov *minus* "empirio-monism" (or rather, *minus* Machism) is a Marxist. For this theory of the identity of social being and social consciousness is *sheer nonsense* and an *absolutely reactionary* theory. If certain people reconcile it with Marxism, with Marxist behaviour, we must admit that these people are better than their theory, but we must not justify outrageous theoretical distortions of Marxism.

Bogdanov reconciles his theory with Marx's conclusions by sacrificing elementary consistency for the sake of these conclusions. Every individual producer in the world economic system realises that he is introducing this or that change into the technique of production; every owner realises that he exchanges certain products for others; but these producers and these owners do not realise that in doing so they are thereby changing *social being*. The sum-total of these changes in all their ramifications in the capitalist world economy could not be grasped even by seventy Marxes. The most important thing is that the *laws* of these changes have been discovered, that the *objective* logic of these changes and of their historical development has in its chief and basic features been disclosed—objective, not in the sense that a society of conscious beings, of people, could exist and develop independently of the existence of conscious beings (and it is only such trifles that Bogdanov *stresses* by his "theory"), but in the sense that social being is *independent* of *the social consciousness* of people. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your *social* consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt *to it* one's social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.

Bogdanov admits all this. And what does this mean? It means *in effect* that he throws overboard his theory of the "identity of social being and social consciousness", that it remains an empty scholastic appendage, as empty, dead and useless as the "theory of general substitution" or the doctrine of "elements", "introjection" and the rest of the Machist nonsense. But the "dead lay hold of the living"; the dead scholastic appendage, *against the will of and independently of the consciousness* of Bogdanov, converts his philosophy into a *serviceable tool* of the Schubert-Solderns and other reactionaries, who in a thousand different keys,

from a hundred professorial chairs, disseminate *this* dead thing as a living thing, direct it against the living thing, for the purpose of stifling the latter. Bogdanov personally is a sworn enemy of reaction in general and of bourgeois reaction in particular. Bogdanov's "substitution" and theory of the "identity of social being and social consciousness" *serve* this reaction. It is sad, but true.

Materialism in general recognises objectively real being (matter) as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity. Historical materialism recognises social being as independent of the social consciousness of humanity. In both cases consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it. From this Marxist philosophy, which is cast from a single piece of steel, you cannot eliminate one basic premise, one essential part, without departing from objective truth, without falling a prey to bourgeois-reactionary falsehood.

Here are further examples of how the dead philosophy of idealism lays hold of the living Marxist Bogdanov.

The article "What Is Idealism?", 1901 (ibid., p. 11, et seq.): "We arrive at the following conclusion: both where people agree in their judgements of progress and where they disagree, the basic meaning of the idea of progress is the same, namely, *increasing completeness and harmony of conscious life*. This is the objective content of the concept progress.... If we now compare the psychological formulation of the idea of progress thus arrived at with the previously explained biological formulation ["biological *progress is an increase in the sum-total of life*", p. 14], we shall easily convince ourselves that the former fully coincides with the latter and can be deduced from it.... And since social life amounts to the psychical life of members of society, here too the content of the idea of progress is the same—increase in the completeness and harmony of life; only we must add: the *social* life of people. And, of course, the idea of social progress never had and cannot have any other content" (p. 16).

"We have found ... that idealism expresses the victory in the human soul of moods more social over moods less social, that a progressive ideal is a reflection of the socially progressive tendency in the idealist psychology" (32).

It need hardly be said that all this play with biology and sociology contains *not a grain* of Marxism. Both in Spencer and Mikhailovsky one may find any number of definitions not a whit worse than this, defining nothing but the "good intentions" of the author and betraying a *complete lack of understanding* of "what is idealism" and what materialism.

The author begins Book III of *Empirio-monism*, the article "Social Selection (Foundations of Method)", 1906, by rejecting the "eclectic socio-biological attempts of Lange, Ferri, Woltmann and many others" (p. 1), and on page 15 we find the following conclusion of the "enquiry": "We can formulate the fundamental connection between energetics and social selection as follows:

"*Every act of social selection represents an increase or decrease of the energy of the social complex concerned. In the former case we have 'positive selection', in the latter 'negative selection'.*" (Author's italics.)

And such unspeakable nonsense is served out as Marxism! Can one imagine anything more sterile, lifeless and scholastic than this string of biological and energeticist terms that contribute nothing, and can contribute nothing, in the sphere of the social sciences? There is not a shadow of concrete economic study here, not a hint of Marx's *method*, the method of dialectics and the world outlook of materialism, only a mere *invention* of definitions and attempts to fit them into the ready-made conclusions of Marxism. "The rapid growth of the productive forces of capitalist society is undoubtedly an increase in the energy of the social whole...." The second half of the phrase is undoubtedly a simple repetition of the first half expressed in meaningless terms which seem to lend "profundity" to the question, but which in reality *in no way* differ from the eclectic biologico-sociological attempts of Lange and Co.!—"but the disharmonious character of this process leads to its culmination in a 'crisis', in a vast waste of productive forces, in a sharp decrease of energy: positive selection is replaced by negative selection" (18).

In what way does this differ from Lange? A biologico-energeticist label is tacked on to ready-made conclusions about crises, without any concrete material whatever being added and without the nature of crises being elucidated.

All this is done with the very best intentions, for the author wishes to corroborate and deepen Marx's conclusions; but in point of fact he only *dilutes* them with an intolerably dreary and lifeless scholasticism. The only "Marxism" here is a *repetition* of an already known conclusion, and all the "new" proof of it, all this "*social energetics*" (34) and "social selection", is a mere *collection of words*, a sheer mockery of Marxism.

Bogdanov is not engaged in a Marxist enquiry at all; all he is doing is to reclothe results already obtained by this enquiry in a biological and energeticist terminology. The whole attempt is worthless from beginning to end, for the concepts "selection", "assimilation and dissimilation" of energy, the energetic balance, and so on and so forth, when applied to the sphere of the social sciences, are *empty phrases*. In fact, an *enquiry* into social phenomena and an elucidation of the *method* of the social sciences *cannot* be undertaken with the aid of these concepts. Nothing is easier than to tack an "energeticist" or "biologico-sociological" label on to such phenomena as crises, revolutions, the class struggle and so forth; but neither is there anything more sterile, more scholastic and lifeless than such an occupation. The important thing is not that Bogdanov tries to fit *all* his results and conclusions into Marxist theory—or "nearly" all (we have seen the "correction" he made on the subject of the relation of social being to social consciousness) —but that the *methods* of fitting—this "social energetics"— are thoroughly false and in no way differ from the methods of Lange.

"Herr Lange (*On the Labour Question*, etc., 2nd ed.)," Marx wrote to Kugelmann on June 27, 1870, "sings my praises loudly, but with the object of making himself important. Herr Lange, you see, has made a great discovery. The whole of history can be brought under a single great natural law. This natural law is the *phrase* (in this application Darwin's expression becomes nothing but a phrase) 'struggle for life', and the content of this phrase is the Malthusian law of population or, rather, over-population. So, instead of analysing the 'struggle for life' as represented historically in various definite forms of society, all that has to be done is to translate every concrete struggle into the

phrase 'struggle for life', and this phrase itself into the Malthusian 'population fantasy'. One must admit that this is a very impressive method—for swaggering, sham-scientific, bombastic ignorance and intellectual laziness."[108]

The basis of Marx's criticism of Lange is not that Lange foists Malthusianism in particular upon sociology, but that the transfer of biological concepts *in general* to the sphere of the social sciences is *phrase-mongering*. Whether the transfer is undertaken with "good" intentions, or with the purpose of bolstering up false sociological conclusions, the phrase-mongering none the less remains phrase-mongering. And Bogdanov's "social energetics", his coupling of the doctrine of social selection with Marxism, is just such phrase-mongering.

Just as in epistemology Mach and Avenarius did not develop idealism, but only overlaid the *old* idealist errors with pretentious terminological nonsense ("elements", "principal co-ordination", "introjection", etc.), so in sociology, even when there is sincere sympathy for Marxist conclusions, empirio-criticism results in a distortion of historical materialism by means of pretentious, empty energeticist and biological verbiage.

A historical peculiarity of modern Russian Machism (or rather of the Machist epidemic among a section of the Social-Democrats) is the following. Feuerbach was a "materialist below and an idealist above"; this to a certain extent applies also to Büchner, Vogt, Moleschott and Dühring, with the essential difference that all these philosophers were pygmies and wretched scribblers compared with Feuerbach.

Marx and Engels, as they grew out of Feuerbach and matured in the fight against the scribblers, naturally paid most attention to crowning the structure of philosophical materialism, that is, not to the materialist epistemology but to the materialist conception of history. That is why Marx and Engels laid the emphasis in their works rather on *dialectical* materialism than on dialectical *materialism*, and insisted on *historical* materialism rather than on historical *materialism*. Our would-be Marxist Machists approached Marxism in an entirely different historical period, at a time when bourgeois philosophy was particularly specialising in epistemology, and, having assimilated in a

one-sided and mutilated form certain of the component parts of dialectics (relativism, for instance), was directing its attention chiefly to a defence or restoration of idealism be low and not of idealism above. At any rate, positivism in general, and Machism in particular, have been much more occupied in subtly falsifying epistemology—simulating materialism and concealing their idealism under a pseudo-materialist terminology—and have paid comparatively little attention to the philosophy of history. Our Machists did not understand Marxism because they happened to approach it *from the other side*, so to speak, and they have assimilated—and at times not so much assimilated as learnt by rote—Marx's economic and historical theory, without clearly apprehending its foundation, viz., philosophical materialism. And the result is that Bogdanov and Co. deserve to be called Russian Büchners and Dührings turned inside out. They want to be materialists above, but are unable to rid themselves of muddled idealism below! In the case of Bogdanov, "above" there is historical materialism, vulgarised, it is true, and much corrupted by idealism, "below" there is idealism, disguised by Marxist terminology and counterfeiting Marxist language. "Socially-organised experience", "collective labour process", and so forth are Marxist words, but they are all *only words*, concealing an idealist philosophy that declares things to be complexes of "elements", of sensations, the external world to be "experience", or an "empirio-symbol" of mankind, physical nature to be a "product" of the "psychical", and so on and so forth.

An ever subtler falsification of Marxism, an ever subtler presentation of anti-materialist doctrines under the guise of Marxism—this is the characteristic feature of modern revisionism in political economy, in questions of tactics and in philosophy generally, equally in epistemology and in sociology.

3. SUVOROV'S "FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY"

The *Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism*, which concludes with the article by Comrade S. Suvorov mentioned above, by very reason of the collective nature of the book

constitutes an unusually aromatic bouquet. When you have at one time and side by side the utterances of Bazarov[109], who says that according to Engels "sense-perception is the reality existing outside us", of Berman, who declares the dialectics of Marx and Engels to be mysticism, of Lunacharsky, who goes to the length of religion, of Yushkevich, who introduces the "Logos in the irrational stream of experience", of Bogdanov, who calls idealism the philosophy of Marxism, of Helfond, who purges J. Dietzgen of materialism, and lastly, of S. Suvorov with his article "Foundations of Social Philosophy"—you at once sense the "aroma" of the new alignment. Quantity has passed into quality. The "seekers", who up to now had been seeking separately in individual articles and books, have come out with a veritable pronunciamento. Individual disagreements among them are obliterated by the very fact of their collective utterance *against* (and not "in") the philosophy of Marxism, and the reactionary features of Machism as a current become manifest.

Under these circumstances, Suvorov's article is all the more interesting for the fact that the author is neither an empirio-monist nor an empirio-criticist, but simply a "realist". What relates him, therefore, to the rest of the company is not what distinguishes Bazarov, Yushkevich and Bogdanov as philosophers, but what they all have in common *against* dialectical materialism. A comparison of the sociological arguments of this "realist" with the arguments of the empirio-monist will help us to depict their *common* tendency.

Suvorov writes: "In the gradation of the laws that regulate the world process, the particular and complex become reduced to the general and simple, and all of them are subordinate to the universal law of development—*the law of the economy of forces*. The essence of this law is that *every system of forces is the more capable of conservation and development the less its expenditure*, *the greater its accumulation and the more effectively expenditure serves accumulation*. The forms of mobile equilibrium, which long ago evoked the idea of objective purposiveness (the solar system, the cycle of terrestrial phenomena, the process of life), arise and develop by virtue of the conservation

and accumulation of the energy inherent in them—by virtue of their intrinsic economy. The law of economy of forces is the unifying and regulating principle of all development—inorganic, biological and social" (p. 293, author's italics).

With what remarkable ease do our "positivists" and "realists" concoct "universal laws"! What a pity these laws are no whit better than those concocted as easily and swiftly by Eugen Dühring. Suvorov's "universal law" is just as empty and bombastic phrase-mongering as Dühring's universal laws. Try to apply this law to the first of the three fields mentioned by the author—inorganic development. You will see that no "economy of forces" *apart from* the law of the conservation and transformation of energy can be applied here, let alone applied "universally". But the author had already set apart the law of the "conservation of energy", had already mentioned it (p. 292) as a separate law.* What then remained in the field of inorganic development apart from this law? Where are the additions or complications, or new discoveries, or new facts which entitled the author to modify ("perfect") the law of the conservation and transformation of energy into the law of the "*economy of forces*"? There are no such facts or discoveries; Suvorov does not even hint at them. He simply—to make it look impressive, as Turgenev's Bazarov used to say—flourished his pen and forth came a new "uni-

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* It is characteristic that Suvorov calls the discovery of the law of the conservation and transformation of energy[110] "the establishment of the basic principles of *energetics*" (292). Has our would-be Marxist "realist" ever heard of the fact that both the vulgar materialists, Büchner and Co., and the dialectical materialist, Engels, regarded this law as the establishment of the basic principles of *materialism*? Has our "realist" ever reflected on the meaning of this difference? He has not; he has merely followed the fashion, repeated Ostwald, and that is all. That is just the trouble: "realists" like this succumb to fashion, whereas Engels, for instance, *assimilated the*, *to him*, *new term*, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2nd ed. of *Anti-Dühring*) and in 1888 (*Ludwig Feuerbach*), but to employ it equally with the concepts of "force" and "motion" and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his *materialism* by adopting a new terminology. The "realists" and other muddleheads seized upon the new term without noticing the difference between materialism and energetics!

versal law" of "real-monistic philosophy" (p. 292). See what fine fellows we are! How are we worse than Dühring?

Take the second field of development—the biological. In this field, where the development of organisms takes place through the struggle for existence and selection, is it the law of the economy of forces or the "law" of the wastage of forces that is universal? But never mind! "Real-monistic philosophy" can interpret the "*meaning*" of a universal law in one field in one way and in another field in another way, for instance, as the development of *higher* organisms from lower. What does it matter if the universal law thus becomes an empty phrase—the principle of "monism" is preserved. And in the third field (the social), the "universal law" can be interpreted in a third sense—as the development of productive forces. That is why it is a "universal law"—so that it can be made to cover anything you please.

"Although social science is still young, it already possesses both a solid foundation and definite generalisations; in the nineteenth century it reached a theoretical level—and this constitutes Marx's chief merit. He elevated social science to the level of a social theory...." Engels said that Marx transformed socialism from a utopia into a science, but this is not enough for Suvorov. It will sound more impressive if we also *distinguish theory from science* (was there a social science before Marx?)—and it does not matter if the distinction is absurd!

"...by establishing the fundamental law of social dynamics according to which the evolution of productive forces is the determining principle of all economic and social development. But the development of productive forces corresponds to the growth of the productivity of labour, to the relative reduction in expenditure and increase in the accumulation of energy [see how fertile the "real-monistic philosophy" is: a new, energeticist, substantiation of Marxism has been created!] ... this is the economic principle. Thus, Marx made the principle of the economy of forces the basis of the social theory...."

This "thus" is truly superb! *Because* Marx has a political economy, let us *therefore* chew the *word* "economy", and call the cud "real-monistic philosophy"!

No, Marx did not make any principle of the economy of forces the basis of his theory. These are absurdities invented by people who covet the laurels of Eugen Dühring. Marx gave an absolutely precise definition of the concept growth of productive forces, and he studied the concrete process of this growth. But Suvorov invented a new term to designate the concept analysed by Marx; and his invention was a very unhappy one and only confused matters. For Suvorov did not explain what is meant by the "economy of forces", how it can be measured, how this concept can be applied, what precise and definite facts it embraces; —and this cannot be explained, because it is a muddle. Listen to this:

"...This law of social economy is not only the principle of the internal unity of social science [can you make anything of this, reader?], but also the connecting link between social theory and the general theory of being" (294).

Well, well, here we have "the general theory of being" discovered anew by S. Suvorov, after it has already been discovered many times and in the most varied forms by numerous representatives of scholastic philosophy. We congratulate the Russian Machists on this new "general theory of being"! Let us hope that their next collective work will be entirely devoted to the substantiation and development of this great discovery!

The way our representative of realistic, or real-monistic, philosophy expounds Marx's theory can be seen from the following example: "In general, the productive forces of men form a genetic gradation [ugh!] and consist of their labour energy, harnessed elemental forces, culturally modified nature and the instruments of labour which make up the technique of production.... In relation to the process of labour these forces perform a purely economic function; they save labour energy and increase the productivity of its expenditure" (298). Productive forces perform an economic function in relation to the process of labour! This is just as though one were to say that vital forces perform a vital function in relation to the process of life. This is not expounding Marx; this is clogging up Marxism with an incredible clutter of words.

It is impossible to enumerate all the clutter contained in Suvorov's article. "The socialisation of a class is expressed in the growth of its collective power over both people and their property" (313). "...The class struggle aims at establishing forms of equilibrium between social forces" (322). Social dissension, enmity and struggle are essentially negative, anti-social phenomena. "Social progress, in its basic content, is the growth of sociality, of social connections between people" (328). One could fill volumes with collections of such banalities—and the representatives of bourgeois sociology are filling volumes with them. But to pass them off as the philosophy of Marxism—that is going too far! If Suvorov's article were an experiment in popularising Marxism, one would not judge it very severely. Everyone would admit that the author's intentions were of the best but that the experiment was very unsuccessful. And that would be the end of it. But when a group of Machists present us with such stuff and call it the *Foundations of Social Philosophy*, and when we see the same methods of "developing" Marxism employed in Bogdanov's philosophical books, we arrive at the inevitable conclusion that there is an inseparable connection between reactionary epistemology and reactionary efforts in sociology.

4. PARTIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL BLOCKHEADS

It remains for us to examine the relation between Machism and religion. But this broadens into the question of whether, in general, there are parties in philosophy, and what is meant by non-partisanship in philosophy.

Throughout the preceding exposition, in connection with every problem of epistemology touched upon and in connection with every philosophical question raised by the new physics, we traced the struggle between *materialism* and *idealism*. Behind the mass of new terminological artifices, behind the clutter of erudite scholasticism, we invariably discerned *two* principal alignments, two fundamental trends in the solution of philosophical problems. Whether nature, matter, the physical, the external world should be taken as primary, and consciousness, mind,

sensation (experience—as the *widespread* terminology of our time has it), the psychical, etc., should be regarded as secondary—that is the root question which *in fact* continues to divide the philosophers into *two great camps*. The source of thousands upon thousands of errors and of the confusion reigning in this sphere is the fact that beneath the covering of terms, definitions, scholastic devices and verbal artifices, these two fundamental trends are *overlooked*. (Bogdanov, for instance, refuses to acknowledge his idealism, because, you see, instead of the "metaphysical" concepts "nature" and "mind", he has taken the "experiential": physical and psychical. A word has been changed!)

The genius of Marx and Engels lies precisely in the fact that during a very long period, *nearly half a century*, they developed materialism, further advanced one fundamental trend in philosophy, did not rest content with repeating epistemological problems that had already been solved, but consistently applied—and showed *how* to apply—*this same* materialism in the sphere of the social sciences, mercilessly brushing aside as rubbish all nonsense, pretentious hotchpotch, the innumerable attempts to "discover" a "new" line in philosophy, to invent a "new" trend and so forth. The verbal nature of such attempts, the scholastic play with new philosophical "isms", the clogging of the issue by pretentious devices, the inability to comprehend and clearly present the struggle between the two fundamental epistemological trends—this is what Marx and Engels persistently tracked down and fought against throughout their activity.

We said, "nearly half a century". And, indeed, as far back as 1843, when Marx was only becoming Marx, i.e., the founder of socialism as a science, the founder of *modern materialism*, which is immeasurably richer in content and incomparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism—even at that time Marx pointed out with amazing clarity the basic trends in philosophy. Karl Grün quotes a letter from Marx to Feuerbach dated October 20, 1843,[111] in which Marx invites Feuerbach to write an article for the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*[112] against Schelling. This Schelling, writes Marx, is a shallow braggart with his claims to having embraced and transcended

all previous philosophical trends. "To the French romanticists and mystics he [Schelling] says: I am the union of philosophy and theology; to the French materialists: I am the union of the flesh and the idea; to the French sceptics: I am the destroyer of dogmatism."* That the "sceptics", be they called Humeans or Kantians (or, in the twentieth century, Machists), cry out against the "dogmatism" of both materialism and idealism, Marx at that time already saw; and, without letting himself be diverted by any one of a thousand wretched little philosophical systems, he was able through Feuerbach to take directly the materialist road against idealism. Thirty years later, in the afterword to the second edition of the first volume of *Capital*, Marx just as clearly and definitely contrasted *his materialism* to Hegel's *idealism*, i.e., the most consistent and most developed idealism; he contemptuously brushed Comtean "positivism" aside and dubbed as wretched epigoni the contemporary philosophers who imagined that they had destroyed Hegel when in reality they had reverted to a repetition of the pre-Hegelian errors of Kant and Hume.[113] In the letter to Kugelmann of June 27, 1870, Marx refers just as contemptuously to "Büchner, Lange, Dühring, Fechner, etc.", because they were incapable of understanding Hegel's dialectics and treated him with scorn.** And finally, take the various philosophical utterances by Marx in *Capital* and other works, and you will find an *invariable* basic motif: insistence upon *materialism* and contemptuous derision of all obscurity, of all confusion and all deviations towards *idealism*. *All* Marx's philosophical utterances revolve within these two fundamental opposites, and from the standpoint of professorial philosophy, their defect lies in this "narrowness" and "one-sidedness". In reality, this refusal to recognise the hybrid projects for reconciling materialism and idealism

* Karl Grün, *Ludwig Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass, sowie in seiner philosophischen Charakterentwicklung*, I. Bd., Leipzig, 1874, S. 361.

** Of the positivist Beesly, Marx, in a letter of December 13, 1870, speaks as follows: "Professor Beesly is a Comtist and as such obliged to think up all sorts of crotchets."[114] Compare this with the opinion of the positivists *à la* Huxley given by Engels in 1892.[115]

constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved *forward* along a sharply-defined philosophical road.

Entirely in the spirit of Marx, and in close collaboration with him, Engels in all his philosophical works briefly and clearly contrasts the materialist and idealist lines in regard to *all* questions, without, either in 1878, or 1888, or 1892,[116] taking seriously the endless attempts to "transcend" the "one-sidedness" of materialism and idealism, to proclaim a *new* trend—some kind of "positivism", "realism", or other professorial charlatanism. Engels conducted his *whole* fight against Dühring *completely* under the watchword of consistent adherence to materialism, accusing the materialist Dühring of verbally confusing the issue, of phrase-mongering, of methods of reasoning which involved a concession to idealism and adoption of the position of idealism. Either materialism consistent to the end, or the falsehood and confusion of philosophical idealism—such is the formulation of the question given in *every paragraph* of *Anti-Dühring*; and only people whose minds had already been corrupted by reactionary professorial philosophy could fail to notice it. And right until 1894, when the last preface was written to *Anti-Dühring*, revised and enlarged by the author for the last time, Engels continued to follow the latest developments both in philosophy and science, and continued with all his former resoluteness to hold to his lucid and firm position, brushing away the litter of new systems, big and little.

That Engels followed the new developments in philosophy is evident from *Ludwig Feuerbach*. In the 1888 preface, mention is even made of such a phenomenon as the rebirth of classical German philosophy in England and Scandinavia, whereas Engels (both in the preface and in the text of the book) has nothing but the most extreme contempt for the prevailing neo-Kantianism and Humism. It is quite obvious that Engels, observing the repetition by *fashionable* German and English philosophy of the old pre-Hegelian errors of Kantianism and Humism, was prepared to expect some good even *from the turn to Hegel* (in England and Scandinavia), hoping that the great idealist and dialectician would help to disclose petty idealist and metaphysical errors.[117]

Without undertaking an examination of the vast number of shades of neo-Kantianism in Germany and of Humism in England, Engels *from the very outset* refutes their fundamental deviation from materialism. Engels declares that the *entire tendency* of these two schools is "*scientifically a step backward*". And what is his opinion of the undoubtedly "positivist", according to the current terminology, the undoubtedly "realist" tendency of these neo-Kantians and Humeans, among whose number, for instance, he could not help knowing Huxley? That "positivism" and that "realism" which attracted, and which continue to attract, an infinite number of muddleheads, Engels declared to be *a t b e s t a philistine method of smuggling in materialism* while publicly abusing and disavowing it! It suffices to reflect only a very little on *such* an appraisal of Thomas Huxley—a very great scientist and an incomparably more realistic realist and positive positivist than Mach, Avenarius and Co.—in order to understand how contemptuously Engels would have greeted the present infatuation of a handful of Marxists with "recent positivism", or "recent realism", etc.

Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start to finish, they were able to detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism and fideism in every one of the "recent" trends. They therefore appraised Huxley *exclusively* from the standpoint of his materialist consistency. They therefore reproached Feuerbach for not pursuing materialism to the end, for renouncing materialism because of the errors of individual materialists, for combating religion in order to renovate it or invent a new religion, for being unable in sociology to rid himself of idealist phraseology and become a materialist.

And whatever particular mistakes he committed in his exposition of dialectical materialism, J. Dietzgen fully appreciated and took over this great and most precious tradition of his teachers. Dietzgen sinned much by his clumsy deviations from materialism, but he never attempted to dissociate himself from it in principle, he never attempted to raise a "new" banner and always at the decisive moment he firmly and categorically declared: I am a materialist; our philosophy is a materialist philosophy. "Of all parties," our Joseph Dietzgen justly said, "the middle

party is the most repulsive.... Just as parties in politics are more and more becoming divided into two camps ... so science too is being divided into two general classes (*Generalklassen*): metaphysicians on the one hand, and physicists, or materialists, on the other.* The intermediate elements and conciliatory quacks, with their various appellations—spiritualists, sensationalists, realists, etc., etc.—fall into the current on their way. We aim at definiteness and clarity. The reactionaries who sound a retreat (*Retraitebläser*) call themselves idealists,** and materialists should be the name for all who are striving to liberate the human mind from the metaphysical spell.... If we compare the two parties respectively to solid and liquid, between them there is a mush."***

True! The "realists", etc., including the "positivists", the Machists, etc., are all a wretched mush; they are a contemptible *middle party* in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question. The attempt to escape from these two basic trends in philosophy is nothing but "conciliatory quackery".

J. Dietzgen had not the slightest doubt that the "scientific priestcraft" of idealist philosophy is simply the antechamber to open priestcraft. "Scientific priestcraft," he wrote, "is seriously endeavouring to assist religious priestcraft" (op. cit., 51). "In particular, the sphere of epistemology, the misunderstanding of the human mind, is such a louse-hole" (*Lausgrube*) in which both kinds of priests "lay their eggs". "Graduated flunkeys", who with their talk of "ideal blessings" stultify the people by their tortuous (*geschraubte*) "idealism" (53)—that is J. Dietzgen's opinion of the professors of philosophy. "Just as the antipodes of the good God is the devil, so the professorial priest (*Kathederpfaffen*) has his opposite pole in the materialist." The materialist theory of knowledge is "a universal weapon against reli-

* Here again we have a clumsy and inexact expression: instead of "metaphysicians", he should have said "idealists". Elsewhere Dietzgen himself contrasts the metaphysicians and the dialecticians.

** Note that Dietzgen has corrected himself and now explains *more exactly* which is the party of the enemies of materialism.

*** See the article, "Social-Democratic Philosophy", written in 1876, *Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, 1903, S. 135.

gious belief" (55), and not only against the "notorious, formal and common religion of the priests, but also against the most refined, elevated professorial religion of muddled (*benebelter*) idealists" (58).

Dietzgen was ready to prefer "religious honesty" to the "half-heartedness" of free-thinking professors (60), for "there a system prevails", there we find integral people, people who do not separate theory from practice. For the Herr professors "philosophy is not a science, but a means of defence against Social-Democracy" (107). "Those who call themselves philosophers—professors and university lecturers—are, despite their apparent free-thinking, more or less immersed in superstition and mysticism ... and in relation to Social-Democracy constitute a single ... reactionary mass" (108). "Now, in order to follow the true path, without being led astray by all the religious and philosophical gibberish (*Welsch*), it is necessary to study the falsest of all false paths (*der Holzweg der Holzwege*), philosophy" (103).

Let us now examine Mach, Avenarius and their school from the standpoint of parties in philosophy. Oh, these gentlemen *boast* of their *non-partisanship*, and if they have an antipodes, it is the *materialist* ... and *only* the materialist. A red thread that runs through *all* the writings of *all* the Machists is the stupid claim to have "risen above" materialism and idealism, to have transcended this "obsolete" antithesis; but *in fact* this whole fraternity is *continually* sliding into idealism and it conducts a steady and incessant struggle against materialism. The subtle epistemological crotchets of a man like Avenarius remain a professorial invention, an attempt to form a small philosophical sect "of his own"; but, *as a matter of fact*, in the general circumstances of the struggle of ideas and trends in modern society, the *objective* part played by these epistemological artifices is in every case the same, namely, to clear the way for idealism and fideism, and to serve them faithfully. In fact, it cannot be an accident that the English spiritualists, like Ward, the French neo-criticists, who praise Mach for his attack on materialism and the German immanentists all fasten on the small school of empirio-criticists! Dietzgen's expression, "graduated flunkeys of fideism", hits

the nail on the head in the case of Mach, Avenarius and their whole school.*

It is the misfortune of the Russian Machists, who undertook to "reconcile" Machism and Marxism, that they trusted the reactionary professors of philosophy and as a result slipped down an inclined plane. The methods of operation employed in the various attempts to develop and supplement Marx were very naïve. They read Ostwald, believe Ostwald, paraphrase Ostwald and call it Marxism. They read Mach, believe Mach, paraphrase Mach and call it Marxism. They read Poincaré, believe Poincaré, paraphrase Poincaré and call it Marxism! *Not a single one* of these professors, who are capable of making very valuable contributions in the special fields of chemistry, history or physics, *can be trusted one iota* when it comes to philosophy. Why? For the same reason that *not a single* professor of political economy, who may be capable of very valuable contributions in the field of factual and specialised investigations, can be trusted *one iota* when it comes to the general theory of political economy. For in modern society the latter is as much a *partisan* science as is *epistemology*. Taken as a whole, the professors of economics are nothing but learned

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* Here is another example of how the widespread currents of reactionary bourgeois philosophy make use of Machism in practice. Perhaps the "latest fashion" in the latest American philosophy is "pragmatism[118] (from the Greek word "pragma"—action; that is, a philosophy of action). The philosophical journals speak perhaps more of pragmatism than of anything else. Pragmatism ridicules the metaphysics both of materialism and idealism, acclaims experience and only experience, recognises practice as the only criterion, refers to the positivist movement in general, *especially turns for support to Ostwald*, *Mach*, *Pearson*, *Poincaré* and *Duhem*, for the belief that science is not an "absolute copy of reality" and ... successfully deduces from all this a God for practical purposes, and only for practical purposes, without any metaphysics, and without transcending the bounds of experience (cf. William James, *Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, New York and London, 1907, pp. 57 and 106 especially). From the standpoint of materialism the difference between Machism and pragmatism is as insignificant and unimportant as the difference between empirio-criticism and empirio-monism. Compare, for example, Bogdanov's definition of truth with the pragmatist definition of truth, which is: "Truth for a pragmatist becomes a class-name for all sorts of definite working values in experience' (ibid., p. 68).

salesmen of the capitalist class, while the professors of philosophy are learned salesmen of the theologians.

The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and refashion the achievements of these "salesmen" (for instance, you will not make the slightest progress in the investigation of new economic phenomena without making use of the works of these salesmen) and *to be able* to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue our *own* line and to combat the *whole line* of the forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machists were unable to do; they *slavishly* follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy. "Perhaps we have gone astray, but we are seeking," wrote Lunacharsky in the name of the authors of the *Studies*. The trouble is that it is not *you* who are seeking, but *you who are being sought*! You do not go with your, i.e., Marxist (for you want to be Marxists), standpoint to every change in the bourgeois philosophical fashion; the fashion comes to you, foists upon you its new falsifications adapted to the idealist taste, one day *à la* Ostwald, the next day *à la* Mach, and the day after *à la* Poincaré. These silly "theoretical" devices ("energetics", "elements", "introjections", etc.) in which you so naïvely believe are confined to a narrow and tiny school, while the ideological and *social tendency* of these devices is immediately seized upon by the Wards, the neo-criticists, the immanentists, the Lopatins and the pragmatists, and *serves their purposes*. The infatuation for empirio-criticist and "physical" idealism passes as rapidly as the infatuation for neo-Kantianism and "physiological" idealism; but fideism takes advantage of every such infatuation and modifies its devices in a thousand ways for the benefit of philosophical idealism.

The attitude towards religion and the attitude towards natural science excellently illustrate the *actual* class utilisation of empirio-criticism by bourgeois reactionaries.

Take the first question. Do you think it is an accident that in a collective work directed *against* the philosophy of Marxism Lunacharsky went so far as to speak of the "deification of the higher human potentialities", of "religious atheism", etc.?* If you do, it is only because the

* *Studies*, pp. 157, 159. In *Zagranichnaya Gazeta*[119] the same author speaks of "scientific socialism in its religious significance" (No.

Russian Machists have not informed the public correctly regarding the *whole* Machist current in Europe and the attitude of this current to religion. Not only is this attitude in no way like that of Marx, Engels, J. Dietzgen and even Feuerbach, but it is the *very opposite*, beginning with Petzoldt's statement that empirio-criticism "contradicts neither theism nor atheism" (*Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, Bd. I, S. 351), or Mach's declaration that "religious opinion is a private affair" (French translation, p. 434), and ending with the *explicit fideism*, the explicitly *arch-reactionary* views of Cornelius, who praises Mach and whom Mach praises, of Carus and of all the immanentists. The neutrality of a *philosopher* in this question *is in itself* servility to fideism, and Mach and Avenarius, because of the very premises of their epistemology, do not and cannot rise above neutrality.

Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every weapon against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism—and that is all that fideism requires. If the perceptual world is objective reality, then the door is closed to every other "reality" or quasi-reality (remember that Bazarov believed the "realism" of the immanentists, who declare God to be a "real concept"). If the world is matter in motion, matter can and must be infinitely studied in the infinitely complex and detailed manifestations and ramifications of *this* motion, the motion of *this* matter; but beyond it, beyond the "physical", external world, with which everyone is familiar, there can be nothing. And the hostility to materialism and the torrents of slander against the materialists are all in the order of things in civilised and democratic Europe. All this is going on to this day. All this is being *concealed* from the public by the Russian Machists, who have *not once* attempted even simply to compare the attacks made on materialism by Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co., with the statements made *in favour of* materialism by Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and J. Dietzgen.

But this "concealment" of the attitude of Mach and Avenarius to fideism will not avail. The facts speak for

3, p. 5) and in *Obrazovaniye*,[120] 1908, No. 1, p. 164, he explicitly says: "For a long time a new religion has been maturing within me."

themselves. No efforts can release these reactionary professors from the pillory in which they have been placed by the kisses of Ward, the neo-criticists, Schuppe, Schubert-Soldern, Leclair, the pragmatists, etc. And the influence of the persons mentioned, as philosophers and professors, the widespread extent of their ideas among the "educated", i.e., the bourgeois, public and the special literature they have created are ten times wider and richer than the special little school of Mach and Avenarius. The little school serves those who require it, and it is exploited as it deserves to be exploited.

The shameful things to which Lunacharsky has stooped are not exceptional; they are the product of empirio-criticism, both Russian and German. They cannot be defended on the grounds of the "good intentions" of the author, or the "special meaning" of his words; if it were the direct and common, i.e., the directly fideist meaning, we should not stop to discuss matters with the author, for most likely not a single Marxist could be found in whose eyes such statements would *not* place Anatole Lunacharsky *exactly* in the same category as Peter Struve. If this is not the case (and it is not *yet* the case), it is exclusively because we perceive the "special" meaning and are *fighting while there is still ground* for a fight on comradely lines. This is just the disgrace of Lunacharsky's statements—that he *could* combine them with his "good" intentions. This is just the evil of his "theory"—that it permits the use of *such* methods or of *such* conclusions for realising good intentions. This is just the trouble—that *at best* "good" intentions are the subjective affair of Tom, Dick or Harry, while the *social significance* of such statements is definite and indisputable, and no reservation or explanation can diminish it.

One must be blind not to see the ideological affinity between Lunacharsky's "deification of the higher human potentialities" and Bogdanov's "general substitution" of the psychical for all physical nature. This is one and the same thought; in the one case it is expressed principally from the aesthetic standpoint, and in the other from the epistemological standpoint. "Substitution", approaching the subject *tacitly* and from a different angle, *already deifies*

the "higher human potentialities", by divorcing the "psychical" from man and by substituting an immensely extended, abstract, divinely-lifeless "psychical in general" for *all physical nature*. And what of Yushkevich's "Logos" introduced into the "irrational stream of experience"?

A single claw ensnared, and the bird is lost. And our Machists have all become ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted, subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took "sensation" not as an image of the external world but as a special "element". It is nobody's sensation, nobody's mind, nobody's spirit, nobody's will—this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind *reflects* an objectively real external world.

5. ERNST HAECKEL AND ERNST MACH

Let us now examine the attitude of Machism, as a *philosophical current*, towards the natural sciences. All Machism, from beginning to end, *combats* the "metaphysics" of the natural sciences, this being the name they give to *natural-scientific materialism*, i.e., to the instinctive, unwitting, unformed, philosophically unconscious conviction shared by the overwhelming majority of scientists regarding the objective reality of the external world reflected by our consciousness. And our Machists deceitfully keep silent about this *fact* and obscure or confuse the *inseparable* connection between the instinctive materialism of the natural scientists and *philosophical materialism* as a trend, a trend known long ago and hundreds of times affirmed by Marx and Engels.

Take Avenarius. In his very first work, *Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses*, published in 1876, he attacked the metaphysics of natural science,* i.e., natural-scientific materialism, and, as he himself admitted in 1891 (without, however, "correcting" his views!), attacked it from the standpoint of epistemological idealism.

* §§ 79, 114, etc.

Take Mach. From 1872 (or even earlier) down to 1906 he waged continuous war on the metaphysics of natural science. However, he was conscientious enough to admit that his views were shared by "a number of philosophers" (the immanentists included), but by "*very few* scientists" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 9). In 1906 Mach also honestly admitted that the "majority of natural scientists adhere to materialism" (*Erkenntnis und Irrtum*, 2. Aufl., S. 4).

Take Petzoldt. In 1900 he proclaimed that the "natural sciences are thoroughly (*ganz und gar*) imbued with metaphysics". "Their experience has still to be purified" (*Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung*, Bd. I, S. 343). We know that Avenarius and Petzoldt "purify" experience of all recognition of the objective reality given us in sensation. In 1904 Petzoldt declared: "The mechanical world outlook of the modern scientist is essentially no better than that of the ancient Indians.... It makes no difference whether the world rests on a mythical elephant or on just as mythical a swarm of molecules and atoms epistemologically thought of as real and therefore not used merely metaphorically (*bloss bildlich*)" (Bd. II, S. 176).

Take Willy, the only Machist decent enough to be ashamed of his kinship with the immanentists. Yet, in 1905 he too declared: "...The natural sciences, after all, are also in many respects an authority of which we must rid ourselves" (*Gegen die Schulweisheit*, S. 158).

But this is all *sheer obscurantism*, out-and-out reaction. To regard atoms, molecules, electrons, etc., as an approximately true reflection in our mind of the *objectively real movement of matter* is equivalent to believing in an elephant upon which the world rests! No wonder that this *obscurantist*, decked in the cap and bells of fashionable positivism, was greeted by the immanentists *with open arms*. There is *not a single* immanentist who would not furiously attack the "metaphysics" of natural science, the "materialism" of natural scientists, *precisely because of the recognition* by the scientists of the objective reality of matter (and its particles), time, space, laws of nature, etc., etc. Long before the new discoveries in physics which gave rise to "physical idealism" Leclair, using Mach as a support,

combated "The Predominant Materialist Trend (*Grundzug*) of Modern Natural Science" (the title of § 6 of *Der Realismus usw.*, 1879), Schubert-Soldern fought "The Metaphysics of Natural Science" (the title of Chapter II of *Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie*, 1884), Rehmke battled with natural-scientific "materialism", that "*metaphysics of the street*" (*Philosophie und Kantianismus*, 1882, S. 17), etc., etc.

And the immanentists quite legitimately drew *direct and outspoken* fideist conclusions from this Machist idea of the "metaphysical character" of natural-scientific materialism. If natural science in its theories depicts not objective reality, but *only* metaphors, symbols, forms of human experience, etc., it is beyond dispute that humanity is entitled to create for itself in another sphere *no less* "*real* concepts", such as God, and so forth.

The philosophy of the scientist Mach is to science what the kiss of the Christian Judas was to Christ. Mach likewise betrays science into the hands of fideism by virtually deserting to the camp of philosophical idealism. Mach's renunciation of natural-scientific materialism is a reactionary phenomenon in every respect. We saw this quite clearly when we spoke of the struggle of the "physical idealists" against the *majority* of natural scientists, who continue to maintain the standpoint of the old philosophy. We shall see it still more clearly if we compare the famous scientist, Ernst Haeckel, with the famous (among the reactionary philistines) philosopher, Ernst Mach.

The storm provoked by Ernst Haeckel's *The Riddle of the Universe* in every civilised country strikingly brought out, on the one hand, the *partisan character* of philosophy in modern society and, on the other, the true social significance of the struggle of materialism against idealism and agnosticism. The fact that the book was sold in *hundreds of thousands* of copies, that it was immediately translated into all languages and that it appeared in specially cheap editions, clearly demonstrates that the book "found its way to the people", that there are *masses* of readers whom Ernst Haeckel at once won over to his side. This popular little book became a weapon in the class struggle. The professors of philosophy and theology in every country of the world set about denouncing and annihilating Haeckel

in every possible way. The eminent English physicist Lodge hastened to defend God against Haeckel. The Russian physicist Mr. Chwolson went to Germany to publish a vile reactionary pamphlet attacking Haeckel and to assure the respectable philistines that not all scientists now hold the position of "naïve realism".* Innumerable theologians joined the campaign against Haeckel. There was no abuse not showered on him by the official professors of philosophy.** It was amusing to see how—perhaps for the first time in their lives—the eyes of these mummies, dried and shrunken in the atmosphere of lifeless scholasticism, began to gleam and their cheeks to glow under the slaps which Haeckel administered them. The high-priests of pure science, and, it would appear, of the most abstract theory, fairly groaned with rage. And throughout all the howling of the philosophical die-hards (the idealist Paulsen, the immanentist Rehmke, the Kantian Adickes, and the others, and their name is legion) one underlying motif is clearly audible: they are all against the "*metaphysics*" of natural science, against "dogmatism", against "the exaggeration of the value and significance of natural science", against "natural-scientific *materialism*". He is a materialist—at him! at the materialist! He is deceiving the public by not calling himself a materialist directly!—that is what particularly drives the worthy professors to fury.

Especially noteworthy in all this tragicomedy*** is the fact that Haeckel himself *renounces materialism* and rejects the appellation. What is more, far from rejecting religion altogether, he has invented his own religion (something like Bulgakov's "atheistic faith" or Lunacharsky's "religious atheism"), and on grounds of *principle*

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* O. D. Chwolson, *Hegel*, *Haeckel*, *Kossuth und das zwölfte Gebot*, 1906. Cf. S. 80.

** The pamphlet of Heinrich Schmidt, *Der Kampf und die Welträtsel* (Bonn, 1900), gives a fairly good picture of the campaign launched against Haeckel by the professors of philosophy and theology. But this pamphlet is already very much out-of-date.

*** The tragic element was introduced by the attempt made on Haeckel's life this spring (1908). After Haeckel had received a number of anonymous letters addressing him by such epithets as "dog", "atheist", "monkey", and so forth, some true German soul threw a stone of no mean size through the window of Haeckel's study in Jena.

advocates a union of religion and science. What is the matter then? What "fatal misunderstanding" started the row?

The point is that Haeckel's philosophical naïveté, his lack of definite partisan aims, his anxiety to respect the prevailing philistine prejudice against materialism, his personal conciliatory tendencies and proposals concerning religion, all this gave the greater salience to *the general spirit* of his book, the *ineradicability* of natural-scientific materialism and its *irreconcilability* with *all* official professorial philosophy and theology. Haeckel personally does not seek a rupture with the philistines, but what he expounds with such unshakably naïve conviction is *absolutely* incompatible with any of the shades of prevailing philosophical idealism. All these shades, from the crudest reactionary theories of a Hartmann, to the positivism of Petzoldt, who fancies himself up-to-date, progressive and advanced, or the empirio-criticism of Mach—*all* are in accord that natural-scientific materialism is "metaphysics", that the recognition of an objective reality underlying the theories and conclusions of science is sheer "naïve realism", etc. And to this doctrine, "sacred" to *all* professorial philosophy and theology, every page of Haeckel *gives a slap in the face*. This scientist, who undoubtedly expressed the very firmly implanted, although ill-defined opinions, sentiments and tendencies of the overwhelming majority of the scientists at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, instantly, easily and simply revealed what professorial philosophy tried to conceal from the public and from itself, namely, the fact that there is a foundation, growing ever wider and firmer, which shatters all the efforts and strivings of the thousand and one little schools of philosophical idealism, positivism, realism, empirio-criticism and other confusionism. This foundation is *natural-scientific materialism*. The conviction of the "naïve realists" (in other words, of all humanity) that our sensations are images of an objectively real external world is the conviction of the mass of scientists, one that is steadily growing and gaining in strength.

The cause of the founders of new philosophical schools and of the inventors of new epistemological "isms" is for

ever and hopelessly lost. They may flounder about in their "original" petty systems; they may strive to engage the attention of a few admirers in the interesting controversy as to who was the first to exclaim, "Eh!"—the empirio-critical Bobchinsky, or the empirio-monistic Dobchinsky[121]; they may even devote themselves to creating an extensive "special" literature, like the "immanentists". But the course of development of natural science, despite its vacillations and hesitations, despite the unconscious character of the materialism of the natural scientists, despite yesterday's infatuation with fashionable "physiological idealism" or today's infatuation with fashionable "physical idealism", is *sweeping aside* all the petty systems and artifices, again and again bringing to the forefront the "metaphysics" of *natural-scientific materialism*.

Here is an illustration of this from Haeckel. In his *The Wonders of Life*, Haeckel compares the monistic and dualistic theories of knowledge. We give the most interesting points of the comparison*:

THE MONISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE	THE DUALISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
. . . . .	. . . . .
3. Cognition is a physiological process, whose anatomical organ is the brain.	3. Cognition is not a physiological but a purely spiritual process.
4. The only part of the human brain in which knowledge is engendered is a spatially limited region of the cortex, the phronema.	4. The part of the human brain which appears to function as the organ of knowledge is in fact only the instrument that permits the spiritual process to manifest itself.
. . . . .	. . . . .
5. The phronema is a highly-perfected dynamo,	5. The phronema as the *organ* of reason is not auton-

* I use the French translation, *Les merveilles de la vie*, Paris, Schleicher, Tables I et XVI.

the individual parts of which, the phroneta, consist of millions of cells (phronatal cells). Just as in the case of every other organ of the body, so in the case of this mental organ, its function, the "mind", is the sum-total of the functions of its constituent cells.

omous, but through its constituent parts (phroneta) and the cells that compose them, serves only as intermediary between the non-material mind and the external world. Human reason differs absolutely from the mind of the higher animals and from the instinct of the lower animals.

This typical quotation from his works shows that Haeckel does not attempt an analysis of philosophical problems and is not able to contrast the materialist theory of knowledge with the idealist theory of knowledge. He *ridicules all* idealist—more broadly, all peculiarly philosophical—artifices from the standpoint of natural science, *without even admitting the idea* that any other theory of knowledge than *natural-scientific materialism* is possible. He ridicules the philosophers from the standpoint of a materialist, *without realising* that his standpoint is that of a materialist!

The impotent wrath aroused in the philosophers by this almighty materialism is comprehensible. We quoted above the opinion of the "true-Russian" Lopatin. And here is the opinion of Mr. Rudolf Willy, the most progressive of the "empirio-criticists", who is irreconcilably hostile to idealism (don't laugh!). "Haeckel's monism is a very heterogeneous mixture: it combines certain natural-scientific laws, such as the law of the conservation of energy ... with certain scholastic traditions about substance and the thing-in-itself into a chaotic jumble" (*Gegen die Schulweisheit*, S. 128).

What has annoyed this most worthy "recent positivist"? Well, how could he help being annoyed when he immediately realised that from Haeckel's standpoint all the great doctrines of his teacher Avenarius—for instance, that the brain is not the organ of thought, that sensations are not images of the external world, that matter ("substance") or "the thing-in-itself" is not an objective reality, and so

forth—are nothing but *sheer idealist gibberish*!? Haeckel did not say it in so many words because he did not concern himself with philosophy and was not acquainted with "empirio-criticism" *as such*. But Rudolf Willy could not help realising that a hundred thousand readers of Haeckel meant as many people spitting in the face of the *philosophy* of Mach and Avenarius. Willy wipes his face in advance, *in the Lopatin manner*. For the *essence* of the arguments which Mr. Lopatin and Mr. Willy marshal against materialism in general and natural-scientific materialism in particular, is exactly the same in both. To us Marxists, the difference between Mr. Lopatin and Messrs. Willy, Petzoldt, Mach and Co. is no greater than the difference between the Protestant theologians and the Catholic theologians.

The "war" on Haeckel *has proved* that this view of ours corresponds to *objective reality*, i.e., to the class nature of modern society and its class ideological tendencies.

Here is another little example. The Machist Kleinpeter has translated from English into German a work by Carl Snyder, *World Picture from the Standpoint of Modern Natural Science* (*Das Weltbild der moderner Naturuwissenschaft*, Leipzig, 1905), which had a wide circulation in America. This work gives a clear and popular account of a number of recent discoveries in physics and other branches of natural science. And the Machist Kleinpeter was called upon to supply the book with a preface in which he makes certain *reservations*, such as, for example, that Snyder's epistemology is "not satisfactory" (S. v). Why so? Because Snyder never entertains the slightest doubt that the world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how "*matter thinks*" (S. 288). In his next book, *The World Machine* (London and New York, 1907), Snyder, referring to the fact that his book is dedicated to the memory of Democritus of Abdera, who lived about 460-360 B. C., says: "Democritus has often been styled the grandsire of materialism. It is a school of philosophy that is a little out of fashion nowadays; yet it is worthy of note that practically all of the modern advance in our ideas of this world has been grounded upon his conceptions. Practically speaking, materialistic assumptions are simply *unescapable* in physical investigations" (p. 140).

"...If he likes, he may dream with good Bishop Berkeley that it is all a dream. Yet comforting as may be the legerdemain of an idealised idealism, there are still few among us who, whatever they may think regarding the problem of the external world, doubt that they themselves exist; and it needs no long pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisps of the *Ich* and *non-Ich* to assure oneself that if in an unguarded moment we assume that we ourselves have a personality and a being, we let in the whole procession of appearances which come of the six gates of the senses. The nebular hypothesis, the light-bearing ether, the atomic theory, and all their like, may be but convenient 'working hypotheses', but it is well to remember that, in the absence of negative proof, they stand on more or less the same footing as the hypothesis that a being you call 'you', Oh, Indulgent Reader, scans these lines" (pp. 31-32).

Imagine the bitter lot of a Machist when his favourite subtle constructions, which reduce the categories of natural science to mere working hypotheses, are laughed at by the scientists on both sides of the ocean as sheer nonsense! Is it to be wondered at that Rudolf Willy, *in 1905*, combats Democritus as though he were a living enemy, thereby providing an excellent illustration of the *partisan character of philosophy* and once more exposing the real position he himself takes up in this partisan struggle? He writes: "Of course, Democritus was not conscious of the fact that atoms and the void are only fictitious concepts which perform mere accessory services (*blosse Handlangerdienste*), and maintain their existence only by grace of expediency, just as long as they prove useful. Democritus was not free enough for this; but neither are our modern natural scientists, with few exceptions. The faith of old Democritus is also the faith of our natural scientists" (op. cit., S. 57).

And there is good reason for despair! The "empiriocriticists" have proved in quite a "new way" that both space and atoms are "working hypotheses"; and yet the natural scientists deride this *Berkeleianism* and follow Haeckel! We are by no means idealists, this is a slander; we are only striving (together with the idealists) to refute the epistemological line of Democritus; we have been

striving to do so for more than 2,000 years, but all in vain! And it only remains for our leader Ernst Mach to dedicate his last work, the outcome of his life and philosophy, *Knowledge and Error*, to *Wilhelm Schuppe* and to remark ruefully in the text that the majority of natural scientists are materialists and that "we also" *sympathise* with Haeckel ... for his "free-thinking" (S. 14).

And there he completely betrays himself, this ideologist of reactionary philistinism who *follows* the arch-reactionary Schuppe and "*sympathises*" with Haeckel's free-thinking. They are all like this, these humanitarian philistines in Europe, with their freedom-loving sympathies and their ideological (as well as political and economic) captivity to the Wilhelm Schuppes.* Non-partisanship in philosophy is only wretchedly masked servility to idealism and fideism.

Let us, in conclusion, compare this with the opinion of Haeckel held by Franz Mehring, who not only wants to be, but who knows how to be a Marxist. The moment *The Riddle of the Universe* appeared, towards the end of 1899, Mehring pointed out that "Haeckel's work, both in its less good and its very good aspects, is eminently adapted to help clarify the apparently rather confused views prevailing in the party as to the significance for it of *historical* materialism, on the one hand, and historical *materialism*, on the other."** Haeckel's defect is that he has no conception of *historical* materialism, which leads him to utter a number of howling absurdities about politics, about "monistic religion", and so on and so forth. "Haeckel is a materialist and monist, not a *historical* but a natural-scientific materialist" (ibid.).

"He who wants to perceive this inability [of natural-scientific materialism to deal with social problems] tangibly, he who wants to be convinced that natural-scientific materialism must be broadened into historical materialism

* Plekhanov in his criticism of Machism was less concerned with refuting Mach than with dealing a factional blow at Bolshevism. For this petty and miserable exploitation of fundamental theoretical differences, he has already been deservedly punished—through two books by Machist Mensheviks.[122]

** Fr. Mehring, "Die Welträtsel", *Neue Zeit*, 1899-1900, XVIII, 1, 418.

if it is really to be an invincible weapon in the great struggle for emancipation of mankind, let him read Haeckel's book.

"But let him not read it for this purpose alone! Its uncommonly weak side is inseparably bound up with its uncommonly strong side, viz., with the comprehensible and clear description (which after all takes up by far the greater and more important part of the book) given by Haeckel of the development of the natural sciences in this [the nineteenth] century, or, in other words, of the *triumphant march of natural-scientific materialism*."*

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* Ibid., p. 419.

CONCLUSION

There are four standpoints from which a Marxist should proceed to form a judgement of empirio-criticism.

First and foremost, the theoretical foundations of this philosophy must be compared with those of dialectical materialism. Such a comparison, to which the first three chapters were devoted, reveals, *along the whole line* of epistemological problems, the *thoroughly reactionary* character of empirio-criticism, which uses new artifices, terms and subtleties to disguise the old errors of *idealism and agnosticism*. Only sheer ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx's and Engels' dialectical method can lead one to speak of "combining" empirio-criticism and Marxism.

Secondly, the place of empirio-criticism, as one very small school of specialists in philosophy, in relation to the other modern schools of philosophy must be determined. Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley. Imagining that he was "purifying experience" generally, Avenarius was in fact only purifying agnosticism of Kantianism. The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism, hand in hand with one of the most reactionary of the idealist schools, viz., the so-called immanentists.

Thirdly, the indubitable connection between Machism and one school in one branch of modern natural science must be borne in mind. The vast majority of scientists, both generally and in the special branch of science in question, viz., physics, are invariably on the side of mate-

rialism. A minority of new physicists, however, influenced by the break-down of old theories brought about by the great discoveries of recent years, influenced by the crisis in the new physics, which has very clearly revealed the relativity of our knowledge, have, owing to their ignorance of dialectics, slipped into idealism by way of relativism. The physical idealism in vogue today is as reactionary and transitory an infatuation as was the fashionable physiological idealism of the recent past.

Fourthly, behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism one must not fail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society. Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially—although this is concealed by a pseudo-erudite quackery of new terms or by a weak-minded non-partisanship—materialism and idealism. The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, which stands fully armed, commands vast organisations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage. The objective, class role of empirio-criticism consists entirely in rendering faithful service to the fideists in their struggle against materialism in general and historical materialism in particular.

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SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER FOUR, SECTION 1*[123]

FROM WHAT ANGLE DID N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY CRITICISE KANTIANISM?

In the first section of Chapter Four we showed in detail that the materialists criticised Kant, and continue to criticise him, from a standpoint diametrically opposite to that from which Mach and Avenarius criticise him. It would not be superfluous to add here, albeit briefly, an indication of the epistemological position held by the great Russian Hegelian and materialist, N. G. Chernyshevsky.

Shortly after Albrecht Rau, the German disciple of Feuerbach, had published his criticism of Kant, the great Russian writer N. G. Chernyshevsky, who was also a disciple of Feuerbach, first attempted an explicit statement of his attitude towards both Feuerbach and Kant. N. G. Chernyshevsky had appeared in Russian literature as a follower of Feuerbach as early as the fifties, but our censorship did not allow him even to mention Feuerbach's name. In 1888, in the preface to the projected third edition of his *The Aesthetic Relation of Art to Reality*, N. G. Chernyshevsky attempted to allude directly to Feuerbach, but in 1888 too the censor refused to allow even a mere reference to Feuerbach! It was not until 1906 that the preface saw the light (see N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 190-97). In this preface Chernyshevsky devotes half a page to criticising Kant and the natural scientists who follow Kant in their philosophical conclusions.

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* See pp. 194-205 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Here is the excellent argument given by Chernyshevsky in 1888:

"Natural scientists who imagine themselves to be builders of all-embracing theories are really disciples, and usually poor disciples, of the ancient thinkers who evolved the metaphysical systems, usually thinkers whose systems had already been partially destroyed by Schelling and finally destroyed by Hegel. One need only point out that the majority of the natural scientists who endeavour to construct broad theories of the laws of operation of human thought only repeat Kant's metaphysical theory regarding the subjectivity of our knowledge...." (For the benefit of the Russian Machists who manage to muddle everything, let us say that Chernyshevsky is below Engels insofar as in his terminology he confuses the opposition between materialism and idealism with the opposition between metaphysical thought and dialectical thought; but Chernyshevsky is entirely on Engels' level insofar as he takes Kant to task not for realism, but for agnosticism and subjectivism, not for recognition of the "thing-in-itself", but for inability to derive our knowledge from this objective source.) "...they argue from Kant's words that the forms of our sense-perception have no resemblance to the forms of the actual existence of objects...." (For the benefit of the Russian Machists who manage to muddle everything, let us say that Chernyshevsky's criticism of Kant is the diametrical opposite of the criticism of Kant by Avenarius, Mach and the immanentists, because for Chernyshevsky, as for every materialist, the forms of our sense-perception do resemble the forms of the actual—i.e., objectively real—existence of objects.) "...that, therefore, really existing objects, their real qualities, and the real relations between them are unknowable to us...." (For the benefit of the Russian Machists who manage to muddle everything, let us say that for Chernyshevsky, as for every materialist, objects, or to use Kant's ornate language, "things-in-themselves", *really* exist and are *fully* knowable to us, knowable in their existence, their qualities and the real relations between them.) "...and if they were knowable they could not be the object of our thought, which shapes all the material of knowledge into forms totally different from the forms of

actual existence, that, moreover, the very laws of thought have only a subjective significance....” (For the benefit of the Machist muddlers, let us say that for Chernyshevsky, as for every materialist, the laws of thought have not merely a subjective significance; in other words, the laws of thought reflect the forms of actual existence of objects, fully resemble, and do not differ from these forms.) “...that in reality there is nothing corresponding to what appears to us to be the connection of cause and effect, for there is neither antecedent nor subsequent, neither whole nor parts, and so on and so forth....” (For the benefit of the Machist muddlers, let us say that for Chernyshevsky, as for every materialist, there does exist in reality what appears to us to be the connection between cause and effect, there is objective causality or natural necessity.) “...When natural scientists stop uttering such and similar metaphysical nonsense, they will be capable of working out, and probably will work out, on the basis of natural science, a system of concepts more exact and complete than those propounded by Feuerbach....” (For the benefit of the Machist muddlers, let us say that Chernyshevsky regards as metaphysical nonsense *all* deviations from materialism, both in the direction of idealism and in the direction of agnosticism.) “...But meanwhile, the best statement of the scientific concepts of the so-called fundamental problems of man’s inquisitiveness remains that made by Feuerbach” (pp. 195-96). By the fundamental problems of man’s inquisitiveness Chernyshevsky means what in modern language are known as the fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge, or epistemology. Chernyshevsky is the only really great Russian writer who, from the fifties until 1888, was able to keep on the level of an integral philosophical materialism and who spurned the wretched nonsense of the neo-Kantians, positivists, Machists and other muddleheads. But Chernyshevsky did not succeed in rising, or, rather, owing to the backwardness of Russian life, was unable to rise, to the level of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels.

NOTES

[1] "*Ten Questions to a Lecturer*" was written by Lenin during the first half of May 1908 in London. He had come there from Geneva to work on his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, and he sent the questions to I. F. Dubrovinsky, a member of the Bolshevik centre and one of the editors of the newspaper *Proletary*, as theses for a speech on the occasion of the lecture entitled "Adventures of One Philosophical School" given by A. Bogdanov in Geneva on May 15 (28), 1908.

Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and others, who supported Machist standpoints in philosophy, took advantage of Lenin's absence to increase their activity. Under the guise of criticising "materialism of the Plekhanov school"; they revised materialist philosophy and tried to show that empirio-monism, the variety of Machism invented by Bogdanov, and not dialectical materialism, was the philosophy of Bolshevism.

In preparing his speech, Dubrovinsky made changes in the second, third and tenth questions and deleted the seventh question. In his speech, which was based on Lenin's theses, Dubrovinsky (who used the pseudonym Dorov) sharply criticised Bogdanov's views, declaring that Bolshevism had nothing in common with empirio-monism and showing that the advocacy of "god-building" was incompatible with dialectical materialism. p. 13

[2] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 369-70). p. 15

[3] See F. Engels, "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of his work *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, and his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 99-102, 370-71). p. 15

[4] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 65. p. 15

[5] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 86. p. 15

[6] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 53-54, 157. p. 15

[7] Lenin is referring to Ernst Mach's book *Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung* (*Knowledge and Error.*

Sketches of the Psychology of Investigation), the first edition of which was published in Leipzig in 1905.

For Lenin's characterisation of the immanentist school see *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, especially Chapter Four, Section 3 (pp. 209-17 of this volume). p. 16

[8] Lenin is referring to the chapter entitled "A. Bogdanov's Empirio-monism", in P. S. Yushkevich's book *Materialism and Critical Realism. Philosophical Trends in Marxism*, St. Petersburg, 1908, pp. 161-93. p. 16

[9] Lenin is referring to Joseph Petzoldt's book *Das Weltproblem von positivistischen Standpunkte aus* (*The World Problem from the Positivist Standpoint*). p. 16

[10] See Lenin's letter to A. M. Gorky of February 12 (25), 1908 present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 448-54). p. 16

[11] The book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* was written by Lenin during February to October 1908 in Geneva and London. It was published in Moscow in May 1909 by the *Zveno* Publishers. The manuscript of the book and Lenin's preparatory material for it have so far not been found.

The book is the outcome of a prodigious amount of creative scientific research carried out by Lenin during nine months. His main work on the book was carried out in Geneva libraries, but in order to obtain a detailed knowledge of the modern literature of philosophy and natural science he went in May 1908 to London, where he worked for about a month in the library of the British Museum. The list of sources quoted or mentioned by Lenin in his book exceeds 200 titles.

In December 1908 Lenin went from Geneva to Paris where he worked until April 1909 on correcting the proofs of his book. He had to agree to tone down some passages of the work so as not to give the tsarist censorship an excuse for prohibiting its publication. It was published in Russia under great difficulties. Lenin insisted on the speedy issue of the book, stressing that "not only literary but also serious political obligations" were involved in its publication.

Lenin's work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* played a decisive part in combating the Machist revision of Marxism. It enabled the philosophical ideas of Marxism to spread widely among the mass of party members and helped the party activists and progressive workers to master dialectical and historical materialism.

This classical work of Lenin's has achieved a wide circulation in many countries, and has been published in over 20 languages. p. 17

[12] V. I. Lenin in a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, dated October 26 (November 8), 1908, wrote: "...if considerations due to the censorship prove *very* severe, the word 'clericalism' could be

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replaced everywhere by the word 'fideism' with an explanatory note ('fideism is a doctrine which substitutes faith for knowledge, or which generally attaches significance to faith'). This is in case of need—to *explain* the nature of the concessions which I am ready to make" (see *Collected Works*, present edition, Vol. 37, p. 395). In another letter to his sister, Lenin proposed replacing the word "clericalism" by the word "Shamanism", to which she answered: "It is already too late for Shamanism. And is it really better?" (Ibid., p. 662). From the text of the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* it can be seen that the word "fideism" was substituted for "clericalism", although the latter word remained unaltered in some places. The note suggested by Lenin was given in the first edition of the book and was retained in subsequent editions. p. 19

[13] Lenin is referring to a religious-philosophical tendency hostile to Marxism called "god-building", which arose in the period of reaction among a section of the party intellectuals who had deserted Marxism after the defeat of the revolution of 1905-07. The "god-builders" (A. V. Lunacharsky, V. Bazarov and others) preached the creation of a new "socialist" religion in an attempt to—reconcile Marxism with religion. At one time A. M. Gorky supported them.

An enlarged meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* (1909) condemned "god-building" and stated in a special resolution that the Bolshevik group has nothing in common with "such a distortion of scientific socialism". The reactionary nature of "god-building" was exposed by Lenin in his work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* and in his letters to Gorky of February-April 1908 and November-December 1913. p. 19

[14] V. I. Nevsky's article "Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Dead Reaction" was published in 1920 as an appendix to the second edition of the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. p. 21

[15] A. Bogdanov put forward the idea of "proletarian culture" as early as 1909, by which he meant that the proletariat should elaborate its "own" culture in contradistinction to that of the past. After the October Socialist Revolution Bogdanov and his fellow-thinkers adopted the so-called proletarian cultural-educational organisations (Proletcult) as the field of their activities. With the aid of this convenient rostrum, they began actively to propagade anti-Marxist views, virtually denied the importance of the cultural inheritance of the past, and endeavoured "by laboratory methods" divorced from life to create a culture for the proletariat, counterposing the latter to the rest of the working people and above all to the peasantry.

Lenin waged a consistent struggle against the separatism and sectarianism of the Proletcult and against the anti-Marxist views of its ideologists. In 1920 the Central Committee of the Party adopted a special decision on subordination of the activities

of the Proletcult to the People's Commissariat for Education. in the twenties, the Proletcult organisations began to decline and in 1932 they ceased to exist. p. 21

[16] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 369-70. p. 33

[17] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 101. p. 33

[18] *Neo-Kantianism*—a reactionary trend in bourgeois philosophy preaching subjective idealism under the slogan of a return to Kantian philosophy. It arose in the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany, where at this time there was an increased interest in Kantianism. In 1865 Otto Liebmann's book *Kant and the Epigones* was published, each chapter ending with the call: "Back to Kant". Liebmann put forward the task of correcting Kant's "main error"—the recognition of "things-in-themselves". The revival of Kantianism was helped by the works of Kuno Fischer and Eduard Zeller, and one of the early representatives of neo-Kantianism was Friedrich Albert Lange who tried to use physiology as a basis for agnosticism.

Later, two main schools of neo-Kantianism were formed: that of Marburg (Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, etc.) and that of Freiburg or Baden (Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, etc.). The former tried to substantiate idealism by speculating on the successes of natural science, especially on the penetration of mathematical methods into physics; the latter counterposed the social sciences to natural science, trying to prove that historical phenomena are strictly individual and not subject to the operation of any laws. Both schools put the question of the logical basis of science in place of the fundamental question of philosophy. Criticising Kant "from the right", the neo-Kantians declared the "thing-in-itself" to be a "limiting concept" to which knowledge was tending. Denying the objective existence of the material world, they regarded as the object of knowledge not the laws of nature and society, but merely the phenomena of consciousness. In contrast to the agnosticism of the natural scientists, that of the neo-Kantians was not "shamefaced materialism", for it asserted the impotence of science in regard to cognition and changes of reality. The neo-Kantians openly attacked Marxism, counterposing to it "ethical socialism". In accordance with their theory of knowledge they declared socialism to be the "ethical ideal" of human social existence, an ideal to which mankind was striving but which it could not attain. This "theory" of the neo-Kantians was seized upon by the revisionists, headed by Eduard Bernstein, who put forward the slogan: "The movement is everything, the final goal is nothing". Neo-Kantianism was one of the philosophical pillars of the Second International. In Russia attempts to "combine" neo-Kantianism and Marxism were made by the "legal Marxists"; G. V. Plekhanov, Paul Lafargue and Franz Mehring opposed the

neo-Kantian revision of Marxism. Lenin laid bare the reactionary nature of neo-Kantianism and showed its connection with other trends of bourgeois philosophy (immanentism, Machism, pragmatism, etc.).

At the present time the representatives of neo-Kantianism are grouped round the magazine *Kantstudien* published in West Germany (Cologne). p. 33

[19] *Die Neue Zeit* (*New Times*)—the theoretical magazine of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart, 1883-1923. Until October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky, after that by Heinrich Cunow. Several works by Marx and Engels were published for the first time in *Neue Zeit*, e.g., K. Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, F. Engels' *Contribution to the Critique of the Social-Democratic Draft Programme of 1891*, and others. Engels constantly helped the editors of the magazine by his advice and often criticised it for allowing departures from Marxism to be published in it. Contributors to *Neue Zeit* included outstanding leaders of the German and international workers' movement at the turn of the century: August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, G. V. Plekhanov, Paul Lafargue, and others. From the second half of the nineties onwards, after the death of Engels, the magazine began systematically publishing articles by revisionists, including a series of articles by Eduard Bernstein, "Problems of Socialism", which marked the opening of a campaign of the revisionists against Marxism. During the First World War, the magazine adopted a Centrist position, in effect supporting the social-chauvinists. p. 33

[20] The *Encyclopaedists*—a group of philosophers, natural scientists and publicists of the French Enlightenment in the eighteenth century who joined in publishing the *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiets* (*Encyclopaedia or Explanatory Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Professions*) (1751-80). It was organised and led by Denis Diderot, whose closest assistant was Jean le Rond d'Alembert. Paul Henri Holbach, Claude Adrien Helvetius and Voltaire actively assisted in publishing the *Encyclopaedia* and Jean Jacques Rousseau contributed to the first volumes.

The Encyclopaedists were the ideologists of the revolutionary bourgeoisie and they played a decisive part in the ideological preparation for the eighteenth-century bourgeois revolution in France. p. 35

[21] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 34, 53-54. p. 41

[22] *Revue néo-scolastique* (*Neo-scholastic Review*)—a theological-philosophical magazine founded by the Catholic philosophical society in Louvain (Belgium), published from 1894 to 1909 under the editorship of Cardinal Mercier. It is now issued under the title of *Revue philosophique de Louvain* (*Philosophical Review of Louvain*). p. 48

[23] *Der Kampf* (*The Struggle*)—a monthly magazine, the organ of Austrian Social-Democracy, published in Vienna from 1907 to 1934. It took up an opportunist, Centrist position under the cover of Left phraseology. Among its editors were Otto Bauer, Adolf Braun, Karl Renner, Friedrich Adler and others. p. 53

[24] *The International Socialist Review*—an American monthly magazine of a revisionist tendency, published in Chicago from 1900 to 1918. p. 53

[25] *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* (*Quarterly of Scientific Philosophy*)—a magazine of the empirio-criticists (Machists), published in Leipzig from 1877 to 1916 (from 1902 its title was *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*) (*Quarterly of Scientific Philosophy and Sociology*). It was founded by Richard Avenarius and published under his editorship until 1896; after 1896 it was edited by Ernst Mach. Contributors included Wilhelm Wundt, Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Schuppe and others.

Lenin's appraisal of the magazine is given on p. 317 of this volume. p. 57

[26] *Spinozism*—the system of views of the Dutch seventeenth-century materialist philosopher Benedict Spinoza, according to whom all things are manifestations (modes) of a single, universal substance which is its own cause and identical with "god, or nature". The essence of substance is expressed in innumerable qualities—attributes, the most important of which are extension and thought. Spinoza regarded causality as a form of the interconnection of the separate phenomena of nature, understanding by it the immediate reciprocal action of bodies whose first cause is substance. The action of all modes of substance, including man, is strictly one of necessity; the notion of accident arises only in consequence of ignorance of the totality of all the acting causes. Since thought is one of the attributes of universal substance, the connection and order of ideas are in principle the same as the order and connection of things, and the possibility of human knowledge of the world is unlimited. For the same reason, of the three forms of cognition—sensuous, rational and rational-intuitive—the last is regarded as the most trustworthy, in which "a thing is perceived singly through its essence or through knowledge of its immediate cause" (B. Spinoza, *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, et de via, qua optime veram rerum cognitionem dirigitur*). This method enables man both to know his own passions and to become master over them; man's freedom consists in knowing the necessity of nature and of the passions of his soul.

Spinozism was not only a form of materialism, but also of atheism, since it rejected ideas of god as a supernatural being who had created the world and rules it. At the same time, by identifying god and nature he made a concession to theology. This retreat, as also the mechanical character of Spinoza's materialism, was due,

on the one hand, to the level of knowledge at that epoch and, on the other hand, to the limited progressive nature of the young Dutch bourgeoisie, whose interests were expressed by Spinoza's philosophy. Subsequently, a sharp ideological struggle, which has continued to the present day, developed round the philosophical legacy of the great Dutch thinker. Idealist philosophy, by taking advantage of the inevitable historical limitations of Spinoza's views, distorts the materialist essence of Spinozism, which was an important stage in the development of the materialist world outlook. p. 61

[27] *Philosophische Studien* (*Philosophical Studies*)—a magazine of an idealist tendency devoted primarily to questions of psychology, published by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig from 1881 to 1904. From 1905 it was published under the title *Psychologische Studien* (*Psychological Studies*). p. 61

[28] *Petrushka*—a serf domestic servant, one of the characters in N. V. Gogol's novel *Dead Souls*; he used to read books by syllables without paying any attention to the meaning, being interested only in the mechanical process of reading. p. 62

[29] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 358-59). p. 64

[30] *Mind*—a magazine of an idealist tendency, devoted to questions of philosophy and sociology. It was published from 1876 in London, and is now issued in Edinburgh; the first editor was Professor Croom Robertson. p. 71

[31] *Struve, P. B.*—a former "legal Marxist", one of the founders of the Cadet Party (see Note 67), a monarchist and counter-revolutionary.

Menshikov, M. O.—a contributor to the reactionary newspaper Novoye Vremya. Lenin called him "a true watchdog of the tsarist Black Hundreds." p. 73

[32] It can be seen from Lenin's letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, dated December 6 (19), 1908, that the original phrase in the manuscript, viz., "Lunacharsky even 'mentally projected' for himself a god", was toned down because of the censorship. Lenin wrote in his letter: "'Mentally projected for himself a god' should be altered to 'mentally projected for himself'—well to use a mild expression—'religious conceptions', or something of that sort" (*Collected Works*, present edition, Vol. 37, p. 403). p. 78

[33] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 55. p. 87

[34] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 363, 372. p. 87

[35] Lenin is referring to the literary portrait drawn by I. S. Turgenev in his prose poem "A Rule of Life". p. 88

[36] *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* (*Archives of Systematic Philosophy*)—a journal of an idealist tendency published in Berlin from 1895 to 1931, being the second, independent section of the journal *Archiv für Philosophie* (see Note 83). Its first editor was Paul Natorp. From 1925 the journal was published under the title *Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie* (*Archives of Systematic Philosophy and Sociology*). p. 95

[37] *Kantstudien* (*Kantian Studies*)—a German philosophical journal of an idealist tendency, the organ of the neo-Kantians. It was founded by Hans Vaihinger and published, with interruptions, from 1897 to 1944 (Hamburg-Berlin-Cologne). Publication was resumed in 1954. The journal devotes considerable space to comments on Kant's philosophy. Besides neo-Kantians, its contributors include representatives of other idealist trends. p. 95

[38] *Nature*—a weekly journal of natural science, published in London from 1869. p. 95

[39] In preparing the first edition of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* for the press, A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova altered the words "a more honest literary antagonist" to "a *more* principled literary antagonist". Lenin objected to this correction and on February 27 (March 12), 1909, he wrote to his sister: "*Please* do not tone down anything in the passages against Bogdanov, *Lunacharsky* and Co. Toning down is impossible. You have done away with the statement that Chernov is a 'more honest' antagonist than they are and that is a great pity. That shade is not brought out. It is not in accord with the whole nature of my accusations. The crux of the matter is that our Machists are *dishonest*, basely craven enemies of Marxism in philosophy" (*Collected Works*, present edition, Vol. 37, p. 416). p. 98

[40] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 369-71. p. 100

[41] Lenin is referring to Voroshilov, a character depicted by I. S. Turgenev in his novel *Smoke*, as the type of a pseudo-learned dogmatist. Lenin gave a description of him in his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 151). p. 100

[42] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 371). p. 101

[43] K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 403). p. 104

[44] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 100. p. 107

[45] F. Engels, "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of his work *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 100). p. 110

[46] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 65. p. 117

[47] *Beltov, N.*—a pseudonym of G. V. Plekhanov. p. 121

[48] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 371). p. 127

[49] *Scepticism*—a philosophical trend that casts doubt on the possibility of knowing objective reality. It arose in ancient Greece as early as the 4th to 3rd centuries B. C. (Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus). The adherents of ancient scepticism drew agnostic conclusions from the premises of sensationalism. Making the subjectivity of sensation into an absolute, the sceptics insisted on the need to refrain from any definite judgements about things. They considered that man cannot go beyond his sensations and determine their truth.

During the period of the Renaissance, the French philosophers Michel Montaigne, Pierre Charron and Pierre Bayle made use of scepticism for combating medieval scholasticism and the Church. In the eighteenth century scepticism was revived in the agnosticism of Hume and Kant, and an attempt to modernise ancient scepticism was made by Gottlieb Schulze (Aenesidemus). The arguments of scepticism were used by the Machists, neo-Kantians and other idealist philosophical schools from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century.

Epicureanism—the doctrine of the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus of the 4th to 3rd centuries B. C. and his successors. The aim of philosophy, according to this doctrine, was man's happiness; freeing him from suffering and enabling him to attain a state of bliss. It taught that philosophy was called upon to overcome obstacles to happiness: the fear of death due to ignorance of the laws of nature and giving rise therefore to belief in supernatural, divine forces.

As regards the theory of knowledge, Epicurus was a sensationalist. He supposed that very subtle images proceed from things and penetrate the human soul through the sense-organs. Conceptions of things are formed on the basis of the sensuous perceptions of the soul, in which memory preserves only the general features of images. Epicurus regarded sense-perceptions themselves as the criterion of truth, and he considered that the source of errors lay in the accidental character of individual sensations or in the over-hasty formation of judgements.

The idealists, who distorted the teaching of this great materialist of ancient Greece, made more attacks on Epicureanism than on the other philosophical theories of antiquity.

In the definition of sensationalism quoted by Lenin, Franck rightly regards Epicureanism as a variety of it, but he draws an incorrect distinction between Epicureanism and objective materialist sensationalism. p. 131

[50] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 120-22. p. 134

[51] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 127. p. 135

[52] See the letter of K. Marx to L. Kugelmann of December 5, 1868 (K. Marx, *Briefe an Kugelmann*, Inoizdat, 1940). p. 135

[53] Lenin is referring to Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" (1845) and to the works by F. Engels: *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1888) and the "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 403-05, 358-403, 93-115). p. 138

[54] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 403, 101. p. 138

[55] *Bishop Eulogius*—member of the State Duma, a monarchist and extreme reactionary. p. 139

[56] *Revue de philosophie* (*Review of Philosophy*)—a French idealist journal founded by E. Peillaubt, which was published in Paris from 1900 to 1939. p. 150

[57] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 33, 36, 55. p. 156

[58] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1958, pp. 387, 389. p. 157

[59] *Annalen der Naturphilosophie* (*Annals of Natural Philosophy*)—a journal of a positivist tendency, published by Wilhelm Ostwald in Leipzig from 1901 to 1921. Its contributors included Ernst Mach, Paul Volkmann and others. p. 165

[60] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 65. p. 173

[61] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 76. p. 176

[62] *Natural Science*—a monthly journal published in London from 1892 to 1899. p. 183

[63] *The Philosophical Review*—an American journal of an idealist tendency, founded by Jacob Gould Schurman. It began publication in 1892. p. 184

[64] Instead of the words "provokes ... not a smile, but disgust", the first edition of the book had "provokes more than a smile". After he had read the proofs Lenin asked A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova to alter the phrase in the text or indicate this in the errata. Lenin's correction was printed in a list of errata appended to the first edition. p. 187

[65] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 157. p. 188

[66] "*The subjective method in sociology*"—an anti-scientific idealist approach to historical processes which refuses to acknowledge objective laws of social development, reducing them to the arbitrary actions of "outstanding personalities". In the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, adherents of the subjectivist school in sociology were the Young Hegelians Bruno Bauer, David Strauss, Max Stirner and others, who declared the people to be an "uncritical mass" that follows "critically thinking personalities". K. Marx and F. Engels in the *Holy Family*, the *German Ideology* and other works made a thorough and profound criticism of the views of the Young Hegelians. In Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century representatives of the subjective method in sociology were the liberal Narodniks (P. L. Lavrov, N. K. Mikhailovsky and others), who denied the objective nature of the laws of social development and reduced history to the actions of individual heroes, "outstanding personalities".

Marxism-Leninism exposed the fallacy of the subjective-idealist trend in sociology and created a genuinely scientific, integral theory of social development, of the decisive part played by the masses in history and of the significance of the activity of individuals. p. 191

[67] *Constitutional-Democrats* (Cadets)—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905; it included representatives of the bourgeoisie, landlord Zemstvo members and bourgeois intellectuals. Prominent leaders of the Cadets were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingarev, P. B. Struve, F. I. Rodichev and others. To deceive the working people the Cadets falsely entitled themselves the "party of people's freedom", but actually did not go beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. The Cadets made the struggle against the revolutionary movement their chief aim and endeavoured to share power with the tsar and feudal landlords. During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the annexationist foreign policy of the tsarist government. During the February bourgeois-democratic revolution they tried to save the monarchy. Occupying a leading position in the bourgeois Provisional Government, the Cadets pursued an anti-popular, counter-revolutionary policy convenient to the American-Anglo-French imperialists. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets

came out as irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power and took an active part in all the armed actions of the counter-revolutionaries and the campaigns of the interventionists. After the rout of the interventionists and whiteguards the Cadets became émigrés but did not cease their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity.

Purishkevich, V. M.—a representative of the parties of the extreme Right in the Duma, a big landlord and arch-reactionary. p. 199

[68] This refers to the opportunist trend that developed within the German Social-Democratic Party in the second half of the seventies of the nineteenth century. Its chief ideologists were Karl Höchberg, Eduard Bernstein and Karl August Schramm, who were influenced by Dühringism. Bernstein and Louis Viereck, along with Johann Most and others, actively helped to spread the eclectic views of Eugen Dühring among the German Social-Democrats. Höchberg, who, as Marx expressed it, had "bought" his way into the Party by his money, demanded that socialism should be made a movement of "humanity in general" based on the "sense of justice" of both the oppressed and the representatives of the "upper classes".

In Berlin, Viereck took the initiative in forming the Mauritanian Club, in which Dühringism prevailed and which set itself the task of bringing "educated people" to "socialism" and achieving class collaboration between the workers and the bourgeoisie. After the promulgation of the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany (1878), the leaders of the Mauritanian Club migrated to Zurich where they continued their efforts to win over the bourgeoisie to "socialism".

The opportunist, anti-Marxist character of Höchberg's group was clearly shown in regard to the founding in Zurich of a central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. Höchberg and his co-thinkers considered that the newspaper should not carry out the revolutionary policy of the Party but should limit itself to the abstract preaching of socialist ideals. The Party leadership—August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht and others—in fact underestimated the opportunist danger by entrusting the publication of the newspaper to the Zurich group.

In July 1879 the *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (*Annal of Social Science and Social Politics*), the journal edited by Höchberg, published an article entitled "A Retrospective Review of the Socialist Movement in Germany", which discussed the revolutionary tactics of the Party. The authors of the article—Höchberg, Schramm and Bernstein—accused the Party of having provoked the Anti-Socialist Law by its attacks on the bourgeoisie, and called for alliance with and subordination to the bourgeoisie, on the grounds that the working class was not able to emancipate itself by its own efforts. These opportunist, reformist views evoked sharp protest from Marx and Engels, who rightly regarded them as a betrayal of the Party, and in September 1879 they came out with their famous "Circular Letter" (see K. Marx and F. Engels,

Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, pp. 388-95). "The result of Marx's 'furious' attack," wrote Lenin in describing the struggle of the founders of Marxism against opportunism, "was that the opportunists retreated and—made themselves scarce. In a letter dated November 19, 1879, Marx announced that Höchberg had been removed from the editorial committee and that all the influential leaders of the Party—Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, etc.—had *repudiated* his ideas" (present edition, Vol, 12, p. 367).

Subsequently Höchberg and Schramm left the workers' movement, but Bernstein, who temporarily refrained from advocating opportunism, became one of the leaders of German Social-Democracy. The theoretical confusion, however, and the opportunist position adopted by Bernstein at the end of the seventies, were not accidental. After Engels' death, Bernstein openly came out with a revision of Marxism, putting forward the opportunist slogan: "The movement is everything, the final goal is nothing", which was a further development of the basic propositions of the 1879 article. p. 203

[69] *Le Socialiste* (*The Socialist*)—a weekly newspaper published from 1885 as the theoretical organ of the French Workers' Party; from 1902 it was the organ of the Socialist Party of France, and from 1905 of the French Socialist Party. The newspaper reprinted articles by Marx and Engels and published articles by prominent leaders of the French and international working-class movement at the turn of the century: Paul Lafargue, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, G. V. Plekhanov and others. The newspaper cessed publication in 1915. p. 204

[70] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 376. p. 206

[71] Lenin is referring to Engels' work *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1888) and the "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 370-71, 99-102). p. 206

[72] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 378. p. 206

[73] See F. Engels' "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of his *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 99). p. 207

[74] *Zeitschrift für immanente Philosophie* (*Journal for Immanentist Philosophy*)—a German reactionary journal, published in Berlin from 1895 to 1900 under the editorship of M. R. Kauffmann, with the participation of Wilhelm Schuppe and Richard von Schubert-Soldern. p. 211

[75] *L'Année philosophique* (*The Philosophical Year*)—the organ of the French "neo-criticists", published in Paris from 1890 to 1913 under the editorship of F. Pillon. p. 212

[76] Lenin is referring to the lying statement of P. A. Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who denied the existence in the postal service of "*cabinets noirs*" engaged in examining the corrospondence of persons regarded as suspects by the tsarist government. p. 220

[77] *Nozdrev*—a character in N. V. Gogol's novel *Dead Souls*; a landlord, swindler and trouble-maker. Gogol called him a "historical personage", since wherever he appeared "histories" and rows developed. p. 223

[78] *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* (*Philosophical Review of France and Abroad*)—a journal founded in Paris in 1876 by the French psychologist Théodule Ribot. p. 224

[79] *The Open Court*—a journal of a religious tendency, published in Chicago from 1887 to 1936. p. 224

[80] *The Monist*—an American philosophical journal of an idealist tendency, edited by Paul Carus. It was published in Chicago from 1890 to 1936. p. 225

[81] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 435-38. p. 229

[82] In Geneva in 1892 appeared the first Russian edition of Engels' work *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, translated by G. V. Plekhanov and with a foreword and notes by him. Commenting on Engels' formulation of the fundamental question of philosophy and characterisation of agnosticism, Plekhanov gave a critical exposition of the theory of knowledge of a number of trends of idealist philosophy (Hume, Kant, the neo-Kantians, etc.) and counterposed to them the materialist theory of knowledge. In doing so he committed an error by saying: "Our sensations are in their way hieroglyphs which inform us of what is taking place in reality. The hieroglyphs do not resemble the events conveyed by them. But they can *with complete fidelity* convey both the events themselves, and—what is the main thing—the relations existing between them" (G. V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, p. 536). In 1905, in the notes to the second edition of Engels' work, Plekhanov admitted: "I also failed to express myself quite exactly" (ibid., p. 515). Plekhanov's error, although appearing to be a question of terminology, was a concession to agnosticism and bore witness to his insufficiently profound understanding of the dialectics of the process of cognition. p. 232

[83] *Archiv für Philosophie* (*Philosophical Archives*)—a German philosophical journal of an idealist tendency, organ of the neo-Kantians and Machists. It was published in Berlin from 1895 to 1931 in two parallel editions: the first, entitled *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (*Archives of the History of Philosophy*), was edited by L. Stein, the second, entitled *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* (*Archives of Systematic Philosophy*), was edited by Paul Natorp. From 1925 the journal appeared under the title of *Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie* (*Archives of Systematic Philosophy and Sociology*). p. 236

[84] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 375. p. 239

[85] The Institute of Marxism-Leninism has in its archives a copy of Joseph Dietzgen's book *Kleinere philosophische Schriften. Eine Auswahl* (*Minor Philosophical Writings. A Selection*), Stuttgart, Dietz, 1903, with annotations by Lenin. The book includes seven articles published in 1870-78 in the newspapers *Volksstaat* (*People's State*) and *Vorwärts* (*Forward*) as well as a work entitled *Streifzüge eines Sozialisten in das Gebiet der Erkenntnistheorie* (*Excursions of a Socialist in the Field of the Theory of Knowledge*), which was published in 1887 as a separate pamphlet.

Most of Lenin 's annotations were made while he was working on the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. They consist of underlinings and remarks in the text and on the margins; in several cases Lenin marks correct ideas of Dietzgen's with the letter "α" and departures from dialectical materialism with the letter "β", Lenin's annotations bring into prominence Dietzgen's description of the partisan character of philosophy, the relations between philosophy and natural science, the subject-matter of philosophy, the fundamental philosophical categories, the problem of the cognisability of the world, the appraisal of Kant, Hegel and Feuerbach, the attitude to Marx and Engels, and Dietzgen's militant atheism. At the same time Lenin notes Dietzgen's confusion in regard to philosophical categories, his attempt to "widen" the concept of matter by including in it "all the phenomena of reality, hence also our cognitive ability", etc. p. 243

[86] Lenin is referring to *Letters of Karl Marx to Kugelmann, Member of the International*, St. Petersburg, 1907 (see K. Marx, *Briefe an Kugelmann*, Inoizdat, 1940). p. 246

[87] P. Dauge wrote an afterword entitled "Joseph Dietzgen and His Critic, G. Plekhanov" to the second Russian edition of Joseph Dietzgen's *Akquisit der Philosophie*. p. 248

[88] *X-rays*, *Becquerel rays*, *radium*—discoveries which laid the basis for the development of atomic physics.

X-rays (Röntgen rays) are extremely short-wave electromagnetic radiation which can pass through media impenetrable by visible

light. They were discovered by the German physicist Wilhelm Konrad Röntgen in December 1895 who described their main properties; later the nature of this radiation was discovered.

In 1896 the French physicist Antoine-Henri Becquerel, while studying the action of various fluorescent substances on photographic film, discovered that uranium salts affect such film in the dark even without previous exposure to light. By further experiments he showed that this action was due to a new form of radiation distinct from X-rays.

Investigating this new form of radiation, Pierre and Marie Curie established that it was due to a hitherto unknown property of matter which they called radioactivity. As a result of their experiments two new radioactive elements were discovered: polonium and radium (1898). Later it was found that Becquerel's rays consist of three components (alpha-, beta- and gamma-rays). p. 250

[89] This discovery was made by James Clerk Maxwell. By generalising Michael Faraday's experimental results in the study of electromagnetic phenomena he created the theory of the electromagnetic field, from which it followed that changes of the electromagnetic field are propagated with the speed of light. On the basis of his researches, Maxwell in 1865 concluded that light consists of electromagnetic vibrations. In 1886-89 his theory was confirmed experimentally by Heinrich Hertz, who proved the existence of electromagnetic waves. p. 251

[90] The study of radioactivity revealed the existence of a special kind of radiation: alpha-, beta- and gamma-rays. In 1903, Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy suggested that radioactivity was the spontaneous transformation of one chemical element into another. This was speedily confirmed by William Ramsay and Frederick Soddy, who discovered that helium was one of the products of radioactive disintegration of radon (1903). Shortly afterwards it was discovered that helium was formed by the disintegration of radium and other radioactive elements showing alpha-radioactivity. This formation of helium was an important argument in favour of the theory of radioactive transformations, and could only be explained by supposing that alpha-rays are the nuclei of helium atoms. This was confirmed in 1909 by the experiments of E. Rutherford and T. Royds. p. 251

[91] Lenin uses the concept of the ether, which was still generally accepted in physics at the beginning of the twentieth century. The idea of the ether as a special material medium filling all space and acting as the carrier of light, gravitational forces, etc., was put forward in the seventeenth century. Later, the notion of different forms of the ether, independent of one another (electromagnetic, magnetic, etc.) was introduced to explain various phenomena. Owing to the success of the wave theory of light, the concept of the luminiferous ether (Christian Huygens, Augustin Fresnel and others) was especially developed; subsequently the hypothesis of a

single ether arose. As science developed, however, the concept of the ether came into contradiction with new facts. The untenability of the hypothesis of the ether as a universal mechanical medium was proved by the theory of relativity; the rational elements contained in the hypothesis of the ether were reflected in the quantum field theory (the vacuum concept). p. 251

[92] Lenin repeatedly pointed out the limited nature of Plekhanov's criticism of Machism. In 1905, in connection with his preface to the second Russian edition of Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Lenin wrote: "How petty are his sallies and 'pinpricks' against the Machists! For me this is the more to be regretted since Plekhanov's criticism of Mach seems to me essentially correct" (*Lenin Miscellany XXVI*, p. 21). In 1907-08, in the works *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, *Materialismus militans* and others, Plekhanov criticised Machism and its adherents in Russia (Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and others) and pointed out the fallacy of their attempts to combine Marxism with the subjective-idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. In so doing, Plekhanov "was less concerned with refuting Mach than with deading a factional blow at Bolshevism" (see p. 355 of this volume).

Plekhanov's opposition to Machism played a positive part in defending Marxist philosophy from the attacks of the revisionists, but he did not give a deep theoretical analysis of empirio-criticism, and did not reveal the direct dependence of Machism on the crisis in natural science, confining himself to a criticism of the idealist epistemological views of some of its adherents. p. 251

[93] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 375. p. 251

[94] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 86. p. 252

[95] The description of the concept of mass given by Henri Poincaré and quoted by Lenin was in accord with the level of development of physics at that time. The development of the electronic theory that followed the discovery of the electron made it possible to explain the nature of the mass of the electron. Joseph John Thomson advanced the hypothesis that the actual mass of the electron is determined by the energy of the electromagnetic field (i.e., the inertia of the electron is due to the inertia of the field). The concept of the electromagnetic mass of the electron was introduced, and this mass was found to depend on the velocity of motion of the electron. The mechanical mass of the electron, however, like that of any other particle, was regarded as unchanging. The existence of the mechanical mass should have been revealed by experiments on the dependence of the electromagnetic mass of the electron on its velocity. However, these experiments, performed by Walter Kaufmann in 1901-02, unexpectedly showed that the electron behaved as if all its mass was of an electromagnetic nature. Hence the conclusion was drawn that, in the case of the electron,

mechanical mass, which was formerly regarded as an inalienable property of matter, has disappeared. This circumstance gave rise to various kinds of philosophical speculations and statements about the "disappearance of matter", the fallacy of which was demonstrated by Lenin. The further development of physics (relativity theory) showed that mechanical mass also depends on velocity of motion and that the mass of the electron cannot be reduced wholly to electromagnetic mass. p. 253

[96] *L'Année psychologique* (*The Psychological Year*)—the organ of a group of French bourgeois idealist psychologists, published in Paris from 1894. It was first edited by Alfred Binet, and afterwards by H. Piéron. p. 258

[97] The idea of the compound nature of the atom arose at the end of the nineteenth century as a result of the discovery of the periodic system of elements by Mendeleyev, the electromagnetic nature of light, the electron, and the phenomena of radioactivity. Various models of the atom were proposed. Lenin regarded as most probable the planetary model, the idea of which was advanced as a guess at the end of the nineteenth century. It was experimentally confirmed by Ernest Rutherford, who investigated the penetration of various substances by alpha-particles (positively charged helium nuclei) and came to the conclusion that the positive charge is concentrated at the centre of the atom, occupying a very small part of the latter's volume. In 1911 he suggested a model of the atom having a positively charged nucleus at the centre, with a mass almost equal to the whole mass of the atom, around which electrons revolve in various orbits, like planets round the sun. This model, however, could not explain the stability of the atom. The first successful attempt to create a theory of atomic structure was based on Rutherford's model and made use of the quantum postulates of Niels Bohr (1913). According to this first quantum theory of the atom, an electron moves in one of the "stable" orbits (corresponding to definite discrete energy values) without radiation; radiation or absorption of a definite portion of energy by the atom occurs only on the passage of the electron from one orbit to another.

Further advances in physics enriched the representation of the structure of the atom. An important part was played here by Louis de Broglie's prediction of wave properties of micro-objects and the subsequent creation of quantum mechanics by Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg and others. According to modern ideas the atomic nucleus is surrounded by a cloud of electrons, which occupy various orbits corresponding to definite energy values, and which form with the nucleus a single interconnected system.

The development of physics has shown that the atomic nucleus consists of elementary particles—nucleons (protons and neutrons). New properties of the electron—besides its mass and charge, which were already known in the early twentieth century—have been discovered, including the possibility of its conversion into other particles, In addition to the electron, a number of new elementary

particles with diverse properties have been discovered (photons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, various kinds of mesons and hyperons). Particles have also been discovered which possess characteristics equal in magnitude to those of other particles but of opposite sign (so-called anti-particles).

The development of knowledge of the structure of matter has led to man's mastery over nuclear processes and the utilisation of nuclear energy, initiating a new technical revolution of tremendous significance for the future of mankind. p. 260

[98] *Positive electron*—the name given at the turn of the century to the elementary particle bearing a charge of positive electricity. The existence of the positive electron (positron) in the modern sense was predicted in 1928 by the British physicist Paul Dirac; in 1932 the American physicist Carl Anderson discovered the positron in cosmic rays. p. 260

[99] *Revue générale des sciences pures et appliquées* (*General Review of Pure and Applied Science*)—a journal of natural science published in Paris from 1890. It was founded by Laurence Olivier. p. 260

[100] This refers apparently to mechanical mass, which classical physics regarded as an eternal and unchanging property of matter. p. 260

[101] Lenin is referring to a speech made at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. by the "Economist" Akimov, who opposed the Party programme put forward by *Iskra*, one of his arguments being that in the programme the word "proletariat" occurred as the object, not the subject, of the sentence. p. 270

[102] *Neo-vitalism*—an idealist trend in biology which arose at the end of the nineteenth century in opposition to the materialist world outlook and Darwinism. Its representatives (Wilhelm Roux, Hans Driesch, Jakob Uexküll and others) revived the anti-scientific views of vitalism. They attempted to explain the phenomena of life and the purposiveness of living organisms by the action of special non-material factors ("life force", "entelechy", etc.), thus making living nature fundamentally different from non-living nature. The fallacious, anti-scientific character of neo-vitalism was exposed in the works of the materialist biologists (Ernst Haeckel, K. A. Timiryazev, I. P. Pavlov, etc.). p. 276

[103] *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii* (*Problems of Philosophy and Psychology*)—a journal of an idealist tendency, founded by Professor N. Y. Grot, published in Moscow from November 1889 to April 1918 (from 1894 it was published by the Moscow Psychological Society). It contained articles on philosophy, psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, critical notes and analyses of theories and works

of West-European philosophers and psychologists, reviews of books on philosophy and of foreign philosophical journals, and other material. In the nineties its contributors included the "legal Marxists" P .B. Struve and S. N. Bulgakov, and in the years of reaction —A. Bogdanov and other Machists. From 1894 it was edited by L. M. Lopatin. p. 299

[104] *Union of the Russian People*—an ultra-reactionary, Black-Hundred organisation of the monarchists, formed in October 1905 in St. Petersburg for combating the revolutionary movement. The Union united reactionary landlords, big house owners, merchants, police officials, clergy, urban petty-bourgeoisie, kulaks, and declassed and criminal elements. It was headed by V. A. Bobrinsky, A. I. Dubrovin, P. A. Krushevan, N. E. Markov 2nd, V. M. Purishkevich and others. Its press organs were the newspapers *Russkoye Znamya* (*Russian Flag*), *Obyedineniye* (*Union*), and *Groza* (*Storm*). Branches of the Union were opened in many Russian towns.

The Union defended the continuance of the tsarist autocracy, the preservation of semi-feudal landlordism and the privileges of the nobility. Its motto was the monarchist, nationalist slogan of the feudal epoch—"orthodox religion, autocracy, nationhood". It chose pogroms and murder as its chief weapon against the revolution. Helped and protected by the police, its members openly and with impunity beat up and murdered leading revolutionary workers and representatives of the democratic intelligentsia, disrupted and fired on meetings, organised anti-Jewish pogroms and viciously persecuted non-Russian nationalities.

After the dissolution of the Second Duma, the Union split into two organisations: the "Chamber of the Archangel Michael" headed by Purishkevich, which advocated using the Third Duma for counter-revolutionary aims, and the Union of the Russian People proper, headed by Dubrovin, which continued the tactics of open terrorism. Both of the Black-Hundred organisations were abolished during the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917. After the October Socialist Revolution, former members of these organisations took an active part in counter-revolutionary revolts and conspiracies against the Soviet power. p. 299

[105] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918. From the beginning of the nineties it passed into the hands of the liberal Narodniks headed by N. K. Mikhailovsky. Grouped round the magazine were publicists who subsequently became prominent members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Party of "Popular Socialists" and the Trudovik groups in the State Duma. In 1906 it became the organ of the semi-Cadet Trudovik Popular Socialist Party. p. 314

[106] These words are an adaptation of a couplet by Goethe, taken by Lenin from I. S. Turgenev's novel *Virgin Soil*. p. 317

[107] This refers to the Preface to Marx's work *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (*Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*) p. 322

[108] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 290. p. 329

[109] *Bazarov*, *V.* (*Rudnev*, *V. A.*), 1874-1939—philosopher and economist. From 1896 onwards took part in the Social-Democratic movement. In 1905-07 collaborated on several Bolshevik publications. In the period of reaction (1907-10) drew away from Bolshevism; advocated "god-building" and empirio-criticism; was one of the leading representatives of the Machist revision of Marxism. p. 331

[110] The discovery of the law of the conservation and transformation of energy, led up to by the whole development of natural science especially contributed to by the work of Lomonosov, occurred in the forties of the nineteenth century (the works of Robert Mayer, James Joule and Hermann Helmholtz). The word energy in its modern sense was introduced in 1853 by William Rankin, but it only came into general use in the seventies and eighties. Most physicists were at first critical of the new law, but its correctness was speedily proved in all spheres of natural science. Engels considered this law one of the most important achievements of the nineteenth century and he looked on it as a universal law of nature expressing in the language of physics the unity of the material world. "The unity of all motion in nature," he wrote, "is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural scientific fact" (*Dialectics of Nature*, p. 264).

Some scientists cast doubt on the universal nature of the law of the conservation and transformation of energy and tried to interpret it in an idealist spirit. Thus, Mach refused to regard it as a universal law of nature and considered that it amounted merely to an acknowledgement of the causal dependence of phenomena. Wilhelm Ostwald regarded it as the sole universal law of nature and he tried to deny the objective reality of matter, to discard the concept of matter and to prove that energy exists without matter, reducing all phenomena of nature, society and thought to energy. A. Bogdanov tried to depict social changes as an increase or decrease of energy.

Lenin criticised "energeticism" as one of the manifestations of "physical idealism" and he showed the untenability in principle of attempts to transfer the laws of natural science to social phenomena. The further development of science, and study of the phenomena of the micro-world, confirmed the universal character of the law of the conservation and transformation of energy; the relativity theory established the universal relationship between energy and mass. p. 332

[111] See *Early Writings of K. Marx and F. Engels*, 1956, Russian edition, pp. 257-58. p. 336

[112] *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (*German-French Yearbooks*)—an annual published in Paris in German, edited by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge. Only the first, double number was issued in February 1844. It contained Marx's works "The Jewish Question" and "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction", as well as Engels' "Outlines of a Criticism of Political Economy" and "The Position of England. Thomas Carlyle. 'Past and Present'". These works mark the definitive adoption of the standpoint of materialism and communism by Marx and Engels. Marx's disagreement in principle with the bourgeois radical Ruge was the main reason why the journal ceased to appear. p. 336

[113] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 19. p. 337

[114] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 290, 306. p. 337

[115] See F. Engels' "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of his *Socialism*: *Utopian and Scientific* (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 99-102). p. 337

[116] Lenin is referring to Engels' works *Anti-Dühring* (1878), *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1888), "Special Introduction to the English Edition of 1892" of *Socialism*: *Utopian and Scientific* (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* and K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 358-402, 93-115). p. 338

[117] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 359.

The turn to Hegel in the second half of the nineteenth century was characteristic of the development of bourgeois philosophy in a number of European countries and the U.S.A. In Britain it began with the appearance in 1865 of James Hutchison Stirling's book *The Secret of Hegel*. The bourgeois ideologists were attracted by Hegel's absolute idealism, which offered wide opportunities for a theoretical justification of religion. There developed a special philosophical trend which was given the name of Anglo-Hegelianism, whose representatives (Thomas Green, the brothers Edward and John Caird, Francis Bradley and others) vigorously attacked materialism, making use of the reactionary aspects of Hegel's doctrine.

In the Scandinavian countries, too, Hegelian philosophy became more influential in the second half of the eighteenth century. In Sweden its revival was sponsored by Johann Borelius who counterposed Hegelianism to the prevailing subjective-idealist philosophy. In Norway the Right-wing Hegelians Marcus Jacob Monrad, G. W. Ling and others interpreted Hegel's philosophy in the spirit of mysticism, discarding its rationalism and trying to subordinate science to religion. In Denmark, where Hegelian phi-

losophy began to spread even during Hegel's lifetime, it was criticised from the same standpoint.

The spread of Hegel's philosophy did not lead to its revival; the bourgeois epigones of Hegel "developed" (mainly in the spirit of subjective idealism) various aspects of his conservative philosophical system. All this paved the way for the emergence at the turn of the century of neo-Hegelianism—a reactionary trend of bourgeois philosophical thought in the imperialist era that attempted to adapt Hegel's philosophy to fascist ideology. p. 338

[118] *Pragmatism*—a subjective-idealist trend of bourgeois (mainly American) philosophy in the imperialist era. It arose in the seventies of the last century in the U.S.A. as a reflection of specific features of the development of American capitalism, replacing the hitherto prevailing religious philosophy. The main propositions of pragmatism were formulated by Charles Peirce. As an independent philosophical tendency it took shape at the turn of the century in the works of William James and Ferdinand Schiller and was further developed in the instrumentalism of John Dewey.

The pragmatists consider that the central problem of philosophy is the attainment of true knowledge. However, they completely distort the very concept of truth; already Peirce looked on cognition as a purely psychological, subjective process of achieving religious belief. James substituted the concept of "usefulness", of success or advantage, for the concept of truth, i.e., for the objectively true reflection of reality. From his point of view, all concepts, including religious ones, are true insofar as they are useful. Dewey went even farther by declaring all scientific theories, all moral principles and social institutions, to be merely "instruments" for the attainment of the personal aims of the individual. As the criterion of the "truth" (usefulness) of knowledge, the pragmatists take experience, understood not as human social practice but as the constant stream of individual experiences, of the subjective phenomena of consciousness; they regard this experience as the sole reality, declaring the concepts of matter and mind "obsolete". Like the Machists, the pragmatists claim to have created a "third line" in philosophy; they try to place themselves above materialism and idealism, while in fact advocating one of the varieties of idealism. In contrast to materialist monism, the pragmatists put forward the standpoint of "pluralism", according to which there is no internal connection, no conformity to law, in the universe; it is like a mosaic which each person builds in his own way, out of his own individual experiences. Hence, starting out from the needs of the given moment, pragmatism considers it possible to give different, even contradictory, explanations of one and the same phenomenon. Consistency is declared to be unnecessary; if it is to a man's advantage, he can be a determinist or an indeterminist, he can assert or deny the existence of God, and so on.

By basing themselves on the subjective-idealist tradition of English philosophy from Berkeley and Hume to John Stuart Mill, by exploiting particular aspects of the theories of Kant, Mach

and Avenarius, Nietzsche and Henri Bergson, the American pragmatists created one of the most reactionary philosophical trends of modern times, a convenient form for theoretically defending the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie. It is for this reason that pragmatism spread so widely in the U.S.A., becoming almost the official American philosophy. There have been advocates of pragmatism at various times in Italy, Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and other countries. p. 342

[119] *Zagranichnaya Gazeta* (*Gazette Etrangère*)—the weekly newspaper of a group of Russian emigrants, published in Geneva from March 16 to April 13, 1908. The four numbers that appeared during this period dealt mainly with the life of Russian emigrants and carried material on events in Russia and abroad. The second number published Lenin's speech "Lessons of the Commune" at an international meeting in Geneva on March 18, 1908. The newspaper contained propaganda for god-building and Machism (articles by A. Bogdanov and A. V. Lunacharsky).

Lenin quotes a passage from A. V. Lunacharsky's "Sketches of Modern Russian Literature", which was published in Nos. 2 and 3 of the newspaper. p. 343

[120] *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*)—a legal monthly literary magazine of a popular scientific and socio-political character published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1909. In 1902-08 it printed articles by Social-Democrats. In No. 2, 1906, the magazine printed Chapters V-IX of Lenin's work "The Agrarian Crisis and the 'Critics of Marx'". p. 344

[121] *Bobchinsky*, *Dobchinsky*—two closely similar characters in Gogol's comedy *Inspector-General*, chatterers and tale-bearers. p. 351

[122] Lenin is referring to two booklets by Machist Mensheviks published in 1908: N. Valentinov's *Philosophical Constructions of Marxism* and P. Yushkevich's *Materialism and Critical Realism*. p. 355

[123] The manuscript of the "*Supplement to Chapter Four*, *Section 1*, 'From What Angle Did N. G. Chernyshevsky Criticise Kantianism?'" was sent by Lenin to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova in the second half of March, when the book was already in the press. In a letter to his sister dated March 10 or 11 (23 or 24), 1909, Lenin wrote in reference to this supplement: "I am sending you a supplement. It is not worth while delaying on account of it. But if there is time, put it at the end of the book, after the conclusion, in small print, for instance. I regard it as extremely important to counterpose 'Chernyshevsky' to the Machists." (*Collected Works*, present edition Vol. 37, pp. 419-20.) p. 359

THE LIFE AND WORK OF

V. I. LENIN

Chronology

(*February 1908-May 1909*)

1906

First half of February	Lenin begins work on the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, becomes a member of the Société de Lecture in Geneva and reads philosophical literature in its library.
January 25 (February 7)	Lenin informs A. M. Gorky by letter that he has been carefully reading the works of Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunacharsky and other Machists and is convinced that their philosophical views are erroneous. "I am for materialism, against 'empirio' and so forth," he writes.
January 31 (February 13)	In a letter to A. M. Gorky, Lenin controverts his stand on questions of philosophy; he defends the materialism of Marx and Engels.
February 11 (24)	Lenin attends a conference of the editorial board of the newspaper *Proletary* in connection with the note in *Die Neue Zeit* about the struggle in the R.S.D.L.P. on questions of philosophy. The conference unanimously adopts Lenin's text of a statement by the editorial board of *Proletary*, which stresses that the philosophical controversy is not of a factional nature and that the whole attempt to present differences on philosophy as factional is radically wrong.
February, before the 12th (25th)	Lenin writes to relatives in St. Petersburg, asking them to find and send him his philosophical manuscript of 1906 attacking Bogdanov's empirio-monism, which he intends to reprint under the heading "Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy".
February 12 (25)	Lenin writes to A. M. Gorky on the need for an irreconcilable struggle against Machism and the Russian Machists (Bogdanov and others); he outlines the history of the differences among the Bolsheviks on questions of philosophy, which have been aggravated by the publication of the Machlsts' book *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*.

March 11 (24)	In a letter to A. M. Gorky, Lenin gives a strongly adverse estimate of the Machists book *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*; he stresses the need for combating the Machists on philosophical questions.
Second half of March-not later than April 3 (16)	Lenin writes the article "Marxism and Revisionism" for the symposium *Karl Marx* (1818-83). In his notes to the article Lenin speaks of his intention in the near future to combat *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* in a number of articles or a special pamphlet.
Not earlier than March-not later than October 14 (27)	Lenin reads and makes notes in J. Dietzgen's *Keinere philosophische Schriften. Eine Auswahl* (*Minor Philosophical Writings. A Selection*), Stuttgart, Dietz, 1903. Lenin makes wide use of this book for his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
April 3 (16)	Lenin informs A. M. Gorky by letter of the "formal declaration of war" on the Machists, having in mind his article "Marxism and Revisionism". Lenin writes in a letter to A. V. Lunacharsky that he has parted company with the advocates of "combining scientific socialism with religion" and with all the Machists.
Between April 10 and 17 (23 and 30	At A. M. Gorky's request, Lenin visits him in Capri. Lenin informs A. Bogdanov, V. Bazarov and A. V. Lunacharsky of his absolute divergence from them on questions of philosophy.
April	Lenin reads F. Engels' article "Über historischen Materialismus" ("On Historical Materialism") printed in the magazine *Die Neue Zeit*, No. 1, XI Jahrgang, I. Band, 1892/93, and makes notes in it. Lenin uses Engels' article for the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
May	Lenin works in the library of the British Museum in London on the literature dealing with philosophy and natural science not available in the Geneva libraries. He needed this literature for writing *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
	Lenin writes "Ten Questions to a Lecturer", which he sends from London as theses for the speech of I. F. Dubrovinsky (Innokenty) on the occasion of the lecture entitled "Adventures of One Philosophical School" given by A. Bogdanov in Geneva on May 15 (28), 1908.

End of May-beginning of June	On his return to Geneva from London, at a meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary*, Lenin and I. F. Dubrovinsky reject A. Bogdanov's draft resolution which stated that advocacy of empirio-criticism "does not contradict" the interests of the Bolshevik faction, and which proposed to condemn I. F. Dubrovinsky's speech on A. Bogdanov's lecture.
Not before May	Lenin reads G. V. Plekhanov's book *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (St. Petersburg, 1908) and makes notes in it.
June 7 (20)	In a letter to M. A. Ulyanova, Lenin expresses regret that P. G. Dauge, the "Moscow Philosopher-Editor", had refused to print *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* and he asks for another publisher to be found.
June 18 (July 1)	In a letter to V. V. Vorovsky in Odessa, Lenin writes that the differences with A. Bogdanov and G. A. Alexinsky have sharpened and a break with them is inevitable; he enquires about the possibility of his book on philosophy being published.
June 30 (July 13)	Lenin informs M. I. Ulyanova by letter about his work on *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* and asks for G. I. Chelpanov's two books, *Avenarius and His School* and *Immanentist Philosophy*, to be sent to him.
August	In the name of the editorial board of *Proletary* Lenin demands that A. Bogdanov should give a public exposition in the press of his philosophical and political views.
September	Lenin writes the preface to *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. He gives the manuscript of his book to V. F. Gorin (Galkin) to read through.
October 14 (27)	Lenin informs A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova in a letter that he has completed his work on the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, and asks for a reliable address to which to send the manuscript and, if at all possible, to conclude an agreement for the book's publication.
October 26 (November 8)	In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova Lenin asks for an address to which to send the manuscript of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*; he agrees, in the event of the censorship being particularly

severe, to replace the word "clericalism" in the book by the word "fideism", explaining its meaning in a footnote.

October 28 (November 10)

In a letter to the Machist Menshevik P. S. Yushkevich in St. Petersburg, Lenin rejects the suggestion that he should contribute to the literary-philosophical symposium which it was proposed to publish.

November, before the 4th (17th)

Lenin sends the manuscript of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* to V. A. Levitsky in Podolsk.

November 13 (26)

In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin acknowledges the receipt of her letter of November 9 (22), which mentioned that the manuscript of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* had been received; he proposes that in the absence of another publisher the manuscript should be sent to V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich at the *Zhizn i Znanie* (*Life and Knowledge*) Publishers; he asks for an addition to the text at the end of the "Introduction", where mention is made of N. Valentinov.

November 27 (December 10)

In a telegram to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin agrees to accept the conditions of the *Zveno* Publishers in Moscow for the publication of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

In a letter to M. A. Ulyanova, Lenin asks A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova to expedite the drawing up of the agreement with the *Zveno* Publishers and insists that the agreement should contain a demand for immediate publication of the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*; he advises that the agreement should be concluded in his name and not in that of Anna Ilyinichna in order to avoid her being involved in responsibility under the press laws.

Between November 29 and December 1 (December 12 and 14)

Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya move from Geneva to Paris, the city to which the publication of the newspaper *Proletary* was being transferred.

December 6 (19)

In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin agrees to a softening of the tone in regard to Bazarov and Bogdanov but objects to softening the expressions relating to Yushkevich and Valentinov in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*; he announces

his agreement to changing the words "clericalism" "mentally projected a god", and so on, only if the publisher demands it by an ultimatum for censorship reasons.

December 11 (24) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin asks to send him a copy of the uncorrected proofs and later the printed sheets of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* in order to be able to make very important corrections; he gives instructions about the type for the paragraph headings. He mentions two letters sent earlier, containing an addition about Erich Becher's book and a number of corrections to the text.

December 30 (January 12, 1909) — In a letter (in French) to the Director of the National Library in Paris, Lenin asks for a ticket giving him the right to use the library.

1908 — Lenin reads Ludwig Feuerbach's book *Sämtliche Werke*, Zweiter Band (*Collected Works*, Vol. 2), Leipzig, 1846, and makes notes in it. Lenin uses this book for *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

Not before 1908 — Lenin reads V. Shulyatikov's book *The Justification of Capitalism in West-European Philosophy, from Descartes to E. Mach*, and makes notes in it, concluding with an appraisal of the book.

Later than 1908 — Lenin reads A. Rey's book *La philosophie moderne* (*Modern Philosophy*), Paris, 1908, and makes notes in it.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

1909

Beginning of the year — Lenin reads lectures on philosophy to a Bolshevik circle in Paris.

January-June — Lenin works in the National Library and the Sorbonne Library of Paris University on literature dealing with problems of philosophy and natural science.

January 2 (February 6) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin acknowledges receipt of the first pages of the proofs of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

January-April — Lenin works on the proofs of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

February 1 (14) — At a meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* Lenin demands that the board publicly oppose Lunacharsky's god-building. An editorial article against god-building ("The Wrong Road") was printed on February 12 (25) in *Proletary*, No. 42.

February 4 or 6 (17 or 18) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin sends corrections to the current page-proofs of the book, reports that 27 pages of the manuscript are missing from the proofs and firmly requests that care be taken to see that nothing is omitted in printing the book.

February 10 (23) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin acknowledges receipt of the 8th and 9th printed sheets of page-proofs; he mentions that there were no omissions, that the proof-reading of the sheets has been done well, and he sends his corrections to them.

February 2 (March 9) — Lenin sends A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova a letter containing corrections to the 10th and 11th printed sheets. Lenin reports about the break with A. Bogdanov and A. V. Lunacharsky and asks that in reading the page-proofs of the book the formulations against them should not be toned down and that the issue of the book should be expedited; he thanks I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov for his help in publishing the book.

February 27 (March 12) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin sends a list of the misprints in printed sheets 6-9 and 13, and again asks for the publication of the book to be expedited. In a postscript Lenin again insists that nothing shall be toned down in the passages opposing Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and other Machists.

March 8-9 (21-22) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin again requests that on no account should the parts opposing Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and others be toned down and sends a list of misprints in printed sheets 1-5 of the book.

March 10 or 11 (23 or 24) — Lenin sends to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova in Moscow the addition "From What Angle Did N. G. Chernyshevsky Criticise Kantianism?" to Section 1, Chapter Four of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

March 13 (26) — Lenin sends A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova a list of the misprints in printed sheets 15-18 of page

proofs and asks to be informed when the book is expected to appear.

March 23 (April 5) — Lenin sends A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova a list of misprints in the 14th printed sheet of the proofs and asks that in the proofs the phrase about Vernadsky "materialist-thinker" should be changed to "naturalist thinker", or to mention it in the list of misprints.

March 2 (April 6) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin acknowledges receipt of printed sheets 10-12 of the book and the 21st printed sheet of the proofs, and he sends a list of the misprints in them.

March 26 (April 8) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin acknowledges receipt of the 22nd printed sheet of the proofs and informs her of the dispatch of the corrections to it; he asks that everything possible be done for the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* to appear in the first half of April. "I have not only literary but also serious political obligations connected with its publication," wrote Lenin.

April 21 (May 4) — In a letter to I. F. Dubrovinsky, Lenin informs him that he has received news that *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* has appeared, and he promises to send it to him in Paris by April 25-26 (May 8-9).

Between April 29 and May 4 (May 12 and 17) — Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* is issued by the *Zveno* Publishers, Moscow.

May 4 (17) — Lenin sends Rosa Luxemburg his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* and asks that the publication of the book should be mentioned in the magazine *Die Neue Zeit*, which was done (see *Die Neue Zeit*, No. 2, October 8, 1909, p. 64).

May 8 (21) — In a letter to M. A. Ulyanova, Lenin acknowledges receipt of the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* and comments favourably on the way the book was published.

May, before the 12th (25th) — Lenin presents a copy of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* to V. F. Gorin (Galkin).

May 13 (26) — In a letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin acknowledges receipt of the book *Materialism and*

Empirio-criticism, comments favourably on the way it was published, and writes about the imminent split with the Otzovists and Ultimatists.

May-September — The magazines *Vozrozhdeniye* (*Rebirth*), No. 7-8, *Sovremenny Mir* (*Modern World*), No. 7, *Kritickeskoye Obozreniye* (*Critical Review*), issue V, and the newspaper *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*), No. 22, publish reviews by bourgeois and Menshevik authors of Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

June 5 (18) — The newspaper *Odesskoye Obozreniye* (*Odessa Review*), No. 436, carries a note by V. V. Vorovsky on V. I. Lenin's book; because of the censorship the note was ostensibly devoted to a book by Max Verworn, *Natural Science and World Outlook*, *The Problem of Life*, Moscow, 1909.

Beginning of the summer — Lenin sends a copy of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov.

Summer — In the summer Lenin visits Paul Lafargue and talks with him on philosophical problems and his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

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PREFACE

Volume 16 contains works written by V. I. Lenin during the period from March 1908 to August 1909.

The volume contains articles and other items by Lenin published in the newspapers *Proletary* and *Sotsial-Demokrat*; documents of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. and the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*.

In his writings: "On to the Straight Road", "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution", "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution", "The Assessment of the Present Situation", "On the Road", Lenin gives an analysis of the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, outlines the tasks and tactics of the Party during the period of the Stolypin reaction, and exposes the liquidationism of the Mensheviks.

His articles "Two Letters", "On the Article 'Questions of the Day'", "A Caricature of Bolshevism", '~he Liquidation of Liquidationism" and the documents of the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* are directed against "liquidationism from the left"—otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building.

In his works: "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century", "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution. Autoabstract", "P. Maslov in Hysterics", "Some Remarks on the 'Reply' by P. Maslov", "From the Editorial Board" and "How Plekhanov and Co. Defend Revisionism", Lenin defends and develops Marxist theory on the agrarian question.

In the articles "Inflammable Material in World Politics", "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics

of Social-Democracy", "Events in the Balkans and in Persia" and "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", Lenin discusses the most important international events and defines the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the struggle against militarism.

This volume includes six documents printed for the first time in Lenin's *Works*. In the article, "British and German Workers Demonstrate for Peace" Lenin exposed the predatory aspirations of the capitalists and their war preparations, and showed the rise of the revolutionary working-class movement. Two documents, "Statement by the Bolsheviks" and "To the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party", are devoted to the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Menshevik liquidators at the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Two speeches at the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* and the "Draft Letter of the Bolshevik Centre to the Council of the School on Capri" are directed against the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders.

ON TO THE STRAIGHT ROAD[1]

Published in the newspaper
Proletary, No. 26,
March 19 (April 1), 1908

Published according
to the text in the newspaper

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The dissolution of the Second Duma[2] and the coup d'état of June 3, 1907[3] were a turning-point in the history of our revolution, the beginning of a kind of special period or zigzag in its development. We have spoken more than once of the significance of this zigzag from the standpoint of the general relation of class forces in Russia and the tasks of the uncompleted bourgeois revolution. We want now to deal with the state of our Party work in connection with this turn of the revolution.

More than six months have passed since the reactionary coup of June 3, and beyond doubt this first half-year has been marked by a considerable decline and weakening of all revolutionary organisations, including that of the Social-Democrats. Wavering, disunity and disintegration—such have been the general features of this half-year. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, because the extreme intensification of reaction and its temporary triumph, coupled with a slowing-down in the direct class struggle, were bound to be accompanied by a crisis in the revolutionary parties.

Now there can be observed, and quite plainly, a number of symptoms showing that the crisis is coming to an end, that the worst is over, that the right road has already been found and that the Party is once again entering the straight road of consistent and sustained guidance of the revolutionary struggle of the socialist proletariat.

Take one of the very characteristic (by far not the most profound, of course, but probably among the most visible) external expressions of the Party crisis. I mean the flight of the intellectuals from the Party. This flight is strikingly characterised in the first issue of our Party's Central Organ,[4] which appeared in February this year. This issue, which provides a great deal of material for assessing the Party's internal life, is largely reproduced in this number. "Recently *through lack* of intellectual workers the area organisation has been dead," writes a correspondent from the Kulebaki

Works (Vladimir area organisation of the Central Industrial Region). "Our ideological forces are melting away like snow," they write from the Urals. "The elements who avoid illegal organisations in general ... and who joined the Party only at the time of the upsurge and of the *de facto* liberty that then existed in many places, have left our Party organisations." And an article in the Central Organ entitled "Questions of Organisation" sums up these reports, and others which we do not print, with the words: "The intellectuals, as is well known, have been deserting in masses in recent months."

But the liberation of the Party from the half-proletarian, half-petty-bourgeois intellectuals is beginning to awake to a *new life* the new *purely proletarian* forces accumulated during the period of the heroic struggle of the proletarian masses. That same Kulebaki organisation which was, as the quotation from the report shows, in a desperate condition—and was even quite "dead"—has been resurrected, it turns out. "Party nests among the workers [we read]* scattered in large numbers throughout the area, in most cases without any intellectual forces, without literature, even without any connection with the Party Centres, don't want to die.... The number of organised members is not decreasing but increasing.... There are no intellectuals, and the workers themselves, the most class-conscious among them, have to carry on propaganda work." And the general conclusion reached is that "in a number of places responsible work, owing to the flight of the intellectuals, is passing into the hands of the advanced workers" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, p. 28).

This reconstruction of the Party organisations on, so to speak, a different class foundation is of course a difficult thing, and it is not likely to develop without some hesitations. But it is only the first step that is difficult; and that has already been made. The Party has already entered the straight road of leadership of the working masses by advanced "intellectuals" drawn from the ranks of the workers themselves.

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Work in the trade unions and the co-operative societies, which was at first taken up gropingly, is now assuming definite shape. Two resolutions of the Central Committee, about the trade unions and the co-operative societies respectively, *both* adopted *unanimously*, were already suggested by the developing local activities. Party groups in all non-party organisations; their leadership in the spirit of the militant tasks of the proletariat, the spirit of revolutionary class struggle; "from non-party to Party ideology" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, p. 28)—this is the path upon which the working-class movement has entered in this field too. The correspondent of a Party organisation in the remote little provincial town of Minsk, reports: "The more revolutionary-minded workers are drawing apart from them [from the legal unions topsy-turvified by the administration] and are more and more sympathetic to the formation of illegal unions."

In the same direction, "from non-party to Party ideology", is developing the work in quite a different sphere, that of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. Strange though it may sound, it is a fact that we cannot all at once raise the work of our parliamentary representatives to a Party level—just as we did not all at once begin to work "in a Party way" in the co-operatives. Elected under a law which falsifies the will of the people, elected from the ranks of Social-Democrats who have preserved their legality, ranks which have thinned very greatly as a result of persecution during the first two Dumas, our Duma Social-Democrats *in effect* inevitably were at first non-party Social-Democrats rather than real members of the Party.

This is deplorable, but it is a fact—and it could hardly be otherwise in a capitalist country entangled by thousands of bonds inherited from serfdom and with a legal workers' party that has been in existence for only two years. And it was not only non-party people who wanted on this fact to base their tactics of setting up a non-revolutionary Social-Democracy, but also those "Bezzaglavtsi"[5] Social-Democrat-like intellectuals who clustered around the Duma group like flies round a honey-pot. But it seems as if the efforts of these worthy followers of Bernstein are suffering defeat! It seems as if the work of the Social-Democrats has

begun to straighten itself out in this sphere, too. We will not undertake to prophesy, nor shall we close our eyes to what vast efforts are still required to organise more or less tolerable parliamentary Social-Democratic work in our conditions. But we may note that in the first issue of the Central Organ there is Party criticism of the Duma group, and a *direct resolution* of the Central Committee about better direction for its work. We do not by any means consider that the criticism in the Central Organ covers all the defects. We think, for example, that the Social-Democrats should not have voted, either for placing the land taxes at the disposal of the Zemstvos[6] in the first instance, nor for *purchase* at a low price of urban land rented by the poor (No. 1 of the Central Organ, p. 36). But these are, comparatively speaking, minor questions. What is basic and most important is that the transformation of the Duma group into a really Party organisation now features in all our work, and that consequently the Party will achieve it, however hard this may be, and however the road may be beset with trials, vacillations, partial crises, personal clashes, etc.

Among the same signs that really Social-Democratic and genuinely Party work is being straightened out there is the obviously outstanding fact of the increase in illegal publications. "The Urals are publishing eight papers," we read in the Central Organ. "There are two in the Crimea, one in Odessa, and a paper is starting soon in Ekaterinoslav. Publishing activity in St. Petersburg, in the Caucasus and by the non-Russian organisations is considerable." In addition to the two Social-Democratic papers appearing abroad, the Central Organ has been issued in Russia, in spite of quite extraordinary police obstacles. A regional organ, *Rabocheye Znamya*,[7] will appear soon in the Central Industrial Region.

From all that has been said, one can form a quite definite picture of the path on which the Social-Democratic Party is firmly entering. A strong illegal organisation of the Party Centres, systematic illegal publications and—most important of all—local and particularly factory Party groups, led by advanced members from among the workers themselves, living in direct contact with the masses; such is the foundation on which we were building, and

have built, a hard and solid core of a revolutionary and Social-Democratic working-class movement. And this illegal core will spread *its* feelers, *its* influence, incomparably wider than ever before, both through the Duma and the trade unions, both in the co-operative societies and in the cultural and educational organisations.

At first sight there is a remarkable similarity between this system of Party work and that which was established by the Germans during the Anti-Socialist Law (1878-90).[8] The distance which the German working-class movement covered during the thirty years following the bourgeois revolution (1848-78), the Russian working-class movement is covering in three years (from the end of 1905 to 1908). But behind this outward similarity is hidden a profound inward difference. The thirty-year period which followed the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany completely fulfilled the objectively necessary tasks of *that* revolution. It fulfilled itself in the constitutional parliament of the early sixties, in dynastic wars which united the greater part of German-speaking territories, and in the creation of the Empire with the help of universal suffrage. In Russia the three years which have not yet passed since the first great victory and the first great defeat of the bourgeois-democratic revolution not only have not fulfilled its tasks but, on the contrary, have for the first time spread realisation of those tasks among *broad* masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. What has been outlived during these two odd years is constitutional illusions and belief in the democratism of the liberal lackeys of Black-Hundred[9] tsarism.

A crisis on the basis of the unfulfilled objective tasks of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is inevitable. Purely economic, specifically financial, internal political and external events, circumstances and vicissitudes may make it acute. And the party of the proletariat—having entered the straight road of building a strong illegal Social-Democratic organisation, possessed of more numerous and more varied implements for legal and semi-legal influence than before—will be able to meet that crisis more prepared for resolute struggle than it was in October and December 1905.

ON THE "NATURE" OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in at the window, exclaims the Cadet *Rech*[10] in a recent editorial. This valuable admission of the official organ of our counter-revolutionary liberals needs to be particularly emphasised, because what is referred to is the *nature* of the Russian revolution. And one cannot sufficiently insist on the force with which events are confirming the basic view of Bolshevism as to this "nature" of the *peasant* bourgeois revolution, which can win only *in opposition to* wavering, wobbling, counter-revolutionary bourgeois liberalism.

At the beginning of 1906, prior to the First Duma, Mr. Struve wrote: "The peasant in the Duma will be a Cadet." At that time this was the *bold* assertion of a liberal who *still dreamt* of re-educating the muzhik from a naïve monarchist into a supporter of the opposition. It was at a time when *Russkoye Gosudarstvo*,[11] the organ of the bureaucracy, the newspaper of the lackeys of Mr. Witte, was assuring its readers that "the muzhik will help us out", i.e., that broad representation of the peasants would prove favourable for the autocracy. Such opinions were so widespread in those days (remote days! two whole years divide us from them!) that even in the Mensheviks' speeches at the Stockholm Congress[12] kindred notes were clearly heard.

But the First Duma had dispelled these illusions of the monarchists and *the illusions of the liberals* completely. The most ignorant, undeveloped, politically virgin, unorganised muzhik proved to be *incomparably more left* than the Cadets.[13] The struggle of the Cadets against the "Trudovik spirit" and Trudovik politics[14] formed the main content of liberal "activity" during the first two Dumas. And when

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№ 27.

ЕЖЕНЕД ГАЗЕТА ВЫХОДИТЪ ПО СРЕДАМЪ

ПРОЛЕТАРІЙ

Российская Социальдемократическая Рабочая Партія.

GENEVE СРЕДА, (8 апр.) 26 МАР. 1908 г.

Органъ С.-Петербургскаго и Московскаго комитетовъ Р. С. Д. Р. П.

О „природѣ" русской революціи

Къ дебатамъ о расширеніи бюджетныхъ правъ Думы.

Front page of the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 27, March 26 (April 8), 1908, featuring Lenin's articles "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution", and "The Debate on the Extension of the Duma's Budgetary Powers"

Reduced

Front page of the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 27, March 26 (April 8), 1908, featuring Lenin's articles "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution", and "The Debate on the Extension of the Duma's Budgetary Powers"

Reduced

after the Second Duma had been dissolved, Mr. Struve—an advanced man among the liberal counter-revolutionaries—hurled his angry judgements on the Trudoviks, and proclaimed a crusade against the "intellectualist" leaders of the peasantry who were "playing at radicals", he was thereby expressing the *utter bankruptcy* of liberalism.

The experience of the two Dumas brought liberalism a complete fiasco. It *did not succeed* in "taming the muzhik". It did not succeed in making him modest, tractable, ready for compromise with the landlord autocracy. The liberalism of the bourgeois lawyers, professors and other intellectualist trash could not "adjust itself" to the "Trudovik" peasantry. It turned out to be politically and economically far *behind* them. And the whole historic significance of the first period of the Russian revolution may be summed up as follows: liberalism has *already* conclusively demonstrated its counter-revolutionary nature, its incapacity to lead the peasant revolution; the peasantry has not *yet* fully understood that it is only along the path of revolution and republic, under the guidance of the socialist proletariat, that a real victory can be won.

The bankruptcy of liberalism meant the triumph of the reactionary landlords. Today, intimidated by those reactionaries, humiliated and spat upon by them, transformed into a serf-bound accomplice of Stolypin's constitutional farce, liberalism will shed an occasional tear for the past. Of course the fight against the Trudovik spirit was hard, unbearably hard. But ... all the same ... may we not win a second time, if that spirit rises again? May we not then play the part of a broker more successfully? Did not our great and famous Pyotr Struve write, even before the revolution, that the middle parties always gained from the sharpening of the struggle between extremes?

And lo, the liberals, exhausted in struggle with the Trudoviks, are playing against the reactionaries the card of a revival of the Trudovik spirit! "The Land Bills just introduced into the Duma by the Right-wing peasants and the clergy," writes *Rech* in the same editorial, "reveal the old Trudovik spirit: Trudovik and not Cadet." "One Bill belongs to the peasants and is signed by 41 members of the Duma. The other belongs to the clergy. The former is more

radical than the latter, but the latter, too, in some respects [listen to the Cadet *Rech*!] leaves the Cadet draft of agrarian reform far behind." The liberals are obliged to admit that, after all the filtering of the electors undertaken and carried out in accordance with the notorious law of June 3, this fact (as we already noted in No. 22 of *Proletary*) is evidence not of some accident, but of the *nature* of the Russian revolution.*

The peasants, writes *Rech*, have a distributable land reserve not in the sense of a transmitting agency, "but in the sense of a permanent institution". The Cadets admit this, but modestly keep silent about the fact that they themselves, while playing up to the reactionaries and cringing to them, in the interim between the First and Second Dumas threw the distributable land reserve out of their programme (i.e., in one way or another, the recognition of land nationalisation) and adopted Gurko's[15] point of view, namely, full private ownership of the land.

The peasants, writes *Rech*, buy land at a fair valuation (i.e., in the Cadet fashion) but—and a momentous "but" this is—the valuation is to be made by the local land institutions "elected by the whole population of the locality concerned".

And once again the Cadets have to keep quiet about one aspect. They have to keep quiet about the fact that this election by the whole population obviously resembles the well-known "Trudovik" Bill in the First Duma and the Second—the Bill providing for local land committees elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. They have to keep quiet about how the liberals in the first two Dumas carried on a disgusting struggle against this Bill, which was the only possible one from a democratic point of view: how abjectly they turned and twisted, wishing *not to say* from the Duma rostrum everything they had said in their press—in the leading article of *Rech* later reprinted by Milyukov ("A Year of Struggle"), in Kutler's draft and in Chuprov's article (the Cadet "Agrarian Question", Volume 2). And what they admitted in their press was that according to their idea the

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 455-59.—*Ed.*

local land committees should consist of an equal number of representatives of the peasantry and of the landlords, with *a representative of the government* as a third party. In other words, the Cadets were betraying the muzhik to the landlord, by assuring that everywhere the latter would have the majority (the landlords plus a representative of the landlord autocracy are always in a majority against the peasants).

We quite understand the swindlers of parliamentary bourgeois liberalism *having* to keep quiet about all this. They are wrong, though, in thinking that the workers and peasants are likely to forget these most important landmarks on the road of the Russian revolution.

Even the clergy—those ultra-reactionaries, those Black-Hundred obscurantists purposely maintained by the government—have gone further than the Cadets in their agrarian Bill. Even they have begun talking about lowering the "artificially inflated prices" of land, and about a progressive land tax in which holdings not exceeding the subsistence standard would be free of tax. Why has the village priest—that policeman of official orthodoxy—proved to be *more* on the side of the peasant than the bourgeois liberal? Because the village priest has to live side by side with the peasant, to depend on him in a thousand different ways, and sometimes—as when the priests practice small-scale peasant agriculture on church land—even to be in a peasant's skin himself. The village priest will have to return from the most police-ridden Duma into his own village: and however greatly the village has been purged by Stolypin's punitive expeditions and chronic billeting of the soldiery, *there is no return to it* for those who have taken the side of the landlords. So it turns out that the most reactionary priest finds it more difficult than the enlightened lawyer and professor to betray the peasant to the landlord.

Yes, indeed! Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in at the window. The nature of the great bourgeois revolution in peasant Russia is such that only the victory of a peasant uprising, unthinkable without the proletariat as guide, is capable of bringing that revolution to victory in the teeth of the congenital counter-revolutionism of the bourgeois liberals.

It remains for the liberals either to disbelieve the strength of the Trudovik spirit—and that is impossible when the facts stare them in the face—or else to pin their faith on some new political trickery. And here is the programme of that piece of trickery in the concluding words of *Rech*: "Only serious practical provisions for this kind of reform [namely, agrarian reform "on the broadest democratic basis"] can cure the population of utopian attempts." This may be read as follows. Mr. Stolypin, Your Excellency, even with all your gallows and your June Third laws you have not "cured" the population of its "utopian Trudovik spirit". Allow us to try just once more. We shall promise the people the widest democratic reform, and in practice will "cure" them by means of buying out the land from the landlords and giving the latter a majority in the local land institutions!

On our part, we shall thank Messrs. Milyukov, Struve and Co. from the bottom of our hearts for the zeal with which they are "curing" the population of its "utopian" belief in peaceful constitutional methods. They are curing it and, in all probability, will effect a final cure.

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MARXISM AND REVISIONISM

Written not later than
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Published in 1908 in the
symposium *Karl Marx—1818-1883*
Signed: *Vl. Ilyin*

Published according
to the symposium

Written not later than
April 3 (16), 1908

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There is a well-known saying that if geometrical axioms affected human interests attempts would certainly be made to refute them. Theories of natural history which conflicted with the old prejudices of theology provoked, and still provoke, the most rabid opposition. No wonder, therefore, that the Marxian doctrine, which directly serves to enlighten and organise the advanced class in modern society, indicates the tasks facing this class and demonstrates the inevitable replacement (by virtue of economic development) of the present system by a new order—no wonder that this doctrine has had to fight for every step forward in the course of its life.

Needless to say, this applies to bourgeois science and philosophy, officially taught by official professors in order to befuddle the rising generation of the propertied classes and to "coach" it against internal and foreign enemies. This science will not even hear of Marxism, declaring that it has been refuted and annihilated. Marx is attacked with equal zest by young scholars who are making a career by refuting socialism, and by decrepit elders who are preserving the tradition of all kinds of outworn "systems". The progress of Marxism, the fact that its ideas are spreading and taking firm hold among the working class, inevitably increase the frequency and intensity of these bourgeois attacks on Marxism, which becomes stronger, more hardened and more vigorous every time it is "annihilated" by official science.

But even among doctrines connected with the struggle of the working class, and current mainly among the proletariat, Marxism by no means consolidated its position all at once. In the first half-century of its existence (from

the 1840s on) Marxism was engaged in combating theories fundamentally hostile to it. In the early forties Marx and Engels settled accounts with the radical Young Hegelians whose viewpoint was that of philosophical idealism. At the end of the forties the struggle began in the field of economic doctrine, against Proudhonism. The fifties saw the completion of this struggle in criticism of the parties and doctrines which manifested themselves in the stormy year of 1848. In the sixties the struggle shifted from the field of general theory to one closer to the direct labour movement: the ejection of Bakuninism from the International. In the early seventies the stage in Germany was occupied for a short while by the Proudhonist Mühlberger, and in the late seventies by the positivist Dühring. But the influence of both on the proletariat was already absolutely insignificant. Marxism was already gaining an unquestionable victory over all other ideologies in the labour movement.

By the nineties this victory was in the main completed. Even in the Latin countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism held their ground longest of all, the workers' parties in effect built their programmes and their tactics on Marxist foundations. The revived international organisation of the labour movement—in the shape of periodical international congresses—from the outset, and almost without a struggle, adopted the Marxist standpoint in all essentials. But after Marxism had ousted all the more or less integral doctrines hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in those doctrines began to seek other channels. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century of the existence of Marxism began (in the nineties) with the struggle of a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism itself.

Bernstein, a one-time orthodox Marxist, gave his name to this trend by coming forward with the most noise and with the most purposeful expression of amendments to Marx, revision of Marx, revisionism. Even in Russia where—owing to the economic backwardness of the country and the preponderance of a peasant population weighed down by the relics of serfdom—non-Marxist socialism has naturally held its ground longest of all, it is plainly passing into

revisionism before our very eyes. Both in the agrarian question (the programme of the municipalisation of all land) and in general questions of programme and tactics, our Social-Narodniks are more and more substituting "amendments" to Marx for the moribund and obsolescent remnants of their old system, which in its own way was integral and fundamentally hostile to Marxism.

Pre-Marxist socialism has been defeated. It is continuing the struggle, no longer on its own independent ground, but on the general ground of Marxism, as revisionism. Let us, then, examine the ideological content of revisionism.

In the sphere of philosophy revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois professorial "science". The professors went "back to Kant"—and revisionism dragged along after the neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the platitudes that priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism—and the revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word alter the latest *Handbuch*) that materialism had been "refuted" long ago. The professors treated Hegel as a "dead dog",[16] and while themselves preaching idealism, only an idealism a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and the revisionists floundered after them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarisation of science, replacing "artful" (and revolutionary) dialectics by "simple" (and tranquil) "evolution". The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and their "critical" systems to the dominant medieval "philosophy" (i.e., to theology)—and the revisionists drew close to them, trying to make religion a "private affair", not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class.

What such "amendments" to Marx really meant in class terms need not be stated: it is self-evident. We shall simply note that the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made at the present time to smuggle in

old and reactionary philosophical rubbish disguised as a criticism of Plekhanov's tactical opportunism.*

Passing to political economy, it must be noted first of all that in this sphere the "amendments" of the revisionists were much more comprehensive and circumstantial; attempts were made to influence the public by "new data on economic development". It was said that concentration and the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production do not occur in agriculture at all, while they proceed very slowly in commerce and industry. It was said that crises had now become rarer and weaker, and that cartels and trusts would probably enable capital to eliminate them altogether. It was said that the "theory of collapse" to which capitalism is heading was unsound, owing to the tendency of class antagonisms to become milder and less acute. It was said, finally, that it would not be amiss to correct Marx's theory of value, too, in accordance with Böhm-Bawerk.[17]

The fight against the revisionists on these questions resulted in as fruitful a revival of the theoretical thought in international socialism as did Engels's controversy with Dühring twenty years earlier. The arguments of the revisionists were analysed with the help of facts and figures. It was proved that the revisionists were systematically painting a rose-coloured picture of modern small-scale production. The technical and commercial superiority of large-scale *production* over small-scale production not only in industry, but also in agriculture, is proved by irrefutable facts. But commodity production is far less developed in agriculture, and modern statisticians and economists are, as a rule, not very skilful in picking out the special branches (sometimes even the operations) in agriculture which indicate that agriculture is being progressively drawn into the process of *exchange* in world economy. Small-scale produc-

* See *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. This is not the place to discuss the book, and I must at present confine myself to stating that in the very near future I shall prove in a series of articles, or in a separate pamphlet, that *everything* I have said in the text about neo-Kantian revisionists essentially applies also to these "new" neo-Humist and neo-Berkeleyan revisionists. (See present edition, Vol. 14.—*Ed.*)

tion maintains itself on the ruins of natural economy by constant worsening of diet, by chronic starvation, by lengthening of the working day, by deterioration in the quality and the care of cattle, in a word, by the very methods whereby handicraft production maintained itself against capitalist manufacture. Every advance in science and technology inevitably and relentlessly undermines the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society; and it is the task of socialist political economy to investigate this process in all its forms, often complicated and intricate, and to demonstrate to the small producer the impossibility of his holding his own under capitalism, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, and the necessity for the peasant to adopt the standpoint of the proletarian. On this question the revisionists sinned, in the scientific sense, by superficial generalisations based on facts selected one-sidedly and without reference to the system of capitalism as a whole. From the political point of view, they sinned by the fact that they inevitably, whether they wanted to or not, invited or urged the peasant to adopt the attitude of a small proprietor (i.e., the attitude of the bourgeoisie) instead of urging him to adopt the point of view of the revolutionary proletarian.

The position of revisionism was even worse as regards the theory of crises and the theory of collapse. Only for a very short time could people, and then only the most short-sighted, think of refashioning the foundations of Marx's theory under the influence of a few years of industrial boom and prosperity. Realities very soon made it clear to the revisionists that crises were not a thing of the past: prosperity was followed by a crisis. The forms, the sequence, the picture of particular crises changed, but crises remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. While uniting production, the cartels and trusts at the same time, and in a way that was obvious to all, aggravated the anarchy of production, the insecurity of existence of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thereby intensifying class antagonisms to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is heading for a break-down—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system—

has been made particularly clear, and on a particularly large scale, precisely by the new giant trusts. The recent financial crisis in America and the appalling increase of unemployment all over Europe, to say nothing of the impending industrial crisis to which many symptoms are pointing—all this has resulted in the recent "theories" of the revisionists having been forgotten by everybody, including, apparently, many of the revisionists themselves. But the lessons which this instability of the intellectuals had given the working class must not be forgotten.

As to the theory of value, it need only be said that apart from-the vaguest of hints and sighs, *à la* Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists have contributed absolutely nothing, and have therefore left no traces whatever on the development of scientific thought.

In the sphere of politics, revisionism did really try to revise the foundation of Marxism, namely, the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy and universal suffrage remove the ground for the class struggle—we were told—and render untrue the old proposition of the *Communist Manifesto* that the working men have no country. For, they said, since the "will of the majority" prevails in a democracy, one must neither regard the state as an organ of class rule, nor reject alliances with the progressive, social-reform bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.

It cannot be disputed that these arguments of the revisionists amounted to a fairly well-balanced system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal-bourgeois views. The liberals have always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions, since the right to vote and the right to participate in the government of the country are shared by all citizens without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the whole history of the Russian revolution in the early twentieth, clearly show how absurd such views are. Economic distinctions are not mitigated but aggravated and intensified under the freedom of "democratic" capitalism. Parliamentarism does not eliminate, but lays bare the innate character even of the most democratic bourgeois republics as organs of class oppression. By helping to enlighten and to organise immeasurably wider

masses of the population than those which previously took an active part in political events, parliamentarism does not make for the elimination of crises and political revolutions, but for the maximum intensification of civil war during such revolutions. The events in Paris in the spring of 1871 and the events in Russia in the winter of 1905 showed as clearly as could be how inevitably this intensification comes about. The French bourgeoisie without a moment's hesitation made a deal with the enemy of the whole nation, with the foreign army which had ruined its country, in order to crush the proletarian movement. Whoever does not understand the inevitable inner dialectics of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy—which leads to an even sharper decision of the argument by mass violence than formerly—will never be able on the basis of this parliamentarism to conduct propaganda and agitation consistent in principle, really preparing the working-class masses for victorious participation in such "arguments". The experience of alliances, agreements and blocs with the social-reform liberals in the West and with the liberal reformists (Cadets) in the Russian revolution, has convincingly shown that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they do not enhance but weaken the actual significance of their struggle, by linking fighters with elements who are least capable of fighting and most vacillating and treacherous. Millerandism in France—the biggest experiment in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, a really national scale—has provided a practical appraisal of revisionism that will never be forgotten by the proletariat all over the world.

A natural complement to the economic and political tendencies of revisionism was its attitude to the ultimate aim of the socialist movement. "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim is nothing"—this catch-phrase of Bernstein's expresses the substance of revisionism better than many long disquisitions. To determine its conduct from case to case, to adapt itself to the events of the day and to the chopping and changing of petty politics, to forget the primary interests of the proletariat and the basic features of the whole capitalist system, of all capitalist evolution, to sacrifice these primary interests for the

real or assumed advantages of the moment—such is the policy of revisionism. And it patently follows from the very nature of this policy that it may assume an infinite variety of forms, and that every more or less "new" question, every more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though it change the basic line of development only to an insignificant degree and only for the briefest period, will always inevitably give rise to one variety of revisionism or another.

The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. No thinking socialist who is in the least informed can have the slightest doubt that the relation between the orthodox and the Bernsteinians in Germany, the Guesdists and the Jaurèsists (and now particularly the Broussists) in France, the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain, Brouckère and Vandervelde in Belgium, the Integralists and the Reformists in Italy, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia, is everywhere essentially similar, notwithstanding the immense variety of national conditions and historical factors in the present state of all these countries. In reality, the "division" within the present international socialist movement is now proceeding along the *same* lines in all the various countries of the world, which testifies to a tremendous advance compared with thirty or forty years ago, when heterogeneous trends in the various countries were struggling within the one international socialist movement. And that "revisionism from the left" which has taken shape in the Latin countries as "revolutionary syndicalism",[18] is also adapting itself to Marxism, "amending" it: Labriola in Italy and Lagardelle in France frequently appeal from Marx who is understood wrongly to Marx who is understood rightly.

We cannot stop here to analyse the ideological content of *this* revisionism, which as yet is far from having developed to the same extent as opportunist revisionism: it has not yet become international, has not yet stood the test of a single big practical battle with a socialist party in any single country. We confine ourselves therefore to that "revisionism from the right" which was described above.

Wherein lies its inevitability in capitalist society? Why is it more profound than the differences of national peculiarities and of degrees of capitalist development? Because in every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are always broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors. Capitalism arose and is constantly arising out of small production. A number of new "middle strata" are inevitably brought into existence again and again by capitalism (appendages to the factory, work at home, small workshops scattered all over the country to meet the requirements of big industries, such as the bicycle and automobile industries, etc.). These new small producers are just as inevitably being cast again into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois world-outlook should again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad workers' parties. It is quite natural that this should be so and always will be so, right up to the changes of fortune that will take place in the proletarian revolution. For it would be a profound mistake to think that the "complete" proletarianisation of the majority of the population is essential for bringing about such a revolution. What we now frequently experience only in the domain of ideology, namely, disputes over theoretical amendments to Marx; what now crops up in practice only over individual side issues of the labour movement, as tactical differences with the revisionists and splits on this basis—is bound to be experienced by the working class on an incomparably larger scale when the proletarian revolution will sharpen all disputed issues, will focus all differences on points which are of the most immediate importance in determining the conduct of the masses, and will make it necessary in the heat of the fight to distinguish enemies from friends, and to cast out bad allies in order to deal decisive blows at the enemy.

The ideological struggle waged by revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which is marching forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the waverings and weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie.

ON THE BEATEN TRACK!

Assessment of the Russian revolution, i.e., of its three first years, is the topic of the day. Unless the class nature of our political parties is ascertained, unless the interests and the mutual relations of classes in our revolution are taken into account, no step forward can be made in defining the immediate aims and tactics of the proletariat. We intend in this article to draw the attention of our readers to one attempt at such an assessment.

In issue No. 3 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,[19] F. Dan and G. Plekhanov have written, the one a systematic assessment of the results of the revolution, the other summarised conclusions about the tactics of the workers' party. Dan's assessment amounts to this, that hopes of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry were bound to prove illusory. "The possibility of new revolutionary mass action of the proletariat ... depends to a great extent on the position of the bourgeoisie." "In the first stages [of such upsurge], so long as the mounting revolutionary working-class movement has not stirred up the town middle class, and the development of revolution in the towns has not lit a conflagration in the countryside—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will find themselves face to face as the principal political forces."

On the tactical conclusions to be drawn from this kind of "truth" F. Dan is obviously reticent. He was evidently ashamed to say, in so many words, what follows automatically from his statement, namely, that the working class should be recommended to adopt the famous tactics of the Mensheviks, that is, support of the bourgeoisie (recall the blocs with the Cadets, support of the watchword of a Cadet

Ministry, Plekhanov's Duma with full powers, etc.). But Plekhanov supplements Dan by ending his article in issue No. 3 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* with the words: "It would be a good thing for Russia if the Russian Marxists in 1905-06 had been able to avoid these mistakes made by Marx and Engels in Germany more than half a century ago!" (He is referring to underestimation of the capacity of capitalism at the time to develop further, and overestimation of the capacity of the proletariat for revolutionary action.)

Nothing could be clearer. Dan and Plekhanov are trying ever so carefully, not calling things directly by their proper names, to justify the Menshevik policy of proletarian dependence on the Cadets. So let us look more closely at the "theoretical case" they try to make out.

Dan argues that the "peasant movement" depends on the "growth and development of the urban revolution in its bourgeois and proletarian channels". Therefore the rise of the "urban revolution" was followed by the rise of the peasant movement, while after its decline "the internal antagonisms of the countryside, held in check by the rise of revolution, once again began to become acute", and "the government's agrarian policy, the policy of dividing the peasantry, etc., began to enjoy a relative success". Hence the conclusion we have quoted earlier—that in the first stages of the new upsurge the main political forces will be the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. "This situation," in Dan's opinion, "can and must be made use of by the proletariat for such a development of the revolution as will leave far behind the *point of departure* of the new upsurge, and will lead to the complete democratisation of society under the badge [*sic*!] of a radical [!!] solution of the agrarian question."

It is not difficult to see that this whole argument is based on a *radical* failure to understand the agrarian question in our revolution, and that this incomprehension is badly covered up by cheap and empty phrases about "complete democratisation", "under the badge" of a "solution" of the question.

F. Dan imagines that "hopes of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" depend and depended on Narodnik prejudices, on forgetting the internal antagonisms in the countryside and the individualist character of the

peasant movement. These are the usual Menshevik views, long known to everyone. But hardly anyone yet has revealed all their absurdity so strikingly as F. Dan has done in the article in question. Our most worthy publicist has contrived *not to notice* that *both* the "*solutions*" of the agrarian question which he contrasts are in keeping with the "individualist character of the peasant movement"! For the Stolypin solution, which in Dan's opinion is enjoying "relative success", is in fact founded on the individualism of the peasants. That is unquestionable. Well, and what about the other solution, which F. Dan called "radical" and bound up with "the complete democratisation of society"? Does the most worthy Dan imagine, by any chance, that it is *not founded* on the individualism of the peasants?

The trouble is that Dan's empty phrase about "the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the agrarian question" serves to conceal a radical piece of stupidity. Unthinkingly, groping like a blind man, he *bumps up* against two objectively possible, and historically not yet finally chosen, "solutions" of the agrarian question, without being able clearly and precisely to grasp the nature of *both* solutions, and the conditions in which one and other are feasible.

Why can Stolypin's agrarian policy enjoy "relative success"? Because within our peasantry capitalist development has long ago brought into being two hostile classes—a peasant bourgeoisie and a peasant proletariat. Is the complete success of Stolypin's agrarian policy possible, and if so, what does it mean? It is possible, if circumstances develop exceptionally favourably for Stolypin, and it means the "solution" of the agrarian question in bourgeois Russia in the sense of the *final* (up to the proletarian revolution) consolidation of private property over *all* the land both that of the landlords and that of the peasants. This will be a "solution" of the *Prussian* type, which will certainly ensure the capitalist development of Russia, but an incredibly slow development, endowing the Junker with authority for many years, and a thousand times more agonising for the proletariat and the peasantry than the other, objectively *possible* and also capitalist, "solution of the agrarian question".

This other solution Dan has called "radical", without thinking of what it implies. It is a cheap catchword, and there is not the very germ of an idea in it. Stolypin's solution is also very radical, since it is radically breaking up the old village commune and the old agrarian system in Russia. The real difference between the *peasant* solution of the agrarian question in the Russian bourgeois revolution, and the *Stolypin-Cadet* solution, is that the first destroys the landlords' private property in land beyond question, and peasant private property very probably (we shall not deal here with this particular question of the peasants' allotment land, because all Dan's arguments are wrong even from the standpoint of our present "municipalising" agrarian programme).

Now one may ask, is it true that this second solution is objectively possible? Beyond doubt. All thinking Marxists are in agreement on this, for *otherwise* the support by the proletariat of the small proprietor's striving to confiscate large-scale landed property would be a reactionary piece of charlatanry. In no other capitalist country will a single Marxist draw up a programme supporting the *peasants*' aspiration to confiscate large-scale landed property. In Russia both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are in agreement as to the necessity of such support. Why? Because *objectively*, for Russia *another* path of capitalist agrarian development is possible—not the "Prussian" but the "American", not the landlord-bourgeois (or Junker) but the peasant-bourgeois path.

Stolypin and the Cadets, the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, Nicholas II and Pyotr Struve are all agreed that there must be a capitalist "cleansing" of the decaying agrarian system in Russia by preserving the landed property of the landlords. All they differ on is how best to preserve it, and how much of it to preserve.

The workers and peasants, the Social-Democrats and the Narodniks (Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries included) are all agreed that there should be a *capitalist* "cleansing" of the decaying agrarian system in Russia by means of the forcible abolition of the landed property of the landlords. They differ in this, that the Social-Democrats understand the capitalist character in

present society of any agrarian revolution, however ultra-radical it may be—municipalisation and nationalisation, socialisation and division—while the Narodniks don't understand this, and wrap up their struggle for peasant-bourgeois agrarian evolution against landlord-bourgeois evolution in philistine and utopian phrases about equalisation.

All the muddle and shallow thinking of F. Dan are due to the fact that he has radically failed to understand the economic basis of the Russian bourgeois revolution. The differences between Marxist and petty-bourgeois socialism in Russia on the question of the economic content and significance of the peasants' struggle for the land in this revolution loomed so large for him that he has "*failed to notice*" the struggle of the real forces in society for one or other of the objectively possible roads in capitalist agrarian evolution. And he has covered up this complete incomprehension with phrases about the "relative success" of Stolypin and "the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the agrarian question".

Actually, the situation in regard to the agrarian question in Russia today is this. The success of Stolypin's policy would involve long years of violent suppression and extermination of a mass of peasants who refuse to starve to death and be expelled from their villages. History has known examples of the *success* of such a policy. It would be empty and foolish democratic phrase-mongering for us to say that the success of such a policy in Russia is "impossible". It is possible! But our business is to make the people see clearly at what a price such a success is won, and to fight with all our strength for another, shorter and more rapid road of capitalist agrarian development *through* a peasant revolution. A peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in a capitalist country is difficult, very difficult, but it is possible, and we must fight for it. Three years of the revolution have taught us and the whole people not only that we must fight for it but also how to fight for it. No Menshevik "methods of approach" to the policy of supporting the Cadets will drive these lessons of the revolution out of the consciousness of the workers.

To proceed. What if, in spite of the struggle of the masses, Stolypin's policy holds good long enough for the "Prussian" way to succeed? Then the agrarian system in Russia will become completely bourgeois, the big peasants will grab nearly all the allotment land, agriculture will become capitalist, and no "solution" of the agrarian question under *capitalism*—whether radical or non-radical—will be possible any more. Then Marxists who are honest with themselves will straightforwardly and openly throw all "agrarian programmes" on the scrap-heap altogether, and will say to the masses: "The workers have done all they could to give Russia not a Junker but an American capitalism. The workers call you now to join in the social revolution of the proletariat, for *after* the 'solution' of the agrarian question in the Stolypin spirit *there can be no other* revolution capable of making a serious change in the economic conditions of life of the peasant masses."

That is how the question of the relationship between a bourgeois and a socialist revolution in Russia stands today—a question muddled up particularly by Dan in his German version of his Russian article (*Neue Zeit*,[20] No. 27).

Bourgeois revolutions are possible, even inevitable, in Russia as well on the basis of Stolypin-Cadet agrarian policies. But in *such* revolutions, as in the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, there could be no question of "the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the agrarian question". Or, more precisely, in such revolutions only petty-bourgeois quasi-Socialists will still babble about a "solution" (and especially a "radical" solution) of an agrarian question which has already been solved in a country where capitalism is fully developed.

But in Russia a capitalist agrarian system is very far as yet from having been developed. This is clear not only to us, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, not only for people who sympathise with the revolution and hope that it may rise again; it is clear even to such consistent, conscious and frankly outspoken enemies of the revolution and friends of the Black-Hundred autocracy as Mr. Pyotr Struve. If he "cries with a loud voice" that we need a Bismarck, that we need the transformation of reaction into revolution

from above, it is because Struve sees in Russia *neither* a Bismarck *nor* revolution from above. Struve sees that the Stolypin reaction and a thousand gallows alone are not enough to create a landlord-bourgeois Russia, made safe for the *Knecht*. You need something more, something like the solution (albeit a Bismarckian solution) of the historic tasks of the nation, like the unification of Germany, the introduction of universal suffrage. But Stolypin can only unite Dumbadze with the heroes of the Riga museum![21] He even *has to* abolish the franchise introduced by Witte under the law of December 11, 1905![22] Instead of peasants contented with Dan's "relative success" of the agrarian policy, Stolypin is forced to hear "Trudovik" demands put forward even by the peasant deputies of the Third Duma!

How can Pyotr Struve, then, not "cry with a loud voice", not groan and weep, when he sees clearly that *it isn't working*—that we are still not getting anything like a well-regulated, modest, moderate and precise, curtailed but stable "constitution"?

Struve knows very well where he is going. But F. Dan has learned nothing and forgotten nothing during the three years of revolution. He is still, like a blind man, seeking to drag the proletariat under the wing of the Struves. He is still muttering the same reactionary Menshevik speeches about our proletariat and bourgeoisie being able to appear as "the principal political forces" ... against whom, most worthy Dan? Against Guchkov, or against the monarchy?

The incredible lengths to which Dan goes here in painting the liberals in rosy colours is revealed by his German article He is not ashamed even to tell the German public that in the Third Duma the petty bourgeoisie in the towns chose "progressive electors" (meaning the Cadets) while the peasants gave 40 per cent of reactionary electors! Long live the "progressive" Milyukovs and Struves, applauding Stolypin! Long live the alliance of the Dans and the Milyukovs against the "reactionary" peasants, displaying their Trudovik spirit in the Third Duma!

And Plekhanov falsifies Engels to serve the purpose of the same reactionary Menshevik theories. Engels said that

the tactics of Marx in 1848 were *correct*, that they and only they really provided reliable, firm and unforgettable lessons for the proletariat. Engels said that these tactics were unsuccessful *in spite of* their being the only correct tactics. They were unsuccessful because the proletariat was insufficiently prepared, and capitalism was insufficiently developed.[23] While Plekhanov, as though he were trying to make fun of Engels, as though to gladden the heart of the Bernsteins and the Streltsovs,[24] interprets Engels as though he "regretted" Marx's tactics, as though he later admitted them to be mistaken, and declared his preference for the tactics of supporting the German Cadets!

Will not G. Plekhanov tomorrow tell us that in regard to the risings in 1849 Engels came to the conclusion that "they should not have taken to arms"?

Marx and Engels taught the proletariat revolutionary tactics, the tactics of developing the struggle to its very highest forms, the tactics which rally the peasantry behind the proletariat—and not the proletariat behind the liberal traitors.

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A BLOC OF THE CADETS AND THE OCTOBRISTS?

A private telegram from St. Petersburg to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*[25] of April 1 (14) states: "Since the end of March secret negotiations have been going on between the Octobrists,[26] the moderate Rights, the Cadets and the Party of Peaceful Renovation[27] about whether they can form a *bloc*. The plan was initiated by the Octobrists, who can no longer count on the support of the extreme Right. The latter, particularly dissatisfied with the Octobrists on account of their interpellation regarding Dumbadze, intend to vote with the opposition against the Centre. Such a manoeuvre would render difficult the work of the Duma since a combination of the extreme Right and the opposition would command 217 votes against the 223 of the Centre and moderate Rights. The first talk (about a bloc) took place on April 12 (March 30, O. S.), and was attended by 30 representatives, chosen on a proportional basis. The talks led to no result, and it was decided to hold a new consultation during the coming week."

How reliable this information may be, we do not know. In any case the silence of the Russian newspapers does not prove that it is wrong, and we think it necessary to inform our readers about this report in the foreign press.

In principle there is nothing incredible in the fact that secret negotiations are going on. By all their political history, beginning with Struve's visit to Witte in November 1905, continuing with the backstairs talks with Trepov and Co. in the summer of 1906,[28] and so forth and so on, the Cadets have *proved* that the essence of their tactics

is to slip in at the backdoor for talks with those in power. But even if this report about negotiations proved to be untrue, it remains beyond doubt that *in practice* in the Third Duma there *exists* a tacit bloc of the Cadets and the Octobrists on the basis of the former taking a turn to the right. A number of Cadet votes in the Third Duma have proved this irrefutably, quite apart from the Cadet speeches and the character of their political activities.

In the Third Duma, we said even before it had been convened, there are *two* majorities (see *Proletary* and the resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1907).* And we were already demonstrating then that to evade recognition of this fact, as the Mensheviks were doing, and above all to evade a *class* description of the *Cadet-Octobrist* majority, means to let oneself be dragged at the tail of bourgeois liberalism.

The class nature of the Cadets is showing itself more and more clearly. Those who would not see this in 1906 are being obliged by facts to *recognise* it today, or else sink completely into opportunism.

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 123-32 and 144-46.—*Ed.*

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION[29]

No one in Russia would now dream of making a revolution according to Marx. This, or approximately this, was recently announced by a liberal—even an almost democratic—even an almost Social-Democratic—(Menshevik) paper, *Stolichnaya Pochta*.[30] And to be quite fair to the authors of this pronouncement, they have successfully caught the *essence* of the current political mood and of the attitude to the lessons of our revolution which undoubtedly prevail among the widest circles of the intellectuals, half-educated philistines and probably in many sections of the quite uneducated petty bourgeoisie as well.

This pronouncement does not only express hatred of Marxism in general, with its unswerving conviction of the revolutionary mission of the proletariat and its wholehearted readiness to support any revolutionary movement of the masses, to sharpen their struggle and to go through with it. It expresses also hatred of the methods of struggle, the forms of action, and the tactics which have been tested *quite recently* in the *actual practice* of the Russian revolution. All those victories—or half-victories, quarter-victories, rather—which our revolution won, were achieved entirely and exclusively thanks to the direct revolutionary onset of the proletariat, which was marching at the head of the non-proletarian elements of the working people. All the defeats were due to the weakening of such an onset, to the tactics of avoiding it, tactics based on the absence of it, and sometimes (among the Cadets) on directly seeking to eliminate it.

And today, in the period of sweeping counter-revolutionary repressions, the philistines are adapting themselves

in cowardly fashion to the new masters, currying favour with the new caliphs for an hour, renouncing the past, trying to forget it, to persuade themselves and others that no one in Russia now dreams of making a revolution according to Marx, no one is dreaming of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and *so forth*.

In other revolutions of the bourgeoisie, the physical victory of the old authorities over the insurgent people always aroused despondency and demoralisation among wide circles of "educated" society. But among the bourgeois parties which had made a real fight for liberty, which had played any appreciable part in real revolutionary events, there were always to be traced illusions the reverse of those which now prevail among the intellectualist petty bourgeoisie in Russia. They were illusions about an inevitable, immediate *and* complete victory of "liberty, equality and fraternity", illusions about a republic not of the bourgeoisie but of all humanity, a republic which would introduce peace on earth and good will among men. They were illusions about the absence of class differences within the people oppressed by the monarchy and the medieval order of things, about the impossibility of conquering an "idea" by methods of violence, about the absolutely opposite nature of the feudalism that had outlived its day and the new free democratic republican system, the bourgeois nature of which was not realised at all, or was realised only very vaguely.

Therefore in periods of counter-revolution representatives of the proletariat who had worked their way through to the standpoint of scientific socialism had to fight (as, for example, Marx and Engels did in 1850) against the illusions of the bourgeois republicans, against an idealist conception of the traditions of the revolution and of its essence, against superficial phrases which were replacing consistent and serious work within a definite class.[31] But in Russia the exact opposite prevails. We don't see any illusions of primitive republicanism hindering the essential work of continuing revolutionary activity in the new and changed conditions. We see no *exaggeration* of the meaning of a republic, the transformation of this essential watchword of the struggle against feudalism and the monarchy into

a watchword of each and every struggle for the liberation of all those that work and are exploited. The Socialist-Revolutionaries[32] and the groups akin to them, who were encouraging ideas *similar* to these, have remained a mere handful, and the period of the three years' revolutionary storm (1905-07) has brought them—instead of widespread enthusiasm for republicanism—a new party of the *opportunist* petty bourgeoisie, the Popular Socialists, a new increase in anti-political rebelliousness and anarchism.

In petty-bourgeois Germany, the day after the first onset of the revolution in 1848 the illusions prevalent among the petty-bourgeois republican democrats were strikingly in evidence. In petty-bourgeois Russia, on the day after the onset of the revolution in 1905, there was striking evidence, and there is still evidence, of the illusions of petty-bourgeois opportunism, which hoped to achieve a compromise without a struggle, feared a struggle and after the first defeat hastened to renounce its own past, poisoning the public atmosphere with despondence, faint-heartedness and apostasy.

Evidently this difference arises from the difference in the social system and in the historical circumstances of the two revolutions. But it is not a question of the mass of the petty-bourgeois population in Russia finding itself in less sharp opposition to the old order. Just the reverse. Our peasantry in the very first stage of the Russian revolution brought into being an agrarian movement incomparably more powerful, definite, and politically conscious than those that arose in the previous bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century. The trouble is that the social stratum which formed the core of the revolutionary democrats in Europe—the master craftsmen in the towns, the urban bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie—*were bound* in Russia to turn to counter-revolutionary liberalism. The class-consciousness of the socialist proletariat, moving hand in hand with the international army of socialist revolution in Europe, the extreme revolutionary spirit of the muzhik, driven by the age-old yoke of the feudal-minded landlords to a state of utter desperation and to the demand for confiscation of the landed estates—these are the circumstances which threw Russian liberalism into the arms of counter-

revolution much more powerfully than ever they did the liberals of Europe. And therefore on the Russian working class there has devolved with particular force the task of preserving the traditions of revolutionary struggle which the intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie are hastening to renounce, developing and strengthening these traditions, imbuing with them the consciousness of the great mass of the people, and carrying them forward to the next inevitable upsurge of the democratic movement.

The workers themselves are spontaneously carrying on just such a struggle. Too passionately did they live through the great struggle in October and December. Too clearly did they see the change which took place in their condition *only* as a result of that direct revolutionary struggle. They talk now, or at any rate they all feel, like that weaver who said in a letter to his trade union journal: "The factory owners have taken away what we won, the foremen are once again bullying us, *just wait*, *1905 will come again*."

Just wait, 1905 will come again. That is how the workers look at things. For them that year of struggle provided a model of *what has to be done*. For the intellectuals and the renegading petty bourgeois it was the "insane year", a model of *what should not be done*. For the proletariat, the working over and critical acceptance of the experience of the revolution must consist in learning how to apply the *then* methods of struggle *more successfully*, so as to make the same October strike struggle and December armed struggle more massive, more concentrated and more conscious. For counter-revolutionary liberalism, which leads the renegading intelligentsia on a halter, assimilating the experience of the revolution is bound to consist in finishing for ever with the "naïve" impulsiveness of "untamed" mass struggle, and replacing it by "cultured and civilised" *constitutional* work, on the basis of Stolypin's "constitutionalism".

Today all and sundry are talking about the assimilation and critical evaluation of the experience of the revolution. Socialists and liberals talk about it. Opportunists and revolutionary Social-Democrats talk about it. But not all understand that it is between the two opposites *abovementioned* that all the multiform recipes for assimilation of the experience of the revolution fluctuate. Not all put

the question clearly: is it the experience of the revolutionary struggle which we must assimilate, and help the masses to assimilate, for the purpose of a more consistent, stubborn and resolute fight; or is it the "experiment" of Cadet betrayal of the revolution that we must assimilate and pass on to the masses?

Karl Kautsky has approached this question in its fundamental theoretical aspect. In the second edition of his well-known work *The Social Revolution*, which has been translated into all the principal European languages, he made a number of additions and amendments touching on the experience of the Russian revolution. The preface to the second edition is dated October 1906: therefore the author already had the material to judge, not only of the *Sturm und Drang* of 1905, but also of the chief events in the "Cadet period" of our revolution, the period of universal (almost universal) enthusiasm over the electoral victories of the Cadets and the First Duma.

What problems in the experience of the Russian revolution, then, did Kautsky consider sufficiently outstanding and basic, or at least sufficiently important to provide *new* material for a Marxist studying *in general* "the forms and weapons of the social revolution" (the heading to paragraph seven in Kautsky's work, as supplemented in keeping with the experience of 1905-06)?

The author has taken two questions.

First, the question of the class composition of the forces which are *capable* of winning victory in the Russian revolution, making it a really victorious revolution.

Secondly, the question of the importance of those higher forms of mass struggle—higher in the direction of their revolutionary energy and in their aggressive character—which the Russian revolution brought forth, namely, the struggle in December, i.e., the armed uprising.

Any socialist (and especially a Marxist) studying at all attentively the events of the Russian revolution is bound to recognise that these really are the root and fundamental questions in assessing the Russian revolution, and also in assessing the line of tactics dictated to a workers' party by the present state of affairs. Unless we fully and clearly realise what classes are *capable*, in the light of objective

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

economic conditions, of making the Russian bourgeois revolution victorious, all our words about seeking to make that revolution victorious will be empty phrases, mere democratic declamation, while our tactics in the bourgeois revolution will inevitably be unprincipled and wavering.

On the other hand, in order concretely to determine the tactics of a revolutionary party at the stormiest moments of the general crisis which the country is living through, it is obviously insufficient merely to indicate the classes capable of *acting* in the spirit of a victorious completion of the revolution. Revolutionary periods are distinguished from periods of so-called peaceful development, periods when economic conditions do not give rise to profound crises or powerful mass movements, precisely in this: that the *forms* of struggle in periods of the first type inevitably are *much more varied*, and the direct revolutionary struggle of the masses predominates rather than the propaganda and agitation activities conducted by leaders in parliament, in the press, etc. Therefore if, in assessing revolutionary periods, we confine ourselves to defining the *line* of activity of the various classes, without analysing the *forms* of their struggle, our discussion in the scientific sense will be incomplete and undialectical, while from the standpoint of practical politics it will degenerate into the *dead letter of the raisoneur* (with which, we may say in parenthesis, comrade Plekhanov contents himself in nine-tenths of his writings on Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution).

In order to make a genuinely Marxist assessment of the revolution, from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, it has to be assessed as the struggle of live social forces, placed in particular objective conditions, acting in a particular way and applying with greater or less success particular forms of struggle. It is on the basis of such an analysis, and only on that basis of course, that it is appropriate and indeed essential for a Marxist to assess the *technical* side of the struggle, the technical questions which arise in its course. To recognise a definite form of struggle and not to recognise the necessity of studying its technique, is like recognising the necessity of taking part in *particular* elections while ignoring the law which lays down the technique of *these* elections.

Let us go on now to the reply given by Kautsky to both the above-stated questions, which, as we know, aroused a very prolonged and heated dispute among the Russian Social-Democrats *throughout* the revolution, beginning with the spring of 1905, when the Bolshevik Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London[33] and the simultaneous Menshevik conference in Geneva laid down the basic principles of their tactics in precise resolutions, and ending with the London Congress of the United R.S.D.L.P. in the spring of 1907.[34]

To the first question Kautsky gives the following reply. In Western Europe, he says, the proletariat constitutes the great mass of the population. Therefore the victory of democracy in present-day Europe means the political supremacy of the proletariat. "In Russia, with her predominantly peasant population, this cannot be expected. Of course, the victory of Social-Democracy in the foreseeable (in German, *absehbar*) future is not ruled out in Russia either: but that victory could be only the result of an alliance (*Koalition*) of the proletariat and the peasantry." And Kautsky even expresses the opinion that such a victory would inevitably give a tremendous impetus to proletarian revolution in Western Europe.

Thus we see that the concept of bourgeois revolution is not a sufficient definition of the forces which may achieve victory in such a revolution. Bourgeois revolutions are possible, and have occurred, in which the commercial, or commercial and industrial, bourgeoisie played the part of the chief motive force. The victory of such revolutions was possible as the victory of the appropriate section of the bourgeoisie over its adversaries (such as the privileged nobility or the absolute monarchy). In Russia things are different. The victory of the bourgeois revolution is impossible in our country *as the victory of the bourgeoisie*. This sounds paradoxical, but it is a fact. The preponderance of the peasant population, its terrible oppression by the semi-feudal big landowning system, the strength and class-consciousness of the proletariat already organised in a socialist party—all these circumstances impart to *our* bourgeois revolution a *specific* character. This peculiarity does not eliminate the bourgeois character of the revo-

lution (as Martov and Plekhanov attempted to present the case in their more than lame remarks on Kautsky's attitude). It only determines the counter-revolutionary character of our bourgeoisie and the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry for victory *in such* a revolution. For a "coalition of the proletariat and the peasantry", winning *victory* in a bourgeois revolution, happens to be nothing else than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

This proposition is the point of departure of the tactical differences which arose in the ranks of the Social-Democrats during the revolution. Only if this is taken into account can one understand all the disputes on particular questions (support of the Cadets in general, a Left bloc and its character, etc.) and the clashes in individual cases. It is only this basic tactical divergence—and not at all the question of "boyevism"[35] or "boycottism", as uninformed people sometimes think—that is the *source* of the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in the first period of the revolution (1905-07).

And one cannot sufficiently urge the necessity of studying this source of the differences with every attention, and of examining *from this point of view* the experience of the First and Second Dumas and of the direct struggle of the peasantry. If we don't do this work *now*, we shall not be able to take a single step in the tactical field, when the next upsurge comes, without awakening old disputes or creating group conflicts and dissensions within the Party. The attitude of Social-Democracy to liberalism and to peasant bourgeois democracy must be determined on the basis of the experience of the Russian revolution. Otherwise we shall have no principle or consistency in the tactics of the proletariat. "The alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry", let us note in passing, should not in any circumstances be understood as meaning the fusion of various classes, or of the parties of the proletariat and the peasantry. Not only fusion, but any prolonged agreement would be destructive for the socialist party of the working class, and would *enfeeble* the revolutionary-democratic struggle. That the peasantry inevitably avers between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat follows from its position as a class;

and our revolution has provided many examples of this in the most varied fields of struggle (the boycott of the Witte Duma; the elections; the Trudoviks in the First and Second Dumas, etc.). Only if it pursues an unquestionably independent policy as vanguard of the revolution will the proletariat be able to split the peasantry away from the liberals, rid it of their influence, rally the peasantry behind it in the struggle and thus bring about an "alliance" *de facto*—one that emerges and becomes effective, when and to the extent that the peasantry are conducting a revolutionary fight. It is not flirtations with the Trudoviks, but merciless criticism of their weaknesses and vacillations, the propaganda of the idea of a republican and revolutionary peasant party, that can give effect to the "alliance" of the proletariat and the peasantry for *victory* over their common enemies, and not for playing at blocs and agreements.

This specific character of the Russian bourgeois revolution which we have pointed out distinguishes it from the other bourgeois revolutions of modern times, but identifies it with the *great* bourgeois revolutions of former times, when the peasantry played an outstanding revolutionary part. In this respect the greatest attention should be paid to what Frederick Engels wrote in his remarkably profound and thought-stimulating article "On Historical Materialism" (the English introduction to *Socialism*: *Utopian and Scientific*, translated into German by Engels himself in *Neue Zeit*, 1892-93, 11th year, Vol. 1). "Curiously enough," says Engels, "in all the three great bourgeois risings [the Reformation in Germany and the Peasant War in the sixteenth century; the English revolution in the seventeenth century; the French revolution in the eighteenth century] the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting; and the peasantry is just the class that, the victory once gained, is most surely ruined by the economic consequences of that victory. A hundred years after Cromwell, the yeomanry of England had almost disappeared. Anyhow, had it not been for that yeomanry and for the plebeian element in the towns, the bourgeoisie alone would never have fought the matter out to the bitter end, and would never have brought Charles I to the scaffold. In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for

gathering at the time, the revolution had to be carried considerably further exactly as in 1793 in France and 1848 in Germany. This seems, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society." And in another passage in the same article Engels points out that the French revolution was the first uprising "that was really fought out up to the destruction of one of the combatants, the aristocracy, and the complete triumph of the other, the bourgeoisie".[36]

Both these historical observations or general conclusions by Engels have been remarkably confirmed in the course of the Russian revolution. It has also been confirmed that only the intervention of the peasantry and the proletariat—"the plebeian element in the towns"—is capable of substantially pushing forward the bourgeois revolution. (Whereas in sixteenth-century Germany, seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France the peasantry could be put in the front rank, in twentieth-century Russia the order must decidedly be reversed, since without the initiative and guidance of the proletariat the peasantry counts for nothing.) It has also been confirmed that the revolution must be taken *very much further* than its direct, immediate and already fully-matured bourgeois aims, if *those* aims are really to be achieved, and if even minimum bourgeois conquests are to be irreversibly consolidated. We can judge therefore with what scorn Engels would have treated the philistine recipes for squeezing the revolution beforehand into a directly bourgeois, narrowly bourgeois framework—in order not to frighten off the bourgeoisie", as the Mensheviks in the Caucasus said in their 1905 resolution, or in order that there should be "a guarantee against a restoration", as Plekhanov said in Stockholm.

Kautsky discusses the other question, the assessment of the insurrection of December 1905, in the preface to the second edition of his booklet. He writes: "I can now no longer assert as definitely as I did in, 1902 that armed uprisings and barricade fighting will not play the decisive part in the coming revolutions. Too clear evidence to the contrary is provided by the experience of the street battles in Moscow, when a handful of men held up a whole army for a week in barricade fighting, and would have almost gained the victory, had not the failure of the revolutionary

movement in other cities made it possible to dispatch such reinforcements to the army that in the end a monstrously superior force was concentrated against the insurgents. Of course, this relative success of the struggle on the barricades was possible only because the city population energetically supported the revolutionaries, while the troops were completely demoralised. But who can affirm with certainty that something similar is impossible in Western Europe?"

And so, nearly a year after the insurrection, when there could be no question of any desire to cheer the spirits of the fighting men, such a careful investigator as Kautsky firmly recognises that the Moscow insurrection represents a "relative success" of struggle on the barricades, and thinks it necessary to amend his previous general conclusion that the role of street battles in future revolutions cannot be a great one.

The struggle of December 1905 *proved* that armed uprising *can* be victorious in modern conditions of military technique and military organisation. As a result of the December struggle the whole international labour movement must henceforth reckon with the probability of similar forms of fighting in the coming proletarian revolutions. These are the conclusions which really follow from the experience of our revolution: these are the lessons which the broadest masses of the people should assimilate. How remote are these conclusions and these lessons from that *line* of argument which Plekhanov opened up by his famous Herostratean comment on the December insurrection: "They should not have taken to arms." What an ocean of renegade comment was called forth by that assessment! What an endless number of dirty liberal hands seized upon it, in order to carry demoralisation and a spirit of petty-bourgeois compromise into the ranks of the workers!

There is not a grain of historical truth in Plekhanov's assessment. If Marx, who had said six months before the Commune that an insurrection would be madness, nevertheless was able to sum up that "madness" as the greatest mass movement of the proletariat in the nineteenth century, then with a thousand times more justification must the Russian Social-Democrats inspire the masses with the con-

viction that the December struggle was the most essential, the most legitimate, the greatest proletarian movement since the Commune. And the working class of Russia will be trained up in such views, whatever individual intellectuals in the ranks of Social-Democracy may say, and however loudly they may lament.

Here perhaps one remark is necessary, bearing in mind that this article is being written for the Polish comrades. Not being familiar, to my regret, with the Polish language, I know Polish conditions only by hearsay. And it may be easy to retort that it is precisely in Poland that a whole party strangled itself by impotent guerrilla warfare, terrorism and fireworky outbreaks, and those precisely in the name of rebel traditions and a joint struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry (the so-called Right wing in the Polish Socialist Party[37]). It may very well be that from this standpoint Polish conditions do in fact radically differ from conditions in the rest of the Russian Empire. I cannot judge of this. I must say, however, that nowhere except in Poland have we seen such a senseless departure from revolutionary tactics, one that has aroused justified resistance and opposition. And here the thought arises unbidden: why, it was precisely in Poland that there was no mass armed struggle in December 1905! And is it not for this very reason that in Poland, and only in Poland, the distorted and senseless tactics of revolution-"making" anarchism have found their home, and that conditions did not permit of the development there of mass armed struggle, were it only for a short time? Is it not the tradition of just *such* a struggle, the tradition of the December armed uprising, that is at times the only serious means of overcoming anarchist tendencies within the workers' party—not by means of hackneyed, philistine, petty-bourgeois moralising, but by turning from aimless, senseless, sporadic acts of violence to purposeful, mass violence, linked with the broad movement and the sharpening of the direct proletarian struggle?

The question of evaluating our revolution is important not only theoretically by any means. It is important directly, practically, in the everyday sense. All our work of propaganda, agitation and organisation is indissolubly bound

up at the present time with the process of the assimilation of the lessons of these three great years by the widest mass of the working class and the semi-proletarian population. We cannot now confine ourselves to the bare statement (in the spirit of the resolutions adopted by the Tenth Congress of the P.S.P. Left wing) that the data available do not allow us to determine at present whether it is the path of revolutionary explosion or the path of long, slow, tiny steps forward that lies ahead of us. Of course, no statistics in the world can at present lay that down. Of course, we must carry on our work in such a way that it should be all imbued with a general *socialist* spirit and content, whatever painful trials the future has in store. But that is not all. To halt at this point means not to give any effective leadership to the proletarian party. We must frankly put and firmly answer the question, in what direction will we now proceed to assimilate the experience of the three years of revolution? We must proclaim openly, for all to hear, for the behoof of the wavering and feeble in spirit, to shame those who are turning renegade and deserting socialism, that the workers' party sees in the direct revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the October and December struggles of 1905, the greatest movements of the proletariat since the Commune; that only in the development of such forms of struggle lies the pledge of coming successes of the revolution; and that these examples of struggle must serve as a beacon for us in training up new generations of fighters.

Carrying on our daily work in that direction, and remembering that only years of serious and consistent preparatory activity ensured the Party its full influence on the proletariat in 1905, we shall be able to reach the point that, whatever the turn of events and the rate of disintegration of the autocracy, the working class will continue to grow stronger and develop into a class-conscious, revolutionary Social-Democratic force.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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CADETS OF THE SECOND GENERATION

The report from Russia printed in this issue under the heading of "News from the Intellectuals", deserves the particular attention of the reader. Just before our paper appeared, we received confirmation of the facts about which our correspondent writes, and must dwell on them in greater detail.

A new political organisation is coming into existence. The social movement is taking a new turn. There is a grouping of elements among the bourgeois democrats who want to be "more left than the Cadets", and who are attracting Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. It seems as though some dim realisation is breaking through that the Cadet opposition in the Third Duma is a decaying corpse, and that "something must be done" apart from it.

Such are the facts. They are anything but conspicuously definite as yet, but they already anticipate events that are understandable and inevitable from the standpoint of the lessons provided by the first three years of the revolution.

The Cadets of the first generation appeared on the open stage of the revolution in the spring of 1905. They have managed during this period of nearly three years to fade without ever having blossomed. Now they are being replaced by Cadets of the second generation. What is the meaning of this generation, and with what problems does it face the workers' party?

The Cadets of the first generation made a noise at their banquets in 1904, carried on the Zemstvo campaign,[38] and expressed the beginnings of the social upswing at a time when relations between the various classes and the

autocracy, and among themselves, were still quite undetermined, i.e., up to the time when the open struggle of the masses and the policy of classes, not of little groups, determined those relations. The Cadets at that time grouped together all sorts of elements in bourgeois, so-called educated society, beginning with the landlord who was not so keen on a constitution as he was on getting a slice of cake for himself, and ending with the working, salaried intellectuals. The Cadets were preparing to act as *mediators* between the "historic authorities", i.e., the tsarist autocracy, and the struggling masses of the working class and the peasantry. The deputation to the tsar in the summer of 1905 was the beginning of this toadyism—for the Russian liberals understand no other form of mediation than toadyism. And since then there has literally not been a single, at all important, stage of the Russian revolution when the bourgeois liberals did not "mediate" by the same method of toadying to the autocracy and to the servants of the Black-Hundred landlord clique. In August 1905 they opposed the revolutionary tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma. In October 1905 they formed the openly counter-revolutionary party of the Octobrists, while at the same time sending Pyotr Struve into Witte's ante-room and preaching moderation and accurate behaviour. In November 1905 they condemned the post and telegraph workers' strike and voiced their condolences at the "horrors" of the soldiers' revolts. In December 1905 they fearfully stuck close to Dubasov,[39] in order next day to hit out against (perhaps one ought to say, to take a kick at) "the madness". At the beginning of 1906 they hotly defended themselves against the "shameful" suspicion that they were capable of campaigning abroad against the 1,000-million ruble loan to strengthen the autocracy. In the First Duma the liberals mouthed phrases about the people's freedom, while on the sly they ran to Trepov's backdoor and fought the Trudoviks and the workers' deputies. By the Vyborg Manifesto[40] they sought to kill two birds with one stone, manoeuvring in such a way that their behaviour could be interpreted, as the occasion required, either in the spirit of support of the revolution or in the spirit of fighting the revolution. Needless to speak of the Second and Third Dumas, where

the liberalism of the Cadets stood revealed in its true Octobrist colours.

During these three years the Cadets have done their job so thoroughly that attempts at a new revival are linked from the very outset with the slogan "more left than the Cadets"! The Cadets of the first generation have *made themselves impossible*. They have buried themselves by their continuous betrayal of the people's freedom.

But are not the Cadets of the second generation, who are replacing those of the first, infected with the same poison of putrefaction? Are not the "Social-Cadets", the Popular Socialist gentry, who are making a particular fuss around the new organisation, intending to repeat the old evolution of which we have had three years' experience?

One has to answer this question not with guesses about the future but by analysis of the past. And this analysis irrefutably shows that the "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks", the Popular Socialist gentry, really did play the part of Cadets in that Trudovik, peasant political organisation—or to be more accurate, political movement—in which they were functioning in their "heydays", for example in the period of the First Duma. Remember the main facts in the history of the "party" (group?) of Popular Socialists in the Russian revolution. They received their baptism in the *Osvobozhdeniye* League.[41] At the congress of the S.R. party in December 1905 they, wavering eternally between the Cadets and the S.R.s, took a stupid middle-of-the-road stand, wishing to be both together with and separate from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. During the period of liberties in October they ran their political newspapers in a bloc with the S.R.s. And the same in the period of the First Duma—"high" diplomacy, "skilful" concealment of differences from the eyes of the world ! After the dissolution of the First Duma, after the failure of the second wave of insurrections, after the suppression of the Sveaborg rising,[42] these gentlemen *take their decision*—to turn to the right. They "legalise" their party, for no other purpose, naturally, than to denounce the idea of insurrection quite legally in the press, and to prove the untimeliness of active republican propaganda. In face of the peasant deputies in the First Duma they win a

victory over the Socialist-Revolutionaries, collecting 104 signatures to their Land Bill[43] as against the 33 for the S.R. Bill.[44] The "sober" bourgeois aspirations of the peasant small proprietor for nationalisation of the land get the upper hand over the vagueness of "socialisation". Instead of striving for the political and revolutionary organisation of the peasants, organisation for insurrection, we see the Social-Cadets striving to play at legality and parliamentarism, striving towards the parochialism of the intellectualist circles. The wavering of the Russian peasant between the Cadet and the intellectualist Popular Socialist opportunist on the one hand, and the intellectually unsteadfast revolutionary S.R. on the other, reflects the dual position of the petty tiller of the soil, his incapacity for conducting a consistent class struggle without guidance by the proletariat.

And if today the Popular Socialist gentlemen are once again beginning their "affair" without the Left Cadets, dragging in their wake the slow-witted Mensheviks and S.R.s, this means that the whole lot of them have learned nothing during the three years of the revolution. They say that economic demands lead to disunity. They want to unite on the basis of more immediate demands—political demands. They have understood absolutely nothing in the course of the revolution, which in Russia, as in other countries, has demonstrated that only the mass struggle is strong, and that such a struggle can develop only in the name of serious economic changes.

That the Mensheviks and the S.R.s keep trailing after the Left Cadets is no news. This happened at the elections to the Second Duma in St. Petersburg. This happened on the question of a Cadet Ministry and a Duma with full powers, with some of them, and on the question of a secret bloc with the Popular Socialists with others. There are evidently profound reasons which rouse among the petty-bourgeois intellectuals "a passion akin to sickness", a passion for coming under the wing of the liberal bourgeoisie.

They cover up this passion, of course, in the usual way—with speeches about making use of the revival, or new grouping of forces, and so forth.

To be sure, gentlemen, we also stand for making use ... of a corpse—only not for its "revival", but to fertilise the

soil with it; not to encourage rotten theories and philistine moods, but that it may play the part of "devil's advocate". We shall use this new, good, excellent example of the Popular Socialists and the Left Cadets to teach the people, to teach them what not to do, and how to avoid Cadet treachery and petty-bourgeois flabbiness. We shall closely follow the growth and development of this new little freak (if it is not still-born), hourly reminding people that every such foetus, *if not still-born*, inevitably and unavoidably signifies in present-day Russia the heralding of the mass struggle of the working class and the peasantry. The *Osvobozhdeniye* League is being reborn. If that is so, it means that the people at the top are beginning to anticipate something: and if that is so, it means that after the beginning will come the continuation, after the fussing of the intellectuals will come the proletarian struggle.

And it is the lessons of struggle, the lessons of revolutionary alignment only in struggle and only with the peasant masses fighting for revolution, that we shall teach the people, in connection with the appearance on the stage of the Cadets of the second generation.

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN RUSSIA TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY[45]

First published in 1918 as
a separate pamphlet
by the *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers

Published according
to the pamphlet text

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN RUSSIA TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY[46]

First published in 1918 as
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Published according
to the pamphlet text

The object of this article is to give a brief outline of the sum total of the social and economic relations in Russian agriculture. A work of this kind cannot bear the character of a special research. It must sum up the results of Marxist research, it must indicate the place of every more or less important feature of our agricultural economy in the general scheme of the Russian national economy, it must trace the general line of development of agrarian relations in Russia and ascertain the class forces which determine that development, one way or another. Therefore we shall examine from this point of view the system of landownership in Russia, then the landlord and peasant systems of farming, and lastly draw general conclusions as to what our evolution during the nineteenth century has led to, and what tasks it has bequeathed to the twentieth century.

I

We are able to outline the system of landownership in European Russia towards the close of the nineteenth century according to the returns of the latest land statistics of 1905 (published by the Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1907[46]).

The total area of registered land in European Russia according to this investigation was 395.2 million dessiatines.* This area was divided into three main groups as follows:

* *Dessiatine* = 2.7 acres.—*Tr.*

	Mill. dess.
1st group: Privately-owned land	101.7
2nd group: Allotment land	138.8
3rd group: State lands, etc.	154.7
Total in European Russia	395.2

It should be said that our statistics include among state lands more than one hundred million dessiatines in the Far North, in the Archangel, Olonets and Vologda governias.* A great part of the state lands must be excluded, once we are dealing with the real area of agricultural lands in European Russia. In my work on the agrarian programme of the Social-Democrats in the Russian revolution (written at the end of 1907, but delayed in publication through circumstances beyond the control of the author), I estimate the actual area of agricultural lands in European Russia at approximately 280 million dessiatines.** This figure includes not 150 million but 39.5 million dessiatines of state land. Hence, *less than one-seventh* of the total land area in European Russia is not in the possession of the landlords and the peasants. Six-sevenths are in the hands of the two antagonistic classes.

Let us examine the way the land is owned by these classes, which differ from each other also as social-estates, since the greater part of the privately-owned lands belongs to the nobility, while the allotment lands are held by the peasants. Out of 101.7 million dessiatines of privately-owned land, 15.8 million dessiatines belong to societies and associations, while the remaining 85.9 million dessiatines belong to private individuals. The following table shows the distribu-

* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 221.—*Ed.*

tion of the latter category of land according to social-estates in 1905, and the parallel figures for 1877:

Social-estate of owners	1905		1877		Incr. or decr. in 1905	
	Mill. dess.	%	Mill. dess.	%	Mill. dess.	How many-fold
Nobility	53.2	61.9	73.1	79.9	– 19.9	– 1.40
Clergy	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.2	+0.1	+1.74
Merchants and notable citizens	12.9	15.0	9.8	10.7	+3.1	+1.30
Urban petty bourgeois .	3.8	4.4	1.9	2.1	+1.9	+1.85
Peasants	3.2	15.4	5.8	6.3	+7.4	+2.21
Other social-estates . . .	2.2	2.5	0.3	0.3	+1.9	+8.07
Foreign subjects	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	–0.1	–1.52
Total belonging to private owners	85.9	100.0	91.5	100.0	–5.6	–1.09

Thus the principal private owners of land in Russia are the nobility. They own an enormous amount of land. But the trend of development is towards a decline in landownership by the nobility. Landownership by people irrespective of the social-estate they belong to is increasing, and increasing very rapidly. The speediest increase in the period between 1877 and 1905 was in landownership by "other social-estates" (eightfold in the 28 years), and then by peasants (more than twofold). The peasants are consequently increasingly crystallising out social elements which are turning into private owners of land. This is a general fact. And in our analysis of peasant farming we shall have to ascertain the social and economic mechanism which is carrying out this crystallisation. For the time being, we must definitely establish the fact that private ownership of land in Russia is developing away from social-estate to non-social-estate ownership. At the end of the nineteenth century, feudal landownership of the nobility still embraced the overwhelming majority of all privately-owned lands, but the trend of development is obviously towards the creation of bourgeois private landownership. Private ownership of land acquired by inheritance from the olden-time

armed retainers, manorial landowners, and tenants by service, etc., is on the decline. Private ownership of land acquired purely and simply with money is on the increase. The power of land is declining, the power of money is growing. Land is being drawn more and more into the stream of commerce; and later on we shall see that this process is going on to a far greater extent than the mere statistics of landownership indicate.

But to what extent the "power of the land", that is to say, the power of medieval landlordism, was still strong in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century is strikingly shown by the figures of the distribution of privately-owned land according to size of properties. The source from which we quote the figures specifies in particular detail the data concerning private landownership on the biggest scale. The following is the distribution according to size of properties:

Groups of properties	Number of properties	Total area of land (dess.)	Average dess. per property
10 dess. and less	409,864	1,625,226	3.9
10 to 50 dess.	209,119	4,891,031	23.4
50 to 500 "	106,065	17,326,495	163.3
500 to 2,000 "	21,748	20,590,708	947.0
2,000 to 10,000 "	5,386	20,602,109	3,825.0
Over 10,000 "	699	20,798,504	29,754.0
Total over 500 dess.	27,833	61,991,321	2,227.0
Grand total for European Russia	752,881	85,834,073	114.0

These figures show that small properties represent an insignificant share of the land owned by private individuals. Six-sevenths of all landowners—619,000 out of 753,000—possess 6.5 million dessiatines of land in all. On the other hand enormous latifundia exist: *seven hundred* owners possess, *on the average*, *30,000 dessiatines of land* each. These seven hundred people possess three times as much land as do 600,000 small owners. And in general the

latifundia represent a distinguishing feature of Russian private landownership. If we take all properties over 500 dessiatines, we get 28,000 owners, possessing 62 million dessiatines, or an average of 2,227 dessiatines each. These 28,000 possess three-fourths of all the privately-owned land.* Taken from the angle of the social-estates to which their owners belong, these enormous latifundia are mainly the property of the nobility. Of 27,833 properties, 18,102, i.e., almost two-thirds, belong to members of the nobility, who possess 44.5 million dessiatines of land, i.e., more than 70 per cent of the total latifundia land. Thus it is clear that in Russia, at the end of the nineteenth century, an enormous amount of land—and the best land at that—was concentrated as before (in the medieval way) in the hands of that privileged social-estate, the nobility, in the hands of the serf-owning landlords of yesterday. Below we shall describe in detail the forms of economy that are taking shape on these latifundia. For the moment we shall merely allude briefly to the well-known fact, strikingly described by Mr. Rubakin, that high-ranking members of the bureaucracy figure, one after another, among these owners of latifundia held by the nobility.[47]

Let us now pass to allotment holdings. Except for 1.9 million dessiatines, not allocated according to size of holding, all the rest of the land, totalling 136.9 million dessiatines, belongs to $12\frac{1}{4}$ million peasant households. On the average this is 11.1 dessiatines per household. But allotment land too is distributed unevenly: almost half, i.e., 64 million out of 137 million dessiatines, belongs to 2.1 million households rich in land, i.e., to *one-sixth* of the total number.

Here are the returns showing the distribution of allotment land in European Russia:

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* In order not to overburden the text with quotations, let us state now that most of our data are taken from the above-mentioned work and from *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1908. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 21-607.—*Ed.*)

Groups of households	Number of households	Total dess.	Average dessiatines per household
Up to 5 dess.	2,857,650	9,030,333	3.1
5 to 8 dess.	3,317,601	21,706,550	6.5
Total up to 8 dess.	6,175,251	30,736,883	4.9
8 to 15 dess.	3,932,485	42,182,923	10.7
15 to 30 dess.	1,551,904	31,271,922	20.1
Over 30 dess.	617,715	32,695,510	52.9
Total for European Russia	12,277,355	136,887,238	11.1

Thus more than half of the allotment households, 6.2 million out of 12.3, have up to 8 dessiatines per household. Taken on the average for Russia as a whole, this amount of land is absolutely insufficient to maintain a family. In order to judge the economic condition of these households, let us recall the general returns of the army-horse censuses (the only statistics which periodically and regularly cover the whole of Russia). In 48 gubernias of European Russia, i.e., excluding the Don Region and Archangel Gubernia, a count taken in the years 1896-1900 showed a total of 11,112,287 peasant households. Of these, 3,242,462, i.e., 29.2 per cent, had no horses, and 3,361,778, or 30.3 per cent, had one horse each. We know what a horseless peasant in Russia is (of course we are dealing here with gross figures and not with exceptional districts specialising in suburban dairy farming or tobacco-growing, etc.). We also know of the poverty and want suffered by the peasant who owns one horse. Six million households stand for a population of from 24 to 30 million. And this whole mass consists of paupers, who have been allotted paltry strips of land which can provide no livelihood, and on which one can only die of starvation. If we assume that in order to make ends meet on a more or less solvent farm not less than 15 dessiatines are required, then we get 10 million peasant households below that standard, possessing 72.9 million dessiatines of land.

To proceed. In regard to allotment holdings, a very important feature must be noted. The unevenness in the distribution of allotment land among the peasants is immeasurably less than that in the distribution of privately-owned

land. On the other hand, among the allotment-holding peasants there is a host of other distinctions, classifications and divisions. These are the distinctions between the various categories of peasants that have arisen historically, in the course of many centuries. In order to give a graphic illustration of these divisions, let us first take the total returns for the whole of European Russia. The statistics for 1905 give the following main categories: peasants who formerly were landlords' serfs—on the average, 6.7 dessiatines of allotment land per household; peasants who formerly were state serfs—12.5 dessiatines; peasants who formerly were crown-land serfs—9.5 dessiatines; colonists—20.2 dessiatines; Chinsh peasants—3.1 dessiatines; Rezeshi—5.3 dessiatines; Bashkirs and Teptyars[48]—28.3 dessiatines; Baltic peasants—36.9 dessiatines; Cossacks—52.7 dessiatines. From this alone it is clear that peasant allotment landownership is purely medieval. Serfdom still lives on in this multiplicity of divisions which have survived among the peasants. The various categories differ from each other, not only in the amount of land they possess, but also in the size of redemption payments, terms of purchase, character of landownership, etc. Instead of taking all-round figures for the whole of Russia, let us take the figures for a single gubernia, and we shall see what all these divisions mean. Take the Zemstvo Statistical Returns for Saratov Gubernia.[49] Apart from the categories for Russia as a whole, i.e., those already enumerated above, we find that local investigators distinguish the following additional categories: gift-land peasants; full owners; state peasants with communal holdings; state peasants with quarter holding; state peasants who formerly were landlords' serfs; state-land tenants; colonist freeholders; settlers; manumitted peasants; peasants who do not pay quit-rent; free tillers; former factory-bound peasants, etc.[50] This system of medieval divisions is carried so far that sometimes peasants living in one and the same village are divided into two quite distinct categories, like peasants "formerly owned by Mr. N. N." and "formerly owned by Madame M. M.". This fact is usually ignored by our writers of the liberal-Narodnik camp, who are incapable of seeing Russian economic relations in development, as the replace-

ment of the feudal order by the bourgeois order. As a matter of fact, unless the full significance of this is appreciated, one cannot begin to understand the history of Russia in the nineteenth century, and particularly the direct results of that history, the events in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. A country in which exchange is growing and capitalism is developing cannot but undergo crises of all kinds if in the principal branch of the national economy medieval relations constitute an obstacle and hindrance at every step. The notorious village commune[51]—the significance of which we shall have to discuss later—does not save the peasant from turning into a proletarian, yet in practice acts as a medieval barrier dividing the peasants, who are, as it were, chained to small associations and to categories which have lost all "reason for existence".

Before proceeding to draw our final conclusions about the ownership of land in European Russia, we must refer to yet another aspect of the question. Neither the figures of the amount of land belonging to the "upper 30,000" landlords and to the millions of peasant households, nor the data concerning the medieval divisions in peasant landownership are sufficient to enable us to estimate the actual degree to which our peasant is "hemmed in", oppressed and crushed by these living survivals of serfdom. In the first place, the lands allotted to the peasants after that expropriation of the peasants for the landlords' benefit which is called the Great Reform of 1861,[52] are of incomparably inferior quality to the land in the possession of the landlords. This is borne out by all the vast literature describing and investigating local conditions issued by the Zemstvo statisticians. It is supported by a mass of irrefutable evidence showing the lower yield on peasant land as compared with that on the landlords' land; it is generally admitted that this difference is due primarily to the inferior quality of the allotment lands, and only secondarily to inferior cultivation and the deficiencies of beggarly peasant farming. Moreover, in a host of cases when the peasants were "freed" from the land by the landlords in 1861, the land was allocated in such a way that the peasants found themselves ensnared by "their" landlords. Russian Zemstvo statistical literature has enriched the science of political economy

with descriptions of the remarkably original, truly native method, hardly to be found anywhere else in the world, of conducting landlord economy. This is the method of farming *by means of cut-off lands*. The peasants were "freed" in 1861 from the watering-places for cattle, from pastures, etc., necessary for their farms. The peasants' lands were wedged in between those of the landlords in such a way as to provide these gentry with an exceedingly reliable—and exceedingly noble—source of revenue in the shape of fines for damages caused by stray cattle, etc. "There's no room to turn a chicken out"—this bitter peasant truth, this grim "humour of the gallows-bird" describes better than any long quotations that peculiar feature of peasant landownership which is beyond the power of statistics to express. Needless to say, this peculiar feature is serfdom pure and simple, both in its origin and in the effect it has upon the method of organisation of landlord economy.

We will now draw our conclusions regarding landownership in European Russia. We have shown the conditions of landlord and peasant landownership taken separately. We must now examine them in their interrelation. In order to do so let us take the approximate figure, quoted above, of the size of the land area in European Russia—280 million dessiatines—and see how all this land is distributed among the various types of holdings. We shall describe the various types in detail later on; for the moment, running somewhat ahead, we will take tentatively the main types. Holdings up to 15 dessiatines per household we shall place in the first group—ruined peasants, crushed by feudal exploitation. The second group will consist of the middle peasantry—holdings ranging from 15 to 20 dessiatines. The third group—well-to-do peasants (peasant bourgeoisie) and capitalist landowners—holdings ranging from 20 to 500 dessiatines. The fourth group consists of feudal latifundia, exceeding 500 dessiatines. By combining in these groups the peasant and landlord holdings, and by rounding off the figures somewhat,* and making approximate calcula-

* For example, among the latifundia are included, besides the 62 million dessiatines of landlords' land, 5.1 million dessiatines of demesne lands and 3.6 million dessiatines of land belonging to 272 trading and industrial companies, each owning more than 1,000 dessiatines.

tions (which I have indicated in detail in the work mentioned above), we get the following picture of Russian landownership towards the close of the nineteenth century:

Landownership in European Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century

Group	Number of holdings (millions)	Total area in dessiatines (millions)	Average dess. per holding
(a) Ruined peasantry, crushed by feudal exploitation . .	10.5	75.0	7.0
(b) Middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
(c) Peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership .	1.5	70.0	46.7
(d) Feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Not classified according to size of property	—	50.0	—
Grand total	13.03	280.0	21.4

We repeat: the correctness of the economic description of the groups taken will be proved later on. And if particular details of this picture (which cannot but be approximate) give rise to criticism, we shall ask the reader to take good care that this criticism of details is not used as a screen for denying the *substance* of the matter. And the substance of the matter is that at one pole of Russian landownership we have 10.5 million households (about 50 million of the population) with 75 million dessiatines of land, and at the other pole *thirty thousand families* (about 150,000 of the population) with 70 million dessiatines of land.

To finish with the question of landownership we must now go beyond the confines of European Russia proper and examine, in general outline, the significance of colonisation. In order to give the reader some idea of the total land area in the Russian Empire (excluding Finland) let us refer to the figures compiled by Mr. Mertvago. For the sake of clarity we give the figures in tabulated form, adding the figures of the population according to the census of 1897.

	Total land area		Including		Including				Population in 1897	
	Square versts (thousands)	Dessiatines (millions)	Lands of which no data are available (mill. dess.)	Lands registered (mill. dess.)	Arable	Meadows	Forests	Total	Total (thousands)	Per sq. verst
					Million Dessiatins					
10 gubernias in Kingdom of Poland . . .	111.6	11.6	—	11.6	7.4	0.9	2.5	10.8	9,402.2	84.3
38 gubernias west of the Volga	1,755.6	183.0	—	183.0	93.6	18.7	34.0	146.3	—	—
12 gubernias north and east of the Volga . .	2,474.9	258.0	—	258.0	22.3	7.1	132.0	161.4	—	—
Total for 50 gubernias of European Russia .	4,230.5	441.0	—	441.0	115.9	25.8	166.0	307.7	93,442.9	22.1
Caucasus	411.7	42.9	22.1	20.8	6.5	2.2	2.5	11.2	9,289.4	22.6
Siberia	10,966.1	1,142.6	639.7	502.9	4.3	3.9	121.0	129.2	5,758.8	0.5
Central Asia	3,141.6	327.3	157.4	169.9	0.9	1.6	8.0	10.5	7,746.7	2.5
Total for Asiatic Russia	14,519.4	1,512.8	819.2	693.6	11.7	7.7	131.5	150.9	—	—
Total for Russian Empire	18,861.5	1,965.4	819.2	1,146.2	135.0	34.4	300.0	469.4	125,640.0	6.7

These figures clearly show how little we know as yet about the outlying regions of Russia. Of course it would be the height of absurdity to think of "solving" the agrarian question in Russia proper by migration to outlying regions. There is not the slightest doubt that only charlatans could propose such a "solution", that those contradictions between the old latifundia in European Russia and the new conditions of life and economy in that same European Russia to which we referred above, will have to be "solved" by a radical change of one kind or another *within European Russia*, and not outside it. The point is not that of delivering the peasants from the survivals of feudalism by means of migration. The fact is that, side by side with the agrarian question of the centre of Russia, we have the agrarian question of colonisation. The point is not that of covering up the crisis in European Russia with the question of colonisation, but of showing the disastrous effects of the feudal latifundia *both* in the centre *and* in the outlying districts. Russian colonisation is being *hindered* by the remnants of serfdom in the centre of Russia. Except by an agrarian revolution in European Russia, except by liberating the peasants from the oppression of the feudal latifundia there *can be no* clearing the way for, and regulation of, Russian colonisation. This regulation must consist not of bureaucratic "concern" for migration nor of the "organisation of migration", about which the writers in the liberal-Narodnik camp like to talk, but of eliminating the conditions which condemn the Russian peasant to ignorance, squalor, and backwardness in a state of permanent bondage to the owners of latifundia.

In his pamphlet (*How Much Land There Is in Russia and How We Use It*, Moscow, 1907), written in conjunction with Mr. Prokopovich, Mr. Mertvago justly points out that the advance of agriculture turns bad land into good land. Academicians Baer and Helmersen, experts on the subject wrote in 1845 that the Taurida Steppe "owing to the climate, and the scarcity of water will *always* be one of the poorest and least suitable regions for cultivation!"[53] At that time the population of Taurida Gubernia produced 1.8 million chetverts* of grain. Sixty years later the population had doubled,

* Chetverts = 5.77 bushels.—*Ed.*

and produces 17.6 million chetverts, i.e., almost ten times as much.

That is a true and important observation, but Mr. Mertvago forgot one thing: the principal factor making for the rapid colonisation of Novorossia was the *fall of serfdom* in the centre of Russia. Only the upheaval in the centre made it possible to settle and industrialise the South rapidly, extensively, in the American way (a very great deal has been said about the *American* growth of southern Russia after 1861). And now, too, only a radical change in European Russia, only the complete elimination of the remnants of serfdom there, the deliverance of the peasantry from the grip of the medieval latifundia, can *really* open a new era of colonisation.

The colonisation question in Russia is a subordinate one in relation to the agrarian question in the centre of the country. The end of the nineteenth century confronts us with the alternative: either the survivals of serfdom are decisively abolished in the "primordial" gubernias of Russia, in which case rapid, extensive, American-style development in the colonisation of our outlying regions is assured; or the agrarian question in the centre drags on, in which case development of the productive forces will necessarily be long delayed, and feudal traditions will be preserved in colonisation as well. In the first case, agriculture will be carried on by a free farmer; in the second case by a debt-bound muzhik and by a gentleman "carrying on" by means of "cut-off" lands.

II

Let us now examine the organisation of the landlord economy. It is generally known that the main feature of this organisation is the combination of the capitalist system ("free hire") and labour-service economy. What is this labour-service system?

To answer this question we must glance back to the organisation of landlord economy under serfdom. Everyone knows what serfdom was legally, administratively and domestically. But seldom do people ask themselves, what essentially were the economic relations between the landlords and the peasants under serfdom? At that time the landlords allotted land to the peasants. Sometimes they loaned the peasants

other means of production too, for example, wood lots, cattle, etc. What did this allotment of the landlords' land to the serf peasants mean? The allotment at that time was *a form of wages*, to employ a term applicable to present-day relationships. In capitalist production, wages are paid to the workers in money. The profit of the capitalist is realised in the form of money. Necessary labour and surplus-labour (i.e., the labour that pays for the maintenance of the worker and the labour that yields unpaid surplus-value to the capitalist) are combined in the single process of labour in the factory, in a single working day at the factory, etc. The situation is different in the corvée economy. Here, too, there is necessary labour and surplus-labour, just as there is in the system of slavery. But these two kinds of labour are separated in time and space. The serf peasant works three days for his lord and three days for himself. He works for his lord on the latter's land or on the production of grain for him. For himself he works on allotted land, producing for himself and for his family the grain that is necessary for maintaining labour-power for the landlord.

Consequently, the feudal or corvée system of economy is similar to the capitalist system in that under both systems the one who works receives only the product of necessary labour, and turns over the product of surplus-labour gratis to the owner of the means of production. Serfdom, however, differs from the capitalist system in the three following respects. First, serf economy is natural economy, whereas capitalist economy is money economy. Secondly, in serf economy the instrument of exploitation is the *tying* of the worker to the land, the allotting of land to him, whereas under the capitalist economy it is the releasing of the worker from the land. In order to obtain an income (i.e., surplus-product), the serf-owning landlord must have on his land a peasant who possesses an allotment, implements and livestock. A landless, horseless, non-farming peasant is useless as an object of feudal exploitation. In order to obtain an income (profit), the capitalist must have before him precisely a worker without land and without a farm, one who is compelled to sell his labour-power on a free labour-market. Thirdly, the allotment-holding peasant must be *personally dependent* upon the landlord, because he will not, possessing

land, work for the landlord except *under coercion*. This system of economy gives rise to "non-economic coercion", to serfdom, juridical dependence, lack of full rights, etc. On the other hand, "ideal" capitalism implies the fullest freedom of contract on a free market—between the property-owner and the proletarian.

Only if we are clear in our minds as to this economic substance of serf economy, or what is the same thing, corvée economy, can we understand the historical place-and significance of labour service. Labour service is the direct and immediate survival of the corvée. Labour service is the transition from the corvée to capitalism. The substance of labour service is this: the landlord's land is cultivated by the peasants *with their own implements* in return for pay partly in cash and partly in kind (for land, for cut-off land, for use of pastures, for loans granted in the winter, etc.). The form of economy known as the métayer system is a variety of labour service. The landlord economy based on labour service *requires* a peasant who has an allotment, as well as implements and livestock if only of the poorest kind; it requires also that the peasant be weighed down by want and place himself in bondage. Bondage instead of free hire is the necessary concomitant of labour-service economy. Here the landlord acts not as a capitalist entrepreneur who owns money and the sum total of the instruments of labour, but—in a system of labour-service economy—as a usurer, taking advantage of the poverty of his peasant neighbour to acquire his labour for next to nothing.

To illustrate this point more clearly, let us take the data of the Department of Agriculture—a source above all suspicion of being unfriendly towards the landowning gentlemen. The well-known publication, *Freely Hired Labour on Farms*, etc. (Issue V, "Agric. and Stat. Inf. Obtd. from *Agricultural Employers*", St. Petersburg, 1892),[54] gives information concerning the Central Black-Earth Belt over eight years (1883-91). The average payment for the complete cultivation of a dessiatine of winter grain by a peasant using his own implements should be reckoned as 6 rubles. If we calculate the cost of the same amount of work performed by freely hired labour—says the same publication—we get 6 rubles 19 kopeks for the work of the man

alone, *not counting* the work of the horse, which cannot be put at less than 4 rubles 50 kopeks (ibid., p. 45, quoted in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 141*). Consequently, the price of freely hired labour amounts to 10 rubles 69 kopeks, while under labour service it is 6 rubles. How is this phenomenon to be accounted for, if it is not something accidental or exceptional, but normal and usual? Words like "bondage", "usury", "extortion", etc., describe the form and nature of the transaction, but do not explain its economic substance. How is a peasant able over a number of years to perform work that is worth 10 rubles 69 kopeks for 6 rubles? He *is able* to do it because his allotment covers part of the expenditure of his family and *makes it possible* for his wage to be forced down below the "free-hire" level. The peasant is compelled to do so precisely because his wretched allotment ties him down to his landlord neighbour, for it does not enable him to live off his own farm. Of course, this phenomenon can be "normal" only as one of the links of the process by which the corvée system is eliminated by capitalism. For the peasant is inevitably ruined by these conditions, and is slowly but surely being transformed into a proletarian.

The following are similar, but slightly more complete data concerning Saratov Uyezd. The average price for tilling one dessiatine of land, and for reaping, carting and threshing the grain, is 9 rubles 60 kopeks if contracted in the winter, 80 to 100 per cent of the wage being paid in advance. The price is 9 rubles 40 kopeks when the job is done as labour service for the lease of land. In the case of freely hired labour it is 17 rubles 50 kopeks! Reaping and carting done as labour service is valued at 3 rubles 80 kopek's per dessiatine, and in the case of freely hired labour at 8 rubles 50 kopeks, etc. Each of these figures tells its long story of the peasant's endless poverty, bondage and ruin. Each of these figures shows to what extent feudal exploitation and the survivals of the corvée *persist* in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century.

It is very difficult to calculate to what extent the labour-service system is prevalent. Usually, on the landed estates the

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 202.—*Ed.*

labour-service system is combined with the capitalist system, and both are applied to various operations in agriculture. An inconsiderable part of the land is tilled by hired labourers using the landlords' implements. The greater part of the land is rented to peasants on a métayer and labour-service basis. The following are a few illustrations taken from the detailed work by Mr. Kaufman, who has compiled some of the latest data on privately-owned estates.* Tula Gubernia (the data refer to 1897-98): "the landlords have retained the old three-field system ... the outlying land is taken by the peasants"; the cultivation of the landlords' land is extremely unsatisfactory. Kursk Gubernia: "the distribution of land to the peasants in dessiatines, which was profitable owing to the high prices prevailing ... has led to the exhaustion of the soil." Voronezh Gubernia: ...the medium and small proprietors "largely run their economies exclusively with the aid of peasants' implements, or lease them out ... on most estates the methods practised are distinguished for the complete absence of any improvements".

Statements like these show that the general description of the various gubernias of European Russia given by Mr. Annensky in his book *The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.*, as regards the prevalence of the labour-service or the capitalist systems can be fully applied to the conditions prevailing at the end of the nineteenth century. We shall quote this description in tabular form:

	Number of gubernias			
	Black-Earth Belt	Non-Black-Earth Belt	Total	Total privately-owned arable (thousand dess.)
I. Gubernias where the capitalist system prevails .	9	10	19	7,407
II. Gubernias where a mixed system prevails	3	4	7	2,222
III. Gubernias where the labour-service system prevails	12	5	17	6,281
Total	24	19	43	15,910

* *The Agrarian Question*. Published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. II, Moscow, 1907, pp. 442-628, "Regarding the Cultural and Economic Significance of Private Landownership".

Thus labour service definitely prevails in the Black-Earth Belt, but yields place in the total of the 43 gubernias included in the above table. It is important to note that group I (the capitalist system) includes areas which are not representative of the central agricultural regions, viz.: the Baltic gubernias, those in the south-west (sugar-beet area) and in the South, and the gubernias of the two capital cities.

The influence of the labour-service system on the development of the productive forces in agriculture is graphically illustrated by the material compiled in Mr. Kaufman's book. "There cannot be any doubt," he writes, "that small peasant renting of land and métayage represent one of the conditions which most of all retard the progress of agriculture." ... In the reviews of agriculture covering Poltava Gubernia, repeated reference is made to the fact that "the tenants till the land badly, sow it with poor seed and allow it to become overgrown with weeds".

In Mogilyov Gubernia (1898), "any improvement in farming is hindered by the inconveniences of the métayer system". The existence of *skopshchina*[55] is one of the main reasons why "agriculture in Dnieper Uyezd is in such a state that it is futile to expect any innovations or improvements". "Our data," writes Mr. Kaufman (p. 517), "definitely point to the fact that even within the bounds of one and the same estate, old and obsolete farming methods continue to be employed on land that is rented out, whereas new and improved methods have already been introduced on land that is cultivated by the owners." For example, on the land that is rented out, the three-field system is retained, sometimes even without the land being manured; on lands farmed on economic lines, however, crop rotation has been introduced. Métayage hinders grass cultivation, the extended use of fertilisers, and the employment of the best agricultural implements. The result of all this is strikingly reflected in the yield figures. For example, on a large estate in Simbirsk Gubernia, the rye crop in the part cultivated on economic lines is 90 poods per dessiatine, wheat 60 poods, oats 74 poods; in the métayer lands it is 58, 28 and 50 poods respectively. Here are general figures for a whole uyezd (Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia).

Yield of rye in poods per dessiatine

Soil grades	Allotment land	Economic crops	Privately-owned lands: Métayer	Privately-owned lands: Rented
I	62	74	—	44
II	55	63	49	—
III	51	60	50	42
IV	48	69	51	51
All grades	54*	66	50	45*

Thus, *landlords'* lands cultivated in feudal fashion (on a métayer basis and rented out in small lots) produce *smaller* yields than allotment lands! This is a fact of tremendous importance, because it irrefutably proves that the main and fundamental cause of Russia's agricultural backwardness, of the stagnation of the whole of the national economy and the degradation of the tiller of the soil to a degree unparalleled anywhere else in the world, is the *labour-service system*, i.e., the direct survival of serfdom. No credits, no land reclamation, no "aid" to the peasant, none of the measures of "assistance" beloved of the bureaucrats and liberals, will yield results of any importance so long as there remains the yoke of the feudal latifundia, traditions, and systems of economy. On the other hand, an agrarian revolution which abolishes landlordism and breaks up the old medieval village commune (the nationalisation of the land, for example, will break it up, not in the police and bureaucratic manner), would unfailingly serve as the basis for remarkably rapid and really wide progress. The incredibly low yield on métayer and rented lands is due to the system of working "for the squire". If this same farmer were relieved of the duty of working "for the squire", yields would increase not only on these lands, but would inevitably increase on the allotment lands as well, simply because of the elimination of the feudal hindrances to farming.

As things are at present, there is, of course, some capitalist progress on the privately-owned economies, but it is exceedingly slow, and inevitably burdens Russia for many

* In Mr. Kaufman's book, p. 521, there is obviously a misprint in these two figures.

years to come with the political and social domination of the "wild landlord".[56] We shall now examine how this progress manifests itself, and try to define some of its general results.

The fact that the yield of the "economic" crops, i.e., the landed estates cultivated on capitalist lines, is higher than on the peasant lands is an indication of the technical progress of capitalism in agriculture. This progress is due to the transition from the labour-service to the wage-labour system. The ruin of the peasants, the decline in horse ownership, the loss of implements, the proletarisation of the tiller, *compel* landlords to change over to cultivating their land with their own implements. Increased use is being made in agriculture of machinery, which raises the productivity of labour and inevitably leads to the development of purely capitalist relations of production. Agricultural machinery was imported into Russia to the value of 788,000 rubles in 1869-72, 2.9 million rubles in 1873-80, 4.2 million rubles in 1881-88, 3.7 million rubles in 1889-96, and 15.2 and 20.6 million rubles respectively in 1902 and 1903. The output of agricultural machinery in Russia was (approximately, according to rough industrial statistics) 2.3 million rubles in 1876, 9.4 million in 1894 and 12.1 million in 1900-03. It is indisputable that these figures indicate progress in agriculture, and precisely capitalist progress, of course. But it is similarly indisputable that this progress is exceedingly slow compared to what is possible in a modern capitalist state: for example, in America. According to the census of June 1, 1900, the acreage of farms in the United States was 838.6 million acres, i.e., about 324 million dessiatines. The number of farms was 5.7 million, the average acreage per farm being 146.2 acres (about 60 dessiatines). Now, the production of agricultural implements for these farms amounted to *157.7 million dollars* in 1900 (in 1890, 145.3 million dollars, in 1880, 62.1 million dollars).* The Russian figures are ridiculously small by comparison, and they are small because the feudal latifundia in Russia are great and strong.

The extent to which improved agricultural implements

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* *Abstract of the Twelfth Census*, 1900, third edition, Washington, 1904, pp. 217 and 302—agricultural implements.

were employed by landowners and peasants respectively was the subject of a special questionnaire circulated by the Ministry of Agriculture in the middle of the nineties of last century. The results of this enquiry, which are given in detail in Mr. Kaufman's book, can be summarised in the following table.

District	Percentage of replies indicating extensive employment of improved agricultural implements	
	Landlords	Peasants
Central Agricultural	20-51	8-20
Middle Volga	18-66	14
Novorussia.	50-91	33-65
Byelorussia.	54-86	17-41
Priozyorny	24-47	1-21
Moscow	22-51	10-26
Industrial	4-8	2

The average for all these districts is 42 per cent among the landlords and 21 per cent among the peasants.

In regard to the employment of manure, all the statistical data irrefutably prove that "in this respect the landlords' farms have always been, and still are, far ahead of the peasant farms" (Kaufman, p. 544). Moreover, it was a widespread practice in post-Reform Russia for the landlord to purchase manure from the peasant. That is the result of direst poverty among the peasants. Recently this practice has been on the decline.

Finally, precise and abundant statistics are available on the level of agricultural technique on landlord and peasant farms respectively as regards grass cultivation (Kaufman, p. 561). The following are the principal conclusions.

Year	Area under fodder grasses in European Russia	
	On peasant farms (dess.)	On landlords' estates (dess.)
1881	49,800	499,000
1901	491,600	1,046,000

What is the effect of all these differences between landlord and peasant farming? All we have to go on here are the yield figures. Throughout the whole of European Russia, the average yield over a period of eighteen years (1883-1900) was as follows (in chetverts):

	Rye	Winter wheat	Spring wheat	Oats
Landlords . . .	6.0	5.75	5.0	8.5
Peasants . . .	5.0	5.0	4.25	7.0
Difference . . .	16.7%	13.0%	15.0%	17.6%

Mr. Kaufman is quite right when he says that the "difference is very slight" (p. 592). We must bear in mind not only that the peasants were left with the *worst land* in 1861, but also that general averages for the whole of the peasantry conceal (as we shall see in a moment) big differences.

The general conclusion we must arrive at from the examination of landlord farming is the following. Capitalism is quite obviously paving a way for itself in this field. Farming on a corvée basis is being replaced by farming on the basis of freely hired labour. Technical progress in capitalist agriculture compared with labour-service and petty-peasant farming is definitely in evidence in all directions. But this progress is exceptionally slow for a modern capitalist country. The end of the nineteenth century finds in Russia the most acute contradiction between the requirements of social development as a whole and serf agriculture which, in the shape of the latifundia owned by the landed nobility and the labour-service system, is a brake on economic evolution and a source of oppression, barbarism, and of innumerable forms of Tatarism in Russian life.

III

Peasant farming is the focal point of the agrarian question today in Russia. We have shown above the conditions of peasant landownership and now we must deal with the organisation of peasant farming—not in the technical sense, but from the standpoint of political economy.

In the forefront we encounter here the question of the peasant commune. A very extensive literature has been devoted to this question, and the Narodnik trend in Russian social thought connects the main points of its world-outlook with the national peculiarities of this "equalitarian" institution. In this respect it should be said, in the first place, that in the literature on the Russian land commune two distinct

aspects of the question are constantly interwoven and very often confused; these are the aspect relating to agricultural methods and mode of life, on the one hand, and the politico-economic aspect, on the other. In most works on the village commune (V. Orlov, Trirogov, Keussler, V. V.),[57] so much space and attention is devoted to the first aspect of the question that the second is left completely in the shade. This method of treating the subject is absolutely wrong. That agrarian relations in Russia differ from those in other countries is beyond doubt, but no two purely capitalist countries, generally recognised as such, will be found, where village life, the history of agrarian relations, the forms of ownership and use of the land, etc., do not differ to the same degree. It is by no means the aspect relating to agricultural methods nor that of village life which have made the question of the Russian land commune so important and acute and have, since the second half of the nineteenth century, divided the two main trends in Russian social thought, i.e., the Narodnik and the Marxist. Possibly local investigators have had to devote so much attention to this aspect of the question in order both to be able to make a comprehensive study of local peculiarities in the agricultural mode of life and to repel the ignorant and brazen attempts of the bureaucracy to introduce petty-detailed regulation permeated with a police spirit. But it is quite impermissible, for an economist at any rate, to allow the study of the various forms of land redistribution, the technique of this redistribution, etc., to obscure the question of what *types of economies* are emerging *within* the commune, how these types are developing, what sort of relations are building up between those who hire workers and those who hire themselves out as labourers, between the well-to-do and the poor, between those who are improving their farms and introducing better techniques, and those who are being ruined, who are abandoning their farms, and fleeing from the village. No doubt it was awareness of this truth that induced our Zemstvo statisticians—who have contributed invaluable material for the study of the national economy of Russia—to abandon, in the eighties of last century, the *official* grouping of the peasantry according to commune, allotment, the number of "registered souls"[58]

or available males, and to adopt the only scientific grouping, according to *economic strength* of households. It should be remembered that at that time, when interest in the economic study of Russia was particularly great, even a writer like V. V., such a "party" man on this subject, heartily welcomed "the new type of local statistical publication" (the title of V. V.'s article in *Severny Vestnik*,[59] No. 3 for 1885) and declared: "These statistics must be adapted, not to such an agglomeration of the most varied economic groups of the peasantry as the village or the commune, but to these groups themselves."

The fundamental feature of our commune, which lent it special importance in the eyes of the Narodniks, is equalised land tenure. We shall leave aside entirely the question of how the village commune achieves this equalisation, and address ourselves directly to the economic facts, to the results of this equalisation. As we have shown above on the basis of precise data, the distribution of the total allotment land in European Russia is by no means equalitarian. Nor is the distribution of land among the various categories of peasants, among the peasants of different villages, even among the peasants belonging ("formerly belonging") to different landlords in the same village in the least equalitarian. Only within the small communes does the machinery of redistribution create the equalisation of these small, exclusive associations. Let us examine the Zemstvo statistics regarding the distribution of allotment land among households. In doing so, of course, we must take the grouping of households not according to the size of families, not according to the number of those working, but according to the *economic strength* of the different households (crop area, number of draught animals, number of cows, etc.). For the entire essence of the capitalist evolution of small farming lies in the creation and intensification of inequality of property within patriarchal associations, and further in the transformation of simple inequality into capitalist relationships. Hence we should be obscuring all the peculiar features of the new economic evolution if we did not set out to make a special study of the differences in economic strength within the peasantry.

Let us take, at first, one typical uyezd (house-to-house

investigations by Zemstvo statisticians with detailed combined tables, adapted to separate uyezds), and then state the reasons that oblige us to apply the conclusions which interest us to the peasants of the whole of Russia. The material is taken from *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapter II.*

In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, where peasant landownership is entirely communal, allotment land is distributed as follows:

	Per household	
	Persons of both sexes	Allotment land (dess.)
Cultivating no land	3.5	9.8
” up to 5 dessiatines	4.5	12.9
” 5 to 10 ”	5.4	17.4
” 10 to 20 ”	6.7	21.8
” 20 to 50 ”	7.9	28.8
” over 50 ”	8.2	44.6
Total	5.5	17.4

We see that with the improvement in the economic strength of the household, the size of the family increases with absolute regularity. Clearly, a large family is one of the factors in peasant well-being. That is indisputable. The only question is, to what social and economic relations does this well-being lead in the present state of the national economy as a whole? As far as allotment land is concerned, we see unevenness in distribution, although not too considerable. The more prosperous a peasant household is, the more allotment land it has *per head*. The lowest group has less than 3 dessiatines of allotment land per head of both sexes; in the next groups, nearly 3 dessiatines, 3 dessiatines, nearly 4, and 4 dessiatines respectively; and finally, in the last, the highest group, over 5 dessiatines of allotment land per head of both sexes. Hence large families and the greatest possession of allotment land serve as the basis of the prosperity of a *small minority* of the peasants. For the two highest groups cover only *one-tenth* of the total number of households. The following table shows as percentages the

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 70-187.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NON-COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

number of households, the population, and the distribution of allotment land among the different groups:

Groups of households	Percentages of total		
	Households	Population of both sexes	Allotment land
Cultivating no land	10.2	6.5	5.7
" up to 5 dessiatines	30.3	24.8	22.6
" from 5 to 10 dessiatines. . . .	27.0	26.7	26.0
" from 10 to 20 dessiatines . .	22.4	27.3	28.3
" from 20 to 50 dessiatines . .	9.4	13.5	15.5
" over 50 dessiatines	0.7	1.2	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

These figures clearly show that there is proportion in the distribution of allotment land, and that we do take into account the result of communal equalisation. The ratios of the population and of allotment land according to groups are fairly close to each other. But here, too, the economic strength of the different households begins to take effect: among the lower groups the ratio of land is *less* than the ratio of the population, and among the higher groups it is *greater*. And this is not an isolated phenomenon, relating to just one uyezd, but is true for the whole of Russia. In the work mentioned above, I have combined similar data for 21 uyezds of 7 gubernias in the most varied parts of-Russia. These data, which cover half a million peasant households, show the same relations in all places. Well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, account for 26.1 to 30.3 per cent of the population and have 29.0 to 36.7 per cent of the allotment land. The poorest households, constituting 50 per cent of the total, account for 36.6 to 44.7 per cent of the population and have 33.0 to 37.7 per cent of the allotment land. We have this ratio in the distribution of the allotment land everywhere, but at the same time the *trend* of the village commune everywhere *is* towards the peasant bourgeoisie: departures from the ratio proceed in all cases in favour of the higher groups of the peasantry.

Hence it would be a profound mistake to think that, in studying the grouping of the peasantry according to economic strength, we ignore the "equalising" influence of the commune. On the contrary, by means of precise data we establish the real economic significance of this equalisation. We demonstrate just how far it extends, and what the whole system of land redistribution leads to in the *final analysis*. Even if this system provides the best distribution of land of various qualities and various categories, it is an indisputable fact that the position of the well-to-do peasants is superior to that of the poor peasants *also* in the matter of the distribution of allotment land. The distribution of other, non-allotment land, as we shall see in a moment, is immeasurably more uneven.

The importance of rented land in peasant farming is well known. The need for land gives rise to an extraordinary variety of forms of bondage relations on this basis. As we have already stated above, very often the renting of land by peasants is in effect a labour-service system of landlord farming—a feudalist way of securing hands for the squire. Thus the feudalist character of land renting by our peasants is beyond doubt. But since we have before us the capitalist evolution of this country, we must make a special study of the question as to how *bourgeois* relations manifest themselves, and whether they do manifest themselves, in peasant land renting. Here again we need data on the various economic groups of the peasantry and not on entire communes and villages. For example, in his *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations*, Mr. Karyshev had to admit that rents in kind (i.e., rentings of land for which payment is made not in money but by métayage or by labour service) as a general rule are *everywhere* more costly than money rent, and very much more costly at that, sometimes twice as much; further, that rent in kind is *most widespread among the poorest groups of the peasantry*. The peasants who are at all well-to-do try to rent land for money. "The tenant takes advantage of every opportunity to pay his rent in money and thus reduce the cost of using other people's land" (Karyshev, op. cit., p. 265).[60]

Hence the whole weight of the feudal features of our land-renting system falls upon the poorest peasants. The well-

to-do peasants try to escape from the medieval yoke, and they succeed in doing so only to the extent that they have sufficient money. If you have money, you can rent land for cash at the ordinary market price. If you have no money, you go into bondage and pay three times as dear for the land, either by métayage or by labour service. We have seen above how many times lower are the prices of work done by labour service than those of work done by freely hired labourers. And if the terms of renting are different for peasants of different economic strength, it is clear that we cannot confine ourselves (as Karyshev constantly does) to grouping the peasants according to their allotment, since such a method of grouping *artificially* lumps together households of different economic strength, and mixes up the rural proletariat with the peasant bourgeoisie.

As an illustration, let us take the figures covering Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, which consists almost entirely of communes (out of 2,455 communes in this gubernia, 2,436 hold the land in communal tenure). The following table shows the ratio between the various groups of households in regard to the renting of land.

Groups of householders	Percentage of household	Dessiatines per households	
		Allotment land	Rented land
With no draught animals	26.4	5.4	0.3
” 1 ” animal	20.3	6.5	1.6
” 2 ” animals	14.6	8.5	3.5
” 3 ” ”	9.3	10.1	5.6
” 4 ” ”	8.3	12.5	7.4
” 5 ” ” and more	21.1	16.1	16.6
Total	100.0	9.3	5.4

The distribution of allotment land is a familiar picture: the prosperous households are better provided with land per head of the population than the poor ones. The distribution of rented land is *dozens of times* more uneven. The highest group has three times as much allotment land as the lowest group (16.1 as against 5.4); but in regard to rented land the highest group has *fifty times* as much as the lowest group (16.6 as against 0.3). Thus, renting does not even out

differences in the peasants' economic strength, but intensifies, increases them dozens of times over. The opposite conclusion, which is repeatedly met with in the writings of the Narodnik economists (V. V., Nik.—on,[61] Maress, Karyshev, Vikhlayev and others), is due to the following error. They usually take the peasants grouped according to the size of allotment land, and show that those with small allotments rent more than those with large allotments—and there they stop. They do not mention that it is largely the well-to-do households in village communes with small allotments that rent land and that, therefore, seeming communal equalisation merely covers up the tremendous unevenness of distribution within the commune. Karyshev himself, for example, admits that "large amounts of land are rented by (a) the categories less provided with land, but (b) by the more well-to-do groups within these categories" (op. cit. p. 139). Nevertheless, he does not systematically study the distribution of rentings by groups.

In order to bring out more clearly the mistake of the Narodnik economists, let us cite the example of Mr. Maress (in his book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, Vol. I, p. 34). From data covering Melitopol Uyezd he draws the conclusion that "the distribution of rented land per head is approximately equal". How does he arrive at this? In this way: if households are grouped according to the number of male workers in them, it will be found that households with no workers rent "on the average" 1.6 dessiatines per renting household, those with one worker rent 4.4 dessiatines, those with two workers, 8.3 dessiatines, those with three workers, 14.0 dessiatines per household. But the point is that these "averages" cover households of absolutely different economic strength; that among the households having one worker, for example, there are those which rent four dessiatines, cultivate five to ten dessiatines and have two or three draught animals, and households which rent 38 dessiatines, cultivate more than 50 dessiatines and have four and more draught animals. Consequently, the equality Mr. Maress arrives at is *fictitious*. As a matter of fact, in Melitopol Uyezd the richest households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, notwithstanding the fact that they are best provided with both allotment and purchased land, account for 66.3 per cent, i.e.,

two-thirds of all the rented land, leaving only 5.6 per cent as the share of the poorest households which constitute *one-half* of the total.

To proceed. If we see, on the one hand, households with no horses, or with only one horse, renting one dessiatine, or even part of a dessiatine, and, on the other hand, households with four or more horses, renting from 7 to 16 dessiatines, it is clear that here quantity is turning into quality. In the first case renting is the result of poverty, and amounts to bondage. The "tenant" placed in such conditions cannot but become an object of exploitation by means of labour service, winter hiring,[62] money loans, etc. On the other hand, the household that has from 12 to 16 dessiatines of allotment land and, *over and above this*, rents from 7 to 16 dessiatines, obviously does so not because it is poor, but because it is well off, not to subsist but to get rich, to "make money". We have here a clear example of the conversion of land renting into capitalist farming, of the rise of capitalist enterprise in agriculture. Such households, as we shall see further on, do not get along without hiring agricultural labourers.

The question now arises: to what extent is this obvious entrepreneur renting of land a general phenomenon? Below we shall quote data which show that the growth of entrepreneur farming varies in different districts of commercial farming. For the moment let us quote a few more examples and draw our general conclusions regarding the renting of land.

In Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, households cultivating 25 dessiatines and over comprise 18.2 per cent of the total number. These have from 16 to 17 dessiatines of allotment land and rent from 17 to 44 dessiatines per household. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, households having five draught animals and more represent 24.7 per cent of the total. They cultivate averages of 25, 53, and 149 dessiatines, and rent respectively 14, 54, and 304 dessiatines of non-allotment land per household (the first figure refers to the group with from 5 to 10 draught animals, representing 17.1 per cent of the households; the second to the group with from 10 to 20 draught animals, representing 5.8 per cent of the households; the third to the group with 20 and more draught animals, representing 1.8 per cent of the households). These households rent averages of 12, 29, and 67 dessiatines respec-

tively of allotment land from other communities, and 9, 21, and 74 dessiatines in their own communities. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 10.1 per cent of the total households cultivate 20 and more dessiatines per household. These have 28 to 44 dessiatines of allotment land per household and rent 14 to 40 dessiatines of arable land and 118 to 261 dessiatines of grassland. In two uyezds in Orel Gubernia (Yelets and Trubchevsk), households with four horses and more comprise 7.2 per cent of the total. They have 15.2 dessiatines per household of allotment land, and by purchasing and renting land they bring up the amount of land they use to 28.4 dessiatines. In Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, the corresponding figures are: 3.2 per cent of the households averaging 17.1 dessiatines of allotment land, and 33.2 dessiatines as the total area in use per household. In three uyezds in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia (Knyaginin, Makaryev and Vasil), 9.5 per cent of the households possess three horses and more. These households average from 13 to 16 dessiatines of allotment land but farm a total of 21 to 34 dessiatines.

From this it is evident that entrepreneur renting of land among the peasantry is no isolated or casual phenomenon, but is general and universal. Everywhere there emerge in the village communes well-to-do households, which always constitute an insignificant minority and always organise capitalist farming with the aid of entrepreneur renting of land. For this reason general phrases about subsistence and capitalist renting can do nothing to clear up questions relating to our peasant farming; a study must be made of the *concrete facts* regarding the development of feudal features in the renting of land, and regarding the formation of capitalist relations *within this very renting of land.*

We quoted figures above showing what ratios of the population and of allotment land are accounted for by the most well-to-do peasant households, comprising 20 per cent of the total. Now we may add that these concentrate in their hands from 50.8 to 83.7 per cent of all the land rented by the peasantry, leaving to the poorest groups, comprising 50 per cent of all households, from 5 to 16 per cent of the total rented land. The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear: if we are asked what kind of renting preponderates in Russia, subsistence or entrepreneur renting, renting through poverty

or renting by well-to-do peasants, feudal renting (based on labour service and bondage) or bourgeois renting, there can be only one answer. Among the households which rent land, undoubtedly the majority do so because of poverty. For the overwhelming majority of the peasants renting means bondage. If we take the quantity of land rented, undoubtedly not less than half of it is in the hands of well-to-do peasants, the rural bourgeoisie, who are organising agriculture on capitalist lines.

Usually statistics of the prices of rented land are only given in "averages", covering the total number of tenants and the total amount of land. The extent to which these averages *camouflage* the extreme poverty and oppression of the peasantry can be seen from the Zemstvo statistics for Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, which, by a lucky exception, show the rental prices paid by the various groups of peasants, viz.:

Groups of households	Percentage of households renting land	Arable in dess. per renting household	Price per dess. in rubles
Cultivating up to 5 dessiatines	25	2.4	15.25
" from 5 to 10 dessiatines. . . .	42	3.9	12.00
" from 10 to 25 dessiatines . .	69	8.5	4.75
" from 25 to 50 dessiatines . .	88	20.0	3.75
" over 50 dessiatines	91	48.6	3.55
Total	56.2	12.4	4.23

Thus, the "average" rental price of 4 rubles 23 kopeks per dessiatine is an outright distortion of the real situation; it obscures the contradictions which are the very crux of the matter. The poor peasants are compelled to rent land at a ruinous price, more than three times the average. The rich buy up land "wholesale" at advantageous prices, and, of course, as occasion offers, lease it to their needy neighbour at a profit of 275 per cent. There is renting and renting. There is feudal bondage, there is Irish renting, and there is trading in land, capitalist farming.

The phenomenon of peasants leasing their allotment land reveals still more strikingly the capitalist relations within the village commune, the pauperisation of the poor and the enrichment of a minority at the expense of this peasant mass which is being reduced to ruin. The renting and letting of land are phenomena in no way connected with the village commune and communal equalisation. Of what significance in real life will this equalised distribution of allotment land be, if the poor are forced to *let* to the rich the land allotted to them on the basis of equalisation? And what more striking refutation of "communalist" views can one imagine than this fact, that real life *circumvents* the official, the register-established equalisation of allotments? The impotence of any kind of equalisation in face of developing capitalism is clearly demonstrated by the fact of the poor letting their allotments and of the rich concentrating rented land in their hands.

How prevalent is this practice of letting allotment land? According to the now obsolete Zemstvo statistical investigations made in the eighties of the last century, to which we have perforce to confine ourselves for the time being, the number of households letting their land and the percentage of allotment land thus let appear to be small. For example, in Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, 25.7 per cent of the householders let their allotment land, the amount of allotment land let representing 14.9 per cent of the total. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 12 per cent of the households let their land. In Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, the amount of land let represents 16 per cent of the total. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, allotment arable land is let by 8,500 householders out of a total of 23,500, i.e., more than one-third. The allotment land let amounts to 50,500 dessiatines out of a total of 410,000 dessiatines, i.e., about 12 per cent. In Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, 6,500 dessiatines of allotment land out of a total of 135,500 dessiatines are let, i.e., less than 5 per cent. In three uyezds of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, 19,000 out of a total of 433,000 dessiatines are let, i.e., also less than 5 per cent. But all these figures only seem insignificant because such percentages tacitly assume that the householders in all groups let their land more or less evenly. But such an assumption is quite

contrary to the facts. What is more important than the absolute figures of renting and letting, than the average percentages of the amount of land let or of the householders letting their land, is the fact that it is the poor peasants who mostly let their land, and that the largest amount of land is rented by the well-to-do peasants. The data of the Zemstvo statistical investigations leave no doubt whatever on this score. The most well-to-do households, comprising 20 per cent of the total, account for from 0.3 to 12.5 per cent of the total land let. On the other hand, the poor groups, comprising 50 per cent of the total households, let from 63.3 per cent to 98.0 per cent of the total land let. And, of course, it is the self same well-to-do peasants who rent the land let by the poor peasants. Here again it is clear that the significance of land-letting varies in the different groups of peasants: the poor peasant lets his land out of poverty, as he is unable to cultivate his land, having no seed, no cattle, no implements, and being desperately hard up for money. The rich peasants let little land: they either exchange one plot of land for another more suitable for their farm, or directly trade in land.

The following are concrete figures for Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia:

	Percentages of	
	householders letting allotment land	allotment land let
Cultivating no land	80	87.1
” up to 5 dessiatines	30	38.4
” 5 to 10 ”	23	17.2
” 10 to 25 ”	16	8.1
” 25 to 50 ”	7	2.9
” over 50 ”	7	13.8
In the uyezd	25.7	14.9

Is it not clear from these figures that the abandonment of the land and proletarisation on a huge scale are combined here with trading in land by a handful of rich people? Is it not characteristic that the percentage of allotment land let rises precisely among those big cultivators who have an average of 17 dessiatines of allotment land per household, 30 dessiatines of purchased land and 44 dessiatines of rented land? All in all, the entire poor group in Dnieper Uyezd, i.e., 40 per cent of the total number of households, having 56,000

dessiatines of allotment land, rents 8,000 and lets 21,500 dessiatines. The well-to-do group, on the other hand, which represents 18.4 per cent of the households, and has 62,000 dessiatines of allotment land, lets 3,000 dessiatines of allotment land and rents 82,000 dessiatines. In three uyezds in Taurida Gubernia, this well-to-do group rents 150,000 dessiatines of allotment land, i.e., three-fifths of the total allotment land let! In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, households possessing no horse (47 per cent of all households) and those having one horse (13 per cent of the total) let allotment land, while owners of ten and more draught animals, i.e., only 7.6 per cent of all households, rent 20, 30, 60 and 70 dessiatines of *allotment* land.

In regard to purchased land, almost the same thing has to be said as in regard to rented land. The difference is that in the renting of land there are feudal features, that in certain circumstances renting is on the basis of labour service and of bondage, i.e., it is a method of binding impoverished neighbouring peasants to the landed estate as farm-hands. Whereas the purchase of land as private property by peasants who have allotment land represents a purely bourgeois phenomenon. In the West, farm-hands and day-labourers are sometimes tied to the land by selling them small plots. In Russia, a similar operation was officially carried out long ago in the shape of the "Great Reform" of 1861, and at the present time the purchase of land by peasants solely expresses the crystallisation out of the village commune of members of the rural bourgeoisie. The way in which the purchase of land by peasants developed after 1861 has been dealt with above in our examination of the statistics of landownership. Here, however, we must point out the enormous concentration of purchased land in the hands of a minority. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, have concentrated in their hands from 59.7 to 99 per cent of land purchased. The poorest households, 50 per cent of the total, possess from 0.4 to 15.4 per cent of all the land purchased by peasants. We can safely say, therefore, that out of the 7,500,000 dessiatines of land which have become the private property of peasants in the period from 1877 to 1905 (see above), from two-thirds to three-fourths are in the hands of an insignificant minority of well-to-do

households. The same applies, of course, to the purchase of land by peasant societies and associations. In 1877, peasant societies owned 765,000 dessiatines of purchased-land and in 1905 the figure was 3,700,000 dessiatines, while peasant associations in 1905 were the private owners of 7,600,000 dessiatines. It would be a mistake to think that land purchased or rented by societies is distributed differently from that purchased or rented individually. The facts prove the contrary. For example in the three mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, statistics collected on the distribution of land rented from the state by peasant *societies* showed that 76 per cent of the rented land was in the hands of the well-to-do group (about 20 percent of the households), while the poorest households, constituting 40 per cent of the total, had only 4 per cent of the total rented land. The peasants divide rented or purchased land only according to "money put down".

IV

Taken all round, the figures quoted above concerning peasants' allotment land, rented land, land purchased and let, lead to the conclusion that with every passing day *the actual use of land* by the peasantry corresponds less and less to the official description of peasant allotment landownership. Of course, if we take gross figures, or "averages" then the amount of allotment land that is let will be balanced by the amount that is rented, the rest of the land rented and purchased will be distributed equally, as it were, among all the peasant households, and the impression will be created that the actual use of land is not very much different from the official, i.e., allotment landownership. But such an impression would be pure fiction, because the actual use of land by the peasantry departs most of all from the original equalised distribution of allotment land *precisely in the extreme groups*: so that "averages" inevitably distort the picture.

As a matter of fact, in the lower groups the total land used by the peasants is relatively—and sometimes absolutely—less than the allotment distribution (letting of land; insignificant share of rented laud). For the higher groups, on the contrary, the total land in use is always both rela-

tively and absolutely larger than the land held as allotments, owing to the concentration of purchased and rented land. We have seen that the poorest groups, constituting 50 per cent of all households, hold from 33 to 37 per cent of the allotment land, but only from 18.6 to 31.9 per cent of the total land used by the peasants. In some cases the drop is almost 50 per cent; for example, in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the percentage of allotment land is 37.4, while that of total land in use is 19.2. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, hold from 29 to 36 per cent of the allotment land, but from 34 to 49 per cent of the total land in use. Here are some concrete figures illustrating these relations. In Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, the poorest households, constituting 40 per cent of the total, have 56,000 dessiatines of allotment land, but they use only 45,000 dessiatines, i.e., 11,000 dessiatines *less*. The well-to-do group (18 per cent of the households) holds 62,000 dessiatines of allotment land, but uses a total of 167,000 dessiatines, i.e., 105,000 dessiatines more. The following table gives the figures for three uyezds in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia.

	Dessiatines per household	
	Allotment land	Total land in use
Peasants with no horse	5.1	4.4
” ” 1 ”	8.1	9.4
” ” 2 horses . . .	10.5	13.8
” ” 3 ”	13.2	21.0
” ” 4 ” and more	16.4	34.6
Total	8.3	10.3

Here, too, as a result of renting and letting, there is an absolute decline in the amount of land in actual use by the lowest group. And this lowest group, i.e., the horseless peasants, comprises fully 30 per cent of the households. Nearly one-third of the households *suffer* an absolute loss as a result of renting and letting land. The one-horse households (37 per cent of the total) have increased their use of land, but to an exceedingly small extent, proportionately less than the average increase in the use of land by the peasants (from 8.3

to 10.3 dessiatines). Hence the *share* of this group in the total land used has diminished: it had 36.6 per cent of the allotment lands in all the three uyezds, now it accounts for 34.1 per cent of the total land in use. On the other hand, an insignificant minority constituting the higher groups have increased their use of land far above the average. Those owning three horses (7.3 per cent of the households) increased the amount of land in their possession by half as much again: from 13 to 21 dessiatines; and those owning many horses (2.3 per cent of the total households) more than doubled the amount of land in use: from 16 to 35 dessiatines.

We see, therefore, as a general phenomenon, *a decline in the role of allotment land in peasant farming*. This decline is taking place at both poles in the countryside, in different ways. Among the poor peasants the role of allotment land is declining because their growing poverty and ruin *compel* them to let their land, to abandon it, to *reduce* the land under cultivation because they lack livestock, implements, seed, and money, and either to hire themselves out on some job or ... to enter the kingdom of heaven. The lower groups of peasants are dying out; famine, scurvy, typhus are doing their work. Among the higher groups of peasants the importance of allotment land is declining because their expanding farms are forced far beyond the bounds of this allotment land, and they have to base themselves on a new type of landownership, not bonded but tree, not of the ancient-tribal kind but bought in the market: on the purchase and renting of land. The richer the peasants are in land, the fainter are the traces of serfdom; the more rapidly economic development proceeds, the more energetic is this emancipation from allotment land, the drawing of all land into the sphere of commerce, the establishment of commercial farming on rented land. Novorossia is a case in point. We have just seen that farming by the well-to-do peasants is done there to a greater extent on purchased and rented land than on allotment land. This may seem paradoxical, but it is a fact: in the part of Russia where land is available in the greatest quantities, the well-to-do peasants, possessing the biggest allotments (from 16 to 17 dessiatines per household) are shifting the centre of gravity of their farming from allotment land to *non-allotment land*!

The fact that the role of allotment land is declining at both rapidly progressing poles of the peasantry is, by the way, of enormous importance in appraising the conditions of that agrarian revolution which the nineteenth century has bequeathed to the twentieth, and which gave rise to the struggle of classes in our revolution. This fact graphically demonstrates that the *break-up* of the old system of landownership—both landlord and peasant ownership—has become *an absolute economic necessity*. This break-up is absolutely inevitable, and no power on earth can prevent it. The struggle is about the form of this break-up and how it is to be effected—in the Stolypin way, by preserving landlordism and by the plunder of the communes by the kulaks, or in the peasant way, by abolishing landlordism and removing all medieval obstacles from the land through its nationalisation. We shall, however, deal with this question in greater detail further on. Here it is necessary to point out the important fact that the decline in the role of allotment land is leading to an extremely uneven distribution of peasant dues and obligations.

It is well known that the dues and obligations falling on the Russian peasant bear very strong traces of the Middle Ages. We cannot here go into the details of Russia's financial history. It is sufficient to mention redemption payments—that direct continuation of medieval quit-rent, that tribute paid to the serf-owning landlords, extracted with the aid of the police state. Suffice it to recall how unequally the lands of the nobility and the peasantry are taxed, the obligations in kind, etc. We quote only total figures of dues and obligations, from the data of the Voronezh *peasant budget* statistics.[63] The average gross income of a peasant family (according to data of 66 typical budgets) is given at 491 rubles 44 kopeks; the gross expenditure, 443 rubles. Net income, 48 rubles 44 kopeks. The total of dues and obligations per "average" household, however, is 34 rubles 35 kopeks. Thus, dues and obligations amount to 70 per cent of the *net income*. Of course, these are only dues in their form, but in fact they are the former feudal exploitation of the "*bonded social-estate*". The net money income of the average family amounts in all to 17 rubles 83 kopeks, i.e., the "taxes" drawn from the Russian

peasant are *double* his net money income—and this is according to the statistics of 1889, not 1849!

But in this case, too, average figures camouflage the peasant's poverty, and present the position of the peasantry in a much better light than it really is. The statistics of the distribution of dues and obligations among the various groups of peasants according to their economic strength show that those paid by the horseless or one-horse peasants (i.e., *three-fifths* of the total peasant families in Russia) are many times in excess not only of their net money income, but even of their net gross income. Here are the figures:

	Budget figures (rubles per household)			
	Gross income	Expenditure	Dues and obligations	Also as percentage of expenditure
a) With no horse	118.10	109.08	15.47	14.19
b) Owning 1 horse . . .	178.12	174.26	17.77	10.20
c) " 2 horses . . .	429.72	379.17	32.02	8.44
d) " 3 " . . .	753.19	632.36	49.55	7.83
e) " 4 " . . .	978.66	937.30	67.90	7.23
f) " 5 " and more	1,755.79	1,593.77	86.34	5.42
Average	491.44	443.00	34.35	7.75

The horseless and one-horse peasants pay in the form of dues *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of all their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf quit-rent was as high as that: the inevitable ruin of the mass of the peasants belonging to him would not have been to the advantage of the landlord. As to the uneven allocation of the dues it is, as we see, enormous. In proportion to their income, the well-to-do peasants pay three to two times less. What is the cause of this inequality? The cause is that the peasants divide the bulk of the dues according to the amount of allotment land held. For the peasant the share of dues and the share of allotment land merge into the single concept—"head". And if, in our example, we calculate the amount of dues and obligations for different groups per dessiatine of allotment land, we will get the following: (a) 2.6 rubles; (b) 2.4 rubles; (c) 2.5 rubles; (d) 2.6 rubles; (e) 2.9 rubles; (f) 3.7 rubles. With the exception of the highest

group, which owns large industrial establishments that are assessed separately, we see an approximately even distribution of the dues. Here, too, the share of allotment land corresponds, as a whole, to the share of dues paid. This phenomenon is a direct survival (and direct proof) of the feudal character of our village commune. From the very conditions of the labour-service system of farming, this could not be otherwise: the landlords could not have provided themselves with bonded labourers from among the local peasants for half a century after the "emancipation" had these peasants not been tied to starvation allotments and not been obliged to pay three times as dear for them. It must not be forgotten that *at the end of the nineteenth century* it has been no rare thing in Russia for the peasant to have to *pay in order to get rid* of his allotment land, to pay "extras" for giving up his allotment, i.e., to pay a certain sum to the person who took over his allotment. For example, Mr. Zhbankov describing the life of the Kostroma peasants in his book *Women's Country* (Kostroma, 1891),[64] says that, among Kostroma folk who leave their holdings in search of work, "it is rare that peasants receive for their land some small part of the dues; usually they let their land on the sole condition that the tenants make some use of it, the owner himself paying all the dues". In *The Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, which appeared in 1896, we find quite a number of similar references to the fact that peasants who become migratory workers have to pay to get rid of their allotments.

Of course, we will find no *such* "power of land" in the purely agricultural gubernias. But even in these gubernias the phenomenon of the declining role of allotment land at both poles in the countryside is undoubtedly to be observed in another form. This fact is universal. That being the case, the distribution of taxes according to the amount of allotment land inevitably gives rise to increasing inequality in taxation. From all sides and by diverse ways economic development is leading to the break-down of the medieval forms of landownership, the scrapping of the social-estate divisions (allotment, landlords' and other lands), to the rise of new forms of economy, evolving indifferently out of fragments of the one and the other type of landownership. The nineteenth century bequeaths to the twentieth century the

imperative and obligatory task of completing this "clearing away" of the medieval forms of landownership. The fight is whether this "clearing" will be done in the form of peasant nationalisation of the land, or in the form of the accelerated plunder of the communes by the kulaks and of the transformation of landlord into Junker economy.

Continuing our examination of the data concerning the present-day system of peasant economy, let us pass from the question of land to the question of livestock raising. Here again we have to establish that, as a general rule, the distribution of livestock among peasant households is *much more* uneven than the distribution of allotment land. Here, for example, we see the extent of livestock raising among the peasants in Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia:

	Per household	
	Allotment land (dess.)	Total livestock (head)
Cultivating no land	6.4	1.1
" up to 5 dessiatines	5.5	2.4
" 5-10 "	8.7	4.2
" 10-25 "	12.5	7.3
" 25-50 "	16.6	13.9
" over 50 "	17.4	30.0
Average	11.2	7.6

The difference in number of livestock between the extreme groups is *ten times* greater than in the amount of allotment land held. The data for livestock raising, too, show that the actual size of the property has little resemblance to what is usually believed to be the case when only average figures are used, and when it is assumed that the allotment determines everything. No matter what uyezd we take, everywhere the distribution of livestock is found to be much more uneven than the distribution of allotment land. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, and having from 29 to 36 per cent of the allotment land, have concentrated in their hands from 37 to 57 per cent of all livestock owned by the peasants in the given uyezd or group of uyezds. The lower groups, constituting 50 per cent of the total households, own 14 to 30 per cent of all the livestock.

But these figures by no means fully reveal the actual differences. No less important, and sometimes even more important than the question of the quantity of livestock, is the question of their *quality*. It goes without saying that the half-ruined peasant, with his poverty-stricken farm, enmeshed on all sides in the toils of bondage, is not in a position to acquire and keep livestock at all good in quality. If the owner (owner indeed!) starves, his livestock must starve; it cannot be otherwise. Budget statistics for Voronezh Gubernia illustrate with extraordinary clarity the wretched condition of livestock raising by the horseless and one-horse peasants, i.e., *three-fifths* of the total peasant farms in Russia. We quote below some extracts from these statistics in order to characterise the state of peasant livestock raising.

	Total livestock per household, in terms of cattle	Average annual expenditure (in rubles)	
		For acquisition and repair of imple ments and purchase of cattle	Cattle feed
(a) With no horse	0.8	0.08	8.12
(b) Owning 1 horse	2.6	5.36	36.70
(c) ” 2 horses	4.9	8.78	71.21
(d) ” 3 ”	9.1	9.70	127.03
(e) ” 4 ”	12.8	30.80	173.24
(f) ” 5 ” and more	19.3	75.80	510.07
Average	5.8	13.14	98.91

In the period from 1896 to 1900 there were in European Russia $3\frac{1}{4}$ million horseless peasant households. One can imagine the state of their “farms” if they spent *eight kopeks* per annum on livestock and implements. One-horse households numbered $3\frac{1}{3}$ millions. With an expenditure of five rubles per annum for buying livestock and implements they can only linger on in a state of everlasting, hopeless poverty. Even in the case of two-horse peasants ($2\frac{1}{2}$ million households) and three-horse peasants (1 million households), expenditure on livestock and implements amounts to only 9-10 rubles per annum. Only in the two higher groups (in

the whole of Russia there are 1 million households of this type out of a total of 11 million) does expenditure on livestock and implements come anywhere near that required for carrying on proper farming.

Quite naturally, in these conditions, the quality of the livestock cannot be the same in the different groups of farms. For example, the value of a draught horse belonging to a one-horse peasant is estimated at 27 rubles, that of a two-horse peasant at 37 rubles, that of a three-horse peasant at 61 rubles, that of a four-horse peasant at 52 rubles and that of a peasant owning many horses at 69 rubles. The difference between the extreme groups is more than 100 per cent. And this phenomenon is general for all capitalist countries where there is small- and large-scale farming. In my book, *The Agrarian Question* (Part I, St. Petersburg, 1908),* I have shown that the investigations made by Drechsler into the conditions of farming and livestock raising in Germany revealed exactly the same state of affairs. The average weight of the average animal on large estates was 619 kilogrammes (op. cit., 1884, p. 259); on peasant farms of 25 and more hectares, 427 kilogrammes, on farms of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 25 hectares, 382 kilogrammes, on farms of $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}$ hectares, 352 kilogrammes, and finally on farms up to $2\frac{1}{2}$ hectares, 301 kilogrammes.

The quantity and quality of the livestock also determine the manner in which the land is tended, particularly the way it is manured. We showed above that all the statistics for the whole of Russia attest that the landlords' land is better manured than the peasants' land. Now we see that this division, which was proper and legitimate for the days of serfdom, is now obsolete. Between the various categories of peasant farms lies a deep gulf, and all investigations, calculations, findings and theories based on the "average" peasant farm lead to absolutely wrong conclusions on this question. Zemstvo statistics, unfortunately, very rarely study the various groups of households and are confined to figures covering the commune. But as an exception to the

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 183-94.—*Ed.*

rule, during a house-to-house investigation made in Perm Gubernia (Krasnoufimsk Uyezd) the following precise data as to the manuring of land by the various peasant households were collected:

	Percentage of farms manuring land at all	Number of cart-loads of manure per manure-using household
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	33.9	80
" from 5 to 10 "	66.2	116
" from 10 to 25 "	70.3	197
" from 25 to 50 "	76.9	358
" more than 50 "	84.3	732
Average	51.7	176

Here we see types of farm that differ in agricultural methods according to the size of farm. And investigators working in another area who paid attention to this question arrived at similar conclusions. Statisticians in Orel Gubernia report that the amount of manure obtained per head of cattle on the farms of well-to-do peasants is almost twice the amount obtained on the farms of needy peasants. In the group with an average of 7.4 head of livestock per household, 391 poods of manure are obtained, while in the group with 2.8 head of livestock per household 208 poods are obtained. The "normal" amount is considered to be 400 poods, so that only a small minority of well-to-do peasants are able to reach this norm. The poor peasants are obliged to use straw and manure for fuel, and sometimes even to sell manure, etc.

In this connection we must examine the question of the increase in the number of horseless peasants. In 1888-91 there were, in 48 gubernias of European Russia, 2.8 million horseless households, out of a total of 10.1 million households, i.e., 27.3 per cent. After approximately nine or ten years, in 1896-1900, out of a total of 11.1 million households, 3.2 million, or 29.2 per cent, were horseless. The increasing expropriation of the peasantry is, therefore, beyond doubt. But if one examines this process from the agronomical point of view, one arrives at a conclusion which at first sight is paradoxical. This was the conclusion arrived at by the well-

known Narodnik writer, Mr. V. V., as early as 1884 (*Vestnik Yevropy*,[65] 1884, No. 7), when he compared the number of dessiatines of arable per horse on our peasant farms with that in the "normal" three-field farm—normal from the point of view of agronomy. It turned out that peasants keep *too many* horses: they plough only 5 to 8 dessiatines per horse, instead of 7 to 10 as required by agronomy. "Consequently," concluded Mr. V. V., "the decline in horse-ownership among a section of the population in this part of Russia [the Central Black-Earth Belt] must, to a certain extent, be regarded as the restoration of the normal ratio between the number of draught animals and the area to be cultivated." In reality, the paradox is due to the fact that decline in horse-ownership is accompanied by the concentration of land in the hands of the well-to-do households, who arrive at a "normal" ratio between the number of horses and the cultivated area. This "normal" ratio is not "restored" (for it never existed in our peasant economy) but is achieved only by the peasant bourgeoisie. The "abnormality", on the other hand, boils down to the fragmentation of the means of production on the small peasant farms: the amount of land cultivated by a million one-horse peasants, with the aid of a million horses, is better and more thoroughly cultivated by well-to-do peasants with the aid of one-half or three-quarters of a million horses.

In regard to implements on the peasant farms, a distinction must be drawn between ordinary peasant implements and improved agricultural implements. Generally speaking, the distribution of the first category corresponds to the distribution of draught animals; we shall find nothing new in statistics of this kind to characterise peasant farming. Improved implements, on the other hand, which are much more expensive, and are a paying proposition only on larger farms, are introduced only on successfully developing farms, and are immeasurably more concentrated. Data concerning this concentration are extremely important, because they alone enable us to judge precisely in what direction, and in what social conditions, there is *progress* in peasant farming. There is no doubt that a step forward has been made in this direction since 1861, but very often the capitalist character of this progress, not only in landlord farming, but also in peasant farming, is contested or called in question.

The following Zemstvo statistical data show the distribution of improved implements among the peasantry:

	Improved agricultural implements per 100 households	
	Two uyezds of Orel Gubernia	One uyezd of Voronezh Gubernia
With no horses	0.01	—
” 1 horse	0.2	0.06
” 2-3 horses	3.5	1.6
” 4 horses and more . . .	36.0	23.0
Average	2.2	1.2

In these localities, improved implements are comparatively little to be found among the peasants. The proportion of households possessing such implements is quite insignificant But the lower groups hardly employ them at all, whereas among the higher groups they are in regular use. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, only 13 per cent of the peasants have improved implements: but the percentage rises to 40 per cent in the group owning 5 to 20 draught animals and to 62 per cent in the group owning 20 and more animals. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia (three districts of this uyezd), there are 10 improved implements for every hundred farms—this is the general average; but for every hundred farms cultivating from 20 to 50 dessiatines there are 50 improved implements and for every hundred farms cultivating 50 dessiatines there are as many as 180 implements. If we take the ratios we used earlier to compare the data of different uyezds, we find that the well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, possess from 70 to 86 per cent of all the improved implements, whereas the poor households, which constitute 50 per cent of the total, account for from 1.3 to 3.6 per cent. Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the progress made in the spread of improved implements among the peasantry (reference to this progress is made, by the way, in the above-mentioned work of the year 1907 by Mr. Kaufman) is the progress of the well-to-do peasantry. Three-fifths of the total peasant households, the horseless and one-horse peasants, are almost completely unable to employ these improvements.

V

In examining peasant farming, we have up till now taken the peasants mainly as proprietors; at the same time we pointed to the fact that the lower groups are being continuously squeezed out of that category. Where do they land? Evidently in the ranks of the proletariat. We must now investigate in detail how this formation of the proletariat, particularly the rural proletariat, is actually taking place, and how the market for labour-power in agriculture is being formed. In the case of the labour-service system of farming the typical class figures are the feudal landlord and the bonded peasant who has been allotted land; in capitalist farming the typical figures are the employer-farmer and the farm-hand or the day-labourer who hires himself out. We have shown how the landlord and the well-to-do peasant are transformed into employers of labour. Now let us see how the peasant is transformed into a hired labourer.

Is the employment of hired labour by well-to-do peasants widespread? If we take-the average percentage of households employing farm-hands among the total peasant households (as is usually done), the percentage will not be very high: in Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, it is 12.9 per cent; in Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 9 per cent; in Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, 8 per cent; in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 10.6 per cent; two uyezds in Orel Gubernia, 3.5 per cent; one uyezd in Voronezh Gubernia, 3.8 per cent; three uyezds in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, 2.6 per cent. But statistics of this kind are, strictly speaking, fictitious, since they express the percentage of households employing farm-hands to the total number of households—including those which provide the farm-hands. In every capitalist society the bourgeoisie constitute an insignificant minority of the population. The number of households employing hired labour will always be "small". The question is, whether it means that a special type of farm is arising, or whether the employment of labour is a chance affair. To this question, too, a very definite answer is provided by Zemstvo statistics, which in all cases show the percentage of households employing farm-hands to be immeasurably larger in the groups of well-to-do peasants than the average for the

uyezd as a whole. Let us quote the figures for Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, which, as an exception to the rule, give information not only about the hiring of farm-hands, but also about the hiring of day-labourers, i.e., the form of hiring that is more typical of agriculture.

	Number of male workers per household	Percentage of farms hiring labours: Hired for definite periods	For mowing	For reaping	For threshing
Cultivating no land. . . .	0.6	0.15	0.6	—	—
" up to 5 dessiatines	1.0	0.7	5.1	4.7	9.2
" 5 to 10 dessiatines	1.2	4.2	14.3	20.1	22.3
" 10 to 20 dessiatines	1.5	17.2	27.2	43.9	25.9
" 20 to 50 dessiatines	1.7	50.0	47.9	69.6	33.7
" more than 50 dessiatines	2.0	83.1	64.5	87.2	44.7
Average	1.2	10.3	16.4	24.3	18.8

It will be seen that a distinguishing feature of the well-to-do households is that they have larger families, they have more of their own family as workers than the poor households have. Nevertheless, they employ incomparably more hired labourers. "Family co-operation" serves as a basis for extending the scale of farming and is thus transformed into capitalist co-operation. In the higher groups, the hiring of labourers is obviously becoming a system, a condition for conducting expanded farming. Moreover, the hiring of day-labourers turns out to be very considerably widespread even among the middle group of peasants: in the two higher groups (constituting 10.3 per cent of the households) the majority of the households hire labourers, while in the group cultivating from 10 to 20 dessiatines (22.4 per cent), *more than two-fifths* of the households hire labourers for reaping. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the well-to-do peasants could not exist if there were not a vast army of agricultural labourers ready to serve them. And if, as we have seen, the data concerning the average percentages of households hiring

labourers show considerable fluctuations for the different uyezds, what is universal is the concentration of households employing agricultural labourers in the higher groups of the peasantry, that is to say, the transformation of the well-to-do households into employers of labour. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, account for from 48 to 78 per cent of the total number of households employing labourers.

In regard to the other pole in the countryside, statistics do not usually indicate the number of households which provide hired labour of all kinds. On quite a number of questions our Zemstvo statistics have made considerable progress compared with the old, official statistics given in governors' reports and issued by various departments. But in one question, the old, official point of view has been retained even in Zemstvo statistics, and that is in regard to the so-called peasant "employments". Farming on his allotment is regarded as the peasant's real occupation; all other occupations are classed as side "employments" or "industries" and in doing so economic categories are lumped together that should be entered separately by anyone knowing the ABC of political economy. For example, the category "agricultural industrialists" includes, together with the mass of wage-labourers, also entrepreneur farmers (for example, melon growers); next to them, also in the category "households with employments", will be included beggars and traders, domestic servants and master-craftsmen, etc. Clearly, this crying political and economic muddle is a direct survival of serfdom. Indeed, it was a matter of indifference to the feudal landlord what occupation *his* quit-rent peasant followed on the side, whether that of a trader, a hired labourer or a master-industrialist. All the serfs were equally bound to pay quit-rent, all were regarded as being temporarily or conditionally absent from their real occupation.

After the abolition of serfdom, this point of view came, with every passing day, into increasingly sharp conflict with reality. Most of the peasant households having earnings on the side undoubtedly belong to the category of households which provide wage-labourers; but we cannot obtain a really exact picture of the situation, because the minority who are *master*-industrialists are included in the general total and

embellish the position of the needy ones. Let us quote an example to illustrate the point. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, the statisticians have singled out the category of "agricultural industries" from the general mass of "industries".[66] Of course, this term is not exact either, but the list of occupations at least indicates that out of a total of 14,063 "industrialists" of this kind, 13,297 are farm-hands and day-labourers. Thus wage-labourers predominate very largely. The distribution of agricultural industries is found to be the following:

	Percentage of male peasants engaged in agricultural industries
Having no draught animals	71.4
" 1 draught animal	48.7
" 2 to 3 draught animals . . .	20.4
" 4 " " . . .	8.5
" 5 to 10 " " . . .	5.0
" 10 to 20 " " . . .	3.9
" 20 draught animals and more	2.0
In the uyezd	25.0

Thus seven-tenths of the horseless peasants and almost half the one-horse peasants are hired labourers. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the average percentage of households whose members engage in agricultural industries is 16.2; but of those which do not cultivate their land 52.3 per cent engage in agricultural industries, and of those which cultivate up to five dessiatines, 26.4 per cent. In other uyezds, where the agricultural industries are not specified, the position is not quite so clear; nevertheless, it remains the general rule that "industries" and "employments" are, broadly speaking, the speciality of the lower groups. The lower groups, constituting 50 per cent of the total households, account for from 60 to 93 per cent of the households with "employments".

We see from this that, in the general scheme of the national economy, the position of the lower groups of the peasantry, particularly the one-horse and horseless households, is that of *farm-hands and day-labourers* (more broadly—hired labourers) *possessing allotments*. This conclusion is confirmed by the statistics showing the increase in the employment of hired labour since 1861 over the whole of Russia,

by the investigations made into the budgets of the lower groups to trace the sources of their incomes, and finally by the statistics on the standard of living of these groups. We shall dwell in somewhat greater detail on this threefold proof.

General statistics regarding the growth in the number of rural hired labour in the whole of Russia are available only for migratory workers, without indicating whether they are engaged in agricultural or non-agricultural occupations. The question as to whether the former or the latter preponderate in the total number was decided in Narodnik literature in favour of the former, but we shall give below the reasons for an opposite point of view. There is no doubt whatever that the number of migratory workers among the peasantry increased rapidly after 1861. All evidence goes to prove this. An approximate statistical expression of this phenomenon is found in the returns dealing with passport revenue and the number of passports issued. Passport revenue amounted to 2,100,000 rubles in 1868; 3,300,000 rubles in 1884, and 4,500,000 rubles in 1894. This shows a more than doubled revenue. The number of passports and certificates issued in European Russia was 4,700,000 in 1884, 7,800,000 in 1897 and 9,300,000 in 1898. In thirteen years, as we see, the number doubled. All these figures correspond, on the whole, with other estimates, for example, with that made by Mr. Uvarov, who summarised the figures of Zemstvo statistics—for the most part obsolete—for 126 uyezds in 20 gubernias and arrived at the likely total of 5,000,000 migratory workers.[67] Mr. S. Korolenko, on the basis of data on the number of surplus local workers, arrived at the figure of 6,000,000.

In the opinion of Mr. Nikolai—on, the "overwhelming majority" of these are engaged in agricultural industries. In *The Development of Capitalism** I showed in detail that the statistics and investigations of the sixties, eighties and nineties fully prove this conclusion to be wrong. The majority, although not the overwhelming majority, of the migratory workers are engaged in non-agricultural occupations. The following are the fullest and latest data concerning the dis-

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 568-81—*Ed.*

tribution, by gubernias, of residential permits issued in European Russia in 1898:

Groups of gubernias	Total residential permits of all kinds issued in 1898
(1) 17 gubernias with predominance of non-agricultural migration	3,369,597
(2) 12 gubernias, intermediate	1,674,231
(3) 21 gubernias with predominance of agricultural migration	2,765,762
Total for 50 gubernias	7,809,590

If we assume that in the intermediate gubernias half are workers in agricultural jobs, then the *approximate*, the most probable distribution will be as follows: about 4,200,000 non-agricultural hired labourers and *about 3,600,000 agricultural hired labourers*. Alongside this figure should be placed the figure given by Mr. Rudnev,[68] who in 1894 summed up the returns of Zemstvo statistics for 148 uyezds in 19 gubernias and arrived at the approximate figure of 3,500,000 agricultural wage-workers. This figure, based on the returns for the eighties, includes both local and migratory agricultural workers. At the end of the nineties, there were so many migratory agricultural workers alone.

The growth in the number of agricultural wage-workers is directly connected with the development of that capitalist enterprise in agriculture which we have traced in landlord and peasant economy. Take, for example, the use of machinery in agriculture. We have quoted precise data proving that, so far as concerns the well-to-do peasants, it signifies the transition to capitalist enterprise. As for landlord economy, the use of machinery, and in general of improved implements, means inevitably the squeezing out of the labour-service system by capitalism. The implements of the peasant are replaced by the implements of the landlord; the old three-field system is supplanted by new farming methods connected with the change in the implements employed; the bonded peasant is not suitable for work with improved implements and his place is taken by the farm-hand or the day-labourer.

In the region of European Russia where the use of machinery developed most after the Reform, the employment of hired labour from outside is also most widespread. This

region comprises the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia. The influx of agricultural labourers into that region has given rise to extremely typical and clearly expressed capitalist relations. These relations deserve to be dealt with, in order to compare the old and hitherto predominant system of labour-service economy with the new tendencies increasingly coming to the fore. First of all, it must be noted that the southern area is distinguished by the highest wages paid in agriculture. According to statistics for a whole decade (1881-91), which preclude any casual fluctuations, the highest wages in Russia are paid in Taurida, Bessarabia and Don gubernias. Here the wages of a labourer hired by the year, including keep, amount to 143 rubles 50 kopeks, and those of a seasonal labourer (for the summer), 55 rubles 67 kopeks. Next highest wages are those paid in the most highly industrial area—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir and Yaroslavl gubernias. Here the wages of an agricultural labourer hired for the year amount to 135 rubles 80 kopeks, and those of a seasonal worker 53 rubles. The lowest wages are paid in the central agricultural gubernias—Kazan, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel and Kursk, i.e., the principal districts where labour service, bondage and all sorts of survivals of serfdom prevail. Here the labourer hired for the year receives only 92 rubles 95 kopeks, a third less than the wages paid in the most highly capitalist gubernias, and the seasonal worker 35 rubles 64 kopeks, 20 rubles less for the summer than is paid in the south. It is precisely from this central district that we see an enormous migration of workers. Every spring more than one and a half million people leave this district, partly to seek agricultural employment (mainly in the south, and partly, as we shall see below, in the industrial gubernias), and also to seek non-agricultural employment in the capital cities and in the industrial gubernias. Between this principal area of egress and the two principal areas of ingress (the agricultural south and the capital cities with the two industrial gubernias) there are zones of gubernias in which average wages are paid. These gubernias attract part of the workers from the "cheapest" and most hunger-stricken central area, while in their turn supplying part of the workers for districts where higher wages are paid. In Mr. S. Korolenko's book, *Freely Hired Labour*, the author

uses very extensive material to give a detailed description of this process of workers' migration and of the shifts in population. In this way capitalism achieves a more even distribution of the population (even, of course, from the point of view of the requirements of capital); levels wages throughout the country; creates a really single, national labour-market; gradually cuts the ground from under the old modes of production by "enticing" the bonded peasant with high wages. Hence the endless complaints of the landed gentry about the local workers becoming corrupted, about the debauchery and drunkenness created by migration, about the workers being "spoilt" by the towns, etc., etc.

By the end of the nineteenth century fairly large capitalist agricultural enterprises were established in the districts to which the greatest number of workers migrated. Capitalist co-operation arose in the employment, for example, of machines like threshers. Mr. Tezyakov, in describing the conditions of life and labour of agricultural workers in Kherson Gubernia,[69] points out that the horse-drawn threshing-machine requires from 14 to 23 and more labourers, while the steam thresher requires from 50 to 70. Some farms employed between 500 and 1,000 workers—an extremely high figure for agriculture. Capitalism made it possible to replace more costly male labour by female and child labour. For example, in the small town of Kakhovka—one of the chief labour-markets in Taurida Gubernia, where as many as 40,000 workers used to gather, and where, in the nineties of the last century, there were between 20,000 and 30,000, the number of women in 1890 comprised 12.7 per cent of all the registered workers, while in 1895 the percentage was already 25.6. Children, in 1893, constituted 0.7 per cent of the total, and in 1895 already 1.69 per cent.

Collecting workers from all over Russia, the capitalist farms sorted them out according to their requirements, and created something akin to the hierarchy of factory workers. For example, the following categories are indicated: full workers and semi-workers, these again being subdivided into "workers of great strength" (16 to 20 years of age) and semi-workers of "little assistance" (children between the ages of 8 and 14). No trace here remains of the old, so-called "patriarchal" relations between the landlord and "his" peas-

ant. Labour-power becomes a commodity like any other. The "truly Russian" type of bondage disappears, yielding place to weekly wage payment, fierce competition, bargaining between workers and employers. The accumulation of enormous masses of workers in the labour-markets, and incredibly arduous and insanitary working conditions, have given rise to attempts to establish public control over the big farms. These attempts are characteristic of "large-scale industry" in agriculture, but of course they cannot be durable so long as political liberties and legal labour organisations are lacking. How hard the working conditions of the immigrant workers are may be judged by the fact that the working day ranges from $12\frac{1}{2}$ to 15 hours. Injuries to workers tending machines have become a common occurrence. Occupational diseases have spread (for example, among workers tending threshing-machines, etc.). All the "charms" of purely capitalist exploitation in the most developed, American, form are to be observed in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, side by side with purely medieval labour-service and corvée systems of economy, which have long ago disappeared in the advanced countries. The whole great variety of agrarian relations in Russia amounts to the interweaving of feudal and bourgeois methods of exploitation.

To complete this account of the conditions of hired labour in Russian agriculture, we may quote statistics regarding the budgets of peasant farms in the lower groups. Wage-labour is included here under the euphemistic heading of "employments" or "industries". In what relation does the income from these "employments" stand to the income from agriculture? The budgets of the horseless and one-horse peasants in Voronezh Gubernia give an exact answer to this question. The gross income of a horseless peasant from all sources is estimated at 118 rubles 10 kopeks, of which 57 rubles 11 kopeks is from farming and 59 rubles 4 kopeks from "industries". The latter sum is made up of 36 rubles 75 kopeks income from "personal industries" and 22 rubles 29 kopeks miscellaneous income. Included in the latter item is *income from the letting of land*! The gross income of a one-horse peasant is 178 rubles 12 kopeks, of which 127 rubles 69 kopeks is from farming and 49 rubles 22 kopeks from "industries" (35 rubles

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

from personal industries, 6 rubles carting, 2 rubles from "commercial and industrial establishments and enterprises" and 6 rubles miscellaneous income). If we subtract the expenditure on farming, we will get 69 rubles 37 kopeks income from farming, as against 49 rubles 22 kopeks income from "industries". That is how three-fifths of the peasant households in Russia obtain their livelihood. Naturally, the standard of living of these peasants is no higher, and sometimes even lower, than that of farm-hands. In this same Voronezh Gubernia the average yearly wage of a farm-hand (during the decade 1881-91) was 57 rubles, plus keep, which cost 42 rubles. Yet the cost of maintaining a *whole family* of four persons amounted to *78 rubles per annum* in the case of a horseless peasant and 98 rubles per annum for a family of five in the case of a one-horse peasant. The Russian peasant has been reduced by labour service, taxes, and capitalist exploitation to such a miserable, starvation standard of life as seems incredible in Europe. In Europe such social types are called *paupers*.

VI

To sum up all that has been said above concerning the differentiation of the peasantry, we will first of all quote the only printed summary statistics for the whole of European Russia, enabling us to judge of the various groups existing within the peasantry at various periods. These are the returns of the army-horse censuses. In the second edition of my book, *The Development of Capitalism*,* I summarised these returns for 48 gubernias in European Russia for the periods 188-91 and 1896-1900. The following is an abstract of the most important results:

	Number of peasant households (in millions)			
	1888-91		1896-1900	
	Total	%	Total	%
Horseless	2.8	27.3	3.2	29.2
Having 1 horse	2.9	28.5	3.4	30.3
" 2 horses. . . .	2.2	22.2	2.5	22.0
" 3 "	1.1	10.6	1.0	9.4
" 4 horses and more	1.1	11.4	1.0	9.1
Total	10.1	100.0	11.1	100.0

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 146.—*Ed.*

As I have already mentioned, incidentally, above, these figures evidence the increasing expropriation of the peasantry. The one-million increase in the number of households went entirely to enlarge the two lowest groups. The total number of horses declined in this period from 16.91 to 16.87 millions, that is to say, the peasantry as a whole became somewhat poorer in horses. The highest group also became poorer in horses: in 188-91 it had 5.5 horses per household compared with 5.4 in 1896-1900.

It is easy to draw the conclusion from these figures that no "differentiation" is taking place among the peasantry; the poorest group increased most, whereas the richest group diminished most (in number of households). This is not differentiation, but levelling up of poverty! And such conclusions, based on similar methods, can very often be found in the literature on the subject. But if we ask: have the relations between the groups within the peasantry changed?—we see something different. In 1888-91 the lowest groups, constituting half the households, owned 13.7 per cent of the total number of horses, and in 1896-1900 the percentage was exactly the same. The most well-to-do groups, which constituted one-fifth of the households, owned 52.6 per cent of the total number of horses in the first period, and 53.2 per cent in the second period. Clearly, the relations between the groups remained almost unchanged. The peasantry became poorer, the well-to-do groups became poorer, the crisis of 1891 made itself felt very seriously, but the relations between the rural bourgeoisie and the peasantry that was being driven to ruin did not change as a result, nor could they change essentially.

This circumstance is often overlooked by those who undertake to judge of the differentiation of the peasantry on the basis of fragmentary statistics. It would be ridiculous to imagine, for instance, that isolated statistics on the distribution of horses are able to explain anything at all in regard to the differentiation of the peasantry. This distribution proves absolutely nothing, if it is not taken together with *the entire sum total* of data on peasant farming. If, in examining these data, we have established what is common among the groups in regard to distribution of the renting and the letting of land, improved implements and manure, earnings and

purchased land, hired labourers and numbers of livestock, if we have proved that all these various aspects of the phenomenon are inseparably interconnected, and reveal in fact the formation of opposite economic types—a proletariat and a rural bourgeoisie—if we have established all this, and only to the extent that we have established this, we can take isolated figures showing, say, the distribution of horses, to *illustrate* all that has been said above. On the other hand, if we are referred to this or that case of diminution in the number of horses owned by the well-to-do group, say, over a given period, it would be sheer nonsense to draw any general conclusions *from this alone* as to the relation within the peasantry between the rural bourgeoisie and the other groups. In no single capitalist country, in no single branch of economy, is there, or can there be (the market being predominant) an even process of development: capitalism *cannot* develop otherwise than in leaps and zigzags, now rapidly advancing, now dropping temporarily below the previous level. And the crux of the matter concerning the Russian agrarian crisis and the forthcoming upheaval is not what degree of development has been reached by capitalism, or what the rate of that development is, but whether it is, or is not, a capitalist crisis and upheaval, whether it is, or is not, taking place in conditions in which the peasantry is being transformed into a rural bourgeoisie and a proletariat, and whether the relations between the various households within the commune are, or are not, bourgeois relations. In other words: the primary object of any study of the agrarian question in Russia is to establish the basic data for characterising the class substance of agrarian relations. And only after we have established what classes and what trend of development we are dealing with, can we take up particular questions about the rate of development, the various modifications in the general trend of development, etc.

Marxist views on post-Reform peasant economy in Russia are grounded on the recognition of this economy as petty-bourgeois in type. And the controversy which economists in the Marxist camp have waged with the Narodnik economists has revolved primarily (and cannot but do so, if the real nature of the differences between them is to be ascertained) around the point as to whether this characterisation is

correct, whether it is applicable or not. Unless *this* point is quite definitely cleared up, no progress whatever can be made towards more concrete or practical questions. For example, it would be an absolutely hopeless and confusing task to examine the different ways of solving the agrarian question bequeathed by the nineteenth century to the twentieth century, if we have not first cleared up in what general direction our agrarian evolution is proceeding, what classes stand to gain should events take this or that course, etc.

The detailed figures on the differentiation of the peasantry quoted above reveal precisely that foundation of all the other questions of the agrarian revolution without an understanding of which it is impossible to proceed. The sum total of the relations between the various groups of the peasantry which we have studied in detail at opposite ends of Russia, reveals to us precisely what is the essence of the social and economic relations existing within the commune. These relations strikingly reveal the petty-bourgeois nature of peasant economy in the present historical situation. When the Marxists used to say that the small producer in agriculture (irrespective of whether he cultivates allotment or any other land) is inevitably, with the development of commodity economy, a petty bourgeois, this proposition caused astonishment; it was said to be a mechanical, groundless attempt to apply outside models to our own original conditions. But the data on the relations between the groups, on the way the rich members of the commune outbid the poorer members for possession of the rented land, on the employment of farm-hands by the former and the conversion of the latter into hired labourers, etc., etc.—all these data confirm the theoretical conclusions of Marxism and render them incontrovertible. The question of the significance of the commune in the trend of Russia's economic development *is decided irrevocably* by these data, because it is this actual trend of the actual (and not imaginary) commune that our data indicate. Despite all the equalised distribution of allotment land and despite the redistributions, etc., *it turns out* that the trend of the real economic development of members of the peasant commune consists precisely in the formation of a rural bourgeoisie and in the squeezing-out of the mass of the poorest peasants into the ranks of the proletariat. As we shall see

further on, both the Stolypin agrarian policy and the nationalisation of the land demanded by the Trudoviks are in line with this trend of development, even though there is an enormous difference between these two forms of "solution" of the agrarian question from the point of view of the rapidity of social development, the growth of productive forces and the maximum observance of the interests of the masses.

We must now also examine the question of the development of commercial farming in Russia. The foregoing exposition included, as a premise, the well-known fact that the whole of the post-Reform period is distinguished by the growth of trade and exchange. We think it is quite superfluous to cite statistics in confirmation of this. But we must show, first, precisely to what extent present-day peasant economy is already subordinated to the market and, secondly, what *special* forms agriculture assumes as it becomes subordinated to the market.

The most precise data on the first question are contained in the budget statistics of the Voronezh Zemstvo. From these statistics we are able to separate the money expenditure and income of a peasant family from the total expenditure and income (gross incomes and expenditures were given above). Here is a table showing the role of the market:

	What percentage of his total expenditure and income is the peasant's money expenditure and income?	
	%	%
With no horse	57.1	54.6
" 1 horse	46.5	41.4
" 2 horses	43.6	45.7
" 3 "	41.5	42.3
" 4 "	46.9	40.8
" 5 " and more	60.2	59.2
Average	49.1	47.9

Thus, even the farm of the *middle* peasant—leave alone that of the well-to-do and of the impoverished, semi-proletarian, peasants—is subordinated to the market to a very powerful extent. Hence all arguments about peasant farming which ignore the predominant and growing role of the market, of exchange, of commodity production, are fundamentally wrong. The abolition of the feudalist latifundia and of

landlordism—a measure upon which all the thoughts of the Russian peasantry were concentrated at the end of the nineteenth century—will *increase* and not diminish the power of the market, for the growth of trade and commodity production *is retarded* by labour service and bondage.

In regard to the second question, it must be pointed out that the penetration of capital into agriculture is a distinctive process which cannot be properly understood if we confine ourselves to bald figures covering the whole of Russia. Agriculture becomes commercial not suddenly, and not to an equal degree on different farms and in different parts of the country. On the contrary, the market usually subordinates to itself one aspect of the complex economy of agriculture in one locality and another aspect in another, the remaining aspects not disappearing, but adapting themselves to the "main", i.e., the money, aspect. For example, in one area it is mainly commercial grain farming that develops: the staple produced for sale is grain. Livestock raising plays a subordinate role in such farming, and further—in extreme cases of the one-sided development of grain farming—almost disappears. The Far-West "wheat factories" in America, for instance, were sometimes organised for one summer, almost without livestock. In other areas it is mainly commercial stock-farming that develops: the staples produced for sale are meat or dairy produce. Purely crop farming adapts itself to stock-farming. Of course, both the size of the farm and the methods of farm organisation will differ in each case. Suburban dairy farming cannot be judged by the area of land under cultivation. The same measure of what is large and small farming cannot be applied to the steppe farmer, the market gardener, the tobacco-grower and the "dairy farmer" (to use an English term), etc.

The penetration of exchange and trade into agriculture gives rise to its specialisation, and this specialisation steadily increases. The same economic indexes (the number of horses, for example) acquire a different significance in different regions of commercial agriculture. Among the horseless peasants in the environs of the capital cities there are, for example, big farmers who possess, say, dairy cattle, do a big volume of business and employ wage-labour. Of course, the number of such farmers among the mass of horseless and

one-horse peasants is absolutely insignificant; but if we take just the gross figures covering the whole country we shall not be able to trace the special type of capitalism in agriculture.

This circumstance deserves special notice. If it is ignored, a correct picture of the development of capitalism in agriculture cannot be obtained, and it is easy to fall into the error of vulgarisation. The full complexity of the process can be grasped only by taking into account the real specific features of agriculture. It is utterly wrong to say that, owing to its specific features, agriculture is not subject to the laws of capitalist development. It is true that the specific features of agriculture hinder its subordination to the market; nevertheless, everywhere and in all countries the *growth of commercial agriculture* is proceeding apace. But the forms in which this formation of commercial agriculture takes place are indeed distinctive, and call for special methods of study.

To illustrate what has been said, let us take graphic examples from various regions of commercial agriculture in Russia. In the commercial grain farming regions (Novorossia, Trans-Volga region) we see an extremely rapid increase in the harvest of cereals. In 1864-66 these gubernias were behind the Central Black-Earth gubernias, with a net harvest of only 2.1 chetverts per head of population; in 1883-87 these gubernias were ahead of the central area with a net harvest of 3.4 chetverts per head. The most characteristic feature of this region in the post-Reform period is expansion of the area under crops. Very often the methods of tilling the land here are of the most primitive kind; attention is concentrated exclusively on sowing the largest possible area. In the second half of the nineteenth century something similar to the American "wheat factories" developed here. One can judge quite well from the area under crops (which among peasants in the higher groups attained 271 dessiatines per household) as to the size and type of farm. In another region—the industrial, and particularly in the environs of the capital cities—such an expansion of the crop area is out of the question. It is not commercial grain farming, but commercial stock-farming, that is particularly characteristic here. In this case a proper picture of the farm cannot be got from the number of dessiatines tilled or the number of horses employed. A much more suitable gauge is the number of cows

(dairy farming). A change in crop rotation, grass cultivation and not the expansion of the crop area, are the characteristic indications here of progress in large-scale farming. The number of households with many horses is smaller here; a smaller number of horses may sometimes even be a sign of progress. On the other hand, the peasants in these parts are better off for cows than in the rest of Russia. Mr. Blagoveshchensky, in summing up the Zemstvo statistics, considered the average to be 1.2 cows per household; in 18 uyezds of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver and Smolensk gubernias, we have 1.6, and in St. Petersburg Gubernia alone 1.8 per household.[70] Both commercial capital and capital invested in production are applied mainly to livestock produce. The size of income depends largely on the number of milch cows owned. Dairy farms are developing. The hiring of agricultural labourers by well-to-do peasants is developing; we have already mentioned that people migrate from the impoverished central area to the *industrial* gubernias to take up *agricultural* work. In a word, the very same socio-economic relations manifest themselves here in an altogether different form, under farming conditions that do not resemble purely crop-raising conditions.

And if we take the cultivation of special crops, like tobacco-growing, or the combination of agriculture and technical processing of the produce (distilling, beet-sugar refining, oil seed-pressing, potato-starch making and other industries), the forms in which capitalist relations manifest themselves will resemble neither those which exist in commercial grain farming nor those which develop in commercial livestock farming. In this case we must take as our gauge either the area under special crops, or the size of the undertaking connected with the given farm, which is engaged in processing the produce.

Gross agricultural statistics, which deal only with the sizes of land plots or with the number of cattle, do not by a long way take account of all this variety of forms, so that conclusions based only on statistics of this kind quite often prove to be wrong. Commercial farming is growing much more rapidly, the influence of exchange is wider, and capital is transforming agriculture much more profoundly than one might suppose from aggregate figures and abstract averages.

VII

Let us now sum up what has been said above about the essence of the agrarian question and the agrarian crisis in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century.

What is the essence of this crisis? M. Shanin, in his pamphlet *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property* (Vilna, 1907), insists that our agrarian crisis is a crisis of agricultural methods, and that its root cause lies in the need for raising the technique of agriculture, which is incredibly low in Russia, in the need for changing over to more efficient methods of arable farming, etc.

This opinion is wrong, because it is too abstract. Undoubtedly a change over to higher techniques is necessary, but, in the first place, this transition has actually been going on in Russia since 1861. However slow the progress, it is beyond all doubt that both landlord farming and peasant farming, as represented by the well-to-do minority, have been going over to grass cultivation, to the use of improved implements, to more systematic and careful manuring of the soil, etc. And since this slow progress in agricultural technique has been a general process since 1861, it is obvious that it is not enough to quote it as an explanation of the universally admitted intensification of the agricultural crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. Secondly, both forms of "solution" of the agrarian question that have been advanced in practice—both the Stolypin solution *from above*, by preserving landlordism and finally doing away with the commune, by having the kulaks plunder it, and also the peasant (Trudovik) solution *from below*, by abolishing landlordism and by nationalising all the land—both these solutions, each in its own way, facilitate the transition to a higher technique and promote agricultural progress. The only difference is that one solution bases this progress on accelerating the process of forcing the poor peasants out of agriculture, while the other bases it on accelerating the process of eliminating labour service by abolishing the feudalist latifundia. That the poor peasants farm their land very badly is an undoubted fact. Undoubtedly, therefore, if their land is allowed to be sacked and plundered by a handful of well-to-do peasants, agricultural technique advances to a higher level. But it is just as

undoubted a fact that the landed estates worked on the basis of the labour-service system and bondage, are cultivated very badly, *worse than the allotment lands* (recall the figures quoted above: 54 poods per dessiatine from allotment land; 66 from landed estates farmed on capitalist lines, 50 from estates cultivated on the métayer system, and 45 from land rented by peasants by the year). The labour-service system of landlord economy means the preservation of incredibly obsolete methods of cultivation, the perpetuation of barbarism both in agricultural technique and in the entire life of society. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that if labour service is rooted out, i.e., if landlordism is completely abolished (and without redemption), then agricultural technique will advance to a higher level.

Consequently, in the agrarian question and the agrarian crisis the heart of the matter is not simply the removal of obstacles to the advance of agricultural technique, but *what way* these obstacles are to be removed, what class is to effect this removal and by what methods. And it is absolutely necessary to remove the obstacles to the development of the country's productive forces—necessary not only in the subjective sense of the word, but also in the objective sense, i.e., this removal is inevitable, and no power on earth can prevent it.

The mistake made by M. Shanin, as well as by many others who write on the agrarian question, is that he approached the correct thesis of the need to raise the level of farming technique in too abstract a fashion, failing to take account of the peculiar forms in which feudalist and capitalist features are interwoven in Russian agriculture. The main and fundamental obstacle to the development of the productive forces in Russian agriculture is the survivals of serfdom, i.e., primarily labour service and bondage, then feudalist taxes, the peasant's inequality in the matter of civic rights, his degraded status in relation to the higher estate of society, etc., etc. The elimination of these survivals of serfdom has long become an economic necessity, and the crisis in agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century has become so intensely aggravated precisely because the process of emancipating Russia from medievalism has been dragging out too long, because labour service and bondage have lingered too long.

They have been dying out since 1861 so slowly that the new organism has come to need violent means for ridding itself of them quickly.

What is this new economic organism of Russian agriculture? We have tried above to show this in particular detail, because the economists in the liberal-Narodnik camp have particularly wrong ideas on this subject. The new economic organism that is hatching out of its feudalist shell in Russia is commercial agriculture and capitalism. The economics of landlord farming, when it is not being conducted on the basis of labour service or the bondage of the allotment-holding peasant, clearly reveal capitalist features. The economics of peasant farming—in so far as we are able to look inside the commune and see what is going on in real life despite the official equalisation of allotment land—again reveal purely capitalist features everywhere. Commercial agriculture is steadily growing in Russia in spite of all obstacles, and this commercial agriculture is inevitably being transformed into capitalist agriculture, although the forms of this transformation are diverse in the highest degree and vary from district to district.

What should constitute that violent elimination of the medieval shell, which has become necessary for the further free development of the new economic organism? The abolition of medieval forms of landownership. In Russia, to this very day, ownership both by the landlords and, to a considerable extent, by the peasants is medieval. We have seen how the new economic conditions are breaking down this medieval framework and divisions in landowning, compelling the poor peasant to let his allotment which he has held from time immemorial, compelling the well-to-do peasant to build up his own comparatively large farm out of the fragments of different types of land: allotments, purchased land, land rented from the landlord. On the landed estate, too, its division into lands cultivated on the basis of labour service, rented to peasants on annual leases, and farmed on capitalist lines, shows that new systems of farming are being built up outside the framework of the old, medieval system of landownership.

That system can be abolished at one stroke by a determined break with the past. Such a measure would be the nation-

alisation of the land, which all the representatives of the peasantry were demanding, more or less consistently, in the period between 1905 and 1907. The abolition of private property in land in no way changes the bourgeois basis of commercial and capitalist landowning. There is nothing more erroneous than the opinion that the nationalisation of the land has anything in common with socialism, or even with equalised land tenure. Socialism, as we know, means the abolition of commodity economy. Nationalisation, on the other hand, means converting the land into the property of the state, and such a conversion does not in the least affect private farming on the land. The system of farming on the land is not altered by whether the land is the property or "possession" of the whole country, of the whole nation, just as the (capitalist) system of farming by the well-to-do muzhik is not altered by whether he buys land "in perpetuity", rents land from the landlord or the state, or "gathers up" the allotment plots of impoverished, insolvent peasants. So long as exchange remains, it is ridiculous to talk of socialism. The exchange of agricultural produce and means of production does not depend upon the forms of landowning at all. (I will remark in parenthesis that I am setting forth here only the economic significance of nationalisation, not advocating it as a programme; that I have done in the work referred to above.*)

As to equalisation, we have already shown above how it is applied in practice in the distribution of allotment land. We have seen that, within the commune, allotment land is distributed fairly equally, with only a slight tendency in favour of the rich peasants. But in the long run very little trace is left of this equalisation, owing to the fact that the poor let their land and that rented land is concentrated in the hands of the rich. Clearly, no equalisation of landholding is able to eliminate inequality in the actual use of the land, so long as there exist property differences among the peasants and a system of exchange which aggravates these differences.

The economic significance of nationalisation does not lie at all where it is very often sought. It does not consist in the fight against bourgeois relationships (as Marx showed long ago,[71] nationalisation is a highly consistent bourgeois

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 294-325.—*Ed.*

measure), but in the fight against feudalist relationships. The multiplicity of medieval forms of landowning hampers economic development; the social-estate divisions hamper trade; the disparity between the old system of landowning and the new economy gives rise to sharp contradictions; owing to the latifundia, the landlords prolong the existence of labour service; the peasants are shut up, as in a ghetto, within the allotment system, the framework of which is being broken down in practice at every step. Nationalisation makes a clean sweep of all medieval relations in landowning, does away with all artificial barriers on the land, and makes the land really free—for whom? For every citizen? Nothing of the kind. The freedom of the horseless peasant (i.e., $3\frac{1}{4}$ million households) consists, as we have seen, in letting his allotment land. The land becomes free *for the farmer*, for the one who really wants, and is *able*, to cultivate it according to the requirements of modern farming in general and of the world market in particular. Nationalisation would hasten the death of serfdom and the development of purely bourgeois farming on land free of all medieval lumber. That is the real historical significance of nationalisation in Russia—what it has come to mean by the end of the nineteenth century.

As for the other, objectively not impossible, road to clear up landowning for capitalism, it consists, as we have seen, in the accelerated plundering of the commune by the rich, and in consolidating private landed property among the well-to-do peasantry. This way leaves the principal source of labour service and bondage untouched; the landlord latifundia are left intact. Obviously, this method of clearing the way for capitalism guarantees free development of the productive forces to a far lesser degree than the first one. Once the latifundia are retained, this inevitably means also the retention of the bonded peasant, of métayage, of the renting of small plots by the year, the cultivation of the "squire's" land with the implements of the peasants, i.e., the retention of the most backward farming methods and of all that Asiatic barbarism which is called patriarchal rural life.

The two ways I have indicated of "solving" the agrarian question in developing bourgeois Russia correspond to the

two paths of development of capitalism in agriculture. I call these two paths the Prussian and the American paths. The characteristic feature of the first is that medieval relations in landowning are not liquidated at one stroke, but are gradually adapted to capitalism, which because of this for a long time retains semi-feudal features. Prussian landlordism was not crushed by the bourgeois revolution; it survived and became the basis of "Junker" economy, which is essentially capitalistic, but involves a certain degree of dependence of the rural population, such as the *Gesindeordnung*,[72] etc. As a consequence, the social and political domination of the Junkers was consolidated for many decades after 1848, and the productive forces of German agriculture developed far more slowly than in America. There, on the contrary, it was not the old slave-holding economy of the big landowners that became the basis of capitalist agriculture (the Civil War smashed the slave-owners' estates), but the free economy of the free farmer working on free land—free from all medieval fetters, from serfdom and feudalism on the one hand, and from the fetters of private property in land, on the other. Land was given away in America, out of its vast resources, at a nominal price; and it is only on a new, fully capitalist basis that private property in land has now developed there.

Both these paths of capitalist development quite clearly emerged in Russia after 1861. The progress of landlord farming is undoubted, and the slowness of this progress is not accidental, but inevitable so long as the survivals of serfdom remain. It is also beyond doubt that the freer the peasants are, the less they are weighed down by the remnants of serfdom (in the south, for example, all these favourable conditions exist), and finally, the better, all in all, the peasants are provided with land, the greater is the differentiation among the peasantry and the more rapid is the process of forming a class of rural capitalist farmers. The whole question of the further development of the country boils down to this: which of the two paths of development will ultimately prevail, and, correspondingly, which class will carry through the necessary and inevitable change—the old landowning gentry or the free peasant farmer?

It is often thought in Russia that nationalisation of the land means removing the land from the sphere of commerce.

This, undoubtedly, is the point of view of the majority of the advanced peasants and of ideologists of the peasantry. But this view is deeply fallacious. The very opposite is the case. Private property in land is an obstacle to the free investment of capital in land. Therefore, where the free renting of land from the state exists (and this is the essence of nationalisation in bourgeois society) the land is drawn *more energetically* into the sphere of commerce than is the case where private property in land prevails. There is much more freedom of capital investment in land, and freedom of competition in agriculture, where land is freely rented than where land is private property. Nationalisation of the land is, as it were, landlordism without the landlord. And what landlordism in the capitalist development of agriculture means is explained in the remarkably profound arguments of Marx in his *Theories of Surplus-Value*. I have quoted these arguments in my work on the agrarian programme mentioned above, but in view of the importance of the question, I take the liberty of repeating them here.*

In the paragraph on the historical conditions of Ricardo's theory of rent (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 2. Teil, Stuttgart, 1905, S. 5-7), Marx says that Ricardo and Anderson "start out from the view, regarded as very strange on the Continent", viz., they presume that "no landed property exists as an obstacle to any investment of capital in the land". At first sight this would seem a contradiction, because it is precisely in England that feudal landed property is considered to have been preserved more completely than anywhere else. But Marx explains that it was in England of all countries that capital "dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture". England is in this respect "the most revolutionary country in the world". "All historically inherited relations—not only the position of the villages but the very villages themselves, not only the habitations of the agricultural population, but this population itself, not only the ancient economic centres, but the very economy itself—have been ruthlessly swept away where they were in contradiction to the conditions of capitalist production in agriculture, or did not correspond to those conditions. The

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 272-76.—*Ed.*

German [continues Marx] finds economic relations determined by the traditional common-land relations [*Feldmarken*], the position of economic centres, and particular conglomerations of the population. The Englishman finds that the historical conditions of agriculture have been progressively created by capital since the fifteenth century. The technical expression customary in the United Kingdom, the 'clearing of estates', does not occur in any continental country. But what does this 'clearing of estates' mean? It means that, without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted for example from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production, instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition, are historically *fashioned* in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, *no landed property exists*; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income. A Pomeranian landowner [Marx refers to Rodbertus, whose theory of rent he refutes brilliantly and in detail in this work], his mind full of his ancestral common lands, economic centres, and the agricultural collegium, etc., is quite likely, therefore, to hold up his hands in horror at Ricardo's 'unhistorical' views on the development of agricultural relations." As a matter of fact, "the English conditions are the only ones in which modern landed property, i.e., landed property *modified* by capitalist production, has developed adequately [in ideal perfection]. Here the English theory [i.e., Ricardo's theory of rent] is the classical one for the modern, i.e., capitalist mode of production."

In England, the clearing of the estates proceeded in revolutionary forms, accompanied by the violent break-up of peasant landowning. The break-up of the old and obsolete order is absolutely inevitable in Russia too; but the nineteenth century (and the first seven years of the twentieth) have not yet settled the question as to which class will do the breaking-up that we need, and in what form. We have shown above what the basis of the distribution of land is

in Russia at the present time. We have seen that $10\frac{1}{2}$ million peasant households with 75 million dessiatines of land are confronted by 30,000 owners of latifundia with 70 million dessiatines. A possible outcome of the struggle, which cannot help breaking out on this basis, is that the holding of land by the ten million households will be almost doubled while the holding of land by the upper 30,000 will disappear. Let us examine this possible outcome from the purely theoretical point of view, from the point of view of the state of the agrarian question in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century. What should be the results of such a change? From the standpoint of landowning relations, it is obvious that the medieval ownership of allotments and medieval landlordism would be completely refashioned. The old order would be utterly swept away. Nothing traditional would be left in landowning relations. What factor, however, would determine the new agrarian relations? The "principle" of equalisation? That is what the advanced peasant, affected by Narodnik ideology, is inclined to believe. That is what the Narodnik thinks. But it is an illusion. In the commune the "principle" of equalisation, recognised by law and hallowed by custom, leads, in fact, to landownership becoming adapted to differences in property status. And on the basis of this *economic fact*, confirmed a thousand times over both by Russian and West-European data, we assert that hopes of equalisation would be shattered as an illusion, and that the *refashioning of landownership would be the only durable result*. Would the significance of *such* a result be great? Very great, because no other measure, no other reform, no other transformation could give such complete guarantees for the most rapid, wide and free progress of agricultural technique in Russia, and for the disappearance from our life of all traces of serfdom, social-estates, and the Asiatic way of life.

Progress of technique?—some may object. But has it not been proved above by means-of precise data that landlord farming is on a higher level than peasant farming in regard to grass cultivation, the employment of machines the manuring of the soil, and, of course, the quality of livestock, etc.? Yes, it has been proved, and this fact is absolutely beyond doubt. But it must not be forgotten that *all*

these differences in economic organisation, technique, etc., are summed up in *yield*. And we have seen that the yield on the landlords' lands *cultivated by peasants on a métayer or other such basis* is lower than the yield on allotment land. That is the point nearly always overlooked when the agricultural level of landlord and peasant farming in Russia is discussed. Landlord farming is on a higher level *insofar* as it is conducted on capitalist lines. And the whole point is that this "insofar", at the end of the nineteenth century, has left the labour-service system as the predominant system of farming in our central districts. *Insofar* as the landlords' lands are still cultivated by the bonded peasant with his antiquated implements, methods, etc., *to that extent* landlordism is the principal cause of backwardness and stagnation. The change in the system of landownership that we are discussing would increase the yield on métayer and rented land (at the present time the yield on such land—see the figures above—is 50 and 45 poods as compared with 54 poods on allotment land and 66 poods on landlords' land cultivated on capitalist lines). Even if this yield were increased *only* to the allotment-land level, the progress would be tremendous. Needless to say, the yield on allotment land would also increase, both as a result of the peasant being freed from the yoke of the feudal latifundia, and also because the allotment lands, like the rest of the land in the state, would then become free land, equally accessible (not to all citizens, but to citizens owning agricultural capital, i.e.—) to farmers.

This conclusion follows not at all from the data we have quoted concerning yield. On the contrary, these data have been quoted merely to give a graphic illustration of the conclusion that follows from the *sum total* of data concerning the evolution of Russian landlord and peasant farming. To refute this conclusion, one has to refute the fact that the history of Russian agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth century is the history of the replacing of feudal by bourgeois production relations.

By sticking to the data concerning the number of peasant farms at the present time we may get the impression that the agrarian transformation we are examining would lead to a considerable fragmentation of agriculture. Just think of it! Thirteen million households on 280 million dessiatines

of land! Is not this a monstrous splitting up of the land? To this we reply: it is *now* that we see such a tremendous splitting up of the land, for it is *now* that thirteen million farms are *operating* on an area of *less* than 280 million dessiatines! Consequently, the change we are interested in would not make things worse at all in this respect. More than that. We would ask further whether there are any grounds for thinking that in the event of this change the number of farms will remain unchanged? That is the view usually taken by those who are influenced by Narodnik theories or by the opinions of the peasants themselves, whose every thought and striving is drawn to the land and who can even dream of the industrial workers being converted into small tillers of the soil. Undoubtedly, a certain number of Russian industrial workers at the end of the nineteenth century also adhere to this peasant point of view. The question, however, is whether this point of view is *correct*, whether it conforms to the *objective* economic conditions and to the course of economic development. One merely has to put this question clearly in order to see that the peasant point of view is conditioned by the obsolescent and irrevocable past, and not by the growing future. The peasant point of view is *wrong*. It represents the ideology of yesterday, whereas economic development is, *in effect*, leading not to an increase but to a diminution of the agricultural population.

The change in landownership relations that we are examining will not and cannot abolish this process of diminution of the proportion of the agricultural population, a process common to all countries of developing capitalism. I may be asked, in what way could this change bring about a diminution of the agricultural population, once the land becomes freely accessible to all? I shall reply to this question with a passage from a speech delivered in the Duma by a peasant deputy Mr. Chizhevsky (Poltava Gubernia). Speaking on May 24, 1906, he said: "In our district, the peasants, the electors who sent us here, figured things out like this: 'If we were a little better off, and if every one of our families could afford to spend five or six rubles a year on sugar—then in every uyezd where it is possible to grow sugar-beet several sugar refineries would be built, in addition to those which already exist.' It is quite natural that if these sugar refine-

ries were built, what a mass of hands would be needed if production were intensified! The output of the sugar refineries would increase, etc." (Verbatim Reports, p. 622.)

This is a very characteristic admission by a local leader. Had he been asked his opinion on the significance of agrarian reform in general, he would probably have expressed Narodnik views. But once it was a question not of "opinions" but of the *concrete* consequences of reform, *capitalist truth* immediately prevailed over *Narodnik utopia*. For what the peasants told their deputy Mr. Chizhevsky is precisely the capitalist truth, the truth of capitalist reality. There really would be a tremendous increase in the number of sugar refineries and in their productivity in the event of any appreciable improvement in the condition of the mass of small tillers of the soil. And it goes without saying that not only the beet-sugar industry, but all the manufacturing industries—textile, iron, engineering, building, etc., etc.—would receive a tremendous impetus, and would need a "mass of hands". And this economic necessity would prove stronger than all the fond hopes and dreams about equalisation. Three and a quarter million horseless households will not become "farmers" *as a result of any* agrarian reform, or any changes in landownership, or any "allotting of land". These millions of households (and quite a few of one-horse households), as we have seen, *struggle* on their patches of land, *let their allotments*. An American development of industry would *inevitably* divert from agriculture the majority of such farmers, whose position in capitalist society is hopeless, and no "right to the land" will be able to prevent this. Thirteen million small farmers with the most miserable, beggarly and obsolete implements, scratching away at their allotment and the landlords' land—that is the reality of today; that is *artificial* over-population in agriculture, artificial in the sense of the forcible retention of those feudalist relations which have long outlived their day, and which *could not* be maintained for a single day without floggings, shootings, punitive expeditions, etc. Any tangible improvement in the condition of the masses, any serious blow to the survivals of serfdom, would *inevitably* strike at the roots of this over-population of the countryside and would immensely accelerate the process (which is taking

place slowly even now) of diverting the population from agriculture into industry, reduce the number of farms from 13 million to a much lower figure, and would lead Russia forward in the American and not in the Chinese manner, as is the case now.

The agrarian question in Russia towards the close of the nineteenth century has imposed upon the classes of society the task of putting an end to the old feudal past and sweeping clear the landowning system, sweeping clear the whole way for capitalism, for the growth of the productive forces, for the free and open struggle of classes. And this very struggle of classes will determine the manner in which this task will be accomplished.

July 1 (new style), 1908

SOME FEATURES OF THE PRESENT COLLAPSE

We have repeatedly had occasion to comment on the ideological and organisational collapse *on the right*, in the camp of the bourgeois democrats and the socialist opportunists, a collapse which is inevitable among parties and trends where petty-bourgeois intellectuals predominate, in a period when counter-revolution is rampant. But the picture of collapse would be incomplete if we did not also dwell on collapse "*on the left*", in the camp of the petty-bourgeois "Socialist-Revolutionaries".

Of course one can use the expression "on the left" in this case only in a very relative sense, to characterise those who are inclined to *play* at Leftism. We have already pointed out in *Proletary* more than once that it was just the period of the Russian revolution at its highest peak which brought out particularly clearly, in open mass politics, all the instability, lack of firmness and of principle of S.R. "revolutionism". It is sufficient to recall only the most outstanding events. The autumn upswing in 1905; the S.R.s are in a secret bloc with the Popular Socialists, who are all for a legal "Popular Socialist Party". The congress of the S.R. Party in December 1905 rejects the "plan" to form such a double of the S.R. Party, but in the spring and summer upswing of 1906 we *again* see the S.R.s in the daily papers, i.e., in the main mouthpieces for agitation among the people, working in a bloc with the Popular Socialists. The latter openly renounce the revolution in the autumn of 1906, after the Sveaborg and Kronstadt[73] defeat, and come out openly as opportunists—yet nevertheless the elections to the Second Duma in St. Petersburg (in the spring of 1907) again revive the Narodnik bloc" of S.R.s, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks.

In short, the revolution has fully and finally revealed the absence of any definite class foundation for the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, reduced it in practice to the role of an adjunct or wing of the petty-bourgeois peasant democrats and *forced* it constantly to waver between verbal revolutionary impulses and Popular Socialist and Trudovik diplomacy. The separating out of the Maximalists, who all through the revolution were constantly separating out of the Socialist-Revolutionaries but could not get fully separated, only confirmed the class instability of Narodnik revolutionism. There remains nothing for the S.R. Centre, the "pure" S.R.s, to do—we had written in issue No. 4 of *Proletary*, in the article entitled "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks"—but to defend themselves against both the "new" trends in Socialist-Revolutionism with arguments borrowed from the Marxists.* While the Social-Democrats emerged from the revolution with one definite class, the proletariat, rallied securely behind it, and with two trends, characteristic of all international Social-Democracy—opportunist and revolutionary—sharply defined, the Socialist-Revolutionaries emerged without any direct basis, without any defined border-line to divide them on the one hand from the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists, linked with a mass of petty proprietors, or on the other hand from the Maximalists, as a terrorist group of intellectuals.

And now, when Maximalism has disappeared (possibly only for a time) we see the revival of a kindred trend in a new dress. *Revolutsionnaya Mysl*,[74] the mouthpiece of a "group of Socialist-Revolutionaries", draws apart (No. 1, April 1908, No. 2, June 1908) from the "official organ of the S.R. Party", i.e., from the central organ, *Znamya Truda*,[75] and announces the "*revision* of our [i.e., S.R.] theoretical outlook, our S.R. methods of struggle and organisation". Of course all this "revision", all this "critical creative work" promised by the new paper is sheer phrase-mongering. In reality there is no question of any revision of theory, nor can there be, since the new paper has no theoretical outlook whatever—all it has is the re-echo, in a thousand different keys, of appeals for terrorism, and a clumsy, inexpert, naïve

* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 199.—*Ed.*

adaptation of their views on revolution, on the mass movement, on the meaning of parties in general, etc., to this allegedly new but in reality old, and indeed very old, method. The amazing poverty of such "theoretical" acquirements stares one in the face when comparing them with the bombastic promises to revise, criticise and create. The complete confusion of theoretical views both of the "new" and of the "old" tendencies in Socialist-Revolutionism is all the more striking in that *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* itself underlines "the evolution taking place in the views of those in charge of the official organ of the S.R. Party"—an evolution consisting in the most intensified emphasising of "systematic central political terror" in order "to precipitate events". That is a quotation from No. 8 of *Znamya Truda*. And in No. 10-11 (February-March 1908) we find exactly the same talk about "straining the efforts of the whole party" for "central political terror", about the necessity of finding "large funds" for this purpose, and together with this a "delicate hint" as to the possible source of such funds. "All parties," writes *Znamya Truda*, pp. 7-8, "including the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators, will enjoy the immediate benefits of this activity. And therefore the party has the right to count on the very widest public aid in this its struggle."

The reader can see that there is nothing new in what the new paper says. The only characteristic thing about it is that it provides instructive material for the assessment of *political collapse*, covered up by "Left" and supposedly revolutionary phrases. The Mensheviks in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (No. 1) justify their collection of funds among the liberals on the grounds that there is a certain political solidarity in their aims. The S.R.s in *Znamya Truda* say to the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators: why, you will enjoy the benefits. Extremes meet. Both petty-bourgeois opportunism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism, albeit from different sides, "make eyes" at the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators.

And it is not only in this that the extremes meet. The revolution has brought disillusionment to both the Mensheviks and the "revolutionary" Narodniks. Both are ready to dismiss the Party principle, the old Party traditions, and the revolutionary mass struggle. "The mistake common to

nearly all the revolutionary parties," writes *Revolutsionnoye Nedomyslie*,* "a mistake which has played a harmful role in the present crisis, consists in an exaggerated belief in the possibility and necessity of a mass rising of the people.... Events have not justified the expectations of the party." In vain, it appears, did the Socialist-Revolutionaries build "a socialist programme according to the Marxist model", build up "a conception of the revolution which identified it with a mass movement and mass insurrection caused by economic needs, with a correction being made, however, for a minority with initiative". Instead of corrections, one must develop "the theory and practice of the active functioning of an initiating minority" (No. 1, pp. 6-7). One must exalt the significance "of the spontaneous feeling which grips the revolutionary and the ideals which inspire him" (No. 2, p. 1); as for theoretical questions, philosophy, scientific socialism—all these are nonsense, in the opinion of the "new" social-revolutionary obscurantists. "Is there hope of an armed uprising in the more or less immediate future?" (that's how they put it: "more or less immediate")—asks *Revolutsionnoye Nedomyslie*, and answers itself: "All are agreed that there is no such hope" (No. 2, p. 2). The conclusion is that in Russia "a political revolution cannot be carried out except by a revolutionary minority" (p. 7). "The reasons for the failure of the revolutionary parties during the last three years were not accidental, and depended in our view not only on objective conditions and not only on tactical mistakes, but lay also in the very conception of their organisation" (p. 10). The revolutionaries, you see, set themselves the "impossible tasks" of really leading the masses. The Social-Democrats *confused* the S.R.s and induced them, to the detriment of their real job of terrorist struggle, to think about organising the peasantry and preparing it for a universal armed uprising (p. 11). Extreme centralisation of the parties—"rule by generals", "the spirit of authoritarianism" (p. 12)—there is the evil. "In a large and strong party the revolutionaries saw the only

* Lenin is sarcastically calling *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (Revolutionary Thought) by the title, which means "Revolutionary Thoughtlessness, Stupidity".—*Ed.*

means and guarantee for achieving the object aimed at, and did not notice either the practical impossibility in our Russian conditions of creating such a party or all its dark sides" (p. 12).

This is enough, we think! The mental chaos that reigns in *Revolutsionnaya Mysl*, the obscurantism it preaches, the mean philistine despair, timidity and disheartenment in face of the first encountered difficulties on which its allegedly revolutionary programme is built, are not worth wasting words on. The quotations we have made speak for themselves.

But let not the reader think that these arguments are pure nonsense, accidentally blurted out by an unknown and insignificant little group. No, such a view would be mistaken. There is logic here, the logic of disillusionment in their party and in a people's revolution, disillusionment in the capacity of the *masses* for direct revolutionary struggle. It is the logic of the keyed-up intellectual, of hysteria, of incapacity for steady, stubborn work, of inability to apply the basic principles of theory and tactics to altered circumstances, of inability to carry on the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation in conditions sharply differing from those which we recently experienced. Instead of exerting every effort to fight the spirit of philistine chaos which is penetrating not only the upper classes but the lower classes as well; instead of gathering together more firmly the scattered party forces to defend tried revolutionary principles; instead of this, unbalanced people, detached from any class connection with the masses, throw overboard all they ever learned, and proclaim "a revision", i.e., a return to the old rubbish-heap, to revolutionary rule-of-thumb methods, to the sporadic petty group activities. No heroism on the part of these groups or individuals in the terrorist struggle will alter the fact that their activity as members of a *party* is an expression of *collapse*. And it is extremely important to grasp the truth, confirmed by the experience of all countries which have undergone the defeat of a revolution, that one and the same psychology, one and the same class peculiarity (that of the petty bourgeoisie, for example) is displayed both in the dejection of the opportunist and in the desperation of the terrorist.

"All are agreed that there is no hope of an armed uprising in the more or less immediate future." Meditate over this flashy and hackneyed phrase. These people have evidently never stopped to consider the objective conditions which at first give rise to a full-scale political crisis, and then, when the crisis becomes acute, to civil war. These people have *learned by heart* the "*slogan*" of armed uprising, without having *understood* the meaning of this slogan or its applicability. That is why, after the first defeats of the revolution they so lightly throw aside their ill-digested slogans, taken on trust. Whereas if these people valued Marxism as the only revolutionary theory of the twentieth century, if they had studied the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, they would have seen the difference between phrase-mongering and the development of really revolutionary slogans. The Social-Democrats did not put forward the "slogan" of insurrection either in 1901, when demonstrations caused Krichevsky and Martynov to begin shouting about "the assault", or in 1902 and 1903, when the late Nadezhdin called the plan of the old *Iskra*[76] "literary exercises". They put forward the slogan of insurrection only after January 9, 1905,[77] when not a single person could doubt any longer that a general political crisis *had broken out*, that it was growing more acute daily and hourly, by the direct movement of the masses. And within a few months this crisis *led to* insurrection.

What lesson follows from this? The lesson that we must now carefully follow the new political crisis that is now brewing, teach the masses the lessons of 1905 and the inevitability of every acute crisis developing into an insurrection, and strengthen the organisation that will release this slogan at the moment the crisis arrives. But it is a barren occupation to ask, "is there hope in the immediate future"? The state of affairs in Russia is such that no thoughtful socialist will venture to prophesy. All that we *know* and can say amounts to this, that without reconstructing agrarian relations, without completely breaking up the old land system, Russia cannot live—but live she will. The struggle is about whether Stolypin will succeed in breaking it up the landlords' way, or whether the peasants, under the leadership of the workers, will do it *themselves* to suit their own purpose. The business

of the Social-Democrats is to imbue the masses with a clear understanding of this *economic* foundation of the growing crisis, and to train up a serious party organisation which could help the people to assimilate the abundant lessons of the revolution, and would be capable of *leading* them in struggle, when the maturing forces become fully ripe for a new revolutionary "campaign".

But this reply, of course, will seem "vague" to people who regard "slogans", not as a practical conclusion from a class analysis and assessment of a particular moment in history, but as a charm with which a party or a tendency has been provided once and for all. Such people don't understand that incapacity to adapt their tactics to the differences between fully defined and not yet defined moments is the result of political inexperience and narrowness of outlook. To strengthen organisation, indeed! Our heroes of the revolutionary "screech" turn up their noses at such a humble, innocent task, which does not promise "immediately", at once, tomorrow morning, to provide a roar and a crash. "Events have not justified the expectations of the party." And this is said after three years of revolution, which gave unexampled *confirmation* of the role and significance of strong parties. It was the Russian revolution which in its very first period demonstrated that it was *possible* even under the Plehve regime[78] to create a *party* that was really capable of leading *classes*. In the spring of 1905 our Party was a league of underground circles; in the autumn it became the party of the *millions* of the proletariat. Did this happen "all at once", gentlemen, or did it take ten years of slow, steady, unobtrusive and quiet work to *prepare* and ensure such a result? And if at such a moment as the present one, the official and unofficial S.R. gentlemen are putting regicide *to the fore* and not the task of setting up a *party* organisation among the peasant masses capable of hammering out something more solid, more ideologically consistent, something more firm and staunch, out of the jelly-like revolutionism of the Trudovik current of opinion, we shall say that Narodnik socialism in Russia is dying, that it has long since died, that its leaders are dimly aware of their "bankruptcy" as Narodniks after the very first campaign of a people's revolution.

We did not expect that peasants would display capacity for a leading role, or even an independent role, in the revolution; and we shall not lose heart at the failure of the first campaign, which revealed the vast extent to which revolutionary-democratic ideas had spread among the peasantry, even though these ideas were extremely hazy and sloppy. And we will be able to work again as consistently and stubbornly as we did before the revolution in order that the Party tradition should not be broken, in order that the Party should grow stronger and be able in the *second* campaign to lead, not two or three million proletarians, but five times or ten times as many. You don't believe in this task? You find it dull? Well, the door is open, worthy friends; you are not revolutionaries, you are simply ranters!

And your official organ treats the question of taking part in the Third Duma in the same hysterical way.* In *Znamya Truda*, No. 10-11, one such hysterical writer sneers at the *mistakes* of our Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma, and exclaims about their statements: "Who knows anything about these statements, about these votings and abstentions?" (p. 11).

We say to this: "Yes, our Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma have made many mistakes. And this very example the S.R.s chose to quote demonstrates the difference in the attitude of *a workers' party* and *a group of intellectuals*. A workers' party understands that in a period of political lull and collapse the latter must inevitably show itself in the Duma group too, since in the Third Duma it was even less capable than in the Second of assembling large party

* For a detailed analysis of S.R. boycottism, see the article on "Parliamentary Cretinism Inside Out" in *Proletary*, No. 18. In the autumn of 1907, seemingly appealing to a genuinely revolutionary boycottist tradition, the S.R.s were already in practice degrading this tradition, cancelling it out, replacing the revolutionary *boycott-assault* by pitiful and impotent "refusal to participate". They were already assuring a credulous public then that to "turn one's back" on the reactionary Duma meant inflicting "a big moral" defeat on the government, and taking "the first serious step to changing the general political picture".

Then, too, we already exposed the true character of these "revolutionary rhetorics ... of gentry who do not scruple to muddle the heads of the masses for the sake of naïve self-advertisement of their party".

forces. Therefore the workers' party criticises and corrects the mistakes of its deputies. Every organisation, by discussing each speech and arriving at the conclusion that such-and-such a statement or speech was a mistake, provides material for political action by the masses. Don't worry, gentlemen of the S.R. Party: at the moment when the political crisis becomes acute, our group—and in any case members of our Duma group—*will know how to do their duty*. And our criticism of their mistakes is done publicly, and openly, before the masses. Our deputies learn from this criticism, the classes learn, the Party learns—the Party which has seen hard times, and knows that it is not by ranting but only by the stubborn and steadfast work of *all* organisations is it possible to emerge with honour from a difficult situation. Even *Proletary*, which, as a newspaper published abroad, realised that it was under an obligation to give its advice from afar with care, openly proposed measures for improving the work of the group. Our open Party criticism, added to the work of the group, achieves the result that the masses know both the Duma statements and the *nature* of the Party's corrections to them. And failure to appreciate the Duma word at a time when Party organisations and the Party press are facing the effects of the deep collapse, is a sign of boundless intellectualist irresponsibility.

The S.R.s don't understand the importance of open socialist speeches which are frankly criticised and corrected in the Party press. The S.R.s prefer to hush up the mistakes of *their* representatives: one more reminder of this was in No. 10-11 of *Znamya Truda*, when it abused us for making "philistine" statements about Gershuni's love of the Cadets. We long ago expressed our opinion on this question,* and would not start repeating it now, so soon after the death by torture at the hands of the tsar's executioners of a man who earned deep respect by his loyalty to a revolutionary organisation. But since the S.R.s have raised the question, we shall give our reply. You can answer us in no way except by abuse, gentlemen; you cannot say, frankly and openly, which of you approves or does not approve of Gershuni's

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 153-60.—*Ed.*

stand at the February (1907) Congress of the S.R. Party. You cannot reply on the substance of the matter and show up the mistakes of your leaders, the number of their supporters, etc., because you do not have a *party*, you attach no value to educating the masses by open criticism of persons, statements, tendencies and shades of opinion.

The working class will know how to train up and harden its organisations by open criticism of its representatives. Not all at once, not without friction, not without struggle and not without hard work—but *we shall solve* the difficult problem which the difficult turn of events has confronted us with, namely, to combine open speeches in the Duma with illegal Party activity. In the working out of this problem will be revealed the maturity of a party which has gone through the first campaign of the revolution. And the working out of this problem will provide a guarantee that in the second campaign the proletariat will be able, under the leadership of Social-Democracy, to fight more ably and more unitedly, and to gain more decisive victories.

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THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION[79]

AUTOABSTRACT

In response to the request of the Polish comrades, I will try briefly to set forth here the contents of my book bearing the above title which was written in November 1907, but which has not yet appeared for reasons *not* under my control.*

In the first chapter of this book I examine the "economic basis and nature of the agrarian revolution in Russia". Comparing the latest data about landownership in Russia (1905 figures) and defining in round figures the land area in all the fifty gubernias of European Russia at 280 million dessiatines, I arrive at the following picture of the distribution of all landed property, both allotment land and privately-owned:

	Number of holdings	Total area in dessiatines (millions)	Average dessiatines per holding
(a) Ruined peasantry crushed by feudal exploitation	10.5	75.0	7.0
(b) Middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
(c) Peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership	1.5	70.0	46.7
(d) Feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Unclassified holdings	—	50.0	—
Grand Total	13.03	280.0	21.4

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431.—*Ed.*

Anyone at all familiar with social statistics will understand that this picture can be only approximately accurate. For us, however, what is important is not the details, in which economists of the liberal-Narodnik trend usually flounder themselves and submerge the essence of the question, but the class content of the process. My picture brings out this content, showing what the struggle in the Russian revolution is about. Thirty thousand landowners—mainly the nobility, but also the state—possess 70 million dessiatines of land. This basic fact should be regarded in the light of another fact: $10\frac{1}{2}$ million peasant households and smallest proprietors possess 75 million dessiatines.

This second group could *double* their possessions at the expense of the first: such is the objectively inevitable *tendency* of the struggle, irrespective of the various views about it held by various classes.

The economic essence of the agrarian crisis emerges from this picture quite clearly. Millions of petty, ruined, impoverished peasants, oppressed by poverty, ignorance and the survivals of feudalism, *cannot* live otherwise than in semi-feudal dependence on the landlord, tilling his land with their own agricultural implements in exchange for pasturage, commonage, watering-places, for "land" in general, loans in the winter, etc., etc. On the other hand, the owners of vast latifundia *cannot* in such conditions manage otherwise than with the help of the labour of their ruined local peasants, since that kind of management does not require any investment of capital or new systems of cultivation. There necessarily arises what has been described many times in Russian economic literature as the labour-service system of economy. This system is merely *the further development of serfdom*. The basis of exploitation is not the separation of the worker from the land, but the compulsory attachment of the ruined peasant to it; not the proprietor's capital but his land; not the implements belonging to the owner of latifundia, but the age-old wooden plough of the peasant; not the progress of agriculture but ancient, centuries-old routine; not "freely hired labour", but enslavement to the money-lender.

The results of this state of affairs in the sphere of agricul-

ture may be expressed in the following figures. Harvest yield on allotment land is 54 poods per dessiatine; on landlord's land, with sowing in separate farms, and worked at the expense of the landlord, using his implements and employing hired labour, it is 66 poods; on the same landlord's land under the métayer system it is 50 poods; and, finally, on land rented by the peasants from the landlord it is 45 poods. Thus landlords' lands worked on a *feudalist-money-lending* basis (the above-mentioned métayage and renting by the peasantry) produce worse yields than the exhausted and qualitatively worse allotment lands. This falling into bondage, consolidated by the feudally-run latifundia, is becoming the *main* obstacle to the development of Russia's productive forces.

Another thing that emerges from the picture drawn above is that this development in a capitalist country *may* take place in two different ways. Either the latifundia remain, and gradually become the basis of capitalist economy on the land. This is the Prussian type of agrarian capitalism, in which the Junker is master of the situation. For whole decades there continue both his political domination and the oppression, degradation, poverty and illiteracy of the peasant. The productive forces develop very slowly, as they did in Russian agriculture between 1861 and 1905.

Or else the revolution sweeps away the landed estates. The basis of capitalist agriculture now becomes the free farmer on *free* land, i.e., land clear of all medieval junk. This is the *American* type of agrarian capitalism, and the *most rapid development of productive forces* under conditions which are more favourable for the mass of the people than any others under capitalism.

In *reality* the struggle going on in the Russian revolution is not about "socialisation" and other absurdities of the Narodniks—this is merely petty-bourgeois ideology, petty-bourgeois phrase-mongering and nothing more—*but about* what road capitalist development of Russia will take: the "Prussian" or the "American". Without ascertaining this *economic* basis of the revolution, it is absolutely impossible to understand *anything* about an agrarian programme (as Maslov has not understood it, because he examines the abstractly desirable, without ascertaining the economically inevitable).

Shortage of space prevents me from setting forth the rest of the first chapter: I will sum up in a few words. All the Cadets do their utmost to obscure the essence of the agrarian revolution, while the Prokopoviches *help* them in this. The Cadets mix up ("reconcile") the two main *types* of agrarian programme in the revolution—the landlord and the peasant types. Then (also in a few words): in Russia both types of capitalist agrarian evolution already made their appearance in the years between 1861 and 1905—both the Prussian (the *gradual* development of landlord economy in the direction of capitalism) and the American (differentiation of the peasantry and a rapid development of productive forces in the more free South, with its abundance of land). Finally, there is the question of colonisation which I deal with in this chapter, and which I shall not be able to dwell on here. I will only mention that the *main* obstacle in Russia to putting into use hundreds of millions of dessiatines is the feudal latifundia persisting in Central Russia. Victory over these landlords will give such a powerful impetus to the development of technique and scientific cultivation that the area of arable land will increase ten times faster than it did after 1861. Here are a few figures. Out of the total area throughout the Russian Empire—1,965 million dessiatines—there is *no* information whatever about 819 million dessiatines. Thus, only 1,146 million dessiatines are available for consideration—of which 469 million dessiatines are in use, but they include 300 million dessiatines of forest. A vast amount of land that is not fit for anything now will become useful in the immediate future *if* Russia *frees herself* from the latifundia.*

Chapter II of my book is devoted to the testing of the agrarian programmes of the R.S.D.L.P. by the revolution. The principal error of all previous programmes has been an

* The liberal-Narodnik economists argue in this way: *in view* of the lack of land in the centre, *in view* of the unsuitability of Siberia, Central Asia, etc., for colonisation, it is *necessary* to allot supplementary lands to the peasantry. This means that there would be no need to hurry with the latifundia, but for the lack of land. Marxists have to argue quite differently: *so long as* the latifundia are not abolished, a rapid development of the productive forces is impossible, either in the centre or in the colonies (in Russia's borderlands).

insufficiently concrete idea of what the *type* of capitalist agrarian revolution in Russia can be. And this mistake was repeated by the Mensheviks, who were victorious at the Stockholm Congress, and gave the Party a programme of *municipalisation*. It was precisely the *economic aspect* of the question—the most important aspect—that at Stockholm *was not examined at all*. Instead, it was "political" considerations, the manoeuvres of politicians and not Marxist analysis, that prevailed. An explanation of this can only *partially* be found in the actual moment when the Stockholm Congress met, when the assessment of December 1905 and the First Duma of 1906 claimed all the attention of the Congress. That was why Plekhanov, who at *Stockholm* carried Maslov's plan for municipalisation, gave no thought at all to the *economic content* of a "peasant agrarian revolution" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 42, the words of Plekhanov) in a capitalist country. Either this was a mere phrase, and "capturing" the peasants by means of demagogy and deception ("*Bauernfang*") unworthy of a Marxist; or there exists the *economic* possibility of the most rapid development of capitalism through *the victory of the peasantry*. And in that case it is essential clearly to realise the kind of victory, the kind of path of agrarian capitalism, the kind of system of relations in landownership, which correspond to that victory of the "peasant agrarian revolution".

The main argument of the most influential "municipalisers" in Stockholm was based on the assertion that the peasants are *hostile* to the nationalisation of the allotment lands. John,[80] who was *reporting* for the supporters of municipalisation, exclaimed: "We would have not one Vendée,[81] but a general revolt of the peasantry [how terrible!] against attempts by the state to interfere with the peasants' *own* allotments, against attempts to 'nationalise' the latter" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 40). Kostrov[82] exclaimed: "To go to the peasants with it [nationalisation] means antagonising them. The peasant movement will go on apart from or against us, and we shall find ourselves thrown overboard in the revolution. Nationalisation deprives Social-Democracy of its strength, isolates it from the peasantry and thus also deprives the revolution of its strength" (p. 88).

That is clear, it would seem. The peasants are hostile to nationalisation: this is the main argument of the Mensheviks. And *if this is true*, is it not obvious that it is ridiculous to carry out "a peasant agrarian revolution" *against the will* of the peasants?

But is it true? In 1905 P. Maslov wrote: "Nationalisation of the land as a means of solving the agrarian problem in Russia at the present time cannot be accepted, first of all [note this "first of all"] because it is hopelessly utopian.... But will the peasants ... agree?" (P. Maslov, *A Critique of Agrarian Programmes*, 1905, p. 20.)

But *in March 1907*: "All the Narodnik groups [the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries] are advocating nationalisation of the land in one form or another" (the journal *Obrazovaniye*,[83] 1907, No. 3, p. 100). And who wrote this? *That same P. Maslov!*

There's your new Vendée! There's your revolt of the peasantry against nationalisation! And instead of honestly admitting his mistake, instead of making an *economic* study of the reason why the peasants should declare in favour of nationalisation, Maslov acted like Ivan the Forgetful. He *preferred to forget* his own words and all the speeches at the Stockholm Congress.

Not only that. In order to cover up the traces of this "unpleasant occurrence", Maslov invented the fable that the Trudoviks had declared for nationalisation for petty-bourgeois reasons, "*placing their hopes in the central authority*" (ibid.). The following comparison shows that this is a fable. The agrarian Bill moved by the Trudoviks in both the *First* and the *Second* Dumas says in Clause 16: "The management of the national lands must be entrusted to local self-governing bodies elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, which shall act independently within the limits laid down by the law."

The agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., carried by the Mensheviks, proclaims that the R.S.D.L.P. demands ... "(4) the confiscation of privately-owned lands, except small holdings, which shall be placed at the disposal of large local self-governing bodies (comprising urban and rural districts, as per Point 3) to be elected on democratic principles".

The essential difference between these programmes is not in the words "management" and "disposal",* but on the question of purchase (which at the Stockholm Congress was rejected by *Bolshevik* votes against Dan and Co. and which the Mensheviks again tried to drag in after the Congress) and on the question of the *peasant* lands. The Mensheviks separate them, the Trudoviks do not. *The Trudoviks have demonstrated to the municipalisers that I was right.*

There can be no doubt that the programme of the Trudoviks brought forward in the First and Second Dumas is the programme of the peasant masses. The literature of the peasant deputies, their signatures to the Bills and the gubernias- they come from, all prove this quite convincingly. In 1905 Maslov wrote that the homestead peasants "in particular" could not agree to nationalisation (p. 20 of the pamphlet I have already quoted). This turned out to be "*particular*" nonsense. In Podolsk Gubernia, for example, the peasants are homesteaders, yet 13 Podolsk peasants in the First Duma, and 10 in the Second, signed the Land Bill of the "104" (the Trudovik Bill quoted above).

Why, then, did the peasants declare for nationalisation? Because they instinctively realised the necessity of *abolishing* all medieval forms of landed property much better than did short-sighted so-called Marxists. Medieval landed property *must* be abolished in order to clear the way for capitalism in agriculture; and in various countries and to various degrees capital *has abolished* the old medieval landownership, subordinating it to the requirements of the market and transforming it in keeping with the conditions of commercial agriculture. Marx already pointed out in the third volume of *Capital* that the capitalist mode of production *finds* landed property in historical forms incompatible with capitalism (clan ownership, communal, feudal, patriarchal, etc., ownership) and re-creates them in keeping with the new economic demands.[84]

In the paragraph, "The historical conditions of Ricardo's theory of rent", in his *Theories of Surplus-Value*** Marx

* An amendment proposing to replace the words "placed at the disposal" by the words "made the private property" was *rejected at Stockholm by the Mensheviks*. (Minutes, p. 152.)

** *Theorien über den Mehrwert*. II Band, 2. Teil, Stuttgart, 1905.

developed this conception with the clarity of genius. He wrote: "Nowhere in the world has capitalist production, since Henry VII, dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture and so adequately moulded its conditions and made them subject to itself. England is in this respect, the most revolutionary country in the world.... But what does this 'clearing of estates'* mean? It means that without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted, for example, from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production, instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition, are historically *fashioned* in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, *no landed property exists*; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income" (pp. 6-7).

Such are the conditions for the speediest possible abolition of forms inherited from the Middle Ages and for the freest possible development of capitalism—the *abolition* of all the old system of landowning, the abolition of private property in land, as an obstacle to capital. In Russia, too, such a revolutionary "*clearing*" of the medieval landowning system is *inevitable*, and no power on earth can stave it off. The question is *only*, and the *struggle* is *solely*, about whether this "clearing" will be done by the *landlords* or by the *peasants*. The "clearing" of medieval landowning by the landlords is the robbery of the peasants that took place in 1861 and the Stolypin agrarian reform of 1906 (legislation under Article 87). *The peasant "clearing" of lands for capitalism is nationalisation of the land.*

It is this *economic* substance of nationalisation in a *bourgeois* revolution carried out by workers and peasants, which Maslov, Plekhanov and Co. have completely failed to understand. They drew up their agrarian programme not for a struggle against medieval landowning as one of the most important survivals of serfdom, not to clear the way

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

completely for capitalism, but for a *pitiful philistine attempt* to combine "harmoniously" the old with the new, landed property which arose as a result of the system of allotment and the latifundia of the feudalists confiscated by the revolution.

In order, finally, to demonstrate all the reactionary philistine character of the *idea* of municipalisation, I quote data about the leasing of land. (I pointed out the importance of the question of leasehold in my dispute with Maslov in 1906, in my pamphlet, *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*.*) In Kamyshin Uyezd of Saratov Gubernia**:

Groups of householders	*Dessiatines per household*			
	Allotment land	Rented land	Leased land	Total crop area
With no draught animals . . .	5.4	0.3	3.0	1.1
" 1 " animal . . .	6.5	1.6	1.3	5.0
" 2 " animals . . .	8.5	3.5	0.9	8.8
" 3 " " . . .	10.1	5.6	0.8	12.1
" 4 " " . . .	12.5	7.4	0.7	15.8
" 5 draught animals and more	16.1	16.6	0.9	27.6
Average	9.3	5.4	1.5	10.8

Take a look at the *real* economic relationship between *allotment* land, which the most sage Maslov and Plekhanov leave to the peasants as their property, and the non-*allotment* land (rented land) which they "municipalised". The horseless peasants—and in 1896-1900 there were in all $3\frac{1}{2}$ million such households out of 11.1 million—*lease ten times more* land than they rent themselves. Their area under crops is five times less than their "allotments". Among the peasants owning one horse (3.3 million households in all Russia) the amount of rented land *scarcely exceeds the amount* of land which they lease, and their crop area is *less* than their "allotment". In all the higher groups, i.e., among the minority of the peasants, the land they rent is several times larger than the land they lease, and the wealthier the peasants

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 165-95.—*Ed.*

** *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. 2nd ed, pp. 51, 54 and 82 (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 93, 97, 130-31.—*Ed.*).

the more does their crop area exceed the size of their "allotment".

Relations like this prevail *throughout* Russia. Capitalism is destroying the agricultural commune; it is *liberating* the peasants from the yoke of the "allotment"; it is diminishing the role of the allotment lands at both poles in the countryside—yet the profound Menshevik thinkers exclaim: "The peasants will revolt against nationalisation of the allotment lands."

It is not only landlord property that dates from the Middle Ages in Russia, but also the peasants' allotment property—a thing the Mensheviks have "overlooked". The reinforcement of allotment property, *which is completely at variance* with the new capitalist relations, is a reactionary measure, and municipalisation *reinforces* allotment property as distinct from non-allotment property, which is "subject to municipalisation". Allotment land ownership divides the peasants with a thousand medieval barriers, and through the medieval fiscal "village commune", retards the development of productive forces. The "village commune" and this allotment ownership are *bound* to be destroyed by capitalism. Stolypin realises this, and destroys them the Black-Hundred way. The peasants feel it, and want to destroy them in the peasant, or revolutionary-democratic way. And the Mensheviks exclaim: "You mustn't touch the allotment lands."

Nationalisation abolishes the obsolete "village commune" and the medieval allotted property as completely as it is conceivably possible for these institutions to be abolished in capitalist society while observing the best interests of the peasant. In the booklet, *Material on the Peasant Question* (A Report of the Delegates' Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union, November 6-10, 1905), published in St. Petersburg in 1905, we read: "The notorious question of the 'village commune' was not raised at all and was tacitly rejected: the land must be placed at the disposal of individuals and associations, state the resolutions passed at both the First and Second Congresses" (p. 12). To the question, whether the peasants themselves would suffer as a result of nationalisation of the allotment lands, the delegates replied: "They will get land in any case when it is distributed" (p. 20). The peasant proprietor (and his ideologist Mr.

Peshekhonov) understands perfectly well that "they will get land in any case when it is distributed" and that soon the feudal latifundia will be abolished. He needs "redistribution" on a vast scale, which means the nationalisation of all lands, in order to shake himself free from the toils of the Middle Ages, in order to "clear" the land, in order that its utilisation should be brought into line with the new economic conditions. This was well expressed in the Second Duma by Mr. Mushenko when, speaking on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, he said, with his native simplicity: "The population [farmers] will be properly distributed only when the land is unfenced, only when the fences imposed by the principle of private ownership of land are removed" (Minutes of the Second Duma, p. 1172). Compare this statement with the words of Marx quoted earlier, and you will realise that the philistine phrases about "socialisation" and "equalisation" conceal a very real content: the bourgeois revolutionary clearing of the old medieval system of landed property.

The municipalisation of lands in the bourgeois revolution is a *reactionary* measure, because it hinders the economically necessary and inevitable process of abolishing medieval landed property, the process of establishing *uniformity* of economic conditions on the land for all *proprietors*, whatever their condition, their past, their allotment in 1861, etc. The division of land into private property now would be *reactionary*, because it would preserve the present, out-of-date and obsolete allotment ownership; but eventually, after the land will have been completely cleared by means of nationalisation, division would be possible as the slogan of a *new* and free *farming class*.* The business of Marxists is to help the radical bourgeoisie (i.e., the peasantry) to carry out the fullest possible elimination of old junk and to ensure the rapid development of capitalism, and not at all to help the petty bourgeoisie in their striving to come to a comfortable arrangement and adapt themselves to the past.

* M. Shanin in his pamphlet, *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property* (Vilna, 1907), underlined that aspect of the question which bears on agriculture, but did not understand the two paths of development and the importance of abolishing the present landowning system.

Chapter III is devoted to "The Theoretical Basis of Nationalisation and of Municipalisation".

Naturally I shall not start repeating to the Polish comrades things that are commonly known to every Marxist, the fact that nationalisation of the land in capitalist society means abolishing absolute, and not differential rent, etc. But having in mind my Russian readers, I *was obliged* to write of this in detail, because Pyotr Maslov was asserting that Karl Marx's theory of absolute rent is a "contradiction" which "one can only account for [!!] by the fact that Volume III is a posthumous publication containing also the rough notes of the author" (*The Agrarian Question*).*

This pretension on the part of Pyotr Maslov, who desires to correct Karl Marx's rough notes, is not anything new for me. In the journal *Zarya*,[85] as early as 1901, I pointed out that Maslov in *Zhizn*[86] had distorted Marx's theory of rent.** Soon afterwards, however, Pyotr Maslov repeated this presumptuous and unquestionable nonsense in 1906 (the preface to the 3rd edition is dated April 26, 1906) *after the publication* of the *Theories of Surplus-Value*, where Marx explained the theory of absolute rent with complete clarity. Here Maslov surpassed himself! As I am unable to repeat here the detailed analysis of Pyotr Maslov's "corrections" to Marx given in my book, I will confine myself only to the observation that these corrections turn out to be the hackneyed arguments of bourgeois political economy. Pyotr Maslov goes as far as to contrast Marx's theory of absolute rent to "brickmaking" (p. 111); he warms up again "the law of diminishing returns", affirms that "without this law it is impossible to explain 'trans-Atlantic' competition" (p. 107) and finally talks himself into the assertion that *without refuting Marx it is impossible to refute the views of the Narodniks*: "If it were not for the 'fact' that the productivity of successive expenditures of labour on the same plot of land diminishes, the idyll which the ... Narodniks depict could, perhaps, be realised." (Maslov in the journal *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 2, p. 123.) In a word, Pyotr Maslov's economic theory does *not* contain one single *new idea* on the question of

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* *The Agrarian Question*, 3rd ed., p. 108, footnote.

** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 127.—*Ed.*

absolute rent, on the "fact" of diminishing returns, on the principal mistakes of "Narodism", on the difference between the improvement of cultivation and the improvement of technique. Having refuted the theory of absolute rent by purely bourgeois arguments worked to death by the official defenders of capitalism, Maslov was bound to land in the ranks of the distorters of Marxism. But while distorting Marxism, Pyotr Maslov was clever enough to *omit all* his corrections to Marx's rough notes from the German translation of his book on *The Agrarian Question*. Faced with Europeans, Maslov *hid his theory in his pocket*! As I wrote in Chapter III, I could not help recalling in this connection the story about a stranger who was present for the first time at a discussion between ancient philosophers but remained silent all the time. One of the philosophers said to the stranger: "If you are wise, you are behaving foolishly; if you are a fool, you are behaving wisely."

Naturally, to repudiate the theory of absolute rent is to deprive oneself of any chance of understanding the significance of the nationalisation of land in capitalist society, because nationalisation can lead to the abolition only of absolute, and not differential, rent. To repudiate absolute rent is to repudiate the economic significance of private landowning as an *obstacle* to the development of capitalism. Thanks to this, Maslov and Co. inevitably reduce the question of nationalisation or municipalisation to a political issue ("who should get the land?") and ignore the economic essence of the question. The combination of private ownership of allotment land (i.e., of inferior land owned by inferior proprietors) with public ownership of the remaining (superior) part of the land becomes an *absurdity* in any at all developed and free capitalist state. It is nothing more or less, than *agrarian bimetallism*.

As a result of this error of the Mensheviks, it transpires that the Social-Democrats have handed over criticism of private ownership of the land to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Marx gave an admirable example of such criticism in *Capital*.* But with us it appears that the Social-Democrats

* See, for example, *Das Kapital*, III, 2. T., S. 346-47, on the price of land as a barrier to the development of capitalism; and Ibid., S. 344-45, 341, 342.[87]

do not conduct that criticism from the point of view of the development of capitalism, and all that reaches the masses is criticism by the Narodniks, i.e., a distorted philistine criticism of private property in land.

I will mention as a detail that the following argument has also been used against nationalisation in Russian literature: it would mean "money rent" for small peasant property. That is not so. "Money rent" (see *Capital*, Vol. III)[88] is a modern form of interest for the landlord. In *present-day* peasant leasehold, payment for land is undoubtedly *money rent* to a certain degree. The abolition of the feudal latifundia will hasten the differentiation of the peasantry and strengthen the peasant bourgeoisie, which is already carrying out capitalist renting of land (recall the data quoted earlier about renting of land among the higher groups of the peasantry).

Finally, it should be said that the view is fairly widespread among Marxists that nationalisation is practicable only at a very high stage of development of capitalism. That is incorrect. It would then be a question not of a bourgeois but of a socialist revolution. Nationalisation of the land is the most consistent bourgeois measure. Marx *repeatedly* affirmed this, from *The Poverty of Philosophy*[89] onwards. In his *Theories of Surplus-Value* Marx says (II. Band, I. Teil, S. 208): "In theory the radical bourgeois arrives at the repudiation of private landed property.... In practice, however, he lacks courage, since the attack on one form of property, private property in relation to the conditions of labour, would be very dangerous for the other form. Moreover, the bourgeois has territorialised himself." In Russia the bourgeois revolution is taking place in conditions when there exists a radical bourgeois (the peasant) who "has the courage" to put forward a programme of nationalisation on behalf of a mass of many millions, and who has not yet "territorialised himself", i.e., he derives more harm from (*medieval*) private property in land, than advantage and "profits" from (bourgeois) property in the same land. The Russian revolution *cannot* be victorious unless that "radical bourgeois", who wavers between the Cadet and the worker, supports the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle by mass action. The Russian revolution cannot be victorious except in the form

of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Chapter IV of the book deals with "political and tactical" considerations in questions of the agrarian programme. First among these is the "famous" argument of Plekhanov. "The key to my position," he exclaimed at Stockholm, "is that I draw attention to the possibility of restoration" (Minutes, p. 113). But the key is a completely rusty one—the Cadet key of a *deal* with reaction under the guise of a "guarantee against restoration". Plekhanov's argument is the most pitiful piece of sophistry, for while he asserts that there is no guarantee against restoration, he nevertheless *invents* such a guarantee. "It [municipalisation] will not surrender the land to the political representatives of the old order" (p. 45, Plekhanov's speech). What is restoration? The passing of power in the state into the hands of representatives of the old order. Can there be a guarantee against restoration? "No, there can be no guarantee" (Minutes, p. 44, Plekhanov's speech). Therefore ... he invents a guarantee—"municipalisation will not surrender the land".

Under municipalisation there will remain the *difference* between allotment and landlords' lands in the *economic sense*, i.e., it will facilitate a restoration, or the *recognition of this difference* de jure. In the *political* sense municipalisation is a *law* changing the ownership of landlords' estates. What is a law? The expression of the will of the ruling classes. If there is a restoration, the *same* classes once again become the *ruling* classes. Will they be bound by law, Comrade Plekhanov? If you gave this any thought, you would understand that no law can restrict the expression of the will of the ruling classes. Nationalisation makes restoration more difficult in the *economic* sense, because it *destroys all* the old barriers, *all* medieval property in land, and *adapts* it to the new uniform capitalist conditions of production.

Plekhanov's sophistry is an acceptance of the *Cadet* tactics of leading the proletariat not to complete victory but *to a deal* with the old authorities. In fact, the only absolute "guarantee against restoration" is a socialist revolution in the West, while a relative guarantee would be to carry the revolution through to its conclusion, to do away with the old in the *most radical fashion*, to provide the *greatest*

degree of democracy in politics (the republic) and to clear the ground for capitalism in the economy.

Another argument of Plekhanov's runs: "In the shape of local self-governing bodies which will possess the land, municipalisation will create a bulwark against reaction. And a very powerful bulwark it will be" (Minutes, p. 45). This is untrue. Never and nowhere has local self-government been a bulwark against reaction in the epoch of capitalism, nor could it be. Capitalism *inevitably* leads to centralisation of state power, and *every* local self-government will *unquestionably* be vanquished if the state authority is reactionary. Plekhanov is preaching *opportunism* when he concentrates attention not on "democracy in the centre", or *a republic*—the only bulwark against reaction conceivable in capitalist society—but on local self-government, which is always impotent in relation to great historical tasks, always small-scale, petty, subordinate and scattered. "A peasant agrarian revolution" *cannot* be victorious in Russia unless it defeats the central authority, but Plekhanov suggests to the Mensheviks views expressed at Stockholm by the Menshevik Novosedsky: "In the event of truly democratic local self-government being established, the programme now adopted may be carried into effect [listen to this!] even with a degree of democratisation of the central government which cannot be described as the highest degree of its democratisation. Even under democratisation of a comparative degree, so to speak, municipalisation will not be harmful, but useful" (Minutes, p. 138).

Nothing could be more clear. Let us teach the people to adapt itself to the monarchy: perhaps the latter won't "notice" our regional activity, and will "grant us our lives" like Shchedrin's gudgeon had his granted. The Third Duma is a good illustration of the possibility of municipalisation and *local* democracy, given a "relative", Menshevik democracy in the centre.

Then municipalisation makes for federalism and separatism in the regions. No wonder, in the Second Duma, the *Right-wing Cossack* Karaulov denounced nationalisation no less strongly than Plekhanov (Minutes, p. 1366) and *declared for municipalisation by regions*. The Cossack lands in Russia already *represent* an example of municipalisation. And it

was just this breaking-up of the state into separate regions that was one of the causes of the defeat of the revolution in the first three years' campaign!

Nationalisation—runs the next argument—strengthens the central authority of the bourgeois state! In the first place, this argument is put forward with the object of arousing distrust in the Social-Democratic parties of the *various nationalities*. "Perhaps, in some places, the peasants would agree to share their lands," wrote P. Maslov in *Obrazovaniye* (1907, No. 3, p. 104). "But the refusal of the peasants in a single large area (for example, Poland) to share their lands would be enough to make the proposal to nationalise all the land an absurdity." A fine argument, to be sure! Should we not give up the idea of a republic, since "the refusal of the peasants in a single large area is enough, etc."? It is not an argument but a piece of *demagogy*. Our political programme excludes any violence and injustice, demanding wide autonomy for the individual provinces (see Clause 3 of the Party programme). Thus, it is not a question of reinventing new "guarantees" which are unattainable in bourgeois society, but of the party of the proletariat using its propaganda and agitation to *call* for unity and not for dismemberment, to solve the lofty problems arising in centralised states, and not to sink into rusticity and national insularity. It is the centre of Russia that solves the agrarian problem: the borderlands *cannot* be influenced otherwise than by *example*.* This is obvious even to every democrat, let alone every Social-Democrat. And the question is only whether the proletariat should *raise* the peasantry to higher aims, or *sink* to the petty-bourgeois level of the peasantry itself.

Secondly, it is asserted that nationalisation will increase the possibility of arbitrary action at the centre, bureaucracy, etc. As regards bureaucracy, it should be observed that the *management* of the land even under nationalisation will remain in the hands of the local self-governing bodies. This means that the argument just quoted is false. The central authority will lay down the general conditions: i.e., for

* In a capitalist state private property in land and nationalisation *cannot* exist side by side. One of them must gain the upper hand. The business of the workers' party is to fight for the higher system.

example, it will prohibit any alienation of the land, etc. And does not our present, i.e., Menshevik, programme hand over to the "democratic state for disposal" not only the "colonisation lands", but also "forest and water areas of national importance"? But it is not wise to hide one's head under one's wing; here, too, *unlimited* arbitrary action is possible, since it is the central state authority itself which will determine *what* forests and waters are of national importance. The Mensheviks are looking for "guarantees" in the wrong place: *only* complete democracy at the centre, only a *republic*, can reduce the probability of disputes between the centre and the regions to a minimum.

"The bourgeois state will grow stronger," cry the Mensheviks, who in secret support the bourgeois monarchists (the Cadets), and in public beat their breasts at the very thought of supporting bourgeois republicans. The genuine historical question which objective historical and social development is putting to us is: a Prussian or an American type of agrarian evolution? A landlords' monarchy with the fig-leaf of a sham constitution, or a peasant (farmers') republic? To close our eyes to *such* an objective statement of the case by history means to deceive oneself and others, hiding in philistine fashion from the acute class struggle, from the acute, simple and decisive presentation of the question of a democratic revolution.

We cannot get rid of the "bourgeois state". Only petty-bourgeois philistines can dream of doing so. Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution precisely because the struggle going on in it is not between socialism and capitalism, but *between two forms of capitalism*, two paths of its development, two forms of bourgeois-democratic institutions. The monarchy of the Octobrists or the Cadets is a "*relative*" bourgeois "democracy", from the point of view of the Menshevik Novosedsky. The proletarian-peasant republic, too, is a bourgeois democracy. In our revolution we cannot make a *single step*—and we have not made a single step—which *did not support* in one way or another one section of the bourgeoisie or another against the old order.

If we are told that nationalisation means using public funds for the army, while municipalisation means using them for public health and education, it is sophistry worthy

of a philistine. Yet literally that is how Maslov argues: "Nationalisation, i.e., [*sic*!] the expenditure of ground-rent on the army and navy ...; municipalisation of the land, i.e., the expenditure of rent on the needs of the population" (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 103). This is petty-bourgeois socialism, or the destruction of flies by the use of a powder to be poured on the flies' tails when they have been caught! Our good Maslov has not realised that, if the Zemstvos in Russia and the municipalities in the West spend more on public health, etc., compared with the state, it is only because the bourgeois state has already carried out *its* most important expenditures (to assure the domination of the bourgeoisie as a class) out of funds coming from the biggest sources of revenue, and has *left* the local authorities with *secondary* sources for the so-called "needs of the population". Hundreds of thousands for the army, a few farthings for the needs of the *proletariat*—that is the true relationship of expenditures in the bourgeois state. And one has to be a Maslov to imagine that it is sufficient to *hand over* ground-rent for "disposal" by the municipalities, for the bourgeois state to be taken in by those subtle "politicians", the Mensheviks! And really, will the bourgeois state, thanks to this "most subtle policy", begin to give hundreds of thousands to the proletarians and farthings to the army and the navy?

In reality, the Mensheviks are pursuing a philistine policy—seeking refuge in the provincial backwoods of local self-government against having to solve the burning problem with which we are faced by history, namely, should our country have a centralised bourgeois republic of farmers, or a centralised bourgeois monarchy of Junkers? You won't dodge the issue, gentlemen! No provincialism, no playing at municipal socialism, will rescue you from *inevitable* participation in the solving of this *acute* problem. Your wriggling really means only one thing—secret support of the Cadet tendency, while failing to understand the importance of the republican tendency.

The Minutes of the Stockholm Congress are clear evidence of the fact that the Mensheviks, in defending municipalisation, are flirting with the Fabian "municipal socialism" existing in Europe. "Some comrades," Kostrov said there, "seem to be hearing about municipal ownership for the

first time. Let me remind them that in Western Europe there is a whole political trend [precisely! Kostrov, without wishing to do so, blurted out the truth!] called 'municipal socialism' [England]" (Minutes, p. 88). That this "*trend*" is the trend of *extreme opportunism* neither Kostrov nor Larin* took into consideration. It is quite consistent for the Socialist-Revolutionaries to drag in petty-bourgeois peddling of reforms as one of the tasks of the bourgeois revolution, but it is not for the Social-Democrats to do it, gentlemen! The bourgeois intellectuals in the West (the Fabians in England, the followers of Bernstein in Germany, the followers of Brousse in France) naturally shift the weight of emphasis from questions of state *structure* to questions of local *self-government*. But what we are faced with is precisely the question of the *structure* of the state, its agrarian basis—and to defend "municipal socialism" here is to *play* at agrarian socialism. Let the petty bourgeoisie hasten to "build themselves a nest" in the peaceful municipalities of future democratic Russia. The task of the proletariat is to organise the masses not for this purpose, but for the revolutionary struggle, for *complete* democratisation today and a socialist revolution tomorrow.

We Bolsheviks are often reproached for the utopianism and fantastic character of our revolutionary views. And these reproaches are heard most often in connection with nationalisation. But this is where they are least of all justified. Those who consider nationalisation to be "utopia" do not think about the necessary balance between political and agrarian changes. Nationalisation is no less "utopian"—from the point of view of an ordinary philistine—than a republic. And both are no less utopian than a "*peasant*" agrarian revolution, i.e., the victory of a peasant uprising in a capitalist country. All these changes are equally "difficult" as far as everyday peaceful development is concerned. And the outcry about nationalisation, of all things, being utopian, testifies first of all to *failure to understand* the essential and unbreakable connection between an economic

* *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*. A particularly vague commentary on the Menshevik programme. See p. 66. On p. 103 this wretched defender of municipalisation points to *nationalisation* as the *best* way out!

and a political upheaval. Confiscation of the landed estates (a demand in our programme recognised both by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks) is impossible without the abolition of the landlord autocracy (and with it the Octobrist, not purely landlord, autocracy). And the autocracy cannot be abolished without the revolutionary action of class-conscious millions, without a great surge of mass heroism, readiness and ability on their part to "storm heaven", as Marx put it when speaking of the Paris workers at the time of the Commune.[90] In its turn, this revolutionary surge is unthinkable without the radical abolition of *all* the relics of serfdom which for ages have oppressed the peasantry, including the *whole* of medieval property in land, all the shackles of the fiscal "village commune", the crumbs of accursed memory "granted" by the government, etc., etc., etc.

Owing to lack of space (I have already gone beyond the length laid down by the editors of *Przegląd*[91]) I omit a summary of the *fifth* chapter of my book ("Classes and Parties in the Debate on the Agrarian Question in the Second Duma").

The speeches of the *peasants* in the Duma are of tremendous political importance, because in them were expressed that passionate desire to get rid of the yoke of the landlords, that fiery hatred of medievalism and the bureaucracy, that spontaneous, ingenuous, often naïve and not quite definite, but at the same time stormy revolutionary spirit of the *ordinary* peasants, which prove better than any long arguments what potential destructive energy has accumulated within the mass of the peasantry against the nobility, the landlords and the Romanovs. The task of the class-conscious proletariat is mercilessly to show up, expose and eliminate all the numerous petty-bourgeois deceptions, allegedly socialist phrases, childishly naïve expectations which the peasants link with an agrarian revolution—but to eliminate them not in order to calm and pacify the peasants (as the betrayers of the people's freedom, the Cadet gentlemen, did in both Dumas) but in order to awaken among the masses a steel-like, unshakable and resolute revolutionary spirit. Without that *revolutionary spirit*, without a stubborn and merciless struggle of the *peasant* masses, all such things

as confiscation, the republic, and universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot are hopelessly "utopian". Therefore the Marxists must put the question clearly and definitely: two directions in the economic development of Russia, two paths of capitalism, have emerged with absolute clarity. Let all think well on this. During the first revolutionary campaign, during the three years 1905-07, both these directions became clear to us not as theoretical general conclusions, not as lessons to be drawn from such-and-such *features* of the evolution which has taken place since 1861. No, these directions have now become clear to us precisely as the directions *mapped out* by hostile classes. The landlords and the capitalists (the Octobrists) are quite clear that there is no other development except the capitalist one, and that *for them* it is impossible to travel that road without compulsory and speedy destruction of the "village commune", that kind of destruction which is identical with ... open robbery by the money-lender, with "destruction and plunder" by the police or "punitive" expeditions. It is the kind of "operation" in which it is extremely easy to break one's neck! As for the masses of the peasantry, they discovered for themselves no less clearly during those same three years that it was hopeless to expect anything from "Our Father the Tsar", or to count in any way on a peaceful road, and that revolutionary struggle was necessary to abolish all medievalism in general and all medieval property in land in particular.

All the propaganda and agitation of the Social-Democrats should be based on bringing these results home to the masses, on preparing the masses to make use of this experience for a resolute and unswerving attack, organised in the best possible way, during the *second* campaign of the revolution.

That is just why Plekhanov's speeches at Stockholm were so reactionary when he talked about the seizure of power by the proletariat and the peasantry meaning the rebirth of "the Narodnaya Volya spirit". Plekhanov himself reduced his argument to an absurdity: according to him, there would take place a "peasant agrarian revolution" without seizure of power by the proletariat, without seizure of power by the peasantry! On the other hand, Kautsky—who at the beginning of the break between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks

was patently inclined to favour the latter—has gone over ideologically to the side of the former, by recognising that only given "the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry" is a victory of the revolution possible.

Without complete abolition of all medieval property in the land, without the complete "clearing", i.e., without nationalisation of the land, such a revolution is unthinkable. The business of the party of the proletariat is to spread most widely this watchword of a most consistent and most radical bourgeois agrarian revolution. And when we have done *that*, we shall see what are the further prospects; we shall see whether such a revolution is *only* the basis for a development of productive forces under capitalism at an American speed, *or* whether it will become the prologue to a socialist revolution in the West.

July 18, 1908

P.S. I do not repeat here my draft of an agrarian programme, which was submitted to the Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and which has often been printed in Social-Democratic literature. I will confine myself merely to some observations. When two directions for capitalist agrarian evolution exist, there must necessarily be included in the programme an "if" (the technical expression used at the Stockholm Congress), i.e., the programme must take both possibilities into account. In other words, so long as things are going as they are, we demand freedom of use of the land, tribunals for lowering rents, abolition of social-estates, etc. *At the same time we fight the present* direction and support the revolutionary demands of the peasantry in the interests of the speediest possible development of productive forces and of wide and free scope for the class struggle. While supporting the revolutionary struggle of the peasants against medievalism, the Social-Democratic Labour Party makes it clear that the best form of agrarian relations in capitalist society (and at the same time the best form in which survivals of serfdom can be eliminated) is the nationalisation of the land, that only in connection with a radical political revolution, the abolition of the autocracy

and the establishment of a democratic republic, is it possible to carry out a radical agrarian revolution, the confiscation of the landed estates and the nationalisation of the land.

Such is the *content* of my draft agrarian programme. The part which describes the bourgeois features of the *whole* of the present agrarian changes, and elucidates the purely proletarian point of view of Social-Democracy, was *adopted* at Stockholm and *became an integral part* of the present programme.

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INFLAMMABLE MATERIAL IN WORLD POLITICS

The revolutionary movement in various European and Asian countries has latterly made itself felt so weightily that we see before us the fairly clear outlines of a new and incomparably higher stage in the international proletarian struggle.

There has been a counter-revolution in Persia—a peculiar combination of the dissolution of Russia's First Duma, and of the Russian insurrection at the close of 1905. Shamefully defeated by the Japanese, the armies of the Russian tsar are taking their revenge by zealously serving the counter-revolution. The exploits of the Cossacks in mass shootings, punitive expeditions, manhandling and pillage in Russia are followed by their exploits in suppressing the revolution in Persia. That Nicholas Romanov, heading the Black-Hundred landlords and capitalists, scared by strikes and civil war, should be venting his fury on the Persian revolutionaries, is understandable. It is not the first time that Russia's Christian soldiers are cast in the role of international hangmen. That Britain is pharisaically washing her hands of the affair, and maintaining a demonstratively friendly neutrality towards the Persian reactionaries and supporters of absolutism, is a somewhat different matter. The British Liberal bourgeoisie, angered by the growth of the labour movement at home and frightened by the mounting revolutionary struggle in India, are more and more frequently, frankly and sharply demonstrating what *brutes* the highly "civilised" European "politicians", men who have passed through the high school of constitutionalism, can turn into when it comes to a rise in the mass struggle against capital and the capitalist colonial system, i.e., a system of enslavement, plunder and violence. The position of the Per-

sian revolutionaries is a difficult one; theirs is a country which the masters of India on the one hand, and the counter-revolutionary Russian Government on the other, were on the point of dividing up between themselves. But the dogged struggle in Tabriz and the repeated swing of the fortunes of war to the revolutionaries who, it seemed, had been utterly defeated, are evidence that the Shah's bashi-bazouks, even though aided by Russian Lyakhovs[92] and British diplomats, are encountering the most vigorous resistance from the people. A revolutionary movement that can offer armed resistance to attempts at restoration, that compels the attempters to call in foreign aid—such a movement cannot be destroyed. In these circumstances, even the fullest triumph of Persian reaction would merely be the prelude to fresh popular rebellion.

In Turkey, the revolutionary movement in the army, led by the Young Turks, has achieved victory. True, it is only half a victory, or even less, since Turkey's Nicholas II has so far managed to get away with a promise to restore the celebrated Turkish constitution. But in a revolution such half-victories, such forced and hasty concessions by the old regime, are the surest guarantee of new and much more decisive, more acute fluctuations of the civil war, involving broader masses of the people. And the school of civil war is never lost upon nations. It is a hard school, and its complete course *necessarily* includes victories for the counter-revolution, the unbridled licence of the infuriated reactionaries, the savage reprisals of the old government against the rebels, etc. But only incurable pedants and doddering mummies can moan over the fact that the nations have entered this very painful school. For it is one that teaches the oppressed classes how to wage civil war and how to carry the revolution to victory. It concentrates in the masses of contemporary slaves the hatred which downtrodden, benighted and ignorant slaves have always carried within them, and which leads to the supreme history-making feats of slaves who have realised the shame of their slavery.

In India lately, the native slaves of the "civilised" British capitalists have been a source of worry to their "masters". There is no end to the acts of violence and plunder which goes under the name of the British system of government in

India. Nowhere in the world—with the exception, of course, of Russia—will you find such abject mass poverty, such chronic starvation among the people. The most Liberal and Radical personalities of free Britain, men like John Morley—that authority for Russian and non-Russian Cadets, that luminary of "progressive" journalism (in reality, a lackey of capitalism)—become regular Genghis Khans when appointed to govern India, and are capable of sanctioning every means of "pacifying" the population in their charge, even to the extent of *flogging* political protestors! *Justice*, the little weekly of the British Social-Democrats, has been *banned* in India by these Liberal and "Radical" scoundrels like Morley. And when Keir Hardie, the British M. P. and leader of the Independent Labour Party, had the temerity to visit India and speak to the Indians about the most elementary democratic demands, the whole British bourgeois press raised a howl against this "rebel". And now the most influential British newspapers are in a fury about "agitators" who disturb the tranquillity of India, and are welcoming court sentences and administrative measures in the purely Russian, Plehve style to suppress democratic Indian publicists. But in India the street is beginning to stand up for *its* writers and political leaders. The infamous sentence pronounced by the British jackals on the Indian democrat Tilak—he was sentenced to a long term of exile, the question in the British House of Commons the other day revealing that the Indian jurors had declared for acquittal and that the verdict had been passed *by the vote of the British jurors*!—this revenge against a democrat by the lackeys of the money-bag evoked street demonstrations and a strike in Bombay. In India, too, the proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle—and, that being the case, the Russian-style British regime in India is doomed! By their colonial plunder of Asian countries, the Europeans have succeeded in so steeling one of them, Japan, that she has gained great military victories, which have ensured her independent national development. There can be no doubt that the age-old plunder of India by the British, and the contemporary struggle of all these "advanced" Europeans against Persian and Indian democracy, will *steel* millions, tens of millions of proletarians in Asia to wage

a struggle against their oppressors which will be just as victorious as that of the Japanese. The class-conscious European worker now has comrades in Asia, and their number will grow by leaps and bounds.

In China, too, the revolutionary movement against the medieval order has made itself felt with particular force in recent months. True, nothing definite can yet be said about the present movement—there is such scanty information about it and such a spate of reports about revolts in various parts of the country. But there can be no doubt about the vigorous growth of the "new spirit" and the "European currents" that are stirring in China, especially since the Russo-Japanese war; and consequently, the old-style Chinese revolts will inevitably develop into a conscious democratic movement. That some of the participants in colonial plunder are this time greatly concerned is borne out by the way the French are acting in Indo-China: they *helped* the "historic authorities" in China to put down the revolutionaries! They feared equally for the safety of their "own" Asian possessions bordering an China.

The French bourgeoisie, however, are concerned not only over their Asian possessions. The barricades at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, near Paris, the shooting down of the strikers who built these barricades (on Thursday, July 30[17]) —these events are renewed evidence of the sharpening of the class struggle in Europe. Clemenceau, the Radical, who governs France on behalf of the capitalists, is working with uncommon zeal to shatter the last lingering remnants of republican-bourgeois illusions among the proletariat. The shooting down of the workers by troops acting on the orders of a "Radical" government has, under Clemenceau, become almost more frequent than before. The French socialists have already dubbed Clemenceau "The Red" for this; and now, when his agents, gendarmes and generals have again shed the blood of the workers, the socialists recall the catchphrase once uttered by this ultra-progressive bourgeois republican to a workers' delegation: "You and I are on different sides of the barricade." Yes, the French proletariat and the most extreme bourgeois republicans have finally taken their place on opposite sides of the barricade. The French working class shed much blood to win and defend the repub-

lic, and now, on the basis of the fully established republican order, the decisive struggle between the propertied class and the working people is rapidly coming to a head. "It was not simply brutality," *L'Humanité*[93] wrote of the July 30 events, "it was part of a battle." The generals and the police were bent on provoking the workers and turning a peaceful unarmed demonstration into a massacre. But the troops that surrounded and attacked the unarmed strikers and demonstrators met with resistance, their action leading to the immediate erection of barricades, and to events which are agitating the whole of France. These barricades, *L'Humanité* says, were built of boards and were ludicrously ineffectual. But that is not important. What is important is that the Third Republic had eliminated the old habit of barricades; whereas now "Clemenceau is reviving that habit"—and he is just as candid about the matter as were "the butchers of June 1848, and Galliffet in 1871", on the subject of civil war.

And the socialist press is not alone in recalling these great historic dates in connection with the events of July 30. The bourgeois press is furiously attacking the workers, accusing them of behaving as if they intended to start a socialist revolution. One paper cites a minor but characteristic incident indicative of the mood of both sides at the scene of action. When the workers were carrying a wounded comrade past General Virvaire, who directed the operations against the strikers, there were shouts from the demonstrators: "*Saluez*!" And the general of the bourgeois republic saluted his wounded enemy.

The sharpening of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is to be observed in all the advanced capitalist countries. The tendency is the same everywhere, though it manifests itself differently in accordance with the difference in historical conditions, political systems and forms of the labour movement. In America and Britain, where complete political liberty exists and where the proletariat has no revolutionary and socialist traditions that could be called living traditions, this sharpening of the struggle is expressed in the mounting movement against the trusts, in the extraordinary growth of socialism and the increasing attention it is getting from the propertied classes, and in workers' organisations, in some cases purely economic

ones, that are beginning to enter upon systematic and independent proletarian political struggle. In Austria and Germany, and partly also in the Scandinavian countries, this sharpening of the class struggle shows itself in election campaigns, in party relationships, in the closer alignment of the bourgeoisie of all sorts and shades against their common enemy, the proletariat, and in the hardening of judicial and police persecution. Slowly but surely, the two opposing camps are building up their strength, consolidating their organisations, drawing apart with increasing sharpness in every sphere of public life, as if preparing, silently and intently, for the impending revolutionary battles. In the Latin countries, Italy and particularly France, the sharpening of the class struggle is expressed in especially stormy, violent, and occasionally forthright revolutionary outbreaks, when the pent-up hatred of the proletariat for its oppressors bursts out with unexpected force, and the "peaceful" atmosphere of parliamentary struggle gives way to episodes of real civil war.

The international revolutionary movement of the proletariat does not and cannot develop evenly and in identical forms in different countries. The full and all-round utilisation of every opportunity in every field of activity comes only as the result of the class struggle of the workers in the various countries. Every country contributes its own valuable and specific features to the common stream; but in each particular country the movement suffers from its own one-sidedness, its own theoretical and practical shortcomings of the individual socialist parties. On the whole we clearly see a tremendous step forward of international socialism, the rallying of million-strong armies of the proletariat in the course of a series of practical clashes with the enemy, and the approach of a decisive struggle with the bourgeoisie—a struggle for which the working class is far better *prepared* than in the days of the Commune, that last great proletarian insurrection.

And this step forward of the whole of international socialism, along with the sharpening of the revolutionary-democratic struggle in Asia, places the Russian revolution in a special and especially difficult position. The Russian revolution has a great international ally both in Europe and

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

in Asia, but, at the same time, and *for that very reason*, it has not only a national, not only a Russian, but also an *international* enemy. Reaction against the mounting proletarian struggle is inevitable in all capitalist countries, and it is uniting the bourgeois governments of the whole world against every popular movement, against every revolution both in Asia and, particularly, in Europe. The opportunists in our Party, like the majority of the Russian liberal intelligentsia, are still dreaming of a bourgeois revolution in Russia that will "not alienate" or scare away the bourgeoisie, that will not engender "excessive" reaction, or lead to the seizure of power by the revolutionary classes. Vain hopes! A philistine utopia! The amount of inflammable material in all the advanced countries of the world is increasing so speedily, and the conflagration is so clearly spreading to most Asian countries which only yesterday were in a state of deep slumber, that the intensification of international bourgeois reaction and the aggravation of every single national revolution are absolutely inevitable.

The historical tasks of our revolution are not being performed by the forces of counter-revolution, and cannot be. The Russian bourgeoisie are necessarily gravitating more and more towards the international anti-proletarian and antidemocratic trend. It is not on liberal allies that the Russian proletariat should count. It must follow its own independent path to the complete victory of the revolution, basing itself on the need for a forcible solution of the agrarian question in Russia by the peasant masses themselves, helping them to overthrow the rule of the Black-Hundred landlords and the Black-Hundred autocracy, setting itself the task of establishing a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry in Russia, and remembering that its struggle and its victories are inseparable from the international revolutionary movement. Less illusions about the liberalism of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie (counter-revolutionary both in Russia and the world over). More attention to the growth of the international revolutionary proletariat!

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FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD[94]

The present sketch of Comrade Maslov's theoretical misadventures is borrowed from the book by N. Lenin which gives a systematic analysis of the tendencies in our agrarian development. Naturally, the exposure of the "original" agrarian theories of Maslov, which are saturated with a spirit of the most crude revisionism, inevitably involves the criticism of some propositions in the Party programme also. We think a discussion in the Party press on this question is quite timely.

As for Comrade Maslov's theoretical "discoveries", we have to address a few words to Comrade Plekhanov in particular about them, since he is the guardian angel of our agrarian revisionist.

In No. 6-7 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, when discussing momentous theoretical issues, you deigned incidentally to launch upon evasive and ambiguous remarks which are nothing short of *indecent*. You took upon yourself to declare in print that such-and-such members of our Party were *no comrades* of yours, while at the same time you lacked the courage to explain openly and plainly whether you had decided to withdraw from our organisation, or whether you sought the expulsion of such-and-such members from it. That was at once cowardly and rude.

So meditate a little, incorruptible warrior, over the revisionist feats of your Maslov. They fall, if anything does, under that little local authority where you, judging by published literature, have the reputation of a dread Dumbadze. Where then is your criticism of Comrade Maslov's revisionist fabrications? Where is your defence of the eco-

nomic theory of Karl Marx? And who, if not you, gave Maslov every support and encouragement?

Our Party Famusovs[95] are not unwilling to play the part of mercilessly determined fighters for Marxism—but in the service of factional favouritism they don't mind covering up very serious departures from Marxism!

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BELLICOSE MILITARISM AND THE ANTI-MILITARIST TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

I

The diplomats are in a flurry. There is a shower of "Notes", "Reports", "Statements"; ministers whisper behind the backs of the crowned puppets who, champagne-glasses in hand, are "working for peace". But their "subjects" know perfectly well that when crows flock together there must be a smell of carrion about. And the Conservative Earl Cromer informed the British Parliament that we were living in times when national (?) interests were involved, and passions were excited, and there was a risk, and more than a risk, that a collision would take place, however pacific (!) the intentions of rulers may be.

Plenty of inflammable material has accumulated in recent times, and it is steadily growing. The revolution in Persia threatens to upset all the barriers or "spheres of influence" set up there by the European powers. The constitutional movement in Turkey threatens to snatch that private estate from the claws of the preying wolves of European capitalism; and looming large and threatening are old "questions" which have now become acute—those of Macedonia, Central Asia, the Far East, etc.

But with the present network of open and secret treaties, agreements, etc., it is sufficient for some "power" to get the slightest of flicks for "the spark to burst into flame".

And the more menacingly the governments rattle their sabres one against the other, the more ruthlessly do they crush the anti-militarist movement at home. The persecutions

of anti-militarists are growing extensively and intensively. The "Radical-Socialist" Ministry of Clemenceau-Briand acts no less violently than the Junker-Conservative Ministry of Bulow. The dissolution of the "youth organisations" throughout Germany, following the introduction of the new law on unions and assemblies, which prohibits persons under the age of 20 from attending political meetings, has made anti-militarist agitation in Germany extremely difficult.

As a result, the dispute about the anti-militarist tactics of the socialists, which had died down since the Stuttgart Congress,[96] is being revived again in the Party press.

At first sight it is a strange thing. When the question is so obviously important, when militarism is so patently and starkly harmful for the proletariat, it would be difficult to find another question on which such hesitation and confusion reign among the Western socialists as in the arguments on anti-militarist tactics.

The fundamental premises for a correct solution of this problem have long ago been established quite firmly, and do not arouse any dispute. Modern militarism is the result of capitalism. In both its forms it is the "vital expression" of capitalism—as a military force used by the capitalist states in their external conflicts ("*Militarismus nach aussen*", as the Germans say) and as a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing every kind of movement, economic and political, of the proletariat ("*Militarismus nach innen*"). A number of International Congresses (Paris 1889, Brussels 1891, Zurich 1893 and finally Stuttgart 1907) provided a perfect expression of this view in their resolutions. The Stuttgart resolution establishes this link between militarism and capitalism most circumstantially, although in keeping with the agenda ("International Conflicts") the Stuttgart Congress was more concerned with that aspect of militarism which the Germans call "external" ("*Militarismus nach aussen*"). Here is the relevant passage in this resolution: "Wars between capitalist states are usually the result of their competition on the world market, since each state strives not only to assure itself of a sphere of export, but also to conquer new regions, and the principal part in this is played by the enslavement of other peoples and countries. These wars then arise from the continuous armaments

produced by militarism, which is the principal implement of class domination of the bourgeoisie and of the political subjugation of the working class.

"A favourable soil for wars are nationalist prejudices, which are systematically cultivated in the civilised countries in the interests of the ruling classes, with the object of diverting the proletarian masses from their own class objectives and making them forget the duty of international class solidarity.

"Thus wars are rooted in the very essence of capitalism; they will end only when the capitalist system ceases to exist, or when the immensity of human and financial sacrifice caused by the development of military technique, and the indignation which armaments arouse in the people, lead to the elimination of the system.

"The working class, which is the principal supplier of soldiers, and which bears the brunt of the material sacrifices, is in particular the natural enemy of wars, because wars contradict the aim it pursues, namely, the creation of an economic system founded on socialist principles, which in practice will give effect to the solidarity of peoples...."

II

Thus the principle which connects militarism and capitalism is firmly established among socialists, and on this point there are no differences. But the recognition of this link does not of itself concretely determine the anti-militarist *tactics* of the socialists: it does not solve the practical problem of how to fight the burden of militarism and how to prevent wars. And it is in the answers to these questions that a considerable divergence of views is to be found among socialists. At the Stuttgart Congress these differences were very marked.

At one pole are German Social-Democrats like Vollmar. Since militarism is the offspring of capitalism, they argue, since wars are a necessary concomitant of capitalist development, there is no need for any special anti-militarist activity. That exactly is what Vollmar declared at the Essen Party Congress. On the question of how Social-Democrats should behave if war is declared, the majority of the German

Social-Democrats, headed by Bebel and Vollmar, hold rigidly to the view that the Social-Democrats must defend their country against aggression, and that they are bound to take part in a "defensive" war. This proposition led Vollmar to declare at Stuttgart that "all our love for humanity cannot prevent us being good Germans", while the Social-Democratic deputy Noske proclaimed in the Reichstag that, in the event of war against Germany, "the Social-Democrats will not lag behind bourgeois parties and will shoulder their rifles". From this Noske had to make only one more step to declare that "we want Germany to be armed as much as possible".

At the other pole is the small group of supporters of Hervé. The proletariat has no fatherland, they argue. Hence all wars are in the interests of the capitalists. Hence the proletariat must combat every war. The proletariat must meet every declaration of war with a military strike and an uprising. This must be the main purpose of anti-militarist propaganda. At Stuttgart Hervé therefore proposed the following draft resolution: "The Congress calls for *every declaration of war*, *whencesoever it may come*, being met with a military strike and an uprising."

Such are the two "extreme" positions on this question in the ranks of the Western socialists. "Like the sun in a drop of water", there are reflected in them the two diseases which still cause harm to the activity of the socialist proletariat in the West—opportunist tendencies on the one hand and anarchist phrase-mongering on the other.

First of all, a few remarks about patriotism. That "working men have no country" was really said in the *Communist Manifesto*. That the attitude of Vollmar, Noske and Co. strikes at this basic principle of *international* socialism is also true. But it does not follow from this that Hervé and his followers are right in asserting that it is of no concern to the proletariat in what country it lives—in monarchical Germany, republican France or despotic Turkey. The fatherland, i.e., the given political, cultural and social environment, is a most powerful factor in the class struggle of the proletariat; and if Vollmar is wrong when he lays down some kind of "truly German" attitude of the proletariat to "the fatherland", Hervé is just as wrong when he takes up

an unforgivably uncritical attitude on such an important factor in the struggle of the proletariat for emancipation. The proletariat cannot be indifferent to the political, social and cultural conditions of its struggle; consequently it cannot be indifferent to the destinies of its country. But the destinies of the country interest it only *to the extent* that they affect its class struggle, and not in virtue of some bourgeois "patriotism", quite indecent on the lips of a Social-Democrat.

More complicated is the other question, namely, the attitude to militarism and war. At the very first glance it is obvious that Hervé is unforgivably confusing these two questions, and forgetting the causal connection between war and capitalism. By adopting Hervé's tactics, the proletariat would condemn itself to fruitless activity: it would use up all its fighting preparedness (the reference is to insurrection) in the struggle against the effect (war) and allow the cause (capitalism) to remain.

The anarchist mode of thought is displayed in full measure here. Blind faith in the miracle-working power of all direct action*; the wrenching of this "direct action" out of its general social and political context, without the slightest analysis of the latter: in short the "arbitrarily mechanical interpretation of social phenomena" (as Karl Liebknecht put it) is obvious.

Hervé's plan is "very simple": on the day war is declared the socialist soldiers desert, while the reservists declare a strike and stay in their homes. But "the strike of the reservists is not passive resistance: the working class would soon go over to open resistance, to insurrection, and the latter would have all the greater chance of ending in triumph because the army on active service would be at the frontiers" (G. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*).

Such is this "effective, direct and practical plan"; and Hervé, confident of its success, proposes that a military strike and insurrection should be the reply to every declaration of war.

It will be clear from this that the question here is not whether the proletariat is able, when it finds such a course

* These words are in French in the original: *action directé*.—*Ed*.

desirable, to reply with a strike and insurrection to a declaration of war. The point at issue is whether the proletariat should be bound by an obligation to reply with an insurrection to *every* war. To decide the question in the latter sense means to take away from the proletariat the choice of the moment for a decisive battle, and to hand it over to its enemies. It is not the proletariat which chooses the moment of struggle in accordance with its own interests, when its general socialist consciousness stands at a high level, when its organisation is strong, when the occasion is appropriate, etc. No, the bourgeois governments would be able to provoke it to an insurrection even when the conditions for it were unfavourable, for example, by declaring a war specially calculated to arouse patriotic and chauvinist feelings among wide sections of the population and thus isolate the insurgent proletariat. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the bourgeoisie which, from monarchist Germany to republican France and democratic Switzerland, persecutes anti-militarist activity with such ruthlessness in peace-time, would descend with the utmost fury on any attempt at a military strike in the event of war, when war-time laws declarations of martial law, courts martial, etc., are in force.

Kautsky was right when he said of Hervé's idea: "The idea of a military strike sprang from 'good' motives, it is noble and full of heroism, but it is heroic folly."

The proletariat, if it finds it expedient and suitable, may reply with a military strike to a declaration of war. It may, among other means of achieving a social revolution, also have recourse to a military strike. But to commit itself to this "tactical recipe" is not in the interests of the proletariat.

And that precisely was the reply given to this debatable question by the Stuttgart International Congress.

III

But if the views of the Hervéists are "heroic folly" the attitude of Vollmar, Noske and those who think like them on the "Right wing" is opportunist cowardice. Since militarism is the offspring of capitalism, and will fall with it—they argued at Stuttgart and still more at Essen—no special

anti-militarist agitation is needed: it should not exist. But a radical solution of the labour question and the women's question, for example—was the reply given them at Stuttgart—is also impossible while the capitalist system exists; in spite of that, we fight for labour legislation, for extending the civil rights of women, etc. Special anti-militarist propaganda must be carried on all the more energetically because cases of interference in the struggle between labour and capital on the part of the military forces are becoming more frequent; and because the importance of militarism not only in the present struggle of the proletariat, but also in the future, at the time of the social revolution, is becoming more and more obvious.

Special anti-militarist propaganda has behind it not only the evidence of principle but also extensive historical experience. Belgium is ahead of other countries in this respect. The Belgian Labour Party, apart from its general propaganda of anti-militarist ideas, has organised groups of socialist youth under the title of Jeunes Gardes (Young Guards). Groups in one and the same area constitute an Area Federation, and all the Area Federations in turn form a National Federation, headed by a "Chief Council". The newspapers of the "Young Guards" (*La jeunesse—c'est l'avenir*, *De Caserne*, *De Loteling*,* etc.) circulate in tens of thousands of copies! The strongest is the Walloon Federation, which has 62 local groups with 10,000 members; in all there are at present 121 local groups of the "Young Guards".

In addition to agitation in print, there is intensive verbal agitation. In January and September (the months of the call-up) public meetings and processions are held in the main towns of Belgium. Outside the town halls, in the open air, socialist speakers explain to the recruits the meaning of militarism. The Chief Council of the "Young Guards" has a Complaints Committee, the duty of which is to gather information about all acts of injustice committed in the barracks. This information, under the heading "From the Army", is daily published in *Le Peuple*, the central organ of the party. Anti-militarist propaganda does not halt at the threshold of the barracks, and socialist soldiers form propaganda groups

* *Youth Is the Future*, *The Barracks*, *The Recruit.—Ed.*

within the army. At the present time there are about 15 such groups ("soldiers' unions").

Following the Belgian model, with varying intensity and forms of organisation, anti-militarist propaganda goes on in France,* Switzerland, Austria and other countries.

Thus specially-anti-militarist activity is not only specially necessary but practically expedient and fruitful. Therefore, since Vollmar opposed it, pointing out the impossible police conditions prevailing in Germany and the danger of it leading to party organisations being broken up, the question reduced itself to the factual analysis of conditions in this particular country. But this was a question of fact and not of principle. Though here, too, there was justice in Jaurès's remark that the German Social-Democrats, who in their youth, in the difficult years of the Anti-Socialist Laws, stood up against the iron hand of Prince Bismarck, could now, with their incomparably greater numbers and strength, not fear persecution at the hands of their present rulers. But Vollmar is all the more wrong when he tries to fall back on the argument that special anti-militarist propaganda is inexpedient in principle.

No less opportunistic is the conviction of Vollmar and those who think like him that the Social-Democrats are bound to take part in a defensive war. Kautsky's brilliant criticism made hay of these views. Kautsky pointed out that it was often quite impossible to make out—especially at times of patriotic excitement—whether a particular war has been brought about with defensive or aggressive aims (the example, Kautsky gave was: was Japan attacking or defending herself at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War?). Social-Democrats would be entangled in a net of diplomatic negotiations if they took into their heads to determine their attitude to a war by this criterion. Social-Democrats may find themselves even in a position to demand offensive wars. In 1848 (it would not hurt the Hervéists to remember this too) Marx

* An interesting feature among the French is the practice known as "The Soldier's Half-penny". Every week the worker pays one sou to the secretary of his union. The money collected in this way is sent to the soldiers "as a reminder that, even in soldier's clothes, they belong to the exploited class, and that in no circumstances should they forget this".

and Engels thought a war of Germany against Russia to be necessary. Later they strove to influence public opinion in Britain in favour of a war with Russia. Kautsky, by the way, puts forward the following hypothetical example: "Assuming," he says, "that the revolutionary movement in Russia is victorious, and the effects of this victory, in France, lead to power passing into the hands of the proletariat; let us assume, on the other hand, that a coalition of European monarchs is formed against the new Russia. Would international Social-Democracy begin protesting if the French Republic then came to the aid of Russia?" (K. Kautsky, *Our Views on Patriotism and War.*)

It is obvious that on this question (just as in discussing "patriotism") it is not the defensive or offensive character of the war, but the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat, or—to put it better—the interests of the international movement of the proletariat—that represent the sole criterion for considering and deciding the attitude of the Social-Democrats to any particular event in international relations.

The lengths to which opportunism can go in such questions too is shown by a recent statement of Jaurès. Expressing his views on the international situation in a German bourgeois-liberal newspaper, he defends the alliance of France and Britain with Russia against the charge of non-peaceful intentions, and treats that alliance as a "guarantee of peace"; he welcomes the fact that "we have now lived to see an alliance of Britain and Russia, two old-standing enemies".

Rosa Luxemburg has given a magnificent assessment of such a view, and a warm retort to Jaurès, in her "Open Letter" to him in the last issue of *Neue Zeit*.

Rosa Luxemburg begins by pointing out that to talk of an alliance between "Russia" and "Britain" means "talking in the language of bourgeois politicians", because the interests of the capitalist states and the interests of the proletariat in foreign policy are opposed to one another, and one cannot speak of a harmony of interests in the sphere of foreign relations. If militarism is the offspring of capitalism, then wars too cannot be abolished by the intrigues of rulers and diplomats; and the task of socialists is not to awaken

illusions on this score, but on the contrary constantly to expose the hypocrisy and impotence of diplomatic "peaceful démarches".

But the main point of the "Open Letter" is the assessment of Britain's and France's alliance with Russia which Jaurès so extols. The European bourgeoisie has given tsarism a chance to repel the revolutionary onset. "Now, in an attempt to turn its temporary victory over the revolution into a final one, absolutism is having recourse first and foremost to the tried method of all shaken despotisms—successes in foreign policy." All alliances with Russia now mean "a holy alliance between the bourgeoisie of Western Europe and Russian counter-revolution, the suppressors and executioners of Russian and Polish fighters for liberty. Such alliances mean the strengthening of the most bloody reaction, not only inside Russia, but in international relations as well.... Therefore the most elementary obligation of socialists and proletarians in all countries is to oppose with all their might an alliance with counter-revolutionary Russia".

Rosa Luxemburg asks Jaurès: "How are we to explain to ourselves that you will strive 'most energetically' to make the government of the bloody executioners of the Russian revolution and the insurrection in Persia an influential factor in European politics, and make the gallows in Russia pillars of international peace—you, who once uttered a brilliant speech in the French Parliament against the loan to Russia; you, who only a few weeks ago printed in your paper *L'Humanité* a fiery appeal to public opinion against the bloody work of the military tribunals in Russian Poland? How can one reconcile your plans for peace, which rely on the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian alliances, with the recent protest of the French Parliamentary Socialist Party and the Administrative Commission of the National Council of the Socialist Party against President Fallieres' visit to Russia—a protest which you signed, and which in passionate terms defends the interests of the Russian revolution? If the President of the French Republic cares to quote your conceptions of the international situation, he will reply to your protest that he who approves the end must approve the means; he who considers alliance with tsarist Russia as the harmony of international peace must accept

everything that strengthens that alliance and leads to friendship.

"What would you have said if once upon a time in Germany, in Russia or in Britain there had appeared socialists and revolutionaries who in the 'interests of peace' had recommended an alliance with the government of the Restoration, or the government of Thiers and Jules Favre, and had vested such an alliance with their moral authority?!"

This letter speaks for itself, and Russian Social-Democrats can only send their greetings to Comrade Rosa Luxemburg for this her protest and for her defence of the Russian revolution before the international proletariat.

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LEO TOLSTOY AS THE MIRROR OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

To identify the great artist with the revolution which he has obviously failed to understand, and from which he obviously stands aloof, may at first sight seem strange and artificial. A mirror which does not reflect things correctly could hardly be called a mirror. Our revolution, however, is an extremely complicated thing. Among the mass of those who are directly making and participating in it there are many social elements which have also obviously not understood what is taking place and which also stand aloof from the real historical tasks with which the course of events has confronted them. And if we have before us a really great artist, he must have reflected in his work at least some of the essential aspects of the revolution.

The legal Russian press, though its pages teem with articles, letters and comments on Tolstoy's eightieth birthday, is least of all interested in analysing his works from the standpoint of the character of the Russian revolution and its motive forces. The whole of this press is steeped to nausea in hypocrisy, hypocrisy of a double kind: official and liberal. The former is the crude hypocrisy of the venal hack who was ordered yesterday to hound Leo Tolstoy, and today to show that Tolstoy is a patriot, and to try to observe the decencies before the eyes of Europe. That the hacks of this kind have been paid for their screeds is common knowledge and they cannot deceive anybody. Much more refined and, therefore, much more pernicious and dangerous is liberal hypocrisy. To listen to the Cadet Balalaikins[97] of *Rech*, one would think that their sympathy for Tolstoy is of the



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Лев Толстой, как зеркало русской революции.

Сопоставление имени великого художника с революцией, которой он явно не понял, от которой он явно отдалился, может показаться на первый взгляд странным и искусственным. Не произвольно ли берем мы то, что очевидно не отражает явления правильно? Но наша революция — явление чрезвычайно сложное; среди массы ее непосредственных участников, современников и очевидцев есть немало сознательных элементов, которые тоже явно не понимали происходящего, тоже отстранялись от насущных исторических задач, возникавших перед всем ходом событий. И если перед нами действительно

The first page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution", 1908.

Reduced

most complete and ardent kind. Actually, their calculated declamations and pompous phrases about the "great seeker after God" are false from beginning to end, for no Russian liberal believes in Tolstoy's God, or sympathises with Tolstoy's criticism of the existing social order. He associates himself with a popular name in order to increase his political capital, in order to pose as a leader of the nation-wide opposition; he seeks, with the din and thunder of claptrap, to *drown* the demand for a straight and clear answer to the question: what are the glaring contradictions of "Tolstoyism" due to, and what shortcomings and weaknesses of our revolution do they express?

The contradictions in Tolstoy's works, views, doctrines, in his school, are indeed glaring. On the one hand, we have the great artist, the genius who has not only drawn incomparable pictures of Russian life but has made first-class contributions to world literature. On the other hand we have the landlord obsessed with Christ. On the one hand, the remarkably powerful, forthright and sincere protest against social falsehood and hypocrisy; and on the other, the "Tolstoyan", i.e., the jaded, hysterical sniveller called the Russian intellectual, who publicly beats his breast and wails: "I am a bad wicked man, but I am practising moral self-perfection; I don't eat meat any more I now eat rice cutlets." On the one hand, merciless criticism of capitalist exploitation, exposure of government outrages, the farcical courts and the state administration, and unmasking of the profound contradictions between the growth of wealth and achievements of civilisation and the growth of poverty, degradation and misery among the working masses. On the other, the crackpot preaching of submission, "resist not evil" with violence. On the one hand, the most sober realism, the tearing away of all and sundry masks; on the other, the preaching of one of the most odious things on earth, namely, religion, the striving to replace officially appointed priests by priests who will serve from moral conviction, i.e., to cultivate the most refined and, therefore, particularly disgusting clericalism. Verily:

Thou art a pauper, yet thou art abundant,
Thou art mighty, yet thou art impotent—
—Mother Russia![98]

That Tolstoy, owing to these contradictions, could not possibly understand either the working-class movement and its role in the struggle for socialism, or the Russian revolution, goes without saying. But the contradictions in Tolstoy's views and doctrines are not accidental; they express the contradictory conditions of Russian life in the last third of the nineteenth century. The patriarchal countryside, only recently emancipated from serfdom, was literally given over to the capitalist and the tax-collector to be fleeced and plundered. The ancient foundations of peasant economy and peasant life, foundations that had really held for centuries, were broken up for scrap with extraordinary rapidity. And the contradictions in Tolstoy's views must be appraised not from the standpoint of the present-day working-class movement and present-day socialism (such an appraisal is, of course, needed, but it is not enough), but from the standpoint of protest against advancing capitalism, against the ruining of the masses, who are being dispossessed of their land—a protest which had to arise from the patriarchal Russian countryside. Tolstoy is absurd as a prophet who has discovered new nostrums for the salvation of mankind—and therefore the foreign and Russian "Tolstoyans" who have sought to convert the weakest side of his doctrine into a dogma, are not worth speaking of. Tolstoy is great as the spokesman of the ideas and sentiments that emerged among the millions of Russian peasants at the time the bourgeois revolution was approaching in Russia. Tolstoy is original, because the sum total of his views, taken as a whole, happens to express the specific features of our revolution as a *peasant* bourgeois revolution. From this point of view, the contradictions in Tolstoy's views are indeed a mirror of those contradictory conditions in which the peasantry had to play their historical part in our revolution. On the one hand, centuries of feudal oppression and decades of accelerated post-Reform pauperisation piled up mountains of hate, resentment, and desperate determination. The striving to sweep away completely the official church, the landlords and the landlord government, to destroy all the old forms and ways of landownership, to clear the land, to replace the police-class state by a community of free and equal small peasants—this striving the is the keynote of every historical step the peasantry has

taken in our revolution; and, undoubtedly, the message of Tolstoy's writings conforms to this peasant striving far more than it does to abstract "Christian Anarchism", as his "system" of views is sometimes appraised.

On the other hand the peasantry, striving towards new ways of life, had a very crude, patriarchal, semi-religious idea of what kind of life this should be, by what struggle could liberty be won, what leaders it could have in this struggle, what was the attitude of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia towards the interests of peasant revolution, why the forcible overthrow of tsarist rule was needed in order to abolish landlordism. The whole past life of the peasantry had taught it to hate the landowner and the official, but it did not, and could not, teach it where to seek an answer to all these questions. In our revolution a minor part of the peasantry really did fight, did organise to some extent for this purpose: and a very small part indeed rose up in arms to exterminate its enemies, to destroy the tsar's servants and protectors of the landlords. Most of the peasantry wept and prayed, moralised and dreamed, wrote petitions and sent "pleaders"—quite in the vein of Leo Tolstoy! And, as always happens in such cases, the effect of this Tolstoyan abstention from politics, this Tolstoyan renunciation of politics, this lack of interest in and understanding of politics, was that only a minority followed the lead of the class-conscious revolutionary proletariat, while the majority became the prey of those unprincipled, servile, bourgeois intellectuals who under the name of Cadets hastened from a meeting of Trudoviks to Stolypin's anteroom, and begged, haggled, reconciled and promised to reconcile—until they were kicked out with a military jackboot. Tolstoy's ideas are a mirror of the weakness, the shortcomings of our peasant revolt, a reflection of the flabbiness of the patriarchal countryside and of the hidebound cowardice of the "enterprising muzhik".

Take the soldiers' insurrections in 1905-06. In social composition these men who fought in our revolution were partly peasants and partly proletarians. The proletarians were in the minority; therefore the movement in the armed forces does not even approximately show the same nation-wide solidarity, the same party consciousness, as were displayed

by the proletariat, which became Social-Democratic as if by the wave of a hand. Yet there is nothing more mistaken than the view that the insurrections in the armed forces failed because no officers had led them. On the contrary, the enormous progress the revolution had made since the time of the Narodnaya Volya[99] was shown precisely by the fact that the "grey herd" rose in arms against their superiors, and it was this self-dependency of theirs that so frightened the liberal landlords and the liberal officers. The common soldier fully sympathised with the peasants' cause; his eyes lit up at the very mention of land. There was more than one case when authority in the armed forces passed to the mass of the rank and file, but determined use of this authority was hardly made at all; the soldiers wavered; after a couple of days, in some cases a few hours, after killing some hated officer, they released the others who had been arrested, parleyed with the authorities and then faced the firing squad, or bared their backs for the birch, or put on the yoke again—quite in the vein of Leo Tolstoy!

Tolstoy reflected the pent-up hatred, the ripened striving for a better lot, the desire to get rid of the past—and also the immature dreaming, the political inexperience, the revolutionary flabbiness. Historical and economic conditions explain both the inevitable beginning of the revolutionary struggle of the masses and their unpreparedness for the struggle, their Tolstoyan non-resistance to evil, which was a most serious cause of the defeat of the first revolutionary campaign.

It is said that beaten armies learn well. Of course, revolutionary classes can be compared with armies only in a very limited sense. The development of capitalism is hourly changing and intensifying the conditions which roused the millions of peasants—united by their hatred for the feudalist landlords and their government—for the revolutionary-democratic struggle. Among the peasantry themselves the growth of exchange, of the rule of the market and the power of money is steadily ousting old-fashioned patriarchalism and the patriarchal Tolstoyan ideology. But there is one gain from the first years of the revolution and the first reverses in mass revolutionary struggle about which there can be no doubt. It is the mortal blow struck at the former softness

and flabbiness of the masses. The lines of demarcation have become more distinct. The cleavage of classes and parties has taken place. Under the hammer blows of the lessons taught by Stolypin, and with undeviating and consistent agitation by the revolutionary Social-Democrats not only the socialist proletariat but also the democratic masses of the peasantry will inevitably advance from their midst more and more steeled fighters who will be less capable of falling into our historical sin of Tolstoyism!

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BRITISH AND GERMAN WORKERS DEMONSTRATE FOR PEACE[100]

As is well known, in Britain and Germany a chauvinist campaign has long been conducted by the bourgeois press, especially the gutter press, in which these countries are incited against each other. Competition in the world market between British and German capitalists is becoming more and more bitter. Britain's former supremacy and her undivided ascendancy in the world market, have become a thing of the past. Germany is one of the capitalist countries that are developing particularly rapidly, and her manufactures are seeking markets abroad on an ever-growing scale. The struggle for colonies and the conflict of commercial interests have in capitalist society become one of the main causes of war. It is therefore not surprising that the capitalists of both countries consider war between Britain and Germany inevitable, and the military men on both sides deem it quite desirable. The British jingoes want to undermine the strength of a dangerous rival by smashing Germany's sea power while it is still immeasurably weaker than Britain's. The German Junkers and generals, headed by that Bourbon, Wilhelm II, are spoiling for a fight with Britain, hoping to be able to use their numerical superiority in land forces, and hoping that the clamour of military victories will stifle the growing discontent of the working masses and prevent the aggravation of the class struggle in Germany.

The British and German workers decided to come out publicly against the growing war danger. For a long time the labour press in both countries had been waging an unremitting struggle against chauvinism and militarism. But what was required now was some more imposing expression of the will of the working class than through the organs of the press. The British workers decided to send a delegation to Berlin to attend a grand demonstration that would declare

the joint determination of the proletariat of both countries to wage war on war.

The demonstration took place in Berlin on Sunday, September 20 (7, old style). This time the British workers' representatives were able to address the proletariat of Berlin without let or hindrance. Two years before, when J. Jaurès had wanted to speak to the German workers on behalf of the French working class at a Social-Democratic mass meeting in Berlin to protest against the bourgeois jingoes, the German Government banned him. This time it did not venture to eject the delegates of the British proletariat.

A mammoth rally of working men was held in one of Berlin's biggest halls. About 5,000 people immediately packed the place, and an overflow of many thousands occupied the surrounding grounds and the street. Stewards wearing red armbands kept order. Comrade Legien, the well-known leader of the German trade unions (called "free", i.e., actually Social-Democratic unions), greeted the British delegation on behalf of the entire politically and industrially organised working class of Germany. He said that fifty years ago French and British workers had demonstrated on behalf of peace. At that time those pioneer socialists were not backed by the organised masses. Today Britain and Germany together had an army of $4\frac{1}{3}$ million organised workers. It was on behalf of this army that the British delegates and the Berlin rally now spoke, declaring that the decision of war or peace lay in the hands of the working class.

In his speech in reply, the British workers' delegate Maddison condemned the jingo slander campaign conducted by the bourgeoisie, and handed over an Address from the Workers of Britain to the Workers of Germany, signed by 3,000 workmen. Among the signatories, he said, were representatives of both trends in the British labour movement (i.e., both Social-Democrats and adherents of the Independent Labour Party, who do not yet hold any consistent socialist point of view). The Address pointed out that wars serve the interests of the propertied classes. The masses of the workers bear all the burdens of war. The propertied classes derive benefit from national calamities. Let the workers unite to fight militarism, to ensure peace!

After other British delegates and a representative of the German Social-Democratic Party, Richard Fischer, had spoken, the meeting closed with the unanimous adoption of a resolution branding the "selfish and short-sighted policy of the ruling and exploiting classes" and expressing readiness to act in accordance with the resolution of the International Congress in Stuttgart, i.e., to fight war by all ways and means. The meeting broke up in an orderly manner amidst the singing of the workers' *Marseillaise*. There were no street demonstrations. The Berlin police and local military authorities were disappointed. It is characteristic of the regime in Germany that the most peaceful demonstration of the workers had to have a police and military demonstration to accompany it. The Berlin garrison was mobilised. Detachments of troops were stationed in different parts of the city in accordance with a strict plan, mostly in such a way that their hiding-places and numbers could not be easily detected. Police units patrolled the streets and squares in the vicinity of the meeting hall, particularly the road leading from there to the royal palace. The latter was ringed with police in plain clothes and troops concealed in house yards. An intricate system of police pickets was organised; groups of policemen loitered at street corners; police officers were detailed to all "important" spots; police cyclists acted as scouts and kept the military authorities informed on every step the "enemy" made; bridges and canal crossings were put under triple guard. "They stood watch over the threatened monarchy," sarcastically wrote *Vorwärts*,[101] commenting on all these measures taken by the government of Wilhelm II.

It was a rehearsal, we add for our part. Wilhelm II and the German bourgeoisie were rehearsing military combat with an insurgent proletariat. Such rehearsals are undoubtedly and in any case useful to both the masses of workers and to the soldiers. *Ça ira* (it will be a success!), as the French workers' song says. Repeated rehearsals are leading, maybe very slowly as yet, but very surely, to the great historical climax.

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THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

A students' strike has been called at St. Petersburg University. A number of other higher education establishments have joined in. The movement has already spread to Moscow and Kharkov. Judging from all the reports in the foreign and Russian newspapers and in private letters from Russia, we are faced with a fairly broad *academic* movement.

Back to the old days! Back to pre-revolutionary Russia! That is what these events signify above all. As before, official reaction is tightening the screw in the universities. The eternal struggle in autocratic Russia against the student organisations has taken the form of a crusade by the Black-Hundred Minister Schwartz—acting in full agreement with "Premier" Stolypin—against the autonomy which was promised the students in the autumn of 1905 (what did not the autocracy, faced with the onset of the revolutionary working class, "promise" Russian citizens at that time!); against an autonomy which the students enjoyed so long as the autocracy had "other things to think of than students", and which the autocracy, if it was to remain such, could not but begin to take away.

As before, the liberal press laments and groans, this time together with some Octobrists—the professors lament and snivel too, imploring the government not to take the road of reaction and to make use of an excellent opportunity "to ensure peace and order with the help of reforms" in "a country exhausted by convulsions"—imploring the students not to resort to unlawful courses which can only play into the hands of reaction, etc., etc., etc. How ancient and antiquated, how

hackneyed are all these tunes, and how vividly they resurrect before our eyes what took place twenty years ago or so, at the end of the eighties of last century! The similarity between that time and this is all the more striking when we take the present moment by itself, apart from the three years of revolution we have gone through. For the Duma (at first sight) with only the tiniest difference expresses that same pre-revolutionary relation of forces—the supremacy of the wild landlord, who prefers using Court connections and the influence of his friend the official to any kind of representation; the support of that same official by the merchants (the Octobrists) who do not dare to differ from their benevolent patrons; the "opposition" of the bourgeois intellectuals who are concerned most of all to prove their loyalty and who describe appeals to those in power as the political activity of liberalism. And the workers' deputies in the Duma recall feebly, far too feebly, the part which the proletariat was recently playing by its open mass struggle.

It may be asked, can we in such conditions attribute any importance to the old forms of primitive academic struggle of the students? If the liberals have sunk to the level of the "politics" of the eighties (one can of course only in irony speak of politics in this connection), will it not be a debasement of the aims of Social-Democracy if it decides that it is necessary to support the academic struggle in some way or other?

Here and there, apparently, Social-Democratic students are putting this question. At any rate, our editorial board has received a letter from a group of Social-Democratic students which says, among other things:

"On September 13, a meeting of the students of St. Petersburg University resolved to call upon students for an all-Russian student strike, the reason given for this appeal being the aggressive tactics pursued by Schwartz. The platform of the strike is an academic one, and the meeting even welcomes the 'first steps' of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Professorial Councils in the struggle for autonomy. We are puzzled by the academic platform put forward at the St. Petersburg meeting, and consider it objectionable in present conditions, because it cannot unite the students for an active struggle on a broad front. We envisage student action only as one co-ordinated with general political action, and in no case apart from it. The elements

capable of uniting the students are lacking. In view of this we are against academic action."

The mistake which the authors of the letter are making is of much greater political importance than may appear at first sight, because their argument, strictly speaking, touches upon a theme which is incomparably more broad and important than the question of taking part in this particular strike.

"We envisage student action only as one co-ordinated with general political action. In view of this we are against academic action."

Such an argument is radically wrong. The revolutionary slogan—to work towards co-ordinated political action of the students and the proletariat, etc.—here ceases to be a live guidance for many-sided militant agitation on a broadening basis and becomes a lifeless dogma, mechanically applied to different stages of different forms of the movement. It is not sufficient merely to proclaim political co-ordinated action, repeating the "last word" in lessons of the revolution. One must *be able* to agitate for political action, *making use* of all possibilities, all conditions and, first and foremost, all mass conflicts between advanced elements, whatever they are, and the autocracy. It is not of course a question of us dividing every student movement beforehand into compulsory "stages", and making sure that each stage is properly gone through, out of fear of switching over to "untimely" political actions, etc. Such a view would be the most harmful pedantry, and would lead only to an opportunist policy. But just as harmful is the opposite mistake, when people refuse to reckon with the actual situation that has arisen and the actual conditions of the particular mass movement, because of a slogan misinterpreted as unchangeable. Such an application of a slogan inevitably degenerates into revolutionary phrase-mongering.

Conditions are possible when an academic movement lowers the level of a political movement, or divides it, or distracts from it—and in that case Social-Democratic students' groups would of course be bound to concentrate their agitation against such a movement. But anyone can see that the objective political conditions at the present time are different. The academic movement is expressing the *beginning*

of a movement among the new "generation" of students, who have more or less become accustomed to a narrow measure of autonomy; and this movement is beginning when other forms of mass struggle are lacking at the present time, when a lull has set in, and the broad mass of the people, still silently, concentratedly and slowly are continuing to *digest* the experience of the three years of revolution.

In such conditions Social-Democrats would make a big mistake if they declared "against academic action". No, the groups of students belonging to our Party must use every effort to support, utilise and extend the movement. Like every other support of primitive forms of movement by Social-Democracy, the present support, too, should consist most of all in ideological and organisational influence on wider sections who have been roused by the conflict, and to whom this form of conflict, as a general rule, is their *first* experience of political conflicts. The student youth who have entered the universities during the last two years have lived a life almost completely detached from politics, and have been educated in a spirit of narrow academic autonomism, educated not only by the professors of the Establishment and the government press but also by the liberal professors and the whole Cadet Party. For this youth a strike on a large scale (if that youth is able to organise a large-scale strike: we must do everything to help it in this undertaking, but of course it is not for us socialists to guarantee the success of any bourgeois movement) is the beginning of a political conflict, whether those engaged in the fight realise it or not. Our job is to explain to the mass of "academic" protesters the objective meaning of the conflict, to try and make it *consciously* political, to multiply tenfold the agitation carried on by the Social-Democratic groups of students, and *to direct all* this activity in such a way that revolutionary conclusions will be drawn from the history of the last three years, that the inevitability of a new revolutionary struggle is understood, and that our old—and still quite timely—slogans calling for the overthrow of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly should once again become a subject of discussion and the touchstone of political concentration for fresh generations of democrats.

Social-Democratic students have no right to shirk such work under any conditions. And however difficult this work may be at the present time, whatever reverses particular agitators may experience in this or that university, students' association, meeting, etc., we shall say: knock, and it will be opened unto you! The work of political agitation is never wasted. Its success is measured not only by whether we have succeeded here and now in winning a majority, or obtaining consent for co-ordinated political action. It is possible that we shall not achieve this all at once. But that is why we are an organised proletarian party—not to lose heart over temporary failures, but stubbornly, unswervingly and consistently to carry on *our work*, even in the most difficult conditions.

The appeal we print below from the St. Petersburg Joint Student Council shows that even the most active elements of the students obstinately cling to pure academic aims, and still sing the Cadet-Octobrist tune. And this at a time when the Cadet-Octobrist press is behaving in the most disgusting fashion towards the strike, trying to prove at the very height of the struggle that it is harmful, criminal, etc. We cannot but welcome the rejoinder which the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party found it necessary to give the Joint Council (see "From the Party"[102]).

Evidently the whips of Schwartz are not enough as yet to change the present-day students from "academics" into "politicians"; they need the scorpions of more and more Black-Hundred sergeant-majors to give a full revolutionary training to new cadres. These cadres, trained by all Stolypin's policy, trained by every step of the counter-revolution, require the constant attention of ourselves, the Social-Democrats, who clearly see the objective inevitability of further bourgeois-democratic conflicts on a national scale with the autocracy, which has joined forces with the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma.

Yes, on a national scale, for the Black-Hundred counter-revolution, which is turning Russia backward, is not only tempering new fighters in the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat, but will inevitably arouse a new movement of the non-proletarian, i.e., bourgeois democrats (thereby implying, of course, not that *all the opposition* will take part in

the struggle, but that there will be a wide participation of truly democratic elements of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, i.e., those capable of struggle). The beginning of a mass student struggle in the Russia of 1908 is a political symptom, a symptom of the whole present situation brought about by the counter-revolution. Thousands and millions of threads tie the student youth with the middle and lower bourgeoisie, the petty officials, certain groups of the peasantry, the clergy, etc. If in the spring of 1908 attempts were being made to resurrect the "*Osvobozhdeniye* League",* slightly to the left of the old Cadet semi-landlord union represented by Pyotr Struve; if in the autumn the mass of youth which is closest of all to the democratic bourgeoisie in Russia is beginning to be disturbed; if the hireling hacks, with malice tenfold, have started howling once more against revolution in the schools; if base liberal professors and Cadet leaders are groaning and wailing at the untimely, dangerous, disastrous strikes which displease those dear Octobrists, which are capable of "repelling" the Octobrists who hold power—that means new powder has begun to accumulate in the powder-flask, it means that *not only* among students is the reaction against reaction beginning!

And however weak and embryonic this beginning may be, the party of the working class must make use of it and will do so. We were able to work years and decades before the revolution, carrying our revolutionary slogans first into the study circles, then among the masses of the workers, then on to the streets, then on to the barricades. We must be capable, *now too*, of organising first and foremost that which constitutes the task of the hour, and without which all talk about co-ordinated political action will be empty words, namely, the task of building a strong proletarian organisation, everywhere carrying on *political agitation* among the masses for its revolutionary watchwords. It is this task of organisation in their own student midst, this agitation based on the concrete movement, that our university groups, too, should tackle.

The proletariat will not be behindhand. It often yields the palm to the bourgeois democrats in speeches at banquets,

* See pp. 63-67 of this volume.—*Ed.*

in legal unions, within the walls of universities, from the rostrum of representative institutions. It never yields the palm, and will not do so, in the serious and great revolutionary struggle of the masses. All the conditions for bringing this struggle to a head are not ripening as quickly and easily as some of us would hope—but those conditions are ripening and gathering head unswervingly. And the little beginning of little academic conflicts is a great beginning, for after it—if not today then tomorrow, if not tomorrow then the day after—will follow big continuations.

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EVENTS IN THE BALKANS AND IN PERSIA

The political press in Russia and throughout Europe is preoccupied lately with the events in the Balkans. For a time a European war seemed dangerously close, and that danger has by no means been eliminated, though it is much more probable that the whole thing will end up in shouting and clamour and war will be avoided.

Let us take a glance at the nature of the crisis and the tasks it imposes on the workers' party in Russia.

A powerful impetus to the political awakening of the Asian peoples was given by the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian revolution. But this awakening spread so slowly from one country to another that in Persia Russian counter-revolution played and continues to play what amounts to a decisive role, while in Turkey the revolution was at once confronted with a counter-revolutionary coalition of the powers, Russia at their head. True, the general tone of the European press and of the diplomatic statements would appear to contradict this. If we are to believe these statements and the semi-official press, there is universal "sympathy" with regenerated Turkey, a universal desire to see her constitutional regime strengthened and developed, general praise for the "moderation" of the bourgeois Young Turks.

All these fine words, however, are typical of the base bourgeois hypocrisy of Europe's present-day reactionary governments and present-day reactionary bourgeoisie. For the fact is that not a single European country calling itself a democracy, and not a single European bourgeois party professing to be democratic, progressive, Liberal, Radical, etc., has in any way demonstrated a genuine desire to promote

the victory and consolidation of the Turkish revolution. On the contrary, they all *fear* its success, for the inevitable result of it would be, on the one hand, to foster the desire for autonomy and genuine democracy in all the Balkan nations and, on the other, ensure the victory of the Persian revolution, give fresh impetus to the democratic movement in Asia, intensify the struggle for independence in India, create free institutions along an immense stretch of Russia's frontier—and, consequently, new conditions that would hamper the policy of Black-Hundred tsarism and facilitate the rise of the revolution in Russia, etc.

Essentially, what we see now going on in the Balkans, Turkey and Persia is a counter-revolutionary coalition of the European powers *against* the mounting tide of democracy in Asia. All the efforts of our governments, all the preaching of the "big" European papers, are aimed at glossing over this fact, misleading public opinion, covering up with hypocritical speeches and diplomatic hocus-pocus the *counter-revolutionary coalition* of the so-called civilised nations of Europe against the nations of Asia, least civilised but most energetic in their striving for democracy. And the very essence of proletarian policy at this stage should be to tear the mask from these bourgeois hypocrites and to reveal to the broadest masses of the people the reactionary character of the European governments who, out of fear of the proletarian struggle at home, are playing, and helping others play, the part of gendarme in relation to the revolution in Asia.

Europe has woven a dense web of intrigue around all the Turkish and Balkan events, and the man in the street is being hoodwinked by the diplomats, who try to divert public attention to trifles, secondary issues, individual aspects of present developments, in an effort to obscure the meaning of the process as a whole. In contrast to this, our task, the task of international Social-Democracy, should be to show the people how these developments are interconnected, to bring out their fundamental trend and underlying motives.

Rivalry among the capitalist powers, anxious to "bite off" as big a piece as they can and extend their possessions and colonies, coupled with fear of an independent democratic movement among the nations dependent on or "protected"

by Europe—these are two mainsprings of all European policy. The Young Turks are praised for their moderation and restraint, i.e., the Turkish revolution is being praised because it is weak, because it is not rousing the popular masses to really independent action, because it is hostile to the proletarian struggle beginning in the Ottoman Empire—and at the same time the plunder of Turkey continues. The Young Turks are praised for making it possible to go on plundering Turkish possessions. They praise the Young Turks and continue a policy, the obvious purpose of which is *to partition Turkey*. In this connection the Social-Democratic *Leipziger Volkszeitung* made this very true and apt comment:

> "In May 1791, far-sighted statesmen who were really concerned for the well-being of their country carried out a political reform in Poland. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria praised the Constitution of May 3, saying it would 'bring prosperity to a neighbouring country'. The whole world extolled the Polish reformers for practising 'moderation', unlike the terrible Jacobins of Paris.... On January 23, 1793, Prussia, Austria and Russia signed a treaty partitioning Poland!
>
> "In August 1908, the Young Turks carried out their political reform with uncommon smoothness. The whole world praised them for practising such respectable 'moderation', unlike the terrible socialists of Russia.... Now, in October 1908, we are witnessing a series of developments that presage the partition of Turkey."

Indeed, it would be childish to believe the *words* of the diplomats and disregard their *deeds*, the collective action of the powers against revolutionary Turkey. The very *fact* that the present developments were preceded by meetings and conversations of the Foreign Ministers and Heads of State of several countries, is enough to dispel this naïve faith in diplomatic statements. In August and September, immediately after the Young Turk revolution and just before the Austrian and Bulgarian declarations, Mr. Izvolsky met King Edward and Premier Clemenceau of the French Republic in Karlsbad and Marienbad; the Austrian and Italian Foreign Ministers, von Aehrenthal and Tittoni, met in Salzburg; then came the meetings between Izvolsky and Aehrenthal in Buchloe on September 15; between Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Emperor Franz-Joseph in Budapest; Izvolsky's meeting with von Schoen, the German

Foreign Minister, and later, with Tittoni and the King of Italy.

These facts speak for themselves. *All the important* points had been agreed upon *before* the Austrian and Bulgarian action secretly and directly, at personal meetings of kings and ministers, *between* the *six* powers: Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, France and Britain. The *subsequent* controversy in the press as to whether Aehrenthal was speaking the truth when he stated that Italy, Germany and Russia had agreed to Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was *a farce from beginning to end*, *a sheer deception*, that can fool only liberal philistines. The foreign policy directors of the European powers—the Izvolskys, Aehrenthals and the whole gang of crowned robbers and their ministers—purposely threw this bone to the press: go on bickering, gentlemen, over who cheated whom and who affronted whom, whether Austria cheated Russia, or Bulgaria cheated Austria, etc., over who was the "first" to begin tearing up the Berlin Treaty,[103] over the different attitudes to the proposed conference of the powers, and so on and so forth. Please keep public attention preoccupied with these interesting and important—oh, very important!—questions. That is exactly what we need in order to conceal *what really matters*, namely, that we have already come to a preliminary agreement on the main thing, i.e., action against the Young Turk revolution, further steps to partition Turkey, revision of the Dardanelles arrangement on one pretext or another, permission for Russia's Black-Hundred tsar to strangle the Persian revolution. That is the crux of the matter; that is what we, the leaders of the reactionary bourgeoisie of all Europe, really need, and that is what we are doing. As for the liberal simpletons in the press and in parliament, they can spend their time debating how it all began, who said what, and in what guise the policy of colonial plunder and suppression of democratic movements is to be finally signed, sealed and presented to the world.

In each of the European Great Powers—with the exception of Austria, which for the time being is "satiated"—the liberal press is accusing *its* government of inadequate defence of *its* national interests. Everywhere the liberals present their country and their government as the most mal-

adroit in "utilising" the situation, as having been fooled, etc. And that precisely is the policy of our Cadets too. They have long been saying that Austria's successes make them "envious" (Mr. Milyukov's own words). This policy of the liberal bourgeoisie in general, and that of our Cadets in particular, is the most revolting hypocrisy, the vilest betrayal of the genuine interests of progress and freedom. For it is a policy which, first, befuddles the democratic consciousness of the masses by hushing up the conspiracy of the reactionary governments. Secondly, it impels every country to follow a so-called active foreign policy, i.e., it sanctions the system of colonial robbery and interference by the powers in Balkan affairs, interference which is always reactionary. Thirdly, it plays directly into the hands of reaction, interesting the people in how much "we" will receive, how much "we" will get out of the booty, how much "we" can bargain for "ourselves". What the reactionary governments need most, at this juncture, is precisely the opportunity to plead that "public opinion" supports their territorial seizures, demands for "compensation", etc. Look, they say, the press of my country accuses me of excessive generosity, of inadequate defence of the national interests, of being too pliable, and it threatens war. Consequently, my demands are most "modest and fair", and must therefore be met in full!

The policy of the Russian Cadets, like that of the European liberal bourgeoisie, is one of subservience to the reactionary governments, defence of colonial aggrandisement and plunder, and interference in the affairs of other countries. The Cadet policy is especially harmful because it is being conducted under the "opposition" flag, and therefore misleads very many, wins the confidence of those who have no faith in the Russian Government and corrupts the masses. Therefore, our Duma deputies and all our Party organisations must bear in mind that we cannot make a single serious step forward in Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation about the Balkan events without revealing—*from the Duma rostrum*, in leaflets and at meetings—the *connection* between the reactionary policy of the autocracy and the hypocritical opposition of the Cadets. We shall never be able to explain to the people how harmful and reactionary the policy of the

tsarist government is, unless we explain that Cadet foreign policy is *essentially the same*. We cannot combat chauvinism and the Black-Hundred spirit in foreign policy, unless we combat the-phrase-mongering, the posing, the mental reservations and dodges of the Cadets.

Where concessions to the liberal-bourgeois point of view lead socialists will be seen from the following example. In the well-known opportunist journal *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist—???—Monthly*), Max Schippel has this to say on the Balkan crisis: "Nearly all thinking party members would consider it a mistake if the view which was recently expressed once more in our Berlin Central Organ [*Vorwärts*] prevailed, the view that Germany has nothing to look for in either the present or future revolutions in the Balkans. Certainly, we should not strive for territorial acquisitions.... But there can be no doubt that the major realignments of the powers in this area, which is an important connecting link between Europe, the whole of Asia and part of Africa, have a direct bearing on our international position.... For the time being the reactionary Russian colossus is of no decisive importance.... We have no reason to see in Russia an enemy always and everywhere, as she was regarded by the democrats of the fifties" (S. 1319).

This silly liberal, parading as a socialist, has failed to notice Russia's reactionary intrigues behind her "solicitude" for the "Slav brothers"! By using the words "we" (meaning the German bourgeoisie), "our" position, etc., he has failed to notice either the blow dealt the Young Turk revolution, or Russia's action against the Persian revolution!

Schippel's statement appeared in the October 22 issue of the journal. On October 18 (5), *Novoye Vremya*[104] published a vitriolic article alleging that the "anarchy in Tabriz has reached incredible dimensions" and the city has been "half destroyed and sacked by semi-savage revolutionaries". In other words, the victory of the revolution over the Shah's troops in Tabriz has immediately aroused the fury of the semi-official Russian journal. It describes Sattar Khan, leader of the Persian revolutionary forces, as the "Pugachov[105] of Aderbaijan" (Aderbaijan, or Azerbaijan, is the northern province of Persia and, according to Reclus, accounts for nearly one-fifth of the total population; Tabriz is

the capital of the province). "One is entitled to ask," *Novoye Vremya* wrote, "whether Russia can endlessly tolerate these outrages, which are ruining our lucrative trade on the Persian frontier.... It should be borne in mind that all Eastern Transcaucasia and Aderbaijan are an ethnological whole.... Tatar semi-intellectuals in Transcaucasia forgetting that they are Russian subjects, have displayed warm sympathy for the disturbances in Tabriz and are sending volunteers to that city... What is much more important for us is that Aderbaijan, which borders on Russia, should be pacified. Deplorable though it may be, circumstances might compel Russia, despite her strong desire not to interfere, to take this task upon herself."

On October 20, the German *Frankfurter Zeitung* carried a dispatch from St. Petersburg that Russian occupation of Aderbaijan is contemplated by way of "compensation". On October 24 (11), the same paper published a telegram from Tabriz: "*Two days ago six battalions of Russian infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery, crossed the Persian frontier and are today expected in Tabriz.*"

The Russian troops were crossing the Persian frontier on the very day when Max Schippel, slavishly repeating the assurances and the *outcries* of the liberal and police press, was telling the German workers that Russia's importance as a reactionary colossus was now a thing of the past, and that to regard Russia as an enemy under all circumstances would be a mistake!

There is to be a new massacre of Persian revolutionaries by the troops of Nicholas the Bloody. The unofficial Lyakhov is being followed by the official occupation of Aderbaijan, and the repetition in Asia of what Russia did in Europe in 1849, when Nicholas I sent his troops against the Hungarian revolution. At that time there were genuine democrats among the bourgeois parties of Europe, who were capable of fighting for freedom, and not only hypocritically talking about freedom, as all the bourgeois democrats do in our day. Russia had then to play the part of European gendarme against at any rate a few European countries. Today *all* the biggest European powers, not excluding the "democratic" republic of the "red" Clemenceau, mortally afraid as they are of any extension of democracy at home because it would

benefit the proletariat, are *helping* Russia play the gendarme in Asia.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that "freedom of action" for Russia against the Persian revolution was *part of the September reactionary conspiracy* of Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, France and Britain. Whether this was explicitly stated in some secret document (which may be published many years hence in a collection of historical materials) or whether it was only intimated by Izvolsky to his most obliging fellow-negotiators, or whether the latter "hinted" that they intended to pass from "occupation" to "annexation", and that the Russians would perhaps like to pass from the Lyakhov policy to "occupation", or whether some other arrangement was made—all that is not of the least importance. What is important is that, however informal, the September counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the powers *is a fact*, the significance of which becomes increasingly clear with every passing day. It is a conspiracy against the proletariat and democracy. It is a conspiracy for directly suppressing the revolution in Asia, or at least for dealing it indirect blows It is a conspiracy for the continuation of colonial plunder and territorial conquest in the Balkans today, in Persia tomorrow, maybe in Asia Minor and Egypt the day after, etc., etc.

Only the world proletarian revolution can overthrow this combined power of the crowned bandits and international capital. The urgent task of all socialist parties is to intensify agitation among the masses, unmask the diplomats of all countries at their tricks and bring out all the facts for the people to see—the facts revealing the infamous role of *all the allied powers* without exception—both as direct performers of the functions of the gendarme, and as his abettors, friends and financiers.

An extremely onerous, but at the same time extremely noble and momentous task falls now to the Russian Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma, where a statement by Izvolsky and a question by the Cadets and Octobrists are expected. The Social-Democratic deputies are members of a body that is a screen for the policy of the chief reactionary power, the chief plotter of counter-revolution, and they must find in themselves the courage and ability *to tell the*

whole truth. At a time like this, the Social-Democratic deputies in the Black-Hundred Duma are people to whom much is given and of whom much is required. For apart from them there is *no one* in the Duma to voice the protest against tsarism from positions *other* than those of the *Cadets* and Octobrists. And a Cadet "protest", at such times and in the present circumstances, is worse than no protest at all since it can be made only *from amidst the selfsame* capitalist wolf-pack, and on behalf of the selfsame wolfish policy.

Our Duma group and all our other Party organisations should therefore set to work at once. Agitation among the masses is now a hundredfold more important than in ordinary times. Three propositions should take first place in all our Party agitation. First, in contrast to the whole of the reactionary and liberal press—from the Black Hundreds to the Cadets—Social-Democrats should expose the diplomatic game of conferences, agreement of the powers, alliances with Britain against Austria, or with Austria against Germany, or any other. Our job is to reveal the *fact* that there exists a reactionary conspiracy of the powers, a conspiracy which the governments are doing everything they possibly can to conceal behind the farce of public negotiations. Our policy should be to denounce this diplomatic farce, bring the truth to the people, expose international anti-proletarian reaction! Secondly, we should reveal the real, as distinct from the asserted, results of this conspiracy, namely, the blow to the Turkish revolution, Russia's assistance in strangling the Persian revolution, interference in the affairs of other nations, and violation of that fundamental democratic principle, the right of nations to self-determination. That right is championed by our programme and the programmes of all the Social-Democratic parties of the world. And there can be nothing more reactionary than the solicitude of the Austrians on the one hand, and the Russian Black Hundreds on the other, for their "Slav brothers". This "solicitude" is being used to screen the vile intrigues that have long won Russia notoriety in the Balkans. This "solicitude" always boils down to encroachments on *genuine* democracy in one Balkan country or another. There is only one sincere way for the powers to show "solicitude" for the Balkan nations, and that is to leave them alone, stop harassing

them by foreign interference, stop putting spokes in the wheel of the Turkish revolution. But, of course, the working class cannot expect that kind of policy from the bourgeoisie.

All the bourgeois parties, including the most liberal and "democratic" in name, our Cadets included, support capitalist foreign policy. That is the third thing which the Social-Democrats must with special vigour bring to the knowledge of the people. For, to all intents and purposes, the liberals and Cadets stand for the present rivalry between the capitalist nations, differing with the Black Hundreds only as to the forms this should take, and insisting only on international agreements different from those upon which the government now relies. And this liberal struggle against one variety of bourgeois foreign policy in favour of another variety of that same policy, these liberal reproaches levelled at the government for lagging behind other countries (in rapine and intervention!) have the most corrupting effect on the masses. Down with all colonial policy, down with the whole policy of intervention and capitalist struggle for the conquest of foreign lands and foreign populations, for new privileges, new markets, control of the Straits, etc.! Social-Democrats do not subscribe to the stupid philistine utopia of "peaceful and just" capitalist progress. Their struggle is against the whole of capitalist society as such, in the knowledge that there is no other champion of peace and liberty in the world than the international revolutionary proletariat.

P. S. After this article had been sent to the press, the papers published a dispatch of the *St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency* denying the report about Russian troops having crossed the Persian border. The dispatch was published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 24, in the second morning edition The *third* edition carried a report from Constantinople dated October 24, 10.50 *p.m.*, stating that on the evening of the 24th news of the Russian troops crossing the Persian border had reached Constantinople. The foreign press, *with the exception of the socialist papers*, is so far silent on the Russian invasion of Persia.

To sum up: we are not yet in a position to learn the whole truth At any rate, the "denials" emanating from the tsarist

government and the *St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency* are not, of course, to be trusted. That Russia, with the knowledge of the powers, is fighting the Persian revolution with every means at her command, from intrigue to the sending of troops, is a fact. That her policy is to occupy Azerbaijan, is likewise beyond doubt. And if the troops have not yet crossed the border, then very probably all the preparations for them to do so have already been made. There is no smoke without fire.

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MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU[106]

On Sunday October 11 (N. S.) there took place in Brussels the first meeting of the International Socialist Bureau since the Stuttgart Congress. The gathering of representatives of various socialist parties was chosen also as a convenient occasion for a conference of socialist journalists and parliamentarians. The first conference took place on the eve of the meeting of the Bureau, the second the day after. The composition of both conferences, it should be mentioned, was scarcely different from that of the Bureau: the majority of the members of the Bureau were both journalists and M.P.s. Only a few Belgian socialist deputies were additional members of the conference on Monday October 12.

The conference of journalists opened at 3 p.m. on Saturday. The question under discussion was that of regulating and developing the relations between the periodical press of the various socialist parties. The Belgians drew up a list of correspondents, members of their party, who were ready to give information to the newspapers of other parties on various particular questions. The wish was expressed that similar lists should be drawn up by other parties, and it was suggested that there should be a note of what languages the correspondent knew. The foreign bulletins of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (*La Tribune Russe*, in French) and of the Social-Democrats (in German)[107] were mentioned as particularly useful publications for our foreign comrades. It was also remarked that in the case of countries where there were different socialist parties, or various tendencies within a single party, a note should be made in the lists stating

which party, etc., the correspondents belonged to Russian Social-Democrats living abroad ought to make use of this international conference to ensure better arrangements for their reports in foreign socialist newspapers.

The conference decided that the International Socialist Bureau was to get in touch with those nations which had no daily socialist papers on the question of publishing regular bulletins (in one of the three official languages of the International, or in all three—French, German and English). Following this, the Bureau was to enquire of the editors of the socialist daily newspapers of the different countries, what sum they would agree to pay in order to receive such bulletins regularly.

The Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee of our Party[108] should take special notice of this decision. The business of informing our foreign comrades about the affairs of Russian Social-Democracy is organised far from satisfactorily, and there should be an immediate and serious discussion on how to put this matter in order, and on publishing a *Party* bulletin abroad in three languages. Everything possible should be done to put such a plan into practice.

The next point discussed was the proposal of Camille Huysmans, the Secretary of the Bureau, that the German Social-Democrats, who have 70 daily newspapers, should take the initiative of setting up an international bureau of telegraph and telephone Communications between the editorial offices of the socialist newspapers in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Brussels, etc. The German delegates said that it was impossible to carry out this plan immediately; but they stated that a central information bureau of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party had recently been set up in Germany, and that when this was working satisfactorily it would be possible to consider transforming this bureau into an international organisation. The conference expressed its satisfaction at this promise, and the meeting ended after deciding that conferences of the socialist journalists of various countries should be timed as before to coincide with meetings of the International Socialist Bureau.

In the evening there was an international mass meeting at the Maison du Peuple at which Austrian, German, British, Turkish and Bulgarian delegates spoke—mainly on the

subject of the international conflicts, and of the struggle of the socialist proletariat of all countries for the preservation of peace. The meeting ended with the unanimous adoption of a resolution as follows: "The international meeting held on October 10 (N.S.) at the Maison du Peuple reaffirms the energetic resolution of the world proletariat to defend peace among the nations and to struggle with all its strength against capitalist militarism, which ruins and oppresses all peoples. The meeting expresses its confidence that the various national sections of the Workers' International will apply in full the decision adopted on this question by the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart." The meeting concluded with the singing of *The Internationale*.

The whole of the next day was taken up with the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau. The first item on the agenda, namely, the affiliation of the British Labour Party, occupied the whole of the morning session. According to the Rules of the International, organisations eligible for membership are, first, socialist parties which recognise the class struggle, and secondly, working-class organisations whose standpoint is that of the class struggle (i.e., trade unions). The Labour Party recently formed in the British House of Commons does not openly call itself socialist, and does not expressly and definitely recognise the principle of the class struggle (which, be it said in parenthesis, the British Social-Democrats call upon it to do). Needless to say this Labour Party was admitted to the International in general and to the Stuttgart Socialist Congress in particular, because, as a matter of fact, this Party is an organisation of a mixed type, standing between the two types defined in Clauses 1 and 2 of the Rules of the International, and embodying the political representation of the British trade unions. Nevertheless, the question of the affiliation of this Party was raised, and raised by the Party itself, in the person of the so-called Independent Labour Party (the I.L.P., as the British call it), which is one of the two subsections of the British section of the International. The other subsection is the Social Democratic Federation.

The Independent Labour Party demanded the *direct* recognition of the Labour Party as an affiliated organisation of the International. Its delegate Bruce Glasier urged the

enormous significance of this representation in Parliament of hundreds of thousands of organised workers who were steadily and surely moving towards socialism. He was very contemptuous of principles, formulas and catechisms. Kautsky, in reply to him, dissociated himself from this attitude of contempt towards the principles and ultimate aim of socialism, but wholly supported the affiliation of the Labour Party as a party waging the class struggle in practice. Kautsky moved the following resolution:

"Whereas by previous resolutions of the International Congresses, all organisations adopting the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle and recognising the necessity for political action have been accepted for membership, the International Bureau declares that the British Labour Party is admitted to International Socialist Congresses, because, while not expressly [*ausdrücklich*] accepting the proletarian class struggle, in practice the Labour Party conducts this struggle, and adopts its standpoint, inasmuch as the Party is organised independently of the bourgeois parties." Kautsky was supported by the Austrians, by Vaillant of the French group, and, as the voting showed, by the majority of the small nations. The opposition came first of all from Hyndman, the representative of the British Social Democratic Federation, who demanded that the *status quo* be maintained until the Labour Party expressly recognised the principle of the class struggle and of socialism; then from Roussel (the second French delegate and a follower of Guesde), Rubanovich of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and Avramov, the delegate of the revolutionary wing of the Bulgarian socialists.

I took the floor in order to associate myself with the first part of Kautsky's resolution. It was impossible, I argued, to refuse to admit the Labour Party, i.e., the parliamentary representation of the trade unions, since Congresses had previously admitted all trade unions whatever, even those which had allowed themselves to be represented by bourgeois parliamentarians. But, I said, the second part of Kautsky's resolution is wrong, because *in practice* the Labour Party is not a party really independent of the-Liberals, and does not pursue a fully independent class policy. I therefore proposed an amendment that the end of the

resolution, beginning with the word "because", should read as follows:

"because it [the Labour Party] represents the first step on the part of the really proletarian organisations of Britain towards a conscious class policy and towards a *socialist* workers' party". I submitted this amendment to the Bureau, but Kautsky would not accept it, stating in his next speech that the International Bureau could not adopt decisions based on "expectations". But the main struggle was between the supporters and the opponents of Kautsky's resolution as a whole. When it was about to be voted on, Adler proposed that it be divided into two parts. This was done, and both parts were carried by the International Bureau: the first with three against and one abstention, and the second with four against and one abstention. Thus Kautsky's motion became the decision of the Bureau. Rubanovich abstained on both votes. Let me add that Adler, who spoke after me and before Kautsky's second speech, replied to me in the following manner—I am quoting from the Belgian socialist organ *Le Peuple*, which gave the most detailed and exact reports of the sessions: "Lenin's proposal is tempting [*séduisante*, Adler said: *verlockend*, enticing], but it cannot make us forget that the Labour Party is now outside the bourgeois parties. It is not for us to judge how it did this. We recognise the fact of progress."

Such was the nature of the debate at the International Bureau on the question under discussion. I shall now take the liberty to deal in greater detail with this debate, in order to explain the position that I took up to the readers of *Proletary*. The arguments advanced by V. Adler and K. Kautsky failed to convince me, and I still think they are wrong. By stating in his resolution that the Labour Party "does not expressly accept the proletarian class struggle", Kautsky undoubtedly voiced a certain "expectation", a certain "judgement" as to what the policy of the Labour Party is now and what that policy should be. But Kautsky expressed this *indirectly*, and in such a way that it amounted to an assertion which, first, is incorrect in substance, and secondly, provides a basis for misrepresenting his *idea*. That by separating in *Parliament* (not during the elections! not in its whole policy! not in its propaganda and agitation!)

from the bourgeois parties, the Labour Party in Britain is taking the first step towards socialism and towards a class policy of the proletarian mass organisations is indisputable. This is not an "expectation" but a fact, the very fact which compels us to admit the Labour Party into the International, since we have already accepted the trade unions. Finally, it is precisely such a formulation that would make hundreds of thousands of British workers, who undoubtedly respect the decisions of the International but have not yet become full socialists, ponder once again over the question why they are regarded as having taken only the *first* step, and what the *next* steps along this road should be. My formulation does not contain even the shadow of a claim that the International should undertake to solve the concrete and detailed problems of a national labour movement, should undertake to determine when the next steps should be taken, and what they should be. But that further steps are necessary in general must be admitted, in relation to a party which does not expressly and clearly accept the principle of the class struggle. Kautsky in his resolution acknowledged this indirectly, instead of doing so directly. It looked as if the International was certifying that the Labour Party was *in practice* waging a consistent class struggle, as if it was sufficient for a workers' organisation to form a separate labour group in Parliament in order *in its entire conduct* to become independent of the bourgeoisie!

On this question Hyndman, Roussel, Rubanovich and Avramov undoubtedly occupied a still more incorrect position (which Rubanovich did not rectify but confused by his abstention on both parts of the resolution). When Avramov declared that to admit the Labour Party would be to encourage opportunism, he expressed a glaringly wrong view. One need only recall Engels's letters to Sorge. For a number of years Engels strongly insisted that the British Social-Democrats, led by Hyndman, were committing an error by acting like sectarians, failing to link themselves with the unconscious but powerful class instinct of the trade unions, and by turning Marxism into a "dogma", whereas it should be a "guide to action".[109] When there exist objective conditions which retard the growth of the political consciousness and class independence of the proletarian masses, one must be

able patiently and steadfastly to work hand in hand with them, making no concessions in principles but not refraining from activity *right in the midst* of the proletarian masses. These lessons of Engels's have been corroborated by the subsequent development of events, when the British trade unions, insular, aristocratic, philistinely selfish, and hostile to socialism, which have produced a number of outright traitors to the working class who have sold themselves to the bourgeoisie for ministerial posts (like the scoundrel John Burns), have nevertheless begun *moving towards* socialism, awkwardly, inconsistently, in zigzag fashion, but still moving towards socialism. Only the blind can fail to see that socialism is now growing apace among the working class in Britain, that socialism is *once again* becoming a mass movement in that country, that the social revolution is approaching in Great Britain.

The International would undoubtedly have acted wrongly had it not directly and resolutely expressed its complete sympathy with this vast step forward by the mass labour movement in Britain, and voiced its encouragement of the great turn that had begun in the cradle of capitalism. But it does not in the least follow from this that the Labour Party can already be recognised as a party in practice independent of the bourgeoisie, as a party waging the class struggle, as a socialist party, etc. It was necessary to rectify one undoubted error committed by the British Social Democratic Federation, but there was no need to give even a shadow of encouragement to *other*, *undoubted and not less important* errors of the British opportunists who lead the so-called Independent Labour Party. That these leaders are opportunists is indisputable. Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the I.L.P., even proposed at Stuttgart that Clause 2 of the Rules of the International be so amended as to require, in place of the recognition of the class struggle, only the good faith (*bona fides*) of labour associations, for affiliation to the International. Kautsky himself immediately detected the opportunist note in the words of Bruce Glasier and dissociated himself from them—*in his speech at the Bureau*, but unfortunately not in his resolution. The speech at the Bureau was delivered before a dozen persons, but the resolution was written for millions.

I have before me the newspapers published by both trends of British socialism containing comments on the meeting of the International Bureau. The organ of the Independent (ahem! ahem!) Labour Party, the *Labour Leader*, rejoices, and *openly declares* to tens of thousands of British workers that the International Socialist Bureau not only recognised the Labour Party (that is true, and it had to be done) but also "*vindicated the policy of the I.L.P.*" (*Labour Leader*, October 16, 1908, p. 665). This is not true. The Bureau did *not* vindicate it. This is an illegitimate, opportunist interpretation of a slight awkwardness in Kautsky's resolution. This slight awkwardness is beginning to bear rather abundant fruit; on top of this comes a poor translation: no wonder the Italians say that translators are traducers (*traduttori—tradittori*). The official translations of the Bureau resolutions into the three official languages have not been published yet, and it is not known when they will appear. Kautsky's resolution states that the Labour Party "adopts the standpoint of the class struggle" (end of the resolution; in the original: *sich ... auf seinen, d. h. des Klassenkampfs, Boden stellt*), which, in the translation of the British *Social-Democrats* reads: "places itself in consequence on the ground of international socialism." In the translation of the British *opportunists* (I.L.P.) it reads: "*adopts the position of international socialism*". (Ibid.) Now try and rectify such mistakes when you carry on agitation among the British workers!

Far be it from me to accuse Bruce Glasier of distorting the resolution. I am sure he could not have had that in mind. And this is not so important. What is important is that the *spirit* of Kautsky's resolution, precisely the *second* part of it, be applied in practical mass work. On the same page of the *Labour Leader*, another member of the I.L.P., describing his impressions of the Bureau meeting and of the mass meeting in Brussels, complains that at the meeting "the emphasis on the ideal and ethical aspect of socialism ... was almost entirely absent", an aspect which, he averred, was always emphasised at I.L.P. meetings. "*In its stead we had ... the barren and uninspiring dogma of the class war.*"

When Kautsky was writing his resolution about the British, he had in mind, not a British "Independent", but a German Social-Democrat....

Justice, the organ of the British Social-Democrats, publishes bitter words from Hyndman against the majority of the Bureau as "whittlers-away of principle to suit the convenience of trimmers". "I have not the slightest doubt," writes Hyndman, "that if the British Labour Party had been told plainly that they either had to accept socialist principles ... or keep away altogether, they would very quickly have decided to bring themselves into line with the International Socialist Party." And in another article in the same issue, *facts* are quoted to prove that *in practice* the Independent Labour Party got some of its members elected under a *jumbled* flag of both Liberalism and the Independent Labour Party (Liberal-Labour Alliance), and that some of the "Independents" *had the backing of the Liberal Minister, John Burns* (*Justice*, October 17, 1908, pp. 4 and 7).

If Hyndman carries out the plan he speaks of, namely, that of raising this question again at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen (1910), then the R.S.D.L.P. must try to get Kautsky's resolution amended.

The second item on the agenda was the question of joint action by the proletariat and the socialists of various countries against the international and colonial conflicts with which the policy of the bourgeois governments is fraught. Vaillant moved a resolution which was adopted with slight amendments. During the discussion the Austrian delegates referred to the fact that their party in its delegations officially opposes the policy of Franz-Joseph, and reaffirms the recognition by socialists of the right of all nationalities to self-determination. But in opposing the policy of Franz-Joseph—said the Austrians—we are also against the policy of Abdul Hamid or Edward VII. Our business is to make the government responsible for the consequences of its actions. The British expressed the desire for more explicit declarations by the Austrian Social-Democrats against their government, but the Austrians did not go further than what has been stated. Avramov, a delegate from the Bulgarian socialists (the "Narrows", i.e., the revolutionary Social-Democrats; in Bulgaria there are also the "Broads", i.e., opportunist Social-Democrats), insisted on the imperialist

bourgeoisie of the Balkan states themselves being mentioned, but the amendment to this effect was rejected. On the subject of the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, stated Avramov, the Bulgarian socialists strongly opposed the bourgeois parties, considering this proclamation to be a harmful piece of adventurism from the point of view of the working class. Bruce Glasier moved that the resolution should include a statement on the necessity of organising international demonstrations; but it was decided that a recommendation to this effect should be sent through the Bureau to the various national parties. Van Kol (a delegate from the Dutch Social-Democrats) suggested that there should be included a protest against the infringements of the Berlin Treaty by the powers. But before the voting he withdrew this proposition, as it had been pointed out that it was not for socialists to make a point of defending treaties concluded by bourgeois states. The text of the resolution adopted by the International Bureau is as follows:

"Whereas, in the first place, the British and German socialists by their demonstrations for peace, the French socialists by their campaign against the Moroccan expedition, the Danish socialists by their proposal for disarmament, were acting in keeping with the decisions of the International,

"Whereas, further, the danger of war persists; capitalist imperialism continues to intrigue in Britain and in Germany, the Moroccan expedition and adventure continues; tsarism, seeking new loans above all, is trying to add an element of confusion to the situation in order to strengthen its position in its struggle against the Russian revolution; in the Balkan Peninsula the intervention of foreign powers and their self-seeking ambitions are inflaming national and religious passions more than ever; the proclamation, quite recently, of the independence of Bulgaria and particularly the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina have increased the peril of war and brought this peril nearer; and whereas, finally, the conspiracies of the governments, their intensified armaments militarism and capitalist competition and plundering of the colonies everywhere constitute a threat to peace,

"The International Socialist Bureau confirms once more that the socialist party and the organised proletariat are the only force capable of preserving international peace, and that they consider it their duty to safeguard it.

"The Bureau calls upon the socialist parties of all countries, in accordance with the resolution of the Stuttgart International Congress, to strengthen their vigilance and their activity, bending every, effort in the direction indicated, and requests the Central Committees

and Executives of the parties, their parliamentary groups and their delegates to the bureau to seek out, together with the Secretariat of the International Socialist bureaus the means and practical measures, both national and international, which according to particular concrete circumstances could most serve to avert war and maintain peace."

The third item on the agenda was a proposal by the British section to hold regular meetings of the International Socialist Bureau twice yearly. No binding resolution was adopted on this question; only a desire was expressed in this sense. Evidently the vast majority do not consider it necessary to convene a meeting more frequently than once a year, as has been the case hitherto—except, of course, in emergencies.

The fourth item on the agenda was the proposal of the Bureau to alter the contributions made by each party for maintenance of the Bureau. Up till now the nominal income of the Bureau was 14,950 francs a year (about 6,000 rubles); it was proposed that this sum should be raised to 26,800 francs or, allowing for the usual arrears, 20,000 francs (8,000 rubles) in round figures. For this purpose each party would have to contribute 100 francs per annum for each vote it possesses at International Socialist Congresses. Russia has 20 votes, and consequently would have to pay 2,000 francs, made up of 700 francs by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 1,000 by the Social-Democrats and 300 francs by the trade unions. Hitherto Russia has been paying 1,500 francs a year, of which we (by arrangement with the Socialist-Revolutionary Party) paid 900 francs. On this question, too, no binding resolution was adopted. The Bureau was instructed to contact the national parties, and a wish was expressed that contributions should amount to 100 francs yearly per vote.

The fifth item was the alteration in the number of votes for Sweden—they were raised to 12—and for Hungary—where a general increase was postponed, but 2 votes were added for Croatia. An Armenian subsection of the Turkish section was also admitted, before the Turkish section itself had yet come into existence. The Armenian socialists in Turkey refused to "wait for" the Turks, and this subsec-

tion was given 4 votes. It would be desirable that our comrades, the Armenian Social-Democrats, who know the position of Armenian socialism in Turkey, should express their opinion on this question.

The sixth item on the agenda was on the admission of the Social-Democratic Party of Chile. This party was formed after a split in the Democratic Party of Chile. The Chilean Social-Democrats were admitted without any discussion.

The seventh item on the agenda was the question of the Zionist socialists in Russia.[110] As is known, they approached the Central Committee of our Party before the Stuttgart Congress, asking to be admitted to the Social-Democratic subsection of the Russian section of the International. Our Central Committee refused, and adopted a resolution stating the reasons why *Zionists*, even though they called themselves "Zionist socialists", should not be included among Social-Democrats. A representative of the Z.S. came to Stuttgart, and in Stuttgart too our subsection refused to admit him, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries abstained. As the Rules allow new members of the International to be admitted only with the consent of the national sections (and if two national subsections are in disagreement a final decision is taken by the International Bureau), the Z.S. could not get into the Congress in the normal way. They appealed to the Bureau, which then adopted a compromise decision—to admit the representative of the Z.S. to the Congress with a *consultative* voice. Now we had to clear up the muddle which had been created. Were the Zionist socialists members of the International or not? Victor Adler declared, as at Stuttgart, strongly against the Z.S. and for a refusal to postpone discussion as they had requested (they had sent a telegram saying they could not attend). Non-appearance, said Adler, was sometimes the best method of defence. I took the floor to recall once again the decision of our Central Committee, and to point out that to admit the Z.S. against the will of both Russian subsections would be an impossible infringement of the Rules of the International. Rubanovich and Zhitlovsky, the representative of the S.J.L.P. (the Socialist Jewish Labour Party,[111] which the S.R.s at Stuttgart had admitted into their subsection) warmly spoke against the non-admission of the Z.S. Rubanovich *could not however*

report any other resolution of the S.R. Party, beyond its *abstention* on this question, while Zhitlovsky (in face of the inevitable exclusion of the Z.S.) was obviously *defending himself*, asserting with comic vehemence that, if the Zionist Socialists were territorialists, then they too—the S.J.L.P.—were territorialists. Naturally, it followed from this, not that the Z.S. ought to be admitted, but only that there was hardly anyone else in the International except the S.R.s who would agree to admit the S.J.L.P. either. Speaking a second time, I emphatically protested against Rubanovich's manoeuvre in trying to force the Zionists on *someone else's* subsection while at the same time not quoting any resolution of his own subsection in favour of the Zionists. In the upshot, the Bureau (with two abstentions, Rubanovich and Vaillant) unanimously adopted Adler's motion, which runs:

"The Bureau states that the admission of the Zionists (with a consultative voice) took place as an exception in relation to the sessions of the Stuttgart Congress, that the Zionists at present are not affiliated to the International Bureau, and proceeds to the next business."

The eighth and last item on the agenda was the confirmation, almost without discussion, of the special composition of the delegation of the French Socialists to the International Bureau. Guesde was appointed one of the delegates from France, while the second French vote in the Bureau was given to two delegates jointly, Vaillant and Jaurès.

The meeting ended with the unanimous adoption of a resolution of sympathy with the Turkish revolution, moved by the Belgian delegate de Brouckère:

"The International Socialist Bureau greets with joy the fall of the infamous regime which Abdul Hamid so long maintained in Turkey with the help of the powers, and welcomes the possibility now presented to the peoples of the Turkish Empire to work out their own destinies, and the introduction of a regime of political liberty which will allow the nascent proletariat to carry on its class struggle in close unity with the proletariat of the whole world."

On Monday October 12 a session of the inter-parliamentary conference was held. There were three items on the agenda: (1) The last parliamentary session, (2) Colonial reforms (re-

port by van Kol), and (3) Socialist action for peace within the Inter-parliamentary Union (report by the Belgian deputy Lafontaine) followed by four questions: (a) Terms of payment for building workers (in the event of the bankruptcy of their employers), (b) Postal voting, (c) New lists of members of the parliamentary groups and their secretaries, (d) Dispatch of documents.

On the first item, the conference confined itself to confirming, on the proposal of Pernerstorfer, the decision of the Stuttgart Congress: secretaries of the parliamentary groups are invited to send *written reports* of the groups to the International Socialist Bureau. A brief exchange of opinion on the two last "questions" led to a similar reminder. On the first two "questions" materials and proposals put forward by some socialist M.P.s were briefly mentioned. Lafontaine's report was on his suggestion postponed. In this connection the Austrians and Germans said that they were against the participation of socialists in bourgeois parliamentary conferences for peace. The Swedish delegate Branting referred to the special conditions which, allegedly, explained the participation of the Swedish Social-Democrats in these conferences. On his motion, it was decided to put down the question of state insurance for the workers on the agenda of the next inter-parliamentary conference to be held at the same time as the next meeting of the Bureau.

The only subject on the agenda on which a short report was read, and on which there was a discussion of not inconsiderable interest, proved to be the question of colonial reforms. The Dutch delegate van Kol, who made himself famous by his opportunist resolution on the colonial question at Stuttgart, tried in his report by a somewhat different approach to drag in his favourite idea of a "positive" colonial programme for Social-Democracy. Setting aside completely the struggle of Social-Democrats against colonial policy, their agitation among the masses against colonial robbery, the awakening of a spirit of resistance and opposition among the oppressed masses in the colonies, van Kol concentrated all his attention on a list of possible "reforms" of life in the colonies within the present system. Like a benevolent official, he listed a variety of questions, beginning with property in land and ending with schools, encourage-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ment of industry, prisons, etc., all the time underlining the necessity of being as practical as possible—for example, reckoning with the fact that universal suffrage is not always applicable to savages, that sometimes one cannot but agree with the necessity of introducing compulsory labour in the colonies instead of prisons, etc., etc. The whole report was saturated with a spirit, not of proletarian class struggle, but of the most petty-bourgeois—and even worse, bureaucratic—peddling of "reforms". In conclusion he suggested that a committee be appointed from the five main countries possessing colonies to draw up a colonial programme for Social-Democracy.

Molkenbuhr on behalf of the Germans, and some Belgians, tentatively sought to follow van Kol, differing from him only on details—whether a single common programme was necessary, wouldn't this be stereotyping, and so forth. This approach to the question served van Kol's purpose, because the very thing he wanted was to reduce everything to "practical details", and to show that "in practice" the differences were smaller than it seemed at Stuttgart. But Kautsky and Ledebour discussed the question in principle, and attacked the fundamental hypocrisy of van Kol's whole position. Van Kol declares, said Kautsky, that in particular cases universal suffrage is inapplicable; therefore, in one form or another he accepts despotism in the colonies, because he does not propose any other electoral system, nor can he do so. Van Kol conceives the possibility of compulsory labour, said Ledebour; therefore, he opens the door to bourgeois policy which uses thousands of different pretexts for preserving slavery in the colonies. Van Kol defended himself extremely stubbornly and extremely badly, asserting for example that sometimes you can't do without taxes in kind, that "he saw this himself in Java", that the Papuans don't know what voting means, that at the elections things are sometimes decided by pure superstition or by getting the voters drunk on rum, etc. Kautsky and Ledebour ridiculed these arguments, asserting that our common democratic programme is unquestionably applicable to the colonies as well, and that it is essential to bring to the fore the struggle against capitalism in the colonies too. Is the superstition of our "educated" Catholics any better than the superstitions

of the savages, asked Ledebour. Even if parliamentary and representative institutions are not always applicable, said Kautsky, democracy is always applicable, and the struggle against every departure from democracy is always obligatory. The respective policies of revolutionary and opportunist Social-Democracy were brought out with complete clarity as a result of this discussion, and van Kol, seeing that his motion would undoubtedly receive "a first class funeral", himself withdrew it.

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P. MASLOV IN HYSTERICS

P. Maslov has published a "Letter to the Editor" in No. 8-9 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* which can only be called hysterical. Indeed, is it not hysterics when he not only tries to shame me by comparing my style with that of the Priest Iliodor, but trots out some *conversation* or other which took place *14 years ago*? The reader may think this a joke, but it is a fact. "When, before the appearance of Volume III of *Capital*, Lenin read my manuscript, in which there was the same answer to the question of the distribution of profit as in Volume III," writes Maslov, "Lenin stated that he considered the ridiculous solution of the problem by Prof. Skvortsov[112] to be correct." Fancy that—*before* the appearance of Volume III, i.e., *before 1894*! One must have the naïveté of a child—which cannot be said of my most reverend opponent—or to be in a state of hysterics, to pretend to remember exactly some conversation which was supposed to have taken place *fourteen years ago*, and one's own unprinted manuscripts. Would it not be better to print that manuscript, eh, Comrade Maslov? What an advantage it would be to prove that Maslov, and Maslov alone, *before* Volume III, solved the problem that Engels put to the world! True, it would seem a bit late perhaps—but better late than never. One cannot really imagine, after all, that Maslov simply wanted to praise himself by referring to his own recollections.

It would appear that the editors of the paper in which Maslov is writing have not yet praised Maslov's amendment to Marx, and so Maslov has decided to praise himself for what he did (under his breath) fourteen years ago.... It would also appear that (if one is to believe the titanic strength of Com-

rade Maslov's memory) I made mistakes fourteen years ago, before the appearance of Volume III of *Capital*, and have not printed these mistakes; whereas Maslov began to make mistakes 7 years and 14 years after the appearance of Volume III, and prints these mistakes. However, it is possible that Maslov's hysterics are not quite unpremeditated. Exactly five years ago Martov threw a fit of hysterics in front of Plekhanov, and thereby impelled him to go over from the Bolsheviks to the Mensheviks. Can P. Maslov be hoping that Plekhanov, after reading his outcries in the newspaper edited by Plekhanov and Co., will go over from the ranks of the supporters of Marx's theory of rent to the supporters of Maslov's theory of rent? That would be very interesting; but so long as it has not happened, let us see how matters stand with Maslov's accusation that my article "consists of a mass of distortion and obvious untruths".

Really, "a mass", Comrade Maslov?

Well, let's look at all your arguments.

"Lenin writes: 'It is not true to say that according to Marx absolute rent results from the low composition of agricultural capital. Absolute rent arises from the private ownership of land. This private ownership creates a special monopoly.'"*

Here Maslov *breaks off my sentence*, which does not end at the word "monopoly" and goes on to refer to a *definite page in Volume IV* (*Theories of Surplus-Value*). This is not distortion on Maslov's part, oh no! It is only a "correction" of somebody else's exposition....

"This is what Lenin writes," continues P. Maslov. "And this is what Marx writes: 'If the average composition of agricultural capital were equal to, or higher than, that of the average social capital, then absolute rent—again in the sense just described—would disappear; i.e., rent which differs equally from differential rent as well as that based upon an actual monopoly price' (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 631, Russian translation[113]). I will leave it to the reader to judge who gives a better version of Marx" (then follows a footnote about the mistake regarding the law of profit which I made fourteen years ago, as P. Maslov so well remembers, in a private conversation with him).

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 301.—*Ed.*

I also leave it to the reader to judge on whose side there are "distortions and obvious untruths". The most worthy Maslov *broke off my sentence before my reference to Marx*, and gives me another reference! What sort of an argument is this? Has not Maslov again and again exposed the self-contradiction of Marx's "rough notes" (I would remind the reader that Maslov in 1906, i.e., even after the *Theories of Surplus-Value* had been published, made so bold as to account for the mistakes he had found in Marx by the fact that Volume III consisted of "rough notes")? Does not this prove that Marx's arguments were faulty, because he derived absolute rent *now* from private property in land, *now* from the low composition of capital in agriculture?

No, it only proves that Maslov is once again in an unholy muddle. You can find in Marx dozens of phrases where absolute rent is derived from private property in land, and dozens of phrases where it is derived from the low composition of agricultural capital. And this for the simple reason that Marx puts forward *both these conditions* in the appropriate passages of his exposition—just as *I put forward both* when I was setting out Marx's ideas. In that very same passage of my article from which Maslov has taken his quotation I also speak of the *low composition* of agricultural capital! (*Proletary*, No. 33, p. 3, cols. 2-3.*) Maslov quotes against me Chapter 45 of Volume III, the chapter on absolute rent. Maslov takes his quotation from page 298 of the original. Yet *earlier* on page 287, Marx says that differential rent is not "created" by private property in land (differential rent is inevitable under capitalism *even without* property in land), whereas property in land creates absolute rent. "Landed property itself," writes Marx in italics, "has created rent" (Vol. III, section 2, S. 287**).

And now the question is, does the quotation from page 287 contradict the quotation from page 298? Not at all. Having ascertained that private property in land *creates* rent (i.e., absolute rent), Marx goes on to ascertain that that rent will be either simply a monopoly, only a monopoly, purely a monopoly, or the *result* of the fact that monopoly prevents the *levelling of profits* on capital low in its compo-

* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 301-02.—*Ed.*

** See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 737.—*Ed.*

sition (agriculture) with that which is higher in composition (industry).

Maslov consequently repeats in the newspaper edited by Plekhanov and Co. his flagrant distortion of Marxism. Maslov consequently insists, here too—without however saying it straight out—that there cannot be any absolute rent, that Marx's theory is an error, while the theory of bourgeois political economy which denies the existence of absolute rent is true.

Why then not say straight out what he has already said in *The Agrarian Question* and what I gave in my quotation? Isn't that a "distortion and obvious untruth"? If not, what is it? In *The Agrarian Question* he says that Marx was wrong and that there can be no absolute rent, whereas in the newspaper edited by Plekhanov and Co. he *keeps silent about this* and talks only about who sets out the views of Marx *more correctly*! So it transpires that all we were arguing about with Maslov was "who sets out Marx's theory more correctly", and that I was not telling the truth when I said that Maslov had "amended" Marx's "rough notes" by throwing out absolute rent! For shame, Comrade Maslov!

"Further. 'Pyotr Maslov,' writes Lenin, 'has failed to understand ... Marx's differential rent as well.... When a fresh investment of capital in his land yields the tenant additional profit and *additional rent* (Lenin's italics), it is the tenant, not the landowner, who appropriates that rent.'* In this connection Lenin, of course, reads the 'ignorant' Maslov the appropriate lecture. We take Volume I of *The Agrarian Question*, and on page 112 we find: 'If the intensification of agriculture, by the fresh investment of 500 rubles, results in the same quantity of product, the tenant will receive a profit not of 25 per cent but of 100 per cent, as on the first investment of capital he pays 333 rubles of rent.... If in the investment of the first capital he contented himself with average profit..., it is of more advantage to him to reduce the rented area and to expend new capital on the same land, because it will result in a surplus over the profit, it will provide rent for the tenant also.' But Lenin needed an untruth in order to abuse me."

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 303.—*Ed.*

Let us see who has told an untruth. To get to the bottom of this, it is important to notice the *dots* in the quotation I made, as reproduced by Maslov. For I quoted all that Maslov had said on this subject in full. Dots stand for *omissions*. And what Maslov has done is to *omit* in his quotation from page 112 of his first volume *the very passage* in which he *attacks Marx*, and which he prints *in italics* on page 112! This may seem incredible, but it is a fact. In my article in *Proletary*, as Maslov's second argument against Marx, I quote the following phrase from page 112 of his first volume: "Rent from the 'last' investment of capital, Rodbertus's rent and Marx's absolute rent, will disappear *because the tenant can always make the 'last' investment the last but one, if it produces anything besides the ordinary profit*" (Maslov's italics).*

This is Maslov's argument against Marx. It was *this* argument which I attacked, and which, I continue to assert, is a mass of falsehood and muddle. And Maslov replies to me by quoting *this same* page 112, but *leaving out* his attack on Marx! In place of this attack he puts *dots*: before the dots he quotes the *beginning* of the page, after them the *end*, but the attack on Marx has disappeared. What is this if not a distortion and an obvious untruth?

I never asserted and do not assert now, that in the four hundred pages of *The Agrarian Question* one cannot find sound passages. I only asserted that *Maslov's arguments against Marx* are unheard-of nonsense and incredible muddle. If Maslov, in the fourth edition he promises, cuts out these arguments, if for example, on page 112 he leaves what he has quoted in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, I will say, and anyone will say, that as from the fourth edition Maslov has ceased to correct Marx. But until this is done, anyone reading Volume I will see on page 112 Maslov's argument against Marx, the argument he *left out* in *Golos*. And everyone will see that I was right in criticising *this* argument, i.e., that this argument against *absolute* rent is ridiculous, since the tenant appropriates during the period of his lease the additional rent from his fresh investment of capital *in full*, i.e., both absolute and differential.

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 302.—*Ed.*

I will not dwell on Maslov's next "example", because it refers to *the very argument* which Maslov omitted in *Golos*. Obviously my criticism of the argument falls if Maslov *withdraws* the argument. But if he does not do this, and only shortens his quotations, I ask the reader, who is responsible for "a mass of distortion and obvious untruths"?

Maslov's last quotation from my article is as follows:

"'What is intensification?' asks Lenin, and replies: 'It is the further expenditure of labour and capital. A reaping-machine, according to the discovery of our great Maslov, is *not* (Lenin's italics) expenditure of capital. A seed drill is not an expenditure of capital.'* Owing to his ignorance of the most elementary terms in the agrarian question, Lenin has given a wrong definition of intensification, and has not only written obvious nonsense but also asserts an obvious untruth. In *The Agrarian Question* (p. 62) I wrote: 'A threshing-machine diminishes the expenditure of labour per unit of land area, both in an extensive and in an intensive economy.' (It is by *such* expenditure, and not expenditure in general, irrespective of the land area involved, that the degree of intensiveness is determined. *P. M.*) A harvester has the same significance."

Look here, my worthy friend, I will say to Maslov in reply: one must draw the line somewhere! Was the argument really about whether the intensiveness of the expenditure of capital is determined per unit of area, or irrespective of the area? That is indeed a distortion and an obvious untruth! The argument was not about that at all. In the *second* part of my article, now quoted by Maslov, I was *not* arguing against *The Agrarian Question* but *against Maslov's article in "Obrazovaniye", 1907, No. 2.*

Just try arguing with an individual who now removes from his works the very arguments against Marx which the critic was challenging, now *throws out entire articles he has written*, and slips under the nose of the reader something quite *irrelevant* to the matter!

The second part of my article is headed: "Is It Necessary to Refute Marx in Order to Refute Narodism?" In this part I criticise *only* Maslov's article in *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 2.

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 309.—*Ed.*

Maslov says nothing in *Golos* about that article, and quotes from his *Agrarian Question*! But that is a silly game of hide-and-seek! I never said that Maslov, in *The Agrarian Question*, went to the length of asserting that to refute Narodism it was necessary to refute Marx.

But in *Obrazovaniye* Maslov *did say this*. And it was to this that I was objecting, and not at all to what expenditure of capital determines intensification. Does or does not Maslov maintain his assertion that "if it were not for the fact that the productivity of successive expenditures of labour on the same plot of land diminishes, the idyll which the Socialist-Revolutionaries ... depict could, perhaps, be realised"?

You go into hiding, worthy opponent? But that means acknowledging defeat.

Do you maintain your assertion that you "happened to be the first to lay special emphasis on the difference between the significance of the cultivation of the soil and of technical progress for the development of farming, and, in particular, for the struggle between large-scale and small production"? That is what you said in *Obrazovaniye*. And that is what I quoted in *Proletary*. It is to that, and only to that question, that your argument about the reaping-machine refers—an argument in *Obrazovaniye*, and not in *The Agrarian Question*. By not defending what he has said in *Obrazovaniye*, Maslov admits he is wrong.

Thus on the substance of the question all Maslov does in *Golos* is to wriggle. He repeats his muddle about Marx not deducing absolute rent from private property in land, but does not directly defend his amendments to Marx; his arguments against Marx he omits from his quotations; what he has said in *Obrazovaniye* he evades altogether. And we repeat: Maslov's abolition of Marx's absolute rent in *The Agrarian Question*, and Maslov's arguments in *Obrazovaniye*, remain unsurpassed pearls of confusion, the importation of a bourgeois point of view into theory.

As regards the German edition of Maslov's book, I poked fun at the fact that in it all the corrections to Marx are hidden away. Maslov defends himself by saying that the publisher did not bring out the whole of the first part of his book. What does this correction by Maslov amount to? I said Maslov had thrown out these corrections. Maslov says it

was the publisher who did it—and the publisher is the German Social-Democrat Dietz.

If it was Dietz who threw out Maslov's "theory", Maslov's "corrections" to Marx, *with* Maslov's consent, then my argument is not affected in any way. If Dietz did it *without* Maslov's consent, then my argument changes only in its form: Dietz, by throwing out the stupidities from Maslov's book, acted wisely.

Was that the correction which the worthy Maslov was seeking?

Maslov says that I "begin to seek heresies in my opponents" because I "wish to cover up" the heresy of my friends. That is not true. Against what I consider heresy in my friends I speak as strongly as I do against you. That can be seen from my footnote in the symposium, *In Memory of Marx*,* which has just appeared. As for Maslov's heresies I "began to seek" them in "*Zarya*" *in 1901*,** i.e., *two years* before the split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, *two years* before Maslov's first municipalisation programme. In 1901 Maslov was my "opponent" in the Party *only* on the question of his corrections to Marx's theory.

P.S. The present article had already been written when I received a special leaflet from the management of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which says:

> "Owing to a printer's error in No. 8-9 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the *comment* of the editorial board to Comrade Maslov's letter was *omitted*. This mistake will be immediately corrected, and the comment made available to subscribers and purchasers."

We have not yet received this correction. I think it my duty to inform our readers about this printer's error. But is there not yet *another* printer's error in the special leaflet I reprint here? Should it not, instead of *Comrade* Maslov, read *Mr*. Maslov? Was it not Plekhanov who declared in print that people who depart from Marx are for him not comrades but gentlemen! Or does not that hold good for *Mensheviks* who preach departure from Marxism?

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* See p. 34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 127.—*Ed.*

SOME REMARKS ON THE "REPLY" BY P. MASLOV[114]

My opponent accuses me of using methods of polemics which distort the issue. To ascertain whether this is true, I will examine P. Maslov's "Reply" step by step.

Maslov's first example. Lenin says that a new upsurge of the revolution is unthinkable without the radical abolition of all the survivals of serfdom, "as though Social-Democracy, in adopting the programme of municipalisation of the land, intends to preserve the survivals of serfdom, to leave the estates in the hands of the landlords".

Every reader will see that Maslov is begging the question; because what I have been pointing out all the time is that the term, a survival of serfdom, applies not only to landlord property but also to the allotment property still in existence. That was what the argument was about. By avoiding this question *all through* his reply, by not saying a word about whether there is a medieval element in allotment property in land, whether to clear away this medievalism is advantageous for capitalism or not, Maslov distracts the attention of the reader. Not to reply to an argument of one's opponent on a question of principle, and to ascribe only "pathos" to him, means not to argue but to turn to abuse.

The second example. My remark about an agrarian and a political revolution being indissolubly connected Maslov calls lack of respect for the reader. Municipalisation does not break this connection either. Is that a reply? Is not Maslov passing over in silence here—(1) my *explicit* reference to the Menshevik Novosedsky, who *definitely* connected municipalisation with an incomplete political revolution; and (2) my argument that municipalisation does

not affect either the medieval village commune or medieval landowning, i.e., unquestionably and firmly condemns the agrarian revolution itself, and only the agrarian revolution, to remain half-finished?

Maslov's third argument: "The peasants' hatred of the landlords and the officials serves Lenin as an argument in favour of his programme and against the programme adopted." Untrue. Every reader will notice that Maslov has substituted "hatred of the *landlords*" for "*hatred of medievalism*" (Maslov himself admits a few lines earlier that that was what I spoke of). He needed this substitution in order to pass over in silence my argument as to the medieval character of *allotment* property.

It is not true that I called my programme a Bolshevik one. Nor is it true that the question of nationalisation was voted on at Stockholm. You should not distort facts, Comrade Maslov!

"No theory of rent affords the least advantage to the programme of nationalisation or municipalisation, because the income from confiscated lands in any case goes to the state or the municipal authority."

Here we have at last an argument in substance. An excellent argument, too, because it best shows how monstrously Maslov is distorting Marxism. Only by rejecting Marx's *absolute rent*, which Maslov has "refuted", can one reduce the question purely to "income", forgetting about the lowering of prices for grain and ensuring access for capital to agriculture! Maslov has confirmed by his argument that the *economic* essence of the question is alien and incomprehensible to him. It is not a question of income, my dear sir, but of the relations of production in agriculture, which change for the better when *absolute* rent is abolished. By rejecting absolute rent in Marx's theory, Maslov has deprived himself of any possibility of understanding the economic significance of nationalisation. Why millions of small proprietors in the Russian bourgeois revolution could and were bound to demand it—that *economic* problem does not exist for Maslov. That's just the trouble with him!

It is true that my articles in the years 1905-08 were directed against the programme of the cut-off lands. But

"to leap and dance" on this question as Maslov does means to throw dust in the eyes of the reader, and not to clear up disputed questions. After all, Maslov himself has not stood by all his programme of 1903! Why then does he hide this from the reader, and put forward only one side of the past? Why does he quote the words, which I do not deny now either, that nationalisation of the land is harmful in a "police state"? Is that argument, or abuse?

For Polish readers who don't know the details of the discussion on the agrarian question among Russian Social-Democrats, I will explain that in 1903, before the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Maslov put forward in the press a different programme from the one he recommended in 1906. I should have thought it impermissible to dig up previous differences, and in my previous article I did not touch on them. But now Maslov himself has brought up the old dispute. It came into his head that it would be a brilliant piece of wit to refute the programme of 1903 which I have given up—or was he perhaps attracted by the thought that to argue about the past would draw attention away from the weak points in his new views? The fact remains that, in touching on earlier disputes, Maslov did not tell the Polish Social-Democrats that he himself had changed his programme of 1903. While blaming his opponent for the open and long since completed alteration in the previous programme, he conceals the fact that he himself has changed his programme. He also conceals the fact that in 1903 Pyotr Maslov not only did not insist on the necessity of leaving the allotment lands at all costs in the hands of their owners, but on the contrary, simply included in his programme the *socialisation* if possible of the *allotment lands* as well.

Splendid, is it not? For whom are recollections of the past unpleasant? For him who has openly recognised the source of mistakes in his previous view, or for him who hides the fact that his views have changed? Why was it that in 1903 P. Maslov thought the socialisation of allotment lands possible as well, while in 1906-08 he flies into a rage at the mere thought of such views being entertained?

Let the reader judge for himself of such "polemical" methods or rather such covering-up of traces. Maslov follows

the recipe of the sly old fellow depicted by Turgenev: denounce as loudly as possible what you want to hide in your own actions! Others have changed their views, and pointed it out themselves. Shout as loudly as possible against these changes, in order to hide the change in your own views! In the absence of arguments, one needs must fall back on swindling.

My table showing the distribution of landed property in European Russia displeases Maslov. He is indignant that I compare "Kalmyk" property with the "intensive economy" of south-western Russia. The reader who is familiar with the literature on the agrarian question knows, of course, that *Maslov himself* as well as other authors compare—though it be for particular districts—the ruined horseless peasant having four dessiatines of land in some remote backwoods, with the rich farmer carrying on intensive market-gardening on the same quantity of land near a large city. Out of place, quite out of place, is Comrade Maslov's boasting of his "detailed analysis"! It is *boasting*, and not scientific argument: because it is impossible to ascertain the *results* of the struggle in any other way than the one I adopted, and Maslov himself understands the impossibility of making "detailed analyses" in *Przegląd*.

In dealing with my argument that when the Trudovik group declared for nationalisation they proved to the Mensheviks that I was right, Maslov does not simply examine this argument, but tries indirectly to weaken it by saying that (1) the nationalisation was "whittled down" and (2) many joined the autonomists in the First Duma "just because their electorate did not want nationalisation of the land".

Is not this evasion of the question? What has nationalisation in common with this "whittling down"? And what have the autonomists in common with what Maslov in 1905 and all the Mensheviks at Stockholm categorically stated about the Russian peasants—that they would not in any case agree to nationalisation, and would reply to it with a Vendée? Maslov passes over in silence the fact—for him an unpleasant one—that the adoption of a programme of nationalisation by the Trudovik group *after* the Stockholm Congress *refuted* the arguments of the Mensheviks. Such

a "reply", in which the real issue is systematically avoided, is not difficult, but it is not of great value. It is a fact that both the First and Second Dumas often put the workers' deputies in an embarrassing position, because the Social-Democrats were "whittling down" nationalisation *more* than the peasants themselves. The Social-Democrats found themselves in the position of timorous philistine intellectuals *advising* the peasant to deal *more carefully* with the old, medieval allotment property, to reinforce it as much as he could, to adapt the new free property in land to capitalism as slowly as possible! The point is, Comrade Maslov, not that the Trudoviks were whittling down nationalisation but that the Social-Democrats, the Marxists, were whittling it down still more—because municipalisation is nationalisation whittled down to the point of distortion. The trouble is not that the autonomists sometimes rejected* nationalisation; the trouble is that the Russian Social-Democrats failed to understand the nature of the struggle of the Russian peasants. Maslov's demagogy is not that he records the disagreement of some of the autonomists with nationalisation, but that he is silent about the fact that many autonomists disagree with municipalisation, and that he uses petty-bourgeois separatist arguments to incite them against nationalisation!

The autonomists are against nationalisation. Let the reader consider in whose favour such an argument works. For my part, I would mention that as early as 1903, when criticising Maslov's programme *of that day*, I called municipalisation whittled nationalisation. I would mention that, when arguing with Maslov in 1906 before the Stockholm Congress, I pointed out that it was wrong to confuse the question of national autonomy with that of nationalisation of the land.** The very foundations of our programme guarantee autonomy. Consequently they also guarantee the autonomous disposal of the nationalised land! Maslov cannot understand this elementary fact! Nationalisation means the abolition of absolute rent, the passing of the land

* Not at all, not all! The fact that nationalisation was defended by the Ukrainian autonomist, Chizhevsky, should have given Maslov food for thought.

** See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 181-84.—*Ed.*

into the property of the state, the prohibition of all transfers of land, i.e., the elimination of all mediators between those who work the land and the owner of the land—the state. Within the limits of this prohibition, the autonomy of countries and peoples in relation to the disposal of the land, the establishment of conditions for settlement, and regulations for distribution, etc., etc., is quite permissible, does not in any way contradict nationalisation and is included in the demands of our political programme. It follows clearly from this that only petty bourgeois—and that is what all the "autonomists" were—could cover up their cowardice, their unwillingness to fight actively to the end for a single, centralised agrarian revolution, by expressing a fear that they would lose their autonomy. For Social-Democracy the question is posed the other way round: it is the business of the proletariat to carry the revolution through to its very end, both in the political sphere and in the agrarian. *For this purpose* it is necessary to nationalise the land—a thing that is demanded by the Trudoviks, i.e., the politically-minded Russian peasants. The important thing for a Marxist is the economic criterion of such a step; and this economic criterion proclaims that, in keeping with Marx's teaching, bourgeois nationalisation of the land ensures the maximum development of productive forces in agriculture. Thus a resolute bourgeois-revolutionary step in the agrarian sphere is indissolubly bound up with a resolute bourgeois-democratic revolution in the political sphere, i.e., with the establishment of a republic, which alone guarantees *true autonomy*. Such is the real relationship between autonomy and an agrarian revolution, which Maslov has completely failed to understand!

Maslov calls my reference to Marx's *Theories of Surplus-Value* an "evasion", because Marx never said "that the peasants want to expropriate themselves". Come, come, Comrade Maslov! Can it really be that you have not understood Marx's clear words? Does Marx say that for capitalism the complete abolition of medieval property in land is an advantage—does he or does he not? Is the nationalisation of the land advocated by the Trudoviks and demanded by the Russian peasants in 1905-07, abolition of medieval property—is

it or is it not? For it was about this that we were talking, my dear sir, and the laughable renaming of bourgeois-peasant nationalisation of the land "expropriation" of the peasants does not in the least refute the correctness of the question as I put it.... "In industry as well," Maslov continues, "capitalism ruins small proprietorship, but does it follow from this that the Social-Democrats have got to assume the task of expropriating the handicraftsmen?"

This is a perfect gem! To call the struggle of the peasants against medieval barriers in landownership, the struggle for nationalisation of the land, which (Marx showed) most favours the development of capitalism, "expropriation" of the peasants, and to put it on the same footing as expropriation of the handicraftsman by the capitalist. For God's sake, Comrade Maslov! Just think, in the name of all that is holy, why we *support* the peasant against the landlord, and leave it to the anti-Semites to support the handicraftsman against the factory!

Maslov does not understand that to support the handicraftsman, i.e., petty proprietorship in industry, can never be the job of Social-Democrats, since this activity is decidedly and invariably reactionary. But support of petty proprietorship in agriculture *may* be the duty of Marxists, and *must* be their duty wherever petty-bourgeois economy is economically *progressive* compared with large-scale feudal economy. Marx never supported small-scale industry against large-scale, but Marx supported small-scale farming in the forties in respect to America, and peasant agriculture against the feudal latifundia in 1848 in relation to Germany. In 1848 Marx proposed the breaking-up of the German feudal estates. He supported the movement of the small farmers against the large-scale slave-owning estates in America, for freedom of the soil and for the abolition of private property in land in America.[115]

Was Marx's trend of thought in agrarian policy correct? It was correct, esteemed Comrade Maslov—who has "revised" the theory of absolute rent in the spirit of bourgeois economics, but has not had time to "revise" the rest of Marx. A bourgeois revolution in the agrarian sphere can be consistent and really victorious only when it forcibly and drastically abolishes all feudal property, when it wipes

out all previous property in land, and instead creates a basis for the new free bourgeois property in land, adapted to the requirements of capital and not of the landlords. Nationalisation of the land is fully in keeping with the trend of such a revolution. Moreover nationalisation of the land is the only measure which ensures that such a revolution takes place with the greatest consistency thinkable in capitalist society. There is no other means so resolutely and painlessly to liberate the peasants from the "ghetto" of allotment property. There is no other means to destroy the old rotten village commune without police, bureaucracy and money-lender.

Viewed objectively, the question presents itself in the Russian bourgeois revolution in the following way, and only in the following way: will Stolypin (i.e., the landlords and the autocracy) adapt the old form of landed property to the requirements of capitalism, or will the peasant masses themselves do it by overthrowing the power of the landlords and the tsar? In the first case, adaptation is only possible by means of reforms, i.e., by a half-hearted, long-dragged-out process, involving a much slower growth of the productive forces, the least possible development of democracy condemning Russia to the prolonged supremacy of the Junker. In the second case, only a revolutionary adaptation is possible, i.e., one which forcibly sweeps away the landlords' estates and ensures the most rapid possible development of the productive forces. Is that revolutionary abolition of landlord property thinkable if the old allotment property of the peasants remains? No, it is unthinkable—and the peasant deputies in both Dumas demonstrated that it was impossible. They demonstrated this by creating a political type of peasantry representative of all Russia in the period of the bourgeois revolution: the *Trudovik* type, who demands *nationalisation* of the land.

In shouting about the S.R. character of nationalisation, Maslov is repeating the old tactic of the Mensheviks: while themselves flirting with the Cadets, to accuse the revolutionary Social-Democrats of coming closer to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. People coquette with the liberal-monarchist landlords and merchants, but are indignant that the revolutionary Social-Democrats in a bourgeois

revolution want to march together with the revolutionary peasant bourgeois. Nor is that all. Thundering against the S.R. character of nationalisation, Maslov demonstrates his complete incomprehension of the Marxist analysis of the Narodnik views and aspirations of the Russian peasantry. Maslov does not understand that the Social-Democrats in Russia were long ago pointing out the reactionary nature of the socialist, or rather quasi-socialist, theories or dreams of a reallotment of the land (the general redistribution), etc., and the *bourgeois progressiveness* of this ideal in present-day semi-feudal Russia. Beyond the S.R.s' petty-bourgeois *phrase* about socialism, Maslov is incapable of discovering the bourgeois reality—namely, revolutionary struggle against all the old medieval rubbish. When a Socialist-Revolutionary talks about equalised land tenure, socialisation of lands, etc., the Socialist-Revolutionary is talking balderdash from the economic point of view, he is revealing his illiteracy in the sphere of economic science and the theory of the development of capitalism. But behind these phrases, behind these dreams, is hidden a live and highly realistic content—not at all a socialist one, however, but a purely bourgeois content, namely, clearing the ground for capitalism, abolishing all medieval and social-estate barriers existing on the land, and the creation of a free arena for capitalism. That is what our poor Maslov can't get himself to understand—and this is directly connected with the fact that Maslov cannot understand Marx's doctrine of absolute rent, which, unlike differential rent, can be abolished in capitalist society, the development of which will be advanced by its abolition.

Incapable of fighting the S.R.s, Maslov vulgarises Marxism, condemning himself only to contemplation of the "rear aspect" of the peasant, who is shackled to his plot of land, and is quite unable to understand the democracy and the revolutionary bourgeois spirit of the peasant who wants to sweep away both landlord property and allotment property in the soil.

Incapable of fighting the S.R.s, Maslov surrenders to them, to the petty-bourgeois socialists the criticism of private property in land. That criticism from the point of view of the development of capitalism, was given by Marx

and should be given by Marxists. But in cutting himself off from that road by his denial of absolute rent, Maslov capitulates to the S.R.s, admitting in theory that they are right—when it is Marx who is right! He capitulates to the S.R.s, who criticise private ownership of the land in a petty-bourgeois way, not from the point of view of the development of capitalism, but only from the point of view of delaying its development. Maslov has not understood that the mistake of the S.R.s in their agrarian programme begins *after nationalisation*, i.e., when they go on to "socialisation" and "equalisation" and reach the point of denying a class struggle amongst the small peasantry. The S.R.s do not understand the *bourgeois* character of nationalisation: that is their principal error. And let any Marxist who has studied *Capital* tell me, is it possible to understand the bourgeois character of nationalisation when one denies the existence of absolute rent?

Furthermore, Maslov says that I am turning all petty-peasant property throughout Europe into medieval property. Quite untrue. In Europe there is no "allotment" property in land, nor are there barriers deriving from the medieval ranks of society: there exists free and capitalist, not feudal, property in land. In Europe there is no peasant movement against the landlords supported by the Social-Democrats. P. Maslov has forgotten all this!

Let us go on to the political arguments. My argument that the municipalisation advocated by the Mensheviks is bound up with the idea of compromise with the monarchy is described by Maslov as an "insinuation" and a "deliberate lie"—but then how about my textual quotation from the speech of the Menshevik Novosedsky, Comrade Maslov? On whose side is there a lie? Isn't the real trouble that you want to use terrible words to wipe away the unpleasant fact of Novosedsky's admission?

Handing over the land to the municipalities increases their chances in the fight against a restoration, asserts Maslov; but I permit myself to think that only the strengthening of a central republican authority can seriously impede reaction, whereas the dispersal of its forces and resources among various regions facilitates the work of reaction. We must strive to unite the revolutionary classes,

and first of all the proletariat, of the various parts of the state into a single army, and not dream of a hopeless, economically impossible and senseless federalist attempt to hand over revenues from confiscated lands to the various regions. "Choose, Polish comrades," says Maslov: "Should a Polish Sejm receive the revenues from confiscated lands, or should these revenues be handed over to the Russians in St. Petersburg?"

A magnificent argument! And, of course, not a hint of demagogy in it! No confusion of the agrarian question with the question of Polish autonomy!

But I will say: the freedom of Poland is impossible without the freedom of Russia. And that freedom will not be achieved if the Polish and Russian workmen do not do their duty of supporting the Russian peasants in their struggle for nationalisation of the land, and in carrying that struggle to complete victory in both the political sphere and the agrarian. Municipalisation and nationalisation should be evaluated from the point of view of the economic development of the centre of Russia and of the political destinies of the country as a whole, and not from the point of view of the specific features of any particular autonomous national territory. Without the victory of the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry in Russia, it is absurd to talk about genuine autonomy for Poland, the rights of municipalities and so forth. They become empty phrases. The peasantry in Russia, on the other hand, inasmuch as it is revolutionary, inasmuch as it rejects the idea of compromise with the bourgeoisie and the Octobrists, but fights together with the workers and all democrats, has already irrefutably proved its sympathy for nationalisation of the land. If the peasantry ceases to be revolutionary, i.e., renounces this sympathy and turns away from a bourgeois-democratic revolution, then the peasants will be pleased with Maslov's anxiety to preserve the old form of property in land—but then Maslov's municipalisation will be altogether ridiculous. But so long as the revolutionary-democratic struggle of the peasantry continues, so long as there is sense in an "agrarian programme" of Marxists in a bourgeois revolution, it is our duty to support the revolutionary demands of the peasantry, including

the demand for nationalisation of the land. Maslov will not strike that demand of the Russian peasants out of the history of the Russian revolution; and it can safely be said that the rise of the tide, the revival of the struggle of the peasants for the land, when it takes place once again, will clearly reveal all the reactionary nature of "municipalisation".

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THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

The agenda of the forthcoming All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. includes the question: "The present situation and the tasks of the Party". The organisations of our Party have already begun (Moscow and St. Petersburg ahead of all other centres in this respect) systematically to discuss this question, which is undoubtedly of extreme importance.

The present period of lull in the movement for liberation, of rampant reaction, of betrayals and despondency in the camp of the democrats, of crisis and partial break-down in the Social-Democratic organisations, makes it particularly vital to take into account first of all the main lessons of the first campaign of our revolution. We have in mind not tactical lessons in the narrow sense of the word, but in the first place the general lessons of the revolution. And, in keeping with this, our first question will be, what are the objective changes which have taken place in the grouping of classes and the political balance of forces in Russia between 1904 and 1908? The main changes can be reduced, in our view, to the following five: (1) There has been a fundamental shift in the agrarian policy of the autocracy on the peasant question; support and reinforcement of the old village commune have been superseded by a policy of speeded-up police destruction and plundering of that commune. (2) The representative arrangements of the Black-Hundred nobility and big bourgeoisie have made a tremendous step forward: instead of the former local elected committees of the nobles and merchants, instead of sporadic attempts at representing them on an all-Russian scale, there is a single representative body, the State Duma,

in which these classes are guaranteed complete preponderance. Representation of the liberal professions—to say nothing of the peasantry and the proletariat—is reduced to the role of an appendage and a makeweight in this so-called "constitutional" institution, the purpose of which is to strengthen the autocracy. (3) For the first time the classes have achieved a definite cleavage and taken shape in open political struggle during this period: the political parties which now exist openly and secretly (half-secretly, to be more exact, for there are no completely "secret" parties in Russia since the revolution), express with previously unheard-of exactness the interests and viewpoint of classes; which during the three years have matured a hundred times more than during the preceding half-century. The Black-Hundred nobility, the national-"liberal" bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats (the Trudoviks with their small Left wing of S.R.s) and proletarian Social-Democracy have all during this period completed the "foetal" stage of their development, and for years ahead have defined their nature, not in words but by facts and mass actions. (4) What before the revolution was known as liberal and liberal-Narodnik "society", or the spokesman and "enlightened" part of the "nation" at large—the broad mass of well-to-do, noblemen's and intellectuals' "opposition", which seemed to be something integral, and homogeneous, permeating the Zemstvos, the universities, all the "decent" press, etc., etc.—has displayed itself in the revolution as the ideologues and supporters of the bourgeoisie, and has taken up what all can recognise now as a *counter-revolutionary* position in respect of the *mass* struggle of the socialist proletariat and the democratic peasantry. The counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie has come into existence and is growing—and this fact does not cease to be a fact because it is denied by the "progressive" legal press, or because our opportunists, the Mensheviks, keep silent about it and do not understand it. (5) Millions among the population have gained practical *experience*, in the most varied forms, of a genuinely mass and directly revolutionary struggle, including a "general strike", the expulsion of landowners, the burning of their country-houses, and open armed uprising. He who was already a revolutionary or a class-conscious worker

before the revolution cannot fully realise the tremendous significance of this fact, which has radically changed a number of previous conceptions of the course of development of a political crisis, the tempo of this development, the dialectics of history created in practice by the masses. The assessment of this experience *by the masses* is an invisible, painful and slow process, playing a far more important part than many an event on the surface of the country's political life which fascinate infants who are not only of an infantile age in politics buts sometimes a good deal older. The leading role of the proletarian masses all through the revolution and in all the fields of struggle, from demonstrations, through insurrection, to (in chronological order) "parliamentary" activity, has become apparent for all to see during this period, if we look over it as a whole.

Such are the objective changes which have created a gulf between pre-October and present-day Russia. Such are the *results* of three years of the most eventful period in our history, results given, of course, in a summarised form, so to speak, insofar as one is able in a few words to outline what is most important and essential. Now let us examine the conclusions in the sphere of tactics which these results dictate.

The change in the agrarian policy of the autocracy is of exceptionally great importance for a "peasant" country like Russia. This change is not an accident, it is not the fluctuations in ministerial lines of action, not an invention of the bureaucracy. No, it is a profound "shift" towards *agrarian Bonapartism*, towards a liberal (economically understood, i.e., bourgeois) policy in the sphere of peasant land relations. Bonapartism is the manoeuvring on the part of a monarchy which has lost its old patriarchal or feudal, simple and solid, foundation—a monarchy which is obliged to walk the tightrope in order not to fall, make advances in order to govern, bribe in order to gain affections, fraternise with the dregs of society, with plain thieves and swindlers, in order not to rely only on bayonets. Bonapartism is the objectively necessary evolution of the monarchy in any bourgeois country, traced by Marx and Engels through a number of facts in the modern history of Europe. And the agrarian Bonapartism of Stolypin, on

this point quite consciously and steadfastly supported both by the Black-Hundred landlords and the Octobrist bourgeoisie, could not even have seen the light, much less have lasted two years now, if the village commune itself in Russia were not developing in a capitalist direction, if within the commune elements were not steadily shaping which the autocracy could begin its flirtation with, to which it could say: "Enrich yourselves!", "Plunder the commune but support me!" Therefore, any assessment of Stolypin's agrarian policy that did not reckon with the Bonapartist methods of the latter, on the one hand, and its bourgeois (that is, liberal) essence on the other would be decidedly erroneous.

For example, our liberals express their dimly realised understanding that Stolypin's agrarian policy is Bonapartism by their attacks on its police character, on the idiotic interference of officials in peasant affairs, etc., etc. But when the Cadets lament the violent break-up of the "age-old" foundations of our country life, they become *reactionary* moaners. Without a violent, revolutionary break-up of the foundations of the old Russian countryside there can be no development of Russia. The struggle is going on—though very many indeed of its participants do not realise it—*only* about whether it will be the violence of a landlords' monarchy against the peasants, or of a peasant republic against the landlords. In both cases a bourgeois, and no other kind of agrarian revolution in Russia is *inevitable*, but in the first case it will be a slow and agonising one, in the second a swift, broad and free-moving one. The struggle of the workers' party for this second road is expressed and recognised in our agrarian programme—not in the part where the senseless idea of "municipalisation" is put forward, but in the part which speaks about *confiscating all the landed* estates. After the experience of three years it is only, perhaps, among the Mensheviks that people can be still found who do not see the link between the struggle for that confiscation and the struggle for a republic. Stolypin's agrarian policy, if maintained for a very long time, if it reconstructed all landed relations in the countryside for good and all on purely bourgeois lines, might force us to give up the idea of any agrarian programme in bourgeois

society (up to this day *even* the Mensheviks, and even the Cherevanins among the Mensheviks, have not reached the point of renouncing our agrarian programme). But Stolypin's policy can by no means induce us to change our tactics today. Since the "confiscation of all landed estates" stands in the programme, only infants can fail to see the revolutionary tactics (in the direct and narrow sense of the word "revolutionary") which follow from this. And it would be wrong to put the question in this way, that if Stolypin's policy is suffering "bankruptcy", that means that a revival is near—and vice versa. The failure of Bonapartist methods does not imply the failure of the policy of the kulak plundering of the village commune. And, vice versa, Stolypin's "success" in the countryside now and in the next years to come will *necessarily* inflame the struggle within the peasantry rather than quench it, for only by a long, a very long road, can the "goal", i.e., the final and complete consolidation of a *purely* bourgeois peasant economy, be achieved. Stolypin's "success" in the years immediately ahead might lead at best to the emergence of a stratum of consciously counter-revolutionary Octobrist peasants, but it is just such a transformation of the well-to-do minority into a politically conscious and united force that would inevitably give a tremendous impetus to the development of political consciousness and unity of the democratic mass against such a minority. We Social-Democrats could wish for nothing better than the transformation of the spontaneous, sporadic, blind struggle between the "sharks" and the "community" into a conscious and open struggle between Octobrists and Trudoviks.

Let us go on to the question of the Duma. Undoubtedly this Black-Hundred "constitutional" body is just another development of the absolute monarchy towards Bonapartism. All those features of Bonapartism which we noted above are revealed with perfect clarity in the present electoral law, in the faked majority of Black-Hundred representatives plus the Octobrists, in the sham imitation of Europe, in the rush for loans, the expenditure of which is allegedly controlled by "the representatives of the nation", and the complete ignoring of all the debates and decisions of the Duma by the autocracy in its practical policy.

The contradiction between the Black-Hundred autocracy, which virtually reigns supreme, and the window-dressing of a bourgeois "constitution" is revealing itself more and more obviously, as bringing with it the elements of a new revolutionary crisis. The autocracy was to have been covered up, dressed up, decked out with the help of the Duma; in effect, the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma with every day of its existence reveals, exposes, lays bare the true character of our state power, its clear class foundations and its Bonapartism. One cannot but recall in this connection the remarkably profound observation of Engels (in his letter to Bernstein on August 27, 1883[116]) on the meaning of the *transition* from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. While the liberals in general and the Russian Cadets in particular see in such a transition the workings of their notorious "peaceful" progress and its guarantee, Engels pointed out the historic role of the constitutional monarchy as a form of state which facilitates a *decisive* struggle between the feudalists and the bourgeoisie. Engels wrote: "But just as this struggle [between feudalism and the bourgeoisie] could not be fought out to a decisive conclusion under the old absolute monarchy but only in a constitutional one (England, France 1789-92 and 1815 30), so the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat can only be fought out in a republic." Engels here gives the title of constitutional monarchy, among others, to the France of 1816, when the famous Chambre Introuvable, a reactionary counter-revolutionary chamber, ran amuck in support of the White Terror against the revolution probably no less violently than our Third Duma. What does this mean? Does Engels recognise the reactionary assemblies of representatives of the landlords and capitalists, who support absolutism in its struggle with revolution, as being genuinely constitutional institutions? No. It means that there may arise historical conditions when institutions which falsify a constitution inflame the struggle for a real constitution, and become a stage in the development of new *revolutionary* crises. In the first campaign of our revolution the majority of the people still believed in the possibility of reconciling a genuine constitution with the autocracy; and the Cadets built their whole policy on system-

atically sustaining this belief among the people, while the Trudoviks followed the lead of the Cadets at least half-way in this respect. Now the autocracy by its Third Duma is showing the people in practice with what "constitution" it can "reconcile itself"—and thereby brings nearer a wider and more resolute struggle *against the autocracy*.

It follows from this, incidentally, that it would be quite wrong to replace our old slogan of "down with the autocracy" with the slogan "down with the Third Duma". Under what conditions could a slogan like "down with the Duma" acquire meaning? Let us assume that we are faced with a liberal, reform-seeking, compromising Duma in a period of the sharpest revolutionary crisis, which had developed to the point of direct civil war. It is quite possible that at such a moment our slogan might be "down with the Duma", i.e., down with peaceable negotiations with the tsar, down with the deceptive institution of "peace", let's call for a direct attack. Now let us assume, on the contrary, that we are faced with an arch-reactionary Duma, elected under an obsolete electoral law, and the absence of any acutely revolutionary crisis in the country. In that case the slogan "down with the Duma" might become the slogan of a struggle for electoral reform. We see neither of these contingencies at the present time. The Third Duma is not a compromising but a downright counter-revolutionary body, which does not cover up the autocracy, but exposes it, and which plays no independent part in any respect; no one anywhere expects it to produce progressive reforms; no one imagines that the source of tsarism's real power and strength lies in this assembly of diehards. All are agreed that tsarism does not repose on it, but makes use of it; that tsarism can pursue its entire present policy, both if the calling of such a Duma be postponed (as the calling of a parliament was "postponed" by Turkey in 1878) and if it be replaced by a "Zemsky Sobor"* or something similar. The slogan "down with the Duma" would mean concentrating the main attack on an institution which is neither independent nor decisive, and which does not play the principal part. Such a slogan would be wrong. We must keep the old slogan of "down

* A central representative assembly.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

with the autocracy" and "long live the Constituent Assembly", because it is precisely the autocracy which continues to remain the real authority, the real support and bulwark of reaction. The fall of the autocracy inevitably means the removal (and the revolutionary removal at that) of the Third Duma as an institution of tsarism; but the fall of the Third Duma by itself would mean either a new adventure by that same autocracy or an attempt at reform—a deceptive and only apparent reform—undertaken by the same autocracy.*

To proceed. We have seen that the class nature of the political parties during the three years of the first revolutionary campaign has become defined with remarkable force and salience. Hence it follows that in all discussions af the present balance of political forces, of the tendencies to change in this balance, etc., it is essential to reckon with these concrete data of historical experience, and not with abstract "general arguments". The entire history of the European states bears witness that precisely in the periods of direct revolutionary struggle deep and lasting foundations of class groupings are laid, and divisions into large political parties take place, which thereafter persist even in very long periods of stagnation. Some parties may go underground, give no sign of life, disappear from the front of the political stage: but at the slightest revival the main political forces inevitably will give signs of themselves again, perhaps in an altered form but with the same character and direction of their activity, so long as the objective tasks of the revolution, which has suffered defeat to this or that extent, are not fulfilled. Hence, it would be the greatest short-sightedness, for example, to presume that because there are no Trudovik organisations in the local areas, and the Trudovik group in the Third Duma is distinguished by its particular confusion and impotence, the masses of the democratic peasantry have therefore completely fallen apart, and play no essential role in the process of the rise of a new revolutionary crisis. Such a

* In the next issue we shall examine the other aspect of the question of "Duma" tactics, and discuss the "letter" from an otzovist comrade in *Rabocheye Znamya*, No. 5. (See pp. 286-302 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

view is worthy only of the Mensheviks, who more and more are falling into the most humdrum "parliamentary cretinism" (take, for example, their truly disgraceful renegade attacks against the illegal Party organisation). Marxists should know that the conditions of representation, not only in our Black-Hundred Duma but even in the most ideal bourgeois parliament, will always create an artificial disparity between the real strength of the various classes and its reflection in the representative institution. For example, the liberal-bourgeois intelligentsia always and everywhere seems in parliaments to be a hundred times stronger than it is in reality (in our revolution, too, opportunist Social-Democrats took the Cadets for what they seemed to be), and on the contrary very broad democratic strata of the petty bourgeoisie (in the towns during the bourgeois revolutions of 1848, in the countryside in Russia) often prove to be an extremely important factor in the open struggle of the masses, while being quite insignificant from the point of view of their representation in parliaments.

Our peasantry entered upon the revolution immeasurably less politically conscious than the liberal bourgeois on the one hand and the socialist proletariat on the other. For this reason it drew from the revolution more painful but valuable disillusionments, more bitter but salutory lessons, than any other class. Quite naturally, it is digesting these lessons with particular difficulty and particularly slowly. Quite naturally many "radicals" from among the intelligentsia will lose patience, and give it all up as a bad job—and so will some Social-Democratic philistines, on whose faces a contemptuous grimace appears whenever someone talks about some peasant democracy or other, but whose mouths water at the mere sight of the "enlightened" liberals. But the class-conscious proletariat will not so easily strike out of its memory what it saw and what it took part in during the autumn and winter of 1905. And taking into account the balance of forces in our revolution, we must know that the certain sign of a genuinely widespread rise in the social tide, of a genuinely approaching revolutionary crisis, will inevitably be, in the Russia of today, a movement among the peasantry.

The liberal bourgeoisie in our country has entered upon the path of counter-revolution. Only the brave Cherevanins can deny this—they and the cowardly editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, who deny their own comrade-in-idea and -arms. But if this counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeois liberals-were to lead anyone to infer that their opposition and discontent, their conflicts with the Black-Hundred landlords, or any rivalry and struggle of the different sections of the bourgeoisie among themselves, can be of no importance in the process of a new upsurge, this would be a tremendous mistake, and real Menshevism inside out. The experience of the Russian revolution, like the experience of other countries, proves beyond doubt that where the objective conditions of a profound political crisis exist, the tiniest conflicts seemingly remote from the real breeding ground of revolution, can be of the most serious importance as the reason, as the last straw, as a turning-point in public feeling, etc. Let us recall that the Zemstvo campaign and the liberals' petitions of 1904 were the forerunner of such an original and purely proletarian "petition" as that of January the Ninth. When the Bolsheviks were arguing about the Zemstvo campaign, it was not against its use for proletarian demonstrations, but against our Mensheviks wanting to confine these demonstrations to the Zemstvo assembly halls, against the demonstrations before the Zemstvo people being declared the highest form of demonstration, and against plans for the demonstrations being drawn up with a view to preventing the liberals from being frightened off. Another example is the student movements. In a country which is going through an era of bourgeois-democratic revolution involving a progressive accumulation of inflammable material, these movements may easily spark off events infinitely more far-reaching than a petty and local conflict over the management of affairs in a single branch of the state administration. Naturally, the Social-Democrats, who carry on the independent class policy of the proletariat, will never adapt themselves either to the student struggle or to new Zemstvo congresses, or to the conceptions of sections of the bourgeoisie which have fallen out among themselves; they will never ascribe independent importance to this

family quarrel, and so on. But it is precisely the Social-Democratic Party which is the party of the class leading the whole struggle for emancipation; it is unquestionably bound to make use of each and every conflict, to inflame it, to extend its importance, to link with it its own agitation for revolutionary slogans, to bring the news of these conflicts to the broad masses, to induce them to take independent and open action with their own demands, etc. In France after 1793, a counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie came into being and steadily grew; nevertheless the conflicts and the struggle between its different sections continued for another hundred years to serve in one way or another as grounds for new revolutions in which the proletariat invariably played the part of the principal motive force, and which it *carried through* to the point of winning a republic.

Let us now consider the conditions for an offensive by this leading and advanced class in our bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat. When the Moscow comrades were discussing this question, they quite rightly underlined the root importance of the industrial crisis. They collected extremely interesting material about this crisis, took into account the significance of the struggle between Moscow and Lodz, and amended in several respects certain conceptions which had hitherto prevailed. It remains only to be wished that this material should not wither away in the subcommittees of the Moscow Committee or the Moscow Area Committee, but should be worked over and published in the press for the whole Party to discuss. For our part we shall confine ourselves to a few remarks on the *presentation* of the question. The direction in which the crisis is moving is, by the way, a moot question (it is generally admitted that a very severe depression, bordering on a crisis, once more reigns in our industry after a very brief and slight boom). Some say that offensive economic struggles by the workers are as impossible as before, and consequently a revolutionary upswing is impossible in the near future. Others say that the impossibility of economic struggle impels a turn to a political struggle, and therefore a revolutionary upswing is inevitable in the near future.

We think that both arguments have at their foundation the same error, which consists in simplifying a complex issue. Undoubtedly the detailed study of the industrial crisis is of the greatest importance. But it is also beyond doubt that no data about the crisis, even if they were ideally accurate, can in reality decide the question of whether a rise of the revolutionary tide is at hand or not: because such a rise depends on a thousand additional factors which it is impossible to measure beforehand. It is indubitable that without the general groundwork of an agrarian crisis in the country, and depression in industry, profound political crises are impossible. But if the general groundwork exists, that does not permit us to conclude whether the depression will for a time retard the mass struggle of the workers in general, or whether *at a certain stage* of events *the same* depression will not push new masses and fresh forces into the political struggle. To answer such a question there is only one way: to keep a careful finger on the pulse of the country's whole political life, and especially the state of the movement and of the mood of the mass of the proletariat. Recently, for example, a number of reports from Party workers in different parts of Russia, in both industrial and agricultural areas, point to an undoubted revival of interest, an influx of fresh forces, a growing interest in agitation, etc. Comparing with this the beginning of mass unrest among the students, on the one hand, and the attempts to revive the Zemstvo congresses, on the other, we can record a certain turn in events, something that is breaking up the complete stagnation of the last eighteen months. How strong that turn is, whether it means the opening stage for a new epoch of open struggle, etc., facts will show. All that we can do now, and all that we must do in any case, is to intensify our efforts to strengthen the illegal Party organisation and multiply tenfold our agitation among the mass of the proletariat. Only agitation can reveal on a broad scale the real state of mind of the masses, only agitation can make for close co-operation between the Party and the whole working class, only making use for the purposes of political agitation of every strike, of every important event or issue in working-class life, of all conflicts within the ruling classes or between one section

of those classes or another and the autocracy, of every speech by a Social-Democrat in the Duma, of every new expression of the counter-revolutionary policy of the government, etc.—only work like this can once again close the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat, and provide accurate material for judging the speed with which conditions for new and more decisive battles are coming to a head.

To sum up. A survey of the results of the revolution and the present situation show clearly that the objective tasks of the revolution have not been performed. The shift towards Bonapartism in the autocracy's agrarian policy and in its general policy both in the Duma and through the medium of the Duma, only sharpens and widens the contradiction between the Black-Hundred autocracy and the supremacy of the "wild landlord", on the one hand, and the requirements of the economic and social development of the whole country, on the other. The police and kulak drive against the masses in the countryside is making the struggle there more acute and politically conscious, bringing—so to speak—the struggle against the autocracy closer to the everyday and vital problems of every village. The defence of revolutionary-democratic demands in the agrarian question (confiscation of all landed estates) is exceptionally binding a duty for the Social-Democrats at such a moment. The Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma, which shows clearly in practice with what "constitution" the autocracy can "be reconciled" and which does not resolve a single question even within the narrowest limits of meeting the needs of the country's economic development, is turning the struggle "for a constitution" into a revolutionary struggle *against the autocracy*. The local conflicts of individual sections of the bourgeoisie among themselves and with the government, in these conditions, bring just such a struggle nearer. The impoverishment of the countryside, depression in industry, a general feeling that there is no way out in the present political situation and that the notorious "peaceful constitutional" way is hopeless, all give rise more and more to new elements of a revolutionary crisis. Our business now is not artificially to invent any new slogans (like that of "Down with the Duma" instead of "Down with the autoc-

racy"), but to strengthen the illegal Party organisation (in spite of the reactionary outcry of the Mensheviks who are trying to bury it) and to develop wide revolutionary Social-Democratic agitation, which will bind the Party firmly together with the masses of the proletariat and mobilise those masses.

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HOW PLEKHANOV AND CO. DEFEND REVISIONISM

The editorial comment in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, i.e., by Plekhanov and Co., on our analysis of Comrade Maslov's letter* in *Proletary*, No. 37, has now appeared as a separate supplement to No. 8-9 of *Golos*.

This "Comment", in length about half a column of *Proletary*, merits the attention of Russian Social-Democrats, for it shows how petty factional interests have led Plekhanov and Co. to *defend* theoretical revisionism with the aid of the most unseemly sophistry. Here are the facts.

"We are the most determined and absolutely irreconcilable opponents of that *re-examination* (revision) of Marxism which is being performed under the reactionary influence of the ideologists of the West-European bourgeoisie and whose object is to strike at the roots of the philosophical, sociological, and economic doctrines of Marx and Engels." That is the first sentence of the comment. "Most determined and absolutely irreconcilable opponents"—could it be put more sharply? It would be hard to produce a more grandiloquent formula for the *promises* of Plekhanov and Co.

But ... the trouble is that our "irreconcilable" enemies of revisionism resort to a very meaningful "but" *in relation to Maslov* (and Plekhanov and Co. wrote this Comment precisely in connection with Maslov's article, precisely on the question of Maslov's revisionism).

"But we have never been Marxist sectarians," Plekhanov and Co. declare, "and we realise only too well that one can differ from Marx and Engels on one question or another,

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* See pp. 247-54 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and far from perverting their point of view or repudiating their method, remain true to both." And this example is cited: Cunow, a Social-Democrat, had "partial differences with Engels" on the question of "the origin of the matriarch te", but "only a morbid mind could accuse him of revisionism on these grounds".

"The foregoing holds good also for our attitude to Comrade Maslov's views on Marx's theory of rent. We do not share this view" (*Golos* adds editorially: "Comrade Martynov made the specific reservation in No. 1 of *Golos* that he did not agree with Comrade Maslov's amendment to the theory of absolute rent"), "but we do not regard it as revisionism...."

The reader can now follow the Plekhanov and Co. trend of reasoning. We are "absolutely irreconcilable opponents of revisionism", *but*—"we do not regard it [Maslov's view on the theory of absolute rent] as revisionism". Revisionism strikes at the roots of Marx's doctrine, whereas Maslov differs with Marx on a partial issue—such is the line of defence taken by Plekhanov and Co., and fully amplified by the reference to Cunow.

We ask the unbiased and thinking reader: is this not sophistry? Marx's theory of absolute rent is declared a "partial issue"! Differences on his theory of rent are *equated* with the fact that Cunow had "partial differences" with Engels on the origin of the matriarchate! Plekhanov and Co. apparently consider their Mensheviks little children to be fed on such explanations. One has to have no respect for oneself or for one's reader to play the clown like this in discussing cardinal questions of principle. Plekhanov and Co. themselves begin their explanation with a solemn phrase in which revisionism is described as striking at the *roots* of Marx's and Engels's doctrine. Very well. But do Plekhanov and Co. renounce *that* attitude in the case of Maslov? Yes or no? Or have Plekhanov and Co. penned their comment only to *conceal* their thoughts?

Maslov has declared, in a number of articles and in several editions of his *Agrarian Question*, that (1) Marx's theory of absolute rent is wrong; (2) the appearance of such a theory is due to the "rough" nature of Volume III; (3) "diminishing returns" are a *fact*; (4) if the theory of

absolute rent were correct and the "law of diminishing returns" wrong, the Narodniks in Russia and the revisionists the world over might prove to be right.

These were the four points which were held against Maslov in the *Proletary* article from which the whole polemic began. But just see how Plekhanov and Co. react. First, they very modestly confine themselves to the question of rent, i.e., they maintain complete silence on all the other questions. Is this not defence of revisionism? Are Plekhanov and Co. going to deny that the revision of Marx's theory about the absurdity of both the law and "fact" of diminishing returns "is being performed under the reactionary influence of the ideologists of the West-European bourgeoisie"? Secondly, the theory of absolute rent is equated with a partial question, with differences ("partial") over the origin of the matriarchate!

This, gentlemen, is mental acrobatics! And you are using them to conceal your public defence of revisionism. For *you do not venture* to state openly that recognition of absolute rent and negation of the law (or "fact") of diminishing returns are *not* the "*roots*" of Marx's economic doctrine on the agrarian question. You defend your "own chap" by adjusting Marx to fit Maslov, by declaring that, in *Maslov's case*, the very *roots* of Marx's *theory* are no more than a matter of "partial differences". You thereby confirm what *Proletary* (No. 33*) said about the Menshevik theoretical Famusovs,** who reward their household by agreeing to regard Marx's economic *theory* as a "partial" question and by putting it on a par with the question of the origin of the matriarchate.

Plekhanov and Co. are "irreconcilable enemies of revisionism"—but if you are a Menshevik, don't be afraid of these dread words! You can go to the *Golos* editors, knowing that for Mensheviks irreconcilability is very reconcilable—so much so that they are prepared to equate "uprooting of theory" with "differences over the origin of the matriarchate". Indulgences are being offered cheap, ladies and gentlemen, the sale is on!

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* See pp. 189-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See Note 95.—*Ed.*

But to continue. We do not share Maslov's views on rent, say Plekhanov and Co. Martynov has already made a reservation to that effect, they add. The "individual" whom the editors of *Proletary* described as "Maslov's guardian angel" (i.e., Plekhanov), has "often [listen to this!] *polemised in the press* [*Golos* italics] with Comrade Maslov on subjects closely related to our agrarian programme".

That, literally, is what Plekhanov and Co. say in their "Comment"!

Learn from your editors how to write disclaimers, Menshevik comrades. Here you have a classical example. The point at issue is revisionism, and the controversy began about whether it was theoretical irreconcilability or *only* petty factional spite that made Plekhanov refer to several of his opponents, in the Party organ, as "Messrs." But the "disclaimer" says: Plekhanov "often polemised in the press" with Maslov, but *not about the rent theory and not* about Maslov's deviations from Marxian theory.

Is there a suitable parliamentary expression to describe such methods? Plekhanov, who is a lover of theoretical controversies, and is able, on occasion, to turn them into campaigns, has *never*, *not once*, *polemised* with Maslov about what constitutes his revisionism, i.e., his negation of the absolute rent theory, his describing it as a "rough note", his defence of the "fact" of diminishing returns, or about whether or not the Narodniks and revisionists might have proved to be right if Maslov had not refuted Marx. Not once did Plekhanov argue on *these points*: he polemised about something quite different, namely, side issues, which the Menshevik Tartuffes* have now concealed behind a subtly hazy, deliberately misleading and diplomatically confused phrase: "subjects closely related to our agrarian programme"!

Brilliant, what? One cannot help congratulating Plekhanov and Co. on this opening defence of revisionism! One cannot help recalling politicians of the Clemenceau stamp. Clemenceau, "irreconcilable" enemy of reaction, "often polemised" with it, but now, with reaction in the

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* Hypocrites: the character typifying this vice in Molière's comedy of the same name.—*Ed*.

saddle, Clemenceau makes reservations and ... serves it. Plekhanov is an "irreconcilable" enemy of revisionism. Plekhanov has "often polemised" with Maslov (on every imaginable subject *except* Maslov's revisionism). And now Maslov has come out against Marx, repeating his old arguments against the Marxian theory in the pages of *Golos*, but Plekhanov and Co. only make *reservations*!

Buy your indulgences, literary gentlemen, sign up with the Mensheviks! Tomorrow you will be given the opportunity to refute Marx's theory of value as well in the pages of *Golos*—with the reservation in a comment by the editors that they "are not in agreement"....

"Will not *Proletary* endeavour," Plekhanov and Co. ask in the same Comment, "'to substantiate its remark' about the connection between Maslov's reflections on absolute rent and the programme which repudiates nationalisation?" With the greatest of pleasure, dear "irreconcilables". Here is a brief first *substantiation* to start with:

"Is it possible, while failing to understand Marx's theory of absolute rent, to appreciate the role of private property in land as an obstacle to the development of the productive forces of capitalist society?"

Consult Maslov, "irreconcilable" Plekhanov and Co., and answer *that* question, which gives you the substantiation you want!

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TWO LETTERS

We print in the present issue of *Proletary* a letter from an otzovist worker[117] published in No. 5 of *Rabocheye Znamya* with a note from the editors saying that they do not share his views, and regard the letter as an article for discussion; and secondly a letter from Mikhail Tomsky, a St. Petersburg worker, which our paper has just received. We print both letters in full. We are well aware that there may be malicious critics capable of wrenching separate passages or phrases from their context, in one or other of these letters, and of grossly misinterpreting them, drawing conclusions from them remote from the intentions of both authors, who were writing hurriedly, in the most unfavourable conditions of secrecy. But it is not worth taking notice of such critics. Any person who is seriously interested in the state of the working-class movement and the condition of Social-Democracy in Russia at the present time will most probably agree with us that both letters are remarkably characteristic of *two tendencies* among our class-conscious workers. These two tendencies are revealing themselves at every turn in the life of all the Social-Democratic organisations of St. Petersburg and Moscow. And as the third tendency, the tendency of Menshevism, which is frankly, and openly—or secretly and shamefacedly—burying the Party, is scarcely represented at all within the local organisations, we can say that the clash between these two tendencies is the *topic of the day* in our Party. That is why it is necessary to dwell in full detail on the two letters.

Both writers recognise that our Party is going through a crisis, not only of organisation but also of ideology and

policy. This is a fact which it would be stupid to hide. We must clearly realise its reasons and understand the way to combat it.

Let us begin with the St. Petersburg worker. It is clear from his whole letter that there are two reasons for the crisis, in his opinion. On the one hand, the lack of Social-Democratic leaders from among the workers has had this result, that the almost mass desertion of the Party by the intellectuals has meant in many places a break-down of the organisation, incapacity to rally and close its ranks, grown thin through heavy repression and the apathy and fatigue of the masses. On the other hand, in the author's opinion, our propaganda and our agitation greatly exaggerated "the present situation", i.e., they concentrated on questions of revolutionary tactics of the moment and not on the preaching of socialism, not on developing the Social-Democratic consciousness of the proletariat. "Workers became revolutionaries, democrats, anything but socialists"; and when the wave of the general democratic, i.e., bourgeois-democratic movement subsided, they left the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party in very large numbers. The St. Petersburg worker links this view with a sharp criticism of "groundless" "invention" of slogans, and with a demand for more serious propaganda work.

We consider that, in arguing against one extreme, the writer sometimes falls into the other; but by and large his point of view is unquestionably and completely correct. It cannot be said that it was a "mistake" to make "whole campaigns" out of topics of the day. This is exaggerated. This means forgetting *yesterday's* conditions from the point of view of *present-day* conditions, and in fact the writer corrects himself by admitting that "the moment of direct actions by the proletariat is, of course, an exceptional question". Let us take two such actions, as far as possible differing in character and separated in time: the boycott of the Bulygin Duma in the autumn of 1905 and the elections to the Second Duma at the beginning of 1907. Could a proletarian party, at all alive and vital, *not* concentrate its principal attention and main agitation at such a time on the slogans of the day? Could a Social-Democratic Party which was leading the masses of the proletariat at both

these moments *not* concentrate its internal struggle on slogans which would determine the immediate action of the masses? To enter the Bulygin Duma or to thwart it? To go into the elections for the Second Duma in a bloc with the Cadets, or against the Cadets? It is sufficient to put these questions clearly, and to recall the conditions of this not distant past, to shed all doubt about the reply. The fierce struggle for this or that slogan came about, not because of a "mistake" by the Party—no, it was aroused by the objective necessity for a swift and solid decision, in conditions when there was no unity in the Party, and when there were two lines of tactics, two ideological currents in the Party, a petty-bourgeois opportunist one and a proletarian revolutionary one.

Neither should things be represented as though not enough was being done at the time for the propaganda of socialism and for spreading knowledge of Marxism among the masses. That would be untrue. It is precisely at that period, from 1905 to 1907, that a mass of serious theoretical Social-Democratic literature—mainly translated—was disseminated in Russia on a scale which will yet *bear fruit*. We must not be sceptics, we must not impose our own impatience on the masses. *Such* quantities of theoretical literature cast in so short a time among the virgin masses who had been as yet scarcely touched by a socialist pamphlet, are not digested all at once. The Social-Democratic booklet is not lost. *It has been sown*. It is growing. And it will bear its fruits—perhaps not tomorrow or the day after, but a little later; we cannot alter the objective conditions in which a new crisis is growing—but it will bear fruit.

Nevertheless there is a profound truth in the main idea of the writer. The truth consists in this, that in a bourgeois-democratic revolution there is *inevitably* a certain interweaving of proletarian-socialist and petty-bourgeois-democratic (both opportunist-democratic and revolutionary-democratic) elements and tendencies. There *could be no* first campaign of a bourgeois revolution in a capitalistically developing "peasant" country without the objective fusion of certain proletarian sections and certain petty-bourgeois sections making itself felt. And we are now going through a process of necessary sorting-out, demarcation.

new crystallisation of the genuinely proletarian-socialist elements, their *cleansing* from those who had "*attached themselves to the movement*" (what the Germans call *Mitläufer*) only because of an "arresting" slogan on the one hand, or for the sake of a joint struggle with the Cadets for a "Duma with full powers", on the other.

This sorting-out is taking place, in varying degrees, in both wings of the Social-Democrats. One cannot get away from the fact that the ranks have been thinned both among the Mensheviks and among the Bolsheviks! We must not be afraid to admit it. There cannot be the least doubt, of course, that the disintegration and demoralisation which can be seen in the ranks of the Right wing of the Party has been avoided by the Left wing. And this is not an accident. Lack of stability in principles could not but facilitate collapse. Events will ultimately show *in practice* where and how the greatest unity of organisation, proletarian loyalty, Marxist consistency have been preserved. Experience resolves such arguments—not words or promises or pledges. The fact remains that disunity and wavering exist, and this fact calls for an explanation. And there can be no other explanation than the necessity of a *new sorting-out*.

Let us illustrate this thought with small examples—the composition of the "prison population" (as the lawyers call it), i.e., the make-up of the people who are in prison, in exile, on hard labour or in emigration for political reasons. That composition does correctly reflect the reality of yesterday, And can there be any doubt that the composition of the "politicals" in places remote and not so remote, is distinguished at present by a tremendous variety of political views and moods, a hotchpotch and utter confusion? The revolution raised up to political life such deep-lying sections of the people, it often brought out on to the surface so many casuals, so many "knights for a day", so many newcomers, that it was quite inevitable that very many of them should lack any kind of integrated outlook on the world. Such an outlook cannot be shaped in the course of a few months of feverish activity—and the average "life expectancy" of most of the revolutionaries during the first period of our revolution probably does not exceed a

few months. Therefore a new sorting-out among the new social layers, the new groups, the new revolutionaries awakened by the revolution is quite inevitable. And this sorting-out is going on. For example, the burial of the Social-Democratic Party, which a number of Mensheviks are attempting, really means that these worthy gentry *are burying themselves* as Social-Democrats. We certainly need not fear this sorting-out. We should welcome it, we should help it. Let there be snivelling from the flabby-minded, who here and there will begin shouting: Again struggle! Again internal friction! Again polemics! Our reply is that without unremitting struggle no genuinely proletarian, revolutionary Social-Democracy has ever built up anywhere. With us in Russia it is building up even in the present difficult circumstances, and *that process will be successful*. The guarantee for this is the whole capitalist development of Russia, the impact of international socialism on us, the revolutionary tendency of the first campaign of 1905-07.

In the interests of this new sorting-out a strengthening of theoretical work is essential. The "present moment" in Russia is precisely one in which the theoretical work of Marxism, its deepening and expansion, are dictated not by the state of mind of this or that individual, not by the enthusiasm of one or another group, and not even by the external police conditions which have condemned many to elimination from "practical work"—but by the whole objective state of affairs in the country. When the masses are digesting a new and exceptionally rich experience of direct revolutionary struggle, the theoretical struggle for a revolutionary outlook, i.e., for revolutionary Marxism, becomes the watchword of the day. Therefore the St. Petersburger is a thousand times right when he emphasises the necessity of deepening socialist propaganda, of working out new questions, of encouraging and developing in every possible way the study groups which are turning out real Social-Democrats, Social-Democratic leaders of the masses, from amongst the workers themselves. Here the role of the local Party *cells*—the very mention of which throws Dan and Co. into epileptic convulsions—is exceptionally great, and the "professional revolutionaries" so hateful to the

opportunist intellectuals are called upon to play a new and gratifying part.

But even here, while defending an absolutely correct idea, Mikhail Tomsky partly falls into the other extreme. Thus, he is wrong when he strikes out of the list of "serious questions" a study of the experience of the revolution during these three years, a study of the practical lessons of the direct struggle of the masses, a summing up of the results of revolutionary-political agitation, etc. Here, most probably, there is simply a gap in the writer's statement of his case, or minor mistakes due to the conditions in which his letter was hastily written. This study, this summing up before the widest possible working-class audience, are much more important than the question of "local courts", "local self-government" and suchlike "reforms" in Stolypin's Russia about which bureaucrats and liberals love to chatter. Such "reforms" under a Black-Hundred Duma and a Black-Hundred autocracy are bound to be a farce.

But Mikhail Tomsky is absolutely right when he strongly objects to the "invention of slogans" in general, and such slogans as "down with the Duma" or "down with the Duma group" in particular. He is a thousand times right when he contrasts this "floundering" with sustained Social-Democratic work of organisation, propaganda and agitation to strengthen the Social-Democratic Party, to reinforce its traditions so hateful to the opportunists, to maintain continuity in its work, to extend and stabilise the influence of *this* Party, the *old* Party (rage, editors of the opportunists' *Golos*!) over the masses of the proletariat.

This brings us to the letter of the Moscow comrade and to criticism of its main point, namely, the far-famed "otzovism". We have repeatedly come out in *Proletary* against otzovism, ever since the time when a minority of the Bolsheviks at the Moscow conference moved their well-known resolution on this question (see *Proletary*, No. 31). We now have before us, also in the name of a minority of the Moscow Bolsheviks, a first systematic attempt to make out a case for otzovism. Let us look at it more closely.

The otzovist comrade starts from the correct premise that the objective tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia have not been achieved, and that "the rev-

olution has not been liquidated". But from this correct premise he draws wrong conclusions. "To what should our Party adapt itself?" he asks. "To years of stagnation, or to a new social upsurge?" And this is where he goes wrong. From the fact that the revolution has not been liquidated there follows the inevitability of a new bourgeois-democratic upsurge—and only that. But it does not follow from this either that this upsurge will *wholly* follow the pattern of the old grouping of elements among bourgeois democracy (a re-grouping might take much longer than we and our opponent might like), or that a "social upsurge" (it were better to say: revolutionary upsurge) is impossible after, say, a *year* of stagnation. We have gone through not less than a year of stagnation, and we are still experiencing it. The otzovist comrade himself admits that "it is difficult and even impossible to say what *will be* that external cause which will *set in motion* ... the masses". Moreover, in inviting the Party "to adapt our tactics and organisation to it [to the revolution, i.e., to a revolutionary upsurge], and not to the political moment of stagnation we are going through", the writer is himself proposing that the organisation should be reconstructed in keeping with the moment of stagnation, with the frantic police repressions, with the impossibility of direct and immediate contacts between our committees and the masses of workers. There is no doubt that in conditions of an upsurge the author would not put forward such a plan of organisation or make it a key issue. Consequently, he is *in fact* refuting his own statement of the question, he is, by his *practice*, making an amendment to his *theory*. This happened because he stated his theoretical premise wrongly. From the inevitability of a new upsurge there follows the necessity of maintaining both our old programme and the old revolutionary watchwords of all our mass work, the necessity of systematically preparing the Party and the masses for new revolutionary battles. But it does not follow from this whether the upsurge has or has not already begun, and whether we have to "adapt ourselves" to its opening stage, or to its highest point. In 1897, in 1901, and at the beginning of 1905, it was absolutely true that a new revolutionary upsurge was inevitable (after the weak upsurges in the early sixties and

late seventies); but at these three moments the revolutionary Social-Democrats knew how to adapt their tactics to the varying conditions of mounting crisis. In 1897 we rejected the "plan" of a general strike, as a phrase—and we were right. In 1901 we did not make the slogan of insurrection the order of the day. After January 9, 1905, both this slogan and a mass strike were correctly made the order of the day by the revolutionary Social-Democrats. We do not wish to imply by any means that a new upsurge is bound (or even "likely") to be as slow. On the contrary, all the facts and all the experience of revolutions in Europe oblige us to expect a tempo incomparably more rapid than in the years 1897-1905. The fact remains that at different *moments* of the upsurge the revolutionary Social-Democrats *always* put forward different slogans. The mistake of the otzovist comrade is that he forgets this experience of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Proceeding to our Duma group, the otzovist comrade starts out with the premise: "The natural fulfilment of the Party, its diplomatic representative, so to speak, is the Duma group." This is wrong. The author exaggerates the significance and the role of the parliamentary group. The author is extolling that role beyond measure, in Menshevik fashion: there must be something in what people say about extremes meeting! From the view that the parliamentary group is the "fulfilment" of the Party the Mensheviks arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to adapt the Party to the group. The otzovists arrive at the conclusion that such a poor "fulfilment" of the Party is disastrous to the Party. In both cases the premise is false. Nowhere under any conditions, even in the most "ideal" bourgeois-democratic republic, would revolutionary Social-Democracy agree to recognise its parliamentary group either as the "natural fulfilment" of the Party or as *its* "diplomatic representative". Such a view is deeply fallacious. We send deputies into bourgeois and bourgeois-Black-Hundred representative institutions not for diplomacy, but for a special type of subsidiary Party work, for agitation and propaganda from a particular rostrum. Even when there is an "ideal" democratic franchise, the parliamentary group of a workers' party will always bear certain traces of the influ-

ence of the general bourgeois circumstances in which the elections take place: for example, it will always be more "intellectual" than the Party as a whole, and therefore we shall never recognise the group to be the "fulfilment" of the Party. The parliamentary group is not a general staff (if I may be allowed to use a "military" simile side by side with the "diplomatic" one used by the writer), but rather a unit of trumpetors in one case, or a reconnaissance unit in another, or an organisation of some other auxiliary "arm".

The otzovist comrade has transformed the parliamentary group from a *subsidiary Party organisation* into the "fulfilment" of the Party in order, by *exaggerating* the significance of the group, to attribute an entirely wrong character to the activity of the contingent which we have sent into the bourgeois-Black-Hundred Duma.

But possibly the writer would not insist on this "fulfilment". Elsewhere in his article he says quite rightly: "One of the chief motives which induced the Party to take part in the elections was its hope of using the Duma rostrum for propaganda and agitation." That is true, and the writer's objection to this true proposition displays his error most forcibly. He writes: "Events, however, showed that agitation in the Third Duma was of no value at all, first because of the make-up of the group itself, and secondly because the masses are completely indifferent to all that goes on within the walls of the Taurida Palace."

We shall begin our examination of this proposition, which is so full of errors, from the end. Agitation is of no value at all *because* the masses are completely indifferent to all that goes on in the Duma. What is this? What does it mean? It would appear, from this monstrous logic, that we should have to "recall" not the parliamentary group but the "masses" for their "indifference"! For, as we all know, what is carried on in the Duma is the policy of the autocracy, the policy of support for tsarism by the Black-Hundred landlord and the Octobrist big capitalist, the policy of servility to tsarism on the part of the liberal Cadet gasbag. To be indifferent "to all that goes on within the walls of the Taurida Palace" means to be indifferent to the autocracy, to the whole internal and external policy of the autocracy! The writer has once again produced an argument

in the spirit of Menshevism inside out. "If the masses are indifferent, then the Social-Democrats should be indifferent too." But we are a party *leading* the masses to *socialism*, and not at all one which follows every change in mood or depression in the spirits of the masses. All Social-Democratic parties have had to cope at times with the apathy of the masses, or their infatuation with some error, some fashion (chauvinism, anti-Semitism, anarchism, Boulangism,[118] etc.), but never do consistently revolutionary Social-Democrats yield to every changing mood of the masses. One can and must criticise the bad policy of Social-Democrats in the Third Duma, when they carry on a bad policy there; but to say that the agitation is of no value *because* of the complete indifference of the masses, means to talk in a non-Social-Democratic way.

Or maybe "the complete indifference of the masses" does not mean indifference to the policy of tsarism in general? In other words, the masses are indifferent to all that is going on within the walls of the Duma, but are *not indifferent*, shall we say, to discussion of the question of street demonstrations, new strikes, insurrection, the inner life of revolutionary parties in general and the Social-Democratic Party in particular? And that is just the trouble with the writer: this, evidently, is just what he thinks, but is *obliged* not to put this obvious nonsense in so many words! If he really could say and prove that the masses at the present moment are not in the least indifferent to politics in general, but on the contrary have a much more lively interest in more active forms of politics, the question naturally would present itself otherwise. If instead of a year of political lull, of decline and disintegration in all Social-Democratic and all workers' organisations, we had had a year of obvious interest of the masses in directly revolutionary forms of struggle, we should be the first to admit that we were wrong. Only the "parliamentary cretins" of Menshevism, who hypocritically close their eyes to the experience of the work of Marx, Lassalle, and Liebknecht in periods of revolution, can stand always and everywhere for participation in any representative institution, without taking into account the conditions of the revolutionary moment. The question of taking part in the Third Duma

or boycotting it, like every other political question, must be considered by Marxists *concretely* and not abstractly, taking into account the *entire* revolutionary situation as a whole, and not the pitiably barren argument that, "if representation exists then one must be represented". A lively interest of the masses in politics would mean that objective conditions existed for a growing crisis, that is, it would mean that a certain upsurge was already visible and when that upsurge gained strength the feeling among the masses would inevitably find expression in *mass action*.

On the latter question the otzovist comrade makes the following admission: "every change in its [the parliamentary group's] activity is closely linked with a change in the regime, which we are not at present strong enough to influence".... Why does the otzovist comrade consider that we are not only powerless at present to change the regime but even to *influence* it? Evidently because, as a Social-Democrat, he has in mind solely action by the masses of the proletariat, and considers such action *at present* impossible and any talk about it useless. But look how, in doing so, he tries to shift the blame, i.e., turns an argument which speaks against otzovism against us:

"*Break through* the police barriers which separate the deputies from the masses," writes the otzovist comrade, "make the parliamentary group come out more sharply and strikingly, in a word, organically fuse its work with the life of the proletariat, and then the workers perhaps will see some positive value in it. But as every change in its activity is closely linked with a change in the regime, which we are not at present strong enough to influence, all dreams of expanding and deepening the work of the group must be abandoned!"

If the expansion and deepening of the work of the Duma group depends on "breaking through the police barriers", why does the conclusion run that "dreams of improving the group must be abandoned", and not that dreams of breaking through police barriers must be abandoned? The writer is obviously illogical, and his argument should be amended in the following way: there must be unremitting work to improve all Party activity and all links of the Party with the masses, and the result of this will inevitably be both

that police barriers in general will be broken through, and in particular Party co-operation with the Duma group, Party influence on the group will become stronger. It is as though the writer were demanding that *we* anti-otzovists should "break through police barriers", and then perhaps he would agree to give up his otzovism. But is it not clear that thereby he is turning the real interconnection and interdependence of political phenomena upside down? Perhaps (we would reply) you might be right, Comrade Otzovist, if the mass could "at present" not only "influence the regime" (every successful political demonstration will influence the regime) but also break through the barriers, i.e., if the mass could *now* break through the "barriers" of the Third Duma, it might be useless, perhaps, for the revolutionary Social-Democrats to send their group into this Duma. Perhaps. But you yourself say that this is not the case: you yourself agree that, in present circumstances, hard and serious preparatory work is still needed to turn that possibility into reality.

"The composition of the group," you say. If recall were proposed with a view to *changing* the composition of the group, this argument might be worth while considering in the light of whether the composition would be improved by new elections upon the resignation of the present group. But the writer has nothing like this in mind. He wants not only to recall the Duma group, but to abolish any representation of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma, declaring participation in the latter to be a mistake. From this point of view to advance "the composition of the group" as a justification for otzovism is the most unforgivable timidity and lack of faith for a Social-Democrat. Our Party succeeded in making the Black Hundreds choose our Party candidates, the Social-Democrats, from among the worker-electors.[119] Are we then to declare that it is hopeless for these Party workmen to be able to expound their socialism, simply and plainly, from the Duma rostrum? Are we to haul down the flag after a few months of struggle against bourgeois "well-informed persons"[120] (see the excellent description of the harm they do, in the letter about the Duma group published in this issue)? Must we declare that our Party is incapable, in a period of temporary

lull and stagnation, of putting forward worker-Social-Democrats who are able to publicly expound their socialism? That is not politics but nervousness. Of course our Duma group itself is mostly to blame for this, because it is precisely by its serious mistakes, and by those mistakes alone, that it drives those who are resentful of it into otzovism. But we will not allow this justified resentment to lead us into a wrong policy. No. We must and shall work hard and persistently to bring the Party and the Duma group closer together, to improve the group itself. We shall not forget that in the experience of international Social-Democracy there were examples of much more prolonged and much more acute struggle between the group and the Party than we have had during the Third Duma. Remember the Germans. Under the Anti-Socialist Law matters went so far that the parliamentary group made a number of the most deplorable anti-Party opportunist mistakes (voting for the subsidy to the shipping company, etc.). The Party had its weekly central organ abroad, and regularly imported it into Germany. The organisation of the German Social-Democrats at that time, in spite of furious police persecution, in spite of the fact that the situation was less revolutionary, for a number of objective reasons, than in present-day Russia, was incomparably broader and stronger than the present organisation of our Party. And the German Social-Democratic Party fought a long war against its parliamentary group, and won it. The ridiculous supporters of the "youth", who spent their time on hysterics instead of on improving the parliamentary group, came, as we all know, to a very bad end. And the victory of the Party expressed itself in the subordination of the parliamentary group.

With us in Russia the Party's struggle with the Duma group to correct the latter's errors is only just beginning. We have not yet had a single Party conference telling the group firmly and clearly that it must correct its tactics in such-and-such definitely specified respects. We have not as yet a central organ appearing regularly, following every step of the group on behalf of the whole Party and giving it direction. Our local organisations have done still very, very little in that field of work—agitation among

the masses on the subject of every speech of a Social-Democrat in the Duma, explaining every mistake in this or that speech. Yet we are being asked to give it all up, to declare the struggle hopeless, to renounce use of the Duma rostrum at times like the present of 1908. Once again, that is not politics but bad nerves.

No striking acts, you say. About these "striking acts" one must distinguish two things: first, the poor state of information in the Party and, secondly, a most serious mistake of principle in the way the very question of striking acts is put.

On the first question it should be said that so far all who wanted to criticise the group in a business-like way have pointed out a number of unquestionably serious mistakes (the declaration; the voting of millions to Schwartz; the consultation with the Popular Democrats; the recognition of religion as a private matter for the *Party*; the lack of any statement on the interpellation of the government on October 15, 1908; the lack of any clear criticism of the Cadets, etc.). To hush up these mistakes as the Mensheviks do—they find everything for the best, with the sole exception of Chilikin's speech—is simply disgusting. We should not hush up these mistakes but thrash them out publicly, in our local and non-local press, at every meeting, in agitational leaflets spread among the masses after every speech. We have done very little as yet in the way of practical criticism of the group, and acquainting the proletarian masses with such criticism. We must, all of us everywhere, set to work in this respect. And when we do, we shall see that there are a number of speeches by the group, and particularly formulas for calling next business, drawn up on the suggestions of representatives of the Central Committee and in agreement with these representatives, which contain a *correct* exposition of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P., which are printed in the Reports of the Duma proceedings and in the supplement to *Rossiya*[121]—and of which not one-hundredth has been used as yet by us in our mass agitation. Needless to say, one should criticise the group, it is dishonest to hush up its mistakes. But all of us have also to strengthen our organisations in the local areas, and develop the agitation to make use of every act by the

Duma group. Only the combination of the two forms of work is activity really worthy of consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats, and only this combination will help us to overcome "the moment of stagnation" and hasten the arrival of a new upsurge.

To proceed. In emphasising "the absence of striking acts", the writer says that "the impression has been created on whom? on some *Mitläufers* who don't understand the ABC of Marxism?] that the Social-Democrats have accepted the existing situation, and are thinking of peaceable cultural work. The existence of the group has become a demonstration, as it were, that the revolution has been buried—if not in words then ... in practice. Wrong though that opinion may be, we can refute it not by arguments but by facts." And the only "fact" which the writer proposed as a means of "reconstructing" all the tactics of "emphasising" the Social-Democratic attitude to the Duma in the eyes of the masses, is recall of the group! It would appear that to recall the group from the Duma is regarded as a "fact" which refutes the "burial of the revolution", and as a "striking act" *which emphasises* the new tactics!

Our reply is that the writer misunderstands the general significance of "striking acts" and "striking" slogans. When we Bolsheviks were carrying on a boycott of the Bulygin Duma in 1905, the slogan was right not because it was "striking" but because it *accurately* expressed the *objective* situation: the existence of an upsurge, which tsarism was trying to divert by promising a consultative Duma. When in the summer of 1906 we released the slogan of "an executive committee of the Left to support insurrection and no support to the demand of a Cadet Ministry", this slogan was right not because it was "striking", but because it *accurately* expressed the *objective* situation; events proved that the Cadets were hindering the struggle, that their secret negotiations with Trepov in June 1906 expressed the manoeuvres of the government, that the *real* fight took place, and was bound to take place, on a different field, after the Duma had been dissolved, namely, on the field of armed struggle (Sveaborg and Kronstadt, as the culmination of the soldiers' and peasants' mutinies). When in 1907 we were fighting for the slogan of no bloc with the Cadets, but a bloc against

the Cadets, this slogan was correct not because it was "striking", but because it accurately expressed the *objective* conditions of the moment. The elections in St. Petersburg, and the sum total of voting and debate) in the Second Duma, proved that the "Black-Hundred menace" was a fiction, and that *in reality* the struggle was against the Cadets and the reactionaries together, not together with the Cadets against the reactionaries.

Undoubtedly some people joined us during the revolution not because they understood the *Marxist* criterion of the correctness of Social-Democratic slogans and tactics, but only because they were "striking". That today, when the wave has ebbed, there remain and will remain only real Marxists, does not frighten us but rejoices us. And we invite the otzovist comrade to think carefully over his argument that the burial of the revolution must be disproved not by words but by facts—and *therefore* let us recall the Duma group! His argument is absolutely wrong. To recall the group by way of *emphasising* the fact that the revolution has not been buried, means the *burial* of those "revolutionaries" who are capable of applying such a policy. For that kind of "revolutionariness" expresses confusion and impotence in that painful, difficult and slow work which is dictated "at present" by objective conditions, and which cannot be simply dismissed or passed over in silence.

In conclusion we would point out that the otzovist comrade himself, at the end of his letter, proposes a *five-point* plan of immediate work which correctly expresses the tasks of the moment and *refutes* his own wrong tactics. We say again: the *practice* of the otzovist comrade is better than his theory. He is unquestionably right when he says that a strong illegal organisation is necessary. He will not insist, probably, on the utterly impracticable "appointment" of local Committee-men by the Central Committee. We should not forget that the professional revolutionary from among the Social-Democratic workers is coming to take the place or rather coming to the aid of the professional revolutionary from among the intellectuals (furious though this makes the Mensheviks, it is a fact); consequently the new illegal organisation will not entirely resemble, and must not *entirely* resemble, the old one. We think likewise

that the expression "to break the Party cells away from each other" in the last sentence of the first point is an awkward phrase which has slipped in by accident, and which it would be quite wrong to find fault with. After all, a Social-Democratic illegal organisation will not break away but bring together the local Party cells which at present are separated from each other. The otzovist comrade is quite right when he emphasises the special importance of socialist propaganda and the opinion poll method of agitation. "Everyday links between the masses and the Party", "drawing the masses into discussion of our agitation slogans"—these are the real *topics of the day*. Recognition of *such* topical questions shows better than any argument, and in spite of all "invented" slogans (as M. Tomsky aptly puts it) that the course of events confronts all of us, both anti-otzovists and otzovists, with *one* essential practical task, one "slogan" of revolutionary Social-Democracy. This is the ideological strengthening of socialism, the organisational strengthening of the illegal workers' party with leaders from among the workers themselves, the development of many-sided Social-Democratic agitation among the masses. *This* work, when tackled more and more energetically, will unite us all. It will pull together, discipline, correct our Duma group better than dozens of mere ultimatums. It will vitalise our work. It will resurrect the atmosphere of vigorous revolutionary activity. It will teach us to gauge exactly the rise of the tide and to determine its symptoms. It will scatter like the dust all the dead, thought-up, "invented" slogans of otzovism!

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THE AGRARIAN DEBATES IN THE THIRD DUMA

Nearly a month of agrarian debates in the Third Duma has provided exceptionally valuable material for the study of the present state of the agrarian question, the lessons of the revolution and the tasks of the proletariat. We shall try and draw the main conclusions from this material. The speakers fall of themselves into four groups—the Rights, the Cadets, the peasants and the Social-Democrats. The differences between the "Right" in the narrow sense of the word and the Octobrists completely fade out. The peasants unquestionably act as a single political tendency on the agrarian question, the difference between the Right-wing peasants and the Trudoviks being only a distinction of shadings within a single tendency. Let us analyse the position which each of these groups took up. (The figures in brackets refer to the pages of the verbatim reports in the supplement to *Rossiya*.)

As could have been expected of Black-Hundred "parliamentarians", the Rights and the Octobrists tried to cover up the substance of their agrarian policy with the litter of juridical casuistry and archive rubbish, holding forth on the relations between the law of November 9, 1906, and Article 12 of the General Statute on the Peasantry (granting the peasants, after redemption, the right to demand a separate piece of land as their private property), then on Article 165 of the Statute of Land Purchase, etc. Posing as a "liberal", Shidlovsky tried to prove that the legislation of Count D. Tolstoy on inalienability of allotments, etc., contradicted the "spirit" of 1861, whereas the law of November 9, 1906, corresponded to that spirit. All this

was sheer humbug, calculated to throw dust into the eyes of the peasantry and obscure the real issue. To a considerable extent the Cadets, as we shall see later, rose to the bait of the Black Hundreds; but for us socialists it is sufficient to point out in a few words what a thick layer of bureaucratic dust must be brushed off the speeches of the Shidlovskys, the Lykoshins and other lackeys of the Black-Hundred tsarist gang to see the real content of their agrarian policy. Mr. Lvov the First, who, we believe, calls himself a Peaceful Renovator, but who in fact is a real Black Hundreder with the manners and graces of a Mr. Struve, expressed this content more clearly than others. "Among the peasantry," said this servant of the landlords, "two elements have emerged: the helpless individual and the lawless mob (*applause from the Right and the Centre*).... Such a condition of the masses is a menace to the lawful [meaning, landlords'] state (*applause from the Right and the Centre*).... The land must belong to all who toil, the land like the air and water; we have come here to get land and freedom." This was the dominating voice. And this voice, snatched directly from those superstitions and prejudices which are rooted in the peasant mass, this voice pointed out to us that superstitious conception of authority which can take from some and give to others.... "Let us recall what was said in this building [continued Mr. Lvov remembering previous Dumas]. It is painful for me to recall this, but I will say, I cannot but say, what was discussed in the agrarian commission. Yes, when even the question of leaving at least vegetable allotments or orchards inviolate met with the strongest opposition, met the most violent resistance, and was carried only by the smallest majority; when it was suggested that all land transactions should be stopped, not only mortgages in the Bank of the Nobility, not only sales to the Peasant Bank, but buying and selling land itself, even gifts and inheritance of land—then obviously one trembled, gentlemen, trembled not for the interests of the landlord, but trembled for the condition and the destiny of the state (*applause of the Centre and the Right. Exclamation*: "*Bravo!*"). On such a foundation it is impossible to build a capitalist, a modern state" (293).

The landlord state "trembled" for its existence, "trembled" at the "voice" (and movement) of the peasant masses. These gentlemen cannot even imagine any capitalism that is not based on the preservation of landlordism, i.e., feudalist landownership. The "educated" Lvovs have not even heard that capitalism develops most widely, freely and rapidly when all private property in land is completely abolished!

For agitation among the masses, the study of extracts from the speeches of Shidlovsky, Bobrinsky, Lvov, Golitsyn, Kapustin and Co. is absolutely necessary. Up till now we have seen the autocracy almost exclusively when it was giving orders, and sometimes, rarely, publishing statements in the spirit of Ugryum-Burcheyev.[122] Now we have the open defence of the landlord monarchy and the Black-Hundred "constitution" by the organised representatives of the ruling classes, and this defence provides very valuable material for the awakening of those sections of the people who are politically unconscious or indifferent. Let us briefly note two particularly important circumstances. In the first place, when setting out their political programme, the Right constantly bring forward to their audience the living enemy against whom they are fighting. This enemy is the revolution. "Fear" of the revolution, which was so clearly expressed by the stupid Lvov, is no less clearly manifest in *all* who at every step recall the recent past with hatred, anger, and grinding of teeth. This direct posing of *all* questions on the basis of *counter-revolution*, this subordination of *all* arguments to one principal and root argument, the struggle against revolution, contains within itself a profound truth. And it makes the speeches of the Right incomparably more valuable material, both for the scientific analysis of the present situation and for purposes of agitation, than the speeches of the half-hearted and cowardly liberals. The unrestrained fury with which the Right attack the revolution, the end of 1905, the risings, the first two Dumas, shows better than any long speeches that the protectors of the autocracy see before them a *living* enemy, that they do not consider the struggle with the revolution ended, that the revival of the revolution looms before them every minute as a very real and immediate

threat. You don't fight a dead enemy in this way. You don't hate a dead enemy like this. The simple-minded Mr. Balakleyev naïvely expressed this common spirit of all the speeches of the Right. Saying that of course the ukase of November 9 could not he rejected, since it expressed the royal will, he declared at the same time: "Gentlemen of the Imperial Duma! We are living at a time of revolution which, in my profound conviction, has far from ended yet" (364). Mr. Balakleyev fears the "revolutionary origin" of the law of November 9; he is afraid it may inflame a new struggle. "We are going through a painful crisis," he said, "and how it will end no one knows. Imagination draws the most sombre pictures, but our duty is not to support sedition and discord among the people."

The second, very important, circumstance refers to the economic, and particularly the agrarian, programme of the Right. This is their defence of the private property in land of the *peasants*, a defence which is the keynote of all their speeches, including that of the arch-priest Mitrofanushka (Bishop Mitrofan), who spoke immediately after the reporter, evidently seeking to frighten the democratic but downtrodden village priests. Comically trying to overcome in himself the habit of playing the religious simpleton and of using the language of the seminary ("the village commune is a primordial phenomenon"), he mouthed such phrases as "Life develops in the direction of a greater and greater individuality of personality"; "We must recognise as useful the new pattern of life among our peasants on the model of the West-European farmers" (69).

It may be asked, why do the class of landlords and the class of capitalists so energetically defend, both in the Second and in the Third Dumas, the private property in land of the *peasants*? Only because such is the "latest government instruction"? Of course not. This instruction itself has been suggested and prompted by the Council of the United Nobility.[123] The landlords and capitalists know perfectly well what enemy they have to fight, they realise only too well that the *revolution has bound up* the victory of the landlords' interests with the victory of private property in land in general; the victory of peasant interests with the abolition of private property in land in

general, both landlords' and peasants' property. The combination of private property in the allotment lands with social property in the expropriated landlords' estates is a poor invention of the Cadets and the Mensheviks. *In reality* the struggle is whether the landlords will be the builder of the new Russia (this is impossible, except on the basis of private property in land of all kinds), or whether it will be the peasant masses (this is impossible in a semi-feudal country without destroying private property *both in* landlords' and *in* allotment lands).

Let us go on to the Cadets. Their speeches are distinguished from those of the Right and those of the Left by a striving to reconcile the irreconcilable, to straddle two stools. Only in that part of Mr. Milyukov's speech in which he spoke as a *historian*, and not as a *Cadet*, have we a splendid selection of facts on the history of the Council of the United Nobility—a summary which does credit to any *democrat*. But on the whole Shingaryov, Berezovsky, Milyukov, Bobyansky and Rodichev swallowed the bait of the Black-Hundred Mr. Shidlovsky, and with enormous zeal stuffed the heads of their audience with juridical casuistry, poured out phrases about "justice" according to Roman law ("for greater show" Rodichev, even inserted the Latin word *aequitas*! "*We*" did learn something in the university after all!), sank to contemptible boot-licking (Mr. Sningaryov certified his "respect" for Stolypin's lackey Lykoshin, and tried to prove that compulsory alienation of land was practised in countries where "the institution of private property is most sacredly observed"). All the Cadet speeches objecting to the law of November 9 struck a note of "caution". We Bolsheviks were accused of denigrating the Cadets by calling them liberal landlords. As a matter of fact, they are worse. They are liberal *placemen*. One cannot imagine a greater corruption of the *democratic* conscience of the masses than this pronouncing in the Duma, by the party of so-called "democrats", of speeches which *blunt the edge* of the struggle, which preach the "caution" of bureaucrats, which basely praise that plundering and enslavement of the peasants by the feudalist landlords known as "the Great Reform" of 1861!

To attack Stolypin for the "indiscreetness" of his agrarian

policy means to become a prostitute, to offer oneself for the post of *such* instruments of this policy as would be able to do *the very same job* "discreetly", i.e., carry out that same landlords' policy under the false flag of "constitutional democracy", carry it out not by force alone but also by deceiving the peasants. Here is one of the numerous Cadet statements which reveal precisely this sense of what they were saying. Mr. Berezovsky, whose speech was highly approved by the Cadet leader Mr. Milyukov (he called it "excellent"), declared:

"I am profoundly convinced that this Bill [the Cadet Land Bill] is far more advantageous for the landowners as well [not only for the peasants]: and I say this, gentlemen, knowing agriculture, engaged in it all my life and owning land myself. For cultured farming the Bill of the party of people's freedom would undoubtedly be more useful than the present system. One should not seize on the bare fact of compulsory alienation, get bitter about it, and call it an act of violence; one should look at what is proposed in our Bill, assess what it amounts to, and consider how this compulsory alienation is to be carried out [golden words, Mr. Berezovsky. Can you have become a Bolshevik?]. Take the Bill of the 42 members of the First Duma; it contained only [that's just it!] recognition that it was necessary in the first instance to subject to compulsory alienation those lands which were not being exploited by the owners themselves. Then the party of people's freedom supported the formation of local committees, which at a given time were to ascertain what lands should be subject to compulsory alienation, what should not be subject to it, and how much land the peasants needed to be satisfied. These committees were composed in such a way that half the members should be peasants and half non-peasants. [Speak out, Mr. Berezovsky, don't be ashamed! The truth can't be hidden anyhow: thanks to the obligatory appointment of a "neutral" chairman by the landlords' government, the landlords would always have a safe majority in the committees over the peasants—see Kutler's draft in Volume II of the Cadet *Agrarian Question*.] In view of this, the general concrete work in the localities, would of course have made it clear how much land was available for compulsory

alienation, how much land the peasants needed and, finally, the peasants themselves would see how far their just demands could be satisfied. Then all this would go through the Duma and the Council of State [just so!] and after being dealt with by them [i.e., after a second whittling-down of the "reform" by the new landlord-bureaucrat majority!] would pass up for the royal sanction [recall the consistent reduction of the size of allotments by similar high authorities in 1861]. The result of this systematic work would undoubtedly have been the genuine satisfaction of the real needs of the population and, linked with this, pacification and preservation of cultured estates, which the party of people's freedom never wished to destroy, except in case of extreme necessity" (143).

Mr. Berezovsky in October 1908 admitted *everything* the Bolsheviks had said in the summer of 1906 about the Cadets' Land Bill! In the First Duma the Cadets were publicly advertising the democratic exterior of their reform, while proving in private conversations with Trepov and his hangers-on its favourable character for the landlords. In the Third Duma the Cadets publicly advertise the landlord character of their reform, while demonstrating its democratic character in conversations held secretly from the police with those few simpletons who can still listen to grandmother's tales. The two-faced Janus turns his "faces" now one way, now another, according to the direction from which the wind blows. The "democrats" fall so low that they try to prove to the Black-Hundred diehards how inoffensive their actions and programmes are at a time of revolution!

Compare with this the speeches of the peasants. Take a typical Right-wing peasant, Storchak. He begins his speech by repeating in full the words of Nicholas II about "the sacred rights of property", the impermissibility of their "infringement", etc. He continues: "May God grant the Emperor health. He spoke well for the whole people" (295). And he finishes: "But if His Majesty said that there should be justice and order, then, of course, if I am sitting on 3 dessiatines of land, and next to me there are 30,000 dessiatines, that is not order and justice" (296)! Compare this monarchist with the monarchist Berezovsky. One is

an ignorant peasant, the other an educated almost-European. The first is as innocent as a babe unborn and amazingly ignorant politically. The link between the monarchy and "order", i.e., the disorder and injustice which protect the owners of 30,000 dessiatines, is not clear to him. The second is a skilled politician who knows all the ins and outs to Witte, Trepov, Stolypin and Co., and who has studied the niceties of European constitutions. The first is one of those millions who toil and moil all their life on 3 dessiatines, and whom economic realities *drive* into mass revolutionary struggle against the holders of 30,000 dessiatines. The second is one of the tens of thousands or at most one hundred thousand landlords who wants "peacefully" to keep his "cultured estate" by throwing a sop to the peasant. Is it not clear that the first *can* make a bourgeois revolution in Russia, *abolish* landlordism and set up a peasant republic (however much this word may frighten him now)? Is it not clear that the second *cannot but* hinder the struggle of the masses without which the victory of the revolution is impossible?

Those people who still cannot for the life of them understand what "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" means, should give some thought to this!

Storchak's agrarian programme is that same Land Bill of the 42 peasant deputies in the Third Duma about which we wrote in *Proletary*,* No. 22. Outwardly very modest, this Bill is *more Left* than the Cadet Bill, as the Cadets themselves admit. By demanding discussion of the reform under which the peasantry is to have land allotted to it by local committees elected by a democratic vote, this Bill *in effect* is a revolutionary document—since the discussion of land reform in the local areas by genuinely democratic elected institutions is absolutely incompatible with the maintenance in present-day Russia of the rule of the tsar and of landlordism. And the fact that, in a Black-Hundred Duma elected on the basis of an electoral law manipulated in favour of the landlords on the instructions of the united nobility, and at a time when the most violent

* See present, edition, Vol. 13, pp. 458-59.—*Ed.*

reaction and unbridled White Terror are rampant, *42 peasants* put their signatures to such a Bill in such a Duma demonstrates the revolutionary state of mind of the peasant mass in Russia of today better than any argument. Let the opportunists strive to prove the necessity of an alliance with the Cadets, the necessity of the proletariat coming closer together with the bourgeoisie in the bourgeois revolution: class-conscious workers will only be strengthened in their conviction, after reading the debates in the Third Duma, that a victorious bourgeois revolution in Russia is impossible without a joint onset by the worker and peasant masses, in spite of the waverings and betrayals of the bourgeoisie.

If Storchak, and the deputies who at bottom share his views—the priest Titov, Andreichuk, Popov IV and Nikityuk—express the revolutionary temper of the peasant mass unconsciously, spontaneously, afraid themselves not only to speak out, but even to think out what their words and proposals imply, the Trudoviks in the Third Duma express the spirit of the peasants' mass struggle outspokenly. Most valuable in this respect are the speeches of the Trudovik peasants, who state their views forthrightly, conveying the moods and aspirations of the masses with amazing precision and liveliness, mixing up programmes (some speak of their sympathy with the Bill of the 42 peasants, others of sympathy with the Cadets), but all the more strongly expressing what lies deeper than any programmes.

Take Kropotov, deputy from Vyatka Gubernia. "My electors told me that the law of November 9 is a landlords' law.... My electors put questions like this: Why is this being done by force? ... Why are our lands handed over to the rural superintendents[124]? ... The electors mandated me to say: You tell them in the Duma that we can't go on living like this.... And as soon as they start applying it [the law of November 9] in our district the new landlords, as our peasants call them, find their houses on fire" (71).... "All they care about is to reward the landlords.... Why is it in the public interest to take the last piece away from the poor man and give it to those who, as I put it, managed just by chance, under the law written by the government, to keep their land? Isn't it in the public interest that people should be forced to cultivate land that is lying idle—the

landlords' land, state, crown and monastery lands? ... 11 rubles 50 kopeks per dessiatine comes in from the peasant, and if, gentlemen, we were fair and imposed this tax equally on all, the land would really prove to be in the hands of the peasants, and no compulsory alienation would be needed. To be fair, there should be a single tax on the land, and then it will be in the hands of the working masses, and then no one will be envious: whoever doesn't want to work, won't pay" (73)....

What strength as yet untried in struggle, what a striving towards struggle is contained in this naïve speech! To avoid "compulsory alienation", Kropotov *in effect* proposes a measure which is tantamount to *confiscation* of the landed estates and nationalisation of *all* the land! That the "single tax" which this adherent of Henry George[125] proposes is tantamount to nationalisation of all the land, Kropotov does not realise; but that he is expressing the true aspirations of *millions*—of this there can be no shadow of doubt.

Take deputy Rozhkov, who begins by saying: "It is difficult for me, a village muzhik, gentlemen, to speak from this rostrum" (77). "The peasants expected from the Duma not the law of November 9, not a law which divides amongst us land we haven't got, but a law under which first our plots of land would have increased, and then division would have begun. The main principles of such a law were submitted on February 20, signed by 47 peasants, but up till now nothing has been done about it.... The rural superintendents are bosses of the land ... but the real masters of that land are tied down by a reinforced state of security.... We have no definite law in the country for purchase of land in order to make use of it ... which would say: don't buy it for use.... And lo and behold, on September 16, 1907, the Stavropol land committee decided that land could be bought only by a man possessing draught animals and agricultural implements. And here, gentlemen, in this very building, nearly half are landlords holding in bondage these men whom the land committee won't allow to buy land. Gentlemen, we know that these people are working for 60-70 rubles a year.... This poor toiler is doomed for ever to be a worker for the landlord, an eternal drudge for other

people, while behind his back his master will consider himself a cultured person."

Tomilov: "The only way out ... in our opinion, is this: the land should be redistributed at once, in all the village communes of Russia, on the basis of a census similar to those previously carried out; this census should establish the number of male persons as on November 3, 1905.

"The fond dream of the peasant is to get land and freedom, but we have heard that so long as the present government is in power, landed property is inviolable. (*Voices in the Centre*: "*Private property*.") Yes, private, noblemen's property. (*Voices in the Centre*: "*And yours too*.") As far as we are concerned, we are prepared to give up our allotments [there it is, the peasant *Vendée*, with which the so wise Plekhanov and Co. were frightening us at Stockholm, in the event that all the land was nationalised[126]!]. I will say that the peasants in any village are willing to give up their allotments, unit for unit, and to become equal. The statement of the representative of the Ministry amounts to this, that so long as power has not passed into the hands of the peasantry and the people generally, the peasants will not see either the land or political liberties. Thank you for your frankness, though we knew it already" (149)....

"And in 1905, when, under the leadership of the conscious elements, the peasants united together (*noise and laughter on the Right*) and said their grim word ... then the nobility began to say 'Why, you've got land, you've got your allotments. Go and divide up that little bone...'."

Petrov III: "Remember, gentlemen, the times of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, and the protest of the peasant people which expressed itself in the movement under the leadership of Razin[127] (*voices on the Right*: "*Oho!*")....

The people most strongly expressed its demands in 1905. Then, too, poverty made the people come out into the streets and say their imperious say about what they needed" (187)....

"All the land must pass into equalised tenure of all the people.... I am of course an opponent of private property in land [the Vendée predicted by Plekhanov positively begins to extend!] and I say that the working people will not get an easier time until all the land passes into their hands" (204).... "I am absolutely convinced you will see once again

the depths of the sea of life disturbed. And then the saying of the Testament will come true: he who lifts the sword shall perish by the sword (*laughter on the Right*). The Trudovik group has not changed its ideals and has not changed its aspirations.... We ... say: all the land to those who work on it, and all power to the working people!" (206).

Merzlyakov: "The land must belong to those who till it.... Only there mustn't be any land racket in Russia, and the land should belong to those who till it by their own labour" (207). And so on.

Lack of space obliges us to quote no more. We shall mention only the names of the speakers who expressed the same ideas less clearly and strongly: Kondratyev, the priest Popov II, Bulat, Volkov II, Dzióbiński, Lachnicki (the last two making official statements on behalf of the Trudovik group).

What conclusions in relation to the agrarian programme of Social-Democracy follow from this attitude of the peasant deputies? All are agreed that the peasants invest the struggle against the feudal latifundia and all the survivals of serfdom with the utopias of petty-bourgeois socialism. This is expressed in the concluding section of our agrarian programme which was drafted by the Bolsheviks and accepted at Stockholm by the Mensheviks (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress).

But the question does not end there. Division of the land, municipalisation, nationalisation are all bourgeois-democratic reforms; but what system should the Social-Democrats support? Municipalisation, answer the Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov, since they got this programme adopted at Stockholm. Nationalisation of the peasant lands would arouse a Vendée, the Mensheviks flatly declared at Stockholm.

Since then, peasant deputies from all over Russia have spoken in three Dumas. Not a single group of peasant deputies has been won over to "municipalisation", which was invented specially in order "not to touch" the peasant lands. *All* the peasant Trudoviks in all three Dumas declared for nationalisation of all the land, expressing this demand sometimes by directly repeating the Trudoviks' programme, sometimes by an original restating of the "single tax",

sometimes by numerous declarations that "the land should go to those who till it", "we are prepared to give up our allotments", etc.

Real life has made a joke of "municipalisation" and the outcry about a "Vendée".

What is the economic basis for the supporting of nationalisation by all politically-conscious peasants? To answer this question, let us recall a statistical comparison made in the Duma by Comrade Belousov[128];

"Some 76 million dessiatines belong to 30,000 landlords (in European Russia), while 73 million dessiatines belong to 10 million peasant households with an allotment of 1 to 15 dessiatines.... There is only one conclusion possible—that four-fifths of the total number of households could double the size of their holding" (209). Even if one or other of these figures is challenged (we think that they cannot be challenged), no alteration in them can affect the crux of the matter, which is the following. In striving to double their holdings, the peasants cannot but strive for the complete fusion and mixing-up of allotment and non-allotment lands. The preservation of allotment lands as private property, the property as at present of the peasant households and communes, while the expropriated non-allotment lands are declared social ("municipal") property is an economic absurdity. It is the most stupid agrarian bimetallism, suited only for taking up space in programmes invented by intellectuals. The economy requires the fusion and mixing up of all lands. The economy is already uniting bits of allotment land with bits of landlords' land (by leasehold); and the elimination of feudalism is impossible without eliminating those distinctions in landowning, those bounds and barriers, which "municipalisation" artificially perpetuates. The economy requires a new landowning, a free landowning adapted to capitalism and not to the old "allotments", distributed and demarcated by bailiffs and official agents. This requirement of economic development is what the peasants express (without realising the capitalist nature of this development) when they declare for nationalisation. The old distinction of allotment and non-allotment landowning contradicts the requirements of capitalism, and it will inevitably be broken down, despite all the efforts of the

Menshevik municipalisers to prop it up. And the breaking-down of this barrier, the amalgamation, the mixing up, the fusion of all categories of lands for the new economy of the farmer, requires the abolition not only of landlords' property, but of all private property in land (the peasants think mistakenly that any citizen will till the soil; it will be tilled by every master, i.e., by the one who has the means to do it!).

Stolypin wants to wipe out all previous barriers of all previous forms of landowning. This desire is economically correct. Capitalism will inevitably put it into effect. The question is only whether this will be done at the expense of millions of peasant households (robbery under the law of November 9) or at the expense of the 30,000 biggest landlords. The latter method is impossible without nationalisation of the land in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. That is why in all the three Dumas all politically-conscious peasants supported nationalisation.

It remains for us to examine the speeches of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma. Only two speakers of our group managed to speak (Gegechkori and Belousov) before a time limit was introduced. The others began refusing to speak, protesting against the "act of force" expressed in this restriction. Both the comrades mentioned did their duty properly. They pointed out the "aristocratic-bureaucratic spirit" of the government's policy; they said that the "statute of 1861 was feudalistic through and through"; that "hatred of the government" had sunk deep into the soul of the peasantry, which was demanding "land and freedom", and which had displayed in 1905 its "solidarity" and its capacity for "revolutionary action". Our Social-Democratic struggle for "confiscation of the latifundia and their transfer to the people" was correctly interpreted by the speakers of our Party, not in the spirit of petty-bourgeois utopias about "equalisation", "socialisation" and so forth, but as a measure to free the country from the yoke of serf-like bondage. The way Gegechkori and Belousov put the question was the way of a revolutionary Social-Democrat. "Might creates Right," concluded Comrade Belousov, "and in order to win Right we must gather our forces and organise them." Both speeches by the Social-Democratic spokesmen in the Third Duma

should be kept for handy reference by every member of the Party who carries on the work of propaganda and agitation. The formula for handing over the land proposed by the Social-Democratic group missed out only the demand that the land should be transferred without compensation. This would have been an important breach of our programme if it had been done deliberately. But Comrade Gegechkori, who read the formula, mentioned twice in his speech the necessity of "alienation without compensation"; therefore the omission can hardly be regarded as deliberate.

Proletary, No. 40,
December 1 (14), 1908
Signed: *N. L.*

Published according
to the text in *Proletary*

THE FIFTH (ALL-RUSSIAN) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[129]

DECEMBER 21-27, 1908 (JANUARY 3-9, 1909)

THE FIFTH (ALL-RUSSIAN) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[129]

DECEMBER 21-27, 1908 (JANUARY 3-9, 1909)

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PRESENT MOMENT AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY

The present political situation is characterised by the following features:

(a) The old feudal autocracy is evolving towards a bourgeois monarchy which covers up absolutism by sham constitutional forms. The alliance of tsarism with the Black-Hundred landlords and the top commercial and industrial bourgeoisie has been openly solidified and recognised by the coup d'état of June 3 and the establishment of the Third Duma. Having of necessity finally taken the path of the capitalist development of Russia, and striving to keep to a path which would preserve the power and the revenues of the feudalist landlords, the autocracy is manoeuvring between that class and the representatives of capital. Their petty disputes are made use of for the maintenance of absolutism, which together with these classes is carrying on a furious counter-revolutionary struggle against the socialist proletariat and the democratic peasantry, who displayed their strength in the recent mass struggle.

(b) The agrarian policy of present-day tsarism is distinguished by the same bourgeois-Bonapartist character. Tsarism has lost all faith in the naïve devotion of the peasant masses to the monarchy. It seeks an alliance with the rich peasants, to whom it has given a free hand to plunder the countryside. The autocracy is making frantic efforts to break up all communal allotment landowning as speedily as possible, and to consolidate purely private landowning. Such a policy makes all the contradictions of capitalism in the countryside a hundred times more acute, and hastens

the division of the countryside into an insignificant minority of reactionaries and a revolutionary mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians.

(c) The liberal bourgeoisie headed by the Cadet Party, having taken the counter-revolutionary path at the very first mass actions in the revolution, continues to pursue that path, coming still closer to the Octobrists, and by its tsarist nationalist agitation—which expresses the growth of self-consciousness of the bourgeoisie as a class—is in fact doing a service to absolutism and the feudal-minded landlords.

(d) The peasant masses, as even their restricted and distorted representation in the Third Duma shows continue —in spite of all the persecutions of the democratic element in the countryside—to remain, all their wavering notwithstanding, on the side of a revolutionary-democratic agrarian upheaval which, by completely abolishing landlordism, would thereby ensure the most rapid, large-scale and free-development of productive forces in a capitalist Russia. The law of November 9 only hastens the division of the peasant masses into irreconcilably hostile and politically-conscious forces.

(e) The proletariat has sustained, and continues to sustain, the heaviest blows of all, both from the autocracy and from the rapidly uniting and aggressive capitalists. In spite of this, the proletariat in comparison with other classes preserves the greatest unity and the greatest loyalty to its class party, with which it was fused by the revolution. The proletariat is continuing the struggle for its class interests and deepening its socialist class-consciousness, remaining the only class capable of giving consistent leadership to a new revolutionary struggle.

(f) On the whole it is beyond doubt that the objective problems of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia remain unsolved. The continuing economic crisis, unemployment and famines prove that the latest policy of the autocracy cannot provide the conditions for the capitalist development of Russia. This policy inevitably leads to the deepening of the conflict between the democratic masses and the master classes, the growth of discontent among new sections of the population, the sharpening and deepening

of the political struggle between the different classes. In such an economic and political situation a new revolutionary crisis is inevitably coming to a head.

(g) The general sharpening of struggle on the world market due mainly to the changes in the industrial situation of Western Europe in the direction of a crisis, which has in 1908 taken the form of a depression, and due to the revolutionary movements in the East which herald the formation of national capitalist states, is intensifying competition, leading to more frequent international conflicts, thereby sharpening the class contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and making the general international situation more and more revolutionary.

Considering this state of affairs, the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. recognises that the principal tasks of the Party at the present time are:

(1) To explain to the mass of the people the meaning and importance of the latest policy of the autocracy and the role of the socialist proletariat which, while pursuing a class policy of its own, must give leadership to the democratic peasantry in the present political situation and in the coming revolutionary struggle.

(2) To thoroughly study and widely popularise the experience of mass struggle in 1905-07, which has provided indispensable lessons in revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics.

(3) To strengthen the R.S.D.L.P. in the form it was built up during the revolutionary epoch; to maintain the traditions of its unfaltering struggle, both against the autocracy and reactionary classes and against bourgeois liberalism; to struggle against deviations from revolutionary Marxism and against attempts, revealed among certain elements of the Party who had fallen under the influence of disintegration, to whittle down the slogans of the R.S.D.L.P. and to liquidate the illegal organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.

At the same time it should be borne in mind that only by promoting the transfer of Party functions to Social-Democratic workers themselves—a process which is already definitely materialising—and only by setting up and consolidating illegal Party organisations can the Party emerge on the right path of development.

(4) To assist in every way possible the economic struggle of the working class, in accordance with the resolutions of the London and Stuttgart Congresses.

(5) To use the Duma and the Duma rostrum for revolutionary Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation.

(6) First among immediate tasks comes prolonged effort to train up, organise and unite the class-conscious masses of the proletariat. Then, subordinated to this task, the work of organisation should be extended to the peasantry and the army, particularly in the form of printed propaganda and agitation—principal attention being given to the socialist education of the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements among the peasantry and in the army.

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early January 1909

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2

DIRECTIVES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATION

Whereas the draft resolutions submitted, and the debates on the question of organisation, have clearly revealed two basic tendencies in the R.S.D.L.P. on the question of the main direction in which the present organisational policy in general is to move,

the Conference instructs the Committee to base its work on the principles of that tendency which recognises that, for work among the masses—which remains as before the fundamental task of Social-Democracy—attention must be focussed on building up and strengthening the illegal Party organisation; and that only under the unfaltering influence of this organisation can all work among the masses, all control of the Duma group, all the activity of the Party around the Duma group, all use of legal and semi-legal organisations, be properly arranged, without any debasing of the class aims of Social-Democracy.

Written on December 24, 1908
January 6, 1909

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3

PRACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS ON VOTING FOR THE BUDGET BY THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

FIRST VARIANT

Voting for the Budget as a whole is declared wrong in principle. The Conference is of the opinion that, as regards voting for particular items in the Budget, the Duma group should be guided by the principle of our programme that Social-Democrats firmly reject reforms involving tutelage of the police and the bureaucracy over the working classes. Therefore the general rule should be to vote against particular items of the Budget, for they nearly always bring in their train not only such tutelage but also downright coercion by the Black-Hundred reactionaries. In cases where some improvement of the conditions of the working people seems likely in spite of these circumstances, it is recommended that the deputies should abstain from voting, but should without fail make a statement setting forth the socialist position. Lastly, in those exceptional cases when the group deems it necessary to vote for a particular item, it is recommended that they should not do so without consulting representatives of the Central Committee and, if possible, the Party organisations in the capital cities.

SECOND VARIANT

On the question of the Budget the Conference considers that on principle it is wrong to vote for the Budget as a whole.

It is also wrong to vote for items of the Budget of the class state which sanction expenditure on instruments for the oppression of the masses (the armed forces, etc.)

In voting for reforms or for items of expenditure for cultural purposes, point of departure should be the principle of our programme that Social-Democrats reject reforms involving tutelage of the police and the bureaucracy over the working classes.

Therefore the general rule should be to vote against the so-called reforms and items of expenditure for so-called cultural purposes introduced in the Third Duma.

In special cases where, in spite of the general conditions, some improvement of the conditions of the working people is no more than probable, it is recommended that the deputies should abstain from voting and state their reasons for doing so.

Lastly, in exceptional cases, where there is no doubt that the workers will benefit, it is permissible to vote for a particular item, but it is recommended that the deputies should consult representatives of the Central Committee and Party and trade union bodies.

Written December 25-26, 1908 (January 7-8, 1909)

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First variant is published according to the pamphlet. Second variant is published according to the manuscript verified with the pamphlet

4

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION ON "THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA"

... at the same time recognises that the blame for the group's deviations does not rest on the group alone, for it has to work in the extremely difficult conditions of a reactionary Duma, but is shared to some extent by all the organisations of the Party and its Central Committee, which have not by far yet done all that was necessary and possible to organise the Party's work in the Duma on proper lines ...

Written December 25-26, 1908 (January 7-8, 1909)

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5

STATEMENT BY THE BOLSHEVIKS[130]

STATEMENT OF FACTS

With reference to Dan's statement about agreements between groups within the Bolsheviks' ranks, we place on record that our agreements are between Party people working within the Party and writing in the Party organs, whereas the Mensheviks, both in their resolution and in all their activities, enter into agreements between Party people and non-Party people who secretly work against the Party, liquidate it and carry on a policy of opportunism without precedent in any European Social-Democratic Party.

Written December 26, 1908 (January 8, 1909)

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany* XXV

Published according to the manuscript

HOW THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES SUM UP THE REVOLUTION AND HOW THE REVOLUTION HAS SUMMED THEM UP

We have often had occasion during the past year (1908) to discuss the current situation and trends among the bourgeois democrats in Russia. We have noted the attempts made with the aid of the Trudoviks to restore the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (*Proletary*, No. 32*); we have described the democratic stand taken by the peasantry and their representatives on the agrarian and other questions (*Proletary*, Nos. 21 and 40**); and we have shown by examples quoted from *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* the amazingly shallow thinking of the Socialist-Revolutionary group, which imagines that it is ultra-revolutionary (*Proletary*, No. 32). To make the picture complete we must now examine the official publications of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In 1908, four issues of *Znamya Truda* were published (Nos. 9 to 13, No. 10-11 being a double number***), and a special Report from the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party on the First Party Conference and the fourth meeting of the Party Council, both held abroad last August. Let us examine this material.

"The party," say the S.R. Central Committee in their Report, "was faced with the task of summing up the results of that period of the great Russian revolution, now over, during which the town proletariat was the principal and

* See pp. 148-58 of this volume.—*Ed*.

** See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 440-46 and the present volume, pp. 303-317.

*** Unfortunately the editorial office of *Proletary* was unable to obtain No. 12.

often almost the sole actor." That is very well said. It is a true statement of the case most unusual for the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Five lines further down, however, we read: "The triumph of the counter-revolution has merely strikingly confirmed the truth, which we never doubted from the very outset, that a successful Russian revolution will either be the work of a mighty alliance of the forces of the town proletariat and those of the toiling peasantry, or will not be brought about at all. So far this alliance has existed only as an idea, embodied in the Socialist-Revolutionary programme which was brought into being by the realities of Russian life. It scarcely began to come into existence. Its rebirth is a matter for the future...."

Now see how long the Socialist-Revolutionaries were able to stick to the truth! Anyone who is in the slightest degree familiar with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic programmes knows that they differ radically in the following: 1) the Social-Democrats declared the Russian revolution to be a *bourgeois* revolution; the Socialist-Revolutionaries denied this; 2) the Social-Democrats maintained that the proletariat and the peasantry were *distinct classes* in capitalist (or semi-feudal, semi-capitalist) society; that the peasantry is a class of petty *proprietors* that can "strike together" against the landlords and the autocracy, "on the same side of the barricades" with the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, and that in *this* revolution it can, in certain cases, march in "alliance" with the proletariat, while remaining quite a separate class of capitalist society. The Socialist-Revolutionaries denied this. The main *idea* in their programme was not that an "alliance of the forces" of the proletariat and the peasantry was necessary, but that there was *no class gulf* between them, that no class distinction should be drawn between them, and that the Social-Democratic idea concerning the petty-bourgeois character of the peasantry, as distinct from the proletariat, is utterly false.

And now the Socialist-Revolutionaries are trying to slur over these two radical differences between the Social-Democrat and the Socialist-Revolutionary programmes with glib specious phrases! From the way these gentlemen sum up the revolution one would think that there had been no

revolution and no Socialist-Revolutionary programme. But, my dear sirs, there was a Socialist-Revolutionary programme, and the whole difference between it and the programme of the Social-Democrats was that the fundamental, theoretical section of the former was based on the denial of the petty-bourgeois character of the peasantry, the denial of any class distinction between the peasantry and the proletariat. There was a revolution, my dear sirs, and the chief lesson it taught was that in their open mass actions the peasantry displayed a class nature of their own, distinct from that of the proletariat, and proved themselves to be petty-bourgeois.

You pretend that you have not noticed this. You do see it, but are merely trying to ignore an unpleasant fact revealed by the revolution. You acted, not "in alliance" with the Trudoviks, but completely merged with them—and this at crucial moments when the open revolution reached its climax—the autumn of 1905 and the summer of 1906. The legal organs of the press at that time were Socialist-Revolutionary-Trudovik organs. Even when the Trudovik and Popular Socialist groups were formed, you were not in alliance, but in a bloc, i.e., practically merged with them in the elections to the Second Duma and in the Second Duma itself. Unlike the programme of the Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, your own programme *suffered defeat* in all the open and truly mass actions of the representatives of the peasantry. Both in the First and in the Second Dumas the overwhelming majority of the peasant deputies adopted the agrarian programme of the *Trudoviks* and *not* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves, in their purely Socialist-Revolutionary publications, from the end of 1906 onwards, were obliged to admit that as a political trend the Trudoviks were *petty-bourgeois*, that underlying this trend were the "private-property instincts" of small proprietors (see the articles written by Mr. Vikhlayev and other Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Popular Socialists).

The question arises, whom do the Socialist-Revolutionaries wish to deceive by "summing up the results" of the revolution and *concealing* the fundamental and most important result in the process?

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Why did the peasantry during the revolution form into a separate political party (or group)—the Trudovik party? Why did the Trudoviks and not the Socialist-Revolutionaries become the party of the peasant masses during the revolution? If the Socialist-Revolutionaries think this was accidental, it's no good talking about either results or programmes, for then instead of results and programmes we get chaos. If it was not accidental, but a result of the fundamental economic relations in modern society, then the correctness of the principal and cardinal point in the programme of the Russian Social-Democrats has been *proved by history*. The revolution has drawn in practice the class distinction between the peasantry and the proletariat that we Social-Democrats have always drawn in theory. The revolution has proved conclusively that a party, which aspires to be a mass party, a class party, in Russia, must *either* be Social-Democratic *or* Trudovik; for it is these, and only these, two trends that the masses themselves clearly marked out by their open actions during the most important and crucial moments. As the events of 1905-07 have proved, intermediate groups were never able to merge with the masses at any time or on any issue. And this also proved the bourgeois character of our revolution. Not a single historian, not a single sane politician, can now deny that the political forces in Russia are divided primarily between the socialist proletariat and the petty-bourgeois democratic peasantry.

"The alliance of the forces of the town proletariat and those of the toiling peasantry ... has so far existed only as an idea." This is an utterly confused and false phrase. The alliance of proletarian and peasant forces has not been merely an "idea", nor did it "scarcely begin to come into existence"; it was a characteristic feature of the whole of the first period of the Russian revolution, of all the great events of 1905-07. The October strike and the December insurrection on the one hand, the local peasant risings and the mutinies of soldiers and sailors on the other, represented that very "alliance of the forces" of the proletariat and the peasantry. It was unorganised, inchoate, often unconscious. The forces were inadequately organised, dispersed, without a central leadership that was really capable of leading,

and so forth. But it was undoubtedly an "alliance of the forces" of the proletariat and the peasantry, the main forces which breached the ramparts of the old autocracy. Unless this fact is understood, it is impossible to understand the "results" of the Russian revolution. The flaw in the conclusion drawn by the Socialist-Revolutionaries is that they say "*trudovoye*"* instead of *Trudovik* peasantry. This slight, negligible difference, a seemingly imperceptible difference, actually reveals the gulf that lies between the pre-revolutionary dreams of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the reality that the revolution finally brought to light.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have *always* used the term *trudovoye* peasantry. The revolution revealed the political physiognomy of the present-day Russian peasantry and has proved it to be a *Trudovik* trend. In that case the Socialist-Revolutionaries were right, you will say? That is not so. History in its irony has preserved and perpetuated the Socialist-Revolutionaries' *term*, but gave it the *connotation* that was predicted by the Social-Democrats. On the moot question as to the petty-bourgeois nature of the labouring peasantry, the history of the revolution has shared the honours between us and the Socialist-Revolutionaries as follows: to them it gave the *word* and to us the *substance*. The labouring peasants, whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries lauded to the skies *before* the revolution, proved *during* the revolution to be such *Trudoviks* that the Socialist-Revolutionaries *had* to disown them! And we Social-Democrats can and *must* now prove that the peasantry is petty-bourgeois not only by using the analysis given in Marx's *Capital*,[131] not only by quotations from the Erfurt Programme,[132] not only by facts and figures from the economic researches of the Narodniks and from Zemstvo statistics, but by the behaviour of the peasantry in the Russian revolution in general and the facts concerning the composition and activities of the *Trudoviks* in particular.

No. We have nothing to complain of the way history has shared the honours between us and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

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* i.e., labouring.—*Ed.*

Znamya Truda, No. 13, p. 3, says: "Had the otzovists succeeded in turning the Social-Democrats back to their extreme militant principles, we would have lost some useful material for polemics, but we would have acquired an ally in consistent militant tactics." And a couple of lines earlier it says: "The struggle for freedom and socialism would only stand to gain if the Left wing took the lead both among the Cadets and among the Social-Democrats."

Very good, Messieurs Socialist-Revolutionaries! You want to pay compliments to our "otzovists" and "Lefts". Allow us, then, to return compliment for compliment. Permit us, too, to avail ourselves of "useful material for polemics".

"Let a number of parties, including the Cadets, Trudoviks and Social-Democrats, support the fiction that a constitutional system exists by their participation in the pasteboard travesty of a Duma" (*Znamya Truda*, ibid.).

So the Third Duma is a pasteboard travesty. This phrase alone is more than sufficient to show the abysmal ignorance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Most esteemed directors of the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Third Duma is much *less* a pasteboard institution than the First and the Second Dumas were! Your failure to grasp this simple fact only confirms the correctness of what *Proletary* said about you in its article "Parliamentary Cretinism Inside Out". You are repeating word for word the common delusion of the vulgar bourgeois democrats, who try to persuade themselves and others that bad, reactionary Dumas are pasteboard institutions, while good, progressive Dumas are not.

As a matter of fact, the First and Second Dumas were pasteboard swords in the hands of the liberal-bourgeois intellectuals who wanted to scare the autocracy a little with the threat of revolution. The Third Duma is a real, not a pasteboard, sword in the hands of the autocracy and the counter-revolution. The First and Second Dumas were pasteboard Dumas because their decisions did not reflect the actual balance of material forces in the struggle of the classes in society, and were mere hollow words. The importance of these two Dumas lay in the fact that behind the front row of Cadet constitutional buffoons were clearly seen the

real representatives of that democratic peasantry and that socialist proletariat who were really making the revolution, fighting the enemy in an open mass struggle, but had not yet been able to crush him. The Third Duma is not a pasteboard Duma, for the simple reason that its decisions reflect the actual balance of material forces brought about by the temporary victory of the counter-revolution and are, therefore, not mere words but words converted into action. The importance of this Duma lies in the fact that it has given all the politically undeveloped elements of the people an object-lesson, showing the relation between representative institutions and the actual possession of state power. Representative institutions, even the most "progressive", are doomed to remain pasteboard institutions so long as the classes represented in them do not possess real state power. Representative institutions, however reactionary they may be, are not pasteboard if the classes represented in them do possess real state power.

To call the Third Duma a pasteboard travesty is an example of the extreme shallowness and extravagant revolutionary phrase-mongering that have so long been the specific distinguishing feature and the chief quality of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Let us proceed. Is it true that the Third Duma is "the fiction of a constitutional system"? No, it is not. Only people ignorant of the elementary principles taught by Lassalle nearly half a century ago could say a thing like that in an official party paper. What does a constitution mean, most worthy members of that elementary propaganda circle known as the Socialist-Revolutionary Party? Does it mean that more "freedom" and better conditions of life exist for the "toiling people" with a constitution than without one? No, only the vulgar democrats think that. The essence of a constitution is that the fundamental laws of the state in general, and the laws governing elections to and the powers of the representative institutions, etc., express the actual relation of forces in the class struggle. A constitution is fictitious when law and reality diverge; it is not fictitious when they coincide. The constitution of Russia in the period of the Third Duma is *less* fictitious than it was in the periods of the First and Second Dumas. If this

conclusion arouses your ire, Messieurs "Socialists"-"Revolutionaries", it is because you do not understand what a constitution is, and cannot tell the difference between a fictitious and a class constitution. A constitution can be a Black-Hundred, landlords' and reactionary constitution, and yet be less fictitious than some "liberal" constitutions.

The trouble with the Socialist-Revolutionaries is that they are ignorant of Marx's historical materialism and Marx's dialectical method; they are wholly under the spell of vulgar bourgeois-democratic ideas. For them a constitution is not a new field, a new form of the class struggle, but an abstract blessing like the "legality", the "law and order", the "general good" of the liberal professors, and so on and so forth. In reality autocracy, constitutional monarchy and republic are merely different forms of class struggle; and the dialectics of history are such that each of these forms passes through different stages of development of its class content, and the transition from one form to another does not (in itself) at all eliminate the rule of the former exploiting classes under the new integument. For instance, the Russian autocracy of the seventeenth century with its Boyar Council and boyar aristocracy bears no resemblance to the autocracy of the eighteenth century with its bureaucracy, its ranks and orders of society, and its occasional periods of "enlightened absolutism"; while both differ sharply from the autocracy of the nineteenth century, which was compelled to emancipate the peasants "from above", although pauperising them in the process, paving the way for capitalism, introducing the principle of local representative institutions for the bourgeoisie. By the twentieth century this last form of semi-feudal, semi-patriarchal absolutism had also become obsolete. Owing to the growth of capitalism and the increase in the power of the bourgeoisie, etc., it became necessary to introduce representative institutions on a national scale. The revolutionary struggle of 1905 became particularly acute around the issue as to who was to convene the first all-Russian representative institution, and how. The December defeat settled this question in favour of the old monarchy; and in these circumstances the constitution could be nothing else than a Black-Hundred and Octobrist one.

In a new field, under institutions of the Bonapartist monarchy, at a higher stage of political development, the struggle is again beginning with the effort to overthrow the old enemy, the Black-Hundred monarchy. Can a socialist party refuse to make use in this struggle of the new representative institutions? The Socialist-Revolutionaries have not even the wit to pose such a question: they make shift with phrases, and nothing but phrases. Listen to this:

> "At the present time we have no parliamentary channels of struggle—we have only non-parliamentary channels. This conviction must become deep-rooted everywhere, and we must relentlessly fight everything that prevents it from becoming so. Let us concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle!"

This Socialist-Revolutionary argument is based on the celebrated subjective method in sociology. Let the conviction become deep-rooted—and the trick is done! It never occurs to the subjectivists that convictions as to whether particular channels are available or not must be tested by objective facts. But let us look at the Report and the resolutions of the conference of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. We read: "...The sombre lull of the hard times, or rather, the time of social stagnation we are now passing through" (p. 4) ... "the consolidation of the reactionary social forces" ... "the fact that the energy of the masses is shackled" ... "among the intellectuals, the most impressionable section of the population, we see exhaustion, ideological confusion and the ebb of forces from the revolutionary struggle" (p. 6), and so on, and so forth. "In view of all this, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party must ... (b) disapprove, for tactical reasons, of schemes for partial mass actions which under present conditions may result in the fruitless waste of popular energy" (p. 7).

Who are the "*we*" in "we have only non-parliamentary channels of struggle"? Obviously a handful of terrorists, for none of the tirades quoted here contains even a hint of the *mass* struggle. "*The fact that the energy of the masses is shackled*" ... and "concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle"—this simple contrast shows us yet once

more how historically true it was to call the Socialist-Revolutionaries revolutionary adventurists.* Is it not adventurism for people to indulge in catchy phrases about concentrating on means of struggle which they themselves admit the masses are at present unable to apply? Is this not the old, old psychology of the intellectual in despair?

"Let us concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle." This slogan was correct in one of the most remarkable periods of the Russian revolution, the autumn of 1905. In repeating it uncritically at the present juncture the Socialist-Revolutionaries are acting like the hero of the popular fable who would persist in shouting the most inappropriate greetings. You have not understood, my dear sirs, *why* the boycott slogan was correct in the autumn of 1905, and in repeating it now, uncritically, unthinkingly, like a catchword learned off by heart, you are displaying, not revolutionariness, but just plain foolishness.

In the autumn of 1905 nobody said anything about "the fact that the energy of the masses was shackled". On the contrary, all parties agreed that the energy of the masses was seething. At that moment, the old regime offered a consultative parliament, obviously with the intention of splitting these seething forces and appeasing them, if only for a moment. At that time the slogan: "Concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle", was not the stock-phrase of a handful of ranters, but the battle-cry of men who really were at the head of the masses, at the head of millions of fighting workers and peasants. The fact that these millions responded to the call proved that the slogan was *objectively correct*, and that it expressed not merely the "convictions" of a handful of revolutionaries, but the actual situation, the temper and the initiative of the masses. Only ridiculous pedlars of politics can repeat this slogan and in the same breath say that "the energy of the masses is shackled".

And, since we have mentioned the ridiculous, we simply must quote the following gem from *Znamya Truda*. "Let us leave it [the government] tête-à-tête in the Duma with the Black Hundreds and with the party that obeys the latest

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 184-205.—*Ed.*

government order,* and take our word for it that if ever these spiders are capable of devouring each other, this is the very situation in which they will do so”.... This “take our word for it” is inimitable and positively disarms an opponent. “Take our word for it”, reader, that the leading articles in *Znamya Truda* are being written by a really sweet Socialist-Revolutionary school miss, who sincerely believes that the “spiders” will begin to “devour each other” if the opposition withdraws from the Third Duma.

The clause concerning the Cadets in the resolution on our attitude towards the non-proletarian parties adopted at the London Congress was most severely criticised by the Mensheviks. Scarcely less severe was their criticism of the clause which deals with the Narodnik or Trudovik parties. The Mensheviks tried to prove that we were indulgent with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or were covering up certain sins which Marxists had long ago proved they were guilty of, and so forth. There were two reasons for the Mensheviks’ vehemence on these points. One of them was their fundamental disagreement with us in our appraisal of the Russian revolution. The Mensheviks insist that the proletariat must make the revolution together with the Cadets, and not with the Trudovik peasantry against the Cadets. On the other hand, the Mensheviks don’t understand that the open action of the masses and classes in the revolution has changed the situation and, in some cases, the character of the parties. Before the revolution the Socialist-Revolutionaries were *only* a group of intellectuals with Narodnik ideas. Would this description be correct after the revolution, or even after 1906? Obviously not. Only those who have learned nothing from the revolution can uphold the old view formulated in this way.

The revolution has *proved* that this group of intellectuals with Narodnik ideas are the extreme Left *wing* of an exceedingly broad and undoubtedly mass Narodnik or Trudovik trend, which expressed the interests and point of view of the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution. This

* Meaning the Octobrists.—*Ed.*

has been proved by the peasant insurrections, by the Peasant Union, by the Trudovik group in three Dumas, and by the free press of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks. But the Mensheviks have failed to understand this. They regard the Socialist-Revolutionaries from a *doctrinaire* point of view: like doctrinaires, they see the flaws in other people's doctrines, but do not see what real interests of real masses, which are a driving force in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, are expressed or concealed by those doctrines. The Socialist-Revolutionary doctrine is pernicious, fallacious, reactionary, adventurist, petty-bourgeois—cry the Mensheviks. Not one step further, not one word more; all else is the work of the devil.

Now that is where *your* mistake begins, we say to the Mensheviks. True, the Socialist-Revolutionary doctrine is pernicious, fallacious, reactionary, adventurist and petty-bourgeois. *But* these vices do not prevent this quasi-socialist doctrine from being the ideological vestments of a really revolutionary—and not compromising—bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in Russia. For the Socialist-Revolutionary doctrine is only a tiny rivulet in the Trudovik, i.e., peasant-democratic torrent. As soon as the open struggle of masses and classes begins, events immediately compel us all, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, to recognise the fact, to admit the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, establish closer relations with the Soviets of peasants', soldiers', post and telegraph workers', railwaymen's, etc., deputies, enter into election agreements with them against the liberals, vote with them in the Dumas against the liberals, and so forth. The revolution has not refuted our opinion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries but corroborated it. But in doing so it has not left the question in its previous shape and position; it has elevated the question to an incomparably higher plane. Previously the question was one only of comparing doctrines, ideologies and the policies of various groups; now it is a matter of comparing the historical activities of the classes and masses which follow this or a kindred ideology. Formerly the question was, is what the Socialist-Revolutionaries say correct? Are the tactics of this ideological organisation correct? Now the question has arisen, what, in effect, is the

behaviour of those sections of the people which consider themselves supporters of the Socialist-Revolutionaries or of ideas akin to theirs (the "labour principle", etc.)? The Mensheviks' error is due to their failure to understand this change that the revolution has brought about.

But apart from the reasons mentioned, this change is important also because it has strikingly revealed the relation of classes and parties. The lesson our revolution teaches is that only parties which have a definite class backing are strong and able to survive, whatever turn events may take. Open political struggle compels parties to establish closer relations with the masses, for without such ties parties are naught. Nominally, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are independent of the Trudoviks. *Actually*, however, during the revolution, they were *compelled* to join forces with the Trudoviks, on pain of being completely eliminated from the political arena. And it can safely be said that at the next rise of the revolutionary tide the Socialist-Revolutionaries (however loudly they may shout now about their complete independence) will again be obliged to join forces with the Trudoviks, or with similar organisations of the masses. The objective conditions of social life and the class struggle are more powerful than pious intentions and written programmes. From this aspect, which is the only correct one, the present rift between the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries is merely evidence of the disintegration of the petty-bourgeois movement, of the lack of steadfastness on the part of the petty bourgeoisie, who are unable to band together in adverse conditions and who "drift apart". On the one hand, we have the Trudoviks—unorganised, unsteady, wavering, without any firm political line in the Third Duma, but undoubtedly springing from the masses, connected with the masses, expressing the needs of the masses. On the other hand we have a handful of Socialist-Revolutionary "otzovists", who have no ties with the masses, who are frantic with despair, losing faith in the mass struggle (see *Revolutsionnaya Mysl*) and concentrating on terrorism. The extreme opportunism of the Trudoviks (bearing in mind the stand of the revolutionary peasantry) and the extreme, purely verbal and meaningless, revolutionariness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are two limitations of one and

the same petty-bourgeois trend, twin symptoms of the same "disease", viz., the instability of the petty bourgeoisie, their incapacity for systematic, persevering, staunch and concerted mass struggle.

These facts throw a new light on the present Duma tactics of the revolutionary parties and, in particular, on the question of otzovism. "We have no parliamentary channels of struggle," cry the boastful Socialist-Revolutionary intellectuals. Who are "we", gentlemen? Intellectuals *without the masses* have never had, and never will have, either parliamentary or non-parliamentary means of struggle of any importance. What masses followed or supported you yesterday, during the revolution? The Trudovik peasantry. Is it true that *they* have "no parliamentary means of struggle"? It is not true. Look at the debates on the agrarian question in the Third Duma. You will find that on this issue the Trudoviks undoubtedly voiced the needs of the masses. Consequently, the smart phrase of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is nothing more than empty phrase-mongering. In 1908, the peasant masses voiced *their* demands from the rostrum of the Duma, and did not engage in "non-parliamentary" action. That is a fact that no amount of "Left" screeching and the shouting of Socialist-Revolutionary-otzovist phrases can obscure.

What was the reason for this? Was it because the "conviction" that non-parliamentary channels are preferable was shaken? Nonsense. The answer is that in this period objective conditions had not yet caused widespread unrest among the masses or stirred them to direct action. If that is the case, and it certainly is so, it was the duty of every party that takes itself seriously to avail itself of *indirect* channels. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to avail themselves of such channels—and what happened? Only that the Trudoviks made a very bad job of it, made a thousand times more mistakes than they would have done had they been guided by a party; they stumbled and fell very often. Out of touch with their class, with their masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries "concentrated" on phrase-mongering; for *in practice* they did *nothing* at all in 1908 to promote "non-parliamentary means of struggle". This dissociation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries from their social roots

immediately begins to aggravate their besetting sin—extravagant, unbridled boasting and bragging, as a means of covering up their impotence. "Our Party can congratulate itself," we read on the first page of the Report ... election to the conference by "really existing [think of that now!] local party organisations" ... "unanimity of feeling was reached on all questions" ... "this was truly the attainment of unanimity" (ibid.), and so on and so forth.

It is not true, gentlemen. With these loud words you are trying to drown the voices of dissension which have been heard quite distinctly, both in *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (spring 1908) and in issue No. 13 of *Znamya Truda* (November 1908). This ballyhoo is a sign of weakness. The non-party opportunism of the Trudoviks and the "party" boastfulness, isolation and phrase-mongering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are two sides of the same medal, two extremes in the disintegration of *one and the same* petty-bourgeois stratum. It was not for nothing that during the revolution, when the struggle brought out all the different shadings, the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried, but tried in vain, to conceal their wavering between the Popular Socialists and the Maximalists.

The cart is in the ditch. The horses have slipped their harness. The coachman sits astride a milestone with his cap at a jaunty angle, and "congratulates" himself on his "unanimity". Such is the picture of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Such are the results of Socialist-Revolutionary otzovism, which has recalled a handful of intellectuals from the arduous, persevering, but the only really serious and fruitful work of educating and organising the masses, in order that they should indulge in loud and meaningless catchwords.

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ON THE ROAD

A year of disintegration, a year of ideological and political disunity, a year of Party driftage lies behind us. The membership of all our Party organisations has dropped. Some of them—namely, those whose membership was least proletarian—have fallen to pieces. The Party's semi-legal institutions created by the revolution have been broken up time after time. Things reached a point when some elements within the Party, under the impact of the general break-up, began to ask whether it was necessary to preserve the old Social-Democratic Party, whether it was necessary to continue *its* work, whether it was necessary to go "underground" once more, and how this was to be done. And the extreme Right (the liquidationist trend, so called) answered this question in the sense that it was necessary to legalise ourselves at all costs, even at the price of an open renunciation of the Party programme, tactics and organisation. This was undoubtedly an ideological and political crisis as well as an organisational one.

The recent All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has led the Party out on to the road, and evidently marks a turning-point in the development of the Russian working-class movement after the victory of the counter-revolution. The decisions of the conference, published in a special Report issued by the Central Committee of our Party, have been confirmed by the Central Committee, and therefore, pending the next Congress, stand as the decisions of the whole Party. These decisions give a very definite answer to the question of the causes and the significance of the crisis, as well as the means of overcoming it. By working in the spirit of the conference

resolutions, by striving to make *all* Party workers realise clearly and fully the present tasks of the Party, our organisations will be able to strengthen and consolidate their forces for united and effective revolutionary Social-Democratic work.

The main cause of the Party crisis is indicated in the preamble of the resolution on organisation. This main cause is the wavering intellectual and petty-bourgeois elements, of which the workers' party had to rid itself; elements who joined the working-class movement mainly in the hope of an early triumph of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and could not stand up to a period of reaction. Their instability was revealed both in theory ("retreat from revolutionary Marxism": the resolution on the present situation) and in tactics (the "whittling down of slogans"), as well as in Party organisation. The class-conscious workers repelled this instability, came out resolutely against the liquidators, began to take the management and guidance of the Party organisations into their own hands. If this hard core of our Party was unable at the outset to overcome the elements of disunity and crisis, this was not only because the task was a great and difficult one amidst the triumph of the counter-revolution, but also because a certain indifference towards the Party showed itself among those workers who, although revolutionary-minded, were not sufficiently socialist-minded. It is precisely to the class-conscious workers of Russia that the decisions of the conference are addressed in the first place—as the crystallised opinion of Social-Democracy concerning the means of combating disunity and vacillation.

A Marxist analysis of present-day class relations and of the new policy of tsarism; an indication of the immediate aim of the struggle which our Party continues as before to set itself; an appreciation of the lessons of the revolution as regards the correctness of the revolutionary Social-Democrats' tactics; elucidation of the causes of the Party crisis; pointing out the role in combating it of the proletarian elements of the Party; solution of the problem of relations between the illegal and legal organisations; recognition of the necessity of utilising the Duma tribune and drawing up precise instructions for the guidance of

Цѣна 10 сантим.

ПАРИЖЪ, Среда 28/10 Февраля 1909 г. № 2.

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦ.-ДЕМОКРАТИЧ. РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ. ПРОЛЕТАРІИ ВСѢХ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ!

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ ОРГАНЪ РОССІЙСКОЙ СОЦІ-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ

СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТЪ

LE SOCIAL-DÉMOCRATE

Organe Central du Parti Social-Démocrate Ouvrier en Russie

На дорогу.

Годъ рѣшенія, годъ жаркаго политическаго разбора, годъ партійнаго воодушевленія лежитъ позади насъ. Организація партіи всѣ сосредоточилась въ числѣ человѣкъ нѣсколько—жалкое состояніе нелегальныхъ организацій—развалилась. Сношенія революціонной полуотпертыя учрежденія партіи теперь прервались совершенно. Доходъ не того, что для нѣкоторыхъ, подавленныя военно расходы измѣнчивъ внутри партіи, отдѣлъ вопросъ, надо ли сохранять прежнюю партію, или-ли продолжать ее дѣло, или-ли пути опять въ полномъ и нѣкъ кто сдѣлать, — и на этотъ вопросъ прямые дѣлали отдѣть на смыслѣ легализаціи во что бы то ни стало, отвѣтъ, не на данного отказа отъ партійной программы, тактики и организаціи (такъ называемая ликвидаторство течеиія). Прежде бывъ, нечаянно, не только организаціонной, но и полно-политической.

Недавно состоявшаяся всероссійская конференція Р. С.-Д. Р. П. выноситъ партіи на дорогу и предсѣдаетъ въ себѣ, вновь, поворотный пунктъ въ развитіи русск. рабочаго, послѣдовательно центръ-революціи. Рѣшенія конференціи, напечатанныя въ особомъ «Извѣстіяхъ», вызвавшихъ Центральнымъ Комитетомъ нашей Партіи, утверждены П.-К.-томъ и является, слѣдовательно, до сегодняшнаго дѣлала рѣшенія всей партіи. Въ этихъ рѣшеніяхъ дано полное и всестороннее рѣшеніе на вопросъ о причинахъ и значеніи кризиса, а также и средствахъ выхода изъ него. Работая въ духѣ резолюцій конференціи необходимо всякаго и полезно сознаніе всѣхъ партійныхъ работниковъ сосредоточить силы партіи, какъ организаціи сумѣвшихъ разбить и сплотить свои силы для дружной и живой революционно-соціалдемократической работы.

Основная причина кризиса партіи указана въ потерѣ организаціонной революціи. Эта основная причина заключается въ чистѣ рабочей партіи отъ господствовавшихъ интеллигентскихъ и мелкобуржуазныхъ элементовъ, которыя примкнули къ рабочему движенію главнымъ образомъ въ періодъ революціи. Такое торжество буржуазно-демократической революціи и которыя не могли устоять въ періодъ реакціи. Неустойчивость сказалась и въ области теоріи (отступленіе отъ революціонного марксизма; ревизіонизмъ и современные элементы) и въ области тактики (ревизіонизмъ лодыгинъ) и въ области организаціонной политики партіи. Стихійныя рабочіе дали второй клеткой неустойчивости, инстинкта рабочаго протеста элементовъ стали брать въ свои руки вполнѣ дѣлать партійность организацій и руководство ими. Если прежде это нормально идеи нашей партіи не смогли оцѣнить элементовъ разбросы и кризисъ, то это не только потому, что кризисъ и трудно было, но и потому что при торжествѣ контръ-революціи, но и потому что пролетаріи руководствуя въ партіи проявлялись въ прежнѣ работать, которыя были настроены революціонно, но обдумали классической соціалистической сознательностью. Именно въ большинствѣ рабочихъ Россіи и обращаетъ въ первую голову рѣшенія конференціи, какъ сознанности и необходимости соціалдемократіи и средствахъ борьбы въ разбросанности и нетвердости.

Марксистской анализъ современного взаимодѣйствія классовъ и новой политики кризиса: — рѣшенія большинствомъ борьбы, которыя ставятъ рабочій на первомъ плана партіи; — отдѣлъ уровень революціи въ вопросъ о правильности революціонно-соціалдемократической тактики; — выдвинутъ протестъ партійного прошлаго и указанія на роль пролетарскаго элемента партіи въ борьбѣ съ ними; — рѣшеніе вопроса о сознательности нелегальной организаціи; — признаніе необходимости использовать легальныя средства и выработка точности руководящихъ указаній для нашей рабочей партіи на смѣнѣ Сибирской критикой на фиктивно; — такого главнаго содержанія рѣшеній конференціи, составитъ полный отвѣтъ на вопросъ о выборѣ партіей рабочаго класса товарного пути въ настоящемъ тяжелое время. Разсмотрѣть значительнѣе этотъ отвѣтъ.

Всемогущественно классовъ въ жизнь политической группировки остается тѣмъ же, какое характерно для переходнаго періода первой революціонной борьбы шести. Громадное большинство крестьянства не можетъ не стремиться къ такому отдѣленному пролетаріату, который увѣренъ бы выступленіемъ и которой воспользовалась бы совершенно царскій власти. Торжество реакціи принимаетъ особенно сильно демократическія качества пролетаріата, несовершенно въ прочной организаціи, но конечно не хотѣ-ть, не быстро на чрезвычайно. Духу, конечно на прибѣжищѣ неустойчивости трудовыхъ, революціонности пресыщаемъ какъ силы нашъ даже въ первой въ Бой Дуэ. Основная линія пролетаріата въ отношеніи къ такимъ буржуазно-демократическимъ разнообразно въ Россіи остается неизмѣненной: руководить демократическимъ протестанствомъ, выражать его интересы какъ либеральныхъ буржуа, партія с.-д., проповѣдывающей обязанности, конечно на нашей частью сорь. отъ пятибрестанъ и въ самомъ послѣднемъ времени, стремящейся подвести интеллигенть-рабочихъ, пользуется шрамъ и реакціи путемъ неизвѣстнаго-свой интересъ. Борьба по принципу ведется — говорить рановаго — за полное уничтоженіе неверныхъ и замѣнами политической власти пролетаріатомъ и революционнымъ крестьянствомъ.

Самоправдывать по принципу стоитъ, какъ главный врагъ пролетаріата и всей демократіи. Но было бы ошибкой думать, что оно остается прежнимъ. Стихійная неустойчивость Стольпинскаго времени изъ политика измѣнилась новый отвѣтъ въ разложеніи старого политаритарнаго, полуабсолютистскаго-полуцеховаго, новый путь пути пролетаріатъ, что въ буржуазную монархію. Дилемма Кавеньяка, нельзя себѣ просить разлить хорошо дилемма Стольпинскаго поставить «полуторатеократіи» на мѣсто «буржуазный», стоитъ на нелѣпой тонкъ арѣнки. Полуторатеократическое самодержавіе было давнаго, буржуазнымъ по своей аграрной политикѣ и по принципу, организаціонному въ общественномъ настоящѣ. Самодержавіе, которое буржуазно, становится теперь только новый первый этапъ революціи, подъ ударами которыхъ на Самодержавіе сдѣлаетъ всеобщій, и которыхъ, и вѣчно въ законодательствѣ и управленіи, и общественномъ порядкѣ, которыхъ не самодержавіе настоящаго можетъ и сортовать въ тонъ, что самодержавіе прошлось сдѣлать, и которыхъ можно дать не только сдѣлать сдѣлать буржуазіе, пришлось вмѣшаторировать между вина и кабинетными, организовывать въ Думѣ опять этотъ сдѣлать, вмѣшаторировать и вечной надеждой на натуральностью кумиса и вечной разоръ прочихъ деревенской massы у богатѣрь, разрывать сдѣлать сдѣлать.

Самодержавіе принуждаетъ себѣ любви конституціонныя учрежденія, но въ то-же время на дѣлѣ постоянно обнаруживаетъ свои разложенность его классовой сущности. Сдѣлавши сонму чаре въ Прусаковскомъ и Гутчковыхъ и только на нихъ. Самодержавіе пытается мѣсть въ себя рушіемъ обстоятельствъ необходимость задать буржуазной революціи — создаетъ нормальныя представительныя, дѣйствительно выбираемыя дѣлами буржуазнаго общества, и частью сдѣлайтеньемъ, запутываетъ и обостряющъ аграрныхъ отношеній въ деревнѣ; но именно практическій результатъ подъ шагомъ самодержавіе оказываетъ до сего пору реальнаго, нуля, а это только еще интересно, неизвѣстно, неопредѣленность нашихъ силъ и нашихъ представленій, которыя историческій мѣлочи. Самодержавіе пропустило

Front page of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. — the newspaper Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 2, January 28 (February 10), 1909, containing Lenin's article "On the Road"

Reduced

our Duma group, linked with direct criticism of its mistakes—such was the principal content of the decisions of the conference, which provide a complete answer to the question of the party of the working class choosing a definite path in the present difficult period. Let us examine this answer more carefully.

The interrelation of classes in their political groupings remains the same as that which prevailed during the past period of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. The overwhelming majority of the peasants cannot but strive for an agrarian revolution which would destroy semi-feudal landownership, and which cannot be achieved without the overthrow of tsarism. The triumph of reaction has borne down heavily on the democratic elements of the peasantry, which is incapable of forming a solid organisation; but despite all oppression, despite the Black-Hundred Duma, despite the extreme instability of the Trudoviks, the revolutionary mood of the peasant masses is clearly evidenced even by the debates in the Third Duma. The fundamental position of the proletariat in regard to the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia remains unaltered: to guide the democratic peasantry and to wrest it from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadet Party—which continues to draw closer and closer to the Octobrists notwithstanding petty private squabbles, and which recently has been striving to establish national-liberalism and to support tsarism and reaction by chauvinist agitation. The struggle goes on as before—says the resolution—for the complete abolition of the monarchy and the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry.

The autocracy, as hitherto, is the principal enemy of the proletariat and of all democratic trends. It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that it remains unchanged. The Stolypin "constitution" and Stolypin's agrarian policy mark a new stage in the break-down of the old, semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal tsarism, a new step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The delegates from the Caucasus, who wished either to delete such a characterisation of the present situation altogether, or to substitute "plutocratic" for "bourgeois", were wrong. The autocracy has long been plutocratic; but it is only after the first stage

of the revolution, under the impact of its blows, that the autocracy is becoming bourgeois, both in its agrarian policy and its direct, nationally-organised alliance with certain strata of the bourgeoisie. The autocracy has been nursing the bourgeoisie for a long time now; the bourgeoisie, by means of the ruble, has long been winning its way to "the top", securing influence on legislation and administration, and a place beside the noble aristocracy. But the peculiar feature of the present situation is that the autocracy has been forced to set up a representative assembly for certain strata of the bourgeoisie, to balance between them and the feudalist-landlords, to form an alliance of these sections in the Duma; it has been forced to abandon all the hopes it had placed in the patriarchalism of the muzhik, and to seek support against the rural masses among the rich peasants, who are ruining the village commune.

The autocracy cloaks itself with pseudo-constitutional institutions, but at the same time its class essence is being exposed as never before, owing to the alliance concluded by the tsar with the Purishkeviches and the Guchkovs, and with no one else. The autocracy is attempting to take upon itself the fulfilment of those tasks of the bourgeois revolution which are objectively necessary—the setting-up of a representative assembly of the people which would really manage the affairs of bourgeois society, and the purging of the countryside of medieval, entangled and antiquated agrarian relations. But the practical results of these new steps taken by the autocracy are, so far, exactly nil, and this only shows more clearly than ever that other forces and other means are necessary for the fulfilment of the historical task. In the minds of millions of people inexperienced in politics, the autocracy was hitherto contrasted with popular representation in general; now, the struggle is narrowing its aims, and is more concretely defining its task as the struggle for power in the state, which determines the character and significance of representation itself. That is why the Third Duma marks a special stage in the break-down of the old tsarism, in the intensification of its adventurist character, in the deepening of the old revolutionary aims, in the widening of the field of struggle (and of the numbers taking part in the struggle) for these aims.

We must get over this stage. The present new conditions require new forms of struggle. The use of the Duma tribune is an absolute necessity. A prolonged effort to educate and organise the masses of the proletariat becomes particularly important. The combination of illegal and legal organisation raises special problems before the Party. The popularisation and clarification of the experience of the revolution, which the liberals and liquidationist intellectuals are seeking to discredit, are necessary both for theoretical and practical purposes. But the tactical line of the Party—which must be able to take the new conditions into account in its methods and means of struggle—remains unchanged. The correctness of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics, states one of the resolutions of the conference, is confirmed by the experience of the mass struggle in 1905-07. The defeat of the revolution resulting from this first campaign revealed, not that the tasks were wrong, not that the immediate aims were "utopian", not that the methods and means were mistaken, but that the forces were insufficiently prepared, that the revolutionary crisis was insufficiently wide and deep—and Stolypin and Co. are working to widen and deepen it with most praiseworthy zeal! Let the liberals and terrified intellectuals lose heart after the first genuinely mass battle for freedom, let them repeat like cowards: don't go where you have been beaten before, don't tread that fatal path again. The class-conscious proletariat will answer them: the great wars in history, the great problems of revolutions, were solved only by the advanced classes returning to the attack again and again—and they achieved victory after having learned the lessons of defeat. Defeated armies learn well. The revolutionary classes of Russia have been defeated in their first campaign, but the revolutionary situation remains. In new forms and by other ways, sometimes much more slowly than we would wish, the revolutionary crisis is approaching, coming to a head again. We must carry on with the lengthy work of preparing larger masses for that crisis; this preparation must be more serious, taking account of higher and more concrete tasks; and the more successfully we do this work, the more certain will be our victory in the new struggle. The Russian proletariat can be proud of the fact that in 1905, under its leadership, a nation

of slaves for the first time became a million-strong host, an army of the revolution, striking at tsarism. And now the same proletariat will know how to do persistently, staunchly and patiently the work of educating and training the new cadres of a still mightier revolutionary force.

As we have said, utilisation of the Duma tribune is an essential element of this work of education and training. The conference resolution on the Duma group indicates to our Party that road which comes nearest—if we are to seek instances in history—to the experience of German Social-Democracy at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law. The illegal Party must know how to use, it must learn how to use, the legal Duma group; it must train up the latter into a Party organisation equal to its tasks. The most mistaken tactics, the most regrettable deviation from consistent proletarian work, dictated by the conditions of the present period, would be to raise the question of recalling the group from the Duma (there were two "otzovists" at the conference, but they did not raise the question openly), or to refrain from directly and openly criticising its mistakes and from enumerating them in the resolution (as some delegates insisted at the conference). The resolution fully recognises that the group has committed mistakes for which it was not alone to blame, and which were quite similar to the inevitable mistakes of all our Party organisations. But there are other mistakes—departures from the *political line* of the Party. Since these departures occurred, since they were made by an organisation openly acting in the name of the whole Party, the Party was bound to declare clearly and definitely that these were deviations. In the history of West-European socialist parties there have been a number of instances of abnormal relations between the parliamentary groups and the Party; to this day these relations are quite often abnormal in the Latin countries, where the groups do not display sufficient Party spirit. We must from the very outset organise Social-Democratic parliamentarism in Russia on a different basis; we must at once establish team-work in this field—so that every Social-Democratic deputy may really feel that he has the Party behind him, that the Party is deeply concerned over his mistakes and tries to straighten out his path—so that every Party worker may take part in the general Duma work of the

Party, learning from the practical Marxist criticism of its steps, feeling it his duty to assist it, and striving to gear the special work of the group to the whole propaganda and agitation activity of the Party.

The conference was the first authoritative meeting of delegates from the biggest Party organisations to discuss the work of the Duma Social-Democratic group during the whole session. And the decision of the conference shows very clearly how our Party will shape its Duma work, how very exacting it will be in this field both to itself and to the group, how undeviatingly and consistently it proposes to work on developing genuinely Social-Democratic parliamentarism.

The question of our attitude to the Duma group has a tactical and an organisational aspect. In the latter respect the resolution on the Duma group is only the application of our general principles of organisational policy to a particular case, principles laid down by the conference in the resolution giving instructions on the question of organisation. The conference has recorded that two main tendencies exist in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on this question: one of them throws the weight of emphasis on the illegal Party organisation, the other—which is more or less akin to liquidationism—throws the weight of emphasis on the legal and semi-legal organisations. The point is that the present situation is characterised, as we have already pointed out, by a certain number of Party workers leaving the Party—especially intellectuals, but also some proletarians. The liquidationist trend raises the question as to whether it is the best, the most active elements that are abandoning the Party and choosing the legal organisations as their field of activity, or whether it is the "vacillating intellectualist and petty-bourgeois elements" that are leaving the Party. Needless to say, by emphatically rejecting and condemning liquidationism, the conference replied that it was the latter elements. The most proletarian elements of the Party, and those elements of the intelligentsia that were most consistent in principle and most Social-Democratic, remained true to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The desertions from the Party mean its purification, they mean getting rid of its least stable element,

of its unreliable friends, of its "fellow-travellers" (*Mitläufer*), who always joined the proletariat for a while and who were recruited from among the petty bourgeoisie or from among the "declassed", i.e., people thrown out of the orbit of some definite class.

From this evaluation of the principle of Party organisation logically follows the line of organisational policy adopted by the conference. To strengthen the illegal Party organisation, to create Party cells in all spheres of work, to set up first of all "entirely Party committees consisting of workers, even if their number be small, in each industrial enterprise", to concentrate the functions of leadership in the hands of leaders of the Social-Democratic movement from among the workers themselves—such is the task today. Needless to say, the task of these cells and committees must be to utilise all the semi-legal and, as far as possible, legal organisations, to maintain "close contact with the masses", and to direct the work in such a way that Social-Democracy responds to all the needs of the masses. Every Party cell and workers' committee must become a "base for agitation, propaganda and practical organising work among the masses", i.e., they must go where the masses go, and try at every step to push the consciousness of the masses in the direction of socialism, to link up every specific question with the general tasks of the proletariat, to transform every act of organisation into one of *class* consolidation, to win by dint of energy and ideological influence (not by their ranks and titles, of course) the leading role in all the proletarian legal organisations. Even if these cells and committees be very small at times, they will be linked together by Party tradition and Party organisation, by a definite class programme; and two or three Social-Democratic members of the Party will thus be able to avoid becoming submerged in an amorphous legal organisation and to pursue their *Party* line under all conditions, in all circumstances and in all kinds of situations, to influence their environment in the spirit of the whole Party, and not allow the environment to swallow them up.

Though mass organisations of one type or another may be dissolved, though the legal trade unions may be hounded out of existence, though every open act of workers' initiative

under a regime of counter-revolution may be ruined by the police on one pretext or another—no power on earth can prevent the concentration of masses of workers in a capitalist country, such as Russia has already become. One way or another, legally or semi-legally, openly or covertly, the working class will find its own rallying points; the class-conscious Party Social-Democrats will everywhere and always march in front of the masses, everywhere and always act together in order to influence the masses in the spirit of the Party. And Social-Democracy, which has proved in open revolution that it is the party of the class, the party that succeeded in leading millions in strikes, in the uprising of 1905, as well as in the elections of 1906-07, will now also be able to remain the party of the class, the party of the masses, the vanguard, which in the hardest times will not lose touch with the bulk of the army, but will be able to help the latter overcome these hard times, consolidate its ranks once more, and train more and more new fighters.

Let the Black-Hundred diehards rejoice and howl inside the Duma and outside it, in the capital and in the remote provinces, let the reaction rage—the ever so wise Mr. Stolypin cannot take a single step without bringing the precariously balancing autocracy nearer its fall, without creating a new tangle of political impossibilities and absurdities, without adding new and fresh forces to the ranks of the proletariat and to the ranks of the revolutionary elements of the peasant masses. A party which succeeds in consolidating itself for persistent work in contact with the masses, a party of the advanced class, which succeeds in organising its vanguard, and which directs its forces in such a way as to influence in a Social-Democratic spirit every sign of life of the proletariat—such a party will win no matter what happens.

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ON THE ARTICLE "QUESTIONS OF THE DAY"

The splendid article reprinted here from issue No. 7 of *Rabocheye Znamya*, the organ of the Central Industrial Region, is a reply to an otzovist article published in issue No. 5 of the same newspaper. The otzovist article was published for the purpose of discussion, with a note by the editors of *Rabocheye Znamya* stating that they disagreed with the author. The present article appeared in No. 7 without any comment, so we may take it that the editors agree with the views expressed.

We in *Proletary* have long been strongly opposing otzovism, and have definitely stated that otzovism—to the extent that it is evolving from a mere mood into a *trend*, a system of politics—is departing from revolutionary Marxism and breaking completely with the principles of Bolshevism. After the appearance of this article in the Moscow organ of the Bolsheviks, however, we must admit that we have not raised the question of otzovism sharply enough hitherto, and that we have underestimated the danger which threatened the principles of our Bolshevik wing on the part of those who wish to wed this otzovism to Bolshevism. We record the fact that Comrade Muscovite, the author of the article we reprint, has put the case as strongly, as definitely and with as firm regard for principle as we have done in private discussions with otzovists. Meeting living representatives of otzovism every day, witnessing locally practical examples of otzovist propaganda, which day by day threatens to depart still more from the path of revolutionary Social-Democracy, our Moscow organ was quite justified in presenting the issue in the sharp and uncompromising terms it did. *Either* revolutionary Marxism, i.e.—in Russia—Bolshevism; *or* otzovism, i.e.,

the renunciation of Bolshevism; this is how the Moscow comrade put the question. Thereby he fully supported the way we formulated the question in our preliminary arguments with the otzovist comrades before the general Party conference.

We are aware that some Bolshevik working men at present sympathise with otzovism, but in the majority of cases their "otzovism" is nothing more than a passing *mood*, fostered by the gross mistakes which our Duma group committed; and the remarks of the author of the article and ourselves do not, of course, apply to them. But inasmuch as otzovism is being erected into a theory, reduced to a complete system of politics—by a small group imagining itself to be the representative of "true" revolutionism—a relentless *ideological war* must be launched against it. The author of the article here reproduced is quite right when he defines the arguments of the otzovist in No. 5 of *Rabocheye Znamya* (whose article we reprinted in *Proletary*, No. 39) and the otzovist *trend* in general with its advocacy of a "labour congress", etc. as equivalent to *Menshevism turned inside out*. And he is even more right when he says that the *principles* which certain otzovists urge in support of their trend objectively—whether they are politically conscious of it or not—threaten to lead them to anarcho-syndicalism or to just plain anarchism.

Moscow's way of stating the issue shows how politically short-sighted—for all their good intentions—are those Bolsheviks who refuse to regard otzovism as a danger on grounds of *principle*, who view the matter *merely* as "disagreements on practical points", and who see in otzovism a "sound core", and not the germ of ideological liquidationism on the left. The Moscow comrade's article should convince them that in screening the otzovists ideologically, or even maintaining friendly neutrality towards otzovist ideas, they are bringing grist to the otzovist mill, *becoming their prisoners of war*, damaging the cause of Bolshevism.

Otzovism is *not* Bolshevism, but the worst political travesty of Bolshevism its worst political enemy could invent. There must be *absolute clarity* on this point. We think that all Bolsheviks, down to the smallest circle, should be perfectly clear in their minds what otzovism stands for, should study it thoroughly and ask themselves: is this

not obvious renunciation—under the flag of "revolutionariness" and "Leftism"—of the fine traditions of the old Bolshevism, as it came into being in the period before the revolution and in the fire of the revolution?

That is why we have initiated a discussion on these questions in *Proletary*. We have published *everything* that was sent to us, and reprinted all that Bolsheviks in Russia have written on the subject. So far, we have not rejected a *single* contribution to the discussion, and we shall continue to pursue the same course. Unfortunately, the otzovist comrades and those who sympathise with them have, so far, sent us little material, and, in general, have avoided making a frank and complete statement of their theoretical *credo* in the press. They prefer to talk "among themselves". We invite all comrades, otzovists and orthodox Bolsheviks alike, to state their views in the columns of *Proletary*. If necessary we shall publish these contributions in pamphlet form. Ideological clarity and consistency—this is what we need, particularly in these difficult times.

We shall leave it to the gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to play down their dissensions, and to congratulate themselves on their "unanimity" at a moment when people are justly saying about them: "You can find anything you like among them—from Popular-Socialist liberalism to liberalism with a bomb."

We shall leave the Mensheviks to their ideological hobnobbing with Cherevanin and Co. Let them practise their double dealing (renouncing Cherevanin in the German press, and embracing him in the Russian); let them cohabit with the ideological liquidators of the fundamental principles of revolutionary Marxism; let them play down their disagreements, and display all their virtuosity in the paste-pot art as they did in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (No. 10-11), where they "resolved" their differences with Plekhanov by the simple device of papering them over.[133]

Our supporters should not be afraid of an internal ideological struggle, once it is necessary. They will be all the stronger for it. It is our *duty* to bring our disagreements out into the open, the more so since, in point of fact, the whole Party is beginning to line up more and more with our trend. We call on our Bolshevik comrades for *ideologi-*

cal clarity and for the sweeping away of all backstairs gossip, from whatever source it may come. There are no end of people who would like to see the ideological struggle on momentous cardinal issues side-tracked into petty squabbles, like those conducted by the Mensheviks after the Second Congress. Such people must not be tolerated in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik working men should strongly discourage such attempts and insist on one thing, and one thing alone: *ideological clarity*, *definite opinions*, *a line based on principle*. Once this complete ideological clarity is achieved, all Bolsheviks will be able on matters of organisation to display the unanimity and solidarity that our wing of the Party has always displayed hitherto.

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THE AIM OF THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE IN OUR REVOLUTION

In the article printed above, Comrade Martov touches upon an extremely important question or, rather, series of questions concerning the aim the proletariat and the Social-Democrats are fighting for in our revolution. He touches upon the history of the discussion of these questions in our Party, upon their relation to the principles of Marxism and to Narodism and upon all the shades of opinion that have been expressed on the subject. He touches upon all aspects of the question, but does not clear up a single one of them. To come to the nub of the matter we must make a systematic survey of the question in all its aspects.

I

We shall begin with the history of the discussion of this question by the Russian Social-Democrats. It was brought up by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks at the beginning of 1905. The former answered it with the "formula": revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (cf. *Vperyod*,[134] No. 14, April 12, 1905*). The latter flatly rejected this definition of the class content of a victorious bourgeois revolution. The Third (Bolshevik) Congress held in London in May 1905 and the Menshevik conference held at the same time in Geneva, officially expressed the views of the two sections of the Party. In keeping with the spirit of the times, both sections of the Party in their resolutions dealt, not with the theoretical and general

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 293-303.—*Ed.*

question of the aim of the struggle and the class content of a victorious revolution in general, but with the narrower question of a provisional revolutionary government. The Bolshevik resolution read: "...The establishment of a democratic republic in Russia will be possible only as the result of a victorious popular uprising, whose organ will be a provisional revolutionary government.... Subject to the relation of forces and other factors which cannot be determined exactly beforehand, representatives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all attempts at counter-revolution, and of defending the independent interests of the working class." The Menshevik resolution read: "...Social-Democracy must not set out to seize power or share it with anyone in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

It is evident from the above that the Bolsheviks themselves, at an all-Bolshevik Congress, *did not include* in their official resolution any such "formula" as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but stated *only* that it was permissible to participate in the provisional government, and that it was the "mission" of the proletariat to "play the leading role" (resolution on armed uprising). The ''formula'': "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", given in the Bolshevik press before the Third Congress, was repeated in the pamphlet *Two Tactics** after that Congress, and it never entered anybody's head to accuse the Bolsheviks of saying one thing in their resolutions and another thing in their commentaries. It never entered anybody's head to demand that the resolutions of a mass party engaged in political struggle should tally, word for word, with the formulas giving a Marxist definition of the class content of a victorious revolution.

Another important conclusion to be drawn from our historical enquiry is this. In the spring of 1905 the *key issue* of the controversy for both sections of the Party was the *conquest of power* by the proletariat and the revolutionary classes in general, and neither section went into the question of what the relations between these classes conquering

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

power might or should be. As we have seen, the Mensheviks reject both the seizing and the sharing of power. The Bolsheviks speak of the "leading role of the proletariat in the revolution" (resolution on the armed uprising) and say that Social-Democrats "may" participate in a provisional government; that the "independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which aims at the complete socialist revolution should be firmly safeguarded" (resolution on the provisional revolutionary government); that the revolutionary movement of the peasants should be "supported", that "the revolutionary-democratic content of the peasant movement should be cleared of reactionary impurities", that "the revolutionary consciousness of the peasants should be developed, and their democratic demands carried to their logical conclusion" (resolution on the attitude to be adopted to the peasant movement). The resolutions of the Bolshevik Congress of 1905 contain no other "formulas" on the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Now let us take the draft resolutions of the two sections a year later, before the Stockholm Congress. These drafts are often forgotten or ignored in the press in general, and in our Party in particular. That is a great pity, for their significance in the history of the tactical principles of Social-Democracy is enormous. It is these draft resolutions which show what lessons the two sections of the Party drew from the experience of the struggles of October and December 1905.

The Bolsheviks in their draft resolution on the class aims of the proletariat write: "Only the proletariat can bring the democratic revolution to its consummation, the condition being that the proletariat, as the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, leads the mass of the peasantry, and imparts political consciousness to its spontaneous struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state" (repeated in the draft resolution for the London Congress, see *Proletary*, No. 14, March 4, 1907*).

Thus the "formula" which the Bolsheviks here chose for themselves reads: the proletariat *leading* the peasantry. The Bolshevik resolutions contain no other formula to express the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the

* See present edition, Vol. 12, p. 139.—*Ed.*

proletariat and the peasantry. This fact cannot be too strongly emphasised, for it is in the hope of its being forgotten or ignored that Comrade Martov attempts to place the resolution adopted at the December Conference of 1908 in a totally false light.

The Mensheviks in their draft resolution (reprinted in Lenin's "Report", pp. 68-70, from *Partiiniye Izvestia*[135]) say that it is the task of the proletariat "to be the driving force of the bourgeois revolution". Please note: not the "leader", not the "guide", as the Bolshevik resolution says, but the "driving force". And among the tasks enumerated is that of "supporting by mass pressure such oppositional steps of the bourgeois democrats as do not clash with the demands in our programme, as may promote their fulfilment and become the point of departure for the further advancement of the revolution".

Thus, the difference between them is reduced by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks themselves to the alternative: "leader" and "guide" of the revolution, who "leads" the peasantry, *or* "driving force of the revolution", which "supports" the various steps taken by the bourgeois democrats. We would add that the Mensheviks, who were the victors at the Stockholm Congress, *themselves withdrew* this resolution in spite of the protests and insistence of the Bolsheviks. Why did the Mensheviks do it? The reader will find the answer to this question when he reads the following passage from the same Menshevik draft resolution: "The proletariat can properly fulfil its task as the driving force of the bourgeois revolution only by organising itself while at the same time drawing more and more new sections of the town bourgeoisie and the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle, democratising their demands, stimulating them to organise and thereby paving the way for the victory of the revolution."

This is obviously a half-hearted concession to the Bolsheviks, for the proletariat is depicted not only as a driving force, but to some extent at least as a leader, since it "draws" and "stimulates" the peasantry and new sections of the town bourgeoisie.

To proceed. On the question of the provisional government, the Menshevik draft resolution reads: "In the event of a general revolutionary upsurge in the country, the

Social-Democrats must everywhere promote the formation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, stimulate other revolutionary-democratic elements to form similar bodies, promote the union of all these bodies into general non-party organisations of popular revolutionary struggle, putting before them those general national tasks of the revolution which from the proletarian point of view can and should be fulfilled at the given stage of the revolution" (ibid., p. 91).

This forgotten draft resolution of the Mensheviks clearly shows that the experience of October-December 1905 completely bewildered the Mensheviks, who surrendered their position to the Bolsheviks. Indeed, is the passage quoted above compatible with the following point in the same draft: "The Social-Democrats must not set out to seize power and establish a dictatorship in the present bourgeois revolution" (p. 92)? This last proposition is quite consistent in principle, and (except where it refers to "sharing power") is an exact repetition of the resolution of 1905. But it hopelessly contradicts the lessons of October-December 1905 which the Mensheviks *themselves reduce to the union of all bodies* of the proletariat and "*other revolutionary-democratic elements*" into "general non-party organisations of popular revolutionary struggle"! If the Soviets of Workers' Deputies "unite" with *similar* revolutionary-democratic bodies into non-party organisations of popular revolutionary struggle, it is obvious that the proletariat *does* set out to "seize power and establish a dictatorship", that it *is taking part* in such seizure of power. The resolution itself says that "the main object" of the revolution is to "wrest political power from the hands of the reactionary government". Although shying at the words "seizure of power and dictatorship", and renouncing these terrible things in the most emphatic manner, the Mensheviks *were forced to admit* after 1905 that the "union" of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies with "similar" revolutionary-democratic bodies followed logically from the course of events, and that this *union* must result in the formation of "*general* non-party" (this is not quite correct; it should have read: non-party or inter-party) "organisations of popular revolutionary struggle". But this *general organisation* is nothing else than a provisional revolutionary government! Afraid to use the exact and direct term, the

Mensheviks replaced it by a *description*; but that does not alter matters. "An organ of popular revolutionary struggle", that "wrests political power" from the hands of the old government is nothing more nor less than a provisional revolutionary government.

While the Mensheviks had to take into account the lessons of October-December 1905 after much blundering and stumbling, the Bolsheviks arrived at their conclusions directly and clearly. The Bolshevik draft resolution on the provisional government declares: "In this open struggle [at the end of 1905] those elements among the local population who were capable of determined action against the old regime (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced sections of the petty bourgeoisie) were impelled by necessity to set up organisations which were in effect the rudiments of a new revolutionary authority—the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities, the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, etc., the Railwaymen's Committees in Siberia and in the south, the Peasant Committees in Saratov Gubernia, the Revolutionary City Committees in Novorossiisk and elsewhere and, lastly, the elected rural bodies in the Caucasus and the Baltic region" (p. 92). The failure of these bodies was due to their disunited and rudimentary state, we read further, while the provisional revolutionary government is defined as the "organ of victorious uprising". The resolution goes on to say: "In order to carry the revolution through to victory, the proletariat is now faced with the urgent task of promoting, jointly with the revolutionary democrats, the unification of the insurrection and of forming a co-ordinating centre for this insurrection in the shape of a provisional revolutionary government." Then follows an almost verbatim repetition of the resolution passed by the Third Congress in 1905.

These quotations from the draft resolutions of the two sections before the Stockholm Congress enable us to put the question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry on a concrete historical basis. Anyone who desires to give a clear and straightforward answer to this question must take into account the experience of the end of 1905. Those who evade examining this experience

will not only be ignoring material of the utmost value to a Russian Marxist. They will furthermore inevitably doom themselves to the "pettifogging" interpretation of formulas, to "slurring over" and "pasting over" (to use Comrade Martov's apt expression) disagreements on matters of principle and to that very unprincipled floundering on questions of the theory and practice of "dictatorship" that is expressed best of all by the formula: "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim—nothing."[136]

The experience of the end of 1905 has undoubtedly proved that "a general revolutionary upsurge in the country" produces special "organisations of popular revolutionary struggle" (according to the Menshevik formula) or "rudimentary organs of a new revolutionary authority" (according to that of the Bolsheviks). It is equally beyond doubt that in the history of the Russian bourgeois revolution these organs were created, first, by the proletariat, and secondly "by other revolutionary-democratic elements"; and a simple reference to the composition of the population of Russia in general, and of Great Russia in particular, will show that the peasantry represent the vast majority of these other elements. Lastly, no less beyond doubt is the historical tendency of these local bodies or organisations to amalgamate. The conclusion that inevitably follows from these undoubted facts is that a victorious revolution in present-day Russia *cannot be* anything but the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Nobody can get away from this inevitable conclusion, except by "pettifogging" and "pasting over" disagreements! If fragments of the question are not torn from their context, if town and country and the various localities are not artificially and arbitrarily separated, if the question of the composition of this or that *government* is not substituted for the question of the dictatorship of *classes*—in short, if the question is examined *as a whole*, then nobody can prove by concrete examples taken from the experience of 1905 that a victorious revolution could be anything else than the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

But before going any further, let us finish with the Party history of the "formula" we are examining. We have seen how the two sections precisely formulated their views in

1905 and in 1906. In 1907, on the eve of the London Congress, the Mensheviks first proposed one draft resolution on the attitude towards the bourgeois parties (*Narodnaya Duma*,[137] 1907, No. 12, March 24, 1907) and at the Congress itself they proposed another. The first draft talks about "combining" the actions of the proletariat with the actions of other classes; the second talks about "utilising" the movement of other classes "for the aims" of the proletariat, and about "support" by the proletariat of certain "oppositional and revolutionary steps" made by other classes, and about Social-Democrats entering into "agreements" with the liberal and democratic classes in "certain definite cases".

The Bolshevik draft, like the resolution adopted by the London Congress, says that the Social-Democrats should "compel them [the Narodnik or Trudovik parties "which more or less closely express the interests and the viewpoint of the broad mass of the peasants and the town petty bourgeoisie"] to side with the Social-Democrats against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets" and that the "joint actions following from this" should "serve only to promote a general onset". The resolution as adopted by the Congress differs from the Bolsheviks' draft in that it contains the additional words, inserted on the initiative of a Polish delegate: "in the struggle to carry the revolution through to victory". This, once again, most clearly reaffirmed the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry; for such a dictatorship *is* "joint action" by these classes, which have "*carried*, or are carrying, the revolution through to victory"!

II

We have only to take a general glance at the history of Party opinions on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry to see how much damage Comrade Martov has done himself by his talk about pettifogging and movements without a goal. Indeed, the first thing that this history shows is that the Bolsheviks themselves have *never*, either in their drafts or in their resolutions, inserted the expression or "formula"—"dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". Nevertheless, up till now, *no one* has ever thought of denying that *all* the Bolshevik drafts

and resolutions between 1905 and 1907 are based *entirely* on the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It would be absurd to deny it, for to do so would indeed be pettifoggery and an attempt to obscure the *real* issue with a mere quibbling over words. The proletariat which "*allies to itself*" the mass of the peasantry, said Lenin in *Two Tactics* (*Twelve Years*, p. 445*); the proletariat which "*leads*" the mass of the peasantry, says the draft resolution of the Bolsheviks in 1906; "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry "in the struggle to carry the democratic revolution through to victory", says the resolution of the London Congress. Is it not obvious that the same idea runs through all these formulations, that this idea is precisely the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat *and* the peasantry, that the "formula", the proletariat *relying upon* the peasantry, *remains part and parcel* of that same dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry?

Comrade Martov tries his hardest to confute this latter proposition. He starts a discussion about the word "*and*". There is no "and"; the formula with "and" in it was rejected!—exclaims Comrade Martov. Don't dare now to put this "and" into unsigned articles in the Central Organ. Too late, too late, dear Comrade Martov: you should have addressed this demand to *all* the Bolshevik organs of the press during the *whole* period of the revolution. All of them, all the time, spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and did so on the basis of resolutions which did not contain *this* "*and*". Comrade Martov has lost this battle of principle over the word "and"; and he has lost it not only because it was belated, but also because her majesty Logic has ruled that "allying to" *and* "leading" *and* "joint actions" *and* "relying upon" *and* "with the help of" (this last expression occurs in the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Polish Social-Democrats[138]) all come within the meaning of the offending "and".

But the Bolsheviks objected to "relying upon", says Comrade Martov, continuing his debate on principles. Yes, they did object; not because it controverted the dictator-

* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 100.—*Ed.*

ship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but because in Russian this "formula" does not sound very well. Usually, it is the weak who rely on the strong. The Bolsheviks are quite willing to accept word for word the Polish formula, "the proletariat *with the help* of the peasantry"—although perhaps it would have been better to say, "the proletariat leading the peasantry". One may argue about all these formulas, but to convert *such* an argument into a "debate on principles" is simply ridiculous. Comrade Martov's attempt to deny that "relying upon" is part of the concept of *joint* action is a model of pettifoggery. Comrade Martov quotes Dan, Axelrod and Semyonov as saying that the conquest of power "by the proletariat, relying upon the peasantry", means conquest of power by "the proletariat *alone*"; but this can only make the reader smile. If we were to say that Martov and Potresov, *relying upon* Cherevanin, Prokopovich and Co., have liquidated the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, would anyone take that to mean that Martov and Potresov liquidated this idea *alone*, *without* Cherevanin, Prokopovich and Co.?

No, comrades, a discussion in the Central Organ should not be reduced to pettifoggery. Such methods will not help you to wriggle out of admitting the fundamental and undoubted fact that the majority of the R.S.D.L.P., including the Poles and the Bolsheviks, stand firmly for (1) recognition of the guiding role of the proletariat, the role of leader, in the revolution, (2) recognition that the aim of the struggle is the conquest of power by the proletariat assisted by other revolutionary classes, (3) recognition that the first and perhaps the sole "assistants" in this matter are the peasants. Those who want to discuss the real issue should try to challenge at least one of these three propositions. Comrade Martov has not examined a single one of them seriously. He forgot to tell his readers that *on each* of these three formulas the Mensheviks hold a view which the Party has *rejected*, and that Menshevism and Menshevism alone is the *delusion which the Party has rejected*! And that was what the Mensheviks' policy was during the revolution—a movement without a goal, and therefore *dependent* on the vagaries of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. And this was the case precisely because the Mensheviks did not know whether the

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proletariat should aspire to be the leader, whether it should aspire to the conquest of power, and whether in doing so it should rely on the assistance of any other particular class. This ignorance inevitably dooms the Social-Democrats' policy to uncertainty, error, sacrifice of principle and dependence on the liberals.

The conference did not bury the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", and did not authorise its elimination from the Party's vocabulary. On the contrary, the conference *endorsed* it, and took *another step* towards its fuller recognition. The London Congress recognised (1) the role of the proletariat as "leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution", and (2) "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry which were to "serve only for the purpose of a general onset", actions, too, by the way, for "carrying the revolution through to victory". All that remained was to recognise that the aim of the struggle in this revolution was the conquest of power by the proletariat and the peasantry. This the conference did in the formula: "The conquest of power by the proletariat, relying on the peasantry."

In saying this we do not in the least deny or play down the differences of opinion between the Bolsheviks and the Poles. The Polish Social-Democrats have every opportunity to voice these differences in their own publications in the Russian language, in the columns of the Bolshevik press, and in the Central Organ. The Polish Social-Democrats have already begun to avail themselves of this opportunity. If Comrade Martov achieves his object, and succeeds in bringing the Polish Social-Democrats into our dispute, each and all will see that we are at one with the Polish Social-Democrats against the Mensheviks on all essentials, and that we disagree only on minor points.

III

As for Trotsky, whom Comrade Martov has involved in the controversy of third parties which he has organised—a controversy involving everybody except the dissentient—we positively cannot go into a full examination of his views here. A separate article of considerable length would be needed for this. By just touching upon Trotsky's mis-

taken views, and quoting scraps of them, Comrade Martov only sows confusion in the mind of the reader, for scraps of quotations do not explain but confuse matters. Trotsky's major mistake is that he ignores the bourgeois character of the revolution and has no clear conception of the transition from this revolution to the socialist revolution. This major mistake leads to those mistakes on side issues which Comrade Martov *repeats* when he quotes a couple of them with sympathy and approval. Not to leave matters in the confused state to which Comrade Martov has reduced them by his exposition, we shall at least expose the fallacy of those arguments of Trotsky which have won the approval of Comrade Martov. A coalition of the proletariat and the peasantry "presupposes either that the peasantry will come under the sway of one of the existing bourgeois parties, or that it will form a powerful independent party". This is obviously untrue both from the standpoint of general theory and from that of the experience of the Russian revolution. A "coalition" of classes *does not at all* presuppose *either* the existence of any particular powerful party, *or* parties in general. This is only confusing classes with parties. A "coalition" of the specified classes *does not in the least* imply *either* that one of the existing bourgeois parties will establish its sway over the peasantry *or* that the peasants should form a powerful independent party! Theoretically this is clear because, first, the peasants do not lend themselves very well to party organisation; and because, secondly, the formation of peasant parties is an extremely difficult and lengthy process in a bourgeois revolution, so that a "powerful independent" party may emerge only towards the end of the revolution. The experience of the Russian revolution shows that "coalitions" of the proletariat and the peasantry were formed *scores and hundreds of times*, in the most diverse forms, without any "powerful independent party" of the peasantry. Such a coalition was formed when there was "joint action", between, say, a Soviet of Workers' Deputies and a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, or a Railwaymen's Strike Committee, or Peasants' Deputies, etc. All these organisations were mainly *non-party*; nevertheless, every joint action between them undoubtedly represented a "coalition" of *classes*. In the course of this a peasant party took shape as an idea, in germ, com-

ing into being in the form of the Peasant Union of 1905,[139] or the Trudovik group of 1906—and *as* such a party grew, developed and constituted itself, the coalition of *classes* assumed different forms, from the vague and unofficial to definite and official political agreements. After the dissolution of the First Duma, for example, the following *three* calls for insurrection were issued: (1) "To the Army and Navy" (2) "To all the Russian Peasants", (3) "To the Whole People". The first was signed by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and the Committee of the Trudovik group. Was this "joint action" evidence of *a coalition of two classes*? Of course it was. To deny it means to engage in pettifoggery, or to transform the broad scientific concept of a "coalition of classes" into a narrow, juridical concept, almost that—I would say—of a notary. Further, can it be denied that this joint *call* for insurrection, signed by the Duma deputies of the working class and peasantry, was accompanied by joint *actions* of representatives of both classes in the form of partial local insurrections? Can it be denied that a joint call for a general insurrection and joint participation in local and partial insurrections necessarily implies the joint formation of a provisional revolutionary government? To deny it would mean to engage in pettifoggery, to reduce the concept of "government" to something completely and formally constituted, to forget that the complete and formally constituted develop from the incomplete and unconstituted.

To proceed. The second call for insurrection was signed by the *Central Committee* (Menshevik!) of the R.S.D.L.P. and also the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary. Party, the All-Russian Peasant Union, the All-Russian Railwaymen's and the All-Russian Teachers' Unions, as well as by the Committee of the Trudovik group and the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The third call for insurrection bears the signatures of the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund,[140] plus all the foregoing signatures except the three unions.

That was a fully constituted political coalition of parties and non-party organisations! That was "the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" *proclaimed* in the form of a threat to tsarism, in the form of a call to the whole

people, but not yet realised! And today one will hardly find many Social-Democrats who would agree with the Menshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat*[141] of 1906, No. 6, which wrote of these appeals: "In this case our Party concluded with other revolutionary parties and groups not a political bloc, but a fighting agreement, which we have always considered expedient and necessary" (cf. *Proletary*, No. 1, August 21, 1906 and No. 8, November 23, 1906*). A fighting agreement cannot be contraposed to a political bloc, for the latter concept embraces the former. A political bloc at various historical moments takes the form either of "a fighting agreement" in connection with insurrection, or of a parliamentary agreement for "joint action against the Black Hundreds and Cadets", and so on. The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has found its practical expression throughout our revolution in a thousand forms, from the signing of the manifesto calling upon the people to pay no taxes and to withdraw their deposits from the savings-banks (December 1905), or the signing of calls to insurrection (July 1906), to voting in the Second and Third Dumas in 1907 and 1908.

Trotsky's second statement quoted by Comrade Martov is wrong too. It is not true that "the whole question is, who will determine the government's policy, who will constitute a homogeneous majority in it", and so forth. And it is particularly untrue when Comrade Martov uses it as an argument against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky himself, in the course of his argument, concedes that "representatives of the democratic population will take part" in the "workers' government", i.e., concedes that there will be a government consisting of representatives of the proletariat *and* the peasantry. On what terms the proletariat will take part in the government of the revolution is, quite another question, and it is quite likely that on this question the Bolsheviks will disagree not only with Trotsky, but also with the Polish Social-Democrats. The question of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes; however, cannot be reduced to a question of the "majority" in any particular revolutionary government, or of the terms

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 150-66 and 307-19.—*Ed.*

on which the participation of the Social-Democrats in such a government is admissible.

Lastly, the most fallacious of Trotsky's opinions that Comrade Martov quotes and considers to be "just" is the third, viz.: "even if they [the peasantry] do this ["support the regime of working-class democracy"] with no more political understanding than they usually support a bourgeois regime." The proletariat cannot count on the ignorance and prejudices of the peasantry as the powers that be under a bourgeois regime count and depend on them, nor can it assume that in time of revolution the peasantry will remain in their usual state of political ignorance and passivity. The history of the Russian revolution shows that the very first wave of the upsurge at the end of 1905, at once stimulated the peasantry to form a political organisation (the All-Russian Peasant Union) which was undoubtedly the embryo of a distinct peasant party. Both in the First and Second Dumas—in spite of the fact that the counter-revolution had wined out the first contingents of advanced peasants—the peasantry, now for the first time acting on a nationwide scale in the Russian general elections, immediately laid the foundations of the Trudovik group, which was undoubledly the embryo of a distinct peasant party. In these embryos and rudiments there was much that was unstable, vague and vacillating: that is beyond doubt. But if political groups like this could spring up at the beginning of the revolution, there cannot be the slightest doubt that a revolution carried to such a "conclusion", or rather, to such a high stage of development as a revolutionary dictatorship, will produce a more definitely constituted and stronger revolutionary peasant party. To think otherwise would be like supposing that some vital organs of an adult can retain the size, shape and development of infancy.

In any case, Comrade Martov's conclusion that the conference agreed with Trotsky, of all people, on the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry in the struggle for power is an amazing contradiction of the facts, is an attempt to read into a *word* a meaning that was never discussed, not mentioned and not even thought of at the conference.

IV

Comrade Martov touches on Kautsky, and in doing so manages once more to pack so many inaccuracies in so few words that to answer him to the point we are obliged to tell the reader the whole story practically from the beginning.

The statement that "many, including Lenin in his preface to Kautsky's article on *Prospects*,* emphatically denied the bourgeois character of our revolution" is utterly false as also is the statement that Kautsky "has declared that the Russian revolution is not bourgeois". The facts are entirely different.

Plekhanov put questions to a number of representatives of the international Social-Democratic movement. His first question was about the "*general character*" of the Russian revolution, and the second was about "the attitude of the Social-Democratic Party towards the bourgeois democrats who are fighting in their own way for political liberty". In formulating the questions in this way Comrade Plekhanov committed two errors against Marxism. First, he confused the "general character" of the revolution, *its social and economic content*, with the question of the motive forces of the revolution. Marxists must not confuse these questions; they must not even *directly* deduce the answer to the second question from the answer to the first without a special concrete analysis. Secondly, he confused the role of the peasantry in our revolution with the role of the bourgeois democracy in general. Actually both the peasantry and the liberals are covered by the scientific term: "bourgeois democracy"; but the attitude of the proletariat towards these two varieties of "bourgeois democracy" must of necessity differ materially.

Kautsky immediately detected Comrade Plekhanov's errors and *corrected them* in his reply. As regards the social and economic content of the revolution, Kautsky did not deny its bourgeois character—on the contrary, he definitely recognised it. Here are Kautsky's statements relevant to the point as quoted in those same *Prospects* which have been so utterly garbled by Comrade Martov.

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 408-13.—*Ed.*

"The present revolution [in Russia] in its effect on the countryside can lead only to the creation of a strong peasantry on the basis of private property in land, and thereby create as wide a gulf between the proletariat and the property-owning section of the rural population as exists already in Western Europe. Therefore one cannot imagine that the present Russian revolution would lead immediately to the introduction of the socialist mode of production, even if it temporarily gave the reins of government to the Social-Democrats" (p. 31 of the Russian translation edited by N. Lenin).

It was this passage that prompted the following words in Lenin's preface (p. 6, ibid.). "Needless to say, Kautsky *fully* agrees with the fundamental thesis of *all* Russian Social-Democrats that the peasant movement is *non-socialist*, that socialism cannot arise from small peasant production, etc." (Lenin's italics in the preface).

Comrade Martov's assertion that Lenin positively denied the bourgeois character of our revolution is positively at variance with the truth. Lenin says just the opposite. Kautsky definitely recognised that in its general character, i.e., in its social and economic content, our revolution is bourgeois.

Plekhanov's "first question"—wrote Kautsky in this article—"cannot, it seems to me, be given a simple answer, one way or the other. The time for bourgeois revolutions, i.e., revolutions in which the bourgeoisie is the motive force, has passed; it has passed for Russia too.... The bourgeoisie is not one of the motive forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia, and that being the case, this movement cannot be called bourgeois" (p. 29). As the reader sees, Kautsky here makes it perfectly clear what he is discussing: he is perfectly clearly speaking of a bourgeois revolution, *not* in the sense of its social and economic content, *but* in the sense of a revolution "of which the bourgeoisie is the motive force".

To proceed. Kautsky corrected Plekhanov's second mistake by drawing a clear and definite distinction between "liberal" and peasant bourgeois democracy. Kautsky stated that "the revolutionary strength of Russian Social-Democracy lies in the community of interests of the industrial prole-

tariat and the peasantry", that "without the peasants we cannot now gain the victory in Russia" (p. 31). Apropos of the dull question of the word "*and*" which monopolises Comrade Martov's discussion of principle, it is interesting to note that in this same article, i.e., in 1906, Kautsky employs *on one and the same page* the expression "*rely*" ("on what class can the Russian proletariat rely?") and the expression: "*the alliance between the proletariat and other classes* in the revolutionary struggle must primarily be based on community of economic interests" (p. 30).

Perhaps Comrade Martov will accuse Karl Kautsky, will say that in 1906—in anticipation of the December 1908 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.—Kautsky set out to "mislead the readers", to "slur over" and "paste over" the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Polish Social-Democrats, to "engage in pettifoggery", and so forth?

We may point out that, in advocating the idea of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution, Kautsky is not proposing anything "new", but is entirely following in the footsteps of Marx and Engels. In 1848, Marx wrote in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[142]: "The big bourgeoisie," i.e., the German bourgeoisie after March 18, 1848—"anti-revolutionary from the very outset, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with reaction out of fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic, bourgeoisie" (see Volume III of Marx's *Collected Works* published by Mehring; so far only two volumes have appeared in Russian). "The German revolution of 1848," wrote Marx on July 29, 1848, "is a mere travesty of the French Revolution of 1789.... The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not abandon its allies the peasants for a moment.... The German bourgeoisie of 1848 is betraying the peasants without the slightest compunction...."

Here in relation to a *bourgeois* revolution Marx is clearly contraposing the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie allied with reaction to the working class allied with the democraic bourgeoisie, i.e., primarily the peasantry. And this view can hardly be put down to the fact that Marx's socialist world-outlook had not fully crystallised at that time. Forty-four years later, in 1892, in his article, "Historical Materialism" (*Neue Zeit*, XI, Vol. I, published in Russian

in the symposium *Historical Materialism*) Engels wrote the following: "...In all the three great bourgeois risings [the Reformation and Peasant War in the sixteenth century in Germany, the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and the French in the eighteenth] the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting.... Had it not been for that yeomanry [in the English Revolution] and for the plebeian element in the towns, the bourgeoisie alone would never have fought the matter out to the bitter end, and would never have brought Charles I to the scaffold."[143]

Consequently, the specific feature of the Russian bourgeois revolution is merely that instead of the plebeian element of the towns taking second place as it did in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is the proletariat which is taking first place in the twentieth century.

V

To conclude. Comrade Martov has touched on an extremely important question that deserves discussing very thoroughly in the columns of the Party's Central Organ. But it is not a question to "touch on", it must be examined in great detail, in the light not only of the teachings of Marx and Engels but also of the experience of the Russian Revolution of 1905-07.

The suggestion that the idea of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is the result of a Narodnik spell cast over the Social-Democrats can only provoke a smile. If that were true, the quasi-Marxists who argue in this way should first of all have accused Kautsky, Marx and Engels of falling under the Narodnik spell. In all the great bourgeois revolutions decisive victory could be achieved only by the proletariat (more or less developed) in alliance with the peasantry; and the same holds true for the bourgeois revolution in Russia. In the experience of 1905-07 the truth of this was given a *practical* demonstration by *every* important turn in events: for in practice all decisive actions, both "combative" and parliamentary, were actually "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Our Party holds firmly to the view that the role of the proletariat is the *role of leader* in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; that *joint actions* of the proletariat and the peasantry are essential to carry it through to victory; that unless *political power is won* by the revolutionary classes, victory is impossible. Rejection of these truths must inevitably doom Social-Democrats to vacillation, to "movement without a goal", to advocating casual agreements with complete disregard for principle, and in practice means falling captive to the Cadets, i.e., making the working class dependent upon the liberal-monarchist, counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Sotsial-Demokrat, Nos. 3 and 4,
March 9 (22) and March 21
(April 3), 1909
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[144]

The article headed "The Question of Organisation in the Russian Social-Democratic Party" printed in No. 79 of *Vorwärts* (I. Beilage, d. 3. IV. 1909) obliges us to address a strong protest to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which has charged us to look after its affairs abroad, we ask the Executive Committee of the German S.D.P. to give careful attention to the extremely abnormal situation which has been created. The Central Organ of German Social-Democracy persistently ignores our formal statement that a special representative body of the C.C. exists abroad, and does not print the report about this institution and its address, which were sent to the paper a long time ago. At the same time *Vorwärts* prints a report "From a Comrade" and sets forth in this report an *official* Party event, namely the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., *without giving the official text* of the (two) resolutions of the conference on the question of organisation. By not giving the official Party resolutions the letter published in *Vorwärts* gives an entirely distorted version of the disputes and differences among the Russian Social-Democrats; what is more, the letter contains a covert factional polemic against the decisions of the conference. Such a form of polemics is liable more than ever to poison the already abnormal relations between the groups within the R.S.D.L.P. Such a form of polemics arouses particular irritation and resentment, while at the same time making

it more difficult to explain to the German comrades the real state of affairs and differences within our Party.

Therefore the Bureau Abroad of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. requests the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party to consider the question of reporting Russian differences in *Vorwärts*, and of the publication in *Vorwärts* of articles on Russian affairs, as well as official communications from the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and official texts of Party resolutions adopted by the R.S.D.L.P.

The Bureau Abroad of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. asks the Executive Committee to adopt a decision as to whether Party life of the Russian Social-Democrats can be reported in *Vorwärts* without giving official information from their C.C. and the official texts of Party resolutions.

As regards the substance of the matter, the Bureau Abroad of the C.C. thinks it essential to point out—among the boundless number of distortions of the truth in this article—at least the following three *main* untruths; to enumerate *all* the misstatements would necessitate the writing of a pamphlet.

(1) The first resolution on the question of organisation adopted by the conference records the fact that in the R.S.D.L.P. there are *two* currents of opinion on the basic questions of organisation. In this resolution the Party condemns the current which is characterised as "liquidationist", i.e., in effect aiming at the destruction of the present R.S.D.L.P. Not only all the Bolsheviks and all the members of the Polish Social-Democratic Party voted for this resolution, but also two delegates from the Bund, out of the three Bundist delegates present.

(2) In the resolution on the assessment of the present situation, proposed by the Bolsheviks and adopted by the Party, it is pointed out at the very beginning that the old feudal autocracy is decaying, making a further step on the road of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The Mensheviks did not offer any draft of their own but voted against this resolution, moving the solitary amendment that the word "bourgeois" should be changed to "plutocratic".

(3) The representatives of the Social-Democrats of the Ukraine did not support and could not support the Mensheviks, because there were no representatives of the Ukraine

at the conference. As for the Polish Socialist Party being in agreement with the Mensheviks, this Party did not participate and could not participate in the conference, since this Party is not a member of the R.S.D.L.P. The proposal of the Mensheviks that the R.S.D.L.P. should amalgamate with this party was rejected by the conference in the form of a motion carried to call next business.

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A CARICATURE OF BOLSHEVISM

We have already given a general appraisal of "otzovism" and "ultimatumism" in *Proletary*, No. 42.* Concerning the resolution of the St. Petersburg otzovists (reprinted in this issue) which served as their platform during the election of delegates to the December Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (and *unfortunately* was not communicated to *Proletary* till *after* the conference) we have to repeat much of what was said there.

This resolution simply teems with fallacious, un-Marxian arguments. Practically every point in it is evidence of the immaturity of its authors' ideas or of their oblivion of the ABC of Social-Democracy. Point 1: "The first stage of the revolution is concluded...." What does that mean? That a stage in social and economic development is concluded? Probably not. The authors have in mind the end of the stage of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. We must assume that the otzovists mean that, if we are not to impute to them something totally absurd. If that is the case, then they admit that present conditions are unfavourable for the direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. But although compelled by the force of circumstances to admit this, the otzovists are unable to *reason out* the conclusions that follow, and cannot, therefore, get their arguments to hang together. "Russia ... is moving towards a new revolutionary upswing".... Quite right! She is only *moving towards* an upswing, i.e., there is no upswing yet—that is what this means, both in logic and in grammar! It appears, however, that this still non-existing upswing is "characterised by

* See pp. 356-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

a sharp conflict", etc. The result is utter nonsense. The otzovists are incapable of characterising the present. They "characterise" the future, which we are "moving towards", in order to cover up failure to understand the present. For instance, the "pauperised town petty bourgeoisie" jump into the picture from God knows where, and the reference to them is not backed by even an attempt at an analysis. Why the future upswing should be "characterised" by a sharp conflict of pauperised petty bourgeois is not evident at all. Nor does there appear to be any reason why the pauperised town petty bourgeoisie should be brought in just at this moment. Lumpen-proletarians are *sometimes* distinguished for their sharp conflicts, and *sometimes* for their amazing instability and inability to fight. The otzovists' ideas are utterly confused, and we are not surprised that at the conference of the R.S.D.L.P. *only two Bundists* voted with the *two* otzovists for the insertion of the reference to the "pauperised town petty bourgeoisie". Our opinion that otzovism is opportunism turned inside out has been magnificently borne out.

With whom will the sharp conflict take place? "With the ruling bloc of the big bourgeoisie and feudalist landlords." And not with the autocracy? The otzovists cannot distinguish absolutism, which is manoeuvring between these two classes, from the direct rule of the two classes; with the absurd result that the struggle against the autocracy drops out of the picture entirely.

"Secret work is going on to organise the forces...." The work of learning the lessons of experience, of digesting new lessons, of accumulating strength may be, and often is, performed in secret; but the organisation of forces cannot be performed in secret even when all work is driven underground. In 1901-03 the *organisation* of forces proceeded illegally, but not secretly. The otzovists are merely repeating scraps of parrot-phrases and garbling them in the process.

Point 2: "The solution of this conflict, in view of the strongly developed class antagonisms in Russia, will assume the form of a revolution".... Class antagonisms in Russia are less strongly developed than in Europe, which is not faced with the task of fighting autocracy. The otzovists fail to see that in trying to broaden their views they are coming closer to their antipodes, the opportunists.

"... of a revolution which will lead to an armed uprising...."

The otzovists have not yet told us anything distinctly about the *object* of the struggle, or about the present stage of development of the autocracy; but they make haste to tell us about the *means* of struggle in order to proclaim themselves "revolutionaries". This is childish, dear comrades, for you are showing us once again that you *have learnt by heart* scraps of good phrases, *without understanding* what they mean. The attitude of the revolutionary Social-Democrats towards insurrection was different in 1897, 1901, and in 1905. It was only after January 9, 1905 that they made it a key issue—although Russia, in 1897 and in 1901, was undoubtedly "moving towards upswing", towards a "sharp conflict" and towards "revolution". It is not enough to learn slogans by heart; one must also learn to judge the opportune moment to issue them. To advocate *one* of the means of struggle at a time when the "upswing" has not begun and "revolution", in the most strict and direct sense of the term, is still a matter of the future (and the otzovists speak of it *in the future*: "*will assume* the form of a revolution") means only to make oneself into a caricature of a revolutionary Social-Democrat. The resolution adopted by the conference speaks of a developing revolutionary crisis and of the aim of the struggle (conquest of power by the revolutionary classes); *more than this* cannot and should not be said at the *present time*.

How the mysterious "municipal reforms" got here, and represented as "radical reforms" at that, God only knows. Apparently the otzovists themselves do not know what this means.

Point 3: "In view of this, Social-Democracy as a consistently revolutionary party must put non-parliamentary action in the forefront."...

And yet there are people (the ultimatumists) who are so short-sighted that our disagreements with the otzovists seem to them differences only about practical matters, disagreements over the ways and means of applying a common line of tactics! In the summer of 1907 the disagreement over boycotting the Third Duma might have been regarded merely as a disagreement over methods, and the mistake of the boycottists merely as a mistake in choice of methods

in applying tactics with which all Bolsheviks were agreed. Today, in 1909, it is ridiculous even to suggest such a thing. The mistake of the otzovists and ultimatumists has developed into a deviation from the principles of Marxism. Just think: "*in view of this*", i.e., in view of the fact that we are "moving towards" an upswing, and that the conflict "will assume the form of a revolution", "in view of this" let non-parliamentary action be put in the forefront! Why, comrades, this is merely a jumble of words to cover up a monstrous confusion of ideas! Before you have even said a word about the Duma in your resolution, you have already concocted the conclusion: "in view of this" ... "non-parliamentary action"! In view of the fact that we do not understand the importance of the Duma and the tasks of the Party at a time when an upswing is maturing, we proclaim that struggle must be outside the Duma—that is the nonsense that the otzovists' case amounts to. They have repeated, without understanding them, scraps of arguments which the Bolsheviks advanced at a time when non-parliamentary action was not merely being proclaimed, but *carried on by the masses*; and repeated them at a time when they themselves consider "the first stage of the revolution concluded", i.e., that for the time being the conditions for direct mass action are absent.

They *have learned by heart* the sound proposition that work in the Duma must be subordinated to the interests and direction of the working-class movement outside the Duma, and repeat *scraps* of what they have learned irrelevantly, and in a garbled, scarcely recognisable form.

Instead of emphasising the necessity of continuing—in addition to work in the Duma—to devote maximum effort to persistent, prolonged and painstaking organisation and agitation among the masses outside the Duma—the otzovists, in company with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, raise a "revolutionary" yelp about "non-parliamentary action", making an onslaught, and so forth.

"Direct action is impossible at the present time," say the otzovists at the end of the resolution (Point 1), although at the beginning of it they *proclaimed* a non-parliamentary struggle. If this is not a caricature of Bolshevism, what is?

And work to carry the revolution through to complete victory"…. First, the scrap of an idea about the means of struggle, then its object! … "and for this purpose to organise the proletariat and the broad masses of the peasantry"…. At a time like the present, when the first and foremost task is to strengthen and rebuild the semi-destroyed Party organisations, this is a mere phrase, comrades!

Point 4 is one of the gems of "otzovism". "The Party may employ only such forms of organisational and agitational action as do not obscure or weaken the revolutionary struggle"….

This, according to the "practical" ultimatumists, is the "practical" way of stating the issue! In 1909 the otzovists are *compelled to search for* theoretical justification and the quest inevitably bogs them down. "Only such forms of action as do not obscure…"—this is a broad hint at the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma and at their utilisation of semi-legal and legal organisations. It appears, then, that there are some "forms of action" which obscure and others which do not. In order to save people who are unable to think the trouble of using their brains, let us draw up a list of "forms of action" and cross out those which "obscure"—now that will be real revolutionary tactics!

Take legal literature, for instance, dear comrades. Does this "form of organisational and agitational action" obscure, or does it not? Of course it does, under the Stolypin regime. Then it must be eliminated according to the otzovists, who do not know how to distinguish the *conditions* in which revolutionary Social-Democrats may resort to the *most varied forms* of action, and therefore talk nonsense. "The Party must pay special attention to the utilisation and reinforcement of existing organisations and the formation of new illegal, semi-legal and, where possible, legal organisations that could serve as its strongholds," declares the resolution of the conference, proposed and carried by the Bolsheviks. *This* resolution is as remote from otzovism as heaven is from earth. "Only *such forms* as do not obscure"—is just a hollow phrase: a mere "yelp", and not a revolutionary utterance. The formation of illegal Party "workers' committees" to *utilise* "semi-legal and, where possible, legal organisations"—these are the tactics of revolutionary

Social-Democrats who take into account what "forms of organisational and agitational action" are prescribed by the present situation, and who are able to display *methods* of genuine Social-Democratic activity in the most diverse "forms".

"Down with legal Social-Democratic literature" is a hollow phrase, impracticable and *therefore only to the advantage of the opportunists*—who are perfectly well aware that it is impracticable. It is difficult to draw a line between Social-Democrats who are ready to answer to the Party for their legal writings and non-Party literary hacks; but it is possible, and it provides a real line of activity for those who want to work with the Party. "Down with the legal Duma group, down with legal organisations"—these are hollow phrases *which are only to the advantage of the opportunists* who would be glad to rid themselves of Party control. To keep on exercising this control, "utilising" legal organisations, *rectifying* every mistake and tactical blunder committed by Social-Democrats—this is Party work, which we and all those who wish to-carry out the decisions of the conference will continue to do.

The end of Point 4: "strenuously opposing all deals between the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the autocracy."

Ugh! The otzovists will insist on *inappropriately* repeating scraps of ideas drawn from Bolshevik literature. Really, comrades, you must try to make out what's what! In the period of the First and Second Dumas, the government was still groping its way towards such *deals*, while the Cadets were recommending deals to the people as slogans of "struggle" (slogans which misled even the Menshevik Social-Democrats). *At that time* a resolute struggle against any *deals* was really the slogan of the day, the task of the moment, the exposure of fraud. Today tsarism has found the way to conclude the deal, and has already done so, with those classes which the otzovists themselves refer to as a "bloc"; and moreover no one is deceived by the deal which has been concluded in the Third Duma. To make the task of "strenuously opposing *all deals*" the pivot of our agitation today means making oneself a caricature of Bolshevism.

Point 5: "Our Duma cannot be regarded as a parliament working in an environment of political liberty, and with a measure of freedom for the class struggle of the proletariat, but is merely a deal between tsarism and the big bourgeoisie".... This contains two mistakes. It is wrong to say "*not* a parliament *but* a deal", for quite a number of the world's parliaments are nothing more than a deal between the bourgeoisie (at various stages of development) and various survivals of medievalism. We had to, and did, fight to prevent Russia's first parliament from being a Black-Hundred and Octobrist parliament, but once it became such in spite of our efforts—and history obliged us to pass through this stage—it is childish to try to exorcise this unpleasant reality with exclamations and declamations. Secondly: according to the authors of the resolution, if there is a "measure of freedom" then it is a "parliament"; if not, it is a "fraud". This is a vulgar-democratic view, worthy of a Cadet but not of a Marxist. Under the Third Duma there is much less freedom than there was under the Second; but the Third Duma is a *less* fictitious parliament, because it *more truly reflects* the actual relation between the state authority and the present ruling classes. As long as power is in the hands of the tsar and the feudalist landlords, there can be no other parliament in bourgeois Russia. It might befit Cadets to try to brush this bare truth under the carpet, but not Social-Democrats.

Point 6, by way of an exception, is correct. But this is precisely an exception which proves the reverse rule, because ... because on this point the otzovists are expounding, not their own ideas, but the ideas of the anti-otzovists who carried the resolutions at the conference.

Conclusions. Point (a) "The Duma being ... a deal ... and a weapon of the counter-revolution".... Quite right! ..."only serves to bolster up the autocracy".... This "only" is wrong. The autocracy has staved off its downfall by organising such a Duma in time: but it has not been strengthened thereby, rather on the contrary, advanced in its decay. The Duma, as a "screen", is more effective than many an "exposure", because for the first time, on a thousand and one issues, it reveals tsarism's dependence on the counter-revolutionary sections of society; it is for the first

time demonstrating *en grand* how close is the alliance between Romanov and Purishkevich, between tsarism and the "Union of the Russian People", between the autocracy and the Dubrovins, the Iliodors and the Polovnyovs.

That the Duma sanctions the crimes of tsarism is beyond doubt; but it is the sanction of particular classes, on behalf of particular class interests, and it is the duty of the Social-Democrats precisely to use the Duma rostrum to reveal these instructive truths of the class struggle.

"The eight months' proceedings of the Third Duma have shown that the Social-Democrats cannot make use of it."

Here is the very essence of otzovism, the error of which our "ultimatumists" are only covering up, confusing the issue by their ridiculous equivocation—that since we have spent so much energy on creating a Duma group, we must not recall it lightly!

There is a straightforward question, and evasions won't do: have these eight months' proceedings proved that it is possible to make use of the rostrum of the Duma, or not? The otzovists' reply is wrong. In spite of the immense difficulties involved in Party *guidance* of the Duma group, it has beyond question *proved the possibility* of making use of the Duma as a platform. To be daunted by difficulties and mistakes is timidity; it is intellectual "yelping", whereas what we want is patient, consistent and persistent proletarian effort. Other socialist parties in Europe encountered even greater difficulties at the beginning of their parliamentary activity, and made many more mistakes, but they did not shirk their duty. They succeeded in overcoming the difficulties and in correcting their mistakes.

(b) "Our Duma group ... persistently pursuing opportunist tactics, could not and cannot be a staunch and consistent representative of the revolutionary proletariat."

The grandest truths can be vulgarised, otzovist comrades, the noblest aims can be reduced to mere *phrase-mongering*—and that is what you are doing. You have degraded the fight against opportunism into mere phrase-mongering, and are thereby only playing into the hands of the opportunists. Our Duma group has made and is making mistakes, but by its very work it has proved that it "could and can" staunchly and consistently represent the proletariat—*could and can*,

when we, the Party, guide it, help it, appoint our best men to lead it, draw up directives, and draft speeches, and explain the harmful and fatal effects of taking advice from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who, not only in Russia but *all over the world*, *always* gain easy access to all kinds of institutions on the parliamentary fringe.

Have the courage to admit, comrades, that we have as yet done far too little to provide this *real* guidance of the work of the Duma group, to help it with *deeds*. Have the courage to admit that we *can* do ten times as much in this direction, if we succeed in strengthening our organisations, consolidating our Party, bringing it closer to the masses, creating Party media exercising a constant influence on large sections of the proletarians. That is what we are working for, that is what everybody must work for who wants to fight opportunism in deeds and not in words.

The otzovists have reduced the struggle against opportunism in the Duma group to a mere phrase. They have learned words by rote without understanding the difference between anarchist and Social-Democratic criticism of opportunism. Take the anarchists. They all pounce on every mistake every Social-Democratic member of parliament makes. They all shout that *even* Bebel once made a speech in an almost patriotic spirit, once took up a wrong stand on the agrarian programme, and so on and so forth. True, even Bebel made opportunist mistakes in his parliamentary career. But what does this prove? The anarchists say that it proves that all the workers' M.P.s should be recalled. The anarchists rail at the Social-Democratic members of parliament and refuse to have anything to do with them, refuse to do anything to develop a proletarian party, a proletarian policy and proletarian members of parliament. And in practice the anarchists' phrase-mongering converts them into the truest accomplices of opportunism, into the reverse side of opportunism.

Social-Democrats draw quite a different conclusion from their mistakes—the conclusion that *even* Bebel could not become Bebel without prolonged Party work in training up real Social-Democratic representatives. They need not tell us, "We have no Bebels in our group." Bebels are not born. They have to be made. Bebels don't spring fully formed like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, but are created by the Party

and the working class. Those who say we have no Bebels don't know the history of the German Party: they don't know that there was a time, under the Anti-Socialist Law, when August Bebel made opportunist blunders and that the Party corrected him, the Party guided Bebel.*

(c) "The continued presence of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma ... can only do harm to the interests of the proletariat ... lower the dignity and influence of the Social-Democrats." To show how "quantity passes into quality" in these preposterous exaggerations, and how anarchist phrases *grow out* of them (irrespective of whether our otzovist comrades desire it or not), we need only refer to Belousov's speech during the 1909 budget debate. If *such* speeches are considered as "harmful", and not as proof that the rostrum of the Duma can and must be utilised, then our disagreement ceases to be a mere difference of opinion about the character of a speech, and becomes a disagreement concerning the fundamental principles of Social-Democratic tactics.

(I) "Launch a wide campaign ... for the slogan: 'Down with the Third Duma'" ....

We have already said in *Proletary*, No. 39, that this slogan, which for a time appealed to some anti-otzovist workers, is *wrong*.** It is either a Cadet slogan, calling for franchise reform under the autocracy, or a repetition of words learned by rote from the period when liberal Dumas were a screen for counter-revolutionary tsarism, designed to prevent the people from seeing clearly who their real enemy was.

(II) "Recall ... the Duma group; this will emphasise both ... the character of the Duma and the revolutionary tactics of the Social-Democrats."

This is a paraphrase of the proposition advanced by the Moscow otzovists, that the recall of the Duma group will emphasise that the revolution is not dead and buried. Such a conclusion—we repeat the words of *Proletary*, No. 39, "emphasises" only the *burial* of those Social-Democrats who

* We hope to deal with this illuminating history and with *its* condemnation of German trends akin to our otzovists in a separate article.

** See pp. 286-302 of this volume.—*Ed.*

are capable of arguing in this way. They *bury* themselves thereby as Social-Democrats; they lose all feeling for genuine proletarian revolutionary work; and for that reason they are so painfully contorting themselves to "emphasise" their revolutionary phrases.

(III) "Devote all efforts to organisation and preparation ... for open ... struggle [and therefore renounce open agitation from the rostrum of the Duma!] ... and to propaganda", etc., etc.

The otzovists have forgotten that it is unseemly for Social-Democrats to refuse to conduct *propaganda* from the rostrum of the Duma.

At this point they give us the argument repeated by some ultimatumists, that "there is no sense in wasting energy on hopeless work in the Duma, let us use *all our forces* more productively". This is not reasoning, but sophistry, which—again irrespective of whether the authors desire it or not—leads to anarchist conclusions. For in *all* countries the anarchists, pointing to the mistakes committed by Social-Democratic members of parliament, argue that it is "a waste of time to bother with bourgeois parliamentarism" and call for the concentration of "all these forces" on organising "direct action". But this leads to disorganisation and to the shouting of "slogans" which are futile because they are isolated, instead of conducting work in every field on the widest possible scale. It only seems to the otzovists and ultimatumists that their argument is new, and applies *only* to the Third Duma. But they are wrong. It is a common argument heard all over Europe, and it is *not* a Social-Democratic argument.

Thus, otzovism and ultimatumism are a caricature of Bolshevism. What gave rise to this caricature? Of course, the fallacies of Bolshevism as a whole, the Menshevik hastens to declare. Such a conclusion, undoubtedly, is very "profitable" for the Mensheviks. Unfortunately for them, however, objective facts do not corroborate, but refute it. The objective facts are that in the development not only of Bolshevism, but of Russian Marxism *in general*, there was a period when Marxism was caricatured, and that Russian

Marxism grew strong and developed in struggle with these growing pains, pains which accompanied the expansion of its sphere of influence. Russian Marxism was born at the beginning of the eighties of the last century in the works of a group of political emigrants (the Emancipation of Labour group).

But Marxism did not become a trend of Russian social thought and a constituent part of the working-class movement in Russia until the middle of the nineties of the last century, when a "wave" of Marxian literature and of a Social-Democratic working-class movement arose in Russia. And what happened? This wave carried with it a *caricature of Marxism* in the shape of Struvism on the one hand and *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism and Economism on the other. Marxism grew and matured because it did not conceal the disagreements in its ranks, did not play the diplomat (as the Mensheviks do with Maslov, Cherevanin, Kuskova, Prokopovich, Valentinov, Yermansky and Co.), but waged a victorious *campaign* against the caricature, which had been engendered by the deplorable conditions of Russian life and the turning-point in the historical development of socialism in Russia. And Bolshevism will grow up and become strong, making no attempt to conceal the *incipient* distortion of its principles by a caricature engendered by the deplorable conditions of Russian life and the turning-point in the counter-revolutionary period, but openly explaining to the masses into what a bog the otzovists and ultimatumists would lead the Duma group and the Party.

Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 44, April 4 (17), 1909

Published according to the Supplement

THE "LEFTWARD SWING" OF THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

The question of the "leftward swing" of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie has long become a standing feature in the columns of our legal press. It has been noted and acknowledged that the Octobrist press has a regular periodic grumble against the "agrarian" (read: feudalist-landlord) Duma and against the corresponding policy of tsarism. It has been noted and acknowledged that quite a number of local and national associations of merchants and industrialists—from provincial stock exchange committees to the "Board of Congresses of Representatives of Commerce and Industry"—have in recent years, and particularly of late, been voicing their dissatisfaction with this pro-landlord policy. There have been descriptions of the Moscow "fraternisation of millions with science", to wit, the private conferences of Moscow's and St. Petersburg's money-bags—Krestovnikov, Goujon, Volsky and others—with the Cadet professors and writers—Manuilov, Struve, Kiesewetter and Co. One need hardly add that the liberal press, including the Menshevik publications, seize on every piece of news of this kind and blazon forth with a thousand variations the rebirth and renovation of liberalism.

This sensational "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie has been reflected in the "political" steps of the tsarist government and in speeches in the Duma. Mr. Timiryazev, darling of the Russian merchants and at the same time an old bureaucrat, has been appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry. On March 13 he made a big "programme" speech in the Duma—such ministerial speeches are called programme speeches in all the arch-reactionary bourgeois and ordinary

bourgeois parliaments in the world "just for show". As a matter of fact the tsarist Minister outlined no programme at all, and merely contented himself, as usual, with meaningless courtesies to the capitalists and threats to the working class, of course combining these threats with stereotyped hypocritical expressions of "sympathy". On March 19 these affectionate exchanges of the Minister with the leaders of capital were repeated in Moscow, where Timiryazev and Krestovnikov exchanged friendly speeches at a meeting of the Moscow Stock Exchange Association. "Russia is sick, but with proper care her malady is not dangerous, and will soon pass," said Krestovnikov, welcoming the highly-esteemed Timiryazev. While Timiryazev, thanking the highly-esteemed Krestovnikov, signified on behalf of the government its benevolent consent to "care for" the patient with the tried Stolypin remedies of the "transition period".

The question arises, what are the objective causes of this "leftward swing" of the bougeoisie, and what is its class significance? In the periodical *Vozrozhdeniye*[145] (No. 1-2) Comrade Martov, with a clarity and directness not very usual for this writer, answers this question in an article entitled "The 'Leftward Swing' of the Bourgeoisie". "Experience has shown," he writes, "that if economic development has ripened for a precisely bourgeois reformation and the bourgeoisie is unable to become its driving force, this only means that the social change cannot be completed until the further development of the class in question makes it the driving force." And elsewhere: "Those who assumed that the Constitution now in force represents a more or less organic union of the nobility with the bourgeoisie as equally 'counter-revolutionary factors' may regard phenomena of the kind indicated above [i.e., the "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie] merely as minor episodes, not necessarily connected with the general trend of social development.... These isolated phenomena may have a symptomatic importance only in the eyes of those who were certain *a priori* that the course of social development is inexorably leading the Russian bourgeoisie, as a class, into sharp opposition to the regime ... of June 3."

Compare with this the declaration of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 12: "We agree also with the proposal of the

Caucasians [i.e., Dan, Axelrod and Semyonov at the last conference of the R.S.D.L.P.] to speak to the Russian monarchy not as 'bourgeois' but as 'plutocratic', for this amendment refutes the fundamentally false assertion of the Bolshevik resolution that Russian tsarism is beginning to voice the class interests of the bourgeoisie."

Here we have the political theory of Menshevism complete with all its conclusions. If our revolution is bourgeois, it cannot be completed until the bourgeoisie becomes its driving force. The "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie proves that it is becoming such a driving force, and there can be no question of calling it counter-revolutionary. Tsarism in Russia is becoming plutocratic, not bourgeois. Obviously the logic of this is to advocate the pursuance of opportunist tactics by the workers' party in our bourgeois revolution, the tactics of support to the liberals by the proletariat, as opposed to the tactics which allot to the proletariat allying to itself the peasantry, the leading role in the bourgeois revolution—which it must play in spite of the vacillations and betrayals of liberalism.

The Menshevik tactics stand revealed as a falsification of Marxism, as a camouflaging of anti-Marxist content with "Marxist" phraseology. The method of reasoning underlying these tactics is not that of Marxists but of liberals dressed up as Marxists. To be convinced of this we have only to cast a cursory glance at the history and results of the bourgeois revolution in Germany. In *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* Marx wrote about the causes of the defeat of the revolution in 1848: "The big bourgeoisie, anti-revolutionary from the very outset, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with reaction out of fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie."[146] This was Marx's point of view, and it is shared by all the German Marxists in their estimate of 1848 and the subsequent tactics of the German bourgeoisie. The counter-revolutionary nature of the big bourgeoisie did not prevent it from "going left", for instance, in the period of the constitutional conflict of the sixties, but inasmuch as the proletariat did not take independent and strong action, the result of this "leftward swing" was not a revolution but only a timid opposition that impelled the monarchy to become more and more

bourgeois, and did not destroy the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the Junkers, i.e., the reactionary landlords.

That is how the Marxists look at it. The liberals, on the contrary, take the view that the workers, with their immoderate demands, their unreasonable revolutionariness their ill-timed attacks on liberalism, prevented the success of the cause of liberty in Germany by precipitating their possible allies into the arms of reaction.

It is quite obvious that our Mensheviks are using Marxist words to disguise their falsification of Marxism, and to disguise their own defection *from* Marxism *to* liberalism.

Both in France after 1789 and in Germany after 1848 the monarchy undoubtedly made "a further step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy". It is equally certain that the bourgeoisie became counter-revolutionary after both these revolutions. Does this mean that after 1789 in France and after 1848 in Germany the basis for a "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie, and for a subsequent bourgeois revolution, had disappeared? Of course not. The French bourgeoisie, for all its counter-revolutionariness "moved left", for example, in 1830, and the German in 1863-64. Inasmuch as the proletariat did not take independent action, inasmuch as it did not win political power even for a short time with the help of the revolutionary sections of the bourgeoisie, the "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie did not lead to revolution (Germany) and led only to further steps in the transformation of the monarchy into a bourgeois monarchy. To the extent that the proletariat did act independently, and won political power in alliance with the revolutionary sections of the bourgeoisie, overthrowing the old regime (as was the case in France more than once in the nineteenth century), the "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie proved to be the prologue to a new bourgeois revolution.

This is the ABC of history that our Mensheviks have forgotten and distorted, adopting the point of view of the liberals: there will be no bourgeois revolution in Russia until the bourgeoisie becomes the driving force! This is an abject failure to understand the dialectics of history and the lessons of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, there will be no bourgeois revolution in Russia until the proletariat, in alliance with the revolutionary elements

of the bourgeoisie (i.e., with the peasantry in our case), becomes an independent driving force, operating in spite of the vacillations and betrayals of the unstable and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It was not it the reign of Nicholas II, dear Menshevik comrades, but in that of Alexander II that Russian tsarism began to be transformed into a "plutocratic" monarchy, "*began* to voice the class interests of the bourgeoisie". But it could never have voiced them had there been no independent class *organisation* of the bourgeoisie. The revolution of 1905 has raised us to a higher stage, and the old struggle is being renewed on a plane of more advanced political relations. The Third Duma is the politically constituted, national alliance of the political *organisations* of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. Tsarism is making an attempt to solve objectively-necessary historical problems with the help of the *organisations* of these two classes. Will it succeed in the attempt?

No. It turns out that the solution of such a problem has not only defied a plutocratic tsarism, which had no national representation of the "upper" classes to fall back on, but it defies even a semi-bourgeois tsarism assisted by a Black-Hundred-bourgeois Duma. The Duma is helping it to solve the problem. But this help *is proving* inadequate. The "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie is due precisely to the *objective* fact that, in spite of Stolypin's doctoring of tsarism, its bourgeois evolution is *not working out*. Just as before 1905, in the period when tsarism knew nothing of representative institutions, the "leftward swing" of the landlords and the marshals of nobility was a symptom of maturing crisis, so in 1909, in the period when tsarism has given national representation to the Krestovnikovs, the "leftward swing" of these money-bags is a *symptom* that "the objective tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia remain unsolved", and that "the *main* factors which brought about the Revolution of 1905, continue to operate" (the conference resolution on the present situation).

The Mensheviks confine their argument to the fact that the revolution in our country is bourgeois and that our bourgeoisie is "going left". But stopping there means converting Marxism, a "guide to action", into a dead letter;

it means falsifying Marxism and virtually adopting the point of view of liberalism. There can be a bourgeois revolution without a single complete victory of the proletariat, when the result is the gradual conversion of the old monarchy into a bourgeois and bourgeois-imperialist monarchy (for instance, Germany). There can be a bourgeois revolution with a number of independent actions by the proletariat, producing both complete victories and heavy defeats, when the result is a bourgeois republic (for instance, France).

The question arises: has Russian history decided in favour of one path or the other? The Mensheviks do not understand this question, they are afraid to raise it, they avoid it, not realising that by avoiding it they are actually dragging in their policy at the tail of the liberal bourgeoisie. We are of the opinion that Russian history has not yet answered this question, that it will be answered by the struggle of the classes in the next few years, that the first round of our bourgeois revolution (1905-07) has proved beyond doubt that our bourgeoisie is utterly unstable and counter-revolutionary, proved that our proletariat is capable of being the *leader* of a victorious revolution, proved the capacity of the democratic masses of the peasantry to help the proletariat make this revolution victorious.

And here again we come up against the purely liberal point of view of the Mensheviks regarding our *Trudovik* peasantry. The Mensheviks say the Trudoviks are full of petty-bourgeois utopias, their fight for the land is a fight in the name of the absurd and reactionary slogans of socialisation of land or equalised land tenure; "consequently" the Trudovik fight for the land *weakens* the fight for freedom, the victory of the Trudoviks would be a reactionary victory of countryside over town. That is the gist both of Martynov's reasoning in No. 10-11 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and of Martov's arguments in the symposium *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*.

Such an estimate of the Trudovik peasantry is just as outrageous a distortion of Marxism as the discourses on the bourgeois revolution quoted above. It is doctrinairism at its worst when a Marxist is unable to grasp the *actual* significance of a revolutionary struggle against the whole system of contemporary landed proprietorship, under the

integument of a Narodnik *doctrine* which really is absurd, visionary and reactionary when viewed as a socialist doctrine. The Mensheviks display incredible blindness and ignorance of the dialectics of Marxism when they fail to see that, the conditions of life of the Russian peasantry being what they are, its bourgeois-democratic revolutionary spirit could not be ideologically expressed otherwise than in the form of "belief" in the sovereign virtue of land equalisation. "What formally may be economically incorrect, may all the same be correct from the point of view of world history."[147] Our Mensheviks have never been able to understand these words of Engels. While exposing the *falsity* of the Narodnik *doctrine*, they closed their eyes like pedants to the *truth* of the contemporary struggle in the contemporary bourgeois revolution, which is expressed by these quasi-socialist doctrines.

But we say: resolute struggle against the quasi-socialist doctrines of the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Co., and frank, firm recognition of the *alliance* between the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry in the *bourgeois* revolution. The victory of this revolution will dissipate like a puff of smoke the doctrine of the sovereign virtue of land equalisation, but the masses of the peasantry in the present struggle express by this doctrine the breadth, strength, courage, enthusiasm, sincerity and invincibility of their historic action which heralds a Russia cleansed of each and every survival of feudalism.

The bourgeoisie is going left, down with Trudovik utopianism, long live support of the bourgeoisie—argue the Mensheviks. The bourgeoisie is going left, we shall say: that means new powder is accumulating in the powder-magazine of the Russian revolution. If today the Krestovnikovs are saying "Russia is sick", it means that tomorrow the socialist proletariat will go into action, leading the democratic peasantry, and will say: "We shall cure her!"

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE WORKERS' PARTY TO RELIGION

Deputy Surkov's speech in the Duma during the debate on the Synod estimates, and the discussion that arose within our Duma group when it considered the draft of this speech (both printed in this issue) have raised a question which is of extreme importance and urgency at this particular moment. An interest in everything connected with religion is undoubtedly being shown today by wide circles of "society", and has penetrated into the ranks of intellectuals standing close to the working-class movement, as well as into certain circles of the workers. It is the absolute duty of Social-Democrats to make a public statement of their attitude towards religion.

Social-Democracy bases its whole world-outlook on scientific socialism, i.e., Marxism. The philosophical basis of Marxism, as Marx and Engels repeatedly declared, is dialectical materialism, which has fully taken over the historical traditions of eighteenth-century materialism in France and of Feuerbach (first half of the nineteenth century) in Germany—a materialism which is absolutely atheistic and positively hostile to all religion. Let us recall that the whole of Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, which Marx read in manuscript, is an indictment of the materialist and atheist Dühring for not being a consistent materialist and for leaving loopholes for religion and religious philosophy. Let us recall that in his essay on Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels reproaches Feuerbach for combating religion not in order to destroy it, but in order to renovate it, to invent a new, "exalted" religion, and so forth. Religion is the opium of the people—this dictum by Marx is the corner-stone of the whole Marxist outlook

on religion.[148] Marxism has always regarded all modern religions and churches, and each and every religious organisation, as instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to befuddle the working class.

At the same time Engels frequently condemned the efforts of people who desired to be "more left" or "more revolutionary" than the Social-Democrats to introduce into the programme of the workers' party an explicit proclamation of atheism, in the sense of declaring war on religion. Commenting in 1874 on the famous manifesto of the Blanquist fugitive Communards who were living in exile in London, Engels called their vociferous proclamation of war on religion a piece of stupidity, and stated that such a declaration of war was the best way to revive interest in religion and to prevent it from really dying out. Engels blamed the Blanquists for being unable to understand that only the class struggle of the working masses could, by comprehensively drawing the widest strata of the proletariat into conscious and revolutionary social *practice*, really free the oppressed masses from the yoke of religion, whereas to proclaim that war on religion was a political task of the workers' party was just anarchistic phrase-mongering.[149] And in 1877, too, in his *Anti-Dühring*, while ruthlessly attacking the slightest concessions made by Dühring the philosopher to idealism and religion, Engels no less resolutely condemns Dühring's pseudo-revolutionary idea that religion should be prohibited in socialist society. To declare such a war on-religion, Engels says, is to "out-Bismarck Bismarck", i.e., to repeat the folly of Bismarck's struggle against the clericals (the notorious "Struggle for Culture", *Kulturkampf*, i.e., the struggle Bismarck waged in the 1870s against the German Catholic party, the "Centre" party, by means of a police persecution of Catholicism). By this struggle Bismarck only *stimulated* the militant clericalism of the Catholics, and only injured the work of real culture, because he gave prominence to religious divisions rather than political divisions, and diverted the attention of some sections of the working class and of the other democratic elements away from the urgent tasks of the class and revolutionary struggle to the most superficial and false bourgeois anti-clericalism. Accusing the would-be ultra-revolutionary Dühring of wanting to repeat Bismarck's

folly in another form, Engels insisted that the workers' party should have the ability to work patiently at the task of organising and educating the proletariat, which would lead to the dying out of religion, and not throw itself into the gamble of a political war on religion.[150] This view has become part of the very essence of German Social-Democracy, which, for example, advocated freedom for the Jesuits, their admission into Germany, and the complete abandonment of police methods of combating any particular religion. "Religion is a private matter": this celebrated point in the Erfurt Programme (1891) summed up these political tactics of Social-Democracy.

These tactics have by now become a matter of routine; they have managed to give rise to a new distortion of Marxism in the opposite direction, in the direction of opportunism. This point in the Erfurt Programme has come to be interpreted as meaning that we Social-Democrats, our Party, *consider* religion to be a private matter, that religion is a private matter for us as Social-Democrats, for us as a party. Without entering into a direct controversy with this opportunist view, Engels in the nineties deemed it necessary to oppose it resolutely in a positive, and not a polemical form. To wit: Engels did this in the form of a statement, which he deliberately underlined, that Social-Democrats regard religion as a private matter *in relation to the state*, but not in relation to themselves, not in relation to Marxism, and not in relation to the workers' party.[151]

Such is the external history of the utterances of Marx and Engels on the question of religion. To people with a slapdash attitude towards Marxism, to people who cannot or will not think, this history is a skein of meaningless Marxist contradictions and waverings, a hodge-podge of "consistent" atheism and "sops" to religion, "unprincipled" wavering between a r-r-revolutionary war on God and a cowardly desire to "play up to" religious workers, a fear of scaring them away, etc., etc. The literature of the anarchist phrasemongers contains plenty of attacks on Marxism in this vein.

But anybody who is able to treat Marxism at all seriously, to ponder over its philosophical principles and the experience of international Social-Democracy, will readily see

that the Marxist tactics in regard to religion are thoroughly consistent, and were carefully thought out by Marx and Engels; and that what dilettantes or ignoramuses regard as wavering is but a direct and inevitable deduction from dialectical materialism. It would be a profound mistake to think that the seeming "moderation" of Marxism in regard to religion is due to supposed "tactical" considerations, the desire "not to scare away" anybody, and so forth. On the contrary, in this question, too, the political line of Marxism is inseparably bound up with its philosophical principles.

Marxism is materialism. As such, it is as relentlessly hostile to religion as was the materialism of the eighteenth-century Encyclopaedists or the materialism of Feuerbach. This is beyond doubt. But the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels goes further than the Encyclopaedists and Feuerbach, for it applies the materialist philosophy to the domain of history, to the domain of the social sciences. We must combat religion—that is the ABC of *all* materialism, and consequently of Marxism. But Marxism is not a materialism which has stopped at the ABC. Marxism goes further. It says: We must *know how* to combat religion, and in order to do so we must explain the source of faith and religion among the masses *in a materialist way*. The combating of religion cannot be confined to abstract ideological preaching, and it must not be reduced to such preaching. It must be linked up with the concrete practice of the class movement, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion. Why does religion retain its hold on the backward sections of the town proletariat, on broad sections of the semi-proletariat, and on the mass of the peasantry? Because of the ignorance of the people, replies the bourgeois progressist, the radical or the bourgeois materialist. And so: "Down with religion and long live atheism; the dissemination of atheist views is our chief task!" The Marxist says that this is not true, that it is a superficial view, the view of narrow bourgeois uplifters. It does not explain the roots of religion profoundly enough; it explains them, not in a materialist but in an idealist way. In modern capitalist countries these roots are mainly *social*. The deepest root of religion today is the socially downtrodden condition

of the working masses and their apparently complete helplessness in face of the blind forces of capitalism, which every day and every hour inflicts upon ordinary working people the most horrible suffering and the most savage torment, a thousand times more severe than those inflicted by extraordinary events, such as wars, earthquakes, etc. "Fear made the gods." Fear of the blind force of capital—blind because it cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people—a force which at every step in the life of the proletariat and small proprietor threatens to inflict, and does inflict "sudden", "unexpected", "accidental" ruin, destruction, pauperism, prostitution, death from starvation—such is *the root* of modern religion which the materialist must bear in mind first and foremost, if he does not want to remain an infant-school materialist. No educational book can eradicate religion from the minds of masses who are crushed by capitalist hard labour, and who are at the mercy of the blind destructive forces of capitalism, until those masses themselves learn to fight this *root* of religion, fight *the rule of capital* in all its forms, in a united, organised, planned and conscious way.

Does this mean that educational books against religion are harmful or unnecessary? No, nothing of the kind. It means that Social-Democracy's atheist propaganda must be *subordinated* to its basic task—the development of the class struggle of the exploited *masses* against the exploiters.

This proposition may not be understood (or at least not immediately understood) by one who has not pondered over the principles of dialectical materialism, i.e., the philosophy of Marx and Engels. How is that?—he will say. Is ideological propaganda, the preaching of definite ideas, the struggle against that enemy of culture and progress which has persised for thousands or years (i.e., religion) to be subordinated to the class struggle, i.e., the struggle for definite practical aims in the economic and political field?

This is one of those current objections to Marxism which testify to a complete misunderstanding of Marxian dialectics. The contradiction which perplexes these objectors is a real contradiction in real life, i.e., a dialectical contradiction, and not a verbal or invented one. To draw a hard-and-

fast line between the theoretical propaganda of atheism, i.e., the destruction of religious beliefs among certain sections of the proletariat, and the success, the progress and the conditions of the class struggle of these sections, is to reason undialectically, to transform a shifting and relative boundary into an absolute boundary; it is forcibly to disconnect what is indissolubly connected in real life. Let us take an example. The proletariat in a particular region and in a particular industry is divided, let us assume, into an advanced section of fairly class-conscious Social-Democrats, who are of course atheists, and rather backward workers who are still connected with the countryside and with the peasantry, and who believe in God, go to church, or are even under the direct influence of the local priest—who, let us suppose, is organising a Christian labour union. Let us assume furthermore that the economic struggle in this locality has resulted in a strike. It is the duty of a Marxist to place the success of the strike movement above everything else, vigorously to counteract the division of the workers in this struggle into atheists and Christians, vigorously to oppose any such division. Atheist propaganda in such circumstances may be both unnecessary and harmful—not from the philistine fear of scaring away the backward sections, of losing a seat in the elections, and so on, but out of consideration for the real progress of the class struggle, which in the conditions of modern capitalist society will convert Christian workers to Social-Democracy and to atheism a hundred times better than bald atheist propaganda. To preach atheism at such a moment and in such circumstances would only be playing *into the hands* of the priest and the priests, who desire nothing better than that the division of the workers according to their participation in the strike movement should be replaced by their division according to their belief in God. An anarchist who preached war against God at all costs would in effect be helping the priests and the bourgeoisie (as the anarchists always do help the bourgeoisie *in practice*). A Marxist must be a materialist, i.e., an enemy of religion, but a dialectical materialist, i.e., one who treats the struggle against religion not in an abstract way, not on the basis of remote, purely theoretical, never varying preaching, but in a concrete way, on the basis of the class struggle

which is going on *in practice* and is educating the masses more and better than anything else could. A Marxist must be able to view the concrete situation as a whole, he must always be able to find the boundary between anarchism and opportunism (this boundary is relative, shifting and changeable, but it exists). And he must not succumb either to the abstract, verbal, but in reality empty "revolutionism" of the anarchist, or to the philistinism and opportunism of the petty bourgeois or liberal intellectual, who boggles at the struggle against religion, forgets that this is his duty, reconciles himself to belief in God, and is guided not by the interests of the class struggle but by the petty and mean consideration of offending nobody, repelling nobody and scaring nobody—by the sage rule: "live and let live", etc., etc.

It is from this angle that all side issues bearing on the attitude of Social-Democrats to religion should be dealt with. For example, the question is often brought up whether a priest can be a member of the Social-Democratic Party or not, and this question is usually answered in an unqualified affirmative, the experience of the European Social-Democratic parties being cited as evidence. But this experience was the result, not only of the application of the Marxist doctrine to the workers' movement, but also of the special historical conditions in Western Europe which are absent in Russia (we will say more about these conditions later), so that an unqualified affirmative answer in this case is incorrect. It cannot be asserted once and for all that priests cannot be members of the Social-Democratic Party; but neither can the reverse rule be laid down. If a priest comes to us to take part in our common political work and conscientiously performs Party duties, without opposing the programme of the Party, he may be allowed to join the ranks of the Social-Democrats; for the contradiction between the spirit and principles of our programme and the religious convictions of the priest would in such circumstances be something that concerned him alone, his own private contradiction; and a political organisation cannot put its members through an examination to see if there is no contradiction between their views and the Party programme. But, of course, such a case might be a rare exception even in Western

Europe, while in Russia it is altogether improbable. And if, for example, a priest joined the Social-Democratic Party and made it his chief and almost sole work actively to propagate religious views in the Party, it would unquestionably have to expel him from its ranks. We must not only admit workers who preserve their belief in God into the Social-Democratic Party, but must deliberately set out to recruit them; we are absolutely opposed to giving the slightest offence to their religious convictions, but we recruit them in order to educate them in the spirit of our programme, and not in order to permit an active struggle against it. We allow freedom of opinion *within* the Party, but to certain limits, determined by freedom of grouping; we are not obliged to go hand in hand with active preachers of views that are repudiated by the majority of the Party.

Another example. Should members of the Social-Democratic Party be censured all alike under all circumstances for declaring "socialism is my religion", and for advocating views in keeping with this declaration? No! The deviation from Marxism (and consequently from socialism) is here indisputable; but the significance of the deviation, its relative importance, so to speak, may vary with circumstances. It is one thing when an agitator or a person addressing the workers speaks in this way in order to make himself better understood, as an introduction to his subject, in order to present his views more vividly in terms to which the backward masses are most accustomed. It is another thing when a writer begins to preach "god-building", or god-building socialism (in the spirit, for example, of our Lunacharsky and Co.). While in the first case censure would be mere carping, or even inappropriate restriction of the freedom of the agitator, of his freedom in choosing "pedagogical" methods, in the second case party censure is necessary and essential. For some the statement "socialism is a religion" is a form of transition from religion to socialism; for others, it is a form of transition *from* socialism to religion.

Let us now pass to the conditions which in the West gave rise to the opportunist interpretation of the thesis: "religion is a private matter". Of course, a contributing influence are those general factors which give rise to opportunism as a whole, like sacrificing the fundamental interests

of the working-class movement for the sake of momentary advantages. The party of the proletariat demands that *the state* should declare religion a private matter, but does not regard the fight against the opium of the people, the fight against religious superstitions, etc., as a "private matter". The opportunists distort the question to mean that the *Social-Democratic* Party *regards* religion as a private matter!

But in addition to the usual opportunist distortion (which was not made clear at all in the discussion within our Duma group when it was considering the speech on religion), there are special historical conditions which have given rise to the present-day, and, if one may so express it, excessive, indifference on the part of the European Social-Democrats to the question of religion. These conditions are of a twofold nature. First, the task of combating religion is historically the task of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, and in the West this task was to a large extent performed (or tackled) by bourgeois democracy, in the epoch of *its* revolutions or its assaults upon feudalism and medievalism. Both in France and in Germany there is a tradition of bourgeois war on religion, and it began long before socialism (the Encyclopaedists, Feuerbach). In Russia, because of the conditions of our bourgeois-democratic revolution, this task too falls almost entirely on the shoulders of the working class. Petty-bourgeois (Narodnik) democracy in our country has not done too much in this respect (as the new-fledged Black-Hundred Cadets, or Cadet Black Hundreds, of *Vekhi*[152] think), but rather *too little*, in comparison with what has been done in Europe.

On the other hand, the tradition of bourgeois war on religion has given rise in Europe to a specifically bourgeois *distortion* of this war by anarchism—which, as the Marxists have long explained time and again, takes its stand on the bourgeois world-outlook, in spite of all the "fury" of its attacks on the bourgeoisie. The anarchists and Blanquists in the Latin countries, Most (who, incidentally, was a pupil of Dühring) and his ilk in Germany, the anarchists in Austria in the eighties, all carried revolutionary phrase-mongering in the struggle against religion to a *nec plus ultra*. It is not surprising that, compared with the anarch-

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ists, the European Social-Democrats now *go to the other extreme*. This is quite understandable and to a certain extent legitimate, but it would be wrong for us Russian Social-Democrats to forget the special historical conditions of the West.

Secondly, in the West, *after* the national bourgeois revolutions were over, *after* more or less complete religious liberty had been introduced, the problem of the democratic struggle against religion had been pushed, historically, so far into the background by the struggle of bourgeois democracy against socialism that the bourgeois governments *deliberately* tried to draw the attention of the masses away from socialism by organising a quasi-liberal "offensive" against clericalism. Such was the character of the *Kulturkampf* in Germany and of the struggle of the bourgeois republicans against clericalism in France. Bourgeois anti-clericalism, as a means of drawing the attention of the working-class masses away from socialism—this is what preceded the spread of the modern spirit of "indifference" to the struggle against religion among the Social-Democrats in the West. And this again is quite understandable and legitimate, because Social-Democrats had to counteract bourgeois and Bismarckian anti-clericalism by *subordinating* the struggle against religion to the struggle for socialism.

In Russia conditions are quite different. The proletariat is the leader of our bourgeois-democratic revolution. Its party must be the ideological leader in the struggle against all attributes of medievalism, including the old official religion and every attempt to refurbish it or make out a new or different case for it, etc. Therefore, while Engels was comparatively mild in correcting the opportunism of the German Social-Democrats who were substituting, for the demand of the workers' party that the *state* should declare religion a private matter, the *declaration* that religion is a private matter for the Social-Democrats themselves, and for the Social-Democratic Party, it is clear that the importation of this German distortion by the Russian opportunists would have merited a rebuke a *hundred times* more severe by Engels.

By declaring from the Duma rostrum that religion is the opium of the people, our Duma group acted quite correctly,

and thus created a precedent which should serve as a basis for all utterances by Russian Social-Democrats on the question of religion. Should they have gone further and developed the atheist argument in greater detail? We think not. This might have brought the risk of the political party of the proletariat exaggerating the struggle against religion; it might have resulted in obliterating the distinction between the bourgeois and the socialist struggle against religion. The first duty of the Social-Democratic group in the Black-Hundred Duma has been discharged with honour.

The second duty—and perhaps the most important for Social-Democrats—namely, to explain the class role of the church and the clergy in supporting the Black-Hundred government and the bourgeoisie in its fight against the working class, has also been discharged with honour. Of course, very much more might be said on this subject, and the Social-Democrats in their future utterances will know how to amplify Comrade Surkov's speech; but still his speech was excellent, and its circulation by all Party organisations is the direct duty of our Party.

The third duty was to explain in full detail the *correct* meaning of the proposition, so often distorted by the German opportunists, that "religion is a private matter". This, unfortunately, Comrade Surkov did not do. It is all the more regrettable because in the earlier activity of the Duma group a mistake had been committed on this question by Comrade Belousov, and was pointed out at the time by *Proletary*. The discussion in the Duma group shows that the dispute about atheism has screened from it the question of the proper interpretation of the celebrated demand that religion should be proclaimed a private matter. We shall not blame Comrade Surkov alone for this error of the entire Duma group. More, we shall frankly admit that the whole Party is at fault here, for not having sufficiently elucidated this question and not having sufficiently prepared the minds of Social-Democrats to understand Engels's remark levelled against the German opportunists. The discussion in the Duma group proves that there was in fact a confused understanding of the question, and not at all any desire to ignore the teachings of Marx; and we are sure that the error will be corrected in future utterances of the group.

We repeat that on the whole Comrade Surkov's speech was excellent, and should be circulated by all the organisations. In its discussion of this speech the Duma group demonstrated that it is fulfilling its Social-Democratic duty conscientiously. It remains to express the wish that reports on discussions within the Duma group should appear more often in the Party press so as to bring the group and the Party closer together, to acquaint the Party with the difficult work being done within the group, and to establish ideological unity in the work of the Party and the Duma group.

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CLASSES AND PARTIES IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

The debates in the Duma on the Synod estimates, then on the restoration of rights to persons who have left holy orders and, finally, on the Old-Believer communities, have provided very instructive material characterising the attitude of the Russian political parties towards religion and the Church. Let us make a general survey of this material, dwelling mainly on the debates on the Synod estimates (we have not yet received the verbatim reports of the debates on the other questions mentioned above).

The first and most obvious conclusion that emerges from the Duma debates is that militant clericalism in Russia not only exists, but is clearly gaining ground and becoming more organised. On April 16, Bishop Metrophanes stated: 'The first steps in our Duma activities pursued the explicit end that we who have been honoured by the votes of the people, should here in the Duma stand above party divisions and form a single group of the clergy, which should throw light on all sides from its ethical point of view.... What is the reason why we have failed to achieve this ideal situation? ... The fault for this lies with those who are sharing these benches with you [i.e., with the Cadets and the "Left"], namely, those clerical deputies who belong to the opposition. They were the first to lift their voice and say that this was neither more nor less than the emergence of a clerical party, and that this was extremely undesirable. Of course, there is no such thing as clericalism among the Russian Orthodox clergy—we never had a tendency of that kind, and in seeking to form a separate group we were pursuing purely ethical and moral ends. But now, gentlemen, when,

as a result of this discord introduced in our brotherly midst by the Left deputies, there followed disunity and division, now you [i.e., the Cadets] blame it on us."

Bishop Metrophanes in his illiterate speech let the cat out of the bag: the Left, don't you see, are guilty of having dissuaded some of the Duma priests from forming a special "moral" (this term is obviously more suitable for hoodwinking the people than the word "clerical") group!

Almost a month later, on May 13, Bishop Eulogius read in the Duma "the resolution of the Duma clergy": "The overwhelming majority of the Duma Orthodox clergy considers" ... that in the interests of the "leading and dominant position of the Orthodox Church" neither freedom of preaching for the Old-Believers, nor the unauthorised functioning of Old-Believer communities, nor the using of the title of priest by Old-Believer clergymen, are permissible. "The purely moral point of view" of the Russian priests stands fully revealed as clericalism pure and simple. "The overwhelming majority" of the Duma clergy, in whose name Bishop Eulogius spoke, probably consisted of 29 Right and moderately Right priests in the Third Duma, and possibly also included 8 priests belonging to the Octobrists. The opposition had probably been joined by 4 priests belonging to the Progressist and Peaceful Renovation groups, and one belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian group.

What is then the "purely moral and ethical point of view of the overwhelming majority of the clergy in the Duma" (the June-the-Third Duma, one should add)? Here are a few excerpts from the speeches: "All I say is that the initiative for these [i.e., Church] reforms must come from within the Church, not from without, not from the state and, of course, not from the Budget Commission. After all, the Church is a divine and eternal institution, its laws are immutable, whereas the ideals of state life, as we know, are subject to constant modifications" (Bishop Eulogius, April 14). The orator recalled "a disturbing historical parallel": the secularisation of Church property under Catherine II. "Who can vouch that the Budget Commission, which this year expressed the desire to put them [the Church funds] under state control will not express next year the desire to deposit them in the State Treasury, and then fully to transfer their

management from the Church authorities to the civil or state authorities?... The Church statutes say that since a bishop is entrusted with Christian souls, then all the more should Church property be entrusted to him.... Today before you [deputies of the Duma] stands your spiritual mother, the holy Orthodox Church, not merely as before representatives of the people, but also as before its spiritual children" (ibid.)

This is pure clericalism. The Church is above the state as the eternal and divine is above the temporal and earthly. The Church cannot forgive the state for secularising Church property. The Church demands a leading and dominant position. In its eyes the Duma deputies are not only—or rather not so much—representatives of the people as "spiritual children".

These are not officials in cassocks, as the Social-Democrat Surkov called them, but *feudalists* in cassocks. Defence of the Church's feudal privileges, outspoken support of medievalism—that is the essence of the policy pursued by the majority of the Third Duma clergy. Bishop Eulogius is by no means an exception. Gepetsky also vociferates against "secularisation" which he calls an intolerable "wrong" (April 14). The priest Mashkevich fulminates against the *Octobrist* report for seeking "to undermine the historic and canonical foundations on which our Church life has rested and must rest ... to push the life and activities of the Russian Orthodox Church off the canonical path on to the path where ... the true princes of the Church—the bishops—will be obliged to give up almost all their rights, inherited-from the apostles, to secular princes.... This is nothing but ... an encroachment on somebody else's property and on the rights and possessions of the Church.... The speaker is leading us towards the destruction of the canonical order of Church life; he seeks to subordinate the Orthodox Church and all its economic functions to the Duma, an institution composed of the most diverse elements in our country, of religious creeds both tolerated and not tolerated" (April 14).

The Russian Narodniks and liberals have long been comforting themselves, or rather deceiving themselves, with the theory" that in Russia there is no basis for militant clericalism, for a struggle of "the princes of the Church" with

the temporal power, and so forth. Our revolution has dispelled this illusion, as it did a number of other Narodnik and liberal illusions. Clericalism existed in a hidden form, so long as autocracy existed intact and inviolate. The all-powerful police and bureaucracy concealed from the gaze of "society" and the people the class struggle in general, and the struggle waged by the "feudalists in cassocks" against the "base rabble" in particular. But the first breach which the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry made in the feudalist autocratic regime laid bare what had been hidden. As soon as the proletariat and the advanced elements of the democratic bourgeoisie began to make use of the political liberty, the freedom to organise the masses, which they had won at the end of 1905, the reactionary classes, too, reached out for independent and open organisations. Under absolute autocracy they did not organise, and did not come out too much in the open, not because they were weak, but because they were strong; not because they were incapable of organisation and political struggle, but because at that time they did not yet feel any real need for independent class organisation. They did not believe in the possibility of a mass movement against the autocracy and the feudalists in Russia. They fully relied on the knout being sufficient to keep the rabble down. But the first wounds inflicted on autocracy compelled the social elements which supported it and needed it to come out into the open. It was no longer possible to use *only* the old knout in fighting masses that had been capable of causing the events of January 9, the strike movement in 1905, and the October-December revolution. It became necessary to build up independent political organisations; it became necessary for the Council of the United Nobility to organise Black Hundreds and engage in the most irresponsible demagogy; it became necessary for "the princes of the Church—the bishops"—to organise the reactionary clergy into an independent force.

A typical feature of the Third Duma, and of the Third-Duma period of the Russian counter-revolution is, indeed, that this organisation of the reactionary forces has come out into the open, has begun to develop on a nation-wide scale and has demanded a special Black-Hundred bourgeois "parliament". Militant clericalism has shown its true colours;

and from now on Russian Social-Democracy will have to act again and again as an observer of, and participant in, the clashes between the clerical and the anti-clerical bourgeoisie. If our general task is to assist the proletariat to unite into a special class, capable of separating from bourgeois democracy, one component of this task is the use of every means of propaganda and agitation, including the rostrum of the Duma, to explain to the masses the distinctions between socialist and bourgeois anti-clericalism.

The Octobrists and Cadets who have come out in the Third Duma against the extreme Right, the clericals, and the government, have eased this task for us immensely by providing an object-lesson of the attitude of the bourgeoisie towards the Church and religion. The legal press of the Cadets and the so-called Progressists is at present devoting special attention to the question of the Old-Believers, to the fact that the Octobrists as well as the Cadets have taken a stand against the government, and to the fact that they have, albeit in a small way, "adopted the course of reform" promised on October 17. What interests us most is the principle involved in this question, i.e., the attitude of the bourgeoisie in general, including the elements who claim the title of Democratic Cadets, towards religion and the Church. We must not allow a relatively minor question—the Old-Believers' conflict with the dominant Church, and the conduct of the Octobrists who are tied up with the Old-Believers, and are partly even dependent on them financially (*Golos Moskvy*[153] is said to be financed by the Old-Believers)—make us lose sight of the root question, that of the interests and policy of the bourgeoisie as a class.

Take a look at the speech delivered by Count Uvarov, an Octobrist in his general views, but who has left the Octobrist group. Speaking after the Social-Democrat Surkov, he started by refusing to deal with this question from the standpoint of principle, as the workers' deputy had done. Uvarov merely attacks the Synod and the Procurator-General for their unwillingness to give the Duma any information on certain Church revenues and on the expenditure of parish funds. Kamensky, the official spokesman of the Octobrists, approaches the question from the same standpoint (April 16), and demands that parishes should be revived

"for the purpose of strengthening the Orthodox faith". Kapustin, the so-called "Left-wing Octobrist", elaborates on this idea. "If we turn to the life of the people," he exclaims, "to the life of the rural population, we observe today, here and now, a sad fact: religious life is tottering, the greatest and sole foundation of the people's moral principles is tottering.... What can replace the concept of sin, what can replace the dictates of conscience? Surely, they cannot be replaced by the concept of class struggle and the rights of this or that class. That is a tragic concept which has taken root in our everyday life. Therefore, if religion is to survive as a foundation of morality, if it is to be within reach of the whole population, it is necessary that the bearers of this religion should enjoy the proper authority...."

The spokesman of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie wishes to strengthen religion, he wishes to enhance the influence of religion on the masses, realising that it is inadequate and out of date, realising even the harm caused to the ruling classes by "officials in cassocks", who are *lowering* the authority of the Church. The Octobrist is fighting against the excesses of clericalism and of police tutelage *in order to strengthen* the influence of the Church on the masses, in order to replace at least some means of addling the wits of the people, which are too crude, too out of date, too threadbare to achieve their object, by more refined and improved means. Police religion is no longer adequate for befuddling the masses: give us a more cultured, more up-to-date, more skilful religion, one that will be effective in a self-governing parish—that is what capital is demanding of the autocracy.

And the Cadet Karaulov *fully* subscribes to this same point of view. This "liberal" renegade (who gradually "evolved" from the Narodnaya Volya* to the Right-wing Cadets) screams his protest against the "denationalisation of the Church, understanding this to mean the exclusion of the masses of the people, of the laity, from the building of the Church". He finds it "*shocking*" (literally so!) that the masses are "losing faith". He raises an outcry, quite in the style of Menshikov,[154] because the "immense intrinsic value of the

* See Note 99.—*Ed.*

Church is being depreciated ... to the great detriment not only of the cause of the Church, but of that of the state as well. He qualifies as "words of gold" the loathsome hypocrisy of the zealot Eulogius on the theme that "the task of the Church is eternal, immutable, hence, it is not possible to link up the Church with politics". He protests against the alliance of the Church with the Black Hundreds *for the sole reason* that the Church may, "with greater might and glory than today, fulfil its grand and holy mission in a Christian spirit of love and freedom".

Comrade Belousov did well to have a good laugh at these "lyrical words" of Karaulov's from the Duma rostrum. However, such ridicule is very far from being adequate. It had to be made clear—and at the first convenient opportunity this should be done from the Duma rostrum—that the standpoint of the Cadets is absolutely identical with that of the Octobrists, and merely expresses the efforts of "cultured" capital to bamboozle the people with religious narcotics by more refined methods of Church deception than the ones now practised by the rank-and-file Russian priests who are still living in the past.

To keep the people in spiritual bondage, there must be the closest possible alliance of the Church and the Black Hundreds, said the "wild landlord" and the old Derzhimorda[155] through their spokesman Purishkevich. You are wrong gentlemen, retorts the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie through their spokesman Karaulov: with such methods you will only make the people turn away from religion for good. Now let us go about it in a more clever, more artful more ingenious way: let us remove the too stupid and crude agent of the Black Hundreds, declare war on "denationalisation of the Church", and inscribe on our banner Bishop Eulogius's "words of gold" to the effect that the Church is above politics. Only in this way shall we be able to fool at least some of the backward workers, and especially of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, and be able to help the renovated Church to fulfil its "grand and holy mission of retaining the masses of the people in spiritual bondage.

Our liberal press, not excluding the newspaper *Rech*, has concentrated of late on censuring Struve and Co. for their

authorship of the symposium *Vekhi*. But Karaulov, the official spokesman of the Cadets in the Duma, has done a superlative job of exposing all the vile hypocrisy of these remonstrances, and these repudiations of Struve and Co. What Karaulov and Milyukov conceal, Struve reveals. The liberals blame Struve *only* for having imprudently blurted out the truth, for showing his hand too openly. The liberals, who censure *Vekhi* and go on supporting the Cadet Party, are most shamelessly deceiving the people—condemning imprudently outspoken *words*, and going on *doing* the very *things* that go with those words.

There is little to say about the conduct of the Trudoviks in the Duma during the debate on the questions under review. As always, a noticeable difference was revealed between the peasant Trudoviks and the intellectual Trudoviks to the disadvantage of the latter, because of their excessive readiness to follow the Cadets. True, Rozhkov, a peasant, revealed in his speech his complete lack of political consciousness; he, too, repeated the Cadet platitudes about the Union of the Russian People helping not to reinforce but to destroy faith. He was unable to suggest any programme. On the other hand, when he began in his artless manner to tell the naked, unvarnished truth about the levies collected by the clergy, about the extortions of the priests, about how, in addition to charging money for conducting a marriage ceremony, they demand "a bottle of vodka, snacks, and a pound of tea, *and sometimes things that I am even afraid to talk about from this rostrum*" (April 16, verbatim report, p. 2259)—this was more than the Black-Hundred Duma could stand. A wild howl arose from the benches of the right. "This is scandalous, this is outrageous!" shouted the Black Hundreds, realising that this simple peasant's speech about extortions, listing the scale of "fees" charged for religious rites, was more likely to revolutionise the masses than any amount of theoretical or tactical anti-religious and anti-Church declarations. Thereupon the band of diehard defenders of autocracy in the Third Duma intimidated their flunkey—the Duma Chairman Meyendorff—and compelled him to rule that Rozhkov must sit down (the Social-Democrats, joined by some Trudoviks, Cadets and others, handed in a protest against this action of the Chairman).

Although the speech delivered by the peasant Trudovik Rozhkov was extremely unsophisticated, it provided an excellent demonstration of the abyss dividing the hypocritical, deliberately reactionary defence of religion by the Cadets, and the primitive, unconscious, matter-of-fact religiousness of the peasant, whose living conditions give rise—against his will and unconsciously—to a truly revolutionary resentment against extortions, and to readiness for a resolute fight against medievalism. The Cadets are the representatives of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is intent on renovating and strengthening religion against the people. The Rozhkovs are the representatives of revolutionary bourgeois democracy, a democracy that is undeveloped, lacking political consciousness, downtrodden, lacking independence, disunited—yet fraught with an all but inexhaustible reservoir of revolutionary energy in the fight against the landlords, the priests, and the autocracy.

Rozanov, a Trudovik intellectual, came close to the Cadets far less unconsciously than Rozhkov. Rozanov could mention disestablishment of the Church as a demand of the "Left", but could not refrain from reactionary, petty-bourgeois phrases about "amending the electoral law in the sense that the clergy should be excluded from participation in the political struggle". The revolutionary spirit, which finds a spontaneous outlet in a typical, average peasant when he begins to tell the truth about how he lives, vanishes in the case of a Trudovik intellectual, to be replaced by hazy and sometimes actually vile phrases. For the hundredth and thousandth time we see the truth confirmed that only if they follow the proletariat's lead will the Russian peasant masses be able to overthrow the oppressive and killing yoke of the feudal-minded landlords, the feudalists in cassocks, the feudal-minded supporters of the autocracy.

The Social-Democrat Surkov, representing the workers' party and the working class, was the only person in the Duma to raise the debates to the truly high level of principle, and said without beating about the bush what the attitude of the proletariat is towards the Church and religion, and what should be the attitude in this matter of all consistent and vigorous democrats. "Religion is the opium of the people.... Not a farthing of the people's money to these mur-

derous enemies of the people who are drugging the people's minds"—this straightforward, bold and outspoken battle-cry of a socialist resounded like a challenge to the Black-Hundred Duma, and met with the response of millions of proletarians, who will spread it among the masses and who will know how to translate it into revolutionary action when the time comes.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*[156]

JUNE 8-17 (21-30), 1909

CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF PROLETARY[166]

JUNE 8-17 (21-30), 1909

REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*

Elsewhere in this issue the reader will find the text of the resolutions adopted at the recent conference of the extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*. The conference was constituted as follows: four members of the *Proletary* Editorial Board, three representatives of the Bolsheviks working in local organisations—St. Petersburg. Moscow regional (Central Russia) and the Urals—and five Bolshevik members of the Central Committee.

The debates which developed at the conference are unquestionably of great importance to the whole Party. They defined more exactly and, to some extent, more completely, that line of policy which the leading organ of the Bolshevik section of the Party has been systematically pursuing in recent times and which, of late, has aroused a number of attacks by some of our comrades who consider themselves Bolsheviks. The necessary explanation took place at the conference, at which the opposition was represented by two comrades.

In view of all this the editors of *Proletary* will make every effort to prepare and publish the fullest possible minutes of the conference. In the present report however we simply want to deal briefly with those points which, if interpreted in a certain way, might give rise—and are already giving rise among comrades abroad—to misapprehensions. The comprehensive and explicitly formulated resolutions of the conference really speak for themselves; the minutes of the conference will provide enough material for a thorough understanding of the resolutions as a whole. The purpose of this report is chiefly to point out the implications

of the decisions and resolutions *for members of the Bolshevik section*.

We shall start with the resolution "On Otzovism and Ultimatumism".

That part of the resolution which is directed expressly against otzovism encountered no serious objections on the part of the representatives of the opposition at the conference. Both these representatives admitted that otzovism, inasmuch as it was shaping into a definite trend, was deviating further and further from Social-Democracy, that some representatives of otzovism, notably its recognised leader Comrade St.,[157] have even managed to acquire a "certain tinge of anarchism". The conference *unanimously* recognised that a persistent and systematic struggle against otzovism as a trend was imperative With ultimatumism matters were different.

Both representatives of the opposition at the conference called themselves ultimatumists. And both of them, in a written statement submitted when the resolution was being voted on, declared that they were ultimatumists, that the resolution proposed to repudiate ultimatumism, that this would mean repudiating themselves, which was something they could not subscribe to. Later, when several other resolutions were adopted against the votes of the opposition, the two representatives of the opposition stated in writing that they considered the resolutions of the conference irregular, that, in adopting them, the conference was declaring a split in the Bolshevik section, and that they would not submit to these resolutions or put them into practice. Later we shall dwell in greater detail on this incident, because it formally completed the breakaway of one of the representatives of the opposition, Comrade Maximov, from the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. Here we want to approach it from another angle.

In assessing ultimatumism, just as, incidentally, in assessing that consistent ultimatumism which goes by the name of otzovism, we have unfortunately to deal not so much with writings as with legend. Neither ultimatumism nor otzovism have yet found expression in any more or less integral "platform". So ultimatumism must be considered in its only concrete expression—the demand that the Social-

Democratic group in the Duma be presented with an *ultimatum* to act in a strict Party spirit and obey all the instructions of the Party centres, or else give up their mandates. To maintain, however, that such a description of ultimatumism is *quite* correct and accurate is, apparently, wrong. And for the following reason. Comrade Marat, one of the two ultimatumists who attended the conference, stated that this description did not apply to him. He, Comrade Marat, admitted that there had been a great improvement lately in the work of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and that he did not intend to present an ultimatum to it now, immediately. He merely thought that the Party should bring pressure to bear on the Duma group by every possible means, the afore-mentioned ultimatum being one of them.

It is of course possible to get along with ultimatumists like *this* within one and the same wing of the Party. *Such* an ultimatumist is bound to reduce his ultimatumism to zero as the work of the Duma group improves. *Such* ultimatumism does not preclude but, on the contrary, implies prolonged work of the Party with and on the Duma group, prolonged and persistent work of the Party in the sense of skilfully making use of activity in the Duma for the purpose of agitation and organisation. Since there are clear signs of an improvement in the activities of the Duma group, work must be continued perseveringly and persistently in the same direction. Ultimatumism will *thereby* gradually lose its objective meaning. In the case of *such* Bolshevik ultimatumists a split is out of the question. In their case it is scarcely justifiable even to draw the line of demarcation prescribed in the resolution "On Otzovism and Ultimatumism" and in the resolution "The Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party". *Such* ultimatumism is nothing more than a shade of opinion in formulating and settling one definite practical question; there is no marked difference of principle here.

The ultimatumism which the resolution describes as an ideological trend in the Party which Bolshevism must disown, is a different thing. This ultimatumism—and it undoubtedly exists—rules out prolonged work on the Duma group by the Party and its central bodies, it rules out prolonged, patient Party activity among the work-

ers in the sense of skilfully utilising the wealth of agitational material provided by the Third Duma. This ultimatumism rules out *constructive*, *creative* Party work on the Duma group. This ultimatumism has only one weapon—the *ultimatum* which the Party must hang over the head of its Duma group like the sword of Damocles, and which the R.S.D.L.P. must accept as a substitute for all that experience in the genuinely revolutionary use of parliamentarism which the Social-Democrats in Western Europe have accumulated by dint of long persistent *practice*. To draw a line between *that* ultimatumism and otzovism is impossible. They are linked inseverably by their common spirit of *adventurism*. And Bolshevism, as the revolutionary trend in Russian Social-Democracy, must dissociate itself from one and the other alike.

But what do we mean, what did the conference mean by this "dissociation"? Are there any grounds for asserting that the conference proclaimed *a split in the Bolshevik section*, as some representatives of the opposition would have us believe? There are no such grounds. The conference stated in its resolutions that tendencies were beginning to appear within the Bolshevik section which run counter to Bolshevism with its specific tactical principles. In our Party Bolshevism is represented by the Bolshevik *section*. But a section is not a party. A party can contain a whole gamut of opinions and shades of opinion, the extremes of which may be sharply contradictory. In the German party, side by side with the pronouncedly revolutionary wing of Kautsky, we see the ultra-revisionist wing of Bernstein. That is not the case within a section. A section in a party is a group of *like-minded persons* formed for the purpose primarily of influencing the party in a definite direction, for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principles in the party in the purest possible form. For this, real *unanimity of opinion* is necessary. The different standards we set for *party* unity and *sectional* unity must be grasped by everyone who wants to know how the question of the internal discord in the Bolshevik section really stands. *The conference did not declare a split in the section*. It would be a profound mistake for any local functionary to understand the resolutions of the conference as an instruction to expel *otzovist-minded* workers, let

alone bring about an immediate split in organisations where there are otzovist elements. We warn local functionaries in all seriousness against such actions. Otzovism, as a coherent, *independent trend* does not exist among the *mass* of the workers. The attempts of the otzovists at self-determination and a complete statement of their views lead inevitably to syndicalism and anarchism. Persons who advocate these trends with any persistence exclude themselves automatically from section and Party alike. To put otzovist-*minded workers' groups* in this category, however large these groups may be, would be absurd. This kind of otzovism is largely a result of being uninformed about the work of the Duma group. The best way to combat *this kind* of otzovism is, first, wide publicity among the workers to keep them fully informed on the work of the Duma group and, secondly, to afford the workers opportunities to come into regular contact with the group and influence it. Otzovist sentiment in St. Petersburg, for instance, could be counteracted to a large extent by arranging a number of talks between our comrades in the Duma and the workers of St. Petersburg. Thus all efforts should be concentrated on avoiding an *organisational split* with the otzovists. Any *ideological* campaign against otzovism and its kindred doctrine syndicalism, conducted more or less persistently and consistently, would soon make all talk of an organisational split absolutely superfluous or, at worst, result in a few otzovists or groups of otzovists *breaking away* from the Bolshevik section and the Party.

That, incidentally, was how matters stood at the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. Comrade Maximov's ultimatumism proved to be utterly irreconcilable with the Bolshevik line, which was formulated once again by the conference. After the resolutions on key issues were adopted he declared that he considered them irregular, although they had been carried by ten votes to two, some of them against a single dissentient vote (Maximov's) with one abstention (for example, the resolution "On Otzovism and Ultimatumism" as a whole). At this the conference passed a resolution disclaiming all responsibility for the political actions of Comrade Maximov. The thing was clear: once Comrade Maximov flatly rejected all the resolutions on key issues adopted by such a large majority of the confer-

ence, he had to realise that there was not between the conference and himself that *unanimity of opinion* which is an elementary condition for the existence of a *section* within a *party*. But Comrade Maximov did not stop there: he emphatically declared not only that he had no intention of carrying out these resolutions, *but that he would not submit to them*. The conference had no choice but to disclaim all responsibility for the political activities of Comrade Maximov. In doing so, however, it declared (see the statement of the St. Petersburg delegate M. T.[158] and others) "that the question here is not of a split in the section but of Comrade Maximov's breakaway from the extended editorial board of *Proletary*".*

We also find it necessary to draw all the attention of Party comrades to other resolutions of the conference: "The Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party", and "The Attitude to Duma Activities Among the Other Fields of Party Work". The important thing here is correctly to understand the formulation of the question of the "Party line" of the Bolsheviks, and of the attitude to legal opportunities in general and to the Duma as a platform in particular.

Our immediate task is to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The very fulfilment of this great task involves one extremely important element: the combating of both varieties of *liquidationism*—liquidationism on the right and liquidationism on the left. The liquidators on the right say that no illegal R.S.D.L.P. is needed, that Social-Democratic activities should be centred exclusively or almost exclusively on legal opportunities. The liquidators on the left go to the other extreme:

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* Comrade Marat also made a statement to the effect that he would not *carry out* the resolutions of the conference, but would *submit to them*. In a special statement, Comrade Marat made the reservation that, while he recognised the necessity of a comradely ideological struggle against otzovism, he did not believe that the struggle should take organisational forms or that it involved a split in the Bolshevik section. As to the question *in general* of an *organisational* split, it is evident from the conference resolution ("On the Party School Set up Abroad at X—"[159]) that a step towards a split was made in this case by the otzovists and the adherents of god-building,[160] because this school is undoubtedly an attempt to form a new *ideological and organisational centre* for a new section of the Party.

legal avenues of Party work do not exist for them, illegality at any price is their "be all and end all". Both, in approximately equal degree, are liquidators of the R.S.D.L.P., for without methodical judicious combination of legal and illegal work in the present situation that history has imposed upon us, the "preservation and *consolidation* of the R.S.D.L.P." is inconceivable. Liquidationism on the right, as we know, is rampant particularly in the Menshevik section, and partly in the Bund. But among the Mensheviks there have lately been significant signs of a return to partyism, which must be welcomed: "the minority of the [Menshevik] section",[161] to quote the conference resolution, "after running the full gauntlet of liquidationism, are now voicing their protest against it, and seeking anew solid party ground for their activities."*

What then are the tasks of the Bolsheviks in relation to this as yet small section of the Mensheviks who are fighting against liquidationism on the right? The Bolsheviks must undoubtedly seek *rapprochement* with this section of the membership, those who are Marxists and partyists. There is no question whatever of sinking our tactical differences with the Mensheviks. We are fighting and shall continue to fight most strenuously against Menshevik deviations from the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Nor, needless to say, is there any question of the Bolshevik section dissolving its identity in the Party. The Bolsheviks have done a good deal to entrench their positions in the Party, but much remains to be done in the same direction. The Bolshevik section as a definite ideological trend in the Party must exist as before. But one thing must be borne firmly in mind: the responsibility of "preserving and consolidating" the R.S.D.L.P., of which the resolution of the conference speaks, now rests primarily, if not entirely, on the Bolshevik section. All, or practically all, the *Party* work in progress, particularly in the localities, is now being shouldered by

* By the "split in the Editorial Board" of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* the resolution has in mind Comrade Plekhanov's resignation from that body, to which Plekhanov himself says he was driven by nothing more nor less than the liquidationist tendencies of the Editorial Board.

the Bolsheviks. And to them, as firm and consistent guardians of Party principle, now falls a highly important task. They must enlist in the cause of *building up the Party* all elements who are fitted to serve it. And in this hour of adversity it would be truly a crime on our part not to extend our hand to pro-Party people in other groups, who are coming out in defence of Marxism and partyism against liquidationism.

This stand was recognised by the great majority at the conference, including all the representatives of the Bolsheviks from the local organisations. The opposition wavered, hesitating to take a definite stand, either for or against us. Yet it was for this line that Comrade Maximov accused the conference of "betraying Bolshevism", of adopting the Menshevik point of view, etc. We had only one reply to make to this: "Say that publicly in the press, before the whole Party membership and the whole Bolshevik section, and the sooner the better; that will enable us once again to expose the true value of your 'revolutionariness', the true nature of your 'protection' of Bolshevism."

We ask comrades to take note of the conference resolution on "The Attitude to Duma Activities, etc." We have already indicated above how intimately the question of "legal opportunities" is bound up with liquidationism of various shades. To fight liquidationism on the left is just as imperative now as to fight liquidationism on the right. The parliamentary cretinism, which would reduce the whole Party organisation to a congregation of workers at the shrine of "legal opportunities", and of Duma activities in particular, is as profoundly alien to the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy as the otzovism that cannot understand the value of legal opportunities *to the Party*, *in the interests of the Party*. In the conference resolutions the use of legal opportunities *for the benefit of the Party* is regarded as being of immense importance. But nowhere in these resolutions are legal opportunities and their use treated as an end in itself. They are everywhere placed in direct *association* with the aims and methods of illegal activity. And this *association* deserves particular attention at the present time. Certain *practical* suggestions are given on this score in the resolution. But they are only *suggestions*. Broadly speaking,

it is not so much now a question of what place "legal opportunities" should occupy among other fields of *Party* work, but of *how* to utilise them with greatest benefit to the Party. During its long years of work underground, the Party has accumulated enormous experience in illegal work. This cannot be said of the other sphere—the use of legal opportunities. Here the Party, *and the Bolsheviks in particular*, have not been active enough. More attention, more initiative and more effort must be turned to making use of this field than has hitherto been the case. We must *learn* to utilise legal opportunities, learn just as zealously as we have been learning to use illegal methods of work. And it is for the purpose of using the legal opportunities for the benefit of the Party that the conference calls upon all to whom the interests of the R.S.D.L.P. are dear to *put their shoulder to the wheel*.

Our attitude to illegal Party work remains unchanged, as of course it must. Our main task is to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and everything else must be subordinated to it. Only after this consolidation has been achieved shall we be able to utilise these same legal opportunities in the interests of the Party. The utmost attention must be paid to those workers' groups which are being formed in the industrial centres, which must take over, and are gradually taking over, the general direction of Party work. All our efforts in all fields of our activity should be aimed at making real Social-Democratic Party cadres out of these groups. Only on this basis is it really possible to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic-Labour Party.

Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 46,
July 3 (16), 1909

Published according
to the Supplement

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE PARTY, JUNE 11 (24)

I think it unnecessary to reply for the hundredth and thousandth time to Comrade Maximov on the question at issue, i.e., to repeat that in breaking away from us he is creating a faction of caricature Bolsheviks or godly otzovists. All this has already been said, printed, chewed over and emphasised in *Proletary*. And I only say: speak out, say *in print* what you have been saying here within four walls—and then, and only then, shall we get an ideological struggle instead of the unseemly bickering that has been going on here for more than three days. Say in print that we are "neo-Bolsheviks", "neo-*Proletary*-ists" "in the new *Iskra* sense", i.e., virtually, Mensheviks, that we "have made two steps back", that we "are destroying the most precious heritage of the Russian revolution—Bolshevism". Say these things, which I have taken down from your speech, *in print*, and we shall show the public yet once more that you do answer to the type of a caricature Bolshevik. Say *in print* that we—I quote your words again—"will die a political death as prisoners of Plekhanov in the event of a new upsurge", that we "will win in the event of a protracted period of reaction", say this *in print*, and we shall, for the benefit of the Party, elucidate once more the difference between Bolshevism and "godly otzovism". But since you refuse (in spite of our direct challenges, *beginning from August* 1908, when you were formally requested at a meeting of the editorial board to come forward with a pamphlet, to express your views in a



The first page of Lenin's manuscript
"Speech on the Question of the Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party",
June 11 (24), 1909

Reduced

pamphlet), since you refuse to fight *openly*, but continue your intrigue within the Party, we *must* get an open statement from you by directly *removing you* from our section (not from the Party but from our section of it), removing you for the sake of an ideological struggle which will teach the Party a great deal.

First published in 1934
in the book *Minutes*
of the Conference
Extended Editorial Board
of "Proletary"

Published according
to the manuscript

SPEECH AND DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN RELATION TO DUMA ACTIVITY

We are coming to the end of the debate, and I don't think there is any need to fix it in a special resolution, because we need to be careful with that. The thing was after all to thrash the matter out among ourselves. In reply to Vlasov[162] on the use of legal opportunities, I will read a draft resolution:

"The Bolshevik Centre resolves: in order *in practice* to achieve—and to achieve in a *revolutionary* Social-Democratic spirit and direction—the objects now recognised by all Bolsheviks of making use of all 'legal opportunities', all legal and semi-legal organisations of the working class in general and the Duma rostrum in particular, the Bolshevik section must definitely and clearly put before itself the aim of securing at any cost the training up of a body of experienced Bolsheviks, specialised in their job and firmly established in their particular *legal* post (trade unions; clubs; Duma committees, etc., etc.)."

Vlasov stated that this refers to the leaders. This is not the case. The trouble is that in our Bolshevik section the view prevails that such specialists are not required. Our forces are few: they must be utilised and allotted to the legal functions, and made responsible for carrying out these functions in the name of the section. If we speak of setting up Party cells, we must know how to do it. I have drafted a resolution on agitation by leaflets:

"Having discussed the question of the Bolsheviks' tasks in relation to Duma activity, the Bolshevik Centre resolves to draw the attention of all local organisations to the im-

portance of agitation by leaflets (in addition to the local and regional press) which spread among the masses information about the Duma work of the Social-Democrats and give direction to this work. Subjects for such leaflets might be indications of questions to be highlighted from the Duma rostrum, the summing up of the Social-Democrats' activity in the Duma and the grouping of the different parties, outlines of propagandist speeches on these questions, analysis of the political significance of particularly important Social-Democratic speeches in the Duma, pointing out omissions or inaccuracies in Social-Democratic Duma speeches, and extracts from these speeches giving practical conclusions important for propaganda and agitation, etc., etc."

And I have also roughed-out in the form of a resolution the points on the question of our attitude to Duma activity which were discussed at the private meeting[163]:

"II. The difference between the revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma and the reformist (or more broadly, opportunist) use can be described by the following indications, which do not pretend to be complete.

"From the standpoint of the external relations, so to speak, of the Duma Social-Democratic group, the difference between the revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma and opportunist use consists in the following: the necessity to combat the tendency on the part of deputies and very often of the bourgeois intellectuals surrounding them—a tendency natural in all bourgeois society (and in Russia during a period of reaction especially)—to make parliamentary activity the basic, most important thing of all, an end in itself. In particular it is essential to make every effort that the group should carry on its work as one of the functions subordinated to the interests of the working-class movement as a whole, and also that the group should be in constant contact with the Party, not drawing apart from it but implementing Party views, the directives of Party congresses and the central institutions of the Party.

"From the standpoint of the internal content of the group's activity, it is essential to bear the following in mind. The aim of the activity of the parliamentary Social-Democratic group differs in principle from that of *all* other political parties. The aim of the proletarian party is not to do

deals or haggle with the powers that be, not to engage in the hopeless patching-up of the regime of the feudalist-bourgeois dictatorship of counter-revolution, but to develop in every way the class-consciousness, the socialist clarity of thought, the revolutionary determination and all-round organisation of the mass of the workers. Every step in the activity of the Duma group must serve this fundamental aim. Therefore more attention must be paid to promoting the aims of socialist revolution from the Duma rostrum. Efforts must he made to ensure that speeches should more often be heard from the Duma rostrum propagandising the fundamental conceptions and aims of socialism, namely, of scientific socialism. Then, in the conditions of continuing bourgeois-democratic revolution, it is extremely important that the Duma group should systematically combat the torrent of counter-revolutionary attacks on the 'liberation movement', and the prevalent tendency (both on the part of the outright reactionaries and of the liberals, especially the Cadets) to condemn the revolution and discredit it, its aims, its methods, etc. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma must bear high the banner of the revolution, the banner of the advanced class, leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

"Furthermore it is essential to point out a task of the Duma Social-Democratic group, which is exceptionally important at the present time, namely, that of participating energetically in all discussions of labour legislation. The group must utilise the rich parliamentary experience of the West-European Social-Democrats, taking special care to avoid the opportunist distortion of this aspect of its activity. The group must not whittle down its slogans and the demands of our Party's minimum programme, but draft and introduce its Social-Democratic Bills (and also amendments to Bills of the government and the other parties), in order to unmask to the masses the hypocrisy and falseness of social-reformism, in order to draw the masses into independent economic and political mass struggle, which alone can bring real gains to the workers or transform half-hearted and hypocritical 'reforms' under the existing system into strong-points for an advancing working-class movement towards the complete emancipation of the proletariat.

"The Duma Social-Democratic group and the whole Social-Democratic Party should take the same stand towards reformism within Social-Democracy, which is the latest product of opportunist vacillation.

"Finally, revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma should differ from opportunist use in that the Social-Democratic group and the Party are bound to explain to the masses in every possible way the class character of all bourgeois political parties, not confining themselves to attacks on the government and outright reactionaries, but exposing both the counter-revolutionary nature of liberalism and the waverings of petty-bourgeois peasant democracy."

Written June 12-13 (25-26), 1909
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Minutes of the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"

Text of the speech published according to the book; text of the draft resolution according to the manuscript

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*

1

ON OTZOVISM AND ULTIMATUMISM

The slogan of boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the First Duma issued by the revolutionary wing of our Party played a great revolutionary role at the time, and was taken up with enthusiasm by all the most active and most revolutionary sections of the working class.

The direct revolutionary struggle of the broad masses was then followed by a severe period of counter-revolution. It became essential for Social-Democrats to adapt their revolutionary tactics to this new political situation, and, in connection with this, one of the exceptionally important tasks became the use of the Duma as an open platform for the purpose of assisting Social-Democratic agitation and organisation.

In this rapid turn of events, however, a section of the workers who had participated in the direct revolutionary struggle was unable to proceed at once to apply revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics in the new conditions of the counter-revolution, and continued simply to repeat slogans which *had been* revolutionary in the period of open civil war, but which now, if merely repeated, might retard the process of closing the ranks of the proletariat in the new conditions of struggle.

On the other hand, in the conditions of this painful crisis, in an atmosphere of decline in the revolutionary struggle, of apathy and dejection even among a section of the workers, at a time when the workers' organisations were being suppressed and when the strength of their resistance

to disintegrating influences was inadequate, there has developed among a section of the working class an attitude of indifference towards the political struggle in general, and of a particularly marked lack of interest in the work of Social-Democrats in the Duma.

It is in such conditions that so-called otzovism and ultimatumism may meet with temporary success among these sections of the proletariat.

The proceedings of the Third Duma, which openly flouts the needs of the workers, work up an otzovist mood among these strata of the workers, who, owing to their inadequate Social-Democratic training, are as yet unable to understand that these proceedings of the Third Duma enable the Social-Democrats to make use of that representative assembly of the exploiting classes in a revolutionary manner, in order to expose to the broadest sections of the people the real nature of the autocracy and of all the counter-revolutionary forces, as well as the need for revolutionary struggle.

Another contributing factor to this otzovist mood among this stratum of the workers has been the exceedingly grave errors committed by the Duma Social-Democratic group, especially during the first year of its activity.

Recognising that this otzovist mood has a detrimental effect on the socialist and revolutionary training of the working class, the Bolshevik wing of the Party considers it necessary:

(a) *in regard to these strata of the workers*: to persevere in the work of Social-Democratic training and organisation, to explain systematically and persistently the utter political futility of otzovism and ultimatumism, the real significance of Social-Democratic parliamentarism and the role of the Duma as a platform for the Social-Democrats during a period of counter-revolution;

(b) *in regard to the Duma Social-Democratic group and Duma work in general*: to establish close connections between the Duma group and the advanced workers; to render it every assistance; to see that the whole Party supervises and brings pressure upon it, *inter alia*, by openly explaining its mistakes; to ensure in practice that the Party guides its activities as a Party organ; and in general that the Bolsheviks carry out the decisions of the recent Party conference on

this matter; for only the increased attention of working-class circles to the activities of the Duma Social-Democratic group, and their organised participation in the Duma activities of the Social-Democrats, will be effective in straightening out the tactics of our Duma group;

(c) *in regard to the Right wing of the Party*, which is dragging the Duma group on to an anti-Party road and thereby tearing it away from the workers' vanguard to wage a systematic, irreconcilable struggle against it, and to expose these tactics as fatal to the Party.

* * *

In the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution a number of elements joined our Party, attracted not by its purely proletarian programme, but chiefly by its gallant and energetic fight for democracy; these elements adopted the revolutionary-democratic slogans of the proletarian party, but without connecting them with the entire struggle of the socialist proletariat as a whole.

Such elements, not sufficiently imbued with the proletarian point of view, have also been found in the ranks of our Bolshevik wing of the Party. In this period of social stagnation such elements more and more reveal their lack of Social-Democratic consistency. Coming as they do into ever sharper contradiction with the fundamentals of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics, they have been creating, during the past year, a trend that seeks to give shape to a theory of otzovism and ultimatumism, but in reality only elevates to a principle and intensifies false notions about Social-Democratic parliamentarism and the work of Social-Democracy in the Duma.

These attempts to create a complete system of otzovist policy out of an otzovist mood lead to a theory which in substance expresses the ideology of political indifference on the one hand, and of anarchist vagaries on the other. For all its revolutionary phraseology, the theory of otzovism and ultimatumism in practice represents, to a considerable extent, the reverse side of constitutional illusions based on the hope that the Duma itself can satisfy certain urgent needs of the people. In essence, it substitutes petty-bourgeois tendencies for proletarian ideology.

No less harmful to the Social-Democratic cause than open otzovism is so-called ultimatumism (i.e., that tendency which on principle renounces the utilisation of the Third Duma rostrum, or which tries to justify its failure to carry out this duty by considerations of expediency, and in striving for the recall of the Social-Democratic group from the Duma, abandons the prolonged work of training the Duma group and straightening its line in favour of presenting to it an immediate ultimatum). Politically, ultimatumism at the present time is indistinguishable from otzovism, and only introduces still greater confusion and disunity by the disguised character of its otzovism. The attempts of ultimatumism to assert its direct connection with the tactics of boycott practised by our wing of the Party during a particular stage of the revolution, merely distort the true meaning and character of the boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the First Duma, which was quite correctly applied by the overwhelming majority of our Party. By their attempt to deduce, from the particular cases in which the boycott of representative institutions was applied at this or that moment of the revolution, that the policy of boycott is the distinguishing feature of Bolshevik tactics, even in a period of counter-revolution, ultimatumism and otzovism demonstrate that these trends are in essence the reverse side of Menshevism, which preaches indiscriminate participation in all representative institutions, irrespective of the particular stage of development of the revolution, irrespective of whether a revolutionary upsurge exists or not.

All the attempts made so far by otzovism and ultimatumism to lay down principles on which to base their theory have inevitably led to denial of the fundamentals of revolutionary Marxism. The tactics proposed by them inevitably lead to a complete break with the tactics of the Left wing of international Social-Democracy as applied to present-day Russian conditions, and result in anarchist deviations.

Otzovist-ultimatumist agitation has already begun to cause unquestionable harm to the working-class movement and to Social-Democratic work. If it continues, it may become a threat to Party unity, for this agitation has already given rise to such ugly phenomena as the alliance between otzovists and Socialist-Revolutionaries (in St. Petersburg)

for the purpose of preventing help for our Party representatives in the Duma; likewise to public speeches at workers' meetings jointly with avowed syndicalists.

In view of all this, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* declares that Bolshevism as a definite trend within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has nothing in common with otzovism and ultimatumism, and that the Bolshevik wing of the Party must most resolutely combat these deviations from the path of revolutionary Marxism.

2

THE TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE PARTY

In the period of decisive triumph of counter-revolution which followed the dissolution of the Second Duma, force of circumstances dictated that all Party activities should be concentrated on the following task: to preserve the Party organisation built up in the years of the high tide of the proletarian struggle, despite all the efforts of reaction, and notwithstanding the great depression in the proletarian class struggle, i.e., to preserve it as an organisation which consciously takes its stand on the basis of orthodox Marxism, and which unites all the "national" Social-Democratic organisations for the purpose of carrying out a single revolutionary Social-Democratic line of tactics.

In the course of this two years' struggle for the Party and partyism, it became quite clear that, on the one hand, the Party had dissociated itself from the elements that had penetrated it as a result of the specific conditions of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and that, on the other hand, the revolutionary Social-Democrats had been further consolidated. On the one hand, the former fellow-travellers of Social-Democracy took quite definite shape—those fellow-travellers, who, on leaving the Party, transferred all their activities into various legal organisations (co-operatives, trade unions, educational societies, advisory committees for the Duma group), where they not only did not carry out the policy of the Party but, on the contrary, fought the Party and strove to wrest these organisations away from it and pit them against the Party. Making a fetish of legality,

and elevating to a principle the narrow forms of activity imposed by the temporary decline of and state of disunity in the working-class movement, these elements—avowed liquidators of the Party—quite obviously took their stand upon the ground of theoretical and tactical revisionism. That the closest connection exists between liquidationism in organisation (the struggle against Party institutions) and the ideological struggle against Marxist theory and the fundamental principles of the programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has now most clearly been revealed and proved by the entire history of the efforts to force an opportunist policy on our Duma group by its intellectual advisers, as well as by the entire course of the struggle between the liquidators and the partyists within the legal workers' organisations and in the workers' groups of the four congresses: of the People's Universities,[164] of the co-operatives,[165] of women[166] and of factory medical officers.[167]

On the other hand, the Left wing of the Party, to whose lot it fell to lead the Party during this period of the decisive triumph of the counter-revolution, theoretically recognised and in practice applied the tactics of expediently combining illegal with legal Party work. This applies to all the Party work with the Duma group and all the Party work in the legal and semi-legal proletarian organisations. It is precisely these forms of work—forms enabling the illegal Party to influence more or less broad masses—that have been brought to the fore by the peculiar conditions of the present historical situation, in addition to the main forms of Party work. It is in these forms of activity that the Party in practice comes into conflict with liquidationism and deals it heavy blows. It is on this ground also that Social-Democrats belonging to various groups of the Party have been and are being drawn together.* And here, finally, on the very same questions of Party tactics and organisation in the con-

* The resolutions on the trade unions and the co-operatives, and a number of resolutions on Duma activities, carried *unanimously* by the Central Committee. Support for the Party line by the overwhelming majority at the recent All-Russian Conference. The experience of conducting the Central Organ, the workers' groups of the said congresses, etc.

ditions of the Third Duma period, the Bolshevik section openly disavows the pseudo-revolutionary, unstable, non-Marxist elements, which, under cover of so-called otzovism, have been opposing the new forms of Party activity.

At the present time, outlining the basic tasks of the Bolsheviks, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* states:

(1) that in the further struggle for the Party and partyism, the task of the Bolshevik section, which must remain the foremost champion of partyism and of the revolutionary Social-Democratic line in the Party, is to give active and all-round support to the Central Committee and the Central Organ of the Party. In the present period of the re-grouping of Party forces, only the central institutions of the Party can serve as the strong and authoritative representa ive of the Party line, around which all genuinely partyist and genuinely Social-Democratic elements can be rallied;

(2) that in the Menshevik camp of the Party, whose official organ, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, is fully controlled by the Menshevik liquidators, the minority of this faction, having explored the path of liquidationism to the very end, is already raising its voice in protest against that path and is again seeking a party basis for its activities (the letter of the "Vyborg" Mensheviks* in St. Petersburg, the split among the Mensheviks in Moscow, the split in the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the corresponding division in the Bund, etc.);

(3) that in such circumstances the task of the Bolsheviks, who will remain the solid vanguard of the Party, is not only to continue the struggle against liquidationism and all the varieties of revisionism, but also to establish closer contact with the Marxist and partyist elements of the other groups, dictated by common aims in the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

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* The Mensheviks in Vyborg District of St. Petersburg.—*Ed.*

3

AGITATION FOR A BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS OR BOLSHEVIK CONFERENCE SEPARATE FROM THE PARTY

Considering:

that the Bolshevik wing, ever since Party unity was restored, has always aligned and rallied the adherents of its political line on issues which have already become the subject of a general Party discussion, and always on the basis of an ideological campaign fought on the general Party arena for its own particular solution of such questions—parallel platforms, discussion in the Party cells, and at general Party congresses;

that this is the only sure way both to rally really like-minded members and to draw into the wing all really kindred elements;

that for the attainment of our main object, to exert such an influence on the Party that the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy shall triumph once and for all in the Party, the alignment of the Bolshevik, solely on the general Party arena is the only right and proper procedure;

that any other procedure, the procedure of calling special Bolshevik conferences and congresses, would inevitably split the Party from top to bottom and would deal an irreparable blow to the section which took the initiative in bringing about such a total split in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,

the extended editorial board of *Proletary* resolves:

(1) To warn all its supporters against agitating for a special Bolshevik congress, as such agitation would lead objectively to a Party split and might radically impair the position which revolutionary Social-Democracy has won in the Party.

(2) To hold the next conference of Bolsheviks at the same time as the regular Party conference, the supreme assembly of the wing as a whole to be an assembly of its supporters at the next Party congress.

(3) In view of the urgent outstanding issues agitating the Party and members of its Bolshevik wing, the Bolsheviks on the Central Committee are instructed to press for a speediest possible general Party conference (to be called in two or three months) and then for a speediest possible Congress.

4

THE PARTY SCHOOL BEING SET UP ABROAD AT X—

After considering the question of the school at X—, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* is of the opinion that the organisation of this school by the promotion group (which includes Comrade Maximov, a member of the extended editorial board) has from the outset been proceeded with over the heads of the editorial board of *Proletary* and been accompanied by agitation against the latter. The steps so far taken by the promotion group make it perfectly clear that under the guise of this school a new centre is being formed for a faction breaking away from the Bolsheviks. The sponsors of this school, acting over the heads of the general centres, have contacted numerous committees in Russia, organised an independent fund and collections, and are appointing their own organisers, without even informing the editorial board of *Proletary* or the general Party centre.

While it recognises that with the present dearth of experienced Party workers a properly constituted and genuinely Party school, even if located abroad, might be of some help; to local organisations in training up useful Party functionaries from among the workers, and while it considers for its part that everything must be done to render such assistance to local organisations as the condition of our organisation will allow, the extended editorial board, on the evidence of the whole line of conduct of the initiators of the school at X—, declares that the aims pursued by these initiators are not aims common to the Bolshevik wing as a whole, as an ideological trend in the Party, but are the private aims of a group with a separate ideology and policy. In view of the dissensions revealed within our ranks on the subject of otzovism, ultimatumism, the attitude to the propaganda of god-building and the internal Party tasks of the Bolsheviks in general; and in view of the fact that the initiators and organisers of the school at X— are one and all representatives of otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* declares that the ideological and political physiognomy of this new centre is quite clearly defined.

In view of this, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* declares that the Bolshevik wing can bear no responsibility for this school.

5

THE BREAKAWAY OF COMRADE MAXIMOV

Considering:

that unanimity on principles and tactics between ten members of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, on the one hand, and Comrade Maximov, on the other, has manifestly proved to be absent on all points of the agenda; that, furthermore, there have lately been actions on Comrade Maximov's part tending also to violate the organisational unity of the Bolshevik wing; that, lastly, Comrade Maximov gave a negative answer to the question whether he would abide by the decisions of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* and carry them out,

the extended editorial board of *Proletary* henceforth disclaims any responsibility for the political actions of Comrade Maximov.

Supplement to
Proletary, No. 46,
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to the Supplement

THE LIQUIDATION OF LIQUIDATIONISM

In a special supplement to the present issue of *Proletary* the reader will find a report on the conference of the Bolsheviks and the text of the resolutions adopted there.* Our purpose in the present article is to assess the importance of this conference and the breakaway of a small group of the Bolsheviks which took place there, from the standpoint both of our wing and of the R.S.D.L.P. as a whole.

The last two years, roughly from the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, up to the present time, have been a period of drastic change, of grave crisis in the history of the Russian revolution and in the development of the working-class movement in Russia and of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in December 1908 reviewed the present political situation, the condition and prospects of the revolutionary movement and the tasks of the party of the working class in the present period. The resolutions passed by the conference are a permanent asset to the Party, and the Menshevik opportunists who sought to criticise them at all costs, only succeeded in betraying the glaring futility of their "criticism" which was unable to offer any intelligent, integral and systematic solution of the problems as an alternative to the one given in the resolutions.

But that was not all. The conference played an important roll in the life of our Party by indicating the existence of *new ideological groupings* in both wings—the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. The struggle between these sections

* See pp. 425-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

can be said without exaggeration to have filled the whole history of the Party, both on the eve of the revolution and during the revolution. Therefore the new ideological groupings are an event of great importance in the life of the Party, an event whose lessons all Social-Democrats should study, understand and digest, if they are to take an intelligent stand on the new issues which this new situation raises.

These new ideological groupings may be briefly described as the appearance of liquidationism on both the extreme flanks of the Party and as the struggle being waged against it. By December 1908 liquidationism stood fully revealed among the Mensheviks, but at that time the fight against it was conducted almost exclusively by others (the Bolsheviks, the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats, a section of the Bundists). The pro-Party Mensheviks, Mensheviks who were opposed to liquidationism, had barely begun to emerge as a trend at that time, and were not at all united or open in their criticism. Among the Bolsheviks both sections were clearly defined and acted openly, namely, the overwhelming majority of orthodox Bolsheviks, who were firmly opposed to otzovism and secured the adoption of their point of view in all the resolutions of the conference, and the otzovist minority who advocated their views as a separate group, and received frequent support from the ultimatumists who wavered between them and the orthodox Bolsheviks. That the otzovists (and the ultimatumists, too, insofar as they are coming round to the otzovist viewpoint) are Mensheviks inside out, liquidators of a new type, has been repeatedly asserted and demonstrated in *Proletary* (see especially issues Nos. 39, 42, and 44*). Thus among the Mensheviks the overwhelming majority were liquidators, and the protest and struggle of the pro-Party men against them were barely beginning to manifest themselves; while among the Bolsheviks the orthodox elements were completely dominant, but an otzovist minority were acting openly. Such was the situation within the Party at the December All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See pp. 286-302, 356-59 and 383-94 of this volume.—*Ed.*

What is this liquidationism, then? What brought it into being? Why is it that the otzovists (and the god-builders of whom we shall say a few words later) are also liquidators, Mensheviks inside out? In a word, what is the social meaning and the social significance of the new ideological grouping within our Party?

Liquidationism in the narrow sense of the word, the liquidationism of the Mensheviks, consists ideologically in negation of the revolutionary class struggle of the socialist proletariat in general, and denial of the hegemony of the proletariat in our bourgeois-democratic revolution in particular. This denial of course takes various forms, and occurs more or less consciously, sharply and consistently. As an example we might mention Cherevanin and Potresov. The former gave such an assessment of the role of the proletariat in the revolution that the *whole* editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, even before the split that took place in it (i.e., both Plekhanov and Martov-Dan-Axelrod-Martynov) had to repudiate Cherevanin, although it did so in a very discreditable form. It repudiated the consistent liquidator in *Vorwärts* to the Germans *without publishing its statement in "Golos Sotsial-Demokrata" for the benefit of Russian readers*! In the article which he contributed to the *Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, Potresov liquidated the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the Russian revolution so successfully that Plekhanov left the liquidationist editorial board.

In respect of organisation, liquidationism means denying the necessity for an illegal Social-Democratic Party, and consequently renouncing the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, leaving its ranks. It means fighting the Party in the columns of the legal press, in legal workers' organisations, in the trade unions and co-operative societies, at congresses attended by working-class delegates, etc. The history of any Party organisation in Russia during the last two years teems with examples of liquidationism on the part of the Mensheviks. As a particularly glaring example of liquidationism, we have already referred (*Proletary*, No. 42, reprinted in the pamphlet *The All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in December 1908*) to the case where the

Menshevik members of the Central Committee made a deliberate attempt to *wreck the Central Committee of the Party*, and stop the functioning of this institution. The almost complete breakdown of the illegal Menshevik organisations in Russia is borne out by the fact that the "Caucasian delegation" at the recent Party conference consisted entirely of residents abroad, while the editorial board of "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*" was confirmed (at the beginning of 1908) by the Central Committee of the Party as a separate literary group, totally unconnected with any organisation functioning in Russia.

The Mensheviks do not weigh up the implications of all these manifestations of liquidationism. They either conceal them or are baffled by them, at a loss to understand the significance of certain facts, floundering in minutiae, vagaries and personalities, unable to draw general conclusions, unable to grasp the meaning of what is going on.

And the meaning of it is that, in a period of bourgeois revolution, the opportunist wing of the workers' party, at times of crisis, disintegration and collapse, is bound to be either out-and-out liquidationist or liquidator-ridden. In a period of bourgeois revolution the proletarian party *is bound* to have a following of petty-bourgeois *fellow-travellers* (what is known as *Mitläufer* in German) who are least capable of digesting proletarian theory and tactics, least capable of holding their own in time of collapse, most likely to carry opportunism to its extreme. Disintegration has set in—and the mass of Menshevik intellectuals, Menshevik writers, have virtually turned liberal. The intelligentsia has swung away from the Party—and *consequently* disintegration has been most complete in the Menshevik organisations. Those Mensheviks who sincerely sympathised with the proletariat and the proletarian class struggle, with proletarian revolutionary theory (and there have always been such Mensheviks who justify their opportunism in the revolution on the grounds that they are anxious to miss no changes in the situation, no convolutions in the complex historical process) found themselves "in the minority once more", in a minority among the Mensheviks, without the determination to fight the liquidators and without the strength to succeed if they tried. But the opportunist fellow-travellers move further

and further to liberalism. Plekhanov becomes exasperated with Potresov, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* with Cherevanin, the Moscow Menshevik workingmen with the Menshevik intellectuals, *and so forth*. The pro-Party Mensheviks, the orthodox Marxists among the Mensheviks, are beginning to break away and, by the logic of things, by becoming *pro-Party*, they draw nearer to the Bolsheviks. And it is our duty to understand this situation, everywhere and in every way to separate the liquidators from the pro-Party Mensheviks, to make closer contact with the latter, not by glossing over differences in principle, but by building up a really united workers' party in which differences of opinion should not stand in the way of the common effort, the common drive, the common struggle.

But are petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the proletariat the exclusive property of the Menshevik wing? No. We have already pointed out in *Proletary*, No. 39,* that they are to be found also among the Bolsheviks, as testified by the entire mode of argument of the consistent otzovists, the whole character of their attempts to justify "new" tactics. No sizable section of a mass workers' party could, by the nature of things, avoid during a time of bourgeois revolution taking on a certain number of "fellow-travellers" of diverse shadings. This is inevitable even in the most highly developed capitalist countries, after the completion of a bourgeois revolution, for the proletariat is ever in contact with the most varied sections of the petty bourgeoisie and is constantly being recruited and replenished from them. There is nothing abnormal or terrible in this, *if* the proletarian party is able thoroughly to absorb these foreign bodies, to control and not be controlled by them, and is able to see in good time that some of these elements really are foreign bodies, and that in certain conditions one must clearly and openly dissociate oneself from them. In this respect the difference between the two wings of the R.S.D.L.P. is that the Mensheviks turned out to be in thrall to the liquidators (i.e., the "fellow-travellers"), proof of which is to be found among the Mensheviks themselves, being supplied both

* See pp. 286-302 of this volume.—*Ed.*

by their Moscow adherents in Russia, and abroad by Plekhanov's repudiation of Potresov and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*; while in the case of the Bolsheviks the liquidationist elements—the otzovists and god-builders—proved to be a small minority from the outset, were rendered harmless from the outset, and were ultimately pushed aside.

That otzovism is Menshevism inside out, that it also leads inevitably to liquidationism, only of a slightly different kind, there can be no doubt. It is not, of course, a matter of personalities or particular groups, but of an objective general tendency—to the extent that otzovism ceases to be a mere state of mind and seeks to evolve into a separate trend. The Bolsheviks stated quite definitely before the revolution, first, that their aim was not to create a separate trend in socialism but to apply to the new conditions of our revolution the basic principles of international revolutionary orthodox Marxist Social-Democracy; secondly, they would do their duty even should it consist in an onerous, slow, humdrum daily grind, if history, after the issue of the struggle and after all opportunities for revolutionary action were exhausted, should condemn us to plod along the by-paths of an "autocratic constitution". The least attentive reader will find these statements in the Social-Democratic literature of 1905. They are of immense importance as a solemn obligation of the whole Bolshevik wing of the Party, a deliberate choice of path. In order to fulfil this obligation to the proletariat, it was necessary to take patiently in hand and re-educate those who had been attracted to Social-Democracy by the days of liberty (there even appeared a type of "Social-Democrat of the days of liberty"), who were attracted chiefly by the vehemence, revolutionary spirit and "vividness" of our slogans, but, who, though militant enough to fight on revolutionary holidays, lacked the stamina for workaday struggle under the reign of counter-revolution. Some of these elements were gradually drawn into proletarian activities and assimilated the Marxist world-outlook. The others only memorised a few slogans without grasping their meaning, could only repeat old phrases and were unable to adapt the old principles of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics to the changed conditions. Their several destinies are graphically illustrated by the evolution of those who

wanted to boycott the Third Duma. In June 1907 they were the majority among the Bolsheviks. But *Proletary* campaigned continuously against the boycott. Events verified this policy and a year later the otzovists were *in the minority* among the Bolsheviks (14 votes against 18 in the summer of 1908) in the Moscow organisation, which had been the stronghold of "boycottism". A year later, when the error of otzovism had been abundantly and repeatedly demonstrated, the Bolshevik wing—and here lies the significance of the recent Bolshevik conference—finally liquidated otzovism and ultimatumism, the thin end of otzovism, finally liquidated this peculiar form of liquidationism.

So let none accuse us of causing a "new split". In the Report on our conference we explain our aims and our attitude in detail. We did everything possible, we left nothing untried, to persuade the dissenting comrades: we were at it for over eighteen months. But as a wing, i.e., a union of like-minded people in the Party, we cannot work without unanimity on fundamental issues. To break away from a wing is not the same as breaking away from the Party. The people who have broken away from our wing in no way lose the possibility of working in the Party. Either they will remain "free lances", i.e., outside any wing, and the general environment of Party work will draw them in. Or they will try to form a new group—as is their legitimate right, if they wish to advocate and develop their own special shade of opinion and tactics—in which case the *whole Party* will very soon see the practical manifestation of those *tendencies*, the ideological implications of which we have tried to assess above.

The Bolsheviks have to lead the Party. To do so they must know their course, they must stop hesitating, they must stop wasting time on persuading waverers, and fighting dissentients in their own ranks. Otzovism and ultimatumism, the thin end of otzovism, are incompatible with the work which the present circumstances require of revolutionary Social-Democrats. During the revolution we learned to "speak French", i.e., to introduce into the movement the greatest number of rousing slogans, to raise the energy of the direct struggle of the masses and extend its scope. Now, in this time of stagnation, reaction and disintegration, we

must learn to "speak German", i.e., to work slowly (there is nothing else for it, until things revive), systematically, steadily, advancing step by step, winning inch by inch. Whoever finds this work tedious, whoever does not understand the need for preserving and developing the revolutionary principles of Social-Democratic tactics *in this phase too, on this bend of the road*, is taking the name of Marxist in vain.

Our Party can make no headway unless it decisively liquidates liquidationism. And liquidationism does not only mean the direct liquidationism of the Mensheviks and their opportunist tactics. It also includes Menshevism inside out. It includes otzovism and ultimatumism, that are impeding the Party in the fulfilment of its immediate task, in which lie all the unique peculiarities of the present time, the task of utilising the Duma rostrum and turning all the semi-legal and legal organisations of the working class into coigns of vantage. The same goes for god-building and the defence of god-building tendencies which are radically at variance with the principles of Marxism. And the same applies to incomprehension of the Party tasks of the Bolsheviks, which in 1906 and 1907 consisted in *overthrowing* the Menshevik Central Committee, as a body which *lacked the support* of the majority of the Party (not only the Poles and Letts, but even the Bundists were against the Central Committee, which was purely Menshevik at the time)—and which now consist in patiently training up partyist elements and knitting them together, in building up a really united and strong proletarian party. The Bolsheviks prepared the ground for partyism by their implacable struggle against the anti-Party elements in 1903-05 and in 1906-07. Now the Bolsheviks must *build the Party*, build the Party out of their wing, build up the Party by utilising the vantage-ground gained in the inner-Party struggle.

Such are the tasks of our wing of the Party in the present political situation and the general position of the R.S.D.L.P. as a whole. They are set forth once more and developed in particular detail in the resolutions of the recent Bolshevik Conference. The ranks have been re-formed for a new struggle. The changed conditions have been taken into ac-

count. The road has been chosen. Let us go forward along it and the revolutionary Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia will begin rapidly to build up into a force which no reaction will shake, and which will stand at the head of all the fighting classes of the people in the next round of our revolution.*

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* *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 15, and *Otkliki Bunda*, No. 2[168] have recently appeared. In these publications there is once again piled up a heap of choice specimens of liquidationism, which will need analysing and evaluating in a separate article in the next issue of *Proletary*.

THE TSAR VISITS EUROPE AND MEMBERS OF THE BLACK-HUNDRED DUMA VISIT ENGLAND

Half a century ago Russia's reputation as an international gendarme was firmly established. In the course of the last century our autocracy rendered no small support to various reactionary causes in Europe even to the point of crushing by downright military force the revolutionary movements in neighbouring countries. One has only to recall the Hungarian campaign of Nicholas I, and the repeated repressions of Poland, to understand why the leaders of the international socialist proletariat from the forties onward denounced tsarism so often to the European workers and European democrats as the chief mainstay of reaction in the whole civilised world.

Beginning with the last three decades or so of the nineteenth century, the revolutionary movement in Russia gradually altered this state of affairs. The more tsarism was shaken by the blows of the growing revolutionary movement at home, the weaker it became as the enemy of freedom in Europe. But in the meantime another international reactionary force had taken definite shape in Europe—the bourgeois governments, which had witnessed insurrections by the proletariat, had realised that a life-and-death struggle between labour and capital was inevitable, and would welcome any adventurer or brigand on the throne for the sake of joining forces against the proletariat. And when, at the beginning of the century, the war with Japan and the Revolution of 1905 dealt powerful body-blows to tsarism, the international bourgeoisie rushed to the rescue, supporting it with milliards in loans and moving heaven and earth to localise the revolutionary conflagration and restore "order"

in Russia. One good turn deserves another. Tsarism had helped the counter-revolutionary bourgeois governments of Europe more than once in their struggle against democracy. Now the bourgeoisie of Europe, which had become counter-revolutionary in relation to the proletariat, helped tsarism in its fight against the revolution.

The allies are celebrating victory. Nicholas the Bloody is going to Europe to pay his respects to the monarchs there and to the President of the French Republic. The monarchs and the President are excitedly preparing to do the honours to the leader of the Black-Hundred counter-revolution in Russia. But victory fell to these noble knights of Black-Hundred and bourgeois reaction not because their enemy was destroyed, but because its forces were split, because the proletariat does not mature simultaneously in all countries. The victory fell to the united enemies of the working class at the cost of postponing the decisive battle, at the cost of widening and deepening the source which—more slowly perhaps than we would wish, but nonetheless surely—is multiplying the numbers of the proletarians, increasing their solidarity, steeling them in struggle, schooling them in operations against the united enemy. This source is capitalism, which awakened the quondam patriarchal "patrimony" of the aristocratic Romanovs, and which is now awakening the Asian states, one after another.

The allies are celebrating victory. Yet every celebration of Nicholas the Bloody and the leaders of the bourgeois European governments is accompanied, echo-like, by the voice of the revolutionary masses of the workers. "We have crushed the revolution," cry Nicholas and Wilhelm, Edward and Fallières, shaking hands with each other under the protection of a bristling shield of bayonets or a long line of warships. "We shall overthrow you all together," replies the revolution like an echo, through the lips of the leaders of the class-conscious proletariat of all countries.

Nicholas the Bloody leaves Russia. He is accompanied by the words of a Social-Democratic member of the Black-Hundred Duma, who voices the republican convictions of all the class-conscious workers of Russia and reminds him of the inevitable downfall of the monarchy. Nicholas arrives in Sweden. He is feted in the royal palace. He is greeted by

soldiers and spies. He is met by the speech of the leader of the Swedish workers, the Social-Democrat Branting, who protests against the dishonouring of his country by the visit of this butcher. Nicholas goes to England, to France, to Italy. Kings and courtiers, ministers and policemen make ready to do him honour. Labour makes ready to meet him—by a meeting of protest in England, a demonstration of popular indignation in France, a general strike on the day which is darkened by his arrival in Italy. Socialist members of parliament in all three countries—Thorne in England, Jaurès in France, Morgari in Italy—have already responded to the call of the International Socialist Bureau, and have declared to the whole world the hatred and contempt which the working class entertains for Nicholas the Pogromist, Nicholas the Hangman, the Nicholas who is now crushing the people of Persia and flooding France with Russian spies and *agents provocateurs*.

The "respectable" bourgeois press in all these countries is in a frenzy of rage, not knowing what of abuse to use next for the actions of the socialists, what to do next to support the ministers and presidents who have ruled socialists out of order for their speeches. But their frenzy is in vain. The parliamentary representatives of the proletariat cannot be gagged; meetings cannot be stopped in really constitutional countries; the fact cannot be concealed, either by self-deception or by the deception of others, that the Russian tsar dare not appear in public whether in London, Paris or Rome.

The grand celebration of the leaders of international reaction, their celebration of the suppression of the revolution in Russia and Persia, *has been ruined* by the unanimous and courageous protest of the socialist proletariat of all the European countries.

And on the background of this protest by the socialists from St. Petersburg to Paris, from Stockholm to Rome, this protest against the tsarist autocracy in the name of the revolution and its principles, all the more glaring does the despicable servility to tsarism on the part of our Russian liberals stand out. Several members of the Black-Hundred Duma, ranging from the moderate Rights to the Constitutional-Democrats, headed by the Chairman of the Duma,

are visiting England. They pride themselves on the fact that they represent the majority in the Duma, its real Centre, without the extreme Right or the extreme Left. They are posing as the representatives of a "constitutional" Russia, singing the praises of the "renovated" order and the adored monarch who has "granted the people" a Duma. There they are, like the swelling frog in Krylov's fable,[169] puffing themselves up as victors over the Black-Hundred reaction which, to hear them talk, wants to abolish the "constitution" in Russia. At a luncheon, given by the Lord Mayor, Mr. Milyukov, leader of the "Constitutional-*Democratic*" (no joke!) Party declared in his speech: "So long as there is a legislative chamber in Russia controlling the budget, the Russian opposition will remain His Majesty's Opposition, and not an opposition to His Majesty" (St. Petersburg News Agency telegram of June 19, old style). In its leading article of June 21 bearing the Khlestakovian[170] title "Europe and Renovated Russia", *Golos Moskvy*, mouthpiece of the Octobrist Party, warmly applauds the utterances of the Cadet leader, declaring that his "moderately constitutional" speech "marks perhaps a turning-point in Cadet policy, a renunciation of the abortive tactics of creating opposition for the sake of opposition".

The police rag *Rossiya* (June 23) devotes a leading article to Milyukov's speech, in which it quotes the "famous" phrase about His Majesty's Opposition, and declares: "Mr. Milyukov in England has undertaken certain responsibilities on behalf of the Russian opposition. If he fulfils his pledge he will render a service to his country for which he will be forgiven no small number of his former transgressions." Your services are rewarded, gentlemen of the Cadet Party. *Vekhi* in general, and Struve in particular, have been commended by Antonius of Volhynia, the "Lord Bishop" of the Black-Hundred zealots; Milyukov, the leader of your party, has been commended by a venal police rag of a newspaper. Your services are rewarded!

It remains for us to remind the reader that we have been exposing the Cadets as Octobrists at heart ever since 1906, when gimcrack "victories" in the Duma turned the heads of many a selfishly-naïve and disinterestedly-naïve person.

We have also to remind the reader that the *purpose* of tsarism's game, now being played so conspicuously in the Third Duma, was exposed by us *over twenty months* ago in *Proletary*, Nos. 19 and 20 (November 1907) when we reviewed the results of the elections to the Third Duma. In the Third Duma as we said, and as was said in the resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1907 *two* majorities are possible: the one consisting of Black-Hundred deputies and Octobrists, the other consisting of Cadets and Octobrists—and *both* of them are counter-revolutionary. "Such a situation in the Duma," states the resolution adopted at that time by the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats (published in *Proletary*, No. 19) and the resolution of the Third All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (*Proletary*, No. 20), "is exceedingly favourable for a double political game being played by both the government and the Cadets."*

This analysis of the situation has now been *fully* corroborated, showing the short-sightedness of those who were ready again and again to proclaim Social-Democratic "support" for the Cadets.

The Cadets are fighting the Octobrists not as opponents of their principles, but as *competitors*. The voter must be "won"—we declare ourselves the party of "the people's freedom". Our "respectability" must be proved—we boost the Maklakovs in the Third Duma, we tell Europe through Milyukov that we are "His Majesty's Opposition". And that is all that Stolypin, the faithful servant of Black-Hundred tsarism needs. Let the Black-Hundred tsarist gang run the country, let them and only them actually decide all the really important questions of policy. But "we" need the Octobrist-Cadet majority for play-acting, to "represent" us in Europe, to facilitate the raising of loans, to "correct" the excesses of the Black Hundreds, to dupe simpletons with "reforms"... that are corrected by the Council of State.

His Majesty knows *his* Opposition. The Cadet Opposition know *their* Stolypin and *their* Nicholas. The simple technique of European parliamentary hypocrisy and chicanery has come easily to both our liberals and our ministers. Both

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 138 and 144.—*Ed.*

are apt students of the methods used by the bourgeois reactionaries of Europe.

On both of them the socialist proletariat of Russia, in growing unity with the socialist proletariat of the whole world, declares unremitting revolutionary war.

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M. LYADOV'S LETTER TO PROLETARY[171]

We gladly give space to Comrade Lyadov's public statement, and have only the following to say to him:

To observe the traditions of Bolshevism—the orthodox Marxist trend in the R.S.D.L.P.—is of course splendid, Comrade Lyadov. But to observe this tradition means, for one thing, protecting Bolshevism from its caricature. But the contortions of otzovism and god-building—as we have proved at length in a number of articles, and as has now been officially recognised by the Bolshevik section—are nothing more than a caricature of Bolshevism.

As regards the "revolutionary ethics" to which Comrade Lyadov appeals, we may calmly leave him to square this account with his own conscience—but as for his "standpoint in principle", it is high time that Comrade Lyadov and those who share his views should state it openly to the whole Party, because, so far, we have only their word for it that they have something more to offer than otzovism and god-building.

In conclusion we express the confident hope that Comrade Lyadov, who has worked for so many years in the ranks of revolutionary Social-Democracy, will not stay very long with the new faction of god-building otzovists, or, as they are called for short, "the godly otzovists", but will return to the Bolshevik ranks.

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A LETTER TO THE ORGANISERS OF THE PARTY SCHOOL ON CAPRI

August 18, 1909

Dear Comrades!

I have just received your invitation. The curriculum of the school, which (curriculum) you say you enclose, I have not received.

My attitude to the school on the Island of Capri is expressed in the resolution of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* (*Proletary*, No. 46, and supplement*). If you have not seen *Proletary* and the supplements to *Proletary*, and the special letter on the school circulated to Bolshevik members of the Party in the form of a printed leaflet, the editorial board will be pleased to send you all these materials. On the point in question, I must inform you that my opinion of the school on Capri, as the enterprise of a *new* faction in our Party—a faction with which I do not sympathise—does not, of course, imply any refusal to deliver lectures to comrades who have been sent from Russia by local organisations. Whatever the views of these comrades, I shall always be glad to give them a series of lectures on questions of interest to Social-Democrats. Of course I shall not go to Capri to lecture, but shall willingly do so in Paris. If only from the financial point of view it would be cheaper for the nine comrades from Russia (I take the figure communicated by Comrade Leva, whose name is not unknown to you) to come to Paris than for three lecturers (I have heard about your proposal to Leva and Innokenty[172]) to travel from

* See pp. 450-51 and 452-60 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Paris to Capri. Apart from financial considerations there are quite a number of reasons incomparably more important, which you undoubtedly understand, why Paris is the place for a real Party school abroad. In any case, I can assure you that the editorial board of *Proletary* would do everything in its power to organise the lectures you desire in Paris.

With Social-Democratic greetings, *N. Lenin*

P. S. You forgot to send the official address of the school.

Published in 1909 in the leaflet "The Question of the Party School"

Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT LETTER OF THE BOLSHEVIK CENTRE TO THE COUNCIL OF THE SCHOOL ON CAPRI[173]

The Executive Commission of the Bolshevik Centre is extremely glad to receive the statement of the "*Council* of the Party School on Capri" of August 16, 1909, that it has no objection to "*ideological control*" by the B.C.

But in order to decide whether the B.C. can undertake this control and make it effective, whether it can give help to the school in the form of lecturers and funds as the Council writes, it is necessary to know in detail all about the school. But the B.C. knows *nothing in detail* about it.

While the *Council of the school could discuss* (as it writes) the attitude of the school to the B.C., knowing the B.C.'s views from printed resolutions and from *Proletary*, knowing the composition of the B.C. from its former members, the B.C. itself is not in a position to *discuss* the question of its attitude to the request from the Council of the school: for the B.C. knows nothing about (1) the *Council* of the school, (2) the *executive commission* of the school, (3) the school's *curriculum* (the executive commission of the school promised to send it, but did not do so), (4) the present composition of the *lecturers* at the school and (5) *students* at the school, (6) the present *funds* of the school, (7) how long the *course* is expected to last, (8) to what extent the students are tied down to the particular place in which the school is being held, i.e., the Island of Capri, (9) whether the students of the school could come to Paris (about which three members of the B.C. wrote to them in their own name), for what period, etc.

Without possessing such information, the B.C. at the present stage can only say one thing: the B.C. is ready to give

every help in the form of literature and lectures to all members of Social-Democratic organisations functioning in Russia, as well as to *all* comrades *delegated* by those organisations, in acquiring a Social-Democratic outlook on the world; and it does not refuse financial aid within the limits of its possibilities, and after discussion of this question in connection with aid to local organisations.

The B.C. herewith officially forwards to the *Council* of the school (1) a file of *Proletary*, Nos. 39-46, (2) the B.C.'s letter about the school (printed), (3) the resolutions of the B.C.

With Social-Democratic greetings,
The Executive Commission of the Extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"

Written between August 5 and 17 (18 and 30), 1909

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Published according to the manuscript

A LETTER TO COMRADES JULIUS, VANYA, SAVELY, IVAN, VLADIMIR, STANISLAV AND FOMA, STUDENTS AT THE CAPRI PARTY SCHOOL

August 30, New Style, 1909

Dear Comrades,

After receiving the curriculum of the school and two letters, in the last of which you ask my reasons for declaring the school to be a new faction, I consider it my duty to explain my view to you once more. "That there is anything factional behind this school is the purest fiction," you write. "A hegemony over the school is inconceivable, for we are the majority on the Council."

I maintain that this is a clear case of self-deception on your part. Whether or not you are being accused of "downright factionalism" is quite beside the point; so is the question of who has the majority on the Council. The point is that the school has been organised (1) on the initiative of the new faction, (2) exclusively with the funds of the new faction, (3) in a place where *only* lecturers from the new faction are present, (4) in a place where lecturers from other sections of the Party, with very rare exceptions, *cannot be present*.

These conditions are not of your making. You are powerless to change them. But these conditions *predetermine* the character of the school, so much so that no good intentions on your part, no decisions of your Council, can make a jot of difference.

In any school, the most important thing is the ideological and political trend of the lectures. What determines the trend? The *lecturing personnel*, entirely and exclusively.

You understand perfectly well, comrades, that "control", "leadership", "curricula", "rules", etc., as applied to the lecturing personnel are just so many meaningless words. No control, no curricula, nor anything of that sort, can make the studies take any other trend than that determined by the lecturing personnel. And *no* self-respecting organisation in the world, no section or group *will undertake* to share responsibility for a school whose trend is already predetermined by the lecturing personnel, if that trend is hostile.

Now look at the lecturing personnel, the factor that has determined the character of the school and its trend. You comrades signed your names in the letter which you sent to me, but the one that you sent to the Central Committee (I received a copy, together with the curriculum of the school) on behalf of the pupils and *lecturers* is not signed by any of the lecturers. Hence I cannot claim to know exactly who the lecturers are. But I know enough to form an opinion about them as a body.

The local organisations in the Central Industrial Region have written us from Russia that the most energetic, if not the only agitator for the Capri school, was Comrade Stanislav, who had already been chosen as one of the lecturers by certain Social-Democratic groups who had heard him read a paper. This Comrade Stanislav is a most ardent otzovist and "critic" of Marxism in philosophy. I need only remind you (1) how he lambasted Kautsky in his well-known booklet on philosophy, (2) how at the Party Conference in December 1908 he formed an otzovist faction with the St. Petersburg otzovist Vs., (3) how the article by "Worker"—an otzovist—edited by him and published in *Rabocheye Znamya*, No. 5, was, *on the admission* of *Rabocheye Znamya* itself, imbued with *anarchistic* ideas.

Next, look at the lecturers you now have over there in Capri. There are no Bolsheviks among them, while all the adherents of the new faction (the faction of the advocates of otzovism and god-building) are represented almost in full. I will not be very far wrong if I say that you see Comrades Maximov, Lunacharsky, Lyadov and Alexinsky among the lecturers at Capri. That is the identical group of comrades who have formed an opposition to *Proletary* ever since the spring of 1908, agitated against it in Russia and abroad

displayed (or supported) tendencies to form a separate faction at the Party Conference in December 1908, and ultimately broke away completely as a separate faction.

To deny that this entire group of comrades are agitating against *Proletary*, supporting and defending the otzovists, would be flouting facts which are known to every member of the Party. To deny that the Island of Capri has found fame even in general Russian literary circles as the literary centre of god-building, would be deriding facts. The whole Russian press reported long ago that Lunacharsky was preaching the word of god-building from the Island of Capri; Bazarov helped him in Russia. Bogdanov has advocated similar philosophical views in a dozen books and articles published by the legal press in Russia, and a dozen papers read abroad. I was on Capri in April 1908 and told all these three comrade that my views on philosophy were unconditionally opposed to theirs (I proposed at the time that our common resources and energies should be used on counterblasting the Menshevik-liquidationist version of the history of the revolution with a *Bolshevik history of the revolution*, but these Capriotes turned down my proposition, preferring to disseminate their own special philosophical views rather than to work for the common cause of the Bolsheviks). The majority of your lecturers on Capri are writers, yet *not one* of them has made a *single* attack in *the press* on the god-building propaganda of Lunacharsky and Bazarov.

If, in spite of all this, you comrades write that it is a "misapprehension" and a "gross" one on my part to think that the school has any association with god-building and otzovism, because "such aims were never contemplated here in this school, and were even out of the question", I can only wonder at your extraordinary naïveté. I repeat: the *real* character and trend of the school is determined not by the good intentions of the local organisations, not by decisions of the "Council" of students, not by "curricula" and so forth, but by the *lecturing personnel*. And since the lecturing personnel is and has been determined entirely by membership of the new faction, it is simply ridiculous to deny the factional character of the school.

To finish with the question of the lecturing personnel, I shall draw your attention to one more fact communicated

to me by Comrade Innokenty, which shows how obvious to *everyone* in the Party is the thing you are trying to deny, namely: the separatist factional character of the Capri school. Shortly before the last meeting of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, Comrade Maximov in Paris approached *Trotsky* and invited him to become a lecturer at the school on Capri. Trotsky told this to Comrade Innokenty, saying: "If this is a Party affair I shall be glad to take part in it; if it is a private concern run by the Capri literati—Maximov, Lunacharsky and Co.—I shall have nothing to do with it." Innokenty replied: "Wait for the decisions of the editorial board of *Proletary*, I'll see that you get them." Thus, even a man like Trotsky, who does not belong to our group, understood immediately (as any Party functionary would, with any experience) that to organise a school on Capri is tantamount to *hiding it away from the Party*, to connecting the school beforehand with a special faction—the new one.

Now I shall go on to the question of Paris. I told you in my letter that if you are really interested in having lectures from myself and my comrades-in-idea you should come to Paris. You reply: "Considering the expense, travelling to Paris is quite unreasonable."

Let us see which of us is really being unreasonable.

You went to Capri via Vienna. If you go back the same way you will have to make a detour to Paris from Northern Italy, then straight on to Vienna. This will involve in all probability an additional expense of 60 francs per person (I am judging by the fact that a ticket to Paris from Geneva, where I lived for a long time, costs 30 francs). Your letter is signed by eight persons, one of whom declares that he "will have no further correspondence", which obviously means that he is not even interested in hearing my talks. That leaves seven comrades. Expenses $=7\times60=420$ francs.

You invited four lecturers from Paris (Leva, myself, Grigori and Innokenty). Travelling expenses from Paris to Capri and back—about 140 francs. Total $4\times140=560$ francs.

It will be *cheaper* for the eight students to come to Paris than to send the four lecturers to Capri.

But the financial aspect, as I have already told you in my last letter,* is not by any means the most important. Think: for whom is it easier to choose a place—the visiting students, or the local lecturers? You went abroad specially to attend the school. That means there can be nothing to prevent you from going where there is a large number of lecturers, where it is possible to organise things on real Party lines.

But the lecturers *cannot* leave the Party centre to go to the Island of Capri. I shall speak for myself. I cannot leave my editorial work on *Proletary*. I cannot leave my editorial work on the Central Organ. I cannot leave my work on the Promotion Commission for the Duma Social-Democratic group, which has its headquarters in Paris. I have to speak at the *Proletary* club in the working-class districts of Paris, where hundreds and thousands of Russian workers are living, and so on. It is absolutely impossible for Party writers to leave Paris to go to Capri.

But for the school, as a Party concern, Bolshevik lecturers are not the only important factor. Paris is the largest emigrant centre, where papers are regularly read in public under the auspices of *all* Party trends, where debates are held and all kinds of study circles are conducted, where there are two or three quite decent Russian libraries, where there are scores of Social-Democratic organisers with long experience of activity in the Party, and so on and so forth. Three Russian Social-Democratic newspapers are published in Paris. In a word, it is clear, as clear as daylight, to anyone who knows anything at all about life abroad, that anyone who goes to Paris to study Social-Democracy is going where he can learn it properly. Anyone who goes to Capri is going there to study a *separatist* factional "*science*".

Whoever holds a school in Paris is holding a real Party school. Whoever holds a school on the Island of Capri is *hiding the school away from the Party*.

The school on Capri is a school *deliberately hidden away from the Party*.

Absolutely no control, no "ideological leadership" of the *Capri* school is possible either by the Central Committee

* See pp. 468-69 of this volume.—*Ed*.

to which you appeal today, or by the editorial board of *Proletary* to which you appealed yesterday. To speak of control and ideological leadership here is idle talk. No one would think of doing such an absurd thing as to send Party "inspectors" to Capri to superintend the school; to send real Party lecturers to Capri (with the rarest exceptions) *is out of the question* at any time. The local organisations in Russia may not have known this, but the organisers of the school *knew it perfectly well*. That was just why they organised the school on Capri—to *mask* its factional character and to hide it away from the Party.

Take the Russian Social-Democrats, eminent for their knowledge of the labour movement abroad, who do not belong to any factions: Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg (Germany), Ch. Rappoport (France), Rothstein (England). Take unattached Social-Democratic writers like Ryazanov, and you will see at once (unless you deliberately close your eyes in order not to see) that they could in the majority of cases, with a bit of effort from the Party, read lectures in Paris; while to go to Capri is absolutely out of the question for them. The money which the organisers of the school have thrown away in sending people to study and lecture in such a remote foreign spot as Capri would have been *quite sufficient* to organise readings by at least some of these lecturers in Paris.

Further, take the new groupings among the Social-Democrats, groupings which it is so important that the Russian comrades should know about (the struggle between the pro-Party element and the liquid1ationists in the Bund; the struggle between the Bolshevik section of the Letts and the Menshevik; between the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Left wing of the P.S.P.; the split in Menshevism, Plekhanov's publication of his *Dnevnik*, exposing the liquidationism of Potresov and the official Mensheviks; the attempts to create a "revolutionary Menshevism", and so on). It is *impossible* to study these important Party events properly in Capri. In Paris there is every possibility of learning the state of affairs at first hand, and not by mere hearsay.

Take finally the syllabus of the Capri school. Of the four sections, one (the third) is headed: "The Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle". In the international Social-Democrat-

ic movement there are tens and hundreds (if not thousands) of syllabuses for propaganda classes of the same type. But *nowhere* will you find: "The Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle". There is the philosophical materialism of Marx and Engels, but nowhere is there the "Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle". And no Social-Democrat in Europe will understand what it is all about. The only people who will understand are those who are conversant with the works of the philosophers Stanislav (A. Volsky), Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and Bazarov. Before teaching the "Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle", such a philosophy must be invented. To invent this *special* philosophy, which swears more and more often by the word "proletarian" the further away it is from the proletarian world-outlook, has been and is the occupation only of the above-mentioned group of members of the new faction.

To conclude. If you comrades insist on your unwillingness, to come to Paris (assuring me at the same time that you want to hear my lectures), this will be conclusive proof that not only the lecturers but some of the students at the Capri school have been infected with the sectarianism of the new god-building-otzovist faction.

With Social-Democratic greetings, *N. Lenin*

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Published according to the manuscript

NOTES

[1] The article "*On to the Straight Road*" was published as an editorial in the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 26.

Proletary (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal newspaper founded by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party; it was published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909 under the editorship of Lenin. *Proletary* was published as the organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg committees of the R.S.D.L.P., and, for a time, as that of the Moscow Area, the Perm, Kursk and Kazan committees. The paper was virtually the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. Altogether fifty issues were put out—the first twenty in Finland, the rest abroad, in Geneva and Paris. The newspaper published over a hundred articles and other items by Lenin.

During the Stolypin reaction *Proletary* played an important role in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations.

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 the conciliators succeeded in obtaining a decision to close down the newspaper. p. 15

[2] *The Duma*—a representative body, which the tsarist government was compelled to convene as a result of the revolutionary events of 1905. Formally the Duma was a legislative body, but actually it had no real power. Elections to the Duma were non-direct, unequal and non-universal. The electoral system was rigged against the working classes and the non-Russian nationalities inhabiting Russia, while considerable numbers of workers and peasants had no vote at all. Under the electoral law of December 11 (24), 1905, the vote of a landlord was equivalent to 3 votes of representatives of the town bourgeoisie, to 15 votes of the peasants, and to 45 votes of the workers. The First Duma (April-July 1906) and the Second Duma (February-June 1907) were dissolved by the tsarist government. After carrying out the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, the government issued a new electoral law which still further curtailed the rights of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie of the towns and ensured the complete domination of the reactionary bloc of the landlords and big capitalists in the Third (1907-12) and Fourth (1912-17) Dumas. p. 17

[3] *Coup d'état of June 3 (16), 1907*—a reactionary act by which the government dissolved the Second Duma and altered the electoral

law. The new law greatly increased representation of the landlords and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the Duma and considerably reduced the already meagre representation of the workers and peasants. The law deprived most of the indigenous population of Asian Russia of the franchise and reduced by half the number of deputies returned by Poland and the Caucasus. The Third Duma, which was elected on the basis of this law and which assembled in November, 1907, was a Duma of Black Hundreds and Cadets.

The coup d'état of June 3 ushered in the Stolypin reaction, which became known as "the Third-of-June regime". p. 17

4 *Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.*—the illegal newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published from February 1908 to January 1917. Fifty-eight issues appeared. Issue No. 1 came out in Russia, but thereafter the paper was published abroad, first in Paris, then in Geneva. The editorial board of the Central Organ, in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., was made up of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats. Over eighty articles and other items by Lenin were published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. On the editorial board Lenin carried on a struggle for a consistent Bolshevik policy. Some of the board members (Kamenev and Zinoviev) adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and tried to side-track Lenin's line. The Menshevik editors, Martov and Dan, sabotaged the work of the editorial board while at the same time openly defending the liquidators in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising fight against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan retiring from *Sotsial-Demokrat* in June 1911. From December 1911 onwards *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin. p. 17

5 *Bezzaglavtsi*—from the title of the journal *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*)—were organisers of, and contributors to, the journal published in St. Petersburg in 1906 by S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, and others. The journal openly advocated revisionism, supported the Mensheviks and liberals, and opposed an independent proletarian policy. Lenin called the group "pro-Menshevik Cadets or pro-Cadet Mensheviks". p. 19

6 *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies formed in the central provinces of tsarist Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility and their powers were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the Provincial Governors and by the Ministry of the Interior, which could rescind any decisions of which the government disapproved. p. 20

7 *Rabocheye Znamya* (*Worker's Banner*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, organ of the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region, of the Moscow and Moscow Area Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. Appeared in Moscow from March to December 1908. Seven issues were published. p. 20

[8] *Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878. Under this law all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, the mass labour organisations and the labour press were banned, socialist literature was confiscated and the Social-Democrats were persecuted. Under pressure of the mass labour movement this law was repealed in 1890. p. 21

[9] *The Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to fight against the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, organised attacks on progressive intellectuals, and carried out anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 21

[10] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, central organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 22

[11] *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* (*The Russian State*)—a government newspaper founded by S. Witte published in St. Petersburg from February 1 (14) to May 15 (28), 1906. p. 22

[12] *The Stockholm Congress*—the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., was held in Stockholm on April 10-25 (April 23-May 8) 1906. It was attended by 112 voting delegates representing 57 local organisations of the Party, and 22 delegates with a consultative voice. In addition there were representatives from the national Social-Democratic parties of Poland and Lithuania, Latvia and the Bund. Many Bolshevik organisations had been smashed up by the government after the armed uprising of December 1905 and were unable to send their delegates to the Congress. The Mensheviks had a majority (albeit a small one) at the Congress.

Lenin spoke at the Congress on the agrarian question, the current situation, the tactics in regard to the elections to the Duma, the armed uprising and other issues.

The preponderance of Mensheviks at the Congress determined the character of its decisions. On a number of questions the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions (the agrarian programme, the attitude towards the Duma, etc.).

The Congress adopted Lenin's formulation of Clause 1 of the Party Rules dealing with Party membership It admitted to membership of the R.S.D.L.P. the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisation of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish S.D.L.P., and laid down the conditions on which the Bund could join the R.S.D.L.P.

The Central Committee elected at the Congress consisted of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks. The editorial board of the Central Organ was formed entirely of Mensheviks.

The work of this Congress was analysed by Lenin in his Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 317-82). p. 22

[13] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership consisting of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries from among the landlords, and bourgeois intellectuals. Among the more prominent Cadet leaders were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. The Cadets called themselves the "party of the people's freedom" in order to mislead the working masses. In reality they never went beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. Their main task they considered to be the fight against the revolutionary movement, and they aimed at sharing the power with the tsar and the feudalist landlords.

During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried to save the monarchy. In the bourgeois Provisional Government, where they held key positions, they pursued a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people but favourable to the U. S., British and French imperialists. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets were the sworn enemies of the Soviet power and participated in all armed counter-revolutionary actions and the campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards were defeated the Cadets fled the country and continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity from abroad. p. 22

[14] *Trudovik politics* (from the word *trud*—"labour")—this refers to the Trudovik group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed from peasant deputies to the First Duma in April 1906. At the start of the Duma proceedings this group united 107 deputies. In the Second Duma the Trudoviks had 104, in the Third 14 and in the Fourth 10 deputies. The Trudoviks demanded the abolition of all class and national restrictions, the democratisation of the Zemstvo and urban self-governing bodies, and the introduction of universal suffrage in the elections to the Duma. Their agrarian programme was based on the Narodnik principles of equalised land tenure—the establishment of a distributable land fund consisting of state, crown, and monastery lands as well as privately-owned lands where they exceeded an established *trudovoy*, or labour, norm; compensation was envisaged for alienated land under private ownership. The implementation of the agrarian reform was to be entrusted to the local peasant committees. p. 22

[15] *Gurko, V. I.*—Deputy Minister of the Interior. p. 26

[16] Lenin quotes from K. Marx's afterword to the second edition of Volume One of *Capital* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 456). p. 33

[17] *Böhm-Bawerk, E.*—an Austrian bourgeois economist. p. 34

[18] "*Revolutionary syndicalism*"—a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist trend that made its appearance in the labour movement of a number of West-European countries at the close of the nineteenth century.

The syndicalists saw no need for the working class to engage in political struggle, they repudiated the leading role of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. They believed that by organising a general strike of the workers the trade unions (in France—syndicats) could, without a revolution, overthrow capitalism and take over control of production. p. 38

[19] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Voice of the Social-Democrat*)—a newspaper, organ of the Menshevik liquidators, published from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva and later in Paris. p. 40

[20] *Die Neue Zeit*—the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky, and subsequently by Heinrich Cunow. Several works by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were published in this journal for the first time, among them Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and Engels's *Contribution to the Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891*. Engels often gave pointers to the editors of *Die Neue Zeit* and criticised the journal for its deviations from Marxism. Prominent leaders of the German and international labour movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contributed to the journal, among them August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Paul Lafargue, and G. V. Plekhanov. Beginning with the middle nineties after the death of Engels, the journal regularly published articles by revisionists, including a series of articles by Eduard Bernstein "Problems of Socialism", inaugurating a revisionists' crusade against Marxism. During the First World War (1914-18) the journal took a Centrist stand and virtually supported the social-chauvinists. p. 45

[21] *Dumbadze, I. A.*—a Black-Hundred general of the tsarist army. As military chief of the town of Yalta he was conspicuous for his brutal treatment of the peaceful population.

The Riga Museum—torture-chamber of the Riga Police Investigation Department where prisoners under examination were cruelly tortured. When the practices of the police were exposed in the press the tsarist government tried to deny the charges by declaring that the instruments of torture kept by the police had been collected "for museum purposes". As a result of this "explanation" the torture-chamber became known as "the Riga museum". p. 46

[22] *The law of December 11 (24), 1905*—an electoral law for elections to the First Duma. Under this law the electorate was divided into four curias, namely, agricultural (landlords), urban (bourgeoisie),

peasant and worker curias. The vote of a landlord was equivalent to 3 votes cast by the urban bourgeoisie, to 15 peasant votes, and to 45 workers' votes. The electoral law gave to a handful of landlords and capitalists an overwhelming preponderance in the Duma. p. 46

[23] This refers to Engels's introduction to Marx's pamphlet *The Class Struggles in France* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38). p. 47

[24] *Streltsov, R. Y.*—a Social-Democrat, a revisionist. p. 47

[25] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a German bourgeois newspaper, published in Frankfort-on-Main from 1856. p. 48

[26] *Octobrists*—members of the League of October Seventeenth, a party formed in Russia after the promulgation of the tsar's manifesto of October 17, 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party representing the interests of the big bourgeoisie and landlords who engaged in capitalist farming. Its leaders were the well-known industrialist and Moscow house owner A. I. Guchkov and the big landowner M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists unreservedly supported the tsarist government's home and foreign policies. p. 48

[27] *The Party of Peaceful Renovation*—a bourgeois-landlord counter-revolutionary organisation. Founded in 1906 by amalgamation of the Left Octobrists with the Right Cadets. Lenin called the Party of Peaceful Renovation "the Party of Peaceful Plunder". p. 48

[28] This refers to the talks between the Cadets and Trepov, Deputy Minister of the Interior, concerning the possibility of setting up a Cadet Ministry. p. 48

[29] This article was written by Lenin to acquaint the Polish Social-Democrats with the differences that existed within the R.S.D.L.P. and was published in their journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 2, in April 1908.

Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny—a journal published in Cracow from 1902 to 1904 and from 1908 to 1910 by the Polish Social-Democrats with the close participation of R. Luxemburg. p. 50

[30] *Stolichnaya Pochta* (*Metropolitan Post*)—a daily newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to February 1908. At first the organ of the Left Cadets, it became, after February 1907, the mouthpiece of the Trudovik group. It was banned by the tsarist government. p. 50

[31] Cf. Marx, Engels, Lenin, *Zur deutschen Geschichte*, Bd. II, Hlb. I, S. 625-28. "Mai bis October". Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1954. p. 51

[32] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and cir-

cles (Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.). The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05) became its official organs. The S.R.s did not see the class distinctions between the proletarian and the small proprietor. They glossed over the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and repudiated the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism; they tried as Lenin put it, to "patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terrorism, which the S.R.s advocated as the basic method of struggle against the autocracy, caused great harm to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the S.R.s envisaged the abolition of private landownership and the transfer of the land to the village communes on the basis of the "labour principle", "equalised" land tenure, and the development of co-operatives. There was nothing socialist in this programme, which the S.R.s described as a programme for "socialising the land". In analysing this programme, Lenin showed that if commodity production and private farming on commonly-owned land were preserved, the rule of capital could not be eliminated nor the labouring peasantry delivered from exploitation and ruin. He also showed that co-operatives functioning under the capitalist system could not save the small peasant, since they only served to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time Lenin pointed out that the demand for equalised land tenure, though not socialist, was historically progressive, revolutionary-democratic in character, inasmuch as it was aimed against reactionary landlordism.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the S.R.s' attempts to pose as socialists; it waged a hard fight against the S.R.s for influence over the peasantry, and revealed the harmful effect which their tactics of individual terrorism had on the working-class movement. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks entered into temporary agreements with the S.R.s in the struggle against tsarism.

The fact that the peasantry did not constitute a homogeneous class accounted for the political and ideological disunity and organisational confusion among the S.R.s, and for their constant wavering between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Already during the first Russian revolution the Right wing of the S.R.s split away from the Party and formed the legal Labour Popular Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Cadets; the Left wing became the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction the Socialist-Revolutionary Party experienced a complete ideological and organizational break-up, and the First World War saw most S.R.s adopt social-chauvinist views.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 the S.R.s, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, formed the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, and the leaders of this party (Kerensky, Avxentyev and Chernov) were members of this government. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of landlordism, and indeed, stood for its maintenance. Socialist-Revolutionary ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized landed estates.

At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the S.R.s founded an independent party. To retain their influence among the peasant masses, they recognised the Soviet power formally and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon turned against the Soviets.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the S.R.s carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activities, vigorously supported the interventionists and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against Soviet statesmen and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War they continued their activities against the Soviet state within the country and among the whiteguard émigrés. p. 52

[33] *The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London between April 12 and 27 (April 20 and May 10), 1905. The Congress was organised and convened by the Bolsheviks under the direction of Lenin. It was the first Bolshevik Congress.

The agenda, drawn up by Lenin, was as follows: (I) *Report of the Organising Committee*. (II) *Questions of Tactics*: (1) the armed uprising; (2) the attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of and during the revolution (this point was devoted to two questions: a. attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of the revolution; b. the provisional revolutionary government); (3) the attitude towards the peasant movement. (III) *Questions of Organisation*: (4) the relations between the workers and the intellectuals within the Party organisations; (5) the Party Rules. (IV) *Attitude Towards Other Parties and Trends*: (6) attitude towards the breakaway group of the R.S.D.L.P.; (7) attitude towards the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations; (8) attitude towards the liberals; (9) practical agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. (V) *Internal Questions of Party Life*: (10) propaganda and agitation. (VI) *Delegates' Reports*: (11) report of the Central Committee; (12) reports of delegates from the local committees. (VII) *Elections*: (13) elections; (14) standing order for publication of the proceedings and decisions of the Congress, and for the assumption of office by the newly elected functionaries.

On all the basic issues dealt with by the Third Congress Lenin had written the draft resolutions, which he substantiated in articles published in the newspaper *Vperyod* prior to the Congress. Lenin spoke at the Congress on the question of the armed uprising, on the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary

government, on the attitude towards the peasant movement, on the Party Rules, and on a number of other questions. The proceedings of the Congress record 138 speeches and motions made by Lenin.

The Congress amended the Party Rules: (a) it adopted Lenin's wording of Clause I; (b) it defined precisely the rights of the Central Committee and its relations with the local committees; (c) it modified the organisational structure of the Party's central bodies: in place of the three centres (the Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the Council of the Party) the Congress established a single competent Party centre—the Central Committee.

On the work and the significance of the Third Party Congress see Lenin's article "The Third Congress" (present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 442-49) and his book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see present edition Vol. 9, pp. 15-140).

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[34] *The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London between April 30 and May 19 (May 13 and June 1), 1907. It was attended by 336 delegates having a vote and consultative voice, of whom 105 were Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 57 Bundists, 44 Polish Social-Democrats, 29 Lettish Social-Democrats and 4 "non-factionals". The Bolsheviks were backed by the Poles and the Letts and had a stable majority at the Congress. The Bolshevik delegates included Lenin, Voroshilov, Dubrovinsky, Stalin, Shahumyan and Yaroslavsky.

The Congress discussed the following questions: (1) Report of the Central Committee. (2) Report of the Duma group and its organisation. (3) Attitude towards the bourgeois parties. (4) The Duma. (5) The "labour congress" and the non-party workers' organisations. (6) The trade unions and the Party. (7) Guerrilla actions. (8) Unemployment, economic crisis, and lock-outs. (9) Organisational questions. (10) The International Congress in Stuttgart (First of May, militarism). (11) Work in the army. (12) Miscellanea. One of the basic questions dealt with at the Congress was that of the policy to be adopted towards the bourgeois parties. Lenin delivered the report on this question. The Congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions on all fundamental issues. It elected a Central Committee consisting of 5 Bolsheviks, 4 Mensheviks, 2 Polish and 1 Lettish Social-Democrats. Alternate members elected to the Central Committee consisted of 10 Bolsheviks, 7 Mensheviks, 3 Polish and 2 Lettish Social-Democrats.

The Congress was a big victory of Bolshevism over the opportunist wing of the Party—the Mensheviks. On the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. see Lenin's article "The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties" (present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 489-509).

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[35] *Boyevism*—from the Russian word *boyevik*, a member of the revolutionary fighting squads, who, during the revolutionary struggle, used the tactics of armed action, helped political prisoners to escape, expropriated state-owned funds for the needs of the revolution,

removed spies and *agents provocateurs*, etc. During the Revolution of 1905-07 the Bolsheviks had special fighting squads. See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 409-18. p. 57

[36] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 104-05 and 107. p. 59

[37] *Polish Socialist Party* (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*)—a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. In 1906 the Party split into the P.S.P. Left wing and P.S.P. chauvinist Right wing. p. 61

[38] *The Zemstvo campaign* was conducted by bourgeois liberals, members of the Zemstvos, between the autumn of 1904 and January 1905. The campaign consisted of a series of conferences, public meetings and banquets at which speeches were made and resolutions passed in support of moderate constitutional demands. p. 63

[39] *Dubasov, F. V.*—Governor-General of Moscow who crushed the armed uprising of December 1905. p. 64

[40] *The Vyborg Manifesto* or "the Vyborg Appeal" was issued by members of the First Duma "To the people from the people's representatives". It was adopted on July 9-10 (22-23), 1908, at a meeting in Vyborg at which about 200 deputies, most of them Cadets, assembled after the dissolution of the First Duma. The appeal called upon the people to offer "passive resistance" to the government by refusing to pay taxes and furnish recruits until the tsar had announced new elections to the Duma. In September 1906 the Congress of the Cadet Party openly admitted that the use of "passive resistance" was "impracticable". p. 64

[41] *Osvobozhdeniye League*—a liberal-monarchist organisation founded abroad by P. Struve in 1904. The *Osvobozhdeniye* people were supporters of a constitutional monarchy and endeavoured to strike a bargain with the tsarist government, concealing their struggle against the revolution under the false guise of democracy. Eventually they formed the core of the Cadet Party. p. 65

[42] *The rising in the Sveaborg fortress* (near Helsingfors), which started during the night of July 17-18 (30-31),1906 broke out spontaneously and prematurely, being largely provoked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. On receiving information about the situation in Sveaborg and the possibility of an armed uprising, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. decided on the urgent dispatch of a delegation to Sveaborg authorised to secure a postponement of the action or, if this could not be achieved, to take the most active part in leading the uprising. The text of the decision was written by V. I. Lenin. Finding it impossible to prevent spontaneous action, the Bolsheviks headed the uprising. Its leaders were lieuten-

ants A. P. Yemelyanov and Y. L. Kohansky, members of the military organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. Seven of the ten artillery companies took an active part in the uprising. The insurgents put forward the slogans of overthrow of the autocracy, freedom for the people, and the transfer of the land to the peasants. The working class in Finland gave active support to the insurgents. On July 18 (31) a general strike was declared in Helsingfors, which eventually spread to other towns. The uprising lasted three days, but the general lack of preparation had its effect, and on July 20 (August 2), after the fortress had been subjected to a naval bombardment, the Sveaborg rising was crushed. Its participants were court-martialled, forty-three men being executed and some hundreds sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment. p. 65

[43] *The Land Bill of the 104 members of the Duma* was introduced by the Trudoviks at the 13th session of the Duma on May 23 (June 5) 1906. The Bill made it the object of land legislation "to work towards the establishment of a system under which all the land with its mineral wealth and waters would belong to the whole people, the land needed for agriculture to be given over only to the use of those who cultivate it with their own labour" (*The Duma in Russia. Documents & Materials*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1957 p. 172). For this purpose the demand was put forward for creating 'a national distributable land fund' consisting of all state, crown, monastery and church lands. Landed estates and other privately-owned lands were to be forcibly alienated to this fund where the size of the respective holdings exceeded the labour standard established for the given locality. Certain compensation was allowed for alienated privately-owned lands. Allotment lands and small private holdings were to be retained for a time by their owners. The Bill also provided for the eventual gradual transfer of these lands to the national fund. The agrarian reform was to be carried out by local committees elected by democratic vote. These demands expressed the interests of the well-to-do peasants, who feared immediate and complete abolition of private ownership of the land and stood for compensation for alienated lands. Lenin remarked that the Bill of the 104 "is permeated with the small proprietor's fear of being too radical, of drawing too large a mass of poor people into the movement" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 469). Despite its inconsistent and utopian character, the "Bill of the 104", as Lenin pointed out, was a platform of struggle for converting the well-to-do section of the enslaved peasantry into free farmers. p. 66

[44] Lenin has in mind the "*Draft of the Fundamental Land Law*" signed by 33 deputies (mostly Trudoviks) of the First Duma. This Bill was drafted with the help of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and expressed their views on the agrarian question. The "Bill of the 33" demanded the immediate and complete abolition of private landownership and proclaimed the equal right of all citizens to use the land and the principle of communal land tenure with equalised

reallotment on the basis of subsistence and labour norms. In comparison with other Bills of the Trudoviks, the "Bill of the 33" was more drastic in that it demanded the immediate abolition of private landownership and confiscation of the landed estates without compensation.

Introduced into the Duma on June 6 (19), 1906, the "Bill of the 33" met with furious resistance on the part of the Cadets and was rejected by 140 votes to 78. p. 66

[45] *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* was written by Lenin in 1908 for an encyclopaedic dictionary issued by Granat Bros. Ltd., but was not published for censorship reasons. This work first appeared in Moscow in 1918 as a separate booklet issued by *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers.

In writing this booklet Lenin made use of statistical returns and tables on the agrarian question contained in his works *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 3, p. 21-607 and Vol. 13, pp. 217-429). p. 69

[46] This refers to the book *Statistics of Landownership for 1905. Returns for 50 Gubernias of European Russia.* Published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior, St. Petersburg, 1907. p. 71

[47] This refers to N. A. Rubakin's article "Our Ruling Bureaucracy in Figures", published in the newspaper *Syn Otechestva* (*Son of the Fatherland*) No. 54, April 20 (May 3), 1905. p. 75

[48] The categories of peasants here listed by Lenin existed in tsarist Russia as survivals of feudal and semi-feudal relations.

Chinsh peasants—peasants who enjoyed the right of *chinsh*—the right of perpetual inheritance of the land—and paid almost invariable quit-rent, called *chinsh*. This form of relations existed mainly in Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia, and parts of the Ukraine bordering on the Black Sea.

Rezeshi—small land proprietors in Moldavia and Bessarabia.

Teptyars—neo-Bashkirs, settlers from the Urals and the Volga region. p. 77

[49] This refers to *The Collection of Statistical Data for Saratov Gubernia. Vol. I, Saratov Uyezd.* Saratov, published by the Saratov Gubernia Zemstvo, 1883. p. 77

[50] *Gift-land peasants*—former serfs who, at the time of the Reform of 1861, received from their landlords as a gift (without having to pay redemption money) miserable allotments amounting to a quarter of the "top" or "statutory" allotment established by law for the given locality. All the rest of the lands that had constituted the peasant allotments before the Reform were seized by the landlord,

who kept his "gift-land peagants", forcibly dispossessed of their land in a state of economic bondage even after serfdom was abolished.

Full owners—former landlords' peasants who had redeemed their allotments before the specified date and had the right to own the land as private property. These were a comparatively small category of the most well-to-do element in the countryside.

State peasants with communal holdings had no private property rights on the land, which they used on the basis of communal landownership.

State peasants with quarter holdings—descendants of former servicemen (children of the boyars, Cossacks, streltsi, dragoons, soldiers, etc.) who guarded the southern and south-eastern borderlands of Muscovy. The Tsar of Muscovy rewarded them for their services with an endowment of a *quarter* lot (half a dessiatine) of land on which they settled in "single households" (hence their name *odnodvortsi*). They enjoyed the right of communal landownership as well as their quarter holdings.

These *odnodvortsi*, being freemen, for a long time held an intermediate position between the nobles and the peasants, and had the right to acquire serfs. Under Peter the Great they were turned into state peasants and their land became the property of the state. Actually, however, the state peasants with quarter holdings disposed of their lands as their own private property. In this they differed from the state peasants with communal holdings, who had no right to buy, sell or bequeath their land.

State peasants who formerly were landlords' serfs—a category of peasants purchased by the state from private owners or presented to the state, etc. Although regarded as state peasants, they enjoyed fewer rights. They were given equal rights in 1859, on the eve of the Reform of 1861, but certain distinctions still remained.

Free tillers—a category of peasants freed from serfdom under the law of February 20, 1803 which allowed landlords to give the peasants their freedom with land on the landlords' own terms. p. 77

[51] *The village commune* in Russia was the communal form of peasant use of the land, characterised by compulsory crop rotation, and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective liability (compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants for making their payments in full and on time, and the performance of various services to the state and the landlords), the regular reallotment of the land with no right to refuse the allotment given, the prohibition of its purchase and sale.

The landlords and the tsarist government used the village commune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze redemption payments and taxes out of the people. p. 78

[52] This refers to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 78

[53] This refers to the book: *Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angränzenden Länder Asiens*. Auf Kosten der Kai-

serl. Akademie der Wissenschaften herausgegeben von K. E. Baer und Helmersen, St. Petersburg, 1845. p. 82

[54] The full title of the book is *Freely Hired Labour on Private Landowner Farms and the Movement of Workers According to a Statistical and Economic Survey of Agriculture and Industry in European Russia*. Compiled by S. A. Korolenko, St. Petersburg, 1892 (*Agricultural and Statistical Information Based on Material Obtained from Farmers*, Issue V). p. 85

[55] *Skopshchina*—the name given in the southern parts of Russia to a type of rent in kind on terms of bondage, the tenant paying the landlord a share of the crop *s kopny* (per corn-shock), and usually fulfilling miscellaneous labour services in addition. p. 88

[56] *Wild landlord*—a type of landlord described by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his satirical fairy-tale published in English under the title of "Wild Gentleman". p. 90

[57] Lenin refers to the following books:

1) V. Orlov, *Forms of Peasant Landownership in Moscow Gubernia*, Moscow, published by Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo, 1879 (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. 4, Issue I);

2) V. Trirogov, *The Village Commune and the Poll-Tax* (*Collected Investigations*), St. Petersburg, 1882;

3) Johannes Keussler, *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des bäuerlichen Gemeindebesitzes in Russland*, Teil 1-3, 1876-87;

4) V. V., *The Peasant Commune* (cf. *Results of Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1892).

V. V.—pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov, an ideologue of liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 93

[58] *Registered souls*—the male population of feudal Russia who were subject to the poll-tax (chiefly peasants and urban petty bourgeois), for which purpose special censuses ("registrations") were held beginning from 1718. The last, tenth, "registration" was made in 1857-59. Redistribution of the land within the village communes took place in a number of districts on the basis of these registration lists. p. 93

[59] *Severny Vestnik* (*Northern Herald*)—a literary, scientific, and political journal of a liberal trend, published in St. Petersburg from 1885 to 1898. In its early years the journal published articles by the Narodniks N. K. Mikhailovsky, S. N. Yuzhakov, V. P. Vorontsov, S. N. Krivenko, and others. From 1891 the journal virtually became the organ of the Russian symbolists and decadents and preached idealism and mysticism. p. 94

[60] This refers to N. Karyshev's book *Peasant Rentings of Non-Allotment Land* (cf. *Results of the Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data*, Vol. II, Dorpat, 1892). p. 97

[61] *Nik.—on*—pseudonym of N. F. Danielson, an ideologue of liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 99

[62] *Winter hiring*—the hiring of peasants for summer work by landlords and kulaks in the winter, when the peasants were badly in need of money and forced to accept extortionate terms. p. 100

[63] This refers to *Evaluation Returns on Peasant Landownership in Zemlyansk, Zadonsk, Korotoyak and Nizhnedevitsk Uyezds*. Supplement to vols. III, IV, V and VI of *Statistical Returns for Voronezh Gubernia*, Voronezh, published by the Voronezh Gubernia Zemstvo, 1889. p. 109

[64] D. N. Zhbankov's sketch "Women's Country" was published in the book *Data for Statistics of Kostroma Gubernia*, Issue 8, Kostroma, published by the Kostroma Gubernia Statistical Committee, 1891. p. 111

[65] *Vestnik Yevropy* (*European Messenger*)—a monthly journal published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to the summer of 1918. It presented the views of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie, and beginning with the nineties waged a systematic struggle against Marxism. p. 116

[66] These data are given in the book *Combined Returns for Samara Gubernia*, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Samara, published by the Samara Gubernia Zemstvo, 1892. p. 121

[67] This refers to M. S. Uvarov's article "The Influence of Industry Employing Migratory Workers on the Sanitary Conditions of Russia" published in *Vestnik Obshchestvennoi Gigieny, Sudebnoi i Prakticheskoi Meditsiny* (*Journal of Public Hygiene and Forensic and Practical Medicine*) in July 1896. p. 122

[68] Lenin is quoting figures from the article "Peasant Industries in European Russia" by N. F. Rudnev, published in *Symposium of the Saratov Zemstvo*, Nos. 6 and 11, 1894. p. 123

[69] This refers to the book *Agricultural Labourers and the Organisation of Sanitary Supervision over Them in Kherson Gubernia*, by N. I. Tezyakov, Kherson, published by the Kherson Gubernia Zemstvo Board, 1896. p. 125

[70] Lenin quotes figures from N. A. Blagoveshchensky's book *Combined Zemstvo House-to-House Census Economic Returns. Vol. I. Peasant Farming*, Moscow, 1898. p. 134

[71] Cf. K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 173-87. p. 138

[72] *Gesindeordnung*—"Regulation for Servants", 1854. One of numerous laws in Prussia depriving farm labourers of all civil rights. Under this law the mere attempt of labourers to organise a strike was punishable with imprisonment. p. 140

[73] This refers to the uprisings in Sveaborg (see present edition, Note 42) and Kronstadt. The uprising of sailors and soldiers in Kronstadt started on July 19 (August 1), 1906, after news had been received of the uprising in Sveaborg. In the spring and summer of 1906, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, preparations had gone forward for an armed uprising of workers, soldiers and sailors in Kronstadt. These preparations, however, were considerably complicated by the arrest on July 9 (22) of most of the members of the military and workers' organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. Nevertheless, with the support of the St. Petersburg Committee and its representative, D. Z. Manuilsky, the Bolsheviks went forward with their preparations for an armed uprising, while at the same time rebuffing the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had been provoking a premature uprising. When the spontaneous Sveaborg rising broke out the preparations for an armed uprising in Kronstadt had not been completed, but in view of the events in Sveaborg the uprising in Kronstadt had to be begun prematurely. The Bolsheviks took the lead in order to make the action as organised as possible. At a prearranged signal the struggle was started almost simultaneously by minemen, sappers, soldiers of the electric-mine company, and sailors of the First and Second Naval Divisions, who were joined by some of the armed workers. The government, however, had received information from *agents provocateurs* of the time fixed for the uprising, and had prepared in advance for the fight. Another factor that worked against the uprising was the disruptive activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. By the morning of July 20 (August 2) the uprising was suppressed.

The St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. passed a decision on July 20 (August 2) to carry out a political general strike in support of the Kronstadt and Sveaborg risings, but on news being received the next day that the uprising had been suppressed this decision was revoked.

The tsarist Government took savage reprisals against the insurgents. More than 2,500 participants in the Kronstadt uprising were arrested. Sentenced by courts martial, 36 men were executed, 130 were sent to penal servitude, 316 were imprisoned and 935 transferred to corrective battalions. p. 148

[74] *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (*Revolutionary Thought*)—the organ of a group of S.R.s, published abroad from April 1908 to December 1909. Six issues appeared. p. 149

[75] *Znamya Truda* (*Banner of Labour*)—central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in Paris from July 1907 to April 1914. p. 149

[76] *Iskra* (*Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks seized control of *Iskra*. From November 1903, beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* became the mouthpiece of the Mensheviks. From then on the "old" *Iskra* was referred to in the Party as the Lenin, Bolshevik *Iskra*, and the "new" *Iskra* as the Menshevik, opportunist *Iskra*. p. 153

[77] *January 9, 1905*—the day on which, by order of the tsar, the troops fired on a peaceful procession of St. Petersburg workers headed by the priest Gapon, who marched to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. This massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January the Ninth marked the beginning of the 1905-07 Revolution. p. 153

[78] *The Plehve regime*—the harsh political regime introduced in Russia in 1902 by the Minister of the Interior, V. K. Plehve, with the object of combating the revolutionary movement. p. 154

[79] The Autoabstract *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution* is a brief summary of the book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). Lenin wrote the Autoabstract in order to acquaint the Polish Social-Democrats with the differences of opinion existing in the R.S.D.L.P. on the agrarian question. It was published in the journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 6, August 1908. p. 158

[80] *John*—the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 162

[81] *Vendée*—a department in western France where the backward peasantry began a counter-revolutionary uprising against the republic at the close of the eighteenth century, during the French bourgeois revolution. The uprising was led by the Catholic clergy, the nobility and émigré royalists, and had the support of England.

Vendée became a synonym for reactionary rebellion and hotbeds of counter-revolution. p. 162

[82] *Kostrov*—leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks N. N. Zhordania. p. 162

[83] *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*)—a literary, popular-scientific, and sociopolitical monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1909. There were Social-Democrats among its contributors between 1902 and 1908. p. 163

[84] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 803-04. p. 164

[85] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* editorial board. Four issues appeared in all.

Zarya published Lenin's writings: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the Critics of Marx'" (under the title "Messrs. the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". p. 169

[86] *Zhizn* (*Life*)—a monthly journal published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901 and abroad in 1902. From 1899 the journal was the organ of the "legal Marxists". p. 169

[87] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 792-93, 788-91, 787-88. p. 170

[88] Ibid., pp. 777-82. p. 171

[89] See K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 173-87. p. 171

[90] Lenin is quoting from a letter of K. Marx to L. Kugelmann dated April 12, 1871 (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 319). p. 178

[91] *Przegląd*—see Note 29. p. 178

[92] *Lyakhov, V. P.*— a colonel in the tsarist army, commander of the Russian troops who crushed the national-revolutionary movement in Persia in 1908. p. 183

[93] *L'Humanité*—a daily newspaper founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party. Shortly after the split in the Party at the December 1920 Congress and the formation of the French Communist Party the newspaper became the Central Organ of the Communists. The newspaper is being published in Paris to this day. p. 186

[94] This note was published in the newspaper *Proletary* as an afterword to the article "Pyotr Maslov Corrects Karl Marx's Rough Notes" (see *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*, present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 300-07. p. 189

[95] *Famusov*—a character from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 190

[96] See Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 75-81 and 82-93). p. 192

[97] *Balalaikin*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's *A Modern Idyll*; a liberal windbag, adventurer and liar. p. 202

[98] From the poem by N. A. Nekrasov "Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia". p. 205

[99] *Narodnaya Volya* (*The People's Will*)—an illegal organisation of the revolutionary-minded Narodnik intellectuals founded in 1879 with the object of fighting the autocracy. It existed up to the second half of the eighties. p. 208

[100] This article was written by Lenin in connection with a workers' meeting held in Berlin on September 7 (20),1908, to protest against the growing menace of war. The article was intended for issue No. 36 of the newspaper *Proletary*, but was not published. p. 210

[101] *Vorwärts*—the central organ of the German Social-Democrats. It began to appear in 1876 and was edited, among others, by Wilhelm Liebknecht. Engels made use of its columns for fighting all manifestations of opportunism. From the middle of the nineties after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* began regularly to carry articles of the opportunists, who predominated in German Social-Democracy and in the Second International. p. 212

[102] This refers to the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. published in "From the Party" column of the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 36, October 3 (16), 1908. The St. Petersburg Committee called upon the Social-Democratic students' groups to dissociate themselves from the appeal of the Joint Students' Council and subordinate the student movement to the aims of Social-Democracy in the nation-wide struggle against tsarism. p. 217

[103] *The Berlin Treaty*—an agreement endorsed on July 13, 1878, by the Congress of representatives of the governments of Russia, Britain, Austro-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy and Turkey after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. p. 223

[104] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. At first moderately liberal, it became in 1876 the mouthpiece of reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. It was opposed to the bourgeois-liberal as well as the revolutionary movement. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called it a specimen of the venal press. p. 225

[105] *Pugachov*, *Yemelyan*—leader of the peasant war in Russia in 1773-75. p. 225

[106] *The International Socialist Bureau*—the executive body of the Second International, consisting of representatives of the socialist parties of all countries and established by decision of the Paris Congress of the Second International in September 1900. The representatives of the Russian Social-Democrats elected to the I.S.B. were G. V. Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky. From 1905 onwards Lenin was a member of the Bureau as a representative of the R.S.D.L.P. He waged a determined fight within the Bureau

against the opportunism of the leaders of the Second International. The I.S.B. ceased to function in 1914. p. 231

[107] The foreign publications referred to are:

La Tribune Russe—the bulletin of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in Paris in French from January 1904 to December 1909, and from October 1912 to July 1913. In 1904 it appeared as a fortnightly, and after that as a monthly.

Russisches Bulletin—published in Berlin by a group of Mensheviks from 1907 to 1916. p. 231

[108] *The Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee* was set up by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1908 in the capacity of the Party's agency abroad, subordinated to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee.

Soon after the Central Committee plenary meeting in January 1910 the Bureau Abroad came under the control of a liquidationist majority and became a rallying centre for anti-Party forces. The liquidationist tactics of the Bureau Abroad compelled the Bolsheviks in May 1911 to recall their representative (Alexandrov—N. A. Semashko). Later the representatives of the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats were recalled.

In January 1912 the B.A.C.C. discontinued its activities. p. 232

[109] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 409-73, 490-91. p. 236

[110] *Zionist Socialists* (*Zionist Socialist Workers' Party*)—a petty-bourgeois Jewish national organisation formed in 1904. The Zionist socialists sought to isolate the Jewish workers from the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat and advocated an agreement with the bourgeoisie in working for the creation of a Jewish state. p. 242

[111] *The Socialist Jewish Labour Party*—a petty-bourgeois nationalist organisation founded in 1900. The programme of the S.J.L.P. was based on a demand for national autonomy for the Jews—the establishment of extraterritorial Jewish parliaments with powers to decide questions relating to the political organisation of the Jews in Russia. The S.J.L.P. stood close to the S.R.s and together with them fought against the R.S.D.L.P. p. 242

[112] *Skvortsov, A. I.*— a bourgeois-economist, author of a number of works on agriculture. Lenin criticised Skvortsov's views repeatedly in his writings (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 198, 474-77 and Vol. 3, p. 54. p. 247

[113] See K. Marx, *Capital,* Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 746. p. 248

[114] This article was written in reply to P. Maslov's article published in September 1908 in issue No. 7 of *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*,

the journal of the Polish Social-Democrats, under the heading "On the Question of the Agrarian Programme. (An Answer to Lenin.)" Maslov attacked the Bolshevik programme expounded by Lenin in his Autoabstract, *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution* (see pp. 158-80 of this volume) and defended the agrarian programme of the Mensheviks. p. 255

[115] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Der Gesetzentwurf über die Aufhebung der Feudallasten" and "The Anti-Kriege Circular". p. 261

[116] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 438-39. p. 272

[117] *Otzovists* (from the Russian word *otozvat*—recall)—the name given to a group of the Bolsheviks (Bogdanov, Pokrovsky, Lunacharsky, Bubnov and others), who demanded that the Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma should be recalled and that work in the legal organisations should be stopped. In 1908 the otzovists formed a group of their own and waged a struggle against Lenin. They emphatically refused to sit in the Duma and work in the trade unions, co-operative societies and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations of the workers. They strove to shut themselves up within the framework of the illegal organisation, to tear the Party away from the non-Party masses and expose it to the attacks of reaction. Lenin called the otzovists "liquidators of a new type" and "Mensheviks inside out".

A variety of otzovism was ultimatumism. The ultimatumists differed only in form from the otzovists. They proposed that an ultimatum should first be presented to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and if it was not complied with, the Social-Democratic deputies should be recalled from the Duma.

Ultimatumism was virtually otzovism in disguise. Lenin called the ultimatumists "shams-faced otzovists".

In the spring of 1909 the otzovists, ultimatumists and the god-builders formed a promotion group to organise an anti-Party school on the Island of Capri (Bogdanov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky and others). Actually this group was the centre of the anti-Party faction of otzovists, ultimatumists, and god-builders.

A meeting of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* held in June 1909 adopted a decision that "Bolshevism, as a definite tendency in the R.S.D.L.P., has nothing in common with otzovism or ultimatumism" and called upon the Bolsheviks to resolutely combat this defection from revolutionary Marxism. Bogdanov (Maximov), the guiding spirit of otzovism, was expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks. p. 286

[118] *Boulangism*—a reactionary chauvinist movement in France in the late nineteenth century, so named after General Boulanger who headed it.

By criticising the policy of the ruling party of moderate Republicans and pretending to oppose the Monarchists, Boulanger

sought to win popularity among the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat and to use their dissatisfaction with the government for his own careerist purposes. Boulanger was in secret contact with the Monarchists, from whom he received subsidies.

The Boulangist movement was not supported by the masses and broke up. p. 295

[119] The elections to the Duma were indirect and had several stages. They were conducted separately for various groups of the population known as curias—they were the landowner, urban, peasant and worker curias.

At the final stage of the election campaign the electors of all the curia gathered at a Gubernia Election Meeting where the election of deputies to the Duma took place. The number of deputies from each curia was fixed beforehand. Thus, if all the electors of a worker curia nominated a Social-Democrat, the rest of the participants in the Gubernia Election Meeting, were obliged to vote for him. p. 297

[120] "*Well-informed persons*"—a group of intellectuals who acted as advisers to the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma. Most of them were liquidators and revisionists, such as A. N. Potresov and S. N. Prokopovich. Taking advantage of the fact that the leaders of the Bolshevik Party were working underground and were unable to take a legal part in the activities of the Duma group, the "well-informed persons" tried to direct the group's activities into anti-Party channels, as a result of which arose the question of dispensing with their services. p. 297

[121] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a Black-Hundred police-ridden daily, published in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1914. In 1906 it became the official organ of the Ministry of the Interior. p. 299

[122] *Ugryum-Burcheyev*—a type of dull narrow-minded dignitary described by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his story *History of a Town*. p. 305

[123] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of feudalist landlords. It was established in May 1906 at the First Congress of Delegates of Gubernia Assemblies of the Nobility, and existed up to October 1917. The chief aim of this organisation was to defend the autocratic regime, the big landed estates and the privileges of the nobility. The Council was headed by Count A. A. Bobrinsky, Prince N. F. Kasatkin-Rostovsky, Count D. A. Olsufyev, V. M. Purishkevich and others. Lenin called it a "council of united feudalists". The Council of the United Nobility was really a semi-governmental body that dictated to the government legislative measures for protecting the interests of the feudalists. A great many of the Council's members belonged to the Council of State and the leading centres of the Black Hundreds. p. 306

[124] *Rural superintendent* (*zemsky nachalnik*)—an administrative office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to strengthen the authority of the landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were granted very great powers—not merely administrative, but also judicial—with regard to the peasants. p. 311

[125] *Henry George*—an American bourgeois economist and publicist, whose views were criticised by K. Marx in his letter of June 20, 1881 to F. Sorge, and by F. Engels in his preface to the American edition of his book *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 414-17). p. 312

[126] This refers to Plekhanov's speech at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. where he was co-reporter on the question of revision of the agrarian programme. Speaking against nationalisation of the land, Plekhanov said: "To make nationalisation harmless we must find a guarantee against restoration; and there is not, nor can there be, any such guarantee. Recall the history of France; recall the history of England; in each of these countries, the wide sweep of the revolution was followed by restoration. The same may happen in our country; and our programme must be such that in the event of its application, the harm that may be caused by restoration may be reduced to a minimum." (Minutes of the Fourth [Unity] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Moscow, 1959, Russ. ed., pp. 59-60.) p. 313

[127] *Razin*, *Stepan*—outstanding leader of the peasant revolt in Russia in 1667-71 against feudal oppression and serfdom. p. 313

[128] The draft of Belousov's speech on the agrarian question was written by Lenin. The statistical comparisons and figures quoted by Belousov were taken from Lenin's books, not yet published at the time, namely, *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-429) and *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* (see pp. 69-147 of this volume). p. 315

[129] *The Fifth* (*All-Russian*) *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Paris on December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909) and was attended by delegates from such major Party organisations as those of St. Petersburg, the Urals, the Caucasus, Moscow and the Central Industrial Region, as well as from the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Bund. There were sixteen voting delegates, of whom 5 were Bolsheviks, 3 Mensheviks, 5 Polish Social-Democrats and 3 Bundists. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was represented by Lenin.

The Conference discussed the following questions: (1) The reports of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., of the C.C. of the Polish

Social-Democratic Party, of the C.C. of the Bund, and of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Urals and the Caucasus; (2) The present political situation and the tasks of the Party; (3) The Social-Democratic group in the Duma; (4) Questions of organisation in connection with the changed political conditions; (5) Affiliation in the local areas with the non-Russian organisations; (6) Affairs abroad; and Miscellanea.

Lenin made a report at the Conference "On the Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party" and speeches on the Duma group, on the organisational and other questions. The Bolsheviks at the Conference waged a struggle against two forms of opportunism within the Party, namely, "against the *liquidators*, the direct opportunists of the Party, and against the *otzovists*, the disguised enemies of the Party". On Lenin's motion the Conference condemned liquidationism and called upon all Party organisations to resolutely combat attempts to liquidate the Party. The Conference is dealt with also in Lenin's article "On the Road" (see pp. 345-55 of this volume). p. 319

[130] This heading has been given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 329

[131] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 763-93. p. 334

[132] *The Erfurt Programme*—the-programme of German Social-Democracy adopted at the Congress in Erfurt in October 1891. p. 334

[133] This alludes to Plekhanov's statement announcing his resignation from the editorial board of the liquidators' newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. It was printed in No. 10-11 of this newspaper, which was being prepared for release. After further talks with Plekhanov the statement was withdrawn and the mention of it in the "contents" was pasted over. This did not put an end to the conflict, however. In May 1909 (issue No. 14), *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* published a letter from Plekhanov informing readers that he had officially resigned from the editorial board. p. 358

[134] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen issues were put out. The newspaper's organiser, manager, and ideological guide was Lenin. Other members of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky.

The outstanding role which the newspaper played in combating Menshevism, restoring partyism, and formulating and elucidating the tactical issues posed by the rising revolution was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress, which recorded a vote of thanks to the editorial board. p. 360

[135] *Partiiniye Izvestia* (*Party News*)—a newspaper, the organ of the United Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., published illegally in

St. Petersburg on the eve of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Two issues were put out: on February 7 (20) and March 20 (April 2), 1906. The editorial board was set up on a parity basis comprising editors from the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* and from the Menshevik newspaper the new *Iskra*. Bolshevik members of the editorial board, among others, were Lenin and Lunacharsky. After the Fourth Congress of the Party *Partiiniye Izvestia* closed down. p. 363

[136] "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim—nothing"—the formula advanced by E. Bernstein, leader of the extreme opportunist wing of the German Social-Democrats and the Second International, and the theoretician of revisionism and reformism. p. 363

[137] *Narodnaya Duma* (*People's Duma*)—a Menshevik daily published in St. Petersburg in March-April 1907. p. 367

[138] This refers to the resolution on the political situation within the country and the tasks of the Party, adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, held in Praga (a suburb of Warsaw) in December 1908.

The Congress repelled liquidationist tendencies and confirmed that the chief task of Social-Democracy was to fight for the conquest of political power by the proletariat with the help of the revolutionary peasantry. p. 368

[139] *All-Russian Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation founded in 1905. Its programme and tactics were elaborated at its first and second congresses held in Moscow in August and November 1900. The Union demanded political liberty and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly. It adopted the tactics of boycott of the First Duma. Its agrarian programme called for the abolition of private landownership and for the transfer of monastery, church, crown and state lands to the peasants without compensation. The Union pursued a vacillating middle-of-the-road policy. While demanding abolition of the landed estates, it agreed to partial compensation for the landlords. The Peasant Union was subjected to police persecutions from the moment it came into existence. It finally broke up at the beginning of 1907. p. 372

[140] *The Bund* (*The General Jewish Workers Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia*) was formed by a founding congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilna in 1897; it was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (1898) "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in respect of questions affecting the Jewish proletariat specifically". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1954, Part I, p. 14, Russ. ed.)

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the working-class movement of Russia. Its Fourth Congress, held in April 1901, resolved to alter the organisational relations with the R.S.D.L.P. established by the latter's First Congress. The resolution said that the Congress regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federation of national organisations and that the Bund should be treated as a member of that federation.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. had rejected its demand that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party. In 1906 the Bund re-entered the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of a resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists persistently supported the opportunist wing of the Party (the Economists, Mensheviks and liquidators) and opposed the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. The Bund countered the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy.

During the period of the Stolypin reaction (1907-10), it adopted a liquidationist stand and was active in forming the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) it adopted the position of the social-chauvinists. In 1917 it supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Bund leadership joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with the Soviet power. In March 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and some of its members joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) according to general procedure. p. 372

[141] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—an illegal newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., published in St. Petersburg from September 17 (30) to November 18 (December 1), 1906. Seven issues were put out. The editorial board was controlled by the Mensheviks. p. 373

[142] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was published in Cologne from June 1 1848 to May 19, 1849 under the management of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Editor-in-Chief was Marx. Under the blows of reaction the newspaper closed down after issue No. 301.

Here Lenin quotes from the articles by K. Marx and F. Engels "Die Berliner Debatte über die Revolution" and "Der Gesetzenwurf über die Aufhebung der Feudallasten" published in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on June 14 and July 30, 1848. p. 377

[143] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 104-05. p. 378

[144] The manuscript has no heading. This heading has been supplied by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 380

[145] *Vozrozhdeniye* (*Revival*)—a journal of the Menshevik liquidators published in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910. p. 394

[146] See K. Marx und F. Engels, "Die Berliner Debatte über die Revolution". p. 397

[147] Lenin is quoting from Engels's "Preface to the First German Edition" of K. Marx's work *The Poverty of Philosophy* (see K. Marx *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 12-13). p. 401

[148] See K. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right*. Introduction. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Religion*, Moscow, 1957, p. 42.) p. 403

[149] See F. Engels, "Flüchtlings-Literatur. II. Das Programme der Blanquisten". p. 403

[150] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 434-37. p. 404

[151] This refers to F. Engels's preface to K. Marx's pamphlet *The Civil War in France* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 479). p. 404

[152] *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*)—a Cadet collection of articles by N. Berdayev, S. Bulgakov, P. Struve, M. Herschensohn and other representatives of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie, published in Moscow in 1909. In their articles on the Russian intelligentsia these writers tried to discredit the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the best representatives of the Russian people, including Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, they vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905 and thanked the tsarist government for having, "with its bayonets and jails", saved the bourgeoisie from "the popular wrath". The writers called upon the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared the programme of the *Vekhi* symposium in point of both philosophy and journalism with that of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, calling the symposium "*an encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy*", "nothing but a flood of reactionary mud poured on democracy". p. 410

[153] *Golos Moskvy* (*Voice of Moscow*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Octobrists—a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and big landlords. Published in Moscow from 1905 to 1915. p. 418

[154] *Menshikov, M. O.* (1859-1919)—a reactionary journalist, one of the editors of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*).—*Ed.* p. 419

[155] *Derzhimorda*—the name of a policeman in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General* typifying an insolent, brutal bully and oppressor. p. 420

[156] *Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"* was held in Paris on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909 and was attended by nine members of the Bolshevik Centre (elected by the Bolshevik section of the Fifth [London] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907) headed by Lenin, and representatives of the St. Petersburg, Moscow Regional and Urals organisations.

The Conference was called to discuss the conduct of the otzovists and ultimatumists. It dealt with the following questions: (1) otzovism and ultimatumism; (2) god-building tendencies among the Social-Democrats, (3) the attitude to Duma activities among the other fields of Party work; (4) the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party; (5) the Party school being set up abroad (on Capri); (6) agitation for a Bolshevik congress or a Bolshevik conference separate from the Party; (7) the breakaway of Comrade Maximov; and other questions.

The Conference was guided by Lenin, who delivered speeches on all the principal questions of the agenda. Otzovism and ultimatumism were represented and defended at the Conference by A. Bogdanov (Maximov) and V. Shantser (Marat). Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, and Tomsky took a conciliatory stand.

The Conference condemned otzovism and ultimatumism, which were qualified as "liquidationism from the left". Bogdanov, the guiding spirit of otzovism and ultimatumism, was expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks. The Conference also condemned god-building and decided to combat it vigorously and expose its anti-Marxist nature.

The headings to Lenin's speeches published in this volume have been given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 425

[157] *St.—Stanislav Volsky*—A. V. Sokolov, leader of the Moscow otzovists. p. 428

[158] *M. T.*—M. P. Tomsky. p. 432

[159] *On the Party School Set Up Abroad*—an anti-Party school set up by Bogdanov (Maximov), Alexinsky and Lunacharsky on Capri (Italy) in 1909 with the assistance of Maxim Gorky. The school was the factional centre of the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders, who united to fight Bolshevism.

Under the guise of pro-Party activities the Bogdanovites got some of the local Social-Democratic organisations to send thirteen students to attend the school.

The school existed about four months (August-December). In November 1909 some of the students headed by the worker N. Y. Vilonov emphatically dissociated themselves from the Bogdanovites when the factional nature of this school became clear to them. They sent to the editors of *Proletary* a protest against the anti-Party activities of the lecturers, for which they were expelled from the school. On Lenin's invitation they came to Paris, where they attended a cycle of lectures including lectures by Lenin:

"The Present Moment and Our Tasks" and "The Agrarian Policy of Stolypin". In December 1909 the group of students who remained on Capri formed, together with the lecturers, the anti-Party group "Vperyod".

The conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* condemned the Capri school, which it qualified as "the new centre of a faction that was breaking away from the Bolsheviks". p. 432

[160] *God-building*—a religious-philosophical literary trend, hostile to Marxism, which in the period of Stolypin reaction arose among a section of the Party intellectuals who had moved away from Marxism after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905-07.

The god-builders (Lunacharsky, Bazarov and others) advocated the creation of a new "socialist" religion and tried to reconcile Marxism with religion. At one time Maxim Gorky supported them. An extended meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* condemned god-building and declared in a special resolution that the Bolshevik group in the Party had nothing in common with "such a distortion of scientific socialism".

The reactionary nature of god-building was exposed by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (see present edition, Vol. 14) and in his letters to Gorky in February-April 1908 and November-December 1913. p. 432

[161] This refers to the *pro-Party Mensheviks*, headed by Plekhanov, who came out against the liquidators during the years of reaction. In December 1908 Plekhanov resigned from the editorial board of the liquidators' newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, and in 1909 he resumed publication of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Social-Democrat's Diary*) for the purpose of fighting liquidationism. While adhering to Menshevism, the Plekhanovites at the same time stood for preserving and strengthening the illegal Party organisation, and consented to form a bloc with the Bolsheviks for that purpose. In 1909 groups of pro-Party Mensheviks were formed in Paris, Geneva, San Remo, Nice and other cities. In St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Kiev and Baku many Menshevik workers came out against the liquidators in favour of a revival of the illegal R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin called on the Bolsheviks to seek closer alignment with the pro-Party Mensheviks, saying that an agreement with them was possible on the basis of a struggle for the Party against liquidationism, "without any ideological compromises, without any glossing over of tactical and other differences of opinion *within the limits* of the Party line" (see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 101). The pro-Party Mensheviks participated with the Bolsheviks in the local Party committees, and contributed to the Bolshevik publications: *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*), *Zvezda* (*Star*), and the Central Organ of the Party *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Lenin's tactics of alignment with the Plekhanovites, which were supported by the majority of the Menshevik workers in Russia, helped to ex-

tend the influence of the Bolsheviks in the legal organisations of the workers and oust the liquidators from them.

At the end of 1911 Plekhanov broke the bloc with the Bolsheviks. On the pretext of combating "factionalism" and a split in the R.S.D.L.P. he tried to reconcile the Bolsheviks with the opportunists. In 1912 the Plekhanovites, together with the Trotskyists, the Bundists and the liquidators, came out against the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 433

[162] *Vlasov*—A. I. Rykov. p. 438

[163] The private meeting—a meeting of Leninist Bolsheviks called by Lenin on the eve of the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. Lenin gave the meeting full information concerning the state of affairs in the Bolshevik section and the struggle against the otzovists, the ultimatumists and the god-builders. The theses contained in Lenin's report formed the basis for the resolutions adopted by the conference of the extended editorial board. p. 439

[164] *The First All-Russian Congress of Members of People's Universities' Associations* was held in St. Petersburg on January 3-6 (16-19), 1908. During the debate on the question of the activities and organisation of the people's universities the workers' group of the congress, headed by the Bolsheviks, introduced motions demanding that the workers' organisations be represented on the boards of the people's universities with the right to take part in arranging the curricula, choosing desirable lecturers on the social sciences, and recognition of the right of every nationality to give tuition in the native language. The congress rejected these demands as being outside the competence of the congress, after which the workers' representatives walked out. p. 447

[165] *The First All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Co-operative Societies* was held in Moscow on April 16-21 (April 29-May 4), 1908. It was attended by 824 delegates, about fifty of whom were Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks). Reports were delivered at the congress on the international co-operative movement, on the role and tasks of the co-operative movement, on the legal status of the consumer societies in Russia and other matters.

Despite the resistance of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks formed a Social-Democratic group at the congress and headed the fight of the representatives from the trade unions and workers' co-operatives against the bourgeois co-operators, who were in the majority at the congress. After a number of speeches by spokesmen of the workers, the police imposed a ban on speeches that touched on questions of the class struggle, the trade unions, aid to workers during strikes and lock-outs, the co-operative press and propaganda, and even the election of a congress bureau and the periodicity of congresses, the police officer attending the proceedings being instructed to arrest immediately anyone "who made socialist speeches

or motions". As a demonstration of protest against this the congress was closed. p. 447

[166] *The First All-Russian Women's Congress* was held in St. Petersburg on December 10-16 (23-29), 1908. Among its delegates were many women workers. Under pressure of the latter the congress adopted resolutions on combating alcoholism, on the position of the peasant woman, on labour protection for women and children, on producers' co-operatives, and on equal rights for Jews. On the main issue—that of the political and civic status of women in the modern community—the women workers submitted a motion demanding universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot without distinction of sex, race and religion. The presiding committee of the congress refused to read out the motion and replaced it by one drafted in a liberal-bourgeois spirit. The women workers walked out as a demonstration of protest. p. 447

[167] *The First All-Russian Congress of Factory Medical Officers and Representatives of Manufacturing Industry* convened on the initiative of the Moscow Society of Factory Medical Officers was held in Moscow on April 1-6 (14-19), 1909. Among its delegates were 52 workers elected by the trade unions chiefly of the big industrial centres (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Baku, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, etc.).

According to its sponsors, the congress was to have been a "festival of reconciliation" between workers and capitalists. The Bolsheviks, however who formed a majority of the working-class delegates, succeeded in getting the workers at the congress to take a class, proletarian line, despite the opposition of the liquidationist elements. Speaking on the concrete questions of sanitary and medical arrangements at the factories, the worker delegates exposed the ideas of "class peace" and social reform, and put forward demands based on the programme of the Marxist party. These speeches were of great political significance and had repercussions throughout the country. Especially lively were the debates on the questions of sanitary inspection arrangements (the Bolsheviks' draft resolution on this point was carried) and of the election of the factory inspection by the workers.

The congress was unable to finish its work. After the police had demanded that no questions liable "to excite class struggle" should be touched on in the debates, and after they had forbidden the motion on the housing question to be put to the vote (since "it mentioned socialism and socialisation of the land") and forbidden some of the worker delegates including the Duma Deputy I. P. Pokrovsky, from continuity their speeches, all the workers and some of the doctors walked out of the congress hall. In view of this the presiding committee decided to close the congress. p. 447

[168] *Otkliki Bunda* (*Echoes of the Bund*)—a non-periodical organ of the Bund's Committee Abroad, published in Geneva from March 1909 to February 1911. Five issues were put out. p. 460

[169] The reference is to Krylov's fable "The Frog and the Ox". p. 464

[170] *Khlestakov*—the chief character in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*, typifying the unrestrained braggart and liar. p. 464

[171] This comment was published in the form of a note to M. N. Lyadov's letter to *Proletary* in which he expressed disagreement with the decisions of the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. p. 467

[172] *Leva*—M. K. Vladimirov; *Innokenty*—I. F. Dubrovinsky. p. 468

[173] Lenin wrote this draft letter in reply to that of the Council of the otzovist-ultimatumist school on Capri addressed to the Bolshevik Centre (the extended editorial board of *Proletary*) soliciting aid for the school in the form of lecturers and funds.

The manuscript has no heading. The present heading has been given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 470

THE LIFE AND WORK OF V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

(*March 1908-August 1909*)

1909

March 19 (April 1)	Lenin's article "On to the Straight Road" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 26.
March 26 (April 8)	Lenin's article "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 27.
Not later than April 3 (16)	Lenin finishes his article "Marxism and Revisionism" for the symposium *Karl Marx (1818-1883)*.
Between April 6 and 18 (April 19 and May 1)	Lenin at the request of Gorky visits him on the Island of Capri where he tells Bogdanov and Lunacharsky of his difference with them on questions of philosophy.
April 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "On the Beaten Track!" and "A Bloc of the Cadets and the Octobrists?" are published in *Proletary*, No. 29.
April 24 (May 7)	Lenin gives a lecture in Geneva on the subject of "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution and Its Probable Future".
April	Lenin's article "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" is published in the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 2.
May 1	Lenin delivers a lecture in Paris on the character of the Russian revolution at a meeting organised by the Bureau of the Paris Social-Democratic group.
Beginning of May	Lenin takes part in the session of the Bureau of the Paris Social-Democratic group at which it is decided to help the Social-Democrats arrested in Switzerland in connection with the expropriation at Tiflis.

May 10 (23)	*Proletary*, No. 30, publishes Lenin's articles "Cadets of the Second Generation" (leading article) and "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" (reprinted from the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 2).
May	Lenin works at the British Museum on his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
May-first half of June	Lenin writes "Ten Questions to a Lecturer" as points for the speech of I. F. Dubrovinsky (Innokenty) at the lecture by A. Bogdanov in Geneva.
June 18 (July 1)	Lenin finishes his work *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary being published by Granat Brothers. Owing to the censorship, the work was not published at the time, and appeared as a separate booklet only in 1918.
	Lenin writes to V. V. Vorovsky in Odessa on the sharpening of philosophical differences and the maturing of a split with the Bogdanov group.
June	On Lenin's suggestion, a discussion on otzovism is started in *Proletary*.
July 2 (15)	Lenin's article "Some Features of the Present Collapse" is published as a leading article in Proletary, No. 32.
July 5 (18)	Lenin finishes the Autoabstract of his book: *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution* (printed in the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 6, August 1908).
July 23 (August 5)	Lenin's articles "Inflammable Material in World Politics" (leader), "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy" and "How Pyotr Maslov Corrects the Rough Drafts of Karl Marx" are published in *Proletary*, No. 33.
August 11-13 (24-26)	Lenin takes part in the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva; exposes the attempt of the Mensheviks to liquidate the C.C. and replace it by an information bureau; is elected on behalf of the Bolsheviks to the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ.
August	At a meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* Lenin challenges Bogdanov to set forth his views openly in the press.

September 11 (24)	Lenin's article "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 35.
Between September 25 and October 2 (October 8 and 15)	Lenin's article "Marxism and Revisionism" is published in the symposium *Karl Marx (1818-1883)*, put out in St. Petersburg.
September 27 (October 10)	Lenin participates in the work of the conference of socialist journalists in Brussels.
	Lenin attends the international meeting devoted to the struggle of the proletariat to preserve peace held at the Maison du Peuple in Brussels.
September 28 (October 11)	Lenin takes part in the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels, criticises Kautsky's resolution on the admission to the International of the British Labour Party, and opposes the admission of the Zionist socialists to the Russian subsection of the International.
September 29 (October 12)	Lenin attends the meeting of the international conference of socialist M. P.s in Brussels.
September	Lenin writes the preface to his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
Before October 3 (16)	Lenin writes his article "British and German Workers Demonstrate for Peace" for *Proletary*, No. 36.
October 3 (16)	Lenin's article "The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 36.
October 14 (27)	In a letter to A. I. Yelizarova Lenin tells her that he has finished his work on the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, and asks her to provide a reliable address where he can send the manuscript.
October 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "Events in the Balkans and in Persia", "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau" and "P. Maslov in Hysterics" are published in *Proletary*, No. 37.
October 28 (November 10)	Lenin rejects the Mensheviks' offer to contribute to the proposed Menshevik symposium.
October-November	Lenin's article "Some Remarks on the 'Reply' by P. Maslov" is published in the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 8-9.

October-December	Lenin directs preparations for the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.
November 1 (14)	Lenin's article "The Assessment of the Present Situation" is published in *Proletary*, No. 38.
Before November 4 (17)	Lenin sends the manuscript of his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* to a secret address for legal publication in Moscow.
November 13 (26)	Lenin's articles "How Plekhanov and Co. Defend Revisionism" and "Two Letters" are published in *Proletary*, No. 39.
Between November 29 and December 1 (December 12 and 14)	Lenin and Krupskaya move from Geneva to Paris where *Proletary* is now to be published.
December 1 (14)	Lenin's article "The Agrarian Debates in the Third Duma" is published in *Proletary*, No. 40.
December 21 (January 3, 1909)	Lenin takes part in the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris.
December 21-27 (January 3-9, 1909)	Lenin takes part in the work of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris reports on "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party", moves a draft resolution on this question and proposes amendments to draft resolutions on other questions.
December 27-29 (January 9-11, 1909)	Lenin takes part in the plenary meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. at which the resolutions of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. are confirmed.
December	Lenin gives a lecture in Paris on the present situation in Russia.

1909

Beginning of the year	Lenin gives lectures on philosophy at a Bolshevik study group in Paris.
January 7 (20)	Lenin's article "How the Socialist-Revolutionaries Sum Up the Revolution and How the Revolution Has Summed Them Up" is published in *Proletary*, No. 41.

January 22 (February 4)	Lenin speaks in Paris on the political situation in Russia.
January 28 (February 10)	Lenin's article "On the Road" is published as a leader in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 2.
February 1 (14)	At a meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* Lenin demands an open attack by the board on the god-building preached by Lunacharsky.
February 12 (25)	Lenin's comment on the article "Questions of the Day", directed against otzovism, is published in *Proletary*, No. 42.
February 17-23 (March 2-8)	Lenin is on holiday at Nice.
March 5 (18)	Lenin speaks in Paris at a meeting of political emigrants on the Paris Commune of 1871.
March 9 and 21 (March 22, and April 3)	Lenin's article "The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution" is published in Nos. 3 and 4 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
March 10 or 11 (23 or 24)	Lenin sends a "Supplement to Chapter Four. Section 1. From What Angle did N. G. Chernyshevsky Criticise Kantianism?" to Moscow for his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
Not earlier than March 23 (April 5)	On behalf of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin sends a protest to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party against the distortion by *Vorwärts* of the essence of the differences among the Russian Social-Democrats.
April 4 (17)	Lenin's article "A Caricature of Bolshevism" is published in the Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 44.
April 8 (21)	Lenin's article "The 'Leftward Swing' of the Bourgeoisie and the Tasks of the Proletariat" is published in *Proletary*, No. 44.
Between April 29 and May 4 (May 12 and 17)	Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* is published in Moscow.
End of April-first half of June	Lenin makes preparations for the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*.

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May 8 (21)	Lenin speaks in Paris at the *Proletary* club on the subject of "Religion and the Workers' Party".
May 13 (26)	Lenin's article "The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 45.
June 4 (17)	Lenin's article "Classes and Parties in Their Attitude to Religion and the Church" is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 6.
Not later than June 7 (20)	Lenin holds a private meeting of members of the editorial board of *Proletary* with representatives from local Social-Democratic organisations, in which he reports on the state of affairs in the Party.
June 8-17 (21-30)	Lenin presides over the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, takes part in the discussion, moves amendments to the resolutions and submits draft resolutions on particular questions. On the main questions the conference adopted Lenin's resolutions.
July 3 (16)	"Report on the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*", written by Lenin, is published in a Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 46.
July 11 (24)	Lenin's articles "The Tsar Visits Europe and Members of the Black-Hundred Duma Visit England" (leader) and "The Liquidation of Liquidationism" are published in *Proletary*, No. 46.
July	In a talk with the Secretary of the Russian section of the Central Committee Lenin gives instructions on the struggle against provocateurs who worm their way into Party organisations.
End of July-August	Lenin goes away on holiday with his family (N. K. Krupskaya, her mother and M. I. Ulyanova) to the village of Bonbon (department of Seine-et-Marne) near Paris.
August 5 (18)	In a letter to the organisers of the Capri school Lenin declines to give lectures at the school, and invites the students to come to Paris to attend lectures by Bolshevik lecturers. In a letter to the Business Commission of the Bolshevik Centre Lenin objects to any aid being given to Trotsky for the publication of his newspaper *Pravda* in Vienna.

Middle of August	Lenin sends to the Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee a secret circular he has received from the International Socialist Bureau regarding organisation of meetings of protest against the imperialist aggressive policy of the Spanish Government in Morocco.
August 17 (30)	In a reply to the students at the Capri school, Lenin explains the anti-Party character of the school, repeats his refusal to deliver lectures in it and invites them to come to Paris.
August	Lenin takes part in the work of the Promotion Commission for the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma.
Summer	Lenin visits Paul Lafargue and discusses his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* with him.

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

16

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PREFACE

Volume 16 contains works written by V. I. Lenin in the period from September 1909 to December 1910.

The volume consists mainly of articles and documents devoted to the struggle for the Party and its revolutionary principles, against the two kinds of opportunism in the Party: the liquidators, the "direct opponents of the Party", and the otzovists, the "hidden enemies of the Party", as well as against the conciliators, who served as a screen for both kinds of opportunists.

The articles "The Liquidators Exposed", "Methods of the Liquidators and Party Tasks of the Bolsheviks", "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and Cherevanin", and "*Golos* (*Voice*) of the Liquidators Against the Party" are devoted to the struggle against liquidationism—the agency of the liberal bourgeoisie in the Party.

The articles "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-building", "A Word to the Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg", "A Shameful Fiasco" and "The *Vperyod* Faction", are directed against otzovism and ultimatumism.

The work "Notes of a Publicist" gives an appraisal of the decisions of the plenary session of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 and an account of the struggle at the plenary session against the liquidators, Trotskyists and conciliators.

The articles "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau", "The Question of Co-operative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen", "Two Worlds", and "Differences in the European Labour Movement" are directed against opportunism in the European labour movement, against the treacherous policy of the leaders of the Second International.

The articles "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" and "Strike Statistics in Russia" are devoted to a study of the experience of the Revolution of 1905-07.

Included in this volume are eight documents published in the *Collected Works* for the first time: "To Pupils of the Capri School", which reveals the anti-Party activity of the Capri school; "Ideological Decay and Disunity Among Russian Social-Democrats"; "The *Vperyod* Group"; "Announcement on the Publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*"; "An Open Letter to All Pro-Party Social-Democrats" with an exposition of the inner-Party situation after the January plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910; and two statements to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Like the majority of the works in this volume, these documents are devoted to the struggle for the Party, the struggle on two fronts.

Among the newly included articles is a large work of Lenin's, "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture", written at the end of 1910. The manuscript of this work has not yet been found in its entirety. The end of the article with the signature *V. Ilyin*, as well as the end of Chapter I and the beginning of Chapter II, which were absent when the work was published in 1932, have now been found, and therefore Chapters I, II and VII are now published in full for the first time.



V. I. LENIN
1910

THE LIQUIDATORS EXPOSED

Our readers know, of course, that during the past year our Party has had to concern itself with the so-called liquidationist trend in Social-Democracy. The liquidators are those most undaunted opportunists who have begun to advocate the view that an illegal Social-Democratic Party is unnecessary in Russia today, that the R.S.D.L.P. is unnecessary. Our readers are also aware that the Bolsheviks waged and carried through a struggle against this liquidationist trend, carried it through at least to such an extent that at the All-Russian Party Conference in December 1908[1] liquidationism was condemned in the most decisive and irrevocable manner against the votes of the Mensheviks and part of the Bundists' (the other part of the Bundists[2] came out against liquidationism).

However, the official organ of the Menshevik faction, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,[3] not only did not admit that it was liquidationist but, on the contrary, assumed an unusually "proud and noble" pose and denied that it was in any way involved in liquidationism. The facts convicted them. But *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* grandly ignored the facts. The recent issue, No. 9, of Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*,[4] (August 1909) is extremely valuable because in it one of the leaders of Menshevism completely exposes liquidationism. This is not the only significance of *Dnevnik* but it is on this aspect of the matter that we must dwell first of all.

No. 45 of *Proletary*[5] published a letter from Mensheviks of Vyborg District (in St. Petersburg) protesting against the Menshevik liquidators. This letter is reprinted in *Golos* No. 14 (May 1909) and the *editors* remark: "The editorial board of *Proletary* pretends to have seen in the letter of the Vyborg comrades a step *away* from the newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*...."

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik* appears. Its author shows the *whole content* of liquidationist ideas in the article published in *Golos* No. 15, without the slightest reservation on the part of the editors (and moreover in an article expressing entirely the same views as those of the editors). Plekhanov quotes in this connection the letter of the Vyborg comrades and says: "This letter shows us how the broad workers' organisations are at times influenced by people who have deserted our Party on the pretext of 'new' work" (*Dnevnik*, p. 10). It is just this "pretext" that has always been put forward by *Golos*! "Such influence," Plekhanov continues, "is by no means a Social-Democratic influence; it is in spirit absolutely hostile to Social-Democracy" (p. 11).

And so, Plekhanov quotes the letter of the Vyborg comrades *against* No. 15 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. We ask the reader: *in point of fact*, *who is it that is "pretending"*? Was *Proletary* "pretending" when it accused *Golos* of liquidationism, or was "*Golos*" *pretending* when it denied that it had any connection with liquidationism.

The *literary dishonesty* of the editorial board of *Golos* has been exposed, and exposed by Plekhanov, who until recently was one of its members.

But this is by no means all.

In *Golos* No. 15 (June 1909), in an article signed *F. Dan*, we find a statement that *Pravda*'s[6] reputation for non-factionalism protects it "from stupid and unscrupulous accusations of liquidationism" (p. 12). One could not put it more forcefully. It would be difficult to show on one's countenance a more lofty, nobler indignation at *Golos* being accused of liquidationism.

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik* appears. The author shows the whole content of liquidationist ideas in one of the articles of *Golos* No. 15 and declares to the Mensheviks who share those ideas: "Why are you offended at the charge of liquidationism when in fact you are very much guilty of this sin?" (p. 5). "Comrade S.[7] [the author of the article in *Golos* No. 15 examined by Plekhanov]* not only can but must be

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated. —*Ed.*

accused of liquidationism, because the plan that he expounds and defends in his letter is in reality nothing but a plan for the liquidation of our Party" (*Dnevnik*, p. 6). In his article Comrade S. plainly expresses his solidarity with "the *Caucasian delegation*", *i.e.*, *with the editorial board of* "*Golos*", which had, as is known, two mandates out of three in this delegation.

Plekhanov continues:

"One must make a choice here: *either* liquidationism *or* a fight against it. There is no third way. In saying so I have in mind, of course, comrades who are guided not by their personal interests but by the interests of our common cause. For those who are guided by their personal interests, for those who are thinking only of their revolutionary careers—and there is indeed such a career!—for them, of course, a third way does exist. Big and little people of this calibre can, and even must at the present time, manoeuvre between the liquidationist and anti-liquidationist trends; under existing conditions they have to make the strongest possible excuses for not giving a straight answer to the question whether it is necessary to combat liquidationism; they have to escape from giving such an answer by means of 'allegories and empty hypotheses', for nobody knows yet which trend will get the upper hand—the liquidationist or anti-liquidationist—and these sapient diplomatists want at any rate to share in the celebration; they want at all costs to be on the side of the victors. I repeat, for such people there is a third way. But Comrade S. will probably agree with me if I say that they are not genuine people, but only 'toy manikins'.[8] They are not worth talking about; they are inborn opportunists; their motto is: 'as you please'" (*Dnevnik*, pp. 7-8).

This can be called: a gentle hint ... at a serious matter. The fifth and last act, scene 1. On the stage are the editors of *Golos*, all except one. Editor So-and-so, addressing the public with an air of exceptional nobility: "the accusations of liquidationism levelled at us are not only stupid but *deliberately dishonest*."

Scene 2. The same persons and "he", the editor of *Golos* who has just safely resigned from the editorial board[9]; he pretends not to notice any of the editors and says, addressing contributor S., who is at one with the editors: "Either

liquidationism, or a fight against it. There is a third way only for revolutionary careerists, who manoeuvre, who make excuses for not giving a straight answer, who wait to see who will get the upper hand. Comrade S. probably agrees with me that these are not genuine people but toy manikins. They are not worth talking about: they are inborn opportunists; their motto is—'as you please'."

Time will show whether "Comrade S.", the collective-Menshevik Comrade S., really agrees with Plekhanov or whether he prefers to retain as his leaders certain toy manikins and inborn opportunists. One thing we can safely say already: among Menshevik *workers*, if Plekhanov, Potresov (a "convinced liquidator" according to Plekhanov's comment on p. 19 of *Dnevnik*) and the toy manikins, whose motto is "as you please", fully lay bare their views before them, you will certainly not find ten per cent who are *in favour* of Potresov and *in favour* of those who say "as you please", *taken together*. You can be sure of that. Plekhanov's statement is sufficient to make Menshevik *workers* turn in disgust from both Potresov and those who say "as you please". Our task is to see to it that the working-class Mensheviks, especially those who are not readily influenced by propaganda coming from the Bolsheviks, become fully *acquainted* with No. 9 of Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*. Our task is to see to it that the working-class Mensheviks now seriously set about clarifying the *ideological basis* of the divergencies between Plekhanov, on the one hand, and Potresov and those who say "as you please" on the other.

On this particularly important question, Plekhanov in *Dnevnik* No. 9 provides material that is also extremely valuable, but far, very far, from adequate. "Hurrah for 'general delimitation'!" exclaims Plekhanov, greeting the fixing of boundaries between the Bolsheviks and the anarcho-syndicalists (as Plekhanov calls our otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders[10]) and declaring that "we Mensheviks must demarcate ourselves from the liquidators" (*Dnevnik*, p. 18). Of course, we Bolsheviks, who have already fixed our *general boundary*, whole-heartedly associate ourselves with this demand for a general delimitation within the Menshevik faction. We shall await with impatience this general delimitation among the Mensheviks. We shall see *where* the

general boundary among them will lie. We shall see whether it will be a really *general* boundary.

Plekhanov depicts the split within the Menshevik ranks over liquidationism as a split over an organisational question. At the same time, however, he provides data which show that the matter is far from being confined to a question of organisation. *So far* Plekhanov has drawn two boundaries, *neither* of which as yet deserves to be called general. The first boundary definitely divides Plekhanov from Potresov, the second divides him indefinitely from the "factional diplomatists", the toy manikins and the inborn opportunists. Concerning Potresov, Plekhanov says that already in the autumn of 1907 he "spoke like a convinced liquidator". But there is more to it than that. Besides this verbal statement of Potresov's on the organisational question, Plekhanov refers to the well-known collective work of the Mensheviks *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, and says that he, Plekhanov, resigned from the editorial board of this symposium because Potresov's article (even after corrections and redraftings demanded by Plekhanov and carried out through the mediation of Dan and Martov) was unacceptable to him. "I became fully convinced that Potresov's article could not be corrected" (p. 20). "I saw," he writes in *Dnevnik*, "that the liquidationist ideas Potresov expressed in Mannheim were firmly established in his mind and that he had completely lost the ability to look at social life, at its present and past, through the eyes of a revolutionary" (pp. 19-20). "Potresov is no comrade of mine ... he and I do not go the same way" (p. 20).

The question here is not at all one of present-day organisational problems, which Potresov did not touch on, and could not touch on, in his article. It is a question of the *fundamental ideas of the Social-Democratic programme and tactics*, which are being "liquidated" by the *collective* Menshevik "work" issued under the *collective* Menshevik editorship of *Martov*, *Maslov and Potresov*.

In order to draw a really general boundary *here* it is not enough to break with Potresov and make a "gentle" hint at the "as you please" heroes. For this it is necessary to *reveal in detail* precisely where, when, why and how "Potre-

sov lost the ability to look at social life through the eyes of a revolutionary". Liquidationism, says Plekhanov, leads to the "slough of the most disgraceful opportunism" (p. 12). "Among them (the liquidators) new wine is converted into a very sour liquid suitable only for preparing petty-bourgeois vinegar" (p. 12). Liquidationism "facilitates the penetration of petty-bourgeois tendencies in a proletarian environment" (p. 14). "I have repeatedly tried to prove to influential Menshevik comrades that they are making a great mistake in displaying at times their readiness to go hand-in-hand with gentlemen who to a greater or lesser extent are redolent of opportunism" (p. 15). "Liquidationism leads straight to the muddy slough of opportunism and petty-bourgeois aspirations hostile to Social-Democracy" (p. 16). Compare all these comments of Plekhanov's with the recognition of Potresov as a convinced liquidator. It is quite clear that Potresov is described by Plekhanov (is now recognised by Plekhanov, it would be more correct to say) as a *petty-bourgeois democrat-opportunist*. It is quite clear that insofar as Menshevism, represented by all the influential writers of the faction (except Plekhanov), participates in this Potresovism (in *The Social Movement*), to that extent Menshevism is now acknowledged by Plekhanov to be a *petty-bourgeois opportunist trend*. Insofar as Menshevism, as a faction, gives its blessing to Potresov, and screens him, Menshevism is now acknowledged by Plekhanov to be a *petty-bourgeois opportunist faction*.

The conclusion is clear: if Plekhanov remains alone, if he fails to gather around him the bulk, or at least a considerable section, of the Mensheviks, if he fails to lay bare before all Menshevik workers the entire roots and manifestations of this petty-bourgeois opportunism, then our estimate of Menshevism will prove to be confirmed by the Menshevik who is the most outstanding as regards theory and who led the Mensheviks farthest in the tactics of 1906-07.

Time will show whether the "revolutionary Menshevism" proclaimed by Plekhanov will be *strong enough* to wage a struggle against the whole circle of ideas that have given rise to Potresov and liquidationism.

In speaking of the general delimitation among the Bolshe-

viks Plekhanov compares the Bolshevik Marxists, Social-Democrats, to Gogol's Osip,[11] who picked up all sorts of rubbish, every little bit of string (including empirio-criticism[12] and god-building). Now the Bolshevik Osip, says Plekhanov jokingly, has begun "to clear the space around him", to expel the anti-Marxists, to throw away the "string" and other rubbish.

Plekhanov's joke touches not on a frivolous question but on a fundamental and very serious one for Russian Social-Democracy, namely, *which* trend within it has been *most* to the benefit of rubbish, "string", i.e., to the benefit of *bourgeois-democratic* influences in the proletarian environment. All the "subtleties" of factional disputes, all the long vicissitudes of the struggle over various resolutions, slogans, etc.—all this "factionalism" (which is now so frequently being condemned by empty cries against "factionalism" that *encourage unprincipledness most of all*) turns on this fundamental and very serious question for Russian Social-Democracy: which trend within it has been the most subservient to bourgeois-democratic influences (which are inevitable to some extent at some time during the bourgeois revolution in Russia, just as they are inevitable in every capitalist country). Every trend in Social-Democracy inevitably receives the adherence of a greater or lesser number of not purely proletarian but semi-proletarian and semi-petty-bourgeois elements; the question is *which trend* is less subordinate to them, more rapidly rids itself of them, more successfully combats them. This is the question of the socialist, proletarian, Marxist Osip in relation to the liberal or anarchist, petty-bourgeois, anti-Marxist "bit of string".

Bolshevik Marxism, says Plekhanov, is a "more or less narrow and crudely conceived Marxism". The Menshevik variety, apparently, is "more or less broad and subtle". Let us look at the results of the revolution, at the results of *six* years of the history of the Social-Democratic movement (1903-09), and what six years they were! The Bolshevik Osips have already drawn a "general boundary" and "shown the door" to the Bolshevik petty-bourgeois "bit of string", which is now whining that it has been "ousted" and "removed".

The Menshevik Osip has proved to be a lone figure, who has resigned both from the official Menshevik editorial board and from the collective editorial board of the most important Menshevik work, a lone protester against "petty-bourgeois opportunism" and liquidationism, which reign *both* in the one *and* the other editorial board. The Menshevik Osip has proved to be *tied up* by the Menshevik "bit of string". He did not pick it up; it picked him up. He has not overpowered it, it has overpowered him.

Tell us, reader, would you prefer to be in the position of the Bolshevik Osip or the Menshevik Osip? Tell us, does that Marxism in the history of the workers' movement prove to be "narrow and crude" that is more firmly linked with the proletarian organisations and is more successfully coping with the petty-bourgeois "bit of string"?

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ON THE OPEN LETTER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MOSCOW REGIONAL COMMITTEE[13]

In connection with this resolution on the celebrated "school" we must remark that we do not make any accusation against the workers who have eagerly seized the opportunity to go abroad to study. These workers made "contact" both with us and with the Central Committee (in the letter just received and the Executive Committee of the Moscow Regional Committee writes that one of the students has already sent it a report as well) and we explained to them the significance of this so-called school. Incidentally, here are a few quotations from the hectographed "Report" of this school which was sent to us. "It has been decided to begin the courses with the students (nine comrades) and lecturers (six comrades) already here." Of these six lecturers the following are well-known to the Party: Maximov, Lunacharsky, Lyadov and Alexinsky. Comrade Alexinsky (at the opening of the school) "pointed out": "A certain place has been chosen as the venue of the school because many of the lecturers are there." Comrade Alexinsky is too modest: not "many" but *all* the lecturers of the *new faction* (some even say all the initiators, and organisers, and agitators, and functionaries) are "there". Finally: "Comrade Alexinsky opened the practical course on the organisational question." We venture to hope that a detailed explanation during this "practical" course is being given of the hints in Maximov's "Report" that the editorial board of *Proletary* is trying to get control over the property of the whole faction....

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THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG[14]

A COMMENT

The election in St. Petersburg has been fixed for September 21. The conditions which the workers' party has to contend with in this election are extraordinarily difficult. But it is an event of the highest importance and all Social-Democrats must exert every effort in the forthcoming election campaign, which in some respects has already begun.

The election is taking place in an atmosphere of the most rabid reaction, with the counter-revolutionary fury of the tsarist government gang raging in full force. All the more important then is it that this reaction should be opposed by the nomination put forward by the Social-Democratic Party, the only party which even from the platform of the Black-Hundred Third Duma has succeeded in raising its voice, declaring its unshakable socialist convictions, reiterating the slogans of the glorious revolutionary struggle, and unfurling the republican banner in the face of the Octobrist-Black-Hundred[15] heroes of counter-revolution and the liberal (Cadet)[16] ideologists and defenders of counter-revolution.

The election is taking place in conditions which entirely preclude the participation of the broad mass of the working class: the workers are excluded from the voters' lists, the ranks of the voters have been decimated by the triumphant aristocratic gang who carried out the coup d'état of June 3, 1907.[17] All the more important is it that there should come out before this audience, least capable of sympathising in general with the ideas of Social-Democracy, a party which combines the fight for socialism with the fight for a consistent and drastic democratic revolution in a bourgeois country. However restricted, however hampered the work

of the Social-Democratic Party has been of late among the working masses, this work has been carried on without a break. Hundreds of workers' groups and circles are upholding the traditions of the Social-Democratic Party, continuing its cause, training new proletarian fighters. Through their deputies, their agitators and their delegates, working-class Social-Democrats will now come forward before the mass of petty-bourgeois voters and remind them of the aims of real democracy which have been forgotten by the bourgeois-democratic parties and groups.

The election is taking place in a situation where the Social-Democratic Party and all working-class organisations whatsoever have been totally outlawed, where it is utterly impossible to hold meetings of workers, where the workers' press is totally banned, where the "opposition" is (through police measures) entirely monopolised by the Cadet Party, which has prostituted itself by a series of unprecedented acts of flunkeyism in the Black Duma and has helped the autocracy to raise money in Europe to spend on prisons and gallows, which has helped to stage the comedy of a constitutional autocracy for the benefit of the European capitalists. All the more important is it that this Cadet monopoly, fenced around by a forest of gallows, and "earned" by the unlimited grovelling of the liberals to tsarism, should be *broken*, broken at all costs, in full view of the masses who see the election, hear about the election, and who are following the chances of the candidates and the results of the election. If the most important thing for the bourgeois politicians in all countries, from the Russian Cadets to the "free-thinkers" of Germany or the bourgeois-democratic "radicals" in France, is to achieve an immediate success, to gain a parliamentary seat, the most important thing for a socialist party is propaganda and agitation among the masses, the most important thing is to advocate the ideas of socialism and of a consistent, self-denying struggle for complete democracy. And the success of this propaganda is very far from being measured solely by the number of votes, hand-picked under the law of June 3, which was passed by the gentlemen of the nobility.

Look at our Cadet press: with what amazing effrontery it uses its monopoly, earned by the accommodatingness of Milyukov and protected by Stolypin.[18] In its leading article

of August 1 *Rech*[19] says: "No one has any doubts as to the outcome of the St. Petersburg election.... If the nomination of Kutler,[20] who was one of the most authoritative deputies in the Second Duma, is fixed, the election victory will be even more imposing." To be sure it will! What could be more imposing" than a victory over the "Lefts" who have been "disqualified" by the Black-Hundred coup d'état? What could be more imposing than a victory over socialism which has to propagate its old ideals in the illegal press and illegal labour organisations, a victory of "democrats" whose democracy fits in easily with the Stolypin Constitution? Who can there be more "authoritative" in the eyes of the petty bourgeois, the philistine, in the eyes of the cowed citizen of Russia, than *ex-minister* Mr. Kutler? For the party of "people's freedom" the *prestige* of a deputy in the Duma is measured by his prestige in the eyes of Romanov, Stolypin and Co.

"We presume," continues *Rech* majestically, "that on this occasion there will be no purposeless splitting of votes between the progressive candidates as well. That is the sense of a statement made by V. V. Vodovozov, one of the representatives of the 'Left bloc'."

This little tirade reflects the whole nature of our Cadets as a drop of water reflects the sun. Splitting the votes is "to no purpose" (the Cadets no longer say it is dangerous in face of the Black Hundreds, because the stupid liberal fable of the Black-Hundred danger has been convincingly refuted by the revolutionary Social-Democrats and by events), why "to no purpose", gentlemen? Because our man *will not get in*, that is the first and last argument of the Cadets. Indeed, this is an *Octobrist* argument, dear opponents of Octobrism; this is the argument of *submission* to the law of June 3, the very same loving submission and joyful obedience for which you reproach the Octobrists! Your essential nature is such that prior to an election, when you come before the voters, before the crowd, you accuse the Octobrists of being incapable of carrying out a policy based on principle, of uttering opportunist phrases about "purposelessness", but *at* elections, *before* the authorities, before the tsar and Stolypin, you pursue the very same policy as the Octobrists. Since it is "purposeless" to vote against the budget—we shall vote for the budget. Since it is "purposeless" to uphold the ideals of

the revolution and freedom—we shall vilify them, we shall publish *Vekhi*,[21] we shall throw mud at the revolution, we shall hire as many renegades as possible—Izgoyevs, Galiches, Struves and so forth—to demonstrate our renunciation of the revolution. Since it is "purposeless" to fight against the autocracy receiving support from foreign capital—we shall help the autocracy to negotiate loans, we shall send Milyukov as a footman on the step of the royal coach of Nicholas the Bloody.

But if the phrase about an ideological struggle at the elections being "purposeless" is a true indication of the "ideological" nature of the Cadets, the next phrase is a model of downright election trickery. Exercising the monopoly of "His Majesty's Opposition",[22] *Rech* slandered, firstly, the Social-Democrats, who have never anywhere declared against splitting votes (and who—this is very important—*won over* the Trudoviks to their leadership in the famous Left bloc, won them over by the firm determination to put up a Social-Democratic candidate *at all costs*), and, secondly, the Trudovik[23] Vodovozov.

Apart from the leading article, there is an item in the issue of August 1 imputing to Vodovozov a statement that the electors have already declared for the Cadets, and that the Trudoviks must either vote for the Cadets or abstain. Only in its issue of August 6 does the organ of the party of "people's freedom" find an odd corner (underneath the "Country Life" column) for a letter from Mr. Vodovozov, who protests that he "*never said*" the words ascribed to him. *Rech* is not at all abashed by this and goes on to argue the point with Vodovozov. The deed is done, the reader has been deceived, the monopoly of the press permitted by the Stolypins has been utilised and that is all that matters. Finally in the issue of August 9 there is a couple of lines on the Social-Democratic candidate Sokolov and on the fact that many Trudoviks propose to vote for him. All that was reported in the leading article of August 1 concerning the Lefts proves to have been a canard....

The difficulties of the task confronting the Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg will not dismay them but will make them redouble their efforts. Not only all Party organisations, every workers' circle, every group of Social-Democratic

sympathisers in any section of the community—even if this group consists of two or three persons and is cut off from active political work, in the way that only Russian citizens can be cut off from politics in the epoch of the Stolypin Constitution—everyone can and must take part in the Social-Democratic election campaign. Some can draw up and distribute the election manifestoes of the Social-Democrats; others can help to circulate the Duma speeches of the Social-Democrats; some can organise a canvass of the electors in order to propagate Social-Democratic ideas and explain the aims of the Social-Democrats in the election campaign; others will speak at meetings of voters or at private meetings; still others can cull a bouquet of extracts from Cadet literature and Cadet speeches that will cure all honest democrats of any desire to vote for the Cadets; others ... but it is not for us in a newspaper published abroad to point out ways and means of agitation, ways and means will be found locally, in St. Petersburg, a hundred times richer, livelier and more varied. The members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma can, by virtue of their position, render particularly valuable services to the election campaign in St. Petersburg; here the Social-Democratic deputies have a particularly useful and particularly grateful part to play. No administrative prohibitions, no police traps, no confiscations of Social-Democratic literature, no arrests of Social-Democratic agitators can prevent the workers' party from doing its duty, namely, to make full use of the election campaign to spread among the masses the whole, undiluted programme of the socialist proletariat, the vanguard in the Russian democratic revolution.

P. S. This article had been sent to press when we read in *Rech* of August 13 the following extremely important news item: "On August 13 the Trudoviks held their first meeting devoted to the Duma election.... It was unanimously decided to support the candidature of the Social-Democrat Sokolov, and *it was resolved not to make this support depend on any political obligations*." Needless to say, the Social-Democrats could not accept support on any other conditions.

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THE FACTION OF SUPPORTERS OF OTZOVISM AND GOD-BUILDING

Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev have issued a special leaflet entitled "Report of the Members Removed from the Enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* to the Bolshevik Comrades." Our victims of removal most bitterly complain to the public of the wrongs suffered by them at the hands of the editorial board and how it removed them.

To show the party of the working class what kind of people these bitterly complaining victims of removal are, let us first of all examine the principles embodied in their leaflet. The reader knows, from *Proletary* No. 46 and the supplement to it, that the Conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* adjudged Comrade Maximov to be one of the organisers of a new faction in our Party, a faction with which Bolshevism has nothing in common, and it disclaimed "all responsibility for the political actions of Comrade Maximov".[24] It is evident from the resolutions of the Conference that the fundamental issue of divergence with the new faction that has broken away from the Bolsheviks (or rather, with Maximov and his friends) is, firstly, otzovism and ultimatumism; secondly, god-building. The attitude of the Bolshevik group to both trends is set out in three detailed resolutions.

What now do the bitterly complaining victims of removal say in reply?

I

Let us begin with otzovism. Our victims of removal sum up the parliamentary or Duma experience of the past years, justify the boycott of the Bulygin and Witte Dumas, as

well as the participation in the Second Duma, and continue:

> "At a time of acute and increasing reaction all this changes again. The Party cannot then carry out a big and spectacular election campaign, nor obtain worth-while parliamentary representation."

The first phrase with an independent idea not copied from old Bolshevik publications at once reveals to us the abysmal political thoughtlessness of the otzovists. Just reflect for a moment, good souls, at a time of acute and increasing reaction is it possible for the Party to organise in a "big and spectacular" way the "training groups and schools" for *boyeviks*[24a] that you speak about on the very same page, in the very same column of your literary production? Reflect for a moment, good souls, can the Party obtain "worth-while representation" in such schools? If you could think, if you were at all capable of political judgement, O you unjustly removed ones, you would see what absolute nonsense you are talking. Instead of *thinking* politically, you pin your faith to a "*spectacular*" signboard and so find yourselves in the role of Simple Simons of the Party. You babble about "training schools" and "intensifying [!] propaganda in the armed forces" (ibid.) because, like all the political infants in the camp of the otzovists and ultimatumists, you consider such activities to be particularly "spectacular", but you are incapable of thinking about the conditions for applying these forms of activity in practice (and not in words). You have *memorised* fragments of Bolshevik phrases and slogans but your *understanding* of them is precisely nil. "At a time of acute and increasing reaction" all work is *difficult* for the Party, but however great the difficulties, it is still *possible* to obtain worth-while parliamentary representation. This is proved too, for instance, by the experience of the German Social-Democrats in a period of "acute and increasing reaction" as during the introduction of the Anti-Socialist Law.[25] By denying this possibility Maximov and Co. only reveal their class political ignorance. To advocate "training schools" and "*intensification* of propaganda in the armed forces" "at a time of acute and increasing reaction" and at the same time to deny the possibility of the Party having worthwhile parliamentary representation is to utter obvious

incongruities which deserve to be published in an anthology of logical absurdities for junior high-school boys. Both training schools and the intensification of propaganda in the armed forces presuppose an inevitable violation of the old laws, breaking through these laws, whereas parliamentary activity by no means necessarily, or at any rate much more rarely, presupposes a breach of the old laws by the new social forces. Now reflect, good souls, when is it easier to force a breach of the old laws: at a time of acute and increasing reaction or when the movement is on the upgrade? Reflect, O unjustly removed ones, and be ashamed of the nonsense you utter in defending the otzovists, who are so dear to you.

Further. Which activity presupposes a wider scope for the energy of the masses, greater influence of the masses on immediate political life—parliamentary activity within the laws framed by the old regime, or propaganda among the troops, which at one stroke directly undermines this regime's material force? Reflect, good souls, and you will see that parliamentary activity takes second place in this respect. And what follows from this? It follows that the stronger the immediate movement of the masses, and the greater the scope of their energy, in other words: the more one can speak of an "acute and increasing" revolutionary onslaught of the people and not of "acute and increasing reaction", *all the more* possible, certain and successful will become both propaganda among the troops and militant actions that are really connected with the mass movement and are not merely the adventurism of unrestrained *boyeviks*. That, O unjustly removed ones, was the reason why Bolshevism could so powerfully develop both militant activities and propaganda among the troops in the period of "acute and increasing" revolutionary upsurge; that was the reason why the Bolsheviks could (beginning from 1907) dissociate, and by 1909 did completely dissociate their group from the *boyevism* that at a time of "acute and increasing reaction" *degenerated*, inevitably degenerated, into adventurism.

But with these heroes of ours, who have learned by heart fragments of Bolshevik phrases, it is the other way round. The highest forms of struggle, which have never anywhere in the world succeeded without a direct onslaught of the masses, are put in the forefront and recommended as "feasi-

ble" at a time of acute reaction, while the lower forms of struggle, which presuppose not so much a direct breach of the law by mass struggle as *utilisation* of the law for the purpose of propaganda and agitation, *preparing the minds* of the masses for struggle, are declared "unfeasible"!!

The otzovists and their "removed" echoers have heard, and committed to memory, that the Bolsheviks regard direct struggle of the masses, drawing into motion even the troops (i.e., the most obdurate section of the population, the slowest to move and most protected against propaganda, etc.) and converting armed outbreaks into the real beginning of an uprising, as the highest form of the movement, and parliamentary activity without the direct action of the masses as the lowest form of the movement. The otzovists and their echoers, such as Maximov, heard this and learned it by heart, but they did not understand it, and so disgraced themselves. The highest form—that means the most "spectacular"—thinks the otzovist and Comrade Maximov. Well, then, I'll raise a highly "spectacular" cry, that should produce the most revolutionary result of all. As for the meaning of it, that can be left to the devil!

Now listen to some more of Maximov's ideas (we continue the quotation from where we left off):

> "The mechanical force of reaction severs the connection of the already existing Party faction with the masses and makes it terribly difficult for the Party to influence them, with the result that this representative body is unable to conduct sufficiently broad and deep organisational and propaganda work in the interests of the Party. If the Party itself is weakened there is not excluded even the danger of degeneration of the faction and its deviation from the main line of Social-Democracy...."

In very truth, isn't that supremely pretty? When it is a matter of the lower, legal forms of struggle they try to frighten us: "the mechanical force of reaction", "unable to conduct sufficiently broad work", "the danger of degeneration". But when it is a matter of the higher forms of the class struggle, which force a breach in the old laws, the "mechanical force of reaction" disappears, there is no "inability" to conduct "sufficiently broad" work among the troops, and the "danger of degeneration" of training groups and schools, please observe, is altogether out of the question!

There you have the best justification of the editorial board of *Proletary*, why it had to *remove* political leaders who spread *such* ideas among the masses.

Get this into your heads, O unjustly removed ones: when the conditions of acute and increasing reaction are really present, when the mechanical force of this reaction really severs the connection with the masses, makes sufficiently broad work difficult and weakens the Party, it is then that the specific task of the Party becomes to master the parliamentary weapon of struggle; and that, O unjustly removed ones, is not because parliamentary struggle is higher than any other forms of struggle; no, it is just because it is *lower* than them, lower, for example, than a struggle which draws into the mass movement *even* the armed forces, which gives rise to mass strikes, uprisings, etc. Then why does mastery of the lowest form of struggle become the specific (i.e., distinguishing the present moment from other moments) task of the Party? Because the stronger the mechanical force of reaction and the weaker the connection with the masses, the more immediate becomes the task of preparing the minds of the masses (and not the task of direct action), the more immediate becomes the task of *utilising* the methods of propaganda and agitation *created by the old regime* (and not a direct onslaught of the masses against this old regime).

II

For any Marxist who has at all pondered over the philosophy of Marx and Engels, for any Social-Democrat who is at all acquainted with the history of the international socialist movement, this conversion of one of the lowest forms of struggle into the specific weapon of struggle of a special historic moment contains nothing surprising. The anarchists have absolutely never been able to understand this simple thing. Now our otzovists and their removed echoers are trying to introduce anarchist modes of thought among Russian Social-Democrats, crying out (like Maximov and Co.) that *Proletary* is dominated by the theory of "*parliamentarism at any price*".

To show how stupid and un-Social-Democratic these outcries of Maximov and Co. are, we shall once more have to

begin with the ABC. Just reflect, O unjustly removed ones, what is the specific difference between the policy and tactics of the German Social-Democrats and those of the socialist workers' parties in other countries? The utilisation of parliamentarism; the conversion of bourgeois Junker (approximate Russian equivalent: Octobrist-Black-Hundred) parliamentarism into an instrument for the socialist education and organisation of the mass of the workers. Does this mean that parliamentarism is the highest form of struggle of the socialist proletariat? Anarchists the world over think it does mean that. Does it mean that the German Social-Democrats stand for parliamentarism at any price? Anarchists the world over think it does mean that, and hence there is no enemy more hateful to them than German Social-Democracy, there is no target they love to aim at more than the German Social-Democrats. And in Russia, when our Socialist-Revolutionaries begin to flirt with the anarchists and advertise their own "revolutionary militancy" they never fail-to drag in real or imaginary errors of the German Social-Democrats, and draw conclusions from them to the detriment of Social-Democracy.

Now let us go further. In what lies the fallacy of the anarchists' argument? It lies in the fact that, owing to their radically incorrect ideas of the course of social development, they are unable to take into account those peculiarities of the concrete political (and economic) situation in different countries which determine the specific significance of one or another means of struggle *for a given period of time*. In point of fact the German Social-Democrats, far from standing for parliamentarism at any price, not only do not subordinate everything to parliamentarism, but, on the contrary, in the international army of the proletariat they best of all have developed such extra-parliamentary means of struggle as the socialist press, the trade unions, the systematic use of popular assemblies, the socialist education of youth, and so on and so forth.

What is the point then? The point is that a combination of a number of historic conditions has made parliamentarism a *specific* weapon of struggle for Germany over a *given period*, not the chief one, not the highest, not of prime and essential importance in comparison with other forms, but merely

specific, the most characteristic in comparison with other countries. Hence, the ability to use parliamentarism *has proved to be a symptom* (not a condition but a symptom) of exemplary organisation of the *entire* socialist movement, in *all* its branches, which we have enumerated above.

Let us turn from Germany to Russia. Anyone who presumed to draw an exact parallel between the conditions in these two countries would be guilty of a number of gross errors. But try to put the question as a Marxist is bound to do: what is the specific peculiarity of the policy and tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats at the present time? We must preserve and strengthen the illegal Party—just as before the revolution. We must steadily prepare the masses for a new revolutionary crisis—as in the years 1897-1903. We must strengthen to the utmost the Party's ties with the masses, develop and utilise all kinds of workers' organisations for the furtherance of the socialist cause, as has always been the practice of all Social-Democratic parties. The specific peculiarity of the moment is, namely, that the old autocracy is making an attempt (an unsuccessful attempt) to solve new historic problems with the help of the Octobrist-Black-Hundred Duma. Hence, the specific tactical task of the Social-Democrats is to use this Duma for *their own* purposes, for spreading the ideas of revolution and socialism. The point is not that this specific task is particularly lofty, that it opens grand vistas, or that it equals or even approaches in importance the tasks which faced the proletariat in, say, the period of 1905-06. No. The point is that it is a special feature of the tactics of the present moment, marking its distinction from the period that is past or from that which is yet to come (for this coming period will *certainly* bring us specific tasks, more complex, more lofty, more interesting than that of utilising the Third Duma). We cannot be equal to the present situation, we cannot solve the whole assemblage of problems with which it confronts the Social-Democratic Party, unless we solve this specific problem of the moment, unless we convert the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma into an *instrument* for Social-Democratic propaganda.

The otzovist windbags, taking their cue from the Bolsheviks, talk, for instance, of taking account of the experience of the revolution. But they do not understand what they

are talking about. They do not understand that taking account of the experience of the revolution *includes* defending the ideals and aims and methods of the revolution *from inside the Duma*. If we do not know how to *defend* these ideals, aims and methods from inside the Duma, through our working-class Party members who might enter and those who have already entered this Duma, it means that we are unable to make the *first* step towards politically taking account of the experience of the revolution (for what we are concerned with here is of course not a theoretical summing up of experience in books and researches). Our task is by no means ended by this first step. Incomparably more important than the first step will be the second and third steps, i.e., the conversion of the experience already gained by the masses into ideological stock-in-trade for new historic action. But if these otzovist windbags themselves speak of an "inter-revolutionary" period they should have understood (if they were able to think and reason things out in a Social-Democratic way) that "inter-revolutionary" signifies precisely that *elementary*, *preliminary tasks come on the order of the day*. "Inter-revolutionary" denotes an unsettled, indefinite situation when the old regime has become convinced that it is impossible to rule with the old instruments alone and *tries* to use a *new* instrument within the general framework of the old institutions. This is an internally contradictory, futile attempt, in which the autocracy is once more going towards inevitable failure, is once more leading us to a repetition of the glorious period and glorious battles of 1905. But it is going *not in the same way as* in 1897-1903, it is *leading* the people to revolution *not in the same way* as before 1905. It is this "not in the same way" that we must be able to understand; we must be able to modify our tactics, *supplementing* all the basic, general, primary and cardinal tasks of revolutionary Social-Democracy by one more task, not very ambitious, but a specific task of the present new period: the task of utilising the Black-Hundred Duma in a revolutionary Social-Democratic way.

Like any new task it seems more difficult than the others, because it requires of people not a simple repetition of slogans learned by heart (beyond which Maximov and the otzovists are mentally bankrupt), but a certain amount of initia-

tive, flexibility of mind, resourcefulness and independent work on a *novel* historical task. But in actual fact this task can appear particularly difficult only to people who are incapable of independent thought and independent effort: actually this task, like every specific task of a given moment, is easier than others because its solvability is determined entirely by the conditions of the given moment. In a period of "acute and increasing reaction" to solve the problem of organising "training schools and groups" in a really serious way, i.e., one that really connects them with the mass movement, that really subordinates them to it, is *quite impossible*, for it is a task set stupidly by people who have *copied* the formulation of it from a good pamphlet, which was based on the conditions of a *different* period. But to solve the problem of subordinating the speeches, actions and policy of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma to the mass party and the interests of the masses *is possible*. It is not easy, compared with the "easy" matter of repeating things learned by heart, but it *can be done*. However we exert all the forces of the Party now, we cannot solve the problem of a Social-Democratic (and not anarchist) organisation of "training schools" at the present "inter-revolutionary" moment, for the solution of this problem requires altogether different historical conditions. On the contrary, by exerting all our forces we shall solve (and we are already *beginning to solve*) the problem of utilising the Third Duma in a revolutionary Social-Democratic way. And we shall do so, O you otzovists and ultimatumists wronged by removal and the harshness of God, not in order to put parliamentarism on some high pedestal, not to proclaim "parliamentarism at any price", but in order, *after* the solution of the "inter-revolutionary" problem, corresponding to the present "inter-revolutionary" period, to *proceed* to the solution of loftier revolutionary problems, which will correspond to the higher, i.e., more revolutionary period of tomorrow.

III

These stupid outcries of Maximov and Co. about the Bolsheviks' standing for "parliamentarism at any price", sound particularly queer in view of the actual history of

otzovism. What is queer is that the shout about exaggerated parliamentarism should come from the very people who have developed and are developing a special trend *exclusively* over the question of their attitude to parliamentarism! What do you call yourselves, dear Maximov and Co.? You call yourselves "otzovists", "ultimatumists", "boycottists". Maximov to this day is so proud of being a boycottist of the Third Duma that he can't get over it, and his rare Party utterances are invariably accompanied by the signature: "Reporter on behalf of the boycottists at the July Conference of 1907."[26] One writer in olden times used to sign himself: "Substantive state councillor and cavalier." Maximov signs himself: "Reporter on behalf of the boycottists"—he, too, is a cavalier, you see!

In the political situation of June 1907, when Maximov advocated the boycott, the mistake was still quite a small one. But when Maximov comes out in July 1909 with a manifesto of sorts and persists in admiring his "boycottism" in regard to the Third Duma, it is downright stupidity. Boycottism, otzovism and ultimatumism—all these expressions in themselves imply the formation of a *trend* over the question of the attitude to parliamentarism and *exclusively* over this question. To make a separate stand on this question, to persist (two years after the Party has settled it in principle!) in this separate stand, is a sign of unparalleled narrow-mindedness. It is just those who behave in this way, i.e., the "boycottists" (of 1909) and the otzovists and the ultimatumists, who prove *thereby* that they do not think like Social-Democrats, that they are putting parliamentarism on a special pedestal, that exactly like the anarchists they make a *trend* out of isolated formulas: boycott that Duma, recall your men from that Duma, present an ultimatum to that group in the Duma. To act like that is to be a caricature of a Bolshevik. Among Bolsheviks the trend is determined by their *common* attitude to the Russian revolution and the Bolsheviks have emphatically declared a thousand times (as it were to forewarn political infants) that to identify Bolshevism with boycottism or *boyevism* is a stupid distortion and vulgarisation of the views of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Our view that Social-Democratic participation in the Third Duma is obligatory, for

instance, follows *inevitably* from our attitude to the present moment, to the attempts of the autocracy to take a step forward along the path of creating a bourgeois monarchy, to the significance of the Duma as an organisation of counter-revolutionary classes in a representative institution on a national scale. Just as the anarchists display an inverted parliamentary cretinism when they *separate* the question of parliament from the whole question of bourgeois society in general and try to create a trend from outcries against bourgeois parliamentarism (although criticism of bourgeois parliamentarism is in principle on the same level as criticism of the bourgeois press, bourgeois syndicalism and so forth), so our otzovists, ultimatumists and boycottists, in exactly the same way, display inverted Menshevism when they *form a separate* trend on the question of the attitude to the Duma, on the question of methods of combating deviations on the part of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma (and not the deviations of bourgeois literati, who come into the Social-Democratic movement incidentally, and so on).

The climax of this inverted parliamentary cretinism is reached in the famous argument of the leader of the Moscow otzovists whom Maximov is shielding: the recall of the Duma group should serve to *emphasise* that the revolution is not dead and buried! And Maximov with pure and unruffled brow does not hesitate to declare publicly: "the otzovists have never (of course, *never*!) expressed anti-parliamentary sentiments at all."

This shielding of the otzovists by Maximov and Co. is one of the most characteristic features of the new faction and we must dwell on it in all the more detail because the unenlightened public is all too often taken in by our bitterly complaining removed ones. It consists firstly in the fact that Maximov and Co. are forever beating their breasts and protesting: we are not otzovists, we do not share the opinions of the otzovists at all! Secondly, Maximov and Co. accuse the Bolsheviks of *exaggerating* the fight against the otzovists. It is an *exact* repetition of the story of the attitude of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists (in the years 1897-1901) to the adherents of *Rabochaya Mysl*. "We are not Economists,"[27] cried the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, beating their breasts, "we do not share the views of *Rabochaya Mysl*, we are carrying

on a controversy with them (in just the same way as Maximov carried on a 'controversy' with the otzovists!), it is only those wicked Iskrists who have brought a false charge against us, slandered us, 'exaggerated' Economism, etc., etc." Thus among the supporters of *Rabochaya Mysl*—frank and honest Economists—there were not a few people who had genuinely gone astray, who had the courage of their convictions, whom it was impossible not to respect—while the *Rabocheye Dyelo* clique abroad specialised in definite intrigues, in covering up their tracks, in playing hide-and-seek and deceiving the public. The consistent and declared otzovists (like Vsev,[28] and Stan,[29] who are well known in Party circles) stand in exactly the same relation to Maximov's clique abroad.

We are not otzovists, cry the members of this clique. But make any of them say a few words about the contemporary political situation and the tasks of the Party and you will hear in full all the otzovist arguments, slightly watered down (as we have seen in the case of Maximov) by Jesuitical reservations, additions, suppressions, mitigations, confusions, etc. Your Jesuitry, O unjustly removed ones, cannot acquit you of the charge of otzovist stupidity, but aggravates your guilt tenfold, for an ideological confusion that is concealed is a hundred times more corrupting to the proletariat, a hundred times more harmful to the Party.*

We are not otzovists, cry Maximov and Co. Yet after June 1908, when he resigned from the small editorial board of *Proletary*, Maximov formed an official opposition inside the collegium, demanded and obtained freedom of discussion for this opposition, demanded and obtained special representation for the opposition in the organisation's chief executive bodies responsible for the circulation of the newspaper. It goes without saying that ever since that time,

* A little example which, by the way, serves to illustrate Maximov's assertion that only *Proletary* is spreading tales about the ultimatumists out of spite. In the autumn of 1908 Alexinsky appeared at the congress of the Polish Social-Democrats and there proposed an *ultimatumist* resolution. This was *before* "*Proletary*" embarked on a determined campaign against the new faction. And what happened? The Polish Social-Democrats ridiculed Alexinsky and his resolution, telling him: "You are nothing more than a cowardly otzovist."

i.e., for over a year all the otzovists have been in the ranks of this opposition, have jointly organised an agency in Russia, have jointly adapted the school abroad (of which more below) for the purposes of an agency, and so on and so forth.

We are not otzovists—cry Maximov and Co. Yet at the All-Russian Party Conference in December 1908, when the more honest otzovists of this opposition came out before the whole Party as a separate group, as a specific ideological trend, and, as such, received the right to put forward their spokesman (the Conference had decided that only separate ideological trends or separate organisations—time being short—could be represented by a separate spokesman), the *spokesman* from the otzovist faction—by sheer accident! sheer accident!—was *Comrade Maximov*....

This deception of the Party by harbouring otzovism is systematically pursued by Maximov's group abroad. In May 1908 otzovism suffered defeat in open battle: it was outvoted by 18 to 14 at the general city conference in Moscow (in July 1907, in this district almost all the Social-Democrats without exception were boycottists but, unlike Maximov, by June 1908 they had the sense to understand that it would be unpardonable stupidity to insist on "boycotting" the Third Duma). *After* this, Comrade Maximov organised abroad an official opposition to *Proletary* and began a controversy in the columns of the Bolshevik periodical, something which had never been practised before. Finally, in the *autumn* of 1908 when the *whole* St. Petersburg organisation divided into otzovists and non-zovists (the term coined by the workers) during the election of delegates to the All-Russian Conference, when discussions were held in *all* districts and subdistricts of St. Petersburg, not on the platform of Bolsheviks versus Mensheviks but on that of otzovists versus non-zovists, the *otzovists hid their platform from the eyes of the public*. It was not communicated to *Proletary*. It was not released for the press. It was not communicated to the Party at the All-Russian Conference of December 1908. *Only after the Conference*, on the insistent demand of the editorial board, was it communicated to us and we printed it in *Proletary* No. 44. ("Resolution of the St. Petersburg Otzovists".)

A well-known otzovist leader in Moscow Region "edited" an article by an otzovist worker, which was published in *Rabocheye Znamya*[30] No. 5, but we have still not received this leader's own platform. We know perfectly well that in the spring of 1909 when the regional conference of the Central Industrial Region was in preparation the otzovist leader's platform was being read and passed from hand to hand. We know from the reports of Bolsheviks that there were incomparably more gems of un-Social-Democratic thought in this platform than in the St. Petersburg platform. *But we were never supplied with the text of the platform*, probably for reasons just as accidental, purely accidental, as those which caused Maximov to address the conference as the spokesman of the otzovist faction.

The question of utilising legal opportunities, too, Maximov and Co. covered up by a "smooth" phrase: "It is taken for granted." It would be interesting to know if "it is taken for granted" now also by the practical leaders of the Maximov faction, *Comrade Lyadov and Stanislav*, *who only three months ago* caused a resolution *to be passed* in the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region, which was then in their hands (the same Regional Bureau which endorsed the famous "school"; the membership of this Bureau has changed since), *against Social-Democratic participation in the congress of factory doctors*.[31] As we know this was the first congress at which the revolutionary Social-Democrats were in the majority. Yet all the prominent otzovists and ultimatumists campaigned against participation in this congress, declaring that it would be "treason to the cause of the proletariat" to take part in it. And Maximov covers up his tracks—"it is taken for granted". We may "take it for granted" that the franker otzovists and ultimatumists are openly disrupting practical work in Russia, while Maximov and Co. who are hankering for the laurels of Krichevsky and Martynov,[32] obscure the point at issue: there are no differences of opinion, no one is opposed to the idea of utilising legal opportunities.

The restoration of the Party bodies abroad, the foreign groups for the organisation of connections, etc., leads inevitably to a repetition of the old abuses which must be combated most relentlessly. It is a complete repetition of the

history of the Economists, who in Russia carried on a campaign against political action while they sheltered themselves abroad behind *Rabocheye Dyelo*. It is a complete repetition of the history of the bourgeois-democratic "Credo" (Credo—a symbol of faith), which was advocated in Russia by Prokopovich and Co. and was made public in the revolutionary Social-Democratic press *against the will of the authors*. Nothing could have a more demoralising influence on the Party than this game of hide-and-seek, this exploitation of the onerous conditions of illegal work to hold things back from Party publicity, this Jesuitry of Maximov and Co., who, while operating *wholly and in every respect* hand in glove with the otzovists, in print beat their breasts and declare that all this business of otzovism is a deliberate exaggeration on the part of *Proletary*.

We are not pettifoggers, we are not formalists, but revolutionaries. What matters to us is not the verbal distinctions which might be drawn between otzovism, ultimatumism, and "boycottism" (of the Third Duma), but the actual content of Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation. And if views which have nothing in common with Bolshevism nor with Social-Democracy in general are being propagated in illegal Russian circles under the mask of Bolshevism, those persons who are hindering a full exposure of these views and a full explanation of their falsity before the whole Party are acting as enemies of the proletariat.

IV

These people have also disclosed themselves on the question of god-building. The enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* adopted and published two resolutions on this question: one on the principle involved, the other with special reference to Maximov's protest. The question arises, what does this same Maximov say now in his "Report"? He writes his "Report" in order to cover up his tracks exactly in the style of the diplomat who said that language was given to man so as to hide his thoughts.[33] We are told that "wrong information" is being spread about the "so-called god-building" trend of Maximov's clique, and that is all.

"Wrong information" do you say? Oh no, my dear fellow, it is just because you know perfectly well that the "information" in *Proletary* on god-building is absolutely correct that you have been covering up the tracks. You know perfectly well that this "information", as is stated in the published resolution, refers primarily to the literary productions emanating from *your* literary clique. These literary productions are very exactly *specified* in our resolution; one thing alone being omitted, which could not be added in the resolution, namely, that for about a year and a half the strongest resentment against the "god-building" of your confrères has been expressed in leading Bolshevik circles, and it is on these grounds (besides those stated above) that the new faction of caricature Bolsheviks has been poisoning for us, by means of evasions, artifices, pin-pricks, objections and quibbles, every opportunity of working. One of the most notable of these quibbles is particularly well known to Maximov because it was a *protest* in writing lodged in due form with the editors of *Proletary* against the publication of an article entitled "Our Ways Part" (*Proletary* No. 42). Perhaps this too is "wrong information", O unjustly removed ones? Perhaps this too was only a "so-called protest"?

No, let me tell you that the policy of covering up tracks does not always succeed and you will never succeed with it in our Party. It is no use playing hide-and-seek and by putting on airs trying to make a secret of something which everybody knows who takes an interest in Russian literature and Russian Social-Democracy. There is a literary clique who, with the help of several bourgeois publishers, are flooding our legal literature with systematic propaganda of god-building. Maximov too belongs to this clique. This propaganda has become systematic precisely in the past eighteen months, when the Russian bourgeoisie for its counter-revolutionary purposes felt a need to revive religion, increase the demand for religion, invent religion, inoculate the people with religion or strengthen the hold of religion on them in new forms. Hence the preaching of god-building has acquired a social, political character. Just as the bourgeois press in the period of the revolution fondled and petted the most zealous of the Mensheviks for their pro-Cadetism, so in the period of counter-revolution the bourgeois press is

fondling and petting the god-builders in the ranks—it is no joke!—in the ranks of the Marxists and even in the ranks of the "also-Bolsheviks". And when the official organ of Bolshevism stated in an editorial that Bolshevism had *nothing in common* with such propaganda (this statement was issued in the press after endless persuasion in letters and personal conversations had failed to stop this disgraceful propaganda), Comrade Maximov lodged a formal, written protest with the editorial board of *Proletary*. He, Maximov, had been elected by the London Congress,[34] hence his "acquired right" was being violated by those who dared to officially repudiate the disgraceful doctrine of god-building. "Why, is our faction in bondage to the god-building literati?" This was the remark that *Comrade Marat*[35] let slip during a stormy scene in the editorial office—yes, yes, the very same Comrade Marat who is so modest, so well-meaning, so peaceable and so good-hearted that he cannot properly decide to this very day whether to go with the Bolsheviks or the godly otzovists.

Or is this perhaps also a piece of "wrong information", O unjustly removed Maximov? There is no clique of god-building literati, you never defended them, you never protested against the article "Our Ways Part"? eh?

Of "wrong information" on the god-building trend Comrade Maximov speaks in his "Report" concerning the *school abroad* which is being held by the new faction. Comrade Maximov is so emphatic about this being "the *first* [Maximov's italics] Party school to be held abroad" and is so bent on misleading the public on this question, that we shall have to speak of the notorious "school" in greater detail.

Comrade Maximov bitterly complains:

> "Not a single attempt, not only to lend support to the school but even to take control over it, was made by the editorial board (of *Proletary*); while spreading false information about the school derived from unknown sources, the editorial board did not address a single enquiry to the organisers of the school to verify this information. Such was the attitude of the editorial board to the whole affair."

So. So. "Not a single attempt even to take control over the school."... In this phrase Maximov's Jesuitry goes so far that it exposes itself.

Remember, reader, Yerogin's hostel in the period of the First Duma. A retired rural superintendent (or some bureau-

cratic knight of the same nature) Yerogin opened a hostel in St. Petersburg for peasant deputies coming in from the country, his desire being to lend support to the "plans of the government". The inexperienced peasants on arriving in the capital were intercepted by Yerogin's agents and directed to Yerogin's hostel, where, of course, they found a *school* in which the heretical doctrines of the "Lefts" were refuted, in which the Trudoviks, etc., were covered with obloquy, and in which the new-fledged Duma members were schooled in "true Russian" statecraft. Fortunately, since the State Duma was held in St. Petersburg it was in St. Petersburg that Yerogin had to organise his hostel, and as St. Petersburg is a centre with a fair breadth and freedom of ideological and political life Yerogin's deputies, of course, very soon began to desert Yerogin's hostel and transfer to the camp of the Trudoviks or the independent deputies. Thus Yerogin's little intrigue resulted only in disgrace, both for himself and the government.

Now imagine, reader, that a Yerogin hostel like this is organised, not in some foreign St. Petersburg, but in some foreign equivalent of Tsarevokokshaisk.[36] If you grant this hypothesis, you will have to agree that the otzovist-god-building Yerogins have used their knowledge of Europe to prove themselves more cunning than the true-blue Russian Yerogin. People calling themselves Bolsheviks set up an exchequer of their own—independent of what, as far as we know, is the one and only general Bolshevik exchequer, out of which comes the cost of publishing and circulating *Proletary*—organised an agency of their own, shipped some of "their" agitators to Tsarevokokshaisk, sent out there some workers belonging to the Social-Democratic Party and proclaimed this (hidden away from the Party in Tsarevokokshaisk) Yerogin hostel the "*first* Party" (party, because it is hidden from the Party) "school abroad".

We hasten to make the reservation—since the removed Comrade Maximov has so vigorously raised the question whether his removal was regular or irregular (of this, later)—that there is nothing at all "irregular" in the actions of the otzovist-god-building Yerogins. Nothing whatsoever. Everything there is quite regular. It is quite regular for kindred spirits in a party to form a group together. It is quite

regular for these kindred spirits to collect a fund and start some joint enterprise of propaganda and agitation. It is quite regular that in this instance they should wish to choose as the form of their enterprise, say, not a newspaper, but a "school". It is quite regular that they should consider it an official Party affair, so long as it is organised by members of the Party and so long as there is a Party organisation, no matter which, assuming political and ideological responsibility for the enterprise. Everything is quite regular here and everything would be quite all right if ... if there were no Jesuitry, no hypocrisy, no deception of your own Party.

Is it not a deception of the Party if you publicly emphasise that the school is a Party affair, i.e., if you restrict yourself to the question of its formal legitimacy and *do not give the names* of the initiators and organisers of the school, i.e., you keep silent about the ideological and political trend of the school as the undertaking of a *new faction* in our Party? There have been two "documents" about this school in the possession of the editors of *Proletary* (for over a year now relations between the editorial board and Maximov have been carried on entirely through the medium of "documents" and diplomatic notes). The first document bore no signature, nobody's signature at all. It was merely an abstract statement of the virtue of education and the educational value of institutions called schools. The second document was signed by figure-heads. Now, coming out in print before the public with praise of the "first Party school abroad" Comrade Maximov, as before, *keeps silent* about the *factional* character of the school.

This policy of Jesuitry is harmful to the Party. We shall expose this "policy". The initiators and organisers of the school are *in actual fact* Comrades "Er"[37] (thus we will name the leader the Moscow otzovists well known to all Party members, who delivered lectures on the school, organised a circle of pupils and was appointed to the roster of lecturers by several workers' circles), Maximov, Lunacharsky, Lyadov, Alexinsky *and so on and so forth*. We do not know and we are not interested in knowing what particular part was played by one or other of the abovementioned comrades, what places they occupy in the various official institutions of the school, in its "Council", "execu-

tive commission", collegium of lecturers, etc. We do not know which "non-factional" comrades might supplement this clique in one or another particular case. All this is quite unimportant. What we assert is that the *actual* ideological and political trend of this school, as a new factional centre, is *determined* **precisely** by the names enumerated and that by concealing this from the Party Maximov is conducting a policy of Jesuitry. What is bad is not that a new factional centre has come into being in the Party—we by no means belong to the class of people who are not averse to making a little political capital out of cheap and fashionable outcries against factionalism—on the contrary, it is a good thing that a distinctive shade of opinion, once it exists, should be able to have its special expression in the Party. What is bad is the deception of the Party and the workers who—naturally—sympathise with the idea of any *school*, as they do with any educational undertaking.

Is it not hypocrisy when Comrade Maximov complains to the public that the editorial board of *Proletary* had not "even" ("*even*!") the desire "to take control over the school"? Only think: in June *1908* Comrade Maximov left the small editorial board of *Proletary*; since that time internal strife has gone on almost continuously in a *thousand* different forms in the Bolshevik group; Alexinsky abroad, "Er" and Co. abroad and in Russia, repeat after Maximov all the arrant nonsense of the otzovists and god-builders against *Proletary* in a thousand different tones. Maximov lodges written and formal protests against the article "Our Ways Part"; everybody who knows anything of Party affairs if only by hearsay speaks of a coming inevitable split in the ranks of the Bolsheviks (it suffices to point out that the *Menshevik Dan* at the All-Russian Conference of December 1908 declared for all to hear, at an official gathering: "Who does not know that the Bolsheviks are now accusing Lenin of betraying Bolshevism"!)—yet Comrade Maximov, playing the role of an innocent, absolutely innocent, child, asks the honourable public, why is it that the editorial board of *Proletary* did not "even" want to take control over a Party school in god-building Tsarevokokshaisk? "Control" over the school! Supporters of *Proletary* in the capacity of "*inspectors*", sitting in at the lectures of Maximov, Lunacharsky, Ale-

xinsky and Co.!! Come now, why do you play this unbecoming, this disgraceful farce? For what purpose? Why throw dust in the eyes of the public by circulating meaningless "programmes" and "reports" of the "school" instead of admitting frankly and openly who are the ideological leaders and inspirers of the new factional centre!

For what purpose?—we shall answer this question presently, but first let us finish with the question of the school: There is room for Tsarevokokshaisk in St. Petersburg and it can be transferred (most of it, anyway) to St. Petersburg, but St. Petersburg can neither be accommodated in nor transferred to Tsarevokokshaisk. The more energetic and independent of the students at the new Party school will manage to find their way from the narrow new faction to the broad Party, from the "science" of the otzovists and god-builders to the science of Social-Democracy in general and Bolshevism in particular. As for those who prefer to limit themselves to a Yerogin education, nothing can be done with them. The editorial board of *Proletary* is prepared to give and will give *every possible* assistance to *all* workers, whatever their views, if they want to migrate (or travel) from the foreign Tsarevokokshaisk to the foreign St. Petersburg and acquaint themselves with Bolshevik views. The hypocritical policy of the organisers and initiators of the "*first Party* school abroad", however, we shall expose before the whole Party.

V

What is the purpose of all this hypocrisy of Maximov's, we asked, and deferred our reply until we had finished talking about the school. But, strictly speaking, the question to be cleared up here is not "for what purpose", but "why?" It would be wrong to think that all the members of the new faction are conducting a hypocritical policy deliberately for a definite purpose. No. The fact is that in the very situation of this faction, in the conditions in which it has appeared and is active, there are causes (which many otzovists and god-builders are not conscious of) that give rise to a hypocritical policy.

There is an old saying to the effect that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. But this saying refers to the sphere of personal ethics. As applied to ideological and political trends it must be said that hypocrisy is the screen adopted by groups that are internally not homogeneous, that are made up of assorted elements, accidentally thrown together, who feel that they are too weak for open, straightforward action.

The composition of the new faction is the determining factor that made it adopt this screen. The general staff of the faction of godly otzovists consists of unrecognised philosophers, ridiculed god-builders, otzovists convicted of anarchistic nonsense and reckless revolutionary phrase-mongering, muddled ultimatumists and, lastly, those *boyeviks* (fortunately few in the Bolshevik faction) who considered it below their dignity to come down from the outwardly showy and "spectacular" to obscure, modest revolutionary Social-Democratic work corresponding to the conditions and tasks of the "inter-revolutionary" period, and on whom Maximov bestows honours by his "spectacular" phrases about training schools and groups ... in 1909. The only thing that holds these diverse elements so strongly together at the present moment is—a burning hatred to *Proletary*, a hatred it has quite properly incurred, because *not a single* attempt by these elements to obtain self-expression in *Proletary*, or even indirect recognition or the slightest defence and condonation, *has ever failed to encounter the most strenuous opposition*.

"Abandon hope for ever"—that was what *Proletary* told these elements in every issue, at every meeting of the editorial board, in every declaration on every Party question of the day.

And when (due to the objective conditions of the development of our revolution and the counter-revolution in our country) it came about that god-building and the theoretical foundations of Marxism became the questions of the day in the literary sphere, and the utilisation of the Third Duma and of the Third Duma platform by the Social-Democratic Party in the sphere of political work, these elements rallied together and the natural and inevitable explosion took place.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Like any explosion it was instantaneous, not in the sense that there had been previously no signs of such tendencies, or isolated manifestations of them, but in the sense that the political fusion of diverse tendencies, including some very remote from politics, took place almost in a flash. Hence the general public, as always, is inclined to be satisfied primarily with a *philistine* explanation of the new split, one imputing it to the bad qualities of one or another of the leaders, the influence of life abroad, parochialism and so on and so forth. There is no doubt that the location abroad, which, due to objective conditions, became the inevitable base of operations of all the central revolutionary organisations, has left its imprint on the *form* of the split. There is no doubt that its *form* was also affected by the idiosyncrasies of the literary circle *one wing* of which came into the Social-Democratic movement. What we call a philistine explanation is not one that takes note of these circumstances, which can explain nothing but the form, the occasions and the "external history" of the split, but one that is based on refusal or incapacity to understand the *ideological and political* foundations, causes and roots of the divergence.

The new faction's failure to understand these foundations is also the reason why it has resorted to the old method of camouflage, covering up tracks, denying the *inseparable* connection with otzovism, etc. The failure to understand these foundations causes the new faction to *speculate on a philistine explanation of the split and on philistine sympathy.*

What indeed is it but speculation on philistine sympathy to weep publicly about being "ousted" and "removed" as Maximov and Co. are doing now? Bestow the charity of your sympathy, for Christ's sake, on the ousted, the unjustly removed ones.... That this is a method counting with infallible certainty on *philistine* sympathy is proved by the curious fact that *even* Comrade Plekhanov, the enemy of all god-building, all "new" philosophy, all otzovism and ultimatumism, etc., *even* Comrade Plekhanov bestowed his mite of sympathy for Christ's sake, taking advantage of Maximov's whining, and over and over again called the Bolsheviks "stiff-necked" in this connection (see Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, August 1909). If Maximov has even managed to extract a mite of sympathy

from Plekhanov, you can imagine, reader, what tears of sympathy for Maximov will be shed by the philistine elements inside and on the fringe of the Social-Democratic movement over the "ousting" and "removal" of the virtuous, well-meaning and modest otzovists and god-builders.

The question of this "ousting" and "removal" is *treated* by Comrade Maximov both from its formal aspect and with regard to the essence of the matter. Let us examine this treatment.

From the formal point of view the removal of Maximov was "irregular", say the removed ones, and "we do not recognise this removal", for Maximov was "elected by the Bolshevik congress, i.e., the Bolshevik section of the Party Congress". Reading Maximov and Nikolayev's leaflet, the public sees a grave accusation ("irregular removal") without being given either an exact formulation of it or material from which to judge the matter. But that is the invariable method of a certain side during splits abroad: to obscure the divergence of principle, to draw a veil over it, to keep silent about the ideological dissensions, to conceal their ideological friends, and to make as much noise as possible about organisational conflicts, which the public is not in a position to analyse exactly and has not the right to sort out in detail. That was how the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists behaved in 1899, with their outcry that there was no Economism in any shape or form, but that Plekhanov had stolen the press. That was how the Mensheviks behaved in 1903 with their outcry that they had made no turn whatsoever to *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism but that Lenin had "ousted" or "removed" Potresov, Axelrod and Zasulich, etc. That is the behaviour of people who are speculating on elements abroad who are fond of rows and sensations. There is no otzovism, nor any god-building, but there is the "irregular removal" of Maximov "by the majority of the editorial board", who want to "*leave at their full disposal*" "*the property of the whole faction*"—come into the shop, gentlemen, we will tell you something most spicy about this business....

An old device, Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev! And the politicians who resort to it are *bound* to break their necks.

Our "victims of removal" talk of "irregularity" because in their opinion the editorial board of *Proletary* has no right to decide the question of the fate of the Bolshevik faction and of the split in its ranks. Very well, gentlemen. If the editorial board of *Proletary* and the 15 Bolshevik members and candidate members of the Central Committee elected at the London Congress have not the right to represent the Bolshevik faction you have every opportunity to make a public declaration to that effect and conduct a campaign for the overthrow of these undesirable representatives or for new elections to replace them. *But you have indeed conducted such a campaign* and only after you had met with a certain number of reverses did you prefer to complain and whine. If you raised the question of a congress or conference of Bolsheviks, Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev, then why did you not tell the public that *several months ago* Comrade "Er" submitted a draft resolution to the Moscow Committee calling for a vote of no confidence in *Proletary* and the holding of a Bolshevik conference to elect a new ideological centre for the Bolsheviks?

Why did you keep silent about this, O wrongly removed ones?

Why did you keep silent about the fact that "Er's" resolution was rejected by every vote except his own?

Why did you keep silent about the fact that in the autumn of 1908 in the whole St. Petersburg organisation from top to bottom a struggle was going on over the platforms of the two trends of Bolshevism, the otzovists and the opponents of otzovism, and that the otzovists were defeated?

Maximov and Nikolayev want to whine to the public because they have been repeatedly defeated in Russia. Both "Er" and the St. Petersburg otzovists had the right to wage a struggle against Bolshevism, in the highest down to the lowest organisations, without waiting for any conference and *without making public* their platforms before the whole Party.

But had not the *Proletary* editorial board, which declared open war on otzovism from June 1908, the right after a year of strife, a year of controversy, a year of friction, conflict, etc., after it had invited three regional delegates from

Russia and consulted several Russian members of the enlarged editorial board, who had not taken part in a single conflict abroad, had it not the right to declare *what was a matter of fact*, to declare that *Maximov had split away from the board*, to declare that Bolshevism has nothing in common with otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building?

Stop this hypocrisy, gentlemen! You fought on what you thought was your strongest ground and you suffered defeat. You went preaching otzovism to the masses in spite of a decision of the official centre of the Bolsheviks and without waiting for a special conference. And now you start whining and complaining because you found yourselves in a ludicrously small minority on the enlarged editorial board, at the conference held with the participation of regional delegates!

Here again we have a device of Russians abroad exactly after the manner of *Rabocheye Dyelo*: playing at "democracy" when the conditions for complete democracy are absent, speculating on the inflammation of all kinds of discontent "abroad" and at the same time transmitting from abroad (through the "school") your otzovist and god-building propaganda—starting a split among the Bolsheviks, and afterwards moaning about a split—forming a private faction (under cover of a "school") and shedding crocodile tears over the "splitting" policy of *Proletary*.

No, this squabble has gone on long enough! A faction is a free union of *kindred minds* within a party and after over a year of strife both in Russia and abroad we had a perfect right, we had the duty, to make a definite decision. And we have done so. You have a perfect right to oppose it, to put forward your platform and try to win a majority for it. If you do not do so, if instead of forming an open alliance with the otzovists and putting forward a common platform you persist in playing hide-and-seek and speculating on a cheap "democracy" abroad, you will get nothing in return but the contempt you deserve.

You are playing a double game. On the one hand, you declare that for a whole year *Proletary* has been "wholly" pursuing a non-Bolshevik policy (and your supporters in Russia have tried *more than once* to gain acceptance for these views in resolutions of the St. Petersburg Committee

and the Moscow Committee). On the other hand, you bewail the split and refuse to recognise the "removal". On the one hand, you are *in fact* hand in glove with the otzovists and god-builders, on the other you repudiate them and pose as peacemakers who want to make peace between the Bolsheviks and the otzovists and god-builders.

"Abandon hope for ever!" You can try to win a majority. You can gain what victories you like among immature Bolshevik members. We shall not agree to any reconciliation. Form your faction, or rather: go on forming it, since you have already begun, but do not try to deceive the Party, do not try to deceive the Bolsheviks. All the conferences and congresses in the world are powerless now to reconcile the Bolsheviks with the otzovists, the ultimatumists and the god-builders. We have said and we repeat it once again: every Bolshevik Social-Democrat and every class-conscious worker must make his fixed and final choice.

VI

Concealing their ideological kin, afraid to declare their real platform, the new faction is trying to fill up the gaps in its ideological stock-in-trade by borrowing *words* from the vocabulary of old splits. The "new *Proletary*", the "new *Proletary* line", shout Maximov and Nikolayev imitating the fight against the new *Iskra* in the old days.

It is a trick that might beguile certain political infants.

But you are not even capable of repeating old words, gentlemen. The "point" of the slogan "against the new *Iskra*" was that when the Mensheviks took over *Iskra* they themselves *had* to start a new line of policy, whereas the Congress (the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903) had endorsed the line of the old *Iskra*. The "point" was that the Mensheviks (through the mouth of *Trotsky* in 1903-04) had to declare: the old *Iskra* and the new are poles apart. And to this day Potresov and Co. are trying to remove from themselves the "traces" of the period when they were guided by the old *Iskra*.

Proletary is now in its 47th issue. The first came out exactly three years ago, in August 1906. In this *first* issue of

Proletary, dated August 21, 1906, we find an *editorial* article "The Boycott" and it states in black and white: "*The time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be boycottists*."* Since that time there has not been a single issue of *Proletary* containing *even one line of print* in favour of "boycottism" (after 1906), otzovism and ultimatumism, without a refutation of this *caricature of Bolshevism*. And now the caricature Bolsheviks are getting on stilts and trying to compare themselves with those who *first* fought the three-year campaign of the old *Iskra* and secured the endorsement of its line by the Second Party Congress and *then* exposed, the *volte-face* of the new *Iskra*!

Comrade Maximov now signs himself "Former editor of the popular workers' newspaper *Vperyod*", wanting to remind the reader that it was said "geese saved Rome". "Your relation to the policy of *Vperyod*,"[38] we tell Maximov in reply to this reminder, was exactly the same as Potresov's relation to the old *Iskra*. Potresov was its editor, but he did not lead the old *Iskra*, the old *Iskra* led him. As soon as he sought to change the policy the supporters of the old *Iskra* turned their backs on him. And now even Potresov himself is making frantic efforts to blot out the "sin of his youth", his participation in the editorship of the old *Iskra*.

Maximov did not lead *Vperyod*, but *Vperyod* led him. Proof: the policy of boycotting the Third Duma, in support of which *Vperyod* did not and could not say a *single word*. Maximov acted very wisely and well when he allowed himself to be led by *Vperyod*. Now he has begun to think up (or, what comes to the same thing, to help the otzovists to think up) a *line of policy* that is inevitably leading him into the morass, just like Potresov.

Remember this, Comrade Maximov: the basis one should take for comparison is the integrity of an ideological and political trend, not "words" and "slogans", which some people *learn by heart* without understanding their meaning. Bolshevism ran the old *Iskra* for three years, from 1900 to 1903, and emerged as an integral trend for the struggle with Menshevism. The Mensheviks persisted for a long time in their new alliance with the anti-Iskrists and the support-

* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 145.—*Ed.*

ers of *Rabocheye Dyelo* until finally they surrendered Potresov (and only Potresov?) to Prokopovich. The Bolsheviks ran the "old" *Proletary* (1906-09) in a spirit of resolute opposition to "boycottism", etc., and emerged as an integral trend for the struggle against those who are now thinking up "otzovism", "ultimatumism", "god-building", etc. The Mensheviks wanted to reform the old *Iskra* in the spirit of Martynov and the Economists, and they broke their necks in the attempt. You want to reform the old *Proletary* in the spirit of "Er", the otzovists and the god-builders—and you will break your necks too.

But what about the "turn towards Plekhanov", says Maximov triumphantly? What about the formation of a "new Centrist faction"? And our "also-Bolshevik" describes as "diplomacy" a "denial" that "the realisation of the idea of a 'centrist group' is being contemplated!"

These cries which Maximov is uttering against "diplomacy" and "uniting with Plekhanov" are simply laughable. Here, too, the caricature Bolsheviks are true to themselves: they have firmly *learned by heart* that Plekhanov pursued an ultra-opportunist policy in 1906-07. And they think that if they repeat it rather frequently, without bothering to analyse the changes that are taking place, this will denote the maximum degree of "revolutionary spirit".

The fact of the matter is that starting from the London Congress the "diplomats" of *Proletary* always openly pursued and succeeded in carrying out a pro-Party policy against the grotesque exaggerations of factionalism, a policy of defending Marxism against anti-Marxist criticism. There are two reasons for Maximov's present outcries: on the one hand, ever since the London Congress there have always been individual Bolsheviks (Alexinsky is an example) alleging that a policy of "conciliation", a "Polish-Lettish" policy, etc., has been substituted for a policy of Bolshevism. These stupid allegations, which were merely evidence of bigoted thinking, were seldom taken seriously by the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, the literary clique to which Maximov belongs and which has never at any time had more than one foot in the Social-Democratic movement, has for a long time regarded Plekhanov as the chief enemy of their god-building and suchlike tendencies. In the eyes of this clique nothing

is more terrible than Plekhanov. Nothing is more destructive to *their* hope of inculcating their ideas into the workers' party than "uniting with Plekhanov".

And now these two elements: bigoted factionalism with its incomprehension of the tasks of the Bolshevik faction in forming the Party, and the god-builders of the literary circles and apologists of god-building, have come together on the "platform": *against* "union with Plekhanov", against the "conciliatory", "Polish-Lettish" policy of *Proletary*, etc.

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik* No. 9, which is now out, makes it unnecessary for us to explain to the reader in special detail what a caricature this "platform" of the caricature Bolsheviks is. Plekhanov exposed the liquidationism of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the diplomacy of its editors and declared that his "way parted" with Potresov, who had ceased to be a revolutionary. It is clear now to every Social-Democrat that *working-class* Mensheviks will go with Plekhanov against Potresov. It should be clear to everyone that the split among the Mensheviks vindicates the policy of the Bolsheviks. It is clear to everyone that Plekhanov's declaration of the pro-*Party* line of policy against the splitting tactics of the liquidators is a *tremendous* victory for Bolshevism, which now holds the predominant position in the Party.

Bolshevism has won this tremendous victory because it pursued its pro-Party policy *in spite of* the outcries of the immature "Lefts" and god-building literati. Only such people as these can be afraid of a rapprochement with the Plekhanov who exposes and expels the Potresovs from the workers' party. Only in the stagnant bog of the god-builders' circle or of the heroes of phrases learned by heart is there any chance of success for a "platform": "Against union with Plekhanov", *that is to say*, against rapprochement with the pro-Party Mensheviks for the struggle against liquidationism, against rapprochement with the orthodox Marxists (which is disadvantageous to the clique of literary Yerogins), against the winning of further Party support for revolutionary Social-Democratic policy and tactics.

We Bolsheviks can point to great achievements in winning such support. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky—Social-Democrats who often write for Russians and to that extent are in our Party—have been won over to our point of view,

although at the beginning of the split (1903) their sympathies were entirely with the Mensheviks. They were won over because the Bolsheviks made no concessions to "criticism" of Marxism, because the Bolsheviks upheld, not the letter of *their own*, definitely *their own* factional theory, but the general spirit and meaning of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics. We shall continue to advance along this path, we shall wage an even more relentless war against pedantic stupidity and reckless phrase-mongering with phrases learned by heart, against the theoretical revisionism of the god-building circle of literati.

Two liquidationist trends have now quite clearly materialised among the Russian Social-Democrats: Potresov's and Maximov's. Potresov is necessarily afraid of the Social-Democratic Party because henceforth there is no hope of *his* line being adopted by it. Maximov is necessarily afraid of the Social-Democratic Party because there is now no hope of *his* line being adopted by it. Both the one and the other will support and shield by fair means or by foul the escapades of the separate literary circles with their peculiar forms of revision of Marxism: Both the one and the other will clutch, as the last shadow of hope, at the preservation of the circle spirit against the Party spirit, for Potresov can still win occasional victories in a select company of bigoted Mensheviks, Maximov can still gain an occasional laurel wreath from circles of especially bigoted Bolsheviks, but neither the one nor the other will ever obtain a firm footing whether among Marxists or in a really Social-Democratic workers' party. They represent two opposite, but mutually complementary, equally limited, petty-bourgeois trends in the Social-Democratic movement.

VII

We have shown what the general staff of the new faction is like. Where can its army be recruited from? From the bourgeois-democratic elements who attached themselves to the workers' party during the revolution. The proletariat everywhere is constantly being recruited from the petty bourgeoisie, is everywhere constantly connected with it

through thousands of transitional stages, boundaries and gradations. When a workers' party grows very quickly (as ours did in 1905-06) its penetration by a mass of elements imbued with a petty-bourgeois spirit is inevitable. And there is nothing bad about that. The historic task of the proletariat is to assimilate, re-school, re-educate all the elements of the old society that the latter bequeaths it in the shape of offshoots of the petty bourgeoisie. But the proletariat must re-educate these newcomers and influence them, not be influenced by them. Of the "Social-Democrats of the days of freedom", who first became Social-Democrats in the days of enthusiasm and celebration, the days of clarion slogans, the days of proletarian victories which turned the heads of even purely bourgeois intellectuals, very many began to *study in earnest*, to study Marxism and to learn persistent proletarian work—they will always remain Social-Democrats and Marxists. Others did not succeed in gaining, or were incapable of gaining, anything from the proletarian party but a few texts and "striking" slogans learned by heart, a few phrases about "boycottism", "*boyevism*", and so forth. When such elements thought to foist their "theories", their world outlook, i.e., their short-sighted views, on the workers' party, a split with them became inevitable.

The fate of the boycottists of the Third Duma is an obvious example that admirably shows the difference between the two elements.

The majority of the Bolsheviks, sincerely carried away by the desire for a direct and immediate fight against the heroes of June 3, were inclined to boycott the Third Duma, but were very soon able to cope with the new situation. They did not go repeating words learned by heart but attentively studied the new historical conditions, pondered over the question why events had gone that way and not otherwise, worked with their heads, not merely with their tongues, carried out serious and persistent proletarian work, and they very quickly realised the utter stupidity, the utter paltriness of otzovism. Others clutched at words, began to concoct "their own line" from half-digested phrases, to shout about "boycottism, otzovism, ultimatumism", to substitute these cries for the proletarian revolutionary work which the given historical conditions dictated, and to collect a new faction

from all sorts of immature elements in the ranks of Bolshevism. Good riddance to you, my friends? We have done everything we could to teach you Marxism and Social-Democratic work. Now we declare the most ruthless and irreconcilable war on the liquidators, both of the Right and of the Left, who are corrupting the workers' party by theoretical revisionism and petty-bourgeois methods of policy and tactics.

Supplement to *Proletary*
No. 47-48,
September 11 (24), 1909

Published according to
the Supplement to *Proletary*

ONCE MORE ON PARTYISM AND NON-PARTYISM

The question of Party and non-Party, necessary and "unnecessary", candidatures is undoubtedly one of the most important—if not the most important—in the present Duma election. First of all and above all, the electors and the broad masses who are watching the election must realise *why* the election is necessary, *what* is the task that faces a Duma deputy, *what* the tactics of a St. Petersburg deputy in the Third Duma should be. But a really full and accurate idea of all this is possible only if the whole election campaign is of a Party character.

For those who desire in the election to uphold the interests of the really broad and broadest masses the first and foremost task is to develop the political consciousness of the masses. The more this consciousness is developed, and in inseparable connection with its development, the more clearly defined is the grouping of the masses according to the real interests of the various classes of the population. All non-partyism, even under exceptionally favourable conditions, invariably indicates that clarity and maturity are lacking in the political consciousness of the candidate, the groups or parties supporting him and the mass of people who take part in his election.

In the case of all the parties devoid of proper organisation and a clear-cut and principled programme, whose aim in the election is to cater for the interests of particular small groups of the propertied classes, the development of the political consciousness of the masses is always thrust into the background, while a clear class grouping of the masses is practically always regarded as undesirable and dangerous. For those who have no desire to come to the defence of the bourgeois parties clarity of political consciousness and of class

alignment comes before everything. This, of course, does not exclude temporary joint actions by different parties in certain special cases, but it does absolutely exclude all non-partyism and all weakening or obscuring of party character.

But for the very reason that we uphold the party principle, in the interests of the broad masses, for the sake of freeing them from any kind of bourgeois influence, for the sake of the fullest clarity of class alignments, we must exert to the maximum our strength and vigilance to see that the Party principle is observed not in *words merely*, *but in fact*.

The non-party candidate Kuzmin-Karavayev, who has already been labelled an "unnecessary candidate", lays down that, strictly speaking, there are no party candidates at the elections in St. Petersburg. This opinion is so false that it is not worth pausing to refute it. It is impossible to doubt that Kutler and N. D. Sokolov are party candidates. Kuzmin-Karavayev is led astray partly by the fact that neither of the parties which have nominated them are existing quite openly as such. But if this makes it difficult to run the elections on a party basis it does not do away with the necessity of it. To give in to *such* difficulties, to fold ones arms in face of them, is absolutely identical with acceding to Mr. Stolypin's desire to hear confirmation of his "constitutionalism" from the lips of the "opposition" (the so-called opposition).

For the masses who are taking part in the St. Petersburg election it is particularly important now to find out *which* parties have *given up* in face of these difficulties and which of them have preserved in their entirety both their programme and their slogans; which have tried to "adapt themselves" to the reactionary regime by curtailing and restricting their Duma activity, their press and their organisation to the framework of this regime and which of them have adapted themselves to it by changing certain forms of activity, but not by any means by clipping their slogans in the Duma, or by strait-jacketing their press, organisation, etc. Such a comprehensive inquiry, based on the history of the parties, based on the facts of their activity inside and outside the Duma, should be the main content of the election campaign. The masses should, in this new and, for democrats, more

difficult situation, re-acquaint themselves with the *parties* which claim the title of democratic. The masses should familiarise themselves again and again with the features that distinguish the bourgeois democrats from the democrats who have nominated N. D. Sokolov on this occasion, the differences in their general outlook, ultimate aims, their attitude to the task of the great international movement for emancipation, their ability to uphold the ideals and methods of the movement for emancipation in Russia. The masses must come out of this election campaign more party-conscious, more clearly aware of the interests, aims, slogans, points of view and methods of action of the different classes—that is the permanent result which the political trend represented by N. D. Sokolov values above everything and which it will be able to achieve by the most strenuous, unwavering, persistent and comprehensive work.

Novy Dyen No. 9,
September 14 (27), 1909
Signed: *Vl. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in *Novy Dyen*

A WORD TO THE BOLSHEVIKS OF ST. PETERSBURG

By the time this issue of *Proletary* reaches Russia the election campaign in St. Petersburg will be over. Hence it is quite in place now to discuss with the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks—and all the Russian Social-Democrats—the struggle with the ultimatumists, which almost came to the point of a total split in St. Petersburg during the election and which is of tremendous significance for the whole Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia.

First of all the four stages of this struggle have to be clearly established, after which we shall dwell on the significance of the struggle and on certain differences of opinion between ourselves and a section of the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg. These four stages are as follows: 1) At the Conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* held abroad the attitude of the Bolsheviks to otzovism and ultimatumism was definitely stated, and the fact of Comrade Maximov's splitting off was also noted (*Proletary* No. 46 and its Supplement*). 2) In a special leaflet likewise printed and circulated abroad, entitled "Report of the Members Removed from the Enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* to the Bolshevik Comrades", Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev (conditionally and partially supported by Comrades Marat and Domov) set out their views on the policy of *Proletary* as a "Menshevik" policy, etc., and defended their ultimatumism. An analysis of this leaflet was given in a special supplement to *Proletary* No. 47-48.** 3) At the very beginning of the election campaign in St. Petersburg the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party adopted an ultimatumist

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 425-33, 442-60.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 29-61 of this volume.—*Ed.*

resolution on the election. The text of this resolution is given elsewhere in this issue. 4) The adoption of this resolution raised a regular storm in Bolshevik Party circles in St. Petersburg. The storm raged, if you will permit the expression, from above and from below. "From above"—the indignation and protests of the representatives of the Central Committee and members of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*. "From below"—the calling of a non-official inter-district meeting of Social-Democratic workers and functionaries in St. Petersburg. The meeting adopted a resolution (see text in this issue) of solidarity with the editorial board of *Proletary*, but sharply censured the "splitting actions" of *both this editorial board* and of the otzovist-ultimatumists. Then a new meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee and Executive Committee was held and the ultimatumist resolution *was rescinded*. A new resolution was adopted in harmony with the policy of *Proletary*. The text of this resolution is quoted in full in the Current Events column of the present issue.

Such, in the main, is the picture of events. The significance of the notorious "ultimatumism" in our Party has now been completely demonstrated in practice and all Russian Social-Democrats should ponder carefully over the questions in dispute. Further, the censure which a section of our comrades in St. Petersburg passed on our "splitting" policy gives us a welcome opportunity to explain ourselves definitively to every Bolshevik on this important question as well. It is better to "explain ourselves" fully now than to arouse new friction and "misunderstandings" at every step in our practical work.

First of all let us establish what *exactly* was the standpoint we adopted on the question of a split immediately after the Conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*. The "Communication" on this Conference (Supplement to *Proletary* No. 46*) states from the outset that ultimatumism, as the trend proposing that an ultimatum should be presented to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, is vacillating between otzovism and Bolshevism. One of our ultimatumists abroad—says the "Communication"—

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 425-33.—*Ed.*

"admitted that there had been a great improvement lately in the work of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and that he did not intend to present an ultimatum to it now, immediately".

"It is of course possible," the "Communication" continues, "to get along with ultimatumists like *this* within one and the same wing of the Party.... In the case of *such* Bolshevik ultimatumists a split is out of the question." It would be ridiculous even to speak of such a thing.

Further on, on the second page of the "Communication" we read:

> "It would be a profound mistake for any local functionary to understand the resolutions of the Conference as an instruction to expel otzovist-minded workers, let alone bring about an immediate split in organisations where there are otzovist elements. We warn local functionaries in all seriousness against such actions."

It would be impossible to express oneself more clearly, one would think. The splitting off of Comrade Maximov, *who refuses to submit* to the resolutions of the Conference, is inevitable. As for the vacillating, indefinite otzovist-ultimatumist elements, far from declaring a split with them we emphatically warned against it.

Now look at the second stage of the struggle. Comrade Maximov and Co. publish a leaflet abroad, in which on the one hand we are accused of a split, while on the other hand the policy of the new *Proletary* (which is supposed to have betrayed the old *Proletary*, the old Bolshevism) is declared Menshevist, "Duma-ist" and so forth. Is it not absurd to complain of a split in the faction, *i.e.*, *in a union of kindred minds within a party*, if you yourselves admit that there is no unanimity? Defending their ultimatumism Comrade Maximov and Co. wrote in their leaflet that "the Party cannot then [i.e., in the conditions of acute and increasing reaction characteristic of the present time] carry out a big and spectacular election campaign, nor obtain worth-while parliamentary representation"—that the "question of the actual usefulness of taking part in a pseudo-parliamentary institution then becomes doubtful and disputable"—that "in essence" *Proletary* was "going over to the Menshevik point of view of parliamentarism at any price". These phrases are accompanied by an evasive defence of otzovism ("the

otzovists have never [!!!] expressed anti-parliamentary sentiments at all") and an evasive repudiation of otzovism (we are not otzovists; the Party must not liquidate the Social-Democratic group in the Duma now; "the Party must" ... "decide whether in the last analysis the whole undertaking—participation in the Third Duma—has not been disadvantageous to it", as though the Party had *not decided* this question already!).

This evasiveness of Maximov and Co. has deceived and still deceives many people. They say: "Well, what harm can the Party or even the faction suffer from people who do not at all refuse to carry out the Party's decisions but only cautiously defend their own somewhat different point of view on tactics?"

Such a reaction to the propaganda of Maximov and Co. is very widespread among the unthinking public who give credence to *words* without taking into account the *concrete political significance* of evasive, guarded, diplomatic phrases in the circumstances of the *present* Party situation. Now they have received an excellent lesson.

Maximov and Co.'s leaflet is dated July 3 (16), 1909. *In August* the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee passed the following resolution by *three* ultimatumist votes to two on the prospective election campaign in St. Petersburg (which is now over).

> "On the question of the election the Executive Committee, without attaching special importance to the State Duma and our group there, but being guided by the general Party decision, resolves to take part in the election, not investing all the available forces, but merely putting forward its own candidates to gather the Social-Democratic votes and organising an election committee subordinated to the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee through its representative."

Let readers compare this resolution with Maximov's foreign leaflet. A comparison of these two documents is the best and surest way of opening the eyes of the public to the *true* character of Maximov's group abroad. This resolution, just like Maximov's leaflet, professes submission to the Party but, again just like Maximov, *in principle* defends ultimatumism. We do not at all mean to say that the St. Petersburg ultimatumists have been guided directly by

Maximov's leaflet—we have no data on this subject. And it is not important. We assert that the *ideological* affinity of the political stand here is indubitable. We assert that this is a particularly clear example of the *application* of "cautious", "diplomatic", tactical, evasive—call it what you will—ultimatumism *in practice*, an application that, to any person who is close to Party work, is familiar from a *hundred* analogous cases which are less "striking", are not authenticated by official documents and concern matters that a Social-Democrat cannot tell to the public for reasons of secrecy, etc. Of course, the St. Petersburg resolution is less skilful as regards literary technique than Maximov's leaflet. But in practice the views of Maximov will always (or in 999 cases out of a thousand) be applied in the local organisations not by Maximov himself but by his less "skilful" supporters. What concerns the Party is not who is more "skilful" in covering up tracks, but what is the *actual* content of Party work, what is the *actual* trend imparted to it by particular leaders.

And we ask any impartial person: is it possible for the supporters of *Proletary* and the authors of such resolutions to work in one faction, i.e., in one union of Party members with kindred opinions? Is it possible to speak *seriously* of putting into effect the Party decision to utilise the Duma and the Duma tribune when such resolutions are passed by the governing bodies of the local committees?

That the resolution of the Executive Committee did *in effect* put a spoke in the wheel of the election campaign that had just begun, that this resolution did in effect *disrupt* the election campaign, was immediately understood by everyone (except the authors of it and the ultimatumists who were enraptured by Maximov's "art" in covering up the tracks). We have already related how the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg reacted to this resolution and we shall say more farther on. As for ourselves, we immediately wrote an article entitled "The Otzovist-Ultimatumist Strike-breakers"[39]—strike-breakers because the ultimatumists, by the position they took, were obviously *betraying* the Social-Democratic election campaign to the *Cadets*—in which we showed what a downright disgrace it was for Social-Democrats to pass such a resolution and invited the Executive Committee which passed this resolution to immediately *withdraw* from

Proletary the heading "Organ of the St. Petersburg Committee" if this Executive Committee claimed to voice the views of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats: we do not want to be hypocritical—said this article—we *have never been* and *never will be* the organ of *such* ... also-Bolsheviks.

The article was already set up and even in page proof when we received a letter from St. Petersburg informing us that the notorious resolution had been *rescinded*. We had to postpone publication (as a result No. 47-48 came out a few days later than it should have). Now, fortunately, we have to speak of the ultimatumists' resolution not in connection with an election campaign in process but in an account of something that is past ... and it would be well if it were "buried in oblivion".

Here is the text of the resolution passed by the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks at a non-official meeting called after the adoption of the notorious resolution:

"This non-official inter-district meeting of Social-Democratic workers and functionaries, having discussed the resolutions of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*, expresses complete solidarity with the political line of the resolutions: 'The Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party', 'The Attitude to Duma Activities, etc.' and 'On Ultimatumism and Otzovism'.

"At the same time the meeting strongly disagrees with the methods of struggle against the ultimatumist comrades pursued by the editorial board in the said resolutions, considering such methods an obstacle to the solution of the basic tasks outlined by the editorial board of *Proletary*—the rebuilding of the Party.

"The meeting protests no less strongly against the splitting actions of our ultimatumist and otzovist comrades."

After this resolution was adopted the St. Petersburg Committee held a new meeting which rescinded the ultimatumist resolution and adopted a new one (see Current Events). This new resolution concludes: "Considering it highly important and essential to utilise the forthcoming election campaign, the St. Petersburg Committee resolves to take an active part in it."

Before we go on to reply to the comrades who do not agree with what they call our splitting policy we shall quote some passages from a letter sent by one of these comrades:

..."But if the participants in the meeting (the non-official inter-district meeting), two-thirds of them workers, were unanimous in their estimate of the present period and of our tactical moves resulting

from it, they were no less unanimous in their disapproval of the methods of struggle which the editorial board of *Proletary* proposed against our tactical opponents—the ultimatumists. They did not agree with the resolutions of *Proletary* that it is necessary to make a factional break with these comrades, but considered that such a break would be a step endangering the existence of the Party.... I am sure that I correctly express the opinion and sentiment of the meeting if I say: *we shall not allow a split*. Comrades! You people abroad have conjured up for yourselves a dreadful demon of ultimatumism that in reality does not exist over here. A *chance* combination in the St. Petersburg Committee and the Executive Committee produced an ultimatumist majority, the result of which was the adoption of a silly, illiterate resolution which dealt these ultimatumists such a moral blow that they can scarcely recover-from it.... At the meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee which adopted this resolution there were no representatives from three districts, and it has now come to light that the representative of the fourth district was not entitled to vote. So there were in effect no representatives from four districts and the one vote which gave the majority to the ultimatumists, is "accounted for". So It turns out that even with the St. Petersburg Committee meeting under strength the ultimatumists did not have a majority.... As regards the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee on the election, the meeting resolved to get it reconsidered and there is no doubt that at the very next meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee, where it now appears that we shall be in the majority, a different resolution will be adopted. The ultimatumists themselves are ashamed of their resolution and agree to have It reconsidered. They all agree, the proposer himself not excepted, it seems, that it is altogether stupid, but—and I emphasise this—there is nothing criminal in it. The ultimatumist comrades who voted for it voiced their disagreement with the author of the resolution who was really following the advice of the saying that one should behave so as 'to acquire capital without incurring blame'."

Thus our supporter charges us with spending our time abroad conjuring up a vision of a dreadful demon of ultimatumism, and with impeding (or undermining) the cause of rebuilding the Party by our splitting attacks on the ultimatumists.

The best reply to this "charge" is the history of what took place in St. Petersburg. That is why we have told it in such detail. The facts speak for themselves.

We considered that Comrade Maximov had broken with our faction because he refused to submit to the resolutions of the enlarged editorial board and organised under the guise of the notorious "school" the ideological and organisational centre of a new organisation abroad. For this we are being censured by some of our supporters who in St. Petersburg *had to use the most drastic measures* (a special non-official meeting of influential workers and the reconsideration of a

resolution already adopted!) to *rescind* an "*altogether stupid*" resolution that reproduced the views of Maximov!!

No, comrades, when you accuse us of splitting and of "conjuring-up demons" you only prove over and over again that it was imperatively necessary to recognise that Maximov had broken with our faction, you only prove that we should have hopelessly disgraced Bolshevism and done irreparable damage to the Party cause if we had not dissociated ourselves from Maximov on the eve of the election in St. Petersburg. Your *deeds*, comrades who accuse us of a split, contradict your *words*.

You "differ only" with *our* methods of combating the ultimatumists. We do not differ at all with *your* methods of combating the ultimatumists, we whole-heartedly and entirely approve of both your methods and the victory you won by them—but we are most profoundly convinced at the same time that *your* methods are nothing more than the *practical application* of "our" methods to a certain Party milieu.

In what do our "bad" methods consist? In the fact that we called for a dissociation from Maximov and Co.? In what do your good methods consist? In the fact that you condemned as "altogether stupid" a resolution wholly advocating Maximov's views, called a special meeting, raised a campaign against this resolution, with the result that the authors themselves became ashamed of it, that it was rescinded and another resolution passed in its stead, *not* ultimatumist *but* Bolshevist.

Your "campaign", comrades, does not cut across our campaign but is a *continuation* of it.

"But we do not admit that anyone has broken away," you will say. Very well. If you want to "refute" our, bad method, try to do abroad what you have done in St. Petersburg. Try to secure that Maximov and his supporters (if only at the site of the celebrated Yerogin "school") admit that the ideological content of Maximov's leaflet ("Report to the Bolshevik Comrades") is "altogether stupid", to secure that Maximov and his clique become "ashamed" of this leaflet, that the notorious "school" issue a leaflet with a *diametrically opposite* ideological content.* If you could secure this you

* Here, incidentally, is an illustration how Maximov and the notorious "school" cover their tracks. The school issued a printed leaflet,

would really refute our methods of struggle and we should gladly admit that "your" methods were better.

In St. Petersburg there was vital, urgent, general Party business in hand: the election. In St. Petersburg the Social-Democratic proletariat immediately *called* the ultimatumists *to order* in *such* a tone that they obeyed at once: the Party spirit prevailed, the proximity of the proletarian masses exerted a favourable influence; it at once became clear to all that the ultimatumist resolution made work impossible. The ultimatumists were immediately presented with an *ultimatum*, and the St. Petersburg ultimatumists (*to their honour be it said*) replied to this ultimatum of the Bolsheviks by submitting to the Party, by submitting to the Bolsheviks, and not by waging a struggle against the Bolsheviks (at least, not at the election; whether they will refrain from a struggle after the election remains to be seen).

Maximov and Co. are ultimatumists not only in sentiment. They are trying to make ultimatumism a whole political line. They are building a complete system of ultimatumist policy (we say nothing of their friendship with the god-builders, for which the St. Petersburg ultimatumists are probably not to blame), they are creating a new trend on this basis, they have begun to wage systematic war against

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dated August 26, 1909, containing the programme of the school, a letter from Kautsky (who very mildly advises that philosophical differences should "not be brought to the fore", and declares that he "does not consider justified the sharp criticism of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma", not to speak of "ultimatumism"!), a letter of Lenin's (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 468-69—*Ed.*) and a resolution passed by the school Council. This droll Council declares that "factional strife has absolutely no relation to its (the school's) aims and objects, which strictly coincide with the general aims and objects of the Party". We read the signatories to the leaflet. Lecturers: Maximov, Gorky, Lyadov, Lunacharsky, Mikhail, Alexinsky. Only think: a school with *such* a roster of lecturers "has absolutely no relation" to "factional strife". Listen, my dear comrades: ... invent, but don't stretch it too far!—We shall be told that the school has "invited" other lecturers too. In the first place, it did so, knowing that these others would practically never be able to come. In the second place, it sent out invitations, but.... "But the school could not offer them (the other lecturers) travelling expenses and maintenance during the period of the lectures." (Leaflet of August 26, 1909). Nice that, is it not? We are absolutely not factionalists, but we "cannot offer" travelling expenses to anyone but our "own" people....

Bolshevism. Of course these inspirers of the otzovists, too, will suffer (and are already suffering) defeat, but to rid our faction and Party more rapidly of the disease of otzovism-ultimatumism, more drastic methods are required and the more decisively we combat the overt and covert otzovists the sooner we shall be able to rid the Party of this disease.

"An accidental majority" of the ultimatumists—say our friends in St. Petersburg. You are profoundly mistaken, comrades. What you see at present among you is a small particle of the *general* phenomenon and you call it "accidental" because you do not see its connection with the whole. Recall the facts. In the spring of 1908 otzovism raises its head in the Central Region and collects 14 votes (out of 32) at the Moscow City Conference. In the summer and autumn of 1908 the otzovist campaign in Moscow: *Rabocheye Znamya* opens a discussion and refutes otzovism. In August 1908 *Proletary* too takes up the controversy. The autumn of 1908: the otzovists form a separate "trend" at the Party's All-Russian Conference. The spring of 1909: the otzovists' campaign in Moscow (see *Proletary* No. 47-48, "Conference of the Moscow Area Organisation"). The summer of 1909: the ultimatumist resolution of the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee.

In the face of these facts to speak of the ultimatumist majority as "accidental" is sheer naïveté. In some localities very marked variations in the make-up of our organisations are inevitable, while reaction is so strong and the membership of the Social-Democratic organisations is so weak, as is the case now. Today the Bolsheviks declare "accidental" an ultimatumist majority in X. Tomorrow the ultimatumists declare "accidental" a Bolshevik majority in Y. There are hosts of people ready to squabble on this score—but we are not among them. It must be understood that these squabbles and wrangles are a *product* of a deep-seated ideological divergence. Only if we understand this can we help the Social-Democrats to replace fruitless and degrading squabbles (over "accidental" majorities, organisational conflicts, money matters, contacts, etc.) by *an explanation of the ideological causes of the divergence*. We know perfectly well that in many towns the struggle between the ultimatumists and the Bolsheviks has spread to the most diverse

branches of work, and has sown discord and disorder also in activities in legal unions, associations, congresses and assemblies. We have letters from the "field of battle" about this discord and disorder—unfortunately, the requirements of secrecy allow us to publish only a tenth, if not a hundredth, part of what we have received *on this subject*. We declare most categorically that the fight against the ultimatumists in St. Petersburg election *was no accident*, but was one of the innumerable symptoms of a general disease.

Hence we repeat over and over again to all our Bolshevik comrades, to all workers who cherish the cause of revolutionary Social-Democracy: there is nothing more erroneous and harmful than attempts to conceal this disease. We must lay bare for all to see the causes, the nature and the significance of our difference with the supporters of otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building. The Bolshevik faction, i.e., the union of like-minded Bolsheviks, who want to *lead* the Party along the line set by *Proletary* and known to all, must be clearly separated, demarcated from the new faction which today leads its supporters inevitably to "accidental" anarchist phrases in the platforms of the Moscow and St. Petersburg otzovists, tomorrow to an "accidental" caricature of Bolshevism in Maximov's leaflet, and the day after that to an accidentally "stupid" resolution in St. Petersburg. We must understand this disease and energetically co-operate to cure it. Where it can be treated by the St. Petersburg method, i.e., by an immediate and successful appeal to the Social-Democratic consciousness of the advanced workers, such treatment is the best of all, there *no one has ever* preached splitting off and demarcation at all costs. But wherever, due to various conditions, centres and circles are being formed on anything like a permanent basis for the propagation of the ideas of the new faction, demarcation is essential. There demarcation from the new *faction* is an *earnest* of practical unity of work in the ranks of the *Party*, for in St. Petersburg the Party practical workers themselves have just admitted that such work is impossible under the banner of ultimatumism.

Proletary No. 49,
October 3 (16), 1909

Published according to
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NOTE TO THE ARTICLE "THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTION"[40]

Only the Bolsheviks have protested against the exaggeration of this Bolshevik idea. When the newspaper *Novy Dyen*[41] struck a false note by demarcation inadequate in principle from the Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, three Bolshevik writers made an attempt to correct this obliteration of differences in programme and to put agitation in the newspaper and at election meetings on more consistent *class*, *socialist* lines. This attempt failed, as far as we know, *through no fault of the Bolsheviks*. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of a certain Bolshevik to protest against Jordansky's arguments in *Novy Dyen* concerning Social-Democratic views on law and order. Jordansky, like many opportunists, vulgarised Engels's well-known statement about the "rosy cheeks" that the Social-Democratic movement had acquired on the basis of "legality". Engels himself strongly protested against a loose interpretation of his idea (see his letters in *Neue Zeit*), which applied to a definite period of development in Germany (with universal suffrage, etc.).[42] Jordansky thinks it is in place to speak of such a thing under the "legality" of June 3.

Proletary No. 49,
October 3 (16), 1909

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DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY AND OF ITS UNITY[43]

The editorial board of the Central Organ[44] recognises that the consolidation of our Party and of its unity may at the present time be achieved only by the *rapprochement*, which has already begun, between definite *factions* that are strong and influential in the practical workers' movement, and not by moralising whining for their abolition. Moreover, this *rapprochement* must take place and develop on the basis of revolutionary Social-Democratic *tactics* and an organisational policy aiming at a determined struggle against liquidationism both of the "Left" and of the "Right", especially against the latter, since "Left" liquidationism, being already routed, is a lesser danger.

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(November 3), 1909

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SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU ON THE SPLIT IN THE DUTCH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[45]

OCTOBER 25 (NOVEMBER 7), 1909

Both Singer and Adler proceeded from a number of facts which I want to mention once again here. First, the split is a fact that has to be taken into account. Secondly, according to Adler himself, the Social-Democratic Party is a socialist Party. Thirdly, it has the incontestable right to participate in international congresses. The S.D.P. itself does not even demand to be allowed to participate in the decisions of the Bureau; it could be granted an advisory vote in the Bureau, as was done in the case of a number of Russian parties. Fourthly, Comrade Adler has found that the votes at international congresses should be divided between the two parties in the Dutch section of the Copenhagen Congress, while the S.D.P. is to be granted the right of appeal to the Congress. Unanimity should be achieved on these four items at this session. I want to add that Comrade Roland Holst mentioned by Troelstra had come out for the acceptance of the S.D.P.

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German

THE TSAR AGAINST THE FINNISH PEOPLE

The Black-Hundred bandits of the Winter Palace[46] and the Octobrist tricksters of the Third Duma have begun a new campaign against Finland. To do away with the constitution that protects the rights of the Finns against the tyranny of the Russian autocrats, to put Finland on a par with the rest of Russia deprived of rights by the exceptional laws—such is the purpose of this crusade which has been inaugurated by the tsar's ukase deciding the question of military service over the head of the Finnish Diet and by the appointment of new senators from Russian officialdom. It would be a waste of time to dwell on the arguments with which these bandits and tricksters are trying to prove the legality and justice of the demands which are presented to Finland under the threat of a million bayonets. The essence of the matter is not in these arguments but in the aim that is being pursued. In the person of free and democratic Finland the tsarist government and its associates want to efface the last trace of the *popular* gains of 1905. Hence the cause of the whole Russian people is at stake in these days when the Cossack regiments and artillery batteries are hastily occupying the urban centres of Finland.

The Russian revolution, supported by the Finns, compelled the tsar to relax the stranglehold which he had kept on the Finnish people for a number of years. The tsar, who wanted to extend his despotic power over Finland, to whose constitution his ancestors and he himself had taken the oath, was compelled to sanction not only the expulsion of Bobrikov's[47] executioners from Finnish soil and the repeal of his own unlawful ukases, but also the introduction of universal and equal suffrage in Finland. After crushing the Russian revolution the tsar is harking back to the past, but with

the difference that he now feels behind him not only the support of the old guard, his hired spies and plunderers of the public purse, but also the support of the moneyed gang, headed by the Krupenskys and Guchkovs, which is operating jointly in the Third Duma in the name of the Russian people.

The bandits' venture has everything in its favour. The revolutionary movement in Russia has been terribly enfeebled and the beast on the throne need have no concern on its account to distract him from his coveted prey. The West-European bourgeoisie, which had once petitioned the tsar to leave Finland in peace, will not lift a finger to halt the bandits. Only just recently it has been given *assurances* that the tsar's intentions are honest and "constitutional" by the very people who, at that time, exhorted Europe to condemn the tsar's policy in Finland. Calling themselves "representatives of the Russian intelligentsia" and "representatives of the Russian people", the Cadet leaders have solemnly assured the European bourgeoisie that they, and the Russian people with them, are *at one with the tsar*. The Russian liberals have done everything to ensure that Europe remains as indifferent to the new attacks of the two-headed ravager on Finland as it was to his excursions against free Persia.

Free Persia has rebuffed tsarism by her own efforts. The Finnish people—and the Finnish proletariat in the lead—are preparing a strong rebuff to the successes of Bobrikov.

The Finnish proletariat is aware that it will have to fight in extremely difficult conditions. It knows that the West-European bourgeoisie who are flirting with the autocracy will not interfere; that the moneyed section of Russian society, partly bribed by Stolypin's policy, partly corrupted by the lies of the Cadets, will not lend Finland the moral support which she enjoyed prior to 1905; that the insolence of the Russian Government has grown beyond measure since it managed to strike a blow at the revolutionary army in Russia proper.

But the Finnish proletariat also knows that the outcome of a political struggle is not decided by a single engagement, that it sometimes entails long years of stubborn effort and the winner in the long run is the side which has the force of historical development behind it. The freedom of Finland will triumph because without it the freedom of Russia is

inconceivable, while without the triumph of freedom in Russia the economic development of the latter is inconceivable.

The Finnish proletariat also knows from glorious experience how to wage a long, stubborn revolutionary struggle for freedom, designed to wear down, disorganise and discredit the vile enemy until circumstances permit the delivery of a decisive blow.

At the same time the proletariat of Finland knows that from the outset of its new struggle it will have on its side the socialist proletariat of all Russia, ready, however onerous the conditions of the contemporary moment, to do their duty, *their whole duty*.

The Social-Democratic group in the Diet has sent a deputation to the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma in order jointly to discuss a plan of action against the coercionists. From the lofty tribune of the Duma our deputies will raise their voice, as they did last year, to brand the tsarist government and unmask its hypocritical allies in the Duma. Let then all the Social-Democratic organisations and all workers exert every effort so that the voice of our deputies in the Taurida Palace[48] is not a cry in the wilderness, so that the enemies of Russian and Finnish liberty see that the whole Russian proletariat is one with the Finnish people. The duty of the comrades in each locality is to use every opportunity that presents itself to make manifest the attitude of the proletariat of Russia to the Finnish question. Beginning with appeals to the Russian and Finnish Social-Democratic groups, and proceeding to more active forms of protests, the Party will find ways enough to break the disgraceful conspiracy of silence in which the Russian counter-revolution is rending the body of the Finnish people.

The struggle in Finland is a struggle for the freedom of all Russia. Whatever bitter moments the new struggle will cost the heroic Finnish proletariat, it will bind with new ties of solidarity the working class of Finland and Russia, preparing them for the moment when they will be strong enough to finish what they began in the October days of 1905 and what they tried to continue in the glorious days of Kronstadt and Sveaborg.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 9,
October 31 (November 13), 1909

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

TO PUPILS OF THE CAPRI SCHOOL[49]

Dear comrades, we have received both your letters about the incipient split in the "school". These are the first comradely letters of kindred thinkers to reach us from Capri and they have made all of us very happy. We most heartily welcome the clear demarcation in the school.

It required time, of course, to lay bare the true character of the school as a new centre of the new faction. We did not doubt for a moment that sooner or later the most class-conscious Social-Democratic workers would find their bearings in this situation and select the right path. We learn from Moscow that letters have been received there from out-and-out "Bogdanovist" pupils of the school who are campaigning openly for the Capri centre and *very greatly helping* all Social-Democratic workers to understand the true significance of the Capri school.

Now to come to the matter in hand. You must, comrades, thoroughly think over the new situation that has arisen so that we can discuss it together and take the right steps, choosing the right time for them. You understand, of course, that a split in the school is now inevitable: you yourselves write that you cannot feel at home in such a school. You, of course, are not counting on united action with the out-and-out "Bogdanovists". And once matters have reached such a pitch that a split in the school is *inevitable*, it is necessary to understand clearly the significance of this split, to have a clear idea of the struggle ensuing from the split, and how the Bogdanovists will try to "*disarm*" all of you (i.e., to deprive you of the possibility of making your influence felt and of telling the truth about the school),

to *compromise* all of you (the nickname "agent of the Bolshevik Centre" bandied about, as you say, by Alexinsky is only a beginning; it is only the bud, *the fruit is still to come*), etc., etc.

You must think this over thoroughly and act firmly, resolutely and intelligently, as in a battle; you yourselves write that a "battle" is going on in the school over the platform. This is the beginning of *battles* against you *wherever* the Bogdanovists have penetrated.

You should begin by making an accurate count of your numbers. How many *resolute* opponents of the "Bogdanovist" platform are there? Can this number be increased or not? If yes, then how and in what period of time? If not, then what is the behaviour of the "neutrals"? You must think over what your behaviour should be during an inevitable split in the school in order as far as possible to *win over* these neutrals *to your side* or at worst to prevent them falling wholly into the hands of the Bogdanovists.

Further, how do you intend to arrange your exit from the school? As a simple departure or as a withdrawal owing to the struggle over platforms? Of course, if the struggle among you has developed as rapidly as one might judge from your first two letters, the split has perhaps already happened, i.e., perhaps the Bogdanovists have already ousted you, quite simply ousted you, and in that case there is nothing to be said. If this has not yet happened—think carefully over how you will arrange your departure. You must give a reply to all the Russian organisations. You must refute precisely and clearly, by giving the facts, all the thousands of attacks which will now be heaped on you by the "Bogdanovists". You must be prepared to defend your views on the school and on the "platform" of the Bogdanovists.

If the question of your departure arises you must see that you are given the means for travelling to Russia. That is the school's obligation, just as prior to the split among the Bolsheviks it was the obligation of the Bolshevik Centre to pay the expenses of travelling to Russia (after the December Party Conference of 1908) for Lyadov, Vsevolod and Stanislav. They demanded their expenses from us at that time and received them.

We shall, of course, help you as regards passports and a meeting with us (in Paris or in some small town, where it would be more secret and save you time, as well as being cheaper). We will discuss where to meet as a separate question and make a choice later on. Our finances are not brilliant and we can only give you modest assistance.

I am writing all this to clarify matters and to exchange opinions with you. When we have received more detailed replies from you and cleared up all the questions by our correspondence we shall convene the executive committee of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* and then settle the amount of assistance, the time and place of our meeting, and so forth.

Please answer in detail. Can you give us your *direct* address?

With greetings,
The Secretary of "Proletary"

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A SHAMEFUL FIASCO

The reader will remember the short but instructive history of the "Party" school in X.—. Here it is. After a year's internal strife the Bolshevik faction categorically dissociated itself from the "new" trends—otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building. The Bolshevik Conference passed a special resolution declaring the school in X.—to be the *centre of a new faction* consisting of the supporters of these trends.* The leaders abroad of the new faction built on these three monster bases split off from the Bolsheviks organisationally. Being endowed with unusual political courage and unshakable belief in their creed, the heroes of the new faction did not venture to come out with visor up in their own newspaper, etc. They chose instead the simple expedient of *deceiving* the Party and our faction: they formed a school abroad which they called a "Party" school and carefully concealed its true ideological complexion. After a number of efforts they managed to collect some thirteen workers in this mock-Party school and a group consisting of Maximov, Alexinsky, Lyadov and Lunacharsky set to work "teaching" them. Throughout, this clique not only concealed the fact that the "school" was the centre of a new faction but strenuously insisted that the "school" was not connected with any faction but was a general Party undertaking. Maximov, Alexinsky, Lyadov and Co. in the role of "non-factional" comrades!**

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 450-51.—*Ed.*

** Incidentally let Comrade Trotsky read the workers' letters inserted elsewhere in this issue and decide whether it is not time he kept his promise to go and teach in the "school" at X.—(if one of the reports of the "school" is correct in saying that such a promise was given). Perhaps this is the opportune moment to come on the "field of battle" holding an olive branch of peace and a cruse of "non-factional" unction.

And, now, finally, the last stage. Of the workers who came abroad to study at this mock-Party school, about half of them are in revolt against the "bad shepherds" Elsewhere we print two letters from pupils of the notorious "school" and several reports from Moscow which completely expose Maximov, Alexinsky, Lyadov and Co. for the adventurers they are. The contents speak for themselves. It is all good stuff: the "regular battle", the "fiercest controversies every day" and the picture of schoolmaster Alexinsky putting his tongue out at the worker students, etc. In the weighty reports of the school all these things will probably be transmuted into "practical studies" of questions of agitation and propaganda, a course "on social philosophies", etc. But alas, no one will take this pitiful, shameful farce seriously now!

For two months the leaders of the new faction have been trying to persuade the workers of the superiority of otzovism and god-building over revolutionary Marxism. Then, losing patience, they began to force the otzovist-ultimatumist "platform" down their throats. And the more enlightened and independent of the workers protested of course. We do not want to serve as a screen for the new ideological centre of the otzovists and god-builders; there is no control over the school either "from below" or "from above", say the worker comrades in their letters. And this is the surest guarantee that the policy of hide-and-seek and demagogic "democratism" is doomed to bankruptcy in the eyes of the *pro-Party* workers. "The local organisations themselves will govern the school in X.—," the workers were told by Maximov and Co. Now this game has been exposed by the same workers who used to have faith in this clique.

In conclusion—one request, godly otzovist gentlemen. When you in your divinely hallowed Tsarevokokshaisk finish—as we hope you will—drawing up your platform, don't hide it from us on the precedent of your action on a previous occasion. In any case we shall get hold of it sooner or later and publish it in the Party press. So it would be better for you not to disgrace yourselves once again.

A separate reprint from
Proletary No. 50,
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reprint

SOME SOURCES OF THE PRESENT IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD

In the present issue of *Proletary* we print one of the numerous letters we have received pointing out the tremendous ideological discord among the Social-Democrats. Special attention is merited by the ideas on the subject of the "German line" (i.e., the prospect of Germany's development after 1848 being duplicated in our own country). In order to trace the sources of the mistaken opinions current in this very important question, for without its clarification the workers' party cannot devise correct tactics, we shall take the Mensheviks and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* on the one hand and Comrade Trotsky's Polish article on the other.

I

The tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Revolution of 1905-07 were based on the principle that the complete victory of this revolution was possible only as a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. What are the *economic* grounds for this view? Beginning with *Two Tactics* (1905)* and continuing with numerous articles in newspapers and miscellanies of 1906 and 1907 we have consistently given the following grounds: the bourgeois development of Russia is now a foregone conclusion but it is possible in two forms—the so-called "Prussian" form (the retention of the monarchy and landlordism, the creation of a strong, i.e., bourgeois, peasantry on the given historical basis, etc.)

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

and the so-called "American" form (a bourgeois republic, the abolition of landlordism, the creation of a farmer class, i.e., of a free bourgeois peasantry, by means of a marked change of the given historical situation). The proletariat must fight for the second path as offering the greatest degree of freedom and speed of development of the productive forces of capitalist Russia, and victory in this struggle is possible only with a revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry.

This is the view embodied in the resolution of the London Congress on the Narodnik or Trudovik parties and on the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards them. The Mensheviks, as we know, are hostile to this resolution, particularly as regards the special question which we are analysing here. But how shaky the *economic* basis of their case is can be seen from the following words of a most influential Menshevik authority on the agrarian question in Russia, Comrade Maslov. In the second volume of his *Agrarian Question*, published in 1908 (the preface is dated December 15, 1907), Maslov wrote: "*As long as* [Maslov's italics] purely capitalistic relations have not developed in the countryside, *as long as* subsistence rent [Maslov wrongly uses this unfortunate expression instead of the term: feudal bondage rent] persists, a solution of the agrarian question most advantageous for democracy will still be possible. The past history of the world shows two types of capitalist development: the type prevailing in Western Europe (not counting Switzerland and some odd corners of other European states), which is the result of a compromise between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, and the type of agrarian relations which have been established in Switzerland, the United States of America, and the British and other colonies. The data which we cite on the status of the agrarian question in Russia does not give us sufficient grounds to say for certain which type of agrarian relations will become established in our country, while our 'scientific conscience' does not allow us to draw subjective and arbitrary conclusions..." (p. 457).

That is true. And it is a full recognition of the economic basis of Bolshevik tactics. It is not a matter of "revolutionary intoxication" (as the Vekhists and the Cherevanins

think) but of *objective*, economic conditions, which would *allow* the possibility of an "American" line of capitalist development in Russia. In his history of the peasant movement in 1905-07 Maslov had to recognise our main premises. The agrarian "programme of the Cadets", he writes in the same place, "is the most utopian as there is no broad social class interested in the question being solved in the way they desire, either the interests of the landowners will prevail with impending political concessions [Maslov means to say: with inevitable concessions to the landowning bourgeoisie] or the interests of democracy" (p. 456).

And that too is true. Hence it follows that the tactics of proletarian support for the Cadets in the revolution was "utopian". Hence it follows that the *forces* of "democracy", i.e., of the democratic revolution, are the forces of the proletariat and peasantry. Hence it follows that there are two roads of *bourgeois* development: one is that of the "landowners, making concessions to the bourgeoisie", the other is that along which the workers and peasants want to lead and can lead this development (cf. Maslov, p. 446: "If all the landed estates were ceded gratis to the peasantry for their use, even then ... the process of the capitalisation of peasant farming would take place, but less painfully...").

We see that when Maslov argues as a Marxist he argues in a Bolshevik way. But the following is an instance where, in attacking the Bolsheviks, he argues just like a liberal. This instance, needless to say, is to be found in the liquidationist book: *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* which is being published under the editorship of Martov, Maslov and Potresov; in the section "Summing up" (Vol. I) we find an article by Maslov: "The Development of the National Economy and Its Influence on the Class Struggle in the Nineteenth Century". In this article, on page 661, we read:

"...some Social-Democrats have begun to regard the bourgeoisie as a hopelessly reactionary class and a negligible quantity. Not only has the strength and importance of the bourgeoisie been underestimated but the historic role of this class has been viewed out of historical perspective: the participation of the middle and petty bourgeoisie in the revolutionary movement and the sympathy towards it by the big bourgeoisie in the first stage of the movement have been ignored, while it is taken as a foregone conclusion that in the future, too, the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

bourgeoisie will play a reactionary role, and so on" (that's just as he has it: "and so on"!). "Hence was deduced the inevitability of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which would contradict the whole trend of economic development."

This tirade is wholly Vekhist. This "Marxism" is all of the Brentano, Sombart or Struve variety.[50] The standpoint of its author is the standpoint of a liberal as distinct from a bourgeois democrat. For a liberal is a liberal precisely because he does not visualise, his mind does not accept, any other course of bourgeois development than the one already in process, i.e., the one led by the landowners, who make "concessions" to the bourgeoisie. A democrat is a democrat precisely because he sees another way and fights for it, the way led by the "people", i.e., the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the proletariat, but he does not see that this way too is bourgeois. In the "Summing up" of this liquidationist book Maslov forgot all about the *two* lines of bourgeois development, about the *strength* of the bourgeoisie of the American type (in its Russian equivalent: a bourgeoisie that grows *out of* the peasantry, *on a soil* swept clean of landlordism by revolutionary means), about the *weakness* of the bourgeoisie of the Prussian type (enslaved by "landowners"); he forgot that the Bolsheviks have never spoken of the "inevitability" of "dictatorship", but of its necessity *for* the victory of the American path; he forgot that the Bolsheviks deduced "dictatorship" not from the weakness of the bourgeoisie, but from the *objective*, economic conditions making possible two lines of development of the bourgeoisie. In its theoretical aspect the tirade quoted is a sheer mass of confusion (which Maslov himself repudiates in the second volume of the *Agrarian Question*); in its practical political aspect it is liberalism, an ideological defence of extreme liquidationism.

Now see how an unsound position on the main *economic* question leads to unsound political conclusions. Here is a quotation from Martov's article "Whither Next?" (*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 13): "In contemporary Russia no one can say definitely just now whether in a new political crisis favourable objective conditions will be created for a radical democratic revolution; we can only indicate the specific conditions under which a revolution of this kind

will become inevitable. Until history decides this question of the future as it was decided for Germany in 1871, the Social-Democrats must not relinquish the aim of meeting the inevitable political crisis with their own revolutionary solution of the political, agrarian and national problem (a democratic republic, the confiscation of landed estates, and the full right of self-determination). But they must *go forward* to meet the crisis which will settle once and for all the question of the 'German' or 'French' consummation of the revolution, not *stand* and wait for the advent of the crisis."

True. Splendid words paraphrasing the resolution of the Party Conference of December 1908. This formulation is in full accord with Maslov's words *in the second volume* of the *Agrarian Question* and the tactics of the Bolsheviks. There is a decided difference between this formulation and the standpoint expressed in the famous exclamation that the "Bolsheviks at the Conference of December 1908 decided to push in where they had had one licking already."[51] We can "go forward with our revolutionary solution of the agrarian question" only together with the *revolutionary* sections of the bourgeois democracy, i.e., only with the peasantry, not with the liberals, who are satisfied with "concessions from the landowners". To go forward to confiscation together with the peasantry—there is nothing but a verbal difference between this formulation and the principle: to go forward to a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But Martov, who came so close to the standpoint of our Party in *Golos* No. 13, does not hold to this position consistently but constantly deviates towards Potresov and Cherevanin, not only in the liquidationist book *The Social Movement* but in the same issue, No. 13. In the same article, for instance, he defines the task of the moment as the "struggle for a *legal* labour movement, including one for winning the legalisation of our own existence [of the Social-Democratic Party!". To say that means making a concession to the liquidators: we want to strengthen the Social-Democratic Party, utilising all legal possibilities and all opportunities of open action; the liquidators want to squeeze the Party into the framework of a legal and open (under Stolypin) existence. We are fighting for the revolu-

tionary overthrow of the Stolypin autocracy, utilising *for this struggle* every case of open action, widening the proletarian basis of the movement for this purpose. The liquidators are fighting for the open existence of the labour movement ... under Stolypin. Martov's statement that it is our duty to fight for a republic and the confiscation of the land is so formulated that it *precludes* liquidationism; his statement about fighting for the open existence of the Party is so formulated that it *does not preclude* liquidationism. Here in the political field is the same inconsistency as Maslov's in the economic field.*

This inconsistency soars to Himalayan heights in Martynov's article on the agrarian question (No. 10-11). Martynov tries to carry on a biting controversy against *Proletary* but, owing to his inability to *formulate* the question, he flounders helplessly and clumsily. For *Proletary*, you see, the result is as Tkachov has it: "Now, a little bit later, or never!"[52] This is the "result" also for Maslov and Martov, dear Comrade Martynov; it should be the result for any Marxist, since it is a question not of a *socialist* revolution (as in the case of Tkachov) but of one of the two methods of consummating the *bourgeois* revolution. Just think, Comrade Martynov: can Marxists undertake in general to support the confiscation of large landed estates or are they obliged to do so only "until" (whether "now, a little bit later" or for quite a long time yet is more than you or I can say) the bourgeois system is definitely "established?" Another example. The law of November 9, 1906[53] "threw the countryside into a great tumult, a state of veritable internecine war, sometimes running to knife-play", says Martynov rightly. And his conclusion: "in the near future to expect any unanimous and impressive revolutionary action of the peasantry, a peasant uprising, is quite impossible in view of this internecine war." It is ludicrous of you, dear Comrade Martynov, to counterpose an uprising, i.e., civil war, to "internecine war". Furthermore, the question of the near future does not enter here since it is not a question of practical directives but of the *line* of the whole agrarian development. Another

* We took as an example only one instance of the political inconsistency of Martov, who in the same article, No. 13, speaks of the coming crisis as a "constitutional" crisis, and so on.

example. "The exodus from the village communes is proceeding at a forced pace." True. What is your conclusion?... "It is obvious that the break-up by the landlords will be successfully completed and that in the course of a few years, precisely in those extensive areas of Russia where quite recently the agrarian movement was taking the most acute forms, the village commune will be destroyed and with it the chief cradle of Trudovik ideology will disappear. Thus one of *Proletary*'s two prospects, the 'bright' one, is eliminated."

It is not a question of the village commune, dear Comrade Martynov, for the Peasant Union in 1905 and the Trudoviks in 1906-07 demanded that the land be transferred not to the village communes but to individuals or free associations. The village commune is being destroyed *both* by the landlords' breaking up of the old system of land tenure under the supervision of Stolypin *and* its breaking up by the peasants, i.e., confiscation for the creation of a new order on the land. *Proletary*'s "bright" prospect is not connected with the village commune or with Trudovism as such, but with the *possibility* of an "American" development, the creation of free farmers. So by saying that the bright prospect is eliminated, and at the same time declaring that "the slogan of expropriating the big landowners will not go by the board" Comrade Martynov is making an unholy muddle. If the "Prussian" type is established this slogan will go by the board and the Marxists will say: we have done everything in our power to bring about a more painless development of capitalism, now we must fight for the destruction of capitalism itself. If, on the other hand, this slogan does not go by the board it will mean that the *objective* conditions are at hand for switching the "train" on to the American "line". In that case the Marxists, if they do not wish to become Struve-ists, will know how to see, behind the reactionary "socialist" phraseology of the petty bourgeois, expressing the latter's subjective views, the objectively real struggle of the masses for better conditions of capitalist development.

Let us sum up. Disputes over tactics are vain if they are not based on a clear analysis of economic possibilities. The question of Russia's agrarian evolution taking a Prussian or American form has been raised by the struggle of

1905-07, which proved its reality. Stolypin is taking another step further along the Prussian path—it would be a ludicrous fear of the bitter truth not to recognise this. We must go through a peculiar historical stage in the conditions created by this new step. But it would be criminal as well as ludicrous not to recognise the fact that Stolypin has *so far* only complicated and aggravated the old state of affairs without creating anything new. Stolypin is "putting his stake on the powerful" and asks for "20 years of peace and tranquillity" for the "reformation" (read: spoliation) of Russia by the landlords. The proletariat must put its stake on democracy, without exaggerating the latter's strength and without limiting itself to merely "pinning hopes" on it, but steadily developing the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation, mobilising all the democratic forces—the peasants above all and before all—calling upon them to ally themselves with the leading class, to achieve the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" for the purpose of a full democratic victory and the creation of the best conditions for the quickest and freest development of capitalism. Failure to fulfil this democratic duty on the part of the proletariat will inevitably lead to vacillations and *objectively* play into the hands of the counter-revolutionary liberals outside the labour movement and the liquidators within it.

Proletary No. 50, November 28 (December 11), 1909

Published according to the text in *Proletary*

METHODS OF THE LIQUIDATORS AND PARTY TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

The crisis affecting our Party at the present time is due, as we have said more than once, to the instability of the petty-bourgeois elements who joined the working-class movement during the revolution and who have now gone over to the liquidationism of the Mensheviks on one flank and to otzovism and ultimatumism on the other. Hence a fight on two flanks is an essential task for defending correct revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics and building the Party. And this fight is being waged steadfastly by the Bolshevik faction, which is thereby rallying and uniting all really Party, really Marxist, Social-Democratic elements.

In order to wage the fight for the Party successfully—for the *Party* emphatically condemned liquidationism at the December Conference in 1908 and equally emphatically dissociated itself from otzovism and ultimatumism at the same Conference—one must have a clear idea of the situation in which this struggle within the Social-Democratic movement has to be carried on. *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 16-17 and the new semi-newspaper of the otzovists and ultimatumists (the 8-page leaflet of Comrades Maximov and Lunacharsky: "To All Comrades") merit attention primarily because they clearly depict this situation. Both *Golos* and Maximov and Co. shield the liquidators. The identity of the methods used by the liquidators of the Right and of the Left is strikingly obvious and demonstrates the equal shakiness of the two positions.

Liquidationism is "a deliberately vague, maliciously indefinite catchword", asserts a leading article in *Golos*. Maximov asserts that *Proletary* magnifies and inflates

practical differences of opinion with the ultimatumists until they become differences in principle. Poor *Golos*! So far it has been able to lay the blame for all "malicious invention" on the Bolsheviks, i.e., on its "factional opponents". Now it is Plekhanov and the Bund that have to be charged with malicious invention (see No. 3 of *Otkliki Bunda* on liquidationism in the Bund). Is it Plekhanov and the Bundists or is it *Golos* who "maliciously" prevaricates; which is more likely to be true?

We are not liquidators, *Golos* assures us, we merely interpret membership of the Party differently; in *Stockholm* we adopted Clause 1 of the Rules *in the Bolshevik way*, but there is no harm in that; now, after Plekhanov's charge of liquidationism against us, we shall bring out Clause 1 and interpret all our notorious liquidationism as being merely a desire to extend the concept of the Party. The Party, you see, is not merely the sum of the Party organisations (as we ourselves conceded to the Bolsheviks *in Stockholm*), but also all those who work *outside* the Party organisations under the control and leadership of the Party!

What a magnificent subterfuge, what a brilliant invention: there is no liquidationism—merely the old disputes over Clause 1! The only unfortunate thing, dear Golosists, is that you thereby *confirm* Plekhanov's charge, for *in fact*, as every Party Social-Democrat and every worker Social-Democrat will understand at once, you have dragged out all the old rubbish about Clause 1 *precisely in defence of* liquidationism (= replacement of the Party organisation by an "amorphous" legal organisation: see the resolution of the December 1908 Conference). *In fact*, what you do is to open the door to the liquidators, however much you assure us *in words* that your "desire" is to open the door for the Social-Democratic workers.

Exactly like Maximov, who assures us that he is not a defender of otzovism, that he only (only!) regards the question of participation in the Duma as "very, very disputable". Clause 1 is disputable, participation in the Duma is disputable—what has this to do with "malicious" inventions about otzovism and liquidationism?

We are not liquidators, *Golos* assures us, we only find that Plekhanov "successfully avoided the question of what

is to be done if the structure of the Party unit hinders nothing more nor less than its rebuilding". In actual fact Plekhanov did not avoid this question but answered it frankly and directly: he replied to the Bolsheviks' removal of the otzovists and ultimatumists by a call to observe the Party principle and by condemning splitting and liquidationism. The Party unit is a type of illegal Party organisation in which as a rule the Bolsheviks predominate and the rebuilding of which (for participation in the Duma, in legal associations, etc.) the otzovists *have hindered*. The pro-Party Mensheviks cannot reply to the Bolsheviks' removal of the otzovists in any other way than that of Plekhanov. Golos, however, prevaricates and in fact *supports* the liquidators, *repeating* in an illegal publication abroad the *liberals*' slander about the conspiratorial character of the Bolsheviks' organisations, about the Bolsheviks' unwillingness to form broad workers' organisations, to take part in congresses, and so forth (for, *by taking part* in the new "opportunities", the Party units were thereby reconstructed for such participation and learned reconstruction in practice). To say that the "*structure*" of the Party unit hinders its reconstruction means *in fact* to advocate a split, to justify the splitting actions of the liquidators *against* the Party, which consists of the sum of the units built precisely in the present way.

We are not liquidators, not legalists, we merely assert in a "Party" (according to its signboard!) "illegal" (but approved by Mme Kuskova) publication that the structure of the Party unit (and of the sum of the units, the Party) *hinders* the rebuilding of the Party. We are not otzovists, not wreckers of the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma, we only assert (in 1909) that the question of participation in the Duma is "very disputable" and that "Duma-ism" overshadows everything for our Party. Which of these two types of liquidator does more harm to the Party?

Plekhanov resigned from *The Social Movement*, declaring that Potresov had ceased to be a revolutionary. Potresov writes a letter to Martov: why have I been insulted. I don't know. Martov replies: I too don't know. The two editors make an "investigation" (*Golos*'s expression!) of the causes of Plekhanov's dissatisfaction. The two editors write

to the third editor, Maslov, but it turns out that Maslov, too, does not know why Plekhanov resigned. They had worked for years with Plekhanov, they had tried to correct Potresov's article *in accordance with Plekhanov's directive* and, when an accusation was made against them in print and openly, they suddenly find themselves unable to understand what Plekhanov is accusing Potresov of and they make an "investigation" of it! Prior to this unfortunate occurrence they were such skilled, such experienced literati—now they have become children who "don't know" what kind of spirit of repudiation of the revolution emanates from Cherevanin's articles, from Potresov, from the whole of *The Social Movement*. Roland-Holst noticed this spirit in Cherevanin—obviously, also out of malice! But Cherevanin, while continuing *together with Potresov* to write in *the same* spirit, inserted somewhere a *reservation* ... where is there any liquidationism here? The Cadets = Vekhists with reservations. Cherevanin, Potresov and *The Social Movement* = repudiation of the revolution with reservations. Yes, yes, what a deliberately vague, maliciously indefinite catchword "liquidationism" is!

But the catchword "god-building" is just as deliberately vague and maliciously indefinite, cry Maximov and Lunacharsky. Cherevanin can be shielded by writing a *reservation*; in what way is Lunacharsky worse than Cherevanin and Potresov? And Lunacharsky together with Maximov concoct a *reservation*. "Why do I reject this terminology?"—such is the heading of the main paragraph in Lunacharsky's article. Let us change inconvenient terms, we will not speak either of religion or of god-building ... one can speak rather of "culture" ... just try afterwards to make out what we are offering you in the shape of a now, genuinely new and genuinely socialist, "culture". The Party is so importunate, so intolerant (Lunacharsky's paragraph: On "Intolerance")—well, let us change the terminology, they are not fighting against ideas, you see, but against "terminology"....

And so, dear Golosists, are you not intending in No. 18-19 to announce your rejection of terminology ... for instance, as regards liquidationism? And so, editors of *The Social Movement*, are you not intending in Volumes III-X to *explain* that "you have been misunderstood", that you

have not called in question any "idea of hegemony", that you do not approve the slightest spirit of liquidationism ... not the least bit!?

On the eve of the Duma elections (in September 1909) the St. Petersburg otzovists and ultimatumists, who have long been *spoiling all the work of the St. Petersburg Committee*, secured the passage of a resolution actually disrupting the elections. The workers raised a revolt in the name of the Party and *forced* the Left liquidators to rescind this stupid resolution. Maximov now prevaricates: the resolution, he says, was "extremely mistaken" but the comrades "themselves rejected it". "It is quite clear," writes Maximov, "this mistake had nothing to do with ultimatumism as such." What is clear, Comrade Maximov, is not this, but your shielding of Left liquidationism, which is *ruinous* for the Party. The Mensheviks of Vyborg District in St. Petersburg came out against liquidationism (also, presumably, solely out of malice?). *Golos* at first approved them (after *Proletary*). Now the Menshevik liquidator G-g[54] comes forward in *Golos* No. 16-17, and—can you imagine?—he swears like a trooper at the Vyborg comrades, using the most abusive language. In the Menshevik organ he abuses the Mensheviks *as being Bolsheviks*! The editors of *Golos* become modest, very modest, innocent, very innocent, and wash their hands of the matter in the Maximov fashion: "We shall not take upon ourselves the responsibility" (p. 2, column 2 of the Supplement to No. 16-17), "it is a question of fact"....

...Well, what wicked slanderers they are who invented the "legend" (Martov's expression in *Vorwärts*[55]) that *Golos* shields liquidationism, helps liquidationism! Is it not a slander to say that someone assists the liquidators if in an illegal organ he ridicules the Duma work of the Central Committee, insinuating that this work has developed "after the majority of the Central Committee began to live abroad" (ibid.)—taking advantage of the fact that *it is impossible* to refute these insinuations, i.e., to *tell* the truth about the Duma work of the illegal Central Committee....

Maximov asserts that the question of the possibility of *Party* leadership of the Duma group is a very, very disputable one (after two years' experience). *Golos* asserts that

this leadership by the *Party* amounts to empty words ("after the majority of the members of the Central Committee began to live abroad"). And both Maximov and the Golosists beat their breasts and declare that only slanderers set afloat rumours about *anti*-Party activity by the Right and Left liquidators.

Both Maximov and the Golosists explain the whole struggle with liquidationism as due to "ousting" inclinations on the part of persons or groups. This is the word that Maximov uses. *Golos* indignantly describes Plekhanov's call for the general delimitation as "surgery", the method of "hair-cutting, shaving and blood-letting", the methods of "Sobakevich-Lenin", the methods of the "dare-devil" P.[56] (P.=a Plekhanov-Menshevik, who was not afraid to tell the truth openly about the liquidationism of the Cherevanins, Larins and Potresovs). *Proletary* uses diplomatic language, flirts with Plekhanov (Maximov), *Proletary* fawns on Plekhanov (*Golos*: "*Proletary*'s feuilletonist", who is "obliging" in relation to Plekhanov). You see: the Maximovites and the Golosists explain the new splits and the new alignments in exactly the same way.

Let us leave such explanations to the toy manikins and get down to business.

Liquidationism is a deep-seated social phenomenon, indissolubly connected with the counter-revolutionary mood of the liberal bourgeoisie, with disintegration and break-up in the democratic petty bourgeoisie. The liberals and petty-bourgeois democrats are trying in thousands of ways to demoralise the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, to undermine and overthrow it, to clear the way for legal workers' associations in which they might achieve success. And in a time like this the liquidators are ideologically and organisationally fighting against the most important remainder of the revolution of yesterday, against the most important bulwark of the revolution of tomorrow. The Golosists (from whom the Party asks no more than an honest, straight fight, without reservations, against the *liquidators*) by their prevaricating are *doing the liquidators a service*. Menshevism is put in a difficulty by the history of counter-revolution: it must either fight liquidationism or become its accomplice. Menshevism inside-out, i.e., otzovism and

ultimatumism, also leads in fact to strengthening liquidationism: to continue to "dispute" about Duma and legal activity, to try to preserve the old organisation, not adapting it to the new historical period, to the changed conditions, means *in fact* a policy of revolutionary inaction and destruction of the illegal organisation.

The Bolsheviks are faced with the task of a fight on two flanks—a "central" task (the essence of which has not been understood by Maximov, who sees here only insincerity and diplomacy). It is impossible to preserve and strengthen the illegal Social-Democratic organisation without reconstructing it systematically, undeviatingly, step by step, *for* coping successfully with the present difficult period, *for* persistent work through the "strongpoints" of legal possibilities of every kind.

Objective conditions have dictated this task to the Party. Who will solve it? The same objective conditions have dictated a *rapprochement of pro-Party members* of all factions and sections of the Party, above all a rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks, and with the Mensheviks of the type of the Vyborg comrades in St. Petersburg and the Plekhanovites abroad. The Bolsheviks for their part have openly proclaimed the need for this rapprochement, and for it we issue a call to *all Mensheviks* capable of openly combating liquidationism, of openly supporting Plekhanov, and, of course, to all Menshevik workers above all. The rapprochement will occur rapidly and extensively if an *agreement* with the Plekhanovites is possible: an agreement on the basis of the struggle for the Party and the Party principle against liquidationism, without any ideological compromises, without any glossing over of tactical and other differences of opinion *within the limits* of the Party line. Let all Bolsheviks, and especially working-class Bolsheviks in the localities, do everything to achieve such agreements.

If the Plekhanovites prove too weak or unorganised, or do not want to reach an agreement, then we shall advance towards the same goal by a longer route, but in any case we shall advance towards it and we shall reach it. Then the Bolshevik faction remains the sole builder of the Party, at once and immediately, in the sphere of practical work

(for Plekhanov's help is only literary). We shall exert every effort to promote this building, we shall be merciless to the contemptible subterfuges and prevarications of the Golosists and Maximovites; at every step in practical Party work we shall expose and brand before the proletariat the anti-Party nature of both of them.

The working class has left the imprint of its proletarian, revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics on the entire bourgeois revolution in Russia. No efforts of the liberals, liquidators and accomplices of liquidationism can do away with this fact. And the advanced workers will build, and build to completion, the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party together with those who want to help them in this matter, against those who do not want to help them, or are incapable of doing so.

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GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA AND CHEREVANIN[57]

Comrade Cherevanin is the prototype and model of the confirmed liquidator among the Mensheviks. He has made this perfectly clear in his well-known book *The Proletariat, etc*. Liquidationism is so strongly pronounced in this book that the well-known Dutch woman writer and Marxist, Roland-Holst, the author of the preface to the German translation, could not refrain from expressing her protest against the distortion of Marxism and its replacement by revisionism. *At that time* the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* printed a repudiation of Cherevanin in *Vorwärts*, declaring that leading Mensheviks do not agree with him. *Proletary* pointed out the hypocrisy of such a repudiation, since it was *not* reprinted in *Golos* and was not accompanied by a systematic explanation of Cherevanin's "mistakes" in the Russian press.* Is not this exactly how bourgeois ministers behave, beginning with Stolypin and ending with Briand: by making reservations, corrections, by repudiating and over-zealous kindred-spirit and over-ardent supporter, and by continuing the old line under this cover?

Golos No. 16-17 publishes a letter from Cherevanin to the editors with its comment. *Proletary* is accused of "slander" because we allegedly "concealed" from the public that Cherevanin himself "corrected the mistake" in his book: *The Contemporary Situation and the Possible Future* (Moscow, 1908).

We shall show our readers once again *what are the methods* of the Golosists, and what it means when they accuse *Proletary* of "slandering" them as liquidators.

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 452-60.—*Ed.*

We shall limit ourselves to a few quotations from Cherevanin's above-mentioned new book. Page 173: "In general I do not retract anything of the analysis which I gave in my book: *The Proletariat in the Revolution*. The proletariat and the Social-Democrats have unquestionably made a number of mistakes which were bound to impede the victory of the revolution, *even if this victory had been possible* [Cherevanin's italics]. But now the question must be asked whether this victory was really possible and whether the mistakes of the proletariat and the Social-Democratic Party were the only causes of the defeat of the revolution. The question itself suggests the answer. The defeat of the revolution is so profound and the reign of the reaction, for the next few years at least, is so secure that it would be quite impossible to refer the causes of this to any mistakes of the proletariat. Here, evidently, it is a question not of mistakes but of deeper causes."

There, according to *Golos*, you have Cherevanin's "correction of the mistake"! Cherevanin does not retract his "analysis", but *deepens* it, adding quite a number of new gems (such as the statistical definition of the "forces of revolution" as *one quarter* of the total population, 21.5%-28%; we shall discuss this gem another time!) . To the thesis that the revolutionary proletariat made mistakes, Cherevanin adds: the revolution did not have the "*possible*" support (p. 197, Cherevanin's italics) of over one quarter of the population—and the Golosists call this a "correction" and loudly accuse *Proletary* of slander.

Page 176: "Let us imagine that the Mensheviks had all along adhered consistently to their Menshevik principles and had not fallen under the influence of the revolutionary intoxication of the Bolsheviks, by taking part in the November strike in St. Petersburg, the forcible introduction of the 8-hour day and the boycott of the First Duma." (Conclusion: the tactics of the proletariat would have improved, but defeat would have followed just the same.)

Page 138: "Perhaps the revolutionary and oppositional [listen to this!] parties in the stormy year of 1905 went too far in their expectations of a radical break-up of the agrarian and political relations."

That should be enough, it seems? Liquidationism and renegacy repeated and aggravated, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*

calls a correction. Tomorrow a German translation of *The Contemporary Situation* will come out—the Golosists will publish a new repudiation *for the Germans*—Cherevanin will publish a new "reservation"—the liquidationist preaching will be intensified—*Golos* will wax nobly indignant at being slanderously accused of liquidationism. An old story, but ever new.

Maslov, Martov and Potresov simply cannot understand, not for the life of them, what was the "spirit" in the writings of Potresov that—at long last!—caused even Plekhanov, a Marxist who had gone to such lengths in manoeuvring round the Cadets, to flare up. So you don't understand, my dear Golosists? And after these quotations from Cherevanin's "corrected" book you still don't understand? How convenient it is sometimes to be dense!

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THE BOURGEOIS PRESS FABLE ABOUT THE EXPULSION OF GORKY

For several days now the bourgeois newspapers of France (*L'Eclair*, *Le Radical*), Germany (*Berliner Tageblatt*) and Russia (*Utro Rossii*, *Rech*, *Russkoye Slovo*, *Novoye Vremya*) have been smacking their lips over a most sensational piece of news: the expulsion of Gorky from the Social-Democratic Party. *Vorwärts* has already published a refutation of this nonsensical report. The editorial board of *Proletary* has also sent a denial to several newspapers, but the bourgeois press ignores it and continues to boost the libel.

It is easy to see how it originated: some penny-a-liner overheard a whisper of the dissensions about otzovism and god-building (a question which has been discussed openly for almost a year in the Party in general and in *Proletary* in particular), made an unholy mess in weaving together his fragments of information and "earned a pretty penny" out of imaginary "interviews", etc.

The aim of this slanderous campaign is no less clear. The bourgeois parties *would like* Gorky to leave the Social-Democratic Party. The bourgeois newspapers are sparing no effort to fan the dissensions in the Social-Democratic Party and to give a distorted picture of them.

Their labour is in vain. Comrade Gorky by his great works of art has bound himself too closely to the workers' movement in Russia and throughout the world to reply with anything but contempt.

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IDEOLOGICAL DECAY AND DISUNITY AMONG RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[58]

The fight against otzovism and liquidationism, which has naturally occupied the first place among the tasks of the really Marxist and Social-Democratic elements of our Party, should not, however, hide from us the more profound evil which has in essence given rise to both otzovism and liquidationism and which, according to all the evidence, will give rise to a number of further new tactical absurdities. This evil is the ideological decay and disunity which has wholly taken possession of liberalism and is finding its way into our Party from all sides.

The following is one of the numerous illustrations of this disunity. A comrade who had long worked in the Party, an old Iskrist and old Bolshevik, was prevented by imprisonment and exile from taking part in the movement for a very long time, almost from the beginning of 1906. He recently returned to work, became acquainted with otzovism-ultimatumism, and rejected it with dissatisfaction and indignation as a scandalous corruption of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics. Having learned of the state of work in Odessa and St. Petersburg, this comrade came, *inter alia*, to the following conclusion or "provisional result" from his observations: "...It seems to me that the hardest time has passed and it remains to liquidate the remnants of the period of break-up and disintegration." But there are not a few of these remnants.

"In all the St. Petersburg work," we read in the same letter, "one feels the absence of a single guiding centre, indiscipline, lack of order, the absence of connection between the separate parts, the absence of unity and plan in the work.

Each one works on his own account. Otzovist tendencies are strong in the illegal organisation, they infect even anti-otzovists" ... (obviously, this refers to those Bolsheviks who, despite *Proletary*'s repeated and emphatic insistence, have not broken with the otzovists, do not wage a relentless war against them, make attempts at conciliation, uselessly delaying the inevitable denouement without obtaining in fact any renunciation of their stupid tactics by the otzovist-ultimatumists).... "On this basis there is developing a characteristic phenomenon which has been quite independently shown in Odessa as well, viz., revolutionary inaction. Wherever the spirit of otzovism prevails, it is strikingly evident that the illegal organisations are doing nothing. One or two propagandist circles, a struggle against legal opportunities—that is the total activity. It is mostly of a disorganising nature, as you can see from the extensive data I sent you from Odessa" ... (used in the article:...*). "As regards legal possibilities, their utilisation lacks a consistent Social-Democratic line. In the darkness of the reaction, the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement have raised their heads and 'brazen it out', knowing that it is not dangerous now to go against the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy. One encounters here such a thoroughgoing revision of revolutionary Social-Democracy, of its programme and tactics, that in comparison with it Bernstein's[59] revisionism seems child's play. The R.S.D.L.P. does not understand Marx, it has made an incorrect analysis of the tendencies of Russian economic development; there was never any feudal system in Russia, there was a feudalistic-trading system; there were not and are not any contradictions between the interests of the bourgeoisie and those of the landed nobility, nor is there an alliance between them, for these two classes invented by Russian Social-Democracy constitute a single bourgeois class (this is a distinctive feature of Russia) and the autocracy is the organisation of this class. The weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, on which was based (??—the interrogation marks are those of the author) the slogan of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' is imagi-

* In the manuscript a place is left blank here for the title of the article.—*Ed.*

nary, and this slogan was and remains utopian. It should be discarded, together with the democratic republic, for the Russian train has gone on to the German lines."...[60]

It is clear that we have here an instantaneous photograph of one of the rivulets of that broad torrent of ideological confusion which gives rise to otzovism and liquidationism, sometimes fantastically mixing up and even blending together the premises of extreme Right and extreme "Left" idiotism. The first half of these premises (the absence of contradiction between the bourgeoisie and feudalistic landownership, etc.) is so illogical and absurd that it is difficult even to take it seriously. It is not worth cry...*.

Written at the end of November
(beginning of December), 1909

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* The manuscript here breaks off.—*Ed.*

EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE DRAFT OF THE MAIN GROUNDS OF THE BILL ON THE EIGHT-HOUR WORKING DAY

II*

In the present, second part of the explanatory note we intend to dwell on the question of the *type* of the Social-Democratic Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day for the Third Duma and on the *grounds* explaining the *basic features* of the Bill.

The original draft in the possession of the Duma Social-Democratic group and given to our subcommittee could be taken as a basis, but it has required a number of alterations.

The main aim of the Bills introduced by the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma must lie in *propaganda and agitation* for the Social-Democratic programme and tactics. Any hopes of the "reformism" of the Third Duma would not only be ludicrous, but would threaten completely to distort the character of Social-Democratic revolutionary tactics and convert it into the tactics of opportunist, liberal social-reformism. Needless to say, such a distortion of Social-Democratic Duma tactics would directly and emphatically contradict the universally binding decisions of our Party, viz.: the resolutions of the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the resolutions, confirmed by the Central

* The first part of the first chapter of the explanatory note should include a popular account, written in as propagandist a manner as possible, of the reasons in favour of the eight-hour working day, from the point of view of the productivity of labour, the health and cultural interests of the proletariat, and the interests in general of its struggle for emancipation.

Committee, of the All-Russian Party Conferences of November 1907 and December 1908.

For Bills introduced by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma to fulfil their purpose, the following conditions are necessary.

(1) Bills must set out in the clearest and most definite form the individual demands of the Social-Democrats included in the minimum programme of our Party or necessarily following from this programme;

(2) Bills must never be burdened with an abundance of legal subtleties; they must give the *main grounds* for the proposed laws, but not elaborately worded texts of laws with all details;

(3) Bills should not excessively isolate various spheres of social reform and democratic changes, as might appear essential from a narrowly legal, administrative or "purely parliamentary" standpoint. On the contrary, pursuing the aim of Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation, Bills should give the working class the most definite idea possible of the *necessary connection* between factory (and social in general) reforms and the *democratic* political changes without which all "reforms" of the Stolypin autocracy are inevitably destined to undergo a "Zubatovist"[61] distortion and be reduced to a dead letter. As a matter of course this indication of the connection between economic reforms and politics must be achieved not by including in all Bills the demands of consistent democracy in their entirety, but by bringing to the fore the democratic and specially proletarian-democratic institutions corresponding to each individual reform, and the impossibility of realising such institutions without radical political changes must be emphasised in the explanatory note to the Bill;

(4) in view of the extreme difficulty under present conditions of legal Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation among the masses, Bills must be so composed that the Bill taken separately and the explanatory note to it taken separately *can achieve their aim* on reaching the masses (whether by being reprinted in non-Social-Democratic newspapers, or by the distribution of separate leaflets with the text of the Bill, etc.), i.e., can be read by rank-and-file unenlightened workers to the advantage of the development

of their class-consciousness. With this end in view the Bills in their *entire* structure must be imbued with a spirit of proletarian distrust of the employers and of the state as an organ serving the employers: in other words, the spirit of the class struggle must permeate the whole structure of the Bill and ensue from the sum of its separate propositions;

finally (5) under conditions in Russia today, i.e., in the absence of a Social-Democratic press and Social-Democratic meetings, Bills must give a sufficiently *concrete* idea of the changes demanded by the Social-Democrats and not limit themselves to a mere *proclamation* of principle. The ordinary unenlightened worker should find his interest aroused by the Social-Democratic Bill, he should be inspired by its concrete picture of change so that later he passes from this individual picture to the Social-Democratic world outlook as a whole.

Proceeding from these basic premises, it has to be admitted that the type of Bill chosen by the author of the original draft of the Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day is *more in accordance* with Russian conditions than, for example, those Bills on a shorter working day which were introduced by the French and German Social-Democrats in their parliaments. For example, the Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day moved by Jules Guesde in the French Chamber of Deputies on May 22, 1894, contains two articles: the first forbids working longer than eight hours per day and six days per week, the second permits work in several shifts provided that the number of working hours per week does not exceed 48.* The German Social-Democratic Bill of 1890 contains 14 lines, proposing a 10-hour working day immediately, a nine-hour working day from January 1, 1894, and an eight-hour day from January 1, 1898. In the session of 1900-02 the German Social-Democrats put forward a still shorter proposal for limiting the working day immediately to ten hours, and subsequently.**

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* Jules Guesde, *Le Problème et la solution*; *les huit heures à la chambre*, Lille. (*The Problem and Its Solution*; *the Eight-Hour Day in Parliament—Ed.*)

** M. Schippel, *Sozial-Demokratisches Reichstagshandbuch* (*Social-Democratic Handbook to the Reichstag—Ed.*) Berlin, 1902, pp. 882 and 886.

In any case, of course, such Bills are ten times more rational from the Social-Democratic point of view than attempts to "adapt" oneself to what is *practicable* for reactionary or bourgeois governments. But whereas in France and Germany, where there is freedom of press and assembly, it suffices to draft a Bill with only a *proclamation of principle*, in our case in Russia at the present time it is necessary to add *concrete propaganda* material in the Bill *itself*.

Hence we regard as more expedient the *type* adopted by the author of the original draft, but a number of corrections need to be made in this draft, for in some cases the author commits what is in our opinion an extremely important and extremely dangerous mistake, viz., he lowers the demands of our minimum programme without any need for it (e.g., by fixing the weekly rest period at 36 hours instead of 42, or by saying nothing about the need to have the consent of the workers' organisations for permitting night work). In a few cases the author, as it were, tries to adapt his Bill to the requirement of "practicability" by proposing, for example, that the *minister* should decide requests for exceptions (with the matter being raised in the legislative body) and by making no mention of the role of the workers' trade union organisations in implementing the law on the eight-hour day.

The Bill proposed by our subcommittee introduces into the original draft a number of corrections in the above-mentioned direction. In particular, we shall dwell on the grounds for the following alterations of the original draft.

On the question of what enterprises should come under the Bill, the sphere of its application should be extended to include all branches of industry, trade and transport, and all kinds of institutions (including those of the state: the post office, etc.) as well as home work. In the explanatory note put forward in the Duma the Social-Democrats must especially emphasise the need for such an extension and for putting an end to all boundaries and divisions (in this matter) between the factory, trading, office, transport and other sections of the proletariat.

The question may arise of agriculture, in view of the demand in our minimum programme for an eight-hour working day "for all wage-workers". We think, however, that it is

hardly expedient *at the present time* for the Russian Social-Democrats to take the initiative in proposing an eight-hour working day in agriculture. It would be better to make the proviso in the explanatory note that the Party reserves the right to introduce a further Bill in regard to both agriculture and domestic service, etc.

Further, in all, cases where the Bill deals with the permissibility of exceptions to the law, we have inserted a demand for the consent of the workers' trade union to each exception. This is essential in order to show the workers clearly that it is impossible to achieve an actual reduction of the working day without independent action on the part of the workers' organisations.

Next, we must deal with the question of the *gradual* introduction of the eight-hour working day. The author of the original draft does not say a word about this, limiting himself to the simple demand for the eight-hour day as in Jules Guesde's Bill. Our draft, on the other hand, follows the model of Parvus* and the draft of the German Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag, establishing a *gradual* introduction of the eight-hour working day (immediately, i.e.. within three months of the law coming into force, a ten-hour day, and a reduction by one hour annually). Of course, the difference between the two drafts is not such an essential one. But in view of the very great technical backwardness of Russian industry, the extremely weak organisation of the Russian proletariat and the huge mass of the working class population (handicraftsmen, etc.) that has not yet participated in any big campaign for a reduction of the working day—in view of all these conditions it will be more expedient *here and now*, in the Bill *itself*, to answer the inevitable objection that a sharp change is impossible, that with such a change the workers' wages will be reduced, etc.** Laying

* Parvus, *Die Handelskrisis und die Gewerkschaften*. Nebst Anhang, Gesetzentwurf über den achtstundigen Normalarbeitstag. München: 1901 (Parvus, *The Trade Crisis and the Trade Unions*. With appendix: Bill on the Eight-Hour Normal Working Day, Munich, 1901.

** On the question of the *gradual* introduction of the eight-hour working day Parvus says, in our opinion quite rightly, that this feature of his Bill arises "not from the desire to come to an understanding with the employers but from the desire to come to an understanding with the workers. We should follow the tactics of the trade unions:

down a gradual introduction of the eight-hour working day (the Germans protracted its introduction to eight years; Parvus to four years; we are proposing two years) provides an immediate reply to this objection: work in excess of ten hours per day is certainly irrational economically and impermissible on health and cultural grounds. The annual term, however, for reducing the working day by one hour fully suffices for the technically backward enterprises to come into line and introduce changes, and for the workers to go over to the new system without an appreciable difference in labour productivity.

The introduction of the eight-hour working day should be made gradual not in order to "adapt" the Bill to the measure of the capitalists or government (there can be no question of this, and if such ideas were to arise-we should, of course, prefer to exclude any mention of gradualness), but in order to show everyone quite clearly the technical, cultural and economic practicability of the Social-Democratic programme in even one of the most backward countries.

A serious objection to making the introduction of the eight-hour working day a gradual one in the *Russian* Social-Democratic Bill would be that this would disavow, even if indirectly, the revolutionary Soviets of Workers' Deputies of 1905, which called for *immediate* realisation of the eight-hour working day. We regard this as a serious objection, for the slightest disavowal of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies *in this respect* would be direct renegacy, or at any rate support of the renegades and counter-revolutionary liberals, who have made themselves notorious by such a disavowal.

We think therefore that *in any case*, whether gradualness will be incorporated in the Bill of the Social-Democratic Duma group or not, in any case it is altogether essential that *both* the explanatory note submitted to the Duma *and* the Duma speech of the Social-Democratic representative, should quite definitely express a view which absolutely excludes the slightest disavowal of the actions of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies and absolutely *includes* our recognition of them as correct in principle, wholly legitimate and necessary.

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they carry out the reduction of the working day extremely gradually for they are well aware that this is the easiest way to counteract a *reduction of wages*". (Parvus's italics, ibid., pp. 62-63).

"The Social-Democrats," so, approximately, the statement of the Social-Democratic representatives or their explanatory note should read, "do not in any case renounce the *immediate* introduction of the eight-hour working day; on the contrary, in *certain* historical conditions, when the struggle becomes acute, when the energy and initiative of the mass movement are at a high level, when the clash between the old society and the new assumes sharp forms, when for the success of the working class struggle against medievalism, for instance, it is *essential* not to stop at anything—in short, in conditions resembling those of November 1905—the Social-Democrats regard the *immediate* introduction of the eight-hour working day as not only legitimate but even *essential*. By inserting in its Bill at the present time a gradual introduction of the eight-hour working day, the Social-Democrats merely desire to show thereby the entire possibility of putting into effect the demands of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P. even under the worst historical conditions, even during the slowest tempo of economic, social and cultural development."

Let us repeat: we consider *such* a declaration on the part of the Social-Democrats in the Duma and in their explanatory note to the Bill on the eight-hour working day as *absolutely* and under all circumstances essential, whereas the question of introducing a gradual establishment of the eight-hour working day in the Bill itself is relatively less important.

The remaining changes made by us in the original draft of the Bill concern particular details and do not require special comment.

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LETTER TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

December 16, 1909

Dear Colleague,

I have received your answer and take up my pen to continue our discussion.

You want to shift the question more to the theoretical (not tactical) ground. I agree. I shall only remind you that your point of departure was a tactical one: certainly you rejected the "classical presentation" of the basic tactical proposition. You indicated this tactical solution (without drawing the final tactical *conclusions* from it) in connection with the rejection of the "American possibility". Therefore, I do not regard as correct the account of our differences of opinion that you give in the following words: "You [i.e., I] emphasise the existence of a movement of the *peasantry*. I recognise the existence of a movement of the peasantry that is *becoming proletarianised*." But this is not the point of difference. Of course I do not deny that the peasantry is becoming proletarianised. The point of difference is whether the bourgeois agrarian system has taken root in Russia to such an extent as to make a sharp transition from the "Prussian" development of agrarian capitalism to the "American" development of agrarian capitalism objectively impossible. If it has, the "classical" presentation of the basic question of tactics falls to the ground. If not—it is preserved.

Well, I maintain that it must be preserved. I do not deny the possibility of the "Prussian" path; I recognise that a Marxist must not "vouch" for *either* of these ways, nor must he *bind* himself *down* to one of them *only*; I recognise that Stolypin's policy[62] is *another* step along the "Prussian" path and that at a certain stage along that path a dialectical

change may set in which would abolish all hopes and prospects for an "American" path. But I assert that at the present time this change has certainly not yet come and that, therefore, it is absolutely inadmissible for a Marxist, absolutely wrong theoretically, to renounce the "classical" presentation of the question. That is where we differ.

Theoretically these differences reduce themselves, if I am not mistaken, to two chief points: 1) I must destroy your "ally", V. Ilyin,[63] in order to justify my position. In other words, this position contradicts the results of the Marxist analysis of the pre-revolutionary economics of Russia. 2) The "classical" presentation may and must be compared with the agrarian opportunism of the revisionists (David and Co.), for there is no substantial, radical difference in principle between the presentation of the question of the workers' attitude towards the "muzhik" in Russia and in Germany.

I consider both these propositions to be radically wrong.

Ad* 1) (In order not to touch on "tactics" I shall set aside Martynov's attack on Ilyin[64] and take up only your presentation of the theoretical question.)

What did Ilyin argue and prove? In the first place, that the development of agrarian relations in Russia is proceeding on capitalist lines *both* in landlord *and* in peasant economy, *both* outside *and* within the "village commune". In the second place, that this development has already *irrevocably* determined that there will be no other path than the capitalist path, *no* other grouping of classes than the capitalist grouping.

This was the subject of the dispute with the Narodniks. This had to be proved. It was proved. It remains proved. At the present time *another*, further question is raised (and *was raised* by the movement of 1905-07), which *presupposes* the solution of the problem that was solved by Ilyin (and, of course, not by him alone), but which presupposes *not only* this, but something bigger, more complex, something new. *Apart* from the problem that was finally and correctly solved in 1883-85, in 1895-99, the history of Russia in the twentieth century has confronted us with a *further* problem,

* With regard to.—*Ed.*

and theoretically there is nothing more erroneous than to recede from it, dismiss it, or wave it aside by a reference to what has previously been solved. That would mean reducing problems of, so to say, a second, i.e., higher, order to problems of a lower, first order. We cannot halt at a *general* solution of the problem of capitalism when *new* events (and events that are of world-historic importance such as those of 1905-07) have raised a more concrete problem, of a more detailed nature, the problem of the struggle between the *two* paths or methods of *capitalist* agrarian development. When we were fighting against the Narodniks to prove that this path was inevitably and irrevocably a capitalist one, we were quite right and we could not *but* concentrate all our strength, all our attention on the question: capitalism or "people's production". This was natural, inevitable and legitimate. Now, however, this question has been *settled* both in theory and in reality (for the petty-bourgeois character of the Trudoviks *en masse* has been proved by recent Russian history), and another, higher question has taken its place: capitalism of type α *or* capitalism of type β. And, in my humble opinion, Ilyin was right when, in the preface to the second edition of his book, he pointed out that it *follows* from the book that *two* types of capitalist, agrarian development are possible, and that the historical struggle *between these types* has not yet come to an end.*

The special feature of Russian opportunism in Marxism, i.e., of Menshevism in our time, is that it is associated with a doctrinaire simplification, vulgarisation and distortion of the letter of Marxism, and a betrayal of its spirit (such was the case with both *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism and Struve-ism). While fighting Narodism as a wrong doctrine *of socialism*, the Mensheviks, in a doctrinaire fashion, overlooked the historically real and progressive historical *content* of Narodism as a theory of the mass *petty-bourgeois* struggle of democratic capitalism against liberal-landlord capitalism, of "American" capitalism against "Prussian" capitalism. Hence their monstrous, idiotic, renegade idea (which has also thoroughly permeated *The Social Movement*) that the peasant *movement* is reactionary, that a Cadet is more progressive

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 31-34.—*Ed.*

than a Trudovik, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" (= the classical presentation) *contradicts* "*the entire course* of economic development" (p. 661 of the Menshevik *Social Movement*). "Contradicts *the entire course* of economic development"—is this not reactionary?

I maintain that the struggle against this monstrous distortion of Marxism was the basis of the "classical presentation" and a *correct* basis, although unfortunately, owing to the natural conditions of the time, this struggle was very zealously conducted as regards tactics, and not zealously enough as regards theory. By the way, "unfortunately" is not the right word here and should be struck out!

This agrarian question is *now* the *national* question of bourgeois development in Russia, and in order not to fall into the error of a mistaken (mechanical) application of the German model, which in many respects is correct and in all respects very valuable, to our conditions, we must clearly understand that the national question of the fully established bourgeois development of Germany was unification, etc., and not the agrarian question; whereas the *national* question of the final consolidation of bourgeois development in Russia *is* precisely the agrarian (and even narrower: the peasant) question.

Such is the purely theoretical basis of the *difference* in *application* of Marxism in Germany in *1848-68* (approximately) and in Russia in 1905??

How can I prove that in our country the *agrarian* question, and not some other, *has assumed* national significance for bourgeois development? I do not even know that it requires proof. I think it is indisputable. But this is precisely the *theoretical* basis and all the partial questions must *turn on this*. If this is disputed, I shall briefly point out (briefly for the time being) that it is precisely the course of events, the facts and the *history* of 1905-07 that have *proved* the importance I have indicated of the agrarian (peasant, and of course petty-bourgeois peasant, but not village-commune peasant) question in Russia. The same thing is being proved *now* by the law of June 3, 1907, and by the composition and activity of the Third Duma, and—a detail—by November 20, 1909,[65] and (what is especially important) by the government's agrarian policy.

If we agree that the *recent* history of Russia, the history of 1905-09, has *proved* the fundamental, prime, national significance (national in the above sense) of the agrarian question in establishing a definite type of bourgeois evolution in Russia, then we can proceed further; otherwise we cannot.

By 1905 the bourgeois development of Russia had already matured sufficiently to require the immediate break-up of the antiquated superstructure—the antiquated medieval system of land tenure (you understand, of course, why, of the *entire* superstructure, I take here land tenure alone). We are now living in the period of *this* break-up, which various classes of *bourgeois* Russia are *trying* to complete, to consummate in their own way: the peasants (+the workers) by means of nationalisation (I am very glad you agree with me on the absolute absurdity of municipalisation: I have already quoted passages from *Theorien über den Mehrwert** in favour of nationalisation in one of my works printed *in part* in Polish)**; the landlords (+the old bourgeoisie, the Girondist bourgeoisie) by the method of November 9, 1906, etc. Land nationalisation = the break-up of the old system of land tenure by the peasants is the economic basis of the American path. The law of November 9, 1906 = the break-up of the old system of land tenure in the interests of the landlords, is the economic basis of the Prussian path. Our epoch, 1905-??, is the epoch of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle between *these* paths, *just as 1848-71* in Germany was a period of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle between two paths of unification (= of the solution of the *national* problem of bourgeois development in Germany), the path *through* the Great-German Republic and the path *through* the Prussian monarchy. *It was only in 1871* that the second path was *finally* (that is where my "completely" comes in) *victorious*. It was then that Liebknecht gave up the boycott of parliament. It was then that the dispute between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers *died down*. It was then too that the question of a general *democratic* revolution in Germany *died down*—and Naumann, David and Co. started in the nineties (twenty years *later*!) to revive the corpse.

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* *Theories of Surplus Value.—Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 158-81.—*Ed.*

In our country the struggle is *still* going on. Neither of the agrarian paths has won so far. In our country, in every crisis of *our* epoch (1905-09-??), a "*general* democratic" movement of the "muzhik" *will arise*, is bound to arise, and to ignore it would be a fundamental mistake which, *in practice*, would lead to Menshevism, although *in theory* the dispute may be placed on a different plane. It is not I who "reduce" the dispute to "Menshevism", it is the *history* of our epoch that *reduces* to Menshevism the ignoring by the proletariat of the national task of the bourgeois development of Russia, for this is precisely the *essence* of Menshevism.

Nebenbei.* Have you read, in *Cherevanin*'s *The Contemporary Situation*, about the *opportunism* of the "classical presentation" of the question by the Bolsheviks? Read it!

Ad 2) I have really said almost all there is to be said about this. In Germany the support *by the workers* of the desire of the "muzhik" to get for himself (i.e., for the muzhik) the land of the big landlords—the Junkers—is reactionary. Isn't that so? Is it not true? In Russia in 1905-09-?? the *denial* of that support is reactionary. *Hic Rhodus hic salta.*** Here it is a question of either renouncing the entire agrarian programme and going over ... almost to Cadetism ... or of *recognising* the difference *in principle* between the presentation of the question in Germany and that in Russia, in principle—not in the sense that the epoch is non-capitalist in our country, but in the sense that these are two *altogether* different *epochs* of capitalism, differing in principle: the epoch *preceding* the final consolidation of the national path of capitalism, and the epoch *succeeding* such consolidation.

I conclude for the time being. I shall try to send you newspaper cuttings on the subject of our discussion. Write when you can spare time. Warm greetings.

Yours, *Starik*.***

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* By the way.—*Ed.*

** Here is Rhodes, leap here!—*Ed.*

*** The Old Man.—*Ed.*

CONCERNING *VEKHI*[66]

The well-known symposium *Vekhi*, compiled from contributions by the most influential Constitutional-Democratic publicists, which has run through several editions in a short time and has been rapturously received by the whole reactionary press, is a real sign of the times. However much the Cadet newspapers do to "rectify" particular passages in Vekhi that are excessively nauseating, however much it is repudiated by some Cadets who are quite powerless to influence the policy of the Constitutional-Democratic Party as a whole or are aiming to deceive the masses as to the true significance of this policy, it is an unquestionable fact that "*Vekhi*" *has expressed the unmistakable essence of modern Cadetism*. The party of the Cadets is the party of *Vekhi*.

Prizing above everything the development of the political and class-consciousness of the masses, working-class democrats should welcome *Vekhi* as a magnificent exposure of the essence of the political trend of the Cadets by their ideological leaders. The gentlemen who have written *Vekhi* are: Berdayev, Bulgakov, Herschensohn, Kistyakovsky, Struve, Frank and Izgoyev. The very names of these well-known deputies, well-known renegades and well-known Cadets, are eloquent enough. The authors of *Vekhi* speak as real ideological leaders of a whole social trend. They give us in concise outline a complete encyclopaedia on questions of philosophy, religion, politics, publicist literature, and appraisals of the whole liberation movement and the whole history of Russian democracy. By giving *Vekhi* the subtitle "A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia" the authors understate the actual subject-matter of their publication, for, with them, the "intelligentsia" in fact appears as the spiritual leader, inspirer and mouthpiece of the whole Russian de-

mocracy and the whole Russian liberation movement. *Vekhi* is a most significant landmark on the road of Russian Cadetism and Russian liberalism in general towards a *complete break* with the Russian liberation movement, with all its main aims and fundamental traditions.

I

This *encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy* embraces three main subjects: 1) the struggle against the ideological principles of the whole world outlook of Russian (and international) democracy; 2) repudiation and vilification of the liberation movement of recent years; 3) an open proclamation of its "flunkey" sentiments (and a corresponding "flunkey" policy) in relation to the Octobrist bourgeoisie, the old regime and the entire old Russia in general.

The authors of *Vekhi* start from the philosophical bases of the "intellectualist" world outlook. The book is permeated through and through with bitter opposition to materialism, which is qualified as nothing but dogmatism, metaphysics, "the most elementary and lowest form of philosophising" (p. 4—references are to the first edition of *Vekhi*). Positivism is condemned because "for us" (i.e., the Russian "intelligentsia" that *Vekhi* annihilates) it was "identified with materialist metaphysics" or was interpreted "exclusively in the spirit of materialism" (15), while "no mystic, no believer, can deny scientific positivism in science" (11). Don't laugh! "Hostility to idealist and religious mystical tendencies" (6)—such is the charge with which *Vekhi* attacks the "intelligentsia". "Yurkevich, at any rate, was a real philosopher in comparison with Chernyshevsky" (4).

Holding this point of view, *Vekhi* very naturally thunders incessantly against the atheism of the "intelligentsia" and strives with might and main to re-establish the religious world outlook in its entirety. Having demolished Chernyshevsky as a philosopher it is quite natural that *Vekhi* demolishes Belinsky as a publicist. Belinsky, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky were the leaders of the "intellectuals" (134, 56, 32, 17 and elsewhere). Chaadayev, Vladimir Solovyov, Dostoyevsky were "not intellectuals at all". The former were

the leaders of a trend against which *Vekhi* is fighting to the death. The latter "tirelessly maintained" the very same things that *Vekhi* stands for today, but "they were unheeded, the intelligentsia passed them by", declares the preface to *Vekhi*.

The reader can already see from this that it is not the "intelligentsia" that *Vekhi* is attacking. This is only an artificial and misleading manner of expression. The attack is being pursued all along the line against democracy, against the democratic world outlook. And since it is inconvenient for the ideological leaders of a party that advertises itself as "constitutional" and "democratic" to call things by their true names, they have borrowed their terminology from the *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*.[67] They are not renouncing democracy (what a scandalous libel!) but only "intellectualism".

Belinsky's letter to Gogol, declares *Vekhi*, is a "lurid and classical expression of intellectualist sentiment" (56). "The history of our publicist literature, after Belinsky, in the sense of an understanding of life, is a sheer nightmare" (82).

Well, well. The serf peasants' hostility to serfdom is obviously an "intellectualist" sentiment. The history of the protest and struggle of the broadest masses of the population from 1861 to 1905 against the survivals of feudalism throughout the whole system of Russian life is evidently a "sheer nightmare". Or, perhaps, in the opinion of our wise and educated authors, Belinsky's sentiments in the letter to Gogol did not depend on the feelings of the serf peasants? The history of our publicist literature did not depend on the indignation of the popular masses against the survivals of feudal oppression?

Moskovskiye Vedomosti has always tried to prove that Russian democracy, beginning with Belinsky at least, in no way expresses the interests of the broadest masses of the population in the struggle for the elementary rights of the people, violated by feudal institutions, but expresses only "intellectualist sentiments".

Vekhi has the same programme as *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* both in philosophy and in publicist matters. In philosophy, however, the liberal renegades decided to tell the whole truth, to reveal *all* their programme (war on materialism and the materialist interpretation of positivism, restoration of mysticism and the mystical world outlook), whereas on

publicist subjects they prevaricate and hedge and Jesuitise. They have broken with the most fundamental ideas of democracy, the most elementary democratic tendencies, but pretend that they are breaking only with "intellectualism". The liberal bourgeoisie has decisively turned away from defence of popular rights to defence of institutions hostile to the people. But the liberal politicians want to retain the title of "democrats".

The same trick that was performed with Belinsky's letter to Gogol and the history of Russian publicist literature is being applied to the history of the recent movement.

II

As a matter of fact *Vekhi* attacks only the intelligentsia that was a voice of the democratic movement and only for that which showed it to be a real participant in this movement. *Vekhi* furiously attacks the intelligentsia precisely because this "little underground sect came out into the broad light of day, gained a multitude of disciples and for a time became ideologically influential and even actually powerful" (176). The liberals sympathised with the "intelligentsia" and sometimes supported it secretly *as long as* it remained *merely* a little underground sect, until it gained a multitude of disciples and became actually powerful; that is to say, the liberals sympathised with democracy as long as it did not set in motion the real masses, for, as long as the masses were not drawn in, it only served the self-seeking aims of liberalism, it only helped the upper section of the liberal bourgeoisie to climb a little nearer to power. The liberal turned his back on democracy when it drew in the masses, who began to realise their *own* aims and uphold their *own* interests. Under the cover of outcries against the democratic "intelligentsia" *the war of the Cadets is in fact being waged against the democratic movement of the masses*. One of the innumerable and obvious revelations of this in *Vekhi* is its declaration that the great social movement of the end of the eighteenth century in France was "an example of a sufficiently prolonged intellectualist revolution, displaying all its spiritual potentialities" (57).

Good, is it not? The French movement of the end of the eighteenth century, please note, was not an example of the democratic movement of the masses in its profoundest and broadest form, but an example of "intellectualist" revolution! Since democratic aims have never anywhere in the world been achieved without a movement of a homogeneous type it is perfectly obvious that the ideological leaders of liberalism are breaking with democracy.

The feature of the Russian intelligentsia that *Vekhi* inveighs against is the *necessary* accompaniment and expression of any democratic movement. "The admixture of the political radicalism of intellectualist ideas to the social radicalism of popular instincts* was achieved with amazing rapidity" (141)—and this was "not simply a political mistake, not simply an error of tactics. The mistake here was a moral one." Where there are no martyred popular masses, there can be no democratic movement. And what distinguishes a democratic movement from a mere "riot" is that it proceeds under the banner of certain radical political ideas. Democratic movements and democratic ideas are not only politically erroneous, are not only out of place tactically but are morally sinful—such in essence is the real opinion of *Vekhi*, which does not differ one iota from the real opinions of Pobedonostsev.[68] Pobedonostsev only said more honestly and candidly what Struve, Izgoyev, Frank and Co. are saying.

When *Vekhi* proceeds to define more precisely the substance of the hateful "intellectualist" ideas, it naturally speaks about "Left" ideas in general and Narodnik and Marxist ideas in particular. The Narodniks are accused of "spurious love for the peasantry" and the Marxists "for the proletariat" (9). Both are blasted to smithereens for "idolisation of the people" (59, 59-60). To the odious "intellectual" "god is the people, the sole aim is the happiness of the majority" (159). "The stormy oratory of the atheistic Left bloc" (29)—this is what impressed itself most on the memory of the Cadet Bulgakov in the Second Duma and particularly aroused his indignation. And there is not the slightest doubt that Bulgakov has expressed here, somewhat more conspicuously than

* "Of the martyred popular masses" is the phrase used on the same page, two lines down.

others, the general Cadet psychology, he has voiced the cherished thoughts of the whole Cadet Party.

That for a liberal the distinction between Narodism and Marxism is obliterated is not accidental, but inevitable. It is not the "trick" of the writer (who is perfectly aware of the distinction) but a logical expression of the present nature of liberalism. At the *present* time what the liberal bourgeoisie in Russia dreads and abominates is not so much the socialist movement of the working class in Russia as the democratic movement both of the workers and the peasants, i.e., it dreads and abominates what Narodism and Marxism have in common, their defence of democracy by appealing to the masses. It is characteristic of the present period that liberalism in Russia has decisively turned against democracy; quite naturally it is not concerned either with the distinctions within democracy or with the further aims, vistas and prospects which will be unfolded when democracy is achieved.

Vekhi simply teems with catchwords like "idolisation of the people". This is not surprising, for the liberal bourgeoisie, which has become frightened of the people, has no alternative but to shout about the democrats' "idolisation of the people". The retreat cannot but be covered by an extra loud roll of the drums. In point of fact, it is impossible to deny outright that it was in the shape of the workers' and peasants' deputies that the first two Dumas expressed the real interests, demands and views of the mass of the workers and peasants. Yet it was just these "intellectualist"* deputies who infected the Cadets with their abysmal *hatred of the "Lefts"* because of the exposure of the Cadets' everlasting retreats from democracy. In point of fact, it is impossible to deny outright the justice of the "four-point electoral system" demand[69]; yet no political leader who is at all honest has the slightest doubt that in contemporary Russia elections on the "four-point" system, really democratic elec-

* *Vekhi*'s distortion of the ordinary meaning of the word "intellectual" is really laughable. We have only to look through the list of deputies in the first two Dumas to see at once the overwhelming majority of peasants among the Trudoviks, the predominance of workers among the Social-Democrats and the concentration of the mass of the bourgeois intelligentsia among the Cadets.

tions, would give an overwhelming majority to the Trudovik deputies together with the deputies of the workers' party.

Nothing remains for the back-sliding liberal bourgeoisie but to conceal its break with democracy by means of catchwords from the vocabulary of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* and *Novoye Vremya*[70]; the whole symposium *Vekhi* positively teems with them.

Vekhi is a veritable torrent of reactionary mud poured on the head of democracy. Of course the publicists of *Novoye Vremya*—Rozanov, Menshikov and A. Stolypin—have hastened to salute *Vekhi* with their kisses. Of course, Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia,[71] is enraptured with this publication of the leaders of liberalism.

"When the intellectual," says *Vekhi*, "reflected upon his duty to the people, he never arrived at the thought that the idea of personal responsibility expressed in the principle of duty must be applied not only to him, the intellectual, but to the people as well" (139). The democrat reflected on the extension of the rights and liberty of the people, clothing this thought in words about the "duty" of the upper classes to the people. The democrat could never and will never arrive at the thought that in a country prior to reform or in a country with a June 3 constitution there could be any question of "responsibility" of the people to the ruling classes. To arrive at this thought the democrat, or so-called democrat, must be completely converted into a counter-revolutionary liberal.

"Egoism, self-assertion is a great power," we read in *Vekhi*, "this is what makes the Western bourgeoisie a mighty unconscious instrument of God's will on earth" (95). This is nothing more than a paraphrase flavoured with incense of the celebrated "Enrichissez vous!—enrich yourselves!"—or of our Russian motto: "We put our stake on the strong!"[72] When the bourgeoisie were helping the people to fight for freedom they declared this struggle to be a divine cause. When they became frightened of the people and turned to supporting all kinds of medievalism against the people, they declared as a divine cause "egoism", self-enrichment, a chauvinistic foreign policy, etc. Such was the case all over Europe. It is being repeated in Russia.

"The revolution should virtually and formally have culminated with the edict of October 17" (136). This is the alpha

and omega of Octobrism, i.e., of the programme of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The Octobrists have always said this and acted openly in accordance with it. The Cadets acted *surreptitiously* in the same way (beginning from October 17), but at the same time wanted to keep up the pretence of being democrats. If the cause of democracy is to be successful, a complete, clear and open demarcation between the democrats and the renegades is the most effective and necessary thing. *Vekhi* must be utilised for this necessary act. "We must have the courage to confess at last," writes the renegade Izgoyev, "that in our State Dumas the vast majority of the deputies, with the exception of three or four dozen Cadets and Octobrists, have not displayed knowledge required for the government and reformation of Russia" (208). Well, of course, how could clod-hopping Trudovik deputies or some sort of working men undertake such a task? It needs a majority of Cadets and Octobrists and that needs a Third Duma....

And so that the people and their idolators should realise their "responsibility" to the bosses in the Third Duma and Third Duma Russia the people must be taught—with the assistance of Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia—"repentance" (*Vekhi*, 26), "humility" (49), opposition to "the pride of the intellectual" (52), "obedience" (55), "the plain, coarse food of old Moses' Ten Commandments" (51), struggle against "the legion of devils who have entered the gigantic body of Russia" (68). If the peasants elect Trudoviks and the workers elect Social-Democrats, this of course is just such devils' work, for by their true nature the people, as Katkov and Pobedonostsev discovered long ago, entertain "hatred for the intelligentsia" (87; read: for democracy).

Therefore, *Vekhi* teaches us, Russian citizens must "bless this government which alone with its bayonets and prisons still protects us ["the intellectuals"] from popular fury" (88).

This tirade is good because it is frank; it is useful because it reveals the truth about the real essence of the policy of the whole Constitutional-Democratic Party throughout the period 1905-09. This tirade is good because it reveals concisely and vividly the whole spirit of *Vekhi*. And *Vekhi* is good because it discloses the whole spirit of the *real* policy of the Russian liberals and of the Russian Cadets included among them. That is why the Cadet polemic with *Vekhi*

and the Cadet renunciation of *Vekhi* are nothing but hypocrisy, sheer idle talk, for in reality the Cadets collectively, as a party, as a social force, have pursued and are pursuing the policy of *Vekhi* and *no other*. The calls to take part in the elections to the Bulygin Duma in August and September 1905, the betrayal of the cause of democracy at the end of the same year, their persistent fear of the people and the popular movement and systematic opposition to the deputies of the workers and peasants in the first two Dumas, the voting for the budget, the speeches of Karaulov on religion and Berezovsky on the agrarian question in the Third Duma, the visit to London—these are only a few of the innumerable *landmarks* of just *that* policy which has been ideologically proclaimed in *Vekhi*.

Russian democracy cannot make a single step forward until it understands the essence of this policy and the class roots of it.

Novy Dyen No. 15,
December 13, 1909
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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THE LAST WORD OF RUSSIAN LIBERALISM

The Russian Social-Democrats drew the main lessons of the revolution in the London resolution on the non-proletarian parties.[73] In this resolution the Social-Democratic proletariat made a clear and precise appraisal of the class relations in the revolution, defined the social basis of all the major parties and the general tasks of the workers' movement in the fight for democracy. The resolution of the December Party Conference of 1908 was a further development of these fundamental views of Social-Democracy.

Now, a year after this Conference, two and a half years after the London Congress, it is extremely instructive to see the views on the present position and the tasks of democracy that are being reached by the most influential representatives of Russian liberalism. The recent "conference" of leading members of the Cadet Party is particularly interesting in this respect. The "conference" endorsed the report of the leader of the party, Mr. Milyukov, who has now had it printed in *Rech* under the heading: "The Political Parties in the Country and in the Duma". This report is an extremely important political document. In it we have what is henceforth the official platform of the Cadet Party. Furthermore, we have here an answer to questions which the Social-Democratic Party raised and settled long ago—an answer supplied by one of the shrewdest diplomats and politicians in the liberal camp, and at the same time one of the most adept historians, who has learned a thing or two from historical materialism, by which he was unmistakably influenced ... when he was a historian.

The historian Milyukov tries to put the question on a thoroughly scientific, i.e., materialist basis. To obtain "firm

strongpoints" for party tactics there must be "a uniform conception of what is taking place in the country". And to understand this one must see how the chief political parties or "political trends" are striving to "find support" in "broad circles of the population".

The method is excellent. Its application immediately reveals to us the transformation of the adept historian into a commonplace liberal sycophant: the Cadets, you see, and everything to the right of them, constitute the "three chief political trends", while everything to the "left" of the Cadets is a "political paroxysm". Thank you for your candour, Mr. Liberal! But we'll see nevertheless what you have to say as a historian? Three chief trends: the first is "demagogic monarchism". Its "purpose" is to "defend the old social foundations of life", a "combination of unlimited autocracy [the liberal, the Constitutional-Democrat unconsciously goes over to the standpoint of the Octobrist who upholds limited autocracy] with the peasantry on the basis of those patriarchal relations in which the nobility is the natural intermediary between the one and the other".... Translated from the language of liberalism into plain ordinary Russian this means the domination of the feudal ("patriarchal") landlords and Black-Hundred tsarism. Mr. Milyukov rightly remarks that this tsarism is becoming "demagogic", that it is "abandoning the old artificial non-partyism or above-partyism and is intervening actively in the process of the organisation of parties in the country". It is this, incidentally, that constitutes the step towards the conversion of the autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy which is dealt with in the resolution of the December Conference of the Social-Democrats in 1908. This is the new development which constitutes the *spectfic* peculiarity of the present moment and which was taken into account by our Party in formulating the *present* tactical aims. Although he correctly notes certain features of the process, Mr. Milyukov, firstly, has not fully thought out the economic roots of it and, secondly, he is *afraid* to draw the logical conclusion about the reasons for the strength of the feudal landlords. This strength is expressed in the fact that in European Russia, according to the official statistics of 1905, ten million poor peasants have 75 million dessiatines of land, while 30,000 big landlords (including the crown lands, i.e.,

those of Nicholas Romanov and his family) own 70 million dessiatines. Can Russia be delivered from "patriarchal" relations *without the total abolition* of these feudal latifundia of the upper thirty thousands, what do you think, Mr. Historian?

The second trend is "bourgeois constitutionalism". Thus Mr. Milyukov names, the Octobrists. "For the big bourgeoisie," he writes, "this trend, perhaps, is too conservative because of its close ties with the bureaucracy and the nobility." They are united by "a negative aim: joint defence against the more radical social or political trends". "The bourgeois constitutionalists of June 3 and November 9", seeking strongpoints for themselves, are trying "to assimilate at least the upper section of the mass of the peasantry [the strong and virile ones, as Mr. Stolypin calls the]. But for the time being this sort of social basis lies entirely in the future." "That is why this trend has perhaps the weakest prospects of finding a social basis"!!

It is a favourite tendency in our country—unfortunately even among would-be Social-Democrats—to attack "revolutionary illusions". But could anything be more naïve than this *liberal* illusion that the social basis of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie ("joint defence") and the landlords is "weak", that they can be defeated by other means than a most vigorous and ruthless revolutionary offensive of the masses, an uprising of the masses? The serious historian again gives way to the commonplace liberal.

The third trend is the Cadets. Mr. Milyukov calls it "democratic constitutionalism" and explains that "the essence of this position consists in a combination of a radical political and radical social programme". The historian is quite eclipsed by the diplomatist and politician. In actual fact the entire policy of the Cadets runs counter to the radicalism of the masses. In words—especially at a "conference" where there are Cadets from the provinces who are somewhat more closely aware of the sentiments of the masses—we are radicals, we are concerned for democracy and the masses.

Mr. Milyukov (particularly under the influence of the "conference", we may be sure) makes no mistakes about the masses. He recognises as an indisputable fact that the "growth of political consciousness in recent years has been

tremendous", that "the causes of mass discontent have not disappeared: it is possible that they have even increased in number and that their effect has grown stronger in proportion to the growth of political consciousness". But, although the historian has to admit this, the liberal gets the upper hand just the same: ..."among the masses, unfortunately, it turned out [during the revolution] that only a bolder secret demagogy was effective, one which flattered the traditional opinions and customary expectations of the masses. This demagogy united in a purely artificial manner the intelligible and legitimate mass slogan of 'land' with the unintelligible and misinterpreted slogan of 'liberty'. Under these circumstances even the grasping by people's minds of the natural connection between the two slogans was only a source of new misunderstandings and gave rise to the same illusions," and so on and so forth, right down to the "principle": neither revolution nor reaction, but "a legal constitutional struggle". The question of returning to the "old tactics of 1905" "must be answered with a categorical and emphatic negative".

As the reader sees, all the good intentions of the historian Milyukov to find strongpoints for party tactics among broad circles of the population came to nothing as soon as it was a question of the peasantry and the proletariat. Mr. Milyukov gives the latter up as a bad job, admitting that "democratic constitutionalism has a wider, better organised and more politically conscious social basis among the urban democracy than any other political party can show, *with the exception of the Social-Democratic Party*, *which is relying on the working class*." But Mr. Milyukov does not lose hope of the peasantry. "In spite of the existence of such obstacles" as "demagogy", etc., he writes, "the possibility is not excluded of democratic constitutionalism acting *parallel* [Milyukov's italics] to the direct expressions of the desires of the popular masses."

Parallel activity!—there you have the new catchword for old liberal tactics. Parallel lines never meet. The bourgeois intellectuals have understood that their liberalism will *never* meet the masses, i.e., will not become *their* voice and leader in Russia—"never", because of the growth of political consciousness after 1905. But the liberals of the Cadet type continue to count on the masses as a *stepping stone* to success,

to domination. Translated into simple and clear language, to proceed "parallel" means to exploit the masses politically, trapping them with democratic words and betraying them in practice. "To support them [the Octobrists] systematically in constitutional questions", these words in Mr. Milyukov's report express the *essence* of the policy of the Cadets. In practice the Cadets are accomplices of Octobrism, they are a wing of bourgeois constitutionalism. Struve and the other Vekhists admit this in candid, blunt and straightforward terms, and demand that the Cadets should stop "ogling the left and fawning on the revolutionaries who despise them" (the words of the well-known renegade Mr. Izgoyev in *Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik*,[74] 1909, No. 46, page 10). Milyukov and Co. are dissatisfied *only* with the bluntness and straightforwardness of the Vekhists *only* because the Vekhists are spoiling their diplomacy, are making it hard for them to lead the backward elements of the masses by the nose. Milyukov is the practical politician, Struve—the liberal doctrinaire, but their peaceful coexistence in the same party is no accident, but a necessity, because *by the very nature of the case* the bourgeois intellectual vacillates between placing hopes in the masses (who can help to pull the chestnuts out of the fire) and placing hopes in the Octobrist bourgeoisie.

"The fact that it is impossible for the present regime to permit free intercourse between the democratic elements who are politically enlightened and the democratic masses prevents the realisation of the main promises contained in the Manifesto of October 17," writes Mr. Milyukov. Here, inadvertently, he has spoken a deeper truth than he intended. Firstly, if it is true that it is *impossible* for the present regime to permit intercourse between the masses and the democrats (and that is unquestionably true) then *revolutionary* tactics are necessary, not a "constitutional" struggle; the people need to be led to the *overthrow* of this regime, not its reformation. Secondly, October-December 1905 and the First Duma and the Second Duma all *proved* that "it is impossible to permit free intercourse" between the "democratic masses" and the Social-Democrats or even the Narodniks of all shades not only "for the present regime" but also *for the Russian liberals*, *the Russian Cadets*. The Cadets were

PRIMARY SOURCE NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

unable to lead the democracy not only of the workers but also of the peasants during the period of civil liberties in October-December 1905, and even during the time of the Dumas watched over by the Goremykins and Stolypins the democracy was not reconciled to the leadership of the Cadets.

The political significance of the Cadet "conference" at the end of 1909 and of Mr. Milyukov's report lies in the fact that the educated representatives of liberalism, being most bitter enemies of revolutionary Social-Democracy, have given signal confirmation of the correctness of its estimate of the moment and of its tactics. Everything of value and truthful in the report merely pads out and repeats over and over again our own basic thesis that the chief mark of distinction of the present moment is the step taken by the autocracy along the path towards transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. This is what distinguishes it from yesterday and tomorrow. This is the basis of the tactics peculiar to the Social-Democrats; tactics which require the *application* of the principles of revolutionary Marxism to altered conditions, and not simply the *repetition* of some slogans or other.

The liberals have recognised that the big bourgeoisie are counter-revolutionary, they have recognised that the masses are becoming more politically conscious and discontented. Then why don't they resolutely enter the service of the big bourgeoisie if they repudiate the revolution, 1905, and the "demagogy" of "land and liberty", if they recognise that Octobrism is too conservative for the big bourgeoisie? Because the "conference" of provincials made it crystal clear to them that the new Stolypin, bourgeois policy of the autocracy is a *failure*. The new social basis for the monarchy "*still lies wholly in the future*"—there you have the liberals' most valuable admission. Well-ordered bourgeois constitutionalism with a monarchy at the head is a very fine thing, but *it is not forthcoming*, it will *not come without a new movement of the masses*—such is the *summing up* of the Cadet "conference". We hate the movement of the masses, we hate the "demagogy" of "land and liberty", we hate "political paroxysms" but we are realistic politicians, we must reckon with facts, we must shape our policy to run *parallel* with the movement of the masses, since it is inevitable. "The possibil-

ity is not excluded" that we can successfully contend for the leadership of the rural and urban masses (except the workers): let us try by talking about our "radicalism" to secure a niche in the people's movement just as our talk of being His Majesty's Opposition secured us a niche in London.

Inadvertently the Cadet conference has signally confirmed the tactics of our Party. We must survive this new historical period when the autocracy is trying to save itself in *a new way* and is plainly heading for bankruptcy *again* on this new path. We must survive this period, systematically, persistently, patiently working to build up a broader and stronger organisation of the more politically conscious masses of the socialist proletariat and the democratic peasantry. We must utilise all conditions and opportunities for Party activity at a time when both the Black-Hundred Duma and the monarchy are obliged to take the path of partyism. We must use this time as a period for training fresh masses of the people, on a new basis, under new conditions, to wage a more vigorous revolutionary struggle for our old demands. The revolution and the counter-revolution have shown that the monarchy is quite incompatible with democracy, rule by the people, freedom of the people—we must carry out among the masses propaganda for the abolition of the monarchy, for republicanism, as the *condition* without which the people cannot be victorious, we must make the slogan of "down with the monarchy" as popular a "household word" as the slogan of "down with the autocracy" became as a result of the long years of persistent work by the Social-Democrats in 1895-1904. The revolution and the counter-revolution have shown in practice the full power and significance of the landlord class—we must sow among the masses of the peasantry propaganda for the complete abolition of this class, the complete destruction of landlordism. The revolution and counter-revolution have shown in actual fact the true nature of the liberals and bourgeois intelligentsia—we must ensure that the masses of the peasantry clearly understand that the leadership of the liberals will ruin their cause, that without independent revolutionary mass struggle whatever the Cadet "reforms", they will inevitably remain in bondage to the landlord. The revolution and counter-revolution have shown us the alliance of autocracy and the bourgeoisie, the alliance

of the Russian and international bourgeoisie—we must educate, rally and organise in three times greater numbers than in 1905 the masses of the proletariat, which alone, led by an independent Social-Democratic Party and marching hand in hand with the proletariat of the advanced countries, is capable of winning freedom for Russia.

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THE ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

On November 7, New Style, the eleventh session of the International Socialist Bureau was held in Brussels. It was preceded, as usual in recent years, by a conference of socialist journalists of different countries. The conference discussed certain practical questions concerning the establishment of more regular contact between the socialist daily newspapers of different lands.

As for the session of the International Socialist Bureau, apart from minor current affairs, there were two big items on the agenda: firstly, the International Socialist Congress to be held in Copenhagen in 1910, secondly, the split in the Dutch party.

On the first item, first of all the date of the Congress was fixed: August 2-September 3, New Style. As regards the place of the Congress the question was raised whether the Russian socialists could travel to Copenhagen without hindrance. Knudsen, the representative of the Danish socialists, replied that, according to their information and all that they knew concerning the intentions of the Danish Government, the police would not interfere with the Russian delegates to the Congress. If it was found on the eve of the Congress that the opposite was the case the International Socialist Bureau would undoubtedly take steps to hold the Congress elsewhere.

The agenda adopted for the Copenhagen Congress was the following: 1) the co-operative movement; 2) international organisation of assistance to big strikes; 3) unemployment; 4) disarmament and the arbitration of international conflicts; 5) the results of labour legislation in different countries and

the question of organising it internationally, particularly the question of the eight-hour day; 6) the improvement of contact between the national parties and the International Socialist Bureau; 7) the abolition of capital punishment.

It was originally intended to include the agrarian question. Vaillant and Molkenbuhr objected on the grounds that it would be difficult to discuss such a question at an international congress without first submitting it to more detailed consideration at congresses of the national parties. A desire was expressed that the congresses of national parties should discuss this question specially, so that it could be in shape for the international congress of 1913.

After adopting resolutions of sympathy with the Swedish workers who have organised one of the biggest general strikes of the recent period, and the workers of Spain who have been fighting heroically against the military adventure of their government, as well as resolutions of protest against the atrocities and murders committed by tsarism in Russia and by the governments of Spain, Rumania and Mexico, the International Socialist Bureau passed to the next main item on its agenda, the question of the split in Holland.

The opportunists and Marxists of the Socialist Party in Holland have long been in conflict. On the agrarian question the opportunists stood for the point in the programme that calls for the allotment of land to agricultural labourers. The Marxists vigorously opposed this point (which was defended by the leader of the opportunists, Troelstra) and secured its removal in 1905. After this the opportunists, attuning their policy to the religious section of the Dutch workers, went to the length of defending state subsidies for religious instruction in the schools. The Marxists put up a strenuous opposition. The opportunists, with Troelstra at their head, counterposed the parliamentary Social-Democratic group to the Party and acted contrary to the decisions of the Central Committee. The opportunists pursued a policy of rapprochement with the liberals and of committing the socialists to their support ("justifying" this, of course, by the aim of obtaining social reforms, which the liberals promised and ... failed to carry out). The opportunists set about revising the old, Marxist programme of the Dutch Social-Democratic Party and, *inter alia*, put forward for this revision such

theses as renouncing the "downfall theory" (a well-known idea of Bernstein's) or desiring that recognition of the programme should oblige party members to recognise the political and economic "*but not the philosophical views of Marx*". The Marxists' opposition to such a policy became more and more acute. Finding themselves ousted from the Central Organ of the party, the Marxists (among them the well-known woman writer Roland-Holst, furthermore Gorter, Pannekoek and others) started a newspaper of their own, *Tribune*. Troelstra unscrupulously persecuted this newspaper, accusing the Marxists of wanting to "oust" him personally, stirring up the petty-bourgeois-minded section of the Dutch workers against the "trouble-makers", the polemicists, the disturbers of the peace—the Marxists. The upshot was that an extraordinary congress of the party in Davant (February 13-14, 1909), which gave the majority to Troelstra's supporters, decided *to close down* "*Tribune*" and have in its place "a supplement" to the opportunist Central Organ of the party! Naturally, the editors of *Tribune* did not agree to this (with the exception of Roland-Holst, who, unfortunately adopted a hopelessly conciliatory position) *and were expelled from the party*.

The result was a split. The old, opportunist party, led by Troelstra and van Kol ("famous" since his opportunist utterances on the colonial question in Stuttgart), kept the title of "Social-Democratic Labour Party" (S.D.L.P.). The new, Marxist party—much smaller in numbers—took the title of "Social-Democratic Party" (S.D.P.).

The Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau tried to assume the role of mediator for the restoration of unity in Holland but made a very bad job of it. It took a formal point of view and, obviously sympathising with the opportunists, blamed the Marxists for the split. Accordingly, their request for the admission of the new party into the International was rejected by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau.

The question of admitting the Dutch Marxists into the International came before a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau itself on November 7, 1909. Everybody wanted to avoid discussion of the real point at issue and to do no more than suggest procedure, i.e., refer the case to be

dealt with in one way or another, to indicate a method of settling the conflict although, of course, the majority of the members of the Bureau must have been well aware of the *real* substance of this matter, the *real* substance of the struggle between the two trends in Holland.

Finally two resolutions were moved, revealing two trends. Singer in support of the Marxists, Adler against. Singer's read as follows:

"The International Socialist Bureau resolves: the Party which has been formed in Holland under the name of the new S.D. Party [there is a mistake in the title: it should be "S.D. Party"], should be admitted to International Socialist Congresses as it satisfies the conditions specified in the Rules of the International. Whether it should have a delegate on the Bureau and how many votes it should have at the Congress is a question for the Copenhagen Congress to decide if the Dutch comrades themselves do not reach a settlement of the dispute."

We see from this text that Singer did not go beyond the formal aspect, leaving the final settlement of the question to the Dutch section of the international congress, but at the same time clearly emphasising that the Marxist party in Holland should be recognised by the International. Adler did not venture to say the opposite, he did not venture to declare outright that he did not consider the Dutch Marxists to be members of the International, that he shared the attitude of the Executive Committee which flatly rejected the Marxists' application. Adler moved that "The request of the S.D.P. be referred to the Dutch section. If no agreement is reached within this section an appeal can be made to the Bureau." The formal attitude is the same as Singer's, but it is clear from the text that the sympathies of this resolution are on the side of the opportunists, for it says nothing about recognising the Marxists as members of the International. And the voting of the resolutions made it instantly manifest that the *spirit* of both one and the other had been perfectly grasped by the members of the Bureau. Singer received 11 votes: from France 2 votes, Germany 2, England 1 (S.D.), Argentina 2, Bulgaria 1, Russia 1 (S.D.), Poland 1 (S.D.), America 1 (the Socialist Labour Party). Adler received 16 votes: from England 1 ("Independent"

Labour Party), Denmark 2, Belgium 2, Austria 2, Hungary 2, Poland 1 (Polish Socialist Party), Russia 1 (S.R.), America 1 (Socialist Party), Holland 2 (van Kol and Troelstra!), Sweden 2.

The organ of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats, *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (No. 259), rightly called this resolution of the International Socialist Bureau a regrettable one. "At Copenhagen the proletarian International must reconsider this decision", it concluded with full justification. Another newspaper of the same trend, the *Bremer Bürgerzeitung* of November 11, 1909, wrote: "Comrade Adler speaks as the advocate of international opportunism in all its glory." His resolution was passed "thanks to the support of the opportunist olla podrida" (Sammelsurium).

To these just words we Russian Social-Democrats can only add that our Socialist-Revolutionaries, of course, made haste to take their place in the opportunist throng together with the P.S.P.

The session of the International Socialist Bureau was followed on November 8, 1909 in Brussels by the fourth session of the inter-parliamentary socialist commission, i.e., of the members of the socialist parliamentary groups of different countries. The groups were but sparsely represented in general (the Russian Social-Democratic group in the Duma was not represented at all). The delegates interchanged reports on question of workers' old-age insurance, the state of legislation in different countries, and Bills drawn up by labour deputies. The best report was one made by Molkenbuhr based on his article published in the *Neue Zeit*.

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THE *VPERYOD* GROUP[75]

A CONSPECTUS

After a series of lectures to the comrades of the *Vperyod* group and after a final conversation with them on Party tasks and the position of the *Vperyod* group in the Party, I find it necessary to set out in written form my attitude to the questions in dispute in order to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

I consider that the platform of the *Vperyod* group is permeated through and through by views which are incompatible with Party decisions (the resolutions of the December Conference in 1908) and are contrary to those decisions.

The *Vperyod* platform takes a wrong view of the present period, for this view leaves out of account the economic and political changes in Russia which are finding expression in the autocracy's new step along the path to conversion into a bourgeois monarchy. Hence *in actual fact* otzovist tactical conclusions follow from the view adopted by the *Vperyod* platform.

Consequently, the *Vperyod* platform is wholly permeated by views that deny the absolute necessity of the Social-Democratic Party's participation in the Third Duma and the absolute necessity of building a new type of illegal Party organisation surrounded by a network of legal organisations and necessarily utilising every legal opportunity.

By putting forward in its platform the task of elaborating a so-called "proletarian philosophy", "proletarian culture", etc., the *Vperyod* group in fact comes to the defence of the group of literati who are putting forward anti-Marxist views in this field.

By declaring otzovism "a legitimate shade of opinion", the platform of the *Vperyod* group shields and defends otzovism, which is doing great harm to the Party.

In view of all this, the personal declarations of the majority of comrades of the *Vperyod* group that they will carry on a sincere correspondence with the Central Organ, that they will fight against the otzovists in a principled and comradely way, that they will co-operate sincerely in utilising legal opportunities, that they will combat all attempts to disrupt the legal workers' organisations and enterprises—these declarations do not inspire confidence and make one fear that the *Vperyod* group will wage a struggle against the Party line in local work and in the work of preparing for a conference.

My attitude to the local functionaries of the *Vperyod* group will depend on their activities in Russia and how they put their declarations into effect.

Lenin

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(the first half of January 1910)

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TOWARDS UNITY

Exactly a year ago, in February 1909, in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 2, we characterised the work of the Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. as putting the Party "on the right path" after "a year of disintegration, a year of ideological and political disunity, a year of Party driftage" (article: "On the Road").* We pointed out that the severe crisis affecting our Party was undoubtedly not only organisational but also ideological and political. We saw the guarantee of a successful struggle of the Party organisation against the disintegrating influences of the counter-revolutionary period primarily in the fact that the tactical decisions of the conference correctly solved the fundamental task: the full confirmation by the workers' party of its revolutionary aims derived from the recent period of storm and stress, and of its revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics confirmed by the experience of the immediate mass struggle, and at the same time the taking into account of the vast economic and political changes occurring before our eyes, the attempts of the autocracy to adapt itself to the bourgeois conditions of the era, to organise itself as a bourgeois monarchy and to safeguard the interests of tsarism and the Black-Hundred landlords by means of an open alliance, extensively and systematically carried out, with the bourgeois top sections in the countryside and with the bosses of commercial and industrial capitalism. We outlined the Party's organisational task associated with the new historical period—the task of the utilisation of all possible legal institutions by the illegal party, including the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, so as to create strongpoints for revolutionary Social-

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 345-55.—*Ed.*

Democratic activity among the masses. Pointing out the resemblance between this organisational task and that solved by our German comrades at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law, we spoke about an "unfortunate deviation from persistent proletarian work" in the shape of rejecting Social-Democratic activity in the Duma or refraining from frank and open criticism of the *policy* of our Duma group, in the shape of rejecting or belittling the illegal Social-Democratic Party, of attempts to replace it by an amorphous legal organisation, to curtail our revolutionary slogans, and so forth.

By taking this backward glance we can more correctly appraise the significance of the recently held plenary session of the Central Committee of our Party.[76] The text of the most important resolutions adopted by the plenary session will be found elsewhere in this issue. Their significance is that they are a big step towards actual unity of the Party, towards the union of all Party forces, towards *unanimous* recognition of those basic propositions on the tactics of the Party and its organisation that decide the *path* of Social-Democracy in our difficult period. This path was *correctly* indicated a year ago and it is now being taken by the *whole* Party, *all* factions of which have become convinced of its correctness. The past year was a year of new factional divisions, of new factional struggle, a year in which the danger of a *break-down* of the Party was accentuated. But the conditions of work in the localities, the difficult position of the Social-Democratic organisation, the urgent tasks of the economic and political struggle of the proletariat, impelled all the factions to unite the Social-Democratic forces. The more powerful, insolent and rampant the counter-revolution became, the more widely foul renegacy and repudiation of the revolution spread among the liberal and petty-bourgeois democratic strata, the more powerfully were all Social-Democrats drawn *towards the Party*. It is highly characteristic that in the second half of 1909, under the influence of this whole combination of circumstances, such widely divergent members of our Party as the Menshevik Comrade Plekhanov, on the one hand, and the *Vperyod* group (a group-of Bolsheviks who had departed from orthodox Bolshevism), on the other, pronounced in favour of the Party principle. In August 1909 the former came out vigorously against a

split and the policy of splitting the Party under the slogan: "The struggle for influence in the Party." The latter group put forward a platform which, it is true, at the beginning speaks of a "struggle for restoring the unity of Bolshevism" but at the end emphatically condemns factionalism, "a party within the Party", "the isolation and exclusiveness of factions", and vigorously demands their "merging" in the Party, their "fusion", and the conversion of the factional centres into centres that are "in actual fact only ideological and literary" (pp. 18 and 19 of the pamphlet: *The Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party*).

The path clearly indicated by the majority of the Party has now been accepted unanimously—not in every detail, of course, but *in the main*—by all the factions. A year of acute factional struggle has led to a decisive step being taken in favour of abolishing *all* factions and *every kind* of factionalism, in favour of the unity of the Party. It was decided to unite all forces for the urgent tasks of the economic and political struggle of the proletariat; the closing down of the factional organ of the Bolsheviks was announced; a decision was adopted unanimously on the need to close down *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, i.e., the factional organ of the Mensheviks. A number of resolutions were passed unanimously, among which we should specially mention here as the most important that on the state of affairs in the Party and that on the convocation of the next Party Conference. The first of these two resolutions merits particularly detailed examination as being, so to speak, the platform for uniting the factions.

It begins with the words: "In furtherance of the basic propositions of the resolutions of the 1908 Party Conference...." We have cited above these basic propositions of the three chief resolutions of this Conference of December 1908: on the appraisal of the present moment and the political tasks of the proletariat, on the organisational policy of the Party and on its attitude to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. There cannot be the slightest doubt that there is no unanimity in the Party in regard to every detail, each item of these resolutions, that the Party press must open its doors widely for their criticism and revision in accordance with the dictates of experience and the lessons of the

increasingly complex economic and political struggle, that this work of criticism, application and improvement must henceforth be regarded by *all* factions, or more correctly all *trends*, in the Party as a matter of their own self-determination, as a matter of elucidating their own policy. But the work of criticism and correction of the Party line must not prevent unity in Party *activity*, which cannot cease for a single moment, which cannot waver, which must be guided in *everything* by the basic propositions of the above-mentioned resolutions.

In furtherance of these propositions, the first point of the decision of the Central Committee recalls the "basic principles" of Social-Democratic tactics, which, in accordance with the method of the whole of international Social-Democracy, cannot be calculated especially in a period such as we are passing through—"merely for the given concrete circumstances of the immediate future", but must take into account various paths and all possible situations, both the possibility of a "rapid break-up" and the possibility of a "relatively unchanging situation". For the first time the possibility arises for the proletariat to apply this method in a planned and consistent fashion. At one and the same time, in one and the same action of the proletariat, in one and the same network of organisational units, our Party's tactics must "prepare the proletariat for a new open revolutionary struggle" (without this we should lose the right to belong to revolutionary Social-Democracy, we should not be carrying out our fundamental task, bequeathed to us by the period of 1905 and dictated by every feature of the contemporary economic and political situation) and "afford the proletariat the possibility of utilising *for itself* all the contradictions of the unstable regime of counter-revolution" (without this our revolutionary character would become a mere phrase, the *repetition* of revolutionary words instead of the *application* of the sum-total of the revolutionary experience, knowledge and lessons of international Social-Democracy to *each* practical activity, to the utilisation of *each* contradiction and vacillation of tsarism, its allies and all bourgeois parties).

The second point of the resolution characterises the change which the workers' movement in Russia is undergoing.

Let us unite and go to the aid of the new generation of Social-Democratic workers, so that they can solve their historical task, renew the Party organisation, and work out new forms of struggle, while in no way renouncing the "tasks of the revolution and its methods" but, on the contrary, upholding them and preparing a wider and firmer basis for a more victorious application of these methods in the coming new revolution.

The third point of the resolution describes the conditions which have evoked among politically conscious workers everywhere an "urge towards concentration of pro-Party Social-Democratic forces, towards the strengthening of Party unity". The chief of these conditions is the strong counter-revolutionary current. The enemy is uniting and attacking. The old enemies—tsarism, the tyranny and violence of officialdom, the oppression and shameless outrages of the feudal landlords—are being joined by a new enemy: the bourgeoisie, which is becoming increasingly united in conscious enmity to the proletariat, an enmity reinforced by its own experience. The revolutionaries are being harassed, tortured and exterminated as never before. Efforts are being made to vilify and defame the revolution, to erase it from the memory of the people. But in no country has the working class ever yet allowed its enemies to take from it the chief attainment of every revolution at all worthy of this name, viz., the experience of mass struggle, the conviction of millions of working and exploited people that this struggle is essential for any serious improvement of their position. And through all its trials the working class of Russia will preserve the readiness for revolutionary struggle, the mass heroism, by which it conquered in 1905 and which will enable it to be victorious more than once in the future.

It is not merely the oppression of counter-revolution and the raging of counter-revolutionary sentiments that unite us. We are being united too by each step taken in modest, daily practical work. The work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma makes steady progress, becoming free from the mistakes that were inevitable at the outset, overcoming scepticism and indifference, forging the weapon of revolutionary propaganda and agitation of organised class struggle, so valued by all Social-Democrats. And every legal congress

in which workers participate, every legal institution into which proletarians penetrate and introduce their class-consciousness, the open defence of labour interests and democratic demands, conduces to the union of forces and the development of the movement as a whole. No persecution by the government, no devices resorted to by its Black-Hundred and bourgeois allies, can put an end to the manifestations of the proletarian struggle in the most varied and sometimes unexpected forms, for capitalism itself at each step of its development teaches and unites its grave-diggers, multiplying their ranks and intensifying their wrath.

The divided character of the Social-Democratic groups and the "parochialism" in their work, from which our movement has suffered so much during the last one-and-a-half to two years, acts in the same direction (the urge towards partyism). It has become impossible to raise the level of practical work without concentrating our forces, without creating a guiding centre. The Central Committee adopted a number of decisions on the organisation and functioning of this centre, on enlarging it by the addition of practical workers, on uniting its work more closely with that in the localities, etc. The theoretical interests that inevitably come to the fore during a period of stagnation likewise require to be united for the defence of socialism in general and of Marxism, as the only scientific socialism, especially in view of the bourgeois counter-revolution, which is mobilising all its forces to combat the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Finally, the last point of the resolution speaks of the ideological and political aims of the Social-Democratic movement. The acute development occurring within the Social-Democratic movement in 1908-09 has led to these problems being raised until now in an extraordinarily sharp form and settled by a most intense factional struggle. This was no accident, but an inevitable phenomenon in the circumstances of the crisis and break-down of the Party organisations. But it *was* inevitable, and the unanimous adoption of the resolution we have examined has clearly demonstrated the general effort to go forward, to pass from fighting for disputed basic propositions to acknowledging them to be indis-

putable and to intensified co-operative work on the basis of this acknowledgement.

The resolution notes that two kinds of deviations from the correct path are inevitably engendered by the present historical situation and by bourgeois influence on the proletariat. The characteristic features of one of these deviations are essentially the following: "Rejection of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, belittling of its role and significance, attempts to curtail the programmatic and tactical tasks and slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, etc." The connection between these errors within the Social-Democratic movement and the counter-revolutionary bourgeois current outside it is obvious. Nothing is so hateful to the bourgeoisie and tsarism as the illegal Social-Democratic Party, which proves by its work its loyalty to the behests of the revolution, its unswerving readiness to wage a relentless struggle against the foundations of Stolypin's "legality". Nothing is so hateful to the bourgeoisie and the servitors of tsarism as the revolutionary aims and slogans of Social-Democracy. It is our imperative task to defend both the one and the other and it is the combination of illegal and legal work that especially demands from us that we combat every "belittling of the role and significance" of the illegal Party. It is just the need to defend the Party position on minor matters, in more modest measures, in particular instances, in the legal framework, that especially requires us to see to it that these aims and slogans are not *curtailed*, that the changed form of the struggle does not destroy its content, does not make it less irreconcilable, does not distort the historical perspective and historical aim of the proletariat, viz., through a series of bourgeois revolutions that achieve a democratic republic to lead all working and exploited people, the whole mass of the people, to the proletarian revolution which overthrows capitalism itself.

On the other hand—and here we proceed to characterise the other deviation—it is impossible to carry out in practice daily revolutionary Social-Democratic work without learning how to change its forms, adapting them to the specific character of each new historical period. "Rejection of Social-Democratic work in the Duma and of utilising legal opportunities, a failure to understand the importance of

both of them" is just the kind of deviation which makes it impossible in practice to pursue a class Social-Democratic policy. The new stage of the historical development of Russia confronts us with new tasks. This does not mean that the old tasks have already been solved, that it is permissible to abandon them; it means that it is necessary to take account of these new tasks, to find new forms of struggle, to work out the tactics and organisation appropriate to them.

Once agreement has begun to be established in the Party on these basic questions, an agreement on the need to *overcome* both of the above-mentioned deviations, chiefly by extending and deepening Social-Democratic work—the chief requirement (for correctly determining the "ideological and political tasks of the Social-Democratic movement") has been achieved. We must now systematically put this achievement into effect, ensure a full and clear understanding of these tasks by all Party circles, by all local Party workers, carry to its logical conclusion the explanation of the danger of both deviations in *all* fields of activity, and put the work on such a footing as to *make impossible* any vacillation to one side or the other. Practical steps in implementing the decisions adopted and the needs of the economic and political struggle itself will then themselves show what remains to be done here and how to do it.

Among these needs is one that forms part of the ordinary course of Party life (when this "ordinary course" exists). We are referring to a Party conference, which would bring together from all parts of Russia representatives of pro-Party Social-Democratic organisations and groups *actually engaged in local work*. This task may be a modest one but the present break-down has made it terribly difficult. The resolution of the Central Committee takes into account the new difficulties (the election of regional delegates by individual local Party units and not by regional conferences, if the latter cannot be convened) and the new tasks (the participation with a consultative voice of Party functionaries from the legal movement).

The objective conditions require that the basis of the Party's organisation should consist of illegal workers' units that are modest as regards size and present forms of work. Much more initiative and independent activity than pre-

viously, however, is required of them in order to learn to carry out revolutionary Social-Democratic work systematically, undeviatingly and in a planned way in the present difficult situation, and the more so because in very many cases they cannot expect assistance from old, experienced comrades. And these primary units cannot solve the tasks of constant influence on the masses and interaction with the masses without establishing, firstly, firm connections with one another and, secondly, without strongpoints in the form of all possible kinds of legal institutions. Hence the necessity for a conference of delegates of these illegal primary units—first of all, immediately and at all costs. Hence the need to draw in *pro-Party* Social-Democrats from the legal movement, representatives "of Social-Democratic groups in the legal movement that are ready to establish a *firm organisational* connection with the local Party centres". Who among our legal Social-Democrats is really pro-Party, in deeds and not merely in words, who among them has really understood the new conditions of work outlined above and how to combine with them the old aims of revolutionary Social-Democracy, who is sincerely prepared to work for the fulfilment of these aims, which groups are really prepared to establish a firm organisational connection with the Party—this is something that can only be ascertained in the localities, in the actual course of daily illegal work.

Let us hope that all Social-Democratic forces will unite for this work, that Party functionaries at the centre and in the localities will set about preparing the conference with the utmost vigour, that this conference will help definitively to reinforce our Party unity and vigorously promote the creation of a broader, more stable and more flexible proletarian basis for the future revolutionary battles.

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GOLOS (*VOICE*) OF THE LIQUIDATORS AGAINST THE PARTY[77]

REPLY TO *GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA*

Golos Sotsial-Demokrata No. 19-20 and the manifesto of Comrades Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov, published separately under the heading "Letter to the Comrades", are so much in the nature of a bomb intended to disrupt the Party immediately after the unity plenum that we are forced to come forward with an immediate, although brief and incomplete, warning, and to address a caution to all Social-Democrats.

We shall begin with the fact that *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* directs its fire at us, at the editorial board of the Central Organ. It accuses us, through the mouth of Comrade Martov, of relegating his article to *Diskussionny Listok*.[78] "My article does not discuss the decisions of the plenum at all," writes Comrade Martov and he lays stress on this; the same thing is repeated word for word in the "Letter to the Comrades".

Anyone who cares to read Comrade Martov's article headed "On the Right Path", will see that it *directly discusses* the decisions of the plenum, directly *opposes* the decisions on the composition of the Central Organ, and gives a detailed justification of the theory of the equality of trends, of the "*neutralisation*" of trends. The glaring untruth uttered by Comrade Martov and the whole editorial board of *Golos* in alleging that this controversial article "does not discuss" the decisions of the plenum looks like a downright mockery of Party decisions.

If anyone is unclear about the difference between discussing the decisions of the plenum and conscientiously

implementing the *line* of the plenum in the Central Organ itself, we invite such people, and *particularly the Mensheviks*, to reflect on Comrade Plekhanov's instructive article in the current issue of the Central Organ and on the no less instructive No. 11 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* by the same author. A Menshevik who does not want to flout the Party decision and Party unity cannot deny that in *Dnevnik* Comrade Plekhanov *discusses* the decisions of the plenum, whereas in the article "In Defence of Underground Activity" he defends the *Party line*. How can one fail to understand this difference unless one is pursuing the malicious aim of *disrupting* the decisions of the plenum?

But it is not enough that Comrade Martov and the whole editorial board of *Golos* utter a glaring untruth in alleging that the article "On the Right Path" does not discuss the decisions of the plenum. The article contains something far worse. It is based entirely on the *theory of equality* of the illegal Party, i.e., the R.S.D.L.P., on the one hand, and of the *legalists*, who have broken away from the Party, yet want to be called Social-Democrats, on the other. The article is based entirely on the theory of a split between *these* "*two parts*" of the working-class vanguard, these "*two parts of Social-Democracy*", which should unite on the same principles of "equality and neutralisation" on which all parts of a whole that have split up always unite!

Shortage of space prevents us from adding to the quotations confirming this description of Martov's views. This will be done in a series of other articles, if it is at all necessary, for scarcely anyone will dare to deny that Martov puts forward the "theory of equality".

Yet this new theory is in direct opposition to the decisions of the plenum; more than that, it is a *downright mockery* of them. The meaning of these decisions, which is clear to all who are conscientiously fulfilling the decisions of the plenum, is that what has to be done away with is the split between the pro-Party Mensheviks and the pro-Party Bolsheviks, the split between these ancient *factions*, and by no means the "split" between *all* the legalists in general and our illegal R.S.D.L.P. The legalists who have broken away from the Party are not at all to be regarded as a "part of Social-Democracy" similar to the Party or on a par with the

Party. On the contrary, they are being called *back to the Party* on the definitely expressed *condition* that they break with liquidationism (i.e., legalism at all costs) and come over to the Party standpoint, to the "Party way of life". The Central Committee's letter on the conference, this *official* commentary on the resolutions of the plenum, one which is absolutely binding on the Party, says with the utmost clarity that it is the *illegal organisations** that must *judge* whether the legalists are *in actual fact pro-Party*, i.e., it specifically rejects the "theory of equality"!

By a specific decision of the plenum this letter of the Central Committee was drawn up by a special committee consisting of Comrades Grigory,[79] Innokenty[80] and Martov. The letter was endorsed *unanimously* by the *whole* of this committee. Now Comrade Martov, as if inspired by some evil spirit, performs a *volte-face*, writes an article wholly imbued with a *directly opposite* theory, and in addition complains, as if in mockery of the Party, when this article is declared controversial!

It is quite obvious that this theory of equality, which is expressed in all the other articles of *Golos* still more sharply and crudely than in the case of Martov, leads *in fact* to the *Party being subordinated to the liquidators*, for the legalist who sets himself against the illegal Party, considering himself on a par with it, is nothing but a liquidator. The "equality" between an illegal Social-Democrat who is persecuted by the police and a legalist who is safeguarded by his legality and his divorce from the Party is in fact the "equality" between the worker and the capitalist.

All this is so apparent, *Golos*'s contemptuous treatment of the decision of the plenum and of the explanation of this decision in the Central Committee's letter is so obvious, that Martov's article can only be called one that points

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* See No. 11 of the Central Organ, pp. 11-12: "Only the local organisations can ensure that this additional representation is extended solely to *real* (the "Letter's" italics) pro-Party elements; our local workers will judge not only by the words of these leaders of the legal movement, but also by *their deeds*, and will exert every effort so that only those are drawn in who in essence are even now part of our Party, who wish to join our Party organisation in order really to work in it, to strengthen it, to subordinate themselves to it and serve it", etc.

out the "*true path*" ... to the victory of the liquidators over the Party.

The pro-Party Mensheviks have already seen this danger. The proof is No. 11 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, in which the Menshevik Plekhanov, who had only read the plenum resolutions and had not yet seen the Central Committee's "Letter", *expressly* points out that in the case of an "inattentive attitude" to the text of the resolution on the legalists, who are "ready to establish a firm organisational connection with the local Party centres", "*the 'liquidators' may find here a convenient loophole for themselves*" (p. 20).

Is it not evident that Plekhanov has an excellent knowledge of his Golosists? He has pointed out the very same *loophole of the liquidators* that *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 19-20 has been "working on" with all its might, in almost all its articles, from the first line to the last. Are we not entitled to call it the "voice" of the *liquidators*?

The lengths to which the Golosists go in their defence of liquidationism can be seen from the following passage in the "Letter to the Comrades": ... "The Central Organ ... has to win the confidence both of the viable elements of the old underground organisations ... [the underground Party organisations display full confidence in both the Central Committee and the Central Organ; it is ridiculous to speak of "winning" here] ... and of the new legal organisations which are now the chief centre [there you have it!] of Social-Democratic work." Thus the legalists who have broken away from the Party are the *chief centre*. It is not they who have to win the confidence of the Party, to become pro-Party in reality, to join the Party, to return to the Party principle, but the Party in the shape of the Central Organ which has to "win their confidence"—evidently by that hidden defence of liquidationism, that preparation of loopholes for liquidationism, which we see in *Golos*!!

The whole of Comrade F. Dan's article "The Fight for Legality" is imbued with the spirit of liquidationism, going as far as downright reformism. By saying that "the fight for legality" is "one of the principal revolutionary tasks", that it is the "banner", etc., Comrade Dan defends not the Social-Democratic but the Cadet point of view. Comrade Dan proclaims "illegal solidarity as an essential weapon in

the fight for legality". This is in the Cadet spirit. For the Cadets the Party is illegal, but their illegality is merely "an essential weapon in the fight for legality". For the Social-Democrats *legal* solidarity is at the present time one of the essential weapons of the *illegal Party*.

... "Only in the light of this [the fight for legality], in its name, is it possible at the present time for the proletariat to wage a struggle which sets itself ... the aim ... of overthrowing the autocracy...."

This argument again must be turned inside-out for it to become a *Social-Democratic* argument. Only in the light of the struggle to overthrow the autocracy, only in its name, is Social-Democratic work in legal organisations really possible. Only in the name of the struggle for the uncurtailed revolutionary demands of the proletariat, only in the light of the programme and tactics of revolutionary Marxism, is it possible for Social-Democrats to make really successful use of all legal opportunities, is it possible and necessary to defend these opportunities with the utmost determination, and to convert them into strongpoints for our Party work.

But this too is not all. The Golosists act in direct contradiction to the decisions of the plenum when they come forward in their letter and in their newspaper with agitation for the *continuance of* "*Golos*" in spite of the decisions of the Central Committee. We are not going to examine here the ludicrous and miserable sophistry by which they seek to justify the breach of a Party decision. We prefer to confine ourselves—at least in the present short article—to a reference to the *voice of pro-Party Menshevism*, to No. 11 of *Dnevnik*. Comrade Plekhanov foresaw also this loophole of the liquidators, saying frankly, simply and clearly something that no loyal Social-Democrat can doubt. "The agitation *against* the closing down of *Golos*," he writes on p. 18, is "an agitation against the abolition of the faction, i.e., for *reducing to naught* the chief possible result of the Central Committee's plenary meeting." What does *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* represent for the Mensheviks of the trend concerned? It is their actual factional—and moreover irresponsible—centre.

Precisely so. To *reduce* unity *to naught*—that is what the concern of *Golos* No. 19-20 and of the manifesto of the four

editors of *Golos* against the decisions of the plenum amounts to. After the unity plenum they came out with a much more open and much more impudent defence of liquidationism than prior to it. When their manifesto tells the Mensheviks that the letter of the C.C. Bureau Abroad to the groups,[81] which calls for the creation of real unity, was *adopted against the votes of the Menshevik and Bundist members of the Bureau Abroad*, everyone realises that we are confronted with a poorly disguised *call for non-compliance with this* letter and for disruption of unity abroad. Let the pro-Party Mensheviks who condemn the Golosists pass from condemnation *to action* if they want at all costs to uphold Party unity. This unity depends now on the pro-Party Mensheviks, on their *readiness and ability to wage an open fight* both against the foreign and the Russian "actual centre" of the Golosist liquidators.

This Russian centre, the Russian M.C. (Menshevik centre) comes out plainly in *Golos* No. 19-20 with an "Open Letter" in which Plekhanov is declared "a liquidator of the ideas of Menshevism". The Mensheviks' withdrawal from the Party is explained—it would be more correct to say, is justified—by the "universally known phenomenon of the necrosis of the Party units"!! Those who withdraw—the manifesto of the M.C. tells us—are "falsely called liquidators" (p. 24 of *Golos*).

We ask any Social-Democrats who are at all capable of impartiality, we ask particularly working-class Social-Democrats, irrespective of trends, whether the appearance of such a manifesto of the M.C. on the morrow of the plenum does not *reduce to naught* the efforts for unity.

We consider it our duty to inform the whole Party of the names of those who signed this famous document, which, we are sure, will have the ill-fame attaching to the name of Herostratus: 1) Avgustovsky, 2) Anton, 3) Vadim, 4) V. Petrova, 5) Georgy, 6) Georg, 7) Yevg. Ha-az, 8) Kramolnikov, 9) D. Koltsov, 10) Nat. Mikhailova, 11) *Roman*, 12) Romul, 13) Solomonov, 14) Cherevanin (of course!), 15) *Yuri*, 16) Y. P-y.[82]

"These signatories," says the editorial board of *Golos* "are old Party workers, well-known to the editorial board; some of them have held responsible posts in the Party."

These names, we reply, will be nailed to the pillory by all class-conscious Social-Democratic workers when they read *Golos* S. D. No. 19-20, when they learn the decisions of the plenum, when they become aware of the following fact:

The Russian Bureau of the C.C. has recently sent an official letter to the C.C.B.A. (the executive organ abroad of the Central Committee). This letter states in so many words:

...“*We made a proposal to Comrades Mikhail*,[83] *Roman and Yuri* [we stressed these names above] *that they should set to work*, *but we received a reply from them saying that not only do they consider the decisions of the plenum harmful but they find the very existence of the C.C. harmful. On these grounds, they refuse even to appear at any meeting for co-optation*”*....

(Let us make it clear for our own part: the chiefs of the Menshevik centre not only themselves refuse to support the C.C., but they refuse to appear for co-opting other Mensheviks, for co-opting Menshevik workers, being very well aware that the refusal to appear for the co-optation will *hold up* the work of the C.C., will *hold up its formation*, and will compel the C.C. to *postpone*, perhaps for months, the very commencement of its work as a C.C.)

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* We shall cite in addition *all* the passages of the letters (of the Russian Bureau of the C.C. and of one of the C.C. members operating in Russia[84]) relating to the convocation of the C.C. in Russia:

...“We request Comrades Martov and the Menshevik members of the C.C. to communicate to us immediately the names and addresses of the comrades whom they propose to co-opt (the St. Petersburg Mensheviks have refused to do this)”.... “It is impossible for the time being to convene the Russian collegium: practically no one has agreed to be co-opted, at present only one Bolshevik has agreed, and that conditionally. *The Mensheviks* (*Mikhail*, *Roman and Yuri*) *have categorically refused*, *considering the work of the Central Committee harmful. The resolutions of the plenum*, *in the opinion of Mikhail and others*, *are also harmful. The interference of the C.C. in the spontaneous process of the grouping of Social-Democratic forces in legal organisations that is now taking place is*, *in their words*, *like plucking the fruit from the mother's womb after two months' pregnancy*. We ask you immediately to indicate to us other comrades to whom we may address a proposal that they should be co-opted. *It is also desirable to publish the attitude of the comrades to this behaviour of Mikhail and the others*.”

Thus the same people who declare in print, with the assistance and approval of Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov, that Plekhanov "falsely calls them 'liquidators'" are directly disrupting the very existence of the C.C. and are proclaiming its existence harmful.

The same people who are exclaiming in the illegal press (through *Golos*) and in the legal press (through the liberals) about "the universally known phenomenon of the necrosis of the Party units", are *themselves disrupting attempts* to put in order, restore and set going these Party units and even such a Party unit as the Central Committee.

Let all Social-Democrats be aware now who the manifesto of Comrades Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov is alluding to when it speaks of "leaders of the legal movement who have now occupied the advanced posts of the militant proletariat". Let all Social-Democrats be aware now who it is that the editorial board of *Golos* is addressing when it writes: "We should like the comrades [of the type of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri] to appreciate the breach which has been made in the official dogma that has actually condemned the Party organisation to inevitable decay, and to attempt to occupy the positions that have been opened to them [Mikhail, Roman, Yuri and the like] owing to this breach."

We address ourselves to all organisations, to all groups of our Party, and we ask them: do they intend to tolerate this flouting of Social-Democracy? Is it permissible now to remain passive spectators of what is taking place, or is it obligatory for them to undertake a resolute fight against the trend that is undermining the very existence of the Party?

We ask all Russian Social-Democrats: can they now still remain in doubt as to the practical, real political significance of the "theory of equality" of trends, of the equality of the legalists and the illegal Party, of the theory of the fight for legality", etc., etc.?

These theories, these arguments, these loopholes, are the *verbal shield* behind which are concealed such *enemies of Social-Democracy* as those like Mikhail, Roman and Yuri, such political accomplices of them as the sixteen Herostratean Mensheviks, such ideological leaders as the literati who conduct the "Voice of the *Liquidators*".

And so, No. 19-20 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and the splitting manifesto of the four editors of *Golos*, "To the Comrades", is direct agitation:

for a factional organ against unity,
against unity abroad,
in defence of flagrant liquidationism,
in defence of the downright opponents of the very existence of the C.C.

Against the Party!

The conspiracy against the Party is revealed. Let all to whom the existence of the R.S.D.L.P. is dear come to the aid of the Party!

Written on March 11 (24), 1910.

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WHAT TO FIGHT FOR?

The recent utterances of the Octobrists, the predominating party in the Duma, in connection with the speeches made by Right-wing Cadets there and elsewhere, are undoubtedly highly symptomatic. "We are isolated in the country and in the Duma," complained the head of the party of counter-revolutionary capitalists, Mr. Guchkov. And the Vekhist Mr. Bulgakov echoes him, as it were, in *Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik*: ... "both the reaction and the revolution deny 'inviolability of the person'; on the contrary they affirm 'violability' of the person with all their heart and soul—there is complete identity between Markov the Second, with his persecution of non-Russian races and his pogrom morality, and the Social-Democrat Gegechkori, who appeals to a 'second great Russian revolution' in the name of inviolability of the person" (No. 8, February 20, 1910, page 25).

"We are waiting," said Mr. Guchkov in the Duma, addressing the tsarist government, signifying by these words that the bourgeoisie, which has surrendered body and soul to the counter-revolution, cannot as yet regard their interests as assured or see anything really firm and stable in the sense of the creation of the famous "renovated" order.

And the Vekhist Bulgakov echoes him: "... I reflect with undiminishing pain on the old, bitter and anguishing thought: yes, it's the same thing [i.e., the reaction and the revolution are the same thing, namely—] ... the same Maximalism effected by force.... Of late *some people are already beginning again to sigh for a new revolution*, as though now, after what we have experienced, anything could be expected from it but the final collapse of Russia" (p. 32).

The Duma leader of the largest bourgeois party and a Right-wing Cadet publicist who is popular in liberal

"society" (*Vekhi* is being issued in a *fifth* edition)—both of them complain, lament and assert that *they are isolated*. They are ideologically isolated among the Maximalists of the reaction and the "Maximalists" of the revolution, among the heroes of the Black Hundred and the "sighers for a new revolution" (the liberals?)— "isolated in the Duma and in the country".

This isolation of the "centre", the isolation of the bourgeoisie who want to change the old regime but do not want to fight it, who want to "renovate" tsarism but fear its overthrow, is no new phenomenon in the history of the Russian revolution. In 1905 when the mass revolutionary movement was growing by leaps and bounds, dealing tsarism blow after blow, the Cadets and the Octobrists alike felt "isolated". The Cadets (the *Osvobozhdeniye* people of that time) began to back out already after August 6, 1905, when they declared against boycotting the Bulygin Duma. The Octobrists finally "backed out" after October 17. In 1906-07 the Cadets were "isolated" in both Dumas, powerless to use their majority, shuttling helplessly between tsarism and revolution, between the Black-Hundred landlords and the onslaught of the proletariat and the peasantry. In spite of their majority in both Dumas the Cadets were isolated all the time, they were caught in a cleft stick between Trepov[85] and the real revolutionary movement and made an inglorious exit without a single victory to their credit. In 1908-09 the Octobrists were in the majority in the Third Duma, worked hand in glove with the government, supported it most loyally—and now they have to admit that in reality not they but the Black Hundreds were in command, and that the Octobrist bourgeoisie is *isolated*.

Such is the summing-up of the historical role of the bourgeoisie in the Russian bourgeois revolution. The experience of those most eventful five years (1905-09), which most of all brought about an open development of the mass struggle, of the class struggle in Russia, proved *by facts* that both sections of our bourgeoisie, the Cadet wing and the Octobrist wing alike, were *actually* neutralised by the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, and were powerless, helpless, pitiful, tossed hither and thither between the hostile camps.

By its continual betrayals of the revolution the bourgeoisie has richly deserved the unceremonious kicks, indignities, and contemptuous spurning which have so long been its portion from Black-Hundred tsarism, from the Black-Hundred clique of the tsar and the landlords. And it is not, of course, any special moral qualities that have occasioned these betrayals on the part of the bourgeoisie and brought this historic retribution upon it but the contradictory economic position of the capitalist class in our revolution. This class feared revolution more than it feared reaction, the victory of the people more than the preservation of tsarism, the confiscation of the landed estates more than the preservation of the power of the feudal landlords. The bourgeoisie was not one of those categories that had nothing to lose in the great revolutionary battle. Only the proletariat was such a category in our bourgeois revolution, and after it the millions of ruined peasantry.

The Russian revolution confirmed the conclusion which Engels drew from the history of the great bourgeois revolutions of the West, namely: In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for gathering at the time, the revolution had to be *carried* considerably *further*.[86] And the proletariat of Russia has led, is leading and *will lead* our revolution forward, impelling events further than the point at which the capitalists and liberals would like to halt them.

In the banquet campaign of 1904 the liberals tried in every way to restrain the Social-Democrats, fearing their impetuous intervention. But the workers were not to be deterred by the spectre of a frightened liberal and led the movement forward, to the 9th of January, to the wave of continuous stakes that swept the whole of Russia.

The bourgeois liberals, including the *Osvobozhdeniye* people who were "illegal" at that time, called on the proletariat to take part in the Bulygin Duma. But the proletariat was not to be deterred by the spectre of a frightened liberal and led the movement forward, to the great October strike, the first victory of the people.

The bourgeoisie split after October 17. The Octobrists definitely sided with the counter-revolution. The Cadets cut themselves adrift from the people and ran pell-mell to

Witte's antechamber. The proletariat marched onward. Placing itself at the head of the people it mobilised the masses for independent historic action in such millions that a few weeks of real freedom once and for all drew an indelible line between the old Russia and the new. The proletariat raised the movement to the highest possible form of struggle—the armed uprising in December 1905. It suffered defeat in this struggle but was not routed. Its uprising was crushed but it succeeded in uniting in battle all the revolutionary forces of the people, it did not allow itself to be demoralised by retreat but showed the masses—for the first time in the recent history of Russia—that the struggle could and must be fought to the finish. The proletariat was repulsed but it did not relinquish the great banner of revolution and at a time when the Cadet majority in the First and Second Dumas were repudiating the revolution, trying to extinguish it and assuring the Trepovs and Stolypins that they were ready and able to extinguish it, the proletariat raised the banner on high and continued to call to action, educating, uniting, and organising forces for the struggle.

Soviets of Workers' Deputies in all the big industrial centres, a number of economic gains wrested from capital, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in the army, peasant committees in Guria and other places; finally, transient "republics" in several cities in Russia—all this was the *beginning* of the conquest of political power by the proletariat relying on the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, particularly the peasantry.

The December movement of 1905 was a great movement because it converted for the first time "a pitiful nation, a nation of slaves" (as N. G. Chernyshevsky said at the beginning of the sixties[87]) into a nation *capable* under proletarian leadership of carrying the fight against the loathsome autocracy to a conclusion and drawing the *masses* into this struggle. It was a great movement because the proletariat gave a practical demonstration of the *possibility* of the conquest of power by the democratic masses, the possibility of a republic in Russia, showed "*how it is done*", showed in practice how the masses set about accomplishing this task. The December struggle of the proletariat left the people a legacy that can serve as an ideological and political beacon for the work of several generations.

And the darker the clouds of rabid reaction, the greater the atrocities of the counter-revolutionary tsarist Black Hundreds, the more frequent the spectacle of *even* the Octobrists shaking their heads, declaring that "they are waiting" for reforms and losing patience, the more frequently the liberals and the democrats "sigh for a new revolution", the more abject the utterances of the Vekhists ("we must consciously *not want* a revolution"; Bulgakov, ibid., page 32)—the more vigorously must the workers' party remind the people *what to fight for*.

We have already said time and again that the aims set by the year 1905, the objectives which the movement of that time came near to attaining, must be fought for now by other methods in view of the altered conditions, in view of the different situation at the present historical moment. The attempts of the autocracy to remould itself on the pattern of a bourgeois monarchy, its long parleys with the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the Third Duma, the new bourgeois agrarian policy, etc.—all these things have led Russia into a unique phase of development, have confronted the working class with the lengthy tasks of preparing a new proletarian army—and a new revolutionary army—tasks of training and organising the forces, of utilising the Duma tribune and all opportunities for semi-legal activity.

We must prove able to carry out our tactical line and build our organisation in such a way as to take into account the altered situation *without lessening* our objectives, without curtailing them or diminishing the ideological and political content of even the most modest, inconspicuous and, at first sight, petty work. It would be just such a lessening of our objectives and weakening of the ideological and political content of the struggle if, for instance, we were to put before the Social-Democratic Party the slogan of fighting for a legal labour movement.

Taken by itself this is not a Social-Democratic but a Cadet slogan, for only the liberals dream of the possibility of a legal labour movement without a new revolution (and, while they dream of it, preach false doctrines to the people). Only the liberals are limiting their objectives through a subsidiary aim, expecting—like the liberals of Western

Europe—to reconcile the proletariat with a "reformed", cleansed, "improved" bourgeois society.

Far from fearing such an outcome the Social-Democratic proletariat, on the contrary, is confident that any reform worth the name, any enlargement of its scope of activity, the base of its organisation and the freedom of its movement will increase its strength tenfold and enhance the revolutionary mass character of its struggle. But in order to bring about a real enlargement of the scope of its movement, to bring about a partial improvement, the slogans we put to the proletarian masses must not be curtailed, must not be attenuated. Partial improvements can be (and always have been in history) merely a by-product of revolutionary class struggle. Only if we set before the mass of the workers the objectives, in all their breadth and magnitude, which our generation inherits from 1905 will we be in a position actually to widen the base of the movement, to draw into it great masses and inspire them with that spirit of selfless revolutionary struggle that has always brought the oppressed classes to victory over their enemies.

Not to neglect a single opportunity, however slight, for open activity, for open action, for widening the base of the movement, continually enlisting new sections of the proletariat, using every weak point in the capitalist position for launching an attack and winning some improvement in daily life—and at the same time permeating all these activities with the spirit of revolutionary struggle, explaining at *every* step and turn in the movement the *full substance* of the objectives which we approached but did not attain in 1905—such must be the policy and tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

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THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST FINLAND

On March 17, 1910 Stolypin introduced a Bill to the State Duma "On the Procedure of Promulgating Laws and General State Ordinances Concerning Finland". This official bureaucratic heading conceals a most brazen campaign of the autocracy against the freedom and independence of Finland.

Stolypin's Bill is concerned with placing under the jurisdiction of the State Duma, the Council of State and Nicholas II all those Finnish affairs which "relate not merely to the internal affairs of this territory". The Finnish Diet is only allowed to tender its "conclusions" on these affairs, and these conclusions are not binding upon anyone whatsoever: in its relation to the empire the Finnish Diet is to be reduced to the status of a Bulygin Duma.

What is meant here by "laws and ordinances which relate not merely to the internal affairs" of Finland? Without citing the whole list, which takes up 17 clauses in Stolypin's Bill, we may mention that it includes the customs relations between Finland and other parts of the empire, deletions from the Finnish criminal code, the railways, the monetary system in Finland, rules on public meetings, the-press laws in Finland and other things.

To put all such questions under the jurisdiction of the arch-reactionary Octobrist Duma! *The utter destruction of Finland's freedom*—that is what is being undertaken by the autocracy, which is counting on the support of the representatives of the landed proprietors and the top section of the merchants, who are united by the constitution of the Third of June.

The plan is foolproof, of course, as far as it concerns only those whose position is legal under this "constitution": fifty

extreme Rights, a hundred nationalists and "Right Octobrists", a hundred and twenty-five Octobrists—such is the black-hand gang which has already mustered in the Duma and has been suitably prepared by the long continued incitements of the government press to ensure the adoption of any measure of violence against Finland.

The old nationalism of the autocracy, which suppressed all "non-Russian races", has now been reinforced, firstly by the hatred of all the counter-revolutionary elements towards a people which managed to utilise the brief victory of the proletariat of Russia in October to create under the very nose of the Black-Hundred tsar one of the most democratic constitutions in the world, and to create free conditions for the organisation of the working masses of Finland, the staunch supporters of Social-Democracy. Finland took advantage of the Russian revolution to secure a few years of freedom and peaceful development. The counter-revolution in Russia is making haste to utilise the complete lull "at home" to take away as much as possible of Finland's gains.

History, as it were, is demonstrating by the example of Finland that the famous "peaceful" progress, so idolised by all philistines, is just one of those brief, unstable, ephemeral exceptions which conclusively prove the rule. And this rule is that only the revolutionary movement of the masses and of the proletariat at their head, only a victorious revolution, can make lasting changes in the life of peoples and seriously undermine medieval rule and semi-Asiatic forms of capitalism.

Finland could only breathe freely when the working class of Russia rose in a gigantic mass and gave a shock to the Russian autocracy. And it is only by joining the revolutionary struggle of the masses in Russia that the Finnish worker can now seek the way to deliverance from the onslaught of the Black-Hundred bashi-bazouks.

The bourgeoisie of Finland has shown its counter-revolutionary qualities even in this peaceful country, which accomplished a revolution *at the expense* of the October days in Russia, which upheld liberty *under the wing* of the December struggle and the two oppositional Dumas in Russia. Bourgeois Finland persecuted the Red Guard of the Finnish workers and accused them of revolutionism; it did every-

thing in its power to prevent the full freedom of the socialist organisations in Finland, it thought to escape violence at the hands of tsarism by compliance (such as the surrender of political offenders in 1907); it accused the socialists of its own country of having been *corrupted* by the Russian socialists, infected with their revolutionary spirit.

In Finland now the bourgeoisie too can see the fruits of the policy of concessions, compliance and "flunkeyism", the policy of directly or indirectly betraying the socialists. Apart from the struggle of the masses, schooled in a socialist way and organised by socialists, the Finnish people will find no escape from their plight: apart from proletarian revolution there is no way of repulsing Nicholas II.

Another thing that reinforces the old nationalism as the policy of our autocracy is the growing class-consciousness and consciously counter-revolutionary attitude of our Russian bourgeoisie. Chauvinism has grown among them with their growing hatred of the proletariat as an international force. Their chauvinism has grown stronger parallel with the growth and intensification of the rivalry of international capital. Chauvinism appeared as a thirst for revenge engendered by the losing of the war with Japan and the powerlessness of the bourgeoisie against the privileged landlords. Chauvinism has found support in the appetites of the true Russian industrialists and merchants who are glad to "conquer" Finland after failing to grab a slice of the pie in the Balkans. Therefore, the representative assembly of the landlords and big bourgeoisie gives tsarism true allies for *settling* with free Finland.

But if the basis of counter-revolutionary "operations" over the free border province has become wider, so has the basis for *repelling* these operations. If instead of the bureaucracy alone and a handful of magnates we have the landed nobility and the wealthiest merchants organised in the Third Duma on the side of the enemies of Finland, we have on the side of her friends those millions of common people who created the movement of 1905, who produced the revolutionary wing in both the First Duma and the Second. And however profound the political lull at the *present* moment these masses of people are alive and are growing in spite of everything. So too is growing a new *avenger* of the new defeat

of the Russian revolution, for the defeat of Finland's freedom is a defeat of the Russian revolution.

Our Russian liberal bourgeoisie is also being exposed now—over and over again—in all its pusillanimity and spinelessness. The Cadets, of course, are *against* the persecution of Finland. They will certainly not vote with the Octobrists. But was it not they who did *most of all* to undermine the sympathy of the "public" for that direct revolutionary struggle, those "tactics" of October and December which *alone* made possible the birth of Finland's freedom?—enabled it to hold out for more than four years now? Was it not the Cadets who rallied the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia to repudiate this struggle and these tactics? Was it not the Cadets who did their utmost to rouse nationalist feelings and sentiments throughout Russian educated "society"?

How right the Social-Democratic resolution (of December 1908) was in saying that the Cadets by their nationalist agitation were *in fact* rendering a service to tsarism and no one else[88] The "opposition" which the Cadets wanted to show the autocracy over Russia's diplomatic reverses in the Balkans proved—as was only to be expected—a miserable, unprincipled, lackey-like opposition, which *flattered* the Black Hundreds, *whetted* the appetites of the Black Hundreds, and *reproved* the Black-Hundred tsar because he, the Black-Hundred tsar, was not strong enough.

So now, most "humane" gentlemen of the Cadet Party, reap what you have sown. You have convinced tsarism that it is weak in its stand for "national" interests; now tsarism is showing you its strength in *nationalist* persecution of a non-Russian race. Your nationalism, neo-Slavism, etc., had a selfish bourgeois essence of a narrow class nature wrapped in high-sounding liberal phrases. The phrases have remained phrases, while the essence has *furthered* the misanthropic policy of the autocracy.

Thus it has always been, and always will be, with liberal phrases. They merely *screen* the narrow egotism and brutal violence of the bourgeoisie; they are only artificial flowers festooning the peoples' chains; they only stupefy the minds of the people, *preventing* them from recognising their real enemy.

But each act of tsarist policy, each month of the existence of the Third Duma is more and more mercilessly destroying the liberal illusions, more and more exposing the impotence and rottenness of liberalism, scattering ever wider and more abundantly the seeds of a new revolution of the proletariat

A time will come—the Russian proletariat will rise for the freedom of Finland, for a democratic republic in Russia.

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THEY ARE NERVOUS ABOUT THE ARMY

The debate in the Duma on the interpellation of the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks concerning the tsarist government's violation of Article 96 of the fundamental laws is not over yet. But it has already given such a picture of the state of affairs and the papers have made such a noise about Stolypin's notorious "declaration of March 31" that it will be quite in place to dwell upon this instructive episode in the history of the June 3 regime.

Our group in the Duma was quite right in interpellating the government about its violation of Article 96 of the fundamental laws and in speaking *to such an extent* as if "in defence" of law, "in defence of justice", "in defence of June 3 legality", and so on and so forth. We say "to such an extent" because here the Social-Democrats unquestionably undertook a complicated task *requiring able handling*; they were undoubtedly wielding a double-edged weapon which with the slightest mistake or even awkward usage might wound the bearer. To speak without metaphors, it might imperceptibly lead the Social-Democrats astray from the policy of class struggle to the policy of liberalism.

The Social-Democrats would have made such a mistake if they had spoken purely and simply of "defending" these fundamental laws, without explaining the *special* character of this "defence". They would have made an even greater mistake had they turned the defence of the fundamental laws or legality in general into some sort of slogan such as "fight for legality"—that would have been in the style of the Cadets.

Fortunately, our comrades in the Duma did neither the one nor the other. The first speaker on the interpellation, Gegechkori, opened *expressly* with an explanation of the *spe-*

cial character of the Social-Democratic *defence* of the fundamental laws. Gegechkori began most aptly with the denunciatory speech of Count Bobrinsky at the Congress of the United Nobility, who with a more than broad hint at the Social-Democrats clamoured for the "removal of these troublemakers from the precincts of the State Duma". "I declare," replied Gegechkori, "that in spite of the denunciation, in spite of violence and threats, the group sitting within these walls will not swerve one jot from its declared aims and objects of defending the interests of the working class."

Bobrinsky called upon the government to eject from the Duma those who are systematically agitating against June 3 legality. Gegechkori opened with a declaration that neither violence nor threats can make the Social-Democrats give up their activities.

Gegechkori laid special stress on the following point: "We, of course, are concerned less than anybody else with upholding the prestige of the Third State Duma, if it has such a thing ..." "it was we, opponents in principle of the existing political order, who protested whenever the forces of reaction sought to curtail the rights of the popular representative assembly in their own interest ..." "when open encroachments are being made on the fundamental laws, we, the opponents in principle of these fundamental laws, are obliged to take them under our protection". And at the conclusion of his speech, dissociating himself from those who make a fetish of legality, Gegechkori said: "If we make this interpellation, if we enter into digressions or into the field of juridical interpretations it is only for the purpose of exposing once again the hypocrisy of the government" (p. 1988 of the verbatim report)....

Gegechkori voiced the consistently democratic, republican views of the socialists when he said: "our laws will correspond to the interests and requirements of the mass of the population only when they are dictated by the *direct will of the people*", and the "*clamour from the right*" noted in this part of the verbatim report emphasised that the shaft had gone home.

Another Social-Democratic speaker, Comrade Pokrovsky, spoke even more clearly and definitely in his speech, referring to the political significance of the interpellation: "Let

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

them (the Octobrists) do this directly and openly. Let them frankly accept the slogan of the Rights; 'Down with the right of the popular representative assembly, long live the ministerial antechamber!' There is no doubt that the majority is working to bring about a time in Russia when constitutional illusions will completely vanish, leaving a black reality from which the Russian people will draw the appropriate conclusions" (quoted from the report in *Rech*, April 1).

This treatment of the whole question based on exposing the hypocrisy of the government and the Octobrists and on destroying constitutional illusions is the only correct Social-Democratic way of presenting the interpellation on the violation of Article 96 of the fundamental laws in the Third Duma. In connection with the proceedings in the Duma this is the aspect that must be brought to the fore in our Party agitation, at labour meetings, in our study circles and groups, and, finally, in private conversations with workers who do not belong to any organisation. We must explain the role of the workers' party, which is *exposing* a bourgeois Black-Hundred fraud inside the bourgeois Black-Hundred Duma itself. Inasmuch as it was not possible in *such* a Duma to treat the question with *complete* clarity or to state in full detail the revolutionary Social-Democratic point of view, it is our duty to amplify what our comrades said from the tribune of the Taurida Palace and popularise their speeches, so that the masses can understand and appreciate them.

What is the *gist* of the history of the violation of Article 96? This article occurs in Chapter Nine "on laws" and specifies the exceptions from the general rule, cases when the ordinances and instructions of the military and naval departments are submitted *directly* to the tsar *without passing through* the State Duma and the Council of State.[89] New expenditure requires grants approved by the State Duma, that is the purport of this article.

A year ago the estimates of the naval general staff were being discussed in the State Duma. A heated dispute arose as to whether the confirmation of these estimates was subject to the jurisdiction of the State Duma or not. The Rights (the Black Hundred) said *no*, maintaining that the Duma had no right to interfere, that it could not dare en-

croach upon the prerogatives of the "imperial leader" of the armed forces, i.e., the tsar, *who alone*, *independent of any Duma*, had the right to endorse the army and navy estimates.

The Octobrists, Cadets and Lefts maintained that this was the prerogative of the Duma. Consequently, it was a question of the Black Hundreds headed by Nicholas II wanting to interpret restrictively the rights of the Duma, wanting to *curtail* the prerogatives of the Duma which had already been curtailed to an incredible extent. The Black-Hundred landlords and, at their head, the richest and blackest reactionary landlord, Nicholas Romanov, made a particular minor question into a question of principle, a question of the prerogatives of the tsar, the prerogatives of the autocracy, accusing the bourgeoisie (and even the Octobrist bourgeoisie) of trying to curtail the prerogatives of the tsar, to limit his power, "to separate the leader of the army from the army", and so on.

Whether the power of the tsar should be interpreted as absolutely unlimited autocracy, quite in the old way, or as power with a most modest *limitation*—such was the point of the dispute. And this dispute swelled a year ago almost to the dimensions of a "political crisis", i.e., threats to kick out Stolypin whom the Black Hundreds accused of "constitutionalism", threats to dissolve the Duma of the Octobrists, whom the Black Hundreds called "Young Turks".[90]

Both the Duma and the Council of State approved the estimates of the naval general staff, i.e., they regarded the question as coming *under their jurisdiction*. Everyone waited to see whether Nicholas II would endorse the decision of the Duma and the Council of State. On April 27, 1909, Nicholas II issued a rescript to Stolypin *refusing* to endorse the estimates and charging the ministers to draw up "regulations" on the application of Article 96.

In other words, the tsar for the hundredth time openly and definitely took the side of the Black Hundreds and resisted the slightest attempts to limit his power. His instruction to the ministers to draw up new regulations was a bare-faced order to *violate the law*, to interpret it in such a way that nothing would be left of it, to "interpret" it in the style of the notorious Russian senatorial "interpreta-

tions". Of course it was specified that the regulations should remain "within the limits of the fundamental laws", but these words were the most obvious hypocrisy. The ministers drew up such "regulations"—and Nicholas II approved them (they are called the regulations of August 24, 1909, from the date of their confirmation)—that the law was circumvented! By the interpretation of the "regulations" en orsed without the Duma, Article 96 of the fundamental laws was reduced to nullity! By these regulations the estimates of the army and navy were *taken out* of the jurisdiction of the Duma.

The result was a splendid exposure of the flimsiness of the Russian "constitution", the brazenness of the Black Hundreds, the partiality of the tsar towards the Black Hundreds, the flouting of the fundamental laws by the autocracy. Of course, the illustration of this theme provided by the coup of June 3, 1907, was a hundred times more conspicuous, complete, intelligible and obvious to the broad masses of the people. Of course, if our Social-Democrats in the Duma were unable to make an interpellation on the violation of the fundamental laws by the Act of June 3 this was only because the bourgeois democrats including the Trudoviks did not provide enough signatures to make up the thirty names necessary for an interpellation—it only goes to show how limited is the specifically Duma form of propaganda and agitation. But the fact that it was impossible to make an interpellation on the Act of June 3 did not prevent the Social-Democrats in their speeches from constantly characterising this Act as a coup d'état. And, as a matter of course, even on a comparatively minor issue the Social-Democrats could not and should not leave unexposed the manner in which the autocracy was flouting the fundamental laws and the rights of the popular representative assembly.

The comparative unimportance, pettiness and insignificance of a question like the estimates of the naval general staff, on the other hand, very sharply emphasised the hypersensitiveness of our counter-revolutionaries, their *nervousness about the army*. In his second speech on March 26, Mr. Shubinskoi, the Octobrist spokesman in the Duma, made a most definite turn towards the Black Hundreds, revealing

that it was just their *nervousness about the army* that made the counter-revolutionaries so extremely sensitive about permitting the slightest interference of representative bodies in the approval of the military and naval estimates. "...The name of the Imperial Leader of the Russian Army is truly a great name" ... cried the bourgeois lackey of Nicholas the Bloody. "...Whatever assertions you [the members of the State Duma] make here, whatever you say about there being a desire to deprive someone of rights, you will not deprive the army of its Imperial Leader."

And in his "declaration" of March 31, in which he did his best to confuse his reply with quite empty, meaningless and patently false speeches about "appeasement" and alleged abatement of repressions, Stolypin came out nevertheless quite definitely on the side of the Black Hundreds *against* the prerogatives of the Duma. If the Octobrists proved to be in agreement with Stolypin, this is nothing new. But if *Rech* of Milyukov and Co. calls Stolypin's reply "if anything, conciliatory as regards the prerogatives of the Duma" (No. 89, April 1—editorial after the leading article) we have before us just one more example of how low the Cadet Party has fallen. "The history of recent years shows," said Stolypin, "that the blight of revolution could not undermine our army...." Could not undermine—this is a misstatement of facts, for the generally known events of the soldiers' and sailors' mutinies in 1905-06, the generally known opinions expressed by the reactionary press at that time, show that the revolution *was undermining* and, consequently, *could undermine* the army. It did not completely undermine the army, that is true. But if at the height of the counter-revolution of 1910, several years after the last outbreak of "unrest" among the troops, Stolypin says (in the same declaration) that he was "*possessed by an alarming thought when he listened to several of the previous speakers*", that this "alarming thought" consisted in an "*uneasy impression of some sort of discord among different state elements* in their attitude to our armed forces", this gives Stolypin away completely and the whole Black-Hundred gang at Nicholas II's Court together with him! It proves that the tsar and his gang not only continue to be nervous but are still in downright *trepidation about the army*. This proves

that the counter-revolution is still holding fast to the standpoint of civil war, the standpoint that the suppression of the popular indignation by military means is an immediate and urgent need. Just consider the following phrases of Stolypin's:

"History ... teaches that an army falls into disorder when it ceases to be united in submission to a single sacred will. Insert into this principle the poison of doubt, *instil in the army even only fragments of the idea that its organisation depends on collective will* and its power will no longer rest on an immutable force—supreme power." And in another passage: "I know, many wanted ... to excite *disputes ruinous to our army*, *concerning prerogatives*" (namely, the prerogatives of the Duma, the prerogatives of "collective will").

Just as murderers are haunted by the ghosts of their victims, so do the heroes of the counter-revolution recollect the "ruinous" influence of "collective will" on the army. Stolypin, as a true servant of the Black Hundreds, sees in every Octobrist a "Young Turk" working for the "*disorganisation of the army*" by making it subordinate to collective will, by permitting "fragments of the idea" about such subordination!

The executioners and assassins of the June 3 monarchy must be suffering from hallucinations, they must have gone clean out of their minds if they take the Octobrists for Young Turks. But these delirious fancies, these extravagancies of the mind are a political malady engendered by a feeling of the insecurity of their position and by acute nervousness about the army. If these gentry, the Stolypins, Romanovs and Co. were able to view with the slightest degree of composure the question of the relation of "collective will" to the army they would see at once that if the tsar had tacitly approved the decisions of the Duma and the Council of State on the naval estimates this would have been ten times less noticeable *to the army* than *Duma debates on the question of the prerogatives of the Duma*, the question of the possible "*disorganisation of the army*". But it is characteristic of our counter-revolution that it gives itself away by its fears. It is *no more able* to consider the question of the disorganisation of the army calmly than a murderer can

listen calmly to talk about the participants and circumstances of the murder he has committed.

The principles involved in the comparatively small and unimportant question of the naval estimates have been brought out by the Black Hundreds, by Nicholas II, and by Mr. Stolypin, so that it only remains for us to express our satisfaction at their clumsiness due to their fears. It only remains for us to take Comrade Pokrovsky's excellent statements about the ending of "constitutional illusions", about the need for the people themselves to draw the conclusions from the undoubtedly "black reality" and compare them with the admirably outspoken views in *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* concerning the "declaration of March 31".

In the leading article of April 3 this newspaper declares:

> "The matter itself, as we already explained last year, is very simple. His Imperial Majesty did not confirm the estimates when passed through legislative channels, but established them by an act of supreme government for which even the existing law (apart from the natural rights of the supreme authority) grants clear powers"....

So. So. The "natural right" of the Russian monarchy to violate the fundamental laws. That is the whole point.

> "...The Duma opposition, however, had the impertinence to make this the occasion for an interpellation which questioned the actions of the supreme authority."

Exactly! *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* makes properly explicit what the Social-Democrats in the Duma could not. The point of the interpellation was to pronounce the actions of the tsar (and of Stolypin, the minister under him) a violation of the fundamental laws.

Further, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* attacks the "revolutionary opposition" and the "revolutionary press" for their theory of *conquest* of popular rights by means of a revolution and denies that there could be any "promises" whatsoever in the "declaration of March 31".

> "The very talk about 'promises' is ludicrous and shows to what extent the revolution has befogged the minds even of persons not officially belonging to the revolutionary camp. What 'promises' can the cabinet give?" "...The cabinet will carry out its lawful duties, true to the readership of the supreme authority.... And we can only

hope that this declaration will be understood *more profoundly* by the Duma in all its implications and thereby help to cure the honourable members from the chronic infection of revolutionary 'directives'."

Precisely so: *more profoundly* to understand the declaration (and attitude) of the government and through it to "cure" the *constitutional illusions*—it is in this that lies the political lesson of the Social-Democratic interpellation on the violation of Article 96.

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PARTY UNITY ABROAD

A base of operations abroad is necessary and inevitable for a party which is working in conditions like ours. Everyone who reflects on the position of the Party will admit this is so. However pessimistic the comrades in Russia feel about "abroad" it will be far from disserviceable to them to *know* what is going on here, particularly after the recent plenary session.

Has unity been achieved abroad? No. And for a very simple reason: one of the sides—the Golosists—shows absolutely no desire to respond to the unanimous appeal of the Central Committee to put an end to the split abroad. The factional *Golos*, contrary to the unanimous decision of the Central Committee, did not close down, although at the plenum one of its editors, Comrade Martov, officially declared (see the minutes of the plenum) that he would try to get it stopped temporarily at any rate.* Before the Central Committee Bureau Abroad had time to take any steps towards unity the four editors of *Golos* (two of them members of the editorial board of the Central Organ!!) issued a manifesto with a thinly veiled injunction not to aim at unity. The foreign C.B.G.A. ("Central Bureau of Groups Abroad", which was elected in Basle one-and-a-half years ago at a *factional* Congress of Mensheviks) did the same.

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* Here is the text of the statement:

"Comrade Martov declares that although he cannot speak *officially* for the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, he can say for himself personally that there will be no obstacles in the editorial board of "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*" to stopping "*Golos*" temporarily after the next issue (for a couple of months or even longer) as an experiment pending the results of the work of the new editorial board of the Central Organ."

This C.B.G.A. now does not even represent all the Mensheviks but only their Golosist section. But with the support of *Golos* it is strong enough to disrupt unity. All the Central Committee Bureau Abroad can do now is to appeal to the groups themselves, the pro-Party elements and above all the workers. But—for reasons which are discussed below—this is not being done, or is being done very unsatisfactorily. As before, the Central Committee abroad can count so far only on the support of the Bolshevik groups. Lately, however, they are being reinforced by the pro-Party Mensheviks, the enemies of liquidationism (for the most part they are on the side of Comrade Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*).

The ideological differentiation of the Mensheviks abroad has, of course, considerable significance as a symptom, as a reflection of what is taking place—perhaps less obviously—in Russia as well. The pro-Party Mensheviks have already passed a number of resolutions in this connection. Here are a few excerpts from them. The anti-Golosist Mensheviks in Paris (there are about 20 of them) write: "...in No. 19-20 of this organ (*Golos*) a new course is undoubtedly indicated, incidentally, in Comrade Dan's article 'The Fight for Legality', which seeks to replace Social-Democratic slogans by a specific slogan, ambiguous to say the least, which is the very twin of the slogan of the 'Economic' period: *the fight for rights*", ... "liquidationism, which the editorial board of *Golos* has repudiated until now, has found frank expression in the last issue of this newspaper". The pro-Party Mensheviks in Geneva (14 persons) find that "the cessation of the factional *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is an essential condition for strengthening Party unity".

The group of pro-Party Mensheviks in Nice is of the opinion (unanimously) that "in No. 19-20 of this organ (*Golos*), liquidationism has already been frankly expressed in a number of articles. The group finds that such a policy on the part of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is harmful and refuses to give it any support whatsoever. The group is indignant at the behaviour of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri, who have proved unworthy of the confidence of the last Party Congress and have carried liquidationist tendencies to their ghastly conclusion as regards practical manifestations". The group of pro-Party Mensheviks in San Remo "unanimously refuse

any support whatsoever for the said publication (*Golos*) because they do not subscribe to its liquidationist tendencies. The group cannot restrain their indignation evoked by the conduct of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri". The pro-Party Mensheviks in Liége write in their resolution: "The letter from Stiva Novich and F. Dan's article 'The Fight for Legality' (in *Golos* No. 19-20) make quite definite the anti-Party trend of this organ.... *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is a centre around which the liquidationist tendencies are grouping." The same point of view is taken by a considerable section of the Menshevik group in Zurich and the majority of the group in Berne. There are supporters of the pro-Party Mensheviks in other cities too.

Only by uniting these Menshevik *pro-Party* elements with the Bolsheviks and the non-factional *Party members* who are opposed to liquidationism could the Central Committee Bureau Abroad achieve results and help the work in Russia. And this is exactly what the Bolsheviks abroad are exhorting all comrades to do (see the resolution of the second Paris group).[91] A struggle against the Golosists who are disrupting unity and against the otzovist-ultimatumists who walked out of the editorial board of *Diskussionny Listok* and the general Party committee of the school and who are also undermining Party unity is inevitable if all the real pro-Party elements are to be brought solidly together. So far this has been left to the private initiative of the pro-Party elements, for the C.C. Bureau Abroad has *so far* proved incapable of adopting the proper position. According to the new Rules, three of the five members of the Bureau Abroad are appointed by "nationals"; thus it is *not* the Central Committee of the Party that determines the personnel of the majority of the C.C. Bureau Abroad, and this produces some unexpected and surprising results. For instance, at a recent session of the C.C. Bureau Abroad a majority was formed *against* the line of the Central Committee. A new majority consisting of one Golosist and two alleged, "non-factional" nationals refused to endorse the "modus" of uniting the groups (in the spirit of the decisions of the plenum, i.e., with the demand that all funds be turned over to the Central Committee and *not* to the factional organs) which was worked out directly after the plenum of the Central Committee. It turned down

the proposal (of a Bolshevik and a Polish Social-Democrat) in a letter to each of the groups that the slogan should be put forward: all funds to be given to the general Party bodies and not to the factional newspapers (i.e., *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*). This decision evoked a sharp protest from two members of the C.C. Bureau Abroad (a Bolshevik and a Polish Social-Democrat), who have sent their protest to the Central Committee.

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ONE OF THE OBSTACLES TO PARTY UNITY

While the *pro-Party* Mensheviks in quite a number of groups abroad are rallying together and coming out more and more strongly against the patently liquidationist trend of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the Vienna *Pravda* is still acting evasively. In No. 12 we find an article entitled "To Unity—Despite All Obstacles". In this article one cannot but approve the first, even if very timid and very incomplete, attempt to carry out the resolution of the C.C. about *explaining* the danger of liquidationism. On the other hand, the whole of the first part of the article is an illustration how much further from defending partyism certain alleged non-factional Social-Democrats are than the *pro-Party* Mensheviks.

Here *Pravda* tells a downright untruth, asserting that the editorial board of the Central Organ in the article entitled "*Golos* (*Voice*) of the Liquidators Against the Party"* declared the "whole agreement" to have been "disrupted". Anyone who has read No. 12 of the Central Organ will see that we did not say anything of the sort. The agreement with the Mensheviks was *on condition* that they recognised partyism and sincerely, consistently renounced liquidationism. *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and a group of its followers in Russia *disrupted* this agreement: some, like Mikhail, Roman, Yuri, etc. in Russia, by declaring openly that the agreement itself was harmful ("the resolutions of the Central Committee are harmful"; the very existence of the Central Committee is harmful; there is no need to liquidate the Party, it has been liquidated already), others, like *Golos*, by defending the utterances of the former. The pro-Party Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov, rebelled against the Golosists for their violation of the agreement. If *Pravda*

* See pp. 156-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

nevertheless wants as before, while speaking of the Mensheviks "in general", to have in mind only the Golosists to the exclusion of the Plekhanovites and the pro-Party Mensheviks, we shall always expose such a mode of action everywhere.

Pravda declares that it "cannot and does not want to enter into a discussion" of the conflicts after the plenum, firstly, because "it is not in possession of the factual data required for a correct judgement".

To this we reply: if *Pravda* abroad has not yet found sufficient "data" in the conduct of the Golosist liquidators it never will. In order to see the truth one must not fear to face the truth.

"...Secondly—and this is the most important—because organisational conflicts require organisational and not literary intervention. "

This principle is correct. But the pro-Party Mensheviks "intervened", as any Party member should, in the appraisal of an ideological and not an organisational conflict. *Pravda* does the opposite. It invokes a principle but does not follow it in practice. Actually, *Pravda* devoted the first paragraph of its article to "interfering" in an *organisational* conflict. And that is not all. In its version of the *organisational* conflict *Pravda* brings grist to the mill of the liquidators by calling our article "harsh in the extreme" but *without qualifying* the anti-Party behaviour of the Golosists; it tells an *untruth* by describing as a *factional* conflict the struggle between the *Party's Central Organ* and the *anti-Party* section of the Mensheviks (namely, the Golosists); it tells a *half*-truth by passing over in silence the splitting manifesto of the four editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, and so forth.

A workers' newspaper should either have kept off the subject of the "organisational" conflict or have given a full account of it, telling the whole truth.

One of the serious obstacles to Party unity lies in the attempts to screen the anti-partyism of *Golos*. Keeping silent about its liquidationism or adopting a frivolous attitude to it only aggravates the danger of liquidationism.

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrades,

We consider it our duty to inform you that it is our deep and firm conviction that the state of affairs in the editorial board of the Central Organ has become absolutely intolerable and that it is quite *impossible* for us to carry out the Party line unless the board's composition is changed.

Only the first two meetings of the editorial board since the plenum afforded us any hope of the possibility of joint work with Comrades Martov and Dan. Comrade Martov's agreement with the Central Committee's letter on the Conference (see No. 11 of the Central Organ. Martov signed this letter) certainly testified to his endeavour *loyally* to carry out the decisions of the plenum. A different tone was earliest of all adopted by Comrade Dan, who declared the leading article of the Central Organ No. 11* *harmful* and in our presence accused Martov of *opportunism like that of the Central Organ*. It has already become clear to us from this that the out-and-out Golosists consider Martov an "opportunist" in the sense of being ready to comply with the decisions of the Party, and the whole question reduces itself to whether Martov will surrender to their attack.

Martov's article "On the Right Path" has shown that the answer is yes. His refusal to insert it in *Diskussionny Listok* (although it obviously *discusses* the Central Committee's decision on the composition of the Central Organ) is evidence of the outbreak of hostilities. On the question of the relation of illegal organisations and those active in them to legal ones, Martov in this article *has obviously gone over from the Central Committee* (the letter on the Conference

* See pp. 147-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

which Martov signed) *to Dan*. "The theory of equality" of illegalists and legalists denotes *a departure from the Central Committee's letter*, *a turn on the part of Martov*, for the contradiction between this "theory" and the Central Committee's letter is evident to anyone who does not want to close his eyes to it.

When, after the rejection of his article (he refused its publication as a comment, and in *Diskussionny Listok* as well), Martov announced in the editorial board of the Central Organ *the outbreak of hostilities by him*, his position and that of Dan became quite clear to us.

It was definitely made clear to the Party by: l) the behaviour of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri; 2) the manifesto of the sixteen Russian Mensheviks; 3) *Golos* No. 19-20; and 4) the splitting manifesto of the four editors of *Golos*. To this has now been added 5) the openly liquidationist statement of Potresov in *Nasha Zarya*"[92] No. 2, where he writes along with Martov and others, and 6) the statement of the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* against Plekhanov ("A Necessary Supplement to *Dnevnik*"[93]), where, side by side with the same Potresov, Martynov, Martov and Axelrod treat the Central Organ of the Party and pro-Party Menshevism *en canaille*.

In our leaflet "*Golos* (*Voice*) of the Liquidators Against the Party" and in No. 12 of the Central Organ we gave an appraisal of the first four statements.* In No. 13 of the Central Organ, which will be out next week, Plekhanov gives his appraisal of Potresov's article in *Nasha Zarya*.

As shown already by the four resolutions of the Menshevik groups and parts of the *Menshevik* groups abroad (Paris, Nice, San Remo, Geneva**), the pro-Party Mensheviks are beginning to unite and come out against *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which has definitely gone over to the liquidators. The *pro-Party* Mensheviks openly oppose *Golos* and the Russian liquidators openly admit *Golos*'s turn to liquidationism *after* the plenum.

The result is that the situation in the Party has altered considerably from that obtaining at the time of the plenum

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* See pp. 156-64 of this volume.—*Ed*.
** See pp. 185-88 of this volume.—*Ed*.

and hence absolutely requires changes in the composition of the Central Organ. The plenum wanted to give the possibility of returning to the Party and working loyally in the Party to *all* Golosists, *all* Social-Democrats, *all* legal participants in the workers' movement *desiring* to come over to the pro-Party position. It was counting not on a split between the two sections of Menshevism but on a general passage of both sections to the pro-Party position.

The blame rests with the Russian centre of the legalists (Potresov, Mikhail and Co.) and with *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* that things turned out otherwise. Their split with the *pro-Party* Mensheviks became a fact. Around the Central Organ and *Diskussionny Listok* we united a number of *pro-Party* Mensheviks (Plekhanov, Rappoport, Avdeyev), with whom we were fully able to arrange Party work devoid of any kind of factionalism, despite all our differences of opinion. Steps are being taken abroad to unite the Bolshevik groups and the pro-Party Mensheviks. The *Golos* groups, on the other hand, have definitely taken a course *against* union.

Consequently, it is not for accidental or personal reasons that an absolutely impossible situation has been created within the editorial board of the Central Organ. If a state of continual squabbling, from which there is no way out, prevails on our editorial board, if we three are definitely powerless to overcome the hostile attitude of the two other editors, if all work in the Central Organ is held up, it is the inevitable result of the *false position*. In accordance with the plenum decisions, rapprochement with the *pro-Party* Mensheviks is essential, but in our Central Organ the *anti-Party* Mensheviks wage a relentless struggle against the *pro-Party Mensheviks* who are outside the Central Organ and helping it!

We are fully confident that the comrades in the Central Committee will realise the absolute impossibility of this situation and will not demand that we exemplify it by recounting the innumerable conflicts and rows in the editorial board. These conflicts, accusations and frictions, the total disruption of the work, are simply the result of the changed political situation, which is *inevitably* bound to lead to the disintegration of the Central Organ if the step

dictated by the *whole* spirit of the plenum decisions is not taken, viz., the replacement of the anti-Party, liquidationist, Golosist Mensheviks by pro-Party Mensheviks, whose entry into the Party and its leading bodies we are *obliged* to assist.

In the Central Committee Bureau Abroad the pro-Party Mensheviks have already announced their desire to have their representatives, i.e., supporters of pro-Party Menshevism, on the editorial board of the Central Organ (and in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad).

We for our part declare that we are *definitely not in a position* to conduct the Party Organ in collaboration with the Golosists, for it is impossible to carry out work exclusively by means of a mechanical majority over people with whom we have no common Party ground.

We hope that the Central Committee will take the necessary organisational steps to change the composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ and to set up a *pro-Party* collegium that is capable of functioning.

Written on or about
May 2, 1910
Mailed from Paris to Russia

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*
Signed: *Members of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ*
Lenin and others

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NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

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I

THE "PLATFORM" OF THE ADHERENTS AND DEFENDERS OF OTZOVISM

A pamphlet published by the *Vperyod* group recently appeared in Paris under the title *The Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party. A Platform Drawn Up by a Group of Bolsheviks*. This is the very same group of Bolsheviks about whom, in the spring of last year, the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* declared that they had formed a new faction. Now this group, "consisting of fifteen Party members—seven workers and eight intellectuals" (as the group itself states), comes forward with an attempt to give a complete, systematic and positive exposition of its own special "platform". The text of this platform bears clear traces of careful, painstaking collective work in an effort to smooth out all rough spots, to remove sharp edges and to stress not so much those points on which the group is at variance with the Party as those on which it is in agreement with the Party. All the more valuable to us, therefore, is the new platform, as the official presentation of the views of the trend concerned.

This group of Bolsheviks first gives its own "interpretation of the present historical situation of our country" (§ I, pp. 3-13), then it gives its own "interpretation of Bolshevism" (§ II, pp. 13-17). And it interprets both the one and the other badly.

Take the first question. The view held by the Bolsheviks (and by the Party) is set out in the resolution of the December Conference of 1908 on the present situation. Do the authors of the new platform share the views expressed in that resolution? If they do, why do they not say so plainly?

If they do, why was it necessary to draw up a separate platform, to give an exposition of their own particular "interpretation" of the situation? If they do not share these views, then again why not state clearly in what particular respect the new group is opposed to the views held by the Party?

But the whole point is that the new group itself is rather hazy about the significance of that resolution. Unconsciously (or subconsciously) the new group inclines towards the views of the otzovists, which are *incompatible* with that resolution. In its pamphlet the new group does not give a popular exposition of all the propositions contained in that resolution, but only of a part of them, without understanding the other part (perhaps even without noticing its importance). The principal factors which gave rise to the Revolution of 1905 continue to operate—states the resolution. A new revolutionary crisis is maturing (clause "f"). The goal of the struggle is still the overthrow of tsarism and the achievement of a republic; the proletariat must play the "leading" role in the struggle and must strive for the "conquest of political power" (clauses "e" and "1"). The state of the world market and of world politics makes the "international situation more and more revolutionary" (clause "g"). *These* are the propositions that are explained in a popular manner in the new platform and *to that extent* it goes hand in hand with the Bolsheviks and with the Party, *to that extent* it expresses correct views and performs useful work.

But the trouble is that we have to lay stress on this "*to that extent*". The trouble is that the new group *does not understand* the *other* propositions of this resolution, does not grasp their connection with the rest, and in particular it does not perceive their *connection* with that irreconcilable attitude to otzovism which is characteristic of the Bolsheviks and which is not characteristic of this group.

Revolution has again become inevitable. The revolution must again strive for and achieve the overthrow of tsarism—say the authors of the new platform. Quite right. But that is not all that a *present-day* revolutionary Social-Democrat must know and bear in mind. He must be able to comprehend that this revolution is coming to us in a new way

and that we must march towards it in a new way (in a different way from the previous one; not merely in the way we did before; not merely with those weapons and means of struggle we used before); that the autocracy itself is not the same as it was before. It is just this point that the advocates of otzovism refuse to see. They persistently want to remain one-sided *and thereby*, in spite of themselves, consciously or unconsciously, they are *rendering a service* to the opportunists and liquidators; by their one-sidedness in one direction they are supporting one-sidedness in another direction.

The autocracy has entered a *new* historical period. It is taking a step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The Third Duma represents an alliance with definite classes. The Third Duma is not an accidental, but a necessary institution in the system of this new monarchy. Nor is the autocracy's new agrarian policy accidental; it is a necessary link in the policy of the new tsarism, necessary to the bourgeoisie and necessary because of its bourgeois character. We are confronted by a *specific* historical period with *specific* conditions for the birth of a new revolution. It will be impossible to master these specific conditions and prepare ourselves for this new revolution if we operate only in the old way, if we do not learn to utilise the Duma tribune itself, etc.

It is this last point that the otzovists cannot grasp. And the defenders of otzovism, who declare it to be a "legitimate shade of opinion" (p. 28 of the pamphlet under review), cannot even now grasp the *connection* this point has with the *whole cycle of ideas*, with the recognition of the specific character of the present moment and with the effort to *take it into account* in their tactics! They repeat that we are passing through an "inter-revolutionary period" (p. 29), that the present situation is "transitional between two waves of the democratic revolution" (p. 32); but they cannot understand what it is that is *specific* in this "*transition*". However, unless we do understand this *transition* it will be impossible to survive it with advantage to the revolution, it will be impossible to prepare for the revolution, to *go over* to the second wave! For the preparation for the new revolution cannot be restricted to repeating that it is

inevitable; the preparation must consist in devising forms of propaganda, agitation and organisation that will take account of the *specific character of this transitional situation*.

Here is an instance of how people talk about the *transitional* situation without understanding what this *transition* actually is. "That there is no real constitution in Russia and that the Duma is only a phantom of it, devoid of power and importance, is not only well known to the mass of the population by dint of experience, it is now becoming obvious to the whole world" (p. 11). Compare this with the estimate of the Third Duma given in the December resolution: "The alliance of tsarism with the Black-Hundred landlords and the top commercial and industrial bourgeoisie has been openly recognised and solidified by the coup d'état of June 3 and the establishment of the Third Duma."

Is it really not "obvious to the whole world" that the authors of the platform did not, after all, understand the resolution, in spite of the fact that for a whole year it was chewed over and over again in the Party press in a thousand ways? And they failed to understand it, of course, not because they are dull-witted, but because of the influence over them of otzovism and the otzovist ideology.

Our Third Duma is a Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma. To assert that the Octobrists and the Black Hundreds have no "power and importance" in Russia (as the authors of the platform do in effect) is absurd. The absence of a "real constitution" and the fact that the autocracy retains full power do not in the least preclude the peculiar historical situation in which this government is forced to organise a counter-revolutionary alliance of certain classes on a national scale, in openly functioning institutions of national importance, and in which certain classes are organising themselves from below into counter-revolutionary blocs which are stretching out their hand to tsarism. If the "alliance" between tsarism and these classes (an alliance which strives to preserve power and revenues for the feudal landlords) is a specific form of class rule and of the rule of the tsar and his gang during the present *transitional* period, a form created by the bourgeois evolution of the country amidst the conditions of the defeat of the "first wave of the revolution"—then

there can be no question of utilising the transition period without utilising the Duma tribune. The peculiar tactics of using the very tribune from which the counter-revolutionaries speak *for the purpose* of preparing the revolution thus becomes *a duty* dictated by the specific character of the *entire* historical situation. If, however, the Duma is merely the "phantom" of a constitution "devoid of power and importance", then there is really no *new* stage in the development of bourgeois Russia, of the bourgeois monarchy, or in the development of the form of rule of the upper classes, etc.; and in that case the otzovists are, of course, correct in *principle*!

Do not imagine that the passage we quoted from the platform was a slip of the pen. In a special chapter, "On the State Duma" (pp. 25-28), we read at the very beginning: "All the State Dumas have hitherto been institutions devoid of real power and authority, and did not express the real relation of social forces in the country. The government convened them under the pressure of the popular movement in order, on the one hand, to turn the indignation of the masses from the path of direct struggle into peaceful electoral channels, and, on the other hand, in order to come to terms in these Dumas with those social groups which could support the government in its struggle against the revolution." This is a sheer tangle of confused ideas or fragments of ideas. If the government convened the Dumas in order to come to terms with the counter-revolutionary classes, it follows at once that the First and Second Dumas had *no* "power and authority" (to help the revolution), whereas the Third Duma *possessed and possesses power* and authority (to help the counter-revolution). The revolutionaries could have (and in certain circumstances should have) refrained from participating in an institution which was powerless to help the revolution. This is indisputable. By bracketing together such institutions of the revolutionary period with the Duma of the "inter-revolutionary period", which has power to help the counter-revolution, the authors of the platform commit a monstrous error. They apply correct Bolshevik arguments to those very cases to which they are really inapplicable! This is indeed to make a caricature of Bolshevism.

In summing up their "interpretation" of Bolshevism, the authors of the platform have even put in a special clause "d" (p. 16), in which this "caricature" of revolutionariness has found, we might say, its classical expression. Here is this clause in full:

> "d) Prior to the consummation of the revolution, no semi-legal or legal methods and means of struggle of the working class, including also participation in the State Duma, can have any independent or decisive importance, but only serve as a means of gathering and preparing the forces for the direct, revolutionary, open mass struggle."

This implies that *after* the "consummation of the revolution" legal methods of struggle, "including" parliamentarism, *can* have independent and decisive importance!

That is wrong. They cannot even then. The platform of the *Vperyod* group contains nonsense.

Furthermore, it follows that "prior to the consummation of the revolution" all means of struggle *except* the legal and semi-legal, i.e., *all illegal* means of struggle, *can* have independent and decisive importance!

That is wrong. There are certain illegal methods of struggle, which, even *after* the "consummation of the revolution" (for example, illegal propaganda circles) and "prior to the consummation of the revolution" (for example, the seizure of money from the enemy, or the forcible liberation of arrested persons, or killing spies, etc.), "*cannot* have any independent or decisive importance, but *only* serve", etc., as in the text of the "*platform*".

To proceed. What is the "consummation of the revolution" referred to here? Obviously, *not* the consummation of the socialist revolution, for then there will be no struggle of the working class, since there will be no classes at all. Obviously then, the reference is to the consummation of the *bourgeois-democratic* revolution. Now let us see what the authors of the platform "meant" by the *consummation* of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Generally speaking, this term may be taken to mean two things. If used in its broad sense, it means the fulfilment of the objective historical tasks of the bourgeois revolution, its "consummation", i.e., the removal of the very soil capable of engendering a bourgeois revolution, the consummation of the *entire cycle* of bourgeois revolutions. In this

sense, for example, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in France was *consummated* only in 1871 (though begun in 1789). But if the term is used in its narrow sense, it means a particular revolution, one of the bourgeois revolutions, one of the "waves", if you like, that batters the old regime but does not destroy it altogether, does not remove the basis that may engender subsequent bourgeois revolutions. In this sense the revolution of 1848 in Germany was "consummated" in 1850 or the fifties, but it did not in the least thereby remove the soil for the revolutionary revival in the sixties. The revolution of 1789 in France was "consummated", let us say, in 1794, without, however, thereby removing the soil for the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.

No matter how the words of the platform, "prior to the consummation of the revolution", are interpreted, whether in the wider or narrower sense, there is no meaning in them in either case. Needless to say, it would be altogether absurd to attempt now to determine the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy *up to* the consummation of the whole period of possible bourgeois revolutions in Russia. As for the revolutionary "wave" of 1905-07, i.e., the first bourgeois revolution in Russia, the platform itself is forced to admit that "it [the autocracy] has beaten back the first wave of the revolution" (p. 12), that we are passing through an "inter-revolutionary" period, a period "between two waves of a democratic revolution".

Now what is the source of this endless and hopeless muddle in the "platform"? It lies in the fact that the platform dissociates itself from otzovism diplomatically without abandoning the ideology of otzovism, without correcting its fundamental error and without even noticing it. It lies in the fact that the Vperyodists regard otzovism as a "legitimate shade of opinion", i.e., they regard the otzovist shade of a caricature of Bolshevism as a *law*, a model, an unexcelled model. Anyone who has set foot on this sloping path is bound to slide into a bog of hopeless confusion; he *repeats* phrases and slogans without being capable of *pondering* over the conditions of their application and the limits of their importance.

Why, for example, did the Bolsheviks in 1906-07 so often oppose the opportunists with the slogan, "the revolution

is not over"? Because the objective conditions were such that the consummation of the revolution in the narrow sense of the word was out of the question. Take, for instance, the period of the Second Duma—the most revolutionary parliament in the world and probably the most reactionary, autocratic government. There was no direct way out of this except by a coup d'état from above, or by an uprising from below. And however much the sapient pedants may now shake their heads, no one could say beforehand whether the government's coup d'état would be successful, whether it would pass off smoothly, or whether Nicholas II would break his neck in the attempt. The slogan, "the revolution is not over", had a most vital, immediately important, practically palpable significance, for it *alone* correctly expressed things as they really were and whither they were tending by virtue of the objective logic of events. And now that the otzovists themselves recognise the present situation as "inter-revolutionary", is not the attempt to represent otzovism as a "legitimate shade of the revolutionary wing", "prior to the consummation of the revolution", a hopeless muddle?

In order to extricate oneself from this vicious circle of contradictions, one must not use diplomacy towards otzovism, but must cut the ideological ground from under it; one must adopt the point of view of the December resolution and think out all its implications. The present inter-revolutionary period cannot be explained away as a mere accident. There is no doubt now that we are confronted by a special stage in the development of the autocracy, in the development of the bourgeois monarchy, bourgeois Black-Hundred parliamentarism and the bourgeois policy of tsarism in the countryside, and that the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is supporting all this. The present period is undoubtedly a transitional period "between two waves of the revolution", but in order to prepare for the second revolution we must master the peculiarities of this transition, we must be able to adapt our tactics and organisation to this difficult, hard, sombre transition forced on us by the whole trend of the "campaign". Using the Duma tribune, as well as all other legal opportunities, is one of the humble methods of struggle which do not result in anything "spectacu-

lar". But the transitional period is transitional precisely because its specific task is to prepare and rally the *forces*, and not to bring them into immediate and decisive action. To know how to organise this work, which is devoid of outward glamour, to know how to utilise for this purpose all those semi-legal institutions which are peculiar to the period of the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma, to know how to uphold *even on this basis* all the traditions of revolutionary Social-Democracy, all the slogans of its recent heroic past, the entire spirit of its work, its irreconcilability with opportunism and reformism—such is the *task of the Party*, such is the task of the moment.

We have examined the new platform's first deviation from the tactics set out in the resolution of the December Conference of 1908. We have seen that it is a deviation towards otzovist ideas, ideas that have nothing in common either with the Marxist analysis of the present situation or with the fundamental premises of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics in general. Now we must examine the second original feature of the new platform.

This feature is the task, proclaimed by the new group, of "creating" and "disseminating among the masses a new, proletarian" culture: "of developing proletarian science, of strengthening genuine comradely relations among the proletarians, of developing a proletarian philosophy, of directing art towards proletarian aspirations and experience" (p. 17).

Here you have an example of that naïve diplomacy which in the new platform serves to cover up the essence of the matter! Is it not really naïve to insert *between* "science" and "philosophy" the "strengthening of genuine comradely relations"? The new group introduces into the *platform* its supposed *grievances*, its accusations against the other groups (namely, against the orthodox Bolsheviks in the first place) that *they* have broken "genuine comradely relations". Such is precisely the *real* content of this amusing clause.

Here "proletarian science" also looks "sad and out of place". First of all, we know now of only one proletarian science—Marxism. For some reason the authors of the platform systematically avoid this, the only precise term, and everywhere use the words "scientific socialism" (pp. 13, 15,

16, 20, 21). It is common knowledge that even outright opponents of Marxism lay claim to this latter term in Russia. In the second place, if the task of developing "proletarian science" is introduced in the platform, it is necessary to state plainly just what ideological and theoretical struggle of our day is meant here and whose side the authors of the platform take. Silence on this point is a naïve subterfuge, for the *essence of the matter* is obvious to everyone who is acquainted with the Social-Democratic literature of 1908-09. In our day a struggle between the Marxists and the Machists has come to the fore and is being waged in the domain of science, philosophy and art. It is ridiculous, to say the least, to shut one's eyes to this commonly known fact. "Platforms" should be written not in order to gloss over differences but in order to explain them.

Our authors clumsily give themselves away by the above-quoted passage of the platform. Everyone knows that it is *Machism* that is *in fact* implied by the term "proletarian philosophy"—and every intelligent Social-Democrat will at once decipher the "new" *pseudonym*. There was no point in inventing this pseudonym, no point in trying to hide behind it. In actual fact, the most influential literary nucleus of the new group is Machist, and it regards non-Machist philosophy as non-"proletarian".

Had they wanted to speak of it in the platform, they should have said: the new group unites those who will fight against non-"proletarian", i.e., non-Machist, theories in philosophy and art. That would have been a straightforward, truthful and open declaration of a well-known *ideological* trend, an open challenge to the other tendencies. When an ideological struggle is held to be of great importance for the Party, one does not hide but comes out with an open declaration of war.

And we shall call upon everyone to give a definite and clear answer to the platform's veiled declaration of a philosophical struggle against Marxism. *In reality*, all the phraseology about "proletarian culture" is just a screen for the *struggle against Marxism*. The "original" feature of the new group is that it has introduced *philosophy* into the Party platform without stating frankly *what* tendency in philosophy it advocates.

Incidentally, it would be incorrect to say that the real content of the words of the platform quoted above is wholly negative. They have a certain positive content. This positive content can be expressed in one name: Maxim Gorky.

Indeed, there is no need to conceal the fact already proclaimed by the bourgeois press (which has distorted and twisted it), namely, that Gorky is one of the adherents of the new group. And Gorky is undoubtedly the greatest representative of *proletarian* art, one who has done a great deal for this art and is capable of doing still more in the future. Any faction of the Social-Democratic Party would be justly proud of having Gorky as a member, but to introduce "proletarian art" into the *platform* on this ground means giving this platform a certificate of poverty, means reducing one's group to a literary *circle*, which exposes itself as being precisely "authoritarian".... The authors of the platform say a great deal against recognising authorities, without explaining directly what it is all about. The fact is that they regard the Bolsheviks' defence of materialism in philosophy and the Bolsheviks' struggle against otzovism as the enterprise of individual "authorities" (a gentle hint at a serious matter) whom the enemies of Machism, they say, "trust blindly". Such sallies, of course, are quite childish. But it is precisely the Vperyodists who mistreat authorities. Gorky is an authority in the domain of proletarian art—that is beyond dispute. The attempt to "utilise" (in the ideological sense, of course) *this* authority to bolster up Machism and otzovism is an *example* of how one should not treat *authorities*.

In the field of proletarian art Gorky is an enormous *asset* in spite of his sympathies for Machism and otzovism. But a *platform* which sets up within the Party a separate group of otzovists and Machists and advances the development of alleged "proletarian" art as a special task of the group is a *minus* in the development of the Social-Democratic proletarian movement; because this platform wants to consolidate and utilise the very features in the activities of an outstanding authority which represent his weak side and are a negative quantity in the enormous service he renders the proletariat.

II

THE "UNITY CRISIS" IN OUR PARTY

On reading this title, some readers perhaps will hardly believe their eyes. "Well, that's the limit! What a lot of crises we have had in our own Party, and now all of a sudden a new crisis, a *unity* crisis!"

The expression which sounds so queer I have borrowed from Liebknecht. He used it in 1875 in a letter (dated April 21) to Engels, giving an account of the union of the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. Marx and Engels thought at that time that no good would come of this union.[94] Liebknecht brushed aside their fears and asserted that the German Social-Democratic Party, which had successfully survived all sorts of crises, would also survive the "unity crisis" (see Gustav Mayer, *Johann Baptist von Schweitzer und die Sozialdemokratie*, Jena, 1909, S. 424).

There can be no doubt whatever that our Party too, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, will successfully survive *its* unity crisis. That it is now passing through such a crisis is obvious to everyone who is acquainted with the decisions of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee and with the events that followed. If one were to judge by the resolutions of the plenum, the union might seem to be most complete and fully accomplished. But if one were to judge by what is taking place now in the beginning of May 1910, if one were to judge by the determined struggle of the Central Organ against *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which is published by the liquidators, by the controversy that has flared up between Plekhanov and the other pro-Party Mensheviks, on the one hand, and the Golosists on the other, or by the extremely abusive attacks of the "*Vperyod*" group on the Central Organ (see the recent leaflet of the group, entitled "To the Bolshevik Comrades"), then *all* unity might easily appear to an outsider to be a mere phantom.

The avowed enemies of the Party are rejoicing. The Vperyodists, the adherents and screeners of otzovism, are indulging in unbridled abuse. Still more bitter is the abuse levelled by the leaders of the liquidators, Axelrod, Martynov, Martov, Potresov and others, in their "Necessary Supplement to Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*". The "conciliators" are

at a loss, complaining and uttering helpless phrases (see the resolution passed on April 17, 1910, by the Vienna Social-Democratic Party Club, which shares Trotsky's viewpoint).

But the most important and fundamental question as to the *reasons* why our Party union is developing in this and in no other way, why the (seemingly) complete unity at the plenum is now replaced by (seemingly) complete disunity, and also the question of what the trend of the further development of the Party should be in view of the "relationship of forces" inside and outside our Party—these fundamental questions are not answered either by the liquidators (*Golos* group) or by the otzovists (*Vperyod* group) or the conciliators (Trotsky and the "Viennese").

Abuse and phrase-mongering are no answer.

1. TWO VIEWS ON UNITY

With touching unanimity the liquidators and the otzovists are abusing the Bolsheviks up hill and down dale (the liquidators attack Plekhanov as well). The Bolsheviks are to blame, the Bolshevik Centre is to blame, the "'individualistic' habits of Lenin and Plekhanov" (p. 15 of the "Necessary Supplement") are to blame, as well as the "irresponsible group" of "former members of the Bolshevik Centre" (see the leaflet of the *Vperyod* group). In this respect the liquidators and the otzovists are entirely at one; their *bloc* against orthodox Bolshevism (a bloc which *more than once* characterised the struggle at the plenum, which I deal with separately below) is an indisputable fact; the representatives of two extreme tendencies, each of them equally expressing subordination to bourgeois ideas, each of them equally anti-Party, are entirely at one in their internal Party policy, in their struggle against the Bolsheviks and in proclaiming the Central Organ to be "Bolshevik". But the strongest abuse from Axelrod and Alexinsky only serves to screen their complete failure to understand the meaning and importance of Party unity. Trotsky's (the Viennese) resolution only differs outwardly from the "effusions" of Axelrod and Alexinsky. It is drafted very "cautiously" and lays claim to "above faction" fairness. But what is its meaning? The "Bolshevik leaders" are to

blame for everything—this is the same "philosophy of history" as that of Axelrod and Alexinsky.

The very first paragraph of the Vienna resolution states: ... "the representatives of all factions and trends ... by their decision [at the plenum] consciously and deliberately assumed responsibility for carrying out the adopted resolutions *in the present conditions*, *in co-operation with the given persons*, *groups and institutions*". This refers to "conflicts in the Central Organ". Who is "responsible for carrying out the resolutions" of the plenum in the Central Organ? Obviously the majority of the Central Organ, i.e., the Bolsheviks and the Poles; it is they who are responsible for carrying out the resolutions of the plenum—"in co-operation with the given persons", i.e., with the Golosists and Vperyodists.

What does the principal resolution of the plenum say in that part of it which deals with the most "vexed" problems of our Party, with questions which were most disputable before the plenum and which should have become least disputable after the plenum?

It says that *bourgeois influence over the proletariat manifests itself*, on the one hand, in rejecting the illegal Social-Democratic Party and belittling its role and importance, etc., and, on the other hand, in rejecting Social-Democratic work in the Duma as well as the utilisation of legal possibilities, the failure to grasp the importance of both the one and the other, etc.

Now what is the meaning of this resolution?

Does it mean that the Golosists should have sincerely and irrevocably put an end to rejecting the illegal Party and belittling it, etc., that they should have admitted this to be a deviation, that they should have got rid of it, and done positive work in a spirit hostile to this deviation; that the Vperyodists should have sincerely and irrevocably put an end to rejecting Duma work and legal possibilities, etc., that the majority of the Central Organ should in every way have enlisted the "co-operation" of the Golosists and Vperyodists *on condition* that they sincerely, consistently and irrevocably renounced the "deviations" described in detail in the resolution of the plenum?

Or does the resolution mean that the majority of the Central Organ is responsible for carrying out the resolutions

(on the overcoming of liquidationist and otzovist deviations) "in co-operation with the *given*" Golosists, who *continue* as before and even more crudely to defend liquidationism, and with the given Vperyodists, who continue as before and even more crudely to assert the legitimacy of otzovism, ultimatumism, etc.?

This question needs only to be put for one to see how hollow are the eloquent phrases in Trotsky's resolution, to see how in *reality* they serve to defend the very position held by Axelrod and Co., and Alexinsky and Co.

In the very first words of his resolution Trotsky expressed the full spirit of the worst kind of conciliation, "conciliation" in inverted commas, of a sectarian and philistine conciliation, which deals with the "given persons" and not the given line of policy, the given spirit, the given ideological and political content of Party work.

It is in this that the enormous difference lies between real partyism, which consists in purging the Party of liquidationism and otzovism, and the "conciliation" of Trotsky and Co., which actually renders the most faithful service to the liquidators and otzovists, and is therefore an evil that is all the more dangerous to the Party the more cunningly, artfully and rhetorically it cloaks itself with professedly pro-Party, professedly anti-factional declamations.

In point of fact, what is it that we have been given as the task of the Party?

Is it "given persons, groups and institutions" that we have been "given" and that have to be "reconciled" irrespective of their policy, irrespective of the content of their work, irrespective of their attitude towards liquidationism and otzovism?

Or have we been given a Party line, an ideological and political direction and content of our entire work, the task of purging this work of liquidationism and otzovism—a task that must be carried out irrespective of "persons, groups and institutions", in spite of the opposition of "persons, institutions and groups" which disagree with that policy or do not carry it out?

Two views are possible on the meaning of and conditions for the achievement of any kind of Party unity. It is extremely important to grasp the difference between these

views, for they become entangled and confused in the course of development of our "unity crisis" and it is impossible to orientate ourselves in this crisis unless we draw a sharp line between them.

One view on unity may place in the forefront the "reconciliation" of "given persons, groups and institutions". The identity of their views on Party work, on the policy of that work, is a secondary matter. One should try to keep silent about differences of opinion and not elucidate their causes, their significance, their objective conditions. The chief thing is to "reconcile" persons and groups. If they do not agree on carrying out a common policy, that policy must be interpreted in such a way as to be acceptable to all. Live and let live. This is philistine "conciliation", which inevitably leads to sectarian diplomacy. To "stop up" the sources of disagreement, to keep silent about them, to "adjust" "conflicts" at all costs, to neutralise the conflicting trends—it is to this that the main attention of such "conciliation" is directed. In circumstances in which the illegal Party requires a base of operations abroad, this sectarian diplomacy opens the door to "persons, groups, and institutions" that play the part of "honest brokers" in all kinds of attempts at "conciliation" and "neutralisation".

Here is what Martov, in *Golos* No. 19-20 relates of one such attempt at the plenum:

> "The Mensheviks, Pravdists and Bundists proposed a composition of the Central Organ which would ensure '*neutralisation*' of the two opposite trends in the Party ideology, and would not give a definite majority to either of them, thus *compelling* the Party organ to work out, in relation to each essential question, that *mean course* which could unite the majority of Party workers."

As is known, the proposal of the Mensheviks was not adopted. Trotsky, who put himself forward as candidate for the Central Organ in the capacity of *neutraliser*, was defeated. The candidature of a Bundist for the same post (the Mensheviks in their speeches proposed such a candidate) was not even put to the vote.

Such is the *actual* role of those "conciliators", in the bad sense of the word, who wrote the Vienna resolution and whose views are expressed in Yonov's article in No. 4 of

Otkliki Bunda, which I have just received. The Mensheviks *did not venture* to propose a Central Organ with a majority of *their own* trend, although, as is seen from Martov's argument above quoted, they recognised the existence of *two opposite trends* in the Party. The Mensheviks did not even think of proposing a Central Organ with a majority of *their* trend. They did not even attempt to insist on a Central Organ with any definite trend at all (so obvious at the plenary session was the absence of any trend among the Mensheviks, who were only required, only-expected, to make a sincere and consistent renunciation of liquidationism). The Mensheviks tried to secure "neutralisation" of the Central Organ and they proposed as *neutralisers* either a Bundist or Trotsky. The Bundist or Trotsky was to play the part of a matchmaker who would undertake to "unite in wedlock" "given persons, groups and institutions", irrespective of whether one of the sides had renounced liquidationism or not.

This standpoint of a matchmaker constitutes the entire "ideological basis" of Trotsky's and Yonov's conciliation. When they complain and weep over the failure to achieve unity, it must be taken *cum grano salis*. It must be taken to mean that the matchmaking failed. The "failure" of the hopes of unity cherished by Trotsky and Yonov, hopes of unity with "given persons, groups and institutions" irrespective of their attitude to liquidationism, signifies only the failure of the matchmakers, the falsity, the hopelessness, the wretchedness of the matchmaking point of view, but it does not at all signify the failure of Party unity.

There is another view on this unity, namely, that long ago a number of profound objective causes, independently of the particular composition of the "given persons, groups and institutions" (submitted to the plenum and at the plenum), began to bring about and are steadily continuing to bring about in the two old and principal Russian factions of Social-Democracy changes that create—sometimes undesired and even unperceived by some of the "given persons, groups and institutions"—ideological and organisational bases for unity. These objective conditions are rooted in the specific features of the present period of bourgeois

development in Russia, the period of bourgeois counter-revolution and attempts by the autocracy to remodel itself on the pattern of a bourgeois monarchy. These objective conditions simultaneously give rise to inseparably interconnected changes in the character of the working-class movement, in the composition, type and features of the Social-Democratic vanguard, as well as changes in the ideological and political tasks of the Social-Democratic movement. Hence the bourgeois influence over the proletariat that gives rise to liquidationism (=semi-liberalism, which likes to consider itself part of Social-Democracy) and otzovism (=semi-anarchism, which likes to consider itself part of Social-Democracy) is not an accident, nor evil design, stupidity or error on the part of some individual, but the inevitable result of the action of these objective causes, and the superstructure of the entire labour movement in present-day Russia, which is inseparable from the "basis". The realisation of the danger, of the non-Social-Democratic nature and harmfulness to the labour movement of both these deviations brings about a rapprochement between the elements of various factions and paves the way to Party unity "despite all obstacles".

From this point of view the unification of the Party may proceed slowly, with difficulties, vacillations, waverings and relapses, but proceed it must. From this point of view the process of unification does not necessarily take place among "given persons, groups and institutions", but irrespective of given persons, subordinating them, rejecting those of them who do not understand or who do not want to understand the requirements of objective development, promoting and enlisting new persons not belonging to those "given", effecting changes, reshufflings and regroupings within the old factions, trends and divisions. From this point of view, unity is inseparable from its ideological foundation, it can grow only on the basis of an ideological rapprochement, it is connected with the appearance, development and growth of such deviations as liquidationism and otzovism, not by the accidental connection between particular polemical statements of this or that literary controversy, but by an internal, indissoluble link such as that which binds cause and effect.

2. "THE FIGHT ON TWO FRONTS" AND THE OVERCOMING OF DEVIATIONS

Such are the two fundamentally different and radically divergent views on the nature and significance of our Party unity.

The question is, which of these views forms the basis of the plenum resolution? Whoever wishes to ponder over it will perceive that it is the second view that forms *the basis*, but in some passages the resolution clearly reveals traces of partial "amendments" in the spirit of the first view. However, these "amendments", while *worsening* the resolution, *in no way remove its basis*, its main content, which is thoroughly imbued with the second point of view.

In order to demonstrate that this is so, that the "amendments" in the spirit of sectarian diplomacy are really in the nature of partial amendments, that they do not alter the essence of the matter and the principle underlying the resolution, I shall deal with certain points and certain passages in the resolution on the state of affairs in the Party, which have already been touched upon in the Party press. I shall start from the end.

After accusing the "leaders of the old factions" of doing everything to prevent unity being established, of behaving in the same way at the plenum too so that "every inch of ground had to be taken from them by storm", Yonov writes:

> "Comrade Lenin did not want 'to overcome the dangerous deviations' by means of 'broadening and deepening Social-Democratic activities'. He strove quite energetically to put the theory of the 'fight on two fronts' in the centre of all Party activities. He did not even think of abolishing 'the state of reinforced protection' within the Party" (p. 22, Art. 1).

This refers to § 4, clause "b", of the resolution on the situation in the Party. The draft of this resolution was submitted to the Central Committee by myself, and the clause in question was altered by the plenum itself after the commission had finished its work; it was altered on the motion of Trotsky, against whom I fought without success. In this clause I had, if not literally the words "fight on two fronts", at all events, words to that effect. The words "overcoming by means of broadening and deepening"

were inserted on the proposal of Trotsky. I am very glad that Comrade Yonov, by telling of my struggle against this proposal, gives me a convenient occasion for expressing my opinion on the meaning of the "amendment".

Nothing at the plenum aroused more furious—and often comical—indignation than the idea of a "fight on two fronts". The very mention of this infuriated both the Vperyodists and the Mensheviks. This indignation can be fully explained on historical grounds, for the Bolsheviks have *in fact* from August 1908 to January 1910 waged a struggle on two fronts, i.e., a struggle against the liquidators and against the otzovists. This indignation was comical because those who waxed angry at the Bolsheviks were thereby only proving their own guilt, showing that they were still very touchy about condemnation of liquidationism and otzovism. A guilty conscience is never at ease.

Trotsky's proposal to substitute "overcoming by means of broadening and deepening" for the fight on two fronts met with the ardent support of the Mensheviks and the Vperyodists.

And now Yonov and *Pravda* and the authors of the Vienna resolution and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* are all rejoicing over that "victory". But the question arises: have they, by deleting from this clause the words about the fight on two fronts, eliminated from the resolution the recognition of the need for that fight? *Not at all*, for since "deviations", their "danger", and the necessity of "explaining" that danger, are recognised, and since it is also recognised that these deviations are a "manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat"—all this *in effect* means that the fight on two fronts is recognised! In one passage an "unpleasant" term (unpleasant to one or other of their friends) was altered, but the basic idea was left intact! The result was only that one part of one clause was confused, watered down and marred by phrase-mongering.

Indeed, it is nothing but phrase-mongering and a futile evasion when the paragraph in question speaks of overcoming by means of broadening and deepening the work. There is no clear idea here at all. The work must certainly at all times be broadened and deepened; the entire *third* paragraph of the resolution deals with this in detail before it

passes on to the specific "ideological and political tasks", which are not always or absolutely imperative but which result from the conditions of the particular period. § 4 is devoted only to these special tasks, and in the preamble to all of its three points it is directly stated that these ideological and political tasks "*have come to the fore* in their turn".

What is the result? It is nonsense, as if the task of broadening and deepening the work has *also* come to the fore in its turn! As if there *could* be a historical "turn" when *this* task was not present, as it is always!

And in what way is it possible to overcome deviations *by means of* broadening and deepening Social-Democratic work? In any broadening and deepening of our work the question of how it should be broadened and deepened inevitably rises; if liquidationism and otzovism are not accidents, but trends engendered by social conditions, then they can assert themselves in any broadening and deepening of the work. It is possible to broaden and deepen the work in the spirit of liquidationism—this is being done, for instance, by *Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*[95]; it is also possible to do so in the spirit of otzovism. On the other hand, the overcoming of deviations, "overcoming" in the real sense of the word, inevitably deflects certain forces, time and energy from the immediate broadening and deepening of correct Social-Democratic work. The same Yonov, for instance, writes on the same page of his article:

"The plenum is over. Its participants have gone their several ways. The Central Committee in organising its work has to overcome incredible difficulties, among which not the least is the conduct of the so-called [only "so-called", Comrade Yonov, not real, genuine ones?] liquidators whose existence Comrade Martov so persistently denied."

Here you have the material—little, but characteristic material—which makes it clear how empty Trotsky's and Yonov's phrases are. The overcoming of the liquidationist activities of Mikhail, Yuri and Co. diverted the forces and time of the Central Committee from the immediate broadening and deepening of really Social-Democratic work. Were it not for the conduct of Mikhail, Yuri and Co., were it not for liquidationism among those whom we mistakenly continue to regard as our comrades, the broadening and

deepening of Social-Democratic work would have proceeded more successfully, for then internal strife would not have diverted the forces of the Party. Consequently, if we take the broadening and deepening of Social-Democratic work to mean the immediate furthering of agitation, propaganda and economic struggle, etc., in a really Social-Democratic spirit, then in regard to this work the overcoming of the deviations of Social-Democrats from Social-Democracy is a minus, a deduction, so to speak, from "positive activity", and therefore the phrase about overcoming deviations *by means of* broadening, etc., is meaningless.

In reality this phrase expresses a vague longing, a pious, innocent wish that there should be less internal strife among Social-Democrats! This phrase reflects nothing but this pious wish; it is a *sigh* of the so-called conciliators: Oh, if there were only less struggle against liquidationism and otzovism!

The political importance of such "sighing" is nil, less than nil. If there are people in the Party who profit by "persistently denying" the existence of liquidators (and otzovists), they will take advantage of the "sigh" of the "conciliators" to cover up the evil. That is precisely what *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* does. Hence the champions of such well-meaning and hollow phrases in resolutions are only *so-called* "conciliators". In actual fact, they are the abettors of the liquidators and otzovists, in actual fact, they do not deepen Social-Democratic work but strengthen deviations from it; they strengthen the evil by temporarily concealing it and thereby making the cure more difficult.

In order to illustrate for Comrade Yonov the significance of this evil, I shall remind him of a passage in an article by Comrade Yonov in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 1. Comrade Yonov aptly compared liquidationism and otzovism to a *benignant ulcer* which "in the process of swelling draws all the noxious elements from the entire organism, thus contributing to recovery".

That's just it. The process of swelling, which draws the "noxious elements" out of the organism, leads to recovery. And that which hampers the purification of the organism from such elements is harmful to it. Let Comrade Yonov ponder over this helpful idea of Comrade Yonov.

3. THE TERMS OF UNITY AND SECTARIAN DIPLOMACY

To proceed. The editorial article of *Golos* on the results of the plenum compels us to touch on the question of the deletion of the words liquidationism and otzovism from the resolution. This editorial article (in No. 19-20, p. 18) declares with an audacity unusual and unprecedented (except among our Golosists) that the term "liquidator" is as elastic as india-rubber, that it has "*engendered all kinds of misunderstandings*" (sic!!), etc., and for this reason "the Central Committee decided to delete this term from the resolution".

What can we call this version of the Central Committee's decisions on the deletion of the term when the editors of *Golos* cannot but know that it is contrary to the truth? What calculation was in the minds of these editors, two of whom were at the plenum and know the "history" of the deletion of the term? Did they really count on not being exposed?

The majority of the commission which drew up the resolution approved the retention of the term. Of the two Mensheviks in the commission, one (Martov) voted for its deletion, the *other* (who repeatedly inclined towards Plekhanov's position) was *against*. At the plenum the following statement was put forward by all the nationals (2 Poles+2 Bundists+1 Lett) and Trotsky.

> "Recognising that it would be desirable intrinsically to apply the term 'liquidationism' to the trend which, as indicated in the resolution, has to be combated, yet taking into account the statement of the Menshevik comrades that *they too consider it necessary to combat this trend* but that the use of such a term in the resolution is of a factional character directed against them, the Mensheviks—we, in the interests of eliminating all unnecessary hindrances to the unification of the Party, propose that this term be dropped from the resolution."

Thus the majority of the Central Committee and, moreover, all the non-factional elements, state in writing that the word liquidationism is intrinsically correct and that liquidationism must be combated, yet the editorial board of *Golos* explains that the term was deleted as being intrinsically unsuitable!!

The majority of the Central Committee and, moreover, all the non-factional elements declare in writing that they agree to the deletion of the term, yielding to the insistence of the Mensheviks (more correctly: yielding to an ultimatum, for the Mensheviks declared that the resolution would not be unanimous otherwise) in view of their promise to "*combat this trend*". And yet the editors of *Golos* write: the resolution gave an "unequivocal reply to the question of the so-called struggle against liquidationism" (page 18, ibid.)!!

At the plenum they promise to reform, pleading: do not employ "a term which is directed against *us*", for from now on we ourselves are going to combat this trend—yet in the first issue of *Golos* after the plenum they declare that the fight against liquidationism is only a "so-called" fight.

Clearly, we have here, on the part of the Golosists, a complete and definite turn to liquidationism, a turn which becomes comprehensible if we take a look at what took place after the plenum as at something integral, connected by cause and effect—particularly the utterances of *Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye* and gentlemen like Mikhail, Yuri, Roman and Co. Of this we shall speak further on, where it will be our task to demonstrate the utter superficiality of the view taken by Trotsky, who is prone to blame everything on the "violation of moral and political obligations" (the Vienna resolution), whereas we are evidently confronted not by an individual or group "violation of commitments", not by a moral or juridical act, but by a *political* act, namely: the rallying of the anti-Party legalists in Russia.

For the present we must dwell on another question, namely, the question of the causes and significance of the action of the plenum in deleting the word liquidationism from the resolution. To explain it purely as a result of the misguided zeal of conciliators like Trotsky, Yonov and Co. would be incorrect. There is yet another factor here. The point is that a considerable portion of the decisions of the plenum were passed not on the usual principle of the minority submitting to the majority, but on the principle of an *agreement* between the two factions, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the mediation of the nationals. This circumstance, apparently, is what Comrade Yonov is hint-

ing at in *Otkliki Bunda* when he writes: "The comrades who are now clinging to formalities know perfectly well how the last plenum would have ended if it had taken a formal point of view."

In this sentence, Comrade Yonov speaks in hints. Like Trotsky, he considers such a mode of expressing his thoughts extremely "tactful", non-factional and specifically pro-Party. In point of fact, this is the very method employed by sectarian diplomats which does nothing but harm to the Party and the pro-Party cause. Such hints are lost to some, pique the sectarian curiosity of others, and set off more scandalmongering and back-biting. Hence Yonov's hints must be deciphered. If he is not referring here to the plenum seeking an agreement (not merely a majority decision) on a number of questions we shall ask him to express himself more explicitly and not put ideas into the heads of the gossips abroad.

If, however, Yonov is referring here to the agreement between the factions at the plenum, his criticism of "the comrades who cling to formalities" vividly shows us yet one more trait of those alleged conciliators who, in effect, are secretly helping the liquidators.

A number of unanimous resolutions were adopted at the plenum by *agreement* between the factions. Why was this necessary? Because actually the relations between the factions were tantamount to a split and, as is always and inevitably the case in any split, the discipline of the whole body (in this instance the Party) is sacrificed to the discipline of the part (in the present instance the faction).

Party conditions in Russia being what they are there was no other way to unity than through an agreement between the factions (whether all the factions or the chief ones, whether parts of factions or whole ones, is another question). Hence, the necessity of a compromise, i.e., concessions on certain points which were not recognised by the majority but were demanded by the minority. One of these concessions was the deletion of the word liquidationism from the resolution. A particularly conspicuous sign of the compromise character of the resolutions of the plenum was the Bolsheviks' *conditional* surrender of their *factional* property to *third* persons. One section of the Party condi-

tionally hands over its property to third persons (from the international Social-Democratic movement) who will have to decide whether this money should be given to the Central Committee or returned to the faction. The character of this contract, which would be quite extraordinary and even impossible in a normal, intact Party, shows clearly on what *conditions* the Bolsheviks accepted the agreement. The declaration of the Bolsheviks printed in the Central Organ No. 11, says clearly that the main ideological and political condition was the passing of the resolution "condemning liquidationism and otzovism and recognising the fight against these trends to be an inalienable element of the political line of the Party", that one of the guarantees for the implementation of this line was the composition of the Central Organ, and that a continuation of their factional organ and factional policy by the Mensheviks would give the Bolsheviks the right to "demand their money back from the trustee". The Central Committee *accepted* these conditions, making direct reference to this declaration of the Bolsheviks in the resolution on the factional centres.

The question is, are these conditions to be kept or not? Are these conditions formal or not? Comrade Yonov, speaking disdainfully of "formalities" has not understood the most elementary distinction between the agreement as the basis of a contract (= the condition that the Bolsheviks should hand over their money, a condition endorsed by the unanimous resolution of the Central Committee on factional centres) and the observance of the formal conditions of the contract as the basis for the preservation of unity.

If Comrade Yonov, now, after the unanimous resolution of the Central Committee on the factional centres, contemptuously dismisses "formalities" he is dismissing the whole resolution of the Central Committee on the factional centres. Comrade Yonov's sophistry amounts to the following: the aggregate decisions of the Central Committee were reached not only through the passing of resolutions by a majority vote but also through an agreement between the warring trends on certain highly important questions—consequently, *henceforth* too these decisions are not formally binding and the minority has the right to demand an agreement! *Since* there is an element of compromise in the deci-

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sions of the Central Committee these decisions can *always* be violated because an agreement is a voluntary affair!

Is not such sophistry a thinly veiled defence of the liquidators?

But while Yonov's sophistries are nothing but ludicrous the endeavour of the Central Committee (the plenum) to make the maximum possible concessions was psychologically and politically right and proper. The Mensheviks and otzovists joined in furious attacks on the Bolshevik Centre, against which they levelled the most savage accusations. Not disagreements in principle, but the "malice" of the Bolshevik Centre—that is what estranges us from the Party above all and before all, said both the Mensheviks and the otzovists.*

This is a very important point which must be cleared up if we are to understand why our unity crisis is taking such a course and no other. There *were no* champions of liquidationism and otzovism in principle; neither the Mensheviks nor the Vperyodists *ventured* to take such a position. Here the effect was seen of a feature of the modern "critics" of Marxism and the critics of genuine Marxist tactics, one already commented on in our literature long ago (and frequently commented on in the international literature against the opportunists), viz., irresolution, unprincipledness, concealment of the "new" policy, the screening of the consistent representatives of liquidationists and otzovists. We are not liquidators, that is a factional term—cried the Mensheviks. We are not otzovists, that is a factional exaggeration—echoed the Vperyodists. And thousands of accusations on all manner of occasions, including that of so-called "criminal actions" (read: expropriations), were-hurled against the Bolshevik Centre *with the aim* of drawing a veil over differences of political principle and of pushing them into the background.

To this the Bolsheviks replied: very well, gentlemen, let the Central Committee examine *all* your accusations

* Compare Yonov's comment: "No less insistent was Comrade Martov in assuring the plenum that the 'dangerous deviations' to the Right were an invention of the spiteful Bolsheviks, that the Party had only one enemy and that was the Bolshevik Centre with its factional ruling of the roost" (p. 22 of the article quoted).

and pronounce "judgement and sentence" on them. There are five national Social-Democrats at the plenum—any decision at all depends on them and a unanimous one even more so. Let them be the "judges" to examine your (i.e., Menshevik and Vperyodist) accusations and satisfy your claims against the Bolshevik Centre. The Bolsheviks went further. They agreed to the maximum compromises in the resolutions demanded by the Mensheviks and Vperyodists.

And so the maximum concessions were made in the resolutions on the state of affairs in the Party and on the conference, all the "accusations" were gone into and *all claims against the Bolshevik Centre were satisfied* on the basis of a decision by *all five national Social-Democrats*.

This was the only way to deprive the opponents of the Party line, i.e., the anti-liquidationist line, of *every opportunity to prevaricate*, *of every opportunity to evade the principles of the question*. And they were deprived of this opportunity.

If now Axelrod and Martov and Co. in the "Necessary Supplement", and Alexinsky and Co. in the leaflet of the Vperyodists again try to drag out accusations against the Bolshevik Centre, tittle-tattle, slander, lies and insinuations—then these gentlemen condemn themselves. That the plenum *unanimously* heard *all* their accusations, rejected *all* of them by its resolution and put it on record that they were rejected is impossible for anyone to deny, whether these or any other knights of discord. That being so it should now be clear to one and all that the people who are once more beginning a squabble (Axelrod, Martov, Alexinsky and Co.) are simply political blackmailers who want to sidetrack questions of principle by scandalmongering. And we shall not treat them as anything else but political blackmailers. We are not going to concern ourselves with any question other than the implementation by the Party of its anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist policy, leaving Axelrod, Martov and Alexinsky to wallow in the mire as much as they like.

The compromises and concessions of the Bolsheviks, their assent to resolutions which in many respects were not forceful enough, were necessary for a clear-cut demarcation based on principle. By meeting *all* the claims of the Men-

sheviks and otzovists that were endorsed by a majority of the nationals,* the Bolsheviks ensured that the sole issue for all Social-Democrats irrespective of trend, except the professional blackmailers, became the implementation of the Party's anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist policy. Under the resolution which depended on the national Social-Democrats, access to Party work, to taking part in the implementation of this policy, was not barred to anyone, to any single member of the Party; no obstacles to its implementation, no extraneous hindrances remained. So if the liquidators now raise their heads again, more conspicuously than ever it *proves* that their extraneous obstacles were a fiction, a blind, scandalmongering dodge, a contrivance of sectarian intriguers and nothing more.

That is why the process of demarcation and division began in real earnest only after the plenum. This division is taking place solely over a most important question of principle—that of the liquidation of our Party. Those "conciliators" who were shocked, aggrieved and astonished because this process of demarcation began after the plenum, only proved by their astonishment that they were under the spell of sectarian diplomacy. A sectarian diplomat might think that a conditional agreement with Martov and Martynov, Maximov and the second Vperyodist[96] means the end of all demarcation, for a divergence of principle is a minor matter to such a diplomat. Conversely, people who attach primary importance to the fundamental question of liquidationism and otzovism see nothing surprising in the fact that a demarcation purely on the basis of principle had to begin *after* satisfying *all* the claims of Martov, Maximov and Co., *after* the maximum concessions to them on questions of organisation, etc.

What has been taking place in the Party since the plenum is not the collapse of Party unity, but the beginning of the union of all those who are really capable and desirous of working in the Party and in the Party spirit, the beginning

* Remember that those with the right to vote at the plenum were 4 Mensheviks, 4 Bolsheviks, 1 Vperyodist, 1 Lett, 2 Bundists and 2 Poles, i.e., the Bolsheviks did not have a majority over the Mensheviks and the Vperyodists even with the Poles and the Lett; the Bundists decided.

of the purging of a real Party bloc of Bolsheviks, pro-Party. Mensheviks, nationals and non-factional Social-Democrats from renegades hostile to the Party, from semi-liberals and semi-anarchists.*

4. PARAGRAPH I OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY

Analysing further the defects of the plenum resolutions I must now dwell on the first point of the resolution on the state of affairs in the Party. It is true that this point does not touch on questions relating directly to one or other conception of Party unity, but I shall have to make a digression since the interpretation of this first point has already given rise to no few disputes in the Party.

In my draft of the resolution this point was totally absent and, with the rest of the *Proletary* editorial board, I most emphatically opposed it. It was inserted by the votes of the Mensheviks and the Poles although they were warned most seriously by a section of the Bolsheviks that the interpretation of this vague, nebulous point would inevitably produce misunderstandings or—worse—render a service to the liquidators.

It need scarcely be said that at the plenum I criticised quite a number of the propositions in this point as inane, vacuous and tautological. To say that the tactics of the Social-Democrats are always the same in their basic principles without defining what these basic principles are or making clear which of them (Marxism in general or certain

* By the way. The following fact may serve to characterise the bloc of the Golosists and Vperyodists against the Bolsheviks (a bloc which exactly resembles the bloc of the Jaurès-ists and Hervé-ists against the Guesde-ists). In his "Necessary Supplement" Martov jeers at Plekhanov for attaching any importance to the membership of the commission on the school. Martov is playing the hypocrite. At the plenum, this same Martov with all the Mensheviks and with Maximov, and assisted by Trotsky, *fought for a resolution* that would recognise the otzovist school in X.—as a Party school with which the Central Committee should *make an agreement*! It was only with difficulty that we managed to defeat this anti-Party bloc.

Of course if the Golosists and Vperyodists enter into the Party they have every *right* to enter into blocs. But it is not a question of right but of the principle underlying the bloc. This is an *unprincipled bloc* against Party and principle.

propositions of Marxism) are involved and why; to say that the tactics of the Social-Democrats are always designed to secure the maximum results without defining either the immediate aim of the struggle (the immediate possible results) at the present time, or the specific methods of struggle to be applied at this time; to say that the tactics are designed for the various courses which development might follow without defining them concretely; to repeat truisms to the effect that our tactics must promote the massing of forces and make the proletariat ready both for open struggle and for the utilisation of the antagonisms within the unstable regime—all these defects are glaringly obvious and convert the whole point into unnecessary and useless ballast.

But there is something still worse in this point. It contains a loophole for the liquidators, as was pointed out at the plenum by various delegates, not only by the Bolsheviks but also by one of the Bundists and even Trotsky. This loophole is a phrase to the effect that the class-conscious proletariat has "*for the first time*, by organising into a Social-Democratic mass party, an opportunity to apply intelligently, systematically and consistently this tactical method of international Social-Democracy". (What method is *this*? The previous reference was to the basic principles of the tactics not the method, let alone a definite method.)

Why for the *first time*? asked the critics of this point at the plenum. If it means that any step in the development of the country produces something new, something higher in the level of industrial technique and clarity of class struggle, etc., then again we are faced with a banality. Then any period will infallibly produce something that comes about for the *first time* compared to a previous period. But we are living through a definite period, a period of counter-revolutionary ebb, a period of an enormous decline in the energy of the masses and the Social-Democratic workers' movement after a revolutionary upsurge. And if it be said that such a period affords the proletariat *for the first time* an opportunity to apply consciously, etc., the method of international Social-Democracy, these words will lead inevitably to a liquidationist interpretation, a purely liberal exaltation of the Third Duma period, an allegedly peaceful and lawful period, over the period of

storm and stress, the period of revolution, when the struggle of the proletariat took direct revolutionary forms and the liberals decried it as "spontaneous folly".

In order to direct special attention to this danger of a liquidationist interpretation of this extraordinarily vague point, I submitted a series of written statements at this meeting of the plenum, emphasising a number of passages from the speeches contributed there. Here are two of my statements:

1) "On Lenin's demand the following words of Comrade T.[97] (Polish S.D.) are entered in the minutes: 'that the tactics of revolution are belittled here in comparison with the counter-revolution is an absolutely false interpretation.'"

2) "On Lenin's demand the interjection of Comrade Martov ("quite right!") to the statement by I.[98] (a Bolshevik who defended this point) that the words in dispute do not belittle but enhance the significance of the revolution and its methods in comparison with the counter-revolutionary methods, is entered in the minutes."

Both statements confirm that the Pole and Bolshevik, with the agreement of Martov, categorically denied the slightest admissibility of a liquidationist interpretation of this point. Of course these two comrades did not at all intend any such interpretation.

But it is well known from of old that what is applied is the law, not the motives of the law, not the intentions of the legislator. The significance of the present point in agitation and propaganda is determined not by the good intentions of any of its authors, not by what they said at the plenum, but by the objective relationship of forces and trends inside the Russian section of the S.D. (the non-Russian Social-Democrats will scarcely pay special attention to this vague point).

Therefore I waited with particular interest to see how this point would now be interpreted in the press, preferring not to hurry with my opinion but to hear first of all the reactions of the Social-Democrats who were not at the plenum or the reactions of the Golosists.

The first issue of *Golos* after the plenum provided quite enough material to appraise our dispute as to how this point would be interpreted.

In *Golos*'s leading article on the results of the plenum we read:

"It would be quite inconceivable and absurd, of course, to suppose that by these words ["for the first time", etc.] the Central Committee wanted to express an indirect condemnation of our former tactics, *inasmuch as they were adapted to the revolutionary situation*" (author's italics; No. 19-20, p. 18).

Very good! The author declares a liquidationist interpretation to be inconceivable and absurd. However, on reading further, we find the following assertion in the same paragraph:

> "These words are an official recognition of the comparative backwardness of our political life in the past in spite of the revolutionary forms in which it was displayed, and this, incidentally, was one of the main causes of the defeat of the revolution; these words are an official recognition of the inordinately elementary character of our former tactics, to which they were condemned by the backwardness of the social relationships these words, lastly, were an official recognition that whatever the political situation in the future, any attempt to return to the dictatorship of the exclusive illegal circles in the movement with the whole policy associated therewith would be a decided step back."

Good, is it not?

One hardly knows where to begin in sorting out this collection of "gems".

I shall begin with the triple reference to "official recognition". To think, how much ridicule this same *Golos* has poured on every official recognition by one or other resolution of an appraisal of the past, of the revolution and of the role of the bourgeois parties, etc.! There you have a specimen of the sincerity of the outcries against "officiality": when the Golosists do not like an *explicit* decision of the Party they laugh to scorn its claims to "officially" decide complex "scientific" questions, and so on and so forth—just as the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* ridicules the Dresden resolution against the opportunists, or as the Belgian ministerialists in our own day ridicule the Amsterdam resolution.[99] But as soon as a Golosist thinks he sees a loophole for liquidationism, he swears and vows *three times over* that this is "recognised officially".

And when a Golosist swears and vows a thing you can be sure that he is ... evading the truth. For the author of the article to speak of the "official recognition" of *his* interpretation is all the more absurd because the *disputable character of the interpretation* of this point was a special subject for debate in the Central Committee. Moreover, from statements *officially entered in the minutes*—yes, yes! here is something really "official"—statements *which quoted these words* of the Pole and the Bolshevik, it is clear that they would never have recognised *Golos*'s interpretation to be a correct one. Our author has only disgraced himself with his talk of official recognition.

The words "for the first time" are a recognition of the "comparative backwardness of the past"—we might let that pass, although there is nothing to show why this should be referred specifically to political life and not to other aspects of social development; but to add "in spite of the revolutionary forms" is to stick out too incautiously the ass's ear of the Vekhist. You can safely bet that of a hundred liberals reading this passage not less than ninety will kiss the Golosists for it, and of a hundred workers not less than ninety will turn their backs on the opportunists. And, "incidentally", the addition about the "causes of the defeat of the revolution" gives away the co-authors of the liquidationist Pentateuch completely: under cover of a vague resolution they want to smuggle in their liberal view on the role of the proletariat in the revolution. Therefore they speak of the "elementary character" and even—mark this!—the *inordinately* elementary character "of our former tactics". The "inordinately" elementary character of our tactics, do you see, ensues from the phrase "to apply 'for the first time' intelligently, systematically and consistently [in a mass party] the method of international Social-Democracy".* The tactics of the period of open struggle, the

* The resolution of the C.C. is interpreted in the same spirit also by Comrade An (see his article "Apropos the Letter from the Caucasus" in the present issue of *Diskussionny Listok*). Comrade An's article confirms the gravest accusations of the author of the *Letter from the Caucasus*, Comrade K. St.[100] although he calls this letter a "lampoon". We shall return again to Comrade An's article, which is curious in many respects.

period of comparative freedom of the press, mass unions, elections with the participation of the revolutionary parties, universal excitement among the population, rapid fluctuations in the policy of the government, the period of certain important victories over the government—these tactics, evidently, were *inordinately* elementary in comparison with the non-elementary tactics of the years 1909-10! How rich in apostasy, how poor in Social-Democratic understanding of events must on be to make such interpretations!

But to deduce from the words "for the first time" a condemnation of the "dictatorship [!!] of the exclusive illegal circles"—this is simply priceless. In the time of the "inordinately elementary" tactics of 1905-07 the leadership of the workers' party was, do you see, much more like a "dictatorship" than in 1909-10, it emanated to a far greater extent from the "underground" organisations and indeed "circles", which were more "exclusive" than in our time! To give this laughable profundity a semblance of truth one has to remember that the opportunists and Cadetophiles felt that they were an "exclusive circle" among the workers during the revolution and find that now, in the *struggle for legality* (don't laugh!) they are not "exclusive" (Milyukov himself is at our side), they are not a "circle" (we have renegade periodicals published openly), they are not "underground", and so on and so forth.

For the first time the proletariat, organising into a mass Social-Democratic Party, observes among people who would like to consider themselves the leaders of the proletariat such a *systematic and consistent* gravitation towards liberal renegacy.

This lesson of the interpretation of the notorious point concerning "*for the first time*" will have to be reckoned with whether they like it or not by the Polish comrade and the Bolshevik* comrade who officially declared that in their opinion a liquidationist interpretation of *their* point would be absolutely false.

* At the plenum, these comrades interpreted §1 as pointing to the growth of class differentiation, the progress of the purely socialist consciousness of the mass of the workers, the strengthening of bourgeois reaction. These thoughts are correct, of course, but they are *not expressed* (and it is *not they* which are expressed) in the propositions comprising §1.

5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECEMBER (1908) RESOLUTIONS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE LIQUIDATORS TO THEM

These last comments on the defects of the plenum resolution must be applied to the introductory words of the first point, which read: "Enlarging upon the main propositions of the resolutions of the Party Conference of 1908, the Central Committee resolves...." This formulation is the result of a concession to the Mensheviks, and this circumstance must be dwelt upon all the more for the fact that we have here again a glaring example of disloyalty in return for the concession, or a crying incapacity to understand the meaning of the Party's definitions of our tactics.

The draft resolution, which was approved by the majority of the commission and was therefore assured of a majority vote at the plenum, had the words: "*in confirmation* of the resolutions of December 1908 and enlarging upon them...." Here too the Mensheviks put forward in the form of an ultimatum their demand for a concession, refusing to vote for the resolution as a whole if the words "in confirmation" were retained, for they regard the resolutions of December 1908 as the height of "factionalism". We made the concession they demanded by agreeing to vote for the resolution without the words about confirmation. I should not be disposed to regret this concession in the slightest if it had achieved its purpose, i.e., if the Mensheviks had received it with the loyalty to a Party decision without which collaboration is impossible. Our Party *has no* other definition of its main problems of tactics, organisation and parliamentary activity in the Third Duma period than the one given in the resolutions of December 1908. Without denying that factional strife was very acute at that time, we shall not insist on any particular sharp expression occurring in the resolutions then directed against the liquidators. But we certainly do insist on the fundamental propositions of these resolutions, for it would be uttering brave words in vain to speak of the Party, the Party principle and Party organisation if we brushed aside the only answer, given by the Party and confirmed by the experience of a year's work, to cardinal fundamental questions, without an answer to which it is impossible to advance a single step whether in propaganda, agitation or organisation. We are quite ready to recog-

nise the need for collaboration in amending these resolutions, in revising them in accordance with the criticism of the comrades of *all* factions, including, of course, the pro-Party Mensheviks; we know that some propositions in these resolutions will probably remain open to dispute in the Party for quite a long time to come, and it will not be possible to settle them in the near future otherwise than by a majority vote. But *as long* as this revision has not been undertaken and completed, *as long* as the Party has not given a new answer to the question of the appraisal of the Third Duma period and the tasks ensuing from it, we *absolutely demand* that all Party Social-Democrats, whatever views they hold, should be guided in their actions by these very resolutions.

It would seem that this is an elementary point of Party principle? It would seem that there could not be any other attitude to Party decisions? But the turn to liquidationism which *Golos* has taken after the plenum caused it in this case, too, to utilise the concession of the majority of the Party not for going over to a loyal Party position, but for immediately declaring its dissatisfaction with the extent of the concession! (Only the Golosists have apparently forgotten that the side which started the dispute about the unanimously adopted compromise resolution, expressing dissatisfaction with it and demanding new concessions and new amendments, thereby gave the other side the right to demand amendments in another direction. And we, of course, are going to exercise this right.)

The editorial in *Golos* No. 19-20, which I have already cited, concerning the results of the plenum says outright that the introductory words to the resolution are a *compromise*. This is true, but it becomes untrue if the fact be suppressed that the compromise enforced by the ultimatum of the Mensheviks was the refusal of the majority of the Central Committee to directly *confirm* all the resolutions of December 1908, and not only the fundamental propositions contained in them.

"From our point of view," continues *Golos*, "this phrase does not harmonise with the unambiguous content of the main points of the resolution, and while it marks a certain turning-point in the development of the Party, nevertheless

it is, of course, connected in sequence with the whole past history of Russian Social-Democracy, but it is least of all [!!] connected with the 'London heritage'.[101] However, we should be incorrigible doctrinaires if we thought it possible to achieve at one stroke absolute unanimity in our Party, if we sacrificed a big step forward in the movement for the sake of parochialism" (!!). "We can leave the correction of these mistakes in the resolution to historians."

This sounds as though the Golosists who attended the plenum had been rebuked for their "complaisance to the Bolsheviks" by their Russian legalists, like Potresov and Co., or by the editors of *Golos* who were not at the plenum, and as though they were apologising to them. We are not doctrinaires, let historians correct the mistakes of the resolution!

To this magnificent declaration we venture to rejoin that pro-Party Social-Democrats draw up resolutions not for the benefit of historians, but to derive *practical* guidance from these resolutions *in their work* of propaganda, agitation and organisation. The Party has no other definition of the problems of this work for the period of the Third Duma. To the liquidators, of course, Party resolutions mean nothing, because the whole Party means nothing to them, and, as far as they are concerned, the whole Party (and not only its resolutions) is a worth-while and interesting study only for "historians". But neither the Bolsheviks nor the pro-Party Mensheviks want to work with the liquidators in one organisation and will not work with them. We shall ask the liquidators to join the Bezgolovtsi[102] or the Popular Socialists.[103]

If the Golosists were loyally inclined towards the Party, if they really complied with the interests of the Party and not those of Potresov and Co., the interests of the organisation of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, not those of a circle of legalist literati, they would have expressed their dissatisfaction with the resolutions of December 1908 in a different manner. Now, after the plenum, they would cease unseemly, contemptuous sniggering which is the special characteristic of the Cadets, at some kind of "decisions" from "underground". They would set about analysing these decisions in a business-like manner and amending

them in accordance with their own point of view, in accordance with their own view of the experience of 1907-10. That would be working for real Party unity, for a rapprochement on a single line of Social-Democratic activity. By refusing to do so the Golosists are in fact carrying out the programme of the liquidators. What, indeed, is the programme of the liquidators on this question? It consists in ignoring the decisions of the underground Party which is doomed to perdition, etc., counterposing to the decisions of the Party the amorphous "work" of free lances who call themselves Social-Democrats and who have ensconced themselves in various legal journals, legal societies, etc., cheek by jowl with liberals, Narodniks and Bezzaglavtsi. We do not need any resolutions, any "estimate of the situation", any definition of our immediate aims of struggle or our attitude to the bourgeois parties—we call all this (following Milyukov!) the "dictatorship of exclusive underground circles" (without noticing that by our amorphousness, lack of organisation and fragmented state we are actually surrendering the "dictatorship" to the liberal circles!).

Yes, yes, there is no doubt that the liquidators can demand nothing more from the Golosists as regards their attitude to Party decisions than that they should deride them contemptuously and ignore them.

It is impossible to discuss seriously the opinion that the resolution of the Central Committee on the state of affairs in the Party in 1909-10 is "least of all" connected with the London heritage, because the absurdity of this opinion leaps to the eye. It is nothing but mockery of the Party to say: we are prepared to take into account its "whole past history" but not that part of it which is directly connected with the present, nor the present itself! In other words: we are prepared to take into account anything that does not define our present actions. We are prepared (in 1910) to take into account "the whole past history" of Social-Democracy except the past history which contains the resolutions adopted on the Cadet Party in the years 1907-08-09, on the Trudovik parties in 1907-08-09, on the aims of our struggle in 1907-08-09. We are prepared to take into account everything except what is essential to becoming pro-Party in practice here and now, to conduct-

ing Party work, to carrying out Party tactics, to guiding in a Party manner the activity of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma.

To the shame of the Bund it has to be said that it provides space in its party paper for the same liquidationist sneers at the London heritage in Comrade Yonov's article (p. 22): "Tell me, if you please," writes Yonov, "what have the resolutions of the London Congress to do with the present moment and the questions which are now on the order of the day? I venture to hope that Comrade Lenin too and all his fellow-thinkers do not know."

Indeed, who am I to know such a mystery! How am I to know that there has been no change of any importance in the main groups of the bourgeois parties (Black Hundreds, Octobrists, Cadets, Narodniks), in their class composition, in their policy, in their attitude to the proletariat and the revolution from the spring of 1907 to the spring of 1910? How am I to know that the small minor changes, which could and should be noted in this sphere, are indicated in the resolutions of December 1908? How am I to know all this?

In Yonov's estimation, it would seem, all this has nothing to do with the present moment and the questions on the order of the day. To him it is superfluous—some Party definition or other of the tactics to be adopted towards the non-proletarian parties. Why burden oneself? This effort to elaborate a Party definition of proletarian tactics—would it not be simpler to call it "special protective measures" or something like that? Would it not be simpler to convert the Social-Democrats into free lances, let them run *wild* to settle current questions "freely", without any "reinforced protection", today with the liberals in the magazine *Nashi Pomoi*, tomorrow with the Bezgolovtsi at a congress of literary hangers-on, the day after tomorrow with the Posse-ists in the co-operative movement.[104] Only—only, dear humble creature, how will this differ from what the legalist liquidators are out for? There will be no difference at all!

Pro-Party Social-Democrats who are dissatisfied with the London decisions or the resolutions of December 1908 and want to work in the Party, in a Party manner, will criticise these resolutions in the Party press, they will

propose amendments, try to convince the comrades, try to win a majority in the Party. We may disagree with such people, but their attitude will be a Party attitude, they will *not* sow *confusion* as Yonov, *Golos* and Co. are doing.

Just look at Mr. Potresov.

This "Social-Democrat", in order to demonstrate publicly his independence from the Social-Democratic Party, exclaims in *Nasha Zarya* No. 2, p. 59: "And how numerous they are, these questions, without the solution of which it is impossible to move a step, impossible for Russian Marxism to become an ideological trend truly investing itself with all the energy and power [couldn't you manage with less rhetoric, dear Mr. Independent!] of the revolutionary mood of the time! How is the economic development of Russia proceeding, what shifting of forces is it producing under the damper of the reaction, what is going on in the countryside and in the towns, what changes is this development producing in the social composition of the working class of Russia, and so on and so forth? Where are the answers or attempts to answer these questions, where is the economic school of Russian Marxism? And what has become of the play of political thought which was once the very life of Menshevism? What has become of its search for organisational forms, its analysis of the past, its estimation of the present?"

If this independent were not so fond of casting laboured phrases to the wind and really thought about what he was saying, he would notice a very simple thing. If it is true that a revolutionary Marxist cannot move a step until these questions are settled (and it is true), their settlement—not in the sense of scientific finality and scientific research but of defining what steps have to be taken and how—is a matter with which the *Social-Democratic Party* must concern itself. For "revolutionary Marxism" *outside* the Social-Democratic Party is simply a parlour phrase of the legal-minded windbag who sometimes likes to boast that "we too" are almost Social-Democrats. The Social-Democratic Party gave *the first steps to an answer* to these questions, and it was *in the resolutions* of December 1908 that it gave them.

The independents have arranged things for themselves rather cunningly: in the legal press they beat their breasts

and ask "where are the first steps to an answer on the part of the revolutionary Marxists?" The independents know that it is impossible to answer them in the legal press. And in the illegal press the friends of these independents (the Golosists) contemptuously refrain from answering the questions "without a settlement of which it will be impossible to move a step". Everything is achieved that is required by the independents (i.e., the renegades of socialism) the world over: the resounding phrase is there, actual independence from socialism and the Social-Democratic Party is there as well.

6. THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT-LEGALISTS

Let us now proceed to ascertain what took place after the plenum. To this question Trotsky and Yonov give a uniform and simple answer. "Neither in the external conditions of political life," states the Vienna resolution, "nor in the internal relations of our Party *did any real changes take place after the plenum* that might hinder the work of building up the Party...." A factional relapse, the surviving heritage of factional relations—that is all.

Yonov supplies the same explanations "personalised".

"The plenum is over. Its participants have gone their several ways.... The leaders of the old factions found themselves at liberty and emancipated themselves from all outside influences and pressure. Moreover, considerable reinforcements arrived: for some of them—in the shape of Comrade Plekhanov, who of late has been ardently advocating that a state of martial law be declared in the Party; for others—in the shape of the sixteen 'old Party members, well known to the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*'" (see No. 19-20, "Open Letter"). "Under these conditions, how could one refrain from throwing oneself into the fray? And so they resumed the old 'game' of mutual extermination" (*Otkliki Bunda* No. 4, p. 22).

"Reinforcements" arrived from the factionalists and—another fight ensued, that is all. True, the "reinforcements" for the Bolsheviks arrived in the person of a pro-Party Menshevik, Plekhanov; he "arrived" to make war on the liquidators, but that is immaterial to Yonov. Yonov apparently

does not like Plekhanov's polemics against Potresov, Comrade I.[105] (who proposed "to dissolve everything"), etc. Of course, he has the right to censure these polemics. But how can this be called "declaring martial law in the *Party*"? War on the *liquidators* means declaring martial law in the *Party*—let us remember this "philosophy" of Comrade Yonov's.

The reinforcements for the Mensheviks abroad were the Russian Mensheviks. But this circumstance does not at all give Comrade Yonov something to think about.

It is obvious what practical conclusion Trotsky and Yonov draw from such an "estimate of the situation". Nothing out of the ordinary has occurred. Simply a factional wrangle. Install new neutralisers and the trick is done. Everything is explained from the standpoint of sectarian diplomacy. All the practical prescriptions are nothing but sectarian diplomacy. Given here are those who "rushed into battle", those who desire to "reconcile": here delete the reference to the "foundation", there add the name of so-and-so to be included in the "institution", and in yet another place "give in" to the legalists in regard to the methods of convening the conference.... It is the old but ever new story of the sectarian spirit abroad.

Our view of what took place after the plenum is different.

Having succeeded in getting the resolutions adopted unanimously, and having eliminated *all* the "squabbling" accusations, the plenum forced the liquidators to the wall. It is no longer possible to hide behind squabbles, it is no longer possible to refer to obduracy and "mechanical suppression" (or the other variants: "special protective measures", "martial law", "state of siege", etc.). It is now possible to leave the Party only because of liquidationism (just as the Vperyodists can leave it only because of otzovism and anti-Marxist philosophy).

Forced to the wall, the liquidators have had to show their true colours. Their Russian centre—it matters not whether it is a formal or an informal, a semi-legal (Mikhail and Co.) or entirely legal centre (Potresov and Co.)—*answered* the call to return to the Party by a *refusal*. The Russian legalist-liquidators have finally broken with the Party and have united in a group of *independent socialists* (inde-

pendent of socialism and dependent on liberalism, of course). The answer of Mikhail and Co., on the one hand, and the writings of *Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*, on the other, mark precisely the fusion of the anti-Party circles of "Social-Democrats" (to be more exact—quasi-Social-Democrats) into a group of *independent socialists*. Hence the "conciliatory" efforts of Trotsky and Yonov are *now* ridiculous and miserable. These efforts can only be explained by a complete failure to understand what is taking place. They are harmless efforts now, for there is no one behind them except the sectarian diplomats abroad, except ignorance and lack of intelligence in some out-of-the-way places.

The conciliators *à la* Trotsky and Yonov mistook the special conditions which allowed conciliationist diplomacy to blossom forth at the plenum for the general conditions of present-day Party life. They made the mistake of taking this diplomacy—which played its part at the plenum *owing* to the presence of conditions that gave rise to a *deep* striving for conciliation (i.e., for Party unity) in both of the principal factions—as an aim in itself, as a lasting instrument in the game between "given persons, groups and institutions".

Certainly there was scope for diplomacy at the plenum, for it was necessary to secure the Party union of pro-Party Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks; and this was impossible without concessions, without compromise. In determining the extent of such concessions the "honest brokers" inevitably came to the front—inevitably, because for the pro-Party Mensheviks and pro-Party Bolsheviks the question of the extent of the concessions was a secondary one, as long as the basis in principle of the union as a whole remained intact. The "conciliators" *à la* Trotsky and Yonov—having pushed their way to the front at the plenum, and having obtained the opportunity to play their part as "neutralisers", as "judges", in eliminating squabbles and satisfying "claims" against the Bolshevik Centre—imagined that as long as the "given persons, groups and institutions" existed they could always play this part. An amusing delusion. Brokers are needed when it is necessary to determine the extent of the concessions needed for obtaining unanimity. The extent of the concessions has to be determined

when there is an acknowledged common basis in principle for a union. The question as to who was to join this union after all the concessions had been made remained open at that time; for in principle the provisional assumption was inevitable that all the Social-Democrats would want to enter the Party, that all the Mensheviks would want loyally to carry out the anti-liquidationist resolution, and that all the Vperyodists would want to do the same in regard to the anti-otzovist resolution.

Now, however, brokers are not required; there is no place for them, because there is no question of the extent of concessions. And this question does not arise because there is no question of any concessions at all. All the concessions (and even excessive ones) were made at the plenum. Now it is exclusively a question of a principled stand in the struggle against liquidationism, moreover not against liquidationism in general, but against a definite group of liquidator-independents, the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co. Should Trotsky and Yonov take it into their heads to "reconcile" the Party with the given persons, groups and institutions, then we all pro-Party Bolsheviks and all pro-Party Mensheviks would regard them simply as traitors to the Party, and nothing more.

The conciliator-diplomats were "strong" at the plenum exclusively because and insofar as both the pro-Party Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks wanted peace and attached subordinate importance to the question of the conditions of peace compared with-the question of the anti-liquidationist and the anti-otzovist tactics of the Party. I, for instance, considered the concessions excessive and fought over the extent of these concessions (this is hinted at by *Golos* in No. 19-20 and is openly stated by Yonov). But I was ready then and would be ready now to reconcile myself even to excessive concessions, provided the *line* of the Party was not thereby undermined, provided these concessions did not lead to the negation of that line, provided these concessions paved the way for bringing people back from liquidationism and otzovism to the Party. But now that Mikhail and Co. and Potresov and Co. have united and come out against the Party and against the plenum,

I refuse to enter into any negotiations about any concessions, since the Party is obliged now to break with these independents, to fight against them resolutely as full-fledged liquidators. And I can speak with confidence not only for myself but for *all* the pro-Party Bolsheviks. The pro-Party Mensheviks, through Plekhanov and others, have expressed themselves clearly enough in the same spirit; and since this is the state of affairs in the Party, the "conciliator"-diplomats *à la* Trotsky and Yonov will either have to abandon their diplomacy or leave the Party and join the independents.

In order to convince oneself that the legalists have definitely united into a group of independent socialists, one has only to review the events after the plenum, to appraise them in essence, and not merely from the standpoint of the petty history of "conflicts", to which Yonov wrongly confines himself.

1) Mikhail, Roman and Yuri declare that the Central Committee (plenum) resolutions and the very existence of the Central Committee are harmful. About two months have elapsed since this fact was published and it has not been refuted. It is obvious that it is true.*

2) Sixteen Russian Mensheviks, including at least two of the three mentioned above, and a number of the most prominent Menshevik writers (Cherevanin, Koltsov, etc.), published in *Golos*, with the approval of the editors, a purely liquidationist manifesto, justifying the Mensheviks' withdrawal from the Party.

3) The Menshevik legally published magazine, *Nasha Zarya*, publishes a programmatic article by Mr. Potresov in which it is bluntly stated that "the Party, as an integral and organised hierarchy of institutions, does not exist" (No. 2, p. 61), that it is impossible to wind up "what in reality no longer exist" as an organised whole" (ibid.). Among the contributors to this journal are Cherevanin,

* Number 21 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* has just appeared. On page 16, Martov and Dan *confirm* the correctness of this fact, when they speak of the "refusal of three comrades [??] to join the Central Committee". Moreover, as usual, they try to hide by wild abuse of "Tyszka-Lenin" the fact that the group of Mikhail and Co. has finally turned into a group of independents.

Koltsov, Martynov, Avgustovsky, Maslov, Martov—the same L. Martov who is capable of occupying a place in the "organised hierarchy of institutions" of the illegal Party which has a centre like that of an "organised body", and at the same time is capable of belonging to the legal group, which with the gracious permission of Stolypin declares this illegal Party to be non-existent.

4) In the popular Menshevik magazine Vozrozhdeniye (No. 5, March 30, 1910), which has the same contributors, an unsigned, i.e., editorial article praises the above-mentioned article by Mr. Potresov in *Nasha Zarya* and adds, after quoting the same passage quoted by me above:

"There is nothing to wind up—and we [i.e., the editors of *Vozrozhdeniye*] would add on our part—the dream of re-establishing this hierarchy in its old underground form is simply a harmful reactionary utopia, which indicates the loss of political intuition by the representatives of a party which at one time was the most realistic of all" (p. 51).

Anyone who regards all these facts as accidental apparently does not want to see the truth. Anyone who intends to explain these facts as "a relapse into factionalism" is lulling himself with a phrase. What have these facts to do with factionalism and the factional struggle, from which both the group of Mikhail and Co. and the group of Potresov and Co. have been standing aside for a long time. No, for one who does not deliberately want to shut his eyes no doubts are possible here. The plenum removed all obstacles (real or imaginary) to the return of the pro-Party legalists into the Party, it removed all obstacles in the way of building up an illegal Party, taking into account the new conditions and new forms of utilising legal possibilities. Four Menshevik members of the Central Committee and two editors of *Golos* have admitted that *all* obstacles in the way of joint Party work have been removed. The group of Russian legalists *has given its answer to the plenum*. This answer is in the *negative*: we do not want to engage in the restoration and strengthening of the illegal Party, for that is a reactionary utopia.

This answer is a fact of the greatest political importance in the history of the Social-Democratic movement. The group of *independent socialists* (independent of socialism)

has definitely rallied together and has definitely broken with the Social-Democratic Party. To what extent this group has crystallised, whether it consists of one organisation or of a number of separate circles very loosely connected—this we do not know as yet, nor is it important. What matters is that the tendency to form groups independent of the Party—a tendency which has long been prevalent among the Mensheviks—has now brought about a new political formation. And henceforth all Russian Social-Democrats who do not want to deceive themselves must reckon with the fact that this group of independents exists.

In order that the significance of this fact may become clear, let us recall first of all the "independent socialists" in France who, in that most progressive bourgeois state, which more than any other has been purged of all that is old, carried this political trend to its logical conclusion. Millerand, Viviani and Briand belonged to the Socialist Party, but repeatedly acted independently of its decisions, in defiance of them, and Millerand's entry into a bourgeois cabinet, on the pretext of saving the republic and safeguarding the interests of socialism, led to his break with the party. The bourgeoisie rewarded the traitors to socialism with ministerial portfolios. The three French renegades continue to call themselves and their group independent socialists, and continue to justify their behaviour on the grounds of the interests of the labour movement and social reform.

Bourgeois society cannot, of course, reward our independents quite as rapidly; they start under conditions immeasurably more backward and they must be satisfied with praises and assistance from the, liberal bourgeoisie (which has long been supporting the Mensheviks' tendencies towards "independence"). But the basic tendency is the same in both cases: being independent of the Socialist Party is justified on the grounds of the interests of the labour movement; "the fight for legality" (the slogan in *Dan*'s formulation, taken up very zealously by the renegade *Vozrozhdeniye* No. 5, page 7) is proclaimed the slogan of the working class; in reality the bourgeois intellectuals group themselves together (parliamentarians in France, literary writers in our country) and act in combination with the liberals;

subordination to the Party is rejected; the Party is declared to be insufficiently "realistic" both by Millerand and Co. and by *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Golos*; they characterise the Party as a "dictatorship of exclusive, underground circles" (*Golos*), and declare that it reduces itself to a narrow, revolutionary association which is harmful to broad progress (Millerand and Co.).

Furthermore, in order to make clear the position of our independents, take the history of the formation of our Russian Popular Socialist Party. This history will help to clarify the position for those who fail to see the kinship between our independents and Millerand and Co. owing to the vast difference in the external conditions of their "work". It is common knowledge that our Popular Socialists represent the legalist and moderate wing of petty-bourgeois democracy, and I believe none of the Marxists have any doubts about this. At the congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the end of 1905, the Popular Socialists came out as liquidators of the programme, tactics and organisation of the revolutionary party of the petty-bourgeois democrats; they acted in the closest alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the newspapers of the days of freedom in the autumn of 1905 and in the spring of 1906. They legalised themselves and seceded, forming an independent party in the autumn of 1906, a fact which did not prevent them, during the elections to the Second Duma and in the Second Duma itself, from merging from time to time with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In the autumn of 1906, I had occasion to write in *Proletary* about the Popular Socialists, and I called them "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks".* Three-and-a-half years have passed since then, and Potresov and Co. have managed to prove to the pro-Party Mensheviks that I was right. It must be acknowledged, however, that even Peshekhonov and Co. acted more honestly in a political sense than did Potresov and his group; after a series of political acts which were in effect independent of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, they openly declared themselves to be a separate political party independent of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

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* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 197-206.—*Ed.*

Of course, this "honesty" is conditioned, incidentally, by the relationship of forces: Peshekhonov was of the opinion that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was powerless, and thought that it was he who stood to *lose* by an informal alliance with it, whereas Potresov thinks he stands to *gain* by political Azefism,[106] i.e., by formally continuing to be a Social-Democrat while in reality acting independently of the Social-Democratic Party.

For the present, Mr. Potresov and Co. deem it most advantageous for themselves to hide behind a borrowed name, using the prestige of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in a thievish manner, corrupting it from within, acting not only independently of it but really against it. It is quite likely that our group of independents will try to parade in borrowed plumes as long as possible; it is quite likely that if the Party is dealt a severe blow, after some big raid upon the illegal organisation, or when circumstances prove particularly tempting, such as, for example, the possibility of being elected to the Duma independently of the Party, the independents themselves will throw off their mask; we cannot foresee all the possible episodes in their political chicanery.

But one thing we know for certain, and that is that the covert activities of the independents are harmful and ruinous to the R.S.D.L.P., the party of the working class, and that we must expose these activities at all costs, we must force the independents into the open and declare that all their connections with the Party are broken off. The plenum took a big step forward in this direction. However strange it may appear at first sight, it was just the consent (insincere or unconscious) of Martov and Martynov, just the maximum, even excessive, concessions that were made to them that helped to reveal the ulcer of liquidationism, the ulcer of "independence" in our Party. No honest Social-Democrat, no Party member, whatever faction he may sympathise with, can deny now that the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co. are *independents*, that in reality they do not recognise the Party, do not want the Party and are working against the Party.

How rapidly, or how slowly, the process of secession and formation of a separate party by the independents

matures depends, of course, on many causes and circumstances that cannot be estimated. The Popular Socialists had a special group before the revolution, and the secession of that group, which was temporarily and loosely affiliated with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, was particularly easy. Our independents still have some personal traditions, ties with the Party, which retard the process of secession, but these traditions are becoming ever weaker, and, besides, the revolution and counter-revolution bring forward new people, free of all revolutionary or Party traditions. The surrounding atmosphere of "Vekhist" moods is very rapidly impelling the spineless intelligentsia towards "independence". The "old" generation of revolutionaries is leaving the stage. Stolypin is doing his utmost to hunt down the representatives of this generation most of whom had divulged all their pseudonyms and their secret channels of work in the days of freedom, in the years of revolution. Prison, exile, penal servitude and emigration constantly increase the number of those withdrawn from the ranks, while the new generation grows slowly. Among the intelligentsia, especially that section of it which has "hitched on" to one or another form of legal activity, there is developing a complete lack of faith in the illegal Party and a disinclination to spend efforts on work which is particularly difficult and particularly thankless in our times. "Friends in need are friends indeed", and the working class, which is passing through the difficult times of attack both by the old and the new counter-revolutionary forces, will inevitably witness the defection of very many of its intellectual "friends of an hour", fine-weather friends, friends only for the duration of the revolution, friends who were revolutionaries during the revolution, but who are yielding to the general depression and are ready to proclaim the "fight for legality" at the first successes of the counter-revolution.

In a number of European countries, the counter-revolutionary forces succeeded in making a clean sweep of the remnants of the revolutionary and socialist organisations of the proletariat, for instance after 1848. A bourgeois intellectual, who in the days of his youth joined the Social-Democratic movement is inclined, because of his petty-bourgeois psychology, to give up the struggle: so it was,

so it will be; to defend the old illegal organisation is hopeless, to create a new one is still more hopeless; generally speaking, we "overestimated" the forces of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, we erroneously ascribed "universal" importance to the role of the proletariat—all of these little ideas of the renegade *Social Movement* directly and indirectly drive towards renunciation of the illegal Party. Once on the slippery slope, the independent fails to observe that he is sliding lower and lower, he does not realise that he is working hand in glove with Stolypin: Stolypin destroys the illegal Party physically, with the aid of the police, the gallows and penal servitude; the liberals do exactly the same thing directly, by their open propaganda of Vekhist ideas; the independents among the Social-Democrats indirectly assist in the destruction of the illegal Party by their shouts about its "atrophy", by their refusal to help it and by their attempts (see the letter of the Sixteen in *Golos* No. 19-20) to justify desertion from it. One step leads to another.

Let us not shut our eyes to the fact that the longer the counter-revolutionary period lasts the more difficult will our fight for the Party become. That our Party comrades do not underestimate the danger, that they look it squarely in the face, is shown, for instance, by the article of Comrade K. in No. 13 of the Central Organ. But the resolute and frank recognition of the weakness of the Party, of the disintegration of the organisations and the difficulties of the situation does not make Comrade K. (or any of the Party comrades) waver for one moment on the question of whether the Party is necessary, whether it is necessary to work for its restoration. The greater the difficulties of our position, the greater the number of enemies (the day before yesterday they were joined by the Vekhists, yesterday by the Popular Socialists, today by the independent Social-Democrats)—the more closely will all the Social-Democrats, irrespective of their shades of opinion, rally in defence of the Party. Many Social-Democrats who might be divided on the question how the revolutionary masses who trust Social-Democracy should be led in the attack cannot fail to be united on the question of the imperative need to fight for the preservation and consolidation of the illegal Social-

Democratic Labour Party that was formed in the period of 1895-1910.

As regards *Golos* and the Golosists, they have most strikingly confirmed what was said of them in the resolution of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* in June of last year. That resolution (see Supplement to No. 46 of *Proletary*, p. 6) reads: "In the Menshevik camp of the Party, whose official organ, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, is fully controlled by the Menshevik liquidators, the minority of this faction, having explored the path of liquidationism to the very end, is already raising its voice in protest against that path and is again seeking a party basis for its activities...."* The distance to the "end" of the path of liquidationism proved longer than we imagined at the time, but the correctness of the basic idea underlying these words has since been proved by facts. The correctness of the expression "captive to the liquidators", as applied to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, has been particularly confirmed. They are indeed captives of the liquidators, for they dare not either openly defend liquidationism or openly rebel against it. Even at the plenum they unanimously adopted the resolutions not as free men but as captives, who for a short while had obtained leave from their "masters" and who returned to slavery on the day after the plenum. Unable to defend liquidationism, they laid the utmost stress on all possible (and imaginary!) obstacles, which had nothing to do with questions of principle, but which prevented them from renouncing liquidationism. And when all these "obstacles" were removed, when all their extraneous, personal, organisational, financial and other claims had been satisfied, they "voted" against their will for the renunciation of liquidationism. Poor fellows! They did not know at that time that the Manifesto of the Sixteen was already on its way to Paris, that the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co. had stiffened in their defence of liquidationism. And they obediently turned round and followed the Sixteen, Mikhail and Potresov back to liquidationism!

The heinous crime of the spineless "conciliators" like Yonov and Trotsky, who defend or justify these people,

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, p. 448.—*Ed.*

is that they are causing their ruin by making them more dependent on liquidationism. Whereas the decisive action of all the non-factional Social-Democrats against Mikhail and Co. and against Potresov and Co. (surely, neither Trotsky nor Yonov would venture to defend *these* groups!) might have brought some of the *Golos* captives of liquidationism back into the Party—the grimaces and the affectation of the "conciliators", while in no way reconciling the Party with the liquidators, only inspire the Golosists with "insensate hopes".

Incidentally, these grimaces and this affectation of the "conciliators" are, undoubtedly, to a large extent due simply to a failure to understand the situation. It is only owing to lack of understanding that Comrade Yonov can confine himself to the question of the publication or non-publication of Martov's article, and that the Viennese supporters of Trotsky can reduce the question to "conflicts" on the Central Organ. Both Martov's article ("On the Right Path" ... to liquidationism) and the conflicts on the Central Organ are only particular episodes which cannot be understood apart from their connection with the whole situation. For instance, Martov's article clearly showed us, who during the past year have studied all the shades of liquidationism and Golosism, that *Martov has turned* (or was turned). The Martov who signed the "Letter" of the Central Committee on the conference *could not* be the same Martov who wrote such article as "On the Right Path." By divorcing Martov's article from the chain of events, from the "Letter" of the Central Committee that preceded it, from No. 19-20 of *Golos* that followed it, from the Manifesto of the Sixteen, from the articles of Dan ("The Fight for Legality"), Potresov and *Vozrozhdeniye*, and by divorcing from the same chain of events the "conflicts" on the Central Organ, Trotsky and Yonov deprive themselves of the possibility of understanding the events that are taking place.* And, conversely, everything becomes quite intelligible as soon as we focus our

* Take also, for instance, "the theory of equal rights" for legal individuals in the illegal Party. Is it not clear *after* the actions of Mikhail and Co. and Potresov and Co. that the meaning and significance of this theory is the recognition of the group of independent-legalists and the subordination of the Party to them?

attention on *what lies at the root of it all*, namely, the final consolidation of the Russian independents and their final break with the "reactionary utopia" of re-establishing and strengthening the illegal Party.

7. PRO-PARTY MENSHEVISM AND ITS EVALUATION

The last question which we must consider in order to understand the "unity crisis" in our Party is the question of so-called pro-Party Menshevism and the appraisal of its significance.

The views held by the non-factionalists, i.e., by those who wish to be regarded as outside the factions—Yonov and Trotsky (*Pravda* No. 12, and the Vienna resolution)—are very characteristic in this respect. Trotsky determinedly and persistently ignores pro-Party Menshevism (this was already pointed out in No. 13 of the Central Organ), while Yonov reveals the "cherished" idea of his fellow-thinker by declaring that the significance of "Comrade Plekhanov's" utterances (Yonov refuses to notice any other pro-Party Mensheviks) consists in their "reinforcing" the factional struggle of the Bolsheviks and in advocating that "martial law be declared in the Party".

That this position of Yonov and Trotsky is wrong should have been obvious to them for the simple reason that it is refuted by facts. From No. 13 of the Central Organ*, we see that in no fewer than seven of the groups abroad assisting the Party (in Paris, Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Liége, Nice, San Remo), the Plekhanovites, or more correctly, the pro-Party Mensheviks, rose against *Golos* and demanded the fulfilment of the decisions of the plenum, demanded that *Golos* cease publication and pointed out the liquidationist nature of the ideological position taken up by *Golos* in No. 19-20. The same process is taking place among the Party workers in Russia, though perhaps less conspicuously. It is ridiculous to keep silent about these facts. To attempt, despite them, to represent Plekhanov's struggle against the Golosists as a journalistic "factional" struggle means—*objectively*—taking the side of the group of independent legalists against the Party.

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* See pp. 189-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The obviously false and untenable position taken up by the above-mentioned "conciliators" should have opened their eyes to the fact that they are wrong in their point of departure, namely, that the political significance of the unity reached at the plenum lies In the agreement with "given persons, groups and institutions". We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the outward forms of Party events and their individual peculiarities; it is necessary to appraise the ideological and political significance of what is taking place. Judging by outward appearances the agreement was made with specified Golosists. But the basis, the condition for agreement was the adoption by the Golosists of Plekhanov's position; that is evident from the analysis given above of the resolution on the state of affairs in the Party.* Outwardly it was the Golosists who appeared as the representatives of Menshevism in the Party judging, for example, by the composition of the Central Organ. In reality, after the plenum the Central Organ began to transform itself into an organ of "collaboration" between the pro-Party Bolsheviks and the Plekhanovites, with the Golosists in full opposition. The result was a zigzag in the development of Party unity; at first there was something in the nature of an indiscriminate conciliatory mass without a clear definition of the ideological basis for unity, but later on the logic of political tendencies gained the upper hand, the sifting of the independents from the Party was accelerated by the maximal concessions that were made to the Golosists at the plenum.

When I heard at the plenum and saw in *Golos* (No. 19-20, p. 18) fierce attacks on the slogan "an agreement between the strong factions for the fight against the liquidators of the Right and of the Left" (this slogan is put in quotation marks by *Golos*, but for some reason it is not stated openly that I defended this slogan both before and at the plenum)—

* Of the four Menshevik members of the Central Committee who were present at the plenum, two directed all their efforts to winning over the Golosists, in effect to Plekhanov's position—by making the maximum concessions to them. This does not mean that these two were firm pro-Party men, that they were proof against a return to the *Golos* camp. It merely means that Menshevism was caught at the moment when it could not as yet *renounce* the Party principle.

I thought to myself: "*abwarten*!" "wait and see". Just wait, gentlemen of *Golos*, you are reckoning "without your host". The point is not that the plenum offered the opportunity of taking part in the agreement to everyone, and not only to the "strong" factions, strong because of their ideological and political position. The point is, will your "host", i.e., the groups of independent-legalists, allow this opportunity to become a reality?

Some months have elapsed, and only the blind can fail to see now that, in reality, it is precisely the "agreement between the strong factions" that constitutes Party unity and drives it forward "despite all obstacles". That is how it should be, that is the only way it can be in view of the real relationship of forces in the Party. No doubt, in the near future, either all the leading organs of the Party will be formally reconstructed in such a way as to express this agreement, or the life of the Party and the progress of its unity will proceed for a time irrespective of its leading organs.

No doubt, at first sight, it may seem strange to call the pro-party Mensheviks a "strong faction", for at the present moment—at any rate abroad—the Golosists are apparently stronger. However, we Social-Democrats judge strength not by the statements of the emigrant groups, not by the way the Menshevik writers group themselves, but from the standpoint as to which position is objectively correct, and which is condemned by the logic of the political situation to subordination to the "independents" from 1898 to 1900, the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists were stronger than the Iskrists both abroad and in Russia, yet they did not constitute a "strong faction".

Now that the Golosists have mobilised all their forces against Plekhanov and brought out all their slop-pails to pour on him—including Mr. Potresov and the recollections of how Martov was "offended" in *1901-03* (sic!)—the impotence of the Golosists becomes particularly obvious. Axelrod and Co. were hopelessly behind the times politically when they published abroad, in April, a symposium of personal abuse against Plekhanov, while in Russia *Nasha Zarya* in its February issue and *Vozrozhdeniye* in its March issue had already shifted the question to a completely differ-

ent plane, and Plekhanov in No. 13 of the Central Organ had already passed from the history of his clashes with the Golosists to a fight against their present-day policy. The Golosists, in recalling old "insults" (right up to 1901!), are floundering as helplessly as the Vperyodists, who are still appealing to the kind-hearted to protect them from the Bolshevik Centre.

And see how our "offended" ones, who in 1910 are raving at the very thought of a "Lenin-Plekhanov" agreement (their terminology!) in just the same way as Maximov did a year ago over the same thing, are more and more betraying themselves. Like Maximov, the Golosists try to make it appear that it is a question of almost a personal agreement "between Lenin and Plekhanov", moreover the actions of the latter are explained as a "wild caprice" (p. 16 of the "Necessary Supplement"), as the "transformation of Saul into Paul", as "fluttering", etc., etc. By recalling Plekhanov's "*five years of activity*" (ibid.) as a Menshevik, Martov is doing his utmost to compromise him (retrospectively) for this fluttering, without noticing that by doing so he is disparaging himself most of all.

In the very same "Necessary Supplement", the collective editorial board of *Golos* assures us (p. 32) that Plekhanov was "great" precisely during the above-mentioned five-year period (1904-08). Just see what follows from this. The Mensheviks proclaim Plekhanov to be "great" not because of his activity during the twenty years (1883-1903) when he remained true to himself, when he was neither a Menshevik nor a Bolshevik, but the founder of Social-Democracy, but because of his activity during the five years when, as the Mensheviks themselves admit, he was "fluttering," i.e., was not following a consistent Menshevik line. It follows that his "greatness" consisted in that he did not sink entirely into the morass of Menshevism.

But it is precisely the five-year history of Menshevism, which Axelrod and Martov recalled to their own disadvantage, that furnishes a number of facts which help to *explain* the split among the Mensheviks by causes other than those petty, personal causes stressed by Martov.

Plekhanov co-opted Axelrod and Martov in 1903, declaring in *Iskra* No. 52, in an article entitled "What Should

Not Be Done", that he wanted to *manoeuvre with the opportunists* and, by these manoeuvres, *reform* them. And in so doing he resorted to the most extreme attacks on the Bolsheviks. At the end of 1904 he tried to save Axelrod, who had obviously slipped into liberalism ("The Plan of the Zemstvo Campaign"), but did it in such a manner as to avoid saying a single word about such gems as proclaiming demonstrations before the Zemstvo members to be "the highest type of demonstration" (in the pamphlet *Letter to the Central Committee*, published for Party members *only*). In the spring of 1905 Plekhanov became convinced of the hopelessness of these "manoeuvres", left the Mensheviks and started *Dnevnik*, advocating reunion with the Bolsheviks. Number 3 of *Dnevnik* (November 1905) is not Menshevik at all.

Having wasted about a year and a half on manoeuvres with the opportunists within the Party (from the end of 1903 to the spring of 1905), Plekhanov, from the beginning of 1906 and during 1907, engaged in *manoeuvring* with the Cadets. In this he went to far greater opportunist extremes than the other Mensheviks. But when Plekhanov, who proclaimed the tactics of "manoeuvring" at the time of the First Duma and after its dispersal (see *Dnevnik* No. 6), proposed an agreement between the revolutionary parties for a struggle for a constituent assembly, *Proletary* (No. 2 of August 29, 1906, in the article, "Vacillating Tactics") immediately pointed out that this position was not Menshevik at all.*

At the London Congress in the spring of 1907, Plekhanov (according to Cherevanin's account, already cited by me in the preface to the symposium *Twelve Years*) fought the *organisational anarchism* of the Mensheviks.** He wanted a "labour congress" as a manoeuvre *for* the development of the Party and not *against* the Party. During the second half of 1907, as we learn from Martov in the "Necessary Supplement", Plekhanov "had to expend a good deal of eloquence" to uphold the need for an illegal (i.e., Party) Menshevik organ in opposition to Axelrod (who apparently

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 179-83.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 94-113.—*Ed.*

preferred legal organs, which in fact were non-Party). In 1908, the conflict over Potresov's article served as an occasion for his break with the liquidators.

What do these facts prove? They prove that the present split among the Mensheviks is not accidental but inevitable. "Manoeuvring" does not exonerate the one who made mistakes for the sake of carrying out manoeuvres, and I withdraw nothing of what I wrote against those mistakes of Plekhanov. However, "manoeuvring" *explains* why it is easy for some Mensheviks to go over to the independents, while for others it is *difficult* and even impossible. A Social-Democrat who by his manoeuvres leads the working class to follow the Cadets does it no less harm than he who acts in this way because of his immanent gravitation towards opportunism. But whereas the former will be able and will manage to call a halt in time, the latter will end up in the ditch. A Russian proverb says: make a certain person pray and he will do it with such zeal that he will bang his forehead against the ground! Plekhanov might have said: make the Potresovs and the Dans go to the Right for the sake of a manoeuvre and they will go to the Right on principle.

The stand taken by certain Mensheviks fully justifies their appellation, "pro-Party Mensheviks". They took their stand upon the struggle for the Party—against the independent-legalists. Mr. Potresov and the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in the "Necessary Supplement" vainly try to evade this simple and obvious question.

Engels too fought the S.D.F. (the British Social-Democrats)—says Potresov, wriggling (p. 24). This is sophistry, my dear sir. Engels corrected the Party,[107] but you do not say how the Party is to be corrected; you do not even say straightforwardly whether an illegal Social-Democratic Party is necessary now, whether the R.S.D.L.P. is necessary or not. In front of Stolypin you say: *No* (*Nasha Zarya*), but in front of Party members, in the illegal press, you dare not say this, you wriggle and twist.

"Lenin-Plekhanov recommend a war against the new forms of the labour movement" (p. 31), "we *start out* from ... the position, conditions and requirements of the real labour movement" (p. 32)—the editors assure us. Sophistry, my

dear sirs. You yourselves have acknowledged that the plenum did *everything* to recognise these new forms, and the Bolsheviks, too, by the struggle they waged *before* the plenum, *proved* it. What we differ on is not the question whether "new forms are necessary", whether it is necessary to conduct legal work, or to found legal societies; we do not differ on this at all. What we differ on is whether it is permissible for legalists conducting such work, like the group of Mikhail and Co., like the group of Potresov and Co., to consider themselves Social-Democrats *while being independent of the Party of the Social-Democrats*, or whether Social-Democratic Party members are *obliged* to recognise the Party, to advocate the need for it, to work in it, to work on its organisation, to set up illegal Party units everywhere and in all unions for regular communications with the Party, etc. And you understand perfectly well that we differ *now*—after the plenum—on this account and only on this account.

The Golosists try to represent our efforts to draw closer to the pro-Party Mensheviks, to enter into an agreement with them in order to fight for the Party against the independents, as a personal bloc between "Lenin and Plekhanov". They violently abuse the author of the article against Potresov, in No. 47-48 of *Proletary*, for his tone of a "flattering courtier" who; they allege, is "speculating on an agreement" with Plekhanov.

I turn to this article and read on p. 7:

> "Of course, all the mistakes committed by Plekhanov during the revolution occurred precisely because he did *not* consistently carry out the policy which he himself had advocated in the old *Iskra*."

Let the reader judge what looks more like "flattery" and "speculation": this blunt indication of what the Bolsheviks regard as Plekhanov's mistake, or the declaration that Plekhanov was "great" precisely in the period when he was a Menshevik and, according to the Mensheviks, was "fluttering".

"Plekhanov will be with us," the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* write, when "the time comes again for *responsible* [*Golos*'s italics] political actions" (p. 32 of the "Necessary Supplement").

This betrays political illiteracy, but is clear enough as regards "speculation". It is illiterate because *now* is just the time which calls for political actions *a hundred times* more *responsible* for the old leaders than during an open struggle when the masses themselves will much more easily find the way. It is clear in the sense of "speculation", because it expresses readiness to recognise Plekhanov as a Menshevik once more as soon as he starts "manoeuvring" again.

We are surprised that the Golosists do not realise the significance of outbursts of this kind on their part alongside, for example, Axelrod's phrase: "We did not want to stoop" (before Plekhanov) "to the role of toadying flunkeys" (p. 19). You are behaving exactly like the *type of people* mentioned in your concluding words. Your attitude towards Plekhanov corresponds precisely to the "formula" of such people: "either coats off, or let's have your hand."

For five years you have been asking for his "hand", now on thirty-two double-sized pages you are "smacking his face", and on the thirty-second page you "express readiness", you are prepared to recognise him as a Menshevik once more and kiss his hand.

As regards ourselves, we are entitled to say that at the time of his "fluttering", Plekhanov was never a Bolshevik. We do not and never will consider him a Bolshevik. But we do consider him a *pro-Party* Menshevik, as we do any Menshevik capable of rebelling against the group of independent-legalists and carrying on the struggle against them to the end. We regard it as the absolute duty of all Bolsheviks in these difficult times, when the task of the day is the struggle for Marxism in theory and for the Party in the practical work of the labour movement, to exert every effort to arrive at a rapprochement with such Social-Democrats.

8. CONCLUSION. THE PLATFORM OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

The Party conference fixed by the plenum cannot and must not confine itself to the agenda proposed by the plenum on condition that all the Mensheviks come over to the Party position. This did not happen, and it is not fitting for us to play hide-and-seek with ourselves.

The election slogan for this conference, the slogan under which it is to be convened and prepared must be the *rallying of the Party members* in the struggle against the group of independent-legalists. In accordance with this task and taking into account the anti-Party position of the Golosists, we must resolutely reorganise all the leading institutions of the Party, so that they shall be concerned not with the squabbles which every Golosist is preparing and will henceforth be preparing for them, but with the *real work of building the Party*. The Golosists do not want to build the Party, they want to help secretly the group of independent-legalists.

The following must be the platform of the Bolsheviks for this conference: to build the Party in accordance with the December (1908) resolutions and in their spirit; to continue the work of the plenum, making the above-mentioned corrections of its decisions, corrections which have been dictated by the entire course of events since the plenum; to concentrate all our efforts on a systematic, undeviating, comprehensive and persistent utilisation of each and every legal possibility in order to gather the forces of the proletariat, to help it to group and consolidate itself, to help it to train itself for the struggle and stretch its limbs; and also steadily to restore the illegal Party units, to learn how to adapt them to new conditions, to restore the illegal purely Party organisations, and, first and foremost, the purely proletarian organisations, which alone are capable of directing all the work in the legal organisations, to imbue this work with the revolutionary Social-Democratic spirit, to carry on an irreconcilable struggle against the renegades and the independent-legalists, and to prepare for the time when our Party, our R.S.D.L.P., having preserved all the traditions of the revolution and of the great victories of the proletariat in 1905, and having strengthened and enlarged the proletarian army of the Party, will lead it into a new battle, to new victories.

THE JUBILEE NUMBER OF *ZIHVA*[108]

When the comrade delegated by the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region made a report on the status of work in the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (this report was summarised in No. 12 of our Party's Central Organ), we were left with the impression of an unusually "normal" and painless development of the Lettish Social-Democratic movement during the difficult times through which we are passing. What created this impression was that the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region, being the most proletarian in composition and with a mainly working-class leadership, has already, in accordance with the demands of objective circumstances, proceeded to work out special tactics and solve the organisational problems of this protracted period of counter-revolution. During the revolution the Lettish proletariat and the Lettish Social-Democratic Party occupied one of the first and most prominent places in the struggle against the autocracy and all the forces of the old order. Incidentally, it is not without interest to note that the official strike statistics of 1905 (published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry)[109] show that Livonian Gubernia takes first place for the persistence of the proletarian strike movement. In 1905 the number of factory workers in Livonian Gubernia totalled 53,917, while the number of strikers was 268,567, i.e., almost five times (4.38) as many! In that year every worker in Livonian Gubernia went on strike on the average 5 times. Next after Livonian Gubernia comes Baku Gubernia, where each factory worker struck 4.56 times, Tiflis Gubernia—4.49 times, Petrokov

Gubernia—4.98 times and St. Petersburg—4.19. In Moscow Gubernia in 1905 the number of workers on strike came to 276,563, i.e., only a few more than in Livonian Gubernia, although the total number of factory workers in Moscow Gubernia is five times as large as in Livonian Gubernia (285,769 against 53,917). We see from this how much more class-conscious, unanimous and revolutionary the Lettish proletariat was in its activity. But we also know that its role of vanguard in the offensive against absolutism was not limited to strike action: it was in the van of the armed uprising, it contributed most of all to raising the movement to the highest level, i.e., the level of an uprising. It succeeded more than any other in drawing the Lettish agricultural proletariat and the Lettish peasantry into the great revolutionary struggle against tsarism and the landlords.

Besides being one of the leading contingents of Russian Social-Democracy during the revolution, the Lettish workers' party has proved to be in the front ranks too during the difficult period of counter-revolution. We learned from the report mentioned above that no special trend has arisen among the Lettish Social-Democrats either of an infatuation for revolutionary phrases (like our "otzovists") or of an infatuation for legal opportunities (like our *liquidators*, who reject the illegal Party and stand aside from the task of restoring and strengthening the R.S.D.L.P.). The Lettish Social-Democratic workers have succeeded in setting about the work of utilising all kinds of legal avenues: the legal unions, various workingmen's associations, the Duma tribune, etc. Moreover they have not in the least "liquidated" the illegal, revolutionary Social-Democratic Party; on the contrary, they have everywhere preserved the workers' illegal Party units, which will uphold and continue the traditions of the great revolutionary struggle, training by steady and persistent effort increasingly numerous and class-conscious masses of combatants drawn from the young generations of the working class.

There is no doubt that among the causes to which the success of the Lettish Social-Democrats is due we must assign the foremost place to the higher development of capitalism, both in town and countryside, the greater clarity

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and definiteness of the class contradictions, their aggravation by national oppression, the concentration of the Lettish population and its superior cultural development. In all these respects the situation in which the Russian working class has to develop and operate is much less developed. It is this underdevelopment that is now engendering a more acute crisis in the Russian section of the R.S.D.L.P. The petty-bourgeois intellectuals in our movement play a big role. They bring liabilities as well as assets: they bring not only the elaboration of questions of theory and tactics but an "elaboration" of every deviation from the Social-Democratic path into a distinct "trend", as, for example, "otzovism" and "liquidationism".

We venture to express the hope that the Lettish Social-Democrats, who have every reason to be proud of their successes, will not consider these vexed questions of the R.S.D.L.P. beneath their dignity.

The more class-conscious the proletariat, the more clearly does it visualise its Social-Democratic aims, the more vigorously does it fight against all petty-bourgeois distortions in the workers' movement, the more is it concerned to free its less developed working-class comrades from the influence of petty-bourgeois opportunism.

The liquidationist trend in the R.S.D.L.P. is a product of the petty-bourgeois relations in Russia. The whole liberal bourgeoisie takes its stand against the revolution, repudiates it, anathematises the tactics of 1905, which, it says, were "bloody and abortive", grovels before the powers that be, exhorts the people to confine themselves to *legal* methods of struggle. And the petty-bourgeois intellectuals in our Party succumb to the influence of counter-revolutionary liberalism. A history of the revolution has been published in five volumes (*The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, edited by Maslov, Martov and Potresov). This history in effect propagates the doctrine of the renegades, that the proletariat "overestimated" its strength and "underestimated" the strength of the bourgeoisie, and so forth. Actually what the masses of the proletariat did underestimate was the treachery of the bourgeoisie; they overestimated the strength of the bourgeoisie in the fight for freedom, and underestimated

their own forces—the force of the offensive of the oppressed and exploited millions.

Legal journals are being published (*Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*) which preach the doctrine that to restore and strengthen the illegal Party, our old R.S.D.L.P. that has stood the test of years, is a "reactionary utopia". The illegal Menshevik organ *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*—comes out in defence of such gentlemen and proclaims the slogan: "Fight for legality." One of the most prominent leaders of Menshevism, Plekhanov, leaves the editorial board and staff of contributors of all these publications, declaring war on them and appealing to the Mensheviks—*the pro-Party Mensheviks*—to support and strengthen the revolutionary, illegal party of the proletariat—the R.S.D.L.P.

Thus our Party has begun a decisive fight against groups of independent legalists who wrongly call themselves Social-Democrats. In reality they are wrecking the cause of the Social-Democrats, they are destroying the Social-Democratic organisation of the working class, changing it into amorphous legal groups which have no principles and which are in fact making the working class dependent on the ideology of the liberals and on liberal political leadership.

About ten years ago our Party carried through a struggle against so-called Economism, which was very much akin to the liquidationism of today. Now the struggle is more difficult, since all the forces of the counter-revolution—not only of the old but also of the new (modern), liberal-bourgeois counter-revolution—are bent on doing away with the traditions of 1905 among the proletariat and destroying its illegal Social-Democratic Party. But the working class, which knew how to lead the Revolution of 1905, will undoubtedly overcome all these deviations from the Social-Democratic path.

Before the Revolution of 1905 the Social-Democrats worked for twenty years in totally illegal circles and built up a party which is leading millions towards the overthrow of the autocracy. Now, after the revolution we can—and, consequently, we must—not only continue the work of the illegal Party units, but increase this work tenfold, surround the Party units with a dense network of legal

organisations, utilise the tribune of the black-reactionary Duma for our agitation, instil among the mass of the workers the lessons learned in the revolutionary struggle, and create a Social-Democratic Party which will lead tens of millions of people to a new onslaught against the autocracy.

Printed in July, 1910
in the newspaper *Zihna* No. 100
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text in the newspaper
Translated from the Lettish

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES FROM THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATION AT THE COPENHAGEN CONGRESS[110]

The Congress is of the opinion,

1) that proletarian co-operative societies enable the working class to better its conditions by reducing exploitation by middlemen, influencing the working conditions in the supplying firms, improving the situation of office workers, and so forth;

2) that proletarian co-operative societies are assuming increasing importance in the mass economic and political struggle, giving assistance in strikes, lock-outs and in cases of victimisation, etc.;

3) that proletarian co-operative societies, when they organise the mass of the working class, teach them independent management and the organisation of distribution, preparing them in this sphere for the role of organiser of economic life in the future socialist society.

On the other hand the Congress is of the opinion,

1) that the improvements secured by co-operative societies are confined within very narrow limits as long as the means of production and distribution remain in the hands of the class whose expropriation is the chief aim of socialism;

2) that co-operative societies, being purely commercial establishments and subject to the pressure of competitive conditions, have a tendency to degenerate into bourgeois share companies;

3) that co-operative societies, not being organisations for the direct struggle against capital, are capable of engendering and do engender the illusion that they are a means of solving the social problem.

Therefore the Congress calls on the workers of all countries:

a) to join the proletarian co-operative societies and promote their development in every way, directing their organisation along strictly democratic lines (a low entrance fee, one share per person, etc.);

b) by untiring socialist propaganda and agitation within the societies to help to spread the ideas of class struggle and socialism among the mass of the workers;

c) with the growth of socialist understanding in the co-operative societies, to develop and strengthen organic ties between the co-operative societies and the socialist party, and also with the trade unions;

d) at the same time the Congress points out that producer co-operatives can contribute to the struggle of the working class only if they are component parts of consumer co-operatives.

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Published according to the manuscript

TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU ON THE REPRESENTATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

September 2, 1910, Copenhagen

At a plenary session in January 1910, the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, in order to emphasise its earnest desire for unity, adopted a decision to request the International Socialist Bureau to accept as representatives of the Party on the Bureau two comrades: *G. Plekhanov* and *N. Lenin*. It goes without saying that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party lays claim to only one vote in the Bureau but it would like to have fuller representation, as in the case of France.

This decision—to add Comrade G. Plekhanov to the present representative, N. Lenin—was unanimously supported by the Social-Democratic delegation at the Congress.

Representative of the R.S.D.L.P. on the International Socialist Bureau.

N. Lenin

Printed in 1911, in the book: *Huitième Congrès socialiste Internationale*, Gand (*The Eighth International Socialist Congress*, Gand).

First published in Russian in 1929 in the second edition of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works*

Published according to the text of the book Translated from the French

THE *VPERYOD* FACTION

The *Vperyod* group has published in Paris a "symposium of articles on current questions" entitled *Vperyod*. Together with Comrade Sazhin's[111] pamphlet (*On the Question of the Regeneration of the Party*), which was "published by private donation" and is obtainable through the editors of the symposium *Vperyod*, and the separate leaflet issued over the signature of the *Vperyod* group and the platform of this group, the Party has now more than sufficient material by which to judge the Vperyodists.

The platform of the Vperyodists is characterised by the following three features. Firstly: of all the groups and factions within our Party it has been the first to give prominence to philosophy and that under cover of a pseudonym. "Proletarian culture", "proletarian philosophy"—these are the words used in the platform. They are a pseudonym for *Machism*, i.e., a defence of philosophical idealism under various garbs (empirio-criticism, empirio-monism, etc.). Secondly: in the political sphere the group has declared otzovism "a legitimate shade of opinion" and reported that some otzovists, members of this group, disagreed with the definition of the Party's tasks in regard to the State Duma. The definition itself given in the *Vperyod* platform is so unclear and confused that it can only be described as an adaptation to the otzovist ideology. Thirdly, and lastly, the platform emphatically condemned factionalism and demanded the unification of factions, their coalition into one party.

And so we have as a result—if we begin from the end—one very good aspiration and two screens on the part of very bad ideological and political trends which stand for a break with Marxism and the subordination of the proletariat

to bourgeois ideology and policy. The *Vperyod* symposium shows vividly what products can result from such a mixture.

The author of the leading article in the symposium, Maximov, keeps strictly to the diplomacy used in the platform, speaking of "proletarian culture" without any explanation of what he means by this. In an article which claims to be a popular exposition this game of hide-and-seek is strikingly obvious. What kind of popular exposition is this if *not a single* reader, unless he happens to be *personally* acquainted with Maximov or has already followed the *whole* controversy about Machism and relating to Machism, *is able* to understand the true meaning of such a phrase? What kind of popular exposition is this when the same Maximov, on page 4 of the symposium, speaks of the "danger to proletarian socialism" represented by those offshoots of the intelligentsia who "uncritically accept and propagate ideas of bourgeois science and philosophy that are incorrect and harmful to the proletariat..."?

The dots are Maximov's. We do not know if they are meant to signify a shamefaced silence. But we are quite sure that to speak, especially in a "popular" article, of the harmfulness of "*bourgeois philosophy*" to the proletariat without specifying clearly and exactly *which* philosophy he is referring to, is to have recourse to the worst form of factional diplomacy. If you consider bourgeois philosophy an important question and raise it in the leading article of a "popular" symposium, then have the courage to speak straight out, defend your ideas and do not conceal them.

Comrade Sazhin, presumably in the capacity of a "practical" man, spoils Maximov's diplomacy most impolitely."*

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* In the *Vperyod* symposium another "practical man", "Tkach I-n"[112] of St. Petersburg also gives the game away not very diplomatically: "Incidentally," he writes, "Beltov's book, *The Monist View*, is especially likely to give rise to such a wrong notion of historical materialism" (Symposium, p. 57). Why, of course! The truest "notion of historical materialism" is given, of course, by the books of the Russian god-builders and Machists—what Vperyodist does not know this? And how can a book which has helped to rear a whole generation of Russian Marxists compete with the philosophical products of the Yushkeviches, Bogdanovs, Valentinovs and Lunacharskys?...

On page 31 of his pamphlet he demands that "Party members" must be "*ensured*" "*complete freedom for their revolutionary and philosophical thought*".

This slogan is thoroughly opportunist. In all countries this kind of slogan has been put forward in the socialist parties only by opportunists and in practice has meant nothing but "freedom" to corrupt the working class with bourgeois ideology. "Freedom of thought" (read: freedom of the press, speech and conscience) we demand from the *state* (not from a party) together with freedom of association. The party of the proletariat, however, is a free association, instituted *to combat* the "thoughts" (read: the ideology) of the bourgeoisie, to defend and put into effect one definite world outlook, namely, Marxism. This is the ABC. Yet their false political position has caused Maximov, Sazhin and Co. to forget this ABC. It was not their personal hypocrisy but the falsity of their political position that made them propagate bourgeois slogans. The falsity consists in the fact that some Vperyodists long with all their heart and soul to drag the proletariat *back*, to the ideas of bourgeois philosophy (Machism), while others are indifferent to philosophy and merely demand "complete freedom" ... for Machism. Hence they are *obliged* one and all to practice diplomacy, to confuse the issue, to play hide-and-seek and to clutch at bourgeois slogans.

And what does "complete freedom of revolutionary thought" *really* mean? Nothing but *freedom* for otzovist and other semi-anarchist ideas. In other words, the same thing is said here as is expressed in the "platform" of the Vperyodists by the phrase about recognising otzovism to be a "legitimate shade of opinion". The result is again petty diplomacy with ideas, playing hide-and-seek, and hypocrisy, due entirely to the same false ideological and political position: we are not Machists, but we are in favour of "complete freedom" for Machism (in the Party); we are not otzovists, but we are in favour of "complete freedom" for the otzovist shade of opinion, or more generally: "for revolutionary thought"! The confusion is further confounded by the fact that *two* Vperyodists over their *personal* signatures (Sazhin and Rabochy Ar.[113]) vigorously maintain the importance and necessity of utilising legal oppor-

tunities and the Duma tribune. "The Social-Democrats," writes *Rabochy Ar.*, "must combat those who are carrying on agitation [but who is carrying on this agitation, Comrade Ar.? Is it not your Vperyodists?] against *any* utilisation *whatsoever* [think of that!] of legal opportunities, because such a mode of action is not Social-Democratic" (pp. 48-49 of the symposium). And the same *Ar.*, *repeating* these words of the Bolsheviks of the *Proletary* trend, violently abuses *Proletary* (post factum) because it allegedly painted the Vperyodists in strange colours! That is what is called retreating all along the line, surrendering all your positions, condemning in the press (again without saying it straightforwardly) those friends of yours, those Vperyodists who once passed a resolution, for instance, to boycott a congress of factory doctors—and covering your retreat, your capitulation, by a beating of drums for battle. Shabby factional diplomacy!

Just take a look at the writings of the "Vperyodists" on the question of factions and factionalism. The "platform" condemned factions and demanded their dissolution. Sazhin fulminates against the factional centres, the "leaders abroad", and so on and so forth. The Vperyodists have shed an ocean of tears over factionalism, have talked themselves hoarse on the subject.

But what have they done? The whole history of the *Vperyod* group since the January (1910) "unity" plenum has been *the formation of a faction from abroad*. Here is an excerpt from a letter (July 15, 1910) sent by a Russian functionary to a member of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad:

"There is a committee (in St. Petersburg) and, in addition, there is a group of Vperyodists with a separate fund and secretary. Money was received from abroad. In Moscow..."—then follows the name of a person who is very close to one of the most prominent otzovists and a comment on the prosecution of such a policy.

Nobody who has any knowledge of Party affairs, or has paid any attention to the policy of the *Vperyod* literary group, can doubt for a single moment that they have been organising a faction from abroad. That the notorious "school in X.—" was the foreign centre of a new faction was stated

in print in July 1909,* and since then even the most unconcerned and uninformed Social-Democrats have become convinced of this fact. The famous "platform" was drawn up abroad by eight intellectuals and seven worker-students. The part played by these workers, who hastily gave their signatures to the slogans of "proletarian philosophy" and recognition of otzovism as a "legitimate shade of opinion" is too obvious to deserve any further comment. We have here a clear-cut case of the formation of a faction by a group of literati abroad, who indeed behave like "khans" (Voinov's[114] expression in the *Vperyod* symposium), for they themselves are conscious of their despotism, *concealing* from the public what is most dear to them, i.e., the bourgeois philosophy of Machism and otzovism. The Vperyodists cry out against "leaders abroad" and at the same time form an organisation which in actual fact is a mere *adjunct* to a handful of literati abroad; they cry out against faction and themselves *secretly* create a new, petty, lifeless and sectarianly empirio-monistic faction. The *political* source of all this hypocrisy is that the real leaders of the faction find it impossible to come out openly and directly in favour of the things that are really dear to them.

We shall confine ourselves to two particularly glaring examples of hypocrisy. On page 53 of the symposium, *Rabochy Ar.* declares that the Bureau of the Central Committee in Russia "is not doing a damned thing" (these words of course are ascribed to a "Leninist" worker who is alleged to have agitated the "Vperyodist" in this strain. Oh, the naïve cunning of "Rabochy Ar."!) and that the Vperyodist (again with the "Leninist" and, of course, on his instigation) proposed that the "Moscow organisation be declared independent of the Russian Central Committee and no longer subordinate to its instructions".

Beginning with January 1910 the Bureau of the Russian Central Committee worked hard to restore the central organisation *in spite of* the opposition both of the Golosist liquidators (the famous Mikhail, Roman and Yuri incident) and of the Vperyodists (who at this time were building *their own* little faction from abroad *against* the Central

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 450-51.—*Ed.*

Committee). And now all these Vperyodists are shedding crocodile tears over the "inaction" of the Bureau of the C.C.! These Vperyodists, who are actually entirely "*independent*" of the Party, and are entirely anti-Party factionalists, write in a popular symposium that local organisations must be declared "independent" of the C.C.

Another example. In the same symposium an anonymous "member of the Party" exercises himself in some hack writer's criticism of the financial report of the C.C. Bureau Abroad. Among other things the anonymous hack writes on p. 60: "What kind of 'trustees' [the report speaks of money received from trustees], why they are 'holding in trust', or have been 'holding in trust', money of the C.C., and for what 'special purposes' this money is destined, is something which nobody will understand here."

That is just how it is printed. *Nobody will understand.*

It is written by members of that same *Vperyod* group which had two representatives at the January plenum that heard the statement of the Bolsheviks about their conditional transfer of money to "trustees" (i.e., to three of the best known representatives of the International Social-Democratic movement). What money, from what source, who were the trustees, and so on—all this was *fully* known to the plenum, i.e., to *all* the factions, i.e., to the "Vperyodists" *as well*. Yet in a "popular" symposium for the deception of the workers, the Vperyodists write "nobody will understand."

It is written in that same *Vperyod* symposium, whose first two articles were signed by *Maximov and Domov*.[115] Both these Vperyodists *are perfectly aware of the whole history* of the receipt of this money by the Bolsheviks and its transfer to the trustees. And now, since it would be "awkward" for them to come forward personally and declare that "nobody will understand", they select for this commission *anonymous hack writers*, who call themselves "members of the Party" on the occasion of their anti-Party conduct. Through these anonymous hacks Maximov and Domov in a "popular" symposium tell the workers a *deliberate untruth*, that "nobody will understand" what kind of "trustees" these are, and so on. And these gentlemen beat their breasts and harangue against "factions" and "leaders abroad".

Through an anonymous "Party member" they "criticise" the financial report of the Central Committee while they themselves announce on the first page of their symposium that hitherto "lack of funds" prevented their group from publishing a newspaper but "*now this obstacle has been removed*". So the *Vperyod* group has now received funds. Pleasant news for the Vperyodists, no doubt. But what a "nerve" you must have, oh most honourable Vperyodists, to utter in print through an anonymous hack in a "popular" symposium a deliberate untruth about the Central Committee to the effect that "nobody will understand" who the "trustees" are and what money is in their possession, and at the same time *say never a word* to the C.C. or the other factions about *what money "Vperyod" has received and what literati are disposing of it*? The Party, it would seem, is accountable to the Vperyodists but the Vperyodists are not accountable to the Party?

It must be repeated over and over again that this hypocrisy of the Vperyodists is due not to the personal traits of Peter or Paul but to the *political* falsity of their whole position; it is due to the fact that the Machist literati and the otzovists *cannot* go into battle *openly and directly* for their non-Social-Democratic pet ideas. Anyone who understands these *political* conditions will not come to a halt bewildered, mystified and downcast at the merely superficial aspect of the matter, at the mass of personal conflicts, bickering, abuse, etc. Anyone who understands these political conditions will not be satisfied by a conciliatory phrase (*à la* Trotsky) to the effect that what we need is "*not* a struggle against the otzovists *but* the overcoming of otzovism", for this is empty and meaningless phrase-mongering. The objective conditions of the counter-revolutionary era, the era of disintegration, the era of god-building, the era of Machism, otzovism and liquidationism—these objective conditions have *put* our Party in a state of war against circles of literati who are organising their own factions, and this struggle cannot be evaded by a phrase. To stand aside from this struggle is to stand aside from one of the contemporary tasks of the Social-Democratic Labour Party.

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THE QUESTION OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN COPENHAGEN

In the present article I intend to confine myself to an account of the transactions of the Congress on the question indicated in the heading and to a description of the trends of socialist thought which came into conflict there.

Prior to the Congress three draft resolutions on co-operative societies were published. The Belgian draft (in No. 5 of the Periodical Bulletin of the International Socialist Bureau, which is issued irregularly in the three official languages of the International Congresses) begins by warning socialist workers against the doctrine of those who regard co-operative societies as something self-sufficient, a sort of means for the solution of the social question. Then, admitting that the working class is extremely interested in utilising the co-operative societies as a weapon in their class struggle, the draft resolution of the Belgian party points out the direct advantages of co-operative societies (combating commercial exploitation, improving the working conditions of persons in the employ of the suppliers, etc.) and expresses the desire for "organic, closer and closer ties" to be established between the socialist parties and the co-operative societies.

The draft resolution submitted by the majority of the French Socialist Party is drawn up in the Jaurès spirit. The co-operative societies are exalted to the skies and are put forward—exactly in the style of the bourgeois reformers—as a "necessary" element of "social reformation". There are vague phrases about converting the co-operatives from

unions of separate persons into general federations of associations. Proletarian co-operative societies are confused with the co-operatives of petty proprietors (in agriculture). The resolution advocates the neutrality of co-operative societies, describing as harmful the imposition of any obligations on the co-operative societies with respect to the Socialist Party.

Lastly, the draft submitted by the minority of the French socialists (Guesde-ists) declares emphatically that the co-operatives in themselves are by no means class organisations (as, for instance, the trade unions are), and that their importance is determined by the use which is made of them. The workers, by joining the co-operative societies *en masse*, can benefit from them in their struggle against capital; from the example they offer, the workers can to some extent get an idea of the socialist society that would be organised after the contradictions of the present social order have been eliminated. The draft therefore emphasises the limited significance of the co-operative societies and calls upon the socialist parties to assist the proletarian co-operative societies, warns against illusions as to the role of co-operative societies, and recommends socialists to unite within the co-operative societies in order to explain to the masses their real task: the conquest of political power and the conversion of the means of production and distribution into common property.

It is quite clear that there are two main lines of policy here: one—the line of proletarian class struggle, recognition of the value of the co-operative societies as a weapon in this struggle, as one of its subsidiary means, and a definition of the conditions under which the co-operative societies would really play such a part and not remain simple commercial enterprises. The other line is a petty-bourgeois one, obscuring the question of the role of the co-operative societies in the class struggle of the proletariat, attaching to the co-operative societies an importance transcending this struggle (i.e., confusing the proletarian and the proprietors' view of co-operative societies), defining the aims of the co-operative societies with general phrases that are acceptable even to the bourgeois reformers, those ideologues of the progressive employers, large and small.

Unfortunately these two lines were only *sketched* in the three drafts that had been prepared beforehand, and they were not opposed one to the other, clearly, distinctly and sharply, as *two trends*, whose conflict should settle the question. Hence the transactions of the Congress proceeded unevenly, confusedly, and as it were spontaneously. It "came up against" differences of opinion every minute, but they were not cleared up and the result was a resolution reflecting the confusion of ideas, one which did not say *everything* that could and should have been said in a resolution of a Congress of Socialist Parties.

In the commission on the question of co-operative societies two trends immediately became apparent. One was represented by Jaurès and Elm. Elm was one of the four German delegates on the co-operative commission and acted as spokesman for the Germans—adopting a definitely opportunistic tone. The other trend was the Belgian. The mediator and conciliator was the Austrian, Karpeles, a prominent leader of the Austrian co-operative movement, who upheld no definite line of principle, but (or "because" rather than "but") who inclined more often than not to the opportunists. Moreover, even when the Belgians did challenge Jaurès and Elm this was due more to the instinct for a really proletarian approach to co-operative affairs than to a distinct understanding of the hostility and the irreconcilable breach between the proletarian and the petty-bourgeois point of view on the question. That is why, for instance, Anseele (chairman of the co-operative commission) made some forceful and excellent speeches to the commission against neutrality in the co-operative societies, against exaggerated ideas of their importance, and urging the necessity of *our* being *socialist* co-operators, not *co-operator* socialists. Yet when the resolution was being drawn up the same Anseele might have driven anyone to despair by his toleration of the formulations put forward by Jaurès and Elm, his reluctance to inquire into the causes of the dissension.

But to return to the meetings of the commission. Naturally the course of its work was decisively influenced by the representatives of nations with a strongly developed co-operative movement. Moreover, it immediately became apparent that there was a difference of opinion between

the Belgians and the Germans, vastly to the disadvantage of the latter. At any rate the Belgians pursued a proletarian line, although not quite consistently, not quite distinctly. Elm came out as an opportunist of the first water (especially in the subcommission, of which more later). Naturally, the leading role belonged to the Belgians. The Austrians were sympathetically disposed to them and at the end of the commission's deliberations an *Austro-Belgian* resolution was read, while Elm, who submitted the German resolution, declared forthright that he thought it would be quite possible to make it agree with Jaurès's draft. Since among the French there was a strong minority against Jaurès (there were 202 mandates for his point of view and 142 for Guesde's) while among the Germans there would have been a no less strong minority against Elm (if the question of the two points of view had come up clearly and sharply), the Austro-Belgian alliance had real chances of victory. And it was not so much a question of "victory" in the narrow sense of the word as of consistently upholding the proletarian point of view on the co-operative societies. Due to the excessive concessions which the subcommission made to Jaurès and Elm, this consistency was not attained.

As for us, the Russian Social-Democrats, we tried to support the Austro-Belgian line in the commission and with this aim in view, before the reading of the Austro-Belgian conciliatory draft, we submitted a draft resolution of our own, as follows:

"DRAFT RESOLUTION
OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATION OF RUSSIA

"The Congress is of the opinion:

"1) That proletarian consumers' societies improve the situation of the working class in that they reduce the amount of exploitation by all kinds of commercial middlemen, influence the labour conditions of the workers employed by the supplying firms and improve the situation of their own employees.

"2) That these societies can assume great importance for the economic and political mass struggle of the proletariat by supporting the workers during strikes, lock-outs, political persecution, etc.

On the other hand the Congress points out:

"1) that the improvements that can be achieved with the help of the consumers' societies can only be very inconsiderable as long

as the means of production remain In the hands of the class without whose expropriation socialism cannot be attained;

"2) that consumers' societies are not organisations for direct struggle against capital and exist alongside similar bodies organised by other classes, which could give rise to the illusion that these organisations are a means by which the social question may be solved without class struggle and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

"The Congress calls on the workers of all countries:

"a) to join the proletarian consumers' societies and to promote their development in every way, at the same time upholding the democratic character of these organisations;

"b) by untiring socialist propaganda in the consumers' societies, to spread the ideas of class struggle and socialism among the workers;

"c) to strive at the same time to bring about the fullest possible co-operation between all forms of the labour movement.

"The Congress also points out that producers' co-operatives can be of importance for the struggle of the working class only if they are a component part of consumers' societies."

All the draft resolutions were handed to a subcommission (the commissions at International Congresses are so large—each nation delegating four representatives to each commission—that it is simply out of the question to work out the text of resolutions at a full commission meeting). This subcommission consisted of ten persons; two Belgians (Anseele and Vandervelde), one Frenchman (Jaurès), one Austrian (Karpeles), one German (Elm), one Dutchman (Wibaut—a Marxist), one Italian, one Dane, one Englishman and one Russian Social-Democrat (Voinov and myself—our Social-Democratic delegation was unable to meet to elect a representative—so we both attended and one voted).

It was in the subcommission that the real business of drawing up the text of the resolution took place. The text adopted by the Congress, except for some small stylistic changes, is the same as the one drawn up by the subcommission; the reader will find the text of the Congress resolution elsewhere in this issue. The fight in the subcommission centred not on the question of the relations of co-operators to the Party—as was the case in the commission—but on the more fundamental question of the significance and role of co-operative societies. The Belgians tended to define their role, quite correctly in principle, as one of the possible (in certain conditions) auxiliary weapons in the proletarian class struggle for the "total expropriation" (expropriation intègrale) of the capitalist class. Elm, supported by Jaurès,

was strenuously opposed and revealed his opportunism to the full. He said it was not certain that matters would ever come to expropriation, that he personally considered it most improbable that for the "majority" (!) this was a debatable question, there was nothing about expropriation in the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party and that one should say "Überwindung des Kapitalismus"—"the overcoming of capitalism". Bebel's famous words in Hannover, uttered at the conclusion of the controversy with Bernstein, "es bleibt bei der Expropriation"—"we stand as before for expropriation,"[116] were forgotten by one of the leaders of German opportunism. In connection with this dispute the "question of socialisation" arose. Jaurès demanded in the form of an ultimatum that the definition of the significance of the co-operative societies should include: "They help the workers [and this was included in the text adopted by the Congress] to prepare the democratisation and socialisation of the means of production and distribution."

This is one of those nebulous, indefinite phrases—entirely acceptable to the ideologists of the petty proprietor and the theoreticians of bourgeois reformism—at which Jaurès is such an adept and to which he is so partial. What is the "democratisation of the means of production and distribution?" (Later in the commission, when the draft came back from the subcommission, the French altered the word "means"—*moyens*—to forces, but this did not make the slightest difference.) Peasant production (as I told the commission) is "more democratic" than large-scale capitalist production. Does this mean that we socialists want to establish small-scale production? And what is "socialisation"? It can be taken to mean conversion into the property of the whole community, but it can also be taken to mean any palliatives, any reforms within the framework of capitalism, from peasant co-operatives to municipal baths and public lavatories. In the subcommission Jaurès referred to the Danish agricultural societies, apparently sharing the view of the bourgeois economists that these are not capitalistic enterprises.

Organising opposition to this opportunism, we (Russian and Polish Social-Democrats) tried appealing from Elm to Wurm, the co-editor of the *Neue Zeit*, who was also repre-

senting the Germans on the co-operative commission. Wurm did not approve of the phrase "democratisation and socialisation", proposed (privately) a number of amendments, and negotiated between Elm and the Marxists; but Elm was so "adamant" that Wurm's efforts came to nothing. Some time after the Congress I read in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (No. 201, August 31, 1910, 3. Beilage), that the question of the co-operative societies had been brought up in the German delegation the Tuesday before. "R. Fischer inquired," wrote the correspondent of this paper, "if there were any differences on the question of co-operatives among the German delegates." *Elm* replied: "Yes. And they can't be eliminated overnight. Congress decisions are always in the nature of a compromise and on this question too matters will probably end in a compromise." *Wurm*: "My views on the question of the co-operative societies are quite different (*durchaus andere*) from the views of von Elm; nevertheless, we shall probably find common ground in a combined resolution." After this the delegation considered further discussion unnecessary.

This report bears out the fact which was already quite evident at the International Congress in Stuttgart.[117] The German delegation is composed equally of Party representatives and trade union representatives. The latter are almost all opportunists as it is usually the secretaries and other trade union "bureaucrats" who are elected. In general the Germans are incapable of pursuing a consistent line of principle at International Congresses and the hegemony in the International often slips from their hands. Wurm's impotence before Elm is but one more illustration of the crisis in German Social-Democracy which consists in the growth of an inevitable and decisive breach with the opportunists.

On the question of financial support for the Party from the co-operative societies, Elm and Jaurès during the proceedings of the subcommission also won an excessive concession from the Belgians, who agreed to the formula: "It rests with the co-operative societies of each country to decide whether and to what extent they should assist the political and trade union movement directly from their own funds."

When the subcommission's draft came back to the commission for final adoption these were the two points upon which we fixed our attention. Together with Guesde we moved two (main) amendments: firstly, to replace the words "(the co-operative societies) help the workers to prepare the democratisation and socialisation of production and distribution" by the words: "(the co-operative societies) help to a certain extent to prepare the functioning of production and distribution after the expropriation of the capitalist class." This amendment, which stylistically is not very happily formulated, does not mean that the co-operative societies *cannot* help the workers at present, but that the future mode of production and distribution, which is being *prepared* now by the co-operative societies, can begin to function *only after* the expropriation of the capitalists. The second amendment concerned the point which speaks of the relation of co-operative societies to the Party. We proposed either to add the words "which (i.e., aid to the workers' struggle) is in any case desirable from the standpoint of socialism", or to replace the whole of this point by another expressly recommending *socialists* in the co-operative societies to advocate and insist upon direct support for the class struggle of the proletariat.

Both amendments were rejected by the commission and collected only about 15 votes. The Socialist-Revolutionaries—as they always do at International Congresses—voted for Jaurès. Before the Russian public they are not averse to reproaching even Bebel with opportunism, but before the European they follow Jaurès and Elm! Wurm tried to patch up the last part of the resolution by rearranging the order of the last three paragraphs. Let it be said first of all that the unification of the co-operatives in a single federation is desirable (second paragraph from the end). Then let it be stated that it rests with the co-operative societies to decide whether they should render direct assistance to the Party or not (third paragraph from the end). And let the last paragraph begin with "but" (*but* the congress declares that it would be desirable to have increasingly intimate relations between the Party, the trade unions and the co-operative societies). Then it would be clear from the *general* context that the Congress *recommends* the co-operative

societies to help the Party. Elm rejected even this amendment! Wurm then withdrew it. After that Wibaut moved it in his own name, we voted for it, but the amendment was rejected.

As to the line to pursue at the plenary session of the Congress, we had a conference with Guesde. Guesde considered—and his opinion was shared by the German revolutionary Social-Democrats—that at the plenary session of the Congress we ought not to start a fight over minor changes, but to vote *for* the resolution as a whole. Its defects consist in the *admission* of a revisionist phrase which is not a substitute for the definition of the aim of socialism but stands *alongside* this definition—and in one *insufficiently emphatic* expression of the idea that workers' co-operative societies should help the workers' class struggle. An attempt should be made to remove such defects but there were no grounds for starting a fight at the general meeting because of them. We agreed with this opinion of Guesde's and the resolution was unanimously adopted at the plenary session of the Congress.

To sum up the work of the Congress on the question of co-operative societies, we must say—without concealing the defects of the resolution either from ourselves or from the workers—that the International gave, in essentials, a correct definition of the tasks of the proletarian co-operative societies. Every member of the Party, every Social-Democratic worker, every class-conscious worker-co-operator must be guided by the resolution that was adopted and carry on all his activity in the spirit of this resolution.

The Copenhagen Congress marks that stage in the development of the labour movement in which its growth was, so to speak, mainly in breadth and in which it *began* to bring the proletarian co-operatives into the orbit of class struggle. Differences with the revisionists came to light but the revisionists are still a long way from coming out with an independent programme. The fight against revisionism has been postponed, but it will come inevitably.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 17,
September 25 (October 8), 1910
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

HOW CERTAIN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS INFORM THE INTERNATIONAL ABOUT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE R.S.D.L.P.

In connection with the International Congress in Copenhagen articles have appeared in a number of publications on the state of affairs in our Party. We shall dwell briefly on three articles written by spokesmen of three different Party (or rather *anti*-Party) trends.

The first place for unceremoniousness should go to an article which appeared, sad to relate, in the central press organ of our comrades in Germany (*Vorwärts*, August 28). This article is anonymous. It is merely subtitled "From Our Russian Correspondent".

From it the reader learns that "the Russian emigrants who play a disproportionately great role in our Party, have never been so remote from the interests and requirements of the Russian labour movement as they are today", that the Central Organ of our Party, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, "is being conducted in a narrow factional spirit" and that the Bolsheviks are noted for "formal and superficial radicalism", that it is only by a process of evolution that they have finally come to a "recognition" of parliamentarism, and so on and so forth. The author is extremely dissatisfied with the majority of our Party. He paints a very black picture of the whole situation in the Party. He sees only one bright spot in the life of the R.S.D.L.P. This is "the workers' newspaper *Pravda*, published in Vienna, which from the outset has stood completely aloof from factional polemics and devotes itself to political agitation", and so forth.

Don't you begin to guess, reader, to whose "non-factional" pen this article belongs? You are not mistaken, of course.

Yes, it is the "non-factional" Comrade Trotsky, who has no compunction about openly advertising his faction's propaganda sheet. He provides the insufficiently informed German readers with the same appraisal of the policy of the Party majority as that made by the liquidators.*

Another literateur, *R. Streltsov*, set out to libel our Party in the organ of the German revisionists. His article was published in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which is edited by Herr Bloch, whom Bebel in Magdeburg justly called a National Liberal. R. Streltsov—who collaborates with Mr. Prokopovich on the newspaper *Tovarishch*[119]—quite openly takes the liquidators under his protection. "Nothing could be more absurd than the accusation which is being made against them." It is the liquidators who are the real Social-Democrats. As for the Party majority, it, you see, "considers superfluous the utilisation of so-called legal opportunities, i.e., the participation of the Social-Democrats in the trade unions, co-operative societies, legal congresses, and so forth." Yes, indeed, the German reader will get a true picture if he studies the history of the Russian revolution from Cherevanin and the contemporary situation and tactical struggle inside our Party—from Streltsov and Trotsky! ...

The third article is from the pen of the ultimatumist (and god-builder) Voinov, writing in *Le Peuple*,[120] the Party organ of our Belgian comrades.** And although Voinov gives the Belgian comrades a wrong idea of the "tactical trends in our Party" (the heading of his article) still, in one respect, his article has performed a valuable service: it has revealed to us once again the essence of otzovist-ultimatumist tactics. Occasionally we do come across blessed writers in the *Vperyod* group who expound the aims

* The fact that this article was published in a Party organ like *Vorwärts* impelled our delegates at the Copenhagen Congress to make a protest to the Central Committee of the German Party. This protest was lodged by the delegates of our Central Organ (G. V. Plekhanov and A. Varsky) and by the Party's representative on the International Bureau (N. Lenin).[118] It was while this question was being discussed by the Social-Democratic delegation that Comrade Trotsky divulged to us the secret that he himself had written the offending article.

** Voinov thoughtfully informs the readers that he is a "delegate at the International Congress in Copenhagen".

of the otzovist-ultimatumists openly without veiling them, as is the common practice in the literary utterances of the Vperyodists. Listen for yourselves. What member of the *Vperyod* group would frankly admit now that the otzovist-ultimatumists are still dreaming about fighting squads, etc.? But the candid Voinov writes frankly that he and his friends want to "continue and develop our preparation for armed action", whereas Lenin, who has swung to the Right, denies "for example, the necessity of training schools" at the present time. What Vperyodist now says openly that an "ultimatum" must be sent to the Duma group? But the good Voinov informs us frankly that the "regeneration of the Party" is necessary to his friends in order to "present an ultimatum to our deputies".... What Vperyodist will tell you in the press for what purpose the otzovist-ultimatumists require a "Party school" abroad? But the loquacious Voinov does not omit to inform us that the "school" is necessary for preparing a "new congress" of the Party and the election of a different Central Committee in place of the present "Right-wing" Central Committee.* Surely the *Vperyod* "diplomats" will not thank Voinov for this candour!

Trotsky, Voinov and Streltsov have fraternally joined hands in opposing the Party line....

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* In this article Voinov thought it expedient ... to add a little boast that "some members of the C.C.'s elected at the Congress, but dissatisfied with the C.C.'s new policy have resigned." Where and when was that, Comrade Voinov?



First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Announcement on the Publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*",
October 1910

Reduced

First page of Рабочая Газета No. 1, October 30 (November 12), 1910, with Lenin's leading article "The Lessons of the Revolution".

Reduced

ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE PUBLICATION OF *RABOCHAYA GAZETA*[121]

The deep crisis of the workers' movement and the Social-Democratic Party in Russia still continues. Disintegration of the Party organisations, an almost universal exodus of the intellectuals from them, confusion and wavering among the Social-Democrats who have remained loyal, dejection and apathy among fairly wide sections of the advanced proletariat, uncertainty as to the way out of this situation—such are the distinguishing features of the present position. Among the Social-Democrats there are not a few who are faint-hearted and of little faith, who are ready to despair of finding their bearings in the prevailing confusion, to despair of restoring and strengthening the Party, the R.S.D.L.P., with its revolutionary aims and traditions, who are ready to stand aloof and to isolate themselves in narrow, petty circles concerned only with "cultural" work and so forth.

The crisis continues, but its end is already clearly visible, the way out has been fully indicated and tested by the Party, the confusion and wavering has already been channelled into fairly definite tendencies, trends and factions, a very clear-cut appraisal of which has been made by the Party—while the assumption of definite shape by the anti-Party tendencies and the clear appraisal of them are already half-way towards getting rid of confusion and wavering.

In order not to give way to despair and disillusion it is necessary only to understand the full depth of the sources of the crisis. One cannot skip over or avoid this crisis, one can only survive it by means of persistent struggle, for it is not accidental but engendered by the *special* stage of

both the economic and the political development of Russia. The autocracy reigns as before. Violence is still more brutal. Tyranny is still more powerful. Economic oppression is still more brazen. But the autocracy can no longer maintain itself *merely* by the old methods. It is *compelled* to make a new attempt, an attempt at an open alliance with the Black-Hundred feudal landlords and the Octobrist capitalists, an alliance in the Duma and through the Duma. The hopelessness of this attempt and the growth of a new revolutionary crisis are obvious to anyone who is still capable of thought. But this revolutionary crisis is being prepared in a new situation, in which classes and parties are marked by immeasurably greater consciousness, solidarity and organisation than before the Revolution of 1905. Russian liberalism has been converted from a well-meaning, dreamy, fragile and immature opposition of benevolent aspirations into a strong, parliamentarily-disciplined party of bourgeois intellectuals, who are conscious enemies of the socialist proletariat and of a revolutionary settlement of accounts with the feudal landlords by the peasant masses. To beg for concessions from the monarchy, to threaten it with revolution (hateful and terrifying to the liberals themselves), continually to betray the struggle for emancipation and desert to the enemy—such is the inevitable lot of the liberal, Constitutional-Democratic Party, inevitable owing to its class nature. The Russian peasantry has shown its capacity for mass revolutionary struggle if the latter is launched by the proletariat, and its capacity for perpetually vacillating between the liberals and the Social-Democrats. The Russian working class has shown that it is the only class that is revolutionary to the end, the only leader in the struggle for freedom, even for bourgeois freedom. And now the great task of continuing the struggle for freedom can and will be accomplished only by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, drawing with it the working and exploited masses. Operating in the new situation, among more conscious and united enemies, the working class must refashion also its own Party, the R.S.D.L.P. In place of leaders from the intelligentsia it is bringing to the fore leaders from among the workers. A new type of working-class member of the Social-Demo-

cratic Party is arising, independently carrying on *all* the activities of the Party and, compared with the previous type, capable of rallying, uniting and organising masses of the proletariat ten times and a hundred times as great as before.

It is to this new worker in the first place that we address our *Rabochaya Gazeta*. This worker has grown out of the stage of wanting to be talked to in childish language or fed with pap. He needs to know all about the political aims of the Party, how it is built, its inner-Party struggle. He is not daunted by the unvarnished truth about the Party on whose strengthening, revival and rebuilding he is engaged. He is not helped, but rather harmed, by those revolutionary phrases in general terms and those sugary conciliatory appeals which he finds in the symposia of *Vperyod* or in Trotsky's newspaper *Pravda*, without obtaining from either the one or the other a clear, precise, straightforward exposition of the Party's policy and the Party's position.

The Party's position is a very difficult one, but the chief difficulty is not that the Party has been terribly weakened and its organisations often completely shattered, nor that inner-Party factional struggle has become acute, but that the advanced section of Social-Democratic workers has not realised clearly enough the nature and significance of this struggle, has not rallied sufficiently for waging it successfully, has not intervened in it with sufficient independence and energy for creating, supporting and consolidating that *core of the Party* which is leading the R.S.D.L.P. from disorder, collapse and wavering on to a solidly based road.

This road has been fully pointed out by the decisions of the December Conference of 1908, which were further developed in the decisions of the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1910. This Party core consists of that union of orthodox Bolsheviks (opponents of otzovism and bourgeois philosophy) and pro-Party Mensheviks (opponents of liquidationism) which at the present time is *carrying out* in practice, and not by virtue of a merely formal attitude, the main work of the R.S.D.L.P.

The workers are being told that this union only intensifies and accentuates factional struggle, a struggle against

the liquidators and otzovists "instead of" a fight against liquidationism and otzovism. This is sheer phrase-mongering, mere childish talk that assumes the worker is not an adult but a child. It is an unpleasant truth that, given the weakness of the Party, the shattered state of its organisations and the inevitability of a base abroad, every trend easily becomes a faction abroad that is virtually independent of the Party, but it is ludicrous (or criminal) to hide this truth from the Social-Democratic worker who has to rebuild *his* Party on the basis of a *definite*, precise and clear Party line. There is no doubt that the most undesirable *forms* of factional struggle prevail among us at present, but precisely in order to refashion the *forms* of this struggle the advanced worker should not dismiss with a phrase or contemptuously turn up his nose at the unpleasant (unpleasant for a dilettante, a guest in the Party) task of refashioning unpleasant forms of unpleasant struggle, but should *understand* the essence and significance of this struggle and *arrange* the work in the localities in such a way that for *each* question of socialist propaganda, political agitation, the trade union movement, co-operative work, etc., etc., the *boundary* is defined beyond which begins the deviation *from* Social-Democracy to liberal liquidationism or semi-anarchist otzovism, ultimatumism, etc., and should *conduct Party affairs* along the correct line defined by these boundaries. We make it one of the main tasks of *Rabochaya Gazeta* to help the workers to fix these boundaries for each of the most important *concrete* problems of contemporary Russian life.

The workers are being told: it was the attempt at unity made by the plenary session of the Central Committee in January 1910, which proved the sterility and hopelessness of the inner-Party factional struggle that "disrupted" unity. People who talk like that are either uninformed or quite incapable of thought, or they are *concealing* their real aims by means of some sort of resonant phrases that sound well but mean nothing. The plenary session "disillusioned" only those who were afraid to face the truth and buoyed themselves up with illusions. However great at times the "conciliatory hotchpotch" at the plenum, the outcome was exactly that unity which alone is possible and necessary.

If the liquidators and otzovists *signed* the resolution on the fight against liquidationism and otzovism, and the next day still more "zealously" stuck to the past, this only proved how impossible it is for the Party to count on non-Party elements, it only showed more clearly what these elements are like. The Party is a voluntary association and unity is possible and useful only when people unite who are desirous and capable of carrying out a common Party policy with at least some degree of conscientiousness, or rather: who are *interested* (through their ideas or tendencies) in carrying out a *common* Party policy. Unity is impossible and harmful when it attempts to muddle and obscure the consciousness of this policy, when it attempts to bind by a fictitious tie those who are definitely pulling the Party in an anti-Party direction. And unity between the main groups of Bolshevism and Menshevism was achieved by the plenum and consolidated, if not thanks to the plenum, at least through the plenum.

A worker who does not want to be spoken to in childish tones cannot fail to understand that liquidationism and otzovism are just as much non-accidental, deep-rooted trends as Bolshevism and Menshevism. Only inventors of fairy-tales "for workers" explain the difference between these two last factions as due to disputes between "intellectuals". In reality these two trends, which have left their mark on the whole history of the Russian revolution, on all the first years (in many respects the most important years) of the mass workers' movement in Russia, were produced by the very process of the economic and political reconstruction of Russia from a feudal into a bourgeois country, were produced by the influences exerted on the proletariat by various bourgeois classes, or more correctly, were produced by the situation of various strata of the bourgeoisie within which the proletariat acted. It follows that Social-Democratic unity in Russia is not possible through the destruction of one of the two trends which took shape in the period of the most open, most extensive, mass, free and historically important actions of the working class during the revolution. But it follows also that the foundations for a real rapprochement between the two factions are not to be found in well-meaning phrases about unity, about the

abolition of factions, etc., but only in the internal development of the factions. It is such a rapprochement that the party of the working class has been experiencing since we Bolsheviks in the spring of 1909 finally "buried" otzovism,[122] while the pro-Party Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov, began a no less determined struggle against liquidationism. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers of *both* factions side with the opponents of otzovism and liquidationism. Therefore, however harsh the inner-Party struggle on this basis, a struggle which is at times difficult and always unpleasant, we must not forget the *essence* of the phenomenon on account of its *form*. He who does not see underlying this struggle (which in the present state of the Party inevitably takes the form of a struggle of factions) the process of the *consolidation* of a basic Party core of class-conscious Social-Democratic workers is like one who fails to see the wood for the trees.

It is the aims of such a consolidation of a genuine Social-Democratic core that will be served also by *Rabochaya Gazeta*, which we Bolsheviks are founding, having secured that the pro-Party Mensheviks (headed by Plekhanov) agree to support our publication. It necessarily makes its appearance as a factional publication, as a factional enterprise of the Bolsheviks. Here, too, perhaps, persons will be found who cannot see the wood for the trees and who will raise an outcry about going "*back*" to factionalism. By setting out in detail our view of the nature and significance of the Party unity that is really coming about and is really important and essential we have already exposed the value of such objections, which would *in fact* signify only *confusing* the problem of unity and *concealing* certain factional aims. We desire above all that *Rabochaya Gazeta* should help the workers to understand quite clearly from beginning to end the entire Party position and all the Party aims.

In embarking on the publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta* we are counting on the assistance both of the Central Committee of our Party and of the local organisations, as well as of individual groups of class-conscious workers at present cut off from the Party. We are counting on the assistance of the Central Committee, knowing that for a number of months past it has not succeeded in arranging its work

correctly in Russia, its failure being due to the fact that, apart from the Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks, it has *not* found help *anywhere* and has frequently encountered the direct opposition of the other factions. This painful phase in the life of the Central Committee will pass, and in order that this should happen the sooner we must not simply "wait" until the Central Committee is re-established, until it has gathered strength, etc., but *immediately*, on the initiative of individual groups and local organisations, start—even if on the most modest scale at first—that work of strengthening the Party line and *real* Party unity on which the Central Committee too is primarily engaged. We count on the assistance of the local organisations and individual groups of workers, for it is only their active work on the newspaper, only their support, their reactions, their articles, materials, information and comments that can put *Rabochaya Gazeta* on a firm basis and ensure its continuance.

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THE LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION

Five years have elapsed since the working class of Russia, in October 1905, dealt the first mighty blow to the tsarist autocracy. In those great days the proletariat aroused millions of the working people to struggle against their oppressors. In the space of a few months of that year the proletariat won improvements which during decades the workers had been vainly waiting from the "superior authorities". The proletariat won for the whole Russian people, if only for a short time, something that Russia had never known before—freedom of the press, assembly and association. It swept Bulygin's fake Duma from its path, extracted from the tsar a manifesto declaring a constitution and made it impossible once and for all for Russia to be ruled without representative institutions.

But the great victories of the proletariat proved to be only semi-victories because the tsarist regime was not overthrown. The December insurrection ended in defeat and the tsarist autocracy began to take back the gains of the working class one by one as the latter's offensive weakened, as the struggle of the masses declined. In 1907 workers' strikes, peasants' and soldiers' outbreaks were much weaker than they had been in 1905 but were still very formidable nonetheless. The tsar dispersed the First Duma, during which the militancy of the people had begun to mount again, but did not dare to change the electoral law all at once. In 1907 the struggle of the workers grew weaker still, and the tsar, having dispersed the Second Duma, staged a coup d'état (June 3, 1907). He broke all the most solemn promises that he had made not to promulgate laws without the consent of the Duma and changed the electoral law in such a way that the landlords and the capitalists,

РАБОЧАЯ ГАЗЕТА

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Уроки революціи

First page of *Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 1, October 30 (November 12), 1910, with Lenin's leading article "The Lessons of the Revolution"

Reduced

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the party of the Black-Hundred elements and their servitors were assured of a majority in the Duma.

Both the victories and the defeats of the revolution taught the Russian people some great historical lessons. In honouring the fifth anniversary of 1905, let us try to ascertain the main substance of these lessons.

The first and main lesson is that *only* the revolutionary struggle of the masses can bring about worth-while improvements in the lives of the workers and in the administration of the state. No "sympathy" for the workers on the part of educated people, no struggle of lone terrorists, however heroic, could do anything to undermine the tsarist autocracy and the omnipotence of the capitalists. This could be achieved only by the struggle of the workers themselves, only by the combined struggle of millions, and when *this* struggle grew weaker the workers immediately began to be deprived of what they had won. The Russian revolution was confirmation of the sentiments expressed in the international hymn of labour:

No saviours from on high deliver,
No trust have we in prince or peer;
Our own right hand the chains must shiver,
Chains of hatred, greed and fear!

The second lesson is that it is not enough to undermine and restrict the power of the tsar. It must be *destroyed*. Until the tsarist regime is destroyed concessions won from the tsar will never be lasting.

The tsar made concessions when the tide of the revolutionary offensive was rising. When it ebbed, he took them all back. Only the winning of a democratic republic, the overthrow of the tsarist regime, the passage of power into the hands of the people, can deliver Russia from the violence and tyranny of officialdom, from the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma, from the despotic power which the landlords and their servitors wield over the countryside. If the miseries of the peasants and the workers have become even harder to bear now, after the revolution, this is the price they are paying for the fact that the revolution was weak, that the tsarist regime was not overthrown. The year 1905, then the first two Dumas, and their dissolution, taught the people a great

deal, taught them above all to fight in common for political demands. At first, upon awakening to political life, the people demanded concessions from the autocracy: that the tsar should convene a Duma, that he should appoint new ministers in place of the old, that the tsar should "grant" universal suffrage. But the autocracy did not and could not agree to such concessions. The autocracy answered the requests for concessions with bayonets. And then the people began to realise that they would have to *fight* against the autocratic regime. Now, we may say, this understanding is being driven even more drastically into the heads of the peasants by Stolypin and the reactionary noblemen's Duma. Yes, they are driving it in and they'll drive it right home.

The tsarist autocracy has also learned a lesson from the revolution. It has seen that it cannot rely on the faith of the peasants in the tsar. It is now strengthening its power by forming an alliance with the Black-Hundred landlords and the Octobrist industrialists. To overthrow the tsarist autocracy will now require a much more powerful offensive of the revolutionary mass struggle than in 1905.

Is such a much more powerful offensive possible? The reply to this question brings us to the *third and cardinal* lesson of the revolution. This lesson consists in our having seen *how* the various classes of the Russian people act. Prior to 1905 many thought that the whole people aspired to freedom in the same way and wanted the same freedom; at least the great majority had no clear understanding of the fact that the different classes of the Russian people had different views on the struggle for freedom and were not striving for the same freedom. The revolution dispelled the mist. At the end of 1905, then later during the First and Second Dumas, *all* classes of Russian society came out openly. They showed themselves in action, revealing what their true ambitions were, what they could fight for and how strongly, persistently and vigorously they were able to fight.

The factory workers, the industrial proletariat, waged a most resolute and strenuous struggle against the autocracy. The proletariat began the revolution with the Ninth of January and mass strikes. The proletariat carried this struggle to its uttermost limit, rising in armed uprising

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

in December 1905 in defence of the bullet-riddled, knouted and tormented peasantry. The number of workers who went on strike in 1905 was about *three million* (and with the railwaymen, post-office employees, etc., probably reached four million), in 1906—one million, in 1907—three-quarters of a million. The world had never yet seen a strike movement raised to such a pitch. The Russian proletariat showed what untold forces there are in the masses of the workers when a real revolutionary crisis matures. The strike wave of 1905, the greatest in the world, did not exhaust all the militant forces of the proletariat by a long way. For instance, in the Moscow factory region there were 567,000 factory workers and the number of strikers was 540,000, while in the St. Petersburg factory region, which had 300,000 factory workers, there were a million strikers. This means that the workers in the Moscow area were still far from developing the same stubbornness in the struggle as the St. Petersburg workers. In Livonian Gubernia (city of Riga) there were 250,000 strikers to the 50,000 workers employed there. In other words, each worker on the average struck more than five times in 1905. Now, in all parts of Russia, there cannot be less than three million factory, mining and railway workers and this number is growing year by year. With a movement as strong as in Riga in 1905 they could turn out an army of *15 million strikers*.

No tsarist regime could withstand such an onslaught. But everyone understands that such an offensive cannot be evoked artificially in accordance with the desires of the socialists or militant workers. It is possible only when the whole country is convulsed by a crisis, mass indignation and revolution. In order to prepare such an onslaught we must draw the most backward sections of the workers into the struggle, we must devote years and years to persistent, widespread, unflagging propaganda, agitation and organisational work, building up and reinforcing all forms of proletarian unions and organisations.

In militancy the working class of Russia was in advance of all the other classes of the Russian people. The very conditions of their lives make the workers capable of struggle and impel them to struggle. Capital collects the workers

in great masses in big cities" uniting them, teaching them to act in unison. At every step the workers come face to face with their main enemy—the capitalist class. In combat with this enemy the worker becomes a *socialist*, comes to realise the necessity of a complete reconstruction of the whole of society, the complete abolition of all poverty and all oppression. Becoming socialists, the workers fight with self-abnegating courage against everything that stands in their path, first and foremost the tsarist regime and the feudal landlords.

The peasants too during the revolution went into action against the landlords and against the government, but their struggle was much weaker. It has been calculated that a majority of the factory workers (about three-fifths) took part in the revolutionary struggle, in strikes, while undoubtedly only a minority of the peasants took part: in all probability not more than one-fifth or one-fourth. The peasants fought less persistently, more disconnectedly, with less political understanding, at times still pinning their hopes on the benevolence of our Father, the Tsar. In 1905 and 1906 the peasants, properly speaking, only gave the tsar and the landlords a bit of a fright. But frightening them is no use. They must be *destroyed*, *their* government—the *tsarist* government—must be wiped off the face of the earth. Now Stolypin and the Black-Hundred, landlord Duma are trying to create new landlord farmers from the ranks of the rich peasants, to be the allies of the tsar and the Black Hundreds. But the more the tsar and the Duma help the rich peasants to ruin the mass of the peasantry, the more politically conscious does this mass become, the less faith will it preserve in the tsar, the faith of feudal slaves, the faith of downtrodden and ignorant people. Each year that passes swells the ranks of the agricultural labourers in the countryside, they have nowhere to seek salvation except in an alliance with the urban workers for joint struggle. Each year that passes fills the countryside with more ruined peasants, utterly destitute, driven to desperation by hunger. When the urban proletariat rises again, millions upon millions of these peasants will throw themselves into the struggle against the tsar and the landlords with greater determination and solidarity.

The bourgeois liberals too took part in the revolution, i.e., the liberal landlords, industrialists, lawyers, professors, etc. They constitute the party of "people's freedom" (the Constitutional-Democrats or Cadets). They promised the people a whole lot of things and made a lot of noise about freedom in their newspapers. They had a majority in the First and Second Dumas. They held out a promise of gaining freedom by "peaceful means", they condemned the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants. The peasants and many of the peasant deputies ("Trudoviks") believed these promises and followed humbly and obediently at the heels of the liberals, standing aside from the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. This was the greatest mistake committed by the peasants (and many townfolk) during the revolution. With one hand, and at that very, very rarely, the liberals assisted the struggle for freedom, while they kept offering the other hand to the tsar, promising to preserve and strengthen his power, to make peace between the peasants and the landlords, to "pacify" the "turbulent" workers.

When the revolution came to the point of a pitched battle with the tsar, the December uprising of 1905, the liberals in a body basely betrayed the freedom of the people and recoiled from the struggle. The tsarist autocracy took advantage of this betrayal of the people's freedom by the liberals, took advantage of the ignorance of the peasants, who to a large extent believed the liberals, and defeated the insurgent workers. And when the proletariat was defeated, no Dumas, no honeyed speeches and promises on the part of the Cadets, could hold back the tsar from abolishing all the vestiges of freedom and restoring the autocracy and the despotic power of the feudal landlords.

The liberals found themselves deceived. The peasants have received a severe but useful lesson. There will be no freedom in Russia as long as the broad masses of the people believe in the liberals, believe in the possibility of "peace" with the tsarist regime and stand aloof from the revolutionary struggle of the workers. No power on earth can hold back the advent of freedom in Russia when the mass of the urban proletariat rises in struggle, brushes aside the wavering and treacherous liberals, and enlists

under its banner the rural labourers and impoverished peasantry.

And that the proletariat of Russia will rise in such a struggle, that it will take the lead in the revolution again, is warranted by the whole economic situation of Russia, all the experience of the revolutionary years.

Five years ago the proletariat dealt the first blow to the tsarist autocracy. The first rays of freedom gleamed for the Russian people. Now the tsarist autocracy has been restored, the feudal lords are reigning and ruling again, the workers and peasants are everywhere being crushed down again, everywhere the Asiatic despotism of the authorities and infamous maltreatment of the people prevails. But these hard lessons will not have been in vain. The Russian people are not what they were prior to 1905. The proletariat has taught them to fight. The proletariat will bring them to victory.

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TWO WORLDS

Much has been written in all the newspapers about the Magdeburg Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party. All the main events of this Congress, all the vicissitudes of the struggle are sufficiently known. The outward aspect of the struggle of the revisionists with the orthodox, the dramatic episodes of the Congress overmuch engaged the attention of the readers, to the detriment of a clarification of the principles involved in this struggle, the ideological and political roots of the divergence. Yet the debates in Magdeburg—above all on the question of the Badenites voting for the budget—provide exceedingly interesting material for characterising the two worlds of ideas and the two class tendencies *within* the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany. The voting for the budget is but one of the manifestations of this division into two worlds, a division which is so deep that it is undoubtedly bound to be expressed on much more serious occasions, much more profound and important. And now, when, as everybody can see, a great revolutionary storm is *impending* in Germany, the Magdeburg debates should be regarded as a small review of forces covering a small fraction of the army (for the question of voting for the budget is only a small fraction of the fundamental questions of Social-Democratic tactics) *before* the beginning of the campaign.

What has this review shown as to how different sections of the proletarian army understand the tasks that confront them? How, judging by this review, will these different sections of the army conduct themselves when the time comes?—these are the questions on which we intend to dwell.

We will begin with one minor (at first glance) clash of opinion. The leader of the revisionists, Frank, strongly

insisted, like all the Badenites, that although the Minister, von Bodman, had originally denied "parity of rights" of the Social-Democrats with the other, bourgeois, parties he had subsequently retracted this "affront". Bebel in his report made the following reply on this point:

"If the minister of a modern state, a representative of the existing state system and social order—and the purpose of the present-day state, as a political institution, is to defend and support the existing state system and social order against all attacks from the Social-Democratic camp, to defend it by force too in case of need—if such a minister declares that he does not recognise parity of rights of the Social-Democrats, then he is quite right from his own point of view." Frank interrupted Bebel with the cry "outrageous!" Bebel continued in reply to him: "I find this quite natural." Frank again exclaimed "outrageous!"

Why was Frank so indignant? Because he is thoroughly imbued with faith in bourgeois "legality", in bourgeois "parity of rights", without understanding the historical *limits* of this legality, without understanding that all this legality *must* inevitably be cast to the four winds when the fundamental and cardinal question of the preservation of bourgeois property is affected. Frank is steeped in petty-bourgeois constitutional illusions; that is why he does not understand the historical *conditionality* of constitutional institutions even in a country like Germany; he believes in the absolute value, the absolute power of the bourgeois (more correctly: bourgeois-feudal) constitution in Germany, and is sincerely *affronted* when a constitutional minister does not wish to recognise his, Frank's, "parity of rights" as a member of parliament, as a man who acts in strict accordance with the law. Intoxicated by this legality, Frank goes so far as to forget the implacable hostility of the bourgeoisie towards the proletariat and, without noticing it, adopts the position of those who regard this bourgeois legality as something eternal, who think that socialism can be fitted inside the framework of this legality.

Bebel brings down the question from these constitutional illusions, which are characteristic of bourgeois democrats, to the firm realities of the class struggle. Can we allow ourselves to be "affronted" because we, the enemies of the whole

bourgeois order, are not accorded parity of rights on the basis of bourgeois law by a champion of this order? Why the very admission that this could affront me, would show me to be unstable in my socialist convictions!

And Bebel tried to drive Social-Democratic views into Frank's head by concrete examples. We could not be "affronted", Bebel told Frank, by the Anti-Socialist Law; we were filled with anger and hatred, "and if it had been in our power at that time, we would have flung ourselves into battle, as we were longing to do heart and soul, we would have smashed to smithereens everything that stood in our path" (here the verbatim report records *loud cries of approval*). "We would have been traitors to our cause not to have done so" (*Hear*, *hear*!). "But it was not in our power."

I take it as an affront that a constitutional minister does not recognise the parity of rights of the socialists, argues Frank. You must not be affronted, says Bebel, because your parity of rights has been denied by a man who not so long ago was strangling you, riding roughshod over all "principles", whose duty it was to strangle you in defence of the bourgeois order, who will put a stranglehold on you tomorrow (Bebel did not say this, but he hinted at it broadly enough; we shall explain in the proper place why Bebel so cautiously confines himself to hints). We would have been traitors if, having the opportunity, we had not throttled these enemies of the proletariat.

Two worlds of ideas: on the one hand, the point of view of the proletarian class struggle, which in certain historical periods can proceed on the basis of bourgeois legality, but which leads *inevitably* to a denouement, an open collision, to the dilemma: either "smash" the bourgeois state "to smithereens" or be defeated and strangled. On the other hand, the point of view of the reformist, the petty bourgeois who cannot see the wood for the trees, who cannot, through the tinsel of constitutional legality, see the fierce class struggle, who forgets in the backwoods of some diminutive state the great historical problems of the present day.

The reformists imagine themselves to be realist politicians, doers of positive work, statesmen. It is in the interests of the masters of bourgeois society to encourage these childish illusions in the ranks of the proletariat, but the

Social-Democrats must destroy them ruthlessly. The talk of parity of rights is "nothing but meaningless phrases", said Bebel. "Anyone who can take in a whole socialist faction with these phrases is certainly a statesman," said Bebel, amid general laughter from the Party Congress, "but those who let themselves be taken in are anything but statesmen." This is a home thrust at all the opportunists in the socialist movement who let themselves be taken in by the National Liberals in Germany and the Cadets in Russia. "Negators," said Bebel, "often achieve far more than those who stand for so-called positive work. Sharp criticism, sharp opposition always falls on fertile ground if this criticism is just, as ours unquestionably is."

The opportunist phrases about positive work mean in many cases working *for the liberals*, in general working for others, who hold the reins of power, who set the course of the given state, society, community. And Bebel drew this conclusion frankly, declaring that "in our Party there are no few National Liberals of this kind, pursuing a National-Liberal policy". As an example he mentioned *Bloch*, the well-known editor of the so-called (*so-called* is Bebel's word) *Socialist Monthly* (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*). "National Liberals have no place in our Party," declared Bebel outright, to the general approval of the Congress.

Look at the list of contributors to the *Socialist Monthly*. You will find there *all* the representatives of international opportunism. They cannot find praise high enough for the behaviour of our liquidators. Are there not two worlds of ideas here when the leader of the German Social-Democrats calls the editor of this journal a National Liberal?

Opportunists throughout the world favour the policy of a bloc with the liberals, now openly and outrightly proclaiming and implementing it, now advocating or justifying election agreements with the liberals, support of their slogans, etc. Bebel has time and again exposed the sheer falsity, the sheer mendacity of this policy, and we can say without exaggeration that every Social-Democrat should know and remember his words.

"If I, as a Social-Democrat, enter into an alliance with bourgeois parties, it is a thousand to one that the bourgeois parties will gain by it, not the Social-Democrats. We shall be the losers. It is a *polit-*

cal law, that wherever the Rights and Lefts enter an alliance, the Lefts lose, the Rights win....

"If I enter into a political alliance with a party whose *principles* are hostile to mine, I must of necessity modify my tactics, i.e., my methods of struggle, in order not to break this alliance. I can no longer criticise ruthlessly, I cannot fight for principles, because this would give offence to my allies; I have to keep quiet, cover up a lot of things, make excuses for the inexcusable, gloss over matters that cannot be glossed over."

Opportunism is opportunism for the very reason that it sacrifices the *fundamental* interests of the movement to momentary advantages or considerations based on the most short-sighted, superficial calculations. Frank pathetically declared in Magdeburg that the ministers in Baden "want us, Social-Democrats, to work together with them"!

We must look not above but below, we said during the revolution to our opportunists who were repeatedly led astray by various prospects held out by the Cadets. Bebel, with the Franks arrayed before him, said in his closing remarks at Magdeburg: "The masses cannot understand that there are Social-Democrats who support with a vote of confidence a government which the masses would much prefer to do away with altogether. I often get the impression that a section of our leaders has ceased to understand the sufferings and afflictions of the masses (*thunderous applause*), that the position of the masses has become alien to them." Yet "all over Germany an enormous resentment has accumulated among the masses".

"We are living through a time," said Bebel in another part of his speech, "when rotten compromises are particularly impermissible. Class contradictions are not subsiding, but growing more acute. We are on the threshold of very, very grave times. What will happen after the forthcoming elections? We shall wait and see. If matters come to the outbreak of a European war in 1912 you will see what we are in for, where we shall have to take our stand. It will probably not be where the Badenites are standing today."

While some people are becoming smugly content with the state of affairs which has become customary in Germany, Bebel himself turns all his attention to the inevitable change which is impending and advises that the Party's

attention should be turned to it. "All our experiences so far have been skirmishes at the outposts, mere trifles," said Bebel in his closing remarks. The main struggle lies ahead. And from the standpoint of this main struggle, the whole tactics of the opportunists are the height of spinelessness and short-sightedness.

Bebel only speaks in hints about the coming struggle. Never once does he say outright that revolution is impending in Germany, although such, undoubtedly, is the idea in his mind—all his references to the aggravation of contradictions, the difficulty of reforms in Prussia, the inextricable position of the government and the classes in command, the growth of resentment among the masses, the danger of a European war, the intensification of the economic yoke as a result of the high cost of living, the amalgamation of the capitalists in trusts and cartels, etc., etc.—all are clearly intended to open the eyes of the Party and the masses to the inevitability of a revolutionary struggle.

Why is Bebel so cautious? Why does he confine himself to pointed references? Because the maturing revolution in Germany encounters a special, peculiar political situation that does not resemble other pre-revolutionary periods in other countries and for that reason requires from the leaders of the proletariat the solution of a somewhat *new* problem. The chief feature of this peculiar pre-revolutionary situation consists in the fact that the coming revolution must inevitably be incomparably more profound, more radical, drawing far broader masses into a more difficult, stubborn and prolonged struggle than all previous revolutions. Yet at the same time this pre-revolutionary situation is marked by the greater (in comparison with anything hitherto) domination of *legality*, which has become an obstacle to those who introduced it. There lies the peculiarity of the situation, there lies the difficulty and novelty of the problem.

The irony of history has brought it about that the ruling classes of Germany, who have created the strongest state known in the whole second half of the nineteenth century, who have consolidated conditions for the most rapid capitalist progress and conditions for the most stable constitutional legality, are now most unmistakably coming to a

point when this legality, *their* legality, *will have to be* shattered—so that the domination of the bourgeoisie may be preserved.

For about half a century the German Social-Democratic Labour Party has made exemplary use of bourgeois legality, having created the best proletarian organisations, a magnificent press, having raised to the highest pitch (that is possible under capitalism) the class-consciousness and solidarity of the proletarian socialist vanguard.

Now the time is drawing near when this half-century phase of German history *must*, by force of objective causes, be replaced by a different phase. The era of utilising the legality created by the bourgeoisie is *giving way* to an era of tremendous revolutionary battles, and these battles, *in effect*, will be the destruction of *all* bourgeois legality, the whole bourgeois system, *while in form* they must begin (and are beginning) with panicky efforts on the part of the bourgeoisie to get rid of the legality which, though it is their own handiwork, has become unbearable to them! "You shoot first, Messieurs the Bourgeoisie!"—with these words, spoken in 1892, Engels summed up the peculiarity of the position and the peculiarity of the tactical problems of the revolutionary proletariat.[123]

The socialist proletariat will not forget for a moment that it is confronted, inevitably confronted, with a revolutionary mass struggle that must sweep away all the legalities of the doomed bourgeois society. But, at the same time, a party which has magnificently utilised a half-century of bourgeois legality *against* the bourgeoisie has not the slightest reason to renounce those conveniences in the struggle, that advantage in battle afforded by the fact that *the enemy is caught in the toils* of his own legality, that the enemy is compelled to "shoot first", is compelled to shatter his own legality.

There lies the peculiarity of the pre-revolutionary situation in modern Germany. That is why old Bebel is so cautious, fixing all his attention on the great struggle which is to come, exerting all the power of his vast talent, his experience and authority against the short-sighted, spineless opportunists, who do not understand this struggle, who are not fit to lead it, who during the revolution will

probably find themselves degraded from the *leaders* to the *led* or even cast aside.

In Magdeburg these leaders were remonstrated with, they were censured, they were given an official ultimatum as the representatives of all that was unreliable that had accumulated in the great revolutionary army, of all that was weak, infected with bourgeois legality and stupefied by pious prostrations before this legality, before all the limitations of what is *one* of the eras of slavery, i.e., one of the eras of bourgeois supremacy. In condemning the opportunists, threatening them with expulsion, the German proletariat thereby expressed its condemnation of all the elements in its mighty organisation personifying stagnation, diffidence, flabbiness and inability to break with the psychology of moribund bourgeois society. In condemning the bad revolutionaries in its own ranks the vanguard class held one of the last reviews of its forces before entering upon the path of social revolution.

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While the attention of all revolutionary Social-Democrats throughout the world was concentrated on seeing how the German workers were preparing for action, selecting the moment for action, keeping a watchful eye on the enemy and *purging* themselves of the weaknesses of opportunism—the opportunists throughout the world were gloating over the differences which had arisen between Luxemburg and Kautsky in their estimate of the present situation, on the question whether one of those turning-points like the Ninth of January in the Russian revolution was due now *or not just yet*, this very minute *or the next*. The opportunists gloated. They did their utmost to make a burning issue of these differences, which were not of prime importance, in the columns of *Socialist Monthly*, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Martynov), *Zhizn*, *Vozrozhdeniye* and suchlike liquidationist papers and *Neue Zeit* (Martov)*. The shabbiness of these methods of the opportunists in all coun-

* In *Neue Zeit* Martov was met with an emphatic rebuke from Comrade Karsky.

tries was indelibly registered in Magdeburg, where differences of opinion among the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Germany did not play any appreciable role. The opportunists however gloated too soon. The Magdeburg Congress *adopted* the first part of the resolution proposed by *Rosa Luxemburg*, in which there is direct reference to the mass strike as a means of struggle.

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THE DEMONSTRATION ON THE DEATH OF MUROMTSEV

A COMMENT

"This Duma," writes the Cadet newspaper *Rech* about the first sitting of the fourth session of the Black-Hundred Duma, "has today divorced itself finally and irrevocably from popular feeling and the national conscience." This is said, of course, with reference to the refusal of the Black-Hundred and Octobrist deputies to honour the memory of Muromtsev, who presided over the First Duma.

It would be difficult to express more conspicuously than in the phrase quoted above the utter falsity of that point of view which our liberals take towards the struggle for freedom in general and the demonstration on the death of Muromtsev in particular.

There is no doubt that a demonstration against the tsarist government, against the autocracy, against the Black-Hundred Duma was called for on the occasion of Muromtsev's death, that a demonstration did take place, that the most diverse and broadest sections of the population took part in it, the most diverse parties extending from the Social-Democrats to the Cadets, "progressists" and Polish Octobrists (the Polish *Kolo*[124]). Nor is there any doubt that the Cadets' appraisal of this demonstration shows for the hundredth and thousandth time how alien they are to democracy, how *ruinous* to the cause of democracy in Russia it is for our Cadets to have the conduct of this cause or even to play a leading part in it.

All democrats and all liberals took part and had necessarily to take part in the demonstration on the death of Muromtsev, for in the darkness of the regime of the Black-

Hundred Duma such a demonstration afforded an opportunity to express openly and on a comparatively broad scale a *protest* against the autocracy. The tsarist autocracy waged a desperate struggle against the introduction of representative institutions in Russia. The autocracy gerrymandered and distorted the convocation of the first parliament in Russia, when the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry compelled it by mass struggle to convoke this assembly. The autocracy cynically flouted and rode roughshod over democracy and the people, *insofar as* the voice of the people, the voice of democracy, resounded in the First Duma. Now the autocracy is persecuting even the recollection of this feeble expression of the demands of democracy in the First Duma (the expression of these demands was much feebler, poorer, narrower, less lively during the First Duma and from the rostrum of the First Duma than in the autumn of 1905 from the rostrums which were created by the wave of open mass struggle).

That is why democracy and liberalism could and had to come together in a demonstration of protest against the autocracy on any occasion that put the masses in mind of the revolution. But, coming together in a common demonstration, they *could not but* express *their* attitude both to the appraisal of the aims of democracy in general and to the history of the First Duma in particular. And the first approach to such an appraisal brought out the insufferable threadbareness, political impotence and political ineptitude of our bourgeois liberalism.

Just think: the Black-Hundred Duma has "today", October 15, 1910, "divorced itself finally and irrevocably" from the people! That is to say, hitherto it was not divorced from them irrevocably. That is to say, participation in honouring the memory of Muromtsev would have remedied, could have remedied the "divorcement" from "popular feeling", i.e., the divorcement of various of our counter-revolutionaries from democracy. Understand, gentlemen, you who lay claim to the lofty title of democrats, that you yourselves, more than anyone else, are detracting from the significance of the demonstration, making it cheap, when you put the question in such a light. "Even putting the lowest moral and political value on the Third Duma," says *Rech*, "it seemed

absurd to think that it would be capable of declining this elementary duty of honouring from the tribune the name of the man who so worthily and brilliantly inaugurated it [!!] and sanctified it." A fine tribute, indeed! Muromtsev inaugurated and sanctified "it", the Third Duma! Inadvertently the Cadets have blurted out the bitter truth that the betrayal of the revolutionary struggle and of the insurrection at the end of 1905 by Russian liberalism and the Russian bourgeoisie "inaugurated and sanctified" the era of counter-revolution in general and the Third Duma in particular. "It was believed," says *Rech*, "that a handful of political rowdies would not be able to stifle the voice of common decency and tact in the Duma majority." So! It was a matter of "common decency and tact", not of protesting against the autocracy. The question is put in the aspect not of democracy "*divorcing itself*" from the counter-revolution but of liberalism *joining forces* with the counter-revolution. Here liberalism is seeking common ground with the counter-revolution, inviting its representatives, the Octobrists, to join them in honouring the memory of Muromtsev not as an expression of protest against the autocracy, but for the observance of "common decency and tact". Muromtsev "inaugurated and sanctified" (such vile words do exist!) the first pseudo-parliament convened by the tsar; you Octobrist gentlemen have seats in the third pseudo-parliament convened by the tsar—will it not be "indecent and tactless" to refuse to fulfil "an elementary duty"? How excellently this quite trivial instance, this one sentiment alone expressed by the Cadets' official organ, reflects the ideological and political rottenness of liberalism in our country. Its policy is to *persuade* the autocracy, the Black-Hundred landlords and their allies, the Octobrists, and not to develop the *democratic* consciousness of the masses. Therefore, its portion —the inevitable and unescapable portion of such bourgeois liberalism in any bourgeois-democratic revolution—is to remain for ever the slave of the monarchy and the feudal lords, for ever to be the recipient of kicks from their jackboots .

If the Cadet deputies had a particle of understanding of the aims of democracy their concern in the Third Duma would have been not for the performance of an "elementary

duty" by the *Octobrists* but for a demonstration before the *people*. What was required for this was not the presentation of a statement to the Chairman (the reading of such a statement, according to Clause 120 of the standing orders, is at the discretion of the Chairman), but to have had the question brought up for discussion in one way or another.

If the Cadet writers had even a particle of understanding of the aims of democracy they would not have reproached the Octobrists with lack of tact but would have explained that it is the behaviour of the Third Duma that underlines the significance of the demonstration on the death of Muromtsev, and raises the question from *conventional* philistine chatter about "decency and tact" to the higher plane of a *political* appraisal of the present regime and the role of the different parties.

But the demonstration on the death of Muromtsev could not fail to raise another question, namely, the question of the historical significance of the First Duma. Needless to say, the Cadets, who had the majority in it and at that time entertained high hopes of a Cadet Cabinet, of a "peaceful" transition to freedom, and the consolidation of their hegemony in the democratic camp, are praising Muromtsev to the skies as a "national hero". The Trudoviks, in the person of Mr. Zhilkin, sank so low that they added their voices to this liberal chorus and openly honoured Muromtsev as the political "educator" of the Left parties.

Such an appraisal of the First Duma coming from the Cadets and the Trudoviks is important as an indication of the extremely low political level of Russian "society". A "society" that is enraptured by the political role of the Cadets in the First Duma has no right to complain of Stolypin or the Third Duma: it has the very government that it deserves. The hegemony of liberalism in the Russian movement for emancipation inevitably implies the weakness of this movement and the impregnability of the dominance of the die-hard landlords. Only the brushing aside of the liberals by the proletariat and the hegemony of the latter have *afforded* victories for the revolution and *can* give more of them in the future.

The period of the First Duma was a time when the proletariat was mustering forces for a new offensive after its de-

feat in December. Revolutionary strike action, which had weakened after December, again raised its head mightily; the peasants fell into line behind the workers (in the spring of 1906 peasant unrest spread over 46 per cent of the uyezds of European Russia); soldiers' "mutinies" increased. The bourgeois liberals were faced with a dilemma: to assist the new *revolutionary* offensive of the masses, and then victory over tsarism would have been possible—or to turn away from the revolution and thereby facilitate the victory of tsarism. A new upsurge of mass struggle, new vacillations of the bourgeoisie, tsarism irresolute and playing a waiting game—such was the *essence* of the First Duma period, such was the *class basis* of this phase in Russian history.

The Cadets as the dominating party in the First Duma and Muromtsev, as one of the leaders of this party, betrayed an utter incomprehension of the political situation and committed a new betrayal of democracy. They turned aside from the revolution, condemned mass struggle, put every possible obstacle in its path and tried to take advantage of the irresolution of the tsarist government, holding up the bogey of revolution and demanding a deal (=a Cadet Cabinet) *in the name* of the revolution. It is clear that such tactics were a *betrayal* as regards democracy, and as regards tsarism they were impotent, pseudo-"constitutional" braggadocio. It is clear that tsarism was only playing for time to concentrate its forces, "*playing*" at negotiations with the Cadets while *preparing* to dissolve the Duma and stage a coup d'état. The proletariat and a section of the peasantry launched a new struggle in the spring of 1906—their fault or their misfortune was that they did not fight resolutely enough or in sufficient numbers. In the spring of 1906 the liberals were absorbed in playing at constitution-making and negotiating with Trepov, decrying those, and obstructing the cause of those, who alone could have *smashed* the Trepovs.

The bourgeois pharisees are fond of the proverb: "*de mortuis aut bene aut nihil*" (say nothing but good of the dead). The proletariat needs the *truth* about political leaders, whether living or dead, for those who really deserve to be called political leaders do not become dead as regards politics upon their physical demise. To repeat a conventional lie

about Muromtsev is to harm the cause of the proletariat and the cause of democracy and to corrupt the minds of the masses. To speak the bitter truth about the Cadets and those who allowed themselves to be led (and taken in) by the Cadets is to honour all that is great in the first Russian revolution and to promote the success of the second.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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IS THIS THE TURN OF THE TIDE?

The present issue was already set up when we received the St. Petersburg and Moscow newspapers of November 12. However inadequate the information supplied by the legal press, it is evident beyond doubt that in a number of cities there have been students' meetings, demonstrations and street processions with protests against capital punishment and with speeches against the government. The St. Petersburg demonstration of November 11, even according to the information of the quite Octobrist-minded *Russkiye Vedomosti*,[125] drew a gathering of *not less than 10,000 people* on the Nevsky. The same newspaper reports that on the St. Petersburg side "large numbers of workers joined the procession as it passed the People's House. At Tuchkov Bridge the procession came to a halt. The police were quite powerless to stop the procession and the crowd proceeded with songs and flags to the Bolshoi Prospekt on Vasilyevsky Ostrov. Only at the university did the police manage to disperse the crowd."

The police and the troops, of course, behaved in the true-blue Russian way.

While we shall postpone to the next issue our appraisal of this unmistakably democratic upsurge, we cannot abstain from saying a few words about the attitude of the various parties to the demonstration. *Russkiye Vedomosti*, which on the 11th published a *false* report that the demonstration had been called off, reported on the 12th that the Social-Democrats had adopted no decision, while some of their deputies had even expressed their disapproval, and only the Trudoviks in the resolution they adopted considered it impossible to hinder the demonstration. We have no doubt that this report which is so discreditable to our Social-

Democratic deputies, is false; in all probability it is just as much a malicious invention of *Russkiye Vedomosti* as their report of the day before that the demonstration had been called off. *Golos Moskvy*[126] reported on the 12th that "with the exception of the Social-Democrats the deputies of all parties disapprove of the students coming out on the streets"

It is clear that the Cadet and Octobrist newspapers are very widely "swerving from the truth", intimidated by the utterly absurd and ludicrous cries from the Right that "the springs preparing the demonstration are being manipulated from the Taurida Palace".

That the Cadets behaved in an unworthy manner is a fact. On the 11th, the day of the demonstration, *Rech* published a manifesto of the Cadet deputies calling for the demonstration not to be held. The reasons urged both in the manifesto and in *Rech*'s leading article are truly infamous: "not to cast a shadow over" the days of mourning! "to hold manifestations, to associate them with the memory of Tolstoy" is to display "a lack of sincere affection for his sacred memory"!! and so on, in a purely Octobrist spirit (compare the leading article in *Golos Moskvy* on the 11th, with almost identical phrases).

Fortunately the vile spoke thrust in the wheel of democracy by the Cadets had no effect. The demonstration was held just the same. And if the police news-sheet *Rossiya* continues to blame the Cadets for everything, even contriving to detect a note of "incitement" in their manifesto in the Duma, according to *Golos Moskvy*, the Octobrists and the extreme Rights (Shulgin) appreciated the *service* rendered by the Cadets, recognising that they were "opposed to the demonstration".

If there is anyone who has not learned from the entire course of the Russian revolution that the cause of the movement for emancipation in Russia is *hopeless* as long as it is led by the Cadets, as long as he is unable to safeguard himself from the treachery of the Cadets, let him study and learn from the facts of contemporary politics, the history of the demonstration of November 11.

At the first sign of a democratic revival the Cadets begin their dirty games again.

We note also a report in *Golos Moskvy* that the workers' approached the students with a view to holding a grand demonstration on the 14th. There is probably some truth in it, for today (November 15 [28]) the Paris papers report the arrest in St. Petersburg of 13 members of the bureau of trade unions for an *attempt* to organise a workers' demonstration.

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L. N. TOLSTOY

Leo Tolstoy is dead. His universal significance as an artist and his universal fame as a thinker and preacher reflect, each in its own way, the universal significance of the Russian revolution.

L. N. Tolstoy emerged as a great artist when serfdom still held sway in the land. In a series of great works, which he produced during the more than half a century of his literary activity, he depicted mainly the old, pre-revolutionary Russia which remained in a state of semi-serfdom even after 1861—rural Russia of the landlord and the peasant. In depicting this period in Russia's history, Tolstoy succeeded in raising so many great problems and succeeded in rising to such heights of artistic power that his works rank among the greatest in world literature. The epoch of preparation for revolution in one of the countries under the heel of the serf-owners became, thanks to its brilliant illumination by Tolstoy, a step forward in the artistic development of humanity as a whole.

Tolstoy the artist is known to an infinitesimal minority even in Russia. If his great works are really to be made the possession of *all*, a struggle must be waged against the system of society which condemns millions and scores of millions to ignorance, benightedness, drudgery and poverty—a socialist revolution must be accomplished.

Tolstoy not only produced artistic works which will always be appreciated and read by the masses, once they have created human conditions of life for themselves after overthrowing the yoke of the landlords and capitalists; he succeeded in conveying with remarkable force the moods of the large masses that are oppressed by the present system, in depicting their condition and expressing their spontaneous

feelings of protest and anger. Belonging, as he did, primarily to the era of 1861-1904, Tolstoy in his works—both as an artist and as a thinker and preacher—embodied in amazingly bold relief the specific historical features of the entire first Russian revolution, its strength and its weakness.

One of the principal distinguishing features of our revolution is that it was a *peasant* bourgeois revolution in the era of the very advanced development of capitalism throughout the world and of its comparatively advanced development in Russia. It was a bourgeois revolution because its immediate aim was to overthrow the tsarist autocracy, the tsarist monarchy, and to abolish landlordism, but not to overthrow the domination of the bourgeoisie. The peasantry in particular was not aware of the latter aim, it was not aware of the distinction between this aim and the closer and more immediate aims of the struggle. It was a peasant bourgeois revolution because the objective conditions put in the forefront the problem of changing the basic conditions of life for the peasantry, of breaking up the old, medieval system of landownership, of "clearing the ground" for capitalism; the objective conditions were responsible for the appearance of the peasant masses on the arena of more or less independent historic action.

Tolstoy's works express both the strength and the weakness, the might and the limitations, precisely of the peasant mass movement. His heated, passionate, and often ruthlessly sharp protest against the state and the official church that was in alliance with the police conveys the sentiments of the primitive peasant democratic masses, among whom centuries of serfdom of official tyranny and robbery, and of church Jesuitism, deception and chicanery had piled up mountains of anger and hatred. His unbending opposition to private property in land conveys the psychology of the peasant masses during that historical period in which the old, medieval landownership, both in the form of landed estates and in the form of state "allotments", definitely became an intolerable obstacle to the further development of the country, and when this old landownership was inevitably bound to be destroyed most summarily and ruthlessly. His unremitting accusations against capitalism—accusations permeated with most profound emotion and most

ardent indignation—convey all the horror felt by the patriarchal peasant at the advent of the new, invisible, incomprehensible enemy coming from somewhere in the cities, or from somewhere abroad, destroying all the "pillars" of rural life, bringing in its train unprecedented ruin, poverty, starvation, savagery, prostitution, syphilis—all the calamities attending the "epoch of primitive accumulation", aggravated a hundredfold by the transplantation into Russian soil of the most modern methods of plunder elaborated by the all powerful Monsieur Coupon.[127]

But the vehement protestant, the passionate accuser, the great critic at the same time manifested in his works a failure to understand the causes of the crisis threatening Russia, and the means of escape from it, that was characteristic only of a patriarchal naïve peasant, but not of a writer with a European education. His struggle against the feudal police state, against the monarchy turned into a repudiation of politics, led to the doctrine of "non-resistance to evil", and to complete aloofness from the revolutionary struggle of the masses in 1905-07. The fight against the official church was combined with the preaching of a new, purified religion, that is to say, of a new, refined, subtle poison for the oppressed masses. The opposition to private property in land did not lead to concentrating the struggle against the real enemy—landlordism and its political instrument of power, i.e., the monarchy—but led to dreamy, diffuse and impotent lamentations. The exposure of capitalism and of the calamities it inflicts on the masses was combined with a wholly apathetic attitude to the world-wide struggle for emancipation waged by the international socialist proletariat.

The contradictions in Tolstoy's views are not contradictions inherent in his personal views alone, but are a reflection of the extremely complex, contradictory conditions, social influences and historical traditions which determined the psychology of various classes and various sections of Russian society in the *post*-Reform, but *pre*-revolutionary era.

That is why a correct appraisal of Tolstoy can be made only from the viewpoint of the class which has proved, by its political role and its struggle during the first denouement of these contradictions, at a time of revolution, that it is destined to be the leader in the struggle for the people's

liberty and for the emancipation of the masses from exploitation—the class which has proved its selfless devotion to the cause of democracy and its ability to fight against the limitations and inconsistency of bourgeois (including peasant) democracy; such an appraisal is possible only from the viewpoint of the Social-Democratic proletariat.

Look at the estimate of Tolstoy in the government newspapers. They shed crocodile tears, professing their respect for "the great writer" and at the same time defending the "Holy" Synod. As for the holy fathers, they have just perpetrated a particularly vile iniquity; they sent priests to the dying man in order to hoodwink the people and say that Tolstoy had "repented". The Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy. So much the better. It will be reminded of this exploit when the hour comes for the people to settle accounts with the officials in cassocks, the gendarmes in Christ, the sinister inquisitors who supported anti-Jewish pogroms and other exploits of the Black-Hundred tsarist gang.

Look at the estimate of Tolstoy in the liberal newspapers. They confine themselves to those hollow, official-liberal, hackneyed professorial phrases about the "voice of civilised mankind", "the unanimous response of the world", the "ideas of truth, good", etc., for which Tolstoy so castigated—and justly castigated—bourgeois science. They *cannot* voice plainly and clearly their opinion of Tolstoy's views on the state, the church, private property in land, capitalism—not because they are prevented by the censorship; on the contrary, the censorship is helping them out of an embarrassing position!—but because each proposition in Tolstoy's criticism is a slap in the face of bourgeois liberalism; because the very way in which Tolstoy fearlessly, frankly and ruthlessly *poses* the sorest and most vexatious problems of our day is a *rebuff* to the commonplace phrases, trite quirks and evasive, "civilised" falsehoods of our liberal (and liberal-Narodnik) publicists. The liberals are all for Tolstoy, they are all against the Synod—and at the same time, they are for ... the Vekhists, with whom "it is possible to disagree", but with whom it is "necessary" to live in harmony in one party, with whom it is "necessary" to work together in literature and politics. And yet the Vekhists are greeted with kisses by Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia.

The liberals put in the forefront that Tolstoy is "the great conscience". Is not this a hollow phrase which is repeated in a thousand variations both by *Novoye Vremya* and by all such newspapers? Is this not an evasion of the *concrete* problems of democracy and socialism which Tolstoy *posed*? Is this not to put in the forefront the feature that expresses Tolstoy's prejudice, not his intellect, the part of him that belongs to the past and not to the future, his repudiation of politics and his preaching of moral self-perfection, but not his vehement protest against all class domination?

Tolstoy is dead, and the pre-revolutionary Russia whose weakness and impotence found their expression in the philosophy and are depicted in the works of the great artist, has become a thing of the past. But the heritage which he has left includes that which has not become a thing of the past, but belongs to the future. This heritage is accepted and is being worked upon by the Russian proletariat. The Russian proletariat will explain to the masses of the toilers and the exploited the meaning of Tolstoy's criticism of the state, the church, private property in land—not in order that the masses should confine themselves to self-perfection and yearning for a godly life, but in order that they should rise to strike a new blow at the tsarist monarchy and landlordism, which were but slightly damaged in 1905, and which must be destroyed. The Russian proletariat will explain to the masses Tolstoy's criticism of capitalism—not in order that the masses should confine themselves to hurling imprecations at capital and the rule of money, but in order that they should learn to utilise at every step in their life and in their struggle the technical and social achievements of capitalism, that they should learn to weld themselves into a united army of millions of socialist fighters who will overthrow capitalism and create a new society in which the people will not be doomed to poverty, in which there will be no exploitation of man by man.

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TO THE COMRADES STUDYING AT THE SCHOOL IN BOLOGNA[128]

Dear Comrades,

I cannot agree to your proposal that I should undertake to read lectures in Bologna, firstly, on grounds of principle and secondly, because it is impossible for me to come to Bologna.

Both the trend and the methods of the group which has organised the school on the island of Capri and in Bologna I consider harmful to the Party and un-Social-Democratic.

The "platform" put forward by the organisers of the Capri school and a section (true, a minority) of their pupils, consists of a defence of digressions from Marxism in philosophy, in politics, and in the definition of the tactical aims of our Party. Moreover, the organisation of the school at Bologna contradicts both this "platform" and the pro-Party principle, because the organisers are acting schismatically, not only giving no assistance (whether in money they possess, or in personal service) to the school commission which was appointed by the plenum of the Central Committee in January 1910, but directly sabotaging all the initiatives taken by this commission.

Hence it is clear that I can take no part in anything undertaken by this anti-Party group which is divorcing itself from the principles of Social-Democracy.

But I should have great pleasure, of course, in giving the *students* of the Bologna school, irrespective of their views or sympathies, a series of lectures on tactics, on the situation of the Party and on the agrarian question. With this in mind I take the liberty of inviting the student comrades to come to Paris on their way back. A whole series of lectures

could be organised there. The travelling expenses could be raised in the following way: 1) The organisers of the Capri school borrowed 500 francs from the Bolsheviks. Now they have money and will probably repay their debt to the Party, i.e., to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad. I, on my part, am prepared to make efforts to get this money allocated to cover the expenses of the journey from Bologna to Paris and I think that the Bolshevik whom we have delegated to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad will do everything in his power to help. 2) If 500 francs will not be enough (I do not know how many students there are at Bologna and how many could make the journey), there is another 1,500 francs that the plenum of the C.C. assigned for the school commission with which the organisers of the Bologna school broke off connections. I think it would be possible to get this money assigned for a course of lectures in Paris for students who might wish to come over from Bologna.

Paris is big enough for the thing to be arranged there quite secretly (there are districts where there are no Russians at all), moreover, it could be arranged somewhere in the outlying suburbs.

In closing I express my thanks to the students at Bologna for their comradely invitation and hope that my proposal about coming to Paris will be accepted.

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

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L. N. TOLSTOY AND THE MODERN LABOUR MOVEMENT[129]

The Russian workers in practically all the large cities of Russia have already made their response in connection with the death of L. N. Tolstoy and, in one way or another, expressed their attitude to the writer who produced a number of most remarkable works of art that put him in the ranks of the great writers of the world, and to the thinker who with immense power, self-confidence and sincerity raised a number of questions concerning the basic features of the modern political and social system. All in all, this attitude was expressed in the telegram, printed in the newspapers, which was sent by the labour deputies in the Third Duma.[130]

L. Tolstoy began his literary career when serfdom still existed but at a time when it had already obviously come to the end of its days. Tolstoy's main activity falls in that period of Russian history which lies between two of its turning points, 1861 and 1905. Throughout this period traces of serfdom, direct survivals of it, permeated the whole economic (particularly in the countryside) and political life of the country. And at the same time this was a period of the accelerated growth of capitalism from below and its implantation from above.

In what were the survivals of serfdom expressed? Most of all and clearest of all in the fact that in Russia, mainly an agricultural country, agriculture at that time was in the hands of a ruined, impoverished peasantry who were working with antiquated, primitive methods on the old feudal allotments which had been cut in 1861 for the benefit of the landlords. And, on the other hand, agriculture was in the hands of the landlords who in Central Russia culti-

vated the land by the labour, the wooden ploughs, and the horses of the peasants in return for the "cut-off lands", meadows, access to watering-places, etc. To all intents and purposes this was the old feudal system of economy. Throughout this period the political system of Russia was also permeated with feudalism. This is evident from the constitution of the state prior to the first moves to change it in 1905, from the predominant influence of the landed nobility on state affairs and from the unlimited power of the officials, who also for the most part—especially the higher ranks—came from the landed nobility.

After 1861 this old patriarchal Russia began rapidly to disintegrate under the influence of world capitalism. The peasants were starving, dying off, being ruined as never before, fleeing to the towns and abandoning the soil. There was a boom in the construction of railways, mills and factories, thanks to the "cheap labour" of the ruined peasants. Big finance capital was developing in Russia together with large-scale commerce and industry.

It was this rapid, painful, drastic demolition of all the old "pillars" of old Russia that was reflected in the works of Tolstoy the artist, and in the views of Tolstoy the thinker.

Tolstoy had a surpassing knowledge of rural Russia, the mode of life of the landlords and peasants. In his artistic productions he gave descriptions of this life that are numbered among the best productions of world literature. The drastic demolition of all the "old pillars" of rural Russia sharpened his attention, deepened his interest in what was going on around him, and led to a radical change in his whole world outlook. By birth and education Tolstoy belonged to the highest landed nobility in Russia—he broke with all the customary views of this environment and in his later works attacked with fierce criticism all the contemporary state, church, social and economic institutions which were based on enslavement of the masses, on their poverty, on the ruin of the peasants and the petty proprietors in general, on the coercion and hypocrisy which permeated all contemporary life from top to bottom.

Tolstoy's criticism was not new. He said nothing that had not been said long before him both in European and in Russian literature by friends of the working people. But

the uniqueness of Tolstoy's criticism and its historical significance lie in the fact that it expressed, with a power such as is possessed only by artists of genius, the radical change in the views of the broadest masses of the people in the Russia of this period, namely, rural, peasant Russia. For Tolstoy's criticism of contemporary institutions differs from the criticism of the same institutions by representatives of the modern labour movement in the fact that Tolstoy's point of view was that of the patriarchal, naïve peasant, whose psychology Tolstoy introduced into his criticism and his doctrine. Tolstoy's criticism is marked by such emotional power, such passion, convincingness, freshness, sincerity and fearlessness in striving to "go to the roots", to find the real cause of the afflictions of the masses, just because this criticism really expresses a sharp change in the ideas of millions of peasants, who had only just emerged from feudalism into freedom, and saw that this freedom meant new horrors of ruin, death by starvation, a homeless life among the lower strata of the city population, and so on and so forth. Tolstoy mirrored their sentiments so faithfully that he imported their naïveté into his own doctrine, their alienation from political life, their mysticism, their desire to keep aloof from the world, "non-resistance to evil", their impotent imprecations against capitalism and the "power of money". The protest of millions of peasants and their desperation—these were combined in Tolstoy's doctrine.

The representatives of the modern labour movement find that they have plenty to protest against but nothing to despair about. Despair is typical of the classes which are perishing, but the class of wage-workers is growing inevitably, developing and becoming strong in every capitalist society, Russia included. Despair is typical of those who do not understand the causes of evil, see no way out, and are incapable of struggle. The modern industrial proletariat does not belong to the category of such classes.

Nash Put No. 7,
November 28, 1910
Signed: *V. I-in*

Published according to
the text in *Nash Put*

AN OPEN LETTER TO ALL PRO-PARTY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in January 1910, we, as representatives of the Bolshevik faction, dissolved our faction and transferred the money and other property belonging to it to three well-known leaders of the international Social-Democratic movement. This transfer and equally the dissolution of the faction were *conditional* steps. Our conditions for taking these steps are known from our statement at the plenum, a statement adopted by the plenum and published in the very first number of the Central Organ issued after the plenum.

Briefly stated, these conditions were that the other factions (and in the first place the faction of Golosists, i.e., the Mensheviks who published and supported *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*) should carry out their duty *loyally*, i.e., sincerely and fully, namely, (1) the fight against liquidationism and otzovism, which by a unanimously adopted resolution of the plenum were declared to be a sign of bourgeois influence on the proletariat, and (2) the dissolution of their factions.

At the present time, after a *year*'s experience, a year of waiting, we have become completely and finally convinced that neither the Golosists nor the Vperyodists have *fulfilled either* of these two conditions.

The result of this conviction as far as we are concerned was, firstly, the publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and, secondly, the statement about the return of the money and property, a statement we handed recently to the Central Committee on December 5, 1910.

After this declaration the state of affairs in form and substance is as follows. We had *conditionally* handed over all

our property and forces to support the anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist work for the restoration of the Party and its full unity. The violation by the Golosists and Vperyodists of the conditions they had accepted is a violation of our agreement. Cancelling this agreement violated by the liquidators and otzovists, we shall work *as before* for the restoration of the Party and its full unity, for the implementation of an anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist policy, but we must carry out this work *not with those allies* that at the plenum (owing to faith in their promises) were admitted to participation in the Party centres. Since, by general recognition and by repeated statements of delegates of national organisations at the plenum and at other Party meetings, conferences, etc., it is our Bolshevik faction that has always been regarded as bearing the *greatest responsibility* for the state of affairs in the Party, we consider it our duty to set out frankly our views on the state of affairs in the Party and on the significance of the steps we have taken.

The January plenum in 1910 was of very great importance in the history of our Party. It definitively laid down the *tactical line* of the Party for the period of counter-revolution by establishing, in *further development* of the December resolutions of 1908, that both liquidationism and otzovism are manifestations of the influence of the bourgeoisie on the proletariat. Further, the plenum *linked* the question of putting an end to factions in our Party—that is to say, the necessity of bringing about *real* unity in the Social-Democratic Labour Party—with the formulation of the Party's ideological and political aims in the present historical period.

We are convinced that these two things accomplished by the plenum in January 1910 are of *historic* significance and that their results are much more important, much more vital, much more lasting, than they may seem to the superficial observer.

But these results were terribly vitiated by the muddled *phrase-mongering* about them. There is nothing so inimical to the spirit of Social-Democracy and so harmful as *phrase-mongering*. And "conciliatory" *phrase-mongering* is no less harmful and liable to lead people astray than liquidationist

and otzovist phrase-mongering. This "conciliatory" phrase-mongering obscures the *essence* of the matter, substitutes aspirations and good intentions for an estimate of the real tendencies and real relationship of forces in the Party, impedes the *rapprochement* of those who could and should come closer together by attempts at playing at unity with those who at the present time do not want to and cannot unite.

During the year that has elapsed since the January plenum this phrase-mongering has exhausted itself and shown what its fruits are. If now from bitter experience of the heroes of "conciliatory" phrases the Party *learns* the lesson how *not* to set about "conciliation" and the abolition of factions, then the year since the plenum will not have passed in vain.

Phrase-mongering amounted to asserting that it is sufficient to obtain "promises" about the abolition of factions, to compose the central bodies out of the most heterogeneous elements, to "balance" opposed elements, and an important step towards the abolition of factions will have been made.

The year's experience showed, as it could not fail to show, that the phrase-mongers' method was a complete failure. It is impossible to build anything on promises, it is ludicrous to base anything on the union of heterogeneous elements that are incapable of uniting. On the morrow of the plenum everything in its decisions and measures that was based *on phrase-mongering* proved to be a soap-bubble. The decisions, resolutions and artificially composed bodies were all *in fact* a dead letter, lifeless institutions. But what was *real* in the actions of the plenum underwent development, was strengthened, showed its effects in the work, and became clothed in new forms of existence *outside* and *apart from* the resolutions.

It would be difficult to imagine a more striking and instructive lesson than that of the events which took place during the year following the plenum, a lesson offered to those people who had delighted in phrase-mongering, vain good intentions and playing at the allocation of seats in various bodies and so forth.

What was it that was real in the actions of the plenum? What was real was its indication of the *connection* between the ideological and political *content* of Party work and the abolition of factions. What was real was the *rapprochement*

of those factions or trends which came together not on the basis of cheap conciliatory phrases, promises, or playing at the allocation of seats in the central bodies, but *on the basis of work*, agreement in their *understanding* of the ideological and political tasks of the moment, agreement *in actual fact* on the formulation of these tasks, and their accomplishment.

As long as magniloquent and cheap phrases about the abolition of factions were being uttered by people who understood neither the objective source of the disagreements nor the *actual* situation that *in-fact* ensured the independence from the Party of certain literary groups (such as that of Mr. Potresov and Co. or that of the Machist and otzovist literati), for so long the phrases remained empty, impotent phrases. But as soon as, owing to a change in the objective conditions, a rapprochement *in work*, a rapprochement in the *understanding* of these objective conditions, began to grow in the two basic and main factions that have left their imprint on the whole history of the workers' movement during the revolution—even more than that, on the *whole* history of the revolution in Russia—no efforts on the part of intriguers who want to undermine this rapprochement or sow distrust in it can halt the process that has begun.

During the past year the actual state of Party affairs arising after the plenum has become quite clear. It is a fact that the Golosists and Vperyodists *signed* the resolutions on the fight against liquidationism and otzovism but in reality conducted and are conducting *all* their propaganda and agitation, *all* their practical activity, in such a way as to support and defend liquidationism and otzovism.

For anyone who has eyes to see, this fact shows how bankrupt is a policy that is satisfied with paper resolutions and how harmful are phrases that are not in accord with deeds.

Further, it is a fact that neither the Golosists nor the Vperyodists relinquished their factional independence *for a single moment*. Both of these factions continue to exist in the fullest actual *independence* of the Party, with their own funds, their own organs, their own agencies. The factional

organisation of the otzovists takes the form of the so-called "school" abroad (in reality it is an institution for systematic selection of agents and planned conduct of organisational work apart from the Party and against the Party). The "school" is supplemented by a separate publishing house and means of transport. The Golosists' factional organisation is *looser* ("freer", less definite in form), the chief role being played by the group of Mr. Potresov and Co., the group of the Sixteen, and the group of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri and Co., which are absolutely independent of the Party. The Golosists take an active part in these groups, directing all propagandist, agitational and organisational activity against the Party and at the same time not refraining from participation in the Party centres in order systematically to undermine their significance and demoralise them from within.

No pro-Party Social-Democrat can fail to see what such a state of affairs leads to.

As regards publication of literature, the year's experience has shown that the Central Organ is *in point of fact* being conducted by the Bolsheviks *plus* the Plekhanovites *against* the Golosists on the editorial board. Life has overstepped the bounds created by conciliatory phrase-mongering: the "conciliators" by promise, the "conciliators" by office, the "conciliators" by instruction of the liquidationist centres, have proved to be a sheer *hindrance to the work*. Plekhanov and his fellow-thinkers, however, who made no promises at the plenum, and who did not take up any office, proved *actual implementers* of the Party line.

The glaring contradiction between form and substance, between phrases and deeds, between the obviously hypocritical existence of a supposedly pro-Party collegium (the editorial board of the Central Organ) and the actual activity in the Central Organ alongside this collegium brings very great demoralisation into Party life. In order to put a stop to this demoralisation, this degradation of what are formally Party institutions to a role that evokes deserved ridicule and rejoicing on the part of enemies of the Party, we must do away with hypocrisy and frankly say what actually exists, frankly admit the conduct of Party work by *two* factions.

As regards unity abroad, absolutely nothing has been done during the year. Wherever the groups were split

previously they remain split now. The groups of Menshevik liquidators have openly become groups in support of *Golos*. The only rapprochement that has been mapped out and *actually* begun is that between the Bolsheviks and the Plekhanovites. The Central Committee Bureau Abroad, in its capacity as co-ordinator of Social-Democratic work abroad, has become an object of ridicule legitimately mocked at by the Vperyodists and Golosists, who observe with satisfaction how the Party centre acts as a collegium for provocatory affairs and for carrying out bureaucratic paper work that is of no use to anyone.

In the most important sphere, that of organisational work locally in Russia, absolutely nothing of any use to the Party has been accomplished during the year. The Central Committee, which had to *invite* the Mikhails, Romans and Yuris on the basis of the "promises" made to the plenum, zealously set about this thankful task so worthy of a revolutionary of inviting into the Party those who ridicule it and continue to harm it, but even so *after a year* have not succeeded in "inviting" anyone. During this period, however, the anti-Party factions have *strengthened* their organisations against the Party: the *Vperyod* faction has developed and its agency has grown stronger, Mr. Potresov's group has grown stronger, as too have the other liquidationist enterprises, which have continued to carry on propaganda against the Party in a number of clubs, co-operative societies, etc., and to intrigue against the Party among the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The role of the Central Committee, which during this time has been occupied in "inviting" the liquidators or in a *formal correspondenc*e on matters concerning the "squabbles" of the Golosists and Vperyodists, is a role that is positively humiliating and we cannot permit the enemies of the Party to reduce the Central Committee to this role.

Only people quite incapable of thought or desirous of indulging in petty intrigue can still *fail to see* that the continuance of such a state of the Party centres *inevitably* prepares the way for a triumph of the liquidators and otzovists, who observe with satisfaction how the Central Committee has entangled itself, and continues to entangle itself, in conciliatory phrase-mongering, in *playing* at conciliation

with those who do not want to be reconciled with the Party.

The liquidators and otzovists have an excellent understanding of conciliatory phrase-mongering and make excellent use of it against the Party. The hero of such phrases, Trotsky, has quite naturally become the hero and sworn advocate of the liquidators and otzovists, with whom he agrees *on nothing* theoretically but *in everything* practically.

Favoured with the assistance of this advocate, both the liquidators and the otzovists have thoroughly mastered the tactics that consists of incessantly vowing and swearing that they are pro-Party. This is repeated by *Golos* and the platform of the *Vperyod* group, while they continue *in fact* to disrupt the Party and carry out all activities in an anti-Party spirit. Formal and verbal "conciliation" has become a weapon of the *Golos* liquidators and Vperyodists.

It goes without saying that we, as representatives of the Bolshevik trend, cannot play this role of dupes. Having waited a whole year, having done everything possible through the pages of the Central Organ to make clear the anti-Party character of the Vperyodists, Golosists and Trotsky, *we cannot assume responsibility* before the Party for institutions which occupy themselves with "invitations" to the liquidators and formal correspondence on "business" raised by the Vperyodists. We want not squabbles but work.

We desire to work jointly with those who want to work in the Party spirit, and have actually proved their ability to do so, i.e., in the first place with the pro-Party Mensheviks and the really non-factional Social-Democrats. We do not desire to be responsible for squabbles with those who do not want to work jointly with the Party, but want to work with Mr. Potresov and the otzovists.

The state of affairs in Russia is such that intensified and harmonious work is urgently required of the Party organisations abroad. The three-year period of the golden days of the counter-revolution (1908-10) is evidently coming to a close and being replaced by a period of incipient upsurge. The summer strikes of the current year and the demonstrations on the occasion of Tolstoy's death are a clear indication of this. The Party's organisational work in Russia has

become weak in the extreme and this weakness has been most shamelessly utilised by the Vperyodists and Golosists, who are developing their anti-Party activity with the aid of the Russian and foreign factional centres.

Under such conditions to continue playing at conciliation with these factional centres, to close one's eyes hypocritically to their independence, to "invite" their representatives for a joint fight against their own policy, to shield them in the eyes of the Party by accepting their members in the centres—means dooming oneself to hopeless squabbling. It means *putting a brake on* the work of the centres abroad, which even without that has been slowed down to such an extent that during the year it has *not* been possible to arrange a *single* meeting of the Central Committee in Russia, and not only not a single conference, but not even an unofficial meeting of local Party workers (whereas the otzovists' "school" and the liquidators' legal organs repeatedly managed to organise against the Party all sorts of conferences and meetings of agents, correspondents of journals, and so on).

We are obliged to repudiate responsibility for this *complete* stoppage of the work of those who have been entangled in conciliation with the Golosists of these centres and to begin immediately the most energetic independent work in uniting the orthodox Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks and non-factional Social-Democrats for organising meetings, conferences, regional bureaux, groups for connections with Party publications, etc. It is to this work, which alone is *actually* capable of leading the Party out of the impasse and freeing the centres from "courting" the Golosists, that we are calling all pro-Party Social-Democrats.

Even before the plenum, in the spring of 1909, in the name of the Bolshevik faction, we proclaimed the policy of a *rapprochement* with the pro-Party Mensheviks, and since then this policy has borne considerable fruit, *despite* the unsuccessful attempt to trust the "promises" of the Golosists and regard them as pro-Party elements. All that has been done since then to really strengthen not the Vperyodist propaganda nor the Golosist defence of liquidationism but *the line of the Party*, to really bring closer together the basic core of *both* the chief factions, has been done by

us *independently* of these unsuccessful attempts at conciliation with the Golosists. And by divesting ourselves of responsibility for continuing these attempts we are confident that we shall achieve a still closer alignment *in work* through *Rabochaya Gazeta*, through legal literature and through the activity abroad of the groups of supporters of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and supporters of Plekhanov.

After the plenum, which in the most clear-cut way posed the question of factions and their abolition, for the first time raising this question *in connection* with the ideological and political line of the factions themselves, i.e., on the real basis of an estimate of *actual rapprochement in work* and not on the basis of empty promises, formal undertakings and suchlike phrases—after the plenum and a year's experience of its results it is *impossible* to continue the old hypocritical playing at hide-and-seek.

We must act openly. We must have the courage to say what the position is. If the Central Committee desire to tell the Party frankly and openly what the position is, this simple statement will be a tremendously powerful weapon in their hands, a hundred times more weighty than any kind of resolutions, wishes, condemnations, expulsions, etc.

To say what the position is means acknowledging that the attempt to abolish *all* factions has, unfortunately, been frustrated by the Golosists and Vperyodists, *but the rapprochement* of the basic core, of the really pro-Party elements of the two main factions, their closer alignment with the pro-Party elements of the nationals and non-factional Social-Democrats, has made a step forward. If Trotsky and similar advocates of the liquidators and otzovists declare this rapprochement "devoid of political content", such speeches testify only to Trotsky's entire lack of principle, the *real* hostility of his policy to the policy of the *actual* (and not merely confined to promises) abolition of factions. To *promise* this abolition after a year's experience of the results of the plenum is sheer chicanery. But whereas the abolition of factions is a mere phrase, the *rapprochement* of the main trends in the two chief factions is a *fact*. No blocs, no magniloquent pledges, no promises of the disappearance of disagreements, follow from this fact, but what does follow is a *real*

possibility of building the Party *in practice*, based on the co-operation of *part* of the Mensheviks and *part* of the Bolsheviks.

If the Central Committee desires with absolute consistency to adopt the course of such an acknowledgement and such work, if it desires to make all the central bodies the organ of such a rapprochement, to free them completely from unworthy and harmful "courting" of the Golosists or "invitations" to the Golosists, to afford the possibility of working without squabbles, then we shall support this policy with all our heart and soul and all our strength, a policy that *in fact* we have been pursuing since the spring of 1909, i.e., already for two whole years.

If the Central Committee does not want to draw this inevitable conclusion from the lessons of the plenum and its results, then let it hand over the conduct of Party work—and of work for the restoration of unity—to the alliance of the Golosists, Vperyodists and Trotsky. This will be more straightforward and honest, and we shall keep aloof from this alliance which has in actual fact demonstrated its anti-Party character.

We are perfectly aware, of course, that in connection with our step certain people (and among them, assuredly, experienced advocates of the liquidators and otzovists) will cry out about a "split". However stupid and hypocritical such cries may be we must pause to warn uninformed people about these probable objections.

In its formal aspect our step—the demand for the return of money and termination of the agreement that we concluded on very definite conditions—is absolutely legitimate. The conditions of our agreement with the Central Committee were openly stated, printed in the Central Organ and accepted *unanimously* by the Central Committee at the plenum. By accepting these *conditions* in the name of the whole Party and printing them in the Party's Central Organ, the Central Committee thereby unequivocally acknowledged that only *with the fulfilment* in actual fact of these conditions could it demand of us a definite mode of action. No one can deny that these conditions have not been fulfilled by the Golosists

and Vperyodists, in spite of the resolution they signed. Our formal right to *cancel* the agreement is therefore indisputable. By cancelling the agreement we proclaim an independent fight for the Party principle, independent work on building the Party *without those* who have proved by a year's experience their unwillingness to work on this, *together with those* Mensheviks and non-factionalists who have proved the opposite. If the agreement, which was directly and explicitly dependent on the Golosists and Vperyodists coming over to the pro-Party position, has proved to have been violated by *them*, it is our full right and *our duty* to cancel the agreement with people who have flouted the Party, and to seek all possible forms of closer alignment with people who support the Party.

Much more important than the formal aspect, however, is the factual state of affairs. Especially illuminating in *this* respect is the hypocrisy of the Golosists and Vperyodists, who both at the plenum and after it continued to make declarations in the press about their pro-Party attitude. The hypocrisy of such asseverations, the glaring falsity of cries about a split on the part of *such* people, is so obvious that it is not worth wasting many words on it. It was the Golosists and the Vperyodists who created an actual split immediately after the plenum—or rather, who did not cease creating it despite their promises at the plenum; it was they who during the whole year continued this split, intensified it, and supported the *independence* from the Party of the group of Potresov and Co., the group of literati, the organisers of the "Machist" school, etc., etc. To allow such splitters to remain in the Party centres means the utter ruin of the Party's cause. To let the previous position remain, where these splitters took advantage of their presence in the Party centres to put a brake on all work, to *demoralise the Party from within* for the benefit of Mr. Potresov or the leaders of the "Machist" school, means to do tremendous, irreparable damage to the cause of Party unity.

Long ago it was said that not everyone who calls out "Lord, Lord" will enter the kingdom of heaven. And, after the experience of the plenum, we must repeat: not everyone who voices cheap phrases about partyism is really pro-Party. The Golosists and Vperyodists split the Party after the

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NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

plenum. That is a fact. Trotsky was their advocate in this matter. That is also a fact.

There is *no* other way of halting the split, of preventing it from spreading than by strengthening, consolidating and formally confirming the rapprochement of those who *actually* carried out Party activity after the plenum, i.e., the pro-Party Mensheviks and Bolsheviks.

Announcing our view of Party affairs to all pro-Party Mensheviks, non-factional pro-Party Social-Democrats and Bolsheviks, as well as all national Social-Democratic organisations, we invite the Bolshevik groups in Russia to begin immediately to rally around *Rabochaya Gazeta* and to set about preparing those meetings and conferences which are essential for restoring the Party and which, owing to the present state of affairs, must inevitably begin with the most modest, unofficial and informal attempts. To give in print more details about the nature of such attempts would be out of place.

We invite the Bolshevik groups abroad to reorganise themselves in such a way as to cease all connection with the Vperyodists, who have fully proved their anti-Party character, and without the hindrance of these defenders of otzovism to begin systematic work for strengthening the Party, closer alignment with pro-Party elements of other factions and the creation of joint clubs, lectures, reports, etc., to take preparatory steps towards a real union abroad of all those who do not follow *Vperyod* and *Golos*. If the existence of two parallel groups is inevitable where there are Golosists, it is not seemly for Bolsheviks to tolerate any longer in their group the anti-Party Vperyodists. Let them find a refuge among the Golosists.

The Editorial Board of *Rabochaya Gazeta*

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ЗВѢЗДА

Современный Міръ

За ОДИНЪ рубль

Наша задача.

„ДЕЯ"

ЗНАНІЕ

Но нашли...

First page of the newspaper *Zvezda* No. 1, 1910

Reduced

First page of the newspaper Zvezda No. 1, 1910 Reduced

First page of the newspaper Zvezda No. 1, 1910 Reduced

DIFFERENCES IN THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MOVEMENT[131]

I

The principal tactical differences in the present-day-labour movement of Europe and America reduce themselves to a struggle against two big trends that are departing from Marxism, which has in fact become the dominant theory in this movement. These two trends are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism). Both these departures from the Marxist theory and Marxist tactics that are dominant in the labour movement were to be observed in various forms and in various shades in all civilised countries during the more than half-century of history of the mass labour movement.

This fact alone shows that these departures cannot be attributed to accident, or to the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even to the influence of national characteristics and traditions, and so forth. There must be deep-rooted causes in the economic system and in the character of the development of all capitalist countries which constantly give rise to these departures. A small book, *The Tactical Differences in the Labour Movement* (*Die taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung*, Hamburg, Erdmann Dubber, 1909), published last year by a Dutch Marxist, Anton Pannekoek, represents an interesting attempt at a scientific investigation of these causes. In our exposition we shall acquaint the reader with Pannekoek's conclusions, which, it must be recognised, are quite correct.

One of the most profound causes that periodically give rise to differences over tactics is the very growth of the

labour movement. If this movement is not measured by the criterion of some fantastic ideal, but is regarded as the practical movement of ordinary people, it will be clear that the enlistment of larger and larger numbers of new "recruits", the attraction of new sections of the working people must inevitably be accompanied by waverings in the sphere of theory and tactics, by repetitions of old mistakes, by a temporary reversion to antiquated views and antiquated methods, and so forth. The labour movement of every country periodically spends a varying amount of energy, attention and time on the "training" of recruits.

Furthermore, the rate at which capitalism develops varies in different countries and in different spheres of the national economy. Marxism is most easily, rapidly, completely and lastingly assimilated by the working class and its ideologists where large-scale industry is most developed. Economic relations which are backward, or which lag in their development, constantly lead to the appearance of supporters of the labour movement who assimilate only certain aspects of Marxism, only certain parts of the new world outlook, or individual slogans and demands, being unable to make a determined break with all the traditions of the bourgeois world outlook in general and the bourgeois-democratic world outlook in particular.

Again, a constant source of differences is the dialectical nature of social development, which proceeds in contradictions and through contradictions. Capitalism is progressive because it destroys the old methods of production and develops productive forces, yet at the same time, at a certain stage of development, it retards the growth of productive forces. It develops, organises, and disciplines the workers—and it crushes, oppresses, leads to degeneration, poverty, etc. Capitalism creates its own grave-digger, itself creates the elements of a new system, yet, at the same time, without a "leap" these individual elements change nothing in the general state of affairs and do not affect the rule of capital. It is Marxism, the theory of dialectical materialism, that is able to encompass these contradictions of living reality, of the living history of capitalism and the working-class movement. But, needless to say, the masses learn from life and not from books, and therefore certain individuals or groups

constantly exaggerate, elevate to a one-sided theory, to a one-sided system of tactics, now one and now another feature of capitalist development, now one and now another "lesson" of this development.

Bourgeois ideologists, liberals and democrats, not understanding Marxism, and not understanding the modern labour movement, are constantly jumping from one futile extreme to another. At one time they explain the whole matter by asserting that evil-minded persons "incite" class against class—at another they console themselves with the idea that the workers' party is "a peaceful party of reform". Both anarcho-syndicalism and reformism must be regarded as a direct product of this bourgeois world outlook and its influence. They seize upon *one* aspect of the labour movement, elevate one-sidedness to a theory; and declare mutually exclusive those tendencies or features of this movement that are a specific peculiarity of a given period, of given conditions of working-class activity. But real life, real history, *includes* these different tendencies, just as life and development in nature include both slow evolution and rapid leaps, breaks in continuity.

The revisionists regard as phrase-mongering all arguments about "leaps" and about the working-class movement being antagonistic in principle to the whole of the old society. They regard reforms as a partial realisation of socialism. The anarcho-syndicalists reject "petty work", especially the utilisation of the parliamentary platform. In practice, the latter tactics amount to waiting for "great days" along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events. Both of them hinder the thing that is most important and most urgent, namely, to unite the workers in big, powerful and properly functioning organisations, capable of functioning well under *all* circumstances, permeated with the spirit of the class struggle, clearly realising their aims and trained in the true Marxist world outlook.

We shall here permit ourselves a slight digression and note in parenthesis, so as to avoid possible misunderstandings, that Pannekoek illustrates his analysis *exclusively* by examples taken from West-European history, especially the history of Germany and France, not referring to Russia *at all*. If at times it seems that he is alluding to Russia, it is

only because the basic tendencies which give rise to definite departures from Marxist tactics are to be observed in our country too, despite the vast difference between Russia and the West in culture, everyday life, and historical and economic development.

Finally, an extremely important cause of differences among those taking part in the labour movement lies in changes in the tactics of the ruling classes in general and of the bourgeoisie in particular. If the tactics of the bourgeoisie were always uniform, or at least of the same kind, the working class would rapidly learn to reply to them by tactics just as uniform or of the same kind. But, as a matter of fact, in every country the bourgeoisie inevitably devises two systems of rule, two methods of fighting for its interests and of maintaining its domination, and these methods at times succeed each other and at times are interwoven in various combinations. The first of these is the method of force, the method which rejects all concessions to the labour movement, the method of supporting all the old and obsolete institutions, the method of irreconcilably rejecting reforms. Such is the nature of the conservative policy which in Western Europe is becoming less and less a policy of the landowning classes and more and more one of the varieties of bourgeois policy in general. The second is the method of "liberalism", of steps towards the development of political rights, towards reforms, concessions, and so forth.

The bourgeoisie passes from one method to the other not because of the malicious intent of individuals, and not accidentally, but owing to the fundamentally contradictory nature of its own position. Normal capitalist society cannot develop successfully without a firmly established representative system and without certain political rights for the population, which is bound to be distinguished by its relatively high "cultural" demands. These demands for a certain minimum of culture are created by the conditions of the capitalist mode of production itself, with its high technique, complexity, flexibility, mobility, rapid development of world competition, and so forth. In consequence, vacillations in the tactics of the bourgeoisie, transitions from the system of force to the system of apparent concessions have been characteristic of the history of all European countries

during the last half-century, the various countries developing primarily the application of the one method or the other at definite periods. For instance, in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century Britain was the classical country of "liberal" bourgeois policy, Germany in the seventies and eighties adhered to the method of force, and so on.

When this method prevailed in Germany, a one-sided echo of this particular system of bourgeois government was the growth of anarcho-syndicalism, or anarchism, as it was then called, in the labour movement (the "Young" at the beginning of the nineties,[132] Johann Most at the beginning of the eighties[133]). When in 1890 the change to "concessions" took place, this change, as is always the case, proved to be even more dangerous to the labour movement, and gave rise to an equally one-sided echo of bourgeois "reformism": opportunism in the labour movement. "The positive, real aim of the liberal policy of the bourgeoisie," Pannekoek says, "is to mislead the workers, to cause a split in their ranks, to convert their policy into an impotent adjunct of an impotent, always impotent and ephemeral, sham reformism."

Not infrequently, the bourgeoisie for a certain time achieves its object by a "liberal" policy, which, as Pannekoek justly remarks, is a "more crafty" policy. A part of the workers and a part of their representatives at times allow themselves to be deceived by seeming concessions. The revisionists declare that the doctrine of the class struggle is "antiquated", or begin to conduct a policy which is in fact a renunciation of the class struggle. The zigzags of bourgeois tactics intensify revisionism within the labour movement and not infrequently bring the differences within the labour movement to the point of an outright split.

All causes of the kind indicated give rise to differences over tactics within the labour movement and within the proletarian ranks. But there is not and cannot be a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the sections of the petty bourgeoisie in contact with it, including the peasantry. It is clear that the passing of certain individuals, groups and sections of the petty bourgeoisie into the ranks of the proletariat is bound, in its turn, to give rise to vacillations in the tactics of the latter.

The experience of the labour movement of various countries helps us to understand on the basis of concrete practical questions the nature of Marxist tactics; it helps the younger countries to distinguish more clearly the true class significance of departures from Marxism and to combat these departures more successfully.

Zvezda, No. 1,
December 16, 1910
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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TOLSTOY AND THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE

Tolstoy's indictment of the ruling classes was made with tremendous power and sincerity; with absolute clearness he laid bare the inner falsity of all those institutions by which modern society is maintained: the church, the law courts, militarism, "lawful" wedlock, bourgeois science. But his doctrine proved to be in complete contradiction to the life, work and struggle of the grave-digger of the modern social system, the proletariat. Whose then was the point of view reflected in the teachings of Leo Tolstoy? Through his lips there spoke that multitudinous mass of the Russian people who *already* detest the masters of modern life but have not *yet* advanced to the point of intelligent, consistent, thoroughgoing, implacable struggle against them.

The history and the outcome of the great Russian revolution have shown that such precisely was the mass that found itself *between* the class-conscious, socialist proletariat and the out-and-out defenders of the old regime. This mass, consisting mainly of the peasantry, showed in the revolution how great was its hatred of the old, how keenly it felt all the inflictions of the modern regime, how great within it was the spontaneous yearning to be rid of them and to find a better life.

At the same time, however, this mass showed in the revolution that it was not politically conscious enough in its hatred, that it was not consistent in its struggle and that its quest for a better life was confined within narrow bounds.

This great human ocean, agitated to its very depths, with all its weaknesses and all its strong features found its reflection in the doctrine of Tolstoy.

By studying the literary works of Leo Tolstoy the Russian working class will learn to know its enemies better, but in

examining the *doctrine* of Tolstoy, the whole Russian people will have to understand where their own weakness lies, the weakness which did not allow them to carry the cause of their emancipation to its conclusion. This must be understood in order to go forward.

This advance is impeded by all those who declare Tolstoy a "universal conscience", a "teacher of life". This is a lie that the liberals are deliberately spreading in their desire to utilise the anti-revolutionary aspect of Tolstoy's doctrine. This lie about Tolstoy as a "teacher of life" is being repeated after the liberals by some former Social-Democrats.

The Russian people will secure their emancipation only when they realise that it is not from Tolstoy they must learn to win a better life but from the class the significance of which Tolstoy did not understand, and which alone is capable of destroying the old world which Tolstoy hated. That class is the proletariat.

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THE BEGINNING OF DEMONSTRATIONS

After three years of revolution, from 1905 to 1907, Russia went through three years of counter-revolution, from 1908 to 1910, three years of the Black-Hundred Duma, an orgy of violence and suppression of rights, a capitalist offensive against the workers, and the retraction of the gains made by the workers. The tsarist autocracy which was half-broken in 1905 but not destroyed, has mustered its forces, joined hands with the landlords and capitalists in the Third Duma and has re-introduced the old order of things in Russia. Stronger than ever is the capitalists' oppression of the workers, more brazen than ever the lawlessness and tyranny of the officials in the towns and, particularly, in the countryside, more ferocious than ever the reprisals against the champions of freedom, more frequent than ever the infliction of capital punishment. The tsarist government, the landlords and the capitalists have taken furious *revenge* on the revolutionary classes, and the proletariat above all, for the revolution, as though hastening to utilise the interruption in the mass struggle for the destruction of their enemies.

But there are enemies that can be defeated in a few battles, can be kept under for a time, but *cannot* be destroyed. The complete victory of the revolution is fully possible and such a victory would utterly destroy the tsarist monarchy, would wipe the feudal landlords from the face of the earth, would transfer all their lands to the peasants without compensation, would replace the rule of officialdom by democratic self-government and political freedom. Such reforms are not only possible, they are *indispensable*, in every country in the twentieth century, they have already been effected more or less completely in *all* the states of Europe, at the cost of more or less prolonged and persistent struggle.

But *no* victories of the reaction, however complete, *no* triumph of counter-revolution *can* destroy the enemies of the tsarist autocracy, the enemies of oppression by the landlords and capitalists, because these enemies are the millions of workers who are being massed in ever-greater numbers in the towns, in the big factories and on the railways. These enemies are the ruined peasantry whose life is many times harder now that the rural superintendents and rich peasants have united for *legalised* plunder, for the appropriation of the peasants' land *with the sanction* of the landlords' Duma, *under the protection* of all the landlord and military authorities. Enemies like the working class and the poor peasantry cannot be destroyed.

And now, after three years of the most wanton riot of counter-revolution, we see that the *mass of the people*, those most oppressed, downtrodden, benighted, intimidated by persecutions in every form, are beginning to raise their heads again, to reawaken and resume the struggle. Three years of executions, persecutions and savage reprisals have destroyed tens of thousands of the "enemies" of the autocracy, hundreds of thousands have been imprisoned or exiled, many hundreds of thousands more have been intimidated. But millions and tens of millions of people are no longer what they were before the revolution. *Never* yet in the history of Russia have these millions experienced such instructive and vivid lessons, such open class struggle. That a new and profound underlying ferment has set in among these millions and tens of millions is evident from this summer's strikes and the recent demonstrations.

Workers' strikes in Russia both during the period of the preparation of the revolution and during the revolution itself were the most widely used means of struggle of the proletariat, of this advanced class, which is the only consistently revolutionary class in modern society. Economic and political strikes, now alternating, now inseparably interwoven, united the mass of the workers against the capitalist class and the autocratic government, threw the whole of society into a ferment, and roused the peasantry for the struggle.

When a continuous wave of mass strikes began in 1895 this was the beginning of the phase of preparation for the

people's revolution. When in January 1905 the number of strikers in this one month exceeded 400,000, this was the beginning of the actual revolution. In all the three years of the revolution the number of strikers, though gradually declining (almost 3,000,000 in 1905, 1,000,000 in 1906, and three-fourths of a million in 1907), was higher than had ever been known in any other country.

When the number of strikers dropped abruptly (176,000) in 1908 and was followed by an even more marked decline in 1909 (64,000) this spelt the end of the first revolution or, rather, the first phase of the revolution.

And now, since the summer of this year, the tide is beginning to rise again. The number of participants in economic strikes is *increasing* and increasing very rapidly. The phase of the *total* domination of the Black-Hundred reaction has come to an end. The phase of a new upsurge is beginning. The proletariat, which *retreated*—although with considerable interruptions between 1905 and 1909, is regaining its strength and is beginning to take the *offensive*. The revival in certain branches of industry leads at once to a revival of the proletarian struggle.

The proletariat has begun. Others, the bourgeois, democratic classes and sections of the population are continuing. The death of Muromtsev, Chairman of the First Duma, a moderate liberal, a foreigner to democracy, evokes the first timid beginning of demonstrations. The death of Leo Tolstoy gives rise—for the first time after a long interval—to *street demonstrations* with the participation mainly of students but partly also of workers. The fact that quite a number of factories and plants stopped work on the day of Tolstoy's funeral marks the beginning, though a very modest one, of demonstrative strikes.

Very recently, the atrocities of the tsarist gaolers, who in Vologda and Zerentui tortured many of our imprisoned comrades who are being persecuted for their heroic struggle during the revolution, have deepened the ferment among the students. Assemblies and mass meetings are being held all over Russia, the police are raiding the universities, beating the students, arresting them, prosecuting newspapers for publishing the slightest particle of truth about the disorders, but only aggravating the unrest by all these actions.

The proletariat has begun. The democratic youth are continuing. The Russian people are awakening to new struggle, advancing towards a new revolution.

The first beginning of the struggle has shown us again that the forces are alive which shook the tsarist regime in 1905 and will destroy it in the coming revolution. The first beginning of the struggle has shown us again the significance of the *mass* movement. No persecutions, no reprisals can halt the movement once the *masses* have risen, once the millions have begun to bestir themselves. Persecutions only pour oil on the flames, draw ever-new contingents of fighters into the struggle. No terrorist acts can help the oppressed masses, and no power on earth can halt the masses when they rise in revolt.

Now they have begun to rise. This upsurge may be rapid, or it may be slow and fitful, but in any case it is leading to a revolution. The Russian proletariat led the way in 1905. Remembering this glorious past it must now exert every effort to restore, reinforce and develop its own organisation, its own Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. At present our Party is passing through difficult days but it is invincible, just as the proletariat is invincible.

So to work, comrades! Get busy everywhere, building organisations, creating and reinforcing Party units of Social-Democratic workers, intensifying economic and political agitation. In the first Russian revolution the proletariat taught the masses to fight for freedom, in the second revolution it must lead them to victory!

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WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE?

Ex-Minister of Agriculture Yermolov's new book about the "present epidemic of incendiarism in Russia" has given rise to controversy in the newspapers. The liberal press has pointed out that fires in the countryside have not decreased but rather increased after the revolution. The reactionary newspapers have taken up Yermolov's outcry and lamentation about "the impunity of the incendiaries", "terrorism in the countryside", and so on. There has been an extraordinary increase in the number of fires in rural localities. For instance, between 1904 and 1907 the figure went up *twofold* in Tambov Gubernia, *two and a half times* in Orel Gubernia, and *threefold* in Voronezh Gubernia. "The more or less well-to-do peasants," writes *Novoye Vremya*, which acts as a lackey of the government, "want to set up farmsteads and are trying to introduce new farming methods, but are besieged, as if by guerrillas in enemy territory, by a lawless rural element that has run wild. They are being burned out and hounded, hounded and burned out until there is nothing left for them to do but 'abandon everything and flee'."

An unpleasant admission indeed for those supporting the tsarist government! For us Social-Democrats the latest information is not lacking in interest as further confirmation of the lies of the government and the pitiful impotence of liberal policy.

The Revolution of 1905 fully showed that the old order in the Russian countryside is irrevocably doomed by history. Nothing in the world can bolster up this order. How is it to be changed? The peasant masses gave the answer by their uprisings in 1905 and through their deputies in the First and Second Dumas. The landed estates must be taken away from the landlords without compensation. When 30,000 landlords (headed by Nicholas Romanov) own *70 million* dessiatines of land and ten million peasant households almost the

same amount, the result can be nothing except bondage, abject poverty, ruin and stagnation of the whole national economy. Hence the Social-Democratic Labour Party called on the peasants to take up the revolutionary struggle. By their mass strikes in 1905 the workers throughout Russia rallied the peasants and directed their struggle. The liberal plan to "reconcile" the peasants with the landlords through "redemption payments at a fair valuation"[134] was an empty, miserable, treacherous trick.

How does the Stolypin government want to refashion the old order in the countryside? It wants to speed up the complete ruin of the peasants, to preserve the landed estates, to help an insignificant handful of rich peasants to set up farmsteads and grab as much as possible of the land of the village communes. The government has realised that the peasant masses are against it and it is trying to find allies among the rich peasants.

Stolypin himself once said that "twenty years of tranquillity" would be needed to carry out the "reform" proposed by the government. By "tranquillity" he means submissiveness on the part of the peasants, the absence of any struggle against violence. Yet without violence committed by the rural superintendents and other authorities, violence at every step, violence against *tens of millions*—without suppressing the slightest signs of independence on the part of these millions, the Stolypin "reform" cannot be carried out. Not even for three years, let alone twenty, has Stolypin been able to bring about "tranquillity", nor will he be able to do so; this is the unpleasant truth of which the tsar's lackeys have been reminded by the ex-minister's book about fires in the countryside.

The peasants do not and-cannot have any other way out of the position of desperate want, poverty, and death by starvation into which the government has plunged them than by mass struggle together with the proletariat to overthrow the tsarist regime. Preparation of the forces of the proletariat for this struggle, the creation, development and consolidation of proletarian organisations—this is the immediate task of the R.S.D.L.P.

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IVAN VASILYEVICH BABUSHKIN

AN OBITUARY

We are living in accursed conditions when it is possible for such things as the following to happen: a prominent Party worker, the pride of the Party, a comrade who unselfishly devoted his life to the cause of the working class, disappears without a trace. Even his nearest relatives, like his wife or his mother, his most intimate comrades do not know for years what has become of him: whether he is pining somewhere in penal servitude, whether he has perished in some prison or has died the death of a hero in battle with the enemy. Such was the case with Ivan Vasilyevich, who was shot by Rennenkampf. We learned about his death only quite recently.

The name of Ivan Vasilyevich is near and dear not only to Social-Democrats. All who knew him loved and respected him for his energy, his avoidance of phrase-mongering, his profound and staunch revolutionary spirit and fervent devotion to the cause. A St. Petersburg worker, in 1895 with a group of other class-conscious workers, he was very active in the district beyond the Nevskaya Zastava among the workers of the Semyannikov and Alexandrov factories and the Glass Works, forming circles, organising libraries and studying very hard himself all the time.

All his thoughts were fixed on one thing—how to widen the scope of the work. He took an active part in drawing up the *first agitational leaflet* put out in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1894, a leaflet addressed to the Semyannikov workers, and he distributed it himself. When the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was formed in St. Petersburg, Ivan Vasilyevich became one of its most active members and worked in it until he was arrested. The idea of starting a political newspaper abroad to promote

the unification and consolidation of the Social-Democratic Party was discussed with him by his old comrades who had worked with him in St. Petersburg, the founders of *Iskra*, and received his warmest support. While Ivan Vasilyevich was at liberty *Iskra* never went short of genuine workers' correspondence. Look through the first twenty issues of *Iskra*, all these letters from Shuya, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Orekhovo-Zuyevo and other places in Central Russia: they nearly all passed through the hands of Ivan Vasilyevich, who made every effort to establish the closest contact between *Iskra* and the workers. Ivan Vasilyevich was *Iskra*'s most assiduous correspondent and its ardent supporter. From the central region Babushkin made his way to the south, where he was arrested in Ekaterinoslav and imprisoned in Alexandrovsk. From Alexandrovsk he escaped with another comrade by sawing through the window-bars of his cell. Without knowing a single foreign language he made his way to London, where the *Iskra* editorial office was at the time. A lot of things were talked over there, a lot of questions were discussed with him. But Ivan Vasilyevich did not get the chance to attend the Second Party Congress ... imprisonment and exile put him out of active service for a long time. The revolutionary wave that arose brought new functionaries, new Party leaders to the fore, but Babushkin at this time was living in the Far North, in Verkhoyansk, cut off from Party life. But the time was not wasted for him, he studied, he equipped himself for the struggle, he was active among the workers who were his comrades in exile, trying to make them class-conscious Social-Democrats and Bolsheviks. In 1905 came the amnesty and Babushkin set out for Russia. But Siberia too was seething with struggle and people like Babushkin were needed there. He joined the Irkutsk Committee and plunged headlong into the work. He had to speak at meetings, carry on Social-Democratic agitation and organise an uprising. While Babushkin and five other comrades—whose names we have not learned—were taking a large consignment of arms from Chita in a separate railway car the train was held up by one of Rennenkampf's punitive expeditions and all six, without the slightest pretence of a trial were lined up on the edge of a common grave hastily dug on the spot and shot. They died like heroes. The story of their death was told by

soldiers who saw it and railwaymen who were in the same train. Babushkin fell a victim to the bestial savagery of the tsarist myrmidon but, in dying, he knew that the cause to which he had devoted his life would not die, that it would be continued by tens, hundreds of thousands, millions of other hands, that other working-class comrades would die for the same cause, that they would fight until they were victorious....

* *
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Some people have concocted and are spreading a fairy-tale to the effect that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is a party of "intellectuals", that the workers are isolated from it, that the workers in Russia are Social-Democrats without a Social-Democratic party, that this was the case particularly before the revolution and, to a considerable extent, during the revolution. The liberals are spreading this lie out of hatred for the revolutionary mass struggle which the R.S.D.L.P. led in 1905, and some socialists have been repeating this lying theory either out of ignorance or irresponsibility. The life history of Ivan Vasilyevich Babushkin, the ten years' Social-Democratic activity of this *worker-Iskrist* is a striking refutation of this liberal lie. I. V. Babushkin is one of those working-class militants who *10 years* before the revolution began to create the *workers*' Social-Democratic Party. Had it not been for the tireless, heroically persistent work of *such* militants among the proletarian masses the R.S.D.L.P. could not have existed ten months let alone ten years. Thanks only to the activities of *such* militants, thanks only to their support, the R.S.D.L.P. developed by 1905 into a Party which *became inseparably fused* with the proletariat in the great days of October and December, which maintained this connection in the person of the *workers*' *deputies* not only in the Second, but even in the Third, Black-Hundred Duma

The liberals (Cadets) want to make a national hero out of the late S. A. Muromtsev who was the Chairman of the First Duma. We, the Social-Democrats, must not let the opportunity slip of expressing our contempt and hatred of the tsarist government, which persecuted even such moderate and inoffensive officials as Muromtsev. Muromtsev was only

a liberal official. He was not even a democrat. He was afraid of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. He expected the liberation of Russia to come not from this struggle, but from the good will of the tsarist autocracy, from an *agreement* with this malicious and ruthless enemy of the Russian people. It is ridiculous to regard such people as national heroes of the Russian revolution.

But there are such national heroes. They are people like Babushkin. They are people who, not for a year or two but for a whole decade before the revolution, whole-heartedly devoted themselves to the struggle for the emancipation of the working class. They are people who did not dissipate their energies on the futile terrorist acts of individuals, but who worked persistently and unswervingly among the proletarian masses, helping to develop *their* consciousness, *their* organisation and *their* revolutionary initiative. They are people who stood at the head of the armed mass struggle against the tsarist autocracy when the crisis began, when the revolution broke out and when millions and millions were stirred into action. Everything won from the tsarist autocracy was won *exclusively* by the struggle of the masses led by such people as Babushkin.

Without such men the Russian people would remain for ever a people of slaves and serfs. With such men the Russian people will win complete emancipation from all exploitation.

The fifth anniversary of the December uprising of 1905 has already passed. Let us honour this anniversary by remembering the militant workers who fell in the fight against the enemy. We request our worker comrades to collect and send us reminiscences of the struggle of that period and additional information about Babushkin and also about other Social-Democratic workers who fell in the uprising of 1905. We intend to publish a pamphlet on the lives of such workers. Such a pamphlet will be the best answer to all sceptics and disparagers of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Such a pamphlet will be excellent reading matter for young workers, who will learn from it how every class-conscious worker should live and act.

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Concerning our declaration[135] there are in existence lying rumours which are deliberately being circulated by the Golosist liquidators and which we consider it our duty to counter by a short account of the essentials of the matter and our views.

The formal aspect of the matter is that an *agreement* between the faction and the Party was concluded at the plenum of January 1910. According to the agreement, our faction undertook to dissolve itself *if* the other factions dissolved themselves. The condition was not observed. *We resume our freedom of struggle* against the liberals and anarchists, who are being encouraged by the leader of the "conciliators", Trotsky. The question of the money is for us a *secondary* matter, although of course we do not intend to hand over the money *of the faction* to the bloc of liquidators+anarchists+Trotsky, while in no way renouncing our right to expose before the international Social-Democratic movement this bloc, its financial "basis" (the notorious Vperyodist "funds" safeguarded from exposure by Trotsky and the Golosists), etc.*

The essential fact is that we *divest ourselves of responsibility* for the *assistance* in demoralising the Party rendered by the "conciliatory" policy (i.e., the policy indulgent to the Golosist liberals and Vperyodist anarchists). We warned

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* The right to represent the faction was given to our *sextet* at the plenum. Of the six votes we have *four*: three in Paris and one by Meshkovsky's (written) power of attorney. If Meshkovsky were to take it into his head to back out, we should *interrogate* the remaining Bolshevik members of the Central Committee and candidate members *elected in London*, and also interrogate the Bolsheviks who have declared themselves by influential work.

the Party officially and openly *even before No. 12* of the Central Organ by making a statement about the conspiracy against the Party in the leaflet "*Golos* (*Voice*) of the Liquidators Against the Party".*

If these words may have seemed to anyone an exaggeration, events have completely and literally confirmed what we said. The liberal liquidators have consolidated themselves *outside* the Party, they have created a faction altogether hostile (*Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye*, *Dyelo Zhizni*) to Social-Democracy and *ready* to disrupt the Party's cause in the elections to the Fourth Duma. The Golosists have *helped* Potresov and Co. to demoralise the Party, *spoiling and hindering* its work from within the central bodies. The Central Committee Bureau Abroad—the only permanent organ in practice—has fallen into the hands of the *liquidators*, thanks in part to the impotence of the Bund and the Letts, and in part to the direct help the Golosists have been given by the liquidationist elements of these national organisations. The C.C. Bureau Abroad not only did nothing to unite the *pro-Party elements* abroad, and not only gave no help to the fight against the Golosists and Vperyodists, but it *concealed* the anti-Party "funds" of the anarchists and the steps taken by the liberals.

The Vperyodists, thanks to the "conciliatory" support of Trotsky and *Golos*, have consolidated themselves as a faction with its own transport, its own *agency*, and have grown *many times* stronger since the plenum of January 1910.

There has been a full development of what was already outlined quite clearly at the plenum (for instance, the defence of the anarchist school, by Trotsky+the Golosists). The bloc of the liberals and anarchists with the aid of the conciliators is shamelessly destroying the remnants of the Party from outside and helping to demoralise it from within. The formalistic game of "inviting" the Golosists and Trotskyists on to the central bodies is finally reducing to impotence the already weakened pro-Party elements.

Divesting ourselves of responsibility for this game, we shall, while *keeping aloof from* it, pursue our pro-Party policy of rapprochement with the Plekhanovites and *ruth-*

* See pp. 156-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

less struggle against the bloc. It stands to reason that we shall *in every way* support *all* steps of the Central Committee if it succeeds in meeting in Russia, restoring the Central apparatus there, establishing a Party organisational base abroad (instead of the liquidationist C.C. Bureau Abroad) and *beginning work* against the liberals and anarchists.

Finally, a few words about the *split* with which the "conciliators" are trying to frighten us. At present the split *de facto* is already complete, for the Potresovites and Vperyodists have *completely* split off and *no one* will bring them back to the Party *line*. If the Central Committee emphatically condemns them as liberals and anarchists, there will be no split *de jure*, for they cannot defend *their* line. If the central bodies cease to play at "inviting" the liberals who are servants of Potresov (the Golosists) and the Vperyodists, there will be no split *de jure*, and the workers will definitely abandon both the *Vperyodists* and the Potresovites. *Any other* policy will prolong the split by encouraging the Potresovites and Vperyodists. As far as we are concerned, we shall keep entirely aloof from any such "other" policy, as *authorised representatives of the Bolshevik trend*, whose guiding significance was recognised by the plenum of January 1910.

The representatives of the Bolshevik trend who signed the agreement with the Central Committee at the plenum and who are authorised (by Meshkovsky's power of attorney) to cancel it.

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HEROES OF "RESERVATION"[136]

The tenth issue of *Nasha Zarya*, the magazine of Mr. Potresov and Co., which we have just received, provides striking examples of carelessness or, rather, unprincipledness in the evaluation of Leo Tolstoy, which need to be dealt with at once, if only in brief.

Here is an article by V. Bazarov, a new warrior in Potresov's ranks. The editors are not in agreement with "certain propositions" in this article, without of course mentioning which propositions they are. That is so much more convenient for covering up confusion! As for ourselves, we find it difficult to point out any propositions in this article that would not arouse the indignation of anyone who has the least bit of regard for Marxism. "Our intelligentsia," V. Bazarov writes, "beaten and dispirited, turned into a sort of amorphous mental and moral slough, and now at the extreme limit of spiritual demoralisation, has unanimously accepted Tolstoy—the *whole* of Tolstoy—as its conscience." That is not true. It is mere phrase-mongering. Our intelligentsia in general, and particularly that of *Nasha Zarya*, certainly looks very "dispirited", but it neither did nor could display any "unanimity" in its appraisal of Tolstoy, and it never did or could appraise correctly the *whole* of Tolstoy. It is precisely the absence of unanimity that is concealed behind the utterly hypocritical talk about "conscience", a catchword fully worthy of *Novoye Vremya*. Bazarov does not fight the "slough"—he encourages the slough.

Bazarov "would like to recall certain instances of injustice [!!] with regard to Tolstoy, of which the Russian intellectuals in general, and we radicals of various persuasions in particular, are guilty". The only thing that is true in this statement is that Bazarov, Potresov and Co. are indeed

"radicals of various persuasions", dependent on the universal "slough" to such an extent that, at a time when the fundamental inconsistencies and weaknesses of Tolstoy's world outlook are being hushed up in the most unpardonable fashion, they rush after "everybody" in a challenging fashion, yelling about "injustice" to Tolstoy. They do not want to yield to the intoxication of "that narcotic particularly widespread among us, which Tolstoy describes as 'the virulence of controversy'". This is the very kind of talk, the kind of tune, that suits the philistines, who turn their backs with supreme contempt on a controversy over principles that are defended consistently and in full.

"The main power of Tolstoy lies in the fact that, having passed through all the stages of demoralisation typical of modern educated men, he succeeded in finding a synthesis...." This is not true. The very thing that Tolstoy did not succeed in finding, or rather could not find, either in the philosophical foundations of his world outlook or in his social-political doctrine, is a synthesis. "Tolstoy was the first [!] to objectivise, i.e., to create not only for himself but for others as well, that *genuinely human* [Bazarov's own italics throughout] religion, of which Comte, Feuerbach, and other representatives of modern culture could only dream subjectively [!]," etc., etc.

This kind of talk is worse than common philistinism. It is an attempt to adorn the "slough" with spurious flowers, capable only of deluding people. More than half a century ago Feuerbach, unable to "find a synthesis" in his world outlook, which represented in many respects "the last word" of German classical philosophy, became embroiled in those "subjective dreams", the negative role of which has long since been appraised by the really progressive "representatives of modern culture". To declare now that Tolstoy "was the first to objectivise" these "subjective dreams" is to join the camp of the retrograde, to flatter the philistines, to echo the Vekhists.

Bazarov writes:

"It goes without saying that the movement [!?] founded by Tolstoy must undergo a profound change if it is really destined to play a great world-wide historic role: the idealisation of the patriarchal-peasant mode of life, the attraction towards a natural economy, and

many other utopian features of Tolstoyism, which loom large [!] at the present time and seem to be its most essential features, are actually nothing but subjective elements not necessarily connected with the basis of Tolstoy's 'religion'."

So it turns out that Tolstoy "objectivised" Feuerbach's "subjective dreams", whereas that which Tolstoy reflected both in his brilliant literary works and in his extremely contradictory doctrine, namely, the special economic features of Russia of the past century, noted by Bazarov, are "nothing but subjective elements" of his doctrine. That is what is called being wide of the mark. But then, there is nothing the "intelligentsia, beaten and dispirited" (etc., as quoted above), enjoys, desires and likes more, there is nothing that humours its dispiritedness more than this exalting of Feuerbach's "subjective dreams" which Tolstoy "objectivised", and this *diversion* of attention from the concrete historical economic and political problems "which loom large at the present time"!

It is obvious that Bazarov is particularly displeased with the "sharp criticism" which the doctrine of non-resistance to evil evoked among the "radical intelligentsia". To Bazarov it is "clear that there is no reason to speak here of passivity and quietism". By way of explaining his thought, Bazarov refers to the well-known tale of "Ivan the Fool" and suggests that the reader "imagine that it is not the Tarakan (Cockroach) tsar who sends soldiers against the Fools, but their own ruler Ivan, now become wise; and that Ivan wants to use these soldiers, whom he recruited from the ranks of the Fools themselves and who are therefore akin to the latter by their entire way of thinking, in order to compel his subjects to comply with some unrighteous demands. It is quite obvious that the Fools, practically unarmed and unfamiliar with military formation, cannot even dream of gaining a physical victory over Ivan's troops. Even if they resort to the most vigorous 'resistance by force', the Fools cannot defeat Ivan physically, but only by means of moral influence, i.e., only by means of the so-called 'demoralisation' of Ivan's troops...." "The Fools' resistance by force achieves the same result (only worse and at the cost of great sacrifice) as resistance without force...." "Non-resistance to evil with force or, to use a more general term, harmony of means and ends [!!] is an idea that is by

no means characteristic only of moral preachers who live secluded from society. This idea is an essential component part of every integral world outlook."

Such are the arguments of the new warrior in Potresov's ranks. We cannot stop to analyse them here. It is perhaps sufficient—on this first occasion—just to reproduce his main argument and to add five words: Vekhism of the purest water.

From the final chords of the cantata on the theme that ears do not grow above one's head: "There is no need to describe our weakness as strength, as superiority over Tolstoy's 'quietism' and 'narrow rationalism' [and over the inconsistency of his reasoning?]. We should not say that, not only because it is at variance with the truth, but also because it hinders us from learning from the greatest man of our times."

Well, well. But, then, there is no reason why you should be getting angry, gentlemen, and answer with ridiculous bravado and abuse (as Mr. Potresov did in Nos. 8-9 of *Nasha Zarya*) if people like Izgoyev bless, praise and kiss you. Neither the old nor the new warriors in Potresov's ranks can cleanse themselves of these kisses.

The general staff of this host provided Bazarov's article with a "diplomatic" reservation. But the leading article by Mr. Nevedomsky, printed without any reservations, is not much better. "While he absorbed," writes this bard of the present-day intelligentsia, "and embodied in a consummate form the fundamental aspirations and strivings of the great epoch of the fall of slavery in Russia, Leo Tolstoy proved to be also the purest and most consummate embodiment of the ideological principle of humanity in general—*the principle of conscience.* "

Boom, boom, boom.... While he absorbed and embodied in a consummate form the fundamental manner of declamation characteristic of liberal-bourgeois journalism, Mr. Nevedomsky proved to be also the purest and most consummate embodiment of the ideological principle of humanity in general—the principle of rant.

One more—and final—statement:

"All those European admirers of Tolstoy, all those Anatole Frances by whatever name they are called, and the Chambers of Deputies, which recently voted by an enormous majority against the abolition of capital punishment and today pay homage to the great

integral man—the whole of that kingdom of intermediateness, half-heartedness, reservationism—compared with them, how magnificent, how powerful towers the figure, cast of a single pure metal, of Tolstoy, that living embodiment of an integral principle."

Phew! What eloquence—and not a word of truth. The figure of Tolstoy is cast neither of a single nor a pure metal, nor of metal at all. And it is *precisely* not for his "integrality", but for his deviation from integrality, that "all those" bourgeois admirers "pay homage" to his memory.

There is only one apt word that Mr. Nevedomsky blurted out inadvertently. That is the word "reservationism", which fits the gentlemen of *Nasha Zarya* just as perfectly as V. Bazarov's above-quoted characterisation of the intelligentsia fits *them*. Throughout it is heroes of "reservation" that confront us. Potresov makes the reservation that he is not in agreement with the Machists, although he defends them. The editors make the reservation that they are not in agreement with "certain propositions" of Bazarov's, although it is obvious to everyone that it is not a question here of certain propositions. Potresov makes the reservation that he has been slandered by Izgoyev. Martov makes the reservation that he is not entirely in agreement with Potresov and Levitsky, although they are the very people whom he renders faithful political service. All of them make the reservation that they are not in agreement with Cherevanin, although they approve more of his *second* liquidationist pamphlet, in which the "spirit" of his first brain-child is greatly increased. Cherevanin makes the reservation that he is not in agreement with Maslov. Maslov makes the reservation that he is not in agreement with Kautsky.

The only thing they all agree on is that they are not in agreement with Plekhanov, and that he slanders them by accusing them of liquidationism, while himself being allegedly unable to explain his present rapprochement with his former opponents.

There is nothing simpler than the explanation of this rapprochement, which is only inexplicable to people with reservations. When we had a locomotive we differed very strongly on the question as to whether the power of that locomotive, the stock of fuel, etc., warranted a speed of, let us say, 25 or 50 miles an hour. The controversy over this

question, as over any question which stirs the opponents deeply, was conducted with passion and often with bitterness. That controversy—and this refers to absolutely every question over which it arose—was carried on in the open, in full view of everyone, it was thoroughly thrashed out, without being glossed over by any "reservations". And none of us ever thought of retracting anything or of whining over the "virulence of the controversy". But today, when the locomotive has broken down, when it is lying in a bog, surrounded by "reservationist" intellectuals who sneeringly declare that there is "nothing to liquidate" because there is no longer any locomotive in existence, we, the "virulent controversionalists" of yesterday, are drawn closer together by our common cause. Without renouncing anything, without forgetting anything, without making any promises about setting aside differences, we are working together for the common cause. We are devoting all our attention and all our efforts to raise the locomotive, to renovate, strengthen and reinforce it, to put it on the rails—as to its speed, or which way to turn one switch or another, we shall discuss that in due time. In these difficult days the immediate task is to create something that will be capable of giving a rebuff to the people "with reservations" and the "dispirited intellectuals", who directly or indirectly promote the prevailing "slough". The immediate task is to dig—even under the most difficult conditions—for ore, to extract iron, and to cast the steel of the Marxist world outlook and of the superstructures corresponding to this world outlook.

Mysl No. 1, December 1910
Signed: *V. I.*

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THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF THE INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE IN RUSSIA[137]

The subject indicated by the above title is dealt with in articles by Trotsky and Martov in Nos. 50 and 51 of *Neue Zeit*. Martov expounds Menshevik views. Trotsky follows in the wake of the Mensheviks, taking cover behind particularly sonorous phrases. Martov sums up the "Russian experience" by saying: "Blanquist and anarchist lack of culture triumphed over Marxist culture" (read: Bolshevism over Menshevism). "Russian Social-Democracy spoke too zealously *in Russian*", in contrast to the "*general European*" methods of tactics. Trotsky's "philosophy of history" is the same. The cause of the struggle is the "adaptation of the Marxist intelligentsia to the class movement of the proletariat". "Sectarianism, intellectualist individualism, ideological fetishism" are placed in the forefront. "*The struggle for influence over the politically immature proletariat*"—that is the essence of the matter.

I

The theory that the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism is a struggle for influence over an immature proletariat is not a new one. We have been encountering it since 1905 (if not since 1903) in innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles in the *liberal* press. Martov and Trotsky are putting before the German comrades *liberal views* with a Marxist coating.

Of course, the Russian proletariat is politically far less mature than the proletariat of Western Europe. But of all

classes of Russian society, it was the proletariat that displayed the *greatest* political maturity in 1905-07. The Russian liberal bourgeoisie, which behaved in just as vile, cowardly, stupid and treacherous a manner as the German bourgeoisie in 1848, hates the Russian proletariat *for the very reason* that in 1905 it proved *sufficiently mature politically* to wrest the *leadership* of the movement from this bourgeoisie and ruthlessly to expose the treachery of the liberals.

Trotsky declares: "It is an illusion" to imagine that Menshevism and Bolshevism "have struck deep roots in the depths of the proletariat". This is a specimen of the resonant but empty phrases of which our Trotsky is a master. The *roots* of the divergence between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks lie, not in the "depths of the proletariat", but in the *economic content* of the Russian revolution. By ignoring this content, Martov and Trotsky have deprived themselves of the possibility of understanding the historical meaning of the inner-Party struggle in Russia. The crux of the matter is not whether the theoretical formulations of the differences have penetrated "deeply" into this or that stratum of the proletariat, but the fact that the economic conditions of the Revolution of 1905 *brought* the proletariat into hostile relations with the liberal bourgeoisie—not only over the question of improving the conditions of daily life of the workers, but also over the agrarian question, over all the political questions of the revolution, etc. To speak of the struggle of trends in the Russian revolution, distributing labels such as "sectarianism", "lack of culture", etc., and not to say a word about the fundamental economic interests of the proletariat, of the liberal bourgeoisie and of the democratic peasantry, means stooping to the level of cheap journalists.

Here is an example: "In the whole of Western Europe," Martov writes, "the peasant masses are considered suitable for an alliance [with the proletariat] only to the extent that they begin to feel the grave consequences of the capitalist revolution in agriculture; in Russia, however, a picture has been drawn of a numerically weak proletariat combining with a hundred million peasants who have not yet felt, or have hardly felt, the 'educational' effect of capitalism, and therefore have not yet been through the school of the capitalist bourgeoisie."

This is not a slip of the pen on Martov's part. It is the central point of *all* the ideas of Menshevism. The opportunist history of the Russian revolution which is being published in Russia under the editorship of Potresov, Martov and Maslov (*The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*) is thoroughly permeated with these ideas. The Menshevik Maslov expressed these ideas still more graphically when he stated in the article which sums up this "work": "a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry *would run counter* to the whole *course of economic development*." It is precisely here that the roots of the divergencies between Bolshevism and Menshevism must be sought.

Martov *substituted* the school of the *capitalist bourgeoisie* for the school of *capitalism*. (Let us state in parenthesis that there is no other bourgeoisie in the world than the capitalist bourgeoisie.) What is meant by the school of capitalism? That capitalism lifts the peasants from the idiocy of rural life, rouses them and *impels them to fight*. What is meant by the school of the "capitalist bourgeoisie"? That "the German bourgeoisie of 1848 is without the least compunction betraying the peasants, who are its most natural allies ... and without whom it is powerless against the nobility" (Karl Marx in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of July 29, 1848).[138] That the Russian liberal bourgeoisie in 1905-07 systematically and persistently betrayed the peasants, that it in fact deserted to the side of the landlords and tsarism against the fighting peasants and put direct obstacles in the path of the development of the peasant struggle.

Under cover of "Marxist" catchwords about the "education" of the peasants by capitalism, Martov is advocating the "*education*" of the peasants (*who fought the nobility in revolutionary fashion*) by the liberals (*who betrayed the peasants to the nobles*).

This is substituting liberalism for Marxism. This is liberalism embellished with Marxist phrases. What Bebel said in Magdeburg about there being National Liberals among the Social-Democrats is true not only of Germany.

It is also necessary to observe that most of the ideological leaders of Russian liberalism were brought up on German literature and are deliberately transplanting to Russia the *Brentano* and *Sombart* brand of "Marxism", which recognises

the "school of capitalism", but rejects the school of revolutionary class struggle. All the counter-revolutionary liberals in Russia, such as Struve, Bulgakov, Frank, Izgoyev and Co., flaunt similar "Marxist" phrases.

Martov compares Russia of the epoch of peasant uprisings against feudalism with "Western Europe", which put an end to feudalism long ago. This is a stupendous distortion of the historical perspective. Are there any socialists "in the whole of Western Europe" whose programme contains the demand: "to support the revolutionary actions of the peasantry including *confiscation of the landed estates*"?[139] No, there are none. The socialists "in the whole of Western Europe" do not at all support the small proprietors in their fight over landownership against the big proprietors. Wherein lies the difference? In the fact that "in the whole of Western Europe" the bourgeois system, including, in particular, bourgeois agrarian relations, was established and took definite shape long ago, whereas in Russia it is just now that a revolution is taking place *over the question of the form* this bourgeois system is to assume. Martov repeats the threadbare method of the liberals, who always contrast the period of revolutionary conflicts over a given question with periods in which there are no such revolutionary conflicts because the question itself was solved long ago.

The tragicomedy of Menshevism lies in the fact that at the time of the revolution it *had* to accept theses which were incompatible with liberalism. If we support the struggle of the "peasantry" for the *confiscation* of the land, it means that we admit that victory is possible and economically and politically advantageous for the working class and the whole of the people. But the victory of the "peasantry" led by the proletariat in the struggle for the *confiscation* of the landed estates is precisely the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*. (Let us recall what Marx said in 1848 about the need for a dictatorship in a revolution, and Mehring's deserved ridicule of those who accused Marx of wishing to achieve democracy by setting up a dictatorship.[140])

The view that the dictatorship of these classes "runs counter to the whole course of economic development" is radically wrong. The very opposite is the case. *Only* such a dictatorship could make a clean sweep of the remnants of feudalism

and secure the speediest development of the productive forces. The policy of the liberals, on the contrary, entrusts the whole matter to the Russian Junkers, who are *retarding* "the course of the economic development" of Russia a hundredfold.

In 1905-07 the contradiction existing between the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry became fully revealed. In the spring and autumn of 1905, as well as in the spring of 1906, *from one-third to one-half* of the uyezds of Central Russia were affected by peasant revolts. The peasants destroyed approximately 2,000 country houses of landlords (unfortunately this is not more than one-fifteenth of what should have been destroyed). The proletariat *alone* wholeheartedly supported this revolutionary struggle, directed it in every way, guided it, and united it by its mass strikes. The liberal bourgeoisie *never* helped this revolutionary struggle; they preferred to "pacify" the peasants and "reconcile" them with the landlords and the tsar. The same thing was then repeated in the parliamentary arena in the first two Dumas (1906 and 1907). *During the whole of that period* the liberals hindered the struggle of the peasants and betrayed them; and it was *only the workers' deputies* who directed and supported the peasants *in opposition to the liberals*. The *entire* history of the First and Second Dumas is full of the struggle of the liberals against the peasants and the Social-Democrats. The struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism is *inseparably* bound up with that history, being a struggle over the question whether to support the liberals or to overthrow the hegemony of the liberals over the peasantry. Therefore, to attribute our splits to the influence of the intelligentsia, to the immaturity of the proletariat, etc., is a childishly naïve repetition of liberal fairy-tales.

For the same reason Trotsky's argument that splits in the international Social-Democratic movement are caused by the "process of adaptation of the social-revolutionary class to the limited (narrow) conditions of parliamentarism", etc., while in the Russian Social-Democratic movement they are caused by the adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat, is absolutely false. Trotsky writes: "While the real political content of this process of adaptation was limited (narrow) from the standpoint of the socialist, final aim,

its forms were unrestrained, and the ideological shadow cast by this process was great."

This truly "unrestrained" phrase-mongering is merely the "ideological shadow" of liberalism. Both Martov and Trotsky mix up different historical periods and compare Russia, which is going through her bourgeois revolution, with Europe, where these revolutions were completed long ago. In Europe the real political content of Social-Democratic work is to prepare the proletariat for the struggle for power against the bourgeoisie, which already holds full sway in the state. In Russia, the question is *still only one of creating* a modern bourgeois state, which will be similar either to a Junker monarchy (in the event of tsarism being victorious over democracy) or to a peasant bourgeois-democratic republic (in the event of democracy being victorious over tsarism). And the victory of democracy in present-day Russia is possible only if the peasant masses follow the lead of the revolutionary proletariat and not that of the treacherous liberals. History has not yet decided this question. The bourgeois revolutions are not yet completed in Russia and *within these bounds*, i.e., within the bounds of the struggle for the *form* of the bourgeois regime in Russia, "the real political content" of the work of Russian Social-Democrats is less "limited" than in countries where there is no struggle for the confiscation of the landed estates by the peasants, where the bourgeois revolutions were completed long ago.

It is easy to understand why the class interests of the bourgeoisie compel the liberals to try to persuade the workers that their role in the revolution is "limited", that the struggle of trends is caused by the intelligentsia, and not by profound economic contradictions, that the workers' party must be "*not* the leader in the struggle for emancipation, *but* a class party". This is the formula that the Golosist liquidators advanced quite recently (Levitsky in *Nasha Zarya*) and which the liberals have approved. They use the term "class party" in the Brentano-Sombart sense: concern yourself only with your own class and abandon "Blanquist dreams" of leading all the revolutionary elements of the people in a struggle against tsarism and treacherous liberalism.

II

Martov's arguments on the Russian revolution and Trotsky's arguments on the present state of Russian Social-Democracy definitely confirm the incorrectness of their fundamental views.

We shall start with the boycott. Martov calls the boycott "abstention from politics", the method of the "anarchists and syndicalists", and he refers *only* to 1906. Trotsky says that the "boycottist tendency runs through the whole history of Bolshevism—boycott of the trade unions, of the State Duma, of local self-government bodies, etc.", that it is the result of sectarian fear of being swamped by the masses, the radicalism of irreconcilable abstention", etc. As regards boycotting the trade unions and the local self-government bodies, what Trotsky says is *absolutely untrue*. It is equally untrue to say that boycottism runs through the whole history of Bolshevism; Bolshevism as a tendency took definite shape in the spring and summer of 1905, *before* the question of the boycott first came up. *In August 1906*, in the official organ of the faction, Bolshevism declared that the historical conditions which made the boycott necessary had passed.*

Trotsky distorts Bolshevism, because he has never been able to form any definite views on the role of the proletariat in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

But far worse is the distortion of the history of this revolution. If we are to speak of the boycott we must start from the beginning, not from the end. The first (and only) victory in the revolution was wrested by the mass movement, which *proceeded under the slogan of the boycott*. It is only to the advantage of the liberals to forget this.

The law of August 6 (19), 1905 created the Bulygin Duma as a consultative body. The liberals, even the most radical of them, decided to participate in this Duma. The Social-Democrats, by an enormous majority (against the Mensheviks), decided to boycott it and to call upon the masses for a direct onslaught on tsarism, for a mass strike and an uprising. Hence, the question of the boycott was not a question within Social-Democracy alone. It was a question

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 141-49.—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

of the struggle of *liberalism against the proletariat*. The entire liberal press of that time showed that the liberals feared the development of the revolution and directed all their efforts towards reaching an "agreement" with tsarism.

What were the objective conditions for an immediate mass struggle? The best answer to this is supplied by the statistics of strikes (subdivided into economic and political strikes) and of the peasant movement. We cite here the principal data, which will serve to illustrate the whole of our subsequent exposition.

Number of Persons Involved in Strikes per Quarter (in thousands)*

	1905				1906				1907			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Total	810	481	294	1,277	269	479	296	63	146	323	77	193
Economic Strikes	411	190	143	275	73	222	125	37	52	52	66	30
Political Strikes	399	291	151	1,002	196	257	171	26	94	271	11	163
Per cent of uyezds affected by the peasant movement		14.2%		36.9%	49.2%		21.1%					

These figures reveal what enormous energy the proletariat is capable of displaying during a revolution. In the entire decade preceding the revolution the number of strikers in Russia was only 431,000, i.e., an average of 43,000 per year, while in 1905 the total number of strikers was 2,863,000—at a time when the total number of factory workers was only 1,661,000! The world has never witnessed a strike movement like it. In the third quarter of 1905, when the question of the boycott arose for the first time, we observe the transition to a new and much more powerful wave of the strike movement

* The periods which are of special importance are enclosed in boxes: 1905, I—Jan. 9; 1905, IV—the climax of the revolution, October and December; 1906, II—the First Duma; 1907, II—the Second Duma. The figures are from the official statistics of strikes,[141] which I am working on in detail for the outline of the history of the Russian revolution that I am now preparing for the press (see pp. 393-421 of this volume.—*Ed.*

(and, following it, of the peasant movement). The *real historical content* of the question of the boycott was whether to help the rise of this revolutionary wave and direct it towards the overthrow of tsarism, or whether to allow tsarism to divert the attention of the masses by the game of a consultative Duma. It is therefore easy to see how much triviality and liberal-like obtuseness there is in the efforts to link the boycott in the history of the Russian revolution with "abstention from politics", "sectarianism", etc. Under the slogan of the boycott adopted *against* the liberals a movement arose which brought about an increase in the number of political strikers from 151,000 during the third quarter of 1905 to *one million* during the fourth quarter of 1905.

Martov declares that the "chief cause" of the success of the strikes in 1905 was "the growing current of opposition *in wide bourgeois circles*". "The influence of these wide sections of the bourgeoisie extended so far that they, on the one hand, directly instigated the workers to political strikes," and, on the other, urged the employers "*to pay the wages of the workers during a strike*" (Martov's italics).

We shall contrast this honeyed praise of the "influence" of the bourgeoisie with dry statistics. In 1905 strikes much more frequently ended in favour of the workers than in 1907. Here are the figures for that year: 1,438,610 strikers presented economic demands; 369,304 workers won their fight, 671,590 ended it with a compromise and 397,716 *lost*. Such *in fact* (and not according to liberal fables) was the "influence" of the bourgeoisie. Martov distorts the actual attitude of the proletariat towards the bourgeoisie in a truly liberal fashion. It was not because the bourgeoisie, on rare occasions, paid for the strikes, or came forward in opposition that the workers won (in "economics" and in politics), but it was *because* the workers were winning victories that the bourgeoisie were disaffected and paid. The *force* of the class attack, the force of the strikes in which millions took part, the force of the peasant riots and of the uprisings in the armed forces were the cause, the "*chief cause*", my dear Martov; the "sympathy" of the bourgeoisie was the effect.

Martov writes: "October 17, which opened up prospects of elections to the Duma and made it possible to hold meetings, to form workers' unions and to publish Social-Demo-

cratic newspapers, indicated the direction along which the work should have been conducted." But the trouble was that "the idea of the possibility of a 'strategy of attrition' did not enter anybody's head. The whole movement was being artificially pushed towards a serious and decisive clash, i.e., towards the December strike and the December "sanguinary defeat".

Kautsky disputed with Rosa Luxemburg whether in Germany in the spring of 1910 the moment had come for the transition from the "strategy of attrition" to the "strategy of overthrow", and Kautsky stated plainly and definitely that this transition was *inevitable* if the political crisis developed further. But Martov, clinging to Kautsky's apron-strings, retrospectively advocated the "strategy of attrition" for the period when the revolution reached its highest intensity. No, my dear Martov, you are merely repeating liberal speeches. October 17 did not "open up" "prospects" of a peaceful constitution—that is only a liberal fairy-tale; it opened *civil war*. This war was prepared, not by the subjective will of parties or groups, but by the whole course of events since January 1905. The October Manifesto signified not the cessation of the struggle, but the balancing of the contending forces: tsarism was *no longer* in a position to govern, the revolution was *not yet* in a position to overthrow it. The objectively inevitable consequence of this situation was a decisive struggle. Both in October and in November civil war was a *fact* (and the peaceful "prospects" were a liberal lie); this war found expression not only in pogroms, but also in the struggle by armed force against insubordinate units of the army, against the peasants in one-third of Russia and against the border regions. Those who under such circumstances regard the December armed uprising and mass strike as "*artificial*" can only *artificially* be classed as Social-Democrats. The *natural* party for such people is the liberal party.

In 1848 and in 1871 Marx said that there are moments in a revolution when surrendering to the enemy without a struggle has a more demoralising effect on the masses than defeat in a fight.[142] December 1905 was not only such a moment in the history of the Russian revolution, it was the natural and inevitable culmination of the *mass* encounters

and battles which had been growing in intensity in all parts of the country during the preceding twelve months. *Even* dry statistics bear witness to this fact. The number of persons who took part in *purely* political strikes (i.e., in which no economic demands were presented) was: in January 1905, 123,000; in October, 328,000; in December, *372,000*. And yet there are people who want us to believe that this growth was "artificial"! We are treated to a fairy-tale to the effect that *such* a growth of the mass political struggle, *in addition* to the mutinies in the armed forces, is *possible* without its inevitable development into an armed uprising! No, this is not a history of the revolution, it is a liberal libel on the revolution.

III

Concerning the October strike, Martov writes: "Just at this time, when general excitement reigns among the working masses ... an attempt is made to merge the struggle for political liberty and the economic struggle into a single whole. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg's opinion notwithstanding, this revealed, not the strong, but the weak side of the movement." The attempt to introduce the eight-hour working day by revolutionary means ended in failure and "disorganised" the workers. "The general strike of the post and telegraph employees in November 1905 acted in the same direction." This is the way Martov writes history.

It is sufficient to glance at the statistics given above to see the falsity of this history. Throughout *all* the three years of the revolution we observe that *every time* the political crisis becomes acute there is an upsurge, not only of the political, but also of the economic strike struggle. Not the weakness, but the *strength* of the movement lay in the combination of the two forms of struggle. The opposite view is the view of the liberal bourgeois, for the very thing he wanted was that the workers should take part in politics, *without*, however, the broad masses being drawn into the revolution and into the struggle against the bourgeoisie. It was precisely after October 11 that the liberal Zemstvo movement finally split; the landlords and industrialists formed the openly counter-revolutionary party of the "Octo-

brists", who unleashed all the force of reprisals against the strikers (while in the press the "Left" liberals, the Cadets, accused the workers of "madness"). Martov, echoing the Octobrists and the Cadets, is of the opinion that the "weakness" of the workers lay in the fact that at that very time they were trying to make the economic struggle still more aggressive. In our opinion the weakness of the workers (and still more of the peasants) lay in the fact that they did not resolutely, widely and quickly enough pass to the aggressive economic and armed political struggle which *inevitably* resulted from the *whole* course of events, and not at all from the subjective desires of particular groups or parties. A wide gulf separates our view from Martov's and, in spite of Trotsky's assertions, this gulf between the views of "intellectuals" reflects only the gulf which *in fact* existed at the end of 1905 *between the classes*, namely, between the revolutionary proletariat, which fought, and the bourgeoisie, which behaved in a treacherous manner.

It must be added that defeats of the workers in the strike struggle are characteristic not only of the end of 1905, which Martov seized upon, but to a still greater extent of 1906 and 1907. The statistics show that during the ten years 1895-1904 the employers won 51.6 per cent of the strikes (according to the number of strikers involved); in 1905, 29.4 per cent; in 1906, 33.5 per cent; in 1907, 57.6 per cent; in 1908, 68.8 per cent. Does this mean that the economic strikes of 1906-07 were "mad" and "inopportune", and that they revealed the "weak side of the movement"? No. It means that inasmuch as the offensive of the revolutionary struggle of the masses was not strong enough in 1905, defeat (both in politics and in "economics") was inevitable, but that if the proletariat had not been able to rise at least *twice* for a *new* attack against the enemy (*a quarter of a million persons* involved in *political* strikes alone during the second quarter of 1906 and also 1907), the defeat would have been *still greater*; the coup d'état would have taken place not in June 1907, but a year, or even more than a year, *earlier*, and the workers would have been deprived of the economic gains of 1905 *even sooner* than they were.

It is this significance of the revolutionary struggle of the masses that Martov absolutely fails to understand. Echoing

the liberals, he says, in reference to the boycott at the beginning of 1906, that "for a time the Social-Democrats remained *outside the political line of battle*". From a purely theoretical standpoint such a presentation of the question of the boycott in 1906 is an incredible simplification and vulgarisation of a very complex problem. What was the *real* "line of battle" during the second quarter of 1906—was it parliamentary or extra-parliamentary? Look at the statistics: the number of persons involved in "economic" strikes rose from 73,000 to 222,000, the number of those involved in political strikes rose from 196,000 to 257,000. The number of uyezds affected by the peasant movement rose from 36.9 per cent to 49.2 per cent of the total. It is known that mutinies in the armed forces also increased greatly and became more frequent during the second quarter of 1906 compared with the first. It is known further that the First Duma was the most revolutionary parliament in the world (at the beginning of the twentieth century), yet at the same time it was the most impotent; not a single one of its decisions was put into effect.

Such are the objective facts. In the estimation of the liberals and Martov, these facts show that the Duma was the real "*line of battle*", whereas uprisings, political strikes and the unrest among the peasants and soldiers were the inconsequential affair of "revolutionary romanticists". And the deep-thinking Trotsky is of the opinion that the factional differences that arose on this ground represented an "intellectualist" "struggle for influence over an immature proletariat". In our opinion the objective data prove that in the spring of 1906 there was such a serious upsurge of a real revolutionary *mass* struggle that the Social-Democratic Party *was obliged* to regard precisely that struggle as the principal struggle and exert every effort to support and develop it. In our opinion the specific political situation at that period—when the tsarist government obtained from Europe a two thousand million loan on the security, as it were, of the convocation of the Duma, and when the tsarist government was hastily promulgating laws against the boycott of the Duma—fully justified the attempt made by the proletariat to wrest the convocation of the first parliament in Russia out of the hands of the tsar. In our opinion it was not the

Social-Democrats, but the *liberals*, who "remained *outside the political line of battle*" at that time. Those constitutional illusions, on the spread of which among the masses the whole career of the liberals in the revolution was based, were most glaringly refuted by the history of the First Duma.

In both the First and the Second Dumas the liberals (Cadets) had a majority and occupied the political foreground with much noise and fuss. But it was just these liberal "victories" that clearly showed that the liberals remained all the time "outside the political line of battle", that they were political comedians who deeply corrupted the democratic consciousness of the masses. And if Martov and his friends, echoing the liberals, point to the heavy defeats of the revolution as an object-lesson of "*what should not be done*", our answer to them is, firstly, that the only real victory gained by the revolution was the victory of the proletariat, which rejected the liberal advice to enter the Bulygin Duma and led the peasant masses to an uprising; secondly, by the heroic struggle it waged during the course of three yeas (1905-07) the Russian proletariat won for itself and for the Russian people gains that took other nations decades to win. It won the *emancipation* of the working masses *from the influence* of treacherous and contemptibly impotent *liberalism*. It won *for itself the hegemony* in the struggle for freedom and democracy as a pre-condition of the struggle for socialism. It won for all the oppressed and exploited classes of Russia the *ability* to wage a revolutionary mass struggle, without which nothing of importance in the progress of mankind has been achieved anywhere in the world.

These gains cannot be taken away from the Russian proletariat by any reaction, or by any hatred, abuse and malice on the part of the liberals, or by any vacillation, short-sightedness and lack of faith on the part of the socialist opportunists.

IV

The development of the factions in Russian Social-Democracy since the revolution is also to be explained, not by the "adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat", but by the changes in the relations between the classes. The

Revolution of 1905-07 accentuated, brought out into the open and placed on the order of the day the antagonism between the peasants and the liberal bourgeoisie over the question of the *form* of a bourgeois regime in Russia. The politically mature proletariat could not but take a most energetic part in this struggle, and its attitude to the various classes of the new society was reflected in the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism.

The three years 1908-10 are marked by the victory of the counter-revolution, by the restoration of the autocracy and by the Third Duma, the Duma of the Black Hundreds and Octobrists. The struggle between the bourgeois classes over the form of the new regime has ceased to be in the forefront. The proletariat is now confronted with the *elementary* task of preserving its proletarian party, which is hostile both to the reaction and to counter-revolutionary liberalism. This task is not an easy one, because it is the proletariat that suffers all the brunt of economic and political persecution, and all the hatred of the liberals because the leadership of the masses in the revolution has been wrested from them by the Social-Democrats.

The crisis in the Social-Democratic Party is very grave. The organisations are shattered. A large number of veteran leaders (especially among the intellectuals) have been arrested. A new type of Social-Democratic worker, who is taking the affairs of the Party in hand, has already appeared, but he has to overcome extraordinary difficulties. Under such conditions the Social-Democratic Party is losing many of its "fellow-travellers". It is natural that petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" should have joined the socialists during the bourgeois revolution. Now they are falling away from Marxism and from Social-Democracy. This process is observed in both factions: among the Bolsheviks in the shape of the "otzovist" tendency, which arose in the spring of 1908, suffered defeat immediately at the Moscow Conference, and after a long struggle was rejected by the official centre of the faction and formed a *separate faction* abroad—the *Vperyod* faction. The specific character of the period of disintegration was expressed in the fact that this faction united those Machists who introduced into their *platform* the struggle against Marxism (under the guise of defence of "proletarian

philosophy") and the ,"ultimatumists", those shamefaced otzovists, as well as various types of "days-of-freedom Social-Democrats", who were carried away by "spectacular" slogans, which they learned by rote, but who *failed to understand* the fundamentals of Marxism.

Among the Mensheviks the same process of the falling away of petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" was expressed in the liquidationist tendency, now fully formulated in Mr. Potresov's magazine *Nasha Zarya*, in *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Zhizn*, in the stand taken by "the Sixteen" and "the trio" (Mikhail, Roman, Yuri), while *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, published abroad, acted as a *servant* of the Russian liquidators in fact and a diplomatic disguise for them before the Party membership.

Failing to understand the historical and economic significance of this disintegration in the era of counter-revolution, of this *falling away of non-Social-Democratic* elements from the Social-Democratic Labour Party, Trotsky tells the German readers that *both* factions are "falling *to pieces*", that the Party is "falling *to pieces*", that the Party is "*demoralised*."

It is not true. And this untruth expresses, firstly, Trotsky's utter lack of theoretical understanding. Trotsky has absolutely failed to understand why the plenum described *both* liquidationism *and* otzovism as a "manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat". Just think: is the severance from the Party of trends which have been condemned by the Party, and which express *bourgeois* influence on the proletariat, an indication of the Party's disintegration, of its demoralisation, or is it an indication of its becoming stronger and purer?

Secondly, in practice, this untruth expresses the "policy" of *advertisement* pursued by Trotsky's faction. That Trotsky's venture is an attempt to create a faction is now obvious to all, since Trotsky has removed the Central Committee's representative from *Pravda*. In advertising his faction Trotsky does not hesitate to tell the Germans that the Party is falling *to pieces*, that *both* factions are falling to pieces and that he, Trotsky, alone, is saving the situation. Actually, we all see now—and the latest resolution adopted by the Trotskyists (in the name of the Vienna Club, on November 26, 1910) proves this quite conclusively—that Trotsky enjoys

the *confidence exclusively* of the liquidators and the Vperyodists.

The extent of Trotsky's shamelessness in belittling the Party and exalting himself before the Germans is shown, for instance, by the following. Trotsky writes that the "working masses" in Russia consider that the "Social-Democratic Party stands *outside* [Trotsky's italics] their circle" and he talks of "Social-Democrats without Social-Democracy".

How could one expect Mr. Potresov and his friends to refrain from bestowing kisses on Trotsky for such statements?

But these statements are refuted not only by the *entire* history of the revolution, but even by the results of the elections to the Third Duma from the workers' curia.

Trotsky writes that "owing to their former ideological and organisational structure, the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions proved altogether incapable" of working in legal organisations; work was carried on by "individual groups of Social-Democrats, but all this took place outside the factions, outside their organisational influence". "Even the most important legal organisation, in which the Mensheviks predominate, works completely outside the control of the Menshevik faction." That is what Trotsky writes. But the facts are as follows. From the very beginning of the existence of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, the Bolshevik faction, through its representatives authorised by the Central Committee of the Party, has all the time assisted, aided, advised, and supervised the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma. The same is done by the editorial board of the Central Organ of the Party, which consists of representatives of the factions (which were dissolved as factions in January 1910).

When Trotsky gives the German comrades a detailed account of the stupidity of "otzovism" and describes this trend as a "crystallisation" of the boycottism characteristic of Bolshevism as a whole, and then mentions in a few words that Bolshevism "did not allow itself to be overpowered" by otzovism, but "attacked it resolutely or rather in an unbridled fashion"—the German reader certainly gets no idea how much subtle perfidy there is in such an exposition. Trotsky's Jesuitical "reservation" consists in omitting a small, very

small "detail". He "forgot" to mention that at an official meeting of its representatives held as far back as the spring of 1909, the Bolshevik faction repudiated and expelled the otzovists. But it is just this "detail" that is inconvenient for Trotsky, who wants to talk of the "falling *to pieces*" of the Bolshevik faction (and then of the Party as well) and not of the *falling away* of the non-Social-Democratic elements!

We now regard Martov as one of the leaders of liquidationism, one who is the more dangerous the more "cleverly" he defends the liquidators by quasi-Marxist phrases. But Martov openly expounds views which have put their stamp on whole tendencies in the mass labour movement of 1903-10. Trotsky, on the other hand, represents only his own personal vacillations and nothing more. In 1903 he was a Menshevik; he abandoned Menshevism in 1904, returned to the Mensheviks in 1905 and merely flaunted ultra-revolutionary phrases; in 1906 he left them again; at the end of 1906 he advocated electoral agreements with the Cadets (i.e., he was in fact once more with the Mensheviks); and in the spring of 1907, at the London Congress, he said that he differed from Rosa Luxemburg on "individual shades of ideas rather than on political tendencies". One day Trotsky plagiarises from the ideological stock-in-trade of one faction; the next day he plagiarises from that of another, and therefore declares himself to be standing *above* both factions. In theory Trotsky is on *no* point in agreement with either the liquidators or the otzovists, but *in actual practice he is in entire* agreement with both the Golosists and the Vperyodists.

Therefore, when Trotsky tells the German comrades that he represents the "general Party tendency", I am obliged to declare that Trotsky represents only *his own* faction and enjoys a certain amount of confidence *exclusively* among the otzovists and the liquidators. The following facts prove the correctness of my statement. In January 1910, the Central Committee of our Party established close ties with Trotsky's newspaper *Pravda* and appointed a representative of the Central Committee to sit on the editorial board. In September 1910, the Central Organ of the Party announced a *rupture* between the representative of the Central Committee and Trotsky owing to Trotsky's anti-Party policy. In Copenhagen, Plekhanov, as the representative of the pro-Party

Mensheviks and delegate of the editorial board of the Central Organ, together with the present writer, as the representative of the Bolsheviks, and a Polish comrade, entered an emphatic protest against the way Trotsky represents our Party affairs in the German press.

Let the readers now judge for themselves whether Trotsky represents a "general Party", or a "general *anti*-Party" trend in Russian Social-Democracy.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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STRIKE STATISTICS IN RUSSIA[143]

Written at the end of 1910

Published December 1910
and January 1911
in the magazine *Mysl* Nos. 1 and 2
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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I

The well-known publications of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, *Statistics of Workers' Strikes in Factories and Mills* for the decade 1895-1904 and for 1905-08, have been commented on in our press on a number of occasions. There is such a wealth of valuable material collected in these publications that a complete study and thorough analysis of it will require a great deal of time. The analysis made in them is but a first, and very far from adequate, approach to the subject. In the present article we intend to acquaint the readers with the preliminary results of an attempt at a more detailed analysis, deferring a full exposition of the subject for publication elsewhere.

To begin with, the fact has been fully established that the strike movement in Russia in the years 1905-07 represented a phenomenon unparalleled anywhere else in the world. Here are the figures showing the number of strikers (in thousands) by years and countries:

	Average	Russia	U.S.A.	Germany	France
for	1895-1904	431			
”	1905	2,863	660	527	438
”	1906	1,108	Maximum number during the fifteen years 1894-1904		
”	1907	740			
”	1908	176			
”	1909	64			

The three-year period 1905-07 is particularly remarkable. The minimum number of strikers in Russia during these three years is greater than the maximum ever attained in any of the most developed capitalist countries. This does not mean, of course, that the Russian workers are more highly developed or stronger than the workers in the West.

But it does mean that mankind had never known before what energy the industrial proletariat is *capable* of displaying in this sphere. The specific feature of the historical course of events was expressed in the fact that the approximate dimensions of this capability were first revealed in a backward country which is still passing through a bourgeois revolution.

In order to be clear on the question as to how it happened that, with the rather small number of factory workers in Russia compared with Western Europe, the number of strikers was so large, we must bear in mind the *repeated* strikes. Here are figures showing the percentage of repeated strikes by years and the ratio between the number of strikers and the number of workers:

Years	The number of strikers as a percentage of the total number of workers	The number of repeated strikes as a percentage of the total number of strikes
1895-1904	1.46%-5.10%	36.2%
1905	163.8	85.5
1906	65.8	74.5
1907	41.9	51.8
1908	9.7	25.4

Hence we see that the triennium 1905-07, which is conspicuous for the number of strikers, is also distinguished for the frequency of repeated strikes and for the high percentage of strikers in relation to the total number of workers.

The statistical data cover also the number of establishments in which strikes occurred and the number of workers who took part in those strikes. Here are the figures for the various years:

	Percentage of strikers in establishments affected by strikes, in relation to the total number of workers
Aggregate for ten years (1895-1904)	27.0%
1905	60.0
1906	37.9
1907	32.1
1908	11.9

This table, like the preceding one, shows that the decline in the number of strikers in 1907 compared with 1906 was,

in general, *considerably less* than the decline in 1906 compared with 1905. We shall see further on that some industries and some districts registered not a decline, but an intensification of the strike movement in 1907 compared with 1906. For the time being we shall note that the figures by gubernias of the number of workers who actually participated in strikes reveal the following interesting phenomena. Compared with 1905 the percentage of workers who took part in strikes in 1906 declined in the overwhelming majority of industrially developed gubernias. On the other hand, there were a number of gubernias in which this percentage *increased* in 1906. They were those least developed industrially, and most out-of-the-way, as it were. They include, for instance, the gubernias of the Far North: Archangel (11,000 factory workers; in 1905, 0.4 per cent of the workers took part in strikes, in 1906—78.6 per cent); Vologda (6,000 factory workers; 26.8 and 40.2 per cent for the years mentioned), Olonets (1,000 factory workers; 0 and 2.6 per cent); then there is Chornoye Morye (Black Sea) Gubernia (1,000 factory workers; 42.4 and 93.5 per cent); of Volga Region—Simbirsk (14,000 factory workers; 10 and 33.9 per cent); of the central agricultural gubernias—Kursk (18,000 factory workers; 14.4 and 16.9 per cent); in the Eastern border area, Orenburg (3,000 factory workers; 3.4 and 29.4 per cent).

The significance of the increase in the percentage of workers who took part in strikes in these provinces in 1906 compared with 1905 is clear: the wave had not reached them in 1905; they began to be drawn into the movement only after a year of unparalleled struggle on the part of the more advanced workers. We shall come across this phenomenon—one very important for an understanding of the historical course of events—more than once in our further exposition.

On the other hand, in 1907 compared with 1906 the percentage of workers who took part in strikes increased in some gubernias that are very highly developed industrially: for instance St. Petersburg (68 per cent in 1906 and 85.7 per cent in 1907—almost as high as in 1905, when 85.9 per cent of the workers took part in strikes), Vladimir (37.1 and 49.6 per cent), Baku (32.9 and 85.5 per cent), Kiev (10.9 and 11.4 per cent), and several others. Consequently, while the increased percentage of strikers in 1906 compared with 1905

in a number of gubernias reveals the rearguard of the working class, which had lagged behind at the moment of the highest development of the struggle, the increase of this percentage in 1907 as compared with 1906 in a number of other gubernias shows us the vanguard of the working class striving to raise the struggle again, to halt the retreat that had begun.

In order to make this correct conclusion even more precise, we shall quote the absolute figures of the number of workers and the number of actual strikers in the gubernias of the first and of the second category:

Gubernias in which the percentage of workers who took part in strikes increased in 1906 compared with 1905:

Number of such gubernias	Number of factory workers in them	Number of workers who actually took part in strikes	
		in 1905	in 1906
10	61,800	6,564	21,484

The average number of factory workers per gubernia is 6,000. The increase in the number of workers who actually took part in strikes totalled 15,000.

Gubernias in which the percentage of workers who took part in strikes increased in 1907 compared with 1906:

Number of such gubernias	Number of factory workers in them	Number of workers who actually took part in strikes	
		in 1906	in 1907
19	572,132	186,926	285,673

The average number of factory workers per gubernia is 30,000. The increase in the number of workers who actually took part in strikes amounted to 100,000, or, if we exclude the Baku oil workers who were not included in the figures for 1906 (probably not more than 20-30,000), to about 70,000.

The role of the rearguard in 1906 and of the vanguard in 1907 is clearly seen from these figures.

For a still more exact idea of the extent of the movement we must take the figures for the various areas of Russia and compare the number of strikers with the number of factory workers. Here is a summary of these figures:

Factory areas	Number of factory workers in 1905 (thousands)	Number of strikers (in thousands) per year				
		1895-1904 total	1905	1906	1907	1908
I. St. Petersburg .	298	137	1,033	307	325	44
II. Moscow	567	123	540	170	154	28
III. Warsaw	252	69	887	525	104	35
IV.—VI. Kiev, Volga and Kharkov .	543	102	403	106	157*	69*
Total . . .	1,660	431	2,863	1,108	740	176

The extent to which the workers took part in the movement varied in the different districts. Altogether there were 2,863,000 strikers in 1905 to a total of 1,660,000 workers, or 164 strikers for every 100 workers; in other words, on the average more than half of all the workers struck twice in that year. But this average glosses over the fundamental distinction between the St. Petersburg and Warsaw areas, on the one hand, and all the other areas, on the other. The St. Petersburg and Warsaw areas together comprise one-third of all the factory workers (550,000 out of 1,660,000), but they accounted for two-thirds of all the strikers (1,920,000 out of 2,863,000). In these areas every worker struck, on the average, nearly four times in 1905. In the other areas there were 943,000 strikers to 1,110,000 workers, i.e., the proportion of strikers was only a quarter of that in the two abovementioned areas. This by itself shows how wrong are the assertions of the liberals, which are repeated by our liquidators, that the workers overestimated their strength. On the contrary, the facts prove that they underestimated their strength, for they did not make full use of it. Had the energy and persistence displayed in the strike struggle (we refer here only to this one form of struggle) been the same through-

* These figures are not strictly comparable with the figures for the preceding years, since the oil workers were not included in the data prior to 1907. The resulting increase is probably not more than 20-30,000.

out Russia as they were in the St. Petersburg and Warsaw areas, the total number of strikers would have been *twice as many*. This conclusion can also be expressed in the following way: the workers were able to estimate only one-half of their strength in this sphere of the movement, for they had not yet brought the other half into play. In geographical terms, this may be stated as follows: the West and Northwest had woken up, but the Centre, the East and the South were still half asleep. The development of capitalism contributes something every day to awakening the tardy.

Another important conclusion from the figures by areas is that in 1906 compared with 1905 the movement declined everywhere, although unevenly; in 1907 compared with 1906 there was a very large decline in the Warsaw area and a rather slight decline in the Moscow, Kiev and Volga areas, whereas in the St. Petersburg and Kharkov areas there was an increase in the number of strikers. This means that, with the level of political consciousness and preparedness of the population as it was at the time, this particular form of the movement had exhausted itself in 1905; inasmuch as the objective contradictions in social and political life had not disappeared, the movement was bound to pass to a higher form. But after a year of recuperation, as it were, or of the mustering of forces during 1906, there were signs of a new upsurge, which actually began in part of the country. In appraising this period the liberals, echoed by the liquidators, speak contemptuously about "the expectations of the romanticists"; a Marxist, however, must state that by refusing to support this partial upsurge the liberals frustrated the last opportunity of upholding the democratic gains.

As regards the territorial distribution of the strikers, it should be noted that the vast majority of them is accounted for by six gubernias with highly developed industries, and with big cities in five of them. The six gubernias are: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Warsaw, Petrokov and Livonia. In 1905 there were 827,000 factory workers in these gubernias, out of a total of 1,661,000; thus they accounted for nearly half of the total. As for the number of strikers in these gubernias, there were 246,000 in all during the decade 1895-1904, out of 431,000, or about 60 per cent of the total number of strikers; in 1905 there were 2,072,000 out of a total of



Diagram of the number of strikers per quarter, 1910
Shaded area—participants in political strikes
Unshaded area—participants in economic strikes
(From V. I. Lenin's rough notebook
"Strike Statistics in Russia", *Lenin Miscellany XXV*)

2,863,000, or about 70 per cent; in 1906—852,000 out of a total of 1,108,000, i.e., approximately 75 per cent; in 1907—517,000 out of a total of 740,000, or approximately 70 per cent; in 1908—85,000 out of a total of 176,000, i.e., less than a half.*

Consequently, the role of these six gubernias was *greater* during the three-year period 1905-07 than in the period before or after it. It is therefore clear that the big urban centres, including the capitals, displayed a considerably greater energy than all the other localities during these three years. The workers scattered in villages and in relatively small industrial centres and towns, comprising half of the total number of workers, accounted for 40 per cent of the total number of strikers in the decade 1895-1904, and for only 25-30 per cent during the period 1905-07. Supplementing the conclusion we arrived at above, we may say that the big cities had woken up, while the small towns and villages were largely still asleep.

As regards the countryside in general, i.e., as regards the factory workers living in villages, we have additional statistical data covering the *number of strikes* (but not that of strikers) in towns and non-urban localities. Here are the figures:

	Number of strikes		
Total for the ten years	In cities	In non-urban localities	Total
1895-1904	1,326	439	1,765
1905	11,891	2,104	13,995
1906	5,328	786	6,114
1907	3,258	315	3,573
1908	767	125	892

In citing these data, the compilers of the official statistics point out that, according to the well-known investigations of Mr. Pogozhev, 40 per cent of all the factories in Russia are located in towns, and 60 per cent in non-urban localities.[144] Consequently, in the normal period (1895-1904), while the number of strikes in the towns was three times as high as in the rural districts, the number of strikes

* In 1908, Baku Gubernia topped the list with 47,000 strikers. The last of the Mohicans of the mass political strike!

as a percentage of the number of establishments was *4½ times* as great in the towns as in the rural districts. In 1905 this ratio was approximately 8:1; in 1906 it was 9:1; in 1907 —15:1 and in 1908*—6:1. In other words, compared with the part played by the factory workers in the villages, the *part played* by the urban factory workers in the strike movement was considerably greater in 1905 than in the previous years; moreover, their role became greater and greater in 1906 and 1907, i.e., proportionately the part played in the movement by the village workers became less and less. The factory workers in the villages, less prepared for the struggle by the preceding decade (1895-1904), showed the least firmness and were the quickest to retreat after 1905. The vanguard, i.e., the urban factory workers, made a special effort in 1906, and a *still greater* effort in 1907, to halt this retreat.

Let us now examine the distribution of the strikers according to industries. For this purpose we single out four main groups of industries: A) metal-workers; B) textile-workers; C) printers, wood-workers, leather-workers, and workers in chemical industries; D) workers in the mineral products industries and food industries. Here are the figures for the different years:

Groups of industries	Total number of factory workers in 1904 (thousands)	Number of strikers (in thousands) for the year				
		1895-1904 total	1905	1906	1907	1908
A	252	117	811	213	193	41
B	708	237	1,296	640	302	56
C	277	38	471	170	179	24
D	454	39	285	85	66	55
Total	1,691	431	2,863	1,108	740	176

The metal-workers were best prepared by the decade preceding 1905. During that decade nearly half of them took

* The figures for 1908 include 228 strikes., and the figures for 1907 include 230 strikes, in the oilfields, which for the first time came under the Inspectorate in 1906.

part in strikes (117,000 out of 252,000). Since they were the best prepared, they made the best showing in 1905 as well. The number of strikers among them was *more than three times* the total number of workers (811,000 as against 252,000). Their role as vanguard stands out even more clearly when we examine the monthly figures for 1905 (it is impossible to give a detailed analysis of these figures in a short article, and we shall do so elsewhere). In 1905 the month with the maximum number of strikers among the metal-workers was not October, as was the case in *all* the other groups of industries, but January. The vanguard displayed the maximum energy in inaugurating the movement; "stirring up" the entire mass. In January 1905 alone 155,000 metal-workers went on strike, i.e., two-thirds of their total number (252,000). In that month alone more metal-workers were on strike than in all the preceding ten years (155,000 as against 117,000). But this, almost superhuman, energy exhausted the strength of the vanguard towards the end of 1905; in 1906 the metal-workers account for the biggest decline in the movement. The maximum drop in the number of strikers is among them: from 811,000 to 213,000, i.e., by nearly three-fourths. In 1907 the vanguard had again gathered strength: the total decline in the number of strikers was very slight (from 213,000 to 193,000), and in the three most important branches—namely, engineering, shipbuilding and foundries—the number of strikers actually *increased* from 104,000 in 1906 to 125,000 in 1907.

The textile-workers constitute the main mass of the Russian factory workers—a little less than half the total (708,000 out of 1,691,000). As regards their preparatory experience in the ten years prior to 1905 they, occupy the second place: one-third of their number (237,000 out of 708,000) took part in strikes. They also occupy the second place for the intensity of the movement among them in 1905: about 180 strikers to every 100 workers. They entered the struggle later than the metal-workers: in January the number of strikers among them was slightly greater than among the metal-workers (164,000 as against 155,000), but in October they had more than twice as many strikers (256,000 as against 117,000). Having entered the struggle later, this main mass proved to be the most firm of all in 1906: in that year the decline

was general, but it was *smallest of all* among the textile-workers, the number of strikers among them dropping by a half (640,000 as against 1,296,000), compared with a decrease of nearly three-quarters among the metal-workers (from 811,000 to 213,000) and of from three-fifths to five-sevenths among the other groups. Only by 1907 was the force of the main mass also exhausted: in 1907 it was this group which showed the *greatest* drop, by more than a half compared with 1906 (302,000 as against 640,000).

Without making a detailed analysis of the figures for the other industries, we shall only note that group D lags behind all of them. It was the least prepared, and its part in the movement was the smallest. If we take the metal-workers as the standard, it may be said that group D "defaulted" to the extent of over a million strikers in 1905 alone.

The relation between the metal-workers and the textile-workers is characteristic as reflecting the relation between the advanced section and the broad mass of the workers. Owing to the absence of-free organisations, a free press, a parliamentary platform; etc., during the period 1895-1904, the masses could rally in 1905 only spontaneously, in the course of the struggle itself. This process took the form of successive waves of strikers; but in order to "stir up" the broad mass, the vanguard was obliged to spend such a tremendous amount of energy at the beginning of the movement that it proved relatively weakened when the movement reached its apogee. In January 1905, there were 444,000 strikers, including 155,000 metal-workers, i.e., 34 per cent of the total; in October, however, when the number of strikers reached 519,000, the number of metal-workers among them was 117,000, i.e., 22 per cent. It is obvious that this unevenness of the movement was tantamount to a certain dissipation of forces owing to the fact that they were scattered, insufficiently concentrated. This means, firstly, that the effect might have been heightened if the forces had been better concentrated, and, secondly, that owing to the objective conditions characteristic of the period under discussion at the beginning of each wave a number of groping actions, as it were, reconnaissances, trial moves, etc., were inevitable and were necessary for the success of the movement. Therefore, when the liberals, echoed by liquidators like Martov,

proceeding from their theory that "the proletariat had overestimated its forces", accuse us of having "followed in the wake of the spontaneous class struggle", these gentlemen are condemning themselves and are paying us, against their will, the greatest compliment.

In concluding our review of the strike figures for each year, we shall deal also with the figures showing the size and the duration of the strikes, and the losses incurred as a result of the strikes.

The average number of strikers per establishment was as follows:

In the ten years 1895-1904	244
" 1905	205
" 1906	181
" 1907	207
" 1908	197

The decrease in the size of strikes (as regards the number of workers involved) in 1905 is explained by the fact that a great number of small establishments joined the struggle, thus lowering the average number of strikers per establishment. The further decrease in 1906 apparently reflects the waning energy of the struggle. 1907 shows a certain advance.

If we take the average number of workers who took part in purely political strikes, we get the following figures for the various years: 1905—180; 1906—174; 1907—203; 1908—197. These figures indicate even more strikingly the waning energy of the struggle in 1906 and its new growth in 1907, or (and, perhaps, at the same time) the fact that it was mostly the biggest establishments that took part in the movement in 1907.

The number of days on strike per striker was as follows:

In the ten years 1895-1904	4.8
" 1905	8.7
" 1906	4.9
" 1907	3.2
" 1908	4.9

The persistence of the struggle, as characterised by the above figures, was greatest in 1905; then it diminished rapidly until 1907, showing a new increase only in 1908. It should be pointed out that, as regards the persistence of

the struggle, strikes in Western Europe are on an incomparably higher level. In the five-year period 1894-98 the number of days on strike per striker was 10.3 in Italy, 12.1 in Austria, 14.3 in France, and 34.2 in Britain.

Taking separately the purely political strikes, the figures are as follows: 1905—7 days per striker, 1906—1.5 days, 1907—1 day. Economic strikes are always more protracted.

If we bear in mind the difference in the persistence of the strike struggles in the different years, we arrive at the conclusion that the figures of the number of strikers are not sufficient to give a proper idea of the relative sizes of the movement in these years. An accurate index is provided by figures of striker-days, which were as follows:

		Of which in purely political strikes
In the ten years 1895-1904 a total of	2,079,408	—
" 1905 " " "	23,609,387	7,569,708
" 1906 " " "	5,512,749	763,605
" 1907 " " "	2,433,123	521,647
" 1908 " " "	864,666	89,021

Thus we see that the accurate figures representing the size of the movement in the year 1905 alone are *more than 11 times* as great as those for all the preceding ten years taken together. In other words, the size of the movement in 1905 was *115 times* as great as the *average per year* for the preceding decade.

This ratio shows us how purblind are those people, whom we encounter only too often among the representatives of official science (and not only among them), who consider the tempo of social-political development in the so-called "peaceful", "organic", "evolutionary" periods as the standard for all times, as the index of the highest possible pace of development modern humanity can achieve. Actually, the tempo of "development" in the so-called "organic" periods is an index of the greatest stagnation, of the greatest obstacles placed in the way of development.

The compiler of the official statistics uses the figures of the number of striker-days to determine the losses incurred by industry. These losses (representing the drop in output) amounted to 10,400,000 rubles in the ten years 1895-1904,

to 127,300,000 rubles in 1905, to 31,200,000 rubles in 1906, to 15,000,000 rubles in 1907, and to 5,800,000 rubles in 1908. In the three years 1905-07, therefore, the drop in output amounted to 173,500,000 rubles.

The losses of the workers in unpaid wages for strike days (determined in accordance with the average daily wages in the various industries) were as follows:

Groups of industries (see above p. 18*)	Number of factory workers in 1905 (thousands)	Losses incurred by workers as a result of strikes (in thousands of rubles)				
		1895-1904 total	1905	1906	1907	1908
A	252	650	7,654	891	450	132
B	708	715	6,794	1,968	659	228
C	277	137	1,997	610	576	69
D	454	95	1,096	351	130	22
Total	1,691	1,597	17,541	3,820	1,815	451

In the three years 1905-07 the losses of the workers amounted to 23,200,000 rubles, or over 14 times more than in the entire preceding decade.** According to the calculation of the compiler of the official statistics, the average loss per worker employed in factories (and not per striker) amounted

* See p. 402 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** It should be borne in mind that in the period when the movement was at its height the workers compelled the employers to cover *part* of these losses. Beginning with 1905, the statistics had to deal with a special cause of strikes (Cause Group *3 b*, according to the official nomenclature): *demand of pay for the time of the strike*. In 1905 there were 632 cases when this demand was presented in 1906—256 cases, in 1907—48 cases, and in 1908—9 cases (prior to 1905 this demand was never presented). The results of the struggle of the workers for this demand are known only for the years 1906 and 1907, and only two or three cases when this was the *main* demand: in 1906, out of 10,966 workers who struck primarily for this demand: 2,171 won the strike, 2,626 lost, and 6,169 concluded a compromise. In 1907, out of 93 workers who struck primarily for this demand, not one won the strike, 52 lost, and 41 compromised. From what we know of the strikes in 1905 we may surmise that in that year the strikes for this demand were more successful than in 1906.

to about ten kopeks a year during the first decade, about ten rubles in 1905, about two rubles in 1906, and about one ruble in 1907. But this calculation leaves out of account the enormous differences in this respect between the workers of the various industries. Here is a more detailed calculation made on the basis of the figures quoted in the above table:

Groups of industries	Average loss (in rubles) caused by strikes, per factory worker				
	Total for 10 years 1895-1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
A	2.6	29.9	3.5	1.8	0.5
B	1.0	9.7	2.8	0.9	0.3
C	0.5	7.2	2.2	2.1	0.2
D	0.2	2.4	0.7	0.3	0.05
Total	0.9	10.4	2.3	1.1	0.3

Hence, we see that the losses per metal-worker (Group A) amounted to nearly 30 rubles in 1905, or three times more than the average, and over ten times more than the average loss per worker in the mineral products industries and in the food industries (Group D). The conclusion we arrived at above, namely, that by the end of 1905 the metal-workers had spent their strength in this particular form of the movement, is even more strikingly confirmed by this table: in Group A the amount of the losses dropped to less than one-eighth in the period from 1905 to 1906; whereas in the other groups it dropped to one-third or one-fourth.

This concludes the analysis of the strike statistics by years. In the next section we shall deal with the monthly figures.

II

A year is too long a period to enable us to investigate the wave-like character of the strike movement. The statistics now give us the right to say that during the three years 1905-07 every month counted for a year. In those three years the working-class movement advanced a full thirty years.

In 1905 there was not a single month when the number of strikers dropped below the minimum *per year* during the decade 1895-1904; there were but two such months in 1906 and two in 1907.

It is to be regretted that the treatment of the monthly data, as well as of the data for the separate gubernias, is very unsatisfactory in the official statistics. Many summaries need to be worked out anew. For this reason, and also for considerations of space, we shall confine ourselves for the time being to the *quarterly* data. With regard to the breakdown into economic and political strikes, it should be noted that the official statistics for 1905 and for 1906-07 are not quite comparable. Strikes of a mixed nature—in the official statistics Group 12 with economic demands and Group 12 b with economic demands—were classified as political in 1905 and as economic in the subsequent years. We shall classify them as economic strikes in 1905 too.

Number of strikers (in thousands)[145]

Year	1905				1906				1907			
Quarter	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Total	810	481	294	1,277	269	479	296	63	146	323	77	193
Of which Econ.	604	239	165	430	73	222	125	37	52	52	66	30
Of which Polit.	206	242	129	847	196	257	171	26	94	271	11	163

The boxes indicate the periods during which the wave rose highest. It is obvious from even a cursory glance at the table that these periods coincide with political events of cardinal importance that are characteristic of the entire triennium. 1905, first quarter—January 9 and its consequences; 1905, fourth quarter—the October and December events; 1906, second quarter—the First Duma; 1907, second quarter—the Second Duma; the last quarter of 1907 shows the least rise occasioned by the November political strike (134,000 strikers) in connection with the trial of the workers' deputies of the Second Duma. Hence this period, which completes the triennium and represents a transition to a new stage in Russian history, is just that exception which proves the rule: the rise of the strike wave in this case does not imply a general social-political upsurge, but on closer examination we

see that there was really no strike wave—but only an isolated demonstration strike.

The rule applying to the triennium that we are studying is that the rise of the strike wave indicates crucial turning-points in the entire social and political evolution of the country. The strike statistics show us graphically what was the principal driving force of this evolution. This does not mean, of course, that the form of the movement we are examining was the sole or the highest form—we know that this was not the case; nor does it mean that we can draw direct conclusions from this form of the movement with regard to particular questions of social and political evolution. But it does mean that what we have before us is a statistical picture (far from complete, of course) of the movement of the class which was the mainspring responsible for the general direction taken by events. The movements of the other classes are grouped around this centre; they follow it, their direction is determined (in a favourable or unfavourable way) by it, they depend on it.

One has only to recall the principal moments in the political history of Russia during the triennium under review to realise that this conclusion is correct. Let us take the first quarter of 1905. What did we see on the eve of this period? The well-known Zemstvo banquet campaign. Was it right to regard the actions of the workers in that campaign as "the highest type of demonstration"? Was the talk about refraining from causing "panic" among the liberals justified? Consider these questions in conjunction with the strike statistics (1903—87,000 strikers; 1904—25,000; January 1905—444,000, including 123,000 political strikers), and the answer will be obvious. The above-mentioned controversy over the question of the tactics in the Zemstvo campaign only reflected the antagonism between the liberal and working-class movements, an antagonism rooted in objective conditions.

What do we see after the January upsurge?* The well-known February edicts, which marked the inauguration

* The quarterly data would make it appear that there was only one upsurge. Actually, there were two: in January, with 444,000 strikers, and in May, with 220,000 strikers. In the interval between these two months, March accounted for the minimum number of strikers—73,000.

of a certain amount of change in the organisation of the state.

Take the third quarter of 1905. The principal event in the political history was the law of August 6 (the so-called Bulygin Duma). Was that law destined to be put into effect? The liberals thought that it was and decided to act accordingly. In the camp of the Marxists a contrary view prevailed, which was not shared by those who objectively supported the views of the liberals. The events of the last quarter of 1905 decided the controversy.

The figures referring to whole quarters make it appear that there was one upsurge at the end of 1905. Actually there were two, separated by an interval during which there was a slight abatement of the movement. The number of strikers in October was 519,000, including 328,000 involved in purely political strikes; in November 325,000 (including 147,000 in political strikes), and in December 433,000 (including 372,000 in political strikes). Publications dealing with the history of the period express the view of the liberals and our liquidators (Cherevanin and Co.), according to which there was an element of "artificiality" in the December upsurge. The statistical data refute this view, for they show that it was precisely this month that accounted for the *highest* number of workers involved in purely political strikes—372,000. The tendencies that impelled the liberals to arrive at their particular appraisal are obvious, but from a purely scientific standpoint it is absurd to regard a movement of such dimensions as at all "artificial", when in one month the number of workers involved in purely political strikes was almost nine-tenths of the total number of strikers during a whole decade.

Finally, let us consider the last two waves—in the spring of 1906 and in the spring of 1907.* What distinguishes

* It should be noted that the history of the strike movement in Russia from 1895 to 1904 shows that there is usually an increase in economic strikes in the second quarter of the year. The average number of strikers per year during the entire decade was 43,000, divided as follows: first quarter, 10,000; second quarter, 15,000; third quarter, 12,000; and fourth quarter, 6,000. A mere comparison of the figures makes it quite obvious that the rise in the strike wave in the spring of 1906 and in the spring of 1907 cannot be explained by the "general"

both of them from the January and May waves in 1905 (of which the first was also stronger than the second) is that they came during the ebb of the movement, whereas the first two waves took place during the rising tide of the movement. This distinction is generally characteristic of the two last years compared with the first year of the triennium. Hence, the correct explanation of the increase registered during these periods of 1906 and 1907 is that they denote a halt in the retreat and an attempt on the part of the retreating forces to resume the offensive. Such is the objective meaning of these upsurges, which is now clear to us in the light of the final results of the whole "three-year period of storm and stress". The First and the Second Dumas represented nothing else than political negotiations and political demonstrations on top, prompted by the halt in the retreat below.

This clearly shows how short-sighted are the liberals who see in these negotiations something self-sufficient and independent, unrelated to whether a particular halt in the retreat is going to be of long duration, or what its outcome will be. This also shows clearly the objective dependence on the liberals of those liquidators who, like Martov, now speak with scorn of the "expectations of the romanticists" during the period of retreat. The statistical data show that it was not a question of the "expectations of the romanticists", but of actual interruptions, halts of the retreat. Had it not been for these halts, the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, which was historically absolutely inevitable since the retreat was a fact, would have taken place sooner, perhaps a year or even more than a year earlier.

Now that we have examined the history of the strike movement in its relation to the principal moments of the political history of the period, let us pass on to an investigation of the interrelation between the economic and the political strikes. The official statistics provide very interesting data touching on this subject. Let us first deal with the general total for each of the three years under review:

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causes of the summer increase in the number of strikes in Russia. One has only to glance at the figures showing the number of workers engaged in political strikes.

	Number of strikes (in thousands)		
	1905	1906	1907
Economic strikes	1,439	458	200
Political strikes	1,424	650	540
Total . . .	2,863	1,108	740

The first conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that there is a very close connection between the economic and the political strikes. They rise simultaneously and drop simultaneously. The force of the movement in the period of the offensive (1905) results from the fact that the political strikes are built, as it were, on the broad basis of the no less powerful economic strikes which, even taken by themselves, far exceed the figures for the entire decade of 1895-1904.

During the decline of the movement the number of those engaged in economic strikes drops faster than the number of those engaged in political strikes. The weakness of the movement in 1906, and particularly in 1907, is undoubtedly the result of the fact that the broad and firm base of the economic struggle was absent. On the other hand, the slower drop in the number of workers involved in political strikes, in general, and the particularly insignificant decrease in that number in 1907 compared with 1906, apparently testify to the phenomenon with which we are already familiar: namely, that the advanced sections were exercising their utmost energy to halt the retreat and to turn it into an offensive.

This conclusion is fully corroborated by the data showing the interrelation between economic and political strikes in the various groups of industries. In order to avoid overburdening the article with figures we shall confine ourselves to a comparison of the quarterly data for the year 1905 with reference to the metal-workers and the textile-workers, using in this instance the summary of the official statistics,* which, as mentioned before, classified the mixed strikes that took place that year as political strikes.

* According to this summary, 1,021,000 workers took part in economic strikes and 1,842,000 in political strikes in 1905. The proportion of the workers who took part in economic strikes thus appears to be less than in 1906. We have already explained that this is wrong.

		Number of strikes (in thousands)			
1905, Quarters		I	II	III	IV
Group A (metal-workers)	Economic	120	42	37	31
	Political	159	76	63	283
Total		279	118	100	314
Group B (textile-workers)	Economic	196	109	72	182
	Political	111	154	53	418
Total		307	263	125	600

Here we see clearly the distinction between the advanced section and the mass of the workers. Among the advanced section those involved in purely economic strikes were a minority from the very beginning, and this holds good for the whole year. Even in this group, however, in the first quarter of the year the number of workers involved in purely economic strikes was very high (120,000). Clearly, among the metal-workers too there were considerable sections which had to be "stirred up", and which started off by presenting purely economic demands. Among the textile-workers we see a very great preponderance of those taking part in purely economic strikes in the initial stage of the movement (in the first quarter of the year). These become a minority during the second quarter, only to become a majority again in the third quarter. In the fourth quarter, when the movement reached its zenith, the number of metal-workers involved in purely economic strikes was 10 per cent of the total number of strikers and 12 per cent of the total number of metal-workers; while among the textile-workers the number of those involved in purely economic strikes represented 30 per cent of the total number of strikers and 25 per cent of the total number of textile-workers.

The interdependence between the economic and political strike is thus quite obvious: no really broad, no really mass movement is possible without a close connection between the two; the concrete expression of this connection consists, on the one hand, in the fact that at the beginning of the movement, and when new sections are just entering it, the purely economic strike is the prevalent form, and, on the other, in

the fact that the political strike rouses and stirs the backward sections, generalises and extends the movement, and raises it to a higher level.

It would be extremely interesting to trace in detail precisely how new recruits were drawn into the movement during the whole three-year period. The main material contains data relating to this subject, for the information obtained was entered on cards dealing with each strike separately. But the analysis of this information in the official statistics is very unsatisfactory, and a wealth of material contained in the cards has been lost, since it was not included in the analysis. An approximate idea is given by the following table showing the number of strikes as a percentage of the number of establishments of different sizes:

Groups of establishments	Number of strikes as a percentage of the number of establishments				
	Total for 10 years 1895-1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
20 workers or less	2.7	47.0	18.5	6.0	1.0
21 to 50 workers	7.5	89.4	38.8	19.0	4.1
51 to 100 "	9.4	108.9	56.1	37.7	8.0
101 to 500 "	21.5	160.2	79.2	57.5	16.9
501 to 1,000 "	49.9	163.8	95.1	61.5	13.0
Over 1,000 "	89.7	231.9	108.8	83.7	23.0

The advanced section, which we have so far observed from the data dealing with the different districts and different groups of industries, now stands out from the data dealing with the various groups of establishments. The general rule throughout these years is that as the size of the establishments increases there is an increase in the percentage of establishments in which strikes occurred. The characteristic features of the year 1905 are, firstly, that the bigger the establishment the larger the number of repeated strikes, and, secondly, that compared with the decade 1895-1904 the rise in the percentage is the steeper the *smaller* the establishments. This clearly indicates the especial rapidity with which new recruits were drawn into the movement, and with which sections that had never before taken part in strikes were enlisted. Rapidly drawn into the movement in the period of the greatest upsurge, these new recruits proved the

least stable: the drop in the percentage of establishments in which strikes occurred in 1907 as compared with 1906 was greatest in the small establishments, and least in the big establishments. It was the vanguard which worked the longest and the most persistently to halt the retreat.

But to return to the interrelation between the economic and the political strike. The quarterly data for the entire triennium, quoted above,* show, in the first place, that all the great advances in the movement were accompanied by a rise not only in the number of workers involved in political strikes, hut also of those involved in economic strikes. The only exception was the upsurge in the spring of 1907; in that year the largest number of workers involved in economic strikes was not in the second but in the third quarter.

At the beginning of the movement (first quarter of 1905) we see an overwhelming prevalence of workers involved in economic strikes over those involved in political strikes (604,000 as against 206,000). The zenith of the movement (fourth quarter of 1905) brings with it a new wave of economic strikes, not as high as in January, however, and with political strikes strongly predominating. The third advance, in the spring of 1906, again shows a very large increase in the number of participants both in economic and in political strikes. These data alone are sufficient to refute the opinion according to which the combination of the economic with the political strike represented a "weak aspect of the movement". This opinion has been often expressed by the liberals; it has been repeated by the liquidator Cherevanin in relation to November 1905; recently it has been repeated by Martov too in relation to the same period. The failure of the struggle for an eight-hour day is especially often referred to as confirming this opinion.

This failure is an undeniable fact; it is also undeniable that any failure implies that the movement is weak. But the view of the liberals is that it is the combination of the economic with the political struggle that is the "weak aspect of the movement"; the Marxist view, on the other hand, is

* See p. 409 of this volume.—*Ed.*

that the weakness lay in the insufficiency of this combination, in the insufficient number of workers involved in economic strikes. The statistical data furnish graphic confirmation of the correctness of the Marxist view, for they reveal the "general law" of the three-year period—namely, that the movement becomes intensified as a result of the intensification of the economic struggle. And there is a logical connection between this "general law" and the basic features of every capitalist society, in which there always exist backward sections which can be aroused only by the most extraordinary accentuation of the movement, and it is only by means of economic demands that the backward sections can be drawn into the struggle.

If we compare the upsurge in the last quarter of 1905 with the one before it and the one after it, i.e., with the first quarter of 1905 and the second quarter of 1906, we see clearly that the upsurge in October-December had a *narrower* economic base than either the one before or the one after, i.e., as regards the number of workers involved in economic strikes as a percentage of the total number of strikers. Undoubtedly, the demand for an eight-hour day antagonised many elements among the bourgeoisie who might have sympathised with the other aspirations of the workers. But there is also no doubt that this demand attracted many elements, not of the bourgeoisie, who had not so far been drawn into the movement. These elements were responsible for 430,000 workers taking part in economic strikes in the last quarter of 1905, their number dropping to 73,000 in the first quarter of 1906 and increasing again to 222,000 in the second quarter of 1906. Consequently, the weakness lay not in the absence of sympathy on the part of the bourgeoisie, but in the insufficient, or insufficiently timely, support on the part of non-bourgeois elements.

It is in the nature of liberals to be dismayed by the fact that a movement of the kind we are discussing always antagonises certain elements of the bourgeoisie. It is in the nature of Marxists to note the fact that this kind of movement always attracts large sections outside the ranks of the bourgeoisie. *Suum cuique*—to each his own.

The official statistics dealing with the results of the strikes are highly instructive as regards the vicissitudes

of the struggle between the workers and the employers. The following is a summary of these statistics:

Results of strikes	Percentage of workers involved in strikes with the results indicated				
	10 years 1895-1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
In favour of the workers	27.1	23.7	35.4	16.2	14.1
Mutual Concessions (compromise)	19.5	46.9	31.1	26.1	17.0
In favour of the employers (against the workers)	51.6	29.4	33.5	57.6	68.8

The general conclusion to be drawn from this is that the maximum force of the movement signifies also the maximum success for the workers. The year 1905 was the most favourable for the workers, because in that year the force of the strike struggle was greatest. That year was also distinguished by the unusual frequency of compromises: the parties had not yet adapted themselves to the new unusual conditions, the employers were bewildered by the frequency of the strikes, which more often than ever before ended in a compromise. In 1906 the struggle became more stubborn: cases of compromise were incomparably rarer; but on the whole the workers were still victorious: the percentage of strikers who won a victory was greater than the percentage of those who lost. Beginning with 1907 defeats for the workers continually increased, and cases of compromise became rarer.

From the absolute figures it will be seen that in the ten years 1895-1904 the total number of workers who won their strikes was 117,000, whereas in 1905 alone more than three times as many workers won their strikes (369,000), and in 1906, one-and-a-half times as many (163,000).

A year, however, is too long a period for a proper study of the wave-like progress of the strike struggle in 1905-07. Since the monthly data would take up too much space, we shall cite the quarterly data for 1905 and 1906. We can omit the data for 1907, since, judging by the results of the strikes, there were no breaks in that year, no declines and rises, but a continuous retreat on the part of the workers and an offensive on the part of the capitalists, as has been fully brought out in the yearly data already cited.

The conclusions that follow from these data are highly interesting and require a detailed examination. On the whole, as we have seen, the success of the struggle, as far as the

Years	1905				1906			
Quarters	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Result of strikes:								
In favour of the workers	158	71	45	95	34	86	37	6
Compromise	267	109	61	235	28	58	46	8
In favour of the employers	179	59	59	100	11	78	42	23
*Total** . . .	604	239	165	430	73	222	125	37

workers are concerned, depends on the force of their onslaught. Do the data cited above confirm this conclusion? The first quarter of 1905 appears to have been less favourable for the workers than the second quarter, although in the latter the movement was weaker. This inference would be wrong, however, since the quarterly data combine the upsurge in January (321,000 workers involved in economic strikes) and the decline in February (228,000) and in March (56,000). If we single out January, the month of upsurge, we find that in this month the workers were victorious: 87,000 won their strikes, 81,000 lost, and 152,000 concluded a compromise. The two months of decline (February and March) brought the workers defeat.

The next period (the second quarter of 1905) was one of an advance, which reached its climax in May. The rise of the struggle signified victory for the workers: 71,000 won their strikes, 59,000 lost, and 109,000 compromised.

The third period (third quarter of 1905 was one of decline. The number of strikers was much less than in the second quarter. The decline in the force of the onslaught signified victory for the employers: 59,000 workers lost their strikes, and only 45,000 won. The workers who lost their strikes represented 35.6 per cent of the total, *i.e.*, *more than in 1906*. This means that the "general atmosphere of sympathy" with the workers in 1905, which the liberals talk so much of as being the main cause of the workers' victories (recently

* The official statistics provide no monthly totals relating to this question; they had to be obtained by adding up the figures for the various industries.

Martov, too, wrote of the sympathy of the bourgeoisie as "the main cause"), in no way prevented the defeat of the workers *when the force of their onslaught diminished*. "You are strong when society sympathises with you," the liberals say to the workers. "Society sympathises with you when you are strong," the Marxists say to the workers.

The last quarter of 1905 seems to be an exception: although it was the period of the greatest advance, the workers suffered defeat. But this is only a seeming exception, for this period again combines the month of upsurge in October, when the workers were victorious in the economic sphere as well (+57,000, —22,000 strikers won and lost respectively) with the two months of November (+25,000, —47,000) and December (+12,000, —31,000), when the economic struggle was on the decline and the workers were defeated. Furthermore, November—a month that was a turning-point, a month of the greatest wavering, of the most even balance between the contending forces, and of the greatest uncertainty as regards total results and the general trend of the further history of Russia as a whole and of the history of the relations between employers and workers in particular —was a month that shows a *larger* percentage of strikes ending in compromise than any other month in 1905: of 179,000 workers involved in economic strikes in that month, 106,000, or 59.2 per cent, ended by compromising.*

The first quarter of 1906 again seems to be an exception: the greatest decline in the economic struggle coupled with, proportionately, the largest number of workers winning their strikes (+34,000, —11,000). But here, too, we have the combination of a month in which the workers suffered defeat—namely, January (+4,000, —6,000)—with months in which the workers scored victories: February (+14,000, —2,000) and March (+16,000, —2,500). The number of workers involved in economic strikes is on the decline throughout this period (January, 26,600; February, 23,300; March, 23,200); but there were already clear indications of an upward trend in the movement as a whole (the total number of strikers amounted to 190,000 in January, 27,000 in February, and 52,000 in March).

* The total number of workers involved in economic strikes was as follows: October, 190,000; November, 179,000; December, 61,000.

The second quarter of 1906 marked a big advance in the movement, which brought with it victories for the workers (+86,000, —78,000); the greatest victories were scored in May and June, the total number of workers involved in economic strikes in June reaching 90,000—the maximum for the whole year; whereas April represents an exception: a defeat for the workers, despite the growth of the movement as compared with March.

Beginning with the third quarter of 1906, we see, on the whole, an uninterrupted decline of the economic struggle lasting to the end of the year, and, correspondingly, defeats of the workers (with a slight exception in August 1906, when the workers were victorious for the last time in the economic struggle: +11,300, —10,300).

Summed up briefly, the vicissitudes of the economic struggle in the years 1905 and 1906 may be formulated as follows: in 1905 there can be clearly distinguished three main advances in the strike struggle in general and in the economic struggle in particular—January, May and October. The number of workers involved in economic strikes in these three months amounted to 667,000, out of a total of 1,439,000 for the whole year; that is to say, not a quarter of the total, but nearly a half. And in all these three months the workers scored victories in the economic struggle, that is to say, the number of workers who won their strikes exceeded the number of those who lost.

In 1906, there is on the whole a clear distinction between the first and the second half of the year. The first half is marked by a half in the retreat and a considerable advance; the second is marked by a serious decline. In the first half of the year 295,000 workers took part in economic strikes; in the second half, 162,000. The first half brought the workers victories in the economic struggle, the second half brought them defeat.

This general summary fully confirms the conclusion that it was not the "atmosphere of sympathy", not the sympathy of the bourgeoisie, but the force of the onslaught that played the decisive part in the economic struggle as well.

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THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM OF MODERN AGRICULTURE[146]

Written after September 11 (24), 1910

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XIX*
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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

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Капиталистическая система современного земледелия

Статья первая

Сохранение стабильности войны, экономическая политика в частности сделала громадное влияние в течение двух трех последних десятилетий. Целый ряд вопросов и прежде самого коренного вопроса, касающегося экономического строя современных государств и его развития, кроме решения прежде на основании общих соображений и руководящих данных, не по крайней мере разрабатывается сколько-нибудь серьезно в настоящее время без учета

First page of the manuscript of the article
“The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture, 1910

Reduced

FIRST ARTICLE

FROM MARX TO MAO
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Social statistics in general and economic statistics in particular have made tremendous advances during the last two or three decades. A series of problems, moreover those most fundamental concerning the economic system of modern states and its development, which were previously decided on the basis of general considerations and approximate data, cannot nowadays be analysed at all seriously without taking into account the mass of data about the whole territory of a given country collected according to a single definite programme and summed up by expert statisticians. In particular, the problems of the economics of agriculture, which arouse particularly many disputes, require answering on the basis of exact, mass data, the more so since in the European states and in America it is a growing practice to make periodic censuses covering all the agricultural enterprises of the country.

In Germany, for example, such censuses were made in 1882, 1895 and the last in 1907. The importance of these censuses has often been mentioned in our press, and it is difficult to find a book or article on the economics of modern agriculture which does not refer to the statistical data on German agriculture. The last census has already occasioned a fair amount of noise in both the German and our own press. Writing in *Kievskaya Mysl*[147] last year, Mr. Valentinov, it will be recalled, loudly clamoured that this census allegedly refuted the Marxist doctrine and Kautsky's views by proving the viability of small-scale production and its triumph over

large-scale production. Recently, in an article entitled "Tendencies in Agrarian Evolution in Germany" published in *Ekonomist Rossii*[148] No. 36 of September 11, 1910, Professor Vobly, on the basis of the data of the 1907 census, tried to refute the applicability to agriculture of "the scheme elaborated by Marx in relation to the development of industry"[149] and to prove that "small enterprises not only do not perish in the struggle against large ones in the sphere of agriculture; on the contrary, each new census registers their success".

We think, therefore, it would be opportune to analyse in detail the data of the 1907 census. True, the publication of the materials of this census is not yet complete; three volumes containing *all* the data of the census* have appeared, but a fourth volume devoted to an "exposition of the results of the census as a whole" has not yet appeared and it is not known whether it will appear soon. But there are no grounds for postponing a study of the *results* of the census until this concluding volume has appeared, for *all* the material is already available, as well as the summary of it, and it is being widely used in the press.

We shall merely note that to put the question in the form in which it is usually put, confining oneself almost exclusively to a comparison of the number of farms of various sizes (in area) and the amount of land they possessed in various years, is an absolutely incorrect approach to the subject. The real differences between the Marxists and the opponents of Marxism on the agrarian question are much more deeply rooted. If the aim is to give a complete explanation of the sources of the differences, then attention must be devoted primarily and most of all to the question of the basic features of the capitalist system of modern agriculture. It is just on this question that the data of the German census of June 12, 1907, are particularly valuable. This census

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* *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 212, Teil 1 *a*, 1 *b* and 2 *a*. Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907. Landwirtschaftliche Betriebsstatistik, Berlin 1909 und 1910. (*Statistics of the German State*, Vol. 212, Part 1 *a*, 1 *b* and 2 *a*. Census of occupations and enterprises of June 12, 1907. Statistics of agricultural production, Berlin, 1909 and 1910.—*Ed.*)

is less detailed on some questions than the earlier censuses of 1882 and 1895 but, on the other hand, it gives for the first time an unprecedented wealth of data on wage-labour in agriculture. And the use of wage-labour is the chief distinguishing mark of every kind of capitalist agriculture.

We shall therefore endeavour first of all to give a general picture of the capitalist system of modern agriculture, relying chiefly on the data of the 1907 German census and supplementing them with the data of the best agricultural censuses of other countries, namely: the Danish, Swiss, American and the last Hungarian censuses. As regards the fact which most of all strikes the eye on a first acquaintance with the results of the census and which is being most talked about, namely, the reduction in Germany of the number of large farms (large in agricultural area) and the amount of land they possess, we shall turn to an examination of this only at the end of our work. For this is one of the complicated facts which are a function of a series of others, and it is impossible to understand its significance without first elucidating several much more important and basic questions.

I

A GENERAL PICTURE OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF MODERN AGRICULTURE

The German agricultural censuses, like all the European (as distinct from the Russian) censuses of the kind, are based on information collected separately about each agricultural enterprise. At the same time the amount of information collected usually increases with each census. For instance, in Germany in 1907, although very important information on the number of cattle used in field work was omitted (this information was collected in 1882 and 1895), for the first time information was collected on the amount of arable land under various cereals and on the number of family workers and wage-workers. The information about each farm obtained in this way is *quite sufficient* for a politico-economic characterisation of the farm. The whole question, the whole difficulty of the task, is how to *sum up* these data in such a way as to obtain an accurate politico-economic characteri-

sation of the different groups or types of farms as a whole. When the summing up is unsatisfactory, when the-grouping is incorrect or inadequate, the result can be—and this continually happens in the treatment of modern census data—that unusually detailed, excellent data on each separate enterprise disappear, become lost or are wholly missing when dealing with the millions of farms of the entire country. The capitalist system of agriculture is characterised by the *relations* which exist between employers and workers, between farms of various types, and if the distinguishing features of these types are taken incorrectly or selected incompletely, then even the best census cannot give a politico-economic picture of the actual situation.

It is clear, therefore, that the methods of summarising or grouping the data of modern censuses are of extreme importance. Later on we shall examine an exposition of *all* the rather diverse methods used in the best censuses enumerated above. For the present let us note that the German census, like the vast majority of the others, gives a full summary, grouping the farms exclusively according to a single feature, namely, the size of the agricultural area of each farm. On this basis the census divides all the farms into 18 groups, beginning with farms of less than one-tenth of a hectare and ending with those over 1,000 hectares of agricultural area. That such detailed subdivision is a statistical luxury unjustified by politico-economic considerations is felt by the authors of the German statistics themselves, who provide a summary of all the data in six—or, by separating a subgroup —seven large groups according to the size of the agricultural area. These groups are as follows: farms having less than half a hectare, one-half to 2, 2 to 5, 5 to 20, 20 to 100, and over 100, the last including a subgroup of farms with over 200 hectares of agricultural area.

The question arises: what is the politico-economic significance of this grouping? Undoubtedly the land is the chief means of production in agriculture; the amount of land is the most accurate criterion of the dimensions of a farm and, consequently, of its type, i.e., for example, whether it is a small, medium or large farm, a capitalist farm or one not using wage-labour. A farm of less than two hectares is usually accounted a small (sometimes called a parcellised or

dwarf) farm; from two to 20 hectares (sometimes from two to 100)—a peasant farm, over 100 hectares a large—*that is to say*, a capitalist farm.

And so, the information on wage-labour collected for the first time by the 1907 census gives us above all a first opportunity of verifying from mass data this "usual" supposition. For the first time we see the introduction in statistical procedure of at least a certain—although far from adequate, as we shall see later—element of rationality, i.e., an element taking into account data of the most direct, immediate politico-economic significance.

In point of fact, much is said about small production. But what is small production? The most usual answer is that small production is one that does not use wage-labour. It is not only Marxists who look at it in this way. Ed. David, for example, whose book, *Socialism and Agriculture* may be called one of the latest summaries of bourgeois theories on the agrarian question, writes on page 29 of the Russian translation: "In all those cases where we speak of small production, we have in mind the economic category which functions without permanent outside assistance and without an auxiliary occupation."

The 1907 census fully establishes first of all that the number of these farms is very small, that in modern agriculture farmers who do not hire workers, and who do not hire themselves out to work for others, are an insignificant minority. Out of the total of 5,736,082 agricultural enterprises in Germany registered by the 1907 census, only 1,872,616, i.e., less than one-third, belong to farmers whose chief occupation is the independent conduct of agriculture and who have no auxiliary occupations. How many of them hire workers? On this there is no information; that is to say, it existed in the most detailed form on the original cards and was lost during the summarising! The compilers did not wish to calculate (after performing a mass of most detailed and futile calculations) how many farms in each group hire permanent or temporary wage-workers.

In order to determine approximately the number of farms that do without wage-labour, we shall single out those groups in which the number of *farms* is less than the number of wage-workers. These will be groups with less than ten hec-

tares of land per farm. These groups include 1,283,631 farmers who regard agriculture as their chief concern and have no auxiliary occupation. These farmers have a total of 1,400,162 wage-workers (if it is assumed that *only* those farmers who regard agriculture as their chief concern and have no auxiliary occupations maintain wage-workers). Only in the groups of farms with two to five hectares is the number of independent farmers without an auxiliary occupation *greater* than the number of wage-workers, namely: 495,439 farms and 411,311 wage-workers.

Of course, cultivators who have auxiliary occupations sometimes have wage-workers and, of course, there are some "small" farmers who hire not one but several wage-workers. But nevertheless there can be no doubt that farmers who do not hire workers and who do not hire themselves out to work are an insignificant minority.

From the data on the number of wage-workers *three* basic groups of farms in German agriculture are immediately distinguishable.

I. *Proletarian* farms. These include groups in which the minority of farmers regard the conduct of independent agriculture as their chief occupation, groups in which the majority are wage-workers, and so on. For example, there are 2,084,060 farms of less than half a hectare. Of these only 97,153 are independent cultivators, and 1,287,312 are *wage-workers* (in all branches of the national economy) by their *chief* occupation. The farms with one-half to two hectares of land numbered 1,294,449. Of these only 377,762 are independent cultivators, 535,480 are wage-workers, 277, 735 carry on small-scale industry, handicrafts or trade, 103,472 are employees or represent "various and unspecified" occupations. Clearly, both these groups of farms are in the main proletarian.

II. *Peasant* farms. The bulk of the farms included here are those of independent cultivators; moreover, the number of family workers in them is greater than that of wage-workers. These will be groups with two to 20 hectares of land.

III. *Capitalist* farms. Here we include farms with more wage-workers than family workers.

The following are the total figures for these groups:

Groups of farms	Total number of farms	Of which		Farms subdivided according to the number of workers			
		independent cultivators	wage-workers	Total number of such farms	The workers in them being		
					total	family workers	wage-workers
I. Less than 2 ha . .	3,378,509	474,915	1,822,792	2,669,232	4,353,052	3,851,905	501,147
II. 2-20 ha	2,071,816	1,705,448	117,338	2,057,577	7,509,735	5,898,853	1,610,882
III. 20 ha or more . .	285,757	277,060	737	285,331	3,306,762	870,850	2,435,912
Total . . .	5,736,082	2,457,423	1,940,867	5,012,140	15,012,140	10,169,608	4,547,941

This table gives a picture of the economic system of modern German agriculture. At the bottom of the pyramid is a vast mass of proletarian "farms", almost three-fifths of the total number; at the top is an insignificant minority (one-twentieth) of capitalist farms. Let us point out, anticipating a little, that this insignificant minority has more than half of all the land and arable area. They have one-fifth of the total number of workers engaged in agriculture and over half the total number of wage-workers.

II

THE REAL NATURE OF THE MAJORITY OF MODERN AGRICULTURAL "FARMS" (PROLETARIAN "FARMS")

Of the "farmers" with less than two hectares of land, the *majority* are wage-workers by their chief occupation. For them agriculture is an auxiliary occupation. Of the 3,378,509 enterprises in this group, 2,920,119 are auxiliary concerns (Nebenbetriebe). A quite small minority, 14 per cent in all, 475,000 out of 3,4 million, are independent cultivators, and this includes those who have *in addition* an auxiliary, non-agricultural occupation.

* ...It is to be noted that the number of wage-workers* ... in this group *exceeds* the number of independent cultivators.

This fact indicates that the statistics here lump together with the mass of proletarians those few capitalist cultivators who carry out large-scale farming on a small plot of land. We shall repeatedly encounter this type in the course of our exposition.

The question arises of the significance of these masses of proletarian "farmers" in the general system of agriculture. In the first place, they represent the link between the feudal and the capitalist systems of social economy, their close connection and their kinship historically, a direct survival of serfdom in capitalism. If, for example, we see in Germany and particularly in Prussia that the statistics of agricultural enterprises include plots of land (known as Deputatland) which the landlord gives the agricultural labourer as part of his

* Here the edge of the manuscript is torn off.—*Ed.*

wages, is this not a direct survival of serfdom? The difference between serfdom, as an economic system, and capitalism lies in the fact that the former *allots* land to the worker, whereas the latter *separates* the worker from the land; the former gives the worker the means of subsistence *in kind* (or forces him to produce them himself on his "allotment"), the latter gives the worker payment in money, with which he *buys* the means of subsistence. Of course, in Germany this survival of serfdom is quite insignificant compared with what we see in Russia with her notorious "labour-rent" system of landlord farming, nevertheless it is a survival of serfdom. The 1907 census in Germany counted 579,500 "agricultural enterprises" belonging to *agricultural workers and day-labourers*, and of these 540,751 belong to the group of "farmers" with less than two hectares of land.

In the second place, the bulk of the "farmers" owning such insignificant plots of land that it is impossible to make a living from them, and which represent merely an "auxiliary occupation", form part of the *reserve army of unemployed* in the capitalist system as a whole. It is, to use Marx's term, the *hidden* form of this army.[150] It would be wrong to imagine that this reserve army of unemployed consists only of workers who are out of work. It includes also "peasants" or "petty farmers" who are unable to exist on what they get from their minute farm, who *have to* try to obtain their means of subsistence mainly by hiring out their labour. Their kitchen garden or potato plot serves this army of the poor as a means of supplementing their wages or of enabling them to exist when they are not employed. Capitalism requires these "dwarf", "parcellised" pseudo-farms so that without expense it can *always* have a mass of cheap labour at its disposal. According to the 1907 census, out of two million "farms" of less than half a hectare 624,000 have only horticultural land and 361,000 have only a potato field. The total cultivated area of these two million "farms" is 247,000 hectares, of which more than half, namely, 166,000 hectares, is *under potato*. The total cultivated area of the million and a quarter "farms" with one-half to two hectares is 976,000 hectares, of which *more than a third*, namely, 334,000 hectares, is under potato. Deterioration of the people's diet (replacement of bread by potatoes) and cheaper labour-power for the employ-

ers—such is the significance of the "farming" of three million agricultural "farms" out of the five million in Germany.

To conclude the description of these proletarian farms, let us add that almost one-third of them (one million out of 3.4 million) do not possess livestock of any kind, two-thirds (2.5 out of 3.4 million) do not have any cattle, more than nine-tenths (3.3 out of 3.4 million) have no horses. The share of these proletarian farms in the total agricultural production is minimal: three-fifths of them have less than one-tenth of all the cattle (2.7 million out of 29.4 million head, reckoning all livestock in terms of cattle), and one-twentieth of all the cultivated area (1.2 out of 24.4 million hectares).

One can imagine what confusion and falsity is introduced into the subject by statistics which *lump together* in this group of farms of less than two hectares of land *millions* of proletarians without horses or cattle and with only a kitchen garden or potato field and *thousands* of big farmers, capitalists, who conduct big cattle-raising or horticultural and suchlike enterprises on 1-2 dessiatines. That such farmers are contained in this group is evident if only from the fact that out of the 3.4 million (with less than two hectares of land) *15,428* are farmers each of whom have six or more workers (taking family and wage-workers together), all of these 15,428 together having 123,941 workers, i.e., an average of eight workers per farm. Taking into account the special features of agriculture as regards machinery, such a number of workers is undoubtedly an indication of large-scale capitalist production. That large-scale cattle-raising farms are included among the mass of proletarian "farms" of less than two hectares, I have already had to point out on the basis of the data of the earlier census of 1895 (see my book: *The Agrarian Question*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 239*). It was quite possible to single out these large-scale farms by means of the data both on the number of cattle and on the number of workers, but the German statisticians prefer to fill *hundreds of pages* with data on *five* subdivisions of the group of owners having less than half a hectare divided into *still smaller* groups according to the amount of land!

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 103-222.—*Ed.*

Socio-economic statistics—one of the most powerful means of acquiring social knowledge—are converted in this way into a monstrosity, into statistics for the sake of statistics, into a game.

That the majority or the great bulk of agricultural enterprises belong to the category of dwarf, parcellised, proletarian farms is a phenomenon that is common to many if not most European capitalist countries, but *not all* capitalist countries. In America, for example, according to data of the 1900 census, the average size of the farms is 146.6 acres (60 hectares), i.e., 7½ times as large as in Germany. The very small farms, if one includes here those of less than 20 acres (8 hectares) form a little over one-tenth (11.8 per cent) of the total number. Even the farms of less than 50 acres (20 hectares) form only one-third of the total number. In order to compare these data with the German statistics one must take into account that farms of less than three acres (=1.2 hectares) are included in the American census only if their gross income amounts to 500 dollars, i.e., the vast majority of farms of less than three acres are not registered at all. Hence we must exclude also the very small farms from the German data. Let us eliminate even all the farms of less than two hectares: of the remaining 2,357,572 farms there will be 1,006,277 of two to five hectares, i.e., over 40 per cent of the farms will be very small farms. In America the situation is quite different.

It is evident that when the traditions of serfdom are absent (or all traces of it are more thoroughly abolished), and when the yoke imposed by land rent on agricultural production is absent (or weakened), capitalism in agriculture can exist and even develop with special rapidity without creating a category of a million agricultural labourers and day-labourers with allotments.

III

PEASANT FARMS UNDER CAPITALISM

We have put under the heading peasant farms those groups in which, on the one hand, the majority of cultivators are independent farmers and, on the other hand, the number of family workers is greater than the number of wage-workers.

It was found that the absolute number of wage-workers in such farms is very great—1.6 million, more than a third of the total number of wage-workers. Obviously there are not a few capitalist enterprises among the general mass (2.1 million) of "peasant" farms. We shall see below the approximate number and significance of these enterprises, for the present we shall deal in more detail with the relationship between family and wage-labour. Let us see how big the average number of workers per farm is:

Groups of farms		Average number of workers per farm		
		Total	Family workers	Wage-workers
Proletarian farms . .	Less than 0.5 ha	1.3	1.2	0.1
	0.5 - 2 ha	1.9	1.7	0.2
Peasant farms . .	2-5 "	2.9	2.5	0.4
	5-10 "	3.8	3.1	0.7
	10-20 "	5.1	3.4	1.7
Capitalist farms . .	20-100 "	7.9	3.2	4.7
	100 ha or more	52.5	1.6	50.9
Altogether		3.0	2.1	0.9

We see from this table that, compared with industry, agricultural enterprises are generally of a small size as regards the number of workers. Only owners possessing more than 100 hectares have over 50 wage-workers: the number of such owners is 23,566, i.e., less than one-half per cent of the total number of farms. The total number of wage-workers on these farms is 1,463,974, i.e., a little less than the total number on the two million peasant farms.

Among the peasant farms, the group that is seen at once to stand out from the rest is that with 10-20 hectares: this group has an average of 1.7 wage-workers per farm. If we single out only the permanent workers we shall find that they number 412,702 for the 412,741 farms of this group (411,940 of the farms distributed according to the number of workers). This means that not a single enterprise is able to do without *permanent* use of wage-labour. That is why we single out this group as that of "Grossbauer", big peasant farmers or peasant bourgeoisie. Usually it is owners of 20 or more hectares that are reckoned to belong to this category, but the 1907 census has shown that the use of wage-labour in agriculture is more widely distributed than is usually thought,

and that the boundary at which the constant use of wage-labour begins must be shifted considerably lower.

Further, in examining the relationship between family and wage-labour, we find that in proletarian and peasant farming the average number of family workers shows a continual increase parallel to the increase in the number of wage-workers, whereas in capitalist farms the number of family workers *begins to fall* as the number of wage-workers grows larger. This phenomenon is quite natural and confirms our conclusion that farms of over 20 hectares are capitalist farms, in which not only is the number of wage-workers greater than that of family workers, but also the average number of family workers per farm is *less* than in the case of peasant farms.

Long ago, even at the very beginning of the controversy between the Marxists and the Narodniks, it was established from Zemstvo statistical data that in peasant farming family co-operation is the basis for the creation of capitalist co-operation, i.e., substantial peasant farms notable for their particularly large number of family workers become converted into capitalist farms employing wage-labour to an ever-increasing extent. Now we see that the German statistics for the whole of German agriculture confirm this conclusion.

Let us take the German peasant farms. As a whole they differ from the proletarian farms by being enterprises based on family co-operation (2.5-3.4 family workers per farm) and not enterprises of individuals. The proletarian farms have to be called the farms of individuals because they do not even average two workers per farm. Among the peasant farms, however, there is competition over the number of wage-workers taken on: the greater the size of the peasant farm, the higher is the number of its family workers and the *more rapidly* does the number of its wage-workers increase. The big peasant farms surpass the small peasant farms (of 2-5 hectares) by less than one-and-a-half times as regards the number of family workers but they exceed them by more than four times as regards the number of wage-workers.

We see here a precise statistical confirmation of the cardinal distinction between the class of small farmers in general, and of small peasants in particular, and the class of wage-workers, a distinction that is always being pointed

out by Marxists and which the bourgeois economists and revisionists are quite unable to grasp. All the circumstances of commodity farming lead to the result that the small peasants are unable to exist without striving to consolidate and extend their enterprises, and this struggle implies a struggle to increase the use of outside labour-power and to make its use cheaper. That is why in every capitalist country the mass of small peasants as a whole, of whom only an insignificant minority "rise to prominence", i.e., become real capitalists, are permeated by capitalist psychology and follow the agrarians in politics. The bourgeois economists (and the revisionists, too, in their wake) support this psychology; the Marxists explain to the small peasants that their only salvation lies in joining hands with the wage-workers.

The data of the 1907 census are also extremely instructive in regard to the proportion between the number of permanent and temporary workers. Altogether the latter are exactly one-third of the total number: 5,053,726 out of 15,169,549. Of the wage-workers 45 per cent are temporary, of the family workers 29 per cent are temporary. But these proportions undergo substantial change in the different types of farm. The following are the data for the groups we have distinguished.

	Groups of farms	Temporary Workers as a Percentage of the Total Number of Workers		
		Family workers	Wage-workers	Total
I	Less than 0.5 ha	55	79	58
	0.5 - 2 "	39	78	45
II	2-5 "	22	68	29
	5-10 "	11	54	24
	10-20 "	14	42	23
III	20-100 "	14	32	25
	100 ha or more	11	33	32
	Average	29	45	33

We see from this table that among the proletarian farms with less than half a hectare (there are altogether 2.1 million such farms!) temporary workers form more than half of both the family workers and wage-workers. These are chiefly auxiliary farms which occupy only part of the time of their owners. Among the proletarian farms of 0.5-2 hectares, too,

the percentage of temporary workers is very high. As the size of the farm increases the percentage falls—with only one exception. This exception is that among wage-workers of the biggest capitalist farms the percentage of temporary workers increases slightly, and since the number of family workers in this group is quite negligible, the percentage of temporary workers among the workers as a whole increases considerably, from 25 to 32 per cent.

The difference between peasant and capitalist farms as regards the total number of temporary workers is not very great. The difference between the numbers of family and wage-workers is very considerable in all types of farm, and if we take into account that among temporary family workers there is, as we shall see, an especially high percentage of women and children this difference becomes still greater. Hence wage-workers are the most mobile element....

IV

LABOUR OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AGRICULTURE

... they carry on agriculture. Generally speaking, women's labour predominates also in the peasant farm, and it is only in the big peasant and capitalist enterprises that men constitute the majority.

There are in general fewer women among wage-workers than among family workers. Obviously, the capitalist cultivators in all the groups are among those farmers who obtain the best labour forces. If the predominance of women over men can be taken as a measure of the straitened circumstances of the farmer and of the unsatisfactory state of a farm that has no possibility of using the best labour forces (and this supposition inevitably follows from all the data on women....

V

SQUANDERING OF LABOUR IN SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION

. . . .

VI

THE CAPITALIST CHARACTER OF THE USE OF MACHINERY IN MODERN AGRICULTURE

. . . .

VII

THE LOW PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR IN SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION AND EXCESSIVE WORK

The significance of the data on the use of machinery in agriculture is usually underestimated in economic literature. Firstly, the capitalist character of the use of machinery is quite often ignored (always, in the case of bourgeois economists); the economists make no investigation of this problem, they do not know how to *raise* it or do not even want to *do* so. Secondly, the use of machinery is considered in isolation and not as a *criterion* of the different types of farm, different methods of cultivation and different *economic* conditions of farming.

If, for example, as a general rule we find an incomparably greater use of machinery in large-scale compared with small-scale production, and a huge concentration of machines in the capitalist farms, which sometimes even have almost a monopoly of up-to-date implements, this is an indication of the *difference in care for the land* among farms of different types. Among the machines registered by the German census are such machines as steam ploughs, seed-drills and potato-planting machines. The fact that they are mainly used in capitalist agriculture means that in this case *care for the land* is better, the technique of cultivation higher and the productivity of labour greater. Bensing,[151] the author of a well-known monograph on agricultural machinery, basing himself on the data of specialists concerning the effect of using various machines, has calculated that, even without changing the system of cultivation, the use of machines by itself raises the net return from farming *many times over*. These calculations have not been refuted by anyone and basically they cannot be refuted.

The small-scale producer who has no opportunity of using up-to-date implements is forced to lag behind *in care for the land*, and it is only individuals or a few dozen out of hundreds and thousands who can try to "overtake" the big farmer by applying more labour to the land while retaining the old tools, and by greater "assiduousness" and a longer working day. The statistics of the use of machinery *indicate* therefore the existence of *excessive labour* in small-scale pro-

duction, a fact which is always stressed by Marxists. No statistics can take direct account of this fact, but if the statistical data are regarded in the light of their *economic* significance, it becomes clear *which types* of farming are *bound* to develop, cannot fail to develop, in modern society when machines are used, and when their use is impossible.

The Hungarian statistics provide an illustration of what has been said. Like the German census of 1907 (and of 1882 and 1895), like the Danish statistics on the use of machines in 1907, and like the French enquiry in 1909, the Hungarian census of 1895, which for the first time collected precise data for the whole country, shows the superiority of capitalist agriculture and the increased percentage of farms with machines as the size of the farms increases. From this angle there is nothing new here but only a confirmation of the German data. The special feature of the Hungarian statistics, however, is that information was collected not only on the few up-to-date implements and machines, but on the *entire*, or almost the entire, farm inventory, on the number of the simplest and most essential implements, ploughs, harrows, carts, etc.

Thanks to these exceptionally detailed data it becomes possible to establish accurately the, as it were, symptomatic significance, characteristic of the whole system of farming, of the information on the use of some agricultural machines and technological "rarities" (such as steam ploughs). Let us take the Hungarian statistical data* on the use of ploughs other than steam ploughs (of which in 1895 there were altogether 179 in the whole of Hungary, including 120 in 3,977 largest farms).

The following are data of the *total* number of ploughs and of the number of the simplest, most primitive and least

* See *Landwirtschaftliche Statistik der Länder der ungarischen Krone* (*Agricultural Statistics of the Lands of the Hungarian Crown*). Budapest, 1900, Vols. 4 and 5. The Hungarian statistics divide all the farms into four chief groups: 1) dwarf farms (less than 5 yokes; one yoke = 0.57 hectares); 2) small farms (5-100 yokes); 3) medium farms (100-1,000 yokes); 4) big farms (over 1,000 yokes). The second group obviously includes very diverge kinds of farms and therefore I make four subdivisions of it.

strongly built of all the implements of this kind (the simplest comprise single-share ploughs with a wooden pole; the others are: the same but with an iron pole, then two- and three-share ploughs, cultivators, ridging ploughs, and ploughs for deep ploughing).

Groups of farms	Number of farms (total)	Number of ploughs (total)	Including the simplest
Dwarf (less than 5 yokes)	1,459,893	227,241	196,852
5-10 yokes	569,534	335,885	290,958
10-20 "	467,038	398,365	329,416
20-50 "	235,784	283,285	215,380
50-100 "	38,862	72,970	49,312
Total small	1,311,218	1,090,505	885,066
Medium (100-1,000 yokes)	20,797	125,157	55,347
Large (over 1,000 yokes) .	3,977	149,750	51,565
Total	2,795,885	1,592,653	1,188,830

Without mentioning the dwarf farms, we see that in the small peasant farms (5-10 yokes, i.e., 2.8-5.7 hectares) 233,000 out of 569,000 do not own any ploughs at all, and of the middle peasant farms 69,000 out of 467,000 are without ploughs. Only the higher groups, i.e., the big peasant and capitalist farms, all have ploughs, and it is only in the farms of over 100 yokes (there are only 25,000 such farms = 0.9 per cent of the total number!) that the more elaborate implements *predominate*. In the peasant farms the simplest implements, those least strongly built and worst in performance, predominate (and the smaller the farm the more marked is this predominance).

Leaving out of account the dwarf farms, which constitute the majority (52 per cent) of all the farm's but which occupy an insignificant fraction of the total area (7 per cent), we reach the following conclusion:

Over one million small- and middle-peasant farms (5-20 yokes) are *inadequately* provided with even the simplest implements for tilling the soil.

A quarter of a million big peasant farms (20-100 yokes) are tolerably equipped with implements of the simplest kind. And only 25,000 capitalist farms (but possessing, it is true, 55 per cent of the entire area of land) are fully equipped with up-to-date implements.

The Hungarian statistics, on the other hand, calculate how many yokes of arable land there are to one agricultural implement and obtain figures such as the following (we quote only the data for ploughs, harrows and carts, while pointing out that the picture of their distribution among the farms is *completely* analogous to that we saw in regard to ploughs).

In farms	Yokes of arable land to one plough	to one harrow	to one cart
dwarf	7	8	7
small	12	13	15
medium	27	45	40
large	28	61	53

This means that the proletarian and peasant farms, which are *quite unsatisfactorily* equipped with all agricultural implements, have an *excessively large number* of them in relation to the whole amount of the arable land of their farms. A beggarly equipment of implements and an unbearable costliness of maintaining them—such is the lot of small-scale production under capitalism. In exactly the same way the statistics relating to housing in every large town show us that the poorest classes of the population, the workers, small traders, petty employees, etc., live worst of all, have the most crowded and worst dwellings and pay most *dearly of all* for each cubic foot. Calculated per unit of space the dwellings of factory barracks or hovels for the poor are more costly than the fashionable dwellings anywhere on the Nevsky.

The conclusion to be drawn from this as regards both Germany and all the capitalist countries is as follows. If the data on the utilisation of a few up-to-date implements and agricultural machines show us that their employment increases as the size of the farm increases, this means that small-scale production in agriculture is poorly equipped with *all* necessary implements. This means that in small-scale production *squandering of labour* on maintaining an immense quantity of poor and out-of-date implements suitable only for farming on a minute scale is combined with *acute want*, causing the peasant to overstrain himself in order somehow to keep going on his plot of land with these obsolete barbaric implements.

That is what the data, so simple and so well-known to all, on the use of agricultural machinery tell us if we reflect on their socio-economic significance.

Capitalism raises the level of agricultural technique and advances it, but it cannot do so except by ruining, depressing and crushing the mass of small producers.

In order to give a graphic illustration of the social significance and tempo of this process, we shall conclude by comparing the data of the three German censuses of 1882, 1895 and 1907. For the purpose of this comparison we must take the data on the *number of instances of the use* of the five agricultural machines which were registered during the whole of this period (these machines are: steam ploughs, seed-drills, mowing machines and harvesters, steam and other threshing-machines). We obtain the following picture:

	Groups of farms	Number of instances of the use of the chief agricultural machines per hundred farms		
		1882	1895	1907
I	Less than 2 ha	0.5	1.6	3.8
II	2-5 ”	3.9	11.9	31.2
	5-10 ”	13.5	32.9	71.1
	10-20 ”	31.2	60.8	122.1
III	20-100 ”	59.2	92.0	179.1
	100 ha or more . . .	187.1	208.9	271.9
	Average	16.6	33.9	8.7

The progress seems considerable: during a quarter of a century the number of instances of the use of the chief machines has grown in general nearly fourfold. But, on making a careful examination, it has to be said that it has required a whole quarter of a century to make the use of at least one of the five chief machines a regular phenomenon in a small minority of the farms that cannot do without the constant employment of wage-labour. For such use can only be called regular when the number of instances of it exceeds the number of farms, and we find that this occurs only in relation to the capitalist and big peasant farms. Together they comprise 12 per cent of the total number of farms.

The bulk of the small and middle peasants, after a quarter of a century of capitalist progress, have remained in a position in which only a third of the former and two-thirds of the latter can use any of these five machines during the year.

(End of first article)

NOTES

[1] The *All-Russian* (*December*) *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* (Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.) was held in Paris on December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909). It was attended by 16 delegates with the right to speak and vote: 5 Bolsheviks, 3 Mensheviks, 5 Polish Social-Democrats and 3 Bundists. The representative of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was Lenin. He delivered a report at the Conference on "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party", and also spoke on the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and on the organisational and other questions. At the Conference the Bolsheviks waged a struggle against two kinds of opportunism in the Party: the liquidators and the otzovists. On the proposal of Lenin, the Conference condemned liquidationism and called on all Party organisations to combat vigorously attempts to liquidate the Party.

For an appraisal of the decisions of the Conference, see Lenin's articles "On the Road" and "Liquidation of Liquidationism" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 343-53, 452-60). p. 15

[2] The *Bundists*—members of the Bund, the shortened title of the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia, founded in 1897. It united mainly semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in Russia's western regions. The Bund pursued an opportunist, Menshevik policy. p. 15

[3] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Voice of the Social-Democrat*)—organ of the Menshevik liquidators abroad; it was published from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva and later in Paris. p. 15

[4] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Diary of a Social-Democrat*)—a non-periodical organ published by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva at considerable intervals from March 1905 until April 1912. In all 16 issues appeared. Publication was resumed in 1916 in Petrograd, but only one issue appeared. p. 15

[5] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal newspaper formed by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. It was published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909, under Lenin's editorship. Bearing the title of organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Party Committees and for a time also of the Moscow District, Perm, Kursk and Kazan Committees *Proletary* was actually the Central Bolshevik Organ.

Altogether 50 issues appeared (the first 20 in Vyborg, Finland). From February 13 (26) to December 1 (14), 1908, *Proletary* was published in Geneva, and from January 8 (21) to November 28 (December 11), 1909, in Paris. It printed over 100 articles and items by Lenin. During the Stolypin reaction it played an outstanding part in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations. p. 15

6 *Pravda* (of Vienna)—a Menshevik newspaper, the factional organ of Trotsky, published in 1908-12 in Vienna. Under cover of "non-factionalism", it took up a liquidationist position on all main issues, and also supported the otzovists and ultimatumists. In 1912, Trotsky and his *Pravda* were the organisers of the anti-Party August bloc. p. 16

7 *S.*—Silvestr Djibladze—a Georgian Menshevik liquidator. p. 16

8 *Toy manikins*—the name given in a story with this title by M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin to the dolls of whom Izuverov, the skilful workman who made them, said: "They have no brains, they do nothing, they have no desires, but instead just an outward appearance." p. 17

9 G. V. Plekhanov was a member of the editorial board of the Menshevik organ *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. The newspaper's development towards liquidationism caused Plekhanov to disagree with the other editors. In December 1908 he virtually ceased to take part in the newspaper, first of all giving notice of his resignation from the editorial board of the five-volume work, *The Social Movement in Russia*, published by the liquidators, and later from the editorial board of *Golos* as well. Plekhanov's formal resignation from the latter occurred on May 13 (26), 1909. p. 17

10 *Otzovists*, *otzovism* (from the Russian word *otozvat*—recall)—an opportunist trend which arose among a section of the Bolsheviks after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution. The otzovists demanded the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Duma and the abandonment of work in legal organisations. In 1908 the otzovists formed a special group and carried on a struggle against Lenin. They refused to take part in the Duma, in the trade unions, co-operatives and other mass legal or semi-legal organisations, and tried to confine themselves to illegal work. Under cover of "revolutionary" phraseology, they hindered the extension of the Party's connections with wide sections of the working class, pursued a policy that cut the Party off from the masses, and thereby weakened the Party. Lenin sharply criticised the otzovists and called them "liquidators of a new type" and "Mensheviks inside-out".

Ultimatumists, *ultimatumism*—a variety of otzovism. The ultimatumists proposed that an ultimatum should be presented to the Social-Democratic Duma group as a preliminary and, on its non-fulfilment, that the Social-Democratic deputies should be withdrawn from the Duma.

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God-builders, *god-building*—a religious-philosophical trend hostile to Marxism which arose in the period of the Stolypin reaction among a section of the Party literary writers who withdrew from Marxism after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution. The "god-builders" (Lunacharsky, Bazarov and others) advocated the creation of a new, "socialist" religion, and tried to reconcile Marxism and religion.

The meeting of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* in June 1909 adopted a resolution which sharply condemned otzovism and ultimatumism, and also god-building. The resolution pointed out that Marxism had nothing in common with these anti-Marxist trends and it called on the Bolsheviks to wage a resolute struggle against them. p. 18

[11] *Osip*—a character in N. V. Gogol's comedy *Inspector-General*. p. 21

[12] *Empirio-criticism*—a subjective idealist trend in bourgeois philosophy which arose at the end of the last century and is linked with the names of the German philosopher Avenarius and the Austrian philosopher Mach. Empirio-criticism denies the objective existence of the material world and its laws, and regards things as complexes of sensations. Underlying the philosophical views of the empirio-critics is an idealist conception of experience, which they interpret as a totality of human feelings and sensations independent of the external world. In his work *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, Lenin made an annihilating criticism of empirio-criticism and its Russian followers, Bogdanov, Bazarov and others (present edition, Vol. 14, pp. 17-361). p. 21

[13] *On the Open Letter of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Regional Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.* (dated August 17 [30], 1909) was written in connection with the discovery of the anti-Party and factional nature of the Capri school.

In the "Letter" the Executive Committee reminds those attending the school that it is their duty to keep in close contact with the Moscow Regional Committee and it calls for a full report on the school's activities. The "Letter" was published in *Proletary* No. 47-48, of September 5 (18), 1909, together with Lenin's comment "From the Editorial Board".

The *Capri school*—a factional centre of the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders, who joined forces against Bolshevism. It was established on the Italian island of Capri in 1909 by A. Bogdanov (Maximov), Alexinsky and Lunacharsky with the participation of Maxim Gorky. Under cover of being pro-Party, the Bogdanovists succeeded in having 13 students sent to attend the school from some local Social-Democratic organisations. The school was in existence for about four months (August to December). In November a split occurred among the students: part of them, headed by N. Y. Vilonov, definitely dissociated themselves from the Bogdanovists. The Leninist students sent a letter to the editors of *Proletary* protesting against the anti-Party behaviour of the lec-

turers, for which they were expelled from the school. At the end of November (beginning of December) 1909, on Lenin's invitation, they went to Paris where they attended a course of lectures, including those by Lenin, viz., "The Present Time and Our Tasks", "Stolypin's Agrarian Policy". In December 1909, the students who remained in Capri, together with the lecturers, founded the anti-Party *Vperyod* group.

A meeting of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* condemned the Capri school as "a new centre of the faction splitting off from the Bolsheviks". p. 23

[14] September 21 (October 4), 1909, was the date fixed for the by-election to the Third Duma to replace the St. Petersburg deputy, the Cadet A. M. Kolyubakin, who had been expelled from the Duma. p. 24

[15] The *Party of Octobrists* (Union of October Seventeenth) was founded in Russia after the issue of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party which represented and defended the interests of the big bourgeoisie and landlords, whose enterprises were on capitalist lines. It was headed by the well-known industrialist and Moscow house-owner, A. I. Guchkov, and the big landlord M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists supported the foreign and domestic policy of the tsarist government.

Black Hundreds—reactionary, monarchist gangs set up by the tsarist police to combat the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals, and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 24

[16] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership including representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries from among the landlords and bourgeois intellectuals. Prominent leaders of the Cadets included P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve, F. I. Rodichev. In order to deceive the working people the Cadets falsely called themselves the party of "people's freedom", but in reality they never went beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered their main task to be the fight against the revolutionary movement and they tried to persuade the tsar and the feudal landlords to share power with them. During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign Policy of conquest. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried to save the monarchy. The Cadets in the bourgeois Provisional Government pursued a counter-revolutionary policy favourable to the U.S., British and French imperialists. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power and participated in all the armed counter-revolutionary actions and campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and white-guards were defeated, the Cadets fled abroad, where they continued their anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary activity. p. 24

[17] The *coup d'état of June 3, 1907* was carried out by the tsarist government, which dissolved the Second Duma and published a new electoral law that reduced severalfold the already small representation of workers and peasants in the Duma. The law deprived a large part of the population of Asiatic Russia of electoral rights and reduced by half the representation of the people of Poland and the Caucasus. Black Hundreds and Octobrists predominated in the Third Duma, which was elected on the basis of this law, and opened in November 1907. p. 24

[18] *Milyukov, P. N.*—leader of the Cadet Party.

Stolypin, P. A.—a reactionary statesman of tsarist Russia and a big landlord, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of the Interior from 1906 to 1911. He headed the regime of savage political reaction after the suppression of the 1905-07 Revolution and organised bloody acts of repression against the revolutionary workers and peasants. p. 25

[19] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Cadet Party, which was published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 26

[20] *Kutler, N. N.*—a prominent leader of the Cadet Party. p. 26

[21] *Vekhi*—a Cadet collection of articles by N. Berdayev, S. Bulgakov, P. Struve, M. Herschensohn and other representatives of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie, published in Moscow in the spring of 1909. In articles on the Russian intelligentsia these writers tried to discredit the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the finest representatives of the Russian people, including V. G. Belinsky and N. G. Chernyshevsky, vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905, and thanked the tsarist government for having, "with its bayonets and jails", saved the bourgeoisie from "the fury of the people". The writers called upon the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared the programme of *Vekhi*, as regards both philosophy and publicist matters, to that of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, and he called the symposium an "encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy", nothing but "a veritable torrent of reactionary mud poured on the head of democracy" (see pp. 123-31 of this volume). p. 27

[22] The expression "His Majesty's Opposition" was used by the leader of the Cadet Party, P. Milyukov. In a speech at a luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of London on June 19 (July 2), 1909, Milyukov declared: "So long as there is in Russia a legislative chamber which controls the budget, the Russian opposition will remain the opposition of His Majesty and not to His Majesty." (*Rech* No. 167, June 21 [July 4], 1909). p. 27

[23] *Trudoviks, Trudovik group*—the group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the State Dumas, consisting of peasants and intellectuals of a

Narodnik persuasion. The Trudovik group was formed in April 1906 from peasant deputies in the First Duma.

The Trudoviks put forward demands for the removal of all social-estate and national restrictions, the democratisation of Zemstvo and urban self-government, and the establishment of universal suffrage for elections to the Duma. The agrarian programme of the Trudoviks was based on Narodnik principles of equalitarian use of the land: the formation of a national fund from state, crown and church lands, and also from privately owned lands if the size of the holding exceeded the established labour norm. It was envisaged that there would be compensation for the privately owned land to be nationalised. Lenin pointed out that the typical Trudovik was a peasant who was "not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his *own* plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal state and for democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 229).

In the Duma the Trudoviks wavered between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. These waverings were due to the class nature of the small peasant farmers. Nevertheless, owing to the fact that the Trudoviks represented the mass of the peasants, the Bolsheviks in the Duma pursued a policy of concluding agreements with them on particular questions for a joint struggle against the tsarist autocracy and the Cadets. In 1917, the Trudovik group merged with the Popular Socialist Party and actively supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 27

[24] The *Meeting of the Enlarged Editorial Board of "Proletary"* was held in Paris on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909. Nine members of the Bolshevik Centre (elected by the Bolshevik group of the Fifth [London] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907) were present at it, headed by Lenin, and representatives of the organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow Region and the Urals. The meeting was convened to discuss the anti-Party stand of the otzovists and ultimatumists and took place under Lenin's leadership. Lenin spoke on all the main questions on the agenda. Otzovism and ultimatumism were defended at the meeting by A. Bogdanov (Maximov) and V. Shantser (Marat). Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and Tomsky adopted a double-dealing position. The meeting condemned otzovism and ultimatumism as "Left liquidationism". It also condemned god-building and adopted a decision for a vigorous struggle against it, exposing its anti-Marxist character. Bogdanov, the inspirer of otzovism and ultimatumism, was expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks. p. 29

[24a] *Boyeviks*—members of the revolutionary fighting squads, who, during the revolutionary struggle, used the tactics of armed action, helped political prisoners to escape, expropriated state-owned funds for the needs of the revolution, removed spies and agent provocateurs, etc. p. 30

[25] The *Anti-Socialist Law* was promulgated in Germany in 1878. The law suppressed all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, mass working-class organisations, and the labour press; socialist literature was confiscated. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. 30

[26] The *July Conference of 1907* was the Third (Second All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. It was held on July 21-23 (August 3-5), 1907, in Finland (Kotka), and was attended by 26 delegates: 9 Bolsheviks, 5 Mensheviks, 5 Polish and 2 Lettish Social-Democrats and 5 Bundists. The Conference was convened to determine the tactics of Social-Democracy in connection with the coup d'état of June 3 and the convocation of the Third Duma. At the Conference Lenin spoke against the boycott of the Duma. A. Bogdanov (Maximov) delivered a report on behalf of the supporters of boycott. Lenin's resolution was adopted by a majority of votes. p. 38

[27] *Economists*, *Economism*—an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international opportunism; its organs were the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*) (1897-1902), published in Russia, and the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*) (1899-1902), published abroad. The programme of the Economists, whom Lenin called Russian Bernsteinians, was the so-called "Credo", written in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova.

The Economists restricted the tasks of the working-class movement to the economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie, and denied the leading role of the workers' party, which, they considered, should merely observe the spontaneous development of the movement and follow in its wake. In their worshipping "spontaneity" they belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and consciousness, declaring that the socialist ideology could grow out of the spontaneous working-class movement; by denying the need for a Marxist party to imbue the workers' movement with socialist consciousness, they cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. They defended disunity, confusion and parochial amateurish approach which existed in the Social-Democratic ranks and opposed the creation of a centralised working-class party. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the revolutionary class path and reduce it to a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The following works of Lenin are devoted to an extensive criticism of the views of the Economists: "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (directed against Credo, written in Siberian exile in 1899 and signed by 17 exiled Marxists), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the '*Profession de Foi*'", "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96; Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin completed the ideological rout of Economism by his book *What Is To Be*

Done? (present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). Lenin's *Iskra* played a great part in combating Economism. p. 39

[28] *Vsev* (Vsevolod)—a pseudonym of the otzovist V. P. Denisov. p. 40

[29] *Stan* (Stanislav)—the otzovist A. V. Sokolov (Volsky), one of the organisers of the anti-Party schools in Capri and Bologna. p. 40

[30] *Rabocheye Znamya* (*Workers' Banner*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, organ of the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Area, of the Moscow and Moscow District Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. It was published in Moscow from March to December 1908; 7 issues appeared. Beginning with No. 5, the newspaper opened its columns to a discussion on the attitude to the Duma and to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. This issue printed an article by an otzovist entitled "Letter of a Worker (The Plan of Party Work in Connection with an Assessment of the Present Moment)". The article was edited by St. Volsky (A. V. Sokolov), leader of the Moscow otzovists, at that time member of the Regional Bureau of the Moscow Central Industrial Area. The article evoked sharp protests from the Party organisations of Central Russia, and a rejoinder in the columns of the newspaper *Proletary*. Lenin criticised the article in his work "Two Letters" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 286-302). p. 42

[31] The *First All-Russian Congress of Factory Doctors and Representatives of Factory Industry* was held on April 1-6 (14-19), 1909, in Moscow. The delegates to the Congress included 52 workers chosen by trade unions, mainly of the big industrial centres. The speeches of the workers' delegates, who were predominantly Bolsheviks, were of great political importance and evoked a response throughout the country. Two questions in particular gave rise to lively debates at the Congress, viz., the organisation of health supervision (a resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks was adopted), and election of factory inspectors by the workers.

The Congress did not finish its work; it was closed down by the police. p. 42

[32] *Krichevsky*, *B. N.* and *Martynov*, *A. S.* were leaders of Economism. p. 42

[33] Lenin is referring to Talleyrand, French diplomat of the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. p. 43

[34] This refers to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in London, April 30-May 19 (May 13 June 1), 1907. p. 45

[35] *Marat*—V. L. Shantser, a member of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*, an ultimatumist, later one of the members of the *Vperyod* anti-Party group. p. 45

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[36] *Tsarevokokshaisk*—one of the uyezd towns of tsarist Russia. p. 46

[37] "*Er*"—A. V. Sokolov (Volsky). p. 47

[38] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—a Bolshevik mass working-class newspaper, under Lenin's guidance. It was published illegally in Vyborg by the editors of the newspaper *Proletary* from September 10 (23), 1906 to January 19 (February 1), 1908; 20 issues appeared. Beginning with No. 2 the newspaper was issued as the organ of the local committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; No. 2 as the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg and Moscow District committees; Nos. 3-7 as the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow District, Perm and Kursk committees; Nos. 8-19—as the previous issues with the addition of the Kazan Committee; in the last issue, No. 20, the Urals Regional Committee took the place of the Perm and Kazan committees. p. 56

[39] Lenin's work *The Otzovist-Ultimatumist Strike-breakers* has not been found. p. 69

[40] The article "*The St. Petersburg Election*" is devoted to the results of the by-election to the Third Duma held in September 1909; it was printed unsigned in Proletary No. 49, October 3 (16), 1909.

The note written by Lenin was directed against N. Jordansky's opportunist article, "No Way Out", published in *Novy Dyen* No. 6. p. 76

[41] *Novy Dyen* (*New Day*)—a legal Social-Democratic weekly newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from July 20 (August 21 to December 13 (26), 1909, 15 issues appeared. The newspaper was closed down by the police. Two articles by Lenin were printed in *Novy Dyen*: "Once More on Partyism and Non-Partyism" and "Concerning *Vekhi*" (see pp. 62-64, 123-31 of this volume). p. 76

[42] This refers to F. Engels's "Introduction" to Marx's work *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*. When the "Introduction" was published by the German Social-Democrats in 1895 it was distorted and subsequently interpreted by them as a renunciation of an armed uprising and barricade fighting.

The complete test of the "Introduction" was published for the first time in the U.S.S.R. alone. (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38.) p. 76

[43] The "*Draft Resolution on the Consolidation of the Party and of Its Unity*" was moved by Lenin at the meeting of the editorial board of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, on October 21 (November 3), 1909. At this meeting Lenin proposed the publication of an editorial article "Methods of Consolidating the Party and its Unity" (so far this article has not been found). In the article Lenin demanded a determined fight against liquidationism and upheld the need to preserve and consolidate the independence of the Bolshevik organisation. The majority of the editorial board, who

were concealed agents of Trotsky (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Varsky), and the Menshevik Martov, rejected Lenin's article as an editorial and proposed that it should be printed over the author's signature as a contribution to discussion. Thereupon Lenin raised the general question of consolidating the Party and its unity for discussion by the editorial board and moved the draft resolution on this subject. The draft, like Lenin's article, was rejected by the conciliatory-liquidationist majority of the editorial board. p. 77

[44] The Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.—*Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—was published illegally from February 1908 to January 1917. Fifty-eight issues appeared; the first issue was printed in Russia, the rest abroad, in Paris and later in Geneva. In conformity with a decision of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the editorial board consisted of Bolshevik, Menshevik and Polish Social-Democrat representatives. *Sotsial-Demokrat* published over eighty articles and shorter items by Lenin. Within the editorial board, Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line. Part of the editorial board (Kamenev and Zinoviev) took a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and tried to prevent Lenin's policy from being carried out. The Menshevik editors, Martov and Dan, sabotaged the work of the editorial board and at the same time openly defended the liquidators in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators led to the resignation of Martov and Dan in June 1911, and from December 1911 onwards *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin. p. 77

[45] *The International Socialist Bureau*—the executive body of the Second International established by decision of the Paris Congress in 1900. Lenin became a member of the Bureau as the official representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and he spoke at its Eleventh Session on November 7 (New Style), 1909. On the meeting of the Bureau, see Lenin's article "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau" (see pp. 140-44 of this volume). p. 78

[46] The *Winter Palace*—the tsar's residence in St. Petersburg. p. 79

[47] *Bobrikov, N. I.*—tsarist Governor-General in Finland from 1898 to 1904; established the police-gendarmerie regime there. p. 79

[48] The *Taurida Palace* was the building in St. Petersburg in which the Duma sessions were held. p. 81

[49] *To Pupils of the Capri School* was written by Lenin in October 1909 in reply to two letters of the workers who were studying at the school and who had dissociated themselves from the Bogdanov group. The letters of the Leninist students were published together with Lenin's article "A Shameful Fiasco" (see pp. 85-86 of this volume) as a separate reprint from the newspaper *Proletary* No. 50, November 28 (December 11), 1909. p. 82

[50] The "*Marxism" of the Brentano, Sombart and Struve variety*—a bourgeois-reformist "theory" that "recognises the 'school of capitalism' but rejects the school of revolutionary class struggle" (*Lenin*). The representatives of this variety of bourgeois distortion of Marxism were:

Lujo Brentano—a German bourgeois economist, an adherent of so-called "state socialism"; he tried to prove the possibility of achieving social equality within the framework of capitalism by means of reforms and reconciling the interests of capitalists and workers.

Werner Sombart—a German bourgeois economist, a falsifier of Marxism. He tried to justify capitalism, depicting it as a harmonious planned system.

Under cover of Marxist phraseology, Brentano, Sombart and their successors in fact defended capitalism and tried to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. The "theories" of Brentano and Sombart were, and still are, extensively used by enemies of Marxism.

P. B. Struve—a Russian bourgeois liberal, a legal Marxist in the nineties and later one of the leaders of the Cadet Party. After the Great October Revolution he was a whiteguard émigré, a bitter enemy of Soviet power. p. 90

[51] Lenin quotes the words of the Menshevik liquidator Dan, who at the Fifth (All-Russian 1908) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., during the discussion of the question "The present moment and the tasks of the Party", declared that the Bolsheviks "decided to push in where they had had one licking already". p. 91

[52] The quotation is from the pamphlet by the Russian Narodnik P. N. Tkachov, *Tasks of Revolutionary Propaganda in Russia*, April 1874, p. 16. p. 92

[53] The *law of November 9, 1906*—Stolypin's agrarian law allowing the peasants to withdraw from the village communes and settle on farmsteads. For a description and appraisal of Stolypin's land reform see Lenin's work "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution 1905-07" (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). p. 92

[54] *G-g* (Georg)—the Menshevik liquidator V. O. Levitsky (V. O. Tsederbaum). p. 99

[55] *Vorwärts*—Central Organ of German Social-Democracy, was published from 1876 onwards, under the editorship of Wilhelm Liebknecht and others. In its columns Frederick Engels waged a struggle against all manifestations of opportunism. From the middle nineties, after the death of Engels, the paper systematically published writings by the opportunists dominant in German Social-Democracy and the Second International. p. 99

[56] *P.*—the Menshevik Plekhanovite F. I. Tsederbaum (P. N. Dnevnitsky). p. 100

[57] For the article "'*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*' *and Cherevanin*" Lenin used his remarks on Cherevanin's book *The Contemporary Situation and the Possible Future*, and especially the "summary of important remarks" written by him on the cover at the end of this book. p. 103

[58] This document is the beginning of an article written by Lenin in Paris at the end of November (beginning of December) 1909. The last portion of the article has not been preserved. The article was intended for *Proletary* No. 50, but was not published in it. p. 107

[59] *Eduard Bernstein*—leader of the extreme opportunist wing of German Social-Democracy and the Second International, a theoretician of revisionism and reformism. p. 108

[60] The *Letter of an "Old Iskrist and Old Bolshevik"* quoted by Lenin was published over the signature "Tr" in the newspaper *Proletary* No. 50 of November 28 (December 11), 1909 ("Letters from St. Petersburg. Letter III"). p. 109

[61] *Zubatov, S. V.*—colonel of gendarmerie and chief of the Moscow Secret Police, who carried out a policy known as "police socialism". In 1901-03, on his initiative legal workers' organisations were set up in order to divert the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. Zubatov's activity in setting up legal workers' organisations was supported by V. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior. Zubatov tried to direct the working-class movement towards the achievement of purely economic demands and to make the workers think that the government was ready to meet their demands. The first Zubatov organisation was set up in Moscow in May 1901 under the name "Society for the Mutual Assistance of Workers in Mechanical Industry". Zubatov organisations were set up also in Minsk, Odessa, Vilna, Kiev and other cities.

The reactionary character of Zubatovism was unmasked by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, who made use of legal workers' organisations to draw wide sections of the working class into the struggle against the autocracy. Owing to the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in 1903, the tsarist government was compelled to liquidate the Zubatov organisations. p. 111

[62] This refers to Stolypin's agrarian policy, which aimed at establishing strong kulak farms as a bulwark of tsarism in the countryside. On November 9 (22), 1906, Stolypin issued a law allowing peasants to withdraw from the village communes and settle on farmsteads; it proposed that the peasant should take his land holding into his personal possession and leave the village commune. The peasant could sell his allotment, which was previously forbidden. Stolypin's land law benefited the kulak top section in the countryside and finally ruined the village poor. p. 117

[63] *V. Ilyin*—a pseudonym of V. I. Lenin. p. 118

[64] This refers to A. S. Martynov's attacks in the organ of the liquidators, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, on the book by V. I. Lenin (V. Ilyin) *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. p. 118

[65] Lenin is referring to an incident at the sitting of the Third Duma on November 20 (December 3), 1909, during the discussion of the Bill on inviolability of the person. The Bill was, in the words of the Duma Left deputies, "a legitimisation of all forms of tyranny that have existed or are in existence in Russia". The out-and-out Black-Hundred speech of Markov (the Second) on November 20 (December 3) in defence of the Bill evoked indignation even from the Cadets, who walked out of the Duma chamber as a sign of protest. The debate on the Bill in the Duma meeting of November 20 (December 3) particularly exposed the Black-Hundred character of the Third Duma. p. 120

[66] Prior to the appearance of this article, Lenin delivered a public lecture in Liége on October 16 (29), 1909, "The Ideology of the Counter-revolutionary Bourgeoisie". On November 13 (26), 1909, Lenin delivered a lecture on the same subject in Paris: "The Ideology of the Counter-revolutionary Liberalism (The Success of *Vekhi* and Its Social Significance)". The plan of the Paris lecture is set out in a poster preserved in the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. It is divided into the following parts: "I. The philosophy against which *Vekhi* fights and the Duma speeches of the Cadet Karaulov. II. Belinsky and Chernyshevsky annihilated by *Vekhi*. III. Why do the liberals hate the 'intellectualist' Russian revolution and its French 'sufficiently prolonged' model? IV. *Vekhi* and the Lefts in Russia. Cadets and Octobrists. The 'sacred cause' of the Russian bourgeoisie. V. What did the democratic revolution in Russia gain by losing its liberal-bourgeois 'allies'? VI. *Vekhi* and Milyukov's speeches at the election meetings in St. Petersburg. How Milyukov criticised the illegal revolutionary newspaper at these meetings." p. 123

[67] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*)—a daily newspaper founded in 1756; beginning with the 1860s, it expressed the views of the most reactionary monarchist elements among the landlords and clergy; from 1905 onwards, it was one of the chief organs of the Black Hundreds. It was closed down soon after the October Revolution of 1917. p. 125

[68] *Pobedonostsev, K. P.*—a reactionary statesman of tsarist Russia, Procurator-General of the Synod. He was virtually head of the government and chief inspirer of unbridled feudalistic reaction during the rule of Alexander III and he continued to play a prominent part under Nicholas II as well. p. 127

[69] The "*four-point electoral system*"—designation of the democratic electoral system, which includes four demands: universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot. p. 128

[70] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. Moderately liberal at the outset, it became after 1876 the organ of reactionary circles of the nobility and the bureaucracy. The paper was hostile not only to the revolutionary, but even to the liberal-bourgeois movement. After 1905 it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* the acme of venality in the press. p. 129

[71] *Anthony*, *Bishop of Volhynia*—an extreme reactionary. p. 129

[72] The words "Enrich yourselves, gentlemen, and you will become electors" are ascribed to Guizot, head of the French Government during the years of the July monarchy (1830-48). p. 129

[73] This refers to the resolution of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. "On the Attitude to Non-proletarian Parties " (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses*, *Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, 7th Russian ed., Part 1, 1953, pp. 164-65). p. 132

[74] *Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik* (*Moscow Weekly*)—a weekly magazine, organ of the bourgeois-landlord counter-revolutionary "Party of Peaceful Renovation", published in Moscow from 1906 to 1910. p. 136

[75] The *Vperyod* group—an anti-Party group of otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders and empirio-monists (adherents of the reactionary idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius), organised in December 1909 on the initiative of A. Bogdanov and G. Alexinsky. Its press organ bore this name. In 1912 the Vperyodists, together with the Menshevik liquidators, united against the Bolsheviks in a general anti-Party bloc (the August bloc) organised by Trotsky.

Since it did not have the support of the workers, the group virtually broke up as early as in 1913. Its final and formal disintegration occurred in 1917 after the February Revolution. p. 145

[76] *The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.* known as the "Unity" plenum, was held January 2-23 (January 15-February 5), 1910 in Paris. The plenum was convened in spite of Lenin with the assistance of Trotsky's hidden allies: Zinoviev Kamenev and Rykov. Present at it, in addition to the Bolsheviks, were representatives of all factions and factional groupings, as well as representatives of national Social-Democratic organisations. The conciliators, hidden Trotskyists, countered Lenin's plan of a rapprochement with the pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanovites) for combating liquidationism by demanding the dissolution of all factions and the union of the Bolsheviks with the liquidators

and Trotskyists. The conciliators got the upper hand at the plenum and Lenin was among the minority. Only on Lenin's insistent demand did the plenum adopt a decision condemning liquidationism and otzovism. In spite of Lenin, the plenum adopted decisions to close down the Bolshevik organ *Proletary* and to dissolve the Bolshevik Centre. Lenin succeeded in securing the inclusion of a condition in the plenum's decision that the factional centres of the Golosists and Vperyodists should be abolished simultaneously with the dissolution of the Bolshevik Centre. The plenum adopted a decision to give financial support to Trotsky's Viennese *Pravda*, which Trotsky's agents, Zinoviev and Kamenev, were trying to have made the organ of the Central Committee. Despite Lenin's protest, Menshevik liquidators were elected to the central bodies.

For Lenin's fight at the plenum against the liquidators, Trotskyists and conciliators, see his "Notes of a Publicist" (pp. 195-259 of this volume). p. 148

[77] The article "*Golos* (*Voice*) of the Liquidators Against the Party" was written by Lenin as an editorial for No. 12 of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The article was issued as a separate print in the second half of March and afterwards published in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 156

[78] *Diskussionny Listok* (*Discussion Bulletin*)—a supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. It was published in Paris by a decision of the January (1910) plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. from March 6 (19), 1910 to April 29 (May 12), 1911; three numbers were issued. p. 156

[79] *Grigory*—G. Y. Zinoviev. p. 158

[80] *Innokenty*—I. F. Dubrovinsky. p. 158

[81] *The Letter of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P.* "To All Comrades Abroad" was published as a separate leaflet on March 3 (16), 1910.

The *Central Committee Bureau Abroad* (C.C.B.A.) was set up by the plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1908 as the general representative body of the Party abroad, subordinate and accountable to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. Shortly after the January plenum, a liquidationist majority developed among the members of the C.C.B.A., and the C.C.B.A. became a centre for mobilising anti-Party forces. The liquidationist tactics of the C.C.B.A. compelled the Leninist Bolsheviks to recall their representative from it in May 1911. A little later the representatives of the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats were recalled. In January 1912 the C.C.B.A. dissolved itself. p. 161

[82] The reference is to the "Open Letter" advocating liquidationist views, signed by the Mensheviks: Avgustovsky—S. O. Tsederbaum-Yezhov; Anton—M. S. Makadzyub; Vadim—V. K. Ikov;

V. Petrova—L. N. Radchenko; Georgy—B. S. Tseitlin-Batusky; Georg—V. O. Tsederbaum-Levitsky; Yevg. Ha-az—V. A. Gutovsky-Mayevsky; Kramolnikov—G. I. Prigorny; D. Koltsov—B. A. Ginsburg; Nat. Mikhailova—R. S. Galbershtadt; Roman—K. M. Yermolayev; Romul—M. L. Kheisin; Solomonov—S. I. Portugeis; Cherevanin—F. A. Lipkin; Yuri—P. A. Bronshtein; Y. P-y—Y. A. Piletsky. p. 161

[83] *Mikhail*—the Menshevik liquidator I. A. Isuv. p. 162

[84] "*One of the C.C. members operating in Russia*"—V. P. Nogin. p. 162

[85] *Trepov, D. F.*—Moscow Chief of Police in 1896-1905, Governor General of St. Petersburg from January 1905 and later Minister of the Interior. He was the actual organiser of the suppression of the Revolution of 1905-07 and the organiser of mass shootings and executions of revolutionary workers and peasants. p. 166

[86] See the Introduction by F. Engels to the English edition of his pamphlet *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. p. 167

[87] N. G. Chernyshevsky. *The Prologue*, Part I. p. 168

[88] See the resolution "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party" adopted by the Fifth (All-Russian 1908) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, 7th Russian ed., Part 1, 1953, pp. 195-97). p. 174

[89] The *Council of State*—one of the supreme state bodies in pre-revolutionary Russia. It was set up in 1810 according to the plan of M. M. Speransky as a legislative consultative institution, the members of which were appointed and endorsed by the tsar. By the law of February 20 (March 5), 1906, the Council of State was reorganised and given the right to confirm or reject Bills after their discussion in the Duma. However, the right to alter fundamental laws and to promulgate a number of particularly important laws remained a prerogative of the tsar.

From 1906 half of the members of the Council of State consisted of elected representatives of the nobility, clergy and big bourgeoisie, and half of the councillors were appointed by the tsar. In consequence, the Council of State was an ultra-reactionary body, which rejected even moderate Bills adopted by the Duma. p. 178

[90] *Young Turks*—the political organisation of the Turkish bourgeoisie, founded in 1894. It sought to limit the absolute power of the Sultan and to convert the feudal empire into a bourgeois constitutional-monarchical state. In 1908 it headed the revolution which made Turkey a constitutional monarchy and became the governing

party. It declared itself dissolved after Turkey's military defeat in the First World War (in the autumn of 1918). p. 179

[91] The *Second Paris Group for Assistance to the R.S.D.L.P.* was formed in November 1908. It was an offshoot of the general Paris group that included the Mensheviks and was a union of the Bolsheviks alone, including members of the Bolshevik Centre, headed by Lenin. The resolution of the Second Paris (Bolshevik) Group for Assistance to the R.S.D.L.P. was adopted at a meeting on March 17 (30), 1910, and was printed as a separate leaflet. p. 187.

[92] *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a legal monthly journal of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. It served as a rallying centre for the liquidators in Russia. p. 192

[93] *A Necessary Supplement to G. V. Plekhanov's "Dnevnik"*—a Menshevik liquidationist leaflet issued by the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in April 1910, directed against G. V. Plekhanov. p. 192

[94] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 352-61. p. 208

[95] *Vozrozhdeniye* (*Regeneration*)—a Menshevik liquidationist magazine legally published in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910; its place was taken by the magazines *Zhizn* (*Life*) in 1910, and *Dyelo Zhizni* (*Cause of Life*) in 1911. p. 217

[96] The *Second Vperyodist*—V. L. Shantser (Marat). p. 225

[97] *T.*—L. Tyszka. p. 228

[98] *I.*—I. F. Dubrovinsky. p. 228

[99] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist Monthly*)—the principal organ of the opportunists in German Social-Democracy and one of the organs of international opportunism. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933.

The magazine criticised the resolution against revisionism, "On Party Tactics", which was adopted at the (Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party in Dresden (September 1903). Subsequently, this resolution was reproduced almost in its entirety at the International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam (August 1904) in the resolution on "International Rules of Party Tactics". p. 229

[100] The *author of "Letter from the Caucasus", K. St.*—J. V. Stalin. His "Letter from the Caucasus" against the Tiflis liquidators was written as early as December 1909 for *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The Mensheviks on the editorial board refused to print the letter in the Central Organ of the Party; it was published only on May 25 (June 7), 1910 in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 2, together with a reply

to it by the leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks—An (N. Jordania). p. 230

[101] This refers to the resolution of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., "On the Attitude to Non-proletarian Parties" (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, 7th Russian ed., Part 1, 1953, pp. 164-65). p. 234

[102] *Bezgolovtsi* (Headless) ironically applied by Lenin to the *Bezzaglavtsi*—a semi-Cadet group (S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, and others) which published a weekly journal *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*) in St. Petersburg (1906). Avowed adherents of "critical socialism"—supporters of the revisionist wing of West-European Social-Democracy (Bernstein and others), the Bezzaglavtsi were opposed to the proletariat pursuing an independent class policy. Lenin called them "pro-Menshevik Cadets" or "pro-Cadet Mensheviks". p. 234

[103] *Popular Socialists* (*Enesy*)—a petty-bourgeois party formed in 1906 by splitting off from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It put forward moderate democratic demands within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. The Enesy rejected the proposal for socialisation of the land contained in the Socialist-Revolutionary programme, and admitted alienation of the landlords' land on the basis of compensation. Lenin called the Enesy "petty-bourgeois opportunists", "social-Cadets", and "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks". The leaders of the Enesy were: A. V. Peshekhonov, V. A. Myakotin, N. F. Annensky, and others. p. 234

[104] *Nashi Pomoi* (*Our Garbage*) was Lenin's ironical name for the liquidationist journal *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*).

The Congress of Literary Hangers-on—the Second All-Russian Congress of Writers, held in St. Petersburg on April 21-28 (May 4-11), 1910, with the participation of representatives of *Nasha Zarya* and the Menshevik *Sovremenny Mir* (*Contemporary World*). At the very first demand of the police, the Congress without any resistance cancelled discussion of a resolution on freedom of the press.

In speaking of the Posse-ists, Lenin is referring to the collaboration of the liquidators in the liberal-bourgeois magazine *Soyuz Potrebitelei* (*Consumers' Association*), which was led by V. A. Posse. p. 236

[105] *I.*—the Menshevik liquidator B. I. Gorev-Goldman. p. 239

[106] *Azefism*—from the name of Azef, a leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, who turned out to be an agent provocateur of the tsarist secret police. p. 246

[107] This refers to F. Engels's article "Der 4. Mai in London" (*Arbeiter-Zeitung*, Wien, Nr. 21, vom 23.5.1890); see also the letters of Engels to Sorge of November 29, 1886, and May 11, 1889 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 469-73). p. 256

[108] *Zihna* (*Struggle*)—a newspaper, the Central Organ of the Lettish Social-Democrats, founded in March 1904. It was issued at considerable intervals in Riga, Brussels and Petrograd; from 1919 it was the organ of the Communist Party of Latvia. p. 260

[109] This refers to the works of V. Y. Varzar, *Statistics of Strikes at Factories During 1905* and *Statistics of Strikes at Factories During the Three Years 1906-08*, published in St. Petersburg by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1908 and 1910. p. 260

[110] The *International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen* was held from August 28 to September 3 (New Style), 1910. The R.S.D.L.P. was represented at the Congress by Lenin, Plekhanov, Lunacharsky, and others. Several commissions were set up by the Congress for preliminary discussion and drafting of resolutions on particular questions. Lenin worked in the Co-operative Commission. His draft resolution on the co-operatives was made the basis of the draft resolution moved in the Co-operative Commission by the R.S.D.L.P. delegation. On the work of the Co-operative Commission and the text of the R.S.D.L.P. delegation's draft resolution on the co-operatives see Lenin's article "The Question of Co-operative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen" (see pp. 275-83 of this volume). p. 265

[111] *Sazhin*—the Vperyodist I. A. Sanzhur. p. 268

[112] "*Tkach I-n*"—the Social-Democrat I. V. Sysoyev, an otzovist-ultimatumist. p. 269

[113] "*Rabochy Ar*"—the Vperyodist F. I. Kalinin. p. 270

[114] *Voinov*—a pseudonym of A. V. Lunacharsky. p. 272

[115] *Domov*—M. N. Pokrovsky. p. 273

[116] Lenin quotes A. Bebel's words in a report on "Attacks on the Fundamental Views and Tactics of the Party" at the German Social-Democratic Congress in Hanover (October 9-14 [New Style], 1899). p. 280

[117] The *International Congress in Stuttgart*—the Seventh International Socialist Congress, held August 18-24 (New Style), 1907. Lenin took part in the Congress as a delegate of the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 75-93). p. 281

[118] The protest at the publication in *Vorwärts* of Trotsky's article slandering the R.S.D.L.P. was written during the session of the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen. p. 285

[119] *Tovarishch* (*The Comrade*)—a bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1906 until 1908 with the close participation of S. N. Prokopovich and Y. D. Kuskova. Though formally not the organ of any particular party, it was in fact the mouthpiece of the Left Constitutional-Democrats. It also published contributions from Mensheviks. p. 285

[120] *Le Peuple* (*People*)—a daily newspaper, the Central Organ of the Belgian (reformist) Labour Party, published from 1884 in Brussels. p. 285

[121] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*)—a popular newspaper, the organ of the Bolsheviks, published in Paris from October 30 (November 12), 1910 to July 30 (August 12), 1912; nine issues appeared. Pro-Party Mensheviks also contributed to the newspaper. Its founder and leader was Lenin, who published more than 10 articles in it. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) noted that *Rabochaya Gazeta* resolutely and consistently defended the Party and the Party principle and made it the official organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks). p. 289

[122] This refers to the resolution written by Lenin and adopted by the conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* in June 1909: "Otzovism and Ultimatumism" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 442-46). p. 294

[123] Lenin quotes F. Engels's article "Socialism in Germany" (Marx/Engels/Lenin, *Zur Deutschen Geschichte*, Band II, 2. Halbband, Berlin, 1954, S. 1140-1141). p. 311

[124] The *Polish Kolo*—a group of Polish deputies in the Duma, united by the demand for Polish autonomy. In the First and Second Dumas, the leading part in this group was played by the Narodovtsi—Polish Black Hundreds. On all the main questions of Duma tactics the Polish *Kolo* supported the Octobrists and the Rights. p. 314

[125] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards by a group of Moscow University liberal professors and Zemstvo leaders. It voiced the interests of the liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democrats. After the October Revolution it was closed down. p. 320

[126] *Golos Moskvy* (*Voice of Moscow*)—a daily newspaper, the organ of the Octobrists, the counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and big landlords. It was published in Moscow from December 1906 to June 1915. p. 321

[127] "*M Coupon*"—a metaphorical name of capital or capitalists in the literature of the eighties and nineties of the last century. It

was first used by Gleb Uspensky in his sketches "Grievous Sins" (*Russkaya Mysl*, 1888, Book XII). p. 325

[128] The *school in Bologna* (Italy)—the second anti-Party school of the *Vperyod* group (end of 1910 to beginning of 1911). It was a continuation of the Capri school—the factional centre of the otzovists and ultimatumists. p. 328

[129] The article "*L. N. Tolstoy and the Modern Labour Movement*" was published in the newspaper *Nash Put*.

Nash Put (*Our Path*)—a semi-legal Bolshevik newspaper organised with the participation of the Central Trade Union Bureau as a continuation of *Vestnik Truda* (*Labour Herald*) (1909); it was published in Moscow from May 30 (June 12) 1910 to January 9 (22), 1911 under the editorship of I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov; 8 issues appeared. The newspaper ceased to be issued after the arrest of the main group of its contributors, who were betrayed by the provocators Malinovsky and Tanin. p. 330

[130] This refers to the telegram sent to Astapovo by the Social-Democratic deputies of the Third Duma to V. G. Chertkov, a close friend and disciple of L. N. Tolstoy: "The Social-Democratic group in the Duma, expressing the feelings of the Russian and the whole international proletariat, deeply mourns the loss of the brilliant artist, the irreconcilable and unconquered fighter against official clericalism, the enemy of tyranny and enslavement, who loudly raised his voice against the death penalty, the friend of the persecuted." p. 330

[131] The article "*Differences in the European Labour Movement*" was published in No. 1 of the newspaper *Zvezda* (*The Star*), in the section entitled "Letters from Abroad".

Zvezda—a Bolshevik legal newspaper, the predecessor of *Pravda*; it was issued in St. Petersburg from December 16 (29), 1910 to April 22 (May 5), 1912 (at first as a weekly, from January 1912 twice a week, and from March three times a week). On February 26 (March 10), 1912, there appeared simultaneously with *Zvezda* the first issue of *Nevskaya Zvezda*, which became the continuation of *Zvezda* after the latter had been closed down. The last, 27th, issue of *Nevskaya Zvezda* was published on October 5 (18), 1912. Contributors to *Zvezda* were: N. N. Baturin, K. S. Yeremeyev, V. M. Molotov (Skryabin), M. S. Olminskv, N. G. Poletayev, J. V. Stalin, and also A. M. Gorky. Until the autumn of 1911, pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanovites) participated in *Zvezda*. The ideological leadership of the newspaper was carried out (from abroad) by Lenin, who published in it and in *Nevskaya Zvezda* about 50 articles.

The legal newspaper *Zvezda* directed by Lenin was a militant Bolshevik organ which upheld the programme of the illegal Party. *Zvezda* established permanent close ties with the workers and devoted an extensive section to workers' correspondence. The

circulation of individual issues reached 50,000-60,000. The newspaper suffered continual persecution by the government; out of 96 issues of *Zvezda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*, 39 were confiscated and 10 were subjected to fines. *Zvezda* prepared the way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily newspaper *Pravda* and was closed down on the day that *Pravda* appeared. p. 347

[132] The "*Young*" faction—a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist group formed in the German Social-Democratic Party in 1890 and composed chiefly of undergraduate students and young writers (hence the name). It put forward a platform that rejected any Social-Democratic participation in parliament. They were expelled from the Party by the Erfurt Congress in October 1891. p. 351

[133] *Johann Most*—German Social-Democrat. In 1880, at the Baden Congress, he was expelled from the Party on account of his disorganising behaviour. In the eighties he became an adherent of anarchism (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 375-76). p. 351

[134] This refers to the plan put forward by the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets) in 1906 for transferring to the peasants part of the landlords' land for which compensation was to be paid to the landlords. The "fair valuation" of which the Cadets spoke meant that the peasants would have to pay for the land much more than it was actually worth. p. 360

[135] This refers to the declaration of the Bolsheviks in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad on November 22 (December 5), 1910, demanding the immediate convocation of the Central Committee to decide the question of the return of the funds of the Bolshevik faction. The declaration was signed by Lenin and other participants of the January plenary session of the Central Committee in 1910. p. 365

[136] The article "*Heroes of 'Reservation'*" was published in the magazine *Mysl* (*Thought*).

Mysl—a Bolshevik legal monthly of a philosophical and socio-economic nature published in Moscow from December 1910. The magazine was founded by Lenin as a counter to the liquidationist journals and for the struggle against them. He edited the magazine from abroad. Lenin wrote six articles for the first four issues of *Mysl*, including the large work "Strike Statistics in Russia". V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov were close collaborators in the magazine, to which pro-Party Mensheviks (G. V. Plekhanov and others) also contributed. The magazine was published until April 1911, five issues appeared. The last, fifth, issue was confiscated. p. 368

[137] The article "*The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia*" was directed against the slanderous articles of Trotsky and Martov published in the magazine *Neue Zeit*, the organ of the German Social-Democrats. Lenin intended to answer Trotsky and Martov in the same magazine, but the editors of *Neue Zeit*, Kautsky and Wurm, did not publish Lenin's article. It was not published until April 29 (May 12), 1911 in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 3. p. 374

[138] Marx/Engels/Lenin, *Zur Deutschen Geschichte*, Baud II, 1. Halbband, Berlin, 1954, S. 254. p. 376

[139] Lenin is referring to the "Tactical Resolution on the Agrarian Question" adopted by the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (See *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, 7th Russian ed., Part 1, 1953, pp. 124-25.) p. 377

[140] This refers to Karl Marx's article "The Berlin Counter-revolution" published on September 13, 1848, in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. This article was included in the third volume of *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle* (*The Literary Legacy of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels and Ferdinand Lassalle*), which was prepared by F. Mehring and published in Stuttgart, 1902, pp. 192-96. In referring to "Mehring's deserved ridicule" Lenin has in mind Mehring's introduction to this third volume, pp. 53-54. p. 377

[141] This refers to V. Y. Varzar's book *Statistics of Strikes at Factories During the Three Years 1906-08*, St. Petersburg, 1910. p. 381

[142] Marx und Engels: *Revolution und Konterrevolution in Deutschland*. See also Marx's letter to Ludwig Kugelmann of April 17, 1871 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 319-20). p. 383

[143] In his article, "Strike Statistics in Russian", Lenin used the official data collected by V. Y. Varzar. Lenin set about analysing the statistical data towards the end of September 1910 (see his rough notebook on "Strike Statistics in Russia", *Lenin Miscellany XXV*, pp. 129-55). On the basis of the collected data, Lenin intended to write an outline of the history of the Russian revolution. He expected the outline to form a book of about 300 pages, which he wanted to have translated afterwards into German. The article "Strike Statistics in Russia" was, in Lenin's words, "a first ap-

proach to the subject", "the preliminary results of an attempt at making a more detailed analysis". Lenin reserved publication of a full account of the results "for another occasion", but he did not manage to write a work of the size he intended. p. 393

[144] A. V. Pogozhev, *Report on the Numbers and Composition of Workers in Russia. Labour Statistics Data*, St. Petersburg, published by the Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1906. p. 401

[145] Lenin cites this same table in his article "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (see p. 381 of this volume) but there he includes mixed strikes among the political strikes, as was done in the government statistics of 1905. However, in his article "Strike Statistics in Russia" Lenin corrects this inaccuracy of the official statistics, including mixed strikes among the economic strikes. This explains the difference in the number of strikers in economic and political strikes for each quarter of 1905 shown in the two tables, although their total number is the same in both. p. 409

[146] The article "*The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture*" is the first part of a large work on capitalist agriculture in Germany which Lenin intended to write as a second instalment of his well-known work, *New Data on the Laws of the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part I. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America*.

The article "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" is included for the first time in Lenin's *Collected Works*. It was published in 1932 in the magazine *Bolshevik* No. 9 and *Lenin Miscellany XIX* after the discovery of part of the manuscript. The succeeding parts of the manuscript are still missing: the end of Chapter III—"Peasant Farms under Capitalism", the beginning and end of Chapter IV—"Labour of Women and Children in Agriculture", Chapters V and VI—"Squandering of Labour in Small-Scale Production" and "The Capitalist Character of the Use of Machinery in Modern Agriculture".

The end of the article with the signature "*V. Ilyin*", as well as the end of Chapter I ("A General Picture of the Economic System of Modern Agriculture") and the beginning of Chapter II ("The Real Nature of the Majority of Modern Agricultural 'Farms' [Proletarian "Farms"]"), which were missing when the article was published in 1932, have now been found; hence Chapters I, II and VII are now published in full for the first time. p. 423

[147] *Kievskaya Mysl* (*Kiev Thought*)—a daily bourgeois-democratic newspaper published in Kiev from 1906 to 1918. Mensheviks were among its most active contributors.

Lenin is referring to the article by the liquidator N. Valentinov, "Concerning the Recent German Census", published in *Kievskaya Mysl* No. 308. p. 427

[148] *Ekonomist Rossii* (*Russian Economist*)—a weekly bourgeois journal devoted to economic and financial questions in Russia and abroad; it was published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1912. p. 428

[149] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 600-863. p. 428

[150] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, pp. 640-48. p. 435

[151] Franz Bensing, *Der Einfluss der landwirtschaftlichen Maschinen auf VoIks- und Privatwirtschaft* (*The Effect of Agricultural Machinery on the National Economy and Private Undertakings*), Breslau, 1897. p. 442

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*September 1909-December 1910*)

1909

The first half of September	Lenin is on holiday with his family—N. K. Krupskaya, her mother and M. I. Ulyanova in Bonbon (France, department of Seine et Marne).
	Lenin writes the article "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-building".
September 5 (18	Lenin's articles "The Liquidators Exposed", "The Election in St. Petersburg" and the note of the editorial board "On the Open Letter of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Regional Committee" are published in the newspaper *Proletary* No. 47-48.
September, prior to 1 (14)	Lenin returns from Bonbon to Paris.
September 11 (24)	Lenin's article "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-building" is published in the Supplement to No. 47-48 of *Proletary*.
September 14 (27)	Lenin's article "Once More on Partyism and Non-partyism" is published in No. 9 of the newspaper *Novy Dyen*.
September 19 (October 2)	Lenin reads a paper in Paris on the (September) by-election in St. Petersburg to the Third Duma.
October, prior to 5 (18)	In his letter to V. A. Karpinsky Lenin dwells on the transfer of the Party library from Geneva to Paris.
October 3 (16)	Lenin's article "A Word to the Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg" is published in No. 49 of *Proletary*.
October 15 (28)	Lenin reads a paper in Liége to members of Social-Democratic groups "The State of Affairs in the Party".

October 16 (29)	Lenin delivers a public lecture in Liége "The Ideology of the Counter-Revolutionary Bourgeoisie".
October 21-22 (November 3-4)	Lenin participates in a meeting of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editorial board. When the editorial board refuses to publish his article "On Methods of Consolidating Our Party and Its Unity" as a leader, he moves a draft resolution on the strengthening of the Party and its unity.
October 23 (November 5)	Lenin leaves Paris for Brussels to attend the Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau.
October 24 (November 6)	Lenin informs the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* that he takes back his statement about resigning from the editorial board. Lenin takes part in the International Conference of Socialist Journalists in Brussels.
October 26 (November 7)	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels on the split in the Dutch Social-Democratic Labour Party.
October 26 (November 8)	Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Commission of the International Socialist Bureau.
Later than October 26 (November 8)	Lenin returns to Paris from Brussels.
October 31 (November 13)	Lenin's article "The Tsar Against the Finnish People" is published as a leading article in No. 9 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
October	In a letter to a group of pupils of the Capri school Lenin informs them that he had received two letters "about the incipient split in the school" and welcomes the "clear demarcation" between some of the pupils and the Bogdanovites; he gives those who had broken away from the otzovists pertinent advice and instructions.
November 1 (14)	Lenin together with I. F. Dubrovinsky and other members of the Central Committee writes a statement to the C.C. Bureau Abroad on the necessity

to convene a plenary session of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in the near future.

November 3 (16) — Lenin talks with N. Y. Vilonov who had come to Paris after the split in the Capri school; in connection with this conversation he writes a letter to A. M. Gorky.

November 13 (26) — Lenin delivers a public lecture in Paris "The Ideology of the Counter-Revolutionary Liberalism (The Success of *Vekhi* and Its Social Significance)".

November 21 (December 4) — Lenin makes a report on the Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau at an ordinary meeting of the Second Paris Group for Assistance to the R.S.D.L.P.; he is elected a member of the committee of the group.

November 28 (December 11) — Lenin's articles: "Some Sources of the Present Ideological Discord", "Methods of the Liquidators and Party Tasks of the Bolsheviks", "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and Cherevanin", and "The Bourgeois Press Fable About the Expulsion of Gorky", are published in No. 50 of the newspaper *Proletary*.

Lenin's article "A Shameful Fiasco" is published as a separate reprint from No. 50 of *Proletary*.

End of November — Lenin delivers lectures in Paris to five comrades expelled from the Capri school on the subjects: "The Present Moment and Our Tasks" and "Stolypin's Agrarian Policy".

Lenin writes the article "Ideological Decay and Disunity Among Russian Social-Democrats".

Autumn — Lenin writes "Explanatory Note on the Draft of the Main Grounds of the Bill on the Eight-hour Working Day" for the Social-Democratic group of the Third Duma.

December 3 (16) — Lenin writes a letter in reply to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov on the question of the "Prussian" or "American" paths of capitalist agrarian development in Russia.

December 13 (26) — Lenin's article "Concerning *Vekhi*" is published in No. 15 of *Novy Dyen*.

Second half of December — Lenin delivers lectures "The Present Moment" and "Stolypin's Agrarian Policy" to a second group of students of the Capri school who had arrived in Paris.

December 2 (January 6, 1910)	Lenin's articles "The Last Word of Russian Liberalism" and "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau" are published in No. 10 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
End of December (first half of January 1910)	Lenin writes a note on "The *Vperyod* Group".
	Lenin works in the Sorbonne library (Paris) on the literature relating to questions of philosophy and natural science.

1910

January 2-23 (January 15-February 5)	Lenin takes part in the work of the plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris; he moves a draft resolution "The State of Affairs in the Party" condemning liquidationism and otzovism. Lenin is elected by the plenum on to the editorial board of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and as a representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau.
End of January (beginning of February)	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the editorial board of the Central Organ against the publication in *Sotsial-Demokrat* of Y. O. Martov's liquidationist article "On the Right Path".
February 13 (26)	Lenin's article "Towards Unity" containing an appraisal of the decisions of the January plenary session of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. is published in No. 11 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
March 6 (19)	The first part of Lenin's work "Notes of a Publicist, I. The 'Platform' of the Adherents and Defenders of Otzovism", is published in No. 1 of *Diskussionny Listok*.
March 7 (20)	At a meeting in Paris of the Second (Bolshevik) Group for Assistance to the R.S.D.L.P., during a discussion of a report on the plenary session of the Central Committee, Lenin speaks in favour of the uniting with the pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanovites).
March 14 (27)	Lenin writes a letter to N. Y. Vilonov in Davos (Switzerland) on union of the Bolsheviks with the pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanovites) for combating the liquidators.

March 16 (29)	In a letter to G. V. Plekhanov Lenin proposes that he should meet him for talks on the state of affairs in the Party.
March 23 (April 5)	Lenin sends a statement to the C.C. Bureau Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. on the conflicts in the editorial board of the Central Organ. Lenin's articles "*Golos* (*Voice*) of the Liquidators Against the Party" (Reply to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*) and "What to Fight For?" are published in No. 12 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
Earlier than March 27 (April 9)	At a closed meeting of the Second (Bolshevik) Group for Assistance to the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris, Lenin moves a resolution for the expulsion from the Party of three Mensheviks who had refused to join the Russian collegium of the C.C. Lenin's resolution is accepted.
March 28 (April 10)	Lenin signs a letter to the Chief Board of the Polish Social-Democratic Party; this letter condemns the wavering displayed by representatives of that party in the struggle against the liquidators in the C.C. Bureau Abroad.
March 29 (April 11)	Lenin writes a letter to A. M. Gorky on Party unity with an appraisal of the work of the January plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.
Earlier than April 26 (May 9)	Lenin writes a statement to the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. on the situation in the editorial board of the Central Organ in connection with the behaviour of the liquidationist section of the board and insists that the liquidators should be replaced by Menshevik members of the Party.
April 26 (May 9)	Lenin's articles "The Campaign Against Finland", "They Are Nervous About the Army", "Party Unity Abroad", and "One of the Obstacles to Party Unity" are published in No. 13 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
May 25 (June 7)	The second part of Lenin's work "Notes of a Publicist, II. The 'Unity Crisis' in our Party" is published in No. 2 of *Diskussionny Listok*.
June 15 (28)	Lenin leaves Paris for Capri to visit Maxim Gorky.
June 18-30 (July 1-13)	Lenin stays with M. Gorky on Capri.

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July 1 (14)	Lenin leaves Capri.
July 9 or 10-August 10 (July 22 or 23-August 23)	Lenin is on holiday with N. K. Krupskaya and her mother in the little seaside town of Pornic (France) on the Brittany coast.
July	Lenin's article "The Jubilee Number of *Zihna*" is published in No. 100 of the newspaper *Zihna* (*Struggle*), the organ of the Social-Democrats of Latvia.
Before August 13 (26)	Lenin meets G. V. Plekhanov in Paris and converses with him.
August 13 (26)	Lenin arrives in Copenhagen for the Eighth Congress of the Second International and takes part in a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau.
August 15-21 (August 28-September 3)	Lenin takes part in the work of the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International.
Between August 15 and 21 (August 28 and September 3)	Lenin convenes a meeting of the Lefts in the Second International in order to organise and unite the revolutionary elements in the international working-class movement.
	Lenin has a meeting with G. V. Plekhanov, N. G. Poletayev and I. P. Pokrovsky on the question of the foundation of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Zvezda*.
August 16 (29)	Lenin takes part in a meeting of representatives of national sections of the Copenhagen Congress, the agenda of which contains the items: 1) Checking of credentials, 2) Appointment of commissions.
August 16-19 (August 29-September 1)	Lenin takes part in the work of the co-operative commission of the Congress, he drafts a resolution on co-operative societies and puts forward amendments to the resolution of the co-operative commission of the Congress.
August 20 (September 2)	Lenin informs the International Socialist Bureau that, by a decision of the January plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., 1910, G. V. Plekhanov as well as V. I. Lenin represents the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau.
	Lenin jointly with G. V. Plekhanov and A. Var-

sky sends a letter to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party protesting against the publication in *Vorwärts* of a slanderous article by Trotsky.

August 30 (September 12) — Lenin's article "The *Vperyod* Faction" is published in No. 15-16 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Lenin writes the article "The Otzovist-Ultimatumist Strike-breakers" (this article has not been found).

August 30-September 12 (September 12-26) — Lenin is in Stockholm where he had come to meet his mother, M. A. Ulyanova, and his sister, M. I. Ulyanova; he delivers lectures at meetings of Social-Democratic groups "The International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen" and "The State of Affairs in the Party".

September 2 (15) — Lenin writes out a subscription card for the loan of books on Danish agriculture from a library in Copenhagen.

September 13 or 14 (26 or 27) — Lenin in Copenhagen reads a paper on the International Socialist Congress.

September 16 (28) — Lenin returns to Paris.

September 21 (October 4) — In a letter to N. A. Semashko, the representative of the Bolsheviks in the C.C. Bureau Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin demands the urgent summoning of a meeting of the Bolsheviks to decide the question of the publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

September 24 (October 7) — Lenin writes a letter to Julian Marchlewski on the latter's proposed article in *Neue Zeit* against Y. O. Martov and gives a number of directives for the article.

September 25 (October 8) — Lenin's articles "The Question of Co-operative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen" and "How Certain Social-Democrats Inform the International About the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P." are published in No. 17 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

Lenin works on the article "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia", which he proposes to publish in *Neue Zeit*. The article was published in No. 3 of *Diskussionny Listok*, April 29 (May 12), 1911.

	Lenin begins working on strike statistics in Russia 1905-08.
November	Lenin conducts negotiations with V. V. Vorovsky and I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov on organising the publication in Moscow of the legal Bolshevik magazine *Mysl*.
End of September-November	Lenin studies strike statistics in Russia for the period 1905-08. He works on the articles "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (published in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 3, 1911) and "Strike Statistics in Russia" (published in the first and second issues of the journal *Mysl* in December 1910-January 1911).
Prior to October 15 (28)	Lenin speaks at a meeting of Bolsheviks in Paris on the question of founding, together with the Plekhanovites, *Rabochaya Gazeta*.
Prior to October 30 (November 12)	Lenin writes the article "Announcement on the Publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*".
October 30 (November 12)	Lenin's article "The Lessons of the Revolution" is published as a leading article in No. 1 of *Rabochaya Gazeta*.
November 1 (14)	Lenin sends No. 1 of *Rabochaya Gazeta* to A. M. Gorky in Capri and informs him of the preparations for publishing jointly with Plekhanov the legal magazine *Mysl*.
November 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "Two Worlds", "The Demonstration on the Death of Muromtsev", "Is This the Turn of the Tide?" and "L. N. Tolstoy" are published in No. 18 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
November 20 (December 3)	Lenin in a letter "To the Comrades Studying at the School in Bologna" refuses to read lectures in Bologna and invites the students to come to courses in Paris.
November 22 (December 5)	In a letter to the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. Bureau Abroad Lenin suggests the immediate remittance of 1,000 rubles for the publication of the newspaper *Zvezda*.
	Lenin and other Bolsheviks submit a statement to the C.C. Bureau Abroad demanding the immediate convocation of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.

Later than November 22 (December 5)	On behalf of *Rabochaya Gazeta* Lenin writes "An Open Letter to All Pro-Party Social-Democrats" describing the inner-Party situation.
November 28 (December 11)	Lenin's article "L. N. Tolstoy and the Modern Labour Movement" is published in No. 7 of the newspaper *Nash Put*.
December 16 (29)	Lenin's article "Differences in the European Labour Movement" is published in No. 1 of the newspaper *Zvezda*.
December 18 (31)	Lenin's articles "Tolstoy and the Proletarian Struggle", "The Beginning of Demonstrations", "What Is Happening in the Countryside?" and "Ivan Vasilyevich Babushkin (An Obituary)" are published in No. 2 of *Rabochaya Gazeta*.
December	No. 1 of the magazine *Mysl* is issued in Moscow containing Lenin's articles "Heroes of 'Reservation'" and "Strike Statistics in Russia" (Chapter 1).
	Lenin writes the article "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture".

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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PREFACE

Volume Seventeen of Lenin's works covers the period December 1910 to April 1912.

The principal contents of the volume are writings reflecting the struggle for the Party, against the liquidators and their accomplices—renegades from the revolution.

In the articles "The State of Affairs in the Party", "Those Who Would Liquidate Us (Re: Mr. Potresov and V. Bazarov)", "The Social Structure of State Power, the Prospects and Liquidationism", "Wreckers of the Party in the Role of 'Wreckers of Legends'", "A Conversation Between a Legalist and an Opponent of Liquidationism", "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto", "From the Camp of the Stolypin 'Labour' Party", Lenin uncovers the ideological roots and essence of liquidationism and exposes the liquidators' systematic wrecking of the work of the leading Party bodies.

The article "The New Faction of Conciliators, or the Virtuous" shows the unprincipled shifts of the conciliators to the side of the liquidators.

In the articles "The Cadets and the Octobrists", "First Exposure of Cadet Negotiations with the Cabinet", "Political Parties in the Five Years of the Third Duma", "The Bloc of the Cadets with the Progressists and Its Significance", Lenin illustrates the class nature of the party of counter-revolutionary liberalism—the Cadet Party.

The elections to the Fourth State Duma are dealt with in "The Election Campaign and the Election Platform", "The Campaign for the Elections to the Fourth Duma", "Fundamental Problems of the Election Campaign".

A considerable part of the volume is taken up by documents which throw light on the significance of the Prague

Party Conference which expelled Menshevik liquidators from the Party, a fact that played an outstanding role in preserving and strengthening the revolutionary party of the proletariat. These documents include the article on "The Climax of the Party Crisis", "Draft Resolution on Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators", the resolutions of the Prague Conference, "Report to the International Socialist Bureau on the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.", the pamphlet "The Anonymous Writer in *Vorwärts* and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P.", "A Letter to Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau".

Lenin's famous article "Certain Features of the Historical Development of Marxism" is included in this volume.

In this edition two letters to the Russian Collegium of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (1910-11) are included in the *Collected Works* for the first time. In these letters Lenin shows how the liquidators, otzovists, *Vperyod* group, and Trotskyites wrecked the work of the Party, and puts forward the task of uniting Party forces in the struggle for the restoration of the Party. The following are also included in Lenin's *Collected Works* for the first time: the note "Judas Trotsky's Blush of Shame"; materials relating to the June Meeting of the members of the C.C. in 1911: "Letter to the Meeting of the C.C. Members of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad", "Summary (Plan) for Report by Three Bolshevik Members of the C.C. to a Private Meeting of Nine Members of the Central Committee", "Draft Resolution Defining Terms of Reference"; the articles "The Social-Democratic Group in the Second Duma", "Agency of the Liberal Bourgeoisie"; documents of the meeting of the Bolshevik groups abroad: "Draft Resolution on the Report 'State of Affairs in the Party'", "Resolution on the Russian Organising Commission for the Convening of a Conference"; the documents of the Prague Conference: draft resolutions on the constitution of the Conference, on the tasks of the Party in the present situation, on the tasks of Social-Democrats in the struggle against the famine, "The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P.", letter "To the Editorial Board of *Zvezda*", and the article "Put Your Cards on the Table".

LETTER TO THE RUSSIAN COLLEGIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[1]

Recent events in the life of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party abroad clearly show that the "unity crisis" of the Party is coming to a head. I, therefore, consider it my duty, solely by way of information, to let you know the significance of recent happenings, the denouement that may be expected (according to this course of events) and the position adopted by orthodox Bolsheviks.

In *Golos*, No. 23,[2] Martov in his article "Where Have We Landed?" gibes at the Plenary Meeting,[3] at the fact that the Russian Collegium of the Central Committee has not met once during the year, and that nothing has been done to carry out the decisions. He, of course, "forgets" to add that it is precisely the liquidator group of Potresovs that has sabotaged the work of the Russian Central Committee; we know of the non-recognition of the Central Committee by Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri,[4] and their statement that its very existence is harmful. The C.C. in Russia has been wrecked. Martov rejoices at this. It stands to reason that the *Vperyod* group[5] also rejoices, and this is reflected in the *Vperyod* symposium, No. 1. In his glee, Martov has blurted out his views prematurely. He screams with delight that "legality will finish them" (the Bolsheviks or the "Polish-Bolshevik bloc"). By this he means that *thanks to the obstruction* of the Central Committee's work by the liquidators, there is no way out of the present situation that would be *legal** from the Party point of view. Obviously, nothing

* See footnote to p. 29.—*Tr.*

pleases the liquidators more than a hopeless situation for the Party.

But Martov was in too much of a hurry. The Bolsheviks still have at their disposal an archi-legal means of emerging from this situation as foreseen by the Plenary Meeting and published in its name in No. 11 of the Central Organ.[6] This is the demand for the return of the funds, because the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups obviously have not abided by the terms agreed on—to eliminate factions and to struggle against the liquidators and the otzovists.[7] It was precisely on these *conditions*, clearly agreed to, that the Bolsheviks handed over their property to the Central Committee.

Then, on the 5th December, 1910 (New Style), the Bolsheviks, having signed the conditions at the Plenary Meeting[8] applied for the return of the funds. According to legal procedure this demand must *lead to the convening of a plenary meeting*. The decision of the Plenary Meeting states that "should it prove impossible" (literally!) for a plenary meeting to take place within three months from the date of the application, then a commission of five members of the C.C.—three from the national, non-Russian, parties, one Bolshevik and one Menshevik—is to be set up.

Immediately, the *Golos* supporters revealed themselves in their true colours. The *Golos* supporter Igor,[9] a member of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad,[10] conscious of the policy of the Russian liquidators, handed in a statement that he was against holding a plenary meeting, but was in favour of a commission. The violation of legality by the *Golos* group is thus apparent, since a plenary meeting may be convened before the conclusion of the three-month period. Once such a request has been made it is not even permissible to raise the question of a commission.

The liquidator Igor, true servant of the Party traitors, Messrs. Potresov and Co., calculates quite simply that the plenary meeting is a sovereign body and consequently its session would open the door to a solution of the whole Party crisis. A commission, however, is not a sovereign body and has no rights apart from the investigation into the claim put forward in the application. (Three Germans are now considering this claim.) Hence, having obstructed the Russian Central Committee, the liquidators (and their lack-

eys abroad, the *Golos* group) are now trying to prevent anything in the nature of a Central Committee from working. We shall yet see whether this attempt succeeds. The Poles in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad[11] are voting for the plenary meeting. It now all depends on the Latvians and the Bund members,[12] from whom so far no reply has been received. Our representative in the Bureau Abroad has submitted and distributed a firm protest against Igor, (Copies of Igor's statement and this protest are attached herewith.)

It has become clear that the struggle for the plenary meeting is a struggle for a legal way out a struggle for the Party. The fight of the *Golos* group against the plenary meeting is a fight against a way out of the Party crisis, is a fight against legality.

Plekhanov and his friends,[13] whom we kept informed of every step, are in complete agreement with us on the necessity for a plenary meeting. They, too, are in favour of it; the draft of our joint statement on this matter is now being considered, and in the near future we shall either come forward with a statement together with Plekhanov's group, or we shall publish an article on the question in the Central Organ.

Further, on the 26th November (N.S.), 1910, Trotsky carried through a resolution in the so-called Vienna Party Club (a circle of Trotskyites, exiles who are pawns in the hands of Trotsky) which he published as a separate leaflet. I append this leaflet.

In this resolution, open war is declared on *Rabochaya Gazeta*,[14] the organ of the Bolsheviks and Plekhanov's group. The arguments are not new. The statement that there are now "no essential grounds" for a struggle against the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups is the height of absurdity and hypocrisy. Everybody knows that the *Golos* and *Vperyod* people had no intention of dispersing their factions and that the former in reality support the liquidators, Potresov and Co., that the *Vperyod* group organised the factional school abroad[15] (using funds of well-known origin), where they teach Machism, where they teach that otzovism is a "legal shade of opinion" (taken literally from their platform), etc., etc.

Trotsky's call for "friendly" collaboration by the Party with the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups is disgusting hypocrisy and phrase-mongering. Everybody is aware that for the whole year since the Plenary Meeting the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups have worked in a "friendly" manner against the Party (and were secretly supported by Trotsky). Actually, it is only the Bolsheviks and Plekhanov's group who have for a whole year carried out friendly Party work in the Central Organ, in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and at Copenhagen,[16] as well as in the Russian legal press.

Trotsky's attacks on the bloc of Bolsheviks and Plekhanov's group are not new; what is new is the outcome of his resolution: the Vienna Club (read: "Trotsky") has organised a "general Party fund for the purpose of preparing and convening a conference of the R.S.D.L.P.".

This indeed is, new. It is a direct step towards a split. It is a clear violation of Party legality and the start of an adventure in which Trotsky will come to grief. This is obviously a split. Trotsky's action, his "fund", is supported only by the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups. There can be no question of participation by the Bolsheviks and Plekhanov's group. That the liquidators (of *Golos*) in Zurich have already supported Trotsky is comprehensible. It is quite possible and probable that "certain" *Vperyod* "funds" will be made available to Trotsky. You will appreciate that this will only stress the adventurist character of his undertaking.

It is clear that this undertaking violates Party legality, since not a word is said about the Central Committee, which alone can call the conference. In addition, Trotsky, having ousted the C.C. representative on *Pravda*[17] in August 1910, himself lost all trace of legality, converting *Pravda* from an organ supported by the representative of the C.C. into a purely factional organ.

Thus, the whole matter has taken on definite shape, the situation has clarified itself. The *Vperyod* group collected "certain funds" for struggle against the Party, for support of the "legal shade of opinion" (otzovism). Trotsky in the last number of *Pravda* (and in his lecture in Zurich) goes all out to flirt with *Vperyod*. The liquidators in Russia sabotaged the work of the Russian Central Committee. The liquidators abroad want to prevent a plenary meeting abroad—in other

words, sabotage anything like a Central Committee. Taking advantage of this "violation of legality", Trotsky seeks an organisational split, creating "his own" fund for "his own" conference.

The roles have been assigned. The *Golos* group defend Potresov and Co., as a "legal shade of opinion", the *Vperyod* group defend otzovism, as a "legal shade of opinion". Trotsky seeks to defend both camps in a "popular fashion", and to call his conference (possibly on funds supplied by *Vperyod*). The Triple Alliance (Potresov+Trotsky+Maximov) against the Dual Alliance (Bolsheviks+Plekhanov's group). The deployment of forces has been completed and battle joined.

You will understand why I call Trotsky's move an adventure; it is an adventure in every respect.

It is an adventure in the ideological sense. Trotsky groups all the enemies of Marxism, he unites Potresov and Maximov, who detest the "Lenin-Plekhanov" bloc, as they like to call it. Trotsky unites all to whom ideological decay is dear, all who are not concerned with the defence of Marxism; all philistines who do not understand the reasons for the struggle and who do not wish to learn, think, and discover the ideological roots of the divergence of views. At this time of confusion, disintegration, and wavering it is easy for Trotsky to become the "hero of the hour" and gather all the shabby elements around himself. The more openly this attempt is made, the more spectacular will be the defeat.

It is an adventure in the party-political sense. At present everything goes to show that the real unity of the Social-Democratic Party is possible only on the basis of a sincere and unswerving repudiation of liquidationism and otzovism. It is clear that Potresov (together with *Golos*) and the *Vperyod* group have renounced neither the one nor the other. Trotsky unites them, basely deceiving himself, deceiving the Party, and deceiving the proletariat. In reality, Trotsky will achieve nothing more than the strengthening of Potresov's and Maximov's anti-Party groups. The collapse of this adventure is inevitable.

Finally, it is an organisational adventure. A conference held with Trotsky's "funds", without the Central Committee,

is a split. Let the initiative remain with Trotsky. Let his be the responsibility.

Three slogans bring out the essence of the present situation within the Party:

1. Strengthen and support the unification and rallying of Plekhanov's supporters and the Bolsheviks for the defence of Marxism, for a rebuff to ideological confusion, and for the battle against liquidationism and otzovism.

2. Struggle for a plenary meeting—for a legal solution to the Party crisis.

3. Struggle against the splitting tactics and the unprincipled adventurism of Trotsky in banding Potresov and Maximov against Social-Democracy.

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THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY

The question of the crisis in our Party has again been given priority by the Social-Democratic press abroad, leading to stronger rumours, perplexity and vacillation among wide Party circles. It is, therefore, essential for the Central Organ of the Party to clarify this question in its entirety. Martov's article in *Golos*, No. 23, and Trotsky's statement of November 26, 1910 in the form of a "resolution" of the "Vienna Club", published as a separate leaflet, present the question to the reader in a manner which completely distorts the essence of the matter.

Martov's article and Trotsky's resolution conceal definite practical *actions*—actions *directed against the Party*. Martov's article is simply the literary expression of *a campaign launched by the* Golos *group to sabotage the Central Committee* of our Party. Trotsky's resolution, which calls upon organisations in the localities to prepare for a "general Party conference" independent of, and against, the Central Committee, expresses the very aim of the *Golos* group—*to destroy the central bodies so detested by the liquidators*, *and with them*, *the Party as an organisation*. It is not enough to lay bare the anti-Party activities of *Golos* and Trotsky; they must be *fought*. Comrades to whom the Party and its revival are dear must come out most resolutely against all those who, guided by purely factional and narrow circle considerations and interests, are striving to destroy the *Party*.

Martov's article "Where Have We Landed?" is poorly disguised mockery of the Plenary Meeting's decisions and the rejoicing of a liquidator over the adversities suffered by the Party. "*Not once* did they succeed in *convening in*

Russia the Collegium of the Central Committee although it consists of only a few members"—this is how Martov writes, using italics, as if bubbling over with the pleasure all liquidators will derive from the publication of this fact.

Unfortunately, what Martov says is true. The Russian Central Committee has not succeeded in meeting. But Martov is mistaken if he thinks that he can evade the question as to *who* sabotaged the work of the Central Committee in Russia. It was not only the police who hindered the holding of the meeting, in addition to the police there was one obstacle of a *political* nature. That obstacle was the well-known refusal by Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri to attend a meeting of the Central Committee even *if only* to co-opt new members, and their statement that they "consider the very existence of the Central Committee harmful".

It cannot be denied that refusal to attend even one meeting for the purpose of co-option, refusal to attend at the invitation of people who carry on their work amid a host of obstacles placed in their way by the police, means *sabotaging the work of the Central Committee*. Nor can it be denied that this political act, accompanied by a statement that its motives were matters of *principle*, was carried out by members of the group of "most prominent" *Golos* contributors in Russia (the letter of the *sixteen*[18] in *Golos*, No. 19-20), who are also members of the liquidationist *legal* groups of Potresov and Co. All these are facts. *The group of independent legalists, the enemies of the Social-Democratic Party—these are the people who sabotaged the work of the Central Committee in Russia.*

When Axelrod asserts (in *Golos*, No. 23) that the "label" of liquidator is tacked on "indiscriminately", when he stoops even to such nonsense as to state that we are capable of calling a liquidator someone who is physically tired or crushed by the struggle for his daily bread; when, indulging as he does in this kind of infantile twaddle, he *maintains silence* about that particular group and those very groups of liquidators who have been mentioned in the Central Organ of the Party *by name*, then there is no need to prove the unscrupulousness of such subterfuges. When Martov and other *Golos* people pretend to "argue" in *Golos* against the liquidators

in Russia, declaring that their acts are "frivolous" (1), and "exhorting" them to wait a little longer (Martov on Levitsky in No. 23), and *at the same time work* hand in glove with them, and, together with them, form a separate *faction* abroad for the purpose of fighting the Party and lending support to its enemies, such as Mr. Potresov, we can see in this but one of many manifestations of political hypocrisy. No politically-minded person will say that Mr. Milyukov is seriously fighting the *Vekhi*[19] writers when he "argues" with them, declares them to be "frivolous", and at the same time *works* hand in glove with them politically. Everyone will see that this only proves Mr. Milyukov's hypocrisy, and by no means disproves his political solidarity with *Vekhi*. No politically-minded person will say that Mr. Stolypin and his government are seriously fighting the Black Hundreds[20] when he "argues" with them (in *Rossiya*[21]), accuses them of "frivolity", but at the same time *works* hand in glove with them. Everyone will see that Mr. Stolypin and the tsar's government thereby prove nothing but their hypocrisy, that this by no means disproves the fact of their political solidarity with the Purishkeviches.

But if everyone is clear about the political hypocrisy of *Golos*, Martov's *hint* that "legality finishes" the official representatives of the Party *cannot be clear* to 999 out of 1,000 readers, because it is a deliberately vague hint.

It is the duty of the Central Organ to disperse any haze enveloping our Party affairs, so that the substance of the differences may become clear to *everyone*.

What Martov means is that, *apart* from a decision of the Central Committee, there is *no other* way out of the crisis that would conform to Party legality. Consequently, *since* the liquidators in Russia have succeeded in sabotaging the work of the Central Committee there (*and if the liquidators abroad succeed in preventing the Central Committee from meeting even outside Russia*), there will be no legal way out of the situation. And Martov rejoices in advance: the Central Committee, he gays, has been completely wrecked, there is *no* legal way out, and the liquidators, he thinks, have won their game.

Martov was in too much of a hurry. He has *blurted out* too soon what Mr. Potresov and the other enemies of the Party *have kept to themselves*.

Yes, Martov is right! The Central Committee alone can find the way out of the crisis in the Party. Hence, if, on account of police obstacles, and on account of the abovementioned political obstacles, the Central Committee is prevented from meeting in Russia, it must be convened abroad. This is the *only* way of approaching a solution to the crisis. The Bolsheviks, one of the Party trends that concluded at the last Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee the agreement which provided for joint Party work outside the factions, took measures to hasten the only possible solution to the Party crisis. The representatives of the Bolshevik group placed its property at the disposal of the Party, *on condition* that simultaneously with the dissolution of its own group centre, those of the Mensheviks (the *Golos* group) and the otzovists (the *Vperyod* group) would also be dissolved. This *has not been done*. What is more, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (the leading organ of the *Golos* group), has deliberately taken under its wing and protection the enemies within the Party, whom the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee unanimously instructed us to fight most resolutely, as representing bourgeois and anti-Party deviations from Social-Democracy. In view of this obvious violation of the terms of the agreement concluded at the Plenary Meeting between all the Party trends and groups, in view of the obvious anti-Party policy of one of the parties to the agreement, the Bolsheviks thought it necessary to demand the return of the funds which a year before they had placed at the disposal of the Party on definite conditions. On December 5, 1910, they filed an application to this effect with the Central Committee Bureau Abroad. Whether the Bolsheviks were right or wrong in acting as they did will be determined by the body appointed by the Plenary Meeting. The point is that *now*, since the representatives of the Bolshevik trend have filed their application, it is imperative to convene a plenary meeting of the Central Committee abroad, and not only for the purpose of finding a way out of the internal crisis in the Party; it is *imperative* as a step dictated to all the trends and groups which conclud-

ed the agreement of January 6, 1910, *according to the obligation they themselves assumed*, *in the resolution which they themselves adopted unanimously*.* The convocation of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee has become not only a necessity in the interests of the Party, it has become a *juridical obligation*. We see again that *there can be no legal way out of the situation*, *other than the convening of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee*....

It is on this point that the policy of the *Golos* group immediately revealed itself.

It would appear that, according to the clear and unequivocal decision of the Central Committee, the only thing for its Bureau Abroad to do, in view of the application filed by the Bolsheviks, was to call a plenary meeting; and only if the attempts to convene it in the course of three months failed, was the Bureau to resort to the other method of settling the question as provided by the Central Committee. But the *Golos* group acted differently.

On December 12, Igorev of *Golos*, a member of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, filed a written statement in which he declared that he was *against calling a plenary meeting* and would agree only to a commission.

It is obvious wherein lies the rub: a plenary meeting is a sovereign body and, if it were convened, *could* find a *legal* way out of the crisis, a legal way out of the impossible state of affairs in Russia. A commission on the other hand, is *not* a sovereign body, it has no rights (except that of examining the Bolsheviks' claim to their funds); it *cannot* find *any legal* way out of the crisis.

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* At the Plenary Meeting, the Central Committee entered into an agreement with certain representatives of the Bolshevik trend, providing for the *conditional* transfer of their funds to the Party. This agreement was recognised as Party *law*, as the source of Party *legality*. It was published in the Central Organ (No. 11), together with the entire procedure stipulated by the meeting in connection with the agreement. The principal provision was, that if the Bolsheviks filed an application showing that the *Golos* and *Vperyod* trends *violated the terms* of amalgamation, *a plenary meeting was to be called* (abroad). The decision printed in No. 11 of the Central Organ, states: "Should it prove impossible for various reasons to arrange a plenary meeting within three months after the representatives of the Bolshevik trend have filed their application", a special commission "is to be set up".

The saying has proved true—he who diggeth a pit shall fall into it.

The kind-hearted Martov had hardly shown the Party the "pit" of the allegedly hopeless, from the legal point of view, situation in which the liquidators would be so happy to see the official Party, when *Igorev of* Golos *found himself in that very pit*!

The Russian liquidators have sabotaged the work of the Central Committee in Russia. Now the liquidators abroad are trying to prevent the meeting of the Central Committee outside Russia. The liquidators are happy in anticipation of that greatest of joys (for Stolypin and for the liquidators)—the absence of *any* Central Committee. What a boon that would be for the Potresovs and for the *Vperyod* faction!

We shall not dwell here on the subterfuges of Igorev of the *Golos* group and on their refutation in the counter-statement filed by a Bolshevik member of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad.* We shall only note the fact that Igorev of *Golos* obligingly and bluntly declared that he would protest against a plenary meeting *even if* it were convened *in conformity with the general Rules* (for which a unanimous decision of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad is required), and not by the adoption of a special decision based on an application. In the opinion of Igorev of *Golos* a plenary meeting is "unwieldy", etc. Naturally—since for the liquidators the very existence of our illegal Party is too "unwieldy". The other "reason" advanced by Igorev is that the plenary meeting would be made up mostly of exiles. But this does not prevent the *Golos* group from lending every support to Trotsky's *purely émigré* plan of calling a "general Party" conference independently of, and against, the Central Committee....

The *Golos* group have decided to disrupt *any and every* attempt to convene the Central Committee.

Further, we must draw the attention of Party members to a more general problem—the state of affairs in the R.S.D.L.P. Like every revolutionary party, our Party can exist and develop only if there is at least an elementary *desire*

* In a letter addressed to the Central Organ this comrade requests us to help him inform the Party of the *Golos* group's attempts to prevent the plenary meeting.

on the part of revolutionaries to help one another in carrying out *common* work.

If the Party Rules and decisions (the Party's "legality") do not serve to *facilitate* this joint work, but are used as *pretexts* for people in some of the most important Party bodies to *hamper* this work from within, then Party work becomes an indignified farce. In any other party the difficulties attending the convening of the Central Committee would have led at once to dozens of ways and means being found to circumvent police obstacles, they would have produced a host of new methods of work. We, however, find factionalists *inside* the Party, some of whom serve the Potresovs, and others the out-and-out otzovists and semi-anarchists, *outside* the Party. In the hands of people like Igorev of *Golos*, "legality" is converted into an instrument for damaging the Party from *within*, for hampering its work, for helping the Potresovs to destroy the Party*. This is an impossible situation. And it will not be remedied by "well-meaning resolutions" which Martov legitimately holds up to ridicule. In order to help matters, we must, first of all, *understand* them. We must understand why it is absurd, unbecoming, and ridiculous to concoct well-meaning resolutions about joint work with gentlemen like Potresov and Co. Once the Party realises that we have here two incompatible policies, that it is a question of Social-Democracy versus liberalism, it will rapidly find a way out. Then we shall succeed in creating a "legality" which the liquidators will be *unable* to use as a means of tripping up the Party.

It must be admitted that Mr. Potresov and his friends, as well as Igorev of *Golos*, deserve our *thanks* for the successful way in which they are helping the Party to *realise* this.

Trotsky's statement, though *outwardly* entirely unconnected with Martov's jeering at the adversities of the Party, and with the attempts of the *Golos* supporters to sabotage the Central Committee, is actually connected with the one

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* When Martov jeers at official Party institutions, saying that "legality finishes them", he is *right insofar* as the fruitfulness of the work is killed by *such* "legal" (i.e., created in accordance with the Party Rules or by decisions of the Plenary Meeting) forms of these institutions as *permit* Mikhail, Roman, Yuri, the *Golos* group (as represented by Igorev), etc., to hamper the work.

and the other by inseverable ties, by the ties of "interest". There are many Party members who still fail to see this connection. The Vienna resolution of November 26, 1910, will undoubtedly help them understand the essence of the matter.

The resolution consists of three parts: (1) a declaration of war against *Rabochaya Gazeta* (a call to "*rebuff it resolutely*" as one of the "new factional group undertakings", using Trotsky's expression); (2) polemics against the line of the Bolshevik-Plekhanov "bloc"; (3) a declaration that the "meeting of the Vienna Club [i.e., Trotsky and his circle]* resolves: to organise a general Party fund for the purpose of preparing and convening a conference of the R.S.D.L.P.".

We shall not dwell on the first part at all. Trotsky is quite right in saying that *Rabochaya Gazeta* is a "private undertaking", and that "*it is not authorised to speak in the name of the Party as a whole*".

Only Trotsky should not have forgotten to mention that he and his *Pravda* are not authorised to speak in the name of the Party *either*. In saying that the Plenary Meeting recognised the work of *Pravda* as useful, he should not have forgotten to mention that it appointed a *representative of the Central Committee* to the Editorial Board of *Pravda*. When Trotsky, in referring to the Meeting's decisions on *Pravda*, fails to mention this fact, all one can say about it is that *he is deceiving the workers*. And this deception on the part of Trotsky is all the more malicious, since in *August* 1910 Trotsky *removed* the representative of the Central Committee from *Pravda*. Since that incident, since *Pravda has severed* its relations with the Central Committee, Trotsky's paper is nothing but a "private undertaking", and one, moreover, that has failed to carry out the obligations it assumed. Until the Central Committee meets again, the *only* judge of the relations between *Pravda* and the Central Committee is the Central Committee *representative* appointed by the Plenary Meeting who has *declared that Trotsky behaved in a manner hostile to the Party*.

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated. —*Ed*.

That is what emerges from the question, so opportunely raised by Trotsky, as to who is "authorised to speak in the name of the Party as a whole".

Nor is that all. Inasmuch as (and so long as) the legalist liquidator-independents obstruct the Central Committee in Russia, and inasmuch as (and so long as) the *Golos* group obstruct the Central Committee abroad, the *sole* body authorised "to speak in the name of the Party as a whole" is the *Central Organ*.

Therefore, we declare, *in the name of the Party as a whole*, that Trotsky is pursuing an anti-Party policy; that, by failing to make the least mention of the Central Committee in his resolution (as if he had already come to an understanding with *Golos* that the work of the Central Committee would be sabotaged), and by announcing in the name of *one group abroad* the "*organisation of a fund* for the purpose of convening a conference of the R.S.D.L.P.", he is *contravening* Party *legality* and is embarking on the path of *adventurism* and a *split*. If the efforts of the liquidators to sabotage the work of the Central Committee meet with success, we, as the sole body authorised to speak in the name of the Party as a whole, will immediately declare that we take no part *whatever* in Trotsky's "fund" or in his venture, and that we shall recognise as a *general Party* conference only one convened *by the Central Organ*, not one convened by Trotsky's circle.*

But so long as events have not brought about the final wrecking of the Central Committee, there is still hope for a way out that is entirely *legal* from the Party point of view.

While calling upon Party members to fight resolutely for this solution based on Party legality, we shall try to investigate "the fundamental principles" of the differences which the *Golos* group and Trotsky are in a hurry to carry to the point of a split—the former, by obstructing the work of the Central Committee, and the latter, by ignoring it and "organising a fund" for the purpose of convening a

* That a general Party conference, one convened by the Central Committee of the Party, is really *needed* and should be called *as soon as possible*—of that there can be no question.

"conference of the R.S.D.L.P." (no joke!) by Trotsky's circle.

Trotsky writes in his resolution that at present "there is no basis for the struggle on principle" being waged by the "Leninists and Plekhanovites" (in thus substituting *personalities* for the *trends* of Bolshevism and pro-Party Menshevism, Trotsky aims at disparagement, but succeeds only in expressing his own lack of understanding).

It is to investigate these fundamental principles that the Central Organ calls upon Social-Democrats throughout Russia—examine this very interesting question while the "uninteresting" struggle over the convocation of the plenary meeting is still going on.

We quote in full the reasons given by Trotsky for his statement that the struggle of the Central Organ is not justified by any basic difference of principle.

> "The conviction has taken firm root among *all* [Trotsky's italics] Party trends, that it is necessary to restore the illegal organisation, to combine legal with illegal work, and to pursue consistent Social-Democratic tactics. These fundamental directives were *unanimously* adopted by the last Plenary Meeting.
>
> "The difficulty now, a year after the Meeting, is not the proclamation of these truths, but *their application in practice*. The way to achieve this is by harmonious work carried on jointly by all sections of the Party—the '*Golos*', 'Plekhanov', 'Leninist', and '*Vperyod*' groups, and the non-factionalists. The Party has already spiritually outgrown the period of its infancy, and it is time that all its members felt and acted as *revolutionary Social-Democrats*, as patriots of their Party and not as members of factions. This co-operation must take place within the framework of the Party as a whole, not around factional bodies."

That is an example of how fine words are worn into shreds by phrase-mongering intended to disguise a monstrous untruth, a monstrous deception both of those who revel in phrase-mongering and of the whole Party.

It is a plain and crying *untruth* that *all* Party trends are convinced of the need to revive the illegal organisation. Each issue of *Golos* shows that its writers regard Mr. Potresov's group as a *Party trend*, and that not only do they "regard" it as such but that they *systematically* take part in its "work". Is it not ridiculous, is it not disgraceful today, a year after the Plenary Meeting, to play at hide and seek, to deceive oneself and deceive the workers, to indulge in

verbal tricks, when it is a question, not of empty phrases, but of "*application in practice*"?

Yes or no? Does Trotsky regard the Potresovs who were specifically mentioned in the Central Organ, as a "Party trend" or not? This is precisely a question of the "application in practice" of the decisions of the Plenary Meeting, and *it is now a year* since it was posed by the Central Organ clearly, bluntly, and unambiguously, so that there could be no evasions!

Trotsky is trying again and again to evade the question by passing it over in silence or by phrase-mongering; for he is concerned to keep the readers and the Party *ignorant of the truth*, namely, that Mr. Potresov's group, the group of sixteen, etc., are absolutely independent of the Party, represent expressly distinct factions, are not only doing nothing to revive the illegal organisation, but are obstructing its revival, and are *not* pursuing *any* Social-Democratic tactics. Trotsky is concerned with keeping the Party ignorant of the truth, namely, that the *Golos* group represent a faction abroad, similarly separated from the Party, and that they actually render service to the liquidators in Russia.

And what about the *Vperyod* group? Trotsky knows perfectly well that ever *since* the Plenary Meeting they have been strengthening and developing their separate faction, disposing of funds independently of the Party, and maintaining a separate factional school in which they teach, not "consistent Social-Democratic tactics", but that "otzovism is a legal shade of opinion"; in which they teach otzovist views on the role of the Third Duma, views expressed in the factional platform of *Vperyod*.

Trotsky maintains silence on this undeniable truth, because the truth is detrimental to the *real* aims of his policy. The real aims, however, are becoming clearer and more obvious even to the least far-sighted Party members. They are: *an anti-Party bloc of the Potresovs with the* Vperyod *group*—a bloc which Trotsky supports and is organising. The adoption of Trotsky's resolutions (like the "Vienna" one) by the *Golos* group, *Pravda*'s flirtation with the *Vperyod* group, *Pravda*'s allegations that only members of the *Vperyod* group and Trotsky's group are active in the localities in Russia, the publicity given by *Pravda* to the *Vperyod*

factional school, Trotsky's direct assistance to this school, these are all facts which cannot long remain concealed. Murder will out.

The substance of Trotsky's policy is "harmonious work" carried on by *Pravda* together with the factions of the Potresovs and *Vperyod*. The various roles in this bloc have been clearly cast: Mr. Potresov and Co. are continuing their legalistic work, independently of the Party, work of destroying the Social-Democratic Party; the *Golos* group represent the foreign branch of this faction; and Trotsky has assumed the role of attorney, assuring the naive public that "consistent Social-Democratic tactics" has taken "firm root among *all* Party trends". The *Vperyod* group also enjoy the services of this attorney, who pleads their right to maintain a factional school and resorts to hypocritical and formal phrases in order to gloss over their policy. Naturally, this bloc will support Trotsky's "fund" and the anti-Party conference which he is convening, for here the Potresovs and the *Vperyod* group are getting what they want, namely, freedom for their factions, blessings of the conference for those factions, a cover for their activity, and an attorney to defend that activity before the workers.

Therefore, it is from the standpoint of "fundamental principles" that we must regard this bloc as *adventurism* in the most literal meaning of the term. Trotsky *does not dare* to say that he sees in Potresov and in the otzovists real Marxists, real champions of loyalty to the principles of Social-Democracy. The essence of the position of an adventurer is that he must forever resort to evasions. For it is obvious and known to everyone that the Potresovs and the otzovists *all* have their *own* line (an anti-Social-Democratic line) and that they are *pursuing* it, while the diplomats of *Golos* and *Vperyod* only serve as a screen for them.

The most profound reason why this bloc is *doomed* to failure—no matter how great its success among the philistines and no matter how large the "funds" Trotsky may succeed in collecting with the assistance of *Vperyod* and Potresov's "sources"—is that it is an *unprincipled* bloc. The theory of Marxism, "*the fundamental principles*" of our entire world outlook and of our entire Party programme and tactics, is now in the forefront of all Party life not by mere

chance, but because it is inevitable. It was no mere chance that since the failure of the revolution, *all* classes of society, the widest sections of the popular *masses*, have displayed a fresh interest in the very fundamentals of the world outlook, including the questions of religion and philosophy, and the *principles* of our Marxist doctrine *as a whole*; that was inevitable. It is no mere chance that the masses, whom the revolution drew into the sharp struggle over questions of tactics, have subsequently, in the period characterised by the absence of open struggle, shown a desire for *general theoretical* knowledge; that was inevitable. We must again explain *the fundamentals of Marxism* to these masses; the defence of Marxist theory is again on the order of the day. When Trotsky declares that the rapprochement between the pro-Party Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks is "devoid of political content" and "unstable", he is thereby merely revealing the depths of his own ignorance, he is thereby demonstrating his own complete emptiness. For it is precisely the fundamental principles of Marxism that have triumphed as a result of the struggle waged by the Bolsheviks against the non-Social-Democratic ideas of *Vperyod*, and as a result of the struggle waged by the pro-Party Mensheviks against the Potresovs and *Golos*. It was precisely this rapprochement on the question of *the fundamental principles* of Marxism that constituted *the real basis* for really harmonious work between the pro-Party Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks during the whole year following the Plenary Meeting. This is a fact—not words, nor promises, nor "well-meaning resolutions". And no matter what differences divided the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the past, and will divide them in future (only adventures are capable of attracting the crowd with *promises* that the differences would be set aside, or that they would be "liquidated" by this or that resolution)—this fact cannot be expunged from history. Only the internal development of the principal factions *themselves*, only *their own* ideological evolution, can provide the guarantee that the factions will really be abolished as a result of their drawing closer together, as a result of their being tested in joint work. This began after the Plenary Meeting. We have *so far not* seen harmonious work between Potresov and the *Vperyod* group and Trotsky; all

we have seen is group diplomacy, juggling with words, solidarity in evasions. But the Party has seen the pro-Party Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks work in harmony for a whole year, and anyone who is capable of valuing *Marxism*, anyone who holds dear the "fundamental principles" of Social-Democracy, will not doubt for a moment that nine-tenths of the workers belonging to *both* groups will be fully in favour of *this* rapprochement.

It is precisely from the standpoint of "fundamental principles" that Trotsky's bloc with Potresov and the *Vperyod* group is adventurism. And it is equally so from the standpoint of the *Party's political* tasks. These tasks were indeed pointed out by the Plenary Meeting *unanimously*, but that does not mean that they can be reduced to that banal phrase—combining legal with illegal work (for the Cadets[22] also "combine" the legal *Rech*[23] with the illegal Central Committee of their party)—which Trotsky deliberately uses in order to please the Potresovs and the *Vperyod* group, who do not object to hollow phrases and platitudes.

"The historical circumstances in which the Social-Democratic movement finds itself in the period of bourgeois counter-revolution," the resolution of the Plenary Meeting states, "inevitably beget—as a manifestation of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat—on the one hand, the repudiation of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, the belittling of its role and importance, attempts to curtail the programmatical and tactical tasks and slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, etc.; and, on the other hand, repudiation of Social-Democratic work in the Duma and of the utilisation of opportunities for legal work, failure to appreciate the importance of the one and the other, inability to adapt revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics to the peculiar historical conditions of the present moment, etc."

After *a year's experience*, no one can evade a direct answer to the question as to the *real* meaning of these points. Nor must it be forgotten that at the Meeting *all* the representatives of the non-Russian nationalities (joined at the time by Trotsky, who is in the habit of joining *any* group that happens to be in the majority at the moment) declared in a written statement that "*in point of fact* it would be desirable to describe the trend mentioned in the resolution as liquidationism, against which it is essential to fight".

The experience of the year since the Plenary Meeting has shown in practice that it is precisely Potresov groups

and the *Vperyod* faction that *are the embodiment* of this bourgeois influence upon the proletariat. The *evasion* of this obvious fact is what we call adventurism, for so far nobody has dared to say openly that the line of Potresov and his friends is *not* liquidationism, or that recognition of otzovism as "a legal shade of opinion" *conforms* to the line of the Party. The year that followed the Meeting has not been wasted on us. We have enriched our experience. We have seen the *practical* manifestation of the tendencies noted at the time. We have seen *factions* arise that embody those tendencies. And *words* about the "harmonious work" of these *anti-Party* factions in an allegedly "Party" spirit can no longer deceive any large sections of the workers.

Thirdly and lastly, Trotsky's policy is adventurism in the *organisational* sense; for, as we have already pointed out, it violates Party legality; by organising a conference in the name of one group abroad (or of a bloc of *two* anti-Party factions—the *Golos* and *Vperyod* factions), it is directly making for a split. Since we are authorised to speak in the name of the whole Party, it is our duty to uphold Party legality to the end. But we by no means want the Party membership to see only the *form* of "legality" and to overlook the *essence* of the matter. On the contrary, we draw the *main* attention of Social-Democrats to the *essence* of the matter, which consists in the *bloc* formed by the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups—a bloc which stands for full freedom for Potresov and his friends to engage in liquidationist activity and for the otzovists to destroy the Party.

We call upon all Social-Democrats to fight resolutely for Party legality, to fight the anti-Party bloc, for the sake of the fundamental principles of Marxism, and in order to purge Social-Democracy of the taint of liberalism and anarchism.

P. S. The publication of the above article in a special edition (decided on by the vote of a majority of the Editorial Board—two representatives of the Bolshevik trend and one representative of the Polish organisation) has led to a protest (published as a separate leaflet) on the part of the two other members of the Editorial Board who belong to the *Golos* trend. The authors of the leaflet do not deal with the

contents of the article, *The State of Affairs in the Party*, on their merits, but accuse the majority of the Editorial Board (1) of violating their formal rights as co-editors, and (2) of committing an act of "police informing". Since the dispute is not conducted on the plane of principles and tactics but along the lines of an organisational squabble and personal attacks, we consider that the most proper procedure is to refer it entirely to the Central Committee. We believe that, even before the Central Committee comes to a decision on this question, all *Party* comrades will be able to form a proper opinion of the "polemical" methods of the two members of the Editorial Board—Martov and Dan.

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CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MARXISM[24]

Our doctrine—said Engels, referring to himself and his famous friend—is not a dogma, but a guide to action. This classical statement stresses with remarkable force and expressiveness that aspect of Marxism which is very often lost sight of. And by losing sight of it, we turn Marxism into something one-sided, distorted and lifeless; we deprive it of its life blood; we undermine its basic theoretical foundations—dialectics, the doctrine of historical development, all-embracing and full of contradictions; we undermine its connection with the definite practical tasks of the epoch, which may change with every new turn of history.

Indeed, in our time, among those interested in the fate of Marxism in Russia, we very frequently meet with people who lose sight of just this aspect of Marxism. Yet, it must be clear to everybody that in recent years Russia has undergone changes so abrupt as to alter the situation with unusual rapidity and unusual force—the social and political situation, which in a most direct and immediate manner determines the conditions for action, and, hence, its aims. I am not referring, of course, to general and fundamental aims, which do not change with turns of history if the fundamental relation between classes remains unchanged. It is perfectly obvious that this general trend of economic (and not only economic) evolution in Russia, like the fundamental relation between the various classes of Russian society, has not changed during, say, the last six years.

But the aims of immediate and direct action changed very sharply during this period, just as the actual social

and political situation changed, and *consequently*, since Marxism is a living doctrine, *various* aspects of it *were bound* to become prominent.

In order to make this idea clear, let us cast a glance at the change in the actual social and political situation over the past six years. We immediately differentiate two three-year periods: one ending roughly with the summer of 1907, and the other with the summer of 1910. The first three-year period, regarded from the purely theoretical standpoint, is distinguished by rapid changes in the fundamental features of the state system in Russia; the course of these changes, moreover, was very uneven and the oscillations in both directions were of considerable amplitude. The social and economic basis of these changes in the "superstructure" was the action of *all* classes of Russian society in *the most diverse* fields (activity inside and outside the Duma, the press, unions, meetings, and so forth), action so open and impressive and on a mass scale such as is rarely to be observed in history.

The second three-year period, on the contrary, is distinguished—we repeat that we confine ourselves to the purely theoretical "sociological" standpoint—by an evolution so slow that it almost amounted to stagnation. There were no changes of any importance to be observed in the state system. There were hardly any open and diversified actions by the *classes* in the majority of the "arenas" in which these actions had developed in the preceding period.

The similarity between the two periods is that Russia underwent capitalist evolution in both of them. The contradiction between this economic evolution and the existence of a number of feudal and medieval institutions still remained and was not stifled, but rather aggravated, by the fact that certain institutions assumed a partially bourgeois character.

The difference between the two periods is that in the first the question of exactly what form the above-mentioned rapid and uneven changes would take was the dominant, history-making issue. The content of these changes was bound to be bourgeois owing to the capitalist character of Russia's evolution; but there are different kinds of bourgeoisie. The middle and big bourgeoisie, which professes a more or less

moderate liberalism, was, owing to its very class position, afraid of abrupt changes and strove for the retention of large remnants of the old institutions both in the agrarian system and in the political "superstructure". The rural petty bourgeoisie, interwoven as it is with the peasants who live "solely by the labour of their hands", was bound to strive for bourgeois reforms of a *different* kind, reforms that would leave far less room for medieval survivals. The wage-workers, inasmuch as they consciously realised what was going on around them, were hound to work out for themselves a definite attitude towards this class of two distinct tendencies. Both tendencies remained within the framework of the bourgeois system determining entirely different forms of that system, entirely different rates of its development, different degrees of its progressive influence.

Thus, the first period necessarily brought to the fore—and not by chance—those problems of Marxism that are usually referred to as problems of tactics. Nothing is more erroneous than the opinion that the disputes and differences over these questions were disputes among "intellectuals", "a struggle for influence over the immature proletariat", an expression of the "adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat", as *Vekhi* followers of various hues think. On the contrary, it was precisely because this class had reached maturity that it could not remain indifferent to the clash of the two different tendencies in Russia's bourgeois development, and the ideologists of this class could not avoid providing theoretical formulations corresponding (directly or indirectly, in direct or reverse reflection) to these different tendencies.

In the second period the clash between the different tendencies of bourgeois development in Russia was *not* on the order of the day, because *both* these tendencies had been crushed by the "diehards", forced back, driven inwards and, for the time being, stifled. The medieval diehards[25] not only occupied the foreground but also inspired the broadest sections of bourgeois society with the sentiments propagated by *Vekhi*, with a spirit of dejection and recantation. It was not the collision between two methods of reforming the old order that appeared on the surface, but a loss of faith in reforms of any kind, a spirit of "meekness"

and "repentance", an enthusiasm for anti-social doctrines, a vogue of mysticism, and so on.

This astonishingly abrupt change was neither accidental nor the result of "external" pressure alone. The preceding period had so profoundly stirred up sections of the population who for generations and centuries had stood aloof from, and had been strangers to, political issues that it was natural and inevitable that there should emerge "a revaluation of all values", a new study of fundamental problems, a new interest in theory, in elementals, in the ABC of politics. The millions who were suddenly awakened from their long sleep and confronted with extremely important problems could not long remain on this level. They could not continue without a respite, without a return to elementary questions, without a new training which would help them "digest" lessons of unparalleled richness and make it possible for incomparably wider masses again to march forward, but now far more firmly, more consciously, more confidently and more steadfastly.

The dialectics of historical development was such that in the first period it was the attainment of immediate reforms in every sphere of the country's life that was on the order of the day. In the second period it was the critical study of experience, its assimilation by wider sections, its penetration, so to speak, into the subsoil, into the backward ranks of the various classes.

It is precisely because Marxism is not a lifeless dogma, not a completed, ready-made, immutable doctrine, but a living guide to action, that it was bound to reflect the astonishingly abrupt change in the conditions of social life. That change was reflected in profound disintegration and disunity, in every manner of vacillation, in short, in a very serious *internal* crisis of Marxism. Resolute resistance to this disintegration, a resolute and persistent struggle to uphold the *fundamentals* of Marxism, was again placed on the order of the day. In the preceding period, extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in formulating their aims had assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain "slogans", certain answers to tactical questions, *without having understood* the Marxist criteria for these

answers. The "revaluation of all values" in the various spheres of social life led to a "revision" of the most abstract and general philosophical fundamentals of Marxism. The influence of bourgeois philosophy in its diverse idealist shades found expression in the Machist epidemic that broke out among the Marxists. The repetition of "slogans" learnt by rote but not understood and not thought out led to the widespread prevalence of empty phrase-mongering. The practical expression of this were such absolutely un-Marxist, petty-bourgeois trends as frank or shamefaced "otzovism", or the recognition of otzovism as a "legal shade" of Marxism.

On the other hand, the spirit of the magazine *Vekhi*, the spirit of renunciation which had taken possession of very wide sections of the bourgeoisie, also permeated the trend wishing to confine Marxist theory and practice to "moderate and careful" channels. All that remained of Marxism here was the phraseology used to clothe arguments about "hierarchy", "hegemony" and so forth, that were thoroughly permeated with the spirit of liberalism.

The purpose of this article is not to examine these arguments. A mere reference to them is sufficient to illustrate what has been said above regarding the depth of the crisis through which Marxism is passing and its connection with the whole social and economic situation in the present period. The questions raised by this crisis cannot be brushed aside. Nothing can be more pernicious or unprincipled than attempts to dismiss them by phrase-mongering. Nothing is more important than to rally *all* Marxists who have realised the profundity of the crisis and the necessity of combating it, for defence of the theoretical basis of Marxism and its fundamental propositions, that are being distorted from diametrically opposite sides by the spread of bourgeois influence to the various "fellow-travellers" of Marxism.

The first three years awakened wide sections to a conscious participation in social life, sections that in many cases are now for the first time beginning to acquaint themselves with Marxism in real earnest. The bourgeois press is creating far more fallacious ideas on this score than ever before, and is spreading them more widely. Under these circumstances disintegration in the Marxist ranks is particularly

dangerous. Therefore, to understand the reasons for the inevitability of this disintegration at the present time and to close their ranks for consistent struggle against this disintegration is, in the most direct and precise meaning of the term, the task of the day for Marxists.

Zvezda, No. 2, December 23, 1910
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

JUDAS TROTSKY'S BLUSH OF SHAME

At the Plenary Meeting Judas Trotsky made a big show of fighting liquidationism and otzovism. He vowed and swore that he was true to the Party. He was given a subsidy.

After the Meeting the Central Committee grew weaker, the *Vperyod* group grew stronger and acquired funds. The liquidators strengthened their position and in *Nasha Zarya*[26] spat in the face of the illegal Party, before Stolypin's very eyes.

Judas expelled the representative of the Central Committee from *Pravda* and began to write liquidationist articles in *Vorwärts*.[27] In defiance of the direct decision of the School Commission[28] appointed by the Plenary Meeting to the effect that no Party lecturer may go to the *Vperyod* factional school, Judas Trotsky did go and discussed a plan for a conference with the *Vperyod* group. This plan has now been published by the *Vperyod* group in a leaflet.

And it is this Judas who beats his breast and loudly professes his loyalty to the Party, claiming that he did not grovel before the *Vperyod* group and the liquidators.

Such is Judas Trotsky's blush of shame.

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THE CAREER OF A RUSSIAN TERRORIST

The above is the subtitle of an article on the death of Karaulov, which Mr. Rubanovich, representative of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party,[29] published in the French socialist newspaper *L'Humanité*.[30] It is, indeed, an instructive career.

After the events of March 1, 1881, Karaulov arrived in Paris and offered his services to the head of the Narodnaya Volya[31] to put the organisation on its feet again. The editor of the *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*,[32] the future renegade Tikhomirov, gave him, permission. Karaulov returned to Russia with Lopatin, Sukhomlin, and others. In 1884 he was arrested in Kiev and sentenced to four years' penal servitude, although his colleagues received death sentences or penal servitude for life.

How is this "strange [in the words of Mr. Rubanovich] clemency" to be explained? Rumour had it, Mr. Rubanovich informs us, that the President of the military court was amazed by the resemblance Karaulov bore to his son, who had died in tragic circumstances. But, Mr. Rubanovich adds, "other explanations of this strange clemency" are current. However, he does not tell us what they are.*

But there are no doubts as to Karaulov's most recent "career". In 1905 he came out so brazenly against the revolutionaries, that the voters repudiated him in the elections to the First and the Second State Dumas: "If I have to choose between two camps," Karaulov said at a meeting (according to a report in *Birzheviye Vedomosti*[33]), "one of which is made

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* He apparently refers to the current suspicion that Karaulov "made a clean breast of it" at the investigation.

up of government troops, and the other of revolutionaries with the notorious slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat, I should not hesitate to join the former against the latter." No wonder Witte interceded on behalf of this man for the reinstatement of his rights. No wonder that Karaulov gained prominence in the Third Duma as one of the most despicable counter-revolutionary Cadets, one of those who always had some hypocritical phrase ready.

The surprising thing is that there are people who consider themselves sympathisers of democracy, and who today, on the occasion of Karaulov's death, extol him as a "democrat", a "fighter", etc.

The surprising thing is that Mr. Rubanovich, who represents the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, can write in a French socialist organ that "much will be forgiven this former Socialist-Revolutionary who went over to the camp of the moderates, because he could strike the proper chord" (the reference is to the sitting of the Duma at which the Rights called Karaulov a jail-bird, and he retorted that he was proud of the fact).

To "forgive" a renegade his career because of an effective *phrase* is fully in the spirit of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. There are renegades from all revolutionary parties in all countries, and there are always some among them who are past masters in the art of playing for effect. But it is not often that revolutionaries, representatives of "revolutionary" parties, openly declare: "Much will be forgiven" a renegade for clever repartee. For such things to happen, it is necessary that the "revolutionary" party should include an enormous proportion of *liberals with bombs*. For such things to happen, it is necessary that these liberals, now left without bombs, should feel at home in "revolutionary" parties that do not in any way concern themselves with upholding revolutionary principles, revolutionary tradition, revolutionary honour and duty.

There is yet another and more profound lesson to be drawn from "the career of a Russian terrorist". It is a lesson of the class struggle; it shows that in Russia at present only revolutionary *classes* can serve as a prop for parties which are to any real extent revolutionary. Not Karaulov alone, but the *mass* of the bourgeois intelligentsia, which until

recently was democratic and even revolutionary-minded, has now *turned its back* on democracy and the revolution. There is nothing accidental in this; it is the inevitable result of the development of class-consciousness on the part of the Russian bourgeoisie which has realised *through experience* how close is the moment when the "camp" of the monarchy and the camp of the revolution will confront each other and has realised through experience *which* side it will have to choose when that moment comes.

Those who want to learn from the great lessons of the Russian revolution must realise that only the development of the class-consciousness of the proletariat, only the organisation of *this* class and the exclusion of petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" from its party, and the elimination of the vacillation, weakness, and lack of principle, characteristic of them, *can* again lead, and surely will lead, to new victories of the people over the monarchy of the Romanovs.

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LEV TOLSTOI AND HIS EPOCH

The epoch to which Lev Tolstoi belongs and which is reflected in such bold relief both in his brilliant literary works and in his teachings began after 1861 and lasted until 1905. True, Tolstoi commenced his literary career earlier and it ended later, but it was during this period, whose transitional nature gave rise to *all* the distinguishing features of Tolstoi's works and of Tolstoi-ism, that he fully matured both as an artist and as a thinker.

Through Levin, a character in *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoi very vividly expressed the nature of the turn in Russia's history that took place during this half-century.

> "Talk about the harvest, hiring labourers, and so forth, which, as Levin knew, it was the custom to regard as something very low, ... now seemed to Levin to be the only important thing. 'This, perhaps, was unimportant under serfdom, or is unimportant in England. In both cases the conditions are definite; but here today, when everything has been turned upside down and is only just taking shape again, the question of how these conditions will shape is the only important question in Russia,' mused Levin." (*Collected Works*, Vol. X, p. 137.)

"Here in Russia everything has now been turned upside down and is only just taking shape",—it is difficult to imagine a more apt characterisation of the period 1861-1905. What "was turned upside down" is familiar, or at least well known, to every Russian. It was serfdom, and the whole of the "old order" that went with it. What "is just taking shape" is totally unknown, alien and incomprehensible to the broad masses of the population. Tolstoi conceived this bourgeois order which was "only just taking shape" vaguely, in the form of a bogey—England. Truly, a bogey, because Tolstoi rejects, on principle, so to speak, any attempt to investigate the features of the social system in

this "England", the connection between this system and the domination of capital, the role played by money, the rise and development of exchange. Like the Narodniks,[34] he refuses to see, he shuts his eyes to, and dismisses the thought that what is "taking shape" in Russia is none other than the bourgeois system.

It is true that, if not the "only important" question, then certainly one of the most important from the standpoint of the immediate tasks of all social and political activities in Russia in the period of 1861-1905 (and in our times, too), was that of "what shape" this system would take, this bourgeois system that had assumed extremely varied forms in "England", Germany, America, France, and so forth. But such a definite, concretely historical presentation of the question was something absolutely foreign to Tolstoi. He reasons in the abstract, he recognises only the standpoint of the "eternal" principles of morality, the eternal truths of religion, failing to realise that this standpoint is merely the ideological reflection of the old ("turned upside down") order, the feudal order, the way of the life of the Oriental peoples.

In *Lucerne* (written in 1857), Tolstoi declares that to regard "civilisation" as a boon is an "imaginary concept" which "destroys in human nature the instinctive, most blissful primitive need for good". "We have only one infallible guide," exclaims Tolstoi, "the Universal Spirit that permeates us." (*Collected Works*, II, p. 125.)

In *The Slavery of Our Times* (written in 1900), Tolstoi, repeating still more zealously these appeals to the Universal Spirit, declares that political economy is a "pseudo science" because it takes as the "pattern" "little England, where conditions are most exceptional", instead of taking as a pattern "the conditions of men in the whole world throughout the whole of history". What this "whole world" is like is revealed to us in the article "Progress and the Definition of Education" (1862). Tolstoi counters the opinion of the "historians" that progress is "a general law for mankind" by referring to "the whole of what is known as the Orient" (IV, 162). "There is no general law of human progress," says Tolstoi, "and this is proved by the quiescence of the Oriental peoples."

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Tolstoi-ism, in its real historical content, is an ideology of an Oriental, an Asiatic order. Hence the asceticism, the non-resistance to evil, the profound notes of pessimism, the conviction that "everything is nothing, everything is a material nothing" ("The Meaning of Life", p. 52), and faith in the "Spirit", in "the beginning of everything", and that man, in his relation to this beginning, is merely a "labourer ... allotted the task of saving his own soul", etc. Tolstoi is true to this ideology in his *Kreutzer Sonata* too when he says: "the emancipation of woman lies not in colleges and not in parliaments, but in the bedroom", and in the article written in 1862, in which he says that universities train only "irritable, debilitated liberals" for whom "the people have no use at all", who are "uselessly torn from their former environment", "find no place in life", and so forth (IV, 136-37).

Pessimism, non-resistance, appeals to the "Spirit" constitute an ideology inevitable in an epoch when the whole of the old order "has been turned upside down", and when the masses, who have been brought up under this old order, who imbibed with their mother's milk the principles, the habits, the traditions and beliefs of this order, do not and cannot see *what kind* of a new order is "taking shape", *what* social forces are "shaping" it and how, what social forces are *capable* of bringing release from the incalculable and exceptionally acute distress that is characteristic of epochs of "upheaval".

The period of 1862-1904 was just such a period of upheaval in Russia, a period in which, before everyone's eyes the old order collapsed, never to be restored, in which the new system was only just taking shape; the social forces shaping the new system first manifested themselves on a broad, nation-wide scale, in mass public action in the most varied fields only in 1905. And the 1905 events in Russia were followed by analogous events in a number of countries in that very "Orient" to the "quiescence" of which Tolstoi referred in 1862. The year 1905 marked the beginning of the end of "Oriental" quiescence. Precisely for this reason that year marked the historical end of Tolstoi-ism, the end of an epoch that could give rise to Tolstoi's teachings and in which they were inevitable, not as something individual,

not as a caprice or a fad, but as the ideology of the conditions of life under which millions and millions actually found themselves for a certain period of time.

Tolstoi's doctrine is certainly utopian and in content is reactionary in the most precise and most profound sense of the word. But that certainly does not mean that the doctrine was not socialistic or that it did not contain critical elements capable of providing valuable material for the enlightenment of the advanced classes.

There are various kinds of socialism. In all countries where the capitalist mode of production prevails there is the socialism which expresses the ideology of the class that is going to take the place of the bourgeoisie; and there is the socialism that expresses the ideology of the classes that are going to be replaced by the bourgeoisie. Feudal socialism, for example, is socialism of the latter type, and the nature of *this* socialism was appraised long ago, over sixty years ago, by Marx, simultaneously with his appraisal of other types of socialism.[35]

Furthermore, critical elements are inherent in Tolstoi's utopian doctrine, just as they are inherent in many utopian systems. But we must not forget Marx's profound observation to the effect that the value of critical elements in utopian socialism "bears an inverse relation to historical development". The more the activities of the social forces which are "shaping" the new Russia and bringing release from present-day social evils develop and assume a definite character, the more rapidly is critical-utopian socialism "losing all practical value and all theoretical justification".

A quarter of a century ago, the critical elements in Tolstoi's doctrine might at times have been of practical value for some sections of the population *in spite of* its reactionary and utopian features. This could not have been the case during, say, the last decade, because historical development had made considerable progress between the eighties and the end of the last century. In our days, since the series of events mentioned above has put an end to "Oriental" quiescence, in our days, when the consciously reactionary ideas of *Vekhi* (reactionary in the narrow-class, selfishly-class sense) have become so enormously widespread among the liberal bourgeoisie and when these ideas have infected even a section of

those who were almost Marxists and have created a liquidationist trend—in our days, the most direct and most profound harm is caused by every attempt to idealise Tolstoi's doctrine, to justify or to mitigate his "non-resistance", his appeals to the "Spirit", his exhortations for "moral self-perfection", his doctrine of "conscience" and universal "love", his preaching of asceticism and quietism, and so forth.

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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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MARXISM AND *NASHA ZARYA*[36]

In a review of the press appearing in *Zvezda*, No. 4, it was correctly stated that at the present moment all Marxist circles are interested in the question of liquidationism and in assessing the problem of the hegemony of the proletariat; and that if the polemics over this important question are to bear fruit, they must deal with principles, they must not be the "*ad hominem* and malicious polemics carried on by *Nasha Zarya*".

I fully share this opinion and shall, therefore, pass over in complete silence the tricks resorted to by that magazine to imply that one can understand only *whom* the controversy is about, but not *what* it is about (*Nasha Zarya*, No. 11-12, p. 47). I shall take *Nasha Zarya* itself *for a year*—just up to its first anniversary and try to examine *what* it is about and what the magazine has to say on this score.

The first issue of *Nasha Zarya* appeared in January 1910. In the second issue, which appeared in February, Mr. Potresov already declared that the controversy between the Machians and the Marxists, and the question of liquidationism were included among the "*trivialities*". "I ask the reader," wrote Mr. Potresov, "whether it is possible that there can exist, in this year of 1909, as something that is actually real and not a figment of a diseased imagination, a liquidationist tendency, a tendency to liquidate what is already beyond liquidation and actually no longer exists as an organised whole" (p. 61).

By this unsuccessful attempt to evade the issue, Mr. Potresov supplied the best corroboration, one startling in its Herostratean boldness, of the view which he intended to refute. In January and February 1910, Mr. Potresov must

have known that his opponents would not agree with his appraisal of the actual state of affairs. Consequently, it could not be dismissed as something "which no longer exists" since the non-existent cannot be appraised. The question is not whether in actual practice one-tenth, or one-twentieth, or one-hundredth, or any other fraction equals nought, it is *whether there exists a trend* which regards that fraction as superfluous. The question is whether there is a difference in principle as to the significance of the fraction, what attitude should be taken toward it, should it be increased, etc. By replying to *this* question that there is "nothing", "nought", and that "nought is but nought", Mr. Potresov fully expressed the liquidationist trend whose existence he denies. His sally was remarkable only for its particular "malice" (as it was aptly put in the press review in *Zvezda*, No. 4), for its lack of straightforwardness and journalistic clarity. But it is precisely because it is not a matter of personalities, but of a trend, that Moscow rushed to the assistance of St. Petersburg. The Moscow *Vozrozhdeniye*,[37] No. 5, of March 30, 1910, quoted Mr. Potresov approvingly and added on its own behalf: "There is nothing to liquidate and for ourselves we may add, the dream of resuscitating that hierarchy, in its old", etc., "shape is nothing but a harmful, reactionary utopia" (p. 51).

It is quite obvious that it is not a question of the old *shape*, but of the old *substance*. It is quite obvious also that the question of "liquidating" is inseparably connected with the question of "resuscitating". *Vozrozhdeniye* went just one little step farther than Mr. Potresov; it expressed *the same* idea a little more clearly, more straightforwardly and more honestly. It dealt with trends and not with personalities. Persons may be evasive rather than straightforward, but trends are certain to reveal themselves in the most varied circumstances, shapes and forms.

Take, for instance, Mr. Bazarov; who was a Bolshevik once and perhaps still considers himself one—all kinds of strange things happen in our days. In the April issue of *Nasha Zarya* he refuted Mr. Potresov, and did this so successfully, so fortunately (for Potresov) that he declared literally that "the notorious question of hegemony" is "the biggest and yet most trivial misunderstanding" (p. 87). Note:

Mr. Bazarov refers to that question as "notorious", i.e., one that had been raised before, that was already known in April 1910! We note this fact, it is very important. We note that Mr. Bazarov's statement that "there will be no question of hegemony" (p. 88) if among the petty bourgeoisie in town and countryside there is "a sufficiently radical sentiment against political privileges", etc., and if it is "permeated with a strongly nationalistic spirit", actually amounts to a complete failure to understand the idea of hegemony and to a renunciation of this idea. It is precisely the concern of the leader to fight "nationalism" and to drive it out of those "sentiments" of which Bazarov speaks. The success of this work cannot be measured by immediate, direct results achieved today. There are times when the results of the resistance to nationalism, of resistance to the spirit of decay, and of resistance to liquidationism—which, incidentally, is as much a manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat as is the nationalism which at times affects a section of the workers—there are times when these results begin to tell only after years, perhaps even after very many years. It happens that a spark merely smoulders for many years, a spark which the petty bourgeoisie regard and proclaim as non-existent, liquidated, extinguished, etc., but which actually lives and feeds the spirit of resistance to despondency and renunciation, and manifests itself after a protracted period of time. Everywhere and always, opportunism clutches at the minute, at the moment, at today, for it is unable to appreciate the connection between "yesterday" and "tomorrow". Marxism, on the other hand, *demands* a clear awareness of this connection, an awareness that expresses itself not in words alone but in deeds. That is why Marxism cannot be reconciled with the liquidationist trend in general, and particularly with the denial of hegemony.

St. Petersburg is followed by Moscow. The Menshevik, Mr. Potresov, is followed by the former Bolshevik, Mr. Bazarov. Bazarov is followed by Mr. V. Levitsky, who is a more straightforward and honest opponent than Mr. Potresov. In the July issue of *Nasha Zarya*, Mr. V. Levitsky writes: "Whereas the previous [form of organisation of the class-conscious workers] was the leadership in the national

struggle for political freedom, the coming one will be the *class* [Mr. Levitsky's emphasis] party of the masses who have embarked upon their historic movement" (p. 103).

This one sentence represents a remarkably apt and concentrated expression of the *spirit* of all the writings of the Levitskys, Potresovs, Bazarovs, of the whole of *Vozrozhdeniye*, the whole of *Nasha Zarya*, and the whole of *Dyelo Zhizni*.[38] The above-quoted passage from Mr. Levitsky could be supplemented, replaced, enlarged upon and illustrated by hundreds of other quotations. It is just as "classical" a phrase as Bernstein's famous: "The movement is everything, the final aim is nothing"[39]—or like Prokopovich's (in the *Credo* of 1899)[40]: the workers should confine themselves to the economic struggle, leaving the political struggle to the liberals.

Mr. Levitsky is theoretically incorrect when he *contrasts* hegemony with a class party. This contrast alone furnishes sufficient grounds for saying that the party which *Nasha Zarya* is *in actual fact* following is not based on Marxism but on liberalism. Only the theoreticians of liberalism throughout the world (recall Sombart and Brentano) conceive of a *class* labour party in the way Mr. Levitsky "conceives" of it. From the standpoint of Marxism the class, so long as it renounces the idea of hegemony or fails to appreciate it, is not a class, or not yet a class, but a *guild*, or the sum total of various guilds.

But while Mr. Levitsky is unfaithful to Marxism, he is quite faithful to *Nasha Zarya*, i.e., to the liquidationist trend. What he said about the substance of *this* trend is the honest truth. In the past (as far as the followers of this trend are concerned) there was "hegemony"; in the future there will not be, nor should there be, any. And what about the present? At present there is the *amorphous* agglomeration which represents the circle of writers and reader friends of *Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, who are engaged, *at present*, in this year of 1911, in advocating the necessity, the inevitability, the usefulness and the logic of a *transition* from the *past* concept of the hegemony of the proletariat to the idea of a class party in the Brentano[41] sense (or, for that matter, in the Struve or Izgoyev sense)

in the *future*. The fact that amorphism is one of the principles of liquidationism was stated by its opponents in so many words as far back as 1908, i.e., *a year* before *Nasha Zarya* came into existence. Since Mr. Mayevsky[42] asks, in December 1910, what is liquidationism, we can refer him to the answer given officially exactly two years ago. In that answer he will find an exact and complete characterisation of *Nasha Zarya*, although the latter came into existence a year after that. How was this possible? It was possible because it was not, nor is it, a question of personalities, but of a trend, which became apparent in 1907 (see, if you must, the concluding part of the pamphlet by Mr. Cherevanin himself, where he deals with the events of the spring of 1907[43]), found patent expression in 1908, was appraised by its opponents at the end of 1908, and in 1910 founded for itself an open press organ and organs.

When you say: in the past there was hegemony, *but* in the future there ought to be a "class party"—you thereby glaringly show the connection between liquidationism and the renunciation of hegemony, and confirm the fact that this trend has broken with Marxism. Marxism maintains: since there was "hegemony" in the past, consequently, the sum of trades, specialities, guilds gave rise to the class; for it is the consciousness of the idea of hegemony and its implementation through their own activities that converts the guilds as a whole into a class. And once they have grown to the level of a "class", no external conditions, no burdens, no reduction of the whole to a fraction, no rejoicing on the part of *Vekhi*, and no pusillanimity on the part of the opportunists, can stifle this young shoot. Even if it is not "seen" on the surface (the Potresovs do not see it, or pretend not to see it, *because* they do not care to see it), it is alive; it lives, preserving the "past" in the present, and carrying it into the future. Because there was hegemony in the past, Marxists are *in duty bound*—despite all and sundry renunciators—to uphold its idea in the present and in the future; and this ideological task fully corresponds to the material conditions which have created the class out of guilds and which continue to create, extend and consolidate it, and which lend strength to its resistance to all "manifestations of bourgeois influence".

The magazine *Nasha Zarya*, however, in the issues published during the year, represents, in a concentrated form, that very expression of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. Liquidationism exists not only as a trend of people who profess to be the supporters of a given class. It represents one of the minor streams in that wide torrent of "regression" which has swept up several classes, is characteristic of the three years 1908-10 and, perhaps, will remain characteristic of a few more years. In the present article I had to confine myself to a definition of this minor stream on the basis of quotations from *Nasha Zarya*, Nos. 2-7. In future articles I expect to dwell on Nos. 10, 11, and 12 of that magazine, as well as to prove in greater detail that the minor stream of liquidationism is but a part of the torrent of *Vekhi* doctrines.

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THOSE WHO WOULD LIQUIDATE US

RE: MR. POTRESOV AND V. BAZAROV[44]

We sometimes come across literary efforts whose only significance lies in their Herostratean nature. A most ordinary literary work, as, for instance, Eduard Bernstein's well-known *The Premises of Socialism*, assumes outstanding political significance and becomes the manifesto of a trend amongst Marxists, although it departs from Marxism all along the line. Similar outstanding significance, by reason of their Herostratean nature, undoubtedly attaches to Mr. Potresov's article on trivialities in last year's February issue of *Nasha Zarya*, and V. Bazarov's article in reply to it in the April *Nasha Zarya*. To be sure, the questions discussed in these articles are far from being so profound or of such wide scope, and have not the same international significance, as the questions raised by Bernstein (or, rather, which he put forward after the bourgeoisie had already done so), but for us Russians, in the period of 1908-9-10-?, these are questions of tremendous and cardinal importance. That is why Mr. Potresov's and V. Bazarov's articles are *not* out of date, and it is necessary, it is our duty, to deal with them.

I

Mr. Potresov, who is fond of artificial, flowery and laboured expressions, devotes his article to "the contemporary drama of our social and political trends". Actually, there is not the slightest trace of the dramatic in what he says or can say, of the post-revolutionary evolution of liberalism, Narodism and Marxism, which he took it upon himself to

discuss. But you cannot get away from the comic in Mr. Potresov's reflections.

"It is precisely liberalism as an ideological trend," writes Mr. Potresov, "that presents a picture of the greatest degeneration and the greatest helplessness. We need only consider the widening gulf between practical liberalism and theorising liberalism"—between the "empiricism" of Milyukov's *Rech* and the theories of *Vekhi*.

Tut, tut, my dear sir! The gulf is widening between what you and semi-liberals like you said and thought of the Cadets in 1905-6-7 and what you are compelled to admit, stuttering and contradicting yourself, in 1909-10. The contradiction between the "empiricism" of the practical liberals and the theories of gentlemen *à la* Struve was fully apparent even before 1905. Just recall how the *Osvobozhdeniye*[45] of those days blundered in literally every one of its attempts at "theorising". Since you are *now* beginning to put two and two together, and find that liberalism "seems" to be "broken up" (this is yet another of your verbal tricks, an empty phrase, for *Vekhi* has *not* broken with *Rech*, or vice versa; they have been, are, and will go on living in perfect harmony with each other), that it is "sterile", "suspended in mid-air", and represents but the "least stable" (*sic*!) "section of bourgeois democrats", who are "not bad as voters", etc.—your cries about the "drama" of liberalism merely signify the tragicomedy of the collapse of your illusions. It is not at the present time, not during the three years 1908-10, but in the preceding three-year period that the liberals "seemed" to be the least stable section of bourgeois democrats. The "least stable" are those quasi-socialists who serve mustard to the public after supper. The distinguishing feature of the previous three-year period (insofar as the question examined by Mr. Potresov is concerned) was liberalism "suspended in mid-air", "sterile", "voting", etc., liberalism. *At that time* it was the political duty of the day to recognise the nature of liberalism for what it was; it was the urgent duty, not only of socialists, but also of consistent democrats, to warn the masses of this. March 1906, not February 1910—that was the time when it was important to sound the warning that the liberalism of the Cadets was suspended in mid-air, that it was sterile, that the objective

conditions reduced it to nothingness, to the farce of being "not bad as voters"; that the victories of the Cadets represented an unstable zigzag between the "serious" constitutionalism (read: sham constitutionalism) of the Shipovs or Guchkovs and the struggle for democracy waged by those elements that were *not* suspended in mid-air and did *not* confine themselves to the fond contemplation of ballots. Just call to mind, my dear sir, who it was that spoke the truth about the liberals at the proper time, in March 1906.[46]

The distinguishing feature, the peculiar characteristic of the three-year period (1908-10) under discussion is by no means the "sterility" of liberalism "suspended in mid-air", etc. Quite the contrary. Nothing has changed in the class impotence of the liberals, in their dread of democracy, and in their political inanity; but this impotence reached its height at a time when there were opportunities to display strength, when conditions made it possible for the liberals to hold full sway in at least a certain field of action. Thus, for instance, at the time the Cadets had a majority in the First Duma, they were in a position to use their majority either to serve democracy or to hamper the cause of democracy, to render assistance to democracy (even if only in such a small matter, as, let us say, the organisation of local land committees) or to stab democracy in the back. And that period was *characterised* by the Cadets being "suspended in mid-air", and those who were "not bad as voters" proving to be nothing but inventors of instructions for the subsequent Octobrist[47] Duma.

In the three-year period that followed, the Cadets, while remaining true to themselves, were *less* "suspended in mid-air" than before. You, Mr. Potresov, resemble that hero of popular lore who loudly voices his wishes and opinions at inappropriate times. The 1909 *Vekhi* group is *less* "suspended in mid-air" than Muromtsev was in 1906, for it is of *real* use and renders *practical* service to the class which represents a great power in Russia's national economy, namely, the landowners and capitalists. The *Vekhi* group helps these worthy gentlemen collect an armoury of weapons for their ideological and political struggle against democracy and socialism. This is something that *cannot* be destroyed by dissolutions of the Duma or, in general, by any political dis-

ЦѢНА 30 КОП.

МЫСЛЬ

ЕЖЕМѢСЯЧНЫЙ
ФИЛОСОФСКІЙ и ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКІЙ ЖУРНАЛЪ.

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Г. ПЛЕХАНОВЪ. Смѣшеніе представленій (*окончаніе*).—Н. Р—КОВЪ. Современная русская аграрная политика и виды на будущее (*окон.*).—В. ИЛЬИНЪ. О статистикѣ стачекъ въ Россіи (гл. II).—Г. Ц—ЧЪ. Къ вопросу объ иностранныхъ капиталахъ въ Россіи.—В. ИЛЬИНЪ. Наши упразднители (*о г. Потресовѣ и В. Базаровѣ*). НА ТЕМЫ ДНЯ:—ГР. Законъ о лишеніи отдыха торгово-промышленныхъ служащихъ.—ПОЛЕМИЧЕСКІЯ ЗАМѢТКИ: Р.—1) «Вѣхи» о Толстомъ. 2) Благодушный либералъ. 3) Совѣтъ г. Клейнберту.—ИНОСТРАННОЕ ОБОЗРѢНІЕ: Х. Л. РАППОПОРТЪ. Дѣйствительность и мечты. П ОРЛОВСКІЙ. Литературные наброски.—ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ЖИЗНЬ.—БИБЛІОГРАФІЯ.—НЕКРОЛОГЪ: П. Зингеръ.

МОСКВА.

Cover of *Mysl*, No. 2, for January 1911, containing Chapter II of Lenin's "Strike Statistics in Russia' and the beginning of the article "Those who Would Liquidate Us (Re: Mr. Potresov and V. Bazarov)"

Reduced

Cover of Мысль, No. 2, for January 1911, containing Chapter II of Lenin's "Strike Statistics in Russia' and the beginning of the article "Those who Would Liquidate Us (Re: Mr. Potresov and V. Bazarov)"

Reduced

turbances occurring under the existing social and economic system. As long as the class of landed proprietors and capitalists exists, their hack journalists, the Izgoyevs, Struves, Franks and Co., will also exist. As far as the "work" of the Muromtsevs and, in general, of the Cadets in the First Duma is concerned, it could be "destroyed" by the dissolution of the Duma (for, in point of fact, they did not do any work; they only indulged in words which, far from serving the people, corrupted them).

The Cadets in the Third Duma are the same party, with the same ideology, the same policy, and to a large degree even the same people, as those in the First Duma. And that is precisely why the Cadets in the Third Duma are less "suspended in mid-air" than they were in the First Duma. Don't you understand this, my dear Mr. Potresov? You were wrong in undertaking a discussion of "the contemporary drama of our social and political trends"! Let me tell you, in strict confidence, that in the future, too, and probably for quite some time to come, the political activity of the Cadets will not be "sterile"—not only because of the reactionary "fecundity" of *Vekhi*, but also because so long as there are political minnows in the ranks of democracy, there will be food for the big fish of liberalism to thrive on. So long as there is the kind of instability in the ranks of the socialists, the kind of flabbiness among the representatives of democracy so vividly exemplified by figures like Potresov, the skill of the "empiricists" of liberalism will always prove sufficient to catch these minnows. Don't worry, Cadets: you'll have plenty to feed on so long as the Potresovs exist!

II

Mr. Potresov's arguments dovetail even less when he discusses Narodism. The Cadets he calls "former democrats" and even "former liberals"; of the peasantry he says: "By entering political life, the peasantry [in Mr. Potresov's opinion, they have not yet entered political life] would usher in an entirely new chapter in history, that of peasant democracy, which would spell the end of the old, intellectual, Narodnik democracy".

So the Cadets are former democrats and the peasantry are future democrats. But who, then, are the present democrats? Was there no democratic, no mass democratic, movement in Russia in 1905-07? Was there none in 1908-10? Potresov resorts to "round-about" phrases, to phrases that evade the essence of the matter, in order to throw a veil over the present. The direct and plain recognition of what indubitably exists at present flies in the face of the whole liquidationist philosophy of the Potresovs, for it would mean the plain and direct recognition of the now indubitable historical fact that the Cadets *never* represented any more or less mass democratic movement in Russia, that they never pursued a democratic policy, whereas the peasantry, the very same "peasant millions" of whom Mr. Potresov also speaks, did and do represent this bourgeois democratic movement (with all its limitations). Mr. Potresov evades this *cardinal* question precisely in order to save the liquidationist philosophy. But he cannot save it!

In trying to ignore the past and the present of the peasant democratic movement, Mr. Potresov again misses the mark when he confidently discusses the future. Late again, my dear sir! You yourself speak of the "possible consequences of the law of November 9"[48]; hence, you yourself admit the possibility (purely abstract, of course) of its success. But as a result of this success the "*new* chapter in history" may prove to be a chapter not only in the history of *peasant* democracy, but also in the history of peasant *agrarians*.

The development of peasant farming in Russia and, consequently, of peasant land tenure and peasant politics cannot proceed along any other but capitalist lines. In its essence, the agrarian programme of the Narodniks, as formulated, for instance, in the well-known Platform of the 104[49] (in the First and Second Dumas), far from contradicting this capitalist development, implies the creation of conditions for the most widespread and most rapid capitalist development. The agrarian programme now in operation, on the other hand, implies the slowest and most narrow capitalist development, one most impeded by the survivals of serfdom. Objective historical and economic conditions have not yet provided an answer to the question—which

of these programmes will, in the final analysis, determine the form bourgeois agrarian relations will assume in the new Russia.

Such are the plain facts which the liquidators find it necessary to confuse.

"In face of all the changes," writes Mr. Potresov, referring to the changes in the ranks of the intellectual, Narodnik democratic movement, "one thing has remained unchanged: so far [!] the real peasantry have not introduced any corrections of their own into intellectualist ideology with its peasant trimmings."

This is a statement of the purest *Vekhi* type and it is absolutely false. In 1905, the "real" peasant masses, the rank and file themselves, acted in the open historical arena, and introduced *quite a number* of "corrections" into the "intellectualist ideology" of the Narodniks and the Narodnik parties. Not all of these corrections have been *understood* by the Narodniks, but the peasantry *did introduce* them. In 1906 and in 1907, the very "real" peasantry created the Trudovik[50] groups and the Draft Platform of the 104, thereby introducing *a number of corrections*, some of which even the Narodniks noted. It is generally recognised, for example, that the "real" peasantry revealed their *economic* aspirations, and approved private and co-operative land tenure in place of the "commune".

The *Vekhi* people who are purging liberalism of democracy, systematically converting it into a servant of the money-bags, are properly performing their mission in history when they declare that the movement of 1905-07 was one of intellectuals, and assert that the real peasantry introduced no corrections of their own into the intellectualist ideology. The tragicomedy of liquidationism is its failure to notice that its assertions have been and are simply a rehash of the *Vekhi* ideas.

III

This transformation becomes even more obvious when Mr. Potresov proceeds to discuss Marxism. The intelligentsia, he writes, "...by its organisation of party circles ... overshadowed the proletariat". You cannot deny the fact that it is the bourgeoisie that has widely circulated this idea through

Vekhi and through the entire liberal press, and has used it against the proletariat. In the essay in which he formulated this idea, Axelrod wrote that "history in a prankish mood" could provide bourgeois democracy with a leader from the Marxist school. History in a prankish mood made use of the pit which Axelrod obligingly threatened to dig for the Bolsheviks, and has put Axelrod himself in it!

If you turn to the objective facts of history, you will find that *all* of them, the entire period of 1905-07, even the elections to the Second Duma (to cite as an example one of the simplest, though not one of the most important, facts), *proved conclusively* that "the organisation of party circles" did not "overshadow" the proletariat, but *developed directly* into the organisation of the parties and trade unions of the proletarian *masses*.

But let us pass on to the main, or "central", point of Mr. Potresov's Herostratean effort. He claims that Marxist thought "is doping itself with the hashish of trivialities"—the struggle against Machism and the struggle against liquidationism, "debating anything and everything ... other than those things that constitute the nerve of a social and political trend like Marxism, anything but questions of economics and questions of politics". And what a host there is of such questions! exclaims Mr. Potresov. "How is the economic development of Russia proceeding, what realignments of forces does this development effect under the cloak of reaction, what is going on in the countryside and in the cities, what changes does this development introduce in the social composition of the working class of Russia, etc., etc? Where are the answers, or even the initial attempts at answers, to these questions, where is the economic school of Russian Marxism?"

The answer, or at any rate, an initial attempt at an answer, is to be found in the very "hierarchy", whose existence Mr. Potresov maliciously and hypocritically denies. The development of the Russian state system during the past three centuries shows that its class character has been changing in one definite direction. The monarchy of the seventeenth century with the Boyars' Duma did not resemble the bureaucratic-aristocratic monarchy of the eighteenth century. The monarchy of the first half of the nineteenth century was

not the same as the monarchy of 1861-1904. In the 1908-10 period a new phase was clearly outlined, marking *one more step* in the same direction, which may be described as the direction leading towards a bourgeois monarchy. The character of the Third Duma and the present agrarian policy are closely connected with this step. The new phase, therefore, is not an accident but represents a specific stage in the capitalist evolution of the country. This new phase does not solve the old problems, nor can it do so; consequently, since *it is unable to eliminate them*, it calls for the use of new methods of approach to old solutions of old problems. That is the peculiar feature of this cheerless, gloomy, difficult period, which, however, has proved to be inevitable. The particular economic and political characteristics of this period have given rise to the distinctive features of the ideological alignments in the ranks of the Marxists. Those who recognise the new methods of approach to the old solution of old problems are finding a common ground in their present joint practical tasks; although they are still divided as to how the old solutions should have been applied or advanced at one juncture or another during the preceding period. Those who deny (or who do not understand) the new methods of approach, or that we are confronted with the old problems and are heading towards the old solution of these problems, are *in fact* deserting Marxism, are *in fact* surrendering to the liberals (as Potresov, Levitsky, and others have done) or to the idealists and the syndicalists (as V. Bazarov and others have done).

Since they have surrendered themselves to alien people and alien ideas, both Potresov and Bazarov, as well as those who share their views, inevitably lose their bearings and find themselves in a most comical and false position. Mr. Potresov beats his breast and shouts: "*Where* is the *initial attempt* at an answer, and what is that *answer*?" Martov, who knows the answer just as well, tries to assure the public that that answer recognises "the bourgeoisie in power"—a common trick whereby liberals take advantage of the temporary enforced silence of their opponents! At the same time they ask us with an offended air: "What do you mean by liquidationism?" This very trick, most worthy gentlemen, is one of the methods of liquidators (if not of renegades);

people claiming allegiance to a "whole"* take advantage of its loss of strength to assure the public that there is no "answer", although the answer has already been given by "the whole".

Liquidationism, writes Mr. Potresov, is "a figment of a diseased imagination", for you cannot liquidate "what is already beyond liquidation and actually no longer exists as an organised whole".

I am not in a position fully to convey to the reader my opinion of these lines; but in order to convey an approximate idea of it, let me ask the reader: What should we call a person whose closest associates and colleagues accept proposals favourable to them made by the "whole" (precisely as a "whole") and who the following day declares in the press that there is no "whole"?

But, enough of that.

The following question of principle is involved: can the view on the necessity for the old solution of the old problems change according to the *degree* of disintegration of the "whole"? or even, if you like, with its disappearance? It is obvious to everyone that it cannot. If the objective conditions, if the fundamental economic and political features of the present epoch, demand the old solution, then the greater the disintegration, the less there is left of the "whole", the more one must be concerned about, and the more ardently must the publicist speak about the need for the "whole". As we have already pointed out, we must recognise the new methods of approach; but who is to apply them? Obviously the "whole". Obviously, the tasks of the publicist as seen by those who understand the importance of the period we are passing through and its basic political features, are diametrically opposed to the *entire* line of the Potresovs. Certainly, no one can even seriously think of denying the connection between the "answer" which I outlined above (to the question of the economics and politics of the present period) and anti-liquidationism.

Let us now turn from the general principles involved in the presentation of the question to its concrete historical aspect. That trend in Marxism which advocates the necessity

* i.e., the Party.—*Tr.*

of the old solution and pursues its line accordingly has fully taken shape in the 1908-10 period. Another trend has also taken shape, one which during *all these three years* has opposed the recognition of the "old solution" and the restoration of the old fundamental forms of the whole. It would be ridiculous to deny this fact. And a third trend which has taken shape has failed during all these three years to understand the new forms of approach, the importance of work in the Third Duma, etc. Such people have recognised the old solution only in words, as one that has been learned by rote but not understood, as words repeated by force of habit but not *applied* consciously and intelligently to the changed circumstances (changed at least in the sphere of work in the Duma, but, of course, not only in that sphere).

The connection between liquidationism and the general philistine mood of "weariness" is obvious. The "weary" (particularly those weary as a result of doing nothing) are making no effort to work out for themselves an exact answer to the question of the economic and political appraisal of the current moment: they all disagree with the above appraisal, formally *accepted by all* as the appraisal given on behalf of the whole; but they all fear even to think of opposing to it *their own* exact viewpoint, for instance that of the collaborators of the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*, *Zhizn*,[51] etc. The "weary" insist: the old no longer exists, it has lost its vitality, it is lifeless, etc., etc.; but they have not the slightest intention of racking their brains for an answer, a purely political and precisely formulated answer, to the unavoidable question (unavoidable for every honest publicist): what exactly should be substituted for the old, and whether it is necessary to restore "what is [allegedly] beyond liquidation, since it is already liquidated" (according to Potresov). For three years they have been abusing the old, reviling it—especially from such platforms as are barred to the advocates of the old—and now, falling into the arms of the Izgoyevs,* they exclaim: What nonsense, what a figment of the imagination all that talk about liquidationism is!

* See his article in *Russkaya Mysl*,[52] 1910, on Potresov the supporter of *Vekhi* ideas. From such embraces Potresov will *never* wash himself clean.

Of *such* "weary" people, of Mr. Potresov and Co., one *cannot* say in the well-known verses of the poet: "...No traitors they—just weary carrying their cross; the fire of anger and of sorrow, while mid-way still, they lost".[53]

"Weary" persons of this kind, who ascend the rostrum of the publicist and from it justify their "weariness" of the old, their unwillingness to work on the old, belong to the category of people who are not just "weary", but are treacherous as well.

IV

The philosophical struggle of the materialists, the Marxists, against the Machists, i.e., against the idealists, is also classed by Mr. Potresov as "triviality". Mr. Potresov is highly indignant over the "orgy" of philosophising ("Oh, my friend Arkady Nikolayevich, spare me your eloquence!"[54]) and, in this connection mentioning Plekhanov and myself as representing the materialists, he describes us as "*political figures of yesterday*". I had a good laugh over this expression. There is so much obvious and amusing boasting in this that our hare really deserves a bit of the bear's ear.* Plekhanov and others—"political figures of yesterday"! The political figures of *today* are apparently Potresov and his "gang". Charming and frank.

Whenever Arkady Nikolayevich accidentally speaks without eccentricity or grimaces, he defeats himself superbly. Just make a little effort, Arkady Nikolayevich, and try to *think*: you deny the existence of liquidationism as a *political* trend, as a trend which distinguishes, *not* Menshevism from Bolshevism, but Potresov and Co. from Plekhanov and the Bolsheviks *jointly*. And yet, while you deny this, you at the same time describe Plekhanov and myself as "political figures of yesterday". Look how clumsy you are: Plekhanov and I *together* may be called political figures of yesterday, precisely because we think that the organisation of yesterday, as a form of yesterday's movement (yesterday's in its *principles*) is necessary today. Plekhanov and

* The allusion is to I. A. Krylov's fable "The Hare at the Hunt", in which the hare boasts about how "we" killed the bear.—*Tr.*

I differed sharply, and we still differ on questions of what steps *that* organisation of yesterday, working on the basis of *that* movement of yesterday, should have taken at one juncture or another; but we are drawn together by the struggle against those who *today* deny the very *principles* of yesterday's movement (this includes also the question of hegemony, of which more later), deny the very *foundations* of yesterday's organisation.

Well, Arkady Nikolayevich, are you still unable to understand what is meant by liquidationism? Do you still think that Plekhanov and I have been drawn together by some Machiavellian plot or by a malicious desire to *substitute* a "struggle on two fronts" for the "defeat" of liquidationism?

But, to return to the "orgy of philosophising".

"We know," writes Mr. Potresov, "what a deep impression on the consciousness of German Social-Democracy was made at the time by Engels's struggle against Dühring, and how theses, seemingly most abstract, were actually of vital and concrete significance to the German working-class movement...." The most abstract theses were of vital and concrete significance! Another bit of phrase-mongering and nothing else! Try to explain, if you "know", what was the "vital and concrete significance" of Engels's *thesis* that Dühring's philosophical reflections on time and space were wrong! The trouble with you is that, like a schoolboy, you learned *by rote*, that "Engels's controversy with Dühring was of great significance"; but you have not *thought* about its meaning, and therefore you repeat what you have learned by rote in a wrong and utterly distorted form. It is wrong to say that "the most abstract theses [of Engels against Dühring] were actually of vital and concrete significance to the German working-class movement". The significance of Engels's most abstract theses was that they explained to the ideologists of the working class what was erroneous in the shift from materialism towards positivism and idealism. If, instead of high-sounding, but hollow, phrases about "a deep impression" or the "vital and concrete significance" of "the most abstract theses", you had given such an exposition (that is, one more or less definitive from the philosophical standpoint) of Engels's views, you would have seen

at once that the reference to Engels's controversy with Dühring goes *against* you.

"We know," Mr. Potresov continues, "what part the struggle against subjective sociology played in the history of the formation of Russian Marxism." ... And what about the part played by Lavrov's and Mikhailovsky's positivist and idealist doctrines in the errors of subjective sociology? Every shot of yours, Arkady Nikolayevich, misses its mark. If you cite an historical parallel, you must single out and point out exactly what is similar in the different events; if not, what you get will not be an historical comparison but words cast to the winds. If we take the historical parallel you cite, we must ask: would the "formation" of *Russian* Marxism have been possible *without* Beltov's[55] explanation of the principles of philosophical materialism and of their importance in refuting Lavrov and Mikhailovsky? There can only be one answer to this question, and that answer, if we are to use the historical parallel in order to draw conclusions with regard to the controversy with the Machists—goes *against* Mr. Potresov.

..."But precisely because we know all this [why, of course! haven't we just seen what it amounts to when Mr. Potresov writes: "We know all this"?], we want to see a living and real connection established at last between the philosophical controversy we are dealing with, and the Marxist social and political trend, its problems and requirements. Meanwhile"—here follows a reference to Kautsky's letter in which it was said that Machism is a *Privatsache* (a private affair), that the controversy over it is a "*fata morgana*", etc.

The reference to Kautsky is typical of philistine judgement. The point is not that Kautsky is "unprincipled", as Mr. Potresov remarks sarcastically (*à la* Izgoyev), but that Kautsky *does not know*, nor does he claim to know, the state of affairs in regard to Russian Machism. In his letter Kautsky admits that Plekhanov is well versed in Marxism, and expresses his own conviction that idealism cannot be reconciled with Marxism, and that Machism is not idealism (or that not every form of Machism is idealism). It is obvious that Kautsky is *mistaken* on the last point, particularly as regards Russian Machism. But it is a pardonable mistake on his part, for he has *never studied* Machism as a whole, and

his opinion was expressed in a private letter obviously written as a warning against exaggerating the differences. But a *Russian* Marxist writer, who, under such circumstances, refers to Kautsky, merely betrays a philistine laziness of mind and cowardice in the fight. In 1908, when the letter was written, Kautsky *may have hoped* that in a certain interpretation Machism could be "reconciled" with *materialism*. But to refer to Kautsky in connection with this question in Russia in 1909-10 means *to undertake the task* of reconciling the Russian Machists with the materialists. Does Mr. Potresov or anybody else really undertake this task in all seriousness?

Kautsky is not unprincipled; but Potresov and Co., who want to proclaim Machism "a private affair", are *a model of unprincipledness* among Russian Marxists today. Kautsky was quite sincere and not a bit unprincipled when, in 1908, never having read the Russian Machists, he advised *them* to seek peace with Plekhanov as a man versed in Marxism, and as a materialist; for Kautsky has always declared in favour of materialism and against idealism, and he expressed the same opinion in his letter. But Potresov and Co., who in 1909-10 hide behind Kautsky, have *not a grain* of sincerity, *not a trace* of respect for principles.

You say, Mr. Potresov, that you fail to see any living and real connection between the philosophical controversy and the Marxist trend? Well, permit me, a political figure of yesterday, most respectfully to point out to you at least the following circumstances and considerations: (1) The controversy over the question as to what is philosophical materialism and why deviations from it are erroneous, dangerous and reactionary *always* has "a real and living connection" with "the Marxist social and political trend"—otherwise the latter would not be Marxist, would not be social and political, would not be a trend. Only narrow-minded "realistic politicians" of reformism or anarchism can deny the "reality" of this connection. (2) Considering the wealth and many-sidedness of the ideological content of Marxism, there is nothing surprising in the fact that in Russia, just as in other countries, various historical periods give prominence now to one, now to another particular aspect of Marxism. In Germany before 1848, the philosophical forming

of Marxism was the aspect particularly stressed; in 1848 it was the political ideas of Marxism; in the fifties and sixties it was the economic doctrine of Marxism. In Russia before the revolution, the aspect that was particularly stressed was the application of the economic doctrine of Marxism to Russian reality; during the revolution, it was Marxist politics; since the revolution it is Marxist philosophy. This does not mean that any of the aspects of Marxism may at any time be ignored; it only means that the *prevalence of interest* in one aspect or another does not depend on subjective wishes, but on the totality of historical conditions. (3) It is not by mere chance that the period of social and political reaction, the period when the rich lessons of the revolution are being "digested", is also the period when the fundamental theoretical, including the philosophical, problems are of prime importance to any *living* trend. (4) The progressive trends of Russian thought cannot fall back upon a great philosophical tradition, such as that connected with the Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century in France, or with the epoch of classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Feuerbach in Germany. That is why it was necessary for the advanced class of Russia to sort out its philosophy and there is nothing strange in the fact that the belated "sorting-out" came about after this advanced class had, during the recent great events, fully matured for its independent historical role. (5) This philosophic "sorting-out" had been ripening for a long time in other countries as well, because modern physics, for instance, had posed a number of new questions which dialectical materialism had to "cope with". In this respect, "our" (to use Potresov's expression) philosophical controversy is of more than just a certain, i.e., Russian, significance. Europe provided material for a "freshening" of philosophical thought; and Russia, which was lagging behind, seized upon this material with particular "eagerness" during the period of enforced lull in 1908-10. (6) Belousov recently said of the Third Duma that it is a sanctimonious body. He grasped correctly the class characteristic of the Third Duma in this respect and justly branded the hypocrisy of the Cadets.

Not accidentally, but of *necessity*, have our reactionaries in general, and the liberal (*Vekhi*, Cadet) reactionaries in

particular, "pounced on" religion. The stick and knout alone are not sufficient to serve the purpose; in any case the stick is cracked. *Vekhi* is helping the advanced bourgeoisie to find a new, ideological stick, a spiritual stick. Machism, as a species of idealism, is *objectively* a weapon in the hands of the reactionaries, a vehicle of reaction. The struggle against Machism "at the bottom" is therefore not accidental but inevitable in an historical period (1908-10) when "at the top" we see not only the "sanctimonious Duma" of the Octobrists and Purishkeviches, but also sanctimonious Cadets and a sanctimonious liberal bourgeoisie.

Mr. Potresov made the "reservation" that he was "not at present touching" upon the subject of "god-building".[56] That is precisely what distinguishes the unprincipled and philistine publicist Potresov from Kautsky. Kautsky *knew nothing either* of the god-building of the Machists *or* of the god-worshipping *Vekhi* people, and therefore he *could* afford to say that not every type of Machism is idealism. But Potresov knows all this, and by "*not touching*" upon the main thing (the main thing to persons with a *narrow* "publicist" approach) acts the hypocrite. By proclaiming the struggle against Machism "a private affair" Mr. Potresov and his like are abetting *Vekhi* in the "social and political" sense.

V

In passing from Mr. Potresov to Bazarov, we must note, to begin with, that, as regards the philosophical controversy, our answers to the former also hold good for the latter. There is only one point to be added: one can quite understand V. Bazarov's tolerant attitude to Mr. Potresov, his insistence on finding "some truth" in Potresov's arguments, for Mr. Potresov (like all the liquidators), while disavowing Machism formally and in words, yields to it, *as a matter of fact*, on the most essential point. The Machists as representatives of a trend, and as a group with a "platform" of its own, have never really dared to demand anything more than that their departure from Marxism be regarded as "a private affair"! It is therefore not surprising that Potresov and Bazarov are ogling each other. The group of liquida-

tionist writers and the group of Machist writers are, in our period of disintegration, *indeed at one* in defending the "freedom of disintegration" from the adherents of Marxism, from the champions of the theoretical foundations of Marxism. And, as *even* Bazarov has proved by his article, this solidarity is *not* confined to questions of philosophy.

I say "even", for Bazarov, in particular, has always been distinguished for his very thoughtful attitude to serious political problems. This fact must be mentioned if we are to appreciate the meaning of the incredible vacillations of this man, and not merely for the purpose of stressing the very useful past activity of a writer who is now out to earn the laurels of Herostratus.

Bazarov, for instance, made the following statement of a Herostratean nature: "In my opinion, the biggest and yet most trivial misunderstanding of our times is the notorious question of the hegemony of the working class". There seems to be some fate pursuing the Machists in our midst. Some of them defend the "freedom of disintegration", declaring that otzovism is a legal shade of opinion; others, who see the folly and harm of otzovism, frankly hold out their hands to the liquidators in the sphere of politics. It is the liquidators in *Nasha Zarya*, and in *Zhizn*, and in *The Social Movement*,[57] who are waging a direct and indirect struggle against the idea of this hegemony. We are sorry to state that Bazarov *has joined their camp*.

What are his arguments on the substance of the matter? Five years ago such hegemony was a fact. "At present, for quite obvious reasons, that hegemony has disappeared. More—it has turned into its direct opposite." The proof: "In our days, in order to become popular in democratic circles of society, it has become a necessity to kick at Marxism". Example: Chukovsky.

You read these lines and you can hardly believe your eyes. Bazarov, who claimed to be a Marxist, has turned into a has-been, into one capable of flirting with the Potresovs.

You have no fear of *God* in you, V. A. Bazarov. Chukovsky and other liberals, as well as a host of Trudovik democrats, have always "kicked" at Marxism, and particularly ever since 1906; but was not "hegemony" a fact in 1906? Get out of your liberal-journalistic cubby-hole, consider at least

the attitude of the peasant deputies in the Third Duma to the working-class deputies. The mere juxtaposition of the unquestionable facts of their political behaviour during the past three years, even a mere comparison between their formulations of motions for next business and the Cadet formulations, to say nothing of a comparison between the political declarations made in the Duma and the conditions under which the large masses of the population have been living during this period, proves incontrovertibly that even today hegemony is a fact. The hegemony of the working class is the political influence which that class (and its representatives) exercises upon other sections of the population by helping them to purge their democracy (where there is democracy) of undemocratic admixtures, by criticising the narrowness and short-sightedness of all bourgeois democracy, by carrying on the struggle against "Cadetism" (meaning the corrupting ideological content of the speeches and policy of the liberals), etc., etc. There is nothing more characteristic of our present times than the fact that Bazarov *could* write such incredible things, and that a group of journalists who also consider themselves friends of the workers and adherents of Marxism patted him indulgently on the back for this!

"It is absolutely impossible to foretell what will be the state of affairs at the moment of the coming revival," Bazarov assures the readers of the liquidationist magazine. "If the spiritual character of urban and rural democracy is approximately the same as it was five years ago, then the hegemony of Marxism will again become a fact.... But there is absolutely nothing out of the way in the supposition that the character of democracy will undergo a substantial change. Imagine, for instance, that among the petty bourgeoisie of the Russian villages and cities a sufficiently radical sentiment exists against the political privileges of the ruling classes, that it is sufficiently united and active, but is permeated with a strongly nationalistic spirit. Since Marxists cannot think of any compromises with nationalism or anti-Semitism, it is obvious that under such circumstances there will not be even a trace of hegemony."

In addition to being wrong, all this is monstrously absurd. If certain sections of the population combine hostility to privilege with nationalist sentiments, surely it is the duty of the leader to explain to them that such a combination hinders the abolition of privilege. Can the struggle against privilege be waged *unless* it is combined with the struggle

of the petty bourgeois who suffer from nationalism, against the petty bourgeois who gain from it? Every struggle of every petty bourgeois against every kind of privilege *always* bears the imprint of petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness and half-heartedness, and it is the business of the "leader" to combat these qualities. Bazarov argues like the Cadets, like the *Vekhi* writers. Or, more correctly, Bazarov has joined the camp of Potresov and Co., who already have been arguing this way for a long time.

What cannot be seen on the surface does not exist. What the Chukovskys and Potresovs do not see is not real. Such are the premises of Bazarov's arguments, which fly in the face of Marxism. Marxism teaches us that so long as capitalism exists the petty-bourgeois masses must inevitably suffer from undemocratic privileges (theoretically, such privileges are "not indispensable" under *pure* capitalism, but the *purification* of capitalism will continue until its death), that they must suffer from economic oppression. Therefore, so long as capitalism exists it will *always* be the duty of the "leader" to explain the source of these privileges and this oppression, to expose their class roots, to provide an example of struggle against them, expose the falsity of the liberal methods of struggle, etc., etc.

That is how Marxists think. That is how they regard the duties of the "leader" in the camp of those whose condition does not permit any reconciliation with privilege, in the camp, not only of the proletarians, but also of the semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses. The Chukovskys, however, think that once that camp has suffered reverses, has been hard-pressed and driven underground, "hegemony has disappeared", and the "question of hegemony has become a most trivial misunderstanding".

When I see Bazarov, who says such disgraceful things, marching hand in hand with the Potresovs, Levitskys and Co., with those who assure the working class that what it needs is not the leadership, *but* a class party; when, on the other hand, I see Plekhanov starting (to use the contemptuous expression of the magnificent Potresov) "a row" at the slightest indications of serious vacillation in the question of leadership, I say to myself, the Bolsheviks would indeed be the wild fanatics obsessed by factionalism their enemies

represent them to be, if, the circumstances being as they are, they wavered even for a moment, if they doubted even for one second that their duty, the duty emanating from all the traditions of Bolshevism, from the very spirit of its teachings and policies, is to hold out their hands to Plekhanov and to express their full comradely sympathy with him. We differed, and still differ, on the questions as to how the leading classes ("hegemons") should have acted at one time or another in the past. But in the present period of disintegration, we are comrades in the struggle against those to whom the question of hegemony is nothing but "a most trivial misunderstanding". As for the Potresovs, Bazarovs, etc., they are strangers to us, no less strangers than the Chukovskys.

Let this be taken note of by those good fellows who think that the policy of rapprochement with Plekhanov is a narrow policy that "smacks of factionalism"; who would like to "extend" the policy to include a reconciliation with the Potresovs, Bazarovs, etc.; and who absolutely refuse to understand why we regard such "conciliationism" as either hopeless stupidity or abject intrigue-mongering.

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THE CADETS ON "TWO CAMPS" AND "SENSIBLE COMPROMISE"

The answer given by *Rech* to the semi-official organ of the Cabinet on the question of the "slogan" for the elections to the Fourth Duma and on the present-day political alignment represents an interesting and significant phenomenon.

Rech agrees with *Russkiye Vedomosti*[58] that "the elections to the Fourth Duma will be a contest between two camps only: the Progressists and the Rights". "Votes will have to be cast not for parties, nor for individual candidates, but for or against the consolidation of the constitutional system in Russia. ["Consolidation" is a very charming way of putting it!] The political meaning of this slogan ... is an objective acknowledgement of the indisputable fact that the line pursued by the government has again united the entire opposition, both to the right and to the left of the Cadets." The Cadets will constitute "the centre of this politically heterogeneous group", and, although they form part of it, "will renounce their former programme and tactics just as little as did the Social-Democrats when they joined the pre-October alliances" (the editorial, January 21).

"Gentlemen, we can say in reply to the semi-official and official press, it is you yourselves who have been instrumental in uniting us.... At present political trends in Russia are merging to an ever greater extent in two big camps—for and against the Constitution.... Our task at present is the same, again the same, just as it was before October 17..." (ibid.).

In assessing these observations we must distinguish between the conditions attending the elections to the Fourth Duma and the social and political meaning of the changes under discussion (the "slogan" and the alignments). The

circumstances of the elections in general, in the provinces in particular, will certainly compel the "opposition" to resort to the vague non-party term "Progressists"[59] on an even wider scale than before. The refusal to legalise even such parties as the Cadets will inevitably lead to this, and the bewilderment of the semi-official organ of the Cabinet on this score is, of course, nothing but sheer hypocrisy. In the big cities, for instance, as the Cadets themselves admit in that very same editorial, independent candidates of "groups more to the left" (to use the expression of *Russkiye Vedomosti*) will stand for election. This alone shows that there can be no question of just *two* camps.

Further, *Rech* thought it best completely to forget the existence of a worker curia, as provided by the present election laws. Finally, with regard to the elections in the villages (the peasant curia) it must be said that here even the *word* "Progressists" will undoubtedly be avoided; but it will probably not be the Cadets who will constitute the *actual* "centre" of the "politically heterogeneous" or politically undefinable groups.

What, then, does the talk about *two* camps amount to? To the fact that it pleases the Cadets, in speaking of the present political situation, to narrow down their field of vision to include *only* those elements that constitute the majority in the Third Duma. The Cadet gentlemen are willing to recognise as political "camps" only that insignificant section of the population represented by these elements. Hitherto the *main* division in this small corner created by the coup d'état of June 3 has been: the Rights, the Octobrists, the Cadets. (It is well known that the character of the Third Duma was determined, in the final analysis, by two majorities: the Rights with the Octobrists and the Octobrists with the Cadets.) Now (according to the forecast of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, with which *Rech* is in agreement) *these three* elements will be divided into two "camps": the Rights and Progressists.

We fully admit that these predictions of the liberals are based not on the wishes of the liberals alone, but on objective facts as well—on the changes in the political situation and in the political sentiments of the Russian bourgeoisie. It would be impermissible, however, to forget that

one can speak of *two* camps only when the field of observation is limited to the majority in the Third Duma. It would be impermissible to forget that the *actual* meaning of all this talk is nothing more than the tendency on the part of the Octobrist and the Cadet "camps" to draw closer together, merge and unite in the Progressist "camp" (with the tacit understanding, of course, that a more or less considerable section of the Octobrist camp will defect to the camp of the Rights). When the Cadets say: "we" have been united, again "we" have one task, etc., these words "we", "us", "our" *actually* mean nothing more than the Octobrists and the Cadets.

Now, what has united "them"? What is "their" task? What is "their" slogan for the elections to the Fourth Duma? "The consolidation of the Constitution", reply *Russkiye Vedomosti* and *Rech*. This reply is only seemingly definite; actually, it defines absolutely nothing; it amounts to the same, absolutely meaningless, reference to some indefinite "mean" between the Octobrists and the Cadets. For both Milyukov and Guchkov agree that "Thank God, we have a Constitution", but when they dream of making common cause, it is for the purpose of "consolidating", not what "we" *have*, but what we have not. It is also a dream, and not a very sensible one at that, that Milyukov and Guchkov, the Cadets and the Octobrists of today, and the "Progressists" of tomorrow, could agree on a definition of what should be included in the desired Constitution. They would be unable to agree either on the legal formulations expressing the Constitution, or on defining what real interests of what actual classes this Constitution should meet and safeguard. Hence, the *real* meaning of this joint slogan amounts to this: while they are being drawn more closely together by "a *negative* aim—that of the struggle against the common enemy" (as *Rech* puts it in the same editorial), the Octobrist and the Cadets cannot define their positive tasks, cannot find in their camps the forces that would be capable of emerging from the deadlock.

The observations of *Rech* on the subject of a "sensible compromise" in connection with another matter are a very clearly expressed admission that they are indeed in a state of deadlock, that it is necessary to emerge from this state,

that this is necessary for both the Octobrists and the Cadets, and that, after they have emerged, both will be absolutely impotent by themselves.

"During the debate in the Duma on the St. Petersburg sewerage system," we read in an editorial in *Rech* of January 20, "the unhealthy undercurrent of the controversy was somewhat lessened, and even the Centre [i.e., the Octobrists] found it possible to accept the sensible compromise which the people's freedom group proposed and the municipality accepted; but the interference of P. A. Stolypin rudely tore away the veil [you, Messrs. Cadets, would like vexed questions to remain hidden under a veil, wouldn't you?] and revealed the same old background, with which everyone has been disgusted for some time—that of the *political* struggle of the state against the municipality."

The liberal bourgeoisie in the guise of an innocent—oh, how innocent!—person dreaming of "sensible compromises" on a businesslike, non-political basis, and the representatives of the old, "non-constitutional", principles in the role of political educators who tear down the veils and reveal the class background! A sensible compromise, the liberal muses, means that what the Cadets, the Octobrists and the non-party bigwigs of capital (the St. Petersburg municipality) have agreed upon may be conceded. There is nothing sensible in the idea of our yielding to you, the government replies; the only sensible thing is that you yield to us.

The minor question of the sanitation of St. Petersburg, of the distribution of the responsibilities and rights between local self-government and autocratic government, became the occasion for the elucidation of truths of no mean importance. What, indeed, is more "sensible"—the wishes, dreams and demands of the whole bourgeoisie, or the power of, say, the Council of the United Nobility[60]?

In the eyes of *Rech*, as well as of the whole Cadet Party, the criterion of the "wisdom" of a compromise is in its approval by men of affairs, businessmen, bigwigs, the Octobrists themselves, the wire-pullers of the St. Petersburg municipality themselves. But the *actual* state of affairs—no matter how it is furbished up with phrases like "Thank God, we have a Constitution"—unmasks these compromises and tears away these veils rather rudely.

To sum up: "You have been instrumental in uniting us", *Rech* says to the semi-official organ of the Cabinet. Who do they mean by "us"? It appears that they mean the Octobrists and the Cadets. What have they united for? For a common task, the consolidation of the Constitution. And what are we to understand by the Constitution and its consolidation? A sensible compromise between the Octobrists and the Cadets. What is the criterion of the wisdom of compromises of this kind? Their approval by the worst representatives of Russian "Kolupayev" capitalism,[61] such as the St. Petersburg municipal councillors. And what is the practical result of these sensible compromises? The result is that P. A. Stolypin, or the Council of State, or Tolmachov,[62] etc., "rudely unmask" these compromises.... Oh, these practical politicians!

But will there not be a third camp at the elections to the Fourth Duma—one that realises how senseless, ridiculous and naïve is the Cadet policy of "sensible compromise"? What do you think of that, gentlemen of *Rech* and *Russkiye Vedomosti*?

Zvezda, No. 8, February 5, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FALL OF SERFDOM

February 19, 1911, marks the fiftieth anniversary of the fall of serfdom in Russia. Everywhere preparations are under way to celebrate this jubilee. The tsarist government is taking every precaution to ensure that only the most reactionary views regarding the so-called "emancipation" of the peasants are put forward in the churches and schools, in the barracks and at public lectures. Circular letters are being rushed from St. Petersburg to all parts of Russia, instructing all and sundry institutions not to order for distribution among the people any books and pamphlets other than those published by the National Club, i.e., by one of the most reactionary parties in the Third Duma. In some places overzealous governors have even gone so far as to dissolve committees organised without police "guidance" (for instance, by the Zemstvos[63]) for the celebration of the anniversary of the Peasant "Reform"; they are being dissolved for showing insufficient willingness to conduct the celebrations along the lines demanded by the Black-Hundred government.

The government is worried. It sees that no matter how downtrodden, intimidated, backward and ignorant a worker or a peasant may be, the mere mention of the fact that fifty years ago the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed nevertheless stirs and agitates people repressed by the Duma of the landlords, of the nobility, people who are suffering more than ever before from the petty tyrannies, violence and oppression of the feudal-minded landowners and of their police and bureaucrats.

In Western Europe the last survivals of serfdom were abolished by the Revolution of 1789 in France and by the

revolutions of 1848 in most of the other countries. In Russia, in 1861, the people, who had for centuries been kept in slavery by the landowners, were unable to launch a widespread, open and conscious struggle for freedom. The peasant revolts of those days remained isolated, scattered, spontaneous "riots", which were easily suppressed. The abolition of serfdom was effected, not by an insurrectionary people, but by the government, which realised after its defeat in the Crimean War[64] that it was no longer possible to maintain the system of serfdom.

It was the landowners themselves, the landowning government of the autocratic tsar and his officials, that "emancipated" the peasants in Russia. And these "emancipators" manipulated matters *in such a way* that the peasants entered "freedom" stripped to the point of pauperism; they were released from slavery to the landowners to fall into bondage to the very same landowners and their flunkeys.

The noble landowners "emancipated" the Russian peasants in such a way that *more than a fifth* of all the peasant land was cut off and taken away by the landlords. The peasants were compelled to pay *redemption money*, i.e., tribute to the former slaveholders, for their own peasant land drenched with their sweat and blood. The peasants paid hundreds of millions of rubles in such tribute to the feudal lords, thus lapsing into ever greater poverty. Not content with grabbing peasant land and leaving to the peasants the worst and sometimes entirely worthless land, the landowners frequently laid traps for them—they divided up the land in such a way as to leave the peasants either without pastures, or without meadows, forests, or water for their animals. In *most* of the gubernias* of Russia proper the peasants, after the abolition of serfdom, remained in the same old state of hopeless bondage to the landowners. After their "emancipation" the peasants still remained the "lower" social-estate, tax-paying cattle, the common herd over whom

* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

the authorities set up by the landowners lorded it at will, from whom they exacted taxes, whom they flogged with birches, manhandled, and humiliated.

In no other country in the world has the peasantry, after its "emancipation", experienced such ruination, such poverty, such humiliations and such outrageous treatment as in Russia.

But the fall of serfdom stirred up the whole people, awakened it from age-long slumber, taught it to seek its own way out, to wage its own fight for complete freedom.

The fall of serfdom in Russia was followed by an increasingly rapid development of cities, and factories, mills and railways were built. Capitalist Russia was advancing to replace feudal Russia. The settled, downtrodden serf peasant who stuck firmly to his village, had implicit faith in the priests and stood in awe of the "authorities" was gradually giving way to a new generation of peasants, peasants who had worked as seasonal labourers in the cities and had learned something from their bitter experience of a life of wandering and wage-labour. The number of workers in the big towns, in the factories, was constantly on the increase. Gradually the workers began to form associations for their common struggle against the capitalists and the government. By waging this struggle the Russian working class helped the peasant millions to rise, straighten their backs and cast off serf habits.

In 1861 the peasants were only capable of "riots". In the decades that followed the Russian revolutionaries who made heroic efforts to rouse the people to struggle remained isolated figures and perished under the blows of the autocracy. By 1905 the Russian working class had gained strength and had matured as a result of the years of strike struggles and the years of propaganda, agitation and organisation carried on by the Social-Democratic Party. And the Russian working class led the whole people, the millions of peasants, *into revolution*.

The Revolution of 1905 undermined the tsarist autocracy. Out of a mob of muzhiks repressed by feudal slavery of accursed memory, this revolution created, for the first time in Russia, a people beginning to understand its rights, beginning to realise its strength. For the first time, the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Revolution of 1905 showed the tsarist government, the Russian landowners and the Russian bourgeoisie that millions and tens of millions of people were becoming *citizens*, were becoming *fighters* who would no longer permit anyone to treat them like cattle, treat them as a mob. The real emancipation of the masses from oppression and tyranny has nowhere in the world ever been effected by any other means than the independent, heroic, conscious struggle of the masses themselves.

The Revolution of 1905 only undermined the autocracy; it did not destroy it. Now the autocracy is venting its rage on the people. The landowners' Duma serves only to oppress and repress the people all the more. Discontent and anger are again rife everywhere. That first step will be followed by a second. The beginning of the struggle will have its continuation. The Revolution of 1905 will be followed by a new, a second, revolution. The anniversary of the fall of serfdom serves as a reminder of, and a call for, this second revolution.

The liberals whine: we need "another February 19". That is not true. This kind of talk is worthy only of bourgeois cowards. No second "February 19" is possible after 1905. There can be no "emancipation from above" of a people which has learned (and *is learning*—from the experience of the landowners' Third Duma) to fight from below. There can be no "emancipation from above" of a people which has been led, even if but once, by the revolutionary proletariat.

The Black Hundreds understand this, and that is why they are afraid of the anniversary of 1861. As Menshikov, that faithful watchdog of the tsar's Black Hundreds, wrote in *Novoye Vremya*: "The year 1861 *failed to prevent 1905*".

The Black-Hundred Duma and the fury with which the tsarist government is persecuting its enemies is not preventing but hastening the new revolution. The grim experience of 1908-10 has taught the people to take up the fight again. The workers' summer strikes (in 1910) have been followed by the students' winter strikes. The new struggle is gaining momentum perhaps more slowly than we would wish, but surely and inevitably.

The revolutionary Social-Democratic movement, while purging itself of the sceptics who have turned their backs on the revolution and the illegal party of the working class, is mustering its ranks and welding its forces for the impending great battles.

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PAUL SINGER

DIED JANUARY 18 (31), 1911

On February 5, this year, the German Social-Democratic Party buried Paul Singer, one of its oldest leaders. The entire working-class population of Berlin, many hundreds of thousands of people, responded to the call of the Party and marched in the funeral procession; they came to honour the memory of a man who had devoted all his strength and all his life to the cause of the emancipation of the working class. Berlin, with its three-million population, had never seen such a multitude—at least a million people marched in or watched the procession. Never had any of the mighty of this world been honoured with such a funeral. Tens of thousands of soldiers can be ordered to line the streets during the funeral of some monarch or a general famous for the slaughter of external and internal enemies; but if the working people in their millions were not attached heart and soul to *their* leader, to the cause of the *revolutionary* struggle of these very masses against the oppression of the government and the bourgeoisie, it would be impossible to rouse the population of a huge city.

Paul Singer came of bourgeois stock, from a family of merchants, and for quite a long time was a wealthy manufacturer. At the beginning of his political career he was associated with the bourgeois democrats. But, unlike the bulk of bourgeois democrats and liberals, who very soon forget their love of liberty out of fear of the successes of the labour movement, Singer was an ardent and sincere democrat, fearless and consistent to the end. He was not caught up by the vacillations, cowardice and treachery of the bourgeois democrats which aroused in him only a feeling of

repulsion and strengthened his conviction that only the party of the revolutionary working class is capable of pursuing the great struggle for liberty to its consummation.

In the sixties of the past century, when the cowardly German liberal bourgeoisie turned its back on the growing revolution in their country, was bargaining with the government of the landowners and becoming reconciled to the unlimited power of the monarchy, Singer turned resolutely toward socialism. In 1870, when the entire bourgeoisie was intoxicated by the victories over France, and when the broad masses of the population fell under the spell of the vile, misanthropic, "liberal" propaganda of nationalism and chauvinism, Singer signed a protest against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine from France. In 1878, when the bourgeoisie helped Bismarck, that reactionary, landlords' ("Junkers'", as the Germans say) minister, to promulgate the Anti-Socialist Law,[65] to dissolve the workers' unions, ban working-class newspapers, and shower persecution upon the class-conscious proletariat, Singer finally joined the Social-Democratic Party.

Since then the history of Singer's life is inseparably bound up with that of the German Social-Democratic Party. He devoted himself heart and soul to the difficult task of building up the revolutionary organisation. He gave the Party all his energy, all his wealth, all his remarkable abilities as an organiser, all his talent as a practical worker and leader. Singer was one of those few, we might say, one of the extremely rare cases of socialists of bourgeois origin whom the long history of liberalism, the history of the treachery, cowardice, deals with the government, and sycophancy of the bourgeois politicians does not enervate and corrupt; *but it steels* and converts them into stalwart *revolutionaries*. There are few *such* socialists of bourgeois origin, and the proletariat should trust *only* these rare people, people who have been tested in the course of many years of struggle, if it desires to forge for itself a working-class party capable of overthrowing contemporary bourgeois slavery. Singer was a ruthless enemy of opportunism in the ranks of the German workers' party, and to the end of his days remained undeviatingly faithful to the uncompromising policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Singer was not a theoretician, or a writer, or a brilliant orator. He was first and foremost a *practical* organiser of the *illegal* party during the period of the Anti-Socialist Law, and a member of the Berlin Municipal Council and, after the repeal of that law, of the Reichstag. And this practical organiser, who spent most of his time in minor, everyday, technical parliamentary and every kind of "executive" activity was great for the reason that he did not make a fetish of details, he did not yield to the quite usual and quite philistine tendency to keep out of any sharp struggle on questions of principle, allegedly for the sake of this "executive" or "positive" activity. On the contrary, every time a question arose concerning the fundamental nature of the revolutionary party of the working class, its ultimate aims, blocs (alliances) with the bourgeoisie, concessions to monarchism, etc., Singer, who devoted all his life to this practical activity, was always to be found at the head of the staunchest and most resolute fighters against every manifestation of opportunism. During the operation of the Anti-Socialist Law, Singer together with Engels, Liebknecht and Bebel was in the fight on two fronts: against the "young",[66] the semi-anarchists, who repudiated the parliamentary struggle, and against the moderate "legalists at any price". In later years, Singer fought just as resolutely against the revisionists.

He earned the hatred of the bourgeoisie, and it followed him to the grave. Singer's bourgeois enemies (the German liberals and our Cadets) now point out with malicious glee that his death means the passing away of one of the last representatives of the "heroic" period of German Social-Democracy, that is to say, the period when its leaders were imbued with a strong, fresh, unqualified faith in revolution and championed a principled revolutionary policy. According to these liberals, the rising generation of leaders, those who are coming to replace Singer, are moderate, punctilious "revisionists", men of modest pretensions and petty calculations. It is true that the growth of the workers' party often attracts many opportunists to its ranks. It is also true that in our day socialists of bourgeois origin most often bring to the proletariat their timidity, narrow-mindedness and love of phrase-mongering rather than firmness of revolutionary convictions. But the rejoicing of the enemies is

premature! The *masses* of workers in Germany, as well as in other countries, are becoming welded ever more strongly into *an army of revolution*, and this army will deploy its forces in the not far distant future—for the revolution is gaining momentum both in Germany and in other countries.

The old revolutionary leaders are passing away; but the young army of the revolutionary proletariat is growing and gaining strength.

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COMMENTS

MENSHIKOV, GROMOBOI, IZGOYEV[67]

The statement[68] made by sixty-six Moscow industrialists—who, according to the calculations of a certain Moscow newspaper, represent capital amounting to five hundred million rubles—has given rise to a number of extremely valuable and characteristic articles in various newspapers. In addition to casting an uncommonly glaring light on the present political situation, these articles furnish interesting material on many fundamental questions of principle relating to the entire evolution in twentieth-century Russia.

Here is Mr. Menshikov of *Novoye Vremya*, setting forth the views of the Right parties and of the government:

"How is it that all these Ryabushinskys, Morozovs, et al., fail to understand that should there be a revolution they will all hang or, at best, become paupers?"

Mr. Menshikov says (*Novoye Vremya*, No. 12549) that he quotes "these vigorous words" "from the letter of a student of a very revolutionary institute". And to this Mr. Menshikov adds his own observations:

"Despite the grim warning of the year 1905, the upper classes of Russia, including the merchant class, are extremely hazy about the impending catastrophe.... Yes, Messrs. Ryabushinsky, Morozov, and all others like you! Despite the fact that you are flirting with the revolution, and despite all the testimonials of liberalism which you are hastening to earn, it is you who are going to be the first victims of the revolution now brewing. You will be the first to hang, not for any crimes you may have committed, but for something which you consider a virtue, merely for possessing those five hundred million rubles you brag so much about.... The liberal bourgeoisie, with the middle sec-

tions of the nobility, the civil service, and the merchant class together with their titles, ranks and capital are heedlessly heading towards the brink of the revolutionary precipice. If the liberal instigators of revolution live to see the day at last when they are dragged to the gallows, let them then recall their indulgent treatment by the old state power, how considerately it listened to them, how it humoured them, and how few were the claims it made upon their empty heads. On that very day, which will be a black day for them, let them compare the blessings of the radical regime with the old, patriarchal order."

That is what the unofficially semi-official organ of the government wrote on February 17—the very same day that *Rossiya*, the officially semi-official organ of the government, was doing its utmost to prove, with the assistance of *Golos Moskvy*,[69] that the "escapade" of the sixty-six "cannot be considered as expressing the opinion of the Moscow merchants". "The Congress of the Nobility," *Rossiya* says, "is an organisation; whereas the sixty-six merchants who say that they acted as private individuals are not an organisation."

It is embarrassing to have two semi-official organs! One refutes the other. One is trying to prove that the "escapade" of the sixty-six cannot be regarded as the expression of the opinion even of the Moscow merchants alone. At the same time the other is trying to prove that the "escapade" is of much wider significance, since it expresses the opinion, not only of the Moscow merchants, and of the merchant class, but of the whole of Russia's *liberal bourgeoisie* in general. On behalf of "the old state power", Mr. Menshikov has undertaken to caution this liberal bourgeoisie: it's your interests we have at heart!

There is probably not a single country in Europe in which this call "not to instigate" addressed to the liberal bourgeoisie by the "old state power", the nobility and the reactionary publicists, did not resound hundreds of times in the course of the nineteenth century.... And never were these calls of any avail, even though the "liberal bourgeoisie", *far from wanting* to "instigate", fought against the "instigators" with the same energy and sincerity with which the sixty-six merchants condemn strikes. Both condemnations and calls are powerless when all the conditions of social life

make one class or another feel that the situation is intolerable, and compel it to voice its feeling. Mr. Menshikov correctly expresses the interests and the point of view of the government and the nobility when he tries to frighten the liberal bourgeoisie with revolution and accuses it of being frivolous. The sixty-six merchants correctly express the interests and the point of view of the liberal bourgeoisie when they accuse the government and condemn the "strikers". But these mutual accusations are only a sure symptom testifying to serious deficiencies in the mechanism", to the fact that, despite all the willingness of "the old state power" to satisfy the bourgeoisie, to meet it half-way and to reserve for it a very influential place in the Duma, and despite the very strong and sincere desire on the part of the bourgeoisie to settle down, establish good relations, come to terms and adjust itself, despite all this, the "adjustment" does not make any headway! This is the substance of the matter, this is the background; the mutual accusations are nothing but trimmings.

Mr. Gromoboi, writing in *Golos Moskvy*, addresses "a necessary warning" to "the government" (*Golos Moskvy*, No. 38, of February 17, in an article entitled "A Necessary Warning"). "No displays of 'firm' rule," he writes, "no volitional impulses will give the country peace unless they go hand in hand with reforms which are long overdue." (Mr. Gromoboi is not very literate in his writings, but the meaning of his words is nevertheless quite clear.) "And the unrest caused by the protracted crisis cannot be given as a *force majeure* reason for not honouring promissory notes." (This is an awkward comparison, Mr. Publicist of the Octobrist merchants. In the first place, the notes happen to be unsigned; secondly, even if they were signed, where is the commercial court to which you could appeal and where is the sheriff, etc., who would enforce the judgement? Think it over, Mr. Gromoboi—you will see that not only the Octobrists, but the Cadets too, are a party of spurious promissory notes in politics.) "In such a case unrest will only increase ... the student riots will be followed by much that has been experienced before. If you turn the ship round you are bound to see its wake.... The bet on the weak was lost; now it may turn out that the bet on the strong will also be

lost. The government will have nothing to show. Its hopes that the unrest will subside may vanish like smoke no matter what kind of elections take place." (Mr. Gromoboi is referring to the elections to the Fourth Duma.) "If the caravans of the opposition begin to move over those cliffs where only the mists of government hovered before, if the government alienates the moderate elements and remains in isolation, the elections will turn into bitter defeat, and the entire system will be shaken because it is not a system based on law."

Menshikov accuses the bourgeoisie of "instigating" "revolution"; the bourgeoisie accuses the Menshikovs of leading to an "increase of unrest". "It is an old story, but ever new."

In dealing with the same subject in the Cadet *Rech* the renegade Izgoyev attempts to draw some sociological conclusions—not realising what a rash thing it is for Cadets in general, and renegades in particular, to undertake such a task. In an article entitled "Juxtaposition" (in the issue of February 14), he draws a comparison between the Congress of the United Nobility and the statement of the sixty-six Moscow merchants. "The United Nobility," he says, "have sunk to the level of Purishkevich; the Moscow industrialists have begun to talk the language of statesmen." In the past, Mr. Izgoyev goes on to tell us, "the nobility rendered the people great services in the cultural field", but "only a minority engaged in cultural activity, while the majority kept the people down.... But such, in general, is the law of history that only the minority of a given class acts in a progressive way."

Very, very fine. "Such, in general, is the law of history." This is what the Cadet *Rech* says through the mouth of Mr. Izgoyev. On closer examination, however, we discover to our amazement that the "general laws of history" do not hold good beyond the confines of the feudal nobility and the liberal bourgeoisie. Indeed, let us recall *Vekhi*, to which the same Mr. Izgoyev contributed, and against which the most prominent Cadets carried on a polemic, but in such a way as to deal only with details, without touching upon fundamentals, principles, essentials. The essential view set forth in *Vekhi*—one shared by all the Cadets and expressed a thousand times by Messrs. Milyukov and Co.—is that,

except for the reactionary nobility and the liberal bourgeoisie, each class in Russia has revealed itself (in the first decade of the present century) by the actions of a minority who succumbed to the "intoxication", were swept along by "intellectual leaders", and are unable to rise to a "statesmanlike" view of things. "We must have the courage to admit," wrote Mr. Izgoyev in *Vekhi*, "that the vast majority of members of our State Dumas, with the exception of thirty or forty Cadets and Octobrists, have not shown themselves to possess the knowledge required to undertake the job of governing and reconstructing Russia." Everybody will understand that this refers to the peasant deputies, the Trudoviks, and the workers' deputies.

Consequently, it is "in general, the law of history" that "only the minority of a given class acts in a progressive way". If it is the minority of the bourgeoisie that acts, then it is a progressive minority, justified by the "general law of history". "Once the minority obtains an opportunity to act, moral prestige extends to the entire class," Mr. Izgoyev informs us. But if it is a minority of peasants or of workers that acts, then this by no means corresponds to "the law of history", this is by no means "the progressive minority of the given class", this minority by no means possesses the "moral prestige" enabling it to speak on behalf of the "entire" class—no, nothing of the kind: this is a minority led astray by "intellectuals", it is not, according to *Vekhi*, statesmanlike, it is anti-historic, has no roots, etc.

It is a risky business for Cadets in general and for *Vekhi* writers in particular to indulge in generalisations, because every attempt they make at generalisations inevitably opposes the inherent affinity between the arguments of the Cadets and those of Menshikov.

Rossiya and *Zemshchina*[70] argue: the sixty-six merchants are a minority by no means representing the class, they have not shown themselves to possess either the knowledge or the ability "to govern and reconstruct Russia"; moreover, they are not even merchants, but "intellectuals" who have been led astray, etc., etc.

The Izgoyevs and the Milyukovs argue: the Trudoviks and the workers' deputies in our State Dumas, for example, are minorities which by no means represent their classes

(i.e., nine-tenths of the population); they have been led astray by "intellectuals", have not shown themselves to possess either the knowledge or the ability to "govern and reconstruct Russia", etc., etc.

How is this inherent affinity between the arguments of *Rossiya* and *Zemshchina*, on the one hand, and those of *Rech* and *Russkiye Vedomosti* on the other, to be accounted for? The reason is this: despite the differences in the classes represented by these two groups of newspapers, neither class is *any longer* capable of any material, independent, creative and decisive historical action that is *progressive*. Not merely the first but the second group of newspapers, not only the reactionaries, but the liberals, too, represent a class that *is afraid* of historical, independent action on the part of other, broader, sections, groups or masses of the population, of other numerically stronger classes.

Mr. Izgoyev, as a renegade "Marxist", will certainly see a crying contradiction in this: on the one hand, we recognise Russia's capitalist development and, consequently, its inherent tendency towards the fullest possible and purest possible rule of the bourgeoisie both in the economic and in the political sphere; on the other hand, we declare that the liberal bourgeoisie is *no longer* capable of independent, creative historical action!

This "contradiction" exists in real life, and is not the result of faulty reasoning. The inevitability of bourgeois rule does not in the least imply that the liberal bourgeoisie is *capable* of such displays of historical independent activity as might free it from its "enslavement" to the Purishkeviches. In the first place, history does not move along a smooth and easy road, such as would imply that every historically ripe change means *ipso facto* that precisely the class which stands to profit most by it, is mature and strong enough to carry this change into effect. Secondly, in addition to the liberal bourgeoisie, there is yet another bourgeoisie; for instance, the entire peasantry, taken in the mass, is nothing but the democratic bourgeoisie. Thirdly, the history of Europe shows us that some changes, bourgeois in their social substance, were accomplished by elements whose background was by no means bourgeois. Fourthly, we see the same thing in the history of Russia during the past half-century.

When the ideologists and leaders of the liberals begin to argue the way the Karaulovs, the Maklakovs, the Milyukovs and the *Vekhi* writers do, *that means* that a number of historical factors have caused the liberal bourgeoisie to exhibit such a pronounced tendency to "beat a retreat" and to show such dread of moving forward, that this forward movement will pass them by, will go beyond them, in spite of their fears. And an altercation such as mutual accusations of being responsible for "increasing unrest" hurled by Gromoboi at Menshikov and by Menshikov at Gromoboi,* is but a sign that this historical movement forward is beginning to be felt by all....

"Contemporary society," says Mr. Izgoyev in the same article, "based on the principle of private property, is a class society, and for the time being it cannot be anything else. Whenever one class is tottering another class is always striving to step into its place."

"What a clever chap," Mr. Milyukov must think when he reads such tirades in his *Rech*. It is rather pleasant to have a Cadet who was a Social-Democrat at the age of twenty-five and by the time he reached thirty-five had "come to his senses" and repented of his errors.

It is rash on your part, Mr. Izgoyev, to dabble in generalisations. Contemporary society is admittedly a class society. Can there be a party in a class society which does not represent a class? You have probably guessed that there cannot be. Then why make such a *faux pas*, why do you prate about a "class society" in the organ of a party which prides itself on, and sees its merit in calling itself a non-class party? (Other people who, not only in words, not merely for the sake of journalistic prattle, recognise contemporary society as a class society, regard such talk as hypocrisy or short-sightedness.)

When you turn your face to the United Nobility or to the liberal Moscow merchants you shout that contemporary society is a class society. But when you have to, when unpleasant (ah, how terribly unpleasant!) events compel you to turn around, even if for a brief moment, to face the peas-

* By the liberal merchants at the nobility and by the nobility at the liberal merchants.

ants or the workers, you begin to rail at the narrow, lifeless, fossilised, immoral, materialist, godless and unscientific "doctrine" of the class struggle. You would surely do better, Mr. Izgoyev, not to tackle any sociological generalisations! Don't ask for trouble.

"Whenever one class is tottering another class is always striving to step into its place."

Not always, Mr. Izgoyev. It happens at times that the two classes, the one that is tottering and the one that "is striving", are both in an advanced stage of decay—one more, the other less, of course, but both are in an advanced stage of decay. It happens that, feeling its decay, the class that "is striving" forward *is afraid* of taking a step forward, and when it does take such a step it is sure to lose no time in taking two steps back. It happens that the liberal bourgeoisie (as was the case in Germany, for instance, and particularly in Prussia) is afraid to "step into the place" of the tottering class, but exerts *every* effort to "share the place" or, rather, to obtain any kind of place, even if it be in the servants' hall—*anything* rather than *step into* the place of the "tottering", anything rather than bring matters to the point where the tottering would "fall". Such things happen, Mr. Izgoyev.

In historical periods when such things do happen, the liberals, if they succeed in passing themselves off as democrats, are liable to bring (and they do bring) the greatest harm to the entire cause of social development; for the difference between the liberals and the democrats is precisely that the former are afraid "to step into the place", while the latter are not. Both the former and the latter are engaged in accomplishing the historically ripe bourgeois change; but the former are afraid to accomplish it, are hindering it by their fear, while the latter, although they often share many illusions on the results that will derive from the bourgeois change, put all their strength and their very soul into its accomplishment.

In illustration of these general sociological reflections, I shall take the liberty of citing one example of a liberal who does not strive, but is afraid to "step into the place" of the tottering class, and who is, therefore (consciously or

unconsciously, that makes no difference), most flagrantly deceiving the population when he calls himself a "democrat". This liberal is the landlord A. Y. Berezovsky the First, Member of the Third Duma, a Cadet. During the debate in the Duma on the agrarian question (in 1908) he delivered the following speech, which was approved of by the leader of the Party, Mr. Milyukov, who described it as "splendid". In view of the forthcoming elections, we make bold to think that it will not be amiss to recall that speech.

"...It is my profound conviction," Mr. Berezovsky said in defending the Agrarian Bill before the State Duma on October 27, 1908, "that this Bill is much more advantageous to the landowners, too, and I am saying this, gentlemen, as one who knows farming, since I own land and have engaged in it all my life.... You must not seize upon the bare fact of compulsory alienation, wax indignant over it and declare that it would be an act of violence; you must examine what this proposition amounts to, what, for instance, the Bill of the 42 members of the First State Duma proposed. That Bill contained only the recognition of the necessity of alienating in the first place the land that is not exploited by the owners themselves, that is cultivated by peasants using their own implements and animals, and, finally, land that is let out to tenants. Further, the party of people's freedom supported the proposal that committees be organised in the localities, which, after working for some time, perhaps even for a number of years, were to ascertain which land was subject to alienation, which was not, and how much land was needed to satisfy the peasants. The committees were to be so constituted that half their membership would have been made up of peasants, and the other half of non-peasants; and it seems to me that in the general actual situation which would thus have been created in the localities, it would have been possible to ascertain properly both how much land there was that could be alienated and how much land was needed for the peasants; and, finally, the peasants would have seen for themselves to what extent their just demands could be satisfied and to what extent their desire to get a lot of land was often wrong and unjustified. Then this material would have been referred to the Duma for further elaboration, after which it would have been referred to

the Council of State,[71] and, finally, it would have been submitted to the tsar for his sanction. That, properly speaking, was the method of procedure at which, for some unknown reason, the government took fright, dissolved the Duma, and thus brought about the present state of affairs. This systematic work would undoubtedly have had as its result, the satisfaction of the true needs of the population and consequently, its pacification, and the preservation of the efficiently run estates, which the party of people's freedom never intended to destroy unless there was an extreme need for this." (Verbatim Reports, p. 398.)

When Mr. Izgoyev, who belongs to the same party as Mr. Berezovsky, writes in his article "Juxtaposition" that "Russia is a democratic country and will not tolerate any oligarchy, either new or old", we can see quite clearly what this kind of talk really means. Russia is by no means a democratic country, nor will she ever become one so long as fairly large sections of the population regard a party like the Cadets as a democratic party. This bitter truth is a thousand times more vital to the people than the honeyed lies dispensed by the representatives of the half-hearted, spineless, and unprincipled liberal oligarchy, the Cadets. The more such "altercations" as those between the Menshikovs and the sixty-six and Gromoboi become the order of the day the more necessary it is to remind people of this bitter truth.

Zvezda, No. 11, February 26, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

TO THE RUSSIAN COLLEGIUM OF THE C.C.

In view of the possibility and likelihood of the Central Committee being convened in Russia, we consider it our duty to outline our views on several important questions affecting our position as people responsible to the Party.

(1) At the January 1910 Plenary Meeting, we, responsible representatives of the Bolshevik trend, concluded an agreement with the Central Committee, published in the Central Organ, No. 11. Our application, submitted by three officials, with power of attorney from Meshkovsky,[72] is a formal cancellation of this agreement owing to the *non-fulfilment* of its clearly-defined conditions by the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups. Naturally, it is understood that we, although compelled to submit this application because no functioning Central Committee actually exists and there is the beginning of a split abroad, will willingly withdraw it, or agree to a review of the agreement, if the Central Committee succeeds in meeting and in re-establishing Party work and the Party line violated by the afore-mentioned factions.

(2) The Party line was clearly defined by the Plenary Meeting, and it is useless for the *Golos* group and Trotsky and Co. to try to confuse the issue. The line consists in recognising that both liquidationism and otzovism are *bourgeois* theories having a fatal influence on the proletariat. After the Plenary Meeting, in violation of its decisions, these two trends have developed and taken shape in anti-Party factions—the Potresov and *Golos* groups on the one hand, and the *Vperyod* group on the other. Among the Mensheviks, support for the Party line laid down by the Meeting was forthcoming from only the so-called pro-Party or Plekhanov

group, those who have been and still are *resolutely* conducting a struggle against the Potresov and *Golos* trends.

(3) For this reason, as representatives of the Bolshevik trend, we emphatically protest against the *Golos* group's attack on *Innokenty*[73] for having refused, in the summer of 1910, to recognise as candidates for co-option those Mensheviks who remained true to *Golos* or whose actions were not fully indicative of their Party affiliation. In doing so, *Innokenty*, the chief representative of a trend in Bolshevism differing from ours, acted correctly, and we have *written* proof that precisely as its representative he defined the Party principle uniting *all* Bolsheviks, before witnesses from the P.S.D.,* in the manner shown.

(4) The attempt of the *Golos* group, in the name of the splitting faction of émigrés, to propose from abroad "their own" candidates for co-option to the C.C. cannot be regarded as anything but an unheard-of affront. While at the Plenary Meeting there may have been people who sincerely believed the pledges of the Mensheviks to struggle against the liquidators, now, a year later, it is quite clear that the *Golos* people cannot be trusted on this question. We protest resolutely against candidates being put forward for election by the émigré faction of liquidators, and demand that Plekhanov's followers *in Russia* be circularised, they can *undoubtedly* provide candidates from among the pro-Party Mensheviks.

(5) The splitting moves of the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups and of Trotsky are now fully recognised, not only by the Bolsheviks and the Poles (in the Central Organ), but also by Plekhanov's group (see the Paris resolution of Plekhanov's group). We assert that the *first* decisive step towards a split was the announcement made by Trotsky on November 27, 1910, without the knowledge of the C.C., of the convening of a conference and of the "fund" for it. Our application (December 5, 1910) was the reply we were forced to make to that announcement. The *Vperyod* school has become one of the centres of this split; Trotsky took part in it *in defiance* of the clear decision of the Party School Commission. We were blamed *in print* by *Golos* for "disorganising" this

* Polish Social-Democrats.—*Ed.*

school. Considering it our duty to *disorganise* anti-Party émigré factions, we demand the appointment of a commission to *investigate* the "funds" of this school and *the help given it by Trotsky and Golos*. By shouting about expropriation, which we put an end to once and for all at the Plenary Meeting, the *Golos* group are not only blackmailing, but *are covering up* their *moral* (and not only moral) support of the *violators* of the resolution of the Meeting.

(6) Olgin,[74] a follower of Plekhanov, has disclosed that Dan frankly explained the desire of the *Golos* group to transfer the C.C. to Russia as being due to the probability (or inevitability) of its failure. The Party tribunal will have to make a pronouncement on this. Anyone who has followed the *Golos* group's policy over the past year will have no doubt that *in actual fact* they have been splitting the C.C. and hampering its work. The London candidates of *Golos* are not only alive, but carry out *political* work in an *anti-Party* spirit both *in the workers' unions and in the press*. By absenting themselves from the C.C. meeting, they confirm their liquidationism. For this reason we are in duty bound to warn the comrades on the C.C. in Russia, who are working under desperately difficult conditions (since they are *all* known to the police), that they are also threatened by an internal enemy inside the Party. We cannot manage without some sort of base abroad unless we are prepared to run the risk of a *single* failure on our part freeing the hands of the disruptive Potresovs. The Central Committee Bureau Abroad, which is *now* carrying out a policy of *aid* to the *Vperyod* and *Golos* groups and to Trotsky, cannot be allowed to remain abroad. We cannot rely on the pledged word or the "signing" of a resolution. We must, if we wish to be *realistic* politicians who are not deluded by mere formalities, study the *ideological-political trends* emanating from the working-class movement and from the counter-revolutionary influence on it.

These trends have grown and developed since 1908. They have brought Plekhanov's group and the Bolsheviks closer together, and have created a bloc between the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups and Trotsky, who support the split while endeavouring to hide its existence. The immediate future of our Party (and it is useless closing our eyes to this) will inevi-

tably be determined by the struggle along these lines; not the desires of individuals or groups, but the objective conditions of the epoch, as shown in the resolution of the Plenary Meeting, give rise to the struggle.

The representatives of the Bolshevik trend, signatories to the agreement with the C.C. in January 1910 (three, and on the authority of the fourth, Meshkovsky).[75]

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APROPOS OF AN ANNIVERSARY

The fiftieth anniversary of the so-called Peasant Reform raises many interesting questions. Here we can touch only upon some of the economic and historical issues, deferring publicist topics in the narrower sense of the term to another occasion.

About ten or fifteen years ago, when the controversies between the Narodniks and the Marxists were first brought before the general public, the difference in the appraisal of the so-called Peasant Reform emerged time and again as one of the most important issues of that controversy. The theoreticians of Narodism, for instance, the well-known Mr. V. V., or Nikolai—on,[76] regarded the basic features of the Peasant Reform of 1861 as something fundamentally different from, and hostile to, capitalism. They said that the Regulations of February 19[77] legalised the "endowment of the producer with means of production" and sanctioned "people's production" *as distinct* from capitalist production. They regarded the Regulations of February 19 as an earnest of the *non*-capitalist evolution of Russia.

Even then the Marxists opposed a fundamentally different view to this theory. The Regulations of February 19 were one of the *episodes* in the replacement of the serf (or feudal) mode of production by the bourgeois (or capitalist) mode. According to this view, the Regulations contain *no* other historico-economic elements. "The endowment of the producer with means of production" is an empty, sentimental phrase which glosses over the plain fact that the peasants, who are small producers in agriculture, were being converted from producers engaged primarily in natural economy into producers of commodities. The precise extent to which commodity production had developed in peasant economy in

various parts of Russia during that epoch is another question. But it is beyond doubt that the "emancipated" peasant was entering the sphere of commodity production and none other. "Free labour" *in place** of serf labour thus meant nothing more than the free labour of the wage-worker or small independent producer under the conditions of commodity production, i.e., of bourgeois social and economic relations. The land *redemption* payments brought out this nature of the Reform in even bolder relief, for they lent a stimulus to monetary economy, i.e., they increased the peasant's dependence on the market.

The Narodniks saw in the emancipation of the peasants with the provision of land allotments a *non*-capitalist principle, the "genesis" of what they called "people's production". In the emancipation of the peasants without land they saw the capitalist principle. The Narodniks (particularly Mr. Nikolai—on) based this view *on the teachings of Marx*, citing in its justification that the freeing of the worker from the means of production is a fundamental condition of the capitalist mode of production. A singular phenomenon: beginning with the eighties (if not still earlier) Marxism was already such an indisputable, actually dominating force among the progressive social doctrines in Western Europe, that for a long time in Russia theories hostile to Marxism could not be openly expressed. These theories made sophistry of Marxism and falsified it (sometimes unconsciously); they appeared to be Marxist and, "by referring to Marx", tried to deny the application of Marx's theory to Russia! The Narodnik theory of Mr. Nikolai—on claimed to be "Marxist" (in the 1880s and 1890s); subsequently the liberal-bourgeois theory of Messrs. Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky and Co. began by "*almost*" fully accepting Marxism, these gentlemen developed their views and preached their liberalism under the guise of "the further critical development" of Marxism. We shall probably have more than one occasion to return to this singular feature of the development of Russian social theories since the end of the nineteenth century (up to and including contemporary opportunism—liquida-

* Insofar as this *replacement* was going on *in actual fact*, we shall see further that it was a more complicated process than would appear on the surface.

tionism, which clings to Marxist *terminology* in order to cover up its anti-Marxist substance).

What interests us at the present moment is the Narodnik appraisal of the "great Reform". It is a radical mistake to think that the striving to deprive the peasants of land in 1861 represented a capitalist tendency, whereas the striving to endow them with land was anti-capitalist, socialist (the best among the Narodniks saw in the term "people's production" a pseudonym for socialism, a pseudonym imposed by *censorship* restrictions). This view is a great sin against historical truth; it transfers Marx's "ready-made" formula (a "formula" which is applicable only to highly developed commodity production) to the conditions of *serfdom*. Depriving the peasants of land in 1861 in most cases actually meant the creation, not of a free labourer in capitalist production, but of a *bonded* (i.e., in fact a semi-serf or even almost serf) *tenant* on the same land that belonged to the "master", the landowner. Actually, the "allotments" of 1861 meant in most cases the creation, not of a free and independent farmer, but of a tenant *bound to the land* and in fact compelled to perform the same old corvée by cultivating the landlord's land with his own farm equipment, in payment for pasture, for meadows, for the necessary arable land, etc.

The peasant entered the sphere of bourgeois social relations to the extent to which he was actually, and not merely nominally, emancipated from serf relations (the essence of these relations was "labour-rent", i.e., the labour performed for the landowner by a peasant endowed with an allotment of land). But this *real* emancipation from feudal relations was much more complicated than the Narodniks thought. *At that time* the struggle between those who were in favour of depriving the peasants of land and those in favour of "endowing" them, often expressed merely a struggle between two *feudalist* camps, a dispute over the question as to whether it was more advantageous to the landowner to have a tenant (or a peasant rendering labour service) without any land *or* with an "allotment", i.e., one bound to the locality, bound by a patch of land insufficient to provide for his living and therefore compelling him to hire himself out for a "livelihood" (selling himself into bondage to the landowner).

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the greater the amount of land the peasants received upon their emancipation, and the cheaper the price they had to pay for it, the more rapidly, fully and freely would capitalism have developed in Russia, and the sooner would the survivals of serfdom and bondage have disappeared, the larger the home market would have become, and the more certain would the development of towns, industry and trade have been.

The Narodniks made the mistake of dealing with the problem in a utopian manner, in the abstract, unrelated to the actual historic circumstances. They declared that the "allotment" was the basis for independent small-scale farming. *Insofar* as this was true, the peasant "endowed with land" became a commodity producer and found himself in the conditions of bourgeois society. *Actually*, however, the "allotment" was too often so small, so burdened with excessive payments, situated so unfavourably for the peasant and so "fortunately" for the landlord, that the "allotment" peasant inevitably found himself in a position of unredeemable bondage, his status remained, in fact, the same as under the relations of serfdom; he performed the same old corvée service (in the form of labour-service, etc.).

Thus, two tendencies were latent in Narodism, which the Marxists defined even then, when they referred to the liberal-Narodnik views, the liberal-Narodnik appraisal, etc. Insofar as the Narodniks painted the Reform of 1861 in bright colours, forgetting that in the majority of cases "endowment" actually meant that the landlords' estates were ensured a supply of cheap slave labour, a supply of cheap hands tied to the place of residence, they descended (often without being aware of it) to the point of view of liberalism, the point of view of the liberal bourgeois, or even of the liberal landowner; objectively they became the advocates of the type of capitalist evolution which is most burdened with landowner traditions, is most bound up with the feudal past, of which it is ridding itself most slowly and with the greatest difficulty.

The Narodniks, however, were bourgeois democrats to the extent that they did not idealise the Reform of 1861, but fought ardently and sincerely for the smallest payments and the largest "allotments", for "allotments" without *any*

restrictions, with the utmost cultural, legal, etc., independence for the peasant. Their only shortcoming was that their democracy was by no means always consistent and determined and that, moreover, they failed to realise that it was of a bourgeois nature. Incidentally, it may be said that the most "Left" of our Social-Narodniks even to this day often conceive of the word "bourgeois" in this connotation as smacking of "politics", whereas, in point of fact, the term bourgeois democracy represents the only exact scientific definition from the Marxist point of view.

These two tendencies in Narodism—the liberal and the democratic—were already quite clearly *indicated* at the time of the Reform of 1861. We cannot dwell here in greater detail on an analysis of these tendencies, particularly on the connection between utopian socialism and the second of these tendencies. We shall merely mention the difference between the ideological and political trends of, say, Kavelin, on the one hand, and Chernyshevsky, on the other.

When we contemplate, in a general way, the change in the entire system of the Russian state in 1861, we are bound to admit that that change was a step in the transformation of feudal monarchy into a bourgeois monarchy. This is true not only from the economic, but also from the political point of view. We need only recall the nature of the reforms in the sphere of the judiciary, administration, local self-government, etc., which followed the Peasant Reform of 1861, to see the correctness of this statement. One may argue whether this "step" was a great or a small one, whether it was quick or slow, but the *direction* in which this step was taken is so clear, it has been made so clear by all the subsequent events, that there can hardly be two opinions about it. It is, however, all the more necessary to stress this *direction* because of the more frequent half-baked opinions we hear nowadays to the effect that "steps" in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy in Russia have been taken only in very recent years.

Of the two Narodnik tendencies referred to, the democratic tendency, the tendency not based on the intelligence and initiative of landowning, bureaucratic and bourgeois circles, was extremely weak in 1861. That is why matters went no further than a very small "step" in the transforma-

tion into a bourgeois monarchy. Still, this weak tendency existed even then. It showed itself subsequently too, sometimes more strongly and sometimes more feebly, both in the sphere of social ideas and in the sphere of the social movement characteristic of the *entire* post-Reform period. This tendency grew with each decade of the period, nurtured by each step in the economic evolution of the country and, consequently, also by the combination of social, juridical and cultural conditions.

These two tendencies, which were only just beginning to emerge in 1861, found a fairly full and open expression forty-four years after the Peasant Reform, in the most varied spheres of social life, in the various twists and turns of the social movement, in the activity of large masses of the population and of important political parties. The Cadets and the Trudoviks—taking each of these terms in its broadest meaning—are the direct descendants and successors, the actual vehicles of the two tendencies which were already taking shape half a century ago. The connection between 1861 and the events that took place forty-four years later is indisputable and obvious. And the fact that both tendencies have survived during half a century, that they have grown stronger, developed and expanded, unquestionably testifies to their strength; it shows that they are deeply rooted in the entire economic structure of Russia.

Menshikov, the *Novoye Vremya* writer, expressed this connection between the Peasant Reform and the events of the recent past in the following singular tirade: "The year 1861 failed to prevent 1905—hence, why shout about the greatness of a reform which has failed so miserably?" (*Novoye Vremya*,[78] No. 12512, of January 11, "An Unnecessary Jubilee".)

With these words Menshikov inadvertently touched upon extremely interesting scientific problems of history; first, the interrelation between reform and revolution in general, and, secondly, the connection, interdependence, and affinity between the socio-historical trends, strivings and tendencies of 1861 and the 1905-07 period.

The concept "reform", is undoubtedly the opposite of the concept "revolution". Failure to remember this contrast, failure to remember the line that divides these two

concepts, constantly leads to very serious mistakes in all historical discussions. But this contrast is not something absolute, this line is not something dead, but alive and changing, and one must be able to define it in each particular case. The Reform of 1861 remained but a reform owing to the extreme feebleness, ignorance and lack of cohesion between the social elements for whom change was essential.

That is the reason for such marked feudal features in this reform, that is why it was so full of bureaucratic monstrosities and brought the peasants such untold misfortunes. Our peasantry has suffered much more from the inadequate development of capitalism than it has from capitalism itself.

Although this reform remained nothing but a reform because of the weakness of certain social elements, it created, despite all obstacles and hindrances, conditions for the further development of those elements; these conditions expanded the area in which the old contradictions came into play and extended the number of groups, strata and classes of the population that took a conscious part in "the play" of contradictions. That is why the followers of the democratic tendency that was hostile to liberalism at the time of the 1861 Reform, those who then (and for a long time after) appeared to be mere individuals with no ground under their feet—that is why those people *proved* actually to be on incomparably more solid ground when the conditions that had been little more than embryonic in 1861 grew to maturity. Those participants in the Reform of 1861 who regarded it as nothing more than a reform* proved to be on more solid ground than the liberal reformists. The former will forever be remembered in history as the advanced representatives of their epoch; whereas the latter will be remembered as people who were irresolute, weak-willed and impotent in face of the forces of the old and obsolete.

In their theories, the Narodniks, beginning with 1861 (and their forerunners even prior to 1861), have, throughout more than half a century, always advocated a *different*, i.e., *non-capitalist*, path for Russia. History has fully

* It is probably a printer's error in Russian. According to the sense, it should read: "as something more than a reform".—*Ed.*

refuted their error. History has fully proved and the events of 1905-07, the action of the various classes of Russian society at that time, have graphically confirmed that Russia is developing along capitalist lines, and that there can be no other path for her development. But he would be a poor Marxist indeed who to this day failed to learn from the history of this half-century the *real* meaning of aspirations expressed in the course of half a century and embodied in an erroneous ideology, in an endeavour to plot a "different" path for the fatherland to travel.

A comparison between 1861 and 1905-07 makes it perfectly clear that the *real* historical meaning of the Narodnik ideology consisted in contrasting *two* paths of *capitalist* development: one path involving the adaptation of the new, capitalist Russia to the old, the subordination of the former to the latter, thus impeding the course of development; the other—the path of supplanting the old by the new, of entirely removing the obsolete that is obstructing the new; of accelerating the course of development. The programmes of the Cadets and the Trudoviks—the former liberal, and the latter democratic—while inconsistent and at times confused and betraying a lack of understanding, represent a vivid expression of the *actual* paths of this development—both *within the framework* of capitalism—which have been steadfastly pursued for more than half a century.

The present period imperatively demands of us that we have a clear understanding of the conditions of these two paths, that we have a clear idea of the two tendencies of 1861 and of their subsequent evolution. We are witnessing a further change in the entire system of the Russian state, *one more* step in its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. This new step, which is just as hesitant, just as vacillating, just as ill-chosen and just as unsound as the previous one, confronts us with the old problems. History has not yet decided which of the two paths of Russia's capitalist development will finally determine her bourgeois system: the objective forces on which the decision depends are not yet exhausted. We cannot tell beforehand what the decision will be, before we have the experience of all the friction, clashes and conflicts that make up the life of so-

ciety. We cannot tell beforehand what will be the resultant of the two tendencies that have been making themselves felt ever since 1861. But we can, and must, insist on a clear understanding of both tendencies, insist that Marxists (and this is one of their duties, in their capacity of "leaders", in the period of disintegration, confusion, scepticism and worship of momentary success) should contribute their activity to this resultant—not in a negative form (like liquidationism or, in general, helpless drifting after one decadent mood or another), but in a positive form, in the form of upholding the interests of evolution in its entirety, its fundamental and most essential interests.

The representatives of the democratic tendency, while marching toward their goal, continually waver and are subject to the influence of liberalism. To prevent these waverings and to end this subjection is one of the most important historical tasks of Marxism in Russia.

Mysl, No. 3, February 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Mysl* text

"THE PEASANT REFORM" AND THE PROLETARIAN-PEASANT REVOLUTION

The celebration of the jubilee, so much feared by the Romanov monarchy, and over which the Russian liberals have gushed so sentimentally, is over. The tsar's government celebrated it by assiduously circulating "among the people" the Black-Hundred jubilee pamphlets issued by the "National Club", by wholesale arrests of all "suspects", by banning meetings at which speeches of even the slightest democratic tinge might be expected, by fining and suppressing newspapers, and by persecuting "subversive" cinemas.

The liberals celebrated the jubilee by weeping buckets of tears about the necessity of "a second February 19" (*Vestnik Yevropy*[79]), by expressing their allegiance (the tsar's picture appearing prominently in *Rech*), and by indulging in talk about their civic despondency, the fragility of the native "Constitution", the devastating "break-up" of the "time-honoured principles of land tenure" by Stolypin's agrarian policy, and so on, and so forth.

In an edict addressed to Stolypin, Nicholas II declared that Stolypin's agrarian policy was the final stage of "the great Reform" of February 19, 1861, i.e., the surrender of peasant land to be plundered by a handful of bloodsuckers, kulaks, and well-to-do peasants, and the surrender of the countryside to the rule of the feudal landowners.

It must be admitted that Nicholas the Bloody, Russia's premier landowner, is nearer to the historical truth than our amiable liberals. The biggest landowner and the chief feudal lord is aware of, or rather has learned from the exhortation of the Council of the United Nobility, the maxim of the class struggle according to which "reforms" that are carried out by feudal lords must of necessity be

feudal in every aspect, must of necessity be accompanied by a regime of out and out violence. Our Cadets, and our liberals in general, fear the revolutionary movement of the masses, which alone is capable of wiping the feudal landowners and their unlimited power in the Russian state from the face of the earth; and this fear prevents them from appreciating the truth that so long as the feudal landowners have not been overthrown, every reform—and, particularly, every agrarian reform—is bound to be feudal in its aspect and nature, and in its mode of application. To fear revolution, to dream of reform, and to snivel because in practice "reforms" are applied by the feudal lords in a feudal way, is the height of baseness and stupidity. Nicholas II is much more straightforward and does more to teach the Russian people sense when he clearly "offers" them the plain choice: either feudal "reforms" or the overthrow of the feudal landowners by a people's revolution.

The Reform of February 19, 1861, was a feudal reform which our liberals are able to dress up and represent as a "peaceful" reform only because at that time the revolutionary *movement* in Russia was so weak as to amount to nothing, and, as for a revolutionary *class*, there existed none among the oppressed masses of those days. The decree of November 9, 1906, and the law of June 14, 1910, are feudal reforms with as much bourgeois content as the Reform of 1861; but the liberals *cannot* represent these as "peaceful" reforms, they cannot dress them up so easily (although they are already beginning to do so, as for instance, in *Russkaya Mysl*), for the few isolated revolutionaries of 1861 may be forgotten, but the Revolution of 1905 cannot be forgotten. The year 1905 saw the birth of a revolutionary *class* in Russia, the proletariat, which succeeded in rousing the peasant masses to the revolutionary struggle. And once a revolutionary class has been born in any country it cannot be suppressed by any amount of persecution; it can only perish if the whole country perishes, it can only die, after it has attained victory.

Let us call to mind the basic features of the Peasant Reform of 1861. The notorious "emancipation" meant the

unscrupulous robbery of the peasants and their subjection to an endless succession of tyrannies and insults. "Emancipation" was seized upon as a pretext to cut off part of the peasants' land. In the black-earth gubernias these cut-off lands amounted to *more* than one-fifth of the total held by peasants; in some gubernias the land that was cut off, taken away from the peasants, amounted to one-third or even two-fifths of all the peasants' land. As a result of "emancipation" the peasants' land was so divided from the landed estates as to compel the peasants to settle on "bad land", and the landed estates were wedged into the peasants' land to make it easier for the noble lords to enslave the peasants and to lease land to them on usurious terms. As a result of "emancipation", the peasants were forced to "redeem" their own land, moreover, they were forced to pay *double or treble* its real price. The overall result of the whole "epoch of reforms" which marked the 1860s was that the peasants remained poverty-stricken, downtrodden, ignorant, and subject to the feudal landowners in the courts, in the organs of administration, in the schools, and in the Zemstvos.

The "great Reform" was a feudal reform; nor could it be anything else, for it was carried out by the feudal landowners. But what was the force that compelled them to resort to reform? It was the force of economic development which was drawing Russia on to the path of capitalism. The feudal landowners could not prevent the growth of trade between Russia and Europe; they could not bolster up the old, tottering forms of economic life. The Crimean war demonstrated the rottenness and impotence of feudal Russia. The peasant "riots", which had been growing in number and intensity in the decades prior to emancipation, compelled Alexander II, the country's biggest landowner, to admit that it would be better to emancipate *from above* than to wait until he was overthrown *from below*.

"The Peasant Reform" was a bourgeois reform carried out by feudal landowners. It was a step in the transformation of Russia into a bourgeois monarchy. In substance the Peasant Reform was a bourgeois measure. The *less* the amount of land cut off from the peasants' holdings, the *more fully* peasant lands were separated from the landed estates, the *lower* the tribute paid to the feudal landowners

by the peasants (i.e., the lower the "redemption" payments) and the *greater the extent* the peasants in any locality were able to escape the influence and pressure of the feudal landowners—the more obvious was the bourgeois essence of the Reform. *To the extent* that the peasant extricated himself from the clutches of the feudal landowner, he became a slave to the power of money, found himself living in the conditions of commodity production and dependent on rising capitalism. After 1861 capitalism developed in Russia at such a rapid rate that in a few decades it wrought a transformation that had taken centuries in some of the old countries of Europe.

The celebrated struggle between the feudal landowners and the liberals, which our liberal and liberal-Narodnik historians have praised and made so much of, was a struggle waged *within* the ruling classes, a struggle waged for the most part *within the ranks of the landowner class*, a struggle waged *exclusively* over the extent and the forms of the proposed *concessions*. The liberals, like the feudal landowners, upheld the property rights and rule of the landowners, and indignantly denounced all revolutionary ideas about *abolishing* those property rights, about *completely overthrowing* that rule.

Such revolutionary ideas could not but ferment in the minds of the serf peasants. The peasant masses, however, were so crushed and stupefied by centuries of slavery that at the time of the Reform they were incapable of anything more than scattered, isolated rebellions, or rather "riots", devoid of any political purpose. Nevertheless, even then there were revolutionaries in Russia who took the side of the peasantry, who saw how limited, how poverty-stricken was the over-advertised "Peasant Reform", and who recognised its true feudal nature. These revolutionaries of whom there were extremely few at that time were headed by N. G. Chernyshevsky.

February 19, 1861, heralded the birth of the new, bourgeois, Russia which had been growing out of the era of serfdom. The liberals of the 1860s, on the one hand, and Chernyshevsky, on the other, were the representatives of two historical tendencies, of two historical forces which to this day have been determining the issue of the struggle

for the new Russia. That is why on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of February 19, it is necessary for the class-conscious proletariat to form as clear an idea as possible of the substance and interrelation of these two tendencies.

The liberals wanted to "emancipate" Russia "from above", taking care not to destroy either the monarchy of the tsars, or the property rights and the rule of the landowners, prevailing upon them only to make "concessions" to the spirit of the times. The liberals were, and still are, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie, which cannot reconcile itself to serfdom, but is afraid of revolution, is afraid of the mass movement which would be capable of overthrowing the monarchy and abolishing the rule of the landowners. That is why the liberals confine themselves to a "struggle for reforms", a "struggle for rights", that is to say, a struggle for a division of power between the feudal landowners and the bourgeoisie. As long as that is the relation of forces, there *can be no* "reforms" save those carried out by the feudal landowners, and *no* "rights" save those limited by the tyranny of the feudal landowners.

Chernyshevsky was a utopian socialist, who dreamed of a transition to socialism through the old, semi-feudal peasant village commune.[80] He did not see, nor could he see in the sixties of the past century, that only the development of capitalism and of the proletariat could create the material conditions and the social force for the achievement of socialism. But Chernyshevsky was not only a utopian socialist; he was also a revolutionary democrat, he approached all the political events of his times in a revolutionary spirit and was able to exercise a revolutionary influence by advocating, in spite of all the barriers and obstacles placed in his way by the censorship, the idea of a peasant revolution, the idea of the struggle of the masses for the overthrow of all the old authorities. In speaking of the "Peasant Reform" of 1861, which the liberals at first tried to whitewash and subsequently even glorified, he described it as *vile*, for he clearly saw its feudal nature, he clearly saw that the liberal emancipators were robbing the peasants of their last shirt. Chernyshevsky spoke of the liberals of the sixties as "*windbags*, *braggarts and fools*",[81] for he clearly saw their

dread of revolution, their spinelessness and their servility before the powers that be.

These two historical tendencies have continued developing in the course of the half-century that has elapsed since February 19, 1861, diverging ever more clearly, definitely and decisively. The forces of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, who preached that "educational" activity was all that was needed, and who fought shy of the revolutionary underground, grew stronger. On the other hand, the forces of democracy and socialism also became stronger, at first merging into one in utopian ideology and in the intellectualist struggles of the Narodnaya Volya and the revolutionary Narodniks. However, since the early nineties, with the transition from the revolutionary struggle of terrorists and individual propagandists to the struggle of the revolutionary classes themselves, these forces diverged.

The decade preceding the Revolution—from 1895 to 1904—was marked by open action of the proletarian masses and by their steady growth, by the growth of the strike struggle, of Social-Democratic working-class propaganda and organisation, and of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. Following the lead of the socialist vanguard of the proletariat, the revolutionary-democratic peasantry has also embarked upon mass struggle, particularly since 1902.

The two tendencies, which in 1861 had just emerged and had begun to appear in literature in bare outline, developed and grew in the Revolution of 1905, and found reflection in the movement of the *masses* and the struggle carried on by *political parties* in the most varied fields of activity, in the press, at mass meetings, in unions, in strikes, in uprisings, and in the State Dumas.

The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie established the Cadet and Octobrist parties that at first (until the summer of 1905) worked together in one liberal Zemstvo movement, and subsequently split into two separate parties fiercely competing with each other (and still doing so), the one putting forward primarily its liberal, the other primarily its monarchist, "*face*"—but always agreeing on the most essential issues; they both denounce the revolutionaries, disparage the December uprising, and honour as their flag the "constitutional" fig-leaf of absolutism. Both parties

have professed and still profess "strictly constitutional" principles, that is to say, they confine themselves to the limited field of activity which the Black-Hundred tsar and the feudal landowners could concede without giving up power, without relinquishing their autocratic rule, without sacrificing a single kopek of revenues, "sanctified" by ages of slave-holding, or parting with the least of their "justly acquired" privileges.

The democratic and the socialist trends separated from the liberal trend, and drew a line of demarcation between themselves. The proletariat organised and acted independently of the peasantry, rallying around its own, working-class, Social-Democratic, party. The organisation of the peasantry in the revolution was incomparably weaker, its actions were infinitely more scattered and feeble, the level of its class-consciousness was much lower, and monarchist illusions (as well as constitutional illusions, which are closely connected with them) often paralysed its energy, made it dependent upon the liberals, and sometimes upon the Black Hundreds and gave rise to empty day-dreams about "God-given land" which prevented it from launching an assault upon the landowning nobility with the object of completely abolishing that class. By and large, the peasantry taken as a mass, nevertheless fought the landowners, acted in a revolutionary spirit, and in all the Dumas—even in the Third Duma which was elected on the basis of representation specifically favouring the feudal landowners—they created Trudovik groups that represented a genuinely democratic movement despite their frequent vacillations. In the mass movement of 1905-07, the Cadets and Trudoviks represented and politically formulated the position and trends of the liberal-monarchist and the revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie respectively.

The year 1861 begot the year 1905. The feudal character of the first "great" bourgeois reform impeded the course of development, condemned the peasants to a thousand still worse and more bitter torments, but it did not change the course of development, did not avert the bourgeois revolution of 1905. The Reform of 1861 delayed the issue by opening a valve, as it were, by permitting some growth of capitalism; but it did not prevent the inevitable issue, which

in 1905 was fought out in an incomparably wider field, in the onslaught of the masses upon the tsar's autocracy and the feudal landowners. The Reform, which the feudal landowners granted at a time when the oppressed masses were completely undeveloped, begot the revolution by the time the revolutionary elements among those masses had reached maturity.

The Third State Duma and Stolypin's agrarian policy represent the second bourgeois reform carried out by the feudal landowners. February 19, 1861, was the first step taken *in the transformation* of the purely feudal autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy; the period of 1908-10 represents the second step, an even more serious one, *along the same road*. Nearly four and a half years have elapsed since the promulgation of the decree of November 9, 1906; more than three and a half years have elapsed since June 3, 1907[82]; yet today the Cadet bourgeoisie, and to a large extent the Octobrist bourgeoisie, are becoming convinced that the "Constitution" of June 3 and the agrarian policy of June 3 have proved "unsuccessful". "The most Right among the Cadets", as Mr. Maklakov, that semi-Octobrist, has been justly dubbed, was fully justified in declaring in the State Duma on February 25, on behalf both of the Cadets and of the Octobrists, that "today it is the pivotal elements of the country who are dissatisfied, those who are most anxious for durable peace, who dread a new rise of the tide of revolution". There is one common slogan: "It is the general opinion," Mr. Maklakov went on to say, "that if we continue on the road along which they are taking us they will lead us to a second revolution".

The common slogan of the Cadet and the Octobrist bourgeoisie in the spring of 1911 confirms that the appraisal of the state of affairs given by our Party in the resolution adopted at its conference in December 1908 was correct. "The principal factors of economic and political life," that resolution stated, "which gave rise to the Revolution of 1905 continue to operate, and, the economic and political situation being what it is, a new revolutionary crisis is inevitably maturing."

Menshikov, the paid hack of the tsarist Black-Hundred government, recently declared in *Novoye Vremya* that the

Reform of February 19 "was a miserable failure", because "the year 1861 failed to prevent 1905". Now the hired lawyers and parliamentarians of the liberal bourgeoisie declare that the "reforms" of November 9, 1906, and of June 3, 1907, are a failure because these "reforms" *lead* to a second revolution.

The two statements, as well as the entire history of the liberal and revolutionary movements in the period 1861-1905, provide extremely interesting material for an elucidation of the very important question of the relation between reform and revolution and the role of reformists and revolutionaries in the social struggle.

The opponents of revolution, some of them with hatred and a gnashing of teeth, others in a spirit of dejection and despondency, admit that the "reforms" of 1861 and of 1907-10 have failed in their purpose, because they do not prevent revolution. Social-Democrats, the representatives of the only consistently revolutionary class of our times, reply: revolutionaries have played an immense historical role in the social struggle and in all social crises *even when* the immediate result of those crises has been half-hearted reforms. Revolutionaries are the leaders of those forces of society that effect all change; reforms are the by-product of the revolutionary struggle.

The revolutionaries of 1861 remained isolated and, on the face of it, suffered complete defeat. Actually, they were the great figures of the day, and the further that day recedes, the more clearly do we see their greatness and the more obvious is the insignificance and paltriness of the liberal reformists of those days.

The revolutionary class of 1905-07, the socialist proletariat, on the face of it, also suffered complete defeat. Both the liberal monarchists and the liquidators among the pseudo-Marxists have been shouting from the house-tops that the proletariat went "too far" and resorted to "excesses", that it succumbed to the attraction of "the spontaneous class struggle", that it let itself be seduced by the pernicious idea of the "hegemony of the proletariat", and so on, and so forth. Actually, the "sin" of the proletariat was that it did not go far enough, but that "sin" is accounted for by the state of its forces at that time and is being atoned for by unre-

mitting activity, even in times of blackest reaction, on the part of revolutionary Social-Democrats, by their steadfast struggle against all manifestations of reformism and opportunism. Actually, everything that has been won from the enemies, and everything that is enduring in these gains, has been won and is maintained only to the extent that the revolutionary struggle is strong and alive in all spheres of proletarian activity. Actually, the proletariat alone has championed consistent democracy to the end, exposing all the instability of the liberals, freeing the peasantry from their influence, and rising with heroic courage in insurrection.

No one is in a position to foretell to what extent really democratic changes will be effected in Russia in the era of her bourgeois revolutions, but there can be no shadow of doubt that *only* the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat will determine the extent and the success of the changes. Between feudal "reforms" in the bourgeois spirit and the democratic revolution led by the proletariat there can only be the vacillations of liberalism and opportunist reformism—impotent, spineless, and devoid of ideals.

When we look at the history of the last half-century in Russia, when we cast a glance at 1861 and 1905, we can only repeat the words of our Party resolution with even greater conviction: "As before, the aim of our struggle is to overthrow tsarism and bring about the conquest of power by the proletariat relying on the revolutionary sections of the peasantry and accomplishing the bourgeois-democratic revolution by means of the convening of a popular constituent assembly and the establishment of a democratic republic".

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WRECKERS OF THE PARTY IN THE ROLE OF "WRECKERS OF LEGENDS"

Exactly a year ago the Central Organ of our Party published the following extremely important letter from the Central Committee Bureau in Russia to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad:

"*We* [*i.e.*, *the Bureau of the C.C. in Russia*] *approached Comrades Mikhail*, *Roman*, *and Yuri*, *suggesting that they should start work*, *but we received a reply which states that*, *in their opinion*, *not only are the decisions of the Plenary Meeting harmful*, *but that the very existence of the Central Committee is harmful. On these grounds*, *they refuse to attend even a single meeting for co-optation*."*

Things could not be clearer. In the persons of Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri we are dealing with open renegades who deem it unnecessary to resort to "diplomacy" and wriggling in the spirit of *Golos*, and who declare *frankly* that they have broken with our Party. Here we have a clash of two "tactics": one, that of Martov, Dan and Co., representing an effort to disintegrate the "old" Party from within, to keep the old Party in a sickly condition until the Stolypin brand of "Social-Democrats", the liquidators, gain a firm foothold; the other, that of Potresov, Levitsky, Mikhail, Roman, Yuri, and Co., proceeds from the fact that the game of sapping the strength of the old Party from within by intrigues is not worth the candle and that it is necessary to effect an open break with the R.S.D.L.P. *at once*.

The publication of the statement by Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri has badly upset the game of their friends and pa-

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* See present edition, Vol. 16, "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party".—*Ed*.

trons of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. But the damage has been done: Dan, Martov and Co. have been obliged to go on covering up their tracks, and while, "on the one hand", they take the part of the three mentioned renegades, "on the other", they make a slight attempt to "disavow" them. Martov even mustered up courage—in the last but one, i.e., in the 23rd, issue of *Golos*, *ten months after* the publication of the fact that his three friends had renounced the Party—to chide the three gentlemen for their "thoughtlessness"....

But now the wheel of "history" (the history of liquidationism) has turned once again. A number of circumstances—primarily the rebuff administered to liquidationism by some Social-Democratic groups engaged in open activities—has caused Potresov, Levitsky, Mikhail, Roman, and Co. to slow down a bit and to get closer to the "wise" and more cautious "tactic" of covering up their tracks *à la* Dan and Martov. This has made it possible for a "rebuttal" of the document quoted above to appear—*a year later*.

Obviously, the "rebuttal" which appeared in *Golos* under the pompous heading "A Wrecked Legend" is *false from beginning to end*. It seems that in "officially" refusing to join the Central Committee or to attend even one meeting for the purpose of co-opting new members the above-mentioned three renegades were actuated by "motives of a personal nature". And only "later, in a *private* [strictly "private", of course] conversation with him [i.e., the representative of the C.C.] we referred to a number of considerations [in this case, of a political nature] which compel us [i.e., Roman, Mikhail, and Yuri] to view with disfavour the proposition made to us".

Hence, Point 1 in the "rebuttal": the statement referred to by the Central Organ was made in "a private conversation" after official uniforms had been laid aside. This extremely "extenuating circumstance" radically alters matters, doesn't it?

But what, *according to their own testimony*, did Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri say in that "private conversation"? They did not say that the decisions of the Central Committee were harmful; all they did, you see, was to take the liberty to observe that "*the road dictated by the Plenary Meeting does not strengthen but weakens the position of the C.C.*";

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

that the recommendation made by the Central Committee to the Party about taking advantage of legal opportunities "*has meant and means the wrecking of the legal workers' organisations*"; that the very first step taken by the C.C. along this road (the publication of the resolution dealing with a conference of the Party) "*has supplied the government with a pretext*" for wrecking workers' organisations. Well, don't you think that this is entirely different from what was stated by the representative of the Central Committee according to whom the three liquidators from the candidates appointed in London "deem the interference of the C.C. in the spontaneous process of the Social-Democratic forces grouping themselves in legal organisations, as being tantamount to performing an abortion in the second month of pregnancy"? And that's what they call a "rebuttal"!

Further it seems that they did not say that the existence of the C.C. is harmful, God forbid! All they did was to express the opinion, strictly "privately" of course, that it would be much better if, instead of the C.C., there existed an "organising group" which "would not be requested to show a mandate" (i.e., a *Party* mandate), just as, in their time, the *Iskra* and *Zarya* group was never requested to show one (i.e., a "mandate").* The main accusation has thus been "rebutted" by Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri almost as successfully as their colleague Igorev recently "rebutted" the charges of plotting against the Central Committee and the Party which the Menshevik pro-Party comrades, Plekhanov and A. Moskovsky,[83] preferred against him.... What is needed, you see, is not a Central Committee, but an "organising group", such as the "*Iskra* and *Zarya* group". To be sure, the *Iskra* and *Zarya* group was a revolutionary Social-Democratic group, whereas Messrs. Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri need a liquidationist organising group. But that is not the point at the moment. The point is that *according to their own testimony*, Martov's and Dan's three allies proposed to replace the C.C. by a private organising group, whom nobody could request to show a despised "mandate" and which could do all the "liquidating" it liked. A fine rebuttal" indeed!...

* See *Golos*, supplement to No. 24, p. 3.

One of the "pivots" of the "rebuttal" published by Roman, Mikhail, and Yuri is the story that the representative of the C.C., who invited them to attend "at least one meeting" of the collegium, tried to persuade them by saying that he (i.e., the representative of the C.C.) and other "Bolsheviks in Russia" were bent on "freeing themselves from the guiding influence of Lenin's circle". This statement made by a Bolshevik in Russia, *for which we have the evidence of three liquidators*, is particularly relished by the editors of *Golos*, who think they can use it to justify somebody and something. It is obvious, however, that the *Golos* crowd have become entangled in their own snares and speak *against* themselves. Just use your brains, esteemed editors of *Golos*. *Let us assume* that the Bolshevik who approached your friends on behalf of the Central Committee was opposed to what you call "Lenin's circle". *So much the worse for you*. For it was the very same Bolshevik who wrote the letter reporting the repudiation of the Party by your three friends, which we printed in No. 12 of the Central Organ. If that Bolshevik is not a follower of what you call "Lenin's circle", then you must consider his evidence to be all the more unbiased. *Let us assume* that the members of the Central Committee who invited you were opposed to "Lenin's circle"*—from your own standpoint that should only aggravate the guilt of the three liquidators who refused to join the Central Committee even under conditions so favourable for them. What has come over the *Golos* gentlemen? They are generally more clever ... at covering up their tracks. You have made a very clumsy job of it, gentlemen! More stupid even than the "rebuttals" published by Stolypin's "Information Bureau".

* Another member of the Central Committee, one of the "Bolsheviks in Russia", is reproached by *Golos* with having, you see, placed "obstacles in the way of co-opting *Golos* people as members of the Central Committee, since he declared that the Bolshevik members of the C.C. ... would permit the co-option only of such candidates as will first sign a statement renouncing 'liquidationism'". The member of the C.C. whom the *Golos* crowd accuse of so terrible a crime is at present *not in a position* to answer the liquidationist gentlemen himself.[84] That is why we shall say on his behalf: *if* what you report of him were true, it would only mean that from the standpoint of the Party he was absolutely right and that he acted fully in the spirit of the decisions of the Plenary Meeting.

You have had ill luck with your "rebuttal", gentlemen of *Golos*, just as you have had ill luck with your recent scurrilous leaflets. You wanted "to prove too much", you wanted to prove that all Social-Democrats are pro-Party—and that's why you have proved nothing. Just reflect a little: one day you publish the leaflet of the fifty-eight[85] (how many of the fifty-eight are hypocrites and how many have been hoodwinked?), in which you represent your opponents ("Lenin's circle") as arch-monsters, as a "gang", etc. And the very next day you (the editors of *Golos*) issue a leaflet containing a "programme of reforms", in which you declare: everything will be perfect if we (the *Golos* group) are allowed representation in all central Party institutions on a basis of equality with these monsters, with people who are guilty of a number of "crimes", etc., etc. Well, when are you acting "for the benefit of the Party", and when are you looking after your own interests, gentlemen—in the first or in the second case? Those fragrant-smelling *Golos* bulletins as well as its supplements, in which "everything has been made use of", including the Geneva otzovists who style themselves an "ideological circle of *Bolsheviks*", would not be worth mentioning, if not for the fact that they shed such glaring light on the entire policy of *Golos*....

Try hard, you "wreckers of legends", do your utmost! There is one legend which you are indeed helping us to wreck—the legend that you still have something in common with revolutionary Social-Democracy.

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THE CADETS AND THE OCTOBRISTS

The notorious "Cabinet crisis" and the election of a new Chairman of the State Duma[86] have provided additional material on the social nature and political significance of the Cadet and the Octobrist parties. For the hundredth or the thousandth time the Russian liberal (save the mark!) bourgeoisie has shown its true colours. From the daily press and from the preceding issue of *Zvezda*, the reader knows what these colours are. It may not be superfluous, however, to sum up some of the conclusions, in view of the fact that the Cadet press, which is the most widely circulated, willingly "thunders" against the Octobrists, but is very loath to deal with the *results* of the Cadets' own actions.

Let us recall the behaviour of the party of "people's freedom" during the elections of the new Chairman of the State Duma. On March 21, *Rech* hastened to report: "The people's freedom group has decided to vote for M. Alexeyenko if he is nominated for the post of Chairman of the State Duma. If, however, Rodzyanko is nominated, the group will vote against him". The Constitutional-"Democrats" offer their services to the "Left" Octobrists. But that is not all. The leading article in *Rech* of the same date declares that Alexeyenko is "universally respected", and tries to deal with the matter from the standpoint of the *entire* State Duma: if, it says, the Rights support the nominee of the majority of the Octobrists (i.e., Alexeyenko's candidacy), then the State Duma may, perhaps, "regain the unanimity" with which the nomination of Khomyakov was once accepted. "This unanimity would show that the *entire* Duma realises the exceptional gravity of the situation."

Thus wrote *Rech*. "The entire Duma", nothing more nor less. This should be recalled as often as possible during the elections to the Fourth Duma!

The Cadets are perfectly well aware that the Rights, on principle, are for a Duma without rights; that the Nationalists justify and defend Stolypin and the violation of Article 87. And yet, merely for the sake of voting for Alexeyenko, the Cadets are prepared to forget everything and to proclaim the unanimity of "the *entire* Duma", although they too are fully aware that the workers' deputies will *under no circumstances* allow themselves to be duped by the "unanimity" of the Third Duma, any more than they did at the time of Khomyakov's election.

It is obvious that, as far as the Cadets are concerned, the workers' deputies and the Trudoviks do not count. The Third Duma without them, but with the Rights, with Markov the Second and Purishkevich, is "the *entire* Duma". *That is what the statement of* Rech *amounts to*. And this reasoning of *Rech* correctly draws the line which many have so often interpreted wrongly—namely, the line between the feudal landowners and the bourgeoisie (even the most "liberal", i.e., the Cadet variety), on the one hand, and the workers and the peasants, i.e., the forces of democracy, on the other. Without the forces of democracy, but with the Rights "we", say the Cadets, are "the entire Duma". That means that when they lay claim to the title of democrats the Cadets are deceiving the people. That means that, as far as the Cadets are concerned, "we" implies the feudal landowners and the bourgeoisie; the rest do not count.

The minor question of the election of a new Chairman of the State Duma has served to remind us once again of the essential truth that the Cadets are *not* democrats, but moderate liberal bourgeois, who long for "the unanimity" of "the entire" parliament of diehard reactionaries and Octobrists. *Competition* with the Octobrists—is all that the "struggle" the Cadets are waging against them amounts to. The Cadets are fighting the Octobrists—there is no doubt of that. But they are not fighting them as representatives of a class, as representatives of larger sections of the population, and the aim of their fight is not to remove the old regime to which the Octobrists are adapting themselves; they are fighting them as *competitors* who are anxious to adapt themselves to *the same* regime, to serve the interests of *the same* class, and to protect it from the too exacting demands

of the wider sections of the population (the democratic elements in general and of the proletariat in particular). All that the Cadets are after is to adapt themselves to the same regime, but in a slightly different way; that is the substance of their policy, the policy of the liberal bourgeois. And it is this competition with the Octobrists, the struggle to step into *their* shoes, that lends the fight of the Cadets its peculiar "pungency". This explains the *special hostility* of the Rights and the Octobrists towards the Cadets; it is a hostility of a special kind: "those fellows" (the democrats) are out to annihilate them, while "these fellows" (the Cadets) want to force them down one rung of the ladder; the first prospect calls for an irreconcilable struggle as a matter of principle, it calls for a life and death struggle; the second prospect implies a fight *for the top jobs*, a contest in the sphere of intrigue, rivalry as regards the methods of winning the very same landowning and bourgeois majority, or of earning the confidence of the very same old regime.

The picture which the Third Duma presented on the day of the election of the new Chairman clearly showed this difference.

The Cadet recorder of events "in parliamentary circles" continued to sing the praises of Alexeyenko in *Rech* of March 23, describing him as "a man quite independent and with a strong sense of dignity", and so on and so forth. This is said of an Octobrist who delighted in the coup of June 3!

Such is the Cadet gauge for strict legality: not to protest against June 3, but to protest against March 14. It reminds one of the American Saying: "If you steal a loaf of bread you'll surely go to jail, but if you steal a railroad you'll be made a senator".

Mr. Litovtsev, who is responsible for the "In Parliamentary Circles" column in *Rech*, on March 23 wrote that the Left Octobrists and the Cadets "spent a good half of the day worrying: what if he decides to accept" (meaning Rodzyanko who pretended that he was declining nomination).

How could the struggle between the Cadets and their opponents help being *sharp* when the matter revolves around a question so close to and so directly affecting the *entire*

Third Duma, namely, "What if Rodzyanko decides to accept?"!

Rodzyanko did decide to accept. What happened at the elections was that the Rights and the Nationalists roared with laughter and applauded for all they were worth; while the "Left" Octobrists and the *Cadets* maintained a stubborn, systematic silence: they were beaten at their own game; they could not rejoice; they *were forced* to maintain silence. "By way of protest", the Cadets cast their vote for the Nationalist Volkonsky. The democrats alone declared loudly, unequivocally, and clearly that they would take no part in the election of the new Chairman of the Third Duma, and that they declined *any* responsibility for "the entire activity of the Third Duma" (Voiloshnikov's words).

On the day of the elections, at the 86th sitting of the Duma, the only ones who *spoke* in the contest between the competitors were Rodzyanko, the head of the Third Duma, Bulat, and Voiloshnikov. The rest were silent.

Voiloshnikov, speaking on behalf of all the members of his group, correctly pointed out that the Cadets, "due to the peculiar nature of their political position, have always placed all their hopes in alliances inside the Duma", and he ridiculed them as gullible liberal.

The Cadets' political position and its peculiar nature are to be explained by the class character of this party. It is an anti-democratic bourgeois-liberal party. That is why they "always place all their hopes in alliances inside the Duma". This is true in two senses: first, in the sense of contrasting what is going on inside the Duma with what is going on outside it; and, secondly, in the sense that it refers to "alliances" among those social elements, those classes, which represent the "entire" Third Duma.

In connection with the election of Rodzyanko, which signified a victory for the Nationalists, only the workers' deputies and the Trudoviks came out with statements which were *not* meant to promote any alliances "inside the Duma"; with statements which explained the attitude of the forces of democracy in general and of the proletarian forces of democracy in particular, toward the *entire* Third Duma, toward the coup of June 3, and toward the Octobrists and the Cadets jointly. These statements represented a proper

notice served on Rodzyanko and the whole of "his" majority, a proper warning to the "responsible" liberal "opposition" (responsible to the third Duma and to the men of June 3) by political parties "responsible" to certain other forces.

Zvezda, No. 16, April 2, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

IN MEMORY OF THE COMMUNE

Forty years have passed since the proclamation of the Paris Commune. In accordance with tradition, the French workers paid homage to the memory of the men and women of the revolution of March 18, 1871, by meetings and demonstrations. At the end of May they will again place wreaths on the graves of the Communards who were shot, the victims of the terrible "May Week", and over their graves they will once more vow to fight untiringly until their ideas have triumphed and the cause they bequeathed has been fully achieved.

Why does the proletariat, not only in France but throughout the entire world, honour the men and women of the Paris Commune as their predecessors? And what is the heritage of the Commune?

The Commune sprang up spontaneously. No one consciously prepared it in an organised way. The unsuccessful war with Germany, the privations suffered during the siege, the unemployment among the proletariat and the ruin among the lower middle classes; the indignation of the masses against the upper classes and against authorities who had displayed utter incompetence, the vague unrest among the working class, which was discontented with its lot and was striving for a different social system; the reactionary composition of the National Assembly, which roused apprehensions as to the fate of the republic—all this and many other factors combined to drive the population of Paris to revolution on March 18, which unexpectedly placed power in the hands of the National Guard, in the hands of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie which had sided with it.

It was an event unprecedented in history. Up to that time power had, as a rule, been in the hands of landowners

and capitalists, i.e., in the hands of their trusted agents who made up the so-called government. After the revolution of March 18, when M. Thiers' government had fled from Paris with its troops, its police and its officials, the people became masters of the situation and power passed into the hands of the proletariat. But in modern society, the proletariat, economically enslaved by capital, cannot dominate politically unless it breaks the chains which fetter it to capital. That is why the movement of the Commune was bound to take on a socialist tinge, i.e., to strive to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, the rule of capital, and to destroy the very *foundations* of the contemporary social order.

At first this movement was extremely indefinite and confused. It was joined by patriots who hoped that the Commune would renew the war with the Germans and bring it to a successful conclusion. It enjoyed the support of the small shopkeepers who were threatened with ruin unless there was a postponement of payments on debts and rent (the government refused to grant this postponement, but they obtained it from the Commune). Finally, it enjoyed, at first, the sympathy of bourgeois republicans who feared that the reactionary National Assembly (the "rustics", the savage landlords) would restore the monarchy. But it was of course the workers (especially the artisans of Paris), among whom active socialist propaganda had been carried on during the last years of the Second Empire and many of whom even belonged to the International, who played the principal part in this movement.

Only the workers remained loyal to the Commune to the end. The bourgeois republicans and the petty bourgeoisie soon broke away from it: the former were frightened off by the revolutionary-socialist, proletarian character of the movement; the latter broke away when they saw that it was doomed to inevitable defeat. Only the French proletarians supported *their* government fearlessly and untiringly, they alone fought and died for it—that is to say, for the cause of the emancipation of the working class, for a better future for all toilers.

Deserted by its former allies and left without support, the Commune was doomed to defeat. The entire bourgeoisie

of France, all the landlords, stockbrokers, factory owners, all the robbers, great and small, all the exploiters joined forces against it. This bourgeois coalition, supported by Bismarck (who released a hundred thousand French prisoners of war to help crush revolutionary Paris), succeeded in rousing the ignorant peasants and the petty bourgeoisie of the provinces against the proletariat of Paris, and forming a ring of steel around half of Paris (the other half was besieged by the German army). In some of the larger cities in France (Marseilles, Lyons, St. Étienne, Dijon, etc.) the workers also attempted to seize power, to proclaim the Commune and come to the help of Paris; but these attempts were short-lived. Paris, which had first raised the banner of proletarian revolt, was left to its own resources and doomed to certain destruction.

Two conditions, at least, are necessary for a victorious social revolution—highly developed productive forces and a proletariat adequately prepared for it. But in 1871 both of these conditions were lacking. French capitalism was still poorly developed, and France was at that time mainly a petty-bourgeois country (artisans, peasants, shopkeepers, etc.). On the other hand, there was no workers' party; the working class had not gone through a long school of struggle and was unprepared, and for the most part did not even clearly visualise its tasks and the methods of fulfilling them. There was no serious political organisation of the proletariat, nor were there strong trade unions and co-operative societies....

But the chief thing which the Commune lacked was time—an opportunity to take stock of the situation and to embark upon the fulfilment of its programme. It had scarcely had time to start work, when the government entrenched in Versailles and supported by the entire bourgeoisie began hostilities against Paris. The Commune had to concentrate primarily on self-defence. Right up to the very end, May 21-28, it had no time to think seriously of anything else.

However, in spite of these unfavourable conditions, in spite of its brief existence, the Commune managed to promulgate a few measures which sufficiently characterise its real significance and aims. The Commune did away with the standing army, that blind weapon in the hands of the

ruling classes, and armed the whole people. It proclaimed the separation of church and state, abolished state payments to religious bodies (i.e., state salaries for priests), made popular education purely secular, and in this way struck a severe blow at the gendarmes in cassocks. In the purely social sphere the Commune accomplished very little, but this little nevertheless clearly reveals its character as a popular, workers' government. Night-work in bakeries was forbidden; the system of fines, which represented legalised robbery of the workers, was abolished. Finally, there was the famous decree that all factories and workshops abandoned or shut down by their owners were to be turned over to associations of workers that were to resume production. And, as if to emphasise its character as a truly democratic, proletarian government, the Commune decreed that the salaries of all administrative and government officials, irrespective of rank, should not exceed the normal wages of a worker, and in no case amount to more than 6,000 francs a year (less than 200 rubles a month).

All these measures showed clearly enough that the Commune was a deadly menace to the old world founded on the enslavement and exploitation of the people. That was why bourgeois society could not feel at ease so long as the Red Flag of the proletariat waved over the *Hôtel de Ville* in Paris. And when the organised forces of the government finally succeeded in gaining the upper hand over the poorly organised forces of the revolution, the Bonapartist generals, who had been beaten by the Germans and who showed courage only in fighting their defeated countrymen, those French Rennenkampfs and Meller-Zakomelskys,[87] organised such a slaughter as Paris had never known. About 30,000 Parisians were shot down by the bestial soldiery, and about 45,000 were arrested, many of whom were afterwards executed, while thousands were transported or exiled. In all, Paris lost about 100,000 of its best people, including some of the finest workers in all trades.

The bourgeoisie were satisfied. "Now we have finished with socialism for a long time," said their leader, the bloodthirsty dwarf, Thiers, after he and his generals had drowned the proletariat of Paris in blood. But these bourgeois crows croaked in vain. Less than six years after the suppression

of the Commune, when many of its champions were still pining in prison or in exile, a new working-class movement arose in France. A new socialist generation, enriched by the experience of their predecessors and no whit discouraged by their defeat, picked up the flag which had fallen from the hands of the fighters in the cause of the Commune and bore it boldly and confidently forward. Their battle-cry was: "Long live the social revolution! Long live the Commune!" And in another few years, the new workers' party and the agitational work launched by it throughout the country compelled the ruling classes to release Communards who were still kept in prison by the government.

The memory of the fighters of the Commune is honoured not only by the workers of France but by the proletariat of the whole world. For the Commune fought, not for some local or narrow national aim, but for the emancipation of all toiling humanity, of all the downtrodden and oppressed. As a foremost fighter for the social revolution, the Commune has won sympathy wherever there is a proletariat suffering and engaged in struggle. The epic of its life and death, the sight of a workers' government which seized the capital of the world and held it for over two months, the spectacle of the heroic struggle of the proletariat and the torments it underwent after its defeat—all this raised the spirit of millions of workers, aroused their hopes and enlisted their sympathy for the cause of socialism. The thunder of the cannon in Paris awakened the most backward sections of the proletariat from their deep slumber, and everywhere gave impetus to the growth of revolutionary socialist propaganda. That is why the cause of the Commune is not dead. It lives to the present day in every one of us.

The cause of the Commune is the cause of the social revolution, the cause of the complete political and economic emancipation of the toilers. It is the cause of the proletariat of the whole world. And in this sense it is immortal.

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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER, THE PROSPECTS AND LIQUIDATIONISM

The questions indicated above occupy, from the point of view of their importance, one of the foremost, if not *the* foremost place in the system of views of a Marxist who wishes to understand the realities surrounding him. The period 1908-10 undoubtedly bears a distinctive character. The social structure of society and of state power is characterised by changes, and unless these changes are understood not a single step can be taken in any sphere of social activity. The understanding of these changes determines the prospects for the future, by which we mean, of course, not idle guessing about things unknown, but the basic trends of economic and political development—those trends, the resultant of which determines the immediate future of the country, those trends which determine the tasks, direction and character of the activity of every intelligent public man. And this last question of the tasks, direction and character of activity is most closely connected with the question of liquidationism.

No wonder then that as far back as 1908, as soon as it had become—or was beginning to become—clear that we were confronted with a new, distinctive period in Russian history, the Marxists paid particular attention to the questions of the social structure of state power, prospects for the future, and liquidationism; they pointed to the inseparable connection between these questions and systematically discussed them. Furthermore, they did not confine themselves to mere discussion, for that would have been "literary scribbling" in the worst sense of the word; that would have been possible only in a discussion group of intellectuals not conscious of their responsibility and not troubled by politics. No, they worked out an exact formulation of the

results of the discussion, a formulation that could serve as a guide, not only for a member of the given literary circle, not only for a person connected in one way or another with a definite intellectualist category, but for any and every conscious representative of the class who regards the ideology of Marxism as his own. This necessary work was completed by the end of 1908.

I have already pointed out the principal results of this work in No. 2 of our journal. I take the liberty of quoting a few lines in order to make further exposition more intelligible.

"The development of the Russian state system during the past three centuries shows that its class character has been changing in one definite direction. The monarchy of the seventeenth century with the Boyars' Duma did not resemble the bureaucratic-aristocratic monarchy of the eighteenth century. The monarchy of the first half of the nineteenth century was not the same as the monarchy of 1861-1904. In the 1908-10 period a new phase was clearly outlined, marking *one more step* in the same direction, which may be described as the direction leading towards a bourgeois monarchy. The character of the Third Duma and the present agrarian policy are closely connected with this step. The new phase, therefore, is not an accident but represents a specific stage in the capitalist evolution of the country. This new phase does not solve the old problems, nor can it do so; consequently, since *it is unable to eliminate them*, it calls for the use of new methods of approach to old solutions of old problems" (No. 2, p. 43). And a few lines further: "Those who deny (or who do not understand) ... that we are confronted with the old problems and are heading towards the old solution of these problems, are *in fact* deserting Marxism, are *in fact* surrendering to the liberals (as Potresov, Levitsky and others have done)" (p. 44).*

Whatever attitude one may adopt towards the set of ideas expressed in these propositions, it would hardly be possible to deny the very close connection and interrelation existing between the separate parts of this appraisal of the given period. Take, for instance, the decree of November 9,

* See pp. 68-69 of this volume.—*Ed.*

1906 (the law of June 14, 1910). There can be no disputing the fact that each of them bears a clearly expressed bourgeois character which marks a change of principle in the agrarian policy long pursued by the "upper" strata towards the village commune and allotment ownership. But so far, not even the most unprincipled weathercocks such as the Cadets, have ventured to assert that this change of principle has *already* settled the question, has *already* created new foundations of capitalist peasant economy, or has *already* eliminated the old problems. The connection between the law of June 14, 1910, and the system of elections to the Third Duma, as well as the social composition of the latter is obvious; it would have been impossible to carry out this law, to take a series of measures to put it into practice other than by establishing an alliance between the central government and the feudal (let us use this not very exact, general European expression) landowners and the upper strata of the commercial-industrial bourgeoisie. We are thus faced with a distinctive stage in the *entire* process of capitalist evolution of the country. Does this stage do away with the retention of "power and revenue" (speaking in a sociological sense) in the hands of the landowners of the feudal type? No, it does not. The changes that took place in this, as in all the other spheres, do not remove the *fundamental* traits of the old regime, of the old relation of social forces. Hence the fundamental task of a politically conscious public man is clear; he must evaluate these new changes, "make use" of them, grasp them, if we may use that expression, and at the same time, he must not allow himself to drift helplessly with the stream, he must not throw out the old baggage, he must preserve the essentials in the forms of activity and not merely in theory, in the programme, in the principles of policy.

How then did Potresov and Martov, Dan and Axelrod, Levitsky and Martynov, the "ideological leaders" who group themselves round publications of the *Vozrozhdeniye*, *Zhizn*, *Dyelo Zhizni*, *Nasha Zarya*, etc., type, react to this definitely formulated answer to the "vexed questions", to this direct and clear exposition of definite views? The fact is that they did not react like politicians, "ideological leaders", responsible publicists, but like a literary group,

like a circle of intellectuals, like free lances of free groups of the writing fraternity. Like men who knew how to appreciate the fashion and the spirit of the times as accepted in liberal parlours, they tittered condescendingly over this antiquated, out-of-date, eccentric striving to formulate answers to vexed questions. Why such exactitude, when one can write wherever one pleases, about anything one pleases, whatever one pleases, and in any way one pleases, when the Milyukovs and Struves furnish excellent examples of all the advantages, conveniences and privileges that follow from the evasion of direct answers, of an exact enunciation of views, of formulated *professions de foi*, etc., when Forgetful Ivans (and especially the Ivans who do not like to recall the exact formulations of the past) are being honoured and respected in the broadest circles of "society"?

Thus, throughout the past three years, we have not observed the slightest attempt on the part of this entire literary fraternity to present *their own* formulated answer to the "vexed questions". There have been many metaphors and idle hypotheses, but not a single straight answer. The distinguishing, characteristic feature of the fraternity under consideration was their love of *amorphism*, i.e., of that symptom which was recognised in the most definite, precise and unequivocal terms to be an integral part of *liquidationism at the very time* the direct reply to the vexed questions was given. To drift aimlessly with the stream, to delight in one's amorphism, to "put paid" to that which is contrasted to the amorphous present—this is one of the main features of liquidationism. Opportunists always and everywhere passively abandon themselves to the stream, rest content with answers "from event to event", from congress (drunks) to congress (factory),[88] they are satisfied to transfer their affiliation from one "association" (albeit the most respectable and useful—trade unions, consumers' societies, cultural societies, temperance societies, etc.) to another, etc. Liquidationism is the sum total of the tendencies that are peculiar to all opportunism in general, and reveal themselves in definite forms in one of our social-political trends in a certain period of Russian history.

History has preserved only two definite opinions of the liquidators on the above "direct answer" (to the vexed ques-

tions). The first opinion: the adjective "bourgeois" ought to be replaced by the adjective "plutocratic". Such a substitution, however, would be utterly incorrect. The epoch of 1861-1904 reveals to us the growth of the influence (and often the preponderating influence) of the plutocracy in the most varied spheres of life. What we see in the 1908-10 period is no longer plutocracy, but *something different*—the result of the bourgeoisie having recognised itself as a class. It is mindful of the lessons received during the preceding three years and is creating an ideology which in principle is hostile to socialism (not to European socialism, not to socialism in general, but specifically to Russian socialism) and to democracy. Moreover, the bourgeoisie is organised nationally, that is, as a class, a definite section of which is permanently represented (and in a very influential way, too) in the Third Duma. Finally, in the agrarian policy of 1908-10, too, there is a system which carries out the definite plan of a bourgeois agrarian regime. To be sure, this plan does not "work" yet; but this failure is the failure of *one* of the bourgeois systems, while the *plutocracy* has undoubtedly been "successful" in the villages, i.e., the village plutocracy is certainly gaining in consequence of the agrarian policy of 1908-10, whereas the bourgeois regime, for which so many sacrifices are made, is still unable to "fit in". In a word, the proposed term "plutocratic" is inept in every respect, so much so that the liquidators themselves apparently prefer to forget this proposal.

Another opinion: the answer outlined above is incorrect because it is equal to the advice to "shove in where we once met with ..."[89] bad luck. This brief but energetic opinion is valuable because it expresses in a striking form the results of all the literary productions of the liquidators from Potresov's *The Social Movement* down to Mr. Levitsky in *Nasha Zarya*. This opinion is a purely negative one; it confines itself to condemning "shoving" without giving any positive indication as to *where* one should "shove". Swim, they seem to say, as best you can, like "everybody else", but do not consider it worth while to indulge in generalisations as to where you will or should emerge.

However much the opportunists would like to avoid being worried by generalisations, to avoid all "unpleasant" talk

about giving a direct answer to the "vexed questions"—this is impossible. Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in through the window. By the irony of history the very same liquidators who like to pose as "progressives", as alien to "conservatism", and who in 1908 scornfully turned up their noses at the suggestions that there was need for a direct answer, were forced, *almost a year and a half later*, in the summer of 1910, to reckon with these suggestions. And they were forced to do so by events in their own camp. They had almost completely evaded the direct answer demanded in certain contemptible, out-of-date, atrophied, useless, pernicious, "hopeless quarters", when suddenly, a year and a half later, a "trend" arises among the liquidators themselves, which also demands a direct answer and which challengingly gives a direct answer!

As was to be expected, the role of "challenger" was assumed by Y. Larin; but this time he was not alone. Larin, we know, is the *enfant terrible* of opportunism. He is distinguished by a great fault (from the point of view of the opportunists); he takes the trends that appear among them seriously, sincerely and thoughtfully, tries to link them up into a consistent whole, to think them out to the end, to obtain direct answers, to draw practical conclusions. Those who are familiar with Larin's book on a broad workers' party (it appeared three or four years ago) will certainly remember how he crushed in his fervent embraces Axelrod's notorious idea of a labour congress.

In March 1910, Larin began to publish a series of articles in *Vozrozhdeniye* on this very question of the social structure of state power, the prospects for the future, and liquidationism. He was joined by Mr. Piletsky. Both writers tackled these questions, to which they vainly sought a direct answer in their liquidationist camp, with the zeal of neophytes, and they began to hit out right and left: no use talking of serfdom in present-day Russia, the government has *already* evolved into a bourgeois government. "Both the first and the second "elements," says Larin singling out the notorious "third element",[90] "may sleep in peace; October 1905 is not on the order of the day" (*Vozrozhdeniye*, No. 9-10, p. 20). "If the Duma were abolished, it would be restored more rapidly than in post-revolutionary Austria, which

abolished the Constitution in 1851 only to recognise it again in 1860, nine years later, without any revolution, simply because it was in the interests of the most influential section of the ruling classes, the section whose economy was run on capitalist lines. Eventually, the struggle of the various sections of the ruling classes amongst themselves after the social system of bourgeois relations has been extended, will force them in our country, as elsewhere, to expand the framework of the electoral system" (ibid., p. 26). "The process of bringing Russia into the capitalist world ... is being completed in the political sphere as well. This means that at the present stage a *nation-wide* revolutionary movement like that of 1905 is impossible" (p. 27).

"Thus, since power [according to Larin's conclusions] is not vested 'almost entirely' in the hands of the feudal landowners, the struggle for power by the 'capitalists of land and factory' against the feudal landowners cannot be transformed into a nation-wide struggle against the existing government" (No. 11, p. 9). "...To base one's tactical line on the expectation of an approaching 'nation-wide revival' would mean condemning oneself to fruitless waiting" (ibid., p. 11). "One must not sit between two stools. If nothing has changed in the social nature of the government, then the tasks and the forms of activity *will necessarily* prove to be the old ones, and the only thing left to do is 'fight the liquidators'. But if anyone wants to go further, *to build the new* to replace, to continue and to raise up the old that is in ruins and has become useless, then let him be consistent and realise what *the conditions for construction* are" (ibid., p. 14).

Well, isn't that Larin naïve? He demands that the opportunists be "consistent", that they should not try "to sit between two stools".

The editors of *Vozrozhdeniye* were taken aback. In No. 9-10 they announced that they disagreed with Larin and wrote that while he revealed "freshness of thought", "Y. Larin's articles failed to convince us". In No. 11, apparently on behalf of the editors, V. Mirov wrote disagreeing with Larin, and acknowledged that Larin and Piletsky represented "a definite *trend* which theoretically has not yet been definitely established, but which speaks in very clear language" (the greatest defect from the standpoint of the oppor-

tunists!). Mr. Mirov wrote: "Larin has touched on another question of liquidationism incidentally and unexpectedly [just like that! this restless Larin with his "very clear language" is always causing annoyance to his friends!]. It seems to us that there is no close connection between the way in which the Party is to be built up and the nature of the Russian Government, and we reserve to ourselves the right to deal separately with this matter" (issue of July 7, 1910, p. 22).

It was L. Martov in *Zhizn*, No. 1, of August 30, 1910, who "dealt separately" with the matter on behalf of that "we". He declared (p. 4) that "he could only join" with V. Mirov and the editors against Larin. Thus the last word in this entire discussion among the liquidators has been uttered by L. Martov.

Let us take a close look at this last word of the liquidators.

As usual, Martov tackles the matter in a very lively manner and very ... "dexterously". He begins by saying that "a careful search was made for the bourgeoisie in power, or for the ruling bourgeoisie, immediately after the coup d'état of June 3, 1907". "The June Third regime is that of the domination of the Russian trading and industrial bourgeoisie. This conception was accepted equally by the above-mentioned group of Menshevik writers (Larin, Piletsky) and by their opposites, the orthodox Bolsheviks, who in 1908" wrote "about the birth of a bourgeois monarchy in Russia".

Isn't this a priceless gem of "dexterity"? Larin reproaches Martov for trying to sit between two stools and bluntly admits, without subterfuges and stratagems, that it is necessary to fight the liquidators if the answer to the vexed questions given by the "orthodox" is not to be redrafted.

But Martov "dexterously" turns somersaults in mid-air and attempts to persuade the readers (who in August 1910 had no opportunity whatever of hearing the other side) that "this scheme" "*was equally acceptable*" to both Larin and the "orthodox"!!

This dexterity smacks of that of Burenin or Menshikov[91] for it is impossible to imagine a more shameless ... deviation from the truth.

Among other things, Martov writes in the same article: "In literary discussions people usually forget who really

'started it'". True, that happens in discussions *among literary men* in which there is no question of working out an exact, properly formulated answer to vexed questions. But it is *precisely not* a discussion among literary men and *not just a literary* "*discussion*" with which we are dealing. L. Martov is *fully aware* of the fact but deliberately misleads the readers of *Zhizn*. Martov knows perfectly well the nature of the formulated answer given and supported by the "orthodox". Martov knows perfectly well that it is precisely this answer that Larin is fighting, calling it "ossified routine", "building castles in the air", etc. Martov knows perfectly well that *he himself* and all his adherents and colleagues rejected the formulated answer given by the "orthodox". Martov knows perfectly well "who really started it", who began (and finished) the framing of the precise answer, and who confined himself to sniggering and expressing dissent, without giving *any* answer at all.

It is impossible to imagine a more disgusting, a more dishonest trick than the one played by L. Martov! Larin by his straightforwardness and outspokenness painfully hurt the diplomats of liquidationism when he admitted (though only after a year and a half) that it was quite impossible to dispense with a definite answer. They cannot face the truth. And L. Martov tries to deceive the reader by making it appear that Larin accepts a scheme that is identical" with that of the orthodox, although in reality the two schemes are *opposed to each other*; Larin's scheme *implies* the justification of liquidationism, that of the "orthodox" *implies* the condemnation of liquidationism.

In order to cover up his trick, Martov picks out from the "scheme" *one* little word and distorts its connection with the context (a method worked out to perfection by Burenin and Menshikov). Martov asserts that the "orthodox" wrote about the "birth of a bourgeois monarchy in Russia"—and since Larin writes that there can be no talk of feudalism in Russia, that the government is already bourgeois—"ergo" the schemes of Larin and of the "orthodox" are "*identical*"!! The trick is done; and the reader who believes Martov is fooled.

In reality, however, the "scheme", or, to be more precise, the answer of the orthodox, is that the old power in Russia

is "*taking another step in the transformation* into a bourgeois monarchy"; and that the path of capitalist development should be such as would "*preserve* their power and their revenue for *precisely the feudal type* of landowners" and that as a result of this state of affairs "the *basic* factors of economic and political life which called forth" the first crisis in the beginning of the twentieth century "*continue to operate*".

Larin says that the government is *already* bourgeois, therefore only partisans of "ossified routine" speak of the "preservation of power" by the feudal landowners, therefore the "basic factors" of the former upsurge *no* longer operate, therefore it is necessary to build something new "in place of 'the old that has become useless'".

The "orthodox" say that the government is taking *another* step *along the path* of transformation into a bourgeois (not government in general, but) monarchy, while the real power remains and is preserved in the hands of the feudal landowners, so that the "basic factors" of former tendencies, of the former type of evolution "continue to operate", and therefore those who talk of "the old that has become useless" are liquidators who *in reality* are captives of the liberals.

The contrast between the two schemes, between the two answers is obvious. We have before us two different *complete* answers, which lead to different conclusions.

Martov is juggling *à la* Burenin, alleging that *both* answers "*speak of*" the "birth of a bourgeois monarchy". One might with equal justice refer to the fact that both answers recognise the continuing capitalist development of Russia! *On the basis* of the common recognition (by all Marxists and by all those who wish to be Marxists) of capitalist development, *a dispute is proceeding* as to the degree, forms and conditions of that development. Martov confuses the issue in order to represent what is beyond dispute as the point at issue. It is on the basis of the *common* recognition (by all Marxists and by all those who wish to be Marxists) of the development of the old power *along the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy* that the dispute is proceeding as to the degree, forms, conditions and course of this transformation; and Martov confuses the issue (do the former factors continue to operate, is it admissible to renounce the old forms, etc.?) in order to represent what is beyond dispute as the point at issue!

That the government of Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been generally evolving "along the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy" is not denied by Larin, just as hitherto it has never been denied by *any* sane man wishing to be a Marxist. The proposal to substitute the word "plutocratic" for the adjective "bourgeois" incorrectly appraises the *degree* of this transformation, but it dares not dispute *in principle* the fact that the actual "path", the path of real evolution, *lies* precisely in this transformation. Let him try to assert that the monarchy of 1861-1904 (i.e., undoubtedly a less capitalistic monarchy than the present one) does *not* represent *one* of the steps "in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy" when it is compared with the period of serfdom under Nicholas I!

Martov does not try to assert this, but on the contrary, "joins" V. Mirov, who, in refutation of Larin, refers to the bourgeois character of the Witte reforms and of the reforms of the sixties![92]

Now let the reader judge of the "dexterity" of Mirov and Martov. At first, in opposition to Larin, they repeat the arguments which *a year and a half ago* were used by the "orthodox" against the closest friends, adherents and colleagues of Martov and Mirov, and then they assure the reader that the "schemes" of Larin and of the "orthodox" are identical.

This is not only an example of "literary scribbling" versus politics (for politics demands definite and direct answers, whereas literary men often confine themselves to beating about the bush); it is more than that—it is an example of the degradation of literature to the level of Bureninism.

After quoting the above words of Larin that "if nothing has changed", etc., "then ... the only thing to do is to fight the liquidators", Martov replies to him:

> "Hitherto we thought that our tasks were determined by the social structure of the society in which we act and that the forms of our activity were determined, in the first place, by these tasks and, in the second place, by *political conditions*. The 'social nature of the government' has, therefore, no *direct* [the italics are Martov's] bearing on the determination of our tasks and forms of activity."

This is not an answer, but an empty, evasive phrase. Martov again attempts to confuse the issue, to shift the

dispute to irrelevant ground. The question is not whether the social nature of the government is *directly* or *indirectly* connected with the tasks and forms of activity. Even if this connection is an *indirect* one it will in no way alter things once the close and indissoluble connection is recognised. Martov does not venture to say a *word* against the recognition of this close and indissoluble connection. His reference to "political conditions" is nothing but dust thrown in the eyes of the reader. To draw a contrast between "the social nature of the government" and the "political conditions" is as senseless as if I were to contrast goloshes made by human hands, to overshoes. Overshoes are goloshes. And there are no other goloshes than those made by human hands. The nature of the government corresponds to the "political conditions". And the nature of the government can never be anything but social.

The sum total of all this is that Martov "beat about the bush" and evaded a direct answer to Larin. He evaded an answer because he had no answer to give. Larin is quite right in stating that views on the "social nature of the government" (to be more precise—its economic nature) are closely and inseparably connected with views on the "tasks and forms of activity". Both Larin and the "orthodox" acknowledge and apply this connection. Martov (and his tribe) displays no such consistency in his views. That is why Martov is compelled to wriggle and make shift with "overshoes".

Listen further.

"There flashed more or less clearly in the minds of these Mensheviks [Martov is referring to Kogan, *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, as an *example*] the idea of the gradual, so to speak 'organic', entry of the working class into that 'legal country'* which received the rudim-

* Perhaps not all readers will understand this gallicism which to my mind is an extreme misfit. "Legal country" is a literal translation of the French *pays légal* which implies those classes or groups, those strata of the population which are represented in parliament and which, unlike the masses of the people, enjoy constitutional privileges. Incidentally, this is typical and may serve as an appraisal of Martov's vacillations. He does not want to admit that Russia in 1908-10 took "another step in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy". But he does admit that the "bourgeoisie" (and not the plutocracy) on June 3, 1907, "obtained the rudiments of a constitutional regime". Who can make head or tail of this?

ents of a constitutional regime, of gradual extension of the June Third privileges of the bourgeoisie [not "plutocracy", eh?] to broad democratic circles. If such were really the fundamental principles of contemporary 'liquidationism' in quotation marks, or of contemporary 'legalism', we would be confronted with the actual liquidation of our traditions, with actual legalism elevated to a principle, with a break in principle with all our past. We would have to wage a serious struggle with such liquidationism.... Are we really destined to see the reformists *creeping into* the regime of a renovated Tolmachovism?" Then comes a footnote by Martov: "Of course [!!] I do not suspect Larin of reformist tendencies".

This long quotation was necessary in order to demonstrate Martov's "method" clearly to the reader. He admits that reformism "flashed more or less clearly" in the mind of Kogan (a Menshevik who systematically collaborates in serious "works" with Martov). He admits that *if* reformism were really the fundamental principle of liquidationism it would be a "break with the past". He hurls a ringing, noisy, stinging phrase at the "reformists" who are "creeping into" etc. And he winds up with, what do you think? with an assurance that he, *of course*, "does not suspect" Larin of reformist "tendencies"!

This is exactly what Eduard Bernstein, Jean Jaurès or Ramsay MacDonald say. They all "admit" that in the minds of certain "extremists" there "flashes" something that is bad: reformism, liberalism. They all admit that *if* liberalism were the "fundamental principle" of *their* policy, that would be a "break with the past". They all hurl ringing, noisy, stinging phrases at the "liberals who are cringing", etc. And they all wind up with ... assurances that they "do not suspect" the Larins—I beg pardon—they "do not suspect" their more candid, more "Right" comrades, adherents, friends, colleagues and collaborators, of liberal-bourgeois tendencies.

The crux of the matter is this: in the articles quoted Larin gave an exposition of the "system" of views of the most undoubted, most genuine reformism! To deny this means denying the obvious, robbing the concept reformism of all meaning. And if you "refute" Larin, "condemn" reformism as "a principle", hurl ringing phrases at those who are "creeping into", and at the same time positively assert that you "do not suspect" Larin of reformism, surely you thereby

expose yourselves completely! By this you prove to the hilt that your reference to your hostility "on principle" to "reformism as a principle" is the same as the vow of a peddlar who says: "Believe me, upon my oath, I paid more for it".

Believe me, upon my oath: I condemn reformism as a principle, *but* I do not "suspect" Larin of reformism (those *suspicious* orthodox people are really disgusting!), and I am at one with Larin in his liquidationist practice.

Such is the "detailed formula" of present-day Russian opportunism.

Here is an example of the application of this formula by Martov *himself*, whom naïve people (or those unable to understand the depth of the *new* re-grouping) still regard as an "undoubted" non-liquidator:

> "The tactics which are to be observed in the activities of the so-called 'liquidators'," writes Martov on pp. 9-10, "are those which place the open workers' movement in the centre, strive to extent it in every possible direction, and seek *within* [the italics are Martov's this open workers' movement, and only there [note: and only there!], the elements for the revival of the Party."

This is what Martov says. And this is nothing but reformism *creeping into* the regime of a renovated Tolmachovism.[93] The italics "creeping into" I have borrowed from Martov himself, for it is important to note that it is *precisely* "creeping into" that Martov *in fact* preaches in the words just quoted. Irrespective of the extent to which such preachings are accompanied by oaths and imprecations against "reformism as a principle", the *matter* is not changed one iota. In reality, having said "and only there", and "in the centre", Martov specifically pursues a reformist policy (in the particular situation in Russia in 1908-10); and as to the vows, promises, assurances, oaths—let political babes believe them.

> "The disputes between Marx and Willich-Schapper in the early fifties of the last century hinged precisely [!!] on the question of the importance of secret societies and the possibility of leading the political struggle *from within them*.... The Blanquist [in France in the sixties] 'prepared' for these events [the downfall of Bonapartism] by setting up secret societies and bottling up individual workers in them, but the French section of the Marxists ... went into the labour organisations, founded them and 'fought for legality' by every-means...."

The cases mentioned are tunes from *quite* a different opera. The dispute between Marx and Willich in the fifties, between the Blanquists[94] and the Marxists in the sixties, *was not one of* whether it was necessary to seek "elements for the revival of the Party" "only" within "peaceful, tolerated organisations" (Martov, *Zhizn*, No. 1, p. 10). Martov knows this perfectly well and is wasting his time trying to mislead his readers. Neither of *these* disputes was conducted over the "revival" of the workers' party; at that time it was impossible to dispute about its revival because it had *never* existed. These two disputes hinged on the question of whether a workers' party—a party based on the *working-class* movement, a *class* party—was necessary at all. That was what Willich denied and the Blanquists of the sixties again denied, as Martov well knows, although he tries to *obscure* matters in dispute *today* by general talk about what is now indisputable. The view that "*only*" in peaceful and tolerated organisations should one seek elements for the revival or for the birth of the Party was *never* shared by Marx, *either* in the fifties or in the sixties; *even at the end of the seventies*, during an immeasurably higher phase of development of capitalism and bourgeois monarchy, Marx and Engels declared *ruthless* war on the German opportunists who had wiped out the recent past of the German party, deplored "extremes", talked of "more civilised" forms of the movement (in the language of the present-day Russian liquidators it is called "Europeanisation"), and advocated the idea that "*only*" in "peaceful and tolerated" organisations should one "seek the elements for the revival", etc.

"To sum up," writes Martov. "The fact that the present regime is an inherently contradictory combination of absolutism and constitutionalism, and that the Russian working class has sufficiently matured to follow the example of the workers of the progressive countries of the West in striking at this regime through the Achilles heel of its contradictions is ample material for the theoretical substantiation and political justification of what the Mensheviks who remain true to Marxism are now doing."

Martov's words ("ample material") are also *ample material* for us to make our summary from. Martov regards as "ample" what is recognised by both the Cadets and a section of the Octobrists. In January 1911 it was none other than

Rech that formulated the question in the way Martov proposed its formulation in August 1910: a contradictory combination of constitutionalism and anti-constitutionalism; two camps—for the constitution and against it. What is *ample* for *Rech* is "ample" for Martov. There is not a *grain* of Marxism in this. Marxism has completely disappeared and has been replaced by liberalism. The fact that we have a "contradictory combination" is *not by any means* "ample" for a Marxist. Marxism only begins with the beginning of the realisation or understanding that this truth is not enough, that it contains within itself a spoonful of truth and a barrel of untruth, that it obscures the depth of the contradictions, that it embellishes reality and rejects the only possible means of finding a way out of the situation.

"The contradictory combination" of the old regime and constitutionalism exists not only in present-day Russia, but also in present-day Germany and even in present-day England (the House of Lords; the Crown's independence of the people's representatives in matters of foreign policy, etc.). What, then, is the position taken up *in reality* (i.e., irrespective of good wishes and pious speeches) by the politician who declares that it is "ample" for a Russian to recognise what is true as regards Germany as well as England? Such a politician is, *in reality*, taking the stand of a *liberal*, of a Cadet. Even a more or less consistent bourgeois democrat in our country cannot, and does not, take such a stand. Martov's *last word*, his concluding *formula* which sums up the entire discussion among the liquidators, is a remarkably exact, a strikingly clear and exhaustively complete expression of *liberal* views smuggled in under a pseudo-Marxist flag.

When the liberals, not only the Cadets, but also a section of the Octobrists, say that it is *ample* for the theoretical substantiation and political justification of our activity to recognise the inherently contradictory combination of the old regime and constitutionalism, the liberals are remaining quite true to themselves. In these words they give a really precise, liberal formula, the formula of the liberal policy of 1908-10 (if not of 1906-10). A Marxist, on the other hand, reveals his Marxism only when and to the extent that he explains the *inadequacy and falsity* of this formula, which eliminates

those specific features which radically and in principle distinguish the Russian "contradictions" from those of the English and German. The liberal says: "It is ample to admit that a great many things in our country contradict constitutionalism". The Marxist replies: "Such an admission is altogether inadequate. It must be understood that there is no elementary, fundamental, cardinal, essential, necessary basis *for* 'constitutionalism' *at all*. The fundamental error of liberalism is that it declares that there is such a basis, whereas there is not; and this error accounts for the impotence of liberalism and is itself explained by the impotence of bourgeois altruism".

Translating this political antinomy into the language of economics, we may formulate it as follows. The liberal assumes that the path of economic (capitalist) development is already mapped out, defined, completed, that it is now only a matter of removing obstacles and contradictions from *that* path. The Marxist believes that this particular path of capitalist development has not, so far, provided a way out of the impasse, *despite* such undoubted bourgeois progress in economic evolution as was marked by November 9, 1906 (or June 14, 1910), the Third Duma, etc.; and he believes that there is *another* path which is *also* a path of capitalist development, a path that can lead us on to the high road, a path which must be pointed out, which must be explained, prepared, insisted upon, pursued, in spite of all the vacillation, lack of faith and faint-heartedness of liberalism.

Martov argues with Larin as if he himself were much more to the "Left" than Larin. Many naïve people allow themselves to be deceived by this and say: certainly, Potresov, Levitsky and Larin are liquidators, certainly, they are of the extreme Right, something like Russian Rouanet[95]; but Martov—Martov is certainly no liquidator! In reality, however, Martov's flamboyant phrases against Larin, against the creeping reformists, are only a blind, for in his *conclusion*, in his last word, in his *resumé*, Martov *actually* supports Larin. Martov is not more "Left" than Larin; he is only more diplomatic, more unprincipled than Larin; he hides himself more cunningly beneath the gaudy rags of pseudo-Marxist phrases. Martov's conclusion that recognition of the contradictory combination is "ample", provides just that *corrobo-*

ration of liquidationism (and liberalism) which Larin requires. But Larin wants to justify this conclusion, to prove it, to think it out to the end, to make it a matter of principle. And Martov says to Larin, as Vollmar, Auer and the other "old birds" of opportunism used to say to the young opportunist Eduard Bernstein: "Dear Larin—I mean dear Eddy—you are an ass! Such things are done, but not talked about". "Dear Larin, for you and me, liquidationist practice should be 'ample', the liberal recognition of the contradiction between the old regime and constitutionalism is 'ample'; but, for God's sake, don't go any further, don't 'deepen' the question, don't seek clarity and consistency of principles, don't make any appraisals of the 'present situation', *for that would expose us both*. Let us act and not talk."

Martov teaches Larin how to be an opportunist.

"One must not sit between two stools," says Larin to Martov, demanding an explanation and justification of the liquidator principles so dear to both of them.

"Well, what sort of opportunist are you," replies Martov, "if you don't know how to sit between two stools?" What sort of opportunist are you if you insist on exact, clear and direct justification of the principles of our practice? It is the business of a real opportunist to sit between two stools, he must advocate the "tactics-as-a-process"* (remember Martynov and Krichevsky in the period of 1901), he must drift with the stream, cover up his traces, evade all matters of principle. Take Bernstein, he knows now (after the lessons given him by Vollmar, Auer, etc.) how to be a revisionist *without proposing* any amendments to the *orthodox* Erfurt *profession de foi*.[96] And we two must also know how to act as liquidators *without proposing* any amendments to the *orthodox* formal answer (of 1908) given to the "vexed questions" of the day.[97] In order to be a real opportunist, my dear, dear Larin, one must do the *creeping* in reality, in one's practice, in the way one goes about one's work; but, in words, before the public, in speeches, in the press, one must not only abstain from seeking theories justifying the act of *creeping*, but, on the contrary, one must shout all the more loudly against those who creep, one must all the more

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 387-97.—*Ed.*

assiduously vow and protest that we are not of the creeping kind.

Larin was silenced. Probably, in the depths of his heart he could not help admitting that Martov was a more skilful diplomat, a more subtle opportunist.

We must examine still another aspect of Martov's concluding formula: it is "ample" to recognise the contradictory nature of the combination of the old regime and constitutionalism. Compare this formula with V. Levitsky's *notorious* formula—"*Not* hegemony, *but* a class party" (*Nasha Zarya*, No. 7). In this formula Levitsky (the Larin of *Nasha Zarya*) expressed, only in a more direct, open, principled manner, what Potresov confused, glossed over, covered up and clothed in pretentious phrases when, under the influence of Plekhanov's ultimatums, he *cleaned up* and revised the article he wrote *against* the hegemony of the proletariat.

Martov's formula and that of Levitsky are two sides of the same medal. The object of the next article will be to explain this circumstance for the benefit of Martov who pretends not to understand the connection between the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat and the question of liquidationism.

P.S. The present article had already been sent to press when we received *Dyelo Zhizni*, No. 2, containing the conclusion of Y. Larin's article "Right Turn and About Turn!" Larin explains reformism, of which L. Martov "of course does not suspect" him, as clearly in the new liquidationist magazine as he explained it previously. For the present, we shall confine ourselves to quoting the *substance* of the reformist programme:

"A state of perplexity and uncertainty, when people simply do not know what to expect of the coming day, what tasks to set themselves—that is what results from indeterminate, temporising moods, from vague hopes of either a repetition of the revolution or of 'we shall wait and see'. The immediate task is, not to wait fruitlessly for something to turn up, but to imbue broad circles with the guiding idea that, in the ensuing historical period of Russian life, the working class must organise itself not for revolution', not 'in expectation

of a revolution', but simply for the determined and systematic defence of its particular interests in all spheres of life; for the gathering and training of its forces for this many-sided and complex activity; for the training and building-up in this way of socialist consciousness in general; for acquiring the ability to orientate itself [to find its bearings]—and to assert itself—particularly in the complicated relations of the social classes of Russia during the coming constitutional reform of the country after the economically inevitable self-exhaustion of feudal reaction...." (p. 18).

This tirade expresses exactly the entire spirit and meaning of Larin's "programme" and of *all* the liquidationist writings in *Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye*, *Dyelo Zhizni*, and others, including L. Martov's "ample" which we have examined above. It is the purest and most complete reformism. We cannot dwell on it now; we cannot examine it here in the detail it deserves. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a brief remark. The Left Cadets, the non-party socialists, the petty-bourgeois democrats (like the "Popular Socialists") and reformists who would like to be Marxists, preach the following programme to the workers: gather your forces, train yourselves, learn, defend your interests *simply* in order to stand up for yourselves during the coming constitutional reform. Such a programme curtails, narrows and emasculates the political tasks of the working class in the period 1908-11 in the same manner as the Economists emasculated these tasks in the period 1896-1901. The old Economists, deluding themselves and others, liked to refer to Belgium (the predominance of reformism among the Belgians was recently brought to light by the excellent writings of de Man and Brouckère; we shall revert to these another time); the Neo-Economists, i.e., the liquidators, like to refer to the peaceful way in which a constitution was obtained in Austria in 1867. Both the old Economists and our liquidators choose instances, cases, episodes in the history of the working-class movement and democracy in Europe that occurred when the workers, for one, reason or another, were weak, lacked class-consciousness and were dependent on the bourgeoisie—and they advance such instances as a model for Russia. Both the Economists and the liquidators serve as conductors for bourgeois influence among the proletariat.

Mysl, No. 4, March 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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POLEMICAL NOTES

In an article entitled "The Results of the Artisans' Congress" in *Nasha Zarya*, No. 2, Mr. B. Bogdanov formulates his conclusions as follows:

> "The striving to break with the old underground and embark upon really open public and political activity—such is the new feature which also characterises the latest phase of our labour movement." (P. 73.) "At a moment of heightened activity in public life, on the eve of by-elections in Moscow and general elections to the Fourth State Duma, the fact is very keenly felt that the politically organised section of the proletariat exercises no influence. The entire activity of the organised workers during recent years has been directed toward the revival of this independent political force. Consciously or unconsciously, all the participants of this movement are becoming agents of the reviving party of the proletariat. But the task of its organised section is not so much to accelerate this movement, not so much to give it formal shape prematurely, as to contribute to its development and lend it the greatest possible scope by drawing the widest possible masses into it and by resolutely breaking with the inactivity of the underground and its stupefying atmosphere." (Pp. 74-75.)

Only in newspapers of the *Novoye Vremya* type, and possibly also in the writings of embittered renegades to liberalism like Mr. Struve and Co., have we hitherto met with such howls about the "stupefying" atmosphere, and similar hysterical cries and appeals to "break" with it. Hitherto it has been the rule for that political press which is considered in any way decent and honest, not to use a particular platform to attack things that cannot be defended from that same platform. For over a year now, however, the crowd of liquidators, which includes B. Bogdanov, Levitsky, Potresov, and others, has been successfully "overcoming" this antiquated democratic prejudice, systematically choosing for their appeals to "break resolutely", etc., only those platforms which assure them a monopoly in any discussion on

the point at issue. It only remains for us to place on record this "well-protected" war waged against the "stupefying atmosphere" and—to pillory the warriors.

The Bogdanovs, Levitskys, and Potresovs juggle with facts when they refer to the workers' urge to act openly and then draw their *own* conclusion that *the workers* are striving to break with the "stupefying atmosphere". They rely for the success of their jugglery on its being impossible for us, the opponents of liquidationism, to make public the facts, known to the Bogdanovs, which testify to the *indignation* of the workers who at various congresses come out openly *against intellectuals* who advocate "breaking" with the underground. At the beginning of 1911, the workers, to their great honour be it said, are striving to engage in open political activity just as energetically as they were, for example, at the beginning of 1905; but neither then nor now have *the workers* ever revolted against the "stupefying atmosphere", nor have they ever wanted "to break" with it. The only ones who may be correctly said to be striving to "break resolutely" are the renegade intellectuals.

Indeed, the reader would do well to reflect on the following fact. A group of writers has been vociferating, particularly since January 1910, about a "*striving to break with the old*", and to "*embark upon really open political activity*". During this period alone, this group has published more than twenty issues of its *own* magazines (*Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye*, *Zhizn*, *Dyelo Zhizni*), not to mention books, pamphlets, and articles in journals and newspapers that are not specifically liquidationist in character. How then, may it be asked, are we to account for the fact that writers who have been working so energetically in the journalistic field, and who speak with so much conviction of the need "resolutely to break with the old" and to "embark upon really open political activity" have so far *themselves*, in *their own group*, not ventured, not plucked up the courage to "break resolutely" with "the old" and to "embark upon really open political activity" with a programme, platform and tactics that would mark a "resolute break" with the "stupefying atmosphere"?

What kind of a comedy is this? What hypocrisy! They speak of "the revival of this political force", rail at "the stupe-

fying atmosphere", demand a *break* with the old, preach "really open political activity", and at the same time refrain from substituting for it *any* programme, *any* platform, *any* tactics and *any* organisation! Why is it that our legalists, our would-be Marxists, lack even as much political honesty as was displayed by the Peshekhonovs and other publicists contributing to *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[98] who began to speak of the stupefying atmosphere and of the need to "embark upon really open political activity" much earlier (beginning from 1905-06) and who *practised what they preached*, actually "broke resolutely with the old", actually came out with an "open" programme, an "open" platform, "open" tactics and an "open" organisation?

Honesty in politics is the result of strength; hypocrisy is the result of weakness. The Peshekhonovs and Co. are a force among the Narodniks, therefore they come out really "openly". The Bogdanovs, Levitskys, Potresovs and Co. are weak among the Marxists and at every step are repulsed by the class-conscious workers; that is why they play the hypocrite, take cover and do not venture *to come out openly* with a programme and tactics of "really open political activity".

The Peshekhonovs and Co. are so strong among the Narodniks that they carry their wares under their own flag. The Bogdanovs, Levitskys, Potresovs, and Martovs are so weak among the Marxists that they are compelled to smuggle in their goods under a foreign flag. In their petty intellectualist magazine (*Nasha Zarya*) they summon up courage and shout: there is no "hierarchy", we must "resolutely break with the old" and "embark upon really open political activity". But when they face the workers, our liquidators act according to the saying: A lion among the lambs becomes a lamb among the lions.

When facing the workers our heroes, who show such enthusiasm for "open political activity" act *anything but openly* and do not offer *any* open programme, tactics or organisation. Hence the reason for the wise diplomacy of Mr. Bogdanov, who, in summarising "the results" of the artisans' congress, offers the advice "not ... to accelerate" the movement for really open political activity, "not ... to give it formal shape prematurely". It looks as if Mr. Bog-

danov has tried to give *formal shape* to his liquidationist plans, and present them to the workers, but burned his fingers in the attempt. This defecting intellectual met with a rebuff from the workers who, even when they err, act more straightforwardly and demand a straightforward answer ("You want us to break with the old? Well, why not come out openly and honestly with what you propose in its place?"). And Mr. B. Bogdanov, like the fox in Krylov's fable, consoles himself by saying—sour grapes! We must not give the new a formal shape prematurely; while breaking with the old we must keep on waving its flag when we go to the workers—don't hurry with the new.

You may say that this means sitting between two stools. But such is precisely the nature of all opportunism. That is precisely what characterises the bourgeois intellectual of today who *plays* at Marxism. Mr. Struve played at Marxism from 1894 to 1898. The Bogdanovs, Levitskys and Potresovs have been playing at Marxism from 1908 to 1911. The liquidators today, like the Economists of those days, serve as the channel for that same bourgeois influence among the proletariat.

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THE MEANING OF THE CRISIS

The notorious Cabinet and political crisis of which so much has been written in the press, poses more profound questions than the liberals, who are making the most noise about it, think. They say that the crisis confronts us with the problem of violation of the Constitution. Actually what the crisis confronts us with is the Cadets' and the Octobrists' mistaken conception of the Constitution, the profound delusion entertained on that score by the two parties. The more widespread this delusion becomes the more insistently must we explain it. The more the Cadets try to use their accusations against the Octobrists as a means of peddling their wrong ideas about the allegedly "constitutional" character of the crisis, ideas common to the Octobrists and the Cadets, the more important it is to explain this community of ideas now being revealed.

Let us take the recent reflections of *Rech* and *Russkiye Vedomosti* on the slogan for the elections to the Fourth Duma. For or against the Constitution—that, say the two main Cadet publications, is how the question is being and will continue to be presented.

Now take a look at the reasoning of the Octobrists. Here is a typical article by Mr. Gromoboi in *Golos Moskvy* for March 30. It is entitled "A Disturbed Ant-Hill". The Octobrist publicist tries to persuade those, in his opinion, conscientious defenders of Mr. Stolypin who "fear the idea of joining the opposition" by proving to them "that they are taking the wrong steps". "To a constitutionalist," exclaims Mr. Gromoboi, "there can be no graver sin than the violation of the Constitution." What can be said on the essence of the matter? asks Mr. Gromoboi; and answering, says:

"Again the flintlock, nationalism, volitional impulses, state necessity? Alas, we have heard all that before, and we have also heard promises that were not justified."

To the Octobrists (and to the *Vekhi* writers who understood most deeply and expressed most vividly the spirit of Cadetism) Stolypin's policy was an attractive "promise". This "promise", the Octobrists confess, was not justified.

What does that mean?

Actually, Stolypin's policy was not a promise, but has been the stark political and economic reality of Russian life in the last four (or even five) years. Both June 3, 1907, and November 9, 1906 (June 14, 1910), were not promises but reality. This reality has been put over and enforced by the representatives of the big landowning nobility and of the élite of the merchant and industrial capitalists, organised on a national scale. When today the spokesman of the Octobrist, Moscow (and, consequently, the all-Russia) capitalists says—"they have not been justified"—that sums up a definite phase of political history, a definite system of attempts to satisfy, through the Third Duma, through Stolypin's agrarian policy, etc., the demands of the epoch, the demands of Russia's capitalist development. The Octobrist capitalists worked conscientiously and assiduously, sparing nothing—not even their pockets—to help these attempts; but now they are obliged to confess that the promise has not justified itself.

Consequently, it is not a matter of broken promises, or of "violation of the Constitution"—for it is ridiculous to dissociate March 14, 1911, from June 3, 1907; the point is that the demands of the epoch cannot be satisfied through what the Octobrists and the Cadets call the "Constitution".

The "Constitution" which gave the majority to the Cadets in the First and Second Dumas could not satisfy the demands of the times, nor can these be satisfied by the "Constitution" which made the Octobrists the decisive party (in the Third Duma). When today the Octobrists say—"they have not been justified", the meaning of this confession, and of the crisis which has extorted it, is that the constitutional illusions both of the Cadets and of the Octobrists have again been shattered, this time finally and completely.

The democratic movement jolted the old out of its groove. The Cadets deprecated the "excesses" of the democratic movement and promised to accomplish the new by peaceful, "constitutional" means. These hopes were not justified. It was Mr. Stolypin who tackled the job of accomplishing the new—but in such a way as to ensure that the changed forms would reinforce the old, that the organisation of the diehard landowners and of the pillars of capital would fortify the old, and that the substitution of private ownership of land for the village commune would create a new stratum of defenders of the old. For years the Octobrists, working hand in glove with Mr. Stolypin, tried to bring this about, "unhampered by the menace" of the democratic movement which for the time being had been suppressed.

These hopes have not been justified.

What has been justified is the words of those who pointed out the futility and harmfulness of constitutional illusions in epochs of rapid and radical changes such as the early twentieth century in Russia.

The three years of the Third, Octobrist Duma, and of its Octobrist "Constitution", of the Octobrists' "life of peace and love" with Stolypin, have not vanished without leaving a trace: the country has made further economic progress, and all and sundry "Right" political parties have developed, grown, shown their worth (and have spent themselves).

The agrarian policy of the Third Duma has shown itself *in operation* in most of the villages and in the most out-of-the-way parts of Russia, where it has stirred up the discontent that had lain dormant for centuries, unceremoniously revealing and accentuating the existing antagonisms, emboldening the kulak and enlightening those at the other end of the scale. The Third Duma has had its effect. And so have the first two Dumas, which produced so many good, well-meaning, innocuous and impotent wishes. The collapse of the constitutional illusions of the years 1906 to 1910, incomparably more pronounced, has been revealed within the shell of the "constitutional" crisis of 1911.

In point of fact, both Cadets and Octobrists alike based their policy on these illusions. They were the illusions of the liberal bourgeoisie, the illusions of the Centre, and there is no essential difference between the "Left" Centre (the

Cadets) and the "Right" Centre (the Octobrists), since, owing to objective conditions; both were doomed to failure. The old has been jolted out of its groove. But neither the Left nor the Right Centre has achieved the new. Who is going to accomplish this inescapable and historically inevitable new, and how, that is a moot question. The "constitutional" crisis is significant because the Octobrists, the masters of the situation, have admitted that this question is *again* an "open" one; they have written "unjustified" across even their apparently most "valid" aspirations, aspirations which are valid from the merchant's point of view, and are commercially sober and modest. The "constitutional" crisis is significant because the experience of the Octobrists has revealed the extreme narrowness, poverty and impotence of the Cadets' catchword—who is for the Constitution, and who is against it.

The democratic movement has shown this slogan to be inadequate. The Octobrist movement has corroborated it by the experience of yet another phase of Russian history. The Cadets will not succeed in dragging Russia back to the former naïve constitutional illusions.

"The orthodox Octobrists," writes Mr. Gromoboi, "are having a fit of nerves; they declare that they will resign from the Bureau, and do not know what to do about their fellow-constitutionalists Their agitation is unjustified. They should remain calm in the knowledge that truth is on their side, and that this truth is so elementary, so universally recognised, that it does not need a Copernicus or a Galileo to prove it. They should go on calmly doing their duty—declare that unlawful actions are unlawful, and without fail, making no compromises, reject the unlawful law."

That is an illusion, Mr. Gromoboi! You cannot dispense with "a Copernicus and a Galileo". Your own efforts have brought no "justification", you will not manage without them.

"When we contemplate this disturbed, teeming ant-hill—the servile press, servile orators, servile deputies [and, you might add, Mr. Gromoboi: the servile, slavish bourgeoisie]—we can only out of humanity pity them and gently remind them that they can no longer serve P. A. Stolypin; they can only cringe before him."

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

But P. A. Stolypin is not unique—he is typical; he is not an isolated individual, but is "hand in glove" with the Council of the United Nobility. The Octobrists have tried to live in harmony with him under the new conditions—under the conditions of a Duma, of a "Constitution", of the bourgeois policy of ruining the village commune *à la* Tolmachov. And if they failed in the attempt, it is by no means Stolypin's fault.

"...After all, the entire strength of people's representatives is derived from their contact with the people; and if they [the Right Octobrists] lose ... their 'identity' by the very fact that they are giving such support [support to Stolypin and his violation of the Constitution], what will they be worth then?"

So this is what we have come to! Octobrists speak of "contact with the people" as the source of "strength of people's representatives"! That is really funny. But no more so than the Cadet speeches in the First and Second Dumas about "contact with the people" alongside their speeches, say, against local land committees. The words which sound funny when uttered by Cadets and Octobrists are by no means funny in themselves; they are significant. For—despite the intentions of those who utter these words today—they express, once more, the collapse of constitutional illusions—which is a useful by-product of the "constitutional" crisis.

Zvezda, No. 18, April 16, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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CONFERENCE OF THE BRITISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Many European socialist parties have taken advantage of the Easter holidays (April 16, N.S.) to hold their conferences: the French, Belgian, Dutch (its opportunist section), the British Social-Democratic Party, and the British Independent Labour Party. We propose to draw the attention of our readers to some items discussed at the conferences of the two last-mentioned parties.

The 31st Annual Conference of the British Social-Democratic Party (S.D.P.) was held in Coventry. The most interesting item discussed was that of "armaments and foreign policy". It is well known that Britain and Germany have been arming very intensively during the past few years. Competition between these two countries in the world market is becoming increasingly acute. The danger of a military conflict is approaching more and more formidably. The bourgeois jingoist press of both countries is raining millions upon millions of inflammatory articles upon the masses, inciting them against the "enemy", howling about the inevitable danger of a "German invasion" or of a "British attack" and clamouring for increased armaments. The socialists of Britain and Germany, and also of France (whom Britain would be particularly glad to drag into war in order to have a continental land army against Germany) are devoting much attention to the threatening war, fighting with might and main against bourgeois chauvinism and armaments, and doing all they can to explain to the most backward sections of the proletariat and of the petty bourgeoisie what misfortunes ensue from a war which serves exclusively the interests of the bourgeoisie.

There were sad exceptions to this among the socialists, several of whom were prominent leaders of the British S.D.P., among them Hyndman. The latter allowed himself to be scared by the screams of the British bourgeois press about the "German menace", and went so far as to assert that Britain had to arm for defence, that she had to have a powerful navy, that Wilhelm was the aggressive party.

True, Hyndman encountered opposition, in fact very strong opposition, within the S.D.P. itself. A number of resolutions from the branches were emphatically against him.

The Coventry Congress, or Conference—to use the English term, which does not correspond in meaning to the Russian "konferentsia"—had to settle the issue. A resolution emphatically opposing any kind of jingoist point of view was proposed by the Central Hackney branch (Hackney, a district in North-East London). In its report on the Conference, *Justice*, the central organ of the S.D.P., quotes only the end of what it terms a "lengthy" resolution, calling for a determined struggle against all increases in armaments, and opposing all colonial and financial aggression. Zelda Kahan, in supporting the resolution, emphasised that during the last forty years Britain had been the aggressor, that Germany would not gain by making Britain a German province; and that no such danger existed. "The British Navy," she said, "is kept to maintain the Empire. Never had the S.D.P. made a bigger and more terrible mistake than in identifying the Party with the jingoist warmongers. As a consequence of this mistake," said Kahan, "the British Social-Democrats have placed themselves outside the international movement."

The entire Party Executive Committee, including Harry Quelch—we have to confess with shame—supported Hyndman. The "amendment" they moved declared no more nor less than the following: "This Conference holds that the maintenance of an adequate navy for national defence" is an "immediate object"!... Then, of course, it goes on to repeat all the "good old words"—about combating imperialist policy, about war against capitalism, etc. All this honey, of course, was spoiled by *a spoonful of tar*, by the phrase recognising the need for an "adequate" navy, a phrase that is

bourgeois both in its evasiveness and in its pure chauvinism. This is in 1911, a time when the British naval budget clearly reveals a tendency to unlimited growth; this is in a country whose navy "defends and protects the Empire", i.e., India included, with its population of nearly 300,000,000 that is being plundered and outraged by British bureaucrats, where "enlightened" British statesmen, like the liberal and "radical" Morley, sentence natives to *transportation* or inflict *corporal punishment* for political offences!

The miserable sophistry Quelch had to resort to may be seen from the following passage in his speech (as reported in *Justice*, which defends Hyndman)!... "If we believe in national autonomy, we must have national defence and that defence must be adequate, or it is useless. We are opposed to imperialism, whether British or German; the small nationalities under Prussian rule hate her despotism, and the small nations threatened by her regard the British Navy and German Social-Democracy as their only hope...."

How quickly those who step on the slippery slope of opportunism slide to the bottom! The British Navy, which helps to enslave India (not a very "small" nation), is placed *on a par* with German Social-Democracy as a champion of national liberty.... Zelda Kahan was right when she said that never yet had British Social-Democracy so disgraced itself. Its sectarian character, noted and condemned long ago by Engels,[99] had never before been so clearly revealed as it was by the *ease* with which even men like Quelch can *go over* to the chauvinists.

The voting on the resolution was evenly divided: 28 for the Executive Committee and 28 against. In order to win a deplorable victory—Hyndman and Quelch had to demand a branch vote, which secured them 47 votes against 33.

Some members of the Social-Democratic Party have voiced a most emphatic protest against chauvinism in their ranks; there has emerged a very strong minority ready to wage a serious struggle. The situation in the Independent Labour Party is worse: there opportunism is no rarity. There the question of whether socialists and the workers should support armaments is debated quite calmly in "discussion" articles in the official organ of the Party, *The Labour Leader* (No. 16, April 21, 1911).

The London correspondent of *Vorwärts* justly remarked that the best criticism of the position of the S.D.P. was an article in the *extremely jingoist Daily Mail* which *praised* the wisdom of the Social-Democratic leaders. He quotes the beginning of the article in that newspaper as saying: "It is encouraging to learn that, however extravagant some of the fallacies and impossible some of the ideals of the Social-Democratic Party in this country, there is at least one supremely important question on which that Party is guided by reason and common sense."

The really gratifying feature of the Birmingham Conference of the I.L.P. was that from its ranks firm and determined voices were heard protesting against the opportunist policy, the policy of dependence upon the Liberals pursued by this party in general, and by the party leader, Ramsay MacDonald, in particular. In reply to the reproach that the Labour members say little about socialism in the House of Commons, MacDonald said with virginal opportunist innocence that Parliament was hardly the place for "propaganda speeches". "The great function of the House of Commons," he said, "is to translate into legislation the socialism that is preached in the country." The speaker forgot all about the difference between bourgeois social reform and socialism! He was prepared to expect socialism from a bourgeois Parliament....

Leonard Hall pointed out in his speech that the I.L.P. had been formed in 1892 for the purpose of killing the old Labour Electoral Association which was merely a wing of liberalism. They had buried the corpse (after killing the Association), but it seemed to have revived in the Labour Party. He added that the leader of the Party was pursuing this policy in his speeches, letters and books.

Another I.L.P. member, George Lansbury, M. P., sharply criticised the policy of the Parliamentary Labour Party for its dependence upon the Liberals and its fear of "endangering" the Liberal government. Lansbury said that more than once he had been so ashamed of the conduct of the Labour members that he had nearly resigned. He went on to say that all the time the Liberals tried to keep the House busy with minor questions and that Labour members were unable to win independence for themselves. "I have never

known a time," said Lansbury, "when both Liberals and Tories had not some great question to hide the poverty question. I am in the House of Commons with the picture before me of those men and women, who night after night toiled in the slums of Bow and Bromley [poor districts in the East End of London] to send me there. They worked for me because they thought I was different from the Liberals and Tories.... They sent me to face the question of poverty, poverty, poverty.... I appeal to you," he said, addressing the Conference, "to keep a solid party in the House of Commons absolutely distinct from the convenience of Liberals and Tories. We must show no more mercy to the Liberals when they do wrong than to the Tories... The men and women who toil and suffer have nothing to hope for from either Liberals or Tories; their only hope lies in, and salvation can come from, their organised effort..." Let us "make it clear to the men and women of the slums that even in Parliament we are true to what we say outside, namely, that Liberals and Tories are the enemies of the people and socialism their only hope".

Lansbury's speech was interrupted by thunders of applause, and when he finished he received a real ovation. In Germany such speeches are an everyday occurrence. In Britain they are a novelty. And when such speeches are beginning to be delivered, when worker delegates at the Conference of the Independent Labour Party (unfortunately, very frequently independent of socialism, but dependent upon the Liberals) applaud such speeches, then we have the right to conclude that *in Britain*, too, the spirit of proletarian struggle is gaining the upper hand over the diplomacy of opportunist parliamentarians like MacDonald. (Let us add in parenthesis that this MacDonald recently sent the Italian reformists an expression of his complete sympathy with their readiness to join a bourgeois Cabinet, and his dislike for "dry theory".)

The speeches of Hall, Lansbury, and others have not changed the policy of the I.L.P. MacDonald remains at the head of the Party, and its policy will continue to be opportunist. The bourgeois influence upon the proletariat is strong—especially in democratic countries. But these speeches do not pass without leaving a trace, they undermine the influence

of the bourgeoisie and of the opportunists. When the British people get a daily newspaper going (and *both* parties are seriously thinking about this), such and only such speeches will reach the minds and hearts of the working class. The Liberals of all countries, Russia included, are rejoicing and laughing now at the sight of the predominance of opportunism in the British labour movement. But "he laughs best who laughs last".

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A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A LEGALIST AND AN OPPONENT OF LIQUIDATIONISM[100]

Legalist: It seems to me that the extreme bitterness of the struggle and controversy with the liquidators in the Social-Democratic press has over-inflamed passions and somewhat obscured the substance of the disagreement.

Anti-liquidator: Isn't it the other way round? Isn't the sharpness of the struggle due to the profundity of the ideological differences? Or you have, perhaps, also joined the camp of the "vacillators"—in other words, the "conciliators"—who are trying to bridge the gulf with hollow phrases and sweeping platitudes?

Legalist: Oh no! I am not at all inclined to "conciliate". On the contrary. The point I want to make is that the liquidators have not enough understanding of what they want and hence are not resolute enough. They are still groping in the dark and developing spontaneously, if one may put it that way. They are still afraid of pursuing their line of thought to its conclusion. That is the reason for that inconsistency, confusion and hesitancy which their opponents mistake for hypocrisy and for fraudulent methods of struggle against the illegal party, etc. The result is a free-for-all and the public at large, for whose benefit the controversy is being conducted, no longer understands what it is all about. Had they had fewer smart diplomats and more confidence in themselves, the liquidators would have proved their case sooner and smashed you to pieces.

Anti-liquidator: That all sounds very nightmarish.... Still, it would be interesting to hear your arguments.

Legalist: In my opinion, the liquidators are right. They ought to adopt the legalist label which has been hurled at them. We shall adopt it and prove that it is the legalists who give the only correct answer—correct from the

standpoint of Marxism—to the vexed problems of the working-class movement in Russia today. Do you or do you not admit that the period we are now passing through represents in some ways a distinctive stage in the economic and political evolution of Russia?

Anti-liquidator: I do.

Legalist: You do so only in words, just as your notorious "December" (1908) resolutions do. Seriously considered, an admission of this sort means that the open existence of, let us say, the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma is not an accident, but an inseparable constituent of "the present moment". The sum total of the present political conditions, the sum total of the conditions obtaining in the working-class movement, is such that it is possible and essential to have an open, *legal* Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and it is possible and essential to have an open, *legal* Social-Democratic workers' party.

Anti-liquidator: Isn't it rather risky—this jump from a Social-Democratic group in the Duma to a Social-Democratic workers' party?

Legalist: Not in the least. The only difference is that the forms in which the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma exists were determined for us from outside; all we had to do was to accept them, to enter, so to speak, into previously prepared premises, whereas it is up to us to find the forms for the existence of a legal workers' party. Here we must show initiative, we must fight for new forms. Those whom you contemptuously call liquidators have embarked upon this fight, have entered on the new path; but, unfortunately, they have only made the first stop. Unfortunately, they are still timid about it, keep looking back and confine themselves to half-measures. This may be inevitable at the beginning of the new road; but the beginning will be followed by further steps. The indecision of the first steps will disappear, and the mistakes will be rectified.

Anti-liquidator: Excellent. Will you be kind enough to explain what these mistakes are and how they will be corrected.

Legalist: With pleasure! We cannot foretell exactly what the legal workers' party of tomorrow will be like, but we can see the general direction in which the working-class

movement is developing. Once we grant that this is the direction, I can boldly draw a picture of the legal party, knowing that the actual party may not be exactly like the picture, but it will be *something like it*. And in order to draw this picture for you I don't have to "invent" anything. All I need is to consider the lessons life teaches us, the experience of activity under the new, post-revolutionary conditions. I need only to sum up this experience, disregarding the irrelevant details, and following the main thread. The working class is legally represented in the Duma. There is a legal Social-Democratic group in the Duma. It is hounded, spied on; it is not allowed to hold meetings, it is deprived of experienced people; tomorrow it may perhaps be scattered in prisons and places of exile—a legal party by no means precludes judicial and police persecution, as your short-sighted followers believe. But the legal group in the Duma exists despite the persecutions. There are legal trade unions and clubs, legal Marxist monthly and weekly journals; they are even more hounded, they are being suppressed, bled white by fines, their editors pay perhaps with a month and a half in prison for each month in the editorial office, the unions are constantly being disbanded but still they exist. Think this over. It is one thing when there are no legal trade unions, no legal Marxist press, and no legal Social-Democratic deputies. That was the position up to 1905. It is a different thing when they do exist, *even if* they are hounded all the time, even if they are constantly being suppressed. This has been the state of affairs since 1907. This is the new feature in the situation. It is this "new feature" that we must be able to turn to account, so as to extend, reinforce, and consolidate it.

Anti-liquidator: You started with the promise to be a more courageous and a more consistent legalist than those whom we have heard before, but so far you have done nothing but repeat what all the liquidators said long ago.

Legalist: As I said before, the picture of a consistent and convinced legalism follows logically from close observation of the experience provided by life. Actually all the various elements that go to make up a legal Social-Democratic workers' party already exist. We must speak out loudly and bluntly and call things by their real names. We must fear-

lessly recognise that these disjointed elements will be, must be, brought together—if not today then tomorrow—and such a party will then emerge. It must be founded, and will be founded. It will bo persecuted, but nevertheless it will exist, the years when there was no legal workers' party will be succeeded by years during which a legal workers' party will lead a precarious existence interrupted by numerous persecutions; and these years in their turn will be succeeded by years when Russia will have a legal Social-Democratic party following the purely European pattern. The years for a legal Social-Democratic party have already begun and it is already something more *real* than your underground organisation which is ninety-nine per cent demolished. In order fully to rally the legalists and imbue their activity with more confidence, system, and steadfastness, we must not be afraid of speaking of things as they are, we must not be afraid of calling this reality by its real name, we must not be afraid of issuing the slogan and raising the banner. What if the courts and the police wrench the banner from our hands, what if they wrench it from us scores of times—they *cannot* destroy it, they cannot take it from us for long; for it sums up what actually exists, is growing and is bound to continue growing.

Anti-liquidator: Keep to the point. Or I may have to remind you of the saying: "He sings well, but nobody knows what the end will be". You promised to speak plainly. Well then, make it plain and more concrete: what are you going to inscribe on your banner?

Legalist: That is exactly what I have been leading up to. We establish a legally functioning association to promote the working-class movement. This association is based on the principles of Marxism. Its aim is to bring about a change in the social conditions of life along Marxist lines, to abolish classes, to abolish the anarchy of production, etc. The immediate aim of the legal party, that is to say, of our association, is the complete democratisation of the political and social system, help in solving the agrarian problem along democratic lines, on the basis of Marxist views, and extensive labour legislation. Finally, the means by which the new association carries on its activity are all the legal means of propaganda, agitation, and organisation.

Anti-liquidator: You don't suppose that our government will permit such an association to be officially registered, do you?

Legalist: Don't worry, I am not as naive as that. Of course, our association will not be registered; but neither will it be right to regard it as illegal—that is the task we set ourselves. In each gubernia, worker after worker will draw up the rules of such an association and submit them to the authorities for endorsement. That will be a consistent and unremitting struggle for legality. The founders and members of such an association will not be liable to prosecution for the "dreadful" clauses of the programme of what is at present our apology for a party; for the R.S.D.L.P. today is nothing but an apology for a party, and the "dreadful" clauses of its programme, such as the demand for a republic and the dictatorship of the proletariat—to say nothing of the "dreadful" clauses in the numerous resolutions about an armed uprising, etc.—frighten no one, are of no significance, and play no role whatever, unless we mean their "*role*" in causing people to be sent to penal servitude, although *in actual fact* they are not guilty of anything illegal. This is the point, this is the tragicomedy of the present situation in the Party. The hand of the dead grips the living. The obsolete "clauses" of various resolutions and of the old Party programme—"clauses" which life itself has repudiated, which have become useless and have actually been relegated to the archives—only serve our enemies, only help them to suppress us, and render no useful purpose, none whatsoever, in promoting the real movement of our days, the *actual* Social-Democratic work now *being carried on* in the Third Duma, in the legally published magazines and newspapers, in the legally existing unions, in the legally held congresses, and so on, and so forth. That is why as far as we legalists are concerned, the *essence* of the question is not the desire to avoid the most dangerous persecutions and penalties (as your followers, who, forgive me for saying so, have been coached to hound the liquidators, would be prepared to conclude), but is, first, the importance *in principle* of an open working-class movement, and, secondly, in taking advantage of the contradictions of the present regime. Yes, yes, Mr. Orthodox, the principles of Marxism

can by no means be reduced to a sum of words learned by rote, or to "orthodox" formulas fixed once and for all; no, they consist in helping the broad working-class movement, in promoting the organisation and initiative of the masses. What if some word or other remains "*unspoken*"—I am fully aware that you and your followers make it a point to "voice" what has been left unsaid by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, by the legally published magazines, etc.; what if some words do remain "*unspoken*"—what of it, the cause will still go on. Larger sections of the workers will be drawn into the movement. A resolute step will be taken towards uniting open actions. Every politically-conscious worker will strike a blow at the regime which oppresses him, he will aim at *the very* contradiction most characteristic of that regime at the moment, the contradiction between the formal recognition of legality and the actual refusal to grant it, between "toleration" of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and the attempts to suppress the Social-Democratic party, between the recognition of workers' associations in official statements and their persecution in actual fact. To strike a blow at the contradictions of the regime which oppresses the proletariat—that and not dead formulas, is *the living soul* of Marxism. One of the principal—I may even say one of the fundamental—reasons why the German Social-Democratic Party has been successful, is that it has always been willing to sacrifice the *formula* in the interests of the movement. After 1871 it succeeded in creating a party whose programme recognised only "lawful" methods of political activity. It succeeded in building up the strongest Social-Democratic movement in the world by means of a Social-Democratic programme which is much more "*legal*" than ours, for it does not contain and never has contained anything about a republic. You, however, are prepared to show the world an example of a "model-radical" Social-Democratic programme in the model-radical *absence* of a Social-Democratic mass organisation, of a Social-Democratic mass movement.

Anti-liquidator: So far your entire plan reduces itself in practice to a "mass movement" of incoming and outgoing papers in the government offices dealing with the affairs of associations and unions, assuming that in every guber-

nia every politically-conscious worker copies your draft plan for a legal Marxist "association" and submits them to the authorities for endorsement. Since you, yourself, say that this association will not be permitted, that means that no open movement, not even an "open" association, is going to be launched anywhere, except in your legalist imagination. But before answering you in detail, I should like to ask you one more question: do you conceive of this legal Marxist "association" as existing *in place* of the old, i.e., the present Party, or *alongside* it?

Legalist: That's just it. You have touched upon a very interesting point! This is one of the unfortunate errors committed by the official leaders of liquidationism. They are afraid of taking a big step forward along the obviously correct road; but at the same time they are taking a number of extremely hazardous steps, totally unnecessary for the cause, in a different direction—namely, that of opportunism. For my part, I would say that one can be a legalist, without being a liquidator. One should be a legalist, without being an opportunist. We must accept the legal *forms* of the movement, and we must accept them not halfway, not in words alone, but seriously and in practice, that is to say, we must immediately set up a legal Marxist workers' party; but it would be impermissible opportunism to renounce the revolution. Yet many, if not the majority, of our liquidators do reveal such a tendency. The denial of the hegemony of the working class is opportunism, and I roundly condemn it. There is no need for us to renounce anything, to liquidate anything. The new, legal party must exist together *with the old*, *alongside* of it. They will reinforce one another.

I see you are smiling. But there is nothing funny in this. You may say that it is "double-entry bookkeeping". But, then, let me ask you this: Is not the joint existence of a legal and illegal press something fully analogous to my plan, or rather to the conclusions I draw from all the lessons of present-day experience? Before 1905, émigrés could not contribute to the legal press; in those days periodicals were banned for printing articles written by such émigrés, even under a *nom de plume*, but it is typical of our contradictory era, that well-known émigrés *sign their own names* to articles appearing both in the illegal and *legal* press. Yet you do not

object to this instance of "double-entry bookkeeping"! It causes no "confusion" whatever. It is force of habit and nothing else that prevents you from realising that this "double-entry bookkeeping" is dictated by all the conditions of our epoch, that we must turn its contradictions to account and know what action to take in *that* sphere in which the most important events of our times are taking place. In *words* you all subscribe to the "combination of illegal with legal work". Then apply it in practice. Having said A, don't be afraid to say B. Since you have accepted this fundamental thesis for tactics and organisation in general, don't be afraid to accept it for *Party* organisation. Get rid of the absurd anarchist prejudice against legality, can't you, and do it resolutely, seriously and sincerely.

Anti-liquidator: That is just the trouble with you; you are merely playing at "legality", pretending "legality", whereas the Germans relied on a legality which actually existed. The example of the legal and illegal press is a particularly glaring argument against you. When a Social-Democrat who is working illegally uses the legal press to publish what is legally permissible, he is not playing at legality, but is actually taking advantage of a legality that, within certain narrow limits, actually does exist. Your legal workers' party, however, or Marxist association (as well as the "open workers' party" of the liquidators from whom you do not really differ *at bottom*) is just a legalist mirage, nothing more; for you, yourself, admit that it will not be permitted, that *actually* these so-called "legal" associations will have no legal existence. Just as the anarcho-syndicalists indulge mainly in "revolutionary acrobatics", so all you manage to achieve is "legalistic acrobatics". The Cadets have a party that functions legally although it is legally non-existent, not because they have turned the contradictions to account, but because there is nothing revolutionary in the *content* of their work, and it does not imply any democratic organisational activity among the masses. Their work is of a liberal-monarchist nature, and the autocracy can afford to permit and tolerate political activity of this kind. But the autocracy cannot afford to tolerate the activity of Marxists among the working class, and it is naïve to try to promote the cause

by a masquerade. Your "legal association", as well as the "open workers' party" of the liquidators, is nothing but a *sham* association, a masquerade, for actually you are counting on the Social-Democrats. The ambiguous and vague formulations which you have chosen to define the aims, platform and tactics of your "association" are but a verbal disguise, flimsy defences, the same sort of legalistic acrobatics. Our Party must speak out in the Duma, found *legally* functioning trade unions and speak at legally held congresses and it would be sheer anarchism or intellectualist nihilism to deny this. It is by recognising *this* kind of activity that we take into account the new conditions of the new epoch. But *legality* for political activity is still out of the question (except for intellectual opportunists), because the conditions for such legality have not yet been won, and it is a futile dream to think that you can "creep into" it. In the case of the Germans, such legality had been fully created by 1871, the transformation of the country on bourgeois lines had been completed and the conditions for a directly revolutionary movement had entirely disappeared. It is these *real* conditions and not the skill of the German Social-Democrats that *made possible* the emergence of a Social-Democratic party that is *really* legal and does not play at legality or indulge in "legalist acrobatics".

It is a naïve dream and a meaningless pastime to try *to copy* some of the legal clauses of the programme of such legal party, some of its resolutions, etc., and transfer this sort of "legality" to Russia, for you cannot *transfer* to Russia the German completion of the bourgeois revolution, the German history of a democracy that had spent itself, the German "revolution from above" of the 1860s,[101] and the *actually* existing German legality. There are some monarchist countries in which republican parties exist legally; what legality will actually be like in Russia after her bourgeois revolutions have been achieved and we have a bourgeois system similar to that existing in Europe, remains to be seen when the future battles are over; it will be determined by their outcome. The task of the Social-Democratic movement today is to be able to prepare itself and the masses for revolution under the special conditions of the period of the June Third regime.

Under these conditions a legal party of the working class, an open workers' party, is a hollow phrase—it simply conceals the desire for the *legalisation* of ... a group of legalist opportunists. *This* is the kind of legalisation actually enjoyed by the Popular Socialists. *This* legalisation is actually enjoyed by the group of our legal, liquidationist journalists. It is not by chance but of necessity, not due to the "errors" of some liquidators but by virtue of the social composition of all the intellectual-liquidationist groups, that all opportunist elements—all those who nurture the idea of renouncing the revolution and repudiating the hegemony of the proletariat—gravitate and cannot help gravitating toward them. The only way in which the legalist may be distinguished from these people is by his *good intentions*; actually, he is indistinguishable. The real conditions of the present epoch are such that the legalisation of the Popular Socialists and the legalisation of the group of liquidationist writers is possible and inevitable; but the legalisation of a workers' party is mere words.

The illegal party of the working class exists, and even the fact that it has, in our days, been extremely weakened, and that most of its organisations have fallen to pieces, does not militate against its existence. Again and again the revolutionary underground is given fresh impetus by newly-emerging study circles and groups. The question reduces itself to the following: what is the organised force, what is the ideological tradition, what is the party capable of influencing, and which will influence, the open actions of the worker deputies in the Duma, of the workers' trade unions, of the workers' clubs, and of the workers' delegates at various legally held congresses? The revolutionary proletarian party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, or the opportunist group of liquidationist writers? That is the *real* essence of the "struggle against liquidationism", that is the real background which creates a gulf between the adversaries in this conflict. And this gulf cannot be bridged by any good intentions, by any attempts to draw a verbal distinction between legalism and liquidationism.

Diskussionny Listok, No. 3,
April 29 (May 12), 1911
Signed: *B. V. Kuprianov*

Published according to
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"REGRET" AND "SHAME"

Every crisis reveals the real nature of phenomena or processes, sweeps away the superficial, the trivial, the external, and demonstrates the more profound fundamentals of what is taking place. Take, for instance, the most common and least complicated of crises in the sphere of economic phenomena, a strike. Nothing serves to reveal more clearly the actual relationships between classes, the real nature of contemporary society, the fact that the vast majority of the population has to submit to the power of *hunger*, and that the propertied minority resorts to organised violence in order to maintain its rule. Take commercial and industrial crises. Nothing refutes so glaringly the various speeches of the champions and apostles of "harmony of interests", nothing reveals so vividly and so fully the entire mechanism of the contemporary, capitalist system, the "anarchy of production", the disunity of the producers and the struggle of each against all and of all against each. Take, lastly, such a crisis as war. All the political and social institutions are tested and verified "by fire and sword". The strength or weakness of the institutions and social system of every nation are determined by the outcome of the war and its consequences. The essential nature of international relations under capitalism—the open robbery of the weaker—is fully and clearly exposed by war.

The significance of our notorious "parliamentary" crisis lies also in its revelation of the *deep-rooted* contradictions of the entire social and political system of Russia. Most of those participating in and acting out this crisis are, unfortunately, not attempting *to explain* it, to indicate its real causes and real significance but are doing their best to obscure it by words, words and more words—some of them

are doing so deliberately, others because of their warped judgement or in deference to routine and tradition. The "big day" in the Third Duma, April 27, the day of the debate with Stolypin, was a big day of "parliamentary" phrase-mongering. But, despite the inordinate torrents of verbiage let loose by Stolypin himself and by his friends and opponents, they were unable *to hide* the essence of the matter. And the more the daily press tries to distract the attention of its readers by harping on liberal phrases, details and juridical formalities, the more appropriate it is to review again the picture of the crisis which was revealed on April 27.

The keynote of Stolypin's speech was defence of the "rights of the Crown" from any "derogation". "The significance of Article 87," said Stolypin, "is that it defines the rights of the Crown, and it cannot be departed from without creating an undesirable precedent." Stolypin objects to the attempts "to discredit the right of the supreme authority to invoke Article 87 in an emergency such as had arisen before the prorogation of the Chambers". "This right," he said, "is incontrovertible; it is based on, and rooted in, the conditions of life itself." "Any other interpretation of this right is inacceptable," he went on to say; "it would violate the meaning and sense of the law, it would reduce to naught the Monarch's right to issue emergency decrees."

All this is very clear, and all this is not mere words. The question is stated in cynically "realistic" terms. The Crown and attempts at its derogation.... If a dispute arises as to who is ultimately to interpret the meaning of the law, then force decides the issue. All this is very clear, and is not mere words.

On the other hand, Maklakov's "ardent, fervent, impassioned, and sincere" reproaches were nothing but mere words, juggling, juridical fictions. "It was with a feeling of profound regret and great shame" (report in *Rech*, April 28, p. 4) that he had heard certain references to the Crown. Maklakov, who spoke on behalf of the entire so-called "constitutional Centre" (i.e., on behalf of the Cadets and Octobrists), defended the usual fiction of the monarchy being constitutional. But the "defence", voiced by the Cadets, or by the Cadets and the Octobrists, consisted of hollow phrase-mongering. What has it to do with regret and shame when

it is a question of force? The bourgeoisie, who would like to have a constitution, regret the fact that the Crown refuses to grant a constitution, and is "ashamed" of this. The Crown is "ashamed" to have anyone impose a constitution on it, regards it as "derogation" and "regrets" any and all interpretation of any law that might be intended to "derogate".

Here we have two sides, and two interpretations of the law. Regrets and shame on both sides, with the only difference that one side does nothing else *but* "regret" and be "ashamed"; whereas the other side *says nothing* either about regretting or about being ashamed—it says only that derogation is "unacceptable".

Surely it is obvious that the ones to be "ashamed" of this state of affairs, the ones to be ashamed of their impotence, should be the Maklakovs, should be the whole of our Cadet and Octobrist bourgeoisie. The spokesman of the council of the united nobility is cynical about the crisis he cynically engineered, he hurls defiance and draws his sword. And the liberal bourgeoisie, like a street-trader who has been scared out of his wits by a police officer, shrinks back in awe, muttering: I regret, I am ashamed to ... be treated in this manner!

"I say," Maklakov vowed, "that I am a better constitutionalist than the Chairman of the Council of Ministers [I can imagine how Stolypin inwardly, and in the privacy of his home, laughed at these words; the point, my dear sir, is not whether one proclaims oneself a constitutionalist, but *who possesses the power* to determine whether a constitution shall exist, and what kind of constitution it shall be!], but for all that I am no less a monarchist than he. [Stolypin smiles even more contentedly, so that's the kind of a fellow he is—starts off by uttering threats, and winds up by offering regrets! He is a great warrior, this Maklakov!] I consider it lunacy to create a monarchy where it has no roots, but just as much lunacy to renounce it where its historical roots are strong." ...

Having first uttered some threats, and then offered his regrets, he now begins to cite arguments *in favour* of Stolypin. Oh, magnificent parliamentarian of the liberals! Oh, incomparable leader of the "constitutional" (*lucus a non*

*lucendo**—"constitutional" though there is no constitution) Centre, of the Cadet and Octobrist Centre!

"The Chairman of the Council of Ministers," thunders our tribune of "people's freedom" (read, of the historical slavery of our people), "may still remain in power; he will hold on to it both because of fear of the revolution which is being engineered by his own agents (*shouts from the benches on the right*: "Shame!", *tumult*) ... and because of the danger of creating a precedent!"

It is a tale about how Ivan Ivanovich cried "shame" upon Ivan Nikiforovich, and Ivan Nikiforovich cried "shame" upon Ivan Ivanovich.[102] "It's a shame not to observe the common standards of constitutional procedure," Ivan Ivanovich says to Ivan Nikiforovich. "It's a shame to threaten a revolution, which you yourself fear, in which you don't believe, and which you don't help," Ivan Nikiforovich says to Ivan Ivanovich.

Well, reader, who do you think had the better of that argument?

The representative of the "constitutional Centre", Lvov the First, spoke after Gegechkori who had quite correctly explained that the liberal press *wrongly* represents the crisis as being of a "constitutional" nature, that the Cadets "have, through their spokesmen, supported the criminal illusion about a constitutional Centre", and that a constitution needs a certain movement, which is still lacking. (Gegechkori made one awkward slip at the end when he mentioned "anarchy"—that was not the word he should have used.)

To judge by the speech of Lvov the First, it seemed at one time that even some of the landowners had learned a thing or two from Gegechkori's explanations. "All that has happened," said Lvov the First, "goes to show indeed that we have no Constitution, and we have no parliamentary system; but neither have we any fundamental laws and, in general, any organised system [that's a good one! And what about the existence of the landowners—doesn't that mean that there is an organised landowners' system? You let your

* An untranslatable Latin pun: its meaning is clear from the context. (Literally "a grove, but not giving light"; *lucus*—a grove, *lucere*—to give light.)—*Ed.*

tongues run away with you, gentlemen of the "constitutional Centre"]—there is only arbitrary rule [that is precisely one of the fundamental and most essential features of the organised landowner system] and demagogy."

Judging by the interpretation of the "progressive" landlord Nikolai Nikolayevich Lvov the First, demagogy stands for something highly unpleasant. Listen further:

"And the men who are now in office employ this demagogy in order to enhance their own influence and their own power. But others, too, will make use of this demagogy—those who want to seize power [brr ... what an odious and immoral desire! Far be it from the Russian liberal bourgeois to entertain such a desire. It is only in the decadent West that the immoral bourgeoisie tries to seize power, and has even invented the unnatural doctrine that only the bourgeoisie in power can safeguard a bourgeois constitution. We, the Russian liberals, have been enlightened by the moral and idealist sermons of Struve, Berdayev and Co. and we are, therefore, of the opinion that power must remain in the hands of the Tolmachovs, whereas the Maklakovs ought to be engaged in writing instructions for the truly constitutional application of that power] ... those who are more proficient in wielding the instrument of demagogy. Fear this demagogy, for everything will be sacrificed to it: your dignity, your possessions, your honour, and Russia's civic system."

The "progressist" Nikolai Nikolayevich Lvov the First talks sense. He is even fairly clear when he refers to "possessions". For instance, if yesterday a landowner owned 10,000 dessiatines, and today he is left with only 50 dessiatines, it means that 9,950 dessiatines have been "sacrificed" to "demagogy". That is clear. That is not mere words. But matters are not so clear when he refers to "dignity" and "honour". Does our progressist imply that a landlord can be a man of "dignity" and "honour" only when he owns 10,000 dessiatines, and that he is bound to lose both if he loses 9,950 of his dessiatines? Or does Lvov the First imply that dignity and honour stand to be sacrificed if the dessiatines do not fetch a fair price—say, 500 rubles a dessiatine?

On the subject of "Russia's civic system" the "progressist" Lvov the First is somewhat at sea. If it is true, as he said,

that we have neither a constitution, nor a parliamentary system, nor fundamental laws, that means that we have no civic system either, and what doesn't exist, cannot be sacrificed. If what Lvov the First said is true this means that our civic system has been sacrificed to our "organised [landowner] system". Wasn't this a slip of the tongue on the part of our "progressist"? Didn't he mean to say that our organised landowner system would be sacrificed to Russia's civic system? Didn't he imply that it would be demagogy if events were to take such a hypothetical course? When he said—"fear this demagogy"—didn't he imply that the majority of the Third Duma ought to fear that hypothetical course of events?

It is a tale about how Ivan Ivanovich accused Ivan Nikiforovich of demagogy, and Ivan Nikiforovich accused Ivan Ivanovich of the same thing: "You are a demagogue," said Ivan Ivanovich to Ivan Nikiforovich, "because you are in office and you are using it to enhance your own influence and your own power, while at the same time pretending to serve the national interests of the population." "No," said Ivan Nikiforovich to Ivan Ivanovich, "you are a demagogue, because you are shouting at the top of your voice and in a public place, that all we have is arbitrary rule, and that we have neither a constitution nor fundamental laws; moreover you are hinting rather impolitely at some sort of sacrifice of our possessions."

We do not know which of them proved, in the long run, that the other was a demagogue. But we do know that when thieves fall out true men come into their own.

Zvezda, No. 21, May 7, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

THE MEETING OF THE C.C. MEMBERS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[103]

MAY 28-JUNE 4 (JUNE 10-17), 1911

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

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1

LETTER TO THE MEETING OF THE C.C. MEMBERS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ABROAD[104]

Igorev's piece of paper dated June 1, 1911, once again shows the disgraceful *game* being played around the convening of the C.C.; that policy of delay and sabotage which the Central Organ of our Party has been exposing for a long time, over a period of several months.

Igorev's assertion that Yudin and Kostrov[105] comprise a temporary Bureau or even a part of it, is out and out lying. *Over a long period of months*, when Makar and Lindov[106] (after Innokenty) *constituted* the Bureau organisation, *selected* agents, *arranged* a number of visits connected with the affairs of the central organisation, organised meetings with agents and candidates for co-option (Makar and Katsap[107] and others, with Milyutin and others), established contact with the general Party centre for Social-Democratic work in the Duma, and with the city Social-Democratic circles at the time of the elections (Moscow), etc., etc., *no such* work was carried out either by Yudin or Kostrov. *Precisely none*, absolutely none of this kind of activity was carried out by either one of them.

Not a single official body of the Party abroad (neither the Central Organ nor the Central Committee Bureau Abroad) received a *single* formal notification of the co-option of Yudin and Kostrov to the Bureau.

For a period of *more than two months* following the arrest of Makar and Lindov, not a single piece of paper, not a single letter was received and no one heard a sound about Yudin or Kostrov regarding their work in the Bureau. Not only were Yudin and Kostrov not recognised by anyone as members of the Bureau (as were, without any argument, Makar

and Lindov), but neither did Yudin or Kostrov ask for a kopek, and, unlike Makar and Lindov, they did not inform the Central Committee Bureau Abroad that they comprised the Bureau.

In such a state of affairs we maintain that Igorev's reference to Kostrov and Yudin comprising the "Bureau" is a *mockery* of the Party, is *deception* of the Party. We shall expose this deception.

Further, after the experience of Inok, Makar and others, and following the exposure by Olgin,[108] etc., we regard all attempts to revive the Central Committee in Russia with the old C.C. members, elected in London, *as playing right into Stolypin's hands*. We warn the Party against those who are angling for uninformed people, who send Central Committee members where conditions are *impossible*, who send them on jobs that *cannot be done*, straight *into the hands of the police*.

Finally, as regards the "*plan*" to call a plenary meeting in *a month's time*, announced in Igorev's paper of June 1, 1911, but of which *he said nothing* to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, we draw the Party's attention to a new *intrigue* of the liquidators in connection with the convening of the Central Committee.

No Central Committee can be convened within a month, but it is possible to "*bring together*" fictitious Central Committee members—that is the kernel of the *Golos* intrigue.

Since the Plenary Meeting, *four* Bolshevik members of the Central Committee (Meshkovsky+Innokenty+Makar+ +Lindov) have been lost *while engaged in the Central Committee work*. The Mensheviks have not lost *one member*, for not one of them has been working!!

And so now, the *Golos* group dare to propose a period of *a month* calculating on bringing in such individuals as *Pyotr*[109] who, for a whole year and a half (since the Plenary Meeting) has not done a *single* stroke of work, who *not once* put in an appearance at the Bureau. The *Golos* group know that within a month it is *not possible* to "*bring together*" Bolsheviks who are in exile either following a trial or by administrative decision.

They sent the Central Committee to Russia "*in order that it might be destroyed there*"!

They lived to see the day when *all* the Bolsheviks had been arrested.

They were able to save all the *fictitious* Menshevik members who had been inactive.

They want to fix a period of one month in which fictitious Central Committee members like Pyotr could be brought there, and Bolsheviks who were working *could not* even be notified!

They are wrong if they think that the *game* the liquidators are playing with the convocation of a plenary meeting will not be disclosed to the Party!

Written between May 19 and 23
(June 1 and 5), 1911

2

SUMMARY (PLAN) FOR REPORT BY THREE BOLSHEVIK MEMBERS OF THE C.C. TO A PRIVATE MEETING OF NINE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

1. History of attempts to restore the Central Committee in Russia.

Two periods:

(a) I. 1910-August (or September) 1910.

Two Bolshevik members of the Central Committee arrested following attempts to convene the Committee. Arranged C.C. meetings *many times*. *Not once* did Mikhail+Yuri+Roman; *not a single* Menshevik, put in an appearance.

(b) End of 1910-spring 1911.

New Bureau formed by two Bolshevik members of the Central Committee. *Not a single* Menshevik participated in their *work* (contact with agents, with the Duma group, with the Moscow Social-Democrats in connection with the elections, etc.).

One Menshevik (Kostrov) turned up at the Bureau once or twice in order to "vote"!

Both Bolsheviks arrested.

Conclusion: *all* Bolshevik members of the Committee arrested on account of the Central Committee work and *while engaged in this* work.

Of the Mensheviks, a section (Mikhail+Yuri+Roman) refused to take *any part whatsoever*, one (Pyotr) took *not* the slightest part for a whole year and a half, one (Kostrov) turned up twice at the Bureau in one and a half years (in 1911!), having played absolutely no part whatsoever in the Central Committee work. For two and a half months after the arrests of the Bolsheviks, this Menshevik took *not a*

single step, nor did he write a single letter stating that he was re-forming the Committee.

Therefore, we consider it insolent for Igorev to state that this Menshevik+Bundist now comprise the *Bureau* (no formal notification of this having been given the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, and it being recognised by *no one*!) .

2. Is it now possible to restore the plenary meeting abroad?

Juridically—9 out of 15 members are available. *Formally* they can (a) proclaim themselves the meeting. Beyond question from the formal point of view, such a step is *probably* admissible with a majority of one, that is, by a vote of five out of these nine, against four. *In reality*, the value of such a formally irreproachable step is insignificant; there can be no doubt that it will be *impossible* for the Central Committee to carry out its *role* under such circumstances.

(b) Formally, it is also possible for these nine available members of the C.C. to bring over from Russia people with the rights of alternate members. What is the actual meaning of such a step? The Mensheviks can "bring" either their liquidators (Mikhail+Yuri+Roman, and others), who (after the famous statement of Mikhail+Yuri+Roman) will not be recognised as Central Committee members by a single honest Party member, or two Central Committee members who attended the Plenary Meeting in January 1910 and since then, for one and a half years, have not carried out any Central Committee work. The period required to bring them together is unpredictable.

The Bolsheviks may bring in another two of their alternate members in addition to the three Bolsheviks already available. In order to do this, months and months of work are required to establish contact with exiles, organise escapes, arrange for aid to their families, etc., etc. It is impossible to say how many months would be required for this "work".

For the Party, the real meaning of this protracted work of bringing together "formal" candidates, who at the moment are incapable of providing genuine central leadership in Russia, will not only be nil, the real meaning will be even worse, for the *game* of allocating places in central bodies

hides from the local Party groups the sad reality in respect of which vigorous action must be taken.

After eighteen months of unsuccessful attempts to restore the Central Committee, to feed the Party with further promises—tomorrow "you" will have a Committee—that would be an affront to the Party. We do not intend to be a party to any such affront.

3. It goes without saying that an attempt to bring together candidates in Russia in order to restore the Central Committee there, can only come from supporters of Stolypin. The police know *all* the candidates and keep them under surveillance as has been shown by the arrests of Innokenty and Makar, twice and three times. That is the first and most important thing to note. And secondly, the real aim of such a gathering—the co-option of people living in Russia—is impossible of achievement now, since there are none available (they were seized with Makar when he was last arrested). It is impossible to achieve the unanimity required by the rules in the co-option of Mensheviks, since not, one Bolshevik (as has already been stated by Inok to Sverchkov) will allow in a single liquidator (or *Golos* supporter).

4. At present the *real* position of the Party is such that almost everywhere in the localities there are informal, extremely small and tiny Party workers' groups and nuclei that meet irregularly. Everywhere they are combating liquidator-legalists in the unions, clubs, etc. They are not connected with each other. Very rarely do they see any literature. They enjoy prestige among workers. In these groups Bolsheviks and Plekhanov's supporters unite, and to some extent those *Vperyod* "supporters" who have read *Vperyod* literature or have heard *Vperyod* speakers, but have not yet been dragged into the isolated *Vperyod* faction set up abroad.

This anti-Party faction undoubtedly has some influence, although it is not great, among a section of St. Petersburg workers. There is sufficient proof that it does not hold itself responsible to any Central Committee, and interferes as much as possible with the work of the Social-Democrats (so far it has not given a direct call to the elections to the Fourth Duma, and continues to flirt with the otzovists).

A far more serious anti-Party and anti-Social-Democratic force is the faction of the *independent legalists* (*Nasha Zarya*+ +*Dyelo Zhizni*+*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*). It has been proved beyond doubt that they recognise no Central Committee and publicly ridicule Central Committee decisions. They *cannot* carry out the Plenary Meeting's decisions (not to "minimise" the role of an illegal party, etc.) because they do not wish to. They cannot help taking the *opposite* line of action.

No honest Social-Democrat can doubt that the "independent legalists" are preparing for the elections to the Fourth Duma, and will conduct their election work *separately from and contrary to* the Party.

The task of Party members is clear: they must no longer permit the slightest delay, nor postpone for even a day a *forthright* declaration against the independent legalists; they must openly and decisively call on Party workers' circles in Russia to prepare for the elections, to work for the election of *only* those Party members who are *fully* loyal and aware of the danger of this tendency, and *during the election campaign* to warn the workers against the "legalist independents" and to struggle against them.

Such is the task of the day for our Party. There must be no deviation from this presentation of an issue with which the existing situation (and the independent legalists) confront us. All evasions, delays, attempts by the legalists to repeat the game of "promises" and "assurances" are fraught with great danger to the Party.

5. Our practical conclusion: the meeting of the nine must absolutely and immediately issue a manifesto to the Party in which the failure to convene the Central Committee in Russia is truthfully and fully described, and which calls upon local Party circles to display initiative and establish regional organising commissions and, following that, a Central *Organising Commission* and to conduct a determined, direct and implacable struggle against the "independent legalists".

A formal vote of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee supporting this call should only take place if the overwhelming majority of the nine members of the Central Committee, not merely five, agree to regard themselves as

the Plenary Meeting and to take the path of decisive struggle against the group (faction) of legalist independents. It is, of course, understood that such a struggle is incompatible with participation by these legalists in central Party bodies, which they have sabotaged, obstructed, weakened and "kept in a sick condition" for eighteen months.

Written between May 19 and 23
(June 1 and 5), 1911

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION DEFINING TERMS OF REFERENCE[110]

Placing on record that all members of the Central Committee living abroad have been invited and that all except one are present, this meeting regards itself to be a conference of Central Committee members living abroad and places on its agenda the question of reconstituting the Central Committee in connection with the general situation within the Party.

Written on May 28 (June 10), 1911

THE RESULTS OF THE DUMA SESSION

"WE DID THIS TOGETHER"

During the "historic" sitting of the Duma on April 27 Mr. Teslenko, who took issue with Mr. Stolypin, said in part:

> "The Chairman of the Council of Ministers said to the State Duma: Yes, gentlemen, I shall come to your assistance in the very near future. There is the Bill about the Old Believers—you'll probably arrange matters so as to vote it down before the recess, and then it will be put into effect during the recess. I even imagined in this a sort of flippant we-know-each-other-well tone, as if we were told: why, we did this together. And, gentlemen, forgive me if it reminds me of the scene in the *Inspector-General*, in which the Mayor of the town says: 'Ah! So you've come to lodge a complaint against me? Have you forgotten how we did this and that together?' And, I presume, gentlemen, that those among you who, perhaps, once counted on this assistance, or who, perhaps, still count on it, must have felt embarrassed and, perhaps, thought (and you did well if you did think so): 'God preserve us from such friends, we can cope with our enemies ourselves'."

By these words, Mr. Teslenko, according to the Verbatim Report, earned "applause from the Left", apparently from the benches of the people's freedom group. The Cadets regarded it as fitting irony directed against the Octobrists. But in this case, as in many others, they applauded without giving thought to the profound meaning of the words which their speaker let fall. They applauded believing that these words wounded only the Octobrists, that they compromised only their particularly hated rivals. They did not realise that Mr. Teslenko's apt phrase, if its meaning is seriously analysed, represents a truth which stigmatises both the Octobrists and the Cadets. It is worth dwelling on this truth at greater length for it concerns one of the most vital questions of the past five or six years—and what years!—of Russia's political history.

"We did this together"—well put, Mr. Teslenko. But it would, perhaps, be more correct to put it this way: you have excellently *repeated* what has been said time and again at "Left" "meetings" which are usually so disparaged by the Cadet gentlemen. "We did this together"—these words by no means apply only to bills in the Third Duma, they by no means apply only to the notorious so-called "miscellany". They apply to *everything* that the Stolypins and the Russian liberal bourgeoisie (or the bourgeoisie that has pretended to be liberal) "have done together" ever since the end of 1905. As for Mr. Stolypin's "flippant tone", it was not something that the Cadet speaker merely "imagined", it was precisely the tone Stolypin assumes in all his speeches, it is the tone of the whole policy of the Stolypins in dealing with the bourgeoisie (who, in the persons of the Octobrist and Cadet deputies, incidentally, constitute the majority in the Third Duma).

This flippant tone—which at every serious turn of events gives way to gross bullying or even to brute force—is accounted for by the fact that not only the Octobrists but the Cadets as well merely play for effect, exclusively for the sake of winning applause (and the Stolypins know this only too well) when they hurl phrases like: "God preserve us from such friends [i.e., from the Stolypins], we can cope with our enemies [meaning, apparently, the reactionaries on the Right, and—how can we express it in the mildest possible terms?—the "exacting" Left] ourselves".

Had these been more than mere words, Russia would by now have been entirely and irrevocably rid of "such friends". But the point is that the Cadets hurl such phrases only in the heat of "opposition" speeches—opposition speeches cannot be made from the national rostrum unless they are given democratic flavour, even if only a slight one. That is why the Cadets sometimes give vent to democratic statements, which may be usefully compared with the *deeds* of these same Cadets. The historical role of a bourgeoisie playing at democracy (or threatening the enemy on the right with democracy) is such that this "playing" with words sometimes serves a useful purpose for some sections of the popular masses since it awakens sincere and profound democratic thought. "When the fiddle is played upstairs, people downstairs want to

dance." There is a Latin proverb that says: *Littera scripta manet*—"what is written is permanent". Nor do spoken words always disappear, even if they are mere words and only spoken for effect.

It does not follow, of course, that hypocritical phrases uttered by the Cadets may be accepted at their face value, and that they may be proclaimed or regarded as an expression of democracy. But it certainly does follow that we ought to make use of every hypocritical phrase uttered by a Cadet so long as it has a democratic ring; that we ought to make use of it, first, to demonstrate the divergence between the words and the deeds of the man uttering them, and, secondly, to show what real, vital and direct significance democracy has for those masses who happen to get an inkling of the flamboyant phrases uttered by the speakers in the Taurida Palace.

The reflections of Mr. Teslenko quoted above are hypocritical, but not because Mr. Teslenko personally was hypocritical in his remarks; he may have been carried away by the torrent of his own oppositionist eloquence. The statement is hypocritical because the *words* of the representative of the Cadet Party are at variance with the *deeds* of that party at all serious moments in modern Russian history.

Recall the events of August 1905. What did Mr. Stolypin's predecessor do at that time? He was setting the stage for the Bulygin Duma[111] and for elections to it. What did Mr. Teslenko and his friends do at that time? Within the limits of their forces and in line with their "speciality " in the sphere of public activity, they were setting the stage for those same elections. Mr. Bulygin (and Mr. Stolypin) would be justified in saying to Mr. Teslenko: "We did this together". And Mr. Teslenko "did this together" for the very reason that he was fearful of being left without those "friends" of his, of whom he now says so magnificently, with the courage of a knight errant: "God preserve us from such friends."...

Recall the events that took place three months after the promulgation of Bulygin's State Duma Act. What did Mr. Stolypin's predecessor do at that time? He resisted, for instance, the movement of the postal and telegraph employees and the numerous ramifications of similar movements. Mr.

Teslenko, or, at any rate, his party as personified by Mr. Struve, Mr. Karaulov, and others, resisted—in its own way—the same movement. Mr. Witte (and Mr. Stolypin) would be justified in saying to the Teslenkos: "We did this together". It was the same in the case of the working-class holiday on May 1, 1906, in the case of the "local land committees" a little later, and in 1907, systematically and invariably, in the attitude to the worker and peasant deputies to the Second Duma, and so on and so forth.

This policy, which the Cadet Party has been pursuing for many years, was summed up correctly by the well-known Cadet writer Mr. Izgoyev when he declared in *Vekhi*:

"We must at last have the courage to admit that the vast majority of members of our State Dumas, with the exception of thirty or forty Cadets and Octobrists, have not shown themselves to possess the knowledge required to undertake the job of governing and reconstructing Russia."

Mr. Izgoyev's "courageous admission" is courageous because, abandoning all appearances and all diplomacy, he has blurted out some words of *truth*. It is true that in "our State Dumas" the Cadets have indeed been guided by the landowner, bourgeois, liberal-monarchist "knowledge", which could not satisfy "the vast majority of members", particularly those on the left. And it goes without saying, of course, that Stolypin fought these latter members, and in fighting them relied for support on the "knowledge" (or, more correctly: on the interests and point of view) of "thirty or forty Cadets and Octobrists". Mr. Stolypin would be justified in saying to the entire Cadet Party: "We did this together"—together we fought against the clumsiness, inexperience, and ignorance of the workers and peasants.

The principal result of this year's session of the Duma is that the excessively "flippant tone" assumed by Stolypin towards the majority of the Third Duma—and, moreover, towards its bourgeois, Octobrist-Cadet, majority—proved too much even for this majority, which cannot be suspected of lacking in patience. The old regime assumes a flippant attitude towards the bourgeoisie, even though the latter is well aware of its own importance under the new, present day economic conditions, and is longing for independence, even for power. The Article 87 episode brought out this

flippant attitude so sharply and, at the same time, affronted some of the mighty of this world so crudely, that even the most patient of people began to grumble. But grumbling is as far as they can go. They are bound hand and foot, and that is why they cannot go any farther. They are bound because at every important juncture of Russian history, in the course of all these last years, they have been afraid of the broad popular movement and turned their backs upon it; they have been hostile to the forces of democracy—to the real, live, active, mass forces of democracy—and have shunned them, attacked them from the rear in the same way as Stolypin has attacked them. And with these facts behind them, the Octobrists and the Cadets now suffer the penalty they deserve; in point of fact, they have *nothing* with which to parry Stolypin when he assumes a flippant tone and tells them: "If I am an enemy of democracy, you, my dear sirs, have proved that you are afraid of democracy—'we did this together'".

Zvezda, No. 23, May 28, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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OLD TRUTHS THAT ARE EVER NEW

The incidents that prevented the workers' delegates from attending the second congress of factory doctors in Moscow are known to readers from press reports.[112] We are not in a position to dwell here on the details of those incidents or to comment upon their significance. We shall merely note the instructive reflections that appeared in *Rech* of April 14, i.e., on the day the congress opened, in a leading article which was written on the eve of these events.

"It is to be regretted," wrote the organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, "that outside obstacles are placed in the way of such participation [participation by representatives of the workers]. The fate likely to befall some too fiery speakers is all too well known. As a result, the representatives of the workers insist on talking about their difficulties in concentrating on special questions, the impossibility of organising proper representation at the congress, about the obstacles put in the way of their organisations, and many other things of a like nature which are far removed from the programme of the congress and the discussion of which distracts attention from the questions on the agenda and sometimes leads to undesirable consequences. The charged atmosphere explains also the intolerance shown by workers' representatives to 'bourgeois' speakers, to all the measures taken by the government, and to the possibility of collaboration with representatives of other social groups."

This whole tirade is a characteristic example of feeble lamentations whose impotence is explained, not by the chance composition or by any special features of the given liberal party, of the given question, etc., but by causes of a more profound nature—by the actual conditions in which the liberal bourgeoisie in general finds itself in twentieth-century Russia. The liberal bourgeoisie is longing for the

kind of "regime" under which it could have dealings with workers not likely "to make too fiery speeches" and who are fairly "tolerant" in their attitude towards the bourgeoisie, towards the idea of *collaboration with the bourgeoisie*, and "*to all* the measures taken by the government". It is longing for a regime under which these unassuming workers "collaborating" with it could "concentrate on the special questions" of social policy and would meekly agree to confine themselves to patching up the threadbare cloak of bourgeois solicitude for "the younger brother". In a word, the Russian liberals are longing for something like the present regime in England or in France, *as distinct* from that of Prussia. In England and France the bourgeoisie holds full sway, and it exercises its rule practically (with few exceptions) by itself, whereas in Prussia it is the feudal landowners, the Junkers, and the monarchist militarists, who are in the ascendancy. In England and France the bourgeoisie makes particularly frequent, free and wide use of the services of men of proletarian origin or traitors to the cause of the proletariat (John Burns, Briand) in the capacity of "collaborators" who "concentrate", undisturbed, "on special questions" and who teach the working class to maintain an attitude of "tolerance" to the rule of capital.

There is not the slightest doubt that the English and French systems are much more democratic than the Prussian; that they are much more favourable for the struggle of the working class, and have to a much greater degree eliminated the medieval institutions which distract the attention of the working class from its principal and real adversary. There is not the slightest doubt, therefore, that support for all aspirations to remodel our country along Anglo-French, rather than Prussian, lines is in the interests of the Russian workers. But we must not confine ourselves to this indisputable conclusion, as is so often done. Only here does the disputed question or questions begin—the dispute is with democrats of various shades.

The aspirations must be given support. To support him who is weak and who wavers, it is necessary to sustain him with something more solid and to dispel the illusions that prevent him from seeing his weakness and understanding its causes. One does not give support to the urge towards bourgeois de-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

mocracy by strengthening those illusions and by adding one's voice to the feeble lamentations of the weak, inconsistent and wavering adherents of democracy, but, on the contrary, one deprives that urge of its force. The bourgeoisie of England and then of France, in the middle of the seventeenth and the late eighteenth century respectively, did not lament the "intolerance" of the younger brother, and made no wry faces over the "too fiery speakers" among the representatives of that younger brother, but they themselves supplied the *most* fiery speakers (and not only speakers) who inculcated a feeling of contempt for the advocacy of "tolerance", for weak *lamentations*, for vacillation and irresolution. Among those fiery speakers there were men who, in the course of centuries, have served as beacons and guides to humanity, despite historical limitations and often the naïveté of their ideas regarding the means of salvation from every kind of misfortune.

The German bourgeoisie, like the Russian, also lamented the fact that the speakers representing the "younger brother" were "too fiery"—and it left behind it in history a model of abasement, infamy, and flunkeyism for which it was rewarded with kicks administered by the "Junkers". The difference in the attitude of the two bourgeoisies was not due, of course, to the "characteristics" of different "races", but to the different levels of economic and political development which caused one of them to fear the "younger brother", and made it vacillate impotently between deprecating the violence of feudalism and censuring the "intolerance" of the workers.

Those are old truths. But they are ever new, and remain so as long as we are treated, in publications issued by people who profess to be Marxists, to lines like the following:

"The failure of the movement of 1905-06 was not due to the 'excesses' of the Lefts, for those 'excesses' were themselves the consequence of the aggregate of a large number of causes; nor was it due to 'treachery' on the part of the bourgeoisie who, everywhere in the West, had 'betrayed' at the crucial moment; it was due to the fact that there was no clearly defined bourgeois party which could supersede the obsolete bureaucracy at the helm of government, and which would be strong enough economically and sufficiently democratic to enjoy the support of the people." And a few lines

further on: "...the weakness of the urban bourgeois democrats who should have become the political centre of attraction for the democratic peasantry..." (*Nasha Zarya*, No. 3, p. 62, article by Mr. V. Levitsky).

Mr. V. Levitsky is more consistent in his renunciation of the idea of "the hegemony of the proletariat" ("the urban bourgeois democrats", and no other group, "*should have become* the centre of attraction"!), or he expresses his ideas more boldly, definitely and consistently than Mr. Potresov, who brushed up his article in *The Social Movement* to comply with Plekhanov's ultimatums.

Mr. V. Levitsky argues just like a liberal. He is an inconsistent liberal, despite his use of many Marxist phrases. He has no idea that an entirely different social category, not the urban bourgeois democrats, *should have become* the "centre of attraction for the democratic peasantry". He forgets that this "should" *was* a reality during momentous historical periods in England and in France, as well as in Russia—they were of momentous significance although they were of short duration in the latter country; in the two first-named countries it was for the most part the democratic, ultra-democratic and "too fiery" plebeian sections that united the various elements of the "lower classes".

Mr. V. Levitsky forgets that even in those brief periods of history when these "lower classes" played the role of "centres of attraction for the democratic peasantry", when they succeeded in *wresting* this role from the liberal bourgeoisie, they did exercise a decisive influence in determining *the degree* of democracy the country in question was to enjoy in the succeeding decades of so-called peaceful development. During the brief periods of *their* hegemony, these "lower classes" trained their bourgeoisie and remoulded it to such an extent that subsequently it was anxious to beat a retreat, but *was unable* to go farther in this retrograde movement than, say, an upper chamber in France, or certain departures from the principles of democratic elections, and so on, and so forth.

This idea, confirmed by the historical experience of *all* European countries—the idea that in epochs of bourgeois change (or, more correctly, of bourgeois revolution) the bourgeois democracy of each country is moulded one way or

another, assumes one form or another, becomes trained in one tradition or another, and accepts one or another minimum of democracy, depending on the extent to which, in the decisive moments of the history of the nation, *hegemony* passes *not* to the bourgeoisie *but* to the "lower classes", to the "plebeian" elements, as was the case in the eighteenth century, or to the proletariat in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—this idea is foreign to Mr. V. Levitsky. The idea of the hegemony of the proletariat constitutes one of the fundamental tenets of Marxism; and the liquidators' departure from these tenets (or even their indifference to them) is a profound source of quite a number of their irreconcilable fundamental differences with the opponents of the liquidationist trend.

Every capitalist country passes through an era of bourgeois revolutions which produces a definite degree of democracy, a definite constitutional or parliamentary regime, a definite degree of independence, love of liberty, and initiative among the "lower classes" in general and the proletariat in particular, a definite tradition permeating the entire political and social life of the country. The particular degree of democracy, or the particular tradition, depends on whether, in the decisive moments, the hegemony belongs to the bourgeoisie or to those at the other end of the scale; it depends on whether it is the former or the latter which (again in those *decisive* moments) constitutes the "centre of attraction for the democratic peasantry" and, in general, for all intermediary democratic groups and sections.

Mr. V. Levitsky is a past master at coining brilliant formulations which have the effect of at once revealing the ideological foundations of liquidationism, bringing them out clearly and in bold relief. Such was his famous formula: "*Not* hegemony, but a class party", which—translated into plain language—means: not Marxism, but Brentanoism (social-liberalism). The two formulas noted in the present article—namely: "the urban bourgeois democrats *should have become* the centre of attraction for the democratic peasantry" and "the failure ... was due to the fact that there was no clearly defined bourgeois party"—are, undoubtedly, destined to become just as famous.

Zvezda, No. 25, June 11, 1911
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECOND PARIS GROUP OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY[113]

INTRODUCTION

The resolution of the Second Paris Group of the R.S.D.L.P. printed below (this group consists mainly of Bolsheviks with a small number of *Vperyod* supporters and "conciliators") outlines the fundamental propositions of the platform of all the Bolsheviks. At a time when the inner-Party struggle is becoming more acute, it is particularly important to make a *fundamental* statement on the cardinal problems of programme, tactics and organisation. People like Trotsky, with his inflated phrases about the R.S.D.L.P. and his toadying to the liquidators, who have nothing in common with the R.S.D.L.P., today represent "the prevalent disease". They are trying to build up a career for themselves by cheap sermons about "agreement"—agreement with all and sundry, right down to Mr. Potresov and the otzovists —while of necessity maintaining complete silence as to the political conditions of this wonderful supposed "agreement". Actually they preach *surrender* to the liquidators who are building a Stolypin labour party.

The Bolsheviks must now close their ranks more firmly, strengthen their group, define more clearly and precisely its Party line (as distinct from the line of the groups which, in one way or another, conceal their "identity"), rally the scattered forces, and go into battle for an R.S.D.L. Party purged of those who spread bourgeois influence among the proletariat.

N. Lenin

I

The meeting of the Second Paris Group of the R.S.D.L.P- after discussing the state of affairs in the R.S.D.L.P. in general, and the latest manifestations of the struggle that has flared up abroad between the Social-Democrats and those who want to be counted as Social-Democrats, considers it necessary, first of all, to draw attention to the fundamental statement of principles unanimously endorsed by the last (January 1910) Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, which defines the nature of real Social-Democratic activity. That statement of principles declares that "renunciation of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, the belittling of its role and importance, attempts to curtail the programmatic and tactical tasks and slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy" are *a manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat*. The only true *Social-Democratic* activity is that which recognises the danger of this deviation and of any ideological and political trend that is otzovist or justifies otzovism, and which really overcomes such deviations.

This meeting further places on record that, despite the above-mentioned unanimous resolution of the Plenary Meeting, and despite the solemn promise made by the *Golos* representatives at the last Plenary Meeting *to renounce* liquidationism and to combat it, the editorial board abroad of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and its group of adherents have for more than eighteen months since that meeting, pursued that very *bourgeois* policy of liquidationism and supported, justified, and defended journals of the Russian legalists that are independent of Social-Democracy and of socialism, such as *Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye*, *Dyelo Zhizni*, etc. Those responsible for these journals, as has been stated repeatedly on behalf of the Party by its Central Organ, and as has also been stated by the pro-Party Mensheviks headed by Comrade Plekhanov, *have nothing in common with the R.S.D.L.P.* Those responsible for these journals not only belittle the role and importance of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, but frankly renounce it, slander the "underground" as renegades would, deny the revolutionary nature of the activity and the revolutionary tasks of the working-class movement

in Russia today, deceive the workers by spreading liberal-bourgeois ideas about the "constitutional" nature of the maturing crisis, throw overboard (and not only curtail) such time-honoured slogans of revolutionary Marxism as the recognition of the *hegemony* of the working class in the struggle for socialism and for the democratic revolution. By preaching and building what they call a legal or "open" workers' party these people have actually become the builders of a *Stolypin "labour" party* and spread bourgeois influence among the proletariat; in reality, the ideas preached by these people are bourgeois in content, and an "open" workers' party under Stolypin amounts to open renegacy on the part of people who have renounced the tasks of the revolutionary struggle of the masses against the tsarist autocracy, the Third Duma, and the entire Stolypin regime.

The meeting places on record that the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, which is supposed to be a technical organ of the C.C., has come completely under the influence of the liquidators.*

By its failure to fulfil, in the course of eighteen months, any one of the commissions given to it by the Central Committee (for instance—to unite the groups abroad on the basis of the acceptance and implementation of the Plenary Meeting's decisions, to help the organisations in the localities, or to see to it that *Golos* is discontinued and an end put to the factional aloofness of the *Vperyod* group), the Bureau Abroad has been of direct assistance to the enemies of the Social-Democratic Party, the liquidators.

The majority of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad showed contempt for the Party by systematically *obstructing*, ever since December 1910, the calling of a plenary meeting (as demanded by the Rules). The first time the Bolsheviks filed their application that the meeting be convened, the Central Committee Bureau Abroad wasted seven weeks just "taking a vote" on this question. After those seven weeks the Central Committee Bureau Abroad acknowledged

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* Igorev of *Golos* (sufficiently exposed and branded by the pro-Party Menshevik Plekhanov) and the Bundist Lieber,[114] who is conducting open propaganda in defence of Mr. Potresov and other figures of a Stolypin labour party, are the leading lights of this Central Committee Bureau Abroad.

that the Bolsheviks' demand for a plenary meeting was "legitimate", but at the same time it in practice *obstructed* the calling of a plenary meeting and did the same again at the end of May 1911. Actually, the role of *this* Central Committee Bureau Abroad has been to render assistance from abroad and from within the central Party bodies to leaders of the legalists and active promoters of a Stolypin labour party, such as Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman, who have declared the very existence of the Central Committee to be harmful (see Nos. 12 and 21-22 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Central Organ of the Party*). The meeting declares that the holding of Party posts by liquidators is outright *deception* of the Party, for the decisions of the Plenary Meeting clearly and unambiguously state that only *those* Mensheviks should be permitted to hold such posts who *conscientiously* abide by their promise to renounce liquidationism and to combat it.**

The meeting is, therefore, of the opinion that it was absolutely incumbent upon the Bolsheviks to break completely with the Central Committee Bureau Abroad as a body which has placed itself outside Party law and outside the Party, and that the Meeting of members of the Central Committee (see its "Notification"), which represented the vast majority of Social-Democratic Party organisations, groups, and circles actually working in Russia, was absolutely right in declaring that "the Central Committee Bureau Abroad has been pursuing a factional anti-Party policy, thereby violating the clear and precise decisions of the 1910 Plenary Meeting".

The meeting resolves to discontinue all relations with the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, and to support the decisions of the Meeting of members of the Central Committee, which has outlined a number of absolutely necessary measures to be taken in order to paralyse the activity of the liquidators, hampering as it does the entire work of the Party;

* See present edition, Vol. 16, "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party", and pp. 129-33 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** As regards the methods resorted to by the liquidators abroad in their fight against the R.S.D.L.P., such as political blackmail and the supplying of information to the secret police—which is what Mr. Martov did with the aid of the *Golos* editors—the meeting expresses its scorn for literary efforts of that nature, which can only arouse the disgust of all decent people.

to call a Party conference, and to help Party functionaries in all localities to revive the illegal organisations and nuclei of the Party. The meeting calls upon all Party comrades in all localities to set to work *at once* (in line with the decisions of the May-June Meeting) to prepare for a Party conference and hold elections to it, and, for this purpose, to establish regular connections with the Organising Commission,[115] the Central Organ and *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

II

The meeting draws the attention of worker Social-Democrats, irrespective of factions, to the fact that the émigré leaders of the *Vperyod* group, and Trotsky, editor of *Pravda*, are pursuing a policy of supporting the liquidators and of an alliance with them against the Party and against its decisions. This policy must be combated all the more vigorously since it is profoundly detrimental to the interests of the proletariat and, as such, is completely at variance with the activity of the *Russian* illegal Social-Democratic groups which, though connected with *Pravda* or *Vperyod*, are absolutely loyal in carrying out the decisions of the Party, and are everywhere struggling persistently against the liquidators to uphold the illegal R.S.D.L.P. and its revolutionary programme.

The meeting particularly warns worker Social-Democrats against the *deception* systematically practised by the *Golos* writers, who describe all the comrades active in the legal movement as opponents of the old Party and adherents of Potresov's new "open" party. Thus, in the latest bulletin, published by *Golos* on June 25 (reporting a "conference" of people active in the legal movement), the *Golos* editors *suppressed* the fact that the conference had *voted down* a motion of the liquidators to boycott a certain legally published newspaper for its anti-liquidationist policy.[116] Thus, the editors of *Golos* also *suppressed* the fact that that same conference *had voted down* the openly legalist and obviously renegade resolutions which had been proposed by *Golos* supporters. Even a Bundist who participated in the conference had there admitted that the proposals of the "Potresovites" were of an anti-Party nature. A number of those

active in the open movement have *already* embarked upon a resolute struggle against the Stolypin "labour" party. And if all Party members work solidly together, the number of such people will undoubtedly increase.

III

Whenever the struggle between Social-Democrats and those who spread bourgeois influence among the proletariat is intensified, all the unprincipled elements invariably bend their efforts to obscure great questions of principle by cheap sensationalism and scandal-mongering, such as those to which the *Golos* people abroad are assiduously treating audiences avid for contaminated spiritual food at meetings organised by the liquidators.

At a time like this it is more than ever incumbent upon revolutionary Marxists to remind all and sundry of the *old* truths *forgotten* by the liquidators, truths which constitute the foundation of our Social-Democratic activity.

The meeting, therefore, reminds all the members of the R.S.D.L.P. of our Party *programme*, of the programme which, at a time when international opportunism is intensifying and when a decisive struggle is maturing between opportunism and revolutionary Social-Democracy, has given a precise, clear, definite, and unyielding formulation of the revolutionary *ultimate goal* of socialism which can be achieved only by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of the immediate revolutionary aims of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of a democratic republic. The *entire* propaganda conducted by our legalists and by *Golos* shows that, *in actual fact*, far from adhering to and carrying out our programme, they are frankly defending *reformism* [as the pro-Party Mensheviks have also admitted (see Plekhanov's *The Diary of a Social-Democrat*[117] and the *Discussion Bulletin*, No. 3)] and are plainly renouncing the immediate revolutionary aims of the R.S.D.L.P.

The meeting reminds all members of the R.S.D.L.P. that to be a *real* Party member, it is not enough to *call* oneself such, nor is it enough to carry on propaganda "*in the spirit*" of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P.; one must also carry

out the *entire* practical work in conformity with the *tactical* decisions of the Party. In the present period of counter-revolution, at a time of universal renegacy, resignation, and despondency, particularly among the bourgeois intellectuals, only the Party decisions on tactics provide an appraisal of the situation, an appraisal of the practical line of conduct from the viewpoint of the principles of revolutionary Marxism. The real R.S.D.L.P., and not the one which *Golos* writers use as a screen for liquidationism, has *no* Party definition of the tasks of Social-Democracy at the present moment except *the resolutions on tactics adopted in December 1908*.

The liquidators, and to a certain extent the *Vperyod* group, hush up these resolutions or confine themselves to cursory references and outcries *against* them precisely for the reason that they feel that these resolutions call for a *line* of activity which radically repudiates both opportunist and semi-anarchist vacillations; which holds aloft the banner of revolution in spite of all and sundry counter-revolutionary trends; and which *explains* the economic and political characteristics of the present period as a new phase in Russia's bourgeois development, a phase which leads to a revolution destined to achieve the old objectives. A Party member is one who pursues the tactical line of the Party *in practice*. And there is only one tactical line of the R.S.D.L.P., the one stated in the resolutions of December 1908, which combine loyalty to the banner of the revolution with due regard for the new conditions of the present period. The resolutions of *the Plenary Meeting held in January 1910*, which are directed against *those who spread bourgeois influence among the proletariat*, represent a logical and direct corollary to, and are the natural continuation and fulfilment of, the resolutions of December 1908, which condemn liquidationism and categorically demand that Social-Democratic work in the Duma should be recognised and advantage taken of the possibilities offered for legal activity. In our days of confusion and disorganisation, we often come across people who invoke the great principle of the unity of the proletarian army in order to justify their unprincipled or cheap diplomatic attempts to effect "unity" or to "draw closer to" those who *spread bourgeois influence among the prole-*

tariat. The meeting most categorically condemns and repudiates all such attempts, regardless of who is responsible for them, and declares-that the great work of uniting and consolidating the fighting army of the revolutionary proletariat cannot be carried out unless a line of demarcation is drawn and a ruthless struggle is waged against those who serve to spread bourgeois influence among the proletariat.

A Party member is one who actually helps *build up* the organisation in conformity with the principles of Social-Democracy. The Party, the R.S.D.L.P., has no other *Party* definition of the nature and tasks of organisational work but the one given in the resolution on the organisational question adopted in December 1908, in the resolution on the same question adopted by the Plenary Meeting of January 1910, and in the letter of the Central Committee published immediately after that Meeting. *Only* all-round help in re-establishing and reinforcing the *illegal* organisation can be regarded as *Party* work; and only the illegal R.S.D.L.P. can and should surround *itself* with a network of legally existing organisations, *make use* of all kinds of legally existing organisations, and *direct* the entire work of such organisations in the spirit of our revolutionary principles. Anyone who does not actually carry on such work, who takes part in the counter-revolutionary crusade in general, and in the liberal crusade in particular, against the "underground", against illegal activity, *deceives* the workers when he speaks of his membership of the R.S.D.L.P.

The elections to the Fourth Duma are drawing near. The more acute the crisis becomes in the top leadership of the Party abroad, the more urgent the need for Social-Democratic functionaries in the localities to show initiative; the more strictly must they insist, and *ensure*, that election activity is *really* carried on in a Party spirit by every group, every nucleus, every workers' circle. Anyone who to this day regards "otzovism" as a "legitimate trend in our Party" takes the name of the R.S.D.L.P. in vain. You *cannot* conduct Party work in the elections to the Fourth Duma unless you most resolutely refuse to have anything to do with such people. He who to this day talks of conducting the Fourth Duma election campaign with the forces and resources of "legally functioning organisations", with the

forces and resources of an "open workers' party", and who at the same time refuses to abide by and carry out the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P. on the illegal organisation and the tactics as set forth in the Party's resolutions, takes the name of the R.S.D.L.P. in vain. He who carries on election activity and does not abide by the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P., but follows the line proposed in articles appearing in *Nasha Zarya*, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, is a builder of a Stolypin "labour" party, and not of the revolutionary Social-Democratic party of the proletariat.

The first aim of our Party at the forthcoming Fourth Duma elections is to educate the masses in socialism and develop mass agitation in favour of a democratic revolution to be accomplished by the forces of the proletariat and revolutionary bourgeois democrats (in the first place the revolutionary peasantry).

In the interests of such propaganda and agitation our Party must organise the *independent* participation of Social-Democrats in the elections and Party candidates must be put forward, not only in the worker curia, but everywhere, in all urban and rural constituencies.

The Party's entire agitational work during the elections must be conducted on two fronts, i.e., against the government and the parties openly supporting it, *as well as* against the Cadet Party, the party of counter-revolutionary liberalism.

Only those people may be Party candidates who really carry out the policy of the R.S.D.L.P. in full, are loyal not only to its programme but also to its resolutions on tactics, and who fight the new Stolypin "labour" party.

As to election agreements, the fundamental principles of the London Party Congress and the Party Conference of July 1907[118] must remain in force.

The Fourth Duma election campaign must be conducted by Party groups of workers, in the spirit of the Party decisions and in strict conformity with them.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PAMPHLET *TWO PARTIES*

Kamenev's pamphlet represents a systematised summary of the material on the struggle against the liquidationist trend waged during the period of counter-revolution by the Bolsheviks and, following their lead, by the whole R.S.D.L.P. Quite naturally, Kamenev devotes most of his space to an elucidation of the divergence on questions of principle between Social-Democracy and the liquidationist trend, a subject to which *Proletary*[119] and the Central Organ of the Party, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, also devoted most of their space during the period from 1908 to 1911.

Kamenev has proved conclusively that, *in point of fact*, the liquidationist group represents a separate party, not the R.S.D.L. Party. His evidence sums up the experience primarily of the years 1909-11, which confirmed the resolution of December 1908. That resolution, which was moved and carried by the Bolsheviks on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P., had already declared that the liquidators *were endeavouring to* "*substitute*" for the R.S.D.L.P. an "amorphous" legally existing federation. That amorphous legally existing federation of Potresov, Larin, Levitsky and Co. (with Mr. Martov and the *Golos* group abroad trailing behind), has now fully revealed itself. It is a group of literary men who have nothing in common with the R.S.D.L.P., and who pursue, not a Social-Democratic, but a liberal labour policy. They are the leading lights of a *Stolypin* "labour" party.

It is a feature specific of Russia at the turn of the century that we often meet with cases of extremely rapid and sometimes very "unexpected" transition from Marxism to liberalism. The Economists and *Credo*—Mr. Struve and Co.—the liquidators, are all rungs of one ladder, stages in a

single process of evolution, expressions of the same tendency. The party of the working class in Russia began to form shortly before the Revolution of 1905; now, in the period of counter-revolution, this party is being reconstructed, and to a certain extent built anew, on a more solid foundation. The bourgeois intelligentsia, attracted to the revolution by the knowledge that Russia has not yet passed through the epoch of democratic revolutions, has been joining the proletariat group after group—and group after group has again deserted the proletariat, having found out through experience that they cannot live up to revolutionary Marxism, that their real place is *outside* the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party. Such are our liquidators, too, some of whom are already speaking quite clearly, bluntly, and frankly of a *new* party they are creating.

Otzovism and liquidationism, while similar in the sense that both represent non-Social-Democratic, bourgeois trends, differ materially in respect of the fate that attended their political evolution. Otzovism was nipped in the bud by the Bolsheviks, and it has not gone so far as to attempt to create a party of its own; today it represents an insignificant group abroad, whose activity has been reduced to aiding the liquidators in their intrigues and struggle against the R.S.D.L.P. The liquidationist trend, on the other hand, has its centre (in the first place, political, and then organisational) in Russia; it has created a party *of its own*, even though it is an amorphous one (so far it is amorphous). That is why it has been necessary for Kamenev to dwell at length on the liquidationist tendency and to touch upon otzovism only in passing.

There are not many people among the adherents of the R.S.D.L.P. capable of sincerely defending the liquidationist trend.* Unfortunately, there are still quite a number of

* Obviously it would be ridiculous to talk of sincerity on the part of the *Golos* group abroad. They are past masters at blackmail and slander, with gentry like Martov in the lead in this respect. The decision arrived at by Kautsky, Mehring and Zetkin that the disputed funds be turned over, *not* to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, *but* to the Technical Commission[120] (see *Bulletin* of the Organising Commission, August 1, 1911), means complete vindication of Comrade Alexandrov and all the Bolsheviks (who are *fully* in agreement with Alexandrov) and complete condemnation of the foul

people who are sincerely opposed to liquidationism, *but do not understand* the conditions under which the struggle against it has to be waged. Of course, they say, liquidationism is a bourgeois trend in the Social-Democratic movement; but why not fight it in the ranks of a single party, just as the Germans fight the Bernsteinians? Why not try to come to an "agreement" with the liquidators?

Our champions of "agreement" fail to understand a very important and very simple thing: the liquidators are not only opportunists (like Bernstein and Co.); they are also trying to build a *separate* party of their own, they have issued the slogan that the R.S.D.L.P. *does not exist*; they pay no heed *whatever* to the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P. That is the difference between us and "Europe", and only people who have not given sufficient thought to the question, or who are not acquainted with Russian conditions, can invoke the example of "Europe". In Europe, an opportunist guilty of but one-tenth of what the Potresovs, Igorevs, Bers, Martovs, Dans, and their like have done and are doing against their Party and in defiance of its decisions would not be tolerated in the ranks of the party a single month. In Europe the parties function openly, and it is possible to see at once whether one belongs to an organisation and submits to its decisions.

Our Party is illegal. It is impossible to "see", and it is impermissible (unless one is an agent of the secret police) to talk openly of whether X, Y, or Z belongs to the organisation. But it is a fact that the Potresovs do *not* belong to the organisation, and that they *sneer* at *all* its decisions, just as the *Golos* people do. How can we come to an "agreement" with the Potresovs who have proved that *as far as they are concerned* the Party *does not exist*? Or with the Martovs and Dans who have proved the same thing? *What* can we agree *on* with the liquidators, unless it is the destruction of the R.S.D.L.P.?

Let the advocates of "agreement" try to name the *terms* of agreement with the liquidators, the *means* of exercising

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slander spread by Martov, Dan, Martynov and Axelrod. We also draw readers' attention to Comrade Victor's[121] letter printed in the Appendix. It shows what vile means Mr. Martov and his abettors stoop to in their fight against political adversaries.

control over the fulfilment of the terms, the *facts* proving that they would be fulfilled. They can name *none* of these. And therefore it is beyond any doubt that references to "agreement" are nothing but idle and puerile talk. This talk only helps the intrigues of the circles abroad (such as the *Vperyod* and *Golos* circles, and the Trotskyites), who have fully demonstrated that they ignore the decisions of the Party, and that they refuse to give up *an iota* of their "freedom" to support the liquidators.

In Russia, in the meantime, the illegal workers' circles have been drawing away from the liquidators, and are dissociating themselves from them to an ever greater extent with each passing day, at the same time slowly and laboriously building up the revolutionary R.S.D.L.P. The task of the adherents of the *Social-Democratic* Labour Party is to help these circles, to translate the decisions of the R.S.D.L.P. into practical work, and to put an end to the game of agreement with the windbags abroad (the *Golos* group, the strongest group abroad, are also mere windbags). Membership of the Party means fighting for the Party. All talk about "agreement" with the liquidators who are building a non-Social-Democratic party, is a violation of the duty deriving from Party membership.

August 2, 1911 *N. Lenin*

P. S. It should be added that the analysis of the "charges" levelled against the Bolshevik Centre, given in the Appendix, represents our collective opinion and has been elaborated on the basis of material and documents in the hands of the Bolshevik Centre, as well as on the basis of information supplied by comrades of the Bolshevik Centre who personally conducted some of its affairs.

N. Lenin

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REFORMISM IN THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

The tremendous progress made by capitalism in recent decades and the rapid growth of the working-class movement in all the civilised countries have brought about a big change in the attitude of the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. Instead of waging an open, principled and direct struggle against all the fundamental tenets of socialism in defence of the absolute inviolability of private property and freedom of competition, the bourgeoisie of Europe and America, as represented by their ideologists and political leaders, are coming out increasingly in defence of so-called social reforms as opposed to the idea of social revolution. Not liberalism versus socialism, but reformism versus socialist revolution—is the formula of the modern, "advanced", educated bourgeoisie. And the higher the development of capitalism in a given country, the more unadulterated the rule of the bourgeoisie, and the greater the political liberty, the more extensive is the application of the "most up-to-date" bourgeois slogan: reform *versus* revolution, the partial patching up of the doomed regime with the object of dividing and weakening the working class, and of maintaining the rule of the bourgeoisie, *versus* the revolutionary overthrow of that rule.

From the viewpoint of the universal development of socialism this change must be regarded as a big step forward. At first socialism fought for its existence, and was confronted by a bourgeoisie confident of its strength and boldly and consistently defending liberalism as an integral system of economic and political views. Socialism has grown into a force and, throughout the civilised world, has already

upheld its right to existence. It is now fighting *for power* and the bourgeoisie, disintegrating and realising the inevitability of its doom, is exerting every effort to defer that day and to maintain its rule under the new conditions as well, at the cost of partial and spurious concessions.

The intensification of the struggle of reformism against revolutionary Social-Democracy *within* the working-class movement is an absolutely inevitable result of the changes in the entire economic and political situation throughout the civilised world. The growth of the working-class movement necessarily attracts to its ranks a certain number of petty-bourgeois elements, people who are under the spell of bourgeois ideology, who find it difficult to rid themselves of that ideology and continually lapse back into it. We cannot conceive of the social revolution being accomplished by the proletariat without this struggle, without clear demarcation on questions of principle between the socialist Mountain and the socialist Gironde[122] *prior* to this revolution, and without a complete break between the opportunist, petty-bourgeois elements and the proletarian, revolutionary elements of the new historic force *during* this revolution.

In Russia the position is fundamentally the same; only here matters are more complicated, obscured, and modified, because we are lagging behind Europe (and even behind the advanced part of Asia), and we are still passing through the era of bourgeois revolutions. Owing to this, Russian reformism is distinguished by its particular stubbornness, it represents, as it were, a more pernicious malady, and it is much more harmful to the cause of the proletariat and of the revolution. In our country reformism emanates from two sources simultaneously. In the first place, Russia is much more a petty-bourgeois country than the countries of Western Europe. Our country, therefore, more frequently produces individuals, groups and trends distinguished by their contradictory, unstable, vacillating attitude to socialism (an attitude veering between "ardent love" and base treachery) characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie in general. Secondly, the petty-bourgeois masses in our country are more prone to lose heart and to succumb to renegade moods at the failure of any *one* phase of our bourgeois revolution; they are more ready to renounce the aim of a complete democratic

revolution which would entirely rid Russia of all survivals of medievalism and serfdom.

We shall not dwell at length on the first source. We need only mention that there is hardly a country in the world in which there has been such a rapid "swing" from sympathy for socialism to sympathy for counter-revolutionary liberalism as that performed by our Struves, Izgoyevs, Karaulovs, etc., etc. Yet these gentlemen are not exceptions, not isolated individuals, but representatives of widespread trends! Sentimentalists, of whom there are many outside the ranks of the Social-Democratic movement, but also a goodly number within it, and who love to preach sermons against "excessive" polemics, against "the passion for drawing lines of demarcation", etc., betray a complete lack of understanding of the historical conditions which, in Russia, give rise to the "excessive" "passion" for swinging over from socialism to liberalism.

Let us turn to the second source of reformism in Russia.

Our bourgeois revolution has not been completed. The autocracy is *trying* to find new ways of solving the problems bequeathed by that revolution and imposed by the entire objective course of economic development; *but it is unable to do so*. Neither the latest step in the transformation of old tsarism into a renovated bourgeois monarchy, nor the organisation of the nobility and the upper crust of the bourgeoisie on a national scale (the Third Duma), nor yet the bourgeois agrarian policy being enforced by the rural superintendents[123]—none of these "extreme" measures, none of these "latest" efforts of tsarism in the *last* sphere remaining to it, the sphere of adaptation to bourgeois development, prove adequate. It just does not work! Not only is a Russia "renovated" by *such* means unable to catch up with Japan, it is perhaps, even beginning to fall behind China. Because the bourgeois-democratic tasks have been left unfulfilled, a revolutionary crisis is still inevitable. It is ripening again, and we are heading toward it once more, in a new way, *not the same* way as before, not at the same pace, and not only in the old forms—but that we are heading toward it, of that there is no doubt.

The tasks of the proletariat that arise from this situation are fully and unmistakably definite. As the only consistently

revolutionary class of contemporary society, it must be the leader in the struggle of the whole people for a fully democratic revolution, in the struggle of *all* the working and exploited people against the oppressors and exploiters. The proletariat is revolutionary only insofar as it is conscious of and gives effect to this idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. The proletarian who is conscious of this task is a slave who has revolted against slavery. The proletarian who is not conscious of the idea that his class must be the leader, or who renounces this idea, is a slave who does not realise his position as a slave; at best he is a slave who fights to improve his condition as a slave, *but not* one who fights to overthrow slavery.

It is, therefore, obvious that the famous formula of one of the young leaders of our reformists, Mr. Levitsky of *Nasha Zarya*, who declared that the Russian Social-Democratic Party must represent "*not* hegemony, but a class party", is a formula of the most consistent reformism. More than that, it is a formula of sheer renegacy. To say, "*not* hegemony, but a class party", means to take the side of the bourgeoisie, the side of the liberal who says to the slave of our age, the wage-earner: "Fight to improve your condition as a slave, but regard the thought of overthrowing slavery as a harmful utopia"! Compare Bernstein's famous formula—"The movement is everything, the final aim is nothing"—with Levitsky's formula, and you will see that they are variations of the same idea. They both recognise *only* reforms, and renounce revolution. Bernstein's formula is broader in scope, for it envisages a socialist revolution (=the final goal of Social-Democracy, as a party of bourgeois society). Levitsky's formula is narrower; for while it renounces revolution in general, it is particularly meant to renounce what the liberals hated most in 1905-07—namely, the fact that the proletariat *wrested* from them the leadership of the masses of the people (particularly of the peasantry) in the struggle for a fully democratic revolution.

To preach to the workers that what they need is "*not* hegemony, but a class party" means to betray the cause of the proletariat to the liberals; it means preaching that *Social-Democratic* labour policy should be replaced by a *liberal* labour policy.

Renunciation of the idea of hegemony, however, is the crudest form of reformism in the Russian Social-Democratic movement, and that is why not all liquidators make bold to express their ideas in such definite terms. Some of them (Mr. Martov, for instance) even try, mocking at the truth, to deny that there is a connection between the renunciation of hegemony and liquidationism.

A more "subtle" attempt to "substantiate" reformist views is the following argument: The bourgeois revolution in Russia is at an end; after 1905 there can be no second bourgeois revolution, no second nation-wide struggle for a democratic revolution; Russia therefore is faced not with a *revolutionary* but with a "constitutional" crisis, and all that remains for the working class is to take care to defend its rights and interests on the basis of that "constitutional crisis". That is how the liquidator Y. Larin argues in *Dyelo Zhizni* (and previously in *Vozrozhdeniye*).

"October 1905 is not on the order of the day," wrote Mr. Larin. "If the Duma were abolished, it would bo restored more rapidly than in post-revolutionary Austria, which abolished the Constitution in 1851 only to recognise it again in 1860, nine years later, without any revolution (note this!), simply because it was in the interests of the most influential section of the ruling classes, the section which had reconstructed its economy on capitalist lines." "At the stage we are now in, a nation-wide revolutionary movement like that of 1905 is impossible."

All Mr. Larin's arguments are nothing more than an expanded rehash of what Mr. Dan said at the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in December 1908. Arguing against the resolution which stated that the "*fundamental* factors of economic and political life which gave rise to the Revolution of 1905, *continue to operate*", that a new—*revolutionary*, and not "constitutional"—crisis was developing, the editor of the liquidators' *Golos* exclaimed: "They [i.e., the R.S.D.L.P.] want to shove in where they have once been defeated".

To shove again toward revolution, to work tirelessly, in the changed situation, to propagate the idea of revolution and to prepare the forces of the working class for it—that, from the standpoint of the reformists, is the chief crime of the R.S.D.L.P., that is what constitutes the *guilt*

of the revolutionary proletariat. Why "shove in where they have once been defeated"—that is the wisdom of renegades and of persons who lose heart after any defeat.

But in countries older and more "experienced" than Russia the revolutionary proletariat showed its ability to "shove in where it has once been defeated" two, three, and four times; in France it accomplished *four* revolutions between 1789 and 1871, rising again and again after the most severe defeats and achieving a republic in which it now faces its *last* enemy—the advanced bourgeoisie; it has achieved a republic, which is the only form of state corresponding to the conditions necessary for the final struggle for the victory of socialism.

Such is the distinction between socialists and liberals, or champions of the bourgeoisie. The socialists teach that revolution is inevitable, and that the proletariat must take advantage of *all* the contradictions in society, of every weakness of its enemies or of the intermediate classes, to prepare for a new revolutionary struggle, to repeat the revolution in a broader arena, with a more developed population. The bourgeoisie and the liberals teach that revolutions are unnecessary and even harmful to the workers, that they must not "shove" toward revolution, but, like good little boys, work modestly for reforms.

That is why, in order to divert the Russian workers *from* socialism, the reformists, who are the captives of bourgeois ideas, *constantly* refer to the example of *Austria* (as well as Prussia) in the 1860s. Why are they so fond of these examples? Y. Larin let the cat out of the bag; because in these countries, after the "unsuccessful" revolution of 1848, the bourgeois transformation was completed "*without any revolution*".

That is the whole secret! That is what gladdens their hearts, for it seems to indicate that bourgeois change is possible *without* revolution!! And if that is the case, why should we Russians bother our heads about a revolution? Why not leave it to the landlords and factory owners to effect the bourgeois transformation of Russia "without any revolution"!

It was because the proletariat in Austria and Prussia was weak that it was unable to prevent the landed proprietors

and the bourgeoisie from effecting the transformation *regardless* of the interests of the workers, in a form *most prejudicial* to the workers, retaining the monarchy, the privileges of the nobility, arbitrary rule in the countryside, and a host of other survivals of medievalism.

In 1905 our proletariat displayed strength unparalleled in any bourgeois revolution in the West, yet today the Russian reformists use examples of the weakness of the working class in other countries, forty or fifty years ago, in order to justify *their own* apostasy, to "substantiate" *their own* renegade propaganda!

The reference to Austria and Prussia of the 1860s, so beloved of our reformists, is the best proof of the theoretical fallacy of their arguments and of their desertion to the bourgeoisie in practical politics.

Indeed, if Austria restored the Constitution which was abolished after the defeat of the Revolution of 1848, and an "era of crisis" was ushered in in Prussia in the 1860s, what does this prove? It proves, primarily, that the bourgeois transformation of these countries had not been completed. To maintain that the system of government in Russia has *already* become bourgeois (as Larin says), and that government power in our country is no longer of a feudal nature (see Larin again), and at the same time to refer to Austria and Prussia as an example, is to refute oneself! Generally speaking it would be ridiculous to deny that the bourgeois transformation of Russia has not been completed: the very policy of the bourgeois parties, the Constitutional-Democrats and the Octobrists, proves this beyond all doubt, and Larin himself (as we shall see further on) surrenders his position. It cannot be denied that the monarchy is taking one more step towards adapting itself to bourgeois development—as we have said before, and as was pointed out in a resolution adopted by the Party (December 1908). But it is still more undeniable that *even* this adaptation, *even* bourgeois reaction, and the Third Duma, and the agrarian law of November 9, 1906 (and June 14, 1910) do *not* solve the problems of Russia's bourgeois transformation.

Let us look a little further. Why were "crises" in Austria and in Prussia in the 1860s *constitutional*, and not revolutionary? Because there were a number of special circum-

stances which eased the position of the monarchy (the "revolution from above" in Germany, her unification by "blood and iron"); because the proletariat was at that time extremely weak and undeveloped in those countries, and the liberal bourgeoisie was distinguished by base cowardice and treachery, just as the Russian Cadets are in our day.

To show how the German Social-Democrats who themselves took part in the events of those years assess the situation, we quote some opinions expressed by Bebel in his memoirs (*Pages from My Life*), the first part of which was published last year. Bebel states that Bismarck, as has since become known, related that the king at the time of the "constitutional" crisis in Prussia in 1862 had given way to utter despair, lamented his fate, and blubbered in his, Bismarck's, presence that they were both going to die on the scaffold. Bismarck put the coward to shame and persuaded him not to shrink from giving battle.

"These events show," says Bebel, "what the liberals might have achieved had they taken advantage of the situation. But they were already afraid of the workers who backed them. Bismarck's words that if he were driven to extremes he would set Acheron in motion [i.e., stir up a popular movement of the lower classes, the masses], struck fear into their heart."

Half a century after the "constitutional" crisis which "without any revolution" completed the transformation of his country into a bourgeois-Junker monarchy, the leader of the German Social-Democrats refers to the *revolutionary* possibilities of the situation at that time, which the liberals did not take advantage of owing to their fear of the workers. The leaders of the Russian reformists say to the Russian workers: since the German bourgeoisie was so base as to cower before a cowering king, why shouldn't we *too* try to copy those splendid tactics of the German bourgeoisie? Bebel accuses the bourgeoisie of not having "taken advantage" of the "constitutional" crisis to effect a revolution because of their fear, as exploiters, of the popular movement. Larin and Co. accuse the Russian workers of having striven to secure hegemony (i.e., to draw the masses into the revolution in spite of the liberals), and advise them to organise "*not* for revolution", *but* "for the defence of their interests

in the forthcoming constitutional reform of Russia". The liquidators offer the Russian workers the rotten views of rotten German liberalism as "Social-Democratic" views! After this, how can one help calling such Social-Democrats "Stolypin Social-Democrats"?

In estimating the "constitutional" crisis of the 1860s in Prussia, Bebel does not confine himself to saying that the bourgeoisie were afraid to fight the monarchy because they were afraid of the workers. He also tells us what was going on among the workers at that time. "The appalling state of political affairs," he says, "of which the workers were becoming ever more keenly aware, naturally affected their mood. Everybody clamoured for change. But since there was no fully class-conscious leadership with a clear vision of the goal and enjoying the confidence of the workers, and since there existed no strong organisation that could rally the forces, the mood petered out [*verpuffte*]. Never did a movement, so splendid in its essence [*in Kern vortrefflich*], turn out to be so futile in the end. All the meetings were packed, and the most vehement speakers were hailed as the heroes of the day. This was the prevailing mood, particularly, in the Workers' Educational Society at Leipzig." A mass meeting in Leipzig on May 8, 1866, attended by 5,000 people, unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by Liebknecht and Bebel, which demanded, on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage, with secret ballot, the convening of a Parliament supported by the armed people. The resolution also expressed the "hope that the German people will elect as deputies only persons who repudiate every hereditary central government power". The resolution proposed by Liebknecht and Bebel was thus unmistakably revolutionary and republican in character.

Thus we see that at the time of the "constitutional" crisis *the leader of the German Social-Democrats* advocated resolutions of a republican and revolutionary nature at mass meetings. Half a century later, recalling his youth and telling the new generation of the events of days long gone by, he stresses most of all his regret that at that time there was no leadership sufficiently class-conscious and capable of understanding the revolutionary tasks (*i.e.*, *there was no revolutionary Social-Democratic Party understanding the*

task implied by the **hegemony** *of the proletariat*); that there was no strong organisation; that the revolutionary mood "petered out". Yet the leaders of the Russian reformists, with the profundity of Simple Simons, refer to the example of Austria and Prussia in the 1860s as proving that we can manage "without any revolution"! And these paltry philistines who have succumbed to the intoxication of counter-revolution, and are the ideological slaves of liberalism, still dare to dishonour the name of the R.S.D.L.P.!

To be sure, among the reformists who are abandoning socialism there are people who substitute for Larin's straightforward opportunism the diplomatic tactics of beating about the bush in respect of the most important and fundamental questions of the working-class movement. They try to confuse the issue, to muddle the ideological controversies, to defile them, as did Mr. Martov, for instance, when he asserted in the legally published press (that is to say, where he is protected by Stolypin from a direct retort by members of the R.S.D.L.P.) that Larin and "the orthodox Bolsheviks in the resolutions of 1908" propose an *identical* "scheme". This is a downright distortion of the facts worthy of this author of scurrilous effusions. The same Martov, pretending to argue against Larin, declared in print that he, "of course" did "not suspect Larin of reformist tendencies". Martov *did not suspect* Larin, who expounded *purely* reformist views, of being a reformist! This is an example of the tricks to which the diplomats of reformism resort.* The same Martov, whom some simpletons regard as being more "Left", and a more reliable revolutionary than Larin, summed up his "difference" with the latter in the following words:

> "To sum up: the fact that the present regime is an inherently contradictory combination of absolutism and constitutionalism, and that the Russian working class has sufficiently matured to follow the example of the workers of the progressive countries of the West in striking at this regime through the Achilles heel of its contradictions, is ample material for the theoretical substantiation and political justification of what the Mensheviks who remain true to Marxism are now doing."

* Compare the just remarks made by the pro-Party Menshevik Dnevnitsky in No. 3 of *Diskussionny Listok* (supplement to the Central Organ of our Party) on Larin's reformism and Martov's evasions.

No matter how hard Martov tried to evade the issue, the result of his very first attempt at a summary was that all his evasions collapsed of themselves. The words quoted above represent a complete renunciation of socialism and its replacement by liberalism. What Martov proclaims as "ample" is ample *only* for the liberals, *only* for the bourgeoisie. A proletarian who considers it "ample" to recognise the contradictory nature of the combination of absolutism and constitutionalism accepts the standpoint of a *liberal labour* policy. He is *no* socialist, he has *not* understood the tasks of his *class*, which demand that the masses of the people, the masses of working and exploited people, be roused against absolutism in all its forms, that they be roused to intervene *independently* in the historic destinies of the country, the vacillations or resistance of the bourgeoisie notwithstanding. But the independent historical action of the masses who are throwing off the hegemony of the bourgeoisie turns a "constitutional" crisis into a *revolution*. The bourgeoisie (particularly since 1905) fears revolution and loathes it; the proletariat, on the other hand, educates the masses of the people in the spirit of devotion to the idea of revolution, explains its tasks, and prepares the masses for new revolutionary battles. Whether, when, and under what circumstances the revolution materialises, does not depend on the will of a particular class; but revolutionary work carried on among the masses is never wasted. This is the only kind of activity which prepares the masses for the victory of socialism. The Larins and Martovs forget these elementary ABC truths of socialism.

Larin, who expresses the views of the group of Russian liquidators who have completely broken with the R.S.D.L.P., does not hesitate to go the whole hog in expounding his reformism. Here is what he writes in *Dyelo Zhizni* (1911, No. 2) —and these words should be remembered by everyone who holds dear the principles of Social-Democracy:

"A state of perplexity and uncertainty, when people simply do not know what to expect of the coming day, what tasks to set themselves—that is what results from indeterminate, temporising moods, from vague hopes of either a repetition of the revolution or of 'we shall wait and see'. The immediate task is, not to wait fruitlessly for something to turn up, but to imbue broad circles with the guiding

idea that, in the ensuing historical period of Russian life, the working class must organise itself not 'for revolution', not 'in expectation of a revolution', but simply [note the *but simply*] for the determined and systematic defence of its particular interests in all spheres of life; for the gathering and training of its forces for this many-sided and complex activity; for the training and building-up in this way of socialist consciousness in general for acquiring the ability to orientate itself [to find its bearings]—and to assert itself—particularly in the complicated relations of the social classes of Russia during the coming constitutional reform of the country after the economically inevitable self-exhaustion of feudal reaction."

This is consummate, frank, smug reformism of the purest water. War against the idea of revolution, against the "hopes" for revolution (in the eyes of the reformist such "hopes" seem *vague*, because he does not understand the depth of the contemporary economic and political contradictions); war against every activity designed to organise the forces and prepare the minds for revolution; war waged in the legal press that Stolypin protests from a direct retort by revolutionary Social-Democrats; war waged on behalf of a group of legalists who have completely broken with the R.S.D.L.P. —this is the programme and tactics of the Stolypin labour party which Potresov, Levitsky, Larin, and their friends are out to create. The real programme and the real tactics of these people are expressed in exact terms in the above quotation—as distinct from their hypocritical official assurances that they are "*also* Social-Democrats", that they "also" belong to the "irreconcilable International". These assurances are only window-dressing. Their deeds, their real social substance, are expressed in this programme, which substitutes a liberal labour policy for socialism.

Just note the ridiculous contradictions in which the reformists become entangled. If, as Larin says, the bourgeois revolution in Russia has been consummated, then the socialist revolution is the next stage of historical development. This is self-evident; it is clear to anyone who does not profess to be a socialist merely for the sake of deceiving the workers by the use of a popular name. *This* is all the more reason why we *must* organise "for revolution" (for socialist revolution), "in expectation" of revolution, for the sake of the "hopes" (not vague "hopes", but the *certainty* based on exact and growing scientific data) *of a socialist* revolution.

But that's the whole point—to the reformist the twaddle about the consummated bourgeois revolution (like Martov's twaddle about the Achilles heel, etc.) is simply a verbal screen to cover up his *renunciation of all revolution*. He renounces the bourgeois-democratic revolution on the pretext that it is complete, or that it is "ample" to recognise the contradiction between absolutism and constitutionalism; and he renounces the socialist revolution on the pretext that "for the time being" we must "simply" organise to take part in the "coming constitutional reform" of Russia!

But if you, esteemed Cadet parading in socialist feathers, recognise the inevitability of Russia's "coming constitutional reform", then you speak against yourself, for thereby you admit that the bourgeois-democratic revolution *has not been completed* in our country. You are betraying your bourgeois nature again and again when you talk about an inevitable "*self-exhaustion* of feudal reaction", and when you sneer at the proletarian idea of *destroying*, not only feudal *reaction*, but *all* survivals of feudalism, by means of a *popular* revolutionary movement.

Despite the liberal sermons of our heroes of the Stolypin labour party, the Russian proletariat will always and invariably put the spirit of devotion to the democratic revolution and to the socialist revolution into *all* that difficult, arduous, everyday, routine and inconspicuous work, to which the era of counter-revolution has condemned it; it will organise and gather its forces for revolution; it will ruthlessly repulse the traitors and renegades; and it will be guided, not by "vague hopes", but by the scientifically grounded conviction that the revolution will come again.

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FROM THE CAMP OF THE STOLYPIN "LABOUR" PARTY

DEDICATED TO OUR "CONCILIATORS" AND ADVOCATES OF "AGREEMENT"

Comrade K.'s[124] letter deserves the profound attention of all to whom our Party is dear. A better exposure of *Golos* policy (and of *Golos* diplomacy), a better refutation of the views and hopes of our "conciliators" and advocates of "agreement" it is hard to imagine.

Is the case cited by Comrade K. an exception? No, it is *typical* of the advocates of a Stolypin labour party, for we know very well that a *number* of writers in *Nasha Zarya*, *Dyelo Zhizni*, etc., have *already* been systematically preaching *these very* liquidationist ideas *for many a year*. These liquidators do not often meet worker members of the Party-the Party very rarely receives such exact information of their disgraceful utterances as that for which we have to thank Comrade K.; but, *always and everywhere*, the preaching of the *group* of independent legalists is conducted precisely in this spirit. It is impossible to doubt this when periodicals of the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* type exist. It is to the advantage of only the most cowardly and most despicable defenders of the liquidators to keep silent about this.

Compare this fact with the methods employed by people like Trotsky, who shout about "agreement" and about their hostility to the liquidators. We know these methods only too well; these people shout at the top of their voices that they are "neither Bolsheviks nor Mensheviks, but revolutionary Social-Democrats"; they zealously vow and swear that they are foes of liquidationism and staunch defenders of the illegal R.S.D.L.P.; they *vociferously abuse those who*

expose the liquidators, *the Potresovs*; they say that the anti-liquidators are "exaggerating" the issue; but *do not say a word* against the definite liquidators, Potresov, Martov, Levitsky, Dan, Larin, and so on.

The real purpose of such methods is obvious. They use *phrase-mongering* to shield the *real* liquidators and do everything to *hamper* the work of the anti-liquidators. This was exactly the policy pursued by *Rabocheye Dyelo*,[125] so notorious in the history of the R.S.D.L.P. for its unprincipled character; it vowed and swore, "We are not Economists, not at all, we are wholly in favour of political struggle"; but in reality it provided a *screen* for *Rabochaya Mysl*[126] and the Economists, directing its whole struggle against those who exposed and refuted the Economists.

Hence it is clear that Trotsky and the "Trotskyites and conciliators" like him are more pernicious than any liquidator; the convinced liquidators state their views bluntly, and it is easy for the workers to detect where they are wrong, whereas the Trotskys *deceive* the workers, *cover up* the evil, and make it impossible to expose the evil and to remedy it. Whoever supports Trotsky's puny group supports a policy of lying and of deceiving the workers, a policy of shielding the liquidators. Full freedom of action for Potresov and Co. in Russia, and the shielding of their deeds by "revolutionary" phrase-mongering abroad—there you have the essence of the policy of "Trotskyism".

Hence it is clear, furthermore, that any "agreement" with the *Golos* group that evades the question of the liquidators' centre in Russia, that is, the leading lights of *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, would be nothing but a continuation of this deception of the workers, this covering up of the evil. Since the Plenary Meeting of January 1910 the *Golos* supporters have made it abundantly clear that they are capable of "subscribing" to any resolution, not allowing any resolution "to hamper the freedom" of their liquidationist activities one iota. Abroad they subscribe to resolutions saying that any disparagement of the importance of the illegal Party is evidence of bourgeois influence among the proletariat, while in Russia they assist the Potresovs, Larins, and Levitskys, who, far from taking part in illegal work, scoff at it and try to destroy the illegal Party.

At present Trotsky, together with Bundists like Mr. Lieber (an extreme liquidator, who publicly defended Mr. Potresov in his lectures and who now, in order to hush up the fact, is stirring up squabbles and conflicts), together with Letts like Schwartz,[127] and so on, is concocting just such an "agreement" with the *Golos* group. Let nobody be deceived on this score: their agreement will be an agreement to shield the liquidators.

P. S. These lines were already set up when reports appeared in the press of an "agreement" between the *Golos* group and Trotsky, the Bundist and the Lett liquidator. Our words have been fully borne out: this is an agreement *to shield* the liquidators in Russia, an agreement between the servants of the Potresovs.

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COMMENT BY *SOTSIAL-DEMOCRAT* EDITORS ON STATEMENT BY COMMISSION CONVENING PLENARY MEETING OF C.C.[128]

For a long time, ever since December 1910, the Editorial Board of the Central Organ has been warning the Party that the *Golos* group is *sabotaging* the plenary meeting.* We now have the facts of their sabotage of plenary meetings, first in Russia and then abroad.

The meeting in Russia was wrecked by Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman. By their "clever rebuttal" they merely confirmed their having been invited to attend a meeting of the Central Committee, if only to co-opt new members, and that it was not the wicked "factional" "Leninist" Bolsheviks who had invited them, but *conciliators*. Yet the three gentlemen refused to attend the meeting. It was their refusal that sabotaged the work of the Central Committee in Russia, for *all* the Bolshevik members of the Central Committee who went to Russia (and they were *all* of them practical leaders) were "eliminated" before they succeeded in calling a plenary meeting after that trio had refused to attend.

No matter what the *Golos* people say now, no matter what they swear to and what assurances they give, no matter how they try to confuse the issue and wriggle out by resorting to imprecations, feuds, and chicanery, there is no getting away from the facts. And it is a fact that a trio of the *chief* leaders of the legalists—Mikhail+Yuri+Roman, the closest associates of Mr. Potresov and of the other heroes of the Stolypin labour party—*sabotaged* the Central Committee in Russia.

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* See pp. 23-38 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Now the *Golos* group has sabotaged the Central Committee abroad as well. The Bolsheviks demanded that it be convened in December 1910; but the liquidationist Central Committee Bureau Abroad *refused* to convene it, pleading that that was the business of the Central Committee Bureau in Russia (this was a lie, because a meeting held abroad did *not* preclude one being held in Russia).

The second time, after the arrests in Russia, the Bolsheviks demanded that the meeting be convened abroad *in April or May 1911*. Again the *Central Committee Bureau Abroad refused* on the plea that half the "Russian Bureau" had *survived*.

Four or five months have passed since then, and the falsity of the excuses cited by the Bureau Abroad has been *fully exposed*: *in four months* not a single letter has been received from "that half" of the "Bureau", there has been no news of a single step taken by that half, not a single spark of life shown. The Liebers, Igorevs, and Schwartzes deceived the Party. By referring to the *non-existent* Bureau in Russia, they *refused* to convene the Central Committee abroad. Yet, the Meeting of members of the Central Committee held in June, proved that *nine* members of the Central Committee *were* abroad at the time.

Anyone who is capable of thinking and of keeping a clear head amid the shouts, imprecations, feuds, and chicanery, cannot help seeing that the Central Committee has been definitely wrecked by the *Golos* people.

The *Golos* group has done everything it could to destroy the Party. The Party will do everything it can to destroy them.

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STOLYPIN AND THE REVOLUTION

The assassination of the arch-hangman Stolypin occurred at a time when a number of symptoms indicated that the first period in the history of the Russian counter-revolution was coming to an end. That is why the event of September 1, quite insignificant in itself, again raises the extremely important question of the content and meaning of the counter-revolution in Russia. One discerns notes of a really serious and principled attitude amid the chorus of reactionaries who are servilely singing the praises of Stolypin, or are rummaging in the history of the intrigues of the Black-Hundred gang which is lording it over Russia, and amid the chorus of the liberals who are shaking their heads over the "wild and insane" shot (it goes without saying that included among the liberals are the former Social-Democrats of *Dyelo Zhizni* who used the hackneyed expression quoted above). Attempts are being made to view "the Stolypin period" of Russian history as a definite entity.

Stolypin was the head of the counter-revolutionary government for about five years, from 1906 to 1911. This was indeed a unique period crowded with instructive events. Externally, it may be described as the period of preparation for and accomplishment of the coup d'état of June 3, 1907. The preparation for this coup, which has already shown its results in all spheres of our social life, began in the summer of 1906, when Stolypin addressed the First Duma in his capacity as Minister of the Interior. The question is, on what social forces did the men who staged the coup rely, or what forces prompted them? What was the social and

economic content of the period ushered in on June 3? Stolypin's personal "career" provides instructive material and interesting examples bearing on this question.

A landowner and Marshal of the Nobility,[129] he was appointed governor in 1902, under Plehve, gained "fame" in the eyes of the tsar and the reactionary court clique by his brutal reprisals against the peasants and the cruel punishment he inflicted upon them (in Saratov Gubernia), organised Black-Hundred gangs and pogroms in 1905 (the pogrom in Balashov), became Minister of the Interior in 1906 and Chairman of the Council of Ministers after the dissolution of the First Duma. That, in very brief outline, is Stolypin's political biography. The biography of the head of the counter-revolutionary government is at the same time the biography of the class which carried out the counter-revolution—Stolypin was nothing more than an agent or clerk in its employ. This class is the Russian landed nobility with Nicholas Romanov, the first nobleman and biggest landowner, at their head. It is made up of the thirty thousand feudal landowners who control seventy million dessiatines of land in European Russia—that is to say, as much land as is owned by ten million peasant households. The latifundia owned by this class form a basis for feudal exaction which, in various forms and under various names (labour-service, bondage, etc.) still reigns in the traditionally Russian central provinces. The "land hunger" of the Russian peasant (to use a favourite expression of the liberals and Narodniks) is nothing but the reverse side of the *over-abundance of land* in the hands of this class. The agrarian question, the central issue in our 1905 Revolution, was one of whether landed proprietorship would remain intact—in which case the poverty-stricken, wretched, starving, browbeaten and downtrodden peasantry would for many years to come *inevitably* remain as the bulk of the population—or whether the bulk of the population would succeed in winning for themselves more or less human conditions, conditions even slightly resembling the civil liberties of the European countries. This, however, *could not be accomplished* unless landed proprietorship and the landowner monarchy inseparably bound up with it were abolished by a revolution.

Stolypin's political biography is the faithful reflection and expression of the conditions facing the tsarist monarchy. Stolypin could only act as he did in the situation in which the revolution placed the monarchy. The monarchy *could not* act in any other way when it became quite clear—became clear in actual practice both *prior* to the Duma, in 1905, and *at the time* of the Duma, in 1906—that the vast, the overwhelming majority of the population had already realised that its interests could not be reconciled with the preservation of the landowning class, and was striving to abolish that class. Nothing could be more superficial and more false than the assertions of the Cadet writers that the attacks upon the monarchy in our country were merely the expression of "intellectual" revolutionism. On the contrary, the objective conditions were such that it was the struggle of the peasants against landed proprietorship that inevitably posed the question of whether our landowning monarchy was to live or die. Tsarism *was compelled* to wage a life-and-death struggle, it *was compelled* to seek other means of defence in addition to the utterly impotent bureaucracy and the army which had been weakened as a result of military defeat and internal disintegration. All that the tsarist monarchy could do under the circumstances was to organise the Black-Hundred elements of the population and to perpetrate pogroms. The high moral indignation with which our liberals speak of the pogroms gives every revolutionary an impression of something abominably wretched and cowardly, particularly as this high moral condemnation of pogroms has proved to be fully compatible with the idea of conducting negotiations and concluding agreements with the pogromists. The monarchy had to defend itself against the revolution, and the semi-Asiatic, feudal *Russian* monarchy of the Romanovs could only defend itself by the most infamous, most disgusting, vile and cruel means. The only honourable way of fighting the pogroms, the only rational way from the point of view of a socialist and a democrat, is not to express high moral condemnation, but to assist the revolution selflessly and in every way, to organise the revolution for the *overthrow* of this monarchy.

Stolypin the pogrom-monger groomed himself for a ministerial post in the only way in which a tsarist governor could:

by torturing the peasants, by organising pogroms and by showing an ability to conceal these Asiatic "practices" behind glib phrases, external appearances, poses and gestures made to look "European".

And the leaders of our liberal bourgeoisie, who are expressing their high moral condemnation of pogroms, carried on negotiations with the pogromists, recognising not only the latters' right to existence, but their leadership in the work of setting up a new Russia and of ruling it! The assassination of Stolypin has occasioned a number of interesting revelations and confessions concerning this question. Witte and Guchkov, for instance, have published letters concerning the former's negotiations with "public figures" (read: with the leaders of the moderate liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie) about forming a Cabinet after October 17,[130] 1905. Among those who took part in the negotiations with Witte—these negotiations must have taken a long time, because Guchkov writes of "the wearisome days of protracted negotiations"—were Shipov, Trubetskoi, Urusov, and M. Stakhovich, i.e., the future leaders of the Cadets, *and* of the Party of Peaceful Renovation,[131] *and* of the Octobrist Party. The negotiations, it turns out, were broken off on account of Durnovo, whom the "liberals" refused to accept as Minister of the Interior, while Witte demanded this in the form of an ultimatum. Urusov, however, a leading light of the Cadet Party in the First Duma, "ardently supported Durnovo's candidacy". When Prince Obolensky suggested Stolypin for the post "some of those present supported the idea, others said that they did not know him". "I remember definitely," writes Guchkov, "that *no one* raised the objection of which Count Witte writes in his letter."

Now the Cadet press, in its desire to emphasise its "democracy" (don't be funny!), particularly, perhaps, in view of the elections in the first curia in St. Petersburg, where a Cadet opposed an Octobrist, is trying to sling mud at Guchkov for those negotiations. "How often," writes *Rech* in its issue of September 28, "the Octobrist fraternity with Guchkov at their head, joined hands with Mr. Durnovo's colleagues in order to please the powers that be. How often, with their eyes riveted on the powers that be, did they turn their backs on public opinion!" The same reproach

levelled by the Cadets at the Octobrists is repeated in a number of variations in the leading article of *Russkiye Vedomosti* of the same date.

But, pardon me, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, what right have *you* to reproach the Octobrists, since *your* representatives also took part in those very same negotiations and even defended Durnovo? At that time, in November 1905, were not *all* the Cadets, like Urusov, in the position of people who have "their eyes riveted on the powers that be" and "their backs turned on public opinion"? Yours is a "family quarrel"; not a matter of principle, but rivalry between equally unprincipled parties; that is what we *have* to say apropos of the present reproaches levelled by the Cadets against the Octobrists in connection with the "negotiations" at the end of 1905. An altercation of this sort only serves to obscure the really important and historically undeniable fact that *all* shades of the liberal bourgeoisie, from the Octobrists to the Cadets inclusive, "*had their eyes riveted on the powers that be*" and "turned their backs" on *democracy* from the time our revolution assumed a really popular character, i.e., from the time it became a democratic revolution because of the democratic forces taking an active part in it. The Stolypin period of the Russian counter-revolution is characterised specifically by the fact that the liberal bourgeoisie had been turning its back on democracy, and that Stolypin *was able to turn* for assistance, sympathy, and advice first to one then to another representative of this bourgeoisie. Had it not been for this state of affairs, Stolypin would not have been able to give the Council of the United Nobility dominance over the counter-revolutionary-minded bourgeoisie and obtain the assistance, sympathy, and active or passive support of that bourgeoisie.

This aspect of the matter deserves special attention, precisely because it is lost sight of, or intentionally ignored, by our liberal press, as well as by such organs of liberal labour policy as *Dyelo Zhizni*. Stolypin not only represented the dictatorship of the feudal landlords, and anyone confining himself to this characterisation has understood nothing of the specific nature and meaning of the "Stolypin period". Stolypin was minister during a period when counter-revolutionary sentiments prevailed among the *entire* liberal

bourgeoisie, including the Cadets, when the feudal landowners *could*, and did, rely on these sentiments, when they *could*, and did, approach the leaders of this bourgeoisie with "offers" (of hand and heart), when they *could* regard even the most "Left" of these leaders as "His Majesty's Opposition", when they *could*, and did, refer to the fact that the ideological leaders of the liberals were turning towards them, towards the side of reaction, towards those who fought against democracy and denigrated it. Stolypin was minister during the period when the feudal landowners bent all their efforts to inaugurate and put into effect as speedily as possible a *bourgeois* policy in peasant life in the countryside, when they had thrown overboard all romantic illusions and hopes based on the muzhik's "patriarchal" nature, and had begun *to look for* allies among the new, bourgeois elements of Russia in general and of rural Russia in particular. Stolypin tried to pour new wine into old bottles, to reshape the old autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy; and the failure of Stolypin's policy is the failure of tsarism on this last, *the last conceivable*, road for tsarism. The landowner monarchy of Alexander III tried to gain support in the "patriarchal" countryside and in the "patriarchal element" in Russian life in general. *That* policy was completely defeated by the revolution. After the revolution, the landowner monarchy of Nicholas II sought support in the counter-revolutionary sentiments of the bourgeoisie and in a bourgeois agrarian policy put into effect by these very same landowners. The failure of these attempts, which even the Cadets, even the Octobrists can no longer doubt, is the failure of the *last* policy *possible* for tsarism.

Under Stolypin the dictatorship of the feudal landowner was not directed against the whole nation, including the entire "third estate", the entire bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the dictatorship was exercised under conditions most favourable for it when the Octobrist bourgeoisie served it with heart and soul, when the landowners and the bourgeoisie had a representative body in which their bloc was guaranteed a majority, and an opportunity was provided for conducting negotiations and coming to an agreement with the Crown, when Mr. Struve and the other *Vekhi* writers reviled the revolution in a hysterical frenzy and propounded

an ideology which gladdened the heart of Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia, and when Mr. Milyukov proclaimed that the Cadet opposition was "His Majesty's Opposition" (His Majesty being a feudal relic). Nevertheless, despite all these favourable conditions for the Romanovs, despite all these conditions being the most favourable that can be conceived from the point of view of the alignment of social forces in twentieth-century capitalist Russia, Stolypin's policy ended in failure. Stolypin has been assassinated at a moment when a new grave-digger of tsarist autocracy—or, rather, the grave-digger who is gathering new strength—is knocking at the door.

* * *

Stolypin's attitude to the leaders of the bourgeoisie, and theirs to him, is most fully characterised by the relations that existed at the time of the First Duma. "The period from May to July 1906 was decisive for Stolypin's career," writes *Rech*. What was the centre of gravity during that period?

"The centre of gravity during that period, was not, of course, the speeches in the Duma," states the official organ of the Cadet Party.

That is a valuable admission, isn't it? How many lances were broken at that time in tilts with the Cadets over the question of whether the "speeches in the Duma" could be regarded as the "centre of gravity" during that period! What a torrent of angry abuse and supercilious doctrinaire lecturing was let loose in the Cadet press against the Social-Democrats who, in the spring and summer of 1906, maintained that the centre of gravity during that period was *not* the speeches in the Duma! What reproaches were levelled by *Rech* and *Duma* at the whole of Russian "society" at that time because it dreamed about a "Convention" and was not sufficiently enthusiastic over the Cadet victories in the "parliamentary" arena of the First Duma! Five years have passed since then; it is necessary to make a general estimate of the period of the First Duma, and the Cadets proclaim quite nonchalantly, as if changing a pair of gloves, that, "of course, the centre of gravity during that period was not the speeches in the Duma".

Of course not, gentlemen! But what was the centre of gravity?

"Behind the scenes," we read in *Rech*, "a sharp struggle was going on between the representatives of two trends. One recommended a policy of compromise with the people's representatives, not even shrinking at the formation of a 'Cadet Cabinet'. The other demanded vigorous action, the dissolution of the State Duma and a change in the election law. That was the programme advocated by the Council of the United Nobility which enjoyed the support of powerful influences.... At first Stolypin hesitated. There are indications that on two occasions, with Kryzhanovsky acting as intermediary, he made overtures to Muromtsev, proposing to discuss the possibility of forming a Cadet Cabinet with himself as Minister of the Interior. But at the same time Stolypin undoubtedly maintained contact with the Council of the United Nobility."

That is how history is written by the educated, learned and well-read liberal leaders! It appears that the "centre of gravity" was *not* the speeches, but the struggle of two trends within the Black-Hundred tsarist Court clique! Immediate "attack", without delay, was the policy of the Council of the United Nobility, i.e., the policy not of individual persons, not of Nicholas Romanov, not of "one trend" in "*high places*", but the policy of *a definite class*. The Cadets clearly and soberly see their rivals *on the right*. But anything *to the left* of the Cadets has disappeared from their field of vision. History was being made by "high places", by the Council of the United Nobility and the Cadets; the common people, *of course*, took no part in the making of history! A definite class (the nobility) was opposed by the party of people's freedom, which stands *above* classes, while the "high places" (i.e., Our Father the Tsar) hesitated.

Is it possible to imagine a higher degree of selfish class blindness, a worse distortion of history and forgetfulness of the elementary truths of historical science, a more wretched muddle and a worse confusion of class, party and individuals?

None are so blind as those who *will not* see democracy and its forces.

Of course, the centre of gravity during the period of the First Duma was not the speeches in the Duma. It was outside the Duma, in the struggle between classes, in the struggle waged by the feudal landowners and *their* monarchy against the masses, against the workers and peasants. It was precisely during that period that the revolutionary movement of the masses was again on the upgrade; the spring and summer of 1906 were marked by a menacing upsurge of the strike wave in general and of political strikes, of peasant riots and of mutinies in the armed forces in particular. *That*, Messrs. Cadet historians, was *why* there was hesitation in "high places". The struggle between the trends within the tsar's gang was over the question whether, bearing in mind the strength of the revolution at the time, they should attempt the coup d'état *at once*, or whether they should *bide their time* and lead the bourgeoisie by the nose a little longer.

The First Duma fully convinced the landowners (Romanov, Stolypin and Co.) that there could be no peace between them and the peasant and working-class masses. This conviction of theirs was in complete accordance with objective reality. All that remained for them to decide was a question of minor importance; when and how to change the election law, at once or gradually? The bourgeoisie wavered; but its entire behaviour, even that of the Cadet bourgeoisie, showed that it feared the revolution a hundred times more than it feared reaction. That was why the landowners deigned to invite the leaders of the bourgeoisie (Muromtsev, Heyden, Guchkov and Co.) to conferences at which they discussed the question of whether they might not *jointly* form a Cabinet. And the *entire* bourgeoisie, including the Cadets, conferred with the tsar, with the pogromists, with the leaders of the Black Hundreds about the means of combating the revolution; but never once since the end of 1905 has the bourgeoisie ever sent representatives of a single one of its parties to confer with the leaders of revolution about *how* to overthrow the autocracy and the monarchy.

That is the principal lesson to be drawn from the "Stolypin period" of Russian history. Tsarism consulted the bourgeoisie when the revolution still seemed to be a force; but it gradually applied its jackboot to kick out *all* the

FROM MARX TO MAO
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leaders of the bourgeoisie—first Muromtsev and Milyukov, then Heyden and Lvov, and, finally, Guchkov—as soon as the revolutionary pressure from below slackened. The difference between the Milyukovs, the Lvovs, and the Guchkovs is absolutely immaterial—it is merely a matter of the sequence in which these leaders of the bourgeoisie turned their cheeks to receive the ... "kisses" of Romanov-Purishkevich-Stolypin and the sequence in which they did receive these ... "kisses".

Stolypin disappeared from the scene at the very moment when the Black-Hundred monarchy had taken everything that could be of use to it from the counter-revolutionary sentiments of the whole Russian bourgeoisie. Now this bourgeoisie—repudiated, humiliated, and disgraced by its own renunciation of democracy, the struggle of the masses and revolution—stands perplexed and bewildered, seeing the symptoms of a gathering new revolution. Stolypin helped the Russian people to learn a useful lesson: either march to freedom by overthrowing the tsarist monarchy, under the leadership of the proletariat; or sink deeper into slavery and submit to the Purishkeviches, Markovs and Tolmachovs, under the ideological and political leadership of the Milyukovs and Guchkovs.

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THE NEW FACTION OF CONCILIATORS, OR THE VIRTUOUS

The *Information Bulletin*[132] of the Technical Commission Abroad (No. 1, August 11, 1911) and the message *To All Members of the R.S.D.L.P.*, signed by "A Group of Pro-Party Bolsheviks", which appeared almost simultaneously in Paris, are attacks identical in substance upon "official Bolshevism" or, according to another expression, upon the "Leninist Bolsheviks". These documents are full of ire; they contain more angry exclamations and declamations than real substance. Nevertheless, it is necessary to deal with them, for they touch upon the most important problems of our Party. It is all the more natural for me to undertake the job of assessing the new faction, first, because it was I who wrote on these very questions in the name of *all* the Bolsheviks *exactly a year and a half ago* (see *Diskussionny Listok*, No. 2*), and, secondly, because I am fully conscious of my responsibility for "official Bolshevism". As regards the expression "Leninist" it is merely a clumsy attempt at sarcasm, intended to insinuate that it is only a question of the supporters of a *single* person! In reality, everybody knows perfectly well that it is not a question of people sharing my personal views on this or that aspect of Bolshevism.

The authors of the message, who sign themselves "pro-Party Bolsheviks", also call themselves "non-factional Bolsheviks", remarking that "here" (in Paris) they are "rather ineptly" called conciliators. Actually, as the reader will see from what follows, this name, which gained currency over fifteen months ago, not only in Paris, not only

* See present edition, Vol. 16, "Notes of a Publicist. II".—*Ed.*

abroad, but also in Russia, is the only one that correctly expresses the political essence of the new faction.

Conciliationism is the totality of moods, strivings and views that are *indissolubly* bound up with the very *essence* of the historical task confronting the R.S.D.L.P. during the period of the counter-revolution of 1908-11. That is why, during this period, a number of Social-Democrats, proceeding from essentially different premises, "lapsed" into conciliationism. Trotsky expressed conciliationism more consistently than anyone else. He was probably the only one who attempted to give the trend a theoretical foundation, namely: factions and factionism express the struggle of the intelligentsia "for influence over the immature proletariat". The proletariat is maturing, and factionalism is perishing of itself. The root of the process of fusion of the factions is not the change in the relations between the classes, not the evolution of the fundamental ideas of the two principal factions, but the observance or otherwise of agreements concluded between *all* the "intellectual" factions. For a long time now, Trotsky—who at one moment has wavered more to the side of the Bolsheviks and at another more to that of the Mensheviks—has been persistently carrying on propaganda for an agreement (or compromise) between *all* and sundry factions.

The opposite view (see Nos. 2 and 3 of the *Diskussionny Listok**) is that the origin of the factions is to be traced to the relations between the classes in the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks only formulated the answers to the questions with which the objective realities of 1905-07 confronted the proletariat. Therefore, only the inner evolution of *these* factions, of the "strong" factions, strong because of their deep roots, strong because their ideas correspond to certain aspects of objective reality, only the inner evolution of precisely these factions is capable of securing a *real* fusion of the factions, i.e., the creation of a genuinely and completely united party of proletarian Marxist socialism in Russia. From this follows the practical conclusion that only a rapprochement in practical work between these two strong factions—and only insofar as they

* See present edition, Vol. 16, "Notes of a Publicist" and "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia".—Ed.

rid themselves of the non-Social-Democratic tendencies of liquidationism and otzovism—represents a real Party policy, a policy that really brings about unity, not easily, not smoothly, and by no means immediately, but in a way that will produce actual results, as distinguished from the heap of quack promises of an easy, smooth, immediate fusion of "all" factions.

These two views were observed even before the Plenary Meeting, when in my talks I suggested the slogan: "Rapprochement between the two strong factions, and no whining about dissolving factions". This was made public immediately after the Meeting by *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. I plainly, definitely, and systematically explained these two views *in May 1910*, i.e., eighteen months ago; moreover, I did this in the "general Party" arena, in *Diskussionny Listok* (No. 2). If the "conciliators", with whom we have been arguing on these subjects since November 1909, have so far not found time to answer that article *even once*, and have not made *even one* attempt to examine this question more or less systematically, to expound their views more or less openly and consistently—it is entirely their own fault. They call their factional statement, which was published on behalf of a separate group, a "public answer". But this public answer of those who *kept silent* for over a year is *not* an answer to the question that was raised long ago, discussed long ago, and answered long ago in two fundamentally different ways; it is a most hopeless muddle, a most incredible confusion of two irreconcilable answers. Every proposition the authors of the message put forward, they immediately refute. In every single proposition, the alleged Bolsheviks (who in reality are *inconsistent* Trotskyites) echo Trotsky's mistakes.

Indeed, look at the main ideas contained in the message.

Who are its authors? They say they are Bolsheviks who "do not share the organisational views of official Bolshevism". That looks as if it were an "opposition" *only* on the question of organisation, does it not? Read the next sentence: "...It is precisely the organisational questions, the questions of building and restoring the Party, that are being put in the forefront now, as was the case eighteen months ago." This is quite untrue, and constitutes the very error

of principle which Trotsky made, and which I exposed a year and a half ago. At the Plenary Meeting, the organisational question *probably* seemed of paramount importance only because, and only insofar as, the *rejection* of liquidationism by *all* factions *was taken* to be real, because the *Golos* and the *Vperyod* representatives "signed" the resolutions against liquidationism and against otzovism to "console" the Party. Trotsky's error was in continuing to pass off the *apparent* for the real *after* February 1910, when *Nasha Zarya* finally unfurled the banner of liquidationism, and the *Vperyod* group—in their notorious school at X[133]—unfurled the banner of defence of otzovism. At the Plenary Meeting, the acceptance of the apparent for the real *may* have been the result of self-delusion. But after it, ever since the spring of 1910, Trotsky has been *deceiving* the workers in a most unprincipled and shameless manner by assuring them that the obstacles to unity were principally (if not wholly) of an organisational nature. This deceit is being continued in 1911 by the Paris conciliators; for to assert now that the organisational questions occupy the first place is sheer mockery of the truth. In reality, it is by no means the organisational question that is now in the forefront, but the question of the entire programme, the entire tactics and the whole character of the Party, or rather a question of *two* parties—the *Social-Democratic* Labour Party and the *Stolypin* labour party of Potresov, Smirnov, Larin, Levitsky, and their friends. The Paris conciliators seem to have been asleep for the eighteen months that have elapsed since the Plenary Meeting, during which time the *entire* struggle against the liquidators shifted, *both* in our camp and among the pro-Party Mensheviks, from organisational questions to questions of whether *the Party is to be a Social-Democratic*, and not a liberal, labour party. To argue now, let us say, with the gentlemen of *Nasha Zarya* about organisational questions, about the relative importance of the legal and illegal organisations, would be simply putting on an act, for these gentlemen may fully recognise an "illegal" organisation like *Golos*, which is subservient to the liquidators! It has been said long ago that the Cadets are recognising and maintaining an illegal organisation that serves monarchist liberalism. The conciliators call themselves Bolshe-

viks, in order to repeat, a year and a half later (and specifically stating moreover that this was done in the name of Bolshevism *as a whole*!), Trotsky's errors which the Bolsheviks had exposed. Well, is this not an abuse of established Party titles? Are we not obliged, after this, to let all and sundry know that the conciliators are not Bolsheviks at all, that they have nothing in common with Bolshevism, that they are simply inconsistent Trotskyites?

Read a little further: "One may disagree with the way official Bolshevism and the majority of the editors of the Central Organ understood the task of the struggle against liquidationism...". Is it really possible seriously to assert that the "task of the struggle against liquidationism" is an organisational task? The conciliators themselves declare that they differ from the Bolsheviks *not only* on organisational questions! But on what exactly do they differ? They are silent on this. Their "public answer" continues to remain the answer of people who prefer to keep silent ... or, shall we say, are irresponsible? For a year and a half they did not attempt *even once* to correct "official Bolshevism" or to expound *their own* conception of the task of the struggle against liquidationism! And official Bolshevism has waged this struggle for exactly three years, since August 1908. In comparing these well-known dates we involuntarily seek for an explanation of this strange "silence" of the conciliators, and this quest involuntarily recalls to our mind Trotsky and Ionov,[134] who asserted that they *too* were opposed to the liquidators, but that they understood the task of combating them *differently*. It is ridiculous, comrades—to declare, three years after the struggle began, that you understand the character of this struggle differently! *Such* a difference in understanding amounts to not understanding it at all!

To proceed. In substance the present Party crisis undoubtedly reduces itself to the question whether our Party, the R.S.D.L.P., should completely dissociate itself from the liquidators (including the *Golos* group) or whether it should continue the policy of compromise with them. It is doubtful whether any Social-Democrat at all familiar with the case would deny that this question constitutes the *essence* of the entire Party situation today. How do the conciliators answer this question?

They write in the message: "We are told that thereby [i.e., by supporting the Meeting] we are violating the Party forms and are causing a split. We do not think so [*sic*!]. But even if this were the case, we would not be afraid of it." (Then follows a statement to the effect that the plenary meeting was sabotaged by the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, that the "Central Committee is the object of a gamble", that "Party forms have begun to be filled in with a factional content", etc.)

This answer can truly be called a "classical" specimen of ideological and political helplessness! Think of it: they are being accused, they say, of causing a split. And so the new faction, which claims to be able to show the way the Party should go, declares publicly and in print: "We do not think so" (i.e., you do not think that there is or that there will be a split?), "but" ... but "we would not be afraid of it".

You can be sure no other *such* example of confusion is to be found in the history of political parties. If you "do not think" that there is or that there will be a split, then explain why! Explain *why* it is possible to work with the liquidators! Say outright that it is *possible*, and therefore necessary, to work with them.

Our conciliators not only do not say this; they say the opposite. In the leading article of the *Bulletin*, No. 1 (it is specifically stated in a footnote that this article was opposed by a Bolshevik who was an adherent of the Bolshevik platform, i.e., of the resolution of the Second Paris Group), we read the following:

"It is a fact that joint work with the liquidators in Russia is impossible", while somewhat earlier it is admitted that it is "becoming more and more difficult to draw even the finest line of demarcation" between the *Golos* group and the liquidators.

Who can make head or tail of this? On the one hand, a highly official statement is made on behalf of the Technical Commission (in which the conciliators and the Poles, who now support them, constitute a majority against us Bolsheviks) that *joint work is impossible*. In plain language this means declaring a split. The word split has no other meaning. On the other hand, the same *Bulletin*, No. 1, pro-

claims that the Technical Commission was set up "not for the purpose of bringing about a split, but for the purpose of averting it"—and the selfsame conciliators write that they "do not think so" (that there is or that there will be a split).

Can one imagine a greater muddle?

If joint work is *impossible*—that can be explained to Social-Democrats and justified in their eyes *either* by an outrageous violation of Party decisions and obligations on the part of a certain group of persons (and then a split with *that* group of persons is inevitable), *or* by a fundamental difference in principle, a difference which causes the *entire* work of a certain trend to be directed *away* from Social-Democracy (and then a split with the whole trend is inevitable). As we know, we have both these things; the Plenary Meeting of 1910 declared it impossible to work with the liquidationist *trend*, while the split with the *Golos group*, which violated all its obligations and definitely went over to the liquidators, is now taking place.

Anyone who consciously says that "joint work is impossible"—anyone who has given any thought to this statement and has grasped its fundamental principles, would inevitably concentrate all his attention and efforts on explaining these principles to the broadest masses so that those masses might be spared as soon and as completely as possible all futile and harmful attempts to maintain *any relations whatsoever* with those with whom it is *impossible* to work. But anyone who makes this statement and at the same time adds "we do not think" there will be a split, "but we would not be afraid of it", reveals by his confused and timid language that *he is afraid of himself*, afraid of the step he has taken, afraid of the situation that has been created! The message of the conciliators produces just such an impression. They are trying to vindicate themselves for something, to appear to be "kind-hearted" in the eyes of someone, to give someone a hint.... Later on we shall learn the meaning of their hints to *Vperyod* and *Pravda*. We must first finish with the question of how the conciliators interpret the "results of the period that has elapsed since the Plenary Meeting", the results summed up by the Meeting of the members of the Central Committee.

It is really necessary to *understand* these results, to understand why they were inevitable, otherwise our participation in events will be spontaneous, helpless, casual. Now see how the conciliators *understand* this. How do they answer the question of why the work and the decisions of the Plenary Meeting, which primarily were meant to bring about unity, resulted in a split between the Central Committee Bureau Abroad (=liquidators) and the anti-liquidators? Our inconsistent Trotskyites have simply copied the answer to this from Trotsky and Ionov, and I am forced to repeat what I said in last May* against those consistent conciliators.

The conciliators answer by saying: it is the fault of factionalism, the factionalism of the Mensheviks, the *Vperyod* group, and of *Pravda* (we enumerate the factional groups in the order in which they appear in the message), and, finally, of the "official representatives of Bolshevism" who "have probably outdone all these groups in their factional efforts". The authors of the message openly and definitely apply the term *non-factional* only to themselves, the Paris conciliators. All are wicked, they are virtuous. The conciliators give no ideological reasons in explanation of the phenomenon in question. They do not point to any of the organisational or other distinguishing features of the groups that gave rise to this phenomenon. They say nothing, not a word, to *explain* matters, except that factionalism is a vice and non-factionalism a virtue. The only difference between Trotsky and the conciliators in Paris is that the latter regard Trotsky as a factionalist and themselves as non-factional, whereas Trotsky holds the opposite view.

I must confess that this formulation of the question, in which political phenomena are explained *only* by the wickedness of some and the virtue of others, always calls to mind those outwardly benevolent faces of which one cannot help thinking, "Probably a rogue".

What do you think of the following comparison? Our conciliators are non-factional, virtuous; we Bolsheviks have outdone all groups in our factional efforts, i.e., we are the most wicked. *Therefore*, the virtuous faction sup-

* See present edition, Vol. 16, "Notes of a Publicist. II".—*Ed.*

ported the most wicked, the Bolshevik faction in its fight against the Central Committee Bureau Abroad!! There is something wrong here, comrades! You are confusing matters more and more with every statement you make.

You make yourselves ridiculous when you and Trotsky hurl accusations of factionalism at one another, as if you were playing at ball; you do not take the trouble to *think*: what is a faction? Try to give a definition, and we predict that you will entangle yourselves still more; for you yourselves are a faction—a vacillating, unprincipled faction, one that failed to understand what took place at the Plenary Meeting and after it.

A faction is an organisation within a party, united, not by its place of work, language or other objective conditions, but by a particular platform of views on party questions. The authors of the message are a faction, because the message constitutes their platform (a very bad one; but there are factions with wrong platforms). They are a faction, because like every other organisation they are bound by internal discipline; their group appoints its representative to the Technical Commission and to the Organising Commission by a majority of votes; it was their group that drew up and published the message-programme, *and so on*. Such are the objective facts which show that outcries against factionalism are bound to be *hypocrisy*. Yet Trotsky and the "inconsistent Trotskyites" maintain that they are not a faction *because* ... "the only" object of their uniting (into a faction) is to abolish factions and to advocate their fusion, etc. But all such assurances are merely self-praise and a cowardly game of hide-and-seek, for the simple reason that the *fact* that a faction exists is not affected by any (even the most virtuous) *aim* of the faction. *Every* faction is convinced that *its* platform and *its* policy are the *best* means of abolishing factions, for no one regards the existence of factions as ideal. The only difference is that factions with clear, consistent, integral platforms *openly* defend *their* platforms, while unprincipled factions *hide* behind cheap shouts about their virtue, about their non-factionalism.

What is the reason for the existence of factions in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party? They exist as the continuation of the split of 1903-05. They are the result

of the weakness of the local organisations which are *powerless* to prevent the transformation of literary groups that express new trends, big and small, into new "factions", i.e., into organisations in which internal discipline takes first place. How can the abolition of factions really be guaranteed? *Only* by completely healing the split, which dates from the time of the revolution (and this will be brought about *only* by ridding the two main factions of liquidationism and otzovism), and by creating a proletarian organisation strong enough to force the minority to submit to the majority. As long as no such organisation exists, the *only thing* that *might* accelerate the process of their disappearance is an agreement by all the factions. Hence, both the ideological merit of the Plenary Meeting and its *conciliationist error* become clear. Its merit was the rejection of the ideas of liquidationism and otzovism; its mistake was the agreement concluded indiscriminately with persons and groups whose deeds are not in accordance with their promises ("they signed the resolution"). The ideological rapprochement on the basis of the fight against liquidationism and otzovism goes ahead—despite all obstacles and difficulties. The conciliationist mistake of the Plenary Meeting* quite inevitably brought about the failure of its conciliatory decisions, i.e., the failure of the *alliance* with the *Golos* group. The rupture between the Bolsheviks (and later also between the Meeting of the members of the Central Committee) and the Central Committee Bureau Abroad *corrected* the conciliationist mistake of the Plenary Meeting. The rapprochement of the factions which are actually *combating* liquidationism and otzovism will now proceed *despite* the forms decided on by the Plenary Meeting, for these forms did not correspond to the content. Conciliationism in general, as well as the conciliationism of the Plenary Meeting, came to grief because the content of the work *separated* the liquidators from the Social-Democrats, and all the forms, diplomacy, and games of the conciliators *could not* overcome this process of separation.

From this, and only this point of view, which I developed in May 1910, *everything* that took place after the Plenary Meeting becomes intelligible, inevitable, resulting

* See *Diskussionny Listok*, No. 2. (See present edition, Vol. 16, "Notes of a Publicist. II".—*Ed.*)

not from the "wickedness" of some and the "virtue" of others, but from the objective course of events, which isolates the liquidationist *trend* and brushes aside all the intermediate major and minor groups.

In order to obscure this undoubted political fact, the complete *failure* of conciliationism, the conciliators are forced to resort to a downright distortion of facts. Just listen to this: "The factional policy of the Leninist Bolsheviks was particularly harmful because they had a majority in all the principal Party institutions, so that their factional policy justified the organisational separatism of other trends and armed those trends against the official Party institutions".

This tirade is nothing but a cowardly and belated "*justification*" of ... liquidationism, for it is precisely the representatives of that tendency who have always justified themselves by references to the "factionalism" of the Bolsheviks. This justification is belated because it was the *duty* of every real Party member (in contrast to persons who use the catchword "pro-Party" for self-advertisement) to act *at the time when* this "factionalism" began, and not a year and a half later! The conciliators, the defenders of liquidationism, *could not* and did not act earlier, because they had *no facts*. They are taking advantage of the present "time of troubles" in order to give prominence to the unfounded arguments of the liquidators. But the facts are explicit and unambiguous; immediately after the Plenary Meeting, in February 1910, Mr. Potresov unfurled the banner of liquidationism. Soon after, in February or March, Messrs. Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri betrayed the Party. Immediately after that, the *Golos* group started a campaign for *Golos* (see Plekhanov's *Diary* the *day following* the Plenary Meeting) and resumed the publication of *Golos*. Immediately after that, the *Vperyod* people began to build up *their own* "school". The *first* factional step of the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, was to found *Rabochaya Gazeta* in *September* 1910, *after* Trotsky's break with the representatives of the Central Committee.

Why did the conciliators resort to such a distortion of well-known facts? In order to give a hint to the liquidators, and curry favour with them. On the one hand, "joint work with the liquidators is impossible". On the other hand—

they are "*justified*" by the factionalism of the Bolsheviks!! We ask any Social-Democrat not contaminated with émigré diplomacy, what political confidence can be placed in people who are themselves entangled in such contradictions? All they deserve are the bouquets with which *Golos* publicly rewarded them.

By "factionalism" the conciliators mean the *ruthlessness* of our polemics (for which they have censured us thousands of times at general meetings in Paris) and the ruthlessness of our *exposure* of the liquidators (they were *against* exposing Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman). The conciliators have been defending and screening the liquidators all the time but have *never dared* to express their defence openly, either in the *Diskussionny Listok* or in any printed public appeal. And now they are using their impotence and cowardice to put a spoke in the wheel of the Party, which has begun emphatically to dissociate itself from the liquidators. The liquidators say, there is no liquidationism, it is an "exaggeration" on the part of the Bolsheviks (see the resolution of the Caucasian liquidators[135] and Trotsky's speeches). The conciliators say, it is impossible to work with the liquidators, *but ... but* the factionalism of the Bolsheviks provides them with a "justification". Is it not clear that this ridiculous contradiction of subjective opinions has one, and only one, real meaning: cowardly defence of liquidationism, a desire to trip up the Bolsheviks and lend support to the liquidators?

But this is by no means all. The worst and most malicious distortion of facts is the assertion that we had a "majority" in the "*principal Party institutions*". This crying untruth has only one purpose: to cover up the *political* bankruptcy of conciliationism. For, in reality, the Bolsheviks did *not* have a majority in *any* of the "principal Party institutions" after the Plenary Meeting. On the contrary, it was the conciliators who had the majority. We challenge anyone to attempt to dispute the following facts. *After* the Plenary Meeting there were only three "principal Party institutions": (1) the Central Committee Bureau in Russia—composed chiefly of *conciliators**; (2) the Central Committee

* Of course, not all conciliators are alike, and surely not all the former members of the Russian Bureau could (and would) accept

Bureau Abroad—on which, from January to November 910, the Bolsheviks were represented by a *conciliator*; since the Bundist and the Latvian *officially* adopted the conciliationist standpoint, the majority, during eleven months following the Plenary Meeting, was *conciliationist*; (3) the Editorial Board of the Central Organ—on which two "Bolshevik factionalists" were opposed by two *Golos* supporters; without the Pole there was *no* majority.

Why did the conciliators have to resort to a deliberate lie? For no other purpose than that of camouflage, to cover up the *political* bankruptcy of conciliationism. Conciliationism predominated at the Plenary Meeting; it had a *majority* in all the principal practical centres of the Party after the Plenary Meeting, and within a year and a half it suffered *complete collapse*. It failed to "reconcile" anyone; it did not create anything anywhere; it vacillated helplessly from side to side, and for that it fully deserved the bouquets of *Golos*.

The conciliators suffered the most complete failure in *Russia*, and the more assiduously and demagogically the Paris conciliators refer to Russia the more important is it to stress this. The *leit-motif* of the conciliators is that Russia is conciliationist in contrast with what we have abroad. Compare these *words* with the *facts*, and you will see that this is just hollow, cheap demagogy. The facts show that for *more than a year* after the Plenary Meeting there were *only* conciliators on the Central Committee Bureau in Russia; they alone made official reports about the Plenary Meeting and officially negotiated with the legalists; they alone appointed agents and sent them to the various institutions; they alone handled all the funds that were sent unquestioningly by the Central Committee Bureau Abroad; they alone negotiated with the "Russian" writers who seemed promising contributors to the muddle (i.e., in respect of conciliationism), etc.

And the result?

The result is nil. Not a single leaflet, not a single pronouncement, not a single organ of the press, not a single "concil-

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responsibility for all the pompous stupidities of the Party conciliators who are merely echoing Trotsky.

iation". As against this the Bolshevik "factionalists" have put their *Rabochaya Gazeta*, published abroad, on its feet after two issues (to say nothing of other matters about which only Mr. Martov speaks openly, thereby helping the secret police). Conciliationism is nil, words, empty wishes (and attempts to trip up Bolshevism on the basis of these "conciliatory" wishes); "official" Bolshevism has proved by deeds that it is absolutely preponderant precisely in Russia.

Is this an accident? The result of arrests? But arrests "spared" the liquidators, who *did no work* in the Party, while they mowed down Bolsheviks and conciliators alike.

No, this is not an accident, or the result of the luck or success of *individuals*. It is the result of the bankruptcy of a political *tendency* which is based on false premises. The very *foundation* of conciliationism is false—the wish to base the unity of the party of the proletariat on an alliance of *all* factions, including the anti-Social-Democratic, non-proletarian factions; false are its unprincipled "unity" schemes which lead to nothing; false are its phrases against "factions" (when *in fact* a new faction is formed)—phrases that are powerless to dissolve the anti-Party factions, but are intended to weaken the Bolshevik faction which bore nine-tenths of the brunt of the struggle against liquidationism and otzovism.

Trotsky provides us with an abundance of instances of scheming to establish unprincipled "unity". Recall, for example (I take one of the most recent instances), how he praised the Paris *Rabochaya Zhizn*,[136] in the management of which the Paris conciliators and the *Golos* group had an equal share. How wonderful!—wrote Trotsky—"neither Bolshevik, nor Menshevik, but revolutionary Social-Democrat". The poor hero of phrase-mongering failed to notice a mere bagatelle—only that Social-Democrat is revolutionary who understands how *harmful* anti-revolutionary pseudo-Social-Democracy can be in a given country at a given time (i.e., the harm of liquidationism and otzovism in the Russia of the 1908-11 period), and who *knows how* to fight against such *non*-Social-Democratic tendencies. By his praise of *Rabochaya Zhizn* which had never fought against the *non*-revolutionary Social-Democrats in Russia, Trotsky was merely *revealing* the plan of the liquidators whom he serves faithfully—*parity*

on the Central Organ implies the termination of the *struggle* against the liquidators; the liquidators actually enjoy full freedom to fight the Party; and let the Party *be tied* hand and foot by the "party" of the *Golos* and Party men on the Central Organ (and on the Central Committee). This would assure complete victory for the liquidators and only their lackeys could pursue or defend such a line of action.

Instances of unprincipled "unity" schemes that promise peace and happiness without a long, stubborn, desperate struggle against the liquidators were provided at the Plenary Meeting by Ionov, Innokentiev, and other conciliators. We saw another such instance in the message of our conciliators who justify liquidationism on the grounds of Bolshevik "factionalism". A further example is to be found in their speeches about the Bolsheviks "isolating" themselves "*from other trends* [*Vperyod*, *Pravda*] *which advocate an illegal Social-Democratic party*".

The italics in this remarkable tirade are ours. Just as a small drop of water reflects the sun, so this tirade reflects the utter lack of principle in conciliationism, which is at the root of its political impotence.

In the first place, do *Pravda* and *Vperyod* represent Social-Democratic trends? No, they do not; for *Vperyod* represents a *non-Social-Democratic* trend (otzovism and Machism) and *Pravda* represents a tiny group, which has *not given* an independent and consistent answer to *any* important fundamental question of the revolution and counter-revolution. We can call a *trend* only a definite sum of political ideas which have become well-defined in regard to *all* the most important questions of *both* the revolution (for we have moved away but little from it and are dependent on it in all respects) *and* the counter-revolution; ideas which, moreover, have proved their right to existence as a trend by being widely disseminated among broad strata of the working class. Both Menshevism and Bolshevism are Social-Democratic trends; this has been proved by the experience of the revolution, by the eight years' history of the working-class movement. As for small groups not representing any *trend*—there have been plenty during this period, just as there were plenty before. To confuse a trend with minor groups means condemning oneself to *intrigue* in Party politics. The emergence

of unprincipled tiny groups, their ephemeral existence, their efforts to have "their say", their "relations" with each other as separate powers—all this is the basis of the *intrigues* taking place abroad: and from this there is not nor can there be any salvation, except that of strictly adhering to consistent principles tested by experience in the long history of the working-class movement.

Secondly—and here we at once observe the practical transformation of the conciliators' lack of principle into intrigue—the message of the Parisians is telling a downright and deliberate lie when it declares: "Otzovism no longer finds open adherents and defenders in our Party". This is an untruth, and everybody knows it. This untruth is refuted by documentary evidence in *Vperyod*, No. 3 (*May 1911*) which *openly* states that otzovism is a "*perfectly legitimate trend* within our Party" (p. 78). Or will our very wise conciliators assert that such a declaration is *not a defence* of otzovism?

It is when people cannot justify their close association with this or that group on grounds of principle that they are compelled to resort to a policy of petty lies, petty flattery, nods, hints, i.e., to all those things which add up to the concept "intrigue". *Vperyod* praises the conciliators; the conciliators praise *Vperyod* and falsely reassure the Party with regard to otzovism. As a result there is bargaining and haggling over positions and posts with the *defenders* of otzovism, with the *violators of* **all** the decisions of the Plenary Meeting. The fate of conciliationism and the substance of its impotent and miserable intriguing, is secretly to assist both the otzovists and the liquidators.

Thirdly—"...joint work with the liquidators in Russia is impossible". Even the conciliators had to admit this truth. The question is—do the *Vperyod* and *Pravda* groups admit this truth? Far from admitting it, they state the very *opposite*, they openly demand "joint work" with the liquidators, and they openly *engage in such work* (see, for example, the report of the Second *Vperyod* School). Is there even a grain of principle *and of honesty* in the proclamation of a policy of rapprochement with groups which give *diametrically opposite* answers to *fundamental* questions?—we ask, because an unambiguous and unanimous resolution of the

Plenary Meeting recognised the question of liquidationism to be a fundamental one. Obviously not; we are confronted with an ideological chasm, and irrespective of the most pious intentions of X or Z all their attempts to span it with a bridge of words, with a bridge of diplomacy, inevitably condemn them to intrigues.

Until it has been shown and proved by reliable facts and a review of the most important questions that *Vperyod* and *Pravda* represent *Social-Democratic trends* (and no one, during the year and a half following the Plenary Meeting has even tried to prove this since it cannot be proved), we shall not tire of explaining to the workers the harmfulness of those unprincipled stratagems, of those underhanded stratagems, which are the substance of rapprochement with *Vperyod* and *Pravda* as preached by the conciliators. It is the *first duty* of revolutionary Social-Democrats to *isolate* these *non*-Social-Democratic and unprincipled groups that are aiding the liquidators. The policy which has been and is being pursued by Bolshevism and which it will pursue to the end despite all obstacles is to appeal to the Russian workers who are connected with *Vperyod* and *Pravda*, over the heads of these groups and against them.

I have said that after a year and a half of *domination* in the Party centres, conciliationism has suffered complete political bankruptcy. The usual answer to this is yes, but that is because you factionalists were hampering us (see the letter of the conciliators—*not* Bolsheviks—Hermann and Arkady[137] in *Pravda*, No. 20).

The *political* bankruptcy of a tendency or a group lies precisely in the fact that *everything* "hampers" it, *everything* turns against it; for it has wrongly estimated this "everything", for it has taken as its basis empty words, sighs, regrets, whimpers.

Whereas in our case, gentlemen, *everything* and *everybody* came to our assistance—and herein lies the guarantee of our success. We were assisted by the Potresovs, Larins, Levitskys—for they *could not* open their mouths without confirming *our* arguments about liquidationism. We were assisted by the Martovs, Dans and others—for they *compelled* everyone to agree with our view that the *Golos* group and the liquidators are one and the same. We were assisted by

Plekhanov *to the very extent* that he exposed the liquidators, pointed out the "loopholes" left open "for the liquidators" (*by the conciliators*) in the resolutions of the Plenary Meeting, and ridiculed the "puffy" and "integralist" passages in these resolutions (*passed by the conciliators against us*). We were assisted by the Russian conciliators whose "invitation", extended to Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman, was accompanied by abusive attacks upon Lenin (see *Golos*), thereby confirming the fact that the refusal of the liquidators was *not* due to the insidiousness of the "factionalists". How is it, my dear conciliators, that, notwithstanding your virtue everybody hampered you, whereas everyone helped us in spite of all our factional wickedness?

It was because the policy of your petty group hinged only on phrase-mongering, often very well-meaning and well-intentioned phrase-mongering, but empty nonetheless. A real approach to unity is created *only* by a rapprochement of *strong* factions, strong in their ideological integrity and an influence over the *masses* that has been tested by the experience of the revolution.

Even now, your outbursts against factionalism remain mere words, because *you yourselves are a faction*, one of the worst, least reliable, unprincipled factions. Your loud, sweeping pronouncement (in the *Information Bulletin*)—"not a centime for the factions"—was mere words. Had you meant it seriously, could you have spent your "*centimes*" on the publication of the message-platform of a new group? Had you meant it seriously, could you have kept quiet at the sight of such *factional* organs as *Rabochaya Gazeta* and *The Diary of a Social-Democrat*? Could you have abstained from publicly demanding that they be closed down?* Had you demanded this, had you seriously stipulated such a condition, you would simply have been ridiculed. However, if, being well aware of this, you confine yourselves to languid sighs, does it not prove over and over again that your conciliationism remains suspended?

* In fairness it should be stated that the Paris conciliators, who have now issued their message, were *opposed to* launching of *Rabochaya Gazeta*; they *walked out of the first meeting* to which they were invited by its editors. We regret that they did not help us (to expose the futility of conciliationism) by openly denouncing *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

The disarming of the factions is possible only on the basis of reciprocity—otherwise it is a reactionary slogan, extremely harmful to the cause of the proletariat; it is a demagogical slogan, for it only *facilitatcs* the uncompromising struggle of the liquidators against the Party. Anyone who advances this slogan now, *after* the attempt of the Plenary Meeting to apply it has failed, *after* the attempt to amalgamate (the factions) has been thwarted by the *Golos* and *Vperyod* factions—anyone who does this without even daring to repeat the condition of reciprocity, without even trying to state it clearly, to determine the methods of control over its *actual* fulfilment, is simply becoming intoxicated by sweet-sounding words.

Bolsheviks, unite—you are the only bulwark-of a consistent and decisive struggle against liquidationism and otzovism.

Pursue the policy of rapprochement with *anti*-liquidationist Menshevism, a policy tested by practice, confirmed by experience—such is our slogan. It is a policy that does not promise a land flowing with the milk and honey of "universal peace" which cannot be attained in the period of disorganisation and disintegration, but it is a policy that in the process of work really furthers the rapprochement of *trends* which represent *all* that is strong, sound, and vital in the *proletarian* movement.

The part played by the conciliators during the period of counter-revolution may be described as follows. With immense efforts the Bolsheviks are pulling our Party waggon up a steep slope. The *Golos* liquidators are trying with all their might to drag it downhill again. *In the waggon* sits a conciliator; he is a picture of meekness. He has such an angelic sweet face, like that of Jesus. He looks the very incarnation of virtue. And modestly dropping his eyes and raising his hands he exclaims: "I thank thee, Lord, that I am not as *these* men are"—a nod in the direction of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—"insidious factionalists who hinder all progress". But the waggon moves slowly forward and in the waggon sits the conciliator. When the Bolshevik factionalists *smashed* the liquidationist Central Committee Bureau Abroad, thereby clearing the ground for the building of a new house, for a bloc (or at least a temporary alliance)

of *Party* factions, the conciliators entered this house and (cursing the Bolshevik factionalists) sprinkled the new abode ... with the holy water of sugary speeches about non-factionalism!

What would have become of the historically memorable work of the old *Iskra*, if, instead of waging a consistent, implacable, principled campaign against Economism and Struveism, it had agreed to some bloc, alliance or "fusion" of *all* groups large and small which were as numerous abroad in those days as they are today?

And yet the differences between our epoch and the epoch of the old *Iskra* considerably increase the harm done by unprincipled and phrase-mongering conciliationism.

The first difference is that we have risen to a far higher level in the development of capitalism and of the bourgeoisie as well as in the clarity of the class struggle in Russia. Certain objective soil already *exists* (for *the first time* in Russia) for the *liberal* labour policy of Potresov, Levitsky, Larin, and their friends. The Stolypin liberalism of the Cadets and the Stolypin labour party are already in process of formation. All the more harmful in practice are conciliationist phrases and intrigues with those groups abroad which support the liquidators.

The second difference is the immeasurably higher level of development of the proletariat, of its class-consciousness and class solidarity. All the more harmful is the *artificial* support given by the conciliators to the ephemeral petty groups abroad (*Vperyod*, *Pravda*, *etc.*), which have not created and are unable to create any *trend* in Social-Democracy.

The third difference is that during the *Iskra* period there were illegal organisations of Economists in Russia, which had to be smashed and split up in order to unite the revolutionary Social-Democrats against them. Today, there are *no* parallel illegal organisations; today it is only a question of fighting *legal* groups that have segregated themselves. And this process of segregation (even the conciliators are forced to admit it) is being *hindered* by the political *game* of the conciliators with the factions abroad that are *unwilling* to work and incapable of working for such demarcation.

Bolshevism has "got over" the otzovist sickness, the sickness of revolutionary phrase-mongering, the playing at "Leftism", the swinging from Social-Democracy to the left. The otzovists came out as a faction when it was *no longer* possible to "recall" the Social-Democrats from the Duma.

Bolshevism will also get over the "conciliationist" sickness, the wavering in the direction of liquidationism (for *in reality* the conciliators were always a plaything in the hands of the liquidators). The conciliators are also hopelessly behindhand. They came out as a faction after the *domination* of conciliationism had exhausted itself during the eighteen months following the Plenary Meeting and there was no one left to conciliate.

P.S. The present feuilleton was written more than a month ago. It criticises the "theory" of the conciliators. As for the "practice" of the conciliators, which found expression in the hopeless, absurd, futile, and shameful squabbles which fill the pages of the conciliators' and the Poles' *Bulleti*n No. 2, it is not worth wasting a single word on.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION PLATFORM

The elections to the Fourth Duma are due to be held next year. The Social-Democratic Party must launch its election campaign *at once*. In view of these forthcoming elections a "livening-up" of all parties is already noticeable. The first phase of the period of counter-revolution has obviously come to an end. Last year's demonstrations, the student movement, the famine in the countryside, and, last but not least, the strike wave, are all unmistakable symptoms showing that a turn has set in, that we are at the beginning of a new phase of the counter-revolution. Intensified propaganda, agitation, and organisation are on the order of the day, and the forthcoming elections provide a natural, inevitable, topical "pretext" for such work. [It should be noted in parentheses that those who, like the small *Vperyod* group among the Social-Democrats, are still hesitant with regard to these elementary truths which have been fully corroborated by reality, by experience, and by the Party, those who maintain that "otzovism" is a "legitimate shade of opinion" (*Vperyod*, No. 3, *May 1911*, *p. 78*), thereby forfeit every claim to be regarded in any way as a serious tendency or trend in the Social-Democratic movement.]

To begin with—a few remarks about the organisation and conduct of the election campaign. In order to launch it *at once*, it is necessary for the illegal *nuclei* of the R.S.D.L.P. to start work immediately on their own *initiative* throughout the country, in all and sundry legal and semi-legal organisations, in all the big factories, among all sections and groups of the population. We must look sad reality straight in the face. In most places there are no strictly

defined Party organisations at all. There is the working-class vanguard, which is devoted to Social-Democracy. There are isolated individuals, and there are small groups. Therefore the first task of all Social-Democrats is to take the initiative in organising nuclei (a word excellently expressing the idea that the objective conditions call for the formation of small, very flexible groups, circles, and organisations); it is the task of *all* Social-Democrats, even where there are only two or three of them, to gain some "foothold", establish connections of one kind or another, and start work that is systematic even if very modest.

In view of the present situation in our Party, there is nothing more dangerous than the tactics of "waiting" for the time when an influential centre will have been formed in Russia. All Social-Democrats know that the work of forming such a centre *is going on*, that *everything possible* toward this end has been done by those who are primarily responsible for this work; but all Social-Democrats must also be aware of the incredible difficulties created by the police—they must not lose heart at the first, second or third failure!—and all should know that when such a centre has been formed, it will take it a long time to establish reliable connections with all the local organisations, and the centre will have to confine itself to *general* political guidance for some considerable time. There must be no delay in the organisation of local *nuclei* of the R.S.D.L.P., nuclei that will act on their own initiative in a strictly Party spirit, function illegally, start at once on the preparatory work for the elections, and immediately take every possible step to develop propaganda and agitation (illegal printing-presses, leaflets, legally published organs, groups of "legally functioning" Social-Democrats, transport facilities, *etc.*, *etc.*)—any delay would jeopardise the whole work.

The principal question for Social-Democrats who value the elections primarily as a means for the political enlightenment of the people, is, of course, the ideological and political content of all the propaganda and agitation to be carried on in connection with them. That is what is meant by an election platform. To every party at all worthy of the name a platform is something that has existed long before the elections; it is not something specially devised "for the

elections", but an inevitable result of the whole *work* of the party, of the way the work is organised, and of its whole trend in the given historical period. And the R.S.D.L.P., too, already has a platform; its platform already exists and has been naturally and inevitably determined by the Party's principles and by the tactics which the Party has *already* adopted, has *already* applied, and is still applying, during the entire period in the political life of the nation which in a certain respect is always "summed up" by elections. The platform of the R.S.D.L.P. is the *sum total* of the work which revolutionary Marxism and the sections of the advanced workers who remained faithful to it have accomplished in the 1908-11 period, the period of the orgy of counter-revolution, the period of the June Third, Stolypin regime.

The three main items that make up this total are: (1) the programme of the Party; (2) its tactics; (3) its appraisal of the dominant ideological and political trends of the given period, or the most widespread of them, or those which are most harmful for democracy and socialism. Without a programme a party cannot be an integral political organism capable of pursuing its line whatever turn events may take. Without a tactical line based on an appraisal of the current political situation and providing explicit answers to the "vexed problems" of our times, we might have a circle of theoreticians, but not a functioning political entity. Without an appraisal of the "active", current or "fashionable" ideological and political trends, the programme and tactics may degenerate into dead "clauses" which can by no stretch of the imagination be put into effect or applied to the thousands of detailed, particular, and highly specific questions of practical activity with the necessary understanding of essentials, with an understanding of "what is what".

As for the ideological and political trends typical of the 1908-11 period and of particular importance for a proper understanding of the tasks of Social-Democracy, the most prominent among them are the *Vekhi* trend, which is the ideology of the *counter-revolutionary liberal* bourgeoisie (an ideology fully in line with the policy of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, no matter what its diplomats say), and *liquidationism*, which is the expression of the same decadent and bourgeois influences in a group which has contact with

the working-class movement. Away from democracy, as far away as possible from the movement of the masses, as far away as possible from the revolution, that is the theme of the trends of political thought that hold sway in "society". As far away as possible from the illegal Party, from the tasks of the hegemony of the proletariat in the struggle for liberation, from the tasks of championing the revolution, that is the theme of the *Vekhi* trend among the Marxists, the trend that has built a nest for itself in *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*. No matter what is said by narrow-minded practical workers or by people who wearily turn away from the difficult struggle for revolutionary Marxism in our difficult epoch, there is *not a single* question of "practical activity", *not a single* question of the illegal or legal work of the Social-Democratic Party in any sphere of its activity, to which the propagandist or agitator could give a clear and complete answer, unless he understood the full profundity and significance of these "trends of thought" typical of the Stolypin period.

Very often it may be useful, and sometimes even essential, to give the election platform of Social-Democracy a finishing touch by adding a brief general slogan, a watchword for the elections, stating the most cardinal issues of current political practice, and providing a most convenient and most immediate pretext, as well as subject matter, for comprehensive socialist propaganda. In our epoch only the following three points can make up this watchword, this general slogan: (1) a republic, (2) confiscation of all landed estates, and (3) the eight-hour day.

The first point is the quintessence of the demand for political liberty. In expressing our Party's stand on questions of this nature, it would be wrong to confine ourselves to the term political liberty or some other term such as "democratisation", etc., wrong because our propaganda and agitation must consider the experience of the revolution. The dissolution of two Dumas, the organisation of pogroms, support for the Black-Hundred gangs and clemency for the heroes of the Black Hundreds, Lyakhov's exploits in Persia[138] the coup d'état of June 3, and a number of further "minor coups d'état" which followed it (Article 87, etc.)—is a far from complete record of the deeds of our monarchy

as represented by Romanov, Purishkevich, Stolypin and Co. Situations do arise and have arisen in history, when it has been possible for a monarchy to adapt itself to serious democratic reforms, such, for instance, as universal suffrage. Monarchy in general is not uniform and immutable. It is a very flexible institution, capable of adapting itself to the various types of class rule. But it would be playing fast and loose with the requirements of historical criticism and treachery to the cause of democracy if one were to proceed from these indisputable abstract considerations and draw conclusions from them with regard to the actual Russian monarchy of the twentieth century.

The situation in our country and the history of our state power, particularly during the past decade, clearly show us that none other than the tsarist monarchy is the centre of the gang of Black-Hundred landowners (with Romanov at their head) who have made Russia a bogey not only for Europe, but now even for Asia—the gang which has developed tyranny, robbery, venality of officials, systematic acts of violence against the "common herd", the persecution and torture of political opponents, etc., to the inordinate dimensions we know today. Since this is the *real* face, the real economic basis and political physiognomy of *our* monarchy, to make the demand for, say, universal suffrage the central issue in the struggle for political liberty would not be so much opportunism as sheer nonsense. Since it is a question of choosing a central issue to be made the general slogan of the elections, the various democratic demands must be arranged in some sort of likely perspective and proportion. After all, one might only raise laughter among educated persons and create confusion in the minds of the uneducated if one were to demand of Purishkevich that he behave decently toward women and that he should realise the impropriety of using "unprintable" language, or if one were to demand tolerance of Illiodor,[139] altruism and honesty of Gurko and Reinbot, respect for law and order of Tolmachov and Dumbadze, and democratic reforms of Nicholas Romanov!

Consider the question from, so to speak, the general historical standpoint. It is obvious (to all, except Larin and a handful of liquidators) that the bourgeois revolution in Russia has not been consummated. Russia is heading for

a *revolutionary* crisis. We must prove that revolution is necessary and preach that it is legitimate and "beneficial". This being the case, we must conduct our propaganda for political liberty so as to pose the question in all its aspects, formulate the goal for a movement that is bent on victory and not one that stops half-way (as was the case in 1905); we must issue a slogan capable of arousing enthusiasm among the masses who can no longer endure life as it is in Russia, who suffer because they are ashamed of being Russians, and are striving for a really free and really renewed Russia. Consider the question from the standpoint of practical propaganda. You cannot help making clear even to the most benighted muzhik that the state must be governed by a Duma which is more freely elected than the First Duma, by a Duma elected by the whole people. But how are we to ensure that the Duma cannot be dispersed. Only the destruction of the tsarist monarchy can guarantee this.

It may be objected that to issue the slogan of a republic as the watchword of the entire election campaign would mean precluding the possibility of conducting it legally, and thereby show that recognition of the importance and necessity of legal work is not seriously intended. Such objections, however, would be sophisms, worthy of the liquidators. We cannot legally advocate a republic (except from the rostrum of the Duma, from which republican propaganda can and should be carried on *fully* within the bounds of legality); but we can write and speak in defence of democracy *in such a way* that we do not in the least condone ideas about the compatibility of democracy with the monarchy; *in such a way* as to refute and ridicule the liberal and Narodnik monarchists; *in such a way* as to make sure that the readers and the audiences form a clear idea of the connection between the monarchy, precisely as a monarchy, and the despotism and arbitrary rule reigning in Russia. Russians have gone through a long school of slavery—they have learnt to read between the lines and add what the speaker has left unsaid. "Do not say 'I can't'—say 'I shan't'"—that is the reply we must give Social-Democrats who are working legally, should they plead that it is "impossible" to make the demand for a republic a central point in our propaganda and agitation.

It is hardly necessary to dwell at particular length on the importance of the demand for the confiscation of all landed estates. At a time when the Russian villages never cease groaning under the burden of the Stolypin "reform", when an extremely fierce struggle is going on between the mass of the population on the one hand and the "new landowners" and the rural police on the other, and when, according to the testimony of extremely conservative people hostile to the revolution, bitterness such as has never before been seen is making itself felt ever more strongly—at such a time the demand must be made a *central* plank of the whole democratic election platform. We shall only point out that this is the very demand that will draw a clear line of demarcation between consistent proletarian democracy and not only the landlord liberalism of the Cadets, but also the intellectual-bureaucratic talk about "standards", "consumption standards", "production standards", "equalitarian distribution", and similar nonsense, of which the Narodniks are so fond, and at which every sensible peasant laughs. For us it is not a question of "how much land does the muzhik need"; the Russian people need to confiscate the *entire* land of the landowners, so as to throw off the yoke of feudal oppression in the *entire* economic and political life of the country. Unless this measure is carried out, Russia will never be free, and the Russian peasant will never eat anything like his fill, nor will he ever be truly literate.

The third point—the eight-hour day—stands even less in need of comment. The counter-revolutionary forces are frantically robbing the workers of the gains of 1905; and all the more intense, therefore, is the struggle of the workers for better working and living conditions, chief among which is the introduction of the eight-hour day.

To sum up, the substance and mainspring of the Social-Democratic election platform can be expressed in three words: *for the revolution*! Shortly before his death Lev Tolstoi said—in a tone of regret typical of the worst aspects of "Tolstoi-ism"—that the Russian people had "learned how to make a revolution" all too quickly. We regret only the fact that the Russian people have not learned this science *thoroughly enough*, for without it they may remain the slaves of the Purishkeviches for many centuries to come. It is

true, however, that the Russian proletariat, in its striving to achieve the complete transformation of society on socialist lines, has given the Russian people in general, and the Russian peasants in particular, indispensable *lessons* in this science. Neither the gallows erected by Stolypin, nor the efforts of *Vekhi*, can make them forget these lessons. The lesson has been given, it is being assimilated, it will be repeated.

The basis of our election platform is the programme of the R.S.D.L.P., our old programme of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Our programme gives a precise formulation of our socialist aims, of the ultimate goal of socialism; and it is a formulation, moreover, which is particularly emphatic in its opposition to opportunism and reformism. At a time when in many countries, including our own, reformism is raising its head and when, on the other hand, there is a growing number of indications that in the most advanced countries the period of so-called "peaceful parliamentarianism" is drawing to a close and a period of revolutionary unrest among the masses is setting in—at such a time our old programme assumes even greater significance (if that is possible). With regard to Russia the programme of the R.S.D.L.P. sets the Party the immediate aim of "overthrowing the autocratic tsar and establishing a democratic republic". The special sections of our programme dealing with the questions of government, finances, and labour legislation, and with the agrarian question, provide exact and definite material to guide the *entire* work of every propagandist and agitator, in all its many aspects; they should enable him to particularise on our election platform in speaking before any audience, on any occasion, and on any subject.

The tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. during the period of 1908-11 have been determined by *the resolutions adopted in December 1908*. Endorsed by the Plenary Meeting held in January 1910, and tested by *the experience* of the whole "Stolypin period", these resolutions provide an exact appraisal of the situation and of the tasks dictated by that situation. Just as before, the old autocracy is still the main enemy; just as before, a revolutionary crisis is inevitable, and Russia is again heading for such a crisis. But the situation is not the same as before; autocracy has taken "a step in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy"; it is trying to strengthen

feudal landed proprietorship by a new, bourgeois agrarian policy; it is trying to arrange alliances between the feudal-minded landowners and the bourgeoisie in the reactionary and servile Duma; it is making use of widespread counter-revolutionary (*Vekhi*) sentiments among the liberal bourgeoisie. Capitalism has advanced a few steps, class contradictions have sharpened, the split between the democratic elements and the *Vekhi* type liberalism of the Cadets has become more pronounced, and the activity of the Social-Democrats has extended to new spheres (the Duma and "legal opportunities"), which enables them to broaden the scope of their propaganda and agitation despite the counter-revolution and even though the illegal organisations have been badly "battered". The old revolutionary tasks and the old, tested methods of revolutionary mass struggle, that is what our Party champions in this period of disorganisation and disintegration, when it is often necessary "to start from the beginning", when, in view of the changed circumstances, it is necessary to resort not only to old methods, but also to conduct the work of preparation and gather forces for the impending period of new battles in a new way, and by new methods.

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FROM THE CAMP OF THE STOLYPIN "LABOUR" PARTY

Nos. 6, 7, and 8 of *Nasha Zarya* are in the main devoted to the election campaign and the election platform. In the articles dealing with these subjects the essence of the liquidators' views is concealed behind an extraordinary number of inordinately inflated, laboured, high-sounding phrases about "the fighting mobilisation of the proletariat", "the widespread and open mobilisation of the masses", "political mass organisations of independent active workers", "self-governing groups", "class-conscious workers", etc., etc. Yuri Chatsky even went so far as to declare that the platform must be a "product" not only of "deep thought" but also of "keen feeling".... These phrases, which, doubtlessly, arouse the enthusiasm of high-school boys and girls, are intended to stun the readers, to "produce a smoke-screen", so as to make it easier for the writers to smuggle in their contraband.

Mr. Yuri Chatsky, for instance, extols the significance of a platform and the importance of having a single platform. "We attach the greatest importance," he writes, "to the sanction [of the platform] by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma; but at the same time we absolutely insist on the condition that the latter does not follow the line of least resistance by sanctioning a platform imposed upon it by circles abroad."

These are the words as they appear in print. Nor are they printed in a Black-Hundred publication which specialises in Jew and émigré baiting, but in a "Social-Democratic" magazine! How low these gentlemen must have fallen if, instead of explaining the difference in principle between *their* platform and the platform of "circles abroad", they raise a howl against those abroad!

Yuri Chatsky goes about it so clumsily that he betrays the name of the circle on whose behalf he is pursuing his liquidationist line. "The element of possible centralisation," he writes, "is the group of Social-Democratic [?] functionaries who are closely connected with the open workers' movement [you mean, through *Nasha Zarya*, don't you?] and are acquiring ever greater stability... [and an ever more pronounced liberal appearance].... We refer particularly to St. Petersburg."...

Why not speak out more plainly, gentlemen! It is unbecoming and foolish to play here at blind-man's-buff; when you speak of "the element of centralisation", or simply the centre (of liquidationism), you mean, and properly so, the group of contributors to the St. Petersburg *Nasha Zarya*. The truth will out.

L. Martov is trying to hide the truth by paraphrasing those postulates of the Social-Democratic programme that are legal and offering them as the basis for an election platform. Nor does he spare fine words to the effect that we need not "renounce" or "curtail" anything. He says this on page 48 of No. 7-8. But on page 54, in the concluding paragraph of his article, we read:

"We [? apparently *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*] must conduct the entire election campaign under the banner [*sic*!] of the struggle of the proletariat for the freedom of its political self-determination, of the struggle for its right to have a class party of its own and to develop its activities freely, for the right to take part in political life as an independent organised force. This principle must govern both the content and tactics of the election campaign and the methods to be used for organisational work."

What a splendid exposition of a *liberal* labour platform! A worker Social-Democrat will "conduct the campaign under the banner" of the struggle for the freedom of the *whole people*, for a democratic republic. A worker who is a liberal is fighting "for the right to have a class party [in the Brentano, social-liberal sense] of its own". To make this the governing principle means betraying the democratic cause. The liberal bourgeois and the astute agents of the government desire nothing better than that the workers should fight for the freedom of their "political self-determi-

nation", but not for the freedom of the whole country. Martov has merely paraphrased Levitsky's formula: "*Not* the hegemony of the proletariat, but a class party"! Martov has formulated a slogan of pure "Neo-Economism". The Economists said that the workers should confine themselves to the economic struggle, leaving the political struggle to the liberals. The Neo-Economists, the liquidators, say that the whole content of the election campaign should be subordinated to the principle: the struggle of the workers for the right to have a class party of their own.

Is Martov aware of the import of these words of his? Does he realise that they imply the renunciation of the revolution by the proletariat?—"liberal gentlemen, in 1905 we opposed you and roused the masses in general, and the peasants in particular, to revolution, we fought for the freedom of the people in spite of liberal efforts to halt the movement, to confine it to the achievement of semi-freedom. From now on we will no longer allow ourselves to be 'carried away'; we will fight for the freedom of the workers to have a class party of their own". That is actually all the *Vekhi*-type, counter-revolutionary liberals (cf. particularly the writings of Izgoyev) demand of the workers. The liberals do not deny the workers' right to have a class party of their own. What they do deny is the "right" of the proletariat, which is the only consistently revolutionary class, to rouse the masses of the people to the struggle in spite of and even against the liberals.

Vowing not to "renounce" and not to "curtail", Martov has so *curtailed* the Social-Democratic platform as to fully satisfy Larin, Potresov, Prokopovich, and Izgoyev.

See how Martov criticises the resolution of the Party on tactics (adopted in December 1908). With regard to the phrase—"a step in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy"—he says that it is "an unfortunate formula", for "it fails to account for the actual step *back* toward division of power between the protagonists of absolutism and the landowning nobility", and "it takes no account of the decisive collision between classes"—meaning, apparently, between the bourgeois liberals and the feudal-minded landowners! Martov forgets that in 1905-07 the liberal bourgeois *feared* a "decisive collision" with the feudal landowners,

preferring a "decisive collision" with the workers and peasants (just as the liberals forget about this and accuse the workers of "excesses"). Martov sees the "step back" of autocracy toward the feudal-minded landowners. (This step is *explicitly* mentioned in the resolution of the Party in the words: "... to preserve the power and revenue of the feudal-minded landowners".) But Martov *fails* to see the "step back" taken by the liberal bourgeois *from* democracy to "law and order", to the monarchy, to a rapprochement with the landowners. Martov fails to see the *connection* between the "step towards a bourgeois monarchy" *and* the counter-revolutionary character of the liberal bourgeoisie with its *Vekhi* mentality. He fails to see it because he is himself "a *Vekhi* advocate among Marxists". Like a liberal who dreams of a "decisive collision" between the liberal bourgeois and the feudal-minded landowners, he throws overboard the historic reality of the *revolutionary* collision between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the feudal-minded landowners on the other, *notwithstanding* the vacillations of the liberals, notwithstanding even their desertion to the party of law and order.

Here, too, we get the same result: Martov rejects the resolution of the Party from the viewpoint of a *liberal* labour policy, but, unfortunately, he does not oppose it by any resolution *of his own* on tactics (although he is compelled to admit that tactics must be based on an appraisal of "the historical meaning of the June Third period"!).

It is therefore quite obvious why Martov writes: "The workers' party should strive ... to prevail upon the propertied classes to take one step or another toward the democratisation of legislation and an extension of constitutional guarantees...". Every liberal concedes that it is quite legitimate for the workers to strive "to prevail upon *the propertied classes*" to take one step or another; all that the liberal stipulates is that the workers should not dare to prevail upon *the non-propertied* to take "steps" which are *not* to the liberals' *liking*. The entire policy of the British liberals, who have so profoundly corrupted the British workers, is to allow the workers to try "to prevail upon the propertied classes", but *not to allow the workers* to win for themselves the leadership of a movement of the whole people.

Similarly it is quite obvious why Chatsky, Martov, and Dan hate the tactics of a "Left bloc". They see in it not just a "Left bloc" for the elections, but the general tactics established by the London Congress—*to wrest* the peasants (and the petty bourgeois in general) away from the influence of the Cadets and *compel* the Narodnik groups *to choose* between the Constitutional-Democrats and the Social-Democrats. To reject these tactics is tantamount to *renouncing democracy*. Only Stolypinite Social-Democrats could fail to see this *today*, after the "Stolypin period", after the exploits of the "Stolypin liberalism of the Cadets" (Milyukov's London slogan—"His Majesty's Opposition"!), *after* the publication of *Vekhi*.

There should be no illusions—we have *two* election platforms, that is a fact. It is a fact that cannot be argued away by phrase-mongering, lamentations, wishes. One is the platform explained above, based on the decisions of the Party. The other is the Potresov-Larin platform, developed and supplemented by Levitsky, Yuri Chatsky and Co., and touched up by Martov. The latter platform, which *claims to be Social-Democratic* is actually *the platform of a liberal labour policy*.

Anyone who fails to understand the difference, the irreconcilable difference, between these *two* platforms of working-class policy cannot conduct the election campaign *intelligently*. He is sure to be haunted at every step by disappointments, "misunderstandings", and comic or tragic mistakes.

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THE GRAND TOTAL

The controversy between Witte and Guchkov was eagerly seized upon by both *Rech* and *Russkiye Vedomosti*, who made use of it in their election campaign. The nature of the controversy is evident from the following tirade in *Rech*:

> "How often the Octobrist fraternity, with Guchkov at their head, joined hands with Mr. Durnovo's colleagues in order to please the powers that be. How often, with their eyes riveted on the powers that be, did they turn their backs on public opinion!"

This is written because in October and November 1905 Witte conferred with Messrs. Urusov, Trubetskoi, Guchkov, and M. Stakhovich regarding the formation of a Cabinet, and the three last-mentioned were categorically opposed to Durnovo's candidature for the post of Minister of the Interior.

While reproaching the Octobrists, the Cadet gentlemen, however, reveal an amazingly poor memory about their own past. The Octobrists "joined hands with Mr. Durnovo's colleagues". That is true. And it goes to prove, beyond any doubt, that it would he ridiculous to talk about the democratic nature of the Octobrists. The Octobrists lay no claim to democracy. But the Cadets call themselves "Constitutional-Democrats". Were not these "democrats" who, in the person of Mr. Urusov, supported Durnovo's candidature at the conferences with Witte, among those who "joined hands with Mr. Durnovo's colleagues"? Weren't the Cadets, as a party, in the First and Second Dumas among those who, "with their eyes riveted on the powers that be, turned their backs on public opinion"?

How can one forget or try to distort facts that are generally known? Recall the discussion in the First Duma on the organisation of local land committees. It was *precisely*

"to please the powers that be" that the Cadets opposed this. On this issue (one of the most important political issues in the period of the First Duma) the Cadets were definitely among those who, "with their eyes riveted on the powers that be, turned their backs on public opinion". For the Trudoviks and the worker deputies, who represented nine-tenths of Russia's population, were at that time *in favour* of local land committees. A similar division of the parties in the First and Second Dumas was observed on scores of other occasions as well.

It is hard to imagine how the Cadets could dispute these facts. Can they really assert that they did not disagree with the Trudoviks and the worker deputies in the First and Second Dumas, or that in all those cases they did not go hand in hand with the Heydens, the Octobrists, and the powers that be? Or that the Trudoviks and the worker deputies, because of the existing electoral system, did not represent the vast majority of the population? Or by public opinion do our "democrats" mean the opinion of the "educated public" (educated in the sense of possessing official diplomas), but not the opinion of the majority of the population?

An historical appraisal of the period during which Stolypin held the post of Prime Minister, i.e., the five years from 1906 to 1911, provides incontrovertible proof that *neither* the Octobrists *nor* the Cadets were democrats. And since only the Cadets claim this title, it is precisely their self-deception, and their deception of "public opinion", of the opinion of the masses on this score, that is particularly obnoxious and harmful.

We do not mean to imply, of course, that the Octobrists and the Cadets represent "one reactionary mass", or that the Octobrists are not less liberal than the Cadets. What we do mean to tell them is that liberalism and democracy are two different things. It is natural for liberals to regard as "public opinion" the opinion of the bourgeoisie, but not that of the workers and peasants. A democrat cannot accept that point of view, and whatever illusions he may at times entertain regarding the interests and aspirations of the masses, the democrat has *faith* in the masses, in the *action* of the masses, in the legitimacy of their sentiments and the expediency of their methods of struggle.

The greater the abuse of the name of democrat, the more insistently must this difference between liberalism and democracy be borne in mind. In all bourgeois countries elections serve as a means of gaining publicity for the bourgeois parties. From the working-class point of view, elections and the election campaign must serve the aim of political enlightenment, of bringing out the *true* nature of the various parties. Political parties cannot be judged by their names, declarations or programmes; they must be judged by their *deeds*.

The controversy between Witte and Guchkov, which touched upon the question of how Stolypin was started on his ministerial career (incidentally, Guchkov testifies that *in the autumn of 1905 none* of the "public figures" objected to Stolypin's candidature), raises a number of other, much more important and pertinent, questions.

The first time Stolypin was mentioned as candidate for the post of Minister of the Interior (in the autumn of 1905) was at a conference Witte held with representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie. Even during the period of the First Duma, Stolypin, in his capacity of Minister of the Interior, "on two occasions, with Kryzhanovsky acting as intermediary, ... made overtures to Muromtsev, proposing to discuss the possibility of forming a Cadet Cabinet". That is what *Rech* wrote in an editorial on September 6, prefacing this statement with the cautious and evasive reservation that "there are indications" that Stolypin did act in that way. It is sufficient to recall that the Cadets had previously either maintained silence on this score, or met any such "indications" with abuse. Now they themselves refer to these indications, thereby obviously confirming their accuracy.

Let us go further in this matter. After the dissolution of the First Duma, when Stolypin became Prime Minister, direct offers to join the Cabinet were made to Heyden, Lvov, and M. Stakhovich. After the failure of this "combination", "P. A. Stolypin, during the first interim between two Dumas, established intimate political connections with Guchkov", and, as we know, these connections were maintained up to 1911.

What is the sum total of all this? Stolypin's candidature for the post of Minister was discussed with the representatives

of the bourgeoisie; then, during his entire ministerial career, from 1906 to 1911, Stolypin made "overtures" to one set of representatives of the bourgeoisie after another, initiating, or trying to initiate, political relations first with the Cadets, then with the Party of Peaceful Renovation, and, finally, with the Octobrists. First Stolypin, as candidate for the post of Minister, was "proposed" to the "public figures", i.e., to the leaders of the bourgeoisie; then Stolypin—*during the whole of his career* in his capacity as Minister—made "overtures" to the Muromtsevs, Heydens, and Guchkovs. Stolypin's career came to an end (it is a well-known fact that Stolypin's resignation was imminent) when he had *exhausted* the whole list of bourgeois parties and groups to whom he could make "overtures".

The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is clear. If the Cadets and the Octobrists are now wrangling over the question as to who was more sycophantic in the negotiations about ministers or with ministers—Urusov or Guchkov, Muromtsev or Heyden, Milyukov or Stakhovich and so on and so forth—it is nothing but a petty squabble which only serves to distract the attention of the public from a vital political question. This vital question is obviously the necessity to understand the conditions and meaning of that particular epoch in the history of the Russian political regime, when ministers were compelled systematically to make "overtures" to the leaders of the bourgeoisie, when ministers *could* find at least some common ground with those leaders, a common ground for frequently conducting negotiations. What is important is not the question as to who was more sycophantic during those negotiations—X or Z—but, first, the fact that the old landowning class could no longer rule without making "overtures" to the leaders of the bourgeoisie; and, secondly, that the diehard landowner and the bourgeois found a *common ground* for negotiations, and that common ground was their *counter-revolutionism*.

Stolypin was not merely a minister of the landowners who had experienced the year 1905; no, he was also a minister during the period of counter-revolutionary sentiments among the bourgeoisie, when the landowners had to make Overtures to them, and could make them because of their common hatred for "nineteen-five". These sentiments of the

bourgeoisie—even if we take only the Cadets, the most Left of the "liberal" parties—were expressed in the sermons of *Vekhi*, which showered abuse on democracy and the movement of the masses, and in Milyukov's "London" slogan, in the numerous unctuous speeches by Karaulov, in the speech of Berezovsky the First on the agrarian question, etc.

It is this particular aspect of the matter that all our liberals, the entire liberal press, and the liberal labour politicians tend to forget. Yet this aspect of the matter is the most important; it explains the historical distinction between the conditions under which landowners were made governors and ministers in the nineteenth century or in the beginning of the twentieth century, and those obtaining *after 1905*. In its altercation with Guchkov, the Cadet *Rech* writes (September 30): "Russian society well remembers Octobrism's record of service".

Of course they do! The liberal public well remember the petty squabble "between friends"—between the Urusovs and Milyukovs on the one hand and the Heydens, Lvovs, and Guchkovs on the other. But Russian democracy in general, and working-class democracy in particular, *remember very well* the "record" of the *entire* liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets included; they remember very well that the great upheaval of 1905 drove the landowners and the landowners' bureaucracy to seek the support of the bourgeoisie, and that the bourgeoisie took advantage of its position in a remarkably fitting manner: it fully agreed with the landowners that local land committees are unnecessary—nay, harmful; and it differed from them on an exceptionally vital question, truly a question of principle—namely: Durnovo *or* Stolypin!

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Signed: *V. F.*

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TWO CENTRES

The opening of the last session of the Third Duma immediately raised the question as to the results of the work of that body. One of the principal results may be formulated in the words of *Rech*, which recently stated in a leading article:

"A number of votes recently taken in the Duma actually reflect the domination of a 'Left Centre' in that body.... The real activity of the Duma, that concerns the vital interests and demands of life, from the very beginning of the session has invariably and systematically proceeded along the lines of a Left Centre (non-existent, of course)."

And, as if to catch out the Prime Minister himself, *Rech* exclaims in a transport of rejoicing: "Mr. Kokovtsov did not hesitate [in his first speech] to declare three times that he was fully in agreement with the arguments of [the Cadet] Stepanov".

It is an indisputable fact that a "Left Centre" actually does exist. Only, it is open to question whether this fact is a symptom of "life" or of stagnation.

From the very beginning there have been two possible majorities in the Third Duma. As far back as the end of 1907, before this Duma began its "activities", the Marxist estimate of the situation and of the Third Duma centred around the recognition of the existence of these "two possible majorities" and their characterisation.

One majority is the Black-Hundred and Right-Octobrist combination, the other—that of the Octobrists and Cadets. The Third Duma was elected on the basis of a law so devised as to produce these two possible majorities. Our liberals pretend in vain that they do not see this.

It was neither accident nor the cunning calculation of individuals, but the entire course of the class struggle in the 1905-07 period, that forced the government to take this path, and no other. Events had shown that it was impossible to bank on the mass of the population. Previously, before the "events", it had been possible to maintain the illusion of an official "popular policy", but that illusion had been shattered by the events. It had become necessary to bank openly and cynically on one ruling class—the class of the Purishkeviches and Markovs—and on the sympathy or the fright of the bourgeoisie. The dominating tendency among some sections of the bourgeoisie was an eager desire to render systematic support (the Octobrists); among other sections it was sympathy for so-called "law and order" or fright (the Cadets)—the difference was of no material importance.

The change referred to in the *entire* political system of Russia was already indicated by the conversations which Witte, Trepov, and Stolypin had conducted since the end of 1905 with Urusov, Trubetskoi, Guchkov, Muromtsev, and Milyukov. This change became fully defined and assumed a state-constitutional form in the Third Duma with its two possible majorities.

There is no need to dwell upon the reason why the present political regime is in need of the first majority. But people are wont to forget that it stands in just as much need of the second—that of the Octobrists and the Cadets. Without the "bourgeois plaintiff" the government could not be what it is. Unless it comes to terms with the bourgeoisie it cannot exist. Without attempts to reconcile the Purishkeviches and Markovs with a bourgeois system and with the bourgeois development of Russia, neither the Ministry of Finance nor all the ministries combined can survive.

And if today the "Left Centre", despite its unassuming character, proves to be dissatisfied, it testifies, of course, to the growing conviction among the bourgeoisie *as a whole* that its sacrifices on the altar of the Purishkeviches have been made in vain.

But "the vital interests and demands of life" cannot be satisfied by these lamentations and complaints of the "Left Centre"; they can only be satisfied if all the forces of democracy are aware of the causes of the impotence and wretched

position of the Centre. This is because the entire Centre, including the Left, is counter-revolutionary: the Purishkeviches make them groan but the Centre *will not and cannot* dispense with them. That is why theirs is such a bitter lot, that is why the Left Centre cannot boast a single victory, not even a shred of a victory.

The "Left Centre" of which *Rech* speaks, represents death and not life—at decisive moments of Russian history, all those belonging to it became scared of democracy and turned their backs on it. But the cause of democracy is a live cause, the most vital in Russia.

The vital interests and demands of life are asserting themselves in spheres that are far removed from the "Left Centre" which occupies the whole attention of the Cadets. On reading, for instance, the reports on the Duma debate on the secret political police, the thoughtful reader naturally could not help noticing that the presentation of the question in the speeches of Pokrovsky the Second and, particularly, of Gegechkori, was vastly different from that of Rodichev and his colleagues, as different as earth and sky, as life and death.

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OLD AND NEW

NOTES OF A NEWSPAPER READER

You take up a batch of newspapers and at once you are completely surrounded by the atmosphere of "old" Russia. You read of a trial held in connection with a pogrom in Armavir: people beaten up with the knowledge and complicity of the authorities; a trap set by the authorities; "a massacre of the Russian intelligentsia in the broad sense of the term suggested and ordered by someone" (the words of the plaintiff in the civil suit). The old but ever new picture of Russian life, a bitter ridicule of the "constitutional" illusions.

Bitter, yet useful ridicule! For it is clear, and the young generation in Russia realises it ever more clearly, that condemnations and resolutions are of no avail. It is a question of the political system as a whole. Historical truth is paving a way for itself through the haze of deceptive dreams that it is possible to pour new wine into the old bottles.

Famine.... People selling cattle, selling girls; throngs of beggars, typhus, death from starvation. "The population have but one privilege—to die quietly and unobtrusively," writes one correspondent.

"The Zemstvo authorities, to put it bluntly, are scared that they may find themselves, with their estates, surrounded by starved and embittered people who have lost all hope of any improvement." (A report from Kazan Gubernia.)

There can hardly be anything more docile than the present-day Zemstvos; yet even they are wrangling with the government over the amount of credit appropriations. They asked for 6,000,000 rubles (in Kazan Gubernia) and the government gave them 1,000,000. They asked for 600,000 rubles (Samara) and received 25,000!

Everything as of old!

At a Zemstvo meeting in Kholm Uyezd,* Pskov Gubernia, even rural superintendents opposed Zemstvo agronomical aid intended only for farmers who had left the village commune! In the Kuban area, at a gathering of Cossack village elders all present unanimously opposed the Third Duma plan to make the peasants' land allotments their private property.

In Tsaritsyn, the Uyezd Assembly resolved not to prosecute an elder who had tortured a woman ("with the object of ascertaining the whereabouts of a criminal"). The gubernia court rescinded that decision.

In the neighbourhood of St. Petersburg, workers caught the manager of Mr. Yakovlev's factory, threw a sack over his head and dragged him towards the Neva. The police dispersed the workers. Eighteen of them were arrested.

Small wonder therefore that, faced with such pictures of real life, even *Rech* is obliged to speak of the "great humiliation of the public". And Mr. Kondurushkin, in his letters from Samara on the famine,** complains: "Russian society seems to me as yielding as rubber, or dough. It can be kneaded and pressed by word or deed. But as soon as it is let alone, it resumes its shape as of old".

> "He, this Russian average citizen and intellectual, rich or poor, is unperturbed. But when people begin to 'swell' from hunger, he will then exult, and rejoice with tears in his eyes. When he sets out to render aid he will absolutely insist on doing so with tears in his eyes and 'noble' feelings in his breast. He will not miss the splendid opportunity to do something for the salvation of his soul. Without feelings and tears, work is not real work, nor is aid real aid. Unless there is an opportunity for him to shed tears, he will not think the cause worthy of his attention and will not lift a finger. No, he must first excite his emotions, make himself cry and blow his nose into a clean handkerchief. But stern calculation, a sound and sober realisation of *state necessity*—that is tedious, there is no soft moodiness in that."

To be sure, it is very much worth while preaching "sternness" in a world of "dough" and "rubber". Only our liberal does not notice *from what aspect* he is doing his preaching;

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* See footnote to p. 88.—*Ed.*

** In the throes of "the melancholy of the universal Russian bleakness".

"a sound and sober realisation of state necessity"—didn't you copy that from Menshikov, Mr. Kondurushkin? Is not such talk about state necessity possible only where there is "dough" and "rubber", only where there is a soft and lachrymose moodiness? It is just because there are dough-like people that the heralds of "sound and sober state necessity" feel so confident.

"Russian society is as yielding as rubber," says Mr. Kondurushkin *as of old*. There are different kinds of society. There was a time when the word "society" included everything and covered everything, when it implied the heterogeneous elements of the population that were waking to conscious activity, and it was also taken to mean only the so-called "educated" people.

But it is in this very respect that things in Russia are no longer what they used to be. At the time when we could speak of society in general, the finest representatives of that society advocated stern struggle, not "sound and sober realisation of state necessity".

But today we can no longer speak of "society" in general. A variety of new forces have revealed themselves in old Russia. The old disasters, like famine, etc., which, as of old, are again looming up in Russia, accentuating the old questions, demand that we take stock of how these new forces have manifested themselves during the first decade of the twentieth century.

"Society" is soft and lachrymose because of the impotence and irresolution of the class towards which it gravitates, and to which nine-tenths of it belong. The preaching of "stern calculation, a sound and sober realisation of state necessity" serves but to justify the domination of the "authorities" over this flabby society.

The last decade, however, has brought forward elements of the population who do not belong to "society" and are not distinguished by softness and lachrymosity....

Everything in Russia is "as of old"—at the top. But there is also something new—at the bottom. He whom "the melancholy of the universal Russian bleakness" helps to discern, find, and ascertain this hard new element which is neither lachrymose nor dough-like, will be able to discover the road that leads to deliverance from the old.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

But he who intersperses his lamentations about this melancholy with talk about "sound and sober realisation of state necessity", will surely remain forever a component part of the "dough" that permits itself to be "kneaded and pressed". Such people are "kneaded and pressed" for the sake of that very "sound and sober state necessity"—and it serves them right.

If, out of a hundred persons who are subjected to that operation, one member of "society" grows hard, that will be a useful result. There will be nothing good without demarcation.

Zvezda, No. 28, November 5, 1911
Signed: *V. F.*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE NAME OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AT THE FUNERAL OF PAUL AND LAURA LAFARGUE NOVEMBER 20 (DECEMBER 3), 1911

Comrades, on behalf of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party I wish to convey our feelings of deep sorrow on the death of Paul and Laura Lafargue. Even in the period of preparation for the Russian revolution, the class-conscious workers and all Social-Democrats of Russia learned profound respect for Lafargue as one of the most gifted and profound disseminators of the ideas of Marxism, ideas that were so brilliantly confirmed by the class struggle during the Russian revolution and counter-revolution. United under the banner of those ideas, the vanguard of the Russian workers waged an organised mass struggle and dealt a blow to absolutism, it upheld, as it continues to uphold, the cause of socialism, the cause of the revolution, the cause of democracy despite the treachery, vacillation, and irresolution of the liberal bourgeoisie.

For the Russian worker Social-Democrats Lafargue symbolised two eras: the era in which the revolutionary youth of France, animated by republican ideas, marched shoulder to shoulder with the French workers to attack the Empire, and the era in which the French proletariat, under Marxist leadership, waged a sustained class struggle against the entire bourgeois system and prepared for the final battle against the bourgeoisie to win socialism.

We, Russian Social-Democrats, who have experienced all the oppression of an absolutism impregnated with Asiatic barbarity, and who have had the good fortune, through the writings of Lafargue and his friends, directly to draw on the revolutionary experience and revolutionary thought of

the European workers—we can now see with particular clarity how rapidly we are nearing the triumph of the cause to which Lafargue devoted all his life. The Russian revolution ushered in an era of democratic revolutions throughout Asia, and 800 million people are now joining in the democratic movement of the whole of the civilised world. In Europe, too, there are increasing signs that the era of so-called peaceful bourgeois parliamentarianism is drawing to an end, to give place to an era of revolutionary battles by a proletariat that has been organised and educated in the spirit of Marxist ideas, and that will overthrow bourgeois rule and establish a communist system.

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 25,
December 8 (21), 1911

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the *Sotsial-Demokrat* text

HYNDMAN ON MARX

The voluminous memoirs of one of the founders and leaders of the British Social-Democratic Party, Henry Mayers Hyndman, have recently been published. The book of nearly five hundred pages is entitled *The Record of an Adventurous Life** and represents the reminiscences, written in lively fashion, of the author's political activity and of the "celebrities" he knew. Hyndman's book provides a great deal of interesting material for the characterisation of British socialism and for an appraisal of certain important problems affecting the entire international working-class movement.

We therefore think it timely to devote a few articles to Hyndman's book, particularly in view of the fact that the Right-wing Cadet *Russkiye Vedomosti* published (on October 14) an article by the liberal Dioneo, which provides an admirable example of how the liberals throw light, or rather darkness, on these problems.

Let us start with Hyndman's reminiscences of Marx. Hyndman made his acquaintance only in 1880, when he apparently knew very little about Marx's teachings and about socialism in general. It is characteristic of British relationships that, born in 1842, Hyndman, until the moment we are speaking of, was a "democrat" of an indefinite hue who had contacts and sympathies with the Conservative Party (Tories). Hyndman turned to socialism after reading *Capital* (in the French translation) during one of his numerous voyages to America between 1874 and 1880.

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* *The Record of an Adventurous Life*, by Henry Mayers Hyndman, London (Macmillan & Co.), 1911.

Accompanied by Karl Hirsch, Hyndman, on his way to visit Marx, mentally compared him to—Mazzini!

The level at which Hyndman makes this comparison can be judged from the fact that he describes Mazzini's influence on those around him as "personal and individually ethical", and considered Marx's influence to be "almost wholly intellectual and scientific". Hyndman went to Marx as to a "supreme analytical genius" and was eager to learn from him; what attracted him in Mazzini was his character and his "elevation of thought and conduct". But that Marx "was far the more powerful mind cannot be disputed". Nor can it be disputed that Hyndman very poorly understood in 1880 (and does not quite understand even now—but of that later) the difference between a bourgeois democrat and a socialist.

"The first impression of Marx as I saw him," writes Hyndman, "was that of a powerful, shaggy, untamed old man, ready, not to say eager, to enter into conflict, and rather suspicious himself of immediate attack. Yet his greeting to us was cordial and his first remarks to me, after I had told him what a great pleasure and honour I felt it to be to shake hands with the author of *Capital*, were agreeable enough; for he told me that he had read my articles on India* with pleasure and had commented on them favourably in his newspaper correspondence.

"When speaking with fierce indignation of the policy of the Liberal Party, especially in regard to Ireland, the old warrior's small deep-sunk eyes lighted up, his heavy brows wrinkled, the broad, strong nose and face were obviously moved by passion, and he poured out a stream of vigorous denunciation, which displayed alike the heat of his temperament and the marvellous command he possessed over our language. The contrast between his manner and utterance when thus deeply stirred by anger and his attitude when giving his views on the economic events of the period was very marked. He turned from the role of prophet and vehement denunciator to that of the calm philosopher without any apparent effort, and I felt from the first that on this latter ground many a long year might pass before I ceased to be a student in the presence of a master.

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* Until he recently turned to jingoism, Hyndman was a determined enemy of British imperialism, and from 1878 carried on a noble campaign of exposure against the shameful acts of violence, outrage, plunder, and indignity (including the flogging of political "criminals") for which Britishers of all parties in India, including the "educated" and "radical" author, John Morley, have long made themselves famous.

"I had been surprised in reading *Capital*, and still more when perusing his smaller works, such as his pronouncement on the Commune of Paris, and his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, how he combined the ablest and coolest examination of economic causes and social effects with the most bitter hatred of classes and even of individual men such as Napoleon III or M. Thiers, who, according to his own theories, were little more than flies upon the wheels of the great Juggernaut car of capitalist development. Marx, of course, was a Jew, and to me it seemed that he combined in his own person and nature, with his commanding forehead and great overhanging brow, his fierce glittering eyes, broad sensitive nose and mobile mouth, all surrounded by a setting of untrimmed hair and beard, the righteous fury of the great seers of his race, with the cold analytical powers of Spinoza and the Jewish doctors. It was an extraordinary combination of qualities, the like of which I have known in no other man.

"As I went out with Hirsch, deeply impressed by the great personality we had left, Hirsch asked me what I thought of Marx. 'Well,' I replied, 'I think he is the Aristotle of the nineteenth century.' And yet as I said it, I knew that this did not cover the ground. For one thing it was quite impossible to think of Marx as acting the courtier to Alexander (of Macedonia) while carrying on the profound studies which have so deeply influenced later generations, and besides he never so wholly segregated himself from immediate human interests—notwithstanding much that has been said to the contrary—as to be able to consider facts and their surroundings in the cold hard light of the greatest philosopher of antiquity. There can be no doubt whatever that his hatred of the system of exploitation and wage slavery by which he was surrounded was not only intellectual and philosophic but bitterly personal.

"I remember saying to him once that as I grew older, I thought I became more tolerant. 'Do you,' he said, '*do* you?' It was quite certain he didn't. It has been, I think, Marx's deep animosity to the existing order of things and his scathing criticism of his opponents which has prevented many of the educated well-to-do class from appreciating his masterly life-work at its full value and has rendered third-rate socialists and logomachers like Böhm-Bawerk, such heroes in their eyes, merely because they have misrepresented and attempted to 'refute' him. Accustomed as we are nowadays, especially in England, to fence always with big soft buttons on the point of our rapiers, Marx's terrible onslaughts with naked steel upon his adversaries appeared so improper that it was impossible for our gentlemanly sham fighters and mental gymnasium men to believe that this unsparing controversialist and furious assailant of capital and capitalists was really the deepest thinker of modern times."

In 1880 Marx was practically unknown to the British public. His health was then failing. His strenuous exertions (sixteen hours a day and more of mental labour!) had sapped his constitution. He was now forbidden by his doctors to do any work in the evenings and, Hyndman relates, "at the

close of 1880 and the beginning of 1881, I had the advantage of very frequent conversations with the Doctor".

> "Our method of talking was peculiar. Marx had a habit when at all interested in the discussion of walking actively up and down the room as if he were pacing the deck of a schooner for exercise. I had acquired on my long voyages (to America, Australia, etc.) the same tendency of pacing to and fro when my mind was much occupied. Consequently, master and student could have been seen walking up and down on opposite sides of the table for two or three hours in succession, engaged in discussing the affairs of the past and the present."

Hyndman does not give anything like a detailed account of the position Marx took *on even a single one of the questions* he discussed with him. From what is quoted above it can be seen that Hyndman concentrated mostly, almost exclusively, indeed, on the *anecdotal* side; this is in line with the rest of his book. Hyndman's autobiography is the life story of a British bourgeois philistine who, being the pick of his class, finally makes his way to socialism, but never completely throws off bourgeois traditions, bourgeois views and prejudices.

While repeating the philistine reproaches against Marx and Engels that they were "autocrats" in "what was supposed to be a democratic" International, that they did not understand practical affairs, did not know people, etc., Hyndman never makes an attempt to test a single one of these reproaches on the basis of an exact, concrete analysis of the circumstances at the periods concerned.

The result is anecdote and not Marxist historical analysis. Marx and Engels fought against the unification of German Social-Democracy (with the Lassalleans[140]), whereas this unity was necessary! That is all that Hyndman says. He does not say a word about Marx and Engels having been a thousand times right in principle in their opposition to Lassalle and the Lassalleans. He does not even raise the question. He does not even ask himself whether "democracy" (organisational) in the period of the International was not a screen for bourgeois sects engaged in disrupting the work of building up proletarian Social-Democracy.

As a result, the story of Hyndman's rupture with Marx is told in such a way that we get absolutely nothing but

gossip (in the spirit of the Dioneos). Engels, you see, was "exacting, suspicious, jealous"; Marx's wife is alleged to have told Hyndman's wife that Engels was Marx's "evil genius" (!); Engels, whom Hyndman never even met (despite what Mr. Dioneo has written in *Russkiye Vedomosti*) was "not disinclined to give full weight to the exchange value of his ready cash in his relations with those whom he helped" (with money; Engels was very rich, Marx very poor). Engels is said to have caused a quarrel between Marx and Hyndman, out of fear that Hyndman, a wealthy man at that time, would take Engels's place as Marx's rich friend!

Of course, the liberals derive pleasure from rehashing such inexpressible vulgarities. And of course it is not at all in the interests of the liberal hacks at least to acquaint themselves with the letters (of Marx and Engels[141]) to Sorge, referred to by Hyndman himself, and *to try and understand* the point at issue. They do not take the trouble to do that! And yet a reference to these letters and a comparison between them and Hyndman's "memoirs" would immediately settle the matter.

In 1881 Hyndman published a pamphlet entitled *England for All* in which he adopts socialism but remains a very, very confused bourgeois democrat. The pamphlet was written for the Democratic Federation (not socialist) which had then been founded and to which a large number of anti-socialist elements belonged. Hyndman paraphrases and copies from *Capital* in two chapters of this pamphlet, *but does not mention Marx*; however, in the preface he speaks vaguely of a certain "great thinker" and "original writer" to whom he is greatly indebted, etc. Hyndman tells us that it was over this that Engels caused a "breach" between him and Marx, and at the same time quotes a letter Marx had written to him (dated December 8, 1880), in which Marx says that, according to Hyndman, he, Hyndman, "does not share the views of my [Marx's] party for England".

It is clear what the difference was—a difference not understood, noticed, or appreciated by Hyndman. It was that Hyndman at that time (as Marx plainly wrote to Sorge on December 15, 1881) was a "well-meaning, petty-bourgeois writer", "half-bourgeois, half-proletarian". Obviously if a man who makes the acquaintance of Marx, be-

comes intimate with him, calls himself a student of his, later forms a "democratic" federation and writes a pamphlet for it in which he misrepresents Marxism and does not mention Marx, the latter could not let it pass without making a "furious" protest. Evidently the protest was made, for Marx in the same letter to Sorge quotes extracts from letters of apology in which Hyndman excuses himself on the ground that "the English don't like to be taught by foreigners" and that "my [Marx's] name was so much detested" (!), etc. (Hyndman himself states that he destroyed nearly all of Marx's letters to him, so that the discovery of the truth from this side is not to be expected.)

Fine apologies, are they not! Well, at a time when the question of the then existing differences between Hyndman and Marx has been cleared up quite definitely, and when even the whole of Hyndman's present book shows that there is much of the philistine and bourgeois in his views (for example, the arguments with which Hyndman defends capital punishment for criminals!), what is offered as the explanation of his rupture with Marx is the "intrigues" of Engels, who for forty years, followed a common line of principle with Marx. Even if all the rest of Hyndman's book were a barrel of honey, this one spoonful of tar would be enough to spoil it!

The differences between Marx and Hyndman at that time are most characteristically revealed by what Hyndman tells us about Marx's opinion of Henry George. Marx's appraisal of Henry George is known from his letter to Sorge dated June 20, 1881. Talking with Marx, Hyndman defended Henry George using the following argument: "George will teach more by inculcating error than other men can impart by complete exposition of the truth".

"Marx," writes Hyndman, "would not hear of this as a sound contention. The promulgation of error could never be of any good to the people, that was his view. 'To leave error unrefuted is to encourage intellectual immorality. For ten who go farther, a hundred may very easily stop with George, and the danger of this is too great to run!'" That was what Marx said!

Yet Hyndman tells us that, on the one hand, he still holds to his previous opinion of Henry George, and that,

on the other hand, George was a boy with a bright farthing dip fooling around within the radius of a man using an electric searchlight.

An excellent comparison, only ... only it was risky for Hyndman to make this excellent comparison side by side with his miserable gossip about Engels.

Zvezda, No. 31, November 26, 1911
Signed: *Vl. Ilyin*

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A LIBERAL LABOUR PARTY MANIFESTO

I

The above would be a fit title for N. R-kov's article in *Nasha Zarya*, No. 9-10.[142]

Painful though it is for Marxists to lose in the person of N. R-kov, a man who, in the years when the movement was on the upgrade served the workers' party faithfully and energetically, the cause must take precedence over all personal or factional considerations, and over all recollections, however "pleasant". The interests of the cause compel us to admit that thanks to the straightforwardness, clarity, and completeness of its views, the manifesto of this new liquidator serves a very useful purpose. N. R-kov enables and compels us to pose the extremely important and cardinal question of "two parties" *irrespective* of any material relating to the "conflict" and to do so on a purely ideological basis, largely outside even the division into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. After R-kov's article, liquidationism can no longer be discussed *as formerly* for he has definitely raised the question to a higher plane. Furthermore, after N. R-kov's article, liquidationism cannot be *merely discussed*; for what we have before us is the most comprehensive plan imaginable of immediate practical action.

N. R-kov begins with an exposition of the "principal objective task in Russia"; he then passes on to an appraisal of the revolution, after which he analyses the present situation and in this connection discusses every class in clear and precise terms, and winds up with a quite explicit description of the entire nature of the new "open political workers' association", which, he says, must be formed and "actually put into effect" without delay. In short, R-kov

begins at the very beginning and by consecutive stages arrives at the very end, as is to be expected of anyone who has any realisation of the serious political responsibility he bears for his words and deeds. And it must be said in fairness to R-kov that from beginning to end he most consistently substitutes liberalism for Marxism.

Take the starting-point of his arguments. He regards it as "absolutely beyond doubt or dispute" that "the principal objective task in Russia at present is the completion of the change from grossly predatory semi-feudal economic practices to civilised capitalism". In his opinion it is debatable whether Russia has reached a position in which, "although the possibility of social upheavals is not excluded, these upheavals are not indispensable or inevitable in the near future".

We consider it to be absolutely beyond doubt or dispute that this is a purely liberal way of presenting the question. The liberals confine themselves to the question of whether we are going to have a "civilised capitalism" or not, whether there are going to be "upheavals" or not. The Marxist refuses to confine himself to this. He demands an analysis that will show *which classes*, *or strata of classes* in the bourgeois society that is emancipating itself, are pursuing this or that definite line in this emancipation—what, for example, are the political forms of the so-called "civilised capitalism" which they are creating. Both in times of "upheaval" and during their undoubted absence, Marxists pursue a line different in principle from liberalism—that of creating truly democratic ways of life, not just "civilised" ways in general. We are all striving for "civilised capitalism", say the liberals, posing as a party that stands above classes. We Marxists, however, must tell the workers and democrats that our understanding of the term "civilisation" differs from that of the liberals.

R-kov presents us with an even more vivid and typically "professorial" distortion of Marxism when he criticises the "superficial observers" who "think that our revolution has failed". "The weak-nerved intelligentsia as a whole," says R-kov, "has always and everywhere indulged in snivelling and whining, followed by moral prostration, renegacy, and mysticism." The "thoughtful observer", on the other hand,

knows that "the raging of reaction often expresses profound social change", that "new social groups and forces take shape and mature in the epoch of reaction".

Thus reasons R-kov. In presenting the question of "renegacy" he has managed to display so much philistinism (even though accompanied by learned verbiage) that no trace is left of the connection between the counter-revolutionary sentiments in Russia and the position and interests of *definite* classes. Not a single *Vekhi* contributor, i.e., the most rabid counter-revolutionary liberal, will dispute the fact that new forces are maturing in the period of reaction; not a single contributor to the liquidationist five-volume publication, which the best of the Mensheviks turned away from,[143] will refuse to subscribe to this. The actual face and the class character of our counter-revolution have vanished from the arguments of our historian, and only hackneyed and hollow phrases remain about some intellectuals being weak-nerved while others are thoughtful observers. R-kov failed to take notice of a question of the utmost importance to a Marxist—namely, how our revolution demonstrated the various methods of action and the various aspirations of the different classes, and why this has given rise to a "renegade" attitude towards the struggle for "civilisation" on the part of other bourgeois classes.

Let us turn to the main issue—R-kov's appraisal of the present situation based on an estimate of the position of all the classes. He begins with the "representatives of our big landowning class", of whom he says: "Not so long ago the bulk of them were [were!] real feudal landowners, typical landed aristocrats. At present only a few of these last Mohicans have survived. This small handful is still grouped around Purishkevich and Markov the Second, and are impotently [!] spluttering the venom of despair.... The majority of our big landowners, noblemen and commoners, who are represented in the Duma by the Nationalists and the Right Octobrists, are gradually and steadily being converted into an agricultural bourgeoisie."

Such is R-kov's "appraisal of the situation". It is obvious that this appraisal is a mockery of reality. In actual fact, the "handful ... grouped around Purishkevich and Markov the Second" are not powerless, but all-powerful. It is pre-

cisely their power and their revenue that the present social and political institutions of Russia protect; it is their will that prevails in the last analysis; it is they who constitute the element determining the entire line of activity and the entire character of the so-called bureaucracy from top to bottom. All this is so generally known, the actual domination in Russia by this very handful is so striking and common, that it requires a truly boundless liberal self-delusion to forget it. R-kov's error is, first, in ridiculously exaggerating the "conversion" of feudal economy into bourgeois economy, and, secondly, in forgetting a "trifle"—just the sort of "trifle" that distinguishes a Marxist from a liberal—namely, the intricacy and spasmodic nature of the process of adaptation of the political superstructure to economic transformation. To explain these two errors of R-kov's it is sufficient to cite the example of Prussia where to this day, despite the considerably higher level of development of capitalism in general, and of the conversion of the old landowning economy into bourgeois economy in particular, the Oldenburgs and the Heidebrands are still omnipotent and control state power, their social substance permeating, as it were, the entire Prussian monarchy, the entire Prussian bureaucracy! To this day, sixty-three years after 1848, and despite the unprecedentedly rapid development of capitalism, the law governing the Landtag elections in Prussia is still so framed as to ensure the domination of the Prussian Purishkeviches. Yet for Russia, six years after 1905, R-kov paints an Arcadian idyll of the "powerlessness" of the Purishkeviches!

The point is that painting an Arcadian idyll about the "steady" conversion of the Purishkeviches and the "triumph of a quite moderate bourgeois progressism" is the main theme of *all* of R-kov's reflections. Take his ideas on present-day agrarian policy. "There is no more striking and widespread illustration" of the conversion (of feudal economy into bourgeois economy) than this policy, declares R-kov. The system of splitting farms into strips isolated from each other is being abolished, and "the elimination of land hunger in twenty agricultural gubernias in the black-earth belt presents no difficulties to speak of, it constitutes one of the urgent tasks of the day, and apparently it will

be settled by a compromise among various groups of the bourgeoisie".

"This anticipated inevitable compromise on the agrarian question already has a number of precedents."

Here you have a complete sample of R-kov's method of political reasoning. He begins by eliminating the extremes, without any supporting data, merely because of his liberal complacency. Then he goes on to declare that a compromise among the various groups of the bourgeoisie is not difficult, and is likely. Then he winds up by saying that such a compromise is "inevitable". By this method one could prove that "upheavals" were neither likely nor indispensable in France in 1788 and in China in 1910. To be sure, a compromise among the various groups of the bourgeoisie presents no difficulties, *if we assume* that Markov the Second has been eliminated not only in R-kov's complacent imagination. But to assume this would mean adopting the standpoint of the liberal who is afraid to dispense with the Markovs and who thinks that everybody will always share his fear.

To be sure, a compromise would be "inevitable" if (the first "if") there were no Markovs; and if (the second "if") we assume that the workers and the peasants who are being ruined are politically sound asleep. But then, again, would not such an assumption (the assumption of the second condition) mean accepting the liberals' wish as reality?

II

Since we are not inclined to accept the liberal wishes or liberal conjectures as reality, we have reached a different conclusion. Without doubt the present agrarian policy is bourgeois in character. But since it is the Purishkeviches who are directing this bourgeois policy, who remain masters of the situation, the result is such a tremendous accentuation of the contradictions that, for the immediate future, at any rate, the likelihood of a compromise must be considered entirely out of the question.

Another important social process, says R-kov in continuing his analysis, is the process of the consolidation of the

big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. Correctly indicating the "mutual concessions" of the Constitutional-Democrats and the Octobrists, the author draws the conclusion: "We must not cherish any illusions—what we see in the offing is the triumph of a quite moderate bourgeois 'progressism'".

Triumph?—Where? Over whom? Is it at the elections to the Fourth Duma of which R-kov has just spoken? If that is what he means, then it will be a "triumph" within the narrow confines of the election law of June 3, 1907. Hence one of two conclusions is inevitable: either the "triumph" will not set up a wave and thus the actual domination of the Purishkeviches will in no way be changed; or this "triumph" will indirectly be the expression of a democratic revival which is bound to come into sharp conflict with the above-mentioned "narrow confines" and with the domination of the Purishkeviches.

In either case the triumph of moderation at elections conducted within moderate bounds will not bring about the least triumph of moderation in real life. The point is, however, that R-kov has already lapsed into a state of "parliamentary cretinism", which enables him to confuse elections conducted on the basis of the June Third law with reality! To demonstrate this incredible fact to the reader we must quote R-kov in full:

"And this triumph is all the more probable since the mass of the urban petty bourgeoisie which in its philistine way, is dejectedly contemplating its shattered illusions, will helplessly gravitate towards moderate progressism, and the peasantry will be all too weak at the elections because the peculiar features of our electoral system enable the landowners who predominate in the gubernia panels of electors to elect 'Rights' to represent the peasants. Such is the picture of the social changes that are taking place in Russia at present, if, for the time being, we leave the working class out of consideration. It is by no means a picture of stagnation or of regression. New, bourgeois, Russia is undoubtedly gaining in strength and is advancing. The State Duma, based on the electoral system established on June 3, 1907, will provide the political sanction for the coming domination of the moderately progressive industrial and commercial bourgeoisie that will share power with the conservative rural bourgeoisie. (England, pure and simple! We omit the comparison with France and Prussia, on which we shall dwell below.) Thus, in summing up everything that has just been said, we must admit that there exist all the prerequisites for a slow, extremely painful for the masses, but never-

theless certain advance of the bourgeois social and political system in Russia. The possibility of storms and upheavals is, naturally, not out of the question, but they will not become something indispensable and inevitable, as was the case before the revolution."

An intricate philosophy, that one cannot deny. If we leave the peasantry out of account, because it is "weak at the elections", and if "for the time being, we leave the working class out of consideration", then, of course, there is absolutely no possibility of upheavals! But what it amounts to is that one who examines Russia from a liberal viewpoint can see nothing but liberal "progressism". Remove your liberal blinkers and the picture becomes an entirely different one. Since the part played by the peasantry in life is quite different from the part it plays in the June Third electoral system, the fact that it is "weak at the elections"—far from opening the gates to a "moderate progressism"—accentuates the antagonism between the peasantry as a whole and the entire system. Since the working class *cannot* be left "out of consideration" either in a capitalist country in general, or in Russia after the experience of the first ten years of the twentieth century in particular, R-kov's argumentation is entirely useless. Since the dominating factor in Russia (both in the Third Duma and above it) is Purishkevichism, occasionally moderated by the grumbling of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, the talk about the "impending domination" of the moderately progressive bourgeoisie is just a liberal lullaby. Since the Guchkovs and Milyukovs by virtue of their class position can oppose the domination of the Purishkeviches with nothing but their grumbling, a conflict between the new, bourgeois Russia and the Purishkeviches is inevitable, and its motive forces will be those whom R-kov, following the example of the liberals, leaves "out of consideration". Just because the Milyukovs and Guchkovs are making "mutual concessions" in cringing before the Purishkeviches, it is all the more necessary for the workers to draw the line between democracy and liberalism. N. R-kov sees neither the conditions giving rise to upheavals in Russia nor the task just indicated, which is obligatory even in the definite absence of an upheaval.

A vulgar democrat may reduce the whole matter to the question whether there is an upheaval or not. The Marxist

is primarily concerned with the line of political demarcation between the classes, which is the *same* during an upheaval and in its absence. R-kov's statement that "the workers must assume the task of exercising political hegemony in the struggle for a democratic regime", is extraordinary after all he has written in his manifesto. What it means is that R-kov gets a guarantee from the bourgeoisie to recognise the hegemony of the workers, while he himself gives the bourgeoisie a guarantee to the effect that the workers renounce the tasks which constitute the substance of hegemony! After he has removed this substance, leaving no trace whatsoever, R-kov naïvely goes on to repeat a hollow phrase. First he gives an appraisal of the situation from which it is evident that, as far as he is concerned, the hegemony of the liberals is an accomplished, irrevocable, and inescapable fact, and then he tries to assure us that he recognises the hegemony of the working class!

The "real" significance of the Duma, argues R-kov, "is no less than that of the French Legislative Corps during the last years of the Second Empire, or that of the proportional mean between the German Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag that was characteristic of Prussia in the eighties of the past century".

This kind of comparison is so frivolous that it is mere playing at historical parallels. In France in the sixties the epoch of bourgeois revolutions had long since come to an end, a direct clash between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was already knocking at the door, and Bonapartism was the expression of the government's manoeuvring between these two classes. It is ridiculous to compare that situation with contemporary Russia. The Third Duma is more reminiscent of the *Chambre introuvable*[144] of 1815! In Prussia, the eighties also marked the epoch of the consummation of the bourgeois revolution, which had completed its work by 1870. The entire bourgeoisie, which included both the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, was contented and reactionary.

Perhaps R-kov fancied he saw a comparison between the role of the democratic and the proletarian deputies in the Legislative Corps and in the Reichstag, and the role of the deputies of the same classes in the Third Duma? That would

be a legitimate comparison; but, then, it would not prove his point, for the conduct of Gegechkori and, to a certain extent, also of Petrov the Third, testifies to such strength, self-confidence, and readiness for battle on the part of the classes which they represent that a "compromise" with the Purishkeviches is not only unlikely but appears to be absolutely out of the question.

III

It was necessary to dwell at particular length on R-kov's appraisal of the role of the various classes, because here we have the ideological roots of our unqualified disagreement. The practical conclusions which R-kov draws, with rare fearlessness and straightforwardness, it must be said in all fairness to him, are interesting primarily because they reduce the author's "theory" to an absurdity. R-kov is a thousand times right, of course, when he connects the question of the possibility of an open political organisation of the workers with an appraisal of the situation, with an estimate of fundamental alterations in the political system. But the trouble is that instead of pointing out such alterations *in real life*, he is only able to present us with amiable professorial syllogisms: the transition to "civilised capitalism" "presupposes" the necessity for an open political organisation of the workers. It is easy to put this on paper, but in real life the Russian political regime will not become a whit more "civilised" because of it.

"Progressism, even if of the most moderate variety, will undoubtedly have to extend the all too narrow confines existing at present." To this we answer: the progressism of the Cadets in the Fourth Duma will not have to, and cannot "extend" anything so long as elements far removed from the Cadets do not bestir themselves in a manner very dissimilar to that customary in the Duma.

"Unless such an organisation exists," says. R-kov, referring to an open and broad political organisation of the workers, "the struggle is bound to assume an anarchistic character harmful, not only to the working class, but to the civilised bourgeoisie as well."

We shall not dwell on the last part of the phrase, comment will only spoil this "gem". As for the first part, it is historically wrong. There was no anarchism in Germany in 1878-90, although there was no "open and broad" political organisation in existence.

Further, R-kov is a thousand times right when he puts forward a concrete plan for an open political workers' "organisation" and suggests that it be inaugurated by the founding of a "political association for the protection of the interests of the working class". He is right in the sense that only empty phrase-mongers can prattle for months and years about the possibility of an "*open*" party, without taking the first simple and natural step to launch it. R-kov is not a phrase-monger; he is a man of deeds and, as such, starts at the beginning and goes the whole hog.

But the point is that his "deeds" are *liberal* deeds, and the "banner" which he is "unfurling" (see p. 35 of the article we are quoting) is the banner of a liberal labour policy. It is immaterial that the programme of the association which R-kov wants to found provides for "the establishment of a new society based on the public ownership of the means of production", etc. Actually, the recognition of this great principle did not prevent a section of the German Social-Democrats in the sixties from pursuing a "royal-Prussian labour policy", nor does it prevent Ramsay MacDonald (leader of the British "Independent Labour Party"—meaning independent of socialism) from pursuing a liberal labour policy. When R-kov speaks of the political tasks of the immediate period, of our present period, it is a system of liberal principles that he propounds. The "banner" which R-kov is "unfurling" was unfurled by Prokopovich, Potresov, Larin, etc., long ago, and the more this banner is "unfurled" the clearer does it become to one and all that what we have before us is a dirty liberal rag worn to shreds.

"There is not a grain of utopia in all this," R-kov tries to persuade us. We must needs reply with a paraphrase of a well-known saying: "You are a great utopian, but your utopia is tiny", Indeed, it would be rather frivolous perhaps to reply to an obviously frivolous statement other than with a joke. How is it possible to regard as other than utopian the suggested foundation of an open workers

association at a time when absolutely peaceful, tame, non-political trade unions are being suppressed? How can one write about the role of the various classes in a way that is liberal from A to Z and yet assure the readers that this does not mean creeping into a regime of renovated Tolmachovism? The good R-kov goes out of his way to declare: "There is no advocacy of any violence in this; there is not a word, not a thought about a violent revolution being necessary, because in reality, too, no such necessity may ever arise. If anyone, blinded by reactionary frenzy, took it into his head to accuse the members of such an 'association' of striving for violent revolution, the whole burden of an absurd, unfounded and juridically flimsy accusation of this sort would fall upon the head of the accuser"!

N. R-kov has an eloquent pen, just like Mr. P. B. Struve who, in 1901, hurled similar terrifying thunderbolts "upon the heads" of those who persecuted the Zemstvo.[145] What a picture—N. R-kov trying to prove to the accusing Dumbadzes that, since he now harbours no "thoughts", the burden of the juridically flimsy- accusations will fall upon the Dumbadzes' own heads! Yes, indeed, we have no parliament as yet, but we have parliamentary cretinism galore. Apparently such members of the new association as the Marxist Gegechkori or even the non-Marxist but honest democrat Petrov the Third would be summarily expelled at the very first meeting of the new association—provided the assembled members are not dispatched, by mistake, to various chilly places before the meeting opens.

The *Nasha Zarya* "liquidators" are rejoicing because R-kov has joined their ranks. But the enthusiastic liquidators do not realise how ardent is the embrace which the newly-won liquidator R-kov brings to them. It is so ardent and so powerful that this much can be vouched for—liquidationism will be smothered by R-kov's ardent embrace just as the labour congress was smothered by Y. Larin's ardent embrace. Y. Larin perpetrated that bloodless murder by the simple device of writing a pamphlet, after which people, primarily out of fear of the embarrassment involved, began to be wary of defending the idea of a labour congress. After the new "manifesto" of liquidationism published by R-kov in *Nasha Zarya*, people, primarily out of fear of the em-

barrassment involved, will begin to be wary of defending the idea of an open liquidationist party.

And, since we must find at least one point on which to agree with R-kov, that idea does contain a "grain" of non-utopianism. Remove your professorial blinkers, my dear sir, and you will then see that the "association" which you intend to "actually put into effect" (after the burden of your admonitions has fallen "upon the heads" of the Mymretsovs[146]) already *exists*—that it has been in existence *for two years*. And you yourself already belong to it! The magazine *Nasha Zarya* (not as a collection of so much printed matter, but as an ideological group) is just such an "association for the protection of the interests of the working class". An open and broad organisation of workers is a utopia; but "open" and frank magazines of opportunist intellectuals are not a utopia—not by any means. In their own way they are undoubtedly protecting the interests of the working class; but to anyone who has not ceased to be a Marxist it is obvious that theirs is an "association" for protecting, in a liberal manner, the interests of the working class as conceived by the liberals.

Zvezda, No. 32, December 3, 1911
Signed: *Vl. Ilyin*

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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE SECOND DUMA[147]

AN ACCOUNT OF THE WHOLE AFFAIR

Four years have passed since all the members of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma, victims of an infamous plot by our government, were put on trial and sent to penal servitude like the worst of criminals. The Russian proletariat fully understood that the charges against its representatives were based on a forgery, but this was the period of unbridled reaction and in addition, sentence was passed behind closed doors so that sufficient evidence of the crime committed by tsarism was not available. Only quite recently the convincing facts contained in the confession of Brodsky, an agent of the secret political police, have thrown full light on the revolting intrigues of our authorities.

This is what actually happened.

Despite the very limited franchise, the Russian proletariat returned 55 Social-Democrats to the Second Duma.

This Social-Democratic group was not only numerically large, but outstandingly sound ideologically. It bore the hallmark of the revolution from which it sprang. Its pronouncements, in which there could still be heard the echoes of the great struggle that had involved the whole country, levelled deep and well-founded criticism, not only at the bills submitted to the Duma, but also at the whole tsarist and capitalist system of government in general.

Armed with the invincible weapon of contemporary socialism this Social-Democratic group was, of all the Left

groups, the most revolutionary, the most consistent, and the most deeply imbued with class-consciousness. It drew the others in its wake and set its revolutionary seal on the Duma. Our rulers considered the group to be the last stronghold of the revolution, its last symbol, the living proof of the powerful influence of Social-Democracy on the proletarian masses and, consequently, a constant threat to reaction, the last obstacle to its triumphant march. Therefore, the government considered it essential not only to rid itself of this too revolutionary Duma, but also to restrict the electoral rights of the proletariat and of the democratically inclined peasantry to the minimum, thus preventing any possibility of the election of a similar Duma in the future. The best method for the realisation of such a coup d'état was to get rid of the socialist Duma group, to compromise it in the eyes of the country—to cut off the head in order to destroy the body.

However, some pretext had to be found for this,—for instance, the possibility of accusing the group of some serious political crime. The inventiveness of the police and the secret political police soon found such an excuse. It was decided to compromise the parliamentary socialist group, accusing it of close ties with the Social-Democratic combat organisation and with the Social-Democratic military organisation. With this aim in view, General Gerasimov, the chief of the secret political police, suggested to his agent Brodsky that he enter these organisations. (All these facts are taken from *L'Avenir*,[148] No. 1 [*The Future*], issued under the editorship of Burtsev in Paris, 50, Boulevard St. Jacques.) Brodsky succeeded in doing so as a rank-and-file member, and later became a secretary. Several members of the military organisation had the idea of sending a delegation of soldiers to the socialist parliamentary group. The secret police decided to use this for its own ends, and Brodsky, having won the confidence of the military organisation, undertook to execute this plan. Several soldiers were elected; a list of soldiers' demands was drawn up and a day was appointed for the delegation to visit the Duma group at its headquarters, without the group even having been warned. As the soldiers were not allowed to go there in army uniform they were obliged to change their clothes. This was

actually carried out at the home of one of the agents of the secret police, where they changed into clothes bought and prepared for them by the secret police. According to this vile plan of Gerasimov's, Brodsky was to have arrived at the premises of the socialist group at the same time as the soldiers, bringing with him revolutionary documents which would implicate our delegates even more. Further, it was agreed that Brodsky would be arrested together with the others, and then, aided by the secret police who would enable him to effect a sham escape, he would be at liberty. But Brodsky arrived too late, and when he reached the premises of the group with the compromising documents, the search had already commenced, and he was not allowed to enter.

Such was the setting prepared most thoroughly by the secret police which allowed reaction, not only to condemn and send to penal servitude the representatives of the proletariat, but, apart from this, to dissolve the Second Duma and to carry out its coup d'état of June 3 (16), 1907. Actually, on that date the government announced in its manifesto (which, like all tsarist manifestos, astounds one with its shameless hypocrisy) that it was compelled to dissolve the Duma, for, instead of supporting and aiding the government in its desire to re-establish peace in the country, the Duma, on the contrary, had acted against all the proposals and intentions of the government and, incidentally, did not wish to append its signature to repressive measures against the revolutionary elements of the country. Furthermore (and I give the text word for word), "acts hitherto unheard of in the annals of history were committed. The judiciary discovered a plot by a whole section of the State Duma against the state and the power of the tsar. When our government demanded the temporary removal of the 55 members of the Duma accused of the crime until the conclusion of the trial, and the imprisonment of those most guilty, the State Duma did not immediately carry out the lawful demands of the authorities which brooked no delay".

Incidentally, the proofs of the tsar's crime were known not only to the government and its closest friends. Our dear Constitutional-Democrats, who never tire of babbling about legality, justice, truth, and so on, who embellish their Party with such a high-sounding title as "party of people's

freedom", have for the past four years also known all the vile details of this dirty affair which had been kept so secret. They looked on passively for four long years while our deputies were tried in defiance of all law, while they suffered penal servitude, while some died and others lost their reason, and ... they remained cautiously silent. Yet they could have spoken for they had deputies in the Duma and had many daily newspapers at their disposal. Caught between reaction and revolution—they feared the revolution more. For this reason they flirted with the government and by their silence shielded it for four long-years and so became its accomplices in crime. It is only recently (the sitting of the Duma of the 17th October, 1911) that during debates on the secret police, one of them, Deputy Teslenko, at last decided to let the cat out of the bag. Here is part of his speech (word for word according to the Verbatim Report): "When it was proposed that proceedings be taken against 53 members[149] of the Second State Duma, a commission was set up by the Duma. This Commission was given all the documents that were to provide evidence that 53 members of the State Duma had organised a plot to set up a republic in Russia by means of an armed uprising. The Commission of the Second State Duma (I made the report on its behalf) came to the conclusion, a unanimous conclusion, that what was being discussed was not a plot hatched against the state by the Social-Democrats, but a plot hatched by the St. Petersburg department of the secret police against the Second State Duma. When the Commission's report, based on documents, was ready, on the eve of the day when all these facts were to be made public from this rostrum, the Second State Duma was dissolved and it was not possible to state (from this rostrum) what had been brought to light. When the trial of the accused commenced, these 53 members of the State Duma demanded that it be heard in public, and that the public should be told that it was not they who were the criminals but the St. Petersburg department of the secret police—the doors were closed and the public was never told the truth."

Such are the facts. For four years our deputies have been languishing in chains in terrible Russian prisons, the severity and savagery of which you are, of course, aware of. Many

have already died there. One of the deputies has lost his reason, the health of many others, as a result of unendurable living conditions, has been impaired and they may die any day. The Russian proletariat can no longer calmly look on while its representatives, whose only crime is that they waged an unremitting struggle in its interests, perish in tsarist prisons. It is even more impossible for it to look on calmly, since from the legal point of view Brodsky's admissions provide complete justification for demanding a fresh trial. A campaign for the release of the deputies has already commenced in Russia.

The workers' paper *Zvezda*, appearing in St. Petersburg devoted a considerable part of its issue dated October 29, 1911 to the question. It appeals to the press, to liberal and Left deputies, to associations and trade unions, but mostly to the proletariat. "There is not, and cannot be," exclaims the paper, "calmness and peace of mind while every hour and every minute all can hear the clanging of the chains fettering those who have been immured, deprived of freedom and every political and civil right only because they had the courage to carry out before the whole country their duty as men and citizens. The public conscience cannot and should not remain calm after the exposure of the horrifying truth. No matter what the difficulties may be they must be overcome and a retrial of the deputies to the Second State Duma demanded! But in the first instance the proletariat must make its powerful voice heard, for it was its representatives who were falsely tried, and who at the present moment languish in penal servitude."

In commencing this struggle, the Russian proletariat appeals to socialists of all countries to give it support, and together with it to proclaim loudly to the whole world their indignation at the savagery and infamy of our present ruling autocracy which, screening itself with a mask of pitiful hypocrisy, surpasses even the barbarism and uncivilised behaviour of the Asiatic governments.

In France, Comrade Charles Dumas has already started the campaign and in an article printed in the newspaper *L'Avenir* has called for energetic support to be given to the Russian proletariat at this difficult moment. Let socialists of all countries follow this example, let them every-

where, in parliament, in their press, at their public meetings, express their indignation and demand a review of the case of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma.

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THE SLOGANS AND ORGANISATION OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WORK INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE DUMA

The question put by the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma concerning the dastardly frame-up staged by the secret police that led to the criminal proceedings being instituted against the Social-Democrat members of the Second Duma,[150] apparently marks a certain turn in our entire Party activity, as well as in the position of democracy in general and in the mood of the working masses.

It is probably the first time that such a resolute protest, revolutionary in tone and content, against the "masters of June Third" has been heard from the rostrum of the Third Duma, a protest supported by the entire opposition, including the extremely moderate, liberal-monarchist, *Vekhi* variety of "His Majesty's Opposition", i.e., the Cadet Party, and including even the Progressists. It is probably the first time since the period of gloom set in (i.e., since 1908), that the country sees, feels, and is tangibly aware that in connection with the revolutionary protest voiced by the deputies of the revolutionary proletariat in the reactionary Duma, the masses of workers are stirring, that there is a rising spirit of unrest in the working-class districts of the capital, that workers are holding meetings (meetings again!) at which revolutionary speeches are delivered by Social-Democrats (the meetings at the Putilov Works, the Cable Works, and other plants), and that there is talk and rumour of a political mass strike (see report from St. Petersburg in the Octobrist *Golos Moskvy* of November 19).

To be sure, revolutionary speeches were made by Social-Democrat deputies in the Third Duma on more than one occasion in the past, too. On more than one occasion our

comrades of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma did their duty splendidly and from the platform of the reactionary and servile Purishkevich "parliament" they spoke plainly, clearly and sharply of the bankruptcy of the monarchy, of a republic, of a second revolution. These services rendered by the Social-Democrat members of the Third Duma must be emphasised all the more strongly, the more often we hear the contemptible opportunist talk of the sham Social-Democrats of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* or *Dyelo Zhizni* who frown upon such speeches.

But never before has there been such a combination of political symptoms indicating a turn—the entire opposition backing the Social-Democrats; the liberal-monarchist, "loyal", "responsible", and cowardly *Rech* stating that the situation is fraught with conflict; the masses showing unrest in connection with the question in the Duma; and the censored press reporting the existence of "alarming sentiments" in the rural districts. Following as it does upon the "Muromtsev" and "Tolstoi" demonstrations of last year, the strikes in 1910 and 1911, and last year's students' "affair", the present instance undoubtedly serves to confirm us in our conviction that the first period of the Russian counter-revolution—the period of absolute stagnation, of dead calm, hangings and suicides, of the orgy of reaction and the orgy of renegacy of every brand, particularly the liberal brand—that this period *has come to an end*. The second period in the history of the counter-revolution has set in: the state of utter dejection and often of "savage" fright is waning; among the broadest and most varied sections of the population there is a noticeably growing political consciousness—or, if not consciousness exactly, at least a feeling that "things cannot go on as before", and that a "change" is required, is necessary, is inevitable; and we see the beginning of an inclination, half instinctive, often still undefined, to lend support to protests and struggle.

It would, naturally, be imprudent to exaggerate the significance of these symptoms and to imagine that the revival is already under way. That is not yet so. The features that characterise the counter-revolution at present are *not the same* as those distinguishing its first period; but the counter-revolution still reigns supreme and imagines itself to be

invincible. To quote the December 1908 resolution of the R.S.D.L.P., the "protracted task of training, educating, and organising" the proletariat[151] is still, as before, on the order of the day. However, the fact that a turn has set in compels us to pay particular attention to the attitude of the Social-Democratic Party to other parties, and to the immediate tasks of the working-class movement.

"His Majesty's Opposition", including the Cadets and the Progressists, appeared to recognise for a moment the leading role of the Social-Democrats and, following the lead of the workers' deputies, walked out of the Duma of landowners and Octobrists, the Duma founded by the Black-Hundred and pogrom-making monarchy of Nicholas Romanov; they walked out and stayed away during the base trickery of the majority who were afraid that the story of the frame-up would be made public.

What does this mean? Have the Cadets ceased to be a counter-revolutionary party or have they never been one, as is asserted by the opportunist Social-Democrats? Ought we to make it our task to "support" the Cadets and to think of some slogan calling for a "general national opposition"?

The enemies of revolutionary Social-Democracy have from time immemorial, it may be said, resorted to the method of reducing its views to an absurdity and have, for the convenience of their polemics, drawn a caricature of Marxism. Thus, in the second half of the nineties of the last century, when Social-Democracy was just springing up in Russia as a mass movement, the Narodniks drew a caricature of Marxism which they labelled "strike-ism". And, such was the irony of history that there were Marxists whom that caricature fitted. They were the Economists. It was possible to save the honour and good name of Social-Democracy only by a ruthless struggle against Economism. And after the Revolution of 1905, when Bolshevism, as the adaptation of revolutionary Marxism to the particular conditions of the epoch, scored a great victory in the working-class movement, a victory which now even its enemies concede, our adversaries drew a caricature of Bolshevism, which they labelled "boycottism", "combatism", etc. And, again, such was the irony of history that there were Bolsheviks whom that caricature fitted. They were the *Vperyod* group.

These lessons of history should serve as a warning against attempts to distort the views of revolutionary Social-Democrats concerning the attitude towards the Constitutional-Democrats (see, for instance, *Vperyod*, No. 2). The Cadets are unquestionably a counter-revolutionary party. Only absolutely ignorant or unscrupulous persons can deny this; and it is the bounden duty of Social-Democrats to make this fact known far and wide, including the rostrum of the Duma. But the Cadets are a party of counter-revolutionary *liberals*, and their liberal nature, as has been emphasised in the resolution on non-proletarian parties adopted at the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (in 1907), makes it our duty to "take advantage" of the peculiar situation and the particular conflicts or cases of friction arising from this situation, to take advantage, for instance, of their sham democracy to advocate true, consistent, and selfless democracy.

Since counter-revolutionary liberalism has sprung up in the country, the forces of democracy in general, and of proletarian democracy in particular, must do everything to separate themselves from it; not for a moment must they forget the dividing line between it and them. But it does not in the least follow from this that it is permissible to confuse counter-revolutionary liberalism with, say, counter-revolutionary feudalism, or that it is permissible to ignore the conflicts between them, to hold aloof from these conflicts or brush them aside. Counter-revolutionary liberalism, for the very reason that it is counter-revolutionary, will *never* be able to assume the role of leader in a victorious revolution; but, for the very reason that it is liberalism, it will *inevitably* keep coming into "conflict" with the Crown, with feudalism, with non-liberal bourgeoisie, and by its behaviour it will sometimes indirectly reflect the "Left", democratic sentiments of the country, or the beginning of a revival, etc.

Let us recall the history of France. At the time of the revolution, bourgeois liberalism had already shown its counter-revolutionary nature—this subject is dealt with, for instance, in Cunow's fine book on revolutionary newspaper literature in France. Yet, not only after the great bourgeois revolution, but even after the revolution of 1848,

when the counter-revolutionary nature of the liberals had brought matters to such a pass that workers were being shot down by republicans—in 1868-70, the last years of the Second Empire—these liberals by their opposition expressed the change of sentiment in the country and the beginning of the democratic, revolutionary, republican revival.

If the Cadets are now playing at "eyes left", as the Octobrists taunt them, that is one of the symptoms and one of the results of the country moving "leftward"; it shows that revolutionary democracy is stirring in the womb of its mother, preparing to come into God's world again. The womb of Russia under the rule of the Purishkeviches and Romanovs is such that it must give birth to revolutionary democracy!

What is the practical conclusion to be drawn from this? The conclusion is that we must watch the growth of this new revolutionary democracy with the greatest attention. Just because it is new, because it is coming into the world after 1905 and after the counter-revolution, and not before it, it is sure to grow *in a new way*; and in order to be able properly to approach this "new", to be able to influence it and help it grow successfully, we must not confine ourselves to the old methods, but must search for new methods as well—we must mingle with the crowds, feel the pulse of real life, and sometimes make our way not only into the thick of the crowd, but also into the liberal salon.

Mr. Burtsev's sheet *L'Avenir*, for instance, is very reminiscent of a liberal salon. There the stupid, liberal, Octobrist-Cadet slogan calling for "a revision of the Statutes of June 3" is defended in a liberal manner; there they prattle eagerly about stool-pigeons, police, *agents provocateurs*, Burtsev, bombs. Nevertheless, when Mr. Martov was in a hurry to get into that salon, he might have been accused only of tactless haste, but not of a fundamental falsehood, *if* ... *if* he had not behaved there like a liberal. We may justify, and sometimes even praise, a Social-Democrat who makes his appearance in a liberal salon as long as he behaves like a Social-Democrat. But in the liberal salon Mr. Martov came out with the liberal balderdash about "solidarity in the struggle for the very freedom of elections and

election propaganda", which is supposed to be maintained "for the period of the elections"!! (*L'Avenir*, No. 5).

A new democracy is growing up—under new conditions, and in a new way. We must learn to approach it properly—that is beyond doubt. We must not approach it for the purpose of lisping like liberals, but in order to uphold and advocate the slogans of true democracy. Social-Democrats must advocate *three* slogans to the new democracy, slogans which are alone worthy of our great cause and which alone correspond to the *real* conditions for the attainment of *freedom* in Russia. These slogans are: a republic; the eight-hour day; and the confiscation of all landed estates.

This is the one correct nation-wide programme of struggle for a free Russia. Anyone who doubts this programme is not yet a democrat. Anyone who denies this programme while calling himself a democrat, has understood all too well how necessary it is for him to hoodwink the people in order to achieve his anti-democratic (i.e., counter-revolutionary) aims.

Why is the struggle for the eight-hour working day a natural condition for the attainment of freedom in Russia? Because experience has shown that freedom cannot be achieved without a selfless struggle on the part of the proletariat, and such a struggle is inseparably bound up with the struggle to improve the workers' conditions. The eight-hour day is an example of such improvements and is the banner of struggle for them.

Why is the struggle for the confiscation of all landed estates a natural condition for the attainment of freedom in Russia? Because, without radical measures to help the millions of peasants who have been reduced by the Purishkeviches, Romanovs, and Markovs to unheard of ruin, suffering, and death from starvation, all talk of democracy and of "people's freedom" is absurd and utterly hypocritical. And unless the landed estates are confiscated for the benefit of the peasants, there can be no question of any *serious* measures to help the muzhik, there can be no question of any serious determination to put an end to muzhik Russia, i.e., to feudal Russia, and to build up a Russia of free tillers of the soil, a democratic bourgeois Russia.

Why is the struggle for a republic a natural condition

for the attainment of freedom in Russia? Because experience, the great and unforgettable experience of one of the greatest decades in the history of Russia—the first decade of the twentieth century—has shown clearly, conclusively, and incontestably that our monarchy is *incompatible* with even the most elementary guarantees of political freedom. The result of Russia's historical development and centuries of tsardom is that at the beginning of the twentieth century there is no other monarchy in Russia, *nor can there be any other*, than *a Black-Hundred and pogrom-making monarchy*. With social conditions and class relations what they are, all the Russian monarchy can do is to organise gangs of murderers to shoot our liberal and democratic deputies from behind, or set fire to buildings in which meetings are held by democrats. The only answer the Russian monarchy can give to the demonstrations of the people demanding freedom is to let loose gangs of men who seize hold of Jewish children by their legs and smash their heads against stones, who rape Jewish and Georgian women and rip open the bellies of old men.

The liberal innocents prattle about the example of a constitutional monarchy like that of England. But if in a civilised country like England, a country which has never known anything like the Mongolian yoke or the tyranny of a bureaucracy, or a military clique riding roughshod over it, if it was necessary in that country to chop off the head of one crowned robber in order to impress upon the kings that they must be "constitutional" monarchs, in a country like Russia we should have to chop off the heads of at least a hundred Romanovs in order to wean their successors from the habit of organising Black-Hundred murders and anti-Jewish pogroms.

If Social-Democracy has learned anything at all from the first Russian revolution, it must insist that in all our speeches and leaflets we discard the slogan "Down with the autocracy", which has proved to be vague and worthless, and that we advance *only* the slogan: "Down with the tsarist *monarchy*, long live a republic".

And let no one try to tell us that the slogan calling for a republic does not apply to the present stage of the political development of the workers and peasants. About ten or

twelve years ago there were not only some Narodniks who would not dare even to think of the slogan, "Down with the autocracy", but even certain Social-Democrats, the so-called Economists, opposed that slogan as being inopportune. Yet by 1903-04 the slogan, "Down with the autocracy", had become a "household word"! There cannot be even a shadow of doubt that systematic and persistent republican propaganda is now bound to find very fertile soil in Russia; for there can be no doubt that the broadest masses, particularly the peasant masses, are thinking grim, profound thoughts about the meaning of the dispersal of two Dumas and the connection between the tsarist government and the landowner-ridden Third Duma, between the tsarist government and the ruin of the countryside by the Markovs. Nobody today can tell how quickly the seed of republican propaganda will sprout—but that is beside the point; the main thing is that the sowing should be done properly, really democratically.

Since we are discussing the question of the slogans for the forthcoming elections to the Fourth Duma and those for all our work outside the Duma, we cannot refrain from mentioning a very important and very incorrect speech made by the Social-Democrat Kuznetsov in the Third Duma. On October 17, 1911, the sixth anniversary of the first victory of the Russian revolution, Kuznetsov spoke in the debate on the workers' Insurance Bill. It must be said in fairness to him, that, in general, he spoke very well. He vigorously championed the interests of the proletariat and made no bones about telling the truth directly, not only to the majority of the reactionary Duma, but to the Cadets as well. But, while fully granting this service rendered by Kuznetsov, we must likewise make no bones about pointing out the mistake he committed.

"I think," said Kuznetsov, "that the workers who have followed attentively the general debate on these questions, as well as the debate on individual clauses of the Bill under discussion, will come to the conclusion that their immediate slogan at present must be: 'Down with the June Third Duma, long live universal suffrage!' Why? Because, I say, the interests of the working class can be properly taken care of only if and when that class will, through universal suffrage,

send into the legislative body a sufficient number of its deputies; they alone will be able to provide a proper solution to the problem of insurance for the working class."

It was here that Kuznetsov came a cropper in a way he probably never suspected, but which we foretold long ago—he came a cropper because the mistakes of the liquidators coincide with those of the otzovists.

While launching, from the rostrum of the Duma, a slogan inspired by the liquidationist magazines *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, Kuznetsov did not notice that the first (and most essential) part of this slogan ("Down with the Third Duma") *fully* reproduces the slogan which the otzovists openly advanced three years ago, and which since then only *Vperyod*, that is to say, the cowardly otzovists, have defended stealthily and covertly.

Three years ago *Proletary*, No. 38, of November 1 (14), 1908, wrote the following in regard to this slogan advanced at the time by the otzovists:

"Under what conditions could a slogan like 'down with the Duma' acquire meaning? Let us assume that we are faced with a liberal, reform-seeking, compromising Duma in a period of the sharpest revolutionary crisis, which had developed to the point of direct civil war. It is quite possible that at such a moment our slogan might be 'down with the Duma', i.e., down with peaceable negotiations with the tsar, down with the deceptive institution of 'peace', let's call for a direct attack. Now let us assume, on the contrary, that we are faced with an arch-reactionary Duma, elected under an obsolete electoral law, and the absence of any acutely revolutionary crisis in the country. In that case the slogan 'down with the Duma' might become the slogan of a struggle for electoral reform. We see nothing of either of these contingencies at the present time."*

The supplement to *Proletary*, No. 44 (of April 4 [17], 1909) printed the resolution of the St. Petersburg otzovists

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* *Proletary* then went on to defend the slogan, "Down with the autocracy". This slogan, as we have already pointed out, must now give way to the slogan: "Down with the tsarist monarchy, long live a republic". (See present edition, Vol. 15, "The Assessment of the Present Situation".—*Ed.*)

which demanded outright that "*Widespread* agitation *should be started* among the masses in favour of the slogan 'Down with the Third Duma'". In the same issue *Proletary* came out against this resolution and pointed out: "This slogan, which for a time appealed to some anti-otzovist workers, is *wrong*. It is either a Cadet slogan, calling for franchise reform under the autocracy [it so happens that, although this was written at the beginning of 1909, it is a perfectly fitting argument against the way Kuznetsov presents the question at the end of 1911!], or a repetition of words learned by rote during the period when the liberal Dumas were a screen for counter-revolutionary tsarism designed to prevent the people from seeing clearly who their real enemy was."*

Hence the nature of Kuznetsov's mistake is clear. His generalised slogan is the Cadet slogan for an electoral reform, which is absolutely meaningless if all the other charms of the Romanov monarchy—the Council of State, the omnipotence of bureaucrats, the Black-Hundred pogrom organisations of the tsar's clique, etc., are left intact. What Kuznetsov should have said, assuming that the question is approached in the same way as he approached it, and assuming that nothing is changed in the general tone of his speech, is approximately the following:

"The workers' Insurance Bill provides the very example which again proves to the workers that neither the immediate interests of their class nor the rights and needs of the people as a whole can be defended without such changes as the introduction of universal suffrage, full freedom of association, of the press, etc. Is it not obvious, however, that it is useless to expect the realisation of such changes so long as the present political system of Russia remains intact, so long as any decisions of any Duma can be overruled, and so long as even a single non-elective governmental institution is left in the state?"

We know perfectly well that Social-Democrat deputies succeeded—and that is to their credit—in making even much plainer and clearer republican statements from the

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, "A Caricature of Bolshevism". —*Ed*.

rostrum of the Third Duma. The members of the Duma have an opportunity to conduct republican propaganda legally from the floor of the Duma, and it is their duty to avail themselves of this opportunity. Our example of how Kuznetsov's speech could be corrected is merely intended to illustrate how he could have avoided the mistake, while preserving the general tone of the speech, and pointing to and emphasising the tremendous importance of such unquestionably indispensable changes as the introduction of universal suffrage, freedom of association, etc.

Wherever a Social-Democrat makes a political speech, it is his duty always to speak of a republic. But one must know how to speak of a republic. One cannot speak about it in the same terms when addressing a meeting in a factory and one in a Cossack village, when speaking at a meeting of students or in a peasant cottage, when it is dealt with from the rostrum of the Third Duma or in the columns of a publication issued abroad. The art of any propagandist and agitator consists in his ability to find the best means of influencing any given audience, by presenting a definite truth in such a way as to make it most convincing, most easy to digest, most graphic, and most strongly impressive.

Never for a moment must we forget the main thing: a new democracy is awakening to a new life and a new struggle in Russia. It is the duty of class-conscious workers, the vanguard of the Russian revolution and leaders of the popular masses in the struggle for freedom, to explain the tasks of consistent democracy: a republic, the eight-hour day, and the confiscation of all landed estates.

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 25,
December 8 (21), 1911

Published according to
the *Sotsial-Demokrat* text

AGENCY OF THE LIBERAL BOURGEOISIE

This issue was almost complete when we received *L'Avenir*, No. 9. We have called this paper a liberal salon. It appears that sometimes agents of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie take the floor in this salon in order to gain control over the revolutionaries. An agent of this kind wrote the leader in No. 9 *welcoming* the decision of the Cadets to form a bloc with the Octobrists! "We could wish," write the liberals with bombs, "that all Left parties, including the socialist and revolutionary parties, would express themselves *in the same spirit* and be guided by *similar principles*."

Of course, why shouldn't the counter-revolutionary liberal want this to happen! Only it is necessary for the public to know what it is all about; when the leader in *L'Avenir* says "we socialists", "we revolutionaries", it must be read as meaning "we liberals".

We have just received the papers with the news that Voiloshnikov has been barred from fifteen sessions of the Duma.[152] The Cadets were *in favour* of his exclusion from *five* sessions! Long live the Cadet-Octobrist bloc—for the exclusion of democrats and Social-Democrats from ten sessions!!

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 25,
December 8 (21), 1911

Published according to
the *Sotsial-Demokrat* text

THE CLIMAX OF THE PARTY CRISIS

Two years ago one could find statements in the Social-Democratic press about a "unity crisis" in the Party.* The disorganisation and disintegration of the period of counter-revolution caused new re-groupings and splits, a new intensification of the struggle abroad, and many who lacked faith or who were weak-nerved lost heart in face of the difficult situation within the Social-Democratic Labour Party. Now, with the formation of the Russian Organising Commission (R.O.C.),[153] we are obviously approaching, if not the end of the crisis, then at any rate a new and decisive turn for the better in the development of the Party. The moment is, therefore, opportune to attempt a general review of the past period of inner Party evolution and of the prospects for the immediate future.

After the revolution the R.S.D.L.P. consisted of three separate, autonomous, national, Social-Democratic organisations, and two factions that were Russian in the narrow sense of the word. The experience of the years 1905, 1906, and 1907, which were unprecedented for their wealth of events, demonstrated that these factions had deep roots in the trends governing the development of the proletariat,- in its general way of life during this period of the bourgeois revolution. The counter-revolution again threw us from the heights to which we had already climbed, down into the valley. The proletariat had to re-group its ranks and gather its forces anew surrounded by Stolypin's gallows and the jeremiads of *Vekhi*.

The new situation gave rise to a new grouping of tendencies in the Social-Democratic Party. In both the new factions—under the severe pressure of the adverse times—a process of segregation commenced, the segregation of the

* See present edition, Vol. 16, "Notes of a Publicist. II".—*Ed.*

least stable Social-Democratic elements, of the various *bourgeois fellow-travellers* of the proletariat. Two currents strikingly expressed this *departure* from Social-Democracy —liquidationism and otzovism. And it was these that inevitably gave rise to the tendency to closer relations between the main cores of both the factions which had remained true to Marxism. Such was the state of affairs which led to the Plenary Meeting of January 1910—the source of both positive and negative results, of the steps forward and of the steps back in the subsequent development of the Social-Democratic Party.

To this very day, many people have failed to understand properly the undeniable ideological merit of the work performed by the Meeting, and the great "conciliationist" mistake it committed. But unless this is understood it is impossible to understand anything at all in the present Party situation. We must therefore pause again and again to explain the source of the present crisis.

The following quotation from an article by a conciliator, written just before the Plenary Meeting and published immediately after it, may help to make this clearer than long discussions or quotations from more direct and more numerous "documents". One of the leaders of the conciliationism which dominated the Meeting—Comrade Ionov, a Bundist—wrote the following in an article "Is Party Unity Possible?", published in *Diskussionny Listok*, No. 1 (March 19, 1910; on page 6 we read the editors' note: "the article was written before the Plenary Meeting"):

> "However harmful otzovism and liquidationism, as such, may be to the Party, their beneficial effect on the factions seems to be beyond doubt. Pathology recognises two kinds of abscess—harmful and harmless. The harmless type is a disease beneficial to the organism. As it grows, it draws various injurious substances from the entire organism and thus helps improve the health of that organism. I believe that a similar role was played by liquidationism in respect of Menshevism and by otzovism-ultimatumism in respect of Bolshevism."

Such is the assessment of the case made by a "conciliator" at the time of the Plenary Meeting; it describes *exactly* the psychology and the ideas of the conciliationism that triumphed there. In the above quotation the main idea is correct, a thousand times correct; and just because it

is correct the Bolsheviks (who even before the Meeting had fully developed the struggle against both liquidationism and otzovism) *could not* break with the conciliators at the Meeting. They could not, because there was agreement on the main idea; it was only on the question of the form in which it should be applied that there were differences. The form will become subordinated to the content—thought the Bolsheviks, and they proved to be right, though this "adaptation of form to content" has cost the Party *two years*, which have been almost "wasted", owing to the mistake committed by the conciliators.

What was this mistake? It was that the conciliators recognised all and sundry tendencies on their mere promise to heal themselves, instead of recognising only those tendencies that were healing (and only insofar as they were healing) their "abscesses". The *Vperyod* and *Golos* groups and Trotsky all "signed" the resolution against otzovism and liquidationism—that is, they promised to "heal their abscesses"—and that was the end of it! The conciliators "believed" the promise and entangled the Party with *non*-Party groups that were, as they themselves admitted, "abscesses". From the point of view of practical politics this was infantile, while from a deeper point of view it lacked an ideological basis, was unprincipled and full of intrigue. Indeed, those who were seriously convinced that liquidationism and otzovism-ultimatumism were abscesses, must have realised that as the abscesses grew they were certain *to draw out* and drain injurious substances from the organism; and they would not contribute to the poisoning of the organism by attempts to drive inside the poisons gathered in the "abscesses".

The first year after the Plenary Meeting was a practical revelation of the ideological poverty of the conciliators. As a matter of fact, all Party work (healing "abscesses") during the whole of that year was done by the Bolsheviks and Plekhanov's group. Both *Sotsial-Demokrat* and *Rabochaya Gazeta* (after Trotsky had expelled the Central Committee's representative) prove that fact. Some of the generally known, legally issued publications of 1910[154] also bear out that fact. These are not words but facts proving joint work in the leading bodies of the Party.

During that year (1910), the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups and Trotsky, all in fact, moved away from the Party precisely in the direction of liquidationism and otzovism-ultimatumism. The "harmless abscesses" behaved harmfully, since they did not drain away the "injurious substances" from the organism of the Party, but continued to contaminate that organism, keeping it in a diseased condition and rendering it incapable of doing Party work. This Party work (in literature, which was accessible to all) was conducted by the Bolsheviks and the Plekhanovites *in spite of* the "conciliatory" resolutions and the collegiums set up by the Plenary Meeting, not in conjunction with the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups, but *against* them (because it was impossible to work in conjunction with the liquidators and otzovists-ultimatumists).

And what about the work in Russia? Not a single meeting of the Central Committee was held during the whole year! Why? Because the members of the Central Committee in Russia (conciliators who well deserved the kisses of *Golos Likvidatorov**) kept on "inviting" the liquidators for twelve, or fifteen months but never got them to "accept the invitation". At the Plenary Meeting, our good conciliators unfortunately did not provide for the institution of "escorts" to bring people to the Central Committee. As a result the Party found itself in the absurd and shameful position, predicted by the Bolsheviks at the Meeting when they fought the credulity and naïveté of the conciliators—work in Russia is at a standstill, the Party's hands are tied, while a disgusting stream of liberal and anarchistic attack on the Party is pouring forth from the pages of *Nasha Zarya* and *Vperyod*. Mikhail, Roman, and Yuri, on the one hand, the otzovists and the "god-builders" on the other, are doing their utmost to *ruin* Social-Democratic work, while the conciliationist members of the Central Committee are "inviting" the liquidators and are "waiting" for them!

By their "application" of December 5, 1910, the Bolsheviks stated openly and formally that they cancelled the agreement with all the other factions. The violation of the

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* *Voice of the Liquidators*, punning on *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of a Social-Democrat).—*Tr.*

"peace" made at the Plenary Meeting, its violation by *Golos*, *Vperyod*, and Trotsky, had become a fully recognised fact.

About six months were spent (until June 1911) in attempts to convene a plenary meeting abroad, which under the agreement was to be convened within three months. The liquidators (*Golos*-ists—Bundists—Schwartz) likewise prevented the convening of this meeting. Thereupon the bloc of three groups—the Bolsheviks, the Poles, and the "conciliators"—made a final attempt to save the situation: to call a conference and to form a Russian Organising Commission. As before, the Bolsheviks were in a minority: from January 1910 to June 1911, the liquidators were predominant (in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad they were the *Golos*-ists—a Bundist—Schwartz; in Russia—those "conciliators" who had been continually "inviting" the liquidators): from June 1911 to November 1, 1911 (the time-limit fixed by the trustees),[155] the conciliators, who were joined by the Poles, were predominant.

This was the state of affairs: both money and the dispatch of agents were in the hands of Tyszka and Mark (the leader of the Paris conciliators)[156]; the only assurance the Bolsheviks received was agreement that they too would be sent on work. The differences arising out of the Plenary Meeting reduced themselves to the last point which it was impossible to evade: whether to work with all one's energy, without "waiting" for anyone, without "inviting" anyone (anyone who wishes and is able to work in a Social-Democratic fashion needs no invitations!), or whether to continue bargaining and haggling with Trotsky, *Vperyod*, etc. The Bolsheviks chose the first path, a fact which they had already openly and directly declared at the Paris Meeting of Central Committee members. Tyszka and Co. chose (and foisted on both the Technical Commission and the Organising Commission Abroad) the second path, which, as was shown in detail in the article of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 24,* was objectively nothing but empty and miserable intrigue.

The result is now clear to all. By November 1, the *Russian Organising Commission* was formed. In reality, it was created by the Bolsheviks and by the pro-Party Mensheviks in

* See pp. 257-77 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Russia. "The alliance of the two strong factions" (strong in their ideological solidity and in their work of healing abscesses"), which so enraged the weak-minded people at the Plenary Meeting and after it (see *Golos*, *Vperyod*, *Otkliki Bunda*,[157] *Pravda*, etc.), became a fact. In such model and outstanding Social-Democratic organisations as the Baku and the Kiev[158] organisations were in the Russia of 1910 and 1911, this alliance, to the great joy of the Bolsheviks, became almost complete fusion, a single indissoluble organism of pro-Party Social-Democrats.

After the test of two years' experience, the snivelling for the dissolution of "all" factions proved to be but a miserable phrase used by empty-headed people who had been fooled by the Potresovs and the otzovists. "The alliance of the two strong factions" performed its work, and in the above-mentioned model organisations it reached a stage where a complete merging into a single party could be effected. The waverings of the pro-Party Mensheviks abroad can no longer alter this accomplished fact.

The two years following the Plenary Meeting, which to many sceptics or dilettantes in Social-Democracy who do not wish to understand the devilish difficulty of the task, seem to be years of useless, hopeless, senseless squabbles, of disorganisation and ruin, were in reality years in which the Social-Democratic Party was led out of the marsh of liquidationist and otzovist waverings on to the high road. The year 1910 was a year of joint work by Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks in *all* the leading (both official and unofficial, legal and illegal) bodies of the Party; this was the first step of the "alliance of the two strong factions" towards ideological preparation, the gathering of the forces under a single banner, that of anti-liquidationism and anti-otzovism. The year 1911 has witnessed the second step—the creation of the Russian Organising Commission. The fact that a pro-Party Menshevik presided at its first meeting is significant: the second step, the creation of an actually functioning centre in Russia, has now been taken. The locomotive has been raised and placed on the rails.

For the first time following *four* years of ruin and disorganisation, a Social-Democratic centre has met together in Russia—in spite of incredible persecution by the police

and the unheard-of intrigues of *Golos*, *Vperyod*, the conciliators, the Poles, and *tutti quanti*. For the first time a leaflet has appeared in Russia addressed to the Party by that centre.[159] For the first time the work of re-establishing the local underground organisations has systematically and thoroughly covered both capital cities, the Volga Region, the Urals, the Caucasus, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Rostov, Nikolayev. All this has taken place in about three months, from July to October 1911, for the Russian Organising Commission met only *after* all these places had been visited. Its first meeting took place *simultaneously* with the restoration of the St. Petersburg Party Committee and with a series of workers' meetings arranged by it, and with the passing of resolutions by the Moscow city district organisations in favour of the Party, etc.

Of course it would be unpardonable naïveté to indulge in light-hearted optimism; we are still confronted with enormous difficulties; police persecution has increased tenfold since the first leaflet by the Social-Democratic centre was published in Russia; one may anticipate long and hard months of work, new arrests and new interruptions. But the main thing has been accomplished. The banner has been raised, workers' circles all over Russia are being drawn to it, and no counter-revolutionary attack can possibly haul it down.

How did the conciliators abroad, and Tyszka and Leder, respond to this gigantic stride forward in the work in Russia? By a final flare-up of miserable intrigue. The "growth of the abscess", which was so prophetically foretold by Ionov on the eve of the Plenary Meeting, is unpleasant, no doubt. But anyone who does not understand that this unsightly process makes Social-Democracy *healthier* should not apply himself to revolutionary work! The Technical Commission and the Organising Commission Abroad refuse to submit to the Russian Organising Commission. The Bolsheviks, of course, turn their backs upon those intriguing abroad with contempt. Then vacillations set in. At the beginning of November, a report on the calling together of the Russian Organising Commission was delivered to the remnants of the

Organising Commission Abroad (two Poles and one conciliator). The report presented such a comprehensive survey of the work that the opponents of the Bolsheviks, the conciliators whom *Golos* praised, *were forced* to recognise the Russian Organising Commission. The Organising Commission Abroad resolved on November 13, 1911, "to be guided by the decisions of the Russian Organising Commission". Four-fifths of the money in possession of the Organising Commission Abroad is transferred to the Russian Organising Commission, which indicates that the Poles and conciliators themselves are *not* able to cast a shadow of doubt on the seriousness of the whole undertaking.

Nevertheless, a few days later, both the Technical Commission and the Organising Commission Abroad again refused to submit to the Russian Organising Commission!! What is the meaning of this game?

The editors of the Central Organ are in possession of a document[160] which will be submitted to the conference and which reveals that Tyszka is agitating for non-participation in the Russian Organising Commission and for non-participation in the conference.

Is it possible to imagine more vile intrigue than this? In the Technical Commission and in the Organising Commission Abroad they undertook to help convene the conference and to form the Russian Organising Commission. They boasted that they would invite "all", but invited no one (though, being in the majority, they had the right to do so and to stipulate any conditions). They could find no one to do the work except the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks. They suffered utter defeat in the field they themselves had chosen. They sank so low as to attempt to "trip up" the Russian Organising Commission, to which, as the authorised body, they had voluntarily handed over four-fifths of their funds for convening the conference!

Yes, an abscess is an unpleasant affair, especially when it is in the process of growth. In No. 24 of the Central Organ it has already been shown why the theoreticians of an alliance of all and sundry groups abroad can only engage in intrigues. Now the Russian worker Social-Democrats will make their choice without any difficulty: whether to defend their Russian Organising Commission and their conference,

or to allow Tyszka, Leder and Co. to sabotage their conference by intrigues. The intriguers have condemned themselves—that is a fact; Tyszka and Leder have already passed convicted into the history of the R.S.D.L.P., but they will never succeed in hindering the conference or in undermining the Russian Organising Commission.

What about the liquidators? For eighteen months, from January 1910 to June 1911, when they had a majority in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad and faithful "friends" in the persons of the conciliators in the Central Committee Bureau in Russia, they did nothing, absolutely nothing, to further the work in Russia! When they were in the majority—work was at a standstill. But when the Bolsheviks broke up the liquidationist Central Committee Bureau Abroad and proceeded to convene the conference, the liquidators began to bestir themselves. The form in which that "stir" expressed itself is very characteristic. The Bundists, who have always very faithfully served the liquidators, recently wanted to take advantage of the present "time of troubles" (among the Latvians, for instance, the issue of the struggle between the two tendencies—liquidationist and Party—has not yet been decided); they got hold of a Caucasian somewhere and the whole company went to the city of Z[161] to grab signatures for the resolutions drafted by Trotsky and Dan in Café Bubenberg (in Berne, August 1911). But they failed to find the leading Latvian organisation; they failed to get the signatures, and no document with the high-sounding heading "Organising Commission of the Three Strongest Organisations" was prepared. Such are the facts.*

Let the Russian workers learn about the way the Bundists are trying to break up the Russian Organising Commission in Russia! Just think: at a time when the comrades preparing the conference were touring the Urals, the Volga

* In addition to the never-lose-heart Bundists, the *Vperyod* people also galloped off to snatch resolutions. From that tiny group—by no means otzovist, heaven forbid!—there galloped off a well-known otzovist[162]; he "galloped" through Kiev, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, "reconciled himself" with the conciliators, and went away without achieving anything anywhere. It is said that the *Vperyod* group blames the unsatisfactory god devised by Lunacharsky for its failure and that it passed a unanimous resolution to devise a better god.

Region, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Rostov, Tiflis, Baku—the Bundists "got hold of" a "Caucasian" (probably one of those committee men who were in possession of the "seal" of the Regional Caucasian Committee and who, in December 1908, sent Dan and Axelrod as representatives to the conference of the R.S.D.L.P.) and took a journey in order to "grab signatures" from the Latvians. Not much more was needed to cause this gang of intriguers, who serve the liquidators and who are absolutely alien to all work in Russia, to come out as the "Organising Commission" of "three organisations" (including the two "strongest" possessors of the seal!). Or perhaps the Bundist gentlemen and the Caucasian will please inform the Party what Russian organisations they visited, when exactly they made these journeys, where they restored the work, and where they made reports? Do try and tell us, dear fellows!

And the past masters of diplomacy abroad with the serious mien of experts, pass judgement: "one must not isolate oneself", "it is necessary to talk things over with the Bund and with the Regional Caucasian Committee".

What comedians!

Let those who are wavering now, who regret the "isolation" of the Bolsheviks, learn and ponder over the significance of the history of the Party during these past two years. *This* isolation makes us feel better than we have ever felt before now that we have cut off the bunch of intriguing nonentities abroad, and have helped to consolidate the ranks of the Russian worker Social-Democrats of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Urals, the Volga Region, the Caucasus, and the South!

Anyone who complains about isolation understands absolutely nothing of the great ideological work accomplished by the Plenary Meeting or of its conciliationist mistake. For a year and a half after the Meeting there was a semblance of unity abroad and complete stagnation of Social-Democratic work in Russia. For the first time in four or six months of 1911 the seemingly extreme isolation of the Bolsheviks served as an impetus to Social-Democratic work in Russia, and restored the Social-Democratic centre in Russia.

Those who have not yet understood the ideological danger of such "abscesses" as liquidationism and otzovism

will now understand it from the history of the impotent squabbles and miserable intrigue to which the wretched *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups have sunk, dragging with them, in their fall, all those who attempted to defend them.

To work, comrades, Party Social-Democrats! Shake off the last remnants of your contacts with non-Social-Democratic tendencies and the groups that foster them in spite of the decisions of the Party. Rally round the Russian Organising Commission, help it convene a conference and strengthen local work. The R.S.D.L.P. has gone through a serious illness; the crisis is passing.

Long live the united, illegal, revolutionary Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM THE CAMP OF THE STOLYPIN "LABOUR" PARTY

An outstanding event in this camp is the article by N. R-kov published in No. 9-10 of the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*. This article is a real *Credo* or manifesto of a liberal labour party. From the very beginning, from his assessment of the revolution and the role of all the classes involved, and proceeding with remarkable consistency to the end, to the scheme for a legal workers' (?) party, in all his arguments, R-kov substitutes liberalism for Marxism.

What is the real task facing Russia? The complete replacement of semi-feudal economy by "civilised capitalism".

That is not Marxism, however, but Struveism or liberalism, for a Marxist distinguishes between classes with their Octobrist, Cadet, Trudovik, or proletarian ideas as to what constitutes "civilised" capitalism.

What is the crux of the problem of appraising of the revolution? R-kov condemns the whining and renegacy of those who shout that the revolution has "failed" and against them puts forward ... the great professorial maxim that during periods of "reaction" too, new social forces are maturing. It is evident that R-kov's answer disguises the *essence* of the matter to the advantage of the counter-revolutionary liberals who fully acknowledge the maxim newly-discovered by R-kov. The essence of the question is: which of the classes that took part in the revolution showed that they were capable of waging a direct, mass revolutionary struggle, which classes betrayed the revolution and directly or indirectly joined the counter-revolution? R-kov concealed this essence and was thus able to ignore the difference be-

tween revolutionary democracy and the liberal-monarchist "progressive" opposition.

As regards the role of the landlord class, R-kov managed without further ado to say something absurd. Not so long ago, he says, the representatives of that class "were" real serf-owners; now "a small handful are still grouped around Messrs. Purishkevich and Markov the Second, and are helplessly [!] spluttering the venom of despair". The majority of the landed nobility, he goes on to say, "are gradually and steadily being converted into an agricultural bourgeoisie".

In actual fact, as everybody knows, the Markovs and the Purishkeviches have *full* power in the Duma, still more in the Council of State, and even more in the tsar's Black-Hundred clique, and yet more in the administration of Russia. It is precisely "their power and their revenue" (resolution of the December 1908 conference) that are guaranteed by a step in *this kind* of transformation of tsarism into a bourgeois monarchy. The conversion of serf economy into bourgeois economy by no means does away immediately with the political power of these Black-Hundred-type landowners. This is obvious from the viewpoint of elementary Marxism, and it also follows from the experience, say, of Prussia after sixty years of "conversion" (since 1848). According to R-kov there is no absolutism and no monarchy in Russia! R-kov applies a liberal school method: the benign elimination (on paper) of social extremes serves as "proof" that a "compromise is inevitable".

Present-day agrarian policy, according to R-kov, indicates an "imminent and inevitable [!] compromise"—between whom?—"between the different groups of the bourgeoisie". But, we ask our "Marxist", what social force will compel the Purishkeviches, who wield all the power, to agree to a compromise? R-kov does not answer this question. But since he goes on to refer to the process of the consolidation of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and "the impending domination of the moderately progressive" bourgeoisie, there is only one conclusion to be drawn—R-kov expects that the moderately progressive bourgeoisie will peacefully take over power from the Purishkeviches and Romanovs.

Incredible as this is, it is a fact. It is precisely this most puerile of liberal utopias that forms the basis of R-kov's conception, although he boasts that "there is not a grain of utopia" in what he says. There is no actual difference between N. R-kov and the extreme liquidators, all of whom—from Larin to Cherevanin, Dan, and Martov—set forth, in slightly different forms and phrases, *the very same fundamental idea* of a peaceful assumption of power by the bourgeoisie (with, at most, *pressure* exerted from "below").

But in real life not in a liberal utopia, we see the domination of Purishkevichism moderated by the grumbling of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs. The "moderately progressive" Octobrists and Cadets, far from undermining this domination, are perpetuating it. The contradiction between this domination and the unquestionably advancing bourgeois development of Russia is becoming ever sharper (and not weaker, as the theorists of "inevitable compromise" think). The motive force in the solution of this contradiction can only be the masses, i.e., the proletariat with the peasantry following its lead.

This former Bolshevik, who has now become a liquidator, dismisses these masses so readily, that it is as if the Stolypin gallows and the torrent of filth let loose by *Vekhi* had eliminated them, not only from the arena of open politics, not only from the pages of liberal publications, but also from real life. The peasantry, says our liberal in his "analysis, are weak at the elections; and as for the working class, he provisionally leaves it "out of consideration"!!

R-kov undertook to prove that a revolution ("upheaval") in Russia, though possible, is not essential. Once the working class and the peasantry are "left out of consideration", even if only provisionally, if only "for the time being", if only because of their "weakness at the elections", a revolution is not, of course, possible, to say nothing of its being essential. But liberal benevolence cannot conjure away either the unrestricted power of Purishkevich and Romanov, or the revolutionary resistance which is growing stronger both among the maturing proletariat and the starving and tormented peasantry. The trouble with R-kov is that he has abandoned the Marxist *line*, the line followed by revolutionary Social-Democrats, who always, under all circum-

stances and in every possible form, in speeches at mass meetings, from the rostrum of the Third Duma, at meetings of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, or in the most peaceable and legally functioning workers' associations, insist that this resistance must be given support, that it must be strengthened, developed, and properly directed toward the achievement of complete victory. In all his arguments N. R-kov has substituted for this line that of the liberal who refuses to see the force that has been driven underground, who refuses to see anything but the Purishkeviches who are being "converted" into "civilised Junkers", or the "moderately progressive" Milyukovs.

That is the specific kind of blindness which is characteristic of the whole of *Nasha Zarya* and of the whole Stolypin labour party. Closely connected with this conception—one due to the blindness caused by liberal blinkers—is the extraordinarily strong emphasis on the legalisation of the workers' party. Since "a compromise is inevitable", there is no point in fighting the inevitable, and all that remains for the working class to do is to follow the example of the other classes of the fully established bourgeois system and feather for itself a humble little philistine nest in a nook of this system. That is the real meaning of the legalists' propaganda, no matter how much Martov, given that role by the Potresovs, Yuri Chatskys, Larins, Dans, and others, may hide it behind "revolutionary" phraseology.

This *real* meaning of a legal "association for the protection of the interests of the working class" is very clearly revealed in R-kov's article. It is obvious that the "powers that be" will never permit such an association, even if it is dominated by the Prokopoviches. It is obvious that they will never agree to let it be "put into' effect". Only blind liberals can fail to see this. But an *association* of intellectuals who, under the guise of socialism, are spreading *liberal* propaganda among the working masses is something that has already been put into effect. This "association" consists of the contributors to *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*. And it is their "banner", the ideological banner of liberalism, that R-kov "unfurls" when he asserts that, unless there exists an open organisation the struggle will inevitably (!) assume an anarchist character; that the old slogans have become

dead letters; that tactics must not be reduced to a "scuffle"; that the new "association" harbours "*no thought* [!] of the need for a forcible revolution", etc. This liberal, renegade propaganda of intellectuals is a reality, whereas the talk of an open working-class association is mere eyewash. An association for the liberal protection of the interests of the working class as understood by the liberals is a reality; *Nasha Zarya* is this "association", and the "open and broad political organisation" of workers in present-day Russia, is an innocuous, empty, misleading liberal dream.

It is a useful thing to organise legally functioning trade unions, as long as we are aware that under present conditions they cannot become either broad, or "political", or stable. But it is an empty and harmful occupation to preach liberal concepts of a political workers' association that *exclude* any idea of the use of force.

In conclusion, here are two amusing bits. The first: "If anyone," writes R-kov, "blinded by reactionary frenzy, took it into his head to accuse the members of such an association of striving for violent revolution, the whole burden of such an absurd, unfounded, and juridically flimsy accusation would fall upon the head of the accuser." We can just visualise the picture of the burden of juridically flimsy accusations falling upon the heads of Shcheglovitov and Co.—and it is not Rodichev but N. R-kov who crushes them under that "burden".

The second: "The workers," writes R-kov, "must assume the task of political hegemony in the struggle for a democratic system." R-kov is in favour of hegemony after he has deprived it of its entire *meaning*. "Workers," says R-kov in effect, "you must not fight against the 'inevitable' compromise, but you must call yourselves leaders." But the very thing a leader has to do is to expose the fiction about a compromise being "inevitable" and to work to organise proletarian and proletarian-peasant resistance to undemocratic bourgeois compromises.

N. R-kov will be as useful in the struggle against liquidationism, as Y. Larin was in the struggle against the false idea of a labour congress. N. R-kov and Y. Larin have had the courage to appear ... naked. R-kov is an honest liquidator. By his fearlessness he will compel people *to think* about

the ideological roots of liquidationism. He will provide ever more corroboration of the correctness of the December 1908 resolutions of the R.S.D.L.P., for he regularly poses (and invariably gives wrong answers to) the very problems which those resolutions analysed and answered correctly. R-kov will help the workers to obtain a particularly clear idea of the wretchedness of those liquidationist diplomats who, like the editors of *Nasha Zarya* (or of *Golos*), twist and turn, piling up reservation upon reservation, and disclaiming responsibility for "certain passages" in R-kov's article, or for the "detailed exposition" of his plan. As if it were a question of separate passages, and not of a uniform, integral, and consistent line—the line of a liberal labour policy!

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TROTSKY'S DIPLOMACY AND A CERTAIN PARTY PLATFORM

Trotsky's *Pravda*, No. 22, which appeared recently after a long interval in which no issue was published, vividly illustrates the decay of the petty groups abroad that attempted to base their existence on their diplomatic game with the non-Social-Democratic trends of liquidationism and otzovism.

The publication appeared on November 29, New Style, nearly a month after the announcement issued by the Russian Organising Commission. *Trotsky makes no mention of this whatsoever*!

As far as Trotsky is concerned, the Russian Organising Commission does not exist. Trotsky calls himself a Party man on the strength of the fact that to him the Russian Party centre, formed by the overwhelming majority of the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, means nothing. Or, perhaps it is the other way round, comrades? Perhaps Trotsky, with his small group abroad, is just nothing so far as the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia are concerned?

Trotsky uses the boldest type for his assertions—it's a wonder he never tires of making solemn vows—that his paper is "not a factional but a Party organ". You need only pay some little attention to the contents of No. 22 to see at once the obvious mechanics of the game with the *non*-Party *Vperyod* and liquidator factions.

Take the report from St. Petersburg, signed S. V., which advertises the *Vperyod* group. S. V. reproaches Trotsky for not having published the resolution of the St. Petersburg *Vperyod* group against the petition campaign,[163] sent to him some time ago. Trotsky, accused by the *Vperyod* group of "narrow factionalism" (what black ingratitude!), twists and

turns, pleading lack of funds and the fact that his paper does not appear often enough. The game is too obvious: We will do you a good turn, and you do the same for us—we (Trotsky) will keep silent about the fight of the Party people against the otzovists and, again, we (Trotsky) will help advertise *Vperyod*, and you (S. V.) give in to the liquidators on the question of the "petition campaign". Diplomatic defence of both non-Party factions—isn't that the sign of a true Party spirit?

Or take the florid editorial grandly entitled "Onward!". "Class-conscious workers!" we read in that editorial. "At the present moment there is no more important [*sic*!] and comprehensive slogan [the poor fellow has let his tongue run away with him] than freedom of association, assembly, and strikes." "The Social-Democrats," we read further, "call upon the proletariat to fight for a republic. But if the fight for a republic is not to be merely the bare [!!] slogan of a select few, it is necessary that you class-conscious workers should teach the masses to realise from experience the need for freedom of association and to fight for this most vital class demand."

This revolutionary phraseology merely serves to disguise and justify the falsity of liquidationism, and thereby to befuddle the minds of the workers. Why is the slogan calling for a republic the *bare* slogan of a *select few* when the existence of a republic means that it would be impossible to disperse the Duma, means freedom of association and of the press, means freeing the peasants from violence and plunder by the Markovs, Romanovs, and Purishkeviches? Is it not clear that it is just the opposite—that it is the slogan of "freedom of association" as a "comprehensive" slogan, used *independently* of the slogan of a republic, that is "bare" and senseless?

It is absurd to demand "freedom of association" from the tsarist monarchy, without explaining to the masses that such freedom cannot be expected from tsarism and that to obtain it there must be a republic. The introduction of bills into the Duma on freedom of association, and questions and speeches on such subjects, ought to serve us Social-Democrats as an occasion and material for our agitation in favour of a republic.

The "class-conscious workers should teach the masses to realise from experience the need for freedom of association"! This is the old song of old Russian opportunism, the opportunism long ago preached to death by the Economists. The *experience* of the masses is that the ministers are closing down their unions, that the governors and police officers are daily perpetrating deeds of violence against them—this is real *experience of the masses*. But extolling the slogan of "freedom of association" as opposed to a republic is merely phrase-mongering by an opportunist intellectual who is alien to the masses. It is the phrase-mongering of an intellectual who imagines that the "experience" of a "petition" (with 1,300 signatures) or a pigeon-holed bill is something that educates the "masses". Actually, it is not paper experience, but something different, the experience of life that educates them; what enlightens them is the agitation of the class-conscious workers for a republic—which is the sole comprehensive slogan from the standpoint of political democracy.

Trotsky knows perfectly well that liquidators writing in legal publications *combine* this very slogan of "freedom of association" with the slogan "down with the underground party, down with the struggle for a republic". Trotsky's particular task is to conceal liquidationism by throwing dust in the eyes of the workers.

It is impossible to argue with Trotsky on the merits of the issue, because Trotsky holds no views whatever. We can and should argue with confirmed liquidators and otzovists; but it is no use arguing with a man whose game is to hide the errors of both these trends; in his case the thing to do is to expose him as a diplomat of the smallest calibre.

It is necessary, however, to argue with the authors of the theses of the platform that got into No. 22 of *Pravda*. The error they are committing is due either to their not being familiar with the December 1908 resolutions of the R.S.D.L.P., or to their not having rid themselves completely of some liquidationist and *Vperyod* waverings of thought.

The first thesis says that the regime established on June 3, 1907, represents, "in fact, the unrestricted domination of

the feudal-type landed nobility". It goes on to point out that they are "disguising the autocratic and bureaucratic nature of their domination with the pseudo-constitutional mask of a State Duma that actually possesses no rights".

If the landowners' Duma "actually possesses no rights" —and that is true—how, then, can the domination of the landowners be "unrestricted"?

The authors forget that the class character of the tsarist monarchy in no way militates against the vast independence and self-sufficiency of the tsarist authorities and of the "bureaucracy", from Nicholas II down to the last police officer. The same mistake, that of forgetting the autocracy and the monarchy, of reducing it *directly* to the "pure" domination of the upper classes, was committed by the otzovists in 1908-09 (see *Proletary*, supplement to No. 44),[164] by Larin in 1910, it is now being committed by some individual writers (for instance, M. Alexandrov[165]), and also by N. R-kov who has gone over to the liquidators.

The analysis of the domination of the feudal landowners assisted by the bourgeoisie, given in the December (1908) resolutions, strikes at the roots of this error.

The second thesis refers to the minimum programme of the R.S.D.L.P., and in this connection "a particularly prominent place" is given to many demands, such as the demand for freedom of association and for the confiscation of the landed estates, but no mention is made of a republic. In our opinion, this is wrong. While we fully admit that it is absolutely necessary to agitate for freedom of association, we consider that the slogan calling for a republic must be given the greatest prominence.

The third thesis: "The necessity of new revolutionary action on the part of the masses", without which our demands cannot be achieved.

This last statement is absolutely true, but it is only half the truth. Marxists cannot confine themselves to a reference to the "necessity" of new action on the part of the masses; they must first show the causes that give rise (if they do give rise) to a new revolutionary crisis. Unless there is such a crisis, "action"—which, indeed, is always "necessary"—is impossible.

The authors are actuated by the best of revolutionary

intentions, but there is some defect in their method of thought. The December (1908) resolutions deduce the "necessity" of new action by a process of reasoning that is not so simple, but that is, however, more correct.

The fourth thesis: "The possibility of such new revolutionary action on the part of the masses in the more or less immediate future, and relentless criticism ... of the counter-revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie", etc.

Criticism is always necessary, *irrespective* of "the possibility of action", even at a time when action on the part of the masses is definitely impossible. To tie up the possibility of action with criticism means confusing the Marxist *line*, which is *always* obligatory, with *one* of the forms of the struggle (a particularly high form). That is the first error. And the second error may be described by the saying: "Don't halloo until you are out of the wood". It is pointless to talk of the possibility of action, this must be proved by deeds. In a platform it is sufficient to note that a revival has set in, and to emphasise the importance of carrying on agitation and paving the way for the action of the masses. Events will show whether the action of the masses will become a fact in the near or not so distant future.

The fifth thesis is splendid, for it stresses the immense importance of the State Duma as a platform from which to carry on agitation.

We do not know who the authors of the platform are. But if (judging by certain indications) they are Russian *Vperyod*-ists they should be warmly congratulated on having got rid of one error of the *Vperyod* group. They are *Vperyod*-ists with the conscience of Party people, for they give a straightforward and clear answer to one of the "vexed" questions. The *Vperyod* group, however, is deceiving the Party in the most unscrupulous manner; for it is defending and screening otzovism, and to this day, December 1911, it has not given a straight answer to the question of participation in the Fourth Duma. To treat such a group as Social-Democratic is a mockery of Social-Democracy.

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THE RESULTS OF THE ARBITRATION OF THE "TRUSTEES"

At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in January 1910, the representatives of the Bolshevik faction (recognised as the representatives of that faction by all participants in the Meeting) concluded, as is well known, an agreement with all the other factions of our Party. This agreement was published in No. 11 of the Central Organ, and its purport was that the Bolsheviks agreed to dissolve their faction and transfer its property to the Central Committee, *on condition* that all the other factions did the same and followed the Party line, that is to say, an anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist line. The agreement, which was endorsed by the Central Committee, definitely provided that in the event of violation of these conditions the funds were to be returned to the Bolsheviks (see the resolution, published in No. 11 of the Central Organ).

The generally known facts of the violation of that agreement by the other factions compelled the Bolsheviks, a year ago, on December 5, 1910, to file an application, i.e., to declare that the agreement was null and void, and to demand the return of their funds.

This demand had to be submitted to the "trustees"—Kautsky, Mehring, and Zetkin—for arbitration. The court of arbitration ruled that, provisionally, up to November 1, 1911, part of the funds were to be turned over for accountable expenditure to the Technical Commission and the Organising Commission Abroad composed of representatives of the Bolsheviks, conciliators, and the Poles.

In October 1911, two of the arbitrators, Mehring and Kautsky, resigned their posts. After this the third arbi-

trator had not the right to exercise authority alone, and after some hesitation also resigned.

Thus it turned out that after November 2, 1911, the Bolshevik faction, which had, on December 5, 1910, annulled the agreement with the other factions, was no longer bound by any contractual relations with the former trustees. Therefore it took possession of its printing-plant and is now taking possession of its other property.

Naturally, having freed itself from the "ties" with the liquidationist, otzovist, and simply intrigue-mongering groups abroad, the Bolshevik faction will devote all its energy, as has already been proved by the efforts of its members in forming the Russian Organising Commission, to rallying all the pro-Party elements around the Russian Organising Commission and the general Party conference which it is convening.

The representatives of the Bolshevik faction, who concluded the agreement at the Plenary Meeting in January 1910.[166]

P.S. The above statement had already been submitted to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, when we read the leaflet of the so-called Central Committee Bureau Abroad containing a letter from two of the former arbitrators, dated November 18, 1911. Whom are Igorev and Lieber trying to deceive by posing as the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, when the Letts and *even* Tyszka have resigned from it? Why are they silent about this resignation? Why do they say nothing about the fact that by November 18, two and a half weeks had elapsed since the court of arbitration had ceased to exist, and that therefore the letter of November 18, 1911, has no significance whatever, nor can it have any? Or, are we, perhaps, to conclude that *prior* to November 1, 1911, Igorev and Martov did *not* recognise the court of arbitration? Then say so, gentlemen, and prove it! Perhaps you recognise the court of arbitration *after* November 1, 1911? Prior to November 1, 1911, *you stood condemned* by the universally recognised court of arbitration; for, despite all your entreaties, demands, and "protests", it refused to give a centime to either you or Trotsky. Now the gentlemen who were condemned by the legitimate, universally recognised court of arbitration, are trying

to shelter behind the private opinion of former members of the court which is no longer binding on anyone. Since the *First* of November, 1911, no court of arbitration has existed, and in this respect we have all gone back to the situation which existed prior to the Plenary Meeting. If the former trustees now attempted to hold up the Bolshevik funds, that would be an unlawful act.

But the point is that all that Igorev and Lieber are after is to create a "sensation"; they are afraid, however, to set forth the history of the arbitration on the basis of exact documents. Unless you cheat you won't sell—that is their motto.

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THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE ELECTIONS TO THE FOURTH DUMA

I. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE

The Cadet Party, which, of all the so-called opposition parties is most favourably situated because of its legal status, has just taken an extremely important step by defining its policy in the election campaign. To judge by the evidence of sources sympathising with the Cadets and most accessible to us, its policy has been defined as follows:

1. The Cadets will put up their own candidates wherever they are sure of being elected.
2. Wherever a Cadet candidate cannot expect an absolute majority, the Cadets will support the *progressive* candidate likely to obtain the highest vote, irrespective of his party affiliation.
3. Where an opposition candidate has no chance at all, and there is the danger of the election of a Black-Hundred candidate, support may be given to the Octobrist candidate but only on condition that he is a genuine constitutionalist which, strange as it may seem, they occasionally are.
4. The Cadets will not enter into any election agreements with the Right Octobrists or with the Nationalists and monarchists. In general, while not forgetting the interests of the Party, they will not sacrifice to the latter the supreme interests of the opposition, in the broad sense of the term.

Such is Cadet policy. Working-class democracy must examine this policy with the greatest attention, analysing its true class substance and its real meaning, which are veiled in the usual conventional phrases. These phrases about "the higher interests of the opposition", etc., are

the first to strike the eye when we read the Cadet resolutions. The fact of the matter, however, is that the policy of the Cadets has been fully and finally defined as the policy of a *Cadet-Octobrist* bloc. This fact must be understood, it is the grain that must be separated from the chaff of official liberal catchwords.

(1) Not a word about a bloc with the Lefts, with the democrats. (2) Only blocs with Right Octobrists are forbidden—with the Gololobov group,[167] who are an insignificant minority among the Octobrists. (3) In practice the phrase about "the higher interests of the opposition in the broad sense of the term" can *only* mean one thing: that as a general rule blocs with the Octobrists are actually permitted (and recommended!).

These three conclusions regarding the *real* policy of the Constitutional-Democratic Party must be firmly borne in mind.

What do they mean? They mean that the "Left Centre" of the bourgeois liberals has defined its policy as that of a bloc with the Right Centre of the bourgeois so-called liberals—speaking openly of its hostility to the Black Hundreds, and expressing its hostility to the Lefts, to the forces of democracy, by omitting any reference to any blocs with the Trudoviks, non-party Lefts, and workers' candidates.

What we said in *Zvezda*, No. 28, in the article "Two Centres", has been fully confirmed.*

There are three *basic* political forces in Russia, and, consequently, three political lines—the Black Hundreds (representing the class interests of the feudal landowners) and, alongside of and above them, the "bureaucracy"; then, the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, the Left (Cadet) and Right (Octobrist) "Centre"; finally, the bourgeois democrats (the Trudoviks, Narodniks, non-party Lefts) and proletarian democracy. That this, and only this is the case, is confirmed by the entire experience of the first decade of the twentieth century, which was an extremely important and eventful decade.

It goes without saying that all boundaries in nature and in society are dynamic; they are not static, but, to a certain

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* See pp. 297-99 of this volume.—*Ed.*

extent, conditional and changing. Among the parties and groups standing "*on the boundary line*" of the main divisions, transitional forms and fluctuations are inevitable; but the substance of the matter, resulting from the relations of the class forces in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century, is undoubtedly determined by none other than the indicated "triple" division. The lumping of the bourgeois liberals (headed by the Cadets) with the bourgeois democrats has caused considerable harm to the Russian liberation movement, and we must bend every effort to ensure that the experience of the great decade (1900-10) helps the democratic movement as a whole to become finally aware that it is a fatal mistake to lump things together in this fashion. Working-class democracy in our epoch is, therefore, faced by two inseparably connected tasks: first, to secure the independent political organisation of the class of wage-earners, independent of all bosses, big and little, even the most democratic, and pledging allegiance to the entire international movement of that class; and, second, to develop and strengthen the forces of Russian democracy (inevitably headed by the workers, just as the bourgeois liberals are inevitably headed by social elements of the Cadet type). The latter task cannot be fulfilled unless we persistently explain to the broadest masses the class roots and the political significance of the difference between bourgeois liberalism (the Cadets) and bourgeois democracy (the Trudoviks, etc.).

The liberal bourgeoisie does not want to and cannot dispense with the Markovs and Purishkeviches, whose domination it only strives to moderate. Bourgeois democracy and the workers can only strive, more or less consistently and consciously, to destroy all the economic and political foundations of that domination.

That, from the standpoint of working-class democracy, is the main content of the campaign in connection with the elections to the Fourth Duma. It is this content that must be primarily emphasised to counteract the Cadet policy of deliberately confusing all the cardinal questions of principle by means of stock phrases about "progressism" and "opposition".

The Cadet-Octobrist bloc is nothing new. It was foreseen by Marxists long ago. They pointed out the inherent class

affinity of the two component parts of this bloc as far back as 1905-07. Two possible majorities became defined as soon as the Third Duma was convened, and by the end of 1907 the Marxists had made this conclusion the cornerstone of their policy. The five years' existence of the Third Duma has confirmed this conclusion. In general outline, the composition of the Third Duma is as follows:*

Rights	160	284—First majority
Octobrists	124	
Liberals	127	251—Second majority
Democrats	29	
Total . . .	440	

Throughout its existence the Third Duma relied on these two majorities, which represent the necessary component parts of the entire system inaugurated on June 3, 1907. The first majority signifies that the "old" is to be preserved in power entirely intact; the second majority signifies "a step toward" a bourgeois monarchy. The first is needed by the June Third system to preserve the "power and revenue" of the Markovs, Purishkeviches and Co.; the second is needed to moderate this domination and to advance in the bourgeois manner (according to the formula: one step forward, two steps back). Experience has now clearly shown that this kind of advance is equal to stagnation, and that no progress is being made in "moderating" Purishkevichism.

Quite a number of votes taken in the Third Duma were decided by the "second majority". Recently, *Rech* definitely admitted this, stating that "a number of votes" at the beginning of the last session "actually reproduce the domination of a Left Centre" (read of the Cadet-Octobrist bloc) in the Duma. Such votes are possible only because the second majority *too*, like the first, is a bulwark of counter-revolution; to illustrate this we need only recall *Vekhi*, or Karaulov's pious speeches, or the "London" slogans.

* The calculation is based on the figures supplied by the official *Handbook* for 1910 (Issue II). The Rights include: Rights proper—51, Nationalists—89, Right Octobrists—11, and 50 per cent of the independents—9. The liberals include: Progressists—39, Cadets—52, all the nationality groups—27, and 50 per cent of the independents —9. The democrats include 14 Trudoviks and 15 Social-Democrats.

Where are the results of these "victories" of the second majority? Where is the proof of the truly marvellous discovery of the Cadet Party that there are "genuine constitutionalists" among the Octobrists? Doesn't this discovery rather show how paltry is the Cadets' conception of "genuine constitutionalism"?

The first and fundamental question of the election campaign is its political content, the ideological line it expresses. The resolution of the Cadet Party proves once more its anti-democratic nature, for the content of the Cadets' election campaign reduces itself to further lowering the concept "constitutionalism" in the eyes of the masses. Instil into the minds of the people the idea that there are genuine constitutionalists among the "Left" Octobrists; that is what the Cadet Party is bent on, that is the meaning of its election policy.

The task of the democrats is a different one; not to belittle the idea of constitutionalism, but to explain that as long as power and revenue remain in the hands of the Markovs and their like it is nothing but a fiction. The content of the election campaign of the working-class democrats is determined by the task of bringing out the difference between liberalism and democracy, of rallying the forces of the latter, and of closing the ranks of the wage-workers throughout the world.

The resolutions of their conference imply that the Cadets are departing still further from democracy. Our task is to rally the forces of democracy to counter every sort of medievalism, and to counter the Cadet-Octobrist blocs.

II. THE ROLE OF WORKER ELECTORS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The campaign for the elections to the Fourth Duma has opened. It was launched by the government sending out circular instructions on assistance to the "national" party, and by taking "measures" to provide for the qualifications of the government candidates, and to eliminate opposition candidates in general, and democratic candidates in particular.

The opposition press has also entered the election campaign. So has the Cadet Party, and its first step was the adoption of resolutions providing for a bloc with the "Left" Octobrists.

Therefore, working-class democracy must immediately pay the utmost attention to the elections, and promptly, without a single week's delay discuss its tactics in all their details, preparing all supporters of democracy in advance for the important and responsible role they are to perform.

In this article we propose to dwell on the role of worker electors. It is clear that in this case too, as always, we must stress the content of the work, that is to say, the ideological-political line of the campaign. Educate and organise the working class, unite it in an independent party that maintains solidarity with the West-European parties, explain to the working class its historical aims in changing the basic conditions of commodity economy and capitalism, segregate its party from *all* bourgeois democratic trends, even those that are "Left", Narodnik, etc.—such is the basic task.

This fundamental task is the same for working-class democracy in all countries. And for this very reason its application in the present epoch in one country, in Russia, requires that the special and concrete tasks of our times be taken into consideration *for the sake* of this general common task. At the present moment two of these specific tasks of Russian working-class democracy are indissolubly connected and, because of objective conditions, require the greatest attention. The first of these two tasks is to understand clearly the connection between the liquidationist trend (represented, as we know, by the magazines *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*) and the widespread bourgeois counter-revolutionary *Vekhi* trend. It is necessary to be clearly aware of the harm of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat in order to overcome it and to achieve the immediate aims affecting the very *existence* of working-class democracy, which the liquidators *are denying*. The second is the task of organising the Left democrats, clearly bearing in mind the necessity to draw a line between democracy (bourgeois democracy) and bourgeois liberalism. This is imperative if

working-class democracy is to exercise that leadership which is one of the indispensable conditions for any step forward by the general movement for freedom.

The lumping of the liberals (the Constitutional-Democratic Party) with the democrats (the Trudoviks, "Narodniks" of the Left persuasion) is fundamentally wrong in principle, and, in practice, leads to the betrayal of the interests of democracy. Upon the worker electors devolves the duty of upholding the correct interpretation of the liberation movement and explaining the class essence of the various parties (without allowing themselves to be taken in by "labels", fine words and fancy names); they must draw a clear line between the *Rights* (from the Black Hundreds to the Octobrists), the bourgeois *liberals* (the Cadets and their kind), and the *democrats* (the Trudoviks and kindred trends are bourgeois democrats; the Marxists represent proletarian democracy).

In accordance with the electoral system instituted by the law of June 3, 1907, the worker electors play a particular role in the gubernia electoral assemblies. Therefore the immediate practical task is to ensure that *all* these electors are staunch and loyal representatives of working-class democracy.

As we know, the election of one of the worker electors to the State Duma is guaranteed in each of the following six gubernias: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Ekaterinoslav, Kostroma, and Kharkov. But the deputies are elected by the *entire* electoral assembly of each gubernia, which means, as a rule, by the *Right* electors, landowners and big bourgeoisie, Octobrists. To secure the election to the Duma of working-class democrats we must see to it that all the worker electors, without a single exception, are true working-class democrats and firmly support one definite candidate from their midst. Even if only one worker elector turns out to be a deserter, a liberal, a Right, the Octobrists will be sure to elect him, against the will of the majority of the worker electors!

But the enumerated six gubernias are not the only ones having worker electors in their electoral assemblies. Altogether the law provides for a total of 112 worker electors in 44 gubernias (out of 53).

What should be the role of these electors? To begin with, they must always pursue a principled line, endeavouring to organise the forces of democracy (particularly, the peasantry) and to help them cast off the influence of the liberals. This is an extremely important field of activity. Secondly, the worker electors are in a position (and should strive) to take advantage of the vote being split between the Rights and the liberals to elect their own candidates to the Duma.

Here is an example to illustrate the last-named task. Two members of the Third Duma from Vyatka Gubernia are Social-Democrats—Astrakhantsev and Putyatin. Yet the law does not provide for a deputy from the worker curia in Vyatka Gubernia. The gubernia electoral assembly in Vyatka is made up of 109 electors, of whom four are elected by the workers. How, then, did *four* workers (out of 109 electors) manage to send *two* deputies to the Duma? Most likely, the votes in the gubernia electoral assembly were equally divided, and the liberals could not gain the upper hand over the Rights without the support of the workers. Compelled to form a bloc with the workers, the liberals had to share seats in the Duma with them, and thus they elected two Social-Democrats to the Duma. The representation from Vyatka in the Duma was constituted as follows: 1 Progressist, 3 Cadets, 2 Trudoviks, and 2 Social-Democrats, or 4 liberals and 4 democrats. In that gubernia the workers might have gained three seats had they succeeded in driving a wedge between the democratic electors and the liberals, provided the former had had a majority over the latter. Suppose that, out of 109 electors, 54 are Rights (50 out of the 53 electors chosen by the landowners and 4 out of the 17 electors from the first assembly of urban voters). Let us suppose, further, that out of the other 55 electors, 20 are liberals (three from the landowner curia, 13 from the first urban curia, and four from the second urban curia), 35 are democrats (23 peasant electors, 8 electors from the second urban curia and 4 from the worker curia). Under these circumstances the democrats would have been bound to obtain 5 seats out of 8, and the workers could have obtained 3 of these seats, provided they enjoyed the confidence of the peasant democrats.

In Ufa Gubernia *all* the seats were captured by the liberals (including Moslems). Not a single representative of the democrats was elected. Yet, considering that there were 30 peasant electors, the three worker electors could undoubtedly have captured seats both for themselves and the Trudoviks had they shown greater skill in organising the democratic forces.

Perm Gubernia is represented in the Third Duma by 6 liberals and 3 democrats, of whom only one is a Social-Democrat. Yet the situation in Perm was as follows: there were 26 peasant electors, and out of them the *liberals*, who had a majority in the gubernia electoral assembly, elected a Trudovik, which means that the peasant curia was a hundred per cent Trudovik (and if, among the peasants, there had been a single deserter from the camp of democracy to the liberals, the latter would have elected the deserter!). The same applies to the second urban curia (13 electors), because from that curia, too, a Trudovik was elected by the votes of the *liberals*. Hence the number of democrats among the electors may be placed at 26+13+5 workers=44, out of a total of 120 electors, including 59 from the landowner curia and 17 from the first urban curia. Even assuming that, with the exception of the democrats, all the electors were liberals, their number was 76, i.e., less than two-thirds. It is more likely, however, that some of the electors were Rights. Consequently, the liberals, although comprising less than two-thirds in the electoral assembly, captured two-thirds of the Perm seats in the Duma. The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this is that, had the democrats been more class-conscious and better organised (and it is above all the workers who must see to this!), they would not have let the liberals put anything over on them. The Social-Democrat Yegorov was elected in Perm Gubernia at the general assembly of the electors, i.e., by the liberals—which means that the liberals *needed* the support of the workers. And it was plainly a mistake on the part of the workers, a direct infringement of the interests of democracy, to give this support *without* securing a *proportionate* share of the seats in the Duma for democracy.

In making these calculations we wish to emphasise that they are merely meant as examples, to illustrate our idea,

for we are not in possession of any exact data regarding the party affiliations of the electors in general or of the electors in each separate curia. Actually, matters are more complicated and represent a more motley picture than might be assumed from our examples. But it is necessary for the workers to understand the *basic* relation of forces in the "intricate mechanism" of elections based on the June Third law. Once they have assimilated the fundamentals, they will be able to understand the details as well.

The two most democratic curias (after the worker curia, of course, which can and should be completely Marxist, completely anti-liquidationist) are the peasant curia and the second urban curia. Of these, the first is more democratic than the second, despite the infinitely greater lack of freedom at the elections in the rural districts and the infinitely worse conditions for agitation and organisation among the peasants, as compared with townspeople.

Indeed, deputies specially elected at the second assembly of urban voters to the Third Duma represented 28 gubernias. Among those thus elected were 16 Rights, 10 liberals, and 2 democrats (Rozanov from Saratov and Petrov the Third from Perm). Deputies specially elected from the peasant curia were sent to the Third Duma from all the 53 gubernias. They included 23 Rights, 17 liberals, 5 democrats and 8 independents. If we divide the independents equally between the Rights and the opposition, we obtain the following comparative data:

Members of the Third Duma	From the Second Urban Curia	From the Peasant Curia
Rights	16	27
Opposition parties	12=43 per cent	26=49 per cent

Opposition deputies thus comprised 43 per cent of the deputies elected by the second urban curia and 49 per cent of the deputies elected by the peasant curia. Considering that, as we know, the peasant deputies in the Third Duma introduced an agrarian bill which was in substance more *democratic* than the bill introduced by the Cadets, and that the bill bore the signatures also of independent and *Right*

peasant deputies, it is obvious that the democracy of the peasant curia surpasses the democracy of the second urban curia *to an even greater extent* than would appear from our data.

Consequently, the workers in general and the worker electors in particular must devote most of their attention to the peasant curia and the peasant electors. As the organisers of the forces of democracy the workers must carry on their activities in the first place among the peasants, and then among the electors from the second urban curia. In both these curias the intermingling of the liberals and democrats is particularly pronounced, is particularly frequent, and is particularly cultivated by the Cadets, who are taking advantage of their experience in "parliamentary deals" and their "democratic" name ("Constitutional-*Democrats*", the "party of *people's freedom*"), which disguises their *anti-democratic*, *Vekhi*, counter-revolutionary substance, in order brazenly to deceive politically undeveloped people.

The ideological and political task of the workers at the present stage of the Russian liberation movement is to organise the forces of democracy. The technical work of the election campaign must be subordinated to this task. Hence the necessity to devote special attention to the peasant curia and then to the second urban curia. In the gubernia electoral assembly, the first duty of the worker elector is to unite all the democrats. In order to get himself nominated, the worker elector needs three votes—he must find two peasant democrats or, if the worst comes to the worst, persuade two liberals, who would not risk anything by nominating a worker. The democratic members of the gubernia electoral assemblies should form blocs with the liberals against the Rights. If it proves impossible to form such a bloc immediately (and most likely this is what is going to happen in the majority of cases, because the electors will not be acquainted with each other), the tactics of the democrats should be to unite first with the liberals to defeat the Rights, and then *with the Rights to defeat the liberals*, so that neither are able to secure the election of their candidates (provided that neither the Rights nor the liberals command an absolute majority by themselves, for if they do the democrats cannot hope to get into the Duma). In accordance with Article 119 of the

Regulations governing the elections, the assembly adjourns. Then the democrats, guided by the exact figures of the votes cast, form a bloc with the liberals, demanding a proportionate share of the seats. *In such cases it is essential that the liberals elect the democrat first and not the other way round*, for history and the entire experience of Europe show that the liberals have often cheated the democrats, whereas the democrats have never cheated the liberals.

If they know which curias send democratic electors, and learn to drive a wedge between the democrats and the liberals, the worker electors *in 44 gubernias* can play an *enormous* role both in organising the forces of democracy in general and in securing the election of a larger number of worker democrats and bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks) to the Duma. In the present Duma there are fifteen of the former and fourteen of the latter. If the workers pursue correct tactics they can, under favourable conditions, secure the election of double that number. The liberals are sure to have a strong group—about a hundred or more deputies—in the Fourth Duma. They will constitute the "responsible opposition" (of the London type) capable of forming a bloc with the Octobrists. We must work to elect a group of several dozen deputies who will constitute a really democratic opposition, not an opposition of the *Vekhi* brand. And this can be achieved.

The law gives the workers the right to choose electors in 44 gubernias. Class-conscious workers in each factory must at once familiarise themselves with the law, take careful note of their duties and their position, and ensure that the electors they send are genuine working-class democrats, not liquidators.

If, as a result of class-conscious, careful and systematic work one hundred and twelve worker electors are elected, they can render very great service both in rallying the working class, which everywhere in Europe aspires to achieve lofty aims of world-wide significance, and also in organising the forces of democracy in Russia.

Time is short. Every class-conscious worker must shoulder this difficult, but doubly worth-while task.

III. THE PEASANTRY AND THE PEASANT ELECTORS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

In the preceding article (*Zvezda*, No. 34) we discussed the role of the worker electors in the election campaign. The long and the short of our reflections was that working-class democrats are faced by a vital twofold task—to unite the class of wage-workers, developing their class-consciousness, their understanding of the great historical objectives of their class, and then to organise the forces of democracy.*

Let us now examine the question of non-proletarian, i.e., bourgeois, democracy. What is its principal class basis in Russia? What are its specific features, its immediate tasks? What is its role in the elections?

The principal class support for Russian bourgeois democracy is the peasantry. The condition of the great bulk of the peasantry is so burdensome, the oppression of the landowners so heavy, the economic conditions so desperately bad, and its lack of civil rights so extraordinarily great, that democratic feelings and desires are springing up among them with an elusive spontaneous inevitability. The way out of the situation which the bourgeois liberals (with the Cadet Party at their head) picture to themselves the sharing of power with the Purishkeviches, the joint rule of the Purishkeviches and the Guchkovs (or the Milyukovs) over the masses—*cannot* satisfy the peasant millions. That is why the class position of the peasantry, on the one hand, and of the big bourgeoisie, on the other, inevitably creates a wide gulf between democrats and liberals.

As a rule, neither of the two political trends is clearly defined, neither is a fully conscious one, but it is a fact that the peasants *gravitate* towards democracy, the bourgeoisie towards monarchist liberalism; this was proved to the hilt during the extremely eventful first decade of the twentieth century in Russia. Not only did the peasant masses display their democracy in the liberation movement of 1905, and in the First and Second Dumas, but even in the nobility-dominated Third Duma; *forty-three* peasant deputies, including Rights and independents, introduced an agrarian bill

* See p. 372 of this volume.—*Ed.*

which was more democratic than that introduced by the Cadets.

In general, the land problem is the main problem of the Russian peasantry today. Less than 30,000 landowners in European Russia possess 70 million dessiatines of land, and practically the same amount is held by 10 million poor peasant households. On the one hand, an average of 2,300 dessiatines per farm; on the other, an average of seven dessiatines. At the present level of Russia's historical development, this could lead to but one economic result—the most widespread practice of all sorts of "labour-service" economy, that is to say, of survivals of the old corvée system. Peasants held in bondage, poverty such as has not been seen in Europe for many years, and periodic famines reminiscent of the Middle Ages, are consequences of this state of affairs.

The Cadet bourgeoisie seeks to settle the agrarian problem in a liberal fashion, so as to preserve the landed estates, selling part of the land to the peasantry at "a fair price", and giving the landowners the upper hand over the peasants in the bodies effecting the "reform". Naturally, the peasants would certainly prefer a democratic solution of the agrarian problem. This democratic solution, even if all the land is transferred to the peasants without compensation, does not and cannot in the least encroach on the foundations of capitalist society—the power of money, commodity production, and the domination of the market. The peasants, for the most part, have a rather hazy idea of the matter and the Narodniks have created a complete ideology, a whole doctrine, which gave that haze something of a "socialist" hue, although there is nothing socialist even in the most radical agrarian revolution.

But, in practice, as the peasant movement grows in volume and in strength, the influence of this hazy conception diminishes, and the real, democratic, substance of the agrarian wishes and demands of the peasants becomes more pronounced. In this sphere, and even more so in the sphere of political questions, of paramount importance is the role played by working-class democracy and its struggle to prevent the submission of the peasants to liberal leadership. It will be no exaggeration to say that there is a very close connection between the successes of Russian democracy as

a whole, those of the past and those yet to come, and the transfer of the political leadership of the peasantry from the liberals to working-class democracy. Unless this leadership passes to the working class, Russian democracy cannot hope to attain any more or less serious successes.

The electoral law of June 3, 1907, as we know, made the greatest "inroads" upon the suffrage of the peasants. We need only remind the readers that that law provided for an increase from 1,952 to 2,594, or 32.9 per cent in the number of electors sent by the landowners, while the number of electors from the peasants and Cossacks was reduced to less than a half, from 2,659 to 1,168, or by 56.1 per cent. In addition, the law of June 3, 1907, provides that the deputies to the Duma from the peasant curia (officially designated: "from conventions of delegates from volosts*") are not to be chosen by the peasant electors alone, as was the case previously, but by the entire electoral assembly of each gubernia, that is to say, by bodies in which landowners and big capitalists predominate.

This being the procedure, the peasant democrats (Trudoviks) can secure seats in the Duma only if *all* the peasant electors, without a single exception, are Trudoviks. In that case the Right landowners will be compelled to elect Trudoviks from the peasant curia, just as they have been compelled to elect Social-Democrats from the worker curia. However, solidarity, organisation, and class-consciousness are naturally much less developed among the peasants than among the workers. Thus there still remains an almost untapped field of serious and rewarding work of political education. And it is this sphere of activity that should command the main attention of all democrats and all Marxists who "go among all classes of the population",** and not that of making advances to and flirting with the counter-revolutionary liberals (the Cadets), a sphere that has become a favourite one with the liquidators on *Nasha Zarya*, etc.

We pointed out in the preceding article that in the elections to the Third Duma the peasant curia proved to be the most democratic of the non-proletarian curias. Out of

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* See footnote to p. 88.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 468.—*Ed.*

53 deputies elected to the Third Duma from the peasant curia, 26, or 49 per cent, were members of the opposition; whereas in the case of the second urban curia (the second assembly of urban voters), only 12 out of 28, or 43 per cent, were members of the opposition. The number of democrats elected to the Third Duma from the peasant curia was 5 out of 53, or 10 per cent; whereas in the case of the second urban curia, their number was 2 out of 28, or 7 per cent.

It is worth while examining which gubernias elected representatives of the opposition from the peasant curia and what was the composition of all the deputies elected by each of them to the Third Duma. Of the 53 gubernias, in each of which the law provides for the election of one deputy from the peasant curia, 23 sent *Rights* (including Octobrists) as representatives of the peasant curia, 17 sent *liberals* (Cadets, Progressists, and Moslems), and only five sent *democrats* (Trudoviks). In eight gubernias independent peasants were elected.

On closer examination we see that *not a single one* of the gubernias which elected a majority of Right deputies to the Third Duma sent a democrat to represent the peasant curia. Democrats (Trudoviks) were elected only in those gubernias where no Right deputies were returned. These five gubernias—Archangel, Vyatka, Perm, Stavropol, and Tomsk—are represented in the Third Duma by 15 liberals, 8 Trudoviks, and 3 Social-Democrats. There is hardly any room for doubt that, had the peasants and the workers in these gubernias been more class-conscious and better organised, it would have been possible to increase, at the expense of the liberals, the proportion of democrats elected.

It may not be perhaps amiss to point out here that altogether 24 gubernias sent a majority of opposition deputies to the Third Duma. In 18 of these 24 only opposition deputies were elected. In all, these 24 gubernias are represented in the Duma by 9 Right deputies, 2 independents, 55 liberals, 14 Trudoviks, and 8 Social-Democrats. The reader will thus readily see that there is a fairly widespread opportunity to increase the proportion of democratic deputies at the expense of the liberals and, in general, to win the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry away from their influence.

It is interesting to note further that in 10 gubernias out of the 17 which elected liberals from the peasant curia, the Rights gained more seats than the opposition. We must therefore assume that, as a rule, *there were no Rights at all* among the peasant electors in these gubernias, for if there had been, the Right majorities in the gubernia electoral assemblies would surely have elected them....

The duty of the working-class democrats with regard to the peasants in the elections is perfectly clear. They must carry their purely class propaganda to a peasantry that is becoming proletarianised. They must help the peasants to unite their forces in the elections to enable them, even on the basis of the June Third electoral law, to send to the Fourth Duma their *own* representatives in as large numbers as possible despite the obstacles put in their way both by the supporters of the old regime and by the liberals. They must strive to consolidate the leadership of working-class democrats and explain the great harm caused by the vacillation of the peasant democrats toward the liberals.

IV. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ELECTIONS TO THE THIRD DUMA

For the purpose of providing a concrete definition of the duties of working-class democrats in the election campaign, it would be useful, we believe, to examine, in as great detail as possible, the data relating to the elections to the Third Duma in a few individual gubernias. In the first place, such an examination will help us to understand more clearly and to become more thoroughly familiar with the intricate and involved electoral system provided by the law of June 3, 1907; and, secondly, it will give all those active in the election campaign a very real idea of their position as democrats, of the "circumstances" under which they will have to carry on their work. If the democrats in the various localities study the data relating to their respective gubernias, that will add to our data, help to correct errors, and immediately arouse the interest of everyone who is aware of his duty to participate in the elections with a view to the political enlightenment of the wage-workers and the organisation of the forces of democracy.

Take, for example, Kazan Gubernia. It is represented in the Third Duma by ten deputies, equally divided between the Rights and the opposition—five Rights (four Octobrists and one Nationalist) and five liberals (one Progressist, two Cadets, and two Moslems). There are neither Trudoviks nor Social-Democrats.

And yet, judging by the data on Kazan Gubernia, it must be admitted that the democrats had a fairly good chance there. Of the Rights, one (Sazonov) was elected by the assembly of landowners, three Octobrists were elected by the first and second assemblies of urban voters (including Mr. Kapustin, an inveterate counter-revolutionary, who was elected at the second assembly of urban voters), and one Octobrist at the general assembly of electors. Of the liberals, one was elected by the assembly of landowners, one from the peasants (the Cadet Lunin) and *three* at the general assembly of electors.

Since the general assembly of electors elected three liberals and one Right, it is obvious that the liberals had a majority in the gubernia electoral assembly, but it was a precarious majority, otherwise not a single Right would have been elected by the general assembly. The precariousness of the liberal majority is also evident from the fact that the landowners elected one Progressist and one Right; had the liberals had a stable majority they would have prevented the latter's election.

Altogether Kazan Gubernia is allowed 117 electors who are divided among the several curias as follows: peasants 33, landowners 50, first urban curia 18, second urban curia 14, and workers 2. Consequently, the landowners together with the first urban curia represent the majority (50+18=68 out of 117). As we know, the law of June 3, 1907, is so framed as to *guarantee* in all gubernias such a majority or an even more "reliable" one, i.e., a majority made up of landowners alone (the landowner curia alone to have an absolute majority in the gubernia electoral assembly).

The liberals won half the seats in the Duma because they were apparently well represented among the landowners. On the other hand, it seems that the urban electors were practically all Rights. Unless we assume this to have been the case, it is hard to explain how it happened that the

deputies elected from the two urban assemblies were Rights when the liberals had a majority in the gubernia electoral assembly. The Cadets were compelled to vote for Rights. Given the precarious majority of the liberals among the electors, mentioned above, the working-class democrats would have a convenient field for action; they could take advantage of the dissensions among the landowners and capitalists to organise the forces of democracy as a whole and to get Social-Democrats and, in particular, Trudoviks elected to the Duma.

If, for instance, there were 57 Rights and as many liberals among the electors and only three democrats (two worker Social-Democrats, and one peasant Trudovik), that alone would enable the three democrats to elect one Social-Democrat to the Duma—not to mention the rewarding task of rallying the democratic forces which these three could tackle, considering that there would be 33 peasant electors. We have assumed that there might be three-democrats, because three is the minimum required by the law (Article 125 of the Regulations governing the elections), to nominate candidates by ballot—a candidate who fails to obtain three nomination ballots, cannot stand for election. Obviously, the three required by the law could be made up by two liberals joining a democrat, provided the liberals do not "progress" (in the *Vekhi* direction) to the point where even in the gubernia electoral assembly they prefer an Octobrist to a Social-Democrat.

In the case of a tie between the Rights and the liberals even one democrat, by voting now with the Rights against the liberals, now with the liberals against the Rights, could prevent the election of any candidate to the Duma and thus (in accordance with Article 119 of the Regulations governing the elections) bring about an adjournment the duration of which, according to the same article, is set by the assembly itself, but may not exceed twelve hours, and arrange for an understanding between the liberals and the democrats on condition that the latter obtain seats in the Duma.

The example of Kazan may serve as an illustration of two possible lines for the workers' policy in the elections to the Fourth Duma (and, consequently, lines for the workers' policy *in general*, since the policy pursued in the elec-

tions is but the application of the general policy to a specific case). One line is to vote, as a general rule, for the more progressive candidates, without going into any further definitions. The other line is to take advantage of the antagonism between the Rights and the liberals to organise the democrats. The ideological implication of the first line is passive subordination to the hegemony of the Cadets; the practical result of this line in case of success would be an increase in the Octobrist-Cadet majority in the Fourth Duma at the expense of the Right Octobrist majority (with a possible *decrease* in the democratic minority). The ideological implication of the second line is the waging of a struggle against the leadership of the Cadets over the peasants and over bourgeois democracy in general; its practical result in case of success would be the increase and consolidation, the strengthening of the group of democrats in the Fourth Duma.

In practice the first line would amount to a liberal labour policy. The second line represents the Marxist working-class policy. As for a more detailed explanation of the meaning of these two policies, we shall have many occasions to revert to that in the future.

Zvezda, Nos. 33, 34, 36, and 1 (37), December 10, 17, 31, 1911, and January 6, 1912
Signed: *William Frey* and *W. Frey*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

OLD AND NEW

Nik. Nikolin's article in *Zvezda*, No. 29, characteristically entitled "The New in the Old", raises a number of extremely interesting and important questions. A discussion on these questions is undoubtedly desirable in order to lay down an exact, clear, and definite line of conduct for adherents to the Russian working-class democratic movement.

The chief shortcoming of Nik. Nikolin's article is that many of his propositions are extremely vague. The author says, without explaining why, that "on many points" he would "perhaps disagree" with me. I, for my part, must say that none of Nikolin's propositions call for disagreement, since he never makes outspoken statements.

Thus, for instance, Nikolin comes out dead against people who believe that "our present situation ... is approximately what it was at the beginning of the twentieth century". According to his interpretation, people holding such an opinion deny that there is something *new* in the old. Of course, they are wrong if they deny that. And, of course, Nikolin is a thousand times right when he says that there is something new in the old which it is necessary to take into consideration and make use of. But. Nikolin says nothing as to what the new consists of, as to how exactly it is to be taken into consideration, etc. On the other hand, it is not clear from the passages he quotes what exactly his opponents mean by the word "approximately". If the new in the old is to be taken into consideration in the same way as the Russian Marxists did exactly three years ago in their appraisal of the political situation created after the three years of storm and stress (i.e., after 1905-07), then, in my opinion, it would not be wrong to say: "our present situation is *approximately* what it was at the be-

ginning of the twentieth century". If, however, people put forward a proposition of this kind without, at first, giving a precise, clear, and definite appraisal of the situation and the problems involved, then, of course, it is wrong.

The old problems, the old methods of solving them, and new ways of preparing for the solution—that, it seems to me, is how, approximately, the answer given three years ago could be formulated. From the standpoint of this answer, participation in the Third Duma, which Nik. Nikolin advocates so warmly and so correctly, appears to be *absolutely* indispensable. The "trend" which repudiates this participation or which hesitates to come out, openly, clearly, and without beating about the bush, in favour of participating in the Third Duma, is taking the name of working-class democracy in vain. Actually this is a trend outside working-class democracy, for it represents a "legitimate shade" of anarchist ideas but by no means of Marxist ideas.

Take the question of the "superstructure". "Formerly," writes Nik. Nikolin, "it may have seemed that the bureaucracy was the sole and chief enemy of 'all Russia'; today nobody thinks so any longer.... We are sufficiently well aware that the Markovs, Krestovnikovs, Volkonskys, Purishkeviches, Guchkovs, Khomyakovs, Avdakovs, and their like, are all representatives of that particular social milieu from which the bureaucracy draws its strength and obtains the motives for its activity."

Nik. Nikolin's emphasis on the connection of the "bureaucracy" with the upper ranks of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie is quite correct and extremely valuable. Only people who have never given a thought to the new brought by the first decade of the twentieth century, who understand nothing about the interdependence between the economic and the political relations in Russia and about the significance of the Third Duma can deny that this connection exists, deny that the present agrarian policy is bourgeois in character, deny in general that "a step" has been taken "towards the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy".

But it is not enough to concede that the connection exists, it is necessary to point out what exactly is the actual nature of this connection. The step taken toward the transformation into something new by no means eliminates the

old, say, "bureaucratic" regime with its vast self-sufficiency and independence, with its "peculiar nature" which the methods of Tolmachov and Reinbot (etc., et al.) lend it, and with its uncontrolled finances. While "drawing strength" from the support of the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie the bureaucracy is not recruited from the bourgeoisie, but from the old, very old, *not* only pre-revolutionary (before 1905), but even pre-Reform (before 1861), landed and office-holding nobility. While it "obtains the motives for its activity" largely from the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie the bureaucracy lends its bourgeois activity *a tendency and a form* that is purely and solely feudal. For, if there is a difference between the bourgeois character of the Prussian Junker and the American farmer (although both of them are unquestionably bourgeois), there is a no less evident and equally great difference between the bourgeois character of the Prussian Junker and the "bourgeois character" of Markov and Purishkevich. Compared with the latter, the Prussian Junker is quite a "European"!

The principal, cardinal, and fatal mistake which, for instance, M. Alexandrov commits in his well-known pamphlet is that he forgets about the vast self-sufficiency and independence of the "bureaucracy"; and N. R-kov, in No. 9-10 of the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*, indulges in this mistake to a point where it is reduced to an absurdity. Only the above-mentioned answer given three years ago contains an exact definition of the extent to which the old persists in the so-called "bureaucratic" regime, and of the changes, or, rather, modifications, that have been introduced by the "new".

I am by no means opposed to the "exploration of other ways and means", and I attach vast importance to constant and repeated discussion of the direct answers to the vexed questions, but I cannot refrain, however, from voicing my protest against the contraband that the liquidators, for example, are smuggling in under the flag of "exploration". It is obvious that the differences of opinion between the "exploring" R-kov and the "exploring" Potresovs, Yezhovs, and Chatskys concern only *details* of their liberal labour policy. The stand taken by all these "explorers" is that of a liberal, not a Marxist, labour policy! It is one thing to

"explore ways" and discuss them from a Marxist standpoint in books, magazines, etc.; and it is a different thing to come out with definite answers in publications giving practical guidance.

Take the question of "romanticism". Nik Nikolin condemns romanticism as a hopelessly obsolete feature of the "old" and cites the following example: "The liberal thought that he was performing the part of champion of all the oppressed, while the socialist believed that he was backed by all 'thinking' and 'labouring' Russia". The example refers to the failure to understand the class struggle, and Nikolin would have been perfectly right, of course, had he said that such a "socialist"—obviously a Narodnik—was really no socialist at all but a *democrat* who cloaked his democracy with pseudo-socialist phrases. But in speaking of romanticism, one must not overlook the *Vekhi*, i.e., counter-revolutionary, interpretation of that term which is current in the most widely circulated, namely, the liberal press. We cannot help protesting against such an interpretation. We cannot help noting the "new" feature, namely, that liberalism in Russia has given rise to the liberal trend of the *Vekhi* type, the policy which the Milyukovs actually pursue although in words they renounce it for purely diplomatic reasons.

Hence the following practical conclusion of major importance: on the basis of the "new" experience of the first ten years of the twentieth century, the line of demarcation between liberalism and democracy must be drawn more sharply. It is, of course, absurd to "lump the liberal opposition with reaction", but this conclusion alone (which Nikolin draws), without the one I have just indicated, is decidedly insufficient.

In general, it must be said that it is in his conclusion that Nik. Nikolin commits his chief sin—that of being vague and leaving things unsaid. Take the first part of his conclusion. "Both the unreasonable infatuation with the old methods of action and the emphatically negative attitude to those methods are equally harmful". In my opinion this is not a dialectical, but an eclectic, conclusion. The unreasonable is unreasonable, and therefore it is always and absolutely harmful—that goes without saying. In order to

lend this part of the conclusion a vital, dialectical significance, it would have to be couched in approximately the following terms: an attempt to justify the refusal to take part in the Third or in the Fourth Duma by references to the old methods of action would be an extremely grave mistake, a hollow phrase, a meaningless cry, in spite of the fact, or—more correctly—because of the fact, that we must have an emphatically positive attitude to those methods.

It is just in passing, since it is impossible for me to dwell on this question in greater detail, that I have thus indicated how, in my opinion, the second part of the quoted conclusion ought to be corrected.

Zvezda, No. 33, December 10, 1911,
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Zvezda* text

MEETING OF THE BOLSHEVIK GROUPS ABROAD[168]

DECEMBER 14-17 (27-30), 1911

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT "STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY"

Organisation of the Social-Democratic Party Forces Abroad and the Tasks of the Bolsheviks

The present state of Social-Democratic organisations abroad is abnormal in the extreme.

From 1908 onwards, when Social-Democratic publishing had begun to shift more and more abroad, and prior to the Plenary Meeting, there was a complete organisational split in all important centres abroad, owing to the complete secession of the Menshevik groups from the Party.

The Plenary Meeting (January 1910) attempted to create unity on the basis of its unanimous approval of an anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist line, and made a particularly energetic call for the establishment of complete unity abroad.

After the Plenary Meeting, however, in view of the non-fulfilment of its terms by the liquidators and otzovists, no unity of the groups abroad was achieved. On the contrary, there was greater disintegration, as in fact the *Vperyod* group broke away from the Bolsheviks, and Plekhanov's followers from the Mensheviks. The parallel—"first" and "second" or Menshevik and Bolshevik—groups continued to exist traditionally, but actually in no way united any sound elements capable of carrying out joint Social-Democratic work.

At the present moment Bolshevik, "conciliator", *Vperyod*, *Golos*, and Plekhanov's groups exist abroad in factional isolation, linked together purely formally, and often not at

all, completely independent of each other, following different ideological lines and having their own individual ties with various Social-Democratic elements in Russia.

The formation of the Russian Organising Commission (R.O.C.) in Russia by the forces of the Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks and the energetic start made by this R.O.C. Collegium to call a general Party conference of the R.S.D.L.P. make for a decisive turn in the history of the Party and show the only possible way, demanded by reality, out of the condition of disruption and collapse.

Since the Plenary Meeting, real Social-Democratic work has been carried out only by the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks; it was particularly harmonious in 1910. The *Golos* group represents nothing but a section abroad of the Russian liquidator group *Dyelo Zhizni* and *Nasha Zarya*, which has placed itself outside the Party; and the *Vperyod* group abroad, which continues to cover up otzovism and through its leader Lunacharsky to carry out religious propaganda, conducts work which is not Social-Democratic.

At the present moment, the R.O.C., created by the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks and supported by nearly all the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, is, in fact, the only absolutely competent centre of Social-Democratic Party work.

Uniting the Bolsheviks in one Social-Democratic organisation abroad, the Meeting places the responsibility for the continuing split abroad on those groups who do not wish to support the Russian centre, the R.O.C., or on those who, cut off from Russia, continue "to play at agreeing", thus supporting *non*-Social-Democratic groups that are isolated from Russian work.

The Bolshevik organisation abroad will, as hitherto, use all its strength to attract, irrespective of trends, all Social-Democrats prepared to support the R.O.C. and to carry out the Party line, that is, the anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist (and equally anti-god-seeker) line, in order that they join forces and merge into one Party organisation.

The practical task of the Party organisation abroad is to struggle against the liquidationist and otzovist trends,

PROMMAPA TOMAS NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

against the disintegration of the groups abroad having no ideological basis, assisting the unification of all real Social-Democratic Party members and pro-Party Mensheviks in particular, and assisting the R.O.C. We consider that the organs which should be supported by Party members are the Central Organ and *Rabochaya Gazeta*, as the isolation of the pro-Party Mensheviks (abroad) can in no manner be justified, and no change of the *line* confirmed by Party decisions can be round in the above-mentioned journals.

Written early in December 1911

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Published according to
the manuscript

2

RESOLUTION ON THE RUSSIAN ORGANISING COMMISSION FOR THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE[169]

This Meeting confirms that for a long time, for two years at least, the Party has recognised the urgent need to call a Party conference. At the present time, despite all obstacles a decisive step has been taken to bring this about. An R.O.C. has been formed in Russia, supported by all local organisations (Kiev, Baku, Tiflis, Ekaterinoslav, Ekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Nikolayev, Saratov, Kazan, Wilno, Dvinsk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Samara, Tyumen, Rostov, and others).

This Meeting welcomes the formation of the R.O.C., and declares it to be the duty of every Party member to render it every support.

Written early in December 1911

Published on January 12, 1912, in the *Notification* of the Committee of the Organisations abroad

Published according to the text of the *Notification*

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

I

The elections to the Fourth Duma are close at hand, and naturally, the question of the election campaign is on the order of the day. It is clear that any wavering as to the advisability, from the point of view of Marxism, of our participation in the elections, is impermissible. It is not within the bounds of Marxism and the working-class party, but only *outside* them, that views, hostile or indefinite, or even merely indifferent to our participation in the elections, can be regarded as "legitimate" shades of opinion. It may even seem somewhat embarrassing to repeat this elementary truth, proved and corroborated by experience many years ago (beginning with the end of 1907), but we nevertheless have to repeat it, for the worst evil we have to contend with now, is confusion and disintegration. And it is not only those who give vague or evasive answers to elementary questions that contribute to this confusion and disintegration, but also those who, for reasons of diplomacy or through lack of principles, etc., defend vagueness and evasion.

The elections to the State Duma naturally impose upon all Marxists, upon all members of the working-class movement, the duty to bend all their efforts to develop the most energetic, persistent activity and initiative in every field of that movement. The answers to the questions on the principles and the programmatic, political and organisational content and line of this activity which were elaborated during recent years, must now be directly applied in practice to the special sphere of "election" activity.

We deliberately speak of answers already formulated. It would be ridiculous indeed to suppose that now, several months, or, for that matter, even a year before the elections, you could manage to "find" the answers, if they had not yet been found, if they had not been thought out and tested by the practical experience of several years. After all, it is a matter of providing answers to *all* the "vexed questions" relating to our world outlook in general, to our appraisal of the previous, extremely eventful period of Russian history, to our estimate of the present period (which, in its main features, became defined as far back as 1908), and to the political and organisational problems which had to be solved, one way or another, by everyone who took part in the working-class movement during the last, say, four years. At present it can only be a matter of applying formulated answers and methods of work to the present particular field of activity, the elections to the Fourth Duma. To say that "in the course of the election campaign", i.e., of one branch of activity, we can work out the answers to the questions relating to *all* branches of activity, relating not only to 1912, but also to "the entire period beginning with 1908", would mean comforting ourselves with illusions, or concealing, justifying the reigning confusion and disintegration.

We are concerned, in the first place, with answers to programme questions. What have developments in the past four years in Russia given us in this respect? It must be admitted by each and all that during these four years no attempts have been made to revise, or amend, or further elaborate the old programme of the Marxists as far as its principles are concerned. Characteristic of the "current period", or more correctly in many respects it could be called the "stagnation" or "rotten" period, is the scornful attitude to the programme, and the desire to abridge and reduce it *without* the least attempt at definite and downright revision. In our epoch "revisionism", in its specific role of bourgeois emasculation of Marxist truths, is not of the militant variety which raises "the banner of revolt" (as, for instance, Bernstein's in Germany some ten years ago, Struve's in Russia some fifteen years ago, or Prokopovich's somewhat later); it is merely a cowardly and furtive renunciation, often defended on the ground of "prac-

tical", mainly only allegedly practical, considerations. The successors and continuers of the "cause" of Struve and Prokopovich—people like Potresov, Maslov, Levitsky and Co—"took part" in the reigning disorder and contributed to it (as also did Yushkevich, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, etc.), mostly by means of timid and unsystematic attempts to throw the "old" Marxism overboard and to replace it by a "new", bourgeois doctrine. It was no mere chance, nor was it due to the caprice of "groups", that questions of theory have attracted so much attention during the past four years. Such questions have been treated as "trivialities", even if only in part, by those who timidly renounce the old Marxism, and by them alone. If we speak today of the defence of the Marxist programme and the Marxist world outlook in connection with and in the course of the election campaign—if we speak of them not merely as an official duty or with the intention of saying nothing, we must take into account the *experience* of the past four years and not mere words, promises, or assurances. These four years have actually brought to light quite a number of "unreliable fellow-travellers" of Marxism among our intellectuals (who often desire to be Marxists), they have taught us to distrust such fellow-travellers, they have served to *enhance* in the minds of thinking workers the importance of Marxist theory and of the Marxist programme in its uncurtailed form.

There is a range of questions in which the programme comes close to or actually merges with tactics. Naturally, these problems assume a considerably greater immediate and practical significance during the election campaign. It is in respect of these problems that the spirit of renunciation and confusion has expressed itself in by far the sharpest form. Some said that the old tasks were no longer valid, because the system of government in Russia had, in essence, already become bourgeois. Others maintained that from now on Russia's development could proceed, like that of Germany or Austria after 1848, without any "leaps". Others again insisted that the idea of the hegemony of the working class had outlived its day, and that Marxists must aspire "*not* to hegemony, but to a class party", etc.

It goes without saying that, literally, not a single prob-

lem of tactics can be solved or explained to any extent completely, fully, and coherently, without an analysis of these ideas, justly described as "liquidationist", and which form an inseparable part of the broad stream of bourgeois public opinion which is turning back and away from democracy. Anyone who has kept his eyes open to what is going on in practical life knows that confusion in these problems is a hundred times more pronounced than might be judged from what has been written on this subject. Nor, of course, could it be otherwise in the years following the events at the end of 1905 and of 1906-07. But the more "natural" this disintegration (in a bourgeois environment), the more urgent and vital is the Marxists' task of waging a comprehensive and unremitting fight against it.

Periods of renunciation and disintegration similar to those of the past four years in Russia have been known to all countries. There were cases when not even groups remained, but only isolated individuals who in similar circumstances managed for ten or more years to "keep the banner flying", to keep the ideas of continuity alive, and subsequently to apply these ideas in a materially changed social and political situation. In Russia matters are not so bad as that; for our "heritage" includes both a programme which has remained intact, and *formulated* answers to the fundamental tactical and organisational problems of the "moment". The liquidationist trend, which has renounced this answer, cannot replace it by anything resembling an explicit and clear answer of its own.

An election campaign implies the application of a definite solution of political problems to complicated propaganda, agitational, organisational, etc., activity. You cannot embark upon such a campaign without a definite answer to the problems. And the answer which the Marxists formulated in 1908 has been fully corroborated by the experience of the past four years. The new, bourgeois content of the government's agrarian policy; the organisation of the landowners and the bourgeoisie in the Third Duma; the behaviour of even the most "Left" bourgeois party, the Cadets, so vividly illustrated by the trip to London, and not only by that trip; the ideological currents of the *Vekhi* type, which enjoyed such immense success among "educated" society—all these

facts clearly indicate that the old problems have not been solved but have to be tackled now under new conditions, in a more bourgeois atmosphere, when the bourgeoisie is systematically turning *away from* democracy and *assuming the role* of a responsible, party, "loyal", etc., "opposition". A new situation and new methods of preparing for the old solution of the old problems, a more evident split between democracy and the anti-democratic liberal bourgeoisie, such are the main features of the answer formulated by the Marxists to the fundamental political questions of the present period.

The answer to the problems of organisation is inseparably connected with the entire world outlook of the Marxists, with their estimate of the political meaning and significance of the June Third period. In the main the old methods are to be preserved and adapted to the new circumstances with their so-called "opportunities" of all sorts, such as open associations, unions, etc. Nuclei, and a network of organisations around them, connected with them, and directed by them, are to be formed. The "nuclei" are to show greater flexibility, using more adaptable methods of work which do not in every particular resemble the old forms. It is also obligatory to take advantage, not only of the platform provided by the Duma, but of all sorts of similar "opportunities". It is an answer that does not in the least tie our hands by any uniform standards or obligatory forms of work; it leaves vast scope for working out the most suitable ways and means of combining various forms of activity. But it is a "firm" answer, based on unshakable principles, and as such it counters the prevailing disorder, spirit of renunciation, and confusion, not only by a verbal proclamation of loyalty to the old, but also by setting up a fundamental organisational principle, which enables us to secure ideological stability in real life. Those who have "accumulated a reserve", even if they are few in number, are uniting and systematically upholding the "hierarchy"—its spirit, its teaching, its principles and traditions, but not, of course, its forms.

The liquidationist trend, on the other hand, *succumbs* to the prevailing amorphousness (prevailing *not only* among us, by no means only in the working class, but to an even

greater extent among other classes and parties); it abandons the work for the old, and uses the quest for "something new" as an excuse for justifying confusion. The liquidationist trend among the Marxists is but one rivulet joining the broad ideological stream of bourgeois society, the stream directed against democracy in general, against the mass movement in particular, and especially against the recent forms of the organisation and leadership of the movement. Such are the general propositions of Marxism, its attitude to the tasks and problems of the present period, an attitude, we repeat, of long standing, which ought now to be translated into an "election campaign" with an integral ideological, programmatic, tactical, and organisational content.

II

Let us now examine the stand taken on the question of the election campaign by *Nasha Zarya*, leading organ of the liquidationist trend.

There is nothing more repugnant to the spirit of Marxism than phrase-mongering. And the most unpleasant feature that strikes one in Nos. 6 and 7-8 of *Nasha Zarya* is the incredible orgy of phrase-mongering that might truly be that of a Tartarin. The Tartarins of our liquidationist trend have converted an election campaign, something customary for Marxists in all lands, and which even in Russia has already been conducted *twice* on a large scale, into something wrapped up in so many pompous words, words and words, that it is simply unendurable.

Mr. Yuri Chatsky, in his article "Time to Begin", *begins* an exposition of the views of the liquidators, and, to all intents and purposes, *finishes* the exposition of these views and does so as the mastermind, leaving it to L. Martov to provide the trimmings, the gloss, the literary ornamentation.

Here is a sample of the writings of Yuri-Tartarin:

"It is hardly possible to expect with any certainty that the election campaign will be conducted, organisationally, in an absolutely centralised manner, although we must strive for this by all those ways we have spoken of ... by organisationally consolidating the

results of the political amalgamation of the worker Social-Democrats in the course of the political campaign...."

For mercy's sake, dear man—why compete with Trotsky? Why try to stun the readers in general, and the workers in particular with all that verbiage about the results of political amalgamation in the course of the political campaign? Or about consolidating those results? After all, it is nothing but words, merely giving yourself airs by the ponderous repetition of a simple idea. Organisational "consolidation" is always essential, before, as well as after, elections. You call the elections a political campaign, then—"to add weight" —you speak of a "series [!] of all-Russian [!] political campaigns", and by all this din and clatter of words you *obscure* the really urgent, vital, and practical question: *how* to organise. Do we need "nuclei" and a network of more or less open, if unstable, unions around them? Yes or no? If we do need them, we need them both before and after the elections—since the elections are but one of our jobs, one of many. If no systematic work has been carried on *for a long time*, you will not succeed in "consolidating" *anything* in the course of the election campaign. Any practical worker will tell you it is nonsense. High-sounding phrases are used only to cover up the absence of an explicit answer to the *fundamental* question, viz., how to organise for every form of activity, and not just for the election campaign.

To speak, apropos of the elections, about "*the fighting mobilisation of the proletariat*" (*sic*! see p. 49), or about a "broad and open mobilisation of the worker masses" (p. 54), and so on and so forth, means not only to lack any sense of proportion, but plainly to harm the modest, necessarily modest, work by fostering phrase-mongering *of exactly the same quality* as that of the "otzovists", "ultimatumists", etc. According to the latter, a boycott is needed as a means of especially stressing that the "spirit" is not dead (but the "spirit" of the work must permeate all spheres of activity, including the elections); the barkers of liquidationism, on the other hand, maintain that the elections will solve everything—"the fighting mobilisation" (one merely wonders how this Russian quasi-"Marxist" can unblushingly put down such things on paper!) and "organisational consoli-

dation of the results of the political amalgamation in the course of a political campaign"! We all know perfectly well that the elections of 1912 (unless conditions arise which will radically change the situation that existed in 1908 and exists in 1911) will not, and cannot, bring about *either* a "broad" *or* an "open" "mobilisation of the masses". All they will give is a modest opportunity for activity that is not very broad and not very open, and this opportunity should be made use of. But there is no point in imitating Trotsky's inflated phrases.

The cry about "open" organisations in connection with the elections is just a bit of plain stupidity. What we say is: better let us do the work *not quite so* openly, fellow-workers, that will be safer, more proper, saner, and *more useful* as a means of influencing *wider sections* of the population than the twaddle about existing "openly". In times such as ours, only utterly stupid or utterly frivolous people can shout and brag: "We can do everything openly".

"A party (a class party) will appear only as a product of the organised creative efforts of the independently active vanguard of the workers" (p. 41).

Phew! Have mercy on us! Don't you know that in all countries it took the advanced workers and real Marxist "intellectuals", who whole-heartedly threw in their lot with the workers, decades to form and train their parties? *Nor can it be different* in our country, and there is no point in this attempt to scare away the Russian working-class reader by that pompous bunk about "creative efforts" (when it is a question of teaching the ABC and of carrying small ordinary stones to lay the foundation), about the "independently active" vanguard, etc. Under the spell of Chatsky-Tartarin, Mr. Martov also lets his tongue run away with him, and he speaks of "independently conscious elements of the working class" (No. 7-8, p. 42), who are coming forward to replace the old personnel now going through a process of "self-liquidation" (ibid.).

They are laying it on thick: "independently active", "independently conscious", "creative", "fighting mobilisation", "the broadest", "most open".... One wonders how it is these gentlemen are not nauseated by all this "verbal incontinence", to use Shchedrin's expression.

The whole point is that they *have* to resort to florid, laboured phrases which are meant to stun and stupefy the workers (and still more so the intellectual, because workers laugh at a style like Yuri Chatsky's, and it is mostly high-school boys who "*fall*" for it), because they have no plain, direct, and clear answer to the plain, clear, and immediate questions. The question of the election platform enables us to give a particularly vivid illustration of the truth regarding the conversion of *vague* thoughts into vague, bombastic, and pompous phrases.

III

In referring to the importance of an election platform, Mr. Yuri Chatsky again speaks with great eloquence. The question of a platform is "one of the most cardinal questions". Splendid! "To the worker Social-Democrats it [the platform] must be a product of feeling [!], of deep thought; they must consider it *their own*." (Yuri Chatsky's italics.)

It is true that the workers ought to give *deep thought* to the platform. Nor would it be at all amiss for intellectuals writing in near-Marxist magazines to give the platform some thought. But the statement that the platform must be "a product of feeling" is more than we can understand. Perhaps Nevedomsky and Lunacharsky will treat us in the next issue of *Nasha Zarya* to "feeling" articles on how the independently active vanguard of the independently conscious masses that are being mobilised is to "feel" an election platform.

And here, if you please, is a gem from an article by Mr. F. Dan: "...the sense and the political content of election tactics change completely depending on who creates and applies these tactics: a self-governing collective of the Social-Democratic working-class vanguard, with all its proletarian and intellectual forces, or various petty groups of intellectuals, be they even 'Social-Democrats', but not backed up by such a collective, not acting under its control and pressure...". Who, indeed, can doubt that Potresov and Dan are by no means a "petty group of intellectuals", *but* men "backed up by the self-governing collective of the vanguard"

and "acting under its control"! O, these Tartarins of the liquidationist trend!

Have Yuri Chatsky, L. Martov, and F. Dan given any thought to the platform? "It's a shame to admit and a sin to conceal," writes Yuri Chatsky, "but it has also happened that for some of us the platform was one thing, and other things were said in election speeches and articles, everyone pulling his own way."

The truth cannot be denied. "For some of us" such things have indeed often happened.

For instance, Yuri Chatsky, after indulging in words full of feeling about a platform which is a product of feeling, begins to talk at extremely great length, and in words no less full of feeling, about the importance and the indispensability of a *single* platform. The words full of feeling are deliberately used to obscure the simple question as to whether there can be a *single* platform where there is no unity of political opinion. If there is among us unity of opinion, why waste words and go to the trouble of breaking down an open door when a platform represents an exposition of opinion!

Yuri Chatsky, however, after a lot of beating about the bush apropos of a "single" platform, very clumsily gives away his own "secret". "We attach the greatest importance," he writes, "to the sanction [of the platform] by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma; but at the same time we absolutely insist on the condition that the latter does not follow the line of least resistance by sanctioning a platform imposed upon it by circles abroad." (P. 50.)

This is described thus: *Der König absolut*, *wenn er unseren Willen tut*—the king is absolute ruler so long as he does *our* bidding. It is desirable to have a single platform—provided it is not a platform "imposed by circles abroad". Surely this means that *actually there are* two platforms? One is the platform which you are abusing as being "imposed from abroad" Surely a language worthy of Purishkevich. Just think of it: Yuri Chatsky, working hand in glove with Martov and Dan, writes in Potresov's magazine about something being imposed from abroad! How low one must have fallen to resort to such methods of inciting ignorant people against "abroad"!). The other platform, apparently,

does not come from abroad, but from the self-governing collective of the broad and open organisations of the mobilised masses. In plainer words and without any flourishes: "the other element of possible centralisation is the group of Social-Democratic [?] functionaries who are closely connected with the open workers' movement and are acquiring ever greater stability and prestige in the process of conducting political campaigns. We refer particularly to St. Petersburg and its leading role in the political campaigns of the past year". That is what Yuri Chatsky writes.

It is all quite simple: the "group" of St. Petersburg liquidators, well known for their work in Mr. Potresov's magazine—that is the "element of centralisation". Clear, very clear, indeed, friend Yuri Chatsky!

There must be a single platform, *but* ... it must not be one "imposed by circles abroad", and it must satisfy the group of St. Petersburg liquidators.... What an ardent advocate of "unity" he is—this Yuri Chatsky!

IV

Let us now take a look at L. Martov's "fundamental platform propositions".... As the basis of the platform he takes the programme—and that is as it should be, of course. Martov gives a paraphrase of sections of the programme. Only it is not clear whether Martov is advocating *that* programme which he outlined in No. 7-8 of *Nasha Zarya*. *That* particle of the old programme is acceptable even to Larin and Levitsky, and, probably, to Prokopovich. Or, does Martov subscribe to the *whole* of the *old* programme?

In fairness it must be noted that there is one passage in Martov's article which indicates the latter to be the case. It is the passage on p. 48 in which he states that sometimes they are compelled to "refrain from speaking out in clear terms" (that is true), but, they must not *renounce*. Nobody can make them *reduce* the content of their demands, he says. These are very fine words. Unfortunately, the *deeds* do not correspond to these words, for we know perfectly well, for instance, that Larin, whom Martov does "not suspect of reformism", *does reduce* and *renounce*. We shall very soon have

occasion to see that Martov, too, in that very same article while promising not to "reduce", and not to "renounce", actually does both.

Consequently, the actual situation is that, on the question of using the programme as a component part and basis of a platform, we have not one but two platforms: *without* reduction and renunciation, and *with* reduction and renunciation, the purport of which is clearly indicated by the nature of the sermons preached by Larin, Levitsky, and Potresov.

Then comes the question of tactics. We must assess the historical meaning of the June Third period, and this assessment ought to serve as the basis of *all* the definitions of our tasks, of *all* the opinions we "express" on any general and particular problems of current politics. Martov himself is obliged to admit—despite the liquidators' characteristic habit of sneering at "assessments of current events"—that this is a cardinal question. And so, this is what Martov declares with regard to the "old", formulated answer to that question:

> "Attempts were made to define the historical meaning of the 'June Third' period by an inept formula, inept because it is liable to lead to misconceptions, which referred to 'a step toward the transformation ["in the transformation" would be the exact quotation] into a bourgeois monarchy'."...

An "inept" formula.... How mild that sounds! Yet it is only recently that Martov's colleagues saw in this formula a complete negation in principle of the viewpoint which seems to them to be the only salvation. It is only recently that F. Dan spoke of those who "want to shove in where they have once been defeated". Why, then, this change of tone? Is there a fundamental divergence on the question of the historical meaning of the June Third period, or not?

Listen further:

> "This formula fails to account for the actual step *back* toward division of power between the protagonists of absolutism and the landed nobility. It follows from the above that after the events of 1905 the forms in which alone it was possible for this division to be effected created favourable conditions for the mobilisation and organisation of the social forces whose historical mission it is to work for the creation of a 'bourgeois monarchy'."...

According to Martov, these social forces are represented by the bourgeoisie that was "given the right to act as a legal or tolerated opposition" by the June Third period.

Now, examine Martov's reasoning. *On the face of it*, he reproaches the "inept formula" only of overlooking the step back taken by the *government*. But, in the first place, this is factually incorrect. Martov has amazingly bad luck with the "formula" of 1908: whenever he sets out to speak of it he immediately reveals a strange inability (or reluctance?) to give an exact reproduction of the "formula" which is so well known to him. The "formula" speaks plainly and explicitly about the preservation of the "power and revenue" of the *feudal* landowners (and not of bourgeois landowners, as Larin would have us say)! Consequently, if this sort of division of power is to be regarded as a "step back", then this step back, far from being overlooked in our formula, is referred to in the most explicit terms. And, secondly, and *this is the main point*, while speaking of the step back taken by the government, Martov obscures, glosses over, the *step back* taken by the *liberal bourgeoisie*. There's the rub! That is the essence of the arguments, which Martov obscures.

The step back taken by the liberal bourgeoisie consists in the *Vekhi* sentiments of this bourgeoisie, its renunciation of democracy, its *drawing closer* to the "parties of law and order", its support (direct and indirect, ideological and political) for the attempts of the old regime to maintain itself at the cost of minimum "steps in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy". Without the counter-revolutionary (*Vekhi* type) liberal bourgeoisie, it is not only impossible for the bourgeois monarchy to take shape, it cannot even begin to take shape. Martov "forgets" this primarily and mainly for the simple reason that he himself is a *Vekhi* man among Marxists.

In evaluating the June Third period, the liberal is entirely concerned with the fact that the government took a "step back" towards the Purishkeviches. Had the same government, with the same fundamental features of the regime (and of its policy of suppression with regard to *democracy*) left intact, taken a "step" towards him, towards the liberal, that would have been all he required. What the liberal says, in effect, is the following: I have proved by *Vekhi* and its

policy (Milyukov's "London") that I, the liberal, am a sincere, serious, implacable, enemy of democracy—of the democracy that is "anti-state", apostate, infantile, criminal, "thievish", immoral, godless, and what not, as stated in *Vekhi*. Yet, notwithstanding all this, power is shared not with me but with Purishkevich! That is the *meaning* of the policy of the liberals after June 3, 1907, that is the meaning of the "Stolypin liberalism" of Struve, Milyukov, and their like. I offer you my very soul, says the liberal lifting up his eyes to the government, yet you prefer Purishkevich!

On the other hand, the standpoint of proletarian democracy in regard to the June Third period, is fundamentally and radically different. The government took its "step back" to the Purishkeviches at a different, considerably higher, stage of development than before. A "step back" to the nobility was taken in the eighties too. But that was a step back taken in post-Reform Russia, in a Russia a long way advanced beyond the era of Nicholas I, when the noble landowner had ruled in the absence of a "plutocracy", in the absence of railways, and in the absence of a growing third element. And so today, the "step back" to the Purishkeviches is combined with a bourgeois agrarian policy and with the bourgeoisie organised and firmly entrenched in the representative institutions. It is Purishkevich's hegemony in the common (both Purishkevich's and Milyukov's) turn *against* democracy, against the movement of the masses, against so-called "excesses", against the so-called "high-brow [*Vekhi*] revolution", etc.

The liberal's job is to "threaten" Purishkevich so as to get him to "move over" a bit, to make more room for the liberals, but making sure at the same time that this does not obliterate from the face of the earth all the economic and political foundations of Purishkevichism. The task of a democrat in general, and of a Marxist, a representative of proletarian democracy, in particular, is to take advantage of any sharp conflict to bring the masses into the arena for the very purpose of effecting this obliteration. From the point of view of the task of the general transformation of Russia, the historical meaning of the June Third period, is precisely that the new step in the transformation into a

bourgeois monarchy is a step towards a greater separation of the classes in every respect and, especially, towards a greater separation of the liberals (the "responsible" opposition to the Purishkeviches) from the democrats (working for the elimination of all the foundations of Purishkevichism).

Hence it is obvious that Martov, while apparently criticising only the "inept formula", *actually* puts forward the platform of a *liberal labour policy*. He sees the "step back" taken by the old regime towards the Purishkeviches, but he refuses to see the step back taken by the liberal bourgeoisie towards the old regime. He sees that the events of 1905 created favourable conditions "for the mobilisation and organisation" of the liberal bourgeoisie against the Purishkeviches and alongside the Purishkeviches, but he *refuses* to see that those events created "favourable conditions" for the mobilisation and organisation of the *Vekhi*-type, counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie against democracy, against the movement of the masses. From the passage quoted from Martov's article it, therefore, follows inevitably that the workers ought to "support" the liberals in the *latter*'s struggle against the Purishkeviches, that they ought to leave the *hegemony* to the liberals; but it does not by any means follow that, *in spite* of the *Vekhi* sentiments of the liberals, *in spite* of the aspirations of the Milyukovs to get a seat next to the Purishkeviches, the workers ought to rouse the masses to the job of doing away entirely with the deepest roots (and the loftiest pinnacles) of Purishkevichism.

Hence it is obvious, further, why Martov can and should agree with Larin on the basic points, differing from him only in details, only in the manner of formulating the tasks of a liberal labour policy. We already have a bourgeois monarchy in Russia, says Larin, our landowners are no longer "feudal lords" but agrarians, i.e., bourgeois entrepreneurs in the countryside. Therefore, we are not facing any historical "leaps", and what we need is "*not* hegemony, but a class party" (Levitsky), our task is to support the liberal constitutionalists, while preserving our own independence.* So far we still have no bourgeois mon-

* As Larin wrote: "to stand up for itself ... during the coming constitutional reform".

archy, objects Martov, but it is "ample" for us to know that the combination of absolutism and constitutionalism is contradictory, and therefore it is necessary for us to strike at the old regime "through the Achilles heel of its contradictions". Neither of the two disputants sees the connection between the bourgeois monarchy that has been born or is being born and the counter-revolutionary nature of the liberal bourgeoisie; both of them fail to take account of the activity of the "leader" in determining not only the extent but also the type of bourgeois transformation in Russia; according to both of them, whether they say so or not, the "arrangements are made" for the working class in the new, bourgeois Russia, but the workers do not *do the arranging* and secure for themselves a democratic following capable of repudiating all the foundations of Purishkevichism.

V

It is interesting to note that Martov's further arguments defeat him even more glaringly.

> "Thus," Martov continues, "the Bourbons who were restored to power in 1815 did not create a bourgeois monarchy, but were compelled to cloak their rule, and the rule of the nobility that backed them, in political forms which hastened the organisation of the bourgeoisie and enabled it to grow into the force that was capable of creating the bourgeois monarchy of 1830."

Splendid. Prior to the Bourbons of 1815 and prior to 1789, France had a feudal, patriarchal monarchy. After 1830 France had a bourgeois monarchy. But what kind of monarchy did Martov set out to discuss (to his own discomfiture), i.e., the monarchy of 1815-30? It is obvious that it was "a step toward the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy". The example cited by Martov is a splendid refutation of his arguments! Further, the French liberal bourgeoisie already began to reveal its hostility to consistent democracy during the movement of 1789-93. As Martov knows perfectly well, democracy did not by any means set itself the task of creating a bourgeois *monarchy*. *In the face* of the vacillations, betrayals, and counter-revolutionary sentiments of the liberal bourgeoisie, France's

democrats, with the working class at their head, created, after a long series of trying "campaigns", the political system which became consolidated after 1871. At the beginning of the era of bourgeois revolutions, the French liberal bourgeoisie was monarchist in outlook; at the end of a long period of bourgeois revolutions, and to the extent to which the actions of the proletariat and of the bourgeois-democratic elements (the "Left bloc" elements, in spite of all that L. Martov may say to the contrary!) became increasingly determined and independent, the French bourgeoisie in its entirety was *recast* into a republican bourgeoisie, retrained, re-educated, reborn. In Prussia, and in Germany in general, the landowner never relinquished his hegemony during the whole period of bourgeois revolutions and he "educated" the bourgeoisie in his own image, after his own likeness. In France, during all the eighty years of bourgeois revolutions, the proletariat, in various combinations with the "Left bloc" elements of the petty bourgeoisie, won for itself hegemony at least four times, and as a result the bourgeoisie had to create a political system more acceptable to its opposite.

Bourgeoisies differ. Bourgeois revolutions provide a vast variety of combinations of different groups, sections, and elements both of the bourgeoisie itself and of the working class. To "deduce" an answer to the concrete problems of the Russian bourgeois revolution of the first decade of the twentieth century from "the general concept" of bourgeois revolution in the narrowest sense of the term is to debase Marxism to liberalism.

"Thus," Martov continues, "after it suppressed the Revolution of 1848, the Prussian government found itself compelled to introduce a constitution and a legislative representative body, organised in the interests of the landowners; these paltry rudiments of a constitutional-parliamentary system served as the basis for the political organisation of the bourgeoisie, which, however, to this day has not succeeded in transforming the state into a 'bourgeois monarchy'.

"Hence the above-mentioned formulation errs in making no mention of the decisive collision between the classes, without which the objective tendency revealed in acts of the June Third type cannot be translated into reality!"

That is truly magnificent, isn't it? Martov is positively a virtuoso when it comes to disguising reformist arguments,

theories, and platforms with catchwords which create the impression of being Marxist and revolutionary! Apropos of the same "formula" which Martov is criticising, F. Dan poured scorn on people who want "to shove in where they have once been defeated". Y. Larin wrote that the working class must organise, not "in expectation of a revolution", but simply for the purpose of "firmly and systematically defending its special interests". Now Martov makes the discovery that the formula errs because *it makes no mention of the decisive collision between the classes*. Simply charming!

But Martov's phrase is not merely comical, it has another feature to it. Martov expressed himself with consummate evasiveness. He did not say to *which* classes he was referring. In the preceding sentences he spoke of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. It might be conjectured that Martov here refers to a decisive collision *only* between the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Only on *this* assumption may Martov's words be "taken seriously". But if *this* assumption is correct, then that shows him up with particular clarity as an advocate or defender of a liberal labour policy.

Our formula "makes no mention of the decisive collision" between the classes of the landowners and the bourgeoisie! But, hold! Our formula speaks plainly, definitely and explicitly of "*petty dissensions*" between these classes. From our viewpoint the dissensions between these classes are *petty*. Great importance attaches to the collision, *not* between these classes, but between other classes, of which the "formula" speaks further on in just as plain and unmistakable terms.

Consequently the question is as follows. No one who shares the Marxist viewpoint can expect Russia's salvation from the "June Third period" to come from anything other than a "decisive collision between the classes". We must be clear on the historical meaning of the "June Third period" if we want to know *which* classes in contemporary Russia can and must (in the sense of objective necessity, not of a subjective "must") come into decisive collision. Martov, apparently, thinks, as do all the liquidators, that in Russia a decisive collision is bound to take place between the landed nobility and the liberal bourgeoisie. (Be it noted in parenthesis that the liquidators will render the work

ing-class movement a real service if they *openly* set forth this view in the draft platform of *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, because they will thereby explain the matter to the workers; if, however, the platform of these publications does *not* openly express this view, it will be shown that the purpose of their platform is to conceal their real views, that the platform is at variance with the real ideological content of the propaganda carried on by these two magazines.)

We think, and this is plainly stated in our "formula", that *no* decisive collision is to be expected between the old type of landed nobility and the liberal bourgeoisie in Russia. Clashes between these two classes are inevitable, but they will be mere "petty dissensions" which *will* "*not decide*" *anything* in Russia's destiny and cannot bring about any decisive, real change for the better.*

A really decisive collision is still to come between *other* classes—a collision on the basis and within the framework of bourgeois society, i.e., of commodity production and capitalism.

What ground is there for this opinion? It is justified both by theoretical considerations and by the experience of 1905-07. In these three years Russia experienced a sharp collision of classes that ranks as one of the greatest class collisions in world history. Nevertheless, even in those three years, in a bourgeois society which lacked even the most

* Naturally, it does not follow from this that the liberal bourgeoisie, together with the landed nobility, represents "one reactionary mass", that the conflicts between these two are of no political significance, that they cannot give rise to a democratic movement, or that it is permissible to ignore these conflicts. To draw such conclusions would be tantamount to reducing a correct proposition to an absurdity, it would betray a lack of understanding of the limits within which this proposition is correct. For it is a well-known fact that "the greatest justice", if reduced to an absurdity because of a failure to understand the limits and conditions of the just and unjust, becomes "the greatest injustice": *summum jus—summa injuria*. We should remember the following fact in the history of Russian Marxism. The appraisal of the liberal-bourgeois parties in Russia (with the Cadet Party at their head) given at the well-known London Congress was exactly the same as that outlined in the present article; but that did not prevent the Congress from recognising the necessity "to make use of the activity of these parties to further the political education of the people".

elementary conditions and guarantees of bourgeois liberty, the collision between the landed nobility and the liberal bourgeoisie, between the latter and the old regime, was neither sharp nor decisive. On the other hand, the sharp and decisive collisions, collisions that could in any way be described as sharp and decisive, were those between the peasants and the landowners, between the workers and the capitalists.

How is this phenomenon to be explained? In the first place, by the fact that the liberal bourgeoisie is so closely linked with the landed nobility economically, their mutual interests are so closely intertwined, that from the standpoint of the former the safest and most desirable course is to reform the latter, but by no means to abolish it. The slowest, even imperceptibly slow, reform is better than abolition, that is how the overwhelming majority of the liberal bourgeois reason, and with Russia's economic and political situation *as it is at present* this class *cannot* reason otherwise.

Further, if we take for instance the strike movement, we find that in Russia, during the three years referred to, it developed to a point never achieved in any of the most advanced and most developed capitalist countries in the world. That is why it was *inevitable* for the liberal bourgeoisie to reason that the slowest, the most imperceptibly slow, reform of the antiquated conditions of labour was better than a resolute breach with the old, that it was better to preserve the old than to make a decisive break with it. On the other hand, the economic condition of the workers and peasants made it *impossible* for them to reason along those lines; here the economic conditions gave rise to really sharp and really decisive collisions. It is wrong to think, as the Narodniks think with regard to the peasantry, and Trotsky with regard to the workers, that those collisions went beyond the limits of bourgeois society. But there can be no shadow of doubt that it is by *such*, and *only by such*, collisions (provided they lead to a definite outcome) that *all* the old, the threadbare, the pre-bourgeois can be fully eradicated, can be abolished without leaving a trace.

The Russian landlords, from Purishkevich to Dolgorukov, have trained our liberal bourgeoisie in a spirit of servility, inertia, and fear of change unparalleled in history

The Russian peasants, under the economic and political conditions *at present obtaining* in Russia, represent that *bourgeois* stratum of the population out of which the era of "collisions", the era of bourgeois revolutions (in the historico-methodological meaning of the term), with the workers taking a leading part, *is educating* a bourgeoisie that is free of the above-mentioned pleasant qualities. But will it complete this education? This question can only be answered when the era of bourgeois revolutions in Russia is at an end. Until that time all the progressive trends of political thought in Russia will inevitably be divided into two main types, depending on whether they are gravitating to the hegemony of the liberals who are striving to remake and renovate Russia in a manner that will not be injurious to the Purishkeviches, or to the hegemony of the working class with the best elements of the peasantry as its following.

I said "are gravitating", because we cannot expect all the progressive trends to be conscious of, i.e., to understand, the class roots of the various policies. But Marxists would not be worthy of the name if they failed to delve down to those roots, and if they failed to understand that both the defence of the special interests of the working class and the training of the working class for its future role in bourgeois Russia will inevitably, owing to the objective interrelation of the social forces, follow the same two main channels: it will either trail along *behind* the liberals (who are marching behind the Purishkeviches or alongside of them), or lead the democratic elements forward *in spite* of the vacillations, desertions, and *Vekhi* sentiments of the liberals.

VI

We have now come face to face with the question of the celebrated "Left bloc" policy. Yuri Chatsky and F. Dan, it may be said without exaggeration, rave and fulminate against a Left bloc. This is all the more natural to the second of these two politicians since he must somehow cover up his betrayal of the workers' cause and his part in the split of the St. Petersburg workers' organisation, for the sake of a bloc with the Cadets, in the spring of 1907! But the question of a Left bloc is an interesting and important question of principle, not only, and even not so much, from the

standpoint of election agreements (under the existing electoral law the "Left bloc" has seldom been realised in practice), but from the point of view of the general character and content of election propaganda and agitation. To "compel" the most numerous democratic masses in the country (the peasants and sections of the non-agricultural petty bourgeoisie akin to them) "to choose between the Cadets and the Marxists", and to pursue a line of "joint action" of the workers and the peasant democrats both against the old regime and against the vacillating counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie, is the basis and substance of the tactics of a "Left bloc". These tactics were sanctioned by the course of events in 1905 (the working-class and peasant movement), by the votes of the "Trudovik" and workers' groups in the First and the Second Dumas, by the attitude of the press of the different parties to the cardinal questions of democracy, and even by the stand on the agrarian question taken by the "peasant group" in the *Third* Duma (considering that there are many Right elements in that group!). It is a well-known fact that the agrarian bill introduced by forty-three peasant members of the *Third* Duma[170] is far more democratic than the liberal bill of the Cadets, a fact the Cadets themselves admit!

There is no doubt that it is precisely in this sense, on general principles, that the liquidators repudiate the "Left bloc" policy. And there is just as little doubt that their repudiation of the Left bloc policy constitutes treason to the cause of democracy. *Not a single* bourgeois-liberation movement the world over has ever failed to provide examples and instances of "Left bloc" tactics, and wherever these movements triumphed, in *all* such cases, it was *always* as a result of these tactics, a result of the struggle being directed along these lines in spite of the vacillations and treachery of the liberals. It was the "Left bloc" tactics—the alliance between the urban "plebs" (=the modern proletariat) and the democratic peasantry that lent sweep and force to the English revolution in the seventeenth century and the French revolution in the eighteenth century. Marx and Engels drew attention to this fact on many occasions, not only in 1848, but much later as well. In order to avoid quoting frequently quoted passages, we shall merely mention

the correspondence between Marx and Lassalle in 1859. Apropos of Lassalle's tragedy *Franz von Sickingen*, Marx wrote that the intended collision in the drama was "not simply tragic, but really the tragic collision that spelled the doom, and properly so, of the revolutionary party of 1848-49". And Marx, indicating in general terms the *entire* line of the future differences between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers,[171] reproached Lassalle for making the mistake of "placing the *Lutheran-knightly* opposition above the *plebeian-Muncerian* opposition".[172]

We are not here concerned with the question whether Marx was right or wrong in making that reproach; we think he was right even though Lassalle defended himself vigorously against this reproach. The important point is that Marx and Engels considered it an obvious mistake to place the "Lutheran-knightly" opposition (the opposition of the liberals and landowners in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century) *above* the "plebeian-Muncerian" opposition (proletarian and peasant, in that same Russia); that both of them considered this absolutely impermissible for a Social-Democrat!

In heaping abuse upon Left bloc tactics, the liquidators try by their words to drown the inescapable fundamental issue of the principle that a "Left bloc" policy is obligatory for every workers' party in every bourgeois-democratic movement. Since they are unable to deal with the question in terms of principle they get into curious contradictions and defeat their own case. Here is an instance. The very same Martov, who dreads a "Left bloc" like the plague, writes in formulating the agrarian programme in his "Fundamental Theses of a Platform" that "as before, the surest, most painless and most advantageous path of cultural development is ... to take the landed estates from their present owners and transfer them to the people". Involuntarily he thus went so far as to advocate, oh horror! nationalisation! That in the first place. Secondly, in expressing this correct idea, Martov (despite his colleague Cherevanin—see the latter's *Vekhi*-type book on *The Present Situation* in 1908) expressed a *Left bloc* idea; his agrarian programme is a programme of *Left bloc* action both against the old regime and *against the liberal parties of the Cadet type*!

"Drive Nature out of the door, and she will fly in through the window"!

The agrarian programme formulated by L. Martov is one on which the workers and the peasant Trudoviks together with their ideological leaders, the Narodniks, are making common cause (actually making common cause, i.e., working together *regardless* of any "agreements"). On the other hand, this programme *separates* both the workers and the peasant Trudoviks, taken together, *from* the Cadets (and from the bourgeois liberals in general). If in addition to this absolutely indisputable political conclusion, you will bear in mind that the agrarian question (the question of democratic agrarian change) is a key question of our liberation movement, then it is obvious that Martov was *compelled* to formulate "Left bloc" tactics in regard to the *central* issue of our epoch!

How and why did this misfortune befall our opponent of the "Left bloc" policy? Very simply. It was necessary for him either to *break* with the old programme openly and unequivocally, which he could not make up his mind to do; he had not yet "caught up" with the courageous (in their renegacy) Cherevanin and Larin. Or else it was necessary to reproduce, at least more or less correctly, the old programme—from which the "Left bloc" policy follows as an inescapable conclusion. Such is the bitter lot of our liquidators.

VII

It remains for us to point out two more important passages in Martov's article. "In each case," he writes, "of such a conflict arising within the June Third system [he is speaking of conflicts and friction which disintegrate and sap this system] the workers' party should strive to prevail upon the propertied classes to take one step or another toward the democratisation of legislation and an extension of constitutional guarantees, and, what is of the greatest independent value to us, toward an extension of the sphere of the unrestricted organisation of the popular forces" (*Nasha Zarya*, No. 7-8, p. 50).

Martov's formulation is very apt, only it is a formulation of the tasks and the line of a liberal labour policy.

"To prevail upon the propertied classes to take a step", to "extend the sphere of the unrestricted organisation of labour"—these phrases of Martov's are exactly those repeated throughout the world by *all* more or less educated liberal bourgeois, all liberal bourgeois imbued to any extent with the "European" spirit. The distinction between a liberal labour policy and a Marxist labour policy begins *only* when and where it is explained to the workers that the above-quoted liberal formulation is inadequate, unsatisfactory, and a deception. To prevail upon the non-propertied classes to take a step toward changing *the very* "sphere" which the liberals are promising to "extend", and to substitute for it a *fundamentally* different "sphere"—that (approximately) is how the tasks and aspirations of the workers' party should be defined, if there is no desire to build up a liberal labour party.

It should be remarked, as a curiosity, that in a note to the quoted passage L. Martov makes the following observation: "As a matter of course, this formulation is sure to give rise to charges of opportunism and 'legalism at all costs'". And how do you think he refutes these charges? By referring to an article by N. Rozhkov printed in the *Obskaya Zhizn*,[173] No. 171. From that article Martov quotes five lines of extremely inept and unintelligible statements about "open political associations". We have not read that article. But, assuming that Rozhkov advocates an "open party", what is this supposed to prove when we are dealing with *Martov*'s formulation of a *liberal* labour *policy*? Since when has it become customary for anyone to justify *one* mistake of his own by pointing to *another* mistake committed by *another* writer?

But the entire *spirit* of Martov's article is best and most vividly conveyed by the following tirade in the concluding section of the last paragraph:

> We must conduct the entire election campaign under the banner of the struggle of the proletariat for the freedom of its political self-determination, of the struggle for its right to have a class party of its own and to develop its activities freely, for the right to take part in political life as an independent organised force. This principle [mark this!] must govern both the content and tactics of the election campaign and the methods to be used for organisational work."

Those are words that *correctly* express the "principle" which determines the "content" of the entire election agitation (and of the entire policy) of the liquidators! As for the fine words about "reducing nothing and renouncing nothing", with which Martov tried to console the Marxist readers, they are nothing but words, hollow words, so long as *this* is how the "principle" is formulated. For the crux of the matter is that the principle itself turns out to be that of a liberal labour policy.

The liberal bourgeois tells the workers: you are justified in fighting, indeed, you must fight, for the freedom of *your own* political self-determination, for the right to have a class party of *your own*, for the right freely to develop your activities, for *the right to take part* in political life as an independent organised force. It is these principles of the liberal, educated, radical, to use the English or French term, bourgeoisie that Martov is offering the workers in the guise of Marxism.

The Marxist tells the workers: in order really and successfully to fight for the freedom of your "own" political self-determination, you must fight for the free political self-determination of the entire people, you must show the people what the successive democratic forms of its political existence should be, and win the masses and the undeveloped sections of the working people away from the influence of the liberals. If your party is really to attain a full understanding of the tasks of the class, and if its activity is actually to be of a class nature and not of a guild nature, it is necessary for it not only to take part in political life, but, in spite of all the vacillations of the liberals, to direct the political life and initiative of the broad strata on to a greater arena than that indicated by the liberals, toward more substantial and more radical aims. He who confines the class to an "independent" corner of "activity" in an arena, the bounds, form, and shape of which are determined or permitted by the liberals, does not understand the tasks of the class. Only he understands the tasks of the class who directs its attention (and consciousness, and practical activity, etc.) to the need for so reconstructing this very arena, its entire form, its entire shape, as to extend it beyond the limits allowed by the liberals.

Wherein lies the difference between the two formulations? In the very fact, *among other things*, that the first *excludes* the idea of the "hegemony" of the working class, whereas the second deliberately defines this very idea; the first is the modern, latest variation of old Economism ("the workers should confine themselves to the economic struggle, leaving the political struggle to the liberals"), whereas the second strives to leave no room in the minds of the workers either for the old Economism or for its new variety.

Now it remains but to answer the concluding question: In what way does Levitsky differ from Martov? The former is one of the younger liquidators, one of the new generation, unaffected by the traditions and memories of the past. He does not beat about the bush, but says plainly, with the eagerness and straightforwardness of youth: "*not* hegemony, but a class party"! Martov, however, is "a man of the world", he once belonged to the old *Iskra* group, he represents a mixture of the old traditions, which have not yet completely vanished,* and of the new liquidationism which has not yet mustered a sufficient amount of courage. That is why he first swears and vows to—"reduce nothing, renounce nothing"—and then, after long and devious circumlocutions, blurts out that the "principle" of the entire election campaign must be a liquidationist one.

But, then, it is precisely the "principle" of the election campaign that constitutes the whole crux of the matter.

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* It would be more correct to say: The substance of these traditions, their ideological core, has completely vanished as far as Martov is concerned, but the words have remained, the habit of carrying the "decent label" of an "unswerving internationalist" still makes itself felt.

FIRST EXPOSURE OF CADET NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CABINET

Those who, six or five and a half years ago, sounded the alarm about the negotiations which the Constitutional-Democrats were, in general, conducting with Cabinet ministers, especially on the subject of ministerial portfolios, cannot help entertaining a feeling of profound satisfaction today. Historical truth is bound to out—it is sometimes divulged in quarters from which truth is least expected. The first revelations have now been made, and, despite all the efforts of "interested" persons (and parties) to hush them up, they will not end here. It may be said with absolute certainty that these exposures will fully corroborate the accusations we levelled against the Cadets at that time.

Witte started them in his controversy with Guchkov. Witte's object and the nature of his revelations are of the basest; it is an intrigue of the worst kind, a desire to trip somebody up, a bid for a portfolio. But it is a well-known fact that when two thieves fall out honest men always come into their own; and when three thieves have fallen out, the gain is likely to be the greater.

What matters most in Witte's letter is that willy-nilly he had to establish certain *facts*—thus providing an opportunity (and making it indispensable) to verify these facts by questioning all those involved in the affair. The basic facts to be gleaned from Witte's letter are the following:

(1) The conference called by Witte was attended by Shipov, Guchkov, Urusov, Y. Trubetskoi, and M. Stakhovich, that is to say, leading figures of the Cadet, Peaceful Renovation, and Octobrist parties.

(2) "At the first session of the conference between Count Witte [we are quoting his letter] and the above-mentioned prominent persons, agreement in principle was reached on all the main questions, except the question of the appointment of the Minister of the Interior."

(3) "Count Witte insisted on Durnovo's appointment, while the prominent persons, with the exception of Prince Urusov, were opposed to it. As for Prince Urusov, he tried to persuade his colleagues at the conference to agree to Durnovo's appointment in view of the gravity of the situation and the impossibility of delaying the matter, and, for his own part, he declared that, in order to set an example, he was prepared to accept the post of Vice-Minister under Durnovo.... At the next session Shipov, Guchkov, and Prince Trubetskoi declared that they could not join a Cabinet that would include Durnovo...."

(4) Stolypin's candidature was mentioned, but it failed to receive unanimous approval. Some were in favour, others were opposed to it.

What amendments has Guchkov introduced to this statement of the facts? He has confirmed that "Durnovo's candidature had the warm support of Prince Urusov, subsequently a member of the First Duma." Witte, according to Guchkov, hesitated, and there was a moment when he was prepared to give up Durnovo because it was known that the press was about to come out with revelations and bitter articles against him. "The whole incident," adds Guchkov, "took place immediately after the Manifesto of October 17, when there reigned the fullest, the most unbridled, I should say, freedom of the press."

The negotiations were prolonged. Guchkov writes of "wearisome days of protracted negotiations". In respect of Stolypin, he says that "nobody expressed the unfavourable opinion mentioned by Count Witte. In describing the general situation obtaining at that time, Guchkov says: "Many 'saviours' of the country have now appeared on the scene.... But where were they in those days? ... At that time many of them had not yet made up their minds on which side of the barricades they were going to stand".

Those are the essential points in Witte's and Guchkov's revelations. The minor details we naturally leave out of

consideration. The historical truth is now quite definitely established: (1) *At that extremely grave moment in the history of Russia there were no serious differences of opinion between the Cadets and the Octobrists*; (2) "At that time many [of the bourgeois leaders and, as Guchkov "subtly" hints, perhaps even of the ministers] had not yet made up their minds on which side of the barricades they were going to stand". But the fact is that those who attended the conference, and did so more than once, were men who all stood *on one definite* "*side of the barricades*". During those conferences the ministers, and the Octobrists, and the Cadets all stood on the same side of the barricade. Historical truth permits of no doubt or misinterpretation: these were conferences at which the government conducted negotiations with the counter-revolutionary, liberal bourgeoisie.

Now look at the behaviour of the Cadets. Ever since the publication of Witte's and Guchkov's revelations (their letters were printed in St. Petersburg on September 26, and in Moscow on September 27, Old Style), the Cadets *have been maintaining complete silence about their* part in the affair, confining themselves to attempts to "twit" Guchkov. That is exactly what *Rech* did in its issue of September 28, and *Russkiye Vedomosti* in its issue of the same date, where they "twitted" Guchkov with having subsequently joined Durnovo's colleagues, but *they have never printed any corrections or denials that affect the historical facts*. The third thief hopes that, thanks to the controversy between Witte and Guchkov, he will go unnoticed!

Then the Octobrists begin to "revenge" themselves on both Witte and the Cadets. On *October 14* (after two weeks of reconnoitring by the Octobrists and of cowardly and mean silence on the part of the Cadets) *Golos Moskvy* carried a "statement of facts" headed "Count Witte and P. N. Durnovo in Alliance with the Cadets". The new revelations bring out the following points: (1) Prince Trubetskoi was a member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party at the time. (2) "Since he did not want to create any misconceptions in Count Witte's mind, Prince Trubetskoi considered it his duty to warn him that he, Prince Trubetskoi, would inform the bureau of his party, which met every day in Professor Petrazhitsky's apartment to discuss current affairs,

about all of Witte's negotiations with men prominent in public life" (it is obvious that neither the Octobrists nor the Cadets regard the worker and peasant democrats as "prominent in public life"; apparently, in October 1905 the workers and peasants were *outside* "public life"!). (3) Mr. Petrunkevich was particularly vehement in his objections to Stolypin's candidature. He said that, "if the worst came to the worst [*sic*!], it was necessary to advise Count Witte to appoint Durnovo, rather than Stolypin, to the post of Minister of the Interior. The other leaders of the Constitutional-Democratic Party fully shared Petrunkevich's opinion, and Prince Trubetskoi was instructed to convey to Count Witte the opinion of the prominent public men who met in Petrazhitsky's apartment". The next morning Trubetskoi visited Count Witte and conveyed to him the exact opinion of the bureau of the Constitutional-Democratic Party about both candidates.

Has Trubetskoi corroborated the reference to his part in the affair? He fully corroborated it when he told both the correspondent of *Novoye Vremya* (see issue of October 15) and the *correspondent* of *Rech* (see issue of October 19) that the information printed in *Golos Moskvy* was "*quite exact*". "The word 'bureau'," said Trubetskoi, "is *perhaps out of place*, it would have been more correct to say 'leaders of the Party'" (meaning the Cadets). Trubetskoi made another, just as immaterial, "correction", stating that he had visited Witte "not the next morning, perhaps, but two or three days later". Finally, in the interview he gave to the *Rech* correspondent, Trubetskoi said:

"Exception must be taken to one statement made by Guchkov. He says that the prominent people refused to join the Cabinet only because of Durnovo. That is not quite so [not quite so!] as far as I am concerned and, if I am not mistaken, the same applies to Shipov and I expressed our willingness to join the Cabinet, but on condition that its programme was drafted beforehand. Witte, however, tried to persuade us to join the Cabinet without insisting on that condition. That was the difference between us and Guchkov, who, as far as I can remember, stipulated no such condition." Trubetskoi is very cautious in his choice of expressions on this point: "not quite so", "as far as I can remember"!

Mr. Petrunkevich deals with the subject in *Rech* of October 19—*three weeks* after the first revelations were published! Now, see *how* he does it.

He begins with a long-winded argument (27 lines) about the inadvisability of relying on people's memories, and points out that Shipov was the only one who kept a diary.

What is the purport of this argument? Do you want to have the truth published, at once and in full? Then nothing could be easier than to *name all* those who took part in the conferences and to question them about it. If, however, you do not want to have the truth about *your own* party published, then do not play at hide-and-seek and do not refer to Shipov.

Then follow *27 lines* of argument about the propensity of the Octobrists for "canards". But what is the point of this argument, once *Golos Moskvy* mentioned *the person* who corroborated its information? Mr. Petrunkevich is obviously at pains to obscure a plain and clear question by heaping up literary and diplomatic rubbish around it. That is a *dishonest* method.

Further follow 20 lines of jibes at Trubetskoi: that he indulges in "personal reminiscences"—as though reminiscences could be anything but personal!—and that the Prince "*never mentioned the matter to anyone*"—the emphasis being Petrunkevich's, who obviously intends this as a rebuke for Trubetskoi's indiscretion. Instead of giving a plain answer to the question, the Cadets have begun to rebuke one another for being indiscreet. What *can* this kind of method mean, except that the Cadets are *chagrined* by the revelations? It betrays their efforts *to hush up* the matter (what they say, in effect, is: don't be indiscreet in the future, Prince).

The 74 lines of introduction are followed, at last, by the denial proper on the following points: (1) The bureau of the Constitutional-Democratic Party was in Moscow and, therefore, could not meet in Petrazhitsky's apartment. (2) "At that time" Petrazhitsky "was not one of the group of persons who directed the affairs of the Party". (3) "The few members [of the bureau of the Constitutional-Democratic Party] who were living in St. Petersburg were not authorised to enter into any negotiations, and still less alliances, with Count Witte, Mr. Durnovo, or any other persons."

(4) "Personally, I [Petrunkevich] visited Petrazhitsky *once* [Mr. Petrunkevich's emphasis], and it is true that on that one occasion there was some talk about the possibility of Prince Trubetskoi being offered the post of Minister of Education, and all those present expressed their conviction that the Prince could accept the offer only on condition that the entire Cabinet adopted a clear and definite programme fully conforming to the conditions of the political situation. Moreover, the Cabinet was to be one that could command the confidence of 'society' [bear in mind *what all* the disputants mean by the word "society": the workers and peasants are not "society"]. It is quite possible that at the same time the personal and political qualities of the various candidates, among them Durnovo and Stolypin, were discussed. But neither my memory, nor the memory of others whom I consulted on the subject, has retained any recollection of a warm speech which, presumably, convinced all those present."

That is all there is to the relevant part of Mr. Petrunkevich's "denial", to which he adds a further 48 lines of jibes at Trubetskoi, to the effect that the latter's memory has failed him, that the Constitutional-Democratic Party concluded no alliance with Durnovo and that it "prevented one of its members, Prince Trubetskoi, from joining a Cabinet which the Party could not support".

Trubetskoi's and Petrunkevich's letters in the *Rech* of October 27 add nothing new. The former insists that it was no other than Petrunkevich who "advised that Durnovo be preferred to Stolypin". Petrunkevich denies this.

Now, what does this all boil down to?

Mr. Petrunkevich declares that the few members of the bureau who were living in St. Petersburg *were not authorised to enter into any negotiations*, but he cannot help confirming the *fact* that negotiations were conducted! He himself states (*Rech*, October 27): "At the conference in Petrazhitsky's apartment we discussed Prince Trubetskoi's candidature".

This then means that *negotiations were conducted*. If, as Mr. Petrunkevich says, the Party "prevented" Prince Trubetskoi, *this means* that the negotiations *were conducted on behalf of the Party*!

Mr. Petrunkevich has an amazing knack of contradicting himself. There were no negotiations, but ... but there was

"a conference on the candidature". The bureau of the Party held no meetings, but ... but the Party took a decision. Such pitiful evasions are characteristic of people who are trying in vain *to conceal* something. What, indeed, could be simpler than to name *all* those who took part in the conference, or to cite the exact decision of the "bureau", or of the Party, or of the leaders, or to set forth the allegedly clear and allegedly definite programme which (allegedly) the Cadets demanded of Witte's Cabinet? But the trouble with our liberals is that they *cannot afford* to tell the truth, they are *afraid* of it, the truth is their *ruin*.

And so they resort to petty and shabby subterfuges, equivocations and evasions, the purpose of which is to prevent the reader (at least the inattentive one) from getting a clear idea of a historical question of great importance, namely, the question of the attitude of the liberals to the government in October 1905.

Why is the truth the ruin of the Cadets? Because the fact that negotiations were conducted, and the circumstances and conditions under which they were conducted, explode the fable that the Cadets are democrats and prove the counter-revolutionary nature of their liberalism.

Could a really democratic party even think of entering into negotiations with a man like Witte at a time like October 1905? Certainly not; for such negotiations necessarily implied that both parties stood, to a certain extent, on common ground, namely the common ground of counter-revolutionary aspirations, sentiments, and proclivities.* There was nothing to negotiate with Witte, except ways and means of putting an end to the democratic mass movement.

Further, assuming for a moment that the Cadets, in entering into negotiations, did have *some* democratic purposes in

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* See the excellent explanation of *this* common ground, on the basis of articles written by Mr. Milyukov *himself* (*A Year of Struggle*), in Y. K.'s article, "From the History of Russian Liberalism", in the almanac *Summer Lightnings*, St. Petersburg, 1907. "Count Witte's resignation means the loss of the last opportunity to come to terms," wrote Mr. Milyukov on April 18, 1906, thus admitting quite clearly and definitely that there had been *negotiations* for *deals* and that there had been *opportunities*, that there was some sense in *repeating* the attempts to negotiate a deal.

mind, could a democratic party have failed to inform the people of those negotiations when they were broken off? It could not. This is exactly where we see the difference between counter-revolutionary liberalism and democracy, undeserving of the epithet counter-revolutionary. The liberal *desires* an extension of liberty, but *in such a way* as not to lend strength to democracy; he wants the negotiations and the rapprochement with the old government to continue, to gain in force, to be put on a firm basis. That is why the liberal *could not afford* to inform the public of the negotiations after they had been broken off, for that would have made it difficult to resume the negotiations, he would thereby "have shown his hand" to democracy and broken with the authorities—but that is precisely something a liberal cannot bring himself to do. A democrat, on the other hand, who happened to be in the position of someone conducting negotiations with Witte and who saw the hopelessness of the negotiations, would immediately make them public, and thereby put the Wittes to shame, expose their game, and bring about a further advance of the democratic movement.

Consider also the question of the programme of the Cabinet and of its composition. All those involved in the affair speak of the latter and say quite clearly and explicitly, such and such portfolios were offered to such and such individuals. But *not a single* clear and explicit word is said about the *former*, i.e., about the programme! Both Trubetskoi and Petrunkevich remember the candidates for portfolios perfectly well, and name them. But *none* of them *says anything* about what the "programme" was! Is it just an accident? Of course not. It results from (and is also positive proof of) the "programmes" having been the last thing the liberal gentlemen thought of, simply meaningless window-dressing, hollow "literature"—actually, Witte could have had no other programme than that of strengthening the government and weakening the democratic movement, and no matter what assurances he gave, and what promises and statements he made, that would be the only policy he would have *pursued*. The "vital" business that they were primarily concerned with was that of the distribution of portfolios. For this reason only, Witte, for instance, could forget *all* about the programme (according to Witte,

there was even complete agreement on principles!), but the controversy over the question as to who was better (or worse?), Durnovo or Stolypin, that is something they all remember, of which they all talk, and in connection with which they all refer to the speeches and arguments made by one person or another.

Murder will out. Even in the deliberately touched up stories of three or four persons the historical truth stands out in fairly bold relief.

Immediately after October 17, the entire liberal bourgeoisie of Russia—from Guchkov to Milyukov, who is undoubtedly politically responsible for Trubetskoi—turned away *from* democracy and drew closer to Witte. Nor was this an accident or the treachery of individuals—it was the *class* that went over to the counter-revolutionary position that corresponds to its economic interests. Only when they had assumed that position could the Cadets conduct negotiations with Witte through Trubetskoi in 1905, with Trepov through Muromtsev in 1906, etc. Unless we understand the distinction between counter-revolutionary liberalism and democracy, we cannot understand anything either about the history of the latter or about its tasks.

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THREE QUESTIONS

The verbatim reports of the State Duma, even of the Third Duma, represent extremely interesting and instructive political material. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the supplement to the rag called *Rossiya* is worth more than all the liberal newspapers. For the liberal newspapers make it their business to whitewash the liberals, and to gloss over the presentation of essential problems, by the Rights on the one hand, and by the representatives of the real masses of the population on the other; they invariably introduce an element of falsehood into the appraisal of the *real nature* of our "home policy". Yet it is precisely the *way* in which the various questions are *presented*, and the appraisal of the *real nature* of the issues involved, that is of prime importance in dealing with all the socio-economic and political problems of the present period.

We shall try to illustrate the above, as far as possible, by the debate in connection with three questions: on the secret political police, the famine, and the "temporary" Regulations of 1881.[174]

The first meeting of the current session of the Duma opened with a speech dedicated to Stolypin by the Chairman, an Octobrist. An interesting feature of the speech was the statement made by the leader of the Octobrists that "his [Stolypin's] constant concern was to ensure steady, even if cautious and circumspect, progress along the path of political and social development in Russia". Well put, isn't it? Stolypin in the capacity of a "progressist"! Many a democrat who read Rodzyanko's speech must have paused to ask why, under the present system of government, under the present political regime, and as long as there exists the class whose policy Stolypin put into effect, there can be no *other* kind of "progress" except the kind that we are wit-

nessing at present, a kind of "progress" which fails to satisfy even the Octobrists. What a pity that none of the members of the Duma who were present during that speech*—those of them who pose as representatives of democracy—displayed any desire to dwell on the *class* roots of the Stolypin brand of "progress".

Yet the debate on the secret political police was a suitable occasion for going into that matter.

Stolypin "trusted the honourable A. I. Guchkov", thundered Markov the Second, "and his no less honourable friends in the Duma Centre. And he paid with his life for his trustfulness. The tranquillity which we experienced is the tranquillity of the grave. There is no other tranquillity. (Voices from the benches on the left: Hear, hear!) There is a revival of revolution.... There is no tranquillity, revolution is imminent. Revolution must be fought, we must fight it tooth and nail, we must give no quarter (laughter on the Left), we must hang all those rascals, fanatics, and scoundrels. That is all I have to say in opposition to the motion that this question be recognised as urgent[175]".

That was how the representative of the landowners presented the question.

Markov the Second was followed by Rodichev, who spoke on the real substance of the question. As usual, he spoke eloquently. But this eloquent liberal presented the question in an incredibly crude way. Liberal words and words—nothing more. "When their [the Octobrists'] Central Committee," exclaimed Mr. Rodichev, "declares with reference to the opposition that it is bent on assassinating its political antagonists, that is a shameful lie. But I am ready to for

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* We learn from the speech of Markov the Second that the workers' deputies were not in the hall at the time. "You," said Markov the Second, addressing the workers' deputies, "...frankly expressed your attitude ... when your benches were vacated a little while ago.... You withdrew.... Even if I don't respect you for that, I can understand you." Markov the Second very often behaves in the Duma like a common rowdy. But the words quoted above, as well as very many statements of his colleagues, show clearly that the question is presented from the standpoint of a definite class. This outspokenness is, as a rule, a hundred times more useful for the development of the political consciousness of the masses than the hackneyed phrases of the liberals who claim to be "above classes".

give you this lie if you vow to put an end to the serpent that has acquired power over the Russian government, to put an end to the spyocracy." (See page 23 of the Verbatim Report in *Rossiya*, and also page 24, again with a "vow".)

Impressive language—terribly impressive! Rodichev is prepared to forgive the Octobrists if they "vow" to put an end! But isn't it all bluff, Mr. Windbag? Not only the Octobrists, but *you*, Cadets, as well—no matter how much you "vow"—cannot *put an end* to any serious evil. Your talk about "vows" in connection with so grave a question only serves *to obscure* the political consciousness of the masses instead of enlightening them; you *muddle* peoples' minds by the din of words, instead of calmly, plainly and clearly explaining *why* the "serpent" has acquired power in the present instance, why it was able to and had to acquire power.

Since Mr. Rodichev does not explain this, since he is afraid of looking simply and directly at the root and the essence of the question, the thing that distinguishes him from the Octobrists is not the way he presents the question, nor his principles, but only the sweep of his eloquence. We need but pay just a little attention to his speech, we need only to ponder over it a little to see that, in substance, Mr. Rodichev shares the standpoint of the Octobrists; it is *only* for this reason that he can promise them "forgiveness" if they "vow". All these offers of forgiveness and all these vows are nothing but a farce played by liberals afraid of more or less consistent democracy. Hence the approach to the question which we see in Rodichev's words about "proportion", in his defence of Lopukhin, etc. At bottom there is *no* distinction between the stand taken by the Octobrists and that taken by the liberals.

On the other hand, consider the speech of Pokrovsky the Second. He began by pointing out that the question put by him and his colleagues "is entirely different in substance" from that put by the Octobrists. And, notwithstanding the fact that there were a few somewhat inept passages in the question put by Pokrovsky the Second and his colleagues, this distinction *in substance* was correctly noted. "We are not worried," said Pokrovsky the Second, "by what seems to worry you—that the political police may spell ruin for the government; what worries us is that the political police,

which the government is cultivating with your assistance, spells ruin for the country."...

And Pokrovsky the Second tried *to explain*—not declaim but explain—why the government needs the political police, and what are the class roots of that institution (class roots are not affected by "vows" and offers of "forgiveness"). "The government," said Pokrovsky the Second, "had become completely alien to society, it had no support whatever in society, because it was the enemy of democracy and in itself consisted only of the paltry remnants of the extinct class of the nobility; therefore it *was obliged* [our emphasis] to entrench itself, to separate and isolate itself from society—and so it created the political police.... Thus we see that as the broad social movement grows and ever larger sections of democracy are swept into this movement, the significance and the influence of the political police also grows."

Pokrovsky the Second apparently felt that the word "society" used here was not explicit in that context, and so he began to use the *correct* word "democracy" instead. At any rate he tried—and that was the great service he rendered—to *explain* the essence of the political police, to throw light on its class roots, and on its connection with the *entire* system of government.

Even if we overlook Mr. Rodichev's unrestrained and vulgar phrase-mongering, is it not obvious that the presentation of the question by Pokrovsky the Second and Gegechkori was as different as earth and sky from the presentation of the question by the Rodichevs? Yet the essential feature distinguishing the presentation of the question by the workers' deputies was their consistent application of democratic principles, only of democratic principles. It is one of our most important tasks in the Third Duma in general, after the period 1906-11 in particular, and especially on the eve of the elections to the Fourth Duma, to explain the profound difference between genuine democracy and the liberalism of the Cadets (the liberalism of "society") who take the name of democracy in vain.

Let us now turn to the second question, that of the famine. The first to speak was Mr. Dzyubinsky, and he spoke very badly. Not that there was anything wrong with his facts,

he had certainly marshalled the proper facts and presented them simply, clearly, and truthfully. He showed no lack of sympathy for the famine-stricken people, he certainly sympathised with the sufferers and was not remiss in his criticism of the government—he criticised it all the time. But his speech was not that of a democrat but of a liberal official; this was its principal defect, and this is also the principal defect of the entire attitude of the "intellectual" members of the Trudovik group, a defect which is even more clearly shown in the verbatim reports of the proceedings in the First and Second Dumas. The only distinction between Dzyubinsky and the Cadets was that the former's speech was free of the counter-revolutionary notes which no attentive person could fail to distinguish in all the speeches of the Cadets. Judging by the presentation of the question, however, Dzyubinsky did not go far beyond the liberal official's point of view. That is why his speech was so infinitely weak, so murderously tedious, so wishy-washy, particularly as compared with the speech made by his colleague, another member of his party, the peasant Petrov the Third, in whom, as in almost all the *peasant* members of the Trudovik group in the First and Second Dumas, one feels a genuine democrat to the marrow of his bones, a democrat "rooted in the soil".

Observe how Mr. Dzyubinsky starts his speech. In speaking of the famine he lays the main stress, of all things, on the relief clauses of the Relief Regulations of June 12, 1900! You feel at once that this man, this political leader, received his most vivid impressions of the famine, not from personal experience, not from his own observations of the life of the masses, not from any clear ideas of that life, but from a textbook on police law. To be sure, he used the most up-to-date and best textbook written by a most liberal professor, one who is as liberal as they make them.

Mr. Dzyubinsky criticised the Regulations of June 12, 1900. Now see *how* he criticises: "Practically from the very moment the Regulations of June 12, 1900, were issued, both the government itself and society recognised that they were unsatisfactory".... The government itself has recognised that they are unsatisfactory, hence, the task of the democrats is to amend the Regulations of June 12,

1900, so that the government itself may consider them "satisfactory"! You can plainly visualise the atmosphere of a Russian provincial government institution. The air is stale, it reeks of a government office. The company is made up of the governor, the prosecutor, the colonel of the gendarmerie, the permanent member and two liberal members of the Zemstvo. One of the liberal members argues that it is necessary to present a petition for amendments to the Regulations of June 12, 1900, since "the government itself has recognised that they are unsatisfactory".... Have a heart, Mr. Dzyubinsky! Why, indeed, do we democrats need the Duma, if we are going to carry *into it* too the language and manners, the way of "political" thinking and the presentation of questions which were pardonable (if they were pardonable) thirty years ago in a provincial government office, or in a snug philistine "nest"—the private office of a liberal engineer, lawyer, professor, or Zemstvo member? A Duma is not needed for that!

There is a proverb: "You can tell a man by the company he keeps". When you read the Duma verbatim reports you feel like paraphrasing that proverb in regard to some of the deputies as follows: "Show me *whom* you are addressing when speaking from the rostrum of the State Duma, and I'll tell you who you are".

Mr. Rodichev, for instance, like all the Cadets, always addresses his words to the government and the Octobrists. Mr. Rodichev, like all the Cadets, calls upon them to take a "vow" and, on that condition, is willing to "forgive" them. In substance, this brilliant phrase uttered by Rodichev (who involuntarily let his eloquence betray him into telling the truth) perfectly expresses the entire spirit of the political stand generally taken by the Cadets in *all* the Dumas, in all the important pronouncements of the Constitutional-Democratic Party in parliament, in the press, and in the ante-rooms of ministers. "I am ready to forgive you this lie if you vow to put an end to the serpent that has acquired power over the Russian government"—these words should be chiselled on the monument which it is high time to erect to Mr. Rodichev.

But Mr. Dzyubinsky is not a Cadet, nor is he one of those political illiterates who regard the Cadets as a democratic

party. He calls himself a Trudovik, a Narodnik. But he lacks democratic sense, to such an extent that when he rises to speak from the rostrum of the State Duma he continues to address officials. He lacks the proper democratic sense to such an extent that he does not address his words to the millions of famine-stricken peasants—and in Russia it is possible to address them from the rostrum of the Duma, and so far, in fact, only from the rostrum of the Duma—but to the few hundred officials who know about the Regulations of June 12, 1900.

"The Regulations of June 12," said Mr. Dzyubinsky, "were intended to serve a purely political purpose; their purpose was to eliminate the Zemstvo-run public organisations and concentrate the relief work among the population entirely in the hands of the government."

"The Regulations of June 12 were intended to serve a purely political purpose." What sort of language is this? How it reeks of hoary antiquity! Twenty-five or thirty years ago, in the cursed eighties of the past century, that was precisely the language *Russkiye Vedomosti* used in criticising the government from the Zemstvo point of view. Wake up, Mr. Dzyubinsky! You have slept all through the first decade of the twentieth century. While you were asleep old Russia died and a new Russia came into being. In this new Russia you *cannot* use the language you do—reproaching the government for intending its regulations to serve a "purely political" purpose. With all the good intentions, manners, and benevolence of your language it is more reactionary than that of the reactionaries in the Third Duma. It is the language of people—or of provincial officials who fight shy of all politics—who regard "politics" as something in the nature of sorcery, and dream of a relief campaign "without politics". The only way to speak to the Russia of today is to appeal for a change from one kind of politics to another, from the politics of one class to the politics of another class or other classes, from one political system to another. This is the ABC not only of democracy, but even of the most narrow liberalism—if we take the meaning of these political terms seriously.

The whole of Dzyubinsky's speech was pervaded with the same spirit. He spoke of the circular instructions

regarding the collection of taxes, of the tax spiral, of reduced railway fares for harvestmen and peasant delegates, he spoke about seed being received too late for the sowing, of cows demanded as security for credits advanced —because the government is more interested in feeding cattle than in feeding people—and about the fact that peasants would rather borrow 75,000 rubles at 12 per cent interest from a private bank than go through the *red tape* of borrowing 70,000 rubles interest free from the treasury. He wound up by citing informative letters from the localities that describe appalling distress. But in the whole of this very well-intentioned speech there was not a spark of democratic feeling, not a trace of appreciation of the tasks of democratic "*politics*". What undoubtedly does follow from his speech—and this was what the well-intentioned Mr. Dzyubinsky wanted to prove—is that our regime is rotten; but the trouble is that the speaker did not even notice that at the same time there "followed" from his speech the rotten morals of a rotten liberal official.

The next speaker but one after Dzyubinsky was Count Tolstoi, deputy from Ufa Gubernia. He is very far removed from Trudovik views, but he spoke exactly like Dzyubinsky "Guided by some sort of political considerations, the government is systematically preventing the Zemstvos from taking part in relief work, with the result that a vast section of the common people are suffering".... Dzyubinsky's and Count Tolstoi's speeches could have been made twenty and fifty years ago. In these speeches there still lingers the spirit of the old, now fortunately dead, Russia, in which there were no classes that were aware, or beginning to be aware, of the difference between the "politics" of the various sections of the population, and that had learned, or had begun to learn, to fight openly and directly for their conflicting interests—the Russia of "common people" at the bottom and liberal Zemstvos and for the most part non-liberal officials on the top. At that time both "the common people" and the liberal Zemstvos were most of all afraid of "some sort of political considerations".

Turn over a few more pages of the Verbatim Report. There you come across speeches which, on the whole, could not have been made in Russia either fifty or twenty years

ago nor for that matter, seven years ago. There is an altercation between Markov the Second and Petrov the Third—men with numbers to their names,[176] as if deliberately to show that we have before us typical representatives of the various classes, that there are many like them. Markov the Second is attacking in the old way; Petrov the Third, on the other hand, is defending himself and is passing from defence to attack *not* in the old way.

Markov the Second: "The wordy and completely irrelevant attacks are to be explained, of course ... by the fact that, no matter what the Russian Government does, there will always be those who raise the people to revolt...". In the Western gubernias ... people are toiling on the land and doing things which your people on the Volga refuse to do [it is not quite clear whom the speaker means by the words "your people on the Volga" for the only speaker who preceded him was the Trudovik Kropotov from Vyatka Gubernia; apparently, "your people on the Volga" did *not* refer to any member of the Duma, *nor* to anything that was or might have been said in the Duma, but to something else], for there are too many loafers on the Volga, and this must be borne in mind.... We know that there are many among your famine-stricken people who actually ought to be made to starve, so as to compel them to work instead of loafing."

Petrov the Third, although he is not from the Volga but from Perm Gubernia, replies: "Let me remind you again, gentlemen, that if Markov the Second is not a loafer he ought to recall the years 1905 and 1906 after which the landed gentry received millions in subsidies from the state treasury. What does that mean? This is what you should have remembered first; you had no right to cast a slur on the peasants."

Markov the Second (from his seat): "Easier there, you!"

These "Seconds" and "Thirds" behave very rudely, don't they?

What lack of restraint compared with the well-mannered, respectable, official language which the Dzyubinskys used to prove to the Marshals of the Nobility that the relief regulations of 1850 ... of 1900 I mean ... are not perfect! It is as if we had just emerged from the respectable private office of a respectable "public figure" into the crush and

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

jam of some city square or busy street. What lack of decorum, what disorder! But we shall see later how "order" was introduced—not by the Chairman, as you might think, oh no!—but introduced by a respectable public figure, Mr. Shingaryov, member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. However, let us finish with this picture of contemporary manners.

Petrov the Third: "It is said that if funds are allocated for relief, the people will spend the money on drink. That is not true, gentlemen. Whose duty is it to prevent this? The fact is that in many gubernias the people have requested that the taverns be closed down, but nothing is being done about it. It is possible, yes, that the population spends part of the money on liquor; but how about yourselves, Markov the Second and you other gentlemen, how much do you spend on liquor? Perhaps, if we divide the total per head, it will turn out that you spend much more on drink than the peasants do.... As long as the land, which ought to belong to the peasants, is in the hands of such Markovs, Purishkeviches, and their fraternity, famines will most certainly keep recurring. But these gentlemen will say that the peasants are to blame for the famine because they are loafers."

Markov the Second (from his seat): "Our peasants are not starving".

Petrov the Third: "I think, gentlemen, that the cardinal point of the question of how to put an end to all starvation is that the land must be taken from those who do not cultivate it, from the 'non-loafing' gentlemen, and transferred to those who do. So long as you do not transfer the land, and I know for certain that you will not, the peasant population will starve. It is thus obvious that strife similar to that which took place in 1905 is again inevitable, and you yourselves are inviting that strife, for a hungry man is like a beast and you, therefore, are provoking the population to make a revolution and to wrest by force what belongs to it by right."

If Muromtsev had been Chairman of the Third Duma he would have surely stopped the speaker—in the First Duma he always stopped speakers for such inappropriate statements. In Muromtsev's absence, Shingaryov, who spoke next, took it upon himself to restore "order". He immedi-

ately took Markov the Second to task for "speaking in a tone worthy of a cheap show", and then he went on to lecture Petrov the Third on *how* to argue with the Markovs. Markov's party colleague Vishnevsky, said Mr. Shingaryov, "spoke sincerely" and came out in favour of supporting the question. He, Shingaryov, expressed the "hope that the government will show more wisdom than Deputy Markov had shown in his speech.... It is the duty of a representative of the Russian people to say to gentlemen: Shame on you".

Rodichev and Shingaryov thus put Markov utterly to shame and, on top of that, Shingaryov, by the model manner in which he polemised with Markov, utterly confounded the Third".

The last of the questions which form the subject of these notes concerned the "temporary" Regulations of August 14, 1881, i.e., the notorious Regulations for the protection of the state, which have been systematically reaffirmed in the course of thirty years and which represent the actual constitution of Russia. The main speakers on this question were Teslenko and Milyukov, and the episode that provided the finishing touch was the "expulsion of Jellinek", i.e., the expulsion of Teslenko for fifteen sittings for quoting a passage from Jellinek,[177] *despite* Teslenko's statement that his words had "nothing in common with the construction which is now, apparently, being put on them by those who want to vote" in favour of expulsion.

Without going into greater detail in respect of this interesting episode, we shall merely note that even in the presentation of this, politically so plain and clear, question of the Regulations of August 14, 1881, Mr. Milyukov, the leader of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, managed to provide a "brilliant" illustration of specific Cadet narrow-mindedness and hypocrisy. "Gentlemen," exclaimed Milyukov, "there is no question more urgent than the one we have raised, for it represents the principal and fundamental contradiction of Russian life [can the contradiction between a scrap of paper and Russian life be called the contradiction of Russian life?]; it is the contradiction between the existing system of government and the methods of administration."

That is not true, Mr. Milyukov. The very Regulations of August 14, 1881, their thirtieth anniversary, and their "peculiar" "juridical nature" prove that there is *perfect* harmony between the "existing system of government" and the methods of administration, that there is no "contradiction" at all. Considering, as he does, that there is a contradiction between the two, and trying, as he does, to make it appear that a gulf lies between the "system of government" and the "methods of administration", Mr. Milyukov *thereby* descends in his criticism of the evil from the plane of the democratic struggle to that of liberal good wishes. By the very fact that he is creating the fiction of a gulf between things that are *indissolubly* connected in real life, Milyukov is lending support to juridical and state-law fictions that are intended *to facilitate* the justification of the evil, to obscure its real roots. Milyukov thereby takes an *Octobrist stand*; for the Octobrists, too, do not deny the existence of the evil, but try to remove the *formal* contradictions while leaving intact the *real* omnipotence of the bureaucracy from top to bottom and from bottom to top.

Like the genuine Cadet that he is, Milyukov—far from even noticing that, for a "democrat", he has hopelessly muddled things, and that he is arguing like an Octobrist—is even *proud* of his "statesmanlike" presentation of the question. Immediately after the words quoted above we read:

"This contradiction, gentlemen, is so obvious that even in your midst [Mr. Milyukov is, of course, addressing the "leading party of the Third Duma"—the Octobrists] it has been pointed out quite frequently; but very seldom did you reach the substance, the root, the primary cause, which we are discussing today. As a rule, what did you make of this problem of the contradiction between the system and the methods of government? You pleaded that the customs of administration cannot be rooted out at one stroke ... [the reference is correct so long ... so long as the entire "administration" is not removed, and this is something the Cadets themselves do not countenance] ... you referred to the local administrative bodies not obeying central instructions, instructions issued by the central authorities; the most that you dared, was to accuse the central authorities

of not giving proper instructions. To you this has always been a question of facts, to us it is a question of right."

You refute yourself splendidly, Mr. Milyukov! The Octobrists are *right*, a hundred per cent right, when they refer to the close and indissoluble connection, to the closest and most indissoluble connection, between the central and local authorities. From this fact a democratic conclusion must be drawn, for it would be ridiculous to deny this connection after all that Russia knows about Tolmachov, Dumbadze, Reinbot, Illiodor, the murderers of Herzenstein, etc. You, however, are drawing the conclusion, naïve in its half-heartedness, that it is a "question of right". But who is going to determine the extent of this right? How will you reach an "agreement" on this point? What is political right, if not the formulation, the registration, of the relationships of might? You have copied your definitions of right from West-European textbooks which *record* what has come into being as a result of a long period of battles in the West, as a result of the established (until disestablished by fundamentally different movements of the working class) balance of forces among the various elements of the West-European bourgeoisie, the West-European peasants, the West-European feudal landowners, government authorities, etc. In Russia this period has just begun, here the question *is presented*—such is the current historical situation—precisely as a question of "facts"; you, however, shrink back from this plain and clear presentation of the question, hiding your head, covering it with a magic cap of invisibility woven from the fictions of "right . Yours is the standpoint of a liberal official, not of a democrat.

Prosveshcheniye, No. 1,
December 1911
Signed: *Peterburzhets*

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THE FAMINE AND THE REACTIONARY DUMA

Not so long ago, under the influence of last year's harvest, the hack journalists confidently held forth on the beneficial results of "the new agrarian policy", and, taking their cue from them, some naïve persons proclaimed that there had been a turn in our agriculture and that it was on the upgrade throughout Russia.

Now, as if timed to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the decree of November 9, 1906, the famine and crop failure which have gripped nearly half of Russia have shown most graphically and incontrovertibly how much wanton lying or childish simplicity there was behind the hopes placed in Stolypin's agrarian policy.

Even according to government calculations, the authenticity and "modesty" of which were demonstrated during preceding spells of famine, the crop failure has affected twenty gubernias; twenty million people "are entitled to receive relief", in other words, they are bloated from hunger and their farms are being ruined.

Kokovtsov would not be Minister of Finance and the head of the counter-revolutionary government if he did not make "encouraging" statements—there is really no crop failure, you see, but merely "a poor harvest"; hunger "does not cause disease", but, on the contrary, "sometimes cures" diseases; the stories about the sufferings of the famine-stricken are all newspaper inventions—as is eloquently testified to by the governors; on the contrary, "the economic conditions of the localities affected by the poor harvest are not so bad at all", "the idea of giving free food to the population is pernicious", and, finally, the measures taken by the government are "sufficient and timely".

The head of the constitutional government forgot to mention his brilliant invention designed to combat the famine,

namely, that police agents should be given authority to organise "famine relief".

"Public aid" even from legal liberal societies has now been abolished and a Saratov police agent, as the only champion of the starving, has been able to spend freely in taverns the funds entrusted to him to aid the famine-stricken.

Naturally, the feudal landowners on the Right were enthusiastic about "the detailed and, so to speak, all-embracing speech of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers" (Deputy Vishnevsky on November 9); naturally, the grovelling Octobrists promptly stated in their motion to pass to next business that "the government has taken timely measures to combat the effects of the crop failure"; and one of their leaders (by no means an ordinary mortal!) indulged in a profound discourse on "unrestricted circulation of canned fish as a means of providing the population with desirable food".

Hunger-typhus, scurvy, people eating carrion for which they fight dogs, or bread mixed with ashes and manure such as was demonstrated in the State Duma—all these things do not exist as far as the Octobrists are concerned. To them the word of the Minister is law.

And the Cadets? Even on this issue they refrained from voicing a straightforward opinion on the infamous behaviour of the government and found nothing better than, through the medium of Kutler, one of their speakers, to "draw reassuring conclusions from the comprehensive speech of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers" (sitting of November 9); and in formulating their motion to pass to next business, they gently described the activity of the government as being merely "insufficiently [!] systematic, inadequate, and not always [!] timely".

The question of relief and of its organisation is but one aspect of the matter, as the Social-Democrat deputy, Comrade Belousov, correctly pointed out in his speech. No less important is the fundamental question which arises each time the discussion turns on the famine—the question of the causes of famine and of the measures to combat crop failures.

The feudal landowners on the Right have a "very simple" solution: the "loafing" muzhik must be made to work still harder and then "he'll deliver the goods" Markov the

Second, the diehard from Kursk, thinks that it is "horrible" that "out of 365 days in the year the muzhik works only 55-70 days, doing nothing for three hundred days", merely warming his back on the stove and "demanding a ration from the government".

The semi-feudal landowners among the Nationalists and Octobrists take a "deeper" view of the matter. In line with their duty to sing the praises of the authorities, they are still trying to persuade people that "the question of famine will be radically solved when the land passes from the hands of the feeble and the drunkards into the hands of the strong and the sober", "when the reform inaugurated by the late P. A. Stolypin is fully implemented, when the stake on the strong is won". (Kelepovsky's speech at the sitting of the Duma on November 9.)

However, the more far-sighted among the recent defenders of the decree of November 9 are already beginning to sense that the breath of death is hovering over this "great reform". N. Lvov, a deputy from Saratov, who was and, as he declared, still is "in favour of the law of November 9", shared with the Duma the following impressions he had gained "from contact with reality": "All those things you are saying here in the State Duma somehow seem terribly removed from the actual suffering which one sees with one's own eyes". "It is necessary to exercise great caution, and it is necessary to spare that section of the population whom some people are inclined to ignore. As a result of the law of November 9, many newcomers have appeared in some gubernias, including Saratov, land prices have risen and the condition of the poor population has become extremely difficult.... Terrible hatred and condemnation are welling up among the peasant poor—and some measures ought to be taken against this state of affairs.... For relying on the strong by no means implies that the poorer peasants ought to be hastened to their doom and left to perish in poverty", and so on and so forth.

In brief, the impressions "gained from contact with reality" are beginning to open the eyes of this landowner who was "in favour of the law of November 9".

The seeds of immeasurably more profound doubt as to the salutary effect of Stolypin's "agrarian reform" have been

planted by this year's famine in the minds of the Right-wing peasants. The motion put forward by Andreichuk, a Right-wing peasant, "that the government shall, at an early date, introduce into the State Duma a bill to limit the amount of land in the hands of big landowners"—a motion supported by all the Right-wing peasants and even by rural priests—shows more than anything else along what lines the peasants, even the Rights among them, think the "struggle against the famine" should be conducted.

The demand voiced by Andreichuk, the demand that comes direct from the peasant world, provides additional proof (recall the statement of the Right- and Left-wing peasant deputies suggesting the compulsory alienation of landed estates in order to provide allotments for those who possess little land, recall the speeches of the peasant deputies in the debate on the decree of November 9, etc.), showing how deeply the need for an agrarian revolution is penetrating into the minds even of the Right-wing peasants, to what great extent even they regard the struggle against famine as *inseparable from the struggle "for land"*.

A real struggle against famine is inconceivable without the appeasement of the peasants' land hunger, without the relief from the crushing pressure of taxes, without an improvement in their cultural standard, without a decisive change in their legal status, without the confiscation of the landed estates—*without a revolution*.

In this sense this year's crop failure is a new reminder of the doom that awaits the entire existing political system, the June Third monarchy.

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THE SIXTH (PRAGUE) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[178]

JANUARY 5-17 (18-30), 1912

THE SIXTH (PRAGUE) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[178]

JANUARY 5-17 (18-30), 1912

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFERENCE[179]

RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUTION

Whereas:

1. The disintegration and collapse of most Party organisations caused by the broad stream of counter-revolutionary feeling and ferocious persecution on the part of tsarism, as well as the prolonged absence of a practical Party centre, a Central Committee, have all been factors responsible for the extremely serious position of the Russian S.D.L. Party;

2. At the present moment, due to the revival of the working-class movement, progressive workers everywhere show an intense desire to re-establish the illegal organisations of the Party, and in this connection most local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. have displayed tremendous and successful initiative in re-establishing the Party and convening a general Party conference;

3. The extremely urgent practical tasks of the working-class movement and of the revolutionary struggle against tsarism (leadership in the economic struggle, political agitation, and proletarian meetings; elections to the Fourth Duma, etc.) make it imperative that prompt and most energetic measures be taken to re-establish a competent practical Party centre, closely linked with the local organisations;

4. After an interval of more than three years since the last conference of the R.S.D.L.P., and after many attempts during more than two years to convene a meeting of representatives of all Party organisations, we have now succeeded in uniting twenty organisations in Russia around the Russian Organising Commission which called the present Conference and which several months ago notified all Social-

Democrats of its convocation and invited to the Conference all, without a single exception, organisations of our Party; furthermore, all organisations were given an opportunity to take part in our Conference;

5. Despite the delay and a number of arrests all the Party organisations functioning in Russia, with very few exceptions, are represented at the present Conference;

It is therefore resolved:

The Conference constitutes itself the general Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which is the supreme Party authority and is pledged to establish competent central bodies.

Written not later than
January 5 (18), 1912

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2
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

This Conference endorses, first and foremost, the resolution adopted at the Party Conference in December 1908 on "The Tasks of the Party in the Present Situation". This Conference points to the extreme importance of that resolution, whose provisions relating to the historical meaning and class essence of the entire June Third regime on the one hand, and the growing revolutionary crisis on the other, have been fully confirmed by the events of the past three years.

Of these events the Conference particularly notes the following:

(a) The agrarian policy of tsarism, with which both the government parties of the landowners and big bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary liberals have bound up their counter-revolutionary interests, has not led to the creation of anything like stable bourgeois relations in the village, nor has it relieved the peasantry of mass hunger, which reflects the extreme worsening of the condition of the population and an enormous loss of productive forces.

(b) In view of its impotence in the face of the world competition of the modern capitalist states and being pushed more and more into the background in Europe, the tsarist autocracy in alliance with the reactionary nobility and the growing industrial bourgeoisie, is now endeavouring to satisfy its predatory interests by means of crude "nationalist" politics, directed against the more cultured regions (Finland, Poland, North-Western Area), and, through colonial conquest, against the peoples of Asia (Persia and Mon-

golia) who are waging a revolutionary struggle for freedom.

(c) The developing economic advance is largely offset by the complete disruption of peasant economy, by the rapacious budgetary policy of the autocracy and the absolute corruption in the bureaucratic apparatus; on the other hand, the increasing cost of living intensifies the poverty of the working class and the broad masses of the population.

(d) In view of this the broad masses of the population have become convinced, during the five-year existence of the Third Duma, that it is unwilling, unable, and powerless to do anything to improve their conditions, and that the parties predominating in the Duma are anti-popular in character.

(e) The onset of a political revival is to be noted among broad democratic circles, chiefly among the proletariat. The workers' strikes of 1910-11, the beginning of demonstrations and proletarian meetings, the start of a movement among urban bourgeois democrats (the student strikes), etc., all these are signs of the growing revolutionary feelings of the masses against the June Third regime.

This Conference, proceeding from all these facts, confirms the tasks confronting the Party as outlined in detail in the resolution of the December 1908 Conference, and draws the particular attention of comrades to:

(1) The fact that, as heretofore, the first task on the order of the day is the continued work of the socialist education, organisation, and unification of the politically-conscious masses of the proletariat;

(2) The necessity for intensive work to re-establish the illegal organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which more than ever before takes advantage of all and every legal possibility, which is capable of leading the economic struggles of the proletariat, and which is the only party able to take the lead in political actions by the proletariat that are growing more frequent;

(3) The necessity to organise and extend systematic political agitation and to give wholehearted support to the incipient mass movement and secure its development under the banner of full implementation of the Party slogans.

Propaganda for a republic, and against the policy of the tsarist monarchy, must be given special prominence to counteract, among other things, the widespread propaganda in favour of curtailed slogans and adaptation to existing "legality".

Written early in January 1912

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3
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE TASKS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FAMINE[180]

Whereas:

(1) The famine affecting 20 million peasants in Russia once again shows the absolutely unbearable conditions of the peasant masses, crushed and oppressed by tsarism and the class of feudal landowners, conditions unimaginable in any civilised country of the world;

(2) The present famine once again confirms the failure of the government's agrarian policy and the impossibility of ensuring anything like normal bourgeois development in Russia so long as its policy in general, and its agrarian policy in particular, are directed by the class of feudal landowners who, through the parties of the Right, dominate the Third Duma, the Council of State, and circles at the Court of Nicholas II;

(3) The Black-Hundred parties (with the Markovs and similar people at the head), by their statements in the Duma and their attempts to lay the blame on the "loafing peasants" have so flaunted the shamelessness of the tsarist-landowner gang that is plundering Russia that the eyes of even the most ignorant are being opened, and indignation of even the most indifferent is being aroused;

(4) The actions of the government in hindering relief for the famine-stricken, the police interference with the Zemstvos, with the collectors of funds and the organisers of kitchen committees, etc., give rise to widespread dissatisfaction even among the bourgeoisie, and voices of protest are raised even among such backward and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie as the Octobrists;

(5) The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, while helping in its press to inform the public of the famine and of the

behaviour of the government, nevertheless, in the person of the Constitutional-Democrat Kutler in the Third Duma, adopted such a moderate-oppositional position that can, under no circumstances, satisfy democrats, any more than it is possible to accept the presentation of the question of relief for the famine-stricken as philanthropy, which is the way the majority of the liberals present it;

(6) Among the working class, despite the worsening of its economic position arising from the increasing numbers of starving and unemployed, a spontaneous desire is to be observed to collect funds to aid the starving and to help them in other ways. This desire natural to every democrat, to say nothing of a socialist, must be supported and furthered by all Social-Democrats in the spirit of class struggle;

The Conference resolves that it is essential:

(a) To bend all efforts to extending propaganda and agitation among the broad masses of the population, and in particular among the peasantry, explaining the connection between the famine and tsarism and its entire policy, to distribute in the villages for agitational purposes the Duma speeches, not only of the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks, but even of such friends of the tsar as Markov the Second, and to popularise the political demands of Social-Democracy —in the first instance the overthrow of tsarist monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic, followed by the confiscation of landed estates;

(b) To support the desire of the workers to aid the famine-stricken as far as possible, advising them to send their donations only to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, to the workers' press, or to workers' cultural-educational and other associations, etc., and forming special nuclei of Social-Democrats and democrats upon their joining groups, committees or commissions for aid to the famine-stricken;

(c) To endeavour to give expression to the anger of the democratic masses aroused by the famine in demonstrations, mass meetings, and other forms that constitute the beginning of a revolutionary mass struggle against tsarism.

Written early in January 1912

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4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON LIQUIDATIONISM AND THE GROUP OF LIQUIDATORS

LIQUIDATIONISM AND THE GROUP OF LIQUIDATORS

Whereas:

(1) The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party for nearly four years has been waging a determined fight against the liquidationist trend, which was characterised at the conference of the Party in December 1908 as

> "an attempt on the part of a group of Party intellectuals to liquidate the existing organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. and to replace it at all costs, even at the price of downright renunciation of the programme, tactics, and traditions of the Party, by a loose association functioning legally."

(2) The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held in January 1910, continuing the fight against this trend, unanimously declared it to be "a manifestation of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat" and demanded, as a condition for real Party unity and for the fusion of the former Bolshevik and Menshevik groups, a complete rupture with liquidationism and the utter rout of this bourgeois deviation from socialism;

(3) In spite of all Party decisions, and in spite of the obligation assumed by the representatives of Menshevism at the Plenary Meeting held in January 1910, a section of the Mensheviks, grouped around the magazines *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, refused to help restore the Central Committee (the refusal of Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman, in the spring of 1910, not only to join the Central Committee but even to attend a single meeting to co-opt new members);

(4) It was precisely after the Plenary Meeting of 1910 that the above-mentioned publications definitely turned to liquidationism all along the line, not only "belittling [contrary to the decision of the Plenary Meeting] the importance of the illegal Party", but openly renouncing it, declaring that the Party was already liquidated, that the idea of reviving the illegal Party was "a reactionary utopia", using the columns of censored magazines to heap ridicule and abuse on it, calling upon the workers to regard the nuclei of the Party and its hierarchy as "dead", etc.;

(5) The few local groups of liquidators, consisting mainly of representatives of the intelligentsia, continuing their work of destroying the Party, not only refused to listen to the call, repeated in 1911, to help revive the illegal Party and convene a Party conference, but, banded together in entirely independent small groups, they openly began to agitate among the workers against the illegal Party and launched an open fight against reviving it—even in those places where the pro-Party Mensheviks predominated (for example, in Ekaterinoslav, Baku, Kiev, etc.);

The Conference declares that by its conduct the above-mentioned group has definitely placed itself outside the Party.

The Conference calls upon all Party members, irrespective of tendencies and shades of opinion, to combat liquidationism, explain its great harmfulness to the cause of the emancipation of the working class, and bend all their efforts to revive and strengthen the illegal Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Written early in January 1912

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5

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

THE RUSSIAN ORGANISING COMMISSION FOR CONVENING THE CONFERENCE

Having heard and discussed the report of the representative of the Russian Organising Commission on its activity in connection with the convening of a general Party conference:

The Conference deems it its duty to stress the enormous importance of the work accomplished by the Russian Organising Commission in rallying all the Party organisations in Russia irrespective of factional affiliation, and in re-establishing our Party as an all-Russian organisation.

The activity of the Russian Organising Commission, in which Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks in Russia worked in harmony, is to be all the more commended since it was carried out under incredibly trying conditions due to police persecution and in face of numerous obstacles and difficulties arising out of the situation within the Party.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFERENCE

Whereas:

(1) The disintegration and collapse of most Party organisations, caused by the broad stream of counter-revolutionary feelings and ferocious persecution on the part of tsarism, as well as the prolonged absence of a practical Party centre, a Central Committee, have all been factors responsible for the extremely serious position in which the R.S.D.L.P. found itself in the period 1908-11;

(2) At the present moment, due to the revival of the working-class movement, progressive workers everywhere

show an intense desire to re-establish the illegal organisations of the Party and inaugurate systematic legal and illegal Social-Democratic activity, and in this connection most local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. have displayed tremendous and vigorous initiative in re-establishing the Party and convening a general Party conference;

(3) The extremely urgent practical tasks of the working-class movement and of the revolutionary struggle against tsarism (leadership in the economic struggle, general political agitation, proletarian meetings, the campaign in connection with the elections to the Fourth Duma, etc.) make it imperative that prompt and most energetic measures be taken to re-establish a competent practical Party centre, closely linked with the local organisations;

(4) After an interval of more than three years since the last conference of the R.S.D.L.P., and after many attempts during more than two years to convene a meeting of representatives of all Party organisations, we have now succeeded in uniting more than twenty organisations in Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Saratov, Kazan, Samara, Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Rostov, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, Nikolayev, Lugansk, Baku, the Tiflis group, the Wilno group, the Dvinsk group, Ekaterinburg, Ufa, Tyumen, a number of places in the Central Region, and others) around the Russian Organising Commission which called the present Conference, and which several months ago notified all Social-Democrats of its convocation and invited to the Conference all, without a single exception, organisations of our Party; furthermore, all organisations were given an opportunity to take part in the Conference;

(5) Despite a number of arrests made by the police, all the Party organisations functioning in Russia, with very few exceptions, are represented at the present Conference;

(6) Groups of Social-Democrats active in the legal working-class movement in some of the big centres of Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Caucasus) were invited to attend the Conference and have given it their endorsement;

It is therefore resolved:

The Conference constitutes itself the general Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which is the supreme Party authority.

THE ABSENCE OF DELEGATES FROM THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONAL CENTRES FROM THE GENERAL PARTY CONFERENCE

Recognising that it is extremely important to strengthen the unity of the Social-Democratic workers of all the nationalities of Russia, and considering it absolutely imperative to establish unity with the non-Russians in the localities and to strengthen the ties between the national organisations and the all-Russia centre, the Conference at the same time is compelled to place on record that:

(1) Experience has conclusively proved that in the Party we cannot tolerate a situation where non-Russians working in total isolation from Russian organisations have chosen to set up a federation of the worst type and—frequently regardless of whether they wanted to or not—placed key Russian organisations in such a position that without non-Russian national centres, which for all practical purposes do not concern themselves with Russian affairs, the R.S.D.L.P. was unable to effect very essential and important Party work.

(2) During the past year one of the non-Russian national centres (that of the Bund) openly co-operated with the liquidators and tried to bring about a split in the R.S.D.L.P.; others (the central bodies of the Latvians and the Polish S.D.) at the decisive moment kept aloof from the fight against the liquidators who are trying to destroy the Party.

(3) The pro-Party elements in the non-Russian organisations, in the first place all the worker members of the Party, knowing what is going on in the *Russian* organisations, are coming out resolutely *in favour* of unity with the Russian illegal Social-Democratic organisations, *in favour* of supporting the Russian Organising Commission, and *in favour* of fighting the liquidationist trend.

(4) The Central Committees of the three national organisations were invited three times (by the Organising Commission Abroad, the Russian Organising Commission, and the delegates to the Conference) to attend the Party Conference, and every facility has been provided for them to send their delegates.

In view of all this, and considering it inexpedient to suspend the activity of the R.S.D.L.P. because of the reluctance of the non-Russian national centres to send delegates to the general Party Conference, the Conference places the

entire responsibility for the failure of the non-Russians to attend on their central bodies. At the same time the Conference instructs the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to work unremittingly for unity and the establishment of normal relations with the non-Russian national organisations affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P.

The Conference is confident that, in spite of all obstacles, worker Social-Democrats of all the nationalities of Russia will work in harmony and fight shoulder to shoulder for the cause of the proletariat and against all the enemies of the working class.

ON THE REPORTS OF THE LOCAL ORGANISATIONS

Having heard the reports of the local organisations the Conference places on record that:

(1) Energetic work is being conducted everywhere among worker Social-Democrats with the object of strengthening the local illegal Social-Democratic organisations and groups;

(2) It has been recognised everywhere that it is necessary to combine illegal with legal Social-Democratic work; it has been recognised everywhere by Social-Democrats that our illegal Party organisations should use the legally existing working-class associations of every kind as bases for carrying on work among the masses. Nevertheless, not enough has so far been done to promote practical Social-Democratic work in trade unions, co-operative societies, clubs, etc.; not enough has so far been done to disseminate Marxist literature, to make use of the speeches of Social-Democrat deputies in the Duma, etc. In this field it is absolutely imperative for the illegal Social-Democratic groups to show greater energy;

(3) Everywhere in the localities, without a single exception, Party work is being conducted jointly and harmoniously mainly by the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks, as well as by *Vperyod* supporters in Russia wherever there are any, and by all other Social-Democrats who recognise the need for an illegal R.S.D.L.P. The entire work is, furthermore, conducted in the spirit of the defence of Party principles and the struggle against liquidationism.

The Conference is confident that, in connection with the revival of the working-class movement, energetic efforts will be continued to strengthen the old and create new, sufficiently flexible, organisational forms which will help the Social-Democratic Party to carry on its struggle for the *old* revolutionary aims and revolutionary methods of achieving them in *new* circumstances.

THE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

This Conference endorses, first and foremost, the resolution on the June Third regime and the tasks of the Party, adopted at the Party Conference in December 1908. This Conference points to the extreme importance of that resolution, whose provisions relating to the historical meaning and class essence of the entire June Third regime on the one hand, and the growing revolutionary crisis on the other, have been fully borne out by the events of the past three years.

Of these events the Conference particularly notes the following:

(a) The agrarian policy of tsarism, with which both the government parties of the landowners and big bourgeoisie and, actually, the counter-revolutionary liberals have bound up their counter-revolutionary interests, has not led to the creation of anything like stable bourgeois relations in the village, nor has it relieved the peasantry of mass hunger, which reflects the extreme worsening of the condition of the population and an enormous loss of the productive forces of the country.

(b) In view of its impotence in the face of the world competition of the modern capitalist states and being pushed more and more into the background in Europe, tsarism in alliance with the reactionary nobility and the growing industrial bourgeoisie, is now endeavouring to satisfy its predatory interests by means of crude "nationalist" politics, directed against the inhabitants of the border regions, against all oppressed nationalities, against the more cultured regions in particular (Finland, Poland, North-Western Area) and, through colonial conquest, against the peoples of Asia (Persia and China) who are waging a revolutionary struggle for freedom.

(c) The developing economic advance is largely offset by the complete disruption of peasant economy, by the rapacious budgetary policy of the autocracy and corruption in the bureaucratic apparatus; on the other hand, the increasing cost of living intensifies the poverty of the working class and the broad masses of the population.

(d) In view of this the broad masses of the population have become convinced, during the five-year existence of the Third Duma, that it is unwilling, unable, and powerless to do anything to improve their conditions, and that the parties predominating in the Duma are anti-popular in character.

(e) The onset of a political revival is to be noted among broad democratic circles, chiefly among the proletariat. The workers' strikes of 1910-11, the beginning of demonstrations and proletarian meetings, the start of a movement among urban bourgeois democrats (the student strikes), etc., all these are signs of the growing revolutionary feelings of the masses against the June Third regime.

This Conference, proceeding from all these facts, confirms the tasks confronting the Party, as outlined in detail in the resolution of the December 1908 Conference, particularly pointing out that the task of winning power by the proletariat, carrying with it the peasantry, remains as before, the task of the democratic revolution in Russia. This Conference draws the particular attention of comrades to:

(1) The fact that, as heretofore, the first task on the order of the day is the continued work of the socialist education, organisation, and unification of the politically-conscious masses of the proletariat;

(2) The necessity for intensive work to re-establish the illegal organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which more than ever before takes advantage of every legal possibility, which is capable of leading the economic struggles of the proletariat, and which is the only party able to take the lead in political actions by the proletariat that are growing more frequent;

(3) The necessity to organise and extend systematic political agitation and to give wholehearted support to the incipient mass movement and secure its development

under the banner of full implementation of the Party slogans.

Propaganda for a republic, and against the policy of the tsarist monarchy, must be given special prominence to counteract, among other things, the widespread propaganda in favour of curtailed slogans and of confining activity to the existing "legality".

ELECTIONS TO THE FOURTH DUMA

I

This Conference recognises the undoubted necessity for participation by the R.S.D.L. Party in the forthcoming election campaign to the Fourth State Duma, the nomination of independent candidates of our Party and the formation in the Fourth Duma of a Social-Democratic group, which as a section of the Party is subordinated to the Party as a whole.

The main tasks of our Party in the elections, and equally of the future Social-Democratic group in the Duma itself—a task to which all else must be subordinated—is socialist, class propaganda and the organisation of the working class.

The main election slogans of our Party in the forthcoming elections must be:

(1) *A democratic republic.*

(2) *The eight-hour working day.*

(3) *Confiscation of all landed estates.*

In all our election agitation it is essential to give the clearest possible explanation of these demands, based on the experience of the Third Duma and all the activities of the government in the sphere of central as well as local administration.

All propaganda on the remaining demands of the Social-Democratic minimum programme, namely: universal franchise, freedom of association, election of judges and officials by the people, state insurance for workers, replacement of the standing army by the arming of the people, and so on, must be inseparably linked with the abovementioned three demands.

II

The general tactical line of the R.S.D.L.P. in the elections should be the following: the Party must conduct a merciless struggle against the tsarist monarchy and the parties of landowners and capitalists supporting it, at the same time steadfastly exposing the counter-revolutionary views of the bourgeois liberals (headed by the Cadet Party) and their sham democracy.

Particular attention in the election campaign must be paid to dissociating the position of the proletarian party from that of *all* non-proletarian parties and explaining the petty-bourgeois essence of the sham socialism of the democratic (chiefly Trudovik, Narodnik and Socialist-Revolutionary) groups, as well as the harm done to democracy by their waverings on the question of consistent and mass revolutionary struggle.

As far as electoral agreements are concerned, the Party, adhering to the decisions of the London Congress, must:

(1) Put forward its candidates in all worker curias and forbid *any* agreement *whatsoever* with other parties or groups (liquidators);

(2) In view of the great agitational significance of the mere fact of nomination of independent Social-Democratic candidates, it is necessary to ensure that in the second assemblies of urban voters, and as far as possible in the peasant curias, the Party puts forward its own candidates;

(3) In cases of a second ballot (Article 106 of the Election Regulations) in the election of electors at the second assemblies of urban voters it is permissible to conclude agreements with bourgeois democrats against the liberals, and then with the liberals against all the government parties. One form of agreement can be the compilation of a general list of electors for one or several towns in proportion to the number of votes registered at the first elections;

(4) In those five cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Odessa, Kiev) where there are direct elections with a second ballot, it is essential in the first elections to put forward independent Social-Democratic candidates for the second urban curia voters. In the event of a second ballot here, and since there is obviously no danger from the Black

Hundreds, it is permissible to come to an agreement only with the democratic groups against the liberals;

(5) There can be no electoral agreements providing for a common platform, and Social-Democratic candidates must not be bound by any kind of political commitment, nor must Social-Democrats be prevented from resolutely criticising the counter-revolutionary nature of the liberals and the half-heartedness and inconsistency of the bourgeois democrats;

(6) At the second stage of the elections (in the uyezd assemblies of delegates, in the gubernia assemblies of voters, etc.), wherever it proves essential to ensure the defeat of an Octobrist-Black Hundred or a government list in general, an agreement must be concluded to share the seats, primarily with bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, etc.), and then with the liberals (Cadets), independents, Progressists, etc.

III

All Social-Democrats must *immediately* commence preparation for the election campaign, and should pay special attention to the following:

(1) It is urgently necessary everywhere to form illegal Social-Democratic nuclei in order that they may without delay prepare for the Social-Democratic election campaign;

(2) To pay the necessary attention to the strengthening and broadening of the legally existing workers' press;

(3) The entire election campaign must be carried out in close alliance with workers' trades unions and all other associations of workers, and the form in which these societies participate must be chosen with due consideration paid to their legal status;

(4) Special attention must be paid to the organisational and agitation preparation of the elections in the worker curias of those six gubernias in which the election of deputies to the Duma from the worker curias is guaranteed (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Kostroma, Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav). Every single worker elector—here and in the other gubernias—must be a Social-Democratic Party member;

(5) Assemblies of workers' delegates, guided by the decision of the illegal Party organisations, must decide *who precisely* is to be elected to the Duma from the workers, and bind all electors, under threat of boycott and being branded as traitors, to withdraw their candidature in favour of the Party candidate;

(6) In view of persecution by the government, the arrest of Social-Democrat candidates, etc., it is necessary to carry out particularly restrained, systematic and careful work, using every means to react quickly to all police tactics and nullify all the tricks and coercion of the tsarist government, and to elect Social-Democrats to the Fourth State Duma, and then in general to strengthen the group of democratic deputies in the Duma;

(7) The candidates of the Social-Democratic Party are endorsed, and instructions concerning the elections are given by the local illegal organisations and groups of the Party, under the general supervision and guidance of the Central Committee of the Party;

(8) If, despite all efforts, it proves impossible to convene a Party congress or a new conference before the elections to the Fourth Duma, the Conference empowers the Central Committee, or an institution appointed for the purpose by the latter, to issue concrete instructions on questions concerning the conduct of the election campaign in the various localities, or to meet special circumstances arising, etc.

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

This Conference recognises that the Social-Democratic group in the Duma made use of the Duma platform in accordance with the line defined by the December (1908) Party Conference, which must remain the guide for the direction of Party work in the Duma.

The Conference, in particular, regards as consistent with the tasks of the proletariat that aspect of the group's activities that it has energetically defended the interests of the workers and all measures for improving their lot (for instance, the labour bills) and in so doing has endeavoured to show all the partial tasks in their relation to the general aims of the liberation movement led by the proletariat,

and points to the mass movement as the only way to rid Russia of the sufferings and shame to which she has been brought by tsarism.

The Conference welcomes the beginning of open actions by the workers in connection with the praiseworthy behaviour of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, which in the reactionary Duma raised the banner of the Social-Democratic deputies to the Second Duma and exposed to the workers of the entire world all the provocative filth of the Black-Hundred tsarist gang that organised the government coup d'état of 1907. The Conference calls on all class-conscious workers in Russia to give wholehearted support to the speeches of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma, and the campaign of proletarian meetings commenced by the St. Petersburg workers.

The Conference recognises that in view of the forthcoming election campaign to the Fourth Duma, the Social-Democratic Duma group must devote still more attention to explaining to the people the class essence of the non-proletarian parties (and in particular to exposing the counter-revolutionary and treacherous nature of the Cadet Party) being guided by the resolution of the London (1907) Congress, which in all its significant sections has been confirmed by the experience of the period of counter-revolution. Furthermore, the central slogans, which must be common to all statements made by members of the Social-Democratic group, must determine the nature of its work and concentrate all its partial demands and reforms on the main points, should be the following three slogans: (1) a democratic republic, (2) the eight-hour day, (3) confiscation of all landed estates and their transfer to the peasantry.

THE CHARACTER AND ORGANISATIONAL FORMS OF PARTY WORK

Recognising that the experience of the past three years has undoubtedly confirmed the main provisions of the resolution on the problem of organisation carried by the December (1908) Conference, and assuming that the new upswing of the working-class movement makes possible the further development of organisational forms of Party work along

the lines indicated therein, i.e., by the formation of illegal Social-Democratic nuclei surrounded by as wide a network as possible of every kind of legal workers' associations,

The Conference considers that:

(1) It is essential for illegal Party organisations to participate actively in the leadership of the *economic struggle* (strikes, strike committees, etc.), and to ensure co-operation in this sphere between the illegal Party nuclei and the trade unions, in particular with the S.D. nuclei in the trade unions, and also with various leaders of the trade union movement;

(2) It is desirable that S.D. nuclei in unions organised on an *industrial* basis should, whenever local conditions permit, function in conjunction with Party branches organised on a *territorial* basis;

(3) It is essential for the maximum possible initiative to be shown in the organisation of S.D. work in legally existing associations—unions, reading rooms, libraries, various types of workers' entertainment societies, the circulation of the trade union journals and the guidance of the trade union press in the spirit of Marxism; the use of the Duma speeches of the S.D. members, the training of workers to become legal lecturers, the creation (in connection with the elections to the Fourth Duma) of workers' and other voters' committees for each district, each street, etc., and the organisation of Social-Democratic campaigns in connection with the elections to municipal bodies, etc.;

(4) It is essential to make special efforts to strengthen and increase the number of illegal Party nuclei, and to seek for new organisational forms for them of the greatest possible flexibility, to establish and strengthen leading illegal Party organisations in every town and to propagate such forms of mass illegal organisations as "exchanges", factory Party meetings, and so on;

(5) It is desirable to draw the study circles into everyday *practical* work—the distribution of illegal Social-Democratic and legal Marxist literature, and so on;

(6) It is essential to bear in mind that systematic agitation through S.D. literature and particularly the regular distribution of the illegal Party paper, issued frequently and regularly can have a tremendous significance for the

establishment of organisational links, both between the illegal nuclei, and between the S.D. nuclei in legally existing workers' associations.

THE TASKS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FAMINE

(1) The famine affecting 20 million peasants in Russia once again shows the absolutely unbearable conditions of the impoverished peasant masses, crushed and oppressed by tsarism and the class of feudal landowners, conditions unimaginable in any civilised country of the world;

(2) The present famine once again confirms the failure of the government's agrarian policy, and the impossibility of ensuring anything like normal bourgeois development in Russia so long as its policy in general, and its agrarian policy in particular, are directed by the class of feudal landowners who, through the parties of the Right, dominate the June Third Duma, the Council of State, and circles at the Court of Nicholas II;

(3) The Black-Hundred parties (with the Markovs and similar people at the head), by their statements in the Duma and their attempts to lay the blame on the "loafing peasants", have so flaunted the shamelessness of the tsarist-landowner gang that is plundering Russia that the eyes of even the most ignorant are being opened, and the indignation of even the most indifferent is being aroused;

(4) The actions of the government in hindering relief for the famine-stricken, the police interference with the Zemstvos, with the collectors of funds and the organisers of kitchen committees, etc., give rise to widespread dissatisfaction even among the Zemstvos and the urban bourgeoisie;

(5) The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, while helping in its press to inform the public of the famine and of the behaviour of the government, nevertheless, through the Constitutional-Democratic group in the Third Duma acted as such a moderate opposition that under no circumstances can its conduct satisfy democrats, any more than it is possible to accept the presentation of the question of relief to the famine-stricken as philanthropy, which is the way the majority of the liberals present it;

(6) Among the working class, despite the worsening of its economic position arising from the increasing numbers of starving and unemployed, a spontaneous desire is to be observed to collect funds to aid the starving and to help them in other ways. This desire natural to every democrat, to say nothing of a socialist, must be supported and furthered by all Social-Democrats in the spirit of class struggle.

Having considered all these points,

The Conference resolves that it is essential:

(a) To enlist all Social-Democratic forces to extend propaganda and agitation among the broad masses of the population, and in particular among the peasantry, explaining the connection between the famine and tsarism and its entire policy; to distribute in the villages for agitational purposes the Duma speeches, not only of the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks, but even of such friends of the tsar as Markov the Second, and to popularise the political demands of Social-Democracy—the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, the establishment of a democratic republic and the confiscation of landed estates;

(b) To support the desire of the workers to aid the famine-stricken as far as possible, advising them to send their donations only to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, to the workers' press, or to workers' cultural-educational and other associations, etc., and forming special nuclei of Social-Democrats and democrats upon their joining groups, committees or commissions for aid to the famine-stricken;

(c) To endeavour to give expression to the anger of the democratic masses aroused by the famine in demonstrations, mass meetings, and other forms of mass struggle against tsarism.

THE PARTY'S ATTITUDE TO THE WORKERS' STATE INSURANCE DUMA BILL

I

1. The share of the wealth produced by the wage-worker which he receives in the form of wages is so insignificant that it is scarcely sufficient to provide for his most essential requirements; the proletarian is therefore deprived of any

opportunity to lay aside any part of his earnings to provide for himself in case of inability to work as a result of accident, illness, old age or permanent disablement, as well as in case of unemployment which is inseparably linked up with the capitalist mode of production. The insurance of workers in all the aforementioned cases is therefore a reform imperatively dictated by the entire course of capitalist development.

2. The best form of workers' insurance is *state* insurance based on the following principles: (a) it should provide for the workers in *all* cases of incapacity (accidents, illness, old age, permanent disablement; extra provisions for working women during pregnancy and childbirth; benefits for widows and orphans upon the death of the bread-winner) or in case of loss of earnings due to unemployment; (b) insurance must include *all* wage-earners and their families; (c) all insured persons should receive compensations equal to their *full* earnings, and *all* expenditures on insurance must be borne by the employers and the state; (d) all forms of insurance should be handled by *uniform* insurance organisations of the *territorial* type and based on the principle of *full* management by the insured persons themselves.

3. The government Bill, passed by the State Duma, is in radical contradiction to all these fundamental requirements of a rational insurance scheme; for (a) it provides for only *two* kinds of insurance, cases of accident and cases of illness; (b) it extends to only a small part (according to the most liberal calculations, to one-sixth) of the Russian proletariat, since it excludes from insurance whole regions (Siberia and, in the government's version, also the Caucasus) and whole categories of workers who particularly need insurance (farm labourers, building workers, railway workers, post and telegraph workers, shop assistants, etc.); (c) it provides for beggarly rates of compensation (the maximum compensation in case of *total* disablement resulting from accidents is set at two-thirds of the earnings, the latter, moreover, calculated on the basis of standards lower than the actual earnings) and at the same time makes the workers pay the lion's share of the expenditure on insurance —for the plan is to make the workers cover the expendi-

tures not only on insurance against illness but also on insurance against "minor" injuries, which in practice are the most numerous. This new procedure is a change for the worse even compared with the present law, according to which compensation for injuries is paid entirely by the employers; (d) it deprives the insurance bodies of every vestige of independence, placing them under the combined surveillance of civil servants (from the courts and the "Council for Insurance Affairs"), the gendarmerie, the police (who, besides exercising general surveillance, are invested with the right to direct the practical activities of the insurance bodies, influence the selection of their personnel, etc.), and the employers (the accident insurance societies under the exclusive control of employers; sick benefit societies run by the factories; society rules guaranteeing the influence of the employers, etc.).

4. This law, which rides roughshod over the most vital interests of the workers, is the only one possible in this present period of frenzied reaction, this period of the domination of counter-revolution, and is the result of many years of preliminary negotiations and agreement between the government and the representatives of capital. An insurance reform really corresponding to the interests of the workers can only be accomplished after the final overthrow of tsarism and the achievement of conditions indispensable for the free class struggle of the proletariat.

II

In view of the aforementioned, the Conference resolves that:

(1) It is the urgent task both of the illegal Party organisations and of the comrades active in the legally existing organisations (trade unions, clubs, co-operative societies, etc.) to develop the most extensive agitation against the Duma Insurance Bill, which affects the interests of the entire Russian proletariat as a class, since it grossly violates them.

(2) The Conference considers it necessary to emphasise that all Social-Democratic agitation concerning the Insurance Bill should be presented in relation to the class posi-

tion of the proletariat in modern capitalist society, and should criticise the bourgeois illusions being spread by the social-reformists; this agitation must, in general, be linked up with our fundamental socialist tasks; on the other hand, it is necessary in this agitation to show the connection between the character of the Duma "reform" and the current political situation and, in general, its connection with our revolutionary-democratic tasks and slogans.

(3) Fully approving of the vote of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma against the Bill, the Conference draws the attention of the comrades to the extensive and valuable material clarifying the attitude of the various classes to labour reforms furnished by the debate in the Duma on this question; the Conference particularly stresses the fact that the debate vividly brought out the aspirations of the Octobrist representatives of backward capital openly hostile to the workers, as well as the attitude of the Constitutional-Democratic Party masked, in the hypocritical speeches of its representatives, by social-reformist phrases about "social peace"; in point of fact, the Cadets came out in the Duma against the independent activity of the working class and virulently contested the principal amendments to the Bill proposed by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma.

(4) The Conference most earnestly warns the workers against all attempts to curtail or completely distort Social-Democratic agitation by confining it to what is legally permissible in the present period of the domination of the counter-revolution; on the other hand, the Conference emphasises that the main point of this agitation should be to explain to the proletarian masses that no real improvement in the worker's conditions is possible unless there is a new revolutionary upsurge, that whoever wishes to achieve a genuine labour reform must above all fight for a new, victorious revolution.

(5) Should the Duma Bill become law in spite of the protest of the class-conscious proletariat, the Conference summons the comrades to make use of the new organisational forms which it provides (workers' sick benefit societies) to carry on energetic propaganda for Social-Democratic ideas in these organisational units and thus turn the new law, devised as a means of putting new chains and a new

yoke upon the proletariat, into a means of developing its class-consciousness, strengthening its organisation and intensifying its struggle for full political liberty and for socialism.

THE "PETITION CAMPAIGN"

1. The counter-revolution, as represented by the government and the Third Duma, regards the working-class movement as its chief enemy and persecutes it in all its forms, systematically infringing upon even those "legal opportunities" remaining to the working class as a result of the revolution.

2. This regime constantly confronts the masses of workers with the fact that they cannot achieve even their most elementary rights (above all, the freedom of association) without the complete overthrow of the tsarist monarchy.

3. The petition circulated in the winter of 1910 by a group of St. Petersburg liquidators, and the agitation which accompanied this petition campaign, isolated the demand for freedom of association from the sum total of all the revolutionary demands of the working class. Instead of explaining to the workers that to win full freedom of association in Russia it is indispensable for the masses to wage a revolutionary struggle for fundamental democratic demands, the liquidators actually preached the so-called "fight for right", that is to say, a liberal fight for the "renovation" of the June Third regime by partial improvements.

4. In view of the specific conditions obtaining in Russian political life and the condition of the masses of the workers, the above-mentioned campaign has inevitably degenerated into the purely formal and meaningless signing of papers and has met with no response and aroused no political interest among the masses.

5. The fate of this petition campaign clearly confirmed the incorrectness of the entire undertaking and its isolation from the working-class masses: altogether 1,300 signatures were collected, the petition campaign having met with absolutely no response in any of the Party organisations *regardless of factions and trends*; nor did our Social-Democratic group in the Duma deem it possible to have anything to do with it.

6. The workers' mass meetings in connection with the fate of the deputies to the Second Duma and the workers' demonstrations held in various cities on January 9, 1912, show that the independent activity of the workers by no means runs in such channels as a petition campaign, nor is it conducted under the banner of "partial rights".

In view of the aforementioned, the Conference

(1) calls upon all Social-Democrats to explain to the workers the paramount importance to the proletariat of freedom of association; this demand must always be closely linked up with our general political demands and our revolutionary agitation among the masses;

(2) while recognising that under certain conditions a mass petition of workers could prove a very effective means of protest, is of the opinion that in the present period in Russia a petition is one of the least effective methods of Social-Democratic agitation.

LIQUIDATIONISM AND THE GROUP OF LIQUIDATORS

Whereas:

(1) The R.S.D.L.P. for nearly four years has been waging a determined fight against the liquidationist trend, which was characterised at the conference of the Party in December 1908 as

"an attempt on the part of a group of Party intellectuals to liquidate the existing organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. and to replace it at all costs, even at the price of downright renunciation of the programme, tactics, and traditions of the Party, by a loose association functioning legally";

(2) The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held in January 1910, continuing the fight against this trend, unanimously declared it to be a manifestation of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat and demanded, as a condition for real Party unity and for the fusion of the former Bolshevik and Menshevik groups, a complete rupture with liquidationism and the utter root of this bourgeois deviation from socialism;

(3) In spite of all Party decisions, and in spite of the obligation assumed by the representatives of all the factions

at the Plenary Meeting held in January 1910, a section of Social-Democrats, grouped around the magazines *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, began to defend openly the trend which the en tire Party has recognised as being the product of bourgeois influence on the proletariat;

(4) The former members of the Central Committee, Mikhail, Yuri, and Roman, refused not only to join the Central Committee in the spring of 1910, but even to attend a single meeting to co-opt new members, and bluntly declared that they considered the very existence of the Party Central Committee to be "harmful";

(5) It was precisely after the Plenary Meeting of 1910 that the above-mentioned chief publications of the liquidators, *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, definitely turned to liquidationism all along the line, not only "belittling [contrary to the decisions of the Plenary Meeting] the importance of the illegal Party", but openly renouncing it, declaring that the Party was "extinct", that the Party was already liquidated, that the idea of reviving the illegal Party was "a reactionary utopia", using the columns of legally published magazines to heap slander and abuse on the illegal Party, calling upon the workers to regard the nuclei of the Party and its hierarchy as "dead", etc.;

(6) At a time when throughout Russia the members of the Party, irrespective of factions, united to promote the immediate task of convening a Party conference, the liquidators, banded together in entirely independent small groups, split away from the local organisations even where the pro-Party Mensheviks predominated (Ekaterinoslav, Kiev) and definitely refused to maintain any Party relations with the local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.;

The Conference declares that by its conduct the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* group has *definitely placed itself outside the Party*.

The Conference calls upon all Party members, irrespective of tendencies and shades of opinion, to combat liquidationism, explain its great harmfulness to the cause of the emancipation of the working class, and bend all their efforts to revive and strengthen the illegal R.S.D.L.P.

THE CENTRAL ORGAN

Having heard and discussed the report of the representative of the Central Organ, the Conference approves of the Central Organ's line in principle and expresses the wish that more space be devoted to articles of a propagandist nature, and that the articles be written in a more popular style, so as to make them more intelligible to the workers.

RABOCHAYA GAZETA

Whereas:

Rabochaya Gazeta has resolutely and consistently championed the Party and its principles, and enjoys the full sympathy of Party functionaries in local Party branches, irrespective of factional affiliation,

The Conference:

(1) calls upon all comrades in the localities to support *Rabochaya Gazeta* in every way;

(2) recognises *Rabochaya Gazeta* as an official organ of the Central Committee of the Party.

NEWSPAPER *PRAVDA*[181]

The Conference annuls the agreement with the editors of *Pravda* concluded by the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in January 1910.

CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATIONAL RULES OF THE PARTY

The following is to be added to Clause 2:

"Co-option is considered permissible—in accordance with the decisions of the December (1908) Conference."

Clause 8 is to be deleted and replaced by the following:

"The Central Committee shall convene conferences of representatives of all the Party organisations as frequently as possible."

Clause 9, third paragraph, dealing with representation at congresses, is amended to read:

"The basis of representation at Party congresses shall be fixed by the Central Committee after preliminary communication with local organisations."

PROPERTY IN THE HANDS OF THE FORMER TRUSTEE, AND FINANCIAL REPORTS

The Conference notes the statement of the authorised representatives of the Bolsheviks, with whom the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee concluded an agreement in January 1910, providing for the conditional transfer by the Bolsheviks of the property of their group to the Central Committee, and resolves that

(1) in view of the fact that the liquidators violated the agreement, and that the trustees have refused to act as arbitrators, the Bolshevik representatives have every formal right to dispose both of the property in their own hands and of the property now in the hands of Comrade Zetkin, former trustee;

(2) following the application made by the representatives of the Bolsheviks, the Conference regards the funds now in Comrade Zetkin's keeping as unquestionably belonging to the Party through the Central Committee elected by the Conference, and

(3) instructs the Central Committee to take all measures immediately to obtain the property of the Party from Comrade Zetkin.

* *
*

The Auditing Committee, having examined the financial reports and the receipts submitted by *Rabochaya Gazeta*, now endorsed by the Conference as an organ of the Central Committee, and also the receipts presented by the group of Bolsheviks to whom funds were advanced by the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee for the purpose of publishing Social-Democratic literature, has found the accounts to be in order and moves that they be accepted by the Conference.

THE RED CROSS

The Conference instructs all the comrades in the localities to make every effort to revive the Red Cross organisation, which is so urgently needed for aid to imprisoned and exiled comrades.

THE PARTY ORGANISATION ABROAD

The Conference recognises the absolute necessity for a single Party organisation abroad that carries on its work of assisting the Party under the control and guidance of the Central Committee.

The Conference approves the Committee of the Organisation Abroad[182] as one of the Party organisations functioning abroad, and summons all Party elements, irrespective of factions and trends, who support the illegal Party and are waging an implacable fight against the anti-Party trends (liquidationism), to rally around the Central Committee in order to assist in the work of the Party in Russia and in creating a single organisation abroad.

All groups abroad, without any exception, may communicate with Russian organisations only through the Central Committee.

The Conference declares that the groups abroad which refuse to submit to the Russian centre of Social-Democratic activity, i.e., to the Central Committee, and which cause disorganisation by communicating with Russia independently and ignoring the Central Committee, have no right to use the name of the R.S.D.L.P.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTACK ON PERSIA

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party protests against the rapacious policy of the tsarist gang which is bent on suppressing the freedom of the Persian people and, in pursuing this policy, does not shrink from carrying out the most barbarous and infamous acts.

The Conference places on record that the alliance between the Russian and British governments which the Russian liberals are widely advertising and supporting in every way, is directed primarily against the revolutionary movement of the democratic forces in Asia, and that, by virtue of this alliance, the Liberal government of Britain is a party to the bloody atrocities perpetrated by the tsarist government.

The Conference expresses its unqualified sympathy for the struggle waged by the Persian people and, particularly, by the Persian Social-Democratic Party, which has lost so many of its members in the fight against the tsarist butchers.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

In view of the campaign of propaganda conducted by the government and liberal newspapers (*Rech*) in favour of taking advantage of the revolutionary movement in China in order to annex, in the interests of Russian capitalists, the Chinese provinces bordering on Russia, the Conference recognises the world-wide importance of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, which is bringing emancipation to Asia and is undermining the rule of the European bourgeoisie. The Conference hails the revolutionary republicans of China, testifies to the profound enthusiasm and complete sympathy with which the proletariat of Russia is following the successes of the revolutionary people of China, and condemns the behaviour of the Russian liberals who are supporting tsarism's policy of conquest.

THE POLICY OF THE TSARIST GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND

The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., the first to be convened since Russian tsarism and the counter-revolutionary Duma passed laws abolishing the rights and liberties of the Finnish people, expresses its complete solidarity with the fraternal Social-Democratic Party of Finland, emphasises that the workers of Finland and Russia have a common task in the struggle against the Russian counter-revolutionary government and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie who are trampling on the rights of the people, and expresses its firm conviction that only as a result of the joint efforts of the workers of Russia and of Finland will tsarism be overthrown and the Russian and Finnish people attain freedom.

GREETINGS TO THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The following telegram was sent on behalf of the Conference to the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party:

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as represented by the Russian Organising Commission and the Central Organ of the Party, sends its ardent greetings to the fraternal German Social-Democratic Party on the occasion of the brilliant victory over all the forces of the bourgeois world it won at the recent elections.[183]

Long live international Social-Democracy; *long live the German Social-Democratic Party!*

Written in January 1912

Published in February 1912 in a pamphlet *All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* Central Committee Publishing House, Paris

Published according to the pamphlet text

AN ORGAN OF A LIBERAL LABOUR POLICY

Before me lie three issues of the St. Petersburg weekly newspaper *Zhivoye Dyelo*[184] which began publication in January last.

I invite readers to look closely at the sermons which it preaches.

The main political question of the day is the elections to the Fourth Duma. Martov's article in No. 2 is devoted to this subject. The slogan he puts forward reads: "We must endeavour to dislodge reaction from its positions in the Duma." And in No. 3 Dan repeats this idea—"The best way to weaken its pernicious influence [that of the Council of State] is to wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries."

The slogan is clear, and every class-conscious worker will have no difficulty, of course, in seeing that it is not a Marxist, not a proletarian, not even a democratic, but a *liberal* slogan. It is the slogan of a liberal labour policy.

Here is Martov's defence of this slogan: "Is this task *feasible* under the existing electoral law? Unquestionably, it is. True, this electoral law guarantees beforehand a majority of electors from the landowners and the first urban [capitalist] curia in a considerable [?] number of gubernia assemblies...".

In his attempt to defend a bad cause Martov was at once forced to make a flagrantly wrong assertion. The electors from the landowners plus the first urban curia comprise an absolute majority, not "in a considerable number" of gubernia assemblies, but *positively in all of them* (in European Russia). And this is not all. In 28 out of 53 gubernias, the electors sent by the landowners *alone* comprise an *absolute majority* in the gubernia assemblies. And these 28 gubernias

send 255 deputies to the Duma—out of a total of 442, i.e., again an absolute majority.

In order to defend the liberal slogan about "dislodging reaction from its positions in the Duma" Martov had to begin by whitewashing the Russian landowners so as to make them look like liberals. Not a bad beginning!

"However," Martov continues, "the last elections showed that among the landowners and the big urban bourgeoisie too, there are elements hostile to the Black-Hundred, nationalist and Octobrist reactionaries."

True. Even some of the electors delegated by the landowners are members of the opposition, Cadets. What conclusion is to be drawn from this? Only that the Duma majority elected on the basis of the law of June 3, 1907, cannot be shifted *farther than a landowners*' "liberal" opposition. The landowner has the last say. This fact remains true, and Martov tries to evade it. Consequently, only if the landowner joins the opposition can the "opposition" (*of the landowners*) gain the upper hand. But that is precisely the crux of the whole question; can one say, without turning into a liberal, that the (*landowners*') "liberal opposition will be capable of dislodging reaction from its positions in the Duma"?

In the first place, we must not gloss over the fact that our electoral law favours the landowners. Secondly, we must not forget that the landowners' "opposition" has all the distinguishing features of so-called "*Left Octobrists*" (with which the Cadets are permitted by their last conference to form blocs!—something that it is no use Martov keeping quiet about). Only comical liberal politicians can talk about a possible victory of "Left Octobrists", and of "wresting the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries" or of "dislodging reaction from its positions in the Duma".

The task of worker democrats is to *take advantage* of the conflicts between the liberals and the present majority in the Duma *for the purpose* of strengthening the democratic forces in the Duma, and by no means to support liberal illusions about the possibility of "wresting the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries".

Our author lands into an even worse mess when he turns to a question of *principle*, to the question as to what *significance* should be attached to the eventuality of "the *entire*

opposition breaking down the Black-Hundred Octobrist majority in the Duma".

"It is to the interest of the workers," argues Martov, "that power in a class state should be transferred from the hands of the savage landowner into the hands of the more civilised bourgeoisie."

A wonderful argument. Only a minor detail has been forgotten—a mere trifle—that "*it is to the interest*" of the Russian "more civilised bourgeoisie", the liberals, the Cadets, *not to undermine* the power of the savage landowner. "It is to the interest" of the liberals to share power with him, taking care not to undermine this power and not to place a single weapon in the hands of democracy.

That is the crux of the matter! And it is to no purpose that you try to evade a serious question and, with an air of importance, chew the cud of trivial commonplaces.

"By strengthening their representation in the Duma," says Martov, "the Cadets and the Progressists will still not be able to assume power, but it will facilitate their advance towards power." Well, well. If that is the case, why is it that, since 1848, the German Cadets and Progressists have "strengthened their representation" in Parliament time and again, but, for all that, they have so far "not come to power"? Why is it that during sixty-four years, *and to this very day*, they have *left* power in the hands of the Junkers? Why is it that the Russian Cadets, although they "increased their representation" in the First and Second Dumas, did not "facilitate their advance towards power"?

Martov accepts Marxism only insofar as it is *acceptable* to *any* educated liberal. It is to the interest of the workers that power should be transferred from the hands of the landowner into the hands of the more civilised bourgeois—every liberal in the world will subscribe to this "conception" of the "*interest of the workers*". But that is still not Marxism. Marxism goes further and says: it is to the interest of the liberals not to undermine the power of the landowner, but to take a place next to him; (2) it is to the interest of the liberals to share power with the landowners in such a way as to leave absolutely nothing to the worker or to democracy; (3) power *actually* does "fall out" of the

hands of the landowners and "passes into the hands" of the liberals *only when* democracy triumphs *in spite* of the liberals. You want proof? Take the entire history of France and the latest events in China. In the latter country the liberal Yuan Shih-kai would never have come to power even provisionally, even conditionally, if Chinese democracy had not scored a victory *in spite* of Yuan Shih-kai.

If the commonplace maxim that a liberal is better than a member of the Black Hundreds is *all* that Struve, Izgoyev and Co. accept in the way of Marxism, the dialectics of the class struggle is a sealed book both to the liberal as well as to Martov.

To sum up: precisely in order that power in Russia may actually "pass" from the hands of the landowners *into* the hands of the bourgeoisie, democracy in general, and the workers in particular, must not be deceived and enfeebled by the *false* slogan of "wresting the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries". The practical task that faces us at the elections is by no means to "dislodge reaction from its positions in the Duma", but to strengthen the forces of democracy in general and of working-class democracy in particular. This task may sometimes clash with the "task" of increasing the number of liberals, but five additional democrats are more important to us, and more useful to the proletariat, than fifty additional liberals.

Hence the following conclusion which Martov refuses to draw, even though he does pretend to agree that the Cadets are *not* democrats, but liberals: (1) in the five big cities,[185] in the event of a second ballot, agreements are permissible *only* with the democrats against the liberals; (2) at *all* the ballots and in *all* the agreements at the second stage, *precedence* should be given to agreements with the democrats against the liberals, and only subsequently may agreements be concluded with the liberals against the Rights.

Zvezda, No. 11 (47), February 19, 1912
Signed: *F. L-ko*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

AGAINST UNITY—WITH THE LIQUIDATORS

No. 7 of the liquidationist newspaper *Zhivoye Dyelo* carries an editorial entitled "For Unity—Against a Split". The article deals with a question that is undoubtedly extremely interesting and important and is exercising the mind of every thinking worker. We consider it our duty to express our opinion—even if in part and in brief, on the obviously and definitely incorrect information offered readers by *Zhivoye Dyelo*.

On the basis of reports in the newspapers *Golos Zemli*, *Russkoye Slovo* and *Kievskaya Mysl*[186] which "agree with the information received by *Zhivoye Dyelo*", the latter establishes the fact that a general Party conference was held abroad, and that this conference has "imposed upon all Marxists in Russia definite tactics to be pursued in the election campaign", and, among other things, placed the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* group *outside the Party* (italics of the *Zhivoye Dyelo*). In this connection, *Zhivoye Dyelo* (which intersperses its article with the usual slander and insinuations against the anti-liquidators) is, first, trying its utmost to discredit the conference, and, second, takes *Nasha Zarya* and Co. under its wing, declaring that they cannot be placed "outside", that the "writers" of that trend "contemptuously shrug their shoulders at this resolution", etc.

We note, to begin with, that the entire content of the article in *Zhivoye Dyelo*, its hysterical tone and its vociferous shouting "for unity" clearly testify to the fact that the liquidators have been touched to the quick and are trying, unsuccessfully, to obscure *the substance of the matter*. It is with this *substance* that we shall now deal.

Naturally, we can neither defend the conference nor supplement or correct the information printed in the abovementioned newspapers (to which *Golos Moskvy* should now be added). For that matter this is not what we have set out to do. And, for that matter, too, it is sufficient to reproduce *word for word* just one sentence from the article in *Zhivoye Dyelo*: "We ask," the liquidators exclaim, "who elected them [the delegates to the conference], who authorised them to speak and decide on behalf of the Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc., Marxists?" It would be quite natural for Mr. Purishkevich or Mr. Zamyslovsky, for example, openly to "ask" such a question. But it is the liquidators who ask this question of the public in the columns of *Zhivoye Dyelo* and this question in itself so splendidly reveals their liquidationist nature, so magnificently exposes them, that it only remains for us to point to these methods of the liquidators and to leave it at that.

We repeat that we are dealing with the questions touched upon in this article only insofar as it is our duty to comment on statements in the press and to note all that is related to the workers' election campaign. The readers must know the truth. When the liquidators say—"For unity—against a split"—it is our duty to reveal the falsehood contained in this statement. First, why play at hide-and-seek and speak of "unity" in general, when as a matter of fact, it is a question *only of unity with the liquidators*? Why does *Zhivoye Dyelo* obscure the real issue? Why doesn't it say openly whether or not it is in agreement with the point of view expressed by *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*? Secondly, it is premature to speak of a *split* so long as we are not confronted by two organised, integral political collectives functioning in the same milieu.

This is the *substance of the matter* that *Zhivoye Dyelo* should speak about—its shouting and abuse will lead it nowhere.

Unity with the liquidators is not a new, but rather an old, issue. More than two years ago, in January 1910, a most determined attempt was made to establish such unity; it was formulated in an agreement and sealed by a unanimous resolution. The attempt failed, that is admitted by all, the liquidators included (see *Nasha Zarya* for 1911,

No. 11, p. 130). Why did it fail? People who are really interested in the question ought to find the answer themselves, by examining the documents. We shall cite here only a few of the *documents*, but the most decisive.

One of the "uniters" or "conciliators", Mr. Ionov, who is well known for his part in the attempt to establish unity with the liquidators, wrote *at the very time* that attempt was made:

"However harmful otzovism and liquidationism, as such, may be to the Party, their beneficial effect on the factions [the Menshevik and the Bolshevik factions] seems to be beyond doubt. Pathology recognises two kinds of abscess—harmful and harmless. The harmless type is a disease beneficial to the organism. As it grows, it draws various injurious substances from the entire organism and thus helps improve the health of that organism. I believe that a similar role was played by liquidationism in respect of Menshevism and by otzovism-ultimatumism in respect of Bolshevism."

Here is one documented confirmation of the fact that the declared condition for unity with the liquidators was that they should completely renounce liquidationism. That was in January 1910. In February 1910, Mr. *Potresov* wrote the following in *Nasha Zarya*, No. 2:

"I ask the reader," wrote Mr. Potresov, "whether it is possible that there can exist, in this year of 1909, as something that is actually real and not a figment of a diseased imagination, a liquidationist tendency, a tendency to liquidate what is already beyond liquidation and actually no longer exists as an organised whole". (*Nasha Zarya*, 1910, No. 2, p. 61.)

All practical workers know that the liquidators acted exactly as directed by Mr. Potresov. *Vozrozhdeniye*, another well-known organ of the liquidators, to which the same Martov, Larin, Levitsky and Co. contributed, quoted these words of Mr. Potresov's in its issue of March 30, 1910, and added approvingly on its own behalf: "There is nothing to liquidate—and for ourselves we [i.e., the editors of *Vozrozhdeniye*] may add, the dream of resuscitating that hierarchy, in its old, underground shape is nothing but a harmful, reactionary utopia..." (*Vozrozhdeniye*, 1910, No. 5, p. 51).

Were there any other persons and trends, besides ours, who interpreted these statements as a *breach* on the part of the liquidators with the old, previously existing political collective? There certainly were. The proof: (1) An article by Mr. Izgoyev in *Russkaya Mysl*, 1910, No. 8—"A *Vekhi* Writer Among Marxists". Mr. Izgoyev always assesses the events taking place among the Marxists from a consistently *Vekhi* viewpoint. "The answer [given by Mr. Potresov to the questions of the working-class movement] *fully accords*," wrote Mr. Izgoyev, "with what was written in *Vekhi*, which he reviles, and what the publicists of *Russkaya Mysl* are saying" (*Russkaya Mysl*, 1910, No. 8, p. 67). (2) The Menshevik Plekhanov wrote in May 1910 apropos of Mr. Potresov's words quoted above: "There is no doubt, however, that *a man for whom our Party does not exist*, *does not himself exist for our Party*. [Plekhanov's italics.] Now all the members of the Party will have to say that Mr. Potresov is no comrade of theirs, and some of them, will, perhaps, stop accusing me on the score that I have long since ceased to regard him as such."

The fact is established, and no subterfuges and evasions can alter matters. The liquidators broke with the previously existing political collective as far back as 1910. No historian of Russian political life can evade this fact unless he wants to depart from the truth. In 1911, Levitsky, Martov, Dan, Larin, Chatsky and Co. repeatedly made statements fully in line with Potresov's. We have only to recall how Larin, in *Dyelo Zhizni* (for 1911, No. 6, p. 15), preached to the workers that it is not difficult "to form circles ... of several hundred people ... in each town", but that it would be just a "masquerade"!

It is our profound conviction that the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this, from more than two years' experience, is that unity *with the liquidators* is an impossibility. Nor is an agreement with them possible. Agreements in this case are *inconceivable* because it is a question of the existence or non-existence of what the liquidators have contemptuously dubbed "the hierarchy". And no abuse from *Zhivoye Dyelo*—an organ of the *very same* liquidators of the *very same* trend—can change anything. The liquidators are *outside*.... That is an irrevocable fact.

It may be objected, perhaps, that this fact implies a split. It does not. A split means the formation of *two* political collectives instead of one. At the present time, however, in March 1912, an observer of our political life, one equipped with the finest telescope and looking from the vantage point of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, New York or elsewhere—will be able to discern *only one* organised, integral political collective, and the only result of the liquidators' abuse is that this collective is gaining strength among the workers.

The trouble with the liquidators is that they have indeed *liquidated* their relations with the old, but they have *created nothing* new. When they do create something, we shall see what it is and, in our capacity of political observers, inform readers about it. But so far the fact remains that there is no other integrated political collective, consequently, there is no split.

The liquidators have long since given notice that they are going to form an "open" political association. But that has nothing to do with the facts. Mr. Levitsky "*himself*", Potresov's and Martov's closest colleague, expressed, in a leading article in *Nasha Zarya*, No. 11 (1911), his *regret* that "we do not see a single, more or less serious, attempt to organise a legally existing *political* [Mr. Levitsky's italics] association". Mr. Levitsky thinks that both the "masses" and the "leaders" are to blame for this. But it is not now a question of who is to blame, but of establishing a fact. *If* Mr. Levitsky and his friends form a legally existing political association, *if* it actually pursues a Marxist (and not a liberal) labour policy, then ... then we shall see. Only you had better make haste, gentlemen, not much time remains to the elections, and Herculean efforts are needed to do in months what has not been done in *years* (or to *do it* in a way diametrically *opposed* to the way it was done before).

The liquidators have decapitated themselves. And it is no use weeping for the hair when the head is gone.

An observer of Russian political life may discover only one political collective in the sphere which interests us. Around it he will find individuals and unorganised small groups which offer no complete answer even to the *most urgent* political problems. In other words, there is disinte-

gration everywhere. As in every case of disintegration there are some who vacillate and some who hope (in vain, alas!) to prevail upon the liquidators *actually* to break with liquidationism. But only hopeless politicians can try to feed themselves on hopes a mere six months before the elections.

Take, for instance, the question of slogans for the election campaign, of tactics, of agreements. There is only one formulated, clear, explicit, and complete answer, and this answer is already known to all the leading workers throughout Russia. *There is no other answer*. Once more, Messrs. Liquidators: It's no use weeping for the hair when the head is gone.

P.S. Trotsky, apparently, classes himself among those who "hope" that the liquidators may mend their ways; for, writing in *Zhivoye Dyelo* he gives a simplified paraphrase of the introductory section of the December 1908 resolutions on the essence of the June Third regime. We shall be very glad if Trotsky succeeds in convincing Larin and Martov, for instance, not to mention others, that they all ought to agree on one definite, explicit, and clear answer to the question of what the substance of our present "Constitution" is. They are shouting about the usefulness of "unity", about the harm of "the circle outlook", and yet they cannot elaborate a united opinion even of their "own" circle, either on questions of principle, or on practical questions of our entire activity! But, to compensate for this, there is phrase-mongering galore! "Social-Democracy," writes Trotsky, "is able to inscribe its great tasks on the inner surface of the cranium, not only as a formula...." What an elegant writer Trotsky is—as elegant as Potresov and Nevedomsky.

Prosveshcheniye, No. 3-4,
February-March 1912
Signed: *M. B.*

Published according to
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POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE FIVE YEARS OF THE THIRD DUMA

I

In the *Rech Year Book for 1912*—that miniature political encyclopaedia of liberalism—we find an article by Mr. Milyukov: "Political Parties *in the State Duma* in the Past Five Years". Written by the acknowledged leader of the liberals, and an outstanding historian at that, this article deserves our special attention, all the more so since it deals with what may be termed the *most important pre-election subject*. The political results of the activity of the parties, the question of their role, scientific generalisations regarding the alignment of social forces, the slogans of the forthcoming election campaign simply ask to be written about, and Mr. Milyukov *had* to touch on all these points, once he had tackled the subject, no matter how much he tried to confine himself to a plain relation of the facts concerning the "external history" of the Duma.

The result is an interesting picture, illustrating the old, but ever new, subject: how is Russian political life reflected in the mind of a liberal?

"The party of people's freedom," writes Mr. Milyukov, "which in the First Duma predominated numerically and in the Second Duma morally, was represented in the Third Duma by only 56-53 deputies. After holding the position of a leading majority it became an opposition party, retaining, however, its dominant position in the ranks of the opposition, both numerically and qualitatively and by the strict group discipline which characterised the speeches and voting of its representatives."

The leader of a party, writing about political parties declares that his party "retained ... its domination ... qualitatively". Not bad—only this self-advertisement might—have been somewhat more subtle.... And, then, is it true that the Cadets dominated in respect of strict group discipline? This is not true, for we all remember the numerous speeches of Mr. Maklakov, for example, who isolated himself from the Cadet group and took up a position to the right of it. Mr. Milyukov made an incautious statement for, while it is safe to advertise the "qualities" of one's party, because such an appraisal is entirely subjective, the facts at once refute the advertisement of party discipline. It is characteristic that the Right wing of the Cadets—both in the Duma, in the person of Maklakov, and in the press, in the person of Messrs. Struve and Co. in *Russkaya Mysl*—took their own line and, far from adhering to strict discipline, they destroyed all discipline in the Cadet Party.

"To its left," continues Mr. Milyukov, "the people's freedom group had only 14 Trudoviks and 15 Social-Democrats. The Trudovik group retained but a shadow of the importance it had formerly had in the First and the Second Dumas. The somewhat better organised Social-Democratic group came out from time to time with sharp invectives regarding 'class contradictions', but, in essence, it could not pursue any tactics other than those also pursued by the 'bourgeois' opposition."

This is all, literally all, that the distinguished historian has to say about the parties to the left of the Cadets in the twenty pages of his article. But the article is supposed to be devoted to an examination of the political parties in the State Duma—it goes into the minutest details of every shift in the ranks of the landowners, dealing at length with the sundry "moderate-Right" or "Right-Octobrist groups" and with every step taken by those groups. Why, then, are the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats practically ignored? For to describe them as Mr. Milyukov *does* is tantamount to ignoring them.

The only possible answer is: because Mr. Milyukov has a particular dislike for these parties, and even a plain statement of generally known facts regarding these parties would run counter to the *interests* of the liberals. In fact,

Mr. Milyukov is perfectly well aware of the reshuffling effected in the composition of the electors which reduced the Trudoviks to "a shadow of the former importance they had had" in the Dumas. This reshuffling, which was effected by Mr. Kryzhanovsky and other heroes of June 3, 1907, undermined the Cadet majority. But can this justify the ignoring and, even worse, the distortion of data relating to the importance of parties having very small representation in the landowners' Duma? The Trudoviks are very poorly represented in the Third Duma, but they have played a very great role during these five years, for they represent millions of peasants. The interests of the landowners especially demanded the reduction of peasant representation. But, we should like to ask, what interests prompt the liberals to brush aside the Trudoviks?

Or take Mr. Milyukov's ill-tempered sally against the Social-Democrats. Is it possible for him not to know that the "tactics" of the latter are distinguished from that of the Cadets not only because there is a difference between a proletarian and a bourgeois opposition, but also because democracy differs from liberalism? Of course, Mr. Milyukov knows this perfectly well, and he could quote examples from the modern history of all European countries to illustrate the difference between democrats and liberals. The point is that when it concerns Russia the Russian liberal *refuses* to see the distinction between himself and the Russian democrats. It is *to the advantage* of the Russian liberal to pose before the Russian readers as a representative of the whole "democratic opposition" in general. But this advantage has nothing in common with the truth.

Actually, it is common knowledge that the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma pursued tactics *absolutely* different from those of the bourgeois opposition in general and of the Cadet (liberal) opposition in particular. It may be safely asserted that, had Mr. Milyukov tried to deal with any one specific political issue, he would not have found *a single one* on which the Social-Democrats did not pursue fundamentally *different* tactics. Having chosen as his subject a survey of the political parties in the Third Duma, Mr. Milyukov distorted the principal and cardinal point: that there were three main groups of political parties, which

pursued three different kinds of tactics—namely, the government parties (from Purishkevich to Guchkov), the liberal parties (Cadets, Nationalists and Progressists), and the democratic parties (the Trudoviks representing bourgeois democracy, and working-class democrats). The first two generalisations are clear to Mr. Milyukov, he sees perfectly well the essence of the affinity between Purishkevich and Guchkov on the one hand, and all the liberals on the other. But he does not see the distinction between the latter and the democrats, because he *will not see* it.

II

This is repeated when he deals with the class basis of the various parties. To the right of him Mr. Milyukov sees this basis and reveals it; but he grows blind the moment he turns to the left. "The very law of June 3," he writes, "was dictated by the united nobility. It was the Right wing of the Duma majority that undertook to defend the interests of the nobility. To this the Left wing of the majority added the defence of the interests of the big urban bourgeoisie". How edifying, isn't it? When the Cadet looks to the right he draws distinct lines of "class contradictions": here the nobility, there the big bourgeoisie. But the moment the liberal turns his glance to the left he puts the words "class contradictions" in ironical quotation marks. The class distinctions disappear: the liberals, in the capacity of a general "democratic opposition", are supposed to represent the peasants, the workers, and the urban democrats!

No, gentlemen, this is not scientific history, nor is it serious politics—it is cheap politics and self-advertisement.

The liberals represent neither the peasants nor the workers. They merely represent a section of the bourgeoisie—urban, landowning, etc.

The history of the Third Duma is so generally known that even Mr. Milyukov cannot help admitting that on frequent occasions the liberals voted together with the Octobrists—not only *against* (the government), but also *in favour* of certain positive measures. These facts, in view of the common history of Octobrism and Cadetism (which in 1904-05, up to October 17, 1905, were one), *prove* to everyone to whom

historical reality means anything at all that the Octobrists and the Cadets are the two flanks of *one class*, the two flanks of the bourgeois *Centre*, which vacillates between the government and the landowners, on the one hand, and democracy (the workers and the peasants), on the other. Mr. Milyukov fails to draw this *fundamental* conclusion from the history of "the political parties in the Third Duma" only because it is not to his interest to do so.

In a new way and under new circumstances, the Third Duma has *confirmed* the fundamental division of Russian political forces and Russian political parties of which there were definite signs in the middle of the nineteenth century, and which acquired a growingly distinct shape in the period 1861-1904, rose to the surface and became fixed in the open arena of the struggle of the masses in 1905-07, remaining unchanged in the 1908-12 period. Why is this division valid to this day? Because the objective problems of Russia's historical development—problems which have always and everywhere, from France in 1789 to China in 1911, formed the content of democratic change and democratic revolutions—have as yet not been solved.

This is grounds for the inevitably stubborn resistance of the "bureaucracy" and the landowners, as well as for the vacillations of the bourgeoisie, for whom changes are essential but who are afraid that the changes may be made use of by democracy in general and by the workers in particular. In the sphere of Duma politics this fear was particularly apparent among the Cadets in the First and the Second Dumas, and among the Octobrists in the Third, Duma, i.e., when those parties represented the "leading" majority. Although the Cadets contend with the Octobrists, they take the same stand on questions of principle and it is really more a matter of rivalry than of a fight. They share with them a cosy place near the government, *alongside* the landowners; hence the apparent keenness of the conflict between the powers that be and the Cadets, their closest rivals.

While ignoring the distinction between the democrats and the liberals, Mr. Milyukov goes into extraordinary detail and examines at great length, with gusto, one might say, the shifts in the ranks of the landowners: Rights, moderate-Rights, Nationalists in general, independent Na-

tionalists, Right Octobrists, plain Octobrists, Left Octobrists. No serious significance can be attached to the divisions and shifts within these limits. At most they are connected with the substitution of a Tverdoonto for an Ugryum-Burcheyev[187] in an administrative post, with the change of persons, with the victories of circles or coteries. In everything essential, their political lines are absolutely identical.

"Two camps will contend [in the elections to the Fourth Duma]", insists Mr. Milyukov, in the same way as the entire Cadet press never tires of insisting. That is not true, gentlemen. There are *three* principal camps that *are contending* and will contend: the government camp, the liberals, and working-class democracy as the centre towards which all the forces of democracy in general gravitate. The division into two camps is a trick of liberal politics, which, unfortunately, does occasionally succeed in misleading some supporters of the working class. Only when it realises the inevitability of a division into three main camps, will the working class be able actually to pursue, not a liberal labour policy, but a policy of its *own*, *taking advantage* of the conflicts between the first camp and the second, but not allowing itself to be deceived even for a moment by the sham democratic phrases of the liberals. The workers must not allow themselves to be deceived, nor must they allow the peasants, the mainstay of bourgeois *democracy*, to be deceived. That is the conclusion to be drawn from the history of the political parties in the Third Duma.

Zvezda, No. 14 (50), March 4, 1912
Signed: *K. T.*

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REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU ON THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[188]

The last few years have been years of indecision and disorganisation for the R.S.D.L.P. For three years the Party could not convene either a conference or a congress, and during the last two years the Central Committee has been unable to develop any activity. True enough, the Party has continued to exist, but only in the form of isolated groups in all the larger cities and, in view of the absence of a Central Committee, each of these groups has led a life of its own, somewhat isolated from the others.

Not so long ago, under the influence of the new awakening of the Russian proletariat, the Party again began to gain in strength, and quite recently we were able, at last, to convene a conference (something that had been impossible ever since 1908), at which the organisations of St. Petersburg and Moscow, of the North-West and the South, the Caucasus and the central industrial region were represented. In all, twenty organisations established close ties with the Organising Commission convening this conference; that is to say, practically all the organisations, both Menshevik and Bolshevik, active in Russia at the present time.

During its twenty-three sessions the Conference, which assumed the rights and duties of the supreme authority of the Party, discussed all the questions on the agenda, among which were a number that were extremely important. The Conference made a comprehensive evaluation of the present political situation and of Party policy, this evaluation fully corresponding to the resolutions of the Conference held in

1908 and to the decisions of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in 1910. The Conference devoted special attention to the Duma elections which are to be held in a few months' time, and adopted a resolution in three sections which gives a very explicit and detailed explanation of the intricate and involved election law, analyses the question of election agreements with other parties, and thoroughly elucidates the position and tactics of the Party in the forthcoming election campaign. The Conference also discussed and adopted resolutions on the questions of combating the famine, of workers' insurance, of trade unions, of strikes, etc.

Further, the Conference considered the question of the "liquidators". This trend denies the existence of the illegal Party, declares that the Party is already liquidated and that the attempts to revive the illegal Party are a reactionary utopia, and maintains that the Party can be revived only as a legally existing organisation. Nevertheless, this trend, which has broken with the illegal Party, has so far been unable to found a legally existing party. The Conference placed on record that for four years the Party had been waging a fight against this trend, that the Conference held in 1908 and the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in 1910 had both declared against the liquidators, and that in spite of all the attempts made by the Party, this trend continued to maintain its factional independence and to carry on a struggle against the Party in the columns of publications appearing legally. The Conference, therefore, declared that the liquidators, grouped around the magazines *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* (to which *Zhivoye Dyelo* should now be added), had placed themselves outside the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P.

Finally, the Conference elected a Central Committee and an editorial board for *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Party's Central Organ. In addition, the Conference specially noted the fact that many groups abroad more or less adhering to socialism are, in any case, entirely divorced from the Russian proletariat and its socialist activity; consequently, these groups are absolutely irresponsible, and under no circumstances can they represent the R.S.D.L.P. or speak in its name; that the Party does not hold itself in any way responsible

or answerable for these groups, and that all relations with the R.S.D.L.P. must be carried on solely through the Central Committee, whose address abroad is: Vladimir Ulyanov, 4, Rue Marie Rose, Paris XIV (for the Central Committee).

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THE ELECTION PLATFORM OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[189]

Worker comrades, and all citizens of Russia!

The elections to the Fourth Duma are to be held in the very near future. Various political parties and the government itself are already energetically preparing for the elections. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the party of the class-conscious proletariat, that by its glorious struggle in 1905 dealt the first serious blow to tsarism and forced it to concede representative institutions, calls on each and every one of you who enjoy electoral rights, as well as the great majority deprived of rights, to play a most energetic part in the elections. All those who strive for the liberation of the working class from wage slavery, all those who hold the cause of Russia's freedom dear, must start work at once so that at the elections to the Fourth Duma, the landowners' Duma, they may unite and strengthen the fighters for freedom, and advance the class-consciousness and organisation of Russian democrats.

It is five years since the government coup of June 3, 1907, when Nicholas the Bloody, the Khodynka Tsar,[190] "the victor and destroyer" of the First and Second Dumas, threw aside his pledges, promises, and manifestos, so that, together with the Black-Hundred landowners and the Octobrist merchants, he could take vengeance on the working class and all the revolutionary elements in Russia, in other words, on the vast majority of the people, for 1905.

Vengeance for the revolution is the hallmark of the entire period of the Third Duma. Never before has Russia known such raging persecution on the part of tsarism. The gallows erected during these five years beat all records of three centuries of Russian history. The places of exile, penal establishments and prisons overflow with political

prisoners in unheard-of numbers, and never before has there been such torture and torment of the vanquished as under Nicholas II. Never before has there been such a wave of embezzlement, such tyranny and violence on the part of officials, who are forgiven everything because of their zeal in the struggle against "sedition"; never before have the ordinary people, and the peasants in particular, been so humiliated by any representative of authority. Never before has there been such avid, ferocious, reckless persecution of the Jews, and after them of other peoples, not belonging to the dominant nation.

Anti-Semitism and the most crude nationalism became the only political platform of the government parties, and Purishkevich became the one complete, undiluted, and perfect personification of all the methods of rule by the present tsarist monarchy.

And what have these frenzied acts of the counter-revolutionaries led to?

The consciousness that it is impossible to continue living in this way is penetrating into the minds of even the "higher", exploiting, classes of society. The Octobrists themselves, the dominant party in the Third Duma, the party of landowners and merchants, terrified of the revolution and cringing before authority, are more and more expressing the conviction in their own press that the tsar and the nobility, which they have served so faithfully and truly, have led Russia into an impasse.

There was a time when the tsarist monarchy was the gendarme of Europe, protecting reaction in Russia and assisting in forcibly suppressing all movements for freedom in Europe. Nicholas II has brought things to such a pass, that he is now not only a European, but an Asiatic gendarme who, with the help of intrigues, money and the most brutal violence, tries to suppress all movements for freedom in Turkey, Persia, and China.

But no tsarist atrocities can halt Russia's progress. No matter how these feudal survivals, the Purishkeviches, Romanovs and Markovs, disfigure and cripple Russia, she is still advancing. With each step of Russia's development the demand for political freedom is becoming ever more insistent. In the twentieth century Russia cannot live without

political freedom any more than any other country can. Is it possible to expect political reforms from the tsarist monarchy, when the tsar himself dissolved the first two Dumas and rode roughshod over his own Manifesto of October 17, 1905? Is it possible to conceive of political reforms in modern Russia, when the gang of officials mocks at all laws, knowing that in doing so, they have the protection of the tsar and his associates? Do we not see how, taking advantage of the tsar's protection, or that of his relatives, Illiodor yesterday, Rasputin today, Tolmachov yesterday, Khvostov today, Stolypin yesterday, Makarov today, trample underfoot all and every law? Do we not see that even the tiny, ludicrously pathetic "reforms" of the landowners' Duma, reforms directed towards refurbishing and strengthening tsarist rule, are repudiated and distorted by the Council of State or the personal decrees of Nicholas the Bloody? Do we not know that the Black-Hundred gang of murderers who shoot at the backs of the deputies whom the rulers want out of the way, who sent to penal servitude the Social-Democratic deputies to the Second Duma, who are always organising pogroms, who insolently rob the treasury on all sides—do we not know that that gang enjoys the special blessings of the tsar and receives his poorly-disguised aid, direction and guidance? Look at the fate, under Nicholas Romanov, of the main political demands of the Russian people for the sake of which the best representatives of the people have been waging a heroic struggle for more than three-quarters of a century, for the sake of which millions rose up in 1905. Is universal, equal and direct suffrage compatible with the Romanov monarchy, when even the non-universal, unequal and indirect suffrage of the elections to the First and Second Dumas was trampled underfoot by tsarism. Is freedom of unions, associations, strikes, compatible with the tsarist monarchy, when even the reactionary, ugly law of March 4, 1906[191] has been brought to nought by the governors and the ministers? Do not the words of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 about the "immutable principle of freedom of citizens", about the "real inviolability of the individual", about "freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and unions", sound like mockery? Every subject of the tsar witnesses this mockery daily.

Enough of liberal lies! As if a union between freedom and the old rule were possible, as if political reforms were conceivable under a tsarist monarchy. The Russian people have paid for their childish illusions with the hard lessons of the counter-revolution. Anyone seriously and sincerely desiring political freedom, will raise the banner of *a republic* proudly and bravely, and *all* the live forces of Russian democracy will certainly be drawn to that banner by the politics of the tsarist-landowner gang.

Time was, and not so long ago, when the slogan "Down with the autocracy" seemed too advanced for Russia. Nevertheless, the R.S.D.L. Party issued this slogan, the advanced workers caught it up and spread it throughout the country; and in two or three years this slogan became a popular saying. To work then, worker comrades and all citizens of Russia, all those who do not want to see our country sink finally into stagnation, barbarity, lack of rights and the appalling poverty of tens of millions. The Russian Social-Democrats, the Russian workers will succeed in making "Down with the tsarist monarchy, long live the Russian Democratic Republic!" a nation-wide slogan.

Workers, remember 1905. Millions of toilers then were given new life, raised to class-consciousness, to freedom, through the strike movement. Tens of years of tsarist reforms did not and could not give you a tenth part of those improvements in your lives which you then achieved by mass struggle. The fate of the Bill on workers' insurance, made unrecognisable by the landowners' Duma with the aid of the Cadets, has once again shown what you can expect "from above".

The counter-revolution has taken away almost all our gains, but it has not taken and cannot take away the strength, courage and belief in their cause of the young workers, nor of the all-Russian-proletariat that is growing and becoming stronger.

Long live the new struggle to improve the lot of workers who do not wish to remain slaves doomed to toil in workshops and factories! *Long live the 8-hour working day*! He who desires freedom in Russia must help the class which dug a grave for the tsarist monarchy in 1905, and which will throw the mortal enemy of all the peoples of Russia

into that grave during the forthcoming Russian revolution.

Peasants! You sent your deputies, the Trudoviks, to the First and Second Dumas, believing in the tsar, hoping by peaceful means to win his agreement to the transfer of landed estates to the people. You have now been able to convince yourselves that the tsar, the biggest landowner in Russia, will stop at nothing in defence of the landowners and officials; at neither perjury nor lawlessness, oppression or bloodshed. Are you going to tolerate the yoke of the former serf-owners, silently bear the affronts and insults of the officials, and die in hundreds of thousands, nay millions, from the agonies of starvation, from disease caused by hunger and extreme poverty, or will you die in the fight against the tsarist monarchy and tsarist-landowner Duma, in order to win for our children a more or less decent life, fit for a human being.

This is the question which the Russian peasants will have to decide. The working-class Social-Democratic Party calls on the peasants to struggle for complete freedom, for the transfer of all land from the landowners to the peasantry, without any compensation whatsoever. Sops thrown to the peasants cannot remedy their poverty or relieve their hunger. The peasants are not asking for charity, but for the land which has been drenched in their blood and sweat for centuries. The peasants do not need the tutelage of the authorities and the tsar, but freedom from officials and the tsar, freedom to arrange their own affairs.

Let the elections to the Fourth Duma sharpen the political consciousness of the masses and draw them again into decisive battles. Three main parties are contesting at the elections: (1) the Black Hundreds, (2) the liberals, and (3) the Social-Democrats.

The Rights, Nationalists, and Octobrists belong to the Black Hundreds. They all support the government; this means that any differences which may exist between them are of no serious significance whatsoever. Merciless struggle against all these Black-Hundred parties—this must be our slogan!

The liberals are the Cadet Party (the "Constitutional-Democrats" or "people's freedom" party). This is the party

of the liberal bourgeoisie, which seeks to share power with the tsar and the feudal landowners in such a way, that their power is not basically destroyed, and does not pass to the people. While the liberals detest the government which prevents them from taking power, while they help to expose it, and introduce vacillation and disintegration into its ranks, their hatred of the revolution and fear of mass struggles is even greater than their hatred of the government, and their attitude towards the popular liberation movement is even more wavering and irresolute, so that in decisive moments they treacherously go over to the side of the monarchy. During the counter-revolution, the liberals, echoing the "Slavonic dreams" of tsarism, posing as a "responsible opposition", grovelling before the tsar as "His Majesty's Opposition", and pouring dirt on the revolutionaries and the revolutionary struggle of the masses, have turned away more and more from the struggle for freedom.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was able to raise the revolutionary banner even in the reactionary Third Duma, it has succeeded even there in helping the organisation and revolutionary enlightenment of the masses, and the peasants' struggle against the landowners. The party of the proletariat is the only party of the advanced class, the class capable of winning freedom for Russia. Today, our Party goes into the Duma, not in order to play at "reforms", not in order to "defend the Constitution", "convince" the Octobrists or "to dislodge reaction" from the Duma, as the liberals who are deceiving the people say they will, but in order to call the masses to the struggle from the Duma rostrum, to explain the teachings of socialism, to expose every government and liberal deception, to expose the monarchist prejudices of the backward sections of the people, and the class roots of the bourgeois parties,—in other words in order to prepare an army of class-conscious fighters for a new Russian revolution.

The tsarist government and the Black-Hundred landowners have recognised to the full the tremendous revolutionary force represented by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. Hence, all the efforts of the police and Ministry of the Interior are directed towards preventing the Social-Democrats from entering the Fourth Duma. Unite then,

workers and citizens! Rally around the R.S.D.L.P. which at its recent conference, recovering from the breakdown during the evil years, again gathered its forces and raised aloft its banner. Let each and every one take part in the elections and the election campaign, and the efforts of the government will be defeated, the red banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy will be hoisted from the rostrum of the Duma in police-ridden, oppressed, blood-drenched, down-trodden and starving Russia!

Long live the Russian Democratic Republic!

Long live the 8-hour day!

Long live the confiscation of all landed estates!

Workers and citizens! Support the election campaign of the R.S.D.L.P.! Elect the candidates of the R.S.D.L.P.!

Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

Written early in March 1912

Printed as a leaflet in March 1912

Published according to the text of the leaflet and verified with a handwritten copy corrected by V. I. Lenin

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZVEZDA*

P.S. TO "THE ELECTION PLATFORM OF THE R.S.D.L.P."[192]

This platform* is being sent only for the *information of all*, particularly the *compilers* of platforms. It is time to *cease writing* platforms when there already *exists* one confirmed and published by the Central Committee. (Leaflets *have already been issued* about this in Russia, but as we *only* possess *one* of them, we cannot send it, but are sending you a handwritten copy.) It would be particularly stupid to draw up a *legal* platform. *Each* and *every* article about the platform and "its principles" must be printed with the signature of the author and with the *subheading*: An Essay in Comment.

Incidentally, I would *very strongly* advise the editors, known to you, *not* to approve *any* platform. For the platform to be confirmed by anyone except the C.C. is a liquidationist trick. Besides, in essence, no good will be done by the editors approving a platform. Let the editors agree with the existing platform or remain silent.

Written on March 13 (26), 1912
Sent from Paris to
St. Petersburg

Published for the first
time in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*,
from the manuscript

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* See p. 506 of this volume.—*Ed.*

PUT YOUR CARDS ON THE TABLE[193]

Our nobility, ministers, members of the Council of State, etc., are well acquainted with the language of the Duchy of Monaco.[194] It is well known who introduced this language to our Council of State! That is why we were somewhat surprised when we came across the expression which heads this article, in *Zhivoye Dyelo*, No. 8.

But the important thing is not the mode of expression. The prestige among the liquidators of the writer using this expression (L. Martov), the importance of the subject touched on ("put your cards on the table" in relation to the election campaign, its principles, tactics, etc.), all this compels us to take up this slogan, irrespective of how it has been expressed.

"Put your cards on the table" is an excellent slogan. And in the first place, we should like to see it applied to the paper *Zhivoye Dyelo*. Put your cards on the table, gentlemen!

People who are experienced in literary affairs can immediately gauge the character of a publication by its contributors, even by isolated expressions which indicate the *trend* of the publication if that trend belongs to those in any degree established and well-known. Such people only need to take one glance at *Zhivoye Dyelo* to realise its adherence to the liquidationist trend.

But it is not so easy for the general public to understand the trend followed by newspapers, particularly when the subjects in question are not theoretical principles, but current politics. It is here that it is very important and appropriate to remember the extremely apt slogan put forward by L. Martov—"Put your cards on the table". For it so happens that in *Zhivoye Dyelo* the cards are under the table!



First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Put Your Cards on the Table", March 1912

Reduced

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Put Your Cards on the Table", March 1912

Reduced

Those ideas which *Zhivoye Dyelo* is beginning to propound have been worked out at all systematically and consistently *only* in the course of the past two years in *Nasha Zarya*, *Zhizn*, *Vozrozhdeniye*, and *Dyelo Zhizni*. A considerable amount of material has accumulated in this period. What is lacking are *summaries*, particularly those produced by the people who for two years have been engaged in the elaboration of those ideas. What is lacking is an *open* exposition, by those holding liquidationist views, of the conclusions they have drawn from two years of "work by *Nasha Zarya*.

It is precisely at this point that the lovers of talks about an "*open* workers' party" turn out to be lovers of a game with *hidden* cards. You read, for instance, in the leader appearing in No. 8, that "the path of the struggle for the general, for general improvement and *basic* change in working and living conditions" lies *through* "the defence of *partial* [author's italics] rights". You read in the same issue about some "Petersburg leaders of the open labour movement", that they "*as previously*" will ... "popularise among Social-Democrats those methods for the revival and creation of a proletarian Social-Democratic party which they have hitherto defended".

Put your cards on the table! What is this theory of the defence of partial rights? This theory has not been stated in any properly formulated, official, *openly* announced postulates, recognised by groups, or representatives of groups of workers. Is it, for instance, the theory propounded to us by V. Levitsky in *Nasha Zarya*, No. 11 for 1911? And then, how can the paper's readers know *what* methods were advocated by some unnamed leaders of the open movement, for the "revival and *creation* of the party", which apparently has not been created, i.e., does not exist? Why not name those leaders, if they are indeed leaders of an "open" movement, if these words are not merely a *conventional* phrase?

The question of "methods of revival and *creation* of the party" is not some incidental question, which can be touched on and resolved in passing among other political questions of interest to any newspaper. On the contrary, this is a basic question. It is impossible to talk about a Party

election campaign, about the election tactics of the Party, about Party candidates, until this question has been resolved; and resolved it must be, in the most unambiguous, positive manner, for apart from a clear-cut theoretical answer, a *practical* decision is required.

The arguments which we frequently meet with to the effect that during an election campaign the elements of revival and creation of the Party, etc., etc., will emerge or rally, are sophistry, and sophistry of the worst kind. It is sophistry because a party is something *organised*! There is not and cannot be an election campaign for the working *class*, without decisions, *tactics*, a platform, and candidates *common to* the whole class, or at any rate to its advanced section.

Sophistry of this kind, obscure statements made in the name of anonymous, unknown, and—*for the proletariat*—elusive open leaders (who does not call himself a "leader of the open labour movement"? How many bourgeois shelter behind this name?)—all this represents a great danger which the worker must be warned against. The danger is that all this talk about "open action" is meant *merely as a blind* while in reality, the worst form of *hidden* dictatorship of a group results.

They inveigh against the "underground" although it is there we see open decisions which have now become pretty well known thanks to the bourgeois press (*Golos Zemli*, *Kievskaya Mysl*, *Russkoye Slovo*, *Golos Moskvy*, *Novoye Vremya*—how many *hundreds of thousands* of readers have now been *openly* informed of quite definite decisions, which mean genuine unity in the election campaign). It is those who cry out *against* the underground or *for* "open political activity" who provide an example of people leaving one shore and not landing on the other. The "old" has been abandoned, but there is only talk of the "new".

We know, and all *openly* know, that "the methods of revival and creation" spoken of by *Zhivoye Dyelo* are merely those which have been developed and defended in *Nasha Zarya*. We know of no others, either stated openly or in any other form. There has been no attempt whatsoever to discuss these methods, openly or otherwise, by representatives of the groups, nor has *any* formal and properly formulated,

official *exposition* of these methods been made. They use the *words* "open", "openly" in a hundred ways to cover what is really something completely closed in the full meaning of the word, something emanating from a circle, from a coterie of writers.

We know some writers, who are responsible to no one, and are indistinguishable from the free-lances of the bourgeois press. We know *their* speeches about "methods", about the liquidation of the "old".

We know nothing more, and nobody knows anything more about *open* political activity. Here you have a paradox—it seems to be a paradox, but in reality it is a direct and natural product of *all* the conditions of Russian life—that through the above-mentioned series of the most widespread bourgeois papers, the masses were informed more accurately, swiftly and directly about "underground" political activities, decisions, slogans, tactics, etc., than about the *non-existent* decisions of "the leaders of the open movement"!

Or maybe someone will assert that an election campaign can be carried out without formulated decisions? That it is possible for tens and hundreds of thousands of voters scattered all over the country to determine tactics, platform, agreements and candidacies without formulated decisions?

In speaking of "putting cards on the table" Martov touched the liquidators' raw spot, and it is impossible to overestimate the effort that must be made to warn the workers. The masses are offered ... the thoughts and projects of "leaders of the open movement", who are *not openly named*, that is, the Potresovs, Levitskys, Chatskys, Yezhovs, and Larins, without formulated decisions, without any definite replies to practical questions, without the participation of at least tens or hundreds of advanced workers in the discussion of every sentence, every word of the important decisions.

They keep their cards hidden because any attempt to turn them face up would reveal quite clearly to the workers that all this has nothing to do with a working-class party or a working-class policy, that it is preaching by *liberal* publicists who take a liberal's attitude to the workers, who liquidate the old and are powerless to provide anything new to replace it.

The danger is great. Under cover of phrases about the "open" tomorrow, the workers are left *not only* without an "open" decision, but *without any* decision *at all* on the urgent practical problems of the present election campaign, of present-day Party life.

Let class-conscious workers give some thought to this dangerous situation.

P.S. (1) Please send immediately books on the electoral law of June 3, 1907, or another copy of the handbook of 1910.[195] Also the electoral *law* with the comments of a *lawyer*. Consult "your people" and send them promptly. Unless I get them I cannot work on the voter's handbook.[196] (2) I am again receiving *Zvezda* irregularly. Speak about it again in your dispatch department. Give my (old) address. It mustn't be sent so irregularly. (3) The article "Fundamentals of a Platform" *does not* require the approval of the Editorial Board; publish it with the signature and with the subheading "An Essay in Comment"; the Board must *not* approve *any* platform; remember, one clumsy step and a squabble is unavoidable. Let the Board refrain and keep silent. The approval of the platform is the job of quite another body. (4) Send me newspapers, journals, books. It is impossible to work without them. (5) Write and tell me exactly when a daily newspaper is likely to come out, its size, etc. (6) Fight against *Zhivoye Dyelo* more energetically —then victory is guaranteed. Otherwise things will be bad. Don't be afraid of polemics. Two or three polemical articles a week are imperative.

Written on March 12 or 13 (25 or 26), 1912

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Published according to the manuscript

DEPUTY T. O. BELOUSOV'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

We were greatly surprised to find in No. 7 of *Zhivoye Dyelo* a reprint from *Rech* of Mr. Belousov's acrimonious statement.[197] There is nothing surprising in the fact that *Rech* opened its columns to this statement of the latest turncoat. It is natural for *Rech* to print the outcries of a former Social-Democrat who alleges that the appraisal of his defection given by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma was prompted by "feelings of revenge". But why does *Zhivoye Dyelo* reprint this? And is it not strange that the same *Zhivoye Dyelo* carries an article, "The Withdrawal of Deputy Belousov", with bitter-sweet statements to the effect that "we must not be upset by the cases of desertion which have occurred."

Zhivoye Dyelo does "not deem it proper to go into an appraisal of Belousov's step so long as the motives by which he was guided have not been made public". Nevertheless, it does attempt it ... but stops half-way and merely pulls faces at "this kind of desertion"!

Why this game? Surely it is time for the press to do its duty by openly discussing facts of political importance.

The Social-Democratic group in the Duma gave as its *unanimous* opinion that the proper procedure for Mr. Belousov would be *immediately to resign his office as deputy*, since he was elected by the votes of Social-Democrats and had been a member of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma for four and a half years.

Mr. Belousov's answer, printed in *Rech*, entirely *evades* this issue. But the voice of class-conscious workers *must not permit* this question to be passed over in silence. Mr. Belousov may prefer to keep silent, but we have no right to. What would be the use of the working-class press if it refrained from discussing facts which are of importance to working-class representation in the Duma?

Is it permissible, from the standpoint of the obligations of any democrat, for a deputy who was elected *as* a Social-Democrat and for four and a half years had belonged to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma to withdraw from the group a few months before the elections, *without at the same time resigning from the Duma*? This is a question of general interest. No democrat who is aware of his obligations to his constituents—not in the sense of being a "solicitor" on behalf of local interests, but of the obligations of a *politician* who in the elections paraded *before all the people* under a *definite* banner—not a single democrat will deny that this is an extremely important question of principle.

Let all workers who read the working-class press and who are interested in the question of workers' representation in the State Duma pay the closest attention to Mr. Belousov's withdrawal, let them ponder over and discuss this question. *They must not keep silent*. It would be unworthy of a class-conscious worker to keep silent on an occasion like this. The workers must learn to stand by *their rights*, by the right of all voters to insist that deputies elected by them remain true to their banner, their right to show these deputies that they *dare not* desert, that they cannot do so with impunity.

Is the Social-Democratic group in the Duma right in insisting that a deputy who has belonged to it for four and a half years, and who was elected to the State Duma by Social-Democratic votes, is *in duty bound*, *now* that he has withdrawn from the group, to resign from the Duma as well? Yes, it is absolutely right! If we are for unity, solidarity, integrity and loyalty to principles on the part of working-class representatives, not only in words, but *in fact*, then we must voice our opinion, we must, each and every one of us, individually and collectively, write to

Zvezda and to the Duma group (also sending copies of the letters to the local press) stating that we emphatically and irrevocably condemn Mr. Belousov's conduct, that not only every supporter of the working class, but every *democrat* as well, must condemn conduct of this kind. What, indeed, will our "*popular* representation" be like, if deputies who were elected under a definite banner and who during nine-tenths of the Duma sessions professed allegiance to that banner, declare *on the eve of new elections*: "I withdraw from the group, *but* I retain my mandate, I desire to remain a representative of the 'people'"!

Not so fast, Mr. Turncoat! What *people* do you now represent? Surely *not* the people that elected you as a Social-Democrat! *Not* the people who, for nine-tenths of the Duma sessions, saw you in the ranks of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma! You are not a representative of the people but a deceiver of the people; for during the time left to the elections it is *impossible*, physically impossible, for the people (even if they enjoyed complete political liberty) to study from the facts, on the basis of your conduct, *who* you are, *what* you have become, *where* you have landed, *who or what* is attracting you. You are in duty bound to quit the Duma, otherwise everyone will have a right to treat you as a political adventurer and a fraud!

There may be many reasons for a withdrawal. There may be a change of views so obvious, definite, open, and motivated by universally known facts, as to prompt a withdrawal which raises no doubts, in which there is nothing reprehensible or dishonourable. But, surely, it is not an accident that at present, and *only* at present, *only* in this case, has the Duma group published a protest in the press! The Social-Democratic group states openly that Mr. Belousov "expressed the desire that the fact of his withdrawal from the group should not be made public". In his answer, reprinted by *Zhivoye Dyelo*, Mr. Belousov is abusive, but he does not deny the fact. We ask: what must every worker think of a man who, while leaving the group, expresses the desire to conceal his withdrawal? If this is not deception, what is?

The Social-Democratic group states in plain words that it "is quite unable to gauge the limits of the further evolu-

tion of its former member". Let the reader give some thought to these highly significant words! The Social-Democratic group in the Duma made no such grave statements in the case of others who have left it. In the present case it is, therefore, a vote of complete non-confidence. More than that, it is a warning to all the voters, to the whole people that no confidence whatsoever may be placed in this deputy. The Social-Democratic group has issued this unanimous warning to all. It is now up to every class-conscious worker to reply that he has heard the warning, has understood it and agrees with it, that he will not tolerate in silence the creation in Russia, among people professing to be democrats, of such parliamentary morals (or, rather, parliamentary immorality) which allow deputies to grab mandates for personal gain, for the purpose of "freely" manipulating these spoils. This has been the case in all bourgeois parliaments, and everywhere the workers who are aware of their historic role are fighting these practices and, *in the process of the struggle*, are training their own working-class members of parliament, men who are not out for mandates, not out to profit by parliamentary manipulations, but are the trusted envoys of the working class.

The workers should not allow themselves to be hoodwinked by sophistry. One such piece of sophistry is the statement of *Zhivoye Dyelo*: "we do not deem it proper to go into an appraisal of T. O. Belousov's step so long as the motives by which he was guided have not been made public".

To begin with, we read in the statement of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma: "In justifying his withdrawal, Mr. Belousov explained that, as much as two years ago the group had become utterly alien to him." Is not this making a motive public? Is this not plain language? If *Zhivoye Dyelo* does not believe the statement of the group, let it say so outright—let it not twist, and squirm, let it not tell us that it does "not deem it proper to go into", when, as a matter of fact, the group has *already* gone into and made public the motives, or the motive, which it considers to be the most important.

Secondly, we read in Mr. Belousov's reply printed in the Cadet *Rech* and the liquidationist *Zhivoye Dyelo*: "I

declare that in its statement the group said absolutely nothing [?!] about the real motives of my rupture with it. I know that circumstances beyond its control do not permit the group to make public my differences with it, which I have set forth both in my oral and written statements".

Now, see how it all works out. The group officially makes public what Mr. Belousov represented as his motive. Mr. Belousov fulminates ("insinuations, innuendoes", etc.), but does not deny that this was what he said; he declares that circumstances beyond the control of the group *do not permit* the latter to "make public" something else. (If it is true that circumstances do not permit it to be *made public*, why do you, sir, *make a public* hint at what cannot be made public? Does not your method smack of insinuation?) Yet *Zhivoye Dyelo* reprints Mr. Belousov's flagrant and crying untruth and adds, on its own behalf: "We do not deem it proper to go into ... *so long* as the motives ... have not been made public"—the very motives which cannot be made public because circumstances beyond control "do not permit" it! In other words, *Zhivoye Dyelo* will withhold its opinion of Mr. Belousov's withdrawal until the publication of things which (according to the statement of Mr. Belousov himself) cannot be made public.

Is it not obvious that, instead of exposing the falsehood of Mr. Belousov's statement reprinted in its pages, *Zhivoye Dyelo* covers up the falsehood?

There is little more that we can add. One who pleads the non-publication of things which cannot be made public, thereby gives his own game away. But it is indispensable and obligatory for everybody who holds dear working-class representation in the Duma to appraise those things which have already been made public and are already known. Mr. Belousov asserts: "My withdrawal from the group has not altered the tendency of my political and public activity one iota". These are hollow words. This is what all renegades say. These words contradict the statement made by the group. We believe the Social-Democratic group, and not the turncoat. As regards Mr. Belousov's "tendency", we, as well as most other Marxists, know one thing—that it has been a sharply *liquidationist* tendency. Mr. Belousov has gone to such lengths of liquidationism that the group

has finally "liquidated" his connections with the Social-Democratic movement. All the better for the movement, for the workers, for the cause of the workers.

And not only the workers but all democrats must demand Mr. Belousov's resignation from the Duma.

Zvezda, No. 17 (53), March 13, 1912
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Zvezda* text

FAMINE

Again famine—as in the past, in the old, pre-1905, Russia. Crops may fail anywhere, but *only* in Russia do they lead to such grave calamities, to the starvation of millions of peasants. The present disaster, as even the supporters of the government and the landowners are compelled to admit, surpasses in extent the famine of 1891.

Thirty million people have been reduced to the direst straits. Peasants are selling their allotments, their livestock, everything saleable, for next to nothing. They are selling their girls—a reversion to the worst conditions of slavery. The national calamity reveals at a glance the true essence of our allegedly "civilised" social order. In different forms, in a different setting, and with a different "civilisation", this system is the *old slavery*, it is the slavery of millions of toilers for the sake of the wealth, luxury and parasitism of the "upper" ten thousand. On the one hand there is hard labour, always the lot of slaves, and on the other the absolute indifference of the rich to the fate of the slaves. In the past, slaves were openly starved to death, women were openly taken into the seraglios of the masters, slaves were openly tortured. In our day, the peasants have been robbed—by means of all the tricks and achievements, all the progress of civilisation—robbed to such an extent that they are starving, eating goosefoot, eating lumps of dirt in lieu of bread, suffering from scurvy, and dying in agony. At the same time the Russian landlords, with Nicholas II at their head, and the Russian capitalists are raking in money wholesale—the proprietors of places of amusement in the capital say that business has never been so good. Such barefaced, unbridled luxury as that now flaunted in the big cities has not been seen for many years.

Why is it that in Russia alone, of all countries, we still witness these medieval spells of famine alongside of the progress of modern civilisation? Because in the conditions under which the new vampire, capital, is stealing upon the Russian peasants the latter are bound hand and foot by the feudal landowners, by the feudal, landowning, tsarist autocracy. Robbed by the landowner, crushed by the tyranny of officials, entangled in the net of police restrictions, harassed and persecuted, and placed under the surveillance of village policemen, priests, and rural superintendents, the peasants are just as defenceless in the face of the elements and of capital, as the savages of Africa. Nowadays it is only in savage countries that one meets with cases of people dying from hunger in huge numbers as they do in twentieth-century Russia.

But famine in present-day Russia, after so many boastful speeches by the tsarist government on the benefits of the new agrarian policy, on the progress of the farms that have left the village commune, etc., is sure to *teach* the peasants a great deal. The famine will destroy millions of lives, but it will also destroy the last remnants of the savage, barbarian, slavish faith in the tsar, which has prevented the peasants from seeing that there must inevitably be a revolutionary fight against the tsarist monarchy and the landowners. The peasants can find a way out of their condition only by abolishing the landed estates. Only the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, that bulwark of the landlords, can lead to a life more or less worthy of human beings, to deliverance from starvation and hopeless poverty.

It is the duty of every class-conscious worker and every class-conscious peasant to make this clear. This is our main task in connection with the famine. The organisation, wherever possible, of collections among the workers for the starving peasants and the forwarding of such funds through the Social-Democratic members of the Duma—that, of course, is also one of the necessary jobs.

Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 8,
March 17 (30), 1912

Published according to
the *Rabochaya Gazeta* text

THE PEASANTRY AND THE ELECTIONS TO THE FOURTH DUMA

The tsarist government has already begun to "prepare" for the elections to the Fourth Duma. The rural superintendents, prodded by the circulars of the governors and the minister, are trying to do their bit, the police and the Black Hundreds are showing their zeal, the "holy fathers", who have been ordered to do their level best for the "Right" parties, are not letting the grass grow under their feet. It is high time the peasants also began to think of the elections.

The elections are of particular importance for the peasants, but their position in the elections is a very difficult one. The peasants are the least politically organised—both as compared with the workers and as compared with the liberal, Cadet Party. Without political organisation, the peasants, who, owing to the conditions under which they live, are the most disunited section of the population, will be absolutely unable to offer resistance to the landowners and officials who are now persecuting and ill-treating them worse than ever before. A group of peasant deputies to the Fourth Duma, really devoted to the cause of the peasantry, politically-conscious and capable of defending all its interests, politically organised and working steadily to extend and strengthen their ties with the peasants in the villages—such a group could be of immense service in helping to unite the peasant masses in their struggle for freedom and for life.

Can such a group be formed in the Fourth Duma? In the Third Duma, there was a group of 14 *Trudoviks*, who championed the democratic interests of peasants; unfortunately, they all too often became dependent on the liberals, the Cadets, who are leading the peasants by the nose, deceiving them with the illusion of "peace" between peasants and

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

landowners, between the peasants and the landowning tsarist monarchy. Besides, it is a known fact that even the "*Right*" peasants in the Third Duma took a more democratic stand than the Cadets on the question of land. The agrarian bill introduced by forty-three peasant deputies in the Third Duma proves this incontrovertibly; and the recent "sally" of Purishkevich against the Right peasant deputies shows that the Black Hundreds have, in general, every reason to be dissatisfied with these "Right" peasant deputies.

Thus the mood of the peasantry, which during the period of the Third Duma has been taught the cruel *lessons* of the new agrarian policy, of the "land misregulation" and of that most terrible calamity—the famine—warrants the belief that it is fully capable of sending *democratic* representatives to the Fourth Duma. The main drawback is the electoral law! Framed by the landowners for their benefit, and endorsed by the landowners' tsar, it provides that the deputies who are to represent the peasants in the Duma shall be elected *not by the peasant electors but by the landowners*. The landowners can choose which peasant electors they like to represent the peasants in the Duma! It is obvious that the landowners will always choose peasants who follow the Black Hundreds.

Hence, if the peasants are to elect their *own* deputies to the Duma, if they are to elect truly reliable and staunch champions of their interests, *they have only one means*. That is to follow the example of the workers and choose as electors only Party members, class-conscious and reliable men thoroughly devoted to the peasantry, and no others.

The working-class Social-Democratic Party resolved at its conference that already at the meetings of the *delegates* (who elect the electors) the workers must decide *who* is to be elected to represent them in the Duma. All the other electors must stand down in their favour, *on pain of being boycotted and branded as traitors*.

Let the peasants do the same. Preparations for the elections must be started at once, and in this connection it is necessary to make their condition clear to the peasants and wherever possible form village groups, even if only small ones, of politically-conscious peasants, to conduct the election campaign. At the meetings of their *delegates*,

before electing the electors, the peasants must decide *who* is to be elected to the Duma from the peasants, and all the other peasant electors must be requested, on pain of being boycotted and branded as traitors, to turn down any offers made them by the landowners, and categorically to *decline* their nomination in favour of the candidate decided on *by the peasants*.

All class-conscious workers, all Social-Democrats, and all true democrats in general, must lend the peasantry a helping hand in the elections to the Fourth Duma. May the severe lessons of the famine and of the plunder of the peasants' land not have been in vain. May there be a stronger and more solid group of peasant deputies in the Fourth Duma, a group of real democrats loyal to the peasantry.

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THE ANONYMOUS WRITER IN *VORWÄRTS* AND THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE R.S.D.L.P.[198]

Written in March 1912

First published as a separate pamphlet in German, Paris, 1912
Signed: *Editorial Board of* Sotsial-Demokrat,
Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published according to the pamphlet text
Translated from the German

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PREFACE

Vorwärts of March 26 carried an official statement on the Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and an anonymous article whose author, in line with a resolution adopted by Russian Social-Democratic groups abroad,[199] heaps abuse on the Conference. The Conference was the culmination of the four years' struggle of the R.S.D.L.P. against the liquidators, and it was held in spite of all the intrigues of the liquidators who endeavoured at all costs to hinder the rebuilding of the Party. The Conference placed the liquidators outside the Party. It is therefore quite natural that the liquidators and their supporters should now attack the Conference.

Since *Vorwärts* refuses to print our reply to the infamous lying article of the anonymous writer and continues its campaign in favour of the liquidators, we are publishing this reply as a separate pamphlet for the information of the German comrades. It is devoted, mainly, to a brief statement of the significance, course and results of the fight against the liquidators.

Editorial Board of Sotsial-Demokrat,
Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

P.S. Our pamphlet had already been sent to the printer when we received Plekhanov's *Diary of a Social-Democrat* No. 16 (April 1912). This issue provides the best proof that *Vorwärts* was deceived by the anonymous writer and, in its turn, misled the German workers.

Plekhanov, while definitely stating that he is still no supporter of the Conference held in January 1912, says in so many words that what the Bund is convening is not a conference of *existing* Party organisations but a "*constituent*" conference, i.e., one which is expected to found a new party; that the organisers of the conference follow a "*typical anarchist principle*"; that they adopted a "liquidationist resolution", that this new conference "is being convened by liquidators".

Some German comrades displayed an amazing naïveté in taking seriously all those dreadful words like "usurpation", "coup d'état", etc., which tiny groups of Russian Social-Democrats abroad like to use in their attacks on the Conference of the Russian organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. Still, we must not forget the saying that a man who has been condemned to death may abuse his judges for 24 hours.

The article in the March 26 issue of *Vorwärts* entitled "Russian Party Life" reproduces the official statement of the Conference, which says that the liquidators have been expelled from the Party. It is a perfectly clear statement: the Russian organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. have taken the viewpoint that it is impossible to work jointly with the liquidators. One may, of course, have a different point of view on this matter, but in that case the author should have dealt in greater detail with the motives leading to the decision and with the entire history of the four years' fight against the liquidationist trend! The anonymous author of the article in *Vorwärts*, however, has not a single word to say on the merits of *this fundamental issue*. It is, indeed, a sign of a very low opinion of the readers when an author completely ignores the substance of the matter but unbur ens himself with melodramatic outpourings. How helpless, then, is our anonymous author if his reply to the fact that the Party has broken with the liquidationist trend contains nothing but abuse.

It is only necessary to quote at random several curious passages from the article of the unknown author. He says that the "trends" or "groups" represented by *Vperyod*, *Pravda*, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, etc., did not take part in the Conference. We should like to ask, what would you say of a German Social-Democrat who lamented the fact that the "group" or "trend" of Friedberg or of the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* was not represented at a Party congress? We,

in our Party, also adhere to the custom that organisations functioning in Russia are entitled to take part in Party conferences, but not all sorts of "trends" or "groups" abroad. If such "groups" are at variance with the Russian organisations, that alone constitutes their severest condemnation, their death sentence which they have justly deserved. The history of the Russian political exiles, like that of exiles from all other countries, abounds in cases of such "trends" or "groups" having become divorced from the activity of the Social-Democratic workers in Russia and dying a natural death.

Don't the cries of our author sound absurd when he alleges that the pro-Party (i.e., anti-liquidationist) Mensheviks who took part in the Conference have been disavowed even by Plekhanov? The Kiev organisation could, of course, disavow the foreign "Plekhanovites" (i.e., Plekhanov's followers); but no writer abroad, no matter who he is, can "disavow" the Kiev organisation. The organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Moscow District, Kazan, Saratov, Tiflis, Baku, Nikolayev, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Wilno, and Dvinsk have "disavowed" all groups abroad which assisted the liquidators or flirted with them. The outcries and abuse of the "disavowed" are hardly likely to change anything in this respect.

Further, surely it is strange for the author to declare in so many words that the "national" Social-Democratic organisations in Russia (the Polish, Latvian, and the Bund) and the Transcaucasian Regional Committee represent "the oldest and strongest organisations of our Russian Party, those which, to all intents and purposes, constitute the backbone of the movement"? The problematical existence of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee is something generally known and was proved by the character of its representation at the conference in 1908. The Polish and Latvian organisations, during the first nine years of the R.S.D.L.P. (1898-1907), led an existence entirely apart, and, in fact, remained isolated from it in the 1907-11 period as well. The Bund seceded from the Party in 1903 and remained outside it until 1906 (or, to be more exact, 1907). Nor have its local branches fully rejoined the Party to this day, as was officially established at the conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

in 1908.[200] Within the Latvian organisation and the Bund at one time the liquidationist, at another the anti-liquidationist elements gained the upper hand. As for the Poles, they sided with the Mensheviks in 1903, with the Bolsheviks in 1905, and in 1912 made an unsuccessful attempt at a "reconciliation" with the liquidators.

This latter failure the author diffidently tries to cover up with the following phrase: "At the beginning a representative of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania also attended this Conference". Why only *at the beginning*? We find the explanation of this diffident silence in the official communiqué of the Bund about this Conference. There it says in black and white that the representative of the Poles withdrew from the Conference and submitted a written statement, which said that it had become impossible for him to collaborate with the Conference because it revealed a spirit of bias and a partiality for the *liquidators*!

To be sure, it is much easier to heap up hollow and meaningless phrases about "unity" (with the liquidators?), as the author is fond of doing, than to study the real essence of the trend of the liquidators, their refusal to help rebuild the Party, and their work of disrupting the Central Committee of the Party. And it is all-the more easy to indulge in phrase-mongering if at the same time silence is maintained regarding the fact that the representative of the Poles refused to work jointly (because such work would be fruitless), not with the Bolsheviks or Leninists, God forbid, but with the Bundists and Latvians.

But what, really, is the origin of liquidationism, and why was it necessary for the Conference of 1912 to constitute itself the supreme Party authority and to expel the liquidators?

The counter-revolution in Russia gave rise to a very pronounced process of disintegration in the ranks of our Party. Persecutions of unparalleled fury rained down upon the proletariat. Defection assumed wide proportions in the ranks of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois fellow-travellers, who had naturally joined the proletariat as the leader of our bourgeois revolution in 1905, began to turn their backs on the Social-Democratic Party. This defection took two forms—that of *liquidationism* and of *otzovism*. The nucleus of the former was made up of the majority of Menshevik writers

(Potresov, Levitsky, Larin, Martov, Dan, Martynov, etc.). They declared that the illegal Party had already been liquidated and that any attempt to revive it was a reactionary utopia. Their slogan was: an open labour party. Obviously, under the political conditions prevailing in Russia, where even the party of the liberals, the Cadets, had no legal status, the formation of an open Social-Democratic working-class party can only remain wishful thinking. The liquidators repudiated the illegal party, but did not fulfil their obligation to found a legal party. In the long run, all they did was to write articles in the legal press in which they ridiculed the "underground", declared, in unison with the liberals, that it was dead, and extolled the virtues-of a liberal labour policy. Plekhanov was absolutely right when he compared the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya* to the German *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. The Menshevik Plekhanov (to say nothing of the Bolsheviks) declared ruthless war on the liquidationist trend, refused to contribute to any of their publications and broke off relations with Martov and Axelrod. "A man for whom our Party does not exist," wrote Plekhanov in the Central Organ about Potresov, "does not himself exist for our Party." As far back as December 1908, a Party conference emphatically condemned liquidationism, which it described as "an attempt on the part of a group of Party intellectuals to liquidate the existing organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. and to replace it [note this well!] by a loose association that is *legal*, *no matter what it costs*". It is obvious that, far from denying that it is essential to make use of all legal opportunities, the R.S.D.L.P. has stressed this point in no unmistakable terms. However, an open legal *party* in Russia is out of the question, and only opportunist intellectuals can speak about such a party. The type of our Party organisation may to a certain extent, of course, be compared to the German type of Party organisation at the time the Anti-Socialist Law was in operation: a legally functioning group in Parliament, all sorts of legally existing workers' associations, as an indispensable condition, but with the *illegal Party organisation* as the foundation.

The "otzovists" wanted to recall the Social-Democratic group from the Third Duma, and issued the slogan

calling for a boycott of that Duma. The otzovists were joined by a section of the Bolsheviks, on whom Lenin and others declared implacable war. The otzovists and their defenders formed the *Vperyod* group, and the writers collaborating in the magazine of that name (Maximov, Lunacharsky, Bogdanov, Alexinsky) have been preaching various forms of the idealistic philosophy, which they describe by the grand name of "proletarian philosophy", and the amalgamation of *religion* with socialism. This group has never exerted any perceptible influence, and it led some sort of existence only by pursuing a policy of compromise with various impotent groups abroad which had lost all contact with Russia. Such groups, inevitable in every split, vacillate now to one side, now to the other; they engage in cheap politics, but represent no definite trend and their activity expresses itself mainly in petty intrigue. One of these groups is represented by Trotsky's *Pravda*.

It is clear, of course, to every Marxist that both liquidationism and otzovism are petty-bourgeois tendencies which attract the bourgeois fellow-travellers of the Social-Democratic Party. "Peace" or "conciliation" with these *tendencies* is something excluded *a priori*. The alternative facing the Social-Democratic Party was either to perish or to rid itself entirely of these tendencies.

That this theoretical conclusion is correct was proved by the attempt at conciliation made in January 1910, when the last Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee declared *unanimously*, *with the liquidators and otzovists concurring*, that *neither* of these tendencies is *Social-Democratic*. But things did not go further than pious wishes. True, both the liquidators and the otzovists "signed" the appropriate resolution, but they continued with all their might to conduct their anti-Party propaganda, and maintained their own organisations. All through 1910 the fight against both tendencies was *steadily growing sharper*. Plekhanov's words quoted above are dated May 1910, and in May 1910 Lenin declared on behalf of the Bolsheviks that, since the liquidators had violated the January resolution there could be no question of conciliation with them.*

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, "Notes of a Publicist. II".—*Ed.*

The attempt to revive the Central Committee in Russia failed because the liquidators refused their assistance. A last-means of saving the cause of "unity" was to convene a meeting of the Central Committee abroad. This attempt was made in May 1911. Of the fifteen members of the Central Committee, nine were abroad. *Eight* came to the meeting, but *two liquidators*—Igorev, adherent of *Golos*, and a Bundist (Ber)—immediately withdrew and thus finally wrecked the Central Committee of the Party.

The refusal of the liquidators to participate in the Central Committee meant their complete secession and the dissolution of the Central Committee. Only one central body still remained abroad at the time—the so-called Central Committee Bureau Abroad. The Bolsheviks withdrew from it when the Central Committee ceased to exist. Only the Poles, Latvians, Bundists and members of the *Golos* group (the liquidators abroad) remained. The reader who is familiar with the article in *Vorwärts* can thus see for himself that it was the same outfit as that of the notorious conference called by the Bund; for the Transcaucasian Regional Committee had commissioned *Golos* supporters to represent it as far back as 1908. Now, let us see what these "oldest and strongest Russian organisations"—to use the words in which our anonymous author describes this latest discovery of his—have done? *They could not agree*, *and even dissolved the Bureau Abroad themselves*! Already in the autumn of 1911 the Central Committee Bureau Abroad published a statement in which it announced its own dissolution, and Plekhanov, in his *Diary*, commented on this in the following lines: "*Requiescat in pace!* This Party institution, which became a weapon in the hands of gentry who strove to liquidate the Party and therefore exposed the Russian Social-Democratic movement to grave peril, could render the revolutionary proletariat only *one* service: to die in good time". (*The Diary of a Social-Democrat*, Part 2. Supplement to No. 15, p. 1.) This opinion, voiced by Plekhanov, of whom nobody can say that he is a supporter of the Conference, shows with sufficient cogency how ridiculous is the pretence of those who shout about "usurpation" and similar things!

One more course remained open to bring about the unity of the Party, viz., to call a conference of *Russian* organi-

sations. The national organisations of the Poles, the Latvians and the Bundists, utterly divorced as they were from the work in Russia, could do absolutely nothing for such a conference.

On November 26, 1910, Trotsky issued an appeal calling for a conference. He had the support (in words) of the *Vperyod* and *Golos* groups (the liquidators abroad). But as might have been foreseen, all the efforts of these groups, owing to their impotence, were fruitless.

In June 1911 an appeal signed by the Bolsheviks, "conciliators" (otherwise known as "pro-Party Bolsheviks") and the Poles was issued. The first step in the work was to invite the strongest organisation at the time, namely, the *Kiev* organisation. October 1911 saw the inauguration of the Russian (i.e., working in Russia, set up by the Russian organisations) Organising Commission for the convening of a conference. This Commission was formed by the Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Tiflis, Baku and Ekaterinburg organisations, which were soon joined by twenty more organisations. The enlistment of representatives of the *Russian* organisations revealed *at once* the absolute preponderance of the Bolsheviks (so-called "Leninists") and the pro-Party Mensheviks. *Inde ira** of the groups abroad which found themselves "disavowed", because they had no followers in Russia.

In January 1912 the Russian Organising Commission at last convened the Conference, which *all* the Russian organisations, without exception, had been invited to attend. Neither the liquidators, nor the "non-Russians" (the Poles, the Latvians, and the Bund), nor the vacillating groups abroad sent delegates. When the Conference was convinced that the *Russian* organisations were represented as fully as possible considering the unprecedentedly difficult conditions under which the Party worked, when it established that without a central body in Russia the Party was doomed, that the split abroad was continuing and that the forthcoming elections to the Fourth Duma demanded the rebuilding of the Party without any further delay, it *had to* constitute itself the *supreme authority of the Party*, elect a Central Committee and place the liquidators outside the Party.

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* Hence the ire.—*Ed.*

Such was the course and the outcome of the protracted fight. The future will show whether the liquidators will succeed in creating an "open" party, or whether they will concoct some kind of fiction of a party on the basis of a rotten compromise.

Are there any clear and easily verifiable data on the strength of the liquidators and the pro-Party people, the followers of the Conference, in Russia *itself*? Yes, there are. There exist *two*—and only two—all-Russia political organs in Russia, to which Marxist writers and members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma contribute. These organs represent *trends*—not like the sheets abroad, which are full of abuse, but in the form of open and serious literary work carried on over a number of years. To be sure, they are not Party organs; they are strictly legal and keep within the bounds fixed by the regime now existing in Russia. However, *all* the most important shades of theoretical thought in the ranks of the Social-Democratic movement find in these organs, on the whole, an unquestionably correct expression. Only *two* "trends"—liquidationism and anti-liquidationism (the followers of the Conference)—are represented; for *no* other more or less serious "trends" *exist*. All those tiny groups, such as the *Pravda*, *Vperyod*, "pro-Party Bolsheviks" (or "conciliators", inclining to conciliatory sentiments), etc., count for nothing. The views of the liquidators find expression in Russia in the monthly *Nasha Zarya* (founded in 1910) and in the weekly *Zhivoye Dyelo* (last issue No. 8). The views of the Party people (Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks) find expression in the monthly *Prosveshcheniye*[201] (founded in 1911—previously appeared under the name of *Mysl*) and in the newspaper *Zvezda* (last issue No. 53). There is nothing more erroneous than the view that the pro-Party Social-Democrats repudiate "legal" activity. The very opposite is the truth, since *in this activity too* they are stronger than the liquidators. The sole undisputed all-Russia open organisation of legally functioning Social-Democrats is the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. It is strictly legal and is not directly connected with the Party. But all its members are known, and it is also known which trend each of them represents.

The liquidationist *Zhivoye Dyelo* counts among its permanent contributors *two* members of the group in the Duma—Astrakhantsev and Kuznetsov.* In the anti-liquidationist *Zvezda* there are eight members of the group—Voronin, Voiloshnikov, Yegorov, Zakharov, Pokrovsky, Predkaln, Poletayev, and Surkov. Two members of the Duma, Chkheidze and Gegechkori, contribute to neither of these organs. One (Shurkanov) contributes to both.

The ratio is 2 to 8! These are indeed indisputable, easily verifiable and clear data enabling us to judge of the relation of forces between the liquidators and the anti-liquidators.

This being so it is unnecessary to waste words on the unknown author's tall talk to the effect that the overwhelming majority follows the liquidators, etc. These phrases *à la* Tartarin de Tarascon are all too reminiscent of Trotsky,** so that it is not worth while discussing them seriously.

The struggle within the R.S.D.L.P. at times assumes very bitter forms. Nothing else could be expected under the conditions of life in exile; nothing else could ever be expected in any other country whose lot it was to endure counter-revolution and exile.

It is nothing but frivolous on the part of anyone to "condemn" these forms of the struggle in high-sounding phrases, to brush them aside and merely indulge in philistine and unctuous reflections on the "merits of unity". Anyone who seriously intends to study the history of the R.S.D.L.P. in the trying period 1908-11 will find at his disposal plenty of illegal and even more of legal literature. This literature contains highly instructive material on the nature of the trends, the fundamental significance of the differences, the roots of the fight, the circumstances and conditions of its development, etc.

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* Until recently there was also Belousov. Now this extreme liquidator—a Russian Bissolati—has resigned from the group in the Duma. The latter has publicly warned all the voters of this, and has demanded his resignation from the Duma. A minor example showing to what lengths consistent liquidationism goes at times!

** At the time of the Copenhagen Congress Trotsky published in *Vorwärts* an anonymous article full of such vile attacks upon the R.S.D.L.P. that not only Lenin, but Plekhanov and Warski as well, both members of the Russian delegation, felt obliged to send a written protest to the Executive Committee.

No Social-Democratic Party in the world was ever formed—particularly in the period of bourgeois revolutions—without a hard struggle and a number of splits with the bourgeois fellow-travellers of the proletariat. The same is true of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which ever since 1898 has been taking shape, growing, gaining in strength and becoming tempered, despite all obstacles, in the hard struggle against such fellow-travellers.

A LETTER TO HUYSMANS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU[202]

Dear Comrade,

In connection with the resolution adopted by a number of groups abroad and also by the editors of two periodicals published abroad, who claim to belong to the R.S.D.L.P., I, as representative of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., state the following:

(1) While for several years it was impossible to convene a conference of the Russian organisations, or to form a Central Committee, or revive the previously elected Central Committee which might have united those organisations, the recently held Party Conference succeeded in bringing together twenty-three Party organisations active in Russia.

All the reports on this Conference, already delivered to most of the Russian Party organisations, were received with warm sympathy everywhere, and all these organisations declared that they would support the Central Committee elected by the Conference. In the issue of *Rabochaya Gazeta* (organ of the Central Committee of the Party) of March 30, 1912, we were already able to publish a number of resolutions adopted by the organisations in St. Petersburg (Vasilyevsky Ostrov District), Moscow, Kiev, Samara and Nikolayev expressing warm sympathy with the Conference and promising to support it and the Central Committee. (Since the publication of that issue, we have received a similar resolution from Tiflis.) Thus we cannot attach the least significance to the protests of small groups abroad which are not backed by any Party organisations in Russia.

(2) The Conference of Party members active in Russia, which has aroused the protest of all the small groups abroad,

dealt especially with the disorganising activities of the groups abroad and with the disrupting effect which these groups often have upon the Party work in Russia. These groups, which are not connected with any organisation functioning in Russia, taking advantage of the fact that they are not responsible to anybody, permit themselves to speak in the name of the Party. This malady, which has gnawed at our Party for a long time, is a result of Russia's political regime, which, on the one hand, condemns our Party to an underground existence and, on the other, compels a great number of Party functionaries to live abroad in exile.

The Conference severely condemned the disorganising activities of these groups, all of them existing abroad and absolutely irresponsible. As far as the Party is concerned, there is nothing unexpected in the attacks by which these groups are trying to discredit the Conference that condemned their conduct.

(3) Among those who signed the resolution we see the *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* group. This signature speaks volumes, for it explains the true meaning of the hostile campaign launched against the Conference by the liquidationist press, as well as by the bourgeois press, in Russia, and even by some foreign newspapers.

The point is that in its resolution summarising the results of the fight among the various trends in our Party in the past four years, the Conference came out emphatically against the trend represented by *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. In order that you may be quite clear on this question, I consider it worth while to quote the resolution in question.

Here it is in full.

"Whereas:

"(1) The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party for nearly four years has been waging a determined fight against the liquidationist trend, which was characterised at the conference of the Party in December 1908 as

"'an attempt on the part of a group of Party intellectuals to liquidate the existing organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. and to replace it at all costs, even at the price of downright renunciation of the programme, tactics, and traditions of the Party, by a loose association functioning legally';

"(2) The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held in January 1910, continuing the fight against this trend, unanimously declared it to be a manifestation of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat and demanded, as a condition for real Party unity and for the fusion of the former Bolshevik and Menshevik groups, a complete rupture with liquidationism and the utter rout of this bourgeois deviation from socialism;

"(3) In spite of all Party decisions and in spite of the obligation assumed by the representatives of all the factions at the Plenary Meeting held in January 1910, a section of Social-Democrats, grouped around the magazines *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*; began to defend openly the trend which the entire Party has recognised as being the product of bourgeois influence on the proletariat;

"(4) The former members of the Central Committee—M-l, Yuri, and Roman, refused not only to join the Central Committee in the spring of 1910, but even to attend a single meeting to co-opt new members, and bluntly declared that they considered the very existence of the Party Central Committee to be 'harmful';

"(5) It was precisely after the Plenary Meeting of 1910 that the above-mentioned chief publications of the liquidators, *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, definitely turned to liquidationism all along the line, not only 'belittling [contrary to the decision of the Plenary Meeting] the importance of the illegal Party', but openly renouncing it, declaring that the Party was 'extinct', that the Party was already liquidated, that the idea of reviving the illegal Party was 'a reactionary utopia', using the columns of legally published magazines to heap slander and abuse on the illegal Party, calling upon the workers to regard the nuclei of the Party and its hierarchy as 'dead', etc.;

"(6) At a time when throughout Russia the members of the Party, irrespective of factions, united to promote the immediate task of convening a Party conference, the liquidators, banded together in entirely independent small groups, split away from local Party organisations even in those places where the pro-Party Mensheviks predominated (in Ekaterinoslav, Kiev) and finally renounced all Party connections with the local R.S.D.L.P. organisations;

"The Conference declares that by its conduct the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* group has *definitely placed itself outside the Party*.

"The Conference calls upon all Party members, irrespective of tendencies and shades of opinion, to combat liquidationism, explain its great harmfulness to the cause of the emancipation of the working class, and bend all their efforts to revive and strengthen the illegal Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party."

(4) In view of all this, it is quite obvious that it is not a question of "usurpation", or a "split", etc., and that this is not the cause of the liquidators' anger. The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. declared against the trend which in practice had long kept aloof from every kind of Party work, which had done its utmost to prevent the re-establishment of the Central Committee and had turned the last remaining Party institution (the Central Committee Bureau Abroad) into "a weapon in the hands of gentlemen who strove to liquidate the Party" (the words of Comrade Plekhanov, who is not a supporter of the Conference).

(5) As regards Social-Democratic organisations of the national minorities, I must put it on record that the R.S.D.L.P. existed as the R.S.D.L.P. up to 1906 (or, more correctly, up to 1907), before the national minority organisations joined our Party (the Bund withdrew from the Party in 1903 and remained outside it until 1906, or, rather, 1907). Hence, in view of their absence from the Conference, it is the duty of the Central Committee to start negotiations with these organisations for the purpose of resuming normal relations with them.

Written late in March 1912

Printed on April 12, 1912, in Circular No. 7 of the International Socialist Bureau
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the Circular text
Translated from the French

THE BLOC OF THE CADETS WITH THE PROGRESSISTS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Several days ago the newspapers carried the story of a conference of "independent Progressists" on the one hand, and Cadets on the other, held in Moscow on March 18.

A semi-official editorial in the semi-official Cadet *Rech* (of March 21) confirms that the conference was held and gives it its appraisal. Even a superficial study of this appraisal is sufficient to enable one to grasp the carefully concealed nature of the matter and to realise the disguise which serves to keep up appearances.

The point is that both the Progressists and the Cadets are opposition groups, and "belong to that section of the opposition which is described as 'responsible'". This is what *Rech* says. Hence, the Cadets cannot help admitting that there are two "sections" within the opposition: one which deserves the title "responsible", and another which does not. This admission of the Cadets brings us at once to the main point.

By referring to themselves as the "responsible" opposition, which is even more often and better described by Milyukov's celebrated "London" slogans about an opposition in the possessive case,[203] the Cadets set themselves and similar groups apart from the democratic movement, i.e., from the Trudoviks and the workers. Actually, the term "responsible opposition" is used to describe the liberal-monarchist bourgeois Centre, which stands midway between democracy on the one hand and autocracy with the feudal landowners on the other. This bourgeois liberal-monarchist Centre, which dreads consistent democracy even more than so-called

"reaction", appeared in the Russian political arena long ago. It has such a long and instructive history behind it that we must not allow ourselves to be deceived with regard to its true nature and still less to keep silent or plead ignorance about it.

This Centre became quite clearly indicated in the epoch of the decline of serfdom. During the interval of almost half a century separating that epoch from 1905, the influence of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in the Zemstvos, in the municipalities, in the schools, and in the press, grew and developed to a considerable degree. The crisis of the old regime in 1905 and the open action of all the classes in Russia gave final form to the liberal-monarchist bourgeois Centre and embodied it in parties representing its right flank (the Octobrists) and its left flank (the Cadets). The separation of this Centre from democracy was extremely pronounced and existed in all fields of public activity and at all "sharp turns" in 1905-07; however, not all the democrats and even not all working-class democrats have grasped the essence and the meaning of this separation.

The Russian bourgeoisie is tied by thousands of economic threads to the old landowning nobility and to the old bureaucracy. In addition to this, the working class of Russia has shown that it is quite independent and capable of taking care of itself; more, it has shown itself capable of leading democracy in spite of the liberals. That is why our bourgeoisie has turned liberal-monarchist and anti-democratic, anti-popular, in fact. That is why it dreads democracy more than reaction. That is why it is constantly vacillating, manoeuvring, betraying the former in favour of the latter. That is why it turned counter-revolutionary after 1905 and obtained a "nook" for itself in the June Third system. The Octobrists (with the permission and under the supervision of the Purishkeviches) have become a government party, while the Cadets have assumed the role of a *tolerated* opposition.

The decision of the Cadet conference to permit blocs with the "Left" (don't laugh!) Octobrists, and the present "informal" amalgamation of the Cadets with the "independent Progressists" are links in a single long chain, stages in the development of the liberal-monarchist bourgeois Centre.

But on the eve of the elections the opposition has to cloak itself in "democratic" attire. The Cadet who is out to catch not only the votes of the big and middle bourgeoisie, but also those of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, shop assistants, etc., must stress that he is a member of the "people's freedom party", a "Constitutional-*Democrat*", no less! On the eve of the elections, and for the sake of the elections, the Cadet Party, actually representing a moderate brand of monarchist liberalism, dresses itself in democratic finery and throws a veil over its rapprochement with the "independent Progressists" and "Left" Octobrists.

This explains the numerous contortions and diplomatic subterfuges we find in *Rech*, its high-flown statements that "the people's freedom party will not adapt itself to circumstances", and so on and so forth. Of course, all this is merely funny. For the entire history of the Cadet Party is nothing but a mockery of its programme, nothing but "adaptation" to circumstances in the worst sense of the term. "Given different political conditions," writes *Rech*, "under which the people's freedom party would be in a position to voice in the legislative body its entire programme, the so-called 'Progressists' would, of course, be its antagonists, just as they were at the more acute occasions in the recent past."

That the period of the Second Duma was a more acute occasion—that is something the Cadet gentlemen will hardly venture to dispute. However, not only the Progressists, but even elements more to the right, far from opposing the Cadets, were their allies *against* the democrats. Furthermore, in the Third Duma the democrats made statements that went far beyond any clause in the programme of the Cadets, hence, the Cadet Party was fully "*in a position to voice ... its entire programme*" even in a "*legislative body*" like the Third Duma! If the Constitutional-Democratic Party refrained from doing so, it is by no means the "political conditions" that are to blame (don't say, "I can't", say "I shan't!"), but the utter alienation of the Cadets from democracy. The Cadets *could have* voiced their entire programme, but it was their *own* estrangement from democracy, *their own turn to the right* that prevented them from doing so.

The arguments of the *Rech* editorial on the bloc with the Progressists is one of the numerous examples of the

ease with which the leaders of the Cadet Party, Milyukov and others, can lead the few "Left" Cadets by the nose. They feed the Left Cadets fine words, use flashy catchwords about "democracy" to appease the Kolyubakins, and at the same time actually conduct their policy in a purely anti-democratic spirit, in the spirit of a rapprochement, of merging with the Progressists and Left Octobrists. The Cadet Party has introduced exactly the same kind of "division of labour" we see among all the West-European bourgeois parliamentarians: the Kolyubakins and other "Left Cadets" speak of "liberty" to the people, while in parliament, in its practical policies, the Cadet Party is entirely at one with the most moderate liberals.

"The new group," write the liquidators referring to the Progressists, "only seals and aggravates the political amorphism, the political confusion of the bourgeois voters, *which is at the root of the political helplessness of the Russian bourgeoisie*."

The political helplessness of the Russian bourgeoisie is by no means caused by the "amorphism" of the "bourgeois voters"—only Left-Cadet illusion-mongers can think so; it is caused by economic conditions, owing to which the bourgeoisie is an enemy of the workers and a slave of the Purishkeviches, a slave who never goes further than grumbling and expressing pious wishes.

The Left-Cadet parliamentarians, whether actuated by an idealist theory of politics or by a vulgar fear of losing the votes of the Left-inclined voters embittered by the Purishkeviches, may conduct their struggle against the official Cadet Party by arguments to the effect that it is high time to listen to reason, recall the programme, take up the cudgels against amorphism, philistinism, unprincipledness, and so on and so forth, in line with the usual bourgeois-democratic phrases.

The Marxists are waging a fight against Cadets of all shades, basing themselves on the materialist theory of politics, explaining the class interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole, which impel it towards a liberal-monarchist programme, towards a rapprochement with the Progressists and "Left" Octobrists. Our response, therefore, will not be to appeal to Cadet reason", to Cadet "memory",

or to Cadet "principles", but to explain to the people *why* the liberals are becoming counter-revolutionaries and are breaking with democrats. We shall not exclaim: Will the Cadets listen to reason at last, will they recall their programme? We shall say: Will the democrats realise, at last, what a deep gulf separates them from the counter-revolutionary liberals—the Cadets? Will those whose economic interests do not fetter them to the landowning nobility, or to the soft jobs and revenues of the bureaucracy, the bar, etc., realise that, if the people's freedom is really dear to them, they must join the working-class democratic movement against the Rights and against the Constitutional-Democratic Party?

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Signed: *B. K.*

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A POOR DEFENCE OF A LIBERAL LABOUR POLICY

In No. 8 of *Zhivoye Dyelo* Martov replies to my article, "An Organ of a Liberal Labour Policy", published in No. 11 of *Zvezda*.* The question under discussion concerns the fundamental line to be followed by the workers in the election campaign and, therefore, merits special attention.

I described *Zhivoye Dyelo* as a publication with a *liberal* labour policy on the following grounds: (1) The slogan issued by Martov and Dan about dislodging reaction from its positions *in the Duma*, about wresting the *Duma* from the hands of the reactionaries, is not a democratic, but a liberal, slogan. The struggle against "reaction" in Russia, far from being confined to the wresting of the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries, is *not* even *focussed* on this. (2) In speaking of the possibility of achieving this aim, Martov started by embellishing our electoral law. He declared that "a majority of electors from the landowners and the first urban curia" is guaranteed "in a considerable number of gubernia assemblies". I reminded him of the facts: that this majority is guaranteed in *all* gubernia assemblies, that in 28 out of 53 gubernias a majority (in the assemblies) is guaranteed to the landowners *alone*, and that these gubernias send 255 out of a total of some 440 deputies to the Duma. (3) In speaking of dislodging reaction from its positions in the Duma, Martov forgot that the Duma *cannot* become anything more than a *landowners*' liberal opposition. The slogan issued by Martov and Dan implies wresting the *landowner* from the grip of reaction. (4) In saying that it is to the interest of the workers that power should be transferred to the "civilised bourgeoisie", Martov "forgot" to mention one thing, namely, that it is to the interest of the liberals to

* See pp. 487-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

share power with Purishkevich so as to prevent democracy from possessing "a single weapon"! (5) In saying that, by growing stronger in the Duma, the Cadets "are facilitating their advance towards power", Martov forgot the experience of 1905-06 in Russia, of 1789 and subsequent years in France and of 1911 in China. This experience tells us that power is transferred to the liberals (or further to the left) only when democracy triumphs *in spite* of the liberals. (6) Consequently, Martov accepts Marxism only insofar as it is acceptable to any educated liberal.

What does Martov reply to these six points? Nothing. He maintains absolute silence. Why then start a controversy if you have decided to say nothing?

While passing over in silence *all* my arguments, Martov tries to "catch" me in the following passage from my article:

> "The practical task that faces us at the elections is by no means 'to dislodge reaction from its positions in the Duma', but to strengthen the forces of democracy in general and of working-class democracy in particular. This task may sometimes clash with the 'task' of increasing the number of liberals, but five additional* democrats are more important to us, and more useful to the proletariat, than fifty additional liberals."

Quoting this passage, Martov (pretending that he has caught "an adherent of reaction"!) gleefully exclaims: "I suggest that the readers ponder over this phrase". I heartily support this proposal.

Martov begins to ponder and in so doing arrives at the following syllogism: The law now provides for a second ballot everywhere. Consequently, "*there may be only one instance*" when, by repulsing fifty liberals, we can elect five democrats. Such an "instance" involves *selling* the democratic vote to the Black Hundreds in exchange for seats in the Duma.

And Martov rejoices and prances for a full fifty lines, pretending that he has smitten an abettor of the Black Hundreds and that in smiting F. L-ko he has also "hit" W. Frey[204] who "is steering the same course".

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* There was a misprint in the article: "strong" instead of "additional". Martov might have easily noticed that it was absurd to juxtapose "strong" democrats to "additional" liberals. But that is not the point at issue.

Martov must think his readers are very naïve. And how careless it was of him to suggest to readers that they should *ponder*, while he himself writes *without thinking*.

The passage in my article to which Martov took such strong exception poses *two* questions for thinking people to answer: (1) Is it true that five democrats in the Duma are of greater use to the workers than fifty liberals? (2) Is it possible for these tasks to "clash" in actual practice?

The pondering Martov evaded the first question *altogether*. That's a pity. You, Messrs. Liquidators, evade questions of politics in order to accuse us of partiality for arithmetic. Fifty liberals in the Duma will give the people a pile of *sham democratic* speeches, thereby corrupting the people, and a *few* "reforms" which, to begin with, will be confined to wash-basins, and, secondly, will be held up in the Council of State and so *forth*. Five democrats, on the other hand, will use the Duma rostrum to explain to the people a number of truths of *democracy* (and workers will use the rostrum also to explain some of the truths of socialism). Which is more useful to the proletariat?

The second question. Is Martov right when he says that the task of electing five democrats ("additional", i.e., in addition to those we have at present) *may clash* with the task of electing fifty liberals *only* in the case which he mentions? For after inviting the readers to ponder, Martov declares without further ado: "There may be only one such instance."

If Martov is right, the reader ought to accuse me, F. L-ko, either of discussing an impossible case, or of a secret desire to sell the votes of the democrats to the Black Hundreds in exchange for seats in the Duma (a secret and *stupid* desire, I may add confidentially. Imagine Purishkevich purchasing the votes of the friends of Petrov the Third and Voiloshnikov *in exchange for* electing Voiloshnikov to the Fourth Duma—that is the sort of probability in which the "pondering" Martov indulges).

If there can be another instance of these two tasks clashing, then Martov is wrong.

Thus, is another instance of such a clash possible? *There could be*, *without any doubt*, if at the *second ballot* the democrats, without entering into an agreement with the liberals, were to fight both the Rights and the liberals.

That is all there is to it.*

The pondering Martov, like all the liquidators, is a prisoner of the idea of two camps, and fails to notice the fight waged by a third camp both against the first and against the second!

Immediately following the passage which fills Martov with indignation, it says in my article:

"Hence the following conclusion ["hence", dear Martov!] which Martov refuses to draw, even though he does pretend to agree that the Cadets are *not* democrats, but liberals: (1) in the five big cities, in the event of a second ballot, agreements are permissible *only* with the democrats against the liberals; (2) at *all* the ballots and in *all* the agreements at the second stage, *precedence* should be given to agreements with the democrats against the liberals, and only subsequently may agreements be concluded with the liberals against the Rights".

Martov mentioned *only* the second point, and declared that I was not telling the truth, because Martov agrees with that point (it remains to be seen whether all the liquidators agree!), *but he maintained silence on the first point*!

Once again: either you keep silent or you argue the issue.

In the event of a second ballot being taken in the five cities, the general line should be: with the democrats *against* the liberals. Agreements with the liberals to be *prohibited* (for experience has shown that on the *whole* there is no danger of a Black-Hundred victory in any of these cities).

Are you *for* or *against* this sort of prohibition? Give a straight answer.

Further, what *can* be the practical result of this second ballot? The votes may be divided *nearly* equally among the three camps. The issue is then decided by the relative majority. Take the simplest example: out of a total of 100 votes, the Rights command 33, the liberals 33, and the democrats 34 votes. The democratic candidate is elected. One vote

* The following "terrible" suspicion occurs to me: is it possible that Martov's whole article is to be explained by his *not knowing* that, according to the law, the second ballot represents new elections and not a contest between two candidates? If this is the case, it will be necessary, before "fighting reaction" in the elections, to fight ignorance of the electoral law!

less for the Social-Democrat and one vote more for the reactionary may decide the issue in favour of the Black Hundreds!

There are two lines of working-class policy: the *liberal* line—fear above all the election of a reactionary, therefore surrender the leadership to the liberal without a fight! The *Marxist* line—do not be dismayed by the liberal cries about the danger of a Black-Hundred victory, but *boldly* plunge into a "three-cornered" contest (to use the English expression). As a general rule there is no danger of the Black Hundreds gaining a victory. And if in exceptional cases a Black-Hundred candidate is elected, this will be compensated for by the fact that *here and there democrats will be elected*!...

You cannot learn to swim unless you go into the water. There can be no contest in which all the chances are known beforehand. If the workers allow themselves to be frightened by the liberal cries about the danger of a Black-Hundred victory, they will *never* learn to fight in a "three-cornered" contest. Everywhere in the world the camp of reaction and the liberal camp rallied their forces earlier and were better organised (with the aid of reactionary laws, of course) than the workers. Everywhere in the world the liberals tell the workers the very same things that Martov is repeating.

Now, for one more, and final, step to show the "pondering" Martov what it means to ponder over matters.

At the second ballot in the five cities, agreements with the liberals are prohibited. In other cases of a second ballot such agreements are not prohibited. Does this mean that they will be concluded *as a rule*? It seems not, doesn't it?

If there is *no* agreement, may it not happen that in *each* case of a second ballot the votes will be divided nearly equally among the three camps?

Apparently it may be, if one really "ponders" over it.

From this follows the conclusion that there are two lines of working-class policy.

The liberal labour policy: there is a swing to the left in the country; "therefore" ... fear above all the danger of a Black-Hundred victory; the slogan is to dislodge reaction from its positions in the Duma; but only the liberals can dislodge it from its positions in the Duma; therefore, you must

not "threaten" the liberals, or "extort" seats from them—surely it is unbecoming for "cultured" workers to extort anything from such nice people as the liberals!—but be prepared to make every kind of concession in concluding agreements with the liberals, and steer clear of a "three-cornered" contest.

The Marxist working-class policy: there is a swing to the left in the country; therefore, do not believe the liberal fables about the danger of a Black-Hundred victory; when entering into agreements with the liberals, you must by all means *threaten them and extort* from them seats in the Duma; and in order to lend weight to your threats, worker comrades, don't fear a "three-cornered" contest; boldly engage in such a fight, and expose the counter-revolutionary liberals to the people; to be sure, wherever there is a fight, there is a possibility of defeat, here and there a reactionary may be elected, but, on the other hand, *here and there democrats will be elected*; it is better for five additional democrats to get into the Duma than for fifty additional liberals; as a general rule, the Black Hundreds will not win in the elections, for the Purishkeviches are too well known, and the liberals are *purposely* trying to scare the people by magnifying the danger of a Black-Hundred victory in order to secure the leadership for themselves (although the Maklakovs are almost as black as the Black Hundreds) and ward off the danger threatening them from the "left".

To sum up: he made no reply to a single point of the six I brought up in dealing with the liberal labour policy. He ignored the question of prohibiting blocs with the liberals in the five cities. He gave no thought to three-cornered election fights *at* the second ballot, although he had promised to "ponder". On the other hand, there are two things he did accomplish: (1) he defended the liberals from "threats", and (2) accused Voiloshnikov's friends of plotting with Purishkevich to sell votes to him on condition that Purishkevich, *in exchange*, should help elect Voiloshnikovs to the Fourth Duma!!

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Signed: *F. L-ko*

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THE SECOND BALLOT IN RUSSIA AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKING CLASS

More and more frequently we come across examples showing how widespread is the wrong idea people have of the second ballot under our electoral law. Dan, writing in No. 1-2 of *Nasha Zarya*, said that our tactics at the second ballot must be the same as in Western Europe. Martov, writing in No. 8 of *Zhivoye Dyelo*, directly pointed to the "German workers" as an example for the Russian workers to follow in their tactics at the second ballot. A special article dealing with the second ballot, recently published by Trotsky, is based on the same error.

The error is repeated so frequently, that we cannot help wondering whether the "general leaning" in certain quarters to the same error of fact is not due to the *unwillingness* to appreciate the tasks of working-class democracy in the fight against the Cadets.

In Russia, the law of June 3, 1907 does *not* provide for a second ballot of the German type; in fact, it does *not* provide for any "second ballot" at all in the strict sense of the term; it only provides for supplementary or new elections. The second ballot in Germany is a choice between two candidates only, those who have received the highest number of votes in the first elections. In the case of the Germans, the second ballot decides solely which of the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes is to be elected.

There is nothing of the sort in Russia. According to our law, any number of any candidates may run for election in the second ballot. Strictly speaking, it is not a second ballot, but new or supplementary elections. Therefore, all references to the German example are quite wrong!

The main article of the law dealing with the second ballot is Article 106 of the Regulations governing the elections. Here we read: "Delegates of the preliminary assemblies and, likewise, electors elected at the assemblies of voters, are recognised as such if they have received more than half the votes cast at the assembly".

Here we have the clearly expressed requirement of an absolute majority in the first round of the elections. Further, the same article states that in cases where no absolute majority has been obtained, "supplementary elections are to be held for the remaining vacancies" (that is to say, for all the electors except those who have been elected by an absolute majority).

Who is regarded as elected at the "supplementary elections"? "Those who obtained a relative majority of the votes," it is stated at the end of this article, "are to be regarded as elected."

The same is stipulated in the law of June 3, 1907 with regard to the second ballot in the case of *direct* elections, i.e., in the cities of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, and Riga. Only instead of using the expression "a relative majority of the votes", Article 140 speaks of "the greatest number of votes". Finally, provision is also made for the second ballot at the elections of members of the Duma by gubernia electoral assemblies—in case none of the candidates received "more than half of the votes cast", i.e., an absolute majority. When a second ballot is taken "those who have received a relative majority of the votes cast are regarded as elected". (Article 350.)

Consequently, our electoral law does not provide for anything like the second ballot in Germany. In this connection there can be nothing more erroneous than to refer to the example and conduct of the German workers. In the official edition of the Regulations Governing the Elections to the State Duma, issued by the Ministry of the Interior, St. Petersburg, 1912, it says in Clause 14 of the interpretations of Article 106: "Persons who took no part in the first round of the elections may also be permitted to participate in the supplementary elections". It is obvious that this refers not only to new voters, but also to new candidates. The law permits the nomination for the second

ballot of a candidate who did not stand in the first elections.

The question is, what political conclusions for our election tactics should be drawn from this feature of the June Third election regulations.

The first, fundamental, and most general conclusion is the following: our law, unlike the German law, provides a *wider* field for election agreements at the second ballot. In Germany it can be only a question of choosing *the lesser evil*: those defeated at the first elections (and they are all those excluded from the second ballot) can have no other aim. In Russia, if on the one hand in the primary elections there were no victors, on the other hand there would, strictly speaking, be no defeated contestants, for *each* may try his luck a second time, in a new contest, by concluding agreements of various kinds with one ally or another.

In Germany, for one thing, the working-class candidate cannot derive any benefit *for himself*, i.e., any direct benefit, from the fight between the Right parties and the bourgeois opposition parties. He may support the liberal opposition against the Rights if both are of practically equal strength; but he cannot take advantage of a tie between his liberal and reactionary opponent to win the victory *himself*. In Russia the latter is possible.

Hence the second conclusion. The Russian electoral law, unlike the German law, provides working-class democracy with a *wider field* for fighting the *liberals* at the second ballot. In Russia, as in most West-European countries, two wings (or two groups of parties) of the ruling propertied classes predominate in the elections: "conservatives" and liberals, the Black Hundreds and the "opposition". The workers are fighting *both* groups of parties. The backward sections of the people, who at first awaken to the struggle against feudalism and absolutism, do not immediately realise their tasks in the struggle against capital, and usually follow the liberals for rather a long time. That is why the working-class parties, when their influence is growing, as a rule win over more followers from the liberals than from the Rights. Hence the usual hypocritical wailings of the "Cadets" of *all* countries about the working-class parties allegedly playing into the hands of the reac-

tionaries, weakening the "general forces of progress", and so on and so forth.

In Germany, the working-class candidate can measure strength with a liberal at the second ballot only in instances when the Rights have been defeated in the first round of the elections, and are excluded from the second ballot. In Russia a working-class candidate can, and therefore should, compete in the second ballot against a liberal *whenever* the Right has obtained a smaller number of votes than the liberal in the first elections. In other words: when a second ballot is taken in Germany, the working-class candidate can meet the liberal only "in single combat"; in Russia, however, it is possible for the second ballot also to be a "three-cornered contest", i.e., one in which Right, liberal, and working-class candidates participate. In cases of a second ballot in Russia, therefore, there may occur *more* instances when the mass of the workers will be interested in securing the election of their own candidate.

We have now come to the third conclusion. In Russia, bearing in mind the present political divisions, a particularly wide field is open at the second ballot for the so-called *Left bloc* in all the curias and at all stages where the liberals are stronger than the reactionaries (the latter including, of course, all the Rights, the Nationalists, and the Octobrists, i.e., all the government parties without exception). Wherever the liberals at the first elections prove stronger than the reactionaries, and the working-class candidates weaker than the liberals, it is the *duty* of the workers, both from the viewpoint of the political task of organising the forces of democracy in general, and from the viewpoint of electing working-class candidates to the Duma, to make common cause with bourgeois democracy (Narodniks, Trudoviks, etc.) *against* the liberals.

Are such instances likely to occur often?

Not very often in the gubernia electoral assemblies; here, in most cases, the liberals will be weaker than the reactionaries, and it will, therefore, be necessary to form a bloc of all the opposition forces in order to defeat the reactionaries.

In the peasant curia, the political divisions are less definite and distinct; here the tyranny of the police is felt more

acutely than anywhere else; here delegates, electors, and even candidates for election to the Duma, are most keenly aware of the necessity to "conceal" their true "face"; there are very few worker candidates so far as party affiliation is concerned. The political task to be performed in this curia is, unquestionably, to organise the forces of democracy and combat the influence and prejudices of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. As for the second ballot, it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions regarding the frequency of one contingency or another, or even regarding the number of actual cases of a second ballot.

In the landowner and the first urban curias the role of democrats in general and of working-class democrats in particular is too insignificant to be dwelt on at all.

There remains the second urban curia. Here there are quite a few workers and voters close to the workers: shop assistants, worker tenants, pensioners, etc. Here there is at least something resembling a political press and something in the nature of meetings. In brief, this is the principal field for a second ballot, with the voters directly participating. Now, how do matters in this curia stand with regard to the party alignment of the voters?

A fairly exact, even if indirect, answer to this question is provided by data on the party allegiance of the electors of the second urban curia in the elections to the Third State Duma. According to the returns published in the Cadet *Rech* (1907, No. 241) for 4,897 electors out of a total of 5,161 in 51 gubernias of European Russia, the 533 electors in the second urban curia were divided by parties as follows: opposition parties 405 (100 "Lefts", 209 Cadets, and 96 Progressists), Right parties 101 (17 moderates, 19 Octobrists and 65 Rights), 21 independents and 6 whose party affiliation was unknown. The three main groups of parties contending in the present elections are clearly indicated here: 100 democrats, 305 liberals, 101 Rights.

The liberals are thus more than three times as strong as the Rights, whose strength is practically equal to that of the democrats. *As a rule*, therefore, there can obviously be no question here of any danger of a Black-Hundred victory. It is further obvious that the *main* task of working-

class democrats in this curia is to fight the liberals. At the present juncture particularly, when, as even the liberals, Octobrists and Purishkeviches admit, there is undoubtedly a general swing to the left in the country, this fight must be put in the forefront. Obviously, in the first stage of the elections the working-class candidates must wage an absolutely independent struggle, putting forward a hundred per cent working-class election lists. In the second stage, at the second ballot, it will *in the majority of cases* be a question of a fight of democrats against liberals.

In order to conduct *that* struggle it will be necessary for the Marxists at the second ballot to make common cause with *all* democrats (i.e., also with the bourgeois democrats, Narodniks, Trudoviks, etc.) *against* the liberals. The entire behaviour of the notorious "responsible opposition", the Cadets, in the Third Duma, the entire policy and tactics of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and on the other, the present movement among the shop assistants, provide a particularly favourable ground for this fight by the democrats, organised by the workers, against the liberals, i.e., against the Cadet Party. Inasmuch as the second urban curia is the one in which there will be the greatest number of cases of a second ballot, the *principal* line to be pursued by the workers at the second ballot is precisely this: with the democrats *against* the Rights and *against* the liberals.

In the final analysis, we come to the conclusion that the liquidators and their defenders are committing both a "technical" and a political mistake on the question of the second ballot. "Technically", they are committing a mistake by confusing the German second ballot with the Russian "supplementary" or new elections. Politically, they are committing a mistake by sinking down to a liberal labour policy, by confining themselves to general phrases about supporting the opposition against the Rights. Actually, the general task of the Marxists in present-day Russia, the task of organising the workers as the vanguard of democracy against *both* the Rights *and* the counter-revolutionary liberals, as well as our special position in the principal "second ballot" curia, demand a different slogan. In cases of a second ballot, primarily in the second urban curia, common cause is

to be made more often with all democrats against the liberals and against the Rights; and only subsequently it may be necessary at the second ballot to join the general opposition bloc against the reactionaries.

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Signed: *M. Sh.*

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LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY

I

The Trudovik conference of which we have already spoken and which was reported in several newspapers (among others, in *Rech* of March 28), is of special importance from the standpoint of making clear party alignments in the elections to the Fourth Duma. After the bloc of moderate liberals (the Cadets and "independent Progressists") and after the resolutions of the working-class democrats about their tactics in the elections, it only remained for the Trudoviks to "define themselves" in order to complete the picture.

By now *all* classes of Russian society, as represented by all political parties of any importance and worthy of attention, have defined their position in the election campaign. For the bourgeois parties, particularly those that have found a "permanent" place for themselves under the June Third regime, the elections are primarily an occasion for an intensified publicity drive, but for working-class democrats, for Marxists, the main task in the election campaign is to *explain* to the people the *nature* of the various political parties, *what* views are advocated and *who* advocates them, what are the real and vital interests behind each party, which *classes* of society shelter behind each party label.

From this point of view we shall have to deal with the conference of the Trudoviks *repeatedly*, and in the interests of the working class, our special attention must be devoted to the fundamental question indicated above. The Black Hundreds, the Right parties, and the *liberals* (the Cadets) all ignore this question, or else they misinterpret its presentation and solution in a thousand ways, not because of any lack of understanding or because of the malice

of individuals, but because the *class* interests of the landowners and the bourgeoisie *compel* them to misrepresent the essence of the peasants' and workers' parties.

On the other hand, the Trudoviks, a mainly peasant party, do not try to evade the question, say, of what distinguishes liberalism from democracy, but their answer to it is a wrong one. Nor is it possible to give a proper answer to the question when approached from the peasant point of view, i.e., that of the small proprietor. It is only from the point of view of the wage-earner that the question is *settled* —this is borne out not only by theory and science, but also by the *experience* of all European countries, by the entire economic and political history of the European parties, particularly in the nineteenth century.

Observe, for one thing, what the liberals say of the Trudoviks and what the Trudoviks say of themselves. The liberal *Rech*, chief organ of the Cadet Party, says that the Trudoviks suffered most from the change in the electoral law effected on June 3, 1907, and that their tactics "cannot in any way differ perceptibly" from the tactics of the Cadets; for the Cadets, if you please, can "repeat" and do repeat practically everything said by the Trudoviks. "Lastly," writes *Rech*, "election agreements with the Trudoviks may perhaps turn out to be necessary in isolated places only, and in few such places at that."

Consider this statement, and you will see that it is the statement of a liberal bourgeois, whom the law of June 3 deprived of his leading position (which he enjoyed under the law of December 11, 1905[205]), but at the same time gave him a by no means insignificant place in the opposition, *segregated* from democracy. You don't matter much, Messrs. Trudoviks, and we are not taking you seriously—that is what the *Rech* statement really amounts to. Why do they not matter? Because the law of June 3 has made them powerless in the elections.

From the standpoint of any democrat, and particularly from the standpoint of any worker, the parties that matter are not those that enjoy a monopoly or privileges under the given electoral law, but those that represent the large masses of the population, especially of the toiling and exploited population. As it happens, however, it is precisely

from these masses that the law of June 3 *protects* the liberal bourgeois—and that is why they do not matter to him. The liberal lawyers and journalists want seats in the Duma, the liberal bourgeois want to share power with the Purishkeviches, that is what they really want. As for the development of the independent political thought of the peasant masses, the development of their initiative as a class, this is something the liberal does not want; more, it constitutes an outright danger to him. The liberals need voters, they need a crowd that would trust and follow them (in order to compel the Purishkeviches to make room), but they fear the political independence of the crowd.

Why, then, are they not afraid of the Trudoviks who, as an "independent" party particularly close to the peasantry, i.e., to the vast majority of the population, are *not* liberals but representatives of bourgeois democracy? For the very reason that the Trudoviks are democrats *insufficiently* independent in their relations with the liberals, *lacking the ability* to fight the liberals for influence over the masses! We must not tire of dwelling hundreds of times on this most important problem of contemporary politics in Russia if we take these politics seriously, conscientiously, as a matter of principle, and not in the fraudulent (or liberal) sense of chasing after Duma seats. As long as Russia's political transformation along democratic lines remains the historical task of the present epoch, the *entire crux* of the problem of this transformation will inevitably consist in the necessity for *very* broad, the broadest possible, masses of the population to become conscious democrats, i.e., emphatic, consistent and determined opponents of liberal narrow-mindedness, half-heartedness and cowardice. And no worker can claim to be a class-conscious worker if he has not realised that he cannot be a consistent fighter for the abolition of wage slavery, *unless* he is fully aware of and works for this political task of our times.

When the liberals, the Cadets, say that their "tactics" do not in any way "differ perceptibly" from Trudovik tactics, it is a case of unmitigated ignorance or shameless lying. The political history of Russia for the past decade teems with hundreds and thousands of refutations of this lie. Russia's most recent history provides proof based on our

Russian *experience* showing that the difference between the liberals and the peasant democrats is immeasurably deeper than any question of "tactics"; this difference has always and invariably come to the surface during the past, say, eight years, despite the fact that the course of events has often given rise to the most drastic changes in "tactics"; this difference goes much deeper than any "programmes", for a programme expresses simply what the advanced representatives of a given class *think* of the tasks and position of their class. Not the opinions of advanced individuals, but the actions of the millions, have shown us the root difference between the *present-day* economic and political condition of the liberal bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the bourgeois-democratic peasantry on the other. Hence the fundamental difference between their class *interests* in regard to the "forces in control" of Russia today. Hence the fundamental difference between them on all points of departure and in the entire scope of political activity.

Both the liberal and the Trudovik may be under the illusion that they hold the same political opinions, for both are "against Purishkevich". But probe just a little below these *opinions* of political leaders, down to the *class position* of the masses, and you will find that in *real life* the liberal bourgeoisie shares political privileges with the Purishkeviches, and their controversy is *only* over the question whether the Purishkeviches are to hold two-thirds of these privileges and the Milyukovs one third, or the other way round. Take "real life", take the economic position of the present-day Russian peasantry as a stratum of small proprietors in agriculture, and you are sure to find that it is by no means a question of dividing political privileges, by no means a question of political privileges at all, but that even the word "*life*" must be written in inverted commas, for the very existence of the Purishkeviches means *death from starvation* for millions of such petty proprietors.

Modern Russia has two bourgeoisies. One is the very narrow stratum of ripe and overripe capitalists who, in the person of the Octobrists and Cadets, are *actually* concerned with sharing the present political power, the present political privileges, with the Purishkeviches. The word "present" in this case must be given a rather broad meaning, so as to

include, for instance; the privileges which the law of June 3, 1907, safeguards today, and the privileges which the law of December 11, 1905, safeguarded yesterday.

The other bourgeoisie is the very wide stratum of petty and in part medium proprietors, who have not yet matured but are energetically endeavouring to do so. They are mostly peasants who in the present era of Russian history are by no means *actually* confronted with the question of privileges, but with the question of how not to starve to death *because of* the Purishkeviches. This is a question that concerns the very foundations of the power of the Purishkeviches in general, the sources of all power held by the Purishkeviches.

The entire history of Russia's political emancipation centres around the struggle between these two bourgeois tendencies. Behind all the thousands upon thousands of fine words about liberty and equality, about "equalitarian" distribution of the land and "Narodism", is the struggle between these bourgeois tendencies. The result of the struggle will inevitably be a Russia that is completely bourgeois and painted entirely or predominantly in one of these two "colours". It is clear that this struggle is by no means without significance for the wage-worker; quite the contrary, if he is a class-conscious wage-worker he most vigorously interferes in this fight, doing his utmost to get the peasant to follow him and not follow the liberal.

This also underlies the problems which the Trudovik conference could not help touching upon. We shall deal with those in greater detail in later articles. For the time being, we shall confine ourselves to a brief summary of what has been said. The question of the Trudoviks and the Cadets is one of the most important questions of Russia's political emancipation. There is nothing more banal than to reduce this question to one of the "strength" of this or that party in the June Third system or of the "advantage" to be derived from different agreements in elections based on this system. On the contrary, the particular questions of agreements, second ballots, etc., can, from the standpoint of the wage-worker, be settled correctly only if the *class* roots of both parties, the bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks) and the bourgeois liberals (Cadets, "Progressists", etc.), have been understood.

II

The conference of the Trudoviks raised a number of highly interesting and instructive political questions. We are now in possession of a splendid commentary on its decisions—Mr. V. Vodovozov's article on "The Election Programme of the Trudovik Group" in No. 13 of the St. Petersburg weekly *Zaprosy Zhizni*,[206] whose closest contributors include Messrs. Kovalevsky and Blank. Mr. Vodovozov's commentary is "splendid", not from our point of view, of course, but because it correctly represents the views and aspirations of the Trudoviks. Everyone interested in the role of the democratic social forces in Russia must pay due attention to Mr. Vodovozov's article.

"The Trudovik group," he writes, "proceeds from the belief that at the present historical moment the interests of the peasantry, the working class and the working intelligentsia, far from contradicting each other, are practically identical, therefore, one party could fully take care of the interests of these three classes of society. But, owing to the force of historical conditions, the working class found its representation in the Social-Democratic Party, and that is why the Trudovik group necessarily had to become primarily the political representative of the peasantry. And such it has been."

Here we see at a glance the fundamental mistake shared by all the Narodniks, including those who are the most "left". They proceed from a "belief" which contradicts all the maxims of economic science and the entire experience of countries which have gone through epochs resembling the present epoch in Russia. They cling to these "beliefs" even when the experience of Russian history compels them to admit that in our country, too, these beliefs are refuted by the course of events.

The Trudoviks' second phrase contradicts their first. If one party could have taken care of the interests both of the working class and the peasantry, what could have given rise to a separate party of the working class? Since such a party was created and became consolidated during a particularly important and particularly crucial period of Russian history (1905), and since even the Trudoviks have to admit that the working class "found" its party "owing to the force of historical conditions", this, consequently, means that

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the "beliefs" of the Trudoviks have been *refuted* by "the force of historical conditions".

If the Trudoviks *have turned out* to be a party of the peasantry, although, according to their own beliefs, they ought not to be a party only of the peasantry, their beliefs must be wrong, must be an illusion. And it is the same sort of illusion as the one entertained by *all* bourgeois-democratic parties of Europe in the period of the struggle against feudalism and absolutism. In one form or another, the idea of a "non-class party" dominated, but the "force of historical conditions" invariably refuted this idea and shattered this illusion. The attempts or efforts to include different classes in "one party" have always been characteristic of bourgeois democracy at the time when it had to look for its main enemy in the past, not in the future—when it saw its enemy in the feudal lords, not in the proletariat.

The claim to "encompass" various classes makes the Trudoviks akin to the Cadets. The latter, too, want to be a party standing *above classes*, they also insist that the interests of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia are "practically identical". And when they speak of the working intelligentsia, they include the Maklakovs too! The class-conscious workers will always combat the various concepts of parties that stand above classes, against every attempt to gloss over the gulf between the class of wage-workers and the class of the petty proprietors.

The Trudoviks resemble the Cadets in sharing bourgeois illusions as to the possibility of fusing the different classes. The difference between them lies in *the class* to which the particular party will be drawn under the influence of events, against the wishes of that party and sometimes in spite of the ideas entertained by some of its members. The Trudoviks have been taught by history to keep closer to the truth, to call themselves a peasant party. The Cadets continue to call themselves democrats, although in actual fact they are counter-revolutionary liberals.

Unfortunately, the Trudoviks are far from being aware of the latter truth—so much so that in the official decisions of their conference they *failed* to give any characterisation of the Cadets. All we read in the official resolutions is that agreements should be concluded "*in the first place*

with the Social-Democrats, *and subsequently* with the Constitutional-Democrats". This is insufficient. The question of election agreements can be settled correctly, consistently, and in a principled manner, *only* if there exists complete clarity as to the class nature of the parties concluding the agreement, as to what constitutes their fundamental divergence, and on what points their interests temporarily coincide.

These matters are dealt with only in Mr. Vodovozov's commentary. *Rech*, which noted and discussed that article, took care to leave its readers entirely *in the dark* with regard to *these very points*. In our opinion, these points ought to be dwelt on with all due attention.

"The Trudovik group," writes Mr. Vodovozov, "is fully aware that the present regime in Russia is a regime of absolutism and arbitrary rule; that is why it has emphatically disapproved of all the actions and steps taken by the Constitutional-Democratic Party to proclaim *urbi et orbi** that in Russia we have a constitutional regime, and why it has assumed a negative attitude to the solemn receptions given to the representatives of the British and French Parliaments as a demonstration of Russian constitutionalism. The Trudovik group has never doubted that only a radical and profound revolution in the entire political and social system can lead Russia on to the highroad of proper and sound development; that is why it has been in sympathy with all expressions of such convictions in our public life. It is this conviction that has implied the existence of a deep gulf between it and the Constitutional-Democratic Party...." Further on the author repeats the same idea about "the peaceful evolutionism of the Cadets and Cadet tactics produced by this evolutionism", "owing to which the Trudoviks have always been farther removed from the Constitutional-Democrats than from the Social-Democrats".

It is obvious why the Cadet *Rech* was obliged to take care to withhold these reflections from its readers. For these reflections represent a clearly expressed desire to draw a line between democratism and liberalism. The line is unquestionably there, but Mr. Vodovozov, although he speaks

* Far and wide.—*Ed.*

of a "deep gulf", has a very shallow conception of this line. According to him, the difference, at bottom, is one of tactics and of the appraisal of the situation: the Trudoviks are in favour of a radical revolution, while the Cadets are peaceful evolutionists; according to the Trudoviks the regime in Russia is one of absolutism, according to the Cadets we have, thank God, a constitution. Such differences may exist between the Right and the Left wings of the same class.

Are these all the differences there are between the Trudoviks and the Cadets? Has not Mr. Vodovozov himself admitted that the Trudoviks are a party of the peasantry? If we take the *class position* of the peasantry in relation, say, to Purishkevich and Purishkevichism, are there no features that distinguish this position from that of the liberal bourgeoisie?

If there are no such distinguishing features, then there is no profound difference between the Trudoviks and the Cadets even in their attitude to feudalism and absolutism. If there are such distinguishing features, then it is the difference of *class interests*, and not the difference of "opinion" on absolutism and the Constitution or on peaceful evolution, that must be stressed.

The Trudoviks want to be more radical than the Cadets. That is very good. But their radicalism would be more consistent and profound if they had a clear idea of the class essence of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, if they plainly referred in their platform to the counter-revolutionary liberalism of the Cadets.

It is therefore in vain that Mr. Vodovozov tries to "justify" himself by pleading external obstacles owing to which, he claims, the Trudoviks "were obliged to draft a resolution in which the most essential points were concealed behind a reference, one not very intelligible to most readers, to the 'platform of the Trudovik group', which is hardly accessible to them". But, to begin with, the Trudoviks were not obliged to confine themselves to the arena fenced off by such obstacles; by confining themselves to this arena, they, just like our liquidators, are betraying how little they differ from the Cadets. Secondly, it was always possible, no matter what the arena, to formulate the class essence of the Cadet liberalism and its counter-revolutionary nature.

Thus we see that the vacillations of the Trudoviks between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats are not fortuitous, but the result of very profound and fundamental conditions, those under which the peasantry has to live. The intermediary position of aloofness from the direct fight between the bourgeois and the proletarian nourishes illusions about a party that stands outside or above classes. What brings the Trudoviks and the Cadets close to one another are the common bourgeois prejudices characteristic both of the big and the small proprietor. Hence, as bourgeois democrats, the Trudoviks lack consistency even in their struggle against the foundations of the power of the Purishkeviches.

The task of the class-conscious workers is to help rally the forces of the peasant democracy, those who are least dependent on the liberals and least liable to yield to their influence, those who are most consistent and determined. Such is the condition of the vast mass of the peasantry that the striving for "a radical and profound revolution", as formulated by Mr. Vodovozov, has extremely strong, widely ramified and deep-seated roots.

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Signed: *P. P.*

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NOTES

[1] *The Russian Collegium of the Central Committee* ("narrow circle of the C.C.", "the acting C.C. in Russia"), confirmed by the Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1908, existed until 1910. It consisted originally of one representative each from the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Polish Social-Democrats, Latvian Social-Democrats and the Bund.

According to the C.C. Rules adopted at the Plenary Meeting in January 1910, the composition of the Russian Collegium of the C.C. was to be enlarged to seven to include the four members of the C.C. elected at the Fifth (London) Congress and three representatives of national (non-Russian) organisations. However, owing to the refusal of the Menshevik-liquidators to co-operate, it was impossible to organise the work of the Russian Collegium of the C.C. after the January Plenary Meeting. Lenin suggested bringing into the Russian Collegium pro-Party Mensheviks to replace the liquidators, but the conciliator members of the C.C. (Nogin, Goldenberg, Leiteisen, and others) did not carry this out.

In the course of 1910 and early in 1911 all Bolshevik members of the C.C. working in Russia were arrested.

This letter is published according to a copy found in the files of the Police Department. The heading to the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 17

[2] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Voice of the Social-Democrat*)—a Menshevik-liquidator organ published in Geneva, and later in Paris, from February 1908 to December 1911.

For Lenin's appraisal of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* see his article "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party" (see present edition, Vol. 16). p. 17

[3] *The Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.*, commonly known as the "Unity" Meeting, was held from January 2 to 23 (January 15-February 5), 1910, in Paris. The Meeting was convened despite Lenin's wishes with the assistance of Trotsky's secret allies, Zinovyev, Kamenev, and Rykov. In addition to the Bolsheviks, representatives of all the factions and factional groups and representatives of the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations were present. Lenin's plan for closer relations with the pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanov's group) in the struggle against the

liquidators was opposed by the conciliators, who were secret Trotskyites. They demanded the disbandment of all factions, and the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with the liquidators and Trotskyites. The conciliators were in the majority at the Meeting. The Bolsheviks were in the minority. It was only due to Lenin's insistence that the Plenary Meeting adopted a resolution condemning liquidationism and otzovism. Notwithstanding Lenin's attitude, the Meeting adopted decisions to abolish the Bolshevik organ *Proletary*, disband the Bolshevik Centre and hand over its property to the C.C., and the available funds to the representatives of the international Social-Democratic movement (the "trustees") Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, and Karl Kautsky. Lenin succeeded in getting conditions for the simultaneous liquidation of the *Golos* and *Vperyod* factional centres included in the resolution of the Plenary Meeting. The Meeting carried a resolution to the effect that financial assistance be given to Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda*, which his agents, Zinovyev and Kamenev, tried to convert into the organ of the Central Committee.

Despite Lenin's protest, Menshevik-liquidators were elected to the central bodies. For Lenin's struggle at the Plenary Meeting against the liquidators, Trotskyites and conciliators see his article "Notes of a Publicist" (see present edition, Vol. 16). p. 17

4 *Mikhail* (I. A. Isuv), *Roman* (K. M. Yermolayev) and *Yuri* (P. A. Bronstein)—Menshevik-liquidators, candidate members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., elected at the Fifth (London) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. p. 17

5 *Vperyod* (*Forward*) group—an anti-Party group of otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders (see Note 56), and empirio-monists (supporters of the reactionary, idealistic philosophy of Mach and Avenarius). The group was formed in December 1909 on the initiative of A. Bogdanov and G. Alexinsky. It had its own organ called *Vperyod*. In 1912 the *Vperyod* group, together with the Menshevik-liquidators, united in a general anti-Party bloc (the August bloc) organised by Trotsky against the Bolsheviks.

Since it had no support among the workers the group actually began to disintegrate as early as 1913, and its final, formal dissolution took place in 1917, after the February Revolution. p. 17

6 *Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.—Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—an illegal newspaper published from February 1908 to January 1917; in all there were 58 issues. The first number was published in Russia, later it was published abroad, first in Paris, then in Geneva. In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Editorial Board of the Central Organ was made up of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Polish Social-Democrats. More than 80 articles and notes by Lenin appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Within the Editorial Board Lenin campaigned for a consistent Bolshevik

line. Some of the editors (Kamenev and Zinovyev) adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators, and tried to prevent the implementation of the Leninist line. The Menshevik members, Martov and Dan, sabotaged the work of the Editorial Board of the paper and at the same time openly defended liquidationism in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan leaving the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* in June 1911. From December 1911 it was edited by Lenin. p. 18

[7] *Liquidationism*—an opportunist trend that spread among the Menshevik Social-Democrats after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution.

The liquidators demanded the dissolution of the illegal party of the working class. Summoning the workers to give up the struggle against tsarism, they intended calling a non-Party "labour congress" to establish an opportunist "broad" labour party which, abandoning revolutionary slogans, would engage only in the legal activity permitted by the tsarist government. Lenin and other Bolsheviks ceaselessly exposed this betrayal of the revolution by the liquidators. The policy of the liquidators was not supported by the workers. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which took place in January 1912 expelled them from the Party.

Otzovism (from the Russian word *otozvat*—to recall)—an opportunist trend represented by a small section of the Bolsheviks which arose after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution.

The otzovists demanded the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the State Duma, and the rejection of work in the trade unions and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations. Under cover of "revolutionary" phrases, the otzovists would actually have deprived the Party of the possibility of employing legal methods of struggle, isolated it from the workers and placed it in danger of attacks by the reactionary forces. Lenin sharply criticised the otzovists and called them "liquidators of a new type" and "Mensheviks turned inside-out". p. 18

[8] Lenin is referring to the conditions ("agreement") of the Bolsheviks which were signed and made known at the "Unity" Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 (see pp. 365-67 of this volume). p. 18

[9] *Igor* (Igorev, Gorev)—the Menshevik-liquidator B. I. Goldman. p. 18

[10] *The Central Committee Bureau Abroad* was set up by the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in August 1908 as a general Party representative body abroad, subordinate and responsible to the Russian Collegium of the C.C. Shortly after the January Plenary Meeting of the C.C. in 1910, the liquidators were in the majority, and the Bureau Abroad became the centre of the anti-Party forces. Its liquidationist tactics compelled the Leninist

Bolsheviks to recall their representative Alexandrov (N. A. Semashko) in May 1911. Some time later the Polish and Latvian Social-Democrat representatives were also recalled. In January 1912 the Bureau Abroad was disbanded. p. 18

[11] This refers to the representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad.

The Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania—a revolutionary party of the Polish working class, arose in 1893, first as the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland, and from August 1900, after the Congress of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania at which the Polish and part of the Lithuanian Social-Democratic parties merged, it began to call itself the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.P.P. & L.). Its merit was in guiding the Polish working class towards unity with the Russian working-class movement and in fighting against nationalism.

During the 1905-07 Revolution, the S.D.P.P. & L. conducted its struggle under slogans very similar to those of the Bolshevik Party, and adopted an uncompromising attitude towards the liberal bourgeoisie. At the same time the S.D.P.P. & L. committed a number of errors; it did not understand Lenin's theory of socialist revolution, did not appreciate the leading role of the Party in the democratic revolution, underestimated the role of the peasantry as an ally of the working class, and the significance of the national-liberation movement. Lenin criticised the mistaken views of the S.D.P.P. & L. but at the same time drew attention to its services to the revolutionary movement in Poland. He noted that the Polish Social-Democrats "for the first time formed a purely proletarian party in Poland, and proclaimed the vitally important principle of the closest alliance between Polish and Russian workers in their class struggle" (see present edition, Vol. 20, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination"). At the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906 the S.D.P.P. & L. was accepted into the R.S.D.L.P. as a territorial organisation.

The S.D.P.P. & L. welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution and launched a struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Poland. In December 1918, at the Unity Congress of the S.D.P.P. & L. and the Left wing of the P.P.S., these parties united and formed the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. p. 19

[12] This refers to the representatives of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region and the Bund.

The Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region (until 1906 the Latvian Social-Democratic Workers' Party) was formed in June 1904 at the First Congress of the Party, and its programme was adopted at its Second Congress in June 1905. In 1905-07 the Latvian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (L.S.D.W.P.) led the revolutionary action of the workers. Lenin pointed out that "during the Revolution the Latvian proletariat and Latvian Social-

Democratic Party occupied one of the first and most important places in the struggle against the autocracy and all the forces of the old order" (see present edition, Vol. 16, "The Jubilee Number of *Zihna*").

The L.S.D.W.P. joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the Fourth (Unity) Congress as a territorial organisation and became known as the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region.

The Bund—the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, was organised in 1897 at an inaugural Congress of Jewish Social Democratic groups in Wilno; it united in the main the semi-proletarian elements, Jewish artisans, in the Western regions of Russia. At the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1898) the Bund joined it "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in regard to questions specially concerning the Jewish proletariat".

The Bund was the vehicle of nationalism and separatism in the Russian working-class movement. The Fourth Congress of the Bund, held in April 1901, voted to change the organisational relations with the R.S.D.L.P. which had been established by the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In its resolution the Congress stated that it regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federated association of national organisations which the Bund joins as a federal unit.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. had rejected its demand to bo recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party. It rejoined in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists constantly supported the opportunist wing (Economists, Mensheviks, liquidators) and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. They opposed the Bolshevik programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination and called for national cultural autonomy. During the years of Stolypin reaction the Bund adopted a liquidationist position and played an active part in forming the anti-Party August bloc. During the First World War, the Bundists took a social-chauvinistic stand. In 1917 the Bund supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, the Bund leadership joined the forces of counter-revolution. At the same time there was evidence of a change among the rank-and-file members of the Bund in favour of co-operation with Soviet power. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself, and part of its members were accepted into the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the conditions as laid down in the Rules. p. 19

[13] This refers to the pro-Party Mensheviks who, led by G. V. Plekhanov, opposed the liquidators during the years of reaction. In December 1908, Plekhanov left the Editorial Board of the liquidationist newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and in 1909 resumed publication of *The Diary of a Social-Democrat* in order to struggle against the liquidators. While maintaining a Menshevik position, Ple-

khanov's group stood at the same time for the preservation and strengthening of the illegal Party organisation, and with this aim in view supported a bloc with the Bolsheviks. In 1909 groups of pro-Party Mensheviks were formed in Paris, Geneva, San Remo, Nice and other towns. In St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Kiev, and Baku, many pro-Party Mensheviks opposed the liquidators and supported the revival of the illegal R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin, calling on the Bolsheviks to draw closer to the pro-Party Mensheviks, showed that agreement with them was possible on the basis of a struggle for the Party, against liquidationism, "without any ideological compromises, without any glossing over of tactical and other differences of opinion within the *limits* of the Party line" (see present edition Vol. 16, "Methods of the Liquidators and Party Tasks of the Bolsheviks"). The pro-Party Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks worked together in the local Party committees, contributed to the Bolshevik publications *Rabochaya Gazeta*, *Zvezda*, and the Central Organ of the Party, *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Lenin's tactics of collaboration with Plekhanov's group, which was supported by the majority of the worker Mensheviks in Russia assisted the extension of Bolshevik influence in the legal workers organisations, and the ousting of the liquidators from them.

At the end of 1911 Plekhanov dissolved the bloc with the Bolsheviks. Under the guise of struggle against "factionalism" and against the split in the R.S.D.L.P. he tried to reconcile the Bolsheviks and the opportunists. In 1912, Plekhanov's group, together with the Trotskyites, Bundists and liquidators, opposed the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 19

[14] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*)—the popular organ of the Bolsheviks, to which the pro-Party Mensheviks also contributed, published in Paris from October 30 (November 12), 1910, to July 30 (August 12), 1912. In all, nine issues appeared. Lenin was the founder and leading editor of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and it published about a dozen of his articles.

The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) noted that *Rabochaya Gazeta* was a determined and consistent defender of the Party and Party principles and pronounced it the official organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks). p. 19

[15] *Factional school abroad*—the factional centre of the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders, who united for struggle against the Bolsheviks. It was organised in 1909 by A. Bogdanov (Maximov), G. Alexinsky and A. Lunacharsky on the Isle of Capri with the participation of Maxim Gorky. Using the Party as a screen Bogdanov's supporters persuaded a number of local Social-Democratic organisations to send thirteen students to the school, which lasted nearly four months (August-December). A split took place amongst the students in November and a group headed by the worker N. Y. Vilonov definitely dissociated themselves from Bogdanov's group. The Leninist students sent a protest to the Editorial Board of the newspaper *Proletary* against the anti-Party behav-

iour of the lecturers and, as a result, were expelled from the school. At the end of November 1909 at Lenin's invitation they went to Paris and attended a course of lectures including his lectures on "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" and the "Agrarian Policy of Stolypin". Those students who remained at Capri together with the lecturers formed the anti-Party *Vperyod* group in December 1909.

A meeting of the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* condemned the Capri school as a "new centre of the faction breaking away from the Bolsheviks". p. 19

[16] Lenin is referring to the joint work of the Bolsheviks with G. V. Plekhanov in the R.S.D.L.P. delegation to the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen which was held from August 28 to September 3 (N. S.), 1910. During the Congress, V. I. Lenin and G. V. Plekhanov sent a protest to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party against the publication, in *Vorwärts*, the central organ of German Social-Democrats, of an anonymous, scurrilous article by Trotsky on the internal situation in the Russian Social-Democratic Party. p. 20

[17] *Pravda* (Vienna)—a Menshevik-liquidator newspaper, Trotsky's factional organ, published during 1908-12 in Vienna. Posing as "non-factional", the newspaper adopted a liquidationist position on all basic questions, and also supported the otzovists and ultimatumists. In 1912 Trotsky with the help of his paper organised the anti-Party August bloc. p. 20

[18] *The letter of the sixteen*—an open letter of the Menshevik-liquidators, their reply to G. V. Plekhanov's statement in No. 9 of *The Diary of a Social-Democrat* (August 1909) against the liquidators and their leader, A. N. Potresov.

Lenin called the letter of the sixteen a "document, which ... will have the ill-fame attaching to the name of Herostratus" (see the article "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party" in the present edition, Vol. 16). p. 24

[19] *Vekhi* group—contributors to a Cadet symposium entitled *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*), published in Moscow in the spring of 1909, containing articles by N. Berdyaev, S. Bulgakov, P. Struve, M. Herschensohn, and other representatives of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. In articles on the Russian intelligentsia these writers tried to discredit the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the best representatives of the Russian people, including V. G. Belinsky and N. G. Chernyshevsky. They vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905, and thanked the tsarist government for having "with its bayonets and jails" saved the bourgeoisie from "the fury of the people". They urged the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared the philosophy and politics of *Vekhi* with that of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*), and called the symposium an "*encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy*", "nothing but a flood of reactionary mud poured on democracy". p. 25

[20] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist bands, set up by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals, and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 25

[21] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a daily newspaper of a reactionary Black-Hundred type published in St. Petersburg from November 1905 to April 1914. From 1906 it was the organ of the Ministry of the Interior. The newspaper was subsidised from the secret government fund put at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior. Lenin called *Rossiya* a "venal police newspaper". p. 25

[22] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Found in October 1905, its membership was made up of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders of the land-owning class, and bourgeois intellectuals. Its leading members were: P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve, F. I. Rodichev, and others. In order to hoodwink the working people, the Cadets hypocritically called themselves "the party of people's freedom", while in actual fact they did not go beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered a struggle against the revolutionary movement to be their primary task; they hoped to share power with the tsar and the feudal landlords. During the First World War they actively supported the tsarist government's predatory foreign policy, and did their best to save the monarchy during the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917. Holding leading posts in the bourgeois Provisional Government they carried out a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people, but approved by U.S., British and French imperialists. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power and actively participated in all armed counter-revolutionary acts and campaigns of the interventionists. They continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activities when they fled abroad after the rout of the interventionist and whiteguards. p. 36

[23] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 36

[24] *Zvezda* (*The Star*), in which this article appeared, was a Bolshevik legal newspaper, the forerunner of *Pravda*, published in St. Petersburg from December 16 (29), 1910 to April 22 (May 5), 1912 (at first weekly, then from January 1912 twice and from March, three times a week). On February 26 (March 10), 1912, No. 1 of *Nevskaya Zvezda* (*Neva Star*) was published at the same time as *Zvezda*, and, after the latter was closed down, continued its work. The last, the 27th issue of *Nevskaya Zvezda* was published on October 5 (18), 1912.

Contributors to *Zvezda* were N. N. Baturin, K. S. Yeremeyev, N. G. Poletayev, M. S. Olminsky, and others, including Maxim Gorky, whom Lenin enlisted as a contributor. The pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanov's group) contributed to *Zvezda* until the autumn of 1911. Lenin gave the paper ideological leadership from abroad, and together *Zvezda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda* published nearly fifty of his articles.

Under Lenin's guidance the legal newspaper *Zvezda* became the militant paper of the Bolsheviks which defended the programme of the illegal Party. *Zvezda* established workers' correspondence on a broad scale, maintaining strong and regular contact with the workers. Some of its issues achieved a circulation of 50,000-60,000 copies.

The newspaper was the constant target of government repression; out of 96 issues of *Zvezda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*, 39 were confiscated and 10 were subject to fines. *Zvezda* paved the way for the publication of the daily Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* and on the very day it was closed down by the government the first issue of *Pravda* appeared. p. 39

[25] The "diehards" was the name given by Russian political literature to the extreme Right-wing representatives of the reactionary landlord class. p. 41

[26] *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a legal journal published monthly by the Menshevik-liquidators in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. It became the rallying-centre of the liquidators in Russia. p. 45

[27] *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—the central organ of German Social-Democrats which began publication in 1876. Wilhelm Liebknecht was one of its editors. Frederick Engels waged a struggle in its columns against all opportunist manifestations. In the mid-nineties, after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* regularly published articles by the opportunists who dominated German Social-Democracy and the Second International. p. 45

[28] *The School Commission* (or *School Committee*) was appointed by the January Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., 1910, to organise a Party school abroad. It was composed of nine people: two Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks, two members of the *Vperyod* group and one representative from each of the national organisations—the Bund and the Latvian and Polish Social-Democratic organisations. p. 45

[29] *Socialist-Revolutionary Party*—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 as a result of the union of various Narodnik groups and circles. The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the magazine *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05) became its official organs. The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not recognise the class differences between the proletariat and petty proprietors, glossed over the class differentiation

and contradictions within the peasantry and rejected the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism, and they tried, as Lenin expressed it, to patch up "the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terrorism advocated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries as the main form of struggle against the autocracy, did great harm to the revolutionary movement and hampered the organisation of the masses for revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land and its transfer to the village communes on the basis of the "labour principle" and equalitarian land tenure (i.e., as much land to be given to each peasant household as it could farm without employing hired labour), and also the development of co-operatives. This programme, which the Socialist-Revolutionaries called the "socialisation of the land", in reality bore no resemblance whatsoever to socialism. In analysing the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Lenin showed that the preservation of commodity production and private farming on commonly-owned land does not eliminate the domination of capital, does not relieve the working peasants of exploitation and ruin. Co-operatives cannot be the means of salvation for the small peasants under capitalist conditions since they serve to enrich the village bourgeoisie. At the same time, Lenin pointed out that the demand for equalitarian land tenure, although not socialist, was of an historically progressive revolutionary-democratic character, inasmuch as it was directed against reactionary landed proprietorship.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the attempts of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to masquerade as socialists, carried out a determined struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries for influence over the peasantry, and showed the danger to the working-class movement of their tactics of individual terrorism. At the same time the Bolsheviks were prepared, on definite conditions, to enter into temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against tsarism.

The fact that the peasantry is not a homogeneous class determined the political and ideological instability and organisational disunity of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and their constant waverings between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As early as the first Russian revolution the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party broke away and formed the legal Popular Socialist Party, whose outlook was close to that of the Cadets, and the Left wing formed the semi-anarchist league of Maximalists. During the Stolypin reaction the Socialist-Revolutionary Party experienced a complete ideological and organisational breakdown. The majority of its members adopted a social-chauvinist position during the First World War.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries together with the Men-

sheviks and Cadets were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government of which the Party leaders (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) were members. The Socialist-Revolutionaries refused to support the demands of the peasants for the abolition of landlordism, supporting its preservation, and the Socialist-Revolutionary ministers of the Provisional-Government sent punitive detachments against those peasants who had seized the landlords' estates.

At the end of November 1917, Left-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries founded the independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Striving to preserve their influence over the peasant masses, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries formally recognised Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but very soon began to struggle against Soviet power.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries engaged in counter-revolutionary subversive activities, actively supported the interventionists and the whiteguard elements, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the civil war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries continued their hostile activities against the Soviet state both within the country and abroad among whiteguard émigrés. p. 46

[30] *L'Humanité*—a daily newspaper founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. Soon after the split in the Socialist Party at the Tours Congress (December 1920) and the formation of the Communist Party, the paper became the latter's organ. It is now published in Paris as the central organ of the French Communist Party. p. 46

[31] *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will)—the secret political organisation of Narodnik-terrorists, formed in August 1879 following the split in the Narodnik organisation *Zemlya i Volya* (*Land and Freedom*). *Narodnaya Volya* was headed by an Executive Committee which included A. I. Zhelyabov, A. A. Kvyatkovsky, A. D. Mikhailov, N. A. Morozov, Sophia Perovskaya, Vera Figner, M. F. Frolenko, and others. While still adhering to Narodnik utopian-socialist ideas, Narodnaya Volya took up the political struggle, regarding the overthrow of the autocracy and the achievement of political freedom as a major aim. Its programme envisaged a "permanent popular representative body" elected by universal suffrage, the proclamation of democratic liberties, the transfer of the land to the people, and measures to put the factories in the hands of the workers. "The Narodnaya Volya members," wrote Lenin, "made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 72).

Narodnaya Volya fought heroically against the tsarist autocracy; guided by their erroneous theory of "active" heroes and a "passive" mass, they planned to remould society without the participation of

the people, by their own efforts, through individual terrorism that would intimidate and disorganise the government. After the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the government was able, by savage reprisals, death sentences, and acts of provocation, to crush it out of existence. Repeated attempts to revive the organisation during the eighties ended in failure. Thus, in 1886 a group in the Narodnaya Volya tradition was formed by A. I. Ulyanov (elder brother of Lenin) and P. Y. Shevyryov; but after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III in 1887, the group was uncovered and its active members executed.

While criticising Narodnaya Volya's erroneous utopian programme, Lenin expressed great respect for its members' selfless struggle against tsarism and valued highly the technique of its underground activities and strictly centralised organisation.

p. 46

[32] *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli* (*Messenger of the People's Will*) was published in Geneva from 1883 to 1886, as the organ of the Narodnaya Volya Party. It was edited by P. L. Lavrov and L. A. Tikhomirov; in all there were five issues. p. 46

[33] *Birzheviye Vedomosti* or *Birzhevka* (*Stock-Exchange Recorder*)—a daily bourgeois newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1880. The name *Birzhevka* was commonly used to indicate the lack of principle and corruption of the bourgeois press. The newspaper was closed down at the end of October 1917. p. 46

[34] *Narodniks*—followers of a petty-bourgeois trend, Narodism, in the Russian revolutionary movement, which arose in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. The Narodniks stood for the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landlords' lands to the peasantry. At the same time, they believed capitalism in Russia to be a temporary phenomenon with no prospect of development and they therefore considered the peasantry, not the proletariat, to be the main revolutionary force in Russia. They regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. With the object of rousing the peasantry to struggle against the autocracy, the Narodniks "went among the people", to the village, but found no support there.

In the eighties and nineties the Narodniks adopted a policy of conciliation to tsarism, expressed the interests of the kulak class, and waged a bitter fight against Marxism. p. 50

[35] Here and elsewhere, in this article, Lenin refers to *The Communist Manifesto* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 21-64). p. 52

[36] This article was published in No. 3 of *Sovremennaya Zhizn* (*Contemporary Life*), a Bolshevik legal weekly socio-political magazine published in Baku from March 26 (April 8) to April 22 (May 5), 1911, under the editorship of S. G. Shahumyan. Three issues ap-

peared, but after the confiscation of the third issue, the magazine was closed down by the government. p. 54

[37] *Vozrozhdeniye* (*Regeneration*)—a legal Menshevik-liquidator magazine, published in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910; it was replaced by the magazines *Zhizn* (*Life*) in 1910 and *Dyelo Zhizni* (*Life's Cause*) in 1911. p. 55

[38] *Dyelo Zhizni* (*Life's Cause*)—a legal magazine of the Menshevik-liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from January to October 1911. p. 57

[39] This refers to the thesis of Eduard Bernstein, an outspoken exponent of revisionist ideas, founder of Bernsteinism, the anti-Marxist, opportunist trend in international Social-Democracy, which arose at the end of the nineteenth century in Germany. p. 57

[40] The reference is to the thesis of the Economists developed in their programme *Credo*, written in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova.

Economism was an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international opportunism. The newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*) (1897-1902) and the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*) (1899-1902) were organs of the Economists.

The Economists limited the tasks of the working-class movement to the economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the affair of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that it should merely observe the spontaneous development of the movement and record events. Deferring to the "spontaneity" of the working-class movement, they belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, and claimed that socialist ideology could develop from the spontaneous working-class movement; they denied the necessity for bringing socialist consciousness into the working-class movement from without, by the Marxist party, and thus, they actually cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. They championed the existing scattered, isolated study circles with their parochial amateurish approach, encouraged disunity in the Social-Democratic ranks, and opposed the creation of a centralised working-class party. Economism threatened to turn the working class away from the path of class, revolutionary struggle, and to convert it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

Comprehensive criticisms by Lenin of the Economist standpoint are to be found in a number of his articles. They include "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (directed against the *Credo*; written in 1899, while Lenin was in Siberian exile, and signed by 17 other exiled Marxists), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the *Profession de foi*" and "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96, and Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?*

brought about the ideological rout of Economism (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). A major part in the struggle against the Economists was also played by the newspaper *Iskra*. p. 57

[41] *Lujo Brentano* (1844-1931)—the German bourgeois economist, the author of a variety of bourgeois distortion of Marxism known as Brentanoism. Brentano advocated "social peace" in capitalist society, the possibility of overcoming the social contradictions of capitalism without resorting to the class struggle, maintaining that the solution of the working-class problem lay in the organisation of reformist trade unions and the introduction of factory legislation and that the interests of workers-and capitalists could be reconciled.

A theory analogous to that of Brentanoism was propounded in Russia by the chief representative of "legal Marxism", P. B. Struve, in an attempt to use Marxism in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Lenin pointed out that "Struveism" takes "from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie" and rejects its "living soul", its revolutionary nature. Struve was in complete agreement with the vulgar political economy preached abroad, and ascribed to capitalism aims which were foreign to it, namely the fullest satisfaction of man's needs; he invited people to "learn from capitalism", and openly advocated Malthusian ideas. According to Lenin, Struve was the "great master of renegacy, who, starting with opportunism, with 'criticism of Marx', ended in the ranks of counter-revolutionary bourgeois national-liberalism".

Among Struve's followers was the bourgeois publicist A. S. Izgoyev whom Lenin called, as he did Struve, a "hack writer for the landlords and capitalists". p. 57

[42] *Mayevsky*—the Menshevik V. A. Gutovsky. p. 58

[43] Lenin is referring to Cherevanin's pamphlet *The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907*, at the end of which the author criticised the decision of the Congress on the question of the labour congress and non-Party workers' organisations from the liquidationist standpoint. p. 58

[44] The article "*Those Who Would Liquidate Us*" appeared in the magazine *Mysl* (*Thought*), a Bolshevik legal monthly philosophical and socio-economic magazine published in Moscow from December 1910. The magazine was started and guided by Lenin from abroad, in order to counter the journals of the liquidators and struggle against them.

Lenin published six articles in the first four issues of *Mysl*, including the major work *Strike Statistics in Russia*. Closely connected with the work of the magazine were V. V. Vorovsky. M. S. Olminsky, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov; G. V. Plekhanov and other pro-Party Mensheviks also collaborated. The magazine was published until April 1911. In all, five issues appeared, the last being confiscated. p. 60

[45] *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a fortnightly bourgeois-liberal magazine, published abroad from 1902 to 1905 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. From January 1904 it became the organ of the liberal-monarchist *Osvobozhdeniye* League. Later, the *Osvobozhdeniye* group made up the core of the Cadet Party, the chief bourgeois party in Russia. p. 61

[46] Lenin refers to his article "*The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*", written in March 1906, and published as a pamphlet in April of that year (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276). p. 62

[47] *Octobrists*—members of the Union of October Seventeenth, founded in November 1905, as a counter-revolutionary party representing the big industrial and commercial capitalists and the landlords who farmed their land on capitalist lines. The Octobrists claimed to accept the Manifesto of October 17, but fully supported the domestic and foreign policy of the tsarist government. The leaders of the Octobrists were K. Guchkov, a big industrialist, and M. Rodzyanko, who owned huge landed estates. p. 62

[48] *The law of November 9* (*22*), *1906* on "Additions to Certain Regulations of the Existing Law on Peasant Land Ownership and Land Tenure", and the law of June 14 (27), 1910 on "Amendments and Addenda to Certain Regulations on Peasant Land Ownership" defined the regulations for the withdrawal of the peasants from the village communes, and for obtaining the title to their allotments. p. 66

[49] *Platform of the 104*—the Land Reform Bill of the Trudovik deputies to the First and Second Dumas was based on Narodnik principles of equalitarian land tenure: the creation of a national fund from state, crown and monastery lands, and also privately-owned lands if the estates exceeded the established "labour standard" (i.e., the amount of land that can be tilled by a peasant family without the help of hired labour). Provision was also made for compensation in respect of alienated land. The implementation of the land reform was to be the responsibility of local land committees. (For information on the Platform of the 104 see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 201-03 and Vol. 13, pp. 267-72.) p. 66

[50] *Trudoviks* (Trudovik group)—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Dumas composed of peasants and intellectuals with Narodnik leanings. The Trudovik group was formed in April 1906 from peasant deputies to the First Duma.

The Trudoviks demanded the abolition of all social-estate and national restrictions, the democratisation of urban and rural local government, and universal suffrage in elections to the State Duma. Their agrarian programme was that outlined in Note 49. Owing to the class nature of the small landowning peasantry the Trudo-

viks in the State Duma wavered between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. Since the Trudoviks to some extent represented the peasantry, the Bolsheviks in the Duma collaborated with them on certain questions relating to the general struggle against tsarism and against the Cadets. In 1917 the Trudovik group merged with the Popular Socialist Party and actively supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution the Trudoviks supported the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 67

[51] *Zhizn* (*Life*)—a magazine published in Moscow by the Menshevik-liquidators. There were two issues, in August and September 1910. p. 71

[52] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly magazine of the liberal bourgeoisie published in Moscow from 1880. After the 1905 Revolution it became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. During the period of its existence Lenin called it "Black-Hundred Thought". The magazine was closed down in the middle of 1918. p. 71

[53] Lenin quotes N. A. Nekrasov's lyrical comedy *The Bear Hunt*. p. 72

[54] Lenin quotes the works of Bazarov from Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. p. 72

[55] *N. Beltov*—G. V. Plekhanov's pseudonym under which his book *The Development of the Monist View of History* was published in 1895. p. 74

[56] *God-builders*—a religious-philosophical trend hostile to Marxism, which arose during the period of Stolypin reaction among a section of the Party intellectuals who had broken with Marxism after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution. The "god-builders" (A. V. Lunacharsky, V. Bazarov, and others) advocated the creation of a new "socialist" religion, attempting to reconcile Marxism with religion. At one time Maxim Gorky was associated with them.

A meeting of the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary*, held on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909, condemned the "god-building" trend and in a special resolution declared that the Bolshevik faction had nothing in common with such distortion of scientific socialism.

The reactionary character of god-building was exposed by Lenin in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, and in letters to Gorky in February-April 1908 and November-December 1913. p. 77

[57] *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*—a five-volume Menshevik publication (four volumes were published) under the editorship of L. Martov, P. Maslov, A. N. Potresov. Plekhanov, who was a member of the original editorial board, left it at the end of 1908 because he disagreed with the inclusion of a liquidationist article by A. N. Potresov in the first volume. p. 78

[58] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 by liberal professors of the Moscow University and Zemstvo personalities; it expressed the views of the liberal landlords and bourgeoisie. From 1905 it was an organ of the Right Cadets, and was closed down after the 1917 October Revolution. p. 82

[59] *Progressists*—chiefly representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and to some extent of the peasantry, who stood for election to the Second and Third Dumas. p. 83

[60] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary landlord organisation formed in May 1906, which exercised great influence on government policy. During the period of the Third State Duma a considerable number of its members were in the Council of State and leading centres of the Black-Hundred organisations. p. 85

[61] "*Kolupayev*" *capitalism*. Kolupayev is the name of a kulak in M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Mon Repos Retreat*. Lenin described this type of capitalism in "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07" (see present edition, Vol. 13, p. 422). p. 86

[62] *Tolmachov, I. N.*—Governor of Odessa, an extreme reactionary. p. 86

[63] *Zemstvos*—local government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. Nobility played the leading part in them. Their functions were limited to purely local economic problems (hospitals and road-building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the gubernia governors and the Minister of the Interior, who could overrule any of their decisions disapproved by the government. p. 87

[64] The war between Russia and the coalition of England, France, Turkey, and Sardinia in 1853-56. p. 88

[65] *The Anti-Socialist Law* (*Exceptional Law Against the Socialists*) was promulgated in Germany in 1878. Under this law all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party and all workers' mass organisations were forbidden; the working-class press was proscribed and socialist literature forbidden; repressions against Social-Democrats began. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the working-class movement. p. 93

[66] *The* "*young*"—the petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist opposition in the German Social-Democratic Party; emerged in 1890. Its central group consisted of young writers and students (hence the name) who claimed the role of theoreticians and leaders in the party. This opposition did not understand the changes that took place

after the rescinding of the Anti-Socialist Law (1878-90) and denied the need for making use of legal forms of struggle; they opposed the participation of Social-Democrats in Parliament and accused the party of defending the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and of opportunism. Engels engaged in struggle against the "young". p. 94

[67] *Gromoboi*—contributor to *Golos Moskvy* (*Voice of Moscow*). *Izgoyev*—a Cadet, publicist, contributor to *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*) and *Rech* (*Speech*) collaborator. p. 96

[68] The statement made by 66 representatives of Moscow commercial and industrial capital, was printed in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, No. 33, February 11 (24), 1911. While recognizing the need to combat the students' strikes, the authors of the statement also condemned the government action on the grounds that its measures against the participants in student disturbances jeopardised the existence of the higher school. p. 96

[69] *Golos Moskvy* (*Voice of Moscow*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Octobrists, the counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and the landlords; published in Moscow from December 1906 to June 1915. p. 97

[70] *Zemshchina* (*Land Affairs*)—a daily Black-Hundred newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from July 1909 to February 1917; organ of the extreme Right deputies to the State Duma. p. 100

[71] *Council of State*—one of the highest state bodies in tsarist Russia. Formed in 1810 according to M. M. Speransky's plan, as a legislative-consultative body whose members were appointed and confirmed by the tsar. It was a reactionary body which voted down even the most moderate bills adopted by the State Duma. p. 105

[72] *Meshkovsky* (I. P. Goldenberg)—member of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., a Bolshevik-conciliator. p. 106

[73] *Innokenty* (Innokentiev, Inok)—I. F. Dubrovinsky, member of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., a Bolshevik; in 1910-11 he became a conciliator. p. 107

[74] *Olgin*—V. P. Fomin, a pro-Party Menshevik. p. 108

[75] Lenin's signature and those of two other members of the Central Committee follow. p. 109

[76] *V. V.* (pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov) and *N—on*, or *Nikolai—on* (pseudonym of N. F. Danielson)—ideologists of liberal Narodism in the 1880s and 1890s. p. 110

[77] *Regulations of February 19, 1861*—the law abolishing serfdom in Russia. p. 110

[78] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper appearing in St. Petersburg from 1866 to October 1917. At first it was moderately liberal, but towards the end of the 1870s it became an organ of reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. It conducted a struggle, not only against the revolutionary, but also against the liberal-bourgeois movement. From 1905, it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called *Novoye Vremya* a typical example of the venal press. p. 115

[79] *Vestnik Yevropy* (*European Messenger*)—a monthly historico-political and literary magazine, of bourgeois-liberal trend, published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. The magazine printed articles directed against the revolutionary Marxists. Until 1908 its editor and publisher was M. M. Stasyulevich. p. 119

[80] The *village* (land) *commune* (Russ. *obshchina* or *mir*)—the communal form of peasant use of the land characterised by compulsory crop rotation and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective liability (the compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants for timely and full payments, and the fulfilment of all kinds of services to the state and the landlords) and the periodical redistribution of the land, with no right to refuse the allotment given. The sale of the allotment was also forbidden.

The landlords and the tsarist government used the village commune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze land redemption payments and taxes out of the people. p. 123

[81] These are the words of Volgin, the hero of N. G. Chernyshevsky's novel *Prologue*. p. 123

[82] This refers to *the government coup of June 3* (*16*), *1907*, reactionary coup, whereby the Second Duma was dissolved and the law on Duma elections changed. The new law greatly increased landlord and commercial-industrial bourgeois representation, and greatly reduced the already small representation of peasants and workers. A large proportion of the population of Asiatic Russia was denied electoral rights, and the representation from Poland and the Caucasus was reduced by half. The composition of the 1907 Third Duma was, therefore, representative of the Black Hundreds and Cadets. p. 126

[83] *A. Moskovsky*—Menshevik G. I. Khundadze. p. 131

[84] *The Bolshevik member of the C.C.* was I. F. Dubrovinsky who was arrested in June 1910 (see Note 73). p. 132

[85] *Leaflet of the fifty-eight*—a leaflet published in Paris in 1911 under the title "To All Members of the Party from the Meeting of Mensheviks in Paris". p. 133

[86] In March 1911 the Council of State turned down the Bill on the establishment of Zemstvos in the Western Gubernias, which had been introduced by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, P. A. Stolypin.

As a result of this attitude, Stolypin handed in his resignation which Nicholas II refused to accept. Stolypin then succeeded in having the State Duma and the Council of State prorogued for three days (from March 12 to 14 [25 to 27]) and passed the law on Zemstvos in the Western Gubernias by invoking Article 87 which empowered the government to adopt laws by-passing the legislative organs when they were not functioning "if extraordinary circumstances make such action essential".

This invoking of Article 87 to by-pass the legislative organs led to the demonstrative resignation of A. I. Guchkov, Chairman of the State Duma, and the election of a new Chairman, the Right Octobrist M. V. Rodzyanko. p. 134

[87] *Rennenkampf* and *Meller-Zakomelsky*—tsarist generals, notorious for their brutal punitive actions during the 1905-07 Revolution. p. 142

[88] Lenin refers here to the first all-Russia temperance congress, held in St. Petersburg on December 28, 1909-January 6, 1910 (January 10-19, 1910), and the first all-Russia congress of factory doctors and representatives of industry, which took place in Moscow on April 1-6 (14-19), 1909. p. 147

[89] Lenin is quoting from the speech of the Menshevik-liquidator Dan, at the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908, in the discussion on "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party". p. 148

[90] The expression "third element" was first used by the Vice-Governor of Samara, V. G. Kondoidi, in his speech at the opening of the Samara Gubernia Zemstvo meeting in 1900, to describe persons representing neither the administration nor the social estates—employees of the Zemstvo, doctors, statisticians, teachers, agronomists, etc. The expression "third element" found its way into literature to describe the democratically-minded intellectuals of the Zemstvos. p. 149

[91] *The dexterity of Burenin or Menshikov*—a dishonest method of conducting polemics, characteristic of Burenin and Menshikov, contributors to the Black-Hundred monarchist paper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*). Lenin used these names as synonyms for dishonest methods of controversy. p. 151

[92] *Witte reforms*—reforms in the sphere of finance, customs policy, railroad construction, factory legislation, carried out by S. Y. Witte between 1892 and 1906, while Minister of Communications

and later Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Reforms of the sixties—bourgeois reforms carried out by the tsarist government: the Peasant Reform (1861), financial reforms (1860-64), abolition of corporal punishment (1863), reforms in the sphere of public education (1862-64), Zemstvo reform (1864), legal reform (1864), reform of press and censorship (1865), municipal reform (1870), military reform (1874). p. 154

[93] See Note 62. p. 157

[94] *Blanquists*—supporters of a trend in the French socialist movement headed by the outstanding revolutionary and prominent representative of French utopian communism—Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881). The Blanquists expected "that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals" (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 392). Substituting the actions of a small group of conspirators for those of a revolutionary party, they took no account of the real situation necessary for a victorious uprising and disregarded the question of ties with the masses. p. 158

[95] *Rouanet*, *Gaston*—a French journalist, member of the Socialist Party; belonged to the Right wing of the Party. p. 160

[96] *The Erfurt profession de foi*—programme of the German Social-Democratic Party adopted at the Erfurt Congress in 1891. p. 161

[97] Lenin refers to the section of the resolution "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party" adopted at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908, in which it was decided to combat liquidationism. p. 161

[98] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. From the early 1890s it was the organ of the liberal Narodniks. From 1906 *Russkoye Bogatstvo* became factually the organ of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party. p. 166

[99] Engels frequently referred to the sectarian nature of British Social-Democracy in letters to F. A. Sorge (see, for example, Engels's letters to Sorge on June 10, 1891, on March 18, 1893, on May 21, 1894 and November 10, 1894; an English translation of the last letter is to be found in: Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 556). p. 175

[100] This article was written following an article by N. A. Rozhkov "An Essential Beginning" sent to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

In this article Rozhkov developed his liquidationist plan for the creation of a legal labour party under the Stolypin regime. Lenin attempted to convince Rozhkov of the incorrectness of his views. "...I earnestly implore you to delay, give up, think over, correspond..." he wrote to Rozhkov on February 23 (March 8), 1911 (*Lenin Miscellany XXV*, p. 66). When it became clear that Rozhkov insisted on the publication of this article, Lenin published his reply in *Diskussionny Listok* (*Discussion Bulletin*), No. 3, a supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, on April 29 (May 12), under the above heading. p. 179

[101] After the defeat of the 1848-49 Revolution, whose main aim had been the reunification of Germany into a single democratic republic, reactionary Prussian Junkers led by Bismarck carried out a policy of uniting Germany "by blood and iron". Its aim was the formation of a single monarchist state with a Prussian king as monarch. The Prussian Junkers relied on the support of the big German bourgeoisie for the fulfilment of this "revolution from above". p. 187

[102] *Ivan Ivanovich* and *Ivan Nikiforovich*—characters in Gogol's *Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich*. p. 192

[103] *The Meeting of the C.C. members of the R.S.D.L.P. living abroad*, organised on Lenin's initiative, was held in Paris on May 28-June 4 (June 10-17), 1911.

The purpose of this Meeting was to work out measures for the calling of a plenary meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and an all-Party conference at an early date. By this time, all the Bolshevik members of the Central Committee working in Russia had been arrested, and the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, which consisted of liquidators, refused to convene the plenary meeting abroad. Invitations to the Paris Meeting were sent on May 14 (27) 1911 by the Bolsheviks and representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats.

Three Bolsheviks, two representatives of the Polish and Lithuanian Social-Democrats, and one representative of the Latvian S.D.W.P. attended the Meeting. A Menshevik *Golos*-ist (who left the Meeting after the resolution on defining terms of reference had been adopted), and a representative of the Bund (who left the Meeting on the second day) were also present.

The agenda of the Meeting included the following items: (1) the convening of a plenary meeting of the C.C.; (2) the holding of a meeting on the forthcoming elections to the Fourth Duma; (3) the convening of a Party conference; (4) the Central Committee Bureau Abroad; (5) the organisation of a Technical Commission.

The Meeting adopted a resolution to convene a plenary meeting of the C.C. abroad; to set up an Organising Commission for calling an all-Russia conference and a Technical Commission Abroad (the T.C.A.) to cater to the needs of the Party press, to provide transport facilities, etc.

The Meeting condemned the anti-Party behaviour of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad and placed the question of its further existence before the Plenary Meeting. Notification about the Meeting was published in a separate leaflet which called on Party organisations to contact the Organising Commission, and to "immediately start practical work for the calling of the conference, which is the only means whereby the Party can be assisted to unite its ranks and prepare itself for the forthcoming struggle". The local Party organisations welcomed the decisions of the Meeting. By September 1 (14), 1911, nearly ten of the more important Party organisations had expressed their confidence in the C.C. Meeting abroad and had started the practical work of preparation for the conference. p. 195

[104] The manuscript had no heading. The heading has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 197

[105] *Yudin* (I. L. Eisenstadt), *Kostrov* (N. N. Zhordaniya)—members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Menshevik-liquidators. p. 197

[106] *Makar* (V. P. Nogin), *Lindov* (G. D. Leiteisen)—members of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., Bolshevik-conciliators, arrested at the end of March 1911. p. 197

[107] *Katsap*—A. Polyakov. p. 197

[108] For *the exposure by Olgin* (pro-Party Menshevik, V. P. Fomin) see p. 108 of this volume. p. 198

[109] *Pyotr* (N. V. Ramishvili)—member of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., one of the leaders of the Georgian Menshevik-liquidators. p. 198

[110] The manuscript had no heading. The heading has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 205

[111] *The Bulygin Duma*—the "advisory representative assembly" which the tsarist government promised to convene in 1905. The Act for its convocation and the regulations governing the elections were drafted by a commission presided over by Minister of the Interior Bulygin, and published on August 6 (19), 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and its convocation was prevented by the forces of the revolution. p. 208

[112] The workers' delegates to the second all-Russia congress of factory doctors and representatives of industry were arrested on April 13 (26), 1911, on the eve of the congress. p. 211

[113] *The meeting of the Second Paris Group of the R.S.D.L.P.* took place on June 18 (July 1), 1911. p. 216

[114] *Lieber*, *Ber* (M. I. Goldman)—a liquidator, one of the leaders of the Bund. p. 218

[115] *Organising Commission* (Organising Commission Abroad, O.C.A.) was set up at the Meeting of members of the Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P. in June 1911 in order to prepare for a conference of the R.S.D.L.P. The O.C.A. consisted of Bolsheviks, conciliators and representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats. Other factions (pro-Party Mensheviks, *Vperyod* group, etc.) did not appoint any representatives to the O.C.A.

The O.C.A. issued a "Notification" about the June Meeting of the members of the Central Committee, and a leaflet "To All Social-Democratic Party Organisations, Groups and Circles" on the calling of a conference and also sent three representatives with full powers to Russia, including G. K. Orjonikidze, who were to carry out the preparatory work for the calling of the conference, and to set up the Russian Organising Commission.

From its inception, the conciliators, supported by the representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats, were in the majority in the O.C.A. In November 1911 it refused to submit to the decisions of the Russian Organising Commission, after which the Bolshevik members of the O.C.A. declined responsibility for its actions and withdrew from it. Subsequently, the conciliator majority of the O.C.A. openly campaigned against the Russian Organising Commission.

In his "Letter to the Editorial Board", published in December 1911 in No. 25 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, G. K. Orjonikidze exposed the anti-Party activities of the O.C.A. p. 220

[116] The reference is to the legal Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda* (see Note 24). p. 220

[117] *The Diary of a Social-Democrat* was published by G. V. Plekhanov, and issued irregularly in Geneva at long intervals from March 1905 to April 1912; 16 numbers appeared. Publication of *The Diary* was recommended in 1916 in Petrograd but only one number appeared. p. 221

[118] *The Fifth* (London) *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* (April 30-May 19 [May 13-June 1], 1907) in its resolution on "Attitude to Non-proletarian Parties" recognised that any united activity with the Narodnik parties must exclude any deviation from the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy, and should serve only the aims of a general attack both against reaction and the treacherous tactics of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Third (Second All-Russia) *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* (July 21-23 [August 3-5], 1907) in a resolution on the question of participation in elections to the State Duma resolved that in the

election campaign and in the Duma itself, Social-Democrats must spread and inculcate in the mass of the people the ideas of socialism and revolutionary slogans, and carry out a determined struggle both against reaction and the leadership of the Cadets in the liberation movement in general, and in the Duma in particular. p. 224

[119] *Proletary*—an illegal newspaper founded by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909 under Lenin's editorship. The organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Party Committees, and for a time also of the Moscow District, Perm, Kursk and Kazan Committees, *Proletary* was actually the Bolshevik Central Organ. Altogether fifty issues appeared (the first twenty in Vyborg, Finland). From February 13 (26) to December 11 (14), 1908, *Proletary* was published in Geneva, and from January 8 (21) to November 28 (December 11), 1909, in Paris.

Proletary carried over one hundred articles and shorter items by Lenin. During the Stolypin reaction it played an outstanding part in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations.

[120] *The Technical Commission* (the Technical Commission Abroad, T.C.A.) was set up at the Meeting of C.C. members in June 1911 to deal with technical matters (publishing, transport, etc.). It was an ad hoc Commission designed to function until the convening of the plenary meeting of the C.C., and subordinate to a group of C.C. members who took part in the Meeting of June 1911. It consisted of one representative each, from the Bolsheviks, conciliators, and Polish Social-Democrats respectively. The conciliators were in the majority and sabotaged the organisational work of the Bolsheviks; refused to abide by the decisions of the Russian Organising Commission and stopped allocating funds for the publication of the Party's Central Organ—*Sotsial-Demokrat*. They also attacked Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the press (publishing leaflets and the *Information Bulletin*).

M. F. Vladimirsky, the Bolshevik representative on the Commission, withdrew from it on October 19 (November 1), 1911, and the Bolsheviks severed all connections with it. p. 226

[121] A letter "To the Party" from the Bolshevik V. K. Taratuta was written because of rumours spread in 1906 about his alleged provocative actions. The investigating committee appointed by the January Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910 went into this matter and unanimously decided that in view of the absence of any incriminating facts, the matter be considered closed and that Taratuta be reinstated with full Party rights. p. 227

[122] *Mountain and Gironde*—the two political groups of the bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution at the close of the eighteenth century. Montagnards (representatives of the Mountain), or Jacobins, was the name given to the more resolute represent-

atives of the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary class of the time; they stood for the abolition of the autocracy and the feudal system. The Girondists, as distinct from Jacobins, vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution, and their policy was one of compromise with the monarchy.

Lenin called the opportunist trend in Social-Democracy the "socialist Gironde" and the revolutionary Social-Democrats "proletarian Jacobins". After the R.S.D.L.P. split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin frequently stressed that the Mensheviks represented the Girondist trend in the working-class movement. p. 230

[123] *Rural superintendent*—the administrative post introduced in 1889 by the tsarist government in order to increase the power of the landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were selected from among the local landed nobility, and were given enormous administrative and judicial powers over the peasantry including the right to have the peasants arrested and flogged. p. 231

[124] In this letter, published in *Sotsial-Democrat*, No. 23, September 1 (14), 1911, it was reported that a prominent St. Petersburg liquidator, addressing a meeting of worker members of the Party in Vyborg District, proposed that instead of reviving the Party organisation they should set up "organising groups" for legal educational work. This proposal was met with a unanimous rebuff, no one voting in its favour. p. 242

[125] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*Workers' Cause*)—a magazine of the Economists, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It was published at irregular intervals in Geneva from 1899 to 1902. Lenin criticised the views expressed by the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group in a number of articles published in *Iskra* and in his book *What Is To Be Done?* p. 243

[126] *Rabochaya Mysl* (*Workers' Thought*)—the Economist newspaper published from 1897 to 1902. Lenin's criticisms of the views of *Rabochaya Mysl* as a Russian variety of international opportunism appeared in articles published in *Iskra* and in his book *What Is To Be Done?* p. 243

[127] *Schwartz* (U. Elias)—a Latvian Social-Democrat, liquidator. p. 244

[128] Lenin wrote this comment to the statement made by the commission appointed by the Meeting of Central Committee members in June 1911 to prepare for a plenary meeting of the Central Committee. The statement cited facts of sabotage on the part of the liquidators to prevent preparations for a plenary meeting of the Central Committee in Russia and abroad. p. 245

[129] *Marshal of the Nobility*—the representative of the nobility of a gubernia or uyezd in tsarist Russia, elected by the local nobility for each uyezd and gubernia. The Marshal of the Nobility was in

charge of all the affairs of the nobility, held an influential post in the administration and took the chair at the Zemstvo meetings. p. 248

[130] In the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, the tsar, terrified by the revolution, promised the people civil liberties and a constitution. p. 250

[131] *The Party of Peaceful Renovation*—a party of big commercial and industrial capitalists and big landowners; it was formed in 1906 and united the Left Octobrists and the Right Cadets. p. 250

[132] The *Information Bulletin* of the Technical Commission Abroad was published in Paris, two issues appearing (in August and October 1911). The conciliators made it their factional organ, in which they conducted an unscrupulous struggle against Bolshevism. p. 257

[133] This school was held in Capri, in 1909, and was the factional centre of the otzovists; it was organised by A. A. Bogdanov. See Note 15. p. 260

[134] *Ionov* (F. M. Koigen)—one of the Bund leaders. p. 261

[135] Lenin is referring to the resolution "On Liquidationism" adopted by the "Conference of Transcaucasian Social-Democratic Organisations", which was really a conference of Caucasian liquidators. The anti-Party nature of the "conference" was exposed in correspondence published in No. 24 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* of October 18 (31), 1911. p. 268

[136] *Rabochaya Zhizn* (*Workers' Life*)—a monthly newspaper, organ of the Menshevik *Golos* group and the conciliators. It was published in Paris from February 21 (March 6) to April 18 (May 1), 1911. Three issues appeared. p. 270

[137] *Hermann*—K. K. Danishevsky, *Arkady*—F. I. Kalinin. p. 273

[138] *Lyakhov, V. P.*—colonel in the tsarist army, was in command of the Russian troops that suppressed the revolutionary movement in Persia in 1908. p. 281

[139] *Monk Illiodor* (S. M. Trufanov, born 1889)—one of the leaders of the Black Hundreds. p. 282

[140] *Lassalleans*—supporters of the German petty-bourgeois socialist Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), members of the General Association of German Workers founded in 1863 at the Congress of Workers' Organisations, held in Leipzig, to counterbalance the bourgeois progressists who were endeavouring to gain influence over the working class. The first Chairman of the Association was Lassalle, who formulated its programme and tactics. The Asso-

ciation's political programme was the struggle for universal suffrage, and its economic programme, the struggle for the workers' production associations, subsidised by the state. In their practical activities, Lassalle and his followers adapted themselves to the hegemony of Prussia and supported the Great-Power policy of Bismarck. "Objectively", wrote Engels to Marx on January 27, 1865, "this was a base action and a betrayal of the whole working-class movement to the Prussians". Marx and Engels frequently and sharply criticised the theory, tactics, and organisational principles of the Lassalleans as an opportunist trend in the German working-class movement. p. 309

[141] This refers to the letters, quoted below by Lenin, of Marx to Sorge of June 20 and December 15, 1881. p. 310

[142] The reference is to N. Rozhkov's article "The Present Situation in Russia and the Main Task of the Working-Class Movement at the Present Moment". Another article by Lenin, "From the Camp of the Stolypin 'Labour' Party", is also a criticism of Rozhkov (see pp. 354-59 of this volume). p. 313

[143] This refers to *The Social Movement in Russia*; see Note 57. p. 315

[144] *Chambre introuvable*—the name given by Louis XVIII to the French counter-revolutionary Chamber of Deputies, elected after the restoration of the Bourbons in August 1815. Its composition was so reactionary that Louis XVIII, fearing a new revolutionary outbreak, was forced to dissolve it. p. 320

[145] Lenin is referring to the preface to S. Y. Witte's "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo" written by P. B. Struve (signed: R. N. S.) which he criticised in "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80). p. 323

[146] *Mymretsov*—a character from G. I. Uspensky's *Budka* (*The Centry Box*) a coarse and boorish type of policeman from an out-of-the-way small town of tsarist Russia. p. 324

[147] This report was published by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau as a supplement to Circular No. 21. The article and material relating to the affair of the Social-Democratic deputies to the Second Duma were published in German, French, and English in the *Bulletin périodique du Bureau Socialiste International*, No. 8. After the publication of Lenin's report the campaign abroad for the release of the Social-Democratic deputies was intensified. In an editorial appearing in No. 8 of the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochaya Gazeta* it was stated that "following the call of the International Socialist Bureau, which sent all parties the report on this matter by Comrade Lenin, our Party representative on the I.S.B., the campaign was considerably intensified by Social-Democratic parties abroad. All Social-

Democratic deputies in Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Austria, etc., made public protests."

The heading to the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 325

[148] *L'Avenir* (*The Future*)—a liberal-bourgeois Russian newspaper which was published in Paris from October 22, 1911 to January 4, 1914 (N. S.) and edited by V. L. Burtsev (some items were published in French). Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries also contributed to its columns. p. 326

[149] Fifty-five members of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma were tried, and, two of them died shortly after, during imprisonment. It was for this reason that 53 deputies were referred to at the sitting of the Duma held on October 17 (30), 1911. p. 328

[150] The question put by the Social-Democratic group was discussed on November 15 (28), 1911 and it was again discussed on three occasions behind closed doors; the question was then handed over to a commission by which it was rejected. p. 331

[151] This quotation is from the resolution of the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908 "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party". p. 333

[152] A. A. Voiloshnikov, member of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, spoke on December 2 (15), 1911 at the 35th sitting of the Duma during the discussion of the Bill on Amendments to the Regulations on Military Service. He described the tsarist army as a police army, and urged the arming of the people in place of the standing army. The Chairman of the Duma thereupon recommended that he be barred from five Duma sittings. After a second statement by A. A. Voiloshnikov at the same sitting, the number of exclusions from sittings was raised to 15. The Cadets voted for the first proposal of the Chairman. p. 342

[153] *Russian Organising Commission* (R.O.C.) for the convening of a Party conference was formed at the end of September 1911 at a meeting of representatives of local Party organisations. The meeting opened in Baku and was guided by G. K. Orjonikidze who had been delegated to call the conference by the Organising Commission Abroad. Representatives of the Baku, Tiflis, Ekaterinburg, Kiev, and Ekaterinoslav organisations took part. Among the delegates were S. G. Shahumyan and S. S. Spandaryan. In view of police persecution and the danger of those participating in the meeting being arrested it was transferred to Tiflis. The Meeting discussed reports from local organisations, the constitution of the R.O.C., relations with the Organising Commission Abroad, elections to the conference, representation from legal organisations, and elections from the non-Russian organisations. A report

of the meeting of the Russian Organising Commission was published by G. K. Orjonikidze in No. 25 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, December 8 (21), 1911. The meeting drew up an appeal to the local organisations, and issued it in leaflet form together with the resolutions of the meeting. p. 343

[154] Lenin is referring to the Bolshevik organs, the newspaper *Zvezda* and the magazine *Mysl*, to which pro-Party Mensheviks also contributed. p. 345

[155] For more information see Lenin's article "The Results of the Arbitration of the 'Trustees'" (see pp. 365-67 of this volume). p. 347

[156] *Mark*—pseudonym of A. I. Lyubimov. p. 347

[157] *Otkliki Bunda* (*Echoes of the Bund*)—an organ of the Bund committee abroad which appeared at irregular intervals in Geneva from March 1909 to February 1911. There were five issues. p. 348

[158] *The Baku Social-Democratic Party* organisation was one of the most active local bodies during the period of reaction and the years of the new revolutionary upsurge. At the beginning of 1911 the Baku Bolshevik Committee and the "leading Menshevik group members" (pro-Party Mensheviks) united for struggle against otzovism and liquidationism, and for the revival of the illegal R.S.D.L.P.; they formed the United Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The Baku Committee supported the decision of the 1911 June Meeting of members of the Central Committee to convene an all-Russia Party conference and actively participated in setting up the Russian Organising Commission.

The Kiev Social-Democratic Party organisation worked almost uninterruptedly during the years of reaction. In 1910-11, the Bolsheviks worked with the pro-Party Mensheviks. The Kiev organisation was the first to support the June Meeting of the Central Committee members and the idea of forming the Russian Organising Commission to convene a Party conference, appointing one of its Committee members to assist the representative of the Organising Commission Abroad. p. 348

[159] This refers to the leaflet issued by the Russian Organising Commission in the autumn of 1911. p. 349

[160] Lenin is referring to G. K. Orjonikidze's letter to the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published in No. 25 of December 8 (21), 1911, under the signature of N. p. 350

[161] *The city of Z* refers to Brussels, where the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region had its committee abroad. p. 351

[162] This refers to the otzovist Stanislav Volsky (the pseudonym of A. V. Sokolov). p. 351

[163] *The petition campaign* refers to a fuss created by the liquidators and Trotsky for agitational purposes around a petition drawn up by the St. Petersburg liquidators in December 1910. The petition, which demanded freedom to organise unions, to hold meetings, and to strike, was to be sent to the Third Duma in the name of the workers. However, the petition campaign was not a success among the workers, only 1,300 signatures having been collected. The Bolsheviks exposed the "liquidationist" character of the petition campaign, and the Resolution of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. "The 'Petition Campaign'" defined the attitude of the Bolsheviks (see pp. 479-80 of this volume). p. 360

[164] Lenin is referring to the resolution put forward by the St. Petersburg otzovists at the extended meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee prior to the December All-Party Conference, 1908 (the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.). The resolution was published in the supplement to No. 44 of *Proletary*, on April 4 (17), 1909. A critical analysis of this document made by Lenin appears in the same supplement, in an article entitled "A Caricature of Bolshevism" (see present edition, Vol. 15). p. 363

[165] *M. Alexandrov*—the Bolshevik M. S. Olminsky. Here and elsewhere, Lenin is referring to his pamphlet *The State, Bureaucracy and Absolutism in the History of Russia*. St. Petersburg, 1910. p. 363

[166] The signatures of Lenin and others follow. p. 366

[167] *The Gololobov group*—supporters of Y. G. Gololobov, one of the extreme Right-wing members of the Union of October Seventeenth (Octobrists) in the Third Duma. p. 369

[168] *The Meeting of the Bolshevik Groups Abroad* took place in Paris on December 14-17 (27-30), 1911. It was called on the initiative of the Paris Group supporting the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochaya Gazeta*. The aim of the Meeting was to unify the Bolshevik organisations abroad and support the convening of an all-Russia Party conference. Eleven delegates with full voting rights participated from Bolshevik groups in Paris, Nancy, Zurich, Davos, Geneva, Liége, Berne, Bremen, and Berlin. Lenin reported on the state of affairs in the Party, and the draft resolution on this question, drawn up by Lenin, served as a basis for the general resolution, adopted by the Meeting. The "Notification" and resolution of the Meeting were published by the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad in a leaflet on January 12, 1912 (N. S.).

The heading to the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 393

[169] The resolution was adopted on December 17 (30), 1911, at the last session of the Meeting of the Bolshevik groups abroad. The resolution was published in the "Notification" of the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad, with the following explanation: "A special resolution of the Meeting drew the attention of all Party comrades to the need to give energetic support to the Russian Organising Commission and the conference which it is convening".

The heading to the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 396

[170] This refers to the agrarian bill of the independent and Right peasant deputies, introduced into the Third Duma on May 10 (23), 1908. The bill envisaged the compulsory alienation with compensation at average market prices of the landed estates not being exploited by their owners. It was proposed to implement the land reform through local land committees elected by a general vote. For Lenin's appraisal of this bill see his articles "The New Agrarian Policy" and "The Agrarian Debates in the Third Duma" in Vol. 13 and Vol. 15 of the present edition respectively. p. 418

[171] *Eisenachers*—members of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, founded in 1869 at the Eisenach Congress. The leaders of the Eisenachers were August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, who were under the ideological influence of Marx and Engels. The Eisenach programme stated that the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany considered itself "a section of the International Working Men's Association and shared its aspirations". Thanks to the regular advice and criticism of Marx and Engels, the Eisenachers pursued a more consistent revolutionary policy than did Lassalle's General Association of German Workers; in particular, on the question of German unification, they followed "the democratic and proletarian path and struggled against any concessions to Prussianism, Bismarckism or nationalism" (see present edition, Vol. 19, "August Bebel"). p. 419

[172] Lenin is quoting from a letter written by Marx to Lassalle on April 19, 1859. When Lenin wrote this article, Marx's letter had not yet been published, and he availed himself of extracts from it which Lassalle had quoted in his reply to Marx and Engels dated May 27, 1859 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 138-40). p. 419

[173] *Obskaya Zhizn* (*Ob Life*)—daily newspaper of a liberal-bourgeois trend, published in Novonikolayevsk (Novosibirsk) from 1909 to 1912. p. 421

[174] The questions were discussed at the sessions of the Third Duma held on October 15 and 17 (28 and 30), 1911. p. 433

[175] *Urgent question*. In Russia's Duma procedure questions were not usually put directly to a minister or submitted for debate without having first been examined by a commission. The Duma itself, however, could decide that a question was "urgent" and should be the subject of an immediate debate. As the reader can see from this article, the debate on whether a question was sufficiently urgent for a debate could obstruct any real discussion of it and ensure its relegation to a commission. From this it follows that no question raised by a small minority in the Duma could ever be voted "urgent" and discussion on it permitted. p. 434

[176] *Men with numbers to their names*—ordinal numbers were added when several members of the Duma had the same name (e.g., Markov the First, Markov the Second). p. 441

[177] *Jellinek, Georg*—a German bourgeois lawyer. p. 443

[178] *The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* worked from January 5 to January 17 (18-30), 1912 in Prague, and actually assumed the character of a Party congress. More than 20 Party organisations were represented at the Conference, as well as representatives of the editorial boards of the Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat* and of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, of the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad, and the group of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. arranging underground transport and travel facilities and known as "the transport group". Apart from two pro-Party Mensheviks, the delegates were all Bolsheviks. Among the delegates were G. K. Orjonikidze, representing the Tiflis organisation, S. S. Spandaryan from Baku, Y. P. Onufriyev from St. Petersburg, F. I. Goloshchokin from Moscow. The Committee of the Organisation Abroad was represented by N. A. Semashko, and the transport group of the C.C. by I. A. Pyatnitsky.

V. I. Lenin represented the Editorial Board of the Central Organ.

Lenin was the leading figure at the Conference. Opening the Conference, he defined the terms of reference, spoke on the current situation and the tasks of the Party, the work of the International Socialist Bureau, made some informative reports and took part in the discussions on the work of the Central Organ, on the tasks of Social-Democracy in the struggle against the famine, on the organisational question, on the work of the Party Organisation Abroad, and on a number of other questions. It was Lenin who drafted the resolutions on the major questions on the conference agenda.

Lenin's speech and the conference resolution on "The Tasks of the Party in the Present Situation" contained a profound analysis of the political situation within the country, reflected the growing revolutionary mood of the people. The Conference emphasised that, as before, the conquest of power by the proletariat, acting as the leader of the peasantry, still remained the chief task of the democratic revolution in Russia.

One of the cardinal problems confronting the Conference was that of ridding the Party of the opportunists. The resolutions adopted on "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators", on "The Party Organisation Abroad" were of tremendous theoretical and practical significance. The liquidators were grouped around two legal magazines, *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*. The Conference declared "that by its conduct the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* group had definitely placed itself outside the Party". The liquidators were expelled from the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference condemned the activities of the anti-Party groups abroad—the Menshevik *Golos* group, the *Vperyod* and Trotsky groups, and recognised the absolute necessity for a single Party organisation abroad, conducting its work under the supervision and guidance of the C.C., and pointed out that Party groups abroad "which refuse to submit to the Russian centre of Social-Democratic activity, i.e., to the Central Committee, and which cause disorganisation by communicating with Russia independently and ignoring the Central Committee, have no right to use the name of the R.S.D.L.P." These resolutions considerably strengthened the unity of the Marxist party in Russia.

A major part of the Conference deliberations was taken up with the question of participation in the election campaign to the Fourth Duma. The Conference stressed that the main Party task in the elections, and of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma itself, was socialist class propaganda and the organisation of the working class. The main election slogans put forward by the Conference were the basic demands of the Party's minimum programme: a democratic republic, the eight-hour day, confiscation of all landed estates.

The Conference adopted a resolution on "The Character and Organisational Forms of Party Work", adopted Lenin's draft on changes in the organisational Rules of the Party, approved the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* as the Party Central Organ, elected a Party Central Committee and set up the Bureau of the C.C. in Russia.

The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. played an outstanding role in building the Bolshevik Party, a party of a new type. It summed up a whole historical period of struggle by the Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks, and consolidated the victory of the Bolsheviks. The Menshevik-liquidators were driven out of the Party. Local Party organisations rallied still closer round the Party on the basis of conference decisions. The Conference strengthened the Party as an all-Russia organisation and defined its political line and tactics in the conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge. Free of opportunists, the Bolshevik Party led the new powerful upsurge of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. The Prague Conference was of great international significance. It showed the revolutionary elements of the parties of the Second International how to conduct a decisive struggle against opportunism by carrying the struggle to a complete organisational break with the opportunists. p. 451

[179] The heading to the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 453

[180] The heading to the document has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 458

[181] This refers to the Vienna *Pravda*—Trotsky's factional Menshevik-liquidator paper. p. 482

[182] *The Committee of the Organisation Abroad* was set up in December 1911 at a meeting of the Bolshevik groups abroad. The tasks of this Committee were dealt with in the general resolution adopted by this meeting. p. 484

[183] The January 1912 German elections to the Reichstag resulted in a great victory for the Social-Democrats, 110 of their candidates being elected, receiving a total of 4,500,000 votes.

Vorwärts published the message of greetings sent by the R.S.D.L.P. in its issue No. 22 of January 27, 1912. p. 486

[184] *Zhivoye Dyelo* (*Vital Cause*)—the weekly legal newspaper of the Menshevik-liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from January 20 (February 2) to April 28 (May 11), 1912. Sixteen issues appeared. p. 487

[185] The five big cities where, according to the electoral law, there were direct elections with second ballots were St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Kiev and Odessa. p. 490

[186] *Golos Zemli* (*Voice of the Land*)—a liberal-bourgeois newspaper, published in St. Petersburg in 1912.

Russkoye Slovo (*Russian Word*)—a daily liberal-bourgeois newspaper, published in Moscow from 1895 until it was banned in 1917.

Kievskaya Mysl (*Kiev Thought*)—a daily liberal-bourgeois newspaper, published in Kiev from 1906 to 1918. Menshevik-liquidators were among its most active contributors. p. 491

[187] Characters from the works by M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin.

Tverdoonto—a retired administrator travelling abroad, from the series of essays *Abroad*.

Ugryum-Burcheyev—a satirical portrait of a mayor, drawn by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his *History of a Town*, who came to be recognised as a typical example of reactionary, stupid and narrow-minded officials. p. 502

[188] *The International Socialist Bureau* (I.S.B.)—the permanent Executive-Information Bureau of the Second International. The decision to set up this Bureau representing the various socialist par-

ties existing at the time was taken at the Paris Congress of the International (September, 1900). The Russian representatives elected to the Bureau were G. V. Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky; V. I. Lenin became a member of the Bureau in 1905, as the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1912 the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Party Conference re-elected Lenin as the Party representative to the Bureau.

Lenin's official report to the Bureau regarding the Conference that took place was distributed in Circular No. 4 of the I.S.B. to all the socialist parties on March 18, 1912 by its Secretary, K. Huysmans, with a request that it be published in their respective organs. It appeared in the central organ of the Belgian Labour Party *Le Peuple* of March 23, 1912, and in the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party *Vorwärts*, No. 72 of March 26, 1912 (Supplement No. 1). *Vorwärts* accompanied this notification with a scurrilous commentary by Trotsky (see Lenin's article "The Anonymous Writer in *Vorwärts* and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P." in this volume, pp. 533-46). p. 503

189 Lenin wrote "*The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P.*" in Paris, early in March 1912, shortly after the Prague Conference. "The Election Platform" was published in Russia by the Central Committee of the Party as a separate leaflet and distributed in 18 localities including the main working-class centres. Reprinted from the leaflet, it appeared as a supplement to No. 26 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. It was also reprinted by many local Bolshevik organisations and by the Russian Bureau of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in Tiflis. The significance of this document is dealt with by V. I. Lenin in his article "The Platform of the Reformists and the Platform of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats". p. 506

190 *Khodynka Tsar*—at Khodynka Field on the outskirts of Moscow, a carnival was arranged on the occasion of the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II on May 18, 1896. Criminal negligence on the part of the authorities led to a tremendous crush in which about 2,000 people lost their lives and tens of thousands were injured. p. 506

191 *The law of March 4, 1906*—temporary regulations providing for a certain freedom of associations, unions and meetings, but which at the same time laid down a number of obstacles, and in fact reduced the law to a scrap of paper. It gave the Minister of the Interior the right not only to suppress associations and unions, but also to refuse official recognition to new unions. p. 508

192 This document is a postscript to the authorised copy of the leaflet "The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P." As the manuscript had no heading it has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 513

193 "*Put Your Cards on the Table*" was written in Paris in March 1912 for publication in the Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda*, but was not

printed at the time. It was sent to the Editorial Board with a covering letter intended as a postscript. p. 514

[194] *The language of the Duchy of Monaco*—the language of gambling. p. 514

[195] This refers to the book *The State Duma, Third Convocation. Handbook*, 1910. p. 520

[196] The pamphlet *Voter's Handbook* (*Our Election Law*) was published in St. Petersburg in 1912.

Lenin attached great importance to the publication of the *Voter's Handbook* and compiled and edited the material for this book. In a letter to the Editorial Board of *Zvezda* dated April 9 (22), 1912, he recommended that the 2nd and 3rd chapters of his article "The Campaign for the Elections to the Fourth Duma" be included (see pp. 372-84 of this volume). He urged that they issue a "serious work" which "would be of value as an effective guide to the elections". However, the *Zvezda* editors were able to issue only the first part of the book which dealt with the electoral law and the regulations concerning the elections to the Duma. p. 520

[197] In February 1912, the Menshevik-liquidator T. O. Belousov, deputy to the Third Duma from Irkutsk Gubernia, notified the Social-Democratic group of his withdrawal from the group. The group unanimously demanded that Belousov immediately resign his seat, and published this demand in *Zvezda*, No. 12, February 23, 1912. Two days later, Belousov published a letter in *Rech*, which also appeared in *Zhivoye Dyelo*, in which he criticised the statement of the group and tried to justify his withdrawal from it. The Irkutsk Stock-Exchange Committee at its meeting of February 29 (March 13) discussed the question of Belousov's resignation from the Duma, and these representatives of commerce and industry asked him to continue as a member of the Duma. Belousov expressed his thanks to the Committee "for their support and faith in him". When he wrote his article Lenin was unaware of Belousov's correspondence with the Irkutsk Stock-Exchange Committee, but on its publication *Zvezda* informed its readers of the contents of this correspondence.

Following the appearance of Lenin's article in *Zvezda* Belousov sent a new statement to the group full of abuse of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. p. 521

[198] The pamphlet is a reply to an anonymous, scurrilous article by Trotsky in *Vorwärts* against the Prague Conference and its decisions. p. 533

[199] This refers to the anti-Party, slanderous resolution adopted on March 12 (N. S.), 1912 in Paris at the meeting of the representatives of the Bund Committee Abroad, the *Vperyod* group, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda*, and of the pro-

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE

Party Mensheviks and conciliators. This resolution was adopted in opposition to the All-Russia (Prague) Party Conference an its decisions. It was published as a separate leaflet in the Vienna *Pravda*, and in *Informatsionny Listok* No. 4 of the Bund. Lenin, as the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. on the International Socialist Bureau wrote an official statement on this and then a letter to Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau (see pp. 547-50 of this volume). p. 535

[200] This refers to the resolution of the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (All-Russia Conference of 1908) "On the Amalgamation of Local National Organisations". p. 539

[201] *Prosveshcheniye* (*Enlightenment*)—a monthly theoretical, legal, Bolshevik magazine, published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. It was founded on Lenin's initiative to replace the Moscow Bolshevik magazine *Mysl*, suppressed by the tsarist government. The circulation of the new magazine reached 5,000 copies. V. V. Vorovsky, A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, N. K. Krupskaya, M. S. Olminsky, M. A. Savelyev contributed to its columns. In response to Lenin's request, Maxim Gorky assumed the responsibility for the literary section of the magazine. While in Paris, and later in Cracow and Poronin, Lenin took an active part in the work of the magazine, edited articles published in it and regularly corresponded with the members of the Editorial Board. Among his articles published in the magazine, are the following: "Fundamental Problems of the Election Campaign", "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "Critical Remarks on the National Question", "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "Disruption of Unity Concealed by Shouts for Unity", "The Methods of Struggle of the Bourgeois Intellectuals Against the Workers", and others.

The magazine exposed the opportunist-liquidators, otzovists, Trotskyites, and also bourgeois Nationalists, and threw light on the struggle of the working class in the conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge; popularised the Bolshevik slogans in the election campaign to the Fourth Duma, it attacked revisionism and centrism in the parties of the Second International and gave news of the international working-class movement. The magazine played an outstanding role in the international Marxist education of the advanced workers in Russia.

On the eve of the First World War the magazine was suppressed by the tsarist government. Its publication was renewed in the autumn of 1917, but only one double number appeared; it carried Lenin's articles "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and "A Review of the Party Programme". p. 544

[202] Lenin's letter was sent to all socialist parties on April 12 (N. S.), 1912 by the International Socialist Bureau with a request that it be published in their press. p. 547

[203] This refers to the expression "His Majesty's Opposition" used by P. Milyukov, the leader of the Cadet Party. In a speech delivered at a Lord Mayor's luncheon in London on June 19 (July 2), 1909, he stated: "As long as there is a legislative chamber that controls the budget in Russia, the Russian opposition will remain His Majesty's Opposition, and not an Opposition to His Majesty". (*Rech*, No. 167, June 21 [July 4], 1909.) p. 551

[204] *F. L—ko*, *W. Frey*—Lenin's pseudonyms. p. 557

[205] The law of December 11 (24), 1905, convening the "legislative" State Duma was published by the tsarist government during the height of the Moscow armed uprising. The law ensured a tremendous majority of landlords and capitalists in the Duma. The First Duma, elected on the basis of the law of December 11, 1905, was a Cadet Duma. p. 570

[206] *Zaprosy Zhizni* (*Demands of Life*)—a weekly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1912. Among its contributors were Cadets, Popular Socialists, and Menshevik-liquidators. p. 574

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*December 1910-April 1912*)

1910

Prior to December 15 (28)	While in Paris, Lenin writes a letter to the Russian Collegium of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., on the state of affairs in the Party.
December 23 (January 5, 1911)	Lenin's article "Certain Features of the Historical Development of Marxism" is published in *Zvezda* No. 2.

1911

After January 2 (15)	Lenin writes the note "Judas Trotsky's Blush of Shame".
January 5 (18)	Lenin delivers a lecture on Lev Tolstoi in Paris.
January 13 (26)	Lenin's article "The Career of a Russian Terrorist" appears in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 19-20.
January 22 (February 4)	Lenin's article "Lev Tolstoi and His Epoch" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 6.
After January 22 (February 4)	Lenin writes the article "Marxism and *Nasha Zarya*", which is published on April 22 (May 5) in No. 3 of *Sovremennaya Zhizn* (Baku).
January	Lenin's article "Those Who Would Liquidate Us (Re: Mr. Potresov and V. Bazarov)" is published in *Mysl*, No. 2.
February 8 (21)	*Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 3, publishes Lenin's articles "The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Fall of Serfdom" and "Paul Singer".
Between February 17 and 26 (March 2 and 11)	Lenin writes the article "Comments (Menshikov, Gromoboi, Izgoyev)". This article appears in *Zvezda*, No. 11, February 26 (March 11).
February 22 or 23 (March 7 or 8)	In his letter to N. G. Poletayev, Lenin exposes the blackmailing tactics of the liquidators and demands decisive and consistent struggle against them.

February	Lenin writes a letter "To the Russian Collegium of the C.C.", on the splitting activities of the *Golos* and *Vperyod* groups and Trotsky.
	Mysl, No. 3, publishes Lenin's article "Apropos of an Anniversary" and the conclusion of the article "Those Who Would Liquidate Us".
March 19 (April 1)	Lenin's article "Wreckers of the Party in the Role of 'Wreckers of Legends'" is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 21-22.
Between March 23 and April 2 (April 5 and 15)	Lenin writes the article "The Cadets and the Octobrists", published in *Zvezda*, No. 16, on April 2 (15).
Between April 8 and 16 (21 and 29)	Lenin writes the article "Conference of the British Social-Democratic Party", published in *Zvezda*, No. 18, on April 16 (29), 1911.
April 15 (28)	Lenin's article "In Memory of the Commune" is published in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 4-5.
Between April 28 and May 7 (May 11 and 20)	Lenin writes the article "'Regret' and 'Shame'", published in *Zvezda*, No. 21, on May 7 (20).
April 29 (May 12)	Lenin delivers a speech at a May Day meeting in Paris.
	Lenin's article "A Conversation Between a Legalist and an Opponent of Liquidationism" is published in No. 3 of *Diskussionny Listok*, supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the C.C.
May 14 (27)	In his letter to Maxim Gorky, Lenin explains his negative attitude to the unification of the Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks, and Social-Democratic Duma group around some press organ in view of the Mensheviks' predominance in the Duma group; criticises the *Zvezda* editorial board for lack of a firm political line; informs him of rumours about Stolypin's circular letter on suppressing all Social-Democratic press organs, and writes about the necessity to intensify underground activities.
	Lenin signs a letter to the members of C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. living abroad, with an invitation to participate in a meeting of the C.C. members.
Between May 19 and 23 (between June 1 and 5)	Lenin writes a letter to the Meeting of the members of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad in which he exposes the intrigues of the liquidators, who sabo-

	taged the convening of a plenary meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.
	Lenin writes a summary (Plan) for the report of three Bolshevik members of the C.C. to a private meeting of nine members of the C.C.
May 28 (June 10)	Lenin's article "The Results of the Duma Session. 'We Did This Together'" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 24.
May 28-June 4 (June 10-17)	Lenin guides the work of the Meeting of members of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., called on his initiative in Paris with the object of working out measures to accelerate the convening of a plenary meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., and an all-Party conference.
June 11 (24)	Lenin's article "Old Truths That Are Ever New" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 25.
June 18 (July 1)	Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Second Paris Group supporting the R.S.D.L.P., and introduces the draft resolution on the state of affairs in the Party. This resolution is adopted by the Group and in July 1911 is published as a separate leaflet.
July 20 (August 2)	Lenin writes the introduction to the pamphlet *Two Parties*.
July	Lenin has a talk with M. A. Savelyev on the publication of the legal Bolshevik magazine *Prosveshcheniye*, and arranges for his participation in editing the magazine.
Spring and summer prior to August 17 (30)	Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya live in Longjumeau (near Paris).
	Lenin arranges the organisation of a Party school there.
	He gives a course of lectures at this school on political economy (29 lectures), the agrarian question (12 lectures) and on the theory and practice of socialism in Russia (12 lectures).
	At the request of the students of the school Lenin reads 3 lectures on the materialist conception of history and a paper on the current situation and the state of Party affairs.
September 1 (14)	*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 23, publishes Lenin's article "Comment by *Sotsial-Democrat* Editors on

	Statement by Commission Convening Plenary Meeting of C.C.",
September 2 (15)	In a letter to Maxim Gorky, Lenin invites him to continue contributing to *Zvezda*.
September 9 or 10 (22 or 23)	Lenin goes to Switzerland to take part in a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Zurich.
September 10-11 (23-24)	Lenin participates in a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau held in Zurich, and defends Rosa Luxemburg's opposition to the opportunism of the German Social-Democrats.
September 12 (25)	Lenin delivers a report on the state of affairs in the Party to a meeting of the local group of the R.S.D.L.P. in Zurich.
September 13 (26)	Lenin reads a paper on "Stolypin and the Revolution" in Zurich.
September 15 (28)	Lenin reads a paper on "Stolypin and the Revolution" in Berne.
September 19 (October 2)	Lenin reads a paper on "Stolypin and the Revolution" in Geneva.
October 18 (31)	*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 24, publishes Lenin's articles "Stolypin and the Revolution", "The New Faction of Conciliators, or the Virtuous", "The Election Campaign and the Election Platform", and "From the Camp of the Stolypin 'Labour' Party". Lenin reads a paper on "Stolypin and the Revolution" in Paris.
October 19 (November 1)	Lenin sends an enquiry to the representative of the Czech Social-Democratic Party on the International Socialist Bureau on the possibility of convening a conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Prague, and asks for assistance in its organisation.
October 23 (November 5)	Lenin's article "The Grand Total" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 26.
November 5 (18)	Lenin's articles "Two Centres" and "Old and New (Notes of a Newspaper Reader)" are published in *Zvezda*, No. 28.
November 14 (27)	Lenin reads a paper on "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto" in Paris.
November 20 (December 3)	Lenin delivers a speech in the name of the R.S.D.L.P. at the funeral of Paul and Laura Lafargue. It is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 25, on December 8 (21).

November 26 (December 9)	Lenin's article "Hyndman on Marx" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 31.
End of November-beginning of December	Lenin writes the article (report) "The Social-Democratic Group in the Second Duma." The article is published in the periodical bulletin of the International Socialist Bureau, No. 8, in December 1911.
December 3 (16)	Lenin's article "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 32.
December 8 (21)	Lenin's articles "The Slogans and Organisation of Social-Democratic War Inside an Outside the Duma", "Agency of the Liberal Bourgeoisie", "The Climax of the Party Crisis", "From the Camp of the Stolypin 'Labour' Party", "Trotsky's Diplomacy and a Certain Party Platform" and "The Results of the Arbitration of the 'Trustees'" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 25.
December 10 (23)	Lenin's article "Old and New" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 33.
December 10 (23)-January 6 (19), 1912	Lenin's articles under the general title "The Campaign for the Elections to the Fourth Duma" are published in *Zvezda*, Nos. 33, 34, 36, for 1911 and No. 1, 1912.
Not later than December 14 (27)	Lenin prepares for a meeting of the Bolshevik groups abroad, works on the theses for a report on the state of affairs in the Party, drafts the resolution "Organisation of the Social-Democratic Party Forces Abroad and the Tasks of the Bolsheviks".
December 14-17 (27-30)	Lenin leads the Meeting of the Bolshevik groups abroad, in Paris.
December 1 (27)	Lenin opens the Meeting with a speech of welcome, and delivers the report on the state of affairs in the Party.
December 15 (28)	Lenin guides the discussion at the Meeting and delivers the concluding speech on his report.
December 16-17 (29-30)	Lenin participates in the discussion on the final text of the resolution. At Lenin's suggestion the Meeting elects the Committee of the Organisation Abroad, and empowers the Committee to draw up the Rules.

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	Lenin speaks in the discussion on support for the Russian Organising Commission and the holding of a Party conference. The Meeting adopts the resolution submitted by Lenin.
Prior to December 17 (30)	*Prosveshcheniye*, No. 1, appears with articles by Lenin: "Fundamental Problems of the Election Campaign" (beginning of the article), "First Exposure of Cadet Negotiations with the Cabinet", and "Three Questions".
December 22 (January 4, 1912)	Lenin's article "The Famine and the Black-Hundred Duma" is published in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 70.
End of the year	Lenin writes an outline for a report on the political situation.

1912

January 5-17 (18-30)	Lenin plays a leading role in the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.; speaks at the opening of the Conference and delivers the report on the tasks of the Party in the present situation; takes the chair at sessions, drafts resolutions on the constitution of the Conference, on the tasks of the Party in the present situation, on liquidationism and the group of liquidators, on the tasks of the Social-Democrats in the struggle against the famine, on the political campaign, and drafts changes in the organisational Rules of the Party.
January 5 (18)	Lenin speaks on the constitution of the Conference.
January 6, 7 and 10 (19, 20 and 23)	At five sessions of the Conference Lenin takes the minutes of the reports of the local organisations.
January 7 (20)	At the fifth session of the Conference Lenin delivers a speech on the work of the Central Organ and a report on the work of the International Socialist Bureau; replies to delegates' questions and speaks in the discussion on the resolution dealing with reports of the local organisations. At the sixth session of the Conference Lenin speaks twice in the discussion on his report on the work of the International Socialist Bureau.
January 8 (21)	At the eighth session of the Conference Lenin speaks in the discussion on the tasks of Social-Democracy in the struggle against the famine.

The draft resolution drawn up by Lenin on this question is adopted by the Conference.

Between January 9 and 13 (22 and 26)

Instructed by the Conference, Lenin draws up a message of Greeting to the German Social-Democrats in connection with their success at the elections to the German Reichstag. This message was published in *Vorwärts* on January 27, 1912.

January 10 (23)

At the eleventh session of the Conference, Lenin takes part in the discussion on the question of Party work abroad.

January 11 (24)

At the twelfth session of the Conference Lenin delivers a speech on organisational questions.

January 12 (25)

At the fifteenth session of the Conference Lenin's draft resolution on the tasks of the Party in the present situation is adopted.

Between January 12 and 17 (25 and 30)

The Prague Conference elects Lenin to the C.C., the Central Organ, and as representative to the International Socialist Bureau.

January 19 (February 1)

Lenin meets the Social-Democratic deputies to the State Duma in Leipzig and acquaints them with the decisions of the Prague Conference.

End of January

Lenin leaves Leipzig for Berlin to receive Party funds from the "trustees" in accordance with the decisions of the Prague Conference.

February

In a letter to Maxim Gorky, Lenin informs him of the All-Russia Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which has taken place, and asks him to write a May Day leaflet for publication in Russia.

February 19 (March 3)

Lenin's article "An Organ of a Liberal Labour Policy" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 11.

February 28 (March 12)

Lenin writes a letter to G. L. Shklovsky in Berne on the necessity of reading a paper in all Swiss towns on the results of the Prague Conference, informs him of its composition and proceedings, the steps taken in Russia to bring its decisions to the knowledge of the local organisations, the break with the liquidators, the intention of the Bund and the Lettish Social-Democrats to convene a conference with the participation of the liquidators and the stand of the Duma Social-Democratic group.

February	Lenin edits the pamphlet *The All-Russia Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, 1912*. The pamphlet was issued in February 1912 in Paris, published by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.
Not earlier than March 2 (15)	Lenin writes the article "Against Unity—With the Liquidators", published in *Prosveshcheniye*, No. 3-4, in February-March 1912.
March 3 (17)	Lenin's article "Political Parties in the Five Years of the Third Duma" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 14.
March 5 (18)	Lenin's Report to the International Socialist Bureau on the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. is distributed to the socialist parties by the Secretary of the I.S.B., in Circular No. 4 of March 18, for publication in their party press.
Beginning of March	Lenin writes "The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P." It is published as a separate leaflet in March 1912 in Russia and abroad in April as a supplement to No. 26 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
March 12-13 (25-26)	Lenin writes "Put Your Cards on the Table". Lenin in a letter to the Editorial Board of *Zvezda* asks them to send him books on the electoral law of June 3 (16), 1907 and other materials essential for compiling and editing the pamphlet *Voter's Handbook* (*Our Election Law*), enquires about the publication of a daily workers' paper, its size, etc.
March 13 (26)	Lenin's article "Deputy T. O. Belousov's Withdrawal from the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 17.
Between March 13 and 19 (between March 26 and April 1)	Lenin writes the pamphlet "The Anonymous Writer in *Vorwärts* and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P." It was published in 1912 in Paris by the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
March 15 (28)	Lenin in a letter to G. K. Orjonikidze and other members of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. Bureau in Russia in Tiflis points out the necessity for strengthening the ties of the local Party organisations with the centre abroad, and urges that organisations be visited and the news of the Prague Conference be brought to them as soon as possible.

March 17 (30)	*Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 8, publishes Lenin's articles "Famine" and "The Peasantry and the Elections to the Fourth Duma".
Between March 23 and 26 (between April 5 and 8)	Lenin writes the article "The Bloc of the Cadets with the Progressists and Its Significance". It is published in *Zvezda*, No. 23, March 29 (April 11).
Prior to March 30 (April 12)	Lenin writes a report and a letter to the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, Huysmans, in connection with the statement of the liquidationist and otzovist groups abroad against the decisions of the Prague Conference. Lenin's report is sent by the International Socialist Bureau on March 30 (April 12) to all socialist parties in Circular No. 7, to be published in their party press.
April 1 (14)	Lenin's article "A Poor Defence of a Liberal Labour Policy" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 24.
April 3 (16)	Lenin's article "The Second Ballot in Russia and the Tasks of the Working Class" is published in *Zvezda*, No. 25.
April 8 and 19 (April 21 and May 2)	Lenin's article "Liberalism and Democracy" is published in *Zvezda*, Nos. 27 and 32.
Prior to April 9 (22)	Lenin edits the *Voter's Handbook* (*Our Election Law*).
April	Lenin guides the organisation of the publication of the legal Bolshevik paper *Pravda*.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 17

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

18

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
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OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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PREFACE

Volume Eighteen contains works written by V. I. Lenin from April 1912 to March 1913, during the new revolutionary upswing in Russia.

The bulk of the volume is made up of writings in which Lenin analyses the socio-economic and political causes of the growth of a new revolution in Russia, elaborates the tactics to be followed by the Bolshevik Party in the conditions of the new revolutionary upswing, and exposes the counter-revolutionary nature of the liberal bourgeoisie and the treacherous part played by the Menshevik liquidators, Trotskyists and Vperyodists in the working-class movement. Among them are the articles "The Revolutionary Upswing" and "Political Parties in Russia", the pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.*, "The Liquidators Against the Party", "How P. B. Axelrod Exposes the Liquidators", etc.

A large number of writings—"The Fourth Duma Election Campaign and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats", "The Platform of the Reformists and the Platform of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats", "Results of the Elections", "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies", etc.—are devoted to the Fourth Duma election campaign, and to appraising the election results and the activity of the Duma Social-Democratic group.

In "The Essence of the 'Agrarian Problem in Russia'", "A Comparison of the Stolypin and the Narodnik Agrarian Programmes", "The Last Valve" and other articles, Lenin reveals the essence of Stolypin's agrarian policy and demonstrates why it was bound to fail.

The resolutions of the "February" meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries, published in this

volume, give directives on all the major questions of Social-Democratic work in Russia.

The volume contains fifteen writings that are included in Lenin's *Collected Works* for the first time. They are concerned with the struggle against the liquidators and with the elaboration of tactical problems of the Bolshevik Party.

The document "Concerning the Workers' Deputies to the Duma and Their Declaration" is a draft declaration for the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma.

In "The Illegal Party and Legal Work", "A Reply to the Liquidators", "Original Postscript to the Pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.*", "Can the Slogan 'Freedom of Association' Serve as a Basis for the Working-Class Movement Today?", "Letter to the Swiss Workers", "On the Attitude to Liquidationism and on Unity. Theses", and "Original Postscript to the Article 'The Development of Revolutionary Strikes and Street Demonstrations'", Lenin criticises the views of the liquidators and of Trotsky, who fully supported the liquidators.

The articles "The Cadets and the Big Bourgeoisie" and "Constitutional Illusions Lost" expose the Duma tactics of the Cadets, the party of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie.

The articles "Revolts in the Army and Navy', "The Workers and *Pravda*", and "Before and Now" analyse the upswing of the revolutionary movement and the development of the legal Bolshevik press.

The "Notification" on the February meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries sums up the results of that meeting.

THE FOURTH DUMA ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The political strikes and the first demonstrations over the Lena shootings[1] show that the revolutionary movement among the masses of workers in Russia is growing. This thickening of the revolutionary atmosphere casts a vivid light on the tasks of the Party and its role in the election campaign.

The crisis is growing in a new situation. The reactionary Duma,[2] a which provides the landlords with power, the bourgeoisie with an arena for making deals, and the proletariat with a small platform, is a necessary factor in this situation. We need this platform, we need the election campaign, *for* our revolutionary work among the masses. We need the illegal Party to *direct* all this work as a whole—in the Taurida Palace, as well as in Kazanskaya Square,[3] at workers' mass meetings, during strikes, at district meetings of worker Social-Democrats, and at open trade union meetings. Only the hopelessly blind can fail even now to see the utter absurdity and perniciousness for the working class of otzovism and liquidationism,[4] those products of decay and disintegration during the period of the triumph of counter-revolution. The example of the Narodniks has shown us clearly the scandalous *zero* one gets as the result of adding the *liquidationism* of the "Trudoviks", as well as of the legally functioning writers of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[5] and *Sovremennik*,[6] to the *otzovism* of the Socialist-Revolutionary "party".

Let us now sum up the facts brought to light during the pre-election mobilisation of political forces. *Three* camps

stand out clearly: (1) The *Rights*—from Purishkevich to Guchkov—are pro-government. The Black-Hundred[7] landlord and the conservative merchant are heart and soul for the government. (2) The *liberal* bourgeois—the "Progressists" and the Cadets, along with groups of various non-Russians—are against the government *and against* the revolution. The counter-revolutionary nature of the liberals is one of the main features of the present historical juncture. Whoever does not see this counter-revolutionary nature of the "cultured" bourgeoisie has forgotten everything and learned nothing, and takes the name of democrat, to say nothing of socialist, in vain. As it happens, the Trudoviks and "our" liquidators see poorly and understand things poorly! (3) The democratic camp, in which only the revolutionary Social-Democrats, the anti-liquidationists, united and organised, have firmly and clearly unfurled *their own* banner, the banner of revolution. The Trudoviks and our liquidators are vacillating *between* the liberals and the democrats, between legal opposition and revolution.

The class roots which brought about the division between the first two camps are clear. But the liberals have succeeded in leading astray many people, from Vodovozov to Dan, as to the class roots which divided the second camp from the third. The liberal "strategy", naïvely blurted out by Blank in *Zaprosy Zhizni*,[8] is very simple: the Cadets are the centre of the opposition, the thill-horse; the outrunners (the "flanks") are the Progressists on the right, and the Trudoviks and the liquidators on the left. It is on this "troika" that the Milyukovs, in their role of "responsible opposition", hope to "ride" to triumph.

The hegemony of the liberals in the Russian emancipation movement has *always* meant, and will always mean, defeat for this movement. The liberals manoeuvre between the monarchy of the Purishkeviches and the revolution of the workers and peasants, betraying the latter at *every* serious juncture. The task of the revolution is to *use* the liberals' fight against the government and to *neutralise* their vacillations and treachery.

The policy of the liberals is to scare Purishkevich and Romanov a little with the prospect of revolution, in order to share power with them and jointly suppress the revolution.

And it is the class position of the bourgeoisie that determines this policy. Hence the Cadets' cheap "democracy" and their *actual* fusion with the most moderate "Progressists" of the type of Yefremov, Lvov, Ryabushinsky and Co.

The tactics of the proletarian Party should be to use the fight between the liberals and the Purishkeviches over the division of power—without *in any way* allowing "faith" in the liberals to take hold among the people—in order to develop, intensify and reinforce the revolutionary onslaught of the masses, which overthrows the monarchy and entirely wipes out the Purishkeviches and Romanovs. At the elections, its tactics should be to unite the democrats *against* the Rights *and against* the Cadets by "using" the liberals' fight against the Rights in cases of a second ballot, in the press and at meetings. Hence the necessity for a revolutionary platform that even now goes beyond the bounds of "legality". Hence the slogan of a republic—as against the liberals' "constitutional" slogans, slogans of a "Rasputin-Treshchenkov constitution".[9] Our task is to train an army of champions of the revolution everywhere, always, in all forms of work, in every field of activity, at every turn of events which may be forced on us by a victory of reaction, the treachery of the liberals, the protraction of the crisis, etc.

Look at the Trudoviks. They are Narodnik liquidators *sans phrases*. "We are revolutionaries," Mr. Vodovozov "hints", "*but*—we can't go against Article 129,[10]" he adds. A hundred years after Herzen's birth, the "party" of the peasant millions is unable to publish even a sheet—even a hectographed one!—in defiance of Article 129!! While gravitating towards a bloc "first of all" with the Social-Democrats, the Trudoviks are unable to say clearly that the Cadets are counter-revolutionary, to lay the foundations for a *republican* peasant party. Yet that is exactly how the question stands after the lessons of 1905-07 and 1908-11: either fight for a republic, or lick the boots of Purishkevich and grovel under the whips of Markov and Romanov. There is no other choice for the peasants.

Look at the liquidators. No matter how much the Martynovs, Martovs and Co. shift and shuffle, any conscientious and sensible reader will recognise that R—kov[11] summed up

their views when he said: "Let there be no illusion. What is in the making is the triumph of a very moderate bourgeois progressism." The *objective* meaning of this winged phrase is the following: revolution is an illusion, the real thing is to support the "Progressists". Surely anyone who does not deliberately close his eyes must see now that it is *precisely this* that the Dans and Martovs are saying, in slightly different words, when they issue the slogan: "Wrest the Duma [the Fourth Duma, a landlord-ridden Duma!]* from the hands of the reactionaries"? Or when they make, again and again, the slip of referring to two camps? Or when they shout, "Do not frustrate" the progressive work of the liberal bourgeois? Or when they fight against a "Left bloc"? Or when, writing in *Zhivoye Dyelo*,[12] they smugly snap their fingers at "the literature published abroad which nobody reads"? Or when they *actually* content themselves with a legal platform and legal attempts at organisation? Or when they form "initiating groups"[13] of liquidators, thus breaking with the revolutionary R.S.D.L.P.? Is it not clear that this is also the tune sung by the Levitskys, who are lending philosophical depth to the liberal ideas about the struggle for right, by the Nevedomskys, who have lately "revised" Dobrolyubov's[14] ideas backwards—*from* democracy *to* liberalism—and by the Smirnovs, who are making eyes at "progressism", and by all the other knights of *Nasha Zarya*[15] and *Zhivoye Dyelo*?

Actually the democrats and the Social-Democrats, even if they had wanted to, would never have been able to "frustrate" a victory of the "Progressists" among the landlords and bourgeois! All this is nothing but idle talk. This is not where the serious differences lie. Nor is this what constitutes the distinction between a *liberal* and a *Social-Democratic* labour policy. To "support" the Progressists on the ground that their "victories" "bring the cultured bourgeois nearer to power" is a liberal labour policy.

We Social-Democrats regard a "victory" of the Progressists as an *indirect* expression of a democratic upswing. It is necessary to use the skirmishes between the Progressists and

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed*.

the Rights—the mere slogan of support for the Progressists is no good. Our job is to promote the democratic upswing, to foster the new revolutionary democracy that is growing in a new way in the new Russia. Unless it succeeds in gathering strength and winning in spite of the liberals, *no* "triumph" of the Progressists and the Cadets in the elections will bring about any serious change in the actual situation in Russia.

The democratic upswing is an indisputable fact now. It is progressing with greater difficulty, at a slower pace and along a more arduous path than we should like, but it is progressing nonetheless. It is *this* that we must "support" and promote by our election work and every other kind of activity. Our task is to organise the revolutionary democrats—by ruthless criticism of Narodnik liquidationism and Narodnik otzovism to forge a republican peasant party—but first of all and above all else to clean "our own house" of liquidationism and otzovism, intensify our revolutionary Social-Democratic work among the proletariat and strengthen the illegal Social-Democratic Labour Party. The outcome of the growing revolutionary crisis does not depend on us; it depends on a thousand different causes, on the revolution in Asia and on socialism in Europe. But it does depend on us to conduct consistent and steady work among the masses in the spirit of Marxism, and only this kind of work is *never* done in vain.

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THE LIQUIDATORS AGAINST THE PARTY

The liquidators of all shades, writing in the legal Russia press, are conducting a campaign of slander against the Party Conference[16] with an easy shamelessness which might well be envied by the Bulgarins and Burenins.[17] The articles in *Zhivoye Dyelo*, which openly question the delegates as to *who* sent them and, under the protection of the censorship, attack what cannot be defended in the legal press, exemplify such disregard for the elementary rules of literary decency that they are bound not only to evoke protests from the adherents of the Conference, but also to disgust any fair-minded political leader. As for the articles of the anonymous informer of *Vorwärts*,[18] they reek of shameless braggadocio and florid lying so overpoweringly as not to permit of any doubt that the liquidators' order for them found itself in experienced hands.*

Driven into a corner, the groups and circles of liquidators do not confine themselves, however, to a campaign of slander against the Party. They are trying to convene a conference of their own. Every measure has been taken, of course, to lend the Organising Committee,[19] which is to convene this conference, the semblance of a "pro-Party", "non-factional", "unity" body. After all, these are such convenient words—when the liquidators want to hook all those who for some reason are dissatisfied with the Party Conference. Trotsky

* To acquaint the German comrades with the actual state of affairs in the R.S.D.L.P., the editorial board of the Central Organ published a special pamphlet in German, exposing, among other things, the methods of the anonymous writer in *Vorwärts*. (See present edition Vol. 17, pp. 533-46.—*Ed*.

was entrusted with singing all the virtues of the Organising Committee and of the forthcoming liquidationist conference; nor could they have assigned the job to anyone fitter than the "professional uniter". And he did sing them—in every variety of type his Vienna printer could find: "The supporters of *Vperyod* and *Golos*, pro-Party Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks,[20] so-called liquidators and non-factionalists—in Russia and abroad—are firmly supporting the work..." of the Organising Committee. (*Pravda*[21] No. 24.)

The poor fellow—again he told a lie, and again he miscalculated. The bloc under the hegemony of the liquidators, which was being prepared in opposition to the Conference of 1912 with so much fuss, is now bursting at the seams and the reason is that the liquidators have shown their hand too openly. The Poles refused to take part in the Organising Committee. Plekhanov, through correspondence with a representative of the Committee, established several interesting details, to wit: (1) that what is planned is a "constituent" conference, i.e., not a conference of the R.S.D.L.P., but of some new party; (2) that it is being convened on "anarchical" lines; (3) that the "conference is being convened by the liquidators". After these circumstances had been revealed by Comrade Plekhanov, there was nothing surprising to us in the fact that the so-called Bolshevik (?!) conciliators plucked up courage and resolved to convict Trotsky of—having told a lie by listing them among the supporters of the Organising Committee. "This Organising Committee, as it is now constituted, with its obvious tendency to impose upon the whole Party its own attitude to the liquidators, and with the principles of organisational anarchy which it has made the basis for increasing its membership, does not provide the least guarantee that a really general Party conference will be convened." That is how our emboldened "pro-Party" people comment on the Organising Committee today. We do not know where the most Leftist of our Left—the *Vperyod* group, who at one time hastened to signify its sympathy with the Organising Committee—stand today. Nor is this of any importance. The important thing is that the liquidationist character of the conference to be held by the Organising Committee has been established by Plekhanov with irrefutable clarity, and that the statesmanlike

minds of the "conciliators" had to bow to this fact. Who remains, then? The open liquidators and Trotsky.

The basis of this bloc is obvious: the liquidators enjoy full freedom to pursue their line in *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nasha Zarya* "as before", while Trotsky, operating abroad, screens them with r-r-revolutionary phrases, which cost him nothing and do not bind them in any way.

There is one little lesson to be drawn from this affair by those abroad who are sighing for unity, and who recently hatched the sheet *Za Partiyu*[22] in Paris. To build up a party, it is not enough to be able to shout "unity"; it is also necessary to have a *political* programme, a programme of political action. The bloc comprising the liquidators, Trotsky, the *Vperyod* group, the Poles, the pro-Party Bolsheviks (?), the Paris Mensheviks, and so on and so forth, was foredoomed to ignominious failure, because it was based on an unprincipled approach, on hypocrisy and hollow phrases. As for those who sigh, it would not be amiss if they finally made up their minds on that extremely complicated and difficult question: With whom do they want to have unity? If it is with the liquidators, why not say so without mincing? But if they are against unity with the liquidators, then what sort of unity are they sighing for?

The January Conference and the bodies it elected are the only thing that actually unites all the R.S.D.L.P. functionaries in Russia today. Apart from the Conference there is only the promise of the Bundists[23] and Trotsky to convene the liquidationist conference of the Organising Committee, and the "conciliators" who are experiencing their liquidationist hang-over.

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IN MEMORY OF HERZEN

One hundred years have elapsed since Herzen's birth. The whole of liberal Russia is paying homage to him, studiously evading, however, the serious questions of socialism, and taking pains to conceal that which distinguished Herzen the *revolutionary* from a liberal. The Right-wing press, too, is commemorating the Herzen centenary, falsely asserting that in his last years Herzen renounced revolution. And in the orations on Herzen that are made by the liberals and Narodniks abroad, phrase-mongering reigns supreme.

The working-class party should commemorate the Herzen centenary, not for the sake of philistine glorification, but for the purpose of making clear its own tasks and ascertaining the place actually held in history by this writer who played a great part in paving the way for the Russian revolution.

Herzen belonged to the generation of revolutionaries among the nobility and landlords of the first half of the last century. The nobility gave Russia the Birons and Arakcheyevs,[24] innumerable "drunken officers, bullies, gamblers, heroes of fairs, masters of hounds, roisterers, floggers, pimps", as well as amiable Manilovs.[25] "But," wrote Herzen, "among them developed the men of December 14,[26] a phalanx of heroes reared, like Romulus and Remus, on the milk of a wild beast.... They were veritable titans, hammered out of pure steel from head to foot, comrades-in-arms who deliberately went to certain death in order to awaken the young generation to a new life and to purify the children born in an environment of tyranny and servility."[27]

Herzen was one of those children. The uprising of the Decembrists awakened and "purified" him. In the feudal Russia of the forties of the nineteenth century, he rose to a

height which placed him on a level with the greatest thinkers of his time. He assimilated Hegel's dialectics. He realised that it was "the algebra of revolution". He went further than Hegel, following Feuerbach to materialism. The first of his *Letters on the Study of Nature*, "Empiricism and Idealism", written in 1844, reveals to us a thinker who even now stands head and shoulders above the multitude of modern empiricist natural scientists and the host of present-day idealist and semi-idealist philosophers. Herzen came right up to dialectical materialism, and halted—before historical materialism.

It was this "halt" that caused Herzen's spiritual shipwreck after the defeat of the revolution of 1848. Herzen had left Russia, and observed this revolution at close range. He was at that time a democrat, a revolutionary, a socialist. But his "socialism" was one of the countless forms and varieties of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois socialism of the period of 1848, which were dealt their death-blow in the June days of that year. In point of fact, it was not socialism at all, but so many sentimental phrases, benevolent visions, which were the expression *at that time* of the revolutionary character of the bourgeois democrats, as well as of the proletariat, which had not yet freed itself from the influence of those democrats.

Herzen's spiritual shipwreck, his deep scepticism and pessimism after 1848, was a shipwreck of the *bourgeois illusions* of socialism. Herzen's spiritual drama was a product and reflection of that epoch in world history when the revolutionary character of the bourgeois democrats was *already* passing away (in Europe), while the revolutionary character of the socialist proletariat had *not yet* matured. This is something the Russian knights of liberal verbiage, who are now covering up their counter-revolutionary nature by florid phrases about Herzen's scepticism, did not and could not understand. With these knights, who betrayed the Russian revolution of 1905, and have even forgotten to think of the great name of *revolutionary*, scepticism is a form of transition from democracy to liberalism, to that toadying, vile, foul and brutal liberalism which shot down the workers in 1848, restored the shattered thrones and applauded Napoleon III, and which Herzen *cursed*, unable to understand its class nature.

With Herzen, scepticism was a form of transition from the illusion of a bourgeois democracy that is "above classes" to the grim, inexorable and invincible class struggle of the proletariat. The proof: the *Letters to an Old Comrade*—to Bakunin—written by Herzen in 1869, a year before his death. In them Herzen breaks with the anarchist Bakunin. True, Herzen still sees this break as a mere disagreement on tactics and not as a gulf between the world outlook of the proletarian who is confident of the victory of his class and that of the petty bourgeois who has despaired of his salvation. True enough, in these letters as well, Herzen repeats the old bourgeois-democratic phrases to the effect that socialism must preach "a sermon addressed equally to workman and master, to farmer and townsman". Nevertheless, in breaking with Bakunin, Herzen turned his gaze, not to liberalism, but to the *International*—to the International led by Marx, to the International which had begun to "*rally the legions*" of the proletariat, to unite "*the world of labour*", which is "abandoning the world of those who enjoy without working".[28]

Failing as he did to understand the bourgeois-democratic character of the entire movement of 1848 and of all the forms of pre-Marxian socialism, Herzen was still less able to understand the bourgeois nature of the Russian revolution. Herzen is the founder of "Russian" socialism, of "Narodism". He saw "socialism" in the emancipation of the peasants *with land*, in community land tenure[29] and in the peasant idea of "the right to land". He set forth his pet ideas on this subject an untold number of times.

Actually, there is *not a grain* of socialism in this doctrine of Herzen's, as, indeed, in the whole of Russian Narodism, including the faded Narodism of the present-day Socialist-Revolutionaries. Like the various forms of "the socialism of 1848" in the West, this is the same sort of sentimental phrases, of benevolent visions, in which is expressed the *revolutionism* of the bourgeois peasant democracy in Russia. The more land the peasants would have received in 1861[30] and the less they would have had to pay for it, the more would the power of the feudal landlords have been

undermined and the more rapidly, freely and widely would capitalism have developed in Russia. The idea of the "right to land" and of "equalised division of the land" is nothing but a formulation of the revolutionary aspiration for equality cherished by the peasants who are fighting for the complete overthrow of the power of the landlords, for the complete abolition of landlordism.

This was fully proved by the revolution of 1905: on the one hand, the proletariat came out quite independently at the head of the revolutionary struggle, having founded the Social-Democratic Labour Party; on the other hand, the revolutionary peasants (the Trudoviks and the Peasant Union[31]), who fought for every form of the abolition of landlordism even to "the abolition of private landownership", fought precisely as proprietors, as small entrepreneurs.

Today, the controversy over the "socialist nature" of the right to land, and so on, serves only to *obscure* and cover up the really important and serious historical question concerning the difference of *interests* of the liberal bourgeoisie and the revolutionary peasantry in the Russian *bourgeois* revolution; in other words, the question of the liberal and the democratic, the "compromising" (monarchist) and the republican trends manifested in that revolution. This is exactly the question posed by Herzen's *Kolokol*,[32] if we turn our attention to the essence of the matter and not to the words, if we investigate the class struggle as the basis of "theories" and doctrines and not vice versa.

Herzen founded a free Russian press abroad, and that is the great service rendered by him. *Polyarnaya Zvezda*[33] took up the tradition of the Decembrists. *Kolokol* (1857-67) championed the emancipation of the peasants with might and main. The slavish silence was broken.

But Herzen came from a landlord, aristocratic milieu. He had left Russia in 1847; he had not seen the revolutionary people and could have no faith in it. Hence his liberal appeal to the "upper ranks". Hence his innumerable sugary letters in *Kolokol* addressed to Alexander II the Hangman, which today one cannot read without revulsion. Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Serno-Solovyevich, who represented the new generation of revolutionary raznochintsi,[34] were a thousand times right when they reproached Herzen for these

departures from democracy *to* liberalism. However, it must be said in fairness to Herzen that, much as he vacillated between democracy and liberalism, the democrat in him gained the upper hand nonetheless.

When Kavelin, one of the most repulsive exponents of liberal servility—who at one time was enthusiastic about *Kolokol* precisely because of its *liberal* tendencies—rose in arms against a constitution, attacked revolutionary agitation, rose against "violence" and appeals for it, and began to preach tolerance, Herzen *broke* with that liberal sage. Herzen turned upon Kavelin's "meagre, absurd, harmful pamphlet" written "for the private guidance of a government pretending to be liberal"; he denounced Kavelin's "sentimental political maxims" which represented "the Russian people as cattle and the government as an embodiment of intelligence". *Kolokol* printed an article entitled "Epitaph", which lashed out against "professors weaving the rotten cobweb of their superciliously paltry ideas, ex-professors, once open-hearted and subsequently embittered because they saw that the healthy youth could not sympathise with their scrofulous thinking". Kavelin at once recognised himself in this portrait.

When Chernyshevsky was arrested, the vile liberal Kavelin wrote: "I see nothing shocking in the arrests ... the revolutionary party considers all means fair to overthrow the government, and the latter defends itself by its own means." As if in retort to this Cadet, Herzen wrote concerning Chernyshevsky's trial: "And here are wretches, weed-like people, jellyfish, who say that we must not reprove the gang of robbers and scoundrels that is governing us."

When the liberal Turgenev[35] wrote a private letter to Alexander II assuring him of his loyalty, and donated two goldpieces for the soldiers wounded during the suppression of the Polish insurrection, *Kolokol* wrote of "the grey-haired Magdalen (of the masculine gender) who wrote to the tsar to tell him that she knew no sleep because she was tormented by the thought that the tsar was not aware of the repentance that had overcome her". And Turgenev at once recognised himself.

When the whole band of Russian liberals scurried away from Herzen for his defence of Poland, when the whole of

"educated society" turned its back on *Kolokol*, Herzen was not dismayed. He went on championing the freedom of Poland and lashing the suppressors, the butchers, the hangmen in the service of Alexander II. Herzen saved the honour of Russian democracy. "We have saved the honour of the Russian name," he wrote to Turgenev, "and for doing so we have suffered at the hands of the slavish majority."

When it was reported that a serf peasant had killed a landlord for an attempt to dishonour the serf's betrothed, Herzen commented in *Kolokol*: "Well done!" When it was reported that army officers would be appointed to supervise the "peaceable" progress of "emancipation", Herzen wrote: "The first wise colonel who with his unit joins the peasants instead of crushing them, will ascend the throne of the Romanovs." When Colonel Reitern shot himself in Warsaw (1860) because he did not want to be a helper of hangmen, Herzen wrote: "If there is to be any shooting, the ones to be shot should be the generals who give orders to fire upon unarmed people." When fifty peasants were massacred in Bezdna, and their leader, Anton Petrov, was executed (April 12, 1861), Herzen wrote in *Kolokol*:

> "If only my words could reach you, toiler and sufferer of the land of Russia!... How well I would teach you to despise your spiritual shepherds, placed over you by the St. Petersburg Synod and a German tsar.... You hate the landlord, you hate the official, you fear them, and rightly so; but you still believe in the tsar and the bishop ... do not believe them. The tsar is with them, and they are his men. It is him you now see—you, the father of a youth murdered in Bezdna, and you, the son of a father murdered in Penza.... Your shepherds are as ignorant as you, and as poor.... Such was another Anthony (not Bishop Anthony, but Anton of Bezdna) who suffered for you in Kazan.... The dead bodies of your martyrs will not perform forty-eight miracles, and praying to them will not cure a toothache; but their living memory may produce one miracle—your emancipation."

This shows how infamously and vilely Herzen is being slandered by our liberals entrenched in the slavish "legal" press, who magnify Herzen's weak points and say nothing about his strong points. It was not Herzen's fault but his misfortune that he could not see the revolutionary people in Russia itself in the 1840s. When *in the sixties* he came to see the revolutionary people, he sided fearlessly with the revolutionary democracy against liberalism. He fought for a

victory of the people over tsarism, not for a deal between the liberal bourgeoisie and the landlords' tsar. He raised aloft the banner of revolution.

In commemorating Herzen, we clearly see the three generations, the three classes, that were active in the Russian revolution. At first it was nobles and landlords, the Decembrists and Herzen. These revolutionaries formed but a narrow group. They were very far removed from the people. But their effort was not in vain. The Decembrists awakened Herzen. Herzen began the work of revolutionary agitation.

This work was taken up, extended, strengthened, and tempered by the revolutionary raznochintsi—from Chernyshevsky to the heroes of Narodnaya Volya.[36] The range of fighters widened; their contact with the people became closer. "The young helmsmen of the gathering storm" is what Herzen called them. But it was not yet the storm itself.

The storm is the movement of the masses themselves. The proletariat, the only class that is thoroughly revolutionary, rose at the head of the masses and for the first time aroused millions of peasants to open revolutionary struggle. The first onslaught in this storm took place in 1905. The next is beginning to develop under our very eyes.

In commemorating Herzen, the proletariat is learning from his example to appreciate the great importance of revolutionary theory. It is learning that selfless devotion to the revolution and revolutionary propaganda among the people are not wasted even if long decades divide the sowing from the harvest. It is learning to ascertain the role of the various classes in the Russian and in the international revolution. Enriched by these lessons, the proletariat will fight its way to a free alliance with the socialist workers of all lands, having crushed that loathsome monster, the tsarist monarchy, against which Herzen was the first to raise the great banner of struggle by addressing his *free Russian word* to the masses.

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LANDOWNERSHIP IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

The famine that has affected thirty million peasants has again revived the question of the condition of the peasantry in Russia. In discussing this question people usually overlook the main point, namely, the interrelation between the existence of large landed estates, primarily in the hands of the nobility, and the condition of the peasantry. It is to this main point that we wish to draw the attention of the reader.

In 1907, the Ministry of the Interior published a volume of *Statistics of Landownership in 1905*. From these official data, which can under no circumstances be suspected of partiality for the peasants, we can obtain a fairly accurate idea of one of the main causes of the famines.

The government statistics put the amount of land in the fifty gubernias of European Russia at 395 million dessiatines. But this figure does not represent the real state of affairs, since it includes more than 100 million dessiatines of state land in the far north, in the Archangel, Olonets and Vologda gubernias. Most of this land is unsuitable for farming, being the tundra and forests of the far north. Reference to this land is usually made for the sole purpose of *obscuring* the actual distribution of the cultivable land.

If we deduct this land, we obtain a total of 280 million dessiatines (in round figures) of usable land. Out of this total 101 million dessiatines are listed as privately owned, and 139 million dessiatines as allotment land. It is necessary to distinguish between the land in the possession of the big landlords and that owned by small peasants.

As regards the large estates, government statistics provide the following data:

Privately-Owned Land in European Russia

Size of estates	Number of estates	Total land (dessiatines)	Average per estate (dessiatines)
Over 500 to 2,000 dessiatines	21,748	20,590,708	947
Over 2,000 to 10,000 dessiatines	5,386	20,602,109	3,825
Over 10,000 dessiatines . . .	699	20,798,504	29,754
Total	27,833	61,991,321	2,227

These figures are incomplete, because they do not include the lands belonging to the crown, to big commercial companies, etc. Nevertheless, these figures give us an idea of the *main* feature of Russian landlordism. *Seven hundred* landlords own *21* million dessiatines, i.e., nearly *thirty thousand dessiatines each.*

Less than 28 thousand landlords own **62** million dessiatines of land, i.e., an average of *2,200 dessiatines per estate.* To this should be added the crown lands—their total is estimated to exceed *five* million dessiatines—and more than *three and a half* million dessiatines belonging to 272 "commercial, industrial, factory and other" companies. The latter are undoubtedly big estates, most of them in Perm Gubernia, where *nine* such companies own *nearly one and a half million* dessiatines of land (the exact figure is 1,448,902).

Consequently, the total land area in the hands of the biggest owners is certainly not less, and most likely more, than *70 million* dessiatines. The number of such big landlords is less than *30 thousand.*

Now take the land owned by the peasants. According to government statistics, the peasants with the smallest allotments had the following amounts of land:

Allotment Land

Size of allotments	Number of (dessiatines)	Total land households	Average per household (dessiatines)
Less than 5 dessiatines	2,857,650	9,030,333	3.1
5 to 8 dessiatines . .	3,317,601	21,706,550	6.5
8 to 15 " . .	3,932,485	42,182,923	10.7
Total	10,107,736	72,919,806	7.0

Consequently, *ten million* peasant families, out of a total of about 13 million, own *73 million dessiatines of land.* The average per household is *seven* dessiatines. To this should be added the small privately-owned estates. The number of owners of farms of less than 10 dessiatines each is placed at 409,864, and they own a total of 1,625,226 dessiatines of land, i.e., less than four dessiatines per household. Consequently, we have a total of *approximately ten and a half million* peasant families with *75 million* dessiatines of land.

Now we can place side by side these principal figures, which are very often forgotten or misrepresented in arguments about the peasant problem:

Large landed estates—*30 thousand* owners, 70 million dessiatines of land.

Small peasant farms—*ten and a half million* owners, 75 million dessiatines of land.

To be sure, these are the gross figures. For a more detailed study of the condition of the peasants and the role of the big estates, it is necessary to take the figures for the various regions or districts, sometimes even for the individual gubernias. But the economists of the government, the liberal and even, to a certain extent, the Narodnik camps very often *obscure the essence* of the land problem by referring to individual regions or to particular aspects of the problem. To get at the *root* of the land problem and of the condition of the peasants, we must not lose sight of the main figures cited above; we must not allow the main point to be obscured by particulars.

In our next article,* we shall cite instances of this kind of obscuring. For the present, we will make the first fundamental summary.

The land in European Russia is so distributed that the big landlords, those owning more than 500 dessiatines each, hold 70 million dessiatines, and the number of such landlords is less than 30 thousand.

On the other hand, the vast majority of the peasants, namely, ten and a half million families out of 13 million peasant families, own 75 million dessiatines of land.

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* See pp. 73-77 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The average large landed estate is *2,200 dessiatines*. The average size of a small peasant farm is *seven* dessiatines.

If the land of the thirty thousand big landlords were transferred to ten million peasant households, the land held by these households would be *nearly doubled*.

In our next article, we shall discuss the economic relations between the landlords and the peasants resulting from this distribution of the land.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 3,
May 6, 1912
Signed: *R. Silin*

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to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE TRUDOVIKS AND THE WORKER DEMOCRATS

The Fourth Duma election campaign has brought about some little revival of activity and has increased the interest in political issues. The broad movement stirred up by the events in the Lena gold-fields has lent importance to this revival and made this interest particularly urgent. More than ever, it is now appropriate to discuss the question of the attitude of the Trudoviks, i.e., of the peasant democrats, to the worker democrats.

In an article entitled "The Trudovik Group and the Workers' Party" (*Zaprosy Zhizni* No. 17), Mr. V. Vodovozov, answering my articles—"Liberalism and Democracy"* —in *Zvezda*,[37] sets forth the Trudovik view on this question. The controversy bears on the very essence of two political trends which express the interests of *nine-tenths* of Russia's population. It is therefore the duty of every democrat to pay the closest attention to the subject of the controversy.

I

The standpoint of the working-class democracy is the class struggle. The wage-workers constitute a definite class in modern society. The position of this class is radically different from that of the class of small proprietors, the peasants. That is why their association in one party is out of the question.

The aim of the workers is to abolish wage slavery by eliminating the rule of the bourgeoisie. The peasants' aim lies in democratic demands that could abolish serfdom, with all

* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 569-77.—*Ed.*

its social roots and in all its manifestations, but which could not even slightly affect the rule of the bourgeoisie.

In Russia today, the tasks which the workers and the peasants have in common are drawing the working-class democracy and the peasant democracy closer together. While necessarily following different paths, the two democracies can, and for the purpose of achieving success should, act jointly against all that is contrary to democracy. Unless there is such joint or common action, unless the peasant democrats get rid of the tutelage of the liberals (Cadets), any serious democratic reforms in Russia will be out of the question.

Those are the views of the working-class democrats, the Marxists, which I have developed in the two articles entitled "Liberalism and Democracy".

The Trudoviks, whose views are expounded by Mr. Vodovozov, want to be a party standing "above classes". They are convinced that one party "could fully take care of the interests of three classes of society": the peasantry, the working class and the "working intelligentsia".

I said that this "conviction" contradicted (1) all the facts of economic science, (2) the entire experience of countries which went through epochs similar to the present epoch in Russia, and (3) Russia's experience during a particularly important and crucial period of her history, the year 1905. I derided the truly Cadet claim to "embrace" different classes, and recalled the fact that the Cadets describe the Maklakovs as "working intelligentsia".

Mr. Vodovozov, without citing these arguments of mine fully and coherently, seeks to disprove them by disjointed statements. In reply to the first argument, for instance, he says: "The peasantry is a mass of people living by their own labour, its interests are the interests of labour, and therefore it represents one contingent of the great army of labour, just as the workers represent another contingent of that army."

This is not Marxist, but bourgeois economic science: the phrase about the interests of labour here obscures the fundamental difference between the position of the small proprietor and that of the wage-worker. The worker owns no means of production and sells himself, his hands, his *labour-*

power. The peasant does own means of production—implements, livestock, and his own or rented land—and sells the *products* of his farming, being a small proprietor, a small entrepreneur, a petty bourgeois.

Even today in Russia peasants hire no less than *two million* agricultural wage-labourers to work on their farms. And if all the landed estates were transferred, without compensation, to the peasants, the latter would employ a much greater number of labourers.

Such a transfer of the land to the peasants is a common interest of the entire peasantry, of all wage-workers, of all democrats, because landlordism is the foundation of the landlords' political power of the type with which Purishkevich, followed by Markov the Second and other "men of the Third Duma"—nationalists, Octobrists, etc.—have made Russia so very familiar.

This shows that the common aim now before the peasants and the workers has absolutely nothing of socialism, despite the opinion of ignorant reactionaries, and sometimes of liberals. That aim is purely democratic. Its achievement would mean the achievement of freedom for Russia, but it would not at all mean the abolition of wage slavery.

If we want to put the joint action of different classes on a sound basis, and if we want to ensure the real and durable success of such action, we must be clear as to the points on which the interests of these classes converge and those on which they diverge. All delusions and "misconceptions" on this score, and any obscuring of the matter with meaningless phrases are bound to have the most ruinous effect, are bound to undermine success.

II

"Agricultural work is different from work in a factory; but then the work of a factory worker is different from that of a shop-assistant, yet *Zvezda* assiduously tries to prove to the shop-assistants that they belong to the same class as the workers, and that therefore they must regard Social-Democrats as their representatives...."

That is how Mr. Vodovozov tries to disprove the arguments regarding the profound class distinction between small proprietors and wage-workers! In this case too, Mr. Vodo-

vozov's arguments are permeated with the usual spirit of bourgeois political economy. The small proprietor who is a farmer belongs to the same *class* as the manufacturer, or the small proprietor who is an artisan, and as the small proprietor who is a shopkeeper; there is no class distinction between them, they are distinguished only by their *occupations*. The wage-worker in agriculture belongs to the same class as the *wage*-worker in a factory or in a commercial establishment.

These are all elementary truths in terms of Marxism. And Mr. Vodovozov is mistaken if he thinks that by describing "my" Marxism as "extremely oversimplified" he can conceal the *essence of the matter*, namely, that the Trudoviks are constantly slipping from Marxist to bourgeois political economy.

Mr. Vodovozov slips into the same error, and along the same lines, when, in dealing with my reference to the profound class distinction between small proprietors and wage-workers as proved by the experience of all countries and by that of Russia, he tries to refute me by pointing out that sometimes one class is represented by several parties, and vice versa. In Europe the workers sometimes follow the liberals, the anarchists, the clericals, etc. The landlords are sometimes divided among several parties.

What do these facts prove? Only that, in addition to *class* distinctions, there are other distinctions, such as religious, national, etc., that affect the formation of parties.

That is true, but what has it got to do with *our* controversy? Does Mr. Vodovozov point to the existence in Russia of specific historical conditions—religious, national and otherwise—that *add themselves* in the *present instance* to the class distinctions?

Mr. Vodovozov did not, and could not, point to any such conditions at all. Our controversy turned entirely on whether it is possible to have in Russia a party "standing above classes", one "serving the interests of three classes". (Incidentally, it is ridiculous to call the "working intelligentsia" a class.)

Theory gives a clear answer to this question: it is impossible! An equally clear answer is provided by the experience of 1905, when *all* the class, group, national, and other distinc-

tions stood out in bold relief in the most open and most massive actions at a highly important turning-point in Russian history. The Marxist theory was *confirmed* by the experience of 1905, which showed that a single party of peasants and workers is *impossible* in Russia.

All three Dumas have shown the same thing.

Why refer, then, to the fact that in various countries of Europe there have been instances of one class divided into several parties or of several classes united under the leadership of a single party? This reference is quite beside the point. By this reference Mr. Vodovozov is merely deviating —and trying to divert the reader—from the point at issue.

If the Russian democracy is to attain success, it is very important for it to know its own strength, to take a sober view of the state of affairs, and to realise clearly which *classes* it can count upon. It would be exceedingly harmful for it to cherish illusions, to cover up class distinctions with empty phrases, or to dismiss them with good wishes.

We must plainly recognise the profound class distinction between the peasants and the workers of Russia, a distinction which cannot be eliminated within the framework of capitalist society, within the framework of domination by the market. We must plainly recognise the points on which their interests coincide *at present*. We must unite each of these classes, cement its forces, develop its political consciousness and define the common task of both.

A "radical" (to use Mr. Vodovozov's term, although I do not think it a fortunate one) peasant party is useful and indispensable.

All attempts to found a party standing "above classes", to unite the peasants and the workers in one party, to represent a non-existent "working intelligentsia" as a class by itself, are extremely harmful and ruinous to the cause of Russian freedom, since such attempts can bring *nothing* but disillusionment, a waste of strength, and confusion in people's minds.

While fully sympathising with the formation of a *consistently* democratic peasant party, we are obliged to combat the above-mentioned attempts. The workers must also combat the influence of the *liberals* upon the democratic peasantry.

III

Concerning the attitude of the liberals towards the bourgeois democracy, and of the Cadets towards the Trudoviks, the conference of the latter said nothing clear and definite.[38] The Trudoviks do not seem to realise that it was the dependence of the democratic peasantry upon the liberals that was one of the principal causes of the failure of the emancipation movement in 1905-06, and that this movement *cannot* be successful so long as wide and leading sections of the peasantry are unaware of the difference between democracy and liberalism, and do not free themselves from the tutelage and domination of the liberals.

Mr. Vodovozov touched upon this question of cardinal importance in an extremely cursory and unsatisfactory manner. He says that "the Cadet Party serves primarily the interests of the urban population". This is not true. This definition of the class roots and political role of the Cadet Party is utterly worthless.

The Cadet Party is the party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The social basis of this party (as well as of the "Progressists") is the economically more progressive (as compared with the Octobrists) sections of the bourgeoisie, but above all the bourgeois intelligentsia. However, a section of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie still follows the Cadets only by tradition (i.e., by mere habit, blind repetition of what was done yesterday), and because they are simply deceived by the liberals.

By calling themselves democrats, the Cadets are deceiving themselves and the people. Actually the Cadets are counter-revolutionary liberals.

This has been fully *proved* by the entire history of Russia, particularly in the twentieth century, and above all in 1905-06. And the publication *Vekhi*[39] *demonstrated* it, exposed it, particularly clearly and completely. Nor can any "reservations" of the Cadet diplomats in regard to *Vekhi* alter this fact.

The first phase of the liberation movement in Russia, the first decade of the twentieth century, revealed that the mass of the population, while gravitating towards democracy, is not sufficiently class-conscious, *cannot distinguish*

between liberalism and democracy, and submits to the leadership of the liberals. So long and insofar as there is no change in this respect, all talk of democratic reform in Russia is pointless. It would be just idle talk.

How does Mr. Vodovozov counter these premises, on which I based my article? "In the present conditions," he writes, "the Trudoviks consider it extremely tactless [!!] to say too much about the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets...."

Well, well! What has "tact" got to do with it? And why "too much"? If it is true that the Cadets are counter-revolutionary liberals, this truth must be told. Whether we should say a lot or only a little about the counter-revolutionary Rights and the counter-revolutionary liberals is not a serious question at all. *Whenever* a publicist speaks of the Rights, and whenever he speaks of the liberals, he must tell the truth. The Trudoviks told the truth about the Rights. We praise them for this. As regards the liberals, the Trudoviks *themselves* began to speak of them, but they *did not speak the whole truth*!

That is the only thing for which we reproach the Trudoviks.

"Too much" or too little—that is quite beside the point. Let the Trudoviks devote a thousand lines to the Rights and five lines to the liberals—we shall have no objections to that. That is not the reason for our objections to the Trudoviks. What we objected to is that in those "five lines" (you must blame yourself, Mr. Vodovozov, for bringing into the controversy your unfortunate expression "too much"!) the truth about the liberals was *not* told.

Mr. Vodovozov avoided answering the real question: are the Cadets counter-revolutionary or not?

It is a big mistake on the part of the Trudoviks to evade this question, for that implies *in fact* that a section of the democrats and a section of the former Marxists are dependent *on* the liberals.

This question is inexorably posed by the entire history of the first decade of the twentieth century.

In Russia today, *new* democratic elements are growing up everywhere, among the most diverse sections of the population. That is a fact. As they grow these democratic elements

must be educated in the spirit of *consistent* democracy. Such education will be impossible unless we explain the true nature of the liberals, who have at their disposal hundreds of press organs and a hundred seats in the Duma, thus constantly exerting an influence along *falsely* democratic lines upon an incomparably greater number of people than we can reach with our propaganda.

The democrats must rally their forces. We shall always praise the Trudoviks for their democratic speeches about the Rights. But theirs will be an inconsistent democracy if, *when* they speak of the liberals, they do so *in liberal fashion*, instead of using a language worthy of democrats.

It is not two, but three camps that are contending in the elections. Do not lump the second camp (the liberals) with the third camp (the democrats), Trudovik gentlemen. Do not obscure the distinction between them—the liberals are doing "*too much*" as it is towards that objectionable end.

Pravda Nos. 13 and 14,
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Signed: *P. P.*

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POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA

The Duma elections are compelling all the parties to intensify their agitation and rally their forces, so that they may return the greatest possible number of deputies of "their own" party.

In Russia, as in all other countries, the election campaign is attended by the most brazen self-advertisement. All the bourgeois parties, that is, those which uphold the economic privileges of the capitalists, are advertising themselves in the same way as individual capitalists advertise their goods. Look at the commercial advertisements in any newspaper—you will see that the capitalists think up the most "striking", bombastic and fashionable names for their merchandise, which they praise in the most unrestrained manner, stopping at no lie or invention whatever.

The general public—at any rate in the big cities and trade centres—has long since become used to commercial advertisement and knows its worth. Unfortunately, political advertisement misleads an incomparably greater number of people; it is much harder to expose and its deception much more lasting. The names of some parties, both in Europe and in Russia, are chosen with a direct eye to advertisement, and their "programmes" are quite often written for the sole purpose of hoodwinking the public. The greater the degree of political liberty in a capitalist country and the more democracy there is, i.e., the greater the power of the people and of their representatives, the more shameless, in many cases, is the self-advertisement of parties.

That being so, how is one to see what is what in the fight between the various parties? Does not this fight, with its fraud and advertising, indicate that representative institutions, parliaments, assemblies of people's representa-

tives, are in general useless and even harmful, as rabid reactionaries, the enemies of parliamentarism make out? No. In the absence of representative institutions there is *much more* deception, political lying and fraudulent trickery of all kinds, and the people have much fewer means of exposing the deception and finding out the truth.

To see what is what in the fight between the parties, one must not take words at their face value but must study the actual history of the parties, must study not so much what they say about themselves as their *deeds*, the way in which they go about solving various political problems, and their *behaviour* in matters affecting the vital interests of the various classes of society—landlords, capitalists, peasants, workers, etc.

The greater the degree of political liberty in a country and the more stable and democratic its representative institutions, the easier it is for the mass of the people to find its bearings in the fight between the parties and to *learn politics*, i.e., to expose the deception and find out the truth.

The division of any society into different political parties is revealed most clearly of all in times of profound crises shaking the whole country. For at such times governments are compelled to seek support among the various classes of society; all phrase-mongering, all that is petty and extraneous, is brushed aside by the gravity of the struggle; the parties strain every nerve and appeal to the *masses*, and the masses, guided by their unerring instinct and enlightened by the experience of an open struggle, follow the parties that represent the interests of a particular class.

The epochs of such crises always determine the party alignment of the social forces of the country concerned for many years or even decades ahead. In Germany, for instance, such crises were the wars of 1866 and 1870[40]; in Russia, the events of 1905. We cannot understand the essence of our political parties, nor gain a clear idea as to which *classes* a particular party in Russia represents, unless we go back to the events of that year.

Let us begin our brief survey of the political parties in Russia with the parties of the extreme Right.

On the extreme right flank, we find the Union of the Russian People.

The programme of this party is set forth as follows in *Russkoye Znamya*, the Union's newspaper published by A. I. Dubrovin:

"The Union of the Russian People, which on June 3, 1907, was accorded the honour of being called upon from the height of the Tsar's throne to be its reliable bulwark, and to serve as an example of law and order to all and in everything, proclaims that the will of the Tsar can only be exercised: (1) if the Tsar's autocratic power, which is indissolubly and vitally bound up with the Russian Orthodox Church, canonically established, manifests itself in full measure; (2) if the Russian nationality is dominant not only in the inner gubernias, but also in the border regions; (3) if there is a Duma, composed exclusively of Russians, as the main assistant of the monarch in his work for building up the state; (4) if the principles of the Union of the Russian People with regard to the Jews are fully observed; and (5) if all officials who are opposed to the Tsar's autocratic power are removed from government service."

We have faithfully copied this solemn declaration of the *Rights*, on the one hand, so that the reader may be directly acquainted with the original and, on the other, because the fundamental motives stated in it are valid for all the parties of the majority in the Third Duma, i.e., for the nationalists and the Octobrists as well. This will be seen from what we say further on.

The programme of the Union of the Russian People in effect repeats the old slogan of the days of serfdom, that is, Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationhood. In regard to the question on which the Union is generally set apart from other kindred parties—namely, recognition or rejection of "constitutional" principles in the Russian political system—it is particularly important to note that the Union is *by no means* opposed to representative institutions in general. It is evident from the programme quoted above that the Union favours a Duma that will play the part of "assistant".

Moreover, the specific feature of the Russian Constitution—if we may call it that—is expressed by the Dubrovinite correctly, i.e., in keeping with the actual state of affairs. It is this stand that is taken by both the nationalists and the Octobrists in their practical policies. The controversy between these parties over the "Constitution" is largely a fight over words. The Rights are not opposed to a Duma; they only stress with particular zeal that it must be an

"assistant", without specifying its powers in any way. The nationalists and the Octobrists, for their part, do not insist on any clearly specified powers of the Duma, let alone on real guarantees of its powers. The Octobrist "constitutionalists" fully agree with the "opponents of Constitution" on the basis of the June Third Constitution.

The programme of the Black Hundreds is straightforward, clear and outspoken on the point of persecuting non-Russians in general and the Jews in particular. As always, they bring out more rudely, brazenly and incitingly what the other government parties more or less "bashfully" or diplomatically keep to themselves.

In reality, both the nationalists and the Octobrists have a hand in the persecution of non-Russians, as is well known to anyone who is at all familiar with the activity of the Third Duma or with such press organs as *Novoye Vremya*, *Svet*, *Golos Moskvy*[41] and the like.

The question is: What is the social basis of the party of the Rights? What class does it represent? What class does it serve?

That party's reversion to the slogans of serfdom, its upholding of all that is outdated, of all that is medieval in Russian life, its complete satisfaction with the June Third Constitution—the *landlords*' Constitution—and its defence of the privileges of the nobility and officialdom all provide a clear answer to our question. The Rights are the party of the semi-feudal landlords, of the Council of the United Nobility.[42] Not for nothing did that Council play such a prominent, indeed a leading, role in the dispersal of the Second Duma, the change of the electoral law and the coup d'état of June 3.[43]

To give an idea of the economic strength of this class in Russia, it is sufficient to cite the following basic fact, proved by the data of the *government* statistics of landownership in 1905, published by the Ministry of the Interior.

Less than 30,000 landlords in European Russia own 70,000,000 dessiatines of land; *the same amount* of land is owned by 10,000,000 peasant households with the smallest allotments. This makes an average of about 2,300 dessiatines per big landlord, and, in the case of the poor peasants, an average of 7 dessiatines per family, per household.

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It is quite natural and inevitable that the peasant cannot live on such an "allotment" but can only die a slow death. The recurrent famines which affect millions, such as this year's famine, continue to dislocate peasant farming in Russia following each crop failure. The peasants are compelled to rent land from the landlords, paying for it by various forms of *labour service*. To pay for the use of the land, the peasant works for the landlord with his horse and his implements. This is nothing short of corvée, except that it is not officially called serfdom. With 2,300 dessiatines of land at their disposal, most of the landlords can run their estates only by keeping the peasants in bondage, by resorting to labour service, that is, the corvée system. They cultivate only part of these huge estates with the help of wage-labourers.

Further, that same class of the landed nobility supplies the state with the overwhelming majority of all higher and middle-ranking civil servants. The privileges of officialdom in Russia represent another side of the privileges and agrarian power of the landed nobility. It is therefore natural that the Council of the United Nobility and the "Right" parties should uphold the policy of adhering to the old feudal traditions not by accident, but because it is inevitable, and not because of the "ill will" of individuals, but under the pressure of the *interests* of a tremendously powerful *class*. The old ruling class, the survivals of landlordism, who remain the ruling class as in the past, has created for itself an appropriate party—the Union of the Russian People or the "Rights" in the Duma and in the Council of State.[44]

But, since there exist representative institutions, and since the *masses* have already come out openly in the political arena, as they did in our country in 1905, each party must necessarily appeal to the people, within certain limits. Now what can the Right parties appeal to the people about?

Of course, they cannot speak plainly in defence of the interests of the landlords. What they do speak of is preserving the old traditions in general, and they spare no efforts to foment distrust towards non-Russians, particularly towards the Jews, to incite the utterly ignorant, the utterly benighted, to pogroms, to "Yid"-baiting. They seek to conceal the privileges of the nobility, the bureaucrats and the landlords with talk about the "oppression" of Russians by non-Russians.

Such is the party of the "Rights". One of its members, Purishkevich, the most prominent spokesman of the Rights in the Third Duma, has worked a good deal, and successfully, to *show* the people *what* the Rights want, *how* they act, and *whom* they serve. Purishkevich is a gifted agitator.

Next to the "Rights", who have forty-six seats in the Third Duma, are the "*nationalists*" with ninety-one seats. There is hardly a shade of difference between them and the Rights. In fact, these are not two parties, but one party which has effected a division of "labour" in persecuting non-Russians, "Cadets" (liberals), democrats, etc. One lot acts more crudely, the other more subtly, but both *are doing* the same thing. Indeed, it is to the government's *advantage* to have the "extreme" Rights—who are capable of any sort of scandal, riot, the murder of people like Herzenstein, Yollos, Karavayev—standing somewhat apart, as if *they* were "criticising" the government from the right.... The distinction between the Rights and the nationalists cannot be of any serious importance.

The *Octobrists* in the Third Duma are 131 strong, including, of course, the "Right Octobrists". Essentially there is nothing in the present policy of the Octobrists to distinguish them from the Rights, except that the Octobrist Party serves not only the landlords, but also the big capitalists, the conservative merchants, and the bourgeoisie, which was so terrified by the awakening of the workers, and then also of the peasants, to independent political life, that it made a *volte-face* towards defence of the old order. There are capitalists in Russia—quite a few, indeed—who treat the workers not a bit better than the landlords treated the serfs of old; they look on workers and clerks as their menials, as servants. Nobody is better fitted to defend this old order than the Right parties, the nationalists and the Octobrists. There are also capitalists who at the Zemstvo[45] and municipal congresses in 1904 and 1905 demanded a "constitution", but are quite willing to make peace on the basis of the June Third Constitution *to oppose* the workers.

The Octobrist Party is the chief counter-revolutionary party of the landlords and the capitalists. It is the leading party in the Third Duma: the 131 Octobrists with the 137 Rights and nationalists constitute a solid majority in the Third Duma.

The electoral law of June 3, 1907, *guaranteed* the landlords and the big capitalists a majority: the landlords and electors of the first urban curia (i.e., the big capitalist curia) have a majority in *all* the gubernia assemblies electing deputies to the Duma. In twenty-eight gubernias the landowners even by themselves have a majority in the election assemblies. The entire policy of the June Third Government has been carried out with the aid of the Octobrist Party, and this party bears the responsibility for all the sins and crimes committed by the Third Duma.

In words, in their programme, the Octobrists uphold a "constitution", and even liberties! In reality, this party supported all the measures taken against the workers (the Insurance Bill, for example—recall the conduct of the *Chairman* of the Duma Committee on Labour, Baron Tiesenhausen!), against the peasants, and against any mitigation of tyranny and lack of rights. The Octobrists are just as much a government party as the nationalists. This situation is not in the least altered by the fact that from time to time —particularly on the eve of elections!— the Octobrists deliver "opposition" speeches. In all countries that have parliaments, the bourgeois parties have long been known to indulge in this *playing at opposition*—a harmless game as far as they are concerned, because no government takes it seriously, and a game which occasionally proves useful as a means of "soothing" the voter by a show of opposition.

However, the greatest expert, the virtuoso, at the game of opposition is the chief opposition party in the Third Duma—the Cadets, *Constitutional-"Democrats"*, the party of "people's freedom".

The very name of this party is part of the game, for in fact it is *not at all* a democratic party, and *by no means* a people's party; it is a party, not of freedom, but of half-freedom, if not of quarter-freedom.

In fact, it is the party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which dreads the popular movement far more than reaction.

The democrat has faith in the people, in the movement of the masses, and he helps this movement in every way, although he fairly often has (as have the bourgeois democrats, the Trudoviks) a wrong notion about the significance

of this movement within the framework of the capitalist system. The democrat sincerely strives to put an end to *all* medievalism.

The liberal is afraid of the movement of the masses; he tries to check it, and *deliberately* defends certain institutions of medievalism—in fact, the most important of them —as a bulwark against the masses, particularly the workers. What the liberals want is by no means to destroy all the foundations of the power of the Purishkeviches, but to share power with them. The democratic petty bourgeois (hence also the peasant and the Trudovik) says: everything for the people and through the people. He sincerely-strives to uproot all the foundations of Purishkevichism, though he does not understand the significance of the wage-workers' struggle against capital. The real aim of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is to share power with Purishkevich and rule with him *over* the workers and *over* the small proprietors.

In the First and the Second Dumas, the Cadets had a majority or occupied a leading position. They used it for a senseless and inglorious *game*: when facing the Right, they played at loyalty and ability to serve as ministers (as if to say that they could solve all the contradictions by peaceful means without spoiling the muzhik or offending Purishkevich); when facing the Left, they played at democracy. The result of this game was that in the end the Cadets got a kick from the right. And on the left they earned the just title of betrayers of people's freedom. In both the First and the Second Dumas, they fought all the time not only against the working-class democrats, but against the Trudoviks as well. We need only recall the fact that the Cadets *defeated* the plan for local land committees proposed by the Trudoviks (in the First Duma), a plan based on the elementary requirements of democracy, on the ABC of democracy. The Cadets thus upheld the *supremacy* of the landlords and the bureaucrats *over* the peasants in the land committees!

In the Third Duma the Cadets have been playing at a "responsible opposition", an opposition in the possessive case.[46] As such, they voted time and again for the government budgets ("democrats"!), explained to the Octobrists that there was nothing dangerous or harmful in their plan of

"compulsory" redemption payments (compulsory for the peasants)—remember Berezovsky the First; they sent Karaulov to deliver "pious" speeches from the rostrum, renounced the movement of the masses, appealed to the "upper strata", and *silenced* the lower strata (the Cadets' fight *against* the workers' deputies over workers' insurance), and so on and so forth.

The Cadets are the party of counter-revolutionary liberalism. By their claim to the role of a "responsible opposition", i.e., a recognised, lawful opposition *permitted* to compete with the Octobrists, an opposition not to, but of the June Third regime—the Cadets have committed suicide as "democrats". The shameless *Vekhi* propaganda of the Cadet ideologists—Struve, Izgoyev and Co., smothered with kisses by Rozanov and Anthony of Volhynia—and the role of a "responsible opposition" in the Third Duma, are two sides of the same medal. The liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, tolerated by the Purishkeviches, wants to seat itself by the side of Purishkevich.

The bloc of the Cadets and the "Progressists" at the present time, for the elections to the Fourth Duma, has provided additional proof of the profoundly counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets. The Progressists do not at all claim to be democrats, they do not say a word about fighting the entire June Third regime, and are far from so much as dreaming of "universal suffrage". They are moderate liberals who do not make a secret of their kinship with the Octobrists. The alliance of the Cadets and the Progressists should open the eyes of even the blindest "yes-men of the Cadets" to the true nature of that party.

The *democratic bourgeoisie* of Russia is represented by the Narodniks of all shades, from the most Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Popular Socialists and Trudoviks. They all readily mouth "socialist" phrases, but it would be impermissible for a class-conscious worker to be deceived as to the real meaning of those phrases. Actually there is *not a grain of* socialism in the "right to land", "equalised division" of the land, or "socialisation of the land". This should be clear to anyone who knows that the abolition of private landownership, and a new, even the "fairest" possible, division of the land, far from affecting commodity production and the

power of the market, of money and capital, leads to their expansion.

However, the phrases about "the labour principle" and "Narodnik socialism" express the democrat's deep faith in the possibility and indispensability of destroying *all* medievalism in landownership and, at the same time, in the political system as well (just as they express his sincere desire to achieve this). Whereas the liberals (the Cadets) seek to share political power and political privileges with the Purishkeviches, the Narodniks are democrats precisely because they are striving, and are bound to strive at present, to abolish *all* the privileges of landed property and *all* privileges in politics.

The position of the great bulk of the Russian peasants is such that they cannot even dream of any compromise with the Purishkeviches (something quite possible, attainable and *near and dear* to the liberal). That is why the democracy of the petty bourgeoisie will have roots among the masses in Russia for a fairly long time to come, whereas Stolypin's agrarian reform,[47] an expression of the Purishkeviches' bourgeois policy against the muzhik, has so far produced nothing durable but—the starvation of thirty million peasants!

The millions of starving small proprietors cannot help striving for a *different* kind of agrarian reform, a democratic one, which cannot break out of the bounds of capitalism or abolish wage slavery, but *can* sweep *medievalism* from the face of the Russian land.

The Trudoviks are an extremely weak group in the Third Duma, but they represent the *masses*. The vacillation of the Trudoviks between the Cadets and the worker democrats is an inevitable result of the class position of the small proprietors, and the fact that it is particularly difficult to rally, organise and enlighten them accounts for the extremely indeterminate and amorphous character of the Trudoviks as a party. That is why the Trudoviks, with the aid of the stupid "otzovism" of the Left Narodniks, present the sad picture of a liquidated party.

The difference between the Trudoviks and our own near-Marxist liquidators is that the former are liquidators out of weakness, while the latter are liquidators out of malice.

The task of the working-class democracy is to help the weak petty-bourgeois democrats, wrest them from the liberals, and rally the democratic camp against the counter-revolutionary Cadets and not merely against the Rights.

Concerning the working-class democracy, which had its group in the Third Duma, we can say but little here.

Everywhere in Europe, the parties of the working class took shape by casting off the influence of general democratic ideology and learning to distinguish between the struggle of the wage-workers against capital and the struggle against feudalism, which they did, incidentally, in order to strengthen the latter struggle, to rid it of all wavering and timidity. In Russia, the working-class democracy completely dissociated itself both from liberalism and from bourgeois democracy (Trudovikism), to the great advantage of the democratic cause in general.

The liquidationist trend among the working-class democrats (*Nasha Zarya* and *Zhivoye Dyelo*) shares the weakness of Trudoviks, glorifies amorphousness, longs for the status of a "tolerated" opposition, rejects the hegemony of the workers, confines itself to *words* about an "open" organisation (while inveighing against the organisation that is not open), and advocates a liberal labour policy. The connection between this trend and the disintegration and decadence of the period of counter-revolution is evident, and its falling-away from the working-class democracy is becoming obvious.

The class-conscious workers, who are not liquidating anything and are rallying their ranks in opposition to liberal influences, organising as a class and developing all forms of trade union and other unity, are coming forward both as representatives of *wage*-labour against capital and as representatives of consistent democracy against the entire old regime in Russia and against any concessions to it.

By way of illustration, we give below the figures relating to the strength of the various parties in the Third Duma, which we borrow from the official Duma *Handbook* for 1912.

Parties in the Third Duma

Landlords	
Rights	46
Nationalists	47
Independent nationalists	17
Right Octobrists	11
Octobrists	120
Total government parties	*268*
The Bourgeoisie	
Progressists	36
Cadets	52
Polish Kolo[47a]	11
Polish-Lithuanian-Byelorussian group	7
Moslem group	9
Total liberals	*115*
Bourgeois Democrats	
Trudovik group	14
Working-Class Democrats	
Social-Democrats	13
Total democrats	*27*
Unaffiliated	27
Grand total	*437*

Thus there have been two possible majorities in the Third Duma: (1) the Rights and the Octobrists = 268 out of 437; (2) the Octobrists and the liberals = 120 + 115 = 235 out of 437. Both majorities are counter-revolutionary.

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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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A QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE ORGANISATIONS OF BIG CAPITAL[48]

The Industry and Economics Department of the Imperial Russian Technical Society sent out a questionnaire on "public organisations of the commercial and industrial class in Russian", or rather on the organisations of big capital. The results of the questionnaire are now set forth in Mr. Gushka's[49] book *Representative Organisations of the Commercial and Industrial Class in Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1912). Both the material contained in the book and the conclusions, which the author indicates in fairly definite terms, deserve serious attention.

I

As a matter of fact, the questionnaire of the Technical Society dealt with the "representative" organisations of capitalists, which make up approximately 80 per cent of all the organisations. About 15 per cent of the organisations are cartels, trusts and syndicates, nearly 5 per cent are associations of employers, and the rest are stock-exchange committees, boards of congresses, etc. These latter organisations are very fond of calling themselves "representative". Their job is to influence government bodies.

The employers' associations, in Mr. Gushka's opinion, conduct a "direct" class struggle against the wage-workers, whereas the representative organisations conduct an "indirect" class struggle—a "struggle against other classes by exerting pressure on the state power and on public opinion".

That terminology is wrong, of course. It at once betrays one of the principal defects which Mr. Gushka has in common with most representatives of "professorial", bourgeois politi-

cal economy. On the face of it, he accepts the concept of the class struggle; on the face of it, the class struggle serves as the basis of his investigation. Actually, however, that concept is narrowed down and distorted. Indeed, from what Mr. Gushka says, the struggle of the capitalists against the wage-workers within the framework of a given political system is a "direct" class struggle, while the struggle *for the political system itself* is an "*indirect*" class struggle! What about the struggle for "state power" itself—where does that belong?

But we shall have occasion to deal with this fundamental fault of Mr. Gushka's "world outlook" in the proper place. The value of his work is not in its theory, but in the summary of facts it offers. The data on organisations of the preponderant type are at any rate of considerable interest.

The total number of "representative" organisations of big capital in Russia in 1910 is given as 143. Seventy-one of them were stock-exchange societies with their committees. Then came 14 committees of commerce and manufacture, three merchants' boards, 51 organisations in the "combined" group (congresses and their boards, advisory bureaus, etc.), and four organisations of an indefinite type. The questionnaire was answered by only 62 organisations, or less than half the total. Out of the 51 organisations in the "combined" group, which is the most interesting, 22 answered the questionnaire.

The data on the time the organisations were founded are characteristic. Of the 32 stock-exchange committees which answered the questionnaire, 9 were founded in the last century, from 1800 to 1900, 5 in the four years 1901-04, 9 *in the two years of revolution*—1905-06—and 9 in the period 1907 to 1910.

> "Here," writes Mr. Gushka, "we clearly see the effect of the impetus which the social movement of the stormy year 1905 lent the process of the self-organisation of the representatives of capital."

Of the 22 organisations in the combined group, only 7 came into being during the period 1870 to 1900, 2 from 1901 to 1904, 8 *in the two years of revolution*—1905-06—and 5 from 1907 to 1910. All those "congress boards" of representatives of industry in general—mine owners, oil industrialists, and so on and so forth—are a product chiefly of the period of revolution and counter-revolution.

The organisations are divided according to industries as follows. The group of stock-exchange committees is predominantly mixed: these committees usually unite all the branches of industry and commerce of the area concerned. In the group of committees of commerce and manufacture, the textile industry is in the forefront. In the main, combined, group, almost half the organisations represent not commerce, but industry—mining and metallurgy, to be specific.

"It is this group of industries (mining and metallurgy) that constitutes the economic basis of the organisations of Russia's modern industrial 'guard'," writes Mr. Gushka, who has a slight weakness for using a "lofty style" in speaking of the subject of his investigation.

Only in the case of a part of the organisations was it possible to establish the total turnover or output for the entire branch of commerce or industry to which the organisation in question belongs. The total thus obtained is 1,570 million rubles, of which 1,319 million rubles belongs to members of the organisations. Consequently, the organised represent 84 per cent of the total. The turnover of 3,134 members of organisations amounted to 1,121 million rubles, or an average of 358,000 rubles per member. The number of workers employed by 685 members of organisations is approximately 219,000 (on p. 111, the author mistakenly puts it at 319,000), or an average of more than 300 workers per member.

It is clear that we are dealing here with organisations of *big* capital, or even the *biggest* capital, to be exact. Mr. Gushka is fully aware of this, for he points out, for instance, that only the really big and biggest merchants and industrialists are admitted as members into the stock-exchange committees and the committees of commerce and manufacture, and that the congresses of representatives of industry and commerce are made up of the "biggest" capitalist undertakings.

That is why the author is wrong when he refers, in the title of his book, to organisations "of the commercial and industrial *class* in Russia". That is incorrect. Here again the author narrows down the concept of class. Actually, Mr. Gushka is dealing with a *stratum*, not with a class. Sure enough, the stratum of the biggest capitalists economically dominates all the other strata, which it unquestion-

ably overwhelms by the size of its turnover. This is beyond doubt. Nevertheless, it is a stratum, and not a class. Thus, for instance, there is a vast distance between the political role of the representative organisations of this stratum and its political domination, as well as between its political domination and that of the commercial and industrial class.

In this connection, we must point out the following argument of Mr. Gushka's: "We in Russia," he writes, "are accustomed to applying a very large scale to define what is called a big or a small undertaking, in view of the well known extraordinary concentration of capital in our country, surpassing the concentration of capital even in Germany...."

The comparison with Germany is wrong. For instance, in the Urals there are very few small undertakings, if any, in the mining and metallurgical industries for reasons of an entirely distinctive nature—due to the absence of full freedom for industry and to the survivals of medievalism. And our official (or, what is the same thing, our Narodnik) distinction between factory and "handicraft" industries—does it not make our industrial statistics incomparable with the German statistics? Does it not very often mislead the observer by speaking of "extraordinary concentration" in Russia and obscuring the "extraordinarily" *scattered character* of the countless small peasant undertakings?

II

It is interesting to note some of the data provided by the questionnaire on the activity of the representative organisations of the biggest capital. For instance, the author gives a summary of the information about their budgets. The budgets of the 22 organisations in the combined group show a total income of 3,950,000 rubles, and the total income of all the organisations is 7.25 million rubles. "This annual budget of our 56 organisations," writes Mr. Gushka, "amounting to 7.25 million rubles, would probably be 50 or 100 per cent higher if the financial reports of the other organisations, those not covered by our questionnaire, were included."

However, more than a half of this budget, namely, 4.5 million rubles, is spent on business and on charity. On

purely representational functions, the 56 organisations spend 2.7 million rubles. "Most of the answers or financial reports put at the head of this expenditure on representation the salaries of the personnel, then the renting of premises. In 64.4 per cent of the organisations, the greatest part of the expenditure goes for maintenance of personnel, and in 26.7 per cent of them it goes for premises."

These figures, in view of the turnover of 1,319 million rubles in the capitalist associations covered by the investigation, show that the expenditure is very modest, so that Mr. Gushka's pompous conclusion that the budget of expenditure is an "*index of the financial might* [author's italics] of the representative organisations of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in Russia" again betrays his inordinate fondness for big words.

The author devotes Chapter IX of his book to the "third element", i.e., the intelligentsia in the service of the capitalist associations. It appears that 29 stock-exchange committees listed 77 representatives of the third element as their employees; the 22 organisations in the combined group listed 180 such employees. Most of the answers speak of 2 to 4 representatives of the third element per organisation. Since capitalist associations often understate this kind of data, the author thinks it probable that "the representative organisations of capital have in their service, holding key posts, a host [!!] of intellectuals numbering *at least a thousand persons*"—secretaries, accountants, statisticians, legal advisers, etc.

Really, it does not take much to set Mr. Gushka talking about a "host".

The publishing activity of the capitalist associations is characterised by the following figures. In addition to the answers to the questionnaire, there accumulated a small library of 288 volumes—the proceedings of congresses, reports, statutes and memoranda—which have never been on sale.

Nine organisations publish periodicals: *Mining and Smelting*, *Oil*, *Industry and Commerce*, *Bulletin of the Russian Association of Distillery Owners*, etc. The author gives the total number of issues of these publications as 2,624 "volumes", to which he adds 452 volumes of "proceedings",

annual reports, etc., as well as 333 volumes of non-periodical publications. Mr. Gushka puts the total at 3,409 "volumes", which he describes as "impressive". The total number of publications probably amounts to 4,000-5,000 volumes.

"It may be said without exaggeration that a veritable treasure lies buried in that library," exclaims Mr. Gushka, "a wealth of material for the study of the anatomy and physiology, if we may say so, of the big bourgeoisie in Russia.... Unless we study this valuable material, we cannot form a proper idea of the balance of the dominant social forces in Russia, and more particularly of the social nature and role of Russian state power both before and after 1905."

Mr. Gushka makes very frequent excursions of this kind into the sphere of the social nature and role of Russian state power. They merit special consideration because of the importance of the question, and because it is misrepresented by the author, who exaggerates things beyond measure and for that very reason vows in passing that he speaks "without exaggeration".

III

"The centre of gravity of the activity of the organisations under survey," writes Mr. Gushka, "as representative organisations, i.e., organisations devoted to representing the interests of the industrial and commercial class, is naturally in the sphere of *formulating the position* of the representatives of this class on various questions concerning its interests, and of *defending this position* by various means."

Undoubtedly, that is exactly where the "centre of gravity" lies. The questionnaire allots much space to questions about the items discussed by the organisations of the capitalists and to the petitions they filed. In summarising the information obtained, the author singles out a long list of what, in his opinion, are "questions of a *general* nature". The most important questions are grouped as follows: (a) workers' insurance, public holidays, etc.; (b) income tax, taxes on enterprises, etc.; (c) tariff policy; (d) transport; (e) joint-stock companies, credit, etc.; (f) consulates abroad, statistics, the organisation of a mining department; (g) participation of the merchant class in the Zemstvo institutions, in the Council of State, in the preliminary discussion of government Bills, etc.

In this connection, Mr. Gushka draws the following conclusion: "In any event, as may be gathered from the enumerated groups of questions and petitions, our organisations have a very wide sphere of activity...." On reading such a conclusion, one cannot help stopping to see whether by any chance the word *not* has been omitted. For it is obvious that the sphere of activity indicated by the author is *not* wide at all. But it is certainly not a slip of the pen we have here; the trouble comes from the essential "pattern" of the author's mentality. "It would be difficult to name any more or less important field of the social and political life of the country that is outside the sphere of activity of the representative organisations of capital," he maintains.

Incredible, but true: Mr. Gushka in all seriousness presents us with this flagrant untruth, which he repeats in a dozen different ways!

"It would be difficult to name...." What about the electoral law? Or the agrarian question? Is it possible that these are not "important fields of the social and political life of the country"?

Mr. Gushka looks at "social and political life" from the narrow peep-hole of a *merchant's* standpoint. He cannot for the life of him understand that his absolute statements testify to narrowness, and certainly not to breadth. The questions raised by the merchants are narrow because they concern *only* the merchants. The capitalists do *not* rise to questions of *general political* importance. "Admission of representatives of industry and commerce" into local or central institutions of one sort or another is the limit of the "courage" they show in their petitions. As to how these institutions are to be organised *in general*, that is something they *are unable* to think of. They accept the institutions which have taken shape at someone else's bidding, and beg for a place in them. They slavishly accept the political basis created by some other class, and on this basis "petition" for the interests of *their* social-estate, *their* group, *their* stratum, unable even in this sphere to rise to a broad understanding of the interests of the whole of their *class*.

Mr. Gushka, who glaringly distorts the facts, slips into a tone of sheer praise. "The energetic and insistent pressure brought to bear upon government bodies," he writes. "Our

organisations" "perfectly [!!] understand this themselves." ... "The organisations of big capital have developed into a regular *lobby* which actually exerts perhaps a greater influence upon legislation than the Duma, the more so"—the author tries to be witty—"as Article 87[50] does not apply to the capitalist parliament, and the organisations of capital have never been purposely dissolved for three days."...

This witticism is an obvious indication of the boundless conceited narrow-mindedness of the big-wigs of industry and of their eulogist, Gushka. A minor detail, a mere trifle, has been overlooked: the Duma raises questions concerning the entire state administration and all classes, being an institution of the whole state, while the organisations of the merchant big-wigs consider it courageous to raise questions concerning *only* the merchants, *only* the rights of the merchants.

Mr. Gushka goes to the length of quoting the statement, made by the Ufa Stock-Exchange Committee in its report for 1905-06, that "the government itself, by a series of fundamental measures to reform the stock-exchange institutions, is selecting ... *worthy assistants for itself*", and he calls this statement "correct", puts the last phrase in italics, and speaks of "real and active co-operation with the government".

On reading such stuff one cannot help thinking of the German word *Lobhudelei*—grovelling adulation, or adulatory grovelling. To speak with a smug countenance—in 1905-06—of "fundamental measures to reform—the stock-exchange institutions"! Why, this is the viewpoint of a flunkey whom the master has permitted to "consult" with the cook about arrangements for dinner, etc., calling the two of them his "worthy assistants".

How close Mr. Gushka is to this point of view can be seen from that subsection of Chapter XV dealing with the results of the petitions of the organisations, which he has entitled "Losing Positions". "It cannot be denied," we read there, "that there are *several fields* in which the petitions and demands of the representatives of capital do come up against government resistance." Then follow examples in this sequence: (1) state-owned forests—the state is itself engaged in the timber industry; (2) railway tariffs—the railways are run by the state itself; (3) the question of representation in the Zemstvos; and (4) the question of representation in the

Duma and in the Council of State. "In both cases," says the author, referring to the last two questions, "the effect of the close ties between the bureaucracy and the other ruling class—the big landowners—makes itself felt, of course."

"But if we leave out the few above-mentioned questions," continues the happy Mr. Gushka, "then it must be admitted that in all the other fields ... the data furnished by our questionnaire show the position of the commercial and industrial class to be a winning one."

Is this not a real gem? The losing position is the timber business, railways, the Zemstvos and parliament. But "if we leave out the few above-mentioned questions", we shall have a winning position!

And in the "conclusion" of his book, where he takes up the cudgels against the "traditional prejudice" about the lowliness and lack of rights of the commercial and industrial class, Mr. Gushka rises to what may be called pathetic *Lobhudelei*:

"It is not as a lowly class lacking rights that the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie sits at the table of Russian statehood, but as a welcome guest and collaborator, as a 'worthy assistant' of the state power, occupying a prominent place both by established custom and by law, by recorded right. Nor is it since yesterday that it has occupied this place."

This would fit perfectly into an official speech delivered by a Krestovnikov, an Avdakov, a Tiesenhausen or their like at a dinner given by a Minister. It is this kind of speeches, written exactly in this kind of language, that are familiar to every Russian. The only question that arises is: how are we to describe a "scientist" who, while laying claim to a "scientific" analysis of a serious questionnaire, introduces into his writings the after-dinner speeches of servile merchants as "the conclusion to be drawn from the questionnaire"?

"We have inherited from the 'good old times'," continues Mr. Gushka, "a view which has acquired the stability of a prejudice, namely, that capitalist Russia is characterised by the contradiction that the big bourgeoisie, while dominating *economically*, remains enslaved *politically*. The whole of the evidence supplied by our questionnaire deals a telling blow at this traditional notion."

It requires unbounded vulgarisation of Marxism, whose terminology Mr. Gushka makes a show of using, to regard a questionnaire on the organisations of capitalists as capable of supplying "material" about the political enslavement of

the bourgeoisie by the autocracy and the landlords. The author hardly touches on the material which supplies the real answer to this question, nor could he have touched on it so long as he kept within the limits of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire, which touches on one aspect of the life of our bourgeoisie, *confirms*, in fact, that the latter is politically enslaved. It shows that the bourgeoisie is making economic progress, that certain particular rights of the bourgeoisie are being extended, that it is becoming ever more organised as a class and is playing an increasing role in political life. But the very fact that these changes are taking place makes *still more profound* the contradiction between the retention of 0.99 of the political power by the autocracy and the landlords, on the one hand, and the growing economic might of the bourgeoisie, on the other.

Mr. Gushka, who makes a show of using Marxist terminology, actually shares the standpoint of an ordinary social-liberal. It is one of Russia's specific features, or maladies if you will, that this liberalism is embellished with Marxist phrases. Adopting the standpoint of liberalism, Mr. Gushka came up against the question of the social nature of the state power in Russia. But he did not appreciate, even approximately, the vast scope and significance of this question.

The class nature of the state power in Russia has undergone a serious change since 1905. That change has been in a bourgeois direction. The Third Duma, *Vekhi* liberalism, and a number of other signs are evidence of a new "step in the transformation" of our old state power "into a bourgeois monarchy". But while taking one more step along this new path, it *remains the old power*, and this only goes to increase the sum total of political contradictions. Mr. Gushka, who came up against a serious question, revealed his inability to deal with it.

IV

In analysing the material of a rather special questionnaire, Mr. Gushka touched on another highly important question of principle, which is worth dwelling on specially. It is the question of "The Role of 1905", as the title of a subsection of Chapter XIII in Mr. Gushka's book reads.

Question 41 of the questionnaire, referring to the number of meetings of the executive body of each organisation during each of the past five years, was intended to ascertain the extent to which the activities of the organisations increased in 1905. The material provided by the answers to the questionnaire "has not"—to quote Mr. Gushka—"revealed any such phenomenon in the life of our organisations", that is, any appreciable increase in activity.

"And that is understandable," Mr. Gushka comments.

Well, how does he explain this phenomenon?

The "employers'" associations, he argues, were bound to have increased their activity in 1905, in view of the increased strike movement.

"The organisations of a purely representative type, however," continues Mr. Gushka, "were, to a certain extent, in an entirely different position: their chief contractor, the government, was on the defensive throughout 1905; it had very little faith in itself and inspired hardly any confidence in others. In that 'crazy' year, 'when the authorities withdrew', it seemed to all, including the industrialists (particularly at the end of the year), that the old 'authorities' would never come back.

"That is why the representative organisations of capital had no reason in those days for intensifying their activity as representative bodies in dealing with the government authorities."

This explanation won't hold water. If the "authorities" had really "withdrawn", the withdrawal of the old political authorities would inevitably have resulted in the new economic authorities increasing their activity and becoming new political authorities. If the government was mainly on the defensive, how could the "collaborator and worthy assistant" of that government (as Mr. Gushka describes the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie) help increasing *its* activity to defend that government and itself? Our author has not at all thought out what he was saying. He confines himself to a mere collection of words—the most current and customary ones. Perhaps he feels that the question at issue is an extremely important one on the answer to which depends, or with the answer to which is closely linked, the answer to the more general question of the political role of the bourgeoisie, and he shrank from tackling an important question in earnest—fled from it, as it were.

Reflect on the following statement of the author on the same point—about the role of 1905:

"Neither did the organisations of capital feel inclined to meet often in order to formulate their attitude towards the social and political problems that preoccupied the whole country at the time. Pushed into the background by the sweeping tide of the popular movement, they preferred to bide their time, to wait for the results of the struggle seething around them. Towards the end, when the 'authorities' unmistakably revealed their inclination to 'come back', the organisations of the commercial and industrial class likewise began gradually to resume their representative activity in its usual form and degree of intensity."

"The organisations of capital" were "pushed into the background by the sweeping tide of the popular movement". Very well! Only, Mr. Gushka is again giving no thought to what he is saying. Against whom was the sweeping tide of the popular movement directed? Against the old regime. How then was it possible for the "collaborator and worthy assistant" of that regime to be pushed into the *back*ground? If it really were a collaborator and worthy assistant, then the greater its economic strength, which was independent of the old organisation of political power, the more vigorously it should have pushed into the *fore*ground.

How was it possible for the "collaborator and worthy assistant" of the old regime to find itself in a position where it "preferred to bide its time"?

Mr. Gushka set out to battle against the theory of the political enslavement of the economically dominating bourgeoisie, and got into a muddle the moment he tackled the job! Contrary to his view, the "theory" which he promised to demolish is reinforced by the course of events in 1905.

Both big commercial and industrial capital and the Russian bourgeois liberals, far from "biding their time" in 1905, took up a very definite counter-revolutionary position. The facts testifying to this are too well known. But there is no doubt that, compared with the forces of absolutism and the landlord class, the very big capital was to a certain extent "*pushed into the background*".

But how could it happen that in a bourgeois revolution the peak of "the sweeping tide of the popular movement" pushed the bourgeoisie into the background more than any other class?

It happened because only by completely distorting the concept of "bourgeois revolution" can one arrive at the view that the latter declines when the bourgeoisie recoils from it. It was bound to happen, because the chief driving force of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is the proletariat and the peasantry, with the bourgeoisie vacillating. Being politically enslaved by the landlords and absolutism, the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, takes a counter-revolutionary stand when the working-class movement grows in intensity. Hence its vacillations and its retreat into the "background". It is both against and for the old order. It is willing to help the old regime against the workers, but it is perfectly capable of "establishing" itself, and even of strengthening and expanding its domination without any landlords and without any remnants of the old political regime. This is clearly shown by the experience of America and other countries.

It is easy to understand, therefore, why the peak of "the sweeping tide of the popular movement" and the greatest weakening of the old regime can cause the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie to retreat hurriedly into the "background". This bourgeoisie is precisely the class which can be neutralised in the struggle between the new and the old, between democracy and medievalism; for, while it feels more at home, at ease and comfortable by the side of the old, this class can also exercise its rule in the event of the most complete victory of the new.

V

In speaking of the questionnaire of the Imperial Russian Technical Society, we cannot pass over in silence an article by Mr. A. Yermansky in Nos. 1-2 and 3 of the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*. Mr. Yermansky gives a most detailed account of Mr. Gushka's book, but not once does he indicate that he disagrees with him! As if a man who considers himself a Marxist could identify himself with the wishy-washy liberalism of a praiser of the commercial and industrial big-wigs!

Mr. Yermansky goes even further than Mr. Gushka in the direction of social-liberalism *à la* Brentano and Sombart,[51] slightly touched up to look like Marxism.

"The organisations of the representative type," writes Mr. Yermansky, "are organisations of class struggle in its full scope and on a national (partly even international) scale. The material provided by the questionnaire produces a picture of a practically boundless range of questions discussed by the organisations. The activity of our organisations extends to almost all problems of state importance, as was justly stated by the Yekaterinoslav Stock-Exchange Committee." That is how Mr. Yermansky talks in a magazine that claims to be Marxist! This talk is blatantly false from beginning to end. It substitutes the *liberal* concept of class struggle for that of the class struggle in the Marxian sense. It proclaims as being of national and state importance the very thing which lacks the main feature of what concerns the *whole* nation and the *whole* state: the organisation of state power and the entire sphere of "state" administration, state policy, etc.

See the lengths to which Mr. Yermansky goes in his misguided zeal. In disputing the view that "the capitalist bourgeoisie in Russia" (he means the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie) is flabby, underdeveloped, and so on, he seeks a "contemporary formula" that would express "the actual position of the big bourgeoisie in Russia".

And what happens? It turns out that Mr. Yermansky sees this formula in the words uttered by Avdakov in the Board of Mining during a debate (mark this!) on the adoption of *a new organisation of mining congresses with an elected chairman*. The practice (in Russia) has been such, said Avdakov, "that so far no one has ever hampered us in anything".

> "That," writes Mr. Yermansky, "is a formula which fits contemporary conditions to a T."

We should think so! As far as the organisation of mining congresses is concerned, no one has hampered the dull-witted merchants who are submissively bearing the yoke of the political privileges of the landlords! Instead of ridiculing the bombastic Kit Kitych[52] Avdakov, Mr. Yermansky strains every nerve in his zeal to assure people that Avdakov is not a Kit Kitych, that he has given a "contemporary formula" which expresses "the actual position of the big

bourgeoisie in Russia"! As for Kit Kitych Avdakov, he is the perfect image of a portly butler who never dared even to think of becoming full master *in place of* his lord and who is touched by the fact that his lord permits him to confer in the servants' hall with the chambermaid, the cook, etc.

The following tirade in Mr. Yermansky's article shows that it is this difference between the status of the butler and the master that he refuses to understand:

> "Here again," he writes, "it will not be superfluous to make one comparison. Everybody remembers how emphatically and with how much publicity, so to speak, the aspirations of the Zemstvo members 'to take part in the affairs of internal administration' were described as 'absurd dreams'. On the other hand, the St. Petersburg Stock-Exchange Committee, which declared, as early as the pre-constitution period, that it was necessary 'to extend as far as possible the right of the stock-exchange societies [note this!] to take part in administrative affairs', was fully justified in adding: 'Such a right of the stock-exchange societies would not constitute any innovation, for the stock-exchange societies already enjoy it in part.' That was 'an absurd dream' in the case of others, was no dream, but reality, an element of a real constitution, in the case of the representatives of big capital."

"Was", but not quite, Mr. Yermansky! Your "comparison" betrays your inability or unwillingness to distinguish between the aspiration (of the landlord class) to become *full* master itself and the aspiration (of the village elder who has grown rich) to consult with the master's *other servants*. here is a world of difference between the two.

It is only natural that Mr. Yermansky should arrive at conclusions entirely in the spirit of Larin. The representatives of big capital in Russia, says Mr. Yermansky, "long ago won the position of a ruling class in the full sense of the term".

This is false from beginning to end. Mr. Yermansky has forgotten *both* the autocracy *and* the fact that power and revenues are still in the hands of the feudal landlords. He is wrong in thinking that "*only* in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century" did our autocracy "cease to be *exclusively* feudal". This "exclusiveness" no longer existed as far back as the epoch of Alexander II, compared with the epoch of Nicholas I. But it is absolutely impermissible to confuse a feudal regime which is shedding the quali-

ties that make it *exclusively* feudal, and which is taking steps towards a bourgeois monarchy, with "the complete domination of the representatives of big capital".

VI

The editors of *Nasha Zarya*, as usual, added a little "reservation" to Mr. Yermansky's article, saying that the author "underestimates the importance which direct participation in the exercise of political power has for it" (the big bourgeoisie).

The method of making little reservations has firmly established itself among the liquidators. In a series of articles, Yermansky expounds in great detail views on the class struggle that are inspired by liberalism. What the magazine preaches is liberalism. As for the "reminiscences of the glorious days" of Marxism, they are squeezed into two lines of a footnote! The readers of *Nasha Zarya* are being brought up in the spirit of liberalism, which is substituted for Marxism, and the editors wash their hands of it—by a little reservation, in just the same way as in the Cadet *Rech*.[53]

The point is not only that Mr. Yermansky "underestimates" a certain aspect of the issue. The point is that his view on the class struggle is wrong from beginning to end. The point is that he makes a fundamental mistake in appraising the social organisation of the autocracy. We pointed out long ago, and shall not cease to point out, that *this* question *cannot be evaded* by ridiculing "the answers of 1908" (or 1912), etc. This question *cannot* be evaded in any political writing that is at all serious.

The difference of opinion between Yermansky and Larin, on the one hand, and the editors of *Nasha Zarya*, on the other, is a difference between frank and, in their own way, honest liquidators and the diplomats of liquidationism. We should have no illusions on this score.

Larin wrote that the state power in our country has already become bourgeois. Therefore the workers must organise, not in expectation of a revolution (and not "for revolution", he added), but for taking part in the constitutional renovation of the country. Yermansky, who approaches the question

from a *different* angle, repeats in substance Larin's *first* premise; but he only hints at the conclusions, without stating them plainly.

Martov "corrected" Larin in the same way as the editors of *Nasha Zarya* are correcting Yermansky, saying that the state power is not bourgeois as yet, and it will be "enough" for the workers to seize on the contradiction between constitutionalism and absolutism.

Thus the result is agreement between Martov (plus the editors of *Nasha Zarya*) and Larin-Yermansky as regards the conclusions, which is quite natural considering their agreement on the fundamental premises of the liberal view on labour policy.

We, however, still believe this view to be fundamentally wrong. The point is not whether Yermansky "underestimates" or Martov "overestimates" the "leftward trend" of the Guchkovs, Ryabushinskys and Co. It is not whether Yermansky "underestimates" or Martov "overestimates" the "importance which direct participation in the exercise of political power has for the *bourgeoisie*". The point is that *both* of them not only "underestimate", but simply do not *appreciate* the importance which "direct participation in the exercise of political power" has for the *working class*, and for the bourgeois democracy that is following its lead and is free from the present-day waverings of the liberals! Both of them have in mind only *one* "political power" and forget about the *other*.

Both of them are looking up to the top and do not see the lower ranks. But if a dozen Ryabushinskys and a hundred Milyukovs are grumbling and giving vent to liberal indignation, that *means* that tens of millions of petty bourgeois and of "small folk" in all walks of life feel that their condition is unbearable. And these millions, too, are a potential source of "political power". Only the rallying of such democratic elements against the Rights and regardless of the vacillation of the liberals can "solve" the problems with which history has confronted Russia since the beginning of the twentieth century.

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THE ESSENCE OF "THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN RUSSIA"

An "agrarian problem"—to use this common and accepted term—exists in all capitalist countries. In Russia, however, there exists, *alongside* the general capitalist agrarian problem, *another*, "truly Russian" agrarian problem. As a brief indication of the difference between the two agrarian problems, we may point out that no civilised capitalist country has any widespread democratic movement of small landowners for the transfer of big landed estates into their hands.

In Russia there *is* such a movement. Accordingly, in no European country, except Russia, do the Marxists put forward or support the demand for the transfer of the land to the small landowners. An inevitable effect of the agrarian problem in Russia is that *all* Marxists recognise this demand, despite disagreements over the *manner* in which tenure and disposal of the transferred land should be organised (division, municipalisation, nationalisation).

Why the difference between "Europe" and Russia? Is it due to the distinctive character of Russia's development, to the absence of capitalism in Russia, or to the special hopelessness and irremediability of our capitalism? That is what the Narodniks of various shades think. But this view is radically wrong, and events disproved it long ago.

The difference between "Europe" and Russia stems from Russia's extreme backwardness. In the West, the bourgeois agrarian system is fully established, feudalism was swept away long ago, and its survivals are negligible and play no serious role. The predominant type of social relationship in Western agriculture is that between the *wage-labourer* and the employer, the farmer or landowner. The small cultivators occupy an intermediary position, some of them

passing into the class of those who hire themselves out, who sell their labour-power (the numerous forms of the peasant's so-called auxiliary work or subsidiary earnings), while others pass into the class of those who hire (the number of labourers hired by small cultivators is much greater than is generally believed).

Undoubtedly, a system of agriculture just as capitalist has already become firmly established and is steadily developing in Russia. It is in this direction that both landlord and peasant farming is developing. But purely capitalist relations in our country are still overshadowed to a *tremendous* extent by *feudal* relations. The distinctive character of the Russian agrarian problem lies in the struggle which the mass of the population, above all of the peasantry as a whole, are waging against these relations. In the West *this* kind of "problem" existed everywhere in olden days, but it was solved there long ago. In Russia, its solution has been delayed —the problem was not solved by the agrarian "Reform" of 1861, *nor can* it be solved under present conditions by the Stolypin agrarian policy.

In the article "Landownership in European Russia" (*Nevskaya Zvezda*[54] No. 3),* we cited the main data revealing the nature of the agrarian problem in present-day Russia.

About 70 million dessiatines of land owned by 30,000 of the biggest landlords, and about as much owned by 10 million peasant households—such is the main background of the picture. What are the economic relations to which this picture testifies?

The 30,000 big landlords represent chiefly the old landed nobility and the old feudal economy. Of the 27,833 owners of estates exceeding 500 dessiatines each, 18,102, or *nearly two-thirds*, are members of the nobility. The huge latifundia in their possession—each of these big landlords owns an average of more then 2,000 dessiatines!—cannot be cultivated with the implements, livestock and hired labour at the disposal of the owners. That being so, the old corvée system is largely inevitable, and this means small-scale cultivation, small-scale farming, on the big latifundia, the cultivation

* See pp. 32-35 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the landlords' land with the implements and livestock of the small peasants.

This corvée system is especially widespread, as we know, in the central, traditionally Russian, gubernias of European Russia, in the *heart* of our agriculture. So-called labour rent is nothing but a direct continuation and survival of the corvée system. The farming methods based on impossible terms of bondage, such as winter hiring,[55] work for the cut-off land,[56] "composite labour service",[57] and so on and so forth, are also part of the corvée system. Under this system of farming, the peasant "allotment" is a means of supplying the *landlord* with farm hands, and not only with farm hands but also with implements and livestock, which, wretched though they are, serve to cultivate the landlords' land.

Dire poverty of the mass of the peasantry, who are tied to their allotments but cannot subsist on them, extremely primitive agricultural techniques, and the extreme inadequacy of the home market for industry—such are the results of this state of affairs. And the present famine affecting 30 million peasants is the most striking proof that at bottom, in substance, this state of affairs has remained unchanged to this day. Only the serf-like downtroddenness, distress and helplessness of the mass of small proprietors in bondage *can* lead to such frightful mass starvation in an epoch of rapidly developing agricultural techniques, which have already achieved a relatively high standard (on the best capitalist farms).

The fundamental contradiction leading to such terrible calamities, which have been unknown to the peasants of Western Europe since the Middle Ages, is the contradiction between capitalism, which is highly developed in our industry and considerably developed in our agriculture, and *the system of landownership*, which remains medieval, feudal. There is no way out of this situation unless the old system of landownership is radically broken up.

Not only the landed property of the landlords, but that of the peasants as well is based on feudal relations. In the case of the former, this is so obvious as to arouse no doubts. We need only note that the abolition of the feudal latifundia, say, of those exceeding 500 dessiatines, will not undermine large-scale *production* in agriculture but will,

indeed, increase and develop it. For the feudal latifundia are bulwarks of *small-scale* farming based on bondage, and not of large-scale production. In most regions of Russia it is practically impossible or, at all events, exceedingly difficult to run *large farms* taking up as much as 500 or more dessiatines of land with the implements and livestock of the owner and with wage-labour. A *reduction* in the size of such estates is one of the conditions for small-scale farming on terms of bondage going out of existence and for agriculture passing to large-scale capitalist production.

On the other hand, the allotment form of peasant land tenure in Russia also retains medieval, feudal features. And it is not only a question of the juridical form, which is now being changed, in sergeant-major fashion, through the destruction of the village commune and the introduction of private land ownership; it is also a question of the *actual* nature of this ownership, which is unaffected by any break-up of the commune.

The actual condition of the vast mass of peasants holding small and dwarf "parcels" (= tiny plots of land), consisting mostly of several narrow strips far removed from each other and distinguished by soil of the poorest quality (due to the delimitation of the peasant land in 1861 under the supervision of the feudal landlords, and due to the exhaustion of the land), inevitably places them in a relation of bondage to the hereditary owner of the latifundium, the old "master".

Just keep clearly in mind the following picture: as against 30,000 owners of latifundia of 2,000 dessiatines each, there are 10,000,000 peasant households with 7 dessiatines of land per "average" household. It is obvious that no matter what destruction of the village commune and creation of private landownership takes place, this will *still not* be able to change the bondage, labour rent, corvée, feudal poverty, and feudal forms of dependence, stemming from this state of affairs.

The "agrarian problem" resulting from such a situation is the problem of doing away with the survivals of serfdom, which have become an intolerable obstacle to Russia's capitalist development. The agrarian problem in Russia is one of radically breaking up the old, medieval forms of land-

ownership, both that of the landlords and that of the allotment peasants—a break-up which has become absolutely indispensable in view of the extreme backwardness of this landownership, in view of the extreme disharmony between it and the whole system of the national economy, which has become capitalist.

It must be a radical break-up, because the disharmony is too great, the old is too old, and "the disease too neglected". In any event and in all its forms, this break-up is bound to be bourgeois in content, since Russia's entire economic life is already bourgeois, and the system of landownership is certain to become subordinate to it, to adapt itself to the dictates of the market, to the pressure of capital, which is omnipotent in our society today.

But while the break-up cannot fail to be radical and bourgeois, there is still this question to be answered: *which* of the two classes directly concerned, the landlords or the peasants, will carry out this change or direct it, determine its forms? Our next article, "A Comparison of the Stolypin and the Narodnik Agrarian Programmes",* will deal with this "unsolved problem".

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 6,
May 22, 1912
Signed: *R. S.*

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* See pp. 143-49 of this volume.—*Ed.*

SOME CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE PRE-ELECTION MOBILISATION

Almost all the political forces taking part in the elections to the Duma are by now finally organised. At any rate, the main party alignments have taken such definite shape that there can be no question of any serious and material changes.

The government began the election campaign long ago. The Rights, the nationalists, and the Octobrists are "at work" with the obvious assistance of the authorities. *Rech* recently published, and many newspapers have reprinted, the circular sent by the governors to the police chiefs about the adoption of "measures" to prevent "Left" candidates from being elected as delegates (particularly from the peasants) or electors. This circular lifts the veil somewhat from the "election" machinery of the Ministry of the Interior. Everything possible—and impossible—will undoubtedly be done in this quarter against the opposition. Not for nothing did Premier Kokovtsov, in his speech to the Moscow merchants, lay so much stress on the perniciousness of "opposition for the sake of opposition".

But while there can be no doubt about the zeal of the government and the police in the elections, it is just as undoubted that a widespread "leftward" swing has taken, or is taking, place in the sentiments of the voters. No stratagems of the government can alter this fact. On the contrary, all that stratagems and "measures" can accomplish is to increase discontent. And it is easy to understand that while this discontent among the big bourgeoisie is expressed by Shubinsky's "opposition" speech, by Ryabushinsky's "cautious" allusion to the desirability of "cultured methods of administration", or by caustic digs at the Ministry on the part of the Cadet

Rech, there is much keener and more serious discontent in the large circle of the "small people" who are dependent on the Ryabushinskys, Golovins and others.

What are the political alignments that have taken definite shape in the camp of the opposition, which gives political expression to this discontent? One group that has taken shape is the "responsible", liberal-monarchist opposition of the Cadets and the Progressists. The bloc of these two parties clearly denotes that the Cadets are much more "to the right" than they seem to be.

Another group that has taken shape is that of the working-class democracy, which has undertaken the task, not of "supporting" the Cadet-Progressist opposition, but of *utilising* the latter's conflicts with the Rights (including the nationalists and the Octobrists) to enlighten and organise the democratic forces. Lastly, the group of the bourgeois democracy has also taken shape: at the conference of the Trudoviks it declared in favour of agreements "in the first place, with the Social-Democrats", but it did not put forward any definite slogan calling for a fight against the counter-revolutionary liberalism of the Cadets, which means that in practice it is wavering between the two.

What are the conclusions to be drawn from this pre-election "political mobilisation" of the parties? The first and principal conclusion, which the working-class democrats drew long ago, is that there are *three*, not two, camps engaged in the contest. The liberals are eager to make it appear that the contest is really between two camps; and the liquidators, as has been shown on many occasions, are constantly slipping into an acceptance of the same view. "For or against a constitution?" is how the Cadets formulate the difference between the two camps. Actually, however, this formulation defines nothing at all, because the Octobrists, too, avow that they are constitutionalists, and indeed, generally speaking, it should be a question not of what can or cannot be called a constitution, but of the exact content of certain liberal or democratic demands.

It is the content of the demands, the real distinctions between the class tendencies, that differentiates the three camps: the Right, or government, camp; the camp of the liberal, or liberal-monarchist, bourgeoisie, which takes a

counter-revolutionary stand; and the democratic camp. Furthermore, it is not so much a question of "chances" under the existing electoral system, for the issue goes much deeper—it concerns the whole character of political propaganda during the elections, the whole ideological and political content of the election campaign.

In view of this state of affairs, the "strategy" of the liberals is daily directed towards taking the leadership of the "whole" opposition movement into their hands. The liberal *Zaprosy Zhizni* blurted out the "secret" of this strategy, so carefully kept by *Rech*. "The Progressists," writes Mr. R. B.[58] in *Zaprosy Zhizni* No. 13, "have opened their campaign by a promising move [!]—they formed the so-called 'non-partisan Progressist bloc', which proved from the first to have a strong appeal for the political opposition circles to the right of the Cadets." On the other hand, "the election platform of the Trudovik group, despite its vagueness—in part due to it, perhaps—meets the requirements of large sections of the democratic intelligentsia". "Under certain conditions, the Trudovik group to the left of the Cadets could perform a role similar to that undertaken by the Progressist group to the right of the Cadets. The opposition front would then be made up of mobile and wavering, but flexible extreme flanks, and an immobile but persistent centre, which strategically has its advantage in the political struggle as well."

What is in the thoughts of the Milyukovs and Shingaryovs is on R. B.'s tongue! It is precisely two "flexible" flanks that the Cadets need: the Progressists for netting the bourgeois June Third voter, and the "vague" democrats for netting the democratic-minded public. Indeed, this "strategy" follows from the very nature of the Cadet Party. It is the party of the counter-revolutionary liberals, which by fraudulent means has won the support of certain democratic strata, such as a section of the shop-assistants, office clerks, etc. What such a party needs is exactly the "non-partisan Progressist" as its real class bulwark, and the vague democrat as an attractive sales ticket.

The landlord Yefremov and the millionaire Ryabushinsky may be described as typical Progressists. The typical vague democrat is represented by the Trudovik in the Narodnik

camp and the liquidator in the Marxist camp. Take the whole history of the Cadet Party, and you will find that its method has *always* been democracy in words, and liberalism "of the Yefremov brand and acceptable to Ryabushinsky" in deeds. From the defeat of the plan for local land committees in 1906 to the vote for the budget in the Third Duma, or to Milyukov's[59] "London" slogans, etc., we see this very *nature* of the Cadet Party and its sham-democratic *attire*.

Mr. R. B. of *Zaprosy Zhizni* is so very clumsy that he inadvertently told the truth, which had been carefully kept from the democrats and muddled by the liberals. The programme of the Progressists, he confesses, "puts the issue on a firm and realistic basis! And yet that programme has nothing except general phrases in a purely Octobrist style (as, for instance, "the complete realisation of the Manifesto of October 17"[60]). What is described as a firm and realistic basis is the basis of a bourgeois liberalism so moderate, so mild and impotent, that it would be simply ridiculous to pin any hopes on it. Those who were "Peaceful Renovators"[61] in 1907, those who in the Third Duma steered a middle course between the Cadets and the Octobrists, are described as a firm and realistic basis!

The millionaire Ryabushinsky is a Progressist. *Utro Rossii*[62] is the mouthpiece of this and similar Progressists. And none other than *Rech*, the paper of the Cadets, who have formed a bloc with the Progressists, wrote: "*Utro Rossii*, organ of the Moscow industrialists, is gratified [by Kokovtsov's speech] more than anyone else.... It echoes Krestovnikov: 'Commercial and industrial Moscow can feel satisfied.'" And *Rech* added for its own part: "As far as *Golos Moskvy* and *Utro Rossii* are concerned, they are willing not to pursue any line, and feel perfectly satisfied."

The question arises: where is the evidence that Yefremov or other Progressists *have* a "line"? There is no such evidence. For democrats to support this sort of progressism, whether it is called progressism or Cadetism, would mean only surrendering their position. But using the conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the landlords, between the liberals and the Rights, is another matter. That is the only way in which a democrat can formulate his task.

To fulfil this task, to politically enlighten and organise

the very wide masses that are economically dependent on the Yefremovs and Ryabushinskys, one has to be well aware of the counter-revolutionary nature of Cadet and Progressist liberalism. The lack of this awareness is the chief defect of both the Trudoviks and the liquidators. The Trudoviks say nothing at all about the class characteristics of liberalism. The liquidators utter phrases about "wresting the *Duma* from the hands of the reactionaries", about the Cadets and Progressists coming closer to power, and about the historically progressive work they are doing (see Martov and Dan). Taken as a whole, it adds up to that very role of a Cadet "flank" which pleases R. B. so much.

To be sure, these are not the subjective wishes of the Trudoviks and the liquidators and, indeed, it is not a question of their subjective plans, but of the objective alignment of the social forces. And in spite of all the adherents of the idea of two camps, in spite of the malicious shouts about disorganisation in the workers' democratic movement (see the same article by Mr. R. B.), this alignment clearly shows us that a third camp has formed. Its line is clearly presented and is known to all. The anti-liquidationist workers are pursuing this line, rallying all the democrats in the struggle *both* against the Rights *and* against the liberals. Without entertaining any illusions about the impotent liberalism of the Cadets, who are grovelling before the reaction in all fundamental questions, the workers are using clashes between that liberalism and the reaction to promote their own cause, their own class organisation, their own democracy, which is now quietly ripening in the broad mass of the people enslaved by the Yefremovs and Ryabushinskys.

Thanks to the anti-liquidationist tactics of the workers, the fight between the Rights and the "responsible" opposition must, and will, serve to develop the political consciousness and independent organisation of an "opposition" which lays no claim to the scarcely honourable title of "responsible".

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRIKES

Ever since 1905 the official strike statistics kept by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry have subdivided strikes into economic and political. This subdivision was necessitated by reality, which has evolved *distinctive* forms of the strike movement. The combination of economic and political strike is one of the main features of these forms. And now that there is a revival of the strike movement, it is in the interest of a scientific analysis, of an intelligent attitude to events, that the workers should look closely into this distinctive feature of the strike movement in Russia.

To begin with, we shall cite several basic figures taken from the government strike statistics. For three years, 1905-07, the strike movement in Russia kept at a height *unprecedented in the world*. Government statistics cover only factories, so that mining, railways, building and numerous other branches of wage-labour are left out. But even in factories alone, the number of strikers was 2,863,000, or a little less than 3 million, in 1905, 1,108,000 in 1906, and 740,000 in 1907. In the fifteen years from 1894 to 1908, during which strike statistics began to be systematically studied in Europe, the greatest number of strikers for one year—60,000—was registered in America.

Consequently, the Russian workers were *the first in the world* to develop the strike struggle on the mass scale that we witnessed in 1905-07. Now it is the British workers who have lent a new great impetus to the strike movement with regard to economic strikes. The Russian workers owe their leading role, not to greater strength, better organisation or higher development compared with the workers in Western Europe, but to the fact that so far Europe has not

gone through great national crises with the proletarian masses taking an independent part in them. When such crises do set in, mass strikes in Europe will be even more powerful than they were in Russia in 1905.

What was the ratio of economic to political strikes in that period? Government statistics give the following answer:

Number of strikers (thousands)

	1905	1906	1907
Economic strikes	1,439	458	200
Political strikes	1,424	650	540
Total	2,863	1,108	740

This shows the close and inseparable connection between the two kinds of strike. When the movement was at its highest (1905), the *economic* basis of the struggle was the broadest; in that year the political strike rested on the firm and solid basis of economic strikes. The number of economic strikers was *greater* than that of political strikers.

We see that as the movement declined, in 1906 and 1907, the economic basis *contracted*: the number of economic strikers dropped to 0.4 of the total number of strikers in 1906 and to 0.3 in 1907. Consequently, the economic and the political strike support each other, each being a source of strength for the other. Unless these forms of strike are closely interlinked, a really wide mass movement—moreover, a movement of *national* significance—is impossible. When the movement is in its early stage, the economic strike often has the effect of awakening and stirring up the backward, of making the movement a general one, of raising it to a higher plane.

In the first quarter of 1905, for instance, economic strikes noticeably predominated over political strikes, the number of strikers being 604,000 in the former case and only 206,000 in the latter. In the last quarter of 1905, however, the ratio was reversed: 430,000 workers took part in economic strikes, and 847,000 in political strikes. This means that in the early stage of the movement many workers put the economic struggle first, while at the height of the movement it was the

other way round. But *all the time* there was a *connection* between the economic and the political strike. Without such a connection, we repeat, it is impossible to have a really great movement, one that achieves great aims.

In a political strike, the working class comes forward as the advanced class of the whole people. In such cases, the proletariat plays not merely the role of one of the classes of bourgeois society, but the role of guide, vanguard, leader. The political ideas manifested in the movement involve the whole people, i.e., they concern the basic, most profound conditions of the political life of the whole country. This character of the political strike, as has been noted by all scientific investigators of the period 1905-07, brought into the movement all the classes, and particularly, of course, the widest, most numerous and most democratic sections of the population, the peasantry, and so forth.

On the other hand, the mass of the working people will never agree to conceive of a general "progress" of the country without economic demands, without an immediate and direct improvement in their condition. The masses are drawn into the movement, participate vigorously in it, value it highly and display heroism, self-sacrifice, perseverance and devotion to the great cause only if it makes for improving the economic condition of those who work. Nor can it be otherwise, for the living conditions of the workers in "ordinary" times are incredibly hard. As it strives to improve its living conditions, the working class also progresses morally, intellectually and politically, becomes more capable of achieving its great emancipatory aims.

The strike statistics published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry fully bear out this tremendous significance of the economic struggle of the workers in the period of a general revival. The stronger the onslaught of the workers, the greater their achievements in improving their standard of living. The "sympathy of society" and better conditions of life are both results of a high degree of development of the struggle. Whereas the liberals (and the liquidators) tell the workers: "You are strong when you have the sympathy of 'society'", the Marxist tells the workers something different, namely: "You have the sympathy of 'society' when you are strong." What we mean by society in this case is all

the various democratic sections of the population, the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants, and the intellectuals, who are in close touch with the life of the workers, office employees, etc.

The strike movement was strongest in 1905. And what was the result? We see that in that year the workers achieved the greatest improvements in their condition. Government statistics show that in 1905 *only* 29 out of every 100 strikers stopped their fight without having gained *anything*, i.e., were completely defeated. In the previous ten years (1895-1904), as many as 52 strikers out of 100 stopped fighting without having gained anything! It follows that the large scale of the struggle contributed immensely to its *success*, almost doubling it.

When the movement began to decline, the success of the struggle began to diminish accordingly. In 1906, 33 strikers out of 100 stopped fighting without having gained anything, or having been defeated, to be exact; in 1907 the figure was 58, and in 1908, as high as 69 out of 100!!

Thus the scientific statistical data over a number of years fully confirm the personal experience and observations of every class-conscious worker as regards the necessity of combining the economic and the political strike, and the inevitability of this combination in a really broad movement of the whole people.

The present strike wave likewise fully confirms this conclusion. In 1911 the number of strikers was double that in 1910 (100,000 against 50,000), but even so their number was extremely small; purely economic strikes remained a relatively "narrow" cause, they did not assume national significance. On the other hand, today it is obvious to one and all that the strike movement following the well-known events of last April had *precisely this* significance.[63]

It is therefore highly important to rebuff from the outset the attempts of the liberals and liberal labour politicians (liquidators) to *distort* the character of the movement. Mr. Severyanin, a liberal, contributed to *Russkiye Vedomosti*[64] an article *against* "admixing" economic or "any other [aha!] demands" to the May Day strike, and the Cadet *Rech* sympathetically reprinted in the main passages of the article.

"More often than not" writes the liberal gentleman, "it is unreasonable to link such strikes with May Day.... Indeed, it would be

rather strange to do so: we are celebrating the international workers' holiday, and we use the occasion to demand a ten per cent rise for calico of such-and-such grades." (*Rech* No. 132.)

What is quite clear to the workers seems "strange" to the liberal. Only the defenders of the bourgeoisie and its excessive profits can sneer at the demand for a "rise". But the workers know that it is the *widespread* character of the demand for a rise, it is the *comprehensive* character of a strike, that has the greatest power to attract a multitude of new participants, to ensure the strength of the onslaught and the sympathy of society, and to guarantee both the success of the workers and the national significance of their movement. That is why it is necessary to fight with determination against the liberal distortion preached by Mr. Severyanin, *Russkiye Vedomosti* and *Rech*, and to warn the workers in every way against this kind of sorry advisers.

Mr. V. Yezhov, a liquidator, writing in the very first issue of the liquidationist *Nevsky Golos*,[65] offers a similar purely liberal distortion, although he approaches the question from a somewhat different angle. He dwells in particular on the strikes provoked by the May Day fines. Correctly pointing out that the workers are not sufficiently organised, the author draws from his correct statement conclusions that are quite wrong and most harmful to the workers. Mr. Yezhov sees a lack of organisation in the fact that while in one factory the workers struck merely in protest, in another they added economic demands, etc. Actually, however, this *variety* of forms of strike does not in itself indicate any lack of organisation at all; it is ridiculous to imagine that organisation necessarily means uniformity! Lack of organisation is not at all to be found where Mr. Yezhov looks for it.

But his *conclusion* is still worse:

"Owing to this [i.e., owing to the variety of the strikes and to the different forms of the combination of economics and politics], the principle involved in the protest (after all, it was not over a few kopeks that the strike was called) became obscured in a considerable number of cases, being complicated by economic demands...."

This is a truly outrageous, thoroughly false and thoroughly liberal argument! To think that the demand "for a few kopeks" is *capable* of "obscuring" the principle involved in the

protest means sinking to the level of a Cadet. On the contrary, Mr. Yezhov, the demand for "a few kopeks" deserves full recognition and not a sneer! On the contrary, Mr. Yezhov, that demand, *far from* "obscuring" "the principle involved in the protest", *emphasises* it! Firstly, the question of a higher standard of living is *also* a question of principle, and a most important one; secondly, whoever protests, not against one, but against two, three, etc., manifestations of oppression, does not thereby weaken his protest but strengthens it.

Every worker will indignantly reject Mr. Yezhov's outrageous liberal distortion of the matter.

In the case of Mr. Yezhov, it is by no means a slip of the pen. He goes on to say even more outrageous things:

> "Their own experience should have suggested to the workers that it was inadvisable to complicate their protest by economic demands, just as it is inadvisable to complicate an ordinary strike by a demand involving a principle."

This is untrue, a thousand times untrue! The *Nevsky Golos* has disgraced itself by printing such stuff. What Mr. Yezhov thinks inadvisable is perfectly advisable. Both each worker's *own experience* and the experience of a very large number of Russian workers in the recent past testify to *the reverse* of what Mr. Yezhov preaches.

Only liberals can object to "complicating" even the most "ordinary" strike by "demands involving principles". That is the first point. Secondly, our liquidator is sorely mistaken in measuring the present movement with the yardstick of an "ordinary" strike.

And Mr. Yezhov is wasting his time in trying to cover up his liberal contraband with someone else's flag, in confusing the question of *combining* the economic and the political strike with the question of *preparations* for the one or the other! Of course, it is most desirable to make preparations and to be prepared, and to do this as thoroughly, concertedly, unitedly, intelligently and firmly as possible. That is beyond dispute. But, contrary to what Mr. Yezhov says, it is necessary to make preparations precisely for a *combination* of the two kinds of strike.

> "A period of economic strikes is ahead of us," writes Mr. Yezhov. "It would be an irreparable mistake to allow them to become inter-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

twined with political actions of the workers. Such combination would have a harmful effect on both the economic and the political struggle of the workers."

One could hardly go to greater lengths! These words show in the clearest possible way that the liquidator has sunk to the level of an ordinary liberal. Every sentence contains an error! We must convert every sentence into its *direct* opposite to get at the truth!

It is not true that a period of economic strikes is ahead of us. Quite the reverse. What we have ahead of us is a period of something more than just economic strikes. We are facing a period of political strikes. The facts, Mr. Yezhov, are stronger than your liberal distortions; and if you could look at the statistical cards dealing with strikes, which are filed in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, you would see that *even* these government statistics fully refute you.

It is not true that "intertwining" would be a mistake. Quite the reverse. It would be an irreparable mistake if the workers failed to understand the great singularity, the great significance, the great necessity, and the great fundamental importance of precisely such "intertwining". Fortunately, however, the workers understand this perfectly, and they brush aside with contempt the preaching of liberal labour politicians.

Lastly, it is not true that such intertwining "would have a harmful effect" on both forms. Quite the reverse. It *benefits* both. It strengthens both.

Mr. Yezhov lectures some "hotheads" whom he seems to have discovered. Listen to this:

"It is necessary to give organisational form to the sentiments of the workers...." This is gospel truth! "It is necessary to increase propaganda for trade unions, to recruit new members for them...."

Quite true, but—*but*, Mr. Yezhov, it is impermissible to *reduce* "organisational form" to the trade unions alone. Remember this, Mr. Liquidator!

"This is all the more necessary since there are many hotheads among the workers nowadays who are carried away by the mass movement and speak at meetings *against unions*, alleging them to be useless and unnecessary."

This is a liberal slur on the workers. It is not "against unions" that the workers—who have been, and always will be, a thorn in the side of the liquidators—have been coming out. No, the workers have been coming out against the attempt to *reduce* the organisational form to "trade unions" alone, an attempt which is so evident from Mr. Yezhov's preceding sentence.

The workers have been coming out, not "against unions", but against the liberal distortion of the nature of the struggle they are waging, a distortion which pervades the whole of Mr. Yezhov's article.

The Russian workers have become sufficiently mature politically to realise the great significance of their movement for the whole people. They are sufficiently mature to see how very false and paltry liberal labour policy is and they will always brush it aside with contempt.

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THE PROBLEM OF RESETTLEMENT

As we know, the government and the counter-revolutionary parties had placed especially great hopes in the settlement of peasants on new land. All the counter-revolutionaries expected that if it would not solve the agrarian problem radically, then at least it would blunt it considerably and render it much less dangerous. That is why they advertised resettlement with particular zeal and encouraged it in every way at the imminent approach, and then during the development, of the peasant movement in European Russia.

What is in the thoughts of the government representatives and the more far-sighted politicians of, say, the Octobrist Party, is on the tongue of such undisguised reactionaries as Markov the Second, the diehard[66] from Kursk. During the debate on the resettlement problem in the Duma, this deputy declared frankly, with praiseworthy straightforwardness: "Yes, it is by means of resettlement that the government should solve the agrarian problem." (First Session.)

There is no doubt that resettlement, if properly organised, could play a role of some importance in Russia's economic development. To be sure, this role must not be overrated even today, when the condition of the Russian muzhik is so intolerable that he is willing to go anywhere, not only to Siberia, but to the end of the world; even today, when the peasants who own little or no land are encouraged in every way to migrate and settle as colonists, so as to keep them from the temptation of contemplating the landlords' latifundia, and when the decree of November 9[67] has greatly facilitated for the settlers the liquidation of the remnants of their farms at home; even today, as even the apologists of the theory of a natural population increase must

admit. It is only in the gubernias that provide the largest percentage of emigrants (the South, West, and the black-earth central area of Russia), that their number equals the natural increase of the population, or slightly exceeds it.

Nevertheless, there is still a substantial reserve of unoccupied land in Siberia suitable for resettlement. True, very little has been done so far to ascertain the extent of that reserve even approximately. In 1896 Kulomzin set the reserve of land fit for resettlement at 130,000 per capita allotments. Since then ten times as many allotments have been apportioned, but the reserve has not yet been exhausted. On the contrary, according to estimates of the Resettlement Department, by 1900 the reserve of land suitable for resettlement amounted to three million per capita allotments, sufficient to provide for six million settlers. As we see, the figures differ considerably, and the range of the variation between them is very great.

Be that as it may, even discounting a certain percentage of the last-mentioned figures to allow for the usual bureaucratic complacency, it is certain that there is still a reserve of land in Siberia and that, consequently, its settlement could have a certain importance both for Siberia and Russia, provided it was properly organised.

It is just this *conditio sine qua non* that the present government does not comply with. The present organisation of resettlement once again demonstrates and proves that our "old order" is quite incapable of meeting even the most elementary economic requirements of the population. The bad organisation of resettlement is additional evidence that the present masters of the situation are powerless to do anything at all for the economic progress of the country.

An explanation of the trend, character and implementation of the resettlement policy was given by the Social-Democratic deputies to the Duma in their speeches during each year's discussion of budget appropriations for the Resettlement Department.

What is the government's aim in resettling the peasants? That is the main question, the answer to which determines the answer to all the others; for the aim of the government's resettlement policy determines its entire character.

Deputy Voiloshnikov, who spoke for the Social-Democrat-

ic group at the Second Session of the Duma, described as follows the government's aims in resettling the peasants: "The resettlement policy is an element of the government's agrarian policy as a whole. When the landlords needed economically weak or insecure peasants as a source of cheap labour, the government did everything to impede resettlement and to keep the surplus population where it was. What is more, it strongly opposed voluntary migration, trying thereby to close that safety valve. But the natural growth of the population went on, and times changed. Storm clouds—the proletariat and the starving peasantry—loomed large, with all their consequences. The government and the landlords seized upon resettlement, which, together with the decree of November 9, they made the basis of their agrarian policy. However, in regard to implementing the decree, attention was centred on the economically strong and prosperous, on taking the land from the poor and transferring it to the prosperous peasants. But in regard to resettlement it is a matter of packing off the poor peasants to Siberia in as large numbers as possible; and while lately there has been evidence of a tendency to an increase in the average proportion of prosperous settlers, the bulk still consists of weak peasants, to use Stolypin's terminology. The land committees are also taking part, or, I should say, have been enlisted to take part in this business of packing off peasants in increased numbers.

"The land committees have been charged with assigning the settlers their plots and thus putting an end to the former agrarian disorders. It follows, gentlemen, that the decree of November 9, the vigorous advertisement of resettlement, the vigorous drive to pack off the weak peasants to Siberia, and the activities of the land committees are two closely connected aspects of the same problem and the same policy. It will be readily seen that the implementation of the decree of November 9 helps settlement of the prosperous and strong on the allotments at the expense of the weak peasants, and will thereby help to squeeze out these weak elements, who are not very suitable as settlers, into border regions that are alien to them. Both as regards the village commune and migration, the government's resettlement policy has been guided solely by the interests of a handful of semi-feudal landlords

and of the ruling classes in general, who are oppressing the masses of workers and the labouring peasantry. The government shows no understanding of the elementary requirements of the country and of the needs of the national economy." (Second Session, 77th sitting.)

This aspect of the matter was disclosed most fully by Deputy Chkheidze (in his speech during the Second Session of the Duma), who drew a detailed picture of the resettlement policy in the Caucasus.

To begin with, the Social-Democratic deputy proved by facts and figures that all the official reports about vacant land in the Caucasus are in glaring conflict with the truth. It should be specially stressed that Deputy Chkheidze, in order to forestall any accusation of partiality or distortion, used only official data and the reports of government officials. According to the figures collected as long ago as the eighties by the former Minister of State Property, "among the state peasants alone, who have been settled on state land in the Caucasus, there were, in the four Transcaucasian gubernias, 22,000 persons who owned no land at all, 66,000 with allotments of less than one dessiatine per capita, 254,000 with allotments of from one to two dessiatines per capita, and 5,013 with allotments of from two to four dessiatines, a total of about 1,000,000 persons having smaller allotments than the minimum fixed for the settlers who have established themselves in the Caucasus. In Kutais Gubernia, 2,541 out of 29,977 household owned no land or less than one dessiatine per household, 4,227 owned from one to two dessiatines per household, 4,016 from two to three, and 5,321 from three to five. According to the latest data, 46 per cent of the villages in the four Transcaucasian gubernias had no state land at all or very little, and in Kutais Gubernia the number of unprovided households was approximately 33 per cent of the total. From the report of the Baku Committee on the needs of the agricultural industries we know that such villages insufficiently provided with land send the landless peasants to take up their residence with those owning large allotments and they remain for many years in this dependent position. And Senator Kuzminsky, in a report submitted to the Emperor, says the following: 'It has been noted that

sometimes the settlers consist of persons who have given up farming and lease the land received for purposes of resettlement to fellow villagers or to native peasants in a neighbouring village.' Thus even twenty-five years ago there were in Transcaucasia hundreds of thousands of state peasants—who, one would think, should have been better provided than other categories of peasants, and whom one could describe without exaggeration as farm labourers. As far back as some twenty-five years ago the local peasants were compelled to rent the land that was allotted to settlers".

Such are the data enabling us to judge of the extent to which the state peasants in the Caucasus are provided with land.

"As for the so-called temporarily bonded[68] peasants," the speaker went on to say, "we see from an examination of the verified deeds that in Tiflis Gubernia 1,444 households were left without any land and 386 households received no land even for their dwelling-houses and gardens. They comprise 13 per cent of the total number of landlords' peasants in Tiflis Gubernia. In Kutais Gubernia there was an even greater number of peasants left without land after the Reform. Even if we take the Tiflis ratio to apply to the former serfs in all the gubernias, we get in Kutais Gubernia 5,590 households, representing 25,000 persons, who received not a single patch of land when the peasants were emancipated in the Caucasus. Twenty years after the Reform, in 1895, continues the author of the memorandum on the abolition of obligatory relations, there were in Yelisavetpol Gubernia 5,308 landless households, or 25,000 persons of both sexes. In Baku Gubernia there were 3,906 households, or 11,709 landless persons of both sexes. And here are data on the amount of land held by the peasants who were temporarily bonded and who have not redeemed their allotments but have some kind of farm. In Tiflis Gubernia the per capita amount is 0.9 dessiatine, and in Kutais Gubernia 0.6 dessiatine. Among those who have redeemed their allotments, the per capita holdings amount to 1.7 dessiatines in Tiflis Gubernia and to 0.7 dessiatine in Kutais Gubernia. That is the extent to which peasants having some sort of farm are provided with land. We find a general description of the economic position of the peasants in the Caucasus in the report of the Kutais Gubernia Committee on the needs of the agricultural industries. According to data culled from various official investigations, the proportion of peasants suffering acute want in Kutais Gubernia is as high as 70 per cent. Furthermore, it is also pointed out that 25 per cent of the nobility in that gubernia are suffering acute want.

"Owners of such plots of land can retain their economic independence," the report goes on to say, "only if they have earnings outside their farms, and they are in no position to spend anything at all on improvements, implements and fertiliser. The big demand could not but have an effect on the cost of renting allotments, which is as high

as 60 per cent of the gross income in the case of the share-cropping system, and sometimes, in years of a poor crop, payment in the form of a definite quantity of the produce of the land exceeds the gross income. Cases of land being leased for money are rare, and the rent amounts to 30 rubles per dessiatine a year. This is the situation in Kutais Gubernia. And now a few figures on the amount of land held by the peasants in four uyezds of Yelisavetpol Gubernia. According to data concerning all the peasants who live on the owner's land, the holdings in four uyezds of Yelisavetpol Gubernia, namely, Jibrail, Zangezur, Shusha and Jevanshir, are up to 0.6 dessiatine per person. Senator Kuzminsky has calculated that the average allotment per male person among the peasants settled on the owner's land in Lenkoran Uyezd of Baku Gubernia amounts to 0.5 dessiatine, and in Kuba Uyezd to 0.9 dessiatine. That, gentlemen," the speaker concluded, "is how the peasants in Transcaucasia are provided with land."

Since the condition of the Caucasian peasants as regards land-hunger differs but little from that of the peasants in Russia, where, one may ask, does the reserve of land for resettlement in the Caucasus come from, and why are people sent there as settlers, instead of resettlement of the local peasants being carried out?

The land for resettlement is obtained as a result of flagrant violation of the land rights of the native inhabitants, and the settlement of peasants from Russia is carried on for the glory of the old nationalist principle of "Russification of the outlying regions".

Deputy Chkheidze cited a number of facts, likewise culled from official sources, about how whole villages of natives were driven from their homes so that a reserve of land might be created for resettlement, how court trials were engineered to justify the expropriation of land held by mountaineers (report on the mountain village of Kiknaveleti, Kutais Uyezd, submitted by Prince Tsereteli, Marshal of the Nobility, to the Minister of the Interior), etc. Nor were all these isolated or exceptional facts but "typical cases", as was also established by Senator Kuzminsky.

The result is downright hostile relations between the settlers and the natives. Thus, for instance, when the Alar community was driven from its lands, "evicted", to quote Senator Kuzminsky, "without being provided with land, and left to its fate", the settlers who seized its land were armed at government expense: the uyezd rural superintendents[69] were ordered to "see to it that the peasants of the newly-

established villages on the Mugan, including those from Pokrovskoye, were supplied with arms—ten Berdan rifles for each hundred households". This is an interesting illustration of the "nationalist course" of the present policy.

Nevertheless, Right-wing deputies to the Duma spoke triumphantly of the existence of a reserve for resettlement amounting to 1,700,000 dessiatines, citing the report of the Vice-Gerent of the Caucasus to this effect. However, according also to the testimony of the Vice-Gerent, nearly half of this reserve has already been taken over by settlers, while a considerable part of it is situated in areas where —according again to the Vice-Gerent's evidence—it is physically impossible for cultivators unaccustomed to the conditions to engage in farming.

Deputy Chkheidze also spoke of the way in which the government provides for the new settlers. "Inadequate water supply and lack of irrigation on the land set aside for resettlement," says the report of the Vice-Gerent, "particularly in the eastern areas of Transcaucasia, is one of the main reasons why many peasants already settled migrate back again. In the Black Sea region the new settlers are deserting their farms because of the absence of roads suitable for wheeled traffic not only between the various settlements, but even within each of the resettlement areas. To this it should be added that in their turn the unfavourable climatic conditions, to which the settlers are unaccustomed and which are attended in many parts of the Caucasus by malaria that affects not only people but livestock as well, no less than the lack of roads, cause the less sturdy of the new settlers to flee from the Caucasus. Due to the above-mentioned causes there is a continuous migration in evidence from the Yelisavetpol and Baku gubernias and from Daghestan Region, as well as from the Tiflis and Black Sea gubernias."

The upshot is that the results of the resettlement in the Caucasus are assessed by the Vice-Gerent himself as follows: "The attitude taken so far to the Caucasian population and its land affairs can no longer be tolerated, if only because it undoubtedly plays a rather prominent part in fostering revolutionary sentiments among the rural population."

The government and the ruling classes are pursuing very similar aims in settling peasants in Siberia; here, too, in

view of the political objectives involved, no consideration whatever is given either to the interests of the settlers or to the rights of the old residents.

In the emigration areas, in Russia, resettlement matters have now been entrusted to the land committees, the rural superintendents and the governors. Vitally interested as they are in reducing the number of peasants with little or no land and in leaving only as many of them as are needed to provide for the requirements of the big landowners (as a source of supply of wage-labour), the land committees have shown such zeal in "moving" poor peasants as to shock even the Resettlement Department. "The land committees," complained one official of the Department, "form parties of completely destitute people who at the outset need an allowance for their travelling expenses, who need a loan not for setting up a home but for food; and even if, as an exception, a settler happens to have some little money, he spends it all on fares and food."

Swarms of these "weak" foster-children of the land policy which proclaimed as its motto "stake on the strong" are being sent off to Siberia in unaltered cattle wagons, packed chock-full with old men, children, pregnant women. In these cattle wagons (which bear the famous inscription: "40 men, 8 horses"), the emigrants have to cook their food and wash their linen; lying in them, too, are often persons afflicted with contagious diseases, whom the emigrants usually keep out sight lest they be removed from the train and thus fall behind the party. At terminal points and stations the emigrants are at best provided with tents; in the worst cases they are left in the open, with no shelter from sun or rain. Deputy Voiloshnikov told the Duma that at Sretensk he had seen people stricken with typhus lying in the open, with no protection from the rain. And conditions such as those described above, under which the peasants have to travel, two Ministers (Stolypin and Krivoshein) find to be "tolerable". "The sanitary conditions provided for the settlers on their way are tolerable," they wrote in a report to the Emperor; "many of them even find conveniences en route to which they have not been accustomed." Truly, there is no limit to bureaucratic complacency!

After going through such ordeals on their way to "the

promised land", the poorest emigrants find no happiness in Siberia either. Here, for instance, is how Deputy Voiloshnikov described their condition in the new places of settlement by quoting from official reports.

One official (a special inspector of the Resettlement Department) writes: "Most of the lots are scattered among taiga forests without water, without ploughland, and without pastures." Another adds: "The granting of loans has entirely lost its significance as a means for setting up homes; the amount of the loans is in itself too small to be of real help in this respect. The established procedure of granting loans has turned the latter into a matter of charity pure and simple, for it is impossible to set up a home and live for two years on the 150 rubles granted as a loan."

And here, by way of example, is a description of the sanitary conditions of the new settlers, quoted from the same official reports:

> "After the typhus," writes one official,* "scurvy has been raging here on a no lesser scale; practically in all the settlements and in every house there are people suffering from this disease or liable to contract it. In many homes there are cases of both diseases. In the Okur-Shask settlement I came across the following picture: the master of the house was ill with typhus in the period of peeling; his pregnant wife was extremely exhausted from undernourishment; their son, a boy of twelve, had swollen glands and scurvy, the wife's sister was sick with scurvy and could not walk; she had a breast-fed baby; her ten-year-old boy was sick with scurvy, was bleeding through the nose and could hardly move; her husband alone, of the whole family, was well.
>
> "Scurvy and typhus are followed by night blindness. There are settlements in which literally all the settlers, without exception, suffer from this blindness. The groups of lots along the Yemna River are covered almost entirely with taiga forests, have no pastures or meadowland, and in the course of two or three years the new settlers barely managed to clear the ground to build wretched huts. There could be no question of the settlers having their own grain; they had to live entirely on the loans, and when these gave out there was a terrible scarcity of bread; many literally starved. The scarcity of bread was aggravated by the scarcity of drinking water."

Such reports are plentiful. Appalling as these official accounts are, they apparently do not tell the whole truth, and

* *Memorandum*, p. 8.

thus give too favourable a picture of the actual state of affairs. Here is, for instance, how Prince Lvov, a man, as we know, of moderate views, who visited the Far East as a representative of the Zemstvo organisation, describes resettlement in Amur Territory:

"Cut off from the world as if they were on an uninhabited island, amid marshy hummocks in the primeval taiga, amid swampy valleys and swampy hills, and forced to put up with barbaric conditions of life, labour and subsistence, the dispirited and indigent settler naturally feels crushed. He lapses into a state of apathy, having exhausted his small store of energy at the very beginning of his struggle against harsh natural conditions in setting up his wretched dwelling. Scurvy and typhus attack the wasted organism and carry it off to the grave. In many of the settlements founded in 1907, the death rate is simply incredible—25 to 30 per cent. There are as many crosses as there are households, and many settlements are doomed to be removed completely to new sites or to the grave-yard. Instead of resettlement, what rivers of bitter tears shed by unhappy families and what costly funerals at state expense in the remote borderland! It will be long before those who survived last year's great wave of resettlement will stand on their feet again after their defeat in the taiga. Many will die, and many others will flee back to Russia, where they will defame the territory by stories about their misfortunes, scaring off new settlers and holding up further resettlement. It is not accidental that this year we witness an unprecedented reverse movement from the Maritime Region, and an influx of new settlers that is one-fifth of the former proportion."

Prince Lvov is justly appalled by the isolation of the settler from the world and his desolation in the boundless Siberian taiga, particularly in view of the lack of roads in Siberia. We can imagine with what brilliant success the policy of setting up separate homestead farms and the apportionment of *otrubs* is now being put into effect there, for the very same men who direct the agrarian policy have proclaimed "the necessity for a decisive turn [!] in the land policy in Siberia", the necessity of "establishing and promoting private property", of "ensuring that individual peasants have their plots in accordance with the decree of November 9, 1906", "assigning lots for resettlement, with the land divided, as far as possible, into *otrub* holdings",* etc.

The conditions of resettlement being what they are, it is quite natural that, according to the Resettlement Depart-

* *Memorandum*, pp. 60, 61, 62.

ment, 10 per cent of the peasants settled in 1903-05 owned not a single draught animal, 12 per cent owned only one draught animal per household, 15 per cent owned no cow, and 25 per cent owned no plough (from the speech of Deputy Gaidarov during the First Session, when he spoke on behalf of the Social-Democratic group). Deputy Voiloshnikov, basing himself on the same official reports, was therefore fully justified when he summed up the results of the resettlement policy in 1906-08 as follows:

"In three years—1906, 1907 and 1908—1,552,439 persons of both sexes, half of them paupers, lured by the government's advertising, were sent across the Urals, into unknown parts, and there left to their fate. According to the Resettlement Department, 564,041 persons settled down, and 284,984 persons of both sexes went back. Thus the Resettlement Department provides information about 849,025 persons. But what has become of the rest? Where are the other 703,414 persons? The government, gentlemen, is perfectly well informed of their bitter lot, but it will say nothing about them. Some of them have gone to live in the villages of the old residents, and some others have swollen the ranks of the Siberian proletariat and are begging for alms.

"As for the vast majority, the government arranged a costly funeral for them, and that is why it keeps silent about them."

That is how the hopes of Markov the Second to "solve the agrarian problem" through resettlement are materialising. Faced with these facts, even the Octobrist spokesmen of big capital had to admit that there are "defects in the resettlement work". During the First Session the Octobrists called (and the Duma supported them) for "changing and improving the travelling conditions of the emigrants", for "creating in the resettlement areas the conditions necessary for their cultural and economic development", and for "respecting the interests and rights of the local peasantry and the non-Russian population when apportioning the land and settling the peasants". It goes without saying that these cautious and deliberately ambiguous wishes have to this day remained "a voice crying in the wilderness". And the Octobrist woodpeckers patiently repeat them year after year.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 11,
June 3, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE REVOLUTIONARY UPSWING[70]

The great May Day strike of the proletariat of all Russia and the accompanying street demonstrations, revolutionary leaflets, and revolutionary speeches before gatherings of workers have clearly shown that Russia has entered a period of revolutionary upswing.

This upswing did not come as a bolt from the blue. The way had been paved for it over a long period by all the conditions of Russian life, and the mass strikes over the Lena shootings and the May Day strikes merely marked its actual arrival. The temporary triumph of the counter-revolution was inseparably bound up with a decline in the mass struggle of the workers. The number of strikers gives an approximate yet absolutely objective and precise idea of the extent of the struggle.

During the ten years preceding the revolution, from 1895 to 1904, the average number of strikers was 43,000 a year (in round figures). In 1905 there were 2,750,000 strikers, in 1906—1,000,000, and in 1907—750,000. The three years of the revolution were distinguished by a rise in the strike movement of the proletariat *unprecedented anywhere in the world*. Its decline, which began in 1906-07, became definite in 1908, when there were 175,000 strikers. The coup d'état of June 3, 1907, which restored the autocratic rule of the tsar in alliance with the Duma of the Black-Hundred landlords and the commercial and industrial magnates, was an inevitable result of the flagging of the revolutionary energy of the masses.

The three years 1908-10 were a period of Black-Hundred counter-revolution at its worst, of liberal-bourgeois renegacy and of proletarian despondency and disintegration.

The number of strikers steadily dropped, reaching 60,000 in 1909 and 50,000 in 1910.

However, a noticeable change set in at the end of 1910. The demonstrations in connection with the death of the liberal Muromtsev, and of Leo Tolstoy, and also the student movement, clearly indicated that a fresh breeze had begun to blow, that the mood of the democratic masses had reached a turning-point. The year 1911 saw the workers gradually going over to an *offensive*—the number of strikers rose to 100,000. Signs from various quarters indicate that the weariness and stupor brought about by the triumph of the counter-revolution are passing away, that once again there is an *urge* for revolution. In summing up the situation, the All-Russia Conference, held in January 1912, noted that "the onset of a political revival is to be noted among broad democratic circles, chiefly among the proletariat. The workers' strikes in 1910-11, the beginning of demonstrations and proletarian meetings, the start of a movement among urban bourgeois democrats (the student strikes), etc., are all indications of the growing revolutionary feelings of the masses against the June Third regime". (See the "Notification" of the Conference, p. 18.*)

By the second quarter of this year these sentiments had become so strong that they manifested themselves in actions by the masses, and brought about a *revolutionary upswing*. The course of events during the past eighteen months shows with perfect clarity that there is nothing accidental in this upswing, that it has come quite naturally and was made inevitable by the whole development of Russia in the previous period.

The Lena shootings led to the revolutionary temper of the masses developing into a revolutionary upswing of the masses. Nothing could be more false than the liberal invention, which Trotsky repeats in the Vienna *Pravda* after the liquidators, that "the struggle for freedom of association is the *basis* of both the Lena tragedy and the powerful response to it in the country". Freedom of association was neither the specific nor the principal demand in the Lena strike. It was not lack of the freedom of association that the Lena

* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 467.—*Ed.*

shootings revealed, but lack of freedom from provocation, lack of rights in general, lack of freedom from wholesale tyranny.

The Lena shootings, as we have already made clear in *Sotsial-Demokrat*[71] No. 26, were an exact reflection of the *entire* regime of the June Third monarchy. It was not at all the struggle for one of the *rights* of the proletariat, even the most fundamental, the most important of them, that was characteristic of the Lena events. What was characteristic of those events was the complete absence of *any* kind of elementary legality. The characteristic feature was that an *agent provocateur*, a spy, a secret police agent, a menial of the tsar, resorted to mass shootings without any political reason whatever. It is this general lack of rights typical of Russian life, this hopelessness and impossibility of fighting for particular *rights*, and this incorrigibility of the tsarist monarchy and of its entire regime, that stood out so distinctly against the background of the Lena events as to *fire* the masses with *revolutionary* ardour.

The liberals have been straining every nerve to represent the Lena events and the May Day strikes as a trade union movement and a struggle for "rights". But anyone who is not blinded by liberal (and liquidationist) controversies will see in them something different. He will see the *revolutionary* character of the mass strike, which is especially emphasised by the St. Petersburg May Day leaflet of various Social-Democratic groups (and even of one group of worker Socialist-Revolutionaries!), which we reprint in full in our news section,[72] and which repeats the slogans advanced by the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912.

And then, it is not really slogans that are the main proof of the revolutionary character of the Lena and May Day strikes. The slogans *formulated* what the facts showed. The mass strikes spreading from district to district, their tremendous growth, the speed with which they spread, the courage of the workers, the increased number of mass meetings and revolutionary speeches, the demand that the fines imposed for celebrating May Day be cancelled, and the combination of the political and the economic strike, familiar to us from the time of the first Russian revolution, are all

obvious indications of the true nature of the movement, which is *a revolutionary upswing of the masses*.

Let us recall the experience of 1905. Events show that the *tradition* of the revolutionary mass strike *lives on* among the workers and that the workers at once took up and revived this tradition. The strike wave of 1905, unprecedented in the world, involved 810,000 strikers during the first, and 1,277,000 during the last quarter of the year, being a combination of the political and the economic strike. According to tentative estimates, the strikes over the Lena events involved about 300,000 workers and the May Day strikes about 400,000, and the strike movement continues to grow. Every day the newspapers, even the liberal ones, bring news of how the wildfire of strikes is spreading. The second quarter of 1912 is not quite over, and yet it is already becoming quite obvious that, as regards the size of the strike movement, the beginning of the revolutionary upswing in 1912 is not *lower*, *but rather higher* than the beginning in 1905!

The Russian revolution was the first to develop on a large scale this proletarian method of agitation, of rousing and uniting the masses and of drawing them into the struggle. Now the proletariat is applying this method once again and with an even firmer hand. No power on earth could achieve what the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat is achieving by this method. A huge country, with a population of 150,000,000 spread over a vast area, scattered, oppressed, deprived of all rights, ignorant, fenced off from "evil influences" by a swarm of authorities, police, spies—the *whole* of this country is getting into a ferment. The most backward sections both of the workers and the peasants are coming into direct or indirect contact with the strikers. Hundreds of thousands of revolutionary agitators are all at once appearing on the scene. Their influence is infinitely increased by the fact that they are inseparably linked with the rank and file, with the masses, and that they remain among them, fight for the most urgent needs of *every* worker's family, and combine with this immediate struggle for urgent economic needs their political protest and struggle against the monarchy. For counter-revolution has stirred up in millions and tens of millions of people a bitter hatred for the monarchy, it has given them the rudiments of an understanding

of the part played by it, and now the slogan of the foremost workers of the capital—long live the democratic republic!—spreads through thousands of channels, in the wake of every strike, reaching the backward sections, the remotest provinces, the "people", the "depths of Russia"!

Very characteristic are the comments made on strikes by Severyanin, a liberal, which were welcomed by *Russkiye Vedomosti* and sympathetically reprinted by *Rech*:

> "Have the workers any grounds for admixing economic or any [!] demands to a May Day strike?" asks Mr. Severyanin; and he answers: "I make bold to think that they have none. Every economic strike can and should be begun only after a serious weighing of its chances of success.... That is why, more often than not, it is unreasonable to link such strikes with May Day.... Indeed, it would be rather strange to do so: we are celebrating the international workers' holiday, and we use the occasion to demand a ten per cent rise for calico of such-and-such grades."

That is how the liberal reasons! And this piece of infinite vulgarity, meanness and nastiness is sympathetically accepted by the "best" liberal papers, which claim to be democratic!

The crudest self-interest of a bourgeois, the vilest cowardice of a counter-revolutionary—that is what lies behind the florid phrases of the liberal. He wants the pockets of the employers to be safe. He wants an "orderly" and "harmless" demonstration in favour of "freedom of association"! But the proletariat, instead of this, is drawing the masses into a *revolutionary* strike, which indissolubly links politics with economics, a strike which wins the support of the most backward sections by the success of the struggle for an immediate improvement in the life of the workers, and at the same time rouses the people *against the tsarist monarchy*.

Yes, the experience of 1905 created a deep-rooted and great tradition of mass strikes. And we must not forget the results that these strikes produce in Russia. Stubborn mass strikes are inseparably bound up in our country with *armed uprising*.

Let these words not be misinterpreted. It is by no means a question of a *call* for an uprising. Such a call would be most unwise at the present moment. It is a question of establishing the *connection* between strike and uprising in Russia.

How did the uprising *grow* in 1905? Firstly, mass strikes, demonstrations and meetings made clashes between the people and the police and troops more and more frequent. Secondly, the mass strikes roused the peasantry to a number of partial, fragmentary, semi-spontaneous revolts. Thirdly, the mass strikes very soon spread to the Army and Navy, causing clashes on economic grounds (the "bean" and similar "mutinies"), and subsequently insurrections. Fourthly, the counter-revolution *itself* started civil war by pogroms, by violence against democrats, and so on.

The revolution of 1905 was defeated not because it had gone "too far", or because the December uprising[73] was "artificial", as renegades among the liberals, and their like imagine. On the contrary, the cause of the defeat was that the uprising did *not go far enough*, that the realisation of its necessity was not sufficiently widespread and firmly assimilated among the revolutionary classes, that the uprising was not concerted, resolute, organised, simultaneous, aggressive.

Let us see now whether signs of a *gathering revolt* are in evidence at present. In order not to be carried away by revolutionary enthusiasm, let us take the testimony of the *Octobrists*. The German Union of Octobrists in St. Petersburg consists mainly of so-called "Left" and "constitutional" Octobrists, who are particularly popular among the Cadets, and who are most capable (in comparison with the other Octobrists and Cadets) of observing events "objectively", without making it their aim to frighten the authorities with the prospect of revolution.

Here is what the *St.-Petersburger Zeitung*, the newspaper of these Octobrists, wrote in its weekly political review on May 6 (19):

"May has come. Regardless of the weather, this is usually not a very pleasant month for the inhabitants of the capital, because it begins with the *proletarian* '*holiday*'. This year, with the impression of the Lena demonstrations still fresh in the minds of the workers, May Day was particularly dangerous. The atmosphere of the capital, saturated with all sorts of rumours about strikes and demonstrations, portended a fire. Our loyal police were visibly agitated; they organised searches, arrested some persons and mobilised large forces to prevent street demonstrations. The fact that the police could think of nothing more clever than to raid the editorial offices of the workers' papers

and arrest their editors does not testify to a particularly intimate knowledge of the wires by which the puppet regiments of the workers were pulled. Yet such wires exist. This is evident from the disciplined character of the strike and from many other circumstances. That is why this May Day strike, the largest we have witnessed so far, was so ominous—there were some 100,000 or perhaps even 150,000 workers of big and small workshops on strike. It was only a peaceful parade, but the solid unity of that army was remarkable, all the more because the recent unrest among the workers was accompanied by other alarming facts. On various naval vessels, *sailors* were arrested for conducting revolutionary propaganda. Judging by all the information that has got into the press, the situation is not very good on our naval vessels, which are not numerous as it is.... The *railwaymen* are also giving cause for anxiety. True, matters nowhere went so far as an attempt to call a strike, but arrests, including such a conspicuous one as that of A. A. Ushakov, an assistant station master on the Nikolayevskaya Railway, show that there is a certain danger there as well.

"Attempts at revolution on the part of immature worker masses can, of course, have only a harmful effect on the outcome of the Duma elections. These attempts are all the more unreasonable because the Tsar has appointed Manukhin, and the Council of State has passed the workers' Insurance Bill"!!

That is how a German Octobrist reasons. We, on our part, must remark that we have received exact first-hand information about the sailors which proves that *Novoye Vremya* has exaggerated and inflated the matter. The Okhrana[74] is obviously "working" in *agent provocateur* fashion. Premature attempts at an uprising would be extremely unwise. The working-class vanguard must understand that the support of the working class by the democratic peasantry and the active participation of the armed forces are the main conditions for a timely, i.e., successful, armed uprising in Russia.

Mass strikes in revolutionary epochs have their objective logic. They scatter hundreds of thousands and millions of sparks in all directions—and all around there is the inflammable material of extreme bitterness, the torture of unprecedented starvation, endless tyranny, shameless and cynical mockery at the "pauper", the "muzhik", the rank-and-file soldier. Add to this the perfectly unbridled, pogromist Jew-baiting carried on by the Black Hundreds and stealthily fostered and directed by the Court gang of the dull-witted and bloodthirsty Nicholas Romanov. "So it was, so it will be"[75]—these revealing words were uttered by the

Minister Makarov, to his own misfortune, and to the misfortune of his class and his landlord tsar!

The revolutionary upswing of the masses imposes great and responsible duties on every working-class Social-Democrat, on every honest democrat. "All-round support for the movement of the masses that is beginning [we should say already: the *revolutionary* movement of the masses that *has begun*], and its expansion on the basis of full implementation of the Party slogans"—this is how the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. defined these duties. The Party slogans—a democratic republic, an eight-hour day, confiscation of all the landed estates—must become the slogans of *all* democrats, of the *people's* revolution.

To be able to support and extend the movement of the masses, we need *organisation and more organisation*. Without an illegal party we cannot carry on this work, and there is no point in just talking about it. In supporting and extending the onslaught of the masses, we must carefully take into account the experience of 1905, and in explaining the need for and inevitability of an uprising, we must warn against and keep off *premature* attempts. The growth of mass strikes, the enlistment of other classes in the struggle, the state of the organisations, and the temper of the masses will all suggest of themselves the moment when all forces must unite in a concerted, resolute, aggressive, supremely courageous onslaught of the revolution on the tsarist monarchy.

Without a victorious revolution there will be no freedom in Russia.

Without the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy by a proletarian and peasant uprising there will be no victorious revolution in Russia.

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THE SLOGANS OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. IN JANUARY 1912 AND THE MAY DAY MOVEMENT

Elsewhere in this issue, the reader will find the full text of a leaflet printed and circulated by the St. Petersburg workers before the May Day action that will from now on be famous. That leaflet is very much worth dwelling on, for it is a most important document in the history of the working-class movement in Russia and in the history of our Party.

The leaflet reflects *a certain* state of disorganisation of the Social-Democratic Party in the capital, for the appeal is signed, not by the St. Petersburg Committee, but by individual Social-Democratic groups and even a group of worker Socialist-Revolutionaries. In most parts of Russia, the state of our Party is such that its directing committees and centres are constantly being arrested, and constantly re-establish themselves thanks to the existence of all kinds of factory, trade union, sub-district and district Social-Democratic groups—the very same "nuclei" that have always roused the hatred of the liberals and liquidators. In the latest issue of the magazine published by those gentlemen (*Nasha Zarya*, 1912, No. 4), the reader can see again and again how Mr. V. Levitsky, writing with impotent rage and *vomiting* abuse, hisses against the "rebirth of the Party through an artificial revival of politically dead nuclei".

What makes the leaflet under review all the more typical and noteworthy is the fact that, owing to the arrest of the St. Petersburg Committee, it was the *nuclei* that had to appear on the scene, nuclei deprived by the will of the police of the "directing centre" so hateful to the liquidators. Owing to this fact, which every revolutionary will find sad,

the *independent* life of the nuclei came into the open. The nuclei had in all haste to rally their forces, establish contacts, and restore the "*underground*" in the face of fierce persecution by the police, who positively raged before May Day. The groups, representatives, etc., whose names appear under the leaflet, all constitute that very *underground* that is hateful to the liberals and the liquidators. While the same liquidationist leader, Mr. Levitsky, speaking on behalf of *Nasha Zarya* and *Zhivoye Dyelo*, of course assailed, foaming at the mouth, the "*cult of the underground*" (see p. 33 of the above-mentioned issue), we had, in the shape of the St. Petersburg leaflet, a precise and complete document revealing to us the existence of that underground, its vitality, the *content* of its work, and its significance.

The St. Petersburg Committee has been wiped out through the arrests, so now we shall see just what the underground nuclei are like in themselves, what they are doing or can do, what ideas they have actually made their own or evolved in their midst, and not merely borrowed from the supreme Party body, what ideas really enjoy the workers' sympathy.

The leaflet shows what the nuclei are doing: they are carrying on the work of the St. Petersburg Committee, which for the time being is shattered (to the delight of all the diverse enemies of the underground). They continue preparing for May Day. They hastily re-establish the contacts between *different* underground Social-Democratic groups. They enlist worker Socialist-Revolutionaries too, for they are well aware of the importance of uniting the proletariat round a living revolutionary cause. They rally these different Social-Democratic groups, and even a "group of worker Socialist-Revolutionaries", round *specific* slogans of the struggle. And this is when the real *character* of the movement, the real *sentiment* of the proletariat, the real *strength* of the R.S.D.L.P. and of *its January* All-Russia Conference, stands out.

As a result of the arrests, there happens to be no hierarchic body able to decree the advancing of particular slogans. Hence the proletarian masses, the worker Social-Democrats and even some of the Socialist-Revolutionaries can be united *only* by slogans that are really indisputable for the masses,

only by slogans that derive their strength not from a "decree from above" (as demagogues and liquidators put it), but from the *conviction* of the revolutionary workers themselves. And what do we find?

We find that, *after* the St. Petersburg Committee had been shattered, at a time when its immediate restoration was impossible, and when one group of workers influenced another group solely by ideological, and not by organisational, means, *the slogans adopted were those of the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which was convened in January 1912* and which evokes a positively mad, savage hatred on the part of the liberals, the liquidators, Lieber, Trotsky and Co.!

"Let our slogans be," the St. Petersburg workers wrote in their leaflet, "a constituent assembly, an eight-hour working day, the confiscation of the landed estates." And further on the leaflet launches the call: "Down with the tsarist government! Down with the autocratic Constitution of June 3! Long live the democratic republic! Long live socialism!"

We see from this instructive document that *all* the slogans put forward by the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. have been adopted by the St. Petersburg proletariat and have set their seal on the first steps of the new Russian revolution. All kinds of slanderers and detractors of the January Conference may carry on their dirty business as much as they like. The revolutionary proletariat of St. Petersburg has answered them. The work started long before the last Conference by revolutionary Social-Democrats, calling on the proletariat to assume the role of leader of the *people's* revolution, has borne fruit despite all police persecution despite the reckless pre-May Day arrests and hounding of revolutionaries, despite the torrent of lies and abuse from the liberal and liquidationist press.

Hundreds of thousands of St. Petersburg proletarians followed by workers throughout Russia, resorted to strikes and street demonstrations not as one of the separate classes of bourgeois society, not with "their own" merely economic slogans, but as the leader raising aloft the banner of the revolution *for* the whole people, *on behalf of* the whole people, and *with the aim of* awakening and drawing into the

struggle *all* the classes who need freedom and are capable of striving for it.

The revolutionary movement of the proletariat in Russia has risen to a higher level. Whereas in 1905 it began with mass strikes and Gaponiads,[76] in 1912, despite the fact that the police has smashed our Party organisations, the movement is beginning with mass strikes and the *raising of the republican banner*! The separate "nuclei" and disconnected "groups" of workers did their duty under the most difficult and trying conditions. The proletariat set up its own "May Day committees" and went into action with a *revolutionary* platform worthy of the class which is destined to free mankind from wage slavery.

The May Day movement also shows what meaning some *words* about "unity" have and how the workers unite *in reality*. Rubanovich, a spokesman for the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, writes in *Budushcheye*,[77] Burtsev's Paris newspaper, that "we must point out the following noteworthy feature of this May Day action: at the preparatory meetings, St. Petersburg workers refused to recognise the division existing among the various socialist groups; ... the prevailing tendency was towards agreement". The leaflet we have reprinted clearly shows what *fact* prompted such an inference. The fact is that the Social-Democratic nuclei, which had lost their guiding centre, re-established contact with all the various groups by winning over workers regardless of the views they held and *advocating to them all* their Party slogans. And precisely because these Party slogans are correct, because they are in keeping with the proletariat's revolutionary tasks and comprise the tasks of a revolution of the whole people, they were accepted by *all* workers.

Unity materialised because the January Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. gave up the idle game of bringing about agreement among small groups abroad, gave up the idle wooing of the liquidators of the revolutionary party, and put forward clear and precise fighting slogans *at the right time*. The proletariat's unity for revolutionary action was achieved not by compromising between the proletarian (Social-Democratic) and the non-proletarian (Socialist-Revolutionary) parties, not by seeking agreement with the liquidators who have broken away from the Social-

Democratic Party, but by rallying the workers of Russian Social-Democratic organisations and by these workers making a correct appraisal of the tasks of the moment.

A good lesson for those who, succumbing to the idle chatter of the liberals of the Bund and the Trotskys from Vienna are still capable of believing in "unity"—with the liquidators. The vaunted "Organising Commission" of Lieber, Trotsky and the liquidators cried out from the house-tops about "unity", but in fact it could not, and did not, supply *a single* slogan actually uniting the revolutionary struggle of the workers. The liquidators supplied *their own*, non-revolutionary slogans, slogans of a liberal labour policy, but the movement disregarded them. That is what lies at the bottom of the Trotskyist fables about "unity"!

Swearing and vowing that he was "unifying", and cursing the Conference as hard as he could, Trotsky assured good souls in Vienna on April 23 (May 6) that "the struggle for freedom of association is the *basis*" (!!) of the Lena events and of their repercussions, that "this demand is, and will be, the *central* [!!] issue of the revolutionary mobilisation of the proletariat". Scarcely a week had passed when these pitiful phrases of the yes-man of the liquidators were swept away like so much dust—by the "representatives of all the organised workers of St. Petersburg", "the Social-Democratic Obyedineniye group", "the central Social-Democratic city group", "the group of worker Socialist-Revolutionaries "the group of worker Social-Democrats" and "the representatives of May Day committees".

The Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg has realised that a new revolutionary struggle must be started, not for the sake of one right, even though it should be the most essential, the most important for the working class, but for the sake of *the freedom of the whole people*.

The Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg has realised that it must generalise its demands, and not break them up into parts, that the republic includes freedom of association, and not vice versa, that it is necessary to strike at the centre, to attack the source of evil, to destroy the whole system, the whole regime, of the Russia of the tsar and the Black Hundreds.

The Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg has realised that it is ridiculous and absurd to claim freedom of association *from* Nicholas Romanov, *from* the Black-Hundred Duma, that it is ridiculous and absurd to presume that Russia's present political system, our "autocratic Constitution of June 3", is *compatible with* freedom of association, that in a country where there is a general and indiscriminate lack of rights, where arbitrary rule and provocation by the authorities reign supreme, and where there is no "freedom" even for simply helping tens of millions of starving people—it is only liberal chatterers and liberal labour politicians that can put freedom of association as "the central issue of revolutionary mobilisation".

The Social-Democratic proletariat of St. Petersburg has realised that and unfurled the *republican* banner, demanding an eight-hour day and confiscation of the landed estates as the only guarantee of the truly democratic character of the revolution.

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THE LIQUIDATORS OPPOSE REVOLUTIONARY MASS STRIKES

The leading article of this issue had already gone to press when we received the first issue of the liquidationist *Nevsky Golos*. V. Yezhov, the well-known liquidator of *Nasha Zarya* at once presented the new organ with such a gem that one is left gasping! Here it is, if you please:

> "Owing to this [i.e., owing to the variety of the strikes, which in some cases did not go beyond a protest against the imposition of fines for celebrating May Day, while in other cases they supplemented the protest with economic demands, etc.], the principle involved in the protest (after all, it was not over a few kopeks that the strike was called) became obscured [!???!] in a considerable number of cases being complicated by economic demands....
>
> "Their own experience should have suggested to the workers that it was inadvisable [!!] to complicate their protest by economic demands, just as it is inadvisable to complicate [!?] an ordinary strike
>
> "It is necessary to give organisational form to the sentiments of the worker masses. It is necessary to increase propaganda for trade unions, to recruit new members for them. This is all the more necessary since there are many hotheads among the workers nowadays who are carried away by the mass movement and speak at meetings *against unions*, alleging them to be useless and unnecessary
>
> "A period of economic strikes [only economic?] is ahead of us. It would be an irreparable mistake to allow them to become intertwined with political actions of the workers [!!!]. Such a combination would have a harmful effect [!!??] on both the economic and the political struggle."

Here you have the perfectly liberal Mr. Severyanin copied by the liquidator! Utter incomprehension of the fact that a *revolutionary* mass strike *necessarily* combines the economic with the political strike; narrow-mindedness, a monstrous distortion of the revolutionary character of the upswing and

attempts to measure it by the yardstick of "ordinary strikes"; the most reactionary advice "not to complicate" politics with economics and not to "intertwine" them; and the using of the legally published press for an attack in the spirit of Struve and Maklakov against the revolutionary worker Social-Democrats, who are described as "hotheads" speaking out "against unions"!

A liberal *cannot* understand a revolutionary Social-Democrat except as one who is "against unions". But the workers at the meetings were, of course, not "against unions", but against *substituting* liberal slogans for revolutionary ones, which is what Mr. Yezhov and Co. are doing. Our slogan is not freedom of association, said the workers, and "trade unions" are not the only, nor the chief, means of "giving" our movement "organisational form". Our slogan is the demand for a republic (see the appeal of the St. Petersburg workers), we are building an *illegal* party capable of leading the revolutionary onslaught of the masses upon the tsarist monarchy. That is what the workers said at the meetings.

But the Liebers and Trotskys are assuring the workers that it is possible for the Social-Democratic proletariat and its Party to "unite" with liberals *à la* Yezhov, Potresov and Co.!

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"UNITERS"

The liquidators are doing their utmost to "unite". The other day they almost "united" with the Polish Socialist Party[78]—with its Left wing (Lewica), which is a faction of Polish social-nationalism.

For more than ten years Polish Social-Democrats have been waging a struggle against the social-nationalism of the P.S.P. As a result, a section of the P.S.P. (the Left wing) had some of its nationalist prejudices knocked out of their heads. But the struggle continues. Polish worker Social-Democrats are *opposed* to unity with the above-mentioned faction of the P.S.P. as an organisation because they think it would be harmful to their cause. Individual workers and groups of the Left wing, who refuse to stop at a half-way revision of the nationalist principles of the P.S.P., are joining the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party. And this is the time when our liquidators are out to "unite" with the P.S.P. Left wing!

It is just as if the Russian Social-Democrats began, independently of the Bund, to "unite" with, say so-called "Socialist-Zionists"[79] or, ignoring the Lettish Social-Democracy, with the so-called "Lettish Social-Democratic Union"[80] (actually a Socialist-Revolutionary organisation).

This is apart from the formal aspect of the matter. At the Stockholm Congress, the Polish Social-Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the R.S.D.L.P., by which any groups in Poland wishing to join the R.S.D.L.P. can do so only by joining an organisation of the P.S.D.[81] And at the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in December 1908, even a proposal to discuss the question of uniting with the Left wing was voted down by an overwhelming majority.

It is quite clear that, while constantly shouting about "unity", Trotsky and his liquidationist friends are actually *aggravating the split* in Poland. Fortunately for the R.S.D.L.P., this whole band of liquidators, together with the "conciliators" trailing behind them, is completely powerless to accomplish anything *in practice*, and this refers to Poland as well. Otherwise the amalgamation of the liquidators with the P.S.P. would certainly cause a very sharp split in Poland.

Why, then, have the liquidators embarked on this obviously adventurist policy? Certainly not because things are going well with them. The point is that they are in need of uniting with someone, of forming some sort of "party". Social-Democrats, the Polish Social-Democracy, refuse to go along with them, so, instead of Social-Democrats, they have to take members of the P.S.P., who have nothing in common with our Party. In the Russian towns, our old Party organisations refuse to go along with them, so they have to take, instead of the Social-Democratic nuclei, the so-called "initiating groups" of liquidators, who have nothing in common with the R.S.D.L.P.

"One does not fly from a good life." Is it not time, liquidator gentlemen, you started to unite with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the Socialist-Revolutionary *liquidators*) as well? After all, these gentlemen, too, seem very anxious to "unite". What a "broad" party you would then have! Larin himself would be content.[82]

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While "uniting" with "foreign powers", the liquidators continue to bargain with the "conciliators" over the terms of "uniting" the liquidator-conciliator camp. Mr. V. Levitsky contributed to *Nasha Zarya* an article which is a sort of manifesto addressed to "all trends" that are prepared to fight against the recent Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

Mr. Levitsky entitled his article "For Unity—Against a Split". Quite like Trotsky, isn't it? Ever since the pro-Party elements thoroughly rebuffed the liquidators *in all* the spheres of activity, Levitsky and Co. have been using a very "conciliatory" language. Why, they are wholly in

favour of "unity". They only advance the following four modest conditions for "unity":

(1) A fight against the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which has united all the Social-Democrats, except a handful of waverers.

(2) The formation, in place of the Party, of "*a central initiating group*" (Mr. Levitsky's italics, *Nasha Zarya* No. 4 p. 31). (What is meant by the liquidators' "initiating" groups has recently been explained in the press by Plekhanov—see his *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*[83] No. 16. Both the Bund and Trotsky, who are doing service for the liquidators, are concealing Plekhanov's explanation from their readers. But you can't conceal it, gentlemen!)

(3) No revival of the "*politically dead nuclei*" (ibid., p. 33).

(4) Acceptance of the slogan "*against the cult of the underground*" (ibid., p. 33).

The programme has been outlined clearly enough if not as frankly and confidently as in the past. And there and then Levitsky explains at great length to all the Trotskys: After all, gentlemen, you have no choice. You had better accept our terms, and in exchange we (i.e., Levitsky and Co.) will readily agree to the following: "to console yourselves", you (i.e., Trotsky and his like) can say that it is not you who have moved closer to the liquidators, but the other way round.

Martov, writing in the same issue of *Nasha Zarya*, threatens in advance the future Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma that if it turns out to be anti-liquidationist like its crafty predecessor, then "cases like the Belousov affair[84] will not be exceptions, but the rule", meaning, in plain language, that the liquidators will *split* the Duma group. Your bark, liquidator gentlemen, is worse than your bite. Had you had the strength to do so, you would long ago have formed your own liquidationist group in the Duma.

The cause of "unity" is in good hands, sure enough.

The miserable comedy of "unification" enacted by the liquidators and Trotsky is repellent to the least exacting people. Unity *is* being achieved, only it is not unity with the liquidators, but *against* them.

* *
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As regards the incredibly Khlestakovian[85] role staged by Trotsky, Lieber (the Bund), and the liquidators, with their vaunted "Organising Commission", we think it sufficient to call the attention of the readers—those who prefer not to trust words but to verify the points at issue by a serious and careful study of the documents—to the following *facts*.

In June 1911, following the withdrawal of Lieber and Igorev from the meeting of the Central Committee members, the Organising Commission Abroad[86] was formed in Paris. The first organisation in Russia to be approached by it was the *Kiev* organisation. Even Trotsky admits that its status as an organisation is indisputable. In October 1911, the Kiev organisation took part in forming the Organising Commission in Russia. In January 1912 the latter convened the conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

In January 1912, a meeting was held by the representatives of the Bund, the Central Committee of the Letts and the Caucasian Regional Committee (all three being liquidationist groups). The Poles withdrew *at once*, declaring that the whole undertaking was a liquidationist affair. The conciliators" and Plekhanov followed suit and *refused to join*, Plekhanov declaring in *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 16 that *that* conference *was being called by the liquidators*. It is now June 1912, and yet neither the Bund nor Trotsky have succeeded in "uniting" *anyone*, except the *Golos* and the *Vperyod* groups; they have not won over a *single* serious and *indisputable* organisation in Russia, have not said a word to deny the substance of Plekhanov's statement, nor made the slightest change in the propaganda conducted by the liquidators in *Nasha Zarya* and similar press organs. For all that, there is no end of phrase-mongering and bragging about "unity".

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THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR POLEMICS AGAINST THE LIBERALS

Mr. Prokopovich, a well-known advocate of revisionism and of a liberal labour policy, contributed to *Russkiye Vedomosti* an article entitled "Danger Ahead". The danger, according to this politician, is that the elections to the Fourth Duma will be shaped by the police chiefs. To combat this danger, he proposes "the unity of all the constitutionalist elements of the country", i.e., the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks, as well as the Cadets and the Progressists.

The Right-Cadet *Russkiye Vedomosti* in an editorial note declares its "*satisfaction*" with Mr. Prokopovich's article. "Such unity of the opposition forces," it says, "we regard as an urgent requirement of the present moment."

The official-Cadet *Rech* gives a summary of Mr. Prokopovich's article and, quoting the opinion of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, comments for its own part:

> "However, judging by the publications of the Social-Democratic trend, which bend all their energies mostly to fight the opposition, one can hardly attach any real importance to this appeal" (i.e., the appeal for "unity").

Thus the important question of the election tactics and the attitude of the workers to the liberals is being raised once more. Once again we see that the liberals pose this question not like serious politicians, but like matchmakers. Their aim is not to establish the truth, but to obscure it.

Indeed, ponder over the following circumstance. Do the liberals mean amalgamation of the parties when they speak of "unity"? Not in the least. Mr. Prokopovich, *Russkiye Vedomosti* and *Rech* are all agreed on this score.

Consequently, what they mean by unity is joint action against the Rights—from Purishkevich to Guchkov—is it not? It would seem that is so!

The question arises: does anyone among the "Lefts" reject such joint action?

No one does. That is common knowledge.

An agreement with the liberals to vote against the Rights is precisely what is meant by "unity" between the democrats and the liberals in the elections. Why, then, are the liberals dissatisfied? Why do they not say that the "Lefts" have quite definitely and explicitly declared in favour of agreements? Why are they so shy of mentioning the fact that *it is the liberals* who have *said nothing* clear, definite, explicit and official about agreements with the Lefts, with the democrats, with the Marxists? Why is it that, in speaking of the election tactics, they *do not say* a word about the well-known decision of the Cadet conference, which permitted of blocs with the "Left Octobrists"?

The facts are there, gentlemen, and no amount of dodging can alter them. It is the Lefts, the Marxists, that have declared, clearly, explicitly and officially, *in favour of* an agreement with the liberals (including both the Cadets and the Progressists) against the Rights. And it is *none other than the Cadets* who have evaded a quite explicit and official answer regarding the Lefts!

Mr. Prokopovich knows these facts very well, and it is therefore absolutely unpardonable on his part to distort the truth by keeping silent about the explicit decision of the Marxists and the evasiveness of the Cadets.

What is the reason for this silence? It is only too obvious from the quoted statement of *Rech* alleging that we "bend all our energies mostly to fight the opposition".

From the wording used by *Rech*, it follows inevitably that if they want to unite with the liberals, the democrats *must not* "bend all their energies" to fight the opposition. But in that case say so plainly, gentlemen! State your terms explicitly and officially. The trouble with you, however, is that you *cannot* do so. You would merely make everyone laugh if you tried to formulate such a condition. By putting forward such a condition you would refute yourselves, for you have all of you unanimously admitted that there are

"*profound differences*" between the liberals and the democrats (to say nothing of the Marxists).

And since there are differences, and profound ones at that, how is it possible to avoid fighting?

The falsity of the liberals is precisely that, on the one hand, they reject amalgamation, acknowledge the existence of profound differences, emphasise that it is impossible "for any of the parties to renounce the fundamental provisions of its programme" (*Russkiye Vedomosti*), and, on the other hand, they *complain* of the "fight against the opposition"!!

But let us examine the matter more closely. To begin with, is it true that the newspapers and magazines, to which *Rech* refers, bend *all* their energies *mostly* to fight the opposition? No, far from it. The liberals cannot point to a single question, not one, in which the democrats do not bend *all* their energies *mostly* to fight the Rights!! Let anyone of you who wishes to check this statement make a test. Let him take any, say, three successive issues of any Marxist newspaper. Let him take three political questions as test cases and compare the *documentary* data showing against whom the fight of the Marxists on the questions selected is mostly "directed" in those newspaper issues.

You will not make that simple and easy test, liberal gentlemen, because *any* such test will prove you wrong.

Nor is that all. There is another, and particularly important, consideration which refutes you even more strongly. *How* do the democrats in general, and the Marxists in particular, *carry on* their fight against the liberals? They carry it on in such a way, and only in such a way, that each—positively and absolutely each—reproach or accusation levelled at the liberals naturally involves an *even sharper* reproach, an *even graver* accusation levelled at the Rights.

That is the gist of the matter, the crux of the issue! A few examples will make our idea quite clear.

We accuse the liberals, the Cadets, of being counter-revolutionary. Show us a *single* one of our accusations of this kind that does not reflect with even greater force upon the Rights.

We accuse the liberals of "nationalism" and "imperialism". Show us a single one of our accusations of this kind

that is not directed with even greater force against the Rights.

We have accused the liberals of being afraid of the movement of the masses. Now can you find in our newspapers a formulation of this accusation such as is not directed against the Rights as well?

We have accused the liberals of defending "certain" medieval institutions that are capable of "operating" against the workers. To accuse the liberals of *that* means accusing *thereby* all the Rights of the same thing, and of even more.

These examples can be multiplied indefinitely. You will find that always and everywhere, without any exception, the working-class democrats accuse the liberals exclusively for being close to the Rights, for the irresolute and *fictitious* nature of their fight against the Rights, for their half-heartedness, *thereby* accusing the Rights, not merely of "half a sin", but of a "whole sin".

"The fight against the liberals" waged by the democrats and the Marxists is more profound, more consistent and richer in content, and it does more to enlighten and rally the masses, than the *fight against the Rights*. That, gentlemen, is how matters stand!

And in order not to leave any doubts on this score, in order to forestall any absurd distortion of the meaning and significance of our fight against the liberals—to forestall, for example, the absurd theory of "one reactionary mass" (i.e., the lumping together of the liberals and the Rights in the single political concept of a reactionary bloc, of a reactionary mass)—we always take care, in our official statements, to speak of the fight against the Rights in terms *different* from those we use in speaking of our fight against the liberals.

Mr. Prokopovich knows this very well, as does every educated liberal. He knows, for instance, that in our definition of the social, class nature of the various parties, we always stress the medievalism of the Rights and the bourgeois nature of the liberals. And there is a world of difference between these two things. Medievalism can (and should) be destroyed, even keeping within the framework of capitalism. Bourgeois nature cannot be destroyed within this framework, but we can (and should) "appeal" from the bourgeois

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

landlord to the bourgeois peasant, from the bourgeois liberal to the bourgeois democrat, from bourgeois half freedom to bourgeois full freedom. It is in such appeals, and only in such appeals, that our criticism of the liberals consists during the period Russia is passing through, i.e., the criticism which we are voicing from the standpoint of the immediate and next tasks of this period.

Take the following statement in Mr. Prokopovich's article. "The creation of sound conditions for the political life of the mass of the people—this is the immediate aim which at present unites the Lefts and the opposition."

Nothing could be more meaningless, more empty and misleading than this statement. Even an Octobrist, even an astute "nationalist", will subscribe to it, because it is so vague. It is a mere promise, sheer declamation, diplomatic concealment of one's thoughts. But if Mr. Prokopovich, like so many other liberals, has been given a tongue so that he may conceal his thoughts, we shall try to do our duty and reveal what is concealed behind his statement. To be on the safe side, let us take a minor example, something of rather little importance.

Is the two-chamber system a sound condition for political life? We do not think so. The Progressists and the Cadets think it is. For holding such views, we accuse the liberals of being anti-democratic, of being counter-revolutionary. And by formulating this accusation against the liberals, we level an even greater accusation at all the Rights.

Further, the question arises: How about "unity between the Lefts and the opposition"? Do we, on account of this difference of opinion, refuse to unite with a liberal against a Right? By no means. The counter-revolutionary views of the liberals on this question, as well as on all similar, *much more important* questions of political liberty, have been known to us for a long time—since 1905 or even earlier. Nevertheless, we repeat even in 1912 that both in a second ballot and at the second stage of the elections it is permissible to enter into agreements with the liberals against the Rights. For, despite its half-heartedness, bourgeois monarchist liberalism is not at all the same as feudal reaction. It would be very bad working-class politics not to take advantage of this difference.

But to proceed. *How* should we take advantage of it? *On what* terms is "unity between the Lefts and the opposition" possible? The answer of the liberal is: since the Lefts are waging a relentless fight against the opposition, there is no point in even talking of unity. And the liberal goes on to explain his idea as follows: the more modest the demand, the wider is the circle of those who agree with it, the more complete is the unity, and the greater the force capable of implementing that demand. A "tolerable" constitution providing for a two-chamber system (and other—how shall we put it mildly?—slight digressions from democracy) will have the support of all democrats and all liberals; that is a great deal. But if you insist on "pure" democracy, the Progressists will drop out, and you will also "alienate" many Cadets, with the result that the "constitutionalist elements" will be disunited and weakened.

That is how the liberal reasons. But we reason differently. Our main premise is that unless the masses are politically conscious there can be no change for the better. The liberal looks to the upper ranks, while we look to the "lower ranks". If we refrain from explaining the harm of the two-chamber system, or even relax ever so slightly the "fight" against all sorts of anti-democratic views on this question, we may "attract" the liberal landlord, merchant, lawyer, professor, who are all of a feather with Purishkevich, and can do nothing serious against the Purishkeviches. By "attracting" them, we alienate the masses—in the sense that the masses, to whom democracy is not just a diplomatic signboard, not a showy phrase, but their own vital cause, a question of life and death, would lose their confidence in the partisans of the two-chamber system; and also in the sense that relaxing the attacks on the two-chamber system implies inadequate political education of the masses, and unless the masses are politically conscious, wide-awake and full of determination, *no* changes for the better can be brought about.

The Cadets and the Prokopoviches tell us that by our polemics against the liberal we are driving a wedge between the Lefts and the opposition. Our answer is that consistent democracy repels the most wavering and unreliable liberals, those most tolerant to Purishkevichism—and they represent a mere handful; on the other hand, it attracts the millions

now awakening to a new life, to a "sound political life", by which we mean something quite different from, something that is not at all the same as, that which Mr. Prokopovich means by it.

Instead of the two-chamber system, we might cite as an example the question of the composition of the land committees Should influence in these committees be so divided as, to give one-third to the landlords, one-third to the peasants and one-third to the bureaucrats, as the Cadets propose, or should they be elected quite freely, on the basis of a *fully* democratic electoral law? What, Mr. Prokopovich, are we to understand, in regard to this point, by "sound conditions for the political life of the mass of the people"? Whom will we repel and whom will we attract by adhering to a consistently democratic course on this question?

And let not *Russkiye Vedomosti* reply that "at present one point dominates over all the other points of the programme, a point common to all the progressive parties—the demand for political liberty". Precisely because this point *dominates*—and this is, indisputable, it is gospel truth—there is a need for the widest masses, for millions upon millions of people, to distinguish between half freedom and freedom and to see the indissoluble connection between political democracy and democratic agrarian reform.

Unless, the masses are interested, politically conscious, wide awake, active, determined and independent, absolutely nothing can be accomplished in either sphere.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 12,
June 10, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
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CAPITALISM AND "PARLIAMENT"

The facts of democracy must not make us lose sight of a circumstance, often overlooked by bourgeois democrats, that in the capitalist countries representative institutions inevitably give rise to specific forms in which capital exercises its influence on the state power. We have no parliament, but then there is no end of parliamentary cretinism among the liberals and of *parliamentary licence* among all the bourgeois deputies.

The workers must thoroughly master this truth if they want to learn how to use representative institutions *for* promoting the political consciousness, unity, activity and efficiency of the working class. All the social forces hostile to the proletariat—the "bureaucrats", landowners and capitalists—are already using these representative institutions *against* the workers. One has to know how they are doing this if one wants to learn to uphold the independent interests of the working class and its independent development.

The Third Duma decided to award bonuses to home manufacturers of machinery. Who are these home manufacturers? The ones "operating" in Russia!

But upon examination we find that they are foreign capitalists who have transferred their plants to Russia. Tariff rates are high and profits immense, so foreign capital is moving *into* Russia. For instance, an American trust—a corporation of capitalist millionaires—has built a huge farm machinery works in Lyubertsi, near Moscow. In Kharkov, farm machines are made by the capitalist Melhose and in Berdyansk by the capitalist John Grieves. These manufacturers are very much of the "truly Russian", "home" variety, aren't they?

But, of course, unless they were helped in every way by Russian capitalists, they would have been *unable* to operate in Russia at all. One good turn deserves another. American, British and German capitalists rake in profits with the help of Russian capitalists, who get quite a big share. Take, for example, the Lena gold-fields or the mining enterprises in the Urals. How many millions foreign and Russian capitalists have shared between them there!

The Duma is very useful to the industrialists in this respect. Both in the Duma and in the Council of State, the capitalists have a goodly number of representatives. The landlords, too, would not amount to much nowadays without capital. For both the capitalists and the landlords, the Duma is a ready-made machinery for passing laws on "bonuses" (to be awarded *to themselves*), protective tariffs (i.e., another form of bonuses to themselves), concessions (a third form of bonuses to themselves), and so on, *without limit*.

The "Sceptic", a liberal writing in the liberal *Rech*, had some very apt comments to make on this matter. He writes with so much feeling against the "nationalists" (who awarded themselves "bonuses" to stimulate the "home" manufacture of machinery by Messrs. Grieves, Melhose, Elworthy, and other companies) that I, too, have become somewhat infected with scepticism.

Yes, the liberal "Sceptic" has not made a bad job of exposing the "nationalists". But why does he say nothing about the Cadets? When Golovin, for instance, was seeking a concession, did not his position as *member of the Duma* and former Chairman of the Duma stand him in good stead in that useful and lucrative pursuit?

When Maklakov was gobbling up his "Tagiyev" fees, did not his position as member of the Duma make it easier for him to get such "profitable" cases?[87]

And what about the numerous other Cadet landlords, merchants, capitalists, financiers, lawyers and brokers who extended their business, promoted their "connections", and put through their "affairs", thanks to their position as members of the Duma and to the benefits and advantages that position affords?

What if an inquiry were made into financial transactions

carried out by Duma members or with the aid of Duma members?

But no—in all capitalist countries measures have been taken to protect "trade secrets" and to guarantee that *not a single* "parliament" should permit such an inquiry.

However, the working-class deputies undoubtedly know a great deal about this matter; and if they took pains to look around, obtain additional information, collect material, look up newspaper files, inquire at the stock exchange, etc., they could themselves carry out a very instructive and useful "inquiry" into the *business* transactions carried out by Duma members or with the aid of such members.

In European parliaments, such transactions are well known, and the workers constantly expose them, naming the persons involved, so as to enlighten the people.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 13,
June 17, 1912
Signed: *A Non-Liberal Sceptic*

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to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE ELECTIONS AND THE OPPOSITION

Marxists long ago defined their fundamental attitude to the elections. The Right-wing parties—from Purishkevich to Guchkov—the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (Cadets and Progressists) and the democrats (worker democrats and bourgeois democrats, i.e., Trudoviks) are the *three* principal camps contesting the elections. The distinction between these camps is a basic one, for they represent different classes and have entirely different programmes and tactics. Correct practical conclusions regarding the election campaign can only be drawn if the principles on which each of the three camps bases its policy are clearly understood.

The Marxists fully established these points* about six months ago, and since then they have been proved correct above all by the utterances of the liberal opposition. Our "neighbours and enemies on the right", while by no means sharing our views, have with commendable zeal provided us with the best confirmation of the correctness of our points. We may proclaim the following *law*: the development of Cadet political activity and political views provides excellent evidence in support of Marxist views. Or, in other words: when a Cadet begins to speak, you may rest assured that he will refute the views of liberal labour politicians no less effectively than a Marxist.

That is why, incidentally, it is doubly useful for the workers to look closely into Cadet policy: first of all, they will get to know the liberal bourgeois very well and, secondly, they will learn to see more clearly the mistakes made by certain supporters of the working class.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 397-402.—*Ed.*

It is this doubly useful result that one may well expect from the recent comments of *Rech* on the important pre-election statements made by *Russkiye Vedomosti*. These are statements by Mr. Akimov (V. Makhnovets), an old Economist, i.e., an opportunist of the period 1897-1902. They amount to a straightforward defence of the "progressive bloc", whose "platform" (a platform that, by the way, has *not* been published!) Mr. Akimov, who chooses to call himself a Social-Democrat, considers "perfectly acceptable for the Social-Democrats".

We have been, and are still being, told by numerous political babes (from Paris to Krasnoyarsk) and seasoned diplomats (from Vienna to Vilna),[88] that a liberal labour policy is a "bogey". But take a look at Mr. Akimov, my dear opponents! You will probably be unable to deny that Akimov is an obvious embodiment of liberal labour policy. Nor will you be able to say that he is unique, i.e., that he is an isolated phenomenon and an inimitable rarity, the only one of its kind. For, numerous though Mr. Akimov's inimitable qualities are, he is not an isolated phenomenon, and it would be a downright untruth to say he is. He made his statement after and in the same vein as Mr. Prokopovich. He found for himself a widely circulated liberal paper, a convenient rostrum from which his speeches carry far. He obtained a "good press" among the liberal journalists. Oh, no, he is not an isolated phenomenon. It does not matter that he ceased long ago to belong to any group. It does not matter that his right to the name of Social-Democrat is absolutely fictitious. But he represents a political *line* which has roots, which is living and, though it often goes into hiding, *invariably* comes into the open when there is the slightest revival of political activity.

Rech "gives full credit to the sober realism" of Mr. Akimov's arguments, and stresses with especial pleasure his opinion that "the Social-Democrats should at present put forward those of their political aims that will have the support of sufficiently large, politically strong sections of the people".

Rech certainly has good reason to rejoice. What *Nasha Zarya* says with a thousand twists and turns, piling one little reservation on another, covering up its tracks, and flaunt-

ing pseudo-Marxist catchwords that have long become outworn, Mr. Akimov blurts out bluntly and rather brusquely, rather simply, with a naïveté verging on innocence.

From a formal point of view, *Nasha Zarya* and *Nevsky Golos* are perfectly in a position, of course, to disclaim all responsibility for Mr. Akimov. But what actually happens is that the general reader, who is not versed in fine points and is not interested in them, derives "Akimovism", and nothing but "Akimovism", from these liquidationist publications. "Don't wreck the Progressist cause," wrote Martov. "Put forward those aims" that will have the support of the *Progressists*, writes Akimov, who, naturally, makes the reservation that the non-partisanship of the Progressists makes it easier for any party to maintain its independence (on paper). *To put forward more* aims than are acceptable to the Progressists means precisely to "wreck" their cause—this is how Martov's slogan is interpreted by the actual political struggle, by the *crowd* which Akimov represents so well.

Akimov is convinced that the Cadets and Progressists constitute "large and politically strong sections of the people". This is just the sort of liberal untruth about which *Nevskaya Zvezda* wrote in a recent article on the nature and significance of the Marxists' polemics against the liberals.* In reality, however, the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, taken as a whole, comprising the Cadets, the Progressists and many others, is a very small section of the people and one that is remarkably weak politically.

The bourgeoisie can never constitute a large section of the people. As for being politically strong, it can be and is that in a whole series of capitalist countries, but not in Prussia or Russia. In these two countries, its amazing, monstrous, all but incredible political impotence is fully explained by the fact that the bourgeoisie here is far more afraid of revolution than it is of reaction. Political impotence is an inevitable result of this. And all talk about the "political strength" of the bourgeoisie is thoroughly false, and consequently good for nothing at all, if it avoids this *fundamental* feature of the state of affairs in Russia.

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* See pp. 122-28 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Mr. Akimov has come out as a most outspoken and moderate liberal. We regard you as a force, Cadet and Progressist gentlemen, he says. We fully accept your platform (although there is no such platform!) and we ourselves are now putting forward *those* aims that have your support. All we ask of you is "that the list of the [Progressist] bloc should include the Social-Democrats". This is what Akimov wrote, word for word! I will accept everything, anything, he says, if only you include me in the liberal list!

It was truly ungracious of *Rech* to *decline* even so moderate a request. After all, it is a question of the June Third voters, the Cadets remind Akimov. And what do the Social-Democrats amount to among *them*? Nothing, "with the exception of the big cities, of which there is no question". And the official Cadet newspaper condescendingly teaches the humble and docile Akimov: "Apart from the border regions, they [the Social-Democrats] will almost everywhere else have to be guided, not by the hope of putting up candidates of their own, but by considerations making for the victory of the progressive bloc over the reactionary bloc of the oppressors of the people."

The liberal has brusquely declined to take the hand humbly proffered by the liberal labour politician! A well-deserved reward for refusing to fight in the big cities. The big cities belong to us because we are strong, say the Cadets, and the rest of Russia belongs to us because the June Third men and their June Third law, which guarantees our monopoly of opposition, are strong too.

Not a bad reply. The lesson which Akimov has been taught is a cruel but useful one.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 14,
June 24, 1912
Signed: *K. F.*

Published according to
the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTIONS

According to newspaper reports, the question of the date when the Fourth Duma should be convened and of the time when elections to it should be held has aroused some doubts among the ruling circles. Some were in favour of postponing the convening of the Duma until January, while others declared for October. Now the question is said to have been decided in favour of the latter opinion.

Thus the elections are quite near at hand—a mere seven to nine weeks. We must take steps to *redouble* our efforts with regard to all aspects of our pre-election work.

I should like to deal in this article with a special question, which, however, has acquired very great general importance for the worker democrats. I mean the role of the St. Petersburg elections.

The elections in St. Petersburg's second urban curia are the focal point of the *entire* Fourth Duma election campaign.

Only in St. Petersburg is there a tolerably well organised working-class press, one which, for all the fierce persecution it is subjected to, for all the fines and the arrests of its editors, for all the instability of its position, and for all that it is kept down by the censorship, is able to reflect, to some little degree, the views of worker democrats.

In the absence of a daily press, the elections remain an obscure matter, and their significance in terms of the political enlightenment of the masses is reduced by half, if not more.

For this reason, the St. Petersburg elections acquire the significance of a *model* of the election campaign which worker democrats have to undertake in the incredibly difficult

conditions of Russian reality. Nowhere else are the workers in a position to hold an election campaign *visible* to everyone. To be sure, the elections in the worker curia are highly important, but there the workers cannot come up against the other classes of the population, and therefore cannot present on an *adequate* scale the *national* demands, and the views on the tasks involved in a *common policy*, which have been worked out by the progressive, proletarian democrats, so *that* they may serve all democrats in general as a guide.

In St. Petersburg the elections are direct. Hence the pre-election struggle here may take much more definite, more distinct and more partisan forms than elsewhere. The other big cities would have been as important as St. Petersburg, but administrative pressure in the provinces is *still* so much stronger than in the capital that it is difficult for worker democrats to force their way through, to get a hearing.

Lastly, in St. Petersburg the struggle in the second curia has to take place between the liberals and the democrats. The Cadets consider the second curia to be *their* domain. St. Petersburg is represented by Milyukov, Rodichev and Kutler.

Obviously, the fact that a fairly large number of democratic voters are represented by the liberals can by no means be considered normal. The elections to the Second Duma showed that Cadet "domination" among the democratic urban voters is very far from being solid. In St. Petersburg itself, the "Left bloc" in the Second Duma elections, i.e., the bloc of worker and bourgeois democrats (Narodniks), not only *could*, but *certainly would*, have won, if at that time Mensheviks like Dan and Co. had not split the workers' election campaign and thereby given rise, among the Narodniks, to wavering and vacillations that were exceedingly harmful to the success of the cause. One has only to recall that in the Second Duma elections even the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" followed the Mensheviks' lead to the last minute, defending their bloc with the Cadets!

The electoral law now in force permits of a second ballot, so that no blocs are required, or permissible, at the first stage.

The struggle in St. Petersburg will be between the worker democrats and the liberals. The Narodniks will hardly be strong enough to act independently—they have been "liquidating" themselves much too zealously by following our liquidators' line. The worker democrats are therefore almost certain to be supported by the bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks and Narodniks), if not at the first stage of the election, then at any rate when a second ballot is taken.

The liberals have their leader, Mr. Milyukov, from St. Petersburg. They have had a large following so far. The funds which the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie supplies them with, the propaganda weapons in the form of two daily newspapers, and an organisation which is virtually tolerated and all but legalised *de facto*, all afford the Cadets tremendous advantages.

On the workers' side are the mass of the workers, consistent and sincere democracy, energy and devotion to the cause of socialism and working-class democracy. The workers can win if they rely on *these* forces and if they have a workers' daily newspaper. The workers' struggle for seats in the Duma for St. Petersburg is undoubtedly acquiring a vast and *country-wide* significance in the entire Fourth Duma election campaign.

Those who like to talk of "unity" of the whole opposition—from the Progressists and Cadets to the warily dodging liquidator Martov and the crudely simple-minded Prokopovich and Akimov—are all at pains to evade the issue of the St. Petersburg elections or to leave it out. They bypass the political centre but readily make their way into what may be called the political backwoods. They speak volubly, fervently and eloquently of what will be opportune at the second stage of the elections, i.e., when the principal, the chief, the decisive, part of the election campaign is over, and they "are eloquently silent" about St. Petersburg, which has been won by the Cadets and which has to be *won back* from them, has to be restored to the democrats.

There were no democratic deputies for St. Petersburg under the law of December 11, 1905, nor under that of June 3, 1907,[89] so that "restored" would seem to be an unsuitable term. But St. Petersburg belongs to the democrats by virtue of the entire course of the entire emancipation movement in

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ЗВѢЗДА

Годъ изданія первый.

Воскресенье 1-го іюля 1912 г.

№ 15

Уроки классовой борьбы.

Значеніе выборовъ въ Петербургъ.

Сравненіе столыпинской и народнической аграрной программы.

First page of *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 15, July 1, 1912, in which Lenin's articles "The Significance of the St. Petersburg Elections" and "A Comparison of the Stolypin and the Narodnik Agrarian Programmes" were published.

Reduced

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Reduced

Russia, and at a certain stage of its development *even* the monstrously high dam of the June Third electoral law will be unable to stem the "democratic flood".

The majority of the voters in the second curia undoubtedly come from the democratic sections of the population. The Cadets induce them to follow their lead *by simply deceiving* them, by making themselves, a liberal-monarchist bourgeois party, out to be democrats. This kind of deceit has been, and is, practised by *all* liberals in the world in elections to every sort of parliament. And the workers' parties in all countries gauge their success by, among other things, the extent to which they succeed in freeing petty-bourgeois democrats from liberal influence.

The Russian Marxists, too, must set themselves this task clearly, specifically, and firmly. That is why, with regard to the big cities, they have said plainly in their well-known January decisions that blocs there are permissible, in view of the known absence of a Black-Hundred danger, *only* with the democrats, against the liberals.* This decision "takes the bull by the horns". It gives a straightforward answer to one of the most important questions of election tactics. It determines the *spirit*, the trend, and the character of the *entire* election campaign.

On the other hand, those liquidators who like to talk of the Cadets as of "representatives" of the "urban democracy" are committing a grave error. This kind of talk *distorts* matters by representing the *liberals*' election victories *over* the democrats, and the liberals' election tricks played *on* democratic voters, as proof of the Cadets' "democracy". As though Europe did not know of dozens of instances of *anti*-democratic parties for years keeping various democratic strata in leading strings, until real bourgeois democrats, but most often Social-Democrats, freed those strata from the influence of political parties that were *alien* to them in spirit.

The election struggle in St. Petersburg is a struggle for hegemony between the liberals and the worker democrats within the whole of Russia's emancipation movement.

This exceptionally important role of the St. Petersburg elections leads us, incidentally, to two practical conclusions.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 469-70.—*Ed.*

He to whom much is given, much shall be asked. The St. Petersburg workers will have to carry on the election campaign in the urban second curia on behalf of *all* the worker democrats of all Russia. It is a great and difficult task that they have to tackle. They must serve as a model. They must show the greatest initiative, energy and perseverance. They have done so in regard to the workers' daily newspaper. At the elections, too, they must continue the work they have begun so splendidly.

The attention of all Russia is riveted on the election struggle in St. Petersburg. All Russia should also *help* St. Petersburg. Unless the St. Petersburg workers receive the most varied aid from all parts of Russia, they will be unable to overcome the "enemy" by themselves.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 15,
July 1, 1912
Signed: *F. F.*

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A COMPARISON OF THE STOLYPIN AND THE NARODNIK AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES

In previous articles (see *Nevskaya Zvezda* Nos. 3 and 6)* we have cited the basic data on landownership in European Russia and described the nature of the agrarian question in Russia. The main point of this question is to abolish medievalism in *landownership*.

The contradiction between capitalism, which prevails throughout the world, including Russia, and medieval *landownership*, as embodied both in the landed estates and in the peasant allotments, is irreconcilable. The old medieval system of landownership is bound to be broken up, and the more drastic, ruthless and bold this break-up, the better for the entire development of Russia and the better for the workers, and for the peasants, who are today crushed and oppressed by innumerable survivals of medievalism, *as well as* by capitalism.

The question may be asked: Such being the situation, how can one compare the Stolypin and the Narodnik agrarian programmes? Are they not in direct opposition to each other?

Yes, they are, but this opposition does not remove the one fundamental point which the two programmes have *in common*, namely, the fact that *both* recognise the necessity of *breaking up* the old system of landownership. The old has to be broken up—as early and thoroughly as possible, say those in charge of Stolypin's "land distribution"; but it has to be broken up in such a way as to ensure that the whole burden of it falls on the shoulders of the majority of the

* See pp. 32-35 and 73-77 of this volume.—*Ed.*

peasants—of the most ruined and most disinherited of them. The landlords should lose nothing in the process. If it is inevitable that they should lose part of their land, then the land should be alienated exclusively by the freely given consent of the landlords, and at a price considered "fair" by the landlords. The well-to-do peasants should be supported, and there is no reason to shrink from the ruin of the mass of "weak" peasants.

Such is the meaning of the Stolypin agrarian programme. The Council of the United Nobility, which entrusted Stolypin with drafting it, behaved as a true representative of the reactionaries—not of those who make fine speeches but of those who mean business. The Council was perfectly loyal to its class interests when it banked on the strong. And indeed, after 1905 it became obvious that the police and the bureaucracy alone were inadequate as a protection against the peasants.

Where else was the Council of the United Nobility to seek for allies? Only among the insignificant minority of the well-to-do peasants—the kulaks. It could not have found any other allies in the countryside. And to win over the "new landlords" to their side, the reactionaries did not shrink from delivering *the whole countryside* into their hands literally to be sacked and plundered.

If a break-up is inevitable, then let us break up *allotment* landownership in *our* favour and for the benefit of the *new landlords*—that is the gist of the agrarian policy which the Council of the United Nobility dictated to Stolypin.

But, speaking in purely theoretical terms, it has to be admitted that a break-up—a no less, and indeed much more, drastic one—is also possible *from the other side*. It cuts both ways. If, for instance, the 70 million dessiatines of land belonging to 30,000 landlords were to pass to 10 million peasant households in addition to the 75 million dessiatines they already own, and if the two categories of land were *merged* and then distributed among the well-to-do and middle peasants (the poor peasants could not use the land anyway, because they have nothing to plough, sow, fertilise and cultivate it with), what would be the result of the reform?

Pose this question from a purely economic standpoint. Consider this fundamental possibility from the angle of the general conditions of capitalist economy throughout the world. You will see that our suggested reform would result in a *more consistent*, drastic and ruthless break-up of *medieval* landownership than the Stolypin programme envisages.

Why medieval and none but medieval? Because *capitalist* landownership *cannot* be abolished, by its very nature, through any transfer of the land, not even through the transfer of all the land to the state (i.e., through what the science of political economy calls land "nationalisation"). Capitalist landownership is the holding of land by those who have capital and adapt themselves best to the market. Regardless of whether the land is still owned by the landlord, or by the state or the allotment peasant, it is bound to have a *master*, who can always rent it. The renting of land is increasing in *all* capitalist countries, under the most diverse forms of landownership. No bans whatever can prevent the capitalist, the master who has capital and knows the market, from laying his hands on the land, since the market dominates the whole of social production, i.e., since this production remains capitalist.

Nor is that all. The renting of land is *even more convenient* for pure capitalism, for the fullest, freest, and most "ideal" adaptation to the market, than is ownership of land. Why? Because private ownership of land *hampers* its transfer from hand to hand, *hinders* the adaptation of land tenure to the conditions of the market, *perpetuates* ownership of the land by a particular family or person and his heirs, even if they are bad farmers. Renting is a more flexible form, under which the adaptation of land tenure to the market takes place most simply, most easily and most rapidly.

That, incidentally, is why Britain is not an exception among the capitalist countries, but is the country that, from the point of view of capitalism, has the most perfect agrarian system, as Marx pointed out in his criticism of Rodbertus.[90] And what is Britain's agrarian system? It is the old system of landownership, landlordism, with the new, free, purely capitalist renting of land.

And what if that landlordism were to exist without landlords, i.e., if the land were owned, not by landlords, but by the state? That, from the point of view of capitalism, would be a *still more* perfect agrarian system, with still greater freedom of adaptation of land tenure to the market, with still greater ease in the mobilisation of the land as an object of economy, with still greater freedom, breadth, clarity and definiteness in the class struggle characteristic of every form of capitalist landownership.

And the more a country is lagging behind world capitalism, the greater the effort it must make to overtake its neighbours, the more it has "neglected" its "disease", the disease of medieval landownership and small-scale bondage farming, and the more imperative that country's need for a *radical* break-up of *all* its relations of landownership, of all its agrarian system, the more natural will be the rise and wide dissemination in that country, among its agricultural population, of all sorts of ideas and plans of land nationalisation.

Both the year 1905 and the two first Dumas proved beyond question—and the Third Duma confirmed it indirectly, through its "peasant" deputies (sifted through a landlord sieve)—that all sorts of ideas and plans for nationalising the land are extremely widespread among Russia's agricultural population. Before approving or condemning these ideas, one should ask oneself *why* they have become widespread and *what* economic necessity has evoked them.

It is not enough to criticise those ideas from the standpoint of their inner logic and harmony or of their theoretical correctness. They should be criticised from the standpoint of the economic necessity reflected in them, however "fanciful", inaccurate or "twisted" this reflection may sometimes be.

The economic necessity which at the beginning of the twentieth century gave rise among the Russian peasantry to ideas of nationalising the land is the necessity of a drastic break-up of the old system of landownership. The ideas of "equalised division" of all the land are ideas of *equality*, necessarily born of the struggle against the survivals of serfdom and *inevitably* transplanted to the land in a situation where 30,000 "residual serf-owners" possess 70

million dessiatines, while 10 million bond peasants possess 75 million dessiatines.

There is nothing utopian about the transfer of the first category of land into the second category, or rather to the owners of this second category. What *is* utopian is merely the dream of equality among the masters of the land while the market dominates; it is utopian to dream of the "*right* to land" for all "citizens, men and women" (including those who have no household) under capitalism. But the utopian character of *these* ideas should not allow us to forget the very true, living reality which is *actually* behind them.

There is nothing utopian about the abolition of *all* medieval distinctions of landownership—landlord, allotment, etc. There is nothing utopian about breaking up the old relations in regard to the land. On the contrary, the development of capitalism most imperatively demands *this* break-up. There *can* be *neither* "equalised division" of the land *nor* "socialisation" of it under capitalism. That is utopia.

Land nationalisation is quite feasible economically under capitalism, and its *real* significance would consist in any case—that is, no matter how it was effected, by whom and on what conditions, whether stably and for a long time or unstably and for a short time—in the maximum elimination of all that is medieval in Russian landownership and Russia's agrarian system; it would consist in the *freest* adaptation of the *new* system of land tenure and landownership to the new conditions of the world market.

Let us imagine for a moment that the Left Narodniks' plan was put into practice, say, through the equal division of all the lands among all citizens, men and women. Such division under capitalism is the greatest absurdity. Under capitalism, it would not and could not last even a year. But does this imply that its results would be zero or negative?

Not in the least! Its results would be of tremendous *advantage*—not the kind the Left Narodniks expect, but a most real advantage. That advantage would consist in all distinctions between the present social-estate and category forms of landownership being broken up. It would be a tre-

mendous gain for the whole national economy, for capitalism, for the proletariat, because nothing could be more harmful to the development of Russia than our old, present-day, landownership. Both landlordism and allotment landownership are *thoroughly* feudal forms of landownership.

An equalised redivision of the land could not last, but it would be impossible to *go back to the old system*! No "restoration" could revive the boundaries once they had been removed. No political force on earth could prevent the establishment of such *new* boundaries, limits, and forms of land tenure as would correspond to the *new* requirements of the market.

"Departition the land," I recall a Left Narodnik saying in the Second Duma. He fancied that the result would be "equalised land tenure". He was mistaken. But speaking *through him* was, as the irony of history would have it, the most consistent and fearless radical *bourgeois*, who is aware of the absurdity of the *old*, medieval "partitions" of our "allotment", "nobility", "church", etc., etc., landownership, and is aware of the necessity of *breaking down all* those partitions to make way for a *new* distribution of the land. Only, this distribution would have to be not "per capita", which is the Narodnik's dream, but *per capital*, as *imposed by the market*.

The Narodniks' constructive plans are utopia. But their constructive plans have an element that is destructive in relation to medievalism. And that element is by no means utopia. It is the most living reality. It is the most consistent and progressive reality from the standpoint of capitalism and the proletariat.

Let us briefly sum up our views. The real similarity between the Stolypin and the Narodnik agrarian programmes lies in the fact that *both* advocate a radical *break-up* of the old, medieval system of landownership. And that is very good. That system deserves no better than to be broken up. The most reactionary *of all* are those Cadets of *Rech* and *Russkiye Vedomosti* who reproach Stolypin for causing a break-up, instead of proving the need for a still more consistent and resolute break-up. We shall see in a following article that the Stolypin type of break-up *cannot* do away

with bondage and labour service, while the Narodnik type *can*.*

For the time being we shall note that the only entirely real result of the Stolypin break-up is a famine among 30 million people. And it remains to be seen whether the Stolypin break-up may not teach the Russian people *how* they *should* carry out a more thorough break-up. It is no doubt teaching that. But will it succeed in it? Time will tell.

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* See pp. 248-53 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE SITUATION IN THE R.S.D.L.P. AND THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY

The R.S.D.L.P. has passed through unprecedentedly hard years of rampant counter-revolution and is now on the right way to re-establishing its organisation and increasing its forces and its guiding influence on the Russian proletariat, which dealt powerful blows at the autocracy in 1905 and will destroy it in the coming revolution.

The hard years 1908-11 were years of division; it was in that period that the present Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, which had joined our Party in 1906 and had marched with us Bolsheviks against the Menshevik opportunists, seceded from the R.S.D.L.P.

The worker Social-Democrats of Poland should make a critical appraisal of this secession of the present Executive from the R.S.D.L.P. Therefore I very gladly accept the proposal of the *Warsaw Committee* of the S.D.P. of Poland and Lithuania that I should briefly explain in *Gazeta Robotnicza*[91] the causes of the division in the Party and the sorry role which the present Executive played in it, and should point out the immediate tasks of the Social-Democratic proletariat of all Russia.

I

Our comrades, the Polish workers, are familiar with the differences existing between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks during the revolution of 1905. A number of prominent representatives of the S.D.P. of Poland and Lithuania, such as Rosa Luxemburg, were on the Mensheviks' side at first, in 1904, but the revolution soon revealed their error, clearly demonstrating the Mensheviks' opportunism.

The counter-revolution of 1908-11 initiated a new stage in Russian history. The old autocracy moved a step closer to a bourgeois monarchy. The Duma of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie came into being. Tsarism had not yet lost its feudal character, but it was pursuing a bourgeois agrarian policy designed to institute private landownership as early as possible, at the price of unprecedented ruin and extermination of millions of peasants. Bourgeois liberalism made a sharp turn towards counter-revolution, and indulged in veritable orgies of renegacy.

Unparalleled division and dissension prevailed among the intelligentsia in general. The proletariat was subjected to persecution on the part of tsarism, which was taking its vengeance for the revolution, and to torrents of slander on the part of the renegades.

The task of the R.S.D.L.P. was to preserve the *revolutionary* Social-Democratic Party of the working class by *adapting itself to the new* conditions of work.

The very first steps towards accomplishing that task brought out new anti-proletarian trends in the R.S.D.L.P. that tended to undermine *the very existence* of the Party. They were engendered by the historical situation which our counter-revolution had created. These bourgeois trends are *liquidationism and otzovism*.

The liquidators, caught up by the wave of bourgeois desertion, repudiated the revolution. Giving up the illegal Party as a bad job, they sought only a legal basis for themselves in the allegedly "constitutional" regime of June 3 (16) and advocated its constitutional renovation. An "open workers' party" and slogans of *constitutional reform* were the gist of their policy. It was not a Social-Democratic, but a liberal labour policy.

Obviously, it would be simply ridiculous to compare the liquidators with the West-European opportunists within the Social-Democratic workers' parties (as the present Executive does under Tyszka's influence). Our liquidators refuse to recognise the Party in its illegal, i.e., its present, form, and are founding a *new*, legal party. It is not a trend inside the Party, but a withdrawal from the Party. The liquidators' obvious repudiation and destruction of the Party gave rise to sharp resistance from the Mensheviks themselves.

The worker Mensheviks in Russia *refused* to follow the liquidators, and outside Russia the Menshevik Plekhanov put himself at the head of the "pro-Party" Mensheviks (anti-liquidators). Plekhanov has now publicly and unequivocally admitted in the press that the liquidators are *founding a new* party.

We shall add, for the Polish workers' information, that the liquidators' main press organs are: abroad, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*[92] (Martov, Dan, Axelrod and other *Golos* supporters); in Russia, *Nasha Zarya* (Potresov, Levitsky, Cherevanin and others). The "otzovists" (from the word *otozvat*,* meaning the Social-Democratic deputies to the Third Duma) boycotted the Third Duma, for they did not realise the necessity of using the Duma rostrum and all "legal opportunities" for revolutionary Social-Democratic work. They reduced the slogans of the revolutionary tactics of 1905 to meaningless phrases. Experience soon showed that boycotting the Third Duma was an absurdity leading the Russian Social-Democrat boycotters to anarchism even against their will. In the summer of 1907 most Bolsheviks favoured a boycott; but as early as the spring of 1908 they had learned the lesson taught by experience and very sharply rebutted otzovist propaganda in St. Petersburg and Moscow. After being defeated so thoroughly in Russia, the otzovists and their defenders eked out a miserable existence abroad in the form of the absolutely impotent little group of *Vperyod* (Lunacharsky, Alexinsky and others).

Needless to add that, owing to the weakness of the majority of organisations in Russia and to the fact that the groups abroad were out of touch with the work going on in Russia, most of those groups were quite "freely" engaged in destroying and disrupting the Party, completely ignoring all discipline and holding no mandate from any organisation in Russia to direct a newspaper or publish pamphlets and leaflets. Besides the little groups holding different views on questions of principle, there sprang up, as usually happens, various little groups that had no principles at all, and strove to make some little political capital by brokerage, petty diplomacy, and intrigues under the guise of

* To recall.—*Tr.*

"reconciling" and "uniting" the Party. Past masters in this respect were Trotsky with the Vienna newspaper *Pravda* and Tyszka with the Executive Committee.

II

The R.S.D.L.P. was confronted with the question of how to re-establish the Party.

Clearly, it was impossible to re-establish the Party *jointly* with those who wanted to *liquidate* the Party or with those who boycotted the Duma and legal opportunities. Either the little groups abroad which were pursuing that bourgeois policy must abandon it in submission to the overwhelming majority of the organisations, groups and circles in Russia, or Russia must re-establish the Party *in spite of* those groups abroad.

In January 1910 the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. held a plenary meeting for the last time; it made an attempt to save the liquidators and otzovists, who were breaking away from the Social-Democrats, and to guide them on to the path of Party work. The absurdity and un-Social-Democratic character of both deviations were so obvious that *no one* ventured to defend them. It was *unanimously* recognised that both were *bourgeois* trends, and that only by repudiating them could conditions be provided for the revival of the Party.

But unanimous decision is insufficient if it is not followed by united action. The liquidators and otzovists, contrary to the decisions of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, did not relax but *intensified* their destructive work. It turned out that it was the Party's Central Organ, led by the Bolsheviks and the Poles, that fought *for the Party* during a year and a half (January 1910 to June 1911), with the Menshevik Plekhanov contributing vigorously to the struggle against the liquidators.

"Working" *against* the Party with might and main were the liquidators, the *Vperyod* group, Trotsky and the Bund. The Letts vacillated, most often siding with the liquidators.

The liquidators carried their destructive work to the point of destroying the Central Committee of the Party! The Plenary Meeting resolved to re-establish the C.C. in

Russia and to co-opt new members; but the liquidators would not even attend a single sitting, and declared that both the illegal Party and the illegal C.C. were "harmful". Under these circumstances, can anyone compare the liquidators with the West-European opportunists unless he is bent on intrigue?

The Party was left without a C.C., and its disintegration was unavoidable. Only the *Russian* organisations, i.e., those operating in Russia, could re-establish it. And that is when Tyszka displayed his hypocritical policy of intrigue in all its splendour by winning in the Executive Committee a majority over the adherents of a more principled policy and pushing the Executive to a break with the R.S.D.L.P., to the point where it found itself *between* the Party and the liquidators of the Party.

To explain that policy, which harms the Polish Social-Democratic movement, we shall first of all cite a fact of the *ideological* struggle in our Party.

The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee unanimously condemned liquidationism, as we have pointed out above. But one section of the most important resolution (known as its Clause 1) was formulated in such a way as to have the directly opposite meaning; it played into the hands of the liquidators. This clause expressed the opinion that at present, i.e., at a time of counter-revolution, the Social-Democrats were *for the first time* making full use of the methods of the international Social-Democracy. This clause, which left a loophole for renegade theories, was proposed by Tyszka, who tried to manoeuvre between the liquidators and the Party. It is only natural that the liquidators should have enthusiastically supported the clause, helping Tyszka to "victory"; some of the Bolsheviks—the so-called group of "conciliators" (i.e., virtual Trotskyists)—also went over to the side of the liquidators.

After the Plenary Meeting Plekhanov superbly and scathingly ridiculed the clause (not knowing who its author was) for its "looseness", vagueness, and generality. I spoke after Plekhanov and told about my fruitless struggle against Tyszka's alliance with the "conciliators" and liquidators.*

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* See present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 226-31.—*Ed.*

In two years, *not one* of the numerous writers of the Executive has spoken *a single word* in defence of that clause.

All that Tyszka's manoeuvring has resulted in is a liquidationist distortion of the views of the Party.

The results of this policy have been even more unfortunate in regard to the organisational question.

The Central Committee does not exist. The Party can be re-established only by a conference of the organisations in Russia. But how to convene such a conference? Obviously, it must be convened *not together* with those who are liquidating the Party, but *without them*.

Tyszka is walking the tight-rope, manoeuvring and playing at "unification" of the Party with those who are liquidating it. First Tyszka plus a small group of "conciliators" (a perfectly impotent little group abroad, which did not during a whole year receive a single order for its printed writings from any organisation in Russia) joined the Bolsheviks, assumed *control* over the convening of a conference, gave money to the agents who were to convene it, and dispatched those agents, asserting as they did so that they were "unifying" the Party (an assertion which brought Homeric laughter both from the liquidators and from us).

The agents began their tour *with Kiev*, with a Menshevik organisation whose status was so indisputable that even our sworn enemies, Trotsky and the Letts, admitted this in the press. In view of the furious attacks of the liquidators on our Conference, the Polish workers must know that it was with the participation of the above-mentioned organisation that the Russian Organising Commission for the convening of the Conference was formed (in October 1911). And it was a delegate from that organisation (Kiev) that was chairman of the Credentials Committee at the Conference!

It should be clear that the majority on the Russian Organising Commission consists of Bolsheviks and part of the "pro-Party" (i.e., anti-liquidationist) Mensheviks. The other little groups were not represented on it, being no more than fictitious units abroad having no connections in Russia.

That is when Tyszka, in despair because there was no possibility of mediating and intriguing, playing at unification with the liquidators, dissociated himself from the

Russian Organising Commission and did not attend the Conference even though he had been invited *three times*.

Instead, he attended a meeting of the *liquidators*[93] to discuss the convening of another (liquidationist) conference, and then left it, saying that there were liquidators there!! Is not a "conciliator" like that a buffoon?*

III

The January Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. united most of the organisations in Russia: St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Volga, the Caucasus, the South, the Western Territory. The Conference established that the liquidators (*Nasha Zarya*) had placed themselves outside the Party. It disclaimed all responsibility for the little groups abroad which were disrupting the Party by their actions.

At its twenty-three sittings, the Conference examined all the tactical questions in detail and adopted a whole series of resolutions in the spirit of the previous four years' work of the Central Organ and all the leading Party bodies. The Conference defined its terms of reference as the supreme Party body and elected the Central Committee.

It is quite understandable why the liquidators, and all the impotent little groups abroad along with them, attack the Conference, foaming at the mouth. The Conference condemned them. Every condemned person is entitled to abuse his judges all day long.

But there is *no* other Central Committee, *no* other Social-Democratic Party in Russia. Tyszka and the Executive who kept away from this Conference and assure the Polish workers that it is possible (with the help of brokers) to "unify" the Party with the liquidators, are deceiving the workers. As a result of this deceit, the Polish workers were unable to confer with their Russian comrades, to discuss with them tactics and slogans at such an important time

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* The Executive Committee, writing in *Vorwärts*, calls Trotsky an agent of the liquidators, and in *Czerwony Sztandar*[94] it argues that there can be no unity, not only with the liquidationist Left wing of the Polish Socialist Party, but with the liquidationist Bund in Poland!! Tyszka, on the other hand, promises to unify the R.S.D.L.P. with the Russian liquidators.

as the revolutionary upswing in April and May, as well as the elections to the Fourth Duma.

The revolutionary upswing of the Russian proletariat is obviously growing stronger. To assist this strengthening, consolidate the illegal organisation, give the movement the correct revolutionary slogans, rebut the opportunism of the legalist liquidators, imbue the legal organisations with an anti-liquidationist spirit, and carry out the elections to the Fourth Duma along these lines—these are the immediate tasks which the R.S.D.L.P. is now carrying out in practice—tasks the theoretical attitude to which was defined at the All-Russia Conference in January.

As far as the trend of their work is concerned, the Polish revolutionary worker Social-Democrats are marching with us. I should therefore like to close by expressing confidence that the proletariat of Poland will be able to join us, the R.S.D.L.P., organisationally as well, despite the vacillation of the present Executive on matters of principle.

Published on July 16, 1912
in *Gazeta Robotnicza* No. 15-16
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the newspaper text

A REPLY TO THE LIQUIDATORS[95]

The liquidators of *Nevsky Golos* are doing their utmost to *disrupt* the unity of the workers' elections in St. Petersburg. They will fail. Hypocritical shouts about "unity" (*coming from liquidators!!*) cannot deceive anyone.

The unity of the working-class democracy is certain.

The workers do not follow the lead of those who liquidate the workers' democratic Party and merely promise to replace it by an open "party " pursuing a liberal labour policy. Unity of the mass of the workers and not "agreement", to the detriment of this unity, with the circles of liquidationist splitters from among the intelligentsia—this is what the politically-conscious workers want. And *Pravda*[96] is following this slogan.

We are not put out by the unworthy sallies of the liquidators, who are *openly* asking *where* to "find" that which does not make a boast of being "open". Draw up your "open" platform, gentlemen, found your new, "open" party—and a good riddance to you!

P.S. I earnestly ask you to answer me immediately, or as soon as possible, on the matter I have raised here. *Keeping silent will not do*. You can spoil everything and evoke protests from the workers *on the left* by keeping silent about this. The liquidators must be rebuffed. We *cannot* conduct an election campaign without saying *for whom* we are doing it (people might think it is for the benefit of the liquidators).

If you do not want to aggravate and spoil *everything* "on the left", publish this "reply to the liquidators". If you do *not* publish it, send this sheet back to me *without delay*. It is *important* to me!

Written in July 1912

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Published according to the manuscript

IN SWITZERLAND

The local socialists call Switzerland a "republic of lackeys". This petty-bourgeois country, in which inn-keeping has long been a major industry, has depended too much on wealthy parasites squandering millions on summer travel in the mountains. A small proprietor toadying to rich tourists—such, until recently, was the most widespread type of Swiss bourgeois.

Things are changing now. A large-scale industry is developing in Switzerland. The use of waterfalls and mountain rivers as direct sources of electric power is laying a big part in this. The power of falling water, which replaces coal in industry, is often called "white coal".

The industrialisation of Switzerland, i.e., the development there of a large-scale industry, has put an end to the former stagnation in the working-class movement. The struggle between capital and labour is assuming a more acute character. The drowsy, philistine spirit which often in the past pervaded some of the Swiss workers' associations is disappearing to give way to the fighting mood of a class-conscious and organised proletariat that is aware of its strength.

The Swiss workers entertain no illusions about the fact that theirs is a bourgeois republic upholding the same kind of wage slavery as exists in all the capitalist countries without exception. At the same time, however, they have learned very well to use the freedom of their republican institutions to enlighten and organise the wide mass of the workers.

The fruits of their work were clearly revealed during the general strike in Zurich on July 12 (June 29, old style).

This is how it came about. The painters and fitters in Zurich had been on strike for several weeks, demanding higher wages and shorter hours. The enraged employers decided to break the resistance of the strikers. The government of the bourgeois republic, eager to serve the capitalists, came to their aid, and began to *deport* foreign strikers! (There are many foreign workers, particularly Italians, who go to Switzerland to work.) But the use of brute force did not help. The workers held their ground as one man.

Then the capitalists resorted to the following method. In Hamburg, Germany, there is a firm, owned by Ludwig Koch, which specialises in supplying strike-breakers. The Zurich capitalists—patriots and republicans, don't laugh!—had that firm send in strike-breakers, who they knew included all sorts of criminals convicted in Germany for pandering, brawling, etc. The capitalists supplied this riff-raff or gang of convicts (lumpenproletarians) with pistols. The brazen band of strike-breakers filled the taverns in the workers' district and there engaged in unheard-of hooliganism. When a group of workers gathered together to eject the hooligans, one of the latter *shot down* a worker who was on strike.

The workers' patience was exhausted. They beat up the murderer. It was decided to make an interpellation in the Zurich City Council on the hooligans' outrages. And when the city authorities, in defence of the capitalists, prohibited strike picketing, the workers resolved to protest by a *one-day general strike*.

All the trade unions declared unanimously for the strike. The printers were the only sad exception. They declared against the strike, and the meeting of 425 representatives of all the Zurich workers' organisations replied to the printers' decision with a stentorian cry of "Shame!" The strike was decided on, even though the leaders of political organisations were against it (the same old spirit of the philistine, opportunist Swiss leaders!).

Knowing that the capitalists and the management would try to wreck the peaceful strike, the workers acted according to the wise maxim, "In war as in war." In war-time one does not tell the enemy *when* an attack will take place. The workers purposely declared on Thursday that the strike would take place on Tuesday or Wednesday, whereas in reality

they had fixed it for *Friday*. The capitalists and the management were taken by surprise.

The strike was a signal success. Thirty thousand leaflets in German and Italian were circulated early in the morning. Some 2,000 strikers occupied the tram depots. Everything stopped. Life in the city came to a standstill. Friday is a market day in Zurich, but the city seemed dead. The consumption of spirits (all alcoholic drinks) was prohibited by the strike committee, and the workers strictly obeyed this decision.

An imposing mass demonstration took place at 2 p.m. When the speeches were over, the workers dispersed peacefully, and without singing.

The government and the capitalists, who had hoped to provoke the workers to violence, saw their failure and are now beside themselves with rage. Not only strike picketing, but also open-air meetings and demonstrations have been prohibited by special decree throughout the Zurich Canton. The police occupied the People's House in Zurich and arrested a number of the workers' leaders. The capitalists announced a three-day lock-out by way of avenging themselves for the strike.

The workers are keeping calm; they scrupulously observe the boycott of spirits and wine, saying among themselves: "Why shouldn't a working man rest three days a year, since the rich rest all the year round?"

Pravda No. 63, July 12, 1912
Signed: *B. Z.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

DEMOCRACY AND NARODISM IN CHINA

The article by Sun Yat-sen, provisional President of the Chinese Republic, which we take from the Brussels socialist newspaper, *Le Peuple*, is of exceptional interest to us Russians.

It is said that the onlooker sees most of the game. And Sun Yat-sen is a most interesting "onlooker", for he appears to be wholly uninformed about Russia despite his European education. And now, quite independently of Russia, of Russian experience and Russian literature, this enlightened spokesman of militant and victorious Chinese democracy, which has won a republic, poses purely Russian questions. A progressive Chinese democrat, he argues exactly like a Russian. His similarity to a Russian Narodnik is so great that it goes as far as a complete identity of fundamental ideas and of many individual expressions.

The onlooker sees most of the game. The platform of the great Chinese democracy—for that is what Sun Yat-sen's article represents—impels us, and provides us with a convenient occasion, to examine anew, in the light of recent world events, the relation between democracy and Narodism in modern bourgeois revolutions in Asia. This is one of the most serious questions confronting Russia in the revolutionary epoch which began in 1905. And it confronts not only Russia, but the whole of Asia, as will be seen from the platform of the provisional President of the Chinese Republic, particularly when this platform is compared with the revolutionary developments in Russia, Turkey, Persia and China. In very many and very essential respects, Russia is undoubtedly an Asian country and, what is more, one of

the most benighted, medieval and shamefully backward of Asian countries.

Beginning with its distant and lone forerunner, the nobleman Herzen, and continuing right up to its mass representatives, the members of the Peasant Union of 1905 and the Trudovik deputies to the first three Dumas of 1906-12, Russian bourgeois democracy has had a Narodnik colouring. Bourgeois democracy in China, as we now see, has the same Narodnik colouring. Let us now consider, with Sun Yat-sen as an example, the "social significance" of the ideas generated by the deep-going revolutionary movement of the hundreds of millions who are finally being drawn into the stream of world capitalist civilisation.

Every line of Sun Yat-sen's platform breathes a spirit of militant and sincere democracy. It reveals a thorough understanding of the inadequacy of a "racial" revolution. There is not a trace in it of indifference to political issues, or even of underestimation of political liberty, or of the idea that Chinese "social reform", Chinese constitutional reforms, etc., could be compatible with Chinese autocracy. It stands for complete democracy and the demand for a republic. It squarely poses the question of the condition of the masses, of the mass struggle. It expresses warm sympathy for the toiling and exploited people, faith in their strength and in the justice of their cause.

Before us is the truly great ideology of a truly great people capable not only of lamenting its age-long slavery and dreaming of liberty and equality, but of *fighting* the age-long oppressors of China.

One is naturally inclined to compare the provisional President of the Republic in benighted, inert, Asiatic China with the presidents of various republics in Europe and America, in countries of advanced culture. The presidents in *those* republics are all businessmen, agents or puppets of a bourgeoisie rotten to the core and besmirched from head to foot with mud and blood—not the blood of padishahs and emperors, but the blood of striking workers shot down in the name of progress and civilisation. In those countries the presidents represent the bourgeoisie, which long ago renounced all the ideals of its youth, has thoroughly prostituted itself, sold itself body and soul to the millionaires

and multimillionaires, to the feudal lords turned bourgeois, etc.

In China, the Asiatic provisional President of the Republic is a revolutionary democrat, endowed with the nobility and heroism of a class that is rising, not declining, a class that does not dread the future, but believes in it and fights for it selflessly, a class that does not cling to maintenance and restoration of the past in order to safeguard its privileges, but hates the past and knows how to cast off its dead and stifling decay.

Does that mean, then, that the materialist West has hopelessly decayed and that light shines only from the mystic, religious East? No, quite the opposite. It means that the East has definitely taken the Western path, that new *hundreds of millions* of people will from now on share in the struggle for the ideals which the West has already worked out for itself. What has decayed is the Western bourgeoisie, which is already confronted by its grave-digger, the proletariat. But in Asia there is *still* a bourgeoisie capable of championing sincere, militant, consistent democracy, a worthy comrade of France's great men of Enlightenment and great leaders of the close of the eighteenth century.

The chief representative, or the chief social bulwark, of this Asian bourgeoisie that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause, is the peasant. And side by side with him there already exists a liberal bourgeoisie whose leaders, men like Yüan Shih-kai, are above all capable of treachery: yesterday they feared the emperor, and cringed before him; then they betrayed him when they saw the strength, and sensed the victory, of the revolutionary democracy; and tomorrow they will betray the democrats to make a deal with some old or new "constitutional" emperor.

The real emancipation of the Chinese people from age-long slavery would be impossible without the great, sincerely democratic enthusiasm which is rousing the working masses and making them capable of miracles, and which is evident from every sentence of Sun Yat-sen's platform.

But the Chinese Narodnik combines this ideology of militant democracy, firstly, with socialist dreams, with hopes of China avoiding the capitalist path, of preventing capitalism, and, secondly, with a plan for, and advocacy of, radical

agrarian reform. It is these two last ideological and political trends that constitute the element which forms *Narodism*—Narodism in the specific sense of that term, i.e., as distinct from democracy, as a supplement to democracy.

What is the origin and significance of these trends?

Had it not been for the immense spiritual and revolutionary upsurge of the masses, the Chinese democracy would have been unable to overthrow the old order and establish the republic. Such an upsurge presupposes and evokes the most sincere sympathy for the condition of the working masses, and the bitterest hatred for their oppressors and exploiters. And in Europe and America—from which the progressive Chinese, *all* the Chinese who have experienced this upsurge, have borrowed their ideas of liberation—emancipation *from* the bourgeoisie, i.e., socialism, is the immediate task. This is bound to arouse sympathy for socialism among Chinese democrats, and is the source of their *subjective* socialism.

They are subjectively socialists because they are opposed to oppression and exploitation of the masses. But the *objective* conditions of China, a backward, agricultural, semi-feudal country numbering nearly 500 million people, place on the order of the day only one specific, historically distinctive form of this oppression and exploitation, namely, feudalism. Feudalism was based on the predominance of agriculture and natural economy. The source of the feudal exploitation of the Chinese peasant was his *attachment* to the land in some form. The political exponents of this exploitation were the feudal lords, all together and individually, with the emperor as the head of the whole system.

But it appears that out of the subjectively socialist ideas and programmes of the Chinese democrat there emerges in fact a programme for "changing all the juridical foundations" of "immovable property" *alone*, a programme for the abolition of feudal exploitation *alone*.

That is the *essence* of Sun Yat-sen's Narodism, of his progressive, militant, revolutionary programme for bourgeois-democratic agrarian reform, and of his quasi-socialist theory.

From the point of view of doctrine, this theory is that of a petty-bourgeois "socialist" reactionary. For the idea that capitalism can be "prevented" in China and that a "social revolution" there will be made easier by the country's back-

wardness, and so on, is altogether reactionary. And Sun Yat-sen himself, with inimitable, one might say virginal, naïveté, smashes his reactionary Narodnik theory by admitting what reality forces him to admit, namely, that "China is on the eve of a gigantic industrial [i.e., capitalist] development", that in China "trade [i.e., capitalism] will develop to an enormous extent", that "in fifty years we shall have many Shanghais", i.e., huge centres of capitalist wealth and proletarian need and poverty.

But the question arises: does Sun Yat-sen, on the basis of his reactionary economic theory, uphold an actually reactionary agrarian programme? That is the crux of the matter, its most interesting point, and one *on* which curtailed and emasculated liberal quasi-Marxism is often at a loss.

The fact of the matter is that he does not. The dialectics of the social relations in China reveals itself precisely in the fact that, while sincerely sympathising with socialism in Europe, the Chinese democrats have transformed it into a reactionary theory, and *on the basis* of this reactionary theory of "preventing" capitalism are championing a *purely capitalist*, a maximum capitalist, agrarian programme!

Indeed, what does the "economic revolution", of which Sun Yat-sen talks so pompously and obscurely at the beginning of his article, amount to?

It amounts to the transfer of rent to the state, i.e., land nationalisation, by some sort of single tax along Henry George lines. There is absolutely nothing else that is *real* in the "economic revolution" proposed and advocated by Sun Yat-sen.

The difference between the value of land in some remote peasant area and in Shanghai is the difference in the rate of rent. The value of land is capitalised rent. To make the "enhanced value" of land the "property of the people" means transferring the rent, i.e., land ownership, to the state, or, in other words, nationalising the land.

Is such a reform possible within the framework of capitalism? It is not only possible but it represents the purest, most consistent, and ideally perfect capitalism. Marx pointed this out in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, he proved it in detail in Volume III of *Capital*, and developed it with partic-

ular clarity in his controversy with Rodbertus in *Theories of Surplus Value*.

Land nationalisation makes it possible to abolish absolute rent, leaving only differential rent. According to Marx's theory, land nationalisation means a maximum elimination of medieval monopolies and medieval relations in agriculture, maximum freedom in buying and selling land, and maximum facilities for agriculture to adapt itself to the market. The irony of history is that Narodism, under the guise of "combating capitalism" in agriculture, champions an agrarian programme that, if fully carried out, would mean the *most* rapid development of capitalism in agriculture.

What economic necessity is behind the spread of the most progressive bourgeois-democratic agrarian programmes in one of the most backward peasant countries of Asia? It is the necessity of destroying feudalism in all its forms and manifestations.

The more China lagged behind Europe and Japan, the more it was threatened with fragmentation and national disintegration. It could be "renovated" only by the heroism of the revolutionary masses, a heroism capable of creating a Chinese republic in the sphere of politics, and of ensuring, through land nationalisation, the most rapid capitalist progress in the sphere of agriculture.

Whether and to what extent this will succeed is another question. In their bourgeois revolutions, various countries achieved various degrees of political and agrarian democracy, and in the most diverse combinations. The decisive factors will be the international situation and the alignment of the social forces in China. The emperor will certainly try to unite the feudal lords, the bureaucracy and the clergy in an attempt at restoration. Yüan Shih-kai, who represents a bourgeoisie that has only just changed from liberal-monarchist to liberal-republican (for how long?), will pursue a policy of manoeuvring between monarchy and revolution. The revolutionary bourgeois democracy, represented by Sun Yat-sen, is correct in seeking ways and means of "renovating" China through maximum development of the initiative, determination and boldness of the peasant masses in the matter of political and agrarian reforms.

Lastly, the Chinese proletariat will increase as the number of Shanghais increases. It will probably form some kind of Chinese Social-Democratic labour party which, while criticising the petty-bourgeois utopias and reactionary views of Sun Yat-sen, will certainly take care to single out, defend and develop the revolutionary-democratic core of his political and agrarian programme.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 17,
July 15, 1912
Signed: *Vl. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST CONGRESS

A few days ago the Thirteenth Congress of the Italian Socialist Party came to a close in the town of Reggio Emilia.

The struggle within the Italian Socialist Party has assumed particularly sharp forms in recent years. Originally there were two basic trends: revolutionary and reformist. The revolutionaries upheld the proletarian character of the movement and combated all manifestations of opportunism, i.e., the spirit of moderation, deals with the bourgeoisie and renunciation of the ultimate (socialist) aims of the working-class movement. The cardinal principle of this trend and the basis of its views are the class struggle.

The reformists, in fighting for reforms, i.e., individual improvements of political and economic conditions, kept forgetting the socialist character of the movement. They advocated blocs and alliances with the bourgeoisie to the point of socialists entering bourgeois ministries, of renouncing consistently republican convictions (in monarchical Italy, republican propaganda in itself is not considered unlawful), of defending "colonial policy", the policy of seizing colonies, of oppressing, plundering and exterminating the natives, etc.

These two basic trends, which exist in one form or another in *all* socialist parties, gave rise in Italy to two further extreme trends that deviated completely from socialism and tended therefore to dissociate themselves from the workers' Socialist Party. One of these non-socialist extremes is *syndicalism*, which became "fashionable" in Italy at one time. The syndicalists inclined towards anarchism, slipped into revolutionary phrase-mongering, destroyed the discipline of the working-class struggle and opposed the use of

the parliamentary platform by socialists, or upheld such opposition.

Anarchist influence is feeble everywhere, and the wor Ingclass movement is rapidly ridding itself of this sickness.

The Italian syndicalists (led by Arturo Labriola) are already *outside* the Socialist Party. Their role in the working-class movement is negligible. The Marxist revolutionaries in Italy, as in other countries, do not in the least indulge in anarchist sentiments and trends, which disrupt the proletarian movement.

The reformists are less staunch with regard to the extreme Right reformists who, by drifting to a liberal labour policy, pass completely into the liberal camp and desert to the bourgeoisie. That is why the removal of these traitors to the working-class cause from the Socialist Party seldom takes place without the Marxist revolutionaries having to wage a most bitter struggle against *all* reformists. This was the case in France, for example, where Millerand, an opportunist and reformist, ended by a deal with the bourgeoisie and entered a bourgeois Ministry.

The same is true of Italy. There the reformists have split into Left reformists (led by Turati) and Right reformists (led by Bissolati). The Reggio Emilia Congress marked the last act of this split.

There were three trends at the Congress: (1) the revolutionaries (they had about 12,500 votes at the Congress, according to the number of their supporters in the Party); (2) the Left reformists (about 9,000), and (3) the Right reformists (about 2,000). The revolutionaries moved for expelling Bissolati and another three extreme Right reformists from the Party. As for the Left reformists, one-third of them also favoured expulsion, but they wanted the reason for it to be expressed in "milder" terms, while two-thirds were against expulsion and for a mere censure.

The revolutionaries, who were in a majority, as the above figures show, gained the upper hand, and Bissolati and Co. were expelled.

What were Bissolati's views and actions which necessitated his expulsion from the Party? Bissolati, in the face of numerous decisions of the Party, went so far in backing the bourgeois Ministry as to almost become a minister

without portfolio" himself (that is, not being a minister, he behaved like a supporter and member of the bourgeois Ministry).

Despite republican convictions, which Italian socialists strictly adhere to, Bissolati began to make trips to the Quirinal, where he visited the king and held negotiations with him! He went as far as to defend Italy's present war against Turkey, although the *entire* Party has emphatically condemned the war as shameless bourgeois plundering and a dirty business—massacring African natives in Tripoli by means of improved deadly weapons.

Following the expulsion of Bissolati and Co., *all* the Right reformists left the Party and founded a party *of their own*, which they named the Socialist Reformist Party. Behind that facade is *in reality* a "party" of liberal-monarchist labour" politicians.

A split is something distressing and painful. But sometimes it becomes indispensable, and then all weakness, all "sentimentality" (a term used in Reggio by a compatriot of ours, Balabanova), is a crime. The leaders of the working class are not angels, saints or heroes, but people like anyone else. They make mistakes. The Party puts them right. The German Workers' Party sometimes had to correct the opportunist errors of even such great leaders as Bebel.

But when someone persists in an error, when, to defend an error, a group is formed that spurns all the decisions of the party, all the discipline of the proletarian army, a split becomes indispensable. And the party of the Italian socialist proletariat has taken the right path by removing the syndicalists and Right reformists from its ranks.

Pravda No. 66, July 15, 1912
Signed: *I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

"FREEDOM OF SPEECH" IN RUSSIA

The newspaper *At Your Service, Sir*, commonly known as *Novoye Vremya*, has reprinted a report received by its worthy colleague, *Peterburgskiye Vedomosti*, from Ivanovo-Voznesensk.

"In our industrial town," says the report, "foul language in the street has supplanted human speech. It is used by factory workers and cabbies and well-dressed people, and by policemen performing their official duties."

Commenting on this picture of mores, *Novoye Vremya* remarks:

"A lucky workers' town, where the most daring Social-Democratic expectations of completely unrestricted freedom of speech have been realised."

How very instructive, this caddish sally, isn't it?

Surely it is common knowledge, gentlemen of the editorial board of a newspaper loyally serving the government, that freedom of speech with regard to foul language has been "realised" in the Third Duma precisely by those Right-wing parties closest to the government. Surely everyone knows that the Purishkeviches, Markovs and *their* colleagues have become famous for this throughout Russia.

It is imprudent of *Novoye Vremya* to talk like that, very imprudent indeed. Why, it could have played its servant's role much more adroitly. Yet here is a paper, one sincerely devoted to the government, suddenly reminding us of the kind of "freedom of speech" that Purishkevich and Co.

practise and the kind practised by the Social-Democratic deputies to the Duma.

Freedom of speech for the Purishkeviches in a landlord Duma, and freedom of speech at workers' meetings.... It is an excellent pre-election topic brought up by *Novoye Vremya*, which is so clumsy in its zealous servility!

Pravda No. 66, July 15, 1912
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

HOW P. B. AXELROD EXPOSES THE LIQUIDATORS

I

P. B. Axelrod is destined to play an original role in the development of the opportunist trend among the Marxists. His idea of a "labour congress", for example, once made quite a stir. A certain number of workers were attracted and carried away by his propaganda. But the more widespread that propaganda became and the nearer the idea drew to being put into effect, the clearer became the *spurious* character of the scheme, which fizzled out of itself. Experience confirmed what the Bolsheviks had pointed out more than once, namely, that Axelrod's "ideas" are an invention of the opportunist intelligentsia, a dream of how to "bypass" grim class and political struggles.

Exactly the same story has now been repeated with regard to the idea of a workers' publishing house and a "non-factional" workers' newspaper. Any St. Petersburg worker will recall how much the liquidators made of that idea until very recently, how they tempted the workers with the dream of "bypassing" all struggle among the worker democrats, and how comically they fumed against *Zvezda* because it showed that the issue of a liberal labour policy (think of the bakers' decision[97]) cannot be bypassed and that all talk about workers' control over a non-factional newspaper is sheer demagogy.

And now Axelrod, writing in the liquidationist *Nevsky Golos* No. 6, has excellently exposed—has had to expose—the demagogy of his own friends. Demagogy means lavishing promises that cannot be fulfilled. The idea of a broad labour congress, a legal workers' publishing house and a non-factional workers' newspaper is tempting. But the point is

that these tempting things *cannot be achieved without* first waging a stubborn and difficult struggle for political liberty in general, for the victory of Marxism among the worker democrats, etc. Demagogic promises are easy to give. But life soon shows that they cannot be fulfilled, and exposes the opportunism of "rosy dreams".

In *Nevsky Golos* No. 6, Axelrod dishes up an amazing amount of empty declamation, asserting, for instance, that he and his friends are "progressive spokesmen of the Party", while their opponents are "reactionaries". Of course, Axelrod likes very much to think so, and the liquidators like to print what he thinks. Only, what cheap talk it is! Praising himself for his "progressive" attitude.... Would it not be better to *explain* the substance and meaning of the divergencies?

"The idea of a non-factional Social-Democratic (genuinely Social-Democratic, without inverted commas) organ is utopian at present and, moreover, a utopia that objectively runs counter to the interests of the Party's political development and the organisational unification of the proletariat under the banner of Social-Democracy. Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in through the window and the cracks."

That is what Axelrod writes. Those are not bad ideas at all. They are perfectly sound in principle. They show that Axelrod's liquidationist friends were quite wrong when yesterday they were still putting out among the mass of the workers the very idea which Axelrod now condemns. Only, we cannot regard the lavishing of unrealisable promises as a "progressive" attitude.

"We may be said to have no factions that have taken shape organisationally," writes Axelrod. "Instead, we have various circles and small groups, of which some hold more or less definite political, tactical and organisational views, while the others waver in various directions, getting in the way of the former."

The first sentence is not entirely correct. Axelrod knows very well that there is something which has *fully* taken shape organisationally—as far as that is possible nowadays. But the second is correct: there *are* many small groups that are wavering and are getting in the way of the others. By stating this truth under the compulsion of events, Axelrod

exposes his friends again. Everyone is aware that what Axelrod's friends are just now making a display of is ostentatious "unification" on paper of the wavering little groups. Do they not promise this fictitious "unification" of all the liquidators and all the waverers in the very same No. 6 of *Nevsky Golos*?

"The focal point and main source of the discord," Axelrod continues, "is, on the one hand, the difference in the attitude of the various Party circles to the new, open Social-Democratic labour movement [shouldn't you have said to the open *Party*, esteemed P. B. Axelrod? It is a bad thing to distort the essence of the divergency!] and, on the other hand, substantial differences over immediate political tasks and the political tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic movement. The requirements of both these categories are becoming particularly burning and topical issues just now when a new social and political movement is beginning. And it is over them that the Russian Social-Democrats have split into two main camps. The question arises whether the projected labour newspaper will be able to take a neutral position between these two opposed camps, and whether such a position is permissible in principle. Obviously not."...

A very correct conclusion. Axelrod has given a good thrashing not only to those of his friends who yesterday were clamouring for a neutral and non-factional newspaper, but also to those who today are assuring naïve people of their "agreement", "unity", solidarity, and so on, with the *neutral* little groups.

There are indeed two main camps. One of them has completely taken shape organisationally. Its answers to all the questions listed by Axelrod are quite formal, precise and definite, unlike the desultory and contradictory little articles of certain writers. As for the other camp, i.e., the liquidationist camp, to which Axelrod belongs, it has admittedly not taken shape organisationally (what we have instead is only hollow promises of an open labour *party*, only talk about open political societies of the workers, which are even less feasible than a labour congress would have been in 1906-07), nor can it answer, in specific and precise terms, the questions listed by Axelrod himself (what we have instead of specific answers is only the journalistic exercises of Yezhov, Levitsky, Klenov, Chatsky, and others).

"As soon as a working group of publishers and journalists makes up its mind to put forward a specific programme of action, to take

a definite stand on questions relating, say, to the election campaign, to put particular tasks and slogans before the workers in the campaign and declare itself for a particular tactic towards the different political parties—as soon, I say, as a publishing association decides to lend its publication the character of an essentially proletarian political organ, it will be faced with the same vexed questions and differences that worry and rend asunder the Russian Social-Democracy. And then it may happen that that association itself will become a new source of the same kind of discord, unless its members come to terms and reach agreement on these questions beforehand."

Axelrod hits out at the liquidators very correctly and very well. What the "association" needs, *Nasha Zarya* and *Nevsky Golos* need still more badly. Then why cannot they *come to terms* on the *vexed questions and differences*? Why cannot they give *precise answers* at least to the more important questions listed by Axelrod (the attitude to different parties, the tasks, slogans and tactics)?

"Physician, cure thyself." Axelrod has so well explained to the *workers* the need for clear and precise answers to the "vexed questions" that the *writers* of *Nasha Zarya* and *Nevsky Golos* (and, perhaps, not only *Nevsky Golos*) ought to heed his words. One *cannot* do without precise and clear answers to the "vexed questions", cannot confine oneself to articles—that would indeed be the circle spirit. *Decisions*—precise, formal, well-considered, and definite decisions—are needed. After all, it is not for nothing that Axelrod speaks—and very aptly!—of a *specific programme of action*, *of tasks and slogans*, etc.

Incidentally, the reason why the liquidators are called liquidators is that, while they have rejected the old, they offer nothing new. That an open party is useful, and that open political societies are necessary, is something which all liquidators have been dinning into our ears. But this talk of theirs is not all that is required, and as for *action*, there is no evidence of it, none whatsoever. There is no evidence of precisely what Axelrod demands from the workers!

In the *Nevsky Golos* feuilleton, below the dividing line, Axelrod has given excellent evidence exposing the liquidators who write *above the dividing line*, in the editorial section of the paper. Read Axelrod's feuilleton carefully and you will see that it is deception and self-deception for the

liquidators to shout about "agreement" concerning an election platform, a "single" platform, etc.

"A *Zvezda* Supporter" has already exposed this deception in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 16. But the exposure provided by Axelrod goes even deeper and is still more valuable because it comes from Axelrod.

We are entirely in favour of a *single* platform—namely, the one which the Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks adopted long ago, and are putting into effect, as "A *Zvezda* Supporter" justly points out. We are entirely in favour of a *single* election campaign precisely on that platform, on the basis of these same decisions, of definite and precise answers to *all* the "vexed questions".

By shouting about "unity", the liquidators seek to carry away ignorant workers by the mere sound of the word. "Unity" is agreeable, "non-factional newspapers" are more attractive! But read Axelrod *at least*, and he will make it clear to you that non-factionalism is *impossible*, that it is utopian; that there are *two camps* among the worker democrats, and that these two camps are *opposed*.

What now? Are the liquidators by any chance going to defend a "platform" *in order to conceal* their views?—a *diplomatic* platform, such as the bourgeoisie likes so much?—a platform that does not furnish any answers to the "vexed questions" but is "simply" and "merely" concerned with "getting into the Duma"?

That would be the height of unprincipledness. But the workers would never accept it. Such platforms, no matter how "open", could not hold their own even for a single day.

Yes, we have had enough of self-deception. It is time we faced up to the truth, which this time has also been plainly acknowledged by the leader of the liquidators, Axelrod. If you, liquidator gentlemen, choose to insist on a platform of your "own" (although you have yet to put it forward, and we do not believe in platforms concocted six weeks before elections!), if you choose to insist on tactics of your "own" (although so far you have nowhere stated them precisely, formally, in a manner befitting a party!), then you alone are to blame. Then it is *you* who violate the unity that is there *already*. Then it is *you* who will be held *entirely* responsible for that violation.

Yes, we have had enough of self-deception. Liquidationist cries about "unity" are no more than a blind. Knowing very well that the workers are against them, the liquidators are equally well aware what a complete, shattering defeat their separate action would bring them. That is why they are willing to promise anything as long as they are elected to the Duma.

That will not do. Only the bourgeois behave in that way. Worker democrats believe only in programmes, decisions, tactics and slogans that have been put into effect *for years* before the elections and are merely *repeated* for the hundredth time during the elections. As for those who make up meaningless "platforms" *without such decisions*, just for the elections, they deserve no confidence whatever.

Axelrod's feuilleton is useful as a means of destroying all self-deception, of enlightening the various concocters of "new", "open", "common" platforms.

II

The closing part of Axelrod's article, of which we spoke in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 18, has now appeared in *Nasha Zarya*. Taken as a whole, that final part has fully borne out our appraisal, and we can merely repeat that Axelrod's article is useful as a means of destroying all self-deception, of revealing the real nature of liquidationism, of appreciating the sheer inanity of the vaunted "non-factionalism" which today is being made so much of, and so very uselessly, in certain quarters.

Axelrod hits out at Trotsky, who is now in alliance (is it a stable one?) with the liquidators, in a particularly eloquent and convincing fashion. "The ideological and organisational union of the progressive elements into an independent faction," writes Axelrod, who amuses himself by calling the liquidators Party progressives and calling us Party reactionaries, "is—in view of the present state of affairs—their direct duty and pressing task." "In this situation in the Party, to talk of 'non-factionalism' as the sole remedy means behaving like the ostrich, which buries its head in sand at the approach of danger; it means deceiving oneself

and others as to the actual state of affairs among the Social-Democrats." (*Nasha Zarya* No. 6, p. 15.)

Poor Trotsky! It is downright cruel and ungracious of Axelrod to inveigh against a true friend of the liquidators and a contributor to Nasha Zarya in this way. What are we to expect now? Will Trotsky come out with a devastating article against the factionalist Axelrod, or will Martov reconcile the conciliator Trotsky with the factionalist Axelrod by pasting together, as usual, what is falling apart with a dozen plastering reservations?

Really, how can anyone speak seriously now of the vaunted bloc* of Trotsky, and the Lettish and Jewish near-Marxists, etc., with Axelrod?

Axelrod's article contains a point that is worthy of serious analysis, namely, the one on the "Europeanisation" of our Social-Democratic movement. But before passing to that point, it is necessary to say a few words about one of the methods of the liquidators.

One page in Axelrod's article (16) is a collection of the strongest, most vicious and choicest terms of abuse, against the anti-liquidators in general and this writer in particular. It would not be worth replying to abuse at all (a person in Axelrod 's position can do nothing but revile and curse) but for documentary evidence indicating that some deliberately use such abuse while others are embarrassed by it.

Mr. Chernov, for example, *replying* in *Zavety*[98] to what Kamenev says to prove that he, leader of the "Left" Narodniks, is drifting from democracy to liberalism, selects a bunch of the most abusive expressions of the liquidators and anti-liquidators, chuckling as he does so. Mr. Chernov's method is so despicable that it suffices to point to it and pass on.

No struggle over principles waged by groups within the Social-Democratic movement *anywhere in the world* has managed to avoid a number of personal and organisational conflicts. Nasty types make it their business deliberately to pick on "conflict" expressions. But only weak-nerved dilettanti from among "sympathisers" can be embarrassed by

* Axelrod's article is dated May 17, 1912, or *five months* after the solemn formation of the Trotskyist and liquidationist bloc to fight the anti-liquidators under the banner of "non-factionalism"!

these conflicts, can shrug them off in despair or in scorn, as if to say "it is all a squabble!" Those who take a serious interest in the working-class movement always learn—it is possible and necessary to learn it, is only by studying the historical role of the great leaders of the working-class movement—to distinguish between the "conflict" aspect of the struggle of *ideas*, of the struggle of trends, and that aspect of it which is a matter of principle. People will always be people, and no historical clash between the Marxist and the anarchist trends (Marx and Bakunin), between the Guesdist and the Jaurèsist, between the Lassallean and the Eisenach trends, etc., has ever managed to do without "conflict" material, without "squabbles".

There still exists a nasty type of writers who deliberately select "from those days" bunches of accusations of a thousand and one dishonesties, etc. But there are serious Social-Democrats who lay bare the *ideological* roots of the differences, which in the splits of particular groups, in the circumstances of political exile, etc., inevitably took the form of conflicts in the nature of desperate squabbles.

Let the reader not imagine that we want to frighten anyone away from studying the data to which Axelrod alludes—merely alludes—in the more abusive passages of his article. Quite the reverse. We *invite* those who want to know everything about the Social-Democratic movement to study those data. They are available in *complete* form abroad, and they include not only passionate accusations, but also documents and evidence by neutral persons. A study of those documents and that evidence will supply an answer to the question *why* the attempt to establish complete peace between the liquidators and the anti-liquidators, made in January 1910, ended in failure.

One of the more interesting passages of fundamental importance in Axelrod's article is the following:

"To organise and unite as a faction is a direct obligation and pressing task of the advocates of a reform, or rather [listen to this!] revolution, in the Party, for this is the only way in which they will be able to accomplish their task—to Europeanise, i.e., radically change the character of, the Russian Social-Democratic movement

as it took shape in the pre-revolutionary period and developed further in the revolutionary period, and organise it on the same principles on which the European Social-Democratic party system is based."

And so, the liquidators advocate a revolution in the Party. This exceptionally truthful statement of Axelrod's is worthy of note, for the bitter truth is more useful than deceit that "uplifts us",[99] and more valuable than diplomatic quibbles and reservations. Try to carry out a revolution in the Party, esteemed P. B. Axelrod! We shall see whether you and your friends will be more successful than those "revolutionaries" who only a short time ago tried to accomplish a "revolution" (against the republic) in Portugal.[100]

But the chief thing in the statement just quoted is the vaunted "Europeanisation", which is being talked about in every possible tone by Dan and Martov and Trotsky and Levitsky and all the liquidators. It is one of the main points of their opportunism.

"To Europeanise, i.e., radically change the character of, the Russian Social-Democratic movement...." Think over these words. What determines the "character" of *any* Social-Democratic movement and *radical* changes in it? The general economic and political conditions of the country concerned, without a doubt. And there is no doubt that the character of the Social-Democratic movement of a people can be radically changed *only* if those conditions undergo *radical* changes.

These are all most elementary and indisputable truths. But it is these truths that expose Axelrod's opportunist error! The trouble with him is that he wants to *bypass* a stubborn and grim struggle for a *radical* change in Russian political conditions, which has not yet taken place, by dreaming of a *radical* change in the "character of the Russian Social-Democratic movement".

Just as the Cadets, who readily talk about Europeanisation (the liquidators have borrowed both the Cadets' catchword and their ideas), by means of this loose term push into the background an exact concept of the solid foundations of political liberty and "*play*" at "constitutional opposition", so the liquidators *play* at "European Social-Democracy", although—in the country where they amuse themselves with their game—there is *as yet no* constitution, *as*

yet no basis for "Europeanism", and a stubborn struggle *has yet to be waged* for them.

A naked savage who put on a top-hat and imagined himself therefore to be a European would look rather ridiculous. Milyukov, a supporter of the bourgeoisie, reminds one of just such a savage when he asserts in the Third Duma that "we have a constitution, thank God", and so does Axelrod, a supporter of the workers, when he puts on a top-hat inscribed "I am a European Social-Democrat". Both of them—Milyukov as well as Axelrod—are ridiculous in their naïveté. They are both opportunists, for, by uttering dreamy phrases about "Europeanism", they evade the difficult and urgent question of how a particular class, in non-European conditions, ought to act *for* a stubborn struggle to secure a *basis* for Europeanism.

Axelrod has *proved* by his article that the result is evasion of a vital and urgent matter by means of dreamy phrases. Trotsky has prepared a perfectly European—yes, truly and perfectly European—plan for setting up a "*press committee*" as an "elected collective control body" of the workers for working-class newspapers (p. 18 of Axelrod's article). Trotsky probably even consulted "European Social-Democrats" about this and received their blessing as a gift—a blessing which he makes a great deal of.

And now the "European Social-Democrat" Axelrod, after waiting two months or so, during which Trotsky plagued all the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats with his letters about "elected collective control bodies", making everyone laugh, has at last taken pity on Trotsky and explained to him that a "press committee" is no good and is impossible, and that what is needed instead is an "*agreement*" between the workers and the liquidationist *Zhivoye Dyelo* (pp. 18 and 19 of Axelrod's article)!!

This is a small example, and we must unfortunately confine ourselves to it. But it is a very typical one. The laughable result produced by Trotsky's "European" plan for a "press committee" is also being produced by the "European" plans of all the liquidators for an "open workers' party" or "legal political societies of the workers", for a "campaign" for "freedom of association", etc.

The *only* result of Trotsky's "European" plans for a "press

committee", an "elected collective control body" for the working-class newspaper "of all the working-class organisations that have taken shape", etc., is that the legalist game of a "workers' publishing house" has taught the workers a special lesson, while the liquidators have in fact *failed to produce either* a "press committee" *or* a working-class press! These are the facts.

The "press committee" was a dream of the opportunist intellectual who, ignoring the difficult non-European conditions of the working-class movement in Russia, drew up a splendid European plan and took advantage of the occasion to boast of his "Europeanism" to the whole world.

This bitter lot of the liquidators is not accidental, it is inevitable. As soon as their "European" plans come near to being realised, they turn out to be soap bubbles, inventions of opportunist intellectuals. This was the case with the labour congress, the "press committee", the workers' legal political society (the confused little reservations by which Martov seeks to "rescue" that "plan" in *Nasha Zarya* No. 5 do not improve matters in the least) and the campaign for freedom of association.

The liquidators describe as "Europeanism" the conditions in which the Social-Democrats have been active in the principal countries of Europe *since 1871*, i.e., precisely at the time when the whole historical period of bourgeois revolutions was over and when the *foundations* of political liberty had taken firm shape for a long time to come. The "change in the character" of the Social-Democratic movement in those countries occurred, firstly, *after* a radical change in political conditions—after a definite constitutional system had been firmly established, comparatively speaking; secondly, that change was only a temporary one, for a definite period (which has lately been nearing its end, as is generally acknowledged by the most cautious Social-Democrats of Europe).

In these conditions of fully established bourgeois constitutionalism, a campaign for, say, freedom of association or universal suffrage, and for *constitutional reforms* in general, could be, under certain circumstances, a campaign of the working class, a real political campaign, a real struggle for constitutional reforms.

In our country, however, opportunist intellectuals transplant the slogans of such "European" campaigns to a *soil* lacking the *most elementary* foundations of European constitutionalism, in an attempt to *bypass* the specific historical evolution which usually *precedes* the laying of these foundations.

The difference between the reformism of our Axelrod and his friends, who pose as "European Social-Democrats", and the reformism of Bissolati, that genuine European, *is* that Bissolati sacrifices the principles of the class struggle and of consistent Marxist theory and practice *for the sake of reforms* which are really effected (with certain curtailments) by the really dominant liberal bourgeoisie. Axelrod, however, makes the same sacrifice as Bissolati *for the sake of reforms* which impotent, light-minded, dreamy liberals merely prattle about.

The liberal bourgeoisie here in Russia will become a real force only when the development of the country overcomes the liberals' timidity and their conciliatory, half-hearted slogans. That is how it has been everywhere. Liberals become a power only when the democracy has won *in spite of* the liberals.

Written late in July 1912

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Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the newspaper text verified against the text in the collection *Marxism and Liquidationism*, Part II, St. Petersburg, 1914

THE RESULTS OF SIX MONTHS' WORK[101]

By founding a workers' daily newspaper, the workers of St. Petersburg have accomplished a major feat, one that without exaggeration can be called historic. The workers' democratic movement has rallied together and consolidated itself in incredibly difficult conditions. Of course, it is not possible to talk of the *stability* of the workers' democratic press in our country. Everyone knows very well the persecution to which working-class newspapers are subjected.

For all that, the founding of *Pravda* is an outstanding proof of the political consciousness, energy and unity of the Russian workers.

It is useful to look back and note some results of the six months' work of the Russian workers for founding a press of *their own*. Since January of this year the interest shown by working-class circles of St. Petersburg in their press has become fully evident and a number of articles dealing with a workers' daily has appeared in newspapers of all shades that come into contact with the world of labour.

I

Data on *who* founded a daily working-class press in Russia and *how* it was founded are, fortunately, available in a comparatively full form. They are the data on the *collection of funds* for a workers' daily newspaper.

Let us begin with the funds with which *Pravda* was brought into being. We have the accounts of *Zvezda*, *Nevskaya Zvezda* and *Pravda* for the period from January 1 to June 30, or exactly six months. Publicity ensured the absolute

accuracy of the accounts, accidental errors being corrected immediately on indications from those concerned.

What is of the greatest importance and interest to us is not the sum total of the funds collected, but the *composition of the givers*. When, for example, *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 3 gave the total contributions for a workers' daily newspaper as 4,288 rubles 84 kopeks (from January to May 5, exclusive of the donations which from April 22, the day when *Pravda* first appeared, came directly to that newspaper), we were at once prompted to ask: what was the role which the workers themselves and groups of workers played in collecting this sum? Does it consist of large donations by sympathisers? Or did the workers themselves show in this case a personal and active concern for the working-class press and make up a large sum out of donations from a *large* number of workers' groups?

From the point of view of the initiative and energy of the workers *themselves*, it is much more important to have 100 rubles collected by, say, 30 groups of workers than 1,000 rubles collected by some dozens of "sympathisers". A newspaper founded on the basis of *five-kopek pieces* collected by small factory circles of workers is a far more dependable, solid and *serious* undertaking (both financially and, *most important of all*, from the standpoint of the development of the workers' democratic movement) than a newspaper founded with tens and hundreds of rubles contributed by sympathising intellectuals.

To obtain exact data on this fundamental and most important matter, we have performed the following operation with regard to the figures on collections published in the three newspapers mentioned. We have singled out *only* the donations stated to have been made by *groups* of factory or office workers.

What we are interested in at the moment is the contributions made by the workers *themselves*—moreover, not by individual ones, who may have come across a collector by chance, not being linked with him ideologically, i.e., in terms of their views and convictions; we mean *groups* of workers, who must no doubt have *discussed* beforehand whether they should donate any money, *whom* they should give it to and for what purpose.

ПРАВДА

ЕЖЕДНЕВНАЯ РАБОЧАЯ ГАЗЕТА.

№ 80. Среда, 1 Августа 1912 г. ЦѢНА 2 коп.

„Бюллетень Конторщика"

„Больное мѣсто".

Средства больничныхъ кассъ.

ОБЗОРЪ ПЕЧАТИ.

Итоги полугодовой работы.

Биржа труда.

First page of *Pravda* No. 80, of August 1, 1912, in which Part III of Lenin's article "The Results of Six Months' Work" was published.

Reduced

First page of Pravda No. 80, of August 1, 1912, in which Part III of Lenin's article "The Results of Six Months' Work" was published.

Reduced

Each report by *Zvezda*, *Nevskaya Zvezda* or *Pravda* which indicated that the money contributed for a workers' daily came from a *group* of factory or office workers, we assumed to be *a group contribution* by the workers themselves.

How many such group contributions by workers were there in the first half of 1912?

Five hundred and four group contributions!

More than five hundred times, groups of workers made contributions for the founding and maintenance of *their* paper, either donating what they had earned in one day, or making a single contribution, or contributing repeatedly from time to time. In addition to individual workers and sympathisers, *504 groups of workers* took a most active part in founding their newspaper. This figure is an unquestionable indication that a deep and conscious interest in a workers' newspaper has been aroused among the *mass* of the workers—and not just in any workers' paper, but in a workers' democratic paper. Since the masses are so politically conscious and active, no difficulties or obstacles can frighten us. There are not, and cannot be, difficulties or obstacles which the political consciousness, activity and interest of the mass of the workers would be unable to overcome in some way or another.

Those 504 group contributions break down by months as follows:

January	1912	14
February	"	18
March	"	76
April	"	227
May	"	135
June	"	34
Six-month total		504

This little table makes clear, incidentally, the great importance of April and May as a *period of radical change*. From darkness to light, from passivity to activity, from action by individuals to action by the masses.

In January and February group contributions by the workers were as yet quite insignificant. Obviously, the activity was only just beginning. March showed a noticeable and substantial rise. Seventy-six group contributions by

workers in one month—this indicates at all events a serious movement among the workers, a tenacious effort by the masses to have their way at all costs, undeterred by having to make donations. This speaks of the workers' deep confidence in their own strength and in the undertaking as a whole, in the trend of the projected newspaper, and so on. In March there was as yet no workers' daily, which means that groups of workers were collecting money and giving it to *Zvezda*, as it were, on credit.

April brought an *enormous* leap that decided the matter. Two hundred and twenty-seven group contributions by workers in one month, an average of over seven contributions a day! The dam had been broken, and the founding of a workers' daily paper was assured. Every group contribution means not merely the sum of five-kopek and ten-kopek pieces, but something far more important—the sum of combined, massed energy, the determination of *groups* to support a workers' newspaper, to disseminate and guide it, to bring it into being through their own participation.

The question may arise: were not the April contributions greatest *after* the 22nd, i.e., after *Pravda* had appeared? No, they were not. *Before* April 22, *Zvezda* reported *188 group contributions*. Between the 22nd and the end of April, *Pravda* reported 39 group contributions. This means that during 21 days of April, before *Pravda* had appeared, there was an average of *nine contributions* a day, while the last nine days of April saw only four contributions a day by groups.

Two important conclusions follow from this:

Firstly, the workers were particularly active *before* the appearance of *Pravda*. By giving money "on credit", showing their confidence in *Zvezda*, the workers expressed their determination to have their way.

Secondly, it is seen that *it was the April effort* of the workers that brought the workers' newspaper, *Pravda*, into being. There can be no doubt as to the closest connection between the general upswing of the working-class movement (not in a narrow guild, narrow trade union sense, but with a scope affecting *all the people*) and the founding of the daily newspaper of the St. Petersburg worker democrats. We need something more than trade union publications, we need a political newspaper of our own—this is what the

masses realised more and more in April; what we need is not just any political workers' newspaper, but a newspaper of the foremost worker democrats; we need a newspaper not only to promote our working-class struggle, but also to provide a model and a beacon for the whole people.

In May the upswing was still very marked. Group contributions averaged more than four a day. On the one hand, it was an indication of the general upswing in April-May. On the other, the mass of the workers realised that, although the publication of a daily newspaper had already begun, its position would be particularly difficult at first and group support particularly necessary.

In June the number of group contributions fell below the March figure. Of course, the fact has to be taken into consideration that *after* the workers' daily newspaper had begun to appear *another* form of assistance to the newspaper arose and acquired decisive significance, namely, subscription to it and its circulation among fellow-workers, acquaintances, countrymen, etc. The politically-conscious friends of *Pravda* do not limit themselves to subscribing to the paper but pass it on or send it to others as a sample, to make it known at other factories, in neighbouring flats or houses, in the countryside and so on. Unfortunately, we have no way of obtaining complete statistics on *this kind* of group assistance.

II

It will be most instructive to see how those 504 contributions by groups of workers are distributed among *towns* and factory localities. In what parts of Russia and how readily did the workers respond to the appeal to help in founding a workers' daily newspaper?

Fortunately, data on this are available for all of the workers' group contributions reported by *Zvezda*, *Nevskaya Zvezda* and *Pravda*.

In summing up these data, we must first of all single out St. Petersburg, which naturally has taken the lead in the matter of founding a workers' newspaper, then fourteen towns and factory localities which sent in contributions *from more than one* group of workers, and lastly, all the other towns, thirty-five in all, which sent in only one group

contribution each during the six months. This is the picture we obtain:

	Total of group contributions
St. Petersburg	412
14 towns with 2 to 12 group contributions each	57
35 towns with 1 group contribution each	35
Total for 50 towns	504

This shows that *almost the whole of* Russia took an active part, to some extent or another, in founding a workers' daily. Considering the difficulties which the circulation of the workers' democratic press encounters in the provinces, it is amazing that *so large a number* of towns should have responded within six months to the appeal of the St. Petersburg workers.

Ninety-two group contributions by workers in forty-nine towns of Russia,* besides the capital, is a very impressive figure, at least for a beginning. There can be no question here of chance, indifferent, passive givers; these are undoubtedly representatives of the proletarian masses, people united by conscious sympathy for the workers' democratic movement although scattered throughout Russia.

We note that the list of provincial towns is headed by Kiev with 12 group contributions, then comes Yekaterinoslav with 8, while Moscow with 6 is only in the fourth place. This lag of Moscow and its entire area can be seen still more clearly from the following summary data on all the areas of Russia:

* Here is a complete list of the towns and localities: **Vicinity of St. Petersburg**: Kronstadt, Kolpino and Sestroretsk. **South**: Kharkov, 4 group contributions; Yekaterinoslav, 8; Ananyev, 2; Lugansk, 3; Kherson, Rostov-on-Don, Pavlograd, Poltava; Kiev, 12; Astrakhan, 4, Chernigov; Yuzovka, 3; Minakovo, Shcherba Mine, Rykov Mine, Belgorod, Yelisavetgrad, Yekaterinodar; Mariupol, 2; Nizhne-Dneprovsk and Nakhichevan. **Moscow area**: Rodniki, 2; Ryazan; Tula, 2- Bezhetsk, 2. **North**: Archangel, 5; Vologda. **West**: Dvinsk, Vilna, Gomel, Riga, Lepaya and Mühlgraben. **Urals**: Perm, Kyshtym, Minyar and Orenburg. **Volga region**: Sormovo and Balakovo Village. **Caucasus**: Baku, 2; Grozny and Tiflis. **Siberia**: Tyumen and Blagoveshchensk. **Finland**: Helsingfors.

Number of group contributions by workers for a workers' daily newspaper during six months—January to June 1912

St. Petersburg and vicinity	415
South	51
Moscow and its area	13
North and West	12
Urals and Volga region	6
Caucasus, Siberia and Finland	7
Total for Russia	504

These data may be interpreted as follows:

In terms of renewed activity of the worker democrats in Russia, proletarian St. Petersburg has already awakened and is at its glorious post. The South is awakening. Mother Moscow, however, and the rest of Russia are still asleep. It is time she awoke too.

The lag of the entire Moscow area becomes obvious when that area is compared with the other *provincial* areas. The South is farther from St. Petersburg, much farther away than Moscow. Nevertheless, the South, which has *fewer* industrial workers than the Moscow area, exceeds that area *almost fourfold* in the number of group contributions by workers.

Moscow seems to be lagging behind even the Urals and the Volga region, for the number of workers in Moscow and its area exceeds their number in the Urals and the Volga region not twice, but many times over. Yet Moscow and its area made only 13 group contributions against 6 in the Urals and the Volga region.

There are probably two special reasons for the lag of Moscow and its area. Firstly, the dominant industry here is the textile industry, in which the economic situation, i.e., market conditions and conditions for a more or less considerable increase in production, has been worse than, say, in metallurgy. That is why textile workers participated less in strikes and showed less interest in politics and in the workers' democratic movement. Secondly, in the Moscow area there are more factories scattered over out-of-the-way localities and therefore less accessible to newspapers than in the big city.

In any case, we must undoubtedly draw a lesson from the data cited above. The closest attention must be paid to the circulation of the workers' newspaper in Moscow. We cannot put up with the lag of Moscow. Every politically-conscious worker realises that St. Petersburg without Moscow is like one hand without the other.

The *bulk* of Russia's factory workers is concentrated in Moscow and its area. In 1905, for instance, according to government statistics, there were 567,000 factory workers here, i.e., *more than one-third* of Russia's total (1,660,000), and many more than in the St. Petersburg area (298,000). The Moscow area is therefore destined to take the *first* place for the number of readers and friends of a workers' newspaper, for the number of politically-conscious representatives of the workers' democratic movement. Moscow will, of course, have to have a workers' daily newspaper *of its own*.

Meanwhile St. Petersburg must help it. Every morning the readers of *Pravda* should tell themselves and their friends: "Workers, remember the Muscovites!"

III

The above data should draw our attention from yet another standpoint, one that is very important and urgent as regards our practical tasks. Everyone realises that a political newspaper is one of the basic conditions for the participation of any class of modern society in the political affairs of the country in general and in an election campaign in particular.

Thus, a newspaper is required by the workers in general, and for carrying out elections to the Fourth Duma in particular. The workers know very well that they can expect no good either from the Third or from the Fourth Duma. But we must take part in the elections, firstly, to rally and politically enlighten the mass of the workers during the elections, when party struggles and the entire political life will be stimulated and when the *masses* will *learn politics* in one way or other; and, secondly, to get our worker deputies into the Duma. Even in the most reactionary Duma, in a purely landlord one, worker deputies *have done*, and can do, a great deal for the working-class cause, provided they

are true worker democrats, provided they are connected with the masses and the masses learn to direct them and check on their activity.

In the first half of 1912 *all* the political parties in Russia began, and virtually *completed*, what is known as the pre-election *mobilisation* of the party forces. Mobilisation is a military term. It means putting the army in a state of readiness for action. Just as an army is put in a state of readiness before a war, the reserves being called up and arms and ammunition distributed, so, before an election, all parties sum up their work, reaffirm their decisions on party views and slogans, rally their forces and prepare to fight all the other parties.

This work, we repeat, is virtually completed. The elections are only *a few weeks* off. During this time we can and must bend our energies to increase our influence on the voters, on the masses, but if a party (the party of any class) has not got ready in six months, nothing can help it any longer, for it is already a *zero* in the elections.

That is why the six months which our statistics cover are six months of *decisive* mobilisation of the workers' forces prior to the Fourth Duma elections. They have been six months of mobilisation of all the forces of the worker democrats—of course, not only with regard to the Duma campaign, but we are for the moment devoting our attention to the latter.

A question arises at this point, a question raised recently by *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 16, and *Pravda* No. 61. It concerns the so-called liquidators, who since January 1912 have been publishing the newspapers *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nevsky Golos* in St. Petersburg. The liquidators, who have their own separate newspapers, say that "agreement" has to be reached with them, the liquidators, if there is to be "unity" of the worker democrats in the elections, otherwise they try to frighten us with the prospect of "duplicate candidates".[102]

It seems that these attempts at intimidation have so far had very little success.

And this is quite understandable. How could anyone seriously take into account people who have rightly earned the name of liquidators and advocates of a liberal labour policy?

But perhaps there are, nevertheless, many workers who follow the erroneous, un-Social-Democratic views of this group of intellectuals? If so, ought we not to pay special attention to these workers? We now have objective, open and quite precise data for an answer to this question. As we know, throughout the first half of 1912 the liquidators showed particular vigour in attacking *Pravda*, *Nevskaya Zvezda*, *Zvezda*, and all opponents of liquidationism in general.

How successful were the liquidators among the workers? We can judge this from the contributions for a workers; daily newspaper published in the liquidationist newspapers *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nevsky Golos*. The liquidators recognised the need for a daily very long ago—in 1911 or perhaps even 1910—and advocated the idea most energetically among their supporters. In February 1912 *Zhivoye Dyelo*, which was first issued on January 20, began to carry reports on the contributions it received for this purpose.

Let us single out from those contributions (which totalled 139.27 rubles in the first half of 1912) *group contributions by workers*, just as we did in the case of the non-liquidationist papers. Let us sum up all the sixteen issues of *Zhivoye Dyelo* and the five issues of *Nevsky Golos* (its issue No. 6 appeared in July), and even add contributions for the benefit of *Zhivoye Dyelo* itself (although we did not take data on such contributions from the non-liquidationist papers). We obtain the following data on the total of group contributions by workers in six months:

Number of group contributions by workers for a workers' daily newspaper during the first half of 1912

	Non-liquidationist newspapers	Liquidationist newspapers
January	14	0
February	18	0
March	76	7
April	227	8
May	135	0
June	34	0
Total	504	15

And so, by dint of frantic effort, the group of liquidationist intellectuals succeeded in enlisting the support of *15 groups of workers in all*!

Could one imagine a more shattering defeat of the liquidators since January 1912? Could one imagine a more specific proof of the fact that we are in the presence of a group of liquidationist intellectuals who are capable of publishing a semi-liberal magazine and newspaper, but totally lack any serious support among the proletarian masses?

Here, in addition, are data on the territorial distribution of the donations sent to the liquidators by groups of workers:

Number of group contributions by workers for a workers' daily newspaper during the first half of 1912

	Non-liquidationist newspapers	Liquidationist newspapers
St. Petersburg and vicinity	415	10
South	51	1
Moscow and its area	13	2
North and West	12	1
Urals and Volga region	6	0
Caucasus, Siberia and Finland	7	1
Total	504	15*

And so, the liquidators' defeat in the South during the six-month period is even worse than in St. Petersburg.

These exact workers' statistics, which were published openly for as long as six months in newspapers of opposed trends, definitely settle the question of "liquidationism". One may revile the opponents of liquidationism and slander them as much as one pleases, but these exact data on group contributions by workers are irrefutable.

It is quite understandable now why neither *Nevskaya Zvezda* nor *Pravda* took the liquidators' threat of "duplicate candidates" seriously It would be ridiculous to take seriously threats from people who in six months of open struggle revealed that they amount to little more than zero. All the defenders of liquidationism have united in *Zhivoye Dyelo*

* Moscow, 2; Nakhichevan, Novonikolayevsk and Archangel, 1 each.

and *Nevsky Golos*. And it took all of them together six months to win over fifteen groups of workers!

Liquidationism amounts to nil in the working-class movement; it is only strong among the liberal intelligentsia.

IV

The data in *Pravda* on all kinds of workers' contributions are, generally speaking, extremely interesting. They provide us, for the first time, with highly accurate data on the most diverse aspects of the working-class movement and the life of Russian worker democrats. We hope to return to the analysis of these data more than once.

At the moment, however, before we finish our survey of data on the contributions made by groups of workers for a daily newspaper, we must point out one practical conclusion.

Workers' groups made 504 contributions to *their* press, to *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. The workers had absolutely no other aim in view except the founding and maintenance of their workers' press. That is precisely why a simple truthful summary of these data for six months provides a most valuable picture of the life of worker democrats in Russia. The five- and ten-kopek pieces collected and marked "from a group of workers of such-and-such a factory" have made it possible also to appraise the workers' sentiments, their class-consciousness, their unity, and their readiness to promote the working-class cause.

That is why this custom of group collections by the workers, brought into being by the upswing in April and May, should by all means be continued, developed and expanded, and it goes without saying that accounts of the collections are necessary too, such as have always been published in *Pravda*.

This custom is of vast importance from the standpoint of both the stability of the working-class press and the common interests of the worker democrats.

The working-class press needs to be developed and strengthened. And this requires money. Workers' newspapers in Russia can be satisfactorily organised through persevering effort only on condition that the workers constantly

arrange massive collections. There is a workers' paper in America (*Appeal to Reason*[103]) which has *over half a million* subscribers. That Russian worker, we would say, paraphrasing a well-known saying, is a poor worker indeed if he does not hope to overtake and surpass his American fellow-workers.

What is very much more important, however, is not the financial aspect of the matter, but something else. Let us assume that a hundred workers in different shops of a factory contribute *one kopek* each on pay-day to the workers' newspaper. That will add up to two rubles a month. Let us assume, on the other hand, that ten well-paid workers meeting by chance collect ten rubles at once.

The former two rubles are worth more than the latter ten. This is so obvious to any worker that it does not have to be explained at length.

It should be made a custom for *every* worker to contribute *one kopek* to the workers' newspaper *every* pay-day. Let subscriptions to the paper be taken as usual, and let those who can contribute more do so, as they have done in the past. It is very important, besides, to establish and spread the custom of "*a kopek for the workers' newspaper*".

The significance of such collections will depend above all on their being regularly held every pay-day, without interruption, and on an ever greater number of workers taking part in these regular collections. Accounts could be published in a simple form: "so-and-so many kopeks" would imply that so many workers at the given factory had contributed to the workers' paper, and if there were any larger contributions, they could be stated as follows: "In addition, so-and-so many workers contributed so-and-so much."

If this custom of *a kopek for the workers' newspaper* becomes established, the workers of Russia will soon raise their papers to the proper standard. Workers' papers should give more information, and of a more varied nature; they should have Sunday supplements and so on, and should have their correspondents in the Duma, in all Russia's towns and in the major cities abroad. The workers' newspaper should develop and improve *steadily*, which cannot be done unless the greatest possible number of workers regularly collect money for their press.

Monthly reports on the *workers' kopek* will show everyone how the workers throughout Russia are shaking of their indifference and drowsiness, how they are awakening to an intelligent and cultured life—not in the official nor in the liberal sense of the term. It will be possible to see clearly how interest in the workers' democratic movement is growing, and how the time is drawing near when Moscow and the other big cities will have workers' papers of their own.

We have had enough of the domination of the bourgeois *Kopeika*![104] That unscrupulous, huckster-minded newspaper has reigned long enough. In a matter of six months, the workers of St. Petersburg have shown how tremendously successful joint collections by the workers can be. May their example and their initiative not be in vain. May the custom of *a workers' kopek for the workers' newspaper* develop and gain strength!

Written on July 12-14 (25-27), 1912

Published in *Pravda* Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, July 29 and 31, and August 1 and 2, 1912
Signed: *A Statistician*

Published according to the newspaper text

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE R.S.D.L.P.[105]

The German comrades often have occasion to read reports of bitter struggles and fundamental divergencies inside the R.S.D.L.P. Unfortunately, such reports originate from particular groups of political exiles. In most cases they come from people who are either absolutely unfamiliar with the actual state of affairs in Russia at the present time or deliberately seek to mislead the German comrades by a one-sided presentation of party politics. Every such group of exiles has its own special "trend", but in reality it consists of people who have lost all living contact with the fighting Russian workers' Party or have never had such contact. Unfortunately, one of this kind of "informants" succeeded in winning the confidence of *Vorwärts*. The Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party in a series of articles opened its columns to a torrent of unheard-of slander against the Russian Party, poured out from the pen of that informant and supposed to be derived from "objective" sources.

Actually, those sources were "subjective" and false through and through. Since *Vorwärts* did not insert our *factual correction*, we had to issue a separate pamphlet entitled *The Anonymous Writer in* Vorwärts *and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P.*,* which was issued in several hundred copies and was sent to the executive committees of all the German Party organisations of any importance and to the editors of the major organs of the Party press.

As far as the factual evidence of the pamphlet is concerned, *Vorwärts* was unable to raise *a single objection*, and thereby tacitly accepted it.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 533-46.—*Ed.*

To enable our German Party comrades to appraise the authenticity of certain reports reaching them, we quote here a letter which the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. sent to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party. The Letts had suggested that the Executive should arrange a joint meeting of eleven "centres" on the question of material support for the election campaign, whereupon the Executive asked those centres about their attitude to the matter. The letter is the answer given by the Central Committee, and it reads as follows:

July 30, 1912*

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Dear Comrades,

Recently we received a copy of the letter sent to you by the Committee of the Lettish Social-Democracy Abroad on June 24. We saw no point in explaining the queer plan of these Letts to you, as we did not think any well-informed person would take that plan seriously. But we were surprised to learn from your letter to us of July 22 that you intend to adopt that plan. This compels us to express our emphatic protest, which we hereby send you. Objectively, the intention of the Executive Committee is nothing short of an attempt to contribute to the split in our Party (the R.S.D.L.P.) and to the formation of a new party hostile to us. This is unprecedented in the history of the whole International. We shall furnish the German comrades with accurate data to bear out our assertion.

THE SITUATION IN THE R.S.D.L.P. SINCE JANUARY 1912

In January 1912 the R.S.D.L.P. held its All-Russia Conference which was attended by delegates from the organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Moscow district,

* The letter is quoted here with minor stylistic changes.

Kazan, Saratov, Tiflis, Baku, Nikolayev, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Vilna and Dvinsk. This Conference restored the Party and elected a new Central Committee in place of the one destroyed by the liquidators; furthermore, the Conference was compelled to declare these liquidators to be outside the Party. (See pamphlet *The Anonymous Writer in* Vorwärts *and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P.*, which was sent to the Executive Committee; it mentioned the protest of the liquidators and of the national organisations—the Poles, the Letts, the Bund and the groups abroad.)

In January also a meeting took place with the aim of setting up an Organising Committee to convene a new conference—a "general Party conference", as the liquidators and their friends called it.

In their letter to the Executive Committee of June 24, the Letts affirmed that this "Organising Committee" involved the following organisations and trends: the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democrats, the Caucasian Regional Committee, the Menshevik *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the Vienna *Pravda* and the *Vperyod* group.

And so, on one side there is the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. elected at the Conference by Russian organisations, i.e., organisations working in Russia (the opponents call it the Leninist trend); on the other side there is the so-called Organising Committee, which promises to convene a "general" Party conference.

WHAT IS THE RELATION OF THE HITHERTO NEUTRAL RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS TO THE SO-CALLED ORGANISING COMMITTEE?

Plekhanov, the best known of the Mensheviks, who had been waging a determined fight against the destruction of the Party by the liquidators, did not attend the January Party Conference, although he was invited. In April 1912 he published his correspondence with the representative of the Organising Committee (see his *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 16).

Plekhanov refused to take part in the so-called Organising Committee because, he said, the Bund was convening not a conference of the existing Party organisations, but an

"*inaugural*" *conference*, *i.e.*, *one that was to found a new party*. The so-called initiating groups, which in reality are the only groups backing the Organising Committee, are, according to Plekhanov, liquidationist groups, which do not belong to the Party and want to form a new party. In April 1912 Plekhanov wrote: "The new conference is being called by the liquidators."

In July this Organising Committee published its *Listok* No. 3, which contains not a word, not a hint, of a reply to Plekhanov. One can judge from this how the Executive Committee is kept informed by the Letts, those very same Letts who complain that the "Leninist" Central Committee does not answer the letters of the Organising Committee.

Is it really so very strange that the Central Committee of the Party—of the old Party—should not reply to those who, according to the hitherto neutral Plekhanov, are founding a new party?

The Organising Committee must first of all prove to the neutral Plekhanov that it is not forming a new party and not liquidating the old one.

The Letts who are taking part in the Organising Committee and who appealed to the Executive Committee on June 24 should—after six months' struggle of this Organising Committee of the liquidators against the Party—have shown by facts and documents the results of this struggle; instead, they show the Executive Committee the **Potemkin villages**[106] **of the liquidators**.

The Letts proposed that the Executive should convene eleven "organisational" centres, organisations and factions of the Russian Social-Democrats. That is literally what they stated (see p. 4 of the Letts' letter to the Executive of June 24).

All over the world, parties have so far been formed of local organisations united by a single central body. But in 1912 the Russian and Lettish liquidators made a great discovery. From now on, a party may be formed of "centres, organisations and factions".

According to the Letts' latest liquidationist electoral geometry, the eleven organisational centres, organisations and factions include, firstly, the Organising Committee and, secondly, six factions, or organisations, or centres, *which*

form that Organising Committee. The Letts' letter says in so many words: "Points 2 to 7 inclusive form the Organising Committee."

Thus the intellectualist groups that are liquidating the Party obtain a *treble* vote, like the aristocracy in the "rotten boroughs":

(1) The Caucasian Regional Committee, a fictitious organisation;

(2) Ditto, as represented by the Paris *Golos*, although *Golos* has no permanent mandate from the Caucasus;

(3) Ditto, as represented by the Organising Committee.

We maintain that the Russian workers will indignantly and contemptuously reject the idea of discussing the question of duplicate candidates, i.e., the attempt of the liquidators jointly with the insignificant groups abroad to cause a split, the more so since these groups represent only intellectualist disorganisers.

We wish to point out the fact that not a single one of the groups abroad that are fighting against the Party has during the past six months received a mandate from any organisation in Russia to publish its newspaper or issue leaflets. If the Letts are trying to prove the contrary to the Executive Committee, let them name in the Russian press at least one such mandate prior to July 22.

Golos Sotsial-Demokrata is not the organ of any Russian organisation.

Nor is Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda* the organ of any Russian organisation. Three years ago *Pravda* was the organ of the Ukrainian Spilka[107] (Southern Russia), but the Spilka cancelled its mandate long ago.

Neither *Vperyod*, nor Plekhanov, nor the "pro-Party Bolsheviks", publish any organs that are Party organs of any organisation in Russia.

It is very easy to refer to groups which do not exist in reality. Nor is it difficult to print reports expressing "sympathy". But to bring out, even for six months, the organ of an organisation operating in Russia, it is necessary to have regular contacts, the unqualified confidence of the mass of the workers in the localities, and unity of views on tactics, which can be achieved only through joint work over a long period. The tiny groups abroad which the Lettish

and Bundist disorganisers are mobilising against the Party lack all this.

As regards the Polish Socialist Party, we shall say briefly: it is *no Social-Democratic* organisation. It has *never* been part of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. There is only one reason for inviting it, namely, it "promises" to become Social-Democratic and join the liquidators! For the disorganisers and lovers of splits, this, of course, is sufficient! If the Polish Socialist Party is to be invited to take part in meetings, why not also invite the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who take part in the Duma elections, the Zionist-Socialists, the Lettish Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, and other similar "trends"?

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE THIRD DUMA

Among the organisational centres the Executive Committee has included the little groups abroad; on the other hand, *it has not invited the Social-Democratic group in the Duma.* This is incredible, yet it is a fact. It will be useful for the Russian workers to know how Trotsky and Co. are misleading our foreign comrades.

In their letter to the Executive Committee of June 24, the Letts wrote:

> "As regards the Social-Democratic Duma group, there can be no question of its good offices in the matter of financial assistance to the election campaign, for the Duma session is drawing to a close and simultaneously the Duma group is thereby dissolving itself" (p. 2 of the repeatedly quoted letter).

This is either deliberate deception, or boundless political ignorance, indicating clearly enough how far the Letts in Brussels are informed about the elections in Russia.

The letter is dated June 24. On June 9, i.e., June 22, new style, the Third Duma was officially dissolved for an indefinite period, all the deputies, the Social-Democrats among them, retaining their mandates. The latter are therefore *still Duma deputies*, which is known to every literate worker in Russia. But this is unknown to the slanderers of the Party abroad.

The only legally existing Social-Democrats in Russia, who are the only official organisation in whatever part of the country they may be, are precisely the members of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma.

All the liquidators hate the group. The sheets of the liquidators (*Nasha Zarya*) heap abuse and insinuations upon it, and all the disorganisers abroad spread tittle-tattle about it. Why? Because the majority of the group, in which pro-Party Mensheviks have always predominated, have always fought with determination against the liquidators and helped to make them quite harmless in St. Petersburg.

In the pamphlet *The Anonymous Writer*, *etc.*, we published an important fact. No one could say a word to refute it. Only *two* members of the group regularly contribute to the liquidationist papers. *Eight* members of the group regularly contribute to the anti-liquidationist papers.*

Both the Letts and Trotsky propose that the Executive Committee should exclude from the meeting this body, the only all-Russia body to have preserved unity! Even if the Letts were mistaken and on June 24 did not know what was known to all the workers in Russia, why did they not take the trouble prior to July 22, i.e., in the course of a whole month, to correct their mistake? Some mistakes are very useful to those who make them.

The intention of the Letts and the liquidators who have misled the Executive Committee is to impose liquidationist candidates on us, against the majority of the Party in Russia, of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, by means of a bloc of fictitious little groups abroad and to obtain money by fraud from the German workers. Such is the gist of the long speeches (of the Letts, Bundists, Trotsky and Co.).

But this deception will not go unpunished.

OFFICIALLY VERIFIABLE DATA ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE LIQUIDATORS COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE PARTY

Every sensible person knows that the empty phrases about what is alleged to be secret "organisations" sympathising with the liquidators are not to be trusted at all.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 545.—*Ed.*

We maintain that all the liquidationist organisations in Russia are fictitious.

It is difficult for those who lack accurate information on the state of affairs in Russian Social-Democratic circles to establish the truth. But even they can ascertain it if they search the written records and examine their meaning, refusing to take anything on trust. We have already given the first commonly known and verifiable fact, namely, the division of the forces in the Social-Democratic Duma group between the liquidators and anti-liquidators.

But now, after six months' struggle between the liquidators and the Party, there are further entirely objective, and still more convincing, facts.

In the letter of June 24 (pp. 5 and 6), the Letts mentioned the legal Marxist papers in St. Petersburg. They named *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nevsky Golos*, which advocate a Menshevik trend (that of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*), and contrasted them with *Zvezda* and the St. Petersburg *Pravda* (not to be confused with Trotsky's liquidationist Vienna *Pravda*), which, according to the Letts, "*are owned and led by Lenin's group*" alone.

Even though this assertion is unfortunate, the Letts have in spite of themselves cited a valid fact against the liquidators.

While the term "open party" is no more than an empty, liberal phrase of the liquidators, open *activity* in the Duma and in the press is the principal activity of Marxist propaganda. It is here, and only here, that facts are to be found which objectively show the relative strength of the liquidators and the anti-liquidators.

There are no other all-Russia political organs except those named by the Letts. The liquidators have *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nevsky Golos*; the anti-liquidators, *Zvezda*, subsequently named *Nevskaya Zvezda*, and *Pravda* (St. Petersburg). There are no other trends or factions in Russia, either in the press or in the public mass arena; all the groups abroad named by the Letts are mere ciphers.

We now have the results of the six months' activities of both trends.

During these six months (January-June 1912) all the Russian parties began, and completed, their preparations

for the elections. Only six or eight weeks now remain till the elections. Most of the electoral lists have been drawn up. The outcome of the elections is virtually predetermined by these six months' preparations.

"Points" 1-7 in the Letts' list declared for the liquidators (the Organising Committee, the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democracy, *Golos*, the Vienna *Pravda*, the Caucasian Regional Committee, *Vperyod*). The anti-liquidators were supported by the Central Committee, which unites the Russian organisations, i.e., those functioning in Russia (only the "Leninist trend", as the liquidators assert).

Now let us see what each of the two has done.

From January 1 to June 30 (old style), 1912, the liquidators published in St. Petersburg sixteen issues of *Zhivoye Dyelo* and five issues of *Nevsky Golos*, or twenty-one issues in all.

During the same six months, the anti-liquidators published thirty-three issues of *Zvezda*, fourteen issues of *Nevskaya Zvezda* and fifty-three issues of *Pravda*, or one hundred issues in all.

Twenty-one to one hundred.

Such is the balance of forces between the liquidators and the Party in Russia. The data on the newspapers are open data; anyone can check and substantiate them.

How do matters stand with the circulation of the papers? The Letts affirm that the liquidators have distributed 30,000 copies. Let us assume that this is not an overstatement. With regard to the anti-liquidationist papers, a person whom Comrade Haase and other members have seen gave the Executive Committee the figure of 60,000 copies. This ratio reduces the influence of the liquidators, as compared with that of the Party, to 1 : 10.

While information on circulation has not been published and may therefore seem exaggerated, other data have been published that are more important, and more convincing.

They are the information concerning the connection of the liquidators and of the Party with the mass of the workers in Russia.

OPEN AND VERIFIABLE DATA ON THE LINKS OF THE LIQUIDATORS AND THE PARTY WITH THE MASS OF THE WORKERS IN RUSSIA

The data on the number of newspaper issues and copies published do not fully prove the superiority of the Party over the liquidators. Even small groups of liberal intellectuals can publish newspapers. Any newspaper which is "friendly to the workers", or even a liberal newspaper of a radical shade, will always find many readers in Russia. It will be read not only by workers, but by liberals and also by petty-bourgeois democrats.

There are facts, however, which reveal much more simply and clearly the links of the liquidators and the Party with the mass of the workers in Russia.

They are the data on the funds collected for a workers' press.

For a long time agitation has been carried on among the workers in Russia for the collection of funds to publish a workers' daily newspaper. Everyone realised that without such a newspaper, participation in the elections would almost be a fiction. A newspaper is the chief weapon in an election campaign, the chief means of Marxist agitation among the masses.

But where is the money for a newspaper to come from?

It is necessary to organise collections among the workers. These collections form a fund and show the strength of the links of this or that group. They are an indication of the prestige of the groups, the confidence placed in them by the workers, and their actual influence on the proletarian masses.

Such collections for a workers' newspaper were begun in St. Petersburg early in 1912. Six months—from January 1 to June 30—is a long enough period. Data on the collections are published in all the newspapers listed above, the liquidationist as well as the anti-liquidationist ones.

The conclusions which may be drawn from these data for six months are best evidence, an open, complete, objective and final answer to the question concerning the balance of the forces of the liquidators and the Party in Russia. Therefore we have given in the appendix a full translation of all the accounts of money collections for a daily workers'

newspaper, taken from all the five above-mentioned newspapers for six months.

Here we give only the totals.

During the six months, the anti-liquidationist newspapers published accounts of 504 money collections among groups of workers, i.e., those giving the name of the workers' groups which made the collections. These collections were made in fifty Russian towns and factory settlements.

During the same six months—from January 1 to June 30, 1912—the liquidationist newspapers published accounts of fifteen money collections among groups of workers. These collections were made in five Russian towns.*

Here are the precise accounts:

Money collections by groups of workers for a workers' daily newspaper January 1 to June 30, 1912

	In liquidationist newspapers	In anti-liquidationist newspapers
January	0	14
February	0	18
March	7	76
April	8	227
May	0	135
June	0	34
	15	504

Ditto: According to the Main Areas of Russia

St. Petersburg and vicinity	10	415
South	1	51
Moscow and its area	2	13
North and West	1	12
Urals and Volga region	0	6
Caucasus, Siberia and Finland	1	7
	15	504

* In spite of the gossip spread by the liquidators, it was these collections, which exceeded 12,000 marks, and the aid rendered earlier by the German comrades, that formed the basic fund of our Social-Democratic press in Russia. The full translation, mentioned in the text, of all the accounts of money collections published by the various Social-Democratic newspapers over the six months was sent to the Executive Committee, the Auditing Committee and Bebel.

After six months' struggle against the Party, the liquidators were completely routed.

The liquidators do not count at all in the Russian Social-Democratic labour movement. This is proved by the above-quoted data, which anyone can verify. Such are the facts published in Russia for a whole half-year, despite the bragging of Trotsky and the liquidators.

It should be noted that Trotsky is a contributor to *Zhivoye Dyelo*. Furthermore, the Letts themselves, in their letter of June 24, admit that all the six groups, including Trotsky, the Menshevik *Golos*, and the leaders of *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nevsky Golos*, form the so-called Organising Committee. Therefore, our data prove that not only the liquidators, but all their pretentious friends abroad are of no account in the Social-Democratic labour movement in Russia.

On the average, only one group of workers in Russia out of thirty sides with them.

We give here the addresses and the dates of publication of all the Social-Democratic papers in St. Petersburg.

Liquidationist

1. *Zhivoye Dyelo*. St. Petersburg, Bolshaya Moskovskaya, 16. No. 1—January 20, 1912; No. 16 (last issue)—April 28, 1912 (suppressed).

2. *Nevsky Golos*. St. Petersburg, Kolokolnaya, 3. No. 1—May 20, 1912; No. 5—June 28, 1912 (still exists—up to July 29, 1912).

Anti-Liquidationist

3. *Zvezda*. St. Petersburg, Razyezzhaya, 10, Apt. 14. No. 1 (37)—January 6, 1912; No. 33 (69)—April 22, 1912 (suppressed).

4. *Nevskaya Zvezda*. St. Petersburg, Nikolayevskaya, 33, Apt. 57. No. 1—February 26, 1912; No. 2—May 3, 1912; No. 14—June 24, 1912 (still exists).

5. *Pravda*. St. Petersburg. Nikolayevskaya, 37, Apt. 18. No. 1—April 22, 1912; No. 53—June 30, 1912 (still exists).

CONCLUSION

The candidates of the R.S.D.L.P. in the forthcoming Duma elections will be nominated by the local Party organisations without distinction of views and trends. The minority of the worker Social-Democrats will everywhere have to submit to the majority.

The notorious duplication of candidates is simply nonsense, serving merely to frighten the foreign comrades and extort money.

All that is wanting is for the notorious ten "trends" to raise the bogey of *ten* candidates and for money to be begged from foreigners for each of them.

There will be no duplicate candidates. The liquidators are so weak that they cannot put up duplicate candidates. We do not negotiate with a handful of liquidators who have betrayed the Party. Neither the Central Committee in Russia nor the local organisations take the liquidators seriously. Note, for example, the latest events in St. Petersburg. The liquidators reported in *Nevsky Golos* (No. 6) that meetings were held with them (the liquidators) in St. Petersburg in connection with carrying out the election campaign. Both *Nevskaya Zvezda* (No. 16) and *Pravda* (No. 61) of July 21 and 23 reported that they had *not* sent representatives to the meetings; moreover, one participant in the meetings announced in *Nevskaya Zvezda* that the workers all over Russia would carry out the decisions of the January Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

"Union of the various trends," he said, referring to the liquidators, "is quite inconceivable in the Social-Democratic election campaign." (*Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 16, July 8 [21], 1912.)

No financial assistance in the world can win the sympathies of the Russian workers for the liquidators. But, of course, it is possible to put up fictitious duplicate candidates in various places with the money of the Executive Committee. In that case the responsibility for such candidates, who will virtually be candidates of the German Executive

Committee, will also fall on the Executive Committee. *The money handed out to the liquidators, who have no daily newspaper, will help them to found a competing organ. That money will be used to bring about a split by those who during long years of struggle have proved their insignificance; the money will be used for trips, etc., with the aim of founding a new party.*

If the Executive Committee now wants to help the liquidators in one way or another, then, much as we respect the fraternal German Party, we shall have to appeal to the International. Then we shall *prove* to the Vienna International Congress[108] *by documents* that the Executive Committee has expressed its readiness by means of financial support to help in bringing about a split in our Party, putting up duplicate candidates and galvanising that corpse—the defeated liquidators. If the German comrades want to help the R.S.D.L.P., they must transfer the money to the Central Committee of the old Party, not to those who are organising a new party.

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

After the Executive Committee had called off the proposed meeting, it informed us that it "cannot give money to any of the Party groups in Russia for the election campaign until all of them jointly indicate to us [the Executive Committee] a body enjoying universal confidence and authorised to receive and distribute funds".

This pretended neutrality of the Executive Committee amounts in reality to a refusal to support the workers' Party in Russia because of the calumny heaped upon it by the little groups abroad and by the "conference" of the liquidators.

Besides the comments made above, we regard it as our duty to add the following.

The Russian newspapers legally existing and published in a Marxist spirit are at the present time the most important legal mouthpiece of the mass of the Russian Social-Democratic workers in connection with the Party's agitation work.

The newspapers appearing abroad, which are illegal in Russia, cannot *really* claim to be as important as those

mentioned above, although their *fundamental* importance for theoretically elucidating the movement is undoubtedly very great. For everyone knows how easily, and sometimes frivolously, such papers are founded by small groups of Russian exiles scattered abroad. Those newspapers have a precarious existence among the groups concerned, and hardly ever reach the Russian members of the Party. That is why they cannot really be said to exert any appreciable influence on Party life in Russia.

After six months' struggle of the anti-liquidationist newspapers (from January to June 1912) there is *only one* liquidationist paper—*Nevsky Golos*. This paper has almost ceased to exist as a political organ. During a month and a half (from June to mid-August), only *two* issues appeared (Nos. 6 and 7). Obviously, no such newspaper can withstand the police persecution that is raging in Russia against *all* workers' newspapers, and even against many quite moderate liberal ones, unless it draws its vital energy from close contact with the mass of the workers.

The weekly *Nevskaya Zvezda* and the daily *Pravda* are now workers' newspapers of this kind; they carry great political weight and are of immediate and topical importance. Both appear in St. Petersburg; our *political opponents* among the Lettish Social-Democrats have contemptuously dismissed them as organs of "Lenin's group". From the *objective* data cited above, which can be openly verified at any time, it should become obvious to our German comrades that this "Lenin's group" comprises, in fact, the overwhelming majority of the Russian worker Social-Democrats.

Hence it is quite understandable why the information coming from the liquidators and groups, or tiny groups, sympathising with them, is *not to be trusted in the least*. All the rumours spread by those little groups together with the Jewish (Bund) and Lettish Social-Democrats, who have no direct contact with the *Russian* movement, about the joint conference of all "trends"[109] that has been convened, or allegedly is about to be convened, turn out to be pure inventions. No such conference, even if it were to take place, could play *any serious part* in the struggle of the Russian proletariat. Basically, therefore, it is, if we reluctantly are to use a harsh word, a question of a swindle.

To make the relevant facts, which are undoubtedly of great political importance, still clearer to our German Party comrades, we shall quote in conclusion some extracts from an article by Axelrod, one of the liquidationist leaders, which appeared in the last issue of the monthly *Nasha Zarya*.

Axelrod wrote:

"The idea of a 'non-factional' Social-Democratic ... organ is utopian at present and, moreover, a utopia that ... runs counter to the interests of the Party's political development.... We may be said to have no factions that have taken shape organisationally. Instead, we have various circles and small groups, of which some hold more or less definite political, tactical and organisational views, while the others waver in various directions, getting in the way of the former.... The focal point and main source of internal Party discord is, on the one hand, the difference in the attitude of the various Party circles to the now, open Social-Democratic and labour movement and, on the other hand, substantial differences over the immediate political tasks and the political tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic movement. The questions of both those categories ... are becoming particularly burning and topical issues just now.... And it is over them that the Russian Social-Democrats have split into two main camps.... The question arises whether the projected labour newspaper [proposed by some workers in St. Petersburg and by many intellectuals abroad] will be able to take a neutral position between those two opposed camps, and whether such a position is permissible on principle. Obviously not.... Such being the situation in the Party, to talk about 'non-factionalism' as a panacea means ... deceiving oneself and others as to the real state of affairs in the Social-Democratic movement.... Factional organisation and consolidation are a direct duty and urgent task of the advocates of a Party reform, or rather revolution" (in the Party).

Axelrod's last words obviously refer to the liquidators. We can only advise our German Party comrades, if they hear from various quarters about "non-factionalism", or about a non-factional conference with the liquidators participating, to demand, for better orientation, a full translation of Axelrod's above-quoted article for the German Social-Democratic press. Then they will see certain fables for what they are, and will be able to judge them.

Editorial Board of Sotsial-Demokrat,
Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

Confidential! Only for the organised members of Social-Democratic parties!

POSTSCRIPT

TO THE PAMPHLET THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE R.S.D.L.P.

Today, September 15, 1912, we have received via Paris the following letter from the Executive Committee, a letter which should make it particularly clear to the German comrades how right we were in protesting against the irresponsible private "informants" of the Executive who are afraid to act openly.

On the 10th inst., the Party Executive wrote:

Berlin, September 10, 1912

Dear Comrade Kuznetsov,

Will you bo so kind as to inform us whether it is true that the constituencies in which all the Social-Democratic groups reached agreement during the elections to the State Duma include the following:

Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov the city of Moscow and Moscow Gubernia, the Don region and Odessa. Kindly send your information as early as possible to H. Müller, *Chemnitz*.

If we have no news from you by September 17, we shall consider the above statement to be true.

With Party greetings, *H. Müller*

We answered the letter as follows:

Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

Dear Comrades, it goes without saying that all that has been reported to the Executive Committee is based on an untruth and is an invention pure and simple of the liquidators. We can affirm with confidence that that fable could have been told to the Executive only by the Letts, the Bundists, or even by Trotsky's adherents, who only a short time ago closed "their" conference, which they would have liked to call a "party conference", but which was in fact a liquidationist conference. In order not to state anything that could not be confirmed and not to quote our organisational correspondence, we shall limit ourselves here to pointing to a document published in St. Petersburg.

On August 28 (September 10, new style), 1912, the St. Petersburg Marxist daily, *Pravda* No. 102, carried a letter received from one of Kharkov's biggest factories and devoted especially to the Duma elections. The letter said openly and plainly that "the names of the liquidators' candidates *have so far not been announced*" and that the liquidators "*deny the necessity for a workers' party*" (*Pravda* No. 102, p. 4, col. 1).

From this alone the German comrades can see how shamelessly the Letts, the Bundists, Trotsky's adherents and all such private informants are deceiving them. The point is, evidently, that all of them, probably including the Caucasians, wanted to obtain money on behalf of pretended "organisations", whose existence cannot be confirmed or verified either by the Party Executive or by anyone else.

Is it possible that the German Party, which has ninety Social-Democratic dailies, cannot—that is, if it does not want to compromise itself by misinterpreting the state of affairs in the Russian Party—open a discussion on the R.S.D.L.P., and openly compel all the informants who are hiding from the light of day to present statements over their signatures and produce documents?

After all, Russia is not as far away as Central Africa, and it would not take much effort on the part of the German worker Social-Democrats to establish the truth and thereby also relieve the German members of the Executive Committee of the need to hear *unverifiable* private stories.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

N. Lenin

Written between July 17 (30) and August 20 (September 2), 1912, the postscript September 2 (15), 1912

Published as a pamphlet in German, Leipzig, 1912

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ORIGINAL POSTSCRIPT TO THE PAMPHLET *THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE R.S.D.L.P.*[110]

After the above lines had gone to press, we received *Nevsky Golos* No. 7, published in St. Petersburg on August 17, old style. Consequently, the liquidationist newspaper has resumed publication after an *interruption of one and a half months*. (The previous issue of this weekly—No. 6—appeared on July 5, old style.)

The information published in *Nevsky Golos* No. 7 provides the best confirmation of the appraisal of the *actual* significance of the liquidators in Russia which was given in our Central Committee's letter to the *Vorstand*.*

Indeed, early in July the paper suspended publication. Needless to say, the liquidators and their friends bent all their efforts to revive it. The results of their efforts *during one and a half months* (July and half August) are reported by *Nevsky Golos itself* (No. 7) as follows:

"This newspaper has received, *for the replenishment of its funds*:

July. From 14 persons, 25 rubles each (I. F., P., G., M. I., K., L., K. F., L., B., Vsh., Lv., Vl., V. P., B. of Moscow); through R., 50 rubles; from M—i, 11 rubles; Shkh., 11 rubles; from 8 persons, 10 rubles each (E., I., Is., S., Rf., Avg., Ob., P. O.); from K. I., 8 rubles; from S., 7 rubles; from K., 5 rubles; B. B., 5 rubles; from F., 6 rubles; M. B., 5 rubles; from Lepaya 5 rubles; Gmp., 3 rubles. Total, 546 rubles.

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* Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.—*Ed*.

"*August*. From Wulfsohn (Zurich), 10 rubles; also from him, 3.57 rubles; Benzia (Zurich), 15 rubles; G—ya (Kishinev), 20 rubles; Az—v (Astrakhan), 3 rubles; Sp—y (Bogorodsk), 15 rubles; V. V., 6 rubles; Y. Y. F., 59 rubles; from Dubbeln, through S., 20 rubles; from B., Moscow, 25 rubles; from Y. L., 10 rubles; L. L., 12 rubles; M. Gr., 3 rubles; from Moscow init. group, 35 rubles; B. B., 5 rubles; B., 5 rubles; from An. Konst., St. Petersb., through L. L., 6 rubles; from a group of friends in Paris, 8.54 rubles; from B., Pavlograd, 20 rubles. Total, 281.11 rubles."

Such is the account published by the liquidators themselves. Their work and their *links with the masses* during the one and a half months present the following picture:

Collected in all	*827.11 rubles*
Including:	
Initiating group, Moscow	35 rubles
A group of friends in Paris	8.54 "
Private contributions by individuals:	
35 contributions amounting to . . .	708 "
15 " " " . . .	75.57 "
Total	827.11 rubles

Everyone knows, as Plekhanov stated in print (*Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 16) as far back as April 1912, that the "*initiating groups*" are groups of *liquidators*.

And so, the liquidators were helped, at the most trying moment, when their paper had suspended publication, by:

one group of liquidators in Russia

one group of friends in Paris

35 well-to-do persons, each of whom contributed an average of 20 rubles (over 40 marks each)

15 private individuals, each of whom contributed an average of 5 rubles (over 10 marks each).

Was not our Central Committee justified in asserting that the liquidators in the Russian working-class movement were of no account at all?

The liquidators refer to the "Caucasian Regional Committee". *Not a single workers' group* in the Caucasus has sent

them a single contribution during those one and a half months.

The liquidators would like to have the help of the Bund and the Lettish Social-Democratic organisation. *Not a single* workers' group, either in the Bund or among the Letts, has sent them a single contribution during one and a half months.

During the same period (July to August 14) *Pravda*, the St. Petersburg daily newspaper of the anti-liquidators, published accounts of *41 group collections by workers* in various parts of Russia, including oil-field workers (Grozny fields, Terek Region) (*Pravda* No. 60) and Jewish workers in Lepaya (*Pravda* No. 67). We venture to think that this aid from workers means more than all the talk and declamation of the "Caucasian Regional Committee", the Letts and the Bund.

No aid in the world, and no "conferences" with the Letts, the Bund, etc., can transform the liquidationist *nothing* in the Russian working-class movement into a something.

Let the German comrades undertake the not too arduous task of collecting the documents on the position of the R.S.D.L.P. and verifying them—after all, Russia is not Central Africa, about which any kind of "tall stories" can be told. The German comrades probably want to end this strange, *gelinde gesagt*,* situation in which they get their information on the Italian, Swedish and any other socialist movement from openly published documents, while their information on the Russian socialist movement is obtained from privately communicated fables and gossip.

Written between August 20 and 24 (September 2 and 6), 1912
Published for the first time

Published according to the manuscript

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* To put it mildly.—*Ed.*

CAPITALISM AND POPULAR CONSUMPTION

Recently the French magazine *La Revue scientifique*[111] published data on the production of *margarine* in various countries. Those data were an additional reminder of the fact noticed long ago that the diet of the people deteriorates as capitalism develops.

As everyone knows, margarine is fat (from which stearine has been removed) processed by a special method. From it an artificial substance is made, known as margarine butter.

Margarine production in the principal European countries has assumed very large proportions. Germany produces 12.5 million poods of it per year, Britain, 7.5 million poods, and so on.

Margarine is cheaper than real butter. Butter is too costly for the vast majority of the population in the capitalist countries. The workers earn so little that they have to buy cheap, low-grade, substitute food products. And yet the workers are the chief consumers. There are millions of workers, and only hundreds of capitalists. And so the output of cheap substitutes is growing daily and hourly, along with the unheard-of luxury of a handful of millionaires.

The wealth of the bourgeoisie is growing. So are the poverty and want of the proletariat and of the mass of small proprietors, peasants, artisans and petty traders, who are being ruined.

Remarkably enough, margarine consumption is highest in the very countries which are particularly famous as producers of large quantities of the finest natural butter. To find out how great the consumption of margarine is, it is

necessary to divide the whole amount of margarine produced in the country concerned (adding import and subtracting export) by the number of inhabitants.

It appears that the greatest consumer of margarine is Denmark—16,4 kilograms (about one pood) a year per inhabitant. Next comes Norway—15 pounds, Germany—7.5 pounds, etc.

Denmark is the richest country for butter output. Danish butter—real butter—ranks among the finest grades. The world's biggest and richest city, London (population, including that of the suburbs, about six million), prefers Danish butter to any other, and pays the highest price for it.

Danish well-to-do peasants, but above all the Danish capitalists, make a good deal of money from the butter trade. And yet Denmark is the world's biggest consumer of substitute butter, margarine!

What is the explanation?

It is very simple. The vast majority of the Danish population, like that of any other capitalist country, consists of workers and propertyless peasants. They cannot afford real butter. Even the middle peasants in Denmark, being in need of money, sell abroad the butter they produce on their farms and buy the cheap margarine for themselves. The wealth of the Danish capitalists is growing, and so are the poverty and want of the Danish workers and peasants.

The same thing is happening here in Russia. Very long ago, some forty years back, when it became fashionable to set up cheese dairies and artels in the countryside, Engelhardt, a democratic writer, noted that the peasants, being in need of money, sold their milk and butter while their children starved to death.

That fact has been noted many times since then. Cheese production is growing, the production of milk for sale is growing, and the few well-to-do peasants and the merchants are becoming rich, while the poor become poorer still. The children of poor peasants, left without milk, die in enormous numbers. Child mortality in Russia is incredibly high.

Fairly often milk is sold to cheese dairies, from which the peasants then get *skimmed milk* for their own consumption.

The rich have the profits from growing production and trade, while the workers and peasants have margarine and skimmed milk. Such is capitalist reality, which liberal and official scholars are at such pains to embellish.

Pravda No. 70, July 20, 1912
Signed: *B. B.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

LIBERALS AND CLERICALS

The priesthood is about to flood the Fourth Duma.

How are we to react to this emergence of the priests on the political scene?

Democrats can never hold the view that priests should not participate in political affairs. It is an arch-reactionary view. It leads only to official hypocrisy and nothing more. In practice, all measures debarring a particular group or section of the population from politics and the class struggle are absolutely impossible and unrealisable.

Let us recall that Bebel and the German Social-Democrats were for freedom of Jesuit agitation in Germany We are against liberal phrases about "prohibiting" Jesuit agitation, said the Social-Democrats. We are not afraid of the Jesuits. Let the Jesuits enjoy *complete freedom* of agitation, but let the authorities guarantee that we Social-Democrats, too, shall enjoy complete freedom of agitation. That is how Bebel and the German Social-Democrats reasoned.

The worker democrats in Russia are fighting against the falsification of suffrage (and all other rights) in favour of the landlords or the priesthood, etc., and not at all against freedom of the priesthood to participate in political affairs. We stand for the class struggle, and we demand complete freedom for any class or social-estate, for either sex for any people, any section or group of the population, to take part in politics.

The liberals' reasoning on this question is wrong and undemocratic. Prince Trubetskoi, for example, wrote not so long ago, to the applause of *Rech*:

"The transformation of the Church into a political instrument is achieved at the price of its internal destruction"

He described the plan of flooding the Duma with priests as "contrary to Christianity and the Church".

That is not true. It is hypocrisy. It is a thoroughly reactionary point of view.

Trubetskoi and other liberals take an *un*democratic stand in their struggle against clericalism. Under the guise of opposing participation of the priesthood in the political struggle, they advocate its more covert (and hence much more harmful) participation.

Worker democrats favour freedom of political struggle for all, including the priests. We are opposed, not to the priests taking part in the election campaign, in the Duma etc., but *solely* to the medieval privileges of the priesthood. We are not afraid of clericalism, and will readily join issue with it—on a free platform on which all will be on an equal footing. The priesthood has always participated in politics *covertly*; the people stand to gain, and to gain a good deal, if the priesthood begins to participate in politics *overtly*.

Pravda No. 74, July 25, 1912
Signed: *A Layman*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

CADETS AND DEMOCRATS

"We are accustomed to think," says the leading article in *Rech*, "that Marxists admit the Cadets to be a democratic party, although they affix the offensive label of 'bourgeois'" (i.e., bourgeois-democratic).

It would be hard to imagine crasser political ignorance on the part of "educated people" who read Marxist literature. The question inevitably arises: does not calculation sometimes make people simulate ignorance?

Since 1906 we have explained hundreds and thousands of times that the Cadets are *not* democrats but a liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. In the spring of 1907 formal decisions adopted by Marxists from all parts of Russia and familiar to every politically-educated person confirmed this and stated for all to hear that the Cadets were a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, that their democracy was "hypocrisy", and that the Cadets were followed by a section of the petty bourgeoisie "only by force of tradition [a blind habit of clinging to the customary, to the old] and because it was *simply deceived by the liberals*".[112]

These ideas have since been reaffirmed and elaborated hundreds and thousands of times.

But the Cadets assert, as if nothing had happened, that they are "in the habit of thinking" that Marxists consider them democrats! There is none so deaf as he who will not hear.

The liberals differ from the conservatives (Black Hundreds) in that they represent the interests of the bourgeoisie, which *needs* progress and a fairly well organised legal system, the observance of legality, of the constitution, and a guarantee of some degree of political liberty.

But this progressive bourgeoisie dreads the democracy and the movement of the masses even more than it dreads reaction. Hence the liberals' perpetual tendency to make concessions to the old, to compromise with it, to defend many fundamental mainstays of the old order. And all this makes for the complete impotence of liberalism, for its timidity half-heartedness and eternal vacillations.

Democrats represent the broad mass of the population. A democrat is not afraid of the movement of the masses but believes in it. In Russia the democrats are represented by the Trudoviks and Left "Narodniks" in general. The Marxists call them *bourgeois* democrats, not at all because they want to "offend" them, but because no redivision of the land and no democratic changes in the state are *sufficient to remove* the rule of capital, of the bourgeois system.

The policy of the worker democrats is clear. We recognise agreements with the liberals against the Rights only at the second stage of the elections, and only where it is impossible together with the democrats to defeat the liberals. We fight side by side with all bourgeois democrats as long as they are true to their democratic principles.

Pravda No. 75, July 26, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE LIBERAL CAMPAIGN

The liberals have begun to get busy and have brought concerted pressure to bear on *Pravda*. Leading articles in the Cadet *Rech*, and the non-partisan progressive Mr. Prokopovich and Mr. R. Blank in *Zaprosy Zhizni* opened fire on the workers' newspaper for its decision to conduct an independent election campaign in St. Petersburg.

> "The efforts of *Nevskaya Zvezda* and *Pravda* are completely useless," asserts *Zaprosy Zhizni*. "Surely they cannot seriously expect the candidate of the workers' party to win in the St. Petersburg city curia, where the workers' participation is negligible."

There you have a sample of the liberal arguments, and a method of intimidating the voter who has not yet risen above philistinism, has not worked out an entirely conscious policy for himself.

There was a time when the liberals tried to intimidate simply with the prospect of a Black-Hundred victory in the elections. But crude lies no longer "work". Everyone knows that there is not the slightest danger of the Black Hundreds winning in the St. Petersburg elections. So a different kind of intimidation is resorted to: "there is no reason to expect the workers to win".

Oh, no, liberal gentlemen, the democratic voter in general, and the worker in particular, has lived through many things, he has thought over and learned many things in the past difficult five years. That sort of intimidation will get you nowhere.

Nowhere in the world have the workers begun *their* election campaign in a big city without being *opposed* by strong liberal parties. Nowhere in the world have worker

democrats succeeded without a stubborn fight in wresting from the liberals their influence on the mass of the lower-grade office workers, shop-assistants, handicraftsmen, petty traders, etc.

Whoever is against the St. Petersburg workers beginning that fight here and now (or rather going on from where they left off in 1906, 1907 and 1909), assumes the name of democrat in vain, and remains in fact a slave of the liberals.

Thousands upon thousands of new democratic voters will now take part in the St. Petersburg elections.

The St. Petersburg workers' great achievement in founding their own workers' daily newspaper fully entitles us to expect no lesser achievements in the election campaign.

Thousands of old voters are awakening to a new, more class-conscious political activity. They are learning, with the help of their workers' newspaper, to fight for a better life for themselves, developing the habit of joint political action, and growing increasingly aware of the great national problems which the worker democrats are solving.

The liberals in St. Petersburg can be defeated. And from the liberals' uneasiness and quarrelsome sallies, from their shouting and their attempts at intimidation, democratic St. Petersburg will derive added confidence that it is on the right path to victory.

Pravda No. 77, July 28, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

REVOLTS IN THE ARMY AND NAVY

Recently a few reports have slipped even into our legal press about revolutionary unrest in the armed forces. We shall mention three chief reports.

Black Sea Fleet. On June 27 a naval court in Sevastopol tried behind closed doors Zelenin, an electrician of the battleship *Ioann Zlatoust*. Together with Karpishin and Silyakov, he was charged with writing and circulating an appeal for an armed revolt. Zelenin, Karpishin and Silyakov were sentenced to death and were shot on July 10.

On July 2 the same court tried the crew of the same battleship. It charged sixteen sailors with incitement to seize the battleship. Ten of the sailors were sentenced to death and five to penal servitude for six years. On July 4 official telegrams reported that the ten men condemned to death had appealed for pardon.

Baltic Fleet. On July 16 the naval court in Kronstadt harbour is to try *sixty-five sailors* of the training ship *Dvina*, the cruiser *Aurora* and the battleship *Slava*. On July 3 the Octobrist paper *Golos Moskvy* received a telephone report from St. Petersburg saying that there was much talk in the city about that sensational trial. The sixty-five sailors are said to be charged with membership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and of "a secret association which had planned an open revolt and the assassination of superior officers". The case goes back, according to the same report, to the arrest of a *Dvina* sailor on January 22, 1912.

It is known, furthermore, that during May arrests were made among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet in Helsingfors.

Lastly, on July 1, there was an attempt at revolt by engineering troops in the village of Troyitskoye, near Tashkent. The insurgents bayoneted Junior Captain Pokhvisnev. *The telegram reporting the incident was not released for publication*. Not until July 10 did a reprint appear in St. Petersburg from *Turkestanskiye Vedomosti*, an official paper which admitted that there *had been a battle* with the insurgents. Riflemen and Cossacks had smashed the insurgent engineers, alleged to have numbered in all 100 to 130 men. The revolt began in the evening and was over, according to the official report, by the morning. *Some 380 engineers* were arrested, of whom "more than one-half [the government paper asserts] undoubtedly [??] had no share" in the revolt. The insurgents killed, besides Pokhvisnev, two second lieutenants—Krasovsky and Koshchenets—and two privates, and wounded five officers and twelve privates. The official paper says nothing about the number of the insurgents killed.

Such is the scant information, clearly incomplete and clearly distorted and minimised by the police, that we now have at our disposal.

But what do these facts mean?

They fully confirm what was pointed out in the decisions of the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912 and explained in greater detail in the Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat* (No. 27), a month ago.*

A *revolutionary* upswing has begun in Russia. With the mass strikes in April and May the Russian proletariat began to pass to the offensive—against capital *and* against the tsarist monarchy, for a better life for the workers, worn out by counter-revolutionary persecution and tyranny in 1908-11, *and* for freedom for the whole people, for a democratic republic.

It is an idle tale the liberals are putting about (followed by the *Nevsky Golos* liquidators) when they say that the

* See pp. 102-09 of this volume.—*Ed.*

basis of the April-May movement was the struggle for freedom of association. The facts belie that tale. One cannot fight for only one of the political rights in enslaved Russia, nor can one fight for constitutional reforms under the tsarist autocracy. The struggle of the proletariat swept over Russia in a wave of strikes that were *both* economic *and* political. The *strength* of the movement lay, and lies, in the combination of the two types of strike. They are not ordinary strikes, they mark a *revolutionary* upsurge of the masses, the *beginning of an offensive* by the mass of the workers against the tsarist monarchy.

The mass strikes were bound to kindle the flames of revolution *everywhere*. And the outbreaks of revolt among the armed forces are a *proof* that those flames are flaring up—there is inflammable material *everywhere*, and *everywhere* a revolutionary mood is growing among the masses, including even those workers and peasants who are held down by barrack drill.

The mass strikes in Russia are inseparably linked with an armed uprising. Where strikes grow, the uprising grows too.

That is what the events mentioned at the beginning of this article have shown.

Those events provide a lesson which is pointed out in the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 27. Appeals for an uprising are most unwise now. An uprising would be *premature*. Only a *combined* onslaught by the mass of the workers, by the peasantry and the best section of the armed forces can create conditions for a *victorious*, i.e., *timely* uprising.

And the foremost workers must do their utmost to strengthen, restore and develop the *illegal* party of the working class, the R.S.D.L.P. *Only* a party such as this will be in a position, by conducting revolutionary agitation and using every means of legal propaganda through the working-class press and through the worker deputies to the Duma, to keep the army of the proletariat from frittering away its forces in hopeless petty revolts and to train it for the great victorious uprising

Long live the revolutionary soldiers and sailors!

Long live concerted, persevering, stubborn revolutionary

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

work to develop a wide revolutionary onslaught by the millions, to develop workers' strikes and peasant movements! It is only by being at the head of the onslaught of the millions, and only in the closest inseparable alliance with them, that the revolutionary section of Russia's armed forces can and will defeat the tsarist monarchy!

Rabochaya Gazeta No. 9,
July 30 (August 12),[113] 1912

Published according
to the text in *Rabochaya Gazeta*

ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS TO THE FOURTH DUMA

On the eve of the elections the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has come forward, despite cruel persecution, despite wholesale arrests, with a clearer, more distinct and more precise programme, tactics and platform than any other party.

In January 1912 the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. summed up the results of the ideological and political work carried out by the Party in the grim years of the counter-revolution. The Conference decisions gave answers to all the pressing questions of the movement. Thanks to those decisions, the election platform was simply a final statement. The platform was published by the Central Committee in Russia and was then reprinted by a whole series of local organisations.[114] The whole bourgeois press reported the Conference and published some of its decisions.

In the six months since the Conference, work has been going on through the Party press and dozens of reports, in hundreds of speeches in factory groups and at the meetings held in April and May, to explain the Conference decisions and to put them into effect. The Party's slogans—a republic, an eight-hour working day, confiscation of the landed estates—have spread throughout Russia and have been accepted by the foremost proletarians. The revolutionary upsurge of the masses, its expression ranging from strikes and meetings to revolts in the armed forces, has proved these slogans to be correct and vital.

Our Party has already made use of the elections, and very extensively too. No amount of "interpretation" by the police, no amount of falsification of the Fourth Duma (by the priesthood or otherwise) can nullify *this* result. Propaganda,

organised strictly on Party lines, has already been carried out everywhere and has *set the tone* for the entire election, campaign of the Social-Democrats.

The bourgeois parties in a hasty, slapdash manner are writing "platforms *for* the elections", for promises, for hoodwinking the voters. The liquidators, too, who are trailing behind the liberals, are now devising a *legal* "platform *for* the elections". The liquidators are making a fuss about platforms in the legal, censored press as they prepare to cover up their utter confusion, disorganisation, and lack of ideological principle, with a respectable, law-abiding "platform for the elections".

Not a platform "for the elections", but elections to implement the *revolutionary Social-Democratic* platform!—that is how the Party of the working class sees it. We have already used the elections to this end, and will use them to the hilt. We will use even the most reactionary tsarist Duma to advocate the revolutionary platform, tactics and programme of the Russian S.D. Labour Party. Truly valuable are only those platforms that complete the long work of *revolutionary* agitation, which has already given *full* answers to *all* the questions of the movement, and not those platforms (particularly the legal ones!) that are composed in all haste as a stop-gap and as a noisy advertisement, as in the case of the liquidators.

Six months have passed since the Party re-established itself. Overcoming incredible difficulties, suffering from fierce persecution and experiencing breaks in the work of this or that local centre or of the common centre—the Central Committee—the Party is definitely going forward, extending its work and its influence among the masses. This extension of the work is taking place *in a new form*: in addition to the illegal nuclei, which are secret and narrow, and better disguised than before, there is broader legal Marxist propaganda. It is just this distinctive character of the new preparations for revolution in the new conditions that has long been noted and acknowledged by the Party.

And we can now give a full answer to the noisy utterances of the liquidators, who threaten us with "duplicate candidates". Empty threats that scare no one! The liquidators are so badly beaten and impotent that *no amount of help*

can revive them. They cannot so much as think of putting up "duplicate candidates"; if they did so, they would win a pitiful, ludicrously insignificant number of votes. They know this and will not try the experiment. They are making a noise merely to divert attention and conceal the truth.

We said "no amount of help". The liquidators are counting on help from abroad. Their friends—particularly the Letts, the Bund, and Trotsky—have announced the convocation of *ten* "centres, organisations and factions"! Don't laugh! The world abroad is rich, great and bountiful. As many as "ten centres"!! The methods used in this case are the same as with the government in the Fourth Duma: preparations for setting up a representative body, and the conversion of a number of ciphers into the semblance of "big numbers". First of all, Trotsky (in Russia he is a cipher, he is only a contributor to *Zhivoye Dyelo*, and his agents are only defenders of the liquidators' "initiating groups"). Secondly, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, i.e., the selfsame impotent liquidators. Thirdly, the "Caucasian Regional Committee", also a cipher, in a third garb. Fourthly, the "Organising Committee"—a fourth garb of the *very same* liquidators. Fifthly and sixthly, the Letts and the Bund, which is wholly liquidationist today. But enough!

Needless to say our Party is laughing at this game of nonentities abroad. They cannot resuscitate a corpse, for the liquidators in Russia are a corpse.

Here are the facts.

For six months the liquidators and *all* their friends have been waging a desperate struggle against the Party. There exists a legal *Marxist* press. It is fearfully handicapped, and does not dare utter a word about a republic, our Party, uprising, or the tsar's gang. It would be simply ridiculous to think of advocating the slogans of the R.S.D.L.P. through that press.

But the worker in Russia is no longer what he used to be. He has become a force. He has paved a way for himself. He has *his own* press, which is handicapped but belongs to him and defends Marxism *theoretically*.

In this open arena, everyone can see the "successes" of the liquidators' struggle against the anti-liquidators. S. V.[115]

of *Vperyod* has already pointed out those successes in Trotsky's Vienna, liquidationist, *Pravda*. The fact is, he wrote, that the workers' *collections* go almost entirely to the anti-liquidators. But he sought to comfort himself, saying that it is not because the workers sympathise with the "Leninists".

Why, naturally "not because", dear friend of the liquidators!

But still, look at the facts.

Six months of open struggle for a *workers' daily newspaper*.

The liquidators have been shouting about it since 1910. What about their success? In six months—from January 1 to July 1, 1912—their papers, *Zhivoye Dyelo* and *Nevsky Golos*, carried the accounts of **15** (*fifteen*) collections made by groups of workers for a workers' daily newspaper! Fifteen groups of workers in six months!

Take the newspapers of the anti-liquidators. See their accounts of the collections made for a workers' daily during the same six-month period. Add up the number of collections by groups of workers. You will find that there were **504** *contributions by workers' groups*!

Here are exact monthly data for the various parts of Russia:

Number of workers' group contributions for a workers' daily newspaper during the first half of 1912

	In anti-liquidationist newspapers	In anti-liquidationist newspapers
January	14	0
February	18	0
March	76	7
April	227	8
May	135	0
June	34	0
Total	504	15
St. Petersburg and vicinity	415	10
South	51	1
The rest of Russia	38	4
Total	504	15

The liquidators have been thoroughly beaten in the eyes of the workers' groups in Russia. The liquidators are a corpse, and no number of terrible (oh, how terrible!) "associations of groups, centres, factions, trends and tendencies" abroad can revive this corpse.

No shrill manifestos abroad and no fake conferences between "initiating groups" and the liquidators can undo or alleviate this complete defeat of the liquidators in the eyes of *hundreds of workers' groups in Russia*.

The unity of the election campaign of the worker Social-Democrats in Russia is *assured*. It is assured not through "agreements" with the liquidators, but through the complete victory over the liquidators, who have already been reduced to their true role, the role of liberal intellectuals. See how well Savin, the Socialist-Revolutionary liquidator, fits into *Nasha Zarya*. See how warmly L. M.[116] praises, in *Listok Golosa Sotsial-Demokrata*, "the initiative" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who repeatedly stray (because of an otzovist hangover!) into liquidationism. Ponder on the significance of the fact that the same sheet holds up the well-known Socialist-Revolutionary "leader", Avksentyev, as an example for Plekhanov. Remember how *all* liquidators kiss the *non*-Social-Democratic Left wing of the Polish Socialist Party. Liquidators of all parties, unite!

Everyone finds his niche in the end. Groups of intellectualist liquidators from among former Marxists and former liberals with a bomb are being welded together by the course of events.

As for the Party of the working class, the R.S.D.L.P., it has, in the six months since it regained its freedom from the bondage of those who had liquidated it, made a huge stride forward, as can be seen from the facts cited.

Rabochaya Gazeta No. 9,
July 30 (August 12), 1912

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to the text in *Rabochaya Gazeta*

CAN THE SLOGAN "FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION" SERVE AS A BASIS FOR THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT TODAY?

In the legal press, the liquidators headed by Trotsky argue that it can. They are doing all in their power to *distort* the true character of the workers' movement. But those are hopeless efforts. The drowning liquidators are clutching at a straw to rescue their unjust cause.

In 1910 little groups of intellectuals began a campaign of *petitions* for freedom of association. It was an *artificial* campaign. The mass of the workers remained indifferent. One cannot fire the proletariat with so futile an undertaking. It was fitting for liberals to believe in political reforms *under* the tsarist autocracy. The workers at once saw through the falsity of the undertaking and remained aloof.

The workers are not against the struggle for reforms—they fought for the Insurance Bill. Through their deputies they used every opportunity in the Third Duma to bring about at least slight improvements. But the point is that the Third Duma and the Insurance Bill are not fiction, but political facts, while "freedom of association" *under* the June Third monarchy of Romanov is an empty promise from rotten liberals.

The liberals are enemies of the revolution. Even now they are outspoken in their opposition to it—the Black-Hundred Third Duma has not taught them to throw off their fear of the revolution. Being afraid of the revolution, the liberals comfort themselves with the hope of *constitutional reforms* and advocate for the workers one of those reforms, freedom of association.

But the workers do not believe the fable about a "constitution" under the conditions of the Third Duma, general

lack of rights, and unbridled tyranny. The workers demand freedom of association *in earnest* and *therefore* they are fighting for freedom for the whole people, for *the overthrow of the monarchy*, for a republic.

The strikes in April and May showed in point of fact that the proletariat had risen in a *revolutionary strike*. The combination of the economic and political strike, revolutionary meetings, and the slogan of a republic advanced by the St. Petersburg workers on May Day—all these facts were conclusive proof of the beginning of a *revolutionary upswing*.

The factual, objective situation in Russia is this: the proletariat has begun a revolutionary struggle of the masses to overthrow the tsarist monarchy, and unrest in the armed forces is growing—an indication that they have joined in the struggle. As for the peasant democrats, the best among them are turning away from the liberals to lend ear to the working-class vanguard.

Meanwhile the liberals, enemies of the revolution, uphold *only* the "constitutional" path and put forward, *against* the revolution, the promise (an empty and false promise) of "freedom of association" *under* Russia's tsarist monarchy!

Such is the actual political situation. And these are the real social forces: (1) the tsarist monarchy, which flouts all "constitution"; (2) the liberal-monarchist bourgeois, who out of fear of the revolution pretend that they believe in a combination of "freedom" and the tsarist regime, and (3) the revolutionary democrats; from the midst of the latter a leader has already risen—the mass of the workers, to whose appeal the sailors and soldiers, from Helsingfors to Tashkent, are responding.

How hopelessly stupid, under the circumstances, is the liquidators' talk about "freedom of association"! Of all "reforms", these sages of liberal labour policy have chosen an *impossible* constitutional reform, which is nothing but a promise, and they are amusing themselves by playing at "European" constitutionalism.

It won't do! The workers are casting aside the liberals and liberal labour policy. They will support, develop and make an object of *their* campaigns, *every* reform that really becomes an immediate issue—both in the Third and in the

Fourth Duma—from insurance to increased salaries for those who slave in offices.

But the workers laugh contemptuously at the empty and absurd promise of a *constitutional* political reform *under* the autocracy. May the revolutionary struggle begun by the masses in order to overthrow the monarchy and win a republic grow in scale and intensity! The struggle will show what half-hearted constitutional reforms will result in if the new revolution is *defeated*, but to suggest to the masses a *non*-revolutionary road, a peaceful constitutional reform, now, at the beginning of a revolutionary onslaught, is something that only the "man in a muffler"[117] can do.

The revolutionary onslaught which has begun calls for revolutionary slogans. Down with the monarchy! Long live the democratic republic, the eight-hour working day, and the confiscation of all landed estates!

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LETTER TO THE SWISS WORKERS[118]

Dear Comrades,

On behalf of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, I confirm hereby for the benefit of all the Swiss comrades that the general Conference of this Party, held in January 1912, *disclaimed* by a special resolution *all responsibility for individual Russian groups abroad*.

I also confirm that the Central Committee of our Party *has so far recognised only one* Russian Social-Democratic organisation abroad, namely, *the Committee of Organisations Abroad* and *its Zurich section*. I enclose a pamphlet published by the Central Organ of our Party in German, which describes in detail the disorganising behaviour of the petty groups of Russians abroad.*

With Party greetings, *Lenin* (*V. Ulyanov*)

Representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Party in the International Socialist Bureau.[119]

Written in July 1912

Hectographed as a separate leaflet in German, August 1912

Published according to the leaflet text
Translated from the German

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* See pp. 203-20 of this volume.—*Ed.*

QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE

A slight increase in the election campaign activity, and the official-Cadet *Rech* has begun to speak (it has done so at last!) of the differences it has with the Lefts over questions of principle.

"We never intended, nor do we intend, to make peace with the June Third regime," writes Rech.

That is not true. You did intend and you do intend to, Cadet gentlemen. Evidence of it is your talk about a "responsible" opposition and an opposition in the possessive case. That is not merely "intending" peace, but a policy of "peace" with the June Third regime.

And what about Karaulov's pious speeches in the pious Third Duma? Or the Cadets' voting for the budget and for its more important items? Or the speeches of Berezovsky the First on the agrarian question? Or Gredeskul's recent statements, repeated in *Rech*? Does not all that amount to a policy of *peace* with the *foundations* of the June Third regime? It certainly does.

"Over a period of five years," writes *Rech*, "we have never seen any difference between the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party *within the framework of the Duma* and those of other opposition parties. Yet in this case it is a question of elections to the Duma."

There you have a specimen of sophistry and distortion of the truth! Not on a single question have Social-Democratic tactics in the Duma been akin to Cadet tactics. They have been fundamentally different on all questions: they have *not* been tactics of "peace" *or* of liberalism; they have *always* been tactics of *democracy* and the *class struggle*.

Does *Rech* really maintain that mere "voting against" can be described as *kinship* in tactics, instead of kinship in posing questions from the standpoint of *principle* in the Duma speeches and in the formulas of procedure?

Does *Rech* really venture to say that it is permissible to say one thing in the Duma and another outside it? But if it does, is it not because it wants to hush up the issue of the *un*democratic character of Cadet propaganda *outside the Duma*?

"We cannot deny the 'democratic' movement, which we serve ourselves, the right to independent aims and actions," writes *Rech*.

That is not true, educated liberal gentlemen! See if you can state your fundamental views on the distinction between liberalism and democracy. See if you can illustrate your views with examples from English, French or German history, even leaving out specifically working-class, proletarian, Marxist democracy. You will not be able to deny the distinction between bourgeois liberalism and bourgeois democracy as regards their attitude to the old order. And we shall always prove to you that you are a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and not at all a democratic party.

Bourgeois democracy in Russia is represented by the Trudoviks and Narodniks of all types.

"Once you have set your hand to the plough you can't give up." You have set out to discuss the principles of the Cadets and the Lefts, so you must really explain those principles. That is the only way to raise election agitation somewhat above the question of how many lawless acts such-and-such a police officer, governor, or administrative body is guilty of.

Pravda No. 79, July 31, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE LAST VALVE

We concluded our previous article on the agrarian question in Russia today (see *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 15) as follows:

"The real similarity between the Stolypin and the Narodnik agrarian programmes lies in the fact that both advocate a radical break-up of the old, medieval system of landownership. And that is very good. That system deserves no better than to be broken up. The most reactionary of all are those Cadets of *Rech* and *Russkiye Vedomosti* who reproach Stolypin for causing a break-up, instead of proving the need for a still more consistent and resolute break-up. We shall see in a following article that the Stolypin type of break-up *cannot* do away with bondage and labour service, while the Narodnik type *can*.

"For the time being we shall note that the only entirely real result of the Stolypin break-up is a famine among 30 million people. And it remains to be seen whether the Stolypin break-up may not teach the Russian people *how* they *should* carry out a more thorough break-up. It is no doubt teaching that. But will it succeed in it? Time will tell."*

And so, the question now confronting us is: why is it that the Stolypin break-up of medieval landownership *cannot*, while the peasant-Trudovik or Narodnik break-up *can*, do away with bondage and labour service?

In starting to analyse this question, we shall note first of all that one of the fundamental defects of the most widespread arguments concerning this matter—arguments that are liberal, Narodnik and partly revisionist (P. Maslov)—

* See pp. 148-49 of this volume.—*Ed.*

is the abstract *presentation* of the question, ignoring the concrete historical "replacement" which is actually coming about. The replacement coming about in Russia has long since occurred in the advanced countries of the West: it is the replacement of a feudal by a capitalist economy.

It is, and can only be, a question of the forms, conditions, rapidity and circumstances of *this* replacement; all *other* considerations, which are not infrequently put in the forefront, are no more than an *unwitting* beating about the bush, the "bush" being precisely this replacement.

The predominant feudal form of modern Russian agriculture is bondage and labour service. The preservation of natural economy to a comparatively considerable degree, the existence of the small cultivator who cannot make both ends meet and farms on a tiny patch of poor land, using old, wretchedly inadequate implements and production methods, and the economic dependence of this small cultivator on the owner of the neighbouring latifundium, who exploits him not only as a wage-labourer (which marks the beginning of capitalism), but as a small cultivator (which is a continuation of the corvée system)—these are the conditions engendering bondage and labour service, or rather, characterising both the one and the other.

For the 30,000 big landlords in European Russia there are 10,000,000 households of the peasant poor. The average result is roughly the following: one landlord owning over 2,000 dessiatines is surrounded by some 300 peasant households, each owning approximately 7 dessiatines of poor and exhausted land and equipped with implements that are incredibly outdated and primitive (from the European point of view, to say nothing of the American).

Some of the well-to-do peasants "get on in the world", i.e., become petty bourgeois using wage-labour to cultivate their land. The landlords, many of whom yesterday were serf-owning lords or are their sons, resort to the same kind of labour on a certain part of their land and for certain farming operations.

But besides these capitalist relations, and pushing them into the background in all the purely Russian gubernias of European Russia, there is the cultivation of landlord land by peasants using their own implements and livestock, that

is to say, labour service, a continuation of the former corvée, and there is also the "utilisation" of the desperate want of the small cultivator (precisely as a *cultivator*, as a small proprietor) for "service" on the neighbouring landed estate, that is to say, *bondage*. Money loans in exchange for work, grain loans, winter hire, land lease, permission to use the road, watering-place, meadows, pastures and woods, the lending of implements and livestock, and so on and so forth, are all infinitely varied forms of modern bondage.

Things are sometimes pushed to the length of obliging the peasant to fertilise the landlord's fields with manure from his own farm, while the "housewife" is obliged to provide eggs—and this not in the eighteenth, but in the twentieth century A. D.!

One has only to pose clearly and precisely the problem of these survivals of medievalism and feudalism in modern Russian agriculture to appreciate the significance of the Stolypin "reform". This "reform", of course, gave dying serfdom a new lease of life, just as the notorious, so-called "peasant" (in reality *landlord*), Reform of 1861, extolled by the liberals and Narodniks, *gave a new lease of life* to the corvée system, perpetuating it in a different guise right up to 1905.

The "new lease of life" given by Stolypin to the old order and old feudal agriculture lies in the fact that another valve was opened, the *last* that could still be opened without expropriating all the landed estates. That valve was opened to let off some of the steam—in the sense that some of the thoroughly impoverished peasants acquired a title to their allotments as personal property and sold them, thus being converted from proletarians with an allotment into proletarians pure and simple, and that, furthermore, some of the well-to-do peasants, having acquired their allotments, and in some cases having settled on *otrubs*, built up even more solid capitalist farms than before.

Lastly, the valve was opened and some of the steam let off in the sense that in some areas a particularly intolerable type of strip holding was abolished and the mobilisation of peasant land required under capitalism was made easier.

But did this new lease of life decrease or increase the overall number of contradictions in the countryside? Did it

decrease or increase the tyranny of the feudal latifundia, or the total amount of "steam"? The answer to these questions can only be the second alternative.

The famine among 30 million peasants is factual proof that the only answer which can be given at present is the second alternative. It is a famine among small proprietors. It presents a picture of the crisis of *the same* old poverty-ridden peasant farming, shackled by bondage and crushed by the feudal latifundia. There are no such famines, nor can there be, in the case of the big *non*-feudal estates, of the capitalist latifundia, in Europe.

The plight of the mass of the peasantry, apart from the proletarians who have completely freed themselves from the land (who "acquired" their land in order to sell it) and a negligible minority of well-to-do peasants, is the same as before or has even become worse. No acquiring of holdings as personal property, no measures against strip holdings, can make the mass of the impoverished peasants—settled on poor, exhausted land and possessing only antiquated, thoroughly worn-out implements and starved draught animals and cattle—to any extent cultured, to any extent masters of their farms.

Around a landlord (of the Markov or Purishkevich type) owning 2,000 dessiatines of land, the owners of tiny seven-dessiatine plots will inevitably remain paupers in bondage, however much they may be resettled, however much they may be freed from the village commune, however much their paupers' plots may be "acquired" as their personal property.

The Stolypin reform *cannot* do away with the bondage and labour service of the mass of the peasants or with famines among them. Decades upon decades of similar periodical famines will be needed before the bulk of the present-day households dies out painfully and the Stolypin reform "succeeds", i.e., before the established bourgeois system of the general European type is introduced in our countryside. At present, however, after a six-year trial of the Stolypin "reform" and six years of "brilliant" progress in the number of those who have "acquired" their land, etc., there cannot be the slightest doubt that the reform has not removed the crisis and cannot remove it.

Both at the present time and for the immediate future, it is beyond all question that Russia confronts us with the old crisis of an economy which is feudal as regards a number of survivals, the old crisis of pauperised small farming held in bondage by the latifundia of the Markov or Purishkevich type.

And this crisis, so graphically documented by the famine of 30 million peasants, confronts us despite Stolypin having opened the *last* valve that the Markovs and Purishkeviches have. They (and the Council of the United Nobility along with them) could have thought up nothing else,* nor can anything else be thought up to enable the Purishkeviches to retain land and power, than the pursuit of a bourgeois policy by these same Purishkeviches.

This is actually what the contradictions of the modern Russian countryside amount to: the pursuit of a bourgeois agrarian policy by the former serf-owners, who fully retain their land and their power. In the agrarian sphere, this is also "a step towards transformation into a bourgeois monarchy".**

This step towards the new has been taken by the old, which has retained its omnipotence, its land, its general appearance and conditions. This is the last step that the old can still take. It is the last valve. There are not, and cannot be, any other valves at the disposal of the Purishkeviches, who are in command of a bourgeois country.

And precisely because this step towards the new has been taken by the old, which has retained its omnipotence, it could not produce, and will not produce, any lasting result. On the contrary, it is leading—as shown clearly by all the symptoms of the period we are passing through—to the growth of the old crisis at a different and higher stage of Russia's capitalist development.

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* It goes without saying that the phrase "thought up" should be taken with a grain of salt: the imagination of the class in command was limited and determined by the entire course of the capitalist development of Russia and the world as a whole. With the given alignment of the classes in a Russia developing along capitalist lines, the Council of the United Nobility could not have acted otherwise if it wanted to retain its power.

** See present edition, Vol. 15, p. 349.—*Ed.*

The old crisis is growing in a new way, in a new situation, at a time when the class relations have become much more definite; but it *is* growing, and its social and economic (and not merely economic) nature remains essentially unchanged.

A negligible number of good, *otrub* farms of the peasant bourgeoisie, while the number of proletarians bound to allotments is declining, while the Purishkeviches retain their omnipotence, while the vast mass of the pauperised and starving middle peasants are in bondage, and while the number of proletarians not bound to allotments is increasing—such is the picture of the Russian countryside today.

Does it still have to be demonstrated that the Stolypin agrarian programme cannot, while the Narodnik (in the historical and class sense of the term) programme can, abolish bondage and labour service? Surely the present situation in the countryside must suggest that given full freedom of mobilisation of the land, good *otrub* farms would inevitably put an end at once to all medieval famines, to all bondage and labour service, if such farms were set up by the free choice of the peasants on all the seventy million dessiatines of landed estates which for the time being are outside the "land distribution system"? And will not the irony of history compel us to say that Stolypin's land surveyors have come in handy for a Trudovik Russia?

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 20,
August 5, 1912
Signed: *R. S.*

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

A LITTLE EXPLANATION

The question whether our Cadets are democrats or a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie is of great scientific interest.

Let us recall that even the Trudovik (bourgeois democrat) Vodovozov showed vacillation on this question.

Concerning this question, *Pravda* referred to *Mr. Gredeskul's recent statements*, *repeated in* "*Rech*".*

Rech answers: "We do not know what statements by Mr. Gredeskul *Pravda* is talking about."

How very nice, isn't it? *Pravda* said in clear and precise terms that it was speaking of the statements *repeated* in *Rech*. Well? Can it be that *Rech does not know* what is published in *Rech*?? Would it not be more natural to suppose that the liberals *want* to forget certain things in their recent past for the sake of their pre-election playing at democracy?

Be that as it may, I shall quote, with a view to clarifying an important scientific question, what Mr. Gredeskul said in a series of public lectures and what he *repeated* in *Rech* No. 117 (2071), without the editors making a single reservation.

"At the very end of my lecture," wrote Mr. Gredeskul, "in arguing against the contention of *Vekhi* that the Russian emancipation movement had failed (allegedly through the fault of the intelligentsia) and comparing it with the opinion of those who stand much further to the left than P. B. Struve but who likewise believe that the movement has brought us absolutely nothing, I upheld a thesis to the contrary, saying that a very great deal had been done, that the very foundations had been laid for the future constitutional edifice, and very deeply and solidly, too, in the very midst of the masses of

* See p. 246 of this volume.—*Ed*.

the people. To provide a critical confrontation for these two assertions and at the same time to express an idea which I also consider of the utmost political importance for our time, I brought both of them into relation with the future and said that from the point of view of the former (if nothing had been done in 1905-06), everything had to be started from the beginning, or, in other words, a second movement had to be organised, whereas from the point of view of the latter assertion (that 1905-06 had seen the laying of the foundations for a Russian constitution), the opposite was true—no second popular movement was needed but merely quiet, persevering and confident constitutional work.

"It was at this point that I was interrupted by the Lepaya chief of police (it happened in Lepaya). In this manner there ensued in Lepaya a police demonstration against a public denial of the need for a new revolution in Russia" (*Rech*, 1912, No. 117 [2071]).

Mr. Gredeskul has fully proved that the Lepaya chief of police made a mistake. But besides this, Mr. Gredeskul has proved two important things: (1) that the polemics of Mr. Gredeskul and Co. against *Vekhi* are so much pretence and empty talk. Actually, in all essential respects, the *whole* Cadet Party is a *Vekhi* party; (2) that the Marxist characterisation of the Cadet Party according to its scientific, economic and political features is perfectly correct.

Pravda No. 85, August 8, 1912
Signed: *N. B.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

WORKERS' EARNINGS AND CAPITALIST PROFITS IN RUSSIA

A survey of factories in Russia was made in 1908.[120] There is no doubt that the survey gave exaggerated figures of the workers' earnings and understated the amount of production and the size of the capitalists' profits, for in our country all surveys of this kind are carried out on purely bureaucratic lines, inquiries being addressed only to the capitalists, while it is considered unnecessary to ask the workers any questions.

Let us see what these statistics, which are particularly advantageous for the capitalists, have revealed.

According to preliminary information—which is all that has been published so far—there were altogether nearly 20,000 factories in Russia (the exact figure is 19,983; we shall give the exact figures in parentheses but shall round them off in the text to make it easier for the reader to visualise and remember the principal data).

The total number of workers of both sexes was 2,250,000 (2,253,787), including mining workers and workers employed in the industries subject to excise duty.

The wages of all those workers totalled *more than 500 million* (555,700,000) rubles.

To find out the average pay per worker, we must divide the total of wages by the number of workers. We get the figure 246 rubles.

This means that in 1908 *two and a quarter million* Russian factory workers earned a mere *twenty* rubles fifty kopeks a month on the average!

Considering that with this sum the worker has to support his family, and this with the present high rents and high food prices, such pay must be described as meagre.

Let us now see what the profits of the capitalists are. To ascertain them, we must subtract all the outlays of the capitalists from the sum total of production, i.e., the gross receipts of all the factories.

The sum total of production exceeds 4,500 million (4,651 million) rubles, and all the outlays of the capitalists total 4.000 million (4,082 million) rubles.

It follows that the capitalists' profits *exceed 500,000,000 rubles* (568,700,000 rubles).

These profits average *28,500 rubles* per establishment. *Each* worker brings the capitalist a profit of *252 rubles a year*.

Let us now compare the workers' earnings and the capitalists' profits. Each worker receives, on the average, 246 rubles a year, but he brings the capitalist an average profit of 252 rubles a year.*

It follows that the worker works *the lesser part* of the day for himself and *the greater part of it* for the capitalist. If, for example, we take the working day to average 11 hours, we shall see that the worker is paid only for five and a half hours and even somewhat less than that. The other five and a half hours he works gratuitously, without receiving any pay, and the entire sum earned by him during this half day constitutes the capitalist's profit.

Pravda No. 85, August 8, 1912
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

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* Altogether the worker creates an annual 498 rubles' worth of new values.

THE STRIKE MOVEMENT AND WAGES

Everyone knows that the famous strike movement of the Russian workers in 1905 achieved very great successes not only in the political, but in the economic sphere as well. The data furnished by the reports of factory inspectors[121] now enable us to form a fairly accurate idea of the magnitude of those successes.

According to those data, the average earnings of a factory worker were:

in 1901	201	rubles	in 1906	231	rubles
” 1902	202	”	” 1907	241	”
” 1903	208	”	” 1908	242	”
” 1904	213	”	” 1909	236	”
” 1905	205	”	” 1910	242	”
average for five years	206	”	average for five years	238	”

This shows that the year 1905 was a turning-point. For it was after 1905 that wages rose *abruptly* from 205 to 231 rubles a year, i.e., *by 26 rubles*, or more than 10 per cent.

With regard to 1905, which shows a drop of 8 rubles in wages compared with 1904, the following must be borne in mind: firstly, 1905 was a year of economic depression, i.e., a slump in industry; secondly, according to data of the Ministry of Trade, the workers that year lost, through not receiving wages during strikes, *17,500,000 rubles*, or over 10 rubles per worker on the average.

Thus, we may assume that real wages in 1905 were 215 rubles a year, but out of these 215 rubles the workers contributed 10 rubles each to the strike movement, which in 1905 was distinguished by remarkable persistence and breadth, unprecedented anywhere else in the world.

The result is that as we now examine the data for a whole decade, 1901-10, we clearly see a *striking* difference between the *pre-revolutionary* and *post-revolutionary* epoch.

Until 1905 the Russian factory worker's wages averaged 206 rubles. After 1905, they averaged 238 rubles, i.e., *32 rubles more per year*—an increase of 15.5 per cent.

Within one year wages experienced such an upward leap that no subsequent efforts by the capitalists (who, it will be recalled, took away all the gains of 1905 one by one) were able to reduce the worker to his former low standard of living. The year 1905 improved the worker's living standard to a degree that normally is attained during several decades.

Through the strikes in 1905 the workers lost, according to official statistics, 17,500,000 rubles by not being paid wages during the strikes. According to the same source, the capitalists' drop in output in 1905 was 127,300,000 rubles.

The rise in wages after 1905, however, brought the workers an average gain of 32 rubles per worker in five years (1906-1910), i.e., a total of 57,600,000 rubles a year, or *286 million rubles in five years*, considering the number of workers to be 1,800,000.

Pravda No. 86, August 9, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE WORKING DAY IN THE FACTORIES OF MOSCOW GUBERNIA

I. M. Kozminykh-Lanin, an engineer, has published a book on the length of the working day and working year in the factories of Moscow Gubernia.

The data collected by the author relate to the end of 1908 and cover 219,669 workers, or a little over seven-tenths of the total number of factory workers in Moscow Gubernia (307,773).

On the basis of these data, the author finds the average working day to be 9½ *hours* for adults and juveniles and 7½ hours for those under age.

It should be noted that these data do not include overtime work (the author has prepared for the press a special book on overtime work) and, secondly, that the author's data are based solely on "obligatory regulations for employers and workers".

Whether these regulations are actually adhered to is a question our engineer does not raise. Only workers' unions, by compiling their own statistics, could collect data on this question as well.

This 9½-hour day varies greatly from one establishment to another.

The author's tables show that *33,466 workers* work *over 10 hours a day*! This covers more than 15 per cent of the total number of workers surveyed.

There are *13,189 workers* who work *over 11 hours a day*, and 75 workers who work over 12 hours a day. The bulk of the workers crushed by this excessively long working day belongs to the textile industry.

If it is taken into account that approximately one-third of the workers are not included in the author's survey, the

conclusion can be drawn that the working day of *more than 20,000* factory workers in Moscow Gubernia is monstrously long.

Lastly, Kozminykh-Lanin's data show that even the extremely obsolete Russian law of 1897, which permits an 11½-hour (!!!) day, *is not observed by the factory owners*. Under that law, when working in two shifts, no worker may work more than 9 hours a day, calculated over a fortnight.

In reality, however, out of the 83,990 two-shift workers surveyed by the author, 14,376 worked *over 9 hours*. This comprises 17 per cent of the total number of those working in two shifts. And of the 3,733 two-shift workers engaged in repair and auxiliary jobs, 2,173, or *nearly three-fifths*, worked over 9 hours a day! A total of 16,500 workers who are compelled—even according to official data—to work longer than allowed by the law!

An eight-hour day existed in Moscow Gubernia in 1908 only for 4,398 workers—out of the 219,669 surveyed. This means that an eight-hour day is perfectly feasible even today; it is only necessary for 215,000 workers to overtake those 4,000.

Pravda No. 88, August 11, 1912
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE WORKING DAY AND WORKING YEAR IN MOSCOW GUBERNIA

The work bearing this title, from the pen of Kozminykh-Lanin, an engineer (Moscow, 1912, published by the Standing Commission of the Museum for the Promotion of Labour under the Moscow Branch of the Imperial Russian Technical Society. Price, 1 ruble 75 kopeks), is a summary of data relating to the end of 1908.

The data cover 219,669 workers, or 71,37 per cent of the total number of factory workers in the gubernia (307,773). The author says that he has "carefully studied the data on each industrial establishment in particular", and has "included in the summary only that part of it which left no room for doubt".

Such statistics would have been of outstanding interest, even though they come very late, had the data been tabulated more sensibly. Unfortunately, it is precisely this word that has to be used, for while Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin has compiled his tables most carefully, putting a very great deal of labour into the calculation of all sorts of totals and percentages he has expended this labour irrationally.

The wealth of material seems to have overwhelmed the author. He has made hundreds and thousands of calculations that are absolutely superfluous and only encumbered his work, but he has not made some dozens of calculations that are absolutely necessary, since no general picture can be obtained without them.

Indeed, the author's principal tables, which almost fill the whole of his book, contain detailed figures, such, for instance, as that the workers who work from 9 to 10 hours a day

are divided into 16 *categories* according to the number of working hours in two successive weeks (from 109 to 120 hours), and the average number of working hours is calculated for each category! And all this has been done twice: for the workers engaged in production and for the auxiliary workers.

It has to be admitted that such detailing is, first of all, absolutely unnecessary and that it looks like indulging in statistics for their own sake, a kind of game with figures, *to the detriment* of a clear picture and of material fit for study. Secondly, nine-tenths of these "averages", which the author has calculated to an accuracy of one per cent, are simply a waste of labour, for out of a thousand readers of the book (which will hardly find a thousand readers), only one reader will perhaps think this sort of "average" necessary (moreover, that one reader could have calculated *it for himself* if he had been so unfortunate as to need it!).

On the other hand, the book *completely lacks* absolutely indispensable summaries that the author *could* have drawn up with far less expenditure of labour and which one cannot do without if one wants to make a sensible study of the data of the survey. There are no summaries (1) giving totals, by production groups, of workers who work in one, two and three shifts; (2) classing workers according to production and auxiliary jobs; (3) giving average working hours according to production groups; (4) giving totals of working time of adults and juveniles; (5) singling out factories with various numbers of workers.

Let us dwell on this last point. The author seems so diligent—judging by the list he gives of the works which he has published or prepared for publication—and has such a wealth of interesting information at his disposal that a critical analysis of his methods may be not only of theoretical, but also of immediate practical use. We have already quoted the author where he says that he has "carefully studied the data on *each* industrial establishment *in particular*".

It follows that a summary of the material, if only by the factory groups used even by our official statistics (up to 20 workers, 21-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-1,000, and over 1,000), was perfectly possible. Was it necessary?

Undoubtedly. Statistics should not give arbitrary columns of figures but should, by means of figures, throw light on those different social types of the phenomenon under study that have fully emerged, or are emerging, in reality. Can there be any doubt that establishments employing 50 and those employing 500 workers belong to essentially different *social types* of the phenomenon we are interested in, or that the entire social development of all the civilised countries increases the *difference* between these types and leads to one of them *superseding* the other?

Let us take the data on the working day. From the author's summary table of totals it can be concluded—provided we *ourselves* do a certain amount of necessary statistical work which we do not see in the book—that 33,000 workers (out of the 220,000 surveyed) work *longer than 10 hours a day*. The average duration of the working day of the 220,000 workers is 9½ hours. The question arises: are not these workers, crushed by an excessive working day, employed in *small* establishments?

This question arises naturally and necessarily. It is by no means arbitrary. The political economy and statistics of all countries of the world *oblige* us to put precisely this question, for the prolongation of working hours by small establishments has been registered only too often. Capitalist economic conditions necessitate this prolongation in the case of small employers.

It turns out that the material at the author's disposal *did contain* data for answering this highly important question, but they have disappeared in his summary! In his summary, the author gives us very long and worthless columns of detailed "averages" but *does not give* the necessary division of factories according to the number of workers.

In the case of Moscow Gubernia, such a division is even more necessary (if we may here use the comparative degree) than elsewhere, for in Moscow Gubernia we see a comparatively large number of small establishments alongside a huge concentration of production. According to statistics for 1910, there were altogether 1,440 establishments in the gubernia, employing 335,190 workers. One-half of this number of workers (i.e., 167,199) was concentrated in *66 factories*, while at the other pole there were 669 establishments

employing a total of 18,277 workers. It is clear that we have here entirely different social types and that statistics which do not distinguish between them are no good at all.

The author was so absorbed in his columns of figures on the numbers of workers who work 94, 95, etc., to 144, hours in two successive weeks, that he *left out altogether* data on the number of establishments. The number is given in the second part of his work, which deals with the length of the working year; but the first part, which deals with the working day, gives no information on the number of establishments, although this information was no doubt available to the author.

The largest factories in Moscow Gubernia represent not only distinctive types of industrial establishment, but also distinctive types of population, with specific living and cultural (or rather cultureless) conditions. The singling out of these factories, and a detailed analysis of the data for each class of establishment, according to the number of workers, are a necessary condition for rational economic statistics.

Let us cite the more important totals from Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin's work.

As we have said, his survey of the length of the working day covers 219,669 factory workers of Moscow Gubernia, or 71.37 per cent of their total number, the textile workers being represented in his statistics more widely than workers engaged in other industries. The survey covered 74.6 per cent of all the textile workers and only 49-71 per cent of the other workers. *Apparently*, the survey was less extensive with regard to *small* establishments; in any case, the data on the number of working days in the year cover 58 per cent of the establishments (811 out of the 1,394 existing in 1908) and 75 per cent of the workers (231,130 out of 307,773). It is plainly the smaller establishments that have been left out.

The author gives summary data on the length of the working day only for all the workers put together. The result is an average of 9½ hours a day for adults and 7½

hours for juveniles. The number of juveniles, it should be noted, is not great: 1,363 against 218,306 adults. This suggests that juvenile workers in particular may have been "hidden" from the inspectors.

Out of the total of 219,669 workers there were 128,628 (58.56 per cent) working in one shift, 88,552 (40.31 per cent) working in two shifts and 2,489 (1.13 per cent) working in three shifts. Two-shift work predominates over one-shift work in the textile industry, where there are 75,391 working in two shifts ("in production", i.e., exclusive of auxiliary workers) against 68,604 working in one shift. The addition of repair and auxiliary workers produces a total of 78,107 working in two shifts and 78,321 working in one shift. In the case of metalworkers, on the other hand, one-shift work predominates considerably (17,821 adult workers) over two-shift work (7,673).

Summing up the total of workers who work different numbers of hours a day, we obtain the following data:

Number of hours worked per day	Number of workers	
Up to 8 hours	4,398	
From 8 to 9 hours	87,402	
" 9 " 10 "	94,403	
" 10 " 11 "	20,202	33,466
" 11 " 12 "	13,189	
12 or more hours . . .	75	
Total	219,669	

This shows how negligible still is the number of workers in Russia who do not work more than 8 hours a day—a mere 4,398 out of 219,669. On the other hand, the number of workers whose working day is excessively, scandalously long is very great: 33,466 out of 220,000, or over 15 per cent, work *more than 10 hours a day*! And this without considering overtime work.

To proceed. The difference in the length of the working day of one-shift and two-shift workers can be seen from the following data, which refer only to adult "production workers", i.e., exclusive of repair and auxiliary workers, who make up 8 per cent of the total.

Length of working day	Percentage of workers (working the indicated number of hours a day)	
	One-shift	Two-shift
Up to 8 hours	1.3	1.0
From 8 to 9 hours	13.3	81.9
" 9 " 10 "	60.7	14.7
" 10 " 11 "	15.2	1.4
" 11 " 12 "	9.5	1.0
12 or more hours	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0

This shows, among other things, that 17 per cent of the two-shift workers work *more than 9 hours* a day, or more than is permitted even by the law of 1897, which Mr. Lanin justly regards as exceedingly outdated. Under this law, when work is carried on in two shifts, the number of hours worked per day must not exceed nine, calculated over a fortnight. And Mr. Lanin in all his calculations and tables takes precisely a period of "two successive weeks".

Since a very definite and precise law is violated so openly, it is easy to imagine the fate of the other provisions of our factory legislation.

The average number of hours worked per day by a one-shift worker (only adult and only engaged in "production") is 9.89. This implies prevalence of a *ten-hour day* without any reduction even on Saturdays, and exclusive of overtime work. Needless to say such a long working day is certainly excessive and cannot be tolerated.

The average number of hours worked per day by a two-shift worker is 8.97, i.e., there predominates in practice the nine-hour day which the law requires in this case. Its reduction to eight hours is particularly imperative because in the case of two-shift work the time from 10 p.m. to 4 (!!) a.m. is considered "night", which means that in effect a very substantial portion of the *night* is considered to be "day" for the worker. A nine-hour day with night turned into *day*, and with constant night work—that is the situation prevailing in Moscow Gubernia!

In conclusion of our review of Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin's data, we wish to point out that he finds the average duration of the working year to be 270 days. For textile workers,

however, the figure is somewhat smaller—268.8 days—and for metalworkers, a little greater—272.3.

The way in which Kozminykh-Lanin has analysed these data on the length of the working year is also most unsatisfactory. On the one hand, excessive, utterly senseless detailing: we find as many as 130 horizontal rows in the overall table on the length of the working year! Data on the numbers of establishments, workers, etc., are given here *separately* for each number of working days (per year) that occurs, beginning with 22 and ending with 366. Such "detailing" is more like complete failure to "digest" the raw material.

On the other hand, here too we do not find the necessary summaries either on the numbers of workers in the factories or on the difference in motive power (manual and mechanical factories). Hence one cannot obtain a picture enabling one to *understand* how various conditions affect the length of the working year. The wealth of data collected by the author has *gone to waste* through very bad handling.

We can ascertain—roughly and far from accurately—the significance of the distinction between large-scale and small-scale production even from the author's data, provided we re-analyse them somewhat. Let us take the *four* main groups of establishments according to length of the working year: (1) those working up to 200 days a year; (2) from 200 to 250; (3) from 250 to 270, and (4) 270 days or longer.

By summing up, for each of these categories, the number of factories and that of the workers of both sexes, we obtain the following picture:

Length of working year	Average number of working days per year	Number of factories	Number of workers	Average number of workers per factory
Up to 200 days	96	74	5,676	76
200 " 250 "	236	91	14,400	158
250 " 270 "	262	196	5,313	297
270 or more "	282	450	152,741	339
Total . .	270	811	231,130	285

This shows clearly that the larger the factory, the longer (on the whole) the working year. Consequently, the social and economic importance of small undertakings is much *less*

in reality than appears from their share in, say, the total number of workers. The working year in these undertakings is so much shorter than in the large ones that their share in production must be quite insignificant. Besides, with a short working year, these factories (the small ones) are incapable of forming a permanent body of proletarians, hence the workers here are more "bound" to the land, probably earn less, are less cultured, etc.

A large factory intensifies exploitation by prolonging the working year to the utmost and thus bringing into existence a proletariat which has completely severed its ties with the countryside.

If we were to study the differences in length of the working year depending on the technical organisation of factories (manual and mechanical motive power, etc.), we could undoubtedly derive a whole series of highly interesting indications of the living conditions of the population, the position of the workers, the evolution of our capitalism, etc. But the author, one can say, has not so much as touched on these questions.

All he has done is to give figures on the average duration of the working year in factories of the different groups of industries. The variations of the general average are very small from 246 days in Group IX (processing of mineral substances) to 291 in Group XII (chemical industry).

These differences, as the reader will see, are far less than those in the duration of the working year in small and large factories in general, irrespective of the industry to which they belong.

Differences in the type of industry are *less* characteristic, and less important for social and economic statistics than differences in the *scale* of production. This does not mean, of course, that the former differences can be ignored. What it does mean is that sensible statistics are absolutely impossible unless the latter differences are taken into account.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 21,
August 12, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

IN BRITAIN

The British Liberals have been in power for six and a half years. The working-class movement in Britain is becoming stronger and stronger. Strikes are assuming a mass character; moreover, they are ceasing to be purely economic and are developing into political strikes.

Robert Smillie, the leader of the Scottish miners who recently showed such strength in mass struggle[122] declares that in their next big fight the miners will demand the transfer of the collieries to state ownership. And this next big fight is approaching inexorably, because all the miners of Britain are perfectly well aware that the notorious Minimum Wage Act cannot bring about any appreciable improvement in their conditions.

And so the British Liberals, who are losing ground, have invented a new battle-cry in order once again to induce the mass of the electors to trust the Liberals for a while. "You can't sell without cheating" is the commercial slogan of capitalism. "You can't get seats in parliament without cheating is the slogan of capitalist politics in free countries.

The "fashionable" slogan invented by the Liberals for this purpose is the demand for "land reform". It is not clear what the Liberals and their expert in humbugging the masses, Lloyd George, mean by that. Apparently, it is a question of increasing the land tax, and no more. But the idea that actually lies behind the resounding talk about "restoring the land to the people", etc., is to collect further millions for military adventures, for the Navy.

In Britain, agriculture is conducted wholly on capitalist lines. The capitalist farmers rent medium-sized plots

of land from the landlords and cultivate them with the aid of wage-workers.

Under these circumstances, no "land reform" can in any way change the conditions of the agricultural workers. In Britain the buying-out of landed estates might even become a new method of fleecing the proletariat, since the landlords and the capitalists, who would retain state power, would sell their land at exorbitant prices. And the price would have to be paid by the taxpayers, i.e., the workers again.

The fuss made by the Liberals about the land question has done good in one respect: it has roused interest in organising the agricultural workers.

When Britain's agricultural workers wake up and join together in unions, the Liberals will no longer be able to get away with charlatan "promises of reform" or of allotments for farm-hands and day-labourers.

Recently a reporter of a British labour newspaper visited Joseph Arch, the veteran agricultural workers' leader who has done much to rouse the labourers to a class-conscious life. This could not be done at one stroke, and Arch's slogan—"three acres and a cow" for every agricultural worker—was a very naïve one. The union he founded fell to pieces, but the cause he fought for is not dead and the organisation of the agricultural workers in Britain is once again becoming an immediate issue.

Arch is now 83 years old. He lives in the same village and in the same house in which he was born. He told his interviewer that the agricultural workers' union had managed to raise wages to 15, 16 and 17 shillings a week. And now the wages of agricultural workers in Britain have again dropped—in Norfolk, where Arch lives—to 12 or 13 shillings a week.

Pravda No. 89, August 12, 1912
Signed: *P.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA

In Russia, as in all capitalist countries, concentration of production is going on, i.e., its concentration to an ever greater extent in a small number of large and very large undertakings.

Under the capitalist system, every undertaking is entirely dependent on the market. In view of this dependence, the larger the undertaking, the more cheaply it can sell its product. A big capitalist buys raw materials more cheaply and expends them more economically; he uses better machinery, etc. Small proprietors, on the other hand, are ruined and go under. Production becomes more and more concentrated in the hands of a few millionaires. Millionaires generally increase their power still more through joint-stock companies, which put in their hands the capital of middle proprietors and "small fry".

Here are data, for example, on the factory industry in Russia for 1910 compared with 1901:[123]

Groups of establishments by number of workers	Number of establishments		Number of workers (thousands)	
	1901	1910	1901	1910
Up to 50	2,740	9,909	244	220
51 to 100	2,428	2,201	171	159
101 " 500	2,288	2,213	492	508
501 " 1,000	403	433	269	303
Over 1,000	243	324	526	713
Total	18,102	15,080	1,702	1,903

Such is generally the situation in all capitalist countries. The number of small establishments is *decreasing*; the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, are ruined and go under;

they join the ranks of office employees, and sometimes of the proletariat.

The number of very large undertakings is growing fast, their share in production as a whole increasing still more.

From 1901 to 1910 the number of large factories employing over 1,000 workers each increased almost 50 per cent—from 243 to 324.

In 1901 they had about half a million (526,000) workers, or less than one-third of the total number, whereas in 1910 the figure *exceeded 700,000*, which is more than one-third of the total.

The bigger factories choke the small ones and concentrate production more and more. Ever greater numbers of workers are brought together in a few undertakings, but the whole profit from the labour of the combined millions of workers goes to a handful of millionaires.

Pravda No. 89, August 12, 1912
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A CAREER

The life story of the millionaire A. S. Suvorin, the publisher of *Novoye Vremya*, who died not long ago, reflected and expressed a very interesting period in the history of Russia's bourgeois society as a whole.

At the start of his career he was a poor man, a liberal and even a democrat; towards the end of his career, he was a millionaire, a self-satisfied and brazen extoller of the bourgeoisie, who grovelled before every turn in the policies of the powers that be. Is this not typical of the *bulk* of the "educated" and "intellectual" members of so-called society? It is true, of course, that not all practise renegacy with such furious success as to become millionaires, but nine-tenths or perhaps ninety-nine out of a hundred, practise the very same renegacy, *beginning* as radical students and *ending* up as holders of "cushy jobs" in some office or other, in some swindle or other.

A penniless student who could not enter university for lack of money; a teacher in an uyezd school, who also held the office of secretary to the Marshal of the Nobility or gave private lessons in the homes of aristocratic and wealthy serf-owners; a budding liberal and even democratic journalist sympathising with Belinsky and Chernyshevsky and hostile to reaction—this is how Suvorin *began* in the fifties and sixties of the last century.

The landlord Katkov, a liberal who sympathised with the British bourgeoisie and the British Constitution, turned during the first upsurge of the democratic movement in Russia (in the early sixties of the nineteenth century) to nationalism, chauvinism and rabid Black-Hundredism.

The liberal journalist Suvorin turned during the second upsurge of the democratic movement in Russia (in the late seventies of the nineteenth century) to nationalism, to chauvinism, to shameless fawning upon the powers that be. The Russo-Turkish War helped this careerist to "find himself", and to find his path of a flunkey rewarded by the huge profits of his newspaper *At Your Service, Sir*.

Suvorin's *Novoye Vremya* earned that nickname, *At Your Service, Sir*, for many decades to come. The newspaper became in Russia model example of the venal press. *Novoye Vremya* became an expression synonymous with the concepts of apostasy, renegacy and sycophancy. Suvorin's *Novoye Vremya* is a specimen of brisk trade, of how to sell stuff "for consumption off or on the premises". It deals in everything, from political convictions to pornographic advertisements.

And now, after the third upsurge of the democratic movement in Russia (in the early twentieth century), how many more liberals have taken the *Vekhi* path, turning to nationalism, to chauvinism, to the defamation of democracy, to sycophancy to the reaction!

Katkov—Suvorin—the *Vekhi* group are all historical stages of the turn taken by the Russian liberal bourgeoisie *from democracy to* the defence of reaction, to chauvinism and anti-Semitism.

The class-conscious workers become steeled in their convictions, realising the inevitability of this turn of the bourgeoisie, as well as of the turn of the working masses to the ideas of working-class democracy.

Pravda No. 94, August 18, 1912
Signed: *I. V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

August 31, 1912

Dear Comrade,

I have received from you Circular No. 15 (July 1912) in which the Executive Committee of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania gives notice of a split in that organisation.

In my quality of representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau, I must emphatically protest against the notice for the following reasons:

1. The Executive of the S.D.P. and L. declares that the Warsaw Committee "is not affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P., of which the S.D.P. and L. is an autonomous section".

But the Executive of the S.D.P. and L. has no authority whatsoever either to decide or to declare who is affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P., which I represent.

Today the Executive of the S.D.P. and L. itself is not affiliated to our Party, for it maintains no organisational relations either with the Central Committee I represent, which was elected at the Conference in January 1912, or with the opposed liquidationist centre (the so-called "Organising Committee").

2. The assertion of the Executive of the S.D.P. and L. that the split occurred "unexpectedly just before the Duma elections" is not in accord with the facts.

I happen to know that the very same Executive of the S.D.P. and L. must have foreseen a split as early as two years ago, when it provoked a sharp conflict with its former members, Malecki and Hanecki, and removed Hanecki from the Board.

3. It is hypocritical of the Executive to declare:

firstly, that *agents provocateurs* have made their way into the Warsaw organisation "as into all the other revolutionary organisations in tsarist Russia";

secondly, that the split came about with "the active co-operation of the secret police", although the Executive cannot give a single name, and does not dare to express any specific suspicion!

How very hypocritical one has to be to make in public the dishonest accusation of "co-operation of the secret police", with the aim of morally destroying one's political opponents, even while lacking the courage to give a single name or express any specific suspicion!

I am confident that every member of the International will indignantly reject these unheard-of methods of struggle.

I have for a number of years known the two former members of the Executive of the S.D.P. and L., Malecki and Hanecki, who openly march shoulder to shoulder with the Warsaw Committee. I have received, precisely from the Warsaw Committee, an official notification confirming this fact.

In the present situation, I consider it my duty to convey to the International Socialist Bureau the enclosed protest from the Warsaw Committee of the S.D.P. and L.

As the statement of the Executive Committee has been circulated to all members of the International Socialist Bureau, I must ask you, dear comrade, to circulate also this statement of mine, together with the protest of the Warsaw Committee, to the representatives of all the parties affiliated to the International.

With Party greetings, *N. Lenin*

Published in *Gazeta Robotnicza*
No. 19, November 21, 1912

Published according
to the newspaper text
Translated from the Polish

THE CADETS AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

In their polemics against *Pravda*, the Cadets were unable, much as they tried, to evade the question whether they are a democratic or a liberal-monarchist party.

This is a highly important question. Its importance goes beyond that of a general question of principle which provides material for elucidating basic political concepts. Moreover, the question of the nature of the Cadet Party, which claims leadership of the entire opposition, is inseparably bound up with *all* the fundamental questions of the Russian emancipation movement in general. That is why anyone who takes an intelligent interest in the election campaign, and appreciates its significance for the political enlightenment of the masses, is bound to pay the greatest attention to this controversy on the nature of the Cadet Party.

The Cadet *Rech* is now trying to stifle this controversy, to shut out questions of principle by subterfuges and quarrelsome sallies ("a lie", "a distortion", etc.), to rake up some abuse or other which the liquidators flung at us when their personal annoyance, caused by sharp organisational conflicts, was at its highest. All these are familiar and battered methods used by people who realise their weakness in a controversy over principles. And for this reason our reply to the Cadets must be a repeated explanation of questions of principle.

What are the distinctions between democracy and liberalism in general? Both the bourgeois democrat and the liberal (all liberals are bourgeois liberals, but not every democrat is a bourgeois democrat) are opposed to the old order, to absolutism, serfdom, the privileges of the upper social-estate, etc; they are for political liberty and a constitutional "legal" system. That is the resemblance between them.

Now for the difference between them. The democrat represents the mass of the population. He shares their petty-bourgeois prejudices, expecting, for example, that a new, "equalised" redivision of all the land would not only abolish all vestiges of serfdom (he would be justified in expecting this), but would also undermine the foundations of capitalism (which is entirely unjustified, for *no* redivision of the land can do away either with the power of the market and of money, or with the power and omnipotence of capital). But the democrat believes in the movement of the masses, in its strength and justice, and has no fear at all of this movement. He advocates the abolition of *all* medieval privileges without exception.

The liberal does not represent the mass of the population but a minority of the latter, namely, the big and middle liberal bourgeoisie. The liberal is *more* afraid of the movement of the masses and of consistent democracy than of reaction. Far from seeking complete abolition of all medieval privileges, he frankly *defends* some privileges which are, moreover, very substantial ones, and strives to ensure that these privileges are divided between the Purishkeviches and the Milyukovs and not abolished altogether.

The liberal defends political liberty and the constitution—invariably in a curtailed form (such as the two-chamber system and many other things), each curtailment amounting to the preservation of a privilege of the serf-owners. Thus the liberal vacillates continuously between the serf-owners and the democrats; hence the extreme, almost incredible *impotence* of the liberals in all matters of any importance.

Russia's democrats are the working class (proletarian democrats) and the Narodniks and Trudoviks of all shades (bourgeois democrats). Russia's liberals are the Cadet Party, as well as the "Progressists" and most of the non-Russian groups in the Third Duma.

Russian democrats have important victories to their credit, Russian liberals none at all. The former have proved their ability to fight, and their defeats have always been great, historic defeats of the whole of Russia; moreover, even after a defeat some of the democrats' demands have invariably been met. The latter, i.e., the liberals, have proved

incapable of fighting, and they have nothing to show in Russian history but a constant contemptuous treatment of the liberals by the serf-owners, comparable to the treatment of the serfs by their lords.

Let us test these general considerations and basic theoretical postulates by the Cadets' agrarian programme. *Pravda* told the Cadets that their undemocratic nature was evident from the speeches on the agrarian question made by the Cadet Berezovsky the Second in the Third Duma.*

The Cadet *Rech* answered, in its issue No. 208: "The speech of Berezovsky the Second was, as we know, a reaffirmation of the Cadet agrarian programme."

See how evasive this answer is! We said that the speech of Berezovsky the First** was a specimen of *un*democratic treatment of the question. *Rech* knows very well what we consider an indication of liberalism as distinct from democracy. But it has no intention of analysing the question seriously, of stating which precisely are the signs of the distinction between liberalism and democracy that it, i.e., *Rech*, considers correct, and of ascertaining whether these signs are evident in the speech of Berezovsky the First. *Rech* does nothing of the kind. It dodges the issue, thus betraying a fundamental weakness and a guilty conscience.

But even *Rech* could not bring itself to disclaim the responsibility of the *entire* Cadet Party for the speech delivered by Berezovsky the First. It admitted—it had to admit—this responsibility by describing the speech as a "reaffirmation of the Cadet agrarian programme".

Splendid. And now we shall quote the main passages from that indisputably and officially Cadet speech by a member of the Third Duma, the Simbirsk landlord A. Y. Berezovsky. We shall see, in analysing the speaker's arguments, whether his point of view is democratic or liberal. And we shall also see whether the Cadet gentlemen succeed in refuting us in their vast press or at their meetings.

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* See p. 246 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Both *Pravda* and *Rech* were mistaken in speaking of Berezovsky the Second. The Cadet is Berezovsky the *First*, Alexander Yeleazarovich, a Simbirsk landlord.

"It is my deep conviction," said A. Y. Berezovsky in the Third Duma in October 1908 (we are quoting from the verbatim report published in *Rossiya*[124]), "that this Bill [the Cadets' land Bill] is far more beneficial to the landowners as well [and not to the peasants alone], and I say this, gentlemen, because I am familiar with agriculture, having engaged in it all my life and being a landowner myself. For a cultured farming system, the Bill of the party of people's freedom would undoubtedly be more useful than the present system. One should not seize on the bare fact of compulsory alienation, become indignant about it, and say that it is violence, but should see and appreciate *what the things proposed in our Bill will amount to and how this compulsory alienation is to be effected....*"

We have emphasised these truly precious words of Mr. A. Y. Berezovsky's—precious because of their rare veracity. Anyone who recalls the speeches and articles of the Marxist Bolsheviks against the Cadets at the time of the First Duma, or who takes the trouble to read those articles now, will have to agree that in 1908 Mr. A. Y. Berezovsky brilliantly confirmed the Bolsheviks of 1906. And we venture to predict that any history that is at all impartial will confirm *their* policy three times over.

In 1906 we said: "Don't trust the *sound* of that phrase—compulsory alienation'." The point is, *who* will compel *whom*. If the landlords compel the peasants to pay for poor lands three times their worth, in the fashion of the notorious compensation of 1861, then this kind of "compulsory alienation" will be a *landlord* reform beneficial to the landlords and ruinous to the peasants.*

The liberals, the Cadets, in raising the question of compulsory alienation, *manoeuvred* between the landlords and the peasants, between the Black Hundreds and the democrats. In 1906, they addressed themselves to the democrats, trying to make their "compulsory alienation" pass for something democratic. In 1908, they addressed themselves to the diehards in the Third Duma, arguing that one should see "what this compulsory alienation will amount to and how it is to be effected".

Let us listen then to the official spokesman of the Cadet Party.

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* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 414-17.—*Ed.*

"Take the Bill of the forty-two members of the First State Duma," said A. Y. Berezovsky. "It contained only [exactly, Mr. Berezovsky!] the recognition of the necessity of alienating first of all those lands which are not exploited by their owners themselves. Furthermore the party of people's freedom favoured the establishment of local committees which would have to ascertain at a certain time which lands are or are not subject to alienation and how much land the peasants require to meet their needs. The committees were to be constituted in such a manner as to ensure that half of the members were peasants and the other half non-peasants."

Mr. A. Y. Berezovsky omitted a trifle from his statement. Anyone who wishes to look into the agrarian Bill prepared by Kutler (the Cadet Party's recognised authority on the agrarian question) and published in Volume II of the Cadet publication, *The Agrarian Question*, will see that, by the terms of the Bill, the chairmen of the committees were to be appointed by the government, i.e., they too were to be representatives of the landlords.

But let us assume even that A. Y. Berezovsky expressed the Cadet views more accurately than Kutler. Let us assume that A. Y. Berezovsky said *everything* and that the Cadets actually want committees made up of *equal numbers* of peasants and "non-peasants", without representatives of the class government. What then? Will anyone dare to assert that such a Bill is democratic?

Democracy is the rule of the majority. Only universal, direct and equal elections can be called democratic. Only such committees are democratic as have been elected by the *entire* population on the basis of universal suffrage. This follows from the general, basic, elementary truths of democracy so indisputably that it even seems strange to have to explain it to the Cadet gentlemen.

On paper, the Cadets recognise universal suffrage. But *in reality*, with regard to one of the most important questions of the Russian emancipation movement, the agrarian question, they do *not* recognise universal suffrage! No subterfuges or reservations remove this fact, which is of prime importance.

And do not imagine that the Cadets merely depart here from the principle of universal suffrage, from the principle of democracy. No. They take as a basis a *different* principle, the principle of "*agreement*" between the old and the new,

between the landlord and the peasant, between the Black Hundreds and the democrats. What the Cadets proclaim is: half to one side and half to the other.

This is a typical principle of the vacillating liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. What this bourgeoisie wants is not the *abolition* of medieval privileges, but their *division* between the landlords and the bourgeoisie. Indeed, how can anyone deny that to grant the "non-peasants" (i.e., the landlords, to put it bluntly) *equality* with the peasants, who make up seven-tenths of the population, means *preserving* and *reaffirming* medieval privileges? What else did medieval privileges amount to but that the landlord meant as much in politics as hundreds and thousands of peasants?

From *equality* of the landlords and the peasants there can be no other outcome but a division of privileges between the landlords and the bourgeoisie. That was precisely the case in 1861, when the landlords ceded one-thousandth of their privileges to the nascent bourgeoisie, while the peasant masses were doomed to *half a century* (1861+50=1911) of the agony of disfranchisement, humiliation, slow starvation, extortion of taxes, etc. Besides, it should not be forgotten that in 1861 the landlords, ceding one-thousandth of their political privileges to the bourgeoisie (the Zemstvo, urban and judicial reforms, etc.), began themselves to develop economically into a bourgeoisie by setting up distilleries and sugar refineries, joining the boards of joint-stock companies, and so on.

We shall see in a moment the final outcome of this "equality" of a negligible number of landlords and a huge number of peasants, as pointed out by Mr. A. Y. Berezovsky himself. But first we must stress the great significance of Berezovsky's statement that the vaunted committees would have to "ascertain which lands *are* or *are not subject* to alienation and how much land the peasants *require* to meet their needs".

All the talk about various "norms" of allotment for the peasants, etc., is nothing but empty words with which, incidentally, our Narodnik intellectuals, including the most "Left" of them, often lull themselves and the peasants. The *only* important question is: will all the lands be subject to alienation or not? And, in the latter case, *who* is to decide "*which are not subject*"? (I do not speak of *who* is to deter-

mine the amount of the compensation, for the very idea of compensation for medieval privileges is a liberal-bourgeois principle, one that is radically, at bottom, absolutely undemocratic and anti-democratic).

All the clauses of the Cadets' land Bills—clauses which have been drafted in detail and bureaucratically polished—are a useless bureaucratic undertaking. The only important question is: *who* is to determine *which* lands are to be alienated and *on what terms*? The most ideal Bill is no more than chicanery if it evades this question.

But how does Mr. Berezovsky decide this sole important question? For it should be clear that, given equality of the peasants and "non-peasants", there will be no agreement in most cases, nor, indeed, is it necessary to draft Bills for an amicable settlement between the serf-owners and the serfs of yesterday. The serf-owners are always agreeable to an "*amicable* settlement" with them, even without any laws.

And Mr. Berezovsky gave a clear answer to the burning question, in speaking to the Third Duma diehards. Listen to what he said next:

> "In view of this, that general concrete work on the spot would, of course, bring to light both the amount of land '*available*' [listen to this!] for alienation and the amount of land required for the peasants [required for what? Would it be for performing services? But that is something the serf-owners have always agreed to!], and finally, the peasants themselves would see to what extent it was possible to meet their fair [ahem! God save us from lordly anger, lordly love and the landlord's "fairness"] demands. Then it would all go through the Duma and [mark this well!] the Council of State and, after being recast [ahem!], would be sanctioned in final form [i.e., made law]. This methodical work [it certainly could not be more "methodical"!] would no doubt result in really meeting the true needs of the population and thereby in pacifying and preserving the cultural farms, which *the party of people's freedom has never wanted to demolish unless strictly necessary*."

This was said by a spokesman of the "party of people's freedom", which it would be fair to call the party of landlord pacification.

It is perfectly clear from this that the "compulsory alienation" proposed by the Cadets implies *compulsion of the peasants by the landlords*. Whoever sets out to deny this must prove that in the Council of State the peasants predomi-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

nate over the landlords! "Equality" of the landlords and the peasants to begin with, and in the end—unless an amicable settlement is reached—a "*recasting*" of the draft by the Council of State.

"The party of people's freedom has never wanted to demolish the cultural farms unless strictly necessary," said the landlord A. Y. Berezovsky, who probably considers his farm "cultural". But we will ask: *who* is to decide *whose* farm is "cultural" and in what sense, and where does "strict necessity" begin? Answer: this will be decided, first by a committee made up of *equal numbers* of landlords and peasants, and then by the Council of State.

Well then? Are the Cadets a democratic party or a counter-revolutionary party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie? Are they a party of "people's freedom" or of landlord pacification?

Russia's bourgeois democrats, i.e., the Trudoviks and Narodniks of all shades, have grievously erred in expecting the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants to bring about "equalisation", the spread of "labour principles", and so on; they have also erred by obscuring, with empty talk about various "standards" of landownership, the question whether there is to be medieval land tenure or not, but these democrats have helped the new to force out the old and have not drafted Bills to enable the old to *retain* a number of privileges.

Really, to deny that the Cadets are not a democratic party but a party of the counter-revolutionary, liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, means simply flying in the face of well-known facts.

In conclusion we shall briefly examine a question which might well be asked by certain naïve Cadets. If the "compulsory alienation" suggested by the Cadets implied compulsion of the peasants by the landlords, why did the majority of the landlords reject it?

This question was answered unintentionally by Mr. Milyukov, in his speech in the Third Duma on October 31, 1908, when he spoke *as a historian*. Milyukov the *historian* had to admit that until the end of 1905 both the government and the *landlords* had regarded the peasantry as a *conservative*

force. At the Peterhof meeting on July 19-26, 1905—that meeting paved the way for the Bulygin Duma[125]—A. A. Bobrinsky, Naryshkin and other pillars of the future Council of the United Nobility were *in favour of giving the peasants a predominant position in the Duma*. At that time Witte held that the mainstay of the autocracy should be (and could be) the "peasant democrats", *not* the nobility *or* the bourgeoisie.*

"Gentlemen," said Mr. Milyukov, "this is an interesting moment because it is at this moment that the government has conceived the idea of compulsory alienation. (*Voices*: "It's Kutler's idea.") Yes, Kutler's, gentlemen.... *Kutler is drafting a Bill on compulsory alienation....*

"He has been working on it, gentlemen; *his work continued for a month or two*—I cannot say exactly—*until the end of 1905*. It went on unhampered until the well-known Moscow events took place, after which there was a noticeable change in sentiment."

On January 4, 1906, the Marshals of the Nobility met in congress. The congress rejected Kutler's draft, which it knew from hearsay and private reports. It adopted an agrarian programme of its own (the future "Stolypin" programme), In February 1906 Minister Kutler resigned. On March 30, 1906, the Witte Cabinet (with its "peasant" programme) was succeeded by the Gurko-Goremykin Cabinet (with its "Stolypin" programme, a programme of the nobility and the bourgeoisie).

These are the facts which Milyukov the historian had to admit.

The inference from them is obvious. The "Cadet" Bill on compulsory alienation was a Bill prepared by Kutler, *Minister* in the Witte Cabinet, who dreamed of an autocracy supported by the peasantry! When the peasants' democratic movement was on the rise, attempts were made to bribe the movement, to corrupt it, to deceive it with a Bill for "peaceful", "compulsory alienation", a "second emancipation", a Bill for a bureaucratic "compulsion of the peasants by the landlords".

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* See *Report of the People's Freedom Group* on the Second Session of the Third Duma (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 43. It is unfortunate—very unfortunate—that the Cadets did not publish Berezovsky's speech.

This is what the facts of history tell us. The Cadets' agrarian Bill is a Witte Minister's plan for "playing" at peasant Caesarism.

The peasant democrats did not live up to expectations. They showed—probably more clearly in the First Duma than in 1905—that since 1861 they had become *politically conscious*. With a peasantry *such as this*, the Kutler-Cadet Bill became an absurdity: the peasants, far from letting themselves be hoodwinked in the old fashion, would have used even the Cadets' local land committees to organise a new onslaught.

On January 4, 1906, the Marshals of the Nobility correctly decided that the Bill prepared by the liberal landlords (Kutler and Co.) was a hopeless affair, and cast it aside. The civil war had *outgrown* liberal-bureaucratic scheme-making. The class struggle had dispelled the vision of "social peace" and raised the issue squarely: "either the Stolypin way or the Trudovik way".

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 22,
August 19, 1912
Signed: *W. Frey*

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

A POOR DEFENCE

In "The Strike Movement and Wages", an article published in *Pravda* No. 86 on August 9,* we cited official statistical data on the average wages of Russian factory workers in the first decade of the twentieth century.

It appeared that by their famous strike movement in 1905 the workers had raised their wages from 206 rubles (the annual average per worker) to 238 rubles, i.e., by 32 rubles, or 15.5 per cent.

Our conclusion did not please the official newspaper *Rossiya*. It devoted the leading article in its August 15 issue to a detailed restatement of the data cited by us (withholding for some reason the name of the newspaper from which it had borrowed the data), and tried to refute our conclusions.

"It is true, of course, that wages rose abruptly in 1906," wrote *Rossiya*. "But it is just as true that the prices of all commodities and food rose simultaneously with them...." And *Rossiya* went on to present its calculations, according to which wages have risen by 20 per cent, while the cost of living has gone up by 24 per cent. *Rossiya*'s calculations are inaccurate in every respect. In reality the rise in wages is not so large, while the rise in the cost of living is more considerable.

But we shall not now correct the mistakes of *Rossiya*. Let us take its figures.

"They do not at all suggest that the workers have gained anything," wrote *Rossiya*. "Indeed, judging by their frequent complaints of hard times, one could rather draw the reverse conclusion, namely, that they have scarcely gained anything."

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* See pp. 258-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

A strange way to reason, isn't it? If wages have risen to a lesser extent than prices of the prime necessities of life, it is necessary to raise wages to a *still greater extent*! Surely this is obvious.

But how can the workers achieve a rise in wages without an economic struggle and without strikes? Has *Rossiya* ever seen capitalists offer the workers a pay rise *of their own accord*, in view of the rising prices of the prime necessities of life?

Rossiya admits that wages rose abruptly in 1906—thanks to a widespread mass strike movement unprecedented in the world for tenacity. But food prices began to climb *before 1905*. The price of bread, for example, has never dropped in Russia *since 1903* but has only risen. The prices of livestock products have never dropped since 1901 but have only risen.

It follows that solely by their strike movement did the workers ensure that wages, *too*, began to rise following the rise in the prices of bread and other foodstuffs. Since the wage rise is inadequate, as is admitted *even* by *Rossiya*, it is necessary to raise *wages* further.

Pravda No. 96, August 21, 1912
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE LIQUIDATORS AND "UNITY"[126]

The seventh issue of *Nevsky Golos*, which appeared a few days ago, can only be described as hysterical. Instead of a labour chronicle, nearly two pages of it contain choice abuse against *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*. Curiously enough, this abuse is offered under the slogan of "unity" of the working class, of "unity" in the election campaign.

Gentlemen—we shall reply to the liquidators—unity of the working class is a great principle. But, really, you make yourselves ridiculous if, while shouting about "unity", you try to impose on the working class the platform and the candidates of a group of liberal liquidationist intellectuals.

Pravda has proved by means of *accurate* figures that "liquidationism is nothing in the working-class movement, and that it is strong only among the liberal intelligentsia" (*Pravda* No. 80, August 1, 1912*). *Nevsky Golos* No. 7, of August 17, now reviles those articles of *Pravda*, calling them "feuilleton-like", "Khlestakovian", and so on. And yet it does not even try to question the simple fact that in the course of six months *Pravda* drew *504* contributions from groups of workers, while the liquidationist papers drew only *15*.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from this but that all the shouting and noise and abuse and clamour about unity are merely intended to cover up the extreme and total impotence of the liquidators within the working class?

No matter how much *Nevsky Golos* may abuse us, we shall calmly point out the incontrovertible facts to the workers. Look at the collections listed in *Nevsky Golos* No. 7, and at those made in July and August "to replenish the funds

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* See pp. 196-200 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the newspaper" (i.e., in plain language, to restore the liquidationist paper suspended for lack of support from the mass of the workers). The report on those collections lists 52 contributions totalling 827.11 rubles. Of these, only two were group collections: one by "*the Moscow initiating group*", amounting to 35 rubles, and the other by a "*group of friends in Paris*"—8.54 rubles. Of the remaining 50 individual contributions, 35 added up to 708 rubles, i.e., o*ver 20 rubles per contribution on the average*.

Nevsky Golos may fume and abuse—the facts will be no less true for that. It is common knowledge that the "initiating groups" are groups of liquidators who have *broken away* from the working-class party. Even Plekhanov admitted this openly and plainly as long ago as April 1912.

A group of break-away liquidators has resumed—with the donations of bourgeois liberal intellectuals—the publication of its newspaper to fight the working-class press! And yet this group is shouting about "unity". Now how can anyone help laughing at that?

Pravda No. 99, August 24, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A TALK ON "CADET-EATING"

Pravda and *Nevskaya Zvezda* have administered a stern but well-deserved rebuttal to Messrs. Blank, Korobka, Kuskova and Co. for their foul liberal attacks against the working-class press.

Nevertheless, however good the answers given to "the gentlemen boycotting the workers" may have been, there is still a most important question of principle to be examined. The Blanks and Kuskovas sought by their crude lies to hush it up, to obscure it. But we must not allow questions of principle to be obscured; we must reveal their full significance, bringing to light the roots of the differences, which are of interest to every class-conscious worker, from beneath the heap of Blank-Kuskova distortions, calumnies and abuse.

One of these roots may be described by the term "Cadet-eating". Listen to the solitary but persistent voices of the liquidators, to the remarks of people whose party views are somewhat indefinite, and you will often encounter, if not an accusation against *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*, at least head-shaking on account of their "Cadet-eating".

Let us, therefore, examine the question of "Cadet-eating", which is a question of principle.

There are two circumstances which explain first of all, and most of all, the occurrence of such an accusation against *Pravda*: (1) failure to understand the essence of the question of "two and three camps" in the election campaign and in present-day politics in general; (2) lack of consideration for the special conditions in which the Marxist press—the newspapers of the worker democrats—has now been placed.

Let us begin with the first question.

All the liberals adhere to the theory of two camps: *for* a constitution and *against* a constitution. They are all agreed on this, from Milyukov to Izgoyev, and from Prokopovich to M. M. Kovalevsky. Nor must we forget that the theory of two camps necessarily follows from the *class nature* of our liberals.

What is this nature from the economic point of view? It is the fact that the liberals are a party of the bourgeoisie, which is afraid of the movement of the peasant masses, and still more of the workers' movement, for this movement is capable of *limiting* (at present, in the immediate future, without changing the capitalist system as a whole) the extent and forms of the bourgeoisie's *economic* privileges. And the economic privilege of the bourgeoisie is ownership of capital, an ownership which in Russia yields twice or three times as much profit as in Europe.

To uphold this "Russian" superprofit, it is necessary to prevent the third camp from gaining independence.

For example, the bourgeoisie can rule quite well even if the working day is eight hours. In fact, its rule will then be fuller, purer, wider and freer than with a ten- or eleven-hour day. But the dialectics of the class struggle are such that, unless there is an extreme need, unless it is the last remedy, the bourgeoisie will never replace the tranquil, habitual, profitable (from an Oblomov[127] point of view) ten-hour day by an eight-hour one.

What we have said about an eight-hour day applies to the upper chamber, to landlordism and many other things.

The bourgeoisie will not relinquish the tranquil, convenient, profitable, old-Russian forms of exploitation to replace them *only* by European, *only* by democratic forms (for democracy, let it be said without offence to the ardent heroes of *Zavety*, is *also* a form of bourgeois rule); it will not do so, we say, unless there is an extreme need, and unless it is the last remedy.

This need can arise only from the movement of the masses achieving a certain system and strength. And the bourgeoisie, which upholds its economic interests, is fighting against this movement, *that is to say*, against the independence of the third camp.

What is the class nature of liberalism from the political point of view? It is fear of the movement of these same social elements, for that movement is capable of undermining political privileges which the bourgeoisie values. Liberalism dreads democracy more than reaction. This was proved in 1905, 1906 and 1907.

To retain *any part* of the political privileges, it is necessary to prevent the independence of the third camp, to keep *all* opposition in *none but* the position expressed by the formula "*for* or *against* a constitution".

This formula expresses an *exclusively* constitutional position. It does *not go beyond* constitutional reforms. The essence of this formula was excellently and accurately expressed by Mr. Gredeskul—who inadvertently blurted out more than he had meant to—in those statements of his which *Rech* repeated without a single reservation and which *Pravda* reproduced not long ago.*

The essence of this formula is quite in the spirit of *Vekhi*, for *Vekhi* wants nothing better and has, in fact, never preached anything else. *Vekhi* is not at all against a constitution or constitutional reforms. It is "*only*" against the democrats, with their criticism of any sort of constitutional illusions.

The Russian liberals have proved to be sufficiently "adroit" politicians to call themselves "democratic" with a view to fighting the democrats and suppressing the latter's independence. Such is the usual and normal method used by every liberal bourgeoisie in all capitalist countries: deceiving the masses with a democratic facade in order to *deflect* them from a truly democratic theory and truly democratic practice.

But the experience of all countries, including Russia, has shown beyond question that only such practice is capable of ensuring real progress, whereas liberalism inevitably dooms itself to impotence by its fear of democracy, and its *Vekhi*-Gredeskul theories: the impotence of Russian liberalism in 1861-1904, and of German liberalism in 1849-1912.

The third camp, that of democracy, which understands the narrowness of liberalism and is free from its half-hearted-

* See pp. 254-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ness and flabbiness, from its vacillation and timid backward looks, cannot take shape, cannot exist, without systematic, undeviating, day-by-day criticism of liberalism.

Those who scornfully or with ill-will dub this criticism "Cadet-eating" are thereby advocating precisely *liberal* views—deliberately or unwittingly. For, in practice, *all* criticism of Cadetism is *thereby*, by its very presentation of questions, a criticism of reaction, of the Rights. Our polemic against the liberals, said *Nevskaya Zvezda* (No. 12)* very justly, "is *more profound and richer in content* than the fight against the Rights".**

In reality there is hardly one Marxist newspaper for every hundred liberal papers in Russia, so that it is simply ridiculous to talk about our "exaggerated" criticism of the Cadets: we are not yet doing even one-hundredth of what is necessary in order that the sentiment of "general opposition" prevailing in society and among the people may be replaced by an anti-liberal, definitely and consciously democratic sentiment.

Without such a "replacement", nothing sensible and useful has ever come about, or will come about in Russia.

Accusations of "Cadet-eating", or scornful smiles at "Cadet-eating", are no more than a *façon de parler*, a way of advocating liberal views, or the views of a liberal labour policy when there is a discussion before or about workers.

From the standpoint of liquidationism that is at all consistent and thought out, accusations of "Cadet-eating" are understandable and *necessary*. They express the essence of liquidationism.

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* See pp. 124-26 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** *Rech* objects to this, saying: if that is so, why do the Rights sympathetically *quote Pravda* against *Rech*? *Rech* makes an overstatement here: if the Rights were to give *Pravda* more *freedom* than to *Rech*, it would be a forcible argument against the Social-Democrats. But everyone knows that the reverse is the case. Our press has a hundred times less freedom than *Rech*; it is a thousand times less firmly established and enjoys 10,000 times less "constitutional" protection. Any literate person realises that *Rossiya and Novoye Vremya* are *teasing Rech* with *Pravda* and that, moreover, they are strangling *Pravda* while merely grumbling at or chiding *Rech*. These are two entirely different things.

Look at the liquidationist views as a whole—at their inner logic, at their interconnection and the interdependence of the various theses: "freedom of association" is a constitutional reform; economic strikes are supplemented with a "political *revival*", no more; a far-reaching election platform is declared to be "lunacy"; the task is formulated as one of fighting for the open existence of the *Party*, i.e., is also formulated as a constitutional reform; the regime in Russia is declared to be bourgeois *already* (Larin); the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie is declared to be already a ruling class; the workers are told that it is "sufficient" to seize on the contradiction between absolutism and constitutionalism (Martov).

Taken as a whole, this is *reformism*, it is the system of views of a liberal labour policy. It makes no difference at all that some Ivan or Pyotr, in defending these views (*some part or other of them*, for liquidationism is going through a "process of growth of growing tasks"), *himself* thinks he is a Marxist.

The point at issue is not their good intentions (of those who have any), but the objective significance of their policy, i.e., what its results are, *cui prodest*—whom it benefits, to whose mill it actually brings grist.

This is defence of the workers' interests *on the basis* provided by the "struggle" (or is it bickering?) between the *liberals* and the Rights; it is not a struggle *for* a democratic, anti-liberal *basis* of sapping the strength of the Rights. The liquidators are supporters of the workers, there is no doubt of that. But they *understand* the interests of the workers in such a way that they uphold these interests *within the framework of the* Russia which the liberals promise to build, not of the Russia which the *democrats* were building yesterday, and will be building tomorrow (and which they are invisibly building even today), *in spite of* the liberals.

That is the crux of the matter. So far there is no new Russia. It has yet to be built. Should the workers build themselves a nest of a "class" (in effect a craft) nature in the Russia of the kind which the Milyukovs are building in common with the Purishkeviches, or should the workers *themselves*, in their own way, build a new Russia entirely without the Purishkeviches and in spite of the Milyukovs?

That new Russia will in any case be bourgeois, but there is quite a big difference between the bourgeois (agrarian and non-agrarian) policy of Stolypin and the *bourgeois* policy of Sun Yat-sen.

The chief feature of the present epoch in Russia is determination of the size of that difference.

"In spite of the Milyukovs", we said. It is this "in spite of" that is "Cadet-eating". That is why, being unafraid of words, we remain, and shall remain, "*Cadet-eaters*" *as a matter of principle*, without forgetting for one moment the special tasks of the working class, *both* against Milyukov and against Sun Yat-sen.

The accusation of "Cadet-eating" is merely a longing (whether conscious or unconscious, makes no difference) to see the workers, in building a new Russia, trail after the Milyukovs and not show the way to our own little Sun Yat-sens in spite of the Milyukovs.

It remains for us to say a few words about a second circumstance, which those who talk about "Cadet-eating" overlook.

It is said: why cannot we develop our views *constructively*? Why engage in excessive *polemics*? Those who say that argue, as it were, in the following way: we are not against a special line entirely different from the Cadet line, nor are we against three camps; we are only against the "substitution of polemics for politics", to use the biting phrase of a friend of the liquidators.

It is easy to answer those who talk like that: in the first place, one cannot develop new views other than through polemics (and Marxist views are new, both as regards the time of their emergence and the extent to which they have spread, in comparison with liberal views). Secondly, the arena in which *Nevskaya Zvezda* and *Pravda* are operating, is an arena of *purely theoretical* Marxist propaganda. It would be wrong to regard this arena as something more: it is *only* a theoretical ABC, a theoretical first step, an indication of the direction of the work, but not yet the work itself.

In this arena, Marxists cannot present their practical conclusions in a "constructive" form, for "reasons beyond our control". It would therefore be a *liquidationist* error to

exaggerate the importance of this arena. The most that can be done here is to indicate the *direction*, and that *only* in the form of a criticism of the Cadets.

Novoye Vremya and *Zemshchina*,[128] in *teasing* the Cadets, draw a picture of the Cadets being *eaten*, and that is all. *Rech*, for obvious reasons, *pretends* to accept this "interpretation". The Korobkas and Kuskovas make the same pretence—some from sheer stupidity, and others from sheer "pro-Cadet flunkeyism".

But every politically literate person sees very well that Marxist "Cadet-eating", on absolutely *every* point of its criticism of the Cadets, indicates the *direction* of a *different* "opposition", if I may use this unsuitable term.

When "eating" a Cadet because of Karaulov's "pious" speeches, a Marxist is not in a position to develop his point of view constructively. But any literate person understands that democracy cannot remain true to the name if it is pious.

When "eating" a Cadet because of Gredeskul's speeches, a Marxist is not in a position to develop his point of view constructively. But any literate person realises that democracy cannot remain true to the name if it shares Gredeskul's views.

When a Marxist—but we should never finish if we undertook to list in this manner all the questions and points of our "Cadet-eating". The two examples are enough to make our thesis on the *second* circumstance perfectly clear: *accusations of Cadet-eating are a form of expressing the philistine, harmful, bad prejudice that a certain arena is an adequate arena.*

We shall remain "Cadet-eaters", incidentally with the very aim of combating that harmful prejudice.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 23,
August 26, 1912
Signed: *K. S.—y*

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE WORKERS AND PRAVDA

Pravda has already summed up some of the results of its six months' work.

These results showed first of all and above all that *only* through the efforts of the workers themselves, *only* through the tremendous upsurge of their enthusiasm, their resolve and stubbornness in the struggle, and *only* after the April-May movement, was it possible for the St. Petersburg workers' newspaper, *Pravda*, to appear.

In its summing up, *Pravda* confined itself for a start to the data on group donations made by workers to their daily newspaper. These data reveal to us only a *small part* of the workers' support; they do not tell us about the much more valuable and difficult direct support—moral support, support through personal participation, support for the policy of the newspaper, support through contributing materials, discussing and circulating the paper, etc.

But even the limited data at the disposal of *Pravda* showed that a very impressive number of workers' groups had *directly* linked themselves with it. Let us cast a general glance at the results.

Number of contributions to Pravda *made by groups of workers*

January 1912	14
February "	18
March "	76
April "	227
May "	135
June "	34
July "	26
August (up to 19th) 1912	21
Total	551

Altogether *five hundred and fifty-one* groups of workers supported *Pravda* by their donations.

It would be interesting to sum up the results of a whole number of other collections and donations by workers. We have constantly seen in *Pravda* reports on contributions in support of various strikes. We have also seen reports on collections for the victims of repressions, for the Lena goldfields victims, for individual *Pravda* editors, collections for the election campaign, for relief of the famine-stricken, and so on and so forth.

The varied nature of these collections makes it much more difficult to assess the results here, and we are not yet in a position to say whether a statistical summary can give a satisfactory picture of the matter. But it is obvious in any case that these varied collections take up a very substantial part of the *workers' life*.

As they look through the reports on workers' collections *in connection* with letters from factory and office workers in all parts of Russia, *Pravda* readers, most of whom are dispersed and separated from one another by the severe external conditions of Russian life, gain *some* idea how the proletarians of various trades and various localities are fighting, how they are awakening to the defence of working-class democracy.

The chronicle of workers' life is only just *beginning* to develop into a permanent feature of *Pravda*. There can be no doubt that subsequently, in addition to letters about abuses in factories, about the awakening of a new section of the proletariat, about collections for one or another field of the workers' cause, the workers' newspaper will receive reports about the views and sentiments of the workers, election campaigns, the election of workers' delegates, what the workers read, the questions of particular interest to them, and so on.

The workers' newspaper is a workers' forum. Before the whole of Russia the workers should raise here, one after another, the various questions of workers' life in general and of working-class democracy in particular. The workers of St. Petersburg have made a beginning. It is to their energy that the proletariat of Russia owes the workers' first daily newspaper after the grim years of social stagnation. Let us,

then, carry their cause forward, unitedly supporting and developing the workers' paper of the capital, the harbinger of the spring to come, when the whole of Russia will be covered by a network of workers' organisations with workers' newspapers.

We, the workers, *have yet* to build *this* Russia, and we *shall build* it.

Pravda No. 103, August 29, 1912
Signed: *St.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

BEFORE AND NOW

Eighteen years ago, in 1894, the working-class movement in St. Petersburg was just being born in its modern mass form illumined by the light of the Marxist teaching.

The seventies had affected a quite insignificant top section of the working class. The foremost representatives of the working class revealed themselves even then as great leaders of the workers' democratic movement, but the masses were still slumbering. Only in the early nineties did *they* begin to awaken, and at the same time there began a new and more glorious period in the history of the entire democratic movement in Russia.

Unfortunately, we must confine ourselves here, in our small parallel, to one aspect of one manifestation of the working-class movement, namely, the economic struggle and economic "exposures".

At that time, in 1894, a very few circles of the foremost workers were heatedly discussing plans for organising factory exposures. A weighty statement by the workers themselves, addressed to their fellow-workers and pointing out the more glaring abuses of power by capital, was an exceedingly rare occurrence at the time. Speaking of such things publicly was out of the question.

But the awakening mass of the workers was able to take up the factory exposures addressed to it, despite all difficulties and in the face of all obstacles. The strike movement was growing, and the *connection* between the economic struggle of the working class and other, higher forms of struggle was developing irresistibly. The vanguard of Russia s democratic movement was awakening, and *ten* years

later it showed itself in its full stature. It is to this force alone that Russia owes the rupture of the old shell.

Those who recall the first factory exposures which the advanced workers of St. Petersburg addressed to the masses in 1894 will find it most interesting and instructive to compare them with the factory exposures made by *Pravda*. This little comparison of one manifestation of the workers' struggle clearly shows the growth of its *entire* scope, its breadth and depth, its strength, etc.

At that time there were a mere five or six factory exposures, secretly circulated by workers in several dozen copies.

Today there are tens of thousands of copies of the daily *Pravda*, each making several exposures relating to the most diverse fields of labour.

At that time there were a mere five or six so-called "circles", which discussed—in secret, of course—the state of affairs in the factories, with some Marxist intellectual or other participating, and decided on the subject of the points to be "published".

Today there are hundreds and thousands of workers' groups springing up spontaneously, discussing their vital needs and taking their letters, their exposures, their appeals for resistance and unity, to *Pravda* of their own accord.

In a matter of eighteen years, the workers have advanced from the first signs of activity, from a most timid beginning, to a movement that is a *mass* movement in the most exact sense of the term.

We must unfortunately limit ourselves *only* to parallels of factory exposures. But they, too, show the great path travelled, and the goal to which this path leads.

Eighteen years are a short span in the history of a whole class which is destined to accomplish the greatest task in the world—the emancipation of mankind.

The greater part of this path has been travelled in the dark. But now the road has been reached. Forward with courage and determination!

Pravda No. 104, August 30, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JUDGES

The First World Congress of Judges is now in session in Vienna, and so is the Thirty-First Congress of German Lawyers.

The speeches of the high-ranking delegates are dominated by an extremely reactionary spirit. The bourgeois lawyers and judges have launched a campaign against the participation of the people in legal procedure.

Two principal forms of such participation are customary in the modern states: (1) the jury, which decides only the question of culpability, while the punishment to be meted out is determined and the procedure directed only by judges of the crown; (2) the court of assessors, who, like our own "social-estate representatives", participate in the decision of *all* questions on a par with the judges of the crown.

And so, the "enlightened" judges of constitutional states are fulminating against all participation of people's representatives in legal procedure. One of the delegates, Elsner, inveighing against the jury and the court of assessors, which he said led to "anarchy in the application of laws", defended instead the principle of the *irremovability* of judges.

We shall remark in this connection that a liberal demand is being put forward here instead of a democratic one and as a disguise for a complete departure from democracy. The participation of people's representatives in a court of justice is undoubtedly a democratic principle. The consistent application of this principle requires, in the first place, that the election of jurors should not be made conditional on *qualifications*, i.e., the right to be chosen should not be restricted by educational, property, residential or any other conditions.

At present, because of the exclusion of workers, most of the jurors are often particularly reactionary petty bourgeois. This evil should be remedied by developing democracy to its consistent and integral form, and not by basely repudiating democracy. It is well known that the election of judges by the people is recognised in all civilised countries as the second condition for consistent democracy in the judicial system.

The irremovability of judges, however, which the liberal bourgeois in general and those of Russia in particular make so much of, is no more than a *division* of medieval privileges between the Purishkeviches and the Milyukovs, between the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie. In *reality* it is impossible fully to put irremovability into practice, and indeed, it is absurd to defend it with regard to unfit, careless, bad judges. In the Middle Ages, judges were appointed exclusively by feudal lords and absolute monarchs. The bourgeoisie, which has now obtained ample access to the judiciary, is *defending itself* against the feudal lords by means of the "principle of irremovability" (for most of the appointed judges will necessarily be—since most of the "educated" lawyers belong to the bourgeoisie—people of bourgeois origin). By defending itself in this way *against the feudal lords*, the bourgeoisie at the same time defends itself *against the democrats* by upholding the principle of the appointment of judges.

It is interesting to note, furthermore, the following passages in a speech by Dr. Ginsberg, a judge from Dresden. He enlarged on *class justice*, i.e., on the manifestations of class oppression and the class struggle in modern legal procedure.

> "Anyone who imagines that the participation of people's representatives in legal proceedings removes class justice is sorely mistaken," exclaimed Dr. Ginsberg.

Quite so, Your Honour! Democracy in general does not remove the class struggle but merely makes it more conscious, freer and more open. But this is no argument against democracy. It is an argument in favour of its consistent development all the way through.

"Class justice no doubt exists in reality," continued the judge from Saxony (and Saxon judges have made a name for themselves in Germany by their ferocious sentences against workers), "but not at all in the Social-Democratic sense, not in the sense of preference given to the rich as against the poor. On the contrary, class justice exists precisely in the reverse sense. Once I had the following case. There were three of us judging—two assessors and myself. One of them was an overt Social-Democrat and the other something of the sort. The defendant was a striker who had thrashed a blackleg ['a worker willing to work'—to quote the exact words used by the Saxon judge], seized him by the throat and shouted: 'We've got you at last, you damned scoundrel!'

"Normally this entails from four to six months imprisonment which is the least punishment that should be meted out for deeds as savage as that. And yet I had the greatest difficulty in preventing the acquittal of the defendant. One assessor, the Social-Democrat said that I didn't understand the psychology of the workers. But I told him that I understood very well the psychology of the beaten man."

The German papers which carried the text of Judge Ginsberg's speech inserted "*Laughter*" at the end of the above passage. The lawyers and judges laughed. To tell the truth, had we chanced to hear that Saxon judge, we, too, should have burst out laughing.

The doctrine of the class struggle is something against which one can conceivably make an effort to argue in terms of (would-be) science. But one has only to approach the matter from a practical standpoint, to look closely at everyday realities, and behold! the most violent opponent of this doctrine can prove to be as gifted an advocate of the class struggle as the Saxon judge, Herr Ginsberg.

Pravda No. 104, August 30, 1912
Signed: *I. V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

IN SWITZERLAND

In *Pravda* No. 63, on July 12,* we told the reader about the general strike in Zurich on June 29 (July 12, new style). It may be recalled that the strike was decided *in defiance of* the leaders of political organisations. The meeting of 425 representatives of all the workers' organisations of Zurich, which declared for the strike, greeted the statement of the printers, who were against the strike, with shouts of "*Shame!*"

By now the press has published data exposing that opportunism.

It appears that the political leaders of the Swiss workers in their opportunism have gone so far as direct *betrayal of the Party*. It is this scathing but justified phrase that the best organs of the Swiss and German working-class press use in describing the conduct of the Social-Democratic members of the Zurich Magistracy (Town Council). The Zurich Town Council, *defending the capitalists*, prohibited strike picketing (and then the workers decided to protest by a one-day general strike).

There are nine members on the Zurich Magistracy, including four Social-Democrats—Erismann, Pflüger, Fogelsanger and Klöti.

And now it has become known that the prohibition of picketing was decided on by the Town Council *unanimously*, that is to say, Erismann and his three Social-Democratic colleagues voted *for* it!!! The Zurich Cantonal Government

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* See pp. 160-62 of this volume.—*Ed*.

had insisted that the Town Council should prohibit all picketing, but the four sapient minnows,[129] that is, Zurich Social-Democrats, made a "*compromise*" proposal to prohibit picketing only in the area of the two mechanical shops where work had been stopped.

Of course, it was just this partial prohibition of picketing that the bourgeoisie was demanding, and the "Social-Democrats'" (?!) proposal was adopted by the bourgeois majority of the Town Council!

What is more, the Zurich Town Council recently published an account of the events occasioned by the general strike. The capitalists declared a three-day lock-out by way of revenge. The Zurich Town Council decided *unanimously*, with *all its four* Social-Democratic members participating, that it was necessary to *call in troops* to reinforce the police in maintaining public order.

Nor is that all. The bourgeois Town Council of Zurich furiously attacked, by a series of repressive measures, those manual and office workers in the town's establishments who had joined in the strike. It sacked 13 workers and imposed disciplinary punishments (demotion, pay cuts) on another 116. These decisions of the Town Council were likewise adopted *unanimously*, with Erismann and his two colleagues participating.

The conduct of Erismann and Co. can only be described as betrayal of the Party.

It is not surprising that the anarcho-syndicalists enjoy a certain success in Switzerland, since it falls to them to criticise before the workers a socialist party which tolerates such opportunist traitors in its ranks. The reason why the treachery of Erismann and Co. is of major international significance is that it shows us *clearly from what quarter* and *in what manner* the working-class movement is threatened with *internal* corruption.

Erismann and Co. are by no means common deserters to the enemy camp; they are simply peaceful petty bourgeois, opportunists who are accustomed to parliamentary "vermicelli" and who have succumbed to constitutional democratic illusions. The moment the class struggle took a sharp turn, all illusions about constitutional "order" and a "democratic republic" were dispelled at once, and our philistines holding

the office of Social-Democratic members of the Town Council lost their heads and slid into the marsh.

Class-conscious workers can see from this sad example the consequences which the spread of opportunism in a workers' party is *bound* to have.

Pravda No. 105, August 31, 1912
Signed: *P. P.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE PRIESTHOOD AND POLITICS

As is known, the most desperate efforts are being made at present to *arouse* the entire priesthood for the elections to the Fourth Duma and to organise it as a solid Black-Hundred force.

It is most instructive to see that the *whole* Russian bourgeoisie—governmental, Octobrist, and oppositional Cadet alike—with equal zeal and agitation is exposing and condemning these plans of the government.

The Russian merchant and the Russian liberal landlord (or rather the landlord playing the liberal) fear the strengthening of an irresponsible government which desires to "cull" for itself the votes of obedient priests. It goes without saying that the democrats' opposition (to use a mild and inexact term) on this point is far more resolute than that of the liberals.

We have already pointed out in *Pravda* the undemocratic approach to the question of the priesthood by the liberals, who either frankly defend the arch-reactionary theory of "non-interference" of the priesthood in politics, or reconcile themselves to this theory.*

A democrat is absolutely hostile to the slightest *falsification* of suffrage and elections, but he is absolutely *in favour* of the widest masses of any priesthood being directly and openly drawn into politics. Non-participation of the priesthood in the political struggle is the most harmful hypocrisy. In reality the priesthood has *always* participated in politics covertly, and the people would only benefit if it were to pass to overt politics.

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* See pp. 227-28 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Of outstanding interest in this respect is the article published in *Rech* a few days ago by Bishop Mikhail, an adherent of the old rites.[130] That writer's views are very naïve. He is under the impression, for example, that "clericalism is unknown [to us] in Russia", that prior to the revolution it (the priesthood) concerned itself only with heavenly matters, and so on.

But the instructive thing is the actual appraisal of events by this apparently informed man.

"It seems indisputable to me that the triumph of the elections will not be a triumph of clericalism," wrote Bishop Mikhail. "United, if artificially, and at the same time, of course, offended by this lording it over their votes and their conscience, the priesthood will see themselves standing between two forces.... Hence the need of a radical change, a crisis, a return to a natural alliance with the people. If the clerical and reactionary trend ... succeeded in growing strong and maturing by itself, this perhaps would not come about. Now that the priesthood has been roused from its quiescence while still with remnants of its former confusion, it will continue its history. And the democracy of the priesthood is the inevitable and closing stage of this history, which will be linked to the priesthood's struggle in its own behalf."

Actually it should be a question of a distribution between the contending classes, and not of "a return to a natural alliance", as the author naïvely believes. If the priesthood is drawn into politics, this distribution will certainly gain in clarity, breadth and political consciousness.

As for the fact that informed observers acknowledge the existence, vitality and force of the "remnants of the former confusion" even in such a social stratum of Russia as the priesthood, it is well worth putting on record.

Pravda No. 106, September 1, 1912
Signed: *I. V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

YET ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN

That ill-famed publication, *Vekhi*, which was a tremendous success in liberal-bourgeois society, a society thoroughly imbued with renegade tendencies, was not adequately countered, nor appraised deeply enough, in the democratic camp.

This was partly due to the fact that the success of *Vekhi* occurred at a time of almost complete suppression of the "open" democratic press.

Now Mr. Shchepetev comes forward in *Russkaya Mysl*[131] (August) with a refurbished edition of *Vekhi* ideas. This is perfectly natural on the part of a *Vekhi* organ edited by Mr. P. B. Struve, leader of the renegades. But it will he just as natural for the democrats, particularly the worker democrats, to make up now for at least a little of what they owe the *Vekhi* people.

I

Mr. Shchepetev's utterances take the form of a modest "Letter from France"—*about the Russians in Paris*. But behind this modest form there is actually a very definite "discussion" of the Russian revolution of 1905 and the Russian democracy.

"That disturbing [Oh! Disturbing *to whom*, esteemed liberal?], troubled and thoroughly confused year 1905 is fresh in everyone's memory...."

"Troubled and thoroughly confused"! What dirt and dregs a person must have in his soul to he able to write like that! The German opponents of the revolution of 1848 called that year the "crazy" year. The same idea, or rather the same

dull, base fright, is expressed by the Russian Cadet writing in *Russkaya Mysl*.

We shall counter him only with a few facts, the most objective and most "unpretentious" ones. That year wages were rising as they had never done before. Land rent was dropping. All forms of association of workers, including even domestic servants, were making unprecedented progress. Millions of inexpensive publications on political subjects were being read by the people, the masses, the crowd, the "lower ranks", as avidly as no one had ever read in Russia until then.

Nekrasov exclaimed, in times long past:

Ah, will there ever be a time
(Come soon, come soon, O longed-for day!)
When people will not buy the books
Of Blücher or some silly lord,
But Gogol and Belinsky's works
From market stalls bring home.[132]

The "time" longed for by one of the old Russian democrats came. Merchants stopped dealing in oats and engaged in more profitable business—the sale of inexpensive democratic pamphlets. Democratic books became goods for the *market*. The ideas of Belinsky and Gogol—which endeared these authors to Nekrasov, as indeed to any decent person in Russia—ran through the whole of that new market literature.

How "troublesome"! cried the liberal pig, which deems itself educated, but in fact is dirty, repulsive, overfat and smug, when *in actual fact* it saw the "people" bringing home from the market—Belinsky's letter to Gogol.[133]

And, strictly speaking, it is, after all, a letter from an "intellectual", announced *Vekhi*, to thunderous applause from Rozanov of *Novoye Vremya* and from Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia.

What a disgraceful sight! a democrat from among the best Narodniks will say. What an instructive sight! we will add. How it sobers up those who took a *sentimental* view of democratic issues, how it *steels* all the living and strong democratic elements, mercilessly sweeping aside the rotten illusions of the Oblomov-minded!

It is very useful for anyone who has ever been enchanted with liberalism to be disenchanted with it. And he who wishes to recall the early history of Russian liberalism will certainly see in the liberal Kavelin's attitude towards the democrat Chernyshevsky the exact prototype of the attitude adopted by the Cadet *Party* of the liberal bourgeoisie towards the Russian democratic *movement of the masses*. The liberal bourgeoisie in Russia has "found itself" or rather its tail. Is it not time the democrats in Russia found their head?

It is particularly intolerable to see individuals like Shchepetev, Struve, Gredeskul, Izgoyev and the rest of the Cadet fraternity clutching at the coat-tails of Nekrasov, Shchedrin and others. Nekrasov, who was weak as a person wavered between Chernyshevsky and the liberals, but all his sympathy went to Chernyshevsky. Out of the very same personal weakness, Nekrasov occasionally sounded the false note of liberal servility, but he himself bitterly deplored his "falsity" and *repented* of it in *public*:

I never sold my lyre, although at times,
When pressed by unrelenting fate
False notes would sound among my rhymes.

"*False notes*" is what Nekrasov himself called the liberal servility he was occasionally guilty of. As for Shchedrin he mocked mercilessly at the liberals, whom he branded for ever by the formula "conformably to villainy".[134]

How outdated this formula is as applied to Shchepetev, Gredeskul and the other* *Vekhi* people! The point now is by no means that these gentlemen must *conform* to villainy. Not by a long shot! They have created *their own theory* of "villainy" on their own initiative and in their own fashion proceeding from Neo-Kantianism and other fashionable European" theories.

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* The objection will probably be raised that Gredeskul, as well as Milyukov and Co., *argued* with *Vekhi*. So they did, but they *remained* Vekhists for all that. See, inter alia, *Pravda* No. 85. (See pp. 254-55 of this volume.—*Ed*.

II

"The thoroughly confused year 1905," writes Mr. Shchepetev. "Everything was mixed up and tangled in the general confusion and muddle."

On this point, too, we can raise only a few theoretical objections. We believe that historical events should be judged by the movements of the *masses* and of classes as a whole, not by the moods of individuals or small groups.

The overwhelming majority of Russia's population consists of peasants and workers. What indication is there of a "general confusion and muddle" among this majority of the population? Quite On the contrary, the objective facts testify irrefutably that it was among the mass of the population that a sorting out unprecedented in breadth and effectiveness was going on, a sorting out which *for ever* did away with "confusion and muddle".

Until then, the elements of patriarchal oppression and those of democracy had really been "confused and mixed up" among the "common people", making up a "general muddle". Evidence of this is to be found in such objective facts as that Zubatovism[135] and the "Gaponiad" proved possible.

It was the year 1905 that for ever put an end to that "muddle". No previous epoch in Russian history had *untangled* with such extreme clarity, by deeds not by words, relations tangled by age-long stagnation and age-old survivals of serfdom. In no other epoch had so distinctly and "efficiently" the *classes* become demarcated, the attitude of the *mass* of the population defined, and the theories and programmes of the "intellectuals" tested by the *actions* of millions.

How was it, then, that indisputable historical facts could be so greatly distorted in the mind of the educated and liberal writer of *Russkaya Mysl*? The explanation is very simple: this *Vekhi* spokesman seeks to impose his subjective sentiments on the whole people. He himself and his entire group—the liberal-bourgeois intelligentsia—found themselves at that time in a particularly "muddled", "thoroughly confused", position. And the liberal shifts his discontent—a natural result of this muddle and of the fact that the masses had exposed the utter worthlessness of liberalism—

to the *masses*, thus laying his own fault at someone else's door.

Indeed, was not the liberals' position a muddled one in June 1905? Or after August 6, when they called for participation in the Bulygin Duma but the people went *in fact* past and beyond the Duma? Or in October 1905, when the liberals had to "trail along behind" and call the strike "glorious" although only the day before they had fought against it? Or in November 1905, when the pitiful impotence of liberalism fully came to light, being demonstrated by so striking a fact as Struve's visit to Witte?

If the Vekhist Shchepetev cares to read the Vekhist Izgoyev's little book about Stolypin, he will see that Izgoyev *had* to admit that "muddle" in the Cadets' position "between two fires" in the First and Second Dumas. And this "muddle" and impotence of liberalism were an inevitable development, for the liberals had no *mass* support either among the bourgeoisie above or among the peasantry below.

Mr. Shchepetev closes his argument on the history of the Russian revolution with the following gem:

> "However, all that muddle was very short-lived. The upper ranks freed themselves little by little from the almost panic terror that had gripped them and, having arrived at the fairly simple conclusion that a good company of soldiers was more effective than all revolutionary verbiage, equipped 'punitive expeditions' and set rapid-firing justice into motion. The results exceeded all expectations. In a matter of two or three years, the revolution was destroyed and eradicated to such an extent that certain security institutions were compelled to stage it in some places...."

While we could provide at least some theoretical commentary for the author's previous discourses, now we have not even this possibility. We must confine ourselves to fastening this glorious discourse to the pillory in as high a position as possible, so that it can be seen for as long a time and from as far off as possible.

However, we can also ask the reader: is it surprising that the Octobrist *Golos Moskvy*, as well as the nationalist Judas-like[136] *Novoye Vremya*, quoted Shchepetev with the greatest delight? In fact, what is the difference between the "historical" appraisal given by the "Constitutional-Democratic" magazine and that given by the above-mentioned two publications?

III

Mr. Shchepetev devotes most space to sketches of life in exile. To find an analogy of these sketches, one would have to dig up *Russky Vestnik*[137] of Katkov's day and take from it novels portraying high-minded Marshals of the Nobility, good-natured and contented muzhiks, and disgruntled brutes, scoundrels and monsters called revolutionaries.

Mr. Shchepetev has observed Paris (assuming that he has) with the eyes of a philistine embittered against the democratic movement, who could see nothing but "unrest" in the appearance in Russia of the first democratic pamphlets for the masses.

It is known that everyone sees abroad what he chooses to. Or, in other words, everyone sees in new conditions *his own self*. A member of the Black Hundreds sees abroad splendid landlords, generals and diplomats. A secret police agent sees there the noblest policemen. A liberal Russian renegade sees in Paris well-meaning concierges and "efficient"* shopkeepers who teach the Russian revolutionary that among them "humanitarian and altruistic sentiments had too much suppressed personal requirements, often to the detriment of the general progress and cultural advancement of the whole of our country".**

A lackey in spirit is naturally keen above all else on the gossip and petty scandals prevailing in the servants' room. It goes without saying that a shopkeeper or a lackey-minded concierge takes no notice of the ideological issues discussed at Paris meetings and in the Paris Russian-language press. How can he see, indeed, that this press raised, as early as 1908, for example, the very same questions concerning the social nature of the June Third regime, the class roots of the new trends among the democrats, and so on,*** as found their way much later, and in much narrower and more distorted (and curtailed) form, into the press "protected" by reinforced security measures?

Shopkeepers and lackeys, however "intellectual" the garb in which people with such a mentality array themselves,

* See Mr. Shchepetev's article, p. 139 (*Russkaya Mysl* No. 8, 1912).
** Ibid., p. 153.
*** See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 267-80.—*Ed.*

cannot notice and grasp these questions. If a particular lackey is called a "publicist" contributing to a liberal magazine, he, that "publicist", will pass over in complete silence the great ideological questions which are posed openly and clearly nowhere but in Paris. On the other hand, this "publicist" will tell you in detail all that is well known in the servants' rooms.

He, this noble Cadet, will tell you in the magazine of the most noble Mr. Struve, that a hapless emigrant-prostitute was evicted from "the flat of a very well-known woman revolutionary in Paris", "not without help from the police"; that the "unemployed" again made a row at a charity ball; that a copyist in a house familiar to Mr. Shchepetev "had rather a considerable sum of money advanced to him and then began to absent himself"; that the exiles "rise at noon and go to bed after 1 or 2 a.m., and there are visitors and noise and arguments and disorder all day long".

All this the lackey magazine of the Cadet Mr. Struve will tell you in detail and with illustrations, with gusto and spiced with pepper—just as well as Menshikov and Rozanov of *Novoye Vremya* do it.

> "Give me money or I'll punch you on the jaw—this is the unambiguously hostile form which the relations between the upper and lower ranks of the exiles have taken. True, this formula has not become widespread, and 'the extreme trend among the lower ranks' has become represented [this is how the educated Cadet writes in Mr. Struve's magazine!] by a mere couple of dozens of very doubtful elements that are perhaps even guided by a skilful hand from outside."

Pause at this statement, reader, and think of the difference between an ordinary lackey and a lackey-minded publicist. Ordinary lackeys—meaning the bulk, of course, which does not include those politically-conscious elements that have already adopted a class point of view and are seeking a way out of their lackey's position—are unsophisticated, uneducated, and often illiterate and ignorant; it is pardonable for them to have a naïve passion for relating whatever reaches them more easily than anything else, and is closest and clearest to them. Lackey-minded publicists, on the other hand, are "educated" persons who are well received in all the finest drawing-rooms. They are aware that the number of common blackmailers among the exiles is very insig-

nificant ("a couple of dozens" for *thousands* of exiles). They even realise that these blackmailers "are perhaps *guided*" by a "*skilful hand*"—from the tea-room of the Union of the Russian People.

And because he realises all this, the lackey-minded publicist operates as befits the "educated". He certainly knows how to cover up his tracks and make the most of his goods! He is not a venal hack of the Black Hundreds—nothing of the kind. He "*himself*" has even pointed out that *perhaps* someone is guiding the dozen or two of blackmailers, but at the same time it is *precisely* and *solely* those blackmailers rows and the absenteeism of copyists that he tells about!

The *Novoye Vremya* school for "*writers*" of *Russkaya Mysl* has not gone to waste. Suvorin of *Novoye Vremya* boasted that he had never received any subsidies—he *merely* "knew himself" how to hit the right tone.

Russkaya Mysl receives no subsidies—God forfend! It *merely* "knows itself" how to hit the right tone, a tone pleasing to the ear of the *Novoye Vremya* people and Guchkov's "stalwarts".

IV

Yes, there is much that is painful in the life of the exiles. It is exiles, and they alone, who in the years of social stagnation and lull raised major questions of principle concerning all Russian democrats. There is more poverty and want among them than elsewhere. The proportion of suicides is particularly great among them, and the proportion of those among them whose whole being is one bundle of sick nerves is incredibly, monstrously great. Indeed, how could things be different with tormented people?

Different people will take interest in different things when they find themselves among exiles. Some of them will be interested in the open discussion of major political questions of principle. Others will be interested in stories about a row at a ball, about an unscrupulous copyist, or about the distaste which concierges and shopkeepers have for the exiles' way of life. Everyone to his taste.

Nevertheless, when you experience all the hardships of a tormented, drab, morbidly nervous life in exile and think

of the life of the Shchepetevs, Struves, Golovins, Izgoyevs and Co., you cannot help saying: what an immense happiness not to belong to this society of "respectable people", to the society where these individuals are received and where people shake hands with them!

Probably, rows do not occur in this "respectable society". Prostitutes do not find themselves in the position of all but room-mates of these gentlemen. Oh, no. They stay in other quarters.

The unemployed raise no rows at dances arranged by these people. For those dances are perfectly decorous. They keep these things apart: the prostitutes (from among the unemployed) live in one flat, while the dances are held in another. And if they take on a copyist, they never allow any depravity, such as letting the copyist take his pay in advance and then dare to absent himself.

Rows over money are out of the question with them. Near them are no starving, tormented, unnerved people, ready to commit suicide. And if "the millions fraternise" today with "science" in the persons of Messrs. Struve and Co., tomorrow with the title of deputy in the persons of Messrs. Golovin and Co., and the day after with the titles of deputy and lawyer in the persons of Messrs. Maklakov and Co.[138]—where do rows come in here?

Those are all noble acts. If the writings of the Struves, Gredeskuls, Shchepetevs and Co. against the democrats give pleasure to the Ryabushinskys, etc., what is wrong with that? After all, Struve receives no subsidies—he "himself" hits the right tone! No one can say that *Russkaya Mysl* is a kept woman of the Ryabushinskys. It will occur to no one to compare the pleasure which the Ryabushinskys derive from certain "publicists" with the pleasure which serf girls gave the landlords in the old days by scratching their heels for them.

Indeed, what blame attaches to Mr. Struve or Mr. Gredeskul or Shchepetev, etc., because their writings and speeches, which express their own convictions, are a sort of heel-scratching for the Russian merchants and landlords, who are embittered against the revolution?

What is so shocking about the fact that Mr. Golovin, an ex-deputy, has got himself a profitable concession? After

all, he has relinquished the title of deputy!! That means that when he was a deputy there was no concession as yet—it was only just in the making. And when he obtained a concession, he ceased to be a deputy. Is it not clear that there is no dirty business here?

Is it not obvious that only slanderers can point a finger at Maklakov? Did he not defend Tagiyev—as he himself stated in a letter published in *Rech*—"according to his convictions"? There can be no doubt whatever that no Paris concierge or shopkeeper will find anything—anything at all—reprehensible, awkward or shocking in the way of life or in the actions of all these respectable Cadet people.

V

Mr. Shchepetev's general statement of principle is worth reproducing in full:

> "Hitherto, and above all in the circles taking part in the revolution, humanitarian and altruistic sentiments have suppressed personal requirements to an excessive degree, often to the detriment of the general progress and cultural advancement of the whole of our country. Too often the desire for the 'public good' and for the 'welfare of the whole people' made people forget about themselves, about their personal needs and requirements, so much so that the social sentiments and aspirations themselves could not be translated into reality in the form of positive [!!], creative, entirely conscious work, and fatally led to passive forms of self-sacrifice. Indeed, not only in this particular sphere, but also in the sphere of the most ordinary relations, the requirements of the individual were constantly suppressed in every manner—by a 'guilty conscience' which often swelled this thirst for heroism and self-sacrifice to hypertrophic proportions, on the one hand, and by an inadequate appraisal of life itself due to the low standard of our culture, on the other hand. The result is a constant split personality, a constant sense of the wrongness and even 'sinfulness' of one's life, a constant desire to sacrifice oneself, to come to the aid of the propertyless and disinherited, and, finally, to go into 'the camp of the perishing'—a fact which has found so full and vivid expression in our literature.
>
> "Nothing of the kind is met with in the views and moral principles of the French people."

This is a commentary on Mr. Gredeskul's political and programmatic statements which *Rech* published without a single reservation and which *Pravda* (No. 85) recalled when *Rech* chose to forget them.

This is a continuation and repetition of *Vekhi*. Once again we can and must see from the example of this discourse that *Vekhi* is merely making a show of fighting against the "intelligentsia" and that it is in fact *fighting against democracy*, which it completely renounces.

It is particularly necessary to stress the unity of *Vekhi*, Gredeskul and *Rech* today, during the elections, when the Cadets, playing at democracy, are doing their utmost to obscure and side-track all the truly important and vital political questions of principle. One of the urgent practical tasks facing the democrats is to raise these questions at election meetings, to explain to as large an audience as possible the meaning and significance of the talk of the Shchepetevs and all the Vekhists, and to expose the hypocrisy of *Rech* and the Milyukovs when they try to disclaim responsibility for *Russkaya Mysl*, although those who were for it are Cadet *Party members*.

The "arguments" with the Vekhists, the "polemics" of the Gredeskuls, Milyukovs and other such gentlemen against them, are no more than eyewash, nothing but a hypocritical disguise for the deep fundamental solidarity between the entire Cadet Party and *Vekhi*. Indeed, how can anyone "argue" against the basic propositions of the passage quoted above? How can he remain in the same party with people who hold such views, without bearing *full* responsibility for this advocacy of an emphatic repudiation of the elementary principles of all democracy?

The issue is obscured by those who are willing to present it *à la Vekhi*, in terms of contrasting "individualism" with "altruism", and so on. The political meaning of these phrases could not be clearer—they are a *volte-face against* democracy, a *volte-face* in favour of *counter-revolutionary* liberalism.

We must realise that this *volte-face* is no accident, but a result of the class position of the bourgeoisie. And we must draw from this the necessary political conclusions as regards the clear demarcation of democracy from liberalism. Unless we are aware of these realities, and unless we bring them home to the mass of the population, there can be no question of any real step forward.

Nevskaya Zvezda Nos. 24 and 25,
September 2 and 9, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE UNITY OF THE CADETS AND *NOVOYE VREMYA*

People in our country are only too often prone to regard the election campaign as a struggle for mandates, i.e., for cosy seats in the Duma.

As far as the class-conscious workers are concerned, this campaign is primarily, and more than anything else, a struggle for principles, i.e., for fundamental views, for political convictions. This struggle, which is being waged before the masses and which draws the masses into politics, is one of the principal advantages of the representative system.

Our Cadets, in reply to our posing fundamental questions about liberalism and democracy, about the policy of "peace" and that of the class struggle, dodge all polemics on the substance of the matter, merely hissing right and left over our alleged "Cadet-eating".

And yet facts indicating a touching unity between the Cadets and the *Novoye Vremya* people in the appraisal of the cardinal issues of life in Russia strike the eye.

The eighth issue of *Russkaya Mysl* has appeared. This magazine is edited by the Cadet Struve, and contributors to it are Izgoyev, Severyanin, Galich and many other Cadets.

In that issue Mr. A. Shchepetev printed, under the title "Russians in Paris", a foul Black-Hundred lampoon against the revolution and revolutionaries. *Novoye Vremya immediately* caught up the tune struck up by *Russkaya Mysl*; it quoted a whole series of "gems" from it, and exclaimed

gleefully: "To think that those wretched representatives of mankind [i.e., the revolutionaries as portrayed by *Russkaya Mysl*] claimed the role of renovators of Russian life."

What will the official Cadet *Rech* say to that? Will it be that that "has no bearing" on the elections, i.e., on the struggle for cosy seats? Or that *Rech* "cannot be held responsible" for *Russkaya Mysl*, i.e., the party cannot be held responsible for its members whom *no* Cadet conference has ever so much as condemned?

Let *Rech* twist and turn, and let unprincipled and spineless people shrug their shoulders at our "Cadet-eating"—we shall never tire of saying to the citizens of Russia: look into the *principles* of the Cadets and don't remain disgracefully indifferent when the "Constitutional-Democrats" are slinging mud at the democrats.

Here are a few passages from the article of Mr. Shchepetev, the Black-Hundred Cadet; although few, they are the most prominent and, moreover, are concerned with questions of principle, not gossip.

"Hitherto, and above all in the circles taking part in the revolution, humanitarian [i.e., man-loving] and altruistic sentiments [i.e., disinterested sentiments not limited to the effort to keep one's skin whole] have suppressed personal requirements to an *excessive degree*, often to the detriment of the general progress and cultural advancement of the whole of our country. Too often the desire for the 'public good' and for the 'welfare of the whole people' [the ironical inverted commas were put in by *Russkaya Mysl*] made people forget about themselves, about their personal needs and requirements.... The result is a constant split personality, a constant sense of the wrongness and even 'sinfulness' of one's life, a constant desire to sacrifice oneself, *to come to the aid of the propertyless and disinherited*, and, finally, to go into 'the camp of the perishing'—a fact which has found so full and vivid an expression in our literature" (*Russkaya Mysl* No. 8, pp. 152-53).

How contemptible is a party pretending to be democratic that tolerates in its ranks these gentlemen who sling mud at the most rudimentary, the most elementary premises convictions and principles of *the whole of democracy*!

The liberal bourgeoisie has developed a hatred for democracy, as has been proved by the issue of *Vekhi*, as is proved monthly by *Russkaya Mysl*, and as has been proved by the Karaulovs and Gredeskuls.

The liberals themselves are placing a bar between themselves and the democrats.

Pravda No. 109, September 5, 1912
Signed: *I. V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

CONCERNING N. S. POLYANSKY'S LETTER

N. S. Polyansky's letter from the countryside, published in this issue of *Pravda*, poses a very interesting question. It would be desirable for the peasants themselves to comment on this question as often as possible.

For our part, we consider it necessary to point out the following.

N. S. Polyansky is perfectly right in saying that only an "idle parasite" would regard the volost meeting as a gathering of fools. Only the peasants *themselves* can decide which form of land tenure and landownership is to be preferred in a particular locality. All interference on the part of the law or the administration in the unfettered use of the land by the peasants is a survival of the serf-owning system. Such interference can only do harm, it can only humiliate and insult the peasant.

A worker-peasant vividly showed, in his letter published in *Pravda* No. 38, the absurd red tape resulting from such interference.

Let us now see what view the tens of millions of people who are for ever working and are for ever being exploited should take of the question: *khutor* or village commune?

What these people have to worry about is not at all the choice between the *khutor* and the village commune. They must worry about who is exploiting them and how they can lighten or do away with this exploitation.

In European Russia, for example, 30,000 of the big landlords own 70,000,000 dessiatines of land, and 10,000,000 poor peasants own as much. Whether these peasants are settled on *khutors* or in communes, their paupers' living conditions will not be changed in the slightest. If you have

seven dessiatines of bad land for your whole family, while your landlord neighbour has 2,000 dessiatines of excellent land, the result will be almost the same as under serfdom, no matter whether you live on a *khutor* or in a commune.

Hungry people are being deluded with talk about *khutors* or communes, about a buckwheat pie or a cabbage pie. Meanwhile they have to eat turnip tops and live on marshy or sandy land; they have to do corvée for using the watering-place, the pastures and ploughlands.

By means of *khutors* attempts are being made to create "small landlords" to defend the big ones. But millions and tens of millions of peasants will starve even more in consequence.

In Western Europe, a really rapid and successful development of agriculture occurred *only where* all survivals of feudal oppression had been completely abolished.

In the genuinely free countries, where agriculture is well organised, there remains only one force that is crushing the peasant and the worker: the force of capital. There is only one way of countering this force—a free alliance of the wage-workers and ruined peasants. Such alliances will develop into a new social system under which cultivated lands, efficient machinery, steam and electricity will serve to improve the life of the working people themselves, and not to enrich a handful of millionaires.

Pravda No. 118, September 15, 1912
Signed: *Fr.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE POLITICAL LINE

It is beyond doubt that the character of *Nevskaya Zvezda* and *Pravda* has been fully established, and is familiar not only to the workers, but also to all the political parties of Russia—thanks to the attacks made on *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda* by the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists (*Rossiya*, *Novoye Vremya*, *Golos Moskvy*, etc.), as well as by the liberals (*Rech*, *Zaprosy Zhizni*, etc.).

An appraisal of the political line followed by the two newspapers is of particular interest in the light of the election campaign, for this appraisal is the inevitable touchstone of views on basic questions of principle. That is why we propose to dwell on N. Nikolin's article in *Nevsky Golos* No. 9, about the line of *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*. The article contains not a few exceedingly angry words, as the reader will see; but we can (and must) disregard that in view of the author's attempt to touch on the essence of important questions.

> "I must admit," wrote N. Nikolin, "that in many respects *Pravda* fulfils rather satisfactorily its task of being an exponent of the desires, needs, requirements and interests of the Russian proletariat. Unfortunately, it considerably depreciates this useful work of its by a perfectly absurd presentation of political realities that is far from the truth and extremely harmful in its consequences."

We shall leave the angry words aside and take the important thing: the presentation of political realities. We readily forgive the writer his annoyance for this straightforward approach to the question, which is really fundamental. Let us argue on the substance of the matter. It is, in fact, im-

possible to take a single step in the field of practical work unless one has firm views as to *what* our "political realities" actually are.

N. Nikolin answers his straight question as follows:

> "*Pravda*—which in this case follows the example of *Nevskaya Zvezda*—assures its readers that the working class must build a new Russia despite the liberals. This sounds proud, of course, but it contains nothing but nonsense. Nobody is building a new Russia—she is *being built* [italics by N. Nikolin himself] in the complicated process of the struggle of different interests, and the task of the working class is not to make chimerical plans for building a new Russia *for others and in spite of all these others*, but to create, within the latter, the most favourable conditions for its further development."

Here, too, we readily forgive the writer his "spleen", his extreme irritation, because he tries to take the bull by the horns. N. Nikolin is more frank, sincere and thoughtful than many liquidators in touching here on one of the deepest sources of our deep differences.

"Nobody is building a new Russia—she is *being built* in the process—". Anyone will recognise in this wonderful argument the basic and invariable keynote of the entire liquidationist (or broader still, entire opportunist) music.

Let us, therefore, analyse this argument carefully.

If a new Russia is being built in the process of the struggle of different interests, this means that the *classes* which have *different* interests are *building* a new Russia in different ways. This is as clear as daylight. What sense is there, then, in N. Nikolin's *contrast*: "nobody is building a new Russia—she is *being built*, etc."?

No sense whatever. It is nonsense from the point of view of the most elementary logic.

But this nonsense has a logic of its own, the logic of opportunism, which inevitably, and not accidentally, slips into Nikolinist errors as it tries to defend its position "in Marxist fashion". It is on this "logic of opportunism" that we must dwell.

Whoever says that a new Russia *is being built* by such-and-such classes stands so firmly on the basis of Marxism that not only N. Nikolin's angry words, but even—even "unity-liquidationist" conferences and all their verbal "thunderbolts" cannot shake him.

Whoever says that "nobody is building a new Russia—she is *being built*, etc.", slips from the objectivism of the class struggle (i.e., from Marxism) to the "objectivism" of a bourgeois justification of reality. Herein lies the source of that sinful fall from Marxism into opportunism which Nikolin (unwittingly) commits.

If I say: a new Russia *has to* be built *in such-and-such a way* from the standpoint of, say, truth, justice, equalised labour, and so on, it will be a subjectivist approach that will land me in the sphere of chimeras. In practice, it is the class struggle, and not my very best wishes, that will determine the building of a new Russia. My ideals of building a new Russia will not be chimerical only if they express the interests of an actually existing class, whose living conditions compel it to act in a particular sense. By thus adopting a stand for the objectivism of the class struggle, I do not in the least justify reality, but, on the contrary, indicate in this reality *itself* the deepest sources (though they are invisible at first sight) and the forces that can transform it.

But if I say: "nobody is building a new Russia—she is *being built* in the struggle of interests", I at once throw a certain veil over the clear picture of the struggle of *such-and-such* classes, and make a concession to those who see only those actions of the ruling classes, i.e., particularly the bourgeoisie, that are on the surface. I slip involuntarily into justifying the bourgeoisie; instead of the objectivism of the class struggle, I adopt as a criterion the bourgeois trend that is most conspicuous, or that is successful for the time being.

We shall illustrate this by an example from history. New Germany (the Germany of the second half of the nineteenth century) was "built" in the process of the struggle of different interests. No educated bourgeois will question this, nor will he go farther than that.

But here is how Marx reasoned during the most "critical" period of the building of *new* Germany.

"The upper bourgeoisie," wrote Marx in 1848, "ever anti-revolutionary, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with the reactionaries for fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie."

"The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not for a moment leave its allies, the peasants, in the lurch. It knew that its rule was grounded in the destruction of feudalism in the countryside, the creation of a free landowning peasant class.

"The German bourgeoisie of 1848 is, without the least compunction, betraying the peasants, who are its most natural allies, the flesh of its flesh and without whom it is powerless against the aristocracy.

"The continuance of feudal rights ... such is the result of the German revolution of 1848. The mountain brought forth a mouse."[139]

In Marx, the *classes* which *built* new Germany stand out at once as if they were living.

A bourgeois scholar who justifies reality in the name of "objectivism" says- Bismarck defeated Marx, Bismarck took into account how "new Germany was *built* in the complicated process of the struggle between different interests". Marx, however, "made chimerical plans for building" a Great-German democratic republic in spite of the liberals, with the aid of the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie (that bourgeoisie which does not enter into alliance with reaction).

That is what bourgeois scholars say in a thousand variations. In examining this question from a purely theoretical standpoint, let us ask ourselves what their mistake is. It is that they cover up and obscure the class struggle. It is that (by means of the would-be profound turn of speech, "Germany was *built* in the process, etc.") they gloss over the circumstance that Bismarck Germany was built by the bourgeoisie, who by its own "betrayals and treachery" made itself "powerless against the nobility".

Marx, however, was enabled by the objectivism of the class struggle to understand *political reality* a hundred times more deeply and accurately, without justifying it at all but, on the contrary, indicating and singling out in it the classes which were building a democratic Germany, and were able to become the bulwark of democracy and socialism even when events had taken a turn exceptionally favourable to Bismarck.

Marx understood political reality so correctly and so deeply that he was able in 1848, half a century in advance,

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to appraise the *essence* of Bismarck Germany as the Germany of a bourgeoisie "powerless against the nobility". At the elections in 1912, sixty-four years after Marx had made his appraisal, the liberals fully confirmed it by their behaviour.

Marx and the Marxists, who had been waging a ruthless struggle against the liberals since 1848—a struggle that was unprecedented in acuteness and evoked a universal howl from the liberals (excuse me for using this sharp phrase esteemed Nikolin!)—were by no means advocates of a "chimera" when they upheld the "plan" for a Great-German democratic state.

On the contrary, by upholding their "plan", propagating it steadfastly and lashing the liberals and democrats who were betraying it, Marx and the Marxists were educating the very class which embodied the *vital* forces of "new Germany" and which, thanks to Marx's consistent and whole-heartedly resolute propaganda, now stands fully armed, ready to fulfil its historic role of grave-digger, not only of the Bismarckian bourgeoisie, but of all bourgeoisie in general.

* * *

The example from German history reveals to us the *logic of opportunism* in the views of Nikolin, who angrily abuses us for our "violent Cadet-eating" *precisely because* he is *unaware* that he himself is drifting to the liquidationist ideas of a liberal labour policy.

The more N. Nikolin (who is not alone!) flies into a rage and tries to brush us aside, the more explicitly and circumstantially will we, who are publicists, repeat to him that our struggle against the Cadets and the liquidators is prompted by considerations which have been deeply thought out and which for more than five years (for more than ten years, to be exact) have been reaffirmed many times by the official decisions of all Marxists. The trouble with N. Nikolin, as well as with the liquidators whom he defends, is that they have *nothing* even approximately formulated, definite and clear with which to counter these numerous, precise, formal tactical decisions adopted long ago.

It is not just a "proud" phrase to say that "the workers must build a new Russia in spite of the liberals". N. Nikolin

knows very well that this idea is expressed in a number of tactical decisions recognised by most Marxists. This is, in effect, a simple *summing up* of Russia's political experience during at least the past decade. It is an absolutely indisputable historical fact that during the last ten years the Russian working class has been *building* a new Russia "in spite of the liberals". Such "building" work is *never* wasted, whatever the temporary "successes" of the Russian pretenders to the role of a Bismarck.

Russian opportunism—vague, indistinct, and eel-like, as it is in other countries—is unable to express its views definitely and clearly, to state formally that the working class must *not* build a new Russia in spite of the liberals but must do this, that and the other. Opportunism would not be opportunism if it were capable of giving clear and straightforward answers. But it expresses its discontent over the workers' policy, and the fact that it gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, by saying: "Nobody is building a new Russia—she is *being built* in the process of the struggle of interests."

And of what is *being built*, it is the "building" which the nobility and the bourgeoisie are doing, with the liberals *correcting* it, that is most conspicuous and striking, and enjoys momentary success and the admiration of the "crowd" more than anything else. "Why try to analyse which classes are building and how—that is all a chimera; we must take what is *being built*"—this is the true meaning of Nikolin's argument, and the "logic of opportunism".

This is indeed forgetting the class struggle. This is what constitutes the main principle of a liberal labour policy. It is through this sort of "logic" that the role of the working class is reduced from leadership of a genuine, consistent, whole-hearted democratic movement to spade-work for the liberals.

Hence the fact, only too familiar to us Russians, that *in words* the opportunists acknowledge that the party of the proletariat, too, should have an "independent" line, which, of course, is acknowledged by Nikolin as well. But *in fact* he defends a line that is *not independent*, but is the line of a liberal labour policy.

Nikolin tries to explain and to show us how very

immaterial it is to *proclaim* the independence of the working class.

The liquidators' platform, reported in *Nevsky Golos* No. 8, also proclaimed it as did Nikolin himself. But even as he *proclaims* "independence", he is advocating a *non-independent* policy.

By rejecting the idea of the working class pursuing a line of its own in present-day politics and in all questions of democracy (or, *in other words*, the idea of the working class "building a new Russia") in spite of the liberals, Nikolin virtually calls on the working class to trail behind the liberals.

That is the crux of the matter. That is the "logic of opportunism". As regards arguments to the effect that the working class should not be "isolated", that "the brunt of the struggle for political liberty should not be borne by the workers", that what is needed is "co-ordination and not division of forces", and so on, all that is meaningless rhetoric. In fact, they are all descriptions and paraphrases of one and the same thing: don't isolate yourselves (*from the liberals*), "co-ordinate your forces" (*with liberal policy*), recognise liberal policy to be an effective struggle for political liberty and not for a deal with the Purishkeviches, and so on and so forth.

We did not dwell on that rhetoric because one who wants to argue on the substance of the matter should take the real starting-points, the roots of the differences, and not the rhetorical flourishes of a basically wrong line.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 26,
September 16, 1912
Signed: *M. M.*

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

THE SUCCESSES OF THE AMERICAN WORKERS

The latest issue of the American labour weekly, *Appeal to Reason*, received in Europe reports that its circulation has increased to 984,000 copies. The letters and demands coming in—writes the editor (No. 875, September 7, new style)—indicate beyond doubt that we shall exceed one million copies in the next few weeks.

This figure—a million copies of a socialist weekly which American courts harass and persecute shamelessly and which is growing and gaining strength under the fire of persecution—shows more clearly than long arguments the kind of revolution that is approaching in America.

Not long ago the sycophantic *Novoye Vremya*, a mouthpiece of venal hacks, wrote about the "power of money" in America, relating with malicious joy the facts about the monstrous venality of Taft, Roosevelt, Wilson and, indeed, *all* Presidential candidates put up by the bourgeois parties. Here is a free, democratic republic for you, hissed the venal Russian newspaper.

The class-conscious workers will reply to that calmly and proudly: we have no illusions about the significance of broad democracy. No democracy in the world can eliminate the class struggle and the omnipotence of money. It is not this that makes democracy important and useful. The importance of democracy is that it makes the class struggle broad, open and conscious. And this is not a conjecture or a wish, but a fact.

At a time when the membership of the German Social-Democratic Party has grown to 970,000 and when the circulation of an American socialist weekly has climbed to 984,000 copies, anyone who has eyes to see must acknowledge that a proletarian is powerless when alone but that millions of proletarians are all-powerful.

Pravda No. 120, September 18, 1912
Signed: *M. N.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE END OF THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR

Representatives of Italy and Turkey have signed preliminary terms of peace, according to telegraphic reports.

Italy has "won" the war, which she launched a year ago to seize Turkish possessions in Africa. From now on, Tripoli will belong to Italy. It is worth while taking a look at this typical colonial war, waged by a "civilised" twentieth-century nation.

What caused the war? The greed of the Italian moneybags and capitalists, who need new markets and new achievements for Italian imperialism.

What kind of war was it? A perfected, civilised bloodbath, the massacre of Arabs with the help of the "latest" weapons.

The Arabs put up a desperate resistance. When, at the beginning of the war, the Italian admirals were incautious enough to land 1,200 marines, the Arabs attacked them and killed some 600. By way of "retaliation", about 3,000 Arabs were butchered, whole families were plundered and done to death, with women and children massacred in cold blood. The Italians are a civilised, constitutional nation.

About 1,000 Arabs were hanged.

The Italian casualties exceeded 20,000, including 17,429 sick, 600 missing and 1,405 killed.

The war cost the Italians over 800 million lire, or over 320 million rubles. It resulted in terrible unemployment and industrial stagnation.

The Arabs lost about 14,800 lives. Despite the "peace", the war will actually go on, for the Arab tribes in the heart

of Africa, in areas far away from the coast, will refuse to submit. And for a long time to come they will be "civilised" by bayonet, bullet, noose, fire and rape.

Italy, of course, is no better and no worse than the other capitalist countries. All of them alike are governed by the bourgeoisie, which stops at no carnage in its quest for new sources of profit.

Pravda No. 129, September 28, 1912
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A GAME OF CHANCE

Novoye Vremya fully discloses the plans of the Russian nationalists. When reading this newspaper, which is "influential" in nationalist quarters, as well as among the Octobrists, the plan that they are firmly pursuing for robbing Turkey becomes obvious.

As usual, the policy of chauvinism and seizure of foreign territory is being carried out first and foremost by inciting the general public against Austria. "The Balkan peoples," writes *Novoye Vremya*, "have rallied together for a holy war of independence. The Austrian diplomat is on the look-out for the moment when they can be plundered."

Austria has torn off a chunk (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Italy has torn off another (Tripoli); it is now our turn to enrich ourselves—such is the policy of *Novoye Vremya*. "A holy war of independence" is merely a phrase to deceive simpletons, for no one in our own Russia has so flouted the truly democratic principles of genuine independence of *all* peoples as have the nationalists and the Octobrists.

But why do the nationalists consider the time favourable for a policy of plunder? This, too, can be clearly seen from *Novoye Vremya*. Italy will not fight—it says in effect; as for Austria, it would be risky for her to start a war against the Balkan Slavs because she has a kindred population of many millions, and Germany would not venture a European war to defeat Turkey.

The nationalists' calculation is frank and shameless to the last degree. While mouthing pompous words about "a holy war of independence" of the peoples, they gamble with the lives of millions in the most cold-blooded way by inciting the peoples to a carnage for the profit of a handful of merchants and industrialists.

The Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria and Italy) is weak at the moment, for Italy has spent 800 million francs on the war against the Turks, and the "interests" of Italy and Austria do not coincide in the Balkans. Italy wants to snatch another morsel—Albania—but Austria will not let her. Our nationalists, who count on this, are playing a reckless game of chance, relying on the strength and wealth of two powers in the Triple Entente (Britain and France) and on the fact that "Europe" will not want a general war over the Straits or over the "rounding off" of "our" territories at the expense of Asiatic Turkey.

In a society of wage slavery, every merchant and every proprietor plays a game of chance, saying as it were: "I shall either be ruined or make a profit and ruin others." Every year hundreds of capitalists go bankrupt and millions of peasants, handicraftsmen and artisans are ruined. The capitalist countries play a similar game of chance with the blood of millions, whom they send into a carnage now here, now there with the aim of seizing foreign territory and plundering their weaker neighbours.

Pravda No. 134, October 4, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE PRIESTHOOD IN THE ELECTIONS, AND ELECTIONS WITH THE PRIESTHOOD

According to reports in the press, the congresses of small landowners and deans of churches in 46 gubernias of European Russia have elected 7,990 delegates, including 6,516 priests. The latter make up 82 per cent.

The complete returns for the fifty gubernias cannot much alter this result.

Let us, therefore, see what these elections signify.

The law provides that the small landowners and the parishes shall elect one delegate *per electoral category* established for participation in the landowners' congress. This means that the number of delegates must be proportional to the amount of land owned by the electorate.

Statistics for 1905 give the following data for the fifty gubernias of European Russia:

Church estates	1,900,000	dessiatines
Lands privately owned by priests	300,000	"
Total owned by the priesthood	2,200,000	"
Lands privately owned by townspeople	3,700,000	"
Lands privately owned by peasants	13,200,000	"
Lands privately owned by other categories	2,200,000	"
Total of small holdings owned by "laymen"	19,100,000	"

These data probably take account of small holdings to a lesser extent than of the lands owned by the priesthood. Nevertheless, it follows that the small private holdings

total 21,300,000 dessiatines, of which priests own 2 200,000 dessiatines, or *a little over* one-tenth. Yet the priesthood has elected upwards of *eight-tenths* of the total number of delegates!!

How could that come about? It was simple enough. The fact is that small landowners seldom go to elections—they lack the means and take little interest in the matter; besides, the police put a thousand obstacles in the way of free elections. The priests, however, have all been "induced" to attend.

The priests will vote for the candidates who suit the government. This explains why *even the landlords* are murmuring, to say nothing of the bourgeoisie. The Octobrists and the nationalists are murmuring too. They all accuse the government of "*engineering*" the elections. But the landlords and the big bourgeoisie *themselves* would like *to engineer the elections*.

Thus there is a clash between absolutism, on the one hand, and the landlords and the bourgeois bigwigs, on the other. The government wanted to secure the backing of the landlords and the top strata of the bourgeoisie; as is known, this idea underlies the whole law of June 3, 1907.

As it happens, however, the government cannot get along *even* with the Octobrists. It has *not succeeded* in organising *even* a feudal-bourgeois monarchy of a kind "satisfactory" to these classes.

Unquestionably, this failure has in fact been acknowledged by the government, which has set about organising *its own officials* in the shape of the subordinate, dependent priesthood!

In the science of history, this device of a government which retains the essential features of absolutism is called Bonapartism. In this case, it is not definite classes that serve as a support, or not they alone, and not chiefly, but hand-picked elements, mostly from among various dependent sections of the population.

How is the possibility of this phenomenon to be explained in "sociological" terms, i.e., from the standpoint of the class struggle?

It is due to a balance between the forces of the hostile or rival classes. If, for example, the Purishkeviches are

competing with the Guchkovs and Ryabushinskys, the government may—provided there is a certain balance between the forces of these rivals—gain *greater* independence (within certain, rather narrow limits, of course) than when either of these classes has a decisive superiority. If, on the other hand, this government is historically linked by continuity and so on with especially "vivid" forms of absolutism, and if militarist and bureaucratic traditions in the sense of non-electivity of judges and officials are strong in the country, then the limits of that independence will be still greater, its manifestations still more open, the methods used in "picking" voters, and electors voting on orders from above, still more crude, and tyranny still more tangible.

It is something like this that contemporary Russia is passing through. The "step towards transformation into a bourgeois monarchy"* is made more difficult by the borrowing of Bonapartist methods. Whereas in France the bourgeois monarchy and the Bonapartist empire differed clearly and sharply from each other, in Germany Bismarck gave models of a "combination" of the two types, with those features which Marx called "military despotism"[140]—to say nothing of Bonapartism—obviously predominating.

It is said that the carp likes to be fried in sour cream. We don't know whether the philistine likes to be "fried" in a bourgeois monarchy, in old feudal absolutism, in the "latest" type of Bonapartism or in military despotism, or, lastly, in a certain blend of all these "methods". But while the distinction may seem very small from the point of view of the philistine and so-called "legal order", i.e., from a *purely* juridical, formally constitutional point of view, it is substantial from the point of view of the class struggle.

It won't make things easier for the philistine to know that he is being beaten not only in the old way but in the new as well. But the *stability* of a regime pressing down the philistine, the *conditions of development* and disintegration of this regime, and its capacity to suffer a rapid fiasco

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, p. 349.—*Ed.*

all depend to a large degree on whether we are confronted with more or less evident, open, solid and direct forms of rule of definite classes, or with various indirect, unstable *forms* of their rule.

The rule of *classes* is harder to eliminate than the unstable forms of the superstructure steeped in the shabby spirit of old times and supported by a picked "electorate '.

The experiment of Sabler and Makarov in "organising" the priesthood for the Fourth Duma elections should be of considerable interest to everyone, both "sociologically" and in terms of practical politics.

Nevskaya Zvezda No. 27,
October 5, 1912

Published according
to the text in *Nevskaya Zvezda*

MR. MILYUKOV'S "POSITION"

The leader of the Cadet Party has lost his way in a wood of three trees. He has been writing articles as long as Menshikov's about "three positions" and "one position". The more he writes, the more evident it becomes that he is trying to *fool* the reader with his talk, to *cover up* the point at issue with his dull and empty verbiage.

Poor learned historian! He has to *pretend* that he does not see the difference between liberalism and democracy. For the whole point is this difference, gentlemen! The Duma votes in general, the attitude towards "reforms", the votes on the budget, and the issue of "extra-parliamentary tactics" all bring out in different *forms* one and the same *point*, the profound difference between the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and the democrats.

For the thousand and first time, we shall briefly repeat what this difference is, for the benefit of the Milyukovs who "don't understand".

The liberals are defending a number of feudal-absolutist privileges (an upper chamber, etc.). The democrats are waging an uncompromising struggle against all privileges.

The liberals are for agreement with the forces of the old in social life; the democrats' tactics are to eliminate these forces.

The liberals are afraid of the independent activity of the masses, they do not trust it, they reject it; the democrats sympathise with it, believe in it, support and encourage it.

That is enough for the moment.

Does Mr. Milyukov really "not understand" this difference, which is familiar even from textbooks of history?

Does he really "not understand" that the very *programme* of the Cadets is a *programme* of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, not of the democrats, and that only liberals (and bad ones at that) could have voted for the budget in the Third Duma, could have declared themselves a loyal opposition, etc.?

Mr. Milyukov understands this perfectly well, and he is trying to fool people with his talk, pretending that he has forgotten the ABC of the difference between liberalism and democracy.

To register in print this pitiful dodging of the Cadets, we shall remark to Mr. Milyukov that in all the *official* Social-Democratic press (except, of course, that of the liquidators, whom we will gladly give up to Mr. Milyukov), in *all* the resolutions of the guiding Social-Democratic bodies, and in the whole policy of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma, we always and invariably meet, in thousands of forms, with the defence of the old tactics which Mr. Milyukov says the Social-Democrats have abandoned.

It is an indisputable historical fact, esteemed learned historian!

We must register in print how low the Cadets must have fallen if they try to deceive the public on questions which are so elementary and have been made perfectly clear by the history of the political parties in Russia.

In conclusion, a little question to Mr. Milyukov—to sum up and recapitulate what we have said: when you Cadet gentlemen agreed to bar Toiloshnikov from five session,[141] were you acting as liberals or as democrats?

Pravda No. 136, October 6, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

DEPUTY OF THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS

The proletariat of the capital is sending one of its elected representatives into the reactionary Duma of the landlords and priests. It is a glorious position this representative will hold. He will have to speak and act on behalf of millions; he will have to unfurl a great banner; he will have to voice the views that for years have been expressed in formal, specific, precise terms by the responsible spokesmen of Marxism and working-class democracy.

The election of someone to that position is a matter of such vast importance that it would be petty, cowardly and disgraceful to be afraid to speak of it straightforwardly, without beating about the bush, to be afraid of "offending" a particular individual, a particular circle, etc.

The election should accord with the will of the majority of the class-conscious, Marxist workers. That is obvious. Nobody would venture to deny this *outright*.

Everyone knows that from 1908 to 1912 a fight was waged among the St. Petersburg workers between the opponents of liquidationism and the liquidators at hundreds and thousands of meetings, discussions and talks, and in various press organs. It would be unseemly for anyone to bury his head in the sand like an ostrich and try to "forget" this fact.

Things are being muddled up by those who today are shouting about "unity" over the election of *one* deputy, for they are raising the wrong issue and *obscuring* the essential point by their shouting.

What has "unity" to do with it when it is necessary to elect *one* person and all are agreed that he must express the will of the majority of the class-conscious worker Marxists??

The liquidators are afraid to say plainly that they would like the choice to be a liquidator or a "non-factionalist" (i.e., a waverer). And since they are afraid to defend their views *openly*, they are trying to smuggle them through by *deceit*, by shouting about "unity".

It is our duty to expose this confusion. If the liquidators are in a majority among the class-conscious workers, no one on earth can prevent them from electing a liquidator. We must establish as accurately, calmly, firmly, prudently and certainly as possible which side has the majority, without bothering about the outcries of people who, *after five years of struggle*, are advocating "unity" (a few days before the elections!) in order to conceal their views.

The workers are not children to believe a fairy-tale like that. Only one of three possible decisions can be adopted: (1) to choose a liquidator; (2) to choose an opponent of liquidationism; (3) to choose a waverer. There have been no others among the Social-Democrats during the five years between 1908 and 1912, nor are there any today!

Workers who want to act as adult and independent people must not tolerate political strike-breakers in their midst. They must see to it that the will of the majority of class-conscious workers is respected and executed.

The workers need a deputy who will express the will of the majority and will know for certain *what* work he will carry out in and outside the Duma.

The will of the majority has been stated, and the deputy for St. Petersburg should be a determined opponent of liquidationism and a supporter of consistent working-class democracy.

Pravda No. 144, October 16, 1912
Signed: *I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE BALKAN PEOPLES AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

Public attention is fixed on the Balkans just now, and understandably so. For the whole of Eastern Europe, the hour is perhaps striking when the peoples themselves will have their free and decisive word to say. There is no longer room for the game of the bourgeois "powers" and their diplomats who are past masters of intrigue, scheming and selfishly tripping up one another.

The Balkan peoples might say, as our serfs used to in the old days: "Save us from lordly anger and lordly love, the worst of all misfortunes."[142] For the Balkan peasants and workers, both hostile and would-be friendly intervention by the European "powers" means only adding all sorts of fetters and hindrances to free progress to the general conditions of capitalist exploitation.

That is one reason why it is essential to fight against both bureaucratic-governmental and liberal "diplomacy". *Rech*, for example, was false through and through when, a few days ago, it invited "Russian society" (i.e., the bourgeoisie) to remember the statement of a British ministerial organ which said that Europe would not permit "misgovernment" in the Balkans! "Let our diplomats not sit back idly," shouted *Rech*.

Even the most "liberal" bourgeois Europe, we say in reply, can bring the Balkans nothing but support for decay and stagnation, nothing but bureaucratic obstacles to freedom. It is "Europe" that is hindering the establishment of a federal republic in the Balkans.

The foremost workers in the Balkans, and all Balkan democrats, pin their hopes solely on the development of the political consciousness, democratic spirit and independent activity of the *masses*, and not on the intrigues of bourgeois diplomats, whatever liberal phrases they adorn themselves with!

Pravda No. 144, October 16, 1912
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE FOX AND THE HEN-COOP

The issue of a Balkan war and of "Europe's" attitude to it is the most burning political issue today. It is important for all democrats in general and for the working class in particular to *understand* the class interests guiding this or that party in this matter.

The policy of the Octobrists, nationalists and unaffiliated "patriots", from *Novoye Vremya* to *Russkoye Slovo*, is clear and simple. The badgering of Austria, incitement to war against her, and shouts about the "Slav tasks" of Russia are a poorly disguised endeavour to divert attention from Russia's domestic affairs and to "grab a piece" of Turkey. Support for reaction at home and for colonial, imperialist plunder abroad—such is the essence of this crude "patriotic" "Slav" policy.

The Cadets' policy is couched in more subtle and diplomatic terms, but in effect their policy is *also a reactionary great-power* policy of *imperialism*. It is particularly important to understand this, for the liberals cunningly veil their views with democratic-sounding phrases.

Look at *Rech*. At first—prior to the "love tryst" of Milyukov and Sazonov[143]—it accused Sazonov of "readiness to bargain" and reproached the nationalists with weakening the "great idea" of capturing Constantinople. But now, after the tryst, *Rech* agrees with *Rossiya*, vigorously censuring the "foolish enthusiasm" of *Novoye Vremya*.

But what is the policy of *Rech* today?

We must not begin with proud demands, for if we do we shall lose support (from France and Britain), and shall "end by becoming, in spite of ourselves, *even more modest than we should be*" (No. 278)!!

And so, *Rech* is against the chauvinists *because* they "will end by being more modest than they should be". It is as much as to say: you chauvinists are bragging and you'll get nothing. But we are in favour of grabbing a big chunk quietly and peacefully, with the support of the French and British bourgeoisie!

"We need" support (from the Triple Entente) "in the interests of our own Balkan *protégés*", writes *Rech*. Mark this: *Rech*, *too*, *favours* the idea of Russia "*protecting*" the Slavs, of the fox protecting the hen-coop, except that it wants this done more cunningly!

"All that can be achieved has to be achieved only in this way—through the joint efforts of European diplomacy," declares *Rech*.

It is clear enough: the essence of Cadet policy is the same kind of chauvinism and imperialism as that of *Novoye Vremya*, only more cunning and subtle. *Novoye Vremya* roughly and stupidly threatens war on behalf of Russia alone. *Rech*, "subtly and diplomatically", *likewise* threatens *war*, but only on behalf of the Triple Entente, far to say "we must not be more modest than we should be" means precisely threatening war. *Novoye Vremya* is in favour of the Slavs being protected by *Russia*, while *Rech* favours their protection by the Triple Entente. In other words, *Novoye Vremya* wants to see only our fox in the hen-coop, while *Rech* favours an agreement among three foxes.

Democrats in general and workers in particular are opposed to all "protection" of the Slavs by foxes or wolves, and advocate the complete self-determination of nations, complete democracy, and the liberation of the Slavs from *all* protection by the "Great Powers".

The liberals and nationalists are arguing about *different ways* of plundering and enslaving the Balkan peoples by the European bourgeoisie. Only the workers are pursuing a genuinely democratic policy, for freedom and democracy everywhere and completely, against all "protection", plunder and intervention!

Pravda No. 146, October 18, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

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A DISGRACEFUL RESOLUTION

The resolution adopted by the St. Petersburg City Council on October 10 has attracted public attention.

The resolution concerns the Balkan war, the most important event in world politics, and it comes from an influential public body—influential among the bourgeoisie. It was adopted *unanimously* by avowed reactionaries and by liberals.

Falbork, a liberal, and all but a "democrat" (!?) and Cadet, urged the necessity of that kind of resolution in an "ardent speech"; he was a member of the drafting commission, and voted for the resolution.

This resolution is a specimen of bourgeois chauvinism, of the bourgeoisie's abject servility to "the powers that be", of bourgeois support for a policy which turns the peoples into cannon fodder.

> "St. Petersburg," says the resolution, which is addressed to the capitals of the belligerent Balkan powers, "shares your hope of a bright future of independent liberty for the oppressed peoples, a liberty in whose name you are shedding your blood."

This is the sort of phrases that chauvinism hides behind! Never and nowhere has "liberty" been won by the oppressed peoples through one people waging *war* against another. Wars between peoples merely increase the enslavement of peoples. Real *liberty* for the Slav peasant in the Balkans, as well as for the Turkish peasant, can be ensured *only* by complete liberty inside *every* country and by a federation of completely and thoroughly democratic states.

The Slav and the Turkish peasants in the Balkans are brothers who are equally "oppressed" by their landlords and their governments.

That is where real oppression lies, and the real obstacle to "independence" and "liberty".

The reactionary and liberal chauvinists, who are openly making common cause in the St. Petersburg City Council (just as they are covertly making common cause in the press, for the arguments of Rech and *Novoye Vremya* on this point are *at bottom* identical, differing only in tone and detail)—these chauvinists advocate turning the peoples into cannon fodder!

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Signed: *T.*

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TWO UTOPIAS

Utopia is a Greek word, composed of *ou*, not, and *topos*, a place. It means a place which does not exist, a fantasy, invention or fairy-tale.

In politics utopia is a wish that can never come true—neither now nor afterwards, a wish that is not based on social forces and is not supported by the growth and development of political, class forces.

The less freedom there is in a country, the scantier the manifestations of open class struggle and the lower the educational level of the *masses*, the more easily political utopias usually arise and the longer they persist.

In modern Russia, two kinds of political utopia have been most persistent and they exert a certain influence on the masses owing to their appeal. They are the liberal utopia and the Narodnik utopia.

The liberal utopia alleges that one could bring about appreciable improvements in Russia, in her political liberty, and in the condition of the mass of her working people, peacefully and harmoniously, without hurting anyone's feelings, without removing the Purishkeviches, without a ruthless class struggle fought to a finish. It is the utopia of *peace* between a free Russia and the Purishkeviches.

The Narodnik utopia is a dream of the Narodnik intellectuals and Trudovik peasants who imagine that a new and just division of the land could *abolish* the power and rule of capital and do away with wage slavery, or that a "just", "equalised" division of the land could be *maintained* under the domination of capital, under the rule of money, under commodity production.

What is it that gives rise to these utopias? Why do they persist rather strongly in present-day Russia?

They are engendered by the interests of the classes which are waging a struggle against the old order, serfdom, lack of rights—in a word, "against the Purishkeviches", and which do not occupy an independent position in this struggle. Utopia, or day-dreaming, is a product of this lack of independence, this *weakness*. Day-dreaming is the lot of the *weak*.

The liberal bourgeoisie in general, and the liberal-bourgeois intelligentsia in particular, cannot but strive for liberty and legality, since without these the domination of the bourgeoisie is incomplete, is neither undivided nor guaranteed. But the bourgeoisie is *more* afraid of the movement of the masses than of reaction. Hence the striking, incredible *weakness* of the liberals in politics, their absolute impotence. Hence the endless series of equivocations, falsehoods, hypocrisies and cowardly evasions in the entire policy of the liberals, who *have to* play at democracy to win the support of the masses but at the same time are deeply anti-democratic, deeply hostile to the movement of the masses, to their initiative, their way of "storming heaven", as Marx once described one of the mass movements in Europe in the last century.[144]

The utopia of liberalism is a utopia of impotence in the matter of the political emancipation of Russia, a utopia of the self-interested moneybags who want "peacefully" to share privileges with the Purishkeviches and pass off this noble desire as the theory of "peaceful" victory for Russian democracy. The liberal utopia means day-dreaming about how to beat the Purishkeviches without defeating them, how to break them without hurting them. Clearly, *this* utopia is harmful not only because it is a utopia, but also because it *corrupts* the democratic consciousness of the masses. If they believe in *this* utopia, the masses will never win freedom; they are not worthy of freedom; they fully deserve to be maltreated by the Purishkeviches.

The utopia of the Narodniks and Trudoviks is the day-dreaming of the petty proprietor, who stands midway between the capitalist and the wage-worker, about abolishing wage slavery without a class struggle. When the issue of economic emancipation becomes as close, immediate and

burning for Russia as the issue of political emancipation is today, the utopia of the Narodniks will prove *no less* harmful than that of the liberals.

But Russia is still in the period of her bourgeois and not proletarian transformation; it is not the question of the economic emancipation of the proletariat that has *most completely* matured, but the question of political liberty, i.e. (in effect), of complete bourgeois liberty.

And in this latter question, the Narodnik utopia plays a peculiar historical role. Being a utopia in regard to the economic consequences that a new division of the land should (and would) have, it is an accompaniment *and symptom* of the great, mass *democratic* upsurge of the peasant masses, i.e., the masses that constitute the *majority* of the population in bourgeois-feudal, modern, Russia. (In a purely bourgeois Russia, as in purely bourgeois Europe, the peasantry will not form the majority of the population.)

The liberal utopia corrupts the democratic consciousness of the masses. The Narodnik utopia, which corrupts their *socialist* consciousness, is an accompaniment, a symptom, and in part even an expression of their democratic upsurge.

The dialectics of history is such that the Narodniks and the Trudoviks propose and promote, as an anti-capitalist remedy, a highly consistent and thoroughgoing capitalist measure with regard to the agrarian question in Russia. An "equalised" new division of the land is utopian, yet a most complete rupture—a rupture indispensable for a *new* division—with the whole of the old landownership, whether landlord, allotment or "crown", is the most necessary, economically progressive and, for a state like Russia, most urgent measure towards bourgeois democracy.

We should remember Engels's notable dictum:

"What formally may he economically incorrect, may all the same be correct from the point of view of world history."[145]

Engels advanced this profound thesis in connection with utopian socialism: that socialism was "fallacious" in the formal economic sense. That socialism was "fallacious" when it declared surplus value an *injustice* from the point of view of the laws of exchange. The theoreticians of bour-

geois political economy were right, in objecting to *that* socialism, in the formal economic sense, for surplus value results from the laws of exchange quite "naturally", quite "justly".

But utopian socialism was *right* from the point of view of world history, for it was a symptom, an expression, a harbinger of the class which, born of capitalism, has by now, in the beginning of the twentieth century, become a mass force which can put an end to capitalism and is irresistibly advancing to this goal.

Engels's profound thesis must be borne in mind when appraising the present-day Narodnik or Trudovik utopia in Russia (perhaps not only in Russia but in a number of Asiatic countries going through bourgeois revolutions in the twentieth century).

Narodnik *democracy*, while fallacious from the formal economic point of view, is correct from the *historical* point of view; *this* democracy, while fallacious as a socialist utopia, is *correct* in terms of the peculiar, historically conditioned democratic struggle of the peasant masses which is an inseparable element of the bourgeois transformation and a condition for its complete victory.

The liberal utopia discourages the peasant masses from fighting. The Narodnik utopia expresses their aspiration to fight, and promises them a million blessings in the event of victory, while this victory will in fact yield them only a hundred blessings. But is it not natural that the millions who are marching to battle, who for ages have lived in unheard-of ignorance, want, poverty, squalor, abandonment and downtroddenness, should magnify tenfold the fruits of an eventual victory?

The liberal utopia is a veil for the self-seeking desire of the new exploiters to share in the privileges of the old exploiters. The Narodnik utopia is an expression of the aspiration of the toiling millions of the petty bourgeoisie to put an end *altogether* to the old, feudal exploiters, but it also expresses the false hope that the new, capitalist exploiters can be abolished along with them.

Clearly, the Marxists, who are hostile to *all and every* utopia, must uphold the independence of the class which can fight feudalism *with supreme devotion* precisely because it is not even one-hundredth part involved in property ownership which makes the bourgeoisie a half-hearted opponent, and often an ally, of the feudal lords. The peasants are involved in small commodity production; given a favourable conjuncture of historical circumstances, they *can* achieve the most complete abolition of feudalism, but they will *always*—inevitably and not accidentally—show a certain vacillation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between liberalism and Marxism.

Clearly, the Marxists must carefully extract the sound and valuable kernel of the sincere, resolute, militant democracy of the peasant masses from the husk of Narodnik utopias.

In the old Marxist literature of the eighties one can discover systematic effort to extract this valuable democratic kernel. Some day historians will study this effort systematically and trace its connection with what in the first decade of the twentieth century came to be called "Bolshevism".

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DEBATES IN BRITAIN ON LIBERAL LABOUR POLICY

It is well known that in Britain there are two workers' parties: the British Socialist Party, as the Social-Democrats now call themselves, and the so-called Independent Labour Party.

This split in the British workers' socialist movement is no accident. It originated long ago. It arose out of the specific features of British history. Capitalism developed in Britain before it did in any other country, and for a long time Britain was the "workshop" of the world. This exceptional, monopoly position created relatively tolerable conditions of life for the *labour aristocracy*, i.e., for the minority of skilled, well-paid workers in Britain.

Hence the petty-bourgeois, craft spirit in the ranks of this labour aristocracy, which has been divorcing itself from its class, following in the wake of the Liberals, and treating socialism contemptuously as a "utopia". The Independent Labour Party is a party of liberal labour policy. It is justly said that this Party is "independent" only of socialism, but very dependent on liberalism.

In recent times Britain's monopoly has been thoroughly undermined. The previous relatively tolerable conditions of life have given way to extreme want as a consequence of the high cost of living. The class struggle is becoming immensely intensified, and along with this the basis for opportunism, the former basis for the spread of the ideas of liberal labour policy among the working class, is being undermined.

So long as these ideas persisted among considerable numbers of British workers, elimination of the split among the workers was out of the question. Unity cannot be *created* by phrases and desires, so long as the Social-Democrats

have to fight against liberal labour policy. *At the present time*, however, this unity is really becoming possible, because the *protest* against liberal labour policy is *growing* in the Independent Labour Party *itself*.

Before us lies the official report of the latest, Twentieth, Annual Conference of that Party, held at Merthyr on May 27 and 28, 1912. The debate on parliamentary policy given in the report is extremely interesting; essentially it was a debate on a deeper issue, that of Social-Democratic and liberal labour policies, although the speakers did not use these terms.

The Conference debate was opened by Jowett, M.P. He moved a resolution against supporting the Liberals, of which we shall speak in greater detail below, and a fellow-thinker, Conway, who seconded the motion, said plainly: "The average worker is asking the question whether the Labour Party in Parliament has a view of its own." Suspicion is growing among the workers that the Labour Party is "tied" to the Liberals. "A feeling is growing in the country that the Labour Party is simply a wing of the Liberal Party." It should be observed that the Parliamentary Labour Party consists *not only* of I.L.P. M.P.s, but also of M.P.s sponsored by trade unions. These call themselves Labour M.P.s and Labour Party members, and *do not belong* to the I.L.P. The British opportunists have succeeded in doing what the opportunists in other countries are frequently inclined to do, namely, in combining opportunist "socialist" M.P.s with the M.P.s of allegedly non-party trade unions. The notorious "broad labour party", of which certain Mensheviks spoke in Russia in 1906-07, has materialised in Britain, and only in Britain.

To give practical expression to his views, Jowett moved a resolution, drawn up in the truly "British" manner, that is, without any general principles (the British pride themselves on their "practicality" and their dislike for general principles; this is just another expression of the craft spirit in the labour movement). The resolution called on the Labour group in the House of Commons *to ignore all threats* that the Liberal government might find itself in a minority and so be compelled to resign, and *to vote steadfastly on the merits of the questions brought before them*.

Jowett's motion "took the bull by the horns". The Liberal Cabinet in Britain, like the entire Liberal Party, is doing its utmost to persuade the workers that all forces must be united against reaction (i.e., against the Conservative Party), that the Liberal majority must be preserved, for it may melt away if the workers do not vote with the Liberals, and that the workers must not isolate themselves but must support the Liberals. And so Jowett puts the question clearly: vote "steadfastly", ignore the threat that the Liberal government may fall, do not vote as the interests of the Liberal Party require it, but on the merits of the questions, i.e., in Marxist language—pursue an independent proletarian class policy and not a liberal labour policy.

(In the ranks of the Independent Labour Party, Marxism is rejected *on principle*, and that is why Marxist language is not used at all.)

The opportunists, who predominate in the Party, immediately attacked Jowett. And—characteristically—they did it exactly as opportunists, in a roundabout way, by an evasion. They did not want to say *plainly* that they were *in favour* of supporting the Liberals. They expressed their idea in *general phrases*, and, of course, did not fail to mention the "Independence" of the working class. Just like our liquidators, who always shout especially loudly about the "independence" of the working class whenever they are *in fact* preparing to replace its independence by a liberal labour policy.

Murray, the representative of the opportunist majority, moved an amendment, i.e., counter-resolution, as follows:

> "That this Conference recognises that the Labour Party, in order to effectually carry out its object, must continue to regard all the possible consequences and effects, immediate and otherwise, of any line of action before adopting it, bearing in mind that its decisions must be guided solely by consideration for its own interest as a party, and by desire to increase its opportunities for attaining its ends."

Compare the two motions. Jowett's motion clearly demanded a break with the policy of supporting the Liberals. Murray's consisted of meaningless commonplaces, quite plausible and at first sight indisputable, but *in fact* serving to disguise *precisely* the policy of supporting the Liberals. Had Murray been acquainted with Marx, and had he

been speaking to people who respected Marxism, he would have thought nothing of sweetening his opportunism with Marxist turns of speech and saying that Marxism demands that all the concrete circumstances of each particular case should be taken into consideration, that we must not tie our hands, that while preserving our independence we "take advantage of conflicts", "seize at the Achilles heel of the contradictions" in the present regime, and so on and so forth.

Opportunism can be expressed in terms of *any* doctrine *you like*, *including Marxism*. The peculiarity of the "destiny of Marxism" in Russia lies precisely in the fact that not only opportunism in the workers' party, but also opportunism in the liberal party (Izgoyev and Co.), likes to dress itself in Marxist "*terms*"! But that is by the way. Let us return to Merthyr.

Jowett was supported by McLachlan.

> "What are the interests of a political party?" he asked. "Are the interests of the party merely to be served by retaining men in the House of Commons? If the interests of the party are to be considered, then the men and women who are outside Parliament have as much right to be considered as the men in Parliament. As a socialist organisation we should try to give effect to our principles in our political activities."

And McLachlan referred to the vote on the Heswell Reformatory case. A boy inmate of the reformatory had been tortured to death. A question was asked in Parliament. The Liberal Cabinet was threatened with defeat: Britain is not Prussia, and a Cabinet that is in the minority must resign. And so, to save the Cabinet, the Labour M.P.s voted in favour of whitewashing the torturer.

The Labour Party, said McLachlan, keeps on taking into account the effect which their vote might have on the fate of the government, thinking that should the Cabinet fall, Parliament would be dissolved and a new general election announced. But that was nothing to be afraid of. The fall of the Cabinet and the announcement of new elections would result in a *combination of the two bourgeois parties* (McLachlan simply said: the "other two parties", without the word "bourgeois". The British do not like Marxist terms!), *and the sooner that happened*, *the better for our movement*. The words of our propagandists should be carried into effect by

the work of our men in the House. Until that was done, the Tory (i.e., Conservative) workman *would never believe there was any difference between the Liberal and Labour Parties*. Even if we lost every seat in the House through upholding our principles, it would do more good than attempts to coax a Liberal government into making concessions!

Keir Hardie, M.P., the Party leader, twists and turns.

"It is not true to say that the Labour Party upholds the balance of power. The Liberals and Irishmen in the House can outvote the Tory and Labour members.... In the case of the Heswell Reformatory I voted for the government purely on the merits of the case, and not in support of the government. The superintendent had been guilty of harshness and cruelty, and every Labour member went to the House determined to vote against the government. But during the debate the other side was put, and it showed that although the superintendent had been guilty of cruel treatment, the record of the School was the best in the Kingdom. Under those circumstances it would have been wrong to vote against the government.... [Such is the pass to which the British opportunists have brought the Labour Party: the leader was not howled down for that sort of speech, but was listened to calmly!]

"The real trouble is not with the I.L.P. members, but that when the Labour Party took over the Miners' Federation, and the miners' members joined the Labour group, *they were Liberals*, and they have not changed their opinions, since they gave a *purely nominal* adherence to the Party....

"Jowett's resolution reduces Parliamentary government to absurdity. The consequences of any vote must be considered....

"I would advise the previous question as regards both the resolution and the amendment." (!!!)

Lansbury, supporting Jowett's resolution, said:

"It is not so foolish as Keir Hardie would have us suppose. It does not mean that in voting upon a question every consideration should be ignored but *only* the consideration as to what effect it would have on the government. I got into the socialist movement through sheer disgust with political caucuses and bosses, and the control of the House of Commons by such people. My experience has been that every question that comes up for discussion has to be discussed in regard to its probable effect on the fortunes of the government of the day.

"It makes it almost impossible for the Labour Party to differentiate itself from the Liberal Party. I do not know of any particular piece of legislation in connection with which the Labour Party has in any kind of way differentiated itself from the Liberals. We as a party were part and parcel of the government in regard to the Insurance Act.... The Labour Party voted steadily for the Bill, and stood by the government all the way through.

"I was ashamed of the vote over the Heswell Reformatory. When a man poured boiling water over a boy until he died I felt ashamed of ... voting for the whitewashing of that man. On that occasion the Labour Party whips ran about the House bringing up their men to prevent the government being defeated.... To accustom men ... to voting against their consciences is deadly for the future of democracy in this country...."

Philip Snowden, M.P., one of the most rabid opportunists, wriggled like an eel. He said:

"My fighting instinct inclines me to support the resolution, but my common sense, judgement, and experience induce me to vote for the amendment. I agree that the present Parliamentary system has a demoralising effect upon those who went to the House moved by idealism and political enthusiasm. But I do not believe the adoption of Jowett's resolution will make much difference. The merits of a question are not confined to the particular question itself. There are certain issues which the Labour Party considers of greater importance than any possible consequences of voting for the government —Women's Suffrage is one—but are we to disregard consequences on every paltry issue? This policy would necessitate repeated General Elections and nothing is more irritating to the public than such contests.... Politics means compromise."

When a vote was taken, 73 voted for the resolution and 195 *against*.

The opportunists carried the day. That is not surprising in an opportunist party like the British I.L.P. But it is now a fully established fact that opportunism is giving rise to an opposition in the ranks of this very Party.

The opponents of opportunism acted far more correctly than their like-minded colleagues in Germany frequently do when they defend rotten compromises with the opportunists. The fact that they came out openly with their resolution gave rise to an extremely important debate on principles, and this debate will have a very strong effect on the British working class. Liberal labour policy persists owing to tradition, routine and the agility of opportunist leaders. But its bankruptcy among the mass of the proletariat is inevitable.

Written in October 1912

First published in
Prosveshcheniye No. 4,
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Signed: *W.*

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A CADET PROFESSOR

Professor Tugan-Baranovsky, a candidate of the Cadet Party, is one of those Russian economists who were near-Marxists in their youth but later quickly "grew wiser", "corrected" Marx with shreds of bourgeois theories, and by their great services as renegades secured university chairs from which to bamboozle students in erudite fashion.

A few days ago Mr. Tugan, who has developed from a Marxist into a liberal, dished up in the newspaper *Rech* the following argument concerning the burning issue of the high cost of living:

> "In my [?] view, the main [aha!] reason for the increased cost of living is perfectly clear. It is due to the enormous growth of the population, chiefly in the towns. The increased population necessitates a change to the use of more intensive cultivation methods which *in accordance with the well-known law of declining productivity* of agricultural labour, leads to a higher labour cost per unit of product."

Mr. Tugan likes to shout "I" and "my". But in fact he merely repeats shreds of bourgeois doctrines refuted long ago by Marx.

The "well-known law of declining productivity" is a bit of old bourgeois rubbish, which ignoramuses and the hired scholars of the bourgeoisie use *to justify capitalism*. Marx long ago disproved this "law", which puts the blame on *nature* (as if to say, productivity of labour is dropping, and there's nothing to be done about it!), whereas in fact the blame lies with the *capitalist social* system.

The "law of declining productivity of agricultural labour" is a bourgeois lie. The law of the growth of *rent*, i.e., of the income of the *owners* of land, under capitalism is a reality.

One reason for the high cost of living is land monopoly, i.e., the fact that land is held as private property. The landowners are therefore taking an ever greater contribution from *growing* productivity of labour. Only the organisation of the workers to defend their interests, only the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, can put an end to the high cost of living.

None but hangers-on of the bourgeoisie, such as the Cadet Mr. Tugan, are capable of trying to defend the fable about the "law" of declining productivity of agricultural labour.

Pravda No. 147, October 19, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A NEW CHAPTER OF WORLD HISTORY

Even the bourgeois press throughout Europe, which for reactionary and selfish reasons defended the notorious *status quo* in the Balkans, is now unanimous in acknowledging that a new chapter of world history has begun.

The defeat of Turkey is beyond question. The victories won by the Balkan states united in a quadruple alliance (Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece) are tremendous. The alliance of these four states is a fact. "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples" is something that has *already* been achieved.

What, then, is the significance of the new chapter of world history?

In Eastern Europe (Austria, the Balkans, Russia), the powerful survivals of medievalism, which terribly hamper social development and the growth of the proletariat, have not yet been abolished. These survivals are absolutism (unlimited autocratic power), feudalism (landlordism and feudal privileges) and the suppression of nationalities.

The class-conscious workers of the Balkan countries are the first to put forward the slogan of a consistently democratic solution of the national problem in the Balkans. That slogan calls for a Balkan federal republic. The weakness of the democratic classes in the present-day Balkan states (where the proletariat is small in number and the peasants are downtrodden, disunited and illiterate) has resulted in an economically and politically indispensable alliance becoming an alliance of Balkan monarchies.

The national question in the Balkans has taken a big stride towards its settlement. Of all the states of Eastern Europe, *Russia alone* remains the most backward today.

Although the alliance which has come into being in the Balkans is an alliance of monarchies and not of republics, and although this alliance has come about through war and not through revolution, a great step has nevertheless been taken towards doing away with the survivals of medievalism throughout Eastern Europe. And you are rejoicing prematurely, nationalist gentlemen! That step is *against* you, for there are *more* survivals of medievalism in Russia *than anywhere else*!

As for Western Europe, the proletariat there is still more vigorously proclaiming the slogan: No intervention! The Balkans for the Balkan peoples!

Pravda No. 149, October 21, 1912
Signed: *T*.

Published according to the *Pravda* text

CADETS AND NATIONALISTS

When we pointed out that the Cadets were essentially national-liberals in their outlook and that their approach to the national question was *anything but democratic*, we got an angry and haughty retort from *Rech*, which accused us of not knowing the facts or misrepresenting them.

Here is a record—one of many. Let the readers and voters judge for themselves.

On October 18 a "circle of persons interested in the Slav question" held a second meeting at Mr. M. M. Kovalevsky's. An appeal to society was read, signed by Y. Anichkov. Kareyev, L. Panteleyev (Cadet ex-candidate), G. Falbork. Mr. Kovalevsky (of course) and others.

Will *Rech* try to dodge responsibility for Kareyev, Panteleyev and Co.?

The gist of the liberals' appeal to society is that

> "**amidst general enthusiasm**, **the hearts of the Russians** ... are beating in sympathy for the Slavs **and with the hope that Russian national consciousness** will help to ensure that they retain the fruits or their victories".

In what way does this differ from the nationalism and chauvinism of *Novoye Vremya* and Co.? Only in that it has white gloves on and that the turns of speech used in it are more diplomatically cautious. But chauvinism is abominable even when wearing white gloves and using the most refined turns of speech.

Democrats will never speak of "general enthusiasm" when beside (and above!) them are Russian nationalists ruthlessly oppressing a number of peoples.

Democrats will never stand for the Slav as such being contrasted with the Turk, whereas one should contrast the

Slav and Turkish peasants, *together*, with the Slav and Turkish landlords and bashi-bazouks.

Democrats will never allow "Russian national consciousness" to be substituted for the *political consciousness* of the partisans of freedom and enemies of oppression in *all* nationalities—at a time when Poles, Jews, and "non-Russians" in general are oppressed and persecuted.

No fair-minded democrat, no sincere supporter of the oppressed nationalities, should vote for the Cadets!

Pravda No. 151, October 24, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE HORRORS OF WAR

The belligerents are doing their utmost to conceal from "outsiders", i.e., from the whole world, what is going on in the Balkans. Correspondents are deceived and held up, and are not allowed on the battlefield until long after battles have come to an end.

That is why only exceptional circumstances enable one at rare intervals to learn the truth about the war. Apparently, such exceptional circumstances helped Mr. Donohoe, a correspondent of the British *Daily Chronicle*. He succeeded in being with the Turkish Army during the battle at Lule Burgaz; then he drove by car to Constantinople, and from there went by sea to Constanta in Rumania. From Constanta he was able to wire London without hindrance.

The Turks suffered a terrible defeat. Up to 40,000 (!) of them fell in battle. A catastrophe not less than that at Mukden,[146] wrote the British correspondent. Three-quarters of the Turkish artillery passed into Bulgarian hands. The Bulgarians would let the Turks come up very close and engage in a hand-to-hand combat, and then would swiftly withdraw while their *machine-guns* mowed the Turks down in hundreds and thousands.

The Turks' retreat became a disorderly flight of stupefied, starving, exhausted and maddened mobs. The correspondent's car got stuck in a crowd of fugitives. The starving Turks begged him for bread. They had to bandage

their own wounds. Doctors were few. There were no dressings and no supples. I have witnessed many a military campaign, wrote the correspondent, but I could never have imagined so appalling a disaster, such a wholesale massacre of starving, exhausted, tormented, helpless peasants from Anatolia (Asiatic Turkey).

Pravda No. 155, October 28, 1912
Signed: *V. Fr.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE CADETS AND THE BIG BOURGEOISIE

The Cadet victories in the first city curias of Moscow and St. Petersburg, then in the elections to the Council of State from the industries, and lastly, the *reactionaries*' aid to the Cadets against the Social-Democrats—a fact established beyond question—are all signs of a very interesting political development of *all* the classes of our society.

Let us recall the Social-Democrats' main decision on the nature of the Cadet Party, adopted in 1907: "The parties of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, and the most important of them—the Cadet Party—have already turned definitely away from the revolution and aim at stopping it through a deal with the counter-revolution; the social basis of these parties is made up of the economically more progressive sections of the bourgeoisie, above all the bourgeois intelligentsia, while a section of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie is still following these parties only by force of tradition [blind habit] and because it is simply deceived by the liberals."

The correctness of this description has been fully borne out by events. The democrats are ousting the Cadets from the second city curia (where there are *many* democratic voters). The Cadets are ousting the Octobrists from the first urban curia.

The more the reaction rages and the more openly the elections are rigged, the more big capital goes over to the side of liberalism. The class nature of the Cadet Party, indicated by the Marxists in 1906 and 1907, is now *being revealed* clearly before the masses.

The error of those who considered the Cadets a party of urban *democrats* is becoming obvious. The alliance of

the Cadets and the reactionaries is gradually turning from a secret into an *open* one: it is the reactionaries who are voting the Cadet Mansyrev in against the Social-Democrat Priedkalns, and the Cadet Nikolayev against the Social-Democrat Pokrovsky.

The strength of Social-Democratic policy, the invincibility of this policy, is due to the fact that the *entire* development of capitalist society is increasingly proving it correct. The Cadets are rallying to the big bourgeoisie, which *cannot* be content for all that it is counter-revolutionary. The democrats are moving to the *left*, away from the Cadets.

Pravda No. 157, November 1, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

TRULY RUSSIAN MORALS

A few days ago the newspaper *Zemshchina* carried, along with verses by Purishkevich, a little article concerning the "famous" official publicist Guryev of *Rossiya* (who from now on will be famous without inverted commas). *Zemshchina* assures its readers that he is a "publicist of a Jewish-liberal shade". How strange! Is it possible that the official *Rossiya*, too, is a Jewish-liberal organ?

But what is the point? It is that Guryev has been unanimously expelled from the board of a St. Petersburg spinning mill by the general meeting of its shareholders. In addition, the meeting resolved to request the procurator to start proceedings against Guryev for his irregular practices.

It appears that Guryev contributed 1,000 rubles and acquired the right to *one-third* of the profits, although two co-owners of the mill had contributed 100,000 rubles! Why this generous treatment of Guryev by the capitalists?

Because that gentleman is a councillor of state, a contributor to the official newspaper *Rossiya*, and so on and so forth. He was Witte's private secretary. He has "exceptional connections". He promised *government subsidies*!

And so, the capitalist gentlemen "valued" those government "connections" fairly highly: 49,000 rubles exactly. You have the goods, we have the money. You have "connections in government quarters", an opportunity of obtaining subsidies, we have money. Sale and purchase. "Connections in government quarters", so-and-so many thousands; a promise of subsidies, so-and-so much; contributions to the official *Rossiya*, so-and-so much. Collect your money, Mr. Guryev!

Guryev collected it—and fooled them. He did not keep his promises but claimed over one-third of the profits and,

what is more, resorted to blackmail, i.e., to extorting money under threat of undermining the credit of the establishment.

A characteristic affair. A typical affair. An everyday occurrence. An illustration to the theme, Government connections and subsidies, and their relation to capital".

Only, where does the "Jewish-liberal shade" come in, gentlemen of *Zemshchina*? It is a truly Russian, truly conservative shade! Don't be so modest, friends of Purishkevich!

Pravda No. 160, November 4, 1912
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE PLATFORM OF THE REFORMISTS AND THE PLATFORM OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL- DEMOCRATS

The revolutionary upswing in Russia made itself clearly felt in the first half of 1912. The number of political strikers, as calculated by the factory owners, reached 515,000 for five months. A particularly important document, reprinted in full in No. 27 of the Central Organ, namely, the May Day appeal of the St. Petersburg workers, provides evidence as to the nature of the strikers' slogans, their demands, the political content of their demonstrations, meetings, etc.

The slogans with which the St. Petersburg workers came forward in those memorable days were not reformist but revolutionary Social-Democratic slogans: a constituent assembly, an eight-hour working day, confiscation of the landed estates, the overthrow of the tsarist government, and a democratic republic.

The revolts and attempted revolts of soldiers and sailors—in Turkestan, in the Baltic Fleet and on the Black Sea—supplied fresh *objective* evidence that after long years of rampant counter-revolution and of a lull in the working-class movement, a new revolutionary upswing had begun.

This upswing coincided with the period of the elections to the Fourth Duma, when all parties and all political trends *had* to present, in one form or another, their *general* appraisal of the political situation. Now, if we want to analyse our political tasks seriously, as the tasks of the working class and not the pious wishes of little groups, and if we want to test programmes and platforms in a Marxist way by comparing them with the facts of the mass struggle and with the actions of *all* the classes of this society, we

must also test the various election platforms on the touchstone of *this revolutionary upswing* of the masses. For, as far as the Social-Democrats are concerned, elections are not a special political operation, not an attempt to win seats through all sorts of promises and declarations, but merely a special occasion for advocating the basic demands and the principles of the political world outlook of the class-conscious proletariat.

The programmes and platforms of all the government parties, from the Black Hundreds to Guchkov, leave no room for doubt. They are plainly and openly counter-revolutionary. It is common knowledge that these parties lack a foothold of any real importance not only among the working class and the peasantry, but *even* among wide sections of the bourgeoisie. These sections have almost completely turned away from the Octobrists.

The programmes and platforms of the liberal bourgeois parties have been published in part almost officially (the platform of the Moslem group) and are partly known quite accurately through the "big" political press (the platforms of the "Progressists" and of the Cadets). The *essence* of all these programmes and platforms has been inimitably expressed in the declarations of the garrulous Cadet, Gredeskul, which were reprinted in *Rech* and from there found their way into the Marxist press.

"A public *denial of the need* for a new revolution in Russia" is how Gredeskul himself formulated his views (cf. *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 27, p. 3). It was he, too, who contrasted the *real* platform of the liberals (with the Cadets at their head) with that of the revolutionaries, saving that "what we need is *merely* quiet, persevering and confident *constitutional* work".

We stress the words "real platform", for in Russia, as in all bourgeois countries, most platforms are mere *window dressing*.

The crux of the matter is what was admitted (in a rare fit of truthfulness) by Mr. Gredeskul. The liberal monarchist bourgeoisie is *opposed* to a new revolution and advocates *only* constitutional reforms.

The Social-Democrats consistently, and the bourgeois democrats (Narodniks) hesitantly, uphold the "need" for

a new revolution, and are carrying on propaganda in favour of such a revolution. The upswing of the *mass* struggle *has begun*. The revolutionary Social-Democrats are trying to extend and strengthen it, helping it develop to a still higher plane, to the stage of *revolution*. The reformists, however, regard the upswing as a mere "revival"; their policy is a policy aimed at obtaining constitutional concessions, constitutional reforms. It follows that the bourgeoisie and proletariat have entered, at this "stage" of Russian history as well, into a struggle for influence over the "people", over the masses. No one can foretell the outcome of this struggle, but neither can anyone entertain any doubts as to the position which the R.S.D.L.P. must occupy in *this* struggle.

It is in this way, and only in this way, that one can start to appraise the election platform of the *Party* and the election platform issued the other day by the "Organising Committee" elected by the liquidationist conference.

The election platform of the Party, published by the Central Committee after the January Conference, was drafted *before* the events of April and May. These events *proved* it correct. A single theme runs through the whole platform—criticism of constitutional reforms in *present-day* Russia as hopeless and utopian, and the propaganda of revolution. The slogans of the platform have been framed *precisely* in such a way as to express the revolutionary tasks with perfect clarity and make it absolutely impossible to mistake them for promises of constitutional reforms. The platform of the Party represents a direct *appeal* of the revolutionary Social-Democrats to *hundreds of thousands* of political strikers, to those who are in the front ranks of the millions of the muzhik armed forces, to whom it *explains* the tasks of an uprising. A revolutionary party could not even dream of a better test for its platform, of a better confirmation of it by experience, than this direct response to the explanations of the Party—the May strikes and the attempted military revolts in June and July.

Look at the platform of the liquidators. Its liquidationist essence is artfully concealed by Trotsky's revolutionary phrases. This camouflage may sometimes blind naïve and altogether inexperienced people, and may even appear to

be "reconciliation" between the liquidators and the Party. But the most cursory examination will rapidly dissipate this self-deception.

The platform of the liquidators was written *after* the May strikes and the attempted revolts in the summer. And in seeking a real practical answer to the question of the essence of this platform, the first thing we ask is: *how* does it appraise those strikes and those attempts?

"The economic upswing...", "...by the growth of its strike movement, the proletariat has signalled the coming new social upswing...", "...the powerful April movement of the proletariat demanding freedom of association"—that is *all* the liquidators' platform says about the April and May strikes.

But this is indeed an untruth! It is a crying distortion of the issue! The *main* thing is omitted here, namely, the *revolutionary* character of the political strike, which is not aimed at winning a constitutional reform, but at *overthrowing* the government, i.e., at revolution.

How could such an untruth come to be written in an illegal, revolutionary leaflet full of "red" phrases? It *had* to be, because *such* is the *view* of the liberals and the liquidators. They see in strikes what they wish to see—a struggle for constitutional reforms. They do not see what they do not wish to see, namely, a revolutionary upswing. We liberals want to fight for reform, but not for revolution—there you have the *truth* of the class position that found expression in the *untruth* of the liquidators.

With regard to the attempted revolts we read, "...the soldiers in the barracks are driven by violence, humiliation and starvation to *outbursts of desperate protest*, then they are suppressed with bullets, the rope", etc.

This is a liberal appraisal. We revolutionary Social-Democrats regard the attempted revolts as the *beginning of an uprising of the masses*, even if an unsuccessful, untimely, incorrect beginning. And we know that the *masses learn* how to make a successful uprising only from the experience of unsuccessful ones, just as the Russian workers, by a series of unsuccessful, and sometimes particularly unsuccessful, political strikes in 1901-04 learned to organise the successful strike of October 1905. We say that the workers

and peasants who are most downtrodden by the barracks *have begun* to rise in revolt. Hence the plain and obvious conclusion: we must *explain* to them how and for what purpose they should prepare for a *successful* uprising.

The liberals take a different view. The soldiers *are* "driven" to "outbursts of *desperate* protest", they say. To a liberal, an insurgent soldier is not the subject of the revolution, not the forerunner of the masses rising in revolt, but an *object* of governmental evil ("driven to desperation"), serving to demonstrate that evil.

See how bad our government is—it *drives* the soldiers to *desperation* and then suppresses them with bullets, says the liberal (the inference being: if we liberals were in power, there would be no soldiers' mutinies).

See how deeply and widely revolutionary energy is maturing among the masses—says the Social-Democrat—even the soldiers and sailors who are downtrodden by barrack drill are beginning to rise in revolt, and by rising badly they teach how to rise successfully.

As you see, the liquidators have "*interpreted*" (in the senatorial sense of the word interpret) the revolutionary upsurge in Russia during the spring and the summer.

After which they "interpreted" the programme of our Party.

The Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. says:

> "The R.S.D.L.P. sets itself the *immediate* political task of overthrowing the tsarist autocracy and replacing it by a democratic republic, whose constitution *would ensure*: (1) the sovereignty of the people" ... etc., and then comes a list of "liberties" and "rights".

One would think that this could not be misunderstood; the "immediate" task is the overthrow of the autocracy and its replacement by a republic, which would *ensure* liberties.

The liquidators have revised all this.

> In their platform we read: "The Social-Democrats call on the people to fight for a democratic republic....
>
> "Striving for this aim, which the people will be able to *achieve only as a result of revolution*, the Social-Democrats *in the present election campaign* [listen to this!] call on the working masses to rally to the following current demands: (1) universal, etc., suffrage ... *in the elections to the Duma*", etc.

Mr. Peshekhonov, a Socialist-Revolutionary liquidator, wrote in the autumn of 1906, when he was founding an "open party" (and almost succeeded in founding it, but the police stepped in and put him in quod!), that the republic was a "*remote* prospect", that "the question of a republic requires extreme caution", that the *immediate* demands now were reforms.

But the Socialist-Revolutionary liquidator was naïve, simple, clumsy and blunt. Do the "European" opportunists ever act in that way? No. They are more cunning, more clever, more diplomatic.

They do not renounce the slogan of a republic—what a libel! They only "interpret" it in a suitable fashion, being prompted by considerations obvious to every philistine. It is a moot point whether there will be a revolution or not, says the man in the street simply, and Trotsky repeats it in a scholarly fashion in *Nasha Zarya* (No. 5, p. 21). A republic "*only* as a result of revolution", but the "*current*" issue "in the present election campaign" is constitutional reforms!

Everything went off so smoothly: the republic is both recognised and relegated to the distant future. Heaps of r-r-revolutionary words were spoken, but in reality the demands put forward "in the present election campaign" (the whole platform is written only for this *present campaign*!) as "current" are those for reforms.

Yes, it was certainly great "masters of diplomacy" who were present at the liquidators' conference. But what puny masters they are! While they may delight the group diplomatists and mislead the simple-minded "conciliators", the Marxists will talk to them in a different strain.

The philistine is satisfied with the undoubted, holy and *empty* truth that it is impossible to say in advance whether there will be a revolution or not. A Marxist is not satisfied with that; he says: our propaganda and the propaganda of all worker Social-Democrats is *one of the factors determining* whether there will be a revolution or not. Hundreds of thousands of political strikers and the foremost men of various units of the armed forces ask us, our Party, what they should strive for, for the sake of what they should rise, what they should try to achieve, whether they should expand the up-

surge that has begun into a revolution, or whether they should direct it towards a struggle for reforms.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats have given their answer to these questions, which are more interesting and important than the philistine-Trotskyist attitude of uncertainty: will there be a revolution or not, who can tell?

Our answer is—criticism of the utopia of constitutional reforms, explanation of the futility of the hopes placed in them, the utmost all-round promotion of the *revolutionary* upsurge, utilisation of the election campaign *for this purpose*. Whether or not there will be a revolution does *not* depend on us *alone*. But we shall do *our* work, and this work will never be in vain. It will sow the seeds of democracy and proletarian independence deep among the masses, and these seeds will *certainly* sprout and produce either a democratic revolution tomorrow, or a socialist revolution the day after.

Those, however, who preach to the *masses* their vulgar, intellectualist, Bundist-Trotskyist scepticism—"we don't know whether there will be a revolution or not, but the '*current*' issue is reforms"—are *already* corrupting the masses, preaching liberal utopias to them.

Instead of *permeating* the election campaign with the spirit of the present, real, "*actual*" political situation, in which half a million workers are engaged in revolutionary strikes, and the foremost men in the muzhik armed forces are firing on their aristocrat officers—instead of this they *dismiss* from their would-be "European" (they are so European, so European, are our liquidators!) "parliamentary" considerations this real situation (in which there is very little of the "European", but very much of the "Chinese", *that is to say*, of the democratic-revolutionary), and having dismissed it by means of a few non-committal phrases, they declare the reformist election campaign to be the *real* thing.

The Social-Democratic Party needs a platform for the elections to the Fourth Duma in order once more to explain to the masses—in connection with the elections, on the occasion of the elections, *and* in debates on the elections—*the need for*, *and the urgency and inevitability of*, the revolution.

They, the liquidators, need a platform "*for*" the elections, i.e., a platform enabling them politely to dismiss consider-

ations about a revolution as an uncertain eventuality and to declare the election campaign for a list of constitutional reforms to be the "real" thing.

The Social-Democratic Party wants to use the elections in order again to drive home to the masses the idea of the need for revolution, and the fact of the revolutionary upswing which has begun. That is why the Social-Democratic Party, in its platform, says briefly and plainly to those voting in the elections *to the Fourth Duma*: *not* constitutional reforms, but a republic, *not* reformism, but revolution.

The liquidators are using the elections to the Fourth Duma to preach constitutional reforms and *weaken* the idea of revolution. It is *for* this purpose and because of this that they depict soldiers' revolts as "outbursts of desperate protest" to which soldiers are "driven", and not as the *beginning* of a mass uprising which will grow or subside according, among other things, to whether or not *all* the Social-Democratic workers of Russia at once begin to support it with all their might, with all their energy, with all their enthusiasm.

It is for this purpose that the May strikes have been "interpreted" from being revolutionary into being reformist.

It is for this purpose that the Party programme has been "interpreted", and instead of the "immediate" task of establishing a republic that will *ensure* liberties, it has been decreed to regard as *current* in the "present election campaign"—for the Fourth Duma, don't laugh!—the demand for various liberties.

How much that is old Chinese there is in Russian life! What an amount of old Chinese practices there is in our tsarism, and also in our liquidators, who wish to fit the "ceremonials" of parliamentary struggle and reformism into a setting which has the Purishkeviches and Treshchenkovs on top and revolutionary attempts of the masses below! How much that is old Chinese there is in these vain efforts of intellectuals to defend themselves against the Khvostovs and Makarovs by producing a letter of recommendation from MacDonald and Jaurès, from Bissolati and Bernstein, from Kolb and Frank!

The diplomatic "reconciliation" of liquidationist views with those of the Party that was staged by Trotsky at the

liquidationist conference does not in reality "reconcile" anything at all. It does not remove the greatest political fact, which determines the entire social and political situation in present-day Russia. That fact is the struggle between the reformist and the revolutionary Social-Democratic platforms; it is the pronouncement of the bourgeoisie, as represented by its liberal party leaders, against the need for a new revolution in Russia and in favour of purely constitutional "work", in opposition to the revolutionary strike of hundreds of thousands of proletarians, which is a call to the masses to begin a real struggle for freedom.

To make one bow to the reformists and another to the revolutionary Social-Democrats does not do away with this objective political fact, does not weaken its force and weight in the slightest degree. Good intentions to smooth over differences arising from this fact—even assuming that these intentions are indeed perfectly "good" and sincere—are powerless to alter the irreconcilably hostile political tendencies arising from the entire counter-revolutionary situation.

The proletariat has risen with its revolutionary Social-Democratic banner, and on the eve of the Fourth, Black-Hundred, Duma, it will not lower it before the liberals, will not furl it to please the reformists, will not consent to blunt or tone down its platform for reasons of group diplomacy.

The platform of revolutionary Social-Democracy versus the platform of reformism—this was the watchword under which the May strikes took place. Under it, too, the R.S.D.L.P. is entering the elections to a landlord and priest Duma, and under it the Party will carry on its entire work in that Duma and among the masses.

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the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

THE ILLEGAL PARTY AND LEGAL WORK

The question of the illegal party and of legal work of the Social-Democrats in Russia is one of the cardinal Party questions. It has been the concern of the R.S.D.L.P. *throughout* the post-revolutionary period, and has given rise to the bitterest struggle within its ranks.

The struggle over this issue has been going on chiefly between the liquidators and the anti-liquidators, and its bitterness is due in full measure to the fact that it *amounted* to the question whether our old, illegal Party was to be or not to be. The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in December 1908 emphatically condemned liquidationism and, in a special resolution, clearly formulated the Party's view on the organisational question: the Party is made up of illegal Social-Democratic nuclei, which must establish for themselves "strong-points for work among the masses" in the form of as wide and as ramified a network of various legal workers' societies as possible.

Both the decision of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in January 1910 and the All-Russia Conference in January 1912 fully confirmed this view of the Party. The thoroughly definite and stable character of this view is perhaps most clearly described in Comrade Plekhanov's latest *Dnevnik* (No. 16, April 1912). We say "most clearly" because it was Plekhanov who at that time took a neutral stand (on the significance of the January Conference). And from his neutral standpoint, he fully confirmed this established Party view, saying that the so-called "initiating groups"—which had broken away from the Party organisation or had deserted it or arisen independently of it—could

not be considered as belonging to the Party without a special decision taken by a congress or conference of the illegal nuclei. It is anarchism in regard to principle, and support for and legitimation of liquidationism in regard to practice, wrote Comrade Plekhanov, to allow the "initiating groups" to decide *for themselves* whether they belong to the Party.

It would seem that, in view of this last explanation by the neutral Plekhanov, the question which has been quite definitely decided by the Party on so many occasions should be regarded as finished with. But the resolution of the latest liquidationist conference makes us return to it in view of the fresh attempts to tangle what had been untangled and to obscure things that are clear. *Nevsky Golos* (No. 9), along with the most furious abuse of the anti-liquidators, declared that the new conference was not liquidationist. Yet the conference resolution on one of the most important issues, that of the illegal Party and legal work, shows most plainly that the conference was liquidationist through and through.

It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the resolution in detail and to quote it in full for this purpose.

I

The resolution of the liquidators' conference is headed "Organisational *Forms* of Party *Building*", yet its very first clause reveals that it is not a question of "forms" of building, but of the *kind* of party—old or new—that they want to "build" in this case. Here is that first clause:

> "This Conference, having discussed the forms and methods of building the Party, has reached the following conclusion:
>
> "1. The transformation of the Social-Democratic Party into a self-governing organisation of the, Social-Democratic proletariat can be effected only insofar as the Social-Democratic organisation takes shape in the course of drawing the mass of the workers into open social and political activities in all their manifestations."

Thus the very first word used in the resolution on *building* the **Party** is an unqualified recognition of the neces-

sity for a *transformation* of the Social-Democratic Party. This is strange, to say the least. To be sure, every member of the Party has a right to seek its "transformation", but then the question has *admittedly* been, for four years already, whether the *old* Party should be recognised! Anyone knows that!

The Party resolution (December 1908) spoke in the clearest possible terms of condemning the liquidators, who wanted to "*replace*" the old Party by a new one. In April 1912 Plekhanov asked point-blank the defenders of the "initiating groups" which planned to (and did) call a liquidationist conference: "Does our old Party exist or not?" (*Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 16, April 1912, p. 8).

This question cannot be evaded. It is posed by a four years' struggle. It fully expresses the gravity of the so-called Party "crisis".

When a question *such as this* is answered by saying: "the *transformation* of the Social-Democratic Party ... can be effected only—", we see at once that it is a meaningless evasion and not an answer.

None but members of the *old* Party may speak of transforming the *Party. By evading* the question whether there is an old Party or not, and decreeing without further ado (with *non*-Party "initiating groups" co-operating) what you call a "transformation", you do no more, gentlemen, than fully confirm that your standpoint is liquidationist! This becomes still more evident when the resolution, after the perfectly meaningless, declamatory phrase about a "self-governing organisation of the Social-Democratic proletariat", reduces the issue to the proposition that the "transformation" "*can* be effected *only* insofar as the Social-Democratic organisation takes shape [we will not dwell on the ridiculous, inflated and stupid phraseology used] in the course of drawing the mass of the workers into *open social and political* activities"!!

What does that mean? Do the authors of this amazing resolution call strikes and demonstrations "drawing the masses into open", etc., activities? Logic suggests that they *do*! In that case the resolution is sheer nonsense, for anyone knows very well that an "organisation *takes shape*" even without strikes and demonstrations. The organisation,

wise gentlemen, is always there, while the masses resort to *open* action only from time to time.

By "open social and political activities" (the bureaucratic-liberal style those people use—just like that of *Russkiye Vedomosti* thirty years ago!) the liquidators mean the *legal* forms of the working-class movement, and not at all strikes, demonstrations and so on. Splendid. In that case, too, the resolution is nonsense, because it is by no means "only" in the course of drawing the masses into the legal movement that in our country the organisation "takes shape", and has taken shape. We *have* organisations in many places where *no* forms of legal movement are allowed.

Thus the main clause of the resolution (the organisation takes shape "*only insofar*") is definitely worthless. It is nothing but a muddle.

But there is an obvious liquidationist *content* to this muddle. A transformation is possible *only* in the course of drawing the masses into the *legal* movement—that is what the gibberish of Clause 1 boils down to. And this *is* the sheerest liquidationism.

For four years the Party has been saying: our organisation consists of illegal nuclei surrounded by as wide and as ramified a network of legal societies as possible.

For four years the liquidators have been denying that they are liquidators, and for four years they have been asserting: a transformation *can be effected only* in the course of drawing the masses into the legal movement. They evade the question of what our Party *consists* of and *what* this *old* Party *is like*, doing it in exactly the way that suits the legalists. It is very much the same old story; in April 1912 Plekhanov asked: does our old Party exist or not? The liquidators' conference replies: "a transformation can be effected *only insofar as* the masses are drawn into the legal movement"!

This reply comes from the legalists, who have broken away from the Party and who yesterday were strong and goaded the Party, but today (having been defeated) are timid and defend themselves by eloquence.

FROM MARX TO MAO
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II

Clause 2 of the resolution reads:

> "2. In view of the changed social and political conditions compared with the pre-revolutionary epoch, the illegal Party organisations already existing or coming into existence must adapt themselves to the new forms and methods of the open working-class movement."

Fine logic again. A *change* in social conditions necessitates only a *change* in the form of organisation, but the resolution in no way substantiates the *direction* of this change.

Why does the resolution refer to "the changed social and political conditions"? Evidently to prove, substantiate and draw the practical conclusion: it is necessary for the illegal organisation to adapt itself to the legal movement. But the premise does not warrant this conclusion. "In view of the changed conditions", the legal must adapt itself to the illegal—such a conclusion would be just as legitimate!

Why this confusion of the liquidators?

Because they are afraid to tell the truth and want to sit on two stools at once.

The truth is that the liquidators stand for a *liquidationist* appraisal (made by Levitsky, Larin, Yezhov and others) of the "present situation", for explaining *how* "social and political conditions have changed" *is* an appraisal of the present situation.

But they are afraid to state that appraisal in plain terms. Indeed, the conference could not bring itself even to raise this question. Tacitly, stealthily, in a smuggling fashion, it upholds the view that there have come about (*some kind of*) changes which necessitate "adapting" the illegal to the legal.

This is a view which in no way differs from the Cadet view, as the Social-Democratic Party press has repeatedly pointed out. The Cadets fully admit that their party "as a whole is compelled to remain illegal" (see Clause 3 of the liquidators' resolution) and that, in view of changed conditions, the illegal party must adapt itself to the legal movement. As far as the Cadets are concerned, this is

enough. To them prohibition of their party, its illegality, is an accident, an "abnormality", a survival whereas the main, essential and basic thing is their legal work. This view of theirs follows *logically* from the "appraisal of the situation" formulated by Mr. Gredeskul: what is needed is not a new revolution, but only "constitutional work".

The illegality of the Cadet Party is an accident; it is an exception from the general rule of "constitutional work". Hence the logical conclusion that the illegal organisation must "adapt itself to the legal movement". And that is how matters actually stand with the Cadets.

But the Social-Democratic Party takes a different view. The main conclusion to be drawn from our appraisal—the Party appraisal—of the situation is that *the revolution is necessary and is coming*. The *forms* of the development leading to the revolution have changed, but the *old tasks* of the revolution remain. Hence the conclusion: the forms of organisation must change, the forms of the "nuclei" must be flexible, their expansion will often occur through the expansion, not of the nuclei themselves, but of their legal "periphery", etc. All this has been stated many times in Party resolutions.

But this change in the *forms* of the illegal organisation is not at all covered by the formula: "adaptation" to the legal movement. It is something entirely different! Legal organisations are *strong-points* for propagating the ideas of *illegal nuclei* among the masses. In other words, we change the form of exerting influence to ensure that former influence continues along *illegal* lines.

In terms of the *form* of the organisations, the illegal "adapts itself" to the legal. But in terms of the *content* of the work of our Party, legal activity "*adapts itself*" to illegal ideas. (Hence—it may be said in passing—the war which "revolutionary Menshevism" has been waging against the liquidators.)

Now judge how profound our liquidators must be to have accepted the *first* premise (on the form of the work) and forgotten the second (on the *content* of the work)!! And they have headed their piece of Cadet wisdom by an argument about the organisational forms of Party *building* that runs as follows:

"We must build the Party in such a way as to reorganise [it] by drawing the masses into the legal movement and to adapt the illegal organisation to that movement."

The question arises: does this look like the answer of the Party? (To build the Party means strengthening and increasing the number of illegal nuclei, surrounding them by a network of legal strong-points.)

Or does it look like legalising a loophole for the liquidators, since it repeats the ideas of the Cadets and the Popular Socialists? It was *precisely* these ideas that Mr. Peshekhonov, a Popular Socialist, was defending in August 1906, when he tried to found an "open party"—see *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1906, No. 8, and *Proletary* No. 4, the article "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks".*

III

Clause 3 of the resolution reads:

"3. The Social-Democratic Party even at the present time, when its organisation as a whole is forced to remain illegal, must endeavour to carry on various parts of its Party work openly and to establish appropriate bodies for this purpose."

We have already pointed out that this is a literally exact description of the *Cadet* Party, correct from the first to the last word. But the term "Social-Democratic" is out of place here.

It is true that the Cadet Party "as a whole" is "forced" to remain illegal, and that "even" at the present time (when we have a constitution, thank God) they endeavour to carry on parts of their party work openly.

The implicit premise which shows through every line of this liquidationist resolution is its recognition of "constitutional work" as the sole work or, at the least, as the chief, fundamental and lasting work.

That is radically wrong. It is precisely a liberal labour policy outlook.

The Social-Democratic Party is illegal both "as a whole" and in its every nucleus, and—*most important of all*—in the entire content of its work, which is to propagate and

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 197-206.—*Ed.*

pave the way for the revolution. Therefore the *most* open work of the most open nucleus of the Social-Democratic Party can*not* be regarded as "openly conducted Party work".

For example, the most "open" nucleus of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907-12 was the Social-Democratic Duma group. It was in a position to speak more "openly" than anyone else. It *alone* was legal, and could speak legally *of a great many things*.

But not of everything! And not only, generally speaking, "not of everything", but not, in particular, even of its own Party and its Party work—"not of everything" nor of the most important thing. That is why, *even* in respect of the Social-Democratic Duma group, we cannot accept Clause 3 of the liquidationist resolution, not to speak of the remaining "various parts" of the Party.

The liquidators advocate an "open", legal party. They are now afraid (the workers have made them afraid, and Trotsky advises them to be afraid) to say so plainly. They now say the *same* thing *using little disguises*. They say nothing about legalising the Party. But they advocate its legalisation *by parts*!

The "initiating groups" of the legalists who have broken away are anti-Party, the neutral Plekhanov told the liquidators in April 1912. The "initiating groups" of the breakaway legalists are precisely the open conduct of various parts of "Party work", the liquidationist conference replies; they are precisely the "open movement" *to which* the illegal Party must "adapt" itself; they are the "open activities", the "drawing" of the masses into which is the yardstick and guarantee of the necessary "transformation" of the Party.

What simpletons the liquidators must have found if their story is true that these views were approved by the "anti-liquidators" brought by Trotsky!

IV

The last clause of the resolution reads:

"4. Being unable, on account of the illegal conditions of its existence, to draw into its sphere large sections of the workers to whom its influence extends, the Social-Democratic organisation must link itself with the politically active sections of the proletariat and through

them with the masses, by establishing various kinds of more or less developed legal or illegal political organisations and various kinds of legal cover (election committees, political societies founded under the law of March 4, municipal companies, societies for combating the high cost of living, and so on), as well as by co-ordinating its actions with non-political working-class organisations."

Here, too, indisputable arguments about legal covers *disguise* what is not merely disputable but downright liquidationist.

Establishing *legal political organisations* is precisely what Levitsky and N. R—kov advocated; it is legalisation of the Party part by part.

For more than a year we have been telling the liquidators: stop talking and start founding your "legal *political* societies", such as the "society for the defence of working-class interests", and so on. Stop phrase-mongering and get down to work!

But they cannot get down to work because it is impossible to realise a liberal utopia in *present-day* Russia. All they can do is to *defend* in this covert fashion their "initiating groups", which are engaged in useful talk and mutual encouragement, in suggestions and considerations about "legal political organisations".

They defend their "initiating groups", officially declaring in their resolution that the illegal organisations *must* "link themselves with the *politically-active sections of the proletariat* and through them with the masses"!!! That is to say, it is *outside* the nuclei that the "politically-active" are to be found! Is this not a mere rewording of the well-known phrases and exclamations to the effect that all the active *have fled* from the "dead Party" into the "initiating groups"?

Trotsky and the liquidators expelled from the Party are putting more "mildly" what *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*[147] said plainly in *reviling* the illegal Party: in their view, it is outside the narrow illegal Party that the most "*active*" are, and it is with these that one must "link oneself". We—the liquidators who have broken away—are the active element; through us the "Party" must link itself with the masses.

The Party has said in no uncertain terms: in leading the economic struggle, the Social-Democratic Party nuclei

must co-operate with the trade unions, with the Social-Democratic nuclei in them, and with individual leaders of the trade union movement. Or, in the Duma election campaign, it is essential that the unions should march abreast of the Party. This is clear, precise and easy to understand. What the liquidators are advocating *instead* is a hazy "co-ordination" of the Party's work in general with the "non-political", i.e., non-Party, unions.

P. B. Axelrod supplied Trotsky with liquidationist ideas. Trotsky advised Axelrod, after the latter's sad reverses in *Nasha Zarya*, to cover up those ideas with phrases that would muddle them up.

Nobody will be deceived by this company. The liquidationist conference will teach the workers to look more closely into the meaning of evasive phraseology. That conference has nothing to give the workers apart from this lesson, which is bitter and uninteresting but not useless in bourgeois society.

We have studied the ideas of liberal labour policy attired in Levitsky's everyday clothes; it is not difficult to recognise them in Trotsky's gaudy apparel as well.

The Party's views on the illegal organisation and its legal work stand out more and more impressively when compared with all that hypocritical masquerading.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 28-29,
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THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SERBO-BULGARIAN VICTORIES

"Macedonia's conquest by Bulgaria and Serbia means for her a bourgeois revolution, a kind of 1789 or 1848." These words of Otto Bauer, the Austrian Marxist, reveal at a stroke the meaning of the events now taking place in the Balkans.

The revolution of 1789 in France and that of 1848 in Germany and other countries were bourgeois revolutions, because the liberation of the country from absolutism and from landlord, feudal privileges in fact provided freedom for the development of capitalism. But it goes without saying that such revolutions were most urgently required by the interests of the working class; in 1789 and 1848 even "non-Party" workers, who were not organised as a class, were leading fighters of the French and German revolutions.

Macedonia, like the other Balkan countries, is economically very backward. She still retains exceedingly strong survivals of the feudal system and of medieval dependence of the peasants on their feudal landlords. Among those survivals are quit-rent (in money or kind), share-cropping (the Macedonian peasant usually gives the landlord one-third of the harvest, that is, less than the Russian peasant does), and so on.

The landlords in Macedonia (known as *spahijas*) are Turks and Mohammedans, while the peasants are Slavs and Christians. The class antagonism is therefore aggravated by a religious and national antagonism.

Thus, the victories gained by the Serbians and Bulgarians denote the undermining of feudal rule in Macedonia,

the formation of a more or less free class of peasant landowners, and a guarantee for the entire social development of the Balkan countries, which has been checked by absolutism and feudal relations.

Bourgeois newspapers, from *Novoye Vremya* to *Rech*, are talking of *national* liberation in the Balkans, leaving out *economic* liberation. Yet in reality it is the latter that is the chief thing.

Given complete liberation from the landlords and from absolutism, national liberation and complete freedom of self-determination of the peoples would be an inevitable result. On the other hand, if the tyranny of the landlords and the Balkan monarchies over the peoples remains, national oppression, too, is bound to persist in some measure or another.

If the liberation of Macedonia had been accomplished through a revolution, that is, through the Serbian and Bulgarian and also the *Turkish* peasants fighting against the landlords of *all* nationalities (and against the landlord governments in the Balkans), liberation would probably have cost the Balkan peoples a hundred times less in human lives than the present war. Liberation would have been achieved at an infinitely lower price and would have been infinitely more complete.

One may ask what are the historical causes of the issue being settled by war and not by revolution. The main historical cause is the weakness, disunity, immaturity and ignorance of the peasant masses in all the Balkan countries, as well as the small number of the workers who had a clear understanding of the state of affairs and demanded a Balkan federal (union) republic.

This brings out the radical difference between the European bourgeoisie and the European workers in their attitude to the Balkan problem. The bourgeoisie, even the liberal bourgeoisie, similar to our Cadets, shouts about the "national" liberation of the "Slavs". Thereby it plainly misrepresents the meaning and historic significance of the events now taking place in the Balkans, and thus *hampers* the real liberation of the Balkan peoples. It thus *contributes* to the preservation of landlord privileges, political tyranny and national oppression in some measure or another.

On the other hand, the worker democrats are the only ones to champion the real and complete liberation of the Balkan peoples. Nothing but economic and political liberation of the *peasants* of all the Balkan nationalities, carried through to the end, can eliminate all possibility of any sort of national oppression.

Pravda No. 162, November 7, 1912
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

REGENERATED CHINA

Progressive and civilised Europe shows no interest in the regeneration of China. Four hundred million backward Asians have attained freedom, and have awakened to political life. *One quarter* of the world's population has passed, so to say, from torpor to enlightenment, movement and struggle.

But civilised Europe does not care. To this day even the French Republic has not officially recognised the Republic of China! A question on this subject is to be asked shortly in the French Chamber of Deputies.

Why this indifference on the part of Europe? The explanation is that throughout the West power is in the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie, which is already three-quarters decayed and willing to sell all its "civilisation" to any adventurer for "stringent" measures against the workers, or for an extra five kopeks' profit on the ruble. To this bourgeoisie, China is *only* booty, and now that Russia has taken Mongolia into her "tender embrace", the Japanese, British Germans, etc., will probably try to tear off a piece of this booty.

But China's regeneration is making speed nevertheless Parliamentary elections are about to be held—the *first* in what was a despotic state. The Lower House will have 600 members and the "Senate", 274.

Suffrage is *neither* universal *nor* direct. It is granted only to persons above the age of 21 who have resided in the constituency for at least two years and who pay direct taxes amounting to about two rubles, or own property worth about 500 rubles. They will first vote for electors, who will elect the members of parliament.

This kind of suffrage indicates in itself that there is an alliance of the well-to-do peasantry and the bourgeoisie, there being no proletariat at all or one that is completely powerless.

The same circumstance is evident from the nature of China's political parties. There are three main parties:

(1) The Radical-Socialist Party, which in fact has *nothing at all* to do with socialism, any more than our own Popular Socialists (and nine-tenths of the Socialist-Revolutionaries). It is a party of petty-bourgeois *democrats*, and its chief demands are political unity of China, development of trade and industry "along social lines" (just as hazy a phrase as the "labour principle" and "equalisation" of our Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), and preservation of peace.

(2) The second party is that of the liberals. They are in alliance with the Radical-Socialists and together with them constitute the *National Party*. This party will in all likelihood win a majority in China's first parliament. Its leader is the well-known Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He is now drawing up a plan for a vast railway network (Russian Narodniks will please note that Sun Yat-sen is doing this *in order that* China may "avoid" a capitalist fate!).

(3) The third party calls itself the Republican League, an example of how deceptive political signboards can be. Actually it is a *conservative* party, backed chiefly by government officials, landlords and the bourgeoisie of *northern* China, which is the most backward part of the country. The National Party, on the other hand, is predominantly a party of the more industrially-developed and progressive *southern* part of the country.

The peasant masses are the mainstay of the National Party. Its leaders are intellectuals who have been educated abroad.

China's freedom was won by an alliance of peasant democrats and the liberal bourgeoisie. Whether the peasants, who are not led by a proletarian party, will be able to retain their democratic positions *against* the liberals, who are only waiting for an opportunity to shift to the right, will be seen in the near future.

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Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Wilson, a "Democrat", has been elected President of the United States of America. He has polled over six million votes, Roosevelt (the new National Progressive Party) over four million, Taft (Republican Party) over three million, and the Socialist Eugene Debs 800,000 votes.

The world significance of the U.S. elections lies not so much in the great increase in the number of Socialist votes as in the far-reaching *crisis* of the *bourgeois* parties, in the amazing force with which their decay has been revealed. Lastly, the significance of the elections lies in the unusually clear and striking revelation of *bourgeois reformism* as a means of combating socialism.

In *all* bourgeois countries, the parties which stand for capitalism, i.e., the bourgeois parties, came into being a long time ago, and the greater the extent of political liberty, the more solid they are.

Freedom in the U.S.A. is most complete. And for a whole *half-century*—since the Civil War over slavery in 1860-65—*two* bourgeois parties have been distinguished there by remarkable solidity and strength. The party of the former slave-owners is the so-called Democratic Party. The capitalist party, which favoured the emancipation of the Negroes, has developed into the Republican Party.

Since the emancipation of the Negroes, the distinction between the two parties has been diminishing. The fight between these two parties has been mainly over the height of customs duties. Their fight *has not had* any *serious* importance for the mass of the people. The people have been deceived and diverted from their vital interests by means of

spectacular and meaningless *duels* between the two bourgeois parties.

This so-called bipartisan system prevailing in America and Britain has been one of the most powerful means of preventing the rise of an independent working-class, i.e., genuinely socialist, party.

And now the bipartisan system has suffered a fiasco in America, the country boasting the most advanced capitalism! What caused this fiasco?

The strength of the working-class movement, the growth of socialism.

The old bourgeois parties (the "Democratic" and the "Republican" parties) have been facing towards the past, the period of the emancipation of the Negroes. The new bourgeois party, the National Progressive Party, is facing towards the *future*. Its programme turns entirely on the question whether capitalism is to be or not to be, on the issues, to be specific, of protection for the workers and of "trusts", as the capitalist associations are called in the U.S.A.

The old parties are products of an epoch whose task was to develop capitalism as speedily as possible. The struggle between the parties was over the question *how* best to expedite and facilitate this development.

The new party is a product of the present epoch, which raises the issue of the very existence of capitalism. In the U.S.A., the freest and most advanced country, this issue is coming to the fore more clearly and broadly than anywhere else.

The entire programme and entire agitation of Roosevelt and the Progressives turn on how to *save capitalism* by means of *bourgeois reforms*.

The bourgeois reformism which in old Europe manifests itself in the chatter of liberal professors has all at once come forward in the free American republic as a party four million strong. This is American style.

We shall save capitalism by reforms, says that party. We shall grant the most progressive factory legislation. We shall establish state control over *all* the trusts (in the U.S.A. that means over *all* industries!). We shall establish state control over them to eliminate poverty and enable everybody to earn a "decent" wage. We shall establish

"social and industrial justice". We revere *all* reforms—*the only* "*reform*" we don't want is *expropriation of the capitalists*!

The national wealth of the U.S.A. is now reckoned to be 120 billion (thousand million) dollars, i.e., about 240 billion rubles. Approximately *one-third* of it, or about 80 billion rubles, belongs to *two* trusts, those of Rockefeller and Morgan, or is subordinated to these trusts! Not more than 40,000 families making up these two trusts are the masters of 80 million wage slaves.

Obviously, so long as these modern slave-owners are there, all "reforms" will be nothing but a deception. Roosevelt has been *deliberately* hired by the astute multimillionaires to preach this deception. The "state control" they promise will become—if the capitalists keep their capital—a means of combating and crushing strikes.

But the American proletarian has already awakened and has taken up his post. He greets Roosevelt's success with cheerful irony, as if to say: You lured four million people with your promises of reform, dear impostor Roosevelt. Very well! Tomorrow those four million will see that your promises were a fraud, and don't forget that they are following you *only* because they feel that it is *impossible* to go on living in the old way.

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Signed: *V. I.*

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THE "VEXED QUESTIONS" OF OUR PARTY

THE "LIQUIDATIONIST" AND "NATIONAL" QUESTIONS

In August 1912 the Executive Committee of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania convened a "territorial conference"[148] of the Polish Social-Democrats. It will be recalled that at present the Executive of the Polish Social-Democracy is an executive *without* a party. In Warsaw, the Polish capital, the local Social-Democratic organisation emphatically condemned the disorganising policy of the Executive, which replied by resorting to vile anonymous accusations of provocation, set up a fictitious Warsaw organisation and hastened to convene a suitably rigged territorial conference "of its own".

Subsequent elections to the Duma by the Warsaw worker curia fully revealed the spurious character of the supporters of the Executive: among the 66 delegates there were 34 Social-Democrats, including only 3 (doubtful) supporters of the Executive.

This introductory remark is necessary for the reader to regard the resolution of the territorial conference of the S.D.P. and L. that we are going to discuss *only* as a resolution of the *Tyszka* Executive, and under no circumstances as a decision of the Polish worker Social-Democrats.

I

The question of the Polish Social-Democrats' attitude towards the R.S.D.L.P. is an unusually important and burning one. Therefore the *decision* adopted by the Tyszka con-

ference on this question, however hard it may be to take it *seriously*, deserves closer study.

It is hard to take seriously the Tyszka resolution, which is full of abuse, if only because of its attitude to the *fundamental* question, that of liquidationism.

This has been a fundamental question in the R.S.D.L.P. during 1908-1912. The Party has been terribly broken up by the counter-revolution. It is making every effort to re-establish its organisation. And *throughout the four years* of counter-revolution, it has been waging a *continuous* struggle against the little groups of Social-Democrats who want to liquidate the Party.

Does it not follow clearly from this that one who has not settled the issue of liquidationism explicitly *has no right* to call himself a Party member?

The Tyszka conference, too, in its resolution on the attitude to the R.S.D.L.P. allotted more space to liquidationism than to anything else. The conference admitted that liquidationism was "a most serious obstacle to the development of the R.S.D.L.P. and a grave danger to its very existence".

"Overt and consistent liquidationism and revolutionary Social-Democracy are mutually exclusive," said the resolution.

As you see, Tyszka and Co. tackled the problem with a bold and firm hand—and dodged solving it!

Who are, then, the "overt and consistent" liquidators? And what is the practical conclusion that follows from the *experience of four years of struggle* against liquidationism?

These natural and necessary questions were answered in clear, precise and convincing terms by the January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which said that the liquidators were the group associated with the publications *Nasha Zarya* and *Zhivoye Dyelo*. This group had placed itself outside the Party.

One may consider this answer right or wrong, but one cannot deny that it is quite clear, one cannot evade making a clear statement of one's attitude!

But the Tyszka conference sought precisely to evade the issue, twist and turn like a petty thief. If it is not true that *Nasha Zarya* represents open and consistent liquida-

tors, as we said clearly in January 1912, then why did Tyszka and Co. not disclose our error to the Polish worker Social-Democrats in August 1912? If it is not true that *Nasha Zarya* has placed itself *outside* the Party, and if you, Messrs. Tyszka, Rosa Luxemburg and Warski, consider it *to be in the Party*, why did not you say so plainly? It was your direct duty to the Polish worker Social-Democrats!

And however much you may abuse and curse and revile "Lenin's" conference in January 1912, the racket you are raising will not enable you to deceive anyone but people who want to be deceived. For, after the January Conference, one cannot be a politically-conscious and honest Social-Democrat, nor speak of the state of affairs in the R.S.D.L.P., without giving a clear and explicit answer to the question: is *Nasha Zarya* liquidationist or not, and does it belong in or outside the Party?

II

The spate of varied and wordy abuse which the Tyszka conference slung at the "Leninists" boils down to one thing —an accusation of *splitting* the Party.

The January Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. considered only the *Nasha Zarya* group to be outside the Party. This is a fact known to all. From this fact even Tyszka and his friends could have drawn the simple and obvious conclusion that the accusation of splitting the Party means regarding the *Nasha Zarya* group as a *Party* group.

Even a child would see that this conclusion is inevitable. And Tyszka and Co. are long past childhood years.

Anyone who accuses us of splitting the Party should have sufficient elementary courage and elementary honesty to say plainly: "The *Nasha Zarya* group is not liquidationist", "it *ought not* to be outside the Party, but belongs *inside* the Party", "it is a *legitimate shade of opinion* in the Party", and so on.

This is the heart of the matter, that the gentlemen who accuse us of splitting the Party, such as Tyszka, say this *in undertones*, shyly, in a roundabout way (for this *naturally* follows from the howls about a split) but they are *afraid* to say it plainly!

It is not easy to say and *prove* that *Nasha Zarya* ought to be in the Party. Anyone who says so assumes a certain responsibility, decides a certain question of principle, and plainly *defends* the chief liquidators. One may (and should) regard such a person as a supporter of the liquidators, but one must admit that he has his convictions and it cannot be denied that he is politically honest, if only within the limits of the narrow question whether or not a definite group of liquidators should be in the Party.

But when an entire organisation, if one may call it that, or a sum total of the organisations of a whole territory, dodgingly and stealthily, shamefacedly and without speaking straight out, defends the liquidators and accuses those who have expelled the liquidators from the Party of causing a split, but does not dare to say plainly, "This group of liquidators ought to be in the Party", the conclusion inevitably suggests itself that what we have before us is not an organisation of Social-Democrats who share such-and-such views, but a *circle of plotters* who want to make political capital out of "utilising" the struggle between the liquidators and the anti-liquidators.

To those who are familiar with the internal affairs of the R.S.D.L.P. since 1907, it has long been an open secret that Tyszka and Co., like the Bundists who preceded them, are specimens of this type of intriguer, "Marxists by weight", or "Tushino turncoats",[149] as Social-Democrats call such people. Tyszka, like some of the Bundists, bases his entire "stand" in the Party on a *game* between the liquidators and the anti-liquidators, on mediation, on profiting from being the extra "weight in the scales", without which neither the liquidators nor the anti-liquidators can have a majority!

In the autumn of 1911, when this old "game" of Tyszka's, of which everyone had grown tired, resulted in his collapse, he was openly called a plotter by the press of *both* opposed trends—the liquidators and the anti-liquidators.

Indeed, place yourself in the position of an extra "weight in the scales", and then the illogical, childishly naïve, ludicrously feeble and helpless resolutions of the Tyszka conference will at once become *perfectly* intelligible to you. This is just the way a plotter should speak: I condemn liquidationism—but I don't say plainly who are the overt

and consistent liquidators! I admit that liquidationism endangers the very existence of the Party—but I don't say plainly whether or not such-and-such a group ought to be in the Party! I can *always*, under all circumstances, derive an advantage from a "position" such as this, can make "political capital" out of it, for *without me* the anti-liquidator cannot defeat the liquidator, *without me* the liquidator cannot have an assured place in the Party!!

"Tyszka" politics are not an accidental or isolated phenomenon. When there is a split and, in general, when there is a bitter struggle between trends, it is *inevitable* that groups should appear which base their existence on a continuous darting from one side to the other, and on petty intrigue. This is a sad and unpleasant feature of the life of our Party, a feature accentuated by the conditions of revolutionary work in exile. Groups of intriguers, and features of intrigue in the policy of certain groups, particularly those lacking strong ties with Russia, are phenomena one has to be aware of if one does not want to be fooled and to fall victim to various "misunderstandings".

III

The slogan of "unity" is "popular", of course, among wide sections of the workers, who do not know *with whom* that unity should be established, *what concessions* to a particular group that *unity* implies, and *on what basis* the policy of including the liquidators in the Party or expelling them from it is shaped.

To be sure, nothing could be easier than demagogically taking advantage of this *incomprehension* of the essence of the matter to howl about a "split". Nothing could be easier than disguising diplomacy by a demand for the "unity" of trends that have irrevocably drifted apart.

But however "popular" the slogan of "unity" among politically-ignorant people, and however convenient it is now for various demagogues, intriguers and group diplomats to hide behind it, we shall never stop demanding from every politically-conscious Social-Democrat a clear and explicit answer to the question decided by the January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

The conference which the liquidators convened in August 1912 showed clearly that all the controversies turn on the question of liquidationism, on whether the liquidators' groups are pro-Party or non-Party (or even anti-Party). Whoever evades this cardinal issue mystifies himself and others.

As a matter of fact, talk about the "factionalism" of the January Conference, and so on, is just such an *evasion* of the cardinal issue. All right, gentlemen, we might answer the talkers, let us assume that the January Conference was arch-factionalist and disruptive, that it was not duly authorised, and so on. But are you not using these "terrible words" merely *to clear yourselves in your own eyes*? A section of the Social-Democrats—it makes no difference which—declared in January that *Nasha Zarya* consisted of anti-Party liquidators who were outside the Party. That opinion is substantiated in a resolution—a detailed, well-grounded resolution prompted by four years of Party history.

Anyone who sincerely wishes to explain and refute the error of these, let us say, "January" Social-Democrats must analyse and refute this resolution. He must say and prove that *Nasha Zarya* should be in the Party, that its ideas are not ruinous to the Party, that such-and-such concessions should be made to that group, that such-and-such obligations should be demanded of it, that the guarantees of the fulfilment of these obligations should consist in this or that, and that the extent of the influence of the group within the Party should be established in such-and-such a way.

To put the question *in this way* would mean conscientiously and honestly refuting the convictions of the January Social-Democrats, would mean *explaining* to the workers what you think wrong. But the point is that *not one* of those who now engage in cheap clamour about a split has taken a single step towards putting the question in this way!!

That is why, contemptuously brushing aside the demagogues and intriguers, we calmly repeat: our resolution expelling the liquidators has not been refuted and is irrefutable. New facts, such as the publication of the liquidationist *Luch*,[150] which has made Trotsky's phrase-mongering

its own, merely increase the force of our resolution a hundred-fold. The facts—the May Day action, the rallying of hundreds of workers' groups around the anti-liquidationist newspaper, the elections to the Fourth Duma by the worker curia—are *conclusive* proof of the correctness of our stand against the liquidators.

No amount of howling about a "split" can shake this conviction, because this howling is a cowardly, covert, hypocritical *defence* of the liquidators.

IV

The January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. posed yet another serious question of principle, that of the *structure* of our Party with regard to nationalities. For lack of space, I shall only briefly touch on this question.

Complete or incomplete federation, "federation of the worst type" or complete unity? That is the question.

The Tyszka conference replies to this problem, too, with nothing but abuse and shouts about "fraud", "distortion of the facts", and so on. What senseless shouters they are, this Tyszka and his retinue!

The complete separateness of the Lettish, Polish and Jewish (Bund) Social-Democrats is a fact. Every Polish Social-Democrat knows that there is *not*, and has never been, *anything* like unity with the Bund in Poland. The same is true of the Russians and the Bund, etc. The non-Russians have their own special organisations, their central bodies, congresses, etc. The Russians lack *these things*, and *their* Central Committee cannot decide Russian questions without the participation of the Bundists, Poles and Letts who are fighting one another and who are unfamiliar with Russian matters.

This is a fact, one that no amount of abuse can suppress. *Everyone* in our Party has seen it since 1907. Everyone has sensed the falsity of this situation. That is why our Conference dubbed it "*a federation of the worst type*".*

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 464-65.—*Ed.*

All honest and sincere Social-Democrats must give a pertinent answer to this presentation of the question.

The correctness of this presentation of the question was *borne out* most convincingly by the August conference, which, as *even* Plekhanov admits, "adapted socialism to nationalism" by its notorious resolution on "national cutural" autonomy.

The Bund and Tyszka's Executive are alike in swearing by all the saints that they stand for unity, while in Warsaw, Lodz and elsewhere there is a *complete split between them*!!

The connection between the "liquidationist question" and the "national question" is not an invention of ours but has been revealed by the realities of life.

Let, then, all serious-minded Social-Democrats raise and discuss the "national question" as well. Federation or unity? Federation for the "nationalities", with separate centres and *without* a separate centre for the Russians, or complete unity? Nominal unity with a virtual split (or secession) of the Bund's local organisations, or real unity from top to bottom?

Anyone who thinks he can get away from these questions is sorely mistaken. Anyone who counts on a simple restoration of the "federation of the worst type" of 1907-11, *mystifies himself and others*. It is already *impossible* to restore that federation. That misbegotten child will never rise from the dead. The Party has moved away from it for good.

Where has it moved to? Towards an "Austrian" federation?[151] Or towards a *complete* renunciation of federation, to actual unity? We are for the latter. We are opposed to "adapting socialism to nationalism".

Let everyone give full thought to this question and finally decide it.

Written in November 1912

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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Translated from the Polish

CONCERNING CERTAIN SPEECHES BY WORKERS' DEPUTIES[152]

What are the basic ideas that should underlie the *first* speech of a workers' spokesman in the Duma?

Naturally, the workers will look forward to the *first* speech with particular eagerness and particular attention. Naturally, it is in the first speech that they expect to find the important and fundamental thing, a concise exposition of the view taken on issues that are of especial concern to everyone and come particularly into the forefront in the country's policies in general and in the practice of the working-class movement (both political *and economic*) in particular.

Among these issues are the following:

(1) *Continuity* of the activity of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. Continuity implies the preservation of an *inseparable connection* with the former Social-Democratic groups of all the former Dumas, it being particularly necessary to stress the connection with the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma—in view of the well-known attack which the counter-revolution made upon it.

It is important to lay stress on continuity, for, unlike the bourgeois parties, the worker democrats see something *integral* and *common* in *their* work in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Dumas, and will not let themselves be distracted by any turn in events (or by any development like the coup d'état of June 3) from fulfilling their tasks, from pursuing their invariable aims.

(2) The second thesis which should go into the first speech of a workers' deputy is socialism. Strictly speaking, it

consists of two subjects. One is the fact that Russia's Social-Democratic Party is a contingent of the international army of the socialist proletariat. That, in fact, is exactly what Pokrovsky said in the Third Duma (see his declaration in the verbatim reports, p. 328 of the official publication, Seventh Sitting, November 16, 1907). It is, of course, absolutely indispensable to make this point.

But there is another point which is highly important in our day. It is a reference to the *present* situation and the tasks of socialism *throughout* the world. What are the characteristics of this situation? (a) An extreme aggravation of the struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie (high cost of living, mass strikes, the *imperialism* of the Powers, their fierce competition over markets and their nearness to war), and (b) the nearness of the realisation of socialism. The working class of the world is fighting not for recognition of its right to have a socialist party, but *for power*, and for the organisation of society along new lines. It is highly important to say so from the Duma platform, to tell the workers of Russia about the beginning of the great battles for socialism in Europe and America, about the *nearness* of the triumph (inevitable triumph) of socialism in the civilised world.

(3) The third thesis concerns the Balkan war and Russia's international position and foreign policy.

It is impossible to omit this subject, which is the most topical. It may be subdivided into the following questions:

(a) The Balkan war. The slogan of a Balkan federal republic should also be proclaimed by the Russian workers' deputy. Against Slav-Turkish enmity. *For* freedom and equal rights for *all* the peoples of the Balkans.

(b) Against the interference of other Powers in the Balkan war. It is absolutely necessary to side with the demonstration for peace which took place in Basle, at the International Socialist Congress.[153] War against war! Against all interference! For peace! Such are the slogans of the workers.

(c) Against the foreign policy of the Russian Government in general, with particular mention of the "lust" to seize (and of the seizure already begun) the Bosphorus, Turkish Armenia, Persia, Mongolia.



First page of Lenin's manuscript "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies". November 1912

Reduced

First page of Lenin's manuscript "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies". November 1912

Reduced

(d) Against the nationalism of the government, with reference to the oppressed nationalities: Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, the Jews, etc. It is highly important to put forward in precise terms the slogan of the *political self-determination* of all nationalities, in contrast to all hedging (such as *only* "equality").

(e) Against liberal nationalism, which is not so crude but is particularly harmful because of its hypocrisy and its "refined" deception of the people. What are the signs of this liberal (Progressist-*Cadet*) nationalism? Chauvinist speeches about the tasks of the "Slavs", speeches about the tasks of Russia as a "Great Power", speeches about Russia reaching an agreement with Britain and France so as to be able to *plunder* other countries.

(4) The fourth thesis is the political position of Russia. The essential thing here is to describe the existing tyranny and lack of rights, and reveal the *compelling* necessity of political liberty.

Special note should be made here of:

(a) The necessity of mentioning the prisons—Kutomara, Algachi, etc.[154]

(b) A reference to the rigging of elections, Bonapartist methods, the fact that the government is no longer trusted even by those classes (the landlords and the bourgeoisie) on which the coup d'état of June 3 counted.

The priests were made to vote against their conscience.

The Duma has moved to the right, while the country has moved to the left.

(c) It is particularly important to state correctly the relationship between the notorious liquidationist slogan of "freedom of association" and the objectives of *political liberty* in general. It is highly important to point out that freedom of the press, association, assembly and strikes is *absolutely* indispensable to the workers, but that it is *precisely* in order to bring it about that we must realise the *inseparable connection* between it and the general foundations of political liberty, a *radical* change in the entire political system. Not the liberal utopia of freedom of association *under* the June Third regime, but a struggle *for* freedom in general, and for freedom of association in

particular, *against this regime* all along the line, against the *foundations* of this regime.

(5) Fifth thesis: the intolerable plight of the peasantry. The starvation of 30 million peasants in 1911. The ruin and impoverishment of the countryside. The government "land distribution system" only makes things *worse*. Financial prosperity is so much tinsel, a pretence of prosperity achieved by extorting dues and befuddling the people with drink. Even the modest land Bill of the **Right-wing** peasants (the "forty-three peasants") submitted to the Third Duma[155] has been shelved. The peasants need deliverance from the oppression of the landlords and of landlordism.

(6) Sixth thesis: three camps in the elections to the Fourth Duma, and three camps in the country:

(a) The government camp. It is impotent. Rigs elections.

(b) The liberal camp. It is highly important to point out, if only very briefly, the counter-revolutionary nature of the liberals, who are *against* a new revolution. One may quote word for word Gredeskul's statement which *Pravda* reprinted in its issue No. 85 (August 8).* "No second popular movement [in other words, no second revolution] was needed but merely quiet, persevering and confident constitutional work". These were Gredeskul's exact words, and *Rech* published them.

Liberal hopes of constitutional *reform with the foundations* of the present system retained, and *without* a broad movement of the people, are *utopia*.

(c) The third camp, the democrats. It is led by the working class. One may say, speaking of the past in the third person, what was said *even* by *Golos Moskvy*, namely, that the working class advanced *three* slogans during the elections: (1) a democratic republic; (2) an eight-hour working day; (3) confiscation of all the landed estates in favour of the peasantry.

(7) Seventh thesis: a reference to the political movement and strikes in 1912.

(a) It is highly important to point out that the number of *political* strikers rose to a million. Resurgence of the entire emancipation movement.

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* See pp. 254-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

(b) It is highly important to stress that the workers by their political strikes set themselves objectives affecting *the whole people*, that they did not raise particular problems but problems affecting *the whole people*.

(c) It is necessary to point out that it is the *connection* between political and economic strikes that lends strength and vitality to the movement.

(d) Mention the workers' protest against the execution of sailors.

(8) The eighth thesis, an important one following from the whole of the foregoing and closely linked with it, is the hegemony of the proletariat, its guiding role, its role as leader. It leads the whole people, the entire democratic movement. It demands freedom and leads into the battle for freedom. It sets an example, provides a model. It raises morale. It arouses a new mood.

(9) The ninth and final thesis: recapitulation and summary. It should be said, speaking of the class-conscious workers in the third person, that they are "unshakably loyal" to *three* principles: first, socialism; second, "the principles of the old, battle-tested Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party"—the workers are loyal to it. This *fact* should be conveyed; third, the workers are loyal to "their republican convictions". It is not a question of an appeal or slogan, but of loyalty to one's convictions. (There exist legal republican parties in a number of monarchies—Britain, Sweden, Italy, Belgium and other countries.)

P.S. The question may also arise of the need to put forward *separately* "freedom of association". It should be borne in mind that the liquidators advocate under this flag the liberal demand for a constitutional reform *while* keeping intact the *foundations* of the June Third—*

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* The manuscript breaks off at this point.—*Ed.*

CONCERNING THE WORKERS' DEPUTIES TO THE DUMA AND THEIR DECLARATION[156]

The Social-Democratic group, speaking from the platform of the Fourth Duma, declares that there is an inseparable continuity between its activity and that of the Social-Democratic groups in the previous Dumas, particularly the one in the Second Duma, a group against which the counter-revolutionaries committed an act of unprecedented political vengeance. The Russian Social-Democratic Party is a contingent of the great international liberation army of the socialist proletariat. This army is now growing rapidly throughout the world. The universal high cost of living, the oppression of capital grouped in associations, cartels, trusts and syndicates, and the imperialist policies of the Powers make the condition of the working masses intolerable and aggravate the struggle between capital and labour. The time is fast approaching when an end will be put to capitalism, when millions of united proletarians will establish a social system in which there will be no poverty of the masses, nor exploitation of man by man.

The Social-Democratic group joins its voice to that of the workers of all countries, who at the International Congress in Basle expressed an emphatic protest against war. The workers demand peace. They protest against all interference in Balkan affairs. Only complete freedom and independence of the Balkan peoples, and only a federal Balkan republic are capable of providing the best way out of the present crisis and a real solution to the national question through the recognition of complete equality and an absolute right to political self-determination for all nationalities without exception.

The Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma protests above all against the foreign policy of the Russian Government. It condemns the hidden intention to enlarge our state by seizing foreign territories on the Bosphorus, in Turkish Armenia, in Persia and China, and condemns the seizure of Mongolia, which disrupts good relations with the great, fraternal Chinese Republic.

All chauvinism and nationalism will find an implacable enemy in the Social-Democratic group—whether the crude, brutal nationalism of the government which crushes and strangles Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, the Jews and the other non-Great-Russian nationalities, or the hypocritically disguised, refined nationalism of the liberals and Cadets, who are willing to talk about the tasks of Russia as a Great Power and about an agreement between her and other Powers with the aim of plundering foreign lands.

The ruling classes resort to noisy nationalist speeches in a vain effort to divert the attention of the people from the intolerable domestic position of Russia. The unheard-of rigging of the Fourth Duma elections, which is reminiscent of the Bonapartist methods of that adventurer, Napoleon III, has shown for the hundredth and thousandth time that the government cannot rely for support upon any one class of the population. It cannot even maintain its alliance with the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, for the sake of which the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, was carried out. The Duma has swung to the right while the whole country has moved to the left.

The whole of Russia is suffocating under the yoke of oppression and tyranny. The entire civilised world hears with startled indignation of the tortures and the suffering of political prisoners in the Kutomara, Algachi and other prisons, where the finest people of our country are languishing in torment. Russia needs political liberty as badly as man needs air to breathe. Russia cannot live and develop unless there is freedom of the press, assembly, association and strikes, and, more than to any other class, these liberties are indispensable to the proletariat, which the lack of rights typical of Russian reality binds hand and foot in the fight it must carry on for higher wages, shorter working hours and better living conditions. The oppression

of capital, the high cost of living, unemployment in the towns and the impoverishment of the countryside make it all the more necessary for the workers to associate in unions and fight for their right to live, while lack of political liberty keeps the worker in the position of a slave or serf. The workers will stop at no sacrifice in their struggle for freedom, well knowing that only a radical change in all the political conditions of Russian life, only the fullest provision of the foundations and pillars of political liberty, can guarantee the freedom of their struggle against capital.

The elections to the Fourth Duma and the workers' mass political strikes in 1912, which involved up to a million workers, showed that the time is drawing near when the workers will again march at the head of all democrats to win freedom. Three camps tested their strength in the election struggle. The camp of government counter-revolution proved so impotent that it had to rig the elections even under the law of June 3, compelling the downtrodden rural priests to vote against their conscience and convictions. The liberal camp moved still further from the democrats towards the big bourgeoisie. The Cadets demonstrated their counter-revolutionary nature by an alliance with the Black Hundreds against the Social-Democrats in Riga and Yekaterinodar, in Kostroma and the first St. Petersburg curia. The liberal utopia of constitutional reform, with the foundations of the present political system unchanged and without a powerful movement of the people, is more and more losing favour among the democrats. The slogan of the liberals is: "There is no need for a second revolution, what is needed is merely constitutional work." Being fully aware of the spuriousness of this slogan, the working class waged its struggle in the elections, rallying all the democratic forces to itself.

Everyone knows, and even the government press said so, that the working class had three slogans in the election campaign: a democratic republic, an eight-hour working day, and confiscation of all the landed estates in favour of the peasants.

The Social-Democratic proletariat is convinced that these three demands are the necessary culmination of the demands shared by every democrat, such as universal suf-

frage, freedom of the press, assembly, association and strikes, the election of judges and government officials by the people, abolition of the standing army and introduction of a people's militia, disestablishment of the Church and separation of the school from the Church, etc.

The condition of the peasant masses in Russia is becoming more and more intolerable. The government's so-called "land distribution system" merely worsens the plight of the majority by ruining the countryside, leading to famine such as affected 30 million peasants last year, and bringing no lasting improvement of agriculture in general. The pretence of financial prosperity is kept up by extorting taxes and befuddling the population with drink, while the government delays its bankruptcy by contracting more and more loans. Even the modest land Bill submitted to the Duma by the forty-three Right-wing peasants has been shelved. No wonder the better section of the peasantry is looking more and more to the working class as the only leader of the people in the struggle for freedom. No wonder all democrats regard the political strikes of 1912, which are inseparably linked with the economic movement of the working class, as the dawn of a new life, of a new more powerful emancipation movement.

The Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma will champion the interests and needs of this movement. It considers that it has no right to conceal from the majority in the Fourth Duma what all the class-conscious workers of Russia are thinking and feeling. The class-conscious workers remain unshakably loyal to socialism. They remain unshakably loyal to the principles of the old, battle-tested Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. In the name of these principles, they remain unshakably loyal to their republican convictions.

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CONCERNING THE EVENT OF NOVEMBER 15

AN UNDELIVERED SPEECH

On November 15 the Fourth Duma opened. And on November 15 there was a demonstration of workers in St. Petersburg.[157] In view of previous political strikes, and because of them, this demonstration had the importance of a major historical event. The strikes led up to demonstrations. The movement of the masses rose to a higher plane—from strikes of a political nature to street demonstrations. This is a great step forward, which should be stressed, noted and estimated at its true worth by all politically enlightened leaders of the proletariat.

The significance of this step forward is all the greater because it coincided with the opening of the Fourth, landlord, Black-Hundred, June Third Duma. A perfectly timed demonstration! Wonderful proletarian instinct, the ability to counter and contrast the opening of the Black-Hundred "parliament" with red banners in the streets of the capital!

Wonderful proletarian instinct, the ability to counter the sycophantic, slavish, Cadet-Octobrist "demonstration" (over Rodzyanko's wretched phrase-mongering about a "constitution"[158]) inside the Palace by a demonstration of the real kind, a truly popular, truly democratic, purely labour demonstration (the intelligentsia, unfortunately, was absent, if we are to trust the newspapers).

Sycophantic chatter about a "constitution" (or pie in the sky *à la* Rodzyanko) inside the Black-Hundred Duma and a specimen of the incipient struggle for freedom and a people's representative assembly (without inverted commas), for a republic, outside the Duma—this contrast revealed the deep and unerring instinct of the revolutionary masses.

The fact that the liberal and liquidationist *Luch* "warned" against such a demonstration is worthy of traitors to the working-class cause.

But how could the Social-Democratic group "warn"? How could it stoop to the level of Cadets—to a slavish level? How did it happen that individual members of it submitted, and accepted such infamy?

The supposition arises—one that is sometimes put forward "in private"—that perhaps there were fears of a provocation in one of the groups "calling for" the demonstration?

Let us assume for a moment that this supposition *was* made. Does it exonerate the Social-Democratic group? No. Or, to be exact, it justifies the group's move from a *personal* point of view, but not *politically*. It exonerates the Social-Democratic Duma group from the suspicion of betrayal of the workers' cause, but not from the accusation of a political error.

Indeed, what would a *workers*' deputy, a real workers' deputy, have done had he, after three days of news about preparations for a demonstration of this kind, heard on the last day the "rumour" (which might have been provocative *too*): "Is there some provocation here?"

The workers' deputy would have found his way to several influential workers. He would have realised that at *such* a time his place was alongside the prominent workers, that it was a hundred times more important to be there with the workers than at the meetings of the Duma group. He would have learned from the prominent workers, from two or three (or perhaps four or five) *influential* workers of the capital, *how matters stood*, what the workers *thought* about it, and *what the mood* of the masses was.

The workers' deputy would have made inquiries about these things—he would have *known how* to make inquiries about them, and would have learnt that there was to be a strike (15 to 50 *thousand!!* according to the bourgeois press), that there was to be a demonstration, that the workers were not thinking of violence and disorders, and that, *consequently*, the rumour about a provocation was no more than a silly rumour.

The workers' deputy would have found out these things,

and would not have let himself be deceived by the terrified petty liberal intellectuals of the infamous "initiating group".

Rumours of a provocation. All right. But were there no rumours during the Gaponiad? A fine worker or workers' leader one would have been had one been unable to distinguish between the incipient peculiar awakening of the masses during the Gaponiad and the *agent provocateur* Gapon, or the police *agents provocateurs* who urged Gapon on!!

Let us assume that the police and *agents provocateurs* had a hand in the preparations for the demonstration on November 15. Let us (although it has not been proved and is incredible; it is more likely that what was a *provocation* was the *rumours* about a provocation).

But let us assume it was so. What of it? One must not resort to violence when there has been no question of it. One must warn against violence. But to warn against a peaceful strike at a time when the masses are *seething*? To warn against a *demonstration*??

It is a very, very sad mistake the Social-Democratic Duma group as a whole has made. And it would be gratifying to learn that this mistake was not made by all, and that many of those who did make it realise their mistake and will not repeat it.

The movement of the proletariat in Russia (whatever the police tricks anywhere) has risen *to a higher plane*.

Written in the latter half November 1912

First published in Lenin's *Collected Works*, Second and Third editions, Vol. XVI, 1930
Signed: *A Non-deputy*

Published according to the manuscript

A LETTER TO J. V. STALIN[159]

Dear friend, local Polish papers report that Jagiello has been admitted into the group, and has been granted a voice but no vote.[160] If that is true, it is a definite victory for the Party principle. In view of the agitation carried on by *Luch*, it is necessary: (1) To publish an article in *Dyen*[161] (I am sending a draft today), ... in the Collegium[162] (we must by all means teach them—doing so while they are with us here—to respond to everything with resolutions and immediately send copies of them here). Here is a tentative draft of such a resolution: "Having examined all the circumstances of Jagiello's admission into the Social-Democratic group, having studied the articles about it in the Marxist organ, *Pravda*, and in the newspaper of the liquidators, *Luch*, and taken into account So-and-So's report on the debate about it in the Social-Democratic Duma group and on the opinions of the various Social-Democratic organisations of Russia, the Collegium resolves: to recognise that the refusal to admit Jagiello with the right to vote was the only proper way out from the point of view of Party principle, since Jagiello is not a member of the Social-Democratic Party and was elected to the Fourth Duma against the will of the majority of the electors in the worker curia of the city of Warsaw. The Collegium condemns the anti-Party agitation carried on by the Bund and the liquidators in favour of admitting Jagiello into the group and expresses the hope that the granting of a consultative voice to Deputy Jagiello may help in rallying all the class-conscious Polish workers closer around the Polish Social-Democrats and in merging them completely with the workers of all nationalities into integral organisations of the R.S.D.L.P."

If, contrary to expectations, the liquidators have won and Jagiello has been admitted, it is still necessary, and doubly so, to have a resolution similar in content, expressing regret and appealing to the Party as a whole.

It is highly important, furthermore, for the Collegium to "correct itself" on the well-known resolution of November 13 and adopt a new one. Something like this: "Having examined all the circumstances of the strike of November 15, the Collegium finds that the warnings against the strike both from the Social-Democratic group and from the St. Petersburg Committee were prompted solely by the fact that part of the organisation was not ready to go into action on that day. However, events showed that nonetheless the movement of the revolutionary proletariat assumed a large scale and developed into street demonstrations in the name of a republic, an eight-hour working day, and confiscation of the landed estates, thus raising the entire working-class movement in Russia to a higher plane. Therefore the Collegium emphatically condemns the propaganda against revolutionary strikes which the liquidators, their ... group and *Luch* are carrying on, and recommends the workers to devote all their efforts to more extensive, thorough and concerted preparations for street demonstrations and political protest strikes, which should be made as short as possible (one-day) and concerted. The Collegium will try to develop a campaign for a strike and demonstration on January 9, 1913, with a special protest against the 300th anniversary of the House of Romanov, which enslaves Russia and drenches her in blood."

Next, it is highly important and essential for the five (curia) deputies to draft a well-grounded resolution on the Badayev case. Something like this: "The five deputies from the worker curia, having considered the baiting of Comrade Badayev by the liquidators in *Luch* and among the St. Petersburg workers, have resolved: (1) not to submit this matter to the Duma group, since the latter has admitted Badayev and no objection was raised in the group to his admission; (2) to investigate the conditions of Badayev's election, provided he abstains from voting on this matter; (3) the fact, established and verified by the five deputies, that (a) the anti-liquidationist mandate was printed before-

hand, and was adopted unanimously by the delegates' meeting, all the electors and delegates who backed Badayev acting in concert and unity and as staunch fellow-thinkers, at the request of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.; (b) that at the meeting of the Social-Democratic delegates fifteen persons voted for the St. Petersburg Committee's list and nine for the liquidators and that not all of the delegates and electors of *Luch* behaved as fellow-thinkers of the liquidators, some of them (Sudakov and others) vacillating; (c) that when three electors had been elected from each side, Badayev's supporters did their duty by moving that the matter be settled by drawing lots to prevent the dispute from being revealed to the bourgeoisie; (d) that the very fact that Badayev's supporters tabled this motion and the fact that the liquidators refused ... the question of P. and M.[163] (a liquidator)—therefore we have resolved: to recognise that Badayev is undoubtedly the elected representative of the majority of the worker Social-Democrats of St. Petersburg and is in fact a candidate at the request of the St. Petersburg Committee; that the entire responsibility for the disorganisation of the Social-Democratic Party elections in the St. Petersburg worker curia falls on the liquidators, who sought to frustrate the will of the majority, knowing themselves to be in a minority; and that the liquidators' refusal to draw lots was an outrageous violation of what is the duty of every Social-Democrat,[164] a violation unheard of in the working-class movement. We have resolved to publish this resolution in the press and to take concerted action among the workers for Badayev and against liquidationist agitation."

This resolution is essential. The Badayev case has already got into the world press. Steklov has printed evasive but foul things in *Die Neue Zeit*. And what is contained in the pamphlet which the liquidators have published in the German language for the International Congress is simply preposterous. We cannot keep silent. It is for the curia deputies to check the facts and exonerate Badayev, with Badayev himself abstaining, of course.

Written December 11, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
Published for the first time

Published according
to a copy found in Police
Department archives

A LETTER TO J. V. STALIN[165]

For Vasilyev

December 6.

Dear friend, with regard to January 9, it is highly important to think things over and make preparations in advance. A leaflet must be prepared in advance calling for meetings, a one-day strike, and demonstrations (the latter should be decided on the spot, where it will be easier to decide).[166] We must "correct" the mistake of November 15—correct it against the opportunists, of course. The slogans in the leaflet must be the three main revolutionary ones (a republic, an eight-hour working day, and confiscation of the landed estates), with special emphasis on the 300 years' "infamy" of the Romanov dynasty. If there is no complete and absolute certainty that we can have the leaflet in St. Petersburg, we must prepare it here beforehand and take it there. The liquidators' impudence over Jagiello is unparalleled. If all of our six representatives have been elected by the worker curia, we must not tacitly submit to any Siberians. The six must by all means voice the most emphatic protest if they are outvoted; they must print their protest in *Dyen* and declare that they are appealing to the rank and file, to the workers' organisations. The liquidators want to innate their majority and force through a split with the Polish Social-Democrats. Is it possible that the workers' representatives from six working-class gubernias will submit to the Skobelevs and Co. or to a chance Siberian[167]? Write more often and in greater detail.

The *Luch* articles against strikes are the height of villainy. We must come out sharply against them in the illegal press. Let me know as soon as possible which of the plans made by you for such action you have chosen.

Best regards.

P.S. Return the document—it is inconvenient to use it, its holder may be in St. Petersburg.

Written December 6, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in the book *The Period of* Zvezda *and* Pravda, *1911-14*, Issue III, 1923

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THE DISEASE OF REFORMISM

"What ails us?" was the question asked in a recent issue of *Luch* by the author of an instructive feuilleton under that heading, written under the influence of the strike of November 15.

The answer is evident from the following two quotations:

> "It would appear to be obvious to those who lay claim to the role of leaders that the demand for the abolition of emergency regulations and for freedom of association is one thing, and is an object of the struggle now and in the near future, while the alteration of the existing system, which the appeal speaks of, is something else. This can be brought about not by playing at strikes, which is what we see at present, but by stubborn, methodical work, by winning one position after another, by straining every nerve, by achieving perfect organisation and drawing into this struggle the mass of the people and not merely the working class....
>
> "If we take an intelligent attitude towards our tasks, methodically defend our interests and do not flare up today only to subside tomorrow, we shall create for ourselves both strong trade union organisations and an open political party that no one will dare encroach upon."

These passages are enough for us to say to the author: you would do better, my dear fellow, to ask "what ails" you yourself. And we will answer you: you are clearly suffering from reformism. You are obsessed with a fixed idea, the idea of a Stolypin workers' party. It is a dangerous disease, and the *Luch* doctors' cure will finish you off altogether.

The author very explicitly and deliberately advocates an "open political party" in contrast to the general demand for political liberty. A comparison of the two passages quoted leaves no room for doubt on this score. All evasion would be useless here.

We would ask the author: why is it that the "open party" of the opportunists among the petty-bourgeois democrats (the Popular Socialists of 1906) and the big-bourgeois liberals (the Cadets in 1906-07 and later) turned out to be a utopia while *your* "open" workers' party is not utopian?

You admit (or, at any rate, the "open" action in the elections *made* you admit) that the Cadets are counter-revolutionary, that they are not democrats, not a party of the masses at all, but a party of the well-to-do bourgeoisie, a party of the first curia. And yet here are you, a "sober-minded, realistic politician", an enemy of "flare-ups and fist-shaking", putting forward, allegedly on behalf of the workers, an "immediate" demand which turned out to be utopian, unattainable for the Cadets!! You are a great utopian, but your utopia is small, petty, and wretched.

You have unwittingly contracted a fashionable disease—there is such an epidemic just now!—the disease of dejection, faint-heartedness, despair and lack of faith. And that disease is pushing you into the pitfall of opportunism, for which Popular Socialists and Cadets alike have already paid the price of universal ridicule.

You consider the demand for abolishing the emergency regulations and for freedom of association to be topical and realistic, "methodical" and "conscious". You are at variance with the Social Democrats radically, for they *understand* the general conditions for achieving (and the seriousness of) such reforms. You are substantially at one with the Progressists and the Octobrists, for these are the people who deceive themselves and others with meaningless talk about reforms and "liberties" under existing conditions. The Italian reformist Bissolati betrayed the working class for the sake of the reforms promised by Giolitti, a *liberal* Minister, with the parties of *all* classes existing "openly". But you are betraying the working class for the sake of reforms that *even* the Izgoyevs and Bulgakovs do *not* expect from Makarov!

You speak contemptuously of "playing at strikes". I am not in a position to answer you properly on that point here. I shall merely point out briefly that it is not really clever to describe a profound historical movement as "playing". You are *angry* at strikes just as *Novoye Vremya* (see

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Neznamov's article in the issue of November 17), the Izgoyevs and the Bulgakovs are. And the reason why you are angry is that reality mercilessly shatters your liberal illusions. The mass of the workers fully recognise the need of organisation, system, preparation, and method, but your statements they treat with contempt, and will continue to do so.

The serious disease that has poisoned your system is due to a very widespread bacillus. It is the bacillus of liberal labour policy, or, in other words, of liquidationism. It is in the air. But however angry you may be at the course of events in general and at November 15 in particular, that course is proving deadly to the bacillus.

Pravda No. 180, November 29, 1912
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

IMPOVERISHMENT IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Bourgeois reformists, who are echoed by certain opportunists among the Social-Democrats, assert that there is no impoverishment of the masses taking place in capitalist society. "The theory of impoverishment" is wrong, they say, for the standard of living of the masses is improving, if slowly, and the gulf between the haves and have-nots is narrowing, not widening.

The falsity of such assertions has lately been revealed to the masses more and more clearly. The cost of living is rising. Wages, *even* with the most stubborn and *most* successful strike movement, are increasing much more slowly than the necessary expenditure of labour power. And side by side with this, the wealth of the capitalists is increasing at a dizzy rate.

Here are some data on Germany, where the workers' condition is far better than in Russia, thanks to a higher standard of culture, to *freedom of strikes* and association, to political liberty, to the millions of trade unionists and the millions of readers of workers' newspapers.

According to data furnished by *bourgeois* sociologists, who draw on official sources, wages in Germany have increased by an average of 25 per cent during the past 30 years. In the same period, the cost of living has gone up by *at least* 40 per cent!!

Food, clothing, fuel and rent have all become more expensive. The worker is becoming impoverished *absolutely*, i.e., he is actually becoming poorer than before; he is compelled to live worse, to eat worse, to suffer hunger more, and to live in basements and attics.

But the *relative* impoverishment of the workers, i.e., the diminution of their *share* in the national income, is still more striking. The workers' *comparative* share in capitalist society, which is fast growing rich, is dwindling because the millionaires are becoming ever richer.

There is no income tax in Russia, and no data are available on the growing wealth of the well-to-do classes of society. Our reality, which is even sadder, is shut off by a veil—the veil of ignorance and lack of publicity.

In Germany there are exact data on the wealth of the propertied classes. In Prussia, for example, the *first* 10,000 million marks (5,000 million rubles) of taxable property belonged to 1,853 persons in 1902 and to 1,108 in 1908.

The number of the very rich has diminished. Their wealth has increased—in 1902 each of them owned property worth 5,000,000 marks (2,500,000 rubles) on the average and in 1908, as much as 9,000,000 marks (4,500,000 rubles)!

People speak of the "upper 10,000". In Prussia the "upper 21,000" rich owned property valued at 13,500 million marks, while the taxable property of the remaining 1,300,000 owners was worth only 3,000 million marks.

Four of the wealthiest millionaires in Prussia (one prince, one duke and two counts) owned property worth 149 million marks in 1907 and 481 million marks in 1908.

Wealth in capitalist society is growing at an incredible rate—side by side with the impoverishment of the mass of the workers.

Pravda No. 181, November 30, 1912
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS "PARLIAMENTARY" REPRESENTATIVES

This is not the first time that Russia's class-conscious workers have had to deal with a collective body of representatives of the working class in the Duma. And each time such a body was formed in the Second, Third or Fourth Duma (we do not mention the First, which most of the Social-Democrats boycotted), there was a *discrepancy* between the views and trend of the *majority* of Social-Democrats and those of their representatives in the Duma.

There are exact data on this discrepancy as regards the Second Duma. In the spring of 1907 it was established officially and beyond question what were the views, tendencies and trends or groups predominating in the Social-Democratic Party and those in the Social-Democratic Duma group.

It was found that, by sending one delegate from every 500 worker Social-Democrats, the Bolsheviks at that time had 105 delegates, the Mensheviks 97 and those not belonging to either group 4.[168]

The Bolsheviks had an obvious superiority.

Among the non-Russian Social-Democrats, the Poles had 44 delegates, the Bundists 57 and the Letts 29. As opponents of opportunism, Menshevism and the Bund strongly predominated among the Letts at that time, the ratio of the "trends" among the non-Russians in general was similar to that among the "Russian" Social-Democrats.

Yet in the Duma group of the Social-Democrats at that time there were 36 Mensheviks and 18 Bolsheviks, with 12 Mensheviks and 11 Bolsheviks among the deputies elected by the worker curia.[169] It is obvious that the Mensheviks predominated.

Thus the balance of the "trends" in the Duma group was not the same as in the Social-Democratic movement but the direct opposite.

Is that an accident?

No. As a general rule, in all countries of the world the parliamentary representatives of the workers' parties have a *more opportunist* composition than that of the workers' parties themselves. The reason is easy to see: firstly, all the electoral systems of the bourgeois countries, even the most democratic, in practice *restrict* suffrage for the workers, either by making it conditional on age (in Russia it has to be 25 years), or on residence and permanence of work (six months in Russia), etc. And it is the young, more politically-conscious and resolute sections of the proletariat that these restrictions generally hit hardest of all.

Secondly, under *any* suffrage in bourgeois society, the non-proletarian elements of the workers' parties—officials of workers' unions, small proprietors, office employees, and particularly the "intelligentsia"—specialise more readily in the "parliamentary" profession (owing to their occupations, social standing, training, etc.).

What are the conclusions to be drawn from this fact, and how did matters stand in the Third and Fourth Dumas compared with the Second? We shall devote our next article to these questions.

Pravda No. 191, December 12, 1912
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE "RECONCILIATION" OF THE NATIONALISTS AND CADETS

The most important political result of the Duma debate on the declaration of the government is the touching unity of the *nationalists*, Octobrists and *Cadets*. Our Russian so-called "society" yields so readily to high-sounding and cheap phrases that we have to lay particular emphasis on this *real* result of the action of *all* parties, with their criticism of political questions of principle.

"The parties disappeared," wrote the nationalist *Novoye Vremya* (No. 13199). "Deputy Maklakov's excellent speech (at the December 7 sitting) united the entire Duma, which applauded him, forgetful of all party calculations and differences of opinion."

This comment by a *nationalist* paper, the chief organ of all toadyism, of persecution of Jews and non-Russians in general, should be remembered and pondered by all who take a serious interest in politics.

It was not because they were "forgetful" of party differences of opinion that the Octobrists and nationalists, the Guchkovites and the *Novoye Vremya* people applauded Maklakov, but because they appreciated the profound *unity of opinion* of the liberal bourgeoisie and the nationalist landlords.

Maklakov revealed that unity of opinion on the fundamental issues of home and foreign policy. "While Russia does not seek war, neither does she dread it," exclaimed this Cadet, to prolonged applause by the *nationalists*. How could they help applauding? Any politically literate person realises that these words expressed the Cadets' *acceptance* of the policy of resorting to the threat of war,

the policy of militarism, of armaments by land and by sea that oppress and ruin the mass of the people.

The liberals, who support militarism, are not feared by the reactionaries, who very correctly argue that support for militarism is *action*, whereas liberal exclamations are *mere words* which simply cannot be made a reality so long as the reactionaries are in power. "Give us millions to spend on armaments, and we will clap and applaud your liberal talk"—this is what every clever semi-feudal landlord says, and should say, to the Duma Balalaikins.[170]

And what about Maklakov's stand on home policy? Is it accidental that the Right-wing priests are highly satisfied, as *Rech* itself testifies, or that *Novoye Vremya* gleefully reprints Maklakov's "keynote": "Let there be no division of Russia into two camps—the country and the government"?

No, it is not accidental, because by his whining about the desirability of "reconciliation" Maklakov *in fact* echoes Kokovtsov. For Kokovtsov, too, desires "reconciliation"!

Kokovtsov desires *no* change in the balance of the social forces. Maklakov did *not* show *the slightest* understanding of the *kind* of change that is necessary or *how* it can be brought about. "Reconciliation" is precisely the term which *obscures* the only serious question, that of the conditions and means of achieving this change—obscures it with rotten phrases that say nothing, that blunt the civic consciousness of the masses and lull them.

A "society" which is capable of applauding the speeches of a Maklakov about "reconciliation" deserves nothing but contempt.

As for the speech of Malinovsky, the workers' representative, on the Ministerial declaration, both the nationalists and the Cadets took pains not to notice that in it the democrats were *posing* questions. But then Malinovsky's speech was *not* intended for their like at all.

Pravda No. 194, December 15, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE NATIONAL-LIBERALS

Recent years have seen a definite differentiation taking place among the Russian liberals. The "genuine" bourgeoisie has been setting itself apart from the general liberal camp. Liberal capital is forming its *own* special party, which is to incorporate (and is incorporating) many bourgeois elements which in the past made common cause with the Octobrists and which, on the other hand, is being joined by the most moderate, big-bourgeois, "respectable" elements of the Cadet Party.

The "Progressist" group in the Third and Fourth Dumas, as well as the one in the Council of State are on the verge of becoming the official party representatives of this national-liberal bourgeoisie in the parliamentary arena. Indeed, the recent congress of the "Progressists" virtually outlined the national-liberal programme which *Russkaya Molva*[171] is advocating.

What do the so-called "Progressists" want? Why do we call them national-liberals?

They do *not* want full and undivided rule of the landlords and the bureaucrats. They seek—and they say so plainly—a moderate constitution with narrowly-restricted rights based on a bicameral system and an anti-democratic suffrage. They want a "strong authority" that would pursue the "patriotic" policy of conquering with sword and fire new markets for "national industry". They want the bureaucrats to heed them as much as they heed the Purishkeviches. And then they would be willing to forget their "old accounts" with the reactionaries and work hand in glove with them to establish a "great" capitalist Russia.

What separates these people from the Octobrist Party is that the landlords constitute too strong an element in

that party and that it is tractable to the point of impotence. From the Cadet Party they are separated by their distaste for the Cadets' demagogical flirting with the democrats. The Cadets' hypocritical talk about universal suffrage and compulsory alienation of the land (even with compensation) seems to these "respectable" constitutionalists quite unnecessary and impermissible.

The national-liberals go straight to the point: one must not be afraid of accusations of "pandering to the reactionary forces" but must fight openly against "appeals for seizing the landed estates" and against "fomenting hatred of the propertied classes"; as regards "military might", there should be neither Right nor Left.

> "We are back in our country.... The Russian army is ... *our own* army.... The Russian court of justice is not Shemyaka's[172] but *our own*.... Russia's world standing is not a vainglorious whim of the bureaucracy but *our own* strength and joy" (see the policy statements of *Russkaya Molva*).

The national-liberals undoubtedly have a certain "future" in Russia. They will be a party of the "genuine" capitalist bourgeoisie, such as we see in Germany. The purely intellectual, liberal elements who have few "roots" will remain with the Cadets. The national-liberals will gain such ideologists as Struve, Maklakov, Protopopov, Kovalevsky and others, who have long had one foot in the reactionary camp. They will no doubt be joined also by the exceedingly moderate "Shipovite" Zemstvo-landlord elements, who likewise favour a constitution with narrowly-restricted rights, a "constitution" for the rich. (It is not for nothing that Mr. Struve has recently recalled Mr. Shipov in such kind terms.)

The "Progressists'" dreams of a "strong authority" pursuing a liberal policy cannot, of course, materialise in the near future. And so the Khvostovs and Purishkeviches are still sitting pretty. It may be that the national liberal party will not take final shape just yet and that their newspaper will cease to exist as *Slovo*,[173] a paper which on the whole had set itself the same aims, did three years ago. (In the Duma, however, the "Progressists" have become relatively stronger than the Cadets.) In any case, the coming

into the open of the national-liberal bourgeoisie indicates a considerable maturing of the class antagonisms in Russia.

The workers must counter the self-determination of the capitalist bourgeoisie by putting ten times greater energy into *their own* organisation and *their own* self-determination as a class.

Pravda No. 200, December 22, 1912

Published according to the *Pravda* text

ON THE ATTITUDE TO LIQUIDATIONISM AND ON UNITY

THESES

1. Four years' struggle against liquidationism.

   The Party defined liquidationism in *December* 1908. Liquidationism condemned for destroying the Party, not for legal work. Anti-liquidationism wins in the legal arena, 1912. ("**Pravda**" and **the elections**.)
2. The liquidators caused a split. The liquidators broke away from the Party. Their initiating groups are a product and manifestation of the split.
3. The August 1912 conference was anti-Party in composition, as even the conciliators had to admit.

   It is impermissible for little groups abroad, having no direct mandate from any Social-Democratic organisation in Russia, and not operating by agreement with it, to act in the name of the Social-Democratic Party.
4. The resolutions of the August conference on basic issues of the movement, above all on the fundamental issue of recognition—complete and sincere recognition—of the illegal Party, are, to put it as mildly as possible, "diplomacy", i.e., evasion of a straightforward answer to the question. They are in effect liquidationist resolutions.
5. The political behaviour of the liquidationist group in *Nashe Zarya* and *Luch* after the (August) conference revealed the absolutely anti-Party character of this group, which found expression (a) in advocacy of an open Party; (b) in scoffing at "underground" work in the legal press; (c) in a struggle against revolutionary strikes and revolutionary mass struggle in general.

A resolute struggle must be waged against this group as anti-Party.

6. The advocacy of unity in the legal press—evading and obscuring the essence of the matter, namely, the question of *recognising* the illegal Party *in practice*—is deception of the workers.
7. The unity of all trends and shades in the illegal organisation is absolutely necessary. Appeal for such unity.

Written in December 1912

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Published according to the manuscript

NOTIFICATION AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE CRACOW MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND PARTY FUNCTIONARIES[174]

Published in pamphlet form
by the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. in Paris,
February 1913

Published according
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and for the "Resolutions",
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NOTIFICATION

A meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries was held in February this year. The Central Committee succeeded in securing the attendance of members of the illegal Party organisations of St. Petersburg (five persons), the Moscow Region (two), the South (two), the Urals and the Caucasus. Elections from the local organisations could not be held, and the meeting was therefore not constituted a conference. Some of the members of the Central Committee were unable to attend because of police measures.

Nearly all the participants in the meeting had been playing a prominent role in various legal workers' societies and in the use of so-called "legal opportunities". Thus the composition of the meeting ensured an accurate picture of the whole of Party work in all the principal areas of Russia.

The meeting held eleven sittings, and drafted resolutions on the following items of the agenda: (1) The revolutionary upswing, the strikes and the tasks of the Party. (2) Building the illegal Party organisation. (3) The Duma Social-Democratic group. (4) The Party press. (5) The insurance campaign. (6) The attitude to liquidationism. The issue of unity. (7) The non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations.

The resolutions were adopted unanimously, the only exception being the abstention of one comrade on two clauses of the "insurance" resolution, and of another on particulars of the resolution on the non-Russians.

Endorsed by the Central Committee, the resolutions of the meeting provide a summary of Party experience and a guiding line on all the major questions of Social-Democratic work in present-day Russia.

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Taking systematic stock of the experience of 1912 is a most important task of the Social-Democrats, for that year saw a great, a historic change in Russia's working-class movement. The point is not merely that decline and disintegration are giving way to a revival. The working class has gone over to a massive offensive against the capitalists and the tsarist monarchy. The wave of economic and political strikes has surged so high that in this respect Russia is once more *ahead of all* the countries of the world, including the most developed of them.

This fact will not, of course, make any class-conscious worker forget how very far ahead of us are the proletarians of the free countries in regard to organisation and class education of the masses. But this fact has proved that Russia has entered a period of the growth of a *new revolution*.

The working class is faced with the great task of bringing about the revolutionary awakening of all the democratic masses and of educating them in the struggle, of leading them to the powerful onslaught which must bring Russia freedom and a republic by destroying the Romanov monarchy. The fundamental task of the moment is to give the utmost support to the open revolutionary struggle of the masses, to organise, extend, deepen and intensify it. Anyone who has failed to realise this task, who does not work in an illegal organisation, group or nucleus promoting the cause of the revolution, is not a Social-Democrat.

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The revolutionary upswing of the proletariat in 1912 was the main cause of the universally recognised change in the mood of the democrats. Both in the elections to the Fourth Duma and in the matter of founding a legal working-class press that advocates at least the basic elements of Marxist theory, the Social-Democrats achieved important

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Совещание Ц.К. Росс. С.Д. Р.П.
Парт. с партийными работниками.

В февраля текущего года
состоялось совещание Ц.К. Росс. С.Д.
Р.П. с партийными работниками. На со-
вещание удалось привлечь членов нева-
лидных, партийных организаций Петер-
бурга (по разу), Московской области (два
раза), Юга (двоих), Урала и Кавказа. Про-
изведя выборы из местных организа-

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Notification" on the meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.
and Party functionaries. January 1913

Reduced

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and Party functionaries. January 1913

Reduced

victories. The tsarist government was unable to prevent these achievements solely because the open revolutionary struggle of the masses had altered the entire social and political situation. While continuing its steadfast, persevering and systematic work of using absolutely all "legal opportunities"—ranging from the platform of the Black-Hundred Duma to a simple temperance society—the R.S.D.L.P. does not for one moment forget that only he is worthy of the lofty name of Party member who really carries on his entire work among the masses in the spirit of the Party decisions that were thought out and adopted from the standpoint of the growing revolution and not of June Third "legality". Our task is not to succumb to the disorder and disintegration left over from the period of 1908-11, but to fight against them. Our job is not to swim with the stream of chaotic and unprincipled legalism, but to use every legal possibility for gradually grouping all live elements around the illegal Party. Our slogan is: no peace with those who misuse legalism to sow scepticism and indifference to the revolutionary struggle of the masses or even to hamper it outright.

We cannot guarantee the realisation of our demands by reducing them, by curtailing our programme, or by adopting the tactics of attracting unenlightened people with the deceptive promise of easy constitutional reforms under Russian tsarism. We can guarantee it only by educating the masses in the spirit of consistent democracy and awareness of the falsity of constitutional illusions. The guarantee lies in the revolutionary organisation of the foremost class, the proletariat, and in the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses.

The period of rampant counter-revolution has left us a heritage of ideological disorder and disruption, organisational disintegration in many centres of the working-class movement, primitive methods and forced isolation from the Party on the part of some, and a scornful, or even malicious, attitude to the "underground" that preserves the behests of the revolution and elaborates revolutionary tactics, on the part of others. The liquidators' break-away from the Social-Democratic Party, their virtual isolation, and in some cases departure from Social-Democratic

principles and disintegration of the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations have all accentuated the demand for *unity* to the utmost degree.

Unity of the Social-Democratic proletariat is a necessary condition for its victories.

Unity of the Social-Democratic proletariat is impossible without the unity of *its* Party, the R.S.D.L.P.

And here we see at once that we cannot decide the question of unity without deciding—not merely in words but by deeds as well—the question of the need for an illegal Party. Anyone who speaks of unity and yet advocates an "open workers' party" deceives himself and the workers. Anyone who speaks of unity, pretending that this question can be decided, cleared up, or at least raised, within the bounds of legality, deceives himself and the workers.

What will solve the problem of unity is certainly not meaningless phrases about "unity" in the legal press, nor agreements with various "straggling" little groups of intellectuals, nor yet the diplomacy of negotiations abroad, but *solely unity* in the localities, the actual *fusion* of *all* worker members of the R.S.D.L.P. into an integral illegal organisation.

The workers have already started of their own accord, from below, on the solution of the problem of unity, the only solution that is serious and realistic. This meeting calls on all Social-Democrats to take the same path.

Worker Social-Democrats everywhere are re-establishing integral illegal organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. in the form of factory nuclei and committees, district groups, town centres, Social-Democratic groups in *all kinds* of legal institutions, etc. Let all who do not wish to doom themselves to the role of powerless individuals join these organisations, where the recognition of the illegal Party and support for the revolutionary struggle of the masses take place under the control of the workers themselves.

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The period of disintegration is passing. The time has come to gather our forces. Let us, then, rally in the illegal organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. They do not close the door to

any Social-Democrat who wishes to work in them, who wishes to help the organisation of the proletariat, its struggle against capital, and the revolutionary onslaught against the tsarist monarchy that it has begun.

A nation-wide political crisis is slowly but steadily maturing in Russia. The June Third system was the last attempt to rescue the tsar's Black-Hundred monarchy, to renovate it by an alliance with the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie, and that attempt fell through. The new democratic forces are growing and gathering strength daily and hourly among Russia's peasantry and town bourgeoisie. The number of proletarians in town and country is growing faster than ever, they are becoming more organised, more united, and more confident of their invincibility, and their confidence is strengthened by the experience of mass strikes.

The R.S.D.L.P., in organising the foremost contingents of this proletariat into an integral whole, must lead it into revolutionary battle in the name of our old revolutionary demands.

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

February 1913

RESOLUTIONS

THE REVOLUTIONARY UPSWING, THE STRIKES AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY

1. The outstanding fact in the history of the working-class movement and the Russian revolution in 1912 was the remarkable development of both the economic and the political strike movement of the proletariat. The number of political strikers reached one million.

2. The character of the strike movement of 1912 deserves special attention. The workers in a number of cases put forward economic and political demands simultaneously; the period of economic strikes was succeeded by a period of political strikes and vice versa. The struggle against the capitalists for the gains of 1905 taken away by the counter-revolution, and the growing cost of living, aroused more and more sections of the workers, confronting them with political issues in the sharpest form. All these forms of combination and intertwining of the economic and political struggle are a condition for and an earnest of the might of the movement, giving rise to revolutionary mass strikes.

3. The beginning of outbursts of discontent and of revolts in the Navy and the Army, which marked the year 1912, was undoubtedly linked with the revolutionary mass strikes of the workers, and indicated the growing ferment and indignation among large sections of the democrats, in particular among the peasantry, who supply the bulk of the troops.

4. All these facts, combined with the general swing to the left in the country, which had its effect on the elections to the Fourth Duma despite the most shameless rigging

of them by the Black-Hundred tsarist government, showed beyond all doubt that Russia had once more entered a period of open revolutionary struggle by the masses. The new revolution, the beginning of which we are experiencing, is an inevitable result of the bankruptcy of the June Third policy of tsarism. This policy was unable to satisfy even the most compliant big bourgeoisie. The mass of the people has become still more enslaved, particularly in the case of the oppressed nationalities, and the peasantry has again been reduced to a state where millions upon millions are starving.

5. Under these circumstances, revolutionary mass strikes are of exceptional importance also because they constitute one of the most effective means of overcoming the apathy, despair and disunity of the agricultural proletariat and the peasantry, rousing them to independent political activity and drawing them into the most concerted, simultaneous and extensive revolutionary actions.

6. The Party organisations, in extending and intensifying their agitation for the immediate demands of the R.S.D.L.P.—a democratic republic, an eight-hour working day, and confiscation of all the landed estates for the benefit of the peasantry—must make it one of the prime objects of their activity to give all-round support to revolutionary mass strikes, and to develop and organise all forms of revolutionary action by the masses. In particular, an essential current task is to organise revolutionary street demonstrations both in combination with political strikes and as independent actions.

7. The fact that some capitalists resort to lock-outs (mass dismissals) against the strikers confronts the working class with new tasks. It is necessary to take careful account of the economic conditions of strikes in every area, every industry and every particular case, find new forms of struggle (such as stay-in strikes) to counteract the lock-outs, and replace political strikes by revolutionary meetings and revolutionary street demonstrations.

8. Some legal press organs are carrying on general agitation against revolutionary mass strikes, irrespective of their appraisal of this or that strike. Besides the liberal press, such agitation is being carried on, for example, by

the group of liquidators in the newspaper *Luch*, against the will of a substantial section of those workers who support the newspaper in one form or another. In view of this, the task of all pro-Party worker Social-Democrats is: (1) to wage a determined struggle against that group; (2) systematically and perseveringly to explain the harm of the above-mentioned agitation to all workers, irrespective of their leanings, and (3) to rally all proletarian forces for the furtherance of revolutionary agitation and revolutionary action by the masses.

BUILDING THE ILLEGAL ORGANISATION

1. In summing up the working-class movement and the Party's work in 1912, this meeting finds that—the new wave of revolutionary actions by the masses that has begun has fully borne out the previous decisions of the R.S.D.L.P. (particularly those of the January 1912 Conference) as regards building the Party. The course of the strike movement in 1912, the Social-Democrats' campaign in the elections to the Fourth Duma, the course of the insurance campaign, etc., have shown beyond doubt that the only correct type of organisational structure in the present period is an illegal party as the sum total of Party nuclei surrounded by a network of legal and semi-legal workers' associations.

2. It is absolutely obligatory to adapt the organisational forms of illegal building to local conditions. A variety of forms of cover for illegal nuclei and the greatest possible flexibility in adapting forms of work to local and general living conditions guarantee the vitality of the illegal organisation.

3. The chief immediate task in the field of organisational work at the present time is to establish in all factories purely Party illegal committees consisting of the most active elements among the workers. The tremendous upswing of the working-class movement creates conditions in which factory Party committees can be restored and the existing ones strengthened in the vast majority of localities.

4. The meeting points out that it has now become essential in every centre to form a single leading organisation out of the disconnected local groups.
In St. Petersburg, for example, a leading City Committee, formed by combining the principle of election by district nuclei and the principle of co-option, has emerged as a type of city-wide organisation.

This type of organisation makes it possible to establish a very close and direct connection between the leading body and the primary nuclei, and at the same time to create a small, mobile, particularly well disguised executive body, authorised to act at any moment on behalf of the entire organisation. The meeting recommends this type for other centres of the working-class movement as well, with such modifications as may be prompted by local and general living conditions.

5. With a view to establishing close links between local organisations and the Central Committee, as well as to guiding and unifying Party work, this meeting deems it imperative to organise regional centres in the principal areas of the working-class movement.

6. A system of authorised nominees is proposed as a most important practical factor in establishing a permanent living link between the Central Committee and local Social-Democratic groups, as well as in devising flexible forms of directing local work in the major centres of the working-class movement. Nominees should be recruited among workers in charge of local work. Only advanced workers can by themselves strengthen and consolidate the central apparatus of the Party locally, and throughout Russia.

7. This meeting expresses the wish that the Central Committee should confer as frequently as possible with local Party functionaries active in various fields of Social-Democratic work.

8. This meeting stresses the repeated Party decisions to the effect that the workers' party cannot exist unless there are regular membership dues and contributions by workers. In the absence of such contributions, particularly in present conditions, the existence of a central (local or

all-Russia) Party body, however modest, will be absolutely impossible.

9. (Not to be published.)

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

1. This meeting notes that despite unheard-of persecution and the rigging of the elections by the government, and despite the Black-Hundred and liberal bloc against the Social-Democrats that in many places assumed a very definite character, the R.S.D.L.P. won tremendous victories in the elections to the Fourth Duma. The Social-Democrats polled an increased number of votes almost everywhere in the second urban curia, which they are wresting more and more from the liberals. In the worker curia which is the most important for our Party, the R.S.D.L.P. retained its undivided supremacy, the working class emphasising with particular unanimity, by electing none but Bolshevik deputies in the curia, its unshakable loyalty to the old R.S.D.L.P. and its revolutionary behests.

2. This meeting hails the vigorous activity of the Social-Democratic deputies to the Fourth Duma, which found expression in a number of speeches in the Duma, the submission of interpellations and the reading of a declaration which in general correctly expressed the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy.

3. This meeting recognises that our Party's established tradition, by which the Duma Social-Democratic group is a body subordinate to the Party as a whole, in the shape of its central bodies, is the only correct one, and finds that in the interests of the political education of the working class and the proper organisation of the Party's work in the Duma, careful attention should be paid to every step of the Social-Democratic group, and in this way Party control exercised over the group.

4. This meeting cannot but regard the resolution concerning Jagiello as a direct violation of Party duty by the Social-Democratic group. That resolution backs the disruptive move of the Bund, which entered into an agreement with a non-Social-Democratic party (the P.S.P.) against

the Polish Social-Democrats and elected Jagiello, a non-Social-Democrat, in opposition to all the Social-Democratic electors, who were in the majority among the working-class electors. The group thereby aggravated the split among the workers in Poland and hampered the cause of unity in the Party as a whole.

5. Comrade Chkhenkeli's defence, on behalf of the group, of cultural national autonomy under the guise of "establishing the necessary institutions for the free development of each nationality" is a direct violation of the Party Programme.[175] The Second Congress of the Party, which adopted the Programme,[176] rejected by a special vote what was in effect an identical formulation. Concessions to nationalist sentiment, even in this disguised form, are impermissible for a proletarian party.

6. The Social-Democratic group's vote in favour of the Progressist (in reality Octobrist) formula of procedure with regard to the declaration of the Minister, and the failure to introduce an independent Social-Democratic formula are a blunder which should be noted by the Party in view of the malicious comments of the liberal press.[177]

7, 8 and 9. (Not to be published.)[178]

ILLEGAL LITERATURE

Having discussed the necessity for all-round development of illegal publishing and worked out a number of concrete instructions on the matter, this meeting insistently calls upon all local organisations of the Party, all workers' nuclei and individual workers to show greater independence and initiative in the matter of transport and contacts with the Bureau of the Central Committee[179] for the distribution of illegal literature.

THE INSURANCE CAMPAIGN

Noting that the working class and its Party, despite all persecution, have displayed great energy in upholding proletarian interests in connection with the introduction of the insurance law, this meeting considers:

1. It is necessary to wage the most determined and concerted struggle against attempts by the government and the capitalists to make the workers elect their delegates to the sick benefit funds blindly, without allowing workers' meetings.

2. Despite the prohibition, workers should everywhere try to hold spontaneous meetings for the preliminary nomination of the candidate delegates they want.

3. Workers should organise revolutionary meetings to protest against the violence and outrages accompanying the introduction of the insurance laws.

4. It is at all events necessary to draw up beforehand a workers' list of candidate delegates from among the more influential worker Social-Democrats and by concerted effort to champion the list also where no meetings can be held.

5. This meeting considers it inadvisable and harmful to boycott the election of delegates. At present the capitalists are devoting their main efforts to preventing the workers from gaining ascendancy in certain proletarian factory nuclei, such as the workers' sick benefit funds should become. A boycott, which at the present time would disunite the workers, would only assist the above-mentioned efforts of the capitalists.

6. The struggle for the proper election of delegates to sick benefit funds must not cease for one moment. While using every opportunity in every way and with the utmost energy, not for a moment allowing the employers to consider the normal course of production assured, and extending and developing the workers' struggle, we must not refrain from securing that the Social-Democratic list is adopted despite all obstacles. Elections do not preclude further development of the struggle. On the contrary, by securing the election of staunch worker Social-Democrats as delegates, we shall facilitate the further struggle for proper elections, in which the delegates will give the utmost assistance to the workers.

7. Wherever elections take place without meetings, it is necessary to carry on agitation for the re-election of delegates through genuinely free elections, with the workers holding meetings by every means available.

8. The Social-Democratic Duma group must immediately make a new interpellation on the banning of workers' election meetings.

9. All agitation on the introduction of insurance must be closely combined with a description of the entire state of affairs in tsarist Russia, explaining our socialist principles and revolutionary demands.

THE ATTITUDE TO LIQUIDATIONISM, AND UNITY

1. The Party's four years of struggle against liquidationism have proved the absolute correctness of the definition given by the December 1908 Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which said:

"Attempts by a certain section of intellectuals in the Party to abolish the existing organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. and replace it by an amorphous association within the framework of legality at all costs, even at the price of a downright repudiation of the programme, tactics and traditions of the Party."

Consequently, the liquidators are condemned not for stressing the necessity of legal work, but for renouncing and destroying the illegal Party.

The founding of the first Marxist workers' daily newspaper in Russia and the election of none but Bolshevik deputies in the worker curia proved beyond all doubt that the Party was able to cope with legal activity, having pushed aside the liquidators.

2. By withdrawing from the illegal Party and grouping themselves separately from the local organisations, the liquidators brought about a split, which they confirmed by setting up so-called initiating groups in a number of localities, above all in St. Petersburg. The January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which decided that the liquidationist group of contributors to *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*—a group forming the core of the initiating groups—had "definitely placed itself outside the Party",* thereby merely registered the split effected by the liquidators.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 481.—*Ed.*

3. The August 1912 conference, which named itself a "conference of organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.", proved in fact to be a liquidationist conference, since its principal and leading section was the literary group of liquidators which had broken away from the Party and was cut off from the mass of the Russian workers.

4. The devotion of the overwhelming majority of the foremost workers to the illegal Party compelled the August conference to make seeming concessions to Party principle and profess recognition of the illegal Party. In reality, however, all the resolutions of that conference are permeated through and through with liquidationism, and immediately after the conference *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*, which announced its adherence to the August decisions, intensified their liquidationist propaganda—

(a) for an open party;

(b) against the underground;

(c) against the Party Programme (defence of cultural national autonomy, revision of the agrarian laws enacted by the Third Duma, shelving the slogan of a republic, and so on);

(d) against revolutionary mass strikes;

(e) for reformist, exclusively legalist tactics.

Hence one of the Party's tasks is still to wage a determined struggle against the liquidationist group of *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*, and to make clear to the mass of the workers the great harm of the liquidators' propaganda.

5. The "unity" campaign launched by the liquidators in the legal press evades and obscures the main issue, that of joining the illegal Party and working in it; thus it misleads the workers, for this issue cannot even be raised in the legal press. In reality the liquidators still behave as splitters, which became only too obvious during the elections in St. Petersburg, for when the electors were divided into two equal groups, it was the liquidators who rejected the proposal for drawing lots, the only means of doing away with the disunity of the workers in the face of the bourgeois parties.

6. Provided the illegal organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. is recognised and joined, the unity of worker Social-Democrats of all trends and shades is an absolute necessity dictated by all the interests of the working-class movement.

Unification on these very principles has already been effected in the Narva district organisation of St. Petersburg and in a number of provincial organisations.

7. This meeting most emphatically supports such unification and recommends that the same thing should immediately be begun everywhere from below, in factory committees, district groups, etc., the worker comrades verifying whether the recognition of the illegal organisation and readiness to back the revolutionary struggle of the masses and revolutionary tactics are really put into effect. Only to the extent that this unity from below is actually established will the final unification of the Party and complete consolidation of unity on an all-Russia scale be accomplished.

NON-RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

1. The experience of 1912 fully confirmed the correctness of the decision which the January (1912) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted on this question.* The Bund's support of the nomination of Jagiello, a non-Social-Democrat, against the Polish Social-Democrats, and the violation of the Party Programme in favour of nationalism by the August (1912) conference of the liquidators, the Bund and the Lettish Social-Democrats revealed with particular clarity the complete bankruptcy of the federalist principles of organising the Social-Democratic Party and the great harm which the isolation of the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations does to the proletarian cause.

2. This meeting therefore calls earnestly on the workers of all the nationalities of Russia to rebuff the militant nationalism of the reactionaries with the utmost determination, to combat all manifestations of a nationalist spirit among the working masses. It calls on the worker Social-Democrats locally to display the closest solidarity, and to merge into integral organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. working in all the languages spoken by the local proletariat and achieving real unity from below, as has long been done in the Caucasus.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 464-65.—*Ed.*

3. This meeting expresses deep regret at the split in the ranks of the Polish Social-Democrats, which greatly weakens the struggle of the worker Social-Democrats of Poland. The meeting is compelled to state that the Executive of the Polish Social-Democrats, which today does not represent the majority of the Social-Democratic organisations of the Polish proletariat, resorts to impermissible methods in combating that majority (for example, groundlessly suspecting the entire Warsaw organisation of provocation). The meeting calls on all the Party organisations which come in contact with the Polish worker Social-Democrats to help them in establishing genuine unity among the Polish Social-Democrats.

4. This meeting points out in particular the extreme opportunism and liquidationism of the decisions adopted by the latest (ninth) conference of the Bund, which withdrew the slogan of a republic, pushed illegal work into the background and was oblivious of the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat. Equally reprehensible is the Bund's resistance to the unification of all worker Social-Democrats in the localities (Warsaw, Lodz, Vilna and elsewhere), a unification which the R.S.D.L.P. has repeatedly urged at its congresses and conferences since 1906.

5. This meeting greets the revolutionary worker Social-Democrats of the Lettish organisation, who perseveringly carry on anti-liquidationist propaganda, and expresses regret that the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democrats is inclined to support the anti-Party moves of the liquidators.

6. This meeting expresses firm confidence that the revolutionary upswing which has begun, and the mass economic and political strikes, street demonstrations and other forms of open revolutionary struggle by the masses will help in completely unifying and merging the worker Social-Democrats in the localities without any distinction between the nationalities, thereby strengthening the onslaught against tsarism, which oppresses all the peoples of Russia, and against the bourgeoisie of all the nations of Russia, which is in the process of uniting.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT IN 1912

The miners' strike was the outstanding event of the past year. While the railway strike in 1911 showed the "new spirit" of the British workers, the miners' strike definitely marked an epoch.

Despite the "war" preparations of the ruling classes, and despite the strenuous efforts of the bourgeoisie to crush the resistance of the rebellious slaves of capital, the strike was a success. The miners displayed exemplary organisation. There was not a trace of blacklegging. Coal-mining by soldiers or inexperienced labourers was out of the question. And after six weeks of struggle the bourgeois government of Britain saw that the country's entire industrial activity was coming to a standstill and that the words of the workers' song, "All wheels cease to whir when thy hand wills it",[180] were coming true.

The government made concessions.

"The Prime Minister of the most powerful empire the world has ever seen attended a delegate meeting of the mine-owners' striking slaves and pleaded with them to agree to a compromise." That is how a well-informed Marxist summed up the struggle.

The British Government, which year after year usually feeds its workers with promises of reform "some day", this time acted with real dispatch. In *five days* a new law was rushed through Parliament! This law introduced a *minimum* wage, i.e., regulations establishing rates of pay *below* which wages cannot be reduced.

It is true that this law, like all bourgeois reforms, is a miserable half-measure and in part a mere deception of the workers, because while fixing the lowest rate of pay,

the employers keep their wage-slaves down all the same. Nevertheless, those who are familiar with the British labour movement say that since the miners' strike the British proletariat *is no longer the same*. The workers have learned to fight. They have come to see the *path* that will lead them to victory. They have become aware of their strength. They have ceased to be the meek lambs they seemed to be for so long a time to the joy of all the defenders and extollers of wage-slavery.

In Britain a change has taken place in the balance of social forces, a change that cannot be expressed in figures but is felt by all.

Unfortunately, there is not much progress in Party affairs in Britain. The split between the British Socialist Party (formerly the Social-Democratic Federation) and the Independent (of socialism) Labour Party persists. The opportunist conduct of the M.P.s belonging to the latter party is giving rise, as always happens, to *syndicalist* tendencies among the workers. Fortunately, these tendencies are not strong.

The British trade unions are slowly but surely turning towards socialism, in spite of the many Labour M.P.s who stubbornly champion the old line of liberal labour policy. But it is beyond the power of these last of the Mohicans to retain the old line!

Pravda No. 1, January 1, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

I have had to be very late in coming out with a denial of what L. Martov wrote in *Luch* (No. 37, October 28, 1912). But how can it be helped? It is easy to tell an untruth, but sometimes it takes a long time *to find out* the truth.

In *Luch* No. 37, L. Martov heaped upon me the choicest abuse seasoned with the sort of "obscure" innuendoes that are usual with that writer. Having become accustomed in ten years to these methods of struggle used by L. Martov, I did not even read his article to the end. But some colleagues pointed out to me that L. Martov alleges that Comrade Haase, a member of the Central Committee of the German Social-Democrats, has said: "Lenin is *deceiving* the International."

To get at the truth, I had to find the *source* of Martov's allegation. He referred to a certain *Miners' Newspaper* No. 225. I could not find it. *Vorwärts* (central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party) contains no such words. I only found them in the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*[181] (the organ of the Bremen Social-Democrats).

I was faced with the necessity of questioning Haase himself if I did not want to imitate L. Martov's frivolous attitude.

I sent a written inquiry to the Central Committee of the German Social-Democrats.

Here is Haase's reply:

Central Committee
of the German Social-Democratic Party
Berlin, December 31, 1912

Dear Comrades,

In reply to your inquiry, I wish to inform you that the wording which, according to you, *Luch* used in reporting my speech in the International Socialist Bureau, is not in accord with the facts. The

question discussed at the meeting was whether the Organising Committee can claim representation on the International Socialist Bureau. I said this was impermissible because, even according to its own statement, the Organising Committee is not an organisation but merely wants to be a union of groups for restoring the unity of the organisation. In this connection, I raised the question of who specifically was entitled to represent the Russian party in its present state, and remarked that if it was true that in its relations with the International Bureau the Central Committee acted as the "R.S.D.L.P.", this name might give rise to misunderstandings.

Thus there was no attack on Lenin here, and in general, the remark was not an insulting one at all. I wanted only to ascertain the state of affairs in view of the above-mentioned assertion, and primarily to raise the question whether the time had not come to take steps towards unifying all the Russo-Polish groups. I was very sorry Lenin was absent.

For the sake of completeness only, I wish to point out that the word "deceit" never passed my lips.

With comradely greetings, *Haase*

And so, in order to heap abuse on me for the thousandth time, L. Martov has repeated (echoing someone else) an *untruth* about Haase.

Haase was *against* the Organising Committee being represented, but he *did not dispute* the representation of the Central Committee.

Haase does not consider that the Central Committee represents the *entire* R.S.D.L.P., including the non-Russians and the liquidators; but then, as far as I know, the Central Committee itself has *never* claimed that it represented either of these.

The non-Russians (the Poles, the Bund, the Letts) have special representatives of their own.

I confine myself to this factual denial.

N. Lenin

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Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY STRIKES AND STREET DEMONSTRATIONS

It has long since been pointed out, and recognised by all, that the year 1912 was an outstanding landmark in the development of the strike movement. But not all have realised and taken proper account of it.

Let us take the data on political strikes in the first eleven months of the year. The result is as follows:

1905		1,052,000
1906		642,000
1907		540,000
. . . . .		. . . . .
1912	about	*900,000*

The number of political strikers in the first nine months was 700,000, according to the most conservative estimates. Strikes in connection with clearing up the matter of the delegates in St. Petersburg[182] involved up to 50,000 persons; the strike in protest against the Sevastopol executions and the strike on November 15, the day when the Duma opened, involved 188,000 persons, according to the Moscow *Manufacturers' Society*. These data are for the period before November 20. Obviously, 900,000 is a minimum figure. Even subtracting 100,000 that are hardly comparable with 1905-07 (factories *outside* the province of the factory inspectorate), we get 800,000.

In any case, the movement definitely surpassed that in 1906 and 1907, and fell but *slightly short* of that in 1905!

What does this mean?

The national scale of the movement at present is, of course, much smaller than in 1905. Consequently, the *beginning* of the revolutionary upswing is *incomparably*

higher today than it was before the first revolution. Consequently, the coming second revolution even now reveals a *much greater* store of revolutionary energy in the proletariat. The proletariat has grown in numbers—by a minimum of 20 per cent. Its concentration has increased. The purely proletarian mainstay of the movement has become stronger due to accelerated dissociation from the land. The size of the proletarian and semi-proletarian population in "domestic" industry, handicrafts and agriculture has grown to an enormous extent defying calculation.

Lastly, there has been an increase in the political consciousness, experience and determination of the foremost democratic class. This is admitted by all, but not all can bring themselves to think out all the implications. Not all can bring themselves to face the truth and admit that we are witnessing *revolutionary* mass strikes, the beginning of a *revolutionary* upsurge.

This is indicated first and foremost by the fundamental and most objective fact, one least of all permitting of subjective interpretation, namely, the scope of the movement. In no country of the world would it be possible, unless there were a revolutionary social situation, to rouse hundreds of thousands of workers to political action for the most varied reasons several times a year. But in our country this rise is taking place spontaneously, because tens of millions of the semi-proletarian and peasant population are passing on, if one can use this expression, to their vanguard a sentiment of concentrated indignation, which is surging up and overflowing.

The Russian workers' revolutionary strike in 1912 was national in the fullest sense of the term. For what should be understood by a national movement is not at all one with which—in the conditions of a bourgeois-democratic revolution—the whole bourgeoisie, or at least the liberal bourgeoisie, is in agreement. Only opportunists hold that view. On the contrary, a national movement is one which expresses the objective needs of the whole country, and aims its heaviest blows at the central forces of the enemy opposing the country's development. A national movement is one which has the sympathy of the vast majority of the population.

Such precisely is the workers' political movement this year, a movement which has the sympathy of all working and exploited people, of all democrats, however weak, downtrodden, disunited and helpless they may be. The more definite demarcation between liberalism and democracy (achieved not without a struggle against those who aspired to "wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries") is a tremendous advantage of the new movement, If the revolution is to succeed, it must know as exactly as possible with whom it can go into battle, which of its allies is unreliable and who is its real enemy.

That is why the direct actions of the liberals (Cadets) against the new revolution are so very significant. And that is why the slogan of a republic, which clears the minds of all democrats willing to fight from the monarchist (as well as "constitutional") illusions which sapped so much the strength of the onslaught in 1905, is of the most exceptional importance (by comparison with Europe) in Russia just now. Of historic importance in the process of growth of the new revolution in Russia are two factors: firstly, the April and May strikes during which the St. Petersburg workers—in spite of the arrest of their leading organisation, the St. Petersburg Committee—put forward the slogan of a republic, an eight-hour working day, and confiscation of the landed estates. Secondly, the November strikes and demonstrations (see letters from Riga and Moscow[183], the same thing happened in St. Petersburg, but the arrests swept away our correspondents). The slogans of those demonstrations were not only "Down with the death penalty! Down with war!", but also "Long live the revolutionary working class and the revolutionary army!"

In the streets of St. Petersburg, Riga and Moscow, the proletariat held out its hand to those foremost fighters of the muzhik armed forces who had risen heroically against the monarchy.

* *
*

The liberal bourgeoisie is against a new revolution, against revolutionary mass strikes. But the liberals are by no means opposed to political strikes in general, that is,

if these are only evidence of a "revival" and support merely the liberal slogan of constitutional reform. And objectively irrespective of their "good" intentions, our liquidators are mere servants of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie they marked both historic moments of the upswing by "pronouncements" against revolutionary strikes!! In *Nevsky Golos* No. 1, on May 20, 1912, the unforgettable and incomparable V. Yezhov rebelled against "complicating" economic strikes by political strikes and vice versa, against their "harmful lumping together" (cf. *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 27, p. 4).*

In November 1912 the liquidationist *Luch*, too, was up in arms against strikes. Afterwards it tried to put inattentive people "on a false scent" by referring to the fact that the Social-Democratic group, too, was against the November 15 strike. But anyone who looks at all into the meaning of the event will easily see through *Luch*'s trickery.

Yes, both the Social-Democratic group and the St. Petersburg Committee found the November 15 strike inopportune. They sounded a warning against that particular strike on that particular day. It was the duty of the working-class press to report this. And *Luch* and *Pravda* did.

But *Luch* did something besides.

After the event of November 15 (when the most zealous in striking was the very same Vyborg District which until then had been most of all linked with the Mensheviks), and after the movement had grown to the dimensions of a demonstration, the sagacious *Luch* carried articles (an editorial and, following the editorial of November 17, a *feuilleton* on November 21) crying out against the "dangerous frittering away of forces", declaring that "if strikes are used frequently, people will stop sympathising with them", advancing the slogan "Let us seek a different path" and "Nothing is to be gained by outbreaks" (!?!), and howling against "playing at strikes".

That is the kind of "philosophy", advocated by you liquidator gentlemen, and long familiar to the St. Petersburg workers, both from *Nevsky Golos* and from speeches by members of your "initiating group", that has gained

* See pp. 116-17 of this volume.—*Ed.*

you the legitimate hatred and contempt of the St. Petersburg workers. A particular strike may be unfortunate or take place at an unfortunate moment. But only liberals and counter-revolutionaries are free to describe as "playing at strikes" one of the world's greatest movements, which brought into action almost a million proletarians!

Frequent strikes are apt to exhaust the workers. It may well be, therefore, that we shall have to call for shorter strikes and for demonstrations that have been better prepared. But the event of November 15 was remarkable precisely as a new step forward in the demonstration movement!

Instead of honestly admitting your mistake (for you were plainly mistaken as to the significance of November 15), you liquidators began to talk, like the most brazen liberals, about the "political illiteracy" of the revolutionary appeal, you who are repeating the ABC of liberal politics!

Let the workers judge the worth of the liquidators' smooth-spoken talk about their "unity" with the Party when it happens that at the time of the rise and development of revolutionary strikes and demonstrations, the liquidators launch a struggle against them, using the legal press to revile illegal appeals!!

* *
*

However, there is a more profound reason for the liquidators' campaign against strikes. The liquidators are slaves of the liberals. And the liberals have really begun to feel ill at ease because of the stubborn character of revolutionary strikes. The "Progressist" factory owner has begun to grumble and even to rage. The Milyukovs now fear lest their "bloc" with Rodzyanko should be disturbed.

Liquidationist policy serves to subject the workers to the liberals. Marxist policy raises the workers to the role of leaders of the *peasantry*. One cannot speak of this legally, liquidator gentlemen, but one must think of it and tell about it to those who want to be revolutionary Social-Democrats.

In free, constitutional Europe, political strikes for the time being (so long as the *socialist* revolution has not yet

begun) serve the struggle for individual reforms. In slave, Asiatic, tsarist Russia, which is drawing near her next *bourgeois-democratic* revolution, political strikes are the only serious means of stirring up the peasantry and the better part of the peasant army, of shaking them up and rousing them to a revolutionary struggle! The time is past—fortunately for Russia—when there was no one to "go among the people" but heroic solitary Narodniks. The time is passing when solitary terrorists could speak of "rousing" the people by terrorism. Russia has left those sad times behind. In 1905 the revolutionary proletariat found for itself a different way "to go among the people", and a different means of drawing the masses into the movement

That means is revolutionary strikes, stubborn strikes shifting from place to place, from one part of the country to another, recurrent strikes, strikes which rouse the backward to a new life of struggle for economic improvements, strikes which brand and lash every salient act of violence or tyranny, every crime of tsarism, strike-demonstrations which unfurl the red banner in the streets of the capital cities and bring revolutionary speeches and revolutionary slogans to the *crowd*, to the mass of the people.

Such strikes cannot be called forth artificially, but neither can they be stopped once they have begun to involve hundreds and hundreds of thousands.

Let the liberal, who is moved by being given a seat beside Rodzyanko "himself", tell the workers: "Brothers, no more outbreaks, seek a different path, take up the peaceful trade union movement, prepare yourselves earnestly for an open European party, don't incite the muzhik to rebellion, don't waste your energy on strikes or 'we' shall stop sympathising with you!"

The workers will know how to assess such talk, and will see through it even in the garb of the "near-Marxist" expressions of any of the *Luch* writers.

The workers will concentrate on *deliberately* supporting, strengthening, developing and consolidating the spontaneously growing revolutionary strike to prepare the peasants and the armed forces for a rising. If strikes exhaust the workers, they should be carried out intermittently, enabling some of the forces to rest while the forces that

are rested or "fresh" are roused to take up the struggle. Shorter strikes should be called. Occasionally strikes should be replaced by demonstrations. But the important thing is that strikes, meetings and demonstrations should take place continuously, that the whole peasantry and the armed forces should know of the workers' stubborn fight, and that the countryside—even the most out-of-the-way corners of it—should see that there is unrest in the towns, that "*their*" people have risen in revolt, that they are waging a life-and-death struggle, that they are fighting for a better life, for higher pay, for an end to the outrages and tyranny of the authorities, for the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, for the overthrow of the tsar's landlord monarchy, for a republic. It is essential that the smouldering resentment and subdued murmurings of the countryside should, along with the indignation in the barracks, find a centre of attraction in the workers' revolutionary strikes. We must work on this indefatigably, and we shall live to see the day when the proletariat, jointly with the peasantry and the armed forces, brings down the landlords and overthrows the tsarist monarchy by a people's uprising.

P.S. *Luch* is making progress: after the unsophisticated V. A. (No. 56) comes the diplomatic F. D.[184] (No. 65). But for all his "diplomacy", the meaning of F. D.'s statements is the same—he is *against* revolutionary strikes! We are faced with an out-and-out liberal to whom it *never occurs* that strikes awaken the peasants and lead them to insurrection, that strikes develop *revolutionary* agitation among the masses and awaken the armed forces, and that it is necessary to pass from strikes (insofar as they are exhausting) to street demonstrations, etc.

F. D.'s. vulgar liberal phrases about the "struggle for the right to organise" as the "immediate task"—a constitutional reform "on the order of the day" under Treshchenko!—is the sole cover for *Luch*'s fight against revolutionary strikes. It is not enough, liquidator gentlemen!

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January 12 (25), 1913

Published according
to the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

ORIGINAL POSTSCRIPT TO THE ARTICLE "THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY STRIKES AND STREET DEMONSTRATIONS"[185]

We call on Social-Democrats to pay particular attention to F. D.'s "Tactical Notes" in *Luch*. How rapidly the coating of showy conciliationism and ''unification'' phrase-mongering in the spirit of Trotsky has disappeared! How clearly the *real* trend of *Luch*—barefaced liquidationism—has been revealed!

In a legal organ, F. D. is waging a regular war not only against revolutionary mass strikes (to say nothing of an uprising), but also against all revolutionary agitation among the masses. In point of fact, F. D. goes much further than V. A. (*Luch* No. 56), betraying his complete ideological kinship with the Bund's "deletion" of the revolution That is what comes of the liquidators' refusal to make a straightforward, clear and formal "appraisal of the situation": it is in fact Larin's appraisal that F. D. upholds by denying the *objective* conditions which make it *imperative* for the workers to organise *for revolution*, for drawing the masses in general and the peasantry in particular into the *revolutionary* movement.

We shall come back to F. D.'s articles again.

Written in January 1913
Published for the first time

Published according to the manuscript

THE SPLIT AMONG THE POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The present split among the Polish Social-Democrats is the fruit of a conflict that began several years ago. At the Sixth Congress of the Party, in 1908, such a sharp antagonism was shown between the Executive Committee, on the one hand, and the Warsaw and Dombrowa area organisations, on the other, that the Congress rejected a motion of confidence in the Executive. The conflict was organisational but had great political significance. The two local organisations insisted on the opportunity to influence the political position of the Party, and claimed widespread discussion of all its steps by the organisations.

The Executive has remained, nevertheless, in the hands of the same people. And its majority, headed by the notorious Tyszka, sticks to its tactics, profiting by the weakening of the Party, by failures and by the conditions of counter-revolution. In the R.S.D.L.P., Tyszka played the master and plotted in the name of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, without paying the slightest attention to the will of the latter. In the policy of the Party, an era of unprincipledness and vacillation began, on such questions, for example, as the trade unions, the attitude to the P.S.P., and the tactics of the Polish Social-Democrats within the R.S.D.L.P. Comrades who laid bare the contradictions in the policy of the Executive and demanded a consistently principled line had their mouths shut by the Executive, which would not allow any discussion in the press and, worse still, *constantly* promised to open a discussion "in the near future", when it would also publish the comrades' protests against its tactics. Tyszka's opponents on the Executive itself, who were all old functionaries, well known to

the whole Party, were ousted one by one. One of them refused to stand for re-election at the Sixth Congress, saying that it was impossible to work with Tyszka, another was ousted in 1909, and a third refused to enter the Executive in 1911.

But as the movement grew and became more active, from early 1911 onwards, discontent began to show in local organisations as well. The "rebellion" was led by the Warsaw organisation, which is the most important and powerful, and above all the most consistent in the revolutionary sense, and which, ever since 1905, has been in the Left wing among the Polish Social-Democrats.

The Executive, of course, became uneasy and made ready to "nip it in the bud". The December 1911 inter-district conference in Warsaw served as the signal for the attack. That conference made bold to insist that the "territory" should be represented more strongly at the next *Party* conference, i.e.—the impious idea!—that the influence of the Executive at the conference should thereby be weakened. But that would have been half the trouble, for a similar resolution was adopted by the Lodz conference as well. Warsaw did something more criminal: it showed that it demanded this not haphazardly, but with a *political aim* in view. It adopted several political resolutions that Tyszka did not like; among other things, it expressed displeasure at the fact that the Executive had submitted no report to Warsaw on its activity, and demanded that the Executive should acquaint the Party with its activity inside the R.S.D.L.P., that it should not make a "Russian" policy secretly from the Polish workers, and so on.

An open struggle began. Tyszka gave vent to a series of "circulars" and "explanations". He "explained" that (1) the Warsaw organisation had trampled the Party Rules underfoot and resorted to a split; (2) that its resolutions were an indication of boycottism, otzovism and anarchism; (3) that it had no ideological differences with the Executive and hence the split had no political basis; (4) that the Warsaw organisation did not exist, the conference had been fictitious, and consequently there was and had been no split; (5) that the Warsaw organisation had been unable to publish a single sheet on its own and had left all

literary work to the Executive; that it had unlawfully devised a disruptive technique of its own and was publishing its own sheets. He also gave a personal description, complete with family details, of a couple of Warsaw "intellectualist *warchols*",* and explained that they had brought about a split but did not work in the organisation and never had.

Finally, seeing that the Warsaw organisation held its ground, Tyszka made up his mind to take "heroic" measures. He decided to call a *fictitious* conference and not to allow it to be attended by the opposition, i.e., the vast majority of the comrades active in the territory. To that end he announced the "dissolution" of the strongest organisation—Warsaw—and formed a separate "Warsaw organisation" of splitters out of two or three agents of his own.

But the most outrageous thing is the "grounds" on which Tyszka "dissolved" the Warsaw organisation. He announced that the organisation, which refused to submit to him, was nothing but a tool of police provocation. So far he has not cited a single serious fact, even of the very smallest kind, to support his allegation. Nor has he published *the name of a single* person he suspects. What is more, to leave the way to retreat open, he wrote like a coward, in a statement to the International Bureau, that provocation could very easily have ensconced itself in Warsaw *as in any other* organisation functioning under the present conditions.

Nevertheless, Tyszka saw fit to "dissolve" the Warsaw organisation, and even to declare it to be outside the R.S.D.L.P. The reader will see that this is no longer a factional struggle but in fact something of a criminal nature.

Needless to say this reckless step by Tyszka's caused indignation ten times as great. The committee which he himself had appointed to inquire into the provocation came out against him. Tyszka replied by expelling from the Party three leaders of the Polish Social-Democracy who had been members of the Party for many years and who enjoyed universal confidence. Forty-four veteran functionaries published a most emphatic protest against the

* Trouble-makers.—*Ed.*

Executive's actions, which are humiliating to any revolutionary. Both in the territory and abroad, people insist that the "Executive" should be called to account. It goes without saying that the Warsaw organisation did not dissolve itself to please Tyszka but continues its work, which is so difficult under present conditions. It was the "opposition" that achieved signal success in the elections for the worker curia of Warsaw. The elections gave the Social-Democrats an absolute majority over all the other parties. Of the 34 Social-Democratic delegates, 31 support the opposition, 2 are vacillating, and only one backs Tyszka. On the other hand, in the provinces, where the "work" is carried on by the Executive and its supporters, the election campaign was lost *everywhere*.

It is to be hoped that the petty and unseemly squabble caused by Tyszka's conduct will soon be a thing of the past and that differences of principle will stand out more clearly. The Polish worker Social-Democrats' desire to establish closer organisational links with their Russian comrades will also find a more specific expression. Tyszka's conduct in the R.S.D.L.P. has resulted in the Executive becoming completely divorced from the life of the Party as a whole and having not a single ally in the R.S.D.L.P., and both sides (the liquidators and anti-liquidators) alike are shrugging their shoulders over the strange and unprincipled "tactics" of Tyszka and his "Executive".

The Polish Social-Democrats are passing through hard times. But already there are signs of a way out. All the sound elements of the Polish Social-Democratic movement are rallying together. And the time is already near when the Polish Social-Democracy will be an organisation of pro-Party worker Social-Democrats who have principles and tactics of their own and are not a plaything in the hands of an unscrupulous plotter.

We think it necessary to complete the report on the split among the Polish Social-Democrats with certain data on the subsequent history of the accusation of "provocation". Here is what we have been told:

Rosa Luxemburg (member of the International Socialist Bureau from the Polish Social-Democracy) wrote a note to the I.S.B. alleging that the Warsaw Committee was made up of splitters and was *in the hands of the secret police*, stating that this was not to be published!

Yet Tyszka *himself* published this abomination in the Polish Social-Democratic press!!

Lenin, upon receiving a copy of Tyszka's note from Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, sent a letter to Huysmans, of course, saying that it was a "most perfidious" act of vengeance, that Malecki and Hanecki, ex-members of the Central Committee, were known to all in the Party; that the committee of inquiry appointed by Tyszka himself had *discovered no* provocation; that to publish anything about provocation among political opponents, without giving names, was a most foul and mean thing to do.*

The Executive replied with mere abuse.

The Basle Congress met. The delegation of the Warsaw Committee was *unanimously* recognised by *all* R.S.D.L.P. delegates—liquidators, Letts, Vperyodists, Bundists and Trotskyists alike!

The Warsaw election resulted in *both* electors being worker Social-Democrats who *supported the Warsaw Committee* and were opposed to Tyszka and Co.

The fictitious nature of Tyszka's parallel organisation has been demonstrated to all. The honest course—of withdrawing the accusation of provocation—is more than Tyszka and his Executive can adopt.

But best of all are our liquidators and their Organising Committee, who love "unity". *Luch*, which officially *adheres* to the August conference, has *twice printed* Tyszka's foul lie!!

On the first occasion it was done by a gentleman who hid behind initials. The second time it was done by Mr. *Avgustovsky*.[186]

And see how brave they are! They put about a foul story —and take cover behind the back of the Executive. We've got nothing to do with it, they seem to say, we cannot be

* See pp. 276-277 of this volume.—*Ed.*

held responsible, we aren't putting about any foul story, we are "*only*" reporting the *fact* that something (a foul story) was *printed* on behalf of the Executive!!

Martov, Trotsky, Lieber, the Letts and Co. are *anonymously* putting about Tyszka's foul story—in the legal press, where documents cannot be quoted—hiding behind Tyszka's back!!

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ON BOLSHEVISM[187]

The origin of Bolshevism is inseparably linked with the struggle of what is known as Economism (opportunism which rejected the political struggle of the working class and denied the latter's leading role) against revolutionary Social-Democracy in 1897-1902. Economism, supported by the Bund, was defeated and eliminated by the well-known campaign of the old *Iskra*[188] (Munich, London and Geneva, 1900-03), which restored the Social-Democratic Party (founded in 1898 but later destroyed by arrests) on the basis of Marxism and revolutionary Social-Democratic principles. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (August 1903), the Iskrists split: the *majority* stood for the principles and tactics of the old *Iskra*, while the *minority* turned to opportunism, and was backed by the one-time enemies of *Iskra*, the Economists and the Bundists. Hence the terms Bolshevism* and Menshevism* (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks). In 1903-04 the struggle was mainly over the Mensheviks' opportunism in questions of organisation. From the end of 1904 on, tactical differences became the most important. The "plan for the Zemstvo campaign"[189] put forward (autumn 1904) by the *new Iskra*, which had deserted to the Mensheviks, took up the defence of the tactics of "not intimidating the liberals". The year 1905 saw the tactical differences take final shape (the Bolshevik Congress, Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London, May 1905, and the Menshevik "conference" held in Geneva at the same time). The Mensheviks strove to adapt working-class tactics to liberalism. The Bolsheviks, however, put forward as the aim of the working class in the bourgeois-democratic revolution: to carry it through to the end and

* From the Russian words for *majority* and *minority*.—*Tr.*

to lead the democratic peasantry despite the treachery of the liberals. The main practical divergencies between the two trends in the autumn of 1905 were over the fact that the Bolsheviks stood for boycotting the Bulygin Duma while the Mensheviks favoured participation. In the spring of 1906, the same thing happened with regard to the Witte Duma. First Duma: the Mensheviks stood for the slogan of a Duma (Cadet) Ministry; the Bolsheviks, for the slogan of a Left (Social-Democratic and Trudovik) Executive Committee that would organise the actual struggle of the masses, etc. This could be set forth in greater detail only in the press abroad. At the Stockholm Congress (1906) the Mensheviks won the upper hand, and at the London Congress (1907), the Bolsheviks. In 1908-09 the *Vperyod* group (Machism[190] in philosophy and otzovism, or boycotting the Third Duma, in politics—Bogdanov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky and others) broke away from the Bolsheviks. In 1909-11, in fighting against them (cf. V. Ilyin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1909*), as well as against the liquidators (Mensheviks who denied the need for an illegal Party), Bolshevism came close to the *pro-Party Mensheviks* (Plekhanov and others), who had declared a resolute war on liquidationism. The Bolshevik organs were: *Vperyod* and *Proletary* (Geneva, 1905), *Novaya Zhizn* (St. Petersburg, 1905), *Volna*, *Ekho*, etc. (St. Petersburg, 1906), *Proletary* in Finland (1906-07), Geneva (1908) and Paris (1909), *Sotsial-Demokrat* in Paris (1909-12). Some of the principal writings of Bolshevism are collected in V. Ilyin's[191] *Twelve Years*, St. Petersburg, 1908, which also gives a more detailed bibliography. The main Bolshevik writers: G. Zinoviev, V. Ilyin, Y. Kamenev, P. Orlovsky and others. In recent years Bolsheviks have been the main contributors to the newspapers *Zvezda* (1910-12), *Pravda* (1912), St. Petersburg, and to the periodicals *Mysl* (1910), Moscow, and *Prosveshcheniye* (1911-13), St. Petersburg.

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* See present edition, Vol. 14.—*Ed.*

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POINCARÉ'S ELECTION

The new President of the French Republic is being effusively congratulated. Take a look at the Black-Hundred-pogromist *Novoye Vremya* and the liberal *Rech*: how touchingly unanimous they are in congratulating President Poincaré and expressing their delight!

The appraisal of foreign policy issues and of the state of affairs in the Western countries is particularly indicative of the profound inner kinship of our Black Hundreds and our liberals. The fact that both of them hail the "national" President, Poincaré, who has been elected by an alliance of the big bourgeoisie and clerical and feudal reaction in France, makes it clear to anyone that the Black Hundreds and liberals disagree only over *methods* of combating socialism.

But Poincaré's election is of greater interest than the zealous "congratulators" think. Class-conscious workers in pondering on the significance of this election, note three circumstances.

Firstly, Poincaré's election means another step forward in aggravating the class struggle confronting France. Poincaré was Premier in a Chamber having a *Radical* majority. But he has been elected President *against* the Radical candidate, Pams, with the aid of *clerical and feudal* reaction, and by the *Right bloc*.

What does that mean? Power in France is in the hands of the *last* bourgeois party, the Radicals.[192] It is becoming less and less distinguishable from "reaction". The *whole* bourgeoisie—from radical to reactionary—is uniting ever more closely against the socialist proletariat, and the boundary between the two sections of the bourgeoisie is becoming

more and more obliterated. This was revealed all the more vividly by the election of Poincaré. This sort of unity is an unmistakable sign of the extreme aggravation of class antagonisms.

Secondly, Poincaré's career is worthy of note, being that of a typical bourgeois businessman who sells himself in turn to all parties in politics, and to all rich men "outside" politics. Poincaré has been a lawyer by profession since the age of twenty. At twenty-six he was a *chef de cabinet* and at thirty-three, a Minister. Rich men and the big-wigs of finance in all countries think highly of the political connections of such dexterous careerists. A "brilliant" lawyer-deputy and a political trickster are *synonyms* in the "civilised" countries.

Worthy of note, thirdly, is the demonstration made by the French Socialists during Poincaré's election. The vote in favour of Vaillant was a demonstration in honour of the Commune. Vaillant is a living memory of it. One has only to see the welcome which Parisian workers give the white-haired Vaillant when he appears on the platform to realise this.

And now, in the very same Versailles where bourgeois France in 1871 sold its country to Bismarck in order to crush the revolt of the proletariat, and in the very same hall where forty-two years ago was heard the beastly howling of the reactionary landlords of France who were longing for a king, the working-class deputies voted for a veteran Communard.

Pravda No. 11, January 15, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

FRANKLY

This newspaper has already noted the failure, in the Council of State, of the Duma Bill to introduce a Zemstvo in Archangel Gubernia. But it is well worth dwelling once more on the importance of this fact, which, for all its insignificance, is highly characteristic.

For almost half a century there has existed a Zemstvo of the nobility, one which guarantees the absolute preponderance of the feudal type of *landlord*. And only in some gubernias, such as Vyatka Gubernia, where there is hardly any landed nobility, the Zemstvo has more of a muzhik character. However, there it is enmeshed even more in all kinds of bureaucratic bans, impediments, restrictions and specifications. It would seem that it is this sort of harmless, curtailed Zemstvo that Archangel Gubernia, too, has been seeking for over a half century.

And now the resolution of the Black-Hundred, landlord and bourgeois Third Duma to introduce a Zemstvo in Archangel Gubernia has been *rejected* by the Council of State. What a glaring light this "trifle" sheds on the *essence* of our "renovated" system! What a splendid lesson on the class roots of politics!

The arguments of the opponents of the Zemstvo on the Council of State are frank—there is no nobility there, you see. "Private" landownership in the whole gubernia amounts to a mere 2,660 dessiatines, exclaimed Mr. Stishinsky, the reporter in the Council of State.

It follows that where there is no landed nobility, the "people" are not mature enough even to deal with the repair of roads and the building of hospitals. But if there are no landlords, they should be implanted, directly or indirectly.

Implanted from where? From central Russia, where they are numerous enough. The landlords of the black-earth central region where the vestiges of serfdom are freshest, where more is left of the corvée (labour service) system than anywhere else, and where diehards like those in Kursk Gubernia rule and reign and govern—those are the ones to rely on where government and public affairs are concerned. In this sense, the attitude of the Council of State to the question of a Zemstvo in Archangel Gubernia is a most instructive and graphic lesson in our statehood.

Pravda No. 13, January 17, 1913
Signed: *V.*

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THE BRIAND CABINET

The well-known renegade Briand, once an extreme revolutionary and an advocate of the "general strike", finds himself again at the head of the French Ministry. Like John Burns in Britain, he has betrayed the working class and sold himself to the bourgeoisie.

The composition of his new Cabinet is of interest. It is dominated by the trio of Jonnart, Etienne and Baudin. What sort of men are they?

Take a look at the liberal papers, such as *Rech* No. 11. You will find there a most detailed account of where the Ministers were educated and where they were employed. You will find shameless advertising and the desire to curry favour: Jonnart is said to be a friend of King Edward, and Baudin, the nephew of a Communard!

"Zhomini this, Zhomini that—and not a word about vodka."[193] *Rech* says nothing about the *crux* of the matter. And the crux of the matter is very simple: this trio is a most arrant and shameless band of financial sharks and swindlers. Etienne has had a hand in all the dirty scandals involving millions, *from Panama onwards*. He is an old hand at financial transactions in the colonies, like the one concerning our own Bashkir lands. Jonnart took part in what was a no less "clean" business—securing the rich iron ore deposits of Ouenza, Africa, as a concession. His kith and kin sit on the boards of some of the largest joint-stock companies. Baudin is a lieutenant of capitalists, contractors and shipyard owners. The Naval Ministry is just the place for him—it is so much closer to contracts and to deliveries for the Navy!

Marx's statement that bourgeois governments are the lieutenants of the capitalist class[194] has nowhere been confirmed more clearly than in France. And the great progress made by France is that the working class has torn off all sham coverings, that it has made the unclear clear, and "cast off from the chains the false flowers adorning them—not in order that mankind might continue to bear those chains in their form, bare of all joy and all delight, but in order that it might cast off the chains and reach for the living flower".[195]

Pravda No. 14, January 18, 1913
Signed: *I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS

The Fourth Duma election campaign has confirmed the appraisal of the historical situation that Marxists have been giving since 1911. The gist of that appraisal is that the first period of the history of Russian counter-revolution is over. The second period has begun, a period characterised by the awakening of "light contingents" of bourgeois democrats (the student movement), by the aggressive economic, and still more non-economic, movement of the working class, and so on.

Economic depression, the vigorous offensive of the counter-revolution, the retreat and disintegration of the democratic forces, and the spate of renegade, *Vekhi*, liquidationist ideas in the "progressive camp"—these are the distinguishing features of the first period (1907-11). As for the second period (1911-12), it is distinguished—economically, politically and ideologically—by the opposite features: an upswing in industry, the inability of the counter-revolution to press forward its offensive with the same force or vigour as before, etc., and the revival of the democratic movement, which forced *Vekhi*, renegade, liquidationist sentiments *to conceal themselves*.

Such is the general background of the picture, which has to be borne in mind if the election campaign of 1912 is to be appraised accurately.

I. MANIPULATING THE ELECTIONS

The most striking characteristic of the elections to the Fourth Duma is their systematic rigging by the government. It is not our aim here to sum up the results of

"manipulating the elections". This has been commented on quite sufficiently by the *entire* liberal and democratic press, and the Cadets' detailed interpellation in the Fourth Duma speaks of the same thing. We shall probably be able to devote a special article to this question when the vast and increasing documentary evidence has been collated.

For the time being we shall only note the principal results of manipulating the elections, and the chief political significance of this manipulation.

The priesthood mobilised against the liberal and Octobrist landlords; repressive measures increased tenfold, and the law most unceremoniously violated to prejudice the rights of the bourgeois democracy in town and country; attempts made to wrest the worker curia from the Social-Democrats by the same means—these are the principal methods used in manipulating the 1912 elections. The purpose of this policy, which is reminiscent of Bonapartist policy, was to form a Right-wing and nationalist majority in the Duma, and this aim, as we know, has not been achieved. But we shall see below that the government has succeeded in "upholding" the former, Third-Duma, situation in our parliament, if we may call it that: there remain two possible majorities in the Fourth Duma, a Right-wing and Octobrist and an Octobrist-Cadet one.

The electoral law of June 3, 1907, "built" the state system of administration—and, indeed, not only of administration—on a bloc of the feudal landlords and the top strata of the bourgeoisie, with the first-named social element retaining a tremendous preponderance in this bloc, while above *both* elements stood a virtually uncurtailed old authority. There is no need now to say what the specific nature of that authority, brought into being by the age-long history of serfdom, etc., has been and still is. At all events, the shift in 1905, the collapse of the old state of affairs, and the open and powerful actions of the masses and classes, necessitated the search for an *alliance* with particular social forces.

The hopes pinned on the "uneducated" muzhik in 1905-06 (the Bulygin and Witte electoral laws) were shattered. The July Third system "banked on the strong", on the landlords and the bourgeois big-wigs. But in the course of a mere five

years the experience of the Third Duma has begun to break this gamble as well! It would be hard to imagine greater servility than the Octobrists showed in 1907-12, and yet even they did not prove servile enough. The old authority (the "bureaucracy"), which is closely akin to them in character, was unable to get along even with them. The bourgeois policy in the countryside (the law of November 9[196]) and full assistance to capitalism were both directed by the very same Purishkeviches, and the results proved to be deplorable. Purishkevichism—refurbished, repaired, and freshened up with a new agrarian policy and a new system of representative institutions—continued to crush everything and hamper progress.

The June Third system developed a crack. "Manipulation" of the elections became inevitable, just as Bonapartist methods are historically inevitable when there is no solid, durable and tested integral social basis, and when there is a need to manoeuvre among heterogeneous elements. If the democratic classes are powerless, or have been greatly weakened for temporary reasons, such methods may be attended by "success" over a number of years. But even the "classical" examples of Bismarck in the sixties of the last entury, or of Napoleon III, bear witness that things do not work out without the most drastic changes (in Prussia it was a "revolution from above"[197] and several exceptionally successful wars).

II. THE NEW DUMA

To ascertain the results of the elections, let us take the official data on the party composition of the Fourth Duma and compare it with that of the Third Duma, not only at the end of its existence (1912), but also at the beginning (1908). We obtain the following instructive picture*:

* The data are taken from the following Duma publications: *Ukazatel* (*Directory*) for 1908, *Spravochnik* (*Reference Book*) for 1912 and *Spravochny Listok* [*IV*] *Gosudarstvennoi Dumy* (*Reference Sheet of the Fourth State Duma*) No. 14, December 2, 1912—corrected data as of December 1, 1912. The three national groups are the Poles, Byelorussians and Moslems.

	Third Duma		Fourth Duma
	1908	1912	
Rights	49	46	65
Nationalists and moderate Rights	95	102	120
Octobrists	148	120	98
Progressists	25	36	48
Cadets	53	52	59
The three national groups	26	27	21
Trudoviks	14	14	10
Social-Democrats	19	13	14
Unaffiliated	—	27	7
Total	429	437	442

The first conclusion to be drawn from these data is that in the Fourth Duma the former two possible majorities remain—the Right-wing and Octobrist majority of 283 votes (65+120+98) and the Octobrist-Cadet majority of 226 votes (98+48+59+21).

As far as the autocratic government is concerned, the most important thing for practical purposes is to have "its own" majority in the Duma. The distinction between the Third and Fourth Dumas is negligible in this respect. In the Third Duma, the Right-wing and Octobrist majority was 292 votes at the beginning and 268 at the end. What we have, now is 283, a figure midway between those two.

But the drop in the Right-wing majority between the beginning and the end of the Third Duma was so considerable that the government, being an autocratic one, could not but resort to extraordinary measures of manipulating the elections. That manipulation is neither an accident nor a departure from the system, as the Meyendorfs, Maklakovs and Co. like to make out, but a measure indispensable for maintaining the "system".

You, liberal gentlemen headed by Maklakov, talk of "reconciling the government and the country" (i.e., the bourgeoisie). But if that is true, there are two alternatives. Either your *talk about reconciliation* is not meaningless words, and then you must also accept "manipulating the elections", for such is the real condition for reconciliation with the real

government. After all, you are so fond of "realistic policy"! Or *your protests* against "manipulating the elections" are not meaningless words, and then you should speak not of reconciliation, but of something entirely unlike reconciliation.

The second majority of the June Third system, the Octobrist-liberal one, was 252 votes in the early period of the Third Duma and 235 at its end, and it has dropped to 226 in the Fourth Duma. Consequently, the government's "election campaign" was in effect a success; the government had its way, once again confirming its autocratic character in practice. For the cries about a Right-wing and nationalist majority were merely haggling. In reality, the government needs both majorities, *both* of which have a counter-revolutionary basis.

It is impossible to lay too much stress on the last circumstance, which the liberals gloss over in order to fool the democrats, while the liberal labour politicians (liquidators) do the same thing from lack of intelligence. The bloc of the Cadets and Octobrists, which came to light so strikingly during Rodzyanko's election (and was perhaps even more strikingly revealed by the unseemly, slavish words of *Rech* about Rodzyanko's speech), is by no means just a "technical" matter. This bloc expresses the community of the counter-revolutionary sentiments of the bourgeoisie in general, from Guchkov to Milyukov; it is made possible only by these sentiments.

On the other hand, the government, too, needs the liberal-Octobrist majority from the point of view of the entire system of the June Third regime. For the Third (and Fourth) Duma is not at all a "cardboard" institution, as it is often made out to be by the claptrap of the "Left" Narodniks, who are bogged down hopelessly in Ropshin-like experiences and "otzovist" phrases.[198] No, the Third and Fourth Dumas are a stage in the development of the autocracy and in that of the bourgeoisie; they are an attempt really to bring them closer together, a necessary attempt after the victories and defeats of 1905. And the failure of this attempt would be the failure not only of Stolypin and Makarov, or of Markov the Second and Purishkevich, *but also of the "conciliator" Maklakov and Co.*!

The government needs a liberal-Octobrist majority in order to try to lead Russia forward while preserving the omnipotence of the Purishkeviches. As regards instruments for curbing or moderating unusually fast-moving over-zealous liberal-Octobrist "Progressism", the government has plenty of them—the Council of State and many many more.

III. CHANGES WITHIN THE JUNE THIRD SYSTEM

The data quoted above provide interesting evidence of the evolution of the political parties, groupings and trends among the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the period of counter-revolution. The composition of the Third and Fourth Dumas hardly tells us anything about the bourgeois (peasant) or worker democrats, for the simple reason that the June Third system was devised with the express aim of ruling out the democrats. In the same way, the non-Russian parties, i.e., those not representing the "dominant" nationality, have been specially oppressed and stifled by the June Third system.

We shall therefore pick out only the Rights, the Octobrists and the Russian liberals—parties which have made themselves thoroughly comfortable within the June Third system and are protected by it against the democrats—and look at the changes that have occurred in these parties.

	Third Duma		Fourth Duma	Comparison of Fourth Duma and beginning of Third Duma
	1908	1912		
Rights	144	148	185	+41, i.e., +28 per cent
Octobrists	148	120	98	−50 " −34 " "
Liberals (Progressists and Cadets) .	78	88	107	+29 " +37 " "

This shows clearly how the so-called "Centre" is dwindling among the privileged strata and how their Right and liberal wings are gaining strength. It is interesting to note that the number of liberals among the landlords and the bourgeoisie is growing *faster* than that of the Rights,

despite the emergency measures taken by the government to rig the elections in favour of the Rights.

There are those who, in view of these facts, like to talk pompously about the aggravation of the contradictions of the June Third system, about the coming triumph of moderate bourgeois progressism, and so on. They forget, firstly, that while the number of liberals is growing among the landlords, and above all among the bourgeoisie, it is the Right wing of the liberals, which bases its policy entirely on "conciliation" with the Rights, that is growing fastest of all. We shall deal with this in detail in a moment. Secondly, they forget that the vaunted "move to the left of the bourgeoisie" is merely a symptom of the real move to the left of the democrats who *alone* are capable of providing the motive forces for a serious change in the regime. Thirdly, they forget that the June Third system is specially intended to take advantage, within very broad limits, of the antagonism between the liberal bourgeoisie and the reactionary nature of the landlords, there existing an even more profound *common* antagonism between these and all democrats, particularly the working class.

To proceed. Our liberals like to pretend that the Octobrists' defeat was due to the "manipulation of the elections", which took away support from this "party of the latest government orders", and so on. Of course, in so doing the liberals themselves pose as an honest opposition, as independent people and, indeed, "democrats", while the distinction between a Maklakov and the Octobrists is in fact perfectly illusory.

Look at the changes that have occurred between the Third and Fourth Dumas compared with those between the beginning and end of the Third Duma. You will see that in the Third Duma the Octobrist Party lost a greater number of its members (28) than in the Fourth Duma elections (22). This, of course, does not mean that there was no "manipulation of the elections", for it was done on the most reckless scale, especially against the democrats. What it does mean is that despite manipulation of the elections in every sort of way, and even despite government pressure and "politics" in general, a process of party demarcation is going on among the propertied classes of Russia, the feudal

reactionary Right wing of the counter-revolution becoming demarcated from the liberal-bourgeois wing of *the same* counter-revolution.

The distinctions between the various groups and factions of the Right-wing and Octobrist Duma majority (Rights, nationalists, moderate Rights, the "Centre", Right Octobrists, and so on) are as unstable, indefinite, accidental, and often artificially constructed, as the distinctions within the Octobrist-liberal majority (Left Octobrists, Progressists, Cadets). What characterises the period we are passing through is not at all that the allegedly independent (Maklakov, of all people!) Constitutional-Democrat is forcing out the Octobrists who are dependent on the government. This is a silly liberal tale.

The characteristic thing is that genuine class parties are in course of formation and that, in particular, the party of counter-revolutionary liberalism is becoming consolidated under cover of noisy oppositional exclamations and honeyed talk about "reconciliation of the government and the country".

The liberal press, which is the most widespread in Russia, is doing its utmost to gloss over this process. We shall therefore turn once more to the precise data of the Duma statistics. Let us remember that we must judge parties, as well as individuals, by their deeds and not by their words. As far as *deeds* are concerned, the Cadets and Progressists make common cause on all the more important issues, and both groups made common cause with the Octobrists in the Third and Fourth Dumas, and in the recent elections (Yekaterinoslav Gubernia: the Rodzyanko-Cadet bloc!) on a whole series of issues.

Let us now look at the data concerning the three parties.

	Third Duma		Fourth Duma	Comparison of Fourth Duma and beginning of Third Duma
	1908	1912		
Octobrists	148	120	98	— 50, i.e., — 34 per cent
Progressists	25	36	48	+ 23 " + 92 " "
Cadets	53	52	59	+ 6 " + 11 " "

We see an enormous and steady decrease of the Octobrists; a slight decrease, and then a small increase, of the Cadets; and *an enormous and steady increase of the Progressists*, who have *almost doubled their numbers* in five years.

If we take the data for 1908 reported by Mr. Milyukov in *Yezhegodnik Rechi** for 1912, p. 77, we shall see the picture in even bolder relief. Mr. Milyukov considers that in the Third Duma in 1908 there were 154 Octobrists, 23 Progressists and 56 Cadets. Comparing the Fourth Duma with this, the increase in the number of Cadets is quite negligible and the number of Progressists is *more than double*.

In 1908 the numerical strength of the Progressists was less than half that of the Cadets. Today it is over 80 per cent of that of the Cadets.

Thus we arrive at the indisputable fact that the *most characteristic* feature of Russian liberalism during the counter-revolution (1908-12) is the tremendous growth of Progressism.

And who are the Progressists?

Both by composition and ideology, they are a *cross-breed of Octobrists and Cadets*.

In the Third Duma the Progressists still called themselves Peaceful Renovators, and one of their leaders, the counter-revolutionary nobleman Lvov, was a Cadet in the First Duma. The number of Progressists in the Third Duma increased, as we have seen, from 25 to 36, i.e., by 11; of these 11 deputies, 9 came over to the Progressists from other parties, namely, 1 from the Cadets, 2 from the moderate Rights, 1 from the nationalists and 5 from the Octobrists.

The rapid growth of the Progressists among the political exponents of Russian liberalism, and the success of *Vekhi* in "society" are two sides of the same medal. The Progressists did in practical politics what *Vekhi* advocated in theory as it spat at the revolution, repudiated democracy, extolled the dirty enrichment of the bourgeoisie as God's work on earth, and so on and so forth.

In orating about reconciliation of the government and the country, the Cadet Maklakov merely sings the praise of what the Progressists are doing.

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* *Rech Yearbook.—Tr.*

The further we move away from 1905 and 1906, the more obvious it becomes how very correct the Bolsheviks were at that time in exposing the Cadets when they were most exultant over their "victories", and in showing the true nature of the Cadet Party* which is now being more and more glaringly revealed by the whole course of events.

The Russian democrats cannot win a single victory unless they drastically undermine the Cadets' "prestige" among the masses. Conversely, the virtual fusion of the Cadets with *Vekhi* and the Progressists is a condition for, and a sign of, the strengthening and consolidation of the democratic movement under the leadership of the proletariat.

IV. WHAT WAS THE ISSUE IN THE ELECTIONS?

In most of the statements and articles on the elections, this question is pushed into the background more than any other, or is even obscured altogether. Yet it is the question of the ideological and political content of the election campaign, the most important question, one which has to be elucidated, or all other questions, and all the usual data on "opposition percentages" and so on, will completely lose their value.

The most widespread reply to this question is that the issue was whether there was to be a constitution or not. That is how the Rights see it. That is how the liberals see it. The view that there were in effect two warring camps, one of them fighting for and the other against a constitution, runs through the entire Right-wing and liberal press. Mr. Milyukov, the Cadet Party leader, and *Rech*, the official organ of that party, put forward this theory of two camps in no uncertain terms, doing so, moreover, on behalf of the conference of the Cadet Party.

But look at this "theory" from the standpoint of the outcome of the elections. How did it stand the test of reality?

The first step of the new Duma was marked by a bloc of the Cadets and the Octobrists (and even some of the Rights) around the "constitutional" candidature of Rodzyanko,

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276.—*Ed.*

whose speech, alleged to contain a constitutional programme, was enthusiastically acclaimed by the Cadets.*

The Octobrist leader Rodzyanko, who, as we know, is regarded as a Right Octobrist, considers himself a constitutionalist, as does Krupensky, the leader of the "Centre faction", or conservative constitutionalists.

To say that the issue was over the constitution means saying nothing, for the question at once arises as to *what kind of* constitution is meant. Is it a constitution in the spirit of Krupensky or Rodzyanko or Yefremov-Lvov or Maklakov-Milyukov? And then comes an even more important question, one that does not concern wishes, statements or programmes—all of which remain on paper—but the real *means* of achieving the desired objective.

With regard to this cardinal point (the only serious one), Mr. Gredeskul's statement—reprinted by *Rech* (No. 117) in 1912—that there is no need for a new revolution, and that what is needed is "merely constitutional work", remains unrefuted and irrefutably correct. *Ideologically and politically*, that statement unites the Cadets and Octobrists much more closely and thoroughly than the assurances of devotion to a constitution, and even to democracy—assurances repeated a thousand times—are supposed to divide them.

Probably some 90 per cent of all the newspapers read in Russia are Octobrist or liberal. This press, by suggesting to the reader the idea of two camps, one of which favours a constitution, exerts an immensely corrupting influence on the political consciousness of the masses. One has only to think that all this campaign culminates in Rodzyanko's "constitutional" declaration which Milyukov has accepted!

In view of this state of affairs, one cannot insist sufficiently on repeating old truths of political science, truths that are forgotten by many people. In Russia, the *urgent* question is: what is a constitution?

A constitution is a deal between the historical forces of the old society (nobiliary, serf-owning, feudal, absolutist)

* In addition to the *Rech* articles of the time, see Mr. Milyukov's statement in the Duma on December 13, 1912: "The Chairman [Rodzyanko] delivered a speech ... he made his declaration, *which we recognised to be our own*" (*Rech* No. 343, December 14)!! There you have the Cadets' constitutional (don't laugh!) *declaration*!

and the liberal bourgeoisie. The actual terms of this deal, and the extent of the concessions made by the old order, or of the victories won by the liberal bourgeoisie, will depend on the victories of the democrats, of the broad mass of the people (primarily the workers), over the forces of the old.

Our election campaign could have its culmination in Milyukov's acceptance of Rodzyanko's "declaration" only because what the liberals are *actually* seeking is not abolition of the *privileges* (economic, political, etc.) of the old society, but *their division* between (to put it briefly) the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The liberals are more afraid of the democrats' popular, mass movement than they are of reaction; this accounts for the liberals' *impotence* in politics, which is amazing from the standpoint of the economic strength of capital.

In the June Third system, the liberals have a monopoly as a tolerated, semi-legal opposition, and the beginning of a political revival (to use a much too weak and inaccurate term) brings large sections of the new, rising generation of democrats under the influence of these monopolists. That is why the *essence* of the issue of political liberty in Russia today amounts to making it clear that there are three and not two warring camps, for it is only the latter camp, the one glossed over by the liberals, that really *has the strength* to achieve political liberty.

The issue in the elections of 1912 was not at all a "constitution", for the Cadets—the chief liberal party, which mainly attacked the Octobrists and defeated them—identified themselves with Rodzyanko's declaration. The battle, held fast in the police grip of the June Third system, was fought over the awakening, strengthening and unification of an *independent democratic movement* free from the vacillation and "Octobrist sympathies" of the liberals.

That is why it is a fundamental mistake to see the real ideological and political content of the election campaign *only* from the "parliamentary" standpoint. What is a hundred times more real than all "constitutional" programmes and platforms is the question of the attitude of the various parties and groups towards the political strike movement which marked the year 1912.

One of the surest ways of distinguishing between the bourgeois parties of any country and its proletarian parties is to examine their attitude to economic strikes. A party which in its press, its organisations and its statements in parliament does *not* fight together with the workers in economic strikes is a bourgeois party, no matter how much it may avow that it is "popular", "radically socialist", and so on. In Russia, *mutatis mutandis* (the appropriate changes having been made), the same must be said about parties that wish to pass for democratic: don't invoke the fact that you have written on a certain slip of paper: "constitution, universal suffrage, freedom of association, equality of nationalities", and so on, for these *words* are not worth a *copper* but show me your *deeds* in connection with the political strike movement of 1912! Even this criterion is *not quite* complete, but it is a serious criterion nevertheless, and not an empty promise.

V. THE ELECTION SLOGANS TESTED BY EXPERIENCE

An election campaign is of outstanding interest to any intelligent political leader because it furnishes *objective* data on the views and sentiments, and consequently interests, of the different *classes* of society. Elections to a representative body are comparable in this respect to a census of the population, for they provide political statistics. To be sure, these statistics may be good (in the case of universal, etc., suffrage) or bad (in the case of elections to our parliament, if one may call it that). To be sure, one must learn to criticise these statistics—just as any statistics—and to use them critically. To be sure, these statistics should be taken in connection with all social statistics in general; and strike statistics, for example, will often turn out—for those who are not affected with the disease of parliamentary cretinism—to be a hundred times more serious and profound than election statistics.

Despite all these reservations, it is beyond question that elections supply *objective* data. Testing subjective wishes, sentiments and views by taking into account the vote of the *mass* of the population representing different classes should always be of value to a politician who is at all worthy of

the name. The struggle of parties—in practice, before the electorate, and with the returns summed up—invariably furnishes data *serving to test* our conception of the balance of the social forces in the country and of the significance of particular "slogans".

It is from this standpoint that we shall try to look at the election returns.

Regarding political statistics, the chief thing that needs to be said here is the obvious worthlessness of the greater part of them owing to the shameless application of administrative "measures": "clarifications", pressure, arrests, deportation, and so on and so forth—without limit. Mr. Cherevanin, for example, who in *Nasha Zarya* No. 9-10 sums up data on several hundred electors in different curias, is compelled to admit that it "*would be ridiculous*" to take the drop in the percentage of opposition electors (compared with the elections to the Third Duma) in the second urban curia and in the peasant curia as proof of a swing to the right. The only curia in respect of which the Mymretsovs, Khvostovs, Tolmachovs, Muratovs and Co. *were unable* to carry out any rigging was the first urban curia. That curia showed an increase in the proportion of "opposition" electors from 56 to 67 per cent, with that of the Octobrists dropping from 20 to 12 per cent, and that of the Rights from 24 to 21 per cent.

But while "clarifications" nullified the significance of election statistics regarding the electors, and while the democratic classes, *excluded* altogether from those privileged by the June Third system, personally experienced all the delights of those clarifications, nevertheless the liberals' *attitude* to the democrats became manifest in the elections. On this point objective data came to light which make it possible to test, by the experience of life, what the different "trends" thought and said *prior to* the elections.

The question of the liberals' attitude to the democrats is by no means "only a party" question, i.e., one that is important *only* in terms of one of the strictly party lines. It is the most important question for *anyone* striving for political liberty in Russia. It is a question of *how* to achieve, after all, the object of the common aspirations of all that is decent and honest in Russia.

The Marxists, in starting on the election campaign of 1912, put in the very forefront the slogans of *consistent* democracy as a counterpoise to liberal labour policy. These slogans can be tested in two ways: firstly, by the view and experience of other countries and, secondly, by the *experience of the campaign* of 1912. Whether the Marxists' slogans are correct or not should now be evident from the relationship which has *actually* come into being between liberals and democrats. What makes this test of slogans objective is that it is not we who tested them but the *masses*, and not merely the masses in general, but *our opponents* in particular.

Did the relations between liberals and democrats during and as a result of the elections develop as the Marxists expected or as the liberals expected or as the liquidators expected?

To get at the root of this matter, let us first recall those "expectations". At the very beginning of 1912, when the question of elections had only just been raised and when the Cadets (at their conference) unfurled the banner of a single opposition (i.e., *two camps*) and the permissibility of blocs with the Left Octobrists, the working-class press raised the question of slogans through the articles of Martov and Dan in *Zhivoye Dyelo*, of F. L—ko[199] and others in *Zvezda* (Nos. 11 [47] and 24 [60], and in *Zhivoye Dyelo* Nos. 2, 3 and 8).

Martov put forward the slogan: "Dislodge reaction from its Duma positions", and Dan, "Wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries". Martov and Dan accused *Zvezda* of *threatening* the liberals and of striving to *extort* Duma seats from the liberals.

Three positions stood out clearly:

(1) The Cadets were for a single opposition (i.e., for two camps) and for the permission of blocs with the Left Octobrists.

(2) The liquidators favoured the slogan: "Wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries" and facilitate the Cadets' and Progressists' "advance to power" (Martov in *Zhivoye Dyelo* No. 2). No *extorting* of seats from the liberals for the democrats.

(3) The Marxists were against the slogan: "Wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries", for that would

mean wresting the *landlord* from the hands of the reactionaries. "The practical task that faces us at the elections is by no means to 'dislodge reaction from its Duma positions', but to strengthen the forces of democracy in general and of working-class democracy in particular" (F. L—ko in *Zvezda* No. 11 [47]).* We must *threaten* the liberals, *extort* seats from them, and go to war against them, undaunted by attempts at intimidation through cries about the Black-Hundred danger (same author, No. 24 [60]**). The liberals "advance to power" *only when* the democrats win *despite* the vacillation of the liberals.

The divergency between the Marxists and the liquidators is most profound and irreconcilable, however easy various good souls may think a verbal reconciliation of the irreconcilable. "Wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries" is a whole range of ideas, a whole system of policy that *objectively* means transferring hegemony to the liberals. "Wrest the democratic movement from the hands of the liberals" is the opposite system of policy, one based on the fact that only a democratic movement which has ceased to be dependent on the liberals *is capable of actually* undermining reaction.

Now see what became in reality of the fight which was so much talked about *before* it began.

Let us take Mr. V. Levitsky of *Nasha Zarya* (No. 9-10) as a witness to the results of the fight—certainly no one will suspect *this* witness of partiality towards *Zvezda* and *Pravda*.

Here is how this witness assesses the results of the fight in the second urban curia, the only curia, as is known, where there was at least a remote resemblance to "European" elections and where it is possible, at least to some slight degree, to sum up the results of the "encounters" between liberals and democrats.

The witness speaks of as many as 63 actions by the Social-Democrats, including 5 cases of *forced* renunciation of nomination, 5 agreements with other parties and 53 independent actions. Of these 53 cases, 4 were in four big cities and 49 during the election of electors.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 490.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 561.—*Ed.*

In 9 cases out of these 49, it was not known whom the Social-Democrats were fighting against, in three it was against the Rights (whom they defeated in all three cases), in one against the Trudoviks (the Social-Democrats winning), and *in the other 36 cases*, *against the liberals* (21 victories of the Social-Democrats and 15 defeats).

Picking out the *Russian* liberals, we have 21 cases in which the Social-Democrats fought them. Here are the results:

		S. D.	Winners, opponents of S. D.	Total number of cases
S. D. versus	Cadets	7	8	15
” ”	other liberals*	4	2	6
	Total	11	10	21

And so, the chief opponents of the Social-Democrats were *liberals* (36 cases against 3); the Social-Democrats suffered their *chief* defeats at the hands of the *Cadets*.

Furthermore, out of five cases of agreement two were general agreements of the opposition against the Rights; *in three* “it may be a question of a Left bloc against the Cadets” (my italics; *Nasha Zarya* No. 9-10, p. 98). In other words, the number of agreements was less than one-tenth of the total number of actions. Sixty per cent of the agreements were against the Cadets.

Lastly, the returns in four big cities were the following:

	Votes cast (maximum figures)			
			Riga	
	St. Peters-burg	Moscow	First ballot	Second ballot
For Cadets	19,376	20,310	3,754	5,517
” Social-Democrats . .	7,686	9,035	*4,583*	4,570
” Octobrists.	4,547	2,030	3,674	—
” Rights	1,990	1,073	272	—
” Trudoviks	1,075	—	—	—

* Progressists and Cadets *together* with Progressists or Trudoviks.

And so, *in all* the four big cities the Social-Democrats fought *against the Cadets*, who in one case won in the second ballot *with help from the Octobrists* (considering these to include the candidate of the Baltic Constitutional Party).

The conclusions drawn by the witness himself are:

"The Cadet monopoly of representation of the urban democrats is coming to an end. The Social-Democrats' immediate task in this field is to win representation from the liberals in all the five cities represented independently. The psychological [??] and historical [what about economic?] preconditions for this—a 'swing to the left' of the democratic voter, the untenability of the Cadet policy, and the reawakening of proletarian initiative—already exist" (*Nasha Zarya*, op. cit., p. 97).

VI. "END" OF THE ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE CADET PARTY

1. The facts have shown that the real meaning of the Cadet slogan of a "single opposition" or "two camps" was deception of the democrats, the liberals' fraudulent appropriation of the fruits of a democratic awakening, and the liberals' *curtailment*, *blunting* and *frustration* of this awakening of the only force capable of pushing Russia ahead.

2. The facts have shown that the only election struggle that was at all like the "open", "European" type consisted *precisely* in wresting the democratic movement from the hands of the liberals. This slogan was a *living reality*, it expressed the awakening of a new democratic movement, an awakening that is actually taking place. As for the liquidators' slogan "Wrest the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries", it was a rotten invention of a circle of liberal intellectuals.

3. The facts have shown that only the "furious" struggle against the Cadets, and only the "Cadet-eating" of which the liberals' spineless servants, the liquidators, accused us, expressed the real need of the real mass campaign, because the Cadets actually turned out to be *even worse* than we had painted them. The Cadets turned out to be outright allies of the Black Hundreds against the Social-Democrat Priedkalns and the Social-Democrat Pokrovsky![200]

It is a historic turning-point in Russia: the Black Hundreds, who had gone to the length of blind hatred of the Cadets, whom they saw as their chief enemy, were impelled

by the course of events to back the Cadets against the Social-Democrats. This seemingly minor fact denotes a very great shift in party policies, showing how superficial in fact were the Black-Hundred attacks on the Cadets and *vice versa*, and how easily in fact Purishkevich and Milyukov *found their bearings*, and came to their unity against the Social-Democrats.

Experience has shown that we Bolsheviks, far from underestimating the possibility of blocs with the Cadets (at the second stage and so on), rather continued to *overestimate* it, for what *actually* occurred in a number of cases was the formation of blocks between the Cadets and the Octobrists against us! This, of course, does not mean that we *refused* (as certain over-zealous otzovists of yesterday and their friends would have liked us to do) in a number of cases, such as at gubernia election meetings, to resort to blocs between ourselves and the Cadets against the Rights. What it does mean is that our *general line* (three camps; democrats against Cadets) was borne out and strengthened still further by experience.

Incidentally, Levitsky, Cherevanin and other contributors to *Nasha Zarya* collected valuable data for our election statistics with the most commendable zeal and diligence. It is a pity they did not sum up the data—which they evidently had—on the number of cases of direct and indirect blocs of the Cadets with the Octobrists and Rights *against* the Social-Democrats.

Priedkalns and Pokrovsky are not isolated cases, for there were many other cases of a similar nature at the gubernia election meetings. They should not be forgotten. They are worthy of serious attention.

To proceed. Our "witness", who had to draw the above conclusions about the Cadets, gave no thought at all to the appraisal of the Cadet Party that these conclusions *bore out*. Who called the Cadets a party of urban democrats? And who had argued *since March 1906*, or even earlier, that this liberal party kept itself alive by deceiving the democratic voter?

Now the liquidators have begun to chant like so many Forgetful Ivans: "The Cadet monopoly is coming to an end." Consequently, there was a "monopoly". What does this

mean? Monopoly is the removal of competition. Was Social-Democratic competition against the Cadets in 1906-07 removed to a greater extent than in 1912?

Mr. V. Levitsky repeats a common phrase *without thinking* of the meaning of the words he is uttering. As he understands it, monopoly means "simply" that the Cadets predominated and that this is over now. But if you claim to be Marxists, gentlemen, you should really ponder, if only a little bit, on the class character of parties, and not treat so flippantly your own statements of yesterday.

If the Cadets are a party of urban democrats, then their predominance is not a "monopoly", but a product of the *class* interests of the urban democrats! If, however, their predominance turned out, a couple of years later, to be a "monopoly", i.e., something accidental and abnormal from the standpoint of the general and fundamental laws of capitalism and relations between the classes in capitalist society, it follows that those who took the Cadets for a party of urban democrats were opportunists, that they were carried away by a short-lived success, bowed down before the fashionable splendour of Cadetism, and abandoned Marxist criticism of the Cadets for liberal servility to them.

Mr. V. Levitsky's conclusion bears out *entirely*, *word for word*, the resolution on the class character of the Cadet Party adopted by the Bolsheviks in London in 1907, a resolution which the Mensheviks vehemently disputed. If the urban democrats followed the lead of the Cadets "*by force of tradition and because they were simply deceived by the liberals*", as the resolution has it, then it is perfectly logical that the severe lessons of 1908-11 dispelled "constitutional illusions", undermined "tradition", exposed the "deceit" and thereby ended the "monopoly".

Wilful or involuntary oblivion of the past, and an extremely thoughtless attitude towards precise, straightforward and clear answers to all important political questions and to verifying these answers by the ample experience of 1905-07 and 1908-12, is a much too widespread phenomenon nowadays. Nothing could be so ruinous to the awakening democratic movement as this oblivion and this attitude.

VII. CONCERNING AN "ENORMOUS DANGER TO THE LANDOWNERSHIP OF THE NOBILITY"

Mr. Cherevanin, summing up the results of the election campaign, holds that the opposition had "49 seats wrested from it in a purely artificial manner, solely through recourse to quite exceptional measures". In his opinion, adding these seats to those that were really won would raise the total to 207, which is only 15 short of an absolute majority. The conclusion he draws is: "On the basis of the June Third system, barring artificial emergency measures, nobiliary-feudal reaction would have been fully and decisively [??!] defeated in the elections."

"In the face of this enormous danger to the landownership of the nobility," he goes on to say, "clashes between priests and landlords are unimportant" (op. cit., p. 85).

There you have the effects of the slogan of wresting the Duma from the hands of the reactionaries! Cherevanin has sorely punished Martov by reducing the latter's slogan to an absurdity and confirming, so to say, the results of liquidationist illusions along with the "results of the election campaign".

A Progressist and Cadet majority in the Fourth Duma would have represented an "*enormous danger to the landownership of the nobility*"! This is a real gem.

It is not a slip of the pen, however, but an inevitable result of the entire ideological content which the liberals and liquidators tried to impart to the election campaign.

The tremendous growth of the role of the Progressists compared with the Cadets, the Progressists' embodiment in politics of the entire renegacy (Vekhism) of the Cadets, and the virtual transition to a Progressist position which the Cadets themselves effected tacitly and secretly, are all facts which the liquidators *refused* to see and which brought them to the "Cherevanin" gem. "One should not talk too much about the counter-revolutionary character of the Cadets" is what, or approximately what, the Trudovik (Narodnik liquidator) Mr. Vodovozov wrote at one time. Our liquidators took the same view.

They even forgot the lesson of the Third Duma, where the Cadet Berezovsky in an official speech "interpreted" the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Cadets' agrarian programme, and proved it to be *beneficial* to the landed nobility. Think of expecting now, in 1912, an "enormous danger to the landownership of the nobility" from the "opposition" Duma of the landlords, or from the Progressists, those slightly repainted Octobrists.

Look here, Mr. Cherevanin, indulge in your fantasies, but have a sense of proportion!

We have an excellent illustration of the election results in connection with the Cherevanin summary of liquidationist tactics. The Fourth Duma approved, by 132 votes to 78, the Progressist formula of procedure.

None other than the Octobrist Antonov officially expressed his complete satisfaction with this most commonplace, empty formula as being an Octobrist one! Mr. Antonov is right, of course. The Progressists submitted a purely Octobrist formula. They played their role, that of reconciling the Octobrists with the Cadets.

Octobrism has been defeated, long live Octobrism! It is Guchkov Octobrism that has been "defeated" and the one that lives on is Octobrism of the Yefremov and Lvov brand.*

VIII. COVERING UP THE DEFEAT

It remains for us to examine the election returns for the worker curia, which is the most important.

No one has had, or has, any doubt that this curia is on the side of the Social-Democrats. The fight waged here was not against the Narodniks, among whom resistance to Narodnik liquidationism (*Pochin*[201] in Paris and the Popular Socialists in St. Petersburg) or Narodnik otzovism *did not occur*, and this lack of resistance to decadent trends reduced the Left Narodniks to *nil*.

The fight in the worker curia was waged only between the Marxists and the liberal labour politicians, the liquidators. In January 1912 the Marxists proclaimed frankly and clearly, openly and without any despicable evasions,

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* *Rech* asserted on December 16 that the Social-Democrats had joined in voting for the Progressists' vile formula. That is incredible. *Pravda* says nothing about it. Perhaps the Social-Democrats who were sitting (or who rose to leave?) were "registered" as voting *for*.

that agreements in the *worker* curia (and in it alone) with the *destroyers* of the workers' Party were impermissible.*

This fact is common knowledge. It is also common knowledge that the liquidators' August conference was described even by the conciliator Plekhanov as "pitiful" and liquidationist (despite the vows of *Nasha Zarya*), and its resolutions as "*diplomacy*", or deceit, to put it plainly.

What did the election returns show?

Did they, or did they not, provide *objective* data as to the relation of the January and August statements to reality? Whom did the working-class electors prove to be supporting?

There are very precise statistical data on this, which the liquidators are trying (in vain!) to obscure, to hide, to drown with outcries and abuse.

Beginning with the Second Duma (the First Duma was boycotted by most of the Social-Democrats), there are exact data on the number of deputies to the Duma from the worker curia, distributed among the various "trends" in the Social-Democratic Party. Here they are:

Deputies elected to the Duma from the worker curia:

	Mensheviks	Bolsheviks	Percentage of Bolsheviks
Second Duma (1907) . . .	12	11	47
Third " (1908-12) . .	4	4	50
Fourth " (1912) . . .	3	6	67

These figures speak for themselves!

In 1907 the Bolsheviks had a majority, registered officially, in the Party (105 Bolshevik and 97 Menshevik delegates). This means that the 47 per cent in the worker curia (the entire group comprised 18 Bolsheviks+36 Mensheviks=54) made up about 52 per cent in the workers' Party.

In 1912, for the first time, *all* the six *curia* deputies were Bolsheviks. It is known that those six gubernias are the principal industrial gubernias. It is also known that a far greater proportion of the proletariat is concentrated in them than in the other gubernias. It is obvious, therefore, and has

* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 469.—*Ed.*

been fully proved by a comparison with 1907, that 67 per cent in the worker curia mean more than 70 per cent in the workers' Party.

During the Third Duma, when the intelligentsia deserted the workers' Party and the liquidators justified this, the workers abandoned the liquidators. The liquidator Belousov's flight from the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, and the turn of the whole group (three-quarters Menshevik) from Menshevism to anti-liquidationism* were signs and sure indications of the fact that *the same* process was going on among the workers. And the elections to the Fourth Duma proved this.

That is why Oskarov, Martov, Cherevanin, Levitsky, etc., are incredibly indignant in *Nasha Zarya*, flinging hundreds of the most Purishkevichist "compliments" at an alleged circle that is alleged to be sectarian and Leninist.

Sectarian circle indeed! A "circle" that in 1908-12 got from the worker curia steadily increasing support—reaching 67 per cent of that curia in the Fourth Duma! They are clumsy polemicists, are the liquidators. They abuse** us as strongly as they can, but the result is the most flattering compliment for us.

Settling controversial issues by an abundance of outcries, abuse and groundless assertions is just like a circle of intellectuals. The workers prefer something different, namely, *objective* data. And in Russia, her present political position

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* The liquidator Oskarov admits this indisputable fact in an amusing manner, saying that the Bolsheviks "*had their way*: they split the group at the critical moment, in fact if not in form" (*Nasha Zarya*, op. cit., p. 3)—meaning the Third Duma group. What he calls a "split" is either the liquidator Belousov's flight, or the fact that *two* members of the group were on a liquidationist newspaper and eight on an anti-liquidationist one, while the rest were neutral.

** The liquidators most readily raise a hullaballoo about St. Petersburg, bypassing the results of the elections for the worker curia, as if to say, "For shame!" It is a shame, of course, gentlemen! The shame is on those against whom a *mandate* was adopted that had been *printed* beforehand, i.e., approved by the organisation. It is disgraceful to back a *person* against a *mandate*. And it was still more disgraceful to refuse to cast lots when the result turned out to be 3 : 3. P., a *Pravda* man well known in St. Petersburg, plainly suggested casting lots to the liquidator M., but the latter rejected it!! Shame on the liquidators for the St. Petersburg elections!

being what it is, there is not, and cannot be, an *objective* measure of the strength and influence of a particular trend among the mass of the workers other than the working-class press and the worker curia of the Duma.

Therefore, liquidator gentlemen, the more you clamour and rail in *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*, the more calmly we shall ask the workers to point out an objective criterion of connection with the masses other than the working-class press and the worker curia in the Duma.

Let the readers who are being deafened with cries about the "sectarian" "Lenin circle" and so on ponder calmly these objective data on the working-class press and the worker curia in the Duma. These objective data show that the liquidators are shouting to cover up their complete defeat.

But it is particularly instructive to compare the coming into being of *Luch*, which appeared *on the day of elections* owing to private initiative, and the coming into being of *Pravda*. The April surge of the working-class movement was one of the greatest historic surges of the workers' mass movement in Russia. Even according to estimates made by factory-owners, hundreds of thousands of workers joined in the movement. And *that movement itself created* "*Pravda*" as its by-product—first by strengthening *Zvezda* and converting it from a weekly into a newspaper appearing every two days, and then by increasing workers' money collections for *Pravda* to 76 in March and 227 in April (taking into account only group contributions by workers).

We have here a classical example of how a movement that has absolutely nothing to do with reformism, brings as a by-product either reforms or concessions, or an extension of bounds, and so on.

The reformists are betraying the working-class movement when they restrict its great scope by reformist slogans (as do our liquidators). The opponents of reformism, however, not only prove loyal to the uncurtailed slogans of the proletariat, but also turn out to be the better "practical workers", for it is precisely broad scope and uncurtailed slogans that ensure the strength which yields, as a by-product, either a concession or a reform, or an extension of bounds, or at least a temporary necessity for the upper ranks to tolerate a disagreeable increase in the activity of the lower ranks.

In 1908-12, while the liquidators were busy reviling the "underground", justifying "flight" from it and chattering about an "open party", the *entire* worker curia left them, and they were unable to use the first, and great, upsurge of the April-May tide!

Mr. Martov in *Nasha Zarya* admits this circumstance which is so sad for him, couching his admission in particularly amusing terms. He reviles and describes as nonentities the Plekhanov and *Vperyod* groups, which *the liquidators themselves* were depicting only yesterday as "centres" and trends, in defiance of our demand that only Russian organisations should be taken into account. And Martov admits bitterly and angrily, amid a torrent of venomous (venomous in a Burenin style) words, that "Lenin's" "sectarian circle" "stood its ground" and "is even taking the offensive", "having entrenched itself in fields that have nothing in common with the underground" (*Nasha Zarya*, op. cit., p. 74).

But this whole admission of Martov's evokes a smile. It is human nature that when the enemy makes a mistake we rejoice maliciously, but when he takes the right step we sometimes get into a childish temper.

Thank you for the compliment you were *forced* to pay us, liberal liquidator! Since the end of 1908 we have been insisting on the use of open forms of the movement, and in the spring of 1909 we broke with a number of friends[202] over it. And if in these "fields" we proved to be a force, it was only because we did not sacrifice content for form. To use the form in good time, to seize hold of the April upsurge, and to win the sympathy, so precious to a Marxist, of the worker curia, it was essential not to renounce the old, not to treat it in a renegade fashion, but firmly to uphold its ideas, its traditions, its material substrata. It was *those* ideas that imbued the April upsurge, it was they that predominated in the worker curia in 1912, and only those who were loyal to them in all fields and all forms could advance in step both with that upsurge and with that curia.

Written in January 1913

Published in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1, January 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the magazine text

EXPERIENCE TEACHES

Anyone who is sincerely interested in the fortunes of the emancipation movement in our country cannot fail to be interested primarily in our *working-class* movement. The years of upswing, as well as those of counter-revolution, showed beyond all doubt that the working class is marching *at the head of all* the liberation forces and that therefore the fortunes of the working-class movement are most closely interwoven with those of the Russian social movement in general.

Take the curve indicating the workers' *strike movement* during the past eight years! And try to draw a similar curve showing the growth and decline of Russia's entire emancipation movement in general during these years. The two curves will coincide perfectly. There is a very close, an inseparable connection between the emancipation movement as a whole, on the one hand, and the working-class movement, on the other.

Look closely at the data on the strike movement in Russia since 1905.

Year	Number of strikers	Number of strikes (thousands)
1905	13,995	2,863
1906	6,114	1,108
1907	3,573	740
1908	892	176
1909	340	64
1910	222	47
1911	466	105
1912 approximately 1,500,000 strikers (economic and political)		

Surely these data show most clearly that the Russian workers' strike movement is the best barometer of the entire nation-wide emancipation struggle in Russia.

There were about three million strikers in the peak year (1905). In 1906 and 1907 the movement ebbed but continued at a very high level, averaging one million strikers. Then it headed downwards and kept on declining to 1910 inclusive: the year 1911 was the turning-point, for the curve began to rise, even though timidly. The year 1912 saw a new major upswing. The curve rose confidently and steadily to the 1906 level, making plainly for the year when, at the figure of three million, it established a *world* record.

A *new epoch* has come. This is now beyond all question. The beginning of 1913 is the best evidence of it. The *mass* of the workers is advancing from individual *partial* issues to the point where it will raise the *general* issue. The attention of the widest masses is now centred on something more than particular defects in our Russian life. It is now a question of the *totality* of these defects, taken as a whole: it is now a question of reform, not reforms.

Experience teaches. The actual struggle is the best solver of the problems which until recently were so debatable. Take a look now, after 1912, at, say, our disputes over the "petitioning campaign" and the slogan "freedom of association". What has experience shown?

It turned out to be impossible to collect even a few tens of thousands of workers' signatures to a very moderate petition. On the other hand, it is a fact that *political* strikes alone involved a *million* people. The talk that one should not go beyond the slogan "freedom of association", because if one did the masses would allegedly not understand us and would refuse to mobilise, turned out to be meaningless and idle talk by people isolated from the realities of life. The living, real millions of the masses, however, mobilised precisely in support of the broadest, the old, uncurtailed formulas. It was only these formulas that fired the masses with enthusiasm. It has now been shown convincingly enough who has actually been advancing with the masses and who without or against them.

A fresh, vigorous and mighty movement of the masses themselves is sweeping aside as worthless rubbish the arti-

ficial formulas hatched in government offices, and marches on and on.

That is what constitutes the historic significance of the great movement taking place under our own eyes.

Pravda No. 15, January 19, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

NEW DEMOCRATS

In his "Motley Encounters" published in the New-Year issue of *Rech*, Mr. Tan touched on an important question to which the workers should pay serious attention. It is the question of the growing numbers of new democrats.

"For about a year or perhaps more," wrote Mr. Tan, "the river of life has been changing and shifting again. Instead of the water decreasing, there has been an increase, coming from God knows where probably from the bowels of the earth and from distant springs. All was quiet and empty for three years. Now there are people appearing crawling one after another out of various crevices and dark corners....

"People of peasant stock who have come up from below are the most interesting. Their name is legion. They have flooded the middle walks of life and are even aiming at the higher ones, especially in the provinces. Technicians, accountants, agronomists teachers, all sorts of Zemstvo clerks. They are all alike—grey-faced broad-boned, uncouth-looking; they are not liable to reflexes, and are, indeed, as tough as cats.... Life must have taken yet another step upwards, for we commoners compared with them are as the nobility were compared with us."

This is very apt and true, although we should not forget that the old as well as the new commoners, those "of peasant stock", the democratic intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, represent the bourgeoisie as distinct from the semi-feudal nobility.

But the bourgeoisie consists of different strata having different historical possibilities. The upper ranks of the bourgeoisie and of the wealthy bourgeois intelligentsia—lawyers, professors, journalists, deputies, etc.—almost invariably gravitate towards an alliance with the Purishkeviches. Thousands of economic threads link *this* bourgeoisie to them.

On the other hand, the peasant bourgeoisie and the new intelligentsia "of peasant stock" are linked by a thousand

threads to the *mass* of the disfranchised, downtrodden, ignorant, starving peasantry, and by virtue of all their living conditions are hostile to *all* Purishkevichism, to any alliance with it.

This new democratic element, which is more numerous and stands closer to the life of the millions, is rapidly learning, gaining strength and growing. It is for the most part full of vague opposition sentiments and feeds on liberal trash. One of the great and responsible tasks of the politically-conscious workers is to help these democrats to get rid of the influence of liberal prejudices. Only in so far as they overcome these prejudices, cast off the wretched burden of liberal illusions, break with the liberals and hold out, their hand to the workers are they, Russia's new democrats, destined to do something real for the cause of freedom.

Pravda No. 15, January 19, 1913
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

ON NARODISM

Mr. A. V. P.[203] has contributed to *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 12 a "leading" article on a "current" subject, headed "Socialism—Popular or Proletarian?"

The article is quite shallow and pointless in itself. It is quite a long time since we encountered in the "leading" articles of a Narodnik publication that considers itself important, such a meaningless set of words, such a spate of evasive, bald phrases, or such a hotchpotch of (eclectic) views.

But the characteristic thing about the article is that it raises the highly important and topical question of the disintegration of Narodism. Narodism is the ideology of Russia's peasant democrats. That is why every class-conscious worker should carefully watch the changes this ideology is undergoing.

I

Narodism is very old. It is considered to have been founded by Herzen and Chernyshevsky. Effective Narodism reached its peak when, in the seventies, revolutionaries began to "go among the people" (the peasantry). The Narodniks' economic theory was developed in its more integral form by V. V. (Vorontsov) and Nikolai—on,[204] in the eighties of the last century. In the early twentieth century, the views of the Left Narodniks were expressed in the most definite form by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The revolution of 1905, which showed *all* the social forces of Russia in an open, mass action of the classes, made a general test of Narodism and defined its place. The only real

content and social significance of Narodism is peasant democracy.

The Russian liberal bourgeoisie is compelled, by virtue of its economic position, to strive not for the *abolition*, but for the *division* of the privileges of Purishkevich and Co. between the feudal landlords and the capitalists. On the other hand, the bourgeois democrats in Russia—the peasants—are compelled to strive for the *abolition* of all these privileges.

For the Narodniks, phrases about "socialism", "socialisation of the land", equalised tenure, and so on, are mere words covering up the fact that the peasants are striving for complete equality in politics and for the complete abolition of feudal landownership.

The revolution of 1905 finally revealed this social essence of Narodism, this class nature of it. The movement of the masses—in the form of the peasant unions of 1905, the local peasant struggles in 1905 and 1906, and the elections to the first two Dumas (the formation of "Trudovik" groups)—all these great social facts, which showed us millions of peasants *in action*, swept aside Narodnik, professedly socialist, phrase-mongering like so much dust and revealed the core: a peasant (bourgeois) democratic movement with an immense, still unexhausted store of energy.

Those whom the *experience* of the greatest epoch in new, modern, Russia has not taught to distinguish between the real content of Narodism and its verbal trappings are hopeless and cannot be taken seriously, they may be writers playing with words (like A. V. P. of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*), but not politicians.

In our next article we shall look more closely at the disintegration of Narodism and at that writer.

II

The experience of 1905 is vastly important precisely because it *compelled* the testing of Narodnik theories by the *movement* of the masses. And that test at once brought about the decay of Narodism and the collapse of Narodnik theories.

At the very first congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in December 1905, the Popular Socialists began to break away from them, and they had seceded completely by the autumn of 1906.

Those Popular Socialists forestalled our liquidators. They chanted in exactly the same way about an "open party", and in the same way they abolished the slogans of consistent democracy and made renegade speeches (see, for example, Mr. Peshekhonov's articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 8, 1906). Those were peasant Cadets, and the Second Duma (which was *not* boycotted by the Narodniks, nor even by the Socialist-Revolutionaries) *proved* that the majority of the peasant deputies followed the opportunists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, with the minority following the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Second Duma finally confirmed what was evident already from the Narodnik newspapers of the "days of freedom" (autumn 1905 and spring 1906), namely, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries could be nothing but the Left wing of Russia's peasant democrats and that outside it they were nothing.

The disintegration of Narodism is bearing this out more and more clearly. While the counter-revolution was rampant, this disintegration progressed rapidly: the Left Narodniks "recalled" themselves from the ranks of the Duma Trudoviks. The old party was virtually liquidated but no new one was founded. Renegacy (which went as far as Ropshin's disgraceful writings "The Pale Horse" and "That Which Was Not") obtained a wide path for itself even to the "Left" Narodniks. Some of them (the *Pochin* group) are abandoning the boycott. Others gravitate towards Marxism (N. Sukhanov, for example, although he is still exceedingly muddled). Still others gravitate towards anarchism. All in all, the break-up is far greater than among the Social-Democrats, for while there are official centres, there is *no* clear, consistent, principled line capable of *combating* decadence.

And now Mr. A. V. P. presents us with an example of this ideological decadence. Once the Narodniks had a theory of their own. What is left now is nothing but "reservations" on Marxism picked up at random. Any unprincipled feuilleton-writer for a glib bourgeois sheet could subscribe to Mr.

A. V. P.'s article in defence of "popular" socialism without risking anything, without committing himself in any way, and *without professing anything*. For "popular" socialism is a meaningless phrase serving to *evade* the question of *which* class or social stratum is fighting for socialism throughout the world.

It suffices to quote two specimens of Mr. A. V. P.'s twaddle.

> "It appears," he wrote, "that the party which has made the doctrine of proletarian socialism its own is in reality prepared to develop its forces also at the expense of other, 'semi-proletarian', or even 'bourgeois', strata."

An objection fit for a fourth-year schoolboy, isn't it? Both semi-proletarians and bourgeois are to be found in the socialist parties of the whole world, so *what follows*? It follows, Mr. A. V. P. concludes, that one may side-step the fact that *only* the proletariat all over the world (1) wages a sustained struggle against the capitalist class and (2) provides a *mass* support for the Social-Democratic parties.

Another example:

> "Take the students," wrote the glib Mr. A. V. P. "Why, they are the most genuine bourgeoisie, and yet the socialists among them—I cannot say how it is now—until recently were almost a majority."

Now isn't that inimitable? Isn't that an argument worthy of a naïve Socialist-Revolutionary schoolgirl? He does not notice, after 1905-07, how tens of millions of peasants and millions of workers took sides in the arena of all political actions, while attaching importance (*as if it were an argument against* "proletarian socialism"!) to the fact that the liberal and democratic student youth in Russia sympathises with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats! Look here, Mr. A. V. P., have a sense of proportion!

Class-conscious workers must follow a straightforward and clear policy with regard to the Narodniks. They must ruthlessly ridicule would-be socialist phrases and *not allow* the only serious question, that of consistent *democracy*, to be *hidden behind them*.

"Popular" socialism, equalised tenure, socialisation of the land, co-operation, the labour principle? All that is not even worth refuting. Experience and the revolution have long

since *swept* it altogether out of the sphere of serious political issues. You are merely hiding the *serious* question, that of *democracy*, behind that sort of twaddle. You must say clearly and plainly whether you are loyal to the slogans of *consistent* democracy. Are you willing and able to transform these slogans into *regular* work among the *masses* of a clearly specified social stratum? If so, the worker democrat will be your ally and friend against all enemies of democracy. If not, go away, you are just a twaddler.

Pravda Nos. 16 and 17,
January 20 and 22, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according
to the *Pravda* text

TO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[205]

We reprint in full the leading article of the latest issue of the St. Petersburg newspaper *Luch* (January 19, 1913, No. 15—101):

"THE MASS OF THE WORKERS AND THE UNDERGROUND

"The authorities have again refused to register the metalworkers' union. Despite all the concessions which the workers were willing to make, the department found every single clause unacceptable. It makes no difference whether the force operating here was the association of factory-owners, which insisted, as the newspapers once reported, that the metalworkers should not be allowed to set up a new trade union, or whether the department itself decided to prevent the rise of such a union. The most progressive and most cultured section of the St. Petersburg workers is being deprived even of the miserable right they enjoyed under the provisional regulations on unions and associations! How much energy has been spent, how many lives have been lost in the struggle to win this bit of a right, which is now reduced to nought with a wave of the hand!

"Strangest of all is the fact that the wide mass of the workers do not at all react to this disfranchisement. Indeed, as a result of the latest persecution of legal organisations, sympathy for the 'underground' is reviving and growing here and there among the workers. We are far from shutting our eyes to this fact, which we find deplorable. But not being accustomed to worship spontaneity, we are trying to realise the meaning of this fact.

"The present talk about the 'underground' is largely reminiscent of the old disputes—now thoroughly forgotten, it seems—about terrorism. Terrorism, too, was 'worshipped' by many who wanted to mask their own worthlessness. It is well, they seemed to say, that there exist heroes; as for us, we'll trail somehow behind them. The same thing is happening now. We are too lazy to think, to seek new paths, and we are waiting for the underground to decide for us, and then we shall act at other people's risk. If we succeed, well and good, and if not, we shall know who is to blame.

"It is exactly this psychology—which, we admit, is rooted in our present political situation and is sufficiently explained by the heavy sacrifices already made for the sake of an open movement—

this psychology of irresponsibility, of a subconscious desire to prove one's absence in the event of failure, that inspires certain sections of the mass of the workers with a resurgent respect for the underground. We say respect for the underground, not flight into it, because it is always single individuals alone who have actually been underground—the masses have nothing to do underground—and those individuals, who are accountable to no one, have had command over mass actions.

"But, it is said, 'legal opportunities' have all been exhausted resulting in an almost complete destruction of the legal organisations. And it is this that is wrong, to say that *all* opportunities have been exhausted. Actually, the *main* opportunity, without which any victory of the working class is unthinkable, has been used very little so far. We have spoken of the masses' methodical participation in upholding their organisations. What has been done so far has been done neither *methodically* enough nor with the *masses* participating in sufficient measure. Thousands of signatures put to a petition for freedom of association are nothing compared with the hundreds of thousands of factory workers. The dozens and rarely hundreds of members of our trade union, educational and various other associations are but a drop in the bucket compared with the huge numbers of workers engaged in a given trade, living in a given district, and so on. And the fact is that those who take a real interest in unions and work in them are still fewer.

"The masses, who assign the pick of the working-class intelligentsia the most dangerous posts in legal organisations, readily give up, and are willing to abandon the cause itself, when those foremost champions have been snatched out of their ranks. Herein lies the root of the weakness of the working-class movement today, and it is here that there is a virgin field for stubborn and persevering Social-Democratic work."

It would be hard to imagine a more complete, more exact and more eloquent document shedding light on the vexed questions of our Social-Democratic Party than this article. The leading article in *Luch* No. 101 with remarkable accuracy summed up all the hundred issues of *Luch* and all the five years' propaganda of the liquidators, P. B. Axelrod, F. Dan V. Yezhov, Levitsky, Potresov, Martov, Martynov and others.

To comment on this leader in detail, one would have to write a whole volume repeating what Marxists of *all* trends have said against the liquidators in the press during 1909-12.

Let us only point out certain things. Sympathy for the underground is reviving and growing among the mass of the workers, and respect for it is resurgent. He who considers this fact deplorable is a liberal and not a Social-Democrat, a counter-revolutionary and not a democrat.

Comparing the underground with terrorism is an unheard-of affront to revolutionary work among the masses. Only the underground poses and solves problems of the growing revolution, directing revolutionary Social-Democratic work and attracting the mass of the workers precisely by this work.

The underground has been and is today drawn from the finest and most class-conscious of the foremost workers, those dearest to the masses. The link between the underground and the masses now can be, and often is, even broader and closer than before, chiefly owing to the greater class-consciousness of the masses, and in part also to "legal opportunities". The talk of an open party is stupid and base, but as far as our Social-Democratic Party nuclei are concerned, "legal opportunities" for *their* work among the masses have by no means been exhausted, and *cannot be* "exhausted".

Is it possible that the leading article in *Luch* No. 101 will not rouse the ire of *all* Social-Democrats? Will there be even a single "trend" among the Social-Democrats tolerant of such propaganda?

Can this summarising leading article fail to assist in settling the *vexed* question of the *unity* of the Social-Democratic Party?

The diplomats of liquidationism have been completely exposed in *Luch* No. 101. They stand unmasked. From now on, only hypocrites can talk about unity with the liquidationist group of *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya*.

It is time those Social-Democrats who so far have wavered for various reasons, who have given no explicit answer to the question under discussion, who have in an evasive form permitted "agreement" with *Luch* and sought to cloak their solidarity with *Luch* by talk about "unity"—it is high time they stopped wavering and spoke out plainly.

Unity with *Luch* is impossible, while unity *against Luch* is perfectly possible and urgently necessary. For the point at issue is unity of the "*underground*", of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, the R.S.D.L.P., and of its revolutionary work among the masses.

Written on January 22
(February 4), 1913

Hectographed in leaflet form
in Cracow, late January, 1913

Published according
to the leaflet text

IN THE WORLD OF THE AZEFS[206]

The nationalist press raised a terrible clamour over the Alyokhin "incident". What! The Austrians had insulted Russia by arresting an innocent Russian engineer on a charge of espionage and by outraging the arrested man! There were endless "patriotic" sallies against Austria.

And now the whole background has come to light—the simple, old, long-familiar background of the affair. Mr. Alyokhin was a victim of Weissmann, an Austrian police agent, who had been shadowing Russian spies in Austria for 2,000 kronen (800 rubles) a month.

The Russian engineer, who knows no German and is evidently a semi-savage as well, naïvely fell for the bait of the *agent provocateur*, who showed him round the arsenals.

Novoye Vremya and our other papers of a Black-Hundred and government trend defend *Russian* Azefs with all their might. But when an Azef turned out to be in the Austrian service, those well-intentioned Russian patriots were fired with "righteous" indignation.

But it turned out, in addition, that Weissmann is a former *Russian* spy and *agent provocateur*. The career of this Weissmann is most instructive.

His father kept a brothel. The son, after this sort of schooling, became a Russian spy in Vienna, Austria, where he also spied on Russian political exiles. Thus, from 1901 to 1905, Weissmann was in the service of the Russian police, being simultaneously a military and a political spy.

Subsequently Weissmann fell out with the Russian police and passed into the service of the Austrian police.

All very simple.

Poor Alyokhin was the victim of a former Russian spy. Now how can the servile Russian newspapers help being indignant at this "treachery" on the part of Austria?

Pravda No. 20, January 25, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE BOURGEOISIE AND REFORMISM

The arguments of *Rech* concerning the urgent issue of strikes deserve the greatest attention on the part of the workers.

That liberal paper cited the following official data on the strike movement:

Year	Strikes	Workers (thousands)
1905	13,995	2,863
1906	6,114	1,108
1907	3,573	740
1908	892	176
1909	340	64
1910	222	47
1911	466	105
1912	1,918	683

We would note in passing that the figures for 1912 are plainly understated, since the number of political strikers is given as only 511,000. Actually their number was about twice as great. We would also recall that as late as May 1912 *Rech* denied the political character of our working-class movement, asserting that the whole movement was only economic. But we intend to deal now with another aspect of the matter.

How does our liberal bourgeoisie assess this fact?

"The main requirements of the political consciousness [why only *consciousness*??] of Russian citizens have yet to be met," wrote *Rech*.

"The working class everywhere is the most mobile and most sensitive section of the urban democrats ... the most active section of the people.... Given constitutional conditions ... given a normal political situation ... there would not have been the loss of tens of thousands of working days [because of the Putilov strike] in an industry which today is of extreme importance in view of external complications" (No. 19).

The point of view of the bourgeoisie is clear. "We" want an imperialist policy, the conquest of foreign territory. "We" are handicapped by strikes. "We" lose surplus value because of the "lost" working days. "We" want to exploit the workers as "normally" as they do it in Europe.

Splendid, liberal gentlemen! Your desire is legitimate, and we are willing to support your effort if—*if* it is not futile and dead!

Rech continued: "It was not out of sympathy for liberties that Prussian statesmen [it ought to have said "Prussian landlords"] granted '*the legalisation of the Social-Democratic Party*'. Reforms bear proper fruit when granted in good time."

Such is the consummate reformism of our bourgeoisie. It confines itself to wistful sighs; it wants to persuade the Purishkeviches without hurting their feelings, to make peace with them without removing them. It should be clear to any intelligent person that by virtue of its *objective* meaning (that is, regardless of the good intentions of individual little groups), the slogan of "legalisation of the Social-Democratic Party" is an inseparable component of this wretched and impotent bourgeois reformism.

We would make only one remark. Bismarck succeeded in his reforms only because he went further than reformism. As we know, he carried out a series of "revolutions from above"; he robbed one of the world's richest countries of five thousand million francs, and he *was in a position* to give universal suffrage and genuine legality to a people intoxicated with a stream of gold and unprecedented military successes.

Do you imagine, liberal gentlemen, that something of the kind could happen in Russia?? Why, then, did you declare reforms in Russia to be hopeless even in the case of the Archangel Zemstvo (a "reform", indeed!)??

Pravda No. 23, January 29, 1913
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

APROPOS OF THE OPEN PARTY

Luch, a newspaper which succeeds in making the more "clamour" among circles of the intelligentsia the less the workers read it, continues its advocacy of *an open workers' party* with a zeal worthy of a better cause.

In the New-Year leading article of the paper we read an old untruth, namely, that the year 1912 "put forward, as its current slogan and as the militant banner of the Russia of the workers, the struggle for freedom of association and the struggle for the open existence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party".

Anyone who really came into contact with the workers' mass movement in 1912 and carefully observed its political character knows very well that the liquidators of *Luch* are telling an untruth. What the workers did put forward as their current slogan and militant banner was *something else*. This was particularly evident, for example, in May, when the foremost workers of different trends (even with a Narodnik minority participating along with the Social-Democratic majority) *themselves* put forward a *different* slogan and unfurled a different "militant banner".

The intellectuals of *Luch* know that, but they are trying to impose *their* want of faith, *their* narrow understanding and *their* opportunism on the workers. A familiar picture with nothing new about it! In Russia, however, the authors of this distortion are able to put it forward all the more easily because it has the monopoly of "open" expression in certain fields.

For all that, the untruth of *Luch* remains an untruth. And it becomes worse when *Luch* continues:

"It is this slogan that will form the pivot of the political mobilisation of the mass of the workers in 1913...."

In other words, *in defiance of* the mass of the workers, who have already advanced a *different* slogan, the intellectuals of *Luch* are going to dock and curtail it! You are free to do that, gentlemen, but what you are promoting is a liberal and not a Social-Democratic cause.

Let the reader recall the recent controversy between *Luch* and *Pravda* over an open party. Why is it that even the Cadets were unable to found an open party?—*Pravda* asked.* And F. D., writing in *Luch*, replied:

"The Cadets recognised that their desire was utopian" when they failed to get their Rules approved; as for the liquidators, they carried on "stubborn methodical work, winning one position after another" (see *Luch* No. 73).

You see: F. D. evaded giving a reply! The Cadets, too, carried on stubborn work and they, too, were "winning positions" in legal publications and legal unions. But even the Cadets have *no* open *party*.

Why, then, do the Cadets continue to dream and talk of an open party? Because they are the party of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie, which is willing to *make peace* with the Purishkeviches for certain little concessions to the liberals, for the little concession of a "peaceful" open Cadet party.

That is the objective significance—which does not depend on good wishes and fine words—of the talk about an open party under the June Third regime. This talk is a *repudiation* of consistent democracy, and an advocacy of *peace* with the Purishkeviches.

It is unimportant what *aims* the liquidators pursue by their advocacy of an open party, or what their intentions and expectations are. That is a subjective question; it is well known that the road to hell is paved with "good" intentions. What is important is the objective significance of the advocacy of an open workers' party under the June Third regime, with a non-open liberal party, etc.

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* See pp. 432-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

This objective significance of the liquidators' talk about an open party is a repudiation of the popular and fundamental conditions and demands of democracy.

That Is why every politically-conscious worker reacts adversely to the liquidators' propaganda, for the issue of an open party" is a *fundamental* question, one that concerns the *very existence* of the working-class Party. It is the very existence of a genuine workers' party that is being radically undermined by liquidationist propaganda.

Pravda No. 24, January 30, 1913
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

MOBILISATION OF PEASANT LANDS

Mobilisation of land is the transfer of landownership from one person to another. With regard to our peasants, both our legislation and our "public" opinion (even liberal opinion, as expressed by the Cadets) still maintain the *feudal* view that mobilisation of peasant lands is harmful and should be prohibited or restricted.

From the democratic point of view, the very assumption that peasants—adult persons and full-fledged citizens—may be prohibited from or impeded in selling their land is a most shameless affront to the peasantry. Only in a country like Russia, where all government officials and the bulk of the liberals still cling to the old, feudal view of the "muzhik" as being slow-witted, underprivileged and requiring tutelage, can this attitude to mobilisation persist.

From the economic point of view, the harm caused by all prohibition and restriction of mobilisation is enormous. Given living conditions that are at all tolerable, the peasant will *never* sell his land. On the other hand, when want or other conditions (resettlement, death of the breadwinner, and so on) *compel* a peasant to sell his land, *no law* can stop him. The law will *always* be bypassed, and bans will merely worsen the terms of sale of the land.

In the January issue of *Russkaya Mysl*, the mouthpiece of the extreme Right-wing Cadets, a cross-breed of liberals and Black Hundreds, a certain Prince V. Obolensky, who apparently shares the usual Black-Hundred and liberal view on mobilisation, was compelled to cite *facts* proving the stupidity and harm of all restrictions on it. Non-peasants are prohibited from buying allotments. So they register as peasants! Or a person is prohibited from buying more than

six per capita allotments. So he signs fictitious, fraudulent deeds in the name of his relatives, and so on! Or he is prohibited from mortgaging allotment land. This makes speculative deals all the easier and the purchase of land by middle peasants all the more difficult!

Only feudal-minded people and hypocrites can expect restrictions on mobilisation to "relieve" the peasantry. As far as the politically-conscious peasants are concerned, they seek an entirely different solution.

Pravda No. 26, February 1, 1913
Signed: *T.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A WORD ABOUT STRIKES

Luch has carried a number of articles against mass strikes. It is obvious that we cannot reply to *Luch* here in the way it deserves.

We shall limit ourselves to a few purely theoretical comments on the *nature* of the arguments of *Luch*. Those who write for *Luch* and who diligently cite examples from Western countries, repeating the catchword "anarcho-syndicalism" and so on in a thousand variations, thereby betray their complete incomprehension of the historical peculiarity of the strikes in Russia in 1912.

Nowhere in Europe have strikes in the twentieth century had, and nowhere do they have or can they have, such importance as in the Russia of the period we are passing through. Why?

For the simple reason that while the period of radical democratic changes has long been absolutely over throughout Europe, in Russia it is just such changes that are on the order of the day—in the historical sense of the phrase.

Hence the nation-wide character of the economic, and still more of the non-economic, strikes in Russia. Strikes in Europe, where they herald entirely different changes, *do not possess* such a nation-wide character (from the standpoint of democratic changes in the country). Moreover, the relation between the strikes in Russia and the position of the agricultural small producers (peasants) is quite unlike what it is in the Western countries.

Putting all this together, we shall see that the arguments of *Luch* leave out of account precisely the national, democratic significance of the economic and non-economic strikes in the Russia of 1912. The most important and historically

distinctive feature of our strikes is the fact that the proletariat comes forward as the leader *despite* the anti-democratic sentiments of the liberals. And it is just this that the *Luch* writers do not understand, and cannot understand from their liquidationist standpoint.

Of course, the point is not at all to appraise the advisability of any particular strike. It is not at all that the most methodical preparations are necessary and sometimes even the replacement of a strike by an action of *the same kind*. The point is the liquidators' *general* incomprehension of *this particular* significance of strikes in general which makes the slogan of "freedom of association" or of an "open party" unsuitable, out of keeping with the existing situation.

What the liquidators see as a disadvantage is the entire character of the movement and not particular cases, while the Marxists and all class-conscious workers see it as an advantage. That is why the workers have been incensed, and continue to be incensed, by *Luch*'s propaganda.

Pravda No. 27, February 2, 1913
Signed: *I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

RUSSIANS AND NEGROES

What a strange comparison, the reader may think. How can a race be compared with a nation?

It is a permissible comparison. The Negroes were the last to be freed from slavery, and they still bear, more than anyone else, the cruel marks of slavery—even in advanced countries—for capitalism has no "room" for other than legal emancipation, and even the latter it curtails in every possible way.

With regard to the Russians, history has it that they were "almost" freed from *serf* bondage in 1861. It was about the same time, following the civil war against the American slaveowners, that North America's Negroes were freed from slavery.

The emancipation of the American slaves took place in a less "reformative" manner than that of the Russian slaves.

That is why today, half a century later, the Russians still show *many more* traces of slavery than the Negroes. Indeed, it would be more accurate to speak of institutions and not merely of traces. But in this short article we shall limit ourselves to a little illustration of what we have said, namely, the question of literacy. It is known that illiteracy is one of the marks of slavery. In a country oppressed by pashas, Purishkeviches and their like, the majority of the population cannot be literate.

In Russia there are *73 per cent of illiterates*, exclusive of children under nine years of age.

Among the U.S. Negroes, there were (in 1900) *44.5 per cent* of illiterates.

Such a scandalously high percentage of illiterates is a disgrace to a civilised, advanced country like the North

American Republic. Furthermore, everyone knows that the position of the Negroes in America *in general* is one unworthy of a civilised country—capitalism *cannot* give either *complete* emancipation or even complete equality.

It is instructive that among the whites in America the proportion of illiterates is not more than 6 per cent. But if we divide America into what were formerly slave-holding areas (an American "Russia") and non-slave-holding areas (an American non-Russia), we shall find 11-12 per cent of illiterates *among the whites* in the former and 4-6 per cent in the latter areas!

The proportion of illiterates *among the whites* is *twice as high* in the former slave-holding areas. It is not only the Negroes that show traces of slavery!

Shame on America for the plight of the Negroes!

Written late January-early February 1913

First published in *Krasnaya Niva* No. 3, 1925
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the manuscript

A DISCOVERY

Bourgeois society lives and subsists exclusively by the wage labour of the millions. Failing this, neither the incomes of the landlords, nor the profits of the capitalists, nor yet the various "derivative" sources of a life of plenty, such as royalties, salaries, etc., would be possible. And the force which drives the millions into the ranks of wage labourers is hunger.

This is an old, universally known, hackneyed fact. The bourgeois public gets used to it and "does not notice" it. But from time to time glaring cases of want and poverty side by side with luxury compel "discoveries" to be made, particularly if the health and well-being of the bourgeois gentlemen are endangered! Once in a while they "discover", in every big city and any rural backwoods, appalling, abominable squalor, want and neglect unworthy of human beings. They "discover" them, inform the public through the "big" newspapers, comment on the fact for a day or two, and then forget it. The sated do not understand the hungry.

Recently in St. Petersburg a Dr. Kozlovsky, who inspected 251 lodging rooms in Rozhdestvensky District, acquainted the public with a "discovery" of this kind.

> "Dark, damp rooms, suffocating air, squalor, people sleeping on trunks or on the floor, horrible overcrowding (3,578 tenants in 251 lodging rooms), crushed bugs on the walls—an appalling picture" (*Novoye Vremya*, No. 13236).

The public health society which heard the report resolved to study the problem, to make representations ... to ask for an investigation—i.e., it did all it could.

A few figures from St. Petersburg statistics for 1911. The Special Department for the Investigation and Accommodation of Paupers had 16,960 paupers entrusted to its care. Of these, 1,761 were *handed over to the courts*—next time they will know better than to disturb clean people!—1,371 were sent back to their native parts (the countryside is "accustomed" to having paupers on its hands), 1,892 remained to be cared for in the institutions of the Department, and 9,694 were *released*.

People did work hard in the Department, after all—they "investigated"; they do not get their salaries for nothing.

The same year 1911 saw 43,156 unskilled workers apply for employment to the city labour exchange (beyond Moskovskaya Zastava). Work was found for 6,076 men.

The "released" (those freed from "care" in the case of the paupers and from jobs in the case of unskilled labour) spend the night in the street, in doss-houses, in lodging rooms.... They are material for discoveries.

Pravda No. 29, February 5, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE

The Thirteenth Conference of the British Labour Party was held in London from January 29 to 31 (new style). It was attended by 500 delegates.

The Conference passed a resolution against war, and by a considerable majority passed another resolution calling on the Party's representatives in Parliament to vote against any electoral reform Bill that does not extend the franchise to women.

The British Labour Party, which exists *side by side* with the opportunist Independent Labour Party and the Social-Democratic British Socialist Party, is something in the nature of a *broad labour party*. It is a compromise between a socialist party and non-socialist trade unions.

This compromise resulted from the peculiarities of British history and the segregation of the labour *aristocracy* in non-socialist, liberal trade unions. These unions have begun to turn towards socialism, and this gives rise to a host of intermediate, confused situations.

On Party discipline, for example, a resolution was adopted threatening expulsion from the Party for violation of the decisions of the Party or of the *Parliamentary group*.

Disputes arose that would be impossible in any other country—as to whether this resolution is directed against the Liberals or against the Socialists?

The fact is that out of forty Labour M.P.s, 27 are *non-Socialists*!! In opposing the resolution, the Socialist Will Thorne said they wanted to *tie the hands* of the thirteen Socialists by subordinating them to the *non-Socialists*. Even Bruce Glasier, of the I.L.P., while supporting the

resolution, admitted that there are about *half a dozen* Labour M.P.s whose place is among the Conservatives. The resolution was carried.

A resolution that not only the posters of the opportunist *Daily Herald*[207] be displayed in Party premises was defeated by 643,000 votes to 398,000. The voting here is calculated according to the number of members which each delegation represents.

The majority at the Conference consisted of non-Socialists and extremely bad Socialists. But definite voices were heard indicating that the mass of the workers are dissatisfied with such a party and they demand that their M.P.s should do less playing at legislation and more socialist propaganda.

Pravda No. 30, February 6, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS SHATTERED

"We have a constitution, thank God!" exclaimed Mr. Milyukov after June 3, 1907. The leader of the liberal bourgeoisie sought comfort in amusing assertions of this kind, while concealing its distrust of the people and its reluctance, its fear, to depart from the "constitutional" path.

Most characteristically, it is just now, when the same Mr. Milyukov or his prim, official-minded liberal *Rech* acknowledges the "beginning of a social upswing" (No. 26), that the collapse of these constitutional illusions is becoming obvious. Underlying these illusions is the desire to dismiss an unpleasant reality (and the unpleasant necessity of taking a path that does not resemble the "constitutional" one), the desire to lull oneself and others with "constitutional" catchwords.

And now look what the liberals have to say of the present situation!

> "It is dull in the Duma because there is no struggle going on" (No. 25).

Well, gentlemen, it was you who said we had a constitution!

> "All the words have been spoken. What is needed now is deeds, *but there is no faith in them*. Hence the apathy" (ibid.).

You lulled yourselves with faith in *words*, which you addressed chiefly to the Octobrists. Now you admit that

you spoke those words to cover up lack of *faith in deeds*.

You have condemned yourselves, liberal gentlemen.

Democrats in general, and workers in particular, have had no faith in words (about the constitution)—*

Written late January-early February 1913
Published for the first time

Published according to the manuscript

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* Part of the MS. has been lost.—*Ed*.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR FRANKNESS

We wish to thank the Black-Hundred *Novoye Vremya* for publishing a frank statement by Kobylinsky, leader of the Rights on the Council of State. We also wish to thank the "leader" himself.

"Every now and again," Mr. Kobylinsky exclaimed, "members of the Duma betray ignorance and inability to legislate.... *Only shopkeepers draft laws like that....*

"We have been attacked for rejecting the Bill to introduce the Zemstvo in Archangel Gubernia.... The Duma did not stop for a moment to think that owing to the absence of cultured elements and the sparse population in Archangel Gubernia, people there would have to elect, as a wit put it, *a muzhik*, a reindeer and a bear to the Zemstvo council....

"Be that as it may, *we shall not allow* the establishment of a *muzhik* Zemstvo, as the Third Duma envisaged it."

Well, how can we help thanking the leader of the Rights on the Council of State, i.e., the leader of the Council of State, for being so frank?

We wholeheartedly recommend to the reader this clear and truthful argument *for* the Council of State instead of the hackneyed, non-committal liberal phrases *against* the Council of State.

Shopkeepers in the Duma ... muzhiks and bears in the Zemstvo ... we shall admit no shopkeepers or muzhiks. There you have the plain language of a feudal-minded landlord.

And mind you, he is right, is this feudal lord, in saying that there is *no* majority in the Duma without the "shopkeepers", i.e., without the *bourgeoisie*, to use the language of a class conscious worker (and not of a wild landlord[208]). He is right, is this feudal lord, in saying that self-government would in fact be *peasant* self-government (the class-

conscious workers prefer the term *peasant* to *muzhik*, which is current among wild landlords). The peasants are a majority.

The Council of State is by no means an accidental political institution but a *class* organ—this is what Kobylinsky's truthful speech implies. The class in question is that of the big landlords. They *will admit no* "shopkeepers or muzhiks".

Really, Russian liberal "shopkeepers", and Octobrist and Cadet gentlemen, you must learn from Kobylinsky how to pose political questions seriously!

Pravda No. 35, February 12, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE QUESTION OF UNITY

The letter which Shagov, the Kostroma workers' deputy, wrote to *Pravda* (No. 22—226) indicated very clearly the terms on which the workers think Social-Democratic unity feasible. Letters from a number of other deputies for the worker curia (*Pravda* Nos. 21-28) confirmed this view. The workers themselves must bring about unity "from below". The liquidators should not fight the underground but should form part of it.

It is amazing that after the question has been posed so clearly and squarely we come across Trotsky's old, pompous but perfectly meaningless phrases in *Luch* No. 27 (113). Not a word *on the substance* of the matter! Not the slightest attempt to cite *precise facts* and analyse them thoroughly! Not a hint of the *real terms* of unity! Empty exclamations, high-flown words, and haughty sallies against opponents whom the author does not name, and impressively important assurances—that is Trotsky's total stock-in-trade.

That won't do, gentlemen. You speak "to the workers" *as though they were children*, now trying to scare them with terrible words ("the shackles of the circle method", "monstrous polemics", "the feudal-serf-owning period of our Party history"), now "coaxing" them, as one coaxes small children, without either convincing them or explaining matters to them.

The workers will not be intimidated or coaxed. They *themselves* will compare *Luch* and *Pravda*; they will read, for example, the leading article in *Luch* No. 101 ("The Mass of the Workers and the Underground"), and simply shrug off Trotsky's verbiage.

"In practice the question of the underground, alleged to be one of principle, is decided by all Social-Democratic groups absolutely alike...," Trotsky wrote in italics. The St. Petersburg workers know from experience that that is not so. Workers in any corner of Russia, as soon as they read the *Luch* leading article mentioned above, will see that Trotsky is departing from the truth.

"It is ridiculous and absurd to affirm," we read in his article, "that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between the political tendencies of *Luch* and *Pravda*." Believe us, my dear author, that neither the word "absurd" nor the word "ridiculous" can frighten the workers, who will ask you to speak to them *as to adults on the substance of the matter*: just expound those tendencies and prove that the leading article in *Luch* No. 101 can he "reconciled" with Social-Democracy!

You cannot satisfy the workers with mere phrases, no matter how "conciliatory" or honeyed.

"Our historic factions, Bolshevism and Menshevism, are purely intellectualist formations in origin," wrote Trotsky.

This is the repetition of a liberal tale. In fact, however, the whole of Russian reality confronted the workers with the issue of the attitude to the liberals and the peasantry. Even if there had been no intelligentsia, the workers *could not* have evaded the issue of whether they should *follow* the liberals or lead the peasantry *against* the liberals.

It is *to the advantage* of the liberals to pretend that this fundamental basis of the differences was introduced by "intellectuals". But Trotsky merely disgraces himself by echoing a liberal tale.

Pravda No. 39, February 16, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

WHAT GOES ON AMONG THE NARODNIKS AND WHAT GOES ON IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

The magazine *Russkoye Bogatstvo* shows us the two streams of the Narodnik or Trudovik current or trend in Russian life that can also be traced by drawing on other, more direct and immediate sources of political knowledge.

Let us recall, for example, the debates in the First and Second Dumas. Unfortunately, the verbatim reports of both have been withdrawn from sale. Nevertheless, the immense political material they provide for studying the views and aspirations of the Russian peasantry and Russian Trudoviks has in part already become, and in part will in the future become, known to every educated person. The chief conclusion to be drawn from this material is that the Trudovik *intellectuals* (including the Socialist-Revolutionary intellectuals) and the *peasant* Trudoviks represent essentially distinct political trends.

The intellectual Narodniks gravitate towards conciliatory or "philanthropic" phrases. One always senses the liberal in them. The standpoint of the class struggle is wholly foreign to them. They are given to moralising. They are pulling the democratic peasantry *back* from the real and direct struggle against its class enemy to vague, forced, impotent, quasi-socialist phrase-mongering.

The peasant Narodniks in both of the early Dumas were full of fire and passion. They were eager for direct and resolute action. They were ignorant, uneducated and unsophisticated, but they rose against their class enemy so straightforwardly, uncompromisingly and implacably that one *sensed* what an impressive social force they were.

In other words, the Narodnik intellectuals are very bad socialists and lukewarm democrats. The peasant Trudoviks are far from playing at socialism, which is quite alien to them, but they are honest, sincere, ardent and strong democrats. No one can foretell whether peasant democracy will win in Russia, for this depends on much too complicated objective conditions. But it is beyond doubt that the Trudovik peasantry *could* win only *in spite of* the tendencies which the Narodnik intelligentsia brings into the movement of the Trudovik peasantry. A vigorous, fresh and sincere democratic movement *can* win, given a favourable historical situation, whereas "socialist" *phrase-mongering* and Narodnik moralising can never win.

I consider this conclusion to be one of the most important lessons of the Russian revolution, and I cherish the hope that some day I may be able to substantiate it by a detailed analysis of Narodnik speeches in the first two Dumas and by other political evidence from the 1905-07 period. For the time being I should like to note the remarkable confirmation of this conclusion to be found in the latest issue (No. 12, 1912) of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, the chief and most authoritative Narodnik organ.

Two articles in that issue produce an impression that is undoubtedly typical. Mr. A. V. P.'s article ("Socialism—Popular or Proletarian?") is a specimen of the intellectualist arguments of the "Popular Socialists" and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

If it had been inevitable for the massive force of the Russian peasantry to be directed in the way that "results" from the *arguments* of Messrs. A. V. P. and Co., the cause of Russia's bourgeois democrats would have been hopelessly lost. For phrase-mongering and moralising *can never* result in history-making *action*. The impotence of *this kind* of Narodism is complete.

In Mr. Kryukov's article, "Without Fire", the peasantry and peasant life and psychology are described by a honey-tongued little priest, who portrays the peasantry in just the way it *itself* has acted, and continues to act. If this portrayal is accurate, Russia's bourgeois democrats—in the shape of the peasantry—are destined to carry out a major historical action that has every

chance of success provided the situation is at all favourable.

To make this point clear, we shall briefly describe Mr. A. V. P.'s "ideas" and quote a few passages from the portrayal of the Russian peasantry given by the little priest.

Mr. A. V. P. defends the foundations of Narodism against Sukhanov, a writer for *Zavety*, who *surrenders* a whole series of cardinal theoretical premises of Narodism to Marxism, advocating a kind of unity between Marxists and Narodniks.

Mr. A. V. P. has no objection to unity but does not propose to "surrender" the principles of Narodism. And it is precisely this *defence* of the purity of the principles and of the solidity of Narodism by such an unquestionably competent and noted Narodnik as Mr. A. V. P. that shows most clearly that his position is quite *hopeless* and that *this kind* of Narodism *is absolutely lifeless*.

Mr. Sukhanov went as far as to say that the proletariat was the only class which was socialist by nature. Of course, if we were to reason with any degree of consistency, this means recognising Marxism and completely giving up Narodnik *socialism* as a bad job.

Mr. A. V. P. is up in arms against Mr. Sukhanov, but his arguments are exceptionally lame. They are nothing but so many little reservations, rectifications, question marks, and eclectic comments to the effect that revisionism "overemphasises" life's corrections to theory, while orthodoxy wastes its time disputing them. The hotchpotch dished up by Mr. A. V. P. exactly resembles the objections of the "humanitarian" bourgeois to the class struggle and class socialism—objections common in all European countries.

Mr. A. V. P. does not venture to deny the fundamental and well-known fact that throughout the world it is only the proletariat that wages a systematic, daily struggle against capital, and that it alone constitutes the mass bulwark of the socialist parties. And Mr. A. V. P. cannot but know that *the freer* a country is politically, *the less* the peasantry shows even feeble socialist leanings. And he simply *plays* on fragments of ideas expressed by European bourgeois professors and opportunists in order to *confuse* the issue,

without even trying to set against Marxism anything at all like an integral, straightforward and clear social theory.

That is why nothing could be more boring than Mr. A. V. P.'s article. And nothing could be more indicative of the total ideological death of Narodnik *socialism* in Russia. It is dead. You can find Mr. A. V. P.'s "ideas" in full in any bourgeois social-reformist publication in the West, so there is no point in refuting them.

But while Narodnik *socialism* is dead in Russia, having been killed by the revolution of 1905 and buried by people like A. V. P., and while nothing is left of it but rotten phrases, Russia's peasant democracy—a democracy that is by no means socialist but as bourgeois as was democracy in America in the 1860s, in France at the close of the eighteenth century, in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, etc., etc.—is *alive*.

The honey-tongued priest's story of the countryside, recorded by Mr. Kryukov, fully confirms this. And let us note in passing that what Kryukov reports perhaps stands out even more vividly and precisely from the observations which the *Vekhi*-minded Bulgakov, an admitted enemy of democracy, published in *Russkaya Mysl* (No. 11, 1912—"At the Elections").

"Servility and cowardice have always been there!" says Kryukov's little priest, speaking of the Russian clergy. "But the difference now is that there has never been so *appallingly calm* and tacit a falling-away from the church as today. It is as if the spirit of life were dead in the church. I repeat that it isn't the intellectuals alone who have left—so have the people.... I must admit it—after all, I've been a country priest for two years."

The honey-tongued priest recalled the year *1905*. At that time he was busy explaining the manifesto to the peasants.

"I had looked forward," he wailed, "to understanding, close unity, *love*, sobriety, a sound mind, an awakening, vigour.... But while understanding did seem to come, we had hatred and internecine strife instead of solidarity and unity. And I was the very first man to be hit by the countryside, and pretty roughly, too. Why, didn't I stand for it heart and soul? I told them all about those liberties and all that sort of thing. And you should have seen how they listened! I imagined you just couldn't make things any clearer than I did, but no—there were other ideas that found their way into the

countryside. Besides, the new explainers made a much spicier stew—they talked about the land and equality and the landlords. *Of course, the muzhiks saw it and swallowed it at once.* First of all they came to tell me that they would pay me for tithes not two hundred rubles but one hundred....

"However, what *vexed* me particularly wasn't that fact—about that hundred rubles—but the totality of the things which so unexpectedly reshaped the countryside. Didn't they all try to open its eyes for it, to rid it of its ignorance, to lighten its darkness! And to tell the truth, they succeeded too. A bit of light did dawn on the blind, and they have no longer been blind since then, even though they haven't really recovered their eyesight. But with that half-vision came only the most sorrowful knowledge and the most choking hatred.... Some day they may sigh regretfully thinking of their past ignorance. There's so much hatred in the countryside that you'd say the very air is saturated with it nowadays.... They are quick with the knife and the cudgel and the fire-brand. There's a feeling of helplessness, the sting of unavenged grievances, internecine quarrels, indiscriminate hatred, envy of all who are better off, who live more comfortably and own more. To be sure, there was envy and hatred and sorrow and vile sin in the past as well, but people had faith in the divine will and realised the futility of worldly benefits. They had faith and *were therefore able to bear it*, hoping to be rewarded in the hereafter. That faith is no more. What people there believe in today is that we are oppressors and they are the oppressed. Weeds and thornapples have sprouted in the countryside from all that talk about freedom.... And now this new law about the land—brother has risen up against brother, son against father and neighbour against neighbour! The hatred and discord now are such that the countryside will choke with it, it certainly will."

We have underlined certain particularly characteristic words in this characteristic description of the countryside by the mealy-mouthed little priest (a genuine Narodnik intellectual!).

The priest is a partisan of "love" and an enemy of "hatred". In this respect he fully shares the Tolstoyan (we may also say Christian), thoroughly reactionary point of view which our Cadets and Cadet-like people are constantly promoting. Such a priest would hardly mind dreaming of some sort of "socialisation of the land" or prattling about the "socialist" significance of co-operation and about "standards of landownership". But when it came to hatred instead of "love", he at once recoiled, went limp and whimpered.

There is any amount of verbal, loud-mouthed "socialism" ("popular and not proletarian"), and in Europe too any

literate philistine approves of it. But when it comes to "hatred" instead of "love", that is the end. Socialism as humane phrase-mongering—yes, we are for it; revolutionary democracy—no, we are against it.

What the honey-tongued little priest says on the hackneyed subject of "hooliganism" in the countryside is absolutely nothing new from the factual point of view. But it is evident from his own story that "hooliganism" is a concept introduced by the *feudal landlords*. "Burning, unavenged grievances" is what the sugary priest notes. And this, of course, is a very far cry from "hooliganism".

In the struggle against Narodism, Marxists have long regarded it as their task to smash Manilovism, cloying phrases, a sentimental supra-class point of view, and vulgar "popular" socialism worthy of a French "Radical Socialist" skilled in shady business deals. But, at the same time, Marxists have long considered it just as much their indispensable task to extract the *democratic* core of Narodnik views. Narodnik socialism is a putrid and evil-smelling corpse. Peasant democracy in Russia is a living force, if Kryukov's honey-tongued priest has depicted it accurately. Indeed, it cannot help being a living force so long as the Purishkeviches are in the saddle, and so long as there are some thirty million who are starving.

"Indiscriminate hatred", we are told. First of all, this is not the whole truth. It is the Purishkeviches and government officials and amiable intellectuals who see no "discrimination". Secondly, even at the beginning of the working-class movement in Russia there was a certain element of "indiscriminate hatred", such as that, for instance, which took the form of destroying machinery during the strikes of the sixties, seventies and eighties of the last century. That did not last. Nor was that the point. It would be banal to demand that people in this situation who were losing their patience should use "kid gloves".

The important thing is the far-reaching break with the old, hopelessly reactionary world outlook, the thorough assimilation of just that doctrine about the "enslaved" that is an earnest of real life and not of the sleep of death.

Narodnik socialism is rotten even in its most Left-wing section. What is alive and vital is the task of purifying, enlightening, arousing and unifying the democratic movement through a deliberate break with doctrines of "love", "patience", and so on. The honey-tongued little priest is sad. We, however, have every reason to rejoice in the ample opportunities for vigorous work.

Prosveshcheniye No. 2,
February 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according
to the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

AN INCREASING DISCREPANCY

NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

I

Recently the Cadet deputies conferred again with local leaders of that party.

As might have been expected, they discussed the features of the present political situation. The liberals appraised the situation as follows:

> "Attention was drawn to the increasing discrepancy between the country's requirements for basic legislation and the impossibility of meeting them under the present system of legislative institutions and in view of the present attitude of the authorities towards popular representation."

The style is as tangled as a ball of wool with which a kitten has been playing for a long time. Our poor liberals—they have nowhere to express their ideas clearly!

But take a closer look: the trouble is not so much that the liberals have *nowhere* to talk as that they have *nothing* to say. The discrepancy is growing not only between the country's requirements and the hopelessness of the "present system", etc., but also between the country's requirements and the liberals' *helplessness*.

Why is it impossible for you, liberal politicians, to meet the requirements of the country? The Cadets reply: because the present system of legislative institutions and the present attitude of the authorities towards popular representation hinder it.

Consequently, we need a different system and a different attitude of the authorities. We shall see in what way

they must be different when we analyse in subsequent articles the "four theses" of the Cadet meeting.

But we must first put the main question: What is the reason for the "present" "system and attitude"? Where could anything *different* come from? The Cadets did not even think of it! Their reticence on this *fundamental* question amounts to hardened, Asiatic philistinism, like saying that there were bad advisers but there can be good advisers.

Is there no connection, Cadet gentlemen, between the "present" and the *interests* of some *class*, such as the class of the big landlords? Or the richest section of the bourgeoisie? Is not there complete *accord* between the "present" and the interests of *definite classes*? Is it not clear that any one who sets about discussing the political situation without taking into account the relations between all the classes engages in useless talk?

Alas! The Cadets have nothing but empty talk to cover up the "increasing discrepancy" between their policy and the requirements of the country.

II

Our liberals in general—and they are followed by the liberal labour politicians (liquidators)—like to talk at length about the "Europeanisation" of Russia. A tiny little truth serves here as a cover for a big untruth.

There can be no doubt that Russia, speaking generally, is becoming Europeanised, i.e., reorganised in the image of Europe (moreover, in "Europe" we should now include Japan and China, in spite of geography). But this Europeanisation has been going on since Alexander II, or perhaps even since Peter the Great; it went on not only during the upswing (1905), but also *during reaction* (1908-11); it has been going on in the police and among the Markov-type landlords, who are "Europeanising" their methods of fighting the democratic movement.

The catchword "Europeanisation" turns out to be so general that it serves to obscure matters, to obscure urgent political issues.

The liberals want a Europeanised Russia. But the Council of the United Nobility, too, sought Europeanisation by *its* law of November 9, 1906 (June 14, 1910).

The liberals want a European constitution. But the constitutions established in various countries of Europe were the result of long and strenuous class struggles between feudalism and absolutism, on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the workers, on the other. Written and unwritten constitutions, with which the liberals "shame" our reactionaries, are merely a record of the *results* of struggle obtained through a series of hard-won victories of the new over the old and a series of defeats inflicted on the new by the old.

The liberals want the results to make their appearance in our country *without* the sum total of advantages and disadvantages of which the results consist! The liberal programme and liberal tactics amount to this: let a European way of life take shape in our country *without* the hard struggle which brought it into being in Europe!

It is understandable that our Kobylinskys greet the liberals' wishes and arguments with contemptuous sallies against "shopkeepers" and "muzhiks". "You want, liberal gentlemen," say the Kobylinskys, "to register on paper victories that you have not yet won in reality."

III

The Cadet meeting approved four theses on tactics. The first reads:

> "The tactic of united action by the entire opposition front, while being a necessary condition for the execution of the Duma's current business, does not, however, guarantee either the securing of a solid and lasting majority in the Duma for the Bills of the opposition or the actual realisation of the Bills whose adoption in the Duma the opposition could secure, with the aid of the Duma Centre."

Translated into plain Russian, this gibberish means the following:

It is only with the Octobrists that the liberals can form a majority in the Duma. Such a majority is not permanent and its decisions are not put into effect.

Quite so. But this leads to the conclusion that to call those decisions "necessary", "current" and "business" (!??) is to deceive oneself and the people.

In defeating the Rights by voting with the Octobrists, we must not adopt the standpoint of legislating in the Fourth Duma, must not sow constitutional illusions—that is what the Cadets should have said to the people had they wanted to be democrats, not in words alone.

The first "thesis" of the Cadet meeting is strikingly illogical. It describes as "business" the approval by an inconstant and unstable majority in the Fourth Duma of Bills that are not put into effect!! The Cadets themselves have on a hundred occasions described this as "vermicelli" and a nuisance, and justly so.

But the Cadet tactics, extremely stupid from the standpoint of logic, become comprehensible from the standpoint of class interests. Let us recall what the Social-Democrats have been saying in the Third and Fourth Dumas ever since 1907. "There are two possible majorities in the Duma," they said, "a Right-wing and Octobrist and an Octobrist-Cadet one. Both take a counter-revolutionary stand" (cf. *Prosveshcheniye*, 1913, No. 1, p. 13).*

The Cadets' February 1913 meeting confirmed what we had been saying in our official decisions since 1907.

"The tactic of united action by the entire opposition front ... with the aid of the Duma Centre" is *indispensable* to the Cadets precisely because, like the Octobrists, they take a counter-revolutionary stand. In view of the inner kinship of the Cadets and Octobrists, it is understandable that they gravitate towards joint 'business', despite-its hopelessness today.

The Octobrists are always whimpering in their press, railing at the revolution, railing at the government, the Rights and the Council of State, but in the Duma they confine themselves to a desire for reforms and follow the government.

The Cadets whimper even more in their press, railing at the revolution, railing at the government, the Rights, the

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* See pp. 496-97 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Council of State and the Octobrists, but in the Duma they confine themselves to a desire for reforms and try to adapt their opposition to the Octobrists.

IV

The second thesis of the Cadet meeting reads:

> "The Duma can be substantially strengthened as a legislative and political factor only by fulfilling three fundamental conditions: democratisation of the electoral law (universal suffrage), a radical reform of the Council of State, and a responsible Ministry."

The gist of the tactics set out here may be expressed by one word: reformism.

Historical science tells us that the distinction between a reformist and a non-reformist change in a given political form is, generally speaking, that in the former case the old ruling class retains power, while in the latter case power is transferred from the old class to a new one. The Cadets do not understand the class basis of historical changes. This is their basic error from the point of view of theory.

From the point of view of practice, the above theoretical distinction depends on whether the particular is changed while the general and basic is left unchanged, or whether it is the latter that is changed.

In different countries and in different periods of history, the bourgeoisie has been reformist or has gone further than that. On the other hand, the working class, which has never considered reforms capable of bringing about radical changes, under certain conditions by no means refrains from advancing immediate demands in the shape of reforms.

The point is, consequently, that the Cadets regard the retention of power by the present ruling class, i.e., the big feudal-type landowners, as indisputable. The Cadets persist in their standpoint of an opposition in the possessive case, continuing to hold the view that "there is a constitution in Russia, thank God".

In other words, the Cadets' "three basic conditions" are those proposed by the liberal bourgeoisie for an *amicable* division of economic and political privileges between the feudal landowners and the capitalists.

The Octobrists have the same standpoint ("reconciliation of the government and the country", as phrased by Maklakov, who is half Octobrist and half Cadet), except that the Octobrists propose conditions for division that are more "*subservient*" with regard to the landowners.

The big subservience of the Octobrists has proved a fiasco. What reasons are there for expecting a different result from the little subservience of the Cadets? From the point of view of reformism, the Octobrists are much more consistent, for those who adopt this point of view must take into account the *acceptability* of reforms, and the Octobrist "reforms" are much more "acceptable".

The only conclusion to be drawn is that the discrepancy between liberal reformism and the requirements of the country is growing.

V

The third thesis of the Cadet meeting reads:

> "Preparing these conditions should become the main tactical task of the Constitutional-Democrats, and current legislative activity, jointly with the other opposition groups and with the Centre, should be utilised as far as it proves feasible but should not run counter to the realisation of these main tasks" (*Rech* No. 34, February 4).

The previous "thesis" was a concession to the Left Cadets, or rather a bait for the democrats, as if to say: support us Cadets, for we are "democrats" and are for universal suffrage!

After the nod to the left comes a serious turn to the right; the third thesis, translated from gibberish into plain Russian reads: we Cadets recognise *joint* current legislative activity *with the Progressists and Octobrists*!

But does not this "current" legislation produce *unrealisable* Bills, as the first thesis admits? The Cadets make a little reservation: "as far as feasible". Speaking more plainly, this is equivalent to saying: we shall busy ourselves with vermicelli, but the responsibility for it falls on the Octobrists! Really, they are good jokers, are our Cadets.

To proceed. Neither the Progressists, nor the Octobrists, who are more consistent than the Cadets in their

adherence to the *reformist* point of view, agree to such "excessively" liberal demands as universal suffrage, radical reform of the Council of State, etc. That being so, how can the Cadets, who continue to pose as democrats, proclaim *joint* current legislative activity with these admitted *opponents* of democracy?

Here, too, the Cadets have a little reservation—to the effect that they, the Cadets, are busy *preparing* for universal suffrage, *preparing*, *jointly* with the Octobrists, for activity that "should not run counter to the realisation" of universal suffrage!

It is a simple loophole—they declare Rodzyanko's speech to be "constitutional", and they vote (not by mistake, as do the Social-Democrats, but by conviction) for the Octobrist formula of procedure with regard to the declaration of the Minister, for all this *does not run counter* to "preparing" for universal suffrage!!

Here we cannot say that the Cadets are good jokers. In this case we should have to use a *different* word.

In all European countries, the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie, which has turned its back on the democratic movement, continues to assert that it is busy *preparing* (jointly with the national-liberals in Prussia and with all the Progressists in France) for "basic" democratic reforms.

The bourgeoisie which has definitely taken the reformist path is a rotten bourgeoisie, impotent in its liberalism, hopeless in the matter of democratic changes, and hostile to the workers, a bourgeoisie which has deserted to the Rights *from* the people.

VI

The fourth, and last, thesis of the Cadet meeting reads:

> "This meeting considers it opportune, along with advancing the three slogans mentioned above, to raise the question of adopting more active tactical measures of parliamentary struggle."

Only parliamentary? And only "to raise the question"?

Just what is meant by "more active tactical measures of parliamentary struggle", Allah alone knows. One might

think the Cadet meeting had deliberately formulated its theses in the most incoherent terms.

In speaking of more active measures, the Cadets clearly want to show that they are moving to the left. But it is nothing more than a *show*, for nothing definite can be read into it.

What are the kind of "measures" of parliamentary struggle that can, generally speaking, be called more active?

Refusal to vote for the Octobrist and Progressist formulas of procedure.

Refusal to make speeches about "reconciliation of the government and the country".

Refusal to be silent whenever a Right-wing and Octobrist majority puts through anti-democratic measures.

Refusal to agree to the closure or curtailment of general debates on matters of principle.

We advise anyone who comes into contact with the Cadets to make a point of asking them whether they have "raised" the question of more active measures, how they have decided this question since they are going to raise it, and how they actually adopt "more active measures".

The country is moving to the left. The new democratic movement is awakening to life. The Cadets' show of a slight swing to the left has a very definite political meaning, namely, to deceive this new democratic movement, to impose its leadership upon it, to make themselves out to be its spokesmen.

The urgent task of the democrats is to prevent this deceit. Anyone who has not drawn from the hard lessons of the past the conclusion that even partial leadership of the democratic elements by the Cadets inevitably results in vacillation, betrayals, and inglorious defeats without struggle, has learned nothing. He should be regarded as an enemy of democracy.

VII

Taken as a whole, the Cadet meeting was an interesting document of the political activity of our "Centre". Normally the press in our country pays little attention to such documents, to the precise and formal decisions of organised

parties. It has a distaste for "resolutions". It prefers interviews and gossip.

But those who take a serious view of politics must carefully analyse party decisions, and Marxists will do all in their power to make such an analysis.

We have described the Cadets as the "Centre". It is *customary*, however, to apply this term to the Octobrists, who stand midway between the Rights and the opposition.

However, both from the point of view of the class basis of the political parties and from that of the nature of *contemporary* politics in general, we must not limit ourselves to the Duma in analysing the parties, must not consider the Octobrists alone to be the "Centre".

Look at the class basis of our parties—the Rights and nationalists, in general, are semi-feudal landlords. They stand *for* the preservation and "aggravation" of the present regime.

Among the Octobrists, Progressists and Cadets, we see landlords of an undoubtedly more bourgeois type, and then the bulk of the big bourgeoisie. All these parties want *reforms*. They all form a *real* centre between the semi-feudal landlords and the democrats (peasants and workers).

The bourgeoisie is more afraid of democracy than of reaction; this applies both to the Progressists and to the Cadets. The oppositional nature of these two parties has, of course, to be taken into account in the practical tasks of everyday politics, but this oppositional nature should not make us close our eyes to the class kinship of these parties and the Octobrists.

The semi-feudal landlords rule both by themselves and in a bloc with the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie. The feudal landlords are against reforms. The bourgeoisie in general is in favour of reforms, and it confines itself to a reformist stand, which is more than we can say of the peasant, let alone of the worker, democrats.

The Cadet meeting clearly showed us the Cadets' *reformism* as their exclusive tactics. The most important thing is to see the *connection* between these tactics and the class interests of the bourgeoisie, and the *inadequacy* of these tactics, the "increasing discrepancy" between them and the requirements of the country. The most important thing is

to see the fundamental kinship of the Cadets and the Octobrists, and the absolute impossibility of any democratic successes whatever under Cadet leadership.

VIII

This article was finished when I received *Golos Moskvy* No. 30, with an editorial under the heading "What Next?", devoted to the Cadet meeting.

Taken in conjunction with the Duma votings on February 6 (adoption of the formula of procedure with regard to Kasso's explanation[209]), that editorial is so important and sheds so vivid a light on the Cadets' attitude to the Octobrists that it is absolutely necessary to comment on those votings.

The official Octobrist organ, *Golos Moskvy*, represents the Cadet meeting (for some reason the paper calls it a "conference") as a victory of the Left Cadets, headed by Milyukov, over the Right Cadets.

> "Legislative activity," said *Golos Moskvy*, expounding the Cadet resolution, "can be utilised only insofar as it does not run counter to these main tasks [i.e., universal suffrage, a reform of the Council of State, and a responsible Ministry].
>
> "To put it more simply, the adoption of this formula is tantamount to renouncing all legislative work within the bounds of what can actually be accomplished, and the Cadet opposition is henceforward assuming a frankly irresponsible character."

Golos Moskvy infers that there is nothing for it but to dissolve the Duma, for the Octobrists will never adopt the Cadets' attitude, which is so "uncompromising" (don't laugh!), there is no majority in the Duma, things are "utterly hopeless"....

See how history is written!

That brings out remarkably well the profound kinship of the Cadets and the Octobrists, and the true nature of their "quarrel": a lovers' quarrel.

On February 6, in Moscow, the official Octobrist organ announced, as we have seen, the complete break-up of the Octobrist-Cadet bloc following the Cadet meeting, which took place *before February 4* (when *Rech* reported the meeting).

On the very same day, February 6, the Octobrists and Cadets in the Fourth Duma, in St. Petersburg, *together*

adopted by 173 votes to 153 the *Octobrist-Cadet* formula of procedure with regard to Kasso's explanation, a formula subsequently rejected by chance when a confirmatory vote was taken!!

That's good, isn't it?

We have here a classical example of how the Octobrists and the *Cadets* fix their political "affairs". They have nothing to do with any "bloc", God forbid! But they distribute the roles among themselves—to fool the public—so "skilfully" that no formal bloc could provide them with anything so "convenient". The Cadets see that the country is moving to the left, that a new democratic movement is arising, and so they play at leftism by putting in circulation, through their meeting, several phrases which say absolutely nothing and are completely meaningless, but which *sound like Left* phrases. The Octobrists *support* this feeling or impression among the public that the Cadets have gone left; they bolster it up by *officially* declaring, in the *Golos Moskvy* editorial, that the Cadets' attitude is uncompromising and that it is impossible to form a majority in the Duma by an alliance of the Octobrists and Cadets; they fulminate against the Cadets for their leftism, clamour for the dissolution of the Duma, and so on and so forth.

But in reality under cover of this clamour they haggled with the Cadets, and at the very time when they were making their sharpest attack on the Cadets' leftism they *struck a bargain* with them on a common formula!!

"The wolves had their fill and the sheep kept their skins." The democrats were hoodwinked, they were deceived and decoyed into the Cadet fold (the Cadets are so Left-wing—see how the Octobrists rail at them for their leftism!), and the Octobrist-Cadet bloc in the Black-Hundred Duma was preserved, strengthened and expanded.

One feels very much like exclaiming: O God, when will the Russian democrats see through this simple stratagem of liberal Cadet bamboozling! For liberal bourgeois politicians in all European countries use, in one form or another, the very same trick: when facing the people, they shout and swear in their official election speeches that they are democrats and radicals (the German "freethinkers", Lloyd George and Co. in Britain), and even socialists (the Radical

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Socialists in France). But *in reality*, in their *actual* policy, they make *common* cause with unquestionably anti-democratic governments and parties, with the Octobrists of various shades and various nationalities.

How old this story is and how infinitely often the Cadets repeat it!

IX

Golos Moskvy asserts that prior to the elections the Cadets

> "carried on bitter polemics against the Lefts, trying to prove the need for legislative work within the bounds of the actual conditions. It was this that warranted the hope that agreement could be reached between the Duma Centre and the opposition. But after the elections the views of the leaders of the Cadet Party underwent an important change. The resolution on Duma tactics proposed by Milyukov and adopted by the conference is entirely at variance with all that was said during the elections—evidently to win the votes of the big urban bourgeoisie. The latter would scarcely have agreed to back the Cadets on the platform which the conference has now put forward."

In this specimen of reasoning, you wonder which is the more astounding—its naïve cunning or naïve ignorance.

The views of the Cadets have not changed *in the least*. The Cadets have always been, and remain, a liberal party leading the democratic movement by fraud. At the 1912 elections, too, they showed the big bourgeoisie their "true" face, their "solidarity" of smart dealers, their "sobriety" as servants of the capitalist class. But at the same time, in front of the democratic voters, they took great pains to suggest that they were democrats and that their Duma tactics did not differ in any essential from Social-Democratic tactics.

These two aspects of the Cadet policy are an indispensable "adjunct of the attire" of every liberal party in any civilised country. To be sure, individual party members often specialise, some in playing at democracy, others in sobering up the "over-zealous" and pursuing a "respectable" bourgeois policy. But then this is true of all countries. For example, Britain's well-known liberal charlatan, Lloyd George, poses in his speeches to the people as a regular revolutionary and all but a socialist, but in reality this Minister follows the policy of his leader, Asquith, who is no different from a Conservative.

The fact that the article in *Golos Moskvy* describes Mr. Milyukov as a representative of the Left Cadets can only call forth a smile. Mr. Milyukov in fact represents official Cadet diplomacy, which is trying to reconcile the undemocratic nature of the party with democratic phrase-mongering.

Golos Moskvy said:

"This new 'post-election' attitude of Mr. Milyukov's was approved by the conference anything but unanimously. A considerable number of participants insisted on the tactic of agreement with the Duma Centre for the purpose of securing the adoption of various Bills and cultural reforms. The advocates of this point of view argued that in discussing various Bills the group should compromise, trying to have them adopted in a liberal spirit, and by no means making them unacceptable." There followed a sally against "the famous Cadet discipline" and "unquestioning submission" of the Cadets to Mr. Milyukov's "autocratic will".

The game is obvious. It is transparent. The Octobrists "tease" the Right Cadets, whom they are trying to represent as defeated and provoke to a more determined struggle against the Left Cadets. But this Octobrist game (which would have been impossible had the Cadets and Octobrists not been members of one and the same little family) does not eliminate the indisputable fact that there are differences of shade between the Left and the Right Cadets, between the Lloyd Georges and the Asquiths of our liberalism.

Look at *Russkaya Molva*. This Progressist organ, which advocates a compromise between the Octobrists and the Cadets, is attracting an increasing number of *official* members of the Cadet Party. Mansyrev and Maklakov and Obolensky and Gredeskul and Alexandrov proved to be contributors—not all at once, but gradually, following the *Vekhi* leader, Struve. It is beyond doubt that these people urged closer links with the Octobrists. Nor could it have been otherwise. But it is just as doubtless that Milyukov is trying to reconcile them with the "Left Cadets" on a platform with a democratic facade and an Octobrist essence.

X

The various parties' Duma formulas of procedure with regard to Kasso's explanation are very interesting. They supply us with accurate material for political analysis, mate-

rial officially confirmed by the deputies of the various parties. It is analysis that this material usually lacks most of all. It gets lost amid the comments of the daily press or in the pile of the Duma's verbatim reports. Yet it is well worth dwelling on if we want to understand the true nature of the various parties.

A leading article in *Rech* declared on the day following the adoption of the formula of no-confidence: "Thus Russian society has obtained from the Duma what it was entitled to expect" (No. 37, February 7). This sounds as though all that "society" had to know was whether the Duma trusts Mr. Kasso!

That is not true. The people and the democrats have to know the *motives* of no-confidence so as to *understand* the causes of a development considered abnormal in politics, and be able to find a *way out* to the normal. Unity of the Cadets, Octobrists and Social-Democrats on just the phrase "we have no confidence" is too little as far as these very serious issues are concerned.

Here is the Octobrists' formula of procedure:

> "The Duma ... considers: (1) all involvement of secondary school pupils in political struggles is ruinous to the spiritual development of Russia's young forces and harmful to the normal course of the life of society; (2) it is necessary, whenever the authorities are informed in good time of undesirable developments in secondary schools, to take preventive measures and not to wait until developments assume an abnormal character*; (3) emphatically declares against the application to pupils of police measures, such as were adopted on December 10, 1912, without the knowledge of the school authorities, instead of natural educational influence; (4) considers anti-educational the slowness with which the fate of pupils removed from schools is decided on, and expecting this incident to be dealt with immediately in a sense benevolent to the pupils, proceeds to the next business."

What are the political ideas of this vote?

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* This text was introduced at the January 25 sitting. At the sitting of February 1, Clause 2 was edited as follows: "It is noted with reference to this particular case that a formal and indifferent attitude to pupils prevails in secondary schools, that teaching staffs are estranged from the families, and that it is necessary to establish a general benevolent view on the rising generation."

Politics are harmful at school. The pupils are to blame. But it is their teachers who should punish them and not the police. We are dissatisfied with the government for its lack of "benevolence" and its slowness.

These are anti-democratic ideas. This is liberal opposition, for it implies: let the old system of authority remain, but *it* should be applied more mildly. You may flog, but within reason, and without publicity.

Look at the Progressist formula of procedure:

> "The Duma finds that (1) the Ministry of Education, being informed of what had lately taken place in the secondary schools of St. Petersburg, adopted an impassive attitude to its duties and failed to protect the secondary schools against incursion by the police; (2) the methods used by police officers, methods which were resorted to without protest on the part of the Ministry of Education and consisted in searching the schools, seizing children and holding them under arrest at police-stations, and in applying impermissible methods of investigation, were utterly unjustifiable, all the more since in this case it was a matter not of safeguarding state security, but of restoring order in the secondary schools; (3) the whole set of measures adopted by the Ministry of Education, measures directed towards estranging the school from the family, creates, through its callous formalism which hampers the moral and intellectual growth of the young generation, conditions favourable to developments that are abnormal in school life. The Duma considers the explanation offered by the Minister of Education to be unsatisfactory and proceeds to the next business."

This formula was introduced on January 30, and the Progressists declared there and then that they would vote for the Octobrists provided the latter added no-confidence. We have seen above the results of this haggling.

On what basis *could* that haggling take place? On the basis of agreement in the main.

The Progressists, too, consider politics in the schools abnormal and they, too, call for "restoring order" (feudal order). They, too, are in opposition in the possessive case—opposition not to the old system of authority but to its application—"impassive, callous", and so on. In the 1860s Pirogov agreed that there must be flogging, but he insisted on the flogging *not* being done impassively or callously. The Progressists have no objection to the present social elements "restoring order", but they advise the latter to do

it more "sympathetically". What progress has been made in our country in five decades!

The Cadets' formula of procedure:

> "Having heard the explanation offered by the Minister of Education and considering: (1) that it shows a complete confusion of the educational point of view with that of the police; (2) that this explanation is a complete denial of the normal foundations on which relations of friendly co-operation can be established between school and family; (3) that the policy of the Ministry, by giving rise to deep resentment among the pupils and to legitimate annoyance in society, itself promotes the creation of an atmosphere making for the early involvement of school youth in Political pursuits and hence itself creates conditions which it should prevent from arising; (4) that treating pupils as being guilty of crimes against the state cripples the lives of the most gifted among the rising generation, snatches numerous victims from its ranks and constitutes a threat to the future of Russia, the Duma considers the explanation offered by the Minister to be unsatisfactory and proceeds to the next business."

Here, *too*, "early" involvement in politics is condemned but in much milder terms and in a form veiled by phrases. This is an anti-democratic point of view. Octobrists and Cadets alike condemn police measures only because they want *prevention* instead. The system should prevent meetings, not disperse them. Obviously, such a reform would only embellish the system but not change it. "We are dissatisfied with the policy of the Ministry," say the Cadets, and from what they say it follows, exactly as with the Octobrists, that *it is possible to wish* for a change in this policy without something much more radical.

The Cadets pronounce themselves against the government much more sharply than the Octobrists, and because of the sharp language politically immature elements overlook the complete identity of the liberal, anti-democratic, *presentation of the issue* by the Cadets and the Octobrists.

The Duma should earnestly teach the people politics. Those who learn their politics from the Cadets are corrupting and not developing their political consciousness.

It is not an accident that the Octobrists, Progressists and Cadets haggled and struck a bargain on a common formula; it is a result of their ideological and political solidarity in the main. Nothing could be more paltry than the policy of the Cadets, who agree to a direct condemnation of

politics in the schools for the sake of finding the explanation offered unsatisfactory. But the Cadets agreed to this because they themselves condemn "early" involvement.

The formula of the Trudovik group:

"Whereas: (1) the brute force used on December 9, 1912, against secondary school pupils, which shocked society by the disgraceful participation of the secret police in educational supervision over pupils of secondary schools, was fully approved in the explanation offered by Mr. Kasso, the Minister of Education, who sneered maliciously at public opinion; (2) the system of secret police and spying, which is a result of the entire policy of the combined Ministry, and in particular of Kasso, the Minister of Education, leads to complete havoc, and threatens in the future to cause a severe shock to the rising generation, the Duma insists that all those discharged on December 9 should be immediately reinstated and, considering the explanation offered by Kasso, the Minister of Education, to be unsatisfactory, demands his immediate resignation, and proceeds to the next business."

This formula is, strictly speaking, a markedly liberal one; but it does not contain what a democrat, *as distinct* from a liberal, should have said. A liberal, too, may find it disgraceful to enlist the assistance of the secret police in educational supervision, but a democrat should say (and teach the people) that *no* "supervisors" have a right to encroach on the free organisation of political circles and talks. A liberal, too, may condemn "the entire policy of the combined Ministry", but a democrat in Russia should make clear that there are certain general conditions by virtue of which any other Ministry would have had to pursue practically the same policy.

The democracy of the Trudovik formula shows *only* in its tenor, in the sentiment of its authors. There is no denying that sentiment is a political symptom. But it would not be amiss to insist that the formula of procedure should contain a well-thought-out idea and not merely "heart-warming" sentiment.

The Social-Democrats' formula of procedure:

"Having heard the explanation offered by the Minister of Education and considering that it indicates: (1) a determination to combat the natural and encouraging desire of school youth to extend their mental horizons through self-education and to hold comradely intercourse; 2) a justification of the system of official formalism, spying and police investigation that is being implanted in the higher,

secondary and elementary schools, a system which cripples youth mentally and morally, ruthlessly stamps out all signs of independence of thought and character, and results in an epidemic of suicides among pupils, the Duma considers the explanation unsatisfactory. Considering, at the same time, that (1) there is an inseparable connection between the domination of the police standpoint in the matter of public education and the domination of the secret police over the whole of Russian life, the suppression of all forms of organised and independent activity by the citizens, and the latter's lack of rights, and that (2) only a radical change in the political organisation and the system of state administration can free the citizens from police fetters and also free the school from them, the Duma proceeds to the next business."

This formula, too, can hardly be considered impeccable. One cannot help wishing it had presented the matter in more popular language and in greater detail, and regretting that it does not stress the legitimacy of engaging in politics, and so on and so forth.

However, our criticism of *all the formulas* is by no means aimed at details of formulation, but exclusively at the *fundamental political ideas* of their authors. A democrat should have said the important thing, namely, that political circles and talks are *natural and to be welcomed*. That is the point. All condemnation of involvement in politics, even if only of "early" involvement, is hypocrisy and obscurantism. A democrat should have raised the level of the question *from* the "combined Ministry" *to* the political system. He should have pointed out the "inseparable connection", firstly, with the "domination of the secret police" and, secondly, with the domination of the class of big landlords of the feudal type in the economic sphere.

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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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SOME RESULTS OF THE "LAND DISTRIBUTION" POLICY

What are the results of the new agrarian policy? All workers take an interest—a very legitimate one—in this question. Government statistics are kept so poorly and are so biassed that they are not to be trusted. The new land policy is no doubt a *bourgeois* policy, but it is wholly managed by the Purishkeviches, Markovs and Co., i.e., feudal landlords of the old type. One could hardly expect anything but failure from this kind of "management".

We wish to note the conclusions drawn by Mr. V. Obolensky in the latest issue (No. 2, 1913) of *Russkaya Mysl*. This is a Black-Hundred and Cadet periodical. The author of the article, too, is a counter-revolutionary, which means that he is a witness partial to the landlords rather than to anyone else. He has discovered in Samara Gubernia an uyezd (Novouzensk) which has made "tremendous" progress in "land distribution", more than fifty per cent of the householders having been allotted land in one piece.

Nevertheless, the conclusion which the author *had* to draw was this:

> "As regards the immediate results of the new agrarian reform ... they can hardly be considered encouraging at all.... A considerable amount of allotment land has passed for a song from peasant semi-proletarians to well-to-do peasants and speculating buyers-up.... Rents have increased.... The difference in cultivability between integral farms and communal strip holdings is quite negligible.... The new law ... has helped to aggravate the contradictions between the conditions of economic activity and its inner content.... Perhaps the minds of the peasants are now working harder than they did at the height of the recent revolution."

It is no use at all asking the liberal of *Russkaya Mysl which way* the minds of the peasants are working. It is not for nothing that he has left out altogether the question of feudal farming on the landed estates.

But it is worth giving some thought to the conclusions drawn by the liberal landlord. All the contradictions have become sharper, exploitation has increased, rent has risen, and progress in farming is *quite negligible*. Not "perhaps" but quite certainly the minds of the peasants are working.

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Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE HISTORICAL DESTINY OF THE DOCTRINE OF KARL MARX

The chief thing in the doctrine of Marx is that it brings out the historic role of the proletariat as the builder of socialist society. Has the course of events all over the world confirmed this doctrine since it was expounded by Marx?

Marx first advanced it in 1844. The *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, published in 1848, gave an integral and systematic exposition of this doctrine, an exposition which has remained the best to this day. Since then world history has clearly been divided into three main periods: (1) from the revolution of 1848 to the Paris Commune (1871); (2) from the Paris Commune to the Russian revolution (1905); (3) since the Russian revolution.

Let us see what has been the destiny of Marx's doctrine in each of these periods.

I

At the beginning of the first period Marx's doctrine by no means dominated. It was only one of the very numerous groups or trends of socialism. The forms of socialism that did dominate were in the main akin to our Narodism: incomprehension of the materialist basis of historical movement, inability to single out the role and significance of each class in capitalist society, concealment of the bourgeois nature of democratic reforms under diverse, quasi-socialist phrases about the "people", "justice", "right", and so on.

The revolution of 1848 struck a deadly blow at all these vociferous, motley and ostentatious forms of *pre*-Marxian

socialism. In all countries, the revolution revealed the various classes of society *in action*. The shooting of the workers by the republican bourgeoisie in Paris in the June days of 1848 finally revealed that the proletariat *alone* was socialist by nature. The liberal bourgeoisie dreaded the independence of this class a hundred times more than it did any kind of reaction. The craven liberals grovelled before reaction. The peasantry were content with the abolition of the survivals of feudalism and joined the supporters of order, wavering but occasionally between *workers' democracy and bourgeois liberalism*. All doctrines of *non*-class socialism and *non*-class politics proved to be sheer nonsense.

The Paris Commune (1871) completed this development of bourgeois changes; the republic, i.e., the form of political organisation in which class relations appear in their most unconcealed form, owed its consolidation solely to the heroism of the proletariat.

In all the other European countries, a more tangled and less complete development led to the same result—a bourgeois society that had taken definite shape. Towards the end of the first period (1848-71), a period of storms and revolutions, pre-Marxian socialism was *dead*. Independent *proletarian* parties came into being: the First International (1864-72) and the German Social-Democratic Party.

II

The second period (1872-1904) was distinguished from the first by its "peaceful" character, by the absence of revolutions. The West had finished with bourgeois revolutions. The East had not yet risen to them.

The West entered a phase of "peaceful" preparations for the changes to come. Socialist parties, basically proletarian, were formed everywhere, and learned to use bourgeois parliamentarism and to found their own daily press, their educational institutions, their trade unions and their co-operative societies. Marx's doctrine gained a complete victory and *began to spread*. The selection and mustering of the forces of the proletariat and its preparation for the coming battles made slow but steady progress.

The dialectics of history were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists. Liberalism, rotten within, tried to revive itself in the form of socialist *opportunism*. They interpreted the period of preparing the forces for great battles as renunciation of these battles. Improvement of the conditions of the slaves to fight against wage slavery they took to mean the sale by the slaves of their right to liberty for a few pence. They cravenly preached "social peace" (i.e., peace with the slave-owners), renunciation of the class struggle, etc. They had very many adherents among socialist members of parliament, various officials of the working-class movement, and the "sympathising" intelligentsia.

III

However, the opportunists had scarcely congratulated themselves on "social peace" and on the non-necessity of storms under "democracy" when a new source of great world storms opened up in Asia. The Russian revolution was followed by revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China. It is in this era of storms and their "repercussions" in Europe that we are now living. No matter what the fate of the great Chinese republic, against which various "civilised" hyenas are now whetting their teeth, no power on earth can restore the old serfdom in Asia or wipe out the heroic democracy of the masses in the Asiatic and semi-Asiatic countries.

Certain people who were inattentive to the conditions for preparing and developing the mass struggle were driven to despair and to anarchism by the lengthy delays in the decisive struggle against capitalism in Europe. We can now see how short-sighted and faint-hearted this anarchist despair is.

The fact that Asia, with its population of eight hundred million, has been drawn into the struggle for these same European ideals should inspire us with optimism and not despair.

The Asiatic revolutions have again shown us the spinelessness and baseness of liberalism, the exceptional

importance of the independence of the democratic masses, and the pronounced demarcation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of all kinds. After the experience both of Europe and Asia, anyone who speaks of *non*-class politics and *non*-class socialism, ought simply to be put in a cage and exhibited alongside the Australian kangaroo or something like that.

After Asia, Europe has also begun to stir, although not in the Asiatic way. The "peaceful" period of 1872-1904 has passed, never to return. The high cost of living and the tyranny of the trusts are leading to an unprecedented sharpening of the economic struggle, which has set into movement even the British workers who have been most corrupted by liberalism. We see a political crisis brewing even in the most "diehard", bourgeois-Junker country, Germany. The frenzied arming and the policy of imperialism are turning modern Europe into a "social peace" which is more like a gunpowder barrel. Meanwhile the decay of *all* the bourgeois parties and the maturing of the proletariat are making steady progress.

Since the appearance of Marxism, each of the three great periods of world history has brought Marxism new confirmation and new triumphs. But a still greater triumph awaits Marxism, as the doctrine of the proletariat, in the coming period of history.

Pravda No. 50, March 1, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

BIG LANDLORD AND SMALL PEASANT LANDOWNERSHIP IN RUSSIA

In connection with the recent anniversary of February 19, 1861,* a reminder of the present distribution of land in European Russia will not be out of place.

The last of ficial statistics of land distribution in European Russia were published by the Ministry of the Interior and date from 1905.

According to these statistics there were (in round numbers) about 30,000 big landlords owning over 500 dessiatines each, their total land amounting to about 70,000,000 dessiatines.

Some 10,000,000 poor peasant households owned the *same amount* of land.



* Anniversary of the abolition of serfdom in Russia.—*Tr.*

It follows that on the average there are about 330 poor peasant families for each big landlord, each peasant family owning about 7 (*seven*) dessiatines, while each big landlord owns about 2,300 (*two thousand three hundred*) dessiatines.

To show this graphically, we have drawn the above diagram.

The large white rectangle in the middle stands for the estate of a big landlord. The small squares around it represent the small peasant holdings.

Altogether there are 324 squares, and the area of the white rectangle equals 320 squares.

Pravda No. 51, March 2, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

FALSE NOTES

Mr. Milyukov's Duma speech on universal suffrage was of outstanding interest because he had to touch on a number of subjects of prime importance to democrats.

Our press in general, including the liberal press, is becoming more and more addicted to the abominably unprincipled habit of disposing of Duma speeches by commenting on them in glowing (Mr. Litovtsev in *Rech*) or abusive terms, without *ever* analysing their *ideological* content!

The workers do not believe in bourgeois political chicanery. They want to *learn* politics. In response to this desire of theirs, we shall attempt an analysis of Mr. Milyukov's speech.

"You," said Mr. Milyukov, addressing himself *all the time* to the Octobrists, "are not linked with authority either by specific commitments or even by gratitude",

for the elections, you say, were rigged against you.

Mr. Milyukov, one of the most educated Cadets, a professor, editor, etc., put forward this argument in the most earnest way, and even added:

"Apparently there is no social stratum in Russia supporting the present government policy..." (*Rossiya* No. 2236).

The falsity of this argument is glaring. None other than Mr. Milyukov himself went on to quote the Frenchman Chasles, who very justly says that the "*crux of the matter*" "*is the agrarian question*".

"To obtain a conservative Third Duma," says Chasles, "the majority had to be shifted from the peasants to the landlords.... The landed proprietors and the aristocracy of wealth can form a bloc of five-

eighths of the votes [in the elections to the Duma under our electoral law] and the minority can literally be crushed: the peasants, the middle classes and the town democrats are invited by the legislator to look on at the elections and not make them, to attend but not participate in them."

The reactionary Chasles argues cleverly and correctly. We thank Mr. Milyukov for his interesting quotations which *defeat* Mr. Milyukov's phrase-mongering! In Russia there evidently is a social "stratum" (the class of landlords—feudal lords or feudal-minded landlords) which supports the policy of the government and is linked "*with authority*" by the bonds of class interests. As for being linked by "commitments" and "gratitude", it is perfect nonsense. Remember that, learned Cadet!

In our next article* we shall show how this learned Cadet circled—like a cat round hot milk—about the "*crux of the matter*" (i.e., the agrarian question), which the reactionary Chasles correctly pointed out.

Pravda No. 55, March 7, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

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* See pp. 590-91 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"THE CRUX OF THE MATTER"

We have seen that Chasles, the French reactionary quoted by Mr. Milyukov, correctly considers that the agrarian question is the "crux of the matter" confronting Russia.*

Mr. Milyukov quoted a clever statement by a clever reactionary but he does not understand it at all!

> "Can the peasant whom you [i.e., the Octobrists and the government, for it is *to them* that Mr. Milyukov talks!] have brought into this body with your own hands be made dependent? After all, he speaks of the land from this rostrum, and he says the same thing as the independent peasant said in the First and Second Dumas. There is no element in Russian life, gentlemen, more independent or more stable than the Russian peasant." (Applause on the right and voices: "Hear, hear".)

Those handclaps must have come from the hypocritical Cadets alone, for everyone knows, firstly, that in the Third and Fourth Dumas the peasants have been saying *not quite* "the same thing" but something weaker than they said in the First and Second Dumas; and secondly, there is in Russian life an element that is more independent and more stable. Mr. Milyukov himself was *compelled* to admit in his speech that it is the *workers* who have done "most" for political liberty in Russia. Or can "independence" be measured with a different yardstick?

But this is not the point. The point is, can the interests of 130,000 landlords and of the mass of the peasantry be reconciled *now*? Mr. Milyukov "talked round and round" this question *to evade an answer*.

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* See pp. 588-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

But Mr. S. Litovtsev, hired by *Rech* to praise P. Milyukov, wrote that Milyukov's speech had

> "dispelled the fog shrouding this sharp and debatable question. To many people, universal suffrage is still a sort of bogey, the height of revolutionism".

There you have yet another specimen of phrase-mongering!

Learn from the reactionary Chasles, liberal wind-bags! The crux of the matter lies in the agrarian question. Can the interests of 130,000 landlord families and 10,000,000 peasant families be reconciled on this question *now*? Yes or no?

That is the "*crux*" of the matter as far as universal suffrage is concerned, Mr. Milyukov, while you *corrupt* the political consciousness of the people by *muddling up* with phrases this main point, which is obvious to any intelligent person.

If your answer to the question is *yes*, I shall refute you by means of *your* own admission that the peasants in the Third and Fourth Dumas have been saying (if less emphatically) the "*same thing*" as they said in the First and Second Dumas.

If, however, your answer is *no*, then *all* your talk about the conciliatory, non-"*one-sided*" character of universal suffrage in the Russia of today falls to the ground.

And your learned references to Bismarck are sheer childishness, for Bismarck "granted" universal suffrage at a time when the bourgeois development of Germany *had already reconciled* the interests of the landlords and all the well-to-do peasants, and even a section of the middle peasants.

The shrewd reader may ask: does it not follow that universal suffrage is impossible in Russia? No, we will answer the shrewd reader, it only follows that a reformist point of view is impossible in Russia.

Pravda No. 56, March 8, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

LIBERAL EMBELLISHMENT OF SERFDOM

Mr. Milyukov, a liberal historian, leader of the Cadet Party, wrote in a recent leading article in *Rech*:

> "Social inequality in Russia [serfdom] turned out to be more fragile and accidentally established than anywhere else in the civilised world. It gave way without resistance [!!!] at the very first stroke of the pen. Milyutin and Solovyov accomplished without difficulty something the feasibility of which Count Stroganov predicted as long ago as the reign of Alexander I."

We are used to seeing all liberal and some Narodnik historians embellish serfdom and the serf-owning state power in Russia. But not all went to the length of such disgraceful "gems" as the one we have just quoted.

Serfdom and the serf-owning landlord class in Russia were not fragile and accidentally established but much "stronger", more firm, powerful and omnipotent "than anywhere else in the civilised world". It did not cede even a small part of its privileges "without resistance", but did it with the greatest resistance. Or perhaps the liberal gentleman could point out in the "civilised world" examples comparable to the fate of Chernyshevsky?

Milyutin and Solovyov *themselves* upheld the privileges of the feudal landlords and the exceedingly onerous "*compensation*" for these privileges. By saying nothing about this, Mr. Milyukov distorts history, which testifies to half a century of "tenacious" feudal privileges, omnipotence and unlimited power after Milyutin and Co., after "*their*" feudal reform.

Why do liberal historians embellish serfdom and feudal reforms? Because they see in the activity of the makers of

such reforms a servility to the feudal lords that is gratifying to them, a fear of democracy that they find encouraging, a desire for a bloc with reaction that they appreciate, and an embellishment of the class struggle that is familiar to them.

The question relates to the distant past. And yet the attitude to the class struggle adopted then and now by the liberals (liberals "without and bureaucrats within"[210]) is a phenomenon of one and the same nature.

By embellishing serfdom, Mr. Milyukov has splendidly portrayed his own self, his party and all Russian bourgeois liberals, who class themselves among the democrats in order to fool simpletons.

Pravda No. 57, March 9, 1913
Signed: *I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A "SCIENTIFIC" SYSTEM OF SWEATING

U.S. capitalism is ahead of all. The greatest development of technology and the most rapid progress are facts which make old Europe emulate the Yankees. But it is not the democratic institutions that the European bourgeoisie is borrowing from America, nor political liberty, nor yet the republican political system, but the latest methods of exploiting the workers.

The most widely discussed topic today in Europe, and to some extent in Russia, is the "system" of the American engineer, Frederick Taylor. Not so long ago Mr. Semyonov read a paper on this system in the assembly hall of the Railway Engineering Institute in St. Petersburg. Taylor himself has described his system under the title of "scientific", and his book is being eagerly translated and promoted in Europe.

What is this "scientific system"? Its purpose is to squeeze out of the worker three times more labour during a working day of the same length as before. The sturdiest and most skilful worker is put to work; a special clock registers—in seconds and fractions of a second—the amount of time spent on each operation and each motion; the most economical and most efficient working methods are developed; the work of the best worker is recorded on cinematographic film, etc.

The result is that, within the same nine or ten working hours as before, they squeeze out of the worker three times more labour, mercilessly drain him of all his strength, and are three times faster in sucking out every drop of the wage slave's nervous and physical energy. And if he dies young? Well, there are many others waiting at the gate!

In capitalist society, progress in science and technology means progress in the art of sweating.

Here is an example from Taylor's book.

Speaking of the operation of loading cast iron on to hand-carts for further processing, the author compares the old and the new, "scientific", system:

	Old system	New system
Number of workers engaged in loading	500	140
Average number of tons loaded by one worker (a ton equals 61 poods)	16	59
Average earnings of workers (rubles)	2.30	3.75
Expenditure incurred by factory owner per ton of load (kopeks)	14.4	6.4

The capitalist cuts his expenditure by *half* or more. His profits grow. The bourgeoisie is delighted and cannot praise the Taylors enough!

The workers get a wage increase at first. But hundreds of workers get the sack. Those who are left have to work four times more intensively, doing a back-breaking job. When he has been drained of all his strength, the worker will be kicked out. Only young and sturdy workers are taken on.

It is sweating in strict accordance with all the precepts of science.

Pravda No. 60, March 13, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

OUR "ACHIEVEMENTS"

The Minister of Finance, in his explanatory note on the Budget, and all the government parties assure themselves and others that our Budget is firmly based. They refer, among other things, to the "achievements" of industry, which indubitably has been on the upgrade in the last few years.

Our industry, as well as our entire national economy, has been developing along capitalist lines. That is indisputable, and needs no proof. But anyone who limits himself to data on "development" and to the smugly boastful statement that "there is an increase of so-and-so many per cent" *shuts his eyes* to Russia's *incredible* backwardness and poverty, which these data reveal.

The output of our entire factory industry was worth 4,307 million rubles in 1908 and about 4,895 million rubles in 1911, says the Minister of Finance exultantly.

But see *what* these figures *mean*. In America a census is taken every ten years. To come upon a figure *similar* to ours, we must go back to 1860, when America still had Negro *slaves*.

In 1860 the output of America's manufacturing industry was valued at 3,771 million rubles, and in 1870 it was worth as much as 8,464 million rubles. In 1910 its value was already as high as 41,344 million rubles, i.e., almost *nine times* as much as in Russia. Russia has a population of 160 million, while America had 92 million in 1910 and 31 million in 1860!

In 1911 the Russian factory worker earned an annual average of 251 rubles, or 8.2 per cent more (in terms of the wages total) than in 1910, exults the Minister of Finance.

In America the average pay of the industrial worker in 1910 was *1,036 rubles*, i.e., more than *four times* that of his Russian counterpart. In 1860 it was *576 rubles*, i.e., double the *present* amount in Russia.

Twentieth-century Russia, the Russia of the June Third "Constitution", *is in a lower position than slave-owning America*.

In Russia, annual productivity per factory worker was 1,810 rubles in 1908, while in America it was 2,860 rubles in 1860 and 6,264 rubles in 1910.

These few figures suffice as a brief illustration of *modern* capitalism and of the medieval oppression of serfdom which fetters it, and which accounts for the sorry plight of the bulk of the peasantry.

As a matter of fact, the plight of the peasantry is inevitably reducing the home market to miserable dimensions and dragging down the worker, who in 1911 earned half the amount earned by the American worker in the period of slavery. Besides, the conditions of the world market confront Russia with the alternative of either being crushed by competitors among whom capitalism is advancing at a different rate and on a truly broad basis, or of getting rid of all the survivals of serfdom.

Pravda No. 61, March 14, 1913
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

AGREEMENT OR SPLIT?

CONCERNING THE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DUMA GROUP

Social-Democratic opinion is alarmed by the threat of a split in the group that sounded in the letter of the seven deputies. The matter has justly aroused keen interest among the workers. It is essential to make an accurate and clear-cut appraisal of the situation.

On one side are all six deputies from the worker curia, i.e., representatives of the vast majority of Russia's working class, as everyone realises. On the other side are the remaining seven deputies, who command an accidental majority of one vote inside the group.

On the face of it, the point at issue is that the seven deputies want to force the other six to become contributors to the newspaper *Luch*, and declare for merging *Pravda* and *Luch*. These demands of the seven deputies seem to us simply unreasonable, to put it plainly. Can anyone be compelled "by a majority vote" to contribute to a newspaper whose trend he does not share? (It goes without saying that any self-respecting editorial board would refuse to have "contributors" who have been dragged in by force, against their will.) Can one speak seriously of merging *Pravda* and *Luch*?

Of course *not*! And we declare plainly that we should consider it a *betrayal* of the proletarian cause for *Pravda* to renounce its struggle against liquidationism, and hence, for *Pravda* and *Luch* to be merged, *so long as* Luch *has not renounced liquidationist propaganda—against the* "*underground*", *against political strikes*, etc. A serious Social-Democrat would hardly believe it if he were told that *Pravda* and the six workers' deputies had decided to commit suicide merely because *Luch* insisted on it. That is out of

the question, and the seven deputies will do well to cease harking back to their absolutely unacceptable and unrealistic "plan".

However, this does not exhaust the issue of the differences within the group. Everyone senses that behind the outward dispute over the forced collaboration with *Luch* there is some other, more serious and important dispute. The point of this dispute is *the attitude of either section of the group to liquidationism*.

And we think that in this matter the workers are entitled first of all to insist on the seven deputies stating *their attitude to liquidationism—in plain*, *precise*, *clear and definite terms*. It is the duty of the seven deputies to do this as openly as the six workers' deputies did it. In the Third Duma group, the overwhelming majority of the deputies were *Mensheviks*. But their attitude to liquidationism was markedly *negative*. Now what is the attitude of the seven deputies today? They have themselves raised the question of *Luch*, i.e., of liquidationism. They are, therefore, doubly obliged to say openly and exactly what they think of the propaganda of *Luch* against the underground (see *Luch* No. 101 and other issues), against political strikes, against the hegemony of the working class in the emancipation movement, etc. Unless this is done, not a single step can be taken towards finding a way out of the situation.

We say plainly: if the Social-Democratic group were found to include even one deputy who would make speeches from the Duma platform like the article in *Luch* No. 101 (which said that the growing sympathy for the "underground" was a "deplorable" fact, etc.), *a break with that deputy would be unavoidable*. And any Social-Democratic deputy who did not get up and say that that speaker did not express the opinion of the Social-Democrats would fail in his duty towards the working class.

Are we right or wrong in expressing this opinion? We shall calmly leave it to the workers to answer this question.

In view of the serious differences between the two halves of the group, unity can be preserved only *if both sides alike strive for agreement*. To "settle" questions bearing on the Party Programme by an accidental majority of one vote means *inviting a split*. That is obvious to anyone. People

who are earnest in their desire for unity will never adopt this way of "settling" questions.

Is such an agreement possible in the group as it now stands? Until recently it *was*. The declaration of the group, read at the beginning of the Fourth Duma's work, is an example. The group rejected liquidationist claims, and thus made an agreement between the two sections possible. Given goodwill, and provided the seven deputies are not preparing for a split, this *will be* possible in the future as well on all important political questions.

The declaration is an example of *what should be done* to avoid a split. On the other hand, the example of "cultural national autonomy" is an example of *what should not be done*, to avoid a split. To put forward this demand, as did Comrade Chkhenkeli, means *cancelling* the Social-Democratic Programme. Hitherto the liquidators have asserted that this demand "does not contradict" the Programme, but now they have been exposed even by the Bundists themselves, who (see *Die Zeit* No. 9[211]) congratulate Chkhenkeli precisely for having "abandoned the rigid standpoint of official theory on the national question". To cancel the Programme by seven votes to six *means* paving the way for a *split*. That is obvious to any class-conscious worker.

And so, the alternative is *agreement or split*!

What do *we* propose? *Agreement*!

Is agreement possible? Yes!

Is it desirable? Yes!

What is needed to bring it about? What is needed is not to cancel the programme, not to revile the "underground", to remain loyal to the old banner! Our demands are modest, as the reader will see.

For agreement between the seven and six, against a split! This is what all class-conscious workers should demand.

Pravda No. 62, March 15, 1913
Signed: *B. B.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

"SPARE CASH"[212]

The government newspapers, headed by the sycophantic *Novoye Vremya*, are extolling our government for the splendid results achieved by the national economy. Just think: 450 million rubles of "spare cash"! Bringing money into the house and not taking it out—that, please note, is how "we" manage our household.

And *Novoye Vremya*, newspaper of the Black-Hundred landlords and Octobrist merchants, comes to the conclusion that there is no risk at all even in waging war when you have such a nest-egg as 450 million rubles.

Let us, however, look at the explanatory note of the Minister of Finance to the Budget for 1913. Perhaps we can find in it, besides self-praise (of which the note is chock-full!), *exact data* on the origin of the vaunted "spare cash"?

We open the Minister's explanatory note and read (Part I, p. 15) that in the five years from 1908 to 1912 *loans* brought the Treasury 339,500,000 rubles. During the same period, loans were paid off to the value of 252,100,000 rubles.

Hence loans have *increased* by a total of *87,400,000 rubles*. There you have the first "source" of the "spare cash". It is a simple one, as you see.

But to proceed. It is known that *on October 1, 1908*, the price of state-monopoly vodka was raised to the limit, that is, from 8 rubles to 8.40 per vedro* (meaning the standard vedro, for the price per table vedro went up from 11 to 12 rubles).

As a result of this "financial measure", the prices of state-monopoly vodka in the five-year period 1908-12 averaged 8.48 rubles per vedro, i.e., exactly *42 kopeks* more than in the previous four years (in 1904-07 it was 8.06 per vedro).

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* Twenty-one pints—*Tr.*

Altogether the Treasury sold 440,500,000 vedros of 40% vodka in five years (1908-12). The 42-kopek increase in profit per vedro added up to *185 million rubles*.

There you have the second source of the "spare cash"!

The third source—the state railways—yielded in four years (1908-11) *53 million rubles* of "net profit", *if one leaves out of account* payment of interest and amortisation of Treasury capital expenditure, which totalled 2,250 million rubles!! Let us assume that in 1912 this "profit" was as high as in 1911, i.e., 105 million rubles. We get a "profit" of *158 million rubles* during the five years. Obviously, a national "economy" in which interest and amortisation on thousands of millions spent are not taken into account is more like national juggling. Let us note that it was not some "Left-wing journalist" (God forbid!) but the *State Control itself* that estimated at *397,600,000 rubles in four years* (1908-11) the interest and amortisation on the investments made by the Treasury in the railway system. In terms of the five years from 1908 to 1912, it adds up to *500 million rubbles*! This is a specimen of *predatory economy*.

We shall now sum up the three sources of the "spare cash":

(1)	Loans	87,400,000 rubles
(2)	Increased price of state-monopoly vodka	185,000,000 "
(3)	State railways (*leaving out of account 500 million rubles interest and amortisation on capital expenditure*)	158,000,000 "
	Total	430,400,000 rubles

This would seem to be enough. No need to indicate the less important "sources".

Is it not clear that our feudal-minded landlords are the greatest financial geniuses? Borrowing money, raising the price of vodka, "leaving out of account" interest and amortisation on thousands of millions spent (on the "economy")—are not these indications of genius?

Are not they proof of the "stability" of our Budget?

Pravda No. 62, March 15, 1913
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

NOTES

[1] This refers to the shooting of unarmed workers in the Lena gold-fields, Siberia, on April 4 (17), 1912.

The gold-fields were owned by British capitalists, and their partners were Russian capitalists, members of the tsar's family, and tsarist dignitaries. The owners made a profit of about 7,000,000 rubles annually. The gold-fields being situated in a region of taiga forests, almost 2,000 kilometres from the Siberian Railway, the capitalists and their helpers committed the worst excesses: they paid the workers niggardly wages for their back-breaking toil, supplied them with rotten food, and outraged the workers' wives and children. Unable to bear the oppression and outrages any longer, the workers went on strike early in March 1912. The strike was led by the Bolshevik group formed in the gold-fields in the autumn of 1911. On March 4 (17), 1912, a central strike committee was elected with the Bolsheviks occupying a leading position on it. The demands to be presented to the management included: an eight-hour working day, a 10 to 30 per cent wage increase, abolition of fines, organisation of medical aid, improvement of food and living quarters, etc. The Board of Lenzoto (Lena Gold-Mining Company) rejected these demands and decided to dismiss the strikers, stop supplying them with food on credit and evict them from the gold-fields barracks, which meant dooming the workers and their families to death by starvation. The workers did not allow the police to carry out the evictions. The strikers held their ground and resisted all attempts at provocation and intimidation. The strike was peaceful and organised.

At the instance of influential British and Russian shareholders of the company, the tsarist authorities decided to use arms against the strikers in order to intimidate workers in Russia. During the night of April 3-4 (16-17) some of the members of the Central Strike Committee were arrested. In reply, on April 4 (17) about 3,000 workers marched to the Nadezhda Mine to lodge a complaint against the unlawful actions of the authorities and hand the Procurator a petition for the release of those arrested. Captain Treshchenkov of the gendarmerie ordered his men to open fire, with the result that 270 workers were killed and 250 injured.

The news of the bloody drama on the Lena aroused the furious indignation of the workers throughout Russia. Protest demonstrations, meetings and strikes took place all over the country. The Social-Democratic Duma group interpellated the government on

the Lena shootings. The insolent reply of the tsar's Minister Makarov—"So it was and so it will be!"—added to the workers' indignation. Strikes protesting against the Lena shootings involved about 300,000 workers. They merged with the May Day strikes in which about 400,000 workers took part. "The Lena shootings," Lenin pointed out, "led to the revolutionary temper of the masses developing into a revolutionary upswing of the masses." (See p. 103 of this volume.) p. 17

[2] The *Duma* was a representative assembly which the tsarist government was forced to convene as a result of the revolutionary events of 1905. Nominally it was a legislative body but it had no real authority. Elections to the Duma were neither direct, nor equal, nor universal. In the case of the working classes, as well as of the non-Russian nationalities of the country, the suffrage was greatly curtailed, a considerable section of the workers and peasants lacking any voting rights. Under the electoral law of December 11 (24), 1905, one landlord vote was made equivalent to three votes cast by representatives of the urban bourgeoisie, 15 peasant votes and 45 votes cast by workers.

The First and Second Dumas (April-July 1906 and February-June 1907, respectively) were dissolved by the tsarist government. On June 3, 1907, the government carried out a coup d'état and issued a new electoral law which still further curtailed the rights of the workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie and guaranteed the complete supremacy of the reactionary bloc of the landlords and big capitalists in the Third and Fourth Dumas (1907-12 and 1912-17). p. 17

[3] The *Taurida* (Tavrichesky) *Palace* was the building in which the Duma held its sessions from 1906 to 1917.

Kazanskaya Square—in front of the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg—was the scene of frequent revolutionary demonstrations. p. 17

[4] See pp. 151-52 of this volume. p. 17

[5] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early 1890s it became a liberal Narodnik organ. In 1906 it virtually became the mouthpiece of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party. p. 17

[6] *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*)—a literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1911 to 1915, around which were grouped Menshevik liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Left liberals. It had no links with the masses of the workers. In 1914 Lenin described its trend as a hybrid of Narodism and Marxism. p. 17

[7] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist bands which the tsarist police formed to combat the revolutionary movement. They murdered revo-

lutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 18

[8] *Zaprosy Zhizni* (*Demands of Life*)—a weekly published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1912. Contributors to it were Cadets, Popular Socialists and Menshevik liquidators. Lenin called it a "liquidationist-Trudovik-*Vekhi*" periodical. p. 18

[9] *Rasputin*, *G. Y.* (1872-1916)—an adventurer who enjoyed great influence at the Court of Nicholas II. "Rasputinism" most strikingly expressed the obscurantism, fanaticism and moral decay typical of the ruling upper stratum of tsarist Russia.

Treshchenkov, *N. V.* (1875-1915)—Captain of Gendarmerie, one of those who led the shooting of the Lena gold-miners in April 1912. p. 19

[10] This refers to Article 129 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Empire, which envisaged severe punishment, including penal servitude, for public actions and dissemination of writings against the tsarist system. p. 19

[11] *R—kov*, N. A. Rozhkov—historian, Social-Democrat, one of the Menshevik liquidators. p. 19

[12] *Zhivoye Dyelo* (*Vital Cause*)—a legal daily newspaper published by the Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg in 1912. Sixteen issues appeared. p. 20

[13] Lenin is referring to the "*initiating groups of Social-Democratic functionaries of the open working-class movement*" which the Menshevik liquidators formed from the end of 1910 onwards as a counter to the illegal Party organisations. The liquidators regarded those groups as nuclei of the new, broad legal party they were advocating, a party within the framework of the June Third, Stolypin regime. They succeeded in forming "initiating groups" in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Yekaterinoslav and Konstantinovka (Donets coal-field) in the shape of small groups of intellectuals dissociated from the working class. These groups opposed the strike movement and revolutionary demonstrations of the workers, and fought against the Bolsheviks in the Fourth Duma elections. The guiding centres of the "initiating groups" were *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* which the liquidators published abroad, and *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, legal liquidationist organs published in Russia. p. 20

[14] *Dobrolyubov*, *N. A.* (1836-1861)—outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, literary critic and materialist philosopher, one of the forerunners of Russian Social-Democracy. p. 20

[15] *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a legal monthly published by the Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. It was the centre for the liquidationist movement in Russia. p. 20

[16] This refers to the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held January 5-17 (18-30), 1912. p. 22

[17] *Bulgarin*, *F. V.*—a reactionary journalist and publisher of the first half of the nineteenth century who engaged in denouncing and slandering progressive magazines and writers of his day. He was notorious for his denunciations of Alexander Pushkin.

Burenin, *V. P.*—a journalist who contributed to the reactionary newspaper *Novoye Vremya*. He engaged in vicious attacks against representatives of all progressive social and political trends.

Lenin uses these two names as synonyms for individuals who resort to dishonest methods of conducting polemics. p. 22

[18] *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published from 1891 to 1933. The slanderous articles against the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which appeared in *Vorwärts* were written by Trotsky. p. 22

[19] This refers to the Organising Committee set up by the January 1912 meeting of liquidators representing the Bund, the Caucasian Regional Committee and the Central Committee of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Territory. Among those who took an active part in the work of the Organising Committee in addition to the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations were the editorial boards of the Vienna *Pravda* and of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the *Vperyod* group and representatives of the liquidators' St. Petersburg "initiating group". Trotsky was the virtual head of the Organising Committee, which was officially entrusted with convening the August 1912 anti-Party conference. p. 22

[20] The *Vperyod* group was an anti-Party group of otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders and empirio-monists (adherents of the reactionary, idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius). The group was formed in December 1909 on the initiative of A. A. Bogdanov and G. A. Alexinsky. It published a printed organ called *Vperyod*. In 1912 it united with the Menshevik liquidators to form a general anti-Party bloc (the August bloc) against the Bolsheviks. This bloc was organised by Trotsky. Failing to gain support among the workers, the group virtually fell to pieces in 1913-14. Its final disintegration occurred in 1917 after the February Revolution.

The *Golos* supporters were Menshevik liquidators grouped around *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov, A. S. Martynov, A. N. Potresov and others), which was published from February 1908 to December 1911 first in Geneva and then in Paris.

The *pro-Party Bolsheviks* were a group of Bolsheviks who took a conciliatory view of liquidationism and otzovism. Most of the conciliators opposed the Lenin bloc of Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks. They urged unprincipled unification of the Bolsheviks with various groups that had no support among the masses but sought to exert influence in the Party.

The *pro-Party Mensheviks* were a small group of Mensheviks led by Plekhanov. They had broken away from the Menshevik liquidators, and opposed liquidationism in 1908-12. p. 23

[21] *Pravda* (Vienna)—a factional newspaper published by the Trotskyists from 1908 to 1912. Its first three issues were published in Lvov, the rest in Vienna. Twenty-five issues appeared in all.

With the exception of its first two issues, which appeared as the organ of the Ukrainian Spilka (Union), the newspaper represented no Party organisation in Russia and was described by Lenin as "a private undertaking". Its editor was Trotsky. Under cover of "non-factionalism", the newspaper opposed Bolshevism from the outset, and upheld liquidationism and otzovism. It advocated the centrist theory of "co-operation" between revolutionaries and opportunists within one and the same party. Following the January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee it took a frankly liquidationist stand. It also backed the anti-Party *Vperyod* group of the otzovists and ultimatumists.

In 1912 Trotsky and his newspaper were the initiators and chief organisers of the anti-Party August bloc. p. 23

[22] *Za Partiyu* (*For the Party*)—a sheet which the pro-Party Mensheviks and conciliators published at irregular intervals in Paris from April 16 (29), 1912, to February 1914. Five issues were brought out. Among those who wrote for it were G. V. Plekhanov, S. A. Lozovsky and A. I. Lyubimov. It was disseminated chiefly abroad and expressed mainly the views of the Paris group of Plekhanov's supporters. p. 24

[23] The *Bund* (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia) came into being in 1897, at the founding congress of the Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilna. In the main, it comprised semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the west of Russia. It represented nationalism and separatism in Russia's working-class movement. p. 24

[24] *Biron*, *E. I.* (1690-1772)—all-powerful favourite of the Empress Anna Ivanovna. He came from the petty nobility of Courland and was not a Russian subject. But while holding no official position, he exerted great influence on the domestic and partly the foreign policy of Russia. He established a terroristic regime and followed a policy of Germanising the state apparatus. He took advantage of his position to rob the Treasury, take bribes and engage in speculative deals. After the death of the Empress he became Regent for a while. He was overthrown in November 1740 as the result of a coup d'état.

Arakcheyev, *A. A.* (1769-1834)—one of the most reactionary representatives of the tsarist autocracy, Minister of War in the reign of Alexander I. A man distinguished by brutality and cruelty, he exerted tremendous influence on Russia's home and foreign

policies. His name is associated with a long period of reaction and police tyranny, brutal militarism, spying, bribery, corruption and soulless, petty formalism, comprising what became known as the "Arakcheyev regime". p. 25

[25] *Manilov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. A sentimental, amiable landowner, Manilov personifies pipe-dreaming and empty talk. p. 25

[26] *The men of December 14* were Russian revolutionary noblemen who fought against serfdom and the autocracy. They revolted on December 14, 1825. p. 25

[27] Lenin is quoting from Alexander Herzen's *Ends and Beginnings*. p. 25

[28] The passage is taken from Herzen's letters "To an Old Comrade" (the fourth and second letters). p. 27

[29] The *village commune* in Russia was the communal form of peasant use of the land, characterised by compulsory crop rotation, and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective liability (compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants for timely and full payments, and the fulfilment of all kinds of services for the benefit of the state and the landlords), the periodical redistribution of the land, with no right to refuse the allotment given, and prohibition of its purchase and sale.

The landlords and the tsarist government used the village cammune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze land redemption payments and exactions from the people. p. 27

[30] The "*peasant Reform*" *of 1861* abolished serfdom in Russia. As a result, the landlords were able to cut off for themselves over one-fifth, or even two-fifths, of the peasants' land. They retained possession of the best parts of the peasants' allotments (the "cut-off lands", woods, meadows, watering places, grazing grounds, and so on), without which the peasants could not engage in independent farming. The redemption payments imposed on the peasants for their allotments were nothing short of plunder by the landlords and the tsarist government. To pay off their debts by instalments to the tsarist government, the peasants were granted credit for forty-nine years at 6 per cent interest. Arrears on redemption payments grew from year to year. The former landlord peasants alone paid the government 1,900 million rubles by way of compensation, while the market price of the land transferred to the peasants did not exceed 544 million rubles. The peasants had in effect to pay hundreds of millions of rubles for their land, which led to the ruin of the peasant households.

Lenin described the "peasant Reform" of 1861 as the first act of mass violence against the peasantry for the benefit of rising capitalism in agriculture, as a "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the landlords. (See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 277.) p. 27

[31] *All-Russia Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation founded in 1905. Its first and second congresses, held in Moscow in August and November 1905, drew up its programme and tactics. The Union demanded political freedom and the immediate convening of a constituent assembly. It favoured the tactic of boycotting the First Duma. Its agrarian programme included the demand for abolishing private landownership and transferring the monastery, church, crown and state lands to the peasants without compensation. Its policy was half-hearted and vacillating. While insisting on the abolition of the landed estates, the Union was agreeable to partial compensation for the landlords.

The Peasant Union was persecuted by the police ever since it came into being. It fell to pieces early in 1907. p. 28

[32] *Kolokol* (*The Bell*)—a political periodical, published under the motto of *Vivos voco*! (I call on the living!) by A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogaryov at the Free Russian Printing Works established by Herzen. The periodical was published in London from July 1, 1857 to April 1865 and in Geneva from May 1865 to July 1867. It was a monthly, but occasionally it was brought out twice a month. In all 245 issues appeared.

In 1868 *Kolokol* was published in French (15 issues appeared), with an occasional supplement in Russian. It had a circulation of 2,500 copies and it was disseminated throughout Russia. It exposed the tyranny of the autocracy, the plunder and embezzlement practised by the civil servants, and the ruthless exploitation of the peasants by the landlords. It issued revolutionary appeals and helped to rouse the people to the struggle against the tsarist government and the ruling classes.

Kolokol was the leading organ of the revolutionary uncensored press and the forerunner of the working-class press in Russia. It played an important role in the development of the general-democratic and revolutionary movement, in the struggle against the autocracy and against serfdom. p. 28

[33] *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (*The Pole Star*)—a literary-political symposium. Its first three issues were published by A. I. Herzen, and the subsequent ones by Herzen and Ogaryov, at the Free Russian Printing Works in London from 1855 to 1862. The last issue appeared in Geneva in 1868. Altogether eight issues appeared. p. 28

[34] The *raznochintsy* (literally, men of various social-estates) were educated members of Russian society drawn from the small townsfolk, the clergy, the merchants and the peasantry, as distinct from those drawn from the nobility. p. 28

[35] *Turgenev*, *I. S.* (1818-1883)—a famous Russian writer who did much for the development of the Russian literary language. His writings reflected the typical contradictions of Russian society. While protesting ardently against serfdom, he put forward moderate liberal demands. Lenin said that "Turgenev ... was drawn to-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

wards a moderate monarchist and nobleman's Constitution, ... was repelled by the muzhik democracy of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky" (see present edition, Vol. 27, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government"). p. 29

[36] *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*)—an illegal organisation of the revolutionary-minded intelligentsia, the Narodniks, founded in 1879 to combat the tsarist regime. It was active until the second half of the 1880s. p. 31

[37] *Zvezda* (*The Star*)—a Bolshevik legal newspaper published in St. Petersburg from December 16 (29), 1910, to April 22 (May 5), 1912, at first once a week, from January 1912 twice weekly, and from March onwards three times a week. Among its contributors were N. N. Baturin, K. S. Yeremeyev, M. S. Olminsky and N. G. Poletayev, as well as Maxim Gorky. The pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanovites) were associated with *Zvezda* until the autumn of 1911. Ideologically the newspaper was led (from abroad) by Lenin, who contributed about 30 articles to it. Thanks to his guidance, it was a militant Bolshevik organ upholding the programme and tactics of the illegal Party. It had an extensive section for workers' correspondence, and kept in constant close touch with the workers. The circulation of some issues was between 50,000 and 60,000 copies.

The authorities were constantly taking repressive measures against *Zvezda*; they confiscated 30 and fined 8 out of a total of 69 issues. *Zvezda* prepared the way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily, *Pravda*; it was closed down by the government on the day the first issue of *Pravda* appeared. p. 36

[38] The *Trudovik conference* met in St. Petersburg in March 1912. It dealt chiefly with the Fourth Duma election campaign. Lenin assessed its decisions in his article "Liberalism and Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 569-78). p. 41

[39] *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*)—a Cadet symposium published in Moscow in the spring of 1909. It contained articles by N. Berdayev, S. Bulgakov, P. Struve, M. Herschensohn and other spokesmen of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. In their articles on the Russian intelligentsia the *Vekhi* writers calumniated the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the foremost representatives of the Russian people, including V. G. Belinsky and N. G. Chernyshevsky. They smeared the revolutionary movement of 1905 and thanked the tsarist government for having with "its bayonets and jails" saved the bourgeoisie "from the fury of the people". *Vekhi* called on the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared its programme both in philosophy and in political writing with the programme of the Black-Hundred newspaper, *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*. He called the collection "*an encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy*" and "a sheer torrent of reactionary mud turned upon the democratic movement" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 123-31). p. 41

[40] This refers to the unification of Germany which the German ruling classes undertook "from above" by means of the policy of "blood and iron", and through diplomatic intrigue and wars. The Prusso-Austrian war of 1866 resulted in the formation of the North-German Union, and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 led to the formation of the German Reich. p. 45

[41] *Svet* (*Light*)—a bourgeois nationalist daily published in St. Petersburg from 1882 to 1917.

Golos Moskvy (*Voice of Moscow*)—a daily newspaper published by the Octobrist Party, a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and big landlords. It was published in Moscow from 1906 to 1915. p. 47

[42] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of the feudal landlords founded in May 1906 at the first congress of the delegates of the gubernia societies of the nobility. It functioned till October 1917. Its main objective was to defend the autocratic system, the big landed estates and the privileges of the nobility. The Council was headed by Count A. A. Bobrinsky, Prince N. F. Kasatkin-Rostovsky, Count D. A. Olsufyev, V. M. Purishkevich and others. Lenin called it the "council of united serf-owners".

The Council virtually became a semi-governmental agency which dictated to the government legislation designed to uphold the interests of the feudal landlords. A considerable number of its members were also members of the Council of State and the leading centres of Black-Hundred organisations. p. 47

[43] This refers to the tsar's Manifesto of June 3 (16), 1907, dissolving the Second Duma and amending the electoral law. The new law greatly increased the proportion of members of the Duma representing the landlords and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, while reducing several times over the proportion of peasant and workers' deputies, already small. It was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905, and the Fundamental Law of 1906, under which all legislation introduced by the government was subject to approval by the Duma.

The new Regulations entitled the landowner curia to elect one elector for every 230 persons, the first urban curia one for every 1,000 and the second urban curia for 15,000, the peasant curia for every 60,000 and the worker curia for 125,000. The landlords and the bourgeoisie elected 65 per cent of the electors, the peasants 22 per cent (instead of the former 42) and the workers 2 per cent (as against 4 per cent in the past). The law disfranchised the indigenous population of Asian Russia and the Turkic peoples of the Astrakhan and Stavropol gubernias, and cut by half the proportion of representatives of the population of Poland and the Caucasus. All those who did not speak Russian were disfranchised throughout Russia. The Third Duma elected under this law was

convened on November 1 (14), 1907. It was Black-Hundred and Octobrist in composition.

The June Third coup d'état ushered in the period of Stolypin reaction. p. 47

[44] The *Council of State*—one of the supreme organs of state government in pre-revolutionary Russia, established in 1810—according to a draft submitted by M. M. Speransky—as an advisory legislative body whose members were appointed by the tsar. Under the law of February 20 (March 5), 1906, it was reorganised and authorised to approve or reject Bills after they had been discussed in the Duma. Nevertheless, the tsar retained the right to amend fundamental legislation and issue certain laws of special importance.

From 1906, one half of the Council members were elected representatives of the nobility, clergy and big bourgeoisie and the other half were dignitaries appointed by the tsar. Hence it was an extremely reactionary assembly which rejected even moderate Bills passed by the Duma. p. 48

[45] *Zemstvos*—so-called local self-government bodies dominated by the nobility. They were set up in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. Their jurisdiction was restricted to purely local economic and welfare matters—hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc. They functioned under the control of the provincial governors and the Minister of the Interior, who could suspend decisions that did not suit the government. p. 49

[46] Lenin is referring to the speech which P. N. Milyukov made at the luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of the City of London in June 1909, during the visit of a delegation from the Third Duma and the Council of State. Milyukov reaffirmed the Cadets' allegiance to the tsarist autocracy and stressed that as long as Russia had a Duma "the Russian opposition would remain an opposition of, not to, His Majesty". p. 51

[47] Lenin is referring to the decree of November 9 (22), 1906, on "Additions to Certain Regulations of the Existing Law on Peasant Land Ownership and Land Tenure", drafted by Stolypin and named the law of June 14, 1910, upon its enactment by the Duma and the Council of State. On November 15 (28), 1906, another decree was issued—"On the Granting of Loans by the Peasant Land Bank on the Security of Allotment Lands". The two decrees granted the peasants the right to take over their allotments as personal property and the right to withdraw from the village commune and settle on *otrubs* or *khutors*. *Khutor* and *otrub* peasants could obtain subsidies through the Peasant Bank to buy land. The Stolypin agrarian legislation aimed at making the kulaks the new social mainstay of the autocracy in the countryside while preserving the landed estates and forcibly destroying the village communes.

The Stolypin agrarian policy speeded up the capitalist evolution of agriculture in the extremely painful "Prussian" way, with the feudal landlords retaining their power, property and privileges.

It intensified the forcible expropriation of the bulk of the peasantry and accelerated the development of the peasant bourgeoisie, whom it enabled to buy up the allotments of the peasant poor at a nominal price.

Lenin described the Stolypin agrarian legislation of 1906 (and the law enacted on June 14 [27], 1910) as the second step, after the 1861 Reform, towards transforming the feudal autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy.

Although the government vigorously advocated the withdrawal of peasants from the village communes, only some 2,500,000 peasant households withdrew from them in European Russia over nine years (1907-15). The right to secede from the village commune was used above all by the rural bourgeoisie, which was thus enabled to strengthen its farms. Some of the poor peasants who wanted to sell their allotments and end their connection with the countryside seceded too. The small peasants, crushed by want, remained poverty-stricken and backward.

The Stolypin agrarian policy did not remove the main contradiction between the peasantry as a whole and the landlord class. Moreover, it brought further ruin to the mass of the peasantry and aggravated the class antagonisms between the kulaks and the peasant poor. p. 53

[47a] The Polish *Kolo* (Circle) was an association of Polish deputies to the Duma. In the First and Second Dumas, its leading core was composed of National-Democrats, members of the reactionary, nationalist party of the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie. The *Kolo* backed the Octobrists on all major tactical issues. p. 55

[48] The article "A Questionnaire on the Organisations of Big Capital" appeared in *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 5-7.

Prosveshcheniye (*Enlightenment*) was a socio-political and literary monthly published by the Bolsheviks legally in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. It was founded on directions from Lenin to replace the Bolshevik periodical, *Mysl* (Moscow), closed down by the authorities. Lenin, who was abroad, guided *Prosveshcheniye* by editing articles for it and maintaining a regular correspondence with the members of its Editorial Board. The periodical published "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "Critical Remarks on the National Question", "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", and other works by Lenin.

The Editorial Board of *Prosveshcheniye* included M. A. Savelyev, M. S. Olminsky and A. I. Yelizarova. The art and literature section was edited by Maxim Gorky. The circulation reached 5,000 copies.

Prosveshcheniye was closed down by the authorities on the eve of the First World War. In the autumn of 1917, however, it resumed publication, but only one (double) issue was brought out; it contained Lenin's works "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and "Revision of the Party Programme". p. 56

[49] *Gushka*, *A. O.*, and *A. Yermansky*, mentioned further on in the article, were pen-names of O. A. Kogan, a Menshevik liquidator. p. 56

[50] *Article 87* of the Fundamental State Laws authorised the Council of Ministers during the Duma recesses to submit Bills directly to the tsar for approval. p. 63

[51] *Brentano*, *Lujo* (1844-1931)—a German bourgeois economist, one of the main exponents of "professorial socialism", who advocated renunciation of the class struggle and held it possible to resolve the social contradictions of capitalist society and reconcile the interests of the workers and capitalists by organising reformist trade unions and introducing factory legislation. On the agrarian question he upheld the reactionary theory of the "stability" of small-scale agriculture and the pseudo-scientific bourgeois "law of diminishing returns". In the closing years of his life he was an outspoken apologist of imperialism.

Sombart, *Werner* (1863-1941)—a German vulgar bourgeois economist, a prominent ideologist of German imperialism. One of the theoreticians of "social-liberalism" in the early period of his activity, he later became an open enemy of Marxism and described capitalism as a harmonious economic system. p. 68

[52] *Kit Kitych* or *Tit Titych*, a character in Alexander Ostrovsky's play, *Shouldering Another's Troubles*. He typifies an uneducated, stupid and barbaric petty tyrant. p. 69

[53] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 71

[54] *Nevskaya Zvezda* (*The Neva Star*)—a legal Bolshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from February 26 (March 10) to October 5 (18), 1912. Twenty-seven issues appeared. At first the newspaper appeared simultaneously with *Zvezda*, which it was intended to replace in the event of the latter's closure or confiscation. After April 22 (May 5), 1912, it was published instead of *Zvezda*, which was closed down by the authorities. It published twenty articles by Lenin. p. 74

[55] *Winter hiring*—the hiring of peasants for summer work, practised by the landlords and kulaks during the winter, when the peasants were badly in need of cash and compelled to accept shackling terms. p. 75

[56] See Note 30. p. 75

[57] "*Composite labour service*"—a form of labour service and of peasant renting of landlord land on onerous terms in post-Reform Russia. Under this system the peasants committed themselves—for money,

a loan for the winter, or for the land rented to them—to till with their own implements and horses one dessiatine of the landlord's spring crop, one dessiatine of his winter crop, and sometimes also one dessiatine of meadowland. p. 75

[58] *R. B.*—R. M. Blank, a Cadet publicist. p. 80

[59] See Note 46. p. 81

[60] This refers to the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, published at the height of the All-Russia October political strike. The Manifesto promised "civil liberties" and a "legislative" Duma. It was a political stratagem of the autocracy designed to gain time, split the revolutionary forces, foil the strike and suppress the revolution. It was a concession wrested from the tsarist regime by the revolution, but that concession by no means decided the fate of the revolution, as the liberals and Mensheviks claimed. The Bolsheviks exposed the real meaning of the Manifesto. On October 18 (31), 1905, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issued its appeal "To the Russian People" revealing the spurious nature of the Manifesto and calling for a continued struggle. "We still need the strike," said the appeal, "to show our enemies that they cannot appease us with a mere slip of paper, and that we want genuine rights and genuine strength." (*Leaflets of the Bolshevik Organisations During the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907*. Part I, Moscow, 1956, p. 185, Russ. ed). p. 81

[61] This refers to the Party of Peaceful Renovation, a constitutional-monarchist organisation of the big bourgeoisie and the landlords. It took final shape in 1906, following the dissolution of the First Duma. It grouped the "Left" Octobrists and Right Cadets. Among its leaders were P. A. Heyden, N. P. Lvov, P. P. Ryabushinsky, M. A. Stakhovich, Y. N. and G. N. Trubetskoi, and D. N. Shipov.

The Peaceful Renovators' programme was close to the Octobrist programme. It defended the interests of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and the landlords who conducted their farming on capitalist lines. Lenin called the Party of Peaceful Renovation a "party of peaceful plunder". In the Third Duma this party merged with the Party of Democratic Reform into the Progressist group. p. 81

[62] *Utro Rossii* (*Morning of Russia*)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from September 1907 to April 1918 (with a break in 1908). Although it called itself a "non-partisan democratic publication", it reflected the interests of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie. It was a Progressist mouthpiece subsidised by Ryabushinsky's bank. It was closed down early in April 1918 for slanderous statements against Soviet rule. From the middle of April to July 1918 it was published under the title of *Zarya Rossii* (*Dawn of Russia*). p. 81

[63] See Note 1. p. 86

[64] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards by moderately liberal intellectuals. Between the 1880s and 1890s contributors to it included writers of the democratic camp—V. G. Korolenko, M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin, G. I. Uspensky and others—and it also published articles by liberal Narodniks. In 1905 it became an organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. Lenin pointed out that the newspaper "provided a unique combination of Right Cadetism and Narodnik overtones" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 135). In 1918 it was closed down along with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 86

[65] *Nevsky Golos* (*Neva Voice*)—a legal newspaper of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from May to August 1912. p. 87

[66] In Russian political writing, the term "diehard" (*zubr*, literally, aurochs) was applied to the extreme Right-wing representatives of landlord reaction. p. 91

[67] See Note 47. p. 91

[68] *Temporarily bonded peasants*—serfs who after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 were obliged to perform certain services for the landlords, i.e., do corvée service or pay quit-rent. The temporarily bonded status of the peasants continued until they had, by agreement with the landlords, acquired their allotments by paying campensation. It was only under the decree of 1881, which discontinued the "obligatory relation" between the peasants and the landlords as from January 1, 1883, that the landlords were obliged to accept compensation. p. 95

[69] In 1889 the tsarist government introduced the administrative office of *rural superintendent* to strengthen landlord rule over the peasants. The rural superintendents, who were selected from among the landed nobility, were vested with vast administrative and also judicial powers over the peasants, including the right to arrest peasants and subject them to corporal punishment. p. 96

[70] The article "The Revolutionary Upswing" was published early in June 1912, after Lenin had made, at a meeting of the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad, a report on developments in Russia (April 26 [May 9], 1912) and read a paper entitled "The Revolutionary Upswing of the Russian Proletariat" (May 31 [June 13]). A printed notice issued by the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad gave a detailed outline of the paper coinciding with the main propositions of this article. p. 102

[71] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*The Social-Democrat*)—the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., published illegally from February 1908 to January 1917. In all 58 issues appeared. The first issue appeared in Russia,

and then publication was transferred, first to Paris and afterwards to Geneva. By decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Editorial Board consisted of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats.

Sotsial-Demokrat published more than eighty articles and other items by Lenin. On its Editorial Board Lenin upheld a consistently Bolshevik line. Two members of the Board—Kamenev and Zinovyev—took a conciliatory view of the liquidators and tried to defeat Lenin's line. Another two members, the Mensheviks Martov and Dan, obstructed the work of the Board and at the same time openly defended liquidationism in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*.

Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators resulted in Martov and Dan resigning from the Editorial Board in June 1911. From December 1911 the newspaper was edited by Lenin. p. 104

[72] The leaflet mentioned by Lenin was printed in St. Petersburg and circulated at the factories before May 1, 1912. It called on the workers to hold meetings and demonstrations in Nevsky Prospekt on May Day, under the slogans put forward by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.: "A constituent assembly, an eight-hour working day, and confiscation of the landed estates." The leaflet ended with the militant appeals: "Down with the tsar's government! Down with the autocratic Constitution of June 3! Long live a democratic republic! Long live socialism!" It was signed: "Meeting of Representatives of All Organised Workers of St. Petersburg", "Social-Democratic 'Unity' Group", "City Central Social-Democratic Group", "Group of Worker Socialist-Revolutionaries", "Group of Worker Social-Democrats of St. Petersburg", and "Representatives of May Day Committees".

On June 4 (17), 1912, the full text of the leaflet was published in the news section of *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 27. p. 104

[73] *The December uprising* was the armed uprising of the Moscow workers against the autocracy in December 1905. For nine days the workers, led by the Moscow Bolshevik Social-Democrats, fought gallantly on the barricades against the tsar's troops. The government did not succeed in crushing the revolt until fresh troops arrived from St. Petersburg. It dealt with the insurgents with monstrous cruelty; the workers' districts ran with blood, and thousands of workers were killed in Moscow and the vicinity. p. 107

[74] The *Okhrana* was an agency of the secret police in tsarist Russia, in charge of political investigation. It was under the jurisdiction of the Police Department. p. 108

[75] See Note 1. p. 108

[76] On January 9, 1905, the tsar ordered his troops to fire on a peaceful demonstration of St. Petersburg workers who were marching to the Winter Palace with the priest Gapon at their head to submit

a petition to the tsar. The atrocious shooting of the defenceless workers gave rise to mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan of "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January 9 were the starting-point of the revolution of 1905-07. p. 113

[77] *Budushcheye* (*L'Avenir*)—a liberal bourgeois weekly published in Paris from October 1911 to January 1914 in Russian (some items were published in French). It was edited by V. L. Burtsev and Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries contributed to it. p. 113

[78] Lenin is referring to the decision of the liquidators' Organising Committee to invite the Left wing of the P.S.P. to the August liquidationist conference.

Polska Partia Socjalistyczna—the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.), a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. In 1906 it split into the Left-wing P.S.P. and the chauvinist Right-wing P.S.P. p. 118

[79] *Zionist-Socialists*—members of the Zionist-Socialist Workers' Party, a Jewish petty-bourgeois nationalist organisation founded in 1904. They sought to isolate the Jewish workers from the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat, and advocated a campromise with the bourgeoisie with a view to bringing about the establishment of a Jewish state. p. 118

[80] The *Lettish Social-Democratic Union*, founded abroad in the autumn of 1900, put forward demands that were close to those of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was imbued to a considerable extent with nationalist tendencies. In 1905 it gained some influence among a section of the peasantry, but it was not long before the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party superseded it. Subsequently the Union ceased to play any appreciable role. p. 118

[81] The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., held in Stockholm on April 10-25 (April 23-May 8), 1906, decided to merge the R.S.D.L.P. with the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and with the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party. They became part of the R.S.D.L.P. as territorial organisations working among the proletariat of all nationalities in the territories concerned. p. 118

[82] Lenin has in mind the Menshevik liquidators' plan to liquidate the illegal Party and replace it by a "broad", petty-bourgeois labour party without a programme, a party similar to the British Labour Party, with a supreme body in the form of a "labour congress" in which Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists alike would be represented. Lenin exposed this exceedingly harmful attempt of the Mensheviks to liquidate the Social-Democratic Labour Party and dilute the vanguard of the working class with petty-bourgeois elements. This idea of the Menshevik liquidators amounted to renunciation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. p. 119

[83] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*The Diary of a Social-Democrat*)—a non-periodical organ published by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva from March 1905 to April 1912, at considerable intervals. Altogether 15 issues appeared. Publication was resumed in Petrograd in 1916, but only one issue appeared. p. 120

[84] In February 1912 T. O. Belousov, a Menshevik liquidator, member of the Third Duma for Irkutsk Gubernia, withdrew from the Social-Democratic Duma group. See Lenin's article "Deputy T. O. Belousov's Withdrawal from the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 521-26). p. 120

[85] *Khlestakov*—a character in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*, typifying a reckless braggart and liar. p. 121

[86] The *Organising Commission Abroad* (O.C.A.) for the convening of a general Party conference was established by a meeting of members of the Central Committee on June 1 (14), 1911, and consisted of representatives of the Bolsheviks, conciliators and Polish Social-Democrats. The other organisations and groups abroad which had been invited to join the Commission did not send their representatives. The O.C.A. sent a group of Party functionaries to Russia, including its authorised representative G. K. Orjonikidze, to help in making preparations for the planned conference. It also issued an appeal "To All Social-Democratic Party Organisations, Groups and Circles", calling on them to set about electing members to the Russian Organising Commission (R.O.C.). But as soon as the O.C.A. was set up a majority in it was gained by the conciliators and the Polish Social-Democrats who backed them. The conciliatory majority pursued an unprincipled policy aimed at continuing talks with the *Vperyod* group and Trotsky, who had refused to send their delegates to the O.C.A. The conciliators' publications accused the Bolsheviks of factionalism. They used their predominance on the O.C.A. to hold up the dispatch of Party money to Russia and obstructed preparations for the conference.

As a result of the work done by the Bolsheviks, the Russian Organising Commission was set up. At the end of October the O.C.A. discussed the Notification which the R.O.C. had adopted concerning its establishment and its resolutions by which it assumed full powers for the convening of the conference while the Organising and the Technical commissions were to be subordinated to the R.O.C. After the conciliatory majority of the O.C.A. had refused to submit to these decisions the Bolshevik representatives withdrew from the O.C.A. On October 30 (November 12) Orjonikidze, who had arrived in Paris, made a report to the meeting of the O.C.A. on the activities of the R.O.C., whereupon the O.C.A. was compelled to recognise the leading role of the R.O.C. Nevertheless, it was not long before the O.C.A. began an open fight against the R.O.C. On November 20 (December 3) it issued a leaflet entitled "An Open Letter to the Russian Organising Commission" accusing the R.O.C. of factionalism. The anti-Party actions of the O.C.A.

were exposed by Orjonikidze in a letter to the Editor published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 25, on December 8 (21), 1911. The entire work of convening the Party conference, held in January 1912, was carried out by the R.O.C., which had rallied all the illegal Party organisations in Russia. p. 121

[87] This refers to the following facts:

In October 1910 F. A. Golovin, a member of the Third Duma, announced that he was resigning his powers as a deputy, and shortly afterwards took an active part in a railway concession.

In March 1912 V. A. Maklakov, another member of the Third Duma, in spite of his status as a deputy, acted as defence counsel for Tagiyev, a big oil industrialist of Baku charged with manhandling Bebutov, an engineer employed by him. p. 130

[88] By "*political babes*" Lenin means here the Bolshevik conciliators who had their little groups in Russia and abroad.

The "*seasoned diplomats*" were the few liquidators grouped around Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda*, and the Bund leaders. p. 133

[89] Lenin is referring to the law of December 11 (24), 1905, on elections to the Duma. That law divided the electorate into four curias —landowner (landlords), urban (the bourgeoisie), peasant and worker. It granted the suffrage to persons who had reached the age of 25 years. With regard to the landowner and urban curias, it established property qualifications; in the peasant curia, only householders had the right of suffrage, and in the worker curia, only persons who had been working on their job for at least six months. The elections were unequal. One landlord vote equalled 3 capitalist, 15 peasant and 45 workers' votes. The law debarred from elections women, agricultural workers, unskilled workers, handicraftsmen, students and servicemen. In the case of the worker curia, the suffrage was granted only to those in factories employing at least fifty male workers. Factories employing over a thousand workers elected one delegate for every full thousand. Elections wore multistage: two-stage for the landlords and capitalists, three-stage for the workers and four-stage for the peasants.

For the law of June 3, 1907, see Note 43. p. 138

[90] See Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. II, Part Two. These propositions of Marx's were set forth and explained by Lenin in "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 139-42). p. 145

[91] *Gazeta Robotnicza* (*Workers' Newspaper*)—an illegal organ published by the Warsaw Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania from May to October 1906. Publication was resumed in 1912. The split among the Polish Social-Democrats in 1912 gave rise to two parallel Party committees. There were two Warsaw Committees and two newspapers bearing the same title of *Gazeta Robotnicza*, one of them being published by the supporters

of the Executive Committee in Warsaw and the other by the oppositionist Warsaw Committee in Cracow. Lenin's article "The Situation in the R.S.D.L.P. and the Immediate Tasks of the Party" was published in the Cracow *Gazeta Robotnicza* No. 15-16. For the split in the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, see Lenin's article "The Split Among the Polish Social-Democrats" (pp. 479-84 of this volume). p. 150

[92] See Note 20. p. 152

[93] This refers to the meeting which the liquidators held in Russia in the middle of January 1912. The meting was called on the initiative of the Bund and the Contra Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Territory. It is known as the "Meeting of National Social-Democratic Organisations". It was attended by two delegates from the Lettish Social-Democrats, two from the Bund, one from the Caucasian Regional Committee and one from the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania (this last delegate was present only at the second sitting). The meeting set up an Organising Committee for convening the Trotskyist-liquidationist August conference of 1912. p. 156

[94] *Czerwony Sztandar* (*Red Banner*)—an illegal newspaper published by the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania from 1902 to 1918 (Zurich-Cracow-Warsaw-Berlin). Publication was suspended between 1914 and 1917. In all 195 issues appeared. p. 156

[95] Lenin s note "*A Reply to the Liquidators*" was written for *Pravda*, the Editorial Board of which received it on July 11 (24), 1912. p. 156

[96] *Pravda* (*Truth*)—a legal Bolshevik daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg, was founded on the initiative of the St. Petersburg workers in April 1912. Its first issue appeared on April 22 (May 5), 1912.

Pravda was published with money collected by the workers. In 1912 the workers made 620 group contributions to the Bolshevik press, 2,181 in 1913 and 2,873 from January to May 1914. Among the correspondents of *Pravda* were advanced workers. In the course of one year alone the newspaper published more than 11,000 items by worker correspondents. Its circulation reached 40,000 to 60,000 copies daily.

Lenin, who was abroad, guided *Pravda* and contributed to it almost every day. He gave directions to the editors and gathered the Party's best writers round the newspaper.

Pravda was a constant target of police persecution. In the first year of its existence it was confiscated 41 times; its editors were sued 36 times and hold in prison for a total of 47½ months. During two years and three months the tsarist government closed down the newspaper eight times, but it continued to appear under different

titles: *Rabochaya Pravda*, *Severnaya Pravda*, *Pravda Truda*, *Za Pravdu*, *Proletarskaya Pravda*, *Put Pravdy*, *Rabochy*, and *Trudovaya Pravda*. It was closed down again on July 8 (21), 1914, shortly before the beginning of the First World War.

Publication was not resumed until after the February Revolution of 1917. On March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* began to appear as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Upon his return from abroad on April 5 (18), Lenin became a member of the Editorial Board and assumed the leadership of the newspaper. Between July and October 1917 *Pravda*, being persecuted by the Provisional Government, had to change its title four times—to *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy* and *Rabochy Put*. From October 27 (November 9) onwards it appeared under its old title of *Pravda*. p. 158

[97] This refers to the resolution of the Board of the St. Petersburg Bakers' Union in favour of the publication of an anti-liquidationist workers' daily. The Board hailed the forthcoming publication of *Pravda* and called on the membership to collect money for the future newspaper. A report on the resolution appeared in *Zvezda* No. 27, on April 8 (21), 1912. p. 175

[98] *Zavety* (*Behests*)—a literary and political monthly of a Socialist-Revolutionary trend, published legally in St. Petersburg from 1912 to 1914. p. 181

[99] The allusion is to the following lines from Alexander Pushkin's poem "The Hero":

I treasure deceit that uplifts us
Above a myriad low truisms. p. 183

[100] This refers to the rebellion which the Portuguese monarchists launched in the summer of 1912 to restore the monarchy. The rebellion was put down. p. 183

[101] The article "*The Results of Six Months' Work*" was written in the first half of July 1912. Lenin's correspondence with *Pravda* concerning the publication of this article survived. In one of his letters to *Pravda*, Lenin asked the editors to print the article in four instalments, as separate feature articles, and agreed only to corrections made for censorship reasons. The article was published in the form suggested by Lenin. p. 187

[102] Lenin is referring to the Menshevik liquidators' threat to nominate their own candidates at the Fourth Duma election for the worker curia as a counter to the Bolshevik candidates. p. 197

[103] *Appeal to Reason*—a newspaper published by the American Socialists, founded in Girard, Kansas, in 1895. It had no official connection with the American Socialist Party but propagated socialist ideas and was very popular among the workers. Among those who wrote for it was Eugene Debs. p. 201

[104] *Gazeta-Kopeika* (*Kopek Newspaper*)—a bourgeois daily of the yellow press type, published in St. Petersburg from 1908. It was closed down in 1918. p. 202

[105] The pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.*, written by Lenin in Cracow, was first published in the German language in Leipzig in September 1912. Its main point is the letter of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. written on July 16-17 (29-30). The letter was a reply to the appeal of the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party on the convening of the R.S.D.L.P. "centres" and "groups" abroad to distribute the funds which the leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party had allotted for the Fourth Duma election campaign. The C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. refused to participate in the meeting, and the meeting did not take place. The Executive of the German Social-Democrats assigned part of the funds to the liquidators' Organising Committee and Caucasian Regional Committee, to the Bund and to the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, thereby backing the liquidators against the Bolsheviks. The pamphlet *Concerning the Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.* was circulated by the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* to the regional and district centres of the German Social-Democratic Party, the delegates of the Party Congress held in Chemnitz in September 1912, and the editors of the major Social-Democratic newspapers of Germany. p. 203

[106] The phrase "*Potemkin villages*" was coined in the first quarter of the nineteenth century to denote a sham facade of prosperity. During Catherine II's journey to the South in 1878 G. A. Potemkin, Governor-General of the Yekaterinoslav Vicegerency, created an impression of exceptional prosperity by having decorative villages, arches, etc., built and parks laid out along the route of the Empress. p. 206

[107] The *Spilka* (Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union) arose late in 1904 having broken away from the petty-bourgeois, nationalist Revolutionary-Ukrainian Party. It entered the R.S.D.L.P. as an autonomous regional organisation. In the inner-Party struggle of the R.S.D.L.P. it sided with the Mensheviks. It broke up in the period of reaction. In 1912 there were only small disconnected groups of the Spilka and by then most of its members had become bourgeois nationalists. Trotsky's liquidationist *Pravda* (Vienna) was published as an organ of the Spilka only in October and December 1908 (the first two issues). p. 207

[108] The Ninth International Socialist Congress of the Second International was to meet in Vienna in the autumn of 1913, but the war which broke out in the Balkans in 1912 and the threat of a world war prompted the International Socialist Bureau to convene an extraordinary congress in Basle on November 24-25, 1912. p. 216

[109] This refers to the *August conference of the liquidators*, which met in Vienna in August 1912 and formed the anti-Party August bloc.

The bloc was organised by Trotsky. The conference was attended by delegates from the Bund, the Caucasian Regional Committee, the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Territory and small liquidationist groups abroad: the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda* and the *Vperyod* group. Delegates from Russia were sent by the St. Petersburg and Moscow "initiating groups" of the liquidators and the editorial boards of the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya* and *Nevsky Golos*. A representative of the Spilka Committee Abroad was present too. The overwhelming majority of the delegates were people who lived abroad and were out of touch with the working class of Russia.

The conference adopted anti-Party liquidationist decisions on all the questions of Social-Democratic tactics and declared against the existence of the illegal Party.

Being composed of heterogeneous elements, the August bloc began to fall apart even while the conference was meeting. The liquidators were unable to elect a Central Committee and limited themselves to setting up an Organising Committee. The blows delivered by the Bolsheviks soon resulted in the final disintegration of the bloc. p. 217

[110] The manuscript bears no title; the title given here has been supplied by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. p. 221

[111] *Le Revue scientifique*—a periodical founded in Paris in 1863. p. 224

[112] Lenin is quoting the resolution of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. "On the Attitude to Non-Proletarian Parties" (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part One, l 954, p. 164, Russ. ed.). p. 229

[113] *Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 9 gave the wrong date of publication—August 12 (30) instead of July 30 (August 12).

Rabochaya Gazeta (*The Workers' Gazette*)—a popular Bolshevik newspaper published in Paris from October 30 (November 12), 1910, to July 30 (August 12), 1912. In all nine issues appeared. Among those who wrote for it were pro-Party Mensheviks. The newspaper was founded and led by Lenin, who contributed more than ten articles. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) noted that *Rabochaya Gazeta* firmly and consistently defended the Party and the Party principle, and made it the official organ of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.). p. 236

[114] "*The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P.*" was written by Lenin in Paris at the beginning of March 1912. The election platform was endorsed by the Central Committee and published in Russia (Tiflis) in leaflet form on behalf of the C.C. The leaflet was delivered to eighteen localities, including the largest proletarian centres. The election platform, reprinted from the leaflet published in Rus-

sia, appeared as a supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 26. It constituted a militant policy document calling for a struggle for the revolution. Lenin attached special importance to the election platform of the Party and exposed the liquidators' attempts to put forward a legal, opportunist platform "for the elections".

In sending to *Zvezda* a copy made from the leaflet "The Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P.", Lenin marked it as follows: "This platform is being sent only for the *information of all*, particularly the *compilers* of the platform. It is time to *cease writing* platforms when there already *exists* one confirmed and published by the Central Committee. (A leaflet *has already been issued* about this in Russia, but as we possess only *one* copy, we cannot send it, but are sending you a hand-written copy.)" (See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 513.) p. 237

[115] *S. V.*—Stanislav Volsky, pseudonym of A. V. Sokolov, one of the organisers of the *Vperyod* group. p. 239

[116] *L. M.*—L. Martov, one of the Menshevik leaders. p. 241

[117] *The man in a muffler*—the chief character in Chekhov's story of that name, a man typifying the narrow-minded philistine who dreads all initiative and all that is new. p. 244

[118] "*Letter to the Swiss Workers*" was written by Lenin in connection with the following events:

In July 1912 the Menshevik liquidators' bureau of the united organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. in Zurich sent a letter to the Executive of *Die Eintracht* (a Social-Democratic organisation) and to the Swiss Workers' League. In the letter the bureau declared itself to be the sole representative of the R.S.D.L.P. groups in Zurich. On July 27 (August 9) the Bolshevik Swiss Section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad held a meeting which was attended by representatives of the Zurich, Davos, Berne, Lausanne and Geneva Bolshevik groups.

The debate at the meeting ended in the adoption of resolutions (1) on the situation in the Party, (2) on the state of affairs abroad, and (3) a protest resolution against the liquidators' bureau. The three resolutions were published in the form of hectographed leaflets, the first and second being in the Russian language and the third, which was published along with Lenin's present letter, in German. p. 245

[119] The *International Socialist Bureau*—the permanent executive and information agency of the Second International. The decision on its formation from representatives of the socialist parties of all countries was adopted at the Paris Congress of the Second International in September 1900. G. V. Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky were elected to the Bureau as representatives of the Russian Social-Democrats. Lenin was a member of the Bureau representing the R.S.D.L.P. from 1905 on. In 1912 the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia

Party Conference re-elected Lenin to the Bureau as representing the R.S.D.L.P. On the Bureau Lenin fought resolutely against the opportunism of the leaders of the Second International. The Bureau ceased to function in 1914. p. 245

[120] This refers to the investigation of Russia's factories carried out by the Industrial Department of the Ministry of Finance in 1908. Preliminary data on the results of the investigation were published by V. Y. Varzar in an article "The Manufacturing Industry of the Empire at the Beginning of 1909" in *Vestnik Finansov, Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* No. 50, on December 11 (24), 1911. Lenin cited data from the summary table in that article. p. 256

[121] This refers to *A Summary of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1910*, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. XXXVII. p. 258

[122] Lenin is referring to the miners' strike in the spring of 1912, which involved about a million miners. See pp. 467-68 of this volume for details. p. 270

[123] Lenin took the figures from *A Summary of Factory Inspectors' Reports for 1910*, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. XV. p. 272

[124] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a reactionary, Black-Hundred daily published in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1914. From 1906 it was the official organ of the Ministry of the Interior. p. 281

[125] The *Bulygin Duma*—an advisory "representative institution" which the tsarist government promised to convene in 1905. The Bill to establish an advisory Duma, and the Regulations on elections to the Duma were drafted by a commission under Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, and made public on August 6 (19), 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed and carried out an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. The government was unable to convene it, and the October general political strike swept it out of existence. p. 286

[126] *Pravda* appended to the article "*The Liquidators and 'Unity'*" a critical survey of the charges made against the newspaper by the liquidators. This section of the article was written by M. S. Olminsky. p. 290

[127] *Oblomov*—the chief character in Ivan Goncharov's novel of that name. He was a personification of routine, stagnation and inertia. p. 293

[128] *Zemshchina* (*Land Affairs*)—a Black-Hundred daily newspaper, the organ of the Right-wing members of the Duma, published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1917. p. 298

[129] The *sapient minnow* personifies the craven philistine in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's fairy-tale of that name. p. 308

[130] *Adherents of the old rites*—followers of a Russian religious movement against the official Orthodox Church. The movement arose in the mid-seventeenth century following the alteration of church rites by Patriarch Nicon. In tsarist times it was subjected to persecution. p. 311

[131] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a liberal bourgeois monthly published in Moscow from 1880 to the middle of 1918. After the revolution of 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. At that time Lenin called it *Chernosotennaya Mysl* (*Black-Hundred Thought*). p. 312

[132] Lenin is quoting from Nekrasov's poem, *Who Can Be Happy in Russia*?

The quatrain quoted in the text further on is taken from Nekrasov's "To the Unknown Friend Who Has Sent Me the Poem 'It Cannot Be'". p. 313

[133] This refers to the "Letter to Gogol", dated July 3, 1847, in which V. G. Belinsky most vividly expressed his revolutionary-democratic ideas. Lenin described the "Letter" as "one of the finest productions of the illegal, democratic press" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 246). p. 313

[134] Lenin borrowed the phrase "*conformably to villainy*" from "The Liberal", a satirical fairy-tale by M. Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 314

[135] *Zubatovism*—the policy of "police socialism", so named after Colonel Zubatov, chief of the Moscow Secret Police, on whose initiative legal workers' organisations were formed in 1901-03 to divert the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. Zubatov's activity in this field was supported by V. K. Plehve, Minister of the Interior. The Zubatovists sought to direct the working-class movement into the narrow channel of purely economic demands, and suggested to the workers that the government was willing to meet those demands. The first Zubatovist organisation—the Society for Mutual Assistance of Mechanical Industry Workers—was set up in Moscow in May 1901. Similar organisations were founded in Minsk, Odessa, Vilna, Kiev and other cities.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, in exposing the reactionary character of Zubatovism, used legal workers' organisations to draw large sections of the working class into the struggle against the autocracy. The growing revolutionary movement in 1903 campelled the tsarist government to abolish the Zubatovist organisations. p. 315

[136] *Judas Golovlyov*—a sanctimonious, hypocritical, serf-owning landlord portrayed in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 316

[137] *Russky Vestnik* (*The Russian Herald*)—a political and literary periodical published between 1856 and 1906. From 1856 to 1887 it was issued in Moscow, with M. N. Katkov as its editor and publisher. Originally it had a liberal trend but in the 1860s it became an organ of feudal reaction. After Katkov's death it was issued in St. Petersburg from 1888 to 1896, in Moscow from 1896 to 1902, and again in St. Petersburg from 1902 to 1906. p. 317

[138] See Note 87. p. 320

[139] The first quotation is taken from Frederick Engels's *The Berlin Debates on the Revolution* and the second from Karl Marx's *The Bill for the Abolition of Feudal Labour Services* (see Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Band 5, Berlin. Dietz Verlag, 1959). p. 331

[140] See Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 33). p. 343

[141] This refers to the following fact:

A. A. Voiloshnikov, a member of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, speaking on December 2 (15), 1911, at the Thirty-Fifth Sitting of the Duma in the debate on the Bill to amend the Rules on Military Service, described the tsarist army as a police force and called for the standing army to be replaced by the arming of the whole people. On account of this speech the Chairman of the Duma moved that Voiloshnikov be excluded from the next five sittings. Following Voiloshnikov's second speech at the same sitting the period of exclusion was increased to fifteen sittings. The Cadets voted for the original motion of the Chairman. p. 346

[142] Said by Liza, the maid, in Alexander Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 349

[143] Milyukov met Sazonov, Minister of the Interior, in September 1912 to discuss the Balkan policy of the tsarist government. p. 351

[144] The expression is taken from the letter appraising the Paris Cammune which Karl Marx wrote to L. Kugelmann on April 12, 1871 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 463). p. 356

[145] Lenin is quoting from Frederick Engels's preface to the first Ger man edition of Karl Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 12-13). p. 357

[146] The reference is to the battle in the Mukden area in February 1905, the last major land engagement of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. The Russians lost about 89,000 men, and the Japanese about 71,000. p. 372

[147] *Dyelo Zhizni* (*Life's Cause*)—a legal periodical published by the Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg from January to October 1911. Nine issues appeared. p. 395

[148] *The Polish Social-Democrats*' "*territorial conference*" met on August 11-17 (N.S.), 1912. All the participants were supporters of the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (Zarzadists), which took a conciliatory position in regard to the liquidators and opposed the Rozlamists, who upheld the Bolshevik standpoint. The Conference approved the activities of the Executive and resolved to dissolve the Party organisations that supported the Rozlamists. It declared for a tactical agreement with the Bund and the Left wing of the P.S.P. in the Fourth Duma elections. It also adopted a decision—analysed in this article—concerning the attitude of the Polish Social-Democrats to the R.S.D.L.P. p. 405

[149] In 1608 Russia was invaded by Polish interventionist troops under Dmitry II the Impostor, an agent of the Polish feudal lords (he was made out to be the youngest son of Tsar Ivan the Terrible). The invaders drew near Moscow and camped in the village of Tushino. The Impostor formed a government with its own Court as a counter to the Moscow government. Some of the Russian noblemen and boyars deserted alternately to the Moscow and the Tushino governments in an effort to safeguard themselves in the event of the victory of either side. It was those deserters that were nicknamed "Tushino turncoats". p. 408

[150] *Luch* (*The Ray*)—a legal daily newspaper published by the Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg from September 16 (29), 1912, to July 5 (18), 1913. In all, 237 issues appeared. The newspaper was supported chiefly by donations from the liberals. Ideologically it was directed by P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov and A. S. Martynov. The liquidators used it to oppose the Bolshevik's revolutionary tactics. They advocated the opportunist slogan of founding a so-called open party, opposed revolutionary mass strikes, and sought to revise the major provisions of the Party Programme. Lenin wrote that "*Luch* has been enslaved by a liberal policy" and called it a renegade organ. p. 410

[151] The term "*Austrian*" *federation* refers to the Austrian Social-Democratic Party's organisation on the national principle. The Vienna Party Congress in 1897 abolished the united party, and replaced it by a federation of six national "Social-Democratic groups": German, Czech Polish, Ruthenian, Italian and South Slav. These groups were all united by a joint congress and a common Central Executive. The Brünn Congress in 1899 reorganised the Central Executive into a federal body composed of the executive committees of the national Social-Democratic parties. Organisational federalism resulted in the break-up of the integral Social-Democratic Party of Austria. p. 412

[152] Lenin's theses "*Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies*" formed the basis of a declaration by the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. The manuscript has survived only in part.

The adoption of the declaration was preceded by a bitter fight of the Bolshevik deputies against the seven Menshevik members of the group. A. Y. Badayev, a Bolshevik member of the group, wrote in his recollections: "Our group devoted a number of meetings to the declaration, which it began to discuss before the Duma opened. The debate was exceedingly heated and often lasted till late into the night. On either side not only deputies but also Party functionaries then in St. Petersburg took part in drafting the declaration.... After a long and stubborn struggle and a number of heated clashes with the Mensheviks we at last had all the fundamental demands of the Bolsheviks incorporated in the declaration." (A. Badayev, *The Bolsheviks in the Duma. Recollections*, Moscow, 1954, p. 67, Russ. ed.)

In accordance with Lenin's directives, the declaration included nearly all the main provisions of the minimum programme. Nevertheless, the Mensheviks succeeded in getting the demand for cultural national autonomy included in the declaration. On December 7 (20), 1912, the declaration was read in the Duma.

On December 8 (21), 1912, *Pravda* carried a verbatim report of the Duma sitting together with the text of the declaration. This *Pravda* issue was confiscated for publishing the declaration, and its editor brought to trial. p. 413

[153] *The Extraordinary International Socialist Congress of the Second International* took place in Basle on November 24-25, 1912. On the opening day there was a large anti-war demonstration and an international protest meeting against the war. On November 25 the Congress unanimously adopted a manifesto calling on the workers to use the organisation and might of the proletariat for a revolutionary struggle against the war danger. p. 414

[154] This refers to the unrest among the political prisoners in the Kutomara and Algachi prisons. It began in August 1912 owing to the Transbaikal Military Governor's order introducing military rules of treatment of political prisoners in Nerchinsk penal-servitude prisons. In protest, the political prisoners at Kutomara declared a fifteen-day hunger strike. The prison administration retaliated by mass torture. Some of the prisoners, driven to despair, committed suicide. Similar events took place in Algachi prison. The summer and autumn of 1912 saw unrest among political prisoners elsewhere in Russia. In response to these developments there were protest strikes of workers in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw and Riga. On behalf of the Social-Democratic and the Trudovik groups in the Fourth Duma, an interpellation was made concerning the outrages against the prisoners. Discussion was postponed by a majority vote but was never resumed. p. 417

[155] This refers to the land Bill which was introduced by (non-party and Right-wing) peasant deputies in the Third Duma on May 10 (23), 1908. The Bill provided for the compulsory alienation, at average market prices, of landed estates not tilled by their owners themselves. For carrying out the land reform, it was proposed that local land committees should be set up to be elected by a general vote. Lenin appraised the Bill in his article "The Agrarian Debates in the Third Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 303-17). p. 418

[156] The document "*Concerning the Workers' Deputies to the Duma and Their Declaration*" was the draft of a declaration of the Social-Democratic group. It was copied by N. K. Krupskaya and sent to the Bolshevik members of the Duma from Cracow on November 13 (26), 1912. The draft was intercepted by the tsar's police. p. 420

[157] The demonstration was organised on the initiative of the Bolshevik representatives of various districts and factories of St. Petersburg. A few days prior to the opening of the Fourth Duma a leaflet was distributed in the factories calling on the workers to organise a one-day political strike on November 15 (28), 1912, and to march to the Taurida Palace. The liquidators, writing in *Luch*, opposed the idea of a march. On November 13 (26) the Social-Democratic group called a meeting of representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee, the Editorial Board of *Pravda*, the liquidators' leading centre—the Organising Committee, and the liquidationist *Luch*. At the meeting the Bolsheviks supported the workers' proposal to mark the opening day of the Black-Hundred Duma by a strike and demonstration. The liquidators emphatically opposed it. After the meeting the Social-Democratic group published in the press a politically erroneous statement in which they took a negative stand on the proposal for a strike. Despite the opposition of the liquidators and the political error of the Social-Democratic group, tens of thousands of workers struck on the day the Duma opened. In a number of factories short meetings were held at which the workers decided to boycott *Luch*.

After the demonstration the Bolshevik members of the Duma admitted their error at workers' meetings. p. 424

[158] Lenin is referring to the speech which Rodzyanko made upon his election to the chair of the Fourth Duma. Rodzyanko signified his "unshakable devotion" to the tsar and his support of a representative constitutional system. p. 424

[159] Lenin's letter was sent from Cracow to Stalin in St. Petersburg on November 28 (December 11), 1912. It had been copied by N. K. Krupskaya in invisible ink. On the way the letter was intercepted, decoded and copied on a typewriter by the police. The copy of the letter was found in the Police Department archives. Some of the words could not be decoded and there are omissions in the text. p. 427

[160] *Jagiello, J. I.*—a member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.) was elected deputy for Warsaw to the Fourth Duma. The Bolsheviks strongly objected to Jagiello's admission into the Social-Democratic group because he had been elected to the Duma thanks to the support of the bourgeoisie and the bloc of the P.S.P. and the Bund. When the issue was first put to the vote, the group split, six Menshevik deputies voting for and six Bolshevik deputies against Jagiello. With the arrival of the Right Menshevik Mankov deputy for Irkutsk, the Mensheviks gained a majority and Jagiello was admitted into the group. But under pressure from the Bolshevik deputies his rights within the group were restricted: he was granted a voice but no vote on all inner-Party questions. p. 427

[161] *Dyen* (*The Day*)—a name given to the newspaper *Pravda* to evade the censor. p. 427

[162] There is an omission in the text of the document. The *Collegium* was the Bolshevik section of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 427

[163] Several words are missing in the letter. "P."—N. G. Poletayev, a Bolshevik member of the Third Duma. The liquidationist "M."—apparently Y. Mayevsky (a pseudonym of V. A. Gutovsky), one of the contributors to the liquidationist *Luch*. p. 429

[164] The delegates from the worker curia of St. Petersburg Gubernia for the Fourth Duma met on October 5 (18), 1912, with 50 delegates present. Of the six electors elected by the delegates, four were Bolsheviks.

The tsarist government was afraid that the Social-Democrats might win in the worker curia and therefore it cancelled the election of delegates in twenty-one St. Petersburg factories. In reply, the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks called on the workers for a one-day political strike. The strike involved about 100,000 workers. The government had to give in and announced supplementary elections. At all the factories where these elections were held the workers adopted a "Mandate of the St. Petersburg Workers to Their Workers' Deputy". On October 17 (30) the Mandate was passed by a new gubernia meeting. But during the second election of electors the vote was not taken by platforms, with the result that three Bolsheviks and three liquidators were elected. The Bolsheviks proposed to the liquidators that lots should be cast to decide who was to be nominated for election to the Duma for the worker curia. The liquidators rejected the proposal. The gubernia meeting of electors elected A. Y. Badayev, a Bolshevik, for the worker curia of St. Petersburg Gubernia. p. 429

[165] N. K. Krupskaya copied the letter to J. V. Stalin in invisible ink, writing it between the lines of another letter. The letter was discovered in the files of the Police Department, among other letters that had been secretely inspected.

Vasilyev—pseudonym of J. V. Stalin. p. 430

[166] The *leaflet on the occasion of January 9, 1913*, "To All Working Men and Women of Russia", was written by J. V. Stalin in December 1912 on the basis of the directives given by V. I. Lenin and was brought out over the signature of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 430

[167] This refers to the Right-wing Menshevik I. N. Mankov, a member of the Fourth Duma. See Note 160. p. 430

[168] Lenin is referring to the composition of the delegates to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 437

[169] Lenin is referring to the composition of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma. p. 437

[170] *Balalaikin*—a character in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *A Modern Idyll*, personifying a liberal windbag, impostor and liar. p. 440

[171] *Russkaya Molva* (*Russian News*)—a daily newspaper published by the Progressist Party in St. Petersburg from December 9 (22), 1912, to August 20 (September 2), 1913. p. 441

[172] *Shemyaka's trial*—an unjust trial (from the title of an old Russian folk story). p. 442

[173] *Slovo* (*The Word*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1904 to 1909. From November 1905 to July 1906 it was an organ of the Octobrist Party. Subsequently it became an organ of the constitutional-monarchist Party of Peaceful Renovation. p. 442

[174] *The Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries* called the "February" Meeting for conspiratorial reasons, was held in Cracow from December 26, 1912 to January 1, 1913 (January 8-14, 1913). Participants in it included Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya and the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma: A. Y. Badayev, G. I. Petrovsky and N. R. Shagov. It was also attended by delegates from the illegal Party organisations of St. Petersburg, the Moscow Region, the South, the Urals and the Caucasus.

The preparations for the Meeting were made by Lenin himself, who also presided over it. He spoke on a number of items and wrote the "Notification and Resolutions of the Meeting".

The Meeting adopted decisions on major issues of the working-class movement. It discussed reports by delegates on the state of local Party organisations, and the work of the editorial boards of *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*.

The resolutions of the Meeting were endorsed by the Central Committee and were hectographed. In the first half of February they were published together with the Notification as a separate pamphlet in Paris. In April 1913 the Central Committee Bureau Abroad circulated a letter to the Party organisations, delegates of the C.C. and individual Party functionaries, calling on them to dis-

cuss the decisions of the "February" Meeting in their committees, Party nuclei and groups. In a letter to Maxim Gorky, Lenin pointed out that the Meeting "was a great success and will play a definite role". p. 447

[175] This refers to the statement which A. I. Chkhenkeli, a Menshevik member of the Duma, made on the government declaration at the Duma sitting on December 10 (23), 1912. p. 461

[176] The formulation rejected by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was the proposal made by Goldblatt, a Bundist, for incorporating in Clause Eight of the Party Programme—on "the right of all the nations included in the state to self-determination"—the following addition: "and to the establishment of institutions guaranteeing complete freedom of their cultural development". p. 461

[177] At the fourteenth sitting of the Duma on December 15 (28), 1912, following the debate on the Government Declaration, the Cadets, Progressists, Trudoviks and nationalists proposed draft formulas of procedure to the next business. The Progressist formula was carried by majority vote. It expressed confidence that the govern ment would implement the Manifesto of October 17, 1905. Mem bers of the Social-Democratic group voted for this formula. After wards they admitted their vote to have been ill-advised. p. 461

[178] The unpublished clauses (7, 8 and 9) of the resolution on the work of the Social-Democratic Duma group called on the Bolshevik deputies to achieve equality in the group with the seven Menshe viks, strike their names off the list of contributors to the liquida tionist *Luch* and rally together for Party work. The text of these clauses has not been preserved. p. 461

[179] *The Bureau of the Central Committee*—the Russian Bureau of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., the Bolshevik Party's practical centre for leading revolutionary struggle in Russia. It was established by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912. Among its members were members of the Central Committee G. K. Orjonikidze, Y. M. Sverdlov, S. S. Spandaryan and J. V. Stalin, and alternate members of the C.C. M. I. Kalinin and Y. D. Stasova. Later on, owing to frequent arrests of Party functionaries in Russia, the composition of the Russian Bureau underwent changes more than once, new members being co-opted to replace those who had dropped out.

The Russian Bureau was led by the Central Committee of the Party headed by Lenin. Its tasks were to carry out the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., rally the local Party organisations to the Central Committee ideologically and organisationally, strengthen Party unity, and combat opportunist trends. The Bureau did a great deal in the way of publishing and distributing Bolshevik leaflets, appeals and other illegal literature. It was an important connecting link between the Central Committee

and local Party organisations. It ceased to function after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917. p. 461

[180] Lenin is quoting from the workers' song which Georg Herwegh, a German poet, wrote in 1863 for the General Association of German Workers. p. 467

[181] *Bremer Bürger Zeitung*—a Social-Democratic daily published from 1890 to 1919. It was under the influence of the Left Social-Democrats of Bremen until 1916, when it passed into the hands of social-chauvinists. p. 469

[182] Before the delegates from the worker curia of St. Petersburg Gubernia held their congress (October 5 [18], 1912) to elect electors to the Fourth Duma, the government gave a so-called clarification on twenty-one of the forty-four factories that had taken part in the elections, saying that the election of delegates at those factories had been found null and void. In reply to this government move, the workers in a number of St. Petersburg factories called a political strike. The strike, which soon spread to every district of St. Petersburg, was accompanied by mass meetings and demonstrations. See also Note 164. p. 471

[183] This refers to reports from Riga and Moscow about, workers' strikes and demonstrations, published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 30, on January 12 (25), 1913. On November 11 (24), 1912, the Riga workers organised a protest demonstration against the death sentences on a group of sailors of the battleship *Ioann Zlatoust* passed by a court martial in Sevastopol, against the torturing of political prisoners, and against the war that had begun in the Balkans. Over 1,500 workers marched through the streets of Riga singing revolutionary songs and carrying red flags. They were received sympathetically by the population. On November 12 (25) many large factories in the city began a political strike. On November 8 (21) the workers in a number of Moscow factories went on strike in protest against the Sevastopol executions. There was also a demonstration but the police soon dispersed it. p. 473

[184] *V. A.*—V. M. Abrosimov, a Menshevik liquidator, subsequently exposed as an *agent provocateur*.

F. D.—F. I. Dan, leader of the Menshevik liquidators. p. 477

[185] The manuscript has no title. The title given here has been supplied by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. p. 478

[186] *Avgustovsky*—pseudonym of S. O. Zederbaum, a Menshevik liquidator. p. 483

[187] The article "*On Bolshevism*" was written by Lenin for the second volume of N. A. Rubakin's book *Among Books*. On January 12

(25), 1913, Lenin sent the article to Rubakin in Clarens, Switzerland, with a letter stipulating that the article "should *not* be altered *in any way*" (see Present edition, Vol. 35, Russian ed., p. 45). The article was published in full. p. 485

[188] *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper. It was founded by Lenin in December 1900 abroad, from where it was secretly sent to Russia. It played a tremendous part in uniting the Russian Social-Democrats ideologically and paving the way for the unification of scattered local organisations in a revolutionary Marxist party. After the split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks that took place at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, *Iskra* passed into the hands of the Mensheviks (beginning with No. 52) and came to be called the "new" *Iskra* as distinct from the "old" *Iskra*, edited by Lenin. p. 485

[189] The *Zemstvo campaign* was conducted by bourgeois liberals between the autumn of 1904 and January 1905. It consisted of a series of congresses, public meetings and banquets at which speeches were made and resolutions passed in support of moderate constitutional demands. Lenin sharply criticised the Menshevik attitude of support for the campaign in his article "The Zemstvo Campaign and *Iskra*'s Plan" (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516). p. 485

[190] *Machism*—a reactionary, subjectivist-idealist philosophical trend which became widespread in Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It was founded by Ernst Mach, an Austrian physicist and philosopher, and Richard Avenarius, a German philosopher.

Machism was particularly dangerous to the working class as a trend of bourgeois idealist philosophy, for while professing to be opposed to idealism it referred to contemporary natural science, a circumstance which gave it a "scientific" semblance. In Russia, Machist influence was strong among a section of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia. It was particularly widespread among the Menshevik intellectuals, such as N. Valentinov and P. S. Yushkevich. Some Bolshevik writers, too, including V. Bazarov, A. Bogdanov and A. V. Lunacharsky, adopted the standpoint of Machism. Under the pretence of developing Marxism, the Russian Machists tried to revise the fundamental tenets of Marxist philosophy. Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* exposed the reactionary nature of Machism. He upheld Marxist philosophy against revisionist attacks and elaborated dialectical and historical materialism in the new historical conditions.

The defeat of Machism struck a powerful blow at the ideological positions of the Mensheviks, otzovists and god-builders. p. 486

[191] *V. Ilyin*—one of Lenin's pseudonyms. p. 486

[192] *The Republican Party of Radicals and Radical-Socialists*—a French bourgeois party which took organisational shape in 1901. In reality

it has existed since the 1880s. Before the First World War it represented mainly the interests of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Between the First and the Second world wars the big bourgeoisie increased its influence in it. Its leaders have repeatedly headed French governments. p. 487

[193] Lenin is quoting from D. Davydov's poem, "The Song of an Old Hussar". p. 491

[194] This refers to the following statement of the Communist Manifesto: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 36.) p. 492

[195] Lenin is quoting from Karl Marx's *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* (K. Marx, F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1. S. 379. Berlin. Dietz Verlag, 1958). p. 492

[196] See Note 47. p. 495

[197] See Note 40. p. 495

[198] By "*Ropshin-like experiences*" Lenin means the reactionary ideas and decadent sentiments which became widespread in the years of reaction among the Socialist-Revolutionary intelligentsia and found a particularly vivid expression in the writings of Ropshin (B. Savinkov). p. 497

[199] *F. L—ko*—a pseudonym of Lenin. p. 507

[200] This refers to the Fourth Duma elections in Riga and Yekaterinodar, where the Cadets voted with the Right-wing Black-Hundred parties against the Social-Democratic candidates. p. 510

[201] *Pochin* (*L'Initiative*)—a Narodnik-liquidationist periodical published by a group of Socialist-Revolutionaries. Its only issue appeared in Paris in June 1912. p. 514

[202] This refers to the decisions of the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in December 1908 and of the enlarged editorial board meeting of *Proletary* in June 1909 (see "*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Russ. ed., Part One, 1954, pp. 195-205, 212-32). p. 518

[203] *A. V. P.*—pseudonym of A. V. Peshekhonov, one of the leaders of the Popular Socialist Party. p. 524

[204] *Nikolai—on*—pseudonym of N. F. Danielson, an ideologist of the liberal Narodism of the 1880s and 1890s. p. 524

[205] The article "*To the Social-Democrats*", intended only for Party members, was published in Cracow as a hectographed leaflet. p. 529

[206] *Azef, Y. F.* (1869-1918)—one of the founders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, became a secret police agent in 1892. He made preparations for and carried out several acts of terrorism to win the confidence of the S. R. leadership. On the other hand, he betrayed members of the S. R. Party to the police. He was exposed in 1908. p. 532

[207] A line seems to be missing in this passage in *Pravda*. The draft resolution analysed by Lenin proposed hanging up posters of *The Daily Herald* as well as of *The Daily Citizen*, which was in the hands of opportunists, on the premises occupied by Party organisations.

The Daily Herald was founded in April 1912 by George Lansbury as a Left-wing Labour newspaper. In 1922 it became the organ of the British Labour Party. p. 548

[208] *The wild landlord*, a character in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's fairy-tale of the same name. p. 551

[209] The explanation offered by Kasso, the Minister of Education, in the Duma was prompted by a question of forty-four members of the Duma tabled on December 14 (27), 1912, regarding the arrest of thirty-four secondary-school pupils in St. Petersburg during a meeting at Witmer's private gymnasium. The pupils were suspected by the secret police of being members of an illegal political group. The question was discussed at five sittings of the Duma. On February 6 (19), 1913, the majority voted for a formula of procedure to the next business that considered the tsarist Minister's explanation unsatisfactory. p. 571

[210] The words quoted by Lenin are a paraphrase of two lines in N. Nekrasov's "Cradle Song", which read as follows:

You will be an official without
And a scoundrel within.... p. 593

[211] *Die Zeit* (*Time*)—a daily newspaper published by the Bund in Yiddish in St. Petersburg from December 20, 1912 (January 2, 1913) to May 5 (18), 1914. p. 600

[212] In the present edition, the article "Spare Cash" includes—between the phrase "national juggling" and the sentence "This is a specimen of predatory economy"—an insertion discovered in 1941, which was missing in the text of the article as it first appeared in Pravda No. 62, on March 15, 1913, and in the second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*. p. 601

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*April 1912-March 1913*)

1912

April-later part of June (*N.S.*)	Lenin lives in Paris
April 22 (*May 5*)	The first issue of *Pravda*, a legal Bolshevik daily, is published.
April 25 (*May 8*)	Lenin's articles "The Fourth Duma Election Campaign and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats", "The Liquidators Against the Party" and "In Memory of Herzen" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 26.
April 26 (*May 9*)	At a meeting of the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad, Lenin reports on the Lena shootings, on strikes in Russia and on the Party tactics necessitated by those events.
May 6 (*19*)	Lenin's article "Landownership in European Russia" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 3.
May 8 and 9 (*21 and 22*)	Lenin's article "The Trudoviks and the Worker Democrats" is published in *Pravda* Nos. 13 and 14.
May 10 (*23*)	Lenin's article "Political Parties in Russia" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 5.
May 22 (*June 4*)	Lenin's articles "The Essence of the 'Agrarian Problem in Russia'" and "Some Conclusions To Be Drawn from the Pre-election Mobilisation" are published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 6.
May 31 (*June 13*)	Lenin reads the paper "The Revolutionary Upsurge of the Russian Proletariat" at the Salle de l'Alcazar, at a meeting organised by the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad.
	Lenin's article "Economic and Political Strikes" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 10.

June 3 (16)	Lenin's article "The Problem of Resettlement" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 11.
June 4 (17)	Lenin's articles "The Revolutionary Upswing", "The Slogans of the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912 and the May Day Movement", "The Liquidators Oppose Revolutionary Mass Strikes" and "'Uniters'" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 27.
	Lenin reads a paper on "Revolutionary Upswing in Russia" in Leipzig.
Latter part, June (N.S.)	Lenin moves from Paris to Cracow to establish closer ties with Russia and give greater guidance to the Bolshevik Duma group and the Editorial Board of *Pravda*.
June 10 (23)	Lenin's article "The Nature and Significance of Our Polemics Against the Liberals" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 12.
June 17 (30)	Lenin's article "Capitalism and 'Parliament'" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 13.
June 21 (July 4)	Lenin in Cracow moves to 218 Ul. Zwierzyniec.
June 24 (July 7)	Lenin's article "The Elections and the Opposition" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 14.
End of June	Lenin writes the article "The Situation in the R.S.D.L.P. and the Immediate Tasks of the Party". The article was published in *Gazeta Robotnicza*, the "Rozlamist" opposition newspaper of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, No. 15-16, on July 3 (16).
July 1 (14)	Lenin's articles "The Significance of the St. Petersburg Elections" and "A Comparison of the Stolypin and the Narodnik Agrarian Programmes" are published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 15.
July 6 (19)	Lenin writes a letter to *Pravda* exposing Trotsky as a liar and intriguer.
Not later than July 8 (21)	Lenin writes the item "A Reply to the Liquidators" for *Pravda*, insisting on a more determined fight against the liquidators at the Fourth Duma elections.
July 11 (24)	Lenin writes a letter to *Nevskaya Zvezda* emphatically condemning the editors' fear of polemics against the liquidators.

July 12 (25)	Lenin's article "In Switzerland" is published in *Pravda* No. 63.
July 12-15 (25-28)	Lenin writes the article "The Results of Six Months' Work" and sends it to Pravda with directions on how it should be published. The article appeared in *Pravda* Nos. 78 to 81, on July 29 and 31 (August 11 and 13), and August 1 and 2 (14 and 15)
July 15 (28)	Lenin's article "Democracy and Narodism in China" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 17.
	Lenin's articles "The Italian Socialist Congress" and "'Freedom of Speech' in Russia" are published in *Pravda* No. 66.
July 17 (30)	Lenin drafts a letter for the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in reply to the inquiry of the Executive Board of the German Social-Democratic Party on the convening of a meeting of R.S.D.L.P. "centres", organisations and groups with the aim of achieving unity at the Fourth Duma elections. The letter formed the main content of the pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.*
July 19 (August 1)	Lenin writes to *Pravda* insisting on an answer as to the editors' intention to introduce into the newspaper an anti-liquidationist section devoted to the Fourth Duma elections.
	Lenin writes to Maxim Gorky to inform him of the revolutionary movement in Russia and of the publication of *Pravda*, a workers' daily newspaper.
July 20 (August 2)	Lenin writes to *Pravda* pointing out the necessity for "launching polemics" against the Cadet press before the elections to the Fourth Duma.
	Lenin's article "Capitalism and Popular Consumption" is published in *Pravda* No. 70.
July 22 and 29 (August 4 and 11)	Lenin's article "How P. B. Axelrod Exposes the Liquidators" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* Nos. 18 and 19.
July 25 (August 7)	Lenin's article "Liberals and Clericals" is published in *Pravda* No. 74.
July 26 (August 8)	Lenin's article "Cadets and Democrats" is published in *Pravda* No. 75.

July 28 (*August 10*)	Lenin's article "The Liberal Campaign" is published in *Pravda* No. 77.
July 30 (*August 12*)	Lenin's articles "Revolts in the Army and Navy", "On the Eve of the Elections to the Fourth Duma", "Can the Slogan 'Freedom of Association' Serve as a Basis for the Working-Class Movement Today?" are published in *Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 9.
July 31 (*August 13*)	Lenin's article "Questions of Principle" is published in *Pravda* No. 79.
Late July-early August	Lenin's "Letter to the Swiss Workers" is brought out as a hectographed leaflet in German in Zurich.
August 5 (*18*)	Lenin's article "The Last Valve" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 20.
August 8 (*21*)	Lenin's articles "A Little Explanation" and "Workers' Earnings and Capitalist Profits in Russia" are published in *Pravda* No. 85.
August 9 (*22*)	Lenin's article "The Strike Movement and Wages" is published in *Pravda* No. 86.
August 11 and 12 (*24 and 25*)	Lenin's articles "The Working Day in the Factories of Moscow Gubernia", "In Britain" and "Concentration of Production in Russia" are published in *Pravda* Nos. 88 and 89.
August 12 (*25*)	Lenin's article "The Working Day and Working Year in Moscow Gubernia" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 21.
August 18 (*31*)	Lenin's article "A Career" is published in *Pravda* No. 94.
	Lenin writes the letter "To the Secretariat of the International Socialist Bureau" protesting against the letter of the Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania by which the I.S.B. was informed of the split among the Polish Social-Democrats.
August 19 (*September 1*)	Lenin's article "The Cadets and the Agrarian Question" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 22.
August 21 (*September 3*)	Lenin's article "A Poor Defence" is published in *Pravda* No. 96.

FROM MARX TO MAO
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August 22 (*September 4*)	In Cracow, Lenin moves to an apartment at 47 Ul. Lubomirskiego.
August 24 (*September 6*)	Lenin's article "The Liquidators and 'Unity'" is published in *Pravda* No. 99.
August 26 (*September 8*)	Lenin's article "A Talk on 'Cadet-Eating'" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 23.
August 29 (*September 11*)	Lenin's article "The Workers and Pravda" is published in *Pravda* No. 103.
August 30 (*September 12*)	Lenin's articles "Before and Now" and "The International Congress of Judges" are published in *Pravda* No. 104.
August 31 (*September 13*)	Lenin's article "In Switzerland" is published in *Pravda* No. 105.
Late August	Lenin writes an introduction and an afterword to the pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.*
September 2 and 9 (*15 and 22*)	Lenin's article "Yet Another Anti-Democratic Campaign" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* Nos. 24 and 25.
September 5 (*18*)	Lenin's article "The Unity of the Cadets and *Novoye Vremya*" is published in *Pravda* No. 109.
September 15 (*28*)	Lenin's article "Concerning N. S. Polyansky's Letter" is published in *Pravda* No. 118.
September 16 (*29*)	Lenin's article "The Political Line" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 26.
September 18 (*October 1*)	Lenin's article "The Successes of the American Workers" is published in *Pravda* No. 120.
September 28 (*October 11*)	Lenin's article "The End of the Italo-Turkish War" is published in *Pravda* No. 129.
Second half of September	Lenin writes a letter to Maxim Corky informing him of the progress of the Fourth Duma elections and asking him to write for *Pravda*.
	Lenin's pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.* is published in German in Leipzig.

October 4 (17)	Lenin's article "A Game of Chance" is published in *Pravda* No. 134.
	Lenin writes to Maxim Gorky suggesting that he should become a permanent contributor to *Pravda*.
October 5 (18)	Lenin's article "The Priesthood in the Elections, and Elections with the Priesthood" is published in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 27.
October 6 (19)	Lenin's article "Mr. Milyukov's 'Position'" is published in *Pravda* No. 136.
October 13 (26)	Lenin writes to *Pravda*, insisting that the Bolsheviks' election platform be propagated with greater determination prior to the congress of the delegates from the St. Petersburg worker curia, that lists of the Bolshevik candidates for the office of elector be published in full and that a special issue of *Pravda* be devoted to the Duma elections.
October 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "Deputy of the St. Petersburg Workers" and "The Balkan Peoples and European Diplomacy" are published in *Pravda* No. 144.
October 18 (31)	Lenin's articles "The Fox and the Hen-Coop" and "A Disgraceful Resolution" are published in *Pravda* No. 146.
October 19 (November 1)	Lenin's article "A Cadet Professor" appears in *Pravda* No. 147.
October 21 (November 3)	Lenin's article "A New Chapter of World History" is published in *Pravda* No. 149.
October 24 (November 6)	Lenin's article "Cadets and Nationalists" is published in *Pravda* No. 151.
October 28 (November 10)	Lenin's article "The Horrors of War" is published in *Pravda* No. 155.
October	Lenin writes the article "Debates in Britain on Liberal Labour Policy". It was published in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 4, 1913.
	Lenin writes the article "Two Utopias".
Early November	Lenin writes the theses "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies" as a guide for the drafting of a declaration of the Social-Democratic group.

November 4 (17)	Lenin's article "Truly Russian Morals" is published in *Pravda* No. 160.
November 5 (18)	Lenin's articles "The Platform of the Reformists and the Platform of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats" and "The Illegal Party and Legal Work" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 28-29.
November 7 (20)	Lenin's article "The Social Significance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Victories" is published in *Pravda* No. 162.
November 8 (21)	Lenin's article "Regenerated China" is published in *Pravda* No. 163.
November 9 (22)	Lenin's article "The Results and Significance of the U.S. Presidential Elections" is published in *Pravda* No. 164.
November 13 (26)	Lenin sends the Bolshevik members of the Fourth Duma his draft of a declaration of the Social-Democratic group.
November	Lenin writes the article "Concerning the Event of November 15. An Undelivered Speech".
November 28 (December 11)	Lenin sends to *Prosveshcheniye* in St. Petersburg a questionnaire for the Bolshevik deputies to sum up the results of the elections for the worker curia.
November 29 (December 12)	Lenin's article "The Disease of Reformism" is published in *Pravda* No. 180.
November 30 (December 13)	Lenin's article "Impoverishment in Capitalist Society" is published in *Pravda* No. 181.
November	Lenin holds a meeting of the Central Committee to discuss the financial crisis in the *Pravda* Editorial Board.
	Lenin writes the article "The 'Vexed Questions' of Our Party. The 'Liquidationist' and 'National' Questions". The article first appeared in August 1913 in *Pismo Dyskusyjne* No. 1, published by the Warsaw and Lodz committees of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania.

December 12 (*25*)	Lenin's article "The Working Class and Its 'Parliamentary' Representatives" is published in *Pravda* No. 191.
December 15 (*28*)	Lenin's "article The 'Reconciliation' of the Nationalists and Cadets" is published in *Pravda* No. 194.
December 22 (*January 4, 1913*)	Lenin's article "The National-Liberals" is published in *Pravda* No. 200.
December	Lenin writes the theses "On the Attitude to Liquidationism and on Unity" for the "February" Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries.
December 26-January 1 (*January 8-14, 1913*)	Lenin leads the "February" Meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries. The Meeting adopted resolutions drafted by Lenin: on the revolutionary upswing; the strikes and the tasks of the Party; the building up of the illegal organisation; the Social-Democratic group in the Duma; illegal literature; the insurance campaign; the attitude to liquidationism, and unity; the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations.
	At the Meeting Lenin outlined a series of steps to improve the work of the *Pravda* Editorial Board.
	Lenin holds a meeting of the Central Committee and Bolshevik deputies to discuss the activities of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma.

1913

Early January	Lenin edits the resolutions and writes the Notification on the "February" Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries.
January 1 (*14*)	Lenin's article "The British Labour Movement in 1912" is published in *Pravda* No. 1.
January 6 (*19*)	Lenin writes the article "Better Late Than Never". It was published in *Pravda* No. 8, on January 11 (24).
January 12 (*25*)	Lenin's articles "The Development of Revolutionary Strikes and Street Demonstrations" and "The Split among the Polish Social-Democrats" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 30.
	Lenin writes to *Pravda* demanding a reorganisation of its Editorial Board.
	Lenin sends his article "On Bolshevism" for the second volume of N. Rubakin's book *Among Books*.

January 15 (28)	Lenin's article "The Significance of Poincaré's Election" is published in *Pravda* No. 11.
January 17 (30)	Lenin's article "Frankly" is published in *Pravda* No. 13.
January 18 (31)	Lenin's article "The Briand Cabinet" is published in *Pravda* No. 14.
Second half of January	Lenin organises publication of the Notification and the resolutions of the "February" Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries.
January 19 (February 1)	Lenin's articles "Experience Teaches" and "New Democrats" are published in *Pravda* No. 15.
January 20 and 22 (February 2 and 4)	Lenin's article "On Narodism" is published in *Pravda* Nos. 16 and 17.
January 22 (February 4)	Lenin writes the appeal "To the Social-Democrats" directed against the liquidators. It was brought out as a hectographed leaflet in Cracow in January 1913.
January 25 (February 7)	Lenin's article "In the World of the Azefs" is published in *Pravda* No. 20.
January 29 (February 11)	Lenin's article "The Bourgeoisie and Reformism" is published in *Pravda* No. 23.
January 30 (February 12)	Lenin's article "Apropos of the Open Party" is published in *Pravda* No. 24.
January	Lenin writes a letter to Maxim Gorky about the planned publication of a legal Bolshevik newspaper in Moscow and the enlarging of the magazine *Prosveshcheniye*, and sends him the resolutions of the "February" Meeting.
	Lenin sends material to *Pravda* for use by members of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma in their speeches on the government budget.
	Lenin's article "Results of the Elections" appears in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1.
End of January	Lenin writes the article "Russians and Negroes".
Early February	Lenin writes the article "Constitutional Illusions Shattered".

Not later than February 1 (14)	Lenin writes a letter to A. Y. Badayev sharply criticising the *Pravda* Editorial Board for publishing A. Bogdanov's letter in No. 24 of the newspaper.
February 1 (14)	Lenin's article "Mobilisation of Peasant Lands" is published in *Pravda* No. 26.
February 2 (15)	Lenin's article "A Word About Strikes" is carried by *Pravda* No. 27.
February 5 (18)	Lenin's article "A Discovery" is published in *Pravda* No. 29.
February 6 (19)	Lenin's article "The British Labour Party Conference" is published in *Pravda* No. 30.
February 6-9 (19-22)	Lenin writes the article "An Increasing Discrepancy. Notes of a Publicist" criticising the decisions of the Cadet meeting. It was published in *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 3 and 4.
February 8 (21)	Lenin writes a letter to *Pravda* congratulating its Editorial Board on the improved quality of the newspaper, and pointing out the need to bring out a special issue dedicated to the thirtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death.
February 12 (25)	Lenin's article "Thank You for Your Frankness" is published in *Pravda* No. 35.
February 16 (March 1)	Lenin's article "The Question of Unity" is published in *Pravda* No. 39.
February 23 (March 8)	Lenin's article "Some Results of the 'Land Distribution' Policy" is published in *Pravda* No. 45.
February	Lenin's article "What Goes Among the Narodniks and What Goes on in the Countryside" is published in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 2.
March 1 (14)	Lenin's article "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx" is published in *Pravda* No. 50.
March 2 (15)	Lenin's article "Big Landlord and Small Peasant Landownership in Russia" is published in *Pravda* No. 51.
March 7 (20)	Lenin's article "False Notes" is published in *Pravda* No. 55.

March 8 (21)	Lenin's article "The Crux of the Matter" is published in *Pravda* No. 56.
March 9 (22)	Lenin's article "Liberal Embellishment of Serfdom" is published in *Pravda* No. 57.
March 10-13 (23-26)	Lenin leads a meeting of members of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in Cracow.
March 13 (26)	Lenin's article "A 'Scientific' System of Sweating" is published in *Pravda* No. 60.
March 14 (27)	Lenin's article "Our 'Achievements'" is published in *Pravda* No. 61.
March 15 (28)	Lenin's article "Agreement or Split? (Concerning the Differences within the Social-Democratic Duma Group)" and "'Spare Cash'" are published in *Pravda* No. 62.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 18

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

19

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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PREFACE

Volume Nineteen contains the works of Lenin written between March and December 1913, in the period of the new upsurge of the revolutionary movement in Russia. The greater part of the volume consists of articles published in the Bolshevik legal press—in the newspapers *Pravda* and *Nash Put* and the magazine *Prosveshcheniye*.

In the articles "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Death of Joseph Dietzgen", "Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle" and "The Marx-Engels Correspondence", Lenin expounded and developed some basic problems of Marxist theory.

The articles "The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.", "The Working Class and the National Question" and others elaborate and substantiate the Bolshevik programme on the national question.

An important place in the volume is occupied by articles against the Menshevik liquidators, Trotskyists, Bundists[1] and Socialist-Revolutionaries,[2] all of which deal with questions of the struggle to consolidate the Bolshevik Party and the unity of the working class; among them are "Controversial Issues", "Working-Class Unity", "Has *Pravda* Given Proof of Bundist Separatism?", "There's a Trudovik for You" and the resolutions of the "Summer" Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party officials held at Poronin.

In "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat", "The Results of Strikes in 1912 as Compared with Those of the Past", "The Role of Social Estates and Classes in the Liberation Movement", "Liberals as Defenders of the Fourth

Duma," Lenin dealt with the political crisis that was maturing in Russia on a nation-wide scale, showed the leading role of the proletariat in the growing revolutionary movement and exposed the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie.

The articles "Is the Condition of the Peasants Improving or Worsening?", "The Land Question and the Rural Poor" and "The Agrarian Question and the Present Situation in Russia" expose the impoverishment and ruin of the greater part of the peasantry as a result of Stolypin's agrarian policy and confront the Bolshevik Party and the working class with the task of drawing the peasantry into an active struggle against the autocracy.

The volume includes documents that characterise Lenin's leadership of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth State Duma—the draft speeches "The Question of Ministry of Education Policy", "The Question of the (General) Agrarian Policy of the Present Government", the articles "The Duma 'Seven'", "Material on the Conflict within the Social-Democratic Duma Group", and others.

There is also a group of articles—"Civilised Barbarism", "A Great Technical Achievement", "Armaments and Capitalism", "Who Stands to Gain?", "The Awakening of Asia", "Exposure of the British Opportunists"—devoted to world economics and politics. Lenin cited facts in these articles showing the decay of capitalism, the growth of armaments, the preparations for a world war and the awakening of the colonial peoples and criticised the growing opportunism in the international working-class movement.

Nine of the documents published in this volume appeared for the first time in the fourth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*. In his report on "Contemporary Russia and the Working-Class Movement" and in the articles "Conversation", "For the Attention of *Luch* and *Pravda* Readers", "A Discreditable Role", "The Working-Class Masses and the Working-Class Intelligentsia" and "The Question of Bureau Decisions", Lenin exposed the liquidators, who strove to destroy the illegal Social-Democratic Party, as out-and-out traitors to the working class. The article "The Split in the Russian Social-Democratic Duma Group" was written by Lenin for the international socialist press in

reply to the slander about the Bolshevik Party that was being spread by the liquidators and Trotskyists. In the articles "The 'Oil Hunger'" and "An Incorrect Appraisal (*Luch* on Maklakov)" Lenin revealed the counter-revolutionary role of the Russian bourgeoisie and showed that they, in alliance with the feudal landowners were hampering Russia's economic development.

ПРОСВѢЩЕНІЕ

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Title page of the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* No. 3, March 1913; this issue contained Lenin's article "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism"

Reduced

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Reduced

THE THREE SOURCES AND THREE COMPONENT PARTS OF MARXISM[3]

Throughout the civilised world the teachings of Marx evoke the utmost hostility and hatred of all bourgeois science (both official and liberal), which regards Marxism as a kind of "pernicious sect". And no other attitude is to be expected, for there can be no "impartial" social science in a society based on class struggle. In one way or another, *all* official and liberal science *defends* wage-slavery, whereas Marxism has declared relentless war on that slavery. To expect science to be impartial in a wage-slave society is as foolishly naïve as to expect impartiality from manufacturers on the question of whether workers' wages ought not to be increased by decreasing the profits of capital.

But this is not all. The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling "sectarianism" in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose *away from* the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate *continuation* of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.

The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German

philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.

It is these three sources of Marxism, which are also its component parts, that we shall outline in brief.

I

The philosophy of Marxism is *materialism*. Throughout the modern history of Europe, and especially at the end of the eighteenth century in France, where a resolute struggle was conducted against every kind of medieval rubbish, against serfdom in institutions and ideas, materialism has proved to be the only philosophy that is consistent, true to all the teachings of natural science and hostile to superstition, cant and so forth. The enemies of democracy have, therefore, always exerted all their efforts to "refute", undermine and defame materialism, and have advocated various forms of philosophical idealism, which always, in one way or another, amounts to the defence or support of religion.

Marx and Engels defended philosophical materialism in the most determined manner and repeatedly explained how profoundly erroneous is every deviation from this basis. Their views are most clearly and fully expounded in the works of Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring*, which, like the *Communist Manifesto*, are handbooks for every class-conscious worker.

But Marx did not stop at eighteenth-century materialism: he developed philosophy to a higher level. He enriched it with the achievements of German classical philosophy, especially of Hegel's system, which in its turn had led to the materialism of Feuerbach. The main achievement was *dialectics*, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of the human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. The latest discoveries of natural science—radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements—have been a remarkable confirmation of Marx's dialectical materialism despite the teachings of the bourgeois philosophers with their "new" reversions to old and decadent idealism.

Marx deepened and developed philosophical materialism to the full, and extended the cognition of nature to include recognition of *human society*. His *historical materialism* was a great achievement in scientific thinking. The chaos and arbitrariness that had previously reigned in views on history and politics were replaced by a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how, in consequence of the growth of productive forces, out of one system of social life another and higher system develops—how capitalism, for instance, grows out of feudalism.

Just as man's knowledge reflects nature (i.e., developing matter), which exists independently of him, so man's *social knowledge* (i.e., his various views and doctrines—philosophical, religious, political and so forth) reflects the *economic system* of society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of the modern European states serve to strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

Marx's philosophy is a consummate philosophical materialism which has provided mankind, and especially the working class, with powerful instruments of knowledge.

II

Having recognised that the economic system is the foundation on which the political superstructure is erected, Marx devoted his greatest attention to the study of this economic system. Marx's principal work, *Capital*, is devoted to a study of the economic system of modern, i.e., capitalist, society.

Classical political economy, before Marx, evolved in England, the most developed of the capitalist countries. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, by their investigations of the economic system, laid the foundations of the *labour theory of value*. Marx continued their work; he provided a proof of the theory and developed it consistently. He showed that the value of every commodity is determined by the quantity of socially necessary labour time spent on its production.

Where the bourgeois economists saw a relation between things (the exchange of one commodity for another) Marx revealed a *relation between people*. The exchange of commodities expresses the connection between individual producers through the market. *Money* signifies that the connection is becoming closer and closer, inseparably uniting the entire economic life of the individual producers into one whole. *Capital* signifies a further development of this connection: man's labour-power becomes a commodity. The wage-worker sells his labour-power to the owner of land, factories and instruments of labour. The worker spends one part of the day covering the cost of maintaining himself and his family (wages), while the other part of the day he works without remuneration, creating for the capitalist *surplus-value*, the source of profit, the source of the wealth of the capitalist class.

The doctrine of surplus-value is the corner-stone of Marx's economic theory.

Capital, created by the labour of the worker, crushes the worker, ruining small proprietors and creating an army of unemployed. In industry, the victory of large-scale production is immediately apparent, but the same phenomenon is also to be observed in agriculture, where the superiority of large-scale capitalist agriculture is enhanced, the use of machinery increases and the peasant economy, trapped by money-capital, declines and falls into ruin under the burden of its backward technique. The decline of small-scale production assumes different forms in agriculture, but the decline itself is an indisputable fact.

By destroying small-scale production, capital leads to an increase in productivity of labour and to the creation of a monopoly position for the associations of big capitalists. Production itself becomes more and more social—hundreds of thousands and millions of workers become bound together in a regular economic organism—but the product of this collective labour is appropriated by a handful of capitalists. Anarchy of production, crises, the furious chase after markets and the insecurity of existence of the mass of the population are intensified.

By increasing the dependence of the workers on capital, the capitalist system creates the great power of united labour.

Marx traced the development of capitalism from embryonic commodity economy, from simple exchange, to its highest forms, to large-scale production.

And the experience of all capitalist countries, old and new, year by year demonstrates clearly the truth of this Marxian doctrine to increasing numbers of workers.

Capitalism has triumphed all over the world, but this triumph is only the prelude to the triumph of labour over capital.

III

When feudalism was overthrown and "*free*" capitalist society appeared in the world, it at once became apparent that this freedom meant a new system of oppression and exploitation of the working people. Various socialist doctrines immediately emerged as a reflection of and protest against this oppression. Early socialism, however, was *utopian* socialism. It criticised capitalist society, it condemned and damned it, it dreamed of its destruction, it had visions of a better order and endeavoured to convince the rich of the immorality of exploitation.

But utopian socialism could not indicate the real solution. It could not explain the real nature of wage-slavery under capitalism, it could not reveal the laws of capitalist development, or show what *social force* is capable of becoming the creator of a new society.

Meanwhile, the stormy revolutions which everywhere in Europe, and especially in France, accompanied the fall of feudalism, of serfdom, more and more clearly revealed the *struggle of classes* as the basis and the driving force of all development.

Not a single victory of political freedom over the feudal class was won except against desperate resistance. Not a single capitalist country evolved on a more or less free and democratic basis except by a life-and-death struggle between the various classes of capitalist society.

The genius of Marx lies in his having been the first to deduce from this the lesson world history teaches and to apply that lesson consistently. The deduction he made is the doctrine of the *class struggle*.

People always have been the foolish victims of deception and self-deception in politics, and they always will be until they have learnt to seek out the *interests* of some class or other behind all moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises. Champions of reforms and improvements will always be fooled by the defenders of the old order until they realise that every old institution, however barbarous and rotten it may appear to be, is kept going by the forces of certain ruling classes. And there is *only one* way of smashing the resistance of those classes, and that is to find, in the very society which surrounds us, the forces which can—and, owing to their social position, *must*—constitute the power capable of sweeping away the old and creating the new, and to enlighten and organise those forces for the struggle.

Marx's philosophical materialism alone has shown the proletariat the way out of the spiritual slavery in which all oppressed classes have hitherto languished. Marx's economic theory alone has explained the true position of the proletariat in the general system of capitalism.

Independent organisations of the proletariat are multiplying all over the world, from America to Japan and from Sweden to South Africa. The proletariat is becoming enlightened and educated by waging its class struggle; it is ridding itself of the prejudices of bourgeois society; it is rallying its ranks ever more closely and is learning to gauge the measure of its successes; it is steeling its forces and is growing irresistibly.

Prosveshcheniye No. 3,
March, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the *Prosveshcheniye* text

BIG ACHIEVEMENT OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

We know that the great Chinese Republic, established at the cost of such sacrifice by progressive democrats among the Asian masses, recently encountered very grave financial difficulties. The six "Great" Powers, which are considered civilised nations, but which in reality follow the most reactionary policies, formed a financial consortium which suspended the granting of a loan to China.

The point is that the Chinese revolution did not evoke among the European bourgeoisie any enthusiasm for freedom and democracy—only the proletariat can entertain that feeling, which is alien to the knights of profit; it gave rise to the urge to *plunder* China, partition her and take away some of her territories. This "consortium" of the six Powers (Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States) was trying to make China bankrupt in order to weaken and undermine the republic.

The *collapse* of this reactionary consortium is a big success for the young republic, which enjoys the sympathy of the working masses the world over. The President of the United States has announced that his government will no longer support the consortium and will officially *recognise* the Republic of China in the near future. The American banks have now *left* the consortium, and America will give China much-needed financial support, opening the Chinese market to American capital and thereby facilitating the introduction of reforms in China.

Influenced by America, Japan has also changed her policy towards China. At first, Japan would not even allow Sun Yat-sen to enter the country. Now the visit has taken place, and all Japanese democrats enthusiastically welcome an

alliance with republican China; the conclusion of that *alliance* is now on the order of the day. The Japanese bourgeoisie, like the American, has come to realise that it stands to profit more from a policy of peace with China than from a policy of plundering and partitioning the Chinese Republic.

The collapse of the robber consortium is, of course, a defeat of no mean importance for Russia's reactionary foreign policy.

Pravda No. 68, March 22, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

OLD PROBLEMS AND THE SENILE DECAY OF LIBERALISM

Deputy Shingaryov, one of the most prominent Cadets,[4] recently delivered a lecture in St. Petersburg on "The New Duma and Old Problems", a lively, interesting and topical subject.

As is the custom, our Cadet trounced the Octobrists.[5] "The Octobrists", he exclaimed, "hesitate to associate themselves with the Right wing and dare not associate with the Left" (*Rech*[6] No. 70). Our bold (bold, that is, before a democratic audience) Cadet apparently regards the Progressists as belonging to the "Left". But Mr. Shingaryov remained silent on the fact that three quarters of these closest friends and political comrades-in-arms of the Cadets are themselves Octobrists.

He wants democrats to regard the Cadets as "Lefts" *notwithstanding* the permanent and very close bloc that actually exists between the Cadets and the Progressists, who stand *half way* between the Cadets and the Octobrists! In other words—the Cadets are angling for the democrats although they are themselves actually held in captivity by the Progressists, who are notoriously *anti*-democratic.

"The torpor reminds one of the state of passengers in a train that has been held up at a wayside station," said Mr. Shingaryov, speaking of the Fourth Duma. "To shake off their torpor and get the train going the passengers would have to clear the way themselves. But to get the heavy legislative machine going, the strength of the passengers alone is not enough. There are three padlocks on our reforms—the law of June 3, the upper chamber and the fact that the executive authorities are not responsible. How these three padlocks will be opened, whether in peace and quietness or in some other way, history will show. Our contemporaries cannot remain absolute non-participants; they must all pull together" (*Rech* No. 70).

References to history are convenient! Mr. Shingaryov and the Cadets refer to history *in the same way* as those people about whom Marx said that they defend the whip because it is a historical whip.[7]

"History will," of course, "show *how* the padlocks will be opened"; that is an incontestable and fruitless truism. It is an excuse deriving from senile decay. A politician must be able to say *which* class owns the padlocks and which classes must open them and *by what means*.

"History will show" exactly what it showed seven and a half years ago—the fruitlessness of liberal reformism and liberal dreams of living in peace with the class that owns the "padlocks".

Pravda No. 71, March 26, 1913
Signed: *M.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE "OIL HUNGER"[8]

The question of the "oil hunger", the inordinate increase in the price of oil and the criminal conspiracy of the oil magnates for the purpose of fleecing the consumer, has aroused quite legitimate interest and quite understandable indignation in the Duma, and to a still greater degree outside the Duma.

The duel between the Minister of Commerce and Industry, who in a faintly disguised form *defended* the oil kings of the syndicate, and Mr. Markov the Second, who furiously and ardently expressed the hurt feelings of the noble feudal landowners—this duel (at the State Duma sitting on March 22) deserves the particular attention of the working class and all democrats. The duel throws a bright light on the relations as a whole that exist between the two "ruling" classes of Russia, the two so-called "higher" (but actually very low, despicable, plundering) classes, the class of feudal landowners and the class of financial tycoons.

It would seem at first glance that the question of the oil syndicate is an isolated one. But that is not so. Actually it is only a manifestation of the general and fundamental question of the government of Russia (or rather the plunder of Russia) by the two commanding classes. The speech by Markov the Second was a magnificent reply to the defender of the oil "kings" given from the standpoint of a *diehard*[9] who was cheated when the prey was divided. No wonder Mr. Markov the Second could not "behold himself", could not look at himself (and his landowning friends) in the mirror at the time of his speech. I shall try to do Mr. Markov the Second a service—I will place a mirror in front of him. I will draw him a portrait of himself. I will show that the

"quarrel" between Markov the Second and Khvostov, on the one hand and the oil kings, the tycoons of the kerosene syndicate, the millionaires of Baku, on the other, is a *domestic* quarrel, a quarrel between *two* plunderers of the people's property. "The falling-out of lovers is the renewing of love." The Minister and Messrs. Nobel & Co., on the one hand, and Messrs. Khvostov, Markov and their friends in the Senate,[10] the Council of State, etc., on the other, are "*lovers*". But the tens of millions of workers and ruined peasants of Russia get a rough deal from this sweet and loving lot!

What lies at the bottom of the oil question?

First of all it is the shameless inflation of oil prices by the oil kings accompanied by the artificial *curtailment* of oil-well and refinery productivity by these "knights" of capitalist profit.

The chief figures illustrating these points have been quoted in the Duma, but I must repeat them in brief to make my further exposition quite clear. The price of oil was six kopeks a pood* in 1902. By 1904 it had risen to fourteen kopeks. Then the price "race" became all the merrier and, after the Revolution of 1905, the price of a pood of oil rose to twenty-one kopeks in 1908-09 and to *thirty-eight kopeks* in 1912.

Thus the price has increased *more than sixfold* in ten years! In the same period the extraction of oil has *decreased* from 600-700 million poods in 1900-02 to 500-585 million poods in 1908-12.

These figures are worth remembering. They deserve some thought. A reduction of output in a decade of tremendous upward leaps in world production, accompanied by *a more than sixfold* price increase.

The Minister of Commerce and Industry put forward unbelievably weak arguments in defence of these merchants and industrialists who are acting in collusion.

"There is an increased demand for fuel," he said. "There is an increased demand for oil from the automobile and aircraft industry." And he comforted us and the Russian people by saying that it is a "world-wide" phenomenon.

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* Pood = 36.11 lbs.—*Ed.*

"What about America?" we ask. This is a question that arises naturally because everybody knows that America is Russia's only serious competitor in oil production. In 1900 Russia and America together produced over nine-tenths of the world's oil and in 1910 they produced over eight-tenths.

If it is a matter of a "world-wide" phenomenon, Mr. Minister, *the same* must also be true of America? In order to create an *impression* on inattentive listeners, the Minister, when defending the conspiring oil plunderers, quoted figures for America ... *but only for two years*! During the two past years the price of oil in America, and in Rumania, too, has doubled.

Very good, Mr. Minister! Why not make your comparison complete? If you want to draw comparisons do so properly. Don't play with figures. You must take the figures for America *for the same period* as that for which the figures for Russia have been given. Surely it must be obvious that this is the most fundamental, the most elementary condition, the very ABC of every conscientious application of statistics!

In Russia in ten years prices have increased *more than sixfold* as compared with the lowest price, that of 1902, quoted by the Minister himself. And in America? Nothing like *such* a rise in prices has occurred. Between 1900 and 1910 the price in America *was reduced*. During recent years it has remained firm.

What, then, is the result? The price has been doubled in America and *increased sixfold* in Russia. In 1900 the output of oil in America was *less* than in Russia and in 1910 it was *three times greater* than in Russia!

This is something the Minister, in his clumsy defence of the oil millionaires' conspiracy, did not want to say. The fact is there, however. Whatever figures you take, there can be no doubt that the rise in prices in America for the past ten years has been incomparably smaller than in Russia, while the output has increased tremendously at a time of disgraceful stagnation or even a step backward in Russia.

We see immediately how little truth and how much untruth there is in our Minister's reference to the "world-wide" phenomenon of price increase. Yes, there are higher prices everywhere. Yes, there are the causes, common to all capitalism, that give rise to it.

The situation is *intolerable* in Russia, however, because in our country it is on oil that the price increase is immeasurably greater, and because in the oil industry we have stagnation instead of increased output. The situation is *absolutely intolerable* in Russia because we see, instead of a broad, free and rapid development of capitalism, stagnation and decay. High prices are therefore a hundred times more malignant in Russia.

Russia has a population of 170,000,000 and America 90,000,000, i.e., a little more than half. America now extracts *three times* more oil than we do and *eighteen times* more coal. Judging by the wages of the workers, living standards in America are *four times* higher than in Russia.

Is it not clear that the Minister's statement to the effect that the evil is a world-wide phenomenon contains a glaring untruth? The evil bears four times, if not ten times, *more heavily* on Russia.

Written not earlier than
March 26 (April 8), 1913

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January 21, 1940

Published according to
the manuscript

THE CADET ASSEMBLY BILL

Among the bills on civil liberties submitted to the Duma by the Cadets there is one on assembly.

The Cadets consider themselves a democratic party. They must realise that an assembly bill submitted to the Fourth Duma has a purely propaganda value, i.e., that the purpose of its submission to the house is the propaganda, dissemination and explanation of the principles of freedom of assembly.

It is from this point of view that the Cadet bill must be appraised—will it help explain to the population of Russia the significance of freedom of assembly, the importance of that freedom and the conditions under which it can be achieved?

It will not. The bill has been drawn up by liberal civil servants, *not* by democrats. It contains a mass of absurd, bureaucratic rules, but not what is needed from the standpoint of democracy.

Meetings are forbidden on railway lines (§ 3) or within a distance of one verst* of the building where the State Duma is in session, etc. (§ 4); a preliminary announcement is required in towns but not in villages (§§ 6 and 7), and so on—what is all this? What is the need for all this miserable, ridiculous, pitiful bureaucratic nonsense?

It has all been copied from European *counter-revolutionary* laws, every bit of it reeks of periods when democracy was under suspicion or suppressed, and it is all hopelessly out of date. It is in the towns, for example, that public meetings are announced in the newspapers—so why this idiotic fuss

* Verst = 0.66 miles.—*Ed.*

about "announcements"? For the sole reason that the Cadets want to show the powers that be that they, the Cadets, have a "statesmanly" point of view, that they are "people of law and order" (i.e., enemies of democracy), and that they are "also able to appreciate" civil service pettifoggery.

There is nothing important or serious in the bill as far as present-day democracy is concerned. What the masses need are premises in which to hold meetings. We need a *law* to the effect that, on the demand of, say, a definite small number of citizens, *all* public buildings, schools, etc., *must* be made available to the people for meetings, free and unhindered, in the evenings and, in general, in non-working hours. This is done in France, and there can be no other obstacles to this democratic custom than the barbarity of the Purishkeviches.

The fact of the matter is that the whole spirit of the Cadet hill on civil liberties, its whole content, is *not* democratic but liberal bureaucratic.

Pravda No. 72, March 27, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE BALKAN WAR AND BOURGEOIS CHAUVINISM

The Balkan War is coming to an end. The capture of Adrianople is a conclusive victory for the Bulgarians, and the problem's centre of gravity has shifted from the theatre of operations to that of the squabbles and intrigues of the so-called Great Powers.

The Balkan War is one link in the chain of world events marking the collapse of the medieval state of affairs in Asia and East Europe. To form united national states in the Balkans, shake off the oppression of the local feudal rules and completely liberate the Balkan peasants of all nationalities from the yoke of the landowners—such was the historic task confronting the Balkan peoples.

The Balkan peoples could have carried out this task ten times more easily than they are doing now and with a hundred times fewer sacrifices by forming a Federative Balkan Republic. National oppression, national bickering and incitement on the ground of religious differences would have been impossible under complete and consistent democracy. The Balkan peoples would have been assured of truly rapid, extensive and free development.

What was the real historical reason for settling urgent Balkan problems by means of a war, a war guided by bourgeois and dynastic interests? The chief cause was the weakness of the proletariat in the Balkans, and also the reactionary influence and pressure of the powerful European bourgeoisie. They are afraid of real freedom both in their own countries and in the Balkans; their only aim is profit at other people's expense; they stir up chauvinism and national enmity to facilitate their policy of plunder and to impede the free development of the oppressed classes of the Balkans.

Russian chauvinism over the Balkan events is no less disgusting than that of Europe. And the concealed, prettified chauvinism of the Cadets, coloured with liberal phrases, is more disgusting and more harmful than the crude chauvinism of the Black-Hundred newspapers. Those newspapers openly attack Austria—in that most backward of European countries the peoples (say we in parenthesis) are ensured far greater liberty than in Russia. The Cadet *Rech*, however, said on the occasion of the capture of Adrianople: "The new circumstances give Russian diplomacy every opportunity of showing greater firmness...."

Fine "democrats", who pretend not to understand that the only firmness that can be spoken of here is firmness in the pursuit of chauvinist aims! No wonder Milyukov and Yefremov, Guchkov, Bennigsen, Krupensky and Balashov got on well together at a dinner given by Rodzyanko on March 14. Nationalists, Octobrists, Cadets—these are but different shades of the disgusting bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism that are irrevocably hostile to liberty.

Pravda No. 74, March 28, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text



Разговоры.

Первый подпольный. Я наблюдаю, как шу
вспыхивает, борьбу среди рабочих у бр. „мен-
шевиков и семерки". Смешная штука до обо-
жания глядеть. Сопоставьте, на минуту вообра-
зите, отсутствие буржуазной и черной гвардии.
... И гляди-ка, что? Мне кажется, что борьба при
этой разрывной форме, что она вырождается в склоку,
в дрязги, что результатом будет всякая скверная
уголовная дискредитация.

Второй подпольный. Ничего не понимаю.
Где мы видели на свете борьбу без гвардии
либо сверху, исходящей от не принятия
разрывной формы? Имеете в виду, что борьбой

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Conversations". March-April 1913

Reduced

CONVERSATION

First Bystander. I am following, as closely as I can, the struggle among the workers over "the six and the seven".[11] I try to follow both newspapers. I compare, as far as possible, the repercussions in the bourgeois and Black-Hundred newspapers.... And d'you know what I think? It seems to me that the struggle is taking grave forms, that it is degenerating into squabbles and bickerings, and that the result will, in any case, be tremendous demoralisation.

Second Bystander. I don't understand you. Whoever heard of a struggle anywhere that did *not* become grave if it was over something really serious? It is because the struggle is over a serious problem that it cannot stop at "a slight quarrel". Those who are used to denying, and who continue to deny, the principles of party organisation will not surrender without the most desperate resistance. Desperate resistance always and everywhere engenders "grave forms of struggle", engenders *attempts* to shift the dispute from the sphere of principles to that of squabbles. What if it does? Because of that do you want us to reject the struggle for the fundamental principles of party organisation?

First Bystander. You are wandering away a bit from the question I raised and are in too much of a hurry to "go over to the offensive". Every workers' group on both sides is in a hurry to "dash off" a resolution, and there is something almost like competition developing between them to see who can outdo the other in the use of strong language. So much vituperation makes the working-class press repulsive to large numbers of working people who are seeking the light of socialism and who, perhaps, throw down the newspaper with a feeling of confusion, or even a feeling of shame for

socialism.... They may even be disappointed in socialism for a long time. A slanging match creates a sort of "*un*-natural selection" that brings the "fist-fight specialists" to the fore.... Prowess in abusing one's opponent is encouraged on both sides. Is *this* the sort of education the socialist party should give the proletariat? Does this not turn out to be approval of, or at least connivance at, opportunism, since opportunism is the sacrifice of the *basic* interests of the working-class movement to momentary success. The basic interests of the working-class movement are being sacrificed to momentary success by both sides.... Instead of experiencing the joy of socialist work, of being inspired by it and showing a serious attitude towards it, the socialists themselves are driving the masses away from socialism. Willy-nilly, those bitter words come to mind—the proletariat will achieve socialism *despite* the socialists.

Second Bystander. We are both outsiders, that is, neither of us is a direct participant in the struggle. But bystanders who are trying to understand what is happening before their eyes may react to the struggle in two ways. Looking on from the outside, one may see only what one might call the outward aspect of the struggle; speaking figuratively, one may see only clenched fists, distorted faces and ugly scenes; one may condemn it all, one may weep and wail on account of it. But one can also, looking on from the outside, understand the *meaning* of the struggle that is going on, which is slightly, if you will excuse my saying so, more interesting and historically more significant than the scenes and pictures of the so-called excesses or extremes of the struggle. There can be no struggle without enthusiasm and no enthusiasm without extremes; and as far as I'm concerned I hate most of all people who focus their attention on "extremes" in the struggle of classes, parties and factions. I always get the impulse—pardon me again—to shout at those people: "I don't care if you drink, as long as you understand what you are doing."[12]

And this is about something big, historically big. A working-class party is being built up. Workers' independence, the influence of the workers on *their own* parliamentary group, decisions by the workers themselves on questions of their own party—such is the great historical significance of what

is going on; the mere wish is becoming *fact* before our very eyes. You are afraid of "extremes" and you regret them, but I watch in admiration a struggle that is actually making the working class of Russia more mature and adult, and I am mad about one thing only—that I am a bystander, that I cannot plunge into the midst of that struggle....

First Bystander. And into the midst of the "extremes", eh? And if the "extremes" lead to the fabrication of resolutions will you also proclaim "hatred" for the people who draw attention to it, who are indignant about it and who demand that such things should be stopped at all costs?

Second Bystander. Don't try to frighten me, please! You won't frighten me, anyway! You really are getting like those people who are ready to condemn publicity because of some false information that has been published. I remember once in *Pravda*[13] a report of the political dishonesty of a certain Social-Democrat was published; some time afterwards the report was refuted. I can well imagine what that Social-Democrat's feelings must have been in the period between publication and refutal! But publicity is a sword that itself heals the wounds it makes. There will be fabrication of resolutions, you say? The falsifiers will be exposed and thrown out, that's all. Serious battles are not staged without a field hospital somewhere nearby. But to allow yourself to be scared, or your nerves shattered by "field hospital" scenes is something unpardonable. If you're scared of wolves, keep out of the forest.

As to opportunism, that is, ignoring the basic aims of socialism, you're putting the blame on the wrong side. According to you, those basic aims are some "angelic ideal" that has nothing to do with the "sinful" struggle for the cause of the day, for the urgent matters of the moment. To look on matters that way is simply to turn socialism into a sweet phrase, into saccharine sentimentalising. Every struggle for every matter of the moment must be *intimately connected* with basic aims. It is only this understanding of the historical meaning of the struggle that makes it possible, by deepening and sharpening it, to get rid of that negative side, that "prowess", that "fist-fighting" which is inevitable wherever there is a crowd making a noise, shouting and shoving, but which disappears of itself.

You speak of a socialist party educating the proletariat. In the present struggle *the very* question at issue is that of defending the *basic* principles of party life. The question of *what* policy *it* wants conducted in the Duma, what attitude *it* has to an open party or an underground one, and whether it considers the Duma group to be *above* the party or vice versa, is confronting every workers' study circle starkly, in a form that demands an immediate and direct answer. This, indeed, is the ABC of party existence, it is a question of whether the party is to be or not to be.

Socialism is not a ready-made system that will be mankind's benefactor. Socialism is the class struggle of the present-day proletariat as it advances from one objective today to another objective tomorrow *for the sake* of its basic objective, to which it is *coming nearer* every day. In this country called Russia, socialism is today passing through the stage in which the politically conscious workers are themselves completing the organisation of a working-class party despite the attempts of the liberal intelligentsia and the "Duma Social-Democratic intelligentsia" to *prevent* that work of organisation.

The liquidators are *out to prevent* the workers from building up their own working-class party—that is the meaning and significance of the struggle between "the six and the seven". They cannot, however, prevent it. The struggle is a hard one, but the workers' success is assured. Let the weak and the frightened waver on account of the "extremes" of the struggle—tomorrow they will see for themselves that not a step further could have been taken without going through this struggle.

Written in March-April 1913

First published May 5, 1932 in *Pravda* No. 123 Signed: *K—v*

Published according to the manuscript

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA AND THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT[14]

A NEWSPAPER REPORT

A few days ago in Cracow a report was delivered by Comrade Lenin, one of the most outstanding leaders of the Russian Social-Democrats. Here follows a brief outline of the report; for the information of our Galician readers we must add that Lenin is the leader of the so-called "Bolshevik" trend, that is, the more radical, implacable trend in the Russian Social-Democratic Party.

While describing the working-class movement in Russia, the speaker noted its great importance to the Western countries as well, since there was no doubt that in the period of socialist revolutions events there would resemble those that had taken place in Russia. As an example, the speaker mentioned the sudden transition from relative calm to the emergence of mass movements. In 1895 the number of strikers in Russia had been only 40,000 whereas in 1905 there had been 400,000 striking workers in January alone; in the course of the whole year the figure had increased to three million.

The present political situation in Russia had come about as a result of revolutionary experience, as a result of the class battles that had taken place at that time. A certain Japanese had called the Russian revolution "an impotent revolution under an incompetent government". The government, however, had made full use of the experience of the revolution. It would suffice to mention the attitude of the government to the peasantry. At first, when the law governing the elections to the First Duma had been drawn up, the government had placed great hopes in the peasantry as a quiet, patriarchal element. But when it turned out that the

Russian peasant, fighting for land, is by nature, not a socialist indeed, as some Narodnik utopians had thought, but, at any rate, a democrat, the government made a *volte-face* and changed the election law.[15]

The present Duma, he said, was no plaything, but an actual organ of power of the reactionary strata, the tsarist bureaucracy allied to the feudal landowners and the top bourgeoisie.

What had been the role of the Russian liberals? In the First and Second Dumas the liberals had tried to pacify the peasants, to divert them from the revolutionary to the so-called constitutional path. It was obvious, however, that the purchase of part of the landed estates, proposed by the Cadets, was only a fresh attempt to plunder and deceive the Russian peasant. This attempt had failed mainly owing to the tactics of the Social-Democrats in the Duma, who had been persistently urging the peasants leftward.

The October strike had been a turning-point in Russian liberalism. Before the revolution the liberals had said that "the revolution must become the ruling power" (Struve), but they later changed their tone, allegedly in fear of the excesses of the revolution although they knew perfectly well that the only "excesses" were those of the government. The Octobrists departed from liberalism and went over directly to the side of the government, serving the government as its lackeys. It was at that time that Guchkov, leader of the Octobrists, had written to Prince Trubetskoi that further revolutionary explosions menaced the very well-being of the bourgeoisie.

Such was the class basis of contemporary counter-revolution. Acts of lawlessness were committed quite openly and the class character of the government had been exposed. The government handed out praise and medals for lawless acts against revolutionary elements. The speaker gave an example: during the recent search of Deputy Petrovsky's apartment the police, in violation of the law, had locked him in a room, and when a question was asked about it in the Duma, the Minister said that they should be grateful to the police for such zeal.

Stolypin had learned from the experience of class battles during the revolution and had launched his notorious agrar-

ian policy of stratifying the peasants into affluent petty bourgeois and semi-proletarian elements. This new policy was a mockery of the old "patriarchal slogans" of Katkov and Pobedonostsev.[16] The government, however, could not have acted otherwise.

The government, therefore, relied on the landowners and the terrified bourgeoisie in introducing the present counter-revolutionary system. It was true that the "united nobility"[17] had tried to get the Duma disbanded as far back as 1906, but the government had then waited before making the coup, expecting results from its agrarian policy in respect of the peasants and changes in the psychology of a bourgeoisie terrified by the revolution.

This counter-revolutionary system had now *played itself out*, had exhausted its social forces. Circumstances had arisen that made any social reforms in contemporary Russia impossible. The Duma was concerned with trivialities; if it did adopt any decision, the Council of State and the Court annulled it or changed it beyond all recognition. *There were no possibilities of effecting reforms in contemporary Russia*. This made clear the demagogy of Cadet tactics in submitting to the Duma various "bills of principle" for all kinds of liberties; they introduced them because they knew that the Duma could under no circumstances adopt them. "We have a constitution, thank God!" Milyukov had exclaimed There could not be any reforms under the existing social system although Russia's internal situation was pitiful and her backwardness, even as compared with Asia, was obvious. Even the Octobrist press had said "it is impossible to go on living like this any longer".

All this made clear the tasks of a proletariat *faced with another revolution*. The mood was rising. In 1910 the number of strikers, according to official statistics, had been only 40,000, but in 1912 it had been 680,000, of which 500,000 had taken part in political strikes.

This made clear the tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats. They would have to strengthen their organisation, their press, etc.; that was the ABC of socialist tactics long since elaborated in the West, especially by the German Social-Democrats. The primary task of the R.S.D.L.P., however, was to train the masses *for democratic revolution*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This task was no longer on the order of the day in the West; theirs was an altogether different task, that of mobilisation, of mustering the masses and training and organising them for the abolition of the capitalist system.

If attention were concentrated on the question of the approaching revolution in Russia and on the tasks of the Social-Democrats in that revolution, the essence of the dispute with those known as "liquidators" among the Russian Social-Democrats would be understood. Liquidationism was not the invention of a section of the Russian Social-Democrats; the first liquidators were the "Narodniks", who in 1906 published their slogans in the magazine *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[18]—down with the underground movement, down with the republic! The liquidators wanted to abolish the illegal party and organise an open party. That was ridiculous, especially if we bear in mind that even the Progressists (a mixture of Octobrists and Cadets) dared not ask to be legalised. Under such circumstances the liquidators' slogans were downright treachery. It stood to reason that an illegal party should take advantage of all legal opportunities—the press, the Duma, even the insurance law[19]—but only for the purpose of extending agitation and organisation; the substance of the agitation must remain revolutionary. *There must be a struggle against the illusion that there was a constitution in Russia, and reformist slogans should be counterposed by the slogan of revolution, of a republic!*

Such was the content of Comrade Lenin's report. One of those present asked him about his attitude to the national question; the speaker said that the Russian Social-Democratic Party recognised in full the right of every nation to "self-determination", to decide its own fate, even to secede from Russia. The Russian revolution and the cause of democracy were not in any way connected (as was the case in Germany) with the cause of unification, centralisation. The democratisation of Russia depended not on the national but on the agrarian question.

At the same time Comrade Lenin stressed the necessity for full unity throughout the revolutionary army of the proletariat of different nationalities in the struggle for the full democratisation of the country. Only on that basis could the national question be solved, as in America, Bel-

gium and Switzerland. The speaker dealt polemically with Renner's theses on the national question and came out sharply against the slogan of cultural-national autonomy. There were people in Russia who maintained that Russia's further development would follow the Austrian path, a path that was slow and rotten. But, said the speaker, we must beware of any national struggle within Social-Democracy because it would militate against the great task of revolutionary struggle; in that respect the national struggle in Austria should be a warning to us.[20] The Caucasian Social-Democrats should be a model for Russia; they conducted propaganda simultaneously in the Georgian, Armenian Tatar and Russian languages.[21]

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EDUCATED DEPUTIES

At the evening sitting on April 2, the Octobrist L. G. Lyuts said, when objecting to the working-class deputies' demand for a discussion of the question asked about the Lena events[22]:

> "Two days from now will be the anniversary of the events on the Lena. Apparently the Social-Democrats are trying to *budirovat* the feelings of the workers in order to encourage excesses...."

The French word *bouder*, rendered in Russian by *budirovat* means *to sulk*, *to pout*. Mr. Lyuts, apparently, derives *budirovat* from *budorazhit* (excite) or, perhaps, *vozbudit* (incite). How the bourgeois deputies and the bourgeois press laughed when a peasant in the First Duma used the foreign word "prerogatives" in the sense of barriers ("*rogatki*" in Russ.—*Ed.*)! The mistake was all the more pardonable since various prerogatives enjoyed by the ruling classes are actually barriers in Russian life. Mr. Lyuts' educational attainments, however, did not "*vozbudirovat*" the laughter of his educated friends or their press.

Pravda No. 83, April 10, 1913
Signed: *B.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

"WHO STANDS TO GAIN?"

There is a Latin tag *cui prodest*? meaning "who stands to gain?" When it is not immediately apparent which political or social groups, forces or alignments advocate certain proposals, measures, etc., one should always ask: "Who stands to gain?"

It is not important *who* directly advocates a particular policy, since under the present noble system of capitalism any money-bag can always "hire", buy or enlist any number of lawyers, writers and even parliamentary deputies, professors, parsons and the like to defend any views. We live in an age of commerce, when the bourgeoisie have no scruples about trading in honour or conscience. There are also simpletons who out of stupidity or by force of habit defend views prevalent in certain bourgeois circles.

Yes, indeed! In politics it is not so important *who* directly advocates particular views. What is important is *who stands to gain* from these views, proposals, measures.

For instance, "Europe", the states that call themselves "civilised", are now engaged in a mad armaments hurdle-race. In thousands of ways, in thousands of newspapers, from thousands of pulpits, they shout and clamour about patriotism, culture, native land, peace, and progress—and all in order to justify new expenditures of tens and hundreds of millions of rubles for all manner of weapons of destruction—for guns, dreadnoughts, etc.

"Ladies and gentlemen," one feels like saying about all these phrases mouthed by patriots, so-called. "Put no faith in phrase-mongering, it is better to see *who stands to gain*!"

A short while ago the renowned British firm Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. published its annual balance-sheet. The

firm is engaged mainly in the manufacture of armaments of various kinds. A profit was shown of £877,000, *about 8 million rubles*, and a dividend of *12.5 per cent* was declared! About 900,000 rubles were set aside as reserve capital, and so on and so forth.

That's where the millions and milliards squeezed out of the workers and peasants for armaments go. Dividends of 12.5 per cent mean that capital is *doubled* in 8 years. And this is in addition to all kinds of fees to directors, etc. Armstrong in Britain, Krupp in Germany, Creusot in France, Cockerill in Belgium—how many of them are there in all the "civilised" countries? And the countless host of contractors?

These are the ones *who stand to gain* from the whipping up of chauvinism, from the chatter about "patriotism" (cannon patriotism), about the defence of culture (with weapons destructive of culture) and so forth!

Pravda No. 84, April 11, 1913
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

IN BRITAIN

(THE SAD RESULTS OF OPPORTUNISM)

The British Labour Party, which must be distinguished from the two socialist parties in Britain, the British Socialist Party and the Independent Labour Party, is the workers' organisation that is most opportunist and soaked in the spirit of liberal-labour policy.

In Britain there is full political liberty and the socialist parties exist quite openly. But the Labour Party is the parliamentary representative of workers' organisations, of which some are non-political, and others liberal, a regular mixture of the kind our liquidators want, those who hurl so much abuse at the "underground".

The opportunism of the British Labour Party is to be explained by the specific historical conditions of the latter half of the nineteenth century in Britain, when the "aristocracy of labour" shared to some extent in the particularly high profits of British capital. Now these conditions are becoming a thing of the past. Even the Independent Labour Party, i.e., the *socialist* opportunists in Britain, realises that the Labour Party has landed in a morass.

In the last issue of *The Labour Leader*, the organ of the Independent Labour Party, we and the following edifying communication. Naval estimates are being discussed in the British Parliament. The socialists introduce a motion to *reduce* them. The bourgeoisie, of course, quash it by voting *for* the government.

And the Labour M.P.s?

Fifteen vote for the reduction, i.e., against the government; 21 *are absent*; 4 vote *for the government*, i.e., against the reduction!

Two of the four try to justify their action on the grounds that the workers in their constituencies earn their living in the armament industries.

There you have a striking example of how opportunism leads to the *betrayal* of socialism, the *betrayal* of the workers' cause. As we have already indicated, condemnation of this treachery is spreading ever wider among British socialists. From the example of other people's mistakes, the Russian workers, too, should learn to understand how fatal are opportunism and liberal-labour policy.

Pravda No. 85, April 12, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

CIVILISED EUROPEANS AND SAVAGE ASIANS

The well-known English Social-Democrat, Rothstein, relates in the German labour press an instructive and typical incident that occurred in British India. This incident reveals better than all arguments why the revolution is growing apace in that country with its more than 300 million inhabitants.

Arnold, a British journalist, who brings out a newspaper in Rangoon, a large town (with over 200,000 inhabitants) in one of the Indian provinces, published an article entitled: "A Mockery of British Justice". It exposed a local British judge named Andrew. For publishing this article Arnold was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment, but he appealed and, having connections in London, was able to get the case before the highest court in Britain. The Government of India hastily "reduced" the sentence to four months and Arnold was released.

What was all the fuss about?

A British colonel named McCormick had a mistress whose servant was a little eleven-year-old Indian girl, named Aina. This gallant representative of a civilised nation had enticed Aina to his room, raped her and locked her up in his house.

It so happened that Aina's father was dying and he sent for his daughter. It was then that the village where he lived learned the whole story. The population seethed with indignation. The police were compelled to order McCormick's arrest.

But Judge Andrew released him on bail, and later acquitted him, following a disgraceful travesty of justice. The gallant colonel declared, as gentlemen of noble extraction

usually do under such circumstances, that Aina was a prostitute, in proof of which he brought five witnesses. Eight witnesses, however, brought by Aina's mother were not even examined by Judge Andrew.

When the journalist Arnold was tried for libel, the President of the Court, Sir ("His Worship") Charles Fox, refused to allow him to call witnesses in his defence.

It must be clear to everyone that thousands and millions of such cases occur in India. Only absolutely exceptional circumstances enabled the "libeller" Arnold (the son of an influential London journalist) to get out of prison and secure publicity for the case.

Do not forget that the British Liberals put their "best" people at the head of the Indian administration. Not long ago the Viceroy of India, the chief of the McCormicks, Andrews and Foxes, was John Morley, the well-known radical author, a "luminary of European learning", a "most honourable man" in the eyes of all European and Russian liberals.

The "*European*" spirit has already awakened in Asia, the peoples of Asia have become democratic-minded.

Pravda No. 87, April 14, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

MERCHANT ACCOUNTANCY

The biggest millionaires, the tycoons of our big industry, belong to a "council of congresses of industrial and commercial representatives". This council of congresses issues its own periodical, *Promyshlennost i Torgovlya*.[23] The interests of our Kit Kityches[24] are defended by this journal in its ponderous, elaborate and mostly semi-literate articles.

They show particular discontent at the injustice of Zemstvo representation and Zemstvo taxation. Believe it or not, the feudal landowner is unfair to poor Kit Kitych! Here is an instructive table showing the composition of the elected membership at uyezd Zemstvo assemblies[25] (*Promyshlennost i Torgovlya*, 1913, No. 3):

	Number of members	Percentages
From the First Electoral Assembly (landed nobility)	5,508	53.4
From the Second Electoral Assembly (commercial and industrial enterprises, etc.)	1,294	12.6
Jointly from the First and Second Assemblies	290	2.8
From village communes	3,216	31.2
In 34 gubernias with Zemstvos	10,308	100.0

There is indeed a crying injustice in the matter of representation in the Zemstvos. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious and incontestable—the Zemstvos in Russia have been put entirely into the hands of the feudal landowners.

These interesting figures must give any educated person cause to ponder over the conditions that give rise to such unequal representation.

It would, of course, be ridiculous to expect the Kit Kityches and their hack writers to be capable of pondering over general political questions or to be interested in political knowledge. The only thing that interests Kit Kitych is that he pays "a lot" and a member of the nobility pays "little". The writer hired by Kit Kitych quotes the total amounts of Zemstvo impositions (as fixed by the official scale)—First Electoral Assembly (24.5 million rubles in 34 gubernias with Zemstvos), Second Electoral Assembly (49 million rubles) and village communes (45.5 million rubles). He divides these impositions by the number of members and in this way determines "the cost of one seat"! Thus it turns out that a seat for a nobleman "costs" 4,500 rubles, for a merchant 38,000 rubles and for a peasant 14,000 rubles.

That is how the hired advocates of the merchant class argue—election rights are calmly examined as though they were an article of commerce. As though those who pay the impositions fixed by the Zemstvo thereby *purchase* the right to representation.

Of course, there actually is glaring inequality in Zemstvo impositions. The full burden of that inequality, however, is not borne by the industrialists, but by the *peasants* and workers. If the peasantry pay 45.5 million rubles that they squeeze out of their poor, exhausted, over-cultivated land while the landowners pay 24.5 million rubles, that can mean nothing but the extortion of millions of rubles *tribute* from the "muzhiks" in the form of Zemstvo impositions in addition to all their other burdens.

This the Kit Kityches do not see. What they are after is that privileges, instead of going to the nobility alone, should be shared "on an equal footing" with the merchants.

Pravda No. 90, April 20, 1913
Signed: *V. F.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A GREAT TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENT

The world-famous British chemist, William Ramsay, has discovered a method of obtaining gas directly from a coal seam. Ramsay is already negotiating with a colliery owner on the practical application of this method.

A great modern technical problem is thus approaching solution. The revolution that will be effected by this solution will be a tremendous one.

At the present time, to utilise the energy contained in it, coal is transported all over the country and burned in numerous factories and homes.

Ramsay's discovery means a gigantic technical revolution in this, perhaps the most important, branch of production in capitalist countries.

Ramsay has discovered a method of transforming coal into gas right where the coal lies, without hauling it to the surface. A similar but much simpler method is sometimes used in the mining of salt: it is not brought to the surface directly, but is dissolved in water, the solution being pumped to the top.

Ramsay's method is to transform, as it were, the coal mines into enormous distilling apparatuses for the production of gas. Gas is used to drive gas engines which can extract *twice as much* energy from coal as steam-engines can. Gas engines, in their turn, transform the energy into electricity, which modern technology can already transmit over enormous distances.

Such a technical revolution would reduce the cost of electricity to *one-fifth* or even *one-tenth* of its present price. An enormous amount of human labour now spent in extracting and distributing coal would be saved. It would be

possible to use even the poorest seams, now not being worked. The cost of lighting and heating houses would be greatly reduced.

This discovery will bring about an enormous revolution in industry.

But the consequences this revolution will have for social life as a whole under the present capitalist system will be quite different from those the discovery would yield under socialism.

Under capitalism the "release" of the labour of millions of miners engaged in extracting coal will inevitably cause mass unemployment, an enormous increase in poverty, and a worsening of the workers' conditions. And the profits of this great invention will be pocketed by the Morgans, Rockefellers, Ryabushinskys, Morozovs, and their suites of lawyers, directors, professors, and other flunkeys of capital.

Under socialism the application of Ramsay's method, which will "release" the labour of millions of miners, etc., will make it possible immediately to shorten the working day *for all* from 8 hours to, say, 7 hours and even less. The "electrification" of all factories and railways will make working conditions more hygienic, will free millions of workers from smoke, dust and dirt, and accelerate the transformation of dirty, repulsive workshops into clean, bright laboratories worthy of human beings. The electric lighting and heating of every home will relieve millions of "domestic slaves" of the need to spend three-fourths of their lives in smelly kitchens.

Capitalist technology is increasingly, day by day, *outgrowing* the social conditions which condemn the working people to wage-slavery.

Pravda No. 91, April 21, 1913
Signed: *I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A FEW WORDS ON RESULTS AND FACTS

The *Pravda* anniversary must turn the thoughts of every politically conscious worker (and, we would add, every politically conscious democrat) to the *results* achieved by the newspaper of consistent democrats and Marxists.

The question of results, of course, is connected with the question of whether the advanced workers of Russia are, in their mass, on the side of *Pravda*. As far as bourgeois subscribers are concerned a newspaper is important if it sells, it does not matter to them where it is sold or whether it serves to rally a certain class and which class; a newspaper is important to the Marxist and consistent democrat as an organ for the *enlightenment* and *consolidation* of truly advanced classes.

We are not indifferent to the question of where and how our newspaper is sold. It is most important for us to *know* whether it really does serve to enlighten and consolidate the advanced class of Russia, i.e., the working class.

To gain this *knowledge* one must look for *facts* that can provide an answer to the question.

By facts, different people understand different things. Bourgeois journalists do not hesitate to lie by omitting to cite a single *precise* and clear fact that can be verified.

Liberal working-class politicians, the liquidators, imitate the bourgeois journalists. One of them, and a leading one at that, F. D.[26] himself, wrote in *Luch*[27] No. 57 (143):

> "It is a fact that cannot be denied and one that we feel [what feeling people they are!] with pride in our day-to-day work, that our newspaper [*Luch*] is truly the organ of a good nine-tenths of the advanced, politically conscious workers of Russia."

It is worth while having a good laugh at this Khlestakov or Nozdryov,[28] and *Pravda* has already had its laugh. Mere

ridicule, however, is not enough. Workers must learn to grasp facts and verify them for *themselves* so that the Nozdryovs will not be able to deceive them or their less developed workmates.

How are facts to be sought and verified? Best of all by finding out how *Pravda* and *Luch* circulate among *workers* (and not among the liberal intelligentsia, who are liquidators almost to a man). But no such facts are available.

Let us look for some others.

Let us take the figures for *the workers' groups* that support *Pravda* and *Luch* by voluntary contributions. These figures, *published* in the two papers, are *facts*. Anybody can verify them, anybody can, by studying them, expose the Nozdryovs, of whom there are many in the world of journalism.

Pravda has once already published these facts for a half year (see No. 80 for 1912*)—for the first six months of 1912—and nobody can refute them. We now give them for *the whole of* 1912 and the beginning of 1913.

Year		Number of collections for newspapers by workers' groups		
		Pravda	*Luch*	Moscow workers' newspapers[29]
1912	1st quarter	108	7	—
"	2nd "	396	8	—
"	3rd "	81	9	—
"	4th "	35	65	5
1913	1st "	309	139	129
"	10 days of April . . .	93	28	43
	Totals	1,022	256	177

Any reader can check these figures by taking *Pravda* and *Luch* and can correct the totals if he finds a mistake.

These are real *facts* that it is worth while distinguishing from the boasting and untruths of Messrs. F. D. and other *Luch* gentlemen.

Do not these facts constitute a splendid confirmation of *Luch*'s reference to nine-tenths, made in the Nozdryov manner?

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 196-200.—*Ed.*

The "nine-tenths" *Luch* supporters, among whom there are, notoriously, the Bund members and the "upper crust" of the Letts, have not been able, in the *more than six months* of *Luch*'s existence (fourth quarter of 1912 and first quarter of 1913, plus ten days of April), to mobilise even *one half* the number of workers *Pravda* and the future Moscow newspaper have been able to. Is this not a true Nozdryov method, this conversion of an obvious *minority* into "nine-tenths"?

The workers are surrounded on all sides by such a sea of lies in the bourgeois newspapers that they must fight for the truth at all costs, they must learn to recognise falsehoods and reject them. The erroneous views of the liquidators of the workers' party must be calmly *refuted*. But an impudent Nozdryov lie, this shameless corruption of the workers, must be branded, and the liars chased out of the workers' midst.

The workers want unity in their actions. The workers are right. Without unity of action there is no salvation for the workers.

When you think of it—*how* can there be unity without the submission of the minority to the majority? Everyone realises that without it unity is impossible.

And so, even if the liquidators were not the liquidators of the Party, the workers would have to know what *views* are held by the majority. If they do not know this the workers cannot achieve *unity of action* (because frequently Party and non-Party workers have to act jointly).

The workers cannot build up *their own* party unless they ruthlessly fight every lie that is told about it. In order to expose lies it is necessary to seek *precise* facts, verify them and think about the meaning of what has been verified.

Class-conscious workers, those who oppose liquidationism, have undoubtedly taken first place in creating a working-class press. They have won an incontestable, overwhelming majority for themselves. They will treat every lie that is spread about this serious and very important question with contempt and disdain.

Pravda No. 92, April 23, 1913
Signed: *K. P.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

We know that since 1905, the government, in connection with its "new" agrarian policy in European Russia, has been making particular efforts to promote peasant resettlement to Siberia. The landowners regarded these resettlement schemes as a sort of opening of the safety valve, and as a "blunting" of the agrarian contradictions in the centre of Russia.

What has happened as a result? Has there been a blunting or a sharpening of contradictions following their transfer to a wider arena?

First of all let us cite some general figures on the resettlement of peasants to Siberia.

From 1861 to 1885 about 300,000 peasants migrated, that is, 12,000 a year; from 1886 to 1905 the number was about 1,520,000, that is, about 76,000 a year; from 1906 to 1910 it was about 2,516,075 or about 500,000 a year.

The growth in the number of peasants resettled in the counter-revolutionary period is enormous. Undoubtedly *a temporary* "rarefaction" of the atmosphere in Central Russia was bound to take place as a result.

But for *how long* and at *what cost*?

The answer to this is provided by the figures showing the *drop* in the wave of settlers that began in 1909 and the amazing *growth* in the number of those returning Here are the figures:

Year	Number of settlers (thousand)	Number returning (percentage)
1905	39	10
1906	141	4
1907	427	6
1908	665	6
1909	619	13
1910	316	36
1911*	183	60

* Eleven months.

Thus the official promoters of resettlement succeeded in rarefying the atmosphere for something like *four* years (1906-09). Then a *new crisis* began, because the huge drop in the number of settlers and the incredible increase in the number of "returnees"—36 per cent and 60 per cent—without any doubt mean a crisis, and an extremely serious one at that, one that covers an immeasurably wider arena.

Thirty-six and 60 per cent of settlers returning means a sharpening of the crisis in Russia and in Siberia. It is the poorest who return to Russia, the most unfortunate, who have lost everything and are bitterly angry. The land question must have become very acute in Siberia for it to have become impossible, despite the efforts of the government, to accommodate hundreds of thousands of settlers.

The figures quoted show without doubt, therefore, that the struggle against the 1905 agrarian crisis in Russia by means of resettlement has brought about a *postponement* of the crisis for only a very short period and at the cost of an incomparably greater sharpening and extension of the crisis, as at present.

An interesting confirmation of this conclusion drawn from dry government statistical data is a book by Mr. A. I. Komarov, a former official of the Forestry Department who was twenty-seven years in the service and took a special interest in the Siberian resettlement scheme. His book is called *The Truth About the Resettlement Scheme* (St. Petersburg, 1913. Price 60 kopeks).

It consists mainly of newspaper articles written by the author under a pseudonym for the newspaper *Novaya Rus*[30] between 1908 and 1910 in which, in a "jovial" manner, he tells a story "of state spoliation or, rather, devastation of Siberian lands and forests that makes the plunder of the Bashkirian lands that once took place seem trivial indeed".

The author's position is that of the well-intentioned official reduced to despair by the "resettlement muddle" (his newspaper articles bore that title), the plunder, ruin and impoverishment of the old inhabitants and the settlers, "the complete disorganisation of all that is called rational forestry", the flight of the settlers back to Russia and the formation of an army, "hundreds of thousands strong", of

"vagrant Russia" and, finally, the impenetrable wall of stupidity and officialdom, the system of secret informers, the embezzling and incompetence in the organisation of the whole business.

Despite the fact that the articles are written in a "jovial" manner, or rather *because they are*, their cumulative effect is to produce a very strong impression of the fumes, the fug, the suffocation that surround the old feudal officialdom. Nothing but disaster can come of a new bourgeois agrarian policy that is carried out by such means and methods and under such circumstances and is guided by such social elements.

Here is a picture of the journey to Siberia made in August 1910 by Prime Minister Stolypin and Mr. Krivoshein, the Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Land Settlement. A speech was made from the platform of the minister's railway coach at the Taiga station ... "everything is magnificent and therefore satisfactory".

"This clownish tour," writes the old civil servant, "this journey so similar to that made by Catherine the Great to the south of Russia, with Mr. Schumann, the Resettlement and Land Administrator of Tomsk Gubernia, playing the role of Potyomkin on instructions from St. Petersburg ... was the last straw that made me abandon the service and publish this pamphlet."

Poor, well-intentioned official—it was too much for him!

Here is a picture of the resettlement muddle at the time of the greatest wave of settlers.

"The lands allotted were not ready, the roads to them had not been laid, the resettlement centres were only just being built.... Then people began settling of their own accord in surveyed forest areas that, took their fancy, and seizing plots leased from the state, reserve plots that had at some earlier date been set aside for the Siberian estates of the nobility, etc.; and then, of course, began the expulsion of these illegal settlers, accompanied by a series of sad and often cruel scenes that it would be superfluous to describe." The resettlement officers were compelled to "tear to pieces areas of state forest that had been surveyed only the day before". "They seized the land piecemeal, took whatever they first laid eyes on, anything so long as they could accommodate, get rid of, the scores of emaciated exhausted people hanging around the resettlement centre and standing for long hours outside the resettlement office people who for some unknown reason invade the gubernia municipal offices in crowds and, in general, do not leave a single government office in peace."

"Many millions of rubles" are being embezzled and wasted. "One conclusion that suggests itself", writes the author, "is the need to transfer the resettlement scheme to the future Siberian Zemstvo." This naïve, "honest-minded" Russian official believes that this threadbare cloak can be patched up ... with a Zemstvo.

Here is a picture of the way the forests are being looked after. Settlers "upon whom fortune had smiled" were permitted to sell timber; they sold 300 dessiatines of mature building timber at 17 rubles per dessiatine. Even by Siberian standards a dessiatine of mature building timber is worth, at the very least, about 200 rubles. Another picture: settlers sold the contractor Zhogolyov 25,000 railway sleepers at four kopeks each. He paid 5 kopeks for felling, 25 kopeks for removal from the forest and 10 kopeks each for transport by steamer, and received *80 kopeks a sleeper* from the treasury.... There you have Octobrist capitalism in the epoch of primitive accumulation, and it lives comfortably side by side with the Purishkeviches and the Purishkevichism of Russian life!

Here is a series of pictures of land settlement. Minusinsk Uyezd, the "Siberian Italy". The old inhabitants of Minusinsk received four dessiatines each and "came to know the sacred rights of property". At the same time they were banned from using tens of thousands of dessiatines of the best land.

"In recent times, this Italy, because of the general organisation of state economy, has been very regularly visited by, to use the official expression, 'crop failures'...."

"...In Yeniseisk Uyezd there is the famous Ob-Yenisei Canal, that has for a number of years duly devoured a good many millions from the treasury, but has not thereby got itself into a decent condition fitting it for the transport of goods, since it was dug in a place where it should not have been dug...."

"Kurinsky resettlement area ... is made up of lands that belonged to non-Russians around the Altai Salt Refinery. The non-Russians had a tough time of it after their land had been taken away from them, but the settlers had a worse time—the local water was quite unsuitable for drinking. Nor did well-digging produce any results. Then the resettlement administration started drilling and drilled down to water that was saltier still. The settlers now drive seven or eight versts to the Yenisei from the village for water, so 'everything is satisfactory'...."

...A very valuable stand of pine had been completely eaten away by the pine moth. When the trouble began the forest warden had to *send a written application* asking for credit. While the correspondence and negotiations with St. Petersburg proceeded, the timber was ruined.... "Everything that is usually called forestry," writes the old warden, "has been totally abandoned."

People of any integrity are squeezed out of the civil service world by informers (p. 118) and the "higher authorities" cut short foresters who have thirty-five years' service behind them with roars of "Silence!" if they dare to tell the truth (p. 121). "A base and sordid period," says the good Mr. Komarov, indignantly, who suggests this "period" began when a "good" boss was changed for a bad one.

The author summarises his illustrations as follows:

"If all I have said sounds like so many anecdotes, then they are anecdotes from a reality that Russian constitutional—save the mark! —life has accustomed us to; and is not the whole of our present-day Russian life one long and rather unpleasant anecdote?"

With regard to the settlers that are returning, Mr. Komarov ridicules the assertion of some "bold" medical man that they constitute no more than 6 per cent. We have quoted exact figures on this question above.

"The Russian landowners, more than anybody, are very, very interested in this [in the number of settlers returning]," writes Mr. Komarov. "This is understandable: those returning are the sort that are destined to play a terrible role in the future. The man who is returning is not the one who all his life has been a farm labourer and is no longer accustomed to that which gave him, like Antaeus of old, gigantic, incredible strength. The man who is returning is the one who, until recently, was a property-owner, a man who never dreamed that he and the land could exist apart. This man is justifiably indignant, to him it is a mortal offence that he has not been provided for, but, on the contrary, that he and his family have been ruined and transformed from farmers and growers of corn into people of no consequence; this man is a menace to any political system, no matter what it be. And the best minds, those that have seen the light since 1905, are paying due consideration to this."

In the spring of 1910, the author visited a Marshal of the Nobility[31] in European Russia; he was a man of conservative convictions who enjoyed the author's trust and esteem.

"'We are considering it indeed we are,' he told me. 'It is not for nothing that we have fled from the country into the town. The

muzhik glowers at us like a wild beast. The young people are almost all hooligans, and now there are these people coming back from you in Siberia who have nothing to lose.'

"I understood dear Pyotr Fyodorovich best of all," continues kindly Mr. Komarov, "when among others who came to me for information 'about the lands in Siberia' was one of the forgotten friends of my childhood, one with whom I had played tip-cat and other games and with whom I had later taken part in fist-fights. Alas, he was no longer my former companion in the village fist-fights but a respectable-looking muzhik with a big beard with silver threads in it and a bald patch exposing half his pate. We had a talk, recalled old times and I mentioned 1905. I must mention that our uyezd was one of those that had been particularly brightly illuminated by the ruddy glow of burning landowners' mansions and ruined estates, and I for my part made a quite natural reproach to my friend, as far as I remember in the following terms:

"'The devil alone knows what you people got up to in 1905! You could have got much better conditions....'

"When I said this, I did not have in mind the theory of the agrarian question as propounded by the Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries which, to anybody in any degree acquainted with political economy, somehow sounds completely inacceptable; I was given this answer:

"'How true your words are.... You're quite right.... That was not what we should have done....'

"'There you are,' I said soothingly, glad that we had understood each other.

"'Yes, it's true enough.... We made a fine blunder.... We shouldn't have let anyone go....'

"'What do you mean by that?'

"'I mean we should have gone through with it, ... given all of them short shrift....'

"And as he spoke his face was smiling and kindly, there were attractive wrinkles around his bright, gentle, childishly naïve and smiling eyes....

"But I admit quite frankly that a cold shiver ran down my back and the hair on my head must have stood on end; if that was how the gentle ones felt about it, what could we expect from those who were coming back, those who had sold their land and were ruined for ever?

"Yes, indeed, the 'banking on the strong' that was presented to Russia by the late Prime Minister and the Octobrists, may, as time goes on and the full effect of the resettlement muddle is felt, bring many horrors into our lives" (p. 75).

We will stop here, at this conversation between a kindly, peaceable intellectual and a gentle, mild, naïve, respectable-looking, bald-headed muzhik.

Pravda No. 96 and 99,
April 27 and May 1, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

VEKHI CONTRIBUTORS AND NATIONALISM

(BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE)

A boring magazine, that *Russkaya Mysl*.[32] There is only one interesting thing about it. Among its writers there are liberals who contribute to and support *Vekhi*,[33] the notorious renegade book in which yesterday's champions of liberty poured mud and filth on *the struggle of the masses for liberty*, a book in which, furthermore, the democratic masses of workers and peasants were depicted as a herd led by "intellectuals"—an old trick used by all Black-Hundred supporters.

It was not mere chance that Russian liberal "educated society" turned against the revolution and against democracy; this was inevitable after 1905. The bourgeoisie was frightened by the independent action of the workers and the awakening of the peasants. The bourgeoisie, especially its richer section, anxious to preserve its position as exploiter, decided that reaction was better than revolution.

It was these selfish class interests of the money-bags that gave rise to the extensive and deep-going *counter-revolutionary* trend among the liberals, a trend against democracy, in defence of any kind of imperialism, nationalism and chauvinism, in defence of all obscurantism.

Class-conscious workers are not surprised at this apostasy, this defection, because the workers never did have a very high opinion of the liberals. It is, however, worth while examining what the liberal renegades are preaching, *with what ideas* they hope to fight democracy in general and Social-Democracy in particular.

"Russian intellectual society," writes Mr. Izgoyev in *Russkaya Mysl*, "was, and, in the mass, still is convinced that the fundamental

question of European life is the proletariat's struggle for socialism against the bourgeoisie...."

Mr. Izgoyev says that this idea is "preconceived and erroneous"; he points out that among the Poles in Germany struggling to maintain their nationality, a new middle stratum has been created and is growing up—"a democratic middle class".

When Izgoyev speaks of "intellectuals" he actually means socialists and democrats. The liberal *is not pleased* that the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is regarded as the fundamental question. The liberal strives to ignite and fan the names of national struggle in order *to divert attention from the serious questions* of democracy and socialism.

Socialism actually does take first place among the "questions of European life" and the national struggle takes ninth place and becomes, furthermore, the weaker and less harmful the more consistently democracy functions. It is ridiculous even to compare the struggle of the proletariat for socialism, a world phenomenon, with the struggle of one of the oppressed nations of Eastern Europe against the reactionary bourgeoisie that oppresses it (and the *Polish* bourgeoisie willingly joins forces with the *German* bourgeoisie against the proletariat on every convenient occasion).

Prosveshcheniye No. 4, April 1913
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Prosveshcheniye* text

THE LIBERALS AND FREEDOM FOR THE UNIONS

The Mining Congress has declared itself in favour of the freedom for the unions. One of the biggest liberal bourgeois newspapers, *Kievskaya Mysl*,[34] has this to say about it:

> "One of the greatest services rendered by the Congress is this declaration of the right of workers to organise, this support for the demand for freedom of workers' association.
>
> "Since the working-class movement in Russia re-emerged after the interval of 1908-09 and greater and more frequent repressions have been showered upon it, the demand for freedom of association is increasingly becoming a demand put forward by *the masses* of the working-class. Until now, however, the demand for the right of association has been regarded as the slogan of the day only in working-class circles. Liberal society showed complete indifference towards it. The Congress, which included quite a number of industrialists, has now been compelled to afford moral support to the demand of the working class."

Here we can clearly see how the liberals are employing their widely circulated, profit-making press *to curtail* the demands and slogans of the working class. The liberals know full well that the workers have quite different "*slogans of the day*", uncurtailed slogans. The liberals *are foisting* on the workers their own liberal narrowness which they claim to be the opinion of "masses" of workers; this is the old, worn-out method of making the supposedly undeveloped masses responsible for the unwillingness of the liberal bourgeoisie to face up to the real source of political privileges and lack of political rights! This was the method employed by the "liberal" serf-owners who, half a century ago, said that the abolition of *all* landowner privileges was *not* "a slogan of the day" for "the masses".

Characteristically, the liberals give themselves away. The Congress demand is incomplete, they say. Why? Listen to this:

"The Congress favoured the right of association but could not hide from itself the fact that the realisation of this right inevitably presupposes a whole series of legal conditions. It is impossible to grant freedom to trade unions where general freedom for unions and societies does not exist. Freedom for the working-class press can only be established where there is freedom for the liberal and democratic press. Freedom of association cannot exist where administrative control is the rule and where the masses of the population are kept from participation in elections to legislative bodies. The Congress should have indicated the need to bring about these conditions if it wished to be consistent."

So the Congress was not consistent. In what way was it not consistent? In its not having listed *certain* reforms, answers the liberal.

But did you list *everything*, gentlemen?

Of course not! You got as far as the "*conditions*" that are "presupposed" before certain liberties can be "*brought about*", but you did not say what these conditions were. You stopped there. You are today afraid of the slogan of the "working-class masses"—not *reforms* but "*reform*". In substance you adopt the viewpoint of Struve. Struve took up this slogan in the spring *preceding* October 17, but he does not accept it today because the entire bourgeoisie, even the most liberal, has turned to the right.

There was a similar situation at the time of the abolition of serfdom. The consistent democrats, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, justly ridiculed the liberals for their *reformism*, underlying which there was always a striving to curtail the activities of the masses and defend a little bit of privilege for the landowners, such as redemption payments for the land, etc.

The liberals are wasting their time trying to blame the poverty of their reformism on the "masses of the working class"!

Pravda No. 101, May 4, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

FOR THE ATTENTION OF *LUCH* AND *PRAVDA* READERS

Both *Luch* and *Pravda* have on a number of occasions published letters from workers demanding that the editors of these newspapers give them a calm and clear exposition of the substance of their differences. This is a legitimate and natural demand, and it is worth while seeing how the two editorial boards have complied with it.

Under the heading "Controversial Issues"* *Pravda* published the explanatory articles that had been asked for. What were they about? Those articles outlined and explained *Party decisions* on disputed questions. Through the author of those articles *Pravda* stated that to decide who is right in the dispute, where the truth lies, one must examine the facts and documents of Party history, try to put aside everything personal, everything extraneous and understand the social roots of the dispute. The dispute with the liquidators, said *Pravda*, "is not a matter of the evil will of certain individuals, but of the historical situation of the working-class movement".** Those who seriously want to get at the bottom of the dispute must take the trouble to understand that historical situation.

"It is necessary to understand," says *Pravda*, "the class origin of the discord and disintegration, to understand what class interests emanating from a non-proletarian environment foster confusion among the friends of the proletariat."**

This is a serious presentation of the question. It is a direct response to the workers' demand that they be helped to

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* See pp. 147-56 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See p. 154 of this volume.—*Ed.*

understand the serious dispute between *Pravda* and *Luch*. In this way the workers will get to know the *facts* of Party life and will learn to distinguish what in this dispute is true and a matter of principle, and what is shallow and fortuitous; they will seek the *class* roots of the discord.

It is possible that a worker, having learned the facts, having read through the documents, etc., will in the end not agree with *Pravda*—that is a matter of his own convictions and his experience. But in any case, if he follows *Pravda*'s advice he will learn a lot and will realise what the whole dispute is about.

Such is *Pravda*'s reply to the workers' demand to make them familiar with the existing differences. How did *Luch* act?

At the same time as *Pravda* published its articles on "controversial issues", *Luch* printed a lengthy article on the same subject. Not a single *fact* is cited in the article, the author does not attach any social significance at all to the dispute and does not call the reader's attention to a single document.

This enormous article, spread over two issues of the paper, is packed with gossip and allusions to personalities. The working-class reader is informed of the "touchiness" and "charming witticisms" of one Marxist, the "superman" pretensions of a second and the "cynicism" of a third. All disputes are attributed to "the settling of personal accounts", to "discontent over matters of seniority" and to the "struggle for power" in the Party. And an underhand rumour, worthy of the official press, is slipped in to suggest that certain "master-hands at revolution" are to blame for it all because they are afraid of losing their influence if the broad masses of the workers enter into the dispute.

What the author and the newspaper that published his article are aiming at is to pack people's heads with gossip, squabbles and personalities, and thus avoid the necessity of explaining their point of view. It would not be half as bad if it were merely gossip. But this is the gossip of an embittered renegade, that is the trouble. Read what he writes at the beginning of the second part of his article about "provoked and provoking acts", about "the dictatorship in the Party of supermen with a cynical attitude to the masses"; read how he abuses the devoted people of 1905 by

calling them "master-hands at revolution" who have behaved in a way that would be quite "impermissible in an environment with any degree of culture". All that, of course, is lifted straight from *Zemshchina*,[35] or from *Vekhi*!

This appeared not in *Novoye Vremya*[36] but in a paper that calls itself a workers' newspaper, it is offered as a reply to working men's demands for a serious explanation of the paper's point of view! And even after that *Luch* dares protest against sharper forms of polemic and set itself up as a model of decorum that wants to put *Pravda* to shame.

We most insistently advise those workers who still believe that *Luch*, unlike *Pravda*, is a newspaper that stands for unification and the cessation of internal squabbles, to read the above-mentioned article and compare it with the way *Pravda* discusses the same questions.

Pravda No. 102, May 5, 1913
Signed: Reader of *Pravda* and *Luch*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF JOSEPH DIETZGEN

Joseph Dietzgen, a tannery worker and one of the most eminent German Social-Democratic philosophical writers, died twenty-five years ago, in 1888.

Joseph Dietzgen was the author of a number of works (most of them translated into Russian) that include *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind* (published in 1869), *A Socialist's Excursions into the Theory of Knowledge*, *Acquisition of Philosophy*, etc. It was Karl Marx, in a letter to Kugelmann on December 5, 1868, who made the best appraisal of Dietzgen and his place in the history of philosophy and of the working-class movement:

"A fairly long time ago he sent me a fragment of a manuscript on the 'faculty of thought' which, in spite of a certain confusion and of too frequent repetition, contains much that is excellent and—as the independent product of a working man—admirable."

Such is the importance of Dietzgen—a worker who arrived at dialectical materialism, i.e., Marx's philosophy, independently. In forming an assessment of the worker Dietzgen it is of great value to remember that he never considered himself the founder of a school.

Dietzgen spoke of Marx as the *leader of a trend* as early as 1873, when few people understood Marx. Dietzgen emphasised that Marx and Engels "possessed the necessary philosophical training". And in 1886, a long time after the publication of Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, one of the chief Marxist philosophical works, Dietzgen wrote of Marx and Engels as the "recognised founders" of a trend.

This must be borne in mind when judging the many supporters of bourgeois philosophy, i.e., idealism and agnosticism (including Machism), who attempt to take advantage of "*a certain confusion*" in Dietzgen's writing. Dietzgen himself would have ridiculed such admirers and would have repulsed them.

To become politically conscious, workers should read Dietzgen but should *never* for a moment *forget* that he *does not always give a true* picture of the doctrine of Marx and Engels, who are the only writers from whom philosophy can *be learned*.

Dietzgen wrote at a time when simplified, vulgarised *materialism* was most widespread. Dietzgen, therefore, laid his greatest stress on the historical changes that had taken place in materialism, on the *dialectical* character of materialism, that is, on the need to support the point of view of development, to understand that all human knowledge is relative, to understand the multilateral connections between, and interdependence of, all phenomena in the universe, and to develop the materialism of natural history to a materialist conception of history.

Because he lays so much stress on the relativity of human knowledge, Dietzgen often becomes confused and makes incorrect concessions to idealism and agnosticism. Idealism in philosophy is a defence, sometimes extremely elaborate, sometimes less so, of clericalism, of a doctrine that places faith above science, or side by side with science, or in some way or another gives faith a place. Agnosticism (from the Greek words "a" *no* and "gnosis" *knowledge*) is vacillation between materialism and idealism, i.e., in practice it is vacillation between materialist science and clericalism. Among the agnostics are the followers of Kant (the Kantians), Hume (the positivists, realists and others) and the present-day Machists. This is why some of the most reactionary bourgeois philosophers, the most thorough-placed obscurantists and direct defenders of clericalism, try to "use" Dietzgen's mistakes.

By and large, however, Dietzgen was a materialist. He was an enemy of clericalism and agnosticism. "The only thing we have in common with earlier materialists," wrote Dietzgen, "is that we accept matter as the prerequisite to,

or foundation of, the idea." That "only thing" is precisely the *essence* of philosophical materialism.

"The materialist theory of knowledge," wrote Dietzgen, "may be reduced to a recognition of the fact that the human organ of knowledge does not irradiate any metaphysical light but is a bit of nature that reflects other bits of nature." That is the materialist theory of the *reflection* in human knowledge of eternally moving and changing matter, a theory that evokes hatred and horror, calumny and distortion on the part of all of ficial, professorial philosophy. And how Dietzgen berated and branded the "certificated lackeys of clericalism", the idealist professors, the realists and others —how he lambasted them with the deep passion of a true revolutionary! "Of all parties," Dietzgen rightly said, speaking of the philosophical "parties", i.e., materialism and idealism, "the vilest is the party of the centre".

To this "vile party" belong the *Luch* editorial board and Mr. S. Semkovsky (*Luch* No. 92). The editors made a tiny reservation. "We do not share the general philosophical point of view", they say, but the exposition of Dietzgen's views is "correct and clear".

That is an appalling untruth. Mr. Semkovsky unconscionably misquoted and distorted Dietzgen, seizing upon the "*confusion*" and ignoring *Marx's appraisal of Dietzgen*. Incidentally, both Plekhanov, a socialist who possesses the greatest knowledge of the philosophy of Marxism, and the best Marxists of Europe *have recognised that appraisal in full*.

Mr. Semkovsky distorts both philosophical materialism and Dietzgen, talking nonsense on the question of "one or two worlds" (this, supposedly, is the "key question"! Learn a little, my friend, at least read Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach*) and on the question of the universe and phenomena (Dietzgen is supposed to have reduced the real world to nothing but phenomena; this is clerical and professorial slander of Dietzgen).

It is impossible to list all Mr. Semkovsky's distortions. Let workers interested in Marxism know that the *Luch* editors are *a union of liquidators* of Marxism. Some want to liquidate the underground, i.e., the Party of the proletariat (Mayevsky, Sedov, F. D., etc.), others, the idea of the

hegemony of the proletariat (Potresov, Koltsov, etc.), the third, the philosophical materialism of Marx (Mr. Semkovsky & Co.), the fourth, the internationalism of proletarian socialism (the Bund members Kosovsky, Medem and other supporters of "cultural-national autonomy"), the fifth, the economic theory of Marx (Mr. Maslov with his theory of rent and the "new" sociology) and so on and so forth.

This blatant distortion of Marxism by Mr. Semkovsky and the editors who defend him is only one of the more obvious examples of the "activities" of this literary "union of liquidators".

Pravda No. 102, May 5, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE BOURGEOISIE AND PEACE

The conference of French and German parliamentarians held in Berne last Sunday, May 11 (April 28 O.S.), reminds us once more of the attitude of the European bourgeoisie to war and peace.

The initiative in calling the conference was taken by representatives from Alsace-Lorraine and Switzerland. Socialist deputies from France and Germany turned up in full force. Of the bourgeois deputies quite a number of French Radicals and Radical-Socialists (petty-bourgeois democrats who are, in fact, alien and, for the greater part, hostile to socialism). An insignificant number of bourgeois deputies from Germany attended. The National-Liberals (midway between the Cadets and the Octobrists, something like our "Progressists") confined themselves to sending greetings. From the party of the "Centre" (the Catholic petty-bourgeois party in Germany that loves playing at democracy) *two* promised to come but—decided not to turn up!

Among the prominent socialists who spoke at the conference were Greulich, a veteran Swiss Social-Democrat, and August Bebel.

A resolution condemning chauvinism and declaring that the overwhelming majority of the two nations, French and German, want peace and demand the settlement of international conflicts by courts of arbitration, was adopted unanimously.

There is no doubt that the conference was an impressive demonstration in favour of peace. But it would be a huge mistake to trust the tender-hearted speeches of those few bourgeois deputies who attended the conference and voted for the resolution. If they seriously wanted peace those

bourgeois deputies should have *condemned* outright the increase in Germany's armaments (the German army is to be increased by 140,000 officers and men; this new government proposal will no doubt be adopted by the bourgeois parties of Germany despite the vigorous protests of the socialists); they should also have condemned in exactly the same way the French government proposal to increase army service to three years.

That was something the bourgeois deputies would not venture to do. Still less were they capable of making a resolute demand for a militia, that is, for the replacement of the standing army by arming the entire people. This measure, which does not go beyond the bounds of bourgeois society, is the only one that can democratise the army and advance the question of peace even one step forward in a manner at all *serious*.

But no, the European bourgeoisie clings frantically to the militarists and reactionaries out of fear of the working-class movement. The insignificant number of petty-bourgeois democrats is not capable of a strong desire for peace and still less capable of bringing it about. Power is in the hands of the banks, the trusts and big capital in general. The one guarantee of peace is the organised, conscious movement of the working class.

Pravda No. 103, May 7, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE AWAKENING OF ASIA

Was it so long ago that China was considered typical of the lands that had been standing still for centuries? Today China is a land of seething political activity, the scene of a virile social movement and of a democratic upsurge. Following the 1905 movement in Russia, the democratic revolution spread to the whole of Asia—to Turkey, Persia, China. Ferment is growing in British India.

A significant development is the spread of the revolutionary democratic movement to the Dutch East Indies, to Java and the other Dutch colonies, with a population of some forty million.

First, the democratic movement is developing among the masses of Java, where a nationalist movement has arisen under the banner of Islam. Secondly, capitalism has created a local intelligentsia consisting of acclimatised Europeans who demand independence for the Dutch East Indies. Thirdly, the fairy large Chinese population of Java and the other islands have brought the revolutionary movement from their native land.

Describing this awakening of the Dutch East Indies, van Ravesteyn, a Dutch Marxist, points out that the age-old despotism and tyranny of the Dutch Government now meet with resolute resistance and protest from the masses of the native population.

The usual events of a pre-revolutionary period have begun. Parties and unions are being founded at amazing speed. The government is banning them, thereby only fanning the resentment and accelerating the growth of the movement. Recently, for example, it dissolved the "Indian Party" because its programme and rules spoke of the striving for

independence. The Dutch *Derzhimordas*[37] (with the approval, incidentally, of the clericals and liberals—European liberalism is rotten to the core!) regarded this clause as a criminal attempt at separation from the Netherlands! The dissolved party was, of course, revived under a different name.

A National Union of the native population has been formed in Java. It already has a membership of 80,000 and is holding mass meetings. There is no stopping the growth of the democratic movement.

World capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia have finally aroused Asia. Hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights and democracy.

The workers of the advanced countries follow with interest and inspiration this powerful growth of the liberation movement, in all its various forms, in every part of the world. The bourgeoisie of Europe, scared by the might of the working-class movement, is embracing reaction, militarism, clericalism and obscurantism. But the proletariat of the European countries and the young democracy of Asia, fully confident of its strength and with abiding faith in the masses, are advancing to take the place of this decadent and moribund bourgeoisie.

The awakening of Asia and the beginning of the struggle for power by the advanced proletariat of Europe are a symbol of the new phase in world history that began early this century.

Pravda No. 103, May 7, 1913
Signed: *F.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

SEPARATISTS IN RUSSIA AND SEPARATISTS IN AUSTRIA

Among the various representatives of Marxism in Russia the Jewish Marxists, or, to be more exact, some of them—those known as the Bundists—are carrying out a policy of *separatism*. From the history of the working-class movement it is known that the Bundists *left the Party* in 1903, when the majority of the party of the working class refused to accept their demand to be recognised as the "sole" representatives of the Jewish proletariat.

This exit from the Party was a manifestation of separatism deeply harmful to the working-class movement. But, in fact, the Jewish workers have entered and continue to enter the Party everywhere in spite of the Bund. Side by side with the *separate* (isolated) organisations of the Bundists, there have *always* existed *general* organisations of the workers—Jewish, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, etc.

From the history of Marxism in Russia we know, furthermore, that when the Bund in 1906 again returned to the Party, the Party stipulated the condition that separatism should cease, i.e., that there should be local unity of *all* the Marxist workers of *whatever* nationality. But this condition *was not* fulfilled by the Bundists, despite its *special* confirmation by a special decision of the Party in December 1908.[38]

That, shortly, is the history of Bundist separatism in Russia. Unfortunately, it is little known to the workers, and little thought is given to it. Those having the closest practical acquaintance with this history are the Polish, the Lithuanian (especially in Vilna in 1907) and the Latvian Marxists (at the same time, in Riga), and the Marxists of South and Western Russia. It is well known, incidentally,

that the Caucasian Marxists, including *all* the Caucasian Mensheviks, have until quite recently maintained local *unity* and even fusion of the workers of all nationalities, and have condemned the separatism of the Bundists.

We should also note that the prominent Bundist, Medem, in the well-known book, *Forms of the National Movement* (St. Petersburg, 1910), admits that the Bundists have never implemented unity in the localities, i.e., they have always been separatists.

In the international working-class movement, the question of separatism came to the front most urgently in 1910, at the Copenhagen Congress. The *Czechs* came forward as separatists in Austria, and destroyed the unity that had existed previously between the Czech and German workers. The International Congress at Copenhagen *unanimously* condemned separatism, but the Czechs have unfortunately remained separatists right up to the present.

Feeling themselves isolated in the proletarian International, the Czech separatists spent a long time searching unsuccessfully for supporters. Only now have they found some—in the *Bundists and liquidators*. The *čechoslauische Sozialdemokrat*, the bit of a journal published by the separatists in German, printed an article in its issue No. 3 (Prague, April 15, 1913) under the title "A Turn for the Better". This "turn" that is supposed to be for the "better" (actually, towards separatism) the Czech separatists saw—where do you think, reader? In *Nasha Zarya*,[39] the liquidators' journal, in an article by the *Bundist* V. Kosovsky!

At last the Czech separatists are not alone in the proletarian International! Naturally they are glad to be able to rope in even liquidators, even Bundists. But all class-conscious workers in Russia should give this fact some thought: the Czech separatists, unanimously condemned by the International, are clinging to the coat-tails of liquidators and Bundists.

Only that complete unity (in every locality, and from top to bottom) of the workers of all nations, which has existed so long and so successfully in the Caucasus, corresponds to the interests and tasks of the workers' movement.

Pravda No. 104, May 8, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME AGAIN

In *Pravda* No. 96 (300)* I quoted the chief resettlement data for Russia. Those data were up to 1911, and that year was incomplete (11 months). In *Rech*, Mr. Kaufmann has now quoted data from official, recently published records for the whole of 1911 and 1912.

It appears that the number of settlers has increased, albeit very slightly—from 190,000 in 1911 to 196,500 in 1912. The number of returning settlers, however, has greatly increased—from 36,000 (1911) to 58,000 (1912).

The explanation of this phenomenon discloses to us still more profoundly the collapse of the new agrarian policy. Until now between three quarters and four-fifths of all settlers have come from the Ukrainian and Central Black-Earth gubernias. That is the centre of Russia where the survivals of serfdom are strongest, where wages are lowest and where the mass of the peasantry live under particularly difficult conditions.

The ruined, impoverished, hungry masses of this centre—the "heart" of Russia—rushed for resettlement (1907-09) and provided, in the end, 60 per cent of those returning, that is, of those who were ruined and still more embittered.

A wave of settlers has now come from another area, this time from the Volgaside gubernias, which until recently produced very few settlers.

What is the reason?

The "harvest failure", the famine of 1911!... The famine embraced a new part of Russia. A new wave of fugitives has left for Siberia. We already know that Siberia will

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* See p. 66 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ruin and embitter the Volgaside peasants still further, as it did the peasants of Central Russia.

In other words, resettlement to Siberia has shown first the peasants of Central Russia and now those of the Volga side that salvation cannot be achieved in this way.

The "new" agrarian policy, ruining one area of Russia after another, the peasants of one district after another, is gradually making it clear to all peasants that their real salvation is not to be found there.

Pravda No. 105, May 9, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Russia is a motley country as far as her nationalities are concerned. Government policy, which is the policy of the landowners supported by the bourgeoisie, is steeped in Black-Hundred nationalism.

This policy is spearheaded against the *majority* of the peoples of Russia who constitute the *majority* of her population. And alongside this we have the bourgeois nationalism of other nations (Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc.), raising its head and trying *to divert* the working class from its great world-wide tasks by a national struggle or a struggle for national culture.

The national question must be clearly considered and solved by all class-conscious workers.

When the bourgeoisie was fighting for freedom together with the people, together with all those who labour, it stood for full freedom and equal rights for the nations. Advanced countries, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and others, provide us with an example of how free nations under a really democratic system live together in peace or separate peacefully from each other.

Today the bourgeoisie fears the workers and is seeking an alliance with the Purishkeviches, with the reactionaries, and is betraying democracy, advocating oppression or unequal rights among nations and corrupting the workers with *nationalist* slogans.

In our times the proletariat alone upholds the real freedom of nations and the unity of workers of all nations.

For different nations to live together in peace and freedom or to separate and form different states (if that is more con-

venient for them), a full democracy, upheld by the working class, is essential. No privileges for any nation or any one language! Not even the slightest degree of oppression or the slightest injustice in respect of a national minority—such are the principles of working-class democracy.

The capitalists and landowners want, at all costs, to keep the workers of different nations apart while the powers that be live splendidly together as shareholders in profitable concerns involving millions (such as the Lena Goldfields); Orthodox Christians and Jews, Russians and Germans, Poles and Ukrainians, everyone who possesses *capital*, exploit the workers of all nations in company.

Class-conscious workers stand for *full unity* among the workers of all nations in every educational, trade union, political, etc., workers' organisation. Let the Cadet gentlemen disgrace themselves by denying or belittling the importance of equal rights for Ukrainians. Let the bourgeoisie of all nations find comfort in lying phrases about national culture, national tasks, etc., etc.

The workers will not allow themselves to be disunited by sugary speeches about national culture, or "national-cultural autonomy". The workers of all nations together, concertedly, uphold full freedom and complete equality of rights in organisations common to all—and that is the guarantee of genuine culture.

The workers of the whole world are building up their own internationalist culture, which the champions of freedom and the enemies of oppression have for long been preparing. To the old world, the world of national oppression, national bickering, and national isolation the workers counterpose a new world, a world of the unity of the working people of all nations, a world in which there is no place for any privileges or for the slightest degree of oppression of man by man.

Pravda No. 106, May 10, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

BRITISH SOCIALIST PARTY CONFERENCE

The British Socialist Party was founded in Manchester in 1911. It included the former Socialist Party, which had earlier been known as the Social Democratic Federation, and several isolated groups and individuals, among them Victor Grayson, a very fiery socialist but one not strong in principles and given to phrase-mongering.

The Second Conference of the British Socialist Party was held in the seaside town Blackpool from May 10 to May 12 (N.S.). Only 100 delegates were present, less than one-third of the full number, and this circumstance, coupled with the bitter struggle of the majority of the delegates against the old party executive, produced a very bad impression on outside observers. The British bourgeois press (exactly like that of Russia) does its best to pick out, colour up and make a splash of episodes from any particularly acute struggle between the party and its executive.

The bourgeois press is not concerned with the *ideological* content of the struggle inside the socialist movement. All it needs is sensation, and a spicy bit of scandal....

The ideological content of the struggle in the B.S.P., however, was very serious. The old executive was headed by Hyndman, one of the founders of the party. He has been acting for a number of years without any attention to the party, and even against the party, on the important question of armaments and war. Hyndman has got it into his head that Germany is threatening to crush and enslave Britain and that socialists should, therefore, support the demand

for a "proper" (i.e., strong) navy for the defence of Britain!

Socialists in the role of supporters of a "strong" navy—and this in a country whose navy helps enslave and plunder in the most shameless, feudal manner the *three hundred millions* of India's population, tens of millions of people in Egypt and other colonies.

Understandably, this fancy idea of Hyndman's pleased the British bourgeoisie (the Conservatives and Liberals). It can also be understood that British Social-Democrats—be it said to their credit—would not tolerate this disgrace and shame and heatedly opposed it.

The struggle was a long and stubborn one; attempts at a compromise were made, but Hyndman was incorrigible. It is greatly to the advantage of British socialism that Hyndman was forced to leave the executive at this Conference and the composition of the executive was, in general, changed by 75 per cent (of its eight members only two were re-elected—Quelch and Irving).

The Conference adopted a resolution against the old executive which reads as follows:

> "This Conference congratulates our French and German comrades on their vigorous opposition to the increase of armaments in their respective countries, and pledges the British Socialist Party, as an integral part of the International Socialist Party, bound by the resolutions on war passed at Stuttgart and Basle, 1912, to pursue the same policy in Great Britain, with the object of checking the growth of all forms of militarism and of reducing the existing abominably high expenditure on armaments."

The resolution is sharply worded. But the truth has to be told, even if sharply. The British Social-Democrats would have forfeited their right to struggle against the opportunists of the so-called Independent (independent of socialism, but dependent on the Liberals) Labour Party if they had not sharply opposed the nationalist sins of their executive.

Let the bourgeois press display their wrath and their buffoonery over the internal struggle among Social-Democrats. The Social-Democrats do not regard themselves as saints; they know that now and again the proletariat be-

comes infected by some dirty disease from the bourgeoisie in its environment—this is inevitable in filthy, disgusting capitalist society. But the Social-Democrats are able to heal their party with direct and fearless criticism. In Britain, too, they will certainly cure the disease.

Pravda No. 109, May 14, 1913
Signed: *V.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

IS THE CONDITION OF THE PEASANTS IMPROVING OR WORSENING?

Under this heading some official ink-slinger, a Mr. Y. P—v, published an article in the official *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta*[40] (No. 100), to prove, of course, that the peasants' condition is improving and "undoubtedly ... is steadily progressing year by year".

It is extraordinarily instructive to note that the figures quoted by the author show *the exact opposite*! This is typical proof of the shameless lying of official writers and official newspapers!

What are the author's figures? First, be it noted that he does not give an exact source. We should not for a moment conclude, therefore, that the official ink-slinger is quoting this unknown source at first hand, or that he is quoting correctly.

Let us, however, for a minute suppose that he is quoting correctly.

"Some Zemstvos," writes the author, "for instance, the Moscow Zemstvo, resort to questionnaires to determine whether the condition of the peasants is worsening or improving. The Zemstvo's local correspondents provide general answers that are then summarised.

"The result of these lengthy investigations (taking six years)," writes Mr. Y. P—v, "was a rather interesting numerical summary for the central zone. To each hundred answers of all types we get"

Answers indicating the economic condition of the peasants:

Year	Improved	Worsened	Unchanged	Total
1907	15	44	41	100
1908	8	53	39	100
1909	8	64	28	100
1910	21	34	45	100
1911	32	16	52	100
1912	38	15	47	100

And so the writer in an official newspaper draws the conclusion—"in the last three years ... we have seen a continuous improvement in the economic level of the peasantry, with a corresponding reduction in the percentage under the headings 'worsened' and 'unchanged'."

Examine the figures carefully. For the first three years there was an obvious and considerable *worsening*. For the last three years there was an *improvement*, but to a far lesser degree than the worsening of the first three years!

Mr. Y. P—v himself admits that these fluctuations "are coincident with the fluctuations in harvests".

Why does he take the three years with good harvests for his *general* conclusions and *ignore* the three years with bad harvests? What would we think of a merchant who summed up the results of his trading by showing his profit and *concealing his losses*? We should call him a swindler, should we not, Mr. Official Writer in an official newspaper?

Now let us make the simple calculation of profit and loss that is obligatory for everyone except swindlers, taking into consideration the "minuses" as well as the "pluses", the "bad" as well as the "good" harvests. To do this we must add up the figures for the six years and divide by six (amazingly clever, Mr. Official Journalist, isn't it?). We then get the *average* for all the six counter-revolutionary years.

The figures are these. From 100 answers:

Favourable ("improved")—20

Unfavourable ("worsened")—38

Average ("unchanged")—42.

That is the result. What does it mean?

It means that the *peasants are growing poorer and being ruined*. For the six years of the counter-revolution the number of *un*favourable answers is, on the average, *almost twice as great* as the number of favourable answers!

This conclusion can be demonstrated clearly by applying the figures to the whole of Russia, to 20,000,000 peasant families, as follows:

In six years 4,000,000 peasant families have improved their condition, 7,600,000 have grown poorer and 8,400,000

families have remained at the former (i.e., impoverished) level!

And this is in a period of high prices when the landowners and bourgeoisie are raking in gold by the shovelful.

In all probability the peasants will thank and bless the landowners' Duma and the government of the landowners.

Pravda No. 111, May 16, 1913
Signed: *F.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

BACKWARD EUROPE AND ADVANCED ASIA

The comparison sounds like a paradox. Who does not know that Europe is advanced and Asia backward? But the words taken for this title contain a bitter truth.

In civilised and advanced Europe, with its highly developed machine industry, its rich, multiform culture and its constitutions, a point in history has been reached when the commanding bourgeoisie, fearing the growth and increasing strength of the proletariat, comes out in support of everything backward, moribund and medieval. The bourgeoisie is living out its last days, and is joining with all obsolete and obsolescent forces in an attempt to preserve tottering wage-slavery.

Advanced Europe is commanded by a bourgeoisie which supports everything that is backward. The Europe of our day is advanced not *thanks to*, but *in spite of*, the bourgeoisie, for it is only the proletariat that is adding to the million-strong army of fighters for a better future. It alone preserves and spreads implacable enmity towards backwardness, savagery, privilege, slavery and the humiliation of man by man.

In "advanced" Europe, the sole advanced class is the proletariat. As for the living bourgeoisie, it is prepared to go to any length of savagery, brutality and crime in order to uphold dying capitalist slavery.

And a more striking example of this decay of the entire European bourgeoisie can scarcely be cited than the support it is lending to reaction in Asia in furtherance of the selfish aims of the financial manipulators and capitalist swindlers.

Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading and gaining in strength. The bourgeoisie

there is *as yet* siding with the people against reaction. *Hundreds* of millions of people are awakening to life, light and freedom. What delight this world movement is arousing in the hearts of all class-conscious workers, who know that the path to collectivism lies through democracy! What sympathy for young Asia imbues all honest democrats!

And "advanced" Europe? It is plundering China and helping the foes of democracy, the foes of freedom in China!

Here is a simple but instructive little calculation. A new Chinese loan has been concluded *against* Chinese democracy: "Europe" is *for* Yüan Shih-kai, who is preparing a military dictatorship. Why does it support him? Because it is good business. The loan has been concluded for about 250,000,000 rubles, at the rate of 84 to a 100. That means that the bourgeois of "Europe" will *pay* the Chinese 210,000,000 rubles, but will take from the public 225,000,000 rubles. There you have at one stroke—a clear profit of *fifteen million rubles* in a few weeks! It really is a "*clear*" profit, isn't it?

What if the Chinese people do not recognise the loan? China, after all, is a republic, and the majority in parliament are *against* the loan.

Oh, then "advanced" Europe will raise a cry about "civilisation", "order", "culture" and "fatherland"! It will set the guns in motion and, in alliance with Yüan Shih-kai, that adventurer, traitor and friend of reaction, crush a republic in "backward" Asia.

All the commanders of Europe, all the European bourgeoisie are *in alliance* with all the forces of reaction and medievalism in China.

But all young Asia, that is, the hundreds of millions of Asian working people, has a reliable ally in the proletariat of all civilised countries. No force on earth can prevent its victory, which will liberate both the peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia.

Pravda No. 113, May 18, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

PROMIAEN TOMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

A DISCREDITABLE ROLE!

(ONCE MORE FOR THE ATTENTION OF *LUCH* AND *PRAVDA* READERS)

In *Pravda* No. 102* I called the attention of reader comrades to an article in *Luch* Nos. 93 and 94.

I compared that article with those published *simultaneously* in *Pravda* under the heading "Controversial Issues".** I said that *Pravda* in its articles gives the reader facts and documents with which to decide disputed questions of organisation and tactics while *Luch* in its article gives him gossip and personal insults that do not help the workers to understand the dispute and only serve to clutter up their heads.

I said that the *Luch* article speaks of the active people of 1905 in the same terms as the organs of terrified landowners and of liberals embittered against the workers.

Luch has sent the worker Herman against me. The worker Herman is a man of determination and possesses a ready tongue. He has berated me in no uncertain terms. I, he says, "want to mislead our reader comrades" and am telling "obvious untruths" and nothing of what I said has ever actually happened. Having thus accused me of a number of crimes, the worker Herman then rounds off his article with a list of titles of articles printed in *Luch*.

Very good! But what about the article in *Luch* that I actually spoke about, and which I quoted? The worker Herman *does not say a single word* about that article, makes no attempt to dispute the correctness of the words I quoted from it, and offers nothing to contest my characterisation of the article as impermissible in the working-class press. What reason is there for that? You cursed me uphill and down dale, my dear man, but not only could you not dis-

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* See pp. 76-78 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See pp. 147-56 of this volume.—*Ed.*

prove a single word of what I said about the *Luch* article, you did not even try to.

Did the article I wrote about appear in issues 93 and 94? It did. And so what right have you to state that "nothing of the sort has actually happened"?

Is that article full of gossip and bickering instead of a calm analysis of the disagreements? You did not dare say a word against that! What right have you to suspect me of a desire to "mislead the comrades"?

Did you understand what you were writing? Did you realise that you, in accusing a contributor to a working-class newspaper of "obvious untruths" and a desire to "mislead readers", have to be ready to answer for it, not to me, but to all those who stand behind *Pravda*, that is, to its working-class readers?

You undertook to defend *Luch* against my accusation that the article in issues 93 and 94 does not explain disputed questions but clutters up the heads of its readers with gossip and "personalities". For that purpose you published in the columns of the same *Luch* a number of unfounded accusations and obvious libels ("Reader" [referring to me 1 wants to mislead our reader comrades), i.e., you did exactly what I accused *Luch* of doing in its article in issue 94. *Your article was a confirmation of my accusation against Luch* and not a refutation of it.

Perhaps you will now say—it was all due to your inexperience. Very good. But your article was read by the editors. Why did they not warn you? Why did they not tell you that when accusing me you would first of all have to refute what I had said about the facts I mentioned, and not evade them by further silence? Why? Apparently because the editors knew that everything I had said about the article in issues 93 and 94 was true, they knew that what I said could not be refuted. That is why they allowed you to indulge in plain vituperation, that is, they repeated the very method I had accused them of in my first article.

Was this a creditable role that you, who signed yourself "worker", played in the hands of the *Luch* editors?

Pravda No. 114, May 19, 1913
Signed: *Reader*.

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE LAND QUESTION SETTLED—LANDOWNER FASHION

As usual there was an immoderate amount of rubbish in the budget debate in the Fourth State Duma. The vain efforts of Markov the Second to trip up Kokovtsov, and the vain efforts of Kokovtsov "to charm away" with words the feudal character of "our" policy and our budget, and the vain efforts of the Cadets to assure a gullible public that Kokovtsov "admitted it was *the Cadets* who had to be taken into consideration" in the Fourth Duma—this was just a lot of tedious, overworked and hypocritical rubbish.

There are, however, a few grains of truth in this rubbish heap. The Markovs, Kokovtsovs and Shingaryovs tried to hide them deeper in it. But it is worth while pulling them *out.*

"I have dealt at such length with the settlement of the land question," Kokovtsov exclaimed on May 13, "because in that question is contained the whole solution of Russia's future...."

It was not the "whole" solution and the "future" in general that needed to be discussed, but the future of the June Third system,[41] which gives all power to the "bureaucracy" and the feudal landowners. Under the *old* rural organisation we cannot retain power—that was what the landowners, taught by bitter experience, had decided. In order to retain power they had to arrange in their own way for the reorganisation of the old countryside on bourgeois lines. That is the basis and the essence of "the land question".

"...Whether the government will be able to do this, whether it [the settlement of the land question] will bring the benefit the government and the legislative institutions expect," continued the Minister, "the future will show...."

Of course, the future will reveal *everything* and show *everything*. It will show the *outcome* of the efforts of the feudals and the efforts of the proletariat that marches at the head of the democrats. But the figures given by the "serious" (by Cadet standards) Mr. Kokovtsov show absolutely nothing. The number of applications for land is rapidly increasing—and Mr. Kokovtsov is enraptured, the Rights in the Duma are enraptured. The number of applications was: in 1907—221,000; in 1908—385,000; in 1909—711,000; in 1910—651,000; in 1911—683,000; in 1912—1,183,000; total 3,834,000.

Arrangements have been made for only 1,592,000 peasant households.

Such are the Minister's "proofs" and his material for judging the future.

On that very same May 13 the *government* newspaper *Novoye Vremya* published data for the house-to-house Zemstvo census taken in 1911 in Samara Uyezd. The number of households obtaining titles to land amounted in that uyezd to forty per cent, that is, higher than the average for Russia. This uyezd, therefore, is most "favourable" for the government.

And how did it turn out? Of the total number obtaining titles to land *less than three out of a hundred* (2.9 per cent) own real, separate farmsteads; only one-sixteenth (6.5 per cent) own their land in one piece and *more than nine-tenths* (90.6 per cent) have land in strips in different places!

Nine-tenths of the title-holding peasants farm strips that are isolated from each other, just as they did before. Farming conditions are even worse than before because *formerly* the commune could "correct" the strip system to some extent by frequent redistributions.

In a mere four years *a third* of the land transferred to the title-holders has already passed into other hands. Loss of land is increasing, impoverishment is increasing still more rapidly and there is growing confusion because of the strips of land. Unbelievable poverty is increasing in the villages, as is the number of famines. The number of landless peasants, pure proletarians, is increasing. The number of impoverished "would-be proprietors" is increasing; they are *trapped* both by the old bondage and by the system

of allotting scattered strips of land that has resulted from the notorious landowners' solution to the land problem.

Apparently this bondage will not be abolished by the *landowners'* solution to the *peasant* land problem. It can only be cured if the land question is settled on broad democratic lines.

Pravda No. 115, May 21, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

ARMAMENTS AND CAPITALISM

Britain is one of the richest, freest and most advanced countries in the world. The armaments fever has long afflicted British "society" and the British Government, in exactly the same way as it has the French, German and other governments.

And now the British press, particularly the labour press, is publishing very interesting data, which reveal the ingenious capitalist "mechanics" of arms manufacture. Britain's naval armaments are particularly great. Britain's shipyards (Vickers, Armstrong, Brown and others) are world-famous. Hundreds and thousands of millions of rubles are being spent by Britain and other countries on war preparations, and of course it is all being done exclusively in the interests of peace, for the preservation of culture, in the interests of the country, civilisation, etc.

And we find that admirals and prominent statesmen of both parties, Conservative and Liberal, are shareholders and directors of shipyards, and of gunpowder, dynamite, ordnance and other factories. A shower of gold is pouring straight into the pockets of bourgeois politicians, who have got together in an exclusive international gang engaged in instigating an armaments race among the peoples and *fleecing* these trustful, stupid, dull and submissive peoples like sheep.

Armaments are considered a national matter, a matter of patriotism; it is presumed that everyone maintains strict secrecy. But the shipyards, the ordnance, dynamite and small-arms factories are *international enterprises*, in which the capitalists of the various countries work together in duping and fleecing the public of the various countries, and

making ships and guns alike for Britain against Italy, and for Italy against Britain.

An ingenious capitalist set-up! Civilisation, law and order, culture, peace—and hundreds of millions of rubles being plundered by capitalist businessmen and swindlers in shipbuilding, dynamite manufacture, etc.!

Britain is a member of the Triple Entente, which is hostile to the Triple Alliance. Italy is a member of the Triple Alliance. The well-known firm of Vickers (Britain) has *branches* in Italy. The shareholders and directors of this firm (through the venal press and through venal parliamentary "figures", Conservative and Liberal alike) incite Britain against Italy, and vice versa. And profit is taken both from the workers of Britain and those of Italy; the people are fleeced in both countries.

Conservative and Liberal Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament are almost all shareholders in these firms. They work hand in glove. The son of the "great" Liberal Minister, Gladstone, is a director of the Armstrong concern. Rear-Admiral Bacon, the celebrated naval specialist and a high official at the Admiralty, has been appointed to a post at an ordnance works in Coventry at a salary of £7,000 (over 60,000 rubles). The salary of the British Prime Minister is £5,000 (about 45,000 rubles).

The same thing, of course, takes place in all capitalist countries. Governments manage the affairs of the capitalist class, and the managers are well paid. The managers are shareholders themselves. And they shear the sheep together, under cover of speeches about "patriotism...."

Pravda No. 115, May 21, 1913
Signed: *Fr.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

HELPLESSNESS AND CONFUSION

(NOTE)

The reasons for the chaos and confusion among modern Social-Democrats and "near Social-Democrats" are not only external (persecutions, etc.), but also internal. A huge number of old "prominent Party people" are completely confused, they have understood absolutely nothing about the new state of affairs (the counter-revolution of the June Third system), and their helpless "dithering"—today to the left, tomorrow to the right—has caused hopeless confusion in everything they undertake.

A perfect example of this embarrassment, helplessness and confusion is to be found in the article by A. Vlasov in *Luch* No. 109 (195).

There is not a single idea, a single sound word in the whole of Vlasov's article. It is all confusion and helpless limping after the liquidators combined with futile efforts to disassociate himself from them. It is not true that "formerly" our Party was sometimes built up "without the workers themselves", or that "the activities of the underground amounted largely (!!?) to abstract (!?) propaganda of the ideas of socialism". The history of the old *Iskra* (1900-03), which created the Party programme and the fundamentals of Party tactics, fully refutes this. It is not true that the Party's task today is "open *work* (!!?), but the secret organisation of it". A. Vlasov has completely failed to understand the liquidationist content of the slogan "struggle for an open party", although it was explained in *Pravda* No. 108 (312), popularly and not for the first time.

It is not true that *Pravda* advises "adopting the work of the old Party organisation as an example". "It is essential

to outline, even if briefly, the nature of the activity of this (new) underground, i.e., its tactics," says A. Vlasov with amusing pomposity ("we, the practical workers"). *As far back as* December 1908[42] the Party "outlined" *its* tactics (and in 1912[43] and 1913[44] confirmed and explained them) and its organisation, giving a clear "*example*" of old tasks and *new* forms of preparation. If A. Vlasov has not yet understood this he has only himself to blame: it is his fate to repeat fragments of liquidationism, the dispute with which, incidentally, has nothing to do with the "organisation question".

Pravda No. 115, May 21, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

DRAFT PLATFORM FOR THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS OF THE LATVIAN AREA[45]

The revolutionary upsurge of the working-class movement in Russia, the sharpening of the political crisis in the country, the economic crisis that will begin in the near or not far distant future, the wavering and confusion among the many groups and circles of Social-Democrats—all this compels class-conscious Latvian workers to appeal to their comrades to make intensive preparations for the convocation of the Fourth Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area and to engage in a thorough discussion of the tasks now confronting revolutionary Social-Democracy.

A group consisting of members of various Latvian Social-Democratic organisations proposes to all Social-Democratic organisations, as material for discussion, the following *platform* of views on the most important questions of principle, questions that concern the very existence of our Social-Democratic Labour Party, and the whole direction its activities should take—in particular those questions which the present Central Committee of the Latvian Social-Democratic Party stubbornly ignores or, we are convinced, decides incorrectly.

APPRAISAL OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE GENERAL TACTICAL TASKS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

It is an open secret that the prevalence of counter-revolution has brought about a deep-going ideological disintegration and a confusion of mind among Social-Democrats. Everywhere there are Social-Democrats who, as Comrade An[46] so aptly put it (*Luch* No. 95), are wandering about

like lost sheep. Views are expressed in the Social-Democratic press to the effect that workers should not prepare for a revolution, that they should not expect a revolution, that the democratic revolution is over, etc. The so-called liquidators (*Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*), supported by the present Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Area, regularly base their tactical arguments on such views, although no responsible group or organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. has expounded them in a manner that is in any way definite, precise and formal.

In the press of this trend we meet at every turn with references to the fundamental difference between Russia's present state system and the pre-October system (as though we no longer needed a revolution to win for ourselves the elements of political liberty), or comparisons of the present tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats with those of European Social-Democrats living under a constitution, the tactics, for example, of the Austrians and Germans in the seventies of the nineteenth century (as though a constitution already existed in Russia, as Milyukov thinks it does), or the promulgation of the slogan of an open workers' party and freedom to form associations (a slogan that could be understood only if there existed the general foundation and the pillars of political liberty and a bourgeois constitution in the country), and so on and so forth.

Under such circumstances, to refuse to give a precise definition of the tactical tasks of Social-Democrats or an appraisal of the political situation, or to postpone this appraisal or definition, would mean not only not fighting against ideological confusion, disintegration, despondency and lack of faith, it would mean directly assisting that disintegration and giving indirect support to views that nullify the old revolutionary Party decisions adopted by the Social-Democrats.

The R.S.D.L.P., however, has an accurate Party answer to these urgent and fundamental questions. The answer was given in the resolution of December 1908, which is a resolution binding on Party members and has not been annulled by anyone.

The years that have passed since the resolution was adopted have fully confirmed its correctness—its statements on

the change in the nature of the autocracy, on the counter-revolutionary nature of liberalism, etc., and its conclusion that the autocracy continues to exist, although in a partly renovated form, that the conditions that gave rise to the 1905 Revolution are still there, that the Social-Democratic Party is confronted with the *old tasks* that demand a revolutionary solution and revolutionary tactics. The employment of the Duma as a tribune, and of *all* legal opportunities, which is categorically demanded in the decisions of the same conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (December 1908), must be effected *entirely* in the spirit of these revolutionary tactics and *in the name of* the old revolutionary tasks of the R.S.D.L.P.

We therefore suggest that all Social-Democratic organisations once more hold a thorough discussion of the resolution, which was, incidentally, confirmed by the January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., and *propose to the Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area that it definitely confirm this resolution*.

We call the serious attention of all comrades to the anti-Party method of the August 1912 (liquidators') Conference of "Social-Democratic organisations", which removed from the agenda the appraisal of the current situation and the definition of general tactical tasks, thus throwing open the door to every possible *renunciation of revolutionary tasks* (on the excuse that "the forecast" concerning the revolution had not been proved, etc.).

We protest in particular against the Bund, which played such an important role at the August Conference, and which at its own Ninth Conference went so far in renouncing revolutionary tasks as to withdraw the slogan of a democratic republic and confiscation of landed estates!

THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The more widespread the economic and political struggle of the workers, the more urgently they feel the need for unity. Unless the working class is united, its struggle cannot be successful.

What is this unity? Obviously, *the unity of the Social-Democratic Party*. All Latvian Social-Democratic workers belong to the Social-Democratic Party and know full well

that the Party is illegal, underground, and cannot be anything else.

There cannot, therefore, be *any other way* in which unity *in deed* (not merely in word) can be achieved except from below, by the workers themselves, in their underground organisations.

It is this demand for unity that the Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area must definitely recognise. It was, incidentally, put forward by the February 1913 meeting held at the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

If *Luch* answered *such an* appeal for unity by ridiculing "Lenin's party", and if the Bund (in the shape of "active Jewish members of the working-class movement") rejected the appeal, both of them, the "Luchists" and Bund members, thereby *proved* their allegiance to the liquidators.

Latvian Social-Democratic workers, who recognise the illegal Party not merely in word but in deed, will not allow themselves to be deceived by legal orations in favour of unity. Let him who wants unity join the illegal Party!

ATTITUDE TO THE LIQUIDATORS

The question of liquidationism, which was first brought up by Party decisions and by the press abroad, has now been offered for the judgement of all class-conscious workers in Russia. Latvian Social-Democratic workers must also endeavour to ensure that there are no evasions or reservations on this question, that it is presented clearly, discussed from all angles and given a definite solution.

We have had enough fairy-tales about the liquidators being the champions of an open movement. These tales have been refuted by *facts* proving that Party members who are against the liquidators, those who are unmistakably supporters of the underground movement, are *incomparably stronger* than the liquidators in *all* spheres of the open movement.

Liquidationism is the rejection or the belittling of the underground, that is, the illegal (and only existing) Party. It is only the underground that works out *revolutionary* tactics and takes those tactics to the masses through both the illegal *and the legal* press.

The decisions adopted by the R.S.D.L.P. in December 1908 and January 1910, which no one has annulled, and which are obligatory for all Party members, clearly and precisely recognise the content of liquidationism as described above, and roundly condemn it.

Nevertheless, *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch* continue preaching liquidationism. In *Luch* No. 15 (101) the growth of sympathy for the underground on the part of the workers was declared *deplorable*. In *Nasha Zarya* No. 3 (March 1913) the author of that article (L. Sedov) emphasised his liquidationism *more than ever*. This was admitted *even by An* in *Luch* (No. 95)! And the *Luch* editors, replying to An, *defend the liquidator Sedov*.

Latvian Social-Democratic workers must at all costs ensure that the Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area *resolutely condemns the liquidationism of* "*Nasha Zarya*" *and* "*Luch*". The conduct of these periodicals has fully confirmed and is daily continuing to confirm the correctness of the resolution on liquidationism adopted at the meeting in February 1913 at the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

THE QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR THE LIQUIDATORS' CONFERENCE AND ORGANISING COMMITTEE BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE LATVIAN AREA

The present Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Area maintains that it supports the August Conference and the Organising Committee *not* because they are liquidator institutions but *for the sake of unity* in the R.S.D.L.P.

Such an answer could satisfy only children, and the Latvian Social-Democratic workers are not children.

Those who organised the August Conference *themselves* invited Plekhanov and the *Vperyod*[47] group to it. Neither of them had taken part in the January Conference, that is, they *showed* not merely in word but in deed that they are *neutral* in the struggle between the trends.

And what did these neutral Social-Democrats say? Plekhanov and Alexinsky forthrightly recognised the August

Conference to be a liquidators' conference. The resolutions of that conference show its liquidationist character to the full. *Luch*, by announcing that it supports the decisions of the August Conference, is preaching liquidationism.

Whom are the worker Social-Democrats of Russia following?

This was demonstrated by the elections to the Duma in the worker curia and by the data on the working-class press.

In the Second Duma the Bolsheviks gained 47 per cent of the votes of the workers' curia (11 deputies out of 23); in the Third Duma they had 50 per cent (4 out of 8) and in the Fourth Duma they had 67 per cent (6 out of 9). The working-class press of the anti-liquidators (*Pravda* and the Moscow newspaper) is supported by 1,199 groups of workers as compared with 256 groups supporting *Luch*.

And so, the present Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Area, in the name of Latvian revolutionary worker Social-Democrats, supports the liquidators *against* the obvious majority of worker Social-Democrats in Russia!

An end must be put to this. We all recognise the underground and revolutionary tactics. We must support the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which implements these tactics and which has behind it the overwhelming majority of worker Social-Democrats in Russia *both* in the underground and in the open movement.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

This question, both in its general theoretical, socialist presentation, and from the practical, organisational point of view (the organisation of our own Party) is in urgent need of discussion and solution by all Social-Democratic organisations.

The liquidators' conference in August 1912—as was admitted even by the neutral Menshevik Plekhanov—*contravened* the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. in the spirit of "*adaptation of socialism to nationalism*".

In fact, this conference recognised, on the proposal of the Bund, the permissibility of the slogan of "cultural-national

autonomy", which was contrary to the decision taken by the Second Party Congress.

This slogan (defended in Russia by *all the bourgeois* Jewish nationalist parties) contradicts the *internationalism* of Social-Democracy. As democrats, we are irreconcilably hostile to any, however slight, oppression of any nationality and to any privileges for any nationality. As democrats, we demand the right of nations to self-determination *in the political sense* of that term (see the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.), i.e., the right to secede. We demand unconditional *equality* for all nations in the state and the unconditional protection of the rights of every national minority. We demand broad self-government and autonomy for regions, which must be demarcated, among other terms of reference, in respect of nationality too.

All these demands are obligatory for every consistent democrat, to say nothing of a socialist.

Socialists, however, do not limit themselves to general-democratic demands. They *fight* all possible manifestations of *bourgeois nationalism*, crude or refined. "National-cultural autonomy" is a manifestation precisely of this type—it *joins* the proletarians and bourgeoisie of *one* nation and *keeps* the proletarians of *different* nations *apart*.

Social-Democrats have always stood and still stand for the *internationalist* point of view. While protecting the equality of all nationalities against the serf-owners and the police state we do not support "*national culture*" but *international* culture, which includes only part of each national culture—only the consistently democratic and socialist content of each national culture.

The slogan of "national-cultural autonomy" deceives the workers with the phantom of a cultural unity of nations, whereas in every nation today a landowners', bourgeois or petty-bourgeois "culture" predominates.

We are against national culture as one of the slogans of bourgeois nationalism. *We are in favour of the international culture of a fully democratic and socialist proletariat.*

The unity of the workers of *all* nationalities coupled with the fullest equality for the nationalities and the most consistently democratic state system—that is our slogan, and it is the slogan of international revolutionary Social-Demo-

racy. This truly proletarian slogan will not create the false phantom and illusion of "national" unity of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, while the slogan of "national-cultural autonomy" undoubtedly does create that phantom and does sow that illusion among the working people.

We, Latvian Social-Democrats, living in an area with a population that is very mixed nationally, we, who are in an environment consisting of representatives of the bourgeois nationalism of the Letts, Russians, Estonians, Germans, etc., see with particular clarity the bourgeois falsity of the slogan of "cultural-national autonomy". The slogan of the *unity* of all and every organisation of workers of *all* nationalities, tested in practice in our own Social-Democratic organisation, is particularly dear to us.

Reference is frequently made to Austria in justification of the slogan of "national-cultural autonomy". As far as this reference is concerned it must be remembered that: first, the point of view of the chief Austrian theoretician on the national question, Otto Bauer (in his book *The National Question and Social-Democracy*) has been recognised as an exaggeration of the national factor and a *terrible underestimation* of the international factor even by such a cautious writer as Karl Kautsky (see: K. Kautsky, *Nationalität und Internationalität*; it has been translated into Russian); secondly, in Russia only the Bund members, together with all Jewish bourgeois parties, have so far defended "cultural-national autonomy", whereas *neither* Bauer nor Kautsky *recognise* national autonomy for the Jews, and Kautsky (*op. cit.*) declares outright that the Jews of Eastern Europe (Galicia and Russia) are *a caste* and not a nation; thirdly, the Brünn* national programme of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party (1899)[48] *does not* fully recognise extra-territorial (personal) national autonomy and goes only as far as to demand the union of all national regions of one nationality throughout the state (Sec. 3 of the Brünn Programme); fourthly, even this programme, obviously a compromise (and unsatisfactory from the standpoint of internationalism), was a complete fiasco in Austria itself, because the compromise did not bring peace but led, instead,

* Now Brno in Czechoslovakia.—*Ed.*

to the secession of the Czech separatists; fifthly, these Czech separatists, unanimously condemned at the Copenhagen Congress by the entire International, declare the Bund type of separatism to be close to them (see: *Der čechoslavische Sozial-demokrat* No. 3, organ of the separatists, which may be obtained gratis from *Prague*: Praha, Hybernska 7); sixthly, Bauer himself demands the unity of Social-Democratic political organisations of various nationalities *in each locality*. Bauer himself considers the "national system" of the Austrian party, which has now led to a *complete* schism, to be unstable and contradictory.

In short, references to Austria speak *against* the Bund and not *in its favour*.

Unity from below, the complete unity and consolidation in each locality of Social-Democratic workers of all nationalities in all working-class organisations—that is our slogan. Down with the deceptive bourgeois, compromise slogan of "cultural-national autonomy"!

We are *against* federation in the structure of our Party, too; we are for the *unity* of local (and not only central) organisations of Social-Democrats of all nations.

The Congress must reject both the slogan of cultural-national autonomy and the principle of federation in the structure of the Party. The Latvian Social-Democrats, like the Polish Social-Democrats, like the Social-Democrats of the Caucasus throughout the period from 1898 to 1912 (for *14* whole years of Party history) must remain true to Social-Democratic internationalism.

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LIBERAL AND MARXIST CONCEPTIONS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE

NOTE

A. Yermansky, a liquidator, poured down an amazing abundance of angry words in *Nasha Zarya* on my criticism of his (and Gushka's) point of view on the question of the political role of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie (*Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 5-7).*

Mr. Yermansky, with his vituperation and recollections of old "insults" (including the "insult" to Mr. Dan & Co., who tried, unsuccessfully, to split the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation in 1907), tries *to conceal* the real substance of the issue.

We shall, however, not permit Mr. Yermansky to conceal the substance of the present dispute by recalling undeserved insults to and defeats of the liquidators. For the present dispute concerns a very important question of principle that comes up again and again for a thousand different reasons.

To be precise, it is the question of the liberal falsification of Marxism, the substitution of a Marxist, revolutionary conception of the class struggle by a liberal conception. We shall never tire of explaining this ideological basis of all the disputes between the Marxists and the liquidators.

Mr. A. Yermansky writes:

> "The 'Marxist' Ilyin refuses to recognise, in the activities of industrial organisations, the class struggle 'on a nation-wide (and partly even international) scale' as I [Yermansky] described them in my article. Why? Because of the 'absence' here 'of the fundamental feature of the nation-*wide* or state-*wide*—the organisation of state power'"... (*Nasha Zarya*, p. 55).

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* See present edition Vol. 18, pp. 56-72.—*Ed.*

Here is an exposition of *the substance* of the question given by Mr. Yermansky himself, who does everything possible and impossible to evade that substance! No matter how he may accuse me of distorting his views and of all the mortal sins, no matter how he twists and turns, even seeking refuge in recollections of the 1907 split, the truth will out.

My thesis, therefore, is clear—the basic feature of the nation-wide is the organisation of state power.

You do not share that view, my angry opponent? You do not think this the only Marxist view?

Then why not say so straight out? Why not counterpose a correct view to an incorrect one? If the view that the fundamental feature of the nation-wide is the organisation of state power is, in your opinion, only Marxism in inverted commas, why do you not refute my error and expound *your* understanding of Marxism clearly, precisely and without evasion?

The answer to these questions will be clear to the reader if we quote the passage from Mr. A. Yermansky which followed *immediately after* the one quoted above:

> "Ilyin wants the big Russian bourgeoisie to carry on their class struggle in a different way, he wants them to try to bring about a change in the entire state system. Ilyin wants, the bourgeoisie do not want—and the one at fault, of course, is Yermansky the 'liquidator', who 'substitutes the *liberal* conception of the class struggle for the conception of the class struggle in the Marxist sense'."

Here you have Mr. Yermansky's tirade in full and it will enable you to get a picture of the evasive liquidator *caught in the act.*

The evasion is obvious.

Have I or have I not indicated correctly the "fundamental feature" of the nation-wide?

Mr. A. Yermansky himself was forced to admit that I indicated precisely the substance of the matter.

And Mr. Yermansky evades an answer, realising that he has been caught!

And having been caught in the act, Mr. Yermansky evades the question of the correctness or incorrectness of the fundamental feature I indicated and jumps over this question to the question of what Ilyin and the bourgeoisie "want".

But no matter how bold, how daring Mr. Yermansky's leaps, they do not disguise the fact that he has been caught.

What have "wants" got to do with it, my dear opponent, when the dispute concerns the *concept* of the class struggle?! You had to admit that I accused you of substituting a liberal for a Marxist *conception*, and that I indicated the "fundamental feature" of the *Marxist* conception as including the organisation of state power in the idea of a nation-wide class struggle.

Mr. A. Yermansky is such a clumsy polemicist, even if an angry one, that he gave a clear explanation, *by his own example*, of the connection between liquidationism in general and his own, Yermansky's, mistakes in particular and the liberal conception of the class struggle!

The question of the class struggle is one of the fundamental questions of Marxism. It is, therefore, worth while dealing with the *concept* of class struggle in greater detail.

Every class struggle is a political struggle.[49] We know that the opportunists, slaves to the ideas of liberalism, understood these profound words of Marx incorrectly and tried to put a distorted interpretation on them. Among the opportunists there were, for instance, the Economists, the elder brothers of the liquidators. The Economists believed that any clash between classes was a political struggle. The Economists therefore recognised as "class struggle" the struggle for a wage increase of five kopeks on the ruble, and refused to recognise a higher, more developed, nation-wide *class* struggle, the struggle for *political aims*. The Economists, therefore, recognised the embryonic class struggle but did not recognise it in its developed form. The Economists recognised, in other words, only that part of the class struggle that was more tolerable to the liberal bourgeoisie, they refused to go farther than the liberals, they refused to recognise the higher form of class struggle that is unacceptable to the liberals. By so doing, the Economists became liberal workers' politicians. By so doing, the Economists rejected the Marxist, revolutionary conception of the class struggle.

To continue. It is not enough that the class struggle becomes real, consistent and developed only when it embraces the sphere of politics. In politics, too, it is possible to restrict oneself to minor matters, and it is possible to go

deeper, to the very foundations. Marxism recognises a class struggle as fully developed, "nation-wide", *only* if it does not merely embrace politics but takes in the most significant thing in politics—the organisation of state power.

On the other hand, the liberals, when the working-class movement has grown a little stronger, dare not deny the class struggle but attempt to narrow down, to curtail and emasculate the concept of class struggle. Liberals are prepared to recognise the class struggle in the sphere of politics, too, but on one condition—that the organisation of state power should not enter into that sphere. It is not hard to understand which of the bourgeoisie's class interests give rise to the liberal distortion of the concept of class struggle.

Now, when Mr. Yermansky rehashed the work of the moderate and punctilious civil servant Gushka, when he expressed solidarity with him, *not noticing* (or not wishing to see?) the liberal emasculation of the concept of class struggle, I pointed out to Mr. Yermansky his chief sin against theory and general principles. Mr. Yermansky grew angry and began to use bad language and to twist and turn, being unable to refute what I had said.

In doing so, Mr. A. Yermansky proved such a clumsy polemicist that he exposed himself with particular clarity! "Ilyin wants, the bourgeoisie do not want," he writes. We now know what particular features of the point of view of the proletariat (Marxism) and of the bourgeoisie (liberalism) give rise to these different "wants".

The bourgeoisie "want" to curtail the class struggle, to distort and narrow the conception and *blunt* its sharp edge. The proletariat "wants" this deception exposed. The Marxist wants whoever undertakes to speak of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie in the name of Marxism *to expose* the narrowness, the *selfish* narrowness, indeed, of the bourgeois *conception* of the class struggle, and not merely to quote figures, not merely to go into ecstasies over "big" figures. The liberal "wants" to appraise the bourgeoisie and its class struggle in such a way as *to conceal* its narrowness, *to conceal* the failure to include in the struggle that which is "basic" and most important.

Mr. A. Yermansky was caught out in discussing in *liberal fashion* the interesting, but ideologically empty or slavishly

compiled figures of Mr. Gushka. Obviously, when this was revealed, there was nothing left for Mr. A. Yermansky to do but curse and wriggle.

Let us continue the passage from Mr. A. Yermansky's article where we left off:

> "It is clear that, in fact, Ilyin is the only person who is replacing a study of the real state of affairs by his own qualifications, and also [!!] by a stereotyped pattern based on schoolboy models drawn from the history of the great French Revolution."

Mr. A. Yermansky has got into such a tangle that he becomes ever more ruthless in "destroying" himself! He does not notice the extent to which his liberalism is revealed by this angry sally against the "stereotypes" of the great French Revolution!

My dear Mr. Yermansky, you must understand (no matter how difficult it may be for a liquidator to understand) that it is impossible "to study the real state of affairs" *without qualifying* it, without appraising it from the Marxist, or the liberal, or the reactionary, etc., point of view!

You, Mr. Yermansky, qualified and still qualify the "study" of the good civil servant Gushka in liberal fashion and I qualify it in Marxist fashion. That is what is at the bottom of it all. By leaving your critical analysis *on the threshold* of the question of *the organisation* of state power, you thereby *proved* the liberal limitations of *your* conception of the class struggle.

Which was to be shown!

Your sally against the "stereotype" of the great French Revolution gives you away completely. Anybody can understand that a stereotype or a French model has nothing to do with the matter—for instance, there were not and could not have been strikes, especially political strikes *at that time*, under "stereotype and model" conditions.

The fact of the matter is that when you became a liquidator you forgot how to apply the *revolutionary* point of view to an appraisal of social events. That is where the trouble lies. Marx certainly did not limit his thinking to "stereotypes and models" taken from the end of the eighteenth century, but the point of view he adopted was always revolutionary, he always *appraised* ("qualified" if you prefer that

"learned" word, my dear Mr. Yermansky!) the class struggle most *profoundly*, always revealing whether it affected "fundamentals", always mercilessly berating any timidity of thought, any concealment of underdeveloped, emasculated, selfishly distorted class struggle.

The class struggle at the end of the eighteenth century showed us how it can become political, how it can develop to really "nation-wide" forms. Since then capitalism and the proletariat have developed to a gigantic extent. The "models" of the old do not prevent, for instance, the study of the new *forms* of struggle that I have, in part, outlined above.

The point of view of the Marxist, however, will *always* require a profound and not a superficial "appraisal", will always expose the poverty of *liberal* distortions, understatements and cowardly concealment.

Let us congratulate Mr. Yermansky on his devoted and splendid explanation of the way in which the liquidators substitute a liberal conception of the class struggle for the Marxist conception, forgetting how to examine social events from the revolutionary point of view.

Prosveshcheniye No. 5, May 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according
to the *Prosveshcheniye* text

FACTORY OWNERS ON WORKERS' STRIKES

I

P. P. Ryabushinsky's press in Moscow has published an interesting book entitled *The Association of Factory Owners in the Moscow Industrial Area in 1912* (Moscow, 1913). The price is not given. The factory owners do not wish their publications to be put on sale.

Yuli Petrovich Guzhon, the president of the association, when opening this year's annual meeting on March 30, congratulated the industrialists "on the beginning of the seventh operative year" of their organisation and declared that the industrialists had "by their unity created for themselves a conception of the might of the industrial corporation that could not be ignored". "The present main task of new members of the association must be the strengthening of the prestige of that might," said Mr. Guzhon.

As you see, the speech was not what one might call literate, it was reminiscent of the speech of some army clerk; nevertheless it was full of arrogance.

Let us look at the sections of the book dealing with facts. More than one-third of it (pp. 19-69) is taken up by the section devoted to *strikes*. The industrialists give us the following picture of the total number of workers taking part in strikes in 1912.

Category of strike	Number of striking workers 1912	1911
Economic	*207,720*	*96,730*
Metal goods industry	64,200	17,920
Textiles " "	90,930	51,670
Other branches	52,590	27,140
Political	*855,000*	*8,380*
Over Lena events	215,000	
May Day celebrations	300,000	
Autumn political strikes	340,000	
Totals	*1,062,720*	*105,110*

It is easy to see that the industrialists' figures are *an understatement*. But for the time being we shall not deal with that (the Lena strike of 6,000 workers has been omitted because the Lena Goldfields do not come under the Factory Inspectorate), but we shall examine the factory owners' statistics.

The number of workers who took part in strikes in 1912 was *more than a half* of the total number of industrial workers in Russia, to be exact, 51.7 per cent. Economic strikes, furthermore, accounted for only *one-tenth* of the workers (10.1 per cent) and political strikes for more than *four-tenths* (41.6 per cent).

"Typical of the past year," write the factory owners, "was the extraordinary growth in the number of political strikes that time and again interrupted the normal course of work and kept the entire industry in a state of tension." This is followed by a list of the most important strikes in the second half of the year—August, in Riga, against the disenfranchisement of workers; September, in Warsaw, over the events at the Kutomary Penal Colony; October, in St. Petersburg, over the annulment of the elections of representatives, in Revel, in memory of the events of 1905, and in St. Petersburg, over the well-known verdict in the case of naval ratings; November, in St. Petersburg, over the Sevastopol verdict and on the day of the opening of the Duma, and then a strike on the occasion of the second anniversary of Leo Tolstoy's death; December, in St. Petersburg, over the appointment of workers in insurance institutions. From this the factory owners draw the conclusion:

"The frequency of the demonstration strikes, which occur one after another, and the unusual variety and difference in the importance of the motives for which the workers considered it necessary to interrupt work, are evidence, not only of a considerable thickening of the political atmosphere, but also of the decline of factory discipline." Then follow the usual threats of "severe measures"—fines, stopping of bonuses, lock-outs. "The interests of the country's production," declare the factory owners, "urgently demand the raising of factory discipline to the high level at which it stands in the West-European countries."

The factory owners wish to raise "discipline" to the "Western" level but do not think of raising the "political atmosphere" to the same level....

We shall leave for subsequent articles the data concerning strike distribution over various areas, and its various branches of industry and according to the degree of success achieved.

II

The 1912 data of the Moscow Factory Owners Association on the incidence of strikes in various areas and branches of industry are very badly compiled. It would do no harm if our millionaires were to hire, say, some high-school boy to help them compile their books and check the tables. Mistakes and absurdities leap to the eye when we compare, for example, the data given on pages 23, 26 and 48. Oh yes, we love talking about culture and "the prestige of the might" of the merchants, but we can't do even the simplest job half-way decently.

Below we give the factory owners' strike statistics—*for economic strikes only*—by areas for 1912 as a whole and for the last seven months of that year:

Areas	For all 1912		For the last 7 months of 1912	
	Number of strikers	Number of days lost (000)	Number of strikers	Number of days lost (000)
Moscow	60,070	799.2	48,140	730.6
St. Petersburg	56,890	704.8	35,390	545.7
Baltic	18,950	193.5	13,210	153.6
South	23,350	430.3	22,195	427.6
Kingdom of Poland	21,120	295.7	12,690	249.9
Totals	180,380	2,423.5	131,625	2,107.4

A glance at the figures for the South is enough to show how useless, i.e., extremely incomplete, the factory owners' statistics are. The figures for the last seven months of 1912 seem to be more reliable, because here, and only here, the distribution of strikers is given in detail according to areas, major industries and the results achieved.

The area data show us that the St. Petersburg workers are in advance of all the workers of Russia in the economic struggle as well (to say nothing of the political struggle). The number of strikers in the St. Petersburg area (35,000 for the last seven months of 1912) is about three-quarters of the number of strikers in the Moscow area (48,000) although the number of factory workers there is *about four times* that of the number in the St. Petersburg area. In the Kingdom of Poland there are slightly more workers than in the St. Petersburg area but the number of strikers there was little more than a third of the St. Petersburg figure.

As far as Moscow is concerned, there is, of course, the need to consider the worsening marketing conditions in the textile industry, although in Poland two-thirds of those participating in economic strikes were textile workers and we shall see later that these textile strikes in Poland were particularly successful.

In 1912, therefore, the St. Petersburg workers to a certain extent drew the workers of other parts of Russia into the economic strike movement.

In respect of *determination*, on the other hand, the strikes in the South and in Poland take first place; in these areas nineteen days per striker were lost, whereas in St. Petersburg and Moscow the figure was fifteen days (in the Baltic area 12 days per striker). The average for all Russia was sixteen days on strike per striker. The gentlemen who compile the factory owners' statistics give the figure for the whole of 1912 as 13.4 days. It follows from this that the persistence of the workers and their determination in struggle were greater in the second half of the year.

Statistics show, furthermore, the *increased persistence* of the workers in the strike struggle. From 1895 to 1904 the average number of days lost per striker was 4.8, in 1909 it was 6.5 days, in 1911 it was 7.5 days (8.2 days if political strikes are excluded) and in 1912, 13.4 days.

The year 1912, therefore, showed that there is a *growing persistence* among workers in the economic struggle and that the number of strikers—compared with the number of workers—is greatest in St. Petersburg.

In our next article we shall examine data on the degree of success achieved by strikes.

III

The factory owners' statistics give the following figures for strikers (in economic strikes) for 1912 according to branches of industry:

Areas	For all 1912		For the last 7 months of 1912	
	Number of strikers	Number of days lost (000)	Number of strikers	Number of days lost (000)
Metalworkers	57,000	807.2	40,475	763.3
Textile workers	85,550	1,025.8	66,590	930.6
Others	37,830	590.5	24,560	413.5
Totals	180,380	2,423.5	131,625	2,107.4

Here the extreme insufficiency of the factory owners' statistics and the extreme carelessness with which they have been compiled are still more apparent—the number of strikers for the first five months (which was 79,970) added to that for the last seven months gives a total of 211,595, and not 180,000, and not 207,000!

The factory owners themselves prove that they *underestimate* the number of strikers.

The metalworkers are in the lead both in the ratio of number of strikers to the total number of workers and in the duration of the strikes; 18 days were lost per metalworker on strike, 14 days per textile worker and 16 days per worker in other industries. The better marketing conditions in the iron and steel industry do not, as we see, relieve the workers of the necessity of striking for a tiny wage increase!

As far as the results of the strikes are concerned, the factory owners' statistics declare that 1912 was a *less favour-*

able year for the workers than 1911 had been. In 1911, they say, 49 per cent of the strikers suffered a defeat and in 1912, 52 per cent were defeated. These data, however, are not convincing, because the figures compared are for *the whole* of 1911 and for *seven months* of 1912.

The strikes of 1912 were offensive and not defensive in character. The workers were fighting *for improved* working conditions and not *against worse conditions*. This means that 52 per cent of the workers did not gain any improvement, 36 per cent were fully or partially *successful* and for 12 per cent the results are unclear. It is very likely that the factory owners concealed their defeat in this 12 per cent of all cases because every success of capital over labour arouses their special attention and jubilation.

If we compare the outcome of strikes for the last seven months of 1912 by areas and by branches of industry, we get the following picture.

The least successful of all were the strikes in the Moscow area—75 per cent of the strikers failed (i.e., did not gain any improvement); then follow the St. Petersburg area with 63 per cent, the South with 33 per cent, the Baltic area with 20 per cent and Poland with 11 per cent of failures. In the last-named *three* areas, therefore, the workers achieved *tremendous* victories. Out of the 48,000 strikers in these three areas, *27,000* achieved improvements, *they were victorious*; 11,000 suffered defeats; the results achieved by 10,000 are uncertain.

In the first two areas (Moscow and St. Petersburg), on the contrary, out of the 83,000 strikers only *20,000* were successful; 59,000 were defeated (i.e., did not achieve any improvement) and the results achieved by 4,000 are uncertain.

Taken by branches of industry, the number of strikers who were defeated was: textile workers, 66 per cent, metalworkers, 47 per cent, and others, 30 per cent.

Marketing conditions were worst of all for the textile workers. In the Moscow area only *6,000* of the 38,000 strikers in the textile industry were successful, 32,000 were defeated; in St. Petersburg there were 4,000 successful and 9,000 defeated. Textile workers in Poland, however, had *8,000* successful strikers and 400 defeated.

The financial results of the strikes (economic strikes) for the last two years are shown as follows by the factory owners' statistics:

	Industrialists' direct losses	Losses of wages	Losses in output for the country
	(thousand rubles)		
Iron and steel industry . .	558	1,145	4,959
Textile industry	479	807	6,010
Other branches	328	529	3,818
Totals for 1912 . . .	1,365	2,481	14,787
Totals for 1911 . . .	402	716	4,563

Thus the factory owners' total losses for two years amount to 1,800,000, workers' losses in wages to *3,000,000 rubles*, and losses in output to 19,000,000 rubles.

Here the factory owners place a period. How wise they are! What did the workers *gain*?

In two years *125,000 workers* gained a victory. Their wages for the year amount to 30,000,000 rubles. They demanded pay increases of 10 per cent, 25 per cent and even 40 per cent, as the factory owners themselves admit. Ten per cent of 30,000,000 rubles is *3,000,000 rubles*. And the reduction in the working day?

And what of the "*new*" (the factory owners' expression) demands, such as the demand "*not* to discharge workers without the consent of their fellow-workers"?

You are wrong, you gentlemen who own factories! Even in the economic sense (to say nothing of political strikes) the workers' gains are *terrifying*. The bourgeoisie does not understand either workers' solidarity or the conditions of proletarian struggle.

About 300,000 workers have sacrificed 3,000,000 rubles to the economic struggle in two years. A direct gain was *immediately* achieved by 125,000 workers. And the whole working class made a step forward.

Pravda Nos. 123, 126, 127 and 131;
May 30, June 2, 5 and 9, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

AN INCORRECT APPRAISAL (*LUCH* ON MAKLAKOV)[50]

...programmes and resolutions of the liberals.*

In the *Luch* (No. 122) editorial we come across a profoundly incorrect appraisal of this important speech. "Cadet doctrinairism" is what *Luch* saw in it, Deputy Maklakov is likened to an animal that brushes out its tracks with its tail. "The numerous parentheses in his speech completely destroyed its oppositional character"—and *Luch* quotes the words of Mr. V. Maklakov to the effect that "reaction is an historical law", that one should (according to Bismarck's theory) be able to distinguish moments when it is necessary to rule in liberal fashion and moments when despotic rule is essential.

"Such speeches could be made by a professor," concludes *Luch*, but not by a politician upholding the right of democracy to self-determination" [?].

No, Mr. V. Maklakov is by no means a doctrinaire and his speech is not that of a professor. And it is nothing less than ridiculous to expect V. Maklakov to uphold the rights of democracy. He is a liberal-bourgeois businessman who has fearlessly exposed the very "guts" of the policy of his class. Mr. V. Maklakov made the accusation that the government could have comprehended [when the revolution had died down] *how to stamp out the revolution entirely*" but failed to comprehend.

"When a government fights against a revolution it is right, that is its duty," exclaimed Mr. V. Maklakov, and added, the same will be true of the revolution, when it is victorious, it will fight against counter-revolution" (here this

* The first page of the manuscript has not been found.—*Ed.*

"experienced" orator made an amusing slip, using, for some unknown reason, only the future tense.) Mr. V. Maklakov repeated several times that he blamed the government "not for fighting disorder and revolution, but for fighting against law and order itself".

Mr. V. Maklakov compared Stolypin to a fireman who breaks the windows of a burning house.

From this it can be seen that the predominant tone and substance of this noteworthy speech are not a professorial stunt or doctrinairism but whole-hearted, persistent counter-revolution. It is all the more important to deal at length with this since the newspaper hubbub over petty details of the "conflict" so zealously hides the substance of it. The policy of liberalism and its class roots cannot be *understood* unless this, its typical and fundamental feature, is mastered.

Luch displays an amazing and amusing lack of understanding of this matter when it exclaims: "Is it not the worst form of doctrinairism to worship the statesmanship of Bismarck who, whatever is said about him, always remained a man of blood and iron?"

What has this to do with doctrinairism, gentlemen? You are right off the mark. V. Maklakov said as clearly as it could be said that he approves "fighting disorder and revolution", approves of "the fireman", and, it goes without saying, V. Maklakov knows very well what that means—blood and iron. V. Maklakov said as clearly as it could be said that *this* was the very policy he favoured—*provided* it succeeded! You have to break windows, he preaches, don't be afraid of breaking windows, we are not sentimental people, we are not professors, not doctrinaires, but when you break windows, do it as Bismarck did, i.e., successfully, *strengthening* the alliance of the bourgeoisie and the landowners.

And you, says V. Maklakov to the government, you break windows *for no reason*, like a street lout, not like a fireman.

Bismarck represented the counter-revolutionary landowners of Germany. He realised he could save them (for a few decades) *only* by a sound alliance with the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. He succeeded in forming this alliance because the resistance of the proletariat was weak and lucky wars helped solve the *current* problem—that of the national unification of Germany.

We have our counter-revolutionary landowners. And we have our counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. V. Maklakov is their foremost representative. He showed by his speech that he is prepared to do any amount of bowing and scraping before Purishkevich & Co. This, however, is not enough for the "marriage" to be a success. The current historical task must be fulfilled, and ours is not national unification (of which we have more than enough...) but *the agrarian problem* ... at a time when the resistance of the proletariat is stronger.

About this, the pitiful liberal, V. Maklakov, who pines for a Russian Bismarck, was unable to say a single articulate word.

Written at the beginning of June 1913

First published in 1937
in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*
Signed: *W.*

Published according to
the manuscript

FRANK SPEECHES BY A LIBERAL

V. M. Sobolevsky, editor of *Russkiye Vedomosti*,[51] recently passed away. The liberals honoured him as a "staunch progressive figure". They spoke and wrote on his personal qualities. They avoided the question of the political trend followed by *Russkiye Vedomosti*.

There is nothing more convenient for our liberals than that ancient, colourless, general haziness—"oppositionism", "progressism". What is hidden behind those words, *what sort* of oppositional activity was displayed by an individual, which class he served, are things they prefer not to discuss. These things are distasteful to liberals.

Democracy, however, should try to establish the truth. Honour V. M. Sobolevsky as a progressive, that is your right. But if you really want to teach politics to the people do not forget the *trend* followed by *Russkiye Vedomosti*, that provides a unique combination of *Right* Cadetism and Narodnik overtones.

Mr. L. Panteleyev, who published in *Rech* an article to the memory of V. M. Sobolevsky, wrote that he was a "great sceptic in respect of the availability of the forces possessed by our progressive society".

Nothing here is definite. What sort of scepticism was it? What society is he talking about? The curtain is drawn back slightly by the words of V. M. Sobolevsky that Mr. Panteleyev quotes: "What has a society to offer that in the mass is saturated to the marrow of its bones with the traditions and habits of serfdom? What support for a new system is to be expected from millions of semi-slaves, beggars, starving people, drunkards and ignoramuses?"

Mr. Panteleyev, who deemed it proper to publish these frank statements, did not notice the light they cast on the attitude of Russian liberals to democracy.

In the summer of 1905, *Russkiye Vedomosti* published an article by Mr. Vinogradov, the star of liberal scholarship, arguing that these semi-slaves should not go too far, that they should be more modest and calm. *Russkiye Vedomosti* was probably a little ahead of other liberal newspapers in declaring quite definitely its counter-revolutionary attitude to events.

There is scepticism and scepticism. As far as a public figure is concerned, one should ask: in respect of *which* class is he a sceptic? Sobolevsky (and his *Russkiye Vedomosti*) was a sceptic and even a pessimist in respect of the peasantry. He was an optimist in respect of the landowners; he pictured them as being capable of "reforms", as "sincerely sympathising with the new social system" as "cultured people", etc. The mixture of this landowner liberalism (not semi-slavish but utterly slavish) and Narodism, was a sign of the rottenness of the "enlightened", well-to-do, satiated liberal society that *taught* slave morality and slave politics to the "millions of semi-slaves" who were awakening. This liberal society was, "to the marrow of its bones", slavish towards the landowners, and the Narodism of *Russkiye Vedomosti* reflects more than anything else the patriarchal Russia of the humble muzhik and the landowner flirting with liberalism.

Pravda No. 125, June 1, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE QUESTION OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION POLICY[52]

(SUPPLEMENT TO THE DISCUSSION ON PUBLIC EDUCATION)

Our Ministry of Public (forgive the expression) "Education" boasts inordinately of the particularly rapid growth of its expenditure. In the explanatory note to the 1913 budget by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance we find a summary of the estimates of the Ministry of Public (so-called) Education for the post-revolutionary years. These estimates have increased from 46,000,000 rubles in 1907 to 137,000,000 in 1913. A tremendous growth—almost trebled in something like six years!

But our official praise-mongers who laud the police "law and order" or *disorder* in Russia ought not to have forgotten that ridiculously small figures always do grow with "*tremendous*" rapidity when increases in them are given as percentages. If you give five kopeks to a beggar who owns only three his "property" will immediately show a "tremendous" growth—it will be 167 per cent greater!

Would it not have been more fitting for the Ministry, if it did not aim at *befogging* the minds of the people and *concealing* the beggarly position of public education in Russia, to cite *other data*? Would it not have been more fitting to cite figures that do not compare today's five kopeks with yesterday's three, but compare what we have with what *is essential* to a civilised state? He who does not wish to deceive either himself or the people should admit that the Ministry was *in duty bound* to produce these figures, and that by not producing *such* figures the Ministry was not doing its duty. Instead of *making clear* to the people, and the people's representatives, what the needs of the state are, the

Ministry *conceals* these needs and engages in a foolish governmental game of figures, a governmental rehash of old figures that explain nothing.

I do not have at my disposal, of course, even a hundredth part of the means and sources for studying public education that are available to the Ministry. But I have made an attempt to obtain *at least a little* source material. And I assert boldly that I can cite *indisputable* official figures that really *do make clear* the situation in our official public "miseducation".

I take the official government *Russian Yearbook* for 1910, published by the Ministry of the Interior (St. Petersburg, 1911).

On page 211, I read that the total number attending schools in the Russian Empire, lumping together primary, secondary and higher schools and educational establishments of all kinds, was 6,200,172 in 1904 and 7,095,351 in 1908. An obvious increase. The *year 1905*, the year of the great awakening of the masses of the people in Russia, the year of the great struggle of the people for freedom under the leadership of the proletariat, was a year that *forced* even our hidebound Ministry to make a move.

But just look at the *poverty* we are doomed to, thanks to the retention of officialdom, thanks to the almighty power of the feudal landowners, *even* under conditions of the most rapid "departmental" progress.

The same *Russian Yearbook* relates in the same place that there were 46.7 people attending school to every 1,000 inhabitants in 1908 (in 1904 the figure was 44.3 to every 1,000 inhabitants).

What do we learn from these figures from a Ministry of the Interior publication that the Ministry of Public Education did not feel inclined to report to the Duma? What does that proportion mean—*less than 50 people* out of a 1,000 *attending school*?

It tells us, you gentlemen who uphold our hidebound public miseducation, of the *unbelievable* backwardness and barbarity of Russia thanks to the omnipotence of the feudal landowners in our state. The number of children and adolescents of school age in Russia amounts to over 20 per cent of the population, that is, to more than *one-fifth*. Even

Messrs. Kasso and Kokovtsov could without difficulty have learned these figures from their departmental clerks.

And so, we have 22 per cent of the population of school age and 4.7 per cent attending school, which is only a *little more than one-fifth*! This means that about *four-fifths* of the children and adolescents of Russia are *deprived* of public education!

There is no other country so barbarous and in which the masses of the people are *robbed* to such an extent of education, light and knowledge—no other such country has remained in Europe; Russia is the exception. This reversion of the masses of the people, especially the peasantry, to savagery, is not fortuitous, it is *inevitable* under the yoke of the landowners, who have seized tens and more tens of millions of dessiatines of land, who have seized state power both in the Duma and in the Council of State, and not only in these institutions, which are relatively *low-ranking* institutions....

Four-fifths of the rising generation are doomed to illiteracy by the feudal state system of Russia. This stultifying of the people by the feudal authorities has its correlative in the country's illiteracy. The same government *Russian Yearbook* estimates (on page 88) that only 21 per cent of the population of Russia are literate, and even if children of preschool age (i.e., children under nine) are deducted from the total population, the number will still be only 27 per cent.

In civilised countries there are no illiterates at all (as in Sweden or Denmark), or a mere one or two per cent (as in Switzerland or Germany). Even backward Austria-Hungary has provided her Slav population with conditions *incomparably* more civilised than feudal Russia has; in Austria there are 39 per cent of illiterates and in Hungary 50 per cent. It would be as well for our chauvinists, Rights, nationalists and Octobrists *to think about* these figures, if they have not set themselves the "statesmanlike" aim of forgetting how to think, and of teaching the same to the people. But even if they have forgotten, the people of Russia *are learning* more and more to think, and to think, furthermore about which class it is that by its dominance in the state condemns the Russian peasants to material and spiritual poverty.

America is not among the advanced countries as far as he number of literates is concerned There are about 11 per

cent illiterates and among the Negroes the figure is as high as 44 per cent. But the American Negroes are *more than twice* as well off in respect of public education as the Russian peasantry. The American Negroes, no matter how much they may be, to the shame of the American Republic, oppressed, are better off than the Russian peasants—and they are better off because exactly half a century ago the people routed the American slave-owners, crushed that serpent and completely swept away slavery and the slave-owning state system, and the political privileges of the slave-owners in America.

The Kassos, Kokovtsovs and Maklakovs will teach the Russian people to copy the American example.

In 1908 there were *17,000,000* attending school in America, that is, *192 per 1,000 inhabitants—more than four times* the number in Russia. Forty-three years ago, in 1870, when America had only just begun to build her free way of life after *purging* the country of the diehards of slavery—forty-three years ago there were in America 6,871,522 people attending school, i.e., more than in Russia in 1904 and almost as many as in 1908. But even as far back as 1870 there were 178 (*one hundred and seventy-eight*) people enrolled in schools to every 1,000 inhabitants, little short of four times the number enrolled in Russia *today*.

And there, gentlemen, you have further proof that Russia *still* has to win for herself in persistent revolutionary struggle by the people *that freedom* the Americans won for themselves half a century ago.

The estimate for the Russian Ministry of Public Miseducation is fixed at 136,700,000 rubles for 1913. This amounts to only 80 kopeks per head of the population (170,000,000 in 1913). Even if we accept the "sum-total of state expenditure on education" that the Minister of Finance gives us on page 109 of his explanatory text to the budget, that is, 204,900,000 rubles, we still have only 1 ruble 20 kopeks per head. In Belgium, Britain and Germany the amount expended on education is two to three rubles and even three rubles fifty kopeks per head of the population. In 1910, America expended 426,000,000 dollars, i.e., 852,000,000 rubles or 9 rubles 24 kopeks per head of the population, on public education. Forty-three years ago,

in 1870, the American Republic was spending 126,000,000 rubles a year on education, i.e., *3 rubles 30 kopeks* per head.

The official pens of government officials and the officials themselves will object and tell us that Russia is poor, that she has no money. That is true, Russia is not only poor, she is a beggar when it comes to public education. To make up for it, Russia is very "rich" when it comes to expenditure on the feudal state, ruled by landowners, or expenditure on the police, the army, on rents and on salaries of ten thousand rubles for landowners who have reached "high" government posts, expenditure on risky adventures and plunder, yesterday in Korea or on the River Yalu, today in Mongolia or in Turkish Armenia. Russia will *always* remain poor and beggarly in respect of expenditure on public education *until* the public educates itself sufficiently to cast off the yoke of feudal landowners.

Russia is poor when it comes to the salaries of school-teachers. They are paid a miserable pittance. School-teachers starve and freeze in unheated huts that are scarcely fit for human habitation. School-teachers live together with the cattle that the peasants take into their huts in winter. School-teachers are persecuted by every police sergeant, by every village adherent of the Black Hundreds, by volunteer spies or detectives, to say nothing of the hole-picking and persecution by higher officials. Russia is too poor to pay a decent salary to honest workers in the field of public education, but Russia is rich enough to waste millions and tens of millions on aristocratic parasites, on military adventures and on hand-outs to owners of sugar refineries, oil kings and so on.

There is one other figure, the last one taken from American life, gentlemen, that will show the peoples oppressed by the Russian landowners and *their* government, *how* the people live who have been able to achieve freedom through a revolutionary struggle. In 1870, in America there were 200,515 school-teachers with a total salary of 37,800,000 dollars, i.e., an average of 189 dollars or *377 rubles* per teacher per annum. And that was *forty years* ago! In America today there are *523,210* school-teachers and their total salaries come to 253,900,000 dollars, i.e., 483 dollars or *966 rubles* per teacher per annum. And in Russia, even at the present

level of the productive forces, it would be quite possible at this very moment to guarantee a no less satisfactory salary to an army of school-teachers who are helping to lift the people out of their ignorance, darkness and oppression, if ... if the whole state system of Russia, from top to bottom, were reorganised on lines as democratic as the American system.

Either poverty and barbarism arising out of the full power of the feudal landowners, arising out of the law and order or disorder of the June Third law, or freedom and civilisation arising out of the *ability and determination* to win freedom—such is *the object-lesson* Russian citizens are taught by the estimates put forward by the Ministry of Public Education.

So far I have touched upon the purely material, or even financial, aspect of the matter. Incomparably more melancholy or, rather, more disgusting, is the picture of spiritual bondage, humiliation, suppression and lack of rights of the teachers and those they teach in Russia. The whole activity of the Ministry of Public Education in this field is pure mockery of the rights of citizens, mockery of the people. Police surveillance, police violence, police *interference* with the education of the people in general and of workers in particular, police *destruction* of whatever the people themselves do for their own enlightenment—this is what the *entire* activity of the Ministry amounts to, the Ministry whose estimate will be approved by the landowning gentry, from Rights to Octobrists inclusive.

And in order to prove the correctness of my words, gentlemen of the Fourth Duma, I will call a witness that *even* you, the landowners, cannot object to. My witness is the Octobrist Mr. *Klyuzhev*, member of the Third and Fourth Dumas, member of the supervisory council of the Second and Third Women's Gymnasia in Samara, member of the school committee of the Samara City Council, member of the auditing board of the Samara Gubernia Zemstvo, former inspector of public schools. I have given you a list of the offices and titles (using the official reference book of the Third Duma) of this Octobrist *to prove* to you that the government *itself*, the landowners *themselves* in our landowners' Zemstvo, have given Mr. Klyuzhev most important posts in

the "work" (the work of spies and butchers) of our Ministry of Public Stultification.

Mr. Klyuzhev, if anybody, has, of course, made his entire career as a law-abiding, God-fearing civil servant. And, of course, Mr. Klyuzhev, if anybody, has by his faithful service in the district earned the confidence of the nobility and the landowners.

And now here are some passages from a speech by this most thoroughly reliable (from the feudal point of view) witness; the speech was made in the *Third* Duma in respect of the estimate submitted by the Ministry of Public Education.

The Samara Zemstvo, Mr. Klyuzhev told the Third Duma, *unanimously* adopted the proposal of Mr. Klyuzhev to make application for the conversion of some village two-year schools into four-year schools. The regional supervisor, so the law-abiding and God-fearing Mr. Klyuzhev reports, *refused* this. Why? The official explanation was: "*in view of the insignificant number of children of school age.*"

And so Mr. Klyuzhev made the following comparison: *we* (he says of landowner-oppressed Russia) have *not a single* four-year school for the 6,000 inhabitants of the Samara villages. In the town of Serdobol (Finland) with *2,800* inhabitants there are *four* secondary (and higher than secondary) schools.

This comparison was made by the Octobrist, the most worthy Peredonov* ... excuse the slip, the most worthy Mr. Klyuzhev in the Third Duma. Ponder over that comparison, Messrs. Duma representatives, if not of the people, then at least of the landowners. Who made application to open schools? Could it be the Lefts? The muzhiks? The workers? God forbid! It was the Samara Zemstvo that made the application *unanimously*, that is, it was the Samara *landowners*, the most ardent Black-Hundred adherents among them. And the government, through its supervisor, refused the request on the excuse that there was an "*insignificant*" number of children of school age! Was I not in every way right when I said that the government *hinders* public education in Russia, that the government is the biggest enemy of public education in Russia?

* Peredonov—a type of teacher-spy and dull lout from Sologub's novel *The Petty Imp*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The culture, civilisation, freedom, literacy, educated women and so on that we see in Finland derive *exclusively* from *there being no* such "social evil" as the Russian Government in Finland. Now you want to foist this evil on Finland and make her, too, an enslaved country. You will not succeed in that, gentlemen! By your attempts to impose political slavery on Finland you will only accelerate the awakening of the peoples of Russia from political slavery!

I will quote another passage from the Octobrist witness, Mr. Klyuzhev. "How are teachers recruited?" Mr. Klyuzhev asked in his speech and himself provided the following answer:

> "One prominent Samara man, by the name of Popov, bequeathed the necessary sum to endow a Teachers' Seminary for Women." And who do you think was appointed head of the Seminary? This is what the executor of the late Popov writes: "*The widow of a General of the Guards* was appointed head of the Seminary and she herself admitted that this was the first time in her life she had heard of the existence of an educational establishment called a Teachers' Seminary for Women"!

Don't imagine that I took this from a collection of Demyan Bedny's fables, from the sort of fable for which the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* was fined and its editor imprisoned. Nothing of the sort. This fact was taken from the speech of the Octobrist Klyuzhev, who fears (as a God-fearing and police-fearing man) even *to ponder* the significance of this fact. For this fact, once again, shows beyond all doubt that there is no more vicious, no more implacable enemy of the education of the people in Russia than the Russian Government. And gentlemen who bequeath money for public education should realise that they are throwing it away, worse than throwing it away. They desire to bequeath their money to provide education for the people, but *actually* it turns out that they are giving it to *Generals of the Guards* and their *widows*. If such philanthropists do not wish to throw their money away they must understand that they should bequeath it to the Social-Democrats, who *alone* are able to use that money to provide the people with real education that is really independent of "Generals of the Guards"—and of timorous and law-abiding Klyuzhevs.

Still another passage from the speech of the same Mr. Klyuzhev.

"It was in vain that we of the Third Duma desired free access to higher educational establishments for seminar pupils. The Ministry did not deem it possible to accede to our wishes." "Incidentally the government bars the way to higher education, not to seminar pupils alone, but to the children of the peasant and urban petty-bourgeois social estates in general. This is no elegant phrase but the truth," exclaimed the Octobrist official of the Ministry of Public Education. "Out of the 119,000 Gymnasium students only 18,000 are peasants. Peasants constitute only 15 per cent of those studying in all the establishments of the Ministry of Public Education. In the Theological Seminaries only 1,300 of the 20,500 pupils are peasants. Peasants are not admitted at all to the Cadet Corps and similar institutions." (These passages from Klyuzhev's speech were incidentally, cited in an article by K. Dobroserdov in *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 6, for 1912, dated May 22, 1912.)

That is how Mr. Klyuzhev spoke in the Third Duma. The depositions of that witness will not be refuted by those who rule the roost in the Fourth Duma. The witness, *against* his own will and *despite* his wishes, fully corroborates the *revolutionary* appraisal of the present situation in Russia in general, and of public education in particular. And what, indeed, does a government deserve that, in the words of a prominent government official and member of the ruling party of Octobrists, *bars the way* to education for the peasants and urban petty bourgeois?

Imagine, gentlemen, what such a government deserves from the point of view of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasants!

And do not forget that in Russia the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie constitute 88 per cent of the population, that is, a little less than *nine-tenths* of the people. The nobility constitute only *one and a half per cent*. And so the government is taking money from nine-tenths of the people for schools and educational establishments of all kinds *and using that money* to teach the nobility, *barring the way* to the peasant and urban petty bourgeois! Is it not clear what this government of the nobility deserves? This government that oppresses nine-tenths of the population in order to preserve the privileges of *one-hundredth* of the population—what does it deserve?

And now, finally, for the last quotation from my witness, the Octobrist official of the Ministry of Public Education, and member of the Third (and Fourth) Dumas! Mr. Klyuzhev:

"In the five years from 1906 to 1910," said Mr. Klyuzhev, "in the Kazan area, the following have been removed from their posts: 21 head masters of secondary and primary schools, 32 inspectors of public schools and *1,054* urban school-teachers; *870* people of these categories have been transferred. Imagine it," exclaimed Mr. Klyuzhev, "how can our school-teacher sleep peacefully! He may go to bed in Astrakhan and not be sure that he will not be in Vyatka the next day. Try to understand the psychology of the pedagogue who is driven about like a hunted rabbit!"

This is not the exclamation of some "Left" school-teacher, but of an Octobrist. These figures were cited by a diligent civil servant. He is *your* witness, gentlemen of the Right, nationalists and Octobrists! This witness of "yours" is compelled to admit the most scandalous, most shameless and most disgusting arbitrariness on the part of the government in its attitude to teachers! This witness of *yours*, gentlemen who rule the roost in the Fourth Duma and the Council of State, has been forced to admit the fact that teachers in Russia are "*driven*" like rabbits by the Russian Government!

On the basis provided by this fact, one of thousands and thousands of similar facts in Russian life, we ask the Russian people and all the peoples of Russia: do we need a government to protect the privileges of the nobility and to "*drive*" the people's teachers "like rabbits"? Does not this government deserve to be *driven out* by the people?

Yes, the Russian people's teachers are driven like rabbits. Yes, the government bars the way to education to nine-tenths of the population of Russia. Yes, our Ministry of Public Education is a ministry of police espionage, a ministry that derides youth, and jeers at the people's thirst for knowledge. But far from all the Russian peasants, not to mention the Russian workers, resemble *rabbits*, honourable members of the Fourth Duma. The working class were able to prove this in 1905, and they will be able to prove again, and to prove more impressively, and much more seriously, that they are capable of a revolutionary struggle for real freedom and for *real public* education and not that of Kasso or of the nobility.

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CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

AN OPEN PARTY AND THE MARXISTS

Pravda Nos. 85, 95, 110, 122, 124 and 126; April 12, 16, May 15, 29, 31, and June 2, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text, collated with that of the pamphlet *Marxism and Liquidationism*, Part II, St. Petersburg, 1914

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I. THE DECISION OF 1908

To many workers the struggle that is now going on between *Pravda* and *Luch* appears unnecessary and not very intelligible. Naturally, polemical articles in separate issues of the newspaper on separate, sometimes very special questions, do not give a complete idea of the subject and content of the struggle. Hence the legitimate dissatisfaction of the workers.

Yet the question of liquidationism, over which the struggle is now being waged, is at the present time one of the most important and most urgent questions of the working-class movement. One cannot be a class-conscious worker unless one studies the question in detail and forms a definite opinion on it. A worker who wishes to participate independently in deciding the destiny of *his* Party will not waive aside polemics, even if they are not quite intelligible at first sight, but will earnestly seek until he finds the truth.

How is the truth to be sought? How can one find one's way through the tangle of contradictory opinions and assertions?

Every sensible person understands that if a bitter struggle is raging on any subject, in order to ascertain the truth, he must not confine himself to the statements made by the disputants, but must examine the *facts* and *documents* for himself, see for himself whether there is any evidence to be had from *witnesses* and whether this evidence is reliable.

This, of course, is not always easy to do. It is much "easier" to take for granted what comes to hand, what you *happen* to hear, what is more "openly" shouted about, and so on. But people who are satisfied with this are dubbed "shallow", feather-brained people, and no one takes them seriously. The truth about any important question cannot be found

unless a certain amount of *independent* work is done, and anyone who is afraid of work cannot possibly arrive at the truth.

Therefore, we address ourselves only to those workers who are not afraid of this work, who have decided to get to the bottom of the matter *themselves*, and try to *discover facts*, *documents*, *the evidence of witnesses*.

The first question that arises is—what is liquidationism? Where did this word come from, what does it mean?

Luch says that the liquidation of the Party, i.e., the dissolution, the break-up of the Party, the renunciation of the Party, is merely a wicked invention. The "factionalist" Bolsheviks, it alleges, invented this charge against the Mensheviks!

Pravda says that the whole Party has been condemning and fighting liquidationism for over four years.

Who is right? How to discover the truth?

Obviously, the only way is to seek for facts and documents of the Party's *history* in the last four years, from 1908 to 1912, when the liquidators *finally split away* from the Party.

These four years, during which the present liquidators *were still* in the Party, constitute the most important period for *discovering* where the term liquidationism came from and how it arose.

Hence, the first and basic conclusion: whoever talks of liquidationism, but *avoids* the facts and *Party* documents of the 1908-11 period, is hiding the truth from the workers.

What are these facts and Party documents?

First of all there is the *Party decision* adopted in December 1908. If the workers do not wish to be treated like children who are stuffed with fairy-tales and fables, they must ask their advisers, leaders or representatives, whether a *Party decision* was adopted on the question of liquidationism in December 1908 and what that decision was.

The decision contains a *condemnation* of liquidationism and an *explanation* of what it is.

Liquidationism is "an attempt on the part of a group of Party intellectuals to *liquidate* [i.e, dissolve, destroy, abolish, close down] the existing organisation of the Party and to replace it at all costs, even at the price of *downright re-*

nunciation of the programme, tactics, and traditions of the Party [i.e., past experience], by a loose association functioning legally [i.e., in conformity with the law, existing "openly"]".

Such was the Party's *decision* on liquidationism, adopted more than four years ago.

It is obvious from this decision what the essence of liquidationism is and why it is condemned. Its essence is the *renunciation* of the "underground", its liquidation and *replacement* at all costs by an amorphous association functioning legally. Therefore, it is *not* legal work, not insistence on the need for it that the Party condemns. The Party condemns—and unreservedly condemns—the *replacement* of the old Party by something amorphous, "open", something which cannot be called a party.

The Party cannot exist unless it defends its existence, unless it unreservedly fights those who want to liquidate it, destroy it, who do not recognise it, who renounce it. This is self-evident.

Anyone who renounces the existing Party in the name of some new party must be told: try, build up a new party, but you cannot remain a member of the old, the present, the existing Party. Such is the meaning of the Party decision adopted in December 1908, and it is obvious that no other decision could have been taken on the question of the Party's existence.

Of course, liquidationism is ideologically *connected* with *renegacy*, with *the renunciation of the programme and tactics*, with *opportunism*. This is exactly what is indicated in the concluding part of the above-quoted decision. But liquidationism is not *only* opportunism. The opportunists are leading the Party on to a wrong, bourgeois path, the path of a liberal-labour policy, but they *do not renounce* the Party itself, they do not liquidate it. Liquidationism is *that brand* of opportunism which goes to the length of *renouncing* the Party. It is self-evident that the Party cannot exist if its members *include* those who do not recognise its existence. It is equally evident that the renunciation of the underground under existing conditions is renunciation of the old Party.

The question is, what is the attitude of the liquidators towards this Party decision adopted in 1908?

This is the crux of the matter, this puts the sincerity and political honesty of the liquidators to the test.

Not one of them, unless he has taken leave of his senses, will deny that such a decision was adopted by the Party and has not been rescinded.

And so the liquidators resort to evasions; they either avoid the question and *withhold* from the workers the Party's decision of 1908, or exclaim (often adding abuse) that this was a decision carried by the Bolsheviks.

But abuse only betrays the weakness of the liquidators. There are *Party decisions* that have been carried by the *Mensheviks*, for example, the decision concerning municipalisation, adopted in Stockholm in 1906.[53] This is common knowledge. Many Bolsheviks do not agree with that decision. But not one of them denies that it is a *Party decision*. In exactly the same way the decision of 1908 concerning liquidationism is a *Party decision*. All attempts to sidestep this question only signify a desire to mislead the workers.

Whoever wants to recognise the Party, not merely in words, will not permit any sidestepping, and will insist on getting at the truth concerning the *Party's decision* on the question of liquidationism. This decision has been supported ever since 1909 by *all the pro-Party Mensheviks*,[54] headed by Plekhanov who, in his *Dnevnik* and in a whole series of other Marxist publications, has repeatedly and quite definitely explained that nobody who wants to liquidate the Party can be a member of the Party.

Plekhanov was and will remain a Menshevik. Therefore, the liquidators' usual references to the "Bolshevik" nature of the Party's 1908 decision are doubly wrong.

The more abuse the liquidators hurl at Plekhanov in *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya*, the clearer is the proof that the liquidators are in the wrong and that they are trying to obscure the truth by noise, shouting and squabbling. Sometimes a novice can be stunned at once by such methods, but for all that the workers will find their bearings and will soon come to ignore this abuse.

Is the unity of the workers necessary? It is.

Is the unity of the workers possible without the unity of the workers' organisation? Obviously not.

What prevents the unity of the workers' party? Disputes over liquidationism.

Therefore, the workers must understand what these disputes are about in order that they *themselves* may decide the destiny of their Party and *defend it*.

The first step in this direction is to acquaint themselves with the *Party's first* decision on liquidationism. The workers must know this decision thoroughly and study it carefully, putting aside all attempts to evade the question or to side-track it. Having studied this decision, every worker will begin to understand the essence of liquidationism, why it is such an important and such a "vexed " question, why the Party has been faced with it during the four years and more of the period of reaction.

In the next article we shall consider another important Party decision on liquidationism which was adopted about three and a half years ago, and then pass on to facts and documents that show how the question stands at present.

II. THE DECISION OF 1910

In our first article (*Pravda* No. 289) we quoted the first and basic document with which those workers who wish to discover the truth in the present disputes must make themselves familiar, namely, the Party decision of December 1908 on liquidationism.

Now we shall quote and examine another, no less important Party decision on the same question adopted three and a half years ago, in January 1910. This decision is especially important because it was carried *unanimously*: all the Bolsheviks, without exception, all the *Vperyod* group, and finally (this is most important) *all* the Mensheviks and the present liquidators without exception, and also all the "national" (i.e., Jewish, Polish and Latvian) Marxists accepted this decision.

We quote here in full the most important passage in this decision:

"The historical situation of the Social-Democratic movement in the period of bourgeois counter-revolution inevitably gives rise, as a manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat, on the one hand, to the renunciation of the illegal Social-Democratic Party,

the belittling of its role and importance, attempts to curtail the programmatic and tactical tasks and slogans of consistent Social-Democracy, etc.; on the other hand, it gives rise to the renunciation of Social-Democratic activities in the Duma and of the utilisation of legal possibilities, to failure to understand the importance of both, to inability to adapt consistent Social-Democratic tactics to the peculiar historical conditions of the given moment, etc.

"It is an integral part of Social-Democratic tactics under such conditions to overcome both deviations by broadening and deepening Social-Democratic work in all spheres of proletarian class struggle and to explain the danger of such deviations."[55]

This decision clearly shows that three and a half years ago all the Marxists, as represented by all the trends without exception, were obliged *unanimously* to recognise two *deviations* from Marxist tactics. Both deviations were recognised as *dangerous*. Both deviations were explained as being due, not to accident, not to the evil will of certain individuals, but to the "*historical situation*" of the working-class movement in the present period.

Moreover, this unanimous Party decision points to the class origin and significance of these deviations. For Marxists do not confine themselves to bare and hollow references to disruption and disintegration. That sense of confusion, lack of faith, despondency and perplexity reign in the minds of many adherents of democracy and socialism is obvious to all. It is not enough to admit this. It is necessary to understand the *class* origin of the discord and disintegration, to understand what *class* interests emanating from a non-proletarian environment foster "confusion" among the friends of the proletariat.

And the Party decision adopted three and a half years ago gave an answer to this important question: *the deviations* from Marxism are generated by "bourgeois counter-revolution", by "*bourgeois influence over the proletariat*".

What are these deviations that threaten to surrender the proletariat to the influence of the bourgeoisie? One of these deviations, connected with the *Vperyod* line and renouncing Social-Democratic activities in the Duma and the utilisation of legal possibilities, *has almost completely disappeared*. None of the Social-Democrats in Russia now preach these erroneous non-Marxian views. The *Vperyod*

group (including Alexinsky and others) have begun to work in Pravda alongside the pro-Party Mensheviks.

The other deviation indicated in the Party decision is liquidationism. This is obvious from the reference to the "renunciation" of the underground and to the "belittling" of its role and importance. Finally, we have a very precise document, published three years ago and refuted by no one, a document emanating from all the "national" Marxists and from Trotsky (better witnesses the liquidators could not wish for). This document states directly that "in essence it would be desirable to call the trend indicated in the resolution liquidationism, a trend which must be combated...".

Thus, the fundamental and most important fact that must be known by everyone who wants to understand what the present controversy is about is the following—three and a half years ago the Party unanimously recognised liquidationism to be a "dangerous" deviation from Marxism, a deviation which must be combated and which expresses "bourgeois influence over the proletariat".

The interests of the bourgeoisie, whose attitude is against democracy, and, generally speaking, counter-revolutionary, demand the liquidation, the dissolution of the old Party of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie are doing everything they can to spread and foster all ideas aimed at liquidating the party of the working class. The bourgeoisie are trying to encourage renunciation of the old tasks, to "dock" them, cut them back, prune them, sap them of meaning, to substitute conciliation or an agreement with the Purishkeviches and Co. for the determined destruction of the foundations of their power.

Liquidationism is, in fact, the spreading of these bourgeois ideas of renunciation and renegacy among the proletariat.

Such is the class significance of liquidationism as indicated in the Party decision unanimously adopted three and a half years ago. It is in this that the entire Party sees the greatest harm and the danger of liquidationism, its pernicious effect on the working-class movement, on the consolidation of an independent (not merely in word but in deed) party of the working class.

Liquidationism means not only the liquidation (i.e., the dissolution, the destruction) of the old party of the working

class, it also means the destruction of the *class independence* of the proletariat, the corruption of its class-consciousness by *bourgeois* ideas.

We shall give an illustration of this appraisal of liquidationism in the next article, which will set forth in full the most important arguments of the liquidationist *Luch*. Now let us sum up briefly what we have stated. The attempts of the *Luch* people in general, and of Messrs. F. Dan and Potresov in particular, to make it appear that "liquidationism" is an invention, are astonishingly mendacious subterfuges based on the assumption that the readers of *Luch* are completely uninformed. Actually, apart from the Party decision of 1908, there is the *unanimous* Party decision of 1910, which gives a complete appraisal of liquidationism as a bourgeois deviation from the proletarian path, a deviation that is dangerous and disastrous to the working class. Only the enemies of the working class can conceal or evade this Party appraisal.

III. THE ATTITUDE OF THE LIQUIDATORS TO THE DECISIONS OF 1908 AND 1910

In the preceding article [*Pravda* No. 95 (299)]. we quoted the exact words of the unanimous Party decision on liquidationism, which define it as a manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat.

As we have pointed out, this decision was adopted in *January 1910*. Let us now examine the behaviour of those liquidators who are brazenly assuring us that there is not, and never has been, any such thing as liquidationism.

In February 1910, in No. 2 of the magazine *Nasha Zarya*, which had only just begun to appear at that time, Mr. Potresov wrote bluntly that "*there is no Party* in the shape of an integral and organised hierarchy" (i.e., ladder, or system of "institutions") and that it was impossible to liquidate "*what in reality no longer exists* as an organised body". (See *Nasha Zarya*, 1910, No. 2, 61.)

This was stated a month or even less *after* the unanimous decision of the Party!

And in March 1910, another liquidationist journal, namely *Vozrozhdeniye*,[56] having the same set of contributors—

Potresov, Dan, Martynov, Yezhov, Martov, Levitsky and Co.—stressed and gave a popular explanation of Mr. Potresov's words:

"There is nothing to liquidate and—we for our part [i.e., the editors of *Vozrozhdeniye*] would add—the dream of re-establishing this hierarchy in its old, underground form is simply a harmful, reactionary utopia indicating a loss of political intuition by members of a party which at one time was the most realistic of all." (*Vozrozhdeniye*, 1910, No. 5, p. 51.)

There is no party, and the idea of re-establishing it is a harmful utopia—these are clear and definite words. Here we have a plain and direct renunciation of the Party. The renunciation (and the invitation to the workers to renounce) came from people who had deserted the underground and were "longing for" an open party.

This desertion from the underground was, moreover, quite definitely and openly supported by P. B. Axelrod in 1912, both in *Nevsky Golos*[57] (1912, No. 6) and in *Nasha Zarya* (1912, No. 6).

"To talk about non-factionalism in the conditions now obtaining," wrote P. B. Axelrod, "means behaving like an ostrich, means deceiving oneself and others." "Factional organisation and consolidation is the manifest responsibility and urgent duty of the supporters of Party reform, or to be more exact, of a revolution in the Party."

Thus P. B. Axelrod is openly in favour of a *Party revolution*, i.e., the destruction of the old Party and the formation of a new one.

In 1913, *Luch* No. 101, in an unsigned editorial stated plainly that "among the workers in some places there is even a revival and growth of sympathy for the underground" and that this was "*a regrettable fact*". L. Sedov, the author of that article, admitted himself (*Nasha Zarya*, 1913, No. 3, p. 49) that the article had "caused dissatisfaction", even among the supporters of *Luch* tactics. L. Sedov's explanations, furthermore, were such as to cause renewed dissatisfaction on the part of a *Luch* supporter, namely An, who has an item in No. 181 of *Luch*, opposing Sedov. He protests against Sedov's assumption that the "underground is an obstacle to the political organisation of our movement, to the

building up of a workers' Social-Democratic Party. An ridicules L. Sedov for his "vagueness" as to whether the underground is desirable or not.

In their long comment on the article the editors of *Luch* came out *in favour of Sedov* and stated An to be "mistaken in his criticism of L. Sedov".

We will examine the arguments of the Luch editors and the liquidationist mistakes of An himself in their proper place. That is not the point we are discussing here. What we must go into carefully at the moment is the fundamental and principal conclusion to be drawn from the documents quoted above.*

The entire Party, both in 1908 and in 1910, condemned and rejected liquidationism, and explained the class origin and the danger of this trend clearly and in detail. *All* the liquidationist newspapers and journals—*Vozrozhdeniye* (1909-10), *Nasha Zarya* (1910-13), *Nevsky Golos* (1912), and *Luch* (1912-13)** *all of them*, *after* the most definite and even unanimous decisions of the Party, reiterate thoughts and arguments of an *obvious* liquidationist nature.

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* In the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* Lenin substituted for this paragraph, up to the word "fundamental", the following text (reproduced from the manuscript):

"In No. 8 of *Zhivaya Zhizn* (July 19, 1913) Vera Zasulich repeating dozens of liquidationist arguments wrote: 'It is difficult to say whether the new organisation [the Social-Democratic Party] ... helped or hindered the work.' Clearly these words are tantamount to renunciation of the Party. Vera Zasulich justifies desertion from the Party by saying: the organisations lost their members 'because at that time there was nothing to do in them'. Vera Zasulich is creating a purely anarchist theory about 'a broad section' *instead of* a party. See the detailed analysis of this theory in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 9, 1913. (See pp. 394-416 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

"What then constitutes the ..."—*Ed.*

** The symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* adds "and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (1913-14)" with the following footnote:

"See, for example, *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 1, 1914, the New Year's leading article: 'The road to an open political party of action is also the road to party unity' [to the unity of the builders of an open party?]. Or No. 5, 1914: 'surmounting [all the obstacles that are placed in the way of organising workers' congresses] is nothing more nor less than a most genuine struggle for the right of association, i.e., for the legality of the working-class movement, closely connected with the struggle for the open existence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party.'"—*Ed.*

Even "Luch" supporters are forced to declare that they disagree with these arguments, with this preaching. That is a fact. Therefore, to shout about the "baiting" of liquidators, as Trotsky, Semkovsky and many other patrons of liquidationism do, is downright dishonesty, for it is an absolute distortion of the truth.

The truth proved by the documents I have quoted, which cover a period of more than *five* years (1908-13), is that the liquidators, flouting all Party decisions, continue to abuse and bait the Party, i.e., the "underground".

Every worker who *himself* wants to examine seriously the controversial and vexed questions of the Party, who wants to decide these questions *for himself*, must first of all assimilate this truth, making an independent study and verification of these Party decisions and of the liquidator arguments. Only those who carefully study, ponder over and reach an independent decision on the problems and the *fate* of their Party deserve to be called Party members and builders of the workers' party. One must not be indifferent to the question of whether it is the Party that is "guilty" of "baiting" (i.e., of too trenchant and mistaken attacks on) the liquidators or whether it is the liquidators who are guilty of *flagrantly violating* Party decisions, of *persistently advocating the liquidation*, *i.e.*, *the destruction* of the Party.

Clearly, the Party cannot exist unless it fights with might and main against those who seek to destroy it.

Having quoted the documents on this fundamental question, we shall, in the next article, pass on to an appraisal of the *ideological* content of the plea for an "*open party*".

IV. THE CLASS SIGNIFICANCE OF LIQUIDATIONISM

In the preceding articles (*Pravda* Nos. 289, 299 and 314) we showed that all the Marxists, both in 1908 and in 1910, irrevocably condemned liquidationism as renunciation of the past. The Marxists explained to the working class that liquidationism is the spreading of bourgeois influence among the proletariat. And *all* the liquidationist publications, from 1909 up to 1913, have flagrantly violated the decisions of the Marxists.

Let us consider the slogan, an "open workers' party", or "a struggle for an open party", which the liquidators are still advocating in *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya*.

Is this a Marxist, proletarian slogan, or a liberal, bourgeois slogan?

The answer must be sought not in the attitude or plans of the liquidators or of other groups, but in an analysis of the relation of social forces in Russia in the present period. The significance of slogans is determined not by the intentions of their authors, but by the relation of forces of all the classes in the country.

The feudal-minded landowners and *their* "bureaucracy" are hostile to all changes making for political liberty. This is understandable. The bourgeoisie, because of its economic position in a backward and semi-feudal country, *must* strive for freedom. But the bourgeoisie fears the activity of the people *more* than it fears reaction. This truth was demonstrated with particular clarity in 1905; it is fully understood by the working class, but not by opportunist and semi-liberal intellectuals.

The bourgeoisie are both liberal and counter-revolutionary. Hence their ridiculously impotent and wretched *reformism*. They dream of reforms and fear to settle accounts in real earnest with the feudal-minded landowners who not only refuse to grant reforms, but even withdraw those already granted. They preach reforms and fear the popular movement. They strive to oust the landowners, but fear to lose *their* support and fear to lose *their own* privileges. It is upon this relation of classes that the June Third system has been built up, which gives unlimited power to the feudal landowners and privileges to the bourgeoisie.

The class position of the proletariat makes it altogether impossible for it to "share" privileges or *be afraid* of anyone losing them. That is why selfishly narrow, miserable and dull-witted reformism is quite foreign to the proletariat. As to the peasant masses—on the one hand they are immeasurably oppressed, and instead of enjoying privilege suffer from starvation; on the other hand, they are undoubtedly petty bourgeois—hence, they inevitably vacillate between the liberals and the workers.

Such is the objective situation.

From this situation it clearly follows that the slogan of an open working-class party is, in its class origin, a slogan of the counter-revolutionary liberals. It contains nothing save reformism; it does not contain even a hint that the proletariat, the only thoroughly democratic class, is conscious that its task is one of fighting the liberals for influence over democrats as a whole; there is not even a suggestion of removing the foundation of all the privileges of the feudal-minded landowners, of the "bureaucracy", etc.; there is not a thought of the general basis of political liberty or of a democratic constitution; instead, this slogan implies the tacit renunciation of the old, and consequently, renegacy and the dissolution (liquidation) of the workers' party.

In brief. In a period of counter-revolution this slogan spreads among the workers the *advocacy of the very thing* the liberal bourgeoisie are themselves *practising*. Therefore, had there been no liquidators, the clever bourgeois Progressists would have *had* to find, or hire, intellectuals to advocate this to the working class!

Only the foolish people will seek to compare the *words* of the liquidators with their *motives*. Their *words* must be compared with the *deeds* and the objective position of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Look at these *deeds*. In 1902, the bourgeoisie was *in favour* of the underground. It commissioned Struve to publish the underground *Osvobozhdeniye*. When the working-class movement led to October 17, the liberals and the Cadets abandoned the underground, then repudiated it, and declared it to be useless, mad, sinful and godless (*Vekhi*).* *Instead of* the underground, the liberal bourgeoisie favoured *a struggle for an open party*. This is an historical fact, confirmed by the incessant attempts at legalisation made by the Cadets (1905-07) and the Progressists (1913).

Among the Cadets we see "open work and its secret organisation"; the kind-hearted, i.e., unwitting, liquidator,

* In the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* the word *Vekhi* is omitted and the following footnote is given:

"There is a fine book *Vekhi* which has gone through numerous editions and contains an excellent compilation of these ideas of counter-revolutionary liberalism".—*Ed.*

A. Vlasov, has only retold the deeds of the Cadets "in his own words".

Why did the liberals renounce the underground and adopt the slogan of "a struggle for an open party"? Was it because Struve is a traitor? No, just the opposite. Struve went over to the other side because the entire bourgeoisie took a turn. And the bourgeoisie turned (1) because it obtained privileges on December 11, 1905,[58] and even on June 3, 1907 obtained the status of a *tolerated* opposition; (2) because it was itself mortally afraid of the popular movement. The slogan of "a struggle for an open party", translated from the language of "high politics" into plain and intelligible language, means the following:

"Landowners! Don't imagine that we want to make life impossible for you. No, just move up a little and make room for us bourgeois [an open party], we shall then defend you five times more 'intelligently', ingenuously, 'scientifically' than the Timoshkins and Sabler's parsons did."[59]

The petty-bourgeois Narodniks,[60] in imitation of the Cadets, took up the slogan of "a struggle for an open party". In August 1906, Messrs. Peshekhonov and Co. of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* renounced the underground, proclaimed the "struggle for an open party", and cut the consistently democratic "underground" slogans out of their programme.

Thanks to their reformist chatter about a "broad and open party", these philistines have been left, as all can see, *without any* party, *without any* contact with the masses, while the Cadets have even stopped thinking of such contacts.

Only in this way, only by analysing the position of the classes, by analysing the general history of the counter-revolution, is it possible to *understand* the nature of liquidationism. The liquidators are petty-bourgeois intellectuals, sent by the bourgeoisie to sow liberal corruption among the workers. The liquidators are traitors to Marxism and traitors to democracy. The slogan of "a struggle for an open party" in their case (as in the case-of the liberals and the Narodniks) only serves to camouflage their renunciation of the past and their *rupture with the working class*. This is a fact that has been proved both by the elections in the worker curia for the Fourth Duma and by the history of the founding of the workers' paper *Pravda*. It is obvious

to all that contact with the masses has been maintained only by those who have not renounced the past and who know how to make use of "open work" and of all and sundry "possibilities" exclusively in the spirit of *that* past, and for the purpose of strengthening, consolidating and developing it.

In the period of the June Third system it could not be otherwise.

"Curtailment" of the programme and tactics by the liquidators (i.e., liberals) will be discussed in our next article.

V. THE SLOGAN OF "STRUGGLE FOR AN OPEN PARTY"

In the preceding article (*Pravda* No. 122) we examined the objective significance (i.e., the significance that is determined by the relations of classes) of the slogan "an open party" or "a struggle for an open party". This slogan is a slavish repetition of the tactics of the bourgeoisie, for whom it correctly expresses their renunciation of the revolution, or their counter-revolutionary attitude.

Let us consider some of the attempts most frequently made by liquidators to defend the slogan of "a struggle for an open party". Mayevsky, Sedov, Dan and all the *Luch* writers try to confuse the open *party* with open work or *activity*. Such confusion is downright sophistry, a trick, a deception of the reader.

In the first place, open Social-Democratic activity in the period 1904-13 is a *fact*. An open party is a *phrase* used by intellectuals to cover up renunciation of the Party. Secondly, the Party has repeatedly condemned liquidationism, i.e., the slogan of an open party. But the Party, far from condemning open activities, has, on the contrary, condemned those who neglected or renounced them. In the third place from 1904 to 1907, open activities were *especially* developed among all the Social-Democrats. But *not a single* trend, *not a single* faction of Social-Democracy at that time advanced the slogan of "a struggle for an open party"!

This is an historical fact. Those who wish to *understand* liquidationism must give thought to this fact.

Did the absence of the slogan "a struggle for an open party" hamper open activities in the 1904-07 period? Not in the least.

Why did no such slogan arise among the Social-Democrats *at that time*? Precisely because at that time there was no raging counter-revolution to draw a section of the Social-Democrats into extreme opportunism. It would have been only *too clear* at the time that the slogan "a struggle for an open party" was an opportunist phrase, a renunciation of the "underground".

Gentlemen, try to grasp the meaning of this historical change. During the 1905 period, when open activities were splendidly developed, there was *no* slogan of "a struggle for an open party"; during the period of counter-revolution, when open activities are less developed, a section of the Social-Democrats (following the bourgeoisie) has taken up the slogan of renunciation of the "underground" and "a struggle for an open party".

Are the meaning and the class significance of this change still not clear?

Finally, the fourth and most important circumstance. *Two kinds* of open activity, in two diametrically opposite directions, are possible (and are to be seen)—one in defence of the old and entirely *in the spirit* of the old, *on behalf* of its slogans and tactics; and another *against* the old, on behalf of its renunciation, of belittling its role, its slogans, etc.

The existence of these two kinds of open activity, hostile and irreconcilable in principle, is a most indisputable historical fact of the period from 1906 (the Cadets and Messrs. Peshekhonov and Co.) to 1913 (*Luch*, *Nasha Zarya*). Can one restrain a smile when one hears a simpleton (or one who for a while plays the simpleton) asking: what is there to argue about if both sides carry on open activities. What the argument, my dear sir, is about is whether these activities should be carried on in defence of the "underground" and in its spirit, or in belittlement of it, against it and not in its spirit! The dispute is only—*only*!—about whether this particular open work is conducted in the liberal or in the consistently democratic spirit. The dispute is "only" about whether it is possible to *confine* oneself to open work—recall Mr. Liberal Struve who did not confine himself to it in 1902, but has wholly "confined himself" to it in the years 1906-13!

Our *Luch* liquidators just cannot understand that the slogan "a struggle for an open party" means carrying into

the midst of the workers liberal (Struve) ideas, decked out in the rags of "near-Marxist" catchwords.

Or take, for instance, the arguments of the *Luch* editors themselves, in their reply to An (No. 181):

> "The Social-Democratic Party is not limited to those few comrades whom the realities of life force to work underground. If the entire *Party* were limited to the underground, how many members would it have? Two to three hundred? And where would those thousands if not tens of thousands of workers be, who are actually bearing the brunt of all Social-Democratic work?"

For any man who thinks, this argument alone is enough to identify its authors as liberals. First, they are telling a deliberate untruth about the "underground". It numbers far more than "hundreds". Secondly, all over the world the number of Party members is "*limited*", as compared with the number of workers who carry on Social-Democratic work. For example, in Germany there are only one million members in the Social-Democratic Party, yet the number of votes cast for the Social-Democrats is about five million, and the proletariat numbers about fifteen million. The proportion of Party members to the number of Social-Democrats is determined in various countries by the differences in their historical conditions. Thirdly, we have *nothing* that could be a substitute for our "underground". Thus, in *opposing* the Party, *Luch* refers to the *non-Party* workers, or those who are *outside the Party*. This is the usual method of the liberal who tries to separate the masses from their *class-conscious* vanguard. *Luch* does not understand the relation between *Party* and *class*, just as the Economists of 1895-1901 failed to understand it. Fourthly, so far our "Social-Democratic work" is genuine *Social-Democratic* work only when it is conducted *in the spirit* of the old, under its slogans.

The arguments of *Luch* are the arguments of liberal intellectuals, who, unwilling to join the actually existing Party organisation, try to *destroy* that organisation by inciting the non-Party, scattered, unenlightened mass against it. The German liberals do the same when they say that the Social-Democrats do not represent the proletariat since their "Party" comprises "only" one-fifteenth of the proletariat!

Take the even more common argument advanced by *Luch*: "we" are for an open party, "just as in Europe". The liberals and the liquidators want a constitution and an open party "as in Europe" *today*, but they do not want the path by which Europe reached that today.

Kosovsky, a liquidator and Bundist, teaches us in *Luch* to follow the example of the Austrians. But he forgets that the Austrians have had a constitution *since 1867*, and that they could not have had it without (1) the movement of 1848; (2) the profound political crisis of 1859-66, when the *weakness* of the working class allowed Bismarck and Co. to *extricate* themselves by means of the famous "revolution from above". What then follows from the precepts of Kosovsky, Dan, Larin and all the *Luch* writers? Only that they are helping to solve our crisis in the spirit of "revolution from above" and *in no other* spirit! But such work of theirs *is precisely* the "work" of a Stolypin workers' party.[61]

No matter where we look—we see the liquidators renouncing both Marxism and democracy.

In the next article we shall examine in detail their arguments on the need to tone down our Social-Democratic slogans.

VI

We must now consider the toning down of Marxist slogans by the liquidators. For this purpose it would be best to take the decisions of their August Conference, but for obvious reasons these decisions can be analysed only in the press published abroad. Here we are obliged to quote *Luch*, Issue No. 108 (194), which, in the article by L. S.[62] gave a remarkably precise exposition of the whole essence, the whole spirit of liquidationism.

Mr. L. S. writes as follows:

"Deputy Muranov so far recognises only three partial demands, which, as is known, were the three pillars of the election platform of the Leninists: the complete democratisation of the state system, an eight-hour day and the transfer of the land to the peasants. *Pravda*, too, continues to maintain this point of view. Yet we, as well as the whole of European Social-Democracy [read—"we, and also Milyukov, who assures us that, thank God, we have a constitution"], see in partial demands a method of agitation which may be crowned with success only if it takes into account the everyday struggle of

the working masses. We think that only things that, on the one hand, are of fundamental importance to the further development of the working-class movement, and on the other hand, may acquire urgency for the masses, should be advanced as the partial demand upon which the Social-Democrats should concentrate their attention at the present moment. Of the three demands advanced by *Pravda*, only one—the eight-hour day—plays and can play a part in the everyday struggle of the workers. The other two demands may at the present moment serve as subjects for propaganda, but not for agitation. Concerning the difference between propaganda and agitation, see the brilliant pages of G. V. Plekhanov's pamphlet *The Struggle Against Famine*. [L. S. is knocking at the wrong door; it is "painful" for him to recall Plekhanov's controversy in 1899-1902 with the Economists whom he is copying!]

"Apart from the eight-hour day, the demand for the right of association, the right to form any kind of organisation, with the corresponding freedom of assembly and freedom of speech both the oral and the printed word, is a partial demand advanced both by the requirements of the working-class movement and by the entire course of Russian life."

Here you have the tactics of the liquidators. What L. S. describes by the words "complete democratisation, etc.", and what he calls the "transfer of the land to the peasants" are not, you see, of "urgency for the masses", they are not "advanced by the requirements of the working-class movement" and "the entire course of Russian life"! How old these arguments are and how familiar they are to those who remember the *history* of Russian Marxist practice, its many years of struggle against the Economists, who renounced the tasks of democracy! With what talent *Luch* copies the views of Prokopovich and Kuskova, who *in those days* tried to entice the workers on to the liberal path!

But let us examine the *Luch* arguments more closely. From the standpoint of common sense they are sheer madness. Can anyone in his right mind really affirm that the above-mentioned "peasant" demand (i.e., one designed to benefit the peasants) is *not* "urgent for the masses", is *not* "advanced both by the requirements of the working-class movement and by the entire course of Russian life?" This is not only an untruth, it is an obvious absurdity. The entire history of nineteenth-century Russia, the entire "course of Russian life" *produced* that question, *made* it urgent, even most urgent; this has been reflected in the *whole* of the legislation of Russia. How could *Luch* arrive at such a monstrous untruth?

It had to arrive at it, because *Luch* is in bondage to *liberal* policy, and the liberals are true to themselves when they reject (or, like *Luch*, put aside) the peasant demand. The liberal bourgeoisie does so, because its *class* position forces it to humour the landowners and to oppose the people's movement.

Luch brings to the workers the ideas of the liberal landowners and is guilty of treachery to the democratic peasantry.

Further. Can it be that only the right of association is of "urgency"? What about inviolability of person? or the abolition of despotism and tyranny, or universal, etc., suffrage, or a single chamber, etc.? Every literate worker, everyone who remembers the recent past, knows perfectly well that all this is urgent. In thousands of articles and speeches all the liberals acknowledge that all this is urgent. Why then did *Luch* declare urgent only one of these *liberties*, albeit one of the most important, while the fundamental conditions of political liberty, of democracy and of a constitutional system were struck out, put aside, relegated to the archives of "propaganda", and excluded from agitation?

The reason, and the only reason is, that *Luch* does not accept what is *unacceptable to the liberals*.

From the standpoint of urgency for the masses, the requirements of the working-class movement and the course of Russian life, there is *no* difference between the three demands of Muranov and of *Pravda* (or, to put it briefly, the demands of consistent Marxists). Working-class, peasant and general political demands are all of *equal* urgency for the masses, are *equally* brought to the forefront both by the requirements of the working-class movement and by "the entire course of Russian life". All three demands are also alike because they are the' partial demands dear to our worshipper of moderation and precision; they are "partial" compared with the final aims, but they are of a very high level compared, for example, with "Europe" in general.

Why then does *Luch* accept the eight-hour day and reject the rest? Why did it decide *on behalf* of the workers that the eight-hour day does "play a part" in their everyday struggle, whereas the general political and peasant demands *do not* play such a part? The facts show, on the one hand, that the workers in their daily struggle advance both the general political and the peasant demands—and, on the other hand,

that they often *fight* for more moderate reductions of the working day.

What is the trouble, then?

The trouble lies in the reformism of *Luch*, which, as usual, *attributes* its own liberal narrow-mindedness to the "masses", to the "course of history", etc.

Reformism, in general, means that people confine themselves to agitating for changes which do not require the removal of the main foundations of the old ruling class, changes that are *compatible* with the *preservation* of these foundations. The eight-hour day is compatible with the preservation of the power of capital. The Russian liberals, in order to attract the workers, are themselves prepared to endorse this demand ("as far as possible"). Those demands for which *Luch* does not want to "agitate" are *incompatible* with the preservation of the foundations of the pre-capitalist period, the period of serfdom.

Luch eliminates from agitation precisely what is not acceptable to the liberals, who do not want to abolish the power of the landlords, but want only to share their power and privileges. *Luch* eliminates precisely what is incompatible with the point of view of reformism.

That's where the trouble lies!

Neither Muranov, nor *Pravda*, nor any Marxist rejects partial demands. That is nonsense. Take insurance, for example. We reject the *deception* of the people by idle talk about partial demands, by *reformism*. We reject *liberal reformism* in present-day Russia as being utopian, self-seeking and false, as based on constitutional illusions and full of the spirit of servility to the landlords. That is the point which *Luch* tries to confuse and hide by phrases about "partial demands" in general, although it admits itself that neither Muranov nor *Pravda* rejects certain "partial demands".

Luch tones down the Marxist slogans, tries to fit them to the narrow, reformist, liberal yardstick, and thus spreads bourgeois ideas among the workers.

The struggle the Marxists are waging against the liquidators is nothing but an expression of the struggle the advanced workers are waging against the liberal bourgeoisie for influence over the masses of the people, for their political enlightenment and education.

LETTER TO M. S. OLMINSKY (VITIMSKY)

Dear Colleague,

First let me congratulate you on your two articles that, in my opinion, were *particularly* well done—one about the liberals and the conference of *Pravda* and *Luch* with liberal editors, and the other in No. 123, about *Pravda*.[63]

In respect of the question of An and Vlasov that you have raised, I cannot agree with you. I think you have taken the *superficial*, external aspect that is immediately visible, and are prepared to forget what is more important, what is basic. And that is dangerous in the highest degree.

You say that An and Vlasov "attack the *Luch* editors" and that "this has not been used".

You are wrong. An and Vlasov *accept what is basic* in *Luch*, i.e., the slogan of "the struggle for an open party", or the slogan of peace (or unity) with the liquidators. *That is basic*. That is what *Luch* wants. The very thing *Luch* wants is to represent itself, *not* as an organ of the liquidators, but as an organ of *both* liquidators *and* Party people. This is a deception that cannot be allowed, it is more dangerous than anything. And it is the deception Trotsky and Semkovsky are gambling on.

To continue—it is not quite true to say "this has not been used". *How* should it be used? To say that An and Vlasov "attack the *Luch* editors and vindicate the *Pravda* line"? That would be untrue. An and Vlasov do not vindicate the *fundamental* line of *Pravda*, they either reject it (An) or do not understand it (Vlasov).

Or should it be used in this way—the *fact* of Sedov's liquidationism is admitted *not only by the enemies* but also

by the supporters of *Luch*? That would be true. And that is what has been done, incidentally, in my article ("Controversial Issues" No. 3, in *Pravda* No. 110).*

"You should divide and not unite your enemies", you write reproachfully to the tactless V. I., who, you say, "unites" them.

Permit me a few words in my defence.

One should divide and not unite one's enemies—that is indisputable. Suppose, however, it is to the *advantage* of one's enemies *to pretend* that they are "divided", that they have on their side not only liquidators but "also" the Letts, "and" Trotsky, "and" the Bund, "and" An? It is this *essence* of liquidationist tactics that you have not noticed—perhaps because you have not read or have not heard everything about the August Conference. This, indeed, is the *essence* and the *substance* of the entire tactics of "saving" the liquidators, i.e., saving the *freedom* of liquidationist lies and liberalism to operate *from inside* the Party.

This is the only way a further attempt at saving the liquidators can be made. And that adroit diplomat An (with the year-old babe Vlasov toddling after him) is engaged in *a very subtle* game. You don't know An! I have studied his diplomacy for years and know how he hoodwinks the *whole of the Caucasus* with it! An has a real talent for diplomacy (I have known him since 1903)—it is, unfortunately, badly employed. He wants to pretend he is against *Luch* and *in this way save Luch*! This is quite obvious to anyone who has a good knowledge of the history of the Party, especially during *January* 1910 and *August* 1912! An chided Dan over petty issues and gave in to him on the main thing (*the slogan* of the struggle for an open party), because he wanted to show "his side" that *he too* is against the liquidators. *No* mistake could be more disastrous than to take An's bait. You *do not know* (and that is understandable) all the ins and outs of the relations between Trotsky, An, the Bund, Braun, etc., and *Luch*—but I do. There is nothing that could *help* the liquidators more than to recognise *An* as an anti-liquidator. This is a fact. An is their one "reliable" *support*. That

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* See pp. 156-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

is also a fact. Warmest regards. My best wishes for your health, keep in good spirits. Write to me, I shall always be glad to chew things over with you.

Yours,
V. I.

P.S. I hear there are many rumours in St. Petersburg to the effect that An (Chkheidze as well) "wanted to take" *Luch* away from Dan ... but did not. I believe this "wanting to take" was *for show* and it ended in an *apparent compromise* that was actually surrender to Dan! Dan is an enemy battery poorly masked. An is another battery of the same enemy, but skilfully masked. I assure you that I know this from my own experience in the matter.

Written June 3 (16), 1913

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Published according to the manuscript

THE QUESTION OF MR. BOGDANOV AND THE *VPERYOD* GROUP[64]

(FOR THE EDITORS OF *PRAVDA*)

The action of the editors in respect of Mr. Bogdanov's distortion of Party history is so scandalous that, to tell the truth, one does not know whether it is possible after this to remain a contributor.

What actually happened?

In my article there was *not a word* against Mr. Bogdanov (who is not a member of the *Vperyod* group); there was not a word of *censure* in general.

As cautiously as possible I stated a *fact*—that the trend condemned *unanimously by the entire Party was* "*connected with the Vperyod line*".*

Not a word more. *Nor could* Mr. Bogdanov quote anything more himself!

The question arises—can this fact be evaded? It cannot, for the Party *simultaneously* condemned both liquidationism and otzovism.[65] Anyone who tried to avoid this fact when speaking of Party history in respect of liquidationism would be *swindling*. I dare say the editors do not demand that I should engage in swindling. I have to believe this, especially in view of the editorial board's having announced its agreement with No. 95!

Is the fact true? The editors agree that it is. It would be difficult *not to agree* since the *Vperyod* group itself declared that otzovism was a "legitimate tendency"!

If the fact is true, then how could they possibly allow ("for the sake of impartiality") Mr. Bogdanov *to lie* about it? The only explanation I can think of is that the editors lack

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* See p. 154 of this volume.—*Ed.*

knowledge of the *Vperyod* group's history (unless someone has been affected by an absolutely blinding enthusiasm for the reactionary trash that philosopher Bogdanov teaches the workers).

The editors probably do not know that the *Vperyod* group is disintegrating completely. Mr. Bogdanov left them a long time ago—his "philosophy" was *condemned* in the press by Alexinsky of the *Vperyod* group. That same Alexinsky condemned "proletarian culture" (from the *Vperyod* platform) *in the press*. Does the editorial board not know this?

Bogdanov, Domov,[66] Lyadov, Volsky[67] and Stepinsky[68] have now *left* the *Vperyod* group (and Lunacharsky is on the point of leaving—see the *new leaflets in Paris*). Does the editorial board not know this?

The editors are supporting the worst (hopeless) elements among the bourgeois liars from the *Vperyod* group *against* the best (like Alexinsky) who have *broken* with Mr. Bogdanov!

The devil alone knows what this all means! This is a mockery of the truth, *of the Party*.

I demand categorically that the enclosed article be printed *in full*. I have always permitted the editors to make changes in a comradely manner, but after Mr. Bogdanov's letter, *I do not grant* any right to alter or do anything else of that kind with this article. If you do not print it, pass it on to *Prosveshcheniye*; I insist on having *complete freedom* to fight against the distortion of Party history. We are struggling against liquidationism and *concealing* otzovism—this is such a despicable position that I can only assume that the blunder was due to *lack of knowledge in the matter*.

The editorial board must state that it has convinced itself that Mr. Bogdanov expounded the *Vperyod* platform *incorrectly* and gave the *facts* incorrectly.

I insist on an immediate reply. I cannot continue to contribute articles in face of Mr. Bogdanov's despicable lying.

At your service, *V. Ilyin*

Written June 3 (16), 1913

First published in 1930 in the second and third editions of V. I. Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XVI

Published according to the manuscript

HAS *PRAVDA* GIVEN PROOF OF BUNDIST SEPARATISM?

Pravda No. 104 (308) published an article "Separatists in Russia and Separatists in Austria".* Now Mr. V. Kosovsky has published an article in *Luch* No. 119 (205) refuting it, or, to be more exact, containing a mass of vituperation against *Pravda* for that article. All we can do is draw the attention of the workers, who are interested in the fate of *their own* organisation, to these slanging attacks by the *Luch* gentlemen, who *evade* the controversial questions.

What proof did *Pravda* offer of Bundist separatism?

1) The Bund *left the Party* in 1903. Mr. Kosovsky's invective did nothing to disprove this fact. The Kosovskys scold because they are powerless to disprove the facts.

2) Jewish workers have joined and are still joining the Party everywhere *in spite of the Bund*.

This poor defender of the Bund cannot say a word against that either!

3) The Bund has deliberately *contravened* the Party decision on the unity of workers of *all nationalities* in local organisations, a decision that was taken in 1906 and given special confirmation in 1908.

Mr. Kosovsky *could not* say a word against that!

4) The Bundist Medem admitted that Bund members had never put into effect this unity in local organisations, that is, had always been separatists.

Again not a single objection from Mr. Kosovsky!

Just think of it, reader; what is the gentleman to do but scold and rage when he *cannot* say *a single word* against the *four* chief points in *Pravda*?

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* See pp. 87-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Pravda, furthermore, gave an exact quotation from the organ of the Czech separatists in Austria, who have been unanimously condemned for their separatism *by the entire* International. That organ *praises* Mr. Kosovsky (his article in the liquidators' *Nasha Zarya*) for his "turn for the better" in respect of the separatists.

Now what, Mr. Kosovsky? Is our quotation not correct? Mr. Kosovsky knows that it is, and is malicious in his impotence: "a review in some Czech news-sheet".

Don't lie, Mr. separatist and Jewish liberal! Lies will not help you, for you will be exposed.

Not "a review" and not in "some Czech news-sheet", but a *special* article in the German *organ* of the Czech separatists.[69] This is a fact, and you have not refuted it.

I do not defend the separatists, says Mr. Kosovsky to justify himself, summarising his article in *Nasha Zarya*.

Is that so? Then the *Czech separatists* have *misunderstood* you? The poor liberal leaders of the Bund! Not only their enemies, even their *friends* "*misunderstood*" them!

Any worker, however, will understand well enough that a petty liar who has been caught red-handed is seeking salvation in evasion and imprecation. You will not scare the workers that way, gentlemen.

Pravda has proved that the Bundists are separatists. Mr. V. Kosovsky has failed to refute it.

Messrs. Kosovsky, Medem & Co., are a group of liberal intellectuals that is corrupting the Jewish workers with bourgeois nationalism and separatism. For this reason *Pravda* has fought against and will continue to fight against the Bund.

Jewish Social-Democratic workers are joining the working-class party in spite of the Bund and against the Bund.

Pravda No. 127, June 1, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

LIBERALS AS DEFENDERS OF THE FOURTH DUMA

From the very inception of the Third Duma, the Marxists pointed out—not in an article here and an article there, but in a formal decision—that the June Third system had deliberately created *two* possible Duma majorities—Right-Octobrist and Octobrist-Cadet.* Both are reactionary in nature, both are *necessary* to the government in the same way as the support of the bourgeoisie is necessary to the landowners.

And now we have lived long enough to see the liberals systematically defending the Fourth Duma and demanding "*popular and public support*" for it.

Improbable as it is, it is a fact. The quoted words are in the leading article of *Rech* No. 139. This leading article is more deserving of the title "historical" than is the voting in the Fourth Duma on the budget estimate of the Ministry of the Interior. This leading article is truly programmatic. The question of the attitude of the Duma to the country and of the country to the Duma—presented broadly and splendidly explained—is an object-lesson to democrats.

> "We will leave it to the Social-Democrats to assert," writes the chief liberal newspaper, "that the Duma is only a decoration, that the work of the Duma is deception and hypocrisy, and that the ideologists of the Duma only deceive the people and feed them constitutional illusions."

Our congratulations to the new *ideologists* of the Duma, of the *Fourth* Duma! It is only a pity that they are such ignoramuses. The Social-Democratic Party has never asserted that the Third and Fourth Dumas are only a decoration,

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 144.—*Ed.*

but has always pointed to the mistake made by the Left Narodniks in thinking and saying so; the Party has always given proof that the Third and Fourth Dumas signify the foundation of a serious and business-like alliance of the counter-revolutionary forces.

"While awaiting [?] the social forces that are still conspicuous only by their absence in the arena of social struggle," writes *Rech*, "the Duma is a social force."

It is indisputable that the Duma, liberal gentlemen, is a force. But what kind of force? It is a landowners' and bourgeois counter-revolutionary force. And if the Cadets "notice" only the "absence" of democratic forces in the arena, there is nothing left for us to do but remind them of that wise saying: there are none so blind as those who *will not* see.

Let us cite here a little historical parallel; eighteen years ago, in 1895 and 1896, a movement of tens of thousands of workers was noticed, noticed *very much* indeed, by liberal society. At the present moment that same "society" notices only the "absence" of a quantity ten times greater. There are none so blind as those who *will not* see.

This unwillingness to see is to be explained by the class interests of the Octobrist and Cadet bourgeoisie, who have turned away from democracy.

"We call upon public opinion," says *Rech*, "to see in the Duma *its own* force ... the direct manifestation of the social will to create interest in the Duma on the part of society," etc., etc.

To what disgraceful depths, into what baseness and filth did the liberals and Cadets have to fall in order to laud the Octobrists and the Octobrist Duma in this manner! Here you have for the hundredth and thousandth time proof that the Cadets are those same Octobrists painted pink to deceive simpletons.

Let us conclude with another historical parallel. Half a century ago the Prussian Octobrists and Cadets[70] "fought" against Bismarck, not only with formulations demanding reforms, but also by refusing him credits. And what happened? In Prussia, the "Third Duma" election law predominates to this day. To this day Prussia stands as an example of a country in which the amazing economic might of the bour-

geoisie is combined with its amazing servility towards the landowners.

Not support for the Cadet-Octobrist bloc in the Duma, but an explanation of its internal rottenness and of the independent tasks of democracy—that is what the interests of the working class and of all democracy demand.

Pravda No. 128, June 6, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE QUESTION OF THE (GENERAL) AGRARIAN POLICY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT[71]

The agrarian policy of the government has radically changed in character since the Revolution of 1905. Formerly, the autocracy followed the line of Katkov and Pobedonostsev and tried to appear in the eyes of the masses of the people as standing "above classes", safeguarding the interests of the peasant masses, safeguarding them from loss of land and from ruin. Needless to say, this hypocritical "concern" for the muzhik in reality masked a purely feudal policy which the above-mentioned "public men" of old pre-revolutionary Russia were conducting with pig-headed directness in all spheres of public and state life. Autocracy in those days relied entirely on the backwardness, ignorance and lack of class-consciousness on the part of the peasant masses. By posing as a champion of the "inalienability" of the peasants' allotments, as an advocate of the "village commune",[72] the autocracy, in the pre-revolutionary period, tried to find support in the economic immobility of Russia, in the deep political slumber of the masses of the peasant population. At that time the land policy was through and through that of the feudal aristocracy.

The Revolution of 1905 caused a change in the entire land policy of the autocracy. Stolypin, punctiliously carrying out the dictates of the Council of the United Nobility, decided, as he himself expressed it, to "bank on the strong". This means that our government was no longer able to *pose* as a champion of the *weak* after the mighty awakening of the proletariat and the broad strata of the democratic peasantry which the Revolution of *1905* brought about in Russia. The people, having succeeded in making the first (though



К вопросу объ аграрной политикѣ (общей) современнаго правительства.

Земельная политика правительства т. е. реакціонера 1907 года рѣзко измѣнила свой прежній характеръ. Раньше самодержавіе вслѣдъ за Катковымъ и Побѣдоносцевымъ, держа себя представителемъ интересовъ народныхъ массъ „надъ классами", охраняющимъ интересы широкой массы крестьянъ, обороняло ихъ отъ обезземеленія и разоренія. Разумѣется, это было „заборъ" о мужикѣ на счетъ прикрѣпленія чисто крѣпостническаго помѣщика, которое называемое „

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "The Question of the (General) Agrarian Policy of the Present Government". 1913

Reduced

as yet inadequate) breach in the old feudal state system of Russia, proved thereby that they had so far awakened from their political slumber, that the tale of the government protecting the "village commune" and the "inalienability of allotments", of the defence of the weak by a government standing above classes—that this tale had finally lost credence among the peasants.

Up to 1905 the government had been able to entertain the hope that the downtrodden state and inertness of the peasants in the mass, of people incapable of ridding themselves of the age-long political prejudices of slavery, patience and obedience, would serve as a prop for it. As long as the peasants remained obedient and downtrodden, the government *could* pretend that it "banked on the weak", i.e., was taking care of the weak, although, in fact, it was concerned exclusively with the feudal landowners and the preservation of its own absolute power.

After 1905, the collapse of the old political prejudices was so profound and widespread that the government and the "Council of the United Feudalists" that controlled it saw that they could no longer gamble on the ignorance and the sheep-like obedience of the muzhik. The government saw that there *could be no peace* between it and the *masses* of the peasant population it had ruined and reduced to complete destitution and starvation. It was this consciousness of the impossibility of "peace" with the peasants that caused the "Council of the United Feudalists" to change its policy. The Council decided to try at all costs to split the peasantry and to create out of it a stratum of "new landowners", well-to-do peasant proprietors, who would "*conscientiously*" protect *from the masses* the peace and security of the huge landed estates, which, after all, had suffered somewhat from the onslaught of the revolutionary masses in 1905.

Therefore, the change in the entire agrarian policy of the government after the revolution was by no means accidental. On the contrary, from the *class* point of view, this change was a *necessity* for the government and for the "Council of the United Feudalists". The government could find no other way out. The government saw that there could be no "peace" with the masses of the peasants, that the peasantry had awakened from its age-long slumber of serfdom. The govern-

ment had no alternative but *to try* by frantic efforts *to split* the peasantry, no matter how much this might ruin the villages, to surrender the countryside to "plunder and exploitation" by the kulaks and the well-to-do muzhiks, and to seek support in an *alliance* between the feudal nobles and the "new landowners", i.e., an alliance with the rich peasant proprietors, with the peasant bourgeoisie.

Stolypin himself, who served the "Council of the United Feudalists" faithfully and well and carried out their policy, said "Give me twenty years of quiet and I shall reform Russia." By "quiet" he meant the *quiet of a graveyard*, the quiet suffering of the countryside silently enduring like sheep the unprecedented ruin and destitution that had overtaken it. By "quiet" he meant the quiet of the *landowners* who would like to see the peasants utterly inert, downtrodden, offering no protest, ready to starve peacefully and amiably, to give up their land, to abandon their villages, to be ruined, as long as it were convenient and pleasing to the landed gentry. By the reform af Russia, Stolypin meant a change that would leave in the villages only contented landowners, contented kulaks and bloodsuckers, and scattered, downtrodden, weak and helpless farm labourers.

Quite naturally and understandably Stolypin, as a landowner, wanted twenty years of this graveyard quiet in Russia, wanted it with all his heart. But we now know, we now all see and feel, that the result of it has been famine affecting thirty million peasants and neither "reform" nor "quiet", that there has been an unparalleled (unparalleled even in long-suffering Russia) intensification of destitution and ruin, and extremely great bitterness and ferment among the peasantry.

To make clear the causes of the *failure* of the government's so-called "Stolypin" agrarian policy, the policy which the State Duma is invited once more to approve by sanctioning the budget (and which undoubtedly will be approved by the landowners' parties in the Duma), I shall dwell at somewhat greater length on the *two* principal, so to say, *trump cards* of our "new" agrarian policy:

First, on the resettlement of the peasants, and, secondly, on the notorious *farmsteads*.

As far as resettlement is concerned, the Revolution of 1905 revealed to the landowners the political awakening of the peasantry and forced them to "open" the safety valve a little and, instead of hampering migration as they had done before, to try to pack off as many restless peasants as possible to Siberia in an attempt to render the atmosphere less "tense" in Russia.

Did the government achieve success? Did it achieve any pacification of the peasantry, any improvement in the peasants' conditions in Russia and in Siberia? Just the opposite. The government only brought about a new sharpening and worsening of the conditions of the peasants both in Russia and in Siberia.

I shall prove this to you in a moment.

In the explanatory memorandum of the Minister of Finance on the budget for 1913 we find the usual official optimism and applause for the "successes" of the government's policy.

The settlers, we are told, transform the unsettled regions into "civilised localities", the settlers are growing rich, improving their farms, and so on and so forth. The usual official panegyric. The old, old "*everything is all right*", "*all quiet on Shipka*".[73]

The only pity is that the explanatory memorandum *completely ignored* the statistics of returned settlers! A strange and significant silence!

Yes, gentlemen, the number of settlers increased after *1905* to an average of half a million a year. Yes, by 1908, the migration wave reached its highest point—665,000 settlers in one year. But later the wave began *rapidly to recede*, and in 1911 dropped to *189,000*. Is it not clear that the highly praised government "arrangements" for the settlers have turned out to be *bluff*? Is it not clear that only six years after the revolution the government is *back where it started*?

And the statistics of the number of returned settlers—so prudently ignored by the Minister of Finance in his "explanatory" (or rather, confusing) memorandum—these statistics reveal a monstrous increase in the number of returned settlers—up to *30 or 40 per cent in 1910*, *and up to 60 per cent in 1911*. This gigantic wave of returning settlers reveals the desperate suffering, ruin and destitution of the peasants who

sold everything at home in order to go to Siberia, and who are now forced to come back from Siberia completely ruined and pauperised.

This enormous stream of destitute returned settlers reveals with irrefutable clarity the *complete failure* of the government's resettlement policy. To produce tables of figures showing the improvement in the farms of the settlers who remained in Siberia for a long time (as was done in the explanatory memorandum on the estimates of the resettlement administration) and to *hush up* the complete and utter ruin of *tens of thousands* of returned settlers simply means distorting the facts! This means presenting the Duma deputies with castles in Spain and fairy-tales about general well-being, whereas in fact we observe ruin and destitution.

Gentlemen, the fact that the Minister of Finance's explanatory memorandum *conceals* the figures of the returned settlers, their desperate, destitute condition, their utter ruin, signifies *frantic* attempts on the part of the government to *conceal the truth*. The attempts are in vain. The truth will out! The truth will have to be admitted. The destitution of the ruined peasants who *returned* to Russia, the destitution of the ruined old inhabitants of Siberia, will *have* to be spoken about.

In order to explain graphically the conclusion I have drawn concerning the complete failure of the government's resettlement policy, I shall quote another opinion, that of a civil servant, who for twenty-seven years—*twenty-seven years*, gentlemen!—served in the Forestry Department in Siberia, an official who has studied resettlement conditions, an official who *was unable to bear* all the abominations that are committed in our resettlement administration.

This civil servant is State Councillor *A. I. Komarov*, who, after serving for twenty-seven years, was compelled to acknowledge that the notorious journey made to Siberia in 1910 by Stolypin and Krivoshein, the Prime Minister and the Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Land Settlement respectively, was a "*clownish tour*"—such is literally the expression used by a State Councillor, a civil servant of twenty-seven years' standing! This official *resigned the service*, he could not tolerate the deception of all Russia that was being practised by means of such "clownish tours",

and he published a special pamphlet containing a truthful account of all the thefts and embezzlement of government funds, the utter absurdity, brutality and wastefulness of our resettlement policy.

The pamphlet is entitled *The Truth About the Resettlement Scheme* and was published in St. Petersburg in the present year, 1913, price sixty kopeks—not expensive, considering the wealth of revealing material it contains. As usual our government, in resettlement, as in all other "affairs" and "branches of administration", is exerting every effort to conceal the truth, and fears lest "its dirty linen be washed in public". Komarov had to *lie low* as long as he was in the service, he had to write his letters of exposure to the newspapers under an *assumed name*, and the authorities tried to "*catch*" the correspondent. Not all civil servants are able to leave the service and publish pamphlets that reveal the truth! But one such pamphlet enables us to judge what rottenness, what an abomination of desolation reigns in general in this "dark realm".

The civil servant A. I. Komarov is not a revolutionary, nothing like one. He himself tells us about his loyal hostility to the theories of both the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. He is just an ordinary, very loyal, Russian civil servant, who would be quite satisfied with elementary, rudimentary honesty and decency. He is a man who is hostile to the Revolution of 1905 and ready to serve the counter-revolutionary government.

It is all the more significant, therefore, that even such a man has left, has abandoned the service, shaking its dust from his feet. He could not stand "*the complete disruption* of all that is *called rational forestry*" (p. 138) by our resettlement policy. He could not stand the "*expropriation of the arable land of the old inhabitants*" which leads to the "gradual impoverishment of the old inhabitants" (pp. 137 and 138). He could not stand "state *spoliation* or, rather, *devastation* of Siberian lands and forests that makes the *plunder of the Bashkirian lands* that once took place seem *trivial indeed*" (p. 3).

The following are Komarov's conclusions:

"*Absolute unpreparedness* of the Chief Resettlement Administration for work on a large scale ... absolute lack of planning in the world

and its bad quality ... allotment of plots with soil unsuitable for agriculture, where there is no water at all, or with no *drinking water*" (p. 137).

When the tide of migration rose, the officials were caught napping. They "tore to pieces areas of state forest that had been surveyed only the day before ... took whatever they first laid eyes on, anything so long as they could accommodate, get rid of, *the scores of emaciated exhausted people* hanging around the resettlement centre and standing for long hours outside the resettlement office..." (p. 11).

Here are a few examples. The *Kurinsky* area is set apart for settlers. This area consists of land that had been taken from the native population near the Altai salt works. The natives have been robbed. The new settlers get salt water unfit for drinking purposes! The government wastes money endlessly on digging wells—but without success. The new settlers have to drive *7 or 8* (seven or eight!) versts for water! (p. 101).

The Vyezdnoi area in the upper reaches of the River Mana, where thirty families were settled. After seven hard years the new settlers finally became convinced that farming was impossible there. *Nearly all of them fled*. The few who remained engage in hunting and fishing (p. 27).

The Chuna-Angara region: *hundreds* of plots are mapped out—900 plots, 460 plots, etc. There are no settlers. Impossible to live there. Mountain ridges, marshes, undrinkable water.

And now the civil servant, A. I. Komarov, tells about those returned settlers whom the Minister of Finance did not mention the *truth* the government finds *unpleasant*.

"*There are hundreds of thousands of them*," writes civil servant Komarov, referring to the ruined and destitute returning settlers. "Those returning are the sort who, in the future revolution, if it takes place, are destined to play a terrible role.... The man who is returning is not the one who all his life has been a farm labourer ... ut the one who until recently was a property-owner, a man who never dreamed that he and the land could exist apart. This man is justifiably exasperated, to him it is a mortal offence that he has not been provided for, but, on the contrary, has been ruined—this man is a menace to any political system" (p. 74).

Thus writes Mr. Komarov, a civil servant who is terrified of the revolution. Komarov is mistaken in thinking that

only *landowner* "political systems" are possible. In the best and most civilised states they manage to get along *even without* the landowners. Russia could also manage without them to the advantage of the people.

Komarov exposes the *ruin* of the old inhabitants. "Crop failures"—what he really means is *famine*—arising from the plunder of the old inhabitants, began to visit even the "Siberian Italy"—Minusinsk Uyezd. Mr. Komarov exposes the way in which the contractors rob the Treasury, the absolute fiction, the falsity of the reports and plans drawn up by the officials, the worthlessness of their work which swallowed up millions, such as the Ob-Yenisei Canal, the waste of *hundreds of millions of rubles*.

All our resettlement schemes, states this God-fearing modest official, are "*nothing but one long and unpleasant anecdote*" (p. 134).

Such is the *truth* concerning the *returned* settlers that has been hushed up by the Minister of Finance! Such in *reality* is the complete *failure* of our resettlement policy! Ruin and destitution *both* in Russia and in Siberia. Plunder of lands, the *destruction* of forests, false reports and official mendacity and hypocrisy.

Let us pass on to the question of the farmsteads.

On this question, too, the explanatory memorandum of the Minister of Finance gives us the same, general, meaningless, official, hypocritical data (or rather *alleged* data) as on the question of migration.

We are informed that by 1912 over one and a half million families had definitely abandoned the village commune; that over a million of these families have been established on farmsteads.

There is *not a single* truthful word *anywhere* in the government reports about the real state of the farmsteads!

Yet we know already, from the descriptions given of the new land settlements by honest observers (like the late Ivan Andreyevich Konovalov) and from our own observations of the countryside and of peasant life, that there are *farmstead peasants* of two altogether different categories. The government, by confusing these categories, by giving data of a general kind, is only deceiving the people.

One category, an insignificant minority, are the well-to-do

peasants, the kulaks, who even before the new land settlement schemes were introduced, lived very well. Such peasants, by leaving the village commune and buying up the allotments of the poor, are undoubtedly enriching themselves at other people's expense, and still further ruining and enslaving the masses of the population. But, I repeat, there are *very few* farmstead peasants of this type.

The other category predominates, and predominates to an overwhelming degree—that of the ruined destitute peasants, who set up farmsteads out of sheer need, because they had nowhere else to go. These peasants say: "Nowhere to go, then let us set up a farmstead." Starving and toiling on their beggarly farms, they clutch at anything for the sake of the resettlement grant, for the sake of the loan they can obtain by settling on a farmstead. On these farmsteads they suffer untold hardships; they sell all their grain in order to pay the bank the instalment on the loan; they are always in debt; they live like beggars in a state of dire distress; they are *driven* from the farmsteads for *defaulting with their instalments* and they are finally transformed into vagabonds.

Now, if instead of handing us meaningless pictures of fictitious prosperity, official statistics had truthfully in formed us of the number of these *destitute farmsteaders* who are living in dug-outs, who keep cattle in their own miserable quarters, who never have enough to eat, whose children are sick and in rags—then we would hear the "*truth about the farmsteads*".

But the point is that the government does its utmost to conceal this truth. Independent, detached observers of peasant life are persecuted and sent out of the villages. Peasants writing to the newspapers come up against tyranny, oppression and persecution by the authorities and the police, of a nature unparalleled even in Russia.

A handful of rich farmsteaders are represented as masses of thriving peasants! The official lie about the kulaks is represented as the truth about the countryside! But the government will not succeed in concealing the truth. The attempts of the government to conceal the truth about the ruined and starving countryside only call forth legitimate *anger* and *indignation* among the peasants. The fact that tens of millions of peasants are starving, as was the case

PROPERTY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

last year and the year before, reveals better than any lengthy argumentation the mendacity and hypocrisy of the tales about the beneficial influence of the farmsteads. This fact shows most clearly that *even after* the change in the government's agrarian policy, *and after* the notorious Stolypin reforms,[74] the Russian countryside is just as much overwhelmed by oppression, exploitation, destitution, lack of human rights as it was under serfdom. The "*new*" agrarian policy of the Council of the United Nobility left untouched the *old* serf-owners and the oppression on their estates of thousands and tens of thousands of dessiatines. The "new" agrarian policy enriched the *old* landowners and a handful of the peasant bourgeoisie, and ruined the masses of the peasants to a still greater extent.

"We bank on the strong," exclaimed the late Stolypin in explanation and justification of his agrarian policy. These words are well worth noting and remembering as extraordinarily truthful, exceptionally truthful words for a minister. The peasants have fully understood and learned through their own bitter experience the truthfulness of these words, which mean that the *new* laws and the *new* agrarian policy are laws *for the rich* and made by the *rich*, a policy for the *rich* and carried out by the *rich*. The peasants have understood the "*simple*" game, that the Duma of the master class makes laws for the master class—that the government is the instrument of the will of the feudal landowners and of their rule over Russia.

If Stolypin wanted to teach *this* to the peasants by means of his "famous" (shamefully famous) dictum, "we bank on the strong", we are sure he has found and will find apt pupils among the masses of the ruined and embittered who, having learned *on whom* the government banks, will understand so much the better *on whom they themselves* should bank—on the working class and on its struggle for freedom.

In order not to make unsupported statements, I shall quote a few examples drawn from real life by so able an observer, one so boundlessly devoted to his work, as Ivan Andreyevich Konovalov. (Ivan Konovalov, *Sketches of the Modern Village*, St. Petersburg, 1913. Price 1 ruble 50 kopeks. In the quotations the pages are indicated.)

In Livny Uyezd, Orel Gubernia, four estates have been

divided into farmsteads: that of Grand Duke Andrei Vladimirovich—5,000 dessiatines, of Polyakov—900 dessiatines, of Nabokov—400 dessiatines, of Korf—600 dessiatines. The total is about 7,000 dessiatines. The size of the farmsteads is fixed at 9 dessiatines each and only in exceptional cases at 12 dessiatines. Thus, there are in all a little over 600 farmsteads.

In order to explain the significance of these figures more graphically, I shall quote the official statistics of 1905 for Orel Gubernia. *Five* nobles in this gubernia owned *143,446* dessiatines, i.e., an average of *28,000 dessiatines* each. It is obvious that such monstrously big estates are not wholly cultivated by the owners; they only serve for oppression and enslavement of the peasants. The number of former serfs of landowners in Orel Gubernia in 1905 with holdings not exceeding 5 dessiatines per farm was 44,500, owning a total of 173,000 dessiatines of land. The landowner has *28,000 dessiatines* and the "*landowner's*" muzhik of the poorer class—*4 dessiatines*.

In 1905, the number of nobles in Orel Gubernia owning 500 dessiatines of land and over was *378*, the total amount of land in their possession being *592,000* dessiatines, i.e., an average of over *1,500* dessiatines each; while the number of "*former serfs of landowners*" in Orel Gubernia having up to 7 dessiatines per household was 124,000, giving them a total of *647,000* dessiatines, i.e., an average of *5 dessiaines* per household.

One may judge by this to what extent the Orel peasants are oppressed by the feudal estates and what a drop in the ocean of misery and destitution were the *four* estates in Livny Uyezd that were divided into farmsteads. But how do the farmstead peasants live on their 9 dessiatine plots?

The land has been valued at 220 rubles per dessiatine. They have to pay 118 rubles and 80 kopeks per annum (i.e., about 20 rubles per dessiatine of sown area). A poor peasant is incapable of paying so much. He lets a part of the land cheaply just to get some ready cash. He sells all his grain to pay the instalment due to the bank. He has nothing left, either for seed or for food. He borrows, enslaves himself again. He has only one horse, he has sold his cow. His implements are old. Improving the farm is out of the question.

"The kids have simply forgotten the colour, let alone the taste, of milk" (p. 198). This sort of farmer falls into arrears with his instalments and is driven off his plot; his ruin is then complete.

In his explanatory memorandum, the Minister of Finance complacently tried to gloss over this ruin of the peasants by the new land settlement, or rather land unsettlement.

On page 57 of the second part of the explanatory memorandum the Minister gives official figures for the number of peasants who had sold their land by the end of 1911. The number is *385,407 families*.

And the Minister "*consoles*" us by saying: the number of buyers (362,840) "*is very close to the number of sellers*" (385,407). For each seller we get on an average 3.9 dessiatines, for each buyer—4.2 dessiatines (p. 58 of the explanatory memorandum).

What is consoling in this? In the first place, even these official figures show that the number of buyers is *less* than the number of sellers. This means that the ruin and destitution of the countryside is increasing. And secondly, who does not know that the buyers of allotments evade the law, which forbids the purchase of land above a small number of dessiatines, by buying in the name of wife, relations, or of some other person? Who does not know that the selling of land under the guise of various other transactions, such as a lease, etc., is very widely practised by the peasants out of sheer necessity? Read, for instance, the works of the semi-Cadet, semi-Octobrist Prince Obolensky in *Russkaya Mysl*, and you will see that even this landowner, who is thoroughly imbued with the views of his class, admits the fact that the allotments are bought up to an *enormous* extent by the rich, and that these purchases are *masked* by means of evasions of the law in thousands of different ways!

And so, gentlemen, the "new" agrarian policy of the government and the nobles was *all* the honourable nobles could produce, leaving their property and their revenues intact (often they even *increased* their revenues by *inflating* the price of the land for sale and by means of the thousands of favours the Peasant Bank extends to the nobility).

And the "*all*" of these nobles proved to be *nothing*. The Countryside is even more destitute, even more *angered*.

Terrible anger reigns in the villages. What is called hooliganism is due mainly to the incredible anger of the peasants, and is their *primitive* form of *protest*. No persecution, no increasing of punishments will allay this anger and stop this protest by millions of hungry peasants who are now being ruined by the "redistribution" of the land with unprecedented rapidity, roughness and brutality.

No, the nobles' or Stolypin's agrarian policy is not the way out; it is only a very painful *approach* towards a new *solution* of the agrarian problem in Russia. What this solution should be is shown indirectly even by the fate of Ireland where, in spite of a thousand delays, hindrances and obstacles placed in the way by the landowners, the land has after all passed into the hands of the farmers.

The essence of the agrarian problem in Russia is most strikingly revealed by the figures for the big landed estates. These figures are given in the official government statistics of 1905, and anyone who is seriously concerned about the fate of the Russian peasantry and the state of affairs in the entire field of politics of our country should study them with great attention.

Let us consider the big landed estates in European Russia: 27,833 landowners own over 500 dessiatines each, giving them a total of *62,000,000 dessiatines of land*! Adding to these the land owned by the imperial family and the enormous estates of the manufacturers in the Urals, we get *70,000,000 dessiatines* owned by less than *30,000* landowners. This gives on an average over *2,000* dessiatines to each big landed proprietor. The size the biggest estates attain in Russia is seen from the fact that *699* proprietors own more than *10,000 dessiatines* each, giving them a total of 20,798,504 dessiatines. On an average these magnates possess almost *30,000* (29,754) *dessiatines* each!

It is not easy to find in Europe, or even in the entire world, another country where big feudal landownership has been preserved on such a monstrous scale.

And the most important point is that capitalist farming, i.e., the cultivation of the soil by hired labourers with the implements and tools of the owners, is being conducted only on a part of these lands. For the most part, farming is being conducted on *feudal* lines, i.e., the landowners enslave the

peasants as they did one hundred, three hundred, and five hundred years ago, forcing the peasants to cultivate the estate land with *their own* horses, with *their own implements*.

This is not capitalism. This is not the European method of farming, gentlemen of the Right and Octobrists; take note of this, you who are boasting of your desire to "Europeanise" (i.e., refashion in the European way) agriculture in Russia! No, this is not European at all. This is the *old Chinese way*. This is the *Turkish way*. This is the *feudal way*.

This is not up-to-date farming, it is land usury. It is the old, old enslavement. The poor peasant, who even in the best year remains a pauper and is half-starved, who owns a weak, scrawny nag and old, miserable, wretched implements, is becoming the slave of the landowner, of the "*master*", because he, the muzhik, has no alternative.

The "master" will neither lease his land, nor give right of way, nor watering-places for animals, nor meadows, nor timber, unless the peasant enslaves himself. If a peasant is caught "illegally" felling wood in the forests, what happens? He is beaten up by the foresters, Circassians, etc., and then the "*master*", who in the Duma delivers fervent speeches on the progress of our agriculture and on the necessity of copying Europe—this same master offers the following alternative to the beaten muzhik: either go to prison or cultivate, plough, sow and harvest two or three dessiatines! The same thing happens when the peasants' cattle trespass on the landowners' estates. The same for the winter loan of grain. The same for the use of meadows and pastures, and so on without end.

This is not big landowner farming. It is the *enslavement* of the muzhik. It is *feudal* exploitation of millions of impoverished peasants by means of estates of thousands of dessiatines, the estates of the landowners who have been squeezing and stifling the muzhik in all directions.

The farmsteads are helping out a handful of rich peasants. But the masses continue to starve as before. Why is it, you landowning gentlemen, that Europe has not known famine for a long time? Why is it that terrible famines, such as that which raged in our country in 1910-11, occurred in Europe only under serfdom?

Because in Europe there is no serf bondage. There are rich and middle peasants and there are labourers in Europe, but not millions of ruined, destitute peasants, driven to despair by perennial suffering and hard labour, disfranchised, downtrodden, dependent on the "master".

What is to be done? What is the way out?

There is only one way out: the liberation of the countryside from the oppression of these feudal latifundia, the transfer of these *seventy million* dessiatines of land from the landed proprietors to the peasants, a transfer that must be effected without any compensation.

Only such a solution can make Russia really resemble a European country. Only such a solution will enable the millions of Russian peasants to breathe freely and recover. Only such a solution will make it possible to transform Russia from a country of perennially starving, destitute peasants, crushed by bondage to the landowner, into a country of "European progress", from a country of illiterate people into a literate country, from a country of backwardness and hopeless stagnation into a country capable of developing and going forward, from a disfranchised country, a country of slaves, into a free country.

And the party of the working class, knowing that without free, democratic institutions there is not and cannot be a road to socialism, points, as a way out of the blind alley into which the government with its agrarian policy has again led Russia, to the free transfer of all the landed estates to the peasants, to the winning of full political liberty by a new revolution.

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CAPITALISM AND TAXATION

Novy Ekonomist (No. 21 for 1913), a journal published by Mr. P. Migulin, with the Octobrists and Cadets jointly collaborating, carries an interesting note about income tax in the United States.

The bill exempts from taxation all incomes up to 4,000 dollars (8,000 rubles). Taxation is envisaged at the rate of one per cent on all incomes exceeding 4,000 dollars, two per cent on all incomes exceeding 20,000 dollars and so on, with slight increases in the percentage as incomes increase. Thus the plan is for a progressive income tax, but with an exceedingly slow rate of progression, so that the owner of a million dollar income generally pays less than three per cent.

The plan estimates that the 425,000 people whose incomes exceed 4,000 dollars will pay 70 million dollars in taxes (about 140 million rubles) and the Octobrist-Cadet editors of *Novy Ekonomist* note with reference to this:

> "Compared with the 700 million rubles import duty and the 500 million rubles excise duty, the expected revenue of 140 million rubles from income tax is negligible and will not change the significance of indirect taxation."

It is a pity that our bourgeois liberal economists who are in words prepared to accept a progressive income tax and have even recorded it in their programme, have evinced no desire to make a definite and precise statement on *what* rates of income tax *they* consider to be obligatory.

Such rates that the significance of indirect taxation would merely be changed, and if so to what extent? Or such rates that indirect taxation would be completely abolished?

The American statistics that *Novy Ekonomist* touches upon provide an instructive illustration to this question.

It can be seen from the bill that the total income of 425,000 capitalists (if the tax provides 70 million dollars)

is estimated at 5,413,000,000 dollars. This is an obvious understatement; a *hundred persons* are shown as having an income of over a million dollars and their income is shown as 150,000,000 dollars. We know that *a dozen* American multimillionaires have incomes incomparably greater. The Secretary of the Treasury in America wants to be "polite" to the multimillionaires....

But even these figures, excessively "polite" to the capitalists, show a noteworthy picture. Statistics in America record only 16,000,000 families. Of these, therefore, *less than half a million* are counted as capitalists. The remaining mass of people are wage-slaves or petty farmers oppressed by capital, etc.

The statistics fix the size of the income enjoyed by the working masses in America quite accurately for a number of categories. For instance, 6,615,046 industrial workers received (in 1910) 3,427,000,000 dollars, i.e., 518 dollars (1,035 rubles) per worker. Then, 1,699,420 railway workers received 1,144,000,000 dollars (673 dollars per worker). Further, 523,210 public school-teachers received 254,000,000 dollars (483 dollars per teacher).

Combining this mass of working people and rounding off the figures we get: workers—8,800,000 with a total income of 4,800,000,000 dollars or 550 dollars each; capitalists—500,000 with a total income of 5,500,000,000 dollars or 11,000 dollars each.

Half a million capitalist families receive an income that is *greater* than that of almost 9,000,000 workers' families. What, might we ask, is the role of indirect taxation and of the planned income tax?

Indirect taxation brings in 1,200,000,000 rubles, i.e., 600,000,000 dollars. The amount of indirect taxation is 75 rubles (37.50 dollars) per family in America. Let us compare the way in which the incomes of capitalists and workers are taxed:

	Million families	Total income	Total indirect taxes	% of income paid as taxes
		(million dollars)		
Workers . . .	8.8	4,800	330	7
Capitalists . .	0.5	5,500	19	0.36

We see that the workers pay seven kopeks to the ruble in indirect taxes while the capitalists pay *one-third* of a kopek. The workers pay, proportionally, *twenty times* more than the capitalists. A system of indirect taxes inevitably creates such an "order" (a very disorderly order) in *all* capitalist countries.

If the capitalists were to pay the same percentage in taxes as the workers, the tax imposed would be *385,000,000* and not 19,000,000 *dollars*.

Does a progressive income tax *of the sort* planned in America change much? Very little. From the capitalists 19,000,000 dollars indirect taxes plus 70,000,000 dollars income tax would be obtained, that is, altogether 89,000,000 dollars *or only one and a half per cent of income*!

Let us divide the capitalists into middle (income 4,000 to 10,000 dollars, i.e., 8,000-20,000 rubles) and wealthy (with an income over 20,000 rubles). We get the following: middle capitalists—304,000 families with a total income of 1,813,000,000 dollars, and wealthy capitalists—121,000 families with a total income of 3,600,000,000 dollars.

If the middle capitalists paid as much as the workers pay, i.e., 7 per cent of income, the revenue would be about 130,000,000 dollars. Fifteen per cent from the income of wealthy capitalists would produce 540,000,000 dollars. The total *would more than cover all indirect taxes*. After the deduction of this tax the middle capitalists would still have an income of 11,000 rubles each and the wealthy an income of 50,000 rubles each.

We see that the demand put forward by the Social-Democrats—the *complete* abolition of all indirect taxes and their replacement by a real progressive income tax and not one that merely plays at it—is *fully* realisable. Such a measure would, without affecting the foundations of capitalism, give tremendous immediate relief to nine-tenths of the population; and, secondly, it would serve as a gigantic impetus to the development of the productive forces of society by expanding the home market and liberating the state from the nonsensical hindrances to economic life that have been introduced for the purpose of levying indirect taxes.

The capitalists' advocates usually point to the difficulty of assessing big incomes. Actually, with hanks, savings so-

cieties, etc., at their present level of development, this is 3' a purely imaginary difficulty. The *one* difficulty is the class-avarice of the capitalists and the existence of undemocratic institutions in the political structure of bourgeois states.

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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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ECONOMIC STRIKES IN 1912 AND IN 1905

The statistics on economic strikes compiled by the Association of Factory Owners in the Moscow Area enable us to draw some parallels between 1912 and 1905. In doing so we shall have to limit ourselves to three groups of industries—metalworking, textile and "others", because the factory owners' association does not give a more detailed classification in its statistics.

Here are the parallel figures:

	Number of strikers participating in economic strikes		
	1905	1911	1912
Metalworkers	230,216	17,920	78,195
Textile workers	559,699	59,950	89,540
Others	230,527	18,880	43,860
Totals	1,020,442	96,750	211,595

The figures for 1905 include only *purely* economic strikes; those with mixed motives, both economic and political, have been omitted. The figures for 1911 and 1912 seem to be far from complete.

If we take the 1905 figures as the starting-point, a comparison of these figures shows us that in 1911 the strike effort of the textile workers was *greater* than that of the metalworkers and "others". In 1911 more than half the total number of strikers were textile workers; their number was more than three times that of the metalworkers. In 1905 the number of textile workers on strike was only two and a half times the number of metalworkers.

As far as the "others" are concerned, the number of strikers in these branches was about the same as the number of striking metalworkers in both 1905 and 1911.

In 1912, however, the metalworkers made an astounding advance, leaving the "others" far behind and almost catching up with the textile workers.

The number of metalworkers who took part in strikes in 1912 was more-than four times the number for 1911. In the same period the number of strikers among the textile workers increased by only 50 per cent (60,000 and 89,000), while that of the "others" increased by just 150 per cent.

It follows, therefore, that the metalworkers made good use of the favourable market conditions of 1912. Encouraged by the victories of 1911, they went over to a more extensive and more determined offensive.

Workers in the "other" branches of industry were also in a favourable position in 1912. Their economic struggle was still more successful than that of the metalworkers, but they did not make such good use of their favourable position as the metalworkers did.

The position of the textile workers in 1912 was worse than that of workers in any other branch of industry; their economic struggle was the least successful. In view of this the number of strikers among them increased more slowly than in other branches.

The factory owners of the Moscow area hope that the wave of strikes will be weaker in 1913. We read in their report for 1912: "The situation in the textile industry is clear enough; until the state of the new harvest is known the mills will work at a slower rate and for the workers to strike under these conditions would be very imprudent."

We shall see to what extent this assumption is justified. In any case both the year of 1912 and the beginning of 1913 have shown that *economic* strikes constitute only a small part of the *entire* "strike wave".

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Signed: *V. I.*

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THE GROWTH OF CAPITALIST WEALTH

Capitalists are not inclined to be frank about their incomes. ''Commercial secrets" are strictly guarded and it is very difficult for the uninitiated to penetrate the "mysteries" of how riches are piled up. Private property is sacred—nobody is permitted to meddle in the affairs of its owner. Such is the principle of capitalism.

Capital, however, has long since overstepped the bounds of private property and introduced joint-stock companies. Hundreds and thousands of shareholders who do not know each other make up a single enterprise; and these property-owners are quite often diddled by smart businessmen who empty the pockets of their business partners using "commercial secrets" as a cover.

Sacred private property has been forced to sacrifice a bit of its sacredness; laws have had to be made compelling joint-stock companies to keep proper books and publish the chief results of their accountancy. This, of course, has not prevented the public being swindled; the swindling has merely taken new forms and become more subtle than before. Big capital, gathering around itself small sums of shareholders' capital from all over the world, has become more powerful still. Through the joint-stock company, the millionaire now has at his disposal not only his own million, but additional capital of, say, 800,000 rubles that may have been gathered from 8,000 petty proprietors.

This makes the absurdity of capitalism much clearer to the masses of the population.

Take, for example, the published reports of insurance companies in Russia over a period of ten years, from 1902 to 1911.

In 1902 share capital amounted to 31.3 million rubles (in 21 joint-stock companies), and in 1911 (in the same 21 companies) it was 34.8 million rubles. The greater part of the capital usually belongs to a handful of millionaires. Ten or twenty magnates perhaps hold shares for eighteen million rubles, which gives them a majority vote, and they can, without any control, dispose of the other thirteen or sixteen million rubles belonging to "small" shareholders.

The professors who defend capitalism chatter about the increase in the number of property-owners when they see a growth in the number of small shareholders. What actually happens is that the power (and the income) of the millionaire magnates *over* the capital of the "small fry" is increased.

Just see how our insurance kings have expanded in the course of this ten years. The *average* dividend on share capital for the ten years was *more* than 10 per cent! Not a bad profit, eh? In the worst year of the decade they "earned" six kopeks in the ruble, and in the best year twelve kopeks!

Reserve capital was doubled—in 1902 it amounted to 152,000,000 rubles and in 1911 to 327,000,000 rubles. Property was almost doubled as well—in 1902 it was valued at 44,000,000 rubles and in 1911 at 76,000,000 rubles.

The result—in ten years in twenty-one companies, 32,000,000 rubles' worth of *new* property!

Who "earned" this property?

Those who did not work, the shareholders, and first and foremost the millionaire magnates who hold most of the shares.

The work was done by hundreds of employees, who canvassed insurance clients, inspected their property and laboured over the accounts. These employees remained employees. They do not receive anything more than their salaries (which, as we know, are in the majority of cases insufficient even to maintain a family decently). They cannot accumulate any property.

If any of the magnates did a bit of "work" *as a director*, he received *special* remuneration in the form of a ministerial salary and bonuses.

The gentlemen holding the shares grew rich *for not* working. During the decade they received on the average three millions a year net profit for the "toil" of clipping coupons, and accumulated additional capital to the tune of thirty-two million rubles.

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THE PEASANTRY AND THE WORKING CLASS

In the Narodnik newspapers and magazines we often meet with the assertion that the workers and the "working" peasantry belong to the same class.

The absolute incorrectness of this view is obvious to anyone who understands that more or less developed capitalist production predominates in all modern states—i.e., capital rules the market and transforms the masses of working people into wage-workers. The so-called "working" peasant is in fact a *small proprietor*, or a petty bourgeois, who nearly always either hires himself out to work for somebody else or hires workers himself. Being a small proprietor, the "working" peasant also vacillates in politics between the masters and the workers, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Statistics on *wage-labour* in agriculture provide one of the most striking proofs of this property-owning, or bourgeois, nature of the "working" peasant. Bourgeois economists (including the Narodniks) usually praise the "vitality" of small production in agriculture, by which they mean farming without wage-labour. But they are not at all fond of precise figures on wage-labour among the peasantry!

Let us examine data on this question gathered by the most recent agricultural censuses—the Austrian census of 1902 and the German of 1907.

The more developed a country, the more extensively is wage-labour employed in agriculture. In Germany, out of a total of 15,000,000 wage-workers, it is estimated that 4,500,000, or 30 per cent, are employed in agriculture; and in Austria, the figure is 1,250,000, or 14 per cent, out of a total of 9,000,000. But even in Austria, if we take farms usu-

ally regarded as peasant (or "working" peasant) farms, i.e., those from 2 to 20 hectares (one hectare equals nine-tenths of a dessiatines, we will find that wage-labour plays an important part. Farms from 5 to 10 hectares number 383,000; of these 120,000 employ wage-workers. Farms from 10 to 20 hectares number 242,000; of these 142,000, or nearly three-fifths, employ wage-workers.

Thus, small ("working") peasant farming exploits *hundreds of thousands* of wage-workers. The larger the peasant farm, the larger the number of wage-workers employed, together with a larger contingent of family workers. For example, in Germany, for every 10 peasant farms, there are:

Size of farm	Family workers	Wage-workers	Total
2 to 5 hectares	25	4	29
5 to 10 "	31	7	38
10 to 20 "	34	17	51

The more affluent peasantry, who have more land and a larger number of "their own" workers in the family, employ *in addition* a larger number of *wage-workers*.

In capitalist society, which is entirely dependent on the market, small (peasant) production on a mass scale is *impossible* in agriculture without the mass employment of wage-labour. The sentimental catchword, "working" peasant, merely deceives the workers by *concealing* this exploitation of wage-labour.

In Austria, about one and a half million peasant farms (from 2 to 20 hectares) employ *half a million* wage-workers. In Germany, two million peasant farms employ *more than one and a half million* wage-workers.

And what about the smaller farmers? They hire themselves out! They are wage-workers with a plot of land. For example, in Germany there are over three and a third million (3,378,509) farms of less than two hectares. Of these *less than half a million* (474,915) are *independent* farmers, and only a little less than *two million* (1,822, 792) are *wage-workers*!

The very position of the small farmers in modern society, therefore, inevitably transforms them into petty bourgeois. They are eternally hovering between the wage-workers and

the capitalists. The majority of the peasants live in poverty, are ruined and become proletarians, while the minority trail after the capitalists and help keep the masses of the rural population dependent upon the capitalists. That is why the peasants in all capitalist countries have so far mostly kept aloof from the workers' socialist movement and have joined various reactionary and bourgeois parties. Only an independent organisation of wage-workers which conducts a consistent class struggle can wrest the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie and explain to them the absolute hopelessness of the small producers' position in capitalist society.

In Russia the position of the peasants in relation to capitalism is just the same as in Austria, Germany, etc. Our "specific feature" is our backwardness: the peasant is still confronted, not with the capitalist, but with the big *feudal* landowner, who is the principal bulwark of the economic and political backwardness of Russia.

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Signed: *V. I.*

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CHILD LABOUR IN PEASANT FARMING

In making a proper appraisal of the conditions in which capitalism places small agricultural production the most important things to study are the conditions of the worker, his earnings, the amount of labour he expends, his conditions of life; then the way the livestock is kept and tended, and, finally, the methods of cultivating and fertilising the soil, the waste of its fertility, etc.

It is not difficult to understand that if these questions are ignored (as they often are in bourgeois political economy) a totally distorted picture of peasant farming is obtained, for the *real* "viability" of the latter depends precisely on the conditions of the worker, on the condition of his livestock, and on the way he tends his land. To assume without proof that in this respect small production is in the same position as large-scale production is merely begging the question. It means at once adopting the bourgeois point of view.

The bourgeoisie wants to prove that the peasant is a sound and viable "proprietor", and not the slave of capital, crushed in the same way as the wage-worker, but more tied up, more entangled than the latter. If one seriously and conscientiously wants the *data* required to solve this controversial problem, he must look for the regular and objective indicators of the *conditions of life and labour* in small and large-scale production.

One of these indicators, and a particularly important one, is the extent to which *child* labour is employed. The more child labour is exploited the worse, undoubtedly, is the position of the worker, and the harder his life.

The Austrian and German agricultural censuses give the number of children and adolescents employed in agriculture

in relation to the total number of persons employed in agriculture. The Austrian census gives separate figures for all workers, male and female, *under* 16 years of age. Of these, there were 1,200,000 out of a total of 9,000,000, i.e., 13 per cent. The German census gives figures only for those *of 14 years of age and under*; of these there were six hundred thousand (601,637) out of fifteen million (15,169,549), or 3.9 per cent.

Clearly, the Austrian and German figures are not comparable. Nevertheless, the *relative numbers* of proletarian, peasant and capitalist farms they reveal are quite comparable.

By proletarian farms we mean the tiny plots of land (up to two hectares or almost two dessiatines per farm) which provide the wage-worker with supplementary earnings. By peasant farms we mean those from 2 to 20 hectares; in these, family labour predominates over wage-labour. Finally, there are the capitalist farms; these are big farms, in which wage-labour predominates over family labour.

The following are the figures on child labour in the three types of farms.

Type of farm	Group according to size of farm	Children employed (% of total number of workers)	
		Austria (under 16)	Germany (under 14)
Proletarian	Less than half a hectare . . .	8.8	2.2
	½ to 2 hectares	12.2	3.9
Peasant	2 ” 5 ”	15.3	4.6
	5 ” 10 ”	15.6	4.8
	10 ” 20 ”	12.8	4.5
Capitalist	20 ” 100 ”	11.1	3.4
	100 hectares and over	4.2	3.6
Total		13.0	3.9

We see from the above that in both countries the exploitation of child labour is *greatest* in *peasant* farms in general, and among the *middle peasant* farms (5 to 10 hectares, i.e., 4.5 to 9 dessiatines) in particular.

Thus, not only is small production worse-off than large-scale production, we also see that the peasant farms, in

particular, are worse-off than the capitalist farms and even than the proletarian farms.

How is this to be explained?

On the proletarian farm, farming is conducted on such an insignificant plot of land that, strictly speaking, it cannot seriously be called a "farm". Here farming is a *secondary* occupation; the principal occupation is wage-labour in agriculture and in industry. In general, the influence of industry raises the standard of life of the worker, and in particular, it reduces the exploitation of child labour. For example, the German census shows the number of persons under the age of 14 employed in industry to be only 0.3 per cent of the total (i.e., one-tenth of that in agriculture) and those under 16 years of age only 18 per cent.

In peasant farming, however, the influence of industry is felt least of all, while the competition of capitalist agriculture is felt most of all. The peasant is unable to keep going without almost working himself to death and compelling his children to work as hard. Want compels the peasant to make up for his lack of capital and technical equipment with his own muscles. The fact that the peasant's children work hardest also indicates that the peasant's cattle work hard and are fed worse: the necessity of exerting the utmost effort and of "economising" in everything inevitably affects every side of the farm.

German statistics show that among wage-workers the largest percentage of children (3.7 or nearly 4 per cent) is to be found in the big capitalist farms (of 100 dessiatines and over). But among family workers, the largest percentage of children is to be found among the peasants—about five per cent (4.9 per cent to 5.2 per cent). As many as 9 per cent of *temporary* wage-workers employed in big capitalist enterprises are children; but among the peasants as many as 16.5 to 24.4 per cent of the temporary *family* workers are children!

In the busy season the peasant suffers from a shortage of workers; he can hire workers only to a small extent; he is compelled to employ the labour of his own children to the greatest extent. The result is that in German agriculture, in general, the percentage of children among family workers is *nearly half as big again* as that among wage-workers—

children among family workers—4.4 per cent; among wage-workers—3 per cent.

The peasant has to work *harder* than the wage-worker. This fact, confirmed by thousands of independent observations, is now fully proved by statistics for whole countries. Capitalism condemns the peasant to extreme degradation and ruin. There is no other salvation for him than through joining the class struggle of the wage-workers. But before the peasant can arrive at this conclusion he will have to experience many years of being disillusioned by deceptive bourgeois slogans.

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THE RESULTS OF STRIKES IN 1912 AS COMPARED WITH THOSE OF THE PAST

The Association of Factory Owners in the Moscow Area has issued statistics on the results of strikes during the last seven months of 1912. These statistics embraced 131,625 workers out of a total of 211,595 who participated (according to the factory owners' figures, undoubtedly reduced) in economic strikes over the whole year of 1912.

We have the figures for the results of strikes in previous years in the official publications of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry covering the decade preceding the revolution (1895-1904) and the three revolutionary years (1905-07).

The data, unfortunately, are not similar weights, and those gathered by the factory owners' association are not so well processed. Official statistics on the results of strikes divide them into three categories: (1) ending to the advantage of the workers, (2) to the advantage of the owners and (3) in a compromise. The statistics of the factory owners divide them into: (1) ending in the defeat of the workers, (2) the complete or partial satisfaction of the workers and (3) strikes whose results are unspecified.

The two sets of data may be compared (even relatively) only in the following way. The workers taking part in strikes that ended in a compromise or whose results are unspecified, are divided into two equal parts between the strikes *won* and *lost*, obtaining as a result only these two headings (approximate, of course). Here are the results of the comparison:

		Number of strikers	Number of strikers in strikes won (thousands)	Percentage won
For ten years before the revolution	1895-1904	424	159	37.5
Three revolutionary years.	1905	1,439	705	48.9
	1906	458	233	50.9
	1907	200	59	29.5
For all	1911	96	49	51.0
For last seven months of	1912	132	55	41.6

All these figures refer only to economic strikes, and the data for 1911 and 1912, furthermore, are incomplete. The number of workers for the whole of 1912 who took part in economic strikes (212,000) *exceeded* the number for 1907.

As can be seen, the year 1911 was a record year for the success of economic strikes, even surpassing the most successful revolutionary year of 1906. In 1906 the percentage of strikers who won their strikes was 50.9 per cent and in 1911 it was 51 per cent.

Strikes in 1912 were less successful than they were in *1905* (1905—48.9 per cent won, 1912—41.6 per cent won), but they were more successful than were, on the average, those of the *decade* 1895-1904 (37.5 per cent), to say nothing of 1907 (29.5 per cent won).

It is interesting to compare these figures with those of Western Europe. In Germany, during the entire first decade of the twentieth century (1900-09) there were 1,897,000 strikers (in Russia the *two years* of the revolution *alone*, counting only economic strikes, yielded as many). Of these, 698,000 or 36.8 per cent won their strikes, i.e., somewhat less than in Russia in the decade preceding the revolution. In Britain for the ten years, 1900-09, the number of strikers was 1,884,000. Out of 1,234,000 strikers, 588,000, or 47.5 per cent, won their strikes, i.e., many more than in Russia in the pre-revolutionary decade, but fewer than in 1905, 1906 and 1911. (The number of strikers winning their strikes was calculated for Germany and Britain on the same basis as for Russia.)

The number of strikers in Russia who won their strikes in 1905 *alone*, was *greater* than the number *for ten years* in Germany or Britain. One may judge from this how much of the proletariat's latent strength is still untapped.

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IN AUSTRALIA

A general election recently took place in Australia. The Labour Party, which had a majority in the Lower House—44 seats out of 75—was defeated. It now has only 36 seats out of 75. The majority has passed to the Liberals, but this majority is a very unstable one, because 30 of the 36 seats in the Upper House are held by Labour.

What sort of peculiar capitalist country is this, in which the workers' representatives predominate in the Upper House and, till recently, did so in the Lower House as well, and yet the capitalist system is in no danger?

An English correspondent of the German labour press recently explained the situation, which is very often misrepresented by bourgeois writers.

The Australian Labour Party does not even call itself a socialist party. Actually it is a liberal-bourgeois party, while the so-called Liberals in Australia are really Conservatives.

This strange and incorrect use of terms in naming parties is not unique. In America, for example, the slave-owners of yesterday are called Democrats, and in France, enemies of socialism, petty bourgeois, are called Radical Socialists! In order to understand the real significance of parties, one must examine not their signboards but their class character and the historical conditions of each individual country.

Australia is a young British colony.

Capitalism in Australia is still quite youthful. The country is only just taking shape as an independent state. The workers are for the most part emigrants from Britain. They left the country at the time when the liberal-labour policy held almost undivided sway there, when the masses of the British workers were *Liberals*. Even now the majority of the skilled factory workers in Britain are Liberals or semi-

Liberals. This is the results of the exceptionally favourable, monopolist position enjoyed by Britain in the second half of the last century. Only now are the masses of the workers in Britain turning (but turning slowly) towards socialism.

And while in Britain the so-called Labour Party is an *alliance* between the non-socialist trade unions and the extremely opportunist Independent Labour Party, in Australia the Labour Party is the *unalloyed* representative of the *non*-socialist workers' trade unions.

The leaders of the Australian Labour Party are trade union officials, everywhere the most moderate and "capital-serving" element, and in Australia, altogether peaceable, purely liberal.

The ties binding the separate states into a united Australia are still very weak. The Labour Party has had to concern itself with developing and strengthening these ties, and with establishing central government.

In Australia the Labour Party has done what in other countries was done by the Liberals, namely, introduced a uniform tariff for the whole country, a uniform educational law, a uniform land tax and uniform factory legislation.

Naturally, when Australia is finally developed and consolidated as an independent capitalist state, the condition of the workers will change, as also will the *Liberal* Labour Party, which will make way for a *socialist* workers' party. Australia is an illustration of the conditions under which *exceptions* to the rule are possible. The rule is: a socialist workers' party in a capitalist country. The exception is: a liberal Labour Party which arises only for a short time by virtue of specific conditions that are abnormal for capitalism in general.

Those Liberals in Europe and in Russia who try to "teach" the people that class struggle is unnecessary by citing the example of Australia, only deceive themselves and others. It is ridiculous to think of transplanting Australian conditions (an undeveloped, young colony, populated by liberal British workers) to countries where the state is long established and capitalism well developed.

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MAY DAY ACTION BY THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT

A year has passed since the Lena events and the first, decisive upsurgence in the revolutionary working-class movement since the June Third coup. The tsar's Black Hundreds and the landowners, the mob of officials and the bourgeoisie have celebrated the 300th anniversary of plunder, Tatar incursions, and the disgracing of Russia by the Romanovs. The Fourth Duma has convened and begun its "work", though it has no faith in that work and has quite lost its former counter-revolutionary vigour. Confusion and tedium have beset liberal society, which is listlessly making appeals *for reforms* while admitting the impracticability of anything even approximating reform.

And now comes a May Day action by Russia's working class, who first held a rehearsal in Riga, then went into resolute action in St. Petersburg on May 1 (O.S.); this action has rent the dim and dreary atmosphere like a thunderbolt. The tasks of the approaching revolution have come to the fore again in all their grandeur, and the forces of the advanced class leading it stand out in bold relief before hundreds of old revolutionaries, whom persecution by hangmen and desertion by friends have not defeated or broken, and before millions of people of the new generation of democrats and socialists.

Weeks before May Day, the government appeared to have lost its wits, while the gentlemen who own factories behaved as if they had never had any wits at all. The arrests and searches seemed to have turned all the workers' districts in the capital upside down. The provinces did not lag behind the centre. The harassed factory owners called

conferences and adopted contradictory slogans, now threatening the workers with punishment and lock-outs, now making concessions in advance and consenting to stop work, now inciting the government to commit atrocities, now reproaching the government and calling on it to include May Day in the number of official holidays.

But even though the gendarmes showed the utmost zeal, even though they "purged" the industrial suburbs, even though they made arrests right and left according to their latest "lists of suspects", it was no use. The workers laughed at the impotent rage of the tsar's gang and the capitalist class and derided the governor's menacing and pitiful "announcements"; they wrote satirical verses and circulated them by hand or passed them on by word of mouth; they produced, as if from nowhere fresh batches of small, poorly printed "leaflets", short and plain, but very instructive, calling for strikes and demonstrations, and reminding the people of the old, uncurtailed, revolutionary slogans of the Social-Democrats, who in 1905 led the first onslaught of the masses against the autocracy and against monarchy.

A hundred thousand on strike on May Day, said the government press the next day. Bourgeois newspapers, using the first telegraphed information, reported a hundred and twenty-five thousand (*Kievskaya Mysl*). A correspondent of the central organ of the German Social-Democrats wired from St. Petersburg that it was a hundred and fifty thousand. And the day after the whole bourgeois press quoted a figure of 200,000-220,000. Actually the number of strikers reached *250,000*!

But, apart from the number of May Day strikers, much more impressive—and much more significant—were the revolutionary street demonstrations held by the workers. Everywhere in and around the capital crowds of workers singing revolutionary songs, calling loudly for revolution and carrying red flags fought for several hours against police and security forces frantically mobilised by the government. And those workers made the keenest of the tsar's henchmen feel that the struggle was in earnest, that the police were not faced with a handful of individuals engaged in a trivial Slavophil affair,[75] that it was actually the *masses* of the capital's working class who had risen.

This was a really brilliant, open demonstration of the proletariat's revolutionary aspirations, of its revolutionary forces steeled and reinforced by new generations, of revolutionary appeals to the people and the peoples of Russia. Last year the government and the manufacturers were able to take comfort from the fact that the Lena explosion could not have been foreseen, that they could not have made immediate preparations to combat its consequences; this time, however, the monarchy had displayed acute foresight, there had been ample time for preparation and the "measures" taken were most "vigorous"; the result was that the tsarist monarchy revealed its complete *impotence* when faced with a revolutionary awakening of the proletarian masses.

Indeed, one year of strike struggle since Lena has shown, despite the pitiful outcries of the liberals and their yes-men against the "craze for striking", against "syndicalist" strikes, against combining economic with political strikes and vice versa—this year has shown what a great and irreplaceable weapon for agitation among the masses, for rousing them, for drawing them into the struggle the Social-Democratic proletariat had forged for itself in the revolutionary epoch. The revolutionary mass-scale strike allowed the enemy neither rest nor respite. It also hit the enemy's purse, and in full view of the whole world it trampled into the mud the political prestige of the allegedly "strong" tsarist government. It enabled more and more sections of the workers to regain at least a small part of what had been achieved in 1905 and drew fresh sections of the working people, even the most backward, into the struggle. It did not exhaust the capacity of the workers, it was frequently demonstrative action of short duration, and at the same time it paved the way for further, still more impressive and more revolutionary open action by the masses in the shape of street demonstrations.

During the last year, no country in the world has seen so many people on strike for political ends as Russia, or such perseverance, such variety, such vigour in strikes. This circumstance alone shows to the full the pettiness, the contemptible stupidity of those liberal and liquidationist sages who tried to "adjust" the tactics of the Russian workers in 1912-13, using the yardstick of "European" con-

stitutional periods, periods that were mainly devoted to the preparatory work of bringing socialist education and enlightenment to the masses.

The colossal superiority of the Russian strikes over those in the European countries, the most advanced countries, demonstrates, not the special qualities or special abilities of Russia's workers, but the *special* conditions in present-day Russia, the existence of a revolutionary situation, the growth of a directly revolutionary crisis. When the moment of a similar growth of revolution approaches in Europe (there it will be a socialist and not a bourgeois-democratic revolution, as in our country), the proletariat of the most developed capitalist countries will launch far more vigorous revolutionary strikes, demonstrations, and armed struggle against the defenders of wage-slavery.

This year's May Day strike, like the series of strikes in Russia during the last eighteen months, was revolutionary in character as distinguished not only from the usual economic strikes but from demonstration strikes and from political strikes demanding constitutional reforms, like, for instance, the last Belgian strike.[76] Those who are in bondage to a liberal world outlook and no longer able to consider things from the revolutionary standpoint, cannot possibly understand this distinctive character of the Russian strikes, a character that is due entirely to the revolutionary state of Russia. The epoch of counter-revolution and of free play for renegade sentiment has left behind it too many people of this kind even among those who would like to be called Social-Democrats.

Russia is experiencing a revolutionary situation because the oppression of the vast majority of the population—not only of the proletariat but of nine-tenths of the small producers, particularly the peasants—has intensified to the maximum, and this intensified oppression, starvation, poverty, lack of rights, humiliation of the people is, furthermore, glaringly inconsistent with the state of Russia's productive forces, inconsistent with the level of the class-consciousness and the demands of the masses roused by the year 1905, and inconsistent with the state of affairs in all neighbouring—not only European but Asian—countries.

But that is not all. Oppression alone, no matter how

great, does not always give rise to a revolutionary situation in a country. In most cases it is not enough for revolution that *the lower classes should not want* to live in the old way. It is also necessary that *the upper classes should be unable* to rule and govern in the old way. This is what we see in Russia today. A political crisis is maturing before our very eyes. The bourgeoisie has done *everything* in its power to back counter-revolution and ensure "peaceful development" on this counter-revolutionary basis. The bourgeoisie gave hangmen and feudal lords as much money as they wanted, the bourgeoisie reviled the revolution and renounced it, the bourgeoisie licked the boots of Purishkevich and the knout of Markov the Second and became their lackey, the bourgeoisie evolved theories based on "European" arguments, theories that revile the Revolution of 1905 as an "intellectualist" revolution and describe it as wicked, criminal, treasonous, and so on and so forth.

And yet, despite all this sacrificing of its purse, its honour and its conscience, the bourgeoisie—from the Cadets to the Octobrists—*itself* admits that the autocracy and landowners *were unable* to ensure "peaceful *development*", were unable to provide the basic conditions for "law" and "order" without which a capitalist country cannot, in the twentieth century, live side by side with Germany and the new China.

A nation-wide political crisis is in evidence in Russia, a crisis which affects the very *foundation* of the state system and not just parts of it, which affects the *foundation* of the edifice and not an outbuilding, not merely one of its storeys. No matter how many glib phrases our liberals and liquidators trot out to the effect that "we have, thank God, a constitution" and that political *reforms* are on the order of the day (only very limited people do not see the close connection between these two propositions), no matter how much of this reformist verbiage is poured out, the fact remains that not a single liquidator or liberal can point to any reformist way out of the situation.

The condition of the mass of the population in Russia, the aggravation of their position owing to the new agrarian policy (to which the feudal landowners had to snatch at as their last means of salvation), the international situation, and the nature of the general political crisis that has taken

shape in our country—such is the sum-total of the objective conditions making Russia's situation a revolutionary one because of the impossibility of carrying out the tasks of a bourgeois revolution by following the present course and by the means available to the government and the exploiting classes.

Such is the social, economic, and political situation, such is the class relationship in Russia that has given rise to a specific type of strike impossible in modern Europe, from which all sorts of renegades would like to borrow the example, not of yesterday's bourgeois revolutions (through which shine gleams of tomorrow's proletarian revolution), but of today's "constitutional" situation. Neither the oppression of the lower classes nor a crisis among the upper classes can cause a revolution; they can only cause the decay of a country, unless that country has a revolutionary class capable of transforming the passive state of oppression into an active state of revolt and insurrection.

The role of a truly advanced class, a class really able to rouse the masses to revolution, really capable of saving Russia from decay, is played by the industrial proletariat. This is the task it fulfils by means of its revolutionary strikes. These strikes, which the liberals hate and the liquidators cannot understand, are (as the February resolution of the R.S.D.L.P. puts it) "one of the most effective means of overcoming the apathy, despair, and disunion of the agricultural proletariat and the peasantry, ... and *drawing them* into the most concerted, simultaneous, and extensive *revolutionary actions*".*

The working class draws into revolutionary action the masses of the working and exploited people, who are deprived of basic rights and driven to despair. The working class teaches them revolutionary struggle, trains them for revolutionary action, and explains to-them where to find the way out and how to attain salvation. The working class teaches them, not merely by words, but by deeds, by example, and the example is provided not by the adventures of solitary heroes but by *mass* revolutionary action combining political and economic demands.

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, p. 457.—*Ed.*

How plain, how clear, how close these thoughts are to every honest worker who grasps even the rudiments of the theory of socialism and democracy! And how alien they are to those traitors to socialism and betrayers of democracy from among the intelligentsia, who revile or deride the "underground" in liquidationist newspapers, assuring naïve simpletons that they are "also Social-Democrats".

The May Day action of the proletariat of St. Petersburg, supported by that of the proletariat of all Russia, clearly showed once again to those who have eyes to see and ears to hear the great historic importance of the revolutionary underground in present-day Russia. The only R.S.D.L.P. Party organisation in St. Petersburg, the St. Petersburg Committee, compelled even the bourgeois press, before the May Day action as well as on the eve of January 9, and on the eve of the Tercentenary of the Romanovs as well as on April 4,[77] to note that St. Petersburg Committee leaflets had appeared again and again in the factories.

Those leaflets cost colossal sacrifices. Sometimes they are quite unattractive in appearance. Some of them, the appeals for demonstration on April 4, for instance, merely announce the hour and place of the demonstration, in six lines evidently set in secret and with extreme haste in different printing shops and in different types. We have people ("also Social-Democrats") who, when alluding to these conditions of "underground" work, snigger maliciously or curl a contemptuous lip and ask: "If the entire Party were limited to the underground, how many members would it have? Two or three hundred? " [See No. 95 (181) of *Luch*, a renegade organ, in its *editorial* defence of Mr. Sedov, who has the sad courage to be an outspoken liquidator. This issue of Luch appeared five days before the May Day action, i.e., *at the very time* the underground was preparing the leaflets!]

Messrs. Dan, Potresov and Co., who make these disgraceful statements, must know that there were thousands of proletarians in the Party ranks as early as 1903, and 150 thousand in 1907, that even now thousands and tens of thousands of workers print and circulate *underground* leaflets, as members of *underground* R.S.D.L.P. cells. But the liquidationist gentlemen know that they are protected by Sto-

lypin "legality" from a legal refutation of their foul lies and their "grimaces", which are fouler still, at the expense of the underground.

See to what extent these despicable people have lost touch with the mass working-class movement and with revolutionary work in general! Use even their own yardstick, deliberately falsified to suit the liberals. You may assume for a moment that "two or three hundred" workers in St. Petersburg took part in printing and distributing those underground leaflets.

What is the result? "Two or three hundred" workers, the flower of the St. Petersburg proletariat, people who not only call themselves Social-Democrats but work as Social-Democrats, people who are esteemed and appreciated for it by the *entire* working class of Russia, people who do not prate about a "broad party" but make up in actual fact the only underground Social-Democratic Party existing in Russia, these people print and circulate underground leaflets. The *Luch* liquidators (protected by Stolypin censors) laugh contemptuously at the "two or three hundred", the "underground" and its "exaggerated" importance, etc.

And suddenly, a miracle occurs! In accordance with a decision drawn up by *half a dozen* members of the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee—a leaflet printed and circulated by "two or three hundred"—*two hundred and fifty thousand* people rise as one man in St. Petersburg.

The leaflets and the revolutionary speeches by workers at meetings and demonstrations do not speak of an "open working-class party", "freedom of association" or reforms of that kind, with the phantoms of which the liberals are fooling the people. They speak of revolution as the only way out. They speak of the republic as the only slogan which, in contrast to liberal lies about reforms, indicates the change needed to ensure freedom, indicates the forces capable of rising consciously to defend it.

The two million inhabitants of St. Petersburg see and hear these appeals for revolution which go to the hearts of all toiling and oppressed sections of the people. All St. Petersburg sees from a real, mass-scale example what is the real way out and what is lying liberal talk about reforms. Thou-

sands of workers' contacts—and hundreds of bourgeois newspapers, which are compelled to report the St. Petersburg mass action at least in snatches—spread throughout Russia the news of the stubborn strike campaign of the capital's proletariat. Both the mass of the peasantry and the peasants serving in the army hear this news of strikes, of the revolutionary demands of the workers, of their struggle for a republic and for the confiscation of the landed estates for the benefit of the peasants. Slowly but surely, the revolutionary strikes are stirring, rousing, enlightening, and organising the masses of the people *for revolution*.

The "two or three hundred" "underground people" express the interests and needs of *millions and tens of millions*, they tell them the truth about their hopeless position, open their eyes to the necessity of revolutionary struggle, imbue them with faith in it, provide them with the correct slogans, and win these masses away from the influence of the high-sounding and thoroughly spurious, reformist slogans of the bourgeoisie. And "two or three" dozen liquidators from among the intelligentsia, using money collected abroad and among liberal merchants to fool unenlightened workers, are carrying the slogans of that bourgeoisie into the workers' midst.

The May Day strike, like all the revolutionary strikes of 1912-13, has made clear the three political camps into which present-day Russia is divided. The camp of hangmen and feudal lords, of monarchy and the secret police. It has done its utmost in the way of atrocities and is already impotent against the masses of the workers. The camp of the bourgeoisie, all of whom, from the Cadets to the Octobrists, are shouting and meaning, calling for reforms and making fools of themselves by thinking that reforms are possible in Russia. The camp of the revolution, the only camp expressing the interests of the oppressed masses.

All the ideological work, all the political work in this camp is carried out by underground Social-Democrats alone, by those who know how to use every legal opportunity in the spirit of Social-Democracy and who are inseparably bound up with the advanced class, the proletariat. No one can tell beforehand whether this advanced class will succeed in leading the masses all the way to a victorious revolution.

But this class is fulfilling its duty—*leading* the masses to that solution—despite all the vacillations and betrayals on the part of the liberals and those who are "also Social-Democrats". All the living and vital elements of Russian socialism and Russian democracy are being educated solely by the example of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, and under its guidance.

This year's May Day action has shown to the whole world that the Russian proletariat is steadfastly following its revolutionary course, apart from which there is no salvation for a Russia that is suffocating and decaying alive.

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NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

The political ignorance of the people of Russia is to be seen, in part, in their inability to look for exact proofs concerning controversial and important historical questions, and in the naïve credence they give to shouting and expostulation, and to the assurances and vows made by people with interests at stake.

The question of liquidationism is confused precisely because the people with interests at stake (i.e., the liquidators themselves) are not too lazy to make assurances and vows, while the "public" are too lazy to look for exact proofs.

What is the substance of the matter? It is the attitude to the revolution and to the underground, the effort to create a mass working-class movement.

Well, are there no exact proofs to offer on the factual aspect of these issues?

Of course, there are. One has only to get out of the habit of taking on trust what the loud-mouthed and the liberals say.

The "issue" of the underground. Should not those who are interested in this question ask: "*Who* works in the underground? *Who* belongs to the underground organisations?" Is it not clear that underground organisations that do not make their presence felt are nothing, are a deception?

In St. Petersburg there are two newspapers—one is anti-liquidationist, the other is the liquidationist *Luch*, "also Social-Democratic". In other cities there are not yet any working-class newspapers.

Should it not be assumed that the liquidators are stronger in St. Petersburg than elsewhere? But who works *in the Party* in St. Petersburg?

Take the evidence of the bourgeois press. You will find there the news that *leaflets were distributed by the St. Petersburg Committee* before January 9, and on the occasion of the Tercentenary of the Romanovs, and on the eve of April 4 and on the eve of May Day.

Have you any reason to doubt the bourgeois press on such a question of fact?

No sensible person would risk expressing such doubt. And anyone who is at all close to the Social-Democratic movement will have *seen* the St. Petersburg Committee's leaflets.

Not a single newspaper mentioned any leaflets issued by the liquidators' "initiative group" in St. Petersburg in connection with these dates that are famous for the great revolutionary acts of the proletarian masses in St. Petersburg.

And no matter how the *Luch* people may "vow" that they are "also Social-Democrats", "also for the underground", and that the "Leninists" and Plekhanov are wrong in "harassing" them, etc., we shall not stop pointing to *facts* that disprove the fables and lies told by *Luch*.

Find us a bourgeois newspaper that reported the appearance of leaflets issued by the liquidators in St. Petersburg on the eve of January 9, on the eve of April 4, or on the eve of May Day. There is none. *There were no leaflets*. The liquidators are not working in the underground. It is *not* the liquidators who constitute the underground organisations of the Party. There are no liquidators on the St. Petersburg Committee. The liquidators are *outside the Party* because *there is no* other Party but that of the underground, and no other organisation in St. Petersburg except the one led by the St. Petersburg Committee.

We have deliberately avoided mentioning the leaflets of the Central Committee and the Organising Committee,[78] because it is difficult to prove that *they* are distributed locally, while from the Organising Committee for almost a whole year we have seen only the *Vienna* May Day leaflet, which has nothing to do with work in St. Petersburg or in Russia.

The liquidators evade direct answers to the question of "the underground" because *they are not there*. Oath-taking

and vows, shouts and curses will not disprove that fact.

Trotsky, doing faithful service to liquidators, assured himself and the naïve "Europeans" (lovers of Asiatic scandal-mongering) that the liquidators are "stronger" in the legal movement. And this lie, too, is refuted by the *facts*.

Take the Duma elections. In the Second Duma the Bolsheviks had 47 per cent of the worker curia; in the Third they had 50 per cent and in the Fourth, 67 per cent. Should these facts be believed, or should one believe Trotsky and the liquidators?

Take the working-class press. In 1912 the anti-liquidationist newspaper comes into being at a much earlier date and is supported by a considerably greater number of workers' groups (according to the published data on collections). There were 620 workers' groups for *Pravda* and 89 for *Luch*.

1913. Party people are already collecting funds for two newspapers, the liquidators have a deficit and their *one* newspaper lives on foreign and undefined (bourgeois) support. *Pravda* is supported by 402 workers' groups, a Moscow workers' paper of the same trend by 172 workers' groups, and *Luch* by 167 workers' groups.

Should one believe these facts or the vows made by *Luch*, Trotsky, F. D. & Co.?

The Metalworkers' Union in St. Petersburg. At the first *open* election where platforms[79] were put forward, ten out of the fourteen were *Pravda* supporters. In the same way as a thief, caught red-handed, shouts "Stop thief!" so the liquidators are shouting "Beware of a split!"

In May 1910 the liquidators were told publicly and clearly (*Diskussionny Listok* No. 2[80]) that they were legalist-independents who had seceded from the Party.* Since then *three years* have passed and only people who are completely wrapped up in their own lies, or who are absolutely ignorant, could deny the *facts* that fully confirm those words.

The liquidators are parasites on the Social-Democratic organism. To "Europe" (the Organising Committee's German pamphlet and Mr. Semkovsky in *Kampf*[81]) they boast of strikes, but in Russia they write disgusting articles in *Luch*

* See present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 238-51.—*Ed.*

against strikes, about the "strike craze" and about the "syndicalism" of revolutionary strikes. To Europe (and to naïve An, also) they claim to be *in favour of* the underground. *Actually*, there are none of them in the underground. Powerless in the working class, they are strong in the moral (and, of course, *not only* moral) support they receive from the bourgeoisie. One has to be as naïve as An, whom the *Luch* editors laugh at as they would at a little child (No. 95), to recognise the slogan of an "open party" while defending the underground! That means surrendering the *content* to the liquidators and fighting them over the *form*! Let An ponder over whether the complete acceptance of the "open party" slogan by a bourgeoisie hostile to the underground is fortuitous!

The "open party" slogan is the slogan of *reformism*, a slogan that means—given the present alignment of class and political forces in Russia—*rejection* of the revolution. The slogan of the underground is the slogan of revolution.

The bourgeoisie cannot influence the workers *directly* in contemporary Russia. As a result of 1905 the workers jeer at the bourgeoisie and its liberalism. The word "Cadet" has become an expletive. And so the role of the bourgeoisie among the workers is played by the liquidators. Their objective significance is that they are the vehicle of bourgeois influence, bourgeois reformism and bourgeois opportunism.

All F. D.'s articles in *Luch*, all the tactical premises of the liquidators are based on reformism, on rejection of the revolution. You have not proved the inevitability of revolution—such is the liquidator's usual answer. Your "forecast" of the revolution is one-sided—trills Mr. Semkovsky, playing up to the liquidators.

That can be answered in a few words. The onset of the revolution, Messrs. Liberals, can be demonstrated *only* by the onset of the revolution. And when the revolution begins, both cowardly liberals and even purely casual people and adventurists are capable of becoming "revolutionaries". October and November 1905 proved this to the hilt.

A revolutionary is not one who becomes revolutionary with the onset of the revolution, but one who defends the principles and slogans of the revolution when reaction is most violent and when liberals and democrats vacillate to

the greatest degree. A revolutionary is one who *teaches the masses* to struggle in a revolutionary manner and nobody can possibly foresee (make a "forecast" of) the results of that "teaching".

The situation in Russia is a revolutionary one. The proletariat, with whom *only* anti-liquidators co-operate and march in step, is training the masses for revolution, *is preparing the revolution*, and is using any and every legal possibility *for it*. In the matter of preparing the revolution, or, which is the same thing, in the matter of the consistent democratic education of the masses, in the matter of fulfilment of our *socialist* duty (since outside of democracy there is no socialism), the revolutionary Social-Democrats are making a *positive* contribution, while the liquidators' contribution is *negative*.

True Social-Democratic work is possible in Russia only when conducted against reformism, against the liquidators.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 31,
June 15 (28), 1913

Published according to
the *Sotsial-Demokrat* text

APROPOS OF ONE UNTRUTH

(LETTER TO THE EDITORS)

We should have welcomed, from all points of view, the appearance of L. Martov's articles in *Luch*, promising an analysis of the question of "the tactical essence of the present dispute", if the very first article had not contained a blatant untruth. My words to the effect that the dispute with the liquidators had nothing to do with the organisational question* were declared to be "unexpected" by L. Martov. "Just look at this!" he exclaimed. "All of a sudden, with the help of God; we have a change", and so on.

Yet L. Martov knows full well that there has been no change at all, that nothing whatever unexpected has happened. In May 1910, over three years ago, I wrote in a Paris publication, which Martov knows quite well, "*about a group of legalist-independents*" (the ideas of *Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*) and said that it had "definitely rallied together and definitely broken with the Party".**

It is obvious that here, too, the dispute does not concern the organisational question (*how* to organise the Party?) but the question *of the existence* of the Party, of the secession of the liquidators from the Party, of their complete breakaway from the Party. Martov must realise that this is not a dispute on the question of organisation.

In October 1911, in a publication equally well known to Martov, signed also by me, it was said: "In reality, it is by no means the organisational question that is now in the forefront", but of the "*existence*" of the Party.***

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* See p. 109 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See present edition Vol. 16, p. 244.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition Vol. 17, p. 260.—*Ed.*

The affairs of the liquidators must be in a bad way if Martov, to evade an examination of the Party's precise decisions, is telling fairy-tales and publishing a blatant untruth.

Pravda No. 136, June 15, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE WORKING CLASS AND NEOMALTHUSIANISM

At the Pirogov Doctors' Congress much interest was aroused and a long debate was held on the question of abortions. The report was made by Lichkus, who quoted figures on the exceedingly widespread practice of destroying the foetus in present-day so-called civilised states.

In New York, 80,000 abortions were performed in one year and there are 36,000 every month in France. In St. Petersburg the percentage of abortions has more than doubled in five years.

The Pirogov Doctors' Congress adopted a resolution saying that there should never be any criminal prosecution of a mother for performing an artificial abortion and that doctors should only be prosecuted if the operation is performed for "purposes of gain".

In the discussion the majority agreed that abortions should not be punishable, and the question of the so-called neomalthusianism (the use of contraceptives) was naturally touched upon, as was also the social side of the matter. Mr. Vigdorchik, for instance, said, according to the report in *Russkoye Slovo*,[82] that "contraceptive measures should be welcomed" and Mr. Astrakhan exclaimed, amidst thunderous applause:

> "We have to convince mothers to bear children so that they can be maimed in educational establishments, so that lots can be drawn for them, so that they can be driven to suicide!"

If the report is true that this exclamation of Mr. Astrakhan's was greeted with thunderous applause, it is a fact that does not surprise me. The audience was made up of bourgeois, middle and petty bourgeois, who have the psy-

chology of the philistine. What can you expect from them but the most banal liberalism?

From the point of view of the working class, however, it would hardly be possible to find a more apposite expression of the completely reactionary nature and the ugliness of "social neomalthusianism" than Mr. Astrakhan's phrase cited above.

... "Bear children so that they can be maimed" ... For that alone? Why not that they should *fight* better, more unitedly, consciously and resolutely than we are fighting against the present-day conditions of life that are maiming and ruining our generation?

This is the radical difference that distinguishes the psychology of the peasant, handicraftsman, intellectual, the petty bourgeois in general, from that of the proletarian. The petty bourgeois sees and feels that he is heading for ruin, that life is becoming more difficult, that the struggle for existence is ever more ruthless, and that his position and that of his family are becoming more and more hopeless. It is an indisputable fact, and the petty bourgeois protests against it.

But *how* does he protest?

He protests as the representative of a class that is hopelessly perishing, that despairs of its future, that is depressed and cowardly. There is nothing to be done ... if only there were fewer children to suffer our torments and hard toil, our poverty and our humiliation—such is the cry of the petty bourgeois.

The class-conscious worker is far from holding this point of view. He will not allow his consciousness to be dulled by such cries no matter how sincere and heartfelt they may be. Yes, we workers and the mass of small proprietors lead a life that is filled with unbearable oppression and suffering. Things are harder for our generation than they were for our fathers. But in one respect we are luckier than our fathers. *We have begun to learn and are rapidly learning to fight*—and to fight not as individuals, as the best of our fathers fought, not for the slogans of bourgeois speechifiers that are alien to us in spirit, but for our slogans, the slogans of our class. We are fighting better than our fathers did. Our children will fight better than we do, and *they will be victorious*.

The working class is not perishing, it is growing, becoming stronger, gaining courage, consolidating itself, educating itself and becoming steeled in battle. We are pessimists as far as serfdom, capitalism and petty production are concerned, but we are ardent optimists in what concerns the working-class movement and its aims. We are already laying the foundation of a new edifice and our children will complete its construction.

That is the reason—the only reason—why we are unconditionally the enemies of neomalthusianism, suited only to unfeeling and egotistic petty-bourgeois couples, who whisper in scared voices: "God grant we manage somehow by ourselves. So much the better if we have no children."

It goes without saying that this does not by any means prevent us from demanding the unconditional annulment of all laws against abortions or against the distribution of medical literature on contraceptive measures, etc. Such laws are nothing but the hypocrisy of the ruling classes. These laws do not heal the ulcers of capitalism, they merely turn them into malignant ulcers that are especially painful for the oppressed masses. Freedom for medical propaganda and the protection of the elementary democratic rights of citizens, men and women, are one thing. The social theory of neomalthusianism is quite another. Class-conscious workers will always conduct the most ruthless struggle against attempts to impose that reactionary and cowardly theory on the most progressive and strongest class in modern society, the class that is the best prepared for great changes.

Pravda No. 137, June 16, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

LIBERAL APPEALS IN SUPPORT THE FOURTH DUMA

The question of the State Duma's attitude to the government and the country is becoming an ever more frequent subject for discussion in the press and is arousing quite a lot of interest. The June Third election law created two possible majorities—Right-Octobrist and Octobrist-Cadet. This latter, the "liberal" majority if you will, was also formed on a number of occasions in the Third Duma.

In the present Fourth Duma the Octobrist-Cadet majority occurs still more frequently. It must not be forgotten, however, that this is not only due to an Octobrist shift to the left but also to a Cadet *shift to the right*, which is expressed by the secession of part of the Cadets to the Progressists, on the one hand, and the constant deals between the Octobrists and the Cadets with the Progressists as intermediaries, on the other.

There is no doubt that the more frequent oppositionist decisions carried in the Fourth Duma by the Octobrist-Cadet majority are evidence of the growing political crisis in Russia, are evidence that the June Third system has entered a blind alley and has not satisfied even the bourgeoisie, who were prepared to sacrifice, for the benefit of that system, for the strengthening of the counter-revolution, their money, their honour and their conscience.

It is typical that even such an out-and-out, implacable reactionary as the German historian Schiemann, who knows Russian and writes for the organ of the German Purishkeviches, comes to the conclusion that the crisis in Russia is growing—either in the form of a system that is purely Plehve[83] in spirit (surely we have already entered that "system"?) or in the form of what this German historian calls upheavals.

What conclusions in practical politics, may we ask, emerge from these increasingly frequent liberal Duma decisions?

The Cadets have already drawn their conclusion on the Octobrists' condemnation of the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior. Their conclusion is to demand the support of the people and society" for the Fourth Duma, to call upon "public opinion" to "see in the Duma *one's own* strength, the direct manifestation of the public will", etc. (See *Pravda* No. 128.)

We have already spoken of the complete ineffectiveness of such a conclusion.* The voting on the Ministry of Public Education estimates was an exceedingly clear confirmation of our appraisal.

The Duma adopted three formulations: (1) a nationalistic, arch-reactionary formulation passed by the votes of the Rights and the Octobrists, (2) an Octobrist formulation passed by the Cadet vote (it expresses the wish, disgusting in its hypocrisy and absolutely impermissible for democrats or even honest liberals, that the Ministry of Public Education will "not be distracted by irrelevant political considerations"); lastly, (3) the wish of the peasant group, which was most likely passed not only with the help of the Constitutional-Democrats but of all democrats, including the Social-Democrats. The wish expressed by the peasants received 137 votes for and 134 against with 4 abstaining.

There can scarcely be any doubt that the error of the Social-Democrats, if they voted for the peasant formulation, was in not presenting their own statement or declaration. It was right to vote in favour, but they should also have added a proviso expressing their disagreement with, for instance, point five of the peasant formulation. That point speaks of the native language in *elementary* schools. Democracy cannot confine itself to elementary schools. And in general, it cannot be admitted that the wishes of the peasants are *consistently* democratic.

It was right to vote in favour, because in the peasant formulation there are no points in support of the government, and no hypocrisy, but it was essential to express disagree-

* See pp. 177-79 of this volume.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ment with the inconsistency and timidity of peasant democracy. Silence on the relationship between the school and the church, for instance, is absolutely impermissible for Social-Democrats, etc.

That, however, is *en passant*.

The main thing is that the Fourth Duma, *after* the Cadets' appeals to support it, adopted the formulation of the nationalists!

Only a blind man could fail to see that support for the Fourth Duma is support for *the wavering Octobrists*.

The Cadets boast that they are pushing the Octobrists into opposition by their support. Let us suppose for a moment that that is so. On what basis is this Octobrist opposition founded? At best, *when* they are in opposition they undoubtedly support the point of view of counter-revolutionary liberalism. That they continue *to depend* on the ministers and to *gratify* them, was demonstrated even by the "progressist" N. Lvov, who was surely pursuing a policy of *gratification* when he banned Shchepkin from two sittings because of an expression a hundred times milder than the usual expressions of the Rights.

When they call on the people to support the wavering Octobrists, the Cadets are trying to make democrats follow in the wake of the worst of the liberals.

The democrats, however, have seen from hundreds of more impressive examples just what our liberals are worth. Democracy would be enfeebled and deprived of leadership if it were again to follow the liberals.

The clash between the bourgeoisie and the government is not an accident, it is an indication of the profound crisis that is maturing on all sides. It is, therefore, imperative to keep a close watch on these clashes. But democracy will be able to achieve something better for Russia only if it does not for one moment forget its duty—to do everything to develop in the population a consciousness of the independent nature of the tasks of democracy as distinct from liberalism, in contrast to liberalism and regardless of liberalism's vacillations.

Pravda No. 139, June 20, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

BOURGEOIS FINANCIAL MAGNATES AND POLITICIANS

The British Labour press is continuing its exposure of the connection between financial "operations" and high politics. These revelations deserve the attention of the workers of all countries because they expose the very basis of state administration in capitalist society. The words of Karl Marx that the government is a committee for managing the affairs of the capitalist class[84] are confirmed to the full.

The Labour Leader No. 24 (June 12, N.S.) devotes a whole page to listing the names of British Ministers (7 names), ex-Ministers (3 names), Bishops and Archdeacons (12 names), Peers (47 names), Members of Parliament (18 names), big newspaper owners, financiers and bankers, who are shareholders or directors in joint-stock companies dealing mainly in munitions.

The author of the article, Walton Newbold, collected all this information from official banking, commercial and industrial, financial and other sources, from the reports of patriotic organisations (like the *Navy League*), etc.

We get a picture quite similar to that once drawn from Russian data by Rubakin, who showed how many big landowners in Russia were members of the Council of State, high dignitaries—now we may add, members of the State Duma, shareholders or directors of joint-stock companies, etc. It is high time to bring Rubakin's facts up to date by using the latest reference books, particularly adding data on participation in financial, commercial and industrial undertakings.

Our liberals (especially the Cadets) have a strong aversion for the "theory" of the class struggle, and particularly insist

on their view that the governments of modern states can stand *outside* classes or *above* classes. But what can you do, gentlemen, if the "theory" which is so distasteful to you corresponds exactly to reality? If all the *fundamentals* of contemporary legislation and contemporary politics clearly show us the class character of the structure and administration of all contemporary states? If even information about the personalities of prominent politicians, members of parliament, high officials, etc., reveals the inseparable connection existing between economic rule and political rule?

The denial or concealment of the class struggle is the worst form of hypocrisy in politics; is banking on the ignorance and prejudices of the least developed strata of the people, the small proprietors (peasants, handicraftsmen, etc.), who are furthest removed from the most acute and direct struggle of classes, and cling as before, as of old, to their patriarchal views. But what is ignorance and backwardness in the peasant is a subtle method of corrupting the people and keeping them in slavery on the part of the liberal intellectuals.

Pravda No. 142, June 23, 1913
Signed: *M.*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THESES ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION[85]

1. The article of our programme (on the self-determination of nations) cannot be interpreted to mean anything but *political* self-determination, i.e., the right to secede and form a separate state.

2. This article in the Social-Democratic programme is *absolutely* essential to the Social-Democrats of Russia

a) for the sake of the basic principles of democracy in general;

b) also because there are, within the frontiers of Russia and, *what is more*, *in her frontier areas*, a number of nations with sharply distinctive economic, social and other conditions; furthermore, these nations (like all the nations of Russia except the Great Russians) are unbelievably oppressed by the tsarist monarchy;

c) lastly, also in view of the fact that throughout Eastern Europe (Austria and the Balkans) and in Asia—i.e., in countries bordering on Russia—the bourgeois-democratic reform of the state that has everywhere else in the world led, in varying degree, to the creation of independent national states or states with the closest, interrelated national composition, has either not been consummated or has only just begun;

d) at the present moment Russia is a country whose state system is more backward and reactionary than that of *any* of the contiguous countries, beginning—in the West—with Austria where the fundamentals of political liberty and a constitutional regime were consolidated in 1867, and where universal franchise has now been introduced, and ending—in the East—with republican China. In all their propaganda, therefore, the Social-Democrats of Russia must

insist on the right of all nationalities to form separate states or to choose freely the state of which they wish to form part.

3. The Social-Democratic Party's recognition of the right of all nationalities to self-determination requires of Social-Democrats that they should

a) be unconditionally hostile to the use of force in any form whatsoever by the dominant nation (or the nation which constitutes the majority of the population) in respect of a nation that wishes to secede politically;

b) demand the settlement of the question of such secession only on the basis of a universal, direct and equal vote of the population of the given territory by secret ballot;

c) conduct an implacable struggle against both the Black-Hundred-Octobrist and the liberal-bourgeois (Progressist, Cadet, etc.) parties on every occasion when they defend or sanction national oppression in general or the denial of the right of nations to self-determination in particular.

4. The Social-Democratic Party's recognition of the right of all nationalities to self-determination most certainly does not mean that Social-Democrats reject an independent appraisal of the advisability of the state secession of any nation in each separate case. Social-Democracy should, on the contrary, give its independent appraisal, taking into consideration the conditions of capitalist development and the oppression of the proletarians of various nations by the united bourgeoisie of all nationalities, as well as the general tasks of democracy, first of all and most of all the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.

From this point of view the following circumstance must be given special attention. There are two nations in Russia that are more civilised and more isolated by virtue of a number of historical and social conditions and that could most easily and most "naturally" put into effect their right to secession. They are the peoples of Finland and Poland. The experience of the Revolution of 1905 has shown that even in these two nations the ruling classes, the landowners and bourgeoisie, reject the revolutionary struggle for liberty and seek a *rapprochement* with the ruling classes of Russia and with the tsarist monarchy *because of their fear* of the revolutionary proletariat of Finland and Poland.

Social-Democracy, therefore, must give most emphatic warning to the proletariat and other working people of all nationalities against direct deception by the nationalistic slogans of "their own" bourgeoisie, who with their saccharine or fiery speeches about "our native land" try to *divide* the proletariat and *divert its attention* from their bourgeois intrigues while they enter into an economic and political alliance with the bourgeoisie of other nations and with the tsarist monarchy.

The proletariat cannot pursue its struggle for socialism and defend its everyday economic interests without the closest and fullest alliance of the workers of all nations in all working-class organisations without exception.

The proletariat cannot achieve freedom other than by revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy and its replacement by a democratic republic. The tsarist monarchy *precludes* liberty and equal rights for nationalities, and is, furthermore, the bulwark of barbarity, brutality and reaction in both Europe and Asia. This monarchy can be overthrown only by the united proletariat of all the nations of Russia, which is giving the lead to consistently democratic elements capable of revolutionary struggle from among the working masses of all nations.

It follows, therefore, that workers who place political unity with "their own" bourgeoisie above complete unity with the proletariat of all nations, are acting against their own interests, against the interests of socialism and against the interests of democracy.

5. Social-Democrats, in upholding a consistently democratic state system, demand unconditional equality for all nationalities and struggle against absolutely all privileges for one or several nationalities.

In particular, Social-Democrats reject a "state" language. It is particularly superfluous in Russia because more than seven-tenths of the population of Russia belong to related Slav nationalities who, given a free school and a free state, could easily achieve intercourse by virtue of the demands of the economic turnover without any "state" privileges for any one language.

Social-Democrats demand the abolition of the old administrative divisions of Russia established by the feudal

landowners and the civil servants of the autocratic feudal state and their replacement by divisions based on the requirements of present-day economic life and in accordance, as far as possible, with the national composition of the population.

All areas of the state that are distinguished by social peculiarities or by the national composition of the population, must enjoy wide self-government and autonomy, with institutions organised on the basis of universal, equal and secret voting.

6. Social-Democrats demand the promulgation of a law, operative throughout the state, protecting the rights of every national minority in no matter what part of the state. This law should declare inoperative any measure by means of which the national majority might attempt to establish privileges for itself or restrict the rights of a national minority (in the sphere of education, in the use of any specific language, in budget affairs, etc.), and forbid the implementation of any such measure by making it a punishable offence.

7. The Social-Democratic attitude to the slogan of "cultural-national" (or simply "national") "autonomy" or to plans for its implementation is a negative one, since this slogan (1) undoubtedly contradicts the internationalism of the class struggle of the proletariat, (2) makes it easier for the proletariat and the masses of working people to be drawn into the sphere of influence of bourgeois nationalism, and (3) is capable of distracting attention from the task of the consistent democratic transformation of the state as a whole, which transformation alone can ensure (to the extent that this can, in general, be ensured under capitalism) peace between nationalities.

In view of the special acuteness of the question of cultural-national autonomy among Social-Democrats, we give some explanation of the situation.

a) It is impermissible, from the standpoint of Social-Democracy, to issue the slogan of *national* culture either directly or indirectly. The slogan is incorrect because already under capitalism, all economic, political and spiritual life is becoming more and more international. Socialism will make it completely international. International culture,

which is now already being systematically created by the proletariat of all countries, does not absorb "national culture" (no matter of what national group) as a whole, but accepts from *each* national culture *exclusively* those of its elements that are consistently democratic and socialist.

b) Probably the one example of an approximation, even though it is a timid one, to the slogan of national culture in Social-Democratic programmes is Article 3 of the Brünn Programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats. This Article 3 reads: "All self-governing regions of one and the same nation form a single-national alliance that has complete autonomy in deciding its national affairs."

This is a compromise slogan since it does not contain a shadow of extra-territorial (personal) national autonomy. But this slogan, too, is erroneous and harmful, for it is no business of the Social-Democrats of Russia to unite into one nation the Germans in Lodz, Riga, St. Petersburg and Saratov. Our business is to struggle for full democracy and the annulment of *all* national privileges and to unite the German workers in Russia with the workers of all other nations in upholding and developing the international culture of socialism.

Still more erroneous is the slogan of extra-territorial (personal) national autonomy with the setting up (according to a plan drawn up by the consistent supporters of this slogan) of national parliaments and national state secretaries (Otto Bauer and Karl Renner). Such institutions contradict the economic conditions of the capitalist countries, they have not been tested in any of the world's democratic states and are the opportunist dream of people who despair of setting up consistent democratic institutions and are seeking salvation from the national squabbles of the bourgeoisie in the artificial isolation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of each nation on a number of ("cultural") questions.

Circumstances occasionally compel Social-Democrats to submit for a time to some sort of compromise decisions, but from other countries we must borrow not compromise decisions, but consistently Social-Democratic decisions. It would be particularly unwise to adopt the unhappy Austrian compromise decision today, when it has been a complete failure

in Austria and has led to the separatism and secession of the Czech Social-Democrats.

c) The history of the "cultural-national autonomy" slogan in Russia shows that it has been adopted by *all* Jewish bourgeois parties and *only* by Jewish bourgeois parties, and that they have been uncritically followed by the Bund, which has inconsistently rejected the national-Jewish parliament (sejm) and national-Jewish state secretaries. Incidentally, even those European Social-Democrats who accede to or defend the compromise slogan of cultural-national autonomy, admit that the slogan is quite unrealisable for the Jews (Otto Bauer and Karl Kautsky). "The Jews in Galicia and Russia are more of a caste than a nation, and attempts to constitute Jewry as a nation are attempts at preserving a caste" (Karl Kautsky).

d) In civilised countries we observe a fairly full (relatively) approximation to national peace under capitalism *only* in conditions of the *maximum* implementation of democracy throughout the state system and administration (Switzerland). The slogans of consistent democracy (the republic, a militia, civil servants elected by the people, etc.) unite the proletariat and the working people, and, in general, all progressive elements in each nation in the name of the struggle for conditions that preclude even the slightest national privilege—while the slogan of "cultural-national autonomy" preaches the isolation of nations in educational affairs (or "cultural" affairs, in general), an isolation that is quite compatible with the retention of the grounds for all (including national) privileges.

The slogans of consistent democracy *unite* in a single whole the proletariat and the advanced democrats of all nations (elements that demand not isolation but the uniting of democratic elements of the nations in all matters, including educational affairs), while the slogan of cultural-national autonomy *divides* the proletariat of the different nations and links it up with the reactionary and bourgeois elements of the separate nations.

The slogans of consistent democracy are implacably hostile to the reactionaries and to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie of all nations, while the slogan of cultural-national autonomy is quite acceptable to the reac-

tionaries and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie of some nations.

8. The sum-total of economic and political conditions in Russia therefore demands that Social-Democracy should *unite* unconditionally workers of all nationalities in *all* proletarian organisations without exception (political, trade union, co-operative, educational, etc., etc.). The Party should not be federative in structure and should not form national Social-Democratic groups but should unite the proletarians of all nations in the given locality, conduct propaganda and agitation in *all* the languages of the local proletariat, promote the common struggle of the workers of all nations against every kind of national privilege and should recognise the autonomy of local and regional Party organisations.

9. More than ten years' experience gained by the R.S.D.L.P. confirms the correctness of the above thesis. The Party was founded in 1898 as a party of all Russia, that is, a party of the proletariat of all the nationalities of Russia. The Party remained "Russian" when the Bund seceded in 1903, after the Party Congress had rejected the demand to consider the Bund the *only* representative of the Jewish proletariat. In 1906 and 1907 events showed convincingly that there were no grounds for this demand, a large number of Jewish proletarians continued to co-operate in the common Social-Democratic work in many local organisations, and the Bund re-entered the Party. The Stockholm Congress (1906) brought into the Party the Polish and Latvian Social-Democrats, who favoured *territorial* autonomy, and the Congress, furthermore, did *not* accept the principle of federation and demanded unity of Social-Democrats of all nationalities in each locality. This principle has been in operation in the Caucasus for many years, it is in operation in Warsaw (Polish workers and Russian soldiers), in Vilna (Polish, Lettish, Jewish and Lithuanian workers) and in Riga, and in the three last-named places it has been implemented *against* the separatist Bund. In December 1908, the-R.S.D.L.P., through its conference, adopted a special resolution confirming the demand for the *unity* of workers of all nationalities, *on a principle other than* federation. The splitting activities of the Bund separatists in not fulfill-

ing the Party decision led to the collapse of all that "federation of the worst type"[86] and brought about the *rapprochement* of the Bund and the Czech separatists and vice versa (see Kosovsky in *Nasha Zarya* and the organ of the Czech separatists, *Der čechoslavische Sozialdemokrat* No. 3, 1913, on Kosovsky), and, lastly, at the August (1912) Conference of the liquidators it led to an *undercover* attempt by the Bund separatists and liquidators and some of the Caucasian liquidators to insert "cultural-national autonomy" into the Party programme *without any defence of its substance*!

Revolutionary worker Social-Democrats in Poland, in the Latvian Area and in the Caucasus still stand for territorial autonomy and the *unity* of worker Social-Democrats of *all* nations. The Bund-liquidator secession and the alliance of the Bund with *non*-Social-Democrats in Warsaw place the *entire* national question, both in its theoretical aspect and in the matter of Party structure, *on the order of the day* for all Social-Democrats.

Compromise decisions have been broken by the very people who introduced them against the will of the Party, and the demand for the unity of worker Social-Democrats of all nationalities is being made more loudly than ever.

10. The crudely militant and Black-Hundred-type nationalism of the tsarist monarchy, and also the revival of *bourgeois* nationalism—Great-Russian (Mr. Struve, *Russkaya Molva*,[87] the Progressists, etc.), the Ukrainian, and Polish (the anti-Semitism of Narodowa "Demokracja"[88]), and Georgian and Armenian, etc.—all this makes it particularly urgent for Social-Democratic organisations in all parts of Russia to devote greater attention than before to the national question and to work out consistently Marxist decisions on this subject in the spirit of consistent internationalism and unity of proletarians of all nations.

α) The slogan of national culture is incorrect and expresses only the limited bourgeois understanding of the national question. International culture.

β) The perpetuating of national divisions and the promoting of refined nationalism—unification, *rapprochement*, the

mingling of nations and the expression of the principles of a *different*, international culture.

γ) The despair of the petty bourgeois (hopeless struggle against national bickering) and the fear of radical-democratic reforms and the socialist movement—only radical-democratic reforms can establish national peace in capitalist states and only socialism is able to terminate national bickering.

δ) National curias in educational affairs.[89]

ε) The Jews.

Written in June 1913

First published in 1925 in the *Lenin Miscellany III*

Published according to the manuscript

INSTRUCTIVE SPEECHES

Mr. Izgoyev, the well-known renegade, who was a Social-Democrat until 1905, but rapidly "grew wiser" ... until he reached a Right-liberal position after October 17, frequently turns his benevolent attention to Social-Democracy in *Russkaya Mysl*, the chief organ of "Octobrist" or counter-revolutionary liberalism.

We can only recommend workers who wish to gain a full understanding of the serious problems of working-class politics to read Mr. Izgoyev's article in the last issue of *Russkaya Mysl* for June of this year.

It is worth while thinking again and again over the exuberant praises of liquidationist *ideology* and *tactics* (i.e., the basic principles of liquidationism) that Mr. Izgoyev so generously dispenses. The liberals are bound to praise the principles and tactics of liberal working-class politicians!

It is worth while thinking again and again over the independent tactical considerations of Mr. Izgoyev, who sympathises whole-heartedly with the liquidators, and who has, after all, been through "the Marxist elementary school" and understands the necessity of seeking the serious roots of the serious struggle of Party members against the liquidators.

Unfortunately we must confine ourselves here to quoting very brief passages from Mr. Izgoyev's instructive article and to giving them the briefest and most incomplete explanation.

In Mr. Izgoyev's opinion, the success of Bolshevism depends on "what hopes there are for the peaceful development of Russia on constitutional lines, even if it is only of the German type. Was it not found possible in Germany to have a

monarchist constitution with civil liberties, without additional security measures and with a widely developed Social-Democratic workers' party? Is this possible in Russia or not? As the scales turn to one side or the other, so the chances of the liquidators and the Bolsheviks rise and fall....

"If no limit is set to the pressure of reaction, and if the constitutional forces in Russia do not prove sufficient for peaceful state reforms, Bolshevism will undoubtedly be victorious and will drive the liquidators into the background." Mr. Izgoyev himself considers the Bolsheviks to be anarchists and the liquidators "true Social-Democrats", who quite reasonably discarded the first two points of the Bolshevik platform and replaced them by freedom of association!

"The storm will pass," writes Mr. Izgoyev, "the time for positive work will come and the liquidators will again (!!?) stand at the head of the working class." Such are the dreams of Mr. Izgoyev. The tactics of the liquidators will, he says, be magnificent when "the storm passes".... And here are his "ideas on tactics":

> "If we think deeply over Bolshevik tactics we have to admit that they are based on the conviction that the struggle for the monarchist constitution in Russia ... [Mr. Izgoyev's dots] ended on June 3. The struggle may, perhaps, go on for direct or consistent democracy, but, given the cardinal Russian historical basis, there cannot be any other constitution than that of June 3. Russian constitutionalists can only count on a constitution without civil liberties, but containing exceptional conditions. We consider the Bolshevik point of view, although at the opposite pole, to be related to that of the Black Hundreds, and to be erroneous and politically harmful. It cannot be denied, however, that it has some content. The continuing inability of the Russian constitutionalists to give the country a guarantee of a system based on law may, in the future, even justify the pessimism of the Bolsheviks. But so far, as *Luch* correctly notes ... [of course!] ... it leads only to mingling with semi-anarchist elements..." (here Mr. Izgoyev, gasping with admiration for *Luch*, follows up with quotations from liquidationist articles).

Mr. Izgoyev calls pessimism *in respect of* the landowners and the bourgeoisie pessimism in general. Is not *such* pessimism inseparably connected with *optimism* in respect of, first and foremost, the proletariat, and secondly, of the petty-bourgeois working masses—this is something Mr. Izgoyev is afraid to consider. Of course, he has good reason to be afraid!

The strangest thing about the kisses this renegade bestows on the liquidators, the most instructive thing in the speeches of this liberal, is that while he sympathises whole-heartedly with the liquidators he *will not risk* denying *the content* of Bolshevik tactics! He, a supporter of "peaceful" development and liquidationist opportunism, is *quite unable* to promise that such a development will be victorious! He, a rabid enemy of Bolshevism, who showers invective upon us (anarchists, Blanquists, indulging in self-praise, etc., etc.), he, the bosom friend of the liquidators, *is compelled* to admit that Bolshevism will be victorious if "the constitutional forces in Russia do not prove sufficient" (i.e., if they prove to be just what they are today...)!

The very angry Mr. Izgoyev, who has a good knowledge of Social-Democratic affairs, is not very bright and did not notice that all these considerations* . . . . . removed the fig-leaf from Messrs. F. D., L. S., Yezhov, Larin, Martov, Potresov & Co.

Thank you, thank you very much, Mr. Izgoyev, you who are so angry with the Bolsheviks! The truth hurts. And you have *accidentally* hurt your liquidator friends with the truth. You have embraced them so "gently" that they are being strangled in your embrace.

Just a few words on a purely historical question. Why is it that the constitution which was "found possible" in Germany is more to the liking of counter-revolutionary liberalism than the French constitution? Only because, my angry but not very bright Mr. Izgoyev, that constitution turned out to be the *mathematical resultant* of the efforts of Bismarck and the liberals, who feared civil liberties for the workers, and of the efforts of the workers who were struggling for the *full* democratisation of Germany in the forties, in the fifties and in the sixties. The German workers proved weak *at that time*. Therefore Bismarck and the Prussian liberals were *one-half* victorious. If the German workers had been stronger, Bismarck would have been one-quarter victorious. If they had been still stronger, Bismarck would not have been victorious at all. Germany obtained civil liberties despite Bismarck, *despite* the Prussian liberals and

* The next page of the manuscript has not been found.—*Ed.*

only because of the persistent and stubborn efforts of the working class (partly, also, of the petty-bourgeois democrats, but only to a very small extent) to achieve the fullest possible democratisation.

Don't you understand anything, Mr. Izgoyev? Don't you understand that history justified "Bolshevik" tactics in Germany, too? Be less angry with the Bolsheviks, be less "kind" to the liquidators, and perhaps you will come to understand.

V. I.
(or unsigned)

P.S. If this is not suitable please pass it on to *Prosveshcheniye*. I think it would be better printed as a satirical piece in *Pravda*.

Written at the beginning of July 1913

First published in 1925 in the magazine *Krasnaya Nov* No. 1

Published according to the manuscript

PICTURES FROM LIFE

Any mention of serfdom in Russian life in general, and in the Russian countryside in particular, calls forth a protest from our liberals, especially from those liberals who love to picture themselves as almost Marxists. What sort of serfdom, they say, is there in twentieth-century Russia! It is simply nothing but "agitation"....

Nevertheless amazingly clear pictures of serfdom are to be met with in the contemporary Russian countryside at every step, and only the accursed inertness of the Russian man in the street, who has "got used to it", makes him pass these pictures by indifferently.

Here is one of them that we have borrowed from the official register of decisions passed by Chernigov Gubernia Zemstvo Assembly for the ten years 1900-09.

"Leaving intact *until the present time* the archaic method of maintaining rural roads by compulsory service is a dark stain on our Zemstvo..." writes Mr. Khizhnyakov on this subject (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*). "To say nothing of the great injustice of this being a service performed exclusively by the peasants ... the very way in which it is done is shameful. After the snow has melted and after torrential rains, the village elders, usually under a threatening order from the police sergeant, 'drive out the people', as we put it, to mend the road. The work is done without any sort of organisation, with no levelling or any technical instructions. I happened to see such work being done with unusual energy, to the accompaniment of menacing shouts from the police sergeants and *with blows of a whip to urge on the slower workers*. It was at the end of summer, just before the governor was due to pass that way.... About five hundred men and women with spades were driven out to work on a stretch of about three versts. On the orders of the police they dug ditches that were absolutely unnecessary and that later had to be filled in again.... And our Zemstvo, in the course of its almost fifty years' existence, has not only failed to remove this burden from the peasant population *but has even increased it*...."

That Zemstvo, like all Russian Zemstvos, is a landowners' Zemstvo.

And so the landowners are continuing to increase the old "service" performed by the peasants. When so instructed by the landowners, the police and the elders "drive out the people", compelling hundreds of peasants to leave the work on their farms and "dig absolutely unnecessary ditches", "without any sort of organisation" and "*with blows of a whip to urge on the slower workers*".

That is where the roots of the power of the Purishkeviches, Markovs & Co., lie. And how disgustingly hypocritical are our smooth, sedate, well-intentioned reformist liberal programmes when compared with such roots!

Pravda No. 149, July 2, 1913
Signed: *T—in*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

THE ADJOURNED DUMA AND THE EMBARRASSED LIBERALS

More than a week has passed since the Fourth Duma[90] adjourned, but reviews and appraisals of its work still continue to appear in the newspapers. Everybody admits that there is general dissatisfaction with the Fourth Duma. It is not only the liberals, not only the "responsible" (to the landowners) opposition that are dissatisfied. The Octobrists, too, are dissatisfied. And the Rights are dissatisfied.

Undoubtedly, this dissatisfaction with the reactionary Duma on the part of the reactionary landowners and the bourgeoisie is extremely typical and portentous. These classes have done everything possible to guarantee what they call "peaceful, constitutional" development.

They did everything—and now they have realised that nothing has come of it! Hence the general dissatisfaction in the camp of the landowners and the bourgeoisie themselves. Neither the Rights nor the Octobrists show that rapture and enthusiasm for the June Third system that was typical of the Third Duma epoch.

Our so-called "upper" classes, the social and political "summit" *cannot* rule Russia in the old way, despite the fact that all the fundamentals of the state system and of the government of Russia have been determined exclusively *by them* and arranged in *their* interests. But the "lower" classes are full of the desire to change this form of government.

The coincidence of this inability of the "upper" classes to administer the state in the old way, and this increased reluctance on the part of the "lower" classes to put up with such administration of the state, makes up precisely what

is called (admittedly somewhat inaccurately) a political crisis on a nation-wide scale.

The growth of this crisis before our eyes is a fact, and a fact that can scarcely be open to doubt.

It would seem that from this it should be clear to democrats and even to intelligent liberals that the centre of gravity of this desire for improvement is not in the Duma, and that the Duma is in this respect only an inaccurate indicator.

But our liberals have for a long time been letting themselves slide. "Both the Third and the Fourth Dumas are a parody of popular representation," said a Rech leading article, "*but they do* exist and *hic Rhodus*, *hic salta*" (a Latin expression that means literally "Here is Rhodes, here jump", i.e., here is the main thing, here is the essence, here prove what you've got to prove, here fight).

You are mistaken, gentlemen! *Rhodes* is *not* here and you will *not* "jump" from here since the beginning was *not* here.

Only the lackeys of the landowners and the money-bags could take the Fourth Duma as a *Rhodes* for democracy, could forget that in addition to the Duma there "*exists*", for example, a working-class movement of nation-wide significance, no matter how the liberals may keep quiet about that significance and no matter how the liberal working-class politicians, the liquidators, may try to curtail and belittle that significance.

> "Have we done everything in our power," asks *Rech*, "to bring influence to bear on the Duma to compel it to follow and fulfil our demands?"

That is not particularly literate but it is clear enough. "We"—refers to the landowners and the bourgeoisie. That is the *only* "society", the *only* "public" opinion, that *Rech* sees and only that society interests it.

Are the more reactionary landowners to be compelled "to fulfil the demands" of the liberal landowners and liberal bourgeoisie who do not themselves know what to "demand" or what they want—a change for the better or a weakening of the working-class movement with its nation-wide scope that is bringing about that change?

Poor liberals!

Pravda No. 151, July 5, 1913

Published according to the *Pravda* text

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AGAINST PROSTITUTION

The *fifth* international congress for the suppression of the white slave traffic recently ended in London.

Duchesses, countesses, bishops, priests, rabbis, police officials and all sorts of bourgeois philanthropists were well to the fore! How many festive luncheons and magnificent official receptions were given! And how many solemn speeches on the harm and infamy of prostitution!

What means of struggle were proposed by the elegant bourgeois delegates to the congress? Mainly two methods—religion and police. They are, it appears, the valid and reliable methods of combating prostitution. One English delegate boasted, according to the London correspondent of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*,[91] that he had introduced a bill into parliament providing for *corporal punishment* for pimps. See the sort he is, this modern "civilised" hero of the struggle against prostitution!

One lady from Canada waxed enthusiastic over the police and the supervision of "fallen" women by policewomen, but as far as raising wages was concerned, she said that women workers did not deserve better pay.

One German pastor reviled present-day materialism, which, he said, is taking hold among the people and promoting the spread of free love.

When the Austrian delegate Gärtner tried to raise the question of the social causes of prostitution, of the need and poverty experienced by working-class families, of the exploitation of child labour, of unbearable housing conditions, etc., he was forced to silence by hostile shouts!

But the things that were said about highly-placed personages—among groups of delegates—were instructive and sublime. When, for example, the German Empress visits a maternity hospital in Berlin, *rings are placed on the fingers* of mothers of "illegitimate" children in order that this august individual may not be shocked by the sight of unmarried mothers!

We may judge from this the disgusting bourgeois hypocrisy that reigns at these aristocratic-bourgeois congresses. Acrobats in the field of philanthropy and police defenders of this system which makes mockery of poverty and need gather "to struggle against prostitution", which is supported precisely by the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie....

Rabochaya Pravda No. 1,
July 13, 1913
Signed: *W.*

Published according to
the *Rabochaya Pravda* text

WORD AND DEED

We are constantly making the mistake in Russia of judging the slogans and tactics of a certain party or group, of judging its general trend, by the intentions or motives that the group claims for itself. Such judgement is worthless. The road to hell—as was said long ago—is paved with good intentions.

It is not a matter of intentions, motives or words but of the objective situation, independent of them, that determines the fate and significance of slogans, of tactics or, in general, of the trend of a given party or group.

Let us approach the analysis of the most important questions of the contemporary working-class movement from that point of view. The strike in St. Petersburg on July 1-3 involved over 62,000 workers even according to the estimates of the bourgeois papers *Rech* and *Russkoye Slovo*, which always give reduced figures in these cases.

We are, therefore, faced with the fact that a mass, over 60,000 strong, went into action. As we know, the direct reason for the strike was to protest against the persecution of the working-class press, the daily confiscation of newspapers, etc., etc. We also know from reports even in such newspapers as *Novoye Vremya*, *Rech*, *Sovremenka*[92] and *Russkoye Slovo* that workers stressed, in their speeches and in other ways, the nation-wide significance of the protest.

How did the various classes of Russian society react to the event? What position did they adopt?

We know that *Rossiya*,[93] *Zemshchina* and similar papers printed the usual sharply condemnatory statements—often accompanied by the crudest invective, threats, etc. There is nothing new in that. It is understandable. It is inevitable.

РАБОЧАЯ ПРАВДА

ГАЗЕТА

СЕГОДНЯ ВЪ НОМЕРѢ:

СТАТЬИ:

СТАТЬИ:

СТРАХОВАНІЕ:

ПО РОССІИ:

ЗА РУБЕЖОМЪ:

ВЪ СПБ.

№ 3. Вторникъ, 16 іюля 1913 г.

ОТКРЫТА ПОДПИСКА НА ГАЗЕТУ „РАБОЧАЯ ПРАВДА"

Рига.

Слова и дѣла.

Издательство „ПРИБОЙ".

ПЕЧАТАЮТСЯ

Къ клеветѣ на Озола.

First page of the newspaper *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 3, July 16, 1913, which contained Lenin's articles "Word and Deed", "Cadets on the Question of the Ukraine", "Fresh Data on German Political Parties" and Exposure of the British Opportunists"

Reduced

First page of the newspaper Rabochaya Pravda No. 3, July 16, 1913, which contained Lenin's articles "Word and Deed", "Cadets on the Question of the Ukraine", "Fresh Data on German Political Parties" and Exposure of the British Opportunists"

Reduced

Much "newer" is the amazing indifference of the bourgeoisie, as reflected in the indifference of the liberal newspapers; furthermore, in many cases this indifference changes to a negative attitude, whereas working-class actions that were less important, numerically less significant (17 or 18 years ago), met with the obvious sympathy of liberal-bourgeois society. Here we undoubtedly have a decisive liberal turn to the right, away from democracy and against democracy.

With reference to the events of July 1-3 in St. Petersburg, one of the most widely circulated, if not the most widely circulated, newspapers in Russia (the liberal *Russkoye Slovo*) said:

> "It is interesting to note the attitude to this strike on the part of the Social-Democratic newspapers published in St. Petersburg. The Social-Democratic *Pravda* devotes considerable space to yesterday's [written on July 3] strike, but the organ of the so-called liquidators' group, the newspaper *Luch*, confines itself to a small note on the strike and devotes a leading article to political strikes [*Luch*, July 2], in which the newspaper protests against such actions by the workers." (*Russkoye Slovo*, July 3, 1913.)

Such are the facts. Hostility on the part of the reactionaries. Indifference and denial by the liberals and liquidators. Unity of liberalism and liquidationism in deed. Unity of mass working-class action, possible only in the struggle against the liquidators.

The proletariat cannot do its democratic duty, serve as the advanced contingent, give service to, educate and consolidate the masses of the people other than by a decisive struggle against the liquidators, who, in fact, are completely dependent on liberalism.

The liberals, too, frequently play at being radicals from the Duma rostrum and do it as well as the various near-Marxist or wavering elements, but that does not prevent the liberals from fighting (with the aid of the liquidators) the democratic aspirations of the masses outside the Duma.

Rabochaya Pravda No. 3,
July 16, 1913

Published according to
the *Rabochaya Pravda* text

CADETS ON THE QUESTION OF THE UKRAINE

For a long time mention has been made in the press and from the Duma rostrum (in the speech of the Social-Democrat Petrovsky, for instance[94]) of the absolute indecency, the reactionary character and the impudence of statements made by certain influential Cadets (headed by Mr. Struve) on the Ukrainian question.

A few days ago we came across an article in *Rech*, the official organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, written by one of its regular contributors, Mr. Mikhail Mogilyansky, an article that *must not* be ignored.

This article is real chauvinist badgering of the Ukrainians for "separatism". "Reckless adventurism", "political delirium", "a political adventure"—are some of the expressions which fill the article of Mr. Mikhail Mogilyansky, a *Novoye Vremya adherent* of the purest water who hides under a mantle of "democracy"! Yet the Constitutional-"Democratic" Party shamelessly provides cover for this article, publishes it with sympathy and by its silence approves such naked chauvinism.

Mr. Mikhail Mogilyansky himself points out that at the All-Ukraine Student Congress in Lvov some Ukrainian Social-Democrats, Ukrainian émigrés from Russia, also spoke against the slogan of political independence for the Ukraine; they spoke against the Social-Democrat Dontsov, who proposed the resolution on "an independent Ukraine" that was adopted at the congress by a majority of all present against two.

It follows, therefore, that there is no question of all Social-Democrats agreeing with Dontsov. But the Social-Democrats disputed the matter with Dontsov, put forward their

own arguments, discussed the matter from the same platform and attempted to convince the same audience.

Mr. Mikhail Mogilyansky lost all sense of elementary-political decency when he hurled his coarse invective drawn from the lexicon of the Black Hundreds against Dontsov and against the entire congress of Ukrainian students, knowing full well that it was impossible for his opponents to refute the views of *Rech*, that it was impossible for them to speak to the Russian audience from the same platform and just as resolutely, openly and freely.

They are pitiful democrats, our Cadets! And those who tolerate, without a violent protest, such sallies by the Cadets are pitiful democrats, too. Marxists will never allow their heads to be turned by nationalist slogans whether they are Great-Russian, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian or any other. Nor do Marxists ever forget the elementary duty of any democrat to struggle against any persecution of any nation for "separatism", the duty to fight for the recognition of the full and unqualified equality of nations, and their right to self-determination.

Views may differ on what this self-determination should be, from the point of view of the proletariat, in each individual case. One can and must dispute with social-nationalists of the Dontsov type, but base persecution for "separatism", the persecution of people who are unable to defend themselves, is the very limit of shamelessness on the part of our Cadets.

Rabochaya Pravda No. 3,
July 16, 1913
Signed: *M.*

Published according to
the *Rabochaya Pravda* text

FRESH DATA ON GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The German statistical office has published some interesting data on the 1912 parliamentary (Reichstag) elections. It is particularly instructive to compare the strength of the various parties in the *towns* and *villages*.

German statistics, like those of most European states, regard all inhabited centres having less than 2,000 inhabitants as villages, unlike Russia which still retains the senseless, arbitrary distinction made by officials and policemen, by which certain inhabited centres are "called" towns irrespective of the number of inhabitants.

German statistics regard inhabited centres with a population of between 2,000 and 10,000 as small towns and those with 10,000 or more inhabitants as big towns.

There proves to be a strikingly regular correlation between the *progressive nature* of a party ("progressive" in the broadest economic and political sense) and the *increase* in the strength of that party in the *towns* and bigger inhabited centres in general.

Four groups of political parties in Germany stand out clearly in this respect:

1) Social-Democrats—the only completely progressive and, in the best sense of the word, "popular" mass party of wage-workers;

2) Progressive People's Party—a petty-bourgeois democratic party, something like our Trudoviks[95] (only under conditions of a fully bourgeois and not a feudal society);

3) National Liberals—the party of the big bourgeoisie, the German Octobrist-Cadet party;

4) all conservative parties, Black-Hundred landowners, clericals, reactionary urban petty bourgeois and peasants

(anti-Semites, "the Centre", i.e., Catholics, conservatives proper, Poles, and so on).

Share of the Votes (% %) Obtained by Parties

	Social-Democrats	Progressists	National Liberals	All conservative parties	Fragmentary and undefined	Total
In villages	19.0	8.8	12.8	58.6	0.8	100.0
In small towns	35.8	12.1	15.0	36.4	0.7	100.0
In big towns	49.3	15.6	13.8	20.0	1.3	100.0
All Germany	34.8	12.3	13.6	38.3	1.0	100.0

Universal franchise exists in Germany. The above table shows clearly that the German village, the German peasantry (like those of *all* European, constitutional, civilised countries) are still, to the present day, *almost completely* enslaved by the landowners and priests, spiritually and politically.

In the German villages almost three-fifths (58.6%) of the votes go to the conservative, i.e., landowner and priest, parties! Everywhere in Europe the peasant was revolutionary when he fought against the feudals, the serf-owners and landowners. Once the peasant had obtained his freedom and a little piece of land he, as a general rule, *made his peace* with the landowners and priests and became a reactionary.

The development of capitalism, however, begins in its turn to pull the peasant out of the embraces of reaction and leads him to the Social-Democrats. In 1912, the German Social-Democrats had *already* obtained *almost one-fifth* (19%) of all rural votes.

The political picture in the German countryside today is, therefore, the following. *One-fifth* for the Social-Democrats, *one-fifth* for the more or less "liberal" bourgeoisie and *three-fifths* for the landowners and priests. There is still quite a lot to be done for the political education of the countryside. By ruining the small peasant and putting the screw on him, capitalism, one might say, is knocking reactionary prejudices out of his head by force.

There is already a different picture in the small towns; the Social-Democrats have overtaken the liberal bourgeoisie (35.8% of the votes as compared with 27%) but have not quite caught up with the conservatives, who obtained 36.4% of the votes. The small towns are the stronghold of the urban petty bourgeoisie engaged mainly in commerce and manufacturing. The petty bourgeoisie waver most of all and do not give a stable majority either to the conservatives, or to the socialists or to the liberal bourgeoisie.

In the big towns there has been a Social-Democratic victory. The Social-Democrats have a following of *half* the population (49.3% of the votes), as many as the conservatives and liberals combined (15.6+13.8+20=49.4%). The conservatives here are supported by only *one-fifth* of the population, the liberal bourgeoisie by *three-tenths* and the Social-Democrats by *a half*. If we were to take the biggest towns there would be an incomparably wider predominance of Social-Democracy.

We know that towns in all modern states and even in Russia grow more rapidly than villages, that the towns are centres of the economic, political and spiritual life of the people and are the chief vehicles of progress. The predominance of Social-Democracy in the towns gives a clear demonstration of its significance as the party of the advanced masses.

Of Germany's population of 65,000,000 only 25,900,000 people were living in rural areas in 1912; 12,300,000 were living in small towns and 26,800,000 in the bigger towns. In recent decades, since Germany became a completely capitalist state, relatively free and possessing a stable constitution and universal franchise, the urban population has grown more rapidly than that of the countryside. In 1882, only 18,900,000 of the 45,000,000 population lived in towns, i.e., 41.8%; in 1895 the total population was 52,000,000, the urban population 26,000,000, i.e., 49.8%; in 1907 out of the 62,000,000 population, 36,000,000 lived in towns, i.e., 58.1%. The population of the biggest towns, those with 100,000 or more inhabitants, was in the same years 3,000,000 7,000,000 and 12,000,000 respectively, i.e., 7.4%, 13.6% and 19.1% of the total population. In the course of twenty-five years the entire population has increased by 36.5%, the

urban population by 89.6% and the population of the biggest towns by 254.4%.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the purely bourgeois parties in present-day bourgeois Germany are supported by a *minority* of the population. In 1912, the Social-Democrats obtained in the whole of Germany *more than one-third* of the total number of votes cast (34.8%), the conservatives (mainly the landowners and priests) somewhat less than *two-fifths* (38.3%), and all the liberal-bourgeois parties *only one-quarter* of the votes cast (25.9%).

How is this to be explained? Why is it that in bourgeois Germany, in a country in which capitalism is developing with particular rapidity, more than sixty years after the revolution (the bourgeois revolution of 1848), landowners' and clerical parties and not purely bourgeois political parties predominate?

The key to the explanation of this phenomenon was provided by Karl Marx as far back as 1848—the German bourgeoisie, frightened of the independence of the proletariat and seeing that the workers were using democratic institutions *for themselves* and against the capitalists, turned its back on democracy, shamefully betrayed the liberty that it had previously defended and began to fawn upon the landowners and clericals.[96] We know that since 1905 the Russian bourgeoisie has been developing these slavish political inclinations and these slavish political ideas more zealously than the German bourgeoisie.

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EXPOSURE OF THE BRITISH OPPORTUNISTS

A Parliamentary by-election recently took place in Leicester, England.

This election is of enormous importance in principle, and every socialist interested in the very important question of the attitude of the proletariat towards the liberal bourgeoisie in general, and the British socialist movement in particular, should ponder deeply over the Leicester election.

Leicester is a *two*-member constituency and each elector has *two* votes. There are only a few constituencies of this kind in Britain, but they particularly favour a tacit bloc between the Socialists and the Liberals, as is emphasised by the correspondent in Britain of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. It was precisely in such constituencies that the most prominent of the leaders of the so-called Independent (independent of socialism, but dependent on liberalism) Labour Party were elected to Parliament. The I.L.P. leaders, Keir Hardie, Philip Snowdell and Ramsay MacDonald, were returned by such constituencies.

And in these constituencies the Liberals, who are in the ascendancy, call on their supporters to cast one vote for the Socialist and one for the Liberal, provided, of course, that the Socialist is a "reasonable", moderate, "independent" one and not an irreconcilable Social-Democrat, whom the British Liberals and liquidators, no less than the Russian, know how to curse as an anarcho-syndicalist, etc.!

What actually takes place, therefore, is the formation of a bloc between the Liberals and the moderate, opportunist Socialists. Actually, the British "independents" (for whom our liquidators express such tender feelings) *depend* on the

Liberals. The conduct of the "independents" in the British Parliament constantly confirms this dependence.

It happened that the I.L.P. member for Leicester, none other than the party leader, MacDonald, resigned for personal reasons.

What was to be done?

The Liberals, of course, put forward their candidate.

Leicester is a factory town with a predominantly proletarian population.

The local I.L.P. organisation called a conference which by 67 votes against 8 decided *to put forward a candidate*. No sooner said than done. Banton, a Town Councillor and prominent member of the I.L.P., was nominated.

Then the Executive Committee of this Party, which assigns the money for the election campaign (and elections in Britain are very costly!), *refused* to endorse Banton's candidature!

The opportunist Executive Committee opposed the local workers.

The Leicester branch of the other British socialist party, which is not opportunist and is *really* independent of the Liberals, then sent its representative to the Leicester I.L.P. and invited them to support *its* candidate, Hartley, a member of the British Socialist Party, a very popular figure in the labour movement, an ex-member of the Independent Labour Party, who left it because of its opportunism.

The members of the Leicester branch of the I.L.P. were in an awkward position: they were heart and soul in favour of Hartley, but ... but what of the discipline in their party, the decision of their Executive Committee? The Leicester people found a way out: they closed the meeting, and *each in his private capacity* declared for Hartley. Next day a huge meeting of workers endorsed Hartley's candidature. Banton himself sent a telegram stating that he would vote for Hartley. The Leicester trade unions declared for Hartley.

The I.L.P. Parliamentary group intervened and published *a protest* in the *Liberal* press (which, like our *Rech* and *Sovremenka*, helps the opportunists) against Hartley's candidature, against "undermining" MacDonald!

The election, of course, resulted in a victory for the Liberals. They obtained 10,863 votes, the Conservatives 9,279, and Hartley 2,580.

Class-conscious workers in various countries quite often adopt a "tolerant" attitude toward the British I.L.P. This is a great mistake. The betrayal of the workers' cause in Leicester by the I.L.P. is no accident, but the result of the entire opportunist policy of the Independent Labour Party. The sympathies of all real Social-Democrats should be with those British Social-Democrats who are determinedly combating the Liberal corruption of the workers by the "Independent" Labour Party in Britain.

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THE IDEAS OF AN ADVANCED CAPITALIST

One of the richest and most eminent American merchants, a certain Edward Albert *Filene*, Vice-Chairman of the International Congress of Chambers of Commerce, is now touring Paris, Berlin and other big European centres to make personal contact with the most influential people of the Commercial world.

At the banquets arranged, as is fitting, by the richest people of Europe in honour of one of the American rich, the latter is developing his "new" ideas on the *world power* of the merchant. *Frankfurter Zeitung*,[97] the organ of German finance capital, reports in detail the ideas of this "advanced" American millionaire.

"We are experiencing a great historic movement," he proclaims, "that will end in the transfer of all power over the modern world to representatives of commercial capital. We are the people who bear the greatest responsibility in the world and we should, therefore, be politically the most influential.

"Democracy is growing, the power of the masses is growing," argued Mr. Filene (rather inclined, it seems, to regard those "masses" as simpletons). "The cost of living is rising. Parliamentarism and the newspapers, distributed in millions of copies a day, are providing the masses of the people with ever more detailed information.

"The masses are striving to ensure for themselves participation in political life, the extension of franchise, the introduction of an income-tax, etc. Power over the whole world must pass into the hands of the masses, that is, *into the hands of our employees*," is the conclusion drawn by this worthy orator.

"The natural leaders of the masses should be the *industrialists and merchants*, who are learning more and more to understand the community of their interests and those of the masses." (We note in parenthesis that the cunning Mr. Filene is the owner of a gigantic commercial house employing 2,500 people, and that he has "organised" his employees in a "democratic" organisation with profit-sharing, etc. Since he considers his employees hopeless simpletons, Mr. Filene is sure that they are completely satisfied and infinitely grateful to their "father-benefactor" ....)

"Wage increases, the improvement of labour conditions, that is what will bind our employees to us," said Mr. Filene, "that is what will guarantee our power over the whole world. Everybody in the world who is at all talented will come to us to enter our service.

"We need organisation and still more organisation—strong, democratic organisation, both national and international," the American exclaimed. He called upon the commercial world of Paris, Berlin, etc., to reorganise *international chambers of commerce*. They should unite the merchants and industrialists *of all* civilised countries in a single, mighty organisation. All important international problems should be discussed and settled by that organisation.

Such are the ideas of an "advanced" capitalist, Mr. Filene.

The reader will see that these ideas are a paltry, narrow, one-sided, selfishly barren *approximation* to the ideas of Marxism propounded over sixty years ago. "We" are great masters at upsetting and refuting Marx; "we", the civilised merchants and professors of political economy, have refuted him completely!... And at the same time we steal little bits and pieces from him and boast to the whole world of our "progressiveness"....

My worthy Mr. Filene! Do you really believe that the workers of the whole world are actually such simpletons?

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WHAT CAN BE DONE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION

There are quite a number of rotten prejudices current in the Western countries of which Holy Mother Russia is free. They assume there, for instance, that huge public libraries containing hundreds of thousands and millions of volumes, should certainly not be reserved only for the handful of scholars or would-be scholars that uses them. Over there they have set themselves the strange, incomprehensible and barbaric aim of making these gigantic, boundless libraries available, not to a guild of scholars, professors and other such specialists, but to the masses, to the crowd, to the mob!

What a desecration of the libraries! What an absence of the "law and order" we are so justly proud of. Instead of *regulations*, discussed and elaborated by a dozen committees of civil servants inventing hundreds of formalities and obstacles to the use of books, they see to it that even *children* can make use of the rich collections; that readers can read publicly-owned books at home; they regard as the pride and glory of a public library, not the number of rarities it contains, the number of sixteenth-century editions or tenth-century manuscripts, but *the extent* to which books are distributed *among the people*, the number of new readers enrolled, the speed with which the demand for any book is met, the number of books issued to be read at home, the number of children attracted to reading and to the use of the library.... These queer prejudices are widespread in the Western states, and we must be glad that those who keep watch and ward over us protect us with care and circumspection from the influence of these prejudices, protect our rich public libraries from the mob, from the *hoi polloi*!

I have before me the report of the New York Public Library for 1911.

That year the Public Library in New York was moved from two old buildings to new premises erected by the city. The total number of books is now about two million. It so happened that the first book asked for when the reading-room opened its doors was in Russian. It was a work by N. Grot, *The Moral Ideals of Our Times*. The request for the book was handed in at eight minutes past nine in the morning. The book was delivered to the reader at nine fifteen.

In the course of the year the library was visited by 1,658,316 people. There were 246,950 readers using the reading-room and they took out 911,891 books.

This, however, is only a small part of the *book circulation* effected by the library. Only a few people can visit the library. The rational organisation of educational work is measured by the number of books issued to be read at home, by the conveniences available to *the majority of the population*.

In three boroughs of New York—Manhatten, Bronx and Richmond—the New York Public Library has *forty-two* branches and will soon have a forty-third (the total population of the three boroughs is almost *three* million). The aim that is constantly pursued is to have a branch of the Public Library within *three-quarters of a verst*, i.e., within ten minutes' walk of the house of every inhabitant, the branch library being *the centre* of all kinds of institutions and establishments for public education.

Almost *eight million* (7,914,882 volumes) were issued to readers at home, 400,000 more than in 1910. To each hundred members of the population of all ages and both sexes, 267 books were issued for reading at home in the course of the year.

Each of the forty-two branch libraries not only provides for the use of reference books in the building and the issue of books to be read at home, it is also a place for evening lectures, for public meetings and for rational entertainment.

The New York Public Library contains about 15,000 books in oriental languages, about 20,000 in Yiddish and

about 16,000 in the Slav languages. In the main reading-room there are about 20,000 books standing on *open* shelves for general use.

The New York Public Library has opened a special, central, reading-room for children, and similar institutions are gradually being opened at all branches. The librarians do everything for the children's convenience and answer their questions. The number of books children took out to read at home was 2,859,888, slightly under three million (more than a third of the total). The number of children visiting the reading-room was 1,120,915.

As far as losses are concerned—the New York Public Library assesses the number of books lost at 70-80-90 per 100,000 issued to be read at home.

Such is the way things are done in New York. And in Russia?

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PETTY PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE

The peasant question in modern capitalist states most frequently gives rise to perplexity and vacillation among Marxists and to most of the attacks on Marxism by bourgeois (professorial) political economy.

Petty production in agriculture is doomed to extinction and to an incredibly abased and downtrodden position under capitalism, say the Marxists. Petty production is dependent on big capital, is backward in comparison with large-scale production in agriculture, and can only keep going by means of desperately reduced consumption and laborious, arduous toil. The frittering away and waste of human labour, the worst forms of dependence of the producer, exhaustion of the peasant's family, his cattle and his land—this is what capitalism everywhere brings the peasant.

There is *no* salvation for the peasant except by joining in the activities of the proletariat, primarily those of the wage-workers.

Bourgeois political economy, and the Narodniks and opportunists who champion it (though they may not always be conscious of the fact), on the contrary, try to prove that petty production is viable and is more profitable than large-scale production. The peasant, who has a firm and assured position in capitalist society, must gravitate, not towards the proletariat, but towards the bourgeoisie; he must not gravitate towards the class struggle of the wage-workers but must try to strengthen his position as a proprietor and master—such, in substance, is the theory of the bourgeois economists.

We will try to test the soundness of the proletarian and bourgeois theories by means of precise data. Let us take the data on *female* labour in agriculture in Austria and Germany. Full data for Russia are still lacking because the

government is unwilling to take a scientifically-based census of all agricultural enterprises.

In Austria, according to the census of 1902, out of 9,070,682 persons employed in agriculture 4,422,981, or 48.7 per cent, were women. In Germany, where capitalism is far more developed, women constitute the *majority* of those employed in agriculture—54.8 per cent. The more capitalism develops in agriculture the more it employs female labour, that is to say, *worsens* the living conditions of the working masses. Women employed in German industry make up 25 per cent of the total labour force, but in agriculture they constitute more than 50 per cent. This shows that industry is absorbing the *best* labour and leaving the weaker to agriculture.

In developed capitalist countries agriculture has already become mainly a women's occupation.

But if we examine statistics on farms of various sizes we shall see that it is in *petty* production that the exploitation of female labour assumes particularly large proportions. On the other hand, even in agriculture, large-scale capitalist production employs mainly male labour, although in this respect it has not caught up with industry.

The following are the comparative figures for Austria and Germany:

Type of farm	Group according to size of farm	Per cent of women employed	
		Austria	Germany
Proletarian	Up to half a hectare*	52.0	74.1
	½ to 2 hectares	50.9	65.7
Peasant	2 to 5 ”	49.6	54.4
	5 to 10 ”	48.5	50.2
	10 to 20 ”	48.6	48.4
Capitalist	20 to 100 ”	46.6	44.8
	100 hectares and over	27.4	41.0
For all farms		48.7	54.8

In both countries we see the operation of the same law of capitalist agriculture. The smaller the scale of production the *poorer* is the composition of the labour force, and the greater the number of women among the total number of persons employed in agriculture.

* One hectare = 0.9 of a dessiatine.—*Ed.*

The general situation under capitalism is the following. On proletarian farms, i.e., those whose "proprietors" live mainly by means of wage-labour (agricultural labourers, day-labourers, and wage-workers in general who possess a tiny plot of land), *female labour predominates over male labour*, sometimes to an enormous extent.

It must not be forgotten that the number of these proletarian or labourer farms is enormous: in Austria they amount to 1,300,000 out of a total of 2,800,000 farms, and in Germany there are even 3,400,000 out of a total of 5,700,000.

On peasant farms male and female labour is employed in nearly equal proportions.

Finally, on capitalist farms, male labour *predominates over female labour*.

What does this signify?

It signifies that the composition of the labour force in petty production is inferior to that in large-scale capitalist production.

It signifies that in agriculture the working woman—the proletarian woman and peasant woman—must exert herself ever so much more, must strain herself to the utmost, must toil at her work to the detriment of her health and the health of her children, in order to keep up as far as possible with the male worker in large-scale capitalist production.

It signifies that petty production keeps going under capitalism only by *squeezing out* of the worker a *larger* amount of work than is squeezed out of the worker in large-scale production.

The peasant is more tied up, more entangled in the complicated net of capitalist dependence than the wage-worker. He thinks he is independent, that he can "make good"; but as a matter of fact, in order to keep going, he must work (for capital) harder than the wage-worker.

The figures on *child* labour in agriculture prove this still more clearly.*

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* See pp. 209-12 of this volume.—*Ed.*

A "FASHIONABLE" BRANCH OF INDUSTRY

Capitalist production develops spasmodically, in fits and starts. At times there is "brilliant" prosperity in industry and then comes collapse, crisis and unemployment. It cannot be otherwise under a system of economy in which individual, isolated proprietors, independent of each other, "work" for an unknown market and have the joint labour of thousands and thousands of workers in big enterprises at their disposal as private property.

An example of a "fashionable" industry that is now developing with particular rapidity and rushing full steam ahead toward a crash is the automobile industry. In Germany, for instance, the number of motor vehicles of all kinds, including motor cycles, was 27,000 in 1907 and 70,000 in 1912.

In France and Britain motor vehicles are still more widespread. Here are the figures for comparison: Germany, 70,000, France, 88,000 and Britain, 175,000.

In proportion to the population, therefore, Germany has *only one-quarter* the number of motor vehicles that Britain has, while Russia is lagging behind to an immeasurably greater extent.

Under the capitalist organisation of economy, motor-cars are available only to an extremely narrow circle of rich people. Industry *could* produce hundreds of thousands of motor vehicles but the poverty of the *masses* hampers development and brings about crashes after a few years of "brilliant" growth.

In passing. Motor vehicles, provided they were in the service of the majority of the population, would be of great significance because an association of united workers could use them instead of a large number of draught animals in

farming and in carting. Such a replacement would enable *millions of dessiatines* now used to produce fodder for horses to be used to produce grain, meat and milk and improve the population's food supply.

Bourgeois economists are only trying to frighten people when they say that agriculture cannot produce sufficient grain!

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DEAD LIQUIDATIONISM AND THE LIVING *RECH*

The first issue of the liquidators' newspaper *Zhivaya Zhizn** carried an article by L. M.[98] entitled "On an Old Theme". We will leave until another occasion the little tricks the enthusiastic author got up to in his haste to "grab by the coat-tails" the Kautsky who argued with Rosa Luxemburg. L. M. copies the worn-out method of the liberals —that of exaggerating *this sort of* dispute and depicting it as important in principle by maintaining a *complete silence* on the position of the German opportunists (reformists)!

Mr. L. M. likes holding Kautsky by the coat-tails, but when speaking of "German Social-Democratic literature" he prefers not to mention—out of modesty, no doubt—the extensive and, indeed, fundamentally important literature put out by reformists related in type to L. M. and *Zhivaya Zhizn*.

I repeat, this will be dealt with another time.

L. M. drags the Germans into Russian affairs by the hair, as the saying goes. The first issue of Zhivaya Zhizn informs us of these affairs through the lips of L. M.:

> ...without a struggle for freedom of association "Russian workers cannot get out of the intolerable situation that dooms them to run like squirrels in a cage, to spend tremendous effort in periodical mass actions of one and the same kind that are rewarded neither by organisational growth nor a strengthening of the political positions gained". The efforts of the advanced proletarians (writes L. M., outlining the *ideas* of advanced *liberals*) should be directed toward "making the working class capable of giving battle and winning victories, not only in one-day strikes but also in all other possible fields".

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* Literally, "Living Life".—*Ed*.

These words contain the essence of the "theory" of the liquidators of the working-class party. "running like a squirrel in a cage"—those words will become famous. They should be repeated in every issue of *Zhivaya Zhizn*, they should become the motto of its whole trend. This is the "slogan" of the liquidators!

In his wisdom, L. M. probably regards making petitions as "other fields" and not "running like a squirrel in a cage"? Then say so straight out, don't be ashamed, gentlemen!

And here you have the real *live* newspaper *Rech*—live because it advocates not the dead doctrine of the liquidators but living class interests (the interests of the bourgeoisie, of course, and not the proletariat). Compare the passages from *Zhivaya Zhizn* of July 11 quoted above with the leading article in *Rech* of July 6.

The *Rech* leading article declares that the working-class movement in 1905 was "national, but in 1913 is a class movement" and with ecstatic enthusiasm repeats the attacks made by the liquidators on the "strike craze", repeats the statement made by the liquidators that "the workers can and must struggle for freedom of speech, assembly and association by other more complicated [really?] political means and not by strikes alone".

It stands to reason that the liberals, like L. M., maintain a modest silence on precisely what "complicated" means they have in mind. The liberals, on the other hand, say straight out that with the introduction of freedom of association and so on, it will be possible, they are convinced, "to conduct *a serious struggle* against the chaotic, casual strikes that disorganise industry" (the same *Rech* leading article).

We shall permit ourselves only one remark—everybody has now recognised the fact of a new wave of strikes, even purely economic strikes. There is nothing more ridiculous and pitiful than to speak of them as "casual".

The class position of the liberals is clear. Any worker will immediately understand their position, will immediately discern the interests of the bourgeoisie in the vague phrases about "complicated" methods. The living *Rech* expresses the interests of the bourgeoisie. Dead liquidationism in *Zhivaya Zhizn* is helplessly limping along behind the

liberals and is unable to say anything clear and straightforward about "other fields" and can only get angry and churn out abuse of the "running like squirrels in a cage" variety....

A noteworthy and at the same time shameful slogan that the liquidators have descended to!

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MOBILISATION OF ALLOTMENT LANDS

A few days ago the official newspaper *Rossiya* published the results of an investigation carried out by the Ministry of the Interior in the summer of 1912 on the question of the mobilisation of allotment lands, that is, their sale and purchase, their transfer from one owner to another.

The Ministry of the Interior selected four gubernias for its investigation—Vitebsk, Perm, Stavropol and Samara (Nikolayev Uyezd). It is typical that the gubernias of the Great-Russian agricultural "centre" of European Russia, the gubernias where the traces of serfdom are the strongest and where the condition of the peasants is worst and the oppression by the feudal landowners is greatest, *were not included* in the investigation! It is obvious that the Ministry did not wish so much *to investigate as to deceive*, did not wish so much *to study* the matter as *to distort it*.

The statistics collected by the Ministry of the Interior and summarised in *Rossiya* are remarkably slipshod, haphazard and primitive; we have before us the usual "official work" produced by Russian civil servants, who can be relied on to bungle the simplest task. For the whole of Russia they examined something like a hundred thousand households but they could not devise a comprehensive programme, or engage competent statisticians, or ensure the uniform application of even a partial consistent programme to all areas!

The general results of the investigation are the following. In the four gubernias mentioned, on January 1, 1912, a total of 108,095 peasant households had left the communes and had acquired titles to their land. This means that of the total number of title-holding households, which now probably amounts to 2,000,000 in the whole of Russia (out

of a total of 12,000,000-13,000,000 households), something like one-twentieth have been investigated. Even such an investigation would, of course, be valuable if it were done conscientiously, that is, if it were done not by Russian civil servants and not under Russian political conditions.

Of the *hundred* thousand or 90 households holding titles, 27,588, i.e., *more than a quarter* (25.5 per cent) sold land. This huge number of sales by peasant owners shows straightaway that in Russia the notorious "private ownership" of land is primarily a means of *liberating* the peasants from the land. In fact, over *ten thousand* (10,380) households out of those that sold land *were not* engaged in farming at all. They had been artificially bound to the soil by the old, semi-medieval commune. The demand made by the Social-Democrats—to grant the right of free exit from the commune—was the only correct one; that alone could have given the peasants without any interference on the part of the police, rural superintendents[99] and similar kindly "authorities" what life in capitalist society insistently demands. You cannot keep anyone on the land who cannot farm it, and to try to do so is absurd.

If the number of title-holding households in the whole of Russia amounts to two million, the above data lead one to suppose that *about 200,000* of them did not engage in farming and immediately sold their land. "Private ownership" immediately threw hundreds of thousands of fictitious farmers out of the countryside! The Ministry of the Interior statistics do not say a word about the price (probably a nominal one) at which these poor people sold their land. Pitiful statistics!

What caused these farmers to sell land to which they had obtained the title? Out of 17,260 such peasants only 1,791, i.e., a tiny minority, sold land in order to improve their farms or to buy new lots. The remaining mass of peasants sold land because they *could not* remain on it—4,117 households sold out to migrate to Siberia; 768 because they were going over to other types of employment; 5,614 from necessity, "drunkenness" (as the official statisticians say!) and bad harvests; 2,498 because of illness, old age and lack of family help; 2,472 for "other" reasons.

These unscrupulous statisticians try to make it seem that only 5,614 households "have actually lost their land"! This, of course, is the despicable kind of trick people who have been ordered to raise a cheer would use. As we have seen, the vast majority of those who sell land are ruined and become landless. It is not for nothing that the peasants who sell out are mostly those owning small plots; even official statistics recognise this fact although, needless to say, they avoid giving any precise and complete figures. Pitiful statistics....

Of the 27,588 title-holders who sold out, more than a half (14,182) sold *all* their land, the remainder selling only part of it. Purchasers of land numbered 19,472. A comparison of the number of purchasers with the number of sellers clearly shows that a concentration of land is taking place, that it is being concentrated in the hands of a *smaller* number of owners. The poor sell land and the rich buy it. Despite their efforts, official scribblers are powerless to minimise the significance of this fact.

In Stavropol Gubernia, 14,282 title-holders sold land to 7,489 purchasers. Of the latter, 3,290 bought *more than 15 dessiatines*—580 bought from 50 to 100 dessiatines, 85 bought from 100 to 500 dessiatines and 7 bought from 500 to 1,000 dessiatines. In Nikolayev Uyezd of Samara Gubernia, 142 purchasers bought from 50 to 100 dessiatines, 102 from 100 to 500 dessiatines and 2 from 500 to 1,000 dessiatines.

In Perm Gubernia, 201 purchasers bought two or more lots of land; in Stavropol Gubernia, 2,957 purchasers bought more than two; of these, 562 bought from 5 to 9 lots, and 168 even *ten or more*!

The concentration of land is taking place on a grand scale. We can see clearly how pitiful, senseless and reactionary are the attempts to *curtail* the mobilisation of the land made by the Third Duma and the government and *defended* by "liberal" *civil servants* through the Cadet Party. There is nothing that reveals the retrograde nature of the Cadets and their civil-service stupidity so much as their defence of "measures" against the mobilisation of peasant lands.

The peasant does not sell his land except from dire need. Attempts to limit this right are despicable hypocrisy and *worsen* the selling conditions for the peasant, because in reality such limitations are evaded in thousands of ways.

The Narodniks, who do not understand the inevitability of land mobilisation under capitalism, hold a much more democratic view when they demand the abolition of private property in land. But only an ignoramus could call such abolition a socialist measure. There is absolutely nothing socialist in it. In England, one of the most developed capitalist countries, the farmers (capitalist tenant farmers) farm land belonging to landlords (big landowners). If this land belonged to the state, capitalism would develop more freely and extensively in agriculture. There would be no hindrances from the landowners. There would be no need to withdraw capital from production to invest in land purchases. The mobilisation of the land, drawing it into circulation, would be *still easier* because the transfer of the land from one person to another would take place more freely, simply and cheaply.

The poorer a country is, and the more it is crushed and stifled under the yoke of feudal landed proprietorship, the more urgent (from the standpoint of the *development* of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces) is the abolition of private property in land, complete freedom for its mobilisation, and the break-down of the old spirit of routine and stagnation in agriculture.

Our Stolypin land legislation, however, far from delivering the peasant from ruin and his land from mobilisation, makes that ruin a hundred times more acute and worsens (to a far greater extent than the "general" capitalist standard) the condition of the peasant, compelling him to accept worse conditions when selling his land.

Rabochaya Pravda No. 12,
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Signed: *V. I.*

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HOW CAN PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN RUSSIA BE INCREASED?

A few days ago the organ of our satraps of industrial capital, *Promyshlennost i Torgovlya*, published a leading article under the above heading. The question they raise is basic, that of the causes of Russia's economic (and every other) backwardness. It deserves the most serious attention.

Our industrial and commercial satraps declare that "it is at first glance paradoxical" for Russia to be among the great and advanced powers as far as her output of iron, oil and a number of other items is concerned, while her level of *per capita consumption* (i.e., the total amount of important items produced per head of the population) "*makes her the neighbour of Spain*", one of the most backward countries.

In 1911, for instance, the amount of iron consumed per head of the population was: 233 kilograms in the United States of America, 136 in Germany, 173 in Belgium and 105 in England, while *in Russia it was a mere 25 kilograms* (one and a half poods). In the half century since the liberation of the peasants the consumption of iron in Russia has increased fivefold, but Russia still remains an unbelievably, unprecedentedly backward country, poverty-stricken and half-savage, four times worse-off than Britain, five times worse-off than Germany and ten times worse-off than America in terms of modern means of production.

What is the reason? The journal is forced to admit that the reason lies wholly in rural living conditions. The rural areas consume a mere quarter of a pood of iron per head

of the population and "the peasant, rural population constitutes five-sixths of the population of Russia".

"A certain statistician has calculated that if the Chinese were to lengthen their national costume by the width of one finger it would be sufficient to provide work for all the cotton mills in England for a whole year."

An apt and eloquent remark!

What must be done to make the tens of millions of Russian peasants "lengthen their national costume", or, putting all metaphors aside, increase their consumption, cease being beggars and become, at long last, just a little bit like human beings?

Our industrial satraps answer with empty phrases—"the general cultural development of the country", the growth of industry, of towns, etc., "increased productivity of peasant labour", etc.

Empty phrase-mongering, pitiful excuses! This development, this "increase" *has been going on* in Russia for more than half a century, no one doubts it has been going on. *All* classes are shouting their heads off about "culture". *Even* the Black Hundreds and the Narodniks are taking their stand on the side of capitalism. For a long time the question to raise has been a different one—*why* is the development of capitalism and culture proceeding at a snail's pace? Why are we falling farther and farther behind? Why does this increasing backwardness make exceptional speed and "strikes" necessary?

Our industrial satraps are afraid to answer this question, which is quite clear to any politically conscious worker, because they are satraps. They are not the representatives of capital that is free and strong, like that of America; they are a handful of monopolists protected by state aid and by thousands of intrigues and deals with the very Black-Hundred landowners whose medieval land tenure (about 70 million dessiatines of the best land) and oppression condemn five-sixths of the population to poverty, and the entire country to stagnation and decay.

"We must work," exclaims Mr. I. B—n in the journal of the satraps, "to approximate the rate of per capita consumption to that of the United States of America and

not that of Spain." This hired scribbler of the satraps does not want to see that subservience to the Black-Hundred landowners *inevitably* "approximates Russia to Spain" and that approximation to America requires a ruthless, devoted struggle against that class all along the line.

Severnaya Pravda No. 3,
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Signed: *W. Frey*

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AUGUST BEBEL

With the death of Bebel we lost not only the German Social-Democratic leader who had the greatest influence among the working class, and was most popular with the masses; in the course of his development and his political activity, Bebel was the embodiment of a whole historical period in the life of international as well as German Social-Democracy.

Two big periods are to be distinguished in the history of international Social-Democracy. The first period was that of the birth of socialist ideas and the embryonic class struggle of the proletariat; a long and stubborn struggle between extremely numerous socialist theories and sects. Socialism was feeling its way, was seeking its true self. The class struggle of the proletariat, which was only just beginning to emerge as something different from the common mass of the petty-bourgeois "people", took the shape of isolated outbursts, like the uprising of the Lyons weavers. The working class was at that time also only feeling its way.

This was the period of preparation and of the birth of Marxism, the only socialist doctrine that has stood the test of history. The period occupied approximately the first two-thirds of the last century and ended with the complete victory of Marxism, the collapse (especially after the Revolution of 1848) of all pre-Marxian forms of socialism, and the separation of the working class from petty-bourgeois democracy and its entry upon an independent historical path.

The second period is that of the formation, growth and maturing of mass socialist parties with a proletarian class

composition. This period is characterised by the tremendous spread of socialism, the unprecedented growth of all kinds of organisations of the proletariat, and the all-round preparation of the proletariat in the most varied fields for the fulfilment of its great historic mission. In recent years a third period has been making its appearance, a period in which the forces that have been prepared will achieve their goal in a series of crises.

Himself a worker, Bebel developed a socialist world outlook at the cost of stubborn struggle; he devoted his wealth of energy entirely, withholding nothing, to the cause of socialism; for several decades he marched shoulder to shoulder with the growing and developing German proletariat and became the most gifted parliamentarian in Europe, the most talented organiser and tactician, the most influential leader of international Social-Democracy, Social-Democracy hostile to reformism and opportunism.

Bebel was born in Cologne on the Rhine on February 22, 1840, in the poor family of a Prussian sergeant. He imbibed many barbarous prejudices with his mother's milk and later slowly but surely rid himself of them. The population of the Rhineland was republican in temper in 1848-49, the period of the bourgeois revolution in Germany. In the elementary school only two boys, one of them Bebel, expressed monarchist sympathies and were beaten up for it by their schoolfellows. "One beaten is worth two unbeaten" is a Russian saying that freely translates the "moral" Bebel himself drew when relating this episode of his childhood years in his memoirs.

The sixties of the last century brought a liberal "springtide" to Germany after long, weary years of counter-revolution, and there was a new awakening of the mass working-class movement. Lassalle began his brilliant but short-lived agitation. Bebel, by now a young turner's apprentice, hungrily devoured the liberal newspapers published by the old people who had been active in the 1848 Revolution, and became an ardent participant in workers' educational associations. Having got rid of the prejudices of the Prussian barracks, he had adopted liberal views and was struggling against socialism.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Life, however, took its course and the young worker, through reading Lassalle's pamphlets, gradually found his way to Marx despite the difficulties involved in getting to know Marx's writings in a Germany that had suffered the oppression of the counter-revolution for more than ten years. The conditions of working-class life, the serious and conscientious study of the social sciences, pushed Bebel towards socialism. He would have arrived at socialism himself, but Liebknecht, who was fourteen years older than Bebel and had just returned from exile in London, helped to accelerate his development.

Evil tongues among Marx's opponents were saying at that time that Marx's party consisted of three people—Marx, the head of the party, his secretary Engels, and his "agent" Liebknecht. The unintelligent shunned Liebknecht as the "agent" of exiles or foreigners, but Bebel found in Liebknecht just what he wanted—living contact with the great work done by Marx in 1848, contact with the party formed at that time, which, though small, was genuinely proletarian, a living representative of Marxist views and Marxist traditions. "There is something to be learnt from that man, damn it!" the young turner Bebel is said to have remarked, speaking of Liebknecht.

In the later sixties Bebel broke with the liberals, separated the socialist section of the workers' unions from the bourgeois-democratic section and, together with Liebknecht, took his place in the front ranks of the Eisenacher party, the party of Marxists that was to struggle for many long years against the Lassalleans, the other working-class party.

To put it briefly, the historical reason for the split in the German socialist movement amounts to this. The question of the day was the unification of Germany. Given the class relationships then obtaining, it could have been effected in either of two ways—through a revolution, led by the proletariat, to establish an all-German republic, or through Prussian dynastic wars to strengthen the hegemony of the Prussian landowners in a united Germany.

Lassale and his followers, in view of the poor chances for the proletarian and democratic way, pursued unstable tactics and adapted themselves to the leadership of the Junker Bismarck. Their mistake lay in diverting the

workers' party on to the Bonapartist-state-socialist path. Bebel and Liebknecht, on the other hand, consistently supported the democratic and proletarian path and struggled against any concessions to Prussianism, Bismarckism or nationalism.

History showed that Bebel and Liebknecht were right, *despite* Germany's having been united in the Bismarckian way. It was only the consistently democratic and revolutionary tactics of Bebel and Liebknecht, only their "unyielding" attitude towards nationalism, only their "intractability" in respect of the unification of Germany and her renovation "from above", that helped provide a sound basis for a genuinely Social-Democratic workers' party. And in those days the essential thing was the *basis* of the party.

That the Lassalleans' flirting with Bismarckism, or their "accommodations" to it, did not harm the German working-class movement was due *only* to the very energetic, ruthlessly sharp rebuff dealt to their intrigues by Bebel and Liebknecht.

When the question was settled historically, five years after the foundation of the German Empire, Bebel and Liebknecht were able to unite the two workers' parties and ensure the hegemony of Marxism in the united party.

As soon as the German parliament was set up, Bebel was elected to it, although at the time he was still quite young—only twenty-seven years old. The fundamentals of parliamentary tactics for German (and international) Social-Democracy, tactics that never yield an inch to the enemy, never miss the slightest opportunity to achieve even small improvements for the workers and are at the same time implacable on questions of principle and always directed to the accomplishment of the final aim—the fundamentals of these tactics were elaborated by Bebel himself or under his direct leadership and with his participation.

Germany, united in the Bismarckian way, renovated in the Prussian, Junker way, responded to the successes of the workers' party with the Anti-Socialist Law. The legal conditions for the existence of the working-class party were destroyed and the party was outlawed. Difficult times were at hand. To persecution by the party's enemies was added

an inner-party crisis—vacillation on the basic questions of tactics. At first the opportunists came to the fore; they allowed themselves to be frightened by the loss of the party's legality, and the mournful song they sang was that of rejecting full-blooded slogans and accusing themselves of having gone much too far, etc. Incidentally, one of the representatives of this opportunist trend, Höchberg, rendered financial aid to the party, which was still weak and could not immediately find its feet.

Marx and Engels launched a fierce attack from London against disgraceful opportunist shilly-shallying. Bebel showed himself to be a real party leader. He recognised the danger in good time, understood the correctness of the criticism by Marx and Engels and was able to direct the party on to the path of implacable struggle. The illegal newspaper *Der Sozialdemokrat* was established and was published first Zurich and then in London; it was delivered weekly in Germany and had as many as 10,000 subscribers.[100] Opportunist waverings were firmly stopped.

Another form of wavering was due to infatuation with Dühring at the end of the seventies of the last century. For a short time Bebel also shared that infatuation. Dühring's supporters, the most outstanding of which was Most, toyed with "Leftism" and very soon slid into anarchism. Engels's sharp, annihilating criticism of Dühring's theories met with disapproval in many party circles and at one congress it was even proposed to close the columns of the central newspaper to that criticism.

All the viable socialist elements—headed, of course, by Bebel—soon realised that the "new" theories were rotten to the core and broke away from them and from all anarchist trends. Under the leadership of Bebel and Liebknecht the party learned to combine illegal and legal work. When the majority of the legally-existing Social-Democratic group in parliament adopted an opportunist position on the famous question of voting *for* the shipping subsidy, the illegal *Sozialdemokrat opposed* the group and, after a battle four weeks long, proved victorious.

The Anti-Socialist Law was defeated in 1890 after having been in operation for twelve years. A party crisis, very similar to that of the mid-seventies, again occurred, The

opportunists under Vollmar, on the one hand, were prepared to take advantage of legality to reject full-blooded slogans and implacable tactics. The so-called "young ones", on the other hand, were toying with "Leftism", drifting towards anarchism. Considerable credit is due to Bebel and Liebknecht for offering the most resolute resistance to these waverings and making the party crisis a short-lived and not very serious one.

A period of rapid growth set in for the party, growth in both breadth and depth, in the development of the trade union, co-operative, educational and other forms of organisation of the forces of the proletariat, as well as their political organisation. It is impossible to assess the gigantic practical work carried out in all these spheres by Bebel as a parliamentarian, agitator and organiser. It was by this work that Bebel earned his position as the undisputed and generally accepted leader of the party, the one who was closest to the working-class masses and most popular among them.

The last crisis in the German party in which Bebel took an active part was that of the so-called Bernsteinism. At the very end of the last century, Bernstein, formerly an orthodox Marxist, adopted purely reformist, opportunist views. Attempts were made to turn the working-class party into a petty-bourgeois party of social reforms. This new opportunism found many supporters among the functionaries of the working-class movement and among the intelligentsia.

Bebel expressed the mood of the working-class masses and their firm conviction that a fight should be put up for full-blooded slogans, when he revolted with great vigour against this new opportunism. His speeches against the opportunists at the congresses in Hanover and Dresden will long remain as a model of the defence of Marxist views and of the struggle for the truly socialist character of the workers' party.[101] The period of preparation and the mustering of working-class forces is in all countries a necessary stage in the development of the world emancipation struggle of the proletariat, and nobody can compare with August Bebel as a brilliant personification of the peculiarities and tasks of that period. Himself a worker, he proved able to

break his own road to sound socialist convictions and became a model workers' leader, a representative and participant in the mass struggle of the wage-slaves of capital for a better social system.

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Signed: *V. I.*

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THE SEPARATION OF LIBERALISM FROM DEMOCRACY

The separation of liberalism from democracy in Russia is one of the basic questions of the entire emancipation movement.

What is the cause of the movement's weakness? Is it because democracy has been *insufficiently* aware and definite in separating from liberalism and has allowed itself to become infected by liberalism's importance and wavering? Or is it because democracy separated from liberalism too soon (or too sharply, etc.) and thus weakened the "force of the common onslaught"?

There can scarcely be anybody interested in the cause of freedom who will argue that this is not a question of fundamental importance. One cannot be a conscious champion of freedom without giving a definite answer to this question. To settle it one must understand which social forces, which classes support liberalism and which support democracy, and what political strivings have their roots in the nature of these classes.

In this article we want to throw some light on this fundamental question from the point of view of current foreign political events. The burning question is naturally that of the Second Balkan War, the defeat of Bulgaria, the Bucharest peace that was so humiliating for her, and Russia's unsuccessful attempt to blame France for not having supported "us", and to obtain a revision of the peace terms.

As we know, *Novoye Vremya* and *Rech* are in agreement about these accusations against France, about this attempt to renew Russia's "active" policy in the Balkans. This

means that there is agreement between the feudal landowners and reactionary nationalist ruling circles on the one hand, and the most politically conscious, most organised circles of the liberal bourgeoisie, who have long been gravitating towards an imperialist policy on the other.

Apropos of this, *Kievskaya Mysl*, a provincial newspaper with a large circulation, which expresses the views of certain sections of petty-bourgeois democracy, said the following in a very instructive editorial on August 1:

> "It is not that the opposition and nationalism have changed places [as Mr. Milyukov asserted in his well-known foreign policy speech in the Duma] but that liberalism has *separated* [*Kievskaya Mysl*'s italics] from democracy and has entered, at first timidly, with backward glances, and then with head held high, upon the same path, the path of political adventure, along which nationalism leads the way under the same Slavophile banner."

And the newspaper in all justice recalls the generally known facts—how *Rech* displayed "chauvinist enthusiasm", how that newspaper, permeated, in general, with "imperialist tendencies", called for an advance to Armenia, to the Bosphorus.

> "Liberalism," said *Kievskaya Mysl*, "by supporting at its own risk Russian foreign policy, which cannot be anything but a reactionary nationalist policy as long as home policy remains such, has also taken upon itself political responsibility for that support."

An incontestable truth. It only has to be fully *analysed*. If it is true that the Russian foreign political line is determined by the line in home policy (and it undoubtedly is), does this refer only to the reactionaries? Obviously not. Obviously it refers to liberalism as well.

Liberalism could not have "separated from democracy" in foreign policy if it was not separated from democracy in home policy. *Kievskaya Mysl* itself has to admit this when it says that "the character of the political mistake of liberalism ... is evidence of profound organic disorders".

That is just it! We should have put it differently—profound class interests of the bourgeoisie—instead of using that somewhat high-sounding and obscure expression. It was these class interests of liberalism that made it fear

(especially in 1905) the democratic movement, and that made it turn *to the right* both in home and foreign policy.

It would be ridiculous for anyone to think of denying the connection between Cadet imperialism and chauvinism today and the Cadet-Octobrist slogan to save the Duma in the spring of 1907, between the Cadet vote against local land committees in the spring of 1906 and the Cadet decision to enter the Bulygin Duma[102] in the autumn of 1905. This is the same policy of one and the same class, which fears revolution more than it does reaction.

One of the main causes of the weakness of the Russian emancipation movement is the lack of understanding of this truth by the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and by petty-bourgeois politicians, writers and ideological leaders in particular.

Contrary to the tales of the liberals who, in order to cover the steps they were taking towards reconciliation with the Rights, pointed to the "implacability" of the Lefts, working-class democrats have never lumped the liberals and Rights together in "one reactionary mass",[103] have never refused *to use* their differences (at the second stage of the Duma elections, for example) in the interests of the emancipation movement. But working-class democrats considered—and must always consider—their task to be one of *neutralising* the wavering liberals, who are capable of becoming "infatuated" with imperialism under Stolypin or Maklakov.

Russian democracy cannot make a serious advance if it does not recognise the deep-going class roots that *separate* liberalism from democracy, if it does not spread the consciousness of this among the *masses*, if it does not learn to neutralise in this way the waverings of the liberals and their betrayals of the cause of "people's freedom". Without this all talk of the successes of the emancipation movement is meaningless.

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A FINE BUSINESS!

There are still many corners of Holy Mother Russia where it is as if serfdom reigned but yesterday. Take the Urals, for example. Landowners there possess tens of thousands of dessiatines of land. The factories (i.e., the same landowners) prevent handicraftsmen from developing small industry. The peasants are still dependent on the landowners and up to now have not been allotted any land.

And the Urals is not a tiny "corner", it is a huge and very rich region.

Litigation between the Stroganov factory workers in the Urals and the management of the factories owned by that very rich landowner over the allotment of land to the peasants according to the law of 1862 (*eighteen sixty-two*!) dragged on for many years.

At last an end was put to the case by a decision of the "supreme institution", the Senate, taken in the spring of 1909. The Senate directed the Perm Gubernia authorities to allot land to the peasants, *to apply* the law of 1862.

Thus, forty-seven years after the promulgation of the law the Senate instructed the landowners to apply it.

And what happened?

What happened was that the landowners lodged a complaint with the landowner Stolypin, who was Minister of the Interior at the time. The Senate is, by law, higher than the Minister of the Interior, but Stolypin "clamped down on the law" and sent the Governor of Perm a telegram—suspend fulfilment of the Senate's instructions!

The Governor suspended it. More correspondence ensued, more red tape.

At last the Council of State agreed with the opinion of the Senate and the decision of the Council of State was

"granted supreme sanction", i.e., was confirmed by the highest authority.

And what happened?

What happened was that the landowners applied to the landowner N. A. Maklakov, who had become Minister of the Interior in place of Stolypin. A deputation from the Urals landowners "convinced" the Minister. The Minister declared that the decision of the Senate and the Council of State was "unclear".

More correspondence ensued, more red tape.

In May 1913 the Senate again adopted a decision that was not in the Minister's favour.

The Urals landowners again wrote to the Minister....

That is how the matter still stands. Although more than half a century has elapsed since the promulgation of the law of 1862 allotting land to the Urals workers, the land has not been allotted.

In relating this instructive story the liberal newspapers come to the conclusion that all is not right with the "rule of law" in Russia. That is true, but it is not the whole truth.

It is ridiculous to speak of "law" when the landowners both make the laws and in practice apply or annul them. There is, therefore, a class that itself creates the "law" and itself annuls it. Liberal speeches about "law" and "reforms", therefore, are empty chatter.

The landowners are also in favour of "law", but it is landowners' law, their own law, the law of their class that they favour.

If the liberals still renounce the "theory" of the class struggle, call it a mistake, etc., in face of these instructive facts, it only goes to show that the liberal conscience is not clear. Do not the liberals want to *share* privileges with the landowners? If so, it is understandable that they do not like the "theory" of the class struggle!

But in what way are the workers to blame if their "theory" is proved correct by real events?

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Signed: *I.*

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THE NATIONALISATION OF JEWISH SCHOOLS

The politics of the government are soaked in the spirit of nationalism. Attempts are made to confer every kind of privilege upon the "ruling", i.e., the Great-Russian nation, even though the Great Russians represent a *minority* of the population of Russia, to be exact, only 43 per cent.

Attempts are made to cut down still further the rights of all the other nations inhabiting Russia, to segregate one from the other and stir up enmity among them.

The extreme expression of present-day nationalism is the scheme for the nationalisation of Jewish schools. The scheme emanated from the educational officer of Odessa district, and has been sympathetically considered by the Ministry of Public "Education". What does this nationalisation mean?

It means segregating the Jews into *special* Jewish schools (secondary schools). The doors of all other educational establishments—both private and state—are to be completely closed to the Jews. This "brilliant" plan is rounded off by the proposal to limit the number of pupils in the Jewish secondary schools to the notorious "quota"!

In all European countries such measures and laws against the Jews existed only in the dark centuries of the Middle Ages, with their Inquisition, the burning of heretics and similar delights. In Europe the Jews have long since been granted complete equality and are fusing more and more with the nations in whose midst they live.

The most harmful feature in our political life generally, and in the above scheme particularly, apart from the oppression and persecution of the Jews, is the striving to fan the flames of nationalism, to segregate the nationalities

in the state one from another, to increase their estrangement, to separate their schools.

The interests of the working class—as well as the interests of political liberty generally—require, on the contrary, the fullest equality of all the nationalities in the state without exception, and the elimination of every kind of barrier between the nations, the bringing together of children of all nations in the same schools, etc. Only by casting off every savage and foolish national prejudice, only by uniting the workers of all nations into one association, can the working class become a force, offer resistance to capitalism, and achieve a serious improvement in its living conditions.

Look at the capitalists! They try to inflame national strife among the "common people", while they themselves manage their business affairs remarkably well—Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and Germans together in one and the same corporation. Against the workers the capitalists of all nations and religions are united, but they strive to divide and weaken the workers by national strife!

This most harmful scheme for the nationalisation of the Jewish schools shows, incidentally, how mistaken is the plan for so-called "cultural-national autonomy", i.e., the idea of taking education out of the hands of the state and handing it over to each nation separately. It is not this we should strive for, but for the unity of the workers of all nations in the struggle against *all* nationalism, in the struggle for a truly democratic *common* school and for political liberty generally. The example of the advanced countries of the world—say, Switzerland in Western Europe or Finland in Eastern Europe—shows us that only consistently-democratic state institutions ensure the most peaceable and human (not bestial) coexistence of various nationalities, *without* the artificial and harmful separation of education according to nationalities.

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IRON ON PEASANT FARMS

Promyshlennost i Torgovlya, the organ of our industrial millionaires, the organ of the Council of Congresses, recently gave vent to a sort of foolishly hypocritical or hypocritically foolish sigh because Russia turns out to be the neighbour of one of the most backward countries, Spain, as far as the per capita consumption of the most important items of production is concerned.

With regard to iron, one of the most important products of modern industry, one of the foundations of civilisation, one might say, Russia's backwardness and barbarism is particularly great.

"A cart with iron tyres is still a rarity in the Russian countryside," the organ of the millionaires admitted.

However, on the question of whether this cultural "rarity" in the Russian village depends on the *incidence* of serf relations and the omnipotence of the feudal landowners (on whom the "aces" of Russian capitalism fawn), the millionaires maintain a modest silence.

We greatly love to chatter about culture, about the development of productive forces, about improving the peasant farm, and so on, and we are past masters at it. Yet whenever it comes to removing the stone that lies in the way of "improving the lot" of millions of impoverished, downtrodden, hungry, ragged, savage peasants, our millionaires become tongue-tied.

Here are some figures from Hungarian agricultural statistics that clearly show the significance the oppression of the peasantry by the landowners has in regard to the extent to which iron is used, *that is*, in regard to the solidity of the iron foundation of culture in the country concerned.

Hungary, of course, is the country closest to Russia, not only geographically, but on account of the omnipotence

of the reactionary landowners, who have retained a tremendous quantity of land from medieval times.

In Germany, for instance, there are 23,000 properties out of 5,500,000 that are more than 100 hectares in extent and together they make up less than a quarter of the total land area; in Hungary there are 24,000 such properties out of 2,800,000 and they make up 45 per cent of the country's total land area! Four thousand Hungarian landowners have more than a thousand dessiatines each, and together they own almost *a third* of all the land. As you can see that is not far removed from "Mother Russia".

Hungarian statistics (1895) made a particularly detailed investigation of the question of iron on peasant farms. It was shown that out of 2,800,000 farms, *a million and a half* belonging to labourers (or proletarians, with up to 5 Joch or 2.85 dessiatines) and also *one million* small peasant farms (up to 20 Joch, that is, up to 11 dessiatines) have to make do with *wooden* implements.

These 2,500,000 farms (out of a total of 2,800,000) no doubt use mainly ploughs with a wooden shaft, harrows with wooden frames and on almost half of them the carts in use are without iron tyres.

There are no complete figures for Russia. The figures available for separate localities show that the poverty, primitiveness and neglect on most Russian peasant farms are incomparably greater than on Hungarian farms.

And it cannot be otherwise. If the tyred cart is not to be a rarity there must be a free, educated, bold farmer who is capable of dealing with the feudal landowners, who is capable of getting away from routine methods and has all the land in the state at his disposal. "Culture" is as much to be expected of the peasant who is still oppressed by the Markovs and Purishkeviches with their landed estates, as humanity is to be expected of the Saltykovas.[104]

The millionaires of our industry prefer to share medieval privileges with the Purishkeviches and to sigh about the deliverance of "the fatherland" from medieval lack of culture....

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Signed: *N. N.*

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METALWORKERS' STRIKES IN 1912

The Association of Factory Owners in the Moscow Industrial Area has this year published (Moscow, 1913, P. P. Ryabushinsky's Press) something in the nature of a report on its activities for 1912. Perhaps the most interesting part of the report is that giving data on the strike movement in various parts of Russia.

I

The total number of strikers in Russia is estimated by the Association of Moscow Factory Owners as 96,750 in 1911 and 211,595 in 1912. These figures are for economic strikes *only*. The Association estimates political strikes as affecting 850,000 workers in 1912, 8,000 in 1911 and 4,000 in 1910.

Note that "for convenient comparison with official information", which does not cover enterprises not under the Factory Inspectorate, the Association of Moscow magnates has omitted the 6,000 Lena strikers. It goes without saying that we still have no guarantee that such a comparison has been done correctly—the factory owners decided to copy the bad aspects of our official statistics and not worry about the completeness of their data or even about the accuracy of those who compiled them. The summary table of the number of strikers (page 23 of the report), for instance, is astonishingly full of crude errors, which we have endeavoured to correct in giving the totals quoted above. That table assessed the metalworkers participating in strikes in the Kingdom of Poland *for the whole of* 1912 as 2,390, and on page 56 we are told that for *seven months* of 1912

a total of 3,790 metalworkers took part in strikes in the Kingdom of Poland!

One cannot help wishing that our Kit Kityches would hire writers able to count or would send their statistics to workers' trade unions to be checked and corrected.

Let us see what role the metalworkers played in the economic strike movement of 1912 according to the factory owners' statistics.

These data distribute the total number of strikers, 211,595, as follows: metalworkers, 78,195; textile workers, 89,540; workers of all other branches of industry, 43,860. Since there are far fewer metalworkers than textile workers in Russia, these figures show immediately that in 1912 the *metalworkers* conducted a most stubborn and persistent strike struggle as compared with workers in other branches of industry. To give this conclusion clearer expression, let us compare the total number of workers in Russia with the number of strikers in 1912.

	Total number of workers in Russia according to statistics		Number of strikers in 1912 (according to the factory owners' data)
	1908 (including miners)	1910 (excluding miners)	
Metalworkers	529,274	280,194	78,195
Textile workers	823,401	840,520	89,540
Others	901,112	831,241	43,860
Totals	2,253,787	1,951,955	211,595

These data show clearly that the metalworkers hold first place for the vigorous nature of their strike struggle; the second place is held by the textile workers, and the workers in other branches of industry take last place.

If the "other" workers had been as energetic in striking as the metalworkers, the number of strikers would have been increased by some 90,000.

There is no doubt that the relatively more favourable market conditions in 1912 facilitated the strike struggle of the metalworkers, but, although the metalworkers outdid everyone else in persistence, the "others", as we shall see later, fared best of all as far as *success* of the economic strikes was concerned.

II

The persistence of the strike struggle is determined, among other things, by the average duration of the strikes. This average is obtained by dividing the total number of days lost through strikes by the number of strikers.

Here are the figures given by the Association of Factory Owners:

	Average duration of strike
1895-1904	4.8 days
1909	6.5 "
1911	8.2 "
1912	13.4 "

"It turns out that the resistance of the workers," says the report, "was almost twice as great in 1912 as that of 1911." To this we must add that if we take the last seven months of 1912 (and, indeed, only for this period are the data in the report under review reasonably well processed), we get an average of *16 days* as the length of a strike.

It therefore follows that the stubbornness of the workers in the strike struggle is undoubtedly increasing and is becoming greater as time goes on.

The duration of the strikes in the different branches of industry was as follows:

	1911	1912	The last seven months of 1912
Metalworkers	10.0 days	14.2 days	18.8 days
Textile workers	9.2 "	11.9 "	14.0 "
Others	5.0 "	15.6 "	16.8 "
All Industries	8.2 "	13.4 "	16.0 "

From this we see that as far as concerns the duration of strikes, metalworkers held first place in 1911 and in the second half of 1912; it was only in the first half of 1912 that the "others" took first place and the metalworkers found themselves in the second place. Throughout the whole of the period under review the textile workers have been in the second place as far as the duration of their strikes is concerned.

III

The factory owners assess the general outcome of the strikes by a computation of "*losses* to industry" from strikes. Our capitalists do not wish to compute what the working class has gained through strikes! Here is a summary of the factory owners' statistics:

Branches of industry	Direct losses to industry from strikes (economic)	Loss of workers' wages	Loss to country in underproduction
		(thousand rubles)	
Metal	558	1,145	4,959
Textile	479	807	6,010
Others	328	529	3,818
Totals for 1912	1,365	2,481	14,787
" " 1911	402	716	4,563

We see from this table that in 1912 the capitalists' loss were *three times* greater than in 1911.

Representatives of bourgeois political economy will object—but, they will say, did not the "country" lose three times as much and were not the workers' wage losses three times as much, and are not the workers' losses in wages of more significance than the factory owners' losses?

According to factory owners' statistics, and bourgeois logic, too, these foolish workers are only doing themselves harm with their strikes, and the solicitous authorities and capitalist benefactors who persecute them for striking are only acting in the interests of the workers....

The same factory owners tell us that they have succeeded in assessing the results of the 1911 strikes in respect of 96,730 strikers.

In the strike struggle 47,369 workers (49 per cent) were *defeated* and 49,361 (51 per cent) achieved the complete or partial *satisfaction* of their demands, i.e., were successful.

This is the result of strikes that factory owners' statistics and bourgeois economy prefer not to take into account! And, indeed, it cannot be reckoned in rubles, for apart from the workers' direct gain in increased wages

when a strike is successful, there is still another "gain". The entire working class, and, therefore, the entire country (the country of the working masses and not of the bourgeois minority) gains from the resistance offered by striking workers to the exploiters. Without that resistance the workers would have become downright paupers, crushed by the high cost of living; without that resistance they would be transformed from human beings into the hopeless slaves of capital.

According to the factory owners' statistics, strikes were less successful in the second half of 1912; 52 per cent of the workers on strike suffered *defeat*, only 36 per cent were *successful*, and for 11 per cent the outcome was not determined. At this point we must make a more thorough examination of the role of striking metalworkers in Russia in general and in the various districts in particular.

IV

The Association of Moscow Factory Owners provides fairly well processed information on strikes, as we have said, only for the last seven months of 1912. The information covers five areas of Russia—the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Baltic and Southern areas, and the Kingdom of Poland.

The metalworkers striking during these months are distributed by areas as follows:

Area	Number of strikers in the last seven months of 1912	
	Total	Metalworkers
Moscow	48,140	3,760
St. Petersburg	35,390	15,160
Baltic	13,210	1,160
Southern	22,195	16,605
Kingdom of Poland	12,690	3,790
Totals	131,625	40,475

In the Southern area, therefore, metalworkers predominate among the total number of strikers. In the St. Peters-

burg area they constitute a very significant section of the strikers (over 40 per cent) and are second only to the textile workers (16,770 strikers in the St. Petersburg area). In the Moscow, Baltic and Polish areas, the metalworkers were but a small minority among the strikers.

By comparing the first five months of 1912 with the last seven months we get:

	Number of strikers:	
	First 5 months	Last 7 months
	1912	
Metalworkers	37,720	40,475
Textile workers	22,950	66,590
Others	19,300	24,560
Totals	79,970	131,625

In the second half of the year the vigour with which the metalworkers engaged in strikes was somewhat less—the strike movement greatly increased among the textile workers while that of workers in other branches of industry remained at approximately the same level.

V

To assess the outcome of strikes the Moscow Association of Factory Owners divides strikers into three groups—those defeated, those successful (whose demands were wholly or partially acceded to) and those whose strikes ended without definite results.

This is one of the most interesting of all questions of strike statistics. The millionaires' association has handled the question badly; for example, there are no data on offensive strikes (when the workers demand an *improvement* in their living and working conditions) and defensive strikes (when workers resist changes introduced by the capitalists *worsening* living and working conditions). Nor is there any detailed information on the causes of strikes (such information is given even in our official statistics), etc.

The way the Association of Moscow Factory Owners have handled what information they do give is, furthermore, extremely unsatisfactory. There are even obvious cases of out-and-out distortion of figures; in the Moscow area, for instance, the number of metalworkers successful in strikes is assessed at 40 (with 3,420 defeated and 300 with undetermined results).

But in the letterpress of the report, page 35, we find that at the beginning of July 1912, there was a strike of workers in a number of art metalware workshops involving *more than 1,200 workers* in 15 enterprises. It was an offensive strike the workers demanded a nine-hour day with a seven-hour day on the eve of holidays, as well as higher wages and better sanitary conditions. The owners of the workshops tried to organise resistance and decided unanimously not to make concessions and not to accept orders from the shops on strike. The workers had apparently chosen a favourable moment it was the height of the building season, "it was hard to find unengaged workers. *By the end of July the owners of the majority of workshops made concessions*".

This is what the report says! And in the statistical table the number of metalworkers winning strikes is shown as 40 (*forty*!). One begins to wonder whether the factory owners' statisticians were not only too willing "to forget" the *victories* of the workers. Did they not strive—unwittingly, of course—to please the Kit Kityches by understating the number of victorious workers?

In any case, organised, class-conscious workers must approach the factory owners' statistics with caution and scepticism and must persist in their attempts to compile *their own,* workers' strike statistics.

The overall figures on the outcome of strikes given by the factory owners are:

Number of strikers	Metal-workers	Textile-workers	Others	Totals
Defeated	19,990	43,085	7,150	70,225
Successful	17,860	20,285	9,520	47,665
Outcome unknown	2,625	3,220	7,890	13,735
Totals	40,475	66,590	24,560	131,625

We see from this that the most successful of all were workers in *other* branches of industry—*more* workers won their strikes than lost them. Second place is held by the metalworkers; the number of successful strikers is nevertheless very considerable—over 40 per cent of the total. The textile workers had the worst results—their losses were more than twice as great as their gains.

VI

Taking them by and large, the results of the strike struggle in 1912 were not bad, although they were not so good as those of 1911. To make it easier to compare the data for different years let us divide the number of strikers, the outcome of whose strikes is unknown, equally between the successful and unsuccessful strikers. In this way we obtain for the last seven months of 1912, a total of 77,000 unsuccessful (i.e., 58.4 per cent) and 55,000 successful (i.e., 41.6 per cent) strikers out of 132,000.

It cannot be guaranteed that these figures are identical in kind with those of official statistics for previous years. We shall, however, quote these figures so that workers will be able to judge the *general* outcome of strikes in Russia in the best and worst years of the working-class movement.

	Number of strikers (thousands)				
	Successful	%	Unsuccessful	%	Totals
1895-1904 (total for ten years)	159	37.5	265	62.5	424
1905	705	48.9	734	51.5	1,439
1906	233	50.9	225	49.1	458
1907	59	29.5	141	70.5	200
1908	—	—	—	—	—
1909	—	—	—	—	—
1910	—	—	—	—	—
1911	49	51.0	47	49.0	96
1912 (seven months)	55	41.6	77	58.4	132

Thus, the results of the strikes in the second half of 1912 were *not so good* as those of 1905, 1906, and 1911 but *better* than those of 1895-1904 and *better* than those of 1907. We must repeat that the figures at our disposal for the

various years are probably not fully comparable, but they can give some idea of the situation.

Let it be noted that according to British strike statistics for the ten years 1900-09 the average annual percentage of workers winning strikes was 26.8, defeated 31.7, and ending their strikes in a compromise 41.3. If the last figure is divided equally between successful and unsuccessful strikers we get: *successful*, 47.5 per cent, *unsuccessful*, 52.3 per cent. Strikes in Russia in 1905 and 1906, and again in 1911, were more successful than the average British strikes despite the tremendous advantages possessed by the British workers in respect of organisation and political liberty.

VII

It is rather interesting to compare the results of metalworkers' strikes in different parts of Russia.

The Moscow and St. Petersburg areas differ from all others in this respect. The strikes of both metalworkers and all other workers were, in general, relatively unsuccessful in the last seven months of 1912 in the Moscow and St. Petersburg areas. The opposite is true of other areas.

Here are the figures for the Moscow and St. Petersburg areas.

	Number of striking metalworkers in the last seven months of 1912	
	Moscow area	St. Petersburg area
Defeated	3,420	10,840
Successful	40	4,170
Outcome unknown	400	150
Totals	3,760	15,160

The number of defeated is much greater than the number of successful strikers. The same is true of the textile workers in both areas and of "the others" in St. Petersburg. Only in the Moscow area did "the others" show a greater number of successful (4,380) than unsuccessful strikers (1,230).

Apparently there were certain general conditions in the Moscow and St. Petersburg districts that were unfavourable to workers' strikes in nearly all branches of industry.

In the South, on the contrary, and in the Baltic and Polish districts, the strikes of all workers in general, and of metalworkers in particular, were successful.

	Number of striking metalworkers in the last seven months of 1912		
	South	Baltic area	Kingdom of Poland
Defeated	4,390	440	900
Successful	10,040	720	2,890
Outcome unknown	2,175	—	—
Totals	16,605	1,160	3,790

The metalworkers had their greatest success in Poland; in general, the economic conditions for a strike movement in that district turned out most favourable for the workers. They were successful there in *all* branches of industry (in the South "the others" suffered a defeat and in the Baltic area the textile workers' struggle ended in "a draw"—there were 1,485 each successful and unsuccessful strikers). Even the textile workers, who were, in general, most severely defeated throughout Russia in the second half of 1912 (43,000 defeated and 20,000 successful) scored a brilliant victory in the Kingdom of Poland—only 390 defeated as compared with 8,060 successful.

In the West and South of Russia the workers attacked the capitalists and scored big victories; in Moscow and St. Petersburg they also attacked but in most cases their attacks were warded off. Unfortunately, the data we are analysing are too scanty to permit a comparison with 1911 and it is impossible to draw a definite conclusion as to the causes of the difference.

VIII

As we have seen, the metalworkers come first as far as the persistence of their strikes is concerned and the textile workers are in the last place. It is interesting to compare

the persistence of the successful strikes of metalworkers with that of the unsuccessful. Here are the figures:

	Number of metalworker strikers	Number of days lost (thousands)	Average number of days lost per striker
Defeated	19,990	230.7	11.5
Successful	17,860	387.3	21.7
Outcome unknown	2,625	145.3	55.4
Totals	40,475	763.3	18.8

We see that the distinguishing feature of successful metalworkers' strikes is that they were almost twice as persistent as the unsuccessful strikes (21.7 days as compared with 11.5 days). Victory was not easily achieved. Only by tremendous vigour and persistence was it possible to break the resistance of the capitalists. The strikes whose outcome was not clearly defined were apparently those in which the strength of the "contestants" was more or less equal and the struggle was extraordinarily stubborn; the average length of strikes leading to indefinite results was 55.4 days.

Be it noted that among "the other" workers we also observe greater stubbornness in successful strikes and among textile workers we see the opposite—the unsuccessful strikes of the latter were the most stubborn.

A comparison of the persistence of metalworkers' strikes in the different areas of Russia gives the following results:

	Average length of strikes per striking metalworker				
	Moscow area	St. Petersburg area	Baltic area	South	Kingdom of Poland
Defeated	11.5	12.1	5.9	12.0	5.2
Successful	7.5	37.2	23.7	14.9	22.4
Outcome unknown	12.0	261.3	—	47.1	—
Totals	11.5	21.4	17.0	18.4	18.3

First place for duration of strikes among the metalworkers in general is taken by the St. Petersburg area; next comes the South, then the Polish and Baltic areas and,

lastly, the Moscow area. With the exception of the Moscow area all other successful strikes were more stubborn than the unsuccessful.

Judging by the persistence of their strikes and also by the percentage of workers participating in the strike struggle, the St. Petersburg metalworkers play the role of vanguard to the metalworkers of all Russia. And the metalworkers in general play the same role to the workers of the other branches of industry.

IX

Extreme brevity is the distinguishing feature of the descriptions of individual strikes in the report by the Moscow Association of Factory Owners. We shall quote a few of these descriptions so that metalworkers may see how the gentlemen who compile reports for factory owners depict their struggle.

In the Moscow area the strike of 1,200 workers in art metalware workshops is a remarkable case. We have already mentioned this.

The factory owners regard the strike at Siemens and Halske, lasting 14 weeks and ending on August 19, as one of the most stubborn in the St. Petersburg area. The Factory Owners' Association reports that 1,600 workers took part. The factory management did not agree to withdraw the fine imposed for May Day but "in exchange expressed the wish to pay the workers a Christmas bonus of three rubles. Then the factory management agreed to include May Day in the list of holidays if the government did not put any obstacles in the way" (page 38 of the report). "During the strike," we read in the report, "there were several cases of workers attacking the newly employed with the help of whom work was partially resumed."

Most noteworthy of the metalworkers' strikes in the South was that of 3,886 Nikolayev shipyard workers that caused the loss of more than 155,000 working days. The workers demanded the eight-hour day, a fifty per cent increase in wages, the annulment of fines and all overtime, and the institution of elected shop stewards, etc. The strike

lasted all the month of June. "At the end of June an agreement was reached between the workers and the shipyard management under which all workers returned to their places; the shipyard recognised the shop stewards, a messroom was opened and wages were increased by 18 per cent." There were clashes between strikers and blacklegs.

The strike that broke out at a locomotive works in Kharkov in November involving 2,000 workers was exceptionally stubborn. The works had urgent government orders to fulfil and "suffered heavy losses on account of the stoppage".

Among the strikes in the Urals area, which were *completely omitted* from the Association of Factory Owners' statistics, we must make special mention of the strike at the Sysert factories. The workers won a wage increase. "At the government munitions factory in Zlatoust the strike was caused by the death of three workers from injuries inflicted by machines. The strikers demanded the installation of safety devices and also an increase in wages."

X

Even a cursory glance at the scanty figures provided by the factory owners' statistics must reveal the following.

Strike statistics that are complete, accurate, intelligently processed and published in good time have tremendous importance, both theoretical and practical, for the workers. They provide valuable information that illuminates every step of the great road the working class is travelling towards its world-wide goals, and also the closer, current tasks of the struggle.

In countries that are to some extent democratic and free, tolerable government statistics are possible. This is out of the question in Russia. Our government statistics are poor, they are absurdly split up among "departments", they are unreliable and their publication is delayed. The factory owners' statistics are little better and still less complete, although sometimes they are published somewhat earlier than those of the sleepy Russian civil servant.

The workers must consider producing *their own*, workers' strike statistics. The difficulties involved in compiling such

statistics are, of course, exceedingly great in view of the persecution of workers' associations and the working-class press in Russia. It is impossible to overcome these difficulties at once. Workers, however, are not accustomed to showing fear of persecution or retreating in face of difficulties.

Even partial strike statistics by workers, i.e., those that cover separate areas, separate branches of industries and relatively short periods, will be of great value. Such statistics will teach the workers how to compile something fuller and better and will at times enable them to compare the factory owners' or civil servants' picture with their own.

We therefore permit ourselves to conclude this analysis of factory owners' statistics with the wish that workers should, despite all the obstacles, again and again attempt to compile their own, workers' strike statistics. Two or three class-conscious workers could compile an accurate description of each strike, the time it begins and ends, the number of participants (with distribution according to sex and age wherever possible), the causes and the results of the strike. Such a description should be sent in one copy to the headquarters of the workers' association concerned (trade union or other body, or the office of the trade union newspaper); a second copy should be sent to the central workers' newspaper; lastly, a third copy should be sent to a working-class deputy of the State Duma for his information.

Both factory owners' and government statistics will always contain not only gaps but also distortions. Even in the press that sympathises with the workers we often come across monstrously false, absurd appraisals of strikes as manifestations of "a craze", etc., appraisals permeated with the bourgeois spirit.

Only by getting down to business themselves will the workers—in time, after stubborn work and persistent effort—be able to help towards a better understanding of their own movement and thus ensure bigger successes for that movement.

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THE RUSSIAN BOURGEOISIE AND RUSSIAN REFORMISM

The working-class press has already reported and given its appraisal of the appeal to the Prime Minister made by Mr. Salazkin in Nizhni-Novgorod on behalf of the merchants of Russia in respect of the "urgent necessity" for radical political reforms. It is, however, worth while returning to the subject on account of two important circumstances.

How rapidly the United Nobility and the merchants of Russia have exchanged roles! For forty years or more, prior to 1905, the nobility played at liberalism and made respectful references to a constitution, while the merchants seemed more satisfied, less oppositional.

After 1905 the situation was reversed. The nobility turned arch-reactionary. The June Third constitution left them quite satisfied and they desired changes only insofar as they were farther to the right. The merchants, on the contrary, became a definitely liberal opposition.

All at once Russia became, as it were, "Europeanised", i.e., fitted into the usual European relations between feudals and bourgeoisie. It stands to reason that this happened only because purely capitalist relations had long been the basis of political grouping in Russia. They had been maturing since 1861 and rapidly reached full maturity in the fires of 1905. All the Narodnik phraseology about Russia's fundamental exceptionalism and all attempts to argue about Russian politics and Russian economics from a supra-class or extra-class position immediately lost all their interest and became boring, inept, ridiculously old-fashioned rubbish.

A step forward has been made; the harmful self-deception has been got rid of; the childish hope of achieving anything worth while and serious without class battles has been got rid of. Take the side of one class or another, help the consciousness and development of one class policy or another—such is the stern but useful lesson taught in an affirmative form by the year 1905 and confirmed in a negative form by the experience of the June Third system.

The extra-class nonsense of the liberal intellectuals and petty-bourgeois Narodniks has been swept aside from the path of history. And a good thing too. It should have been done long ago!

On the other hand, take a look at the reformism of the liberal merchants of Russia. They announce the "urgent necessity for the reforms" recorded in the Manifesto of October Seventeenth. Everybody knows that the Manifesto speaks of "the unshakable foundations of civil liberty", "real inviolability of person", "freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and association", and also "the further development of the principle of universal franchise".

Obviously, this is really a list of radical political reforms. Obviously, the implementation of even one of those reforms alone would constitute a great change for the better.

And now *all* the merchants of Russia, economically the most powerful class in capitalist Russia, demand *all* these reforms. Why is it that these demands have been treated by everyone with complete indifference, why does everyone think they lack seriousness—everyone, from the Prime Minister who listened to them, ate and drank, replied, expressed his thanks and went away, down to that Moscow merchant who said that Salazkin's words were excellent but would not amount to anything?

Why is this?

It is because Russia is in that peculiar historical situation, which for a long time the big European states have not experienced (but which, at some time or other, occurred in each one of them), when reformism is particularly dull, ridiculous, impotent and, therefore, repellent. There is no doubt that the implementation of any of the reforms demanded by the merchants—either freedom of conscience or freedom of association or any other freedom—would mean a

great change for the better. Every advanced class—first and foremost the working class—would grasp with both hands the slightest reformist possibility of effecting any change for the better.

That is a simple truth that the opportunists just cannot understand when they make such a fuss about their sapient "partial demands", although the example of the excellent way the workers seized upon the "partial" (though real) insurance reform should have been a lesson to everybody.

But the point is that there is nothing "*real*" in the reformism of the liberals as far as political reforms are concerned. In other words—everybody knows full well, both the merchants and the Octobrist-Cadet majority in the Duma, that there is not and cannot be the tiniest reformist path to any one of the reforms demanded by Salazkin. Everybody knows, understands and feels it.

For this reason there is more historical realism, historical reality and efficacy in a simple indication of the absence of a reformist path than there is in widely-broadcast, inflated, high-sounding nonsense about any reforms you like. He who knows that there is no reformist path and passes that knowledge on to others is doing a thousand times more *in deed* to utilise insurance and any other "possibility" for purposes of democratic progress than those who chatter about reforms and do not believe what they themselves say.

The truth that reforms are possible only as a by-product of a movement that is completely free of all the narrowness of reformism has been confirmed a hundred times in world history and is *particularly* true for Russia today. That is why liberal reformism is so dead. That is why the contempt for reformism on the part of democrats and of the working class is so much alive.

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THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ESTATES AND CLASSES IN THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Statistical data on crimes against the state in Russia have been published in a legal journal. The statistics are very instructive, they provide precise figures on the question of the role of the social estates and classes in the liberation movement at different historical epochs.

Unfortunately, the data are incomplete. The epochs dealt with are: 1827-46 (the epoch of serfdom); 1884-90 (the epoch of the *raznochintsi** movement, the merging of the bourgeois-liberal and liberal-Narodnik movements). Lastly there is the epoch immediately preceding the revolution (1901-03) and the revolutionary epoch (1905-08), that is, the epochs of the bourgeois-democratic and proletarian movements.

The figures on the role played by the social estates are the following; out of one hundred persons charged with crimes against the state there were:

Epoch	Nobility	Urban petty bourgeoisie and peasants	Clergy	Merchants
1827-46	76	23	?	?
1884-90	30.6	46.6	6.4	12.1
1901-03	10.7	80.9	1.6	4.1
1905-08	9.1	87.7	?	?

From these figures it can be seen how rapidly the nineteenth-century liberation movement became democratised

* *Raznochintsi* (sing. *raznochinets*)—professional class not drawn from the nobility many of whom took part in the revolutionary democratic movement.—*Ed.*

and how sharply its class composition changed. The epoch of serfdom (1827-46) saw the absolute predominance of the nobility. That is the epoch from the Decembrists to Herzen. Feudal Russia is downtrodden and motionless. An insignificant minority of the nobility, helpless without the support of the people, protested. But these, the best of the nobility, helped *to awaken* the people.

In the epoch of the *raznochintsi* or the bourgeois-liberal epoch (1884-90), the nobility were already a smaller group in the liberation movement. If, however, we add to them the clergy and merchants we get 49 per cent, i.e., *almost a half*. The movement still remains half a movement of the privileged classes—of the nobility and the top-level bourgeoisie. Hence the impotence of the movement, despite the heroism of individuals.

The third (1901-03) and fourth (1905-08) epochs are those of the peasant and proletarian democrats. The role of the nobility is a very small one. The urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry make up eight-tenths of the whole before the revolution and nine-tenths during the revolution. The masses have awakened. Hence the two results: (1) the possibility of obtaining something of a serious nature and (2) the liberals' hatred of the movement (the appearance of counter-revolutionary liberalism).

Still more interesting are the data on occupations, available only for the last three epochs. Out of each hundred participants in the liberation movement (charged with state crimes) there are people engaged in:

Epoch	Agriculture	Industry and commerce	Liberal professions and students	No definite occupation or no occupation
1884-90	7.1	15.1	53.3	19.9
1901-03	9.0	46.1	28.7	8.0
1905-08	24.2	47.4	22.9	5.5

These are extraordinarily instructive figures. The role of the *raznochintsi* in the epoch of the Narodniks and the Narodnaya Volya Party (1884-90) is immediately revealed; the *majority* of the participants (53.3 per cent) were students or people following liberal professions. A mixed

bourgeois-liberal and liberal-Narodnik movement with students and intellectuals playing an outstanding role—such is the class essence of the parties and the movement of that time. The peasants ("agriculture") and industrial workers ("industry and commerce") provided a small minority (7 and 15 per cent). The so-called declassed people, that is, those who have been squeezed out of their own class and have lost contact with any definite class—this group of people constitutes *one-fifth* (19.9 per cent), they are more numerous than the peasants and more numerous than the workers!

This accounts for the peculiar forms taken by the movement, the magnificence of its heroism, and its impotence.

Then we come to the pre-revolutionary epoch (1901-03). The leading role is played by the urban workers ("industry and commerce"). Although they were a minority of the population they provided *almost a half* (46.1 per cent) of the participants. The intelligentsia and the students were *already* in the second place (despite the fables of the liberals and liquidators about the workers' party). The role of the peasants was insignificant ("agriculture" 9 per cent) but was growing.

The last epoch, 1905-08. The proportion of the urban workers increased from 46.1 to 47.4 per cent. They had already aroused the peasant masses, whose share in the movement increased more than that of all other classes—from 9 to 24.2 per cent, that is, by *almost three times*. The peasantry had now outstripped the liberal intellectuals and the students (22.9 per cent). The role of the declassed elements, those who had been ejected from their own class, was very insignificant (5.5 per cent). The deliberately libellous character of the liberal theory on the "intellectual" nature of our revolution here stands out in bold relief.

The proletariat and bourgeois democrats (the peasantry)—these were the social forces of the movement. But the peasantry, who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population as compared with the workers and town dwellers, lagged a long way behind and provided only *a quarter* (24.2 per cent) of the participants because so far they had been only slightly aroused.

All that remains is to end on a note of praise for the June Third (Stolypin) agrarian policy that is very successfully, rapidly and energetically arousing the others....

Severnaya Pravda No. 22,
August 28, 1913;
Nash Put No. 4,
August 29, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Severnaya Pravda* text

CLASS WAR IN DUBLIN

In Dublin, the capital of Ireland—a city of a not highly industrial type, with a population of half a million—the class struggle, which permeates the whole life of capitalist society everywhere, has become accentuated to the point of class war. The police have positively gone wild; drunken policemen assault peaceful workers, break into houses, torment the aged, women and children. Hundreds of workers (over 400) have been injured and *two killed*—such are the casualties of this war. All prominent workers' leaders have been arrested. People are thrown into prison for making the most peaceful speeches. The city is like an armed camp.

What has happened? How could such a war have flared up in a peaceable, cultured, civilised free state?

Ireland is something of a British Poland, only rather more like Galicia than the Poland represented by Warsaw, Lodz and Dombrowski. National oppression and Catholic reaction have turned the proletarians of this unhappy country into paupers, the peasants into toilworn, ignorant and dull slaves of the priesthood, and the bourgeoisie into a phalanx, masked by nationalist phrases, of capitalists, of despots over the workers; finally, the administration has been turned into a gang accustomed to every kind of violence.

At the present moment the Irish nationalists (i.e., the Irish bourgeoisie) are the victors. They are buying up the lands of the English landlords; they are getting national *self-government* (the famous Home Rule for which such a long and stubborn struggle has been going on between Ireland and England); they will freely govern "their own" country jointly with "their own" Irish priests.

Well, this Irish nationalist bourgeoisie is celebrating its "national" victory, its maturity in "affairs of state" by declaring a war to the death on the Irish labour movement.

An English Lord-Lieutenant lives in Dublin, but in fact he has less power than the Dublin capitalist leader, a certain Murphy, publisher of the *Independent* ("Independent"—my eye!), principal shareholder and director of the Dublin tramways, and a shareholder in many capitalist enterprises in Dublin. Murphy has declared, on behalf of all the Irish capitalists, of course, that he is ready to spend three-quarters of a million pounds (nearly seven million rubles) to destroy the Irish trade unions.

And these unions have begun to develop magnificently. The Irish proletariat, awakening to class-consciousness, is pressing the Irish bourgeois scoundrels engaged in celebrating their "national" victory. It has found a talented leader in the person of Comrade *Larkin*, Secretary of the Irish Transport Workers' Union. Larkin is a remarkable speaker, a man of seething Irish energy, who has performed miracles among the unskilled workers—that mass of the British proletariat which in Britain is so often cut off from the advanced workers by the cursed petty-bourgeois, liberal, aristocratic spirit of the British skilled worker.

A new spirit has been aroused in the Irish workers' unions. The unskilled workers have brought unparalleled animation into the trade unions. Even the women have begun to organise—a thing hitherto unknown in Catholic Ireland. So far as organisation of the workers is concerned Dublin looks like becoming one of the foremost towns in the whole of Great Britain. The country that used to be typified by the fat, well-fed Catholic priest and the poor, starving, ragged worker who wore his rags even on Sunday because he could not afford Sunday clothes, that country, though it bears a double and triple national yoke, has begun to turn into a country with an organised army of the proletariat.

Well, Murphy proclaimed a crusade of the bourgeoisie against Larkin and "Larkinism". To begin with, 200 tramwaymen were dismissed in order to provoke a strike during the exhibition and *embitter* the whole struggle. The Trans-

port Workers' Union declared a strike and demanded the reinstatement of the discharged men. Murphy engineered lock-outs. The workers retaliated by downing tools. War raged all along the line. Passions flared up.

Larkin—incidentally, he is the grandson of the famous Larkin executed in 1867 for participating in the Irish liberation movement—delivered fiery speeches at meetings. In these speeches he pointed out that the party of the English bourgeois enemies of Irish Home Rule was openly calling for resistance to the government, was threatening revolution, was organising armed resistance to Home Rule and with absolute impunity was flooding the country with revolutionary appeals.

But what the reactionaries, the *English* chauvinists Carson, Londonderry and Bonar Law (the English Purishkeviches, the nationalists who are persecuting Ireland), may do the proletarian socialist may not. Larkin was arrested. A meeting called by the workers was banned.

Ireland, however, is not Russia. The attempt to suppress the right of assembly evoked a storm of indignation. Larkin *had to be* tried. At the trial Larkin became the accuser and, in effect, put Murphy in the dock. By cross-questioning witnesses Larkin proved that Murphy had had long conversations with the Lord-Lieutenant on the eve of his, Larkin's, arrest. Larkin declared the police to be in Murphy's pay, and no one dared gainsay him.

Larkin was released on bail (political liberty cannot be abolished at one stroke). Larkin declared that he would appear at a meeting no matter what happened. And indeed, he came to one disguised, and began to speak to the crowd. The police recognised him, seized him and beat him up. For two days the dictatorship of the police truncheon raged, crowds were clubbed, women and children were brutally treated. The police broke into workers' homes. A worker named *Nolan*, a member of the Transport Workers' Union, was beaten to death. Another died of injuries.

On Thursday, September 4 (August 22, O.S.), Nolan's funeral took place. The proletariat of Dublin followed in a procession 50,000 strong behind the body of their comrade. The police brutes lay low, not daring to annoy the crowd, and exemplary order prevailed. "This is a more

magnificent demonstration than when they buried Parnell" (the celebrated Irish nationalist leader), said an old Irishman to a German correspondent.

The Dublin events mark a turning-point in the history of the labour movement and of socialism in Ireland. Murphy has threatened to destroy the Irish trade unions. He has succeeded only in destroying the last remnants of the influence of the Irish nationalist bourgeoisie over the Irish proletariat. He has helped to steel the independent revolutionary working-class movement in Ireland, which is free of nationalist prejudices.

This was seen immediately at the Trades Union Congress which opened on September 1 (August 19, O.S.), in Manchester. The Dublin events inflamed the delegates—despite the resistance of the opportunist trade union leaders with their petty-bourgeois spirit and their admiration for the bosses. The Dublin workers' delegation was given an ovation. Delegate Partridge, Chairman of the Dublin branch of the Engineers' Union, spoke about the abominable outrages committed by the police in Dublin. A young working girl had just gone to bed when the police raided her house. The girl hid in the closet, but was dragged out by the hair. The police were drunk. There "men" (if one may call them such) beat up ten-year-old lads and even five-year-old children!

Partridge was twice arrested for making speeches which the judge himself admitted were peaceful. "I am sure," said Partridge, "that I would now be arrested if I were to recite the Lord's Prayer in public."

The Manchester Congress sent a delegation to Dublin. The bourgeoisie there again took up the weapon of nationalism (just like the bourgeois nationalists in Poland, or in the Ukraine, or among the Jews!) declaring that "Englishmen have no business on Irish soil!" But, *fortunately*, the nationalists have already lost their influence over the workers.*

Speeches delivered at the Manchester Congress were of a kind that had not been heard for a long time.

* The Irish nationalists are already expressing the fear that Larkin will organise an independent Irish workers' party, which will have to be reckoned with in the first Irish national parliament.

A resolution was moved to transfer the whole Congress to Dublin, and to organise a general strike throughout Britain. Smillie, the Chairman of the Miners' Union, stated that the Dublin methods would compel all British workers to resort to revolution and that they would be able to learn the use of arms.

The masses of the British workers are slowly but surely taking a new path—they are abandoning the defence of the petty privileges of the labour aristocracy for their own great heroic struggle for a new system of society. And once on this path the British proletariat, with their energy and organisation, will bring socialism about more quickly and securely than anywhere else.

Severnaya Pravda No. 23,
August 29, 1913;
Nash Put No. 5,
August 30, 1913
Signed: *V.*

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NEW LAND "REFORM" MEASURES

The government has drafted a new bill on peasant land tenure. It is proposed to speedily "limit the fragmentation" of individual farmsteads and non-commune holdings. The landowners want to "protect small landed properties" from scattering, disintegration and fragmentation.

In essence the law prohibits the break-up of *medium-sized* peasant holdings—farmsteads and non-commune properties. When such lands are sold or inherited they must pass into the hands of a single owner. Co-heirs are to receive a cash "indemnity", to be assessed by landowners' survey commissions.

Cash for the indemnity payments is to be advanced on especially favourable terms by the Peasant Bank with the land as security. The size of the average (undivided) holdings is to be determined on the basis of the 1861 feudal laws on the size of the decree allotment.[105]

The significance of this bill is obvious. The landowners want to create privileged landed properties protected against capitalism for the peasant bourgeoisie. Realising that their privileges and their feudal system of land tenure are shaky, the landowners are trying to win over to their side the richest section of the peasant bourgeoisie, insignificant in numbers as it is. I will share a small part of my privileges with you, says the landowner to the kulaks and rich peasants, I will help you grow richer at the expense of the masses of peasants, who are being ruined, and you will protect me from those masses, you will be the bulwark of law and order. Such is the class meaning of the new bill.

Here we have absolutely perfect conformity with the general tendency of the June Third agrarian policy,

otherwise known as the Stolypin agrarian policy. It is one and the same landowners' policy, and the landowners as a class have not been able to pursue any other policy in Russia since 1905. There is no other way in which they can uphold their privileges or even their existence.

Democrats, both working-class and bourgeois (i.e., the peasantry as a mass), must recognise this indisputable truth of class relationships and draw from it the inevitable conclusion. There is nothing more foolish and reactionary than the bureaucratic point of view held by the liberals and the Narodniks, who fear the *mobilisation* of peasant lands, i.e., their free sale and purchase. *Rech*, for instance, in two editorials, states in reference to the new bill that "the protection of small landed properties is a necessity". The trouble, you see, was that the June Third agrarian policy was adopted "suddenly, as a sharp political weapon".

This is the sapient liberal, in the role of a "supra-class" civil servant, reproaching Stolypin, the leader of the landowners, for having used a political weapon for the benefit of the landowners! The cowardly desire to escape the inevitable class struggle is hidden by whimpering about the connection between the interests of a class and the politics of a class. No wonder Stolypin only laughed at *such* opponents.

"The protection of small landed properties", that favourite formula of the liberals (Russian) and the Narodniks, is a reactionary phrase. The working class supports the peasantry (and guides it) only when, and only to the extent that, its actions are democratic, that is, when they are in the interests of social development and of capitalist development, when they are in the interests of the country's deliverance from the yoke of the feudals and from their privileges. Every curtailment of the mobilisation of peasant lands is, first, a foolish measure, incapable of halting capitalism, a measure that can only worsen the condition of the masses, make their life more difficult and compel them to evade the law. Secondly, it is a measure that actually creates a small section of *privileged* petty bourgeois, the most hidebound and backward enemies of progress.

The working class does not counterpose to the class politics of the feudal landowners phrases in the "supra-class"

spirit, it counterposes the interests of the other classes that constitute nine-tenths of the population. The peasantry, as a petty-bourgeois mass, will for a long time waver between the consistent democracy of the proletariat and hopes of obtaining concessions from the landowners, hopes of sharing their privileges.

However, the conditions provided by the Russian landowners are so burdensome for the peasants, starvation for millions is so common under these conditions, that there can be no doubt whatsoever which side everything that is alive, viable and politically conscious will follow.

Nash Put No. 4,
August 29, 1913;
Severnaya Pravda No. 24,
August 30, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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THE MERCHANT SALAZKIN AND THE WRITER F. D.

The speech delivered by the merchant Salazkin is undoubtedly of great social significance. Gone for ever is that historical epoch, the epoch of "primitive accumulation", in which the landed nobility grumbled and appealed for "faith", and the merchant bowed and expressed his gratitude.

Gone, too, is the first period of the June Third, counter-revolutionary epoch, when the merchant, terrified to death by the movement of the masses, gazed upon Stolypin with admiration and tender emotion. The second period has begun, the period of working-class upswing, "social" revival and merchant liberalism.

A correct appraisal of this liberalism, something between Octobrism and the Cadet Party, is to an increasing extent being *forced* (by the course of events) even *upon* petty-bourgeois democrats. *Severnaya Pravda* recently quoted the just arguments of *Kievskaya Mysl* (see *Severnaya Pravda* No. 9,* August 11) on the *separation* of liberalism from democracy, on the *rapprochement* between the liberalism of the Cadets—to say nothing of the "Progressists"—and reactionary nationalism.

There are, however, some writers who lag behind even petty-bourgeois democracy because they are held in bondage by their own opportunist doctrine. At the head of these writers, of course, stands the liquidator F. D.

In his appraisal of Salazkin's speech, F. D. wrote (*Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, August 23) that the Black Hundreds were right to raise an outcry against Salazkin, "but the

* See pp. 302-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Left-wing [meaning liberal] press was also right in pointing out the organic inability of the bureaucracy to meet the pressing requirements of the country. *Rossiya* alone was not right."

"Salazkin's speech is not to be explained by love for radical programmes," says F. D., "but by the absence of law and order. The merchant has revolted.... And if such is the case, no matter how hostile the merchant may be towards radical programmes he will be compelled, if not today then tomorrow, to combine his efforts with those of the more radical sections of the country."

Such is F. D.'s appraisal. He goes no further than combining liberalism with the workers.

Very original! F. D. does not notice the combination of the efforts of the merchant with those of the Black-Hundred landowner. He does not notice that Salazkin is upholding the "fundamentals" of the June Third regime and within the framework of those fundamentals wants to push Purishkevich into the background.

Nor does he notice the difference between the *reformist* position of the liberals and Salazkin, and the position of the working class, which is alien to the wretched narrowness of reformism. The writer F. D. has overlooked the substance of the present difference between democracy and liberalism.

F. D. is interested in *one thing alone*—"combining" the liberals and the workers. An interesting ... speciality!

Regard F. D.'s article as a political document, regard it from the "all-Europe" point of view (for, indeed, F. D. and his friends are fond of talking about their Europeanism...). You will see that F. D. shares in full the position of Lloyd George and the extreme opportunists of the "workers' party" (on a British scale); or the position of Combes and Jaurès (on a French scale); or the position of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the organ of the Left liberals in Berlin, and of Bernstein, Kolb and Vollmar.

There is nothing in F. D.'s article that is unacceptable to a Left Cadet who is doing his best "to combine" "the efforts of the Salazkins with those of the more radical sections of the country".

The Marxist tells the workers—take advantage of the disagreement between the Salazkins and the Purishkeviches by neutralising the vacillation of the Salazkins, who are

much more closely "combined" with the Purishkeviches than with the opposition. The liberal tells the workers—the Salazkins will be compelled to combine their efforts with yours.

How comes it that the writer F. D. forgot to explain the class roots of the reformism of the liberals in general and of Salazkin in particular? How did F. D. even forget to point out the whole absurd, ridiculous, ugly narrowness of the reformism of Salazkin-type merchants under Russian conditions?

Was it not because the writer, *despite* his Marxist "signboard", upholds the very same reformist point of view that the merchant Salazkin holds *in conformity* with the interests of his class and his progressist, i.e., semi-Octobrist, signboard?

Severnaya Pravda No. 26,
September 1, 1913
Signed: *Para-conciliator*

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the *Severnaya Pravda* text

THE STRUGGLE FOR MARXISM

Recently there has been a lively discussion in the newspapers about collections made by St. Petersburg workers for the working-class press. It must be admitted that a most detailed and serious discussion of this question is essential since it is one of tremendous importance from the point of view of political principles.

How does the matter stand? The liquidators (*Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*) insist on the equal division of funds collected. The Marxists (*Severnaya Pravda*) demand division according to the wishes of the workers who contribute their pence. The workers must themselves decide, by a discussion on the trend represented by each newspaper, *for whom* they have made their contributions.

The resolution of twenty-two Vyborg supporters of the liquidators, the first *document* on the question, said simply (see *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 2, August 9): "Take collections for the benefit of working-class newspapers on a parity basis." Then the resolutions of some of the workers of the Nobel Works and the Putilov Works (ibid., Nos. 6, 8, 9, 10) upheld and actually put into practice the division of collections into *three equal* parts—one part each for the Marxists, liquidators and Narodniks. The *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* editors tacitly approved and defended it in an article by G. R.[106] (No. 9).

Severnaya Pravda, on the contrary, showed that equal division is an incorrect method and one that does not correspond to the aim and purposes of Marxism.

Every class-conscious worker, we repeat, must study this question with care and quite independently.

What are the arguments in favour of equal division? Reference is made to the "sacred slogan of Marxist workers—Workers of all countries, unite!"

The question arises—does this slogan demand the alliance of Marxist workers, who are members, say, of a Marxist party, with those who support *bourgeois* parties? Any worker who gives this a little thought will agree that it does not.

In all countries, even in the most advanced, there are workers who support bourgeois parties—they are for the Liberals in Britain, for the Radical-Socialists in France, for the Catholics, and the liberal "people's" party in Germany, for the Reform (petty-bourgeois) Party in Italy, etc., including the petty-bourgeois P.S.P. (Polish Socialist Party) in neighbouring Poland.

The great slogan calls upon workers to unite in a proletarian, independent, class party, and *not one* of the parties mentioned above is proletarian.

Take the basic principle of our Narodniks. From the Narodnik point of view, the abolition of the private ownership of land and its equalitarian division is socialism or "socialisation", but it is an erroneous and *bourgeois* point of view. Marx long ago showed that the more daring *bourgeois* economists can and do demand the abolition of private property in land.[107] It is a *bourgeois* reform that *extends* capitalism's field of action. We support the peasants as *bourgeois* democrats in their struggle for land and freedom against the feudal-minded landowners.

However, unity between a proletarian organisation of wage-workers and petty-bourgeois peasant democrats is a flagrant violation of the great Marxist slogan. Attempts at such unity would do great damage to the working-class movement and always end in an early collapse.

The history of Russia (in the years 1905, 1906 and 1907) has demonstrated that there is not and cannot be any mass, class support for the Narodniks, except that of the Left-wing peasantry.

The liquidators and the workers who follow them, therefore, have retreated from Marxism, have left the *class* path and entered on the path of non-party unity between wage-workers and a petty-bourgeois party. For it is, indeed, a

non-party alliance when the worker is told: don't try to find out which is the proletarian and which is the petty-bourgeois party, fork out equally for both!*

The masses "cannot get at the root of things", wrote G. R. in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 9. That is precisely why we need an old, tried and tested Marxist newspaper *to develop the political consciousness* of the masses who "cannot get at the root of things", *to help* them get at that root and *understand* it.

The reference made by G. R. and similar writers who *oppose* organised, Marxist unity (but never raise the question of uniting the two parties!)—their reference to "masses who cannot get at the root of things" is nothing but the *preaching* of non-party tendencies, is a *retreat* from Marxism, is the underhanded pursuit of petty-bourgeois views and policies.

By such a policy the liquidators justify their name, i.e., they are deserters from the Marxist organisation, its destroyers.

Another argument (see G. R.'s article and the discussion by the editors of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* in No. 6) is that collections taken in accordance with political trends would disrupt "unanimous opposition to the reactionaries", who persecute workers' newspapers.

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* The way in which some workers respond to the liquidators' unprincipled preaching may also be judged from the following resolution published in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 21.

"We find this decision [to divide collections equally between the three newspapers] to be necessary and the only just one; first, because all three newspapers are, as workers' newspapers, equally subjected to penalties and persecution and, secondly, the overwhelming majority of workers, both here and in other parts of the country, have not yet gained a full understanding of the specifics of the various party trends and cannot with full knowledge attach themselves to any one of them, but are equally in sympathy with all of them."

The liquidators' newspaper has never made an attempt to explain to its readers, has never given them an opportunity of finding out, whether a Narodnik newspaper may be considered a working-class newspaper, and whether it should be confused with a Marxist or even with a liquidators' newspaper. *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* prefers to stick to the "elemental", to plod along behind those who do not understand, as long as it can be "a nuisance" to the Marxists.

When a politically conscious worker has thought this over he will see that it is the old liberal argument about disrupting "unanimity against reaction" by the separation of the democrats from the liberals. It is a bourgeois argument and is profoundly erroneous.

The non-party masses "who cannot", as G. R. asserts, "get at the root of things", learn splendidly from examples. One who is still ignorant and not politically conscious, who cannot think or is too lazy to think and "get at the root of things" will wave his hand and say "I also protest, give them all an equal share". But one who *begins* to think and "get at the root of things", will *also* go to listen to *a discussion on platforms*, to the defence of the views of each trend, and, by listening to those who are *more* politically conscious, will himself gradually learn, and his indifference and his broad sympathy for all will change to a definite, thoughtful attitude to the newspapers.

The liquidators have forgotten all these elementary truths that "every worker should know and remember". They have proved by their *plan* to "divide equally" that they are *correctly* regarded as the vehicle of the non-party spirit, as renegades from Marxism and advocates of the "bourgeois influence over the proletariat" (see the unanimous decision of the Marxists, January 1910).

The Marxist organisation unites *politically conscious* workers by its common programme, common tactics, common decisions on the attitude to reaction, capitalists, bourgeois democrats (Narodniks), etc. All these *common* decisions—among others, the decisions of 1908, 1912 and 1913 on the absurdity and harmfulness of *reformism*—are upheld and are persistently implemented by the Marxists.

Discussions (talks, debates, disputes) about parties and about-common tactics are essential; without them the masses are disunited; without them common decisions are *impossible* and, therefore, unity of action is also impossible. Without them the Marxist organisation of those *workers* "who can get at the root of things" *would disintegrate* and the influence of the bourgeoisie on the unenlightened would thereby be facilitated.

In advocating collections in accordance with political trends, collections accompanied by a discussion on

platforms, the best St. Petersburg workers are struggling for Marxism against the champions of a non-party spirit.

We are confident that the workers will always and everywhere bend all their efforts to uphold *only* the Marxist system of collections and discussions, which *educate* the masses.

Severnaya Pravda No. 27,
September 3, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
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FROM MARX
TO MAO

NOT FOR
COMMERCIAL
DISTRIBUTION

A WEEK AFTER THE DUBLIN MASSACRE

On Sunday, September 7 (August 25, O.S.), exactly a week after the police massacre, the Dublin workers organised a huge meeting to protest against the conduct of the Irish capitalists and the Irish police.

The meeting took place in the same street (O'Connell Street) and at the same spot where the meeting banned by the police was to have taken place the previous Sunday. It is a historic spot, a spot where it is most convenient to organise meetings and where they are most frequently held in Dublin.

The police kept out of sight. The streets were filled with workers. There were crowds of people, but complete order prevailed. "Last Sunday," exclaimed an Irish speaker, "the police truncheon reigned here without reason; today reason reigns without the police truncheon."

Britain *has* a constitution—and the authorities did not dare to bring their drunken policemen into action for the second time. Three platforms were put up and six speakers, including representatives of the English proletariat, condemned the crime perpetrated against the people, called upon the workers to display international solidarity, to wage a common struggle.

A resolution was unanimously adopted demanding freedom of assembly and association, and calling for an immediate investigation—under the direction of independent persons and with a guarantee of publicity for all the proceedings—of the conduct of the police the previous Sunday.

In London a magnificent meeting was held in Trafalgar Square. Groups of socialists and workers came with their banners. There were many posters with cartoons and

slogans on topical events. The crowd particularly applauded a poster depicting a policeman waving a red flag with the inscription, "Silence!"

Outstanding speeches were made by Ben Tillett, who showed that the "Liberal" government of Britain is no better than a reactionary one, and Partridge, Dublin Secretary of the Engineers' Union, who described in detail the shameless acts of police violence in Dublin.

It is instructive to note that the principal slogan at the London and Dublin meetings was the demand for freedom of association. This is quite understandable. Britain *has* the foundations of political liberty, *has* a constitutional regime, generally speaking. The freedom of association demanded by the workers is one of the reforms absolutely necessary and quite achievable under the present constitutional regime (just as achievable as, say, the partial reform of workers' insurance in Russia).

Freedom of association is equally indispensable to the workers of Britain and of Russia. And the British workers quite rightly advance this slogan of a political reform essential to them, perfectly well aware of the path to be followed for its achievement and of its complete feasibility under the British Constitution (just as the Russian workers would be right in advancing the partial demand for amendments to the Insurance Act).

In Russia, however, precisely those general foundations of political liberty are absent *without which* the demand for freedom of association is simply ridiculous and is merely a current liberal phrase designed to deceive the people by suggesting that the path of reform is possible in our country. In Russia the fight for freedom of association—freedom most urgently needed by both the workers and the entire people—cannot be conducted *without* contrasting the impotent and false reformism of the liberals with the consistent democracy of the workers, who have no reformist illusions.

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QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE IN POLITICS

THE LIBERAL BOURGEOISIE AND REFORMISM

In the name of the merchants of all Russia, the millionaire Salazkin made an appeal for extensive political reforms in a speech at Nizhni-Novgorod Fair. At a meeting of three thousand metalworkers in St. Petersburg, the reformists suffered a decisive defeat, receiving only 150 votes for their candidates for membership of the executive body.[108]

These two facts, which simply cry out for comparison, make even quite unprincipled people ask questions of principle concerning present-day Russian politics. There are masses of people in all classes in Russia that are interested in politics, but few of them realise the significance of the theoretical principles involved in the presentation of questions of politics. Few people realise the significance of political parties that always give well-considered, precise and properly formulated answers to these questions. When the parties are connected with definite classes, such answers are given on the basis of work among the masses and are verified by years of such work.

The answers given by the Marxists were precisely of this type when four and a half years ago they appraised the June Third system and their tasks in relation to it.* Workers who for years and years have been acting conscientiously in the spirit of those answers in every possible sphere are divided by a deep gulf from those confused intellectuals who fear any sort of definite answer and who, at every step, slide into reformism and liquidationism.

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* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 321-24.—*Ed.*

One can only pity those people who, watching the struggle of the Marxists against the liquidators, avoid the issue with miserable words about the harmfulness of disputes, squabbles, internecine struggles, factionalism.... Many self-styled Marxists and all "Left" Narodniks belong to this category!

Those who, in principle, are champions of the bourgeoisie and enemies of Marxism, the liberals from the newspaper *Rech*, have been unable to ignore the above facts. They repeat all their tired, pitiful phrases in an editorial article (in issue No. 234), but now they go further.

The liberals are forced to admit that "the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the liquidators is going on everywhere", and that "it has percolated all the pores of the working-class organism".

So what of it? Could it be accidental?

No....

"Important disagreements on matters of principle have long been apparent; in the final analysis they may be reduced to the question of the course to be taken in the further development of the country."

At last they have thought it out! The Marxists explained this in December 1908, the liberals have begun to realise it in August 1913. Better late than never.

"Is the path of reforms conceivable," continues the liberal newspaper, "or are 'reforms possible only as a by-product of a movement that is completely free of all the narrowness of reformism' [quoted from *Severnaya Pravda*]. That is how the question is presented."

Precisely! The question of liquidationism is merely part of the question of the non-party reformists who have broken away from Marxism.

It will be interesting to see how the liberals, the champions of reformism in principle, defend it.

"There is, of course, a great deal of metaphysics and fatalism in the opinion that reforms are possible only as a 'by-product'. There can be no reforms without reformers and reformism, even if only as a 'by-product'"....

There again you have a sample of angry words and an attempt to evade an answer! What have metaphysics got to do with it, when historical experience, the experience of England, France, Germany and Russia, the experience of

all modern history in Europe and Asia, shows that serious reforms have always been merely the by-product of a movement completely free of the narrowness of reformism?

And what has fatalism to do with it, when that same experience says clearly that it is the very classes hostile to reformism that have produced the greatest effect?

Or perhaps there is more "fatalism" to be observed in the conduct of the Russian working class in the early years of the twentieth century than there was in the conduct of the liberal Zemstvo people and bourgeoisie in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century? You liberal gentlemen make yourselves ridiculous!

Can you possibly be such ignoramuses that you do not see the connection between the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class and their desire to confine themselves to reformism, between the condition of the working class and its contrary desire?

Indeed, gentlemen, you are poor advocates of reformism in general! But perhaps your defence of reformism in present-day Russia is better?

"It must be admitted," continues *Rech*, "that the situation now obtaining, one that has time and again demonstrated to the most modest reformers the futility of their efforts, turns people's thoughts, and especially their feelings, towards the negation of reformism."

So there you have it! It seems that even you, who make a principle of advocating reformism, cannot find support either in historical experience or in "the situation now obtaining" in Russia. Even you have to admit that the situation is against you!

What metaphysicians and fatalists you are, gentlemen—or what blind slaves to the narrow, selfish, cowardly moneybag—if you continue to uphold the unprincipled position of reformism in contradiction to the experience of history, in contradiction to the experience of "the situation now obtaining"! Are not you, who do not believe in reforms yourselves, actually defending that bourgeoisie that strives to gain profit at other people's expense?

It is understandable that an advanced contingent of the working class of Russia, the metalworkers of St. Petersburg, have dealt a crushing defeat to the reformists and liquidators among their number. According to the figures

of the liberal and reformist *Rech*, the reformist liquidators obtained 150 out of 2,000 votes, that is, seven and a half per cent of the total. Does this not show again and again—after the elections of workers to the Fourth Duma, after the history of the emergence of the working-class press in St. Petersburg and Moscow—that the liquidators represent only confused and half-liberal intellectuals, and that the mass of the politically conscious workers have firmly and resolutely condemned and rejected them?

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LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS ON THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

On several occasions the newspapers have mentioned the report of the Governor of the Caucasus, a report that is noteworthy, not for its Black-Hundred spirit but for its timid "liberalism". Among other things, the Governor objects to artificial Russification of non-Russian nationalities. Representatives of non-Russian nationalities in the Caucasus are *themselves* striving to teach their children Russian, as, for example, in the Armenian church schools, in which the teaching of Russian is not obligatory.

Russkoye Slovo (No. 198), one of the most widely circulating liberal newspapers in Russia, points to this fact and draws the correct conclusion that the hostility towards the Russian language in Russia "stems exclusively" from the "artificial" (the right word would have been "forced") implanting of that language.

"There is no reason to worry about the fate of the Russian language. It will itself win recognition throughout Russia, " says the newspaper. This is perfectly true, because the requirements of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities living in one state (as long as they wish to live together) to study the language of the majority. The more democratic the political system in Russia becomes, the more powerfully, rapidly and extensively capitalism will develop, the more urgently will the requirements of economic exchange impel various nationalities to study the language most convenient for general commercial relations.

The liberal newspaper, however, hastens to slap itself in the face and demonstrate its liberal inconsistency.

"Even those who oppose Russification," it says, "would hardly be likely to deny that in a country as huge as Russia there must be one single official language, and that this language can be only Russian."

Logic turned inside out! Tiny Switzerland has not lost anything, but has gained from having not *one single* official language, but three—German, French and Italian. In Switzerland 70 per cent of the population are Germans (in Russia 43 per cent are Great Russians), 22 per cent French (in Russia 17 per cent are Ukrainians) and 7 per cent Italians (in Russia 6 per cent are Poles and 4.5 per cent Byelorussians). If Italians in Switzerland often speak French in the common parliament they do not do so because they are compelled by some savage police law (there are none such in Switzerland), but because the civilised citizens of a democratic state themselves prefer a language that is understood by a majority. The French language does not excite hatred in Italians because it is the language of a free civilised nation, a language that is not imposed by disgusting police measures.

Why should "huge" Russia, a much more varied and terribly backward country, *inhibit* her development by the retention of any kind of privilege for any one language? Should not the contrary be true, liberal gentlemen? Should not Russia, if she wants to overtake Europe, put an end to every kind of privilege as quickly as possible, as completely as possible and as vigorously as possible?

If all privileges disappear, if the imposition of any one language ceases, all Slavs will easily and rapidly learn to understand each other and will not be frightened by the "horrible" thought that speeches in different languages will be heard in the common parliament. The requirements of economic exchange will themselves *decide* which language of the given country it is to the *advantage* of the majority to know in the interests of commercial relations. This decision will be all the firmer because it will be adopted voluntarily by a population of various nationalities, and its adoption will be the more rapid and extensive the more consistent the democracy and, as a consequence of this, the more rapid will be the development of capitalism.

The liberals approach the language question in the same way as they approach all political questions—like

hypocritical hucksters, holding out one hand (openly) to democracy and the other (behind their backs) to the serf-owners and police. We are against privileges, shout the liberals, and under cover they haggle with the serf-owners for first one, then another, privilege.

Such is the nature of *all* liberal-bourgeois nationalism—not only Great-Russian (it is the worst of them all because of its violent character and its kinship with the Purishkeviches) but Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Georgian and every other nationalism. Under the slogan of "national culture" the bourgeoisie of *all* nations, both in Austria and in Russia, are *in fact* pursuing the policy of splitting the workers, emasculating democracy and haggling with the serf-owners over the sale of the people's rights and the people's liberty.

The slogan of working-class democracy is not "national culture" but the international culture of democracy and the world-wide working-class movement. Let the bourgeoisie deceive the people with various "positive" national programmes. The class-conscious worker will answer the bourgeoisie—there is only one solution to the national problem (insofar as it can, in general, be solved in the capitalist world, the world of profit, squabbling and exploitation), and that solution is consistent democracy.

The proof—Switzerland in Western Europe, a country with an old culture, and Finland in Eastern Europe, a country with a young culture.

The national programme of working-class democracy is: absolutely no privilege for any one nation or any one language; the solution of the problem of the political self-determination of nations, that is, their separation as states by completely free, democratic methods; the promulgation of a law for the whole state by virtue of which any measure (Zemstvo, urban or communal, etc., etc.) introducing any privilege of any kind for one of the nations and militating against the equality of nations or the rights of a national minority, shall be declared illegal and ineffective, and any citizen of the state shall have the right to demand that such a measure be annulled as unconstitutional, and that those who attempt to put it into effect be punished.

Working-class democracy counterposes to the nationalist wrangling of the various bourgeois parties over questions of language, etc., the demand for the unconditional unity and complete solidarity of workers of *all* nationalities in *all* working-class organisations—trade union, co-operative, consumers', educational and all others—in contradistinction to any kind of bourgeois nationalism. Only this type of unity and solidarity can uphold democracy and defend the interests of the workers against capital—which is already international and is becoming more so—and promote the development of mankind towards a new way of life that is alien to all privileges and all exploitation.

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THE LANGUAGE OF FIGURES[109]

I

It is well known that particularly in 1905 and after factory workers' wages throughout Russia soared. The factory inspectors' reports say that the average wages of factory workers in Russia for the five years 1901-05 were 206 rubles and for the following five years, 1906-10, were 238 rubles.

The wages of workers in Moscow Gubernia are somewhat below the average for Russia. According to Factory Inspector Kozminykh-Lanin, they averaged 201 rubles in the 1901-05 period and 235 rubles for the succeeding four years, 1906-09.

As a result of 1905, therefore, the wages per worker in Moscow Gubernia increased by an average of *34 rubles*, i.e., by almost 17 per cent. Estimating the number of factory workers in Moscow Gubernia at between 300,000 and 350,000, this constitutes a total *annual* gain for all workers of something like *11,000,000 rubles*.

We see that the sacrifices made by the workers during the strikes of 1905 have been repaid by a considerable improvement in their economic position.

Although the victory of the June Third system, i.e., the counter-revolutionary system, led to the withdrawal of a number of the workers' gains, capital did not succeed in reducing workers' wages to the former low level. Workers' wages in Moscow Gubernia averaged about 200 rubles from 1901 to 1905, fluctuating between 197 rubles (1902) and 203 rubles (1905). In 1906, when the results of 1905 first

made themselves felt, wages rose to 228 rubles, and in 1907, to 237 rubles; in 1908 there was a slight drop (236.5 rubles) and in 1909 they again rose to 237 rubles.

The figures show that without the gains of 1905-06 the workers would have been subjected to intolerable poverty since the cost of living has been rising throughout the past decade.

II

Wages at the bigger factories in Moscow Gubernia are, as a rule, higher than those paid at the smaller establishments. The textile workers, who constitute 68 per cent, i.e., more than two-thirds, of the total number of factory workers in our gubernia, received the following average annual wages for the year 1909.

	Rubles	Per cent
Factories employing more than 1,000 workers . .	219	100
” ” from 501 to 1,000 ” . .	204	93
” ” ” 101 ” 500 ” . .	197	90
” ” ” 51 ” 100 ” . .	188	86
” ” ” 21 ” 50 ” . .	192	88
” ” ” 20 or less ” . .	164	75
Totals	211	96

The bigger the factory, the higher the wages. The same is to be found among the metalworkers. It is easier for the workers at a big factory to unite, repulse the capitalist and uphold their own demands collectively. To catch up with their more advanced comrades the workers in small factories and workshops must unite more strongly in associations (trade union, educational, co-operative and others) and rally more closely around their working-class newspaper.

Strikes are more easily organised and are conducted more successfully at big factories because of the greater solidarity of the workers. The big factories took part in the strike movement of 1905 and 1906 to a greater extent than the small factories.

We see that on account of this the workers in the biggest factories *gained more* from the strikes of those years than the workers at small establishments. Here are the figures for workers in all industries in Moscow Gubernia;

Average annual wages per worker

Category of factory	Five years 1901-05	Four years 1906-09	Ruble increase
Employing more than 1,000 workers	196	234	+38
" from 501 to 1,000 "	186	231	+45
" " 101 " 500 "	211	238	+27
" " 51 " 100 "	215	240	+25
" " 21 " 50 "	216	241	+25
" " 20 or less "	193	207	+14
Totals	201	235	+34

First of all we must explain, in respect of these figures, the (apparent) exception to the rule formulated above, according to which wages at the bigger factories are higher than at smaller establishments. The point is that metal-workers, printers and some others earn much more than textile workers (360 rubles, 310 rubles as compared with 211 rubles, etc.). The *share* of the textile workers in the total number of workers at big factories is much greater than their share at the medium and small establishments. This accounts for the apparent exception to the rule, which makes it appear that wages are higher at medium and small than at big factories.

What conclusion are we to draw concerning increased wages at big and small factories since 1905?

At the big factories (those employing 500 or more workers) the increase amounts to about 40 rubles a year, that is, about 20 kopeks to a ruble.

At medium and small factories, employing from 21 to 500 workers, the increase amounts to about 25 rubles, that is, about 12 kopeks to a ruble.

At the very smallest factories (20 workers and less) the increase is a mere 14 rubles, that is, 7-8 kopeks to a ruble.

Thus the more vigorous and united strike struggle by workers at the big factories resulted in a greater increase in wages. We have already said that workers in small factories can catch up with the workers in big factories in this respect by uniting in associations.

III

Increased wages were not the only gains made by workers in the strike movement of 1905. The position of the workers has, in general, changed for the better.

It is impossible to express the exact extent of this improvement in figures, but in 1905-06 every worker realised the improvement and felt it strongly.

The data given by Factory Inspector Kozminykh-Lanin enable us to determine the influence of 1905 only on the *fining* of workers. By fining workers the capitalist is taking upon himself the role of judge. For this reason fines are always accompanied by particularly extensive arbitrary action in respect of the workers and at times even by direct humiliation of the workers. It is natural that the workers always demand the *annulment* of fines, the abolition of the capitalists' right to be judges in the workers' affairs.

The following are the figures for fines levied on all workers in Moscow Gubernia year by year.

Year	Average fine per worker (kopeks)
1901	30
1902	27
1903	27
1904	29
1905	17
1906	12
1907	15
1908	18
1909	21

We see how successfully the workers "reduced" the amount of the fines. Before 1905 the fines amounted to 27-30 kopeks a worker.

But then comes the year 1905. Fines immediately drop to almost a half—to 17 kopeks. In 1906 the results of 1905 are more clearly demonstrated—fines drop to 12 kopeks.

The revolution passes. The capitalists grow bolder. The fines again rise to 15-18-21 kopeks.

But even in 1909—the year of the longest and deepest lull—the capitalists did not succeed in raising fines to the former disgraceful level. No matter how the capitalist

may fawn upon Purishkevich, these two "dear friends" have not succeeded in going back to the good old days—the *worker in Russia has changed*. The worker in Russia has learned a thing or two!

If we compare the total fines with the total wages of the workers—and such a comparison is essential for it is not the same thing to pay twenty kopeks out of wages of one ruble as paying twenty kopeks out of wages of a ruble and a half—the victory of the workers in 1905 becomes still more obvious.

Out of every 100 rubles of the workers' wages, the fines per annum averaged in kopeks:

1901	15	1906	5
1902	14	1907	6
1903	13	1908	8
1904	14	1909	9
1905	9		

It follows, therefore, that the workers of Moscow Gubernia achieved a reduction of atrocious fines to *one-third* as a result of 1905. They will succeed in obtaining the complete abolition of fines.

IV

In conclusion let us take a brief glance at the question of what share of his wages the Moscow worker obtains in cash.

The Moscow workers are in a difficult position in this respect. In 1909 their total wages amounted to 73,000,000 rubles; of this sum they received 61,500,000 rubles, that is, 84.2 per cent, in cash. Almost a tenth of their wages, 7,200,000 rubles, was paid in the shape of groceries and other commodities from the factory shops. This type of wages places the workers in serf-like dependence on the owners and gives those owners "superprofits".

The position of workers in the cotton industry is particularly bad—over one-fifth of their wages (5,900,000 rubles out of 28,800,000) is paid in foodstuffs. If the workers were to win for themselves free workers' co-operatives there would not only be a saving of hundreds of thousands of rubles for the slaves of capital, but the semi-serf dependence

of the workers on the factory owners' shops would be removed.

To continue: 3,750,000 rubles (5 per cent) of the workers' wages went to pay for products they took from the shops of consumers' associations, etc. Lastly, 680,000 rubles (0.9 per cent) of the wages went for the maintenance of workers boarded by factory owners.

This form of payment, which dooms the workers to a thousand forms of dependence of a serf character, has been preserved most noticeably in industries processing silk and flax, and after them in those processing food and livestock products.

As for the influence of 1905 on the forms in which wages are paid, we may say that there have been practically no gains. Here are the figures, as from 1901:

Year	Workers' total wages (million rubles	*Percentages of wages paid in:* Cash	Goods from factory shops	Goods from consumers' associations	Boarding of workers by factory owners
1901 .	53	81.4	8.9	7.3	2.4
1902 .	54	81.5	9.1	7.0	2.4
1903 .	57	83.0	8.3	6.6	2.1
1904 .	55	82.7	9.0	6.5	1.8
1905 .	57	82.8	9.2	6.5	1.5
1906 .	64	85.1	7.6	5.8	1.5
1907 .	71	83.8	9.4	5.3	1.5
1908 .	73	82.9	10.4	5.2	1.5
1909 .	73	84.2	9.8	5.1	0.9

Since 1905 payment in cash has increased to an extremely insignificant extent. The system of boarding workers by factory owners has been reduced to an equally small extent. And payment of wages through factory shops, on the contrary, has somewhat increased.

Taking it by and large, the situation has remained as bad as it was before. Moscow workers must struggle for the payment of wages in cash and for the replacement of factory shops by free workers' consumers' associations.

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BOURGEOIS GENTLEMEN ON "FAMILY" FARMING

At the Kiev Agricultural Congress, before an audience of 1,000 landowners from all parts of Russia, Professor Kosinsky read the first paper, in which he tried to prove that "family farming" had become paramount in agriculture.

The question of "family" farming is one of the most important when one is seeking an explanation of capitalist relations in agriculture. In Russia, moreover, there is the Narodnik bourgeois party (this includes the Left Narodniks), which tries to make the workers believe it is a socialist party and most zealously advocates "family" farming. It is, therefore, necessary for every class-conscious worker to understand what this "family" farming is.

Mr. Bourgeois Professor Kosinsky, producing no data of any kind, asserted that peasant farming is growing and large-scale farming, which exploits wage-labour, is collapsing and dying out. The professor

> "distinguished three forms of peasant farms: (1) parcellised (dwarf) farms, when the peasant works at a factory, and at home, in his own village, has only a vegetable garden or an allotment attached to his house, the cultivation of which provides a small addition to his income; (2) subsistence farms, with a somewhat larger allotment, the cultivation of which does not meet all the requirements of the family, some members of which work elsewhere; (3) family farms, peasant farms proper, on which the entire family works.
>
> "Agrarian evolution is leading to the break-up of the second category and its replacement by family and parcellised farms. The future is assured mainly for the family farms. The average size of these farms, expressed in Russian measure, is about 50 dessiatines. The triumph of family farming is in no way accompanied by the proletarianisation of the rural districts" (*Kievskaya Mysl* No. 242).

These, then, are the principles of the bourgeois theory of "family" farming borrowed by the Narodniks. Every

worker who is in any way familiar with political economy will immediately see that what Mr. Bourgeois calls parcellised or dwarf farms are the *proletarian*, labourer farms, the "farms" of *wage*-workers.

Evidently by "subsistence" farms he means small peasant farms which do not produce mainly for exchange; not commercial farms, but natural economy farms (on which the peasant produces his own food). In admitting that these farms are being ousted our uninformed bourgeois professor admits the victory of capitalism, the growth of exchange, and the squeezing out of small farming. By *what kind* of farming is it being ousted? Firstly by proletarian farming. This is precisely what is called proletarianisation, Mr. Uninformed Professor! Secondly by "family" farming, in which the average size of farms is about 50 dessiatines.

It remains for me to prove to the uninformed professor and to his Socialist-Revolutionary (Narodnik) pupils that "family" farming is precisely *petty-bourgeois*, *capitalist* farming.

What is the principal feature of capitalism? The employment of wage-labour. It is time our professors and Socialist-Revolutionaries learnt this truth.

What do European, scientific statistics tell us about wage-labour in peasant farming? They tell us that not only 50 dessiatine farms, but even farms of *over 10 hectares* (a hectare is about the same as a dessiatine), *in the majority of cases*, cannot dispense with wage-labour!

Germany. The last census (1907). Number of farms from 10 to 20 hectares—412,741. These employ 711,867 wage-workers. Even the farms from 5 to 10 hectares employ a total of 487,704 wage-workers on 652,798 farms. In other words: even here the number of wage-workers equals more than half the total number of farms. And everybody knows that in the overwhelming majority of cases the small farmer does not employ more than one hired worker.

Austria. The last census (1902). Number of farms from 10 to 20 hectares—242,293. Of these the *majority*, 142,272, i.e., nearly three-fifths, employ wage-workers. We will add that the development of capitalism in Austria is far behind that of Germany. Taking Austrian agriculture as a whole, the percentage of wage-workers employed is *half*

the German percentage (14 per cent as against 30 per cent).

Switzerland. The last census (1905). Number of farms from 10 to 15 hectares—19,641. Of these, 11,148, i.e., the *majority*, employ wage-workers. Of the farms of 5 to 10 hectares about 36 per cent in Switzerland and 33 per cent in Austria employ wage-workers.

One can judge from this how profoundly ignorant, or extremely unconscientious, is the bourgeois professor in whose train the Narodniks follow, a professor who *denies* the proletarianisation of the rural districts and *admits* that "subsistence" farms are being ousted, firstly, by proletarian farms, and secondly, by "family" farms, applying this sentimental catchword to farms employing wage-workers!

All those who praise the successes of "family" farming under capitalism (including our Left Narodniks) are bourgeois, who deceive the workers. The deception lies, firstly, in painting the bourgeoisie in bright colours. The exploiter of wage-labour is called a "working" farmer! Secondly, the deception lies in concealing the gulf that divides the overwhelming majority of the proletarian farms from the insignificant minority of capitalist farms.

The interests of the bourgeoisie demand the embellishment of capitalism and the concealment of the gulf that divides the classes. The interests of the proletariat demand the exposure of capitalism and of the exploitation of wage-labour; they demand that the eyes of the masses be opened to the immensity of the gulf that divides the classes.

Here are brief figures taken from the census of 1907, showing the gulf that divides the classes in German agriculture. Total number of farms—5,700,000. Of these, proletarian farms (up to two hectares) number 3,400,000. The overwhelming majority of these "farmers" are *wage-workers* who possess small plots of land.

Then follow the petty farmers (2 to 5 hectares per farm; total number of farms, 1,000,000). These are the poorest peasants. Less than half of them (495,000) are independent tillers *without* any other occupation. The majority are in need of outside employment, i.e., they have to sell their labour-power. These peasants join the proletariat most easily.

We will combine these to make up *Group I*: proletarian and small peasant farms.

Group II: middle peasant farms (5 to 10 hectares). As we have seen, a fairly large number of these exploit wage-workers. The middle peasant is a petty bourgeois who wavers between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Group III: the rest, i.e., the capitalists (20 hectares and over) and big peasants (10 to 20 hectares). As we have seen, the *majority* of the big peasants exploit wage-workers.

Thus, Group I consists of proletarian and small peasant farms; Group II consists of middle peasant farms; Group III consists of big peasant and pure capitalist farms. Let us see how much land and livestock these groups own.

Group	Number of farms (000,000)	Number of workers (000,000)	Area of land (000,000 hectares) (000,000)	Number livestock (in terms of cattle)	Number of machines (000,000)
I	4.4	7.3	5.0	7.0	0.2
II	0.6	2.5	4.6	5.1	0.4
III	0.7	5.4	22.2	17.3	1.2
Total	5.7	15.2	31.8	29.4	1.8

Such is the picture of modern agriculture; not the picture drawn by the professor, or by the Narodniks, but the real picture. *Most* of the land, livestock and machines belong to an insignificant minority (less than one-eighth—0.7 out of 5.7) of capitalists and peasant bourgeois. The *overwhelming majority* of the "farmers" (4.4 million out of 5.7 million) have less than two workers, less than two dessiatines and less than two head of livestock per farm. These are paupers. Their share in the total agricultural production is insignificant. They are led by the nose with promises of salvation under capitalism.

Compare the productivity of labour in the various groups (i.e., the number of workers per dessiatine of land and per head of livestock), and you will see a barbarous dissipation and waste of labour on the small farms. The capitalist farms own nearly all the machines and labour productivity is high.

Compare the number of livestock with the amount of land (including meadow land, land under fodder crops, etc.)

in the various groups. You will see starving cattle in the small farms and capitalist "prosperity" among the small group at the top.

The Marxists champion the interests of the masses and say to the peasants: there is no salvation for you except by joining in the proletarian struggle. The bourgeois professors and the Narodniks are deceiving the masses with fables about small "family" farming under capitalism.

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the *Pravda Truda* text

HARRY QUELCH

On Wednesday, September 17 (September 4, O.S.), Comrade Harry Quelch, leader of the British Social-Democrats, died in London. The British Social-Democratic organisation was formed in 1884 and was called the Social Democratic Federation. In 1909 the name was changed to Social-Democratic Party, and in 1911, after a number of independently existing socialist groups amalgamated with it, it assumed the name of the British Socialist Party.

Harry Quelch was one of the most energetic and devoted workers in the British Social-Democratic movement. He was active not only as a Social-Democratic Party worker, but also as a trade-unionist. The London Society of Compositors repeatedly elected him its Chairman, and he was several times Chairman of the London Trades Council.

Quelch was the editor of *Justice*,[110] the weekly organ of the British Social-Democrats, as well as editor of the party monthly journal, the *Social-Democrat*.

He took a very active part in all the work of the British Social-Democratic movement and regularly addressed party and public meetings. On many occasions he represented British Social-Democracy at international congresses and on the International Socialist Bureau. Incidentally, when he attended the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress he was persecuted by the Wurtemburg Government, which *expelled* him from Stuttgart (without trial, by police order, as an alien) for referring at a public meeting to the Hague Conference as a "thieves' supper". When, the day following Quelch's expulsion, the Congress resumed its session, the British delegates left empty the chair on which Quelch had sat, and hung a notice on it bearing the inscription:

"Here sat Harry Quelch, now expelled by the Wurtemburg Government."

The South Germans often boast of their hatred for the Prussians because of the Prussian red tape, bureaucracy and police rule, but they themselves behave like the worst Prussians where a proletarian socialist is concerned.

The historical conditions for the activities of the British Social-Democrats, whose leader Quelch was, are of a very particular kind. In the most advanced land of capitalism and political liberty, the British bourgeoisie (who as far back as the seventeenth century settled accounts with the absolute monarchy in a rather democratic way) managed in the nineteenth century to *split* the British working-class movement. In the middle of the nineteenth century Britain enjoyed an almost complete monopoly in the world market. Thanks to this monopoly the profits acquired by British capital were extraordinarily high, so that it was possible for some crumbs of these profits to be thrown to the aristocracy of labour, the skilled factory workers.

This aristocracy of labour, which at that time earned tolerably good wages, boxed itself up in narrow, self-interested craft unions, and isolated itself from the mass of the proletariat, while in politics it supported the liberal bourgeoisie. And to this very day perhaps nowhere in the world are there so many liberals among the advanced workers as in Britain.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, things began to change. Britain's monopoly was challenged by America, Germany, etc. The economic basis for the narrow, petty-bourgeois trade-unionism and liberalism among British workers has been destroyed. Socialism is again raising its head in Britain, getting through to the masses and growing irresistibly *despite* the rank opportunism of the British near-socialist intelligentsia.

Quelch was in the front ranks of those who fought steadfastly and with conviction against opportunism and a liberal-labour policy in the British working-class movement. True, isolation from the masses sometimes infected the British Social-Democrats with a certain sectarianism. Hyndman, the leader and founder of Social-Democracy in Britain, has even slipped into jingoism. But the party of the Social-

Democrats* has fought him on this, and over the whole of Britain the Social-Democrats, and they *alone*, have for decades been carrying on systematic propaganda and agitation in the Marxist spirit. This is the great historical service rendered by Quelch and his comrades. The fruits of the activities of the Marxist Quelch will be reaped in full measure by the British working-class movement in the next few years.

In conclusion we cannot refrain from mentioning Quelch's sympathy for the Russian Social-Democrats and the assistance he rendered them. Eleven years ago the Russian Social-Democratic newspaper had to be printed in London. The British Social-Democrats, headed by Quelch, readily made their printing-plant available. As a consequence, Quelch himself had to "squeeze up". A corner was boarded off at the printing-works by a thin partition to serve him as editorial room. This corner contained a very small writing-table, a bookshelf above it, and a chair. When the present writer visited Quelch in this "editorial office" there was no room for another chair....

Pravda Truda No. 1,
September 11, 1913;
Nash Put No. 16,
September 12, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

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* The party here referred to is the British Socialist Party, founded in 1911.—*Ed.*

MARXISM AND REFORMISM

Unlike the anarchists, the Marxists recognise struggle for reforms, i.e., for measures that improve the conditions of the working people without destroying the power of the ruling class. At the same time, however, the Marxists wage a most resolute struggle against the reformists, who, directly or indirectly, restrict the aims and activities of the working class to the winning of reforms. Reformism is bourgeois deception of the workers, who, despite individual improvements, will always remain wage-slaves, as long as there is the domination of capital.

The liberal bourgeoisie grant reforms with one hand, and with the other always take them back, reduce them to nought, use them to enslave the workers, to divide them into separate groups and perpetuate wage-slavery. For that reason reformism, even when quite sincere, in practice becomes a weapon by means of which the bourgeoisie corrupt and weaken the workers. The experience of all countries shows that the workers who put their trust in the reformists are always fooled.

And conversely, workers who have assimilated Marx's theory, i.e., realised the inevitability of wage-slavery so long as capitalist rule remains, will not be fooled by any bourgeois reforms. Understanding that where capitalism continues to exist reforms cannot be either enduring or far-reaching, the workers fight for better conditions and use them to intensify the fight against wage-slavery. The reformists try to divide and deceive the workers, to divert them from the class struggle by petty concessions. But the workers, having seen through the falsity of reformism, utilise reforms to develop and broaden their class struggle.

The stronger reformist influence is among the workers the weaker they are, the greater their dependence on the bourgeoisie, and the easier it is for the bourgeoisie to nullify reforms by various subterfuges. The more independent the working-class movement, the deeper and broader its aims, and the freer it is from reformist narrowness the easier it is for the workers to retain and utilise improvements.

There are reformists in all countries, for everywhere the bourgeoisie seek, in one way or another, to corrupt the workers and turn them into contented slaves who have given up all thought of doing away with slavery. In Russia, the reformists are liquidators, who renounce our past and try to lull the workers with dreams of a new, open, legal party. Recently the St. Petersburg liquidators were forced by *Severneya Pravda** to defend themselves against the charge of reformism. Their arguments should be carefully analysed in order to clarify an extremely important question.

We are not reformists, the St. Petersburg liquidators wrote, because we have not said that reforms are everything and the ultimate goal nothing; we have spoken of movement to the ultimate goal; we have spoken of advancing through the struggle for reforms to the fulness of the aims set.

Let us now see how this defence squares with the facts.

First fact. The liquidator Sedov, summarising the statements of all the liquidators, wrote that of the Marxists' "three pillars" two are no longer suitable for our agitation. Sedov retained the demand for an eight-hour day, which, theoretically, can be realised as a reform. He deleted, or relegated to the background the very things that go beyond reforms. Consequently, Sedov relapsed into downright opportunism, following the very policy expressed in the formula: the ultimate goal is nothing. When the "ultimate goal" (even in relation to democracy) is pushed further and further away from our agitation, that is reformism.

Second fact. The celebrated August Conference (last year's) of the liquidators likewise pushed non-reformist demands further and further away—until some special occasion—instead of bringing them closer, into the heart of our agitation.

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* See pp. 325-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Third fact. By denying and disparaging the "old" and dissociating themselves from it, the liquidators thereby confine themselves to reformism. In the present situation, the connection between reformism and the renunciation of the "old" is obvious.

Fourth fact. The workers' economic movement evokes the wrath and attacks of the liquidators (who speak of "crazes", "milling the air", etc., etc.) as soon as it adopts slogans that go beyond reformism.

What is the result? In words, the liquidators reject reformism as a principle, but in practice they adhere to it all along the line. They assure us, on the one hand, that for them reforms are not the be-all and end-all, but on the other hand, every time the Marxists go beyond reformism, the liquidators attack them or voice their contempt.

However, developments in every sector of the working-class movement show that the Marxists, far from lagging behind, are definitely in the lead in making practical use of reforms, and in fighting for them. Take the Duma elections at the worker curia level—the speeches of our deputies inside and outside the Duma, the organisation of the workers' press, the utilisation of the insurance reform; take the biggest union, the Metalworkers' Union, etc.,—everywhere the Marxist workers are ahead of the liquidators, in the direct, immediate, "day-to-day" activity of agitation, organisation, fighting for reforms and using them.

The Marxists are working tirelessly, not missing a single "possibility" of winning and using reforms, and not condemning, but supporting, painstakingly developing every step beyond reformism in propaganda, agitation, mass economic struggle, etc. The liquidators, on the other hand, who have abandoned Marxism, by their attacks on the very existence of the Marxist body, by their destruction of Marxist discipline and advocacy of reformism and a liberal-labour policy, are only disorganising the working-class movement.

Nor, moreover, should the fact be overlooked that in Russia reformism is manifested also in a peculiar form, in identifying the fundamental political situation in present-day Russia with that of present-day Europe. From the liberal's point of view this identification is legitimate, for the liberal believes and professes the view that "thank

God, we have a Constitution". The liberal expresses the interests of the bourgeoisie when he insists that, after October 17, every step by democracy beyond reformism is madness, a crime, a sin, etc.

But it is these bourgeois views that are applied in practice by our liquidators, who constantly and systematically "transplant" to Russia (on paper) the "open party" and the "struggle for a legal party", etc. In other words, like the liberals, they preach the transplanting of the European constitution to Russia, *without* the specific path that in the West led to the adoption of constitutions and their consolidation over generations, in some cases even over centuries. What the liquidators and liberals want is to wash the hide without dipping it in water, as the saying goes.

In Europe, reformism actually means abandoning Marxism and replacing it by bourgeois "social policy". In Russia, the reformism of the liquidators means not only that, it means destroying the Marxist organisation and abandoning the democratic tasks of the working class, it means replacing them by a liberal-labour policy.

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THE LAND QUESTION AND THE RURAL POOR

A paper on this important subject was read by Minin, a Chernigov agronomist, at the All-Russian Agricultural Congress on September 3 in Kiev.

Mr. Minin, apparently a Narodnik (who agreed, incidentally, with the bourgeois professor Kosinsky on the viability of "family" farming), demonstrated in all justice that agronomy helps the affluent peasant. The agrarian regulations help the strong and ruin the poor. They are a chariot in which the strong sit and crush the defeated.

There can be no doubt that this is an absolute truth. Only people without a conscience could deny it. But in what does Mr. Minin see "salvation"?

He said (according to the report in *Kievskaya Mysl* No. 244):

> "The only thing that will save the smallest farms after the reallocation is for them to form themselves into voluntary co-operatives for the joint exploitation (collective tilling) of their own land."

Obviously, this Narodnik remedy is simply childish. The landowners and kulaks are driving millions of peasants from the land and ruining millions more. World capitalism as a whole, the entire power of international commerce, the might of capital to the tune of thousands of millions in the hands of the bourgeoisie of all countries are pulling Russia along with them, sustaining and supporting her bourgeoisie in the towns and in the *countryside*, including those within the village communes. And now we are told that the collective tilling of "their own scraps of land by ruined peasants is "salvation"! This is like trying to beat a railway train with a wheelbarrow—in speed and carrying capacity.

It won't work, my Narodnik gentlemen! You are right, of course, when you say that the railway train is crushing the poor, but wheelbarrows are not what you should be thinking about.

Not backward from the train to the wheelbarrow, but onward from the capitalist train to that of the united proletarians.

The innocent dreams of the Narodniks are not only childishly naïve, they are actually harmful because they divert the minds of the poor from the class struggle. There is no salvation for the rural poor *outside* the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the reconstruction of the entire capitalist system. All these unions, co-operatives, associations, etc., can only be of use if they participate consciously in that class struggle.

Although it is beyond all shadow of doubt that the development of capitalism and the proletarianisation of the countryside must inevitably continue in Russia, as in the rest of the world, it would be the greatest mistake to confine oneself to this truth.

There are various kinds of capitalism—the semi-feudal capitalism of the landowners with its host of residual privileges, which is the most reactionary and causes the masses the greatest suffering; there is also the capitalism of free farmers, which is the most democratic, causes the masses less suffering and has fewer residual privileges.

What influence, for example, would the transfer of all the land to the peasants without compensation have on the development of capitalism in Russia? That would not be socialism. That would *also* be capitalism, yet it would not be Purishkevich-Guchkov but democratic, Narodnik-peasant capitalism. The development of capitalism would proceed more rapidly, more extensively, more freely and with less suffering for the masses.

That is the *real substance* of the present, existing agrarian problem in Russia. That is what the advocates of landowners' solution of the land question and bourgeois agronomy on the one hand, and the Narodniks and Left Cadets (such as Shakhovskoi) on the other, were arguing about in Kiev (without understanding the substance of the issue). They were arguing about whether bourgeois democrats

should leave the Purishkeviches to complete the organisation of the new Russia on feudal-capitalist lines, or whether they should take that organisation into their own hands, into the hands of the masses, into the hands of the peasants, and continue it without the Purishkeviches on free, democratic, capitalist lines.

It is not difficult to understand the position of the politically conscious worker on this issue. We know perfectly well that both the Stolypin path of development and that of the Narodniks mean the development of capitalism, which will in any case lead to the triumph of the proletariat. We shall not lose heart, no matter which turn history takes. But we shall not allow history to take any turn without our participation, without the active intervention of the advanced class. The working class is not indifferent to the clashes between the Purishkeviches and the peasant democrats; its attitude is one of heartiest, most devoted defence of the interests of peasant democracy and democracy for the entire people in their most consistent form.

Not the least concession to the alleged socialism (but actually petty-bourgeois dreaming) of the Narodniks, which is rotten through and through, but the greatest attention to the peasant democrats, to their education, to awakening and rallying them, to liberating them from every kind of stifling prejudice—such is the line taken by the politically conscious worker.

Do you want to dream of the victory of the wheelbarrow over the train? Then your way is not ours, we are the enemies of banal Manilovism.[111] Do you want to fight against the Purishkeviches? Then your way is ours, but remember that the workers will not forgive the slightest vacillation.

But the working class treats those who, in obsequious haste, declare the "complete" success of Stolypin's solution of the land question with the contempt that advanced, strong classes hostile to reformism always display towards opportunists and towards the knights of transient success.

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HOW DOES BISHOP NIKON DEFEND THE UKRAINIANS?

It is reported in *Kievskaya Mysl* that Bishop Nikon, deputy to the State Duma, Right, was the first to put his signature to the bill on the Ukrainian school and Ukrainian associations submitted to the Duma.

The hill says: teaching in elementary schools in the Ukrainian language shall be permitted; Ukrainian teachers shall be appointed; the teaching of the Ukrainian language and the history of the Ukraine shall be introduced; Ukrainian associations shall not be persecuted and they shall not be closed "at the discretion of the authorities, which is frequently undisguised lawlessness".

Thus Purishkevich's party comrade, Bishop Nikon, does not like *lawlessness* in *certain* cases.

Bishop Nikon is quite right in assuming that the question he raises "is one of outstanding importance, one that concerns the perversion of the thirty-seven million Ukrainians"; in saying that "the rich, beautiful, talented, flourishing and poetic Ukraine is being condemned to degeneration, gradual stultification and slow extinction".

The protest against the oppression of the Ukrainians by the Great Russians is a perfectly just one. But let us look at the arguments Bishop Nikon puts forward in defence of the Ukrainian demands.

"The Ukrainian people do not seek any of this notorious autonomy, re-establishment of the Zaporozhye Sech or something of that kind; the Ukrainians are not separatists.... The Ukrainians are not people of foreign extraction, they are our own people, our blood brothers, and as such should not suffer any limitations in respect of their language and the development of their national culture; otherwise we equate them, our brothers, with the Jews, Poles, Georgians and others, who actually are people of foreign extraction."

And so it boils down to this—the Ukrainian Bishop Nikon and others of his school of thought are begging the Great-Russian landowners to grant *privileges* to the Ukrainians on the grounds that they are their brothers, while the Jews are people of foreign extraction! To put it simply and forthrightly—because the Jews and others are of foreign extraction we agree to oppress them, if you make concessions to us.

The picture is the familiar one of the defence of "national culture" *by all* bourgeois nationalists, from the Black Hundreds to the liberals, and even to the bourgeois-democratic nationalists!

What Bishop Nikon refuses to understand is that the Ukrainians cannot be protected from oppression unless all peoples, without exception, are protected from all oppression, unless the concept "people of foreign extraction" is completely expunged from the life of the state, unless the complete equality of rights of all nationalities is upheld. No one can be protected from national oppression unless the most extensive local and regional autonomy and the principle of settling *all* state questions in accordance with the will of the majority of the population (that is, the principle of consistent democracy) are consistently put into practice.

Bishop Nikon's slogan of "national culture" for the Ukrainians means nothing more than the propagation of Black-Hundred ideas in the Ukrainian language; it is the slogan of Ukrainian-clerical culture.

Politically conscious workers have understood that the slogan of "national culture" is clerical or bourgeois deception—no matter whether it concerns Great-Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Polish, Georgian or any other culture. A hundred and twenty-five years ago, when the nation had not been split into bourgeoisie and proletariat, the slogan of national culture could have been a single and integral call to struggle against feudalism and clericalism. Since that time, however, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has gained momentum everywhere. The division of the "single" nation into exploiters and exploited has become an accomplished fact.

Only the clericals and the bourgeoisie can speak of national culture in general. The working people can speak only

of the international culture of the world working-class movement. That is the only culture that means full, real, sincere equality of nations, the absence of national oppression and the implementation of democracy. Only the unity and solidarity of workers of all nations in *all* working-class organisations in the struggle against capital will lead to "the solution of the national problem".

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NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

I. NON-PARTY INTELLECTUALS AGAINST MARXISM

The editors of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* have come out in defence of the non-Party agitation to divide collections equally between the liquidators, the Narodniks and the Marxists.

When it was pointed out to them that such a division is an absolutely unprincipled method that undermines the foundations of the Marxist attitude to petty-bourgeois trends,* the editors did not know what to say in reply and tried to pass it off with a joke. We, they said, don't know anything about a "Marxist system of collections".

The renegades want to "make amiable jokes" about our old decisions.

The workers, however, will allow no joking on such a question.

That same twenty-third issue of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* informs us that the liquidators' agitation has attracted two working-class groups in Russia—a group of printing workers in the town of Dvinsk and a group at the Nemirov-Kolodkin factory in Moscow. These groups contributed their collections *equally* to the liquidators', Narodniks' and Marxist newspapers.

Let the renegade intellectuals laugh off the question; the workers, however, must and will decide it.

To preach the equal division of collections means preaching non-partisanship and confusing (or equating) newspapers that hold the proletarian class point of view with

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* See pp. 343-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

those of the petty bourgeoisie, the Narodnik newspapers. The "amiable jokers", those who write for the liquidators' newspaper, cannot raise any objection to this elementary truth, although their jokes and sniggers probably arouse the admiration of the bourgeois public. A person who has suffered a complete fiasco among the workers often recompenses himself with the admiration expressed by the bourgeoisie when he ridicules the very idea of a consistently Marxist solution to questions of current practice.

The liquidators have taken comfort—at a meeting of metalworkers they suffered a complete defeat. At any meeting of the bourgeois gentry the liquidators are awarded an amiable smile for amiable jokes directed against the position held by a workers' newspaper.

Let everyone have what he wants. Let the liquidators console themselves with their successes among the bourgeoisie. The workers, however, will explain to the masses the indubitable truth that to preach the equal division of workers' collections is preaching non-partisanship, is preaching the confusion or the equation of the proletariat's Marxist newspaper with an intellectual and petty-bourgeois newspaper, like that of the Narodniks.

II. LIBERAL BLINDNESS

The usual method adopted by West-European opportunists, from the time of Eduard Bernstein, whose views were vigorously rejected by German Social-Democracy, is the following:

"Take a look at things as they are," said Bernstein and the other opportunists, "have the courage to say outright what is—in Germany we are all engaged in a struggle for reforms, we are all reformists in essence, we are a party of reforms. And the abolition of wage-slavery in a series of crises is all words, an empty utopia."

Since then the opportunists have repeated this trick of theirs a hundred times and the entire bourgeois press (our Cadet *Rech* above all) is constantly making use of this argument of the opportunists *against* Marxism. Anyone seriously interested in the fate of the working-class move-

ment should have a proper knowledge of this worn-out manoeuvre of the downright enemies and false friends of the proletariat.

In St. Petersburg quite recently (September 4) the not unknown liquidator D. repeated in the liquidators' newspaper the all-Europe bourgeois manoeuvre with a crudeness or arrogance that is worthy of attention.

Let the reader judge for himself.

"We open any workers' newspaper, say even *Severnaya Pravda*," wrote D., "and what do we see? We read of the activities of workers' organisations, trade unions, clubs and co-operatives; of the meetings of the members of those organisations and of their leading committees, of insurance agents, etc.; of lectures and reports organised by workers; of strikes and strike committees; of the organisation of various collections; of attempts at political action on the part of groups of workers in defence of the workers' press, to honour the memory of Bebel or for some other immediate purpose."

That is what D. and others like him have "seen" and still "see" in *Severnaya Pravda*. And just like Bernstein, of course, he exclaims: "It will do no harm to look first *at what is*" (D.'s italics). Whereupon he comes to the conclusion that all this is the struggle for freedom of association. "The slogan of struggle for freedom of association as the most important current demand", "epitomises *what is*" (D.'s italics).

Bernstein maintained that he was "generalising what is" when he asserted that the working-class struggle was a struggle for reforms.

D. maintains that he is "generalising what is" when he asserts that the working-class movement in Russia is reformist.

Bernstein tried to give a *liberal* content to the workers' struggle for reforms, a struggle filled with a far from reformist content. D. is acting in literally the same fashion. He sees *nothing* but liberal reformism and tries to pass off his blindness as reality.

Severnaya Pravda, of course, did fight for even the slightest improvement in the workers' life and in the conditions of the workers' struggle, but did not do it in the liberal way, as gentlemen like D. do! There *was* a lot in Severnaya Pravda that they missed—there was the struggle against reformism, there was defence of the "old", defence of full-blooded slo-

gans, etc. Gentlemen like D. are of the opinion that such things are not important. They "*fail to see*" them, they do not want to see them, just because they are liberals. Like all liberals, they cannot understand the *connection*, the close, inseverable connection the Marxists make between defence of the slightest improvement and defence of the slogans of their organisation, etc. It is not clear to them that this connection determines the radical difference between the world outlook of the liberal (he is also in favour of freedom of association) and that of the working-class democrat.

Divorce the struggle for reforms from the struggle for the final goal—that is what Bernstein's preaching actually amounts to. Divorce the struggle for improvements, for freedom of association, etc., from the struggle against reformism, from the defence of Marxism, from its spirit and its political trend—that is what the preaching of D. and the other liquidators actually amounts to.

They want to impose their liberal blindness (not seeing the connection with the past, not seeing its trend, not seeing the struggle against reformism) on the working class. As the meeting of metalworkers on August 25 showed again and again, advanced workers have already seen through the liberal nature of D. and his petty group.

III. A NECESSARY EXPLANATION

In issue No. 24 of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* we came across an amusing sally against our description of the Dublin events.* It would probably not have been worth while responding to an amusing item had the liquidators' newspaper not gone so far as to offer an explanation that is extremely important and instructive for the workers. Judge for yourselves. We made a distinction between Britain, where the workers' demand for the *reform* of trade union legislation (laws on freedom of association) is of very serious and real importance because the general basis of political liberty exists in that country, and Russia, where such a demand

* See pp. 348-49 of this volume.—*Ed.*

is not serious, is an empty liberal phrase, but where such reforms as insurance are seriously practicable under the existing political system.

The liquidators do not understand the difference. Let us try to explain it by asking two questions: 1. Why is a bourgeois-democratic revolution, a revolution for political liberties, impossible in England? 2. Why was it that in Russia, towards the end of the last century, in 1897, for example, partial *reforms* of the factory laws were quite possible, and nobody disputed the partial demands of the workers in this sphere, whereas all Marxists in those days considered that the demand for partial political reforms was a liberal deception?

When the liquidators have given these questions some thought they may be able to guess the reasons for taking a different attitude to various reforms in Russia and in Britain.

And now for the important explanation given in the liquidators' newspaper.

"*But*," *it says* (*No. 24*, *page 2*, *column 1*) "*if this basis* [i.e., *the general basis of political liberties*] *is not necessary for partial changes in insurance legislation*, *why is it necessary for a partial change in the law of March 4*, *1906 and certain articles of the decree on strikes of December 2*, *1905*?"

We congratulate you on your frankness and thank you for it! You have hit the mark—"a partial change in the laws of March 4, 1906 and December 2, 1905"[112] is quite possible *without* anything general! Superb.

Only—do you know what?—that "partial change in the laws of March 4, 1906 and December 2, 1905" is not called "*freedom of association*" but Octobrist deception of the people.

The *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* writers have admitted exactly what was to be proved.

By the "freedom of association" that the liberals and liquidators treat you to, must be understood:

"*A partial change in the laws of March 4*, *1906 and December 2*, *1905*."

Once again we thank you for your frankness. And so we shall put it on record that the main, central, chief, primary, etc., etc., slogan of the liquidators is, by their own admis-

sion, the demand for *a partial change in the laws of March 4, 1906 and December 2, 1905.*

Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta has brilliantly refuted its association with the liberals, has it not?

It is not for nothing that the liquidators have been called Social-Democratic Octobrists!

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Signed: *N—k*

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CIVILISED BARBARISM

Britain and France are the most civilised countries in the world. London and Paris are the world's capitals, with populations of six and three million, respectively. The distance between them is an eight- to nine-hour journey.

One can imagine how great is the commercial intercourse between these two capitals, what masses of goods and of people are constantly moving from the one to the other.

And yet the richest, the most civilised and the freest countries in the world are now discussing, in fear and trepidation—by no means for the first time!—the "difficult" question of whether a tunnel can be built under the English Channel (which separates Britain from the European Continent).

Engineers have long been of the opinion that it can. The capitalists of Britain and France have mountains of money. Profit from capital invested in such an enterprise would be absolutely certain.

What, then, is holding the matter up?

Britain is afraid of—invasion! A tunnel, you see, would, "if anything should happen", facilitate the invasion of Britain by enemy troops. That is why the British military authorities have, not for the first time, wrecked the plan to build the tunnel.

The madness and blindness of the civilised nations makes astonishing reading. Needless to say, it would take only a few seconds with modern technical devices to bring traffic in the tunnel to a halt, and to wreck the tunnel completely.

But the civilised nations have driven themselves into the position of barbarians. Capitalism has brought about a situation in which the bourgeoisie, in order to hoodwink

the workers, is *compelled* to frighten the British people with idiotic tales about "invasion". Capitalism has brought about a situation in which a whole group of capitalists who stand to lose "good business" through the digging of the tunnel are doing their utmost to wreck this plan and hold up technical progress.

The Britishers' fear of the tunnel is fear of themselves. Capitalist barbarism is stronger than civilisation.

On all sides, at every step one comes across problems which man is quite capable of solving *immediately*, but capitalism is in the way. It has amassed enormous wealth—and has made men the *slaves* of this wealth. It has solved the most complicated technical problems and has blocked the application of technical improvements because of the poverty and ignorance of millions of the population, because of the stupid avarice of a handful of millionaires.

Civilisation, freedom and wealth under capitalism call to mind the rich glutton who is rotting alive but will not let what is young live on.

But the young is growing and will emerge supreme in spite of all.

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THE BLACK HUNDREDS

There is in our Black-Hundred movement one exceedingly original and exceedingly important feature that has not been the subject of sufficient attention. That feature is ignorant peasant democracy, democracy of the crudest type but also extremely deep-seated.

No matter how much the commanding classes try to fence our political parties off from the people both by means of the June Third election law and by thousands of "peculiar features" of our political system, reality has its way. Every political party, even of the extreme Right, has to seek some sort of link with the people.

The extreme Rights constitute the party of the landowners. They cannot, however, confine themselves to links with the landowners alone. They have to conceal those links and pretend that they are defending the interests of the entire people, that they stand for the "good old", "stable" way of rural life. They have to appeal to the most deep-rooted prejudices of the most backward peasant, they have to play on his ignorance.

Such a game cannot be played without risk. Now and again the voice of the real peasant life, peasant democracy, breaks through all the Black-Hundred mustiness and cliché. Then the Rights are compelled to get rid of the "inconvenient" peasant democrat. Naturally this banishment of the most faithful Black Hundreds, their expulsion from their own camp by the extreme Rights because of their democracy, is not without its educational effect on the masses.

Bishop Nikon, an extreme Right-winger has, for instance, been forced to abandon his Duma work. Why?

FROM MARX TO MAO
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A letter from Bishop Nikon himself, published in *Yeniseiskaya Mysl*,[113] gives a clear answer to this. It stands to reason that Bishop Nikon dare not speak openly about the reasons for his withdrawal. But Bishop Nikon, quoting a letter from a peasant, does write: "The land, bread and other important questions of our Russian life and of the region do not appear to reach either the hands or the hearts of the authorities or the Duma. These questions and such solution of them as is possible are regarded as 'utopian', 'hazardous', untimely. Why do you keep silent, what are you waiting for? For moods and revolts for which those same 'undernourished', hungry, unfortunate peasants will be shot down? We are afraid of 'big' issues and reforms, we limit ourselves to trivialities and trifles, good though they may be."

That is what Bishop Nikon writes. And that is what very many Black-Hundred peasants think. It is quite understandable why Bishop Nikon *had* to be removed from Duma affairs and Duma speeches for such statements.

Bishop Nikon expresses his Black-Hundred democracy in arguments that are, in essence, very far from correct. The land, bread and all other important questions *do* reach the hands and hearts (and pockets) of the "authorities" and the Duma.

The "authorities" and the Duma *provide* "such solution" to these questions "as is possible"—and it is indeed the *possible* solution, the one that accords with the interests and power of the landowners who are dominant among the authorities and in the Duma.

Bishop Nikon realises that his Black-Hundred views are being undermined by the real state of affairs; they are being destroyed by what he observes in the Duma and in the attitude of the "authorities", etc. Bishop Nikon, however, cannot *understand* the reason for all this, or is afraid to understand it.

But reality will win through, and out of ten in any village who think as Bishop Nikon does, nine will, in the long run, most likely prove less obtuse in mastering the lessons of life than the bishop.

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RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND RUSSIAN REFORMS

There is a little magazine called *Grazhdanin*[114] compiled by Prince Meshchersky. The Prince, who has been through fire and water in the various higher civil service "spheres" of St. Petersburg, usually preaches in this magazine the most reactionary things.

The magazine is interesting primarily because in it the talkative Prince is continually divulging the secrets of the higher administration of Russia. For Russia is actually administered by those landowner dignitaries in whose society Prince Meshchersky moved and is still moving. And they actually do administer Russia in exactly the way, in exactly the spirit, by exactly the means advised, assumed and suggested by Prince Meshchersky.

In the second place, the magazine is interesting because its courtly editor, confident that it will never *reach the people*, often exposes the Russian administration in the most ruthless manner.

Here are two interesting admissions made by this princely dignitary:

> "A very typical phenomenon," he writes. "From time to time people come to us from France, or Belgium, or England, nice people who show a sympathy for Russia and the Russians, they stay in luxurious circumstances in a hotel, submit their letters of introduction to some official or another ... and quite soon, in perhaps ten days or so, these newly arrived foreigners are received by some minister and are given hopes of receiving some concession, which they take off home with them.... Then hack they come again and a week later they have already acquired a concession somewhere in Russia and are counting up the foreseeable profits with such energy that they have dreams of millions."

That is what Prince Meshchersky writes. By way of exception he writes the truth. Features of Asiatic primitiveness, governmental graft, the schemes of financiers who share their monopoly incomes with highly-placed officials, are still boundlessly strong in Russian capitalism. When our Narodniks fight, and fight with good reason, against such disgusting and shameless swindles, they often regard it as a war against capitalism. Their mistake is obvious. They are actually fighting *for the democratisation* of capitalism.

"When I was abroad," the arch-reactionary Prince writes in another place, "I was in contact with people in different walks of life.... I do not remember that ally sort of social or state reforms ever constituted the subject of the conversation.... I read the newspapers ... but found no articles about reforms.... As soon as I crossed the frontier and reached home, I found the reverse; I took up the first Russian newspaper I came across and on the first, the second and even the third page there were articles about some sort of reforms."

Correctly observed. The bourgeoisie does not need reforms in Europe. In Russia they are necessary. The princely dignitary cannot understand the reason for this difference—just as some wise people cannot understand that the strongly anti-reformist tactics of the workers are justified because of the bourgeoisie's need for reforms.

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HOW VERA ZASULICH DEMOLISHES LIQUIDATIONISM

Zhivaya Zhizn No. 8 (July 19, 1913), carried an excellent article by Vera Zasulich in defence of liquidationism ("Apropos of a Certain Question"). We ask all those interested in questions affecting the working-class movement and democracy to pay careful attention to this article, which is valuable both because of its contents and because of the forthrightness of its authoritative author.

I

In the first place, Vera Zasulich, like all liquidators, does her best to calumniate the Party, but her frankness as a writer exposes her so clearly that it is amazing. "The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," we read in the article, "is an underground organisation of intellectuals for propaganda and agitation among the workers, which was founded at the Second Congress, and which split immediately." Actually, the Party was founded in 1898 and based itself on the awakening of a mass working-class movement in the 1895-96 period. Dozens and hundreds of workers (like the late Babushkin in St. Petersburg) not only attended lectures at study circles but as early as 1894-95 *themselves carried on agitation* and then founded workers' organisations in other cities (the Ekaterinoslav organisations founded by Babushkin when he was exiled from St. Petersburg, etc.).

The relative dominance of intellectuals in the early days of the movement was to be observed everywhere and not only in Russia. By using this fact to slander the workers'

party, Vera Zasulich crushes liquidationism among all thinking workers who experienced the agitation and strikes of 1894-96.

"In 1903," writes Vera Zasulich, "the underground study circles engaged in this work were united to form a secret society with hierarchical rules. It is difficult to say whether the new organisation as such helped or hindered current work...."

Anyone who does not wish to be accused of having a short memory, must know that groups of intellectuals and workers, not only in 1903, but beginning from 1894 (and in some cases even earlier) *helped* both in economic and political agitation, in strikes and in propaganda. To assert publicly that "it is difficult to say whether the new organisation helped or hindered the work" is not merely stating a tremendous and obvious historical untruth—it means *renouncing the Party*.

What value, indeed, can one place on the Party if it is difficult to say whether it helped or hindered the work? Is it not clear that the sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath?

The liquidators have to renounce the Party in retrospect in order to justify their renunciation of it at the present time.

Vera Zasulich, speaking of this present time, the June Third epoch, says: "I have heard reports of the district branches of the organisation losing members...."

There is no disputing that fact. The district and all other branches of the organisation have lost members. The question is one of how this phenomenon of flight from the organisation is to be explained, what attitude is to be adopted towards that phenomenon.

Vera Zasulich answers: "they lost their members because at that time there was nothing to do in them."

The answer is definite and may be equated with a definite condemnation of the underground and justification of flight from it. How does Vera Zasulich prove her statement? 1) There was nothing for propagandists to do because "many workers had collected whole libraries" of books published in the days of freedom, "which the police had not yet succeeded in confiscating".

Vera Zasulich has an interesting knack of not noticing how she refutes her own words. If the police were "confiscating" the libraries, *it means* that discussions on what had been read, the assimilation of it and further study *was giving rise* precisely to underground work! Vera Zasulich wants to prove that there "was nothing to do", while her own admission shows that there *was* something to do.

2) "Underground political agitation was out of the question at that time. Furthermore, it was neither the right, nor the duty of the districts to take the initiative in such 'actions'."

Vera Zasulich repeats the liquidators' words without knowing the state of affairs. That the period under discussion was a difficult one, more difficult than before, there is no denying. The work of the Marxists, however, is *always* "difficult" but the thing that makes them different from the liberals is that they do not declare what is difficult to be impossible. The liberal calls difficult work impossible so as to conceal his renunciation of it. The difficulty of the work compels the Marxist to strive for greater solidarity among the best elements in order to overcome the difficulties.

The objective fact that the work in the period under discussion was *possible* and was conducted is proved, for example, by the elections to the Third and Fourth Dumas, if by nothing else. Surely Vera Zasulich does not believe that supporters of the underground movement could have been elected to the State Duma *without* the participation of the underground.

3) "There was nothing to do in the underground groups, but outside them there was a mass of essential social work to be done." Clubs, various associations, congresses, lectures, etc.

Such is the argument put forward by all liquidators and repeated by Vera Zasulich. Her article could simply be recommended for use in workers' circles as an object-lesson on the misadventures of the liquidators!

The underground was necessary because, among other things, Marxist work in clubs, associations, at congresses, etc., was connected with it.

Compare this argument of mine with that of Vera Zasulich. Ask yourself, *what grounds* has Vera Zasulich for depicting work in legal associations as something carried on

"*outside*" the work of the underground groups? Why "outside" and not "in close contact with", why not "in the same direction"?

Vera Zasulich has no factual grounds whatsoever, because everybody knows that there was probably not a single legal association, etc., in which members of the underground groups did not take part. The only grounds Vera Zasulich has for her assertions is the subjective mood of the liquidators. The liquidators did get the feeling that there was nothing *for them* to do in the underground, that *they* sympathised only with work that was *outside* the underground, only if it was *outside* the ideological line of the underground. In other words, Vera Zasulich's "grounds" amount to *justification* of the liquidators' flight from the underground!

Pitiful grounds indeed.

We cannot, however, confine ourselves to pointing out the subjective grounds for Vera Zasulich's writings, the errors of fact and logic with which literally every phrase of her article teems. We must seek the objective grounds for the undoubted fact that the "districts lost their members", that there was a flight from the underground.

We have not far to look. It is well enough known that the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois society of Russia at the time under discussion was carried away to a very great extent by counter-revolutionary temper. It is well enough known what profound antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat came to the surface in the days of freedom and engendered that counter-revolutionary temper and also confusion, despondency and loss of spirit among many vacillating friends of the proletariat.

This objective relationship between classes in the period under discussion explains fully enough why the bourgeoisie in general and the liberal bourgeoisie in particular (for domination over the masses of the people had been snatched out of their hands) *were bound* to hate the underground, declare it worthless and "ineffective" (Vera Zasulich's expression), condemn and reject *underground* political agitation and also the conduct of legal work in the spirit of the underground, in accordance with the slogans of the underground and in direct ideological and organisational contact with it.

The first to flee from the underground were the bourgeois intellectuals who succumbed to the counter-revolutionary mood, those "fellow-travellers" of the Social-Democratic working-class movement who, like those in Europe, had been attracted by the liberating role played by the proletariat (in Europe—by the plebs in general) in the bourgeois revolution. It is a well-known fact what a mass of Marxists left the underground after 1905 and found places for themselves in all sorts of legal cosy corners for intellectuals.

No matter what subjective "good" intentions Vera Zasulich may have had, her repetition of the arguments of the liquidators amounts objectively to a rehash of the petty ideas of the counter-revolutionary liberals. The liquidators, who are so loud in their talk of "independent action by the workers", etc., actually represent and defend the intellectuals who have defected from the working-class movement and gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie.

The flight of some people from the underground could have been the result of their fatigue and dispiritedness. Such individuals may only be pitied; they should be helped because their dispiritedness will pass and there will again appear an urge to get away from philistinism, away from the liberals and the liberal-labour policy, to the working-class underground. But when the fatigued and dispirited use journalism as their platform and announce that their flight is not a manifestation of fatigue, or weakness, or intellectual woolliness, but that it is to their credit, and then put the blame on the "ineffective", "worthless", "moribund", etc., underground, these runaways then become disgusting renegades, apostates. These runaways then become the worst of advisers for the working-class movement and therefore its dangerous enemies.

When one finds the liquidators defending and lauding such elements and at the same time coming out with vows and assurances that they, the liquidators, stand for unity, one can only shrug one's shoulders and ask oneself whom they hope to deceive with this blissful idiocy and hypocrisy. Is it not obvious that a working-class party cannot possibly exist without a determined struggle against the lauding of defection from the Party?

The liquidators (with Vera Zasulich following them) enjoy calling these apostates and runaways "the living forces of the working class". But these evasions of the liberal intellectuals have long been refuted by indisputable facts of a country-wide scale. Of the deputies from the worker curias 47 per cent were Bolsheviks in the Second Duma, 50 per cent in the Third Duma and 67 per cent in the Fourth Duma. This is an irrefutable proof that the workers left the liquidators in the period between 1907 and 1913. The emergence of the first working-class daily newspaper and the events now to be observed in the trade unions add still further proofs to this. If we glance at the objective facts and not at the empty, boasting declarations of the liberal intellectuals, we shall see that the living forces of the working class are those of the supporters of the underground, the opponents of the liquidators.

All Vera Zasulich's discourse on the past is, however, only the beginning. There is something better to come. Her defence of renegation and defection from the Party is only the introduction to her defence of the destruction of the Party. It is these important sections of her article that we shall now examine.

II

"The underground organisation," we read in the article, "has always been the weakest feature of Social-Democracy in Russia ..." ("always"—neither more nor less). Bold historians, our liquidators. "Always" means in 1882-93, before the mass working-class movement under the organised leadership of the Party; it means in 1894-1904. And in the 1905-07 period?

> "But even if it had been ten times better, it would not have survived the revolution and counter-revolution. In the history of Europe I cannot remember a single revolutionary organisation that, after living through a revolution, proved effective in the moment of reaction."

This argument provides such a rich collection of "gems" that one does not know where to begin sorting them out!

Zasulich "cannot remember" in European history the case she is discussing. But can she remember "in the history

of Europe" a bourgeois revolution that took place when there were independent working-class parties with hundreds of thousands, a million members in neighbouring countries, and with capitalism highly developed and having created in the country in question a united industrial proletariat and a working-class movement on a national scale?

Vera Zasulich cannot "remember" a case of this kind because there has not been one "in the history of Europe". Mass political strikes did not and could not play a decisive role in any bourgeois revolution in European history before the twentieth century.

And so what do we get? We get this. The liquidators refer to "the history of Europe" as an example, where at the time of the bourgeois revolutions, *there were no* independent proletarian parties with mass strikes; they cite that example *for the purpose of renouncing* the tasks, or of *belittling*, clipping, curtailing, docking the tasks to be done in a country in which the two above-mentioned basic conditions (an independent proletarian party and mass strikes of a political nature) *were present* and still are present!

Vera Zasulich fails to understand—and this failure to understand is extremely typical of the liquidators—that she has *repeated the idea of the liberal* Prokopovich, using different words, for a different reason and approaching the subject from a different angle. That liberal, at the time when he, as an extreme Economist (1899), was breaking away from the Social-Democrats, expressed the idea that "the political struggle is for the liberals, the economic struggle for the workers".

All opportunists in the working-class movement of Russia from 1895 to 1913 have been drawn towards this idea and have lapsed into it. It is in struggle against this idea that the Social-Democratic Party in Russia has grown; only in struggle against this idea *could* it have grown. The struggle against this idea, the liberation of the masses from the influence of this idea is, in fact, the struggle for an independent working-class movement in Russia.

Prokopovich expressed the idea in its application to present tasks, using the imperative or the desiderative mood.

Vera Zasulich repeats the idea in the form of an allegedly-historical, retrospective discourse, or a review of events.

Prokopovich spoke forthrightly, frankly, clearly and sharply—abandon your idea of political independence, brother workers! Vera Zasulich, not realising whither liquidationism was leading her, has reached the same abyss by a zigzag route; the example of Europe also shows you, brother workers, that you cannot expect to have an "effective" organisation of your old tested *type*, of the same type as your organisation in 1905. Since 1905 the liberals have abandoned empty dreams of an "underground" and have created an "effective" organisation, an open one, which, although not legalised by the June Third system, is tolerated by it, retains its parliamentary group, its legal press and its local committees, which are actually known to everybody. Your old organisation, brother workers, is ineffective, and according to the lessons taught by "the history of Europe" *was bound to be*, but we liquidators promise you and offer you a new "open party" every day. What more do you want? Be content with our, the liquidators', promises, curse your old organisation in stronger terms, spit upon it, deny it and remain for the time being (until you get the "open party" we have promised) *without any organisation*!

This is exactly the real meaning of Vera Zasulich's liquidationist arguments, the meaning determined *not* by her will and mind, but by the relation of the classes in Russia, the objective conditions of the working-class movement. That is exactly what the liberals want. Vera Zasulich is only *echoing* Prokopovich!

Unlike late eighteenth-century Europe and Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century Russia provides an example of a country in which the old organisation has demonstrated its viability and efficiency. This organisation has been preserved even in times of reaction despite the defection of the liquidators and a host of the philistines. This organisation, while preserving its basic type, has been able to adapt *its form* to the changing conditions, has been able to vary that *form* to meet the requirements of the moment that marks "another step in the transformation into a bourgeois monarchy".[115]

An objective proof of this adaptation of the old organisation is to be seen—if we take one of the simplest, most obvious proofs, a proof that is most easily understood by the

liberals—in the results of the elections to the Fourth Duma. Two-thirds of the deputies elected by the worker curias proved to be members of the old organisation, among them the six from the main industrial gubernias. In those gubernias there are about a million factory workers. Everything vital, all those politically conscious and influential among the genuine *masses*, the proletarian masses, participated in the elections, and in so doing changed the *form* of their old organisation, modifying the *conditions* of its activity but preserving its general line, the ideological and political basis and *content* of its activity.

Our position is clear. It was delineated irrevocably in 1908. The liquidators, however—and this is their misfortune—have no position as long as they have no *new* organisation. They can do nothing but sigh over the bad past and dream of a better future.

III

"Organisation is essential to the Party," writes Vera Zasulich. She is not content even with the Stockholm (1906) decision, adopted at a time when the Mensheviks *predominated and were forced* to accept the famous Clause One of the Rules.

If that is true (and it most certainly is), Vera Zasulich is wrong and she will have to renounce the *Mensheviks*' Stockholm decision. Organisation is not only "essential to the Party"—that is recognised by every liberal and every bourgeois who wishes to "use" the working-class party for politics directed against the working class. The Party *is* the sum-total of its organisations linked together in a single whole. The Party *is* the organisation of the working class divided into a long chain of all kinds of local and special, central and general organisations.

Here, again, the liquidators find themselves without any position. In 1903, they put forward their idea of Party membership, according to which not only those belonging to its organisations but those who were working (outside the organisations) under their control were regarded as Party members. Vera Zasulich recalls this episode, apparently deeming it important.

"... as far back as the Second Congress ten years ago," she writes, "the Mensheviks felt that it was impossible to tack away the whole Party in the underground...."

If the Mensheviks felt a revulsion against the underground in 1903, why was it that *in 1906*, in the period of an immeasurably more "open" Party, they *themselves*, having a majority at the Congress, reversed the Menshevik formulation they had adopted in 1903 and *accepted* the Bolshevik formulation? Vera Zasulich writes Party history in such a way that one comes across an amazing, unbelievable distortion of the facts at every step!

It is an indisputable fact that at Stockholm in 1906 the Mensheviks accepted the Bolshevik definition of the Party as the sum of its organisations; if Vera Zasulich and her friends have *again* changed their views, if they now consider that *their* 1906 decision was a mistake, why do they not say so straight out? In general, Vera Zasulich seems to regard this question as one of importance since she has raised it herself and herself has recalled the year 1903!

The reader can see that there is nothing more feeble and confused than the liquidators' views on the question of organisation. It is a complete absence of views. It is a model of characterlessness and confusion. Vera Zasulich exclaims crossly: "Organisational opportunism is a foolish expression." But "being cross" won't help. Did not Cherevanin *himself* say in a published statement that "organisational anarchy" had been noted among the future liquidators at the meetings of the *Menshevik* group in London in 1907. At that time, the most prominent liquidators found themselves (and find themselves again today) in the highly original situation of slaying liquidators.

"Organisation is essential to the Party," writes Vera Zasulich. "But it will only be possible for the organisation to embrace the whole Party for any lengthy period and exist peacefully [!] in one and the same form and with one and the same set of rules [listen to this!] when Russian social life has achieved and consolidated [if it is ever consolidated in Russia] a system of legality and at last travels a smooth road, leaving behind the mountainous path that it has been following at an accelerating pace for a whole century, at times ascending, at times crashing into the abyss of reaction, whence having recovered from injuries received, it starts scrambling uphill again...."

Here is an argument put forward by the liquidators that deserves a prize as a model of confusion. Try and understand what the author is getting at.

A change in the "Rules"? Then for God's sake, gentlemen, say what changes in the Rules you are talking about! And don't make fools of yourselves, don't try to prove "philosophically" that the Rules are not something unchangeable.

But although she speaks of "one and the same set of Rules" (incidentally they were changed in 1912*) Vera Zasulich proposes *no* changes at all.

What does she mean? She means that the Party will become an organisation when the mountainous path comes to an end and Russia travels a smooth road. That is an exceedingly respectable idea and it belongs to the liberals and *Vekhi*; until the *smooth road* is reached everything is nasty and evil, the Party is not a party and politics are not politics. On the "smooth road" everything will be "in order" and on the "mountainous path" there is nothing but chaos.

We read this argument long ago, put forward by the liberals. This argument is understandable, natural and legitimate from the point of view of the liberals' hatred of the underground and the "mountainous path". The facts are distorted (for there have been a number of *organised parties* in the underground in Russia), but we realise that the liberals' hatred of the underground blinds them to the facts.

But again, what does Vera Zasulich mean? Apparently, according to her, the organised party is impossible in Russia. Therefore? Indistinct ideas and things left unsaid, the confusion of the issue by long, heavy, tortuous periods, endless beating about the bush. The only thing one senses is that the author is worming her way towards renunciation of all organisation. And as she worms her way closer to this, Vera Zasulich speaks out—here is her crowning idea:

> "We have a broad section of workers who would have every right to join any socialist party in the West. All our forces are in this rapidly growing section of the workers, who lack only the opportunity of formally joining a party to found one, and no matter what we call this section we shall both think of it and speak of it as the party."

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 482.—*Ed.*

When arguments concern the liquidation of the Party, therefore, we must realise that by the word *party* the liquidators mean *something quite different*. What do they mean by party?

Here it is—"a broad section of workers ... who lack only [!] the opportunity of formally joining a party to found one [!!]".

Incomparable! The party consists of those "who lack the opportunity of formally joining it". The party is those who remain outside the party.

Truly, Vera Zasulich has gathered some wonderful gems for us by saying frankly what all the liquidators are wandering about *on the verge of*.

IV

There are about a million Party members in Germany today. The Social-Democrats there receive about 4,250,000 votes and there are about 15,000,000 proletarians. Here is a simple and vivid example that will untangle what the liquidators have tangled. One million—that is the *party*, one million in the party organisations; 4,250,000 is the "broad section". It is actually much broader because women are disfranchised, as are many workers who do not possess the residential qualification, age qualification, etc., etc.

The "broad section" consists almost entirely of Social-Democrats and without it the party would be powerless. When any action is taken, this broad section expands to two or three times that size because on such occasions a mass of those who are not Social-Democrats follow the party.

Surely this is clear? It really is a little awkward to have to point out something so elementary!

In what way does Germany differ from Russia? Certainly not because in Russia there is no difference between the "party" and the "broad section"! To understand this let us first look at France. There we see (approximately—more accurate figures would only strengthen my argument):

Party	about 70,000*
"Broad section" (voting for the Social-Democrats)	about 1,000,000
Proletarians.	about 10,000,000

And in Russia? Party—150,000 in 1907 (calculated and verified at the London Congress). Today the number is not known, probably much less, 30,000 or 50,000, we cannot say definitely.

Our "broad section" is 300,000-500,000 if we add up the number of those voting for the Social-Democrats. Lastly, proletarians—probably about 20,000,000. I repeat that these are approximate figures, but *any other* figures that anybody might arrive at through closer calculation would only add strength to my argument.

My argument is that in all countries, everywhere and always, there exists, *in addition* to the party, a "broad section" of people *close to the party* and the huge mass of the *class* that founds the party, causes it to emerge and nurtures it. By not understanding this simple and obvious point, the liquidators are repeating the error of the Economists of 1895-1901; the Economists simply could not understand the difference between the "party" and the "class".

The party is the politically conscious, advanced section of the class, it is its vanguard. The strength of that vanguard is ten times, a hundred times, more than a hundred times, greater than its numbers.

Is that possible? Can the strength of hundreds be greater than the strength of thousands?

It can be, and is, *when the hundreds are organised.*

Organisation increases strength tenfold. God knows this is no new verity. But it is not our fault if for the benefit of Vera Zasulich and the liquidators we have to begin at the beginning.

The political consciousness of the advanced contingent is, incidentally, manifested in its ability to organise. By organising it achieves *unity of will* and this united will of an advanced thousand, hundred thousand, million *becomes* the will of the class. The intermediary between the

* The exact figure given at the last Congress in Brest (1913) was 68,903.[116]

party and the class is the "broad section" (broader than the party but narrower than the class), the section that votes Social-Democrat, the section that helps, sympathises, etc.

The *relationship* of the party to the class differs in different countries, depending on historical and other conditions. In Germany, for example, about one-fifteenth of the class is organised in the party; in France about a hundred-and-fortieth part. In Germany there are four or five Social-Democrats of the "broad section" to every Party member; in France there are fourteen. In France there has never actually been a party 100,000 strong—and this in conditions of "open" organisation and political liberty.

Any reasonable person will understand that there are historical conditions, objective causes, which made it possible to organise one-fifteenth of the class in the party in Germany, but which make it more difficult in France, and *still more difficult* in Russia.

What would one think of the Frenchman who declared that "our party is a narrow circle and not a party; you cannot tuck the party away in an organisation; the party is the broad section, *all forces* are in it, etc."? You would probably express surprise at the fact that this Frenchman was not in a mental hospital.

And here in Russia we are expected to take people seriously who feel, see and know that our path is *still mountainous*, that is, the conditions for organisation are *more difficult*, and nevertheless declare that they "will think and speak of the broad section [the unorganised!] as the party". These people are confused runaways from the Party, confused Social-Democrats *outside the Party or close to the Party* who have not withstood the pressure of the liberal ideas of decline, despondency and renunciation.

V

"For the underground to be a useful force," writes Vera Zasulich in the conclusion to her excellent article, "the underground, even if it alone is called the party, must display an attitude towards the worker Social-Democrats [i.e., towards the broad section in which Zasulich sees "all forces", and of which she declared: "we shall think of it and speak of it as the party"] similar to that of party officials to the party."

Think carefully over this statement, the gem of gems in an article so rich in gems. First Zasulich knows very well what is meant by a *party* in present-day Russia. But dozens of liquidator writers are continually assuring the public that they do not know it, with the result that disputes on the liquidation of the *Party* are so unbelievably confused by these gentry. Let readers who are interested in the fate of the working-class movement and oppose vulgar, commonplace liquidators turn to Vera Zasulich's article and gain from it the answer to the question that has been and is still being obscured—what is a party?

Secondly, examine Vera Zasulich's conclusion. The underground's attitude to the broad section should be that of party officials to the party, she tells us. May we ask what is the essence of the attitude of the officials of any association to that association? Obviously it is that the official does not carry out his own will (or that of a group or circle), but the will of the association.

How is the will of a broad section of several hundred thousands, or several million, to be determined? *It is absolutely impossible to determine the will of a broad section that is not organised in an association*—even a child would understand that. It is Vera Zasulich's misfortune, and that of the other liquidators, that they have taken a position on the inclined plane of organisational opportunism and are constantly sliding down into the swamp of the worst anarchism.

For anarchism is precisely what it is, in the fullest and most accurate meaning of the word, when Vera Zasulich declares that the liquidators *will think and speak* of the broad section as the party, and that the underground should display the attitude towards it that it would to a higher organisation, to a supreme arbiter on the question of "officials", etc., although she herself admits that the "broad section lacks only the opportunity of formally joining a party" and therefore "lacks the opportunity of *forming a party*".

When an appeal is made to broad sections or to the masses against the organisation and at the same time the impossibility of organising those sections or masses *is admitted*, that is pure anarchism. The anarchists constitute one of the most harmful elements of the working-class movement be-

cause they are always shouting about the mass of the oppressed classes (or even about the oppressed masses in general), always ruining the good name of any socialist organisation but are themselves unable to create *any* other organisation as an alternative.

The Marxists have a fundamentally different view of the relation of the unorganised (and unorganisable for a lengthy period, sometimes decades) masses to the party, to organisation. It is to enable the mass of a *definite class* to learn to understand its own interests and its position, to learn to conduct its own policy, that there must be an organisation of the advanced elements of the class, immediately and at all costs, even though at first these elements constitute only a tiny fraction of the class. To do service to the masses and express *their* interests, having correctly conceived those interests, the advanced contingent, the organisation, must carry on all its activity among the masses, drawing from the masses all the best forces without any exception, at every step verifying carefully and objectively whether contact with the masses is being maintained and whether it is a live contact. In this way, and *only* in this way, does the advanced contingent train and enlighten the masses, expressing *their* interests, teaching them organisation and directing *all* the activities of the masses along the path of conscious class politics.

If the political activity of the masses as a whole, when directly or indirectly drawn into elections, or participating in them, should result in *all* the elected representatives of the workers being supporters of the underground and its political line, supporters of the Party, we have an objective fact *proving* the viability of our contact with the masses, proving the right of that organisation to be and to call itself the *sole* representative of the masses, and *sole* vehicle for the expression of the class interests of the masses. *Every* politically conscious worker, or rather, every group of workers, *was able* to participate in the elections and direct them one way or the other; and if the result is that the organisation that is ridiculed, cursed and treated with disdain by the liquidators has been *able to lead the masses*, that means that the attitude of our Party to the masses is correct in principle, it is the Marxist attitude.

The theory of the "*broad section* ... who lack *only* the opportunity of formally joining a party to found one" is an anarchist theory. The working class in Russia cannot consolidate and develop its movement if it does not struggle with the greatest determination against this theory, which corrupts the masses and destroys the very concept of organisation, the very principle of organisation.

The theory of the "broad section" *to replace* the party is an attempt to justify an extremely high-handed attitude towards and *mockery* of the mass working-class movement (furthermore, the mockers never fail to speak of the "masses" in their every phrase and to use "mass" freely as an adjective in all its cases). Everyone realises that the liquidators are using this theory to make it appear that *they*, their circle of intellectuals, represent and express the will of the "broad section". What, they would say, does the "narrow" party mean to us when we represent the "broad section"! What does an underground mean to us, an underground that carries with it a million workers to the polls, when we represent the broad section numbering, perhaps, millions and tens of millions!

The objective facts—the elections to the Fourth Duma, the appearance of workers' newspapers and the collections made on their behalf, the Metalworkers' Union in St. Petersburg, the shop assistants' congress[117] serve to show clearly that the liquidators are a group of intellectuals that have fallen away from the working class. But the "theory of the broad section" enables the liquidators to get round all objective facts and fills their hearts with pride in their unacknowledged greatness....

VI

Vera Zasulich's article is such a collection of oddities from the point of view of logic and of the ABC of Marxism that the reader naturally asks himself—is it possible that there is no *other* meaning to all these meaningless phrases? Our review would be incomplete if we did not point out that *there is a point of view* from which the article is quite comprehensible, logical and correct. That is the point of view of the split.

The history of the working-class movement is full of examples of unsuccessful, useless and even harmful parties. Let us suppose for a moment that our Party is one of them. In that case it is harmful and criminal to tolerate its existence, and still more so to tolerate its representatives. It is then obligatory to struggle *for the destruction* of that party and its replacement by a new party.

From the point of view of a profound conviction of the harmfulness of the underground, such statements as "it is not known whether it (the Party) helped or hindered", whether it now helps or hinders, are natural and understandable. We shall justify and praise* those who leave it and put it down to the "ineffectiveness" of the old party. We shall appeal to *non-party people against* that old party so that they will join the new party.

Vera Zasulich did not express this point of view of the split in full. Perhaps this fact is subjectively important and noteworthy to the author. Objectively, however, it is of little importance. If a writer says A, B, C, and then all the letters of the alphabet except the last, it is a safe bet that 999 readers out of 1,000 will add (aloud or to themselves) the last letter. The liquidators are all in this ridiculous position; they produce a whole collection of arguments for a split and then either say nothing at all or say that they "favour unity".

Apropos of Vera Zasulich's article and of a dozen similar articles by L. S., Dan, Levitsky, Yezhov, Potresov and Martov we have only one answer—the first condition for unity is the absolute condemnation of the "theory of the broad section in place of the party", the condemnation of all acts against the underground, the condemnation of Vera Zasulich's article and the definite discontinuance of all such sallies. The party cannot be "united" without struggling against those who question the necessity for its existence.

From the point of view of a split Vera Zasulich's article is logical and correct. If the liquidators succeed in founding

* In passing. This *defence* of the renegades is implicit in Vera Zasulich's phrase "the broad section only lack the opportunity of formally joining a party to found one". There are thousands of facts that prove the opposite. By speaking of "lack of *opportunity*", Vera Zasulich is actually defending philistinism, or worse.

a new party and if that new party turns out better than the old, Vera Zasulich's article (and all the liquidators' literature) will be justified historically. It would be foolish sentimentality to deny the founders of a better, genuine, truly working-class party the right *to destroy* the old, ineffective, useless party. If the liquidators do not establish any new party at all, if they do not create any new working-class organisation, then all their literature and Vera Zasulich's article will remain as a monument to the confusion of those who dropped out of the Party, of those characterless intellectuals who were carried away by the counter-revolutionary stream of despondency, disbelief, and philistinism and went plodding along behind the liberals.

One thing or the other. There is no middle way. There is nothing here to "reconcile"; you cannot "slightly bury" the old party and "slightly create" a new one.

The specific nature of the time through which Russia is now living is demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that a relatively small Party nucleus which was able to hold out during the storm and to remain in existence despite the breaking of individual organisational ties here and there, a nucleus that has ensured for itself an uncommonly strong influence among the overwhelming mass of the workers (not as compared with present-day Europe, of course, but with the Europe of 1849-59), that this nucleus is surrounded by a multitude of anti-Party, non-Party, extra-Party and near-Party Social-Democrats and near Social-Democrats.

And that is precisely how matters should stand in a country with the Mont Blanc of the German Social-Democratic Party next to it, while inside that country ... inside even the liberals do not see any other road except the "mountainous path", Messrs. Struve & Co. having for more than ten years trained hundreds and thousands of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, wrapping up their petty liberal ideas in almost Marxist words.

Take Mr. Prokopovich. A notable figure in journalism and in public activities in Russia. In essence, undoubtedly, a liberal. There is, however, reason to fear that he regards himself as a Social-Democrat—an anti-Party Social-Democrat. Take Mr. Makhnovets (Akimov). A liberal of a more

melancholy temperament and with a more strongly expressed love for the workers. He no doubt considers himself a Social-Democrat—a non-Party Social-Democrat. Take the writers in *Kievskaya Mysl*, *Nasha Zarya*, *Luch*, etc. They form a whole collection of extra-Party and near-Party Social-Democrats. Some of them are engaged mainly in dreaming about the foundation of a new, open party, but have not yet made a final decision on the question of whether they will disgrace themselves too much if they set about fulfilling this plan of genius "*prematurely*". Others specialise in solemnly declaring that they do not want to liquidate anything, that they are for unity and in complete agreement with ... the German Social-Democrats.

Take the Social-Democratic Duma group. One of its most prominent figures, Chkheidze, whom Nekrasov seems to have had prophetically in mind when he wrote:

But at times avoids an issue,
That is painful, hard to solve.[118]

The years 1911 and 1912 were the most difficult and painful period for the Social-Democrats in the epoch of the Third and the beginning of the Fourth Duma. The working-class press—liquidators' and anti-liquidators'—took shape. Chkheidze "avoided the issue". He did not go with either one or the other. He was a near-Party Social-Democrat. He seemed to be waiting and watching; on the one hand, there was no party but the old one, and on the other hand, it might happen that "they" would bury the party a little bit.... You read his speeches and quite often applaud a sally against the Rights that is often witty and stinging, his heated and astringent words, his defence of the old traditions, and at the same time you have to hold your nose when you open a liquidators' newspaper that thunders against "crazes", waves tradition carelessly aside and teaches the workers disdain for organisation—all apparently with the approval of Chkheidze, whose name is an ornament to the list of contributors. You come across an article by An accompanied by a sharp criticism of him from the *Luch* editors and cannot help but wonder—have not our poor Chkheidze and our kindly An suffered a tragi-comic defeat in their attempt to cast off the yoke of Dan....

There are people who, in the name of the great principle of proletarian unity, advise the Party to come to an agreement with one of the groups of near-Party, almost-Social-Democrats, that wants to "avoid", or is wavering on, the question of whether to bury or to strengthen the old organisation. It can well be understood that these people are themselves wavering or have a very poor acquaintance with the real state of affairs. A party that wants to exist cannot allow the slightest wavering on the question of its existence or any agreement with those who may bury it. There is no end to those who want to act as intermediaries in such an agreement, but they are all people, who, to use an old expression, are burning their oil in vain and wasting their time.

P.S.

P. B. Axelrod's concluding article in No. 13 of *Zhivaya Zhizn* (July 25, 1913) headed "Then and Now" provided an amazingly vivid confirmation of our words. The real essence of this well-padded article is not, of course, in its amusing boosting of the liquidators' August Conference, but in the resurrection of the labour congress question. It goes without saying that Axelrod prefers to say nothing about his bitter and painful experience with the idea of a labour congress in 1906 and 1907—why rake up the past? Nor does Axelrod mention the specific conditions of the *present day*, when it appears possible to hold labour congresses of a special character, as it were, and for special reasons (a shop-assistants' congress today, perhaps an insurance or trade union congress tomorrow, etc.). Axelrod is probably not pleased with the experience of the shop-assistants' congress, at which the majority (as the liquidators have been forced to admit in *Zhivaya Zhizn*) was *against* the liquidators.

Axelrod does not say anything about what has been and what is. He prefers to let his imagination run wild on the future "thaw"—luckily we cannot know anything about its concrete conditions! He toys with the idea of convening "a Social-Democratic labour congress if not of all Russia, then one of all Russians"—which is then called exactly that, a congress of all Russians.

Thus there are two changes to the former brilliant plan; first, it is not merely a labour congress, but a Social-Democratic labour congress. That is progress. Let us congratulate Axelrod on having taken a step forward in six years. Let us congratulate him if he has become convinced of the harm caused by fantastic plans to "unite" with the Left Narodniks. Secondly, he replaces "all-Russia congress" by "congress of all Russians". That signifies rejection of complete unity with workers of *non-Russian* nationality in Russia (Axelrod regards the collapse among them of the idea of a labour congress as being final!). That is two steps backward. That is the hallowing of separatism in the working-class movement.

But this is still not the best part. Why was Axelrod dreaming of a labour congress? This is why:

> "The labour congress will complete the liquidatory process that has been going on during the past few years, the liquidation of the old party regime that grew up on the outdated historical basis of the feudal state and the hierarchical socio-political regime and at the same time will mark the beginning of a completely new epoch in the historical life of Russian Social-Democrats, the epoch of development on exactly the same lines as the Social-Democratic parties in the west."

Everybody knows that "exactly the same lines" are the lines of a *legal* party. Speaking without equivocation, this means that the liquidators need the labour congress to "*complete the liquidation*" of the old party and to found a *new*, *legal* party.

Such, in brief, is the idea behind Axelrod's long disquisitions.

Here you have the last word in near-Party Social-Democracy! For the members of the party to work in the party and strengthen it is an old, outdated idea that Axelrod has banished to the archives. We are not liquidating anything, that is libel, we only "stand aside" and shout for all to hear about the "completion of the liquidation of the Party". We vow and swear that tomorrow we shall be excellent members of the future legal party.

These sweet near-Party Social-Democrats of 1913 are very much like those liberals of 1903 who assured us that they were proper Social-Democrats and would certainly

become members of the Social-Democratic Party—when it became legal, of course.

We do not for a moment doubt that there will be a period of political liberty in Russia and that we shall have a legal Social-Democratic Party. Probably some of those near-Party Social-Democrats of today will become members of it.

And so—until we meet again in the ranks of the future, legal party, our future comrades! In the meantime, excuse us, we are not going the same way, because as yet you, near-Party Social-Democrats, are carrying on liberal and not Marxist work.

Prosveshcheniye No. 9,
September 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Prosveshcheniye* text

RESOLUTIONS OF THE SUMMER, 1913, JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND PARTY OFFICIALS[119]

Written September 1913

Published in 1913 in the pamphlet Notification and Resolutions of the Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials. Issued by the Central Committee

Published according to the text of the illegal mimeographed edition of the resolutions collated with the text of the pamphlet

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THE TASKS OF AGITATION IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

1. The situation in the country is becoming increasingly acute. The rule of the reactionary landowners is causing increasing discontent even among the most moderate sections of the population. The obstacle to anything like real political liberty in Russia is still the tsarist monarchy, which is hostile to all real reform, protects only the power and revenues of the feudal landowners, and suppresses with exceptional cruelty every manifestation of the working-class movement.

2. The working class continues to act as the leader of the revolutionary struggle for nation-wide liberation. The mass revolutionary strike movement continues to grow. The genuine struggle waged by the advanced contingents of the working class is proceeding under revolutionary slogans.

Owing to the very circumstances of the struggle the mass economic movement, which in many cases starts with the most elementary demands, is to an increasing degree merging with the revolutionary working-class movement.

It is the task of the advanced workers to accelerate by their agitational and educational activities the process of uniting the proletariat under the revolutionary slogans of the present epoch. Only in this way will the advanced workers succeed in fulfilling their other task of rousing the peasant and urban democrats.

3. The working-class struggle, which is proceeding under revolutionary slogans, has compelled the liberal-Octobrist bourgeoisie and a section of the manufacturers to talk volubly about the need for reforms in general, and for limited freedom of association in particular. While feverishly organising in employers' associations, introducing insurance

against strikes and calling upon the government to harass the working-class movement systematically, the bourgeoisie is at the same time urging the workers to abandon their revolutionary demands and to confine themselves *instead* to individual constitutional reforms and a semblance of freedom of association. The working class should take advantage of every sign of vacillation on the part of the government as well as of disagreements between the bourgeoisie and the reactionary camp, to intensify its attack in both the economic and political fields of struggle. But to be able to make good use of the situation the working class must continue to adhere to the platform of full-blooded revolutionary slogans.

4. This being the general state of affairs, the task of the Social-Democrats is to continue to conduct extensive revolutionary agitation among the masses for the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic. Vivid examples from real life must be used continuously to demonstrate all the harmfulness of reformism, i.e., the tactics of putting demands for partial improvement to the fore *instead* of revolutionary slogans.

5. In their agitation in favour of freedom of association and for partial reforms in general, the liquidators descend to liberalism. Actually, they deny that it is necessary to conduct revolutionary agitation among the masses, and in their press they frankly declare that the slogans "democratic republic" and "confiscation of the land" cannot serve as subjects for agitation among the masses. They advocate freedom of association as the all-inclusive slogan of the day, and, in fact, urge it as a substitute for the revolutionary demands of 1905.

6. This Conference, giving warning of the pernicious, reformist agitation of the liquidators, points out again that the R.S.D.L.P. long ago advanced in its minimum programme the demands for freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc., closely linking these demands with the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy. This Conference confirms the resolution of the January 1912 Conference, which states: "The Conference calls upon all Social-Democrats to explain to the workers the paramount importance to the proletariat of

freedom of association; this demand must always be closely linked up with our general political demands and our revolutionary agitation among the masses."*

The main slogans of the epoch still are: (1) a democratic republic; (2) confiscation of the landed estates; (3) an 8-hour day. Freedom of association is included here as part of the whole.

RESOLUTION ON THE ORGANISATIONAL QUESTION AND ON THE PARTY CONGRESS

1. The reports from the localities have shown that the most urgent organisational task is not only to consolidate the leading Party organisations in every town, but also to link up the towns with each other.

2. As a first step towards regional amalgamation this Conference recommends the organisation of meetings (and where possible conferences) of comrades from different centres of the working-class movement. Every effort must be made to have all branches of Party activity represented at these meetings: political, trade union, insurance, co-operative, etc.

3. This Conference affirms that for the purpose of co-ordinating activities throughout Russia, the system of having representatives of the Central Committee is absolutely essential. A beginning has only just been made in applying the decision on representatives adopted by the February Conference. Advanced workers in the districts should see to it that such representatives are appointed at least in every large centre of the working-class movement, and as many of them as possible.

4. This Conference places on the order of the day the question of convening a Party congress.[120] The growth of the working-class movement, the maturing of a political crisis in the country and the need for united working-class actions on a nation-wide scale, make it necessary and possible to convene such a congress—after adequate preparations for it have been made.

5. This Conference invites the comrades in the districts, when discussing this subject, to make suggestions for the

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 480.—*Ed.*

congress agenda, for the desirable date of convocation, for draft resolutions, etc.

6. This Conference points out that apart from other difficulties, the problem of meeting the expenses of the congress can also be solved only by the workers themselves.

This Conference calls upon the comrades to start a fund for the convocation of the Party congress.

THE STRIKE MOVEMENT

1. This Conference confirms the resolutions of the January 1912 Conference, and of the February 1913 Conference,* which contains an appraisal of the strike movement fully borne out by the experience of the past few months.

2. Characteristic of the new stage of revival of the revolutionary strike is the movement in Moscow and the rising temper in several districts hitherto unaffected by the movement.

3. This Conference welcomes the initiative taken by the St. Petersburg Committee and by a number of Party groups in Moscow in raising the question of a general political strike, and in taking steps in this direction in July and September this year.**

4. This Conference affirms that the movement is approaching the moment when it will be opportune to bring up the question of a general political strike. Systematic agitation in preparation for this strike must be started everywhere immediately.

5. The slogans for these political strikes, which must be vigorously disseminated, should be the fundamental revolutionary demands of the day: a democratic republic; an 8-hour day; confiscation of the landed estates.

6. This Conference calls upon all local Party officials to develop an extensive leaflet propaganda and to establish the most regular and closest communication possible

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 465-68 and Vol. 18, pp. 456-58.—*Ed.*

** The Editorial Board of the Central Organ which was instructed to publish the resolutions of the Conference, added a reference to the September events that fully confirmed the correctness of these resolutions.

between the political and other working-class organisations of the various cities. It is particularly necessary to secure co-ordination of activities primarily between the St. Petersburg and Moscow workers, so that the political strikes that are likely to arise from various causes (persecution of the press, strikes to enforce insurance, etc.) may as far as possible take place simultaneously in both cities.

THE PARTY PRESS

1. This Conference points to the vast importance of the legal press for Social-Democratic agitation and organisation, and therefore calls upon Party bodies and upon all class-conscious workers to increase their assistance to the legal press by securing for it the widest possible circulation, and by organising mass collective subscriptions and regular collections of contributions. The Conference reaffirms that such contributions are counted as Party membership dues.

2. Special efforts must be made to consolidate the legal workers' newspaper in Moscow[121] and to issue a workers' newspaper in the South at the earliest possible date.

3. This Conference expresses the desire that the closest possible contact be established between the existing legal working-class periodicals by means of an exchange of information, arrangement of conferences, etc.

4. Recognising the importance of a theoretical organ of Marxism and the need for one, this Conference expresses the desire that all the organs of the Party and trade union press should make the workers familiar with the magazine *Prosveshcheniye*, and urge them to subscribe to it regularly and to render it their systematic support.

5. This Conference draws the attention of Party publishing houses to the great need to publish an extensive series of popular, Social-Democratic agitation and propaganda pamphlets.

6. In view of the recent intensification of the revolutionary mass struggle, and of the need to report on it in the fullest detail (which the legal press cannot do), this Conference calls special attention to the need to stimulate in every way the development of underground Party publishing activities; in addition to publishing illegal leaflets,

pamphlets, etc., it is absolutely essential to secure the more frequent and regular issue of the illegal Party organ (the Central Organ).[122]

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ACTIVITIES IN THE DUMA

Having examined in detail the resolution of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, adopted at the December 1908, Conference, and having discussed all the facts concerning the activities of the Social-Democrats in the Fourth Duma, this Conference affirms:

1. that the aforesaid resolution quite correctly defined the aims and objects of Social-Democratic activities in the Duma, and that this resolution must therefore continue to serve as a guide to these activities in the future;

2. that the last subsection of Point 3 (3 h) of the December resolution (on voting or abstaining from voting on questions concerning the improvement of the conditions of the workers)[123] should be interpreted as follows. If bills, motions, etc., concern immediate and direct improvements in conditions for workers, minor salaried employees and working people generally (for example, reduction of hours, increase of wages, the removal of even minor evils in the lives of the workers and of broad sections of the population in general, etc.), the clauses that provide for such improvements should be voted for.

In cases when the conditions the Fourth Duma attaches to these improvements make them dubious, the group should abstain from voting, but must *unfailingly* formulate its motives for so doing, after having first discussed the question with representatives of workers' organisations.

This Conference affirms that:

on all questions, important bills, etc., the Socialist-Democratic group in the Duma must independently formulate its own motion to pass on to next business.

In cases of the group's vote against the government, after the Social-Democratic motion has been rejected, coinciding with the vote of other parties, the group must endeavour to formulate its own motives for voting for another party's motion, or part of a motion.

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

This Conference is of the opinion that united action on the part of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma is possible and essential.

This Conference affirms, however, that the conduct of the seven deputies gravely jeopardises the unity of the group.

Taking advantage of their accidental majority of one, the seven deputies encroach on the elementary rights of the six workers' deputies, who represent the overwhelming majority of the workers of Russia.

The seven deputies, guided by narrow factional interests, deprive the six deputies of the opportunity to speak in the Duma on very important questions affecting the lives of the workers. In several cases when the Social-Democratic group put up two or more speakers, the six deputies were not given an opportunity in spite of repeated demands to put up their own speaker.

Similarly, in appointing representatives to various Duma committees (for example, the Budget Committee) the seven deputies refuse to allow the six to have one of the two places.

When the group elects representatives to bodies that are of importance to the working-class movement, the seven deputies, by a majority of one, deprive the six of all representation. The staff that serves the group is always elected in a biased manner (for example, the demand for a second secretary was rejected).

This Conference is of the opinion that such conduct on the part of the seven deputies inevitably gives rise to friction in the group, which hinders united action and threatens to split the group.

This Conference protests most emphatically against this conduct on the part of the seven deputies.

The six deputies represent the overwhelming majority of the workers of Russia and act in complete harmony with the political line of its organised vanguard.

This Conference is therefore of the opinion that united action on the part of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma is possible only if the two sections of the group enjoy equal rights, and if the seven deputies abandon their steamroller tactics.

Notwithstanding irreconcilable disagreements in spheres of activity outside as well as inside the Duma, this Conference demands that the group should maintain unity on the basis of the aforesaid equality of rights of its two sections.

This Conference invites class-conscious workers to express their opinion on this important question and to exert all efforts to help preserve the unity of the group on the only possible basis, that of equal rights for the six workers' deputies.

WORK IN LEGAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. In the present period of revival of the economic and political struggle of the working class it is particularly necessary to intensify activities in all the legal working-class associations (trade unions, clubs, sick benefit societies, co-operative societies, and so forth).

2. All activities in legal working-class associations must be conducted not in a neutral spirit, but in keeping with the spirit of the decisions of the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and of the International Congress in Stuttgart.[124] Social-Democrats should recruit members for all working-class associations from the widest possible working-class circles, and urge all workers to join them irrespective of their party opinions. But the Social-Democrats in these associations should form themselves into Party groups and by prolonged and systematic activities secure the establishment of the closest relations between the associations and the Social-Democratic Party.

3. The experience of the international and of our Russian working-class movement teaches that it is necessary from the very inception of such working-class organisations (trade unions, co-operative societies, clubs, etc.) to strive to convert every one of them into a stronghold of the Social-Democratic Party. This Conference urges all Party members to bear this important task in mind, for it is a particularly urgent one in Russia, where the liquidators are making systematic efforts to utilise the legal societies *against* the Party.

4. This Conference is of the opinion that in electing delegates to the sick benefit societies, in all trade union activities, etc., it is necessary, while upholding the complete

unity of the movement and the submission of the minority to the majority, to pursue the Party line, secure the election of supporters of the Party for all responsible posts, etc.

5. For the purpose of summing up the experience of practical activities in legal working-class societies it is desirable to arrange more frequent conferences with active participants in the work of local legal working-class organisations and to invite to general Party conferences as large a number as possible of representatives of Party groups operating in these legal societies.

RESOLUTION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The orgy of Black-Hundred nationalism, the growth of nationalist tendencies among the liberal bourgeoisie and the growth of nationalist tendencies among the upper classes of the oppressed nationalities, give prominence at the present time to the national question.

The state of affairs in the Social-Democratic movement (the attempts of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, the Bund and the liquidators to annul the Party Programme,[125] etc.) compels the Party to devote more attention than ever to this question.

This Conference, taking its stand on the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P., and in order to organise correctly Social-Democratic agitation on the national question, advances the following propositions:

1. Insofar as national peace is in any way possible in a capitalist society based on exploitation, profit-making and strife, it is attainable only under a consistently and thoroughly democratic republican system of government which guarantees full equality of all nations and languages, which recognises no compulsory official language, which provides the people with schools where instruction is given in all the native languages, and the constitution of which contains a fundamental law that prohibits any privileges whatsoever to any one nation and any encroachment whatsoever upon the rights of a national minority. This particularly calls for wide regional autonomy and fully democratic local self-government, with the boundaries of the self-governing and autonomous regions determined by the local

inhabitants themselves on the basis of their economic and social conditions, national make-up of the population, etc.

2. The division of the educational affairs of a single state according to nationalities is undoubtedly harmful from the standpoint of democracy in general, and of the interests of the proletarian class struggle in particular. It is precisely this division that is implied in the plan for "cultural-national" autonomy, or for "the creation of institutions that will guarantee freedom for national development" adopted in Russia by all the Jewish bourgeois parties and by the petty-bourgeois, opportunist elements among the different nations.

3. The interests of the working class demand the amalgamation of the workers of all the nationalities in a given state in united proletarian organisations—political, trade union, co-operative, educational, etc. This amalgamation of the workers of different nationalities in single organisations will alone enable the proletariat to wage a victorious struggle against international capital and reaction, and combat the propaganda and aspirations of the landowners, clergy and bourgeois nationalists of all nations, who usually cover up their anti-proletarian aspirations with the slogan of "national culture". The world working-class movement is creating and daily developing more and more an international proletarian culture.

4. As regards the right of the nations oppressed by the tsarist monarchy to self-determination, i.e., the right to secede and form independent states, the Social-Democratic Party must unquestionably champion this right. This is dictated by the fundamental principles of international democracy in general, and specifically by the unprecedented national oppression of the majority of the inhabitants of Russia by the tsarist monarchy, which is a most reactionary and barbarous state compared with its neighbouring states in Europe and Asia. Furthermore, this is dictated by the struggle of the Great-Russian inhabitants themselves for freedom, for it will be impossible for them to create a democratic state if they do not eradicate Black-Hundred, Great-Russian nationalism, which is backed by the traditions of a number of bloody suppressions of national move-

ments and systematically fostered not only by the tsarist monarchy and all the reactionary parties, but also by the Great-Russian bourgeois liberals, who toady to the monarchy, particularly in the period of counter-revolution.

5. The right of nations to self-determination (i.e., the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic method of deciding the question of secession) must under no circumstances be confused with the expediency of a given nation's secession. The Social-Democratic Party must decide the latter question exclusively on its merits in each particular case in conformity with the interests of social development as a whole and with the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.

Social-Democrats must moreover bear in mind that the landowners, the clergy and the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations often cover up with nationalist slogans their efforts to divide the workers and dupe them by doing deals behind their backs with the landowners and bourgeoisie of the ruling nation to the detriment of the masses of the working people of all nations.

* * *

This Conference places on the agenda of the Party congress the question of the national programme. It invites the Central Committee, the Party press and the local organisations to discuss (in pamphlets, debates, etc.) the national question in fullest detail.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE NARODNIKS

1. The London Congress, in summing up the activities of the Narodnik parties—including, among others, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party—in the period of revolution, definitely stated that these parties constantly vacillated between submission to the hegemony of the liberals and determined struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state; and it also pointed to the pseudo-socialist character of their propaganda, which tones down the antagonism between the proletarian and the small proprietor.

2. The period of reaction has brought out these features still more strongly, for, on the one hand, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party has abandoned a consistently democratic policy, and certain elements in it are even criticising the revolution, thereby following in the footsteps of the liberals; on the other hand, this party has been reduced to a mere group of intellectuals divorced from the life of the masses.

3. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party officially continues to advocate terrorism, the history of which in Russia has fully confirmed the correctness of Social-Democratic criticism of this form of struggle, and which ended in complete defeat. Furthermore, its boycott of the elections and the complete inability of this organisation of intellectuals to exercise systematic influence on the course of the social development of the country have brought it about that nowhere has this party been in the slightest degree a factor in the new revival of the revolutionary movement.

4. The petty-bourgeois socialism of the Narodniks reduces itself to the pernicious preaching to the working class of ideas that obscure the ever-widening gulf between the interests of labour and capital and tone down the acuteness of the class struggle; it fosters petty-bourgeois utopias in the sphere of co-operation.

5. The Narodniks are greatly hindered in conducting republican-democratic propaganda among large masses of the peasantry by their vacillation in the struggle for democratic slogans, their narrow group character and their petty-bourgeois prejudices. The interests of this propaganda itself therefore demand, in the first place, strong criticism of the Narodniks by the Social-Democrats.

This Conference does not by any means reject the joint action with the Narodnik parties especially provided for by the London Congress, but suggests that the tasks of the Social-Democrats are:

a) to expose the vacillations and tendency to abandon consistent democracy that are manifesting themselves in the Narodnik parties;

b) to combat the petty-bourgeois socialism of the Narodniks, which tends to obscure the gulf between capital and labour;

c) to support the republican-democratic trends among the peasant masses and constantly point out to them that only the consistently democratic socialist proletariat can serve as a reliable leader of the masses of the poorer peasants in their struggle against monarchy and landed proprietorship;

d) to devote greater attention to the propagation of Social-Democratic ideas among the groups of workers—although these are not numerous—who have not yet rid themselves of the obsolete theories of Narodism.

THERE'S A TRUDOVIK FOR YOU!

Zavety[126] is an out-and-out Narodnik, *Left*-Narodnik, publication with Mr. Chernov himself on the staff. It is a bulky and serious magazine. And if the celebrated "*family labour* principle" that all Trudoviks,* all Narodniks, including all the Socialist-Revolutionaries, have constantly on their lips is to be found anywhere it is in this magazine.

Some people even assert that the "family labour principle" is a socialist principle, and that its theoreticians are socialists.

Let us see how Mr. S. Zak, a Left Narodnik who has made a special study of the question of industrial capitalism, discusses the "*family labour* principle" in industry.

Mr. S. Zak distinguishes three types of industry: (1) "family labour" industry; (2) "transitional" industry which stands midway between "family labour" and capitalist industry, and (3) capitalist industry. Enterprises employing over 50 workers he classifies as capitalist; those employing from 11 to 50 workers come under the heading "transitional industry" and *those employing no more than 10* he classifies as "*family labour*" industry.

Why does he classify the last-named enterprises as "family labour"? The reason, if you please, is that "since those undertakings do not employ on the average even one clerk and one technician per undertaking, it is absurd to say that they are capitalist undertakings".

This theory is worthy of a semi-literate clerk, but not of an author who wants to be regarded as a socialist! Until Mr. Zak and the other Narodniks have invented "*their own*",

* See Note 95.—*Ed.*

new, truly Russian political economy, we shall stick to the old view that capitalism means production of *commodities*, in which *labour-power* is also transformed into a commodity.

This is elementary, and to be ignorant of it is disgraceful. The Narodniks say that they subscribe to Marx's theories, and that they are opposed to bourgeois political economy, but what they offer the public is nothing more than the views of the most banal philistine, who has learnt nothing and who repeats scraps of bourgeois phrases, such as: if the owner has an "office", he is a capitalist. But if my plant is a small one, how can I be a capitalist? I am a working man!

The defence of such views in the press is a rejection of the science of political economy, it is the defence of ignorance.

Capitalists may be small or big, foolish or clever, but this is not a criterion of capitalism. Capitalism means producing *commodities* and hiring wage-labour.

In the opinion of our Narodnik another criterion of "family labour" industry is—do the members of the owner's family take part in the work? Anybody who is familiar with the rudiments of political economy knows that family labour is typical of *petty-bourgeois* industry. Exalting the petty bourgeoisie with the title of "family labour" industry shows a complete failure to understand what socialism is.

Here are Mr. Zak's own figures. For every group of 100 factories, we find on the average the following numbers of members of owners' families employed: (1) 28 in the factories employing up to 3 workers; (2) 34 in the factories employing 4 to 5 workers; (3) 22 in the factories employing 6 to 10 workers.

Our "neo-Narodnik" is splendid, is he not? He himself quotes figures which show that wage-labour *predominates*, and yet he calls it "family labour" industry!

Mr. Zak skips over the returns of various industrial censuses, waxes enthusiastic over the "numerous" "working" masters he finds, and asserts that this proves the "unsoundness of the orthodox theory"—as the Narodniks ironically call Marx's doctrine. We shall quote the complete figures of the German census returns, to which Mr. Zak primarily refers. We shall take industry in the broad sense of the term, including commerce and transport.

Enterprises	Number	%	Number or quantity (millions)					
			Workers	%	H. P.	%	Kilowatts	%
One-man workshops	1,452,000	44.4	1.4	10.1	—	—	—	—
Small (2 to 5 workers)	1,524,000	46.7	3.8	26.2	0.7	7.4	0.1	7.1
Medium (6 to 50 workers)	259,000	8.0	3.5	24.3	1.5	17.3	0.2	15.7
Large (51 workers and over)	31.000	0.9	5.7	39.4	6.6	75.3	1.2	77.2
Total	3,266,000	100.0	14.4	100.0	8.8	100.0	1.5	100.0

Look closely at this picture of capitalism in industry. One-man, petty-bourgeois workshops are very "numerous": *one and a half million*. Their *share* of industry? *One-tenth* of the workers and *none* of the machinery, either steam or electrically driven!

What about the big capitalists? They account for *one-hundredth* of the factories, but they employ nearly two-fifths (39 per cent) of the total number of workers and have *over three-fourths* (75-77 per cent) of the total machinery.

Every intelligent worker will see at once that these figures fully confirm his everyday experience: the existence of a vast number of miserable petty bourgeois crushed by capital, and the *most complete predominance* of a handful of large capitalist enterprises.

To proceed. The statistics, so hopelessly garbled by this "Left" Narodnik, reveal a very rapid growth of capitalism and the elimination of small production. We shall compare the returns of three German censuses, that of 1882, 1895 and 1907 (the last). So as not to weary the reader with figures, we shall take only the most important of them; we shall compare the one-man workshops with the capitalist plants, taking medium and large together.

Year	One-man workshops		Medium and large capitalist plants	
	% of total number of plants	% of total number of workers	% of total number of plants	% of total number of workers
1882	62	26	4	41
1895	54	17	7	53
1907	42	10	9	63

Twenty-five years ago the one-man workshop owners constituted the majority of the masters (three-fifths). Now they constitute the minority (two-fifths). Formerly, they employed one-fourth of the total number of workers; they now employ only one-tenth.

On the other hand, the share of the capitalist plants shows a rapid increase. Twenty-five years ago they employed only a minority of the workers (two-fifths), but they now employ the *majority*, nearly two-thirds of the total number of workers (63 per cent). And we have already seen that the concentration of steam, to say nothing of electrically driven *machinery*, in the hands of a small number of capitalists is *far greater* than the concentration of workers.

Thus, the industrial censuses of the free and rapidly developing countries are the best proof of the correctness of Marx's theory. Capitalism rules everywhere. Everywhere it is squeezing out small production. Everywhere the masses of peasants and small artisans and handicraftsmen are being ruined. Big capital forces down and crushes the small master in a thousand ways that are still poorly reflected in statistics. There is no salvation for the small master. His only way of escape is to join the struggle of the proletariat.

From first to last the theory of the "family labour principle" and "family labour industry" is a repetition of the old bourgeois prejudices, prejudices that are being shattered all the time by the experience of every country.

In trying to prove to the workers that the capitalist or small master who employs from five to ten wage-workers is a "working master", the Left Narodniks only reveal their own bourgeois nature.

Pravda Truda No. 18,
October 1, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Pravda Truda* text

BEWILDERED NON-PARTY PEOPLE

One of the most widespread and unhealthy symptoms of our public life is the contempt (if not open hostility) that is displayed towards adherence to a party.

It is characteristic of political free lances, political adventurers and political Manilovs to repudiate party affiliations and to talk pompously about party "bigotry", "dogmatism", intolerance, and so on, and so forth. As a matter of fact, the use of such expressions merely reflects the ridiculous and paltry conceit or self-justification of intellectuals who are shut off from the masses and feel compelled to cover up their feebleness. Serious politics can only be promoted by the *masses*; non-party masses that do not follow the lead of a strong party are, however, disunited, ignorant masses, without staying power, prone to become a plaything in the hands of adroit politicians, who always emerge "opportunely" from the ranks of the ruling classes to take advantage of "favourable" circumstances.

Russia is one of the most petty-bourgeois countries in the world and is least accustomed to free political activities. This, and this alone, explains the contempt that is so widespread in this country for adherence to a party. One of the tasks of class-conscious workers in Russia (and one of the great historical services they must render) is to wage a systematic and persevering struggle against this attitude.

The following is one of the latest examples of the smug non-partisanship that reigns among the *near-Party* intellectuals.

The workers have organised the collection of funds for working-class newspapers on an extensive scale. It is not difficult to understand that when the masses have con-

sciously decided for themselves *which* newspaper to assist and which *trend* to support, such collections *teach* them ideologically sound and principled politics.

The liquidators, who so-often descend to non-party politics, have launched their notorious campaign for the *collections to be shared equally*. In this they were prompted solely by the desire to cover up their own weakness, and in their haste they did not have time to think and realise that the principle underlying such a campaign is precisely the principle of *non-partisanship*.

They were immediately exposed by the real state of affairs. Russian petty-bourgeois society *made the liquidators*' slogan its own: share and share alike with everybody, with the liquidators and with the Narodniks!

When their political gamble is exposed, these non-party people who have renounced the Marxist past for the sake of visions of something as "broad" as it is unprincipled, begin to twist and turn. G. R., in No. 24 of the liquidators' newspaper, assures us that the liquidators are not at all in favour of uniting with the Narodniks, and alleges that such union has been "systematically advocated" by the Marxists.

A cruder distortion of the truth could scarcely be imagined. If G. R. and Co. were not non-party, if they did not treat the *history* of Marxism like philistines, they would know that it was *only* due to the Marxists (supporters of *Pravda*) that the question of the attitude the workers should adopt to the various parties was *settled* quite officially more than six years ago.* The Marxists alone gave a precise definition of the *class* basis of *all* the important parties in Russia; the liquidators have never been able to do this. The Marxists alone of all the parties in Russia, *six years* ago, defined the exact nature of the various "trends" and the attitude that should be adopted towards them in place of a chaotic, unprincipled attitude ("as circumstances demand") towards individual parties.

Since then, events have brilliantly confirmed the correctness of this definition in the most unquestionable manner.

The definition states clearly and precisely that the Narodniks are petty-bourgeois democrats with whom "joint

* See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 136-38.—*Ed*.

action" is possible only against reaction and against liberalism.

Now, G. R. and Co., in asserting that they are opposed to uniting with the Narodniks, want to wriggle out of it by saying: "We are in favour of the collections being shared equally between the *two* newspapers when 'mass collections' are made, but we are opposed to this when collections are made 'among groups of politically conscious supporters'!" (See *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 24.)

In the first place, it has already been proved by actual experience that a non-party plan emerges from your advocacy of share and share alike. This is a fact. This very issue No. 24, contains a resolution adopted by one workers' group which says: *equally with the Narodniks*, *too*. As is always the case with them, our non-partisans or independents, find themselves in the wrong box!

In the second place, can a group of politically conscious supporters be called such if it is unable to enlighten the masses? No, gentlemen, non-partisans, it cannot! Politically conscious supporters will say to the masses—let everybody contribute, let everybody unite, but *try*, in doing so, *to distinguish* the trends of the different newspapers!

To contribute and say "share and share alike" means being non-party, indifferent and not politically conscious. To contribute and say, "*for such and such a trend*", means being politically conscious, and taking part consciously in a *common* action.

G. R. distorts this political ABC. The result is that G. R. and Co., the liquidators, while asserting that they are opposed to uniting with the Narodniks, are *actually* continuing their policy of uniting with them on a *non-party* basis; they are continuing a *non-party* policy extremely harmful to the workers, one which cannot be tolerated.

Worker democrats have more than once offered determined resistance to the advocacy of non-partisanship and must do so again in the future, for it dulls the political consciousness of the workers and makes it easier for all sorts of frauds to be perpetrated upon them.

Za Pravdu No. 3,
October 4, 1913
Signed: *Kar—ov*

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text

THE LIBERALS AND THE LAND PROBLEM IN BRITAIN

On Saturday, October 11 (September 28, O.S.), the British Liberal Minister, Lloyd George, opened his "Land Campaign" in two "brilliant" speeches delivered in the town of Bedford. Just as our Kit Kitych Guchkov promised "to settle accounts" with the Russian privileged and all-powerful landowners, so the British Liberal Minister promised to start a campaign on the land question, to expose the landlords and appeal to the people on the issue of a "radical" (Lloyd George is extremely radical!) land reform.

The Liberal press in Britain tried to give their leader's campaign as impressive an appearance as possible. Publicity, publicity at all costs! If the speech is too long, let us publish a brief "summary" of it, let us call it a land "charter", let us embellish it in such a way as to conceal the diplomatic subterfuges of the parliamentary huckster behind a long list of reforms—a minimum wage, 100,000 cottages for the workers, and the "compulsory alienation of the land at its *net* [!!] value to the landlords".

In order to show the reader *how* the Minister of the British Liberal bourgeoisie carries on agitation among the people, we shall quote several passages from Lloyd George's Bedford speeches.

"There is no question more vital, ... than the question ... of the land!" exclaimed the speaker. "It enters into everything—the food the people eat, the water they drink, the houses they dwell in, the industries upon which their livelihood depends." And to whom does the land belong in Britain? To a handful of rich people! One-third of all the land belongs to members of the House of Lords. "Landlordism is

the greatest of all monopolies in this land." The power of the landlords is boundless. They may evict their tenants, and devastate the land worse than an enemy would. "Now, I am not attacking the landlords either individually or as a class," the Minister took pains to declare, "but can such a state of affairs be allowed to continue?"

During the last few decades the agricultural population has declined from over two million to one and a half million, while the number of gamekeepers has increased from 9,000 to 23,000. There is no other country in the world where there is so much uncultivated land and where the farmers suffer so much from game bred by the rich for their amusement.

The wealth of Britain is increasing at an astonishing rate. But what about the farm labourers? Nine-tenths of them earn less than twenty shillings and sixpence (about 10 rubles) per week, a sum which in workhouses is considered to be barely sufficient to prevent an inmate from starving. Sixty per cent of the farm labourers earn less than eighteen shillings (about 9 rubles) per week.

The Conservatives propose that the land be purchased in small holdings. "But him who talks about purchase," thundered the British Rodichev,[127] "I shall ask: *at what price?*" (*Laughter.*)

Will not the high price crush the small buyer? Will he not be crushed by high rates? There is a Small Holdings Act which is supposed to provide land for workers. Here is an example. The total rates and taxes on a plot of land are assessed at £30 (nearly 270 rubles). This land is bought and resold to poor people in small holdings. The price they pay turns out to be £60!

The depopulation of rural England threatens to make our country defenceless—without a strong peasantry there can be no strong army. Now, can either a Russian or a British Liberal get along without playing on crude nationalist and chauvinist sentiments?

"The landlords did not create the land," exclaimed Lloyd George, "the country must choose between the power of the landlords and the welfare of the workers. We must act firmly and determinedly against monopoly—and property in land is the greatest monopoly. The tenant farmer must

obtain guarantees that he will not be evicted, or deprived of the fruits of his energy and skill." (A voice: "What is the remedy?") "We must act, enough of timid attempts at half-measures. We must deal with it thoroughly, we must do as businessmen do. It is no use tinkering and mending, we must put the land monopoly under better control.

"We must secure a minimum wage for the labourer, shorten the working day, give him a decent, comfortable cottage and a plot of land so that he can grow a certain amount of produce for his family. We must secure for him a *ladder of progress* in order that the 'enterprising' labourer may rise from the small allotment, the kitchen garden, to the small holding. And the most enterprising might look forward to taking their position as one of the substantial farmers in the community. You are tempted with the charms of emigration to America and Australia. But we want the British worker to find sustenance for himself, a free life and comfort for himself and for his children right here, in England, in our own country."

Thunderous applause.... And one can almost hear the isolated voices of those in the audience who were not fooled (like the one who shouted: "What is the remedy?") saying: "He sings well; but will he do anything?"

He sings well, this British Liberal Minister, this favourite of the petty-bourgeois crowd, a past master in the art of breaking strikes by brazen deception of the workers, the best servant of British capital, which enslaves both the British workers and the 300 million population of India. What power, however, induced this hardened politician, this lackey of the money-bags, to make such "radical" speeches?

The power of the labour movement.

In Britain there is no conscripted army. The people cannot be restrained by violence—they can be restrained only by deception. The labour movement is growing irresistibly. The people's attention must be diverted, the masses must be "engaged" with high-sounding schemes for reform, a pretence must be made of waging war on the Conservatives, sops must be promised to prevent the masses from losing faith in the Liberals, to ensure that they follow the industrial and financial capitalists like sheep following shepherds.

And the promises of reform ... does not the English proverb say that promises are like pie-crusts, made to be broken? Lloyd George makes promises and the Liberal Cabinet as a whole will cut them to a fifth before setting about their realisation. The Conservatives, in their turn, will make a *further* cut, the result being a tenth.

The reformism of the British bourgeoisie is the clearest indication of the growth of a deep-going revolutionary movement among the British working class. No eloquent orator, no Liberal charlatan can stop this movement.

Za Pravdu No. 8,
October 12, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text

A WEAK DEFENCE OF A WEAK CASE

A certain G. Golosov is mortally offended over the fact that I, in *Prosveshcheniye*, referred to Chkheidze as a "near-Party Social-Democrat".*

G. Golosov is in a towering rage; he hurls invectives right and left and burdens his lines with exclamation marks and marks of interrogation. But the greater the anger he displays the more evident it becomes that his angry outcries are merely a screen to cover up his lack of proof.

I did refer to Chkheidze as a near-Party Social-Democrat. It should not be difficult for Golosov to realise that he could refute mo if he proved that Chkheidze is a *Party* Social-Democrat.

I mentioned the fact that at the most critical moment in the history of the Social-Democratic group (and in the history of the regeneration of the Party) Chkheidze "avoided the issue". When the liquidator and anti-liquidator press came into being (1911 and beginning of 1912) Chkheidze was *neither on one side nor on the other*.

Does my angry opponent disprove this precisely indicated fact?

He does not. Angry G. Golosov does not disprove this fact, nor can he do so. Poor Golosov; he is wrathful, but he is weak! He timidly evades the fact that proves that Chkheidze's behaviour (notwithstanding his oratorical talent and parliamentary experience) was the behaviour of a *near-Party* man.

If irate G. Golosov were able to think, he would realise that a man proves his party allegiance by taking a most

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* See p. 413 of this volume.—*Ed.*

energetic, direct, and open part in the affairs of his party (and not only of its group in the Duma). The rise of a liquidator and anti-liquidator press marked an extremely important moment in the modern history of the Marxist organisation. Hence, I proved up to the hilt that Chkheidze is a near-Party man.

In a fit of hysterical rage G. Golosov exclaims: "The Party is supposed to be where V. Ilyin and G. Zinoviev are."

Thus, good Golosov adds to his troubles by raising the extremely interesting and important question as to *where* the Party is. If G. Golosov cannot think, the workers can, and they have all thought and are thinking about this question.

The Party is *where* the majority of the class-conscious worker Marxists who take an active part in political life are to be found.

G. Golosov's anger rises to the pitch of hysteria simply because he realises he is unable to disprove this plain truth.

The elections to the Fourth Duma, the history of the inception and growth of *Pravda*, the election to the Executive Committee of the Metalworkers' Union, the insurance campaign and the resolutions passed by the workers in support of the six worker deputies—all *proved* that the Party is on the side of the six, that it supports their line. *Their* slogans have been adopted and tested by the *mass* actions of workers in all branches of the working-class movement.

Irate Golosov is angry simply because he is unable to disprove the precise, obvious and indisputable fact that the Marxists beat the liquidators in the elections, in the trade unions, in the effort to establish daily newspapers and in the insurance campaign.

Those against whom *all* the facts speak have no alternative but to "get angry" and go into hysterics.

The Party is where the majority of the workers have rallied around the Party's decisions which provide complete, systematic and accurate answers to the most important problems. The Party is where the majority of class-conscious workers are united by the singleness of these decisions and by a single will to implement them conscientiously.

In defending the "right" of Chkheidze (and of the seven) to flout these decisions and the will of the working class,

G. Golosov, like all the liquidators, is trying to break up the Marxist organisation in the interests of non-partisanship.

There can be no doubt that the workers will continue to back the position of *their* six deputies as against the *near-Party* position of the seven.

Za Pravdu No. 12,
October 17, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text

DECLARATION[128]

Dear Comrades,

Our joint activities in the State Duma during the past year revealed a number of disagreements and points of friction between our group and yours—the other seven Social-Democratic deputies. Matters have reached the stage of open polemics in the press; and the last decisions you adopted just before the adjournment of the State Duma in June 1913, when some of the deputies had already left, revealed to the full that the situation had become intolerable and had reached an impasse. These decisions which you adopted by a vote of seven against six, are: refusal to allow the Bolsheviks (i.e., the six deputies) to have one of the two seats on the Budget Committee, and the election of one delegate (instead of two) to a certain important body.

After repeatedly, by seven votes against six, depriving the six workers' deputies of the right to nominate one of the two speakers put up in the Duma, the aforesaid decisions were the last drop that filled the cup to overflowing.

You are aware that we have been, and still are, acting entirely in keeping with the spirit of consistent Marxism, and ideologically adhere to all its general decisions.

You are aware, comrades, that absolutely objective facts prove that it is no exaggeration to say that our activities have been in complete harmony with the political consciousness and will of the overwhelming majority of the Marxist advanced workers in Russia. This was proved by the case of *Pravda*, the first workers' newspaper which was brought into being by the revival of the working-class movement in April and May 1912, and which rallied to its side the majority of the workers. It was proved by the circulation of *Pravda*, which reached 40,000. It was proved by the collec-

tion of funds for *Pravda* by workers' groups, the progress of which that newspaper always openly reported. It was proved by the Fourth Duma elections in the worker curia, which resulted in the Bolsheviks winning all the seats in the curia, and which revealed an indisputable and undisputed enormous growth of Marxist and anti-liquidator convictions among the class-conscious workers of Russia as compared with the elections in the worker curia to the Second and Third Dumas. Lastly, it was proved by the election of the Executive Committee of the Metalworkers' Union in St. Petersburg and by the case of the first workers' newspaper in Moscow this year. It goes without saying that we regard it as our absolute duty to act in strictest harmony with the will of the majority of the workers of Russia who are united by Marxism.

You seven deputies, however, act independently of this will and contrary to it. You boldly adopt decisions that run counter to the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers. We shall mention, for example, your acceptance on vague terms, of Jagiello, who is not a Social-Democrat, and to this day has not been recognised by a single Social-Democrat in Poland; and your adoption—contrary to the will of the majority of the workers—of nationalist slogans, such as so-called cultural-national autonomy, and so forth. We do not know exactly your attitude towards the liquidator trend, but we think that you incline towards liquidationism rather than fully support it. Be that as it may, it nevertheless remains an indisputable fact that you do not feel bound by the opinions and demands of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia, with whom we go hand in hand.

Needless to say, under these circumstances, every socialist in every country in the world, every class-conscious worker, will regard as monstrous your efforts to suppress us by means of one vote, to deprive us of one of the two seats on Duma committees, or other bodies, to deprive us of spokesmen in the Duma, etc., and to foist upon us tactics and a policy that have been condemned by the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia.

We affirm, and cannot but affirm at the present time, that our disagreements are irreconcilable in other spheres of activity besides that of the Duma. We are compelled to

regard your efforts to suppress us and to deprive us of one of the two seats as being undoubtedly aimed at a split and, as such, precluding all possibility of co-operation between us. Nevertheless, respecting as we do the strong desire of the workers that the unity of the Social-Democratic deputies be preserved at least in the Duma and in face of the outside world, and bearing in mind our year's experience, which has proved that it *is possible* to achieve such unity in *Duma* activities by means of an *agreement*, we call upon you to declare precisely and unambiguously, once and for all, that the suppression, in any form, of the six deputies from the worker curia by seven votes is impermissible. The unity of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma can be really maintained only on the condition that the equality of the seven and six is fully and definitely recognised, and that the principle of agreement between them on all questions concerning Duma activities is adhered to.

Za Pravdu No. 13,
October 18, 1913

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THE DUMA "SEVEN"

The long-winded statements and arguments of the seven deputies to the State Duma in defence of liquidationism create a very strange impression.

All the time the seven discuss *solely* Duma activities, Social-Democratic activities in the *Duma*!

Outside of the Taurida Palace *nothing* of an organised character exists for the seven! "We, the seven of us, decided; we and Jagiello voted; we appointed speakers; we adopted a declaration"—this is all one hears from the seven. "We members of the Duma", "we in the Duma"—except for this, the seven know and understand nothing.

The seven have already become so thoroughly infected with liquidationist views that they have ceased to understand the ABC of Marxism.

According to Marxist standards, deputies to the Duma should *not* carry out *their own* will, but the will of the Marxist organisation, *not their own* decisions, but those of the Marxist body as a whole, *not their own*, but its tactics. It is a shame and a disgrace that this ABC of Marxism should have to be explained to Duma deputies! What a pass their inclinations towards the liquidators must have brought them to if they dare to act as non-Party people, as subverters of the proletarian political organisation!

The seven pro-liquidators *dare not even ask* "where is the Marxist organisation?"

And yet, this is the crux of the whole question.

All appeals for unity are sheer hypocrisy if those who make them evade the question of the *single* will, the *single* decisions and *single* tactics of the *majority* of the advanced and class-conscious workers of Russia organised on a Marxist basis.

Za Pravdu long ago indicated the criteria by which the Marxist will of the majority of the workers, opposition to which means splits, disorganisation and disruption can (and must) be judged.

These criteria are: (1) the elections to the Fourth Duma in the worker curia; (2) the case of the workers' newspapers; (3) the trade unions. In Europe they add to these what is the most important—the number of openly registered members of political parties. Everybody will understand that data of the latter kind cannot be obtained in Russia; they are partly compensated for by *common decisions*, which every honest worker regards as binding.

The liquidators and the seven *do not say* a word about this, not a word about the characteristics of the Marxist organisation, about its decisions and its tactics! The liquidators and the seven want "unity", that is, they want the six workers' deputies *to submit to the seven non-Party* deputies; that is, *they want to flout the will of the Marxist body as a whole*.

The liquidators and the seven want the Social-Democratic Duma group to act on its own according to its own sweet will, *in isolation from and opposed* to this body as a whole. And this disgraceful, disruptive demand they call a demand for unity.

The appeals for unity made by the seven remind one of a well-known quip: the seven want to "unite" with the six in the same way as a man "unites" with a piece of bread. He *swallows* it.

The seven non-Party men want to swallow the six Marxists; and they demand that this should be called "unity"

The destruction of the Marxist organisation by the seven deputies who have *alienated themselves* from the majority of the workers, by the seven *pro-liquidator* deputies, by the seven who have forgotten that in the Duma they are only the *vehicles* of the will of the majority of the workers—this is what the liquidators and the seven deputies are aiming at!

The working class protests against this astounding, disruptive behaviour of the arrogant enemies of working-class organisation, and emphatically demands subordination in Duma activities *as in all else*.

Za Pravdu No. 19,
October 25, 1913
Signed: *V. F.*

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the *Za Pravdu* text

THE LIBERAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE LIQUIDATORS

The Cadet Party, the leading party of the liberal bourgeoisie in Russia, has a number of men at its headquarters who have received a European education. In our day a man cannot be regarded as educated if he is not generally familiar with Marxism and the West-European working-class movement.

Since they have a large number of bourgeois intellectuals in their ranks, the Russian Cadets are, of course, familiar with Marxism; among them there are even some who were Marxists, or near-Marxists in their youth, but who grew "wiser" as they grew older and became liberal philistines.

All this explains the difference between the attitude of the old, European liberals, and that of the new, Russian liberals towards Social-Democracy. The former tried to prevent the emergence of Social-Democracy and denied its right to existence; the latter have been obliged to resign themselves to the fact: "We have no doubt," says the leading article in *Rech* (No. 287), "that Social-Democracy is destined to become the open political party of the proletariat in Russia." That is why the fight our liberals are waging against Social-Democracy has assumed the form of a struggle *in favour of opportunism in the ranks* of Social-Democracy.

Impotent to prevent the rise and growth of Social-Democracy, our liberal bourgeois are doing their best *to make it grow in the liberal way*. Hence, the prolonged and systematic efforts of our Cadets to foster opportunism (and liquidationism in particular) in the ranks of the Social-Democrats; the liberals *rightly* regard this as the *only* way of retaining

their influence over the proletariat and of making the working class dependent upon the liberal bourgeoisie.

The liberals' appraisal of the fight waged by the six workers' deputies against the seven pro-liquidator deputies is therefore very instructive. As onlookers, the liberals are compelled candidly to admit the main fact: the seven are the "parliamentary elements of Social-Democracy", they are a "party of parliamentary activity", they have in their ranks "the entire intelligentsia of the Duma Social-Democrats". Their line is that of the "evolution of Social-Democracy into an open parliamentary party", a line connected with a special "trend in tactics". "*Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* is the organ of the Social-Democrat parliamentarians."

Za Pravdu, on the contrary, is the "organ of the irreconcilables", says *Rech*, who are not a party of parliamentary activity but are the "antithesis of such a party".

The party of "*intellectual deputies*" versus "*workers' deputies*", such is *Rech*'s verdict. *Rech* says superciliously that it is impossible to tell whom the majority of the workers support, but it refutes itself in the very next breath by the following illuminating passage:

> "The longer the transition to this normal existence" (i.e., open, legal existence) "is delayed," it says, "the more reason will there be to anticipate that the *parliamentary majority of the Social-Democratic intellectuals will be compelled to yield to the non-parliamentary workers' majority* and to its present mood. We saw the deplorable consequences of such a divergence of trends at the end of 1905. And whatever one's opinion may be of the future upshot of the present impasse, it is hardly likely that anyone will be found to justify the blunders committed by the inexperienced leaders of the spontaneous mass temper in those winter months." This is what *Rech* writes.

We have stressed what interests us now particularly in this admission.

The non-parliamentary workers' majority versus the "parliamentary majority of the Social-Democratic intellectuals",—even the liberals perceive this as the issue in the controversy between the six and the seven.

The seven and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* represent the majority of the self-styled Social-Democratic intelligentsia *as opposed* to the "non-parliamentary workers' majority", *as opposed to the Party*.

The old party has disappeared; we don't need the old party; we will do without the party, we will make shift with one newspaper and activities in the Duma, and advocate the formation of an open party in the future—such, virtually, is the position of the seven and the position of all liquidators.

One can understand, therefore, why the liberals speak so kindly of the seven and of the liquidators, why they praise them for understanding parliamentary conditions, and refer to their tactics as "intricate, thoughtful and not oversimplified". The seven and the liquidators carry *liberal slogans* into the ranks of the working class—why should not the liberals praise them? The liberals could not wish for anything better than the erection of a bulwark of intellectuals, parliamentarians and legalists *against* the old party, *against* the "non-parliamentary workers' majority".

Let this bulwark call itself Social-Democratic; its name is not important, what is important is its liberal-labour policy—that is the way the enlightened bourgeoisie argues, and from its point of view it argues quite correctly.

The liberals have realised (and have blurted out) what all class-conscious, advanced workers realised long ago—that the *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* group and the seven that follow its lead, are this bulwark of liberal intellectuals who have split off from the Social-Democratic Party, repudiate the Party, denounce its "underground" activities and pursue a systematic policy of concessions to bourgeois reformism, bourgeois nationalism, etc.

The unity of the "non-parliamentary workers' majority", which is the genuine Party majority and is really independent of the liberal bourgeoisie, is *inconceivable* unless this bulwark of intellectual liquidators of the workers' party is vigorously combated.

Za Pravdu No. 20,
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CAPITALISM AND WORKERS' IMMIGRATION

Capitalism has given rise to a special form of migration of nations. The rapidly developing industrial countries, introducing machinery on a large scale and ousting the backward countries from the world market, raise wages at home above the average rate and thus attract workers from the backward countries.

Hundreds of thousands of workers thus wander hundreds and thousands of versts. Advanced capitalism drags them forcibly into its orbit, tears them out of the backwoods in which they live, makes them participants in the world-historical movement and brings them face to face with the powerful, united, international class of factory owners.

There can be no doubt that dire poverty alone compels people to abandon their native land, and that the capitalists exploit the immigrant workers in the most shameless manner. But only reactionaries can shut their eyes to the *progressive* significance of this modern migration of nations. Emancipation from the yoke of capital is impossible without the further development of capitalism, and without the class struggle that is based on it. And it is into this struggle that capitalism is drawing the masses of the working people of the *whole* world, breaking down the musty, fusty habits of local life, breaking down national barriers and prejudices, uniting workers from all countries in huge factories and mines in America, Germany, and so forth.

America heads the list of countries which import workers. The following are the immigration figures for America:

Ten years	1821-30	99,000
” ”	1831-40	496,000
” ”	1841-50	1,597 000
” ”	1851-60	2,453,000
” ”	1861-70	2,064,000
” ”	1871-80	2,262,000
” ”	1881-90	4,722,000
” ”	1891-1900	3,703,000
Nine ”	1901-09	7,210,000

The growth of immigration is enormous and continues to increase. During the five years 1905-09 the average number of immigrants entering America (the United States alone is referred to) was *over a million* a year.

It is interesting to note the change in the place of origin of those emigrating to America. Up to 1880 the so-called *old* immigration prevailed, that is, immigration from the old civilised countries, such as Great Britain, Germany and partly from Sweden. Even up to 1890, Great Britain and Germany provided more than half the total immigrants.

From 1880 onwards, there was an incredibly rapid increase in what is called the *new* immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, from Austria, Italy and Russia. The number of people emigrating from these three countries to the United States was as follows:

Ten years	1871-80	201,000
” ”	1881-90	927,000
” ”	1891-1900	1,847,000
Nine ”	1901-09	5, 127,000

Thus, the most backward countries in the old world, those that more than any other retain survivals of feudalism in every branch of social life, are, as it were, undergoing compulsory training in civilisation. American capitalism is tearing millions of workers of backward Eastern Europe (including Russia, which in 1891-1900 provided 594,000 immigrants and in 1900-09, 1,410,000) out of their semi-feudal conditions and is putting them in the ranks of the advanced, international army of the proletariat.

Hourwich, the author of an extremely illuminating book, *Immigration and Labour*, which appeared in English last year, makes some interesting observations. The number of

people emigrating to America grew particularly after the 1905 Revolution (1905—1,000,000; 1906—1,200,000; 1907—1,400,000; 1908 and 1909—1,900,000 respectively). Workers who had participated in various strikes in Russia introduced into America the bolder and more aggressive spirit of the mass strike.

Russia is lagging farther and farther behind, losing some of her best workers to foreign countries; America is advancing more and more rapidly, taking the most vigorous and able-bodied sections of the working population of the whole world.*

Germany, which is more or less keeping pace with the United States, is changing from a country which released workers into one that attracts them from foreign countries. The number of immigrants from Germany to America in the ten years 1881-90 was 1,453,000; but in the nine years 1901-09 it dropped to 310,000. The number of foreign workers in Germany, however, was 695,000 in 1910-11 and 729,000 in 1911-12. Dividing these immigrants according to occupation and country of origin we get the following:

	Foreign workers employed in Germany in 1911-12 (thousands)		
	Agriculture	Industry	Total
From Russia	274	34	308
” Austria	101	162	263
” other countries	22	135	157
Total	397	331	728

The more backward the country the larger is the number of “unskilled” agricultural labourers it supplies. The advanced nations seize, as it were, the best paid occupations for themselves and leave the semi-barbarian countries the worst paid occupations. Europe in general (“other countries”) provided Germany with 157,000 workers, of whom *more than eight-tenths* (135,000 out of 157,000) were industrial workers. Backward Austria provided only six-tenths

* Other countries on the American Continent besides the United States are also rapidly advancing. The number of immigrants entering the United States last year was about 250,000, Brazil about 170,000 and Canada over 200,000; total 620,000 for the year.

(162,000 out of 263,000) of the industrial workers. The most backward country of all, Russia, provided only *one-tenth* of the industrial workers (34,000 out of 308,000).

Thus, Russia is punished everywhere and in everything for her backwardness. But compared with the rest of the population, it is the workers of Russia who are more than any others bursting out of this state of backwardness and barbarism, more than any others combating these "delightful" features of their native land, and more closely than any others uniting with the workers of all countries into a single international force for emancipation.

The bourgeoisie incites the workers of one nation against those of another in the endeavour to keep them disunited. Class-conscious workers, realising that the break-down of all the national barriers by capitalism is inevitable and progressive, are trying to help to enlighten and organise their fellow-workers from the backward countries.

Za Pravdu No. 22,
October 29, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

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the *Za Pravdu* text

MATERIAL ON THE CONFLICT WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DUMA GROUP[129]

A conflict has broken out between the six Social-Democratic deputies from the worker curia in the State Duma—Badayev, Malinovsky, Muranov, Petrovsky, Samoilov and Shagov, on the one side, and the other seven members of the Social-Democratic group in the State Duma, on the other. Both the six and the seven have appealed to the workers to discuss the question and to express their opinions.

The discussion is already under way among the St. Petersburg workers, and to enable it to proceed successfully, we publish the following summary of material and considerations, which will interest all workers who have the fate of their Marxist organisation at heart.

WHOSE WILL?

The main question that confronts the workers in connection with the split in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma is the relation between the Duma group and the Marxist body as a whole. Whose will should determine the decisions, tactics and conduct of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma?

The experience of all Social-Democratic parliamentary groups throughout the world provides a clear and absolutely

indisputable answer to this question. Social-Democrat parliamentary deputies are the vehicles of the will of the class-conscious and organised proletariat of the country in question. The decisions adopted by the advanced proletariat, and which it carries out in all its economic and political struggle, are *binding* for Social-Democrat representatives in parliament. Parliamentary deputies who disagree with the will of the class-conscious, organised and advanced proletariat, resign, i.e., surrender their title of deputy.

These general and fundamental principles, to which all Marxists all over the globe subscribe, must first of all be clearly understood and thoroughly assimilated so that no unscrupulous persons may confuse and obscure the point at issue.

Anyone who attempts to defend the conception that Social-Democrat parliamentary deputies should be independent of the will of the majority of the organised and class-conscious workers at once exposes himself as an enemy of the Marxist organisation and a disruptor of all unity, of all united action on the part of worker Social-Democrats.

The question now is, how can we Russian workers determine what are the will and decisions of the majority of the class-conscious and united worker Social-Democrats of Russia?

WHAT IS THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE CLASS CONSCIOUS WORKERS OF RUSSIA?

In all countries in the world the following criteria determine the will of the politically organised proletariat.

First, the workers' newspapers. The support which the proletariat renders the different workers' newspapers reveals its political will and indicates the trend it stands for.

Second, parliamentary elections. Election laws in different countries vary, but it is often possible to determine without error *which deputies* the working class elects. The *trend* to which the deputies elected by the workers belong *indicates the will* of the proletariat.

Third, various workers' associations and societies, especially the trade unions, which wage a struggle against capital, give an indication of the will of the proletariat.

Fourth, in Western Europe, the most precise index of the will of the proletariat is the decisions of the socialist parties, which conduct their activities openly, and whose membership is known.

It is common knowledge that there is no open Social-Democratic Party in Russia. In this country even the Constitutional-Democratic Party is presumed to be banned. In Russia, those who attack or renounce the "underground", or justify renouncing it, are therefore called liquidators, i.e., renegades, disruptors of the workers' organisation.

Let us now examine *facts* concerning the will of the advanced workers of Russia.

WHAT DID THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH DUMAS REVEAL CONCERNING THE WILL OF THE PROLETARIAT?

For the reactionary purpose of separating the workers from the peasants, the Russian election law provides for the establishment of worker curias, i.e., the separate election of workers' deputies. But this enables us all the more easily to ascertain the will of the workers, who return to the Duma men who agree with their views and trend.

That is why *all* the candidates elected by the *worker curias* at the elections to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas were *Social-Democrats*. All informed people (except the politically unscrupulous) were therefore compelled to draw the conclusion that it was the will of the workers of Russia to march solidly in step with the Social-Democrats.

But *which* trend *inside* the Social-Democratic movement did the workers support?

A clear-cut reply to this question is provided by the returns which show to which *trends* the candidates elected by the worker curias belonged. In the Second Duma there were 23 deputies elected by the worker curia; of these 11 (i.e., 47 per cent) were Bolsheviks. It is common knowledge that

at that very time, the spring of 1907, a certified majority in the workers' party supported the Bolsheviks.

To the Third Duma, after the election reform, the worker curia elected only eight deputies. Of these, four (i.e., 50 per cent) were Bolsheviks. To the Fourth Duma the worker curia elected nine deputies, of whom six (i.e., 67 per cent) were Bolsheviks.

Thus, over a period of six years, from 1907 to 1912, when the intelligentsia *deserted* Social-Democracy, the workers *in increasing numbers* came over to the side of the Bolsheviks.

Over two-thirds of the workers of Russia support the views and line of the *six* deputies from the worker curia in the Fourth Duma—Badayev, Malinovsky, Muranov, Petrovsky, Samoilov and Shagov. These deputies are backed by the *overwhelming majority* of the class-conscious workers who take an active part in politics.

The intellectuals deserted the Marxist organisation; they tried to liquidate it. The workers deserted the liquidators. Only unscrupulous people can deny the truth of this.

WHO ARE THE DEPUTIES?

On the very day that the declaration of the six deputies* appeared in the newspapers, the liquidators' newspaper (issue No. 60) hastened to the defence of the seven deputies and argued that the latter had received *no fewer* workers' votes than the six.

At that time our paper (issue No. 13) published figures which completely shattered the liquidators' position and knocked the bottom out of the "argument" they advanced.

These figures showed the number of workers in the gubernias which returned Social-Democratic deputies to the Duma; they also gave a perfectly clear idea of which section of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma received the highest number of workers votes, and even how much higher.

Here are the figures:

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* See pp. 446-48 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Gubernia	Name of deputy	Thousands		
		Number of workers according to factory inspectors' reports	Mining Industry	Totals
Moscow	Malinovsky . . .	348	3	351
Vladimir	Samoilov	202	3	205
St. Petersburg. .	Badayev	170	27	197
Ekaterinoslav . .	Petrovsky . . .	33	85	118
Kostroma . . .	Shagov.	91	—	91
Kharkov	Muranov	45	1	46
	Totals . . .	889	119	1,008
Warsaw	Jagiello.	78	—	78
Don Region . . .	Tulyakov	18	41	59
Ufa	Khaustov	6	31	37
Taurida	Buryanov. . . .	10	10	20
Irkutsk	Mankov	2	11	13
Tiflis	Chkheidze. . . .	5	—	5
Kars and Batum Region . . .	Chkhenkeli . . .	1	1	2
	Totals . . .	120	94	214

Since deputy Jagiello is not really a member of the group of seven deputies, for he does not belong to the Social-Democratic Party and has no voice in the relations between the six and the seven deputies, and furthermore, since he was elected to the Duma contrary to the wishes of the majority of the worker electors of the city of Warsaw, the number of workers in the Warsaw Gubernia cannot be counted as having voted in favour of the seven deputies.

The upshot is that out of 1,144,000, the seven deputies can claim only 136,000, or 11.8 per cent, or about *one-tenth*, whereas the six deputies can claim 1,008,000, or 88.2 per cent, or about *nine-tenths*.

The liquidators' emphatic statement that the workers' vote was equal is utterly refuted.

What do they say in answer to that?

Their answer is worth repeating in full, and it call be explained only by the hopelessness of their case.

"*Leaving aside the question as to whether these figures are correct or significant*, we assert ..." says Mr. F., in No. 61 of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*.

Gentlemen, you raised the question of the number of workers' votes. The figures are presented to you, but you leave them aside.

Barely had he finished saying this, when another statement appeared in the next issue (No. 62), at which one can only wonder.

"*Our newspaper yesterday expressed its opinion on the arithmetical side of this assertion.*"

Leaving aside means "expressing an opinion". Who are the simpletons that the liquidators count on fooling?

In quoting these figures, which the liquidators have not been able to refute, we have not said a word about the particularly important place in our electoral system occupied by the gubernias which elected the six workers' deputies. Discouraged by the *facts*, the liquidators are now talking about the special privileges provided for the six deputies by the law of June 3, about our being supposed to stand in awe of Stolypin's curias, about our regarding only the six deputies as Social-Democrats, etc.

Assertions of this kind have a very definite "if unflattering" name.... We will not soil our lips!...

The numbers of workers in the various gubernias remain unchanged. They can and must be compared.

The German Social-Democrats count their election gains in spite of the fact that women there are deprived of the franchise.

All this is so clear and simple that one can only wonder whom the liquidators expect to mislead with their "arguments".

WHAT IS THE WILL OF THE WORKERS AS SHOWN BY WORKERS' NEWSPAPERS IN RUSSIA?

It is common knowledge that workers' newspapers began to appear in Russia after the 1908-10 period of despondency and collapse, i.e., in 1911; and they became firmly established in 1912.

Take the year 1912. The first to appear and become firmly established was the weekly *Zvezda*,[130] which later began to appear twice a week and paved the way for the daily

Pravda. *Pravda* appeared thanks to the *extraordinarily strong* support of the workers in April 1912. This newspaper rallied around itself the majority of the class-conscious workers. Its line was the line of the *majority* of the united and class-conscious proletarians.

By 1913 there were *two* all-Russian newspapers of the same trend. A tremendous wave of working-class support brought into being *Nash Put*, a Moscow newspaper of *the same* trend.

The other trend, the liquidators, started a daily newspaper, *Luch*, only in the *autumn* of 1912, after publishing very feeble weeklies.

Thus, the facts prove beyond doubt that the *majority* of the workers rallied around *Pravda* very much earlier. The liquidator newspaper was launched later, and it *opposed the will* of the majority, *tried to effect a split*, i.e., it demonstrated the refusal of the minority to submit to the majority.

Every worker will understand that workers' *unity* of action is *thwarted* if a *second* newspaper is published in the same city with the object of undermining the first. *Not a single* Social-Democratic Party anywhere in Europe would tolerate anything of the sort.

WHAT IS THE WILL OF THE WORKERS AS SHOWN BY COLLECTIONS FOR WORKERS' NEWSPAPERS?

Bourgeois newspapers are maintained by large sums of capital. Workers' newspapers are maintained by funds collected by the workers themselves.

In making contribution to a publication or a newspaper of any particular trend the workers very clearly express their will.

The funds that the workers have contributed to the workers' press in Russia are therefore a most important index of the workers' will. Only absolute ignoramuses or unscrupulous people (like the Cadets and the liquidators) can attempt to brush this aside.

The following figures show how many *collections* were made by *workers' groups*; they have been published more than once, and are open to verification by anyone who can read.

	Number of collections made by workers' groups			
	For *Pravda*	For the Moscow newspaper	For both	For *Luch*
1912	620	5	625	89
1913 to April 1	309	129	438	139
1913, from April 1 to October	1,252	261	1,513	328
Totals for the two years . .	2,181	395	2,576	556

These figures cover a *long* period of time. They cover the *whole* of 1912 and nine months of 1913. They cover the *whole of Russia.**

What do they show? They undoubtedly show that *supporters* of *Za Pravdu*, supporters of the *six workers' deputies*, opponents of liquidationism *clearly predominate* among the class-conscious workers.

All those who refuse to recognise the decisions of this overwhelming majority are schismatics, disruptors, violators of the will of the workers.

WHAT IS THE WILL OF THE WORKERS AS SHOWN BY THE ST. PETERSBURG TRADE UNIONS?

It is common knowledge that the metalworkers are the most developed and most advanced section of the working class not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Russia, and not only Russia, but throughout the world.

Nobody can deny—and on the day the metalworkers assembled the liquidators *themselves* admitted it—that the metalworkers are the *vanguard* of the entire Russian proletariat.

What did the metalworkers' meeting in St. Petersburg prove?

The occasion was the election of the Executive Committee. There were two lists of candidates.

One list, published in the liquidators' newspaper and backed by the latter, contained the *names of a number* of well-known liquidators.

* In the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* there is a footnote to this passage: "By May 1914 *Pravda* had in round figures 6,000 workers' groups. The liquidators had about 1,500."—*Ed.*

The other list, published in *Pravda*, was *anti-liquidationist*.

The liquidators fraudulently gave out their list as the decision of the union, but their fraud did not help them.

The metalworkers' meeting was attended by about *3,000 people*. Of these, only some *150* cast their votes for the liquidators' list of candidates.

Obviously, this quite clearly revealed the will of the class-conscious and advanced workers. The workers will not allow any mention of liquidationism.

Of all the trade unions in St. Petersburg, the Printers' Union alone still supports the liquidators,* thereby isolating itself from the rest of the St. Petersburg proletariat. But even there, it must be observed, not everything is "favourable" for the liquidators. Are there many admirers of the liquidators to be found among the shop assistants, woodworkers, gold- and silversmiths, tailors, bakers, builders, tavern employees, and so forth? How many are there, and where are they? Are many of these admirers to be found in the cultural and educational institutions? There is little evidence of them! And yet the liquidators, in denouncing the "underground" and the "strike craze", in pleading for legality in the shelter of Stolypin reforms, assert that everything legal supports them! Whom are the working-class intelligentsia supporting? In our last issue *106 working-class students* expressed their greetings to the six and denounced the liquidators!

In following the lead of the liquidators the seven deputies are *flouting the will* of the majority of the workers. This has been proved by the Duma elections, by the collections for the newspapers, by the meeting of the metalworkers, by all the activities in the legal movement, and by the present insurance campaign (the support rendered the insurance weekly in response to the appeal of the six workers' deputies).

The seven deputies who are *flouting* the will of the majority of the workers must bear in mind the inevitable consequences if they insist on pursuing *their own* will in *opposition to* the majority of the workers.

* In the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* there is a footnote to this passage: "Evidently even this union is now beginning to shift away from the liquidators."—*Ed*.

IDEOLOGICAL UNITY

The liquidator newspaper writes:

"Social-Democracy constitutes a definite ideologically united body and those who do not subscribe to its ideas do not belong to it."

That is the truth, but not the whole truth, for Social-Democracy is not only an *ideologically but also an organisationally* united body. This can be forgotten only by liquidators, i.e., by those who refuse to recognise precisely the organised body, who ignore its will, flout its decisions, etc.

Our liquidators, those who wrote for *Luch* and are now writing for *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, exposed themselves most vividly to the masses of the workers by opposing and strongly combating the Russian Marxist organisation.

The liquidators have been strongly condemned in a number of decisions adopted by this, the only existing political organisation of the workers of Russia. They have been condemned for their intolerable, disruptive and schismatic attitude towards this organisation. These decisions were passed in 1908, in 1910 and in 1912. Russian workers who take an interest in the affairs of their class are familiar with them. But the liquidators not only did not consider it necessary to abide by these decisions, they have unceremoniously flouted them by all their actions and their propaganda.

That explains why the liquidationist newspaper, in discussing the question of *organisation*, concealed from its readers the fact that Social-Democracy represents not only an ideologically but also an organisationally united body. Operating in complete isolation from the organisation, flouting its decisions, making its very existence the subject of derision, the liquidators, naturally, prefer not to remind the workers of this.

But although the liquidator writer conceals this circumstance from his readers, he has nevertheless had to admit that those who do not subscribe to the ideas of the Social-Democratic organisation cannot possibly be regarded as belonging to it. But the liquidators are the very people who come under this category. Their ideas are not Social-Democratic but liberal-labour ideas. The ideas of opportunists and legalists, the ideas of those who trim down

consistent Marxist slogans and advocate the destruction of the old organisation and the formation of an open party under the June Third regime, can nowhere ever be regarded as Social-Democratic by anybody.

Both in their organisational activities and in their propaganda of non-Marxist ideas, the liquidators have *gone beyond the bounds* of Social-Democracy.

Social-Democracy is a definite organisationally united body and those who refuse to submit to the discipline of this organisation, who ignore it and flout its decisions, do not belong to it. Such is the basic rule.

But the liquidator who let the cat out of the bag is also right. He is right when he says that *those who do not subscribe to Social-Democratic ideas do not belong to Social-Democracy*. Precisely, Mr. Liquidator. Only you fail to see that these words apply primarily and most aptly to yourself and your liquidator ideas.

THE LIQUIDATORS AND THE BOURGEOISIE

If anybody has any doubts about this let him watch the attitude of the bourgeois politicians and the bourgeois press towards liquidationism, its ideas and the struggle it is waging against the Marxist working-class organisation. Anybody who does this will very soon become convinced that *the bourgeoisie greets every pronouncement by the liquidators against the Marxists with paeans of praise and admiration*. It welcomed the liquidators' pronouncements against the old organisation; gleefully it took up their campaign against the workers on strike and their denunciation of the "strike craze".

But while admiring and praising the liquidators, the bourgeois press could not close its eyes to a very sad circumstance. It was obliged to admit that liquidationism, which is so pleasing to the bourgeois liberals (birds of a feather flock together!), is only an intellectualist trend and meets with no success among the masses of the workers. The liberals deplore this very much, but every class-conscious worker should rejoice at it!

See how *Rech*, the leading organ of the bourgeois liberals, appraised what happened in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma.

It stated plainly that the seven are the "parliamentary elements of Social-Democracy", that they belong to the "party of parliamentary activity", that "the position of the intellectualist deputies is more thoughtful". To put it briefly, the position of the liquidators and of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* suits the liberal gentlemen more than that of the six workers' deputies.

"All of them were elected directly by the workers", say the liberals in respect of the workers' deputies; they constitute a group of "irreconcilables", and their slogans are much more "intelligible" to the masses of the workers.

Now it is precisely this "irreconcilability" of the workers' deputies and their direct contact with the masses that the liberal gentlemen do not like. And they tearfully declare that "there is reason to anticipate that the parliamentary majority of the Social-Democratic intellectuals will be compelled to yield to the non-parliamentary workers' majority".

In this controversy the liberal gentlemen desire from the bottom of their hearts to see the victory of the "moderates", the liquidators, the advocates of "parliamentary" tactics; and they would like to see the irreconcilable workers' deputies with their "straightforward" slogans tied hand and foot!

But even the liberals have an inkling that the working class and its devotion to the uncurtailed slogans will prevent the realisation of the liquidator and liberal dream of a victory of the opportunists in the ranks of Social-Democracy.

DECISION OF THE UNITED MARXISTS

The seven deputies, who oppose the will of the majority of the proletariat, furtively evade the fact that the six are acting in harmony with that will.

The following is an already published decision of the Marxists:

"This Conference is of the opinion that *united action* on the part of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma is *possible and essential*.

"This Conference affirms, however, that the *conduct of the seven deputies* gravely *jeopardises the unity* of the group.

"Taking advantage of their accidental majority of one,

the seven deputies encroach on the elementary rights of the six workers' deputies who represent the overwhelming majority of the workers of Russia.

"The seven deputies, guided by narrow factional interests, deprive the six deputies of the opportunity to speak in the Duma on very important questions affecting the lives of the workers. In several cases, when the Social-Democratic group put up two or more speakers, the six deputies were not given an opportunity in spite of repeated demands to put up even one of theirs.

"Similarly, in appointing representatives to various Duma committees (for example, the Budget Committee) the seven deputies refuse to allow the six to have one of the two places.

"When the group elects representatives to bodies that are of importance to the working-class movement, the seven deputies, by a majority of one, deprive the six of all representation. The staff that serves the group is always elected in a biased manner (for example, the demand for a second secretary was rejected).

"This Conference is of the opinion that such conduct on the part of the seven deputies inevitably gives rise to friction in the group, which hinders united action and threatens to split the group.

"This Conference protests most emphatically against this conduct on the part of the seven deputies.

"The six deputies represent the overwhelming majority of the workers of Russia and act in complete harmony with the political line of the organised vanguard of the working class. This Conference is therefore of the opinion that united action on the part of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma is possible *only* if the two sections of the group *enjoy equal rights*, and if the seven deputies abandon their steamroller tactics.

"Notwithstanding irreconcilable disagreements in spheres of activity outside as well as inside the Duma, *this Conference demands that the group should maintain unity* on the basis of the aforesaid equality of rights of its two sections.

"This Conference invites class-conscious workers *to express their opinion* on this important question *and to exert all efforts to help preserve the unity* of the group on the only

possible basis, that of equal rights for the six workers' deputies."*

This decision clearly and precisely expressed through the medium of workers' representatives the will of the majority that we discussed in detail above.

Only non-Party Social-Democrats can act contrary to this will. *Only liquidators* can advise the seven to act as *they think fit*, as schismatics and disruptors of the workers' organisation.

OUR WORK WITHIN THE DUMA GROUP

The six deputies submitted to the judgement of the workers the question of their being suppressed in the Duma group by the accidental majority within the group.

They quoted astonishing facts about the group. What have the seven deputies said in reply?

Instead of making a clear and straightforward statement refuting the cases of their being restricted in the Duma activities, enumerated by the six, the seven deputies quoted a number of cases when there was no restriction or suppression.

No doubt there were cases in the activities of the group when the rights of the six deputies were respected; if this were not so it would have been nothing short of an insult to the proletariat, and such a situation in the Duma group would be intolerable even for a single day.

That the unity of the group is possible and that agreement is essential is proved by the experience of the year the group has been in existence.

But this experience also shows that within the group the six deputies were tied hand and foot by the seven who inclined towards liquidationism and ignored the majority of the workers.

The facts which are quoted by the six deputies, and which clearly depict the state of affairs in the group, have not been refuted.

The seven deputies: 1) attempted to change the Programme of the Social-Democratic Party. In the Duma, for example,

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* See pp. 425-26 of this volume.—*Ed.*

they advocated the cultural-national autonomy rejected by all Marxists in 1903.

2) Accepted deputy Jagiello into the group with the right to vote on Duma affairs and wanted to grant him a vote on Party affairs although he belongs to another organisation and does not belong to the Social-Democrats.

3) Refused to allow the six deputies to have their own secretary in spite of their repeated demands for one.

4) Restricted the six deputies in every way as regards speaking in the Duma.

5) Refused to allow the six deputies representation on a certain important body.

6) Restricted the right of the six deputies to be represented on Duma committees, including the Budget Committee.

To all these charges the seven deputies have but one reply—for *the benefit of the cause*.

Obviously, the suppression and restriction of the activities of the six deputies, who represent the overwhelming majority of the workers of Russia, cannot be shown to benefit the *workers' cause and the cause of Social-Democracy*.

The following facts and figures on Social-Democrat representation on Duma committees, show convincingly how the six deputies were suppressed in the Duma group.

Of the 26 committees on which the Social-Democrats are represented:

the six deputies are represented on *seven*; the other seven deputies are represented on *thirteen*—nearly *twice as many*.

Of the 20 committees on which there is one Social-Democratic representative:

the six deputies are represented on *seven*; the other seven are represented on *thirteen*—nearly *twice as many*.

Of the committees on which there are two Social-Democratic representatives:

the six deputies are represented on *three*; the other seven are represented on *six—twice as many*.

On each of three of these committees the seven had two representatives.

Not one of the six deputies sits on more than two committees. Of the seven, *Chkhenkeli sits on six committees*; *Skobelev sits on six*, *and Mankov sits on four*.

WHAT DO THE SIX DEMAND?

The six demanded the right to have their own secretary, one *of the two* seats on the Budget Committee, and the election of two representatives instead of one to a certain important body.

The seven *have admitted* that they *have not conceded these demands to this day, and have even rejected them.*

Every worker will agree that these demands are quite fair.

The seven will forfeit all confidence if they refuse to yield to these fair demands.

The seven are in duty bound to grant *equal rights, complete equality* to the six workers' deputies who act in conformity *with the will of the majority.*

Only in this way can the seven—who act *contrary to the will* of the majority—take a step towards unity, at least in Duma activities.

The workers must compel the seven to respect the will of the majority!

UNITY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE DUMA

There is only one way of ensuring unity outside the Duma, and that is, by maintaining the unity of the workers' cells, by bringing into these cells all those who sincerely and honestly desire to work for the benefit of the working class under the leadership of its political organisation. Entry is open to all. All those who desire to work in harmony with the organisation can and should join. Only in this way can we ensure unity in the working-class movement; *unity from below, unity in practical activities, in the struggle, under mutual control.*

Our newspaper issued this slogan long ago, and has always championed it. There is no evidence, however, that the liquidators are following the same road, which is always open to them if they really want Social-Democratic activity and unity.

But what about unity in Duma activities.

Everywhere unity in parliamentary activities is always achieved in one way only: by the parliamentary represent-

atives submitting to the majority of the organised workers. But the seven deputies who are inclining towards liquidationism refuse to respect the will of this majority. They refuse to respect the clear-cut decisions of the organised workers. They prefer to use their accidental majority of one vote to suppress the six deputies who express the will of the overwhelming majority of the workers and are operating in complete ideological harmony with the Marxist organisation.

The only proper thing for those who refuse to respect the Marxist body as a whole to do is to say so openly.

But they prefer to stick tight to their position of alleged non-responsibility. Not only do they refuse to respect the decisions of the organised workers, but they want to use their *majority in the Duma* to violate the decisions that express the will of the proletariat outside the Duma.

Unity in the Duma will be possible only if the seven deputies abandon this line of conduct.

The six deputies demand no more than that.

Our comrades say: unity of action will be possible in the Duma if the seven deputies, who do not feel bound by the decisions of the Marxists, abandon their tactics of suppressing us, who desire to keep in step with these ideological decisions.

On this basis unity is possible.

But only on this basis. The seven deputies' refusal to accede to these demands indicates that they are deliberately and openly heading for a split. The overwhelming majority of the organised workers, who, as the above quoted figures show, support the six, *offer* to work with the seven deputies on the basis of agreement. That the latter reject this offer, shows that they have completely and definitely *broken away* from the Marxist workers' organisation. It shows that the seven vacillating deputies have entirely gone over to schismatic liquidationism.

Za Pravdu No. 22,
October 29, 1913

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text
collated with the symposium
Marxism and Liquidationism,
Part II, St. Petersburg, 1914.

A CADET PROPERTY-OWNER ARGUES "ACCORDING TO MARX"

Mr. Velikhov, property-owner, member of the State Duma and the Cadet Party, editor and publisher of *Gorodskoye Dyelo*,[131] published in his magazine an article in defence of the Kiev congress of urban representatives of "the intellectualist bureaucracy".

This malicious phrase, borrowed from the reactionary press, denotes the democratic intelligentsia, who, be it known, have given offence to the poor property-owners by analysing the "property-owners' institutions" and demanding political clarity. "The intellectualist bureaucracy," complains Mr. Velikhov, tried "primarily to impose a general-political role on the congress."

Mr. Velikhov calls this trend at the congress "political" and contrasts it to another trend, "*municipal*".

The views of the latter he outlines as follows:

> "The revolution, said the urban representatives, has passed and is not likely to be repeated in the near future. It is probable that it was not completely successful because the revolutionary-minded classes [which classes? Say what you mean Mr. Velikhov!] acted at that time without having acquired sufficient knowledge and experience and were not trained to take over state power. The broad road of meetings, slogans, tub-thumping speeches and resolutions of protest no longer satisfies anyone, and has apparently outlived itself. Ahead of us there is tremendous cultural work of a practical nature."

That is how a property-owner speaks. He shows the point of view of the serf-owner both in his morals and in his urge to forget that at the decisive moment the bourgeoisie went over to the side of the feudalists. He repeats in a peculiar way some "would-be Marxist" phrases that he has heard somewhere, probably among the liquidators:

"In Russia," he writes, "where the working-class proletariat is still small in numbers and weak, where, even according to Marx's *Capital*, government should pass from the landed aristocracy to the urban bourgeoisie at the next stage of historical development, to attack the bourgeoisie, to disdain them, to hinder their attempts to struggle against the present political system and regime means putting the brake on natural progress." (*Gorodskoye Dyelo*, 1913, No. 20, pp. 1341-1342.)

Quite, quite "according to Marx"!

My dear progressive and even Constitutional-Democratic property-owner! "The attempts of the bourgeoisie to struggle against the present political system" have *never* been hindered by the Marxists. You will never be able to show a single case of "struggle" in which the "weak proletariat" did not participate *more* energetically. The Marxists and the workers *have not disdained a single case* of bourgeois "struggle" against the feudal landowners.

But do you not recall, you who quote Marx, those historical examples that have been increasingly frequent since 1848, of the bourgeoisie *betraying* the struggle against the feudal landowners and going over *to their side*?

Russian history, too, teems with such examples, especially in 1904 and still more so in the autumn of 1905, still more so in the winter of that year and then in the spring of 1906, and so on and so forth.

Can you not understand, Mr. Property-Owner who quotes Marx, that the interests of *the struggle* against the feudal landowners demand that *those* bourgeois who talk about struggle and, by their actions, betray it should be exposed, attacked and discredited?

Za Pravdu No. 23,
October 30, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text

THE WORKING-CLASS MASSES AND THE WORKING-CLASS INTELLIGENTSIA

The liquidators' journal *Nasha Zarya* No. 9 carried an article under this heading by G. Rakitin in which the author is forced to admit that which the liquidators' newspaper brushes aside in impotent wrath. Rakitin is superior to the various F. D.'s because he at least tries *to think some things over and get an understanding of the issue* instead of treating the reader to boring invective.

"The victory"—that is how Rakitin begins his article—"The victory won by the supporters of *Pravda* at the general meeting of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union, and several other facts that bear witness to the growing influence of Bolshevism in the work-class milieu (especially in St. Petersburg) provide food for thought; how has it come about that strongholds of the Menshevik trend, and specifically of the so-called 'liquidationism', have begun to escape from the influence of the trend that laid the foundation of open working-class organisations in Russia, and that has alone worked actively in them during the past few years?"

Notice has to be taken of this passage to show the reader a rare case of "a bright interval" where the liquidators are compelled to admit the truth. In the articles by F. D. & Co., *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* merely frets and fumes when shown the exact figures on the elections to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas, or on the collections made by workers' groups, etc., figures which *prove* the dominance of the *Pravda* trend among politically conscious (those participating in political life) workers.

G. Rakitin admits the fact. He also admits the victory at the metalworkers' meeting and "*other facts*" (although he modestly refrains from saying what those facts are—a method that is purely literary-intellectual and is calculated

to hide from the workers *exact* figures that would make *independent* verification possible). Rakitin, in general, admits "the growing influence of Bolshevism in the working-class milieu, especially in St. Petersburg"; he admits that "strongholds" of liquidationism "have begun to escape from the influence" of that "trend".

Rakitin strives to *explain* this fact, a sad one for the liquidators, in a way most *comforting* to them.

What is his explanation?

"The working-class masses" are going through a "Bolshevik stage of the movement" admits G. Rakitin (p. 59). But "the working-class intelligentsia", he declares (p. 57) "are in the majority of cases supporters of the so-called 'liquidator' trend". Hence, of course, the conclusion that "comforts" the liquidators—"the Bolshevik stage of the movement" is a "temporary infatuation of the masses and the rising generation of workers with Bolshevik slogans", an influence "rather of instinct and intuition than consciousness and calculation"; the addiction of the working masses to "the primitive peasant world outlook", the "overestimation of the significance of spontaneous outbursts"; the failure to understand the "flexible class tactics" (of the liquidators) and its replacement by "the simplified tactics of Bolshevism", etc., etc.

In short, the *Nasha Zarya* contributor provides a magnificent explanation—*Pravda*'s majority is immature, undeveloped, spontaneous, feeble and the liquidator minority is intellectualist, flexible, politically conscious, etc. In exactly the same way all reactionary writers always explain that the masses have democratic convictions because they are foolish, undeveloped and so on, while the nobility and the bourgeoisie are developed and intelligent!

But please show us, my dear Rakitin, where your proofs are. You admitted yourself that *facts* bear witness to the victory of the *Pravda* supporters, to the masses "going through a Bolshevik stage of the movement"! Where are the *facts* proving that the overwhelming majority of the working-class intelligentsia support the liquidators? Where are facts such as the elections to the State Duma, or the number of collections by workers' groups, or the victory of some list of candidates in the trade unions?

Rakitin does not adduce *a single* fact, not even a single argument!

We therefore permit ourselves to disagree with Rakitin. It is *gratifying* to him, of course, to regard the Bolshevik *working-class masses* as undeveloped and stupid ("instinct and not consciousness") and the liquidator minority as developed and intelligent. But to write history, to provide *an explanation of the stages of the working-class movement* basing oneself on what is gratifying to the person of the historian and not on facts—that, if Rakitin will excuse me, is simply amusing puerility. I cannot say, of course, whether it is "instinct and intuition" that compel the liquidator Rakitin to consider the liquidator minority particularly intelligent, clever and advanced, but is it proper for *a writer* to be guided by "instinct and intuition" and not by "*consciousness and calculation*"?

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or November 1913

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Published according to
the manuscript

THE SPLIT IN THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DUMA GROUP[132]

Dear Comrades,

In issue No. 266 of your newspaper, you published an article by your "Russian correspondent" on the split in the Russian Social-Democratic Duma group. Unfortunately, that article is far from objective and in a certain respect may mislead the German reader. We hope, Comrades, that you will respond to our request to publish this brief denial so that German workers and the fraternal German party will be correctly informed on these elementary facts.

1) Your Russian correspondent begins by saying that Social-Democracy in Russia "suffers from fragmentation into *many* organisations, groups and trends". This in itself is absolutely untrue. Every Russian Social-Democrat and, in general, everyone interested in the historical struggle in Russia, knows that at present in the Russian working-class movement there are only *two* trends, *two* leading newspapers in St. Petersburg and two political lines—the Marxists and the liquidators. The former, i.e., the Marxists, publish in St. Petersburg the daily newspaper *Za Pravdu* (very recently the government destroyed their second newspaper in Moscow *Nash Put*). The latter publish *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* in St. Petersburg. There are *no other* "trends" of any kind in the Russian working-class movement; even among Russian students abroad and among émigrés all other intermediate, so-called "trends" are disappearing. Every Russian Social-Democrat today has to choose between the Marxists and the liquidators.

2) Your "Russian correspondent" defines the difference between the Russian Marxists and the liquidators as being

the same as that between radicals and revisionists in Germany, as being the same as the difference "between a Bebel or a Ledebour on the one hand and a Frank or a David on the other". But that is not quite true. The Russian liquidator, it goes without saying, supports the revisionist platform. He has adopted the worst features of West-European opportunism. Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference between the liquidators and the revisionists. A Frank or a David would never assert that the existence of the present German Social-Democratic Party and its organisation is "harmful". Our liquidators, however, are struggling against the very existence of the Party, they are actually destroying ("liquidating") its underground organisation, they struggle even against its decisions during (political) strikes, and as a reward for this activity enjoy the applause and whole-hearted support of the entire Russian bourgeoisie.

3) Your correspondent writes that "a political disagreement in the Duma group" between the six Marxists and the seven deputies with liquidator tendencies emerged only on one occasion. But that is not so. Disagreements occurred at every step, as has been incontrovertibly proved by the St. Petersburg working-class press. Things went so far that the seven, by a majority of one, voted to renounce the Programme of our Party. In the very first political declaration proclaimed from the Duma rostrum, the seven deputies renounced before the whole of Russia the Programme adopted at the Second Party Congress in 1903. To the joy of those nationalist elements (the Bund) that adhere to the liquidators, they declared that Russian Social-Democrats defend what is known as "cultural-national autonomy". The Party, however, rejects this demand, which in Russia is supported by almost all bourgeois nationalists. When the Programme of the Party was being elaborated this demand was rejected by *all* Russian Social-Democrats. Quite recently Plekhanov described this demand as the "adaptation of socialism to *nationalism*". The six Marxist deputies made a sharp protest against this betrayal of the Programme. The seven deputies, however, stuck to their decision, which was directed against the Party.

4) Your correspondent says it can only be proved "indirectly" that the six Marxist deputies represent the major-

ity of the working class. This is absolutely untrue. We shall quote a few exact figures to show how many workers are represented by the six and how many by the seven.

Gubernia	Name of Marxist deputy	Number of workers according to factory inspectorate
St. Petersburg	Badayev	197,000
Moscow	Malinovsky	351,000
Vladimir	Samoilov	205,000
Ekaterinoslav	Petrovsky	118,000
Kostroma	Shagov	91,000
Kharkov	Muranov	46,000
	Total	1,008,000

Gubernia	Other deputies	Number of workers according to factory inspectorate
St. Petersburg	Badayev	197,000
Warsaw	Jagiello	78,000
Don Region	Tulyakov	59,000
Ufa	Khaustov	37,000
Taurida	Buryanov	20,000
Irkutsk	Mankov	13,000
Tiflis	Chkheidze	5,000
Kars Region	Chkhenkeli	2,000
	Total	214,000

The entire worker curia is represented by Marxist deputies. The six Marxist deputies represent a number of workers that is *five times* greater, by a conservative estimate, than that represented by the seven who favour liquidationism.

Is this an "indirect" proof?

Here are some more figures on the number of *workers' groups* supporting the legal press of the Marxists and of the liquidators by the collection of funds.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

	Pravda	Moscow newspaper	Total for Marxist press	Liquidators' newspaper
1912	620	5	625	89
1913 to April 1	309	129	438	139
1913, from April 1 to October	1,252	261	1,513	328
Totals for the two years	2,181	395	2,576	556

These figures were published in the St. Petersburg newspaper *Za Pravdu* No. 22,* and no one has *disputed them*. Your correspondent should have known them. Contributions from groups are always acknowledged in both newspapers, and the figures are regarded by our enemies in the bourgeois camp as evidence of the alignment of forces of the two trends.

Here, too, the figures show that the Marxists are supported by five times as many workers' groups as the liquidators.

Can this be called "indirect" proof?

Unlike the legal Social-Democratic parties in Western Europe, we cannot at the present time publish the exact strength of our membership. Nevertheless, we also have direct proof of whom the workers support.

In the Second Duma, among the twenty-three deputies from the worker curia (all Social-Democrats) eleven (i.e. 47 per cent) were Bolsheviks. In the Third Duma, four out of eight, i.e., 50 per cent were Bolsheviks. In the Fourth Duma, six out of nine, i.e., 67 per cent. Perhaps these data on the elections to *three Dumas* in *five* years (1907-12) are also "indirect proofs"?

How that a statement of the six against the seven has been published in the press, all trade unions that have expressed an opinion are on the side of the six deputies against the seven. Every day the Marxist newspaper in St. Petersburg publishes numerous resolutions of many workers, elected representatives, trade unions, and workers' cultural and educational organisations that support the six deputies.

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* See pp. 461 and 465 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The six workers' deputies, who represent the whole working class of Russia, have formed their own Social-Democratic workers' group in the Duma, which in all respects submits to the will of worker Social-Democrats. The seven deputies act as an "independent" group. The six workers' deputies have proposed to the seven an agreement for work in the Duma. Up to now the seven have bluntly rejected the proposal. An agreement, however, is inevitable.

Such is the true state of affairs.

Editorial Board of the Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party —"Sotsial-Demokrat"

Written at the beginning or November 1913

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Published according to the Pravda text collated with the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*

Translated from the German

THE LEFT NARODNIKS ON THE CONTROVERSIES AMONG THE MARXISTS

Issue No. 3 of *Volnaya Mysl*[133] contains an article bearing the pretentious title: "Unity, Duality or Trinity."

"We openly declare," says this article, "that the claim of the Bolshevik faction that it alone embraces the entire working-class movement is as unreasonable and absurd as the efforts of the two Social-Democratic factions to embody the entire socialist movement in Russia. The future belongs only to the unification of all the socialist trends in a single Party.

"And we, who issued this slogan in the beginning of 1900, shall remain true to it to the end."

This is a perfect example of the amusingly irate statements that are made about "unity"! *Not a word* about the principles which underlie the historical struggle that has raged between Marxists and Narodniks for several decades. Nor do we hear a word about the history of the movement of 1905-07, when the open activities of the *masses* of the population of all classes revealed in practice the *fundamental* difference between the Social-Democratic proletariat and the "*working*" (i.e., petty-bourgeois) peasantry.

The existence in Russia of a radical and serious newspaper that formulates the question in *this* way, shows vividly how necessary it still is to wage a long and persistent struggle for the *most elementary* definition of principles.

That the Bolsheviks enjoy the backing of the majority of the class-conscious workers is a fact which their enemies, the liquidators, are compelled to admit, albeit angrily and through their clenched teeth.

This cannot be refuted by sentiment. The workers will not be intimidated if the words: "unreasonable and absurd" are bawled at them—they will only smile.

From the standpoint of ideas, the entire history of Marxism in Russia is the history of the struggle against petty-bourgeois theories, beginning with "legal Marxism" and Economism. This was no chance struggle, nor is its direct continuation at the present time accidental. It is in the struggle against petty-bourgeois liquidationism and Left Narodism that the workers' party in Russia is taking shape and maturing as a genuine proletarian class party in this difficult period of the June Third regime.

"We Left Narodniks have never tried to profit by other people's misfortunes," writes *Volnaya Mysl*, but in the same breath asserts that the split is the cause of "the complete inner weakness of our Social-Democratic movement"!

To write a thing like that, gentlemen, means nothing if not "profiting"—not, however, say we, by other people's "misfortunes", but by "other people's *ideological struggle*"; for it is the ideological conflict between liberal and proletarian policy that lies at the root of the controversies among the Marxists. The workers, unperturbed by angry words or by sentiment, have already learned to detect the basic principles of the struggle.

"There is *less* disagreement in the united parties in the European working-class movement than among us," writes *Volnaya Mysl*. This is a very common, but very fallacious argument. Nowhere in Europe is there any sign of an attempt to replace the proletarian, Marxist organisation by ... talk about a "broad" party formed with Purishkevich's blessing ... etc.

From controversies of *this sort* the workers will learn to *build* a workers' party *in deeds* and not merely in words.

Za Pravdu No. 34,
November 13, 1913

Published according to
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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE PRESENT SITUATION IN RUSSIA

(NOTES OF A PUBLICIST)

Two interesting articles on this subject appeared in recent magazines. One was in the liquidators' *Nasha Zarya* (No. 6, 1913, N. Rozhkov) and the other in *Russkaya Mysl*, the organ of the Right Cadets (No. 8, 1913, Y. Y. Polferov). There can be no doubt that the two authors wrote their articles knowing nothing about each other, and that they proceeded from entirely different premises.

Nevertheless, the resemblance between the two articles is astonishing. They both clearly demonstrate—and this gives them a special value—the kinship of the principles underlying the ideas of the liberal-labour politicians and those of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie.

N. Rozhkov uses exactly the same material as Mr. Polferov, except that the latter's is more copious. Capitalism has been developing in Russian agriculture since the 1905 Revolution. The prices of grain and land are rising; imports of agricultural machinery and of fertilisers, as well as the home manufacture of both, are increasing. Small credit institutions are growing, and so is the number of peasants who are setting up their independent farmsteads. Wages are rising (44.2 per cent from 1890 to 1910, says N. Rozhkov who forgets the rise in the cost of living in the same period!). Commercial stock-breeding, vegetable oil production and grass cultivation are on the increase, and progress is being made in agricultural education.

Needless to say, all this is very interesting. From the point of view of Marxism there has never been the slightest doubt that the development of capitalism cannot be halted.

Had the authors merely adduced new data to explain this they would certainly have deserved our thanks.

But how should these data be appraised; and what conclusions should be drawn from them?—that is the crux of the matter. Here, N. Rozhkov jumps to conclusions with an eagerness that is positively touching. "Feudal serf economy has been transformed into bourgeois capitalist economy ... the transition to bourgeois conditions in agriculture is are accomplished fact, about which there cannot be the slightest doubt.... The agrarian problem in its previous form is now a thing of the past in Russia.... No attempt must be made to galvanise the corpse—the agrarian problem in its old form."

As the reader sees, the conclusions are perfectly clear and just as perfectly—liquidationist. The editors of the liquidator magazine (as has long been the custom in commercialised journals with no principles) appended a small *reservation* to the article, stating: "There is much in this that we do not agree with ... we do not think it is possible to assert *so emphatically*, as N. Rozhkov does, that Russia will proceed precisely along the path mapped out by the law of November 9-June 14...."

The liquidators are "not so emphatic" as N. Rozhkov! What a profound, principled attitude to the question!

In this article N. Rozhkov has proved once again that he *has learned by heart* a number of Marxist propositions, but *has not understood* them. That is why they "popped out" so easily.

The development of capitalism in Russian agriculture was also under way in 1861-1904. All the symptoms of this development that Rozhkov and Polferov now point out were in existence at that time. The development of capitalism did not avert the *bourgeois-democratic* crisis in 1905, but paved the way for it and intensified it. Why? Because the old, semi-feudal, natural, economy had been eroded, while the *conditions for the new*, bourgeois economy had not yet been created. Hence, the unusual intensity of the 1905 crisis.

The ground for *such* crises has disappeared, says Rozhkov. This, of course, could possibly he true if we were to speak abstractly, of capitalism in general, and *not* of Russia, *not*

of 1913. Marxists, it goes without saying, recognise the existence of a bourgeois-democratic agrarian problem only under special conditions (*not* always, and *not* everywhere).

But Rozhkov has not the slightest inkling of what propositions he has to prove in order to confirm the *concrete* conclusion he draws.

The peasants are discontented with their conditions? "But the peasants are discontented everywhere," writes Rozhkov.

To compare and identify the discontent of the West-European peasants whose village life and legal status are based on a fully developed bourgeois system, and who have their "parties of law and order", with the *famines* in Russia, with the *complete* degradation of village life caused by the social-estate system with the *complete* domination of feudalism in the sphere of the law, etc., is puerile and absurd. Rozhkov cannot see the wood for the trees.

Capitalism is growing, *corvée* (labour service) is declining, he writes. "The vast majority of landowners," writes the liberal Polferov "... are developing more and more the contract and métayage system, which has arisen exclusively out of the peasants' need of money and land."

The liberal writing in *Russkaya Mysl* is less of a naïve optimist than the ex-Marxist writing in the liquidator *Nasha Zarya*!

N. Rozhkov did not even attempt to deal with the data showing the *degree* to which métayage, labour service, *corvée*, bondage are prevalent in the rural districts *today*. With amazing unconcern, he ignored the fact that these forms are *still* widespread. But this fact leads to the conclusion that the *bourgeois-democratic* crisis has become still more acute.

Don't galvanise the corpse, writes the liquidator, echoing the liberal, who uses *other* words to indicate that the demands of 1905 are a "corpse".

To this we have replied: Markov and Purishkevich are not corpses. The economic system which engendered them, and is engendering their class to this day, is not a corpse. To fight that class is the living task of living workers who have a live understanding of their class aims.

The renunciation of this task proves that the liquidators are a decomposing *corpse*, for although they do not all speak "so emphatically" as Rozhkov, they *all* forget, or obscure, the struggle against agrarian (and particularly landowner) Purishkevichism and against political Purishkevichism.

The domination of the Purishkeviches in our life is the reverse side of the same medal that in our rural districts is called labour service, bondage, *corvée*, serfdom, the absence of the most elementary general conditions for the bourgeois system of economy. If the millionaire-proprietors at the top (Guchkov and Co.) are grumbling, then the conditions of the millions of small proprietors (the peasants) at the bottom must be absolutely intolerable.

When they set out to deal with the roots of Purishkevichism the workers are by no means neglecting their "own" tasks in order to "galvanise" something that is alien to them. No. In *this way* the democratic aims of *their* struggle, of their class, become clearer to *them* and they teach democracy and the elements of socialism to the broad masses. For only "royal-Prussian socialism" (as Marx called it in his statement against Schweitzer)[134] can leave in the shade the feudal domination of Purishkevichism in general, and of landowner Purishkevichism in particular.

Without noticing it, Rozhkov has descended to the position of Polferov, who says: "The simple allotment of additional land" would not "save" the situation without intensification! As if intensification would not proceed a hundred times faster if Purishkevichism *were abolished*! As if the question were merely one of the peasants, whether they should or should not be "allotted additional land", and not a question of the *entire* nation, of the *entire* development of capitalism, a development which is being distorted and retarded by Purishkevichism!

Rozhkov has blurted out the *real nature* of liquidationism, and revealed the *connection* that exists between the all-embracing slogan "freedom of association" (see how this slogan is dealt with in the *liberal* speech delivered by Tulyakov and in the *Marxist* speech delivered by Badayev in the Slate Duma on October 23, 1913)—revealed the connection between this slogan and *satisfaction* with the present state of the agrarian problem.

This connection is an objective fact and *Nasha Zarya*'s "small reservations" will not obliterate it.

Stop thinking about the entire nation, about Purishkevichism in every sphere of life, about the famines that afflict the peasantry, about *corvée*, labour service and serfdom; fight "for legality", for "freedom of association" as one of a series of reforms—such are the *ideas* that the *bourgeoisie* fosters in the minds of the workers. Rozhkov and the liquidators are merely trailing unwittingly in the wake of the bourgeoisie.

We, however, think that the proletarians, the foremost representatives of the entire mass of the working people, cannot achieve even their own emancipation except by waging an all-round struggle against Purishkevichism for the sake and in the interests of the struggle against the bourgeoisie; and these are the ideas that distinguish the Marxist from the liberal-labour politician.

Za Pravdu No. 36,
November 15, 1913
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text

TWO METHODS OF CONTROVERSY AND STRUGGLE

Some controversies and conflicts of opinion in the press help the reader to obtain a better understanding of political problems, to appreciate their importance more profoundly, and to solve them more confidently.

Other controversies, however, degenerate into recrimination, intrigues and squabbling.

The advanced workers, who are aware of the responsibility *they* bear for the progress of the work of educating and organising the proletariat, must keep careful watch to prevent the *inevitable* controversies, the *inevitable* conflict of opinions, from *degenerating* into recrimination, intrigues, squabbling and slander.

This is a question of the workers' cause, the workers' organisation, it is the most serious and important question of combating the slightest attempts at disruption. It cannot be treated lightly. Those who have not learned to cut at the very roots of disruption are useless as organisers; and without an organisation the working class is *nothing*. No movement, including the working-class movement, is possible without debates, controversy and conflict of opinions; and *no* organisation *is possible* if resolute measures are not taken to prevent controversies from degenerating into recrimination and squabbling.

We invite class-conscious workers to examine from this angle the conflict between the six and the seven Social-Democrat Duma deputies.

The six considered it their duty to respect the will and decisions of the Marxist conference. The Duma representatives of the proletariat are duty bound to obey the will of

the majority of the class-conscious, organised, Marxist workers outside the Duma.

This is a general principle, the general basis of all our views on the tasks of the working-class movement.

If this view is wrong it must be refuted and rejected. If it is correct, if it is the ABC without which no policy can be pursued, without which *no* organisation is possible, then this view must be accepted and firmly adhered to in spite of all the howling, outcries, attacks and slander.

Worker comrades! Debate this question. Arrange debates, talks and discussions to obtain absolute clarity on this question, but have no dealings with those who resort to recrimination instead of argument.

What did the liquidators say in reply to the first and fundamental argument of the six deputies?

Their only reply was abuse! They abused the conference; they abused the "underground a hundred times over, and that is all.

Is that a reply? Is it not simply an attempt to disrupt, to wreck the organisation?

Things have gone so far that F. D. in No. 70, writes literally the following: "Where are the responsible bodies that promoted their candidatures and gave them their instructions?"

Worker comrades, think over what this question means! You will find that it is one worthy of ... those who carry out interrogations!... Will you not realise, F. D. and other liquidators, that we *cannot* argue with you when you put questions of *that sort*.

Examine the substance of the matter. Is the decision of the conference correct; does it correctly express the interests and views of the majority of the workers? *Pravda* answers this question by quoting a series of exact figures (see *Za Pravdu*, Tuesday, October 29, 1913).* These figures show that the *Pravda* trend enjoys the support of the absolute and indisputable *majority* of class-conscious workers, i.e., of those who take an active part in politics.

These figures compared the elections to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas in the worker curia—and they

* See pp. 458-74 of this volume—*Ed*.

referred to the number of workers represented by the six and the seven and to the number of workers' groups which openly assisted in collecting funds for the respective newspapers etc.

What did the liquidators say in reply to this argument on the substance of the question of the majority?

Abuse was their only reply. The liquidators do not refute a single figure not a single one. They do not even make an attempt to correct them or quote others in place of them!

The thing is as clear as daylight. Those who evade precise data on the question of the majority *run counter* to the will of the majority; they are disruptors.

The seven Duma deputies are inclining towards liquidationism for they sanction abuse of the "underground" and take a hand in flouting the will of the majority. This shows that the seven are *non-Party*. And no man in his senses will allow seven non-Party men to suppress Party decisions and the supporters of Party decisions by one vote.

No amount of liquidator abuse will refute this plain and simple fact.

The six deputies performed their duty and the more the liquidators shout and rave the sooner will all workers and Marxists understand that the six are right and that the establishment of equality and concoid with the non-Party Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma is inevitable.

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WOULD-BE "UNITERS"

The Berlin group of Polish Social-Democrats (Rosa Luxemburg, Tyszka and Co.), which the Polish worker Social-Democrats emphatically repudiate, is irrepressible. It persists in calling itself the "Executive Committee" of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, although there is not a person in the world who can say what this miserable Executive *without* a party "administers".[135]

The worker Social-Democrats of Warsaw and Lodz declared long ago that they had dissociated themselves from the aforesaid Berlin group. The State Duma elections in Warsaw and the insurance campaign in that city revealed to all that there is only one Social-Democratic organisation in Poland, namely, the one that has categorically declared it does not recognise the disruptors and slanderers on the Executive Committee. Of the feats performed by this Executive it is sufficient to mention one: these people came out with the *unsupported* statement that the main bulwark of the Polish worker Social-Democrats, the Warsaw organisation, was "in the clutches of the secret police". A year elapsed, but this Executive produced no evidence whatever in support of their atrocious charge. This, of course, was enough in itself to discourage any honest person, active in the working-class movement, from having any dealings whatever with the people in the Tyszka group. As the reader sees, the fighting methods of these people differ very little from those employed by our Martov, Van and Co....

And it is this group of persons, condemned by *all* the parties working in Poland, that has now decided to act as the saviour of the Russian working-class movement.

Rosa Luxemburg has sent to the International Socialist Bureau[136] a proposal that it should discuss the question of restoring unity in Russia. One of the motives that she advances for this is that the "Lenin group", if you please, is causing disruption in the *Polish* Social-Democratic Party.

This statement gives the Berlin group away at once. It is common knowledge that the Bolsheviks are shoulder to shoulder with the Polish worker Social-Democrats who have repudiated this group of intriguers. That fact keeps our notorious Executive awake at nights, and explains its "unity" campaign, which was opened with attacks on the Russian Marxists and has the object of supporting the Russian liquidators.

Rosa Luxemburg would never have done this if things were "going well". Even her group refused to meet the liquidators at the "August" reconciliation.

But having lost all significance in the Polish and in the Russian working-class movement owing to its lack of principles and to its intrigues, this tiny group of political bankrupts is now clutching at the liquidators' coat-tails. It turns out, of course, that the "Lenin group" is guilty of all mortal sins, and therefore—therefore it is necessary, at all costs, to amalgamate with it. The old, old story!...

What is essentially the Russian Marxists' attitude towards the proposal that the International Socialist Bureau should investigate the disagreements among the Russians?

As far as we know, they will be very pleased if the West-European comrades can be persuaded to investigate the substance of our controversies. We have heard that the Russian Marxists have, for their part, sent to the International Socialist Bureau a proposal that it should also investigate the split in the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the disgraceful conduct of the Tyszka group towards the genuine workers' organisations in Poland. The Marxists will be very pleased if the International Bureau also examines the disagreements between the six and the seven Duma deputies. This will bring before our foreign comrades the question of whether the parliamentary group should be subordinate to the workers' party, or, on the contrary,

whether the workers' party should be subordinate to the parliamentary group.

The Marxists will be still more pleased if Rosa Luxemburg's proposal that the question of Russian unity be placed on the agenda of the International Congress to be held in Vienna in 1914 is accepted.

The new International has twice discussed such questions at its congresses. The first occasion was in Amsterdam, in 1904, when the question of unity in France was discussed. The Congress examined the *substance* of the controversy between the Guesdists (Marxists) and Jaurèsists (revisionists) and *condemned* the line of the Jaurèsists, condemned their tactics of joining bourgeois Cabinets, of compromising with the bourgeoisie, etc. And on the basis of this decision on the *substance* of the issue it proposed that the conflicting groups should unite.

The other occasion was in Copenhagen in 1910, when the Czech-Austrian split was discussed. The Congress again discussed the substance of the controversy, expressed its opposition to the "Bundist-nationalist" principles of the Czech separatists, and declared that the trade unions in a given country should *not* be organised on a national basis; and it was on the basis of this settlement of the *substance* of the controversy that the Congress recommended the two sides to unite. (Incidentally, the Czech Bundists refused to obey the decision of the International.)

If the Russian question is brought up at the Vienna Congress there can be no doubt that the Congress will express an opinion on the importance of the "underground" in a country like present-day Russia, on the question as to whether, under present conditions, Marxists should be guided by the prospects of "evolution" *or* by the prospects of "uncurtailed" slogans, etc. At all events, it will not be without interest to hear the opinion of the International on all these questions....

Unfortunately, however, this is still a long way off. Meanwhile, we merely have the irate but impotent pronouncement of the Rosa Luxemburg and Tyszka group in Berlin. We advise Mr. F. D. to make good use of this pronouncement against the Marxists and in defence of the liquidators. Although the liquidators' newspapers reported the disgrace-

ful exploits of this Berlin group in its struggle against the Polish workers, Mr. F. D. will not, of course, be able to resist the temptation to drink also from this ... fresh spring.

But the Russian workers will say: *We* ourselves will establish unity in our Russian workers' organisations. As for feeble intrigues, we shall simply laugh at them.

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A LETTER TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

December 6, 1913

Dear Friend,

Your letter of November 15 gave me great pleasure. You must realise how highly one in my position appreciates the opinions of comrades in Russia, especially thoughtful people, who are thinking hard studying the subject. I was therefore particularly pleased to get your early reply. One feels less isolated when one receives letters like this. But poetry enough—let's get down to business.

1. You are *in favour* of an official language in Russia. It is "necessary; it has been and will be of great progressive importance". I disagree emphatically. I wrote about this long ago in *Pravda*,* and so far have not been refuted. Your argument does not convince me in the least. Quite the reverse. The *Russian* language has undoubtedly been of progressive importance for the numerous small and backward nations. But surely you must realise that it *would have been* of much greater progressive importance had there been no compulsion. Is not an "official language" a stick that *drives people away* from the Russian language? Why will you not understand the *psychology* that is so important in the national question and which, if the slightest coercion is applied, besmirches, soils, nullifies the undoubtedly progressive importance of centralisation, large states and a uniform language? But the economy is still more important *than* psychology: in Russia we *already* have a *capitalist* economy, which makes the *Russian* language essential. But you have no faith in the power of the economy and want to prop it up with the crutches of the rotten police regime.

* See pp. 354-57 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Don't you see that in this way you are *crippling* the economy and hindering its development? Will not the collapse of the wretched police regime multiply tenfold (even a thousandfold) the number of voluntary associations for protecting and spreading the Russian language? No, I absolutely disagree with you, and accuse you of *königlich-preussischer Sozialismus*!*

2. You are *opposed* to autonomy. You are in favour *only* of regional self-government. I disagree entirely. Recall Engels's explanation that centralisation does not in the least preclude local "liberties".[137] Why should Poland have autonomy and not the Caucasus, the South, or the Urals? Does not the central parliament determine the *limits* of autonomy? We are certainly in favour of democratic centralism. We are opposed to *federation*. We support the Jacobins as against the Girondists. But to be afraid of autonomy in Russia of all places—that is simply ridiculous! It is reactionary. Give me an example, imagine a case in which autonomy *can* be harmful. You cannot. But in Russia (and in Prussia), this narrow interpretation—only local self-government—plays into the hands of the rotten police regime.

3. "The right to self-determination does not imply only the right to secede. It also implies the right to federal association, the right to autonomy," you write. I disagree entirely. It does *not* imply the right to *federation*. Federation means the association of equals, an association that demands *common* agreement. How can *one* side have a *right* to demand that the other side should *agree* with it? That is absurd. We are opposed to federation in principle, it loosens economic ties, and is unsuitable for a single state. You want to secede? All right, go to the devil, if you can break economic bonds, or rather, if the oppression and friction of "coexistence" *disrupt* and ruin economic bonds. You don't want to secede? In that case, excuse me, but don't decide *for* me; don't think that you have a "*right*" to federation.

"Right to autonomy?" Wrong again. We are *in favour of autonomy for all* parts; we are in favour of the *right* to

* Royal Prussian socialism.—*Ed.*

secession (and not *in favour* of everyone's *seceding*!). Autonomy is *our* plan for organising a democratic state. Secession is not what we plan at all. We do not advocate secession. In general, we are opposed to secession. But we stand for the *right* to secede owing to reactionary, Great-Russian nationalism, which has so besmirched the idea of national coexistence that sometimes *closer* ties will be established *after* free secession!

The right to self-determination is an *exception* to our general premise of centralisation. This exception is absolutely essential in view of reactionary Great-Russian nationalism; and any rejection of this exception is opportunism (as in the case of Rosa Luxemburg); it means foolishly playing into the hands of reactionary Great-Russian nationalism. But exceptions *must not be* too broadly interpreted. In this case there is *not*, and *must not* be anything more than the *right to secede*.

I am writing about this in *Prosveshcheniye*.* Please do not fail to write to me in greater detail when I have finished these articles (they will appear in three issues). I will send something more. I was mainly responsible for getting the resolution passed. I delivered a series of lectures on the national question in the summer,[138] and have made some little study of it. That is why I intend to "stick tight", although, of course, *ich lasse mich belehren*** from comrades who have studied the question more deeply and for a longer period.

4. So you are opposed to "altering" the Programme; opposed to a "national programme", are you? Here, too, I disagree. You are afraid of *words*. You must not let words frighten you. *Everybody* changes it (the Programme) any way, *surreptitiously*, in an underhand manner, and for the worse. We, however, define, make more precise, develop and consolidate our position in keeping with the spirit of the Programme, with the *consistently* democratic spirit, with the Marxist (anti-Austrian) spirit. This *had to be done*. Let the opportunist (Bundist, liquidator, Narodnik) scum

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* See present edition, Vol. 20, "Critical Remarks on the National Question".—*Ed.*

** I am willing to take advice.—*Ed.*

have their say, let them give *their* equally *precise* and *complete* answers to *all* the problems raised, and solved, in our resolution. Let them try. No, we have not "given way" to the opportunists, we have *beaten* them on *all* points.

A popular pamphlet on the national question is very much needed. Write. Looking forward to reply, I send you my very heartiest greetings. Regards to all friends.

Yours, *V. I.*

Written November 23
(December 6), 1913

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"CULTURAL-NATIONAL" AUTONOMY

The essence of the plan, or programme, of what is called "cultural-national" autonomy (or: "the establishment of institutions that will guarantee freedom of national development") is *separate schools for each nationality*.

The more often all avowed and tacit nationalists (including the Bundists) attempt to obscure this fact the more must insist on it.

Every nation, irrespective of place of domicile of its individual members (irrespective of territory, hence the term "extra-territorial" autonomy) is a united officially recognised association conducting national-cultural affairs. The most important of these affairs is education. The determination of the composition of the nations by allowing every citizen to register freely, irrespective of place of domicile, as belonging to any national association, ensures absolute precision and absolute consistency in segregating the schools according to nationality.

Is such a division, be it asked, permissible from the point of view of democracy in general, and from the point of view of the interests of the proletarian class struggle in particular?

A clear grasp of the essence of the "cultural-national autonomy" programme is sufficient to enable one to reply without hesitation—it is absolutely impermissible.

As long as different nations live in a single state they are bound to one another by millions and thousands of millions of economic, legal and social bonds. How can education be extricated from these bonds? Can it be "taken out of the jurisdiction" of the state, to quote the Bund formula,

classical in its striking absurdity? If the various nations living in a single state are bound by economic ties, then any attempt to divide them permanently in "cultural" and particularly educational matters would be absurd and reactionary. On the contrary, efforts should be made to *unite* the nations in educational matters, so that the schools should be a preparation for what is actually done in real life. At the present time we see that the different nations are unequal in the rights they possess and in their level of development. Under these circumstances, segregating the schools according to nationality would *actually* and inevitably *worsen* the conditions of the more backward nations. In the Southern, former slave States of America, Negro children are still segregated in separate schools, whereas in the North, white and Negro children attend the same schools. In Russia a plan was recently proposed for the "nationalisation of Jewish schools", i.e., the segregation of Jewish children from the children of other nationalities in separate schools. It is needless to add that this plan originated in the most reactionary, Purishkevich circles.

One cannot be a democrat and at the same time advocate the principle of segregating the schools according to nationality. Note: we are arguing at present from the general democratic (i.e., bourgeois-democratic) point of view.

From the point of view of the proletarian class struggle we must oppose segregating the schools according to nationality far more emphatically. Who does not know that the capitalists of all the nations in a given state are most closely and intimately united in joint-stock companies, cartels and trusts, in manufacturers' associations, etc., which are directed *against* the workers irrespective of their nationality? Who does not know that in *any* capitalist undertaking—from huge works, mines and factories and commercial enterprises down to capitalist farms—we *always*, without exception, see a larger variety of nationalities among the workers than in remote, peaceful and sleepy villages?

The urban workers, who are best acquainted with developed capitalism and perceive more profoundly the psychology of the class struggle—their whole life teaches them or they perhaps imbibe it with their mothers' milk—such workers instinctively and inevitably realise that segregat-

ing the schools according to nationality is not only a *harmful* scheme, but a downright fraudulent swindle on the part *of the capitalists*. The workers *can* be split up, divided and weakened by the advocacy of such an idea, and still more by the segregation, of the ordinary peoples' schools according to nationality; while the capitalists, whose children are well provided with rich private schools and specially engaged tutors, *cannot in any way* be threatened by any division or weakening through "cultural-national autonomy".

As a matter of fact, "cultural-national autonomy", i.e., the absolutely pure and consistent segregating of education according to nationality, was invented not by the capitalists (*for the time being* they resort to cruder methods to divide the workers) but by the opportunist, philistine intelligentsia of Austria. There is *not a trace* of this brilliantly philistine and brilliantly nationalist idea in any of the democratic West-European countries with mixed populations. This idea of the despairing petty bourgeois could arise only in Eastern Europe, in backward, feudal, clerical, bureaucratic Austria, where *all* public and political life is hampered by wretched, petty squabbling (worse still: cursing and brawling) over the question of languages. Since cat and dog can't agree, let us at least segregate all the nations once and for all absolutely clearly and consistently in "national curias" for educational purposes!—such is the psychology that engendered this foolish idea of "cultural-national autonomy". The proletariat, which is conscious of and cherishes its internationalism, will never accept this nonsense of refined nationalism.

It is no accident that in Russia this idea of "cultural-national autonomy" was accepted *only by all* the Jewish bourgeois parties, then (in 1907) by the conference of the *petty-bourgeois* Left-Narodnik parties of different nationalities, and lastly by the petty-bourgeois, opportunist elements of the *near-Marxist* groups, i.e., the Bundists and the liquidators (the latter were even too timid to do so straightforwardly and definitely). It is no accident that in the State Duma *only* the semi-liquidator Chkhenkeli, who is infected with nationalism, and the petty-bourgeois Kerensky, spoke in favour of "cultural-national autonomy".

In general, it is quite funny to read the liquidator and Bundist references to Austria on this question. First of all, why should the most backward of the multinational countries be taken as the *model*? Why not take the most advanced? This is very much in the style of the bad Russian liberals, the Cadets, who for models of a constitution turn mainly to such backward countries as Prussia and Austria, and not to advanced countries like France, Switzerland and America!

Secondly, after taking the Austrian model, the Russian nationalist philistines, i.e., the Bundists, liquidators, Left Narodniks, and so forth, have themselves changed it *for the worse*. In this country it is the Bundists (plus *all* the Jewish bourgeois parties, in whose wake the Bundists follow without always realising it) that mainly and primarily use this plan for "cultural-national autonomy" in their propaganda and agitation; and yet in Austria, the country where this idea of "cultural-national autonomy" originated, Otto Bauer, the father of the idea, devoted a special chapter of his book top roving that "cultural-national autonomy" *cannot* be applied to the Jews!

This proves more conclusively than lengthy speeches how inconsistent Otto Bauer is and how little he believes in his own idea, for he excludes the *only* extra-territorial (not having its own territory) nation from his plan for extra-territorial national autonomy.

This shows how Bundists borrow *old-fashioned* plans from Europe, multiply the mistakes of Europe tenfold and "develop" them to the point of absurdity.

The fact is—and this is the third point—that at their congress in Brünn (in 1899) the Austrian Social-Democrats *rejected* the programme of "cultural-national autonomy" that was proposed to them. They merely adopted a compromise in the form of a proposal for a union of the nationally delimited *regions* of the country. This compromise did *not* provide either for extra-territoriality or for segregating education according to nationality. In accordance with this compromise, in the most advanced (capitalistically) populated centres, towns, factory and mining districts, large country estates, etc., there are no separate schools for each nationality!

The Russian working class has been combating this reactionary, pernicious, petty-bourgeois nationalist idea of "cultural-national autonomy", and will continue to do so.

Za Pravdu No. 46,
November 28, 1913

Published according to
the *Za Pravdu* text

COTERIES ABROAD AND RUSSIAN LIQUIDATORS

Issue No. 86 of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* contains a scurrilous article against Social-Democrats that deserves attention *in spite of* its abusive character and *in spite of* the insinuations of which everybody is sick and tired.

This article is entitled "The German Social-Democratic Press on the Split". It deserves attention because it very clearly explains to Russian workers something they have not known up to now, and which they *ought to know*.

They *ought to know* what intrigues the coteries of Russian Social-Democrats abroad are hatching *against* the Social-Democratic organisation in Russia, for ignorance of these intrigues constantly and inevitably condemns many Russian Social-Democrats to making comic and tragi-comic mistakes.

The liquidators' article commences with italics: "*Not a single* voice has so far been heard in the ranks of the German Social-Democrats" in favour of a split (by "split", the liquidators mean the *building* of a Marxist organisation *in opposition* to the liquidators).

Note the italics in the first sentence of the article: "*Not a single voice*"!

The worn-out trick of the bourgeois hack-writer—not everybody reads a newspaper through to the end, but everybody sees the *first* striking words of an article....

Read the liquidators' article further. It quotes the opinion of a Frankfurt newspaper, which is, of course, *in favour of* the liquidators, but it says nothing about the fact that this newspaper is an opportunist one!

My dear liquidators! Do you think the Russian workers are fools who do not know that there are opportunists among the German Social-Democrats, and that the *Socialist*

(*alleged*) *Monthly*, the chief organ of the German opportunists, *constantly* supports *Nasha Zarya*?

We read further. The opinion of a Dresden newspaper. It condemns the split in general. Neither the newspaper's sympathies in Russian affairs, nor its position on German affairs is indicated. The liquidators do not want to enlighten the Russian workers, but to fool them by leaving a number of things unsaid.

We read further. The Leipzig organ of the Social-Democrats

> "a fortnight ago published a report from Russia describing the situation in tones rather favourable to the schismatics".

This is literally what is published in the liquidator newspaper; and, of course, not a word in italics.

And, of course, not a word, not a syllable, not a sound on *the substance* of that "unpleasant" report! Oh, we are past masters in the art of petty trickery and miserable intrigue!

On the one hand, we have italics: "*Not a single* voice"; and on the other hand, the *only* report from Russia turns out to be written "in tones rather favourable" to the opponents of the liquidators.

We read further:

> "The issue [of the Leipzig Social-Democratic newspaper] of November 15 contains a long *editorial* [liquidators' italics!] article"....

from which *only* the passages that favour the liquidators are quoted.

Russian workers! It is high time you learned to expose the liquidators' lies.

The liquidators print the word "editorial" in italics. This is a *lie*. The article is signed with the initials *J. K.*,[139] i.e., it is *not* an editorial article, but an article by an individual contributor!

The liquidators are deceiving the Russian workers in the most brazen and insolent manner.

This is not all. The liquidators *concealed* the fact that in this very same report the *seven* are called "*shameless splitters*" for admitting Jagiello to the Duma group, in opposition to the will of the Polish Social-Democrats!

And this is still not all. The liquidators *concealed* a fact which is obvious to every politically-informed person. The article signed J. K. was written by one of *Tyszka*'s supporters. All the evidence goes to prove this. Tyszka's supporters are the group of Rosa Luxemburg, Tyszka & Co. in Berlin, those who circulated a most abominable rumour about the presence of provocateurs in the Warsaw Social-Democratic organisation. Even *Luch* (true, this was *after* Jagiello had been smuggled into the Duma group!) admitted that this was abominable. Even *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* has admitted more than once that "Tyszka & Co." do not represent the Polish Social-Democratic workers of Warsaw in fighting against the *workers' insurance centre*, to which the Bund, the Lefts and the Polish Social-Democrats (of Warsaw, and not Tyszka & Co., of course) are affiliated.

And now, in order to fool the Russian workers, the liquidators clutch at the coat-tails of the Tyszka crowd. A drowning man clutches at a straw (even at a filthy and rotten one).

The article of the Tyszka supporter, J. K., like all the pronouncements of that group, throbs with but one desire: to hatch an intrigue around the split, to make "a little political capital" out of it. Pretending that coteries "divorced" from the working-class movement in Russia are viable political organisations, hatching intrigues around this, uttering sentimental phrases *instead of* studying events in Russia—such is the nature of "Tyszka-ism", and it is what nine-tenths of the separate and "independent" coteries abroad are engaged in.

They seem now to be reviving in the hope of being able to "play on" the split between the six and the seven....

Vain hope! Russian worker Social-Democrats have matured sufficiently to be able *themselves* to decide the fate of their organisation by a majority vote, and contemptuously to brush aside the intrigues of the coteries abroad. Members of these coteries very often write in the German Social-Democratic press expressing the point of view of these coteries; but it is not at all difficult to recognise this crowd "by their ears".

Za Pravdu No. 46,
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the *Za Pravdu* text

THE CADET MAKLAKOV AND THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT PETROVSKY

It is some considerable time now since the Social-Democrat Petrovsky spoke in the State Duma on the question of the rules and was deprived of the right to speak by the Chairman for "unparliamentary language" addressed to the Minister, and so forth. As a "topic of the day" in the narrow sense of the term this matter is perhaps out of date. But the fact of the matter is that the speeches delivered by Petrovsky and the Cadet Maklakov deserve more attention than ordinary "news of the day".

The Cadet Maklakov spoke in the State Duma on the question of the new rules. This gentleman was the author of the rules and the spokesman for the Rules Committee. On a number of questions the Cadet Maklakov spoke *against* the Cadet group in the Duma, and with the aid of the Octobrists and the Rights secured the adoption of *most reactionary* rules directed *against* the opposition.

This is not new. It has long been common knowledge that V. Maklakov is a favourite of the Octobrists and that he is an Octobrist at heart. But the *extremely important* fact of our public life that is revealed by this long-known circumstance deserves the closest attention.

Here we have one of the most prominent Cadets himself *suppressing the freedom of the Duma* with the aid of the Rights and Octobrists on a question on which the Duma is relatively *less impotent* than on other questions. The Social-Democrat Petrovsky was a thousand times right in speaking sharply against such an old hand at shady politics.

But what is the main point here? Was V. Maklakov's conduct crooked because Mr. V. A. Maklakov is *himself crooked*? Of course, not, and that is not the point, anyway.

Just as the Beilis case[140] was interesting and important because it very vividly revealed what is behind our home politics, its behind-the-scenes "machinery", etc., so this minor (relatively) case of V. Maklakov's speech *against* the Cadets and against the freedom of the Duma reveals for the hundredth and hundred-and-first time what is really behind the policy of the party of our Russian liberal bourgeoisie.

The struggle between the Cadets and the Octobrists is a struggle between *competitors*—that is why it is so sharp and unscrupulous. It was *possible* for V. Maklakov, favourite of the Octobrists and suppressor of the freedom of the Duma, to become a "leading light" among the Cadets *because*, and *only* because, the Cadets have the *same class basis* as the Octobrists. They are two different wings, or representatives of different trends, of the liberal bourgeoisie, who are more afraid of democracy than they are of the Purishkeviches.

This is material. This is important. This is the quintessence of politics. This is the reason our bourgeoisie is astoundingly impotent politically, its economic power notwithstanding.

The Social-Democrat Petrovsky performed his duty as a democrat in opposing V. Maklakov, the suppressor of the freedom of the Duma. There will be no freedom in Russia until the democratic masses learn to despise the Maklakovs as well as the parties that produce gentlemen of this type.

Za Pravdu No. 47,
November 29, 1913
Signed: *M.*

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ZABERN

Sometimes "incidents" occur in politics when the nature of a certain order of things is revealed, as it were, suddenly, and with extraordinary power and clarity in connection with some relatively minor happening.

Zabern is a small town in Alsace. Over forty years ago Alsace was severed from France by the victorious Prussians (with only one party in Germany, the Social-Democratic Party, emphatically protesting). For over forty years the French population of Alsace has been forcibly "Germanised" and "driven" by every possible form of pressure into the royal Prussian, drill-sergeant, bureaucratic discipline that is called "German culture". But the Alsatians have been retorting to all this with their hymn of protest: "You have taken our Alsace and our Lorraine, you may Germanise our field, but never, never, never will you capture our hearts."

One day a Prussian aristocrat, a young officer named Forstner brought things to a climatic. He grossly insulted the Alsatian people (he used the word *Wackes*, a coarse term of abuse). The German Purishkeviches had used this sort of language in barracks a million times without causing any trouble, but the million and first time—the fat was in the fire!

The pent-up anger of decades against tyranny, nagging and insult, against decades of forced Prussianisation, burst out on the surface. It was not a revolt of French culture against German culture. The Dreyfus case[141] showed that there is as much crude militarism capable of every kind of savagery, barbarism, violence and crime in France as in any other country. No, this was not a revolt of French

culture against German culture, but the revolt of the democracy fostered by a number of French revolutions against absolutism.

The unrest of the population, their resentment against the Prussian officers, the jeers hurled at these officers by the proud, freedom-loving French crowd, the rage of the Prussian militarists, the arbitrary arrests and assaults on people in the street—all this gave rise in Zabern (and later throughout Alsace) to "anarchy", as the bourgeois newspapers call it. The landowning, "Octobrist", clerical, German Reichstag, by an overwhelming majority, passed a resolution *against* the Imperial German Government.

"Anarchy" is a silly catchword. It presupposes that there has been and still is in Germany an "established" civil, legal system which, on the instigation of the devil, has been violated. The catchword "anarchy" is impregnated through and through with the spirit of official, university German "scholarship" (with apologies to real scholarship), the scholarship that cringes before the landowners and the militarists, and sings the praises of the exceptional "*rule of law*" in Germany.

The Zabern incident showed that Marx was right when, nearly forty years ago, he described the German political system as a "military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms".[142] Marx's appraisal of the real nature of the German "constitution" was a hundred thousand times *more profound* than those of hundreds of bourgeois professors, priests and publicists who sang the praises of the "legal state". They all bowed and scraped in face of the successes and triumphs of the German rulers of the day. In appraising the class nature of politics, Marx was not guided by the "zigzag" of events, but by the *entire* experience of *international* democracy and of the international working-class movement.

It was not "anarchy" that "burst out" in Zabern; it was the *true* nature of the German regime, the sabre rule of the Prussian semi-feudal landowners that was aggravated and came to the surface. If the German bourgeoisie had possessed a sense of honour, if it had possessed brains and a conscience, if it had believed what it said, if its deeds were not in contradiction to its words, in short, if it were *not* a bourgeoisie

confronting millions of socialist proletarians, the Zabern "incident" would have been "incidental" to the bourgeoisie's becoming republican. As it is, the whole affair will be confined to platonic protests by bourgeois politicians—in parliament.

But things will not stop there outside parliament. The mood of the petty-bourgeois masses in Germany has been and is undergoing a change. Conditions have changed, the economic situation has changed, *all the props* of the "peaceful" rule of the aristocratic Prussian sabre have been *undermined*. Whether the bourgeoisie likes it or not, *events* are sweeping it towards a profound political crisis.

The time when the "German Michael" slumbered peacefully under the guardianship of the Prussian Purishkeviches, while the course of Germany's capitalist development was exceptionally favourable, has gone. The general, fundamental collapse is irresistibly maturing and approaching....

Za Pravdu No. 47,
November 29, 1913
Signed: *V. I.*

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the *Za Pravdu* text

THE QUESTION OF BUREAU DECISIONS[143]

Today, Monday, December 2 (15), yesterday's decision of the Bureau on Russian affairs became known—so far from a brief telegram. Plekhanov has announced his resignation in writing, i.e., resigned *of his own accord*.

The Organising Committee (OC), the liquidators' leading institution, has been affiliated, i.e., has obtained the right to representation in the Bureau.

(Apropos of this it must be mentioned that according to the Rules, not only the most opportunist parties, but even semi-party workers' organisations may affiliate. The most opportunist groups of the British are affiliated; therefore, the affiliation of the OC could not be prevented.)

What is the result? Plekhanov has been squeezed out by the liquidators! If the liquidators try to rejoice, over this, they must be answered—*hypocritical supporters of unity*. The liquidators have managed to *replace* Plekhanov. That is the actual result. Let all workers in general, and worker Mensheviks in particular, judge whether the liquidators are sincerely striving for unity, whether sincere supporters of unity would have substituted themselves for Plekhanov. Surely there cannot be anybody so naïve as to believe that the replacement of Plekhanov by a liquidator is a step *towards* unity and not *away* from it.

At all events I can offer the editors an article on the subject if the liquidators have started any foolish jubilation. It can also be added (later) that having become affiliated, the OC members (the liquidators) have committed themselves to becoming an *entity*, i.e., a party. Probably an *open party*, eh gentlemen? Time will show.

At last "unification has been entrusted to the executive"—says the telegram. That means that the Executive Committee of the Bureau (Vandervelde+Bertrsnd+Anseele+the Secretary Huysmans) has been instructed to take measures or to take steps towards re-establishing unity.

Apparently (or probably) that has been done without any reproach to us. In that case it is quite acceptable to us. It must be said that the Executive Committee of the Bureau *always* and unconditionally must work for unity, and that two years ago, Huysmans, the Secretary of the Bureau, asked Lenin in writing what measures should be adopted as a step towards unity. Entrusting this to the Executive, therefore, is, I repeat, quite acceptable to us, and any possible misinterpretations by the liquidators will be simply untrue.

Nothing is said in the telegram about the seven and the six. It is known from a letter, however, that at the beginning of the Bureau session a liquidator was named during the roll-call. Our representative then said that the six had not elected him, to which Huysmans replied with an explanation of the rules, according to which representation (from socialist parliamentary groups) is granted only to the majority *irrespective* of party membership. It is probable that they left it at that—one liquidator from the seven or the eight. If such are the rules (which we shall verify—*so far* we have had to accept the official explanation of the rules of the Bureau by the Secretary of the Bureau at an official session), then it was a good thing we did not waste our efforts and did not "put in an appearance", did not go there and make demands. It has no practical significance. It is not convenient to speak about it in the press. If the liquidators start rejoicing—we shall again answer them: hypocritical supporters of unity, who contravene the will of the majority of politically conscious workers.

And so the result is as mentioned elsewhere.

We also see from the letter of our representative that the liquidators have been agitating Kautsky (who represented the Germans) to have a *commission* appointed on the question of unity. Kautsky censured Rosa Luxemburg for her attack on Lenin and was of the opinion that nothing

could be done from abroad; it was necessary for the Russian workers to demand unity.

We shall await a confirmation of these statements. We are certainly in favour of *unity* in accordance with the will of the *majority* of politically conscious workers in Russia.

Such is the state of affairs according to information at present available.

Written December 2 (15), 1913

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Published according to the manuscript

WORKING-CLASS UNITY

Lately, the polemics that *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* has been conducting against the six worker deputies in the Duma have been steadily losing any business-like and ideological character and assuming more and more the character of a "squabble". It is *all the more* necessary, there fore, to *turn* these polemics *back* into the channels of a serious examination of controversial questions. Every class-conscious worker will probably agree with us about this.

We have before us the "big names" that the liquidators always juggle with. Tsereteli and Gegechkori condemn the six; the "leading body" of the August Conference (1912) does the same. For the thousand and first time they call the six splitters, and proclaim "unity".

We, for our part, undeterred by raving and shouting, will, for the thousand and first time, calmly call upon the workers to reflect upon the question and study it.

The working class needs unity. But unity can be effected only by a united organisation whose decisions are conscientiously carried out by all class-conscious workers. Discussing the problem, expressing and hearing different opinions, ascertaining the views of the *majority* of the organised Marxists, expressing these views in the form of decisions adopted by delegates and carrying them out conscientiously—this is what reasonable people all over the world call *unity*. Such a unity is infinitely precious, and infinitely important to the working class. Disunited, the workers are nothing. United, they are everything.

Are there, we ask, data available that will enable every class-conscious worker who desires to study the controversy for himself to judge whether unity *has been maintained*

among worker Social-Democrats during the past few years?

Efforts must be made to collect such data, to verify them and to publish them as material for the purpose of enlightening, uniting and organising the workers.

The newspaper *Pravda* has been in existence since April 1912, and its trend has always (and not one of its opponents has ever denied this) strictly conformed to the decisions which on *three occasions* in this period (once in 1912 and twice in 1913) were passed by the leading Marxist body. How many workers have accepted these decisions (on all questions of working-class life; altogether there were about forty decisions) and have carried them out?

The reply to this question—obviously a very important and interesting one—can be only approximate, but it is based on absolutely precise and objective and *not* biased data. In 1912 and 1913 there were basically *two* workers' newspapers, which advocated *different* views to the masses of the workers. Both of them published reports of the workers' groups which collected funds for the respective newspapers. Needless to say, the workers' groups which collected funds for a *given* newspaper thereby expressed by deeds (and not merely by words) their sympathies for the policy pursued by that paper, and their determination to back the decisions that it supports.

The publication of these data in the two rival newspapers is the best guarantee against mistakes, which interested workers can themselves correct. Here are the data, which have been published *many times* before, have *never* been refuted by anyone, and have never been superseded by other data. In the course of nearly two years, from January 1912 to October 1913, 556 workers' group collections were made for *Luch*, 2,181 for *Pravda*, and 395 for the Moscow workers' newspaper.

One may boldly assert that nobody but a person blinded by prejudice would hesitate to admit that the majority (and the overwhelming majority at that) supported *Pravda*. Slowly but surely the *Pravda* people are building up *real unity* among the workers, uniting them by uniform decisions, which they conscientiously carry out. *This is the first time* in Russia that a Marxist daily newspaper, which scru-

pulously defends uniform and precise decisions, has been able for so long to *unite* more and more systematically and closely *workers' groups* scattered all over the country.

This is unity in deeds ana not merely in words! Of course, this is not everything but it is actual deeds and not merely words, not a mere advertising.

But Tsereteli, Gegechkori and the "August leading body", like all the other liquidators, *stubbornly* ignore the facts!

They shout about "unity", but say nothing about the fact that it is the liquidators—obviously in the minority among the class-conscious workers—who *are violating unity*, are flouting the will of the majority!

No outcries, no clamour and no abuse can refute this plain and simple fact; and all references made by the "August leading, and so forth", to all sorts of "bodies" and groups, only raise a smile. Just think, gentlemen! What are your "bodies and groups" worth if *no* workers, or only an *obvious* minority, support them? Such "bodies and groups" are *breakaway* bodies if they fail to call upon all the workers to obey the will of the majority.

The experience of the revival of the working-class movement during the past two years increasingly confirms the correctness of the *views* of *Pravda*. The experience of uniting the *workers* of Russia on definite decisions formulated by the Marxists is more and more clearly revealing the successes, growth and strength of our organisation. It goes without saying that we shall proceed along this path more boldly and quickly, undaunted by abuse, by outcries, or by anything else.

Za Pravdu No. 50,
December 3, 1913

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the *Za Pravdu* text

A STUBBORN DEFENCE OF A BAD CASE

Those gentlemen, the liquidators, are stubbornly defending the Octobrist clause that "slipped" into their Bill on liberties. This is Clause 5, which by a legal twist limits freedom of association by stating that the workers shall not be liable to criminal prosecution for their actions "*if, in general, they are not actions of a nature that renders them criminally-liable*".

The reactionary nature of this clause is obvious. It is obvious that *genuine* Social-Democrats would say the very opposite of this pettifoggery, i.e., they would say that acts committed in the course of a strike, for the purpose of assisting oppressed fellow workers, should not be liable to punishment, or at least, that the penalty should be reduced.

It is obvious that the liquidators will have to delete this reactionary clause from their Bill; the workers will compel them to do so.

But instead of straightforwardly admitting their mistake the liquidators (guided by Burenin-Gamma[144]) twist and turn and resort to petty lying. Mr. Gorsky assures us in *Novaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta*[145] that the conferences held abroad (three or four years ago)[146] "with the closest co-operation of N. Lenin" adopted similar clauses in a Bill on strikes.

All this is a downright falsehood.

At these conferences abroad the work was divided as follows. Subcommittees drafted the bills, while the general committee discussed certain fundamental questions. Lenin

was not even a member of the Strike Subcommittee (he was a member of the Eight-Hour-Day Subcommittee); and on the general committee, Lenin *opposed* every point that conceded or recognised criminal liability!

Mr. Gorsky wants to throw the blame for a Bill drafted by a certain Mr. F. D. (an ex-member of the Strike Subcommittee!) on Lenin. That trick won't work, gentlemen.

In defending this bad case Mr. Burenin-Gamma advanced another bad argument. He wrote:

> "They [the Social-Democrats] should keep their class struggle within certain limits, not out of respect for 'bourgeois law', but out of respect for the legal and moral consciousness of the broad masses of the people."

Now this is an argument that is indeed worthy of a philistine!

Out of considerations of *expediency* we wage our class struggle within certain limits, Mr. Liquidator, and avoid everything which may (under certain circumstances) disrupt our ranks or facilitate the enemy's onslaught upon us at a time when this is to his advantage, etc. Failing to understand these real reasons, the liquidator falls into the opportunist morass. What are the broad masses of the people? Those masses are the undeveloped proletarians and petty-bourgeois who are full of prejudices—philistine, nationalist, reactionary, clerical and so on, and so forth.

How can we, for example, "*respect*" the "legal and moral consciousness" of anti-Semitism, which, as everybody knows, has very often proved to be a dominant feature of the consciousness of the "broad masses of the people" even of Vienna (a city that is more cultured than many Russian cities).

The "legal and moral consciousness" of the broad masses of *philistines* will condemn, let us say, a blow struck at a blackleg, when it was struck in the heat of defending a strike called for an increase of a starvation wage. We shall not *advocate* violence in such cases because it is *inexpedient* from the point of view of *our* struggle. But we shall not "respect" this philistine "consciousness"; on the contrary,

we shall steadily combat it by all the means of persuasion, propaganda and agitation at our command.

Mr. Burenin-Gamma's appeal for "respect" for the legal and moral consciousness of the broad masses of the people is the appeal of a philistine for respect for philistine prejudices.

It is further proof (in addition to a thousand others) of the philistinism of the liquidators.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 1, December 7, 1913

Published according to the *Proletarskaya Pravda* text

THE CADETS AND "THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION"

Last summer, *Rech*, the chief liberal newspaper in Russia, published an article by Mr. Mikhail Mogilyansky on the All-Ukraine Student Congress in Lvov. *Rabochaya Pravda* at the time pointed out that Mr. Mogilyansky in a manner most reprehensible (for a democrat, or for a man who poses as a democrat) showered *abuse* on the Ukrainian separatism advocated by Mr. Dontsov,* and others. We stated at once that the issue was not whether one agreed or disagreed with Mr. Dontsov, whom many Ukrainian Marxists opposed, we said it was *impermissible* to hurl such epithets at "separatism" as "delirium" and adventurism. We said that this was a chauvinist approach, and that in criticising any particular plan for secession, a Great-Russian democrat must agitate for *freedom* to secede, for the *right* to secede.

As the reader will see, this is a question of principle, of programme, and concerns the duties of democrats in general.

But now, six months later, Mr. Mikhail Mogilyansky again brings this point up in *Rech* (No. 331) but does not reply to us; he replies to Mr. Dontsov, who sharply attacked *Rech* in the Lvov newspaper *Shlyakhi*[147] and incidentally pointed out that "*Rech*'s chauvinistic thrust was properly branded only in the Russian Social-Democratic press".

In replying to Mr. Dontsov, Mr. Mogilyansky states *three times* that "criticism of Mr. Dontsov 's recipes *does not imply repudiation of the right of nations to self-determination*".

This statement by a contributor to the liberal *Rech* is extremely important and we invite our readers to pay partic-

* See pp. 266-67 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ular attention to it. The more rarely the liberal gentlemen establish and analyse the fundamental and material truths of democracy instead of indulging in common political-oppositional scandal-mongering, the more persistently must we call for a serious appraisal of every case in which they do so.

Does our Constitutional-"Democratic" Party recognise the right of nations to self-determination or not? This is the interesting question that Mr. Mogilyansky inadvertently raises.

He thrice repeats his reservation, but he does not give a straightforward answer to this question! He knows perfectly well that neither the programme of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, nor its daily political sermons (propaganda and agitation) provide a straightforward, precise and clear answer to this question.

"It must be said," writes Mr. Mogilyansky, "that even the 'right of nations to self-determination' is not a fetish that must never be criticised: the unhealthy conditions of life of a nation may engender unhealthy tendencies in national self-determination; and to expose the latter does not mean repudiating the right of nations to self-determination."

This is a beautiful example of a liberal evasion which the Semkovskys repeat in different strains in the columns of the liquidators' newspaper! Oh, no, Mr. Mogilyansky, *no* democratic right is a "fetish", and never must the *class* content, for example, of any of them be forgotten. All general democratic demands are *bourgeois*-democratic demands; but only anarchists and opportunists can deduce from this that it is not the business of the proletariat to back these demands in the most consistent manner possible.

The *right* to self-determination is one thing, of course, and the *expediency* of self-determination, the secession of a given nation under given circumstances, is another. This is elementary. But does Mr. Mogilyansky, do Russian liberals, does the Constitutional-Democratic Party admit that it is the *duty* of a democrat to preach to the masses—particularly the Great-Russian masses—the great significance and urgency of this right?

No, no, and no again. That is what Mr. Mogilyansky evades and conceals. That is one of the roots of the *nationalism*

and chauvinism of the Cadets—not only of Struve, Izgoyev and the other outspoken Cadets, but also of the diplomats of the Cadet Party like Milyukov, and the philistines of that party like.... But their names are not important!

The class-conscious workers of Russia will not forget that in addition to national reactionaries we have in this country national liberals, and that the rudiments of national democracy are springing up (recall Mr. Peshekhonov's appeal in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 8, 1906, for "caution" concerning the nationalist prejudices of the Great-Russian muzhik).

Advocacy of the right to self-determination is very important in the fight against the abscess of nationalism in all its forms.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 4,
December 11, 1913
Signed: *I.*

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A GOOD RESOLUTION AND A BAD SPEECH

All class-conscious workers in Russia undoubtedly showed interest in the resolution on Russian affairs passed by the International Bureau and paid attention to it. It is known that the pivot of this resolution was the decision to organise or arrange a "*general exchange of opinion*" among "all sections of the working-class movement" of Russia, including those which accept the Social-Democratic programme, as well as those whose programmes "are in agreement" (or "in harmony"—*im Einklange*) with it.

The latter definition is extremely broad, for it embraces not only the supporters of Jagiello, but also every group that wishes to declare that its programme "harmonises" or "is in agreement with" the Social-Democratic programme. This broad definition, however, will not do any harm for, of course, it is desirable that the widest possible circle should participate in this "*exchange of opinion*" so as not to exclude any of those with whom even individual groups of Social-Democrats *might desire* to unite. We must not forget that two plans were proposed at the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau: (1) Kautsky's plan to "arrange a general exchange of opinion" and *no more*. An exchange of opinion before impartial colleagues, the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau, will *ascertain* the state of affairs and the depth of the disagreements; (2) The plan proposed by Rosa Luxemburg, but withdrawn after Kautsky's objections. This plan proposed a "unification conference" (*Einigungskonferenz*) "to restore the united party".

This second plan was not so good, of course, for, the first essential is to gather precise data, apart from the fact that Rosa Luxemburg was merely trying to smuggle in "restoration" of the notorious "Tyszka group".

The plan accepted was Kautsky's; it was more cautious and approached the question of unity more systematically, *through* a preliminary "exchange of opinion" and the study of precise data. It is quite natural therefore that Kautsky's resolution should have been adopted unanimously.

But a distinction must be drawn between Kautsky's resolution, which was adopted by the Bureau, and the *speech* he made, in the course of which he said some *monstrous things* on one point. We have already commented briefly on this matter, but the appearance, of the report of Kautsky's speech in *Vorwärts* (the chief organ of the German party)[148] compels us to deal with this important question in greater detail.

Objecting to Rosa Luxemburg, Kautsky said that "the old party had disappeared although old names had been retained which, however, in the course of time (*im Laufe der Jahre*—during the past few years) had acquired a new content. Old comrades could not simply be excluded merely because their party (*ihre Partei*) did not bear the old name".

When Rosa Luxemburg objected to this and said that "Kautsky's statement that the Russian party was dead [*sei tot*] was a thoughtless expression", Kautsky limited himself to "protesting that he did not say that Russian Social-Democracy was dead. He merely said that the old forms were broken, and that a new form would have to be created".

This is the translation of the official record of the passages relevant to our question.

It is obvious that Kautsky did not say and could not have said that *Social-Democracy* was dead. But he did say that the *party* had disappeared, and this *he did not withdraw*, in spite of the protest that was made!

This is incredible, but it is a fact.

The confusion Kautsky betrayed here is stupendous. To the exclusion of *which* "old comrades" did he refer? Potresov and Co.? By "*their* party" did he mean liquidator amorphousness?

Or did Kautsky have in mind the "P.S.P. Left wing" which was excluded by Rosa Luxemburg's formula? If so, then his expression "old comrades" is unintelligible, for *never* since the Social-Democratic Party has been in existence,

i.e., since 1898, have the members of the P.S.P. and Social-Democrats been fellow party members.

As far as we are concerned the two interpretations are the same, for it would be ridiculous indeed to exclude the liquidators from an "exchange of opinion" on the question of unity (for the whole question centres round them), just as it would be ridiculous to exclude the P.S.P. Left wing (speaking abstractly, the liquidators—anything can be expected of them—are quite capable of making an ultimatum of their defence of their break-away alliance with the *non*-Social-Democratic P.S.P.). At all events it must be ascertained exactly not only what the liquidators want of the party, but also what their allies want.

The undoubted fact remains that at the Bureau, Kautsky went to the length of saying that the Russian party had disappeared.

How could he have descended to such a monstrous statement? To understand this the Russian workers must know *who informs* the German Social-Democratic press about Russian affairs? When the Germans write they usually avoid the question of our disagreements. When Russians write for German Social-Democratic publications we either see all the émigré coteries allied with the liquidators in a campaign of scurrilous abuse against the "Leninists" (as was the case in *Vorwärts* in the spring of 1912), or the writings of the Tyszkas and Trotskys, or a member of some other émigré coterie, deliberately obscuring the issue. *For years* there has not been a single document, collection of resolutions, analysis of ideas, or a single attempt to collect the facts!

We regret that the German leaders (who show ability in collecting and analysing facts when they study theory) are not ashamed to listen to and repeat the fairy-tales of their liquidator informants.

The Bureau's *resolution* will be carried out, but Kautsky's speech will remain a sad curiosity.

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THE NATIONALITY OF PUPILS IN RUSSIAN SCHOOLS

To obtain a more precise idea of the plan for "cultural-national autonomy", which boils down to segregating the schools according to nationality, it is useful to take the concrete data which show the nationality of the pupils attending Russian schools. For the St. Petersburg educational area such data are provided by the returns of the school census taken on January 18, 1911.

The following are the data on the distribution of pupils attending elementary schools under the Ministry of Public Education according to the *native languages* of the pupils. The data cover the whole of the St. Petersburg educational area, but *in brackets* we give the *figures for* the city of St. Petersburg. Under the term "Russian language" the officials constantly lump together Great-Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian ("Little Russian", according to official terminology). Total pupils—265,660 (48,076).

Russian—232,618 (44,223); Polish—1,737 (780); Czech—3 (2); Lithuanian—84 (35); Lettish—1,371 (113); Zhmud—l (0); French—14 (13); Italian—4 (4); Rumanian—2 (2); German—2,408 (845); Swedish—228 (217); Norwegian—31 (0); Danish—1 (1); Dutch—1 (0); English—8 (7); Armenian—3 (3); Gipsy—4 (0); Jewish—1,196 (396); Georgian—2 (1); Ossetian—1 (0); Finnish—10,750 (874); Karelian—3,998 (2); Chud—247 (0); Estonian—4,723 (536); Lapp—9 (0); Zyryan—6,008 (0); Samoyed—5 (0); Tatar—63 (13); Persian—1 (1); Chinese—1 (1); not ascertained—138 (7).

These are comparatively accurate figures. They show that the national composition of the population is extremely mixed, although they apply to one of the basically Great-

Russian districts of Russia. The extremely mixed national composition of the population of the large city of St. Petersburg is at once evident. This is no accident, but results from a law of capitalism that operates in all countries and in all parts of the world. Large cities, factory, metallurgical, railway and commercial and industrial centres generally, are certain, more than any other, to have very mixed populations, and it is precisely these centres that grow faster than all others and constantly attract larger and larger numbers of the inhabitants of the backward rural areas.

Now try to apply to these real-life data the lifeless utopia of the nationalist philistines called "cultural-national autonomy" or (in the language of the Bundists) "taking out of the jurisdiction of the state" questions of national culture, i.e., primarily educational affairs.

Educational affairs "shall be taken out of the jurisdiction of the state" and transferred to 23 (in St. Petersburg) "national associations" each developing "its own" "national culture"!

It would be ridiculous to waste words to prove the absurdity and reactionary nature of a "national programme" of this sort.

It is as clear as daylight that the advocacy of such a plan means, *in fact*, pursuing or supporting the ideas of bourgeois nationalism, chauvinism and clericalism. The interests of democracy in general, and the interests of the working class in particular, demand the very opposite. We must strive to secure the *mixing* of the children of *all* nationalities in *uniform* schools in each locality; the workers of all nationalities must *jointly* pursue the proletarian educational policy which Samoilov, the deputy of the Vladimir workers, so ably formulated on behalf of the Russian Social-Democratic workers' group in the State Duma.[149] We must most emphatically oppose segregating the schools according to nationality, no matter what form it may take.

It is not our business to segregate the nations in matters of education in any way; on the contrary, we must strive to create the fundamental democratic conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the nations on the basis of equal rights. We must not champion "national culture", but expose the clerical and bourgeois character of this slogan in

the name of the international culture of the world working-class movement.

But we may be asked whether it is possible to safeguard the interests of the *one* Georgian child among the 48,076 schoolchildren in St. Petersburg on the basis of equal rights. And we should reply that it is impossible to establish a special Georgian school in St. Petersburg on the basis of Georgian "national culture", and that to advocate such a plan means sowing *pernicious* ideas among the masses of the people.

But we shall not be defending anything harmful, or be striving after anything that is impossible, if we demand for this child free government premises for lectures on the Georgian language, Georgian history, etc., the provision of Georgian books from the Central Library for this child, a state contribution towards the fees of the Georgian teacher, and so forth. Under real democracy, when bureaucracy and "Peredonovism"[150] are completely eliminated from the schools, the people can quite easily achieve this. But this real democracy can be achieved *only* when the workers of *all* nationalities are united.

To preach the establishment of special national schools for every "national culture" is reactionary. But under real democracy it is quite possible to ensure instruction in the native language, in native history, and so forth, *without* splitting up the schools according to nationality. And complete local self-government will make it impossible for anything to be forced upon the people, as for example, upon the 713 Karelian children in Kem Uyezd (where there are only 514 Russian children) or upon the 681 Zyryan children in Pechora Uyezd (153 Russian), or upon the 267 Lettish children in Novgorod Uyezd (over 7,000 Russian), and so on and so forth.

Advocacy of impracticable cultural-national autonomy is an absurdity, which now already is only disuniting the workers ideologically. To advocate the amalgamation of the workers of all nationalities means facilitating the success of proletarian class solidarity, which will guarantee equal rights for, and maximum peaceful coexistence of, all nationalities.

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STRIKES IN RUSSIA[151]

In the majority of West-European countries, strike statistics were placed on a proper footing comparatively recently—some ten or twenty years ago. In Russia there are strike statistics dating from 1895 only. The chief defect in our official statistics, apart from understatement concerning the number of participants, is that they cover only workers in enterprises subordinated to the Factory Inspectorate. Railwaymen, metallurgical workers, tramway workers, workers in trades subject to excise, etc., miners, building and rural workers are not included in the statistics.

Here are summarised data for the entire period covered by Russian strike statistics.

Year	Number of strikes		Number of strikers	
	Total	Percentage of all enterprises	Total	Percentage of all workers
1895	68	0.4	31,195	2.0
1896	118	0.6	29,527	1.9
1897	145	0.7	59,870	4.0
1898	215	1.1	43,150	2.9
1899	189	1.0	57,498	3.8
1900	125	0.7	29,389	1.7
1901	164	1.0	32,218	1.9
1902	123	0.7	36,671	2.2
1903	550	3.2	86,832	5.1
1904	68	0.4	24,904	1.5
1905	13,995	93.2	2,863,173	163.8
1906	6,114	42.2	1,108,406	65.8
1907	3,573	23.8	740,074	41.9
1908	892	5.6	176,101	9.7
1909	340	2.3	64,166	3.5
1910	222	1.4	46,623	2.4
1911	466	2.8	105,110	5.1
1912	1,918	?	682,361	?

The extent to which these figures are understated may be judged, for example, from the fact that such a cautious writer as Mr. Prokopovich cites another figure for 1912—*683,000* strikers, but "according to another estimate, 1,248,000 in factories, and in addition a further 215,000 in enterprises not under the Factory Inspectorate", i.e., *1,463,000* or almost a million and a half.

The number of economic strikes (from 1905) is as follows:

Year	Number of strikes	Number of workers	Year	Number of strikes	Number of workers
1905	4,388	1,051,209	1909	290	55,803
1906	2,545	457,721	1910	214	42,846
1907	973	200,004	1911	442	96,730
1908	428	83,407	1912	702	172,052

Thus the history of strikes in Russia may be divided into four clear-cut periods (if we omit the eighties with their famous Morozov strikes[152], noted even by the reactionary publicist Katkov as the emergence of the "labour question" in Russia):

		Average number of strikes per annum
1st period (1895-1904),	pre-revolutionary . .	43,000
2nd period (1905-07),	revolutionary. . . .	1,570,000
3rd period (1908-10),	counter-revolutionary	96,000
4th period (1911-12),	present, beginning of revival	394,000

In general, the average number of strikers a year in Russia over the eighteen years was 345,400. In Germany the average for fourteen years (1899-1912) was 229,500, and for Britain the average for twenty years (1893-1912) was 344,200. To give a clear picture of the connection between strikes in Russia and the country's political history, we cite the figures for 1905-07 in three-month periods (*quarters*):

Years	1905				1906			
Quarters	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Number of strikers (thousands) per quarter	Beginning of revolution			Revolution		First Duma		
Total	810	481	294	1,277	269	479	296	63
Economic	411	190	143	275	73	222	125	37
Political	399	291	151	1,002	196	257	171	26

Year	1907			
Quarters	I	II	III	IV
Number of strikers (thousands) per quarter		Second Duma		
Total	146	323	77	193
Economic	52	52	66	30
Political	94	271	11	163

The extent to which workers from various parts of Russia participated in strikes may be seen from the following figures:

Factory district	Number of factory workers (thousands) in 1905	*Number of strikers (thousands)*	
		Total for 10 years (1895-1904)	Number in 1905
St. Petersburg	299	137	1,033
Moscow	567	123	540
Warsaw	252	69	887
3 Southern Regions	543	102	403
Totals	1,661	431	2,863

This table shows the relative backwardness of Moscow, and still more of the South, and the outstanding priority of St. Petersburg and its area (including Riga), and also of Poland.

The strikers in the main branches of industry were distributed as follows:

Groups of industries	Total number of factory workers (thousands) in 1904	*Number of strikers (thousands)* Total for 10 years (1895-1904)	Number in 1905
Metalworking . . .	252	117	811
Textile	708	237	1,296
Printing, woodworking, leather, chemicals	277	38	471
Ceramics, food . . .	454	39	285
Totals	1,691	431	2,863

This shows that the metalworkers are in the lead and the textile workers are backward, the remaining workers being still more backward.

The strikes are grouped in accordance with their causes in the following way (for 14 years, 1895-1908): political, 59.9 per cent of the strikers; on wage issues, 24.3 per cent; on the issue of the working day, 10.9 per cent; labour conditions, 4.8 per cent.

In respect of the results of the strikes we get the following division (if the number of strikers whose strikes ended in a compromise be divided equally between "won" and "lost"):

Number participating in economic strikes (thousands)

	Total for 10 years (1895-1904)	%	1905	%	1906	%	1907	%	1911	%	1912	%
Won . . .	159	37.5	705	48.9	233	50.9	59	29.5	49	51	55	42
Lost . . .	265	62.5	734	51.1	225	49.1	141	70.5	47	49	77	58
Totals .	424	100	1,439	100	458	100	200	100	96	100	132	100

The figures for 1911 and 1912 are incomplete and are not fully comparable with the preceding figures.

In conclusion we give brief data on the distribution of strikes according to the size of the enterprise and according to the location of the enterprise:

Number of strikers per 100 in each category:

Category of enterprise	Total for 10 years—1895-1904	In 1905
20 workers or less . . .	2.7	47
21 to 50 workers . . .	7.5	89.4
51 to 100 ” . . .	9.4	108.9
101 to 500 ” . . .	21.5	160.2
501 to 1,000 ” . . .	49.9	163.8
Over 1,000 ” . . .	89.7	231.9

Percentage of strikes

	in towns	outside towns
1895-1904 . . .	75.1	24.9
1905	85	15

The dominance of the workers of big industrial establishments in the strike movement and the relative backwardness of rural factories are quite clear from these figures.

Written in 1913

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THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The Conference of the Central Committee has adopted a resolution on the national question,* which has been printed in the "Notification", and has placed the question of a national programme on the agenda of the Congress.

Why and how the national question has, at the present time, been brought to the fore—in the entire policy of the counter-revolution, in the class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie and in the proletarian Social-Democratic Party of Russia—is shown in detail in the resolution itself. There is hardly any need to dwell on this in view of the clarity of the situation. This situation and the fundamentals of a national programme for Social-Democracy have recently been dealt with in Marxist theoretical literature (the most prominent place being taken by Stalin's article[153]). We therefore consider that it will be to the point if, in this article, we confine ourselves to the presentation of the problem from a purely Party standpoint and to explanations that cannot be made in the legal press, crushed as it is by the Stolypin-Maklakov oppression.

Social-Democracy in Russia is taking shape by drawing exclusively on the experience of older countries, i.e., of Europe, and on the theoretical expression of that experience, Marxism. The specific feature of our country and the specific features of the historical period of the establishment of Social-Democracy in our country are: first, in our country, as distinct from Europe, Social-Democracy began to take shape *before* the bourgeois revolution and continued taking shape *during* that revolution. Secondly, in our country

* See pp. 427-29 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the inevitable struggle to separate proletarian from general bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy—a struggle that is fundamentally the same as that experienced by every country—is being conducted under the conditions of a complete theoretical victory of Marxism in the West and in our country. The form taken by this struggle, therefore, is not so much that of a struggle for Marxism as a struggle for or against petty-bourgeois theories that are hidden behind "almost Marxist" phrases.

That is how the matter stands, beginning with Economism (1895-1901) and "legal Marxism" (1895-1901, 1902). Only those who shrink from historical truth can forget the close, intimate connection and relationship between these trends and Menshevism (1903-07) and liquidationism (1908-13).

In the national question the old *Iskra*, which in 1901-03 worked on and completed a programme for the R.S.D.L.P. as well as laying the first and fundamental basis of Marxism in the theory and practice of the Russian working-class movement, had to struggle, in the same way as on other questions, against petty-bourgeois opportunism. This opportunism was expressed, first and foremost, in the nationalist tendencies and waverings of the Bund. The old *Iskra* conducted a stubborn struggle against Bund nationalism, and to forget this is tantamount to becoming a Forgetful John again, and cutting oneself off from the historical and ideological roots of the whole Social-Democratic workers' movement in Russia.

On the other hand, when the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. was finally adopted at the Second Congress in August 1903, there was a struggle, unrecorded in the Minutes of the Congress because it took place in the *Programme Commission*, which was visited by almost the entire Congress—a struggle against the clumsy attempts of several Polish Social-Democrats to cast doubts on "the right of nations to self-determination", i.e., attempts to deviate towards opportunism and nationalism from a quite different angle.

And today, ten years later, the struggle goes on along those same two basic *lines*, which shows equally that there is a profound connection between this struggle and all the objective conditions affecting the national question in Russia.

At the Brünn Congress in Austria (1899) the programme of "cultural-national autonomy" (defended by Kristan, Ellenbogen and others and expressed in the draft of the Southern Slavs) was *rejected*. *Territorial* national autonomy was adopted, and Social-Democratic propaganda for the obligatory union of all national regions was only a *compromise* with the idea of "cultural-national autonomy". The chief theoreticians of this unfortunate idea themselves lay particular emphasis on its *inapplicability* to Jewry.

In Russia—*as usual*—people have been found who have made it their business to enlarge on a little opportunist error and develop it into a system of opportunist policy. In the same way as Bernstein in Germany brought into being the Right Constitutional-Democrats in Russia—Struve, Bulgakov, Tugan & Co.—so Otto Bauer's "forgetfulness of internationalism" (as the supercautious Kautsky calls it!) *gave rise* in Russia to the *complete* acceptance of "cultural-national autonomy" *by all* the Jewish bourgeois parties and a large number of petty-bourgeois trends (the Bund and a *conference* of Socialist-Revolutionary national parties in 1907). Backward Russia serves, one might say, as an example of how the microbes of West-European opportunism produce whole *epidemics* on our savage soil.

In Russia people are fond of saying that Bernstein is "tolerated" in Europe, but they forget to add that nowhere in the world, with the exception of "holy" Mother Russia, has Bernsteinism engendered Struvism,[154] or has "Bauerism" led to the justification, by Social-Democrats, of the refined nationalism of the Jewish bourgeoisie.

"Cultural-national autonomy" implies precisely the most refined and, therefore, the most harmful nationalism, it implies the corruption of the workers by means of the slogan of national culture and the propaganda of the profoundly harmful and even anti-democratic segregating of schools according to nationality. In short, this programme undoubtedly contradicts the internationalism of the proletariat and is in accordance only with the ideals of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie.

But there is *one case* in which the Marxists are duty bound, if they do not want to betray democracy and the proletariat, to defend one special demand in the national question;

that is, the *right* of nations to self-determination (§ 9 of the R.S.D.L.P. Programme), i.e., the right to political secession. The Conference resolution explains and motivates this demand in such detail that there is no place left for misunderstanding.

We shall, therefore, give only a brief description of those amazingly ignorant and opportunist objections that have been raised against this section of the Programme. In connection with this let us mention that *in the course of the ten years*' existence of the Programme *not one single unit* of the R.S.D.L.P., not one single national organisation, not one single regional conference, not one local committee and not one delegate to a congress or conference, has attempted to raise the question of changing or annulling § 9!

It is necessary to bear this in mind. It shows us at once whether there is a grain of seriousness or Party spirit in the objections raised to this point.

Take Mr. Semkovsky of the liquidators' newspaper. With the casual air of a man who has liquidated a party, he announces: "For certain reasons we do not share Rosa Luxemburg's proposal to remove § 9 from the Programme altogether" (*Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 71).

So the reasons are a secret! But then, how can secrecy be avoided in face of such ignorance of the history of our Programme? Or when that same Mr. Semkovsky, incomparably casual (what do the Party and the Programme matter!) makes an exception for Finland?

> "What are we to do ... if the Polish proletariat wants to carry on a joint struggle together with the whole proletariat of Russia within the framework of one state, and the reactionary classes of Polish society, on the contrary, want to separate Poland from Russia and, through a referendum, obtain a majority of votes in favour of separation; are we, Russian Social-Democrats, to vote in a central parliament together with our Polish comrades *against* secession, or, in order not to infringe on the 'right to self-determination', vote *in favour* of secession?"

What, indeed, are we to do when such naïve and so hopelessly confused questions are raised?

The *right* to self-determination, my dear Mr. Liquidator, certainly does *not* imply the solution of the problem by a central parliament, but by a parliament, a diet, or a referendum of the *seceding minority*. When Norway seceded

from Sweden (1905) it was decided by Norway *alone* (a country half the size of Sweden).

Even a child could see that Mr. Semkovsky is hopelessly mixed up.

"The right to self-determination" implies a democratic system *of a type* in which there is not only democracy in general, but specifically one in which there *could not be an undemocratic* solution of the question of secession. Democracy, speaking generally, is compatible with militant and tyrannical nationalism. The proletariat demands a democracy that *rules out* the forcible retention of any one of the nations within the bounds of the state. "In order not to infringe on the right to self-determination", therefore, we are duty bound *not* "to vote for secession", as the wily Mr. Semkovsky assumes, but to vote for the right of the seceding region to decide the question *itself*.

It would seem that even with Mr. Semkovsky's mental abilities it is not difficult to deduce that "the *right* to divorce" does not require that one should *vote* for divorce! But such is the fate of those who criticise § 9—they forget the ABC of logic.

At the time of Norway's secession from Sweden, the Swedish proletariat, if they did not want to follow the nationalist petty bourgeoisie, were *duty bound to vote* and agitate against the annexation of Norway by force, as the Swedish priesthood and landed proprietors desired. This is obvious and not too difficult to understand. Swedish nationalist democrats could refrain from a type of agitation that the principle of the *right* to self-determination demands of the proletariat of *ruling*, *oppressor nations*.

"What are we to do if the reactionaries are in the majority?" asks Mr. Semkovsky. This is a question worthy of a third-form schoolboy. What is to be done about the *Russian* constitution if democratic voting gives the reactionaries a majority? Mr. Semkovsky asks idle, empty questions that have nothing to do with the matter in hand—they are the kind of questions that, as it is said, seven fools can ask more of than seventy wise men can answer.

When a democratic vote gives the reactionaries a majority, one of two things may, and usually does occur: either the decision of the reactionaries is implemented and its

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

harmful consequences send the masses more or less speedily over to the side of democracy and against the reactionaries; or the conflict between democracy and reaction is decided by a civil or other war, which is also quite possible (and no doubt even the Semkovskys have heard of this) under a democracy.

The recognition of the right to self-determination is, Mr. Semkovsky assures us, "playing into the hands of the most thorough-paced bourgeois nationalism". This is childish nonsense since the recognition of the *right* does not exclude either propaganda and agitation *against* separation or the exposure of bourgeois nationalism. But it is absolutely indisputable that the denial of the *right* to secede is "playing into the hands" of the *most thorough-paced reactionary Great-Russian* nationalism!

This is the essence of Rosa Luxemburg's amusing error for which she was ridiculed a long time ago by German and Russian (August 1903) Social-Democrats; in their fear of playing into the hands of the bourgeois nationalism of oppressed nations, people play into the hands not merely of the bourgeois but of the reactionary nationalism of the *oppressor* nation.

If Mr. Semkovsky had not been so virginally innocent in matters concerning Party history and the Party Programme he would have understood that it was his duty to refute Plekhanov, who, *eleven years ago*, in defending the draft programme (which became the Programme in 1903) of the R.S.D.L.P. in *Zarya*,[155] made *a special point* (page 38) of the recognition of the right to self-determination and wrote the following about it:

> "This demand, which is not obligatory for bourgeois democrats, even in theory, is obligatory for us as Social-Democrats. If we were to forget about it or were afraid to put it forward for fear of impinging on the national prejudices of our compatriots of Great-Russian origin, the battle-cry of world Social-Democracy, 'Workers of all countries, unite!' would be a shameful lie upon our lips."

As long ago as the *Zarya* days, Plekhanov put forward the basic argument which was developed in detail in the conference resolution, an argument to which the Semkovskys have not attempted to draw attention for eleven years. In Russia there are 43 per cent Great Russians, but Great-

Russian nationalism rules over the other 57 per cent of the population and oppresses all nations. The National-Liberals (Struve & Co., the Progressists, etc.) have already joined forces with our national-reactionaries and the "first swallows" of *national* democracy have appeared (remember Mr. Peshekhonov's appeal in August 1906 to be cautious in our attitude to the nationalist prejudices of the muzhik).

In Russia only the liquidators consider the bourgeois-democratic revolution to be over, and the concomitant of *such* a revolution all over the world always has been and still is national movements. In Russia in particular there are oppressed nations in many of the border regions, which in neighbouring states enjoy greater liberty. Tsarism is more reactionary than the neighbouring states, constitutes the *greatest* barrier to free economic development, and does its utmost to foster Great-Russian nationalism. For a Marxist, of course, *all other conditions being equal*, big states are always preferable to small ones. But it would be ridiculous and reactionary even to suppose that conditions under the tsarist monarchy might be equal to those in any European country or any but a minority of Asian countries.

The denial of the right of nations to self-determination in present-day Russia is, therefore, undoubted opportunism and a refusal to fight against the reactionary Great-Russian nationalism that is still all-powerful.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 32,
December 15 (28), 1913

Published according to
the *Sotsial-Demokrat* text

KAUTSKY'S UNPARDONABLE ERROR

In *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 6, we commented on the speech Comrade Kautsky delivered* during the discussion of Russian affairs in the International Socialist Bureau, and on the amazing—to the Russian reader—complete and deplorable ignorance of Russian affairs that he then displayed.

In his speech Kautsky said that in Russia "the old Party is dead". In a second speech, replying to the objections that had been raised to this, Kautsky said: "I did not say that Russian Social-Democracy is dead; I merely assert that the old forms are broken and that new forms must be created." This is how *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the German party, whose delegate Kautsky was, reports the matter. *Vorwärts* is published in the city where Kautsky lives, and, of course, if he had found that he had been incorrectly reported he would have hastened to correct the report, as he has done on more than one occasion on questions far less important than the "question of the existence" of an entire Party, and of one affiliated to the International at that

And now, No. 101 of *Novaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta* publishes its *own* report of the meeting of the International Bureau, in which Kautsky's second speech is so reported as to make it appear that Kautsky definitely *denied* that he had stated that the "Party is dead".

We would have been the first to rejoice had Kautsky really spoken a second time in order emphatically to withdraw the view which he had expressed, and which was based on his most deplorable ignorance of Russian Party life. But alas! We have no grounds whatever for giving more credence to the report in *Novaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta* than to the report in the central organ of the German party.

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* See pp. 528-30 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The liquidators' newspaper is trying to hush up the matter. But it is quite clear. In his statement about the old Party being "dead" Kautsky not only betrayed ignorance of the facts about the Russian working-class movement, but also revealed what sort of influence the liquidator whisperers abroad exercise upon our foreign comrades.

After uttering his monstrous phrase and meeting with objections, Kautsky tried to correct himself. As reported in Vorwärts, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, he appears to have corrected himself badly, and as reported by the liquidator correspondent he appears to have corrected himself better, but not very much better, for what does he mean by the "form" of Social-Democracy, if not the Party?

The point, however, is not how Kautsky corrected himself, but the unpardonable mistake he committed as a result of liquidator efforts abroad. Class-conscious workers in Russia could, of course, easily expose these whisperers abroad if only they wanted to, and it is high time they did want to! They must organise the work of informing our foreign comrades about their movement in such a way as to tear this business out of the hands of irresponsible émigré coteries. They must counteract the efforts being made by whisperers to use the ignorance (natural) of foreign parties for their own liquidator ends. That is why we called upon the worker comrades to respond as vigorously as possible to the International Bureau's appeal to clarify the disagreements between the Marxists and the liquidators. Let the foreign comrades at last hear the voices of the workers themselves and not those of the liquidator whisperers. This is important, this is essential if we value the idea of international unity.

We make this appeal for a genuine clarification of disagreements, for keeping our foreign comrades informed by means of resolutions, decisions and voting by the workers themselves in order to counteract the liquidators' attempts to conceal or garble the facts of what took place at the meeting of the Bureau.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 8,
December 15, 1913

Published according to
the *Proletarskaya Pravda* text

ONCE MORE ON THE SEGREGATION OF THE SCHOOLS ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY

Marxists resolutely oppose nationalism in all its forms, from the crude reactionary nationalism of our ruling circles and of the Right Octobrist parties, down to the more or lees refined and disguised nationalism of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties.

Reactionary, or Black-Hundred, nationalism strives to safeguard the privileges of one nation, condemning all other nations to an inferior status, with fewer rights, or even with no rights at all. Not a single Marxist, and not even a single democrat, can treat this nationalism with anything else but the utmost hostility.

In words, bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic nationalists recognise the equality of nations, but in deeds they (often covertly, behind the backs of the people) stand for certain privileges for one of the nations, and always try to secure greater advantages for "their own" nation (i.e., for the bourgeoisie of their own nation); they strive to separate and segregate nations, to foster national exclusiveness, etc. By talking most of all about "national culture" and emphasising what separates one nation from the other, bourgeois nationalists *divide the workers* of the various nations and fool them with "nationalist slogans".

The class-conscious workers combat *all* national oppression and *all* national privileges, but they do not confine themselves to that. They combat all, even the most refined, nationalism, and advocate not only the unity, but also the *amalgamation* of the workers of *all* nationalities in the struggle against reaction and against bourgeois nationalism in all its forms. Our task is not to segregate nations, but

to unite the workers of all nations. Our banner does not carry the slogan "national culture" but *international* culture, which unites all the nations in a higher, socialist unity, and the way to which is already being paved by the international amalgamation of capital.

The influence of petty-bourgeois, philistine nationalism has infected certain "would-be socialists", who advocate what is called "cultural-educational autonomy", i.e., the transfer of educational affairs (and matters of national culture in general) from the state to the individual nations. Naturally, Marxists combat this propaganda for the *segregation of nations*, they combat this refined nationalism, they combat the *segregating of the schools according to nationality*. When our Bundists, and later, the liquidators, wanted to support "cultural-national autonomy" *in direct opposition to* our Programme, they were condemned not only by the Bolsheviks, but also by the pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanov).

Now Mr. An, in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (No. 103) is trying to defend a bad case by subterfuge, and by showering abuse upon us. We calmly ignore the abuse; it is merely a sign of the liquidators' feebleness.

To have schools connected in the native languages—this, Mr. An assures us, is what is meant by segregating the schools according to the nationalities of the pupils; the *Pravda* people, he says, want to deprive the non-Russians of their national schools!

We can afford to laugh at this trick of Mr. An's, for everybody knows that *Pravda* stands for the fullest equality of languages, and even for the abolition of an official language! Mr. An's impotent rage is causing him to lose his head. This is dangerous, dear Mr. An!

The right of a nation to use its native language is explicitly and definitely recognised in § 8 of the Marxist programme.[156]

If Mr. An is right in stating that having schools conducted in the native languages means segregating the schools according to nationality, why did the Bundists in 1906, and the liquidators in 1912, "supplement" (or rather, *distort*) the Programme adopted in 1903—at the very Congress which *rejected* "cultural-national autonomy"—which *fully*

recognises the right of a nation to use its *native language*?

Your subterfuge will fail, Mr. An, and you will not succeed in covering up with your noise, clamour and abuse the fact that the liquidators have *violated* this Programme, and that they have "adapted socialism to nationalism", as Comrade Plekhanov expressed it.

We do not want to have the Programme violated. We do not want socialism to be adapted to nationalism. We stand for complete democracy, for the complete freedom and equality of languages, but give no support whatever to the proposal to "transfer educational affairs to the nations" or to "segregate schools according to nationality".

"The question at issue is that of segregating the schools according to nations," writes Mr. An, "hence, these nations must exist in each locality, hindering each other's development; and consequently, *they must be segregated* in the sphere of public education as well."

The words we have emphasised clearly reveal how liquidationism is dragging Mr. An away from socialism towards nationalism. The *segregation* of nations within the limits of a single state is harmful, and we Marxists strive *to bring the nations together and to amalgamate them*. Our object is not to "segregate" nations, but to secure for them, through full democracy, an equality and coexistence as peaceful (relatively) as in Switzerland.*

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 9, December 17, 1913

Published according to the *Proletarskaya Pravda* text

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* Mr. An boldly asserts that "there is no intermixing of nations even in the cantons of Switzerland". Will he not blush if we mention *four* cantons: Berne, Fribourg, Graubünden and Valais?

MR. GORSKY AND A CERTAIN LATIN PROVERB

Mr. Gorsky, in the liquidator newspaper, is continuing to defend the obvious mistake of the seven deputies who adopted the deplorable clause on "criminally-liable actions". Mr. Gorsky, your wriggling is all in vain! It is no use saying that you are not familiar with F. D.'s draft; you can easily obtain it through the editorial office of your newspaper. Don't let F. D. play the part of the witness who is "not to be found". That would be ridiculous.

In vain does Mr. Gorsky assert that Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev have "by their silence" accepted responsibility for the draft made by F. D. and his friends. Each of the three writers mentioned would need a staff of ten secretaries and a special newspaper to refute all the nonsense that is uttered in the wide world.

In vain does Mr. Gorsky hide behind the backs of the *worst* (possible) socialists, who would *lessen* the penalties for "criminally-liable actions" if they are not abolished altogether. There is a good Latin proverb which says: "It is natural for all men to err; but only a fool persists in his error."

Remember this proverb, Mr. Gorsky and Mr. F. D., and advise the seven deputies to delete the Octobrist clause on "criminally-liable actions" from their bill!

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 10,
December 18, 1913

Published according to
the *Proletarskaya Pravda* text

THE MARX-ENGELS CORRESPONDENCE[157]

The long-promised edition of the correspondence of the famous founders of scientific socialism has at last been published. Engels bequeathed the work of publishing it to Bebel and Bernstein, and Bebel managed to complete his part of the editorial work shortly before his death.

The Marx-Engels correspondence, published a few weeks ago by Dietz, Stuttgart, consists of four big volumes. They contain in all 1,386 letters by Marx and Engels covering an extensive period, from 1844 to 1883.

The editorial work, i.e., the writing of prefaces to the correspondence of various periods, was done by Eduard Bernstein. As might have been expected, this work is unsatisfactory both from the technical and the ideological standpoint. After his notorious "evolution" to extreme opportunist views, Bernstein should never have undertaken to edit letters which are impregnated through and through with the revolutionary spirit. Bernstein's prefaces are in part meaningless and in part simply false—as, for instance, when, instead of a precise, clear and frank characterisation of the opportunist errors of Lassalle and Schweitzer which Marx and Engels exposed, one meets with eclectic phrases and thrusts, such as that "Marx and Engels were not always right in opposing Lassalle" (Vol. III, p. xviii), or that in their tactics they were "much nearer" to Schweitzer than to Liebknecht (Vol. IV, p. x). These attacks have no purpose except to serve as a screen and embellishment for opportunism. Unfortunately, the eclectic attitude to Marx's ideological struggle against many of his opponents is becoming increasingly widespread among present-day German Social-Democrats.

(1

Переписка Маркса съ Энгельсомъ.
— Энгельсъ какъ одинъ изъ основателей коммунизма. 1)

Давно обѣщанное изданіе переписки знаменитыхъ основателей научнаго соціализма какъ увидѣло свѣтъ. Энгельсъ завѣщалъ изданіе Бебелю и Бернштейну, и Бебель успѣлъ незадолго до своей смерти закончить свою часть редакціонной работы.

Переписка Маркса и Энгельса, вошедшая въ сколько недѣль тому назадъ въ Штутгартѣ у Дица, представляетъ изъ себя четыре большихъ тома. Въ нихъ вошло всего 1386 писемъ Маркса и Энгельса за громадный промежутокъ времени съ 1844 по 1883 годъ.

Редакторская работа, т.е. составленіе предисловій къ переписки за отдѣльные періоды, выполнена Д. Бернштейномъ. Какъ и слѣдовало опасаться, эта работа неудовлетворительна ни съ технической ка

1) Начало неоконченной статьи, написанной въ 1913 г. въ началѣ 1914 года.

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's
"The Marx-Engels Correspondence"
End of 1913.
Reduced

From the technical standpoint, the index is unsatisfactory—only one for all four volumes (Kautsky and Stirling are omitted, for instance); the notes to individual letters are too scanty and are lost in the editor's prefaces instead of being placed in proximity to the letters they refer to, as they were by Sorge, and so forth.

The price of the publication is unduly high—about 20 rubles for the four volumes. There can be no doubt that the complete correspondence could and should have been published in a less luxurious edition at a more reasonable price, and that, in addition, a selection of passages most important from the standpoint of principle could and should have been published for wide distribution among workers.

All these defects of the edition will, of course, hamper a study of the correspondence. This is a pity, because its scientific and political value is tremendous. Not only do Marx and Engels stand out before the reader in clear relief in all their greatness, but the extremely rich theoretical content of Marxism is graphically revealed, because in their letters Marx and Engels return again and again to the most diverse aspects of their doctrine, emphasising and explaining—at times discussing and debating—what is newest (in relation to earlier views), most important and most difficult.

There unfolds before the reader a strikingly vivid picture of the history of the working-class movement all over the world—at its most important junctures and in its most essential points. Even more valuable is the history of the *politics* of the working class. On the most diverse occasions, in various countries of the Old World and the New, and at different historical moments, Marx and Engels discuss the most important principles of the *presentation* of the *political* tasks of the working class. And the period covered by the correspondence was a period in which the working class separated from bourgeois democracy, a period in which an independent working-class movement arose, a period in which the fundamental principles of proletarian tactics and policy were defined. The more we have occasion in our day to observe how the working-class movement in various countries suffers from opportunism in consequence of the stagnation and decay of the bourgeoisie, in consequence of the attention of the labour leaders being engrossed in the triv-

ialities of the day, and so on—the more valuable becomes the wealth of material contained in the correspondence, displaying as it does a most profound comprehension of the *basic* aims of the proletariat in bringing about change, and providing an unusually flexible definition of the tasks of the tactics of the moment from the standpoint of these revolutionary aims, without making the slightest concession to opportunism or revolutionary phrase-mongering.

If one were to attempt to define in a single word the focus, so to speak, of the whole correspondence, the central point at which the whole body of ideas expressed and discussed converges—that word would be *dialectics*. The application of materialist dialectics to the reshaping of all political economy from its foundations up, its application to history, natural science, philosophy and to the policy and tactics of the working class—that was what interested Marx and Engels most of all, that was where they contributed what was most essential and new, and that was what constituted the masterly advance they made in the history of revolutionary thought.

We intend in the following account, after giving a general review of the correspondence, to outline the most interesting remarks and arguments of Marx and Engels, without pretending to give an exhaustive account of the contents of the letters.

I. GENERAL REVIEW

The correspondence opens with letters written in 1844 by the 24-year-old Engels to Marx. The situation in Germany at that time is brought out in striking relief. The first letter is dated the end of September 1844 and was sent from Barmen, where Engels's family lived, and where he was born. Engels was not quite 24 years old at the time. He was bored with family life and was anxious to break away. His father was a despot, a pious manufacturer, who was outraged at his son's continual running about to political meetings, and at his communist convictions. Engels wrote that had it not been for his mother, of whom he was

deeply fond, he would not have spent at home even the remaining few days before he was due to leave. "You would never believe," he complained to Marx "what petty reasons, what superstitious fears were put forward by the family against my departure."[158]

While he was still in Barmen—where he was delayed a little longer by a love affair—Engels gave way to his father and worked for about two weeks in the factory office (his father was a manufacturer). "Huckstering is too horrible," he writes to Marx. "Barmen is too horrible, the way they waste their time is too horrible, and above all things it is too horrible to remain, not merely a bourgeois, but a manufacturer, a bourgeois who actively opposes the proletariat." He consoled himself, Engels goes on to say, by working on his book on the condition of the working class (this book appeared, we know, in 1845 and is one of the best works of world socialist literature). "And perhaps one can while being a Communist remain in one's outward status a bourgeois and a huckstering beast as long as one does not write, but to carry on a wide communist propaganda and at the same time engage in huckstering and industry will not work. Enough. At Easter I quit here. Add to this the drowsy life of a thoroughly Christian-Prussian family—I cannot stand it any longer; I might in the end become a German philistine and introduce philistinism into communism."[159] Thus wrote the young Engels. After the Revolution of 1848 the exigencies of life obliged him to return to his father's office and to become a "huckstering beast" for many long years. But he was able to stand firm and to create for himself, not Christian-Prussian surroundings, but entirely different, comradely surroundings, and to become for the rest of his life a relentless foe of the "introduction of philistinism into communism".

Social life in the German province, in 1844 resembled Russian social life at the beginning of the twentieth century, before the Revolution of 1905. There was a general urge for political life, a general seething indignation in opposition to the government; the clergy fulminated against the youth for their atheism; children in bourgeois families quarrelled with their parents over their "aristocratic treatment of servants or workers".

The general spirit of opposition found expression in the fact that everybody declared himself to be a Communist. "The Police Commissary in Barmen is a Communist," Engels writes to Marx. He was in Cologne, Düsseldorf, Elberfeld—wherever he turned he stumbled upon Communists! "One ardent Communist, a cartoonist ... named Seel, is going to Paris in two months. I shall give him your address; you will all like him for his enthusiastic temperament and his love of music, and he could very well be useful as a cartoonist."[160]

"Miracles are happening here in Elberfeld. Yesterday [this was written on February 22, 1845], we held our third communist meeting in the largest hall and the best restaurant of the city. The first meeting was attended by 40 people, the second by 130 and the third by at least 200. The whole of Elberfeld and Barmen, from the moneyed aristocracy to the small shopkeepers, was represented, all except the proletariat."

This is literally what Engels wrote. Everybody in Germany at that time was a Communist—except the proletariat. Communism was a form of expression of the opposition sentiments of all, and chiefly of the bourgeoisie. "The most stupid, the most lazy and most philistine people, who take no interest in anything in the world, are almost becoming enthusiastic over communism."[161] The chief preachers of communism at that time were people of the type of our Narodniks, "Socialist-Revolutionaries", "Popular Socialists",[162] and so forth, that is to say, well-meaning bourgeois, some to a greater, others to a lesser degree, furious with the government.

And under such conditions, amidst countless pseudo-socialist trends and factions, Engels was able to find his way to *proletarian* socialism, without fearing to break off relations with a mass of well-intentioned people, who were ardent revolutionaries but bad Communists.

In 1846 Engels was in Paris. Paris was then seething with politics and the discussion of various socialist theories. Engels eagerly studied socialism, made the acquaintance of Cabet, Louis Blanc and other prominent socialists, and ran from editorial office to editorial office and from circle to circle.

His attention was chiefly focussed on the most important and most widespread socialist doctrine of the time—Proudhonism. And even *before* the publication of Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty* (October 1846; Marx's famous reply, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, appeared in 1847), Engels, with ruthless sarcasm and remarkable profundity, criticised Proudhon's basic ideas, which were then being particularly advocated by the German Socialist Grün. His excellent knowledge of English (which Marx mastered much later) and of English literature enabled Engels at once (letter of September 16, 1846) to point to the example of the bankruptcy of the notorious Proudhonist "labour bazaars"[163] in England. Proudhon *disgraces* socialism, Engels exclaims indignantly—it follows from Proudhon that the workers must *buy out* capital.

The 26-year-old Engels simply annihilates "true socialism" We meet this expression in his letter of October 23, 1846, long before the *Communist Manifesto*, and Grün is mentioned as its chief exponent. An "anti-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, philistine" doctrine, "sheer phrase-mongering", all kinds of "humanitarian" aspirations, "superstitious fear of 'crude' communism" (Löffel-Kommunismus, literally: "spoon communism" or "belly communism"), "peaceful plans to bestow happiness" upon mankind—these are some of Engels's epithets, which apply to *all* species of pre-Marxist socialism.

"The Proudhon plan of association," writes Engels, "was discussed for three evenings. At first I had nearly the whole clique with Grün at their head against me.... The chief point was to prove the necessity for revolution by force." (October 23, 1846). In the end he got furious, he writes, and drove his opponents so hard that they were obliged to make an open attack on communism. He demanded a vote on whether they were Communists or not. This caused great indignation among the Grünites, who began to argue that they had come together to discuss "the good of mankind" and that they must know what communism *really was*. Engels gave them an extremely simple definition so as to permit no opportunity for evasions. "I therefore defined," Engels writes, "the objects of the Communists in this way: (1) to achieve the interests of the proletariat in opposition

to those of the bourgeoisie; (2) to do this through the abolition of private property and its replacement by community of goods; (3) to recognise no means of carrying out these objects other than a democratic revolution by force."[164] (Written a year and a half before the 1848 Revolution.)

The discussion ended with the meeting's adopting Engels's definition by thirteen votes against the votes of two Grünites. These meetings were attended by some twenty journeymen carpenters. Thus the foundations of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany were laid in Paris sixty-seven years ago.

A year later, in his letter of November 23, 1847, Engels informed Marx that he had prepared a draft of the *Communist Manifesto*, incidentally declaring himself opposed to the catechism form originally proposed. "I begin: What is Communism?" writes Engels. "And then straight to the proletariat—history of its origin, difference from former workmen, development of the contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie, crises, results.... In conclusion the Party policy of the Communists."

This historical letter of Engels's on the first draft of a work which has travelled all over the world and which to this day is true in all its fundamentals and as actual and topical as though it were written yesterday, clearly proves that Marx and Engels are justly named side by side as the founders of modern socialism.

Written at the end of 1913

First published November 28, 1920 in *Pravda* No. 268 Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the manuscript

NOTES

[1] *Bundists*—members of the Bund (*General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia*), organised in 1897. It was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the Western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (March 1898). At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (July 17 [30]-August 10 [23], 1903) the Bundists demanded that the Bund be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat. Upon the rejection of this organisational nationalism by the Congress, the Bund left the Party.

In 1906, after the Fourth (Unity) Congress, the Bund re-entered the Party. The Bundists persistently supported the Mensheviks and waged an unremitting struggle against the Bolsheviks. Although formally belonging to the R.S.D.L.P., the Bund was actually a bourgeois-nationalist type of organisation. It opposed the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy. It played an active role in creating the August anti-Party bloc and was expelled from the Party together with other opportunists by the Prague Conference in January 1912.

During the First World War (1914-18), the Bund adopted a social-chauvinist position and in 1917 supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. It fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution, and later, during the Civil War, leading Bund members joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with Soviet power. When the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat over internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention had become obvious, the Bund announced that it had relinquished its struggle against Soviet power; in March 1921 the Bund went into voluntary liquidation and Part of the membership entered the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in accordance with the general rules for admission to the Party. p. 17

[2] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (*S.R.s*)—a petty-bourgeois party that emerged in Russia in 1902 as a union of Narodnik groups and circles. The party programme adopted at the First Congress in 1905 was a hash of old Narodnik ideas and revisionist falsifications of Marxism. The S.R.s failed to see the class difference between the proletariat and petty proprietors; they glossed over the class contradictions within the peasantry, denied the leading role of the

proletariat in the revolution and rejected the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the sphere of theory the S.R.s were extreme Right-wing revisionists and reformists, having borrowed their theoretical views from Bernstein, Hertz, David and Vandervelde. As a slogan for the peasant movement they put forward the utopian demand for the "socialisation of the land" under capitalist conditions. The S.R.s preached the subjectivist idea of "active heroes" and the "passive mass", and, adopting terrorism as their chief mode of struggle, did considerable harm to the mass revolutionary movement.

During the Revolution of 1905-07, the S.R.s acted as bourgeois democrats. In 1906 the Right-wing S.R.s founded the semi-Cadet Trudovik Popular Socialist Party and formed a bloc with the Cadets. During the First World War the S.R.s adopted a social-chauvinist position.

Following the victory of the February Revolution, the S.R. Party split into three groups—the Rights, headed by E. Breshko-Breshkovskaya and Kerensky, the Lefts, headed by Spiridonova, and the Centrists, headed by Chernov. The Right and Centrist leaders entered the bourgeois Provisional Government, implemented a Cadet policy and took part in organising the Kornilov putsch that aimed at the establishment of a military-monarchist dictatorship in Russia. Spiridonova's group, the Left wing of the party, officially formed itself into the party of Left S.R.s at the end of November 1917. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the S.R.s conducted counter-revolutionary, subversive activities, joined the armies of the intervention and entered the whiteguard governments set up by foreign imperialists. Following the defeat of the intervention they continued their hostile activities against the Soviet state both inside the country and in whiteguard émigré circles. In an effort to maintain their influence among the peasant masses, they entered the first Soviet Government in November 1917. When the Treaty of Brest was ratified they walked out of the Council of People's Commissars and in the summer of 1918 organised a revolt for the purpose of provoking war with Germany and overthrowing the Soviet Government. The party of Left S.R.s began to disintegrate after the defeat of the revolt. p. 17

[3] This article was published in 1913 in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 3, dedicated to the Thirtieth Anniversary of Marx's death.

Prosveshcheniye (*Enlightenment*) was a Bolshevik social, political and literary monthly published legally in St. Petersburg from December 1911 onwards. Its inauguration was proposed by Lenin to replace the Bolshevik journal *Mysl* (*Thought*), a Moscow publication banned by the tsarist government. Lenin directed the work of the journal from abroad and wrote the following articles for it: "Fundamental Problems of the Election Campaign", "Results of the Election", "Critical Remarks on the National Question", "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", and others.

The journal was suppressed by the tsarist government in June

1914, on the eve of the First World War. Publication was resumed in the autumn of 1917 but only one double number appeared; this number contained two articles by Lenin: "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and "A Review of the Party Programme". p. 23

4 *Cadets*—members of the *Constitutional-Democratic Party*—the chief party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia, founded in October 1905. The Cadets called themselves the "party of people's freedom", but in reality strove to come to terms with the autocracy in order to retain tsarism in the form of a constitutional monarchy. At the time of the First World War (1914-18) they demanded "war till victory is won". After the victory of the February Revolution they came to terms with the S.R. and Menshevik leaders of the Petrograd Soviet and as a result acquired a leading position in the bourgeois Provisional Government where they pursued an anti-popular, counter-revolutionary policy. Following the October Socialist Revolution they acted as the agents of foreign imperialism and were the organisers of the internal counter-revolutionary forces. Lenin called the Cadet Party the all-Russian headquarters of the counter-revolution. p. 31

5 *Octobrists*—members of the *Union of October Seventeenth*—a party that took shape after the publication of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party that represented the big bourgeoisie and big capitalist farmers. Its leaders were the well-known industrialist and Moscow house-owner, A. Guchkov, and the big landed proprietor M. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists gave full support to the domestic and foreign policy of the tsarist government. p. 31

6 *Rech* (*Speech*)—the central daily newspaper of the Cadet Party that was published in St. Petersburg from February 1906 onwards. It was suppressed by the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917, but continued to appear under other names until August 1918. p. 31

7 Lenin here refers to a statement by Marx in his Introduction to *A Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right*: "A school that legitimises the vileness of today by the vileness of yesterday, a school that declares every cry of the serf against the whip to be rebellious since the whip is an ancient, hereditary, historical whip ... that *historical school of law* would have invented German history if it had not itself been invented by German history." (See Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 380, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1956.) p. 32

8 The MS. has no heading. This title was provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 33

9 *Diehard* was the name given to the extreme Right wing of the reactionary landed proprietors. p. 33

[10] *Senate*—one of the highest government bodies in tsarist Russia. It was founded by Peter I in 1711 to replace the Boyars' Council as the supreme administrative and executive body dealing with current governmental questions. The members of the Senate were appointed by the tsar from among the higher civil servants.

Council of State—one of the highest Government bodies of tsarist Russia. It was founded in 1810 as a legislative advisory body whose members were appointed or approved by the tsar. The Council of State was a reactionary body that rejected even moderate bills passed by the State Duma. p. 34

[11] See "Material on the Conflict Within the Social-Democratic Duma Group", p. 458 of this volume. p. 43

[12] This is the concluding line of Ivan Krylov's fable "Musicians"; it has become proverbial in Russian. The fable is about a landowner who boasted to his neighbour of the choir that he had formed from his serfs. The singers had no ear for music and no voices, but this did not bother the serf-owner, who valued them mainly for their soberness and exemplary behaviour. p. 44

[13] *Pravda* (*Truth*)—Bolshevik legal daily published in St. Petersburg. It was founded in April 1912 on the initiative of St. Petersburg workers.

Pravda was a mass working-class newspaper maintained by funds collected by the workers themselves. Articles were contributed by a large group of worker-correspondents and worker-writers—in one year alone the paper published 11,000 items from its worker-correspondents. The average circulation was 40,000, and occasionally it reached 60,000 copies.

Lenin directed the work of the paper from abroad, writing an article almost daily; he gave his advice to the editors and mustered the Party's best literary forces for the paper.

The police persecuted *Pravda* systematically; in the first year of publication 41 issues were confiscated and 36 summonses were made against the editors.

In the course of two years and three months *Pravda* was suppressed eight times but each time it again appeared under a new name—*Rabochaya Pravda* (*Workers' Truth*), *Severnaya Pravda* (*Northern Truth*), *Pravda Truda* (*Labour's Truth*), *Za Pravdu* (*For Truth*), *Proletarskaya Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*), *Put Pravdy* (*The Way of Truth*), *Rabochy* (*The Worker*), *Trudovaya Pravda* (*Labour Truth*). The newspaper was finally suppressed on July 8 (21), 1914, on the eve of the First World War, and publication did not begin again until after the February Revolution. From March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* was published as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin joined the editorial board on April 5 (18), 1917, on his return from abroad and guided the work of the editors. On July 5 (18), 1917, the *Pravda* offices were wrecked by military cadets and Cossacks. From July to October 1917, *Pravda*, persecuted by the Provisional Government, frequently changed its

name and appeared as: *Listok Pravdy* (*Pravda's Sheet*), *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*), *Rabochy* (*The Worker*), and *Rabochy Put* (*Workers' Path*). Since October 27 (November 9), 1917, the newspaper has appeared regularly under its original name of *Pravda*. p. 45

[14] This newspaper report of a lecture delivered by Lenin in Cracow on April 18, 1913 (N.S.) was published in *Naprzód* (*Forward*) the Central Organ of the Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia, issued in Cracow from 1892 onwards. p. 47

[15] Lenin is here referring to the reactionary coup d'état of June 3 (16) 1907 when the government dissolved the Second Duma and changed the law regulating elections to the Duma.

The new election law greatly increased the Duma representation of the landed proprietors and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and greatly reduced the already tiny number of peasant, worker and non-Russian deputies. The new law allotted one elector to 230 voters in the landowner curia, 1,000 voters in the first urban curia (big bourgeoisie), 15,000 voters in the second urban curia (other urban voters), 60,000 voters in the peasant curia, and 125,000 in the worker curia. As a result of the June Third Election Law, the Third and Fourth Dumas were mainly Black-Hundred and Cadet in composition. p. 48

[16] *The "patriarchal slogans" of Katkov and Pobedonostsev* was the name Lenin gave to their demand for the "inalienability" of peasant allotments, the preservation of the village commune and other survivals of serfdom. Katkov was the editor of the reactionary *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (*Moscow Recorder*) and Pobedonostsev was the Procurator General of the Synod, both were ardent advocates of the policy of privileges for the landed nobility, pursued by Alexander III. p. 49

[17] This refers to a reactionary organisation, the *Council of the United Nobility*, founded in May 1906. The Council exercised considerable influence over the policy of the tsarist government. Lenin called it the "Council of the United Feudalists". p. 49

[18] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to the middle of 1918. In the early 1890s it became an organ of the liberal Narodniks. From 1906 onwards the magazine was actually the organ of the Popular Socialist Party, a semi-Cadet organisation. In this period Lenin defined the policy of Russkoye Bogatstvo as "Narodnik, Narodnik-Cadet". p. 50

[19] The law referred to was promulgated on June 23 (July 6), 1912; it provided for insurance against illness and accidents and was adopted by the Third Duma under pressure from the working-class movement. The law covered only 20 per cent of all industrial workers and did not provide benefits in cases of disablement, old age and unemployment.

The Bolshevik Party organised a mass campaign for the expansion of workers' insurance, thereby strengthening its influence among the working-class masses. p. 50

[20] The struggle within the Austrian Social-Democratic Party resulted in the fragmentation of the united party into six national Social-Democratic parties—German, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian and South-Slav. There was constant friction between these parties. p. 51

[21] The Social-Democrat Bolshevik organisations in the Caucasus united the advanced proletarians of many nationalities. p. 51

[22] The reference is to the shooting of unarmed workers in the Lena Goldfields (Siberia) on April 4 (17), 1912.

News of the bloody drama in the Lena Goldfields aroused the wrath of the working class throughout Russia; there were street demonstrations, meetings and protest strikes all over the country. The Social-Democratic Duma group submitted a question to the tsarist government on the Lena shootings. The insolent answer given by the Tsar's Minister Makarov: "So it has been, and so it will be in the future" served to increase the indignation of the workers. Up to 300,000 workers took part in strikes of protest against the Lena shootings. The strikes merged with the May Day strikes in which 400,000 workers took part. p. 52

[23] *Promyshlennost i Torgovlya* (*Industry and Commerce*)—the organ of the council of congresses of industrial and commercial representatives; the journal was published in St. Petersburg from January 1908 to December 1917. It expressed the views of the big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. p. 59

[24] *Kit Kitych*—the nickname of Tit Titych (*Kit* in Russian means "whale"), a rich merchant in A. N. Ostrovsky's comedy *Shouldering Another's Troubles*. Lenin applies the epithet to capitalist tycoons. p. 59

[25] *Zemstvos*—the name by which local self-government bodies in the rural districts were known; they were set up in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. The Zemstvos were dominated by the nobility and their competence was limited to purely local economic and welfare matters (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). They functioned under the control of the governors of the gubernias and the Ministry of the Interior, which could block any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 59

[26] *F. D.*—F. Dan, one of the leading Menshevik liquidators. p. 63

[27] *Luch* (*The Ray*)—legal daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from September 1912 to July 1913 by the Menshevik liquidators. p. 63

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[28] *Khlestakov*—the hero of Gogol's *Inspector-General*; an inveterate braggart and liar.

Nozdryov—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls*, a brawling landowner and swindler. p. 63

[29] As early as the summer of 1912, Lenin had spoken of the need to publish a legal working-class newspaper in Moscow. "Every politically conscious worker realises that St. Petersburg without Moscow is like one hand without the other," he wrote. "... Moscow will of course have to have a workers' daily newspaper of *its own*." Nevertheless Lenin considered it necessary to consolidate *Pravda* and then start the newspaper in Moscow—*Moscow Pravda*, he called it in a letter to Maxim Gorky. The question of publishing a Party newspaper in Moscow was discussed at the Conference of Central Committee members in Poronin on July 27 (August 9), 1913.

A campaign to collect funds for a Moscow newspaper began in December 1912 after a letter had appeared in *Pravda* (No. 176, November 24, 1912) from a group of Moscow workers pointing out the importance and the feasibility of launching a working-class newspaper in Moscow; the letter also appealed for collections to be made for a newspaper fund. The appeal was taken up energetically by the workers, but the appearance of the paper was delayed by the arrest of a group of Bolsheviks making preparations for its issue. The first issue of the Moscow workers' newspaper appeared on August 25 (September 7), 1913 and was called *Nash Put* (*Our Path*). p. 64

[30] *Rus* (*Russia*) (*Molva* [*Tidings*], *Novaya Rus* [*New Russia*], *Oko* [*The Eye*])—the various names under which a bourgeois-liberal newspaper was published in St. Petersburg from 1903 to 1910. p. 67

[31] *Marshal of the Nobility*—the elected representative of the nobility of a gubernia or uyezd. He was in charge of all the affairs of the nobility, occupied an influential position in the administration and took the chair at meetings of the Zemstvo. p. 70

[32] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly bourgeois liberal magazine that began publication in Moscow in 1880. After the 1905 Revolution it became the organ of the right wing of the Cadet Party. In this period of its existence Lenin referred to it as "Black-Hundred Thought". The magazine was suppressed in mid-1918. p. 72

[33] *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*)—a symposium issued in Moscow in the spring of 1909 by counter-revolutionary bourgeois liberal journalists. In articles on the Russian intelligentsia, the Vekhi writers attempted to denigrate the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the liberation movement in Russia and the views and activities of the prominent revolutionary democrats of the nineteenth century—V. Belinsky, N. Dobrolyubov, N. Chernyshevsky and D. Pisarev. They reviled the revolutionary movement of 1905 and thanked

the tsarist government for having saved the bourgeoisie from "the fury of the people with its bayonets and jails". p. 72

[34] *Kievskaya Mysl* (*Kiev Thought*)—a liberal-bourgeois daily published from December 1906 to December 1918. The Menshevik liquidators were closely connected with the paper. p. 74

[35] *Zemshchina* (*Land Affairs*)—a Black-Hundred daily published in St. Petersburg from July 1909 to February 1917. It was subsidised by the tsarist government and the Council of the United Nobility. p. 78

[36] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. It was at first a moderately liberal paper but towards the end of the 1870s it became an organ of reactionary nobility and bureaucratic circles. The paper conducted a struggle not only against the revolutionary movement, but also against the liberal-bourgeois movement; from 1905 onwards it was one of the organs of the Black Hundreds. Lenin referred to *Novoye Vremya* as an example of the venal press. p. 78

[37] *Derzhimorda*—the name of a policeman in Gogol's *Inspector-General*, a boorish, insolent oppressor, a man of violence. p. 86

[38] The decisions here referred to were Draft Terms for the Union of the Bund with the R.S.D.L.P. (adopted at the Fourth [Unity] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906) and the resolution on "The Unity of National Organisations in the Localities" (adopted at the Fifth [All-Russian] Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908). p. 87

[39] *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a Menshevik liquidator monthly published legally in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. It served as a rallying centre for the liquidationist forces in Russia. p. 88

[40] *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta* (*Commercial and Industrial Gazette*)—government daily published in St. Petersburg from 1893 to September 1918. The newspaper carried statistics and economic reviews of industry, trade, agriculture and finance. p. 96

[41] The June Third Law (see Note 15) marked the beginning of the period known as the "Stolypin reaction" (also the June Third system). p. 103

[42] Lenin here refers to the decisions passed by the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Paris between December 21 and December 27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909). The Conference was attended by 16 delegates with full powers: five Bolsheviks, three Mensheviks, five Polish Social-Democrats and three Bundists. Lenin represented the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.; he delivered a report on "The Tasks of the Party in the Present Situation"; he also spoke on the Social-Democratic Duma group and on organisational and other questions. At the Conference the Bolsheviks fought two opportunist trends in the Party—liquidationism

and otzovism. On Lenin's proposal the Conference condemned liquidationism and called upon all Party organisations to struggle resolutely against all attempts to liquidate the Party. Bolshevik resolutions on all questions were adopted. p. 109

[43] "In 1912" refers to the decisions of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held from January 5 (18) to January 17 (30), 1912, which actually fulfilled the functions of a Party congress. Lenin guided the work of the Conference.

The important business of the Conference was that of purging the Party of opportunists. The resolutions adopted on "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators" and on "The Party Organisation Abroad" were of great importance both from the theoretical and from the practical points of view. The liquidators grouped around two legal publications, *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*) and *Dyelo Zhizni* (*Life's Cause*). The Conference put on record "that by its conduct the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* group had definitely placed itself outside the Party". The liquidators were expelled from the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference condemned the activities of anti-Party groups abroad—the *Golos* group of Mensheviks, the *Vperyod* group and Trotsky's group. It recognised the absolute necessity for a single Party organisation abroad promoting Party interests under the guidance and control of the Central Committee and resolved that groups abroad "which refuse to submit to the Russian centre of Social-Democratic activity, i.e., to the Central Committee, and which cause disorganisation by communicating with Russia independently and ignoring the Central Committee, have no right to use the name of the R.S.D.L.P." These resolutions played an important part in strengthening the unity of the Marxist party in Russia.

The Prague Conference played an outstanding part in the organisation of the Bolshevik Party a party of a new type. It summed up a whole historical epoch of the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks and strengthened the victory of the Bolsheviks. Party organisations in all localities were consolidated on the basis of the Conference decisions; the Conference also strengthened the Party as an all-Russian organisation, and outlined the political line and tactics of the Party under conditions of the new revolutionary upsurge. The Bolshevik Party, purged of the opportunists, headed a mighty new upsurgence of the revolutionary mass struggle.

The Prague Conference was of great international significance. It offered revolutionary elements in the parties of the Second International a model of determined struggle against opportunism, pursuing the struggle as far as complete organisational rupture with the opportunists. p. 109

[44] "In 1913" refers to the Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party officials held in Cracow from December 26, 1912 to January 1, 1913 (January 8-14, 1913). Underground Party organisations in St. Petersburg, Moscow Region, the South, the Urals and the Caucasus were represented. Lenin presided over

the Conference and spoke on "The Revolutionary Upsurge, Strikes and the Party's Tasks" and on "The Attitude to Liquidationism, and Unity" (the texts of these speeches have been lost); Lenin also compiled or edited all the Conference resolutions and wrote the "Notification" of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the Conference.

The Conference took decisions on the most important questions of the working-class movement—the tasks of the Party in connection with the new revolutionary upsurge and the growth of the strike movement, the building of the underground organisation, the work of the Social-Democratic Duma group, the insurance campaign, the Party press, the national Social-Democratic organisations, the struggle against liquidationism and the unity of the party of the proletariat.

The decisions of the Conference played an important part in strengthening the Party and its unity, in extending and consolidating the Party's contacts with the masses, and in the elaboration of new forms of Party work fitted to the mounting activity of the working-class movement. The Resolutions of the Cracow Conference were confirmed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 109

[45] Lenin wrote this Draft Platform for the Latvian Bolsheviks in May 1913, when preparations were being made to convene the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area. It was a time when the struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Latvian Social-Democratic Party had become sharper; all the central positions in the Party had been seized by Menshevik liquidators and conciliators. The Latvian Bolsheviks formed their own group with the support of Bolshevik-minded workers. Lenin helped them in their struggle against the liquidationist leadership.

The Bolshevik leaders of the Latvian Social-Democrats set up their centre abroad—the Bureau of Groups Abroad—and published Lenin's platform as a reprint from No. 8 of their *Bilitens* (*Bulletin*) under the heading "Our Platform for the Fourth Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area". The Draft Platform was republished in issue No. 9-10 of the *Bilitens*. The editors of the *Bilitens*, influenced by the conciliatory elements among them, omitted the section of the platform dealing with the national question, and made some alterations and deletions in other sections. p. 110

[46] *An*—pseudonym of N. N. Jordania, leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks. p. 110

[47] *Vperyod* group—an anti-Party group consisting of otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders, empirio-monists (supporters of the reactionary idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius); it was organised abroad in December 1909 and was headed by A. Bogdanov and G. Alexinsky; there were several small circles, mainly of intellectuals, in Paris, Geneva and Tiflis. The views of the *Vpe-*

ryod group were, to use Lenin's words, "a caricature of Bolshevism". The group found no support among the workers and disintegrated in 1913. p. 114

[48] The programme referred to is the Austrian Social-Democratic Party's Programme on the National Question adopted at the Congress in Brünn (Brno) in September 1899. p. 117

[49] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, p. 42. p. 121

[50] Until 1954 this article was known under the heading given by the editors "Apropos of Cadet Maklakov's Speech". In 1954 the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U. received a number of documents from the Cracow-Poronin Lenin archive, among them Lenin's list of articles written for *Pravda*, from which it was established that Lenin had entitled this article "An Incorrect Appraisal (*Luch* on Maklakov)". p. 132

[51] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards by liberal professors of Moscow University and Zemstvo officials; it expressed the views of the liberal landowners and bourgeoisie. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Right Cadets; shortly after the October Revolution in 1917 it was suppressed. p. 135

[52] Lenin prepared this draft speech for a Bolshevik deputy to the Duma; the speech was delivered on June 4 (17), 1913 by A. E. Badayev during the debate on the Budget Committee's report on estimates of the Ministry of Education for 1913. The greater part of Lenin's draft was read almost word for word by Badayev, but he did not finish the speech. When he read the sentence "Does not this government deserve to be driven out by the people?" he was deprived of the right to speak. p. 137

[53] The reference is to the Menshevik agrarian municipalisation programme adopted at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin criticised this programme in his "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." (see Vol. 10) and "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07" (see Vol. 13). p. 152

[54] *Pro-Party Mensheviks*—a small group of Mensheviks led by Plekhanov that broke with the Menshevik liquidators and opposed liquidationism in the 1908-12 period. p. 152

[55] Lenin quotes from the decision condemning liquidationism and otzovism adopted by the January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the question: "The State of Affairs in the Party". p. 154

[56] *Vozrozhdeniye* (*Regeneration*)—a legal journal published by Menshevik liquidators in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910. p. 156

[57] *Nevsky Golos* (*Neva Voice*)—a legal newspaper published by Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg from May to August 1912. p. 157

[58] Lenin refers to the law, promulgated on *December 11* (*24*), *1905*, on the convening of a "legislative" State Duma; the law was promulgated by the tsarist government when the Moscow insurrection was at its height. The First Duma, elected under this law, had a Cadet majority. p. 162

[59] By "*Sabler's parsons*" Lenin means the orthodox priests who were drawn into active participation in the election to the Fourth Duma on instructions issued by the reactionary Sabler, Procurator General of the Synod, to ensure the election of deputies amenable to the tsarist government. p. 162

[60] *Narodniks*—supporters of Narodism, the petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement in the sixties to the eighties of the last century. The Narodniks campaigned for the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of landed estates to the peasants. They denied that in accordance with the regular laws of capitalism, capitalist relations and a proletariat were developing in Russia and, as a consequence of this, considered the peasantry to be the chief revolutionary force; they regarded the village commune as an embryonic form of socialism. The Narodniks, therefore, went out to the villages to arouse the peasants to struggle against the autocracy. The Narodniks proceeded from a false premise on the role of the class struggle in history, believing that history is made by heroes, who are passively followed by the masses. The Narodniks adopted terrorist tactics in their struggle against tsarism.

In the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century the Narodniks adopted a conciliatory policy towards tsarism, began to fight for the interests of the kulaks and conducted a stubborn struggle against Marxism. p. 162

[61] *Stolypin*—Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1906 to 1911. With his name are connected the suppression of the First Russian Revolution (1905-07) and the period of brutal political reaction that followed.

Stolypin workers' party—was the name given by the Russian workers to the Menshevik liquidators who adapted themselves to the Stolypin regime and, at the cost of renouncing the programme and tactics of the R.S.D.L.P., attempted to obtain the sanction of the tsarist government to establish an open, legal, allegedly working-class party. p. 166

[62] *L.S.* (*L.Sedov*)—pseudonym of the Menshevik liquidator B. A. Ginsburg. p. 166

[63] The articles referred to were published by M. S. Olminsky (Vitimsky) in *Pravda* No. 106 and No. 123 on May 10 and May 30, 1913 under the heading "Who Is on Whose Side?" and "The Truth". p. 170

[64] This letter to the editors of *Pravda* was evoked by the publication of a declaration by A. Bogdanov in *Pravda* No. 120 on May 26, 1913. Bogdanov tried to deny Lenin's point that the renunciation of work in the Duma and the use of other legal possibilities were connected with the *Vperyod* line (see p. 154 of this volume). In a comment to Bogdanov's letter made by the editors, it was stated that Bogdanov's declaration had been published for "purposes of objectivity"; this Lenin vehemently objected to.

In answer to this comment Lenin sent, together with this letter, an article (unpublished at that time and not found since) against Bogdanov's distortion of Party history. On a number of occasions Lenin warned the editorial board that Bogdanov's collaboration with a Bolshevik newspaper was impermissible. On Lenin's demand Bogdanov was excluded from the list of *Pravda* contribu ors after he had written an article, "Ideology", which contained open propaganda of Machist views. p. 173

[65] *Otzovism* (from *otozvat*—to recall)—an opportunist trend that took shape among Bolsheviks after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905-07. The otzovists believed that under the conditions obtaining in the period of reaction the Party should conduct only underground work; they demanded the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Duma and refused to participate in trade unions and other legal and semi-legal working-class organisations. The policy advocated by the otzovists would have alienated the Party from the masses and converted it into an isolated sect. p. 173

[66] *Domov*—pseudonym of M. N. Pokrovsky. p. 174

[67] *Volsky*, *Stanislav*—pseudonym of A. V. Sokolov. p. 174

[68] *Stepinsky*—pseudonym of V. R. Menzhinsky. p. 174

[69] The publication referred to is Der *čechoslavische Sozialdemokrat*. p. 176

[70] By "Prussian Octobrists and Cadets" Lenin meant the Progressives, the party of the Prussian liberal bourgeoisie. p. 178

[71] Lenin prepared this speech for a Bolshevik deputy to the Duma. It was delivered by N. R. Shagov on June 9 (22), 1913, during the debate on the Budget Committee's report on the estimates of the Department of State Lands. The speech aroused shouts from the Right deputies and the speaker was several times warned by the chairman that he would be deprived of the right to speak for breaking the rule prohibiting the reading of speeches. Shagov was forced to leave out a number of passages from Lenin's text; about half the speech was delivered. p. 180

[72] The *village commune* in Russia was a communal form of peasant land tenure characterised by compulsory crop rotation and undi-

vided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective liability (compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants for making their payments in full and on time and the performance of various services to the state and the landowners), the regular reallotment of the land with no right to refuse the allotment given, the prohibition of its purchase and sale.

The Russian village commune dates back to ancient times and in the course of historical development gradually became one of the mainstays of feudalism in Russia. The landowners and the tsarist government used the village commune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze redemption payment and taxes out of the people. Lenin pointed out that the village commune "does not save the peasant from turning into a proletarian, yet in practice acts as a medieval barrier dividing the peasants, who are, as it were, chained to small associations and to categories which have lost all 'reason for existence'". (See present edition, Vol. 15, p. 78.)

The problem of the village commune aroused heated arguments and brought an extensive economic literature into existence. Particularly great interest in the commune was displayed by the Narodniks, who saw in it the guarantee of Russia's socialist evolution by a special path. By tendentiously selecting facts and falsifying them and employing so-called "average figures", the Narodniks sought to prove that the commune peasantry in Russia possessed a special sort of "stability", and that the peasant commune protected the peasants against the penetration of capitalist relations into their lives, and saved them from ruin and class differentiation. As early as the 1880s, G. V. Plekhanov had shown that the Narodnik illusions about "commune socialism" were unfounded, and in the 1890s Lenin completely refuted the Narodnik theories. Lenin brought forward a tremendous amount of statistical material and innumerable facts to show how capitalist relations were developing in the Russian village, and how capital, by penetrating the patriarchal village commune, was splitting the peasantry into two antagonistic classes, the kulaks and the poor peasants.

In 1906 the tsarist Minister Stolypin issued a law favouring the kulaks that allowed the peasants to leave the commune and sell their allotments. This law laid the basis for the official abolition of the village commune system and intensified the differentiation among the peasants. In the nine years following the promulgation of the law, over two million peasant families withdrew from the communes. p. 180

[73] This expression originated during the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78. There was heavy fighting in the Shipka Pass but the headquarters of the Russian Army issued communiqués stating "All quiet on Shipka". The expression was used ironically in respect of those who tried to hide the true state of affairs. p. 185

[74] The Stolypin reforms were agrarian laws promulgated in 1906 and 1907. On November 9 (22), 1906 a law was published giving peas-

ants the right to withdraw from the communes and giving them the title to their allotment lands. Before this (on August 12 [25]) a law was passed on the sale of some of the crown lands and (August 27 [September 9]) on the sale of state lands through the Peasant Bank. Later, on November 15 (28), a law was passed permitting loans to peasants from the Peasant Land Bank on the security of peasant allotments. p. 191

[75] This refers to the Slavophil demonstrations organised by reactionary nationalist elements in St. Petersburg on March 17, 18 and 24 (March 30 and 31 and April 6), 1913 on the occasion of the Serbo-Bulgarian victories over the Turks during the first Balkan War. The reactionaries tried to use the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples in the interests of the expansionist, Great Power politics of Russian tsarism in the Near East. p. 219

[76] The strike referred to here took place in Belgium from April 14 to April 24 (N. S.), 1913. It was a general strike of the Belgian proletariat demanding a constitutional reform—the introduction of universal suffrage. Of the more than one million Belgian workers, between 400,000 and 500,000 took part in the strike. The development of the strike was regularly reported in *Pravda*, and lists of Russian workers' contributions in aid of the strike were also printed. p. 221

[77] April 4, 1913 was the first anniversary of the shooting of workers in the Lena Goldfields; it was marked by a one-day strike of St. Petersburg workers in which over 85,000 people participated. p. 224

[78] The Organising Committee was the Menshevik guiding centre; it was formed at the liquidators' conference in August 1912 and functioned until the election of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party in August 1917. p. 229

[79] *The elections to the Executive of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union* took place on April 21 (May 4), 1913. The election meeting was attended by 800 metalworkers and 400 others were unable to crowd into the premises where the meeting was held. The Bolsheviks proposed a list of candidates that had been published in *Pravda* No. 91 and distributed beforehand among those attending the meeting. Despite the insistence on the part of the liquidators that candidates be elected irrespective of political allegiance, the overwhelming majority of those present voted for the *Pravda* list. Ten members out of fourteen were elected to the Executive from the *Pravda* list. p. 230

[80] *Diskussionny Listok* (*The Discussion Bulletin*)—supplement to the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., published in accordance with a decision taken by the January (1910) Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. from March 1910 to April 1911 in Paris. There were three issues.

Diskussionny Listok No. 2, published on May 25 (June 7), 1910 contained the final part of Lenin's "Notes of a Publicist". (See Vol. 16, pp. 195-259.) p. 230

[81] *Der Kampf* (*The Struggle*)—a monthly published by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party; it was opportunist, centrist in trend, and concealed its betrayal of the cause of the proletarian revolution and its service to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie by Leftist phrases; it was published in Vienna from 1907 to 1938. p. 230

[82] *Russkoye Slovo* (*Russian Word*)—a bourgeois liberal daily published in Moscow from 1895 to November 1917; it appeared again for several months in 1918 under the title *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*). p. 235

[83] *Plehve*, *V. K.* (1846-1904)—a reactionary statesman; from 1867 he served in the Department of Justice; as public prosecutor he conducted the investigation for and took part in the Narodnaya Volya trial. In 1902 he became Minister of the Interior and Chief of the Gendarmerie, in which posts he did everything possible to stifle the growing revolutionary movement, dealing ruthlessly with workers' strikes and demonstrations and with the peasant movement; he tried to break up the working-class movement by means of provocations, etc. In 1904 he was assassinated by the Socialist-Revolutionary Sazonov. p. 238

[84] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, p. 36. p. 241

[85] These theses were written by Lenin for his lectures on the national question delivered on July 9, 10, 11 and 13 (N. S.), 1913 in the Swiss towns of Zurich, Geneva, Lausanne and Berne. p. 243

[86] The decisions of the Prague Conference (1912) called the relations that the national Social-Democratic organisations had with the R.S.D.L.P. from 1907 to 1911 "*federation of the worst type*". Although the Social-Democratic organisations of Poland, Lithuania and the Latvian Area, and also the Bund, belonged to the R.S.D.L.P., they actually held themselves aloof. Their representatives did not take part in guiding all-Russian Party work; directly or indirectly they promoted the anti-Party activities of the liquidators. (See Vol. 17, pp. 464-65 and Vol. 18, pp. 411-12.) p. 250

[87] *Russkaya Molva* (*Russian Tidings*)—a bourgeois daily, organ of the Progressists, founded in 1912. Lenin called the Progressists a mixture of Octobrists and Cadets. The paper appeared in St. Petersburg in 1912 and 1913. p. 250

[88] *Narodowa Demokracja* (*National Democracy*)—a reactionary, chauvinist party of the Polish bourgeoisie, founded in 1897. Afraid

of the growing revolutionary movement, the party changed its original demand for Polish independence to one or limited autonomy within the framework of the autocracy. During the 1905-07 Revolution, Narodowa Demokracja was the main party of Polish counter-revolution, the Polish Black Hundreds, to use Lenin's expression. They supported the Octobrists in the State Duma.

In 1919 the party changed its name to Zwiazek Ludowo-Narodowy (National-Popular Union) and from 1928 it became the Stronnictwo Narodowo (National Party). After the Second World War, individuals from this party, having no longer any party of their own, attached themselves to Mikolajczyk's reactionary party, the Polske Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Popular Party). p. 250

[89] This refers to the segregation of the schools according to nationality, one of the basic demands of the bourgeois-nationalist programme for "cultural-national autonomy". p. 251

[90] The Fourth Duma adjourned for the summer vacation after the first session. The summer vacation lasted from June 25 to October 15 (July 8 to October 28), 1913. p. 258

[91] *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (*Leipzig People's Newspaper*)—the organ of the Left wing of the German Social-Democratic Party, published daily from 1894 to 1933; for a number of years it was edited by Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg. From 1917 to 1922 it was the organ of the German "Independents", and after 1922 it became the organ of the Right Social-Democrats. p. 260

[92] *Sovremenka* refers to *Sovremennoye Slovo* (*Contemporary Word*)—a Cadet daily published in St. Petersburg from 1907 to 1918. p. 262

[93] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a Black-Hundred daily published in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1914. From 1906 onwards it was the organ of the Ministry of the Interior. Lenin called it "a venal police newspaper". p. 262

[94] The Bolshevik Deputy. G. I. Petrovsky, spoke at the session of the State Duma on May 20 (June 2), 1913, during the debate on the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior. The speech was drafted by Lenin. In a letter dated April 18 (May 1), 1913, sent by Nadezhda Krupskaya from Cracow to St. Petersburg on Lenin's instructions, she said that every effort must be made to deliver the speech in full on account of its outstanding importance. The manuscript of the draft has not been found. p. 266

[95] *Trudoviks*, *Trudovik group*—also known as the peasant group; a group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed in April 1906 by peasant deputies to the First Duma. They demanded the abolition of all social-estate and national restrictions, democratisation of the rural and urban local government bodies, and universal suffrage

in elections to the State Duma. Their agrarian programme was based on the Narodnik principle of equalitarian land tenure and envisaged the formation of a national land fund to include state, crown and monastery lands, as well as private holdings exceeding the area that could be tilled by the owner's family, with payment of compensation for land alienated from private owners. The implementation of the land reform was to be entrusted to local peasant committees. p. 268

[96] Lenin refers here to an article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* "The Berlin Debates on the Revolution" ("Die Berliner Debatte über die Revolution") (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. V, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1959). p. 271

[97] *Frankfurter Zeitung* (*Frankfort Newspaper*)—a bourgeois daily published in Frankfort-on-Main from 1856 to 1943. p. 275

[98] *L. M.—L. Martov*, one of the Menshevik leaders. p. 285

[99] *Rural superintendent*—an administrative post introduced by the tsarist government in 1889 to increase the power of the landowners over the peasantry. The rural superintendents, appointed from among the local landed nobility, were granted tremendous powers not only administrative, but juridical, which included the right to arrest peasants and order corporal punishment. p. 289

[100] *Der Sozialdemokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—the illegal organ of the German Social-Democratic Party published from 1879 to 1890. p. 299

[101] The speeches referred to are "The Attack on the Fundamental Views and Tactics of the Party" delivered at the Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party in Hanover (October 9-14, 1899); "The Tactics of the Party" and "Collaboration with the Bourgeois Press" delivered at the Dresden Congress (September 13-20, 1903). p. 300

[102] *Bulygin Duma*—the advisory representative institution that the tsarist government promised to convene in 1905. The draft of a law founding an advisory State Duma and the election procedure were elaborated by a commission under the chairmanship of Minister of the Interior Bulygin and promulgated on August 6 (19), 1905. The Bolsheviks declared an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma and put it into effect; the government was unable to convene the Duma, its attempts to do so being foiled by the political general strike of October 1905. p. 304

[103] This refers to Lassalle's well-known thesis that all other classes constitute one reactionary mass as compared with the working class. The thesis was included in the programme of the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany adopted at the Gotha Congress in 1875.

Marx criticised this anti-revolutionary thesis in his "Critique of the Gotha Programme". (See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 25-27). p. 304

[104] *Saltykova, Darya Ivanovna* (1730-1801)—a serf-owner notorious for her brutal treatment of her serfs. p. 310

[105] *Decree allotment*—was fixed by the law of February 19, 1861. In the black-earth and non-black-earth regions two sizes of allotment were fixed, a higher and a lower (the latter being one-third of the former), but for the steppe areas, because of the abundance of land, only one type of allotment was fixed by special decree and was known as the "decree allotment". p. 337

[106] *G. R.* (*G. Rakitin*)—pseudonym of the Menshevik liquidator V. O. Tsederbaum. p. 343

[107] Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value* (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*. 2. Teil. Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1959, S. 36). p. 344

[108] The Executive of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union was re-elected on August 25 (September 7), 1913. The meeting was attended by about 3,000 workers. Despite the efforts of the liquidators to turn the meeting against the Bolshevik Executive of the union, a resolution of thanks to the Executive for its work was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The list of candidates, first voted on, put up by the liquidators obtained about 150 votes; the Bolshevik list, published in *Severnaya Pravda*, was adopted by a vast majority. p. 350

[109] When this article was published in *Nash Put* (*Our Path*) it was accompanied by the following editorial comment: "The editors offer the author their apologies for the *necessary* deletions and amendments to his article." Exactly what changes were made is not known since Lenin's manuscript has not been found. p. 358

[110] *Justice*—a weekly founded in London in 1884 us the central organ of the Social Democratic Federation of Great Britain; from 1911 onwards it was the organ of the British Socialist Party. When the party was split in 1916 it became the organ of the minority of social-chauvinists; it continued publication until 1925.

In 1902 and 1903, Lenin's *Iskra* was printed by the *Justice* press. p. 369

[111] *Manilov*—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls*, a chatterbox and empty day-dreamer whose name has become a synonym for the passive easy-going attitude to reality typical of such characters. p. 378

[112] *The Law of March 4* (*17*), *1906*—temporary rules for associations, unions and meetings—permitted their organisation but placed so

many obstacles in their way that the law was practically reduced to nought. The law granted the Minister of the Interior the right to suppress associations and unions at his own discretion and also to refuse the registration of new unions.

The Law of December 2 (*15*), *1905* was the name given to the temporary regulations under which strikers were subject to conviction as criminals. p. 386

[113] *Yeniseiskaya Mysl* (*Yenisei Thought*)—a daily bourgeois liberal newspaper published in Krasnoyarsk from 1912 to 1915. p. 391

[114] *Grazhdanin* (*The Citizen*)—a reactionary magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1872 to 1914. From the 1880s it was the organ of the extreme monarchists and was edited by Prince Meshchersky and financed by the government. It had a small circulation but was influential in bureaucratic circles. p. 392

[115] This description of the evolution of tsarism in the period of the Stolypin reaction is quoted from a resolution of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., held in 1908. p. 401

[116] The *Brest* (*Tenth*) *Congress of the French Socialist Party*—was held in the town of Brest, March 23-25, 1913. p. 406

[117] This refers to the Fourth Congress of Commercial and Industrial Employees held in Moscow, June 29-July 3 (July 12, 1913. The Congress was attended by 378 delegates. The Bolsheviks, who were supported by almost half the delegates, also had the support of the Left Narodnik section of the Congress, which gave them the majority. The liquidators were represented by an insignificant group. Detailed reports of the Congress were published in *Pravda*. The Congress was closed by order of the Minister of the Interior. p. 410

[118] Lenin is here quoting, with some words changed, from Nekrasov's poem "A Man of the Forties":

But at times avoids an issue,
That is urgent, that alarms.... p. 413

[119] The *Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials* (for purposes of secrecy it was known as "the summer" or "August" Conference), was held from September 23 to October 1 (October 6-14), 1913 in the village of Poronin (near Cracow) where Lenin spent the summer months. The Conference was attended by twenty-two delegates (17 with a vote and 5 with voice but no vote). Sixteen delegates represented local Party organisations: St. Petersburg—Inessa Armand, A. Y. Badayev and A. V. Shotman; Moscow and the Central Industrial Area—F. A. Balashov, Y. T. Novozhilov, R. V. Malinovsky and A. I. Lobov (the two last-named were found to be provocateurs); Ekaterinoslav—G. I. Petrovsky; Kharkov—M. K. Muranov; Kostroma—N. R. Shagov; Kiev—Y. F. Rozmirovich ("Galina"); Urals—S. I. Deryabina ("Sima", "Elena"). Lenin, Krupskaya, Troyanovsky and others

represented the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, the Central Organ of the Party *Sotsial-Demokrat* and the magazine *Prosveshcheniye*. The Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma also represented the Party organisations in the constituencies and towns that elected them to the Duma. Representatives of the Left wing of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, J. S. Hanecki, G. Kamenski ("Domski") and others attended; these delegates had a voice but no vote.

The Conference discussed the following questions: (1) reports from the localities, report on the work of the Polish Social-Democrats, report on the work of the Central Committee; (2) the national question; (3) the work of Social-Democrats in the Duma; (4) the situation in the Social-Democratic Duma group; (5) the question of organisation and the Party congress; (6) the strike movement; (7) work in legal associations; (8) the Narodniks; (9) the Party press; (10) the forthcoming International Socialist Congress in Vienna. The first two days were devoted to a private conference of the Duma deputies on questions of practical work in the Duma.

Lenin guided the work of the Conference; he opened the meeting with an introductory speech and delivered reports on the work of the Central Committee, the national question and the International Socialist Congress in Vienna; Lenin also spoke on almost all the points of the agenda, made proposals and compiled or edited the draft resolutions.

Reports from the localities told of the growth of the working-class movement. The Conference decided in favour of united All-Russian Party work to guide the actions of the working class on a country-wide scale.

Lenin's report on the Central Committee activity summarised what had been done since the Prague Conference in 1912. In his report on the Vienna International Socialist Congress Lenin proposed sending as many delegates as possible from both legal and illegal organisations, and suggested the holding of a Party congress at the same time as the International Congress. The Conference ended with Lenin's closing speech.

The minutes of the Conference at Poronin have not been found. The resolutions were published as a separate pamphlet under the title *Notification and Resolutions of the Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials*, issued abroad by the Central Committee. For reasons of secrecy some of the resolutions were not printed in full; omitted were point 6 of the resolution on the strike movement and points 1-5 of the resolution on the Party press. The full texts of the resolutions were published illegally in a mimeographed edition. p. 417

[120] It was intended to hold the Party congress at the same time as the International Socialist Congress, which would have made it easier to keep secret the preparations for calling it. Intensive preparations for the congress were made during the spring and summer of 1914, but owing to the outbreak of war the congress was not held. p. 421

[121] The newspaper referred to was *Nash Put* (*Our Path*) published in Moscow from August 25 to September 12 (September 7-25), 1913. The paper was launched on Lenin's proposal and under his guidance; Lenin sent his articles simultaneously to *Pravda* and to *Nash Put*. Among the contributors to *Nash Put* were Maxim Gorky, the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma, Demyan Bedny, M. S. Olminsky and I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov. The newspaper was popular among the workers and received immense help from them; 395 groups of workers supported the paper by monetary collections. Its daily circulation was from 17,000 to 20,000 copies.

The newspaper was persistently persecuted by the police and finally suppressed; only 16 issues appeared. Moscow workers responded to the suppression of *Nash Put* with mass strikes in protest against the persecution of the working-class press. They did not, however, succeed in re-starting the paper. p. 423

[122] The *Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.*, the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, began appearing illegally in February 1908. The first issue was printed in Russia but owing to the arrest of the editors and destruction of the printing-press the paper was moved out of the country—first to Paris and then to Geneva. Altogether 58 issues appeared.

In accordance with a decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. the Editorial Board was composed of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats. The newspaper printed Lenin's articles giving guidance to the Party. On the Editorial Board Lenin conducted a struggle for a consistently Bolshevik line. Some of the editors (Kamenev and Zinoviev) adopted a line of conciliation towards the liquidators and attempted to prevent Lenin's political line from being implemented. The Mensheviks Martov and Dan sabotaged the work of the Central Organ Editorial Board and at the same time openly defended liquidationism in the newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Voice of a Social-Democrat*). Lenin's implacable struggle against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan's resigning from the Editorial Board in June 1911. From December 1911 *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin.

In 1912 and 1913 the paper appeared with big intervals between issues, only 6 issues appearing in those years. After the outbreak of the First World War *Sotsial-Demokrat* was published more regularly, the last issue appearing in Geneva on January 18 (31), 1917. p. 424

[123] The subsection referred to was that of a resolution on "The Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" adopted by the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908. Lenin's draft for this subsection was adopted by the Conference with some amendments that spoiled the original formulation (the conditions under which voting was permissible for items of expenditure on cultural requirements were less definite in the resolution than in Lenin s draft). This part of the resolution on "Social-Democratic

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Activities in the Duma" was confirmed in a new, improved version by the Poronin (Summer) Conference. p. 424

[124] The congresses referred to are the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907 and the International Social Congress at Stuttgart in the same year; the resolutions were directed against the opportunist principle of trade union "neutrality". p. 426

[125] The resolution refers here to the decision adopted by the liquidators' August Conference in 1912 to the effect that "cultural-national autonomy" was compatible with the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 427

[126] *Zavety* (*Testament*)—a legal Socialist-Revolutionary literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from April 1912 to July 1914. p. 432

[127] *Rodichev, F. M.*— a landowner from Tver Gubernia, one of the organisers and most active members of the Cadet Party. p. 440

[128] The text of the "*Declaration*" was worked out by Lenin together with the Bolshevik deputies to the Duma at the Poronin (Summer) Conference.

At the first meeting of the Social-Democratic Duma group on October 16 (29), 1913, at the beginning of the second session of the Fourth Duma, the Bolshevik deputies submitted to the Menshevik deputies an ultimatum in which they demanded equal rights for the "six" and the "seven". The Bolshevik deputies left the meeting when no satisfactory answer was forthcoming. On October 18 (31), the "Declaration" was published in *Za Pravdu* over the signatures of the Bolshevik deputies accompanied by an appeal to workers to discuss the demand made by the "six" of the "seven" and give support to the worker-deputies in re-establishing the unity of the Social-Democratic Duma group. p. 446

[129] In sending this "*Material*" to the newspaper *Za Pravdu*, Lenin proposed that the Sunday issue of the paper contain a separate leaflet dealing exclusively with the campaign to support the Bolshevik "six". When Lenin heard that the issue containing the article had been confiscated he proposed that the editors reprint it in the following issues. The article was not, however, published again in the paper. It was reprinted in 1914 in the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* under the heading "Material on the History of the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Group in the Duma", and added to it was a section entitled "Workers' Comment on the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Group in the State Duma". p. 458

[130] *Zvezda* (*The Star*)—a Bolshevik legal newspaper, the immediate predecessor of *Pravda*; it was published in St. Petersburg from December 16 (29). 1911) to April 22 (May 5), 1912 (it was at first a

weekly but from January 1912 it appeared twice a week and from March three times a week). On February 26 (March 10), 1912, *Nevskaya Zvezda* (*The Neva Star*) No. 1 appeared simultaneously with *Zvezda* and when the latter was suppressed became its successor. The last, twenty-seventh issue of *Nevskaya Zvezda* appeared on October 5 (18), 1912.

Up to the autumn of 1911 the pro-Party Mensheviks (Plekhanov's group) contributed to *Zvezda*. Lenin guided the work of the paper (from abroad) ideologically, about fifty of his articles being published in *Zvezda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*.

Zvezda contained an extensive section "Correspondence from Workers" and maintained regular contact with workers. The circulation of some issues reached 50,000-60,000 copies.

The newspaper was constantly subjected to government persecution; of 96 issues (*Zvezda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*) 39 were confiscated and fines were imposed on ten others. *Zvezda* prepared the way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily *Pravda*; *Pravda* No. 1 appeared on the day *Zvezda* was suppressed by the government. p. 463

[131] *Gorodskoye Dyelo* (*Urban Affairs*)—a Cadet fortnightly devoted to questions of municipal economy and administration; it was published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1918. p. 475

[132] This article was written in answer to a slanderous version of the split in the Russian Social-Democratic Duma group that was published unsigned in the German Social-Democratic *Leipziger Volkszeitung* on November 15 (N.S.), 1913.

Lenin tried to acquaint the International Social-Democratic movement, and especially the German Social-Democrats, with the true state of affairs in the working-class movement in Russia, but the opportunist leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party did not print articles by Bolsheviks in *Vorwärts*, its central organ. *Leipziger Volkszeitung* alone published the article after a long delay, which it explained as due to lack of space and "other reasons". p. 480

[133] *Volnaya Mysl* (*Free Thought*)—one of the names under which the Left-Narodnik (S.R.) legal newspaper *Zhivaya Mysl* (*Living Thought*) was published; the paper appeared in St. Petersburg from August 1913 to July 1914 and frequently changed its name. p. 485

[134] *Royal-Prussian socialism* is the name Marx and Engels gave to the policy of conciliation with Bismarck's government, a policy pursued by Lassalle and by his successor Schweitzer, editor of the Lassallean newspaper *Sozialdemokrat*. p. 490

[135] The differences of opinion between the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania and the Warsaw organisation, the strongest and most consistently revolutionary Polish Social-Democratic organisation, arose in 1908 at the Sixth Congress of that party. The line of behaviour of the Executive

Committee headed by Rosa Luxemburg, L. Tyszka and others was sharply criticised at the Congress; the Board was criticised for its unprincipled position in the R.S.D.L.P., for not allowing criticism from the local organisations, etc. The Congress passed a vote of no confidence in the Executive.

The Executive, in 1912, announced the dissolution of the Warsaw Committee on the grounds of its "schismatic" activities, accused it falsely of connections with the secret police, and established a new Warsaw Committee from among its own supporters. From this moment the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania was split into two.

Lenin kept track of the struggle within the Polish Social-Democratic Party. He published a number of articles in both the Russian and Polish Party press on the split in the Polish Social-Democratic Party and spoke in the International Socialist Bureau against the attacks of the Executive on the Warsaw organisation.

The "schismatics" agreed with the tactical line of the Bolsheviks on a number of points and tried to establish organisational ties with the Bolsheviks despite their differences on the national question (the "schismatics" adopted the semi-Menshevik position of Rosa Luxemburg and her followers). The "schismatics" took part in the Poronin Conference (see Note 119). During the First World War the two divisions of the Polish Social-Democrats formed a single party with an internationalist platform. In December 1918 the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania together with the Left elements of the Polish Socialist Party established the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. p. 495

[136] *The International Socialist Bureau* was the executive body of the Second International established by a decision of the Paris Congress in 1900. p. 496

[137] Lenin here refers to a passage in Engels's "Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891". (Engels, "Zur Kritik des sozial-demokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891". *Die Neue Zeit*, 1901-02, 20 Jhrg. 1. Band, Stuttgart, 1902.) p. 500

[138] The lectures here referred to are those Lenin delivered in 1913 in Switzerland. (See Note 85.) p. 501

[139] *J. K.* (*J. Karski*)—pseudonym of J. J. Marchlewski. p. 509

[140] The *Beilis case*—the trial of the Jew Beilis, organised for provocative purposes by the tsarist government in 1913 in Kiev. Beilis was falsely accused of the ritual murder of a Christian boy, Yushchinsky (the murder was actually committed by the Black Hundreds). The tsarist government staged this trial to stir up anti-Semitism and make use of anti-Jewish pogroms to divert the attention of the masses from the revolutionary movement that was growing throughout the country. The trial aroused public indignation; in a number of towns workers' demonstrations of protest were held. Beilis was acquitted. p. 512

[141] The *Dreyfus case*—the trial in 1894 of Dreyfus, a Jewish General Staff officer who was falsely accused of espionage and high treason; the trial was staged for provocative purposes by French reactionary militarists. A Court Martial sentenced Dreyfus to imprisonment for life. The strong public movement for a review of the case led to a sharp conflict between republican and monarchist forces in France. Dreyfus was acquitted in 1906.

Lenin described the Dreyfus case as "one of the many thousands of fraudulent tricks of the reactionary military caste". p. 513

[142] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Critique of the Gotha Programme", *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 33. p. 514

[143] This letter was addressed by Lenin to the editors of *Za Pravdu* when he received the first report of the decisions of the December session (1913) of the International Socialist Bureau on the unification of the R.S.D.L.P.

The question was raised by Rosa Luxemburg (member of the Bureau from the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania) in support of the Russian liquidators, who had been defeated in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. At the session on December 14 (N. S.), 1913, the resolution proposed by Kautsky was adopted; in this resolution the Executive Committee of the Bureau was instructed, allegedly for the purpose of re-establishing the unity of the R.S.D.L.P., to organise an exchange of opinion "between all factions of the working-class movement in Russia".

At the conference held in July 1914 in Brussels in accordance with the decision of the Bureau, the leaders of the Second International, on the pretext of "reconciling" the Bolsheviks and liquidators, demanded that the Bolsheviks cease their criticism of the liquidators; the Bolsheviks refused, and continued their struggle against the liquidators. p. 516

[144] *Burenin, V. P.*—staff employee of the reactionary newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*); engaged in libelling and besmearing all progressive social and political trends. Lenin uses the name as a synonym for those who conduct polemics by dishonest methods.

Gamma—pseudonym of L. Martov. p. 522

[145] *Novaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta* (*New Liquidators' Gazette*)—Lenin's ironical appelation for the Menshevik *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (*New Workers' Newspaper*). p. 522

[146] This refers to a committee to assist the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma in preparing bills for the Duma; it was set up in Paris in 1909, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks participating. The committee had subcommittees to elaborate bills on the eight-hour day, on the right to strike and on trade unions. The bill on strikes was drawn up by the Menshevik Dan; it included a point recognising the criminality of participation in strikes. When the bill was discussed by the committee Lenin spoke vehemently against this point. p. 522

[147] *Shlyakhi* (*Paths*)—nationalist organ of the Ukrainian Students' Union; it was published in Lvov from April 1913 to March 1914. p. 525

[148] *Vorwärts* (*Forward*)—the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party; from 1876 onwards it was edited by Wilhelm Liebknecht and others. Engels conducted a struggle in the paper's columns against all manifestations of opportunism. From the middle nineties, after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* regularly published articles by the opportunists dominant in the German Social-Democratic Party and in the Second International. During the First World War *Vorwärts* adopted a social-chauvinist position. p. 529

[149] Sumoilov made his statement at a session of the State Duma on November 26 (December 9), 1913, during the discussion on a bill to increase the salaries of teachers of religion in agrarian schools. p. 532

[150] For Lenin's characterisation of Peredonov see the article "The Question of Ministry of Education Policy". (See p. 143 of this volume.) p. 533

[151] Lenin wrote this article for the pocket calendar *Sputnik Rabochego* (*Worker's Handbook*) *for 1914*, issued by the Priboi Party Publishing House in December 1913. It contained essential information on labour legislation in Russia, the Russian and international working-class movement, political parties, associations and unions, the press, etc. The *Worker's Handbook* was sequestered but the issue was sold in one day before the police could confiscate it. When Lenin received a copy of the *Handbook* he wrote in a letter to Inessa Armand that 5,000 copies had already been sold. A second, amended edition was published in February 1914 with deletions and amendments made for purposes of censorship and with a list of books for self-education added. Altogether 20,000 copies of the *Handbook* were sold. p. 534

[152] For details of the strike at the Morozov mills see "Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers", V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 29-72. p. 535

[153] The work referred to is Stalin's *Marxism and the National Question*. p. 539

[154] *Struvism*—a variety of the bourgeois distortion of Marxism.

Struve, P. B.—Russian bourgeois liberal, exponent of legal Marxism in the nineties. He later became one of the leaders of the Cadet Party and after the October Revolution, as a white émigré was an inveterate enemy of the Soviet Union. p. 541

[155] Lenin here refers to Plekhanov's article "Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Party" published in *Zarya* No. 4, in August 1902.

Zarya (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the editors of *Iskra*. Four numbers

appeared in three issues. The Lenin writings published in *Zarya* were: "Casual Notes" (Vol. 4), "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (Vol. 5), the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (published under the title "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question" [ibid.]), "Review of Home Affairs" (ibid.) and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (Vol. 6). p. 544

[156] This refers to § 8 of the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted at the Second Congress of the Party. p. 549

[157] The article "The Marx-Engels Correspondence" here published was the beginning of an extensive article that Lenin planned at the time of the publication of the German four-volume edition of the Marx-Engels Correspondence in September 1913. Lenin made a deep study of the correspondence; the Institute of Marxism-Leninism has in its possession a thick notebook (76 pages) in which Lenin summarised the letters and copied extracts from them.

Lenin intended to publish "The Marx-Engels Correspondence" in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* in 1914, and an announcement to that effect was printed in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 7 on December 14, 1913; the article, however, remained unfinished and was first published in *Pravda* on November 28, 1920, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Engels's birth. On this occasion Lenin added a subtitle "Engels as One of the Founders of Communism" and provided a footnote to the title: "The beginning of an unfinished article written in 1913 or early 1914". p. 552

[158] Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, dritte Abteilung, Band 1, Marx-Engels Verlag GmbH, Berlin, 1929, S. 1 u. 20-21. p. 555

[159] Marx-Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 29-31. p. 555

[160] Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, dritte Abteilung, Band 1, Marx-Engels Verlag GmbH, Berlin, 1929, S. 3. p. 556

[161] Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, dritte Abteilung, Band 1, Marx-Engels Verlag GmbH, Berlin, 1929, S. 14. p. 556

[162] *Popular Socialists*—a legal petty-bourgeois party formed in 1906 by the separation of part of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The demands put forward by the party did not go beyond a constitutional monarchy. p. 556

[163] Engels an das Kommunistische Korrespondenz-Komitee in Brüssel, Paris, 1846, September 16. [Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, dritte Abteilung, Band 1, Marx-Engels Verlag GmbH, Berlin, 1929, S. 34.] p. 557

[164] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 35-36. p. 558

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*March-December 1913*)

March-April	Lenin lives in Cracow.
March 22 (*April 4*)	Lenin's "Big Achievement of the Chinese Republic" published in *Pravda* No. 68.
March 23 (*April 5*)	In a letter to *Pravda* editors Lenin indicates how the six Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth State Duma are to be supported in their struggle against the seven Mensheviks, gives instructions on the campaign to gain subscribers for *Pravda* and on expansion of the publication of illegal literature.
March 26 (*April 8*)	"Old Problems and the Senile Decay of Liberalism" published in *Pravda* No. 71.
Not earlier than March 26 (*April 8*)	Lenin writes "The 'Oil Hunger'" when the question of the oil syndicate is being debated in the Duma.
March 27 (*April 9*)	"The Cadet Assembly Bill" published as the leading article of *Pravda* No. 72.
March 29 (*April 11*)	"The Balkan War and Bourgeois Chauvinism" published in *Pravda* No. 74.
March-April	Lenin writes "Conversation".
April 5 (*18*)	Lenin lectures in Cracow on "Contemporary Russia and the Working-Class Movement"; a report of the lecture is published in the Polish newspaper *Naprzód* No. 92.
April 6 (*19*)	Issue No. 3 of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* devoted to Thirtieth Anniversary of the death of Karl Marx carries Lenin's "Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism".
April 11 (*24*)	"Who Stands to Gain?" published in *Pravda* No. 84.
April 12 (*25*)	"In Britain" published in *Pravda* No. 85.

April 12 (25)-June 2 (15)	Series of articles under the general heading "Controversial Issues" published in *Pravda* Nos. 85, 95, 110, 122, 124 and 126.
April 13 (26)	Lenin lectures in Leipzig on "Social Revival in Russia and the Tasks of the Social-Democrats".
April (later than 13 (26)	Lenin writes an article in which he criticises Potresov for his attacks on Plekhanov's anti-liquidationist position.
April 14 (27)	"Civilised Europeans and Savage Asians" published in *Pravda* No. 87.
April (earlier than 18 [May 1])	Lenin sends a draft speech on the national question to G. I . Petrovsky for him to read in the Duma.
	Lenin sends May Day leaflets to *Pravda*.
April 18 (May 1)	Lenin attends workers' May Day meeting in Cracow.
April 20 (May 3)	"Merchant Accountancy" published in *Pravda* No. 90.
April 21 (May 4)	Lenin sends a letter to Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth State Duma asking for new bills and Duma reference material.
	"A Great Technical Achievement" published in *Pravda* No. 91.
April 23 (May 6)	"A Few Words on Results and Facts" published in the special issue of *Pravda* (No. 92), devoted to the paper's first anniversary.
April 23-24 (May 6-7)	Lenin and Krupskaya move for the summer to the village of Poronin (near Cracow).
Not earlier than April 26 (May 9)	In a letter to Maxim Gorky, Lenin asks him to write an article or story for the May issue of *Prosveshcheniye*.
April 27 and May 1 (May 10 and 14)	"Significance of the Resettlement Scheme" published in *Pravda* Nos. 96 and 99.
April 29 (May 12)	Following the victory of the Bolsheviks at the elections to the Executive of the Metalworkers' Union, Lenin writes letter to *Pravda* concerning

	the consolidation of the Union in the struggle against liquidationism and on aid for the periodical *Metallist*.
May 4 (17)	Issue No. 4 of *Prosveshcheniye* is published carrying Lenin's "*Vekhi* Contributors and Nationalism".
	"The Liberals and Freedom for the Unions" appears as the leading article of *Pravda* No. 101.
May 5 (18)	*Pravda* No. 102 carries two of Lenin's articles—"For the Attention of *Luch* and *Pravda* Readers" and "Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Death of Joseph Dietzgen".
May 7 (20)	*Pravda* No. 103 carries two of Lenin's articles—"The Bourgeoisie and Peace" (leading article) and "The Awakening of Asia".
May 8 (21)	*Pravda* No. 104 carries the article "Separatists in Russia and Separatists in Austria".
May 9 (22)	"The Resettlement Scheme Again" published in *Pravda* No. 105.
Not later than May 10 (23)	Lenin sends draft speech to St. Petersburg to be read in State Duma by Bolshevik deputy during 1913 budget discussion.
May 10 (23)	"The Working Class and the National Question" published as the leading article of *Pravda* No. 106.
May (not earlier than 13 [26]) and June 3 (16)	In letters to *Pravda* editors Lenin congratulates staff on improvements in paper and gives practical advice on how "to obtain hundred-thousand circulation"; he demands correction of mistakes made.
May 14 (27)	"British Socialist Party Conference" published in *Pravda* No. 109.
May 16 (29)	"Is the Condition of the Peasants Improving or Worsening?" published in *Pravda* No. 111.
May 18 (31)	"Backward Europe and Advanced Asia" published in *Pravda* No. 113.
May 19 (June 1)	"A Discreditable Role!" published in *Pravda* No. 114.

May 21 (June 3)	*Pravda* No. 115 publishes the articles—"The Land Question Settled—Landowner Fashion" (leading article), "Armaments and Capitalism" and the note "Helplessness and Confusion".
May (before 25 [June 7])	Lenin writes the Draft Platform for the Fourth Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area. The Draft Platform was published separately in Lettish in November 1913 as a reprint from *Biletens* No. 8 (issued by the Bureau of Groups of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area Abroad) and in *Biletens* No. 9-10.
May-June	Lenin takes charge of the organisation and enrolment to the Party school at Poronin; draws up the curriculum; writes to Plekhanov and Gorky inviting them to lecture at the school and arrange talks with students.
	"Factory Owners on Workers' Strikes" published in *Pravda* Nos. 123, 126, 127 and 131 dated May 30, June 2, 5 and 9.
Beginning of June	Lenin writes "An Incorrect Appraisal (*Luch* on Maklakov)".
June 1 (14)	"Frank Speeches by a Liberal" published in *Pravda* No. 125.
Not later than June 2 (15)	Lenin writes draft speech for Duma Deputy A. E. Badayev "The Question of Ministry of Education Policy".
June 3 (16)	Lenin writes letter to M. S. Olminsky (Vitimsky) and a second letter to *Pravda* editors on "The Question of Mr. Bogdanov and the *Vperyod* Group"; sends note for *Pravda* against Bogdanov.
June 5 (18)	"Has *Pravda* Given Proof of Bundist Separatism?" published in *Pravda* No. 127.
June 6 (19)	"Liberals as Defenders of the Fourth Duma" published as the leading article of *Pravda* No. 128.
Not later than June 7 (20)	Lenin writes draft speech for Duma Deputy N. R. Shagov "The Question of the (General) Agrarian Policy of the Present Government".
June 7 (20)	"Capitalism and Taxation" published in *Pravda* No. 129.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

June 8 (21)	Issue No. 5 of *Prosveshcheniye* publishes "Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle".
	"Economic Strikes in 1912 and in 1905" published in *Pravda* No. 130.
June 9 (22)	"The Growth of Capitalist Wealth" published in *Pravda* No. 131.
June 9-11 (22-24)	Lenin takes N. K. Krupskaya to Berne for her to obtain medical treatment on the way from Poronin to Berne they visit Vienna.
June 11 (24)	"The Peasantry and the Working Class" published in *Pravda* No. 132.
June 12 (25)	The articles "Child Labour in Peasant Farming" and "The Results of Strikes in 1912 as Compared with Those of the Past" published in *Pravda* No. 133.
June 13 (26)	"In Australia" published in *Pravda* No. 134.
June 15 (28)	*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 31 carries Lenin's "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat" as leading article and also "Notes of a Publicist".
	"Apropos of One Untruth. Letter to the Editors" published in *Pravda* No. 136.
June 16 (29)	"The Working Class and Neomalthusianism" published in *Pravda* No. 137.
June 17 (30)	In a letter addressed to N. I. Podvoisky in St. Petersburg, Lenin outlines for the Bolshevik Duma deputies their tactics in respect of the Menshevik deputies (in connection with the preparation of the Duma group's report on its activities).
June 20 (July 3)	"Liberal Appeals to Support the Fourth Duma" published in *Pravda* No. 139.
June 23 (July 6)	"Bourgeois Financial Magnates and Politicians" published in *Pravda* No. 142.
June, before 26 (before July 9)	Lenin compiles his "Theses on the National Question" and a plan for a lecture on the subject.
June 26 (July 9)	The St. Petersburg court passes a decision on the destruction of Lenin's pamphlet: "*When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool....* (From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist)", St. Petersburg, 1907.

	Lenin delivers a lecture on the national question in Zurich and takes notes of the discussion.
June 27 (*July 10*)	Lenin lectures in Geneva on "Social-Democracy and the National Question" and takes notes of the discussion.
June 28 (*July 11*)	Lenin lectures in Lausanne on the national question.
June 30 (*July 13*)	Lenin lectures in Berne on the national question and takes notes of the discussion.
Beginning of July	Lenin writes "Instructive Speeches".
July 2 (*15*)	*Pravda* No. 149 publishes "Pictures from Life".
July 5 (*18*)	*Pravda* No. 151 publishes "The Adjourned Duma and the Embarrassed Liberals" as the leading article. Beginning with this issue *Pravda* is suppressed by the tsarist government.
July 12 (*25*)	On the suppression of *Pravda*, Lenin writes to Maxim Gorky suggesting a meeting between them on Lenin's return journey from Berne to Poronin to discuss the possibility of Gorky's helping restart the publication of a Bolshevik newspaper.
July 13 (*26*)	"Fifth International Congress Against Prostitution" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 1.
July 16 (*29*)	The articles "Word and Deed" (leading article), "Cadets on the Question of the Ukraine" "Fresh Data on German Political Parties", and "Exposure of the British Opportunists" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 3.
July 17 (*30*)	"The Ideas of an Advanced Capitalist" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 4.
July 18 (*31*)	"What Can Be Done for Public Education" and "Petty Production in Agriculture" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 5.
July 21 (*August 3*)	"A 'Fashionable' Branch of Industry" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 8.

Lenin reports on "The State of Affairs in the Party" at the Second Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad in Berne.

July 22-24 (*August 4-6*) — Lenin and Krupskaya return to Poronin from Berne.

July 24 (*August 6*) — "Dead Liquidationism and the Living *Rech*" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 10.

July 26 (*August 8*) — "Mobilisation of Allotment Lands" published in *Rabochaya Pravda* No. 12.

July 27 (*August 9*) — Lenin guides the conference in Poronin of members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which discussed the situation in the Party and current tasks, the Duma Social-Democratic group, the Party school and the Party press, in particular the question of publishing a Bolshevik newspaper in Moscow.

Lenin participates in a conference of Central Committee members on the question of co-opting new members to the Central Committee and the selection of "representatives" or "agents" of the Central Committee.

August 3 (*16*) — "How Can Per Capita Consumption in Russia Be Increased?" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 3.

August 4 (*17*) — Lenin's condolences on the occasion of the death of August Bebel, sent in the name of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., published in the German newspaper *Vorwärts* No. 211.

August 8 (*21*) — Lenin's article "August Bebel" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 6.

August 11 (*24*) — "The Separation of Liberalism from Democracy" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 9 as the leading article.

In a letter addressed to S. G. Shahumyan Lenin asks for material on the national question and statistics on the Caucasian nationalities.

August 18 (*31*) — "A Fine Business!" and "The Nationalisation of Jewish Schools" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 14.

August 21 (September 3)	The St. Petersburg court passes a decision on the destruction of Lenin's pamphlet: "Martov's and Cherevanin's Pronouncements in the Bourgeois Press", St. Petersburg, 1906.
	"Iron on Peasant Farms" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 16.
August 24-October 25 (September 6-November 7)	"Metalworkers' Strikes in 1912" published in the journal *Metallist* Nos. 7, 8, and 10.
August 27 and 28 (September 9 and 10)	"The Russian Bourgeoisie and Russian Reformism" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 21 and *Nash Put* No. 3.
August 28 and 29 (September 10 and 11)	"The Role of Social Estates and Classes in the Liberation Movement" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 22 and *Nash Put* No. 4.
August 29 and 30 (September 11 and 12)	"Class War in Dublin" and "New Land 'Reform' Measures" published in *Severnaya Pravda* Nos. 23 and 24 and *Nash Put* Nos. 4 and 5.
September 1 (11)	Lenin instructs a representative of the Priboi publishers on arranging the publication of legal Party literature and a journal on questions of insurance; he also conferred with a representative of *Prosveshcheniye* on the further work of that journal.
	"The Merchant Salazkin and the Writer F. D." published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 26.
September 3 (16)	"The Struggle for Marxism" and "A Week After the Dublin Massacre" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 27; the latter article also appeared in *Nash Put* No. 8.
September 4 (17)	"Questions of Principle in Politics" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 28 and *Nash Put* No. 9.
September 5 and 7 (18 and 20)	"Liberals and Democrats on the Language Question" published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 29 and *Nash Put* No. 12.
September 6 (19)	The St. Petersburg court passes a decision on the destruction of Lenin's pamphlet: "The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections", St. Petersburg, 1907.

September 8 and 10 (21 and 23)	"The Language of Figures" published in *Nash Put* Nos. 13 and 14.
September 11, 12 and 14 (24 25 and 27)	"Bourgeois Gentlemen on 'Family' Farming" and "Harry Quelch" published in *Nash Put* Nos. 15 and 16, and *Pravda Truda* Nos. 1 and 4.
September 12 (25)	"Marxism and Reformism" published in *Pravda Truda* No. 2.
September 13 (26)	"The Land Question and the Rural Poor", "How Does Bishop Nikon Defend the Ukrainians?", "Notes of a Publicist" published in *Pravda Truda* No. 3.
September 17 (30)	"Civilised Barbarism" published in *Pravda Truda* No. 6.
September 23-October 1 (October 6-14)	Lenin directs the work of the "summer" or "August" Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party officials at Poronin; writes and edits the draft resolutions adopted by the Conference.
September 23-24 (October 6-7)	Lenin conducts a private meeting with the Bolshevik Duma deputies on questions of work in the Duma.
September 25-October 1 (October 8-14)	Lenin takes the chair at the Poronin Conference; delivers reports on the work of the Central Committee, the national question and the International Socialist Congress; takes part in the discussion on a number of questions.
October 1 (14)	Lenin guides a meeting of the Central Committee which discusses practical steps to be taken by the Bolshevik Duma deputies in respect of the Menshevik deputies.
September 26 (October 9)	"The Black Hundreds" (leading article) and "Russian Government and Russian Reforms" published in *Pravda Truda* No. 14.
September 29 (October 12)	Issue No. 9 of *Prosveshcheniye* carries Lenin's "How Vera Zasulich Demolishes Liquidationism".
October 1 (14)	"There's a Trudovik for You" published in *Pravda Truda* No. 18.

October 4 (17)	"Bewildered Non-Party People" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 3.
October 7 (20)	Lenin and Krupskaya return to Cracow from Poronin.
October 12 (25)	"The Liberals and the Land Problem in Britain" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 8.
October 17 (30)	"A Weak Defence of a Weak Case" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 12.
October 18 (31)	*Za Pravdu* No. 13 publishes the declaration, written by Lenin, which the Bolshevik deputies presented to the Menshevik Duma deputies.
October, not earlier than 20 (November 2)	In a letter to the *Za Pravdu* editors, Lenin tells the Bolshevik Duma deputies how they should act in the event of the Menshevik "seven" announcing that they are the Social-Democratic group in the State Duma.
October 25 (November 7)	"The Duma 'Seven'" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 19.
October 26 (November 8)	"The Liberal Bourgeoisie and the Liquidators" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 20.
October, before 27 (November 9)	Lenin instructs the *Za Pravdu* editors to organise a newspaper campaign in support of the Bolshevik "six".
October 29 (November 11)	"Capitalism and Workers' Immigration" and "Material on the Conflict Within the Social-Democratic Duma Group" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 22.
October 30 (November 12)	"A Cadet Property-Owner Argues 'According to Marx'" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 23.
End of October	In a letter to the *Za Pravdu* editors Lenin offers his congratulations on the victory over the disorganisers of the Party, the Menshevik "seven" and on the formation of the Social-Democratic workers' group in the Duma.
October-December	Lenin writes his "Critical Remarks on the National Question" published in Nos. 10, 11 and 12 of *Prosveshcheniye*.

Beginning of November	Lenin writes to Gorky criticising his justification of god-building.
	Lenin writes: "The Working-Class Masses and the Working-Class Intelligentsia" and "The Split in the Russian Social-Democratic Duma Group", the latter published in the German newspaper *Leipziger Volkszeitung* No. 298.
November 13 (26)	"The Left Narodniks on the Controversies Among the Marxists" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 34.
November 15 (28)	"The Agrarian Question and the Present Situation in Russia", "Two Methods of Controversy and Struggle", and "Would-Be 'Uniters'" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 36.
Middle of Novvember	In a letter to Maxim Gorky Lenin exposes the reactionary nature of god-building and criticises Gorky's views on that subject.
November 23 (December 6)	Lenin writes to S. G. Shahumyan on the national question.
November 28 (December 11)	"'Cultural-National' Autonomy" and "Coteries Abroad and Russian Liquidators" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 46.
November 29 (December 12)	Lenin sends "Notes for a Report to Local Branches" to St. Petersburg; they dealt with the Poronin (Summer) Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials.
	"The Cadet Maklakov and the Social-Democrat Petrovsky", and "Zabern" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 47.
December 2 (15)	Lenin writes to the *Za Pravdu* editors on "The Question of Bureau Decisions".
December 3 (16)	"Working-Class Unity" published in *Za Pravdu* No. 50.
December 7 (20)	"A Stubborn Defence of a Bad Case" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 1.
December 11 (24)	"The Cadets and 'The Right of Nations to Self-Determination'" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 4.

December 13 (*26*)	"A Good Resolution and a Bad Speech" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 6.
December 14 (*27*)	"The Nationality of Pupils in Russian Schools" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 7.
	The pocket calendar *Worker's Handbook for 1914* published with Lenin's article "Strikes in Russia".
December 15 (*28*)	"The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P." published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 32.
	"Kautsky's Unpardonable Error" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 8.
December 17 (*30*)	"Once More on the Segregation of the Schools According to Nationality" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 9.
December 18 (*31*)	Lenin's note on "Mr. Gorsky and a Certain Latin Proverb" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 10.
End of the year	Lenin studies the four-volume edition of the Marx-Engels correspondence in German; makes notes, and copies extracts from the letters.
	Begins his article "The Marx-Engels Correspondence".

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 19

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

20

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 20 contains the works of V. I. Lenin written between December 1913 and August 1914, with the exception of the article "Critical Remarks on the National Question", which was written somewhat earlier and published serially in October to December 1913.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to the Bolsheviks' struggle against opportunism in the Russian and international labour movement: against the liquidators, the Trotskyists, the *Vperyod* group, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the opportunists of the Second International. Among these are the articles: "The Break-up of the 'August' Bloc", "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity", "Narodism and Liquidationism as Disintegrating Elements in the Working-Class Movement". "The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement", "The Vperyodists and the *Vperyod* Group", Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference and Instructions to the C.C. Delegation, "A Fool's Haste Is No Speed", "Comment on Kautsky's Letter".

The Bolshevik programme on the national question is elaborated in the articles "Critical Remarks on the National Question" and "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination".

A conspicuous place in the volume is occupied by articles on the agrarian question, among them "The Peasantry and Hired Labour", "Serf Economy in the Rural Areas" and "The Agrarian Question in Russia".

Articles published for the first time in Lenin's *Collected Works* are "The Liquidators and the Decisions of the Lettish Marxists", "Reply to the Article in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*". In these articles Lenin denounces the liquidators'

attempts to distort Party decisions and conceal objective data concerning monetary contributions to the Marxist and liquidationist newspapers. Other articles included for the first time in the *Collected Works* are: "Bill on the Equality of Nations and the Safeguarding of the Rights of National Minorities", and "The Polish Social-Democratic Opposition at the Parting of the Ways". These were published previously in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*.

The Instructions to the Central Committee Delegation to the Brussels-Conference have been supplemented by a new letter of Lenin's.

In previous editions of the *Collected Works* the draft speech on "The Estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture" was published from the manuscript, four pages of which were missing. In the present edition the missing pages, which were found in 1941, have been restored.



V. I. Lenin
1914

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION[1]

Written in October-December 1913

Published in 1913 in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 10, 11, and 12
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the journal text

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It is obvious that the national question has now become prominent among the problems of Russian public life. The aggressive nationalism of the reactionaries, the transition of counter-revolutionary bourgeois liberalism to nationalism (particularly Great-Russian, but also Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, etc.), and lastly, the increase of nationalist vacillations among the different "national" (i.e., non-Great-Russian) Social-Democrats, who have gone to the length of violating the Party Programme—all these make it incumbent on us to give more attention to the national question than we have done so far.

This article pursues a special object, namely, to examine, in their general bearing, precisely these programme vacillations of Marxists and would-be Marxists, on the national question. In *Severnaya Pravda*[2] No. 29 (for September 5, 1913, "Liberals and Democrats on the Language Question"*) I had occasion to speak of the opportunism of the liberals on the national question; this article of mine was attacked by the opportunist Jewish newspaper *Zeit*,[3] in an article by Mr. F. Liebman. From the other side, the programme of the Russian Marxists on the national question had been criticised by the Ukrainian opportunist Mr. Lev Yurkevich (*Dzvin*,[4] 1913, Nos. 7-8). Both these writers touched upon so many questions that to reply to them we are obliged to deal with the most diverse aspects of the subject. I think the most convenient thing would be to start with a reprint of the article from *Severnaya Pravda*.

---

* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 354-57.—*Ed.*

1. LIBERALS AND DEMOCRATS ON THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

On several occasions the newspapers have mentioned the report of the Governor of the Caucasus, a report that is noteworthy, not for its Black-Hundred[5] spirit, but for its timid "liberalism". Among other things, the Governor objects to artificial Russification of non-Russian nationalities. Representatives of non-Russian nationalities in the Caucasus are *themselves* striving to teach their children Russian; an example of this is the Armenian church schools, in which the teaching of Russian is not obligatory.

Russkoye Slovo[6] (No. 198), one of the most widely circulating liberal newspapers in Russia, points to this fact and draws the correct conclusion that the hostility towards the Russian language in Russia "stems exclusively from" the "artificial" (it should have said "forced") implanting of that language.

"There is no reason to worry about the fate of the Russian language. It will itself win recognition throughout Russia," says the newspaper. This is perfectly true, because the requirements of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities living in one state (as long as they wish to live together) to study the language of the majority. The more democratic the political system in Russia becomes, the more powerfully, rapidly and extensively capitalism will develop, the more urgently will the requirements of economic exchange impel various nationalities to study the language most convenient for general commercial relations.

The liberal newspaper, however, hastens to slap itself in the face and demonstrate its liberal inconsistency.

> "Even those who oppose Russification," it says, "would hardly be likely to deny that in a country as huge as Russia there must be one single official language, and that this language can be only Russian."

Logic turned inside out! Tiny Switzerland has not lost anything, but has gained from having not *one single* official language, but three—German, French and Italian. In Switzerland 70 per cent of the population are Germans (in Russia 43 per cent are Great Russians), 22 per cent French (in Russia 17 per cent are Ukrainians) and 7 per cent Italians (in Russia 6 per cent are Poles and 4.5 per cent Byelorus-

sians). If Italians in Switzerland often speak French in their common parliament they do not do so because they are menaced by some savage police law (there are none such in Switzerland), but because the civilised citizens of a democratic state themselves prefer a language that is understood by a majority. The French language does not instil hatred in Italians because it is the language of a free civilised nation, a language that is not imposed by disgusting police measures.

Why should "huge" Russia, a much more varied and terribly backward country, *inhibit* her development by the retention of any kind of privilege for any one language? Should not the contrary be true, liberal gentlemen? Should not Russia, if she wants to overtake Europe, put an end to every kind of privilege as quickly as possible, as completely as possible and as vigorously as possible?

If all privileges disappear, if the imposition of any one language ceases, all Slavs will easily and rapidly learn to understand each other and will not be frightened by the "horrible" thought that speeches in different languages will be heard in the common parliament. The requirements of economic exchange will themselves *decide* which language of the given country it is to the *advantage* of the majority to know in the interests of commercial relations. This decision will be all the firmer because it is adopted voluntarily by a population of various nationalities, and its adoption will be the more rapid and extensive the more consistent the democracy and, as a consequence of it, the more rapid the development of capitalism.

The liberals approach the language question in the same way as they approach all political questions—like hypocritical hucksters, holding out one hand (openly) to democracy and the other (behind their backs) to the feudalists and police. We are against privileges, shout the liberals, and under cover they haggle with the feudalists for first one, then another, privilege.

Such is the nature of *all* liberal-bourgeois nationalism—not only Great-Russian (it is the worst of them all because of its violent character and its kinship with the Purishkeviches[7]), but Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Georgian and every other nationalism. Under the slogan of "national culture"

the bourgeoisie of *all* nations, both in Austria and in Russia, are *in fact* pursuing the policy of splitting the workers, emasculating democracy and haggling with the feudalists over the sale of the people's rights and the people's liberty.

The slogan of working-class democracy is not "national culture" but the international culture of democracy and the world-wide working-class movement. Let the bourgeoisie deceive the people with various "positive" national programmes. The class-conscious worker will answer the bourgeoisie—there is only one solution to the national problem (insofar as it can, in general, be solved in the capitalist world, the world of profit, squabbling and exploitation), and that solution is consistent democracy.

The proof—Switzerland in Western Europe, a country with an old culture and Finland in Eastern Europe, a country with a young culture.

The national programme of working-class democracy is: absolutely no privileges for any one nation or any one language; the solution of the problem of the political self-determination of nations, that is, their separation as states by completely free, democratic methods; the promulgation of a law for the whole state by virtue of which any measure (rural, urban or communal, etc., etc.) introducing any privilege of any kind for one of the nations and militating against the equality of nations or the rights of a national minority, shall be declared illegal and ineffective, and any citizen of the state shall have the right to demand that such a measure be annulled as unconstitutional, and that those who attempt to put it into effect be punished.

Working-class democracy contraposes to the nationalist wrangling of the various bourgeois parties over questions of language, etc., the demand for the unconditional unity and complete amalgamation of workers of *all* nationalities in *all* working-class organisations—trade union, co-operative, consumers', educational and all others—in contradistinction to any kind of bourgeois nationalism. Only this type of unity and amalgamation can uphold democracy and defend the interests of the workers against capital—which is already international and is becoming more so—and promote the development of mankind towards a new way of life that is alien to all privileges and all exploitation.

2. "NATIONAL CULTURE"

As the reader will see, the article in *Severnaya Pravda*, made use of a particular example, i.e., the problem of the official language to illustrate the inconsistency and opportunism of the liberal bourgeoisie, which, in the national question, extends a hand to the feudalists and the police. Everybody will understand that, apart from the problem of an official language, the liberal bourgeoisie behaves just as treacherously, hypocritically and stupidly (even from the standpoint of the interests of liberalism) in a number of other related issues.

The conclusion to be drawn from this? It is that *all* liberal-bourgeois nationalism sows the greatest corruption among the workers and does immense harm to the cause of freedom and the proletarian class struggle. This bourgeois (and bourgeois-feudalist) tendency is all the more dangerous for its *being concealed* behind the slogan of "national culture". It is under the guise of national culture—Great Russian, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, and so forth—that the Black-Hundreds and the clericals, and also the bourgeoisie of *all* nations, are doing their dirty and reactionary work.

Such are the facts of the national life of today, if viewed from the Marxist angle, i.e., from the standpoint of the class struggle, and if the slogans are compared with the interests and policies of classes, and not with meaningless "general principles", declamations and phrases.

The slogan of national culture is a bourgeois (and often also a Black-Hundred and clerical) fraud. Our slogan is: the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movement.

Here the Bundist[8] Mr. Liebman rushes into the fray and annihilates me with the following deadly tirade:

"Anyone in the least familiar with the national question knows that international culture is not non-national culture (culture without a national form); non-national culture, which must not be Russian, Jewish, or Polish, but only pure culture, is nonsense, international ideas can appeal to the working class only when they are adapted to the language spoken by the worker, and to the concrete national conditions under which he lives; the worker should not be indifferent to the condition and development of his national culture, because

it is through it, and only through it, that he is able to participate in the 'international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movement'. This is well known, but V. I. turns a deaf ear to it all...."

Ponder over this typically Bundist argument, designed, if you please, to demolish the Marxist thesis that I advanced. With the air of supreme self-confidence of one who is "familiar with the national question", this Bundist passes off ordinary bourgeois views as "well-known" axioms.

It is true, my dear Bundist, that international culture is not non-national. Nobody said that it was. Nobody has proclaimed a "pure" culture, either Polish, Jewish, or Russian, etc., and your jumble of empty words is simply an attempt to distract the reader's attention and to obscure the issue with tinkling words.

The *elements* of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in *every* national culture, since in *every* nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But *every* nation also possesses a bourgeois culture (and most nations a reactionary and clerical culture as well) in the form, not merely of "elements", but of the *dominant* culture. Therefore, the general "national culture" is the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie. This fundamental and, for a Marxist, elementary truth, was kept in the background by the Bundist, who "drowned" it in his jumble of words, i.e., *instead of* revealing and clarifying the class gulf to the reader, he in fact obscured it. *In fact*, the Bundist acted like a bourgeois, whose every interest requires the spreading of a belief in a non-class national culture.

In advancing the slogan of "the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movement", we take *from each* national culture *only* its democratic and socialist elements; we take them *only* and *absolutely* in opposition to the bourgeois culture and the bourgeois nationalism of *each* nation. No democrat, and certainly no Marxist, denies that all languages should have equal status, or that it is necessary to polemise with one's "native" bourgeoisie in one's native language and to advocate anti-clerical or anti-bourgeois ideas among one's "native" peasantry and

petty bourgeoisie. That goes without saying, but the Bundist uses these indisputable truths to obscure the point in dispute, i.e., the real issue.

The question is whether it is permissible for a Marxist, directly or indirectly, to advance the slogan of national culture, or whether he should *oppose* it by advocating, in all languages, the slogan of workers' *internationalism* while "adapting" himself to all local and national features.

The significance of the "national culture" slogan is not determined by some petty intellectual's promise, or good intention, to "interpret" it as "meaning the development through it of an international culture". It would be puerile subjectivism to look at it in that way. The significance of the slogan of national culture is determined by the objective alignment of all classes in a given country, and in all countries of the world. The national culture of the bourgeoisie is a *fact* (and, I repeat, the bourgeoisie everywhere enters into deals with the landed proprietors and the clergy). Aggressive bourgeois nationalism, which drugs the minds of the workers, stultifies and disunites them in order that the bourgeoisie may lead them by the halter—such is the fundamental fact of the times.

Those who seek to serve the proletariat must unite the workers of all nations, and unswervingly fight bourgeois nationalism, *domestic* and foreign. The place of those who advocate the slogan of national culture is among the nationalist petty bourgeois, not among the Marxists.

Take a concrete example. Can a Great-Russian Marxist accept the slogan of national, Great-Russian, culture? No, he cannot. Anyone who does that should stand in the ranks of the nationalists, not of the Marxists. Our task is to fight the dominant, Black-Hundred and bourgeois national culture of the Great Russians, and to develop, exclusively in the internationalist spirit and in the closest alliance with the workers of other countries, the rudiments also existing in the history of our democratic and working-class movement. Fight your own Great-Russian landlords and bourgeoisie, fight their "culture" in the name of internationalism, and, in so fighting, "adapt" yourself to the special features of the Purishkeviches and Struves—that is your

task, not preaching or tolerating the slogan of national culture.

The same applies to the most oppressed and persecuted nation—the Jews. Jewish national culture is the slogan of the rabbis and the bourgeoisie, the slogan of our enemies. But there are other elements in Jewish culture and in Jewish history as a whole. Of the ten and a half million Jews in the world, somewhat over a half live in Galicia and Russia, backward and semi-barbarous countries, where the Jews are *forcibly* kept in the status of a caste. The other half lives in the civilised world, and there the Jews do not live as a segregated caste. There the great world-progressive features of Jewish culture stand clearly revealed: its internationalism, its identification with the advanced movements of the epoch (the percentage of Jews in the democratic and proletarian movements is everywhere higher than the percentage of Jews among the population).

Whoever, directly or indirectly, puts forward the slogan of Jewish "national culture" is (whatever his good intentions may be) an enemy of the proletariat, a supporter of all that is *outmoded* and connected with *caste* among the Jewish people; he is an accomplice of the rabbis and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, those Jewish Marxists who mingle with the Russian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and other workers in international Marxist organisations, and make their contribution (both in Russian and in Yiddish) towards creating the international culture of the working-class movement—those Jews, despite the separatism of the Bund, uphold the best traditions of Jewry by fighting the slogan of "national culture".

Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism—these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the *two* policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question. In advocating the slogan of national culture and building up on it an entire plan and practical programme of what they call "cultural-national autonomy", the Bundists are *in effect* instruments of bourgeois nationalism among the workers.

3. THE NATIONALIST BOGEY OF "ASSIMILATION"

The question of assimilation, i.e., of the shedding of national features, and absorption by another nation, strikingly illustrates the consequences of the nationalist vacillations of the Bundists and their fellow-thinkers.

Mr. Liebman, who faithfully conveys and repeats the stock arguments, or rather, tricks, of the Bundists, has qualified as "the *old assimilation story*" the demand for the unity and amalgamation of the workers of all nationalities in a given country in united workers' organisations (see the concluding part of the article in *Severnaya Pravda*).

"Consequently," says Mr. F. Liebman, commenting on the concluding part of the article in *Severnaya Pravda*, "if asked what nationality he belongs to, the worker must answer: I am a Social-Democrat."

Our Bundist considers this the acme of wit. As a matter of fact, he gives himself away completely by *such* witticisms and outcries about "assimilation", *levelled against* a consistently democratic and *Marxist* slogan.

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.

Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the latter characterises a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society. The Marxists' national programme takes both tendencies into account, and advocates, firstly, the equality of nations and languages and the impermissibility of all *privileges* in this respect (and also the right of nations to self-determination, with which we shall deal separately later); secondly, the principle of internationalism and uncompromising struggle against contamination of the proletariat with bourgeois nationalism, even of the most refined kind.

The question arises: what does our Bundist mean when he cries out to heaven against "assimilation"? He *could not* have meant the oppression of nations, or the *privileges* enjoyed by a particular nation, because the word "assimilation" here does not fit at all, because all Marxists, individually, and as an official, united whole, have quite definitely and unambiguously condemned the slightest violence against and oppression and inequality of nations, and finally because this general Marxist idea, which the Bundist has attacked, is expressed in the *Severnaya Pravda* article in the most emphatic manner.

No, evasion is impossible here. In condemning "assimilation" Mr. Liebman had in mind, *not* violence, *not* inequality, and *not* privileges. Is there anything real left in the concept of assimilation, after all violence and all inequality have been eliminated?

Yes, there undoubtedly is. What is left is capitalism's world-historical tendency to break down national barriers, obliterate national distinctions, and to *assimilate* nations—a tendency which manifests itself more and more powerfully with every passing decade, and is one of the greatest driving forces transforming capitalism into socialism.

Whoever does not recognise and champion the equality of nations and languages, and does not fight against all national oppression or inequality, is not a Marxist; he is not even a democrat. That is beyond doubt. But it is also beyond doubt that the pseudo-Marxist who heaps abuse upon a Marxist of another nation for being an "assimilator" is simply a *nationalist philistine*. In this unhandsome category of people are all the Bundists and (as we shall shortly see) Ukrainian nationalist-socialists such as L. Yurkevich, Dontsov and Co.

To show concretely how reactionary the views held by these nationalist philistines are, we shall cite facts of three kinds.

It is the Jewish nationalists in Russia in general, and the Bundists in particular, who vociferate most about Russian orthodox Marxists being "assimilators". And yet, as the afore-mentioned figures show, out of the ten and a half million Jews all over the world, *about half* that number live in the *civilised* world, where conditions favouring

"assimilation" are *strongest*, whereas the unhappy, downtrodden, disfranchised Jews in Russia and Galicia, who are crushed under the heel of the Purishkeviches (Russian and Polish), live where conditions for "assimilation" *least* prevail, where there is most segregation, and even a "Pale of Settlement",[9] a *numerus clausus*[10] and other charming features of the Purishkevich regime.

The Jews in the civilised world are not a nation, they have in the main become assimilated, say Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer. The Jews in Galicia and in Russia are not a nation; unfortunately (through *no* fault of their own but through that of the Purishkeviches), they are still a *caste* here. Such is the incontrovertible judgement of people who are undoubtedly familiar with the history of Jewry and take the above-cited facts into consideration.

What do these facts prove? It is that only Jewish reactionary philistines, who want to turn back the wheel of history, and make it proceed, not from the conditions prevailing in Russia and Galicia to those prevailing in Paris and New York, but in the reverse direction—only they can clamour against "assimilation".

The best Jews, those who are celebrated in world history, and have given the world foremost leaders of democracy and socialism, have never clamoured against assimilation. It is only those who contemplate the "rear aspect" of Jewry with reverential awe that clamour against assimilation.

A rough idea of the scale which the general process of assimilation of nations is assuming under the present conditions of advanced capitalism may be obtained, for example, from the immigration statistics of the United States of America. During the decade between 1891-1900, Europe sent 3,700,000 people there, and during the nine years between 1901 and 1909, 7,200,000. The 1900 census in the United States recorded over 10,000,000 foreigners. New York State, in which, according to the same census; there were over 78,000 Austrians, 136,000 Englishmen, 20,000 Frenchmen, 480,000 Germans, 37,000 Hungarians, 425,000 Irish 182,000 Italians, 70,000 Poles, 166,000 people from Russia (mostly Jews), 43,000 Swedes, etc., grinds down national distinctions. And what is taking place on a grand,

international scale in New York is also to be seen in *every* big city and industrial township.

No one unobsessed by nationalist prejudices can fail to perceive that this process of assimilation of nations by capitalism means the greatest historical progress, the breakdown of hidebound national conservatism in the various backwoods, especially in backward countries like Russia.

Take Russia and the attitude of Great Russians towards the Ukrainians. Naturally, every democrat, not to mention Marxists, will strongly oppose the incredible humiliation of Ukrainians, and demand complete equality for them. But it would be a downright betrayal of socialism and a silly policy *even* from the standpoint of the bourgeois "national aims" of the Ukrainians to *weaken* the ties and the alliance between the Ukrainian and Great-Russian proletariat that now exist within the confines of a single state.

Mr. Lev Yurkevich, who calls himself a "Marxist" (poor Marx!), is an example of that silly policy. In 1906, Sokolovsky (Basok) and Lukashevich (Tuchapsky) asserted, Mr. Yurkevich writes, that the Ukrainian proletariat had become completely Russified and needed no separate organisation. Without quoting a single fact *bearing on the direct issue*, Mr. Yurkevich falls upon both for saying this and cries out hysterically—quite in the spirit of the basest, most stupid and most reactionary nationalism—that this is "national passivity", "national renunciation", that these men have "split [!!] the Ukrainian Marxists", and so forth. Today, despite the "growth of Ukrainian national consciousness among the workers", the *minority* of the workers are "nationally conscious", while the majority, Mr. Yurkevich assures us, "are still under the influence of Russian culture". And it is our duty, this nationalist philistine exclaims, "not to follow the masses, but to lead them, to explain to them their national aims (*natsionalna sprava*)" (*Dzvin*, p. 89).

This argument of Mr. Yurkevich's is wholly bourgeois-nationalistic. But even from the point of view of the bourgeois nationalists, some of whom stand for complete equality and autonomy for the Ukraine, while others stand for an independent Ukrainian state, this argument will not wash. The Ukrainians' striving for liberation is opposed by the

Great-Russian and Polish landlord class and by the bourgeoisie of these two nations. What social force is capable of standing up to these classes? The first decade of the twentieth century provided an actual reply to this question: that force is none other than the working class, which rallies the democratic peasantry behind it. By striving to divide, and thereby weaken, the genuinely democratic force, whose victory would make national oppression impossible, Mr. Yurkevich is betraying, not only the interests of democracy in general, but also the interests of his own country, the Ukraine. Given united action by the Great-Russian and Ukrainian proletarians, a free Ukraine *is possible*; without such unity, it is out of the question.

But Marxists do not confine themselves to the bourgeois-national standpoint. For several decades a well-defined process of accelerated economic development has been going on in the South, i.e., the Ukraine, attracting hundreds of thousands of peasants and workers from Great Russia to the capitalist farms, mines, and cities. The "assimilation"—within these limits—of the Great-Russian and Ukrainian proletariat is an indisputable fact. *And this* fact is *undoubtedly* progressive. Capitalism is replacing the ignorant, conservative, settled muzhik of the Great-Russian or Ukrainian backwoods with a mobile proletarian whose conditions of life break down specifically national narrow-mindedness, both Great-Russian and Ukrainian. Even if we assume that, in time, there will be a state frontier between Great Russia and the Ukraine, the historically progressive nature of the "assimilation" of the Great-Russian and Ukrainian workers will be as undoubted as the progressive nature of the grinding down of nations in America. The freer the Ukraine and Great Russia become, the *more extensive and more rapid* will be the development of capitalism, which will still more powerfully attract the workers, the working masses of *all* nations from all regions of the state and from all the neighbouring states (should Russia become a neighbouring state in relation to the Ukraine) to the cities, the mines, and the factories.

Mr. Lev Yurkevich acts like a real bourgeois, and a short-sighted, narrow-minded, obtuse bourgeois at that, i.e., like a philistine, when he dismisses the benefits to be

gained from the intercourse, amalgamation and assimilation of the *proletariat* of the two nations, for the sake of the momentary success of the Ukrainian national cause (*sprava*). The national cause comes first and the proletarian cause second, the bourgeois nationalists say, with the Yurkeviches, Dontsovs and similar would-be Marxists repeating it after them. The proletarian cause must come first, we say, because it not only protects the lasting and fundamental interests of labour and of humanity, but also those of democracy; and without democracy neither an autonomous nor an independent Ukraine is conceivable.

Another point to be noted in Mr. Yurkevich's argument, which is so extraordinarily rich in nationalist gems, is this: the minority of Ukrainian workers are nationally conscious, he says; "the majority are still under the influence of Russian culture" (*bilshist perebuvaye shche pid vplyvom rosiiskoi kultury*).

Contraposing Ukrainian culture as a whole to Great-Russian culture as a whole, when speaking of the proletariat, is a gross betrayal of the proletariat's interests for the benefit of bourgeois nationalism.

There are two nations in every modern nation—we say to all nationalist-socialists. There are two national cultures in every national culture. There is the Great-Russian culture of the Purishkeviches, Guchkovs and Struves—but there is also the Great-Russian culture typified in the names of Chernyshevsky and Plekhanov. There are *the same two* cultures in the Ukraine as there are in Germany, in France, in England, among the Jews, and so forth. If the majority of the Ukrainian workers are under the influence of Great-Russian culture, we also know definitely that the ideas of Great-Russian democracy and Social-Democracy operate parallel with the Great-Russian clerical and bourgeois culture. In fighting the latter kind of "culture", the Ukrainian *Marxist* will always bring the former into focus, and say to his workers: "We must snatch at, make use of, and develop to the utmost every opportunity for intercourse with the Great-Russian class-conscious workers, with their literature and with their range of ideas; the fundamental interests of *both* the Ukrainian and the Great-Russian working-class movements demand it."

If a Ukrainian Marxist allows himself to be swayed by his *quite legitimate and natural* hatred of the Great-Russian oppressors *to such a degree* that he transfers even a particle of this hatred, even if it be only estrangement, to the proletarian culture and proletarian cause of the Great-Russian workers, then such a Marxist will get bogged down in bourgeois nationalism. Similarly, the Great-Russian Marxists will be bogged down, not only in bourgeois, but also in Black-Hundred nationalism, if he loses sight, even for a moment, of the demand for complete equality for the Ukrainians, or of their *right* to form an independent state.

The Great-Russian and Ukrainian workers must work together, and, as long as they live in a single state, act in the closest organisational unity and concert, towards a common or international culture of the proletarian movement, displaying absolute tolerance in the question of the language in which propaganda is conducted, and in the purely local or purely national *details* of that propaganda. This is the imperative demand of Marxism. All advocacy of the segregation of the workers of one nation from those of another, all attacks upon Marxist "assimilation", or attempts, where the proletariat is concerned, to contrapose one national culture as a whole to another allegedly integral national culture, and so forth, is *bourgeois* nationalism, against which it is essential to wage a ruthless struggle.

4. "CULTURAL-NATIONAL AUTONOMY"

The question of the "national culture" slogan is of enormous importance to Marxists, not only because it determines the ideological content of all our propaganda and agitation on the national question, as distinct from bourgeois propaganda, but also because the entire programme of the much-discussed cultural-national autonomy is based on this slogan.

The main and fundamental law in this programme is that it aims at introducing the most refined, most absolute and most extreme nationalism. The gist of this programme is that every citizen registers as belonging to a particular nation, and every nation constitutes a legal entity with the right to impose compulsory taxation on its members,

with national parliaments (Diets) and national secretaries of state (ministers).

Such an idea, applied to the national question, resembles Proudhon's idea, as applied to capitalism. Not abolishing capitalism and its basis—commodity production—but *purging* that basis of abuses, of excrescences, and so forth; not abolishing exchange and exchange value, but, on the contrary, making it "constitutional", universal, absolute, "*fair*", and free of fluctuations, crises and abuses—such was Proudhon's idea.

Just as Proudhon was petty-bourgeois, and his theory converted exchange and commodity production into an absolute category and exalted them as the acme of perfection, so is the theory and programme of "cultural-national autonomy" petty bourgeois, for it converts bourgeois nationalism into an absolute category, exalts it as the acme of perfection, and purges it of violence, injustice, etc.

Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even of the "most just", "purest", most refined and civilised brand. In place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity, a unity that is growing before our eyes with every mile of railway line that is built, with every international trust, and every workers' association that is formed (an association that is international in its economic activities as well as in its ideas and aims).

The principle of nationality is historically inevitable in bourgeois society and, taking this society into due account, the Marxist fully recognises the historical legitimacy of national movements. But to prevent this recognition from becoming an apologia of nationalism, it must be strictly limited to what is progressive in such movements, in order that this recognition may not lead to bourgeois ideology obscuring proletarian consciousness.

The awakening of the masses from feudal lethargy, and their struggle against all national oppression, for the sovereignty of the people, of the nation, are progressive. Hence, it is the Marxist's *bounden* duty to stand for the most resolute and consistent democratism on all aspects of the national question. This task is largely a negative one. But this is the limit the proletariat can go to in supporting nationalism,

for beyond that begins the "positive" activity of the *bourgeoisie* striving to *fortify* nationalism.

To throw off the feudal yoke, all national oppression, and all privileges enjoyed by any particular nation or language, is the imperative duty of the proletariat as a democratic force, and is certainly in the interests of the proletarian class struggle, which is obscured and retarded by bickering on the national question. But to go *beyond* these strictly limited and definite historical limits in helping bourgeois nationalism means betraying the proletariat and siding with the bourgeoisie. There is a border-line here, which is often very slight and which the Bundists and Ukrainian nationalist-socialists completely lose sight of.

Combat all national oppression? Yes, of course! Fight *for* any kind of national development, *for* "national culture" in general?—Of course not. The economic development of capitalist society presents us with examples of immature national movements all over the world, examples of the formation of big nations out of a number of small ones, or to the detriment of some of the small ones, and also examples of the assimilation of nations. The development of nationality in general is the principle of bourgeois nationalism; hence the exclusiveness of bourgeois nationalism, hence the endless national bickering. The proletariat, however, far from undertaking to uphold the national development of every nation, on the contrary, warns the masses against such illusions, stands for the fullest freedom of capitalist intercourse and welcomes every kind of assimilation of nations, except that which is founded on force or privilege.

Consolidating nationalism within a certain "justly" delimited sphere, "constitutionalising" nationalism, and securing the separation of all nations from one another by means of a special state institution—such is the ideological foundation and content of cultural-national autonomy. This idea is thoroughly bourgeois and thoroughly false. The proletariat cannot support any consecration of nationalism; on the contrary, it supports everything that helps to obliterate national distinctions and remove national barriers; it supports everything that makes the ties between nationalities closer and closer, or tends to merge nations. To

act differently means siding with reactionary nationalist philistinism.

When, at their Congress in Brünn[11] (in 1899), the Austrian Social-Democrats discussed the plan for cultural-national autonomy, practically no attention was paid to a theoretical appraisal of that plan. It is, however, noteworthy that the following two arguments were levelled against this programme: (1) it would tend to strengthen clericalism; (2) "its result would be the perpetuation of chauvinism, its introduction into every small community, into every small group" (p. 92 of the official report of the Brünn Congress, in German. A Russian translation was published by the Jewish nationalist party, the J.S.L.P.[12]).

There can be no doubt that "national culture", in the ordinary sense of the term, i.e., schools, etc., is at present under the predominant influence of the clergy and the bourgeois chauvinists in all countries in the world. When the Bundists, in advocating "cultural-national" autonomy, say that the constituting of nations will keep the class struggle within them *clean* of all extraneous considerations, then that is manifest and ridiculous sophistry. It is primarily in the economic and political sphere that a serious class struggle is waged in any capitalist society. To separate the sphere of education *from this* is, firstly, absurdly utopian, because schools (like "national culture" in general) cannot be separated from economics and politics; secondly, it is the economic and political life of a capitalist country that *necessitates* at every step the smashing of the absurd and outmoded national barriers and prejudices, whereas separation of the school system and the like, would only perpetuate, intensify and strengthen "pure" clericalism and "pure" bourgeois chauvinism.

On the boards of joint-stock companies we find capitalists of different nations sitting together in complete harmony. At the factories workers of different nations work side by side. In any really serious and profound political issue sides are taken according to classes, not nations. Withdrawing school education and the like from state control and placing it under the control of the nations is in effect an attempt to *separate* from economics, which unites the nations, the most highly, so to speak, ideological sphere of social

iife, the sphere in which "pure" national culture or the national cultivation of clericalism and chauvinism has the freest play.

In practice, the plan for "extra-territorial" or "cultural-national" autonomy could mean only one thing: *the division of educational affairs according to nationality*, i.e., the introduction of national curias in school affairs. Sufficient thought to the *real* significance of the famous Bund plan will enable one to realise how utterly reactionary it is even from the standpoint of democracy, let alone from that of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.

A single instance and a single scheme for the "nationalisation" of the school system will make this point abundantly clear. In the United States of America the division of the States into Northern and Southern holds to this day in all departments of life; the former possess the greatest traditions of freedom and of struggle against the slave-owners; the latter possess the greatest traditions of slave-ownership, survivals of persecution of the Negroes, who are economically oppressed and culturally backward (44 per cent of Negroes are illiterate, and 6 per cent of whites), and so forth. In the Northern States Negro children attend the same schools as white children do. In the South there are separate "national", or racial, whichever you please, schools for Negro children. I think that this is the sole instance of actual "nationalisation" of schools.

In Eastern Europe there exists a country where things like the Beilis case[13] are still possible, and Jews are condemned by the Purishkeviches to a condition worse than that of the Negroes. In that country a scheme for *nationalising Jewish schools* was recently mooted in the Ministry. Happily, this reactionary utopia is no more likely to be realised than the utopia of the Austrian petty bourgeoisie, who have despaired of achieving consistent democracy or of putting an end to national bickering, and have invented for the nations school-education *compartments* to keep them from bickering *over the distribution* of schools ... but have "constituted" themselves for an *eternal* bickering of one "national culture" with another.

In Austria, the idea of cultural-national autonomy has remained largely a flight of literary fancy, which the Austrian

Social-Democrats themselves have not taken seriously. In Russia, however, it has been incorporated in the programmes of all the Jewish bourgeois parties, and of several petty-bourgeois, opportunist elements in the different nations—for example, the Bundists, the liquidators in the Caucasus, and the conference of Russian national parties of the Left-Narodnik trend. (This conference, we will mention parenthetically, took place in 1907, its decision being adopted *with abstention* on the part of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries[14] and the P.S.P.,[15] the Polish social-patriots. Abstention from voting is a method surprisingly characteristic of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and P.S.P., when they want to show their attitude towards a most important question of principle in the sphere of the national programme!)

In Austria it was Otto Bauer, the principal theoretician of "cultural-national autonomy", who devoted a special chapter of his book to prove that such a programme cannot possibly be proposed for the Jews. In Russia, however, it is precisely among the Jews that all the bourgeois parties—and the Bund which echoes them—have adopted this programme.* What does this go to show? It goes to show that history, through the political practice of another state, has exposed the absurdity of Bauer's invention, in exactly the same way as the Russian Bernsteinians (Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky, Berdayev and Co.), through their rapid evolu-

* That the Bundists often vehemently deny that *all* the Jewish bourgeois parties have accepted "cultural-national autonomy" is understandable. This fact only too glaringly exposes the actual role being played by the Bund. When Mr. Manin, a Bundist, tried, in *Luch*,[16] to repeat his denial, he was fully exposed by N. Skop (see *Prosveshcheniye* No. 3[17]) But when Mr. Lev Yurkevich, in *Dzvin* (1913, Nos. 7-8, p. 92), quotes from *Prosveshcheniye* (No. 3, p. 78) N. Sk.'s statement that "the Bundists together with all the Jewish bourgeois parties and groups have long been advocating cultural-national autonomy" and *distorts* this statement by *dropping* the word "Bundists" and *substituting* the words "national rights" for the words "cultural-national autonomy", one can only raise one's hands in amazement! Mr. Lev Yurkevich is not only a nationalist, not only an astonishing ignoramus in matters concerning the history of the Social-Democrats and their programme, but a *downright falsifier of quotations* for the benefit of the Bund. The affairs of the Bund and the Yurkeviches must be in a bad way indeed!

tion from Marxism to liberalism, have exposed the real ideological content of the German Bernsteinism.[18]

Neither the Austrian nor the Russian Social-Democrats have incorporated "cultural-national" autonomy in their programme. However, the Jewish bourgeois parties in a most backward country, and a number of petty-bourgeois, so-called socialist groups *have adopted it* in order to spread ideas of bourgeois nationalism among the working class in a refined form. This fact speaks for itself.

Since we have had to touch upon the Austrian programme on the national question, we must reassert a truth which is often distorted by the Bundists. At the Brünn Congress a *pure* programme of "cultural-national autonomy" *was* presented. This was the programme of the South-Slav Social-Democrats, § 2 of which reads: "Every nation living in Austria, irrespective of the territory occupied by its members, constitutes an autonomous group which manages all its national (language and cultural) affairs quite independently." This programme was supported, not only by Kristan but by the influential Ellenbogen. But it was withdrawn; not a single vote was cast for it. A *territorialist* programme was adopted, i.e., one that did *not* create *any* national groups "irrespective of the territory occupied by the members of the nation".

Clause 3 of the adopted programme reads: "The self-governing *regions* of one and the same nation shall jointly form a nationally united association, which shall manage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis" (cf. *Prosveshcheniye*, 1913, No. 4, p. 28[19]). Clearly, this compromise programme is wrong too. An example will illustrate this. The German colonists' community in Saratov Gubernia, plus the German working-class suburb of Riga or Lodz, plus the German housing estate near St. Petersburg, etc., would constitute a "nationally united association" of Germans in Russia. Obviously the Social-Democrats cannot *demand* such a thing or *enforce* such an association, although of course they do not in the least deny *freedom* of every kind of association, including associations of any communities of any nationality in a given state. The

segregation, by a law of the state, of Germans, etc., in different localities and of different classes in Russia into a single German-national association may be practised by anybody—priests, bourgeois or philistines, but not by Social-Democrats.

5. THE EQUALITY OF NATIONS AND THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

When they discuss the national question, opportunists in Russia are given to citing the example of Austria. In my article in *Severnaya Pravda** (No. 10, *Prosveshcheniye*, pp. 96-98), which the opportunists have attacked (Mr. Semkovsky in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*,[20] and Mr. Liebman in *Zeit*), I asserted that, insofar as that is at all possible under capitalism, there was only one solution of the national question, viz., through consistent democracy. In proof of this, I referred, among other things, to Switzerland.

This has not been to the liking of the two opportunists mentioned above, who are trying to refute it or belittle its significance. Kautsky, we are told, said that Switzerland is an exception; Switzerland, if you please, has a special kind of decentralisation, a special history, special geographical conditions, unique distribution of a population that speak different languages, etc., etc.

All these are nothing more than attempts to *evade* the issue. To be sure, Switzerland is an exception in that she is not a single-nation state. But Austria and Russia are also exceptions (or are backward, as Kautsky adds). To be sure, it was only her special, unique historical and social conditions that ensured Switzerland *greater* democracy than most of her European neighbours.

But where does all this come in, if we are speaking of the *model* to be adopted? In the whole world, under present-day conditions, countries in which any particular institution has been founded on *consistent* democratic principles are the exception. Does this prevent us, in our programme, from upholding consistent democracy in all institutions?

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* See pp. 20-22 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Switzerland's special features lie in her history, her geographical and other conditions. Russia's special features lie in the strength of her proletariat, which has no precedent in the epoch of bourgeois revolutions, and in her shocking general backwardness, which objectively necessitates an exceptionally rapid and resolute advance, under the threat of all sorts of drawbacks and reverses.

We are evolving a national programme from the proletarian standpoint; since when has it been recommended that the worst examples, rather than the best, be taken as a model?

At all events, does it not remain an indisputable and undisputed fact that national peace under capitalism has been achieved (insofar as it is achievable) *exclusively* in countries where consistent democracy prevails?

Since this is indisputable, the opportunists' persistent references to Austria instead of Switzerland are nothing but a typical Cadet device, for the Cadets[21] always copy the worst European constitutions rather than the best.

In Switzerland there are *three* official languages, but bills submitted to a referendum are printed in *five* languages, that is to say, in two Romansh dialects, in addition to the three official languages. According to the 1900 census, these two dialects are spoken by 38,651 out of the 3,315,443 inhabitants of Switzerland, i.e., by a little over *one per cent*. In the army, commissioned and non-comissioned officers "are given the fullest freedom to speak to the men in their native language". In the cantons of Graubünden and Wallis (each with a population of a little over a hundred thousand) both dialects enjoy complete equality.*

The question is: should we advocate and support this, the living *experience* of an advanced country, or borrow from the Austrians *inventions* like "extra-territorial autonomy", which have not yet been tried out anywhere in the world (and not yet been adopted by the Austrians themselves)?

To advocate this invention is to advocate the division of school education according to nationality, and that is a downright harmful idea. The experience of Switzerland

* See René Henry: *La Suisse et la question des langues*, Berne, 1907.

proves, however, that the greatest (relative) degree of national peace *can be*, *and has been*, *ensured in practice* where you have a consistent (again relative) democracy throughout the state.

"In Switzerland," say people who have studied this question, "there is *no national question* in the East-European sense of the term. The very phrase (national question) is unknown there...." "Switzerland left the struggle between nationalities a long way behind, in 1797-1803."*

This means that the epoch of the great French Revolution, which provided the most democratic solution of the current problems of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, *succeeded* incidentally, *en passant*, in "*solving*" the national question.

Let the Semkovskys, Liebmans, and other opportunists now try to assert that this "exclusively Swiss" solution is *inapplicable* to any uyezd or even part of an uyezd in Russia, where out of a population of only 200,000 forty thousand speak *two dialects* and want to have *complete equality* of language in their area!

Advocacy of complete equality of nations and languages distinguishes only the consistently democratic elements in each nation (i.e., only the proletarians), and *unites* them, not according to nationality, but in a profound and earnest desire to improve the entire system of state. On the contrary, advocacy of "cultural-national autonomy", despite the pious wishes of individuals and groups, *divides the nations* and in fact draws the workers and the bourgeoisie of any one nation closer together (the adoption of this "cultural-national autonomy" by all the Jewish bourgeois parties).

Guaranteeing the rights of a national minority is inseparably linked up with the principle of complete equality. In my article in *Severnaya Pravda* this principle was expressed in almost the same terms as in the later, official and more accurate decision of the conference of Marxists. That decision demands "the incorporation in the constitution of a fundamental law which shall declare null and void all privileges enjoyed by any one nation and all infringements of the rights of a national minority".

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* See Ed. Blocher: *Die Nationalitäten in der Schweiz*, Berlin, 1910.

Mr. Liebman tries to ridicule this formula and asks: "Who knows what the rights of a national minority are?" Do these rights, he wants to know, include the right of the minority to have "its own programme" for the national schools? How large must the national minority be to have the right to have its own judges, officials, and schools with instruction in his own language? Mr. Liebman wants it to be inferred from these questions that a "*positive*" national programme is essential.

Actually, these questions clearly show what reactionary ideas our Bundist tries to smuggle through under cover of a dispute on supposedly minor details and particulars.

"Its own programme" in its national schools!... Marxists, my dear nationalist-socialist, have a *general* school programme which demands, for example, an absolutely secular school. As far as Marxists are concerned, no *departure* from this general programme is anywhere or at any time permissible in a democratic state (the question of introducing any "local" subjects, languages, and so forth into it being decided by the local inhabitants). However, from the principle of "taking educational affairs out of the hands of the state" and placing them under the control of the nations, it ensues that we, the workers, must allow the "nations" in our democratic state to spend the people's money on clerical schools! Without being aware of the fact, Mr. Liebman has clearly demonstrated the reactionary nature of "cultural-national autonomy"!

"How large must a national minority be?" This is not defined even in the Austrian programme, of which the Bundists are enamoured. It says (more briefly and less clearly than our programme does): "The rights of the national minorities are protected by a special law to be passed by the Imperial Parliament" (§4 of the Brünn programme).

Why has nobody asked the Austrian Social-Democrats the question: what exactly is that law, and exactly which rights and of which minority is it to protect?

That is because all sensible people understand that it is inappropriate and impossible to define particulars in a programme. A programme lays down only fundamental principles. In this case the fundamental principle is implied with the Austrians, and directly expressed in the decision of the

latest conference of Russian Marxists. That principle is: no national privileges and no national inequality.

Let us take a concrete example to make the point clear to the Bundist. According to the schoal census of January 18, 1911, St. Petersburg elementary schools under the Ministry of Public "Education" were attended by 48,076 pupils. Of these, 396, i.e., less than one per cent, were Jews. The other figures are: Rumanian pupils—2, Georgians—1, Armenians—3, etc.[22] Is it possible to draw up a "positive" national programme that will cover this diversity of relationships and conditions? (And St. Petersburg is, of course, far from being the city with the most mixed population in Russia.) Even such specialists in national "subtleties" as the Bundists would hardly be able to draw up) such a programme.

And yet, if the constitution of the country contained a fundamental law rendering null and void every measure that infringed the rights of a minority, any citizen would be able to demand the rescinding of orders prohibiting, for example, the hiring, at state expense, of special teachers of Hebrew, Jewish history, and the like, or the provision of state-owned premises for lectures for Jewish, Armenian, or Rumanian children, or even for the one Georgian child. At all events, it is by no means impossible to meet, on the basis of equality, all the reasonable and just wishes of the national minorities, and nobody will say that advocacy of equality is harmful. On the other hand, it would certainly be harmful to advocate division of schools according to nationality, to advocate, for example, special schools for Jewish children in St. Petersburg, and it would be utterly impossible to set up national schools for *every* national minority, for one, two or three children.

Furthermore, it is impossible, in any country-wide law, to define how large a national minority must he to be entitled to special schools, or to special teachers for supplementary subjects, etc.

On the other hand, a country-wide law establishing equality can be worked out in detail and developed through special regulations and the decisions of regional Diets, and town, Zemstvo, village commune and other authorities.

6. CENTRALISATION AND AUTONOMY

In his rejoinder, Mr. Liebman writes:

"Take our Lithuania, the Baltic province, Poland, Volhynia, South Russia, etc.—everywhere you will find a *mixed* population; there is not a single city that does not have a large national minority. However far decentralisation is carried out, different nationalities will always be found living together in different places (chiefly in urban communities), and it is democratism that surrenders a national minority to the national majority. But, as we know, V. I. is opposed to the federal state structure and the boundless decentralisation that exist in the Swiss Federation. The question is: what was his point in citing the example of Switzerland?"

My object in citing the example of Switzerland has already been explained above. I have also explained that the problem of protecting the rights of a national minority can be solved *only* by a country-wide law promulgated in a consistently democratic state that does not depart from the principle of equality. But in the passage quoted above, Mr. Liebman repeats still another of the most common (and most fallacious) arguments (or sceptical remarks) which are usually made against the Marxist national programme, and which, therefore, deserve examination.

Marxists are, of course, opposed to federation and decentralisation, for the simple reason that capitalism requires for its development the largest and most centralised possible states. *Other conditions being equal*, the class-conscious proletariat will always stand for the larger state. It will always fight against medieval particularism, and will always welcome the closest possible economic amalgamation of large territories in which the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie can develop on a broad basis.

Capitalism's broad and rapid development of the productive forces *calls for* large, politically compact and united territories, since only here can the bourgeois class—together with its inevitable antipode, the proletarian class—unite and sweep away all the old, medieval, caste, parochial, petty-national, religious and other barriers.

The right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to secede and form independent national states, will be dealt with elsewhere.* But while, and insofar as, different

* See pp. 393-454 of this volume.—*Ed.*

nations constitute a single state, Marxists will never, under any circumstances, advocate either the federal principle or decentralisation. The great centralised state is a tremendous historical step forward from medieval disunity to the future socialist unity of the whole world, and only *via* such a state (*inseparably* connected with capitalism), can there be any road to socialism.

It would, however, be inexcusable to forget that in advocating centralism we advocate exclusively *democratic* centralism. On this point all the philistines in general, and the nationalist philistines in particular (including the late Dragomanov[23]), have so confused the issue that we are obliged again and again to spend time clarifying it.

Far from precluding local self-government, with *autonomy* for regions having special economic and social conditions, a distinct national composition of the population, and so forth, democratic centralism necessarily demands *both*. In Russia centralism is constantly confused with tyranny and bureaucracy. This confusion has naturally arisen from the history of Russia, but even so it is quite inexcusable for a Marxist to yield to it.

This can best be explained by a concrete example.

In her lengthy article "The National Question and Autonomy",* Rosa Luxemburg, among many other curious errors (which we shall deal with below), commits the exceptionally curious one of trying to *restrict* the demand for autonomy to Poland alone.

But first let us see *how* she defines autonomy.

Rosa Luxemburg admits—and being a Marxist she is of course bound to admit—that all the major and important economic and political questions of capitalist society must be dealt with exclusively by the central parliament of the whole country concerned, not by the autonomous Diets of the individual regions. These questions include tariff policy, laws governing commerce and industry, transport and means of communication (railways, post, telegraph, telephone, etc.), the army, the taxation system, civil** and crim-

* *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*,[24] Kraków, 1908 and 1909.

** In elaborating her ideas Rosa Luxemburg goes into details, mentioning, for example—and quite rightly—divorce laws (No. 12, p. 162 of the above-mentioned journal).

inal law, the general principles of education (for example, the law on purely secular schools, on universal education, on the minimum programme, on democratic school management, etc.), the labour protection laws, and political liberties (right of association), etc., etc.

The autonomous Diets—on the basis of the general laws of the country—should deal with questions of purely local, regional, or national significance. Amplifying this idea in great—not to say excessive—detail, Rosa Luxemburg mentions, for example, the construction of local railways (No. 12, p. 149) and local highways (No. 14-15, p. 376), etc.

Obviously, one cannot conceive of a modern, truly democratic state that did *not* grant such autonomy to every region having any appreciably distinct economic and social features, populations of a specific national composition, etc. The principle of centralism, which is essential for the development of capitalism, is not violated by this (local and regional) autonomy, but on the contrary is applied by it *democratically*, not bureaucratically. The broad, free and rapid development of capitalism would be impossible, or at least greatly impeded, by the *absence* of such autonomy, which *facilitates* the concentration of capital, the development of the productive forces, the unity of the bourgeoisie and the unity of the proletariat on a *country-wide* scale; for bureaucratic interference in *purely* local (regional, national, and other) questions is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and political development in general, and an obstacle to *centralism* in serious, important and fundamental matters in particular.

One cannot help smiling, therefore, when reading how our magnificent Rosa Luxemburg tries to prove, with a very serious air and "purely Marxist" phrases, that the demand for autonomy is applicable *only* to Poland and *only* by way of exception! Of course, there is not a grain of "parochial" patriotism in this; we have here only "practical" considerations ... in the case of Lithuania, for example.

Rosa Luxemburg takes four gubernias—Vilna, Kovno, Grodno and Suvalki—assuring her readers (and herself) that these are inhabited "mainly" by Lithuanians; and by adding the inhabitants of these gubernias together she finds

that Lithuanians constitute 23 per cent of the total population, and if Zhmuds are added, they constitute 31 per cent—less than a third. The natural inference is that the idea of autonomy for Lithuania is "arbitrary and artificial" (No. 10, p. 807).

The reader who is familiar with the commonly known defects of our Russian official statistics will quickly see Rosa Luxemburg's mistake. Why take Grodno Gubernia where the Lithuanians constitute only 0.2 per cent, *one-fifth of one per cent*, of the population? Why take the whole Vilna Gubernia and not its Troki Uyezd alone, where the Lithuanians constitute the *majority* of the population? Why take the whole Suvalki Gubernia and put the number of Lithuanians at 52 per cent of the population, and not the Lithuanian uyezds of that gubernia, i.e., five out of the seven, in which Lithuanians constitute *72* per cent of the population?

It is ridiculous to talk about the conditions and demands of modern capitalism while at the same time taking not the "modern", not the "capitalist", but the medieval, feudal and official-bureaucratic administrative divisions of Russia, and in their crudest form at that (gubernias instead of uyezds). Plainly, there can be no question of any serious local reform in Russia until these divisions are abolished and superseded by a *really* "modern" division that really meets the requirements, *not* of the Treasury, *not* of the bureaucracy, *not* of routine, *not* of the landlords, *not* of the priests, but of capitalism; and one of the modern requirements of capitalism is undoubtedly the greatest possible national uniformity of the population, for nationality and language identity are an important factor making for the complete conquest of the home market and for complete freedom of economic intercourse.

Oddly enough, this obvious mistake of Rosa Luxemburg's is repeated by the Bundist Medem, who sets out to prove, not that Poland's specific features are "exceptional", but that the principle of national-territorial autonomy is unsuitable (the Bundists stand for national extra-territorial autonomy!). Our Bundists and liquidators collect from all over the world all the errors and all the opportunist vacillations of Social-Democrats of different countries and different

nations and appropriate to themselves the *worst* they can find in world Social-Democracy. A scrap-book of Bundist and liquidator writings could, taken together, serve as a model Social-Democratic *museum of bad taste*.

Regional autonomy, Medem tells us didactically, is good for a region or a "territory", but not for Lettish, Estonian or other areas (*okrugs*), which have populations ranging from half a million to two million and areas equal to a gubernia. "*That would not be autonomy, but simply a Zemstvo*.... Over this Zemstvo it would be necessary to establish real autonomy" ... and the author goes on to condemn the "break-up" of the old gubernias and uyezds.*

As a matter of fact, the preservation of the medieval, feudal, official administrative divisions means the "break-up" and mutilation of the conditions of modern capitalism. Only people imbued with the spirit of these divisions can, with the learned air of the expert, speculate on the contraposition of "Zemstvo" and "autonomy", calling for the stereotyped application of "autonomy" to large regions and of the Zemstvo to small ones. Modern capitalism does not demand these bureaucratic stereotypes at all. Why national areas with populations, not only of half a million, but even of 50,000, should not be able to enjoy autonomy; why such areas should not be able to unite in the most diverse ways with neighbouring areas of different dimensions into a single autonomous "territory" if that is convenient or necessary for economic intercourse—these things remain the secret of the Bundist Medem.

We would mention that the Brünn Social-Democratic national programme is based entirely on national-territorial autonomy; it proposes that Austria should be divided into "nationally distinct" areas "instead of the historical crown lands" (Clause 2 of the Brünn programme). We would not go as far as that. A uniform national population is undoubtedly one of the most reliable factors making for free, broad and really modern commercial intercourse. It is beyond doubt that not a single Marxist, and not even a single firm democrat, will stand up for the Austrian crown lands

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* V. Medem: "A Contribution to the Presentation of the National Question in Russia", *Vestnik Yevropy*,[25] 1912, Nos. 8 and 9.

and the Russian gubernias and uyezds (the latter are not as bad as the Austrian crown lands, but they are very bad nevertheless), or challenge the necessity of replacing these obsolete divisions by others that will conform as far as possible with the national composition of the population. Lastly, it is beyond doubt that in order to eliminate all national oppression it is very important to create autonomous areas, however small, with entirely homogeneous populations, towards which members of the respective nationalities scattered all over the country, or even all over the world, could gravitate, and with which they could enter into relations and free associations of every kind. All this is indisputable, and can be argued against only from the hidebound, bureaucratic point of view.

The national composition of the population, however, is *one* of the very important economic factors, *but not the sole and not* the most important factor. Towns, for example, play an *extremely important* economic role under capitalism, and everywhere, in Poland, in Lithuania, in the Ukraine, in Great Russia, and elsewhere, the towns are marked by mixed populations. To cut the towns off from the villages and areas that economically gravitate towards them, for the sake of the "national" factor, would be absurd and impossible. That is why Marxists must not take their stand entirely and exclusively on the "national-territorial" principle.

The solution of the problem proposed by the last conference of Russian Marxists is far more correct than the Austrian. On this question, the conference advanced the following proposition:

> "...must provide for wide regional autonomy [not for Poland alone, of course, but for all the regions of Russia]* and fully democratic local self-government, and the boundaries of the self-governing and autonomous regions must be determined [not by the boundaries of the present gubernias, uyezds, etc., but] by the local inhabitants themselves on the basis of their economic and social conditions, national make-up of the population, etc."**

Here the national composition of the population is placed on *the same level* as the other conditions (economic first,

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) are by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 427-28.—*Ed.*

then social, etc.) which must serve as a basis for determining the new boundaries that will meet the needs of modern capitalism, not of bureaucracy and Asiatic barbarism. The local population alone can "assess" those conditions with full precision, and on that basis the central parliament of the country will determine the boundaries of the autonomous regions and the powers of autonomous Diets.

* * *

We have still to examine the question of the right of nations to self-determination. On this question a whole collection of opportunists of all nationalities—the liquidator Semkovsky, the Bundist Liebman and the Ukrainian nationalist-socialist Lev Yurkevick—have set to work to "popularise" the errors of Rosa Luxemburg. This question, which has been so utterly confused by this whole "collection", will be dealt with in our next article.[26]

ONCE MORE ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU AND THE LIQUIDATORS

The characteristic feature of the publicists of the *Novaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta*, namely, hypocrisy goaded on by impotent malice, has never reached such limits as it has in their articles concerning the decision of the International Bureau.[27]

To what lengths they have gone can be seen from the fact that, after their very first articles on this subject, Huysmans, the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, felt constrained to authorise Comrade Popov to convey to the Russian workers his protest against the attempts of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* to "exploit, in its factional interests, the lack of information" of the Russian readers, his protest against the "utter inaccuracy and disloyalty" of the liquidators' published reports concerning the Bureau's decisions.

Since the *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* publicists have received such a resounding ... testimonial from the Bureau's Secretary, we can calmly ignore their attempts to accuse *us* of distorting the true character of the decisions passed in London. People who have been publicly accused by the Secretary of the Bureau of "exploiting" the Bureau's decisions "in their factional interests" and of being "disloyal" to them, may shout as much as they please about their respect for the International, etc., but scarcely anyone will believe them. Every worker knows now what name to give the manipulations by which Mr. D.[28] tries so hard to read into the resolution of the Bureau such things as "the methods of building" the Party, "condemnation" of the Six,[29] "rejection" of our "claims" and "recognition" of the Social-Demo-

cratic character of the Left wing.[30] Literary juggling with the resolutions of the Bureau is hardly a sign of respect for those resolutions, Mr. D.!

How great, though, is the confusion of these jugglers! See how they are forced to contradict themselves at every turn!

1) In No. 102, Mr. D. solemnly stated: "The International Socialist Bureau *censured* the six deputies for resigning from the Duma group. In issue No. 104, another juggler, Mr. L. S.,[31] no less solemnly declared: "The International Socialist Bureau handed out neither testimonials *nor censure*." And—please note!— both gentlemen are highly pleased with the Bureau's decision; one because it "censured", and the other because it did not! Can one imagine a picture of greater confusion?

Indeed, there was good reason for the liquidators' confusion! The main point of the Bureau's resolution states unequivocally the following: "*Any practical step towards unity must be preceded by a preliminary clarification of existing differences*."

This decision is a perfectly correct one.

If we do not want to present the working class with a hodgepodge of miscellaneous elements miscalled "unity", and if we want real unity of *action*, the first obligatory step in this direction must be to ascertain exactly what the "points of disagreement" are. Let us first ascertain exactly the "points of disagreement" by means of a "general exchange of opinion", and then it will become clear whether it is possible to talk about any practical steps towards unity. That is how the question is formulated in the Bureau's resolution. We whole-heartedly approve of this formulation. We responded to the proposal of the International Socialist Bureau by calling upon the workers calmly and thoughtfully to discuss our disagreements once more, and to express their views on the points of disagreement. We, for our part, promised to do all we could to help familiarise our foreign comrades with the existing differences. The resolution published in *Proletarskaya Pravda*, No. 9, gives a quite correct summary of the points on which we and the liquidators[32] disagree. This is what our reply to the Bureau's proposal should be, and of course, there could be no other line of action for those who have serious

consideration for the Bureau's decision to promote a "general exchange of opinion on the points of disagreement".

But—and this is the whole point—no task is more unpleasant, undesirable, and unacceptable to the liquidators than that of ascertaining our main differences on questions of theory, programme, tactics and organisation. All their subterfuges, distortions and abuse in connection with the Bureau's resolution are solely designed to *obscure* its demand for a preliminary clarification of differences. Both Mr. L. S. and Mr. D. run ahead zealously: could we not somehow "unite" without "certificates" giving the ideological "service record" of those uniting? Could we not do without "quotations from old journals and newspapers"?—Mr. L. S. worries. Could we not stop recalling "the past"?—Mr. D. pleads. We understand them very well: there is nothing pleasant for Mr. L. S. in the recollections of articles about the "underground" (*Luch* No. 15 [101]), or for Mr. D. in recollections of the "fight-for-legality" slogan. And we fully endorse the Bureau's decision insofar as it proposes that the errors of the past should not be raked up. We shall not deny the liquidators the amnesty for the "errors of the past", for which they plead. The past, as such, does not interest us; what does interest us is the work of today and tomorrow. As regards that work, we want to know whether the campaign against the "underground" conducted in the liquidationist press is to *continue*, whether they will *continue* to argue that the "three pillars"[33] are inapplicable at the present time, whether they will defend the distortion of the programme by the August bloc people[34] and so forth.

The clarification of these questions and of the degree to which we differ on them is, according to the Bureau's resolution, a *precondition* to any progress towards unity, if we are not to accept "unity" in the liquidationist meaning of lumping together, without regard for principles, all who care to call themselves Social-Democrats.

"The counts of the indictment have already been drawn up," Mr. L. S. thunders. We should not like to recall here the story about the thief who fears his own shadow, but why does Mr. L. S. take ordinary peace terms to be an "indictment"? We say: the organisation to be created as a result of unity should be based on such and such principles—accept-

ance of the old programme, a definite form of organisation, uncurtailed slogans,[35] resolute tactics, etc. But you immediately declare that this formulation of the programme, tactics and tasks of the organisation, is nothing but a "complete list of liquidators' sins". We are sorry for you, but neither we nor the Bureau know of any method of building new organisations other than by clarifying their programme, their tactics, and so forth.

We are guilty of a still more grievous sin, however. Not only have we proposed the conditions for the creation of an organisation, i.e., clarified the terms of peace, but we have, moreover, submitted these terms to the bar of the workers' opinion.

We maintain that there is no other way of carrying out the Bureau's decision than the one we have chosen.

The Bureau calls upon *all* those who profess to be Social-Democrats to clarify their differences as a preliminary step towards solving the problem of unity.

The resolution we published responded to the Bureau's appeal by giving a "list" of views on the basic questions of programme, tactics and organisation, and by submitting our "list" to the workers, for their consideration. If the liquidators were to follow our example, we would have, in the more or less near future, the clearly formulated opinions of all parties, and a clear idea as to which side has the support of the majority of the organised workers. The task set before the Russian proletariat by the International Socialist Bureau would be brought nearer to fulfilment. But the liquidators, of course, will to the very last shun this path, for the simple reason that neither a precise formulation of their political views nor the submission of these views to the bar of the broad circles of the workers is in the interests of their group.

Under these circumstances they will inevitably strive to substitute for the definite "clarification of differences" demanded by the Bureau, petty personal squabbles, distortions, and wilful misrepresentations, which can only hamper its work, and they will constantly necessitate those lessons in "loyalty which the Secretary of the International has already been compelled to teach the liquidators.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 11, December 19, 1913

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NATIONAL-LIBERALISM AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Coming to the aid of the muddled Mr. Mogilyansky, the editors of the liberal *Rech*[36] recently (in issue No. 340) published an unsigned, i.e., official and editorial statement on an important issue, namely, the right of nations to self-determination.

Evading a direct answer, Mr. Mogilyansky had asserted that his views had "nothing in common with the repudiation of the right of nations to self-determination". Now *Rech* officially declares that Clause 11 of the Constitutional-Democratic Party programme gives a "direct, precise and clear answer to the question of the right to free *cultural* self-determination".

The word we have underlined is particularly important, since it was *not* "cultural" self-determination that was discussed in Mr. Mogilyansky's first article, or in Mr. Dontsov's reply to it, or in Mr. Mogilyansky's polemic with Mr. Dontsov. The question discussed was the *political* self-determination of nations, i.e., the right of nations to secede, whereas by "cultural self-determination" (a meaningless, pompous phrase, which contradicts the *entire* history of democracy) the liberals really mean only freedom of languages.

Rech now declares that *Proletarskaya Pravda* hopelessly confuses self-determination with "separatism", with secession by a nation.

Which side is revealing hopeless (or perhaps deliberate...) confusion?

Will our enlightened "Constitutional-Democrats" deny that, throughout the entire history of international democ-

racy, and especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, self-determination of nations has been understood to mean precisely *political* self-determination, i.e., the right to secede, to form an independent national state?

Will our enlightened "Constitutional-Democrats" deny that the International Socialist Congress held in London in 1896, in reaffirming the established democratic principle (to which, of course, the Congress did not confine itself) also had in mind *political* and not some sort of "cultural" self-determination?

Will our enlightened "Constitutional-Democrats" deny that Plekhanov, for example, who wrote about self-determination as far back as 1902, thereby understood political self-determination?

Please, gentlemen, explain yourselves more clearly; do not conceal the fruits of your "enlightenment" from the "mob"!

On the main issue *Rech* states:

"*Actually, the Cadets have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of 'nations to secede' from the Russian state.*"

Splendid! Thank you for being so candid, and for making such an explicit statement of principles! We draw the attention of *Rossiya*, *Novoye Vremya*, *Zemshchina*,[37] and others, to this "most loyal" statement by the Cadets' semi-official organ!

But stay your ire, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, should you be called *national-liberals* precisely for that reason. Herein lies one of the root causes of your chauvinism and of your ideological and political bloc with the Purishkeviches (or of your ideological and political dependence upon them). The Purishkeviches and their class inculcate in the ignorant masses the "firm" belief that it is "right" to "grab 'em and hold 'em".[38] The Cadets have studied history and know only too well what—to put it mildly—"pogrom-like" actions the practice of this "ancient right" has often led to. A democrat could not remain a democrat (let alone a proletarian democrat) without systematically advocating, precisely among the Great-Russian masses and in the Russian language, the "self-determination" of nations in the political and not in the "cultural" sense.

Always and everywhere the characteristic feature of national-liberalism lies in its taking a stand entirely on the basis of relations (and boundaries) determined by the Purishkevich class and protected (often to the detriment of economic development and of "culture") by Purishkevich methods. In effect, this means adapting oneself to the interests of the feudal-minded landlords and to the worst nationalist prejudices of the dominant nation, instead of systematically combating those prejudices.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 12,
December 20, 1913

Published according to
the text in *Proletarskaya Pravda*

NARODISM AND LIQUIDATIONISM AS DISINTEGRATING ELEMENTS IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The St. Petersburg Narodnik newspaper *Severnaya Mysl*[39] recently published a report from Riga concerning the progress of the insurance campaign.[40] Among other things the author, B. Braines, wrote:

> "The boycottist trend is apparent only among the shoemakers, where boycottist groups have been formed. Unfortunately, the Narodniks are the leading spirits in these groups. At the other factories the campaign is making little headway."

This candid confession throws a strong light on the present condition and political significance of Narodism in Russia. The correctness of the appraisal of Narodism made by the conference of Marxists[41] is unexpectedly and strikingly confirmed by the Narodniks themselves.

Just think of it: a Left-Narodnik newspaper, unable to make any refutation whatsoever, publishes the *regrets* of its correspondent that the *Narodniks* are the "*leading spirits*" of the boycottist groups!

Here is a splendid illustration of the political disintegration of Narodism. Here is an example of Russian non-partyism and indifference to the party principle. We must deal with this example, because an example from the life of "another" party reveals to us with striking clarity the true cause of an evil which is generally very widespread, and from which we suffer considerably.

During the period of counter-revolution a great variety of trends and groups, all practically independent of one another, arose among the Narodniks. In this respect, both the Narodniks and the Marxists were evidently affected by the operation of the general causes stemming from the

entire historical situation created by the Third of June system.[42] Among the Narodniks; individual groups came out in the press, for example, in a far more liquidationist vein than was the case with us (the Paris publications of 1908-10), and there were groups of quite an anarchist character, and the most prominent writers of that trend began to talk and write like liberals and renegades (Mr. V. Chernov in *Zavety*[43]), and so forth.

Nevertheless, formally and outwardly, the Narodniks appear to be much more "*united*" than the Marxists are. There is no definite split among the Narodniks, no intense, stubborn, systematic and prolonged inner struggle among them. It seems, at first glance, as though they are all the time held together by certain common ties. In their literature one constantly comes across proud references to Narodnik "unity", in contrast with the "Marxist" (and most often "Bolshevik") "tendency towards discord and splits".

Those who want to understand the meaning and significance of what is taking place in the working-class and socialist movements in Russia must ponder very, very carefully over this contraposing of "Marxist splits" and "Narodnik unity".

Among us Marxists and near-Marxists there are also no few groups and grouplets which are practically almost independent of one another, and which sedulously preach "unity" (quite in the Narodnik spirit), and still more sedulously condemn "Marxist splits".

What does it all mean? Are we to envy "Narodnik unity"? Are we to seek the reasons for this distinction in the pernicious qualities of "certain" "leaders" (a very widespread method) or in the Marxists' pernicious tendency towards "dogmatism", "intolerance", and so forth?

Consider the facts. These tell us that the Narodniks are far more tolerant and conciliatory, that they are far more "united", and that the abundance of groups among them does not lead to sharp splits. At the same time the facts tell us quite incontrovertibly that the Narodniks are politically *impotent*, that they have no organised or durable contacts with the masses, that they are *incapable of any* mass political action. The example of the Narodnik boycottists in Riga merely serves to illustrate most strikingly what was revealed

not only in the insurance campaign, but also in the Duma elections, the strike movement, the working-class press (even more broadly, the democratic press at large), the trade unions, and so forth. For example, we read the following in issue No. 2 of the Left-Narodnik *Severnaya Mysl*:

"*To the honour of the Marxists be it said that at present they enjoy considerable influence in the unions* [*i.e.*, *the trade unions*] *whereas we Left Narodniks work in them without a definite plan*, *and for that reason our influence is scarcely felt*."

Strange, is it not? The conciliatory, tolerant, "united", non-splitting, broad-minded, non-dogmatic Narodniks—*notwithstanding their ardent desire and striving*—conduct *no* insurance campaign, exercise *no* influence on the trade unions, and have *no* organised group in the Duma. But the "dogmatic" Marxists, who are "for ever splitting" and thereby enfeebling themselves, fought a splendid election campaign during the Fourth Duma elections, are conducting successful activities in the trade unions, are running a splendid and vigorous insurance campaign, carry on fairly effective activities in the strike movement, pass unanimous decisions which are consistent in principle, and are unanimously, firmly and with conviction supported by an obvious and unquestionable majority of the class-conscious workers.

Strange, is it not? Are not the "conciliatoriness", and all the other splendid spiritual qualities of the Narodniks merely *sterile things*?

That is exactly what they are—sterile! The "unity" of the varied intellectualist little groups is bought by the Narodniks at the price of their utter political impotence among the masses. And with us Marxists, too, it is the Trotskyists,[44] the liquidators, the "conciliators", and the "Tyszka-ites",[45] those who shout loudest about group unity, who display *the same* intellectualist impotence, while the real political campaigns, not the imaginary ones, but those that grow out of actual conditions (election, insurance, daily press, strike campaigns, etc.) show that the *majority* of the class-conscious workers are rallied around those who are most often, most zealously and most fiercely accused of being "splitters".

The conclusion to be drawn is clear, and however unpalatable it may be to the host of intellectualist groups the course

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of the working-class movement *will compel* them to admit it. This conclusion is that attempts to create "unity" by means of "agreements" or "alliances" among intellectualist groups, which *in fact* express tendencies that are *injurious* to the working-class movement (Narodism, liquidationism, etc.), lead only to complete disintegration and impotence. Both Narodism and liquidationism have *proved* this by their lamentable example.

Only *in opposition* to these groups and grouplets (in a strenuous struggle, which is inevitable under bourgeois conditions and amidst a host of petty-bourgeois vacillations) is real unity building up among the working-class masses led by the majority of the class-conscious proletarians.

Naïve people will ask: How are we to distinguish the intellectualist groups which are causing damage to the working-class movement by disintegrating it and condemning it to impotence, from that group or groups which ideologically express the working-class movement, rally, unite and strengthen it? There are only two ways of distinguishing one from the other: theory and practical experience. It is necessary seriously to examine the theoretical content of such *trends of thought* as Narodism and liquidationism (the principal petty-bourgeois trends that are disintegrating the working-class movement). It is necessary to carefully study the practical experience of the mass working-class movement as a means of rallying the majority of class-conscious workers around integral and considered decisions, based on principle and applied in elections, in insurance campaigns, in activities in the trade unions, in the strike movement, in the "underground", and so forth.

He who gives close thought to the theory of Marxism and close attention to the practical experience of the last few years will realise that the elements of a genuine workers' party are rallying in Russia *in spite of* the motley, noisy, and vociferous (but essentially futile and harmful) groups of Narodniks, liquidators, and so forth. Unity of the working class is emerging from the disintegration of these groups and their isolation from the proletariat.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 12,
December 20, 1913

Published according to
the text in *Proletarskaya Pravda*

COMMENT ON KAUTSKY'S LETTER[46]

K. Kautsky has realised (at last!) that the Tyszka group of "Tyszka" and Rosa Luxemburg does not represent the Polish Social-Democratic workers and that the Warsaw and Lodz organisations have to be reckoned with.

It is a good thing that he has at last understood facts which have been known to Russian Marxist workers *for years*. But the very fact that *for years* Rosa L. and Tyszka could pass off a *fiction* for reality shows how deplorably misinformed are the German Social-Democrats, including Kautsky!

Kautsky reveals still greater ignorance of the subject when he writes that "as far as he knows" the Polish Socialist Party "Left wing" split away from the P.S.P. "Right wing"[47] in order to take a *fully* Social-Democratic stand.

It is well known—one may say here—that this time Kautsky does *not at all* know what he is writing about. Our readers should make themselves familiar with at least the article by Henryk Kamieński "From Nationalism to Liquidationism" (*Prosveshcheniye* No. 10). The author of this article is a Pole and *knows* what he is writing about. From this article our readers will see that the P.S.P. Left wing is *not* Social-Democratic at all. Besides, it would be ridiculous to think that people who desire to take a fully Social-Democratic stand, and are *capable* of doing so, would retain "their own" programme and the title of a non-Social-Democratic party.

The forthcoming "exchange of opinions" among *all* Social-Democratic groups in Russia and Poland through the medium of the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau will reveal Kautsky's error and show that *none*

of the Polish Social-Democrats regard, nor can regard, the P.S.P. Left wing as a Social-Democratic Party.

We would add that Kautsky says nothing to repudiate (although he wrote in *Vorwärts*[48]) the report of his statement made in this very *Vorwärts* that "the old Party has disappeared" in Russia. The forthcoming "exchange of opinions" will also expose this monstrous blunder of Kautsky's.

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NOVOYE VREMYA AND *RECH* ON THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

As was to be expected, the controversy between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets on the question of the right of nations to self-determination has aroused the interest of *Novoye Vremya*. In issue No. 13563, this mouthpiece of Great-Russian nationalism writes:

> "What to Social-Democrats is an axiom of political wisdom [i.e., recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, to secession] is today beginning to cause disagreement even among the Cadets."

Despite this Black-Hundred dig at the liberals (the word "even"), *Novoye Vremya* is compelled to quote the *Rech* statement that "the Cadets have never undertaken to defend the right of nations to secede from the Russian state".

This statement is so forthright that *Novoye Vremya* is compelled to prevaricate. It writes:

> "Judging by the facts, the loose concept of cultural self-determination evidently differs, from the Cadets point of view, from the advocacy of separatism, only in its mode of operation."

But *Novoye Vremya* understands perfectly well the difference between the absurd "cultural", and real, i.e., *political*, self-determination, for further on we read:

> "Indeed, the Cadets have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of nations to secede from the Russian state ... except by the immeasurably more polished method of accepting subsidies for their press organs from non-Russians and Jews."

The old, crude and ridiculous Black-Hundred device of taunting the liberals for receiving assistance from the Jews! But we must not allow these silly little tricks to obscure the main thing: and the main thing is that *Novoye Vremya*,

in admitting that the Cadets have never undertaken to defend the *right to secede*, has come to fully realise the difference between the Social-Democrats and the Cadets.

The difference between the Constitutional-Democrats and the Social-Democrats is the distinction between national-liberals and consistent democrats.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 16, December 25, 1913

Published according to the text in *Proletarskaya Pravda*

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Mr. Martov *has confirmed* the fact already noted in *Proletarskaya Pravda* that I was not a member of the Strike *Subcommittee*, and that on the *committee* I *opposed* the clause concerning "criminal liability".* I need now only add that I advocated not only "mitigation" of penalties, as Mr. Martov "remembers", but of course the *complete deletion* of such a clause. There was no need for me to move any amendments, because the draft then under discussion *did not contain* any such clause, and it was Mr. F. Dan who unsuccessfully tried to introduce it (even L. Martov found the courage to oppose Mr. F. Dan on that occasion).

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 17,
December 29, 1913
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text in *Proletarskaya Pravda*

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* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 522-24.—*Ed.*

FOUR THOUSAND RUBLES A YEAR AND A SIX-HOUR DAY

This is the battle-cry of the class-conscious American workers. They say: We have only one political question before us, and that is the question of the workers' earnings and their working day.

To Russian workers it may at first sight seem very strange and puzzling to have all social and political questions reduced to a single one. But in the United States of America, the most advanced country in the world, which has almost complete political liberty, where democratic institutions are most developed, and where tremendous progress has been made in labour productivity, it is quite natural that the question of socialism should come to the fore.

Thanks to the existence of complete political liberty, it is possible in America, better than in any other country, to calculate the total production of wealth and draw up a statistical report of production. That calculation, based on reliable data, shows that in America there are, in round numbers, 15,000,000 working-class families.

Together, these working-class families annually produce consumers' goods to the value of sixty thousand million rubles. This works out at 4,000 rubles a year per working-class family.

But at present, under the capitalist social system, only half this vast amount of wealth, only thirty thousand millions, goes to the workers, who constitute nine-tenths of the population. The other half is pocketed by the capitalists who, with all their apologists and hangers-on, constitute only one-tenth of the population.

In America, as in other countries, unemployment is rife and the cost of living is steadily rising. Want among the workers is becoming more and more distressful and intolerable. American statistics show that *about half* the workers are working *part time*. And what an immense amount of social labour is still being wasted owing to the preservation of senseless, backward and scattered small production, particularly in agriculture and in commerce!

Thanks to complete political liberty and the absence of feudal landlords in America, machinery is employed there on a wider scale than anywhere else in the world. The aggregate power of the machines employed in the manufacturing industry alone amounts to *eighteen million* steam h.p. At the same time, an investigation of all power resources in the form of waterfalls showed, according to the report of March 14, 1912, that by converting the power of waterfalls into electricity America could immediately obtain an additional *sixty million* h.p.!

Already a land of boundless wealth, it can at one stroke *treble* its wealth, *treble* the productivity of its social labour, and thereby guarantee to *all* working-class families a decent standard of living worthy of intelligent human beings, and a not excessively long working day of six hours.

But owing to the capitalist social system we see in most of the big cities of America—and in the rural districts too for that matter—appalling unemployment and poverty, a wanton waste of human labour side by side with the unprecedented luxury of the multimillionaires, of the rich, whose fortunes run into thousands of millions.

The American working class is rapidly becoming enlightened, and is organising in a powerful proletarian party. Sympathy for this party is growing among all the working people. Working with the aid of first-class machines, and seeing at every turn marvels of engineering and the magnificent successes of labour resulting from the organisation of large-scale production, the wage-slaves of America are beginning clearly to realise what their tasks are, and are advancing the plain, obvious and immediate demands for an income of four thousand rubles a year for every working-class family, and a six-hour day.

The aim of the American workers is quite attainable in any civilised country in the world; but to achieve it, the country must enjoy the fundamental conditions of freedom....

And there is no road to a free future other than by way of an independent working-class organisation, educational, industrial, co-operative and political.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 19,
January 1, 1914
Signed: *I.*

Published according to
the text in *Proletarskaya Pravda*

IS A COMPULSORY OFFICIAL LANGUAGE NEEDED?

The liberals differ from the reactionaries in that they recognise the right to have instruction conducted in the native language, at least in the *elementary* schools. But they are completely at one with the reactionaries on the point that a compulsory official language is necessary.

What does a compulsory official language mean? In practice, it means that the language of the Great Russians, who are a *minority* of the population of Russia, is imposed upon all the rest of the population of Russia. In every school the teaching of the official language must be *obligatory*. All official correspondence must be conducted in the official language, not in the language of the local population.

On what grounds do the parties who advocate a compulsory official language justify its necessity?

The "arguments" of the Black Hundreds are curt, of course. They say: All non-Russians should be ruled with a rod of iron to keep them from "getting out of hand". Russia must be indivisible, and all the peoples must submit to Great-Russian rule, for it was the Great Russians who built up and united the land of Russia. Hence, the language of the ruling class must be the compulsory official language. The Purishkeviches would not mind having the "local lingoes" banned altogether, although they are spoken by about 60 per cent of Russia's total population.

The attitude of the liberals is much more "cultured" and "refined". They are for permitting the use of the native languages within certain limits (for example, in the elementary schools). At the same time they advocate an obligatory official language, which, they say, is necessary in the interests of "culture", in the interests of a "united" and "indivisible" Russia, and so forth.

"Statehood is the affirmation of cultural unity.... An official language is an essential constituent of state culture.... Statehood is based on unity of authority, the official language being an instrument of that unity. The official language possesses the same compulsory and universally coercive power as all other forms of statehood....

"If Russia is to remain united and indivisible, we must firmly insist on the political expediency of the Russian literary language."

This is the typical philosophy of a liberal on the necessity of an official language.

We have quoted the above passage from an article by Mr. S. Patrashkin in the liberal newspaper *Dyen*[49] (No. 7). For quite understandable reasons, the Black-Hundred *Novoye Vremya* rewarded the author of these ideas with a resounding kiss. Mr. Patrashkin expresses "very sound ideas", Menshikov's newspaper stated (No. 13588). Another paper the Black Hundreds are constantly praising for such very "sound" ideas is the national-liberal *Russkaya Mysl*.[50] And how can they help praising them when the liberals, with the aid of "cultured" arguments, are advocating things that please the *Novoye Vremya* people so much?

Russian is a great and mighty language, the liberals tell us. Don't you want everybody who lives in the border regions of Russia to know this great and mighty language? Don't you see that the Russian language will enrich the literature of the non-Russians, put great treasures of culture within their reach, and so forth?

That is all true, gentlemen, we say in reply to the liberals. We know better than you do that the language of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky is a great and mighty one. We desire more than you do that the closest possible intercourse and fraternal unity should be established between the oppressed classes of all the nations that inhabit Russia, without any discrimination. And we, of course, are in favour of every inhabitant of Russia having the opportunity to learn the great Russian language.

What we do not want is the element of *coercion*. We do not want to have people driven into paradise with a cudgel; for no matter how many fine phrases about "culture" you may utter, a *compulsory* official language involves coercion, the use of the cudgel. We do not think that the great and mighty Russian language needs anyone having to study it by *sheer compulsion*. We are convinced that the development

of capitalism in Russia, and the whole course of social life in general, are tending to bring all nations closer together. Hundreds of thousands of people are moving from one end of Russia to another; the different national populations are intermingling; exclusiveness and national conservatism must disappear. People whose conditions of life and work make it necessary for them to know the Russian language will learn it without being forced to do so. But coercion (the cudgel) will have only one result: it will hinder the great and mighty Russian language from spreading to other national groups, and, most important of all, it will sharpen antagonism, cause friction in a million new forms, increase resentment, mutual misunderstanding, and so on.

Who wants that sort of thing? Not the Russian people, not the Russian democrats. They do not recognise national oppression *in any form*, even in "the interests of Russian culture and statehood".

That is why Russian Marxists say that there must be *no* compulsory official language, that the population must be provided with schools where teaching will be carried on in all the local languages, that a fundamental law must be introduced in the constitution declaring invalid all privileges of any one nation and all violations of the rights of national minorities.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 14 (32), January 18, 1914

Published according to the text in *Proletarskaya Pravda*

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

At your personal request I am writing the following brief report (*bref rapport*) in my own name, and apologise in advance for any gaps in this report (*rapport*), as I am hard pressed for time. The Central Committee of our Party will probably find occasion to send its own official report* to the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau, and to correct any possible errors in my own private report.

What are the differences (*dissentiments*) between the Central Committee of our Party and the *Organising Committee*? That is the question. These differences may be reduced to the following six points:

I

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was formed in 1898 as an *illegal* Party, and has *always* remained such. Today too our Party can exist only as an illegal Party, since in Russia even the party of the moderate liberals has not been legalised.

Until the 1905 Revolution in Russia, however, the liberals published an illegal organ abroad.[51] When the revolution was defeated, the liberals turned their backs upon it and indignantly rejected the idea of an illegal press. And so after the revolution the idea arose in the opportunist wing of our Party of renouncing the illegal Party, of *liquidating* it (hence the name "*liquidators*") and of *substituting* for it a legal ("open") party.

On two occasions, in 1908 and in 1910, our entire Party condemned liquidationism[52] *formally* and unqualifiedly. On

* See pp. 233-36 of this volume.—*Ed.*

this point the differences are absolutely irreconcilable. It is impossible to restore and build up an illegal Party with people who do not believe in it and have no desire at all to build it up.

The Organising Committee and the Conference of August 1912[53] which elected it, recognise the illegal Party *in word*. *In deed*, however, after the decisions of the August Conference, the liquidators' newspaper in Russia (*Luch* and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* in 1912-13), continued to *attack*, in the legal press, the very existence of the illegal Party (numerous articles by L. S., F. D., Zasulich, and others).

Thus, we disagree with the Organising Committee because the latter is a fiction, which in word denies that it is liquidationist, but in fact screens and whitewashes the liquidators' group in Russia.

We disagree with the Organising Committee because the latter is unwilling (and unable, for it is helpless against the liquidators' group) to condemn liquidationism emphatically and irrevocably.

We cannot build up an illegal Party except by fighting those who attack it in the legal press. In Russia there are now (since 1912) *two* St. Petersburg workers' dailies: one fulfils and carries out the decisions of the illegal Party (*Pravda*). The other (*Luch* and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*) attacks the illegal Party, defies it, and tries to convince the workers that it is unnecessary. Unity between the illegal Party and the group that is fighting against the existence of the illegal Party is impossible until the paper run by the liquidators' group radically changes its line, or until the Organising Committee emphatically condemns it and breaks with it.

II

Our differences with the liquidators are the same as those between reformists and revolutionaries everywhere. However, these differences are greatly aggravated and made irreconcilable by the fact that the liquidators, in the legal press, fight against revolutionary slogans. Unity is impossible with a group which, for example, declares in the legal press that the slogan of a republic, or of the confiscation of

the big landed estates, is unsuitable for agitation among the masses. In the legal press we cannot refute such propaganda, which is objectively tantamount to betraying socialism and making concessions to liberalism and the monarchy.

And the Russian monarchy is such that a few more revolutions will be needed to teach the Russian tsars constitutionalism.

There can be no unity between our illegal Party, which secretly organises revolutionary strikes and demonstrations, and the group of publicists who in the legal press call the strike movement a "strike craze".

III

We disagree on the national question. This question is a very acute one in Russia. The programme of our Party emphatically rejects so-called "extra-territorial and national autonomy". Advocacy of the latter actually amounts to the preaching of refined bourgeois nationalism. Nevertheless, the August Conference of the liquidators (1912) recognised this "extra-territorial national autonomy" thereby deliberately violating the Party Programme. Comrade Plekhanov, who takes a neutral stand between the Central Committee and the Organising Committee, protested against this violation of the Programme, describing it as adaptation of socialism to nationalism.

We disagree with the Organising Committee because the latter refuses to rescind a decision which violates our Party Programme.

IV

Furthermore, we disagree on the national question in respect of organisation. The Copenhagen Congress definitely condemned the division of trade unions according to nationality.[54] Moreover, the experience of Austria has shown that in this respect it is impossible to draw a distinction between the trade unions and the political party of the proletariat.

Our Party has always stood for a united, international organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In 1908, before the split, the Party repeated its demand for the amalga-

mation of all the national Social-Democratic organisations in the local areas.

We disagree with the Bund, the separate Jewish workers' organisation, which supports the Organising Committee, because, despite Party decisions, the Bund flatly refuses to proclaim the principle of the unity of all national organisations in the local areas, and to bring about such an amalgamation.

It must be emphasised that the Bund refuses to amalgamate not only with organisations subordinated to our Central Committee, but also with the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Polish Socialist Party (the Left wing). Consequently, when the Bund poses as an amalgamator, we reject its claim, and declare that it is the Bund that is splitting the movement, since it refuses to bring about international unity among the Social-Democratic workers in the local organisations.

V

We disagree with the step taken by the Organising Committee in defending the alliance of the liquidators and the Bund with a non-Social-Democratic party, the P.S.P. (the Left wing), *despite* the protests of the two sections of the Polish Social-Democratic Party.

The Polish Social-Democratic Party has been affiliated to our Party ever since 1906-07.

The P.S.P. (the Left wing) was *never* affiliated with our Party.

By entering into an alliance with the P.S.P. *in opposition* to the two sections of the Polish Social-Democratic Party the Organising Committee is guilty of scandalous splitting action.

By accepting in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma the non-Social-Democrat Jagiello, a member of the P.S.P., despite formal protests by the two sections of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, the Organising Committee and its supporters among the deputies in the Duma are guilty of scandalous splitting action.

We disagree with the Organising Committee because the latter is unwilling to condemn and annul this splitting alliance with the P.S.P. (the Left wing).

VI

Lastly, we disagree with the Organising Committee, and with many of the groups and fictitious organisations abroad, because our opponents are unwilling to admit openly, loyally and unequivocally that our Party enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia.

We attach extremely great importance to this because, on the basis of bald statements unsupported by precise and verifiable facts, the most glaring falsehoods are often circulated abroad about the state of affairs in Russia.

The alternative is clear: either our opponents admit that there are irreconcilable differences between us (in which case their talk about unity is hypocrisy), or they see no irreconcilable differences (in which case, if they do not want to be regarded as splitters, they must loyally admit that we are the absolute majority).

By what public and verifiable facts can it *be proved* which side enjoys the support of the real majority of the class-conscious and organised Social-Democratic workers in Russia?

First, by the Duma elections.

Secondly, by the information published in both Social-Democratic newspapers during the whole of 1912 and nearly the whole of 1913.

It can be readily understood that the only convincing material on the question at issue is provided by the daily newspapers of the two trends in St. Petersburg for two years.

Thirdly, by public statements made by workers in Russia (in the columns of *both* newspapers) in favour of one or the other of the two Social-Democratic groups in the Duma.

All these three sets of facts were given in our Central Committee's official report to the International Socialist Bureau (session of December 14, 1913). I will briefly recapitulate these facts.

First: 47 per cent of the deputies elected by the worker curia in the elections to the Second Duma (1907), 50 per cent of such deputies in the elections to the Third Duma (1907-12), and 67 per cent in the elections to the Fourth Duma were Bolsheviks (i.e., our adherents).

Объединив (29)
за 2 года громадное
большинство рабочих
С.Д. идут в России,
мы заявляем требо-
вание приказа на
организационный
метод. Обсудить б
него мы не можем.

Кто признает
меньшевиков партией,
того мы обви-
няем в расколе,

Pages 29-30 of Lenin's letter to Camille Huysmans
dated January 31-February 1, 1914

если он не
чрезвычайно признает
наш организационный метод, подтвержденный Декабрьским съездом и волей большинства сознательных рабочих.

Таков мой краткий доклад.

С сод. прив. Н. Ленин.

Вчера
Отправлен 31 I – 1 II. 1914.

Pages 29-30 of Lenin's letter to Camille Huysmans
dated January 31-February 1, 1914

Secondly, during 21 months between January 1, 1912 and October 1, 1913, the two workers' newspapers in St. Petersburg published reports of the funds collected by workers' groups: 556 groups collected funds for the liquidators and *all* their allies, while 2,181 groups collected funds for our Party.

Thirdly, up to November 20, 1913, 4,850 workers expressed support, *over their signatures*, for our group in the Duma, as against 2,539 workers who expressed support for the liquidators (and all their allies, the Bund, the Caucasians, and so on and so forth).

These precise and verifiable facts prove that during the two years, we *united the overwhelming majority* of Social-Democratic workers' groups in Russia, despite the incredible difficulties the illegal Party in Russia has to contend with.

(In the matter of publishing illegal literature and organising illegal, strictly Party conferences, the odds in our favour are even greater.)

Since we have in two years united the overwhelming majority of Social-Democratic workers' groups in Russia, we claim recognition for our method of organisation. We cannot depart from that method.

Those who recognise the illegal Party, but refuse to recognise our method of organisation, which has been endorsed by two years' of experience and by the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers, are guilty of splitting tactics.

Such is my brief report.

With Social-Democratic greetings, *N. Lenin*
Brussels, January 31-February 1, 1914

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Published according to
the manuscript

THE PURPOSE OF ZEMSTVO STATISTICS

(*Penza Gubernia Zemstvo. Summary of a Valuation and Statistical Investigation of Penza Gubernia. Series III. Investigation of Landed Property. Part II. Census of Peasant Households. Section I. Reference Data on Villages and Detailed Tables of Commune House-to-House Returns Census. Vol. 3: Krasnoslobodsk Uyezd, Penza. 1913. Price 1 ruble. Preface 10 pages. Text 191. Total 201 pp.*)

The Penza Zemstvo[55] is conducting a valuation and statistical investigation on the basis of a programme so full and detailed that it must arouse exceptional interest in every student of Russia's economic system.

A complete census is being taken of *all* peasant households according to an *abbreviated* household card. In addition, every third household is described according to a more detailed *brief* household card; every ninth household is described in a still fuller household card, called the *detailed* card; every *twenty-seventh* household is described in a still fuller household card, called the *special* card; and, lastly, twenty-five households in the uyezd (probably representing about one-thousandth of the total households) gave their *budgets* in still greater detail.

In all, we have *five* degrees of more or less detailed investigation, and the fuller programme contains all the questions that are included in the abbreviated programme. In the preface, the authors indicate the degree of fullness of each of these *five* descriptions in the following manner:

"The budget covers the entire production and consumption of the peasant household.

"The special description studies, in each household, the sale and purchase of agricultural produce and the turnover of stock-breeding (on a special form), and all the questions contained in the detailed household card.

"The detailed household card lists all the properties, undertakings and occupations of the members of the household, registers the sex, age and literacy of the members of the family and the value of livestock, dead stock and buildings, and records the incomes from undertakings and occupations and crops, and expenditure on hiring labour.

"The brief household card contains only data on the sex, age and literacy of the members of the family, and lists their properties, undertakings and occupations, livestock and dead stock.

"The abbreviated household card registers the size of the family divided according to sex, the number of male workers, the properties and undertakings of the family, except rented land, the principal livestock, the literacy and outside occupations of the male workers and also the number of boys and girls attending school."

It is to be regretted that the volume contains no appendix with a full list of the questions contained in all the five types of descriptions. Only the briefest ("abbreviated") household card is appended, and this gives (approximately) a no less detailed description of the households than is given in the cards used in agricultural censuses organised on European lines.

It may be said without exaggeration that if the Penza statisticians investigate the whole gubernia according to the above programme the data they will collect will be almost ideal. Let us assume that there are 270,000 households in the gubernia (actually the figure is probably higher). This will give us 90,000 descriptions containing data on the amount of land rented, and on all the live and dead stock; it will also give us 30,000 descriptions containing data on the crops (*of each household*), on expenditure on hired labour, and value of farm implements and buildings. It will give us a further 10,000 descriptions of the sale and purchase of agricultural produce as well as the "turnover of stock-breeding" (i.e., probably a precise description of the conditions under which livestock is kept and fed, the productivity of stock-breeding, etc.). And lastly, it will give us *two hundred and fifty* budgets which, counting ten typical groups of peasant households, will give *exhaustive* descriptions of *each* group based on twenty-five budgets per group, i.e., quite sufficient to obtain steady averages.

In short, if this programme is fulfilled, peasant husbandry in the Penza Gubernia will have been studied magnificently, and far better than in West-European censuses (which, it is true, cover the whole country, not a gubernia).

The whole point is, how these excellent data will be *tabulated*. That is the main difficulty. Herein lies the weakest spot of our Zemstvo statistics, which as far as thoroughness and care for detail are concerned, are splendid. The data on each of the 300,000 households (or each of the 90,000, 30,000 or 10,000) may be splendid, but if they are not properly tabulated they will be utterly useless for scientific purposes, for an understanding of Russia's economics, inasmuch as general averages per village commune, volost, uyezd or gubernia, tell us very little.

It is precisely at the present time that semi-medieval (patriarchal and feudal) agriculture in Russia is undergoing a process of capitalist transformation. This process started over half a century ago. During this long period of time, a vast amount of miscellaneous *information* on the various features of this process has been collected in Russian economic literature. The important thing now is that this mass of Zemstvo statistics, so admirable in details, thoroughness and authenticity, should be properly *tabulated*. These statistics must be tabulated in such a way as to *provide an answer*, a precise and objective answer, based on mass data, to *all* the questions *indicated* or outlined in the course of over half a century's analysis of the post-Reform economics of Russia (and at the present time the Stolypin agrarian legislation poses a great number of new and extremely interesting questions concerning Russia's *post-revolutionary* economics).

The statistical returns must be tabulated in such a way as to *make it possible* to study from them the process by which the old, feudal, natural economy, based on the corvée and labour service, is being destroyed and superseded by commercial, capitalist economy. No person in Russia at all familiar with politics and economics can now doubt that this process is going on. The only question is *how* to tabulate these excellent house-to-house data so as to *prevent them from being wasted*, and to facilitate the study of *all* aspects of this extremely complex and varied process.

To meet these requirements, the tabulation of the house-to-house statistics should yield the greatest number of *group and complex tables* drawn up in the most rational and detailed manner, so that *all the types* of households that have

been noted—or *evidence* of which have been noted (this is no less important)—may be studied separately. Without varied and rationally compiled group and complex tables, this wealth of house-to-house statistics will simply be wasted. That is the greatest weakness of present-day statistics, which of late have been suffering increasingly from what I would call "statistical cretinism"—an inability to see the wood for the trees; *economic types* of phenomena are submerged in a welter of figures, types that can be brought out *only* in varied and rationally compiled group and complex tables.

To be called *rationally* compiled, such tables must first of all enable one to trace the process of development of capitalism in all its ramifications and forms. Only such a tabulation can be regarded as rational as will bring into focus the best preserved types of natural economy and the various degrees to which it is being superseded by commercial and capitalist agriculture (in different areas commercial agriculture assumes different forms, drawing first one and then another branch of agriculture into the process of production for the market). The various types of economy that are in the process of transition from exclusively natural agriculture to the *sale* of labour-power (what we call "industries", which consist in the sale of labour-power) and also to the *purchase* of labour-power, should be dealt with separately in special detail. So also must the various types of households according to their level of wealth (degree of accumulation of capital, and of *opportunity* of forming and accumulating it), and according to size of aggregate agricultural production, and the size of those branches of agricultural production which in the given locality and at the given time lend themselves most easily to transformation into *commercial* agriculture or *commercial* stock-breeding, and so on and so forth.

This transformation of natural economy into *commercial* agriculture is the crux of the matter in a study of the modern economics of agriculture. The endless errors and prejudices of official, liberal-professorial, petty-bourgeois Narodnik and opportunist "theory", are due to failure to understand this transformation or to inability to trace it in its extremely varied forms.

Judging from the volume mentioned above, the work of the Penza statisticians is being performed by people who do not go about the job in bureaucratic fashion, but are really interested in their subject and capable of producing scientific research of immense value. Nevertheless this work seems to be suffering from an excess of statistical red tape or statistical zeal and from a lack of politico-economic common sense and purpose.

The volume under review contains, first of all, reference material on the villages. This material takes up a little less than one-tenth of the book. The other nine-tenths consist of tables drawn up according to village communes. Each group of peasants (according to size of holdings) in each commune in each village is given a separate horizontal line (there are altogether 1,009 for the whole uyezd) containing 139 columns. The information is given in remarkable detail. Nine-tenths of this information will probably never be required for any kind of reference even by the most inquisitive of the local inhabitants.

But remarkable detail verges on something like statistical mania when we see columns 119-139, i.e., *twenty-one* columns, giving the *relative numbers*, i.e., the percentages, for each of the thousand uyezd divisions! The statisticians have made thousands and tens of thousands of calculations for a single uyezd, which even the local inhabitants may need only in highly exceptional cases. The statisticians have made about 15,000 to 20,000 calculations, of which probably *only* a dozen or two will be needed by local inhabitants *alone*, who could have made these calculations *themselves* on the rare occasions they required them.

The vast labour wasted by the statisticians detracts from the amount of work they are able (with the available personnel and the available budget—the Zemstvo budgets provide very modest funds for statistics!) to devote to investigation. The volume under review contains thousands of figures constituting an unnecessary statistical "luxury", but it does *not* contain *a single* summary. All summaries have been left for subsequent volumes. In the first place, we are not sure that other volumes will appear, nor can the Russian Zemstvo statisticians, who are too dependent on police tyranny, be sure of this. And secondly, without a

test being made of the various group and complex tables according to uyezd, it is never possible to obtain a full and scientifically satisfactory system of summarised, group and complex tables according to gubernia.

So far we have a deplorable fact—a volume of Zemstvo statistics of negligible, almost negatory scientific value, on which an immense amount of labour has been wasted, and which contains a wealth of valuable and up-to-date data (*the result of the law of November 9*!) that have not been summarised, collated, grouped, or combined.

We shall mention at least some of the groups that could and should have been established in order to render this wealth of Zemstvo statistics serviceable. The uyezd and the gubernia should be divided into districts showing where commercial agriculture of the various types is most prevalent (the distilling of liquor from grain and potatoes; the sale of dairy products; butter and oil making; special commercial crops, and so on, and so forth); then according to the prevalence of non-agricultural and migratory industries; conditions of landlord economy (the nearness of landed estates, or the absence of same; the predominance of serf-like corvée, labour service, métayage, share-cropping, and so forth, or of capitalist, landlord farming employing hired labour); also the degree to which commerce and capitalist turnover in general are developed (an extremely important division which must positively be made as an elementary requirement of political economy, and which can easily be made, although that is usually not done: that is to say, to group villages according to their distance from railways, market-places, trade centres, and so forth); according to size of village (in the Krasnoslobodsk Uyezd there are about 30,000 households distributed over 278 villages, but 19 of the largest villages have a total of 9,000 households; in all probability the conditions vary).

It is desirable and necessary to group households not only according to the size of their holdings but also according to the crop area (in their preface the compilers say that peasant farming in Penza Gubernia is conducted "mainly on the peasants' own land and not on rented land"; but this statement is too sweeping, and the question of renting land is of vast importance and should be elaborated in detail);

likewise, according to the area under commercial crops, wherever and whenever they are to be observed and can be itemised; further, according to "industries" (but not in the crude way that this is usually done, as if in mockery of political economy, by taking "households with members engaged in industries" and those without such members; it is absolutely necessary to indicate the status of the person in the industry: households in which a large, medium, or small number of the members go out to work as hired labourers; households which own small or large establishments employing a small, medium or large number of wage-workers, and so forth), and according to the number of livestock owned (this has partly been done in this volume), etc.

Complex tables, ten of them, say, with the households divided (again approximately) into ten groups according to the various indications of capitalism's penetration into agriculture, would give—assuming that we have 80 columns —8,000 new calculations, i.e., would take up much less space than the 20,000 worthless calculations of percentages for each separate village commune.

The scientific value of such varied complex tables which show the great diversity of forms in which agriculture and the agriculturalist are subordinated to the market, would be tremendous. It may be said without exaggeration that they would revolutionise the science of agricultural economics.

Prosveshcheniye No. 1,
January 1914
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

BOOK REVIEW

Labour Protection Exhibits at the All-Russia Hygiene Exhibition in St. Petersburg in 1913.
St. Petersburg 1913. Pp. 78. Price not indicated.

This extremely useful book briefly catalogues the material on labour protection exhibited at the All-Russia Hygiene Exhibition. It contains a vast amount of valuable statistical data on a number of questions affecting the lives of the workers, such as the number of workers employed in various industries, female and child labour, the working day and wages, sanitary conditions and labour protection, sickness and mortality among the workers, alcoholism, workers' insurance, and so on and so forth.

Appended is an excellent index to the literature on labour protection.

The absence, in many cases, of absolute figures (only percentages are given) is a shortcoming of the book, as is the absence of a general *subject* index that would enable the reader quickly to find the data he needed on different questions.

It would be desirable to have these faults eliminated in subsequent editions. All who are interested in the labour question, and all trade unions, insurance and other working-class organisations, will undoubtedly avail themselves of this book. Subsequent editions can and should make this book a systematic catalogue of material on questions concerning the conditions and protection of labour in Russia.

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THE LIBERALS' CORRUPTION OF THE WORKERS

The boycott, or rather the frothy radical chatter that is increasingly becoming the sole content of liquidator writings, often obscures from the reader the *principles* underlying liquidator propaganda. That is exactly what the liberal-labour politicians are after—that amidst the din, hullabaloo, and fireworks of radical claptrap the workers should more easily swallow bourgeois platitudes *against* the Marxist organisation.

But class-conscious workers will not be deceived by the rantings of sham "political campaigns" launched by the disruptors of the workers' organisation. What class-conscious workers appreciate most of all and first of all in every press organ is adherence to high principle. What are the workers really being taught under cover of the "opposition" claptrap, clamour and claims to defend the interests of the workers?—that is the main, the basic and, properly speaking, the only important question that every thinking worker asks himself. The thinking worker knows that the most dangerous of advisers are those liberal friends of the workers who claim to be defending their interests, but are actually trying to destroy the class independence of the proletariat and its organisation.

It is therefore our bounden duty to open the workers' eyes to the manner in which the liquidators are destroying the organisation. Take, for example, the programmatic leading article in the New Year's issue of the liquidators' organ. We are told:

> "The working class is heading towards a political party of the proletariat, which will function openly and be sufficiently powerful and broad to resist the efforts of any political regime to deprive it of all rights, to deprive it of the possibility of fulfilling its normal functions of political leadership."

There you have an example of "*normal*" liberal claptrap in all its glory! No sensible liberal would refuse to raise both hands in favour of this splendid formula, by means of which the liquidator newspaper tries to *conceal* the fact that it is "heading" and striving towards the destruction of everything the proletariat has during the last twenty years achieved in the way of Marxist organisation, at the cost of so much effort.

Further on it is still more candid:

> "The road to the open political party of action is also the road to Party unity."

It has been stated thousands and thousands of times, in the most formal and most solemn declarations, stated as far back as 1908 and 1910, that this kind of talk is tantamount to renouncing, to liquidating, the past. But the liquidators, nothing daunted, go on harping on the same theme in the hope of deceiving some terribly ignorant people with their outcries about "unity".

Traitors to the entire Marxist past clamouring about an "open party"—and "unity"!... Why, this is an insult to the class-conscious workers. It is an insult even to the "August" Conference of 1912, at which a handful of naïve people believed that the liquidators had abandoned the shameful liberal slogan of an open party.

But the whole point is that this gang of liberal hacks, all those F. D.'s, Gammas, L. M.'s, Em-El's, Rakitins,[56] etc., etc., are waging *their* liberal campaign to destroy the Marxist organisation, deliberately flouting the resolutions of both 1908 and 1910, and trying to deceive the non-class-conscious workers. They think there are still ignorant people about, who will believe their promises of an "open party" and fail to see that this is simply a variety of the liberal campaign against the existence of the genuine Marxist organisation! And whilst there are ignorant people about, this handful of liberal hacks, who seek to liquidate the past, will continue their dirty work, no matter how many times they are told that "unity" with these disruptors and disorganisers is an absurdity and a fraud.

The New Year "leaderist" of the liquidator newspaper does not stand alone. He is backed by all the liquidators,

Mr. P. Karpov, for example, who, in issue No. 5 (123) of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, assures us that

> "overcoming [all the obstacles that are put in the way of organising workers' congresses] is nothing more nor less than a genuine struggle for freedom of association, i.e., for the legalisation of the working-class movement, which is closely linked with the struggle for the open existence of the workers' Social-Democratic Party".

No liberal or even Octobrist will deny sympathy with the struggle for the legalisation of the working-class movement! No liberal will utter a sound of protest against an "open party"; he will even support those who advocate it as his best accomplices in fooling the workers.

In fulfilment of our duty, we shall never tire of repeating to the class-conscious workers that advocacy of an open workers' party is empty liberal chatter, designed to corrupt the workers and to destroy the Marxist organisation. The latter *cannot* exist and grow unless a determined and relentless struggle is waged against those who are directing all their efforts towards destroying the Marxist organism, into which the upsurge of the last two years has infused new and healthy blood.

Put Pravdy No. 9,
January 31, 1914
Signed: *K. T.*

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

In his letter, published in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 16, A. Bogdanov concealed the main reason for his disagreement with *Pravda*.

That reason is that A. Bogdanov has for many years been opposing the philosophy of Marxism and upholding bourgeois idealist views against the materialism of Marx and Engels.

For that reason, the Marxist Bolsheviks several years ago considered it their duty to come out against Bogdanov. For the same reason the Marxist Mensheviks, in the person of G. V. Plekhanov, are conducting a literary struggle against Bogdanov. And lastly, for the very same reason, even the so-called *Vperyod* group[57] has broken with Bogdanov.

True, ever since Bogdanov began to contribute to *Pravda*, we doubted whether he would refrain from carrying his fight against the philosophy of Marxism into the columns of the workers' newspaper. Unfortunately, A. Bogdanov hastened to confirm our fears. After getting several small popular articles on innocuous subjects, published in *Pravda*, he shortly submitted an article entitled "Ideology", in which, in the most "popular" manner, he launched an attack upon the philosophy of Marxism. *The editors refused to publish that anti-Marxist article. This was the cause of the conflict.*

We advise A. Bogdanov, instead of complaining about "family rows" to get *that* article entitled "Ideology" *published* (the liquidationist newspaper will not, of course, refuse hospitality to an anti-Marxist article). All Marxists will then be able to see the real reason for our disagreement with Bogdanov, concerning which he said *not a word* in his lengthy letter.

We believe that the workers have set up a newspaper of their own in order that it should *advocate* Marxism, and not have its columns used to distort Marxism in the spirit of bourgeois "scholars".

We are also very glad that A. Bogdanov has once again raised the question of the article on the *Vperyod* group, which he sent to *Pravda* last summer. Since A. Bogdanov desires it, he will receive (in *Prosveshcheniye*) a detailed statement about the number of untruths that article contained, and about the immense harm that adventurist group has caused the working-class movement in Russia.*

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* See pp. 487-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE LIQUIDATORS' LEADER ON THE LIQUIDATORS' TERMS OF "UNITY"

Every crisis, every turning-point in any movement, is particularly interesting (and particularly useful to those who belong to it) in that it brings into clear and sharp focus that movement's fundamental trends, its fundamental laws.

The International Socialist Bureau's decision to arrange an "exchange of opinions" among all groups in Russia's working-class movement also marks a certain crisis or turning-point in the movement. It will undoubtedly be very useful "loyally", as the resolution of the International Socialist Bureau expresses it, i.e., sincerely, to "exchange opinions" before an authoritative international body. It will make *everybody* take a closer and more serious look *at the course* of the working-class movement in Russia.

We ought to be extremely grateful to Mr. F. D., the well-known leader of the liquidators, for having *of his own accord* published in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 108 an extremely valuable statement of his views on "amalgamation", covered with only a thin veil of convention and bashfulness. Our best greetings to Mr. F. D.! It is pleasanter by far to talk with the opponent *himself* than with muddled or feeble go-betweens, etc.!

With praiseworthy candour Mr. F. D. sets forth and compares *two* points of view on amalgamation: one of them he rejects as "profoundly erroneous"; the other he approves of and adheres to.

This is how Mr. F. D. sets forth the first point of view:

"One may argue thus: the differences among the Social-Democratic trends in Russia are negligible. Therefore, on the grounds of their negligibility, we must, with help from the International, devise

some *organisational form* of amalgamation—either federation, or a certain quota restricting the powers of any majority. Once an acceptable *external form* of unity' is found, the negligible differences will 'vanish' of themselves—everything will come right in the end."

Mr. F. D. calls this point of view "profoundly erroneous", without, however, naming its advocates (Trotsky, Kautsky, and all the "conciliators" in general). The veil of convention and bashfulness must have prevented Mr. F. D. from mentioning the well-known names of the supporters of this "profoundly erroneous" idea! But *actually* concealment of the truth benefits only the opponents of the working class!

Thus, the views of the conciliators are "profoundly erroneous". Why is that?

In answering this question Mr. F. D. winds the veil thrice round his bashful face. "It will explode," he says, "it will lead to collapse", "*be the differences great or small*!"

The words quoted in italics give Mr. F. D. away completely. Murder will out, however you "veil" it.

With the full candour you reveal, Mr. F. D., your petty evasions are useless and ridiculous. Are the differences *negligible*, or are they *not negligible*? Give us a straight answer. There is no middle course, for the point at issue is whether unity is *possible* (*yes*, *it is possible* if the differences are negligible, or small) or impossible (*no*, *it is impossible* if the differences are *not* "negligible").

In condemning the "negligible" differences, Mr. F. D. admitted *thereby* that the disagreements are important. But he was afraid to say so openly (what would the "Seven"[58] say? What would Trotsky, the Bundists, An,[59] and all the conciliators say?). He tried to wrap his answer in a long-winded and deadly dull discourse *on the second* point of view on unity.

But even in this long-winded discourse it is not difficult to get to the heart of the matter:

"This platform [i.e., the one that Mr. F. D. considers desirable and acceptable] must ensure the non-Leninists full opportunity, within the united Social-Democratic Party, to campaign and fight for the open existence of Social-Democracy."

Enough! Quite enough, Mr. F. D.! This is the real gist of the matter, not phrases or declamations.

To ensure the liquidators full opportunity to fight the "underground"—that is what Mr. F. D.'s "platform" amounts to, since everybody understands perfectly well that the fig-leaf of a "fight for open existence" is intended to cover up the fight against the "underground", which all workers know is being waged.

That is the crux of the matter, and all those Trotskys, Ans, Bundists; conciliators, "Sevens", and so forth, are nice people, but political nonentities. The heart of the matter is in Mr. F. D.'s group, the "old" group of liquidators.

The Marxist organisation's differences with this group are absolutely irreconcilable, for agreement (let alone unity), not only with those who repudiate the "underground", but even with those who have any doubts on that score, is totally out of the question. The workers have long realised that this is the crux of the matter as far as the liquidators are concerned, for they *dismissed the latter from office* in *all* fields of the working-class movement.

There was a time when the Marxist organisation condemned the liquidators (1908-09). That time has long passed away. There was a time when the Marxist organisation proclaimed forgiveness and peace to all who were prepared to renounce liquidationism (1910-11). That time has long ago passed away. There was a time when the Marxists re-established their organisation, *in opposition* to the liquidators (1912-13). That time, too, has passed away. Then came a time when the Marxist organisation *won over* the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers, in opposition to all and sundry liquidators together with *their* allies.

This has been proved by incontrovertible facts. The proportion of Bolshevik deputies elected by the worker curia rose from 47 per cent in the Second Duma elections to 50 per cent in the Third Duma elections, and to 67 per cent in the Fourth Duma elections (autumn 1912). In the course of 21 months, between January 1, 1912 and October 1, 1913, the Party rallied *two thousand* workers' groups, while the liquidators and *all* their allies united only *five hundred*. Not only have Mr. F. D. and his friends made no attempt to refute these incontrovertible facts, but *they themselves*, speaking through Mr. Rakitin in the columns of *Nasha*

Zarya,[60] have admitted that the *masses of the workers* support the Bolsheviks.

Clearly, anyone who offers the Marxist organisation a "platform" giving the liquidators "every opportunity" to liquidate that organisation—anyone who, "in the name of unity", flouts the will of the vast majority of the class-conscious workers, is simply making a mockery of "unity".

Do you want unity? Then renounce liquidationism unequivocally, renounce the "fight for open existence", and submit loyally to the majority. You do not want unity? You may please yourself, but do not complain if, in a few months' time, you will have no worker following left at all, and you will have become not "near-Party" but "near-Cadet" intellectuals.

Put Pravdy No. 12,
February 4, 1914
Signed: *K. T.*

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME IN AUSTRIA AND IN RUSSIA

In Austria the national programme of the Social-Democratic Party was discussed and adopted at the Brünn Congress in 1899. There is a very widespread but mistaken opinion that this Congress adopted what is known as "cultural-national autonomy". The reverse is true: the latter was *unanimously rejected* there.

The South-Slav Social-Democrats submitted to the Brünn Congress (see p. XV of the official Minutes of the Congress in German) a programme of cultural-national autonomy worded as follows:

> (§2) "every nation inhabiting Austria, *irrespective of the territory on which its members reside*, shall constitute an autonomous group which shall quite independently administer all its national (language and cultural) affairs".

The words underlined by us clearly express the *gist* of "cultural-national autonomy" (otherwise called extra-territorial). The state is to perpetuate the delimitation of nations in educational and similar affairs, and every citizen is free to register with any nation he pleases.

At the Congress this programme was defended both by Kristan and the influential Ellenbogen. It was later withdrawn, however. Not a single vote was cast for it. Victor Adler, the Party's leader, said, "...I doubt whether anybody would at present consider this plan practicable" (p. 82 of the Minutes).

One of the arguments against it, on principle, was advanced by Preussler, who said: "The proposals tabled by comrades Kristan and Ellenbogen would result in chauvinism being perpetuated and introduced into every tiny community, into every tiny group" (ibid., p. 92).

Clause 3 of the Brünn Congress programme relevant to this subject reads as follows:

"The self-governing *regions* of a given nation shall form a single national association which shall settle all its national affairs quite autonomously."

This is a *territorialist* programme which *directly precludes*, for example, *Jewish* cultural-national autonomy. Otto Bauer, the principal theoretician of "cultural-national autonomy", devoted a *special chapter* of his book (1907) to proving that "cultural-national autonomy" for the Jews could not be demanded.

We would mention on this issue that Marxists stand for full freedom of association, including the association of any national regions (uyezds, volosts, villages, and so forth); but Social-Democrats cannot possibly agree to having statutory *recognition* given to single *national associations* within the state.

In Russia, as it happens, *all* the Jewish bourgeois parties (as well as the Bund, which actually follows in their wake) *adopted* the programme of "extra-territorial (cultural-national) autonomy", which was rejected by all the Austrian theoreticians and by the Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party!

This fact, which the Bundists for quite obvious reasons have often tried to deny, can be easily verified by a reference to the well-known book, *Forms of the National Movement* (St. Petersburg, 1910)—see also *Prosveshcheniye* No. 3, 1913.

This fact clearly shows that the more backward and more petty-bourgeois social structure of Russia has resulted in some of the Marxists becoming much more infected with bourgeois nationalism.

The Bund's nationalist vacillations were formally and unequivocally condemned long ago by the *Second* (1903) Congress, which *flatly rejected* the amendment moved by the Bundist Goldblatt on "the setting up of institutions guaranteeing freedom of development for the nationalities" (a pseudonym for "cultural-national autonomy").

When, at the August 1912 Conference of liquidators, the Caucasian Mensheviks, who until then had for decades

been strenuously fighting the Bund, themselves slipped into nationalism, under the influence of the entire *nationalist* atmosphere of the counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks *were not the only ones* to condemn them. The Caucasian Mensheviks were also emphatically condemned by the Menshevik Plekhanov, who described their decision as "the adaptation of socialism to nationalism".

"The Caucasian comrades," Plekhanov wrote, "who have begun to talk about cultural autonomy instead of political autonomy, have merely certified the fact that they have unwisely submitted to the hegemony of the Bund."

Besides the Jewish bourgeois parties, the Bund and the liquidators, "cultural-national autonomy" was adopted only by the conference of the petty-bourgeois national parties of the Left-Narodnik trend. But even here four parties (the Jewish Socialist Labour Party; the Byelorussian Hromada; the Dashnaktsutyun and the Georgian Socialists-Federalists[61]), adopted this programme, while the two largest parties *abstained from voting*: these were the Russian Left Narodniks and the Polish "Fracy" (P.S.P.)!

The Russian Left Narodniks expressed particular opposition to the *compulsory*, legal-state associations of nationalities proposed in the famous Bund plan.

From this brief historical survey it is clear why both the February and the summer conferences of Marxists in 1913 emphatically condemned the petty-bourgeois and nationalist idea of "cultural-national autonomy".*

Put Pravdy No. 13,
February 5, 1914
Signed: *M.*

Published according to the text in *Put Pravdy*

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, p. 461 and Vol. 19, pp. 427-28.—*Ed.*

A HIGHBORN LIBERAL LANDLORD ON THE "NEW ZEMSTVO RUSSIA"

Deafened by liberal catch-phrases, people in our country are apt to overlook the actual class stand of the liberal party's real bosses. In *Russkaya Mysl* No. 12, Prince Yevgeny Trubetskoi has splendidly revealed this stand and strikingly shown to what extent liberal landlords like the Trubetskois, and reactionary landlords like the Purishkeviches have drawn closer together on all important issues.

Stolypin's agrarian policy[62] is one such momentous issue. The highborn liberal landlord has this to say of it:

> "Ever since Stolypin became Premier, the government's entire concern for the countryside has been prompted largely by two motives: fear of Pugachovism,[63] which caused so much trouble in 1905, and the desire to offset it with a new type of peasant—one who is well-to-do and therefore cherishes private property, one who will not be susceptible to revolutionary propaganda...."

By the very use of the word "Pugachovism" our liberal reveals that he is at one with the Purishkeviches. The only difference is that the Purishkeviches utter this word ferociously and menacingly, whereas the Trubetskois pronounce it in the dulcet and sugary Manilov manner,[64] to the accompaniment of phrases about culture, disgustingly hypocritical exclamations about the "new peasant communities" and the "democratisation of the countryside", and pathetic speeches on things divine.

Owing to the new agrarian policy, the peasant bourgeoisie is growing much faster than before. There is no question about that. The peasant bourgeoisie in Russia cannot help growing whatever the political and agrarian system may be, because Russia is a capitalist country which has been completely drawn into the orbit of world capitalism. His

Liberal Highness would have known this had he possessed at least an elementary knowledge of the "fundamental principles of Marxism", of which he speaks with such boundless *aplomb* and with equally boundless ignorance. But His Highness exerts every effort to obscure the fundamental question of what the development of capitalism is like *without* any Purishkeviches, and what it is like *with* their class in complete power. His Highness goes into ecstasies over the progress of co-operation, fodder grass cultivation, and "growing prosperity"; but he does not say a word about the high cost of living, the mass pauperisation of the peasants, their desperate poverty and starvation, about labour rent, and so forth. His Highness sees that the "peasants are turning bourgeois", and goes into raptures over it, but our liberal landlord turns a blind eye to the fact that they are becoming wage-labourers under conditions in which the relations of feudal bondage are preserved.

"The intelligentsia's first contact with the broad masses of the peasantry," he writes, "took place as far back as 1905, but at that time it bore an altogether different character; it was destructive rather than constructive. At that time the affiliation was established solely for the purpose of destroying the old forms of life, and was therefore superficial. The demagogue intellectual did not imbue the peasants' minds and peasant life with his own independent ideas; if anything, he himself was guided by the instincts of the masses of the people. He flattered them and adapted his party programme and tactics to them."

Familiar Purishkevich-style talk! A little example: if eighty peasant homesteads of twenty-five dessiatines each are set up on 2,000 dessiatines of the Trubetskois' land, that will be "destructive"; but if a score or so of such homesteads are set up on the land of the pauperised village-commune peasants, that will be "constructive". Is that not so, Your Highness? Don't you realise that in the first instance, Russia would really be "bourgeois-democratic", and in the second she would remain Purishkevichian for decades to come?

However, shying away from unpleasant questions, the highborn liberal assures his readers that the big landowners, who are selling their land, will "soon, very soon" disappear entirely.

"If, by its measures, the government does not accelerate the future revolution excessively, 'compulsory alienation' will no longer be a problem when that revolution does come, as there will be almost nothing left to alienate."

According to the latest statistics of the Ministry of the Interior,[65] 30,000 landlords owned 70,000,000 dessiatines of land in 1905, while a similar area was owned by 10,000,000 peasants. But that does not concern the highborn liberal in the least! He assures his readers that the Purishkeviches will disappear very "soon", because he wishes to defend the Purishkeviches. The only thing that really interests him is that:

"there will be in the countryside enough people interested in private property to counter, not only Pugachov propaganda, but socialist propaganda in all its forms".

Thanks for being so candid!

"What will the result be?" the liberal prince asks. "Will the government, with the aid of the intelligentsia [who are joining co-operative societies, etc.], re-educate the peasants to become loyal petty landed proprietors, or, on the contrary, will the intelligentsia educate them with the aid of government loans?"

The prince anticipates neither of these alternatives. But that is merely a hypocritical turn of speech. Actually, as we have seen, he stands heart and soul for peasants being re-educated to become "loyal petty landed proprietors", and assures us that "the intelligentsia is coming down to earth", and that there will be no room for the "demagogic agrarian programme" of the socialists (which, in the opinion of His Highness, runs counter to the "fundamental principles of Marxism". Don't laugh, reader!).

That a landlord should entertain such views is not surprising. Neither is his indignation at the growth of atheism surprising, or his pious speeches. What is surprising is that there are still foolish people in Russia who do not understand that while such landlords and such politicians set the tone in the liberal party, including the Cadet Party, it is ridiculous to hope that the people's interests can be really defended "with the co-operation" of the liberals and the Cadets.

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NARODISM AND THE CLASS OF WAGE-WORKERS

The tenth anniversary of the death of the liberal-Narodnik writer Mikhailovsky has provided the Narodniks with a pretext for reviving the old dispute about the significance of the Marxists' struggle against the Narodniks. That dispute is of no little interest: first, historically, since the rise of Marxism in Russia was the point at issue; second, theoretically, since the dispute concerned the fundamental questions of Marxist theory; and third, practically, *inasmuch as* the Left-Narodnik newspaper in St. Petersburg is trying to win the workers over to its side. Mr. Rakitnikov, the Narodnik, writes:

> "Nobody, of course, now puts the case the way it was put in the sixties and seventies, viz., whether Russia can avoid the phase of capitalism. Russia is already in that phase."

This interesting statement by a Left Narodnik brings us straightaway to the gist of the matter. Is it true that the question as to whether "Russia can avoid the phase of capitalism" was discussed only in the sixties and seventies? No. It is absolutely untrue. This question was discussed by the Narodniks in general, and by the contributors to *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[66] (i.e., members of Mikhailovsky's group) in particular, both in the eighties and the nineties. It is sufficient to mention Mr. Nikolai—on,[67] for example.

Why then, did Mr. Rakitnikov *conceal* the eighties and the nineties from his readers? Was it merely to cover up the Narodniks' errors, and thus help to spread them among the workers? This is a shabby trick, and things must be going bad with those who resort to such tricks.

What are the implications of the theory that "Russia can avoid the phase of capitalism", a theory that was propounded by Mikhailovsky and his group, and survived right down to the nineties of the last century?

That was the theory of utopian, petty-bourgeois socialism, i.e., the *dream* of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, who sought a way of escape from capitalism *not in the wage-workers' class struggle* against the bourgeoisie, but in *appeals* to the "entire nation", to "society", *that is*, *to that very same bourgeoisie*.

Prior to the rise of the working-class movement, such theories of "socialism" were prevalent in all countries and they merely reflected in fact the hopes of petty-bourgeois theoreticians that the class struggle could be avoided, dispensed with. In all countries, as in Russia, the class-conscious working-class movement had to wage a persistent struggle against these petty-bourgeois doctrines of "socialism" which were in keeping with the status and point of view of the petty proprietors.

The working-class movement cannot exist or develop successfully until this theory of the benevolent petty proprietors regarding the possibility of "avoiding" capitalism is refuted. By covering up the fundamental mistake of the Mikhailovsky group, Mr. Rakitnikov is bringing confusion into the theory of the *class struggle*. Nevertheless it is this theory alone that has shown the workers the way out of their present conditions, shown how the workers themselves can and should endeavour to achieve their emancipation.

"Russia is already in the phase of capitalism," writes Mr. Rakitnikov.

This remarkable admission is tantamount to admitting the fundamental error of Mikhailovsky and his group.

Moreover, it is tantamount to a complete renunciation of Narodism.

The Left Narodniks who are in agreement with this admission are now fighting the Marxists not as Narodniks, but as opportunists in the socialist movement, as supporters of petty-bourgeois deviations from socialism.

Indeed, if "Russia is already in the phase of capitalism", it follows that Russia is a capitalist country. It follows that

in Russia, as in all capitalist countries, the *petty proprietors*, including the peasants, are petty bourgeois. It follows that in Russia, as in all capitalist countries, the wage-workers' class struggle against the bourgeoisie is the only way in which socialism can be achieved.

To this day the programme of the Left Narodniks (not to mention their *Russkoye Bogatstvo* friends) dares not admit that Russia is a capitalist country. Mr. Rakitnikov defends Narodism by *surrendering* the Narodniks' programme to the Marxists! A poor defence!

Mr. Rakitnikov argues with the Marxists not like a Narodnik but like an opportunist when he says:

> "to support peasant farming does not mean battling against the stream of inexorable economic development. *And an increasing number of socialists in the West is adopting this point of view.*"

We have emphasised the words that completely betray our poor "Left Narodnik"! We know that in the West the class of wage-workers *alone* has been able as a class to form socialist parties. We know that in the West the *peasantry* as a class forms, not socialist but bourgeois parties. We know that it is *not* the socialists, but the opportunists in the West who support petty-bourgeois farming.

"To support peasant farming!..." Look about you. Peasant *proprietors* are forming associations to market grain, hay, milk and meat at the highest prices, and to hire labour at the lowest. The freer the peasants are and the more land they possess, the clearer do we see this.

Mr. Rakitnikov is trying to persuade the class of wage-workers to "support petty-bourgeois farming". A fine sort of "socialism", indeed!

The wage-workers support only the peasants' struggle against the feudalists and the serf-like conditions, but that is quite different from what Mr. Rakitnikov wants.

In Russia, the great years of 1905-07 definitely proved that the wage-workers were the only class to act and rally as a socialist force. The peasantry acted and rallied as a bourgeois-democratic force. With the development of capitalism the difference between the classes becomes more marked from day to day.

"Left-Narodnik" propaganda amounts, in effect, to the corruption and disruption of the wage-workers' class movement with the aid of petty-bourgeois slogans. The Left Narodniks would be well advised to turn to democratic work among the peasants—that is something which even *non*-socialists can do.

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Signed: *V. I.*

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MORE ABOUT "NATIONALISM"

"In our day", when attempts are being made to stage another Beilis case, the nationalists' propaganda could bear more frequent scrutiny. The nature of this propaganda was revealed with striking clarity at the recent second congress of representatives of the "All-Russia National Association".

It would be highly erroneous to think that the significance of this propaganda is negligible inasmuch as this entire "All-Russia Association", which was represented only by 21 delegates from all over Russia, is negligible and fictitious, a mere shadow. The "All-Russia National Association" is insignificant and a shadow, but its propaganda is backed by all the parties of the right and by all the *official* institutions; its propaganda is conducted in every village school, in every military barrack, and in every church.

The following is a press report of a paper read at this congress on February 2.

"Savenko, a member of the Duma, read a paper on 'Mazeppism',[68] as the Ukrainian movement is called in the jargon of the nationalists. Savenko expressed the opinion that the separatist tendencies [i.e., for secession from the state] among the Byelorussians and the Ukrainians were particularly dangerous. The Ukrainian movement constituted a specially great and real menace to the integrity of Russia. The immediate programme of the Ukrainians was federalism and Ukrainian autonomy.

"The Ukrainians linked their hopes of autonomy with the defeat of Russia in a future war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. On the ruins of Great Russia an autonomous Poland and an autonomous Ukraine would be founded under the sceptre of the Habsburgs and within the boundaries of Austria-Hungary.

"If the Ukrainians really succeeded in tearing their 30,000,000 away from the Russian people, it would mean the end of the Great-Russian Empire. (*Applause.*)"

Why is this "federalism" no obstacle to the integrity of the United States, or of Switzerland? Why is "autonomy"

no obstacle to the integrity of Austria-Hungary? Why has "autonomy" even cemented the ties between Britain and many of her colonies for a long time to come?

Mr. Savenko has presented his case for "nationalism" in such a ridiculous light that he has made it extremely easy to refute his ideas. The integrity of Russia, if you please, is "menaced" by the autonomy of the Ukraine, whereas the integrity of Austria-Hungary is *cemented* by universal suffrage and the autonomy of her various regions! Is not this very strange? Will it not occur to those who read and hear this "nationalist" propaganda to ask why it is impossible to *cement* the integrity of Russia *by granting* autonomy to the Ukraine?

By persecuting "subject peoples", the landlord and bourgeois nationalists try to split and corrupt the working class the better to be able to dope it. The class-conscious workers retaliate by demanding complete equality and *unity* for the workers of all nationalities *in practice*.

In declaring the Byelorussians and Ukrainians to be subject peoples, the nationalist gentry forget to add that the Great Russians (the only non-"aliens" in Russia) constitute only 43 per cent of the population. Hence, the "subject peoples" are in the majority! How then can the minority keep its hold on the majority if it offers the latter no *benefits*, the benefits of political freedom, national equality, and local and regional autonomy?

By persecuting the Ukrainians and others for their "separatism", for their secessionist strivings, the nationalists are upholding the *privilege* of the Great-Russian landlords and the Great-Russian bourgeoisie to have "their own" state. The working class is opposed to *all* privileges; that is why it upholds the *right* of nations to self-determination.

The class-conscious workers do not advocate *secession*. They know the advantages of large states and the amalgamation of large masses of workers. But large states can be democratic only if there is complete equality among the nations; that equality implies the *right* to secede.

The struggle against national oppression and national privileges is inseparably bound up with the defence of that right.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE PEASANTRY AND HIRED LABOUR

No phrase has been worked harder among the Narodniks than that about the Marxists "setting the working people by the ears" by drawing a line between the hired workers and the peasants and pitting one class against the other. And no phrase is more mendacious, serving as it does to cover up defence of the interests of the small proprietor, the petty bourgeois; the exploiter of the hired labourer.

The following interesting data are from the Moscow Zemstvo Statistics published in 1913 (*A Handbook of Economic Statistics*, Vol. VII, Moscow, 1913). The Moscow statisticians investigated fruit and vegetable gardening in Moscow Uyezd. The investigation covered over 5,000 households, which the statisticians divided into seven districts according to their proximity to Moscow and the degree of intensity of cultivation (i.e., expenditure of a large amount of capital and labour on each dessiatine of land).

The employment of hired labourers by the peasants was investigated in fairly great detail. What is the result?

In the first four districts the number of households employing labour is 67 per cent (i.e., over two-thirds of the total number of households); in the remaining districts it ranges from 43 to 64 per cent. Hence it is evident that the overwhelming majority of the peasant households near Moscow are the farms of petty capitalists who hire labourers.

Still more interesting are the figures showing the number of households which employ labourers by the year or season. The percentages of such households are as follows:

District	I	26.6	per cent
”	II	16.7	” ”
”	III	16.4	” ”
”	IV	19.0	” ”
”	V	9.9	” ”
”	VI	5.0	” ”
”	VII	6.4	” ”

As a rule, the more intensive a given district, the higher is the percentage of peasants who employ labourers by the year and the season.

The figures covering entire districts, however, lump together the poor and the rich peasants in each district. Hence, they are only very rough figures which give a *varnished* picture, for they *cover up* the contrasts between poverty and wealth, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Let us take the figures for the groups of farms classified according to amount of land held in tenure (i.e., amount of land under cultivation). These figures are far more reliable than the figures of allotment land ownership, which to this day, *even around Moscow*, retains its feudal-bureaucratic character. Among the peasants who own small allotments there are rich peasants who lease land. And among the peasants who own large allotments there are poor peasants who rent out their allotments, and landless or rather non-farming peasants.

In all districts the percentage of non-farming peasants who employ labourers is nil. That is natural. The non-farming peasant is himself a proletarian.

Peasants with farms of under half a dessiatine: the percentage of households employing labourers ranges from 0 to 57 (we are taking one of the three subgroups, so as not to complicate the question).

Farmers with between one half and one dessiatine: the percentage of households employing labourers ranges from 0 to 100.

Farmers with one to three dessiatines: the percentage of households employing labourers ranges from 46 to 100 (in different districts).

Farmers with from three to five dessiatines: the percentage of households employing labourers ranges from 66 to 97.

Farmers with from five to ten dessiatines: the percentage of households employing labourers ranges from 75 to 100.

From this we clearly see that the non-farming peasants are themselves proletarians (hired labourers). The larger the farm, *the more often* is hired labour exploited. Even among the farmers who have from three to five dessiatines, *no less than* two-thirds of the total exploit hired labour!

Such is the plain, well-known and obvious fact, which the Narodniks try to distort. What is true of the Moscow area is true, to a lesser degree, of all other places. Everyone knows that *every* town and *every* mile of railway draw peasant economy into the orbit of commerce and capitalism. The "Left Narodniks" are the only ones who refuse to see the truth, which explodes their petty-bourgeois theory.

That truth is that *every* mile of railway, *every* new shop that is opened in the village, *every* co-operative society that is formed to make buying easier, *every* factory, and so forth, draw peasant economy into the orbit of commerce. And that means that the peasantry is *breaking up* into proletarians, and *proprietors* employing hired labourers.

There can be no improvement in peasant economy that does not involve an increase in the exploitation of hired labour on the improved farms.

That is why the Marxists defend the interests of labour—and they are the only ones to do so—by distinguishing the proletarians, the hired workers, both in town and countryside.

The Narodniks, on the other hand, defend (in practice) the interests of the *exploiters* of hired labour when they talk about the "peasantry" and "peasant economy", for the more the peasant resembles a "proprietor", the *more he exploits* hired labour.

It is in the interests of the bourgeoisie (in whose footsteps the Narodniks blindly follow) to *confuse* the peasant proletariat with the peasant bourgeoisie.

It is in the interests of the proletariat to combat this confusion and to draw a clear line between classes *everywhere*, including the peasantry. It is useless deceiving oneself and others by talking about the "peasantry". We should ourselves learn and teach the peasants that even among the peasantry the gulf between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is widening day by day.

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MR. STRUVE ON THE NEED TO "REFORM THE GOVERNMENT"

Mr. Struve is one of the most outspoken of the counter-revolutionary liberals. It is often very instructive, therefore, to lend an ear to the political comments of a writer who is a striking illustration of the correctness of the Marxian analysis of opportunism (for Mr. Struve, as we know, began with opportunism, with a "criticism of Marxism", and in a few years fell as low as counter-revolutionary, bourgeois national-liberalism).

In the January issue of *Russkaya Mysl*, Mr. Struve discussed the need "to reform the government". In the first place, he admits the *failure* of the Stolypin policy,[69] as well as of the entire reaction of 1907-14 and Octobrism.[70] Reaction "faces a crisis", writes Mr. Struve. In his opinion, attempts at back-pedalling reforms, such as turning the Duma into a legislative-consultative body, will "put the government in the same position it was in before 1905", with this important difference, however, that the people have changed since then. "In 1905 the sympathies and instincts of the masses swung over to the intelligentsia."

This is written by a Vekhist,[71] a fervent opponent of revolution and an exponent of the most obscurantist theories. Even he is compelled to admit that the *masses* have swung to the left; but this liberal dares not say more plainly, clearly and exactly which classes among these masses have aligned themselves with which parties.

"Our people has not taken shape yet, has not yet separated into its elements. The fact that it has been conservative for such a long time and gone revolutionary overnight, as it were, does not tell us what it will become when all its latent potentialities will have developed."

This is a specimen of the phrase-mongering with which the bourgeoisie *covers up* unpalatable truths. Obviously, what is implied here by the term people is the peasantry, since the bourgeoisie (let alone the landlords) and the working class have sufficiently taken shape, and are sufficiently differentiated. The liberal dares not in so many words admit that the *bourgeois peasantry* "has not yet taken shape", *despite* the frantic efforts of the new agrarian policy.

"What is the way out of the present situation?" Mr. Struve asks, and replies: "There is only a single alternative: either steadily increasing political unrest, in which the middle classes and the moderate elements that represent them ... [so the moderate elements "represent" the middle classes? This is not very intelligent but politically it is fairly clear; which elements, then, "represent" the peasantry and the workers?] will again be pushed into the background by the elemental pressure of the popular masses who will be inspired by the extreme elements, or, *the reform of government.* We shall not deal here with the first way out. Under the conditions prevailing in Russia we definitely adhere to the point of view that it is impossible for us either to work effectively towards such a solution, or even simply to desire it...." (Thank you for being so candid, Mr. Struve! Our liquidators could well take a lesson in plain-speaking and candour from this man, instead of beating about the bush the way L. M. does in the January issue of *Nasha Zarya.*)

"It is left for us to suggest to the public mind the second way out as being an urgent problem which has to be solved by the joint efforts of all progressive and, at the same time, preservatory forces."

Of this second way out Mr. Struve has absolutely nothing to say except empty phrases. The bourgeoisie is for moderation, the masses are for "extremes"—this the liberal is compelled to admit. As to what the social structure of the reformable "government" must be, what its class basis should be, and what has become of the landlords who reigned and governed unchallenged prior to the bourgeoisie—of all this Mr. Struve dares not even think. Helplessness, impotence and complete lack of principles and ideals—such are the inevitable features of the liberal bourgeoisie so long as it fawns (as Messrs. Struve and Co. do) on the Purishkeviches.

"Strange as it may appear," Mr. Struve writes, "there is nothing that we could wish the government more than that it should forget that there ever were events, facts and moods which we are accustomed to call the Russian revolution."

Splendid, profound, wise, and earnest political advice! Let the "government forget". After all, aged people do sometimes forget what is happening to them and around them!

The spokesmen of senile Russian liberalism measure others with their own yardstick.

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THE NARODNIKS ON N. K. MIKHAILOVSKY

The tenth anniversary of the death of N. K. Mikhailovsky (who died on January 28, 1904) was marked by a spate of laudatory articles in the liberal-bourgeois and Narodnik (i.e., bourgeois-democratic) press. It is not surprising that the liberals and bourgeois democrats laud N. K. Mikhailovsky, but one cannot help protesting against the flagrant distortion of the truth and the corruption of proletarian class-consciousness when attempts are made to pass Mikhailovsky off as a socialist and to prove that his bourgeois philosophy and sociology are compatible with Marxism.

Mikhailovsky was one of the finest spokesmen of Russian bourgeois democracy in the latter third of the last century. The masses of the peasantry, who (not counting the urban petty bourgeoisie) are the only important and mass vehicles of bourgeois-democratic ideas in Russia, were then still dormant. The best people from their midst, and those who deeply sympathised with their hard lot, the *raznochintsi* (mostly students, teachers and other intellectuals), tried to enlighten and rouse the dormant peasant masses.

The historic service that Mikhailovsky rendered the bourgeois-democratic movement for the liberation of Russia was that he warmly sympathised with the hard lot of the peasants, strenuously combated all manifestations of feudal tyranny, advocated in the legal, open press—if only by hints—sympathy and respect for the "underground", where the most consistent and determined *raznochintsi* democrats operated, and even gave direct personal help to the "underground". Today, when not only liberals but also liquidators, both Narodnik (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*) and Marxist, betray a shameless and often renegade attitude towards the

"underground", one cannot help putting in a good word in memory of the service rendered by Mikhailovsky.

Though he was an ardent champion of freedom and of the oppressed masses of the peasantry, Mikhailovsky shared all the weaknesses of the bourgeois-democratic movement. He thought there was something "socialistic" in the idea of transferring all the land to the peasants, especially without redemption, and therefore considered himself a "socialist". Of course, this was a profound error, which was fully revealed by Marx and by the experience of *all* civilised countries, where, until the complete collapse of serf-ownership and absolutism, the bourgeois democrats *constantly* imagined themselves to be "socialists". The transfer of all the land to the peasants, particularly on the terms indicated, is a very useful measure under the rule of the feudal-minded landlords, but it is a bourgeois-democratic measure. Today every sensible socialist is aware of that. The experience of all the world goes to show that the more land (and the cheaper) the peasants have received from the feudalists, the more "land and liberty" there has been, the *more rapidly* capitalism has developed and the *more speedily* the *bourgeois* nature of the peasants has been revealed. If Mr. N. Rakitnikov (in issue No. 3 of *Vernaya Mysl*[72]) has not yet realised that the proletariat's support of the *bourgeois*-democratic peasants against the feudal landlords is not socialism at all, one can only smile at his simplicity. It is a dull business refuting errors that have long been refuted by all class-conscious workers.

Not only in the field of economics, but also in those of philosophy and sociology, Mikhailovsky's views were *bourgeois-democratic* views veiled by *quasi*-socialist phrases. Such were his "progress formula", his "struggle for individuality" theory and so on. In philosophy Mikhailovsky was a *step backward* from Chernyshevsky, the greatest exponent of utopian socialism in Russia. Chernyshevsky was a materialist, and to the end of his days (i.e., until the eighties of the nineteenth century) he ridiculed the petty concessions to idealism and mysticism that were made by the then fashionable "positivists" (Kantians, Machists, and so forth). And Mikhailovsky trailed in the wake of these very positivists. To this very day, these reactionary philosophical

views prevail among Mikhailovsky's disciples, even among the extreme "Left" Narodniks (such as Mr. Chernov).

That the "socialism" of Mikhailovsky and the Narodniks is mere bourgeois-democratic phrase-mongering was conclusively proved by the actions of all classes and their mass struggle in 1905-07. Most of the peasant deputies in the First and Second Dumas sided, *not* with the Left Narodniks, but with the "Trudoviks"[73] and the "Popular Socialists".[74] This is a fact that must not be forgotten or distorted. And, following the Marxists, even the Left Narodniks, in the persons for example of Vikhlayev, Chernov, and others, have been compelled to admit the bourgeois nature of the Trudovik Popular Socialists!

Let individual workers who sympathise with the Left Narodniks ask their teachers to produce *everything* the Left Narodniks wrote *against* the Trudovik Popular Socialists in 1906-07.

In those years mass action by the peasants proved conclusively that the peasantry takes a *bourgeois-democratic* stand. The Left Narodniks are at best only a small wing of peasant (i.e., bourgeois) democracy in Russia. The workers have supported the peasants (against the feudal landlords), and will continue to do so, but to confuse these classes, to confuse bourgeois democracy with the socialist proletariat, is reactionary adventurism. All class-conscious workers will strenuously combat this, particularly at the present time when the class cleavage has been made quite clear by the great experience of the mass struggle of 1905-07, and is becoming clearer day by day in our rural districts.

For a very long time, over ten years in fact, Mikhailovsky was the head and guiding spirit of the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* publicist group. What did this group produce in the great days of 1905-07?

It produced the first liquidators among the democrats!

Let individual workers who sympathise with the Left Narodniks ask their teachers to show them *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for August 1906, and all that was written by the Left Narodniks when they called this group "Social-Cadets", and so forth!

The Mikhailovsky group brought forth the first liquidators who, in the autumn of 1906, proclaimed an "open party",

and renounced the "underground" and its slogans two or three years before our Marxist liquidators did so. What came of the "open party" proclaimed by the Myakotins, Peshekhonovs, and other associates of Mikhailovsky? Nothing—the complete absence of any party whatsoever, and the complete isolation of the "open" group of opportunist Narodniks from the masses.

Mikhailovsky, who never renounced the "underground" (or rather, died shortly before his group went over to liquidationism), should not be held fully responsible for the paltry and contemptible opportunism of Messrs. Peshekhonov, Myakotin and Co. But is it not characteristic that in issue No. 3 of *Vernaya Mysl*, which is dedicated to Mikhailovsky, we again find the corrupt bloc between the "Left" Narodniks and the "Social-Cadets" of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*? And if we recall what Mikhailovsky wrote to Lavrov about his attitude towards revolutionaries, shall we not have to admit that, on the whole, the "Social-Cadets" are his faithful successors?

We pay tribute to Mikhailovsky for the sincere and skilful struggle he waged against the serf-owning system, the "bureaucracy" (we beg to be excused for this loose term), and so forth, for his respect for the "underground" and the assistance he rendered it, but not for his bourgeois-democratic views, or his vacillating tendencies towards liberalism, or his "Social-Cadet" group of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*.

It is no accident that the bourgeois democrats in Russia, i.e., in the first place the peasantry, vacillate between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat; that is due to their class position. It is the workers' job to liberate the peasantry from the influence of the liberals and relentlessly to combat "Narodnik" doctrines.

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CONCERNING A. BOGDANOV

The editors have received a letter signed by thirteen "Left Bolsheviks" and bearing the address "Tiflis, Caucasus", asking for our opinion on the question of having A. Bogdanov as a contributor. The signatories call themselves "ideological adherents of the *Vperyod* group", and their tone is openly and definitely hostile to our newspaper.

Nevertheless, we consider it necessary to have it out with them once and for all.

Why has it become impossible to have A. Bogdanov as a contributor to workers' newspapers and journals that adhere to a stand of consistent Marxism? Because A. Bogdanov is not a Marxist.

The writers of the letter, following the cue given by Bogdanov himself in his letter to the liquidator newspaper, try to account for A. Bogdanov's disappearance from the columns of our newspapers on personal grounds, as being due to personal spite, and so forth. All this is sheer nonsense that is not worth going into or explaining. Everything is much simpler and plainer.

If the writers of the letter were interested, not in "personalities", but in the history of the organisational and ideological relations among the Marxists, they would know that as far back as May 1909 a delegate meeting of Bolsheviks, after a long and detailed preliminary discussion, *rejected all responsibility* for A. Bogdanov's literary-political utterances.[75] If the writers of the letter attached less importance to philistine scandal and gossip and paid more attention to the ideological struggle among the Marxists, they would know that in his books A. Bogdanov has built up a definite social and philosophical system and that *all* Marxists, irrespective of group allegiance, have expressed their opposition to this

system as being non-Marxist and anti-Marxist. All who are interested in the history of Marxism and the working-class movement in Russia know—and those who do not *should make it their business* to learn, read and find out—that the question of A. Bogdanov's contributions to a workers' newspaper is bound up with a much more important question of principle, namely, the relation between Marxist philosophy and Bogdanov's theories. This question has been discussed, examined, and worked to death in books, pamphlets and articles. The question of a writer's contributions to the workers' press should be approached from the political angle, i.e., not from the point of view of the writer's style, wit, or popularising talent, but from that of his general trend, from the point of view of *what* he is bringing into the working masses by his theories. The Marxists are convinced that the sum of A. Bogdanov's literary activities amounts to attempts to instil into the consciousness of the proletariat the touched-up idealistic conceptions of the bourgeois philosophers.

If anybody thinks that this is not the case and that, in the controversy over the philosophical principles of Marxism, it is not Plekhanov and not Ilyin,[76] but Bogdanov who is right, that person should come out in support of Bogdanov's system, and not argue that one popular article or another of Bogdanov's ought to be given space in the columns of a workers' newspaper. But we know of no supporters of Bogdanov's system among Marxists. His theories have been opposed, not only by his "factional" opponents, but also by his former colleagues in his political group.

That is how the matter stands with Bogdanov. His attempts to "modify" and "correct" Marxism have been examined by Marxists and recognised as alien to the spirit of the modern working-class movement. The groups he formerly co-operated with have rejected all responsibility for his literary and other activities. One can think whatever one pleases about Bogdanov after this, but to demand that he be given space in the columns of the workers' press, which is called upon to disseminate the elementary principles of Marxism, reveals a failure to understand either Marxism, Bogdanov's theories, or the task of spreading Marxist education among the masses of the workers.

As regards the business of educating the masses of the workers, to which our newspaper is dedicated, our path and Bogdanov's diverge, for we differ in our understanding of what that education should be. That is the real issue, which, for self-interested motives, is being obscured by hints about personal relations. Workers to whom the *trend* of their newspaper is dear should brush aside as trash all these attempts to reduce the issue to the "personalities" of certain writers; they must look into the character of Bogdanov's theories. When they begin to do so they will speedily reach the conclusion we have arrived at, namely, that Marxism is one thing, and Bogdanov's theories are quite another. A workers' newspaper should clear the minds of the proletariat of bourgeois, idealistic hodge-podge, not offer them this indigestible fare in their columns.

We may be told: Nevertheless, *Pravda* did publish several of Bogdanov's articles. So it did.

But, as everyone now can see, this was a mistake inevitable in such a new undertaking as the publication of the first workers' newspaper in Russia. The comrades who were in charge at the time had hoped that, in the popular articles which Bogdanov offered the newspaper, propaganda of the ABC of Marxism would overshadow these specific features of Bogdanov's theories. As might have been expected, things turned out differently. After the first articles, which were more or less neutral, Bogdanov sent in an article in which he obviously attempted to convert the workers' newspaper into an instrument for the propaganda, not of Marxism, but of his own empirio-monism. A. Bogdanov evidently attached so much importance to this article that after it, i.e., since the spring of 1913, he sent in no more articles.

The question of Bogdanov's contributions became a matter of principle to our editorial board, who settled it in the way our readers already know.

Now a word about the *Vperyod* group. In the columns of our newspaper, it has been called "adventurist".*

Owing to their inability to think politically and not like philistines, the writers of the letter saw in this too an

* See p. 94 of this volume.—*Ed.*

insinuation against the personalities of the members of this group. This, too, is absurd. Marxists call "adventurist" the policy pursued by groups that do not take their stand on the basis of scientific socialism, such groups, for instance, as the anarchists, Narodnik terrorists, and so forth. No one will try to deny that the *Vperyod* group is leaning towards anarcho-syndicalism, or that they are tolerant of Lunacharsky's "god-building",[77] Bogdanov's idealism, and the doctrinal anarchist proclivities of S. Volsky, and so forth. Insofar as the policy of the *Vperyod* group has tended towards anarchism and syndicalism, every Marxist will call it a policy of adventurism.

This is simply a fact, which has been confirmed by the complete break-up of the *Vperyod* group. As soon as the working-class movement revived, this patchwork group, stitched together from the most heterogeneous elements, without a definite political line or understanding of the principles of class politics and Marxism, fell completely apart.

Marching under the banner of Marxism, the working-class movement will ignore these groups, these "empirio-monists", "god-builders", "anarchists", and the like.

Put Pravdy No. 21,
February 25, 1914

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EDITORIAL COMMENT ON VETERAN'S ARTICLE: "THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE LETTISH PROLETARIAT"

We gladly publish Comrade Veteran's[78] article, which gives an outline of the history of the national question among the Letts in general and in the Lettish Social-Democratic Party in particular. Draft amendments or addenda by Lettish Marxists for the decision by the Summer (1913) Conference[79] would be very welcome. Lettish Social-Democrats have long been in sympathy with the Bund; but this sympathy was shaken firstly by the theoretical criticism of the Marxists, and secondly by the Bundists' separatism in practice, particularly after 1906. We hope that the discussion of the national question among Lettish Social-Democrats will continue and that it will lead to the adoption of definite decisions.

As regards Comrade Veteran's remarks, we have only the following comment to make. He thinks our reference to Switzerland* unconvincing because all three nations in that country are historical and have been equal from the very beginning. But "nations without a history" cannot find models or patterns anywhere (apart from utopias) except among historical nations. As for the equality of nations, that is something even advocates of "cultural-national autonomy" take for granted. Consequently, the experience of civilised mankind tells us that *where* genuine equality of nations and consistent democracy exist, "cultural-national autonomy" is superfluous; and where they do *not* exist, it remains utopian, and propaganda in its favour is propaganda in favour of refined nationalism.

Prosveshcheniye No. 2,
February 1914

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the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

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* See pp. 20-21 of this volume.—*Ed.*

PREFACE TO THE SYMPOSIUM: *MARXISM AND LIQUIDATIONISM*[80]

The symposium herewith presented to the reader consists of articles written between 1909 and 1914. This was a period in which the working-class movement in Russia encountered particularly serious difficulties. Marxists, however, were not and could not be content with simply pointing to the difficulties, with simply complaining about the general disintegration, break-down, and so forth. It was necessary to determine the economic and political causes of the break-down from the point of view of the particular stage of Russia's capitalist development, and determine the class significance of the broadest trend that reflected this break-down, namely, the trend of *liquidationism*.

The basic answer to this question, which is extremely important to the working-class movement, was given by the Marxists in December 1908 in the form of very precise, fully formulated and official decisions.[81] These decisions had to be clarified, disseminated and applied to the everyday problems of the economic and political movement. This was done in the articles we have collected in the present symposium, which, for reasons "beyond the editors' control" is unfortunately far from complete.

At present, after a Marxist daily press has been in existence in St. Petersburg for nearly two years, the entire question of the significance and appraisal of liquidationism, not only in theory, but also in practice, has been *submitted*—if one may so express it—to the decision of the workers themselves. This is tremendously fortunate for the working-class movement of Russia, and a great sign of its maturity. The class-conscious workers are themselves seeking the truth and they will find it; they will determine the class signifi-

cance of liquidationism, employ the practical experience of their mass movement to verify its appraisal, and devise expedient methods to combat it.

Our object in publishing the present symposium is to come to the aid of all workers interested in the fate of the movement of their class. The articles are given here, not in their chronological order, but according to *subjects*, in the order (approximately) of their transition from theory to practice.

First come the fundamental questions (Section 1) a solution for which must be found if we are to have anything like intelligent tactics and an intelligent policy. Here the reader will find an appraisal of the present historical situation and of the class significance of the struggle of the Marxist trends. The next question dealt with is that of the hegemony of the proletariat in connection with the criticism of the liquidator's principal "work" (*The Social Movement*): And lastly, come articles on the question of the bourgeoisie's "swing to the left".

Then come (Section 2) articles on the election campaign, on the results of the Fourth Duma elections, and on Duma tactics.

After that comes (Section 3) the question of the "open party", and the question of unity, which is inseparably connected with it.

Section 4 deals with liberal-labour politics in its various applications. After a general appraisal of reformism comes an examination of the questions of "partial demands", freedom of association, the strike movement, the attitude of the liquidators towards the liberals and vice versa.

The last subject (Section 5) is the liquidators and the working-class movement. Here the reader will find an appraisal of the working-class movement in the years 1905-07 given by Koltsov, one of the leaders of liquidationism, in his principal work; an examination of the workers' attitude towards the liquidators in practice; and the most up-to-date material on the history of the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma.

In the "conclusion" an attempt is made to review the struggle of trends in the present-day working-class movement.

We permit ourselves the hope that our symposium will help the workers to find and study the data on the controversial issues. Naturally, we have been *unable* to include a good deal of important material. On the other hand, in a symposium of articles by different authors written over a series of years repetition is inevitable. There are, of course, individual shades among the authors. But, taken together, all their articles are no more than a commentary, an application of formulated Marxist decisions, whose recognition, among other things, distinguishes the class-conscious organised Marxist workers from the liquidators of the workers' party, and from those who are dropping away from the Party. One of our main objects is to clarify and test these decisions, and to make it easier to formulate such amendments and addenda to them as may become necessary in the course of time.

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POLITICAL DISPUTES AMONG THE LIBERALS

Put Pravdy (No. 18) of last Friday published an article entitled "Mr. Struve on the Need to 'Reform the Government'"* in which we informed our readers of the appraisal of the political situation in Russia given by one of the most outspoken and consistent of the counter-revolutionary liberals.

The next day *Rech* published a tremendously long "doctrinal" article by Mr. Milyukov "against" Mr. Struve in connection with this very article on the need to reform the government. It will be useful to dwell on this dispute between the two liberals, firstly, because vital issues of Russian politics are involved, and secondly, because it reveals the *two political types* of leading bourgeois. And they are types that will have important political significance in Russia for a long time to come, for decades, types that are of similar significance in all capitalist countries. In its own interests, the proletariat must know these types.

During the past few years Mr. Struve has set forth his views most fully and clearly in the book *Vekhi*.[82] These are the views of a counter-revolutionary liberal, an adherent of religion (and of philosophical idealism as the truest and most "scholarly" road to it), and an opponent of democracy. They are the clear, distinctly expressed views, not of an individual, but of a class, for as a matter of fact the *entire mass* of the Octobrist and *Cadet* bourgeoisie in Russia during 1907-14 subscribed to them.

The crux of the matter is that the Octobrist and Cadet bourgeoisie have swung to the right, away from democracy. The crux of the matter is that this bourgeoisie is more afraid

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* See pp. 114-16 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the people than of reaction. The crux of the matter is that this rightward swing has not been accidental, but has been caused by the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The crux of the matter is that Struve and then Maklakov have told the truth about their class and their party more frankly than other Cadets have.

And this home truth has been very unpalatable to the diplomats of the Cadet Party (headed by Mr. Milyukov), who deem it necessary to flirt with democracy in the belief that the role of this democracy is not quite played out, and that the bourgeoisie may perhaps have to live and act in a milieu created, not only by the Purishkeviches but—God forbid—by the democracy, by the "mob", by the "street", by the workers.

While taking the same line as Mr. Struve and Mr. Maklakov, Mr. Milyukov tries to cover it up, show himself off before the public, fool democracy and keep it in leading strings. That is why Mr. Milyukov *pretends* that he disagrees with *Vekhi*, that he disagrees with Struve, and that he is refuting Maklakov, when *as a matter of fact* he is merely teaching Struve and Maklakov how to conceal their thoughts more cunningly.

The gist of Mr. Milyukov's long article against Struve is his accusation that Struve is "hopelessly muddled".

Hot and strong, is it not?

Where is the muddle? It is in Struve's holding the "optimistic" belief that the government can be reformed, while at the same time saying that it is learning no lessons from the "upheavals" and is making them inevitable. The way out, according to Mr. Struve, is either "unrest", or the reform of government. As for the first way out, Mr. Struve does not want to "effectively work" for it or even "wish" it.

Mr. Struve is indeed muddled, but then *so is Mr. Milyukov*—completely, absolutely muddled, for neither can the Constitutional-Democratic Party—of which Milyukov is the leader—"wish" the first way out or "effectively work" for it.

This is proved, not by words (those who in politics judge men and parties by their words are foolish), but by their *deeds*, i.e., by *the entire history* of the Constitutional-Democratic Party from 1905 to 1914, for almost a decade.

The Constitutional-Democratic Party is more afraid of siding with the workers (on questions of the minimum programme, of course) than of being dependent on the Purishkeviches.

This applies to the entire party, to the entire Cadet and Octobrist bourgeoisie. And Milyukov simply makes himself ridiculous when he tries to lay the blame for this on Struve alone.

In all countries the experience of history shows that a bourgeoisie which desires progress vacillates between siding with the workers and being dependent on the Purishkeviches. In all countries—and the more civilised and free the country, the more marked this is—we see two types of bourgeois politicians. One type openly leans towards religion, towards the Purishkeviches, towards a forthright struggle against democracy, and tries to build up consistent theoretical evidence to support this tendency. The other type specialises in *covering up* this very same tendency by *flirting* with democracy.

There are diplomatic Milyukovs everywhere, and the workers must learn to detect the cloven hoof at once.

Put Pravdy No. 25,
March 1, 1914

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THE "LABOURING" PEASANTRY AND THE TRADE IN LAND

The Left-Narodnik talk about the "labouring" peasantry is such a scandalous imposture and corruption of the *socialist* consciousness of the workers that it is necessary to examine it again and again.

The more our Left Narodniks flaunt their platitudes and saccharine speeches, the more important it becomes to counter them with precise data on peasant economy.

There is nothing the Left Narodnik fights shy of so much as *precise* data on the peasant bourgeoisie and the peasant proletariat.

Let us take the returns of the last Zemstvo statistical survey of the peasants in the vicinity of Moscow.[83] Here agriculture has taken on a relatively very pronounced commercial character due to the considerable development of fruit and vegetable farming. And this example of a district that is more developed as regards the domination of the market reveals all the more strikingly the *essential* features of *all* peasant economy under capitalism.

The first district of Moscow suburban peasant economy (we take only this one district because, unfortunately, the statistics do not give us general summaries) covers *over two thousand* peasant farms. The number is sufficiently large to enable us to study the typical relations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie among the "labouring" peasantry.

It is noteworthy that capitalist agriculture here is developing on ordinary land with farms of extremely small size, 2,336 peasant farms having a total of 4,253 dessiatines of allotment land, i.e., an average of less than two dessiatines per farm. If we add 1,761 dessiatines of leased land and subtract 625 dessiatines of land rented out, we get a total

of 5,389 dessiatines, i.e., an average of less than two dessiatines per farm. Nevertheless, two-thirds of the peasants employ hired labour!

The higher the level of agricultural techniques, the more intensive the farming, and the stronger the influence of the market, the more often do we meet with *large-scale* production on *small* plots of land. This is constantly overlooked by bourgeois professors and our Left Narodniks, who are so enthusiastic about small farms (reckoned in area of land), and *gloss over* the capitalist nature of modern small farms that employ hired labour.

Let us examine the trade that is going on in allotment land. The figures for leased and rented out land show that this trade is very considerable. About half the leased land is *allotment* land. Altogether, 625 dessiatines of *allotment* land is rented out, and 845 dessiatines are leased. Clearly, the old system of allotment land tenure, which by its very nature is identified with serfdom and medievalism, is becoming an *obstacle* to modern trade and capitalist circulation. Capitalism is *breaking down* the old system of allotment tenure. Farming is not adapting itself to the *official* allotment, but is demanding the *free* sale and purchase of land, free renting and leasing in conformity with the demands of the market, the requirements of the bourgeois economic system.

Take the peasant proletariat. Under this category, first of all, come 405 households (out of the 2,336) which are either landless or have up to half a dessiatine of land. These 405 households own 437 dessiatines of allotment land. But these are poor, largely horseless, peasants, who do not have the wherewithal to engage in farming. They rent out 372 dessiatines—the greater part of their land—and are themselves becoming wage-workers. Of the 405 households, 376 "provide" agricultural labourers, or industrial workers who have given up farming.

Take the richest peasant bourgeoisie. Here 526 households have farms of over three dessiatines. This already is capitalist farming, with fruit and vegetable growing. Of these 526 farmers 509 employ labourers. The working members of the families number 1,706, and they employ 1,248 labourers (by the year or season), exclusive of day-labourers (51,000 working days).

These households own a total of 1,540 dessiatines, an average of less than three dessiatines of allotment land per household. But they rent out only 42 and lease 1,102 dessiatines, of which 512 dessiatines is allotment land! By "concentrating" land in this way, these "labouring" peasants, having an average of *three working members of the family* per farm, are becoming typical bourgeois with an average of two and a half *hired* labourers per farm and nearly a hundred hired day-labourer working days. The buying and selling of the *produce* of land leads to the development of the buying and selling of *land itself* (leasing and renting out), and to the buying and selling of *labour-power*.

Now consider the Left Narodniks' assertion that the abolition of private ownership of the land means "withdrawing the land" from commercial circulation! This is a purely philistine fairy-tale. In fact, the very opposite is the case; this abolition would draw the land into commercial circulation *on a vaster scale* than ever before. The capital now being spent on the purchase of land would be released, the feudal and bureaucratic obstacles to the free transfer of land from one person to another would disappear, and capitalism, i.e., the renting out of land by the proletariat and the "concentration" of land by the bourgeoisie, would develop still more rapidly.

This measure, which is useful as a means of fighting the feudal landlords, the Left Narodniks try to pass off as "socialism", though actually it is only a bourgeois measure. It is undeniable that the peasant proletarians and the peasant bourgeoisie have *common* interests against the landlords. Every Marxist working man knows that, but to *obscure* consciousness of the class antagonisms between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie by jabber about the "labouring" peasantry means deserting to the bourgeoisie, deserting to the enemies of socialism.

Moscow suburban farming shows us, as if under a magnifying glass, what is going on *everywhere* in Russia in a milder and less definable form. Everywhere the peasant who does not hire himself out or does not himself employ hired labour is already becoming the exception. Every day, even in the remoter districts, we find trade developing, and the gulf between the proletarians (hired workers) and the small pro-

prietors, the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants, widening more and more.

It is the aim of the urban proletariat to develop a clear realisation of this class antagonism, which, in the rural districts, *is obscured* by the specific features of agriculture and the survivals of serfdom. It is the aim of the bourgeoisie, in whose footsteps the petty-bourgeois Left Narodniks are foolishly following, to *hinder* the realisation of this class antagonism by means of empty, meaningless and utterly false phrases about the "labouring" peasantry.

Put Pravdy No. 26,
March 2, 1914
Signed: *V. I.*

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the text in *Put Pravdy*

WHAT IS WORRYING THE LIBERALS

In connection with V. Maklakov's Duma speeches and his press statements in favour of the "new" plan for combining the tactics of the Cadets and Octobrists, there has of late been a good deal of talk about the revival of liberalism. The Zemstvo banquet in Moscow has lent colour to these rumours.

It is noteworthy that particular emphasis has been laid on the fact that *even* V. Maklakov, that most moderate of liberals, with a leaning towards Octobrism, has lost "faith in the possibility of a way being found out of the impasse without revolutionary upheavals and cataclysms". This, literally, is what is written in *Rech*, the chief organ of the liberals, by Mr. Shingaryov who, together with Mr. Milyukov, *pretends* to criticise the "Right" Cadets, V. Maklakov and P. Struve, "*from the left*".

But the disputes among the Cadets have been most trifling. They have been arguing whether the proposal made to the Octobrists about joining the opposition is new or not, and whether that proposal, which has been made a hundred times and never led to anything, is worth repeating for the hundred and first time. Behind these absolutely meaningless disputes one can discern the liberals' chief and common cause of *worry*, which hinders the cause of Russia's liberation only slightly less than the Octobrists' vacillations. You gentlemen of the liberal fold, who are arguing all the time with the Octobrists and about the Octobrists, should take a good look at yourselves!

Take the small political encyclopaedia issued by *Rech* and entitled *The Year-Book* for 1914. Among its contributors are the most prominent and most responsible Cadets, the acknowledged leaders of the party, headed by Milyukov and

Shingaryov. In the survey of "Our Public Life" (by Mr. Izgoyev), we read the following appraisal of the fundamental issues in Russian home policies:

> "By its excessive zeal the Administration is only weakening the anti-revolutionary forces within the community."

Don't you think it absurd, Messrs. the Cadets, to hurl thunderbolts at the Octobrists, when the most genuine Octobrism is preached in your own publications?

A result of the Administration's "hopeless and misguided" struggle against educational institutions, writes Mr. Izgoyev, is:

> "a corruption of life, leading to the weakening of the purely public [!] activity, which produces the spiritual antidotes to ideas that are really a menace to the country".

Now this is a tone worthy, not only of an Octobrist, but even of a prosecutor, a Shcheglovitov.[84] And as if to illustrate what these "ideas that are a menace to the country" are, our liberal says:

> "One can understand [from the point of view of the corruption of life by the misguided Administration] why at workers' meetings and in the trade unions the Bolsheviks gain the upper hand over the more level-headed and cultured leaders [!?] of the working-class movement."

This political appraisal of the liquidators is uttered and reiterated by the liberals times without number. As a matter of fact, we have here nothing more nor less than a political alliance between the liberals and the liquidators. In turning their backs on the "underground" and advocating a legal party the liquidators are doing in the ranks of the workers exactly what the liberals want them to do.

Put Pravdy No. 29,
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NARODNIKS AND LIQUIDATORS IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

(A VALUABLE ADMISSION)

In recent issues of the Left-Narodnik newspaper, we find, side by side with complaints about our (the Pravdists') "factionalism", valuable admissions by several Narodniks about their views on important issue of the trade union movement coinciding with those of the liquidators. We have always said it, but it is pleasant indeed to hear this confession from our opponents' lips.

"On this question we differ sharply from the Bolsheviks, who regard the union as their special preserve [!]... The Mensheviks' view [for some reason the Narodniks say "Mensheviks" instead of "liquidators"] of the union as an extra-factional organisation is identical with ours [the Narodniks']. This, perhaps, accounts for our good relations with the Mensheviks in past activities." This was written in *Vernaya Mysl* No. 6.

"The line of conduct taken by the executives of those unions in which the Left Narodniks have been in control all the time in noway differs from the line of conduct of the so-called liquidationist unions," the same Left-Narodnik newspaper added.

An extraordinarily frank and valuable admission! On their own showing, it appears that our "frightfully Left" Narodniks behave in the trade union movement exactly like the liquidators.

Hence, the blocs (alliances, agreements) between the liquidators and the Narodniks against the Marxists, which have been repeatedly mentioned in our press.

The Narodnik *Stoikaya Mysl*[85] even frankly defends these blocs between the Left Narodniks and the liquidators against the Marxists.

"During the present period of Pravdist preponderance in the trade union organisations ... there is nothing terrible or strange in temporary agreements between the Narodniks and the Luchists," writes *Stoikaya Mysl* No. 2.*

The liquidators are not so candid. They know that "such things" are done, but not spoken of. To call oneself a Social-Democrat while at the same time allying with an alien party against the Social-Democrats is "tactics" that can be pursued only underhandedly.

But this does not change anything. The alliance between the liquidators and the Narodniks in the trade union movement (and in the educational societies) is a *fact*. And in the present state of affairs it is inevitable. The liquidators and the Narodniks are united by their common hostility towards consistent Marxism, in all spheres of activity. In trade union activity they are united in both being representatives of the "neutralism of *weakness*", "*willy-nilly* neutralism". Neither the liquidators nor the Narodniks have any real influence in the trade union movement. Although a feeble minority, they demand "equality" with the Marxists. This demand is "theoretically" defensible only from the neutralist point of view. Hence the "neutralism" of all groups with little influence in the working-class movement.

The Narodniks say that they are uniting with the liquidators "*solely for the purpose of protecting the non-factionalism of the workers' organisations against the extravagant claims of the Pravdists*" (*Stoikaya Mysl* Nos. 2 and 4).

What are these "claims" of the Pravdists? Have they shut the door of any union or society to workers who hold political views different from their own? Have they stuck any "label" on any of the unions? Have they split any organisation? They have done nothing of the kind! Our opponents have not quoted a single *fact* of this kind, nor can they do

* Mr. Boris Voronov, the author of the article, his eyes big with surprise, quotes as an example of incredible "factionalism" the fact that at the meetings of the executive of one of the unions "they discussed the question of assisting the Pravdist press, and technical editorial questions (how to improve the correspondence department, etc.)". Oh, horror! What a crime it is to assist a newspaper, which unites nine-tenths of the advanced workers, with correspondence and the like! How, after this, can the Narodniks help throwing themselves into the arms of the liquidators?...

so. By the "extravagant claims" of the Pravdists they mean that the Pravdists do not want to associate themselves with the petty-bourgeois policy of the Narodniks and liquidators, and, while loyally submitting to the majority of the workers *within a single union*, they fight for influence for their Marxist ideas.

We have never been guilty of the sins ascribed to us. It is the Narodniks and the liquidators who are guilty of them. Here are the facts. Several years ago the Narodniks obtained a majority in the Railwaymen's Union. This happened because they had the backing, not of the workers, but of the railway clerks, and because of other fortuitous circumstances. What did the Narodniks do? They immediately "stuck a label" on that union, compelled it to adopt its own special "platform", ousted the Social-Democrats and non-Party workers, and compelled them to form a parallel union of their own.

Now that was a really "extravagant claim". They hastened to make good their first chance victory by affixing a label. The fact that the Narodniks do not do this in other unions is not because they are so virtuous, but because their influence everywhere among the workers is *very slight*.

The same thing applies to the liquidators. When they controlled the Metalworkers' Union they turned it into a branch of the liquidators' organisation. The organ of the union published provocative articles against the "underground" (see *Nash Put* No. 20, p. 2, *Metallist* No. 3, etc.[86]), although no general meeting of the members ever expressed approval of the liquidator line.

Such are the actual facts. By the "extravagant claims" of the Pravdists they mean that the Pravdists try to get the workers to settle their affairs themselves by a majority vote. If at a general meeting of metalworkers 3,000 vote for the Pravdists and a hundred or two vote for the liquidators and the Narodniks combined, then, in the name of so-called "non-factionalism" we are supposed to admit that 3,000 is equal to 200! This is what liquidator-Narodnik "non-factionalism" means.

We do not defend neutralism; we are opposed to it. But we do not behave like the Narodniks and liquidators when they obtain a chance majority in some union. Only feeble

groups with no principles lose their heads at the first "victory" and hasten to "consolidate" their victory by a majority of a score or so of votes. Excited and in a hurry not to miss such a golden opportunity, they hastily revise their "principles", forget their neutralism, and stick on a label. Marxists do not behave like that. They are not stray visitors in the working-class movement. They know that sooner or later all the unions will take their stand on the basis of Marxism. They are convinced that the future belongs to their ideas and, therefore, they do not force events, do not goad the unions on, and do not stick labels on them or split them.

Steadily and confidently they carry on their Marxist propaganda. They patiently teach Marxism to the workers, drawing on the lessons of life, and no deals between unprincipled groups will divert them from that path.

There was a time when the present-day liquidators demanded that the trade unions should be Party unions and have official representation in the Party. There was a time when the Narodniks compelled the Railwaymen's Union to officially swear allegiance to their programme. Today both have swung to the opposite extreme, and stand for neutralism. They have been compelled to do this by the political weakness of their positions.

We are following our old road, proclaimed long ago and upheld by the entire body of Marxists. The liquidators have a full right to enter into an alliance with the Narodniks. But it is an alliance based on abandonment of principles and on weakness. The road which the liquidator-Narodnik bloc proposes to the unions is not the road of the advanced workers.

Put Pravdy No. 30,
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PIOUS WISHES

The liberal newspapers recently published or favourably reported K. Arsenyev's appeal for greater attention to be paid to the collection of information on summary exile.

"Although numerous cases of arbitrary and lawless acts on the part of the Administration are reported in the newspapers," wrote K. Arsenyev, "others, no less numerous and outrageous, pass unnoticed and unobserved. This omission could be rectified to a considerable extent if some sort of system were introduced in the collection of information on the subject. The reasons for summary exile and arrest, which are being widely practised to this day, especially among the workers, become known only by chance and, therefore, in a fragmentary way. Similarly, news about the condition of the exiles in their places of exile finds its way into the press only by accident."

What is true is true! The liberal parties, the liberal members of the Duma, the liberal lawyers, the liberal journalists, various groups of liberals, and so forth, could very easily collect and publish legally and illegally, very full and systematic material on *every* one of those cases which "are being widely practised, especially among the workers".

Rech, for example, "heartily welcomed the advice and the appeals coming from that highly respected public figure" K. Arsenyev.

Then why don't you go ahead, gentlemen? Surely you, of all people, have every opportunity and means of organising the proper collection and publication of information about this "everyday feature" of Russian life, which you all protest against and condemn, and about which you are always talking! But see, not a single liberal newspaper, which is a thousand times better "provided for" (in all respects) against all kinds of obstacles and barriers, collects precise information about *all* cases of exile and arrest.

We are obliged to say that our liberals are past masters in the art of expressing good and pious wishes, but when it comes to publishing the names of all those who have been exiled or to publishing information about them and systematic reports of how they are faring, in Arsenyev's own *Vestnik Yevropy*, or in *Russkiye Vedomosti*,[87] or in *Rech*, then nothing is done.

Evidently, it is much easier (and safer) to "support" appeals in word than *to do* something *in response* to those appeals....

Put Pravdy No. 32,
March 9, 1914

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A LIBERAL PROFESSOR ON EQUALITY

Liberal Professor Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky is on the warpath against socialism. This time he has approached the question, not from the political and economic angle, but from that of an abstract discussion on equality (perhaps the professor thought such an abstract discussion more suitable for the religious and philosophical gatherings which he has addressed?).

> "If we take socialism, not as an economic theory, but as a living ideal," Mr. Tugan declared, "then, undoubtedly, it is associated with the ideal of equality, but equality is a concept ... that cannot be deduced from experience and reason."

This is the reasoning of a liberal scholar who repeats the incredibly trite and threadbare argument that experience and reason clearly prove that men are *not* equal, yet socialism bases its ideal on equality. Hence, socialism, if you please, is an absurdity which is contrary to experience and reason, and so forth!

Mr. Tugan repeats the old trick of the reactionaries: first to misinterpret socialism by making it out to be an absurdity, and then to triumphantly refute the absurdity! When we say that experience and reason prove that men are *not* equal, we mean by equality, equality in *abilities* or *similarity* in physical strength and mental ability.

It goes without saying that in this respect men are *not* equal. No sensible person and no socialist forgets this. But *this kind* of equality has *nothing whatever* to do with socialism. If Mr. Tugan is quite unable to *think*, he is at least *able* to read; were he to take the well-known work of one of the

founders of scientific socialism, Frederick Engels, directed against Dühring, he would find there a special section explaining the absurdity of imagining that economic equality means anything else than the *abolition of classes*. But when professors set out to refute socialism, one never knows what to wonder at most—their stupidity, their ignorance, or their unscrupulousness.

Since we have Mr. Tugan to deal with, we shall have to start with the rudiments.

By political equality Social-Democrats mean *equal rights*, and by economic equality, as we have already said, they mean the *abolition of classes*. As for establishing human equality in the sense of equality of strength and abilities (physical and mental), socialists do not even think of such things.

Political equality is a demand for equal political rights for *all* citizens of a country who have reached a certain age and who do not suffer from either ordinary or liberal-professorial feeble-mindedness. This demand was first advanced, not by the socialists, not by the proletariat, but by the *bourgeoisie*. The well-known historical experience of all countries of the world proves this, and Mr. Tugan could easily have discovered this had he not called "experience" to witness solely in order to dupe students and workers, and please the powers that be by "abolishing" socialism.

The bourgeoisie put forward the demand for *equal* rights for all citizens in the struggle against medieval, feudal, serf-owner and caste privileges. In Russia, for example, unlike America, Switzerland and other countries, the privileges of the nobility are preserved to this day in all spheres of political life, in elections to the Council of State, in elections to the Duma, in municipal administration, in taxation, and many other things.

Even the most dull-witted and ignorant person can grasp the fact that individual members of the nobility are *not* equal in physical and mental abilities any more than are people belonging to the "tax-paying", "base", "low-born" or "non-privileged" peasant class. But in *rights*, all nobles are *equal*, just as all the peasants are equal in their lack of rights.

Does our learned liberal Professor Tugan now understand the difference between equality in the sense of equal rights, and equality in the sense of equal strength and abilities?

We shall now deal with economic equality, In the United States of America, as in other advanced countries, there are no medieval privileges. All citizens are equal in political rights. But are they equal as regards their *position in social production*?

No, Mr. Tugan, they are not. Some own land, factories and capital and live on the unpaid labour of the workers; these form an insignificant minority. Others, namely, the vast mass of the population, own no means of production and live only by selling their labour-power; these are proletarians.

In the United States of America there is no aristocracy, and the bourgeoisie and the proletariat enjoy *equal* political rights. But they are *not* equal in *class* status: one class, the capitalists, own the means of production and live on the unpaid labour of the workers. The other class, the wage-workers, the proletariat, own no means of production and live by selling their labour-power in the market.

The abolition of classes means placing *all* citizens on an *equal* footing with regard to the *means of production* belonging to society as a whole. It means giving all citizens *equal* opportunities of working on the publicly-owned means of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the publicly-owned factories, and so forth.

This explanation of socialism has been necessary to enlighten our learned liberal professor, Mr. Tugan, who may, if he tries hard, now grasp the fact that it is absurd to expect *equality* of strength and abilities in socialist society.

In brief, when socialists speak of equality they always mean *social* equality, equality of social status, and not by any means the physical and mental equality of individuals.

The puzzled reader may ask: how could a learned liberal professor have forgotten these elementary axioms familiar to anybody who has read any exposition of the views of socialism? The answer is simple: the *personal* qualities of

present-day professors are such that we may find among them even exceptionally stupid people like Tugan. But the *social* status of professors in bourgeois society is such that only those are allowed to hold such posts who sell science to serve the interests of capital, and agree to utter the most fatuous nonsense, the most unscrupulous drivel and twaddle against the socialists. The bourgeoisie will forgive the professors all this as long as they go on "abolishing" socialism.

Put Pravdy No. 33,
March 11, 1914

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THE BRITISH LIBERALS AND IRELAND

What is taking place today in the British Parliament in connection with the Bill on Irish *Home Rule* is of exceptional interest as far as class relationships and elucidation of the national and the agrarian problems are concerned.

For centuries England has enslaved Ireland, condemned the Irish peasants to unparalleled misery and gradual extinction from starvation, driven them off the land and compelled hundreds of thousands and even millions of them to leave their native country and emigrate to America. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ireland had a population of five and a half millions; today the population is only four and one-third millions. Ireland has become depopulated. Over five million Irish emigrated to America in the course of the nineteenth century, so that there are now *more* Irish in the United States than there are in Ireland!

The appalling destitution and sufferings of the Irish peasantry are an instructive example of the lengths to which the landowners and the liberal bourgeoisie of a "dominant" nation will go. Britain owes her "brilliant" economic development and the "prosperity" of her industry and commerce largely to her treatment of the Irish peasantry, which recalls the misdeeds of the Russian serf-owner Saltychikha.[88]

While Britain "flourished", Ireland moved towards extinction and remained an undeveloped, semi-barbarous, purely agrarian country, a land of poverty-stricken tenant farmers. But much as the "enlightened and liberal" British bourgeoisie desired to perpetuate Ireland's enslavement and poverty, reform inevitably approached, the more so that the revolutionary eruptions of the Irish people's fight for liberty and land became more and more ominous. The year 1861 saw

the formation of the Irish revolutionary organisation of *Fenians*. Irish settlers in America gave it every assistance.

With the formation, in 1868, of the government of Gladstone—that hero of the liberal bourgeoisie and obtuse philistines—the *era of reform* in Ireland set in, an era which has dragged on very nicely till the present day, i.e., just under half a century. Oh, the wise statesmen of the liberal bourgeoisie are very well able to "make haste slowly" in the matter of reform!

Karl Marx, who had been living in London for over fifteen years, followed the struggle of the Irish with great interest and sympathy. He wrote to Frederick Engels on November 2, 1867: "I have done my best to bring about this demonstration of the English workers in favour of Fenianism.... I used to think the separation of Ireland from England impossible. I now think it inevitable, although after the separation there may come federation...." Reverting to the same subject in a letter dated November 30th of the same year, Marx wrote: "The question now is, what shall we advise the English workers? In my opinion they must make the repeal of the Union [the abolition of the union with Ireland] (in short, the affair of 1783, only democratised and adapted to the conditions of the time) an article of their *pronunziamento*. This is the only legal and therefore only possible form of Irish emancipation which can be admitted in the programme of an *English* [workers'] party."[89] And Marx went on to show that what the Irish needed was Home Rule and independence of Britain, an agrarian revolution and tariffs against Britain.

Such was the programme proposed to the British workers by Marx, in the interests of Irish freedom, of accelerating the social development and freedom of the British workers; because the British workers could not become free so long as they helped to keep another nation in slavery (or even allowed it)

Alas! Owing to a number of special historical causes, the British workers of the last third of the nineteenth century proved dependent upon the Liberals, impregnated with the spirit of liberal-labour policy. They proved to be, not at the head of nations and classes fighting for liberty, but in

the wake of the contemptible lackeys of the money-bags, the British Liberals.

And the Liberals have for *half a century* been dragging out Ireland's liberation, which has not been completed to this day! It was not until the twentieth century that the Irish peasant began to turn from a tenant farmer into a freeholder, but the Liberals have imposed upon him a system of *land purchase at a "fair" price*! He has paid, and will continue to pay for many years, millions upon millions to the British landlords as a reward for their having robbed him for centuries and reduced him to a state of chronic starvation. The British liberal bourgeois has made the Irish peasant thank the landlord for this in hard cash....

A *Home Rule* Bill for Ireland is now going through Parliament. But in Ireland there is the Northern province of Ulster, which is inhabited partly by English-born Protestants as distinct from the Catholic Irish. Well then, the British Conservatives, led by Carson, the British version of our Black-Hundred landlord Purishkevich, have raised a frightful outcry against Irish Home Rule. This, they say, means subjecting Ulstermen to an alien people of alien creed! Lord Carson has threatened rebellion, and has organised gangs of reactionary armed thugs for this purpose.

An empty threat, of course. There can be no question of a rebellion by a handful of hoodlums. Nor could there be any question of an Irish Parliament (whose powers are determined by *British* law) "oppressing" the Protestants.

It is simply a question of the reactionary landlords trying to *scare* the Liberals.

And the Liberals are losing their nerve, bowing to the reactionaries, making concessions to them, offering to conduct a *referendum* in Ulster and put off reform for Ulster for six years!

The haggling between the Liberals and the reactionaries continues. Reform can wait: the Irish have waited half a century; they can wait a little longer; you can't very well "offend" the landlords!

Of course, if the Liberals appealed to the people of Britain, to the proletariat, Carson's reactionary gangs would melt away immediately and disappear. The peaceful and full achievement of freedom by Ireland would be guaranteed,

But is it conceivable that the liberal bourgeois will turn to the proletariat for aid against the landlords? Why, the Liberals in Britain are also lackeys of the money-bags, capable only of cringing to the Carsons.

Put Pravdy No. 34,
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THE TAYLOR SYSTEM—MAN'S ENSLAVEMENT BY THE MACHINE

Capitalism cannot be at a standstill for a single moment. It must forever be moving forward. Competition, which is keenest in a period of crisis like the present, calls for the invention of an increasing number of new devices to reduce the cost of production. But the domination of capital converts all these devices into instruments for the further exploitation of the workers.

The Taylor system is one of these devices.

Advocates of this system recently used the following techniques in America.

An electric lamp was attached to a worker's arm, the worker's movements were photographed and the movements of the lamp studied. Certain movements were found to be "superfluous" and the worker was made to avoid them, i.e., to work more intensively, without losing a second for rest.

The layout of new factory buildings is planned in such a way that not a moment will be lost in delivering materials to the factory, in conveying them from one shop to another, and in dispatching the finished products. The cinema is systematically employed for studying the work of the best operatives and increasing its intensity, i.e., "speeding up" the workers.

For example, a mechanic's operations were filmed in the course of a whole day. After studying the mechanic's movements the efficiency experts provided him with a bench high enough to enable him to avoid losing time in bending down. He was given a boy to assist him. This boy had to hand up each part of the machine in a definite and most efficient way. Within a few days the mechanic performed the work of

assembling the given type of machine in *one-fourth* of the time it had taken before!

What an enormous gain in labour productivity!... But the worker's pay is not increased fourfold, but only half as much again, at the very most, and *only for a short period* at that. As soon as the workers get used to the new system their pay is cut to the former level. The capitalist obtains an enormous profit, but the workers toil four times as hard as before and wear down their nerves and muscles four times as fast as before.

A newly engaged worker is taken to the factory cinema where he is shown a "model" performance of his job; the worker is made to "catch up" with that performance. A week later he is taken to the cinema again and shown pictures of his own performance, which is then compared with the "model".

All these vast improvements are introduced *to the detriment* of the workers, for they lead to their still greater oppression and exploitation. Moreover, this rational and efficient distribution of labour is confined *to each factory*.

The question naturally arises: What about the distribution of labour in society as a whole? What a vast amount of labour is wasted at present owing to the disorganised and chaotic character of capitalist production as a whole! How much time is wasted as the raw materials pass to the factory through the hands of hundreds of buyers and middlemen, while the requirements of the market are unknown! Not only time, but the actual products are wasted and damaged. And what about the waste of time and labour in delivering the finished goods to the consumers through a host of small middlemen who, too, cannot know the requirements of their customers and perform not only a host of superfluous movements, but also make a host of superfluous purchases, journeys, and so on and so forth!

Capital organises and rationalises labour within the factory for the purpose of increasing the exploitation of the workers and increasing profit. In social production as a whole, however, chaos continues to reign and grow, leading to crises when the accumulated wealth cannot find purchasers, and millions of workers starve because they are unable to find employment.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The Taylor system—without its initiators knowing or wishing it—is preparing the time when the proletariat will take over all social production and appoint its own workers' committees for the purpose of properly distributing and rationalising all social labour. Large-scale production, machinery, railways, telephone—all provide thousands of opportunities to cut by three-fourths the working time of the organised workers and make them four times better off than they are today.

And these workers' committees, assisted by the workers' unions, will be able to apply these principles of rational distribution of social labour when the latter is freed from its enslavement by capital.

Put Pravdy No. 35,
March 13, 1914
Signed: *M. M.*

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the text in *Put Pravdy*

A "RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION" AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL-DEMOCRATS IN THE MARCH 1 CONFERENCE

The newspapers have already had a good deal to say about the conference held on March 1 between government spokesmen and certain members of the Duma; however, the importance of this conference as far as the position and aims of the "opposition" in the Duma is concerned, has not by any means been sufficiently highlighted.

We would remind our readers that just before March 1 a number of liberal newspapers in St. Petersburg, Moscow and the provinces, raised and animatedly discussed the general question of a Duma in the doldrums, the Duma's impotence and lifelessness, of members fleeing from the Duma, the aims of the opposition, and so forth.

Just before March 1, Milyukov and Shingaryov, the most outstanding leaders of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party, came out in the St. Petersburg and Moscow press against Mr. Struve for his appeals for "reform of the government", as well as against the Right-wing Cadet V. Maklakov for his "pessimistic-optimistic" appeals for an agreement with the Octobrists. Just before March 1, Mr. Milyukov did his utmost to pose as an opponent of Vekhism, i.e., of consistent and avowed counter-revolutionary liberalism.*

The composition and the character of the March I Conference proved once again that all the flimsy reservations made by the Constitutional-Democratic Party leaders against P. Struve and V. Maklakov, all their efforts to pose as being "more Left" than the aforesaid politicians, are sheer hypocrisy

* See pp. 129-31 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and an attempt to hoodwink democrats. *In actual fact* it was the policy of the Vekhists among the liberals that triumphed at this conference, the policy of Struve and V. Maklakov, not of Messrs. Milyukov, Shingaryov and Co., the Constitutional-Democratic Party's official leaders and diplomats.

The conference was attended only by representatives of the government parties and of the liberal-bourgeois opposition; neither the Social-Democrats nor the Trudoviks (bourgeois democrats) were invited (on the pretext that they are "anti-militarists on principle, and always vote against all war credits". The real reason, however, is that the sponsors did not want to receive a reasoned and public refusal, which would certainly have been forthcoming, at least from the Social-Democrats).

When the opposition members—according to a most official report in *Rech*—"*attempted to raise the question of our domestic policies*" they were told that the only question that could be discussed was that of war credits, and that "government spokesmen do not deem it possible at this conference to make any statements on questions concerning domestic policies".

"*Nevertheless*," wrote *Rech*, "several deputies, among them I. N. Yefremov, A. I. Shingaryov and others, *did*, in their speeches, *touch upon* questions concerning the internal situation."

So much the more irrelevant, ridiculous, absurd and undignified, it must be said concerning this statement, was the role played by the Cadet, Constitutional-Democratic, deputies. Were their party called the Moderate Liberal-Monarchist Party, i.e., a name truly expressing its class nature and its real political character, the conduct of the Constitutional-Democratic deputies would have been quite normal from the party point of view. But for people who wish to be considered democrats, for people among whom even such Right-wingers as V. Maklakov publicly declare that they *have lost faith* "in the possibility of a way being found out of the impasse without revolutionary upheavals and cataclysms" (this is exactly how Mr. Shingaryov *himself* expounded V. Maklakov's views in *Rech* No. 55, for February 26; and Mr. Milyukov *himself* wrote in the same vein in the issue of

that paper for February 25)—for such people, participation in a conference with the Rights and Octobrists was a public slap in the face.

The Constitutional-Democrats slapped their own faces. By participating in the conference they publicly repudiated their own statements about their "loss of faith". They publicly demonstrated their readiness to prove that *their faith was alive*, and this is tantamount to readiness to serve and be subservient.

Trust the Cadets to understand perfectly both the inseverable connection that exists between home and foreign policies and the significance of "allocating credits"....

Put Pravdy No. 36,
March 14, 1914
Signed: *M. M.*

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the text in *Put Pravdy*

THE BREAK-UP OF THE "AUGUST" BLOC

All who are interested in the working-class movement and Marxism in Russia know that a bloc of the liquidators, Trotsky, the Letts, the Bundists and the Caucasians was formed in August 1912.

The formation of this bloc was announced with tremendous ballyhoo in the newspaper *Luch*, which was founded in St. Petersburg—not with workers' money—just when the elections were being held, in order to sabotage the will of the majority of the organised workers. It went into raptures over the bloc's "large membership", over the alliance of "Marxists of different trends", over "unity" and non-factionalism, and it raged against the "splitters", the supporters of the January 1912 Conference.[90]

The question of "unity" was thus presented to thinking workers in a new and practical light. The facts were to show who was right: those who praised the "unity" platform and tactics of the August bloc members, or those who said that this was a false signboard, a new disguise for the old, bankrupt liquidators.

Exactly *eighteen months* passed. A tremendous period considering the upsurge of 1912-13. And then, in February 1914, a new journal—this time eminently "unifying" and eminently and truly "non-factional"—bearing the title *Borba*, was founded by Trotsky, that "*genuine*" adherent of the August platform.

Both the contents of *Borba*'s issue No. 1 and what the liquidators wrote about that journal before it appeared, at once revealed to the attentive observer that the August bloc *had broken up* and that frantic efforts were being made to conceal this and hoodwink the workers. But this fraud will also be exposed very soon.

Before the appearance of *Borba*, the editors of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*[91] published a scathing comment stating: "The real physiognomy of this journal, which has of late been spoken of quite a lot in Marxist circles, is still unclear to us."

Think of that, reader: since August 1912 Trotsky has been considered a leader of the August unity bloc; but the whole of 1913 shows him to have been dissociated from *Luch* and the Luchists. In 1914, this selfsame Trotsky establishes *his own* journal, while continuing fictitiously on the staff of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Nasha Zarya*. "*There is a good deal of talk in circles*" about a secret "memorandum"—which the liquidators are keeping dark—written by Trotsky against the Luchists, Messrs. F. D., L. M., and similar "strangers".

And yet the truthful, non-factional and unifying Editorial Board of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* writes: "Its physiognomy is still unclear to us!"

It is not yet clear to them that the August bloc has fallen apart!

No, Messrs. F. D., L. M. and other Luchists, it is perfectly "clear" to you, and you are simply deceiving the workers.

The August bloc—as we said at the time, in August 1912—turned out to be a mere screen for the liquidators. *That bloc has fallen asunder*. *Even* its friends in Russia have not been able to stick together. The famous uniters even failed to unite themselves and we got *two* "August" trends, the Luchist trend (*Nasha Zarya* and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*) and the Trotskyist trend (*Borba*). Both are waving scraps of the "general and united" August banner which they have torn up, and both are shouting themselves hoarse with cries of "unity"!

What is *Borba*'s trend? Trotsky wrote a verbose article in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 11, explaining this, but the editors of that liquidator newspaper very pointedly replied that its "physiognomy is still unclear".

The liquidators do have their *own* physiognomy, a liberal, not a Marxist one. Anyone familiar with the writings of F. D., L. S., L. M., Yezhov,[92] Potresov and Co. is familiar with this physiognomy.

Trotsky, however, has never had any "physiognomy" at all; the only thing he does have is a habit of changing sides, of skipping from the liberals to the Marxists and back again, of mouthing scraps of catchwords and bombastic parrot phrases.

In *Borba* you will not find *a single* live word on any controversial issue.

This is incredible, but it is a fact.

The question of the "underground"? *Not a word.*

Does Trotsky share the views of Axelrod, Zasulich, F. D., L. S. (*Luch* No. 101) and so forth? *Not a murmur.*

The slogan of fighting for an open party? *Not a single word.*

The liberal utterances of the Yezhovs and other Luchists on strikes? The annulment of the programme on the national question? *Not a murmur.*

The utterances of L. Sedov and other Luchists *against two* of the "pillars"[93]? *Not a murmur.* Trotsky assures us that he is in favour of combining immediate demands with ultimate aims, but there is not a word as to his attitude towards the *liquidator* method of effecting this "combination"!

Actually, under cover of high-sounding, empty, and obscure phrases that confuse the non-class-conscious workers, Trotsky is defending the liquidators by passing over in silence the question of the "underground", by asserting that there is no liberal-labour policy in Russia, and the like.

Trotsky delivers a long lecture to the seven Duma deputies, headed by Chkheidze, instructing them how to repudiate the "underground" and the Party in a *more subtle manner.* This amusing lecture clearly points to the *further break-up* of the Seven. Buryanov has left them. They were unable to see eye to eye in their reply to Plekhanov. They are now oscillating between Dan and Trotsky, while Chkheidze is evidently exercising his diplomatic talents in an effort to paper over the new cracks.

And these near-Party people, who are unable to unite on their *own* "August" platform, try to deceive the workers with their shouts about "unity"! Vain efforts!

Unity means recognising the "old" and combating those who repudiate it. Unity means rallying the majority of the workers in Russia about decisions which have long been

known, and which condemn liquidationism. Unity means that members of the Duma must work in harmony with the will of the majority of the workers, which the six workers' deputies are doing.

But the liquidators and Trotsky, the Seven and Trotsky, who tore up their own August bloc, who flouted all the decisions of the Party and dissociated themselves from the "underground" as well as from the organised workers, are the worst splitters. Fortunately, the workers have already realised this, and all class-conscious workers are creating their own *real* unity *against* the liquidator disruptors of unity.

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CAPITALISM AND THE PRESS

When thieves fall out, honest men come by their own, to some extent. When bourgeois newspapermen quarrel they reveal to the public the venality of the "big dailies" and the tricks they are up to.

N. Snessarev of the *Novoye Vremya* quarrelled with that newspaper, misappropriated some of its funds, and was dismissed after a scandal. He has now published a "book" of 135 pages entitled *The Mirage of "Novoye Vremya". As Good as a Novel*. St. Petersburg, 1914. Posing, as is the custom, as a "perfect gentleman", Mr. Snessarev describes the ethics which have long established themselves in the capitalist countries of the West, and which are penetrating more and more into the bourgeois press in Russia, where of course the soil is exceptionally favourable for the most sordid and disgusting forms of bribery, toadyism, etc., which are practised with impunity.

"Everybody has gradually become accustomed to live beyond his means," this *Novoye Vremya* man writes with a charming air of "injured innocence". "When and how society will rid itself of this phenomenon, or whether it will rid itself of it at all, nobody can tell. But that such is the situation at the present time is a recognised fact." And one of the magic means by which one can live above one's income is to get bourgeois newspapers to "*participate*" in promoting concessions. "I could mention scores of different concessions," relates our *Novoye Vremya*-ist, "which owe their existence, not only to certain connections, but also to certain articles published in certain newspapers. *Novoye Vremya* is of course no exception." For example, one day, a representative of the London Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company called on Mr. Snessarev and invited him to draft the Articles of Associa-

tion of a Russian Marconi Co. and a plan for a concession for that Company. "The remuneration for this work was fixed at 10,000 rubles, and an agreement was reached."

The "victimised" Snessarev relates that, not only did he sell himself to the capitalists for this sum, but that the whole newspaper *Novoye Vremya* sold itself to conduct "a campaign in favour of the concession", for which it received a 50 per cent rebate on telegrams, a "cushy job" as a founder of the Company, and a grant of 50,000 rubles' worth of shares.

London capitalists—fleecing the Russians—concessions from the Russian Government—press participation—wholesale corruption—anybody and everybody bought and sold for thousands of rubles—such is the truthful picture revealed by the disgruntled crook Snessarev.

Novoye Vremya, an enterprise with millions invested in it, was collapsing. The pampered sons of the renegade millionaire A. S. Suvorin were squandering and dissipating millions. This noble newspaper had to be saved. "P. L. Bark, Managing Director of the Volga-Kama Bank, appeared on the scene" (p. 85). He persuaded A. S. Suvorin to transfer the business to a company, whose Articles of Association had received *His Majesty*'s approval in August 1911. Of the eight hundred shares (at 5,000 rubles per share), 650 went to A. S. Suvorin. In forming the Company they drew up a fictitious balance-sheet, Mr. Snessarev explains (p. 97), adding that "such a balance-sheet could have been accepted either by people totally ignorant of figures, or by people like Mr. Guchkov, that is to say, people who know their business perfectly, but pursue aims of their own". The heroes of this Company's inauguration (the inaugural meeting was held on November 10, 1911) were *Snessarev himself*, P. L. Bark, V. P. Burenin, Octobrist member of the Duma Shubinsky, the sons of that noble renegade A. S. Suvorin, and others.

As the reader sees, this highly respectable Company has been operating with great zeal since November 1911, but *since 1912*, the "victimised" Snessarev informs us, *Novoye Vremya* has been receiving a subsidy in the shape of the advertisements of the Land Banks ("not a very great income"- a mere 15,000 rubles per annum, or "something round about that" figure!). According to the law, these advertisements

had to be given to the newspaper with the largest circulation. At that time *Novoye Vremya* did *not* have the largest circulation, but it "set in motion" ("for the first time", the noble Snessarev avows) its backstairs influence and connections in government circles in order to retain these Land Bank advertisements. "The matter was discussed by the Council of Ministers and after rather serious hesitation it was decided to allow *Novoye Vremya* to retain the advertisements" (p. 21).

A literary and art society's club, "in plain words, a gambling-house" (p. 69) was formed; "in the club's debt book the members of the staff of *Novoye Vremya* had thousands of rubles against their accounts. These debts were simply written off".

In co-operation with Menshikov and others, the stockbroker Manus, who grew rich on the stock exchange and piled up a fortune of "several millions" (p. 120), launched a campaign in *Novoye Vremya* demanding Kokovtsov's resignation from the Cabinet. We leave it to our readers to figure out how many thousands each of these "public servants" received, and how much they have yet coming to them.

A whirligig of millions began: *Novoye Vremya* with a balance of five millions, of which about three millions are fictitious; salaries and fees of two and three thousand rubles *per month* to second-rate and third-rate members of the staff; hundreds of thousands and millions wasted; loans from banks amounting to hundreds of thousands; universal corruption; prostitution in all its forms, illegal and legal, sanctified by marriage; the cream of high St. Petersburg society; millionaires, Cabinet Ministers, stockbrokers and distinguished foreigners; gambling-houses; blackmail in different forms; "no political convictions" (p. 36); envy and intrigues; Amfiteatrov and Snessarev challenging an engineer to a duel for insulting the editors of *Novoye Vremya*, who had slung mud at the students; A. S. Suvorin, "who was very fond" of Amfiteatrov, but "could not deny himself the pleasure of annoying him", by letting through an article by Burenin confining a "nasty" dig at the actress Raiskaya, Amfiteatrov's wife; Burenin kicks Amfiteatrov out; Suvorin's scapegrace sons run up debts amounting to hundreds of thousands of rubles.

Novoye Vremya's loss in 1905—150,000 rubles.

Scared by 1905, Moscow merchants and manufacturers gave 100,000 rubles to found a patriotic newspaper for workers. At their request *Novoye Vremya* undertook to arrange the matter.

The newspaper "dragged out a miserable existence" for two years and then closed down. Muscovites lost 100,000 rubles, and the *Novoye Vremya* people 150,000 rubles (p. 61).

Thieves, male prostitutes, venal writers, venal newspapers. Such is our "big press". Such is the flower of our "high" society. "Everybody" knows these people; they have connections "everywhere".... The brazen insolence of feudalists embracing in the dark with the brazen corruption of the bourgeoisie—such is "Holy Russia".

Put Pravdy No. 41,
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A RADICAL BOURGEOIS ON THE RUSSIAN WORKERS

It is sometimes useful to see how people judge us, our workers' press, our workers' unions, our working-class movement, *from outside*. It is instructive to know the views of our enemies, both overt and covert, the views of indefinite people and indefinite "sympathisers", if they are at all intelligent and have some idea of politics.

Under the latter category undoubtedly comes the "Trudovik" or "Popular Socialist"—or, if the truth were to be told, just the ordinary radical bourgeois or bourgeois democrat—Mr. S. Yelpatievsky.

This writer is a staunch supporter and associate of N. K. Mikhailovsky, now the object of fulsome praise from the "Left Narodniks", who, in defiance of common sense, are trying to pass themselves off as socialists. Mr. S. Yelpatievsky is a close observer of the life of the Russian man in the street, to whose moods he is so "sensitive".

He may well be called one of Russia's leading liquidators, seeing that he and his friends, as far back as in the autumn of 1906 (see the ill-famed August issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for 1906), proclaimed the need for an "open party", attacked the narrow-mindedness of the "underground", and started to touch up the most important slogans of this "underground" in the spirit of an open, that is to say, legal, party. In word, and in the minds of these "Social-Cadets" (as *even* the Left Narodniks *were obliged* to call them at the time), their repudiation of the "underground" and their liquidationist proclamation of an "open party" or "struggle for an open party", were prompted by the desire "to go among the masses", to organise the masses.

In deed, however, the plan of the "Popular Socialists" contained nothing but philistine, petty-bourgeois faint-heart-

edness (in regard to the masses) and credulity (in regard to the authorities). For their advocacy of an "open party" some of them were threatened with the lock-up and some were kept there, and as a result, they remained without any contact with the masses, open or otherwise, and without a party of any kind, open or otherwise. They remained what our liquidators now are, namely, a group of liquidator legalists, a group of "independent" writers (independent of the "underground", but ideologically dependent on liberalism).

The period of despondency, collapse and disintegration has passed. New currents are stirring, and Mr. S. Yelpatievsky, who is so sensitive to man-in-the-street moods, has written an article, published in this year's January issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, on the moods of the different classes in Russian society. The article bears the pretentious title "Life Goes On".

Life goes on, our Narodnik exclaims, calling to mind all kinds of congresses, Salazkin's speech[94] and the Beilis case. Things are undoubtedly stirring in the provinces, although "it is sometimes difficult now to distinguish, not only the Right Cadet from the Left Octobrist, but the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Social-Democrat [you mean liquidator Social-Democrat, don't you, Mr. Narodnik liquidator?] from the Left Cadet, judging by local [and, of course, exclusively legal] tactics". "Something like a unification of Rus is taking place on either side of the wall dividing Russia. On one side have rallied the united aristocracy, the united bureaucracy, the civil servants and other folk who 'live on the Treasury'; on the other side—just the rank and file, the mass of provincial society".

Our Narodnik's outlook, as you see, is not broad, and his analysis is shallow—the same old liberal contraposing of government and society. It is rather difficult to say anything about the class struggle within society, about bourgeoisie and workers, about the growing dissension between liberalism and democracy from the standpoint of the provincial man in the street.

It is difficult to draw conclusions about the rural masses, writes Mr. S. Yelpatievsky.

"Darkness and silence hung over the countryside, where it was difficult to see anything and from where it was hard to hear any-

thing".... The co-operative movement "suddenly burst forth, spreading far and wide" ... the struggle between the *otrub*[95] and the commune peasants ... "*all this did not stand out clearly enough*".

"Admittedly, the wall that is being flung up between the *otrub* and the commune peasants as a result of the government's efforts to divide and split the rural masses is rising higher and higher, but the countryside has evidently not yet produced the feeling and sentiment suitable to the government's aims. The desire for and expectation of land still continue to burn brightly in the hearts of both, and the desire for freedom, for 'rights', which was formerly obscured by the 'land', is evidently becoming increasingly stronger and more compelling."

After observing that "it is the Right-wing circles that are now persistently repeating the word revolution", that these circles "are really scared, really expect a conflict, and are convinced that a catastrophe is unavoidable", our chronicler of Russian life ends up by saying this about the workers:

"*I need not say anything here about the organised workers. There is no need to grope there for one's conclusions—everything there is clear and visible to all. Opinions there are fairly definitely established, there are not only desires and expectations there, but also demands, reinforced by volitional impulses—not sporadic outbreaks, but systematised and fairly well developed methods....* [The dots are Mr. Yelpatievsky's.] *And, undoubtedly, opinions, desires and expectations percolate from this organised environment into the rural environment from which it sprang.*"

This was written by a man who has never been a Marxist and has always stood aloof from the "organised workers". And this appraisal of things *from outside* is all the more valuable to the class-conscious workers.

Mr. Yelpatievsky, one of the "foremost" leaders of liquidationism, would do well to ponder over the implications of the admission he has been obliged to make.

For one thing, among *which* workers does he find "fairly definitely established opinions" and "fairly well developed and systematised methods"? *Only* among the opponents of liquidationism (because, among the liquidators themselves, there is complete chaos in opinions and methods); *only* among those who have not hurried faint-heartedly to turn their backs on the "underground". *Only* among these, indeed, "*everything is clear and visible to all*". Paradoxically enough, it is a fact that chaos reigns among those who yearn for an "open party", that "everything is clear and visible to all", that "opinions are fairly definitely established and meth-

ods fairly well developed" only among the adherents of the "underground", among those who are faithful to the precepts of this allegedly bigoted and hidebound "underground" (cf. *Nasha Zarya*, *Luch*, *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*).

The first to give birth to liquidationism (Mr. Yelpatievsky, leader of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*) was the first to sign its death warrant and read the burial service at its grave.

Although Mr. Yelpatievsky himself may not be aware of it, the question he raises is far beyond the understanding of certain politicians.

Secondly—and this is most important of all—why is it that in one of the most turbulent and difficult periods of Russian history, in the five years 1908-13, the proletariat was the only class of *all* the classes in the Russian nation that did not "grope" its way about? Why was it only among the proletariat that "everything is clear and visible to all"? Why is the proletariat emerging from the state of utter ideological disintegration and collapse and vacillation in matters concerning programme, tactics and organisation—such as now reign among the liberals, the Narodniks and intellectualist "would-be Marxists"—with "opinions fairly definitely established" and with "methods systematised and fairly well developed"? It is not only because these opinions were established and these methods developed by the "underground", but because there are profound social causes, economic conditions and factors which are operating more and more effectively with every new mile of railway that is built, and with every advance that is made in trade, industry and capitalism in town and countryside, factors which increase, strengthen, steel and unite the proletariat and keep it from following the *lead* of the man in the street, keep it from wavering like philistines, from faint-heartedly renouncing the "underground".

Those who ponder on this will realise the enormous harm that is caused by attempts to "fuse" into a single party the advanced members of the wage-worker class and the inevitably wavering and unstable petty-bourgeois peasantry.

Prosveshcheniye No. 3,
March 1914

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POLITICAL LESSONS

Some time ago, the Council of State rejected the proposal that Polish should be the official language in the future self-governing Poland. This vote, which took place against the wishes of the head of the Ministry, throws considerable light on the question of Russia's master classes and on the "specific features" of our political system and administration.

The long history of the Polish language question in connection with Polish self-government has been highlighted in the press. The Russian landlords, who are at the helm of the state, started negotiations with the Polish aristocracy on this question a long time ago, as far back as 1907. The terms were discussed for at least co-operation, or simply a relatively peaceful cohabitation between the Russian Black Hundreds and the Polish Black Hundreds. And all this was done, of course, entirely and solely in the interests of the "national culture".

Polish national culture was defended by the Polish landlords, who bargained for self-government (instead of autonomy) and for Polish as the official language. Russian national culture was defended by the Great-Russian landlords, who stipulated (possessing everything, they had no need to bargain) supremacy for Russian national culture and the severance from Poland of the "Russian" Holm area. The two parties made a deal, which, among other things, was directed *against* the Jews, whom they reduced in advance to a restrictive "*numerus clausus*", so that Poland should not lag behind Russia in Black-Hundred baiting and oppression of the Jews.

Stolypin is reported to have conducted these negotiations with the Polish aristocracy, the land magnates of Poland, in person. Stolypin made promises. The bills were introduced.

But ... the Holm area found itself detached from Poland, whereas the Polish language in a self-governing Poland *was rejected* by our Council of State. Stolypin's cause was "faithfully and truly" championed by Kokovtsov, but without avail. The Right members of the Council of State did not support him.

Here is another agreement, although a minor one, that was "torn up". Recently, Guchkov stated in the name of the all-Russian bourgeoisie that the latter had entered into a tacit agreement with the counter-revolutionary government "to support it in return for reforms". The support was given, but *no* reforms ensued.

In the example we have quoted, it was not the bourgeoisie, not the opposition, but the blue-blooded landlords who concluded what was also a tacit agreement, viz., "we" shall take a step towards Stolypin, and shall receive self-government, with the Polish language. They took the step, but received no Polish language

Valuable political lessons are to be learnt from this small example. The struggle of nationalities is developing before our eyes into a deal between the ruling classes of two nations, in which special provision is made for the oppression of a third nation (the Jewish). We must not forget that all ruling classes, the bourgeoisie as well as the landlords, even the most democratic bourgeoisie, behave in the same way.

Russia's real political system and administration are revealed in their class basis: the landlords give the orders; they decide and rule. The power of this class is supreme. It gives the bourgeoisie "access" ... only to agreements, which it *tears up*.

Nor is that all. It appears that even *within* the master class itself agreements are "torn up" with extraordinary and supernatural ease. This is what distinguishes Russia from other class states; this constitutes our exceptionalism, under which problems resolved in Europe two hundred or a hundred years ago are still unresolved here.

Prosveshcheniye No. 3,
March 1914
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

THE NATIONAL EQUALITY BILL[96]

Comrades:

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma has decided to introduce in the Fourth Duma a Bill to abolish the disabilities of the Jews and other non-Russians. The text of this Bill you will find below.

The Bill aims at abolishing all national restrictions against all nations: Jews, Poles, and so forth. But it deals in particular detail with the restrictions against the Jews. The reason is obvious: no nationality in Russia is so oppressed and persecuted as the Jewish. Anti-Semitism is striking ever deeper root among the propertied classes. The Jewish workers are suffering under a double yoke, both as workers and as Jews. During the past few years, the persecution of the Jews has assumed incredible dimensions. It is sufficient to recall the anti-Jewish pogroms and the Beilis case.

In view of these circumstances, organised Marxists must devote proper attention to the Jewish question.

It goes without saying that the Jewish question can effectively be solved only together with the fundamental issues confronting Russia today. Obviously, we do not look to the nationalist-Purishkevich Fourth Duma to abolish the restrictions against the Jews and other non-Russians. But it is the duty of the working class to make its voice heard. And the voice of the *Russian* workers must be particularly loud in protest against national oppression.

In publishing the text of our Bill, we hope that the Jewish workers, the Polish workers, and the workers of the other oppressed nationalities will express their opinion of it and propose amendments, should they deem it necessary.

At the same time we hope that the Russian workers will give particularly strong support to our Bill by their declarations, etc.

In conformity with Article 4 we shall append to the Bill a special list of regulations and laws to be rescinded. This appendix will cover about a hundred such laws affecting the Jews alone.

A BILL FOR THE ABOLITION OF ALL DISABILITIES OF THE JEWS AND OF ALL RESTRICTIONS ON THE GROUNDS OF ORIGIN OR NATIONALITY

1. Citizens of all nationalities inhabiting Russia are equal before the law.

2. No citizen of Russia, regardless of sex and religion, may be restricted in political or in any other rights on the grounds of origin or nationality.

3. All and any laws, provisional regulations, riders to laws, and so forth, which impose restrictions upon Jews in any sphere of social and political life, are herewith abolished. Article 767, Vol. IX, which states that "Jews are subject to the general laws in all cases *where no special regulations affecting them have been issued*" is herewith repealed. All and any restrictions of the rights of Jews as regards residence and travel, the right to education, the right to state and public employment, electoral rights, military service, the right to purchase and rent real estate in towns, villages, etc., are herewith abolished, and all restrictions of the rights of Jews to engage in the liberal professions, etc., are herewith abolished.

4. To the present law is appended a list of the laws, orders, provisional regulations, etc., that limit the right of the Jews, and which are subject to repeal,

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FARM LABOURERS' WAGES

Wages in the manufacturing industry are known to have risen by about *twenty per cent* since 1905.

A first attempt to study the situation as regards the wages of *agricultural labourers* was made in the recently published pamphlet by I. Drozdov, *The Wages of Farm Labourers in Russia in Connection with the Agrarian Movement in 1905-06* (St. Petersburg, 1914, published by M. I. Semyonov, price 50 kopeks). We shall deal with the main conclusions of this interesting treatise.

The farm labourer's average daily wage in European Russia was as follows (in kopeks):

	Kopeks	Per cent
Average for 1902-04	64.0	100.0
" " 1905	64.8	101.2
" " 1906	72.0	112.5
" " 1907	73.1	114.2
" " 1908	72.4	113.1
" " 1909	75.8	118.4
" " 1910	76.6	119.6

These figures show that the highest increase in wages occurred in 1906, the very year when the impact of the 1905 movement must have been at its strongest.

Thus, beginning with 1905, an increase was achieved also in the incredibly low pay of farm labourers! That this progress is still far from adequate is evident from a comparison between money wages and grain prices. The author of the pamphlet made this comparison and expressed the money wages of farm labourers quoted above *in terms of grain* (rye) at average local prices. He found that wages expressed in terms of grain *dropped* from 0.93 poods in 1902-04 to 0.85 poods in 1905 and 0.91 poods in 1906.

In other words, for his day's pay the farm labourer in Russia could buy 0.93 poods of rye in 1902-04 and only 0.91 poods in 1906. Obviously, if not for the impetus of 1905 and 1906, the reduction in *real* wages would have been even greater.

Wages fluctuate considerably from year to year according to the harvest and other causes. For example, between 1905 and 1907 wages rose, though very unevenly, and then in 1908 (the year when the reaction was strongest) they *dropped*, to rise slightly again in 1909 and 1910.

In view of the fluctuation of wages from year to year, it is necessary to take for the purposes of comparison, not individual years, but decades. Making such a comparison, Mr. Drozdov defines the average wage of farm labourers in European Russia for the ten years 1891-1900 at 55.08 kopeks per day, and for the subsequent ten years (1901-10) at 69.18 kopeks per day. This shows an increase of 25.5 per cent.

This means that *three million* farm labourers in Russia (the number is undoubtedly greatly understated) secured increases in pay amounting to about *eighty million rubles per year*, if we count only 200 working days per year.

True, during this period, the price of food products increased on an average by 20.5 per cent. Hence, the *actual* increase in wages, or increase in real wages, was very slight. Expressing daily money wages in terms of grain, the author found an increase of only 3.9 per cent during the revolutionary ten years as compared with the pre-revolutionary ten years. Thus, by exerting all their efforts the labourers succeeded in *keeping wages* at their former level and in raising them only *very slightly*.

On the other hand, a comparison of the changes in labourers' wages and *in the price of land* during the same two decades reveals an *enormous* increase in the incomes of the *landed gentry*. Purchasing land means purchasing the *income* obtained from the land; it means purchasing *rent*; the price of land is therefore capitalised rent. We see that during the two decades the average price per dessiatine rose from R.69.1 to R.132.4, *i.e.*, *almost doubled*!

The wages of millions of hired workers increased by *one-fourth*. The incomes of the landlords *doubled*. Wages barely kept pace with the price of food products, but the landlords'

incomes rose five times as high as the price of food products. The landowners and well-to-do peasant *proprietors* are growing steadily richer.

It should be borne in mind that the increase in the income from land and the increase in the price of agricultural produce steadily and inevitably widen the class gulf between the rural bourgeois and the rural proletarian, between the *small proprietor* (albeit a "labouring" proprietor) and the wage-worker. Therefore, those who say to the "labouring" peasants: under capitalism your small farm will not save you from poverty and want, your *only* salvation lies in joining the hired workers—speak the truth. But those who, like our "Narodniks", try to defend the interests of the "labouring" peasant *economy* and declare that petty economy is viable under capitalism—such people foster bourgeois aspirations, cultivate the bourgeois, non-proletarian "streak" in the small proprietor, and speak like bourgeois.

Put Pravdy No. 49,
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Signed: *V. I.*

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the text in *Put Pravdy*

THE LETTISH WORKERS AND THE SPLIT IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

Workers who read the liquidationist press know how often the Russian liquidators have boasted about the Lettish Marxist workers being on their side. When the liquidators split the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, they also repeatedly referred to the Letts. "Nobody would think of accusing the Lettish Social-Democratic workers of repudiating the 'underground'," they wrote, "and yet these Lettish workers are on our side."

Those who knew the facts never doubted that the liquidators were ... deviating from the truth. When the question of the Six and the Seven came up for discussion, the overwhelming majority of these Lettish workers declared in favour of the Six. *Pravda* published scores of resolutions passed by many hundreds of Lettish Social-Democratic workers and quite a number of groups in Riga, Mitau, Libau, and other centres, in defence of the stand taken by the six workers' deputies. Next after St. Petersburg, the city that expressed itself most emphatically on this question was Riga, that important Lettish working-class centre. The resolutions passed by the overwhelming majority of Riga workers breathed a spirit of ardent devotion to the ideas of consistent Marxism, and of sincere indignation with the liquidators.

But one thing is true: eager support, for the liquidators and their Seven came from the Lettish "leadership". The Lettish newspaper, which was then controlled by the liquidators, published articles against the Six which, by their scandalous tone and liquidationist content, put them on a par with the articles published in the St. Petersburg organ of the Russian liquidators.

True, only a very insignificant number of the Lettish *workers* supported the liquidationist campaign. The "leading" body, however, was on the side of the liquidators, and they continued to speak "on behalf of" the Lettish organised proletariat....

But some time elapsed and representatives of all Lettish Marxist workers met.[97] Naturally, the question of the split in the Duma Social-Democratic group was a high point in their proceedings. The "leading" liquidators did everything they possibly could to back the Seven, or, at least, to get the question shelved. Alas, they failed. Through their official representatives[98] the Lettish Social-Democratic workers adopted the following resolution (we quote it verbatim, except for unavoidable changes):

"*The split in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma.*

"Representatives of all the Lettish Marxist workers express their profound regret over the split in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and are of the opinion that this split was the inevitable consequence of the split outside the group, among the Russian Marxists.

"They emphasise that the unity of the group is essential, and declare that this unity can be achieved:

"1) if unity is based on the decisions adopted by the supreme institutions of the Marxist body prior to the split in the latter, namely, *the Programme of the Marxist body, its Rules*, *the London decisions*, *the decisions of the all-Russia representative body of the Marxists of December 1908 and of January 1910*;

"2) *if a mode of joint activity is found*, *which will safeguard the rights of the minority in the group.*

"*The Lettish Marxist workers instruct their leading body to support all steps towards unity in keeping with the views expressed in this resolution.*"

Such is the resolution. As the reader will see, its gist is that recognition of the *old* Marxist body is made an essential condition of unity. With those who do not recognise the Programme, Rules, and decisions of 1907, 1908 and 1910,[99] unity is impossible. That is what the Lettish workers said. And that is what makes the Lettish resolution so important.

Conciliatory trends were undoubtedly very strong at the Lettish Congress. The Letts did not want to tell the liquidationist group in the Duma plainly and bluntly that it was a group of splitters, who were flouting the will of the workers, and that they ought to resign from the Duma. They did not want to do that, evidently because the Lettish minority does not go to the same lengths as the Russian liquidators, and also because the Letts still have hopes of a possible reconciliation with the Chkheidze group.

At all events, the Lettish workers formulated precise and clear *conditions* of unity.

How are the issues that split the group in the Duma resolved from the point of view of the Lettish resolution?

The Letts demand, firstly, acceptance of the Programme. This means that they *condemn* advocacy of the famous "cultural-national autonomy" from the Duma rostrum. For the Programme officially rejected this demand, and even liquidator L. Martov has admitted that "cultural-national autonomy" is scarcely in keeping with the Programme. If unity is to become possible, the liquidators must renounce cultural-national autonomy. Such is the meaning of the Lettish reply to the first point at issue.

Next comes the dispute about admitting deputy Jagiello into the group. *How* do the Lettish workers settle this dispute? They say: see the decision of December 1908. We take up this document, look and read:

"On amalgamation with the P.S.P. Left-wing.

"After hearing the proposal of our Menshevik comrades concerning amalgamation with the P.S.P. Left-wing, the all-Russia representative body of the Marxists proceeds without debate to the order of the day." (See Report, p. 46.)

The thing is clear. The all-Russia decision of 1908 flatly rejected the proposal to amalgamate with Jagiello's party in any shape or form. The liquidators *violated* this decision. Consequently, they must reverse their splitting decision concerning Jagiello.

Further, the Letts demand acceptance of all decisions on points of principle adopted in December 1908 and January 1910. What are these decisions? And how do they appraise

liquidationism? We take the documents concerned and read:

"Whereas in a number of areas attempts have been observed on the part of some of the Party intelligentsia to liquidate the 'underground' and to substitute for it an amorphous federation acting at all costs within the limits of legality, even at the cost of openly abandoning the programme, tactics and traditions of the Marxist body ... *holds that it is necessary to wage a relentless struggle against the liquidators' attempts*, and calls upon all truly Marxist workers, irrespective of group or trend, to offer the most strenuous resistance to these attempts."

This is how the 1908 decisions condemned liquidationism (see p. 38 of the Report). The Letts demanded acceptance of these decisions.

Next come the decisions of January 1910. Here we read: "The historical situation in the Social-Democratic movement in the period of bourgeois counter-revolution inevitably gives rise—*as a manifestation of the bourgeois influence on the proletariat*—to ... repudiation of the illegal Party, belittling of its role and importance, and attempts to whittle down the programmatic and tactical tasks and the slogans of the entire body of Marxists."

Thus did the decisions of 1910 condemn liquidationism. And it was the Letts again who demanded recognition of these decisions by the liquidators.

The Lettish resolution was adopted *unanimously*. Even the Lettish liquidators who were present dared not vote against it. They had received a sufficiently severe lesson from the Lettish workers, who respect the "underground" and recognise the decisions of the old body of Marxists. To vote against this resolution would have meant defying the whole Lettish proletariat and losing their last supporters among the workers.

Such were the decisions of the Lettish workers (over three thousand organised workers being represented).

In a very polite form, without using a single harsh word, but nonetheless firmly and emphatically, the Lettish workers said to the Chkheidze group:

"Do you want unity? Then recognise the extremely important decisions of the old body of Marxists, retract your

violations of the Programme and decisions of 1908-10, repudiate those who have repudiated the 'underground'; in short, take your stand on the basis of Marxism."

The last really workers' organisation, in whose name the Chkheidze group tried to speak, turned its back on that group. As was to be expected, only a handful of liquidators now support the seven deputies who are inclining towards liquidationism. The proletarian element is abandoning or has already abandoned them.

A group without workers—such is the liquidationist group in the Duma.

After the Letts' decision, this is now absolutely indisputable.

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THE "AUGUST" FICTION EXPOSED

Over eighteen months ago, in August 1912, there occurred an event of fairly great importance in the history of the working-class movement in Russia, On the eve of the elections to the Fourth Duma, the liquidators "united" with, as they put it, the representatives of different trends at the August Conference, thereby attempting to prove that they were not liquidators at all, that they had not liquidated anything, and had no intention of doing so, and that "unity" between them and the really serious, non-fictitious workers' Marxist organisations was quite possible.

The August Conference shifted the dispute between the liquidators and their opponents to a different plane: it became, not only a question of whether the liquidators' theory and tactics were correct, but also of whether the liquidators' utterances were confirmed or refuted by *their own* deeds. Was *their* August Conference a fiction, make-believe, a fraud and a bubble, or was it a serious affair, a sincere step, something real that showed the *possibility* of the liquidators rectifying their errors?

That is how the matter stood.

The liquidators' deeds, the results of their August Conference, had to provide an answer to this question.

This answer has now been given by the only Marxist body, namely, the Lettish Marxists, recognised by *all* trends and groups without exception as Marxists who have not violated Party decisions, and have *themselves* gone through the famous August experience. We learn from well-informed sources that the meeting of the highest representatives of the organised Lettish Marxists in Russia has drawn to a close. The supremely authoritative character of this assembly of representatives of the Lettish organised Marx-

ists has not been challenged by anyone, not by a single trend or by a single group; on the contrary, it was attended by representatives and authorised delegates, not only from the majority of the workers of Russia (anti-liquidators), *but also from the liquidators*, from their leading, August body, as well as from the Bund and the P.S.P. Left-wing.

The eighteen months' experience of August blocs and institutions was discussed from every angle and appraised by those who had themselves gone through this experience in an endeavour to help the liquidators rid themselves of liquidationism.

What was the upshot of this discussion and appraisal?

"*The attempt on the part of the conciliators*," *the decision of the Lettish organised Marxists reads*, "*to unite at all costs with the liquidator*s (*the August Conference of 1912*) *proved fruitless*, *and the uniters themselves became ideologically and politically dependent upon the liquidators*"....

This is the official decision of an unbiased body of Marxists, which fully and conclusively exposes the August fiction!

What we have been saying for two years, and what the liquidators—while calling God to witness, and heaping abuse upon us—have been denying, has now been proved and officially declared by those who *themselves participated* in the August Conference, in the August bloc, and in the leading August body.

The Lettish organised Marxists have officially admitted that the "focal point of the inner-Party struggle during the past five years has been the question of the liquidationist trend" long ago condemned by the entire Party, and that their, the Lettish, representative *was being recalled* from the August leading body because that body (so runs the decision of the Lettish Marxists) "*has not dissociated itself from the liquidators*".

Thus, events have fully proved that we were right, and have once again exposed the liquidators. We were right when we said that the August Conference was a fiction, an imposture, a customary (in petty-bourgeois parties and groups) *pre-election fraud*. The liquidators dared not go to the elections with their banner and honestly stand by their

convictions; they hid behind the August bloc, calling God to witness that they were not liquidating-anything.

The Letts have exposed this fraud.

Mind you, these Letts were and remain *neutral*, so neutral that they decided not to enter into any organisational relations with any section of the Russian organised Marxists! The exposure of the August fiction and of the liquidators' election masquerade is the more significant for its coming from *neutral* organisations.

We shall have more than one occasion to revert to the decisions of the Lettish Marxists, which prove once again how right we were when we said that the unity of the Marxist workers in Russia was possible only *in opposition* to the liquidators. In conclusion, we would mention only one particularly important decision on the national principle in the Marxist organisation.

The Lettish Marxists themselves represent the workers of a disfranchised and oppressed nation, and conduct their activities in centres with very mixed populations. In Riga, for example, they have to deal with German, Russian, Lettish, Jewish and Lithuanian proletarians. Long years of experience have firmly convinced the Lettish Marxists of the correctness of the principle of *international unity* in the local organisations of the working class.

"*In every city*," *the Lettish Marxists' decision reads*, "*there must be one united organisation of Marxist proletarians, which must operate on the lines recognised by the Stockholm Congress*, *and in conformity with the commentaries of the All-Russia Conference of 1908*."

These commentaries, as we know, *definitely* condemned the principle of federation. Not the federation of national workers' organisations, but international unity, a single organisation that conducts activities in *all* the languages spoken by the proletariat in every local area.

That is the only correct principle of Marxism. That is the only socialist form of resistance to the nationalist philistines, who are trying *to split the proletariat into national sections*. That is a demand for the decision of the entire Party to be carried out, a decision the Bund has violated and is continuing to violate in a most flagrant manner.

An end is coming to the deception sown among the workers by the liquidators and Bundists, who are causing a split while trying to shout loudest about "unity". The decision of the Lettish Marxists, who are neutral in our (Russian) conflict, has conclusively proved to all workers that real *unity* can and must be built up only in opposition to those splitters who defy the Party's long-standing and constant demand for the abandoning of liquidationism and of the principle that workers' organisations should be divided according to nationality.

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SOCIALISM DEMOLISHED AGAIN[100]

Published in March 1914
in the journal *Sovremenny Mir* No. 3
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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the text in the journal

SOCIALISM DEMOLISHED AGAIN[100]

Published in March 1914
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Less than a decade separates us from the turbulent period of 1905, and yet the change that has taken place in Russia in this short time seems tremendous. Russia seems all at once to have changed from a patriarchal into a modern capitalist country. Leo Tolstoy, the ideologist of the old Russia, expressed this in a characteristic and rueful tirade when he complained that the Russian people "have learnt with astonishing rapidity to make revolutions and parliaments".[101]

Naturally, Russia's "sudden" transformation into a bourgeois country in a matter of five or ten years in the twentieth century was possible only because the entire second half of the preceding century had been a stage in the transition from the feudal to the bourgeois system.

It is interesting to note how this change affected the attitude towards Marxism of our official, university science of political economy. In the good old days, only government professors of the extreme right engaged in the business of "demolishing" Marx. Liberal-Narodnik professorial scholarship as a whole treated Marx with respect, "recognised" the labour theory of value, and thereby created the naïve illusion among "Left Narodniks" that in Russia there was no soil for a bourgeoisie.

Today, there has "suddenly" sprung up in this country a host of liberal and progressive "Marxophobes", among them men like Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky,* or Mr. Struve, etc. All of them *have disclosed* the true content and significance of liberal-Narodnik "respect" for Marx. In word, their respect has remained, but in deed, their long-standing inability to understand materialist dialectics and the theory of the class struggle has inevitably led them to renounce the theory of labour value.

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* See pp. 144-47 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Until 1905 the bourgeoisie saw no other enemy than, the feudalists and the "bureaucrats"; that is why they tried to be sympathetic towards the theory espoused by the European proletariat, and tried not to see the "enemy on the left". After 1905, a counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie appeared in Russia, and professorial, liberal scholarship, *without the slightest loss* of prestige in "society", seriously proceeded to demolish Marx.

We propose to acquaint the reader with the latest scholarly work of one of these "serious" scholars.

I

Last year V. P. Ryabushinsky published Part I of Mr. Pyotr Struve's work *The Economy and Prices* (M. 1913). The celebrated "alliance between science and industry", which was first marked by Mr. Ryabushinsky's publication of Mr. Struve's discourse on "Great Russia", has gained strength and attained full stature. From a simple alliance between science and industry there has now emerged an alliance between science, industry and the authorities, for Mr. Struve submitted his research as a treatise for a scientific degree, which has been conferred on him.

In his preface Mr. Struve assures us that he planned this work about fifteen years ago. Consequently, we have every reason to expect a piece of serious and solid research.

The author himself holds a very high opinion of his work, in which he promises to "revise" ("critically", of course) "certain traditional problems and principles of political economy". The revision also involves the significance of price "as the fundamental concept of political economy".

> "This revision will lead to the posing of new methodological problems for our science in the spirit of consistent empiricism, based on strictly evolved, precise concepts and clear distinctions."

This sentence, taken from the concluding lines of Mr. Struve's "work", contains the *leit-motif*, as it were, of his treatise. The author's programme is "consistent empiricism" (this is how any fashionable philosopher starts in our day, no matter what sanctimonious humbug his theory may lead up to) and the "strict evolution of precise concepts and clear

distinctions". The familiar motive of the celebrated "criticism", which so often amounts to nothing more than verbal scholasticism....

Mr. Struve wants to see "consistent empiricism" particularly in that part of his book, by far the larger, in which he gives "sketches and materials on the historical phenomenology of price" (this takes up nearly the whole of Section 2 of Part I). And by "strict evolution of precise concepts and clear distinctions" he means his disquisition, in Section 1 and in the Introduction, on "some fundamental philosophical motives in the development of economic thinking", on "the economy and society", etc.

We shall first deal with these fundamental theoretical reflections of Mr. Struve's.

II

"The normative, ethical conception of worth (*tsennost*) [value (*stoimost*); Mr. Struve persistently uses the wrong term "worth" instead of "value", although the incorrectness of this was proved to him long ago] that still prevails also among the canonists, is not so far removed as it may seem from the conception of worth as the intrinsic 'basis' or 'law' of price. Indeed, we see that the '*bonitas intrinseca*' '*valor*', and '*pretium naturale*'* of the canonists is transformed into the '*intrinsic value*', or '*natural value*', or '*natural price*', i.e., the objective worth** of the later economists" (XXV).

Here we see Mr. Struve's main idea (or rather his main ideophobia) and the typical methods of this author. To discredit the scientific law of value, Mr. Struve tries hard to identify it with the "ethical" law of the canonists. Mr. Struve, of course, cannot produce a shred of evidence to support this. Considering that he writes "we see" in a footnote referring to a passage (and an irrelevant one at that) in the work of a

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* Intrinsic utility; price, worth, and natural price.—*Ed.*

** Incidentally, in admitting that the "later" (compared with the medieval canonists) economists have in mind precisely *objective* "worth", Mr. Struve immediately reveals the incorrectness of his own subjectivist insistence on the word "worth" as against "objective" "*value*".

Russian Kantian of 1810, one can imagine what difficulty our scholar had in his search for proofs!

Mr. Struve cannot but know that in the Middle Ages all scientific laws, not only the law of value, were understood in a religious and ethical sense. Even the laws of natural science were interpreted by the canonists in the same way. Therefore, the identification of the canonists' law of price with that of the representatives of classical political economy simply cannot be taken seriously. This "idea" of Mr. Struve's could hardly be called an idea; it is simply ideophobia covered up with a purely childish trick.

Mr. Struve continues:

"The 'law of worth' becomes the '*idée fixe*' of political economy. And in this sphere the 'universalist' ('realistic') thought motive stands out most clearly in the works of an author who blends it with the greatest sweep of general-philosophical conception of economic science, namely, *Marx*. In his works this motive is combined with a materialist world outlook that is all the more valuable for not being elaborated in detail. He turned labour value, not only into a law, but also into the 'substance' of price. We have shown more than once in our works the way in which this mechanically naturalist and at the same time 'realistic' conception of worth vainly tries to embrace the world of empirical phenomena of economic life and culminates in a colossal and hopeless contradiction."

This is a striking illustration of Mr. Struve's "scientific" method! This is his method of annihilating Marx! A couple of pseudo-scientific terms, a hint at thought motives, and a reference to a short magazine article in *Zhizn*[102] in 1900—that is all he can boast of. That is not much, Professor!

In his brief magazine articles Mr. Struve failed to prove that there was any kind of contradiction, let alone a "colossal" one, between Vol. I and Vol. III of Marx's *Capital*, between the labour theory of value and the formation of average price on the basis of the law of value.

The medieval "distinction" between nominalism and realism and the contraposition of universalism and singularism, which Mr. Struve juggles with, add nothing whatever to our understanding of Marx's theory, to criticism of it, or to the clarification of Mr. Struve's own theory (or what he

claims to be his own theory). It is juggling, scientific junk, but not science. Of course, in the controversy between medieval nominalists and realists there is some analogy with the controversy between materialists and idealists, but analogies and historical continuity can be established between very many other theories, not only into the Middle Ages, but also into ancient times. To study seriously the links between the controversies of at least the Middle Ages and the history of materialism, special research would be required. Our author's book, however, contains no trace whatever of a serious study of the subject. He flits from subject to subject, hints at a thousand questions without examining a single one, and with a boldness that is amusing enunciates the most emphatic conclusions.

He himself is compelled to admit in the passage we have quoted that Marx blended his philosophy and political economy into an *integral* materialist world outlook, and that Marx's general philosophical conception is *the broadest*!

This is no trifling admission. A person who is compelled to make such an admission and who talks about a critical revision of political economy and about its new methodological tasks, is in duty bound seriously to examine *all* the components of Marx's "integral" materialist world outlook. But Mr. Struve does not even attempt to do that. He confines himself to a few slighting remarks against "metaphysical materialism". Who does not know that, from the point of view of the fashionable theories of agnosticism (Kantianism, positivism, Machism, and so forth), both consistent materialism and consistent philosophical idealism are "metaphysics"? In making remarks of this kind, Mr. Struve merely *hints* at his own philosophical world outlook, which has nothing integral about it. But the task of examining and studying Marx's *integral* materialist world outlook cannot be dismissed with remarks of this kind. To attempt to do so is merely to issue oneself with a *testimonium paupertatis*.

III

On the other hand, the attempt to identify Marxism with the scholastic doctrine of original sin is such a gem in Mr. Struve's scientific treatise that we cannot refrain from

examining it in greater detail. We ask our readers' forgiveness in advance for quoting long passages, but one must be accurate here in order to pin down more firmly the methods used by modern liberal-professorial science.

"It is quite clear to me," writes Mr. Struve, "that many centuries ago Marx's theory of labour worth, in its logical structure had its extremely close analogy and prototype in the 'realistically' grounded scholastic doctrine of original sin.... Just as according to Marx empirical 'prices' are governed by the law of worth, and owe their existence to the substance of worth, so to speak, so, according to scholasticism, the empirical actions of men are determined by original sin.

"Here are some analogies.

"*Marx*: 'The matter will be most readily pictured by regarding this whole mass of commodities, produced by one branch of industry, as one commodity, and the sum of the prices of the many identical commodities as one price. Then, whatever has been said of a single commodity applies literally to the mass of commodities of an entire branch of production available in the market. The requirement that the individual value of a commodity should correspond to its social value is now realised, or further determined, in that the mass contains social labour necessary for its production, and that the value of this mass is equal to its market value.'[103]

"*Thomas Aquinas*: 'We must say that all men who are born of Adam may be regarded as one man, since they are identical in the nature which they inherited from their progenitor, just as, for example, all men who live in one county are regarded as one body, and the whole county as one man'...."

Quite enough, is it not? Mr. Struve assures us that this is "not playing at striking [!?] analogies or witticising". Perhaps. But it is undoubtedly playing at vulgar analogies, or rather, simply clowning. If people who regard themselves as liberal and progressive scholars are capable of tolerating such heroes of buffoonery in their midst; if these heroes are granted scientific degrees, and are allowed to instruct the young, then that only shows for the hundredth and thousandth time what the "law" of the bourgeois era is: the more

insolently and shamelessly you make mock of science in the effort to demolish Marx, the greater is your merit.

Mr. Struve had to resort to clownish antics in order to cover up his sheer inability to refute Marx. That the whole mass of commodities of a given branch of industry is exchanged for the sum of commodities of another branch, is an indisputable fact. That all "empiricists" determine average price by taking the whole mass of commodities and dividing the aggregate price by the number of individual commodities, is also a fact. Statistics, for which Mr. Struve has such a liking (and which, as we shall see below, he only "hints at" instead of trying to study), prove to us at every turn that Marx's method is constantly employed. But what do professional "socialistophobes" care? The thing is to take a kick at Marx; all the rest will take care of itself.

The nature of the philosophical authorities who give Mr. Struve their benediction in his noble occupation can be seen, among other things, from the following words uttered by our professor:

> "In this work [that of summing-up the ideas of the nineteenth century] impartial posterity should assign a prominent place to the great French metaphysician Renouvier, to whom many of the critical and positive ideas of our times can be traced" (43).

Renouvier was the head of the French school of "neo-critical idealism", "an obscurantist of the first water", as he was called by the empirio-critic (i.e., anti-materialist philosopher) Willy (see my remarks on Renouvier in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy*. Moscow, 1909, p. 247). * Renouvier wrote the word "law" with a capital L and simply converted it into a basis for religion.

See by what methods Mr. Struve demolishes Marx's "integral [as he himself admits] materialist world outlook"; he puts Marx on the same footing as a medieval theologian on the sole grounds that Marx takes the aggregate prices of commodities of a single branch of production, while the medieval theologian, Thomas Aquinas, takes all men who descend from the first man Adam, and uses this as a basis for his doctrine of original sin. At the same time

* See present edition, Vol. 14, p. 211.—*Ed.*

Marx is demolished in the name of the "great" Renouvier who preached philosophical idealism in the nineteenth century and used the concept of "law" as a basis for religion!

O Mr. Struve! O disciple of the "great" Renouvier! O teacher charged with the enlightenment of Russian youth!

IV

"In the vast reconstruction," writes Mr. Struve, "which the edifice of political economy, as based on the idea of natural law, underwent after the onslaught of historism, both mystical and materialist, that idea was an utter failure. Its basic inner contradiction manifested itself. The latter revealed itself perhaps most glaringly in that form of 'natural' political economy which became the theoretical foundation of bourgeois economic liberalism.... Indeed, if natural law reigns in economic life, there can be no facts in that life which are out of harmony with natural law, or contradict it. And yet liberal 'natural' political economy constantly fought, in books and in life, against such facts.... After the bankruptcy of bourgeois liberal political economy it became almost indecent to speak of 'natural law'. On the one hand, it was obviously unscientific to single out from an integral and, in principle, uniform social economic process certain individual aspects, relations and phenomena, as 'natural', and place them in a special category of phenomena. On the other hand, the proclamation of 'natural law', which even in economic liberalism rested on an unconscious ethical motive, was ethically discredited because it was regarded as a method that justified or perpetuated certain social relations and forms that were only of temporary significance, because it was regarded as a 'bourgeois' apologia" (56-57).

This is how the author disposes of the idea of natural law. And this has been written by a man who is compelled to admit that "the materialist Marx extended a hand to the materialist Petty across the whole of the eighteenth century" (56), and that "Petty is the most striking and most outstanding exponent of the powerful current which at the time flowed from natural to social science" (50).

It is common knowledge that a powerful current flowed from natural to social science not only in Petty's time, but in Marx's time as well. And this current remains just as powerful, if not more so, in the twentieth century too. How can one raise the question of this "current" and speak of the materialism of Petty and Marx in a work that claims to be scientific, and is meant to study "the philosophical

motives of economic thinking", without saying anything whatever about the philosophical premises and deductions of natural science?

But that is precisely Mr. Struve's manner: to raise, or rather, touch upon, a thousand and one questions, to "hold forth" on everything, to present everything as being weighed and considered, but to give nothing except a hash of quotations and running comments.

It is a downright falsehood to say that the idea of natural law is bankrupt in political economy, and that it is "indecent to speak of it". On the contrary. It is the "current from natural to social science" that has been reinforcing this idea and made it inevitable. It is "materialist historism" that conclusively substantiated this idea, after stripping it of its metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of this term, i.e., anti-dialectical) absurdities and defects. To say that the "natural law" of the classics is "ethically discredited" as being a bourgeois apologia, is sheer nonsense. It means distorting both the classics and "materialist historism" in the most flagrant manner. For the classics sought and discovered a number of capitalism's "natural laws", but they failed to understand its transitory character, failed to perceive the class struggle within it. Both these faults were remedied by materialist historism and "ethical derogation" has nothing to do with it.

By employing exaggeratedly "strong" language ("indecent" to speak about "natural law"), Mr. Struve is trying in vain to conceal his *dread* of science, a *dread* of scientific analysis of the modern economy, so characteristic of the bourgeoisie. Lordly scepticism is characteristic of them, as it is of all declining classes, but the idea of a natural law governing the functioning and development of society is not declining, but is steadily gaining ground.

V

We shall now examine the "strictly evolved, precise concepts and clear distinctions" which Mr. Struve promised to provide for the "formulation of new methodological problems" of political economy.

"We define economy" we read on page 5, "as the subjective teleological entity of rational economic activity or economic management."

This sounds "awfully learned", but it is really a mere juggling with words. Economy is defined as economic management! A statement of the obvious.... The "subjective entity of economic management" may be found in dreams and fantastic novels.

Afraid to say the production of *material* products ("metaphysical materialism"!), Mr. Struve gives us a gewgaw, not a definition. By eliminating every element and symptom of social relationships, Mr. Struve has "invented", as if on purpose, an "economy" that *political economy* has never studied, and can never study.

Here are the "three main types of economic systems" that he then goes on to enumerate: 1) the sum total of parallel economic units; 2) the system of interacting economies, and 3) "community-economy" as the "subjective teleological entity". The first type covers, if you please, economies that are not interlinked and do not interact (an attempt to revive Robinson Crusoe!); the second refers to slavery, serfdom, capitalism, and simple commodity production; the third refers to communism, "which was practised in the Jesuit state in Paraguay to the extent that it is at all practicable". This masterly classification, in which no trace of historical reality is discernible, is supplemented by the distinction drawn between economic and social systems.

Economic categories, Mr. Struve tells us edifyingly, "express the economic relation in which every subject engaged in economy stands to the surrounding world"; *inter-economic* categories "express phenomena that spring from the interaction of the autonomous economies"; *social* categories "spring from the social inequality among interacting people engaged in economy".

Thus, the economic system of slavery, serfdom and capitalism may be logically, economically and historically detached from social inequality! This is what emerges from Mr. Struve's clumsy efforts to introduce new definitions and distinctions. "Arguing in the abstract, the sum total of parallel economic units is compatible with relations of equality and inequality. It may be a peasant democracy or a feudal society."

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This is how our author reasons. From the point of view of theory—logic, economics and history—his reasoning is utterly absurd. By stretching the concept of the "sum total of parallel economic units" to cover almost everything, he reveals how meaningless that concept is. Peasant democracy, feudalism, and proprietors living side by side (on one floor, on one landing, in a St. Petersburg apartment house), are all the "sum total of parallel economic units"! The author has already forgotten that, in his system, this sum total is supposed to characterise *one of the three* main types of economic systems. Mr. Struve's "scientific" definitions and distinctions are mere gibberish.

This crude and trivial quibbling, however, this flouting of logic and history has a "meaning" of its own. That "meaning" is bourgeois despair and "don't-care-a-damn attitude" (if one can thus translate the French expression "*je m'en fiche*"). Despair of ever being able to give a scientific analysis of the present, a denial of science, a tendency to despise all generalisations, to hide from all the "laws" of historical development, and make the trees screen the *wood*—such is the class idea underlying the fashionable bourgeois scepticism, the dead and deadening scholasticism, which we find in Mr. Struve's book. "Social inequality" *should not* be attributed to the economic system; it is *impossible* to do that (because the bourgeoisie does not wish it)—that is Mr. Struve's "theory". Let political economy indulge in truisms, scholastics and the senseless pursuit of trivial facts (examples of which will be found below), and let the question of "social inequalities" recede into the safer sphere of sociological and legal arguments. These unpleasant questions can more easily be "ducked" in that sphere.

Economic reality glaringly reveals the class division of society as the basis of the economic system of both capitalism and feudalism. From the moment political economy made its appearance, science has concentrated its attention on *explaining* this class division. Classical political economy took a number of steps along this road, and Marx took a step further. Today's bourgeoisie is so scared by this step, so disturbed by the "laws" of modern economic evolution, which are all too obvious and too formidable, that the bourgeois and their ideologists are prepared to throw all

the classics and all the laws overboard, so long as they can relegate all these social inequalities, or whatever you call them ... to the archives of jurisprudence.

VI

Mr. Struve would particularly like to relegate the concept of value to the archives. "Worth," he writes, "as something distinct from price, independent of it and yet determining it, is a phantom" (96). "The category of objective worth is merely, so to speak, the metaphysical doubling of the category of price" (97).

To demolish socialism, Mr. Struve has chosen the most ... radical, the easiest, and at the same time the most flimsy method, that of repudiating science altogether. Here the lordly scepticism of the *blasé* and frightened bourgeois reaches its *nec plus ultra*. Like the advocate in Dostoyevsky's novel who, in defending his client charged with murder for the purpose of robbery, went to the length of saying that there had been neither robbery nor murder; Mr. Struve "refutes" Marx's theory of value simply by *asserting* that value is a phantom.

> "At present it is no longer necessary to refute it [the theory of objective value]; it need only be described in the way we have done here and in our 'Introduction' to show that it does not and cannot exist in scientific theory" (97).

Now how can one help calling this most "radical" method most flimsy? For thousands of years mankind has been aware of the operation of an objective law in the phenomenon of exchange, has been trying to understand it and express it with the utmost precision, has been testing its explanations by millions and billions of day-by-day observations of economic life; and suddenly, a fashionable representative of a fashionable occupation—that of collecting quotations (I almost said collecting postage stamps)—comes along and "does away with all this": "worth is a phantom".

Not for nothing has it been said that were the truths of mathematics to affect the interests of men (or rather, the interests of classes in their struggle), those truths would be heatedly challenged. No great brains are needed to challenge the incontestible truths of economic science. Just a word

inserted about value being a phantom, *something independent of price*—and the trick is done!

It does not matter that such an insertion is ridiculous. Price is a manifestation of the law of value. Value is the law of price, i.e., the generalised expression of the phenomenon of price. To speak of "independence" here is a mockery of science, which in all fields of knowledge reveals the operation of fundamental laws in a seeming chaos of phenomena.

Take, for example, the law of the variation of species and of the formation of higher species from lower ones. It would be very cheap to designate as a phantom the generalisations of natural science, the already discovered laws (accepted by all despite the host of seeming contraventions and deviations shown in the medley of individual cases), and the search for corrections and supplements to them. In the field of natural science, anyone who said that the laws governing phenomena in the natural world were phantoms would be put into a lunatic asylum, or simply laughed out of court. In the field of economic science, however, a man who struts about ... stark naked ... is readily appointed professor, for he is really quite fitted to stultify the minds of the pampered sons of the bourgeoisie.

> "Price is a fact. We will put it this way: price is the concept of the real exchange relations between wealth in the process of exchange; it is a realised exchange relation.
>
> "Worth is a norm. We will put it this way: worth is the concept of the ideal, or what ought to be the interrelation between wealth in the process of exchange" (88).

How characteristic of Mr. Struve is this negligent, ostentatiously off-hand remark: "We will put it this way". Deliberately ponderous, and, juggling with abstruse terms and new-fangled formulations, Mr. Struve suddenly adopts the *feuilleton* tone.... Indeed, it would be difficult to proclaim value a phantom without adopting a *feuilleton* tone.

If price is a "realised exchange relation", then it may be asked: relation between what? Obviously, between the economic units engaged in the process of exchange. If this "exchange relation" does not arise accidentally, as an isolated case and for a brief period, but repeats itself with invariable regularity, everywhere, and every day, then it is obvious that this "exchange relation" links the sum total

of economic units in *a single economic system*; obviously, there is a firmly established division of labour between these economic units.

Thus, all Mr. Struve's wily reasoning about "inter-economic" relations, which are alleged to be *separable* from social relations, are *already* collapsing like a house of cards. Mr. Struve has driven the concept of commodity production out of the door only to let it steal in through the window. Mr. Struve's famous "empiricism" consists in expelling from science generalisations that are unpleasant to the bourgeoisie, but which nevertheless have to be recognised unofficially, so to speak.

If price is an exchange relation, then one must inevitably understand the difference between an individual exchange relation and a constant one, between an accidental and mass relation, between a momentary relation and one that embraces a long period of time. If that is the case—and it certainly is—we must as inevitably work upward from the accidental and the individual to the constant and widespread: from price to value. Mr. Struve's attempts to proclaim value as something which "should be", to identify it with ethics, or with the doctrine of the canonists, and so forth, collapse like a house of cards.

By saying that the recognition of value as a phantom is "empiricism" and that the striving (which can be traced "from Aristotle" to Marx—p. 91—and it should be added: through the whole of classical political economy!)—the striving to discover the *law* of the formation of and change in prices is "metaphysics", Mr. Struve repeats the method of the latest philosophical reactionaries, who by "metaphysics" mean the materialism of natural science in general, and by "empiricism" mean taking a step towards religion. Expelling *laws* from science means, in fact, *smuggling in the laws of religion*. In vain does Mr. Struve imagine that his "little stratagems" can deceive anybody with reference to this simple and undoubted fact.

VII

As we have seen, Mr. Struve has evaded a pitched battle with the Marxists and taken shelter behind scepticism in general. But he has made up for this by the zeal with which

he has scattered remarks against Marxism throughout his book, in the hope of catching his readers after they have been stunned by the mass of random and disjointed quotations flung at them.

For example, he quotes a brief passage from Saint-Simon, mentions a series of books on Saint-Simon (this copying from German bibliographies is systematically practised by our "scholar", evidently as the surest road ... to a scientific degree), and quotes lengthy passages from Renouvier about Saint-Simon.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from this?

It is the following: "Paradoxical as it may seem, it is simply an incontrovertible historical fact that the higher form of socialism, so-called scientific socialism, is the offspring of the liaison between revolutionary and reactionary thought" (51-52). For the path to scientific socialism can be traced through Saint-Simon, and "Saint-Simon was a disciple of both eighteenth century Enlightenment, and of the reactionaries of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries" (53). "This should always be borne in mind: historical materialism is essentially the product of the reaction against the spirit of the eighteenth century. First, it is the reaction of the organic view against rationalism; secondly, it is the reaction of economism against politicism. Moreover, in his religious period, Saint-Simon represented the reaction of emotion and religion against the ideas of law and human justice" (54-55). To seal this, Mr. Struve repeats: "Marxism is the formula of the French theocratical school, and of the historical counter-revolutionary reaction in general, translated into the language of positivism, atheism and radicalism. Dismissing reason, Marx remained a revolutionary and a socialist" (55)....

If Marx succeeded in assimilating and further developing, on the one hand, "the spirit of the eighteenth century" in its struggle against the feudal and clerical powers of the Middle Ages, and on the other hand, the economism and historism (and also the dialectics) of the philosophers and historians of the early nineteenth century, it only proves the depth and power of Marxism, and only confirms the opinions of those who regard Marxism as the *last word* in science. With a clarity that left no room for misunderstanding

Marx always pointed out that the doctrines of the reactionaries—historians and philosophers—contained profound ideas about the operation of definite laws and the class struggle in the march of political events.

But Mr. Struve performs capers and declares that Marxism is the offspring of reaction, although he immediately adds that Marxism can be traced, *not* to Saint-Simon the *clericalist*, but to Saint-Simon the historian and economist!

It appears that, by means of a catch-phrase, and *without saying a single* serious word about the contribution made by Saint-Simon to social science *after* the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and *before* Marx, our author *has leaped* over the whole of social science in general.

Inasmuch as this science was built up, first, by the classical economists, who discovered the law of value and the fundamental division of society into classes; *inasmuch* as important contributions to this science were made, in conjunction with the classical economists, by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century in its struggle against feudalism and clericalism; *inasmuch* as this science was promoted by the historians and philosophers of the early nineteenth century who, notwithstanding their reactionary views, still further explained the class struggle, developed the dialectical method and applied it, or began to apply it, in social life—Marxism, which made tremendous advances along precisely this path, marks the *highest development* of Europe's entire historical, economic and philosophical science. Such is the logical deduction. But Mr. Struve's deduction says: Marxism is *therefore* not worth refuting, the laws of value, and so forth, are not even worth discussing, and Marxism is the offspring of reaction!

Does Mr. Struve really think that he can deceive his readers and disguise his obscurantism with such crude methods?

VIII

Obviously, Mr. Struve's scientific treatise would not have been a scientific treatise submitted for a scientific degree if it did not set out to "prove" that socialism is impracticable.

Perhaps you think this is going too far? Is it possible, in a work dealing with the question of price and economy as well as "certain philosophical motives" of political economy, to "prove" that socialism is impracticable without even attempting to study the historical tendencies of capitalism?

Oh, for Mr. Struve there is nothing easier! Listen:

"In the final analysis, economic liberalism envisages complete identity—on the basis of the operation of 'natural law'—between the rational and what ought to be, and the natural and necessary in the socio-economic process, its complete rationalisation.... Socialism, in its most perfect form of historical, or what is called scientific socialism, while rejecting 'natural law', at the same time accepts this fundamental idea of economic liberalism. It also assumes that harmony is possible between a rational structure and the natural course of things, and that the complete rationalisation of the socio-economic process is possible" (p. 58). Then come a few off-hand phrases about this "belief" (p. 59) and the following ponderous scientific deduction (p. 60). (Paragraph 7, Chapter 2, Section I of Part I of Mr. Struve's "work"):

"Comparing the socialist and liberal ideal with the world of reality, scientifically empirical research must admit that the belief contained in these ideals is groundless. In the formal sense, both these ideals are equally impracticable, equally utopian."

When reading things like this, one can scarcely believe the evidence of one's eyes. What a degree of senile decay and prostitution has been reached by present-day professorial science! Mr. Struve knows perfectly well that scientific socialism is based on the fact of capitalism's socialisation of production. This fact is borne out by a host of phenomena to be observed all over the world. And there is a wealth of "empirical" evidence pointing to the degree and rapidity with which these phenomena are developing.

But our scholar, who evades the question of the socialisation of production and does *not* touch upon a *single* sphere of these innumerable facts in his "scientifically empirical research", declares, on the basis of a few meaningless phrases about liberalism and rationalisation, that the question is scientifically solved!

It is not true to say that liberalism envisages complete rationalisation. It is not true to say that Marxism *repudiates* "natural law". The entire phrase, "complete rationalisation", is false and meaningless; it is all a shoddy evasion, a stupid game in pursuit of a single purpose: to evade an issue that has been clearly and precisely formulated by scientific socialism; to stun young students with claptrap about socialism being impracticable.

IX

The bulk of Mr. Struve's treatise, much more than a half, is devoted to "sketches and materials on the historical phenomenology of price".

This is where our ardent advocate of "consistent empiricism", who declares value to be a phantom and has studied *prices* as facts, can really show his mettle!

Price statistics in the last few years have made great advances. An enormous amount of material has been collected in all countries. Quite a few books have been published on the history of prices. If our strict scholar does not even condescend to refute Marx's theory of value, why could he not at least analyse some of the fundamental problems of this theory with the aid of the "empirical" material furnished by the history and statistics of prices? Thousands of commodities and hundreds of sections or periods of the history of their prices can be found, where the influence of all extraneous factors can be eliminated—with the exception of the labour "*factor*"—and where precise data is available on the amount of labour consumed in the production of a given commodity. Why could not our advocate of "consistent empiricism", in a work of "scientific research" on prices, even *touch upon* these data in the section dealing with the "historical phenomenology of price"?

Why? Obviously because Mr. Struve was only too well aware of the hopelessness of his case, of the impossibility of refuting the theory of objective, labour value, and instinctively felt that he must *steer clear* of all scientific research.

The hundreds of pages of Mr. Struve's treatise devoted to "sketches and materials on the historical phenomenology of price" are an exceptionally remarkable illustration of

how present-day bourgeois scientists steer clear of science. What will you not find in these pages! Comments on fixed and free prices; several observations on the Polynesians; excerpts from the market regulations issued by (ah, what erudition!) King Andrianampoinimerina, unifier of Madagascar, in 178?-1810; several clauses of the Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon (about 2100 B. C.) concerning a surgeon's fee for performing an operation; several passages, mostly in Latin and highly scholarly, concerning the scheduling of the purchase price of women in ancient German codes; the translation of seven passages referring to commercial law from the works of the holy lawgivers of India, Manu and Yajna Valmiki*; the protection of purchasers in Roman law, and so on and, so forth, right up to Hellenic examples of the police regulation of prices in Rome and the Christianisation of Roman police law in the legislation of the Carolings.

We may expect that Mr. V. P. Ryabushinsky, who published Mr. Struve's treatise, will immortalise his own fame as a patron and the fame of Mr. Struve as a serious scholar, by publishing another hundred or so of volumes of sketches and materials on the historical methodology of prices describing, let us say, the bazaars of all times and all nations, with illustrations in the text and with comments by Mr. Struve wrenched from the best German bibliographies. Consistent empiricism will triumph, while the phantoms of various "laws" of political economy will vanish like smoke.

X

In the old pre-revolutionary Russia, scholars and scientists were divided into two big camps: those who made up to the government, and those who were independent; by the former were meant hired hacks and those who wrote to order.

This crude division, which corresponded to patriarchal, semi-Asiatic relations, is undoubtedly now obsolete and

* Mr. S. F. Oldenburg, politely replying to Mr. Struve's enquiry writes that "the law books on the questions that you [Mr. Struve] touch upon evidently closely reflect actual life". (Footnote 51b, §8, Subsection II, Chapter 2, Section II, Part I of Mr. Struve's work.)

should be relegated to the archives. Russia is rapidly becoming Europeanised. Our bourgeoisie is almost quite mature, and in some ways overripe. Its scholars and scientists are "independent" of the government; they are incapable of writing to order; they earnestly and conscientiously study problems from a point of view and by methods which they sincerely and conscientiously believe to coincide with the interests of "captains" of our commerce and industry like Mr. V. P. Ryabushinsky. To earn the reputation of a serious scientist or scholar and to obtain official recognition of one's works in our times, when such advances have been made in everything, one must prove with the aid of a couple of "Kantian-style" definitions that socialism is impracticable; one must demolish Marxism by explaining to one's readers and listeners that it is not worth refuting, and by quoting a thousand names and titles of books by European professors; one must throw by the board all scientific laws in general, to make room for religious laws; one must pile up a mountain of highly scientific lumber and rubbish with which to stuff the heads of young students.

It does not matter if the result is far more crude than that coming from the bourgeois scientists and scholars of Germany. The important thing is that Russia, after all, has definitely taken the path of Europeanisation.

FORMS OF THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT[104]

(THE LOCKOUT AND MARXIST TACTICS)

Lockouts, i.e., the mass discharge of workers by common agreement among employers, is as necessary and inevitable a phenomenon in capitalist society as strikes are. Capital, which throws the whole of its crushing weight upon the ruined small producers and the proletariat, constantly threatens to force the conditions of the workers down to starvation level and condemn them to death from starvation. And in all countries there have been cases, even whole periods in the life of nations, when the failure of the workers to fight back has led to their being reduced to incredible poverty and all the horrors of starvation.

The workers' resistance springs from their very conditions of life—the sale of labour-power. Only as a result of this resistance, despite the tremendous sacrifices the workers have to make in the struggle, are they able to maintain anything like a tolerable standard of living. But capital is becoming more and more concentrated, manufacturers' associations are growing, the number of destitute and unemployed people is increasing, and so also is want among the proletariat; consequently, it is becoming harder than ever to fight for a decent standard of living. The cost of living, which has been rising rapidly in recent years, often nullifies all the workers' efforts.

By drawing larger and larger masses of the proletariat into the organised struggle, the workers' organisations, and first and foremost the trade unions, make the workers' resistance more planned and systematic. With the existence of mass trade unions of different types, strikes become more stubborn: they occur less often, but each conflict is of bigger dimensions.

Lockouts are caused by a sharpening of the struggle, and in their turn, sharpen that struggle. Rallying in the struggle and developing its class-consciousness, its organisation and experience in that struggle, the proletariat becomes more and more firmly convinced that the complete economic reconstruction of capitalist society is essential.

Marxist tactics consist in combining the *different* forms of struggle, in the skilful transition from one form to another, in steadily enhancing the consciousness of the masses and extending the area of their collective actions, each of which, taken separately, may be aggressive or defensive, and all of which, taken together, lead to a more intense and decisive conflict.

Russia lacks the fundamental conditions for *such* a development of the struggle as we see in the West-European countries, namely, a struggle waged through the medium of firmly established and systematically developing trade unions.

Unlike Europe, which has enjoyed political freedom for a long time, the strike movement in Russia in 1912-14 extended beyond the narrow trade union limits. The liberals *denied* this, while the liberal-labour politicians (liquidators) failed to understand it, or shut their eyes to it. But the fact compelled them to admit it. In Milyukov's Duma speech during the interpellation on the Lena events, this *forced*, belated, half-hearted, platonic (i.e., accompanied, not by effective assistance, but only by sighs) admission of the *general* significance of the working-class movement was quite definite. By their liberal talk about the "strike craze" and their *opposition* to combining economic and other motives in the strike movement (we would remind our readers that Messrs. Yezhov and Co. began to talk *in this fashion* in 1912!) the liquidators aroused the legitimate disgust of the workers. That is why the workers firmly and deliberately had the liquidators "removed from office" in the working-class movement.

The Marxists' attitude towards the strike movement caused no wavering or dissatisfaction among the workers. Moreover, the significance of lockouts was formally and officially appraised by the organised Marxists *as far back*

as February 1913[105] (true, in an arena which the liquidators, those slaves of the liberals, do not see). Already in February 1913 the formal decision of the Marxists definitely and clearly spoke of lockouts and the necessity of *taking them into account* in our tactics. How are they to be taken into account? By going more carefully into the expediency of any given action, by changing the form of struggle, substituting (it was precisely substitution that was proposed!) one form for another, the general tendency being to *rise to higher* forms. The class-conscious workers are well acquainted with certain concrete cases when the movement rose to higher forms which were historically subjected to repeated test, and which are "unintelligible" and "alien" only to the liquidators.

On March 21, immediately after the lockout was declared, the Pravdists issued their clear-cut slogan: *Do not* let the employers choose for us the time and form of action; do not go on strike now! The labour unions and the organised Marxists knew and saw that this slogan was *their own*, drawn up by that same majority of the advanced proletariat which had secured the election of its representatives to the Insurance Board,[106] and which is guiding *all* the activities of the St. Petersburg workers *in the face* of the disruptive and liberal outcries of the liquidators.

The slogan of March 21—do not go on strike now—was the slogan of the workers, who knew that they would be able to *substitute* one form for another, that they were striving and would continue to strive—through the constantly changing forms of the movement—for a general rise to a higher level.

The workers knew that the disrupters of the working-class movement—the liquidators and the Narodniks—would try to disrupt the workers' cause in this case, too, and they were prepared in advance to offer resistance.

On March 26, both the liquidator and Narodnik groups of disrupters and violators of the will of the *majority* of the class-conscious workers of St. Petersburg and of Russia, published in their newspapers the bourgeois banalities that are common to these camps. The Narodniks (to the delight of the liquidators) chattered about "thoughtlessness" (the class-conscious workers have long been aware that nobody

is so thoughtless as the Narodniks), while the liquidators delivered liberal speeches (already analysed and condemned in *Put Pravdy* No. 47) and urged that instead of strikes the workers should resort to ... no, not the corresponding higher forms, but to ... petitions and "resolutions"!

Brushing aside this shameful liberal advice of the liquidators, and brushing aside the thoughtless chatter of the Narodniks, the advanced workers firmly proceeded along their own road.

The old decision, which called, in *certain* cases of lockouts, for strikes to be superseded by *certain* higher forms of struggle corresponding to them, was well known to the workers and correctly applied by them.

The employers failed to achieve the provocative purpose of their lockout. The workers did not accept battle on the ground chosen by their enemies; in due time, the workers applied the decision of the organised Marxists and, with greater energy and more demonstratively, conscious of the importance of their movement, continue to march along the old road.

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THE LEFT NARODNIKS WHITEWASH THE BOURGEOISIE

As soon as the Left-Narodnik gentry pass from empty and general phrases about the "labouring peasantry"—phrases that have been worked to death and reveal ignorance of both *The Communist Manifesto* and of *Capital*—to *precise figures*, we immediately see how the Left Narodniks whitewash the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeois character of the entire "labouring peasantry" theory is disguised behind catch-phrases and exclamations, but it is exposed by facts and by a study of Marx's theory.

Thus, in *Stoikaya Mysl* No. 14, a certain Mr. Batrak,[107] who writes in an extremely highbrow style, discusses "socialism and the peasantry".

"*The number of labour economies is growing*," Mr. Batrak declares, and goes on to quote French and German statistics. Statistics are not the sort of thing that can be dismissed with catch-phrases or exclamations, and deception is very quickly exposed.

In France, the total area of "small farms", i.e., those of *five to ten hectares* (a hectare is slightly less than a dessiatine) has increased.

Very good, Mr. Batrak! But have you not heard that the more intensive farming is, the more often one meets with the employment of *wage-labour* on "*small*" (in area) farms? Does not this hushing up of the facts about the employment of wage-labour mean whitewashing the bourgeoisie, Mr. Batrak?

Let us take the German figures. Out of 652,798 farms of five to ten hectares, 487,704 employ *hired labourers*. What do you say to that? Most small farmers exploit wage-workers! And in France? In France, vinegrowing, which

entails the employment of *wage-labour* on small holdings, is far more widespread than in Germany

The "labour economy" theory is one that deceives the workers by hushing up the facts about the employment of wage-labour.

Mr. Batrak takes Germany. The "small and medium" farms go as "labour" economies (the tongue is so flexible it can call anybody a "labouring" farmer!). And so, from the fact that the number of "small" and "medium" farms is growing Mr. Batrak infers that the number of "labour" economies is growing.

But consider the figures quoted by this new champion of the bourgeoisie.

He starts with farms of *up to* two hectares. They constituted 58.3 per cent in 1882, 58.22 per cent in 1895 and 58.89 per cent in 1907. An increase, is it not?

But our "Left Narodnik" *has hushed up the fact that this is an increase in the number of wage-workers*!

The figures he distorts state definitely that of the 3,378,509 farmers who own farms of up to two hectares (1907), *only* 474,915, i.e., a little over $\frac{1}{10}$ (one-tenth), are independent farmers whose chief occupation is agriculture. *Most of them are wage-labourers* (1,822,792).

Of the 3,378,509 farms, 2,920,119, i.e., the vast majority, are *subsidiary* undertakings where farming does *not* provide the main earnings.

One may ask: Is not passing off *farm-hands and day-labourers*, wage-workers, as "labouring farmers" a white-washing of the bourgeoisie and capitalism?

Does not the silly catch-phrase of "labouring farmers" serve here to *conceal* the gulf between the proletariat (the wage-workers) and the bourgeoisie? Does not this catch-phrase serve as a means of putting over bourgeois theories?

To proceed. Farms from two to five hectares. These constituted 18.60 per cent in 1882, 18.29 per cent in 1895 and 17.57 per cent in 1907. This is what Mr. Batrak writes.

What is his deduction? On that point he is *silent*.

The deduction is: a *decrease*, not growth. It is precisely in this group of farms, and only in this group, that *employers of labour* (people who buy the labour of private individuals)

and those who *hire themselves out* do not quite preponderate. The number of farmers who hire labour is 411,311 (counting the number of hired labourers) while the number of those who hire themselves out is 104,251 (the latter is not the total number; here the statistics are incomplete). Together, we get a total of 515,000, and the total number of these peasant farms is 1,006,277, so that even here more than half either hire themselves out or employ labourers!

The nice little catch-phrase of "labour economy serves to deceive the workers by *withholding* the facts about the *buying and selling of labour-power*.

Mr. Batrak then takes farms of five to twenty hectares, and shows that their number is increasing.

But what about the employment of wage-labour? Not a word, not a sound about that. The theoreticians of labour economy" have been commissioned by the bourgeoisie to conceal the figures about the employment of wage-labour.

We shall take these figures: 652,798 farms (1907) of five to ten hectares employ 487,704 wage-labourers, i.e., more than half exploit wage-labour.

A total of 412,741 farms of ten to twenty hectares employ 711,867 wage-labourers, *i.e.*, *all*, *or nearly all*, *exploit wage-labour*.

What should we call a man who poses as a "socialist" and yet classifies *exploiters of wage-labour* as "labouring farmers"?

As the Marxists have more than once explained, the Left Narodniks are petty bourgeois, who whitewash the bourgeoisie and obscure the fact that it exploits wage-labour.

We shall return to the bourgeois theories of the Left Narodniks, and particularly to Mr. Batrak's theories, on a future occasion. At present we shall briefly sum up.

The "labour economy" theory is a bourgeois deception of the workers, based, among other things, on the *concealment* of the figures concerning the buying and selling of labour-power.

As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the "small and medium" peasants to whom the Left Narodniks are fond of referring without discrimination, either sell or buy labour-power, either hire themselves out or hire labour. That is the *crux of the matter*, which the bourgeois "labour economy" theory obscures.

The proletarian says to the small peasant: you are a semi-proletarian, so *follow the lead* of the workers; it is your only salvation.

The bourgeois says to the small peasant: you are a small proprietor, a "labouring farmer". Labour economy "grows" under capitalism as well. You should be with the proprietors, not with the proletariat.

The small proprietor has two souls: one is a proletarian and the other a "proprietory" soul.

The Left Narodniks are, *in effect*; repeating the theories of the bourgeoisie and *corrupting* the small peasants with "proprietory" illusions. That is why the Marxists relentlessly combat this bourgeois corruption of the small peasants (and backward workers) by the Left Narodniks.

Put Pravdy No. 56,
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ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL POLICY[108]

I wish to deal with our government's policy on the national question. This is one of the most important of the questions that come within the jurisdiction of our Ministry of the Interior. Since the time the Duma last discussed the estimates of this Ministry, our ruling classes have been bringing the national question in Russia into the forefront and rendering it more and more acute.

The Beilis case attracted the repeated attention of the whole civilised world to Russia and exposed the disgraceful state of affairs in this country. There is not a vestige of legality in Russia. The Administration and the police are given a free hand in their wanton and shameless persecution of the Jews, even to the extent of covering up and condoning crimes. This precisely was the upshot of the Beilis case, which revealed the closest and most intimate connection....*

To show that I am not exaggerating when I speak of the pogrom atmosphere Russia is breathing, I can quote the evidence of that most "reliable", most conservative writer, Prince Meshchersky, the "minister-maker". Here is the opinion of "a Russian from Kiev", published in Prince Meshchersky's journal, *Grazhdanin*.[109]

> "The atmosphere in which we are living is suffocating; wherever you go there is whispering, plotting; everywhere there is blood lust, everywhere the stench of the informer, everywhere hatred, everywhere mutterings, everywhere groans...."*

the political atmosphere which Russia is breathing. To talk or think about law, legality, a constitution, and similar liberal naïveties in such an atmosphere is simply ridiculous, or rather, it would be ridiculous, were it not so ... serious!

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* The next page of this manuscript is missing.—*Ed.*

This atmosphere is felt day in day out by every person in the country who is at all intelligent and observant. But not everyone has the courage to admit the *significance* of this pogrom atmosphere. Why does such an atmosphere reign in our country? Why is it *able* to reign? Only because the country is actually in a state of scarcely concealed *civil war*. Some find it very unpleasant to admit this truth; they would put a cloak over it. Our liberals, both the Progressists[110] and the Cadets, are particularly fond of stitching such a cloak out of patches of almost quite "constitutional" theories. But I permit myself to consider that there is nothing more harmful, nothing more criminal than for representatives of the people to spread edifying deception from the rostrum of the Duma.

The government's entire policy towards the Jews and other "subject peoples"—pardon me for using this "government" expression—will at once become clear, natural and inevitable if we face the truth and admit the undoubted fact that the country is in a state of scarcely concealed civil war. The government is not ruling, but is waging war.

It chooses "genuinely Russian", pogrom methods of warfare because *it has no others at its disposal*. Everybody defends himself the best he can. Purishkevich and his friends cannot defend themselves otherwise than by pursuing a "pogrom" policy; for *they* have no other means. It is no use sighing; it is absurd to try to make shift with talk about a constitution, or law, or the system of administration; here it is simply a matter of the *class* interests of Purishkevich and Co., a matter of the difficult position this class is in.

Either settle accounts with this class resolutely and not merely in word, or else admit that the "pogrom" atmosphere is inevitable and inescapable in the entire policy of Russia. Either resign yourselves to this policy, or else support the popular, mass, and, in the first place, the proletarian movement against it. These are the only alternatives. There can be no middle course here.

In Russia, even according to official, i.e., palpably exaggerated statistics, which are faked to suit the "government's plans", the Great Russians constitute no more than 43 per cent of the entire population of the country. The

Great Russians in Russia constitute *less* than half the population. Officially, according to Stolypin "*himself*", even the Little Russians, or Ukrainians, are classed as a "*subject people*". Consequently, the "subject peoples" in Russia constitute 57 per cent of the population, i.e., the majority of the population, almost three-fifths, in all probability actually more than three-fifths. In the Duma I represent Ekaterinoslav Gubernia, the overwhelming majority of whose population are Ukrainians. The ban on the celebrations in honour of Shevchenko[111] was such an excellent, splendid, exceptionally happy and well-chosen measure as far as anti-government agitation is concerned, that no better agitation could be conceived. I think that none of our best Social-Democratic agitators against the government could ever have achieved such sensational success in so short a time as was achieved by this measure in rousing opposition to the government. After this measure was taken, millions upon millions of ordinary people began to be converted into public-minded citizens and were made to see the truth of the saying that Russia is "a prison of nations".

Our parties of the right and our nationalists are now clamouring so vehemently against the "Mazeppists" and our famous Bobrinsky is defending the Ukrainians from the oppression of the *Austrian* Government with such splendid, democratic zeal, that one would think he wanted to join the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. But if by "Mazeppism" is meant gravitation towards Austria and preference for the Austrian political system, then perhaps Bobrinsky will not be one of the least prominent of the "Mazeppists", for he complains and rants about the oppression of the Ukrainians in Austria! Just think how hard it must be for a Russian Ukrainian; for instance for an inhabitant of Ekaterinoslav Gubernia which I represent, to read or hear this! If Bobrinsky "himself", if the nationalist Bobrinsky, if Count Bobrinsky, if squire Bobrinsky, if factory owner Bobrinsky, if Bobrinsky who has links with the highest nobility (almost with the "spheres") thinks that the status of the national minorities is unjust and oppressive in Austria, where there is nothing like the disgraceful Jewish Pale of Settlement, or the despicable practice of deporting Jews at the whim of

despotic governors, or the prohibition of the native language in schools, then what should be said about the Ukrainians in Russia? What should be said about the other "subject peoples" in Russia?

Do not Bobrinsky and the other nationalists, as well as the Rights, realise that they are bringing home to the subject peoples" in Russia, that is, to three-fifths of the population of Russia, the fact that Russia is a *backward* country *even* compared with Austria, which is the most backward of European countries?

The whole point is that the position of Russia, which is governed by the Purishkeviches, or rather, groaning under-the heel of the Purishkeviches, is so peculiar that the utterances of the nationalist Bobrinsky admirably explain and foment Social-Democratic agitation.

Keep it up, noble factory owner and landlord Bobrinsky; you will certainly help us to arouse, enlighten and stir up both the Austrian and the Russian Ukrainians! In Ekaterinoslav I heard several Ukrainians say that they wanted to send Count Bobrinsky an address of thanks for his successful propaganda in favour of the Ukraine's secession from Russia. I was not surprised to hear this. I saw propaganda leaflets, on one side of which was the Ukase banning the Shevchenko celebrations while on the other side were excerpts from Bobrinsky's eloquent speeches *in favour* of the Ukrainians.... I advised sending these leaflets to Bobrinsky, Purishkevich and *other* Ministers.

But if Purishkevich and Bobrinsky are superlative agitators in favour of transforming Russia into a democratic republic, our liberals, including the Cadets, are trying to conceal from the people *their agreement* with the Purishkeviches on certain fundamental questions of national policy. I would not be fulfilling my duty if, in speaking on the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, which is pursuing a national policy everybody is aware of, I did not mention this *agreement* of the Constitutional-Democratic Party with the Ministry of the Interior's principles.

Indeed, is it not clear that anybody who wishes to be putting it mildly—in "opposition" to the Ministry of the Interior must also know the *ideological* allies of this Ministry in the Cadet camp.

According to a *Rech* report, the Constitutional-Democratic Party, or the "party of people's freedom", held its regular conference in St. Petersburg on March 23 to 25 of this year.

"National questions," says *Rech* (No. 83), "were discussed... in a most lively manner. The deputies from Kiev, who were supported by N. V. Nekrasov and A. M. Kolyubakin, stated that the national question was a maturing major factor which had to be met more firmly than it had been up to now. But F. F. Kokoshkin said that both the programme and previous political experience called for very careful handling of the 'elastic formulas' of political self-determination for 'nationalities'."

This is *Rech*'s version of the matter. And although this version is deliberately worded to keep the greatest numbers of readers *in the dark*, the gist of the matter is nevertheless clear to every observant and thinking person. *Kievskaya Mysl*,[112] which sympathises with the Cadets and voices their views, reports Kokoshkin's speech with the addition of the following comment: "Because it may lead to the disintegration of the state."

This, undoubtedly, was the gist of Kokoshkin's speech. Among the Cadets, Kokoshkin's point of view prevailed even over the extremely timid democratism of the Nekrasovs and Kolyubakins. Kokoshkin's point of view is that of the *Great-Russian* liberal-bourgeois nationalist who defends the privileges of the *Great Russian* (although they are a minority in Russia), and defends them *hand in hand* with the Ministry of the Interior. Kokoshkin "theoretically" defended the policy of the Ministry of the Interior—that is the gist, the core, of the matter.

"More careful handling of political self-determination" of nations! Care must be taken that it does not "lead to the disintegration of the state"!—that is the *substance* of Kokoshkin's national policy, which *fully coincides* with the main line of policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior. But Kokoshkin and the other Cadet leaders are not infants. They are perfectly familiar with the saying: "The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath." The state exists for the people, not the people for the state. Kokoshkin and the other Cadet leaders are not

infants. They know perfectly well that in our country the state is (in effect) the Purishkevich class. The integrity of the state is the integrity of the Purishkevich class. If one looks at the *essence* of their policy, stripped of its diplomatic trappings, one will realise what the Kokoshkins are concerned about.

For the sake of illustration I shall quote the following simple example. In 1905, as you know, Norway seceded from Sweden in face of vehement protests from the Swedish landlords, who threatened to go to war against Norway. Fortunately, the feudalists in Sweden are not all-powerful as they are in Russia, and there was no war. Norway, with a minority of the population, seceded from Sweden in a peaceful, democratic, and civilised way, not in the way the feudalists and the militarist party wanted. What happened? Did the people lose by it? Did the interests of civilisation or the interests of democracy, or the interests of the working class, suffer as a result of this secession?

Not in the least! Both Norway and Sweden are countries that are far more civilised than Russia is—incidentally, *precisely because* they succeeded in applying in a democratic manner the formula of the "political self-determination" of nations. The breaking of *compulsory* ties *strengthened* voluntary economic ties, strengthened cultural intimacy, and mutual respect between these two nations, which are so close to each other in language and other things. The common interests, the closeness of the Swedish and Norwegian peoples actually *gained* from the secession, for secession meant the rupture of *compulsory* ties.

I hope that this example has made it clear that Kokoshkin and the Constitutional-Democratic Party take their stand entirely with the Ministry of the Interior when they try to scare us with the prospect of the "disintegration of the state" and urge us to be "careful in handling" an absolutely clear formula, which is accepted without question by the entire international democracy—the "political self-determination" of nationalities. We Social-Democrats are opposed to *all* nationalism and advocate democratic *centralism*. We are opposed to particularism, and are convinced that, *all other things being equal*, big states can solve the problems of economic progress and of the struggle between the

proletariat and the bourgeoisie far more effectively than small states can. But we value only voluntary ties, never compulsory ties. Wherever we see *compulsory* ties between nations we, while by no means insisting that every nation must secede, do *absolutely* and emphatically insist on the *right* of every nation to political self-determination, that is, to secession.

To insist upon, to advocate, and to recognise this *right* is to insist on the equality of nations, to refuse to recognise *compulsory* ties, to oppose all state privileges for any nation whatsoever, and to cultivate a spirit of complete class solidarity in the workers of the different nations.

The class solidarity of the workers of the different nations is strengthened by the substitution of voluntary ties for compulsory, feudalist and militarist ties.

We value most of all the equality of nations in popular liberties and for socialism....*

and insist on the privileges of the Great Russians. But we say: no privileges *for any* one nation, complete equality of nations and the unity, amalgamation of the workers of *all nations*.

Eighteen years ago, in 1896, the International Congress of Labour and Socialist Organisations in London adopted a resolution on the national question, which indicated the only correct way to work for both real popular liberties and socialism. The resolution reads:

"This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination, and expresses its sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism. This Congress calls upon the workers of all these countries to join the ranks of the class-conscious workers of the whole world in order jointly to fight for the defeat of international capitalism and for the achievement of the aims of international Social-Democracy."

And we, too, call for unity in the ranks of the workers of all nations in Russia, for only such unity can guarantee the equality of nations and popular liberties, and safeguard the interests of socialism.

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* The next two pages of this manuscript are missing.—*Ed.*

The year 1905 united the workers of all nations in Russia. The reactionaries are trying to foment national enmity. The liberal bourgeoisie of *all* nations, first and foremost the Great-Russian bourgeoisie, is fighting for the privileges of *its own* nation (for example, the Polish koło[113] is opposed to equal rights for Jews in Poland), is fighting for national segregation, for national exclusiveness, and is thereby *promoting* the policy of our Ministry of the Interior.

But true democracy, headed by the working class, holds aloft the banner of complete equality of nations and of unity of the workers of all nations in their class struggle. From this point of view we reject so-called "cultural-national autonomy", that is, the division of educational affairs in a given state according to nationality, or the proposal that education should be taken out of the hands of the state and transferred to separately organised national associations. A democratic state must grant autonomy to its various regions, especially to regions with mixed populations. This form of autonomy in no way contradicts democratic centralism; on the contrary, it is only through regional autonomy that genuine democratic centralism is *possible* in a large state with a mixed population. A democratic state is bound to grant *complete freedom* for the various languages and annul *all* privileges for any one language. A democratic state will not permit the oppression or the overriding of any one nationality by another, either in any particular region or in any branch of public affairs.

But to take education out of the hands of the state and to divide it according to nationality among separately organised national associations is harmful from the point of view of democracy, and still more harmful from the point of view of the proletariat. This would merely serve to perpetuate the segregation of nations, whereas we must strive to unite them. It would lead to the growth of chauvinism, whereas we must strive to unite the workers of all nations as closely as possible, strive to unite them for a joint struggle against *all* chauvinism, against *all* national exclusiveness, against *all* nationalism. The workers of all nations have but one educational policy: freedom for the native language, and democratic and *secular* education.

I conclude by expressing my gratitude once again to Purishkevich, Markov II and Bobrinsky for their effective agitation against the entire political system in Russia, for the *object-lessons* they have given, which prove that Russia's transformation into a democratic republic is inevitable.

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CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN BRITAIN

Dealing in *Put Pravdy* No. 34 with the interesting events in Ireland, we spoke of the policy of the British Liberals, who allowed themselves to be scared by the Conservatives.*

Since those lines were written, new events have occurred which have transformed that particular conflict (between the Liberals and Conservatives) over the question of Home Rule for Ireland into a general constitutional crisis in Britain.

As the Conservatives threatened a Protestant "rebellion" in Ulster against Home Rule for Ireland, the Liberal Government set part of its troops into motion in order to compel respect for the will of Parliament.

But what happened?

Generals and other British Army officers mutinied!

They declared that they would not fight against Protestant Ulster as that would run counter to their "patriotism", and that they would resign.

The Liberal Government were absolutely stunned by this revolt of the landowners standing at the head of the army. The Liberals have been accustomed to console themselves with constitutional illusions and phrases about the rule of law, and close their eyes to the real relation of forces, to the class struggle. And this real relation of forces has been such that, owing to the cowardice of the bourgeoisie, a number of *pre*-bourgeois, medieval institutions and privileges of the landed gentry have been preserved in Britain.

To suppress the revolt of the aristocratic officers, the Liberal Government should have appealed to the people, to the masses, to the proletariat, but that was something the

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* See pp. 148-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"enlightened" Liberal bourgeois gentlemen feared more than anything else. The government *actually made concessions* to the mutinous officers, persuaded them to withdraw their resignations, and gave them *written assurances* that troops would not be used against Ulster.

Efforts were made to conceal from the people the disgraceful fact that such written assurances had been given (March 21, new style), and the Liberal leaders, Asquith, Morley and others, lied in the most incredible and shameless manner in their official statements. However, the truth came out. The fact that written promises had been given to the officers was not denied. Apparently, "pressure" was brought to bear by the King. The resignation of Secretary for War Seely, the assumption of his portfolio by Asquith "himself", the re-election of Asquith, the circular to the troops about respect for law—all this was nothing but sheer official hypocrisy. The fact remains that the Liberals yielded to the landowners, who had flouted the constitution.

Stormy scenes ensued in Parliament. The Conservatives heaped well-deserved ridicule and scorn upon the Liberal Government, while the Labour M. P., Ramsay MacDonald, one of the most moderate of the liberal-labour politicians, protested in the strongest terms against the reactionaries' conduct. He said that these people were always ready to fulminate against strikers, but when it came to Ulster they refused to do their duty because the Irish Home Rule Bill affected their class prejudices and interests. (The landowners in Ireland are English, and Home Rule for Ireland, which would mean Home Rule for the Irish bourgeoisie and peasants, threatens to somewhat curtail the voracious appetites of the noble lords.) These people, Ramsay MacDonald continued, thought only of fighting the workers, but when it came to compelling the rich and the property-owners to respect the law, they refused to do their duty.

This revolt of the landowners against the British Parliament, the "all-powerful" Parliament (as the Liberal dullards, especially the Liberal pundits, have thought and said millions of times), is of tremendous significance. March 21 (March 8, old style), 1914, will be an epoch-making turning-point, the day when the noble landowners of Britain

tore the British constitution and British law to shreds and gave an excellent lesson of the class struggle.

This lesson stemmed from the impossibility of blunting the sharp antagonisms between the proletariat and bourgeoisie of Britain by means of the half-hearted, hypocritical, sham-reformist policy of the Liberals. This lesson will not be lost upon the British labour movement; the working class will now quickly proceed to shake off its philistine faith in the scrap of paper called the British law and constitution, which the British aristocrats have torn up before the eyes of the whole people.

These aristocrats behaved like revolutionaries *of the right* and thereby shattered all conventions, tore aside the veil that prevented the people from seeing the unpleasant but undoubtedly real class struggle. All saw what the bourgeoisie and the Liberals have been hypocritically concealing (they are hypocrites everywhere, but nowhere, perhaps, such consummate hypocrites as in Britain). All saw that the conspiracy to break the will of Parliament had been prepared long ago. Real class rule lay and still lies *outside* of Parliament. The above-mentioned medieval institutions, which for long had been inoperative (or rather seemed to be inoperative), quickly came into operation and proved to be *stronger* than Parliament. And Britain's petty-bourgeois Liberals, with their speeches about reforms and the might of Parliament designed to lull the workers, proved in fact to be straw men, dummies, put up to bamboozle the people. They were quickly "*shut up*" by the aristocracy, the men in *power*.

How many books have been written, especially by German and Russian liberals, in praise of law and social peace in Britain! Everybody knows that the historical mission of the German and Russian liberals is to show servile admiration for what the class struggle has produced in Britain and in France, and to proclaim the results of that struggle as the "truths of science", a science that stands "*above classes*". In reality, however, "law and social peace" in Britain were merely a brief result of the torpor the British proletariat was in approximately between the 1850's and 1900's.

Britain's monopoly has come to an end. World competition has sharpened. The cost of living has gone up. Associa-

tions of big capitalists have crushed the small and medium businessmen and come down with their full weight upon the workers. Once more the British proletariat has awakened after the close of the eighteenth century, after the Chartist movement of the 1830's and 1840's.

The constitutional crisis of 1914 will mark another important stage in the history of this awakening.

Put Pravdy No. 57,
April 10, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

UNITY

Three issues of the journal *Borba*, which declares itself to be "non-factional", have already appeared in St. Petersburg. The journal's main line is to advocate unity.

Unity with whom? *With the liquidators*.

The latest issue of *Borba* contains two articles in defence *of unity with the liquidators*.

The first article is by the well-known liquidator Y. Larin, the same Larin who recently wrote in one of the liquidationist journals:

> "The path of capitalist development will be cleared of absolutist survivals without any revolution.... The immediate talk is ... to imbue wide circles with the leading idea that in the coming period the working class must organise, not 'for revolution', not 'in anticipation of revolution'...."

Writing in *Borba*, this same liquidator now urges unity and proposes that it should take the form of *federation*.

Federation implies agreement between organisations enjoying equal rights. Thus, in the matter of determining the tactics of the working class, Larin proposes placing the will of the overwhelming majority of the workers, who stand for the "uncurtailed slogans", on an *equal* footing with the will of negligible groups of liquidators, whose views coincide more or less with the passage just quoted above. According to the subtle plan of the liquidator Larin, the majority of the workers are to be deprived of the right to take any step until they obtain the consent of the liquidators of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*.

The workers have rejected the liquidators, but now, according to the plan of the liquidator Larin, the latter are to regain a leading position by means of federation. Thus, the federation proposed by Larin is simply a new

attempt to impose on the workers the will of the liquidators whom the working-class movement has rejected. The liquidators reason as follows: we were not allowed to come in by the door, so we will steal in by the window, and call "unity through federation" that which is actually a violation of the will of the majority of the workers.

The editors of Borba disagree with Larin. Federation, i.e., gradual agreement between the liquidators and the Marxists *as equal parties*, does not satisfy them.

It is not agreement with the liquidators they want but a new amalgamation with them "on the basis of common decisions on tactics", which means that the overwhelming majority of the workers, who have rallied to the tactical line of *Put Pravdy*, must *abandon* their own decisions for the sake of *common tactics with the liquidators*.

In the opinion of *Borba*'s editors, the tactics developed by the class-conscious workers, which have stood the test of experience of the entire movement during the past few years, must be set aside. Why? So as to make room for the tactical plans of the liquidators, for views that have been condemned both by the workers and by the whole course of events.

Utter defiance of the will, the decisions and the views of the class-conscious workers is at the bottom of the idea of unity with the liquidators which the editors of *Borba* propose.

The will of the workers has been clearly and definitely expressed. Anyone who has not taken leave of his senses can say exactly which tactics the overwhelming majority of the workers sympathise with. But along comes the liquidator Larin and says: the will of the majority of the workers is nothing to me. Let this majority get out of the way and agree that the will of a group of liquidators is equal to the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers.

After the liquidator comes a conciliator from *Borba*, who says: the workers have devised definite tactics for themselves and are striving to apply them? That means nothing at all. Let them abandon these tested tactics for the sake of *common tactical decisions with the liquidators*.

And the conciliators from *Borba* describe as *unity* this violation of the clearly expressed will of the majority of the

workers, a violation designed to secure equality for the liquidators.

This, however, is not unity, but a flouting of unity, a flouting of the will of the workers.

This is not what the Marxist workers mean by unity.

There can be no unity, federal or other, with liberal-labour politicians, with disruptors of the working-class movement, with those who defy the will of the majority. There can and must be unity among all consistent Marxists, among all those who stand for the entire Marxist body and for the uncurtailed slogans, independently of the liquidators and apart from them.

Unity is a great thing and a great slogan. But what the workers' cause needs is the *unity of Marxists*, not unity between Marxists, and opponents and distorters of Marxism.

And we must ask everyone who talks about unity: unity with whom? With the liquidators? If so, we have nothing to do with each other.

But if it is a question of genuine Marxist unity, we shall say: Ever since the Pravdist newspapers appeared we have been calling for the unity of all the forces of Marxism, for unity from below, for unity in practical activities.

No flirting with the liquidators, no diplomatic negotiations with groups of wreckers of the corporate body; concentrate all efforts on rallying the Marxist workers around the Marxist slogans, around the entire Marxist body. The class-conscious workers will regard as a crime any attempt to impose upon them the will of the liquidators; they will also regard as a crime the fragmentation of the forces of the genuine Marxists.

For the basis of unity is class discipline, recognition of the will of the majority, and concerted activities in the ranks of, and in step with, that majority. We shall never tire of calling all the workers towards this unity, this discipline, and these concerted activities.

Put Pravdy No. 59,
April 12, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

ORGANISED MARXISTS ON INTERVENTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU

We are informed that the International Bureau has received the reply of the organised Marxists to the Bureau's offer to intervene in the affairs of Russian Social-Democracy.[114] We publish below the more important parts of this reply.

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Following receipt of the "Supplement" to No. 11 of *The Periodical Bulletin of the International Bureau*, the representative body of Russia's organised Marxists feels bound to express profound gratitude to the International Bureau and its Executive Committee for their assistance to the working-class movement and for their efforts to strengthen and consolidate it by ensuring its unity.

The present situation among Russian Marxists is as follows.

The general state of affairs in 1907-08 led to an extremely grave ideological crisis among Marxists and the break-up of their organisations. Both in 1908 and in 1910, organised Marxists formally recognised the existence of a special theory advocated by the *liquidators*, who repudiated and sought to liquidate the old Party, and were out to form a new and legal party. This trend was emphatically and irrevocably condemned by a formal decision. However, the liquidators refused to accept these decisions and continued their splitting and disruptive activities against the "entire body".

In January 1912,[115] the entire Marxist body was *opposed* to the liquidators, who were declared to be outside its ranks.

Since then, the overwhelming majority of class-conscious workers in Russia have rallied in support of the decisions adopted in January 1912 and of the guiding body that was elected at the time. This fact, of which all workers in Russia are aware, can and must be corroborated by objective facts, in view of the incredible number of unsupported and grossly untrue statements circulated by the liquidators and by the scattered groups abroad.

1. The electoral law of Russia places the workers in a separate worker curia. Of the members of the Duma elected by this curia, the Bolsheviks constituted 47 per cent in the Second Duma (1907), 50 per cent in the Third Duma (1907-12), and 67 per cent in the Fourth Duma (1912-14).
The elections to the Fourth Duma were held in September 1912, and the majority that was gained (two-thirds) proved organised Marxism's complete victory over liquidationism.

2. In April 1912, the Marxist daily newspaper *Pravda* began to appear. In opposition to it, the liquidators started, also in St. Petersburg, a rival organ, *Luch*, which pursued splitting tactics. In the course of two years, from January 1, 1912 to January 1, 1914, the liquidators' newspaper, together with all their supporters in the shape of the numerous groups abroad and the Bund, received the backing—according to that newspaper's own reports—of *750* workers' groups, whereas during the same period *Pravda*, which fights for the Marxist line, rallied around itself *2,801* workers' groups.

3. Early in 1914, elections were held in St. Petersburg of representatives of the workers' sick insurance societies on the All-Russia Insurance Board and the Metropolitan Insurance Board. To the first body the workers elected five members and ten deputy-members; to the second, they elected two members and four deputy-members. In both cases, the *lists of candidates put forward by* Pravda *supporters were elected in their entirety*. In the last elections the ballot figures announced by the chairman were: *Pravda* supporters—*37*; liquidators—*7*; Narodniks—*4*; abstentions—*5*.

We shall confine ourselves to these very brief figures. They show that real unity among Marxists in Russia is making

steady headway and that the unity of the majority of the class-conscious workers on the basis of the decisions of January 1912 has already been achieved.

The document then goes on to describe the disruptive activities of the various groups abroad and the liquidators, who are persistently trying to *thwart the will* of the majority of Russian workers.

Besides partyists and liquidators, there are now no less than *five* separate *Russian* Social-Democratic groups operating abroad, besides the national groups. For two whole years, 1912 and 1913, there has not been a shadow of any objective evidence that these groups abroad are in touch with the working-class movement in Russia. In August 1912 the liquidators formed what is called the "August bloc", which included, among others, Trotsky, the "Bund", and the Lettish Social-Democrats. That this "bloc"—which really served as a screen for the liquidators—was a fiction, was pointed out long ago. Now this "bloc" has fallen completely apart. The Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats, which was held in February 1914, decided to withdraw its representatives from the bloc because the latter had not dissociated itself from the liquidators. Trotsky, too, in February 1914, founded his own group's journal, in which he backed his *outcries* for unity by *breaking away* from the August bloc!

The "Organising Committee", which now represents the "August bloc", is a pure fiction, and it is obviously impossible to enter into any relations with that fiction. Since the liquidators talk about "unity" and "equality", it should be said that it is the prime duty of advocates of unity to refrain from throwing into disarray the ranks of the united overwhelming majority of the workers, and emphatically to repudiate the liquidators, who are out to destroy the entire Marxist body. Talk about "unity" coming from the liquidators is no less a mockery of the actual unity of the majority of the workers in Russia than similar talk about unity by the "Allemane-Cambier party" in France, or by the "P.P.S." in Germany.

The authors then go on urgently to request the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau to bend every effort to hasten the "interchange of opinion among all

the Social-Democratic groups on controversial issues" (resolution of the December 1913 session of the International Bureau), in order to expose to an impartial body, to the International, the utterly fictitious nature of the "August bloc" and of the liquidators' "Organising Committee", and also to expose all their disruptive activities against the united majority of the Social-Democratic workers of Russia.

Put Pravdy No. 61,
April 15, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

NATIONAL EQUALITY

In *Put Pravdy* No. 48 (for March 28), the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma published the text of its Bill on national equality, or, to quote its official title, "Bill for the Abolition of All Disabilities of the Jews and of All Restrictions on the Grounds of Origin or Nationality".*

Amidst the alarms and turmoil of the struggle for existence, for a bare livelihood, the Russian workers cannot and must not forget the yoke of national oppression under which the tens and tens of millions of "subject peoples" inhabiting Russia are groaning. The ruling nation—the Great Russians—constitute about 45 per cent of the total population of the Empire. Out of every 100 inhabitants, over 50 belong to "subject peoples".

And the conditions of life of this vast population are even harsher than those of the Russians.

The policy of oppressing nationalities is one of *dividing* nations. At the same time it is a policy of systematic *corruption* of the people's minds. The Black Hundreds' plans are designed to foment antagonism among the different nations, to poison the minds of the ignorant and downtrodden masses. Pick up any Black-Hundred newspaper and you will find that the persecution of non-Russians, the sowing of mutual distrust between the Russian peasant, the Russian petty bourgeois and the Russian artisan on the one hand, and the Jewish, Finnish, Polish, Georgian and Ukrainian peasants, petty bourgeois and artisans on the other, is meat and drink to the whole of this Black-Hundred gang.

But the working class needs *unity*, *not division*. It has no more bitter enemy than the savage prejudices and superstitions which its enemies sow among the ignorant masses,

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* See pp. 172-73 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The oppression of "subject peoples" is a double-edged weapon. It cuts both ways—against the "subject peoples" and against the Russian people.

That is why the working class must protest most strongly against national oppression in any shape and form.

It must counter the agitation of the Black Hundreds, who try to divert its attention to the baiting of non-Russians, by asserting its conviction as to the need for complete equality, for the complete and final rejection of all privileges for any one nation.

The Black Hundreds carry on a particularly venomous hate-campaign against the Jews. The Purishkeviches try to make the Jewish people the scapegoat for all their own sins.

And that is why the R.S.D.L. group in the Duma did right in putting *Jewish* disabilities in the forefront of its Bill.

The schools, the press, the parliamentary rostrum—everything is being used to sow ignorant, savage, and vicious hatred of the Jews.

This dirty and despicable work is undertaken, not only by the scum of the Black Hundreds, but also by reactionary professors, scholars, journalists and members of the Duma. Millions and thousands of millions of rubles are spent on poisoning the minds of the people.

It is a point of honour for the *Russian* workers to have this Bill against national oppression backed by tens of thousands of proletarian signatures and declarations.... This will be the best means of consolidating *complete* unity, amalgamating all the workers of Russia, irrespective of nationality.

Put Pravdy No. 62,
April 16, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

THE LIQUIDATORS AND THE LETTISH WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The recent decision of all organised Lettish workers condemning the liquidators and supporting the Marxist line, struck a decisive blow at the "August bloc", by showing that sooner or later all proletarian elements will break with the liquidators. *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* is doing its utmost to explain away this unpleasant fact. This rather difficult job has been tackled by L. M. and F. D.

We shall not trouble to reply to the petty wrangling which the liquidators have started. The only aspect of the matter we consider important is that which has organisational and political significance.

The liquidators say: True, the Lettish Marxists have withdrawn from the "August bloc", but they have not joined the "Leninists".

Quite right, gentlemen! The Lettish Marxists have indeed remained *neutral*. In our very first articles concerning the Lettish decisions, we said that the Letts had taken *only the first step*, that, generally speaking, they had acted like *conciliators*.*

But have the liquidators considered what follows from this?

If the Letts are really conciliators, if they advocate unity at any price, and if they are neutral in the organisational conflict, then the political appraisal of liquidationism made by the conciliatory Lettish Marxists *is a still more telling blow at the liquidators*.

From the political aspect, this appraisal is quite clear and straightforward. The Lettish workers have emphatically endorsed the old decision that *liquidationism is a manifestation*

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* See pp. 177-81 of this volume.—*Ed*.

of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. They have declared that unity with the liquidators means becoming "ideologically and politically dependent upon the liquidators".

Yes, Messrs. L. M. and F. D., the Letts have indeed remained neutral; they have not yet abandoned "conciliatory" hopes; they have not yet drawn all the practical conclusions from the stand they took; they have given too lenient treatment to the groups which defend you. But it was precisely these lenient and neutral people who told you that your liquidationist line expressed only the influence of the *bourgeoisie* on the backward sections of the workers.

The ludicrous muddle the liquidators have got themselves into in appraising the Lettish decisions can be seen from the articles published in *Zeit*, a newspaper of the Jewish liquidators. Here Mr. Yonov tells us in verbose articles that "the Lettish comrades do not stand for a split; on the contrary, they strongly oppose such tactics".

The same writer goes on to say that "the general spirit of the resolution [of the Letts] is beyond all doubt the Leninist spirit. It [the resolution] is based on hostility towards liquidationism, on recognition of the need to combat it" (*Zeit* No. 14).

Agree among yourselves, liquidators, and say either one thing or the other.

The liquidators hope that the Letts will yet take a *step backward*—to liquidationism. We hope that they will take a step forward, to the position of the Russian Marxists. Time will show whose hopes will be justified. We calmly leave that to the course of the Lettish and of the entire Russian working-class movement. For the present, one thing has been achieved: the Letts have dealt mortal blow at the "August bloc" and recognised that liquidationism is a bourgeois trend.

A few words about the Letts' decision concerning the split in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The six liquidator deputies have not given a straightforward answer to the question as to whether they accept the terms of the Letts. With Mr. F. D.'s assistance, they are trying to "pull the wool over our eyes", as the saying goes. However, they will not succeed.

Look at Mr. F. D.'s "arguments". Confronted with the 1908 decision (which the Letts *endorsed*) against amalgamation with the Jagiello party, he replies by stating that the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma accepted ... the Lithuanian Social-Democrats. The "slight" difference here is merely that Russia's Marxists resolved on more than one occasion to *amalgamate* with the Lithuanians, but *not to amalgamate* with the P.S.P., because that party is *not* Marxist. The difference is that the Lithuanian deputies were returned to the Duma with the full support of all the local Social-Democrats, whereas Jagiello was elected *in the teeth of opposition* from the Polish Social-Democrats, *in the teeth of opposition* from the majority of the worker electors.

The Letts made it a condition of unity that the all-Russia decisions of 1908 and 1910 condemning liquidationism as a *bourgeois* trend should be recognised. Does the Chkheidze group accept this condition? What has Mr. F. D., who defends this group, to say about this? Only that "lack of space prevents us [i.e., him] from dealing" with these all-Russia decisions.

Very well, we shall wait until *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* finds more space in which to say, at last, what its attitude is towards the 1908 and 1910 decisions of the entire Marxist body, which recognised liquidationism as a bourgeois trend.

As for the workers, they will undoubtedly draw their own conclusions from the liquidators' shuffling, and realise that these people are dead to the cause of Marxism.

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SERF ECONOMY IN THE RURAL AREAS

Our liberals refuse to admit that serf economy is still practised on a vast scale in the Russian countryside to this day. Serfdom lives on, for when the semi-pauper peasant, held in bondage by means of money loans or the renting of land, works for the landlord with his wretched horse and implements, we have here the economic essence of serf economy.

Under capitalism the worker owns neither land nor implements of production. Under serf economy the exploited labourer has both land and implements of production, but these serve to enslave him, to *tie* him to the "squire".

The journal *Russkaya Mysl*, which is noted for its preaching of *respect* for landed property, *accidentally blurted out* the truth in its March issue.

> "Winter hiring,"[116] we read in that issue "—is this not absurd in our age, the age of electricity and aeroplanes? And yet this form of slavery and bondage continues to flourish to this day, like a leech on the body of the peasantry.
>
> "Winter hiring is a curious and characteristic feature of ancient Russia. It has preserved in all its freshness the feudal term of 'bonded peasants'."

This was written not by some "Left" organ, but by a journal of the counter-revolutionary liberals!

According to local statistics for the spring of 1913, the "bonded" households sometimes—as, for example, in Chernigov Gubernia—constitute as much as 56 per cent, i.e., nearly *three-fifths*, of the total number of households. And during winter hire the peasant receives *half or one-third* of the pay he gets during summer hire.

Here we have purely serf bondage and hopeless poverty among the peasants, side by side with "progress" in the development of the *otrubs*, fodder grass cultivation, the employment of machines, and so forth, over which some naïve people wax so enthusiastic. As a matter of fact, this progress, perpetuating as it does appalling poverty and bondage among the masses of the peasants, only worsens their conditions, makes crises more inevitable, and intensifies the contradiction between the requirements of modern capitalism and barbarous, medieval and Asiatic "winter hiring".

Métayage, tilling the soil in return for half the crop, or mowing hay in return for every third haycock (the "one-third" system) are also direct survivals of serfdom. According to the latest statistics, the area of land cultivated by peasants on the métayer system in the various districts of Russia ranges from 21 to 68 per cent of the area of the peasants' own land. And the area of land on which hay is mown on the métayer system is even larger, ranging from 50 to 185 per cent of the area of the peasants' own land!...

"In some cases," we read in this moderate-liberal journal, "the métayer, in addition to paying for the land with half the crop, and for the hay with two-thirds of the crop, is obliged to *work gratis* on the owner's farm for one or two weeks, in most cases with his own horse, or with one of his children."

How does this differ from serfdom? The peasant works for the landlord without pay, and receives land from him on a métayage basis!

Our liberals always regard the "peasant question" from the point of view of the peasants' "land hunger" or the need for "state arrangement" of the peasants' living conditions, or of allotting them land according to this or that "norm" (this is a fault of the Narodniks, too). This point of view is basically erroneous. It is all a matter of the class struggle on the basis of the feudal relations of production, and nothing more. So long as the present system of landlordism exists, the perpetuation of bondage, serfdom and, as *Russkaya Mysl* expresses it, slavery, is *inevitable*. No "reforms" or political changes will be of any use here. The point at issue here is the ownership of the land by a class which

reduces all "progress" to snail's pace, and turns the masses of the peasantry into downtrodden paupers tied to the "squire".

The issue here is not that of a "subsistence" or a "producer's" norm (all this is Narodnik nonsense), not that of "land hunger", or "allotting land", but of abolishing class, semi-feudal oppression, which is hindering the development of a capitalist country. Only in this way can the "proverbial" "pillars" of the class-conscious Russian workers begin to be understood.

Put Pravdy No. 66,
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FROM THE HISTORY OF THE WORKERS' PRESS IN RUSSIA

The history of the workers' press in Russia is indissolubly linked up with the history of the democratic and socialist movement. Hence, only by knowing the chief stages of the movement for emancipation is it possible to understand why the preparation and rise of the workers' press proceeded in a certain way, and in no other.

The emancipation movement in Russia has passed through three main stages, corresponding to the three main classes of Russian society, which have left their impress on the movement: (1) the period of the nobility, roughly from 1825 to 1861; (2) the *raznochintsi* or bourgeois-democratic period, approximately from 1861 to 1895; and (3) the proletarian period, from 1895 to the present time.

The most outstanding figures of the nobility period were the Decembrists[117] and Herzen. At that time, under the serf-owning system, there could be no question of differentiating a working *class* from among the general mass of serfs, the disfranchised "lower orders", "the ruck". In those days the illegal general democratic press, headed by Herzen's *Kolokol*,[118] was the forerunner of the workers' (proletarian-democratic or Social-Democratic) press.

Just as the Decembrists roused Herzen, so Herzen and his *Kolokol* helped to rouse the *raznochintsi*—the educated representatives of the liberal and democratic bourgeoisie who belonged, not to the nobility but to the civil servants, urban petty bourgeois, merchant and peasant classes. It was V. G. Belinsky who, even before the abolition of serfdom, was a forerunner of the *raznochintsi* who were to

completely oust the nobility from our emancipation movement. The famous Letter to Gogol,[119] which summed up Belinsky's literary activities, was one of the finest productions of the illegal democratic press, which has to this day lost none of its great and vital significance.

With the fall of the serf-owning system, the *raznochintsi* emerged as the chief actor from among the masses in the movement for emancipation in general, and in the democratic illegal press in particular. Narodism,[120] which corresponded to the *raznochintsi* point of view, became the dominant trend. As a social trend, it never succeeded in dissociating itself from liberalism on the right and from anarchism on the left. But Chernyshevsky, who, after Herzen, developed the Narodnik views, made a great stride forward as compared with Herzen. Chernyshevsky was a far more consistent and militant democrat, his writings breathing the spirit of the class struggle. He resolutely pursued the line of exposing the treachery of liberalism, a line which to this day is hateful to the Cadets and liquidators. He was a remarkably profound critic of capitalism despite his utopian socialism.

The sixties and seventies saw quite a number of illegal publications, militant-democratic and utopian-socialist in content, which had started to circulate among the "masses". Very prominent among the personalities of that epoch were the workers Pyotr Alexeyev, Stepan Khalturin, and others. The proletarian-democratic current, however, was unable to free itself from the mainstream of Narodism; this became possible only after Russian Marxism took ideological shape (the Emancipation of Labour group, 1883), and a steady workers' movement, linked with Social-Democracy, began (the St. Petersburg strikes of 1895-96).

But before passing to this period, from which the appearance of the workers' press in Russia really dates, we shall quote figures which strikingly illustrate the *class* differences between the movements of the three periods referred to. These figures show the classification of persons charged with state (political) crimes according to social estate or calling (class).* For every 100 such persons there were:

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* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 328-31.—*Ed.*

	Nobles	Urban petty bourgeoisie and peasants	Peasants	Workers	Intellectuals
In 1827-46	76	23	?	?	?
" 1884-90	30.6	46.6	7.1	15.1	73.2
" 1901-03	10.7	80.9	9.0	46.1	36.7
" 1905-08	9.1	87.7	24.2	47.4	28.4

In the nobility or feudal period (1827-46), the nobles, who were an insignificant minority of the population, accounted for the vast majority of the "politicals" (76%). In the Narodnik, *raznochintsi* period (1884-90; unfortunately, figures for the sixties and seventies are not available), the nobles dropped to second place, but still provided quite a high percentage (30.6%). Intellectuals accounted for the overwhelming majority (73.2%) of participants in the democratic movement.

In the 1901-03 period, which happened to be the period of the first political Marxist newspaper, the *old Iskra*, workers (46.1%) *predominated* over intellectuals (36.7%) and the movement became wholly democratised (10.7% nobles and 80.9% "non-privileged" people).

Running ahead, we see that in the period of the first mass movement (1905-08) the *only* change was that the intellectuals (28.4% as against 36.7%) were displaced by peasants (24.2% as against 9.0%).

Social-Democracy in Russia was founded by the Emancipation of Labour group, which was formed abroad in 1883. The writings of this group, which were printed abroad and uncensored, were the first systematically to expound and draw all the practical conclusions from the ideas of Marxism, which, as the experience of the entire world has shown, alone express the true essence of the working-class movement and its aims. For the twelve years between 1883 and 1895, practically the only attempt to establish a Social-Democratic workers' press in Russia was the publication in St. Petersburg in 1885 of the Social-Democratic newspaper *Rabochy*; it was of course illegal, but only two issues appeared. Owing to the absence of a mass working-class movement, there was no scope for the wide development of a workers' press.

The inception of a mass working-class movement, with the participation of Social-Democrats, dates from 1895-96,

PROPERTY OF CPSU NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the time of the famous St. Petersburg strikes. It was then that a workers' press, in the real sense of the term, appeared in Russia. The chief publications in those days were illegal leaflets, most of them hectographed and devoted to "economic" (as well as non-economic) agitation, that is, to the needs and demands of the workers in different factories and industries. Obviously, this literature could not have existed without the advanced workers' most active participation in the task of compiling and circulating it. Among St. Petersburg workers active at the time mention should be made of Vasily Andreyevich Shelgunov, who later became blind and was unable to carry on with his former vigour, and Ivan Vasilyevich Babushkin, an ardent Iskrist (1900-03) and Bolshevik (1903-05), who was shot for taking part in an uprising in Siberia late in 1905 or early in 1906.

Leaflets were published by Social-Democratic groups, circles and organisations, most of which, after the end of 1895, became known as "Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class". The "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" was founded in 1898 at a congress of representatives of local Social-Democratic organisations.[121]

After the leaflets, illegal working-class newspapers began to appear; for example, in 1897 *St. Petersburg Rabochy Listok*[122] appeared in St. Petersburg, followed by *Rabochaya Mysl*, which was shortly afterwards transferred abroad. Since then, almost right up to the revolution, local Social-Democratic newspapers came out illegally; true, they were regularly suppressed, but reappeared again and again all over Russia.

All in all, the workers' leaflets and Social-Democratic newspapers of the time—i.e., twenty years ago—were the direct forerunners of the present-day working-class press: the same factory "exposures", the same reports on the "economic" struggle, the same treatment of the tasks of the working-class movement from the standpoint of Marxist principles and consistent democracy, and finally, *the same two main trends*—the Marxist and the opportunist—in the working-class press.

It is a remarkable fact, one that has not been duly appreciated to this day, that as soon as the *mass* working-class movement arose in Russia (1895-96), there at once

appeared the division into Marxist and opportunist trends—a division which has changed in form and features, etc., but which has remained essentially the same from 1894 to 1914. Apparently, this particular kind of division and inner struggle among Social-Democrats has deep social and class roots.

The *Rabochaya Mysl*, mentioned above, represented the *opportunist* trend of the day, known as Economism. This trend became apparent in the disputes among the local leaders of the working-class movement as early as 1894-95. And abroad, where the awakening of the Russian workers led to an efflorescence of Social-Democratic literature as early as 1896, the appearance and rallying of the Economists ended in a split in the spring of 1900 (that is, prior to the appearance of *Iskra*, the first issue of which came off the press at the very end of 1900).

The history of the working-class press during the twenty years 1894-1914 is the history of the two trends in Russian Marxism and Russian (or rather all-Russia) Social-Democracy. To *understand* the history of the working-class press in Russia, one must know, not only and not so much the names of the various organs of the press—names which convey nothing to the present-day reader and simply confuse him—as the *content*, nature and ideological line of the different sections of Social-Democracy.

The chief organs of the Economists were *Rabochaya Mysl* (1897-1900) and *Rabocheye Dyelo* (1898-1901). *Rabocheye Dyelo* was edited by B. Krichevsky, who later went over to the syndicalists, A. Martynov, a prominent Menshevik and now a liquidator, and Akimov, now an "independent Social-Democrat" who in all essentials agrees with the liquidators.

At first only Plekhanov and the whole Emancipation of Labour group (the journal *Rabotnik*,[123] etc.) fought the Economists, and then *Iskra* joined the fight (from 1900 to August 1903, up to the time of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.). What, exactly, was the essence of Economism?

In word, the Economists were all for a mass type of working-class movement and independent action by the workers, emphasising the paramount significance of "economic" agitation and urging moderation or gradualness in pass-

ing over to political agitation. As the reader sees, these are exactly the same catchwords that the liquidators flaunt today. In practice, however, the Economists pursued a liberal-labour policy, the gist of which was tersely expressed by S. N. Prokopovich, one of the Economist leaders at that time, in the words: "economic struggle is for the workers, political struggle is for the liberals". The Economists, who made the most noise about the workers' independent activity and the mass movement, were in practice an opportunist and petty-bourgeois intellectual wing of the working-class movement.

The overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers, who in 1901-03 accounted for 46 out of every 100 persons charged with state crimes, as against 37 for the intelligentsia, sided with the *old Iskra*, against the opportunists. *Iskra*'s three years of activity (1901-03) saw the elaboration of the Social-Democratic Party's Programme, its main tactics, and the forms in which the workers' economic and political struggle could be combined on the basis of consistent Marxism. During the pre-revolutionary years, the growth of the workers' press around *Iskra* and under its ideological leadership assumed enormous proportions. The number of illegal leaflets and unlicensed printing-presses was exceedingly great, and increased rapidly all over Russia.

Iskra's complete victory over Economism, the victory of consistent proletarian tactics over opportunist-intellectualist tactics in 1903, still further stimulated the influx of "fellow-travellers" into the ranks of Social-Democracy; and opportunism revived *on the soil of Iskrism*, as part of it, in the form of "Menshevism".

Menshevism took shape at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (August 1903), originating from the *minority* of the Iskrists (hence the name Menshevism*) *and from all the opportunist opponents of* Iskra. The Mensheviks reverted to Economism in a slightly renovated form, of course; headed by A. Martynov, all the Economists who had remained in the movement flocked to the ranks of the Mensheviks.

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* The Russian word Menshevism is derived from *menshinstvo*, the English for which is minority.—*Ed.*

The *new Iskra*, which from November 1903 appeared under a new editorial board, became the chief organ of Menshevism. "Between the old *Iskra* and the new lies a gulf", Trotsky, then an ardent Menshevik, frankly declared. *Vperyod* and *Proletary*[124] (1905) were the chief Bolshevik newspapers, which upheld the tactics of consistent Marxism and remained faithful to the old *Iskra*.

From the point of view of real contact with the masses and as an expression of the tactics of the proletarian masses, 1905-07, the years of revolution, were a test of the two main trends in Social-Democracy and in the working-class press—the Menshevik and Bolshevik trends. A legal Social-Democratic press could not have appeared all at once in the autumn of 1905 had the way not been paved by the activities of the advanced workers, who were closely connected with the masses. The fact that the legal Social-Democratic press of 1905, 1906 and 1907 was a press of *two* trends, of two groups, can only be accounted for by the different lines in the working-class movement at the time—the petty-bourgeois and the proletarian.

The workers' legal press appeared in all three periods of the upswing and of relative "freedom", namely, in the autumn of 1905 (the Bolsheviks' *Novaya Zhizn*,[125] and the Mensheviks' *Nachalo*[126]—we name only the chief of the many publications); in the spring of 1906 (*Volna*, *Ekho*,[127] etc., issued by the Bolsheviks, *Narodnaya Duma*[128] and others, issued by the Mensheviks); and in the spring of 1907.

The essence of the Menshevik tactics of the time was recently expressed by L. Martov in these words: "The Mensheviks saw no other way by which the proletariat could take a useful part in that crisis except by assisting the bourgeois liberal democrats in their attempts to eject the reactionary section of the propertied classes from political power—but, while rendering this assistance, the proletariat was to maintain its complete political independence." (*Among Books* by Rubakin, Vol. II, p. 772.) In practice, these tactics of "assisting" the liberals amounted to making the workers *dependent* on them; in practice they were liberal-labour tactics. The Bolsheviks' tactics, on the contrary, ensured the independence of the proletariat in the bourgeois crisis, by fighting to bring that crisis to a head, by exposing

the treachery of liberalism, by enlightening and rallying the petty bourgeoisie (especially in the countryside) to counteract that treachery.

It is a fact—and the Mensheviks themselves, including the present-day liquidators, Koltsov, Levitsky, and others, have repeatedly admitted it—that in those years (1905-07) the masses of the workers followed the lead of the Bolsheviks. Bolshevism expressed the proletarian essence of the movement, Menshevism was its opportunist, petty-bourgeois intellectual wing.

We cannot here give a more detailed characterisation of the content and significance of the tactics of the two trends in the workers' press. We can do no more than accurately establish the main facts and define the main lines of historical development.

The working-class press in Russia has almost a century of history behind it; first, the pre-history, i.e., the history, *not* of the labour, *not* of the proletarian, but of the "general democratic", i.e., bourgeois-democratic movement for emancipation, followed by its own twenty-year history of the proletarian movement, proletarian democracy or Social-Democracy.

Nowhere in the world has the proletarian movement come into being, nor could it have come into being, "all at once", in a pure class form, ready-made, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. Only through long struggle and hard work on the part of the most advanced workers, of all class-conscious workers, was it possible to build up and strengthen the class movement of the proletariat, ridding it of all petty-bourgeois admixtures, restrictions, narrowness and distortions. The working class lives side by side with the petty bourgeoisie, which, as it becomes ruined, provides increasing numbers of new recruits to the ranks of the proletariat. And Russia is the most petty-bourgeois, the most philistine of capitalist countries, which only now is passing through the period of bourgeois revolutions which Britain, for example, passed through in the seventeenth century, and France in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

The class-conscious workers, who are now tackling a job that is near and dear to them, that of running the working-

class press, putting it on a sound basis and strengthening and developing it, will not forget the twenty-year history of Marxism and the Social-Democratic press in Russia.

A disservice is being done to the workers' movement by those of its weak-nerved friends among the intelligentsia who fight shy of the internal struggle among the Social-Democrats, and who fill the air with cries and calls to have nothing to do with it. They are well-meaning but futile people, and their outcries are futile.

Only by studying the history of Marxism's struggle against opportunism, only by making a thorough and detailed study of the manner in which independent proletarian democracy emerged from the petty-bourgeois hodge-podge can the advanced workers decisively strengthen their own class-consciousness and their workers' press.

Rabochy No. 1,
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WHAT SHOULD NOT BE COPIED FROM THE GERMAN LABOUR MOVEMENT

Karl Legien, one of the most prominent and responsible representatives of the German trade unions, recently published a report of his visit to America in the form of a rather bulky book entitled *The Labour Movement in America*.

As a very prominent representative of the international as well as German trade union movement, K. Legien gave his visit the nature of a special occasion, one of state importance, one might say. For years he conducted negotiations on this visit with the Socialist Party of America and the American Federation of Labour, the labour-union organisation led by the famous (or rather infamous) Gompers. When Legien heard that Karl Liebknecht was going to America, he refused to go at the same time "so as to avoid the simultaneous appearance in the United States of two spokesmen whose views on the party's tactics and on the importance and value of certain branches of the labour movement did not entirely coincide".

K. Legien collected a vast amount of material on the labour-union movement in America, but failed to digest it in his book, which is cluttered up with patchy descriptions of his journey, trivial in content and trite in style. Even the labour-union rules of America, in which Legien was particularly interested, are not studied or analysed, but merely translated incompletely and without system.

There was a highly instructive episode in Legien's tour, which strikingly revealed the *two tendencies* in the international and particularly in the German labour movement.

Legien visited the chamber of deputies of the United States, known as the Congress. Brought up in the police-

ridden Prussian state, he was favourably impressed by the democratic customs of the Republic, and he remarks with understandable pleasure that in America the government provides every congressman not only with a private office fitted with all modern conveniences, but also with a paid secretary to help him cope with a congressman's manifold duties. The simplicity and easy manners of the congressmen and the Speaker of the House were in striking contrast with what Legien had seen in European parliaments, and especially in Germany. In Europe, a Social-Democrat could not even think of delivering to a bourgeois parliament at an official session a speech of greeting! But in America this was done very simply, and the name of Social-Democrat did not frighten anybody ... except *that Social-Democrat himself*!

We have here an example of the American bourgeois method of killing unsteady socialists with kindness, and the German opportunist method of renouncing socialism in deference to the "kindly", suave and democratic bourgeoisie.

Legien's speech of greeting was translated into English (democracy was not in the least averse to hearing a "foreign" language spoken in its parliament); all two hundred odd congressmen shook hands in turn with Legien as the "guest" of the Republic, and the speaker expressed his thanks.

"The form and content of my speech of greeting," writes Legien, "were sympathetically received by the socialist press both in the United States and Germany. Certain editors in Germany, however, could not resist pointing out that my speech proved once again what an impossible task it is for a Social-Democrat to deliver a Social-Democratic speech to a bourgeois audience. Well, in my place, these editors would, no doubt, have delivered a speech against capitalism and in favour of a mass strike, but I considered it important to emphasise to this parliament that the Social-Democratic and industrially organised workers of Germany want peace among the nations, and through peace, the development of culture to the highest degree attainable."

Poor "editors", whom our Legien has annihilated with his "statesmanlike" speech! The opportunism of trade union leaders in general, and of Legien in particular, has long been common knowledge in the German labour movement, and has been duly appraised by a great many class-conscious

workers. But with us in Russia, where far too much is spoken about the "model" of *European* socialism with precisely the worst, most objectionable features of this "model" being chosen, it would be advisable to deal with Legien's speech in somewhat greater detail.

When he addressed the highest body of representatives of capitalist America, this leader of a two-million-strong army of German trade unionists—namely, the Social-Democratic trade unions—this member of the Social-Democratic group in the German Reichstag, delivered a purely liberal, bourgeois speech. Needless to say, not a single liberal, not even an Octobrist, would hesitate to subscribe to a speech about "peace" and "culture".

And when German socialists remarked that this was not a Social-Democratic speech, this "leader" of capital's wage-slaves treated them with scathing contempt. What are "editors" compared to a "practical politician" and collector of workers' pennies! Our philistine Narcissus has the same contempt for editors as the police panjandrums in a certain country have for the third element.[129]

"These editors" would no doubt have delivered a speech "against capitalism".

Just think what this quasi-socialist is sneering at! He is sneering at the idea that a socialist should think it necessary to speak *against* capitalism. To the "statesmen" of German opportunism such an idea is utterly alien; they talk in such a way as *not to offend* "capitalism". Disgracing themselves by this servile renunciation of socialism, they brag of their disgrace.

Legien is not just anybody. He is a representative of the army of trade unions, or rather, the officers' corps of that army. His speech was no accident, no slip of the tongue, no casual whimsy, no blunder of a provincial German office clerk overawed by American capitalists, who were polite and revealed no trace of police arrogance. If it were *only* this, Legien's speech would not be worthy of note.

But it was obviously not that.

At the International Congress in Stuttgart, half the German delegation turned out to be sham socialists of this type, who voted for the ultra-opportunist resolution on the colonial question.[130]

Take the German magazine *Sozialistische* (??) *Monatshefte*[131] and you will always find in it utterances by men like Legien, which are thoroughly opportunist, and have *nothing* in common with socialism, utterances touching on *all* the vital issues of the labour movement.

The "official" explanation of the "official" German party is that "nobody reads" *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, that it has no influence, etc.; but that is *not true*. The Stuttgart "incident" proved that it is not true. The most prominent and responsible people, members of parliament and trade union leaders who write for *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, constantly and undeviatingly propagate their views among the masses.

The "official optimism" of the German party has long been noted in its own camp by those people who earned Legien's appellation of "these editors"—an appellation contemptuous from the point of view of the bourgeois and honourable from the point of view of a socialist. And the more often the liberals and the liquidators in Russia (including Trotsky, of course) attempt to *transplant* this amiable characteristic *to our soil*, the more determinedly must they be resisted.

German Social-Democracy has many great services to its credit. Thanks to Marx's struggle against all the Höchbergs, Dührings, and Co., it possesses a strictly formulated theory, which our Narodniks vainly try to evade or touch up along opportunist lines. It has a mass organisation, newspapers, trade unions, political associations—that same mass organisation which is so definitely building up in our country in the shape of the victories the *Pravda* Marxists are winning everywhere—in Duma elections, in the daily press, in Insurance Board elections, and in the trade unions. The attempts of our liquidators, whom the workers have "removed from office", to evade the question of the growth of this mass organisation in Russia in a form adapted to Russian conditions are as vain as those of the Narodniks, and imply a similar intellectualist *breakaway* from the working-class movement.

But the merits of German Social-Democracy are merits, not because of shameful speeches like those delivered by Legien or the "utterances" (in the press) by the contribu-

tors to *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, but *despite* them. We must not try to play down the *disease* which the German party is undoubtedly suffering from, and which reveals itself in phenomena of this kind; nor must we play it down with "officially optimistic" phrases. We must lay it bare to the Russian workers, so that we may learn from the experience of the older movement, learn what should not be copied from it.

Prosveshcheniye No. 4,
April 1914
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

BOOK REVIEW

N. A. Rubakin, *Among Books*, Vol. II.
Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1913.
Price 4 rubles. Second Edition

This bulky tome of 930 large pages of very small type, printed partly in double columns, is an "attempt to review Russian book treasures in connection with the history of scientific-philosophical and literary-social ideas". Thus runs the subtitle of the book.

The second volume, which we are here reviewing, covers the various fields of the social sciences. This includes, among others, socialism in Western Europe as well as in Russia. A publication of this type is obviously of great interest, and the author's plan is on the whole a correct one. It is really impossible to give a *sensible* "review of Russian book treasures" and a "work of reference" for self-education and libraries otherwise than in connection with the history of ideas. What is needed here is "preliminary remarks" to every section (these the author provides) with a general survey of the subject and an accurate summary of *each* ideological trend, as well as a list of books for the particular section and for each ideological trend.

The author and his numerous collaborators, as mentioned in the preface, have expended an enormous amount of labour and started an extremely valuable undertaking, which deserves from us the cordial wish that it may grow and develop in scope and depth. Very valuable, among other things, is the fact that the author excludes neither foreign publications nor publications that have been prosecuted. No decent library can dispense with Mr. Rubakin's work.

The faults of this book are its author's eclecticism and the fact that he does not sufficiently enlist, or rather, that

he has barely begun to enlist, the co-operation of specialists on definite subjects.

The first fault is perhaps due to the author's peculiar aversion for "polemics". In his preface, Mr. Rubakin says: "Never in my life have I taken part in any polemics, for I believe that in the overwhelming majority of cases polemics are one of the best means of obscuring the truth with all sorts of human emotions." The author does not realise, for one thing, that there has never been, nor can there be, any human *search* for truth without "human emotions". The author forgets, secondly, that he has set out to review "the history of ideas", and the history of ideas is that of the succession, and *consequently* of the *conflict* of ideas.

One of the two—*either* we ignore the conflict of ideas, in which case it is rather difficult to undertake a review of its history (let alone participate in this conflict), *or* else we abandon the claim "never to take part in any polemics". For example: I turn to Mr. Rubakin's "preliminary remarks" on the theory of political economy and at once see that the author escapes from this dilemma firstly by means of *veiled* polemics (a form that has all the demerits of polemics and none of its great merits), and, secondly, by defending eclecticism.

In his outline of Bogdanov's *Short Course*, Mr. Rubakin ventures" to note the "interesting" similarity between one of the deductions made by the "Marxist" author and "N. K. Mikhailovsky's well-known formula of progress" (p. 815).

O, Mr. Rubakin, who says, "Never in my life have I taken part in any polemics"....

On the preceding page he eulogises the "strictly scientific method, profound analysis and critical attitude towards extremely important theories" of—who would you think?—that exemplary eclecticist Mr. Tugan-Baranovsky! Mr. Rubakin himself is compelled to admit that this professor is somewhat of an adherent of Marxism, somewhat of an adherent of Narodism and somewhat of an adherent of the "theory of marginal utility",[132] and yet calls him a "socialist"! Does not writing a monstrous thing like this amount to indulging in *polemics* of the worst kind *against* socialism?

Had Mr. Rubakin divided the 14,000 odd words (i.e., a whole pamphlet) which he wrote as an introduction to the literature on political economy, into four parts, and had he arranged to have them written by, say, a Black-Hundred-man, a liberal, a Narodnik, and a Marxist, we would have had a more *public* polemic, and 999 readers out of a thousand would have discovered the truth a thousand times more easily and quickly.

Mr. Rubakin has resorted to this kind of device—that of enlisting the co-operation of representatives of "polemics"—in the question of Bolshevism and Menshevism, and devoted half a page to me* and another half to L. Martov. As far as I am concerned, I am quite satisfied with L. Martov's exposition, for example, with his admission that liquidationism amounts to attempts "at creating a legal workers' party", and to "a negative attitude to surviving underground organisations" (pp. 771-72), or with his admission that "Menshevism saw no other way in which the proletariat could take a useful part in the crisis" (i.e., that of 1905) "except by helping the bourgeois liberal democrats in their attempts to eject the reactionary section of the propertied classes from political power—but while rendering this assistance, the proletariat was to maintain its complete political independence" (772).

As soon as Mr. Rubakin continues this outline of Menshevism on his own, he falls into error—for example, his assertion that Axelrod "*withdrew*" from liquidationism together with Plekhanov (772). While we do not blame Mr. Rubakin very much for such errors, which are inevitable in the initial stages of a work of this varied and compilatory nature, yet we cannot help wishing that the author would more often employ the method of enlisting the co-operation of representatives of the different trends *in all* fields of knowledge. This would make for greater accuracy and completeness of the work, as well as for its *impartiality*; only eclecticism and *veiled* polemics stand to lose by this.

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 485-86.—*Ed.*

LIQUIDATIONISM DEFINED

Readers of our paper are aware what a great deal of controversy and conflict liquidationism is causing in the working class movement of Russia today. We have repeatedly pointed out that every class-conscious worker (in a sense, we would even say every politically-conscious democrat) must have a clear and definite understanding of liquidationism.

Nonetheless, our opponents in both *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Nasha Zarya* not only fail to publish in full and explain to their readers the gist of the official decisions dealing with liquidationism (for example, from the texts of 1908 and 1910), but, what is far worse and far more harmful, they either flatly "deny" the existence of liquidationism, or else mouth incoherent irrelevancies, *instead of* accurately reporting the decision *unanimously* adopted in 1910.

We therefore consider it necessary to take advantage of such a rare occasion as that afforded by *L. Martov himself*, who has given in the press an astonishingly (for this writer) exact and truthful definition or description of liquidationism.

In Volume II of N. Rubakin's well-known book *Among Books* (second edition, Moscow, 1913, p. 771) we find that Mr. Rubakin has published without the slightest alteration a letter from L. Martov replying to Mr. Rubakin's request "to set forth the gist and history of Menshevism". In this letter L. Martov writes literally the following:

"After the social movement was crushed, the same tendency of the Mensheviks [namely, the tendency "to start party construction anew in a more definite class-socialist spirit or to give Social-Democracy a new basis for its radical self-reformation"] towards the organisational reform of the Party found expression in increased activities aimed at the formation of all kinds of non-party labour organisations—trade unions, self-education societies (in some cases, co-operative

societies), etc., *and in attempts*, *through these societies*, *to form a legal workers' party*, or organised outposts of it [in the course of the controversy, those who took part in these attempts were dubbed "legalists" or "*liquidators*" *because of their negative attitude towards the surviving underground organisations*]."

This is all that Martov had to say about liquidationism. We have underlined the principal passages. We shall not dwell on the minor misstatement that it was only "in the course of the controversy" and that only "those who took part in these attempts" who were called liquidators; as a matter of fact, the general Marxist, official decision of 1908, which is binding on all Marxists, speaks of liquidationism as a definite trend. But that is a relatively minor point.

The major point is that L. Martov has here unwittingly revealed that he understands and knows what liquidationism is.

Attempts to form a legal workers' party and of course advocacy and defence of this idea; a negative attitude towards the organisations of the "old type" which still survive (and, naturally, may arise anew)—such is the crux of the matter, which *Nasha Zarya*, *Luch*, and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* have tried a thousand times to confuse, obscure and deny.

The reader who gives thought to the significance of the facts we have quoted will realise why the mere mention of "unity" by the liquidators is capable of arousing, in class-conscious workers, either violent indignation and protest, or (according to their mood) scathing ridicule. One can conceive of an advocate of the legal-party idea sincerely and honestly repudiating the "underground", if those are his convictions. But one *cannot* conceive of sincere and honest talk about "unity" on the part of those who contribute to *Nasha Zarya* or *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*. To write for these journals means, *in effect*, to fight *against* the "underground" and *for* a legal party, which they continue to advocate and stand up for.

Therefore, when the International Socialist Bureau, in December 1913, brought up the question of ascertaining the conditions on which unity could be achieved in Russia, the organised Marxists in St. Petersburg and Moscow at once

publicly declared that the primary and basic condition was emphatic and unqualified rejection of liquidationism, a complete and radical change in the *entire trend* of the *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch* group. The *Luch* people answered, also publicly (both F. D. and L. M.), that they did not agree with this.

That being the case, it is obvious that people who talk about "unity" with this group, which persists in its liberal ideas, are deceiving both themselves and others. Real unity has already been developed and will continue to be developed among the majority of the class-conscious workers, who have rallied round the Marxist decisions and round the entire Marxist body, against this splitting group.

Put Pravdy No. 73,
April 29, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE SYMPOSIUM *MARXISM AND LIQUIDATIONISM*

Liquidationism is an issue of vital importance, not only to labour democracy but to Russian democracy generally. When our democratic press tries to sidestep this issue, or skim over it as a "private controversy" among Marxists, it merely reveals a desire to evade an appraisal of the cardinal political problems of our day. For the question of liquidationism is one of our entire appraisal of the June Third system, and, in broader terms, of our counter-revolution generally. It is a question of the basic tasks and methods of the democrats.

No one, I believe, has questioned the fact that the latest period of Russian history, beginning approximately with 1908, has been marked not only by the extreme intensification of reaction's persecution of everything democratic, but by profound ideological disunity and disintegration, which has affected the proletariat as well as all bourgeois-democratic elements. But whereas *everyone* acknowledges this obvious fact, only the Marxists have set themselves the clear and immediate task of precisely defining the *class* roots and *class* implications of this disunity and disintegration. Without such a definition there can be no conscious choice of tactics.

Work in that direction started in our Marxist press abroad in 1908, i.e., as soon as disunity became a fact. The Marxists could not accept this disunity, as the liberals had done, nor could they confine themselves to subjectively condemning it, as even the best (in the democratic sense) of the Narodniks had done. The social trends called for a socio-economic, i.e., class explanation.

December 1908 saw an explanation of the substance of liquidationism given in the Bolshevik press and endorsed by a Party decision which was binding on all. The spring of 1909 saw a formal break between the Bolsheviks (as represented by their leading body) and the so-called Vperyodists,* who accepted otzovism[133] or considered it a "legitimate trend" and defended "god-building" and the reactionary philosophy of Machism.** This break revealed the main features of "Left liquidationism", its leaning towards anarchism, just as Right liquidationism, or liquidationism proper, leans towards liberalism.

By January 1910 this Marxist analysis of the present disunity and disintegration, nine-tenths of which had been given by the Bolshevik press abroad, was so complete and the facts so irrefutably established, that *all* Marxists, representatives of *all* trends (including *both* the liquidators and the Vperyodists) were compelled *unanimously* to acknowledge, in the decisions of January 1910, that both the liquidationist and Vperyodist "deviations" were *manifestations of bourgeois influence* on the proletariat.

A glance at the situation in the *non*-Marxist movement will be enough to make one realise the social significance of this Marxist analysis and Marxist decision. Among the liberals we find the extreme Vekhist liquidationism and confusion, which persists *to this day*, on the question of whether the methods of 1905 have been abandoned or not. Among the *Left* Narodniks we find extreme liquidationist pronouncements, beginning with the Paris publications of 1908-11, the nebulous liquidationism of *Pochin*[134] and ending with the liquidationist mouthings of Savinkov-Ropshin and Chernov in *Zavety*. On the other hand, the Left Narodniks' official otzovism continues to erode and weaken their ranks.

The objective validity of the Marxist analysis was confirmed by the fact that in the course of the five odd years since 1908 *all* progressive trends of social thought have been constantly coming up against *these* selfsame liquidationist and Narodnik errors, *these* selfsame questions of applying old methods to the solution of old but still

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* Alexinsky, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, S. Volsky and others.

** See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 425-51.—*Ed.*

unresolved problems, and of marshalling our forces in a new situation and with new methods.

At the beginning of the June Third period, Marxist analysis helped to reveal the theoretical deviations towards liquidationism and otzovism. Now, at the close of the period, we see how, even in the open arena, in full sight of everybody, the vast majority of class-conscious workers of Russia have rallied around the Marxists, while both *flanks* of the democratic press, which seeks to influence the proletariat, are preoccupied with petty-bourgeois liquidationism and petty-bourgeois Narodism. Not so long ago the Left-Narodnik *Severnaya Mysl* (No. 1) carried the following report from a Mr. Braines on the social insurance campaign in Riga:

> "The boycottist trend is apparent only among the shoemakers, where boycottist groups have been formed. Unfortunately, the Narodniks are the leading spirits in these groups." (Quoted in the article "Narodism and Liquidationism as Disintegrating Elements in the Working-Class Movement",* in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 12, for December 20, 1913.)

The same paper had to admit that:

> "To the honour of the Marxists be it said that they enjoy considerable influence at present in the unions [i.e., the trade unions] whereas we Left Narodniks work in them without a definite plan, and for that reason our influence is scarcely felt." (Ibid.)

The doctrinal feebleness of the Left Narodniks, who combine the new-fangled opportunism of the European philistines with the purely Russian philistine defence of "labouring" proprietors, is naturally complemented by tactical feebleness and vacillation. Nothing remains of the old Left-Narodnik party except vacillation, and the same applies to the liquidators. Defeated in the working-class movement, these petty-bourgeois trends had no choice but to *form a bloc against the Marxists.*

It has been a steady descent. From advocacy of a legal party, from the speeches of the Potresovs and the Yushkeviches, with their renouncement of the idea of hegemony and of Marxism, the liquidators have sunk to a direct *struggle* against the Marxist party. Here is what a St. Petersburg Left Narodnik wrote the other day in *Stoikaya Mysl* (No. 5):

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* See pp. 59-62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"As soon as we came into the hall (where the election of the Insurance Board was taking place) the narrow factional stand taken by the Pravdists at once became clear. But we do not lose hope. Together with the liquidators we are drawing up a non-factional list that will give us one seat on the Board and two alternate seats. (Quoted from *Put Pravdy* No. 38, for March 16, 1914.)

Petty-bourgeois democrats of all trends who wish to corrupt the workers with bourgeois influence—unite against the Marxists! The silly word "non-factional", which fascinates people who are incapable of thinking and learning, is so convenient and pleasing a word for the philistine! But the bloc with the Left Narodniks was no help to the poor liquidators, and never can be. The class-conscious workers elected to the Insurance Board *only* Marxists, opponents of liquidationism.

Grouplets of non-Party intellectuals, who seek to subject the workers to bourgeois policy and bourgeois ideology, have now taken definite shape in Russia: the liquidators and the Left Narodniks. For nearly twenty years, ever since Economism first appeared on the scene (1894-95), the ground has been laid for this *alliance* of opportunists from among the near-Party Marxists with the Narodniks *against* consistent Marxism. It is high time to face the facts squarely and say firmly and emphatically: the Marxist working-class movement in Russia is being built, and can be built, *only* in a struggle against liquidationism and Narodism.

All over the world, in every capitalist society, the proletariat is inevitably connected with the petty bourgeoisie by a thousand ties, and everywhere the period of formation of workers' parties was attended by its more or less prolonged and persistent ideological and political subjection to the bourgeoisie. This is common to all capitalist countries, but it assumes different forms in different countries, depending on historical and economic factors. In Britain, in conditions of complete political freedom and with the country enjoying a long period of monopoly, the liberal bourgeoisie was for decades able to corrupt and ideologically enslave the majority of class-conscious workers. In France, the traditions of republican petty-bourgeois radicalism have been converting very many workers into supporters of the "Radical"

bourgeois party, or of equally bourgeois anarchism. In Germany, half a century ago, the workers still followed the liberal Schulze-Delitzsch and were taken in by the "national-liberal" ("Royal-Prussian") opportunistic vacillation of Lassalle and Schweitzer, while today hundreds of thousands of workers follow the Catholic "centre", with its sham "democracy".

In Russia, the *bourgeois-democratic* solution of the peasant question has not been completed to this day. It is therefore not surprising to see petty-bourgeois Narodism parading as "socialism". Russia is the *most* petty bourgeois of all capitalist countries. Consequently, as soon as Marxism became a *mass* social trend in Russia, intellectualist petty-bourgeois opportunism made itself felt, first in the form of Economism and "legal Marxism" (1895-1902), later in the form of Menshevism* (1903-08), and finally in the form of liquidationism (1908-14).

Liquidationism has now reached full maturity, a complete break with the Marxist workers' party. If Mr. L. M., the most "Left" of the liquidators—and the most adroit in producing evasive formulas—writes:

> "experience has shown that the 'legal workers' party' is not a reactionary dream, for *such a party*, *in a certain sense*, *exists* in Russia at present..." (L. M.'s italics; *Nasha Zarya* No. 2, 1914, p. 83),

then it should be clear to all that it is absurd and preposterous even to think *of the possibility* of "uniting" or "reconciling" *such* a group with the Marxist workers' party.

Only hopelessly empty-headed people can now talk of the Marxist workers' party "uniting" with *such* a group, with that of *Nasha Zarya* and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* group.

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* The liquidationist historians present a ludicrous spectacle indeed when they have to dodge and manoeuvre in order to *disguise* the unpleasant but irrefutable fact that Menshevism (and liquidationism even more so) emerged *from* the very Economism, Bundism and "legal Marxism" against which the old *Iskra*, builder of the working-class party in Russia, fought for *three years*. See, for instance, Mr. Potresov's pamphlet on Axelrod. Mr. Potresov has tried just as zealously and just as unsuccessfully to disguise and *conceal* the fact that in his "Zemstvo campaign plan"[135] Axelrod urged us not to frighten the liberals away. Incidentally, even the Menshevik Plekhanov has fully admitted the historical (in addition to theoretical) kinship between liquidationism, and Economism and "legal Marxism".

Class divisions in Russia in 1914 are in every respect more politically definite and sharper than they were in 1904. At that time it was only the landed nobility that showed no cleavage, and the salon liberalism of some of its representatives frightened even the old regime. At that time, this regime considered the muzhik such a reliable pillar of law and order that it allowed him a very large measure of influence in the Bulygin and Witte Dumas.[136] At that time, Guchkov-Milyukov-Peshekhonov liberalism and democracy could still present a single and uniform school of thought. At that time Menshevism wanted to be—and in effect was—an *inner*-Party trend, one that sought to defend opportunist slogans in "programmatic discussions" *within* the workers' party.

Present-day liquidationism has since then moved miles to the right. It has quitted the Party, shaken the dust of the "underground" from its feet, and is a closely knit anti-partyist centre of journalists writing for the legal liberal and liquidationist press, men whom the workers have removed from every office in all working-class organisations and societies. To compare *this* liquidationism with the Menshevism of 1903-07 is to allow oneself to be blinded and deafened by old names and catchwords, and to have absolutely no understanding of the evolution of class and party relations in Russia during the past ten years.

Present-day liquidationism, that of 1914, is the same as the *Tovarishch* group of 1907.[137]

It is quite natural that in exile and emigration, where people are so out of touch with real conditions, so immured in memories of the past, of the events of seven or ten years ago, one comes across dozens of these "have-beens", who dream of "unity" between the workers' party and the group of Messrs. L. M., F. D., Potresov, Yezhov, Sedov and Co. And there are also very many of these "have-beens", but of a poorer moral calibre, among intellectuals associated with the workers' party in 1904-07 and now holding "cushy jobs" in various legal organisations.

No less natural is it that among Russian working-class youth of today all these dreams and all this talk of complacent individuals about "unity" of liquidators and the workers' party produce either Homeric and most impolite

laughter, or else bewilderment and pity for these intellectualist Manilovs. This is perfectly natural, for our present-day working-class youth *have seen* the liquidators desert the Party, seen their *flight* from the "defunct Party cells", heard their renegade speeches about the "underground" and the harmfulness of "boosting the illegal Press" (see statement in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, March 13, 1914), have been obliged to *combat* the bloc of this gentry both with the Narodniks and with the non-party element at a number of congresses, in the elections to the Fourth Duma, at a number of meetings of workers' societies, and in the elections to the Insurance Board, and have been obliged to *remove* these individuals *from office* in every workers' organisation.

Let Trotsky, in *Borba*, cast imploring looks at Skobelev and Chkheidze; let contributors to the Paris newspaper *Za Partiyu**[138] look with hope and trust to Buryanov[139]; let them reiterate all this talk about "unity"—their words now have a ring of sadness and irrelevancy.

To preach "unity" between Marxists and people who claim that a "legal workers' party is not a reactionary dream", etc., one has to be either fantastically stupid, or else have no knowledge and no understanding whatever of the Russian working-class movement and of the position in the local organisations, or else one has to long for such a pleasant "pendulum" state of affairs in which—who knows!—Trotsky (or some other "non-factionalist") will be invited to engineer "non-factional" unity "on an equal basis" between the group that contribute to *Nasha Zarya*, *Dyen* and *Kievskaya Mysl* and the groups of Marxist workers. What a sweet and delightful prospect!

But real life, the real history of the attempts to "unite" with the liquidators, reveals something very far removed from this sweet and delightful prospect. There was a serious and concerted effort to unite with the liquidators in January 1910, but it was wrecked by the liquidators. There was unity of *all* groups and grouplets with the liquidators against the hateful Conference of January 1912. This was

* Plekhanov.

ardent and passionate unity based on the most passionate (and violently abusive) invective against that Conference, with both Trotsky and the *Za Partiyu* contributors and, of course, all the Vperyodists taking part in this "union". If the evil Leninist splitters were really an obstacle to unity, then real unity would have blossomed forth immediately after the joint statement against the Leninists, which these groups and the liquidators published in *Vorwärts* in March 1912!

But, alas, these queer unity-builders have since then—since the workers in Russia, having inaugurated *Pravda* in April, proceeded to unite the hundreds and thousands of workers' groups in all parts of the country on a basis of loyalty to the Party—these queer unity-builders have, ever since March 1912, displayed ever greater disunity amongst themselves! By August 1912 the famous "August bloc" of the liquidators was formed *without* the Vperyodists and *without* "*Za Partiyu*".

The next eighteen months saw the growth, maturity and ultimate consolidation of the unity of workers' groups in Russia, in *all* legal working-class societies, in all the trade unions and organisations and in a good many newspapers and organs, with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma, which is prepared to carry out the will of the majority of the workers.

But what of our "unity-builders"?

Oh, their "unity" efforts have been so felicitous and successful that instead of one *Vperyod* group there are now two (not counting Bogdanov, the empirio-monist whom some take for a third *Vperyod* group[140]); instead of a single Trotsky-and-liquidator paper (*Luch*), there is now, in addition, Trotsky's own organ, *Borba*, which this time promises genuine "non-factionalism". And besides Trotsky's timid withdrawal from the liquidator ranks, there has been a complete and resolute withdrawal from them of *all the organised Lettish Marxists*, who, *despite* their strict neutrality and non-factionalism, forthrightly declared at their 1914 Congress:

"*The conciliators* (*participants in the August bloc*) *have themselves fallen into ideological and political dependence on the liquidators*"*!*

From March 1912, when *everyone* united with the liquidators against the evil "Leninist splitters", up to March 1914, when the fictitious "August bloc" finally fell to pieces, it became abundantly clear that the real unity of the Marxist workers (in Russia, not in Paris or Vienna) is proceeding, and will only proceed, *in opposition* to the liquidationist group and *regardless* of the empty talk about "unity" with the advocates of a "legal workers' party".

Thousands of workers' groups openly, and publicly rallying around the Marxist paper—here is living proof of genuine unity and its development. Based on the principles evolved by the Marxists at the beginning of the June Third period, this unity has enabled us—a hundredfold more successfully than anyone else has done—to utilise every legal opportunity, to utilise it *in the spirit* of a ruthless war against the ideas that condemn the "boosting of the illegal press", or accept advocacy of "a legal party", or renounce hegemony, or relegate to the background the "pillars",[141] etc., etc.

And only such unity, based on these principles, indicates the correct path to the Russian working class.

Written in April 1914

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MORE ABOUT THE POLITICAL CRISIS

A good deal has already been said in the newspapers about the famous Duma session of April 22 at which all the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks were ejected.[142] However, the full implications of this event have not yet been sufficiently explained.

Every political crisis, whatever its outcome, is useful in that it brings to light things that have been hidden, reveals the forces operating in politics, exposes deception and self-deception, catch-phrases and fictions, and affords striking demonstration of "*things as they are*", by forcibly driving them home.

All the democratic members of the Duma, both Social-Democrats and Trudoviks, were suspended for fifteen sessions and ejected, most of them by armed force. This was done in deference to those who, by taking measures against Chkheidze, clearly revealed their "firm" intention of taking a step (or rather, a dozen steps at once) towards the right. The Rights and Octobrists, *plus some of the Progressists*, i.e., the bourgeois liberals, who are in close, in fact, inseparable league with the Cadets, voted for this ejection.

The Cadets abstained! This abstention by a party which claims to be democratic admirably revealed—by no means for the first time—the true nature of the Cadet gentry's liberalism. The Fourth Duma prepares to expel Chkheidze, then the other Social-Democrats, and then all the democrats, and starts by suspending them, yet the "leaders" of the liberal opposition *abstain from voting*! No matter how many gallons of ink the liberals and Cadets may afterwards use up to invent sophisms and evasions such as: we merely disapproved of the "form" of the Social-Democrats' speeches,

etc.—the crux of the matter will remain clear to anybody who does not wish to deceive himself.

Abstaining from voting when Goremykin, Rodzyanko and their majority expelled the democratic deputies actually implied tacit support, moral approval and political endorsement of Goremykin and Rodzyanko and their majority.

One cannot agree with the point of view expressed by L. M. in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 61, who wrote that the "Duma majority headed by the Octobrists have committed political suicide". That is the point of view of a Left liberal, not of a democrat, and certainly not of a Social-Democrat.

The Duma majority and the Octobrists have not committed suicide at all. All of them are deliberate counter-revolutionaries, deliberate participants in the June Third bloc and in the Stolypin system, deliberate enemies of democracy. Since they recognise Goremykin as their political leader, why is it suicide for them to follow this leader against their class enemies, against the representatives of democracy, who are notoriously hostile to the Octobrists?

What is the purpose of these turgid and utterly false phrases about "suicide"? Such phrases *assume* that the Octobrists are *not* the enemies of democracy, i.e., assume something that is disgustingly false. These phrases resemble the vulgar democratism of those misguided Left Narodniks who often shouted that the Third and the Fourth Duma were a "pasteboard" institution, a house of cards. The Octobrists' vote for Goremykin, Maklakov and Shcheglovitov could have been considered suicidal only if the Octobrists had expressed the "will of the people". Actually, however, they express the "*will*" of those sections of the big bourgeoisie and the landlords which stand in mortal fear of the people.

No, let us face the truth squarely. In politics that is always the best and the only correct attitude.

And the truth is that the Duma events of April 22 shattered and killed the remnants of constitutional and legalistic illusions The counter-revolutionary bloc of Purishkevich, Rodzyanko and the "Left" Octobrists, plus a section of the Progressists, came out against democracy bluntly,

openly, determinedly, in soldier fashion (not in the metaphorical, but in the literal sense of this last term, for soldiers were called into the Duma). The counter-revolutionary liberals, Milyukov and Co., *abstained from voting*. This could only have been expected after all that has happened in the Third and the Fourth Duma, after all that happened in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Well, the less self-deception there is, the better for the people. What has the country gained from the Duma events of April 22? It has gained by losing another particle of illusions that are detrimental to the cause of freedom in this country.

Put Pravdy No. 76,
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THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The profound ideological change that has taken place among the *opposition*, or progressive, sections of the people is an extremely important and distinctive feature of post-revolutionary Russia. To forget this distinctive feature is to prevent oneself from understanding the Russian revolution and its character, as well as the tasks of the working class in our time.

The ideological change among the liberal bourgeoisie is expressed in the rise of an anti-democratic trend (Struve, Izgoyev and V. Maklakov openly, the rest of the Cadets secretly, "bashfully").

Among the democrats this change is expressed in the utter ideological confusion and vacillation that prevail among both the Social-Democrats (proletarian democrats) and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (bourgeois democrats). Even the best representatives of democracy confine themselves to *bewailing* this confusion, vacillation and backsliding. The Marxists, however, look for the *class* roots of this *social* phenomenon.

The chief symptom of this break-down is liquidationism, which as far back as 1908 was officially defined as "an attempt by a certain part of the intelligentsia to liquidate" the "underground", and to "substitute" for it a legal workers' party, a definition that was endorsed by "the entire Marxist body".[143] At the last official meeting of leading Marxists held in January 1910, which was attended by representatives of *all* "trends" and groups, there was *not a single* person who protested against the condemnation of liquidationism as a *manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat*. This condemnation, which was also an

explanation of the *class* roots of liquidationism, was adopted *unanimously*.

Over four years have passed since then, and the vast experience of the mass working-class movement has provided a thousand proofs that this appraisal of liquidationism is correct.

The facts have shown that, between them, the theory of Marxism and the practical experience of the mass working-class movement have killed liquidationism, which is a bourgeois and anti-workers' trend. It is sufficient to recall how, in a single month, March 1914, *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* vilified the "illegal press" (issue of March 13), and demonstrations (Mr. Gorsky in the issue of April 11), and how Bulkin, in perfect imitation of the liberals, vilified the "underground" (*Nasha Zarya* No. 3), how the notorious *L. M.*, on behalf of the editors of *Nasha Zarya*, fully supported Bulkin on this point and argued the case for "building a legal workers' party"—it is sufficient to recall all this to understand why the attitude of the class-conscious workers towards liquidationism *cannot* be anything else than that of ruthless condemnation and complete boycott of the liquidators.

But here a very important question crops up: How did this trend arise historically?

It arose in the course of the *twenty years*' history of Marxism's ties with the mass working-class movement in Russia. Up to 1894-95 there were no such ties. The Emancipation of Labour group only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement.

It was only the propaganda of 1894-95 and the strikes of 1895-96 that established firm and inseverable ties between Social-Democracy and the mass working-class movement. And *immediately* an ideological struggle commenced between the two trends of Marxism: the struggle between the Economists and the consistent Marxists or (later) Iskrists (1895-1902), the struggle between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks (1903-08), and the struggle between the liquidators and the Marxists (1908-14).

Economism and liquidationism are two different forms of the same petty-bourgeois, intellectualist opportunism that

has existed for twenty years. That there is a personal as well as ideological connection between all these forms of opportunism is an undoubted fact. It is sufficient to mention the name of the leader of the Economists, A. Martynov, who subsequently became a Menshevik and is now a liquidator. It is sufficient to call a witness like G. V. Plekhanov, who, on very many points,* stood close to the Mensheviks, but nevertheless openly admitted that the Mensheviks absorbed intellectualist opportunist elements into their ranks, and that the liquidators continued the errors of Economism and were disrupters of the workers' party.

People who (like the liquidators and Trotsky) ignore or falsify this twenty years' history of the ideological struggle in the working-class movement do tremendous harm to the workers.

A worker who takes an anythingarian attitude towards the history of his own movement cannot be considered class-conscious. Of all the capitalist countries, Russia is one of the most backward and most petty bourgeois. That is why the *mass* working-class movement gave rise to a petty-bourgeois, opportunist *wing* in that movement, not by chance, but inevitably.

The progress made during these twenty years in ridding the working-class movement of the influence of the bourgeoisie, of the influence of Economism and of liquidationism, has been *tremendous*. For the first time, a real, proletarian foundation for a real Marxist party is being securely laid. It is generally admitted, even the opponents of the Pravdists

* Why do we say "on very many points"? Because Plekhanov occupied a *special* position, and departed from Menshevism *many* times: (1) at the 1903 Congress Plekhanov fought the opportunism of the Mensheviks, (2) after the Congress Plekhanov edited Nos. 46-51 of *Iskra*, also in opposition to the Mensheviks, (3) in 1904 Plekhanov defended Axelrod's plan for a Zemstvo campaign in such a way that he passed over its chief mistakes in silence, (4) in the spring of 1905 Plekhanov left the Mensheviks, (5) in 1906, after the dissolution of the First Duma, the stand Plekhanov took was not at all a Menshevik one (see *Proletary*,[144] August 1906), (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 179-83.—Ed.); (6) at the London Congress in 1907—as Cherevanin relates—Plekhanov opposed the "organisational anarchism" of the Mensheviks. One must know these facts in order to understand why the Menshevik Plekhanov so long and so resolutely fought liquidationism and denounced it.

are compelled to admit—the facts compel them to admit it!—that among class-conscious workers the Pravdists constitute the overwhelming majority. What the Marxist "plenum" of January 1910 recognised *theoretically* (that liquidationism is "bourgeois influence on the proletariat"), the class-conscious workers have been putting into practice during the past four years; they have secured practical recognition of it by weakening the liquidators, by removing them from office, by reducing liquidationism to a group of legal, opportunist publicists standing outside the mass working-class movement.

During this twenty-year-old conflict of ideas the working-class movement in Russia has been growing in scope and strength and steadily maturing. It has defeated Economism; the flower of the class-conscious proletariat have sided with the Iskrists. At every decisive stage in the revolution they have left the Mensheviks in the minority: *even* Levitsky *himself* has had to admit that the masses of the workers sided with the Bolsheviks.

And, finally, it has now defeated liquidationism and, as a result, has taken the correct road of the broad struggle—illumined by Marxist theory and summed up in uncurtailed slogans—of the advanced class for the advanced historical aims of mankind.

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BILL ON THE EQUALITY OF NATIONS AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES[145]

1. The boundaries of Russia's administrative divisions, rural and urban (villages, volosts, uyezds, gubernias, parts and sections of towns, suburbs, etc.), shall be revised on the basis of a register of present-day economic conditions and the national composition of the population.

2. This register shall be made by commissions elected by the local population on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot with proportional representation; national minorities too small (under proportional representation) to elect one commission member shall elect a commission member with a consultative voice.

3. The new boundaries shall be endorsed by the central parliament of the country.

4. Local self-government shall be introduced in all areas of the country without exception, on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot with proportional representation; areas with specific geographical, living or economic conditions or a special national composition of the population shall have the right to form autonomous regions with autonomous regional Diets.

5. The limits of jurisdiction exercised by the autonomous Diets and local self-governing bodies shall be determined by the central parliament of the country.

6. All nations in the state are absolutely equal, and all privileges enjoyed by any one nation or any one language are held to be inadmissible and anti-constitutional.

7. The local self-governing bodies and autonomous Diets shall determine the language in which business is to be conducted by state and public establishments in a given area or region, all-national minorities having the right to demand absolute safeguards for their language on the basis of the principle of equality, for example, the right to receive replies from state and public establishments in the language in which they are addressed, etc. Measures by Zemstvos, towns, etc., which infringe the equality of languages enjoyed by the national minorities in financial, administrative, legal and all other fields, shall be considered non-valid and subject to repeal on a protest filed by any citizen of the state, regardless of domicile.

8. Each self-governing unit of the state, rural and urban, shall elect, on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot with proportional representation, boards of education to take care, wholly and autonomously, of expenditures on all the cultural and educational needs of the population subject to the control and management of the town and Zemstvo bodies.

9. In territorial units with a mixed population the number of members on the boards of education shall not be less than twenty. This number (20) may be increased by order of the self-governing bodies and autonomous Diets. Areas shall be considered as having a mixed population where a national minority constitutes up to five per cent of the population.

10. Every national minority of a given self-governing unit that is too small to elect, under proportional representation, one member of the board of education shall be entitled to elect a member with a consultative voice.

11. The proportional share of the funds expended on the cultural and educational needs of the national minorities in a given area shall not be less than the proportional share of the national minorities in the whole population of the given area.

12. A census of the population, with due account of the native language of citizens, shall be carried out every ten years throughout the state, and every five years in regions and areas with a mixed population.

13. All measures by boards of education which in any way infringe the complete equality of nations and languages of the local population or the proportionality of expenditures on cultural and educational needs in conformity with the share of the national minorities in the population, shall be considered non-valid and subject to repeal on a protest of any citizen of the state, regardless of domicile.

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"NEIGHBOURING SQUIRES"

There are certain winged words which most aptly express rather complex phenomena. Among these should undoubtedly be included the statement made by a certain landlord, member of the Right majority in the Duma, in connection with Goremykin's speech during the historic session of April 22.

"*How nice it would be to have squire Goremykin for a neighbour!*"

These words, uttered on the day the workers' and peasants' deputies were ejected from the Duma, are a very useful reminder now that these deputies have resumed their seats. These words admirably describe the force which the democrats have to contend with within the Duma and outside it.

The petty squire who uttered these winged words spoke them in jest but he unwittingly voiced a truth that was more serious and profound than he had intended. Indeed, take the whole of this Fourth Duma, the whole of this majority of Rights and Octobrists, and all the "bigwigs" in the Council of State—what are they all if not "neighbouring squires"?

In Russia 194 privy councillors own 3,103,579 dessiatines of land, an average of over 20,000 dessiatines per privy councillor. And all the big landowners in Russia, numbering less than 30,000, own 70,000,000 dessiatines of land. It is this class that forms the majority in the Duma, in the Council of State and among high government officials, to say nothing of the Zemstvo and local administrations. They are all "neighbouring quires".

In our capitalist age these "neighbouring squires" are increasingly becoming factory owners, distillers, sugar manufacturers, and so forth; they are increasingly becoming shareholders in all kinds of commercial, industrial, financial,

and railway undertakings. The highest nobility are becoming closely interwoven with the big bourgeoisie.

These "neighbouring squires" are the best *class* organisation in Russia, for they are organised, not only as neighbours, not only in associations, but also as a state force. They occupy all the most important institutions in the land, which are fashioned "in their own image", to suit their own "needs" and interests. True, our state system has very important features of its own, attributable to the military history of Russia, and so forth, features which may sometimes displease even the class of the landed gentry. Nevertheless, by and large, the Great-Russian landed gentry set a splendid pattern of class organisation!

Our bourgeoisie make little use of this pattern. They dare not think, for example, of organising *their own* class into a state power. But the proletariat, organising as a class, has never forgotten and never will forget the splendid pattern set by the "neighbouring squires"....

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THE NARODNIKS AND "FACTIONAL COERCION"

The more the working-class movement develops and the greater unity it shows in action, the louder do the intellectualist grouplets, who are isolated from the masses, shout about "factionalism", "Pravdist contagion", "factional blindness", and so forth. These people little suspect that in doing so they are issuing themselves with a *testimonium paupertatis*. What they take for a sort of natural calamity, which can only be loudly bewailed, is really a sign of the maturity and consistency of our working-class movement.

Nothing has exposed the gross falsity of these intellectualist outcries against the workers' "factionalism" so much as the recent open elections of the workers' insurance representatives.

Take the Narodnik newspaper *Mysl Truda*.[146] *After* all the insurance elections in St. Petersburg are over, we read in the issue of that paper for April 20 a ranting article which, with a serious air, argues that on no account must there be any "yielding to the factional coercion [!] of the Pravdists".

Factional coercion! What presumption on the part of this Narodnik paper to make such a demagogic statement!

Just think, reader. Open elections by the workers take place. The workers hold an opinion poll among themselves as to the political trends of the participants. The following unchallenged figures of the political composition of the electors are published for general information: Pravdists 37, liquidators 7, Narodniks 4, and unspecified 5. The workers, naturally, elect a majority of Pravdists. (The minority, too, was represented—the Mensheviks, not the liquidators.) And after this the Narodnik newspaper makes an uproar about "factional coercion".

You are simply making yourselves look ridiculous, Narodnik gentlemen. What you have done is to clearly demonstrate how utterly *meaningless* that threadbare *cliché* "factionalism" is. You have overlooked two simple figures—37 and 4. Only 4 out of 53 worker electors were Narodniks, that is, a mere 7 per cent. Apparently, the Narodniks think the workers ought to elect their representatives not by a majority vote, but by a *minority*. To please the Narodniks, 37 worker electors should have been equated with 4. Thirty-seven equals four—that, strictly speaking, is what the good "non-factional" Narodniks are trying to din into the workers. No wonder the workers cannot make head or tail of this profound Narodnik wisdom.

There is a limit to everything, "non-factional" Narodniks. By shouting about the "factional coercion" of the majority when you have 4 electors out of 53 you are only proving one thing, namely, that you do not respect the will of the majority, that in raving against "factionalism" you are trying to *thwart the will of the vast majority of the workers*. You, and you alone, are actually trying to practice coercion of the overwhelming majority by an insignificant minority.

By pursuing the paltry and unprincipled policy of a coterie that is isolated from the masses, you, with your ranting against "factional coercion", are trying to act upon the workers' nerves and to *extort* from them, by this unbecoming trick, satisfaction of your parochial interests. If there is any "factionalism" of the worst possible kind, it is exemplified in the behaviour of the liquidator and Narodnik circles, who are trying to thwart the will of the workers.

We see the same picture in connection with the insurance elections in so big a centre as *Riga*.

A meeting of the sick benefit societies is held to nominate candidates for the Gubernia Insurance Board. Twenty-one sick benefit societies are represented. There is a sharp struggle of political trends. On one side—the liquidators, Narodniks, non-party people and several trade unions. On the other—the Pravdists. Lots of speakers from both sides take the floor. In the end the Pravdist list of candidates receives 44 votes, while the bloc of all the others receives 20. (These figures are from the same source—*Mysl*

Truda No. 2.) The Pravdists thus have a majority of over two-thirds.

After this the Narodniks again start their plaint about "factionalism" and "factional coercion".

Notice the word-juggling. The Narodniks, as we know, have never been a *section* of Social-Democracy. The Narodniks and the Social-Democrats have always been *two* separate *parties*, with programmes, tactics and organisations o~ their own. The struggle between the Social-Democrats and the Narodniks is a struggle between political *parties*, not a struggle between sections of a party. "Factionalism" has nothing to do with it.

It is clear enough that in vociferating against "factionalism" the liquidators and "conciliators" are merely playing into the hands of the *enemies* of the workers' party, are merely sowing chaos and disunity, are confusing terms, and bamboozling the workers

The outcry against "factionalism" has become a system. The enemies of the Marxists are deliberately using it to bamboozle the workers. When some decision adopted by the workers is not to the liking of some intellectual or group of intellectuals, the outcry is raised, "Help! 'Factionalism'! Help! 'Factional coercion'!"

You will astonish nobody with that sort of thing, gentlemen. When the splitter and liberal, F. D., in *Severnaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta*[147] calls God to witness in every other line that he is for "unity"; when Trotsky in his superintellectual highbrow mouthpiece rants about "factional emancipation"; when the petty-bourgeois quasi-socialists of *Mysl Truda* asseverate that they stand for unity, the workers tell them: whoever stands for true unity of the working-class movement must submit to the majority of the class-conscious workers and not dare oppose the Marxist programme and Marxist tactics.

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CORRUPTING THE WORKERS WITH REFINED NATIONALISM

The more strongly the working-class movement develops the more frantic are the attempts by the bourgeoisie and the feudalists to suppress it or break it up. Both these methods—suppression by force and disintegration by bourgeois influence—are constantly employed all over the world, in all countries, and one or another of these methods is adopted alternately by the different parties of the ruling classes.

In Russia, particularly after 1905, when the more intelligent members of the bourgeoisie realised that brute force alone was ineffective, all sorts of "progressive" bourgeois parties and groups have been more and more often resorting to the method of *dividing* the workers by advocating different bourgeois ideas and doctrines designed to weaken the struggle of the working class.

One such idea is refined nationalism, which advocates the division and splitting up of the proletariat on the most plausible and specious pretexts, as for example, that of protecting the interests of "national culture", "national autonomy, or independence", and so on, and so forth.

The class-conscious workers fight hard against *every kind* of nationalism, both the crude, violent, Black-Hundred nationalism, and that most refined nationalism which preaches the equality of nations *together* with ... the *splitting up* of the workers' cause, the workers' organisations and the working-class movement *according to* nationality. Unlike all the varieties of the nationalist bourgeoisie, the class-conscious workers, carrying out the decisions of the recent (summer 1913) conference of the Marxists, stand, not only for the most complete, consistent and fully applied *equality*

of nations and languages, but also for the *amalgamation* of the workers of the different nationalities in *united* proletarian organisations of every kind.

Herein lies the fundamental distinction between the national programme of Marxism and that of any bourgeoisie, be it the most "advanced".

Recognition of the equality of nations and languages is important to Marxists, not only because they are the most consistent democrats. The interests of proletarian solidarity and comradely unity in the workers' class struggle call for the fullest equality of nations with a view to removing every trace of national distrust, estrangement, suspicion and enmity. And full equality implies the repudiation of all privileges for any one language and the recognition of the *right* of self-determination for all nations.

To the bourgeoisie, however, the demand for national equality very often amounts in practice to advocating national exclusiveness and chauvinism; they very often couple it with *advocacy* of the division and estrangement of nations. This is *absolutely* incompatible with proletarian *internationalism*, which advocates, not only *closer relations* between nations, but the *amalgamation* of the workers of all nationalities in a given state in *united* proletarian organisations. That is why Marxists emphatically condemn so-called "cultural-national autonomy", i.e., the idea that educational affairs should be *taken out* of the hands of the state and transferred to the *respective* nationalities. This plan means that in questions of "national culture" educational affairs are to be split up in *national associations* according to the nationalities in the given state federation, each with its own *separate* Diet, educational budgets, school boards, and educational institutions.

This is a plan of refined nationalism, which corrupts and divides the working class. To this plan (of the Bundists, liquidators and Narodniks, i.e., of the various petty-bourgeois groups), the Marxists contrapose the principle of complete equality of nations and languages and go to the extent of denying the necessity of an official language; at the same time they advocate the closest possible relations between the nations, uniform *state* institutions for all nations, uniform school boards, a uniform education policy

(secular education!) and the unity of the workers of the different nations in the struggle against the *nationalism of every national bourgeoisie*, a nationalism which is presented in the form of the slogan "national culture" for the purpose of deceiving simpletons.

Let the petty-bourgeois nationalists—the Bundists, the liquidators, the Narodniks and the writers for *Dzvin*—openly advocate their principle of refined bourgeois nationalism; that is their right. But they should not try to fool the workers, as Madam V. O.[148] does, for example, in issue No. 35 of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, where she assures her readers that *Za Pravdu* is *opposed* to instruction in schools being given in the native languages!

That is gross slander. The Pravdists not only recognise this right, but are *more consistent* in recognising it than anyone else. The Pravdists, who identified themselves with the conference of Marxists, which declared that *no compulsory official language was necessary*, were the *first* in Russia to recognise *fully* the right to use the native language!

It is crass ignorance to confuse instruction in the native language with "dividing educational affairs within a single state according to nationality", with "cultural-national autonomy", with "taking educational affairs out of the hands of the state".

Nowhere in the world are Marxists (or even democrats) opposed to instruction being conducted in the native language. And *nowhere in the world* have Marxists adopted the programme of "cultural-national autonomy"; Austria is the *only* country in which it *was proposed*.

The example of Finland, as quoted by Madam V. O., is an argument against herself, for in that country the *equality of nations and languages* (which we recognise unreservedly and more consistently than anybody) is recognised and carried out, but *there is no question there about taking educational affairs out of the hands of the state*, about separate national associations to deal with all educational affairs, about partitioning up the school system of a country with national barriers, and so forth.

Put Pravdy No. 82,
May 10, 1914
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the text in *Put Pravdy*

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The present political situation in Russia is marked by the growth of the strike movement in general, as well as by an increase in the number of political strikes (for example, May 1st strikes), and by the growth of the Pravdist trend among the workers (the Insurance Board elections in the two capitals, and the election of the All-Russia Insurance Board provided additional proof of this).

The connection between the nature of the working-class movement and the trend which the overwhelming majority of class-conscious workers have recognised as *their own* is obvious and requires no special explanation.

Another feature of the present political situation is the fact that a "Left bloc" is taking exceptionally clear and distinct shape, i.e., the emergence of joint action by proletarian and bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks and liquidators) against both the Purishkeviches and treacherous bourgeois liberalism. The obstruction organised by the Left in the Duma, and the suspension of the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks by the votes of the Rights, the Octobrists and a section of the Progressists, with the Cadets *abstaining from voting*, have clearly shown what this "Left bloc" is. Proletarian democrats have not weakened their independence by a jot, nor have they retreated from their proletarian, Pravdist line. The only ones to support this line against the liberals have been the Trudoviks and liquidators, although they both often waver and incline towards the liberals.

Lastly, the present political situation is marked by vacillation and discontent among the bourgeois classes. This was expressed in the speeches and resolutions of the Commercial and Industrial Congress. They revealed obvious discon-

tent with the government, and an obvious mood of opposition.

This also found expression in the anti-Cabinet motion adopted in the Duma by the Octobrists—the Zemstvo people and the liberals—during the debate on the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior. Jubilant at the Octobrists having adopted "their" point of view, the Cadets forget to add that they themselves had adopted the *Octobrist* point of view!

The resolution adopted by the Fourth Duma expresses a quite definite counter-revolutionary and imperialist point of view. In this resolution the government's policy is condemned because

> "administrative tyranny all over the country is causing discontent and unrest among large, tranquil [i.e., bourgeois reactionary and landlord] sections of the population, and is thereby stimulating the rise and growth of anti-government tendencies".

The Octobrists are referring to democracy. The Cadets have again and again publicly renounced democracy. So much the better, for they never have been, and never can be, democrats; they merely deceived democracy when they undertook to represent it. Democracy in Russia cannot take a single step forward unless it sees through the bourgeois liberal frauds perpetrated by the Cadets.

To sum up.

Continued growth of the working-class movement. Greater unity between the majority of the workers and Pravdism.

Definite emergence of a "Left bloc", expressed in joint action by proletarian and bourgeois democrats (Trudoviks and liquidators) against the Rights and against the Cadets.

Disintegration, vacillation, mutual distrust and discontent within the Third of June system, among the landlords and reactionary bourgeoisie. "They" accuse one another—the Purishkeviches accuse the liberals, and the liberals the Purishkeviches—of encouraging and accelerating the new revolution.

Such is the situation.

Put Pravdy No. 85,
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WORKERS' UNITY AND INTELLECTUALIST "TRENDS"

In the course of their movement's progress, the class-conscious workers constantly look back on the road this movement has travelled and constantly consider whether it is the right one, and whether it can possibly be improved.

Of all the classes in Russia, not a single one, not even the educated and wealthy bourgeoisie, discusses its tactics, that is, the direction and the methods of its movement, so outspokenly, clearly, and as far as possible openly as the working class does. Only people who are shallow-minded or who fear the participation of the broad masses in politics can think that the open and heated controversies over tactics that are constantly to be seen in the working-class press are inappropriate or unnecessary. As a matter of fact, it is these heated controversies that help and teach all the workers to discuss their own, labour, policy from every angle, and to evolve a firm, distinct and definite class line for the movement.

The workers employed at the Stationery Office recently gave a very convincing demonstration of what the attitude of the class-conscious workers is, and should be, towards controversies over tactics,

In *Put Pravdy* No. 68, they wrote: "We wish to point out to comrades in the Stationery Office who responded to the call of the supporters of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, and made equal collections for both newspapers in the belief that this was a step towards unity, that we consider this step wrong, one that will not lead to the unity of the working-class movement, but, on the contrary, will put off

the day when the workers will unite under the single banner of Marxism. Let us take the following example. Let us assume that two men are arguing heatedly over a question that concerns us, that this argument annoys us, and we want to put a stop to it. What should we do under the circumstances? Clearly, we should ascertain which of the two is in the right and take his side; the one who is wrong will then see that he is mistaken, or, if he does not see his mistake, will peter out and stop arguing. But if we support and encourage both disputants, the argument will never cease."

This is what the workers of the Stationery Office wrote, Their simple explanation, which every worker understands, is unassailable.

"Equal" assistance or the desire to merge, or "unite, *all* trends" (which, incidentally, is what Duma sympathisers with liquidationism are saying) actually amounts to a desire to order the workers about from outside in the belief that the workers themselves are unable to "grasp these things". Any little group of intellectuals can publish a pamphlet or a paltry journal, and proclaim themselves a "trend", as, for example, the group of the anti-Marxist philosopher Bogdanov, or Trotsky's group, or N. N. Himmer's, which vacillates between the Narodniks and the Marxists, and so forth.

There are any number of "trends", and the workers are told: help them all "equally", recognise "*all trends*"!

Naturally, any worker who is at all class-conscious will ask: What is the argument about? About *my* struggle? About *my* policy and tactics? About *my* Party?

If so, then I will work it all out for myself, gentlemen, and I will proclaim as *my own* only those tactics I approve of and agree with.

This is as clear as daylight.

It is only because there is no free press in Russia and because there are still lots of workers (especially in the provinces) who have seen one or another working-class newspaper for the first time and are as yet quite "unable to grasp" the problems of working-class policy—it is only because of this that it is possible in Russia for the intellectuals to try to run the workers by appealing

to them to recognise "all trends" and to assist them "equally"

In the market-place it often happens that the vendor who shouts loudest and calls God to witness is the one with the shoddiest goods for sale.

In the market-place of intellectualist fuss and bustle it often happens that those who shout loudest against running the workers are the very intellectuals who try to do so and proclaim the formation of a countless number of anti-Marxist and anti-proletarian "trends".

Take St. Petersburg. No man in his right mind can deny that, compared with the provinces, the workers in St. Petersburg are more cultured and intelligent, more accustomed to and capable of independently "grasping" all questions connected with the theory of Marxism and the practice of the working-class movement.

What do we find there?

The St. Petersburg workers did *grasp* the question, and recognised the *Pravdist* trend as the right one.

The overwhelming majority of the workers in St. Petersburg declared in favour of Pravdism and proved by action that they recognise *only* this "trend" as *their own*.

In the provinces the Pravdists preponderate to a lesser extent, but even so they still do preponderate. This has been proved during the last two years by the facts about the workers' groups, facts which are "unpalatable" to the opponents of Pravdism, but which remain facts for all that.

The majority of class-conscious workers discussed the question, weighed the arguments for and against the various tactics, and recognised the Pravdist tactics as *their own*. Attempts to thwart and to disrupt the unity and will of this majority of workers are now being made by the founders of the intellectualist "trends" of liquidationism, Trotskyism (*Borba*), the mixture of Narodism and Marxism (Mr. Himmer's *Sovremennik*[149]), and others.

We are convinced that all these intellectualist "trends", preaching anti-Marxist ideas or urging concessions to them, will fall to the ground upon impact with the class-consciousness and the will of the advanced Marxist workers. The example of St. Petersburg confirms our conviction.

It is highly amusing to hear the intellectualist founders of groups and "trends" that are trying to disrupt the unity of the workers vociferating about "unity". They are against unity of the workers, which has been achieved in fact, and are for unity of the intellectualist trends, which is promised in word.

Put Pravdy No. 85,
May 13, 1914

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THE LEFT NARODNIKS

The Left Narodniks in *Stoikaya Mysl* No. 20, and the Narodniks in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 4, have attacked the Narodnik *Russkiye Vedomosti* for having declared in favour of the freedom of mobilisation, i.e., the purchase, sale, and mortgaging of allotment land.

This question is interesting because it strikingly confirms the Marxist appraisal of the extremely backward and reactionary character of Narodnik theory. The practical significance of this question is another reason for us to deal with it.

In a society in which commodity production prevails, every small farmer is inevitably and increasingly drawn into the sphere of *exchange* and becomes increasingly dependent on the *market*, not only the local and national, but the *world* market as well. Each day of economic progress throughout the world, each mile of new railway laid, each new rural worker who migrates to the town or goes to work in a factory in search of "earnings", each new agricultural machine that is introduced, in short, literally each step in world economic life draws the most remote localities into the sphere of exchange. Millions and millions of phenomena observed day by day prove that production for exchange, commodity production, capitalism, are growing in all parts of the world, and all countries without exception. That production for exchange and simple commodity production are evolving into capitalism is another phenomenon confirmed by millions and millions of daily economic observations in every village, in every trade, and in every handicraft.

Clearly, every peasant who finds himself in this *milieu* of world economy is a *commodity producer* and with every

day becomes more and more dependent on the market, selling his products, buying implements of production and articles of consumption, hiring labourers, or hiring himself out as a labourer. Under these circumstances, since land is private property, freedom to buy, sell and mortgage land is an essential condition for the development of capitalism. Attempts to restrict this freedom can lead to nothing except a thousand and one devices for evading the law, to a thousand and one obstacles in the form of red tape and bureaucracy, to the *deterioration* of the conditions of the peasants. Attempts to check world capitalism by means of laws or regulations restricting freedom to mobilise the land are just as witless as are attempts to stop a train by means of a wattle fence. To defend such attempts means defending serf bondage, stagnation and *decay* in the rural areas.

Anyone who has learnt the ABC of political economy knows that Russia is undergoing a change-over from the system of serf-ownership to capitalism.

There is *no* "third" system of national economy in Russia. Both the serf-owning system and capitalism signify the exploitation of labour; *in this sense both* systems signify "the noose and bondage". But the characteristic features of the serf-owning system are: age-long stagnation, downtrodden and ignorant toilers, and a low level of labour productivity. The characteristic features of capitalism are: very rapid economic and social development, an enormous increase in the productivity of labour, elimination of the slave mentality among the toilers and the awakening of their ability to unite and to take an intelligent part in the affairs of life.

Hence, to call capitalism a noose and bondage, and at the same time to *advocate*, as the Narodniks do, *retarding* the development of capitalism, means, *in fact*, defending the survivals of serfdom, barbarism and stagnation.

Marxists have always called and will always call the Left Narodniks "socialist-reactionaries", for advocating restrictions to the freedom of mobilisation.

We advise class-conscious workers to give battle to the Left Narodniks and all other kinds of Narodniks, precisely on this question! It can safely be said that the Left Narodniks will be backed by dotards, who, in addition to defending

restrictions to the freedom of mobilisation, defend belief in the devil, servility, flogging, cohabitation with daughters-in-law, and "instructing" the womenfolk with a cudgel.

We, on the other hand, will have the backing of the entire fresh and literate young generation, who do not believe in devils. It is sufficient to quote just one passage from Mr. Peshekhonov to have this generation treat such people in the way they deserve.

"I said," writes Mr. Peshekhonov, "that the peasants are not able to make sufficiently sensible use of mortgage loans. And this, of course, is quite understandable, since labour economy does not permit it...."

The peasants are not "sensible", if you please! The feudalists and liberal government officials are "able", if you please, to decide *for* the peasant!

This, then is the interesting, practical, small but plain question that concerns us closely. This is the sort of question on which the Left-Narodnik gentlemen should be ridiculed at every meeting attended by alert and politically-conscious peasants.

"Labour" economy is the empty, sentimental catchword of the intellectual. Every peasant knows perfectly well that you cannot live without buying and selling. This simple fact scatters to the winds all talk about "labour" economy.

* * *

The Left Narodniks throw dust in the eyes of the "muzhik" by confusing the question of freedom of mobilisation with the advocacy of "taking the land out of commodity circulation and converting it into public property" (*Stoikaya Mysl* No. 20).

In the first place, only crass ignoramuses can be unaware of the fact that "converting the land into public property" does *not* mean taking the land out of commodity circulation, *but the opposite*; it means *drawing it into* that circulation more freely and rapidly, and on a larger scale.

Learn the political economy of Marx, Messrs. the "socialist-reactionaries"!

Secondly, as Marx demonstrated and proved, the *radical* bourgeoisie can put forward, and have often put forward,

the demand for the "conversion of the land into public property". This cannot be disputed. But only a conservative bourgeois, not a radical, can think that this conversion can be facilitated by the advocacy of *feudal* restrictions to the freedom of mobilisation.

As long as land is private property, any constraints imposed upon its mobilisation are harmful and reactionary. There is no way of achieving the ideals of labour democracy other than by ensuring the most rapid elimination of the traces of serfdom and the most rapid development of capitalism.

* * *

Marxists have always said and now repeat that the peasants' democratic views must be *divested of feudal* survivals. The Narodniks deserve support *only insofar* as they oppose serfdom and support democracy. But insofar as they defend oppression and backwardness, petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness and selfishness, they are the greatest of reactionaries.

Put Pravdy No. 86,
May 14, 1914

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THE LIQUIDATORS AND MALINOVSKY'S BIOGRAPHY

In their numerous articles concerning Malinovsky's resignation,[150] the liquidators assert, among other slanderous things, that Malinovsky was brought into prominence only by the "splitting activities" of the Pravdists, that Malinovsky was a political "weathercock", and so on and so forth.

Below we quote, word for word, an *editorial* article in the liquidationist newspaper *Luch*, which the liquidators published the day after Malinovsky was elected to the Duma, i.e., at a time when the liquidators did not yet have to stoop to foul lies in their struggle against their opponents.

The following is the full text of the article (*Luch*, October 28, 1912, No. 37):

R. V. MALINOVSKY
(Deputy representing the Moscow workers)

The deputy elected by the workers of the Moscow Gubernia is Roman Malinovsky, former secretary of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union. In his person the Social-Democratic group in the Duma acquires for the first time a prominent practical worker in the trade union movement, who in the grim years of reaction played an active part in the legal working-class organisations.

Malinovsky has been a member of the Union since its foundation on May 1, 1906. At the beginning of 1907 he was elected Secretary of the Union and held that responsible post continuously until November 1909, when he was arrested at a preliminary meeting of the first workers' delegation to the Temperance Congress. Deportation from St. Petersburg interrupted his activities in the Union, but he continued to maintain ideological contact with the organisation

The years of Malinovsky's secretaryship was a period in the life of the Union in which it had to contend, not only with severe external conditions, but also with the apathy of the workers themselves. Malinovsky's personal example served as an effective weapon against this "internal enemy".

His energy seemed inexhaustible. He undertook the responsible task of leading a strike with the same ardour as he carried out the painstaking work of organisation.

And, what is most important, Malinovsky always strove to link up this day-by-day work with the general tasks of the working-class movement in the struggle around the problems of the day, never losing sight of the ultimate aim.

Trade union work took up a great deal of Malinovsky's time and energies, but his activities did not end there. In one degree or another he has participated in all the workers' actions of the past few years. He represented the St. Petersburg workers at the Co-operative Congress in Moscow in 1908. At Easter 1909, he represented the St. Petersburg metalworkers at the First Congress of Factory Panel Doctors, where he read a paper on old age and disability insurance. The metalworkers also elected him their delegate to the Temperance Congress, but his arrest prevented him from attending.

In Moscow Malinovsky's activities have of necessity been more restricted. But here, too, he has not been idle; he took an active part in the preparations for the Second Congress of Factory Panel Doctors, and at one time was closely associated with the workers' co-operative movement, etc.

The new Moscow deputy has always shown a lively interest in the political working-class movement too.

In his convictions he is a Bolshevik. But this did not prevent him in 1908, when, after the London Congress, the Bolsheviks tried to secure Party representation on the executives of the trade unions, from opposing his political friends for the sake of unity of the trade union movement. It did not prevent him at the First Congress of Factory Panel Doctors from protesting against the disruptive conduct of the Moscow Bolsheviks in the interests of unity of the workers' delegation.

There is every reason to believe that the activities of the new workers' deputy will be as fruitful in the political field as they have been in the trade union movement.

Such were the complimentary terms in which the *liquidators themselves wrote about the Bolshevik Malinovsky two years ago*. Could they have written otherwise, considering the work that Malinovsky was doing in the sight of all the workers? *Even* the liquidators, who at that time were already his political opponents, could not but treat him with profound respect. They spoke of his preceding activities, which had already brought him to the fore, in terms that were most flattering to Malinovsky. They held him up as an example to others There was not a word about his being a "weathercock". Nor was the fairy-tale yet invented that he had been returned to the Duma as a candidate of liquidationist "unity".

A fortnight later the first meeting of the united Social-Democratic group in the Duma was held. The liquidators themselves unanimously elected Malinovsky as the vice-chairman of the group, in exactly the same way as they had previously supported his candidacy as chairman of workers' delegations to public congresses (the Congress of Factory Panel Doctors, for example), and so forth. After the Duma elections, the most prominent member of the August bloc (the pillar of today's journal *Borba*) wrote letters to Malinovsky couched in the most flattering terms, in which he all but called him a future Bebel.

But when it was discovered that Malinovsky sharply opposed liquidationism, when he took a step which he himself shortly afterwards had to admit was a profoundly erroneous one, the liquidators poured upon the ex-deputy, upon whom they had previously showered their praise, the filthiest slander they could collect in the garbage heaps of the Black-Hundred newspapers.

Everybody knows that with his political background and talents Malinovsky could have played an important role in any political group, and that the liquidators would have honoured him had he associated himself with them. But the liquidators are not ashamed to say that Malinovsky was pushed into the forefront by the "split".

It makes one *blush with shame* to see people using a man's private misfortune in their struggle against a hostile political trend. We have no desire to compare Malinovsky with Khrustalev[151]; but what would the liquidators have said, after what happened to Khrustalev, had their political opponents made the fate of this one man an excuse for discrediting Menshevism, and "used" the Khrustalev case against the entire Menshevik trend? And yet it is common knowledge that Khrustalev was a Menshevik, that he was their prominent representative at the London Congress, in the press, and so forth. It is common knowledge that at one time the Mensheviks were proud of Khrustalev.

The Pravdists have no lack of political opponents; but *not a single* hostile newspaper—with the exception, perhaps, of the Dubrovinites and Purishkevich's paper—has sunk so low as the liquidationist newspaper has sunk these days. Even the liberals have behaved far more decently.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

To hurl the most incredible insults at an opponent and then to end up with a long-winded appeal for ... unity with this very slandered opponent—such are the mean, canting and despicable tactics of all these Martovs and Dans.

Their disgusting conduct in connection with Malinovsky's resignation should open the eyes even of the blind.

Rabochy No. 2,
May 22, 1914
Signed: *Pravdist*

Published according to
the text in *Rabochy*

TWO PATHS

In an article which attracted the attention of the class-conscious workers, An, leader of the Caucasian liquidators, recently announced that he disagreed with *Luch* and its successors, disagreed with their *opportunist* tactics.

This statement implies the *break-up* of the "August bloc", a fact no subterfuges or tricks can refute.

At present, however, we wish to draw the readers' attention to something else, namely, to An's argument about Russia's two paths of development. He writes:

> "*Luch* bases its tactic on the possibility of reform, it aims at reform. *Pravda* bases its tactic on a 'storm', it aims at a break-up."

From this An draws the conclusion that the two tactics have to be united. This conclusion is wrong. It is not a Marxist conclusion.

Let us examine the matter.

By what is Russia's *path*, the nature and speed of her development, determined?

By the alignment of social forces, by the resultant of the class struggle.

That is obvious.

What social forces operate in Russia? What is the line of the class struggle?

Russia is a capitalist country; she cannot but develop capitalistically. Russia is now undergoing a bourgeois-democratic transformation, a release from the serf-owning system, emancipation. Under conditions of world capitalism Russia's emancipation is inevitable. What we do not yet know is the resultant of the social forces that are working towards emancipation. These forces, in the main, are: 1) bourgeois monarchist liberalism (the capitalists and some of the landlords of the Progressist, Cadet and partly Octo-

brist parties); 2) the bourgeois democrats (the peasantry, urban petty bourgeois, intellectuals, and so on); 3) the proletariat.

Each of these classes acts—we take only the action of the masses, of course—in line with the economic position of the given class. There can be *only one* resultant.

In what sense, then, can we speak of Russia's two paths? Only in the sense that, until the outcome of the struggle, we do not and shall not know this resultant, which will approach *one of the two* simplest and clearest lines visible at once to everybody. The first line is "reform", the second a "storm".

Reform is the name given to changes which leave the power in the country in the hands of the old ruling class. Changes of the opposite order are called "storms". The class interests of bourgeois liberalism demand *only* reforms, since the bourgeoisie is more afraid of "storms" than of reaction, and wishes to keep the old feudalist institutions (the bureaucracy, two chambers, and so on) as protection against the workers. The peasantry in all countries of the world without exception, Russia included, vacillates, in the matter of bourgeois-democratic reform, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Such vacillation is inevitable, since the peasants are opposed to the landlords and serfdom while themselves being petty proprietors and petty bourgeois.

As for the proletariat, its interests, which coincide with those of the vast majority of the population, of all the exploited, move in a direction that is *not* reformist, along a path which is described in Russia as that of the "three pillars".

If the majority of the peasants and the population follow the liberals, the "path" will be the worst, the least advantageous to the workers and the exploited, and the most painful to them. If the majority of the peasants and the population follow the workers, the reverse will be the case. One resultant or the other will be fully revealed only by the final outcome of the struggle.

We now see the true implications of An's vague and confused argument. He has sensed rather than understood the liquidators' opportunism and their betrayal of the working class.

The liquidators are reformists. They pursue, in effect, a *liberal-labour*, not a Marxist workers' policy. They are trying to subordinate the workers to the bourgeoisie.

The Pravdists are pursuing a Marxist and proletarian policy by defending the interests of the working class in the matter of transforming Russia. Do the Pravdists overlook the possibilities of reform? This question is easily answered by referring to the facts. Take insurance reform, which is something real, and not dreamt up. Everyone sees that the Pravdists seized on this ten times more strongly than the liquidators did: see *Voprosy Strakhovania*[152] and the results of the elections to the All-Russia Insurance Board.

Take the "partial demands" of the economic struggle during strikes. Everyone knows that the Pravdists are conducting this real and not dreamt-up campaign a thousand times more intensely and energetically.

If there were a group that denied the use of reforms and partial improvements, we *could not* join it, because that would be a non-Marxist policy, a policy harmful to the workers.

Neither could we join the liquidators, because repudiation and abuse of the "underground", repudiation and relegation of the two "pillars", the advocacy in present-day Russia of a struggle for a legal party and the possibility of political reforms—all this is a betrayal of the working class, desertion to the bourgeoisie.

The Pravdists, in the words of An, "aim at a storm and break-up" but, as the facts show, miss no opportunity, however slight, of supporting real reforms and partial improvements and explaining to the masses the sham of reformism. This is the only correct, the only truly Marxist tactic, and that is why it has been adopted by the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers throughout Russia (this has been proved by the facts, by the number of workers' groups).

Only adherents of petty-bourgeois democracy, the Narodniks and the liquidators, are vainly fighting against the workers, against Pravdism.

Rabochy No. 3,
May 24, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Rabochy*

PLEKHANOV, WHO KNOWS NOT WHAT HE WANTS

Plekhanov, as we know, has often found himself in an awkward fix on questions of tactics and organisation. During the past eleven years (since the autumn of 1903, when he went over from the Bolsheviks to the Mensheviks) he has repeatedly and comically made a muddle of these questions.

He is beginning to get muddled again, a sad circumstance we feel obliged to acquaint our readers with. But first of all, we will recall the great service that Plekhanov rendered during the difficult years (1909-11). He praised the "underground" and staunchly supported the Party decisions on combating liquidationism. He exposed the opportunism of the liquidators and their revival of Economism (a bourgeois trend in Marxism in 1894-1902). He showed that, by repudiating the "underground", the liquidators were betraying the Party. He quite rightly explained that "Mr. Potresov" was a Judas, and that the apostles were stronger *without* Judas than *with* him.

These were clear, definite and integral ideas, fully in keeping with the decisions of 1908 and 1910.

But look at Plekhanov's new *volte-face*. In the newspaper *Yedinstvo*[153] he now denounces the Pravdists for their "factionalism" and "usurpation", and asserts that we have "not one working-class press but two".

This is not very literate, but the meaning is clear. A liquidationist newspaper is declared a working-class newspaper! Fancy that! And yet this, selfsame Plekhanov had argued that the resolution declaring liquidationism to be a manifestation of *bourgeois influence on the proletariat* was a correct one.

It is useless for Plekhanov to try to forget this. The workers will only ridicule such forgetfulness.

The liquidationist press is *not* a workers' press, but one that serves as a vehicle of *bourgeois influence on the proletariat*. This has been definitely and clearly stated in the decision of the "entire Marxist body",[154] and the liquidators are to this day strikingly corroborating it (see, for example, the concordant remarks of Bulkin and Martov *against* the "underground" in *Nasha Zarya*, 1914, No. 3).

What is the meaning of Plekhanov's appeals for unity with the liquidators? Unity with the group of publicists who repudiate the "underground" in true Potresov style? To advocate such unity one must *advocate repudiation of the "underground"*!

Plekhanov has got into such a muddle that he does not know where he stands.

The liquidators have made it abundantly clear in *Nasha Zarya*, in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (run by F. D. and L. M.) and through the agency of Chkheidze and Co., that they *stand their ground*, i.e., they defend Potresov and tolerate abuse of the "underground". They defend the idea of a legal workers' party.

But Plekhanov condemns liquidationism as a crime against the Party while at the same time advocating "unity" with the liquidators.

We can only smile at this.

The Pravdists warmly welcome all workers who really want to recognise the "form" which Potresov rejects; as for the empty phrases about "unity" with the opponents of the "underground", they regard them as empty phrases from people who know not what they want.

The Pravdists calmly meet the charge of being "usurpers" by saying: Does not one who is fond of declaiming, who is fond of phrases and dreads the *facts*, resemble a usurper and impostor? Plekhanov lives abroad; why is he so modestly reticent about the fact that from August 1912 to May 1914 the liquidators have *not* published *a single issue* of their newspaper abroad? *Neither* have they published *a single* factual reference to "organisations" which Plekhanov too has defended.

The opponents of the liquidators, however, have published a number of *factual* references to *all* localities in Russia, *in a number* of issues.

Plekhanov says nothing about these facts, because the facts refute his phrases.

Take the openly verifiable data published in Russia. During two full years, 1912 and 1913, the Pravdists *united* (and proved this by group collections) *2,801* workers' groups; the liquidators united *750*. If we add 1914, from February 1 to May 6 (preliminary estimate), we shall have *5,302* as against *1,382*.

The Pravdists have a majority of about *four-fifths*!

Naturally, the only thing that people who *dread* the facts can do is to keep on uttering phrases.

Around the precise and clear decisions, thrice supplemented and verified by the representatives of the workers (in January 1912 and in February and the summer of 1913), the Pravdists *united* four-fifths of the class-conscious workers in Russia. These decisions have been amplified in hundreds of articles and have been put into effect.

Now these are not phrases, not fables, not anecdotes about goitres and savages (Plekhanov is still retailing old jokes!) but *facts*. This is *real unity*, unity of the *workers*, who have tested *their* tactics by experience.

To slightingly call these tactics "Leninist"—tactics which have been approved by thousands of workers—is only a compliment to Lenin, but it does not do away with the *5,000* workers' groups, with their unity, or with their Party.

The catchwords "factionalism", "fragmentation", "disintegration", and so forth, apply to Plekhanov and his present-day friends. Look at the list of contributors to the intellectualist Narodnik journal *Sovremennik*, published on page 1 of Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo*. Here we have Himmer and Co. who preach *anti-Marxist* ideas. Plekhanov was right when he described them as the ideas of "*socialist-reactionaries*". Here we have the god-builders and Machists: Bogdanov, Bazarov and Lunacharsky. Here we have the liquidators: Dan, Martov and Cherevanin (for some reason Potresov, mentioned in No. 66 of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, is missing from the list). Here also we have the liberal Bogucharsky, and so forth.

And in this *Sovremennik*, which lacks the faintest trace of anything working-class, Mr. Himmer openly boasts that

Plekhanov is in favour of unity with him! *But Plekhanov is silent.*

Is it not time to doff the mask, before the workers tear it off, perhaps rudely! Among intellectualist *anti-Marxist* circles, among the flotsam of bourgeois democracy—this is where poor Plekhanov has accidentally landed. This is where you will find chaos, disintegration and tiny factions, which are opposing the unity achieved in the course of two years by thousands of workers' groups of the Pravdist trend.

We are sorry for Plekhanov. Considering the struggle he waged against the opportunists, Narodniks, Machists and liquidators, he deserves a better fate. We shall, however, continue to build up the unity of the workers' groups—already built to the extent of four-fifths—which pursue definite tactics tested by experience.

We shall accept anybody and everybody who renounces liquidationism; the door is not locked.

With the example of Trotsky's *Borba* and Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* before our eyes, we shall show the deplorable and ridiculous vacillations of the intellectualist grouplets which, cut off from the working-class movement, keep on vacillating, swing to one side one day and to the other side the next, from the weak-kneed intellectual Potresov to the weak-kneed intellectual Himmer.

This is a sad spectacle, but one that is inevitable in a petty-bourgeois country in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic transformations.

Rabochy No. 4,
May 25, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Rabochy*

THE ESTIMATES OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE[155]

Our government considers its new agrarian policy—that of stepping up the destruction of the village communes by means of the rural superintendents[156] and of encouraging the *otrub* system—a highly effective weapon in its struggle against the revolution. Already in 1906, soon after the revolution, the Council of the United Nobility[157] called upon the government to introduce private landownership among the peasantry so as to create, as quickly as possible, a class of rich peasants that would side with the landlords against the peasant masses. Stolypin immediately adopted the policy recommended by the Council of the United Nobility. The landlord parties in the Third Duma, the Rights and the Octobrists, whole-heartedly supported this new agrarian policy, which they regarded, not only as an effective means of combating the revolution, but as a great advance towards the European economic system, a step towards eliminating the survivals of serfdom.

As is known, the praises of the new agrarian policy, which is represented as an instrument of "emancipation", have been sung in a thousand different keys in the governmental, Right, and Octobrist press.

It is from this standpoint that I wish, in my speech, to deal with the *principles* underlying the government's policy on the agrarian question. We are told on every hand that the number of land plots "registered" as private property and the number of *otrubs* are increasing. But nothing is said about the extent to which bondage and feudal relations still exist in our rural districts. Yet that is the crux of the matter. We are promised a "European" reform of our backward agriculture, with the class of the feudalist Purishke-

viches retaining full economic and political power. The promises remain promises, but what is the state of affairs in the countryside *today*, *after* all the progress the government boasts of? To what extent are the peasant masses *still* borne down by bondage and feudalist oppression?

To answer this question I shall call to witness a journal whose editor recently won well-merited and enthusiastic praise from *Anthony*, *Bishop of Volhynia himself*, and, of course, from writers like Rozanov of *Novoye Vremya*, who are notoriously reactionary and notoriously ready to serve the government. This is not a "Left" journal, God forbid! It is a journal run by people who have echoed *all* the abuse and vituperation the reactionaries heap on the revolution. It is a journal which stands up stoutly for clericalism and the sanctity of landlord property. You probably guess that I am referring to *Russkaya Mysl*.

This journal, by way of exception, spoke the truth and quoted figures, precise figures, showing the extent to which things like *métayage* and *winter hiring* are practised in Russia. Everybody knows that these are common everyday features in our countryside. But "everybody" prefers to speak about everything under the sun except these everyday features.

"Winter hiring," writes this journal, "is this not absurd in our age, the age of electricity and aeroplanes ? And yet this form of slavery and bondage continues to flourish to this day, like a leech on the body of the nation.... Winter hiring has preserved in all its freshness the feudal term of 'bonded' peasants."

This appraisal of winter hiring is not mine, but that of a journal notorious for its hatred of revolution. Slavery, bondage, serfdom—this is what quite "loyal" people are *compelled* to call "the order of things" existing in our countryside.

In winter hiring:

"the peasant accepts the hardest conditions, as little as a half and a third of the pay he usually receives in spring and summer hiring. In winter he gets paid as much per dessiatine for ploughing (three times) sowing, reaping or mowing, binding, and carting to the threshing shed as he does in summer only for harvesting (reaping and binding)."

How many peasants abide in this state of serfdom, bondage and slavery?

"According to local reports, *in the spring of 1913* the number of 'bonded' households in some villages of the South-West was as much as 48 per cent of the total, in Mogilev Gubernia 52 per cent, and in Chernigov Gubernia 56 per cent."

And this, mind you, refers to the spring of 1913! This is after the harvest of 1912! This was during the alleged sensational successes of the so-called "land organisation", which the government is boasting of and proclaiming from the house-tops!

What else, after that, can you call this notorious "land organisation" but a whited sepulchre, which masks the same old serfdom?

Half the peasant households are "bonded", enslaved through dire poverty. Hunger, hunger even during a good crop year, makes the peasants give their labour in thrall to the landlord in winter for a third of the pay. In practice, this amounts to a continuation of the corvée, of serfdom, because the very essence of serfdom is preserved in the shape of a pauperised, starving, ruined peasant, who, even in the best year, is compelled to till the landlord's land with his poor implements and half-starved animals on terms of "winter hiring".

Let the number of plots registered as private property increase. This may even be a useful measure in regard to those proletarians who will rid themselves of a burden and be freer to fight for liberty and socialism.

But, obviously, no "registrations", no "blessings" of private ownership can help those millions of households, those tens of millions of peasants, who have *nowhere* to go to from the village and are compelled to give themselves in winter in thrall to the landlords.

These peasants are bound to strive towards a transfer of all the landed estates into their hands without payment, for this is the *only* way out for them, the only escape from hopeless enslavement. Communal landownership has nothing to do with it. Both the homesteader and the fullest "individual proprietor" will, like the commune peasant, remain for ever downtrodden slaves if they are unable to make their crop last *longer than St. Nicholas Day** and

* December 6 (old style).—*Ed.*

are compelled to borrow from the landlord on usurious terms.

It is absurd, as far as these tens of millions of peasants are concerned, to speak about the "progress" of farming, about a "rising level of agriculture", about improved methods of working the land, and so forth. What improved methods can there be when dire poverty makes the peasant hire himself out to the landlord at a third of the pay, while in the summer his own grain is spilling because in the summer the police will drag him away to work for the "*squire*" in payment for the advances of grain or money he has had from him!

And the landlord, who advances grain or money for winter hiring, is quite unlike the "European" employer, or any capitalist employer for that matter. He is not an employer, but a usurer or a feudal lord. Improved methods are not only unnecessary under such a "system of farming", but positively *undesirable*. They are both *unnecessary* and *detrimental* to it. A ruined, pauperised, starving peasant with half-starved animals and wretched implements—that is what this landlord system of farming *needs*, a system that is *perpetuating* the backwardness of Russia and the misery of the peasants. With the bulk of the peasant population living under such conditions of serf dependence, these conditions would continue for decades to come, until the peasants liberated themselves from this yoke; for the creation of a small minority of rich "*otrub* farmers", or the establishment of private holdings and their sale by the proletarians, would have no effect whatever on the enslaved position of the peasant masses.

This is what the praisers of the new, Stolypin agrarian policy forget, or rather try to forget, try to obscure and screen. They all sing in chorus that this policy means "progress", but what they *do not say* is that this progress affects a very small minority and is proceeding at a snail's pace, while the *majority* are in the same old state of bondage and serfdom.

The number of *otrub* farmers is increasing, more machines are being imported into Russia, grass cultivation is developing, and the number of co-operative societies in the rural districts is growing. All that is true, defenders of the govern-

ment! But there is the reverse of the medal, which you are trying to conceal. For all this much-vaunted progress, most of the peasants are still in a state of feudal slavery. That is what makes all this "progress" so *meager* and *precarious*; that is what makes famines inevitable; that is what makes the home market so weak and wretched, that is what enables oppression and tyranny to maintain such a firm hold, and that is what *increases* the inevitability of another agrarian revolution, because all the greater is the contradiction between an age of aeroplanes, electricity and automobiles, and "winter hiring" or "métayage".

And here are the *latest* figures on métayage in Russia, given in the journal, approved of by Anthony of Volhynia. The peasants' crops cultivated on the métayer system amounted to 21 per cent of the crops on their own lands in the Central gubernias, to 42 per cent in the Lake gubernias, and to 68 per cent in the North-Western gubernias! The corresponding figures for grass mowing are 50 per cent in the Central gubernias, and 110-185 per cent in the Lake, Trans-Volga and North-Western gubernias!

Thus, métayer haymaking *predominates* over the peasants' own haymaking in *three* vast regions of Russia!

What is the "métayer system"?

"The peasant, using the landlord's land but his own seeds, does all the cultivation and harvesting down to carting the sheaves to the threshing shed, and takes only half the crop for himself. The hay meadows are worked on a "one-third" system, the métayer taking one haycock to every two that go to the landlord."

But that is not all.

"In some cases (especially in Minsk and Chernigov gubernias), the métayer in addition to paying for the land with half the crop, and for the Lay with two-thirds of the crop, *is obliged to work gratis on the owner's farm for one or two weeks, in most cases with his own horse, or with one of his children.*"

What is this if not the corvée, pure and simple? What is this if not the ancient serf system of farming?

There is nothing new in these figures whatever. On the contrary—they reveal to us the hoary past, which has survived in all its monstrous aspects *side by side* with the "new" agrarian policy. Anyone in touch with rural life has long been aware of the existence of this hoary past. Statisticians

and observers of country life have written dozens and hundreds of books about that past. And that hoary past predominates to this day, perpetuating the scandalous backwardness and scandalous tyranny that reign in Russia.

No laws can put a stop to this serfdom so long as the bulk of the land remains the property of the all-powerful landlords. No "private landownership" in place of the "communes" of downtrodden peasants can be of any help.

According to the official statistics on landownership for 1905 published by the Ministry of the Interior *less than 30,000* landlords in European Russia own *seventy million* dessiatines of land.

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UNITY

"The workers are tired of splits. The workers want unity. The workers are disgusted at the fact that the split sometimes even takes the form of brawling...."

Such and similar statements can sometimes be heard from workers.

The workers do need unity. And the important thing to remember is that *nobody* but themselves will "give" them unity, that *nobody can* help them achieve unity. Unity cannot be "promised"—that would be vain boasting, self-deception; unity cannot be "created" out of "agreements" between intellectualist groups. To think so is a profoundly sad, naïve, and ignorant delusion.

Unity must be *won*, and only the workers, the class-conscious workers themselves can win it—by stubborn and persistent effort.

Nothing is easier than to write the word "unity" in yard-long letters, to promise it and to "proclaim" oneself an advocate of unity. In reality, however, unity can be furthered only by the efforts and organisation of the advanced workers, of *all* the class-conscious workers.

Unity without organisation is impossible. Organisation is impossible unless the minority bows to the majority.

These are incontestible truths. Nobody will question them. The only—only!—thing is to put them into effect. That is not easy. That requires effort, perseverance, the solidarity of all class-conscious workers. But without that effort there is no use talking about working-class unity.

The resolution adopted by the Amsterdam International Congress presses for the unity of the workers' parties in all countries.[158] This resolution is correct. It demands the *unity of the workers*, but with us attempts are being made to

substitute for it the *unity of intellectualist groups which refuse to bow to the will of the workers*!

It would be ridiculous, were it not so sad.

During the last two-and-a-half years (since January 1, 1912), the majority of the class-conscious workers all over Russia have, in fact, united around the Pravdist decisions adopted in January 1912, in February 1913 and in the summer of 1913. This is proved by precise figures showing the number of workers' groups in which collections have been made for various newspapers. The various intellectualist groups which cannot find any backing among the mass of the workers may ignore these figures and pass them over in silence, but they cannot do away with them. It only shows that the various intellectualist groups are cut off from the masses of the workers and are *afraid of the truth*.

The number of workers' groups in which collections were made for newspapers in St. Petersburg:

	Pravdist	Liquidationist
For the two full years, 1912 and 1913	2,801	750
For half of 1914 (January 1 to May 13)	2,873	671
Total	5,674	1,421

These figures, which have been published many times and have never been revised or challenged, show that the liquidators have the support of *only one-fifth* of the class-conscious workers (and their figures include *all* their allies; the Caucasians, Trotskyists, Bundists and the Letts; their allies are now *falling away* from them; the Letts *have already done so*).

Thus, four-fifths of the workers have accepted the Pravdist decisions *as their own*, have approved of Pravdism, and *actually* rallied around Pravdism.

Now this is real unity of the *workers*, not of intellectualist groups, unity in deed, not merely in word, unity as a result of two-and-a-half years of effort in the working-class movement all over Russia, not a mere promise of unity.

It is for this unity, for submission to this four-fifths majority of the workers, that we must go on fighting. *There is not*, *nor can there be*, any other way to unity. The workers are not infants to believe that this four-fifths majority will

allow the minority of one-fifth, or intellectuals who have no workers' backing at all, to *flout the will* of the majority of the workers! The very idea is ridiculous and absurd.

Let those who want to abuse the Pravdists and call them "usurpers" do so. Let this abuse unite the liquidators, Plekhanov, Trotsky, the Vperyodists, the Bundists, and anybody else who pleases. This is abuse coming from impotent little groups, who are angry at their own impotence. This clamour for "unity" on the part of impotent little groups, which have cut themselves off from the masses of the workers, is sheer hypocrisy, for *it is they* who are violating unity, it is they who are *flouting the will of the majority by their splitting tactics*.

These groups are striving in vain. Their abuse is not worth taking notice of. The Pravdist workers are building up and will continue to build up the *unity of the workers*, despite all vituperation from angry but impotent intellectualist groups.

Trudovaya Pravda No. 2,
May 30, 1914

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A FOOL'S HASTE IS NO SPEED

A recent issue of *Der Kampf*,[159] the Austrian Social-Democratic monthly, contained a sensational paragraph signed F. A., stating that Eduard Bernstein, leader of the German opportunists, had renounced his revisionist, opportunist views and returned to Marxism.

Revisionism—revision of Marxism—is today one of the chief manifestations, if not the chief, of bourgeois influence on the proletariat and bourgeois corruption of the workers. That is why Eduard Bernstein, the opportunist leader, has won such world-wide notoriety.

And now we are told that Bernstein has returned to Marxism. This piece of news should seem strange to anyone at all familiar with German Social-Democratic literature. *Sozialistische Monatshefte*,* the principal organ of the opportunists, is still published and continues to preach purely bourgeois views which, in effect, amount to a complete betrayal of socialism. And Bernstein continues to be a leading contributor to the journal. What can the matter be?

It appears that Bernstein gave a lecture in Budapest in which, according to a local paper, he renounced revisionism.

F. A., the Austrian author, has proved exceedingly gullible and imprudent in hastening to proclaim to the world that Bernstein has revised his views. But the liquidator V. Levitsky, one of the leading opportunist contributors to the opportunist journal *Nasha Zarya* (the Menshevik Plekhanov has dubbed it the *Russian* "*Socialist Monthly*") has proved more imprudent still: in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (April 3, No. 46) he published a lengthy article under the resonant title of "From Revisionism to Marxism", based *wholly* on F. A.'s report.

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* *Socialist Monthly.—Ed.*

Mr. Levitsky did not even wait for Bernstein's lecture to appear in the press. A fool's haste is no speed.

On learning what world-wide "fame" his Budapest lecture had won, Bernstein wrote a letter to the Brussels Social-Democratic paper *Le Peuple*[160] on April 11 (new style) in which he bluntly declared: "The report in *Der Kampf* is absolutely without foundation. I said nothing new in Budapest and did not recant any of the views expressed in *Premises of Socialism* [Bernstein's chief opportunist work]. The report of my lecture in the Budapest paper simply confused my words with the remarks of the reporter!"

The whole affair proved an ordinary newspaper hoax.

It did, however, reveal the deplorable proneness of some Austrian (only Austrian?) Social-Democrats to *disguise* opportunism and proclaim its disappearance.

Excessive zeal has carried Mr. Levitsky to preposterous lengths. He writes in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*: "With the reversion [?] to Marxism of the father [?] of revisionism, Bernstein, revisionism within the German Social-Democratic movement has been killed for good [!?]."

Every word here is a gem: there has been no reversion, Bernstein is no father, revisionism has not been killed.

"In Russia" the zealous Mr. Levitsky writes, "revisionism has ceased to be a modish doctrine even among the Left Narodniks, who at one time were inclined to fall back on it in their fight against Marxism. Within the Russian Social-Democratic movement revisionism had no influence whatever, despite the attempts of some writers to transplant it to Russian soil."

Every word here is an untruth. On *all* major issues the Left Narodniks even now "fall back on" the revisionist "doctrines". That is proved by every issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and *Zavety*, by every issue of *Stoikaya Mysl*. Glossing over the opportunism of the Left Narodniks can only cause harm.

There has been some revisionist *influence* within Russian Social-Democracy *since the very beginning* of the mass working-class and mass Social-Democratic movement in 1895-96. Does Mr. Levitsky mean to say he has not heard of the struggle which consistent Marxists and adherents of the old *Iskra* waged for many years against the Economists? Does he mean to say he has not heard of the Party resolutions and

the numerous articles written during that period, affirming, proving and explaining that Economism was the Russian form of revisionism and opportunism? Does Mr. Levitsky mean to say he has forgotten about Mr. A. Martynov, a leading liquidator of today, and a leading Economist of yesterday?

Mr. Levitsky denies revisionism in order to disguise *his own* revisionism. We would remind him only of the four following facts: 1) Was it not the Menshevik Plekhanov who declared in the press in 1909-10 that the Mensheviks had absorbed into their ranks quite a number of opportunist elements? 2) Was it not the same Plekhanov who demonstrated the opportunist nature of the liquidationist "fight-for-legality" slogan? 3) Was it not *several* anti-liquidationist Mensheviks who demonstrated the *connection* between liquidationism and Economism? 4) Is it not opportunism to renounce, as Koltsov does, "two pillars" (out of the three) as unsuitable for agitation?

These four facts alone—and forty-four more could be cited—are clear proof that the Economism of 1895-1902, the Menshevism of 1903-08 and the liquidationism of 1908-14, all represent the Russian form or species of opportunism and revisionism, no more and no less.

Prosveshcheniye No. 5,
May 1914
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

DISRUPTION OF UNITY UNDER COVER OF OUTCRIES FOR UNITY

Published in May 1914
in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* No. 5
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in the journal

DISRUPTION OF UNITY UNDER COVER OF OUTCRIES FOR UNITY

Published in May 1914
in the journal Prosveshchenije No. 5
Signed: V. Ilyin

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The questions of the present-day working-class movement are in many respects vexed questions, particularly for representatives of that movement's recent past (i.e., of the stage which historically has just drawn to a close). This applies primarily to the questions of so-called factionalism, splits, and so forth. One often hears intellectuals in the working-class movement making nervous, feverish and almost hysterical appeals not to raise these vexed questions. Those who have experienced the long years of struggle between the various trends among Marxists since 1900-01, for example, may naturally think it superfluous to repeat many of the arguments on the subject of these vexed questions.

But there are not many people left today who took part in the fourteen-year-old conflict among Marxists (not to speak of the eighteen- or nineteen-year-old conflict, counting from the moment the first symptoms of Economism appeared). The vast majority of the workers who now make up the ranks of the Marxists either do not remember the old conflict, or have never heard of it. To the overwhelming majority (as, incidentally, was shown by the opinion poll held by our journal[161]), these vexed questions are a matter of exceptionally great interest. We therefore intend to deal with these questions, which have been raised *as it were* anew (and for the younger generation of the workers they are really new) by Trotsky's "non-factional workers' journal", *Borba*.

I. "FACTIONALISM"

Trotsky calls his new journal "non-factional". He puts this word in the top line in his advertisements; this word is stressed by him in every key, in the editorial articles of *Borba* itself, as well as in the liquidationist *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, which carried an article on *Borba* by Trotsky before the latter began publication.

What is this "non-factionalism"?

Trotsky's "workers' journal" is Trotsky's journal *for* workers, as there is not a trace in it of either workers' initiative, or any connection with working-class organisations. Desiring to write in a popular style, Trotsky, in his journal for workers, explains for the benefit of his readers the meaning of such foreign words as "territory", "factor", and so forth.

Very good. But why not also explain to the workers the meaning of the word "non-factionalism"? Is that word *more* intelligible than the words "territory" and "factor"?

No, that is not the reason. The reason is that the label "non-factionalism" is used by the worst representatives of the worst remnants of factionalism *to mislead* the younger generation of workers. It is worth while devoting a little time to explaining this.

Group-division was the main distinguishing feature of the Social-Democratic Party during a definite historical period. Which period? From 1903 to 1911.

To explain the nature of this group-division more clearly we must recall the concrete conditions that existed in, say, 1906-07. At that time the Party was united, there was no split, but group-division existed, i.e., in the united Party there were *virtually two* groups, two virtually separate organisations. The local workers' organisations were united, but on every important issue the two groups devised two sets of tactics. The advocates of the respective tactics disputed among themselves in the united workers' organisations (as was the case, for example, during the discussion of the slogan: a Duma, or Cadet, Ministry, in 1906, or during the elections of delegates to the London Congress in 1907), and questions were decided *by a majority vote*. One group was defeated at the Stockholm Unity Congress (1906), the other was defeated at the London Unity Congress (1907).

These are commonly known facts in the history of organised Marxism in Russia.

It is sufficient to recall these commonly known facts to realise what glaring falsehoods Trotsky is spreading.

For over two years, since 1912, there has been *no* factionalism among the organised Marxists in Russia, no disputes over tactics in *united* organisations, at united *conferences* and congresses. There is a *complete* break between the

Party, which in January 1912 formally announced that the liquidators *do not* belong to it, and the liquidators. Trotsky often calls this state of affairs a "split", and we shall deal with this appellation separately later on. But it remains an undoubted fact that the term "factionalism" *deviates from the truth*.

As we have said, this term is a repetition, an uncritical, unreasonable, senseless repetition of *what was true yesterday*, i.e., in the period that has already passed. When Trotsky talks to us about the "chaos of factional strife" (see No. 1, pp. 5, 6, and many others) we realise at once *which* period of the past his words echo.

Consider the present state of affairs from the viewpoint of the young Russian workers who now constitute nine-tenths of the organised Marxists in Russia. They see *three* mass expressions of the different views, or trends in the working-class movement: the Pravdists, gathered around a newspaper with a circulation of 40,000; the liquidators (15,000 circulation) and the Left Narodniks (10,000 circulation). The circulation figures tell the reader about the *mass* character of a given tenet.

The question arises: what has "chaos" got to do with it? Everybody knows that Trotsky is fond of high-sounding and empty phrases. But the catchword "chaos" is *not only* phrase-mongering; it signifies *also* the transplanting, or rather, a vain attempt to transplant, to Russian soil, in the present period, the relations that existed *abroad* in a *bygone* period. That is the whole point.

There is no "chaos" whatever in the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks. That, we hope, not *even* Trotsky will dare to deny. The struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks has been going on for over thirty years, ever since Marxism came into being. The cause of this struggle is the radical divergence of interests and viewpoints of two different classes, the proletariat and the peasantry. If there is any "chaos" anywhere, it is only in the heads of cranks who fail to understand this.

What, then, remains? "Chaos" in the struggle between the Marxists and the liquidators? That, too, is wrong, for a struggle against a *trend*, which the entire Party recognised as a trend and condemned as far back as 1908, cannot be

called chaos. And everybody who has the least concern for the history of Marxism in Russia knows that liquidationism is most closely and inseverably connected, even as regards its leaders and supporters, with Menshevism (1903-08) and Economism (1894-1903). Consequently, here, too, we have a history extending over nearly twenty years. To regard the history of one's own Party as "chaos" reveals an unpardonable empty-headedness.

Now let us examine the present situation *from the point of view* of Paris or Vienna. At once the whole picture changes. *Besides* the Pravdists and liquidators, we see *no less than five Russian* groups claiming membership of one and the same Social-Democratic Party: Trotsky's group, two *Vperyod* groups, the "pro-Party Bolsheviks" and the "pro-Party Mensheviks".[162] All Marxists in Paris and in Vienna (for the purpose of illustration I take two of the largest centres) are perfectly well aware of this.

Here Trotsky is right in a certain sense; this is indeed group-division, chaos indeed!

Groups within the Party, i.e., nominal unity (all *claim* to belong to one Party) and actual disunity (for, in fact, all the groups are independent of one another and enter into negotiations and agreements with each other as sovereign powers).

"Chaos", i.e., the absence of (1) objective and verifiable proof that these groups are linked with the working-class movement in Russia and (2) absence of any data to enable us to judge the actual ideological and political physiognomy of these groups. Take a period of two full years—1912 and 1913. As everybody knows, this was a period of the revival and upswing of the working-class movement, when every trend or tendency of a more or less *mass* character (and in politics this mass character alone counts) *could not but* exercise some influence on the Fourth Duma elections, the strike movement, the legal newspapers, the trade unions, the insurance election campaign, and so on. Throughout those two years, not one of these five groups abroad asserted itself in the slightest degree *in any* of the activities of the mass working-class movement in Russia just enumerated!

That is a fact that anybody can easily verify.

And that fact proves that we were right in calling Trotsky a representative of the "worst remnants of factionalism".

Although he claims to be non-factional, Trotsky is known to everybody who is in the least familiar with the working-class movement in Russia as the representative of "Trotsky's *faction*". Here we have group-division, for we see two essential symptoms of it: (1) nominal recognition of unity and (2) group segregation in fact. Here there are remnants of group-division, for there is no evidence whatever of any real connection with the mass working-class movement in Russia.

And lastly, it is the worst form of group-division, for there is *no* ideological and political definiteness. It cannot be denied that this definiteness is characteristic of both the Pravdists (even our determined opponent L. Martov admits that we stand "solid and disciplined" around universally known formal decisions on all questions) and the liquidators (they, or at all events the most prominent of them, have very definite features, namely, liberal, not Marxist).

It cannot be denied that some of the groups which, like Trotsky's, really exist exclusively from the Vienna-Paris, but by no means from the Russian, point of view, possess a degree of definiteness. For example, the *Machist* theories of the Machist *Vperyod* group are definite; the emphatic repudiation of these theories and defence of Marxism, in addition to the theoretical condemnation of liquidationism, by the "pro-Party Mensheviks", are definite.

Trotsky, however, possesses no ideological and political definiteness, for his patent for "non-factionalism", as we shall soon see in greater detail, is merely a patent to *flit* freely to and fro, from one group to another.

To sum up:

1) Trotsky does not explain, nor does he understand, the historical significance of the *ideological* disagreements among the various Marxist trends and groups, although these disagreements run through the twenty years' history of Social-Democracy and concern the fundamental questions of the present day (as we shall show later on);

2) Trotsky fails to understand that the main specific features of *group-division* are nominal recognition of unity and actual disunity;

3) Under cover of "non-factionalism" Trotsky is championing the interests of a group abroad which particularly lacks definite principles and has no basis in the working-class movement in Russia.

All that glitters is not gold. There is much glitter and sound in Trotsky's phrases, but they are meaningless.

II. THE SPLIT

"Although there is no group-division, i.e., nominal recognition of unity, but actual disunity, among you, Pravdists, there is something worse, namely, splitting tactics," we are told. This is exactly what Trotsky says. Unable to think out his ideas or to get his arguments to hang together, he rants against group-division at one moment, and at the next shouts: "Splitting tactics are winning one suicidal victory after another". (No. 1, p. 6.)

This statement can have only one meaning: "The *Pravdists* are winning one victory after another" (this is an objective, verifiable fact, established by a study of the mass working-class movement in Russia during, say, 1912 and 1913), *but I*, *Trotsky*, denounce the Pravdists (1) as splitters, and 2) as suicidal politicians.

Let us examine this.

First of all we must express our thanks to Trotsky. Not long ago (from August 1912 to February 1914) he was at one with F. Dan, who, as is well known, threatened to "*kill*" anti-liquidationism, and called upon others to do so. At present Trotsky does not threaten to "kill" our trend (and our Party—don't be angry, Citizen Trotsky, this is true!), he only prophesies that it will kill *itself*!

This is much milder, isn't it? It is almost "non-factional", isn't it?

But joking apart (although joking is the only way of retorting mildly to Trotsky's insufferable phrase-mongering).

"Suicide" is a mere empty phrase, mere "Trotskyism".

Splitting tactics are a grave political accusation. This accusation is repeated against us in a thousand different keys by the liquidators and by all the groups enumerated above, who, from the point of view of Paris and Vienna, actually exist.

And all of them repeat this grave political accusation in an amazingly frivolous way. Look at Trotsky. He admitted that "splitting tactics are winning [read: the Pravdists are winning] one suicidal victory after another". To this he adds:

"*Numerous advanced workers, in a state of utter political bewilderment, themselves often become active agents of a split.*" (No. 1, p. 6.)

Are not these words a glaring example of irresponsibility on this question?

You accuse us of being splitters when all that we see in front of us in the arena of the working-class movement in Russia is liquidationism. So you think that our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong? Indeed, *all* the groups abroad that we enumerated above, no matter how much they may differ from each other, are agreed that our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong, that it is the attitude of "splitters". This, too, reveals the similarity (and fairly close political kinship) between *all* these groups and the liquidators.

If our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong in theory, in principle, then Trotsky should say so *straightforwardly*, and state *definitely*, without equivocation, why he thinks it is wrong. But Trotsky has been evading this extremely important point *for years*.

If our attitude towards liquidationism has been proved wrong in practice, by the experience of the movement, then this experience should be analysed; but Trotsky fails to do this either. "Numerous advanced workers," he admits, "become *active agents* of a split" (read: active agents of the Pravdist line, tactics, system and organisation).

What is the cause of the deplorable fact, which, as Trotsky admits, is confirmed by experience, that the *advanced* workers, the *numerous* advanced workers at that, stand for *Pravda*?

It is the "utter political bewilderment" of these advanced workers, answers Trotsky.

Needless to say, this explanation is highly flattering to Trotsky, to all five groups abroad, and to the liquidators. Trotsky is very fond of using, with the learned air of the expert, pompous and high-sounding phrases to explain

historical phenomena in a way that is flattering to Trotsky. Since "numerous advanced workers" become "active agents" of a political and Party line which does not conform to Trotsky's line, Trotsky settles the question unhesitatingly, out of hand: these advanced workers are "in a state of utter political bewilderment", whereas he, Trotsky, is evidently "in a state" of political firmness and clarity, and keeps to the right line!... And this very same Trotsky, beating his breast, fulminates against factionalism, parochialism,- and the efforts of intellectuals to impose their will on the workers!

Reading things like these, one cannot help asking oneself: is it from a lunatic asylum that such voices come?

The Party put the question of liquidationism, and of condemning it, before the "advanced workers" as far back as 1908, while the question of "splitting" away from a very definite group of liquidators (namely, the *Nasha Zarya* group), i.e., that the only way to build up the Party was *without* this group and in opposition to it—this question was raised in January 1912, over two years ago. The overwhelming majority of the advanced workers declared *in favour of* supporting the "January (1912) line". Trotsky himself admits this fact when he talks about "victories" and about "numerous advanced workers". But Trotsky wriggles out of this simply by hurling *abuse* at these advanced workers and calling them "splitters" and "politically bewildered"!

From these facts sane people will draw a different conclusion. Where the *majority* of the class-conscious workers have rallied around precise and definite decisions, there we shall find *unity* of opinion and action, there we shall find the Party spirit, and the Party.

Where we see liquidators who have been "removed from office" by the workers, or half a dozen groups outside Russia, who for two years have produced *no* proof that they are connected with the mass working-class movement in Russia, there, indeed, we shall find bewilderment and *splits*. In now trying to persuade the workers *not to carry out the decisions* of that "united whole", which the Marxist Pravdists recognise, Trotsky is *trying* to disrupt the movement and cause a split.

These efforts are futile, but we must expose the arrogantly conceited leaders of intellectualist groups, who, while causing splits themselves, are shouting about others causing splits; who, after sustaining *utter defeat* at the hands of the "advanced workers" for the past two years or more, are with incredible insolence *flouting* the decisions and the will of these advanced workers and saying that *they* are "politically bewildered". These are entirely the methods of Nozdrev,[163] or of "Judas" Golovlyov.[164]

In reply to these repeated outcries about a split and in fulfilment of my duty as a publicist, I will not tire of repeating *precise*, unrefuted and irrefutable figures. In the Second Duma, 47 per cent of the deputies elected by the worker curia were Bolsheviks, in the Third Duma 50 per cent were Bolsheviks, and in the Fourth Duma 67 per cent.

There you have the majority of the "advanced workers", there you have the Party; there you have unity of opinion and action of the majority of the class-conscious workers.

To this the liquidators say (see Bulkin, L. M., in *Nasha Zarya* No. 3) that we base our arguments on the Stolypin curias. This is a foolish and unscrupulous argument. The Germans measure their successes by the results of elections conducted under the Bismarckian electoral law, which excludes women. Only people bereft of their senses would reproach the German Marxists for measuring their successes under the *existing* electoral law, without in the least justifying its reactionary restrictions.

And we, too, without justifying curias, or the curia system, measured our successes under the *existing* electoral law. There were curias in all three (Second, Third and Fourth) Duma elections; and *within* the worker curia, *within* the ranks of Social-Democracy, there was a *complete* swing against the liquidators. Those who do not wish to deceive themselves and others must admit this objective fact, namely, the victory of *working-class unity over* the liquidators.

The other argument is just as "clever": "Mensheviks and liquidators voted for (or took part in the election of) such-and-such a Bolshevik." Splendid! But does not the same thing apply to the 53 per cent *non*-Bolshevik deputies returned to the Second Duma, and to the 50 per cent returned

to the Third Duma, and to the 33 per cent returned to the Fourth Duma?

If, instead of the figures on the deputies elected, we could obtain the figures on the electors, or workers' delegates, etc., we would gladly quote them. But these more detailed figures are *not* available, and consequently the "disputants" are simply throwing dust in people's eyes.

But what about the figures of the workers' groups that assisted the newspapers of the different trends? During *two* years (1912 and 1913), 2,801 groups assisted *Pravda*, and 750 assisted *Luch*.* These figures are verifiable and nobody has attempted to disprove them.

Where is the *unity of action and will of the majority* of the "advanced workers", and where is the *flouting* of the will of the majority?

Trotsky's "non-factionalism" is, actually, splitting tactics, in that it shamelessly flouts the will of the majority of the workers.

III. THE BREAK-UP OF THE AUGUST BLOC

But there is still another method, and a very important one, of verifying the correctness and truthfulness of Trotsky's accusations about splitting tactics.

You consider that it is the "Leninists" who are splitters? Very well, let us assume that you are right.

But if you are, why have not all the other sections and groups proved that unity is possible with the liquidators *without* the "Leninists", and *against* the "splitters"?... If we are splitters, why have not you, uniters, united among yourselves, and with the liquidators? Had you done that you would have proved to the workers *by deeds* that unity is possible and beneficial!...

Let us go over the chronology of events.

In January 1912, the "Leninist" "splitters" declared that they were a Party *without* and *against* the liquidators.

In March 1912, *all* the groups and "factions": liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, "pro-Party Bolsheviks" and "pro-

* A preliminary calculation made up to April 1, 1914, showed 4,000 groups for *Pravda* (commencing with January 1, 1912) and 1,000 for the liquidators and all their allies taken together.

Party Mensheviks", in their Russian news sheets and in the columns of the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts*, *united* against these "splitters". All of them unanimously, in chorus, in unison and in one voice vilified us and called us "usurpers", "mystifiers", and other no less affectionate and tender names.

Very well, gentlemen! But what could have been easier for you than to unite *against* the "usurpers" and to set the "advanced workers" an example of *unity*? Do you mean to say that if the advanced workers had seen, on the one hand, the unity of all against the usurpers, the unity of liquidators and *non*-liquidators, and on the other, *isolated* "usurpers", "splitters", and so forth, they would not have supported the former?

If disagreements are only invented, or exaggerated, and so forth, by the "Leninists", and if unity between the liquidators, Plekhanovites, Vperyodists, Trotskyists, and so forth, is really *possible*, why have you not proved this during the past two years by *your own* example?

In August 1912, a conference of "uniters" was convened. *Disunity* started at once: the Plekhanovites refused to attend at all; the Vperyodists attended, but walked out after protesting and exposing the fictitious character of the whole business.

The liquidators, the Letts, the Trotskyists (Trotsky and Semkovsky), the Caucasians, and the Seven "united". But did they? We stated at the time that they did not, that this was merely a screen to cover up liquidationism. Have the events disproved our statement?

Exactly eighteen months later, in February 1914, we found:

1. that the Seven was breaking up. Buryanov had left them.

2. that in the remaining new "Six", Chkheidze and Tulyakov, or somebody else, could not see eye to eye on the reply-to be made to Plekhanov. They stated in the press that they would reply to him, *but they could not*.

3. that Trotsky, who for many months had practically vanished from the columns of *Luch*, had *broken away*, and had started "his own" journal, *Borba*. By calling this journal "non-factional", Trotsky clearly (clearly to those who

are at all familiar with the subject) intimates that in his, Trotsky's, opinion, *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch had proved to be* "factional", i.e., poor uniters.

If you are a uniter, my dear Trotsky, if you say that it is possible to unite with the liquidators, if you and they stand by the "fundamental ideas formulated in August 1912" (*Borba* No. 1, p. 6, Editorial Note), why *did not you yourself* unite with the liquidators in *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*?

When, before Trotsky's journal appeared, *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* published some scathing comment stating that the physiognomy of this journal was "unclear" and that there had been "quite a good deal of talk in Marxist circles" about this journal, *Put Pravdy* (No. 37)* was naturally obliged to expose this falsehood. It said: "There has been talk in Marxist circles" about a secret memorandum written by Trotsky *against* the *Luch* group; Trotsky's physiognomy and his breakaway from the August bloc were perfectly "clear".

4. An, the well-known leader of the Caucasian liquidators, who had attacked L. Sedov (for which he was given a public wigging by F. Dan and Co.), now appeared in *Borba*. It remains "unclear" whether the Caucasians now desire to go with Trotsky or with Dan.

5. The Lettish Marxists, who were the only real organisation in the "August bloc", had *formally* withdrawn from it, stating (in 1914) in the resolution of their last Congress that:

> "*the attempt on the part of the conciliators to unite at all cost with the liquidators* (*the August Conference of 1912*) *proved fruitless, and the uniters themselves became ideologically and politically dependent upon the liquidators.*"

This statement was made, after eighteen months experience, by an organisation which had itself been *neutral* and had *not* desired to establish connection with *either* of the two centres. This decision of *neutrals* should carry all the more weight with Trotsky!

Enough, is it not?

Those who accused us of being splitters, of being unwilling or unable to get on with the liquidators, were *themselves*

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* See pp. 158-61 of this volume.—*Ed.*

unable to get on with them. The August bloc proved to be a fiction and broke up.

By concealing this break-up from his readers, Trotsky is deceiving them.

The experience of our opponents has proved that we are right, has proved that the liquidators cannot be co-operated with.

IV. A CONCILIATOR'S ADVICE TO THE "SEVEN"

The editorial article in issue No. 1 of *Borba* entitled "The Split in the Duma Group" contains advice from a conciliator to the seven pro-liquidator (or inclining towards liquidationism) members of the Duma. The gist of this advice is contained in the following words:

> "first of all consult the Six whenever it is necessary to reach an agreement with other groups...." (P. 29.)

This is the wise counsel which, among other things, is evidently the cause of Trotsky's disagreement with the liquidators of *Luch*. This is the opinion the Pravdists have held ever since the outbreak of the conflict between the two groups in the Duma, ever since the resolution of the Summer (1913) Conference was adopted. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma has reiterated in the *press*, even after the split, that it continues to adhere to this position, in spite of the repeated refusals of the Seven.

From the very outset, since the time the resolution of the Summer Conference was adopted, we have been, and still are, of the opinion that *agreements* on questions concerning activities in the *Duma* are desirable and possible; if such agreements have been repeatedly arrived at with the petty-bourgeois peasant democrats (Trudoviks), they are all the more possible and necessary with the petty-bourgeois, liberal-labour politicians.

We must not exaggerate disagreements, but we must face the facts: the Seven are men, leaning towards liquidationism, who yesterday entirely followed the lead of Dan, and whose eyes today are travelling longingly from Dan to Trotsky and back again. The liquidators are a group of legalists who have broken away from the Party and are pursuing a liberal-

labour policy. Since they repudiate the "underground", there can be no question of unity with them In matters concerning Party organisation and the working-class movement. Whoever thinks differently is badly mistaken and fails to take into account the profound nature of the changes that have taken place since 1908.

But *agreements* on certain questions with this group, which stands outside or on the fringe of the Party, are, of course, permissible: we *must* always compel this group, too, like the Trudoviks, to choose between the workers' (Pravdist) policy and the liberal policy. For example, on the question of fighting for freedom of the press the liquidators clearly revealed vacillation between the liberal formulation of the question, which repudiated, or overlooked, the illegal press, and the opposite policy, that of the workers.

Within the scope of a *Duma* policy in which the most important *extra-Duma* issues are not directly raised, agreements with the seven liberal-labour deputies are possible and desirable. On this point Trotsky has shifted his ground *from* that of the liquidators *to* that of the Party Summer (1913) Conference.

It should not be forgotten, however, that to a group standing outside the Party, agreement means something entirely different from what Party people usually understand by the term. By "agreement" in the Duma, non-Party people mean "*drawing up* a tactical resolution, or line". To Party people agreement is an attempt to *enlist* others in the work of carrying out the Party line.

For example, the Trudoviks have no party. By agreement they understand the "voluntary", so to speak, "drawing up" of a line, today with the Cadets, tomorrow with the Social-Democrats. We, however, understand something entirely different by agreement with the Trudoviks. We have Party decisions on all the important questions of tactics, and we shall never depart from these decisions; by agreement with the Trudoviks we mean *winning* them over to our side, *convincing* them that we are right, and *not rejecting* joint action against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals.

How far Trotsky has forgotten (not for nothing has he associated with the liquidators) this elementary difference

between the Party and non-Party point of view on agreements, is shown by the following argument of his:

> "The representatives of the International must bring together the two sections of our divided parliamentary group and jointly with them ascertain the points of agreement and points of disagreement.... A detailed tactical resolution formulating the principles of parliamentary tactics may be drawn up...." (No. 1, pp. 29-30.)

Here you have a characteristic and typical example of the liquidationist presentation of the question! Trotsky's journal forgets about the Party; such a trifle is hardly worth remembering!

When different parties in Europe (Trotsky is fond of inappropriately talking about Europeanism) come to an agreement or unite, what they do is this: their respective representatives meet and first of all ascertain the points of disagreement (precisely what the International proposed in relation to Russia, without including in the resolution Kautsky's ill-considered statement that "the old Party no longer exists"[165]). Having ascertained the points of disagreement, the representatives decide *what decisions* (resolutions, conditions, etc.) on questions of tactics, organisation, etc., *should be submitted to the congresses of the two parties*. If they succeed in drafting unanimous decisions, the congresses decide whether to adopt them or not. If *differing* proposals are made, they too are submitted for final decision to the congresses of the two parties.

What appeals to the liquidators and Trotsky is only the *European* models of opportunism, but certainly not the models of European partisanship.

"A detailed tactical resolution" will be drawn up by the members of the Duma! This example should serve the Russian "advanced workers", with whom Trotsky has good reason to be so displeased, as a striking illustration of the lengths to which the groups in Vienna and Paris—who persuaded even Kautsky that there was "no Party" in Russia—go in their ludicrous project-mongering. But if it is sometimes possible to fool foreigners on this score, the Russian "advanced workers" (at the risk of provoking the terrible Trotsky to another outburst of displeasure) will laugh in the faces of these project-mongers.

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"Detailed tactical resolutions," they will tell them, "are drawn up among us (we do not know how it is done among you non-Party people) by Party congresses and conferences, for example, those of 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912 and 1913. We shall gladly acquaint uninformed foreigners, as well as forgetful Russians, with our Party decisions, and still more gladly ask the representatives of the Seven, or the August bloc members, or Left-wingers or anybody else, to acquaint us with the resolutions of their congresses, or conferences, and to bring up at their next congress the definite question of the attitude they should adopt towards our resolutions, or towards the resolution of the neutral Lettish Congress of 1914, etc."

This is what the "advanced workers" of Russia will say to the various project-mongers, and this *has already been said* in the Marxist press, for example, by the organised Marxists of St. Petersburg. Trotsky chooses to ignore these published terms for the liquidators? So much the worse for Trotsky. It is our duty to warn our readers how ridiculous that "unity" (the August type of "unity"?) project-mongering is which refuses to reckon with the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia.

V. TROTSKY'S LIQUIDATIONIST VIEWS

As to the substance of his own views, Trotsky contrived to say as little as possible in his new journal. *Put Pravdy* (No. 37) has already commented on the fact that Trotsky has not said a word either on the question of the "underground" or on the slogan of working for a legal party, etc.* That, among other things, is why we say that when attempts are made to form a separate organisation which is to have *no* ideological and political physiognomy, it is *the worst* form of factionalism.

Although Trotsky has refrained from openly expounding his views, quite a number of passages in his journal show what kind of ideas he has been trying to smuggle in.

In the very first editorial article in the first issue of his journal, we read the following:

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* See pp. 158-61 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"The pro-revolutionary Social-Democratic Party in our country was a *workers*' party only in ideas and aims. Actually, it was an organisation of the Marxist intelligentsia, which led the awakening working class." (5.)

This is the old liberal and liquidationist tune, which is really the prelude to the *repudiation* of the Party. It is based on a distortion of the historical facts. The strikes of 1895-96 had already given rise to a *mass* working-class movement, which both in ideas and organisation was linked with the Social-Democratic movement. And in these strikes, in this economic and non-economic agitation, the "intelligentsia *led* the working class"!?

Or take the following exact statistics of political offences in the period 1901-03 compared with the preceding period.

Occupations of participants in the emancipation movement prosecuted for political offences (per cent)

Period	Agriculture	Industry and Commerce	Liberal professions and students	No definite occupation, and no occupation
1884-90	7.1	15.1	53.3	19.9
1901-03	9.0	46.1	28.7	8.0

We see that in the eighties, when there was as yet *no* Social-Democratic Party in Russia, and when the movement was "Narodnik", the intelligentsia predominated, accounting for over half the participants.

But the picture underwent a complete change in 1901-03, when a Social-Democratic Party already existed, and when the old *Iskra* was conducting its work. The intelligentsia were now a *minority* among the participants of the movement; the *workers* ("industry and commerce") were far more numerous than the intelligentsia, and the workers and peasants together constituted more than half the total.

It was precisely in the conflict of trends within the Marxist movement that the petty-bourgeois intellectualist *wing* of the Social-Democracy made itself felt, beginning with Economism (1895-1903) and continuing with Menshevism (1903-1908) and liquidationism (1908-1914). Trotsky

repeats the liquidationist slander against the Party and is afraid to mention the history of the twenty years' conflict of trends within the Party.

Here is another example.

"In its attitude towards parliamentarism, Russian Social-Democracy passed through the same three stages ... [as in other countries] ... first 'boycottism' ... then the acceptance in principle of parliamentary tactics, but ... [that magnificent "but", the "but" which Shchedrin translated as: The ears never grow higher than the forehead, never!*] ... for purely agitational purposes ... and lastly, the presentation from the Duma rostrum ... of current demands...." (No. 1, p. 34.)

This, too, is a liquidationist distortion of history. The distinction between the second and third stages was invented in order to smuggle in a defence of reformism and opportunism. Boycottism as a stage in "the attitude of Social-Democracy towards parliamentarism" never existed *either* in Europe (where anarchism has existed and continues to exist) *or* in Russia, where the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, for example, applied *only* to a definite institution, was *never* linked with "parliamentarism", and was engendered by the peculiar nature of the struggle between liberalism and Marxism for the continuation of the onslaught. Trotsky does not breathe a word about the way this struggle affected the conflict between the two trends in Marxism!

When dealing with history, one must explain concrete questions and the class roots of the different trends; anybody who wants to make a Marxist study of the struggle of classes and trends over the question of participation in the Bulygin Duma, will see therein the roots of the liberal-labour policy. But Trotsky "deals with" history only in order to *evade* concrete questions and to *invent* a justification, or a semblance of justification, for the present-day opportunists!

"Actually, all trends," he writes, "employ the same methods of struggle and organisation." "The outcries about the liberal danger in our working-class movement are simply a crude and sectarian travesty of reality." (No. 1, pp. 5 and 35.)

This is a very clear and very vehement defence of the liquidators. But we will take the liberty of quoting at least

* Meaning the impossible.—*Ed.*

one small fact, one of the very latest. Trotsky merely slings words about; we should like the workers themselves to ponder over the facts.

It is a fact that *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* for March 13 wrote the following:

> "*Instead of emphasising the definite and concrete task that confronts the working class, viz., to compel the Duma to throw out the bill* [*on the press*], *a vague formula is proposed of fighting for the 'uncurtailed slogans', and at the same time the illegal press is widely advertised, which can only lead to the relaxation of the workers' struggle for their legal press.*"

This is a clear, precise and documentary defence of the liquidationist policy and a criticism of the *Pravda* policy. Well, will any literate person say that both trends employ "the same methods of struggle and organisation" on this question? Will any literate person say that the liquidators are *not* pursuing a *liberal*-labour policy on this question, that the liberal menace to the working-class movement is purely imaginary?

The reason why Trotsky avoids facts and concrete references is because they relentlessly refute all his angry outcries and pompous phrases. It is very easy, of course, to strike an attitude and say: "a crude and sectarian travesty". Or to add a still more stinging and pompous catch-phrase, such as "emancipation from conservative factionalism".

But is this not very cheap? Is not this weapon borrowed from the arsenal of the period when Trotsky posed in all his splendour before audiences of high-school boys?

Nevertheless, the "advanced workers", with whom Trotsky is so angry, would like to be told plainly and clearly: Do you or do you not approve of the "method of struggle and organisation" that is definitely expressed in the above-quoted appraisal of a definite political campaign? If you do, then you are pursuing a liberal-labour policy, betraying Marxism and the Party; to talk of "peace" or of "unity" with *such* a policy, with groups which pursue *such* a policy, means deceiving yourself and others.

If not, then say so plainly. Phrases will not astonish, satisfy or intimidate the present-day workers.

Incidentally, the policy advocated by the liquidators in the above-quoted passage is a foolish one even from the

liberal point of view, for the passage of a bill in the Duma depends on "Zemstvo-Octobrists" of the type of Bennigsen, who has already shown his hand in the committee.

* * *

The old participants in the Marxist movement in Russia know Trotsky very well, and there is no need to discuss him for their benefit. But the younger generation of workers do not know him, and it is therefore necessary to discuss him, for he is typical of all the five groups abroad, which, in fact, are also vacillating between the liquidators and the Party.

In the days of the old *Iskra* (1901-03), these waverers, who flitted from the Economists to the Iskrists and back again, were dubbed "Tushino turncoats" (the name given in the Troublous Times in Rus to fighting men who went over from one camp to another[166]).

When we speak of liquidationism we speak of a definite ideological trend, which grew up in the course of many years, stems from Menshevism and Economism in the twenty years' history of Marxism, and is connected with the policy and ideology of a definite class—the liberal bourgeoisie.

The only ground the "Tushino turncoats" have for claiming that they stand above groups is that they "borrow" their ideas from one group one day and from another the next day. Trotsky was an ardent Iskrist in 1901-03, and Ryazanov described his role at the Congress of 1903 as "Lenin's cudgel". At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik, i.e., he deserted from the Iskrists to the Economists. He said that "between the old *Iskra* and the new lies a gulf". In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, now co-operating with Martynov (the Economist), now proclaiming his absurdly Left "permanent revolution" theory. In 1906-07, he approached the Bolsheviks, and in the spring of 1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.

In the period of disintegration, after long "non-factional" vacillation he again went to the right, and in August 1912, he entered into a bloc with the liquidators. He has now

deserted them again, although *in substance* he reiterates their shoddy ideas.

Such types are characteristic of the flotsam of past historical formations, of the time when the mass working-class movement in Russia was still dormant, and when every group had "ample room" in which to pose as a trend, group or faction, in short, as a "power", negotiating amalgamation with others.

The younger generation of workers should know exactly whom they are dealing with, when individuals come before them with incredibly pretentious claims, unwilling absolutely to reckon with *either* the Party decisions, which since 1908 have defined and established our attitude towards liquidationism, *or* with the experience of the present-day working-class movement in Russia, which has actually brought about the *unity* of the majority on the basis of full recognition of the aforesaid decisions.

BOOK REVIEW

I. Drozdov, *The Wages of Farm Labourers in Russia in Connection with the Agrarian Movement in 1905-06*. St. Petersburg (published by M. I. Semyonov), 1914. Pp. 68. Price 50 kopeks.

One cannot but welcome Mr. Drozdov's initiative in raising, in his pamphlet, an extremely interesting and important question. The author has taken the figures of the daily wages (expressed in terms both of money and of grain), the rye crop yield on private landlord fields during 1902-04, and the annual figures for the period 1905-10, and compared these data for different parts of European Russia.

The author found the biggest pay rises for 1905 in the south-western region (a ten per cent rise compared with 1902-04). The average increase for Russia was 1.2 per cent in 1905, and 12.5 per cent in 1906. From this the author draws the conclusion that wages rose most in regions in which agricultural capitalism is most developed, and the strike form of struggle (as distinct from what is known as the "riot and wreck" form) is most widespread. Strictly speaking, these figures are inadequate to support this conclusion. For example, the second highest rise in wages occurred in 1905 in the Urals region (a rise of 9.68 per cent, as against 10.35 per cent in the south-western region). If we take average wages for the *whole* of the post-revolutionary period, i.e., 1905-10, we shall get an index number of 110.3 (taking 1902-04 at 100) in the south-western region, and 121.7 in the Urals. The author, as it were, makes an "exception" for the Urals, on the basis of my book *The Development of Capitalism*. But in that book I made an exception for the Urals in studying workers' mass *migration*, not the level of wages in general.* The author's reference

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 586.—*Ed.*

to my book, therefore, is wrong. Nor can his reference to the very small percentage of private landlord farming in the Urals* be regarded as satisfactory. The author should have taken the more detailed gubernia figures and compared the rise in wages with the figures showing the relative *strength* of the agrarian movement in general, and of its strike form, "riot and wreck" form, and so on.

On the whole, the money wages of agricultural labourers throughout Russia rose *most* between 1905 and 1906. Taking the wages of 1902-04 at 100, the index number for 1905 and 1906 will be 101.2 and 112.5 respectively. The index numbers for the ensuing four years are: 114.2, 113.1, 118.4 and 119.6. It is clear that with the *general* rise in money wages as a result of the revolution, we see the direct and predominating influence of the struggle of 1905-06.

Referring our readers to Mr. Drozdov's excellent pamphlet for the details, we shall observe here that the author has no grounds whatever for describing as "manifestly impracticable" those demands of the peasants which virtually amounted to "smoking out the landlords" (p. 30). Equally groundless and unreasoned is his statement that in the "riot and wreck" regions the "struggle was waged for equalised land tenure, and, in general, for other equally petty-bourgeois, utopian demands" (p. 38). Firstly, the peasants fought, not only for land tenure, but for landownership ("smoking out"); secondly, they fought, not for equalised tenure, but for the transfer to them of the landed estates—that is something entirely different. Thirdly, what was and remains utopian is the subjective *hopes* (and "*theories*") of the Narodniks in the matter of "equality", "socialisation", "taking the land out of commercial circulation", and similar nonsense; but there was nothing "utopian" in the petty-bourgeois masses "smoking out" the feudalists. The author confuses the objective historical significance of the peasants' struggle for land—a struggle that was progressive-bourgeois and radical-bourgeois—with the subjective theories and hopes of the Narodniks, which were, and still are, utopian

* In this connection the author puts the northern region on a par with the Urals. But in the northern region, wages in 1905 dropped by six per cent, and in 1906 showed only an eight per cent rise.

and reactionary. Such confusion is profoundly erroneous, undialectical and unhistorical.

Comparing the averages for 1891-1900 with those for 1901-10, the author draws the general conclusion that daily *money* wages all over Russia rose by 25.5 per cent, while *real* wages, expressed in terms of grain, rose *only* by 3.9 per cent, i.e., underwent hardly any change at all. We would remark that, arranged to reflect money-wage rises during the above-mentioned decades, the order of the various regions is as follows: Lithuania 39 per cent, the Volga area 33 per cent, the Urals 30 per cent, the Ukraine 28 per cent, the central agricultural region 26 per cent, etc.

In conclusion, the author compares the rise in agricultural labourers' wages during the past two decades (1891-1900 and 1901-10) with the rise in ground-rent. It appears that for the whole of Russia, average wages rose from 52.2 kopeks per day to 66.3 kopeks, i.e., by 27 per cent. However, the price of land—it is well known that the price of land is capitalised rent—rose from 69.1 rubles per dessiatine to 132.4 rubles, *that is*, by 91 per cent. In other words, wages rose by one-fourth, while ground-rent *almost doubled*!

"And this circumstance," the author rightly concludes, "signifies only one thing, namely: the deterioration in the relative standard of living of the agricultural labourers in Russia, with a simultaneous relative rise in the standard of living of the landowning class.... The social gulf between the landlord class and the class of wage-labourers is steadily widening."

Prosveshcheniye No. 5,
May 1914
Signed: *V. I.*

Published according to
the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

CLARITY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED
CLASS-CONSCIOUS WORKERS, PLEASE NOTE

In *Put Pravdy* No. 63, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group made a last attempt to ascertain whether the six deputies (the Chkheidze group) now intend—after the vast majority of the class-conscious workers have condemned their alliance with the liquidators—to take steps towards an agreement with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma.[167]

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group asked the "Social-Democratic group" whether it now intended *unreservedly* to recognise the decisions of the entire Marxist body of 1903 (the Programme) and of 1908-10 (condemnation of the liquidators). Why the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group put this question in the forefront, is clear. The decisions of 1903, 1908 and 1910 were adopted *prior to any splits* between the Marxists and the liquidators. These decisions are the banner of all Marxists. If any agreement between the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group and the "Social-Democratic group" is at all possible, then it is of course possible only on the basis of the unqualified recognition of these decisions, which were adopted before the split.

In issue No. 2 of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, the Chkheidze group published an "Open Reply" in which clarity is at last achieved and which therefore deserves the most serious attention from all workers who seriously try to understand the causes of the disagreements, and want genuine unity.

1. THE PROGRAMME AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

At the Marxist *Congress* which drew up the Programme (1903), the Bundists (Jewish liquidators) proposed that a demand be included in the Programme for "the establishment

of institutions that will guarantee them complete freedom of cultural development". This was opposed by the present-day liquidators Martynov, Martov and Koltsov. They argued, quite correctly, that this demand ran counter to the international principles of Social-Democracy. This demand was *rejected* by all votes against the vote of the Bundists (see the Minutes).

Marxists assert that the "establishment of institutions" is the same "cultural-national autonomy", which Social-Democracy rejects.

In their "Open Reply" the six deputies assert the contrary. They say: we advocated the "establishment of institutions", but we did not advocate cultural-national autonomy.

Very well, we say in reply; *let us assume* for a moment that the two are not the same. *But the Congress also rejected the "establishment of institutions"*. You know that perfectly well. You know that, to please the nationalists, *you have retreated from the Programme*. It was for this violation of the Programme that the Bundists, whose proposals the Congress rejected, complimented you.

After the Social-Democratic group made its declaration at the opening of the Fourth Duma, they wrote:

> "It may be pointed out that the formula of the Social-Democrats [i.e., liquidators] lacked clarity. That is quite true. *But the important thing is that the workers' deputies* [i.e., Chkheidze's supporters] *abandoned the rigid point of view* on which the official theory on the national question is based." (*Zeit* No. 9, editorial, column 3.)

The "official theory" is nothing more nor less than the *Programme*. The Bundists compliment Chkheidze and his friends for *infringing the Programme*. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group asked: Is the "Social-Democratic group" willing to retract this infringement of the Programme?

The reply was clear: "This formula [i.e., establishment of institutions] contains absolutely nothing that the Social-Democratic group should retract" (cf. "Open Reply").

We refuse to retract this infringement of the Programme—such was the reply of the "Social-Democratic group".

2. THE DECISION OF 1908

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group next asked the "Social-Democratic group" whether it was willing to recognise the 1908 decision of the Marxists, which was recently endorsed also by the Lettish conciliators.

This decision reads as follows:

> "Liquidationism is an attempt on the part of a certain section of the Party intelligentsia to liquidate [i.e., to dissolve, destroy, abolish, put an end to] the existing Party organisation, and to substitute for it an amorphous federation acting within legal bounds [i.e., within the law, in open existence] at all costs, even at the cost of openly abandoning the programme, tactics and traditions [i.e., the preceding experience] of the Party."

And this decision goes on to say that "*it is necessary to wage a most relentless ideological and organisational struggle against these liquidationist attempts*" (cf. Report, p. 38).[168]

This decision was adopted by the united Marxist body in the presence of representatives of all groups, including the liquidators (Dan, Axelrod and others), the Bundists, and so forth. It was adopted in December 1908, *before* there were any splits.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group asked the Chkheidze group whether it accepted *this* 1908 decision, which condemned liquidationism.

What did the Chkheidze group say in reply?

Not a word! Not a sound! It treated the decision of 1908 as though it did not exist. Incredible, but a fact. And this silence is more eloquent than words. It reveals an incredibly *arrogant* disregard for decisions. Decisions that are not to my liking are simply non-existent—such are the ethics of the liquidationist deputies.

The latter acted in the same way when it came to accepting deputy Jagiello into the group. It was pointed out to them that the 1908 decision rejected "unity" with Jagiello's *non*-Social-Democratic party. But to this they replied that in 1907, i.e., a year before this decision was adopted, the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma had accepted as members the Lithuanian deputies who were unquestionably Social-Democrats. This means openly mocking at decisions.

3. THE 1910 DECISION

This decision reads as follows:

"The historical situation in the Social-Democratic movement in the period of bourgeois counter-revolution inevitably gives rise—*as a manifestation of the bourgeois influence on the proletariat*—on the one hand, to repudiation of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, belittling of its role and importance, and attempts to whittle down the programmatic and tactical tasks and the slogans of consistent Social-Democracy, etc., and on the other hand, to repudiation of Social-Democratic activities in the Duma and of the utilisation of legal possibilities, failure to understand the importance of either inability to apply consistent Social-Democratic tactics to the specific historical conditions prevailing at the present time, etc.

"An inalienable element of Social-Democratic, tactics under these conditions is the elimination of both these deviations by extending and intensifying Social-Democratic activities in all fields of the proletarian class struggle, and explanation of the dangers of these deviations."

This decision was adopted *unanimously*, prior to any splits, in the presence of representatives of *all* groups. It condemns liquidationism and otzovism.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group asked the "Social-Democratic group" whether it recognised that decision. The latter replied: "The 1910 decisions do not even contain the *word* liquidationism".

The "word" is not there! But *whom* did the entire Marxist body have in mind when it condemned the "repudiation of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, the belittling of its role and importance"? Whom if not the liquidators?

Lastly, we have a most authentic document, published three years ago and refuted by nobody, a document emanating from all the "national" Marxists (Letts, Bundists and Poles), and from Trotsky (the liquidators cannot imagine better witnesses). This document plainly states that "it would in fact be desirable to call the trend mentioned in the resolution liquidationism, which must be combated...."

How can the deputies have the effrontery to mislead the workers in this unblushing manner?

The "Social-Democratic group" refuses to recognise the 1910 decisions! Instead, it declares that it is in "complete agreement" with the liquidationist *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*.

The 1903, 1908 and 1910 decisions of the entire Marxist body do not exist for the liquidationist deputies. For them only the "decisions" of the liquidationist newspaper exist.

4. "TRENDS"

While flouting direct decisions and ignoring the will of the workers, the "Social-Democratic group" dilates on the usefulness of all "trends of Marxism".

Marxists all over the world take the *workers' organisations* as their basis. In our country, however, some people want to take elusive "trends" as their basis. In Germany and in fact all over the world, the Social-Democrats unite the *workers*, their local cells, organisations and groups. In our country, some people want to unite "trends".

"All trends among the Marxists"! But among the liquidators alone there are at least two "trends": *Borba* and *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, disputing with each other as to which of them is the best custodian of the "August precepts".

The idea of uniting ten "trends", all of them isolated from the masses, is hopeless. The idea of uniting *all workers* willing to build up the entire Marxist body is a great cause, which is being accomplished before our very eyes with the ardent support of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group.

* * *

Clarity has been achieved. The overwhelming majority of the workers (see the returns of the insurance elections, group collections and the correspondence between the workers' groups and the two groups in the Duma) have declared in favour of the Marxists, in favour of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group, and against the liquidators. The August bloc has broken down; the Lettish Social-Democrats and Buryanov have left them, and the supporters of An and of *Borba* are leaving them; the six deputies grouped around Chkheidze have joined *the worst* and most liquidationist fragment of the August bloc.

The workers must draw their own conclusions.

Trudovaya Pravda No. 7,
June 5, 1914

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ADVENTURISM

When Marxists say that certain groups are adventurist, they have in mind the very definite and specific social and historical features of a phenomenon, one that every class-conscious worker should be familiar with.

The history of Russian Social-Democracy teems with tiny groups, which sprang up for an hour, for several months, with no roots whatever among the masses (and politics without the masses are adventurist politics), and with no serious and stable principles. In a petty-bourgeois country, which is passing through a historical period of bourgeois reconstruction, it is *inevitable* that a motley assortment of intellectuals should join the workers, and that these intellectuals should attempt to form all kinds of groups, adventurist in character in the sense referred to above.

Workers who do not wish to be fooled should subject every group to the closest scrutiny and ascertain how serious its principles are, and what roots it has in the masses. Put no faith in words; subject everything to the closest scrutiny—such is the motto of the Marxist workers.

Let us recall the struggle between Iskrism and Economism in 1895-1902. These were two trends of Social-Democratic thought. One of them was proletarian and Marxist, which had stood the test of the three years' campaign conducted by *Iskra*, and been tested by all advanced workers, who recognised as their own the precisely and clearly formulated decisions on Iskrist tactics and organisation. The other, Economism, was a *bourgeois*, opportunist trend, which strove to subordinate the workers to the liberals.

Besides these two important trends, there were a host of small and rootless groups (*Svoboda*, *Borba*,[169] the group

that published the Berlin leaflets, and so forth). These have long been forgotten. Though there were no few honest and conscientious Social-Democrats in these groups, they *proved* adventurist in the sense that they *had no* stable or serious principles, programme, tactics, organisation, and no roots among the masses.

It is thus, and only thus—by studying the history of the movement, by pondering over the ideological significance of definite theories, and by putting phrases to the test of facts—that serious people should appraise present-day trends and groups.

Only simpletons put faith in words.

Pravdism is a trend which has given precise Marxist answers and resolutions (of 1908, 1910, 1912 and 1913—in February and in the summer) on all questions of tactics, organisation and programme. The continuity of these decisions since the time of the old *Iskra* (1901-03), let alone the London (1907) Congress, has been of the strictest. The correctness of these decisions has been proved by the five or six years' (1908-14) experience of all the advanced workers, who have accepted these decisions *as their own*. Pravdism has united four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia (5,300 Social-Democratic workers' groups out of 6,700 in two-and-a-half years).

Liquidationism is a trend with a history that goes back almost twenty years, for it is the direct continuation of Economism (1895-1902) and the offspring of Menshevism (1903-08). The liberal-bourgeois roots and the liberal-bourgeois content of this trend have been recognised in official decisions (1908 and 1910; small wonder that the liquidators are afraid even to publish them in full!). The liquidators' liberal ideas are all linked up and of a piece: down with the "underground", down with the "pillars", for an open party, against the "strike craze", against the higher forms of the struggle, and so forth. In liberal-bourgeois "society" the liquidators have long enjoyed the strong sympathy of the Cadets and of the non-Party (and near Party) intellectuals. Liquidationism is a serious trend, only not a Marxist, not a proletarian trend, but a liberal-bourgeois one. Only witless people can talk about "peace" with the liquidators.

Now take the other groups which pose as "trends". We shall enumerate them: 1) the *Vperyod* group plus Alexinsky; 2) ditto plus Bogdanov; 3) ditto plus Voinov; 4) the Plekhanovites; 5) the "pro-Party Bolsheviks" (actually conciliators: Mark Sommer and his crowd); 6) the Trotskyists (i.e., Trotsky even minus Semkovsky); 7) the "Caucasians" (i.e., An minus the Caucasus).

We have enumerated the groups mentioned *in the press*. In Russia and abroad they have stated that they want to be *separate* "trends" and groups. We have tried to list all the Russian groups, omitting the non-Russian.

All these groups, without exception, represent sheer adventurism.

"Why? Where is the proof?" the reader will ask.

Proof is provided by the history of the last decade (1904-14), which is most eventful and significant. During these ten years members of these groups have displayed the most helpless, most pitiful, most ludicrous vacillation on serious questions of tactics and organisation, and have shown their *utter inability* to create trends with roots among the masses.

Take Plekhanov, the best of them. The services he rendered in the past were immense. During the twenty years between 1883 and 1903 he wrote a large number of splendid essays, especially those against the opportunists, Machists and Narodniks.

But since 1903 Plekhanov has been vacillating in the most ludicrous manner on questions of tactics and organisation: 1) 1903, August—a Bolshevik; 2) 1903, November (*Iskra* No. 52)—in favour of peace with the "*opportunist*" Mensheviks; 3) 1903, December—a Menshevik, and an ardent one; 4) 1905, spring—after the victory of the Bolsheviks—in favour of "unity" between "brothers at strife"; 5) the end of 1905 till mid-1906—a Menshevik; 6) mid-1906—started, on and off, to move away from the Mensheviks, and in London, in 1907, censured them (Cherevanin's admission) for their "organisational anarchism"; 7) 1908—a break with the liquidators; 8) 1914—a new turn towards the liquidators. Plekhanov advocates "unity" with them, without being able to utter an intelligible word to explain on what *terms* this unity is to be achieved, why unity with *Mr*. Potresov

has become possible, and what guarantees there are that any terms agreed to will be carried out.

After a decade of such experience we can safely say that Plekhanov is capable of producing ripples, but he has not produced, nor will he ever produce, a "trend".

We quite understand the Pravdists, who willingly published Plekhanov's articles against the liquidators. They could not very well reject articles which, in full accord with the decisions of 1908-10, were directed against the liquidators. Now Plekhanov has begun to repeat—with the liquidators, with Bogdanov and the rest—phrases about the unity of "all trends". We emphatically condemn this line, which should be relentlessly combated.

Nowhere in the world do the workers' parties unite groups of intellectuals and "trends"; they unite *workers* on the following terms: (1) recognition and application of definite Marxist decisions on questions of tactics and organisation; (2) submission of the minority of class-conscious workers to the majority.

This unity, on the basis of absolute repudiation of the opponents of the "underground", was achieved by the Pravdists in the course of two-and-a-half years (1912-14) to the extent of four-fifths. Witless people may abuse the Pravdists and call them factionalists, splitters, and so forth, but these phrases and abuse will not wipe out the unity of the workers....

Plekhanov now threatens to destroy this unity of the majority. We calmly and firmly say to the workers: put no faith in words. Put them to the test of facts, and you will see that every step taken by every one of the above-mentioned adventurist groups more and more glaringly reveals their helpless and pitiful vacillation.

Rabochy No. 7,
June 9, 1914
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in *Rabochy*

THE LIQUIDATORS AND THE DECISIONS OF THE LETTISH MARXISTS

What worker does not remember the noise the liquidators raised when, in a special issue of our newspaper, we acquainted the reader with the latest decisions of the Lettish Marxists and remarked that the Letts had paid tribute to the spirit of compromise while at the same time dealing a death blow at the liquidationist August bloc.*

The liquidators have used every means in their power to challenge this conclusion. All the resourcefulness of Martov, all the ... truthfulness of Dan, all the wit and brilliant literary talent of Semkovsky and Yonov—everything has been mobilised for this purpose. The liquidators have been determined at all cost to "prove" that the Lettish Congress did not condemn the liquidators, did not come out against the August bloc, and so on and so forth. In a word, "It's not me, it's not my horse, I'm not the driver".**

Now, after a lapse of only two or three months, the journal of the liquidators themselves (*Nasha Zarya* No. 4) has published an article by Mr. Weiss, the most "prominent" Lettish liquidator, who *fully confirms* our own appraisal of events.

Mr. Weiss is a most vigorous opponent of ours. He heaps harsh "criticism" on the Russian "Leninists" and the Lettish majority. However, he has the courage to openly admit defeat, while promising to go on fighting for his liquidationist views. He does not shift and shuffle; he does not, like Semkovsky, try to prove that white is black and vice versa. One may sharply dispute with such an opponent,

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* See pp. 177-85 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** A Russian proverb.—*Ed.*

but he nevertheless commands respect for not having recourse to the trivial methods of the Semkovskys.

Mr. Weiss writes:

> "The predominant tendency there [at the Congress] among the Lettish Marxists, by a majority of one, and, on some questions, a majority of two votes, was one of sympathy ... with the 'Lenin circle'."
>
> "The Fourth Congress of the Lettish Marxists is an attempt to revert to the old ... Bolshevik ideology."
>
> "The resolution on the Duma group was adopted unanimously. It was a big concession *on the part of the minority* of the Congress [that is, a concession to the "Leninists"]."
>
> "The Lenin circle can count on the official support of the Letts", and so on.

The writer makes the reservation that "the minority succeeded somewhat in marring Lenin's triumph". He calls (and rightly so!) "curious" the concessions made by the majority to the conciliators.

But he clearly and unequivocally recognises the fact that the Congress took an anti-liquidationist stand, and, on the main issue, took sides with the Pravdists.

It is the same old story. For two or three months the liquidators raise a hullabaloo, only to admit afterwards that it was we who correctly presented the facts in the first instance.

To what lengths the liquidators sometimes go in their striving to "explain" unpalatable Party decisions can be seen from the following. In December 1908, as is known, the all-Russia conference of Marxists *rejected* the proposal to amalgamate with Jagiello's party (the P.S.P.). This was done in the most emphatic form—by proceeding with the agenda without debating the motion for amalgamation with the non-Social-Democratic party of deputy Jagiello. At their Congress in 1914, the Letts endorsed all the decisions adopted in 1908, thereby declaring their refusal to have the non-Social-Democrat Jagiello admitted to the Social-Democratic group. This decision is most unpalatable to the liquidators.

And yet in *Zeit*, the newspaper of the Jewish liquidators, we find this decision "explained" in the following manner:

> "What does proceeding with the agenda mean? It means that the meeting does not want to put the motion to the vote, does not want

either to reject or adopt it. In such cases it calls the next business. The question of amalgamation with the Jagiello trend was simply left open [!] at the meeting of 1908." (*Zeit* No. 17.)

Is not such an "explanation" of Party decisions sheer ... impudence?

When the liquidators' proposal for amalgamation with the Jagiello trend was rejected, F. Dan wrote at the time (in 1908) in his official press report:

"At the proposal of the Polish delegation [the Polish Social-Democrats] the conference refused even to discuss our resolution and passed on to the next business. In this minor fact, circle intolerance and circle habits of thought have apparently reached their uttermost limit." (F. Dan's Report, p. 45.)

F. Dan used this strong language because he knew that proceeding with the agenda meant a *flat rejection* of the proposal for amalgamation with Jagiello's non-Social-Democratic party. And now this flat rejection is "explained" to us as meaning that the question has been "left open", and that everyone is free to decide it in his own way! This is really the last straw in the flouting of Marxist decisions.

No amount of wriggling will help the liquidators. The Marxist line has been endorsed by life itself. Events in the Lettish Social-Democratic movement confirm this no less strikingly than the entire course of the working-class movement throughout Russia does.

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THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS PRESS

There is nothing more important to class-conscious workers than to have an *understanding of the significance* of their movement and a *thorough knowledge* of it. The only source of strength of the working-class movement—and an invincible one at that—is the class-consciousness of the workers and the broad scope of their struggle, that is, the participation in it of the *masses* of the wage-workers.

The St. Petersburg Marxist press, which has been in existence for years, publishes exclusive, excellent, indispensable and easily verifiable material on the scope of the working-class movement and the various trends predominating in it. Only those who wish to conceal the truth can ignore this material, as the liberals and liquidators do.

Complete figures concerning the collections made for the Pravdist (Marxist) and liquidationist newspapers in St. Petersburg for the period between January 1 and May 13, 1914, have been compiled by Comrade V.A.T.[170] We publish his table below in full, and shall quote round figures in the body of this article as occasion arises, so as not to burden the reader with statistics.

The following is Comrade V.A.T.'s table. (See pp. 364-65.)

First of all we shall deal with the figures showing the *number* of workers' groups. These figures cover the whole period of existence of the Pravdist and liquidationist newspapers. Number of *workers*' groups:

	Supporting the Pravdist newspapers	Supporting the liquidationist newspapers
For 1912	620	89
For 1913	2,181	661
1914, from Jan. 1 to May 13 .	2,873	667
Total	5,674	1,421

Collections for Marxist (Pravdist) and from January 1

Collections made by	St. Petersburg				Moscow			
	Pravdist		Liquidationist		Pravdist		Liquidationist	
	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)
Workers' groups . . .	2,024	13,943.24	308	2,231.98	130	865.00	25	263.52
Total from non-workers	325	1,256.92	165	1,799.40	46	260.51	24	1,137.30
including:								
Student and youth groups	26	369.49	19	292.13	8	119.30	3	21.00
Groups of "adherents", "friends", etc.	8	164.00	14	429.25	8	42.10	5	892.00
Other groups	2	8.00	6	72.60	1	2.00	—	—
Individuals	281	650.96	120	966.72	29	61.63	14	197.80
Unspecified	8	64.47	6	38.70	2	33.50	2	26.50
From abroad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total . . .	2,349	15,200.16	473	4,103.38	176	1,125.51	49	1,400.82

Liquidationist newspapers in St. Petersburg to May 13, 1914

Provinces				Total			
Pravdist		Liquidationist		Pravdist		Liquidationist	
Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)	Number of collections	Sum collected (rubles)
719	4,125.86	338	2,800.62	2,873	18,934.10	671	5,296.12
332	1,082.79	230	2,113.90	713	2,650.01	453	6,759.77
20	162.13	23	317.09	54	650.92	45	630.22
28	252.72	35	1,129.35	42	458.82	54	2,450.60
30	115.29	24	113.52	33	125.29	30	186.12
221	332.05	132	443.80	531	1,046.62	266	1,608.32
33	220.60	16	110.14	43	318.57	24	175.34
—	—	—	—	10	49.79	34	1,709.17
1,051	5,208.65	568	4,914.52	3,586	21,584.11	1,124	12,055.89

The total number of groups is 7,095. Of course, there are groups which made several collections, but separate data for these are not available.

We see that *only* one-fifth of the total number of workers' groups are in sympathy with the liquidators. In two-and-a-half years, Pravdism, Pravdist decisions and Pravdist tactics have *united* four-fifths of Russia's class-conscious workers. This fact of workers' unity can well bear comparison with the phrases about "unity" uttered by the various grouplets of intellectuals, the Vperyodists, Plekhanovites, Trotskyists, etc., etc.

Let us compare the figures for 1913 and 1914 (those for 1912 are not comparable, because *Pravda* appeared in April, and *Luch* five months later). We shall find that the number of Pravdist groups has grown by 692, *i.e.*, *31.7 per cent*, whereas the liquidationist groups have gone up by 10, *i.e.*, *1.5 per cent*. Hence, the workers' readiness to support the Pravdist newspapers has grown *20 times as fast* as their readiness to support the liquidationist newspapers.

Let us see how the workers in various parts of Russia are divided according to trend:

	Per cent of total workers' groups	
	Pravdist	Liquidationist
St. Petersburg	86	14
Moscow	83	17
Provinces	68	32

The inference is clear: the more politically developed the masses of the workers are, and the higher their level of class-consciousness and political activity, *the higher* is the number of Pravdists among them. In St. Petersburg the liquidators have been almost completely dislodged (fourteen out of a hundred); they still have a precarious hold in the provinces (32 out of 100), where the masses are politically less educated.

It is highly instructive to note that figures from an entirely different source, namely, those giving the number of workers' delegates elected during the Insurance Board elections, tally to a remarkable degree with those of the workers' groups. During the election of the Metropolitan Insurance Board, 37 Pravdist and 7 liquidationist delegates were

elected, i.e., 84 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Of the total number of delegates elected, the Pravdists constituted 70 per cent (37 out of 53), and at the election of the *All-Russia* Insurance Board they obtained 47 out of 57, i.e., 82 per cent. The liquidators, non-party people and Narodniks form a small minority of workers, who still remain under bourgeois influence.

To proceed. The following are interesting figures on the average amounts collected by workers' groups:

	Average amounts collected by workers' groups	
	Pravdist (rubles)	Liquidationist (rubles)
St. Petersburg	6.88	7.24
Moscow	6.65	10.54
Provinces	5.74	8.28
Whole of Russia	6.58	7.89

The Pravdist groups show a natural, understandable and, so to speak, normal tendency: the average contribution from the average workers' group rises with the increase in the average earnings of the working masses.

In the case of the liquidators, we see, apart from the spurt in the Moscow groups (of which there are only 25 in all!), that the average contributions from the provincial groups are *higher* than those from the St. Petersburg groups! How are we to explain this odd phenomenon?

Only a more detailed analysis of the figures could provide a satisfactory reply to this question, but that would be a laborious task. Our conjecture is that the liquidators unite the minority of the higher-paid workers in certain sections of industry. It has been observed all over the world that such workers cling to liberal and opportunist ideas. In St. Petersburg, the longest to put up with the liquidators were the printing workers, and it was only during the last elections in their Union, on April 27, 1914, that the Pravdists won half the seats on the Executive and a majority of the seats for alternate members. In all countries the printers are most inclined towards opportunism, and some grades among them are highly paid workers.

If our conclusion about the minority of the workers, the labour aristocracy, being in sympathy with the liquidators

is merely conjectural, there can be no doubt whatever where *individuals* are concerned. Of the contributions made by non-workers, *more than half* came from individuals (531 out of 713 in our case, 266 out of 453 in the case of the liquidators). The average contribution from this source in our case is R.1.97 whereas among the liquidators it is *R.6.05!*

In the first case, the contributions obviously came from lower-paid office workers, civil servants, etc., and from the petty-bourgeois elements of a semi-proletarian character. In the case of the liquidators, however, we see that they have rich friends among the bourgeoisie.

These rich friends from among the bourgeoisie take still more definite shape as "groups of adherents, friends, etc." These groups collected R.458.82 for us, i.e., two per cent of the total sum collected, the average donation per group being R.10.92, which is only half as much again as the average donation of workers' groups. For the liquidators, however, these groups collected R.2,450.60, i.e., over 20 per cent of the total sum collected, the average donation per group being *R.45.39*, i.e., *six times* the average collected by workers' groups!

To this we add the collections made abroad, where bourgeois students are the main contributors. We received R.49.79 from this source, i.e., less than one-fourth of one per cent; the liquidators received R.1,709.17, i.e., *14 per cent*.

If we add up individuals, "adherents and friends", and collections made abroad, the total amount collected from these sources will be as follows:

Pravdists—R.1,555.23, i.e., *7 per cent* of the total collections.

Liquidators—R.5,768.09, i.e., *48 per cent* of the total collections.

From this source we received less than one-tenth of what we received from the workers' groups (R.18,934). This source gave the liquidators *more* than they received from the workers' groups (R.5,296)!

The inference is clear: the liquidationist newspaper is *not* a workers' but a *bourgeois* newspaper. It is run mainly on funds contributed by *rich friends from among the bourgeoisie.*

As a matter of fact, the liquidators are far more dependent upon the bourgeoisie than our figures show. The Pravdist newspapers have *frequently* published their financial reports for public information. These reports have shown that our newspaper, by adding collections to its income, is paying its way. With a circulation of 40,000 (the average for May 1914), this is understandable, in spite of confiscations and a dearth of advertisements. The liquidators, however, published their report *only once* (*Luch* No. 101), showing a deficit of 4,000 rubles. After this, they adopted the usual bourgeois custom of not publishing reports. With a circulation of 15,000, their newspaper cannot avoid a deficit, and evidently this is covered again and again by their rich friends from among the bourgeoisie.

Liberal-labour politicians like to drop hints about an "*open* workers' party", but they do not like to *reveal* to genuine workers their actual dependence upon the bourgeoisie! It is left for us, "underground" workers, to teach the liquidator-liberals the benefit of open reports....

The overall ratio of worker and non-worker collections is as follows:

Collected by	Out of every ruble collected for	
	Pravdist newspapers	liquidationist newspapers
Workers	87 kopeks	44 kopeks
Non-workers . . .	13 "	56 "
Total	1.00 ruble	1.00 ruble

The Pravdists get one-seventh of their aid collections from the bourgeoisie and, as we have seen, from its most democratic and least wealthy sections. The liquidationist undertaking is *largely* a bourgeois undertaking, which is supported only by a minority of the workers.

The figures concerning the sources of funds also reveal to us the class status of the readers and buyers of the newspapers.

Voluntary contributions are made only by regular readers, who most intelligently sympathise with the trend of the given newspaper. In its turn, the trend of the given newspaper willy-nilly "adapts itself" to the more "influential" section of its reading public.

The deductions that follow from our figures are, first, theoretical, i.e., such as will help the working class to understand the conditions of its movement, and secondly, practical deductions, which will give us direct guidance in our activities.

It is sometimes said that there is not one working-class press in Russia, but two. Even Plekhanov repeated this statement not long ago. But that is not true. Those who say this betray sheer ignorance, if not a secret desire to help the liquidators spread bourgeois influence among the workers. Long ago and repeatedly (for example, in 1908 and 1910), the Party decisions clearly, definitely, and directly pointed to the bourgeois nature of liquidationism. Articles in the Marxist press have explained this truth hundreds of times.

The experience of a daily newspaper, which openly appeals to the masses, was bound to *disclose* the real *class* character of the liquidationist *trend*. And that is what it did. The liquidationist newspaper has indeed proved to be a bourgeois undertaking, which is supported by a minority of the workers.

Moreover, let us not forget that almost up to the spring of 1914 the liquidationist newspaper was the mouthpiece of the August bloc. It was only lately that the Letts withdrew from it, and Trotsky, Em-El, An, Buryanov and Yegorov have left, or are leaving, the liquidators. The break-up of the bloc is continuing. The near future is bound to reveal still more clearly the bourgeois character of the liquidationist *trend* and the sterility of the intellectualist *grouplets*, such as the Vperyodists, Plekhanovites, Trotskyists, etc.

The practical deductions may be summed up in the following points:

1) 5,674 workers' groups united by the Pravdists in less than two-and-a-half years is a fairly large number, considering the harsh conditions obtaining in Russia. But this is only a beginning. We need, not thousands, but tens of thousands of workers' groups. We must intensify our activities tenfold. Ten rubles collected in kopeks from hundreds of workers are more important and valuable, both from the ideological and organisational point of view, than a hundred rubles from rich friends among the bourgeoisie.

Even from the financial aspect, experience goes to prove that it is possible to run a well-established workers' newspaper with the aid of workers' kopeks, but impossible to do so with the aid of bourgeois rubles. The liquidationist undertaking is a bubble, which is bound to burst.

2) We lag behind in the provinces, where 32 per cent of the workers' groups support the liquidators! Every class-conscious worker must exert every effort to put an end to this lamentable and disgraceful state of affairs. We must bring all our weight to bear in the provinces.

3) The rural workers are apparently still almost untouched by the movement. Difficult as work in this field may be, we must press forward with it in the most vigorous manner.

4) Like a mother who carefully tends a sick child and gives it better nourishment, the class-conscious workers must take more care of the districts and factories where the workers are sick with liquidationism. This malady, which emanates from the bourgeoisie, is inevitable in a young working-class movement, but with proper care and persistent treatment, it will pass without any serious after-effects. To provide the sick workers with more plentiful nourishment in the shape of Marxist literature, to explain more carefully and in more popular form the history and tactics of the Party and the meaning of the Party decisions on the bourgeois nature of liquidationism, to explain at greater length the urgent necessity of proletarian unity, i.e., the submission of the minority of the workers to the majority, the submission of the one-fifth to the four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia—such are some of the most important tasks confronting us.

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Symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism*,
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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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LEFT-WING NARODISM AND MARXISM

Marxists have repeatedly spoken about the importance of the free mobilisation (i.e., the buying, selling and mortgaging) of peasant land. This real and practical problem affords a striking illustration of the petty-bourgeois and even *positively reactionary* character of our Narodniks.

All Narodniks, from the semi-Cadets of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* ("Social-Cadets" as Chernov, Vikhlayev and similar people once rightly called them) to the ultra-"Left" Narodniks of *Stoikaya Mysl*, are opposed to the free mobilisation of peasant land in general, and of allotment land in particular.

The Marxists, however, openly state in their *Programme* that they will "*always and invariably oppose any attempt to check the course of economic progress*".

The economic development of Russia, as of the whole world, proceeds from feudalism to capitalism, and through large-scale, machine, capitalist production to socialism.

Pipe-dreaming about a "different" way to socialism other than that which leads through the *further* development of capitalism, through large-scale, machine, *capitalist* production, is, in Russia, characteristic either of the liberal gentlemen, or of the backward, petty proprietors (the petty bourgeoisie). These dreams, which still clog the brains of the Left Narodniks, merely reflect the backwardness (reactionary nature) and feebleness of the petty bourgeoisie.

Class-conscious workers all over the world, Russia included, are becoming more and more convinced of the correctness of Marxism, for life itself is proving to them that only large-scale, machine production rouses the workers, enlightens and organises them, and creates the *objective* conditions for a *mass* movement.

When *Put Pravdy* reaffirmed the well-known Marxist axiom that capitalism is progressive as compared with feudalism,* and that the idea of checking the development of capitalism is a utopia, most absurd, reactionary, and harmful to the working people, Mr. N. Rakitnikov, the Left Narodnik (in *Smelaya Mysl* No. 7), accused *Put Pravdy* of having undertaken the "not very honourable task of putting a gloss upon the capitalist noose".

Anyone interested in Marxism and in the experience of the international working-class-movement would do well to ponder over this! One rarely meets with such amazing ignorance of Marxism as that displayed by Mr. N. Rakitnikov and the Left Narodniks, except perhaps among bourgeois economists.

Can it be that Mr. Rakitnikov has not read *Capital*, or *The Poverty of Philosophy*, or *The Communist Manifesto*? If he has not, then it is pointless to talk about socialism. That will be a ridiculous waste of time.

If he has read them, then he ought to know that the *fundamental* idea running through *all* Marx's works, an idea which since Marx has been confirmed in all countries, is that capitalism is *progressive* as compared with feudalism. It is in this sense that Marx and all Marxists "put a gloss" (to use Rakitnikov's clumsy and stupid expression) "upon the capitalist noose"!

Only anarchists or petty-bourgeois, who do not understand the conditions of historical development, can say: a feudal noose or a capitalist one—it makes no difference, for both are nooses! That means confining oneself to *condemnation*, and failing to understand the *objective* course of economic development.

Condemnation means our subjective dissatisfaction. The objective course of feudalism's evolution into capitalism enables *millions* of working people—thanks to the growth of cities, railways, large factories and the migration of workers—to *escape* from a condition of feudal torpor. Capitalism itself rouses and organises them.

Both feudalism and capitalism oppress the workers and strive to keep them in ignorance. But feudalism *can* keep,

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* See pp. 298-301 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and *for centuries* has kept, millions of peasants in a downtrodden state (for example, in Russia from the ninth to the nineteenth century, in China for even more centuries). But capitalism *cannot* keep the workers in a state of immobility, torpor, downtroddenness and ignorance.

The centuries of feudalism were centuries of torpor for the working people.

The decades of capitalism have roused millions of wage-workers.

Your failure to understand this, gentlemen of the Left-Narodnik fraternity, shows that you do not understand a thing about socialism, or that you are converting socialism from a struggle of millions engendered by objective conditions into a benevolent old gentleman's fairy-tale!

To advocate the slightest *restriction of the freedom* to mobilise allotment land *actually* amounts to becoming a reactionary, an abettor of the feudalists.

Restriction of the freedom to mobilise allotment land *retards* economic development, *hinders* the formation, growth, awakening and organisation of the wage-worker class, *worsens* the conditions of the workers and peasants, and *increases* the influence of the feudalists.

The Peshekhonovs and Rakitnikovs are *in fact* abettors of precisely these "categories", when they advocate restriction of the freedom to mobilise peasant land.

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN RUSSIA

The agrarian question in Russia is of tremendous importance at the present time. It is common knowledge that this question has been given front-rank prominence, not only by the broad masses of the people, but also by the government.

Historically, the movement of 1905 was characterised precisely by the fact that the vast majority of the population in Russia, namely, the peasantry, made the agrarian question a key issue. Both the liberal-bourgeois party and the workers' party took this fact into consideration in their respective programmes. On the other hand, when the government, in its June Third regime, brought about an alliance between the landlords and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie, it made the agrarian question the pivot of its policy (the forcible destruction of communal landownership and the conversion of allotment land into private property, mainly in the homestead system).

What is the economic essence of the agrarian question in Russia? It is the reorganisation of Russia on bourgeois-democratic lines. Russia has become a capitalist, bourgeois country, but the system of landownership in this country has to a very large degree remained feudal, as regards both landlordism and peasant allotment ownership. In very many cases the system of land economy has remained feudal: labour service and the corvée, under which the semi-ruined, pauperised, and starving petty proprietors rent land, grassland and pastures and borrow money from the landlords; with the obligation to repay the debt by working on the "squire's" land.

The more feudalist rural Rus lags behind industrial, commercial, capitalist Russia, the more complete will be

the inevitable break-up of the ancient, feudalist system of landownership, both landlordism and allotment ownership.

The landlords tried to effect this break-up in the landlord fashion, to suit the interests of the landlords, retaining their own landed estates, and helping the kulaks to grab the peasants' land. The majority of the peasants tried to do this in peasant fashion, to suit the interests of the peasants.

In either case the reform *remains bourgeois in character*. In his *Poverty of Philosophy*, in *Capital*, and in *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Marx amply proved that the bourgeois economists often demanded the *nationalisation* of the land, i.e., the conversion of all land into public property, and that this measure was a *fully bourgeois* measure. Capitalism will develop more widely, more freely and more quickly from such a measure. This measure is very progressive and very democratic. It will do away completely with serfdom, will break the monopoly in land, and will abolish *absolute* rent (the existence of which the liquidator P. Maslov, trailing in the wake of bourgeois scholars, erroneously denies). It will speed up the development of the productive forces in agriculture and purge the class movement among the wage-workers.

But, we repeat, this is a *bourgeois*-democratic measure. Like Mr. V—dimov in *Smelaya Mysl*, the Left Narodniks persist in calling the *bourgeois* nationalisation of the land "*socialisation*" and persistently ignore Marx's comprehensive explanations of what nationalisation of land under capitalism implies.

The Left Narodniks persist in reiterating the purely bourgeois theory of "labour economy" and its development under "socialisation", whereas, in fact, with the nationalisation of the land, it is *capitalist* landownership in its purest form, free of feudalism, that will inevitably develop more widely and quickly.

The catchword of "socialisation of the land" merely denotes the Left Narodniks' utter failure to grasp the principles of Marx's political economy, and the fact that they are going over (stealthily, by fits and starts, and often unconsciously) to the side of bourgeois political economy.

PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Marx advised class-conscious workers, while forming a clear idea of the bourgeois character of all agrarian reforms under capitalism (including the nationalisation of the land), to support bourgeois-democratic reforms as against the feudalists and serfdom. But Marxists cannot confuse bourgeois measures with socialism.

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THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF VITUPERATION

(ON THE QUESTION OF UNITY)

Can abusive language have political significance?—the reader will ask.

Undoubtedly. Here is an example taken from a field all class-conscious workers are interested in.

We, Pravdists, are abused for "usurpers", people who seize power illegally. *In March 1912*, the Plekhanovites, Vperyodists, Trotskyists, the liquidators, and a host of other groups "united" to abuse us in this way.

Now, *in June 1914*, after a lapse of two odd years, the supporters of *Yedinstvo*, the liquidators, Vperyodists, Trotskyists and probably a dozen other groups, are once more "*uniting*" to abuse us.

To help the reader grasp the political significance of this vituperation, we ask him to recall certain elementary things that the supporters of *Yedinstvo* and Co. are trying to "talk away" with their clamour and abuse.

"They" have all declared the Conference of January 1912 to be an act of usurpation, illegal seizure of power. That Conference, they argue, had no right to call itself the supreme organ of the entire Marxist body.

Splendid, gentlemen! But see how the *political facts* expose the inanity and falsity of your phrases.

Let us assume that you are right, and that the Conference of January 1912 was an "illegal seizure of power". What follows from that?

It follows that all the groups, trends and circles, and all the Social-Democrats who resented this "illegal seizure of power", should have *stood up for* the "law". Is that not so? They should have united, not only to vilify the usurpers, but also *to overthrow them*.

This would seem indisputable, would it not?

It would seem that the brave Plekhanov, the courageous Trotsky, the bold Vperyodists and the noble liquidators *could not* have united to abuse the usurpers *without also* uniting *for the purpose of overthrowing the usurpers*.

If our heroes had not done that, they would have shown themselves to be mere windbags, would they not?

And what had to be done to overthrow the "usurpers"?

All that the noble protestants against usurpation had to do was to get together *without* the usurpers, condemn them, and show the workers a *practical example*, *a fact*—a fact and not promises, deeds and not phrases—of what legitimate bodies are like, as distinct from usurpatory ones.

Only a person who regards all class-conscious workers in Russia as idiots could fail to agree that what these workers would have done, on seeing the united activities of the noble protestants against the "usurpers", would be to support these protestants, throw out the usurpers, and treat them with ridicule and scorn!

Clear enough, it would seem?

One would think it absolutely indisputable that it was *the bounden duty*, not only of every Marxist, but of every self-respecting democrat, to unite with all opponents of "usurpation", with the purpose of *overthrowing* the usurpers.

But actually?

What actually happened?

What happened *two years after* our noble opponents of "usurpation" took the field against the usurpers?

What happened was that the "usurpers" united $\frac{4}{5}$ (*four-fifths*) of all the class-conscious workers of Russia around their decisions.

For two-and-a-half years, from January 1, 1912, to May 13, 1914, the Pravdist newspapers received financial support from 5,674 workers' groups, while the noble opponents of "usurpation", the liquidators and their friends, received the support of 1,421 workers' groups.

The "usurpers" brought about the *unity* of four-fifths of the workers of Russia, not merely in word, but in deed.

The noble enemies of "usurpation", however, went up in smoke, for their August bloc collapsed; Trotsky, the Letts,

the Caucasian leaders, etc., fell away in *separate* little groups, *which*, *in the actual movement*, *proved to be mere cyphers*, both individually and collectively.

How is this miracle to be explained?

How could four-fifths of the workers stand *for* vile "usurpation" *against* the numerous, manifold, noble enemies of usurpation who represented "*a multitude of trends*"?

Reader, this could and had to happen for the following reason: in politics abusive language often serves as a screen for utter lack of principles and sterility, impotence, angry impotence, on the part of those who use such language.

That is all there is to it.

But in spite of all the abuse that is heaped on the Pravdists, "usurpers", Leninists, etc., the class-conscious workers are uniting, and will continue to unite, around the principles and tactics of consistent Marxism. Despite all this kind of language, they recognise *unity only from below*, *the unity of the workers based on condemnation of liquidationism*, on acceptance of all the decisions of the "entire Marxist body". The-subordination of the minority to the majority, not compromise with intellectualist groups—only this can serve as the principle of the working-class movement.

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OBJECTIVE DATA ON THE STRENGTH OF THE VARIOUS TRENDS IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT[171]

There can be no more important duty for class-conscious workers than that of *getting to know* their class movement, its nature, its aims and objects, its conditions and practical forms. That is because the strength of the working-class movement lies entirely in its political consciousness, and its *mass* character. At each step in its development, capitalism increases the number of proletarians, wage-workers; it rallies, organises and enlightens them, and in this way moulds a class force that must inevitably march towards its goal.

The Marxists' programme and their decisions on tactics, as constantly expounded in the press, help the masses of the workers to understand the nature, aims and objects of the movement.

The struggle between the various trends in the working-class movement of Russia has deep class roots. The two "trends" which are fighting Marxism (Pravdism) in the working-class movement of Russia and which, because of their mass form and their roots in history, deserve to be called "trends", i.e., Narodism and liquidationism, express the bourgeoisie's influence on the proletariat. This has been explained many times by the Marxists and acknowledged in a number of decisions adopted by them in regard to the Narodniks (the fight against whom has been going on for thirty years) and in regard to the liquidators (the history of liquidationism goes back about twenty years, for liquidationism is the direct continuation of Economism and Menshevism).

More *objective* data on the strength of the different trends in Russia's working-class movement are now steadily accumulating. Every effort must be made to collect, verify and study these objective data concerning the behaviour and moods, not of individuals or groups, but of the *masses*, data taken from different and *hostile* newspapers, data that are *verifiable* by any literate person.

Only from such data can one learn and study the movement of one's class. One of the greatest, if not the greatest, faults (or crimes against the working class) of the Narodniks and liquidators, as well as of the various groups of intellectuals such as the Vperyodists, Plekhanovites and Trotskyists, is their *subjectivism*. At every step they try to pass off their desires, their "views", their appraisals of the situation and their "plans", as the will of the workers, the needs of the working-class movement. When they talk about "unity", for example, they majestically ignore the *experience* acquired in creating the genuine unity of the *majority* of Russia's class-conscious workers in the course of two-and-a-half years, from the beginning of 1912 to the middle of 1914.

Let us then tabulate the available *objective* data on the strength of the various trends in the working-class movement. Those who believe in subjective appraisals and promises are free to go to the "groups". We invite only those who desire to study objective figures. Here they are:

	Pravdists	Liquidators	Per cent		Left Narodniks
			Pravdists	Liquidators	
Duma Elections					
1. Number of deputies elected by worker curia:					
Second Duma, 1907	11	12	47	53	—
Third Duma, 1907-12 . . .	4	4	50	50	boycott
Fourth Duma, 1912	6	3	67	33	

Объективная декада о силе течений в рабочем движении России.

	Прав. цифры	Лиц. цифры	Процентъ прав. %	Процентъ лиц. %	Левые подписи
1. Выборы в Г. Думу. Число депутатов рабочей курии: II Дума, 1907 г.	11	12	47	53	—
III Дума, 1907-1912	4	4	50	50	} бойкот
IV Дума, 1912	6	3	67	33	
2. Число рабочих групп, дававших денежные взносы в газеты (в сотн.): 1912	620	89	—	—	—
1913	2181	661	76,3	23,1	264
1914 (по 1 мая)	2873	671	81,1	18,9	524
3. Денежные сборы на газеты. Процент сборов не от рабочих (с 1 янв. по 1 мая 1914 г.)	—	—	13	56	50
4. Тиражи (с 1 янв.) газет (данные, соц. и нелег. Д. Кондуровой)	40.000	160.000	71,2	28,8	12.000 (из 6 милл.)
5. Число рабочих групп, обращавшихся с разными вопросами в ГД и другие думские фракции (с 1913 по 6 июня 1914 г.)	1295	215	85,7	14,3	—
6. Денежные суммы, проходившие через ГД и другие думские фракции. Процент сумм не от рабочих (с окт. 1913 г. по 6 июня 1914 г.)	—	—	6	46	—
7. Выборы в всероссийские профессиональные союзы. Число уполномоченных	47	10	82,4	17,6	? 1–2 ?
8. Выборы в губернские профессиональные союзы. Число уполномоченных	37	7	84,1	15,9	4
9. Число денежных фондов, капитальные издания за все время	3	1	—	—	?
10. Из каких процентов фондов состоят издания, находящиеся у буржуазных (нейтральных, т. е. буржуазные)	—	—	0	100	?
11. Число подписей, данных в обоих газетах, за ГД и другие думские фракции (6-ти и 7-ми)	6722	2985	69,2	31,8	—
12. Зарубежная печать. Число номеров руководящей газеты, вышедших после августовской (1912 г.) конференции ликвидаторов по июнь 1914 г.	5	0	—	—	9
13. Число указаний в этих номерах на неотложность фракционной (кадры, школы, страхкассы и т. д.)	44	0	—	—	21
14. Число корреспонденций, в данных исключительно за рабочих, а не от всех классов и буржуазных групп, без участия редакции	0	5 (6,2%)	—	—	0
15. Профессиональных союзов, в которых большинство членов (а не только руководящие) состоит из рабочих (а не сл.)	~~29~~ 14	~~3~~ 4	~~91~~ 77,8	~~11~~ 22,2	~~8~~ 2

A page of Lenin's manuscript with a rough draft of his table to the article "Objeective Data on the Strength of the Various Trends in the Working-Class Movement". June 1914
Reduced

	Pravdists	Liquidators	Per cent		Left Narodniks
			Pravdists	Liquidators	
Number of Workers' Groups Which Donated Funds:					
2. Number of contributions by workers' groups to St. Petersburg newspapers:					
1912	620	89	—	—	—
1913	2,181	661	76.9	23.1	264
up to May 13, 1914	2,873	671	81.1	18.9	524
Election of Workers' Delegates to Insurance Boards:					
3. Number of delegates to All-Russia Insurance Board . .	47	10	82.4	17.6	?1-2?
4. Ditto Metropolitan Insurance Board	37	7	84.2	15.9	4
Signatures to Resolutions in Favour of Each of the Duma Groups:					
5. Number of signatures published in both newspapers in favour of the Six (Pravdist) and for the Seven (liquidators)	6,722	2,985	69.2	30.8	—
Connection with Workers' Groups:					
6. Number of contribution letters from workers' groups to either of the Duma Groups (Oct. 1913 to June 6, 1914)	1,295	215	85.7	14.3	—
Circulation of St. Petersburg newspapers:					
7. Number of copies printed (figured collected and published by E. Vandervelde)	40,000	16,000	71.4	28.6	12,300 (3 times a week)

	Pravdists	Liquidators	Per cent		Left Narodniks
			Pravdists	Liquidators	
Press Abroad:					
8. Number of issues of the leading newspaper published after August (1912) Conference of liquidators up to June 1914	5	0	—	—	9
9. Number of references in these issues to *non*-legal organisations (one locality counted as one reference) .	44	0	—	—	21
Dependence on the Bourgeoisie:					
10. Funds collected for St. Petersburg newspapers (from January 1 to May 13, 1914). Percentage of contributions from *non*-workers	—	—	13	56	50
11. Number of financial reports published in the newspapers during entire period . . .	3	1	—	—	?(0?)
12. Percentage of such reports showing deficits covered from unspecified, i.e., bourgeois sources	—	—	0	100	?
13. Funds handled by either of the Duma groups (from October 1913 to June 6, 1914). Percentage of funds obtained from non-workers . . .	—	—	6	46	—
14. Number of items of correspondence passed off as coming from workers, but actually taken from bourgeois newspapers without indicating source	—	5 (in two issues, Nos. 17 and 19 of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*			0

	Pravdists	Liquidators	Per cent		Left Narodniks
			Pravdists	Liquidators	
Trade Unions:					
15. Number of trade unions in St. Petersburg in which majority of members (judging by majority of executives) sympathise with respective trends	$14\frac{1}{2}$*	$3\frac{1}{2}$*	—	—	2

First of all we shall briefly explain the above figures and then draw the conclusions that follow from them.

It will be best to make the explanations point by point.

Point 1. Figures showing the number of electors and delegates elected are *not available*. To complain about our using "curia" figures is simply ridiculous, for no other are available. The German Social-Democrats measure their successes under the Bismarck electoral law, which excludes women and thereby creates a "male" curia!

Point 2. The number of workers' groups which pay and not only "sign resolutions" is the most reliable and true criterion, not only of the strength of the trend, but also of its state of organisation and its Party spirit.

That is why the liquidators and the "groups" betray such subjective dislike for this criterion.

The liquidators argued: We have also a Yiddish and a Georgian newspapers, but the *Pravda* stands alone. That is not true. Firstly, the Estonian and Lithuanian newspapers are Pravdist.[172] Secondly, if we take the provinces, is it permissible to forget Moscow? During 1913 the Moscow workers' newspaper[173] rallied, united *390* workers' groups (*Rabochy* No. 1, p. 19), whereas the Yiddish newspaper *Zeit*, from issue No. 2 (December 29, 1912) to June 1, 1914, united *296* workers' groups (of these 190 were united up to

* In one union the Pravdists and liquidators had an equal number of supporters.

March 20, 1914, and 106 from March 20 to June 1, 1914). Thus, Moscow alone amply "covered" the liquidators' subjective reference to *Zeit*!

We invite the Georgian and Armenian comrades to collect data on the liquidators' newspapers in the Caucasus. How many workers' groups are there? Objective data covering all aspects are needed.

Mistakes in counting the groups may have been made, but only in individual cases. We invite everybody to verify the figures and correct them.

Points 3 and 4 require no explanation. It would be desirable to initiate an enquiry for the purpose of collecting *new* data from the provinces.

Point 5. The 2,985 liquidator signatures *include* 1,086 Bundist and 719 Caucasian signatures. It is desirable that the local comrades verify these figures.

Point 6. The treasurers of the two groups publish reports *of all* funds each group receives for various objects. These figures serve as an exact and objective index of contacts with the workers.

Point 7. Circulation of newspapers. The figures were collected and published by E. Vandervelde but hushed up by the liquidators and the liberals (*Kievskaya Mysl*). "Subjectivism." It is desirable that fuller figures be collected, if only for one month.

Points 8 and 9. Here we have an objective illustration of the liquidators' renunciation of the "underground", i.e., of the Party. But from January 1 to May 13, 1914, receipts from abroad gave the Pravdists R.49.79 (one-fourth of one per cent) and the liquidators R.1,709.17 (fourteen per cent). Don't say, "I can't"; say, "I don't want to"!

Points 10 to 14. These are objective evidence of the dependence of the liquidators and Narodniks on the bourgeoisie, evidence of their bourgeois character. *Subjectively*, the liquidators and Narodniks are "socialists" and "Social-Democrats". *Objectively*, both as regards the substance of their *ideas* as well as the *experience* of the mass movement, they are groups of bourgeois intellectuals, which are splitting the minority of workers away from the workers' party.

We especially draw our readers' attention to the way in which the liquidators fake workers' correspondence. This

is an unprecedented and downright fraud! Let all Marxists in the localities expose this fraud and collect objective data (see *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 12, June 11, 1914[174]).

Point 15. These figures are particularly important and ought to be supplemented and verified by means of a separate enquiry. We have taken the figures from *Sputnik Rabochego*, Priboi Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1914.[175] Among the unions included in the liquidators' list were the Clerks' Union, the Draftsmen's Union, and the Druggist Employees' Union (at the last election of the Executive of the Printers' Union on April 27, 1914, half the members of the Executive and more than half of the alternate members elected were Pravdists). The Narodnik list of unions includes the Bakers' Union and the Case-Makers' Union. Aggregate membership about 22,000.

Of the thirteen unions in Moscow, ten are Pravdist and three indefinite, although they are closer to the Pravdists. There is not a single liquidationist or Narodnik union in Moscow.

The conclusions to be drawn from these objective data are that Pravdism is the only Marxist, proletarian trend, really independent of the bourgeoisie, and has organised and united *over* four-fifths of the workers (in 1914, 81.1 per cent of the workers' groups as compared with the liquidators). Liquidationism and Narodism are undoubtedly bourgeois-democratic, not working-class trends.

The correctness of the Pravdists' programmatic, tactical and organisational ideas, their decisions and line has been wholly and splendidly confirmed by the experience of the mass movement in 1912, 1913 and half of 1914. From our conviction that we are on the right road we should draw the strength for still greater efforts.

Trudovaya Pravda No. 25,
June 26, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Trudovaya Pravda*

HOW STRONG IS THE LEFT-NARODNIK TREND AMONG THE WORKERS

Throughout the world a section of the workers, as is well known, still follows the lead of various bourgeois parties. During the period of bourgeois-democratic reform in Russia, a minority of the class-conscious workers still follows the lead of the bourgeois group of liquidationist writers, and of the bourgeois-democratic Narodnik trend.

It has been reiterated many times in precise, clearly formulated and official *decisions* of the Marxists (1903, 1907 and 1913)[176] that the entire Narodnik trend, including the Left Narodniks, is a bourgeois (peasant) democracy in Russia. That some of the workers should follow the lead of the Left Narodniks, who describe radical *peasant* (but in substance downright *bourgeois*) demands as "socialism", is quite natural in a capitalist country during an intense movement against survivals of serfdom.

But exactly which section of the class-conscious workers follows the lead of the Left Narodniks?

Sovremennik, one of the most unprincipled intellectualist journals, which (on the basis of false phrases) "unites" the Left Narodniks, Plekhanov, and Mr. Potresov and Co., recently stated that "about" one-third of the workers follow the lead of the Left Narodniks.

This is a barefaced, deliberate lie, like those commonly uttered by the liquidators.

As far as we know, only three sets of objective data showing the degree of influence the Left Narodniks exercise among the workers are available. These are, firstly, the circulation figures of the newspapers. Secondly, the figures showing the number of workers' groups which have collected funds.

Thirdly, the figures showing the number of delegates elected to the Metropolitan Insurance Board.

We shall compare these data, which differ from the barefaced lies of Martov, Himmer and Co. in that *anybody* can find them in open and public sources appertaining to the *different* parties, and verify them.

	Pravdists	Liquidators	Left Narodniks	Per cent		
				Pravdists	Liquidators	Left Narodniks
Number of copies of St. Petersburg newspapers published per week	240,000	96,000	36,000	64.5	25.8	9.7
Number of collections by workers' groups for whole of 1913. .	2,181	661	264	70.2	21.3	8.5
For 1914 (up to May 13)	2,873	671	524	70.6	16.6	12.8
Number of delegates elected to Metropolitan Insurance Board	37	7	4	77.1	14.6	8.3

The circulation figures are the most "favourable" to the bourgeois groups (the liquidators and Left Narodniks). But the liquidator and Left-Narodnik newspapers are bourgeois newspapers, *not* working-class! This is proved by the figures of the funds collected (from January 1 to May 13, 1914). The liquidators' reports show that 56 per cent of their *total* collections came from *non*-workers (*Trudovaya Pravda* No. 15).* In the case of the Left Narodniks, 50 per cent of their collections came from this source. Moreover, as far as is known, the Left Narodniks have never published the financial reports of their newspaper, which, like that of the liquidators, is evidently maintained by *rich friends from among the bourgeoisie.*

* See pp. 363-71 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The Pravdist newspaper is the only working-class newspaper. Both the liquidationist and the Left-Narodnik newspapers are *bourgeois newspapers*. No lie can refute this *objective fact*.

The figures of the workers' groups approach most closely and exactly to European party membership figures.

The number of Left-Narodnik groups is growing very rapidly (it has doubled in the course of the year) and now constitutes 12.8 per cent of the total groups of all the newspapers. Their number is growing *at the expense of the liquidators*, for the number of the latter's groups is almost at a standstill (an increase of only ten groups in the first half of 1914 at a time when the working-class movement showed an enormous growth) and their percentage is *diminishing*: from 21.3 per cent to 16.6 per cent.

By their opportunism and renunciation of the Party, the liquidators are pushing their working-class supporters towards the *other*, more "radical" (in word) bourgeois group.

Between 1913 and 1914, the Pravdists obtained 692 new groups, the liquidators 10, and the Left Narodniks 260. In percentages the increases are: Pravdists plus 31.7, liquidators plus 1.5, Left Narodniks plus 100 (small figures always increase faster than big ones; for example, if Plekhanov has nine workers' groups and, by the time of Vienna—and for Vienna[177]—there will be 27 or 45, the percentage increase will be plus 200, or plus 400).

The Insurance Board election figures apply only to St. Petersburg. It should be said that in 1914 the Left Narodniks in St. Petersburg are *ahead of the liquidators* as far as collection by workers' groups is concerned.

Thus, between January 1 and May 13, 1914, the Pravdists in St. Petersburg received contributions from 2,024 workers' groups, the liquidators from 308 and the Left Narodniks from *391* groups. The percentages are: Pravdists 74.3, liquidators 11.4, Left Narodniks 14.3.

Like the true opportunists they are, our liquidators reacted to this increase in strength of the Left Narodniks, not by intensifying their struggle for the principles of Marxism, but by entering into a bloc with the Left Narodniks against the Marxists (Pravdists)!

The Left Narodniks, in *Sovremennik*, openly advocate such an alliance on behalf of all their leaders; but the liquidators *lack the courage* to explain their conduct to the workers openly and straightforwardly. They do it in an underhand way. They are genuine Cadets.

For example. Recently, the Left-Narodnik newspaper (*Zhivaya Mysl Truda* No. 3, June 15, 1914) published an article entitled "The Insurance Delegates Elections at the Aivaz Works". In this article we read: ... "Of necessity, the Aivaz workers will be offered a choice of two lists: *one*, *a joint Menshevik and Left-Narodnik list* ... the other a Pravdist list...." (Our italics.)

Alliance with the liquidators is interpreted in this article by the Left Narodniks as the principle of co-operation among all "*socialist*" trends, i.e., the liquidators are alleged to have renounced not only the resolution of 1907, which defined the Left Narodniks as a bourgeois trend, but also the resolution of 1903 proposed by Axelrod.

Marxists regard the increase in the Left Narodniks' strength as a symptom, or presage, of a revival among the peasantry which, of course, is enough to "turn the heads" of non-class-conscious proletarians and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. As far as we Marxists are concerned, this fact will only stimulate our efforts in advocating Marxism as against petty-bourgeois Narodism.

Fellow-workers! Put less faith in promises and fairy-tales! Study more closely the *objective* data on your own working-class movement and on how the bourgeois ideas and the bourgeois practices of the liquidators and Left Narodniks influence a minority of the workers.

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the text in *Trudovaya Pravda*

THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Written February-May 1914

Published in April-June 1914
in the journal *Prosveshcheniye*
No. 4, 5 and 6
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Published according to
the text in the journal

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Clause 9 of the Russian Marxists' Programme, which deals with the right of nations to self-determination, has (as we have already pointed out in *Prosveshcheniye*)* given rise lately to a crusade on the part of the opportunists. The Russian liquidator Semkovsky, in the St. Petersburg liquidationist newspaper, and the Bundist Liebman and the Ukrainian nationalist-socialist Yurkevich in their respective periodicals have violently attacked this clause and treated it with supreme contempt. There is no doubt that this campaign of a motley array of opportunists against our Marxist Programme is closely connected with present-day nationalist vacillations in general. Hence we consider a detailed examination of this question timely. We would mention, in passing, that none of the opportunists named above has offered a single argument of his own; they all merely repeat what Rosa Luxemburg said in her lengthy Polish article of 1908-09, "The National Question and Autonomy". In our exposition we shall deal mainly with the "original" arguments of this last-named author.

1. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS?

Naturally, this is the first question that arises when any attempt is made at a Marxist examination of what is known as self-determination. What should be understood by that term? Should the answer be sought in legal definitions deduced from all sorts of "general concepts" of law? Or is it rather to be sought in a historico-economic study of the national movements?

It is not surprising that the Semkovskys, Liebmans and Yurkeviches did not even think of raising this question,

* See pp. 17-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and shrugged it off by scoffing at the "obscurity" of the Marxist Programme, apparently unaware, in their simplicity, that the self-determination of nations is dealt with, not only in the Russian Programme of 1903, but in the resolution of the London International Congress of 1896 (with which I shall deal in detail in the proper place). Far more surprising is the fact that Rosa Luxemburg, who declaims a great deal about the supposedly abstract and metaphysical nature of the clause in question, should herself succumb to the sin of abstraction and metaphysics. It is Rosa Luxemburg herself who is continually lapsing into generalities about self-determination (to the extent even of philosophising amusingly on the question of how the will of the nation is to be ascertained), without anywhere clearly and precisely asking herself whether the gist of the matter lies in legal definitions or in the experience of the national movements throughout the world.

A precise formulation of this question, which no Marxist can avoid, would at once destroy nine-tenths of Rosa Luxemburg's arguments. This is not the first time that national movements have arisen in Russia, nor are they peculiar to that country alone. Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements. Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity and unimpeded development of language are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its various classes and, lastly, for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each and every proprietor, big or little, and between seller and buyer.

Therefore, the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of *national states*, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied. The

most profound economic factors drive towards this goal, and, therefore, for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilised world, the national state is *typical* and normal for the capitalist period.

Consequently, if we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but by examining the historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevitably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state.

Later on we shall see still other reasons why it would be wrong to interpret the right to self-determination as meaning anything but the right to existence as a separate state. At present, we must deal with Rosa Luxemburg's efforts to "dismiss" the inescapable conclusion that profound economic factors underlie the urge-towards a national state.

Rosa Luxemburg is quite familiar with Kautsky's pamphlet *Nationality and Internationality*. (Supplement to *Die Neue Zeit*[178] No. 1, 1907-08; Russian translation in the journal *Nauchnaya Mysl*,[179] Riga, 1908.) She is aware that, after carefully analysing the question of the national state in § 4 of that pamphlet, Kautsky arrived at the conclusion that Otto Bauer "*underestimates* the strength of the urge towards a national state" (p. 23 of the pamphlet). Rosa Luxemburg herself quotes the following words of Kautsky's: "The national state is the form *most suited* to present-day conditions, [i.e., capitalist, civilised, economically progressive conditions, as distinguished from medieval, pre-capitalist, etc.]; it is the form in which the state can best fulfil its tasks" (i.e., the tasks of securing the freest, widest and speediest development of capitalism). To this we must add Kautsky's still more precise concluding remark that states of mixed national composition (known as multinational states, as distinct from national states) are "always those whose internal constitution has for some reason or other remained abnormal or underdeveloped" (backward). Needless to say, Kautsky speaks of abnormality exclusively in the sense of lack of conformity with what is best adapted to the requirements of a developing capitalism.

The question now is: How did Rosa Luxemburg treat these historico-economic conclusions of Kautsky's? Are they right or wrong? Is Kautsky right in his historico-economic theory, or is Bauer, whose theory is basically psychological? What is the connection between Bauer's undoubted "national opportunism", his defence of cultural-national autonomy, his nationalistic infatuation ("an occasional emphasis on the national aspect", as Kautsky put it), his "enormous exaggeration of the national aspect and complete neglect of the international aspect" (Kautsky)—and his underestimation of the strength of the urge to create a national state?

Rosa Luxemburg has not even raised this question. She has not noticed the connection. She has not considered the *sum total* of Bauer's theoretical views. She has not even drawn a line between the historico-economic and the psychological theories of the national question. She confines herself to the following remarks in criticism of Kautsky:

> "This 'best' national state is only an abstraction, which can easily be developed and defended theoretically, but which does not correspond to reality." (*Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, 1908, No. 6, p. 499.)

And in corroboration of this emphatic statement there follow arguments to the effect that the "right to self-determination" of small nations is made illusory by the development of the great capitalist powers and by imperialism. "Can one seriously speak," Rosa Luxemburg exclaims, "about the 'self-determination' of the formally independent Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs, Greeks, partly even the Swiss, whose independence is itself a result of the political struggle and the diplomatic game of the 'concert of Europe'?!" (P. 500.) The state that best suits these conditions is "not a national state, as Kautsky believes, but a predatory one". Some dozens of figures are quoted relating to the size of British, French and other colonial possessions.

After reading such arguments, one cannot help marvelling at the author's ability to misunderstand *the how and the why of things*. To teach Kautsky, with a serious mien, that small states are economically dependent on big ones, that a struggle is raging among the bourgeois states for the predatory suppression of other nations, and that imperialism

and colonies exist—all this is a ridiculous and puerile attempt to be clever, for none of this has the slightest bearing on the subject. Not only small states, but even Russia, for example, is entirely dependent, economically, on the power of the imperialist finance capital of the "rich" bourgeois countries. Not only the miniature Balkan states, but even nineteenth-century America was, economically, a colony of Europe, as Marx pointed out in *Capital*.[180] Kautsky, like any Marxist, is, of course, well aware of this, but that has nothing whatever to do with the question of national movements and the national state.

For the question of the political self-determination of nations and their independence as states in bourgeois society, Rosa Luxemburg has substituted the question of their economic independence. This is just as intelligent as if someone, in discussing the programmatic demand for the supremacy of parliament, i.e., the assembly of people's representatives, in a bourgeois state, were to expound the perfectly correct conviction that big capital dominates in a bourgeois country, whatever the regime in it.

There is no doubt that the greater part of Asia, the most densely populated continent, consists either of colonies of the "Great Powers", or of states that are extremely dependent and oppressed as nations. But does this commonly-known circumstance in any way shake the undoubted fact that in Asia itself the conditions for the most complete development of commodity production and the freest, widest and speediest growth of capitalism have been created only in Japan, i.e., only in an independent national state? The latter is a bourgeois state, and for that reason has itself begun to oppress other nations and to enslave colonies. We cannot say whether Asia will have had time to develop into a system of independent national states, like Europe, before the collapse of capitalism, but it remains an undisputed fact that capitalism, having awakened Asia, has called forth national movements everywhere in that continent, too; that the tendency of these movements is towards the creation of national states in Asia; that it is such states that ensure the best conditions for the development of capitalism. The example of Asia speaks *in favour* of Kautsky and *against* Rosa Luxemburg.

The example of the Balkan states likewise contradicts her, for anyone can now see that the best conditions for the development of capitalism in the Balkans are created precisely in proportion to the creation of independent national states in that peninsula.

Therefore, Rosa Luxemburg notwithstanding, the example of the whole of progressive and civilised mankind, the example of the Balkans and that of Asia prove that Kautsky's proposition is absolutely correct: the national state is the rule and the "norm" of capitalism; the multinational state represents backwardness, or is an exception. From the standpoint of national relations, the best conditions for the development of capitalism are undoubtedly provided by the national state. This does not mean, of course, that such a state, which is based on bourgeois relations, can eliminate the exploitation and oppression of nations. It only means that Marxists cannot lose sight of the powerful *economic* factors that give rise to the urge to create national states. It means that "self-determination of nations" in the Marxists' Programme *cannot*, from a historico-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state.

The conditions under which the bourgeois-democratic demand for a "national state" should be supported from a Marxist, i.e., class-proletarian, point of view will be dealt with in detail below. For the present, we shall confine ourselves to the definition of the *concept* of "self-determination", and only note that Rosa Luxemburg *knows* what this concept means ("national state"), whereas her opportunist partisans, the Liebmans, the Semkovskys, the Yurkeviches, *do not even know that*!

2. THE HISTORICALLY CONCRETE PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION

The categorical requirement of Marxist theory in investigating any social question is that it be examined within *definite* historical limits, and, if it refers to a particular country (e.g., the national programme for a given country), that account be taken of the specific features

distinguishing that country from others in the same historical epoch.

What does this categorical requirement of Marxism imply in its application to the question under discussion?

First of all, it implies that a clear distinction must be drawn between the two periods of capitalism, which differ radically from each other as far as the national movement is concerned. On the one hand, there is the period of the collapse of feudalism and absolutism, the period of the formation of the bourgeois-democratic society and state, when the national movements for the first time become mass movements and in one way or another draw *all* classes of the population into politics through the press, participation in representative institutions, etc. On the other hand, there is the period of fully formed capitalist states with a long-established constitutional regime and a highly developed antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—a period that may be called the eve of capitalism's downfall.

The typical features of the first period are: the awakening of national movements and the drawing of the peasants, the most numerous and the most sluggish section of the population, into these movements, in connection with the struggle for political liberty in general, and for the rights of the nation in particular. Typical features of the second period are: the absence of mass bourgeois-democratic movements and the fact that developed capitalism, in bringing closer together nations that have already been fully drawn into commercial intercourse, and causing them to intermingle to an increasing degree, brings the antagonism between internationally united capital and the international working-class movement into the forefront.

Of course, the two periods are not walled off from each other; they are connected by numerous transitional links, the various countries differing from each other in the rapidity of their national development, in the national make-up and distribution of their population, and so on. There can be no question of the Marxists of any country drawing up their national programme without taking into account all these general historical and concrete state conditions.

It is here that we come up against the weakest point in Rosa Luxemburg's arguments. With extraordinary zeal, she embellishes her article with a collection of hard words directed against § 9 of our Programme, which she declares to be "sweeping", "a platitude", "a metaphysical phrase", and so on without end. It would be natural to expect an author who so admirably condemns metaphysics (in the Marxist sense, i.e., anti-dialectics) and empty abstractions to set us an example of how to make a concrete historical analysis of the question. The question at issue is the national programme of the Marxists of a definite country—Russia, in a definite period—the beginning of the twentieth century. But does Rosa Luxemburg raise the question as to *what historical* period Russia is passing through, or *what are the concrete* features of the national question and the national movements of that *particular* country in that *particular* period?

No, she does not! *She says absolutely nothing about it*! In her work you will not find even the shadow of an analysis of how the national question stands in *Russia* in the present historical period, or of the specific features of *Russia* in this particular respect!

We are told that the national question in the Balkans is presented differently from that in Ireland; that Marx appraised the Polish and Czech national movements in the concrete conditions of 1848 in such and such a way (a page of excerpts from Marx); that Engels appraised the struggle of the forest cantons of Switzerland against Austria and the Battle of Morgarten which took place in 1315 in such and such a way (a page of quotations from Engels with the appropriate comments from Kautsky), that Lassalle regarded the peasant war in Germany of the sixteenth century as reactionary, etc.

It cannot be said that these remarks and quotations have any novelty about them, but at all events it is interesting for the reader to be occasionally reminded just how Marx, Engels and Lassalle approached the analysis of concrete historical problems in individual countries. And a perusal of these instructive quotations from Marx and Engels reveals most strikingly the ridiculous position Rosa Luxemburg has placed herself in. She preaches eloquently and

angrily the need for a concrete historical analysis of the national question in different countries at different times, but she *does not make the least* attempt to determine *what* historical stage in the development of capitalism *Russia* is passing through at the beginning of the twentieth century, or what the *specific features* of the national question in this country are. Rosa Luxemburg gives examples of how *others* have treated the question in a Marxist fashion, as if deliberately stressing how often the road to hell is paved with good intentions and how often good counsel covers up unwillingness or inability to follow such advice in practice.

Here is one of her edifying comparisons. In protesting against the demand for the independence of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg refers to a pamphlet she wrote in 1898, proving the rapid "industrial development of Poland", with the latter's manufactured goods being marketed in Russia. Needless to say, no conclusion whatever can be drawn from this on the question of the *right* to self-determination; it only proves the disappearance of the old Poland of the landed gentry, etc. But Rosa Luxemburg always passes on imperceptibly to the conclusion that among the factors that unite Russia and Poland, the purely economic factors of modern capitalist relations now predominate.

Then our Rosa proceeds to the question of autonomy, and though her article is entitled "The National Question and Autonomy" *in general*, she begins to argue that the Kingdom of Poland has an *exclusive* right to autonomy (see *Prosveshcheniye*, 1913, No. 12*). To support Poland's right to autonomy, Rosa Luxemburg evidently judges the state system of Russia by her economic, political and sociological characteristics and everyday life—a totality of features which, taken together, produce the concept of "Asiatic despotism". (*Przegląd* No. 12, p. 137.)

It is generally known that this kind of state system possesses great stability whenever completely patriarchal and pre-capitalist features predominate in the economic system and where commodity production and class differentiation are scarcely developed. However, if in a country

* See pp. 45-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

whose state system is distinctly *pre*-capitalist in character there exists a nationally demarcated region where capitalism is *rapidly* developing, then the more rapidly that capitalism develops, the greater will be the antagonism between it and the *pre*-capitalist state system, and the more likely will be the separation of the progressive region from the whole—with which it is connected, not by "modern capitalistic", but by "Asiatically despotic" ties.

Thus, Rosa Luxemburg does not get her arguments to hang together even on the question of the social structure of the government in Russia with regard to bourgeois Poland; as for the concrete, historical, specific features of the national movements in Russia—she does not even raise that question.

That is a point we must now deal with.

3. THE CONCRETE FEATURES OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA, AND RUSSIA'S BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REFORMATION

"Despite the elasticity of the principle of 'the right of nations to self-determination', which is a mere platitude, and, obviously, equally applicable, not only to the nations inhabiting Russia, but also to the nations inhabiting Germany and Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, America and Australia, we do not find it in the programmes of any of the present-day socialist parties...." (*Przegląd* No. 6, p. 483.)

This is how Rosa Luxemburg opens her attack upon § 9 of the Marxist programme. In trying to foist on us the conception that this clause in the programme is a "mere platitude", Rosa Luxemburg herself falls victim to this error, alleging with amusing boldness that this point is, "obviously, equally applicable" to Russia, Germany, etc.

Obviously, we shall reply, Rosa Luxemburg has decided to make her article a collection of errors in logic that could be used for schoolboy exercises. For Rosa Luxemburg's tirade is sheer nonsense and a mockery of the historically concrete presentation of the question.

If one interprets the Marxist programme in Marxist fashion, not in a childish way, one will without difficulty grasp the fact that it refers to bourgeois-democratic national movements. That being the case, it is "obvious" that this

programme "sweepingly", and as a "mere platitude", etc., covers *all* instances of bourgeois-democratic national movements. No less obvious to Rosa Luxemburg, if she gave the slightest thought to it, is the conclusion that our programme refers *only* to cases where such a movement is actually in existence.

Had she given thought to these obvious considerations, Rosa Luxemburg would have easily perceived what nonsense she was talking. In accusing *us* of uttering a "platitude" she has used *against us* the argument that no mention is made of the right to self-determination in the programmes of countries where there are *no* bourgeois-democratic national movements. A remarkably clever argument!

A comparison of the political and economic development of various countries, as well as of their Marxist programmes, is of tremendous importance from the standpoint of Marxism, for there can be no doubt that all modern states are of a common capitalist nature and are therefore subject to a common law of development. But such a comparison must be drawn in a sensible way. The elementary condition for comparison is to find out whether the historical periods of development of the countries concerned are at all *comparable*. For instance, only absolute ignoramuses (such as Prince Y. Trubetskoi in *Russkaya Mysl*) are capable of "comparing" the Russian Marxists' agrarian programme with the programmes of Western Europe, since our programme replies to questions that concern the *bourgeois-democratic* agrarian reform, whereas in the Western countries no such question arises.

The same applies to the national question. In most Western countries it was settled long ago. It is ridiculous to seek an answer to non-existent questions in the programmes of Western Europe. In this respect Rosa Luxemburg has lost sight of the most important thing—the difference between countries where bourgeois-democratic reforms have long been completed, and those where they have not.

The crux of the matter lies in this difference. Rosa Luxemburg's complete disregard of it transforms her verbose article into a collection of empty and meaningless platitudes.

The epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Western, continental Europe embraces a fairly definite period,

approximately between 1789 and 1871. This was precisely the period of national movements and the creation of national states. When this period drew to a close, Western Europe had been transformed into a settled system of bourgeois states, which, as a general rule, were nationally uniform states. Therefore, to seek the right to self-determination in the programmes of West-European socialists at this time of day is to betray one's ignorance of the ABC of Marxism.

In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of bourgeois-democratic revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan wars—such is the chain of world events of *our* period in our "Orient". And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of a *whole series* of bourgeois-democratic national movements which strive to create nationally independent and nationally uniform states. It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighbouring countries are passing through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to self-determination.

But let us continue the quotation from Rosa Luxemburg's article a little more. She writes:

> "In particular, the programme of a party which is operating in a state with an extremely varied national composition, and for which the national question is a matter of first-rate importance—the programme of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party—does not contain the principle of the right of nations to self-determination." (Ibid.)

Thus, an attempt is made to convince the reader by the example of Austria "in particular". Let us examine this example in the light of concrete historical facts and see just how sound it is.

In the first place, let us pose the fundamental question of the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In Austria, this revolution began in 1848 and was over in 1867. Since then, a more or less fully established bourgeois constitution has dominated, for nearly half a century, and on its basis a legal workers' party is legally functioning.

Therefore, in the internal conditions of Austria's development (i.e., from the standpoint of the development of capitalism in Austria in general, and among its various nations in particular), there are *no* factors that produce

leaps and bounds, a concomitant of which might be the formation of nationally independent states. In assuming, by her comparison, that Russia is in an analogous position in this respect, Rosa Luxemburg not only makes a fundamentally erroneous and anti-historical assumption, but also involuntarily slips into liquidationism.

Secondly, the profound difference in the relations between the nationalities in Austria and those in Russia is particularly important for the question we are concerned with. Not only was Austria for a long time a state in which the Germans preponderated, but the Austrian Germans laid claim to hegemony in the German nation as a whole. This "claim", as Rosa Luxemburg (who is seemingly so averse to commonplaces, platitudes, abstractions...) will perhaps be kind enough to remember, was shattered in the war of 1866. The German nation predominating in Austria found itself *outside the pale* of the independent German state which finally took shape in 1871. On the other hand, the Hungarians' attempt to create an independent national state collapsed under the blows of the Russian serf army as far back as 1849.

A very peculiar situation was thus created—a striving on the part of the Hungarians and then of the Czechs, not for separation from Austria, but, on the contrary, for the preservation of Austria's integrity, precisely in order to preserve national independence, which might have been completely crushed by more rapacious and powerful neighbours! Owing to this peculiar situation, Austria assumed the form of a dual state, and she is now being transformed into a triple state (Germans, Hungarians, Slavs).

Is there anything like this in Russia? Is there in our country a striving of the "subject peoples" for unity with the Great Russians in face of the danger of *worse* national oppression?

One need only pose this question in order to see that the comparison between Russia and Austria on the question of self-determination of nations is meaningless, platitudinous and ignorant.

The peculiar conditions in Russia with regard to the national question are just the reverse of those we see in Austria. Russia is a state with a single national centre—

Great Russia. The Great Russians occupy a vast, unbroken stretch of territory, and number about 70,000,000. The specific features of this national state are: first, that "subject peoples" (which, on the whole, comprise the majority of the entire population—57 per cent) inhabit the border regions; secondly, the oppression of these subject peoples is much stronger here than in the neighbouring states (and not even in the European states alone); thirdly, in a number of cases the oppressed nationalities inhabiting the border regions have compatriots across the border, who enjoy greater national independence (suffice it to mention the Finns, the Swedes, the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Rumanians along the western and southern frontiers of the state); fourthly, the development of capitalism and the general level of culture are often higher in the non-Russian border regions than in the centre. Lastly, it is in the neighbouring Asian states that we see the beginning of a phase of bourgeois revolutions and national movements which are spreading to some of the kindred nationalities within the borders of Russia.

Thus, it is precisely the special concrete, historical features of the national question in Russia that make the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination in the present period a matter of special urgency in our country.

Incidentally, even from the purely factual angle, Rosa Luxemburg's assertion that the Austrian Social-Democrats' programme does not contain any recognition of the right of nations to self-determination is incorrect. We need only open the Minutes of the Brünn Congress, which adopted the national programme,[181] to find the statements by the Ruthenian Social-Democrat Hankiewicz on behalf of the entire Ukrainian (Ruthenian) delegation (p. 85 of the Minutes), and by the Polish Social-Democrat Reger on behalf of the entire Polish delegation (p. 108), to the effect that one of the aspirations of the Austrian Social-Democrats of both the above-mentioned nations is to secure national unity, and the freedom and independence of their nations. Hence, while the Austrian Social-Democrats did not include the right of nations to self-determination directly in their programme, they did nevertheless allow the demand for national independence to be advanced by *sections* of the

party. In effect, this means, of course, the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination! Thus, Rosa Luxemburg's reference to Austria speaks *against* Rosa Luxemburg in *all* respects.

4. "PRACTICALITY" IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Rosa Luxemburg's argument that § 9 of our Programme contains nothing "practical" has been seized upon by the Opportunists. Rosa Luxemburg is so delighted with this argument that in some parts of her article this "slogan" is repeated eight times on a single page.

She writes: § 9 "gives no practical lead on the day-by-day policy of the proletariat, no practical solution of national problems".

Let us examine this argument, which elsewhere is formulated in such a way that it makes § 9 look quite meaningless, or else commits us to support all national aspirations.

What does the demand for "practicality" in the national question mean?

It means one of three things: support for all national aspirations; the answer "yes" or "no" to the question of secession by any nation; or that national demands are in general immediately "practicable".

Let us examine all three possible meanings of the demand for "practicality".

The bourgeoisie, which naturally assumes the leadership at the start of every national movement, says that support for all national aspirations is practical. However, the proletariat's policy in the national question (as in all others) supports the bourgeoisie only in a certain direction, but it never coincides with the bourgeoisie's policy. The working class supports the bourgeoisie only in order to secure national peace (which the bourgeoisie cannot bring about completely and which can be achieved only with *complete* democracy), in order to secure equal rights and to create the best conditions for the class struggle. Therefore, it is *in opposition to the practicality* of the bourgeoisie that the proletarians advance their *principles* in the national question; they always give the bourgeoisie *only conditional* support. What every bourgeoisie is out for in the national

question is either privileges for its *own* nation, or exceptional advantages for it; this is called being "practical". The proletariat is opposed to all privileges, to all exclusiveness. To demand that it should be "practical" means following the lead of the bourgeoisie, falling into opportunism.

The demand for a "yes" or "no" reply to the question of secession in the case of every nation may seem a very "practical" one. In reality it is absurd; it is metaphysical in theory, while in practice it leads to subordinating the proletariat to the bourgeoisie's policy. The bourgeoisie always places its national demands in the forefront, and does so in categorical fashion. With the proletariat, however, these demands are subordinated to the interests of the class struggle. Theoretically, you cannot say in advance whether the bourgeois-democratic revolution will end in a given nation seceding from another nation, or in its equality with the latter; *in either case*, the important thing for the proletariat is to ensure the development of its class. For the bourgeoisie it is important to hamper this development by pushing the aims of its "own" nation before those of the proletariat. That is why the proletariat confines itself, so to speak, to the negative demand for recognition of the *right* to self-determination, without giving guarantees to any nation, and without undertaking to give *anything at the expense* of another nation.

This may not be "practical", but it is in effect the best guarantee for the achievement of the most democratic of all possible solutions. The proletariat needs *only* such guarantees, whereas the bourgeoisie of every nation requires guarantees for *its own* interest, regardless of the position of (or the possible disadvantages to) other nations.

The bourgeoisie is most of all interested in the "feasibility" of a given demand—hence the invariable policy of coming to terms with the bourgeoisie of other nations, to the detriment of the proletariat. For the proletariat, however, the important thing is to strengthen its class against the bourgeoisie and to educate the masses in the spirit of consistent democracy and socialism.

This may not be "practical" as far as the opportunists are concerned, but it is the only real guarantee, the guar-

antee of the greater national equality and peace, despite the feudal landlords and the *nationalist* bourgeoisie.

The whole task of the proletarians in the national question is "unpractical" from the standpoint of the *nationalist* bourgeoisie of every nation, because the proletarians, opposed as they are to nationalism of every kind, demand "abstract" equality; they demand, as a matter of principle, that there should be no privileges, however slight. Failing to grasp this, Rosa Luxemburg, by her misguided eulogy of practicality, has opened the door wide for the opportunists, and especially for opportunist concessions to Great-Russian nationalism.

Why Great-Russian? Because the Great Russians in Russia are an oppressor nation, and opportunism in the national question will of course find expression among oppressed nations otherwise than among oppressor nations.

On the plea that its demands are "practical", the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations will call upon the proletariat to support its aspirations unconditionally. The most practical procedure is to say a plain "yes" in favour of the secession of a *particular* nation rather than in favour of all nations having the *right* to secede!

The proletariat is opposed to such practicality. While recognising equality and equal rights to a national state, it values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and assesses any national demand, any national separation, *from the angle* of the workers' class struggle. This call for practicality is in fact merely a call for uncritical acceptance of bourgeois aspirations.

By supporting the right to secession, we are told, you are supporting the bourgeois nationalism of the oppressed nations. This is what Rosa Luxemburg says, and she is echoed by Semkovsky, the opportunist, who incidentally is the only representative of liquidationist ideas on this question, in the liquidationist newspaper!

Our reply to this is: No, it is to the bourgeoisie that a "practical" solution of this question is important. To the workers the important thing is to distinguish the *principles* of the two trends. *Insofar as* the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights the oppressor, we are always, in every case,

and more strongly than anyone else, *in favour*, for we are the staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression. But insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for *its own* bourgeois nationalism, we stand against. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation.

If, in our political agitation, we fail to advance and advocate the slogan of the *right* to secession, we shall play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal landlords and the absolutism of the *oppressor* nation. Kautsky long ago used this argument against Rosa Luxemburg, and the argument is indisputable. When, in her anxiety not to "assist" the nationalist bourgeoisie of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg rejects the *right* to secession in the programme of the Marxists *in Russia*, she is *in fact* assisting the Great-Russian Black Hundreds. She is in fact assisting opportunist tolerance of the privileges (and worse than privileges) of the Great Russians.

Carried away by the struggle against nationalism in Poland, Rosa Luxemburg has forgotten the nationalism of the Great Russians, although it is *this* nationalism that is the most formidable at the present time. It is a nationalism that is more feudal than bourgeois, and is the principal obstacle to democracy and to the proletarian struggle. The bourgeois nationalism of *any* oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed *against* oppression, and it is this content that we *unconditionally* support. At the same time we strictly distinguish it from the tendency towards national exclusiveness; we fight against the tendency of the Polish bourgeois to oppress the Jews, etc., etc.

This is "unpractical" from the standpoint of the bourgeois and the philistine, but it is the only policy in the national question that is practical, based on principles, and really promotes democracy, liberty and proletarian unity.

The recognition of the right to secession for all; the appraisal of each concrete question of secession from the point of view of removing all inequality, all privileges, and all exclusiveness.

Let us consider the position of an oppressor nation. Can a nation be free if it oppresses other nations? It cannot. The interests of the freedom of the Great-Russian population* require a struggle against such oppression. The long, centuries-old history of the suppression of the movements of the oppressed nations, and the systematic propaganda in favour of such suppression coming from the "upper" classes have created enormous obstacles to the cause of freedom of the Great-Russian people itself, in the form of prejudices, etc.

The Great-Russian Black Hundreds deliberately foster these prejudices and encourage them. The Great-Russian bourgeoisie tolerates or condones them. The Great-Russian proletariat cannot achieve *its own* aims or clear the road to its freedom without systematically countering these prejudices.

In Russia, the creation of an independent national state remains, for the time being, the privilege of the Great-Russian nation alone. We, the Great-Russian proletarians, who defend no privileges whatever, do not defend this privilege either. We are fighting on the ground of a definite state; we unite the workers of all nations living in this state; we cannot vouch for any particular path of national development, for we are marching to our class goal along *all* possible paths.

However, we cannot move towards that goal unless we combat all nationalism, and uphold the equality of the various nations. Whether the Ukraine, for example, is destined to form an independent state is a matter that will be determined by a thousand unpredictable factors. Without attempting idle "*guesses*", we firmly uphold something that is beyond doubt: the right of the Ukraine to form such a state. We respect this right; we do not uphold the privileges of Great Russians with regard to Ukrainians; we *educate* the masses in the spirit of recognition of that right, in the spirit of rejecting *state* privileges for any nation.

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* A certain L. Vl.[182] in Paris considers this word un-Marxist. This L. Vl. is amusingly "*superklug*" (too clever by half). And "this too-clever-by-half" L. Vl. apparently intends to write an essay on the deletion of the words "population", "nation", etc., from our minimum programme (having in mind the class struggle!).

In the leaps which all nations have made in the period of bourgeois revolutions, clashes and struggles over the right to a national state are possible and probable. We proletarians declare in advance that we are *opposed* to Great-Russian privileges, and this is what guides our entire propaganda and agitation.

In her quest for "practicality" Rosa Luxemburg has lost sight of the *principal* practical task both of the Great-Russian proletariat and of the proletariat of other nationalities: that of day-by-day agitation and propaganda against all state and national privileges, and for the right, the equal right of all nations, to their national state. This (at present) is our principal task in the national question, for only in this way can we defend the interests of democracy and the alliance of all proletarians of all nations on an equal footing.

This propaganda may be "unpractical" from the point of view of the Great-Russian oppressors, as well as from the point of view of the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations (both demand a *definite* "yes" or "no", and accuse the Social-Democrats of being "vague"). In reality it is this propaganda, and this propaganda alone, that ensures the genuinely democratic, the genuinely socialist education of the masses. This is the only propaganda to ensure the greatest chances of national peace in Russia, should she remain a multi-national state, and the most peaceful (and for the proletarian class struggle, harmless) division into separate national states, should the question of such a division arise.

To explain this policy—the only proletarian policy—in the national question more concretely, we shall examine the attitude of Great-Russian liberalism towards the "self-determination of nations", and the example of Norway's secession from Sweden.

5. THE LIBERAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISTS IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

We have seen that the following argument is one of Rosa Luxemburg's "trump cards" in her struggle against the programme of the Marxists in Russia: recognition of the right

to self-determination is tantamount to supporting the bourgeois nationalism of the oppressed nations. On the other hand, she says, if we take this right to mean no more than combating all violence against other nations, there is no need for a special clause in the programme, for Social-Democrats are, in general, opposed to all national oppression and inequality.

The first argument, as Kautsky irrefutably proved nearly twenty years ago, is a case of blaming other people for one's own nationalism, in her fear of the nationalism of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations, Rosa Luxemburg is actually playing into the hands of the Black-Hundred nationalism of the Great Russians! Her second argument is *actually* a timid evasion of the question whether or not recognition of national equality includes recognition of the right to secession. If it does, then Rosa Luxemburg admits that, in principle, § 9 of our Programme is correct. If it does not, then she does not recognise national equality. Shuflling and evasions will not help matters here!

However, the best way to test these and all similar arguments is to study the attitude of the *various classes* of society towards this question. For the Marxist this test is obligatory. We must proceed from what is objective; we must examine the relations between the classes on this point. In failing to do so, Rosa Luxemburg is guilty of those very sins of metaphysics, abstractions, platitudes, and sweeping statements, etc., of which she vainly tries to accuse her opponents.

We are discussing the Programme of the Marxists *in Russia*, i.e., of the Marxists of all the nationalities in Russia. Should we not examine the position of the *ruling* classes of Russia?

The position of the "bureaucracy" (we beg pardon for this inaccurate term) and of the feudal landlords of our united-nobility type is well known. They definitely reject both the equality of nationalities and the right to self-determination. Theirs is the old motto of the days of serfdom: autocracy, orthodoxy, and the national essence—the last term applying only to the Great-Russian nation. Even the Ukrainians are declared to be an "alien" people and their very language is being suppressed.

Let us glance, at the Russian bourgeoisie, which was "called upon" to take part—a very modest part, it is true, but nevertheless some part—in the government, under the "June Third" legislative and administrative system. It will not need many words to prove that the Octobrists are following the Rights in this question. Unfortunately, some Marxists pay much less attention to the stand of the Great-Russian liberal bourgeoisie, the Progressists and the Cadets. Yet he who fails to study that stand and give it careful thought will inevitably flounder in abstractions and groundless statements in discussing the question of the right of nations to self-determination.

Skilled though it is in the art of diplomatically evading direct answers to "unpleasant" questions, *Rech*, the principal organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, was compelled, in its controversy with *Pravda* last year, to make certain valuable admissions. The trouble started over the All-Ukraine Students' Congress held in Lvov in the summer of 1913.[183] Mr. Mogilyansky, the "Ukrainian expert" or Ukrainian correspondent of *Rech*, wrote an article in which he poured vitriolic abuse ("ravings", "adventurism", etc.) on the idea that the Ukraine should secede, an idea which Dontsov, a nationalist-socialist, had advocated and the above-mentioned congress approved.

While in no way identifying itself with Mr. Dontsov, and declaring explicitly that he was a nationalist-socialist and that many Ukrainian Marxists did not agree with him, *Rabochaya Pravda* stated that the *tone* of *Rech*, or, rather, the *way it formulated the question in principle*, was improper and reprehensible for a Great-Russian democrat, or for anyone desiring to pass as a democrat.* Let *Rech* repudiate the Dontsovs if it likes, but, *from the standpoint of principle*, a Great-Russian organ of democracy, which it claims to be, cannot be oblivious of the *freedom* to secede, the *right* to secede.

A few months later, *Rech*, No. 331, published an "explanation" from Mr. Mogilyansky, who had learned from the Ukrainian newspaper *Shlyakhi*,[184] published in Lvov, of Mr. Dontsov's reply, in which, incidentally, Dontsov

* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 268-69.—*Ed.*

stated that "the chauvinist attacks in *Rech* have been properly sullied [branded?] only in the Russian Social-Democratic press". This "explanation" consisted of the thrice-repeated statement that "criticism of Mr. Dontsov's recipes" "has nothing in common with the repudiation of the right of nations to self-determination".

"It must be said," wrote Mr. Mogilyansky, "that even 'the right of nations to self-determination' is not a fetish [mark this!] beyond criticism: unwholesome conditions in the life of nations may give rise to unwholesome tendencies in national self-determination, and the fact that these are brought to light does not mean that the right of nations to self-determination has been rejected."

As you see, this liberal's talk of a "fetish" was quite in keeping with Rosa Luxemburg's. It was obvious that Mr. Mogilyansky was trying to evade a direct reply to the question whether or not he recognised the right to political self-determination, i.e., to secession.

The newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda*, issue No. 4, for December 11, 1913, also put this question *point-blank* to Mr. Mogilyansky and to the Constitutional-Democratic *Party*.*

Thereupon *Rech* (No. 340) published an unsigned, i.e., official, editorial statement replying to this question. This reply boils down to the following three points:

1) §11 of the Constitutional-Democratic Party's programme speaks bluntly, precisely and clearly of the "right of nations to free *cultural* self-determination".

2) *Rech* affirms that *Proletarskaya Pravda* "hopelessly confuses" self-determination with separatism, with the secession of a given nation.

3) "*Actually, the Cadets have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of 'nations to secede' from the Russian state.*" (See the article "National-Liberalism and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 12, December 20, 1913.**)

Let us first consider the second point in the *Rech* statement. How strikingly it shows to the Semkovskys, Liebmans, Yurkeviches and other opportunists that the hue and cry

* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 525-27.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 56-58 of this volume.—*Ed.*

they have raised about the alleged "vagueness", or "indefiniteness", of the term "self-determination" is *in fact*, i.e., from the standpoint of objective class relationships and the class struggle in Russia, *simply a rehash* of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie's utterances!

Proletarskaya Pravda put the following *three* questions to the enlightened "Constitutional-Democratic" gentlemen of *Rech*: (1) do they deny that, throughout the entire history of international democracy, and especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, self-determination of nations has been understood to mean precisely political self-determination, the right to form an independent national state? (2) do they deny that the well-known resolution adopted by the International Socialist Congress in London in 1896 has the same meaning? and (3) do they deny that Plekhanov, in writing about self-determination as far back as 1902, meant precisely political self-determination? When *Proletarskaya Pravda* posed these three questions, *the Cadets fell silent*!

Not a word did they utter in reply, for they had nothing to say. They had to admit tacitly that *Proletarskaya Pravda* was absolutely right.

The liberals' outcries that the term "self-determination" is vague and that the Social-Democrats "hopelessly confuse" it with separatism are nothing more than attempts to *confuse* the issue, and evade recognition of a universally established democratic principle. If the Semkovskys, Liebmans and Yurkeviches were not so ignorant, they would be ashamed to address the workers in a *liberal* vein.

But to proceed. *Proletarskaya Pravda* compelled *Rech* to admit that, in the programme of the Constitutional-Democrats, the term "cultural" self-determination means in effect the *repudiation of political* self-determination.

"Actually, the Cadets have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of 'nations to secede' from the Russian state"—it was not without reason that *Proletarskaya Pravda* recommended to *Novoye Vremya* and *Zemshchina* these words from *Rech* as an example of our Cadets' "loyalty". In its issue No. 13563, *Novoye Vremya*, which never, of course, misses an opportunity of mentioning "the Yids" and taking digs at the Cadets, nevertheless stated:

"What, to the Social-Democrats, is an axiom of political wisdom [i.e., recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, to secede], is today beginning to cause disagreement even among the Cadets."

By declaring that they "have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of nations to secede from the Russian state", the Cadets have, in principle, taken exactly the same stand as *Novoye Vremya*. This is precisely one of the fundamentals of Cadet *national-liberalism*, of their kinship with the Purishkeviches, and of their dependence, political, ideological and practical, on the latter. *Proletarskaya Pravda* wrote: "The Cadets have studied history and know only too well what—to put it mildly—pogrom-like actions the practice of the ancient right of the Purishkeviches to 'grab 'em and hold 'em' has often led to." Although perfectly aware of the feudalist source and nature of the Purishkeviches' omnipotence, the Cadets are, nevertheless, taking their stand *on the basis* of the relationships and frontiers created by that very class. Knowing full well that there is much in the relationships and frontiers created or fixed by this class that is un-European and anti-European (we would say Asiatic if this did not sound undeservedly slighting to the Japanese and Chinese), the Cadets, nevertheless, accept them as the utmost limit.

Thus, they are adjusting themselves to the Purishkeviches, cringing to them, fearing to jeopardise their position, protecting them from the people's movement, from the democracy. As *Proletarskaya Pravda* wrote: "In effect, this means adapting oneself to the interests of the feudal-minded landlords and to the worst nationalist prejudices of the dominant nation, instead of systematically combating those prejudices."

Being men who are familiar with history and claim to be democrats, the Cadets do not even attempt to assert that the democratic movement, which is today characteristic of both Eastern Europe and Asia and is striving to change both on the model of the civilised capitalist countries, is bound to leave intact the boundaries fixed by the feudal epoch, the epoch of the omnipotence of the Purishkeviches and the disfranchisement of wide strata of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.

The fact that the question raised in the controversy between *Proletarskaya Pravda* and *Rech* was not merely a literary question, but one that involved a real political issue of the day, was proved, among other things, by the last conference of the Constitutional-Democratic Party held on March 23-25, 1914; in the official report of this conference in *Rech* (No. 83, of March 26, 1914) we read:

> "A particularly lively discussion also took place on national problems. The Kiev deputies, who were supported by N. V. Nekrasov and A. M. Kolyubakin, pointed out that the national question was becoming a key issue, which would have to be faced up to more resolutely than hitherto. F. F. Kokoshkin pointed out, however [this "however" is like Shchedrin's "but"—"the ears never grow higher than the forehead, never!"] that both the programme and past political experience demanded that 'elastic formulas' of 'political self-determination of nationalities' should be handled very carefully."

This most remarkable line of reasoning at the Cadet conference deserves serious attention from all Marxists and all democrats. (We will note in parentheses that *Kievskaya Mysl*, which is evidently very well informed and no doubt presents Mr. Kokoshkin's ideas correctly, added that, of course, as a warning to his opponents, he laid special stress on the danger of the "disintegration" of the state.)

The official report in *Rech* is composed with consummate diplomatic skill designed to lift the veil as little as possible and to conceal as much as possible. Yet, in the main, what took place at the Cadet conference is quite clear. The liberal-bourgeois delegates, who were familiar with the state of affairs in the Ukraine, and the "Left" Cadets raised the question *precisely of the political* self-determination of nations. Otherwise, there would have been no need for Mr. Kokoshkin to urge that this "formula" should be "handled carefully".

The Cadet programme, which was of course known to the delegates at the Cadet conference, speaks of "cultural", *not* of political self-determination. Hence, Mr. Kokoshkin was *defending* the programme *against* the Ukrainian delegates, and *against* the Left Cadets; he was defending "cultural" self-determination *as opposed to* "political" self-determination. It is perfectly clear that in opposing "political" self-determination, in playing up the danger of the

"disintegration of the state", and in calling the formula "political self-determination" an "*elastic*" one (quite in keeping with Rosa Luxemburg!), Mr. Kokoshkin was defending Great-Russian national-liberalism against the more "Left" or more democratic elements of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and also against the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.

Mr. Kokoshkin won the day at the Cadet conference, as is evident from the treacherous little word "however" in the *Rech* report; Great-Russian national-liberalism has triumphed among the Cadets. Will not this victory help to clear the minds of those misguided individuals among the Marxists in Russia who, like the Cadets, have also begun to fear the "elastic formulas of political self-determination of nationalities"?

Let us, "however", examine the substance of Mr. Kokoshkin's line of thought. By referring to "past political experience" (i.e., evidently, the experience of 1905, when the Great-Russian bourgeoisie took alarm for its national privileges and scared the Cadet Party with its fears), and also by playing up the danger of the "disintegration of the state", Mr. Kokoshkin showed that he understood perfectly well that political self-determination can mean nothing else but the right to secede and form an independent national state. The question is—how should Mr. Kokoshkin's fears be appraised in the light of democracy in general, and the proletarian class struggle in particular?

Mr. Kokoshkin would have us believe that recognition of the right to secession increases the danger of the "disintegration of the state". This is the viewpoint of Constable Mymretsov, whose motto was "grab 'em and hold 'em". From the viewpoint of democracy in general, the very opposite is the case: recognition of the right to secession *reduces* the danger of the "disintegration of the state".

Mr. Kokoshkin argues exactly like the nationalists do. At their last congress they attacked the Ukrainian "Mazeppists". The Ukrainian movement, Mr. Savenko and Co. exclaimed, threatens to weaken the ties between the Ukraine and Russia, since Austrian Ukrainophilism is strengthening the Ukrainians' ties with Austria! It remains unexplained why Russia cannot try to "strengthen" her ties with the

Ukrainians *through the same method* that the Savenkos blame Austria for using, i.e., by granting the Ukrainians freedom to use their own language, self-government and an autonomous Diet.

The arguments of the Savenkos and Kokoshkins are exactly alike, and from the purely logical point of view they are equally ridiculous and absurd. Is it not clear that the more liberty the Ukrainian nationality enjoys in any particular country, the stronger its ties with that country will be? One would think that this truism could not be disputed without totally abandoning all the premises of democracy. Can there be greater freedom of nationality, as such, than the freedom to secede, the freedom to form an independent national state?

To clear up this question, which has been so confused by the liberals (and by those who are so misguided as to echo them), we shall cite a very simple example. Let us take the question of divorce. In her article Rosa Luxemburg writes that the centralised democratic state, while conceding autonomy to its constituent parts, should retain the most important branches of legislation, including legislation on divorce, under the jurisdiction of the central parliament. The concern that the central authority of the democratic state should retain the power to allow divorce can be readily understood. The reactionaries are opposed to freedom of divorce; they say that it must be "handled carefully", and loudly declare that it means the "disintegration of the family". The democrats, however, believe that the reactionaries are hypocrites, and that they are actually defending the omnipotence of the police and the bureaucracy, the privileges of one of the sexes, and the worst kind of oppression of women. They believe that in actual fact freedom of divorce will not cause the "disintegration" of family ties, but, on the contrary, will strengthen them on a democratic basis, which is the only possible and durable basis in civilised society.

To accuse those who support freedom of self-determination, i.e., freedom to secede, of encouraging separatism, is as foolish and hypocritical as accusing those who advocate freedom of divorce of encouraging the destruction of family ties. Just as in bourgeois society the defenders of privilege

and corruption, on which bourgeois marriage rests, oppose freedom of divorce, so, in the capitalist state, repudiation of the right to self-determination, i.e., the right of nations to secede, means nothing more than defence of the privileges of the dominant nation and police methods of administration, to the detriment of democratic methods.

No doubt, the political chicanery arising from all the relationships existing in capitalist society sometimes leads members of parliament and journalists to indulge in frivolous and even nonsensical twaddle about one or another nation seceding. But only reactionaries can allow themselves to be frightened (or pretend to be frightened) by such talk. Those who stand by democratic principles, i.e., who insist that questions of state be decided by the mass of the population, know very well that there is a "tremendous distance"[185] between what the politicians prate about and what the people decide. From their daily experience the masses know perfectly well the value of geographical and economic ties and the advantages of a big market and a big state. They will, therefore, resort to secession only when national oppression and national friction make joint life absolutely intolerable and hinder any and all economic intercourse. In that case, the interests of capitalist development and of the freedom of the class struggle will be best served by secession.

Thus, from whatever angle we approach Mr. Kokoshkin's arguments, they prove to be the height of absurdity and a mockery of the principles of democracy. And yet there is a modicum of logic in these arguments, the logic of the class interests of the Great-Russian bourgeoisie. Like most members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, Mr. Kokoshkin is a lackey of the money-bags of that bourgeoisie. He defends its privileges in general, and its *state* privileges in particular. He defends them hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder with Purishkevich, the only difference being that Purishkevich puts more faith in the feudalist cudgel, while Kokoshkin and Co. realise that this cudgel was badly damaged in 1905, and rely more on bourgeois methods of fooling the masses, such as frightening the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants with the spectre of the "disintegration of the state", and deluding them with phrases

about blending "people's freedom" with historical tradition, etc.

The liberals' hostility to the principle of political self-determination of nations can have one, and only one, real class meaning: national-liberalism, defence of the state privileges of the Great-Russian bourgeoisie. And the opportunists among the Marxists in Russia, who today, under the Third of June regime, are against the right of nations to self-determination—the liquidator Semkovsky, the Bundist Liebman, the Ukrainian petty-bourgeois Yurkevich—are *actually* following in the wake of the national-liberals, and corrupting the working class with national-liberal ideas.

The interests of the working class and of its struggle against capitalism demand complete solidarity and the closest unity of the workers of all nations; they demand resistance to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie of every nationality. Hence, Social-Democrats would be deviating from proletarian policy and subordinating the workers to the policy of the bourgeoisie if they were to repudiate the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of an oppressed nation to secede, or if they were to support all the national demands of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations. It makes no difference to the hired worker whether he is exploited chiefly by the Great-Russian bourgeoisie rather than the non-Russian bourgeoisie, or by the Polish bourgeoisie rather than the Jewish bourgeoisie, etc. The hired worker who has come to understand his class interests is equally indifferent to the state privileges of the Great-Russian capitalists and to the promises of the Polish or Ukrainian capitalists to set up an earthly paradise when they obtain state privileges. Capitalism is developing and will continue to develop, anyway, both in integral states with a mixed population and in separate national states.

In any case the hired worker will be an object of exploitation. Successful struggle against exploitation requires that the proletariat be free of nationalism, and be absolutely neutral, so to speak, in the fight for supremacy that is going on among the bourgeoisie of the various nations. If the proletariat of any one nation gives the slightest support to the privileges of its "own" national bourgeoisie, that will inevitably rouse distrust among the proletariat of

another nation; it will weaken the international class solidarity of the workers and divide them, to the delight of the bourgeoisie. Repudiation of the right to self-determination or to secession inevitably means, in practice, support for the privileges of the dominant nation.

We will get even more striking confirmation of this if we take the concrete case of Norway's secession from Sweden.

6. NORWAY'S SECESSION FROM SWEDEN

Rosa Luxemburg cites precisely this example, and discusses it as follows:

> "The latest event in the history of federative relations, the secession of Norway from Sweden—which at the time was hastily seized upon by the social-patriotic Polish press (see the Cracow *Naprzód*[186]) as a gratifying sign of the strength and progressive nature of the tendency towards state secession—at once provided striking proof that federalism and its concomitant, separation, are in no way an expression of progress or democracy. After the so-called Norwegian 'revolution', which meant that the Swedish king was deposed and compelled to leave Norway, the Norwegians coolly proceeded to choose another king, formally rejecting, by a national referendum, the proposal to establish a republic. That which superficial admirers of all national movements and of all semblance of independence proclaimed to be a 'revolution' was simply a manifestation of peasant and petty-bourgeois particularism, the desire to have a king 'of their own' for their money instead of one imposed upon them by the Swedish aristocracy, and was, consequently, a movement that had absolutely nothing in common with revolution. At the same time, the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway showed once more to what extent, in this case also, the federation which had existed until then was only an expression of purely dynastic interests and, therefore, merely a form of monarchism and reaction." (*Przegląd*.)

That is literally all that Rosa Luxemburg has to say on this score! Admittedly, it would have been difficult for her to have revealed the hopelessness of her position more saliently than she has done in this particular instance.

The question was, and is: do the Social-Democrats in a mixed national state need a programme that recognises the right to self-determination or secession?

What does the example of Norway, cited by Rosa Luxemburg, tell us on this point?

Our author twists and turns, exercises her wit and rails at *Naprzód*, but she does not answer the question! Rosa

Luxemburg speaks about everything under the sun so as to *avoid saying a single word* about the actual point at issue!

Undoubtedly, in wishing to have a king of their own for their money, and in rejecting, in a national referendum, the proposal to establish a republic, the Norwegian petty bourgeoisie displayed exceedingly bad philistine qualities. Undoubtedly, *Naprzód* displayed equally bad and equally philistine qualities in failing to notice this.

But what has all this to do with the case?

The question under discussion was the right of nations to self-determination and the attitude to be adopted by the socialist proletariat towards this right! Why, then, does not Rosa Luxemburg answer this question instead of beating about the bush?

To a mouse there is no stronger beast than the cat, it is said. To Rosa Luxemburg there is evidently no stronger beast than the "Fracy". "Fracy" is the popular term for the "Polish Socialist Party", its so-called revolutionary section, and the Cracow newspaper *Naprzód* shares the views of that "section". Rosa Luxemburg is so blinded by her fight against the nationalism of that "section" that she loses sight of everything except *Naprzód*.

If *Naprzód* says "yes", Rosa Luxemburg considers it her sacred duty to say an immediate "no", without stopping to think that by so doing she does not reveal independence of *Naprzód*, but, on the contrary, her ludicrous dependence on the "Fracy" and her inability to see things from a viewpoint any deeper and broader than that of the Cracow anthill. *Naprzód*, of course, is a wretched and by no means Marxist organ; but that should not prevent us from properly analysing the example of Norway, once we have chosen it.

To analyse this example in Marxist fashion, we must deal, not with the vices of the awfully terrible "Fracy", but, first, with the concrete historical features of the secession of Norway from Sweden, and secondly, with the tasks which confronted the *proletariat* of both countries in connection with this secession.

The geographic, economic and language ties between Norway and Sweden are as intimate as those between the Great Russians and many other Slav nations. But the union between Norway and Sweden was not a voluntary one, and

in dragging in the question of "federation" Rosa Luxemburg was talking at random, simply because she did not know what to say. Norway was *ceded* to Sweden by the monarchs during the Napoleonic wars, against the will of the Norwegians; and the Swedes had to bring troops into Norway to subdue her.

Despite the very extensive autonomy which Norway enjoyed (she had her own parliament, etc.), there was constant friction between Norway and Sweden for many decades after the union, and the Norwegians strove hard to throw off the yoke of the Swedish aristocracy. At last, in August 1905, they succeeded: the Norwegian parliament resolved that the Swedish king was no longer king of Norway, and in the referendum held later among the Norwegian people, the overwhelming majority (about 200,000 as against a few hundred) voted for complete separation from Sweden. After a short period of indecision, the Swedes resigned themselves to the fact of secession.

This example shows us on what grounds cases of the secession of nations are practicable, and actually occur, under modern economic and political relationships, and the *form* secession sometimes assumes under conditions of political freedom and democracy.

No Social-Democrat will deny—unless he would profess indifference to questions of political freedom and democracy (in which case he is naturally no longer a Social-Democrat)—that this example *virtually* proves that it is the *bounden duty* of class-conscious workers to conduct systematic propaganda and prepare the ground for the settlement of conflicts that may arise over the secession of nations, not in the "Russian way", but *only in the way* they were settled in 1905 between Norway and Sweden. This is exactly what is meant by the demand in the programme for the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination. But Rosa Luxemburg tried to get around a fact that was repugnant to her theory by violently attacking the philistinism of the Norwegian philistines and the Cracow *Naprzód*; for she understood perfectly well that this historical fact *completely refutes* her phrases about the right of nations to self-determination being a "utopia", or like the right "to eat off gold plates", etc. Such phrases only express a smug and opportunist belief in the

immutability of the present alignment of forces among the nationalities of Eastern Europe.

To proceed. In the question of the self-determination of nations, as in every other question, we are interested, first and foremost, in the self-determination of the proletariat within a given nation. Rosa Luxemburg modestly evaded this question too, for she realised that an analysis of it on the basis of the example of Norway, which she herself had chosen, would be disastrous to her "theory".

What position did the Norwegian and Swedish proletariat take, and indeed had to take, in the conflict over secession? *After* Norway seceded, the class-conscious workers of Norway would naturally have voted for a republic,* and if some socialists voted otherwise it only goes to show how much dense, philistine opportunism there sometimes is in the European socialist movement. There can be no two opinions about that, and we mention the point only because Rosa Luxemburg is trying to obscure the issue by speaking *off the mark*. We do not know whether the Norwegian socialist programme made it obligatory for Norwegian Social-Democrats to hold particular views on the question of secession. We will assume that it did not, and that the Norwegian socialists left it an open question as to what extent the autonomy of Norway gave sufficient scope to wage the class struggle freely, or to what extent the eternal friction and conflicts with the Swedish aristocracy hindered freedom of economic life. But it cannot be disputed that the Norwegian proletariat had to oppose this aristocracy and support Norwegian peasant democracy (with all its philistine limitations).

And the Swedish proletariat? It is common knowledge that the Swedish landed proprietors, abetted by the Swedish clergy, advocated war against Norway. Inasmuch as Norway was much weaker than Sweden, had already experienced a Swedish invasion, and the Swedish aristocracy carries enor-

* Since the majority of the Norwegian nation was in favour of a monarchy while the proletariat wanted a republic, the Norwegian proletariat was, generally speaking, confronted with the alternative: either revolution, if conditions were ripe for it, or submission to the will of the majority and prolonged propaganda and agitation work.

mous weight in its own country, this advocacy of war presented a grave danger. We may be sure that the Swedish Kokoshkins spent much time and energy in trying to corrupt the minds of the Swedish people by appeals to "handle" the "elastic formulas of political self-determination of nations carefully" by painting horrific pictures of the danger of the "disintegration of the state" and by assuring them that "people's freedom" was compatible with the traditions of the Swedish aristocracy. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the Swedish Social-Democrats would have betrayed the cause of socialism and democracy if they had not fought with all their might to combat both the landlord and the "Kokoshkin" ideology and policy, and if they had failed to demand, *not only* equality of nations in general (to which the Kokoshkins also subscribe), but also the right of nations to self-determination, Norway's freedom to secede.

The close alliance between the Norwegian and Swedish workers, their complete fraternal class solidarity, *gained* from the Swedish workers' recognition of the right of the Norwegians to secede. This convinced the Norwegian workers that the Swedish workers were not infected with Swedish nationalism, and that they placed fraternity with the Norwegian proletarians above the privileges of the Swedish bourgeoisie and aristocracy. The dissolution of the ties imposed upon Norway by the monarchs of Europe and the Swedish aristocracy strengthened the ties between the Norwegian and Swedish workers. The Swedish workers have proved that in spite of *all* the vicissitudes of bourgeois policy—bourgeois relations may quite possibly bring about a repetition of the forcible subjection of the Norwegians to the Swedes!—they will be able to preserve and defend the complete equality and class solidarity of the workers of both nations in the struggle against both the Swedish and the Norwegian bourgeoisie.

Incidentally, this reveals how groundless and even frivolous are the attempts sometimes made by the "Fracy" to "use" our disagreements with Rosa Luxemburg against Polish Social-Democracy. The "Fracy" are not a proletarian or a socialist party, but a petty-bourgeois nationalist party, something like Polish Social-Revolutionaries. There never has been, nor could there be, any question of unity between

the Russian Social-Democrats and this party. On the other hand no Russian Social-Democrat has ever "repented" of the close relations and unity that have been established with the Polish Social-Democrats. The Polish Social-Democrats have rendered a great historical service by creating the first really Marxist, proletarian party in Poland, a country imbued with nationalist aspirations and passions. Yet the service the Polish Social-Democrats have rendered is a great one, not because Rosa Luxemburg has talked a lot of nonsense about § 9 of the Russian Marxists' Programme, but despite that sad circumstance.

The question of the "right to self-determination" is of course not so important to the Polish Social-Democrats as it is to the Russian. It is quite understandable that in their zeal (sometimes a little excessive, perhaps) to combat the nationalistically blinded petty bourgeoisie of Poland the Polish Social-Democrats should overdo things. No Russian Marxist has ever thought of blaming the Polish Social-Democrats for being opposed to the secession of Poland. These Social-Democrats err only when, like Rosa Luxemburg, they try to deny the necessity of including the recognition of the right to self-determination in the Programme of the *Russian* Marxists.

Virtually, this is like attempting to apply relationships, understandable by Cracow standards, to all the peoples and nations inhabiting Russia, including the Great Russians. It means being "Polish nationalists the wrong way round", not Russian, not international Social-Democrats.

For international Social-Democracy stands for the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination. This is what we shall now proceed to discuss.

7. THE RESOLUTION OF THE LONDON INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, 1896

This resolution reads:

"This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination [*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*] and expresses its sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism. This Congress calls upon the workers of all these countries to join the ranks of the class-conscious [*Klassenbewusste*—those who understand their

class interests] workers of the whole world in order jointly to fight for the defeat of international capitalism and for the achievement of the aims of international Social-Democracy."*

As we have already pointed out, our opportunists—Semkovsky, Liebman and Yurkevich—are simply unaware of this resolution. But Rosa Luxemburg knows it and quotes the full text, which contains the same expression as that contained in our programme, viz., "self-determination".

How does Rosa Luxemburg remove this obstacle from the path of her "original" theory?

Oh, quite simply ... the whole emphasis lies in the second part of the resolution ... its declarative character ... one can refer to it only by mistake!

The feebleness and utter confusion of our author are simply amazing. Usually it is only the opportunists who talk about the consistent democratic and socialist points in the programme being mere declarations, and cravenly avoid an open debate on them. It is apparently not without reason that Rosa Luxemburg has this time found herself in the deplorable company of the Semkovskys, Liebmans and Yurkeviches. Rosa Luxemburg does not venture to state openly whether she regards the above resolution as correct or erroneous. She shifts and shuffles as if counting on the inattentive or ill-informed reader, who forgets the first part of the resolution by the time he has started reading the second, or who has never heard of the discussion that took place in the socialist press *prior* to the London Congress.

Rosa Luxemburg is greatly mistaken, however, if she imagines that, in the sight of the class-conscious workers of Russia, she can get away with trampling upon the resolution of the International on such an important fundamental issue, without even deigning to analyse it critically.

Rosa Luxemburg's point of view was voiced during the discussions which took place prior to the London Congress, mainly in the columns of *Die Neue Zeit*, organ of the German

* See the official German report of the London Congress: *Verhandlungen und Beschlüsse des internationalen sozialistischen Arbeiter- und Gewerkschafts-Kongresses zu London, vom 27. Juli bis 1. August 1896*, Berlin, 1897, S. 18. A Russian pamphlet has been published containing the decisions of international congresses in which the word "self-determination" is wrongly translated as "autonomy".

Marxists; *in essence this point of view was defeated in the International*! That is the crux of the matter, which the Russian reader must particularly bear in mind.

The debate turned on the question of Poland's independence. Three points of view were put forward:

1. That of the "Fracy", in whose name Haecker spoke. They wanted the International to include in *its own* programme a demand for the independence of Poland. The motion was not carried and this point of view was defeated in the International.

2. Rosa Luxemburg's point of view, viz., the Polish socialists should not demand independence for Poland. This point of view entirely precluded the proclamation of the right of nations to self-determination. It was likewise defeated in the International.

3. The point of view which was elaborated at the time by K. Kautsky, who opposed Rosa Luxemburg and proved that her materialism was extremely "one-sided"; according to Kautsky, the International could not at the time make the independence of Poland a point in its programme; but the Polish socialists were fully entitled to put forward such a demand. From the socialists' point of view it was undoubtedly a mistake to ignore the tasks of national liberation in a situation where national oppression existed.

The International's resolution reproduces the most essential and fundamental propositions in this point of view: on the one hand, the absolutely direct, unequivocal recognition of the full right of all nations to self-determination; on the other hand, the equally unambiguous appeal to the workers for *international* unity in their class struggle.

We think that this resolution is absolutely correct, and that, to the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is this resolution, with both its parts being taken as an integral whole, that gives the only correct lead to the proletarian class policy in the national question.

Let us deal with the three above-mentioned viewpoints in somewhat greater detail.

As is known, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels considered it the bounden duty of the whole of West-European democracy, and still more of Social-Democracy, to give active support to

the demand for Polish independence. For the period of the 1840s and 1860s, the period of the bourgeois revolutions in Austria and Germany, and the period of the "Peasant Reform" in Russia,[187] this point of view was quite correct and the only one that was consistently democratic and proletarian. So long as the masses of the people in Russia and in most of the Slav countries were still sunk in torpor, so long as *there were no* independent, mass, democratic movements in those countries, the liberation movement of the *gentry* in Poland assumed an immense and paramount importance from the point of view, not only of Russian, not only of Slav, but of European democracy as a whole.*[188]

But while Marx's standpoint was quite correct for the forties, fifties and sixties or for the third quarter of the nineteenth century, it has ceased to be correct by the twentieth century. Independent democratic movements, and even an independent proletarian movement, have arisen in most Slav countries, even in Russia, one of the most backward Slav countries. Aristocratic Poland has disappeared, yielding place to capitalist Poland. Under such circumstances Poland could not but lose her *exceptional* revolutionary importance.

The attempt of the P.S.P. (the Polish Socialist Party, the present-day "Fracy") in 1896 to "establish" for all time the point of view Marx had held in a *different epoch* was an attempt to use the *letter* of Marxism against the *spirit* of Marxism. The Polish Social-Democrats were therefore quite right in attacking the extreme nationalism of the Polish petty bourgeoisie and pointing out that the national question was of secondary importance to Polish workers, in

* It would be a very interesting piece of historical research to compare the position of a noble Polish rebel in 1863 with that of the all-Russia revolutionary democrat, Chernyshevsky, who (like Marx), was able to appreciate the importance of the Polish movement, and with that of the Ukrainian petty bourgeois Dragomanov, who appeared much later and expressed the views of a peasant, so ignorant and sluggish, and so attached to his dung heap, that his legitimate hatred of the Polish gentry blinded him to the significance which their struggle had for all-Russia democracy. (Cf. Dragomanov, *Historical Poland and Great-Russian Democracy*.) Dragomanov richly deserved the fervent kisses which were subsequently bestowed on him by Mr. P. B. Struve, who by that time had become a national-liberal.

creating for the first time a purely proletarian party in Poland and proclaiming the extremely important principle that the Polish and the Russian workers must maintain the closest alliance in their class struggle.

But did this mean that at the beginning of the twentieth century the International could regard the principle of political self-determination of nations, or the right to secede, as unnecessary to Eastern Europe and Asia? This would have been the height of absurdity, and (theoretically) tantamount to admitting that the bourgeois-democratic reform of the Turkish, Russian and Chinese states had been consummated; indeed it would have been tantamount (in practice) to opportunism towards absolutism.

No. At a time when bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and Asia have begun, in this period of the awakening and intensification of national movements and of the formation of independent proletarian parties, the task of these parties with regard to national policy must be twofold: recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination, since bourgeois-democratic reform is not yet completed and since working-class democracy consistently, seriously and sincerely (and not in a liberal, Kokoshkin fashion) fights for equal rights for nations; then, a close, unbreakable alliance in the class struggle of the proletarians of all nations in a given state, throughout all the changes in its history, irrespective of any reshaping of the frontiers of the individual states by the bourgeoisie.

It is this twofold task of the proletariat that the 1896 resolution of the International formulates. That is the substance, the underlying principle, of the resolution adopted by the Conference of Russian Marxists held in the summer of 1913. Some people profess to see a "contradiction" in the fact that while point 4 of this resolution, which recognises the right to self-determination and secession, seems to "concede" the maximum to nationalism (in reality, the recognition of the *right of all* nations to self-determination implies the maximum of *democracy* and the minimum of nationalism), point 5 warns the workers against the nationalist slogans of the bourgeoisie of any nation and demands the unity and amalgamation of the workers of all nations in internationally united proletarian organisations. But this is a "contradiction"

only for extremely shallow minds, which, for instance, cannot grasp why the unity and class solidarity of the Swedish and the Norwegian proletariat *gained* when the Swedish workers upheld Norway's freedom to secede and form an independent state.

8. THE UTOPIAN KARL MARX AND THE PRACTICAL ROSA LUXEMBURG

Calling Polish independence a "utopia" and repeating this *ad nauseam*, Rosa Luxemburg exclaims ironically: Why not raise the demand for the independence of Ireland?

The "practical" Rosa Luxemburg evidently does not know what Karl Marx's attitude to the question of Irish independence was. It is worth while dwelling upon this, so as to show how a *concrete* demand for national independence was analysed from a genuinely Marxist, not opportunist, standpoint.

It was Marx's custom to "sound out" his socialist acquaintances, as he expressed it, to test their intelligence and the strength of their convictions."[189] After making the acquaintance of Lopatin, Marx wrote to Engels on July 5, 1870, expressing a highly flattering opinion of the young Russian socialist but adding at the same time:

"*Poland* is his weak point. On this point he speaks quite like an Englishman—say, an English Chartist of the old school—about Ireland."[190]

Marx questions a socialist belonging to an oppressor nation about his attitude to the oppressed nation and at once reveals a defect *common* to the socialists of the dominant nations (the English and the Russian): failure to understand their socialist duties towards the downtrodden nations, their echoing of the prejudices acquired from the bourgeoisie of the "dominant nation".

Before passing on to Marx's positive declarations on Ireland, we must point out that in general the attitude of Marx and Engels to the national question was strictly critical, and that they recognised its historically conditioned importance. Thus, Engels wrote to Marx on May 23, 1851, that the study of history was leading him to pessimistic conclusions in regard to Poland, that the importance of Poland was

temporary—only until the agrarian revolution in Russia. The role of the Poles in history was one of "bold (hotheaded) foolishness". "And one cannot point to a single instance in which Poland has successfully represented progress, even in relation to Russia, or done anything at all of historical importance." Russia contains more of civilisation, education, industry and the bourgeoisie than "the Poland of the indolent gentry". "What are Warsaw and Cracow compared to St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa!" Engels had no faith in the success of the Polish gentry's insurrections.

But all these thoughts, showing the deep insight of genius, by no means prevented Engels and Marx from treating the Polish movement with the most profound and ardent sympathy twelve years later, when Russia was still dormant and Poland was seething.

When drafting the Address of the International in 1864, Marx wrote to Engels (on November 4, 1864) that he had to combat Mazzini's nationalism, and went on to say: "Inasmuch as international politics occurred in the Address, I spoke of countries, not of nationalities, and denounced Russia, not the *minores gentium*." Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the "labour question". But his theory is as far from ignoring national movements as heaven is from earth.

Then came 1866. Marx wrote to Engels about the "Proudhonist clique" in Paris which "declares nationalities to be an absurdity, attacks Bismarck and Garibaldi. As polemics against chauvinism their doings are useful and explicable. But as believers in Proudhon (Lafargue and Longuet, two very good friends of mine here, also belong to them), who think all Europe must and will sit quietly on their hind quarters until the gentlemen in France abolish poverty and ignorance—they are grotesque." (Letter of June 7, 1866.)

"Yesterday," Marx wrote on June 20, 1866, "there was a discussion in the International Council on the present war.... The discussion wound up, as was to be foreseen, with 'the question of nationality' in general and the attitude we take towards it.... The representatives of 'Young France' (*non-workers*) came out with the announcement that all national ties and even nations were 'antiquated prejudices'. Proudhonised Stirnerism.... The whole world waits until the

French are ripe for a social revolution.... The English laughed very much when I began my speech by saying that our friend Lafargue and others, who had done away with nationalities, had spoken 'French' to us, i.e., a language which nine-tenths of the audience did not understand. I also suggested that by the negation of nationalities he appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption by the model French nation."

The conclusion that follows from all these critical remarks of Marx's is clear: the working class should be the last to make a fetish of the national question, since the development of capitalism does not necessarily awaken *all* nations to independent life. But to brush aside the mass national movements once they have started, and to refuse to support what is progressive in them means, in effect, pandering to *nationalistic* prejudices, that is, recognising "one's own nation" as a model nation (or, we would add, one possessing the exclusive privilege of forming a state).*

But let us return to the question of Ireland.

Marx's position on this question is most clearly expressed in the following extracts from his letters:

"I have done my best to bring about this demonstration of the English workers in favour of Fenianism.... I used to think the separation of Ireland from England impossible. I now think it inevitable, although after the separation there may come federation." This is what Marx wrote to Engels on November 2, 1867.

In his letter of November 30 of the same year he added:

"...what shall we advise the *English* workers? In my opinion they must make the *Repeal of the Union*" [Ireland with England, i.e., the separation of Ireland from England] (in short, the affair of 1783, only democratised and adapted to the conditions of the time) an article of their *pronunziamento*. This is the only legal and therefore only possible form of Irish emancipation which can be admitted in the programme of an *English* party. Experience must show later

* Cf. also Marx's letter to Engels of June 3, 1867: "...I have learned with real pleasure from the Paris letters to *The Times* about the pro-Polish exclamations of the Parisians against Russia.... Mr. Proudhon and his little doctrinaire clique are not the French people."

whether a mere personal union can continue to subsist between the two countries....

"...What the Irish need is:

"1) Self-government and independence from England;

"2) An agrarian revolution...."

Marx attached great importance to the Irish question and delivered hour-and-a-half lectures on this subject at the German Workers' Union (letter of December 17, 1867).

In a letter dated November 20, 1868, Engels spoke of "the hatred towards the Irish found among the English workers", and almost a year later (October 24, 1869), returning to this subject, he wrote:

"*Il n'y a qu'un pas* [it is only one step] from Ireland to Russia.... Irish history shows what a misfortune it is for one nation to have subjugated another. All the abominations of the English have their origin in the Irish Pale. I have still to plough my way through the Cromwellian period, but this much seems certain to me, that things would have taken an other turn in England, too, but for the necessity of military rule in Ireland and the creation of a new aristocracy there."

Let us note, in passing, Marx's letter to Engels of August 18, 1869:

"The Polish workers in Posen have brought a strike to a victorious end with the help of their colleagues in Berlin. This struggle against Monsieur le Capital—even in the lower form of the strike—is a more serious way of getting rid of national prejudices than peace declamations from the lips of bourgeois gentlemen."

The policy on the Irish question pursued by Marx in the International may be seen from the following:

On November 18, 1869, Marx wrote to Engels that he had spoken for an hour and a quarter at the Council of the International on the question of the attitude of the British Ministry to the Irish Amnesty, and had proposed the following resolution:

"Resolved,

"that in his reply to the Irish demands for the release of the imprisoned Irish patriots Mr. Gladstone deliberately insults the Irish nation;

"that he clogs political amnesty with conditions alike degrading to the victims of misgovernment and the people they belong to;

"that having, in the teeth of his responsible position, publicly and enthusiastically cheered on the American slaveholders' rebellion, he now steps in to preach to the Irish people the doctrine of passive obedience;

"that his whole proceedings with reference to the Irish Amnesty question are the true and genuine offspring of that '*policy of conquest*', by the fiery denunciation of which Mr. Gladstone ousted his Tory rivals from office;

"that the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association express their admiration of the spirited, firm and high-souled manner in which the Irish people carry on their Amnesty movement;

"that this resolution be communicated to all branches of, and workingmen's bodies connected with, the International Workingmen's Association in Europe and America."

On December 10, 1869, Marx wrote that his paper on the Irish question to be read at the Council of the International would be couched as follows:

"Quite apart from all phrases about 'international' and 'humane' justice for Ireland—which are taken for granted in the International Council—*it is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working class to get rid of their present connexion with Ireland*. And this is my fullest conviction, and for reasons which in part I can *not* tell the English workers themselves. For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working-class ascendancy. I always expressed this point of view in the *New York Tribune*[191] [an American paper to which Marx contributed for a long time]. Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will *never accomplish anything* until it has got rid of Ireland.... The English reaction in England had its roots in the subjugation of Ireland." (Marx's italics.)

Marx's policy on the Irish question should now be quite clear to our readers.

Marx, the "utopian", was so "unpractical" that he stood for the separation of Ireland, which half a century later has not yet been achieved.

What gave rise to Marx's policy, and was it not mistaken?

At first Marx thought that Ireland would not be liberated by the national movement of the oppressed nation, but by the working-class movement of the oppressor nation. Marx did not make an Absolute of the national movement, knowing, as he did, that only the victory of the working class can bring about the complete liberation of all nationalities. It is impossible to estimate beforehand all the possible relations between the bourgeois liberation movements of the oppressed nations and the proletarian emancipation movement of the oppressor nation (the very problem which today makes the national question in Russia so difficult).

However, it so happened that the English working class fell under the influence of the liberals for a fairly long time, became an appendage to the liberals, and by adopting a liberal-labour policy left itself leaderless. The bourgeois liberation movement in Ireland grew stronger and assumed revolutionary forms. Marx reconsidered his view and corrected it. "What a misfortune it is for a nation to have subjugated another." The English-working class will never be free until Ireland is freed from the English yoke. Reaction in England is strengthened and fostered by the enslavement of Ireland (just as reaction in Russia is fostered by her enslavement of a number of nations!).

And, in proposing in the International a resolution of sympathy with "the Irish nation", "the Irish people" (the clever L. Vl. would probably have berated poor Marx for forgetting about the class struggle!), Marx advocated the *separation* of Ireland from England, "although after the separation there may come federation".

What were the theoretical grounds for Marx's conclusion? In England the bourgeois revolution had been consummated long ago. But it had not yet been consummated in Ireland; it is being consummated only now, after the lapse of half a century, by the reforms of the English Liberals. If capitalism had been overthrown in England as quickly as Marx had at first expected, there would have been no room for a bourgeois-democratic and general national movement in Ireland. But since it had arisen, Marx advised the English workers to support it, give it a revolutionary impetus and see it through in the interests of *their own* liberty.

The economic ties between Ireland and England in the 1860s were, of course, even closer than Russia's present ties with Poland, the Ukraine, etc. The "unpracticality" and "impracticability" of the separation of Ireland (if only owing to geographical conditions and England's immense colonial power) were quite obvious. Though, in principle, an enemy of federalism, Marx in this instance granted the possibility of federation, as well,* *if only* the emancipation of Ireland was achieved in a revolutionary, not reformist way, through a movement of the mass of the people of Ireland supported by the working class of England. There can be no doubt that only such a solution of the historical problem would have been in the best interests of the proletariat and most conducive to rapid social progress.

Things turned out differently. Both the Irish people and the English proletariat proved weak. Only now, through the sordid deals between the English Liberals and the Irish bourgeoisie, is the Irish problem *being solved* (the example of Ulster shows with what difficulty) through the land reform (with compensation) and Home Rule (not yet introduced). Well then? Does it follow that Marx and Engels were "utopians", that they put forward "impracticable" national demands, or that they allowed themselves to be influenced by the Irish petty-bourgeois nationalists (for there is no doubt about the petty-bourgeois nature of the Fenian movement), etc.?

No. In the Irish question, too, Marx and Engels pursued a consistently proletarian policy, which really educated the masses in a spirit of democracy and socialism. Only such a policy could have saved both Ireland and England half a

* By the way, it is not difficult to see why, from a Social-Democratic point of view, the right to "self-determination" means *neither* federation *nor* autonomy (although, speaking in the abstract, both come under the category of "self-determination"). The right to federation is simply meaningless, since federation implies a bilateral contract. It goes without saying that Marxists cannot include the defence of federalism in general in their programme. As far as autonomy is concerned Marxists defend, not the "right" to autonomy, but autonomy *itself*, as a general universal principle of a democratic state with a mixed national composition, and a great variety of geographical and other conditions. Consequently, the recognition of the "right of nations to autonomy" is as absurd as that of the "right of nations to federation".

century of delay in introducing the necessary reforms, and prevented these reforms from being mutilated by the Liberals to please the reactionaries.

The policy of Marx and Engels on the Irish question serves as a splendid example of the attitude the proletariat of the oppressor nations should adopt towards national movements, an example which has lost none of its immense *practical* importance. It serves as a warning against that "servile haste" with which the philistines of all countries, colours and languages hurry to label as "utopian" the idea of altering the frontiers of states that were established by the violence and privileges of the landlords and bourgeoisie of one nation.

If the Irish and English proletariat had not accepted Marx's policy and had not made the secession of Ireland their slogan, this would have been the worst sort of opportunism, a neglect of their duties as democrats and socialists, and a concession to *English* reaction and the *English* bourgeoisie.

9. THE 1903 PROGRAMME AND ITS LIQUIDATORS

The Minutes of the 1903 Congress, at which the Programme of the Russian Marxists was adopted, have become a great rarity, and the vast majority of the active members of the working-class movement today are unacquainted with the motives underlying the various points (the more so since not all the literature relating to it enjoys the blessings of legality...). It is therefore necessary to analyse the debate that took place at the 1903 Congress on the question under discussion.

Let us state first of all that however meagre the Russian Social-Democratic literature on the "right of nations to self-determination" may be, it nevertheless shows clearly that this right has always been understood to mean the right to secession. The Semkovskys, Liebmans and Yurkeviches who doubt this and declare that § 9 is "vague", etc., do so only because of their sheer ignorance or carelessness. As far back as 1902, Plekhanov, in *Zarya*, defended "the right to self-determination" in the draft programme, and wrote that this demand, while not obligatory upon bourgeois democrats, was "obligatory upon Social-Democrats". "If we were to forget it or hesitate to advance it," Plekhanov wrote, "for fear of

offending the national prejudices of our fellow-countrymen of Great-Russian nationality, the call ... 'workers of all countries, unite!' would be a shameful lie on our lips...."[192]

This is a very apt description of the fundamental argument in favour of the point under consideration; so apt that it is not surprising that the "anythingarian" critics of our programme have been timidly avoiding it. The abandonment of this point, no matter for what motives, is *actually* a "shameful" concession to *Great-Russian* nationalism. But why Great-Russian, when it is a question of the right of *all* nations to self-determination? Because it refers to secession *from* the Great Russians. The interests of the *unity of the proletarians*, the interests of their class solidarity call for recognition of the right of *nations to secede*—that is what Plekhanov admitted twelve years ago in the words quoted above. Had our opportunists given thought to this they would probably not have talked so much nonsense about self-determination.

At the 1903 Congress, which adopted the draft programme that Plekhanov advocated, the main work was done by the *Programme Commission*. Unfortunately no Minutes of its proceedings were kept; they would have been particularly interesting on this point, for it was *only* in the Commission that the representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats, Warszawski and Hanecki, tried to defend their views and to dispute "recognition of the right to self-determination". Any reader who goes to the trouble of comparing their arguments (set forth in the speech by Warszawski and the statement by him and Hanecki, pp. 134-36 and 388-90 of the Congress Minutes) with those which Rosa Luxemburg advanced in her Polish article, which we have analysed, will find them identical.

How were these arguments treated by the Programme Commission of the Second Congress, where Plekhanov, more than anyone else, spoke against the Polish Marxists? They were mercilessly ridiculed! The absurdity of proposing to the Marxists of *Russia* that they should reject the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination was demonstrated so plainly and clearly that the Polish Marxists *did not even venture to repeat their arguments at the plenary meeting of the Congress*! They left the Congress, convinced of the

hopelessness of their case at the supreme assembly of Marxists—Great-Russian, Jewish, Georgian, and Armenian.

Needless to say, this historic episode is of very great importance to everyone seriously interested in *his own* programme. The fact that the Polish Marxists' arguments were completely defeated at the Programme Commission of the Congress, and that the Polish Marxists gave up the attempt to defend their views at the plenary meeting of the Congress is very significant. No wonder Rosa Luxemburg maintained a "modest" silence about it in her article in 1908—the recollection of the Congress must have been too unpleasant! She also kept quiet about the ridiculously inept proposal made by Warszawski and Hanecki in 1903, on behalf of all Polish Marxists, to "amend" § 9 of the Programme, a proposal which neither Rosa Luxemburg nor the other Polish Social-Democrats have ventured (or will ever venture) to repeat.

But although Rosa Luxemburg, concealing her defeat in 1903, has maintained silence over these facts, those who take an interest in the history of their Party will make it their business to ascertain them and give thought to their significance.

On leaving the 1903 Congress, Rosa Luxemburg's friends submitted the following statement:

> "We propose that Clause 7 [now Clause 9] of the draft programme read as follows: § 7. *Institutions guaranteeing full freedom of cultural development to all nations incorporated in the state.*" (P. 390 of the Minutes.)

Thus, the Polish Marxists at that time put forward views on the national question that were so vague that *instead of* self-determination they practically proposed the notorious "cultural-national autonomy", only under another name!

This sounds almost incredible, but unfortunately it is a fact. At the Congress itself, attended though it was by five Bundists with five votes and three Caucasians with six votes, without counting Kostrov's consultative voice, *not a single* vote was cast for the *rejection* of the clause about self-determination. Three votes were cast for the proposal to add "cultural-national autonomy" to this clause (in favour of Goldblatt's formula: "the establishment of institutions guaranteeing the nations full freedom of cultural develop-

ment") and four votes for Lieber's formula ("the right of nations to freedom in their cultural development").

Now that a Russian liberal party—the Constitutional-Democratic Party—has appeared on the scene, we know that in *its* programme the political self-determination of nations has been replaced by "cultural self-determination". Rosa Luxemburg's Polish friends, therefore, were "*combating*" the nationalism of the P.S.P., and did it so successfully that they proposed the substitution of a *liberal* programme for the Marxist programme! And in the same breath they accused our programme of being opportunist; no wonder this accusation was received with laughter by the Programme Commission of the Second Congress!

How was "self-determination" understood by the delegates to the Second Congress; of whom, as we have seen, *not one* was opposed to "self-determination of nations"?

The following three extracts from the Minutes provide the answer:

"*Martynov* is of the opinion that the term 'self-determination' should not be given a broad interpretation; it merely means the right of a nation to establish itself as a separate polity, not regional self-government" (p. 171). Martynov was a member of the Programme Commission, in which the arguments of Rosa Luxemburg's friends were repudiated and ridiculed. Martynov was then an Economist in his views, and a violent opponent of *Iskra*; had he expressed an opinion that was not shared by the majority of the Programme Commission he would certainly have been repudiated.

Bundist Goldblatt was the first to speak when the Congress, after the Commission had finished its work, discussed §8 (the present Clause 9) of the Programme.

He said:

> "No objections can be raised to the 'right to self-determination'. When a nation is fighting for independence, that should not be opposed. If Poland refuses to enter into lawful marriage with Russia, she should not be interfered with, as Plekhanov put it. I agree with this opinion within these limits" (pp. 175-76).

Plekhanov had not spoken on this subject at all at the plenary meeting of the Congress. Goldblatt was referring to what Plekhanov had said at the Programme Commission, where the "right to self-determination" had been explained

in a simple yet detailed manner to mean the right to secession. Lieber, who spoke after Goldblatt, remarked:

> "Of course, if any nationality finds that it cannot live within the frontiers of Russia, the Party will not place any obstacles in Its way" (p. 176).

The reader will see that at the Second Congress of the Party, which adopted the programme, it was unanimously understood that self-determination meant "only" the right to secession. Even the Bundists grasped this truth at the time, and it is only in our own deplorable times of continued counter-revolution and all sorts of "apostasy" that we can find people who, bold in their ignorance, declare that the programme is "vague". But before devoting time to these sorry would-be Social-Democrats, let us first finish with the attitude of the Poles to the programme.

They came to the Second Congress (1903) declaring that unity was necessary and imperative. But they left the Congress after their "reverses" in the Programme Commission, and their *last word* was a written statement, printed in the Minutes of the Congress, containing the above-mentioned proposal to *substitute* cultural-national autonomy for self-determination.

In 1906 the Polish Marxists joined the Party; *neither* upon joining *nor* afterwards (at the Congress of 1907, the conferences of 1907 and 1908, or the plenum of 1910) *did they introduce* a single proposal to amend § 9 of the Russian Programme!

That is a fact.

And, despite all utterances and assurances, this fact definitely proves that Rosa Luxemburg's friends regarded the question as having been settled by the debate at the Programme Commission of the Second Congress, as well as by the decision of that Congress, and that they tacitly acknowledged their mistake and corrected it by joining the Party in 1906, after they had left the Congress in 1903, without a single attempt to raise the question of amending § 9 of the Programme through *Party* channels.

Rosa Luxemburg's article appeared over her signature in 1908—of course, it never entered anyone's head to deny Party publicists the right to criticise the programme—and, *since*

the writing of this article, *not a single* official body of the Polish Marxists has raised the question of revising § 9.

Trotsky was therefore rendering a great disservice to certain admirers of Rosa Luxemburg when he wrote, on behalf of the editors of *Borba*, in issue No. 2 of that publication (March 1914):

> "The Polish Marxists consider that 'the right to national self-determination' is entirely devoid of political content and should be deleted from the programme" (p. 25).

The obliging Trotsky is more dangerous than an enemy! Trotsky could produce *no* proof, except "private conversations" (i.e., simply gossip, on which Trotsky always subsists), for classifying "Polish Marxists" in general as supporters of every article by Rosa Luxemburg. Trotsky presented the "Polish Marxists" as people devoid of honour and conscience, incapable of respecting even their own convictions and the programme of their Party. How obliging Trotsky is!

When, in 1903, the representatives of the Polish Marxists walked out of the Second Congress *over* the right to self-determination, Trotsky could have said *at the time* that they regarded this right as devoid of content and subject to deletion from the programme.

But after that the Polish Marxists *joined* the Party whose programme this was, and they have never introduced a motion to amend it.*

Why did Trotsky withhold these facts from the readers of his journal? Only because it pays him to speculate on fomenting differences between the Polish and the Russian opponents of liquidationism and to deceive the Russian workers on the question of the programme.

Trotsky has never yet held a firm opinion on any important question of Marxism. He always contrives to worm his

* We are informed that the Polish Marxists attended the Summer Conference of the Russian Marxists in 1913 with *only* a consultative voice and did not vote at all on the right to self-determination (secession), declaring their opposition to this right in general. Of course, they had a perfect right to act the way they did, and, as hitherto, to agitate in Poland against secession. But this is not quite what Trotsky said; for the Polish Marxists did not demand the "deletion" of § 9 from the programme".

way into the cracks of any given difference of opinion and desert one side for the other. At the present moment he is in the company of the Bundists and the liquidators. And these gentlemen do not stand on ceremony where the Party is concerned.

Listen to the Bundist Liebman.

"When, fifteen years ago," this gentleman writes, "the Russian Social-Democrats included the point about the right of every nationality to 'self-determination' in their programme, everyone [!] asked himself: What does this fashionable [!] term really mean? No answer was forthcoming [!]. This word was left [!] wrapped in mist. And indeed, at the time, it was difficult to dispel that mist. The moment had not come when this point could be made concrete—it was said—so let it remain wrapped in mist [!] for the time being and practice will show what content should be put into it."

Isn't it magnificent, the way this "ragamuffin"[193] mocks at the Party programme?

And why does he mock at it?

Because he is an absolute ignoramus, who has never learnt anything or even read any Party history, but merely happened to land in liquidationist circles where going about in the nude is considered the "right" thing to do as far as knowledge of the Party and everything it stands for is concerned.

Pomyalovsky's seminary student boasts of having "spat into a barrel of sauerkraut".[194] The Bundist gentlemen have gone one better. They let the Liebmans loose to spit publicly into their own barrel. What do the Liebmans care about the fact that the International Congress has passed a decision, that at the Congress of their own Party two representatives of their own Bund proved that they were quite able (and what "severe" critics and determined enemies of *Iskra* they were!) to understand the meaning of "self-determination" and were even in agreement with it? And will it not be easier to liquidate the Party if the "Party publicists" (no jokes, please!) treat its history and programme after the fashion of the seminary student?

Here is a second "ragamuffin", Mr. Yurkevich of *Dzvin*. Mr. Yurkevich must have had the Minutes of the Second Congress before him, because he quotes Plekhanov, as repeated by Goldblatt, and shows that he is aware of the fact that self-determination can only mean the right to secession. This, however, does not prevent him from spreading slander

about the Russian Marxists among the Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie, alleging that they stand for the "state integrity" of Russia. (No. 7-8, 1913, p. 83, etc.) Of course, the Yurkeviches could not have invented a better method than such slander to alienate the Ukrainian democrats from the Great-Russian democrats. And such alienation is in line with the entire policy of the group of *Dzvin* publicists who advocate the *separation* of the Ukrainian workers *in a special* national organisation!*

It is quite appropriate, of course, that a group of nationalist philistines, who are engaged in splitting the ranks of the proletariat—and objectively this is the role of *Dzvin*—should disseminate such hopeless confusion on the national question. Needless to say, the Yurkeviches and Liebmans, who are "terribly" offended when they are called "near-Party men", do not say a word, not a single word, as to how *they* would like the problem of the right to secede to be settled in the programme.

But here is the third and principal "ragamuffin", Mr. Semkovsky, who, addressing a Great-Russian audience through the columns of a liquidationist newspaper, lashes at § 9 of the Programme and at the same time declares that "for certain reasons he does not approve of the proposal" to delete this clause!

This is incredible, but it is a fact.

In August 1912, the liquidators' conference raised the national question officially. For eighteen months not a single article has appeared on the question of § 9, except the one written by Mr. Semkovsky. And in this article the author *repudiates* the programme, "without approving", however, "for *certain* reasons" (is this a secrecy disease?) the proposal to amend it! We may be sure that it would be difficult to find anywhere in the world similar examples of opportunism, or even worse—renunciation of the Party, and a desire to liquidate it.

A single example will suffice to show what Semkovsky's arguments are like:

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* See particularly Mr. Yurkevich's preface to Mr. Levinsky's book (written in Ukrainian) *Outline of the Development of the Ukrainian Working-Class Movement in Galicia*, Kiev, 1914.

"What are we to do," he writes, "if the Polish proletariat wants to fight side by side with the proletariat of all Russia within the framework of a single state, while the reactionary classes of Polish society, on the contrary, want to separate Poland from Russia and obtain a majority of votes in favour of secession by referendum? Should we, Russian Social-Democrats in the central parliament, vote together with our Polish comrades *against* secession, or—in order not to violate the 'right to self-determination'—vote *for* secession?" (*Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 71.)

From this it is evident that Mr. Semkovsky does not even understand the *point at issue*! It did not occur to him that the right to secession presupposes the settlement of the question by a parliament (Diet, referendum, etc.) of the *seceding* region, *not* by a central parliament.

The childish perplexity over the question "What are we to do", if under democracy the majority are for reaction, serves to screen the real and live issue when *both* the Purishkeviches and the Kokoshkins consider the very idea of secession criminal! Perhaps the proletarians of *all* Russia ought not to fight the Purishkeviches and the Kokoshkins today, but should by-pass them and fight the reactionary classes of Poland!

Such is the sheer rubbish published in the liquidators' organ of which Mr. L. Martov is one of the ideological leaders, the selfsame L. Martov who drafted the programme and spoke in favour of its adoption in 1903, and even subsequently wrote in favour of the right to secede. Apparently L. Martov is now arguing according to the rule:

No clever man is needed there;
Better send Read,
And I shall wait and see.[195]

He sends Read-Semkovsky along and allows our programme to be distorted and endlessly muddled up in a daily paper whose new readers are unacquainted with it!

Yes. Liquidationism has gone a long way—there are even very many prominent ex-Social-Democrats who have not a trace of Party spirit left in them.

Rosa Luxemburg cannot, of course, be classed with the Liebmans, Yurkeviches and Semkovskys, but the fact that it was this kind of people who seized upon her error shows with particular clarity the opportunism she has lapsed into.

10. CONCLUSION

To sum up.

As far as the theory of Marxism in general is concerned, the question of the right to self-determination presents no difficulty. No one can seriously question the London resolution of 1896, or the fact that self-determination implies only the right to secede, or that the formation of independent national states is the tendency in all bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

A difficulty is to some extent created by the fact that in Russia the proletariat of both the oppressed and oppressor nations are fighting, and must fight, side by side. The task is to preserve the unity of the proletariat's class struggle for socialism, and to resist all bourgeois and Black-Hundred nationalist influences. Where the oppressed nations are concerned, the separate organisation of the proletariat as an independent party sometimes leads to such a bitter struggle against local nationalism that the perspective becomes distorted and the nationalism of the oppressor nation is lost sight of.

But this distortion of perspective cannot last long. The experience of the joint struggle waged by the proletarians of various nations has demonstrated all too clearly that we must formulate political issues from the all-Russia, not the "Cracow" point of view. And in all-Russia politics it is the Purishkeviches and the Kokoshkins who are in the saddle. Their ideas predominate, and their persecution of non-Russians for "separatism", for *thinking* about secession, is being preached and practised in the Duma, in the schools, in the churches, in the barracks, and in hundreds and thousands of newspapers. It is this Great-Russian nationalist poison that is polluting the entire all-Russia political atmosphere. This is the misfortune of one nation, which, by subjugating other nations, is strengthening reaction throughout Russia. The memories of 1849 and 1863 form a living political tradition, which, unless great storms arise, threatens to hamper every democratic and *especially* every Social-Democratic movement for decades to come.

There can be no doubt that however natural the point of view of certain Marxists belonging to the oppressed nations (whose "misfortune" is sometimes that the masses of the

population are blinded by the idea of their "own" national liberation) may appear at times, *in reality* the objective alignment of class forces in Russia makes refusal to advocate the right to self-determination tantamount to the worst opportunism, to the infection of the proletariat with the ideas of the Kokoshkins. And these ideas are, essentially, the ideas and the policy of the Purishkeviches.

Therefore, although Rosa Luxemburg's point of view could at first have been excused as being specifically Polish, "Cracow" narrow-mindedness,* it is inexcusable today, when nationalism and, above all, governmental Great-Russian nationalism, has everywhere gained ground, and when policy is being shaped by this *Great-Russian nationalism*. In actual fact, it is being seized upon by the opportunists of *all* nations, who fight shy of the idea of "storms" and "leaps", believe that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is over, and follow in the wake of the liberalism of the Kokoshkins.

Like any other nationalism, Great-Russian nationalism passes through various phases, according to the classes that are dominant in the bourgeois country at any given time. Up to 1905, we almost exclusively knew national-reactionaries. After the revolution, *national-liberals* arose in our country.

In our country this is virtually the stand adopted both by the Octobrists and by the Cadets (Kokoshkin), i.e., by the whole of the present-day bourgeoisie.

Great-Russian national-democrats will *inevitably* appear later on. Mr. Peshekhonov, one of the founders of the "Popular Socialist" Party, already expressed this point of view (in the issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for August 1906) when he called for caution in regard to the peasants' nationalist prejudices. However much others may slander us Bolsheviks and accuse us of "idealising" the peasant, we always

* It is not difficult to understand that the recognition by the Marxists of the *whole of Russia*, and first and foremost by the Great Russians, of the *right* of nations to secede in no way precludes *agitation* against secession by Marxists of a particular *oppressed* nation, just as the recognition of the right to divorce does not preclude agitation against divorce in a particular case. We think, therefore, that there will be an inevitable increase in the number of Polish Marxists who laugh at the non-existent "contradiction" now being "encouraged" by Semkovsky and Trotsky.

have made and always will make a clear distinction between peasant intelligence and peasant prejudice, between peasant strivings for democracy and opposition to Purishkevich, and the peasant desire to make peace with the priest and the landlord.

Even now, and probably for a fairly long time to come, proletarian democracy must reckon with the nationalism of the Great-Russian peasants (not with the object of making concessions to it, but in order to combat it).* The awakening of nationalism among the oppressed nations, which became so pronounced after 1905 (let us recall, say, the group of "Federalist-Autonomists" in the First Duma, the growth of the Ukrainian movement, of the Moslem movement, etc.), will inevitably lead to greater nationalism among the Great-Russian petty bourgeoisie in town and countryside. The slower the democratisation of Russia, the more persistent, brutal and bitter will be the national persecution and bickering among the bourgeoisie of the various nations. The particularly reactionary nature of the Russian Purishkeviches will simultaneously give rise to (and strengthen) "separatist" tendencies among the various oppressed nationalities, which sometimes enjoy far greater freedom in neighbouring states.

In this situation, the proletariat of Russia is faced with a twofold or, rather, a two-sided task: to combat nationalism of every kind, above all, Great-Russian nationalism; to recognise, not only fully equal rights for all nations in

* It would be interesting to trace the changes that take place in Polish nationalism, for example, in the process of its transformation from gentry nationalism into bourgeois nationalism, and then into peasant nationalism. In his book *Das polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat* (*The Polish Community in the Prussian State*; there is a Russian translation), Ludwig Bernhard, who shares the view of a German Kokoshkin, describes a very typical phenomenon: the formation of a sort of "peasant republic" by the Poles in Germany in the form of a close alliance of the various co-operatives and other associations of *Polish* peasants in their struggle for nationality, religion, and "Polish" land. German oppression has welded the Poles together and segregated them, after first awakening the nationalism of the gentry, then of the bourgeoisie, and finally of the peasant masses (especially after the campaign the Germans launched in 1873 against the use of the Polish language in schools). Things are moving in the same direction in Russia, and not only with regard to Poland.

general, but also equality of rights as regards polity, i.e., the right of nations to self-determination, to secession. And at the same time, it is their task, in the interests of a successful struggle against all and every kind of nationalism among all nations, to preserve the unity of the proletarian struggle and the proletarian organisations, amalgamating these organisations into a close-knit international association, despite bourgeois strivings for national exclusiveness.

Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the unity of the workers of all nations—such is the national programme that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teach the workers.

This article had been set up when I received No. 3 of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, in which Mr. Vl. Kosovsky writes the following about the recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination:

> "Taken mechanically from the resolution of the First Congress of the Party (1898), which in turn had borrowed it from the decisions of international socialist congresses, it was given, as is evident from the debate, the same meaning at the 1903 Congress as was ascribed to it by the Socialist International, i.e., political self-determination, the self-determination of nations in the field of political independence. Thus the formula: national self-determination, which implies the right to territorial separation, does not in any way affect the question of how national relations *within* a given state organism should be regulated for nationalities that cannot or have no desire to leave the existing state."

It is evident from this that Mr. Vl. Kosovsky has seen the Minutes of the Second Congress of 1903 and understands perfectly well the real (and only) meaning of the term self-determination. Compare this with the fact that the editors of the Bund newspaper *Zeit* let Mr. Liebman loose to scoff at the programme and to declare that it is vague! Queer "party" ethics among these Bundists.... The Lord alone knows why Kosovsky should declare that the Congress took over the principle of self-determination *mechanically*. Some people want to "object", but how, why, and for what reason—they do not know.

THE BOURGEOIS INTELLIGENTSIA'S METHODS OF STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WORKERS

In all capitalist countries throughout the world, the bourgeoisie resorts to two methods in its struggle against the working-class movement and the workers' parties. One method is that of violence, persecution, bans, and suppression. In its fundamentals, this is a feudal, medieval method. Everywhere there are sections and groups of the bourgeoisie—smaller in the advanced countries and larger in the backward ones—which prefer these methods, and in certain, highly critical moments in the workers' struggle against wage-slavery, the *entire* bourgeoisie is agreed on the employment of such methods. Historical examples of such moments are provided by Chartism in England, and 1849 and 1871 in France.[196]

The other method the bourgeoisie employs against the movement is that of dividing the workers, disrupting their ranks, bribing individual representatives or certain groups of the proletariat with the object of winning them over to its side. These are not feudal but *purely* bourgeois and modern methods, in keeping with the developed and civilised customs of capitalism, with the democratic system.

For the democratic system is a feature of bourgeois society, the most pure and perfect bourgeois feature, in which the utmost freedom, scope and clarity of the class struggle are combined with the utmost cunning, with ruses and subterfuges aimed at spreading the "ideological" influence of the bourgeoisie among the wage-slaves with the object of diverting them from their struggle against wage-slavery.

In keeping with Russia's boundless backwardness, the feudal methods of combating the working-class movement are appallingly predominant in that country. After 1905,

however, considerable "progress" was to be noted in the employment of liberal and democratic methods to fool and corrupt the workers. Among the liberal "methods" we have, for example, the growth of nationalism, a stronger tendency to refurbish and revive religion "for the people" (both directly and indirectly in the form of developing idealistic, Kantian and Machist philosophy), the "successes" of bourgeois theories of political economy (combined with the labour theory of value, or substituted for it), etc., etc.

Among the democratic methods of fooling the workers and subjecting them to bourgeois ideology are the liquidationist-Narodnik-Cadet varieties. It is to these that we intend to draw our readers' attention in the present article on certain topical events that have occurred *on the fringe* of the working-class movement.

1. THE LIQUIDATORS' AND THE NARODNIKS' ALLIANCE AGAINST THE WORKERS

It is said that history is fond of irony, of playing tricks with people, and mystifying them. In history this constantly happens to individuals, groups and trends that do not realise what they really stand for, i.e., fail to understand *which class* they *really* (and not in their imagination) gravitate towards. Whether this lack of understanding is genuine or hypocritical is a question that might interest the biographer of a particular individual, but to the student of politics this question is of secondary importance, to say the least.

The important thing is how history and politics *expose* groups and trends and reveal the bourgeois nature concealed behind their "pseudo-socialist" or "pseudo-Marxist" phraseology. In the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolutions, scores of groups and trends have everywhere, all over the world, imagined themselves to be "socialists" and have posed as such (see, for example, the schools listed by Marx and Engels in Chapter III of the *Communist Manifesto*[197]). History has speedily exposed them in a matter of ten to twenty years, or even less.

Russia is now passing through just such a phase.

It is over ten years since the Economists, then their successors the Mensheviks, and then the Mensheviks' suc-

cessors—the liquidators, began to fall away from the working-class movement.

The Mensheviks were especially vociferous in their assertions that the Bolsheviks had drawn close to the Narodniks....

And now we have before us a very definite *alliance* between the liquidators and the Narodniks directed against the working class and against the Bolsheviks, who have remained true to that class.

The alliance between the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia—liquidationist and Narodnik—against the workers has been developing spontaneously. At first it was stimulated by "practice". No wonder people say that practice marches ahead of theory (especially in the case of those who are guided by a false theory). When the St. Petersburg workers removed the liquidators from office, expelled these representatives of bourgeois influence from the executives of the trade unions and from their responsible positions on the Insurance Boards, the liquidators *found themselves* in alliance with the Narodniks.

"As soon as we came into the hall (where the election of the Insurance board was taking place)," a sincere and naïve Narodnik wrote in *Stoikaya Mysl*, issue No. 5, "the narrow and factional stand taken by the Pravdists at once became clear. But we did not lose hope. Together with the liquidators, we drew up a non-factional election list giving one seat on the board and two alternate seats." (See *Put Pravdy* No. 38, March 16, 1914.)

Poor liquidators, what a cruel trick history has played on them! How relentlessly has their new "friend and ally" the Left Narodnik, exposed them!

The liquidators did not even manage to renounce their own very formal statements and resolutions of 1903 and other years, describing the Left Narodniks as bourgeois democrats!

History has swept away phrases, dispelled illusions and exposed the class nature of the groups. Both the Narodniks and the liquidators are groups of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, whom the Marxist workers have removed from the movement, and who are trying to sneak in again under false pretences.

They are using the catchword "factionalism" as a cloak, a word that the notorious Akimov, the leader of the Economists, used as a weapon against the Iskrists at the Second Party Congress in 1903. Akimov's catchword, that of an extreme opportunist, was the only weapon left to the liquidators and Narodniks: That rag of a *Sovremennik* seemed to have come into the world with the deliberate purpose of showing up to all literate people how rotten, useless and rusty that weapon was.

This *Sovremennik* is quite a startling event in our democratic journalistic world. Side by side with the names of casual contributors (need drives all sorts of people into *strange* journals in order to earn a little money!), we find an *obviously demonstrative* combination of names intended to represent a combination of trends.

The liberal Bogucharsky; the Narodniks Sukhanov, Rakitnikov, B. Voronov, V. Chernov, and others; the liquidators Dan, Martov, Trotsky and Sher (Potresov's name was announced in issue No. 66 of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* next to that of Plekhanov, but for some reason it ... vanished); the Machists Bazarov and Lunacharsky, and last, G. V. Plekhanov, the principal hero of *Yedinstvo** (spelt both with a small and a capital letter)—such are the *ostentatious* names that sparkle in the list of *Sovremennik*'s contributors. And fully in keeping with this, the *highlight* of the journal's trend is the advocacy (by the Narodniks) of an alliance between the Narodniks and the "Marxists" (no joking!) .

The reader can judge what this advocacy is from the articles penned by Mr. Sukhanov, the head of this journal. Here are some of the *most important* of this gentleman's "ideas".

"The old cleavage, at all events, has disappeared. It is no longer possible to determine where Marxism ends and Narodism begins. Both Narodism and Marxism will be found on either side. And both sides are neither Marxist nor 'Narodnik'. Indeed, could it, and can it, be otherwise? Can any twentieth-century collectivist think in any but the Marxist way? And can any socialist in Russia be anything but a Narodnik?"

"The same thing should be said about the present-day Marxist agrarian programme as we said last time about the Narodnik agrar-

* See Note 153.—*Ed.*

ian programme: in its method of stating the case it is a Marxist programme, but in its practical aims it is a Narodnik programme. It appeals to the 'historical course of things' and it strives to embody the slogan: land and freedom". (No. 7, pp. 75-76.)

That will suffice, I think!

This Mr. Sukhanov publicly boasts that Plekhanov agrees with him. But Plekhanov is silent!

But let us examine Mr. Sukhanov's line of argument.

This new ally of Plekhanov and the liquidators has "liquidated" the difference between Marxism and Narodism on the ground that, as he claims, the practical aims of both trends embody the slogan: land and freedom.

This, wholly and literally, is an argument in defence of "*unity*" between the workers and the bourgeoisie. We might say, for example, that "in their practical aims" both the working class and the liberal bourgeoisie "strive to embody" the slogan of a constitution. From this, the clever Mr. Sukhanov should draw the conclusion that the cleavage into proletariat and bourgeoisie has been "liquidated" and that it is "impossible to determine where" proletarian democracy "ends" and bourgeois democracy begins.

Take the text of the Marxist agrarian programme. Sukhanov behaves like all liberal bourgeois who pick out a "practical" slogan ("Constitution"!) and declare that the difference between the socialist and the bourgeois world outlook is a matter of "abstract theory"! But we take the liberty of believing that the meaning and significance of practical slogans, the interests of which class these slogans serve, and how they serve them, are matters to which class-conscious workers and all those who take an intelligent interest in politics cannot remain indifferent.

We turn to the Marxist agrarian programme (which Mr. Sukhanov referred to in order to distort it out of all recognition) and at once find, next to practical points that are objects of controversy among Marxists (for example, municipalisation), other points that are *indisputable*.

"With a view to eliminating survivals of the serf system, which are a direct and heavy burden upon the peasants, and in order to facilitate the free development of the class struggle in the rural districts" ... this is how the Marxist agrarian programme begins. To Mr. Sukhanov this is

unimportant "abstract theory"! Whether we want a constitution to facilitate the free development of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie or to facilitate "social conciliation" between the workers and the capitalists is a matter of no importance; that is "abstract theory". That is what all bourgeois would have us believe.

The bourgeois correctly expresses his class interests when he tries to persuade the workers of this. Mr. Sukhanov behaves entirely like a bourgeois when he *relegates to the background* the question as to *what* we need agrarian reforms *for*—for the purpose of facilitating the free development of the class struggle between the wage-workers and their masters, big and small, or for the purpose of facilitating "social conciliation" between them with the aid of bourgeois catchwords like "labour" economy?

A little further on we read in the Marxist agrarian programme that Marxists ... "will always and invariably oppose every attempt to check the economic progress". As is known, that is the very reason why Marxists declare that every attempt, however slight, to restrict the freedom of mobilisation (the buying, selling, mortgaging, etc.) of peasant land is a *reactionary* measure harmful to the workers and to social development as a whole.

The Narodniks—from the "Social-Cadet" Peshekhonov to the Left Narodniks of *Smelaya Mysl*—stand *for* restricting the freedom of mobilisation in one way or another. The Narodniks are the worst kind of *reactionaries* on this question, the Marxists say.

Mr. Sukhanov evades this point! He is reluctant to recall that it was this that made Plekhanov call the Narodniks "socialist-reactionaries". Mr. Sukhanov brushes "abstract theory" aside on the plea that he stands for "practice", and he brushes aside "practice" (freedom to mobilise peasant land) on the general plea that he stands for the slogan of "land and freedom".

The conclusion to be drawn is clear: Mr. Sukhanov is nothing more nor less than a bourgeois who is trying to *obscure* the class strife between workers and masters.

And it is these bourgeois that the Marxist agrarian programme refers to when it says:

"In all cases and in every situation connected with democratic agrarian reform" (note: under all circumstances and in every situation, i.e., municipalisation, division, or any other likely form) ... Marxists "make it their object to work steadily towards an independent class organisation of the rural proletariat, to explain to it the *irreconcilable* antagonism between its interests and those of the peasant bourgeoisie, to *warn it against being beguiled by the petty farming system*, which will *never*, as long as *commodity production* exists, be able to abolish poverty among the masses," etc.

That is what the Marxist agrarian programme says. That is exactly what is said in that point of the programme which the Mensheviks accepted *from the Bolsheviks' draft* at the Stockholm Congress, i.e., the point that is least disputed and most generally recognised among Marxists.

That is what it says in the most important point on the question of Narodism, which deals with the "*small* farming system".

But Mr. Sukhanov passes this question over in complete silence!

Mr. Sukhanov has done away with the "old cleavage", with the division of trends into Marxism and Narodism, *by ignoring* the clear and definite wording of the "Marxist agrarian programme" aimed *against* Narodism!

Without doubt, Mr. Sukhanov is a mere windbag—many of his kind haunt the drawing-rooms of our liberal "society"—who has no idea of Marxism, and airily "does away" with this unimportant socialist division into Marxism and Narodism.

As a matter of fact, Marxism and Narodism are poles apart, both in theory and in practice. Marx's theory is that of the development of capitalism and of the class struggle between the wage-workers and the master class. The theory of Narodism is the theory of the bourgeois whitewashing of capitalism with the aid of catchwords like "labour economy"; it is a theory which plays down, obscures and hinders the class struggle by means of these very same catchwords, by advocating restriction of the mobilisation of the land, and so forth.

Historically, the depth of the gulf between Marxism and Narodism in Russia was revealed by *practice*—not of slogans, of course, for only brainless people can regard "slogans" as "practice"—but by the practice of the *open and mass struggle of millions* in 1905-07. This practice showed that Marxism had merged with the working-class movement and that Narodism had merged (or had begun to merge) with the movement of the petty-bourgeois peasantry (the Peasant Union,[198] the First and Second Duma elections, the peasant movement, and so forth).

Narodism stands for bourgeois democracy in Russia.

This was proved by the half a century of evolution of this trend and by the open struggles of the millions in 1905-07. This was recognised repeatedly in the most emphatic and official manner by the supreme bodies of the "Marxist whole" from 1903 to 1907, and down to the Summer Conference of 1913.

The publicists' alliance that we see today among the *leaders* of Narodism (Chernov, Rakitnikov and Sukhanov) and various Social-Democratic intellectualist factions that are either openly opposed to the "underground", i.e., the workers' party (the liquidators* Dan, Martov and Cherevanin) or else help these liquidationist *workerless groups* (Trotsky and Sher, Bazarov, Lunacharsky and Plekhanov), is *in fact* nothing more nor less than an *alliance of bourgeois intellectuals directed against the workers.*

We regard Pravdism as the expression of the workers' unity on the basis of genuine recognition of the "underground" and of definite decisions that co-ordinate and guide tactics in the old spirit (the decisions of January 1912 and of February and the summer of 1913). It is a fact that between January 1, 1912 and May 13, 1914, Pravdism united 5,674 workers' groups as against 1,421 united by the liquidators, and none, or almost none, by the *Vperyod*, Plekhanov, Trotsky and Sher, and other groups. (See *Rabochy* No. 1, "From the History of the Workers' Press in Russia", p. 19 and *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 2, of May 30, 1914.**)

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* How zealously Mr. Voronov defends the liquidators in *Sovremennik*!

** See pp. 319-21 of this volume.—*Ed.*

It is a fact that this workers' unity is built on the firm basis of integral, complete and, in principle, consistent decisions on *all* questions affecting the lives of the Marxist workers. Here you have a *whole*, for four-fifths have an absolute right to represent, to act and speak on behalf of the "whole".

But the *Sovremennik* alliance of the leaders of Narodism and all sorts of Social-Democratic workerless groups (without definite tactics, without definite decisions, knowing only vacillations between the trend and the united body of Pravdism on the one hand, and the liquidators on the other) —this alliance sprang up *spontaneously*. *Not one* of the "Social-Democratic workerless groups" dared to come out *in favour of* such an alliance straightforwardly, clearly and openly—because the Summer Conference of 1913 expressed opposition to an alliance with the Narodniks! Not one of these groups, neither the liquidators, the *Vperyod* people, nor Plekhanov and Co., and Trotsky and Co., dared do this! All of them simply swam with the stream, carried along by their opposition to Pravdism and a desire to break or weaken it, and instinctively seeking assistance one from another *against* the four-fifths of the workers—the liquidators from Sukhanov and Chernov, Sukhanov and Chernov from Plekhanov, Plekhanov from these two, Trotsky also from them, and so forth. None of these groups displays anything like a uniform policy, tactics that can be called at all definite, or a frank declaration to the workers in defence of its alliance with the Narodniks.

It is a most unprincipled alliance of bourgeois intellectuals against the workers. Plekhanov is to be pitied for the disreputable company he finds himself in, but let us face the truth squarely. People can call the alliasnce of these groups "unity" if they wish to, but we call it a *breakaway* from the working-class whole, and the *facts* prove that our view is correct.

2. HOW THE LIBERALS DEFEND "UNITY" BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND THE LIQUIDATORS

The arrival in Russia of Emile Vandervelde, the Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau, naturally gave a fillip to the discussion of the question of unity. E. Vander-

velde's immediate mission was to collect information on this question, explore the ground and take all possible steps to promote unity. We know from press reports that he visited the editorial offices of both newspapers, the Marxist and liquidationist, and exchanged opinions with representatives of both these newspapers at a "banquet".

Soon after Vandervelde returned to Brussels, an interview with the Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau appeared in the two principal French socialist dailies, the Paris *Humanité*[199] and the Brussels *Peuple* in their issues of Sunday, June 21, new style. In this interview the differences among the Russian Social-Democrats were inaccurately formulated by Vandervelde. Some of them, he said, "want to organise legally and demand the right of association, while others want to secure the immediate proclamation ... of the 'pillar'* ... and the expropriation of the land." Vandervelde called *this* difference "rather childish".

We shall scarcely be wrong in assuming that this comment of Vandervelde's will evoke a "rather good-natured" smile from class-conscious workers in Russia who read it. If "some" "want to organise legally", that is, if they stand for an open, legal party, then it is obvious that others challenge *this point*, not by referring to the "pillar" or "pillars", but by defending the "underground" and categorically refusing to take part in the "struggle for a legal party". A difference of this kind is one that affects the Party's very existence and—our highly esteemed comrade E. Vandervelde will forgive our saying so—there can be no "conciliation" here. It is impossible partly to abolish the "underground" and partly to substitute a legal party for it....

But Vandervelde did not only question people about the differences. On this matter both the Chairman and the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau have collected in their briefcases a mass of documents, reports and letters from representatives of all and sundry, from real and from fictitious "leading bodies". Vandervelde evidently decided to take advantage of his visit to St. Petersburg to collect certain *factual* data on the degree to which the different socialist (and "pseudo-socialist") trends and groups in Russia

* I.e., a democratic republic.—*Ed.*

exercise *mass* influence. Vandervelde is a man with no little political experience, and of course he knows perfectly well that in politics in general and in the working-class movement in particular only those trends which exercise mass influence can be taken seriously.

On this question we find the following statement by Vandervelde in the two French socialist newspapers mentioned above: "The socialists in Russia have three daily newspapers. The revolutionaries [evidently this refers to the Left Narodniks] publish newspapers with a circulation of 10,000 to 12,000; the Leninists have a circulation of 35,000 to 40,000 and the moderates [*moderés*—evidently this refers to the liquidators] about 16,000."

Here E. Vandervelde is slightly in error. As is well known, the Left-Narodnik newspaper is not a daily; it comes out three times a week. Moreover, according to our information, he has understated the maximum circulation of the Pravdist newspaper; it has reached 48,000. It would be desirable for exact information on this question (so important for a study of the working-class movement) to be collected for a whole month for example, if it is impossible to collect it for a year.

But what a great difference there is between Vandervelde, the true European, who attaches no importance to Asiatic gullibility or rule-of-thumb methods but collects the *facts*, and the Russian, liquidationist and liberal-bourgeois windbags, who pose as "Europeans"! For example, in an article published in the newspaper *Rech* and entitled "E. Vandervelde and the Russian Socialists" (No. 152, of June 7 [20], the day before the interview with Vandervelde appeared in Paris and Brussels), the official representatives of the Cadets wrote the following:

> "When, at a dinner-party, one of the Bolsheviks assured Vandervelde that they had no one to unite with, as 'in the workshops, among the working class, all were already united around the single Pravdist banner, except for a mere handful of intellectuals', he of course, was guilty of an exaggerated polemical overstatement."

This is a sample of a liquidationist and liberal lie clothed in glib and polished phrases.

"An exaggerated polemical overstatement!" As if there are overstatements which are not exaggerations.... The

official Cadets not only write in an illiterate manner, but also deliberately deceive their readers. If the Bolsheviks were guilty of "a polemical overstatement" why don't you, Cadet gentlemen—since you have raised this question in the press—quote *facts* that are not an overstatement and not polemical?

During the three or four days he spent in Russia, E. Vandervelde, who does not know Russian, managed to collect *objective* data. But the St. Petersburg Cadets, just like the St. Petersburg liquidators,* have *never* published *any* objective data in their newspapers, and groundlessly and hypocritically accuse the Pravdists of "overstatement"!

Let us take Vandervelde's data. According to these, the weekly circulation of the Marxist, liquidationist and Narodnik newspapers respectively is as follows:

		per cent	per cent	
Marxist newspaper	240,000	64.5	71.4	100%
Liquidationist	96,000	25.8	28.6	
Narodnik	36,000	9.7		
Total	372,000	100.0		

These are the objective data collected by the Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau. Even if we include the Narodniks, with whom *only* the liquidators, Machists and Plekhanov wish to "unite" but are afraid to say so openly, the Pravdists still have a majority of nearly two-thirds. Without counting the Narodniks, the Pravdists have a majority of 71.4 per cent, i.e., *more than seven-tenths*, over the liquidators!

But the newspapers are read and maintained not only by workers. The objective data on collections published in both the Marxist and liquidationist newspapers have shown that (between January 1 and May 13, 1914) the Pravdists had 80 per cent of the workers' groups, the St. Petersburg percentage being as high as 86. Of the sum of 21,000 rubles collected by the Pravdists, over eight-tenths was from workers, whereas with the liquidators, *more than half the*

* The liberal *Kievskaya Mysl*, for which a large number of liquidators write, published the interview with Vandervelde from *Le Peuple*, but omitted the circulation figures! (*Kievskaya Mysl* No. 159.)

*donations came from the bourgeoisie.** Hence, it has been fully and definitely proved that the circulation figures *understate* the predominance of the Pravdists, since the liquidationist newspaper *is maintained* by the bourgeoisie. And the no less objective returns of the Insurance Board elections show that during the election of the All-Russia Insurance Board the Bolsheviks had 47 delegates out of 57, i.e., 82.4 per cent.

In spreading among the masses, through the medium of their press, the accusation that the Pravdists "overstate" (and even "exaggeratedly overstate"), without quoting any objective data either on the circulation of the newspapers, or on the workers' groups, or on the Insurance Board elections, the Cadets are deliberately lying, and *elevating the liquidators*.

The class interests of Russia's liberal bourgeoisie compel it of course to defend the liquidators, whom the Marxists unanimously regard (the decision of 1910) as "*vehicles of bourgeois influence on the proletariat*". But when, at the same time, the liberals try to pose as "impartial" people, their lie becomes particularly hypocritical and disgusting.

The Cadets' utterances have one and only one political purpose, viz., to use the liquidators as vehicles of bourgeois influence on the workers.

"There is no doubt," *Rech* continues, "that genuine [!] working-class intellectuals, those workers who bore the brunt of Social-Democratic [! as appraised by the Cadets, who are experts in Social-Democracy] work in the most trying years, sympathise, not with the Bolsheviks, but with their opponents [the liquidators and Mensheviks]. To dissever these elements from the Russian workers' party would so impoverish it intellectually that the Bolsheviks themselves would stand aghast at their own handiwork."

This is what the Cadets write in a *Rech* editorial article.

And here, for comparison, is what L. M., the liquidators' ideological leader, wrote in issue No. 3 of *Nasha Zarya* (1914, p. 68).

"This is a revolt [of the Pravdist workers] against the Dementievs, Gvozdevs, Chirkins, Romanovs, Bulkins, Kabtsans and the rest, as

* See the article "The Working Class and Its Press" in *Trudovaya Pravda*, June 14. (See pp. 363-71 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

representatives of a whole—and, in the capitals, fairly large—section of the Marxist workers, who have been trying to 'liquidate' the childishly romantic stage of the Russian working-class movement.

As you see, the similarity is complete. In Rech editorial articles the Cadets fully repeat in their own name the refrain that L. M. sings in *Nasha Zarya*. The limited circulations of *Nasha Zarya* and *Nasha Likvidatorskaya Gazeta* are *supplemented* by the Cadet newspapers, which vouch for the Social-Democracy of Bulkin, Chirkin and Co.

Mr. L. M. gives the names of a handful of liquidationist workers. We willingly repeat these names. All class-conscious workers in Russia will at once recognise these *liberal workers*, who have long been known for the struggle they have been waging against the "underground", i.e., against the Party. Read what Bulkin wrote in this very same *Nasha Zarya* alongside of L. M. and you will see that both repudiate the "underground" and, to the delight of the liberals, abuse it.

And so we shall place on record and take cognisance of the fact that the "Dementievs, Gvozdevs, Chirkins, Romanovs, Bulkins and Kabtsans", whom Mr. L. M. mentions, are, *as the Cadets assure us*, "genuine working-class intellectuals". They are indeed genuine liberal workers! This is fully borne out by Bulkin's article. We strongly advise class-conscious workers not yet familiar with the utterances of the abovementioned liberal proletarians to read it.

The liberal *Rech* tries to scare us with the prospect of the "disseverance from the workers' party" of these (as *Rech* assures us) Social-Democrats, of these Social-Democrats whom *Rech* eulogises.

But we shall reply merely with a smile, for it is common knowledge that this handful of men have cut themselves off by going over to the liberal-liquidators, and that this "disseverance" served as a guarantee and foundation for the formation of a genuine *workers*' (not liberal-labour) party.

In the same editorial article *Rech* praises the "*civic courage of the calm and sometimes damping utterances*" of the liquidators and liberal workers. Trust *Rech* and the liberals to praise them! The liberals in Russia, particularly after 1905, can exert no direct influence on the workers. They cannot help appreciating the liquidators, who under the guise of

Social-Democracy carry on the same liberal "damping" work and act as vehicles for this same "bourgeois influence on the proletariat" (see decision of 1910!).

"The differences between them [the Social-Democratic groups] will not be soon removed," *Rech* writes, "but while preserving their specific features they must unite, not carry their strife into the ranks of the workers, who are only just awakening to conscious political life. The split among the workers is a matter of great rejoicing to the reactionaries. This alone is enough to make honest people in both groups strive sincerely and seriously for unity."

This is what *Rech* writes.

We are very glad *not* to belong to the liberal company of "honest" people and to those they regard as "honest". We would consider it a *dishonour* to belong to such people. We are convinced that only utterly naïve or foolish people can believe in the "impartiality" of the liberal bourgeois, especially where the working-class movement for emancipation, i.e., its movement against the bourgeoisie, is concerned.

The Cadets are mistaken in thinking that the Russian workers are childishly naïve, or that they are capable of believing the liberal bourgeoisie's "impartial" appraisal of "honesty". The liberal bourgeois regards the liquidators and their advocates as "honest" men *because*, *and only because*, liquidationism renders a political service to the bourgeoisie as a vehicle of bourgeois influence on the proletariat.

Accepting full responsibility for their acts, the united Marxists of Russia declared straightforwardly, openly and before all the workers of Russia, that a definite group of liquidators, the *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch* group, etc., stood *beyond the pale of the Party*. This declaration was made in January 1912. Since then, in the course of two-and-a-half years, 5,674 workers' groups, as against 1,421 groups for the liquidators and all their supporters, i.e., four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia, have aligned themselves with Pravdism, i.e., *approved of* the January decision. The liquidators acted in such a way that the workers *moved away* from them. Our decision has been confirmed by events and by the experience of the vast majority of the workers.

It is in their own *selfish class* interests that the liberals advocate "unity" (between the workers and the liquidators).

Only the liquidators' breakaway from the workers' party enabled the latter to weather the hard times *with honour*—we attach to this word a different meaning from what you *Rech* gentlemen do! The separation of the liquidators from the workers' party gave the reactionaries cause, not for "rejoicing" but for *sorrow*, since the liquidators stood in the way of recognition of the old forms, the old "hierarchy", the old decisions, etc., and they themselves, for two-and-a-half years, proved absolutely incapable of forming any kind of organisation whatsoever. The "August" (1912) bloc of the liquidators and their friends collapsed.

It was only *despite* the liquidators, only *without* them and *against* them, that the workers were able to conduct that brilliant campaign of strikes, insurance elections and the establishment of newspapers which everywhere resulted in a four-fifths majority for the opponents of liquidationism.

By a "split" the liberals understand the removal from the workers' ranks of the opponents of the "underground", a handful of liquidationist intellectuals. By "unity" they understand the *maintenance* of liquidationist *influence* over the workers.

We regard the matter differently. By "unity" we mean the fact of four-fifths of the workers having rallied around the old banner. By a split we mean the refusal of the liquidationist group to accept and bow to the will of the majority of the workers, thus flouting that will. Convinced by experience that during two-and-a-half years Pravdism has rallied four-fifths of the workers, we consider it necessary to advance towards still greater unity along the *same path*—from four-fifths to nine-tenths, and then to ten-tenths of the workers.

The difference in the positions and points of view of the proletariat and of the bourgeoisie gives rise to two opposite views regarding the liquidators—our view and that of the liberals.

How is Plekhanov's position to be explained? In 1908 he broke with the liquidators so emphatically, and at one time upheld, in the press, the Party's decisions in opposition to the liquidators with such firmness, that some people hoped that his vacillations had come to an end. Now, when four-fifths of the workers have rallied around Pravdism, Ple-

khanov is beginning to vacillate again. The only possible explanation of his "position", which, in effect, now *fully* coincides with that of the liberal *Rech*, is that it is due to his personal vacillations—a disease he contracted in 1903.

Like *Rech*, Plekhanov interprets "unity" to mean ensuring the liquidators' influence over the workers in defiance of the will of the workers, in defiance of the Party's decisions, in spite of the liquidators' flouting of these decisions. Yesterday Plekhanov compared Mr. Potresov with Judas, and quite rightly stated that the apostles were stronger *without* Judas than *with* him. Today, however, when the *facts* have definitely proved that the liquidators are entirely at one with Potresov and that they flout the Party's decisions, Plekhanov turns towards the liquidators and advises the Pravdists not to talk to them in the "language of conquerors"! In other words, to put it more bluntly, the majority of the workers should *refrain* from demanding that their will be recognised and their decisions respected by the minority, which follows the lead of those who are deliberately violating the Party's decisions!

The class-conscious workers will have to sadly admit that Plekhanov is suffering from another attack of the political disease of wavering and vacillation which he contracted ten years ago ... and will ignore him.

There is, however, another explanation of Plekhanov's vacillations, an explanation to which we give second place because it does Plekhanov even less credit. Groups of vacillating intellectuals inevitably spring up between the contending *trends*—the liquidationist (which draws its social strength from the sympathy of the liberal bourgeoisie) and the Pravdist (which draws its strength from the class-consciousness and solidarity of the majority of the workers in Russia, who are awakening from their darkness and are seeing the light). These groups have no social force behind them, and can have no mass influence on the workers, because politically they are mere cyphers. Instead of a firm, clear line which attracts the workers and is confirmed by living experience, *narrow circle diplomacy* reigns in such groups. The absence of contact with the masses, the absence of historical roots in

the mass trends of Social-Democracy in Russia (Social-Democracy became a mass movement in Russia with the strikes of 1895), and the absence of a consistent, integral, clear and absolutely definite line tested by many years of experience, i.e., lack of answers to the questions of tactics, organisation and programme—such is the soil on which narrow circle diplomacy thrives, and such are its symptoms.

Plekhanov's newspaper *Yedinstvo*, as a political body, reveals all these symptoms (like Trotsky's *Borba*. Incidentally, let the reader ponder over the *reasons* for the disunity between these alleged "uniters", *Borba* and *Yedinstvo*...). Deputy Buryanov, like every deputy who is comparatively "long-lived" among the very short-lived politicians in Russia, was for a long time a liquidator, but has now "vacillated" towards Plekhanov. Whither he has vacillated and for how long, he does not himself know. But for narrow circle diplomacy there is, of course, no greater stroke of luck than the acquisition of such a "vacillating" deputy, who aspires to "unity" between the Six who want to help the liquidators of the Party *flout* the will of the majority of the workers, and the Six who want to give effect to that will.

Imagine "unity" between the two Sixes *independently* of the will of the majority of the workers. You will say that it is unimaginable and monstrous, because deputies should perform the will of the majority! But what the proletariat regards as monstrous the *liberals* regard as a virtue, a boon, a blessing, honesty, and probably, even something sacred. (Struve, in *Russkaya Mysl*, will certainly argue tomorrow, and he will be supported in this by Berdayev, Izgoyev, Merezhkovsky and Co., that the Leninists are sinful "splitters", while the liquidators and Plekhanov, who is today defending them from the "conqueror" workers, are holy instruments of the will of God.)

Accept for a moment this (in effect liberal) point of view of "unity" between the two Duma Sixes *independently* of the will of the majority of the workers. You will at once realise that it is in the narrow circle interests of Buryanov and the group of publicists who write for *Yedinstvo to play upon* the differences between the two Sixes, and use their differences in order to act the perpetual role of the "conciliator"!

Such a conciliator, be it Buryanov, Trotsky, Plekhanov, Sher, Chernov, Sukhanov, or anybody else, may say: On the one hand, the liquidationist Six are wrong, for they are liquidating the Party's decisions. On the other hand, the Pravdist Six are wrong, because they talk to their colleagues in the unbecoming, improper, and sinful "language of conquerors", claiming to do so on behalf of an alleged majority. Such a "conciliator" may even go to the length of calling this eclectic and intriguer's conduct "dialectical" and lay claim to the title of "uniter".... After all, there have been cases like this in our Party. Recall, for example, the part played by the Bundists and Tyszka at the Stockholm and London congresses, and in the period of 1906-11 in general.

Those were happy days for the narrow circle diplomats and sad ones for the workers' party, days when the class-conscious workers had not yet rallied closely enough against those vehicles of bourgeois influence, the Economists and Mensheviks.

Those days are now passing. *Rech*, the Cadet organ, *bewails* the "carrying of strife into the ranks of the workers". This is the point of view of the liberal gentleman. We *welcome* the "carrying of strife into the ranks of the workers", for they and they alone will *distinguish* between "strife" and differences on principles; they will sort out these differences for *themselves*, form *their own* opinion and decide not "with whom to go, but where to go",* i.e., their own definite and clear line, drawn up and tested by themselves.

That day is approaching and it has come. The mass of Pravdist workers can *already* distinguish between "strife" and differences; they have already sorted out these disagreements for themselves and have already determined their own line. The figures concerning the workers' groups *after* two years of open struggle (1912 and 1913) have proved this *in fact*.

Narrow circle diplomacy is coming to an end.**

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* As it was magnificently expressed by the Moscow workers (see *Rabochy* No. 6, of May 29, 1914), who at once saw through the fraud of Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo*.

** The participation of the *leaders* of the various groups, such as the liquidators' group (Dan and Martov), Plekhanov's, Trotsky's, and Lunacharsky's groups, in the alliance with the Narodniks (*Sov-*

3. WHY THE WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS PUBLICLY DENOUNCED THE LIQUIDATORS AS SLANDERERS?

Put Pravdy, issue No. 92 for May 21, 1914, published the resolution adopted by *representatives of ten industrial organisations in the city of Moscow*. This resolution very emphatically and sharply condemned Malinovsky's disruptive resignation as a "crime", then expressed complete confidence in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma ("march firmly along your road—the working class is with you!"), and lastly, publicly denounced the liquidators of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* as people who "*throw scurrilous abuse at the retiring deputy*"; these people's conduct is compared with "the spreading of slanderous rumours by the Right press with the object of creating confusion in the ranks of the workers".

"It is the sacred duty of all those to whom the cause of labour is dear," the representatives of the ten industrial organisations of Moscow stated in their resolution, "to rally their forces and offer united resistance to the slanderers." "In reply, the working class will rally more closely around its representatives [i.e., the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group] and *contemptuously ignore the slanderers*."

There is no need for us to quote any more of the numerous workers' resolutions couched in similar terms, or the opinion of the Lettish workers' newspaper,* etc. That would be need less repetition.

Let us see what happened.

Why did the class-conscious workers of Russia, through the representatives of ten industrial organisations in Moscow, and many others, publicly denounce the liquidators of

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remennik) is another sample of narrow circle diplomacy, for *not one of them* had the courage to say to the workers beforehand, plainly and straightforwardly, "I am joining this alliance for such and such a reason". As the fruit of narrow circle diplomacy, *Sovremennik* is a still-born undertaking.

* "We do not think it is necessary to deal with the rumours that have been circulated by the press, or with the downright slander uttered against Malinovsky and against the whole group and its consistent line because such slander is *always spread for a dishonest purpose*, and always proves false." (*Trudovaya Pravda* No. 1, May 23, 1914.)

Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta as filthy slanderers, and call upon the working class contemptuously to ignore them?

What did *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* do?

It spread insidious rumours and insinuations to the effect that Malinovsky is an agent provocateur.

It did not name a single accuser. It did not quote a single definite fact. It did not submit a scrap of definitely formulated evidence, backed by references to at least Party pseudonyms, to objects of police raids, dates, or anything of the kind.

All we had was insidious rumours, an attempt to create a sensation out of Malinovsky's "inexplicable" resignation from the Duma. But it was precisely for this inexplicable resignation, for this secret flight that the organised workers, the members of the workers' party, severely censured Malinovsky.

The organised Marxist workers at once called together all their various local, trade union, Duma and all-Russia directing bodies, and straightforwardly and publicly declared to the proletariat and to the world at large: Malinovsky did not give us the reasons for his resignation, nor did he give us any warning of it. This inexplicable behaviour, this act of unprecedented insubordination, makes his conduct that of a deserter at a time when we are waging a grim, arduous and responsible class struggle. We have judged the deserter and ruthlessly condemned him. There is no more to be said about it. The case is closed.

"One person is nothing. The class is everything. Stick to your guns. We are with you" (telegram sent by forty Moscow shop assistants to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group. See *Put Pravdy* No. 86, May 14, 1914).

The case is closed. The organised workers saw it through to the end in an *organised* manner, then closed their ranks for further work. Forward, to work!

But intellectualist circles behave differently. The "inexplicable" affair does not induce them to deal with it in an *organised* manner (*not a single* leading body of the liquidators or of their friends came out with an open, straightforward and *full appraisal of the merits of the case*!) but rouses *scandal-mongering* interest. Ah, "here is something inexplicable!"—the gossips of intellectual society are intrigued.

The gossips have no facts whatever to go by. The scandal-mongers of Martov's circle are *incapable of organised* action, of calling together a committee, collecting information of political interest or significance, of verifying, analysing, jointly discussing, and formulating an official and responsible decision for the guidance of the proletariat. The gossips are incapable of doing anything like that.

But then these intellectual gossips are past masters of the art of scandal-mongering, of going to or from Martov (or other filthy slanderers like him) and encouraging insidious rumours, or picking up and passing on insinuations! Whoever has been but once in the company of these scandal-mongering intellectualist gossips will certainly (unless he is a gossip himself) retain for the rest of his life disgust for these despicable creatures.

Each to his own. Every social stratum has its own way of life, its own habits and inclinations. Every insect has its own weapon. Some insects fight by excreting a foul-smelling liquid.

The organised Marxist workers acted in an organised manner. They closed in an organised manner the case of the unsanctioned resignation of a former colleague, and carried on with their work, went on with the struggle in an organised manner. The liquidationist intellectualist gossips could not and did not go further than filthy gossip and slander.

The organised Marxist workers at once recognised these gossips, from the very first articles in *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, and at once gave them the appraisal they fully deserved: "filthy slander", "contemptuously ignore them". Not a shadow of belief in the "rumours" circulated by Martov and Dan; a firm determination to ignore them, to attach no importance to them.

Incidentally, the workers, who were indignant with the liquidators, referred in their resolutions to the liquidators in general. I believe it would have been far more correct to name Martov and Dan, as was done in Lenin's telegram,[200] and in some of the articles and resolutions. We have no grounds for accusing *all* the liquidators and branding them publicly for indulging in filthy slander. But for ten years, beginning with their attempt to flout the will of the Second (1903) Party Congress, Martov and Dan have repeatedly shown their

"style" of fighting by means of insinuations and filthy slander. It was of no avail for these two individuals to try and hide behind the plea that somebody or other was divulging the names of the actual editors of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*. Nowhere has a word or a sound been uttered about editorship, or actual editors.

But the slanderers, whom the workers' party knows from its ten years of history, had to be named, and named they were.

The slanderers tried to bamboozle the inexperienced, or those utterly incapable of thinking for themselves, by means of the "plausible" demand for an "unofficial" trial. They pleaded ignorance of anything definite, asserted that they were not accusing anybody, that rumours were "not enough" to ground a charge on, for they could serve only as a basis for "investigation"!

But the entire *corpus delicti*—to use a legal term—of filthy slander consists in people circulating insidious, anonymous rumours in the press, without mentioning a single honest citizen, or a single reputable and responsible democratic body capable of vouching *for the truth* of these rumours!

That is the crux of the matter.

Martov and Dan have long been known and repeatedly exposed as slanderers. This has been spoken of dozens of times in the press abroad. When Martov, in collaboration with and on the responsibility of Dan, wrote the special libellous pamphlet, *Saviours or Destroyers*, *even* the mild and cautious Kautsky, who has of late been greatly given to making "concessions" to the liquidators, called it "*disgusting*".

That is a fact long ago published in the press abroad.

And after this, Martov and Dan want us to agree to an investigation undertaken on *their* initiative, on the basis of *their* slanderous statements, and *with the participation* of the very groups that shield them!

That is downright impudence, and sheer stupidity on the part of the slanderers.

We *do not believe* a single word of Dan's and Martov's. *We shall never agree* to any "investigation" into insidious rumours *with the participation* of the liquidators and the groups that help them. This would mean *covering up* the

crime committed by Martov and Dan. We shall however thoroughly expose it to the working class.

When Martov and Dan, with their backers, the Bundists, Chkheidze and Co., the August bloc members, etc., directly or indirectly call upon us to conduct a joint "investigation" with them, we say in reply: "We do not trust Martov and Dan. We do not regard them as honest citizens. We shall treat them as despicable slanderers and nothing else."

Let those who shield Dan and Martov, or the weak-kneed intellectuals who believe the "rumours" circulated by those gentlemen, bemoan the idea of a bourgeois court. That does not frighten us. Against the blackmailers, we are *always and absolutely* in favour of the bourgeois legality of a bourgeois court.

When a man says: "Give me a hundred rubles, otherwise I shall reveal the fact that you are unfaithful to your wife and are living with A."—that is criminal blackmail. In such a case we are in favour of appealing to a bourgeois court.

When a man says: "Make political concessions to me, recognise me as an equal member of the Marxist body, or else I shall spread rumours about Malinovsky being an agent provocateur"—that is political blackmail.

In such a case we are in favour of appealing to a bourgeois court.

And this point of view was adopted by the workers *themselves* who, as soon as they read the very first articles of Dan and Martov, distrusted them, and did not say to themselves: "Really, if Martov and Dan write about these 'rumours' they must be true?" No, the workers grasped the point *at once* and said: "The working class will ignore filthy slander."

Either make a direct charge backed by your signatures, so that a bourgeois court may convict and punish you (there are no other means of combating blackmail), or continue to carry the stigma of slanderers that the representatives of the ten workers' industrial organisations have publicly placed upon you. That is the alternative that confronts you, Messrs. Martov and Dan!

A leading body investigated these rumours and pronounced them absurd. The workers of Russia trust this body, and it will *utterly* expose those who spread slander. Martov must not think that *he* will remain unexposed.

But, you will say, the political groups which defend the liquidators, or even partly sympathise with them, do not trust our leading body. Of course they do not. We do not want them to trust us, and we shall *not take a single* step that might suggest that we place the slightest trust in them.

We say: Gentlemen, members of the groups *that trust* Martov and Dan, and want to "unite" with them, all of you August bloc people, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, Bundists, and so on, and so forth, please come out in the open and show your true colours! Either of two things, gentlemen:

Since you yourselves want to "unite" with Martov and Dan, and call upon the workers to do so, that shows that you (unlike us) trust the recognised leaders of the ideological political trend known as the liquidators. Since you trust them and consider it possible to "unite" with them, admit it and advocate it, then *do* something; don't merely *talk* about it!

Either you call upon Dan and Martov (you trust them and they trust you) to disclose the source of the "rumours", investigate them yourselves, and then publicly declare to the working class: We vouch for the fact that this is not the silly scandal of gossips, or the spiteful insinuations of angry liquidators, but *weighty and serious* evidence. When you do that and prove that the moment these rumours arose, the liquidationist, Plekhanovist, and other leading bodies examined them and immediately informed the Pravdist leading body, we shall answer: Gentlemen, we are convinced that you are mistaken and we shall prove that to you, but we admit that you have behaved like honest democrats.

Or else, you—leaders of "trends" and groups which call upon the workers to unite with the liquidators—hide behind the backs of Dan and Martov, allow them to utter as much slander as they please, refrain from calling upon them to disclose their sources, and do not take the trouble (*and the political responsibility*) to verify the truth of the rumours.

In that case we shall openly declare to the workers: Comrades, don't you see that all these group leaders are *aiding* and *abetting* these filthy slanderers?

We shall see what the workers will decide.

For the sake of illustration, we shall take a concrete case. When the leading body, which is recognised by four-fifths

of the class-conscious workers of Russia, declared that it had investigated the rumours and was absolutely convinced that they were utterly absurd (if not worse), *two* groups made statements in the press: (1) the group of Chkheidze, Chkhenkeli, Skobelev, Khaustov, Tulyakov, Mankov and Jagiello; (2) the August bloc people, i.e., the leading August body of the liquidators.

What did they say?

Only that they *had taken no part* in the investigation into the rumours conducted by the leading body of the Pravdists! That is all they said!

Let us consider this case.

Let us suppose, firstly, that instead of the group of Chkheidze and Co. we have honest democrats before us. Let us assume that these people had elected Malinovsky as the vice-chairman of *their* Duma group. Suddenly, rumours appear in the press, in the organ for which they are politically responsible, to the effect that Malinovsky is an agent provocateur!

Can there possibly be two opinions about what the elementary and bounden duty of all honest democrats should be under such circumstances?

Their duty should be immediately to appoint a committee from their own ranks or anybody else they please, immediately to investigate the source of these rumours, those who have spread them and when they did so, ascertain the *authenticity* and grounds of these rumours, and then declare publicly, straightforwardly and honestly to the working class: Comrades, we have worked, *we have investigated* and we vouch for the fact that this is a serious matter.

That is what honest democrats would do. But to say nothing, to refrain from any investigation, and to continue to bear responsibility for a press organ that spreads insidious rumours means sinking to the lowest depths of meanness and baseness, means behaving in a manner unworthy of an honest citizen.

Secondly, let us assume that instead of Chkheidze and Co. we have before us aiders and abettors of filthy slander, who *either heard* these insidious rumours from Martov or his friends but never thought of taking them seriously (for who among those that have anything to do with Social-

Democratic activity has not, scores of times, heard patently absurd "rumours" it would be ridiculous to pay attention to?) or who heard nothing at all, but, knowing the Dan and Martov "style", preferred not to "get mixed up in such a complicated and troublesome business"[201] for fear of besmirching and disgracing themselves for the rest of their lives by openly expressing belief in the truth of the rumours spread in the press by Martov and Dan, but at the same time desired *surreptitiously* to shield the latter.

People like the ones we have taken in our second assumption *would behave precisely in the way Chkheidze and Co. did.*

The same applies fully to the August bloc men.

Let the workers themselves choose one of these two assumptions; let them examine and ponder over the conduct of Chkheidze and Co.

Now let us examine Plekhanov's behaviour. In issue No. 2 of *Yedinstvo* he describes the liquidators' articles on Malinovsky as "outrageous" and "disgusting", but he adds, obviously as a reproach to the Pravdists: this is the fruit of *your* splitting tactics. "It's no use crying over spilt milk!"

How is this behaviour of Plekhanov's to be interpreted?

If, despite the plain statement by Dan and Martov that they regarded these rumours as true and authentic (otherwise they would not have demanded an investigation), Plekhanov describes the liquidators' articles as outrageous and disgusting, it shows that he does not in the least trust Dan and Martov! It shows that he, *too*, regards them as filthy slanderers!

If that were not the case, what reasonable grounds would there have been for publicly describing as "disgusting", articles written by people who desire (as they claim) to promote the cause of democracy and of the proletariat by exposing a grave and frightful evil, namely, agents provocateurs?

But if Plekhanov does not believe a single word of Martov's and Dan's, if he regards them as filthy slanderers, how can he blame *us* Pravdists for the methods of struggle employed by the liquidators who have been expelled from the Party! *How* can he write: "It's no use crying over spilt milk." This can only mean that he *justifies* Dan and Martov *on the grounds of the "split"*!

That is monstrous, but it is a fact.

Plekhanov *justifies* filthy slanderers, whom he himself does not trust in the least, on the grounds that the Pravdists are to blame for having expelled these slanderers from the Party.

This behaviour of Plekhanov's (as he has already been told publicly by a "group of Marxists" who were ready to believe him, but were soon disillusioned in him) is a diplomatic defence of blackmailers, i.e.; a defence prompted by narrow circle diplomacy, which is objectively tantamount to encouraging the blackmailers to continue with their blackmailing.

Since we—Martov and Dan must be arguing—succeeded at once in getting the "anti-liquidationist" Plekhanov, who does not trust us, to *blame* the Pravdists, even indirectly, even partly, for driving us into this desperate struggle by their "split", why ... why, let's carry on! Let's continue on the same lines. Plekhanov *encourages* us to hope that we *shall obtain concessions* as a reward for our blackmail!*

The workers straightaway saw through Plekhanov's narrow circle diplomacy. This was proved by the opinion the Moscow workers expressed about issue No. 1 of *Yedinstvo*, and by the reply of the "group of Marxists" who were inclined to trust Plekhanov but later called him a "diplomat".[202] Before very long Plekhanov's narrow circle diplomacy will be utterly exposed.

In January 1912, representatives of the workers publicly and officially expelled from the Party a definite group of liquidators headed by Martov and Dan. Since then, in the course of two-and-a-half years, the workers of Russia have

* The reader will find that Trotsky engages in the same defence of blackmail as Plekhanov does, only in a more covert and cowardly form. In issue No. 6 of *Borba*, he, a *contributor* to *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, does not utter a word in condemnation of the "campaign" conducted by Dan and Martov, but accuses the Pravdists of sowing "the poisonous seeds of hatred and splitting" (p. 44)! Thus, not slander, oh, no, but carrying out the Party's decision concerning those who are vehicles of bourgeois influence and who hurl abuse at the "underground" must be regarded as "poison". Very well, we shall place this on record.

approved of this decision by a four-fifths majority, and adopted it as *their own*. The blackmail and slander of Martov and Dan will not induce the workers to "make concessions", but will convince them more firmly than ever that only *without* the liquidators and *against* them is it possible to build up the workers' "entire Marxist body", four-fifths of which has already been built.

Everybody is now talking about the growth of the Russian workers' political consciousness, about the fact that they themselves are now handling all affairs connected with the workers' party, and their greater maturity and independence after the revolution. Trotsky and Plekhanov also appeal to the workers against "intellectuals' circles" or the "factionalism of the intellectuals". But—and this is a remarkable circumstance!—as soon as mention is made of the *objective* facts showing which political trend the *present-day* class-conscious workers of Russia choose, approve of and create, Plekhanov, Trotsky and the liquidators all change their ground and shout: These workers, the Pravdist workers, who form the majority of the class-conscious workers in Russia, follow the lead of Pravdism only because they are "bewildered" (*Borba* No. 1, p. 6), are only "*being swayed*" by "demagogy", or factionalism, etc., etc.

It follows, therefore, that the liquidators, Plekhanov, and Trotsky recognise the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers, *not* in the present, but in the future, only in the future event of the workers agreeing with them, with the liquidators, Plekhanov, and Trotsky!

What amusing subjectivism! What an amusing dread of objective facts! But if we are not to engage simply in mutual recriminations, accusing each other of intellectualist parochialism, we must take the *present* facts, the *objective* facts.

The political education of the workers, which everybody admits is making progress, is another thing which our conciliators, Plekhanov, Trotsky and Co., talk about with amusing subjectivism. Plekhanov and Trotsky are *wavering* between the two contending trends in the Social-Democratic class movement and are ascribing to the workers their own

subjective vacillations, saying: The fact that the workers participate in this conflict of trends is evidence of their ignorance; when they become more enlightened they will stop fighting, will cease to be "factional" (Plekhanov, like Trotsky, repeats "by force of habit" parrot-phrases such as "factionalism", although the Pravdists put an end to "factionalism" in January 1912, i.e., two-and-a-half years ago, by straightforwardly and openly expelling the liquidators).

The subjectivism of this appraisal of the situation by Plekhanov and Trotsky is most glaring. Turn to history—after all, there is no harm in a Marxist turning to the history of the movement!—and you will find a story of *nearly twenty years*' struggle against the bourgeois trends of Economism (1895-1902), Menshevism (1903-08) and liquidationism (1908-14). There can be no doubt whatever about the unbroken connection and continuity between these three varieties of "bourgeois influence on the proletariat". It is a historical fact that the advanced workers of Russia participated in this struggle and sided with the Iskrists against the Economists, with the Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks (as Levitsky *himself* was compelled to admit by the weight of objective facts), and lastly, with Pravdism against liquidationism.

The question arises: Does not this historical fact concerning the *mass* Social-Democratic workers' movement point to something more important than the subjective and pious wishes of Plekhanov and Trotsky, who for the last ten years have been giving themselves credit for their failure to fall into step with the mass Social-Democratic workers' trend?

The objective facts of the present period, taken from both sources—the liquidationist and Pravdist—as well as the history of the last twenty years, abundantly prove that the struggle against liquidationism and the victory achieved over it is *precisely* the result of the political education of the Russian workers and of the formation of a *genuine* workers' party which does *not* yield to petty-bourgeois influences in a petty-bourgeois country.

Plekhanov and Trotsky, who offer the workers their subjective pious wishes for the avoidance of conflict (wishes which ignore both history and the mass trends among the Social-Democrats), look upon the political education of the

workers from the point of view of copy-book maxims. History has existed up to now, but now it has ceased to exist—as Marx wittily retorted in his criticism of Proudhon.[203] Up to now, for twenty years, the workers have received their political education solely in the course of the struggle against the bourgeois trend of Economism and against the later varieties of a similar trend, but now, after a couple of "copy-book" maxims about the harmfulness of conflicts, maxims served up by Plekhanov and Trotsky, history will cease, the mass roots of liquidationism (which owe their mass character to the support of the bourgeoisie) will vanish, mass Pravdism (which became a mass movement solely as a result of the "bewilderment" of the workers!) will vanish, and something "real" will arise.... The reasoning followed by Plekhanov and Trotsky is truly amusing!

The workers can obtain real political education only in the course of a sustained, consistent, all-out struggle of proletarian influences, aspirations and trends against bourgeois influences, aspirations and trends. Not *even* Trotsky will deny that liquidationism like the Economism of 1895-1902) is a manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat; as for Plekhanov, he *himself*, in the long-distant past, fully a year-and-a-half or two-and-a-half years ago, defended the Party decision which established this truth.

But nowhere in the world have bourgeois influences on the workers ever taken the form of ideological influences alone. When the bourgeoisie's ideological influence on the workers declines, is undermined or weakened, the bourgeoisie *everywhere and always* resorts to the most outrageous lies and slander. And every time that Martov and Dan flouted the will of the majority of organised Marxists, every time they lacked the weapon of the ideological struggle, they resorted to the weapon of insinuation and slander.

Till now, however, they have done this in conditions of exile abroad, before a relatively limited "audience", and often got away with it. But this time they have come out before tens of thousands of Russian workers and have immediately pulled up short. The "trick" of emigrants' gossip and slander has missed fire. The workers have already proved politically educated enough to see at once the insincerity, the dishonesty of the utterances of Martov and Dan *from the very*

character of these utterances, and they have denounced them publicly, before the whole of Russia, as slanderers.

The advanced workers of Russia have taken another step forward along the road of political education by *knocking out* of the hands of one bourgeois group (the liquidators) the weapon of slander.

Neither the bourgeois alliance between Plekhanov and Trotsky, the liquidationist leaders, and the Narodniks, nor the efforts of the liberal press to proclaim it the duty of "honest" people to secure unity between the workers and those who want to liquidate the workers' party, nor the campaign of slander conducted by Martov and Dan will check the growth and development of proletarian solidarity with the ideas, programme, tactics and organisation of Pravdism.

Prosveshcheniye No. 6,
June 1914
Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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the text in *Prosveshcheniye*

THE VPERYODISTS AND THE *VPERYOD* GROUP

The St. Petersburg liquidators' newspaper has published an article by A. Bogdanov containing the sharpest accusations against *Pravda* and Pravdism. The journal run by Trotsky, who yesterday was the close friend of the liquidators and today has half deserted them, has now published a letter (No. 4, p. 56) from the Paris and Geneva circles of the *Vperyod* ideological and Marxist group.

In Russia only a single group—in the Caucasus—has come out in defence of this Paris-Geneva group, which has been in existence since 1909, i.e., for about five years. In view of this, it would seem a waste of time to add anything to the explanations already given in *Put Pravdy*.*

However, the persistence of the liquidators and their quondam friend Trotsky in defending the *Vperyod* group impels us to reply to them once again, the more so that the accumulating evidence of an actual alliance between the liquidators, Trotsky and the *Vperyod* people affords an opportunity of explaining to the workers in Russia the political significance of this alliance from the standpoint of principle.

The *Vperyod* group broke away from the Bolsheviks abroad in 1909. At the end of that year it issued a pamphlet entitled: *The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party*, in which the "platform" of this group was expounded.

> "In the work of drafting this platform," we read on page 32 of this pamphlet, "fifteen Party members participated, of whom seven were workers and eight intellectuals. The major part of the platform was adopted unanimously. Only on the question of the Duma did three abstain (two otzovists and one 'anti-boycottist')."

This platform (p. 17 and others) defended "proletarian philosophy".

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* See pp. 121-24 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Of the names of Vperyodists whom the latter themselves have mentioned in the press, we shall mention the following: N. Maximov, Voinov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky, Lyadov, S. A. Volsky, Domov and A. Bogdanov.[204]

What has become of these Vperyodists?

N. Maximov has left the *Vperyod* group.

Voinov and Alexinsky remained in the group, but later fell out with each other and now belong to *two* different *Vperyod* groups. This was officially announced in Paris.

A. Lunacharsky has fallen out with Alexinsky.

Lyadov has evidently left the group; nothing is known of his attitude towards the new split in the *Vperyod* group.

S. A. Volsky has gone over to the Left Narodniks, judging from his regular contributions to the latter's publications (see *Zavety*).

Domov published, in *Vperyod* No. 3 (May 1911), a statement that "he was no longer taking any part whatever in the publications of the *Vperyod* group" (p. 78).

A. Bogdanov has announced in the press that he has left the *Vperyod* group.

Such are the facts.

And now compare these facts with the statement of the Paris and Geneva Vperyodists published by Trotsky:

> "The assertion by *Put Pravdy* that, from the moment it came into being, the *Vperyod* group consisted of heterogeneous anti-Marxist elements loosely stuck together, and fell to pieces with the revival of the working-class movement, does not correspond to the facts."

The reader will see from this that the Vperyodists' statement published by Trotsky, who is perfectly familiar with all the names we have mentioned and with the entire history of the *Vperyod* group, which he has assisted on more than one occasion, is an outrageous and glaring-falsehood, and that what *Put Pravdy* said was the absolute truth.

We shall also recall the following fact. *Sovremenny Mir*, in 1910 or 1911 I think, published a review by G. A. Alexinsky of a book by A. A. Bogdanov, in which the latter was referred to as a "gentleman" who had nothing in common with Marxism.

How is this to be explained?

It is to be explained by the fact that the Vperyodists were really a group of heterogeneous, anti-Marxist elements,

loosely stuck together. As regards ideological trend, there were *two* such elements there, Machism and otzovism, which, incidentally, is evident from the passages quoted above.

Machism is the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius, modified by Bogdanov. It is advocated by Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and Volsky, and *is concealed* in the *Vperyod* platform under the pseudonym of "proletarian philosophy". In effect, this philosophy is a species of philosophical idealism, i.e., a subtle defence of religion, and it was no accident that Lunacharsky has slipped from this philosophy into advocating a blending of scientific socialism with religion. Even today, A. Bogdanov, in a number of "new" books, defends this utterly anti-Marxist and utterly reactionary philosophy, which both the Menshevik G. V. Plekhanov and the Bolshevik V. Ilyin[205] have strongly opposed.

We now ask all and sundry whether the liquidators A. Bogdanov, Trotsky and the Paris-Geneva Vperyodists acted honestly when, in publishing statements by *Vperyod* and about *Vperyod*, they *concealed* from the Russian workers:

1) the fact that the *Vperyod* group itself included "proletarian philosophy", i.e., "Machism", in its platform;

2) the fact that Marxists belonging to different groups waged a long and persistent struggle against "Machism" as an out-and-out reactionary philosophy;

3) the fact that even Alexinsky, that ardent Vperyodist, who signed this platform jointly with the Machists, was some time later compelled to protest in the sharpest possible terms against Machism.

We shall now deal with otzovism.

We have seen above that the otzovists belonged to the *Vperyod* group. This group's platform—as was pointed out immediately it appeared in the press abroad—contained a veiled form of otzovism and unpardonable concessions to it, for example, in point d), on p. 16 of the platform, where it says that (for a certain period)

> "none of the semi-legal and legal ways and means of struggle of the working class, including participation in the Duma, can be of independent and decisive importance".

This is the same old otzovism, only veiled, vague and confused. Both the Party Bolsheviks, i.e., those opposed

to liquidationism, and the pro-Party Mensheviks have repeatedly explained that such a platform is unacceptable to Social-Democrats, that it is a defence of otzovism, utterly fallacious and most harmful.

The otzovists were opposed to going into the Third Duma, but events clearly showed that they were mistaken, and that, *in fact*, their point of view led to anarchism.

The veiled and modified defence of otzovism that we have quoted could not, *in practice*, have resulted in the line which *Pravda* successfully pursued, and which led the Pravdists to victory over the disruptors of the Party, the liquidators, in the vast majority of the legal and ultra-legal working-class organisations.

That is why, when the Vperyodists to this day talk of "uncurtailed Left Marxism", it is our duty to speak up and warn the workers; it is our duty to declare that these fine words contain an anti-Marxist doctrine which will cause immense harm to the working-class movement, and is absolutely incompatible with the latter.

This Vperyodist species of "uncurtailed Left Marxism" is a travesty of Bolshevism, as the Bolsheviks said and proved long back, over five years ago. Even if the Vperyodists have failed to realise it, we virtually have here a deviation from Marxism towards anarchism.

The Plenum of January 1910—the very Plenum which the Vperyodists refer to in Trotsky's journal as having endorsed their group—*unanimously condemned this deviation* as being just as harmful as the liquidators' deviation. Throughout 1910 the leading bodies set up by the Plenum to carry out its decisions, for example, the Editorial Board of the Central Organ,[206] *repeatedly* and at great length pointed out in the columns of their publications that the Vperyodists, like the liquidators, were *violating* the decisions of the Plenum, and that, like the liquidators, they were in fact v*ehicles of bourgeois influence on the proletariat*.

Since, in Trotsky's journal, the Vperyodists now refer to the "first and second *Vperyod* schools", we feel bound to recall the facts. Half the workers *left* the first school because experience had convinced them of its anti-Marxist and disruptive character. As regards the second school, the Central Organ, in pursuance of the decisions of the Plenum,

made a point of warning the workers against it and explained that it bore the character just mentioned.

But who helped this second school?

Only the liquidators and Trotsky, *notwithstanding* the official warning given by the Party's official organ.

In this second school we plainly see a bloc, an alliance, between the liquidators, the Vperyodists and Trotsky's group exactly like the one we now see in the columns of the St. Petersburg liquidationist newspaper and in Trotsky's *Borba*.

This is an alliance of anti-Marxist and disruptive groups, which detest *Pravda*'s Marxism and the comradely Party discipline which rallies the vast majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia around *Pravda*.

We *cannot but* call "adventurism" this alliance, like the *Vperyod* group itself, and Vperyodism as a whole, for nothing can come of Vperyodism and of its "bloc" with Trotsky and the liquidators except disregard of principles, the encouragement of anti-Marxist ideas (without openly preaching them), and the disruption of the working-class movement.

But while being basically and unswervingly opposed to *Vperyod* and Vperyodism, we have never, and never shall, shut the door against those Vperyodists who (like the majority of the founders of *Vperyod*) are leaving that group and intend to help the majority of Russia's class-conscious workers, organised and united by Pravdism. No leniency whatever must be shown towards the defence of Machism (from which, unfortunately, Bogdanov won't budge), or of Vperyodism; but no obstacles should be put in the way of comrades who have conscientiously recognised *Vperyod*'s mistake and are turning *from Vperyod* back to the Party.

As regards the attacks and abuse to which "those writers Ilyin, Zinoviev and Kamenev" are subjected by Bogdanov in the liquidators' newspaper and by the Vperyodists in Trotsky's journal, we shall state briefly that these writers have always carried out the *decisions* of the organised Marxist workers, who have demonstrated to all the world by their solidarity with Pravdism or by their votes in the election of the Metropolitan and All-Russia Insurance Boards, that they constitute the overwhelming majority of the organised and class-conscious workers of Russia.

Acting in accordance with these decisions and in keeping with their spirit, these writers have every reason to consider that their activities are in harmony with the will of the majority of the Marxist workers, and they will not of course be deterred from their activities by abuse coming from the Vperyodists, Trotsky and the liquidators.

The history of the *Vperyod* group, of its break-up, and its repeated blocs with Trotsky and the liquidators, is a matter of some general interest to the workers, and even of some public interest, for it represents a typical case of isolated groups of intellectuals being formed in the period of break-down and disintegration. Anybody is at liberty to form a separate ideological group and to point out a different road to the proletariat, but much will be expected of any founder of a new group. It goes without saying that nobody can be blamed for making mistakes, but to *persist* in mistakes that have been explained both by the theory and the practice of a movement of over five years is tantamount to waging war against Marxism, against the organised and united majority of the workers.

The vacillations and deviations of the liquidators and Vperyodists are no accident; they have been engendered by the period of break-down and disintegration. We see these bourgeois deviations on both sides of the road of the class struggle of the Marxist workers, and these serve as a warning to every class-conscious worker.

P.S. The above lines were already written when we received a copy of Trotsky's *Borba* containing another letter from "the Geneva, Paris and Tiflis *Vperyod* Marxist circles and from St. Petersburg fellow-thinkers".

From the signatures to this letter we see that during these four and a half years the Vperyodists, who issued "*their own*" platform at the very end of 1909, have acquired in Russia *one* "Tiflis circle" and probably *two* "St. Petersburg fellow-thinkers" (three would no doubt have constituted a St. Petersburg, or metropolitan, or all-Russia, Marxist ideological circle!). To anyone more or less seriously interested in politics, this result of *Vperyod*'s four years of "activity" should suffice to serve as a criterion of this group. Let

Trotsky amuse himself by uniting with it in the columns of his "*own*" sheet; let the Vperyodists and Trotskyists play at being "powers", "trends", and contracting parties. This is simply the childish make-believe of people who, by uttering pompous phrases, want to conceal the fact that their "groups" are mere bubbles.

It is amusing to read how these groups vociferate about unity and splits! Don't you understand, gentlemen, that there can only be a question of the unity of the mass working-class movement, the unity of the workers party; as for unity with groups of intellectuals, who in the course of four years have found no support among the workers of Russia, you and Trotsky can chatter to your heart's content about that! That is not worth arguing about.

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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

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EDITORIAL COMMENT ON OCKSEN LOLA'S "APPEAL TO THE UKRAINIAN WORKERS"[207]

We have much pleasure in publishing the appeal of our comrade, a Ukrainian Marxist, to the Ukrainian class-conscious workers. Unity irrespective of nation. This call is particularly urgent in Russia at the present time. The petty-bourgeois intellectuals of Dzvin, the workers' evil counsellors, are trying as hard as they can to drive a wedge between the Ukrainian and the Great-Russian Social-Democratic workers. *Dzvin* is serving the cause of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie.

We shall, however, serve the cause of the international-workers: we shall rally, unite and merge the workers of all nations for united and joint activities.

Long live the close fraternal alliance of the workers of the Ukrainian, Great-Russian and all other nations of Russia!

Trudovaya Pravda No. 28,
June 29, 1914

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the text in *Trudovaya Pravda*

REPORT OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TO THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE C.C. DELEGATION[208]

Written June 23-30 (July 6-13), 1914

First published in 1929 in the second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XVII

Published according to the manuscript

REPORT OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TO THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE C.C. DELEGATION[205]

Written June 28-30 (July 6-13), 1914

Published according to the manuscript

First published in 1929 in the second and third editions of Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. XVII

Before proceeding to the report on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, I shall first of all take this opportunity of performing a pleasant duty, and on behalf of that body express profound thanks to Comrade Vandervelde, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau, for visiting our country and making himself personally acquainted with the leaders of the working-class movement in St. Petersburg. We are particularly grateful to Comrade Vandervelde for being the first to establish direct contact between prominent members of the International and the class-conscious and leading workers of Russia, and also for publishing in the foreign socialist press (we have in mind *Le Peuple* and *l'Humanité*) objective data on the working-class movement in Russia, data collected on the spot from the editors of the newspapers of the three trends, namely the Pravdist (i.e., our Party), the liquidationist and the Socialist-Revolutionary trends.

I shall divide my report on the question of the unity of the Russian Social-Democratic movement into the following four parts: (1) first, I shall explain the gist of the main differences among the Social-Democrats; (2) I shall then quote data concerning the mass working-class movement in Russia, showing how our Party line has been *tested by the experience of this movement*; (3) I shall explain how the line and position of our opponents have been tested by the same experience. Fourth and last, I shall formulate, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, concrete, positive and *practical* proposals for unity.

I

There are two bodies of opinion on what is at present taking place in the Russian Social-Democratic movement.

One opinion, expounded by Rosa Luxemburg in the proposal she made to the International Socialist Bureau last year (December 1913) and shared by the liquidators and the groups which support them, is as follows: in Russia the "chaos" of factional strife reigns among a multitude of factions, the worst of which, namely, the Leninist faction, is most active in fomenting a split. Actually, the differences do not preclude the possibility of joint activities. The road to unity lies through agreement or compromise among all trends and groups.

The other opinion, which we hold, is that there is nothing resembling "chaos of factional strife" in Russia. The *only* thing we have there is a struggle against the liquidators, and it is *only* in the course of this struggle that a *genuinely* workers' Social-Democratic Party is being built up, which has already united the *overwhelming majority*—four-fifths—of the class-conscious workers of Russia. The illegal Party, in which the majority of the workers of Russia are organised, has been represented by the following conferences: the January Conference of 1912, the February Conference of 1913, and the Summer Conference of 1913. The legal organ of the Party is the newspaper *Pravda* (*Vérité*), hence the name Pravdist. Incidentally, this opinion was expressed by the St. Petersburg worker who, at a banquet in St. Petersburg which Comrade Vandervelde attended, stated that the workers in the factories of St. Petersburg are united, and that outside of this unity of the workers there are only "general staffs without armies".

In the second part of my report I shall deal with the objective data which prove that ours is the correct opinion. And now I shall deal with the substance of liquidationism.

The liquidationist groups were formally expelled from the Party at the R.S.D.L.P. Conference in January 1912, but the question of liquidationism was raised by our Party much earlier. A definite official resolution, binding upon the whole Party and unreservedly condemning liquidationism, was adopted by the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held as far back as December *1908*. In this resolution liquidationism is defined as follows:

(Liquidationism is) "an attempt on the part of some of the Party intelligentsia to liquidate the existing organisa-

tion of the R.S.D.L.P. and to substitute for it an amorphous federation acting at all cost within the limits of legality, even at the cost of openly abandoning the programme, tactics and traditions of the Party".

From this it is evident that as far back as *1908* liquidationism was officially declared and recognised as an *intellectualist* trend, and that in substance it stood for the *renunciation* of the illegal Party and the *substitution*, or advocacy of the substitution, of a legal party for it.

The Central Committee's plenary meeting held in January *1910* once again *unanimously* condemned liquidationism as "*a manifestation of the influence of the bourgeoisie on the proletariat*".

From this we see how mistaken is the opinion that our differences with the liquidators are no deeper and are less important than those between the so-called radicals and moderates in Western Europe. There is not a single—literally not a single—West-European party that has ever had occasion to adopt a general party decision against people who desired to *dissolve* the party and to *substitute* a new one for it!

Nowhere in Western Europe has there ever been, nor can there ever be, a question of whether it is permissible to bear the title of party member *and at the same time* advocate the dissolution of that party, to argue that the party is useless and unnecessary, and that another party be substituted for it. Nowhere in Western Europe does the question concern the very *existence* of the party as it does with us, i.e., whether that party is t*o be or not to be*.

This is not disagreement over a question of organisation, of *how* the party should be built, but disagreement concerning the very *existence* of the party. Here, conciliation, agreement and compromise are totally out of the question.

We could not have built up our Party (to the extent of four-fifths) and cannot continue to build it otherwise than by relentlessly fighting those publicists who in the legal press fight against the "underground" (i.e., the illegal Party), declare it to be an "*evil*", justify and eulogise desertion from it, and advocate the formation of an "open party".

In present-day Russia, where even the party of the extremely moderate liberal is not legal, our Party can exist only

as an illegal party. The exceptional and unique feature of our position, which somewhat resembles that of the German Social-Democrats under the Anti-Socialist Law[209] (although, even then, the Germans enjoyed a hundred times more legality than we do in Russia), is that our illegal Social-Democratic Labour Party consists of *illegal* workers' organisations (often called "cells") which are surrounded by a more or less dense network of *legal* workers' associations (such as sick insurance societies, trade unions, educational associations, athletic clubs, temperance societies, and so forth), Most of these legal associations exist in the metropolis; in many parts of the provinces there are none at all.

Some of the illegal organisations are fairly large, others are quite small and in some cases they consist only of "trusted agents".[210]

The legal associations serve to some extent as a *screen* for the illegal organisations and for the extensive, legal advocacy of the idea of working-class solidarity among the masses. Nation-wide contacts between the leading working class organisations, the maintenance of a centre (the Central Committee) and the passing of precise Party resolutions on all questions—all these are of course carried out quite illegally and call for the utmost secrecy and trustworthiness on the part of advanced and tested workers.

To come out in the legal press *against* the "underground" or in favour of an "open party" is simply to *disrupt* our Party, and we must regard the people who do this as *bitter enemies* of our Party.

Naturally, repudiation of the "underground" goes hand in hand with repudiation of revolutionary tactics and advocacy of reformism. Russia is passing through a period of bourgeois revolutions. In Russia even the most moderate bourgeois—the Cadets and Octobrists—are decidedly dissatisfied with the government. But they are all enemies of revolution and detest us for "demagogy", for striving again to lead the masses to the barricades as we did in 1905. They are all bourgeois who advocate only "reforms" and spread among the masses the highly pernicious idea that reform is *compatible* with the present tsarist monarchy.

Our tactics are different. We make use of every reform (insurance, for example) and of every legal society. But we

use them to develop the revolutionary consciousness and the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In Russia, where political freedom to this day does not exist, these words have far more direct implications for us than they have in Europe. Our Party conducts *revolutionary strikes*, which in Russia are growing as in no other country in the world. Take, for example, the month of May alone. In May 1912, 64,000 and in May 1914, 99,000 workers were involved in economic strikes.

The number involved in political strikes was: 364,000 in 1912 and 647,000 in 1914. The combination of political and economic struggle produces the revolutionary strike, which, by rousing the peasant millions, trains them for revolution. Our Party conducts campaigns of *revolutionary meetings* and *revolutionary street demonstrations*. For this purpose our Party distributes *revolutionary leaflets* and an *illegal newspaper*, the Party's Central Organ. The ideological unification of all these propaganda and agitation activities among the masses is achieved by the slogans adopted by the supreme bodies of our Party, namely: (1) an eight-hour day; (2) confiscation of the landed estates, and (3) a democratic republic. In the present situation in Russia, where absolute tyranny and despotism prevail and where all laws are suppressed by the tsarist monarchy, *only* these slogans can effectually unite and direct the entire propaganda and agitation of the Party aimed at effectually sustaining the revolutionary working-class movement.

It amuses us to hear the liquidators say, for example, that we are opposed to "freedom of association", for we not only emphasised the importance of this point of our programme in a special resolution adopted by the January Conference of 1912, but we made ten times more effective use of the curtailed right of association (the insurance societies, for example) than the liquidators did. But when people tell us in the legal press that the slogans of confiscation of the land and of a republic cannot serve as subjects for agitation among the masses, we say that there can be no question of our Party's unity with *such* people, and such a group of publicists.

Since the purpose of this first part of my report is to explain the *gist* of our differences, I shall say no more on this

point, except to remind you that the fourth part of my report will contain practical proposals, with an exact list of all the cases where the liquidators have departed from our Party's programme and decisions.

I shall not here go into the details of the history of the liquidators' *breakaway* from our illegal Party, the R.S.D.L.P., but will merely indicate the *three* main periods of this history.

First period: from the autumn of 1908 to January 1910. The Party combated liquidationism with the aid of precise, official, Party decisions condemning it.

Second period: from January 1910 to January 1912. The liquidators *hindered* the work of restoring the Central Committee of the Party; they disrupted the Central Committee of the Party and *dismissed* the last remnants of it, namely, the Technical Commission of the *Bureau* Abroad of the Central Committee.[211] The Party committees *in Russia* then (autumn 1911) set up the Russian Organising Commission[212] for the purpose of restoring the Party. That Commission convened the January Conference of 1912. The Conference restored the Party, elected a Central Committee and expelled the liquidationist group from the Party.

Third period: from January 1912 to the present time. The specific feature of this period is that a majority of four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia have rallied around the decisions and bodies created by the January Conference of 1912.

I now come to the second part of my report, in which I shall describe the present state of our Party and of the liquidators in the light of the mass working-class movement in Russia. I shall try to answer the question: does the *experience of the mass movement* confirm the correctness of our Party's line or of the liquidators' line?

II

On April 22, 1912 (old style) the working-class daily, *Pravda*, began to appear in Russia, *thanks to* the restoration of the Party at the January Conference of 1912; this newspaper is pursuing the line (often by hints and always in a curtailed form) laid down by that Conference.

Obviously, we never mention in *any organ of the press* the illegal connection that exists between the Party's illegal Conference of January 1912 and the Central Committee it set up, on the one hand, and the legal newspaper *Pravda*, on the other. In September 1912, the rival newspaper of the liquidators, *Luch*, now called *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, began to appear. Then, in the autumn of 1912, the Fourth Duma elections took place. In 1913, a new insurance law came into force in Russia, establishing sick funds for the workers. Lastly, the legal trade unions, relentlessly persecuted by the government and repeatedly suppressed, were, nevertheless, constantly revived.

It is not difficult to understand that all these manifestations of the *mass* working-class movement—especially the daily newspapers of the *two* trends—provide a vast amount of public, verifiable, and *objective* data. We deem it our duty to the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau emphatically to protest against the habit of the liquidators and their defenders abroad of making unsubstantiated statements, assurances and declamations, while *ignoring* the objective facts of the mass working-class movement in Russia.

It is these facts that have definitely strengthened us in our conviction that the line we are pursuing is the right one.

In January 1912 the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which restored the illegal Party, was held. The liquidators and the groups abroad (including Plekhanov) greeted it with abuse. But what about the workers in Russia?

The answer to this question was provided by the Fourth Duma elections.

These elections were held in the autumn of 1912. Whereas in the Third Duma *50 per cent* (four out of eight) of the deputies elected by the worker curia belonged to our trend, in the Fourth Duma six out of nine, i.e., *67 per cent*, of the deputies elected by the worker curia were supporters of the Party. This proves that the masses of the workers sided with the Party and rejected liquidationism. If the six members of the Duma, who incline towards liquidationism, now really desire unity with the *Party* group in the Duma, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group, then we are

obliged to say that recognition of the fact that these deputies are carrying out the will of the majority of the workers is the condition for unity.

To proceed. Daily newspapers are extremely important media of working-class *organisation*. They contain a vast amount of material proving this, i.e., the figures showing *the number of contributions received from workers' groups*. Both newspapers, the Pravdist (i.e., the Party) and the liquidationist, publish reports of financial contributions received from workers' groups. These reports are, for Russia, the best conceivable index—public and legal—of the actual state of *organisation* of the masses of the workers.

In Western Europe, where the socialist parties are legal, the number of party members is known to everybody, and discussions concerning the organised working-class movement are always based on these figures.

In Russia we have no open, i.e., legal party. The Party's organisations are illegal, secret, "underground", as we say. But an *indirect*—and also unerring—index of the state of these organisations is provided by the *number of financial contributions received from workers' groups*.

These figures have been published openly and regularly in both newspapers—for over two years in ours and over eighteen months in the liquidators'—and if any false claim or mistake were made it would immediately have called forth a protest on the part of the workers themselves. Consequently, these figures are absolutely reliable and are the best public and legal index of the state of organisation of the masses of the workers.

Our liquidators, and the groups abroad which defend them, persistently ignore these figures, and say nothing about them in their press; but our workers merely regard this as evidence of their desire to *flout the will of the majority of the workers*, as evidence of their lack of honesty.

Here are the figures for the *whole* of 1913. The Pravdists received 2,181 money contributions from workers' groups, while the liquidators received 661. In 1914 (up to May 13), the Pravdists had the support of 2,873 workers' groups, and the liquidators, of 671. Thus, the Pravdists organised 77 per cent of the workers' groups in 1913, and 81 per cent in 1914.

The Pravdists have been publishing these figures regularly since 1912, inviting investigation, pointing to their objective character, and calling upon the genuine (not hypocritical) friends of "unity" straightforwardly and honestly to submit to the will of the majority of the workers. *Failing this*, all their talk about unity is sheer hypocrisy.

After the liquidators had been fighting the Party for eighteen months, the class-conscious workers of Russia, by a four-fifths majority, *approved of* the *Pravda* line and demonstrated their loyalty to the "underground" and to revolutionary tactics. What we expect from the liquidators and their friends is not phrases about "unity" *against* the Party's will, but a straightforward answer to the question: do they or do they not accept the will of the vast majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia?

It is easy to give empty assurances, but it is very difficult to organise a genuine working-class newspaper that is really maintained by the workers. All the foreign comrades know this, and they are more experienced than we are. A real working-class newspaper, i.e., a newspaper that is really financed by the workers and which pursues the Party line, is a powerful instrument of organisation.

What do these figures show? These objective figures show that *Pravda* is a genuinely working-class newspaper, whereas the liquidationist newspaper, which repudiates the "underground", i.e., the Party, both in its ideas and in the sources from which it obtains its funds is, *in fact*, *a bourgeois* newspaper.

From January 1 to May 13, 1914, both newspapers, as usual, published reports of collections, and our newspaper published a summary of these reports. Here are the results, *Pravda* collected R.21,584.11, of which R.18,934.10 came from workers' groups. Thus, 87 per cent of the contributions came from organised workers and only 13 per cent from the bourgeoisie.

The liquidators collected R.12,055.89, of which R.5,296.12 came from workers' groups, i.e., only 44 per cent—*less than half*. The liquidators get *more than half* their funds from bourgeois sources.

Moreover, day in day out the entire liberal-bourgeois press eulogises the liquidators, *helps* them to flout the will

of the majority of the workers, and *encourages* them in their reformism and repudiation of the "underground".

The activities of the groups abroad are exemplified in the newspaper *Yedinstvo*, run by Comrade Plekhanov, deputy Buryanov, and others. I have before me three issues of this newspaper, the first for May 18 and the third for June 15 of this year. The reports in these issues show that somebody contributed 1000 rubles to the newspaper through Comrade Olgin, who lives abroad, while collections made abroad amounted to R.207.52. *Six* (six!) workers' groups contributed 60 rubles.

And this newspaper, which is supported by six workers' groups in Russia, calls upon the workers not to heed the Party's decisions, and calls it a "splitters'" Party! A Party which in the course of two-and-a-half years rallied *5,600* groups of workers around the definitely formulated decisions of the *three* illegal conferences of 1912 and 1913 is a "splitters'" Party; whereas Plekhanov's group, which united six workers' groups in Russia and collected 1,200 rubles abroad for the purpose of *thwarting* the will of the Russian workers, is a group which stands for "unity", if you please!

Plekhanov accuses others of being factionalists, as though making separate collections for a separate group, and calling upon the workers not to carry out the decisions adopted by a four-fifths majority, *is not* factionalism.

As for us, we say plainly that we regard the behaviour of Plekhanov's group as a model of *disruption*. Plekhanov's conduct is the same as though Mehring, in Germany, were to organise six workers' groups and, in an independent newspaper, call upon the German Social-Democrats to defy the party which had, let us assume, split away from the Poles.

Plekhanov and we speak in different tongues. We call the solidarity of four-fifths of the workers in Russia real unity, and not unity merely in word; and we call *disruption* the struggle conducted by groups abroad—financed with money collected abroad—against the majority of the Russian workers.

According to the figures Comrade Vandervelde obtained in St. Petersburg and made public in the press, *Pravda* has a circulation of 40,000, while the liquidationist newspaper has one of 16,000. *Pravda* is maintained by the workers and

pays its way, but the liquidationist newspaper is maintained by those whom our newspaper calls their *rich friends from among the bourgeoisie*.

We are submitting to the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau the financial reports published in both newspapers. To foreign comrades, who know what a serious business a working-class newspaper is, this will be far more convincing than assurances, promises, statements, and abuse of the Leninists.

We ask the liquidators: do they still choose to ignore the *objective fact* that their group's newspaper is *in effect a* bourgeois undertaking run for the purpose of advocating repudiation of the "underground" and of *flouting* the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia?

If they do, then all their talk about "unity" will continue to evoke derision from our workers.

Those who earnestly seek unity should sincerely admit that the entire liquidationist line is utterly fallacious, as has been proved by Party decisions commencing with 1908, as well as by the *experience* of the struggle waged by the *masses of the workers* during the past two-and-a-half years.

To proceed. Here are the objective figures concerning the election of workers' representatives to the insurance bodies. We reject as mere liberalism all talk about political, constitutional reforms in present-day tsarist Russia and will have nothing to do with it; but we take advantage of *real* reforms, such as insurance, *in deed* and not in word. The *entire* workers' group on the All-Russia Insurance Board consists of *Pravda supporters*, i.e., of workers who have condemned and rejected liquidationism. During the election to this All-Russia Insurance Board, 47 out of the 57 delegates, i.e., 82 per cent, were Pravdists. During the election of the Metropolitan, St. Petersburg, Insurance Board, 37 of the delegates were Pravdists and 7 were liquidators, the Pravdists constituting 84 per cent.

The same can be said about the trade unions. When they hear the talk of the Russian Social-Democrats abroad about the "chaos of factional strife" in Russia (indulged in by Rosa Luxemburg, Plekhanov, Trotsky, and others), our foreign comrades perhaps imagine that the trade union movement in our country is split up.

Nothing of the kind.

In Russia there are no duplicate unions. Both in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, the trade unions are *united*. The point is that in these unions the *Pravdists* completely *predominate*.

Not one of the thirteen trade unions in Moscow is liquidationist.

Of the twenty trade unions in St. Petersburg listed in our Workers' Calendar together with their membership, only the Draftsmen's, Druggist Employees' and Clerks' Unions, and half the members of the Printers' Union, are liquidationist. In all the other unions—Metalworkers', Textile Workers', Tailors', Woodworkers', Shop Assistants', and so forth—the Pravdists *completely* predominate.

And we say plainly: if the liquidators do not want drastically to change their tactics and put a stop to their disruptive struggle against the organised majority of the class-conscious workers in Russia, let them stop talking about "unity".

Every day *Pravda* commends the "*underground*", if only obliquely, and condemns those who repudiate it. And the workers follow the lead of *their Pravda*.

Here are figures on the illegal press published abroad. *After* the liquidators' August Conference in 1912, our Party, up to June 1914, put out *five* issues of an illegal leading political newspaper; the *liquidators—nil*; the Socialist-Revolutionaries—*nine*. These figures do not include leaflets issued in Russia for revolutionary agitation during strikes, meetings and demonstrations.

In these five issues you will find mention of *44* illegal organisations of our Party; the liquidators—*nil*; the Socialist- Revolutionaries—*21* (mainly students' and peasants).

Lastly, in October 1913, an independent Russian Social-Democratic Labour group was formed in the Duma, the aim of that group, unlike that of the liquidators, being to *carry out*, not flout, the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia. At that time *both* newspapers published *resolutions* from workers all over Russia supporting either the line of the Party group or that of the liquidationist group. The *signatures* to the resolutions in favour of the Pravdist, i.e., the Party group in the Duma, numbered *6,722*, whereas those supporting the liquidationist group numbered

2,985 (including 1,086 signatures of Bundist workers and 719 of Caucasian workers). Thus, together with all their allies, the liquidators succeeded in collecting *less than one-third* of the signatures.

These, briefly, are the objective data which we oppose to the bare statements by the liquidators. These objective data on the *mass* working-class movement in Russia during the past two-and-a-half years definitely prove, through the experience of the class-conscious workers, that our Party line is correct.

Here I must digress and quote a concrete case to prove why "unity" or even "peace" with the present newspaper of the present liquidators is entirely ruled out.

This is an extremely important case, which will explain the attitude of the liquidators towards our Party's illegal activities, and I therefore ask the comrades to pay special attention to it.

It is common knowledge that since 1912 the revolutionary mass strikes have been developing with remarkable success in Russia. The factory owners have tried to counter them with lockouts. To formulate the Party's attitude towards this form of struggle, a conference of our Party, held in February *1913* (note the date: *1913*!) drew up and published a resolution *illegally*.[213]

This resolution (page 11 of the illegal publication) definitely advanced "the immediate task of organising revolutionary street demonstrations". It definitely recommended (ibid.) that "to counteract lockouts, new forms of struggle should be devised, such as the go-slow strike, for example, and, instead of political strikes, revolutionary meetings and revolutionary street demonstrations should be organised".

This, we repeat, was in February 1913, i.e., six months after the August Conference (1912) of the liquidators, the very same conference which assured the whole world that the liquidators were *not* opposed to the "underground". *Neither* during those six months, from August 1912 to February 1913, *nor during the ensuing twelve months*, from February 1913 to February 1914, did the August bloc issue a *single resolution* on this question. Absolutely none! Listen further.

On March 20 1914, the St. Petersburg factory owners decided to retaliate to a strike by declaring a lockout. In one day 70,000 workers in St. Petersburg were dismissed.

In conformity with our Party's resolution, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., our Party's illegal organisation in St. Petersburg, decided to meet the lockout with a revolutionary demonstration on April 4, the anniversary of the shootings in the Lena gold-fields.[214]

It illegally issued an appeal to the workers, a copy of which lies before me now. It is signed: "The St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." It repeats the Party's slogans (a republic and confiscation of the land) and ends with the words:

"Comrades! Come out onto the Nevsky Prospekt at 11 a.m. on April 4."

Needless to say, *Pravda itself*, as a legal publication, could not mention this appeal, let alone reprint it.

What was to be done? How could it convey to its working-class readers, if only to the most class-conscious and advanced of them, the *idea* that it was necessary to support the illegal appeal for an illegal revolutionary demonstration?

The only thing was to resort to the method that we always resort to, namely, hinting.

And so on the very day of the demonstration, on Friday, April 4, 1914, our paper (*Put Pravdy* No. 54) published an unsigned leading article under the discreet heading: "Forms of the Working-Class Movement."* This article makes direct mention of the "formal decision adopted by the Marxists in February 1913" and *hints* at a demonstration of a revolutionary character in the following words:

"The class-conscious workers are well acquainted with certain concrete cases when the movement rose to higher forms [i.e., forms of the struggle] which, historically, were subjected to repeated tests, and which are 'unintelligible' and 'alien' only to the liquidators." (*Put Pravdy*, 1914, No. 54.)

The Russian police and public prosecutors missed the hint. But the class-conscious workers did not.

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* See pp. 209-12 of this volume.—Ed.

The demonstration took place. All the bourgeois evening newspapers of April 4 were full of it. The next day, April 5, our paper (see *Put Pravdy* No. 55) *quoted* excerpts from the bourgeois newspapers, which stated that "during the last few days large numbers of leaflets signed by the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. were distributed among the workers, calling for a demonstration on April 4, the anniversary of the events in the Lena gold-fields".

Our paper could not be prosecuted for publishing *this* passage from the bourgeois newspapers. The result was that the decision of the illegal Party was carried out. A revolutionary demonstration was organised, and this work was *backed* by a legal newspaper with a readership of 40,000 workers.

And what did the liquidators do?

As I have already said, *neither* during the six months from August 1912 to February 1918, *nor* during the whole of the ensuing twelve months did *a single illegal decision* of the August bloc appear.

Nobody heard anything of illegal appeals by the liquidators (in connection with April 4, 1914) in St. Petersburg, nor did the bourgeois newspapers mention them. It must be said that evidence by the bourgeois newspapers is *very important*, for when leaflets are distributed in really large numbers, the bourgeois newspapers always hear and write about it. On the other hand, if leaflets are distributed in insignificant numbers, the masses are not aware of the fact, and the bourgeois newspapers say nothing about it.

Thus, the liquidators themselves did nothing to organise the revolutionary demonstration on April 4, 1914. They held aloof.

Moreover, in reporting the demonstration the next day, the legal liquidationist newspaper

did not reproduce the information given in the bourgeois newspapers about the distribution of leaflets signed by the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party!

This is monstrous, but it is a fact. I attach here a copy of the liquidationist newspaper of April 5, 1914 (*Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 48), in order to denounce this fact before the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau.

Just think what this means! People who shout that they want "unity" with our Party, people who claim to be Social-Democrats, *conceal* from the workers the *existence* of the illegal organisation of our Party, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., conceal the fact that the latter issued *revolutionary*, illegal, underground leaflets, and that *it* organised the demonstration on April 4, 1914.

People who shout about "unity" with our Party *refrain from reproducing* information published in the bourgeois newspapers about the mass distribution of *underground* leaflets signed by the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party!

This should help our comrades in the foreign parties to understand why the question of the "underground" is of such vital and cardinal importance to us.

But even that is not all. A week later, on April 11, 1914, an article appeared in the liquidationist newspaper (*Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 51) in which the author *sneered* at the article published in *Pravda* of April 4, the day of the demonstration, on the "higher forms" of the struggle, *sneered* at the fact that *Pravda* had

"*clothed its ideas in a form that is difficult to understand*"!

Just think: the legal liquidationist newspaper, which is constantly criticising and abusing the "underground" *sneers* at the fact that our legal newspaper, which desires to *help* the "underground", does this only in the form of hints!

And for our newspaper's *hint* at "higher forms", i.e., at the revolutionary demonstration organised by the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party, the liquidators publicly, in their newspaper, in that very same article, called us "*adventurists*" and "most unprincipled adventurists", "*anarcho-syndicalists*" "*acting as agents provocateurs* against the workers"!

I have with me all the documents, a copy of the leaflet issued by the St. Petersburg Committee, a copy of our newspaper, and a copy of the liquidationist newspaper. Let those comrades who are interested request that these documents be translated for them in full.

On behalf of the Central Committee of our Party and of the vast majority of the organised Social-Democratic workers

of Russia, I declare: *there can be no "unity" and no "peace" with this group of liquidators as long as a newspaper like this exists*!

We *cannot* carry on our revolutionary activities among the masses in "unity" with such a newspaper.

III

I now come to the third part of my report. Having examined the *experience* of the mass working-class movement in Russia, which has confirmed the correctness of our line, I now propose to examine the *experience* of our opponents.

Our opponents, both the liquidators and groups abroad, such as Plekhanov's, like to apply to us the abusive term of "usurpers". They repeated this abuse in the columns of *Vorwärts* in March 1912. But *Vorwärts* did not give us an opportunity of replying! Let us see what political significance there is in the accusation that we are "usurpers".

I have already said that the 1912 Conference was convened by the Russian Organising Commission which was set up by the Party committees after the liquidators had wrecked the old Central Committee. We take credit for having restored the illegal Party, and the majority of the workers of Russia have recognised this.

But let us assume for a moment that our numerous opponents (numerous in the opinion of the intellectualist groups and the Party groups living abroad) are right. Let us assume that we are "usurpers", "splitters", and so forth. In that case, would it not be natural to expect our opponents to prove, *not merely with words*, *but by the experience* of their activities and their unity, that we are wrong.

If we are wrong in asserting that the Party can only be built up by fighting the liquidationist groups, then should we not expect the groups and organisations which disagree with us to *prove from the experience of their* activities that unity with the liquidators is possible?

But the experience of our opponents shows this. In January 1912, our illegal Party was restored by our Conference, which was representative of the majority of organisations in Russia.

In March 1912, the following united in the columns of *Vorwärts* to abuse us:

the liquidators
the Bund
the Letts
the Poles
the Trotskyists
and the Vperyodists.

What a lot of "trends" and "groups", one might think! How easy it should have been for them to set the workers of Russia a good example by their unity!

But when steps were taken to convene the "August" Conference of the liquidators, it was found that our opponents *could not* march in step.

Both the Poles and Plekhanov refused to attend the "August" Conference of the liquidators.

Why?

Because they *could not* agree even on the meaning of the term: membership in the Party!

And so, when Plekhanov's group or Rosa Luxemburg or anybody else, assure themselves and others that *it is possible* to unite with the liquidators, we answer: dear comrades, you just try yourselves to "unite" with the liquidators on a definition of Party membership, *not in word*, *but in deed*.

Further. The Vperyodists attended the August Conference, but afterwards *walked out* in protest and denounced it as a fiction.

Then, in February 1914, eighteen months after the "August Conference" of the liquidators, the Congress of the Lettish Party was held. The Letts had always been in favour of "unity". The Lettish workers *had wanted* to work with the liquidators and had proved this not merely in word, but in deed, *by experience*.

And after eighteen months' experience, the Letts, *while remaining strictly neutral*, declared at their congress that they were withdrawing from the August bloc because:

—as the resolution of the Lettish Congress reads:

"The attempt by the conciliators to unite at all costs with the liquidators (the August Conference of 1912) proved

fruitless, and the uniters themselves became ideologically and politically dependent upon the liquidators."

If anybody else wants to make the "experiment of uniting with the liquidators", let them do so. We, however, declare that until the liquidators definitely abandon their liquidationist line, unity with them is absolutely impossible.

Lastly, Trotsky's group, the Caucasians under their leader An, and a number of other liquidators ("Em-El", for example) have practically *dropped out* of the August bloc and founded *their own* journal, *Borba*. This journal has no connection with the workers whatsoever, but by its very existence, by its criticism of the liquidators' opportunism, by its breakaway from the liquidators, this journal, which belongs to the group of former liquidators, *has proved* in deed and by experience that unity with the liquidators is impossible.

Unity will be possible only when the liquidators are ready, once and for all, to abandon their entire tactics and cease to be liquidators.

I shall now proceed to formulate the precise and formal conditions for such "unity".

IV

The following are the practical, concrete conditions, formulated by our Central Committee, which will make "unity" with the liquidators possible for our Party.

First:

1. The Party resolutions on liquidationism, adopted in December 1908 and January 1910, shall be confirmed in the most emphatic and unreserved fashion, in application precisely to liquidationism.

In order that this confirmation may be accepted by all class-conscious workers in Russia as something really serious and final, and in order that no room may be left for any ambiguity, it shall be agreed that whoever opposes (especially in the legal press) the "underground", i.e., the illegal organisation, calls it a "corpse", declares it non-existent, that its restoration is a reactionary utopia, and so forth, or, in general, deprecates the role and importance

of the "underground", shall be deemed deserving of condemnation and shall not be tolerated in the ranks of the illegal R.S.D.L.P.

It shall be agreed that whoever opposes (especially in the legal press) the "advertising of the illegal press" shall be deemed deserving of condemnation and shall not be tolerated in the ranks of the illegal Party. Membership in the illegal Party shall be open only to those who sincerely devote all their efforts to promoting the development of the illegal *press*, the publication of illegal leaflets, and so forth.

It shall be agreed that whoever, in any form whatsoever, advocates the formation in present-day Russia of an "open" (i.e., legal) workers' party—for objectively such a party would be a tsarist-monarchist labour party—whoever proclaims the slogan of an "open party" or of "fighting" for such a party, shall be deemed deserving of condemnation and shall not be tolerated in the ranks of the illegal Party.

It shall be agreed that whoever, in any form whatsoever, opposes (especially in the legal press) revolutionary mass strikes (i.e., strikes which combine the economic and political struggle with revolutionary agitation) and opposes the organisation of revolutionary meetings and street demonstrations, shall be deemed deserving of condemnation and shall not be tolerated in the ranks of the illegal Party. The banning of attacks against the revolutionary activities of the Party, which conducts strikes and demonstrations, shall also apply to condemnation, in the legal press, of the "strike craze" among the workers, or of "higher forms of the struggle" (=the legal pseudonym for demonstrations).

It shall be agreed that the journal *Nasha Zarya* and the newspaper *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* are guilty of such deviations from the Social-Democratic line towards "bourgeois influence".

2. It shall be agreed that whoever, in any form whatsoever, declares (especially in the legal press) that the slogans of a democratic republic and confiscation of the landed estates—slogans incorporated in our Party's programme and particularly urgent in present-day Russia, where the tsarist monarchy has reduced the tsar's formal recognition of the constitution to sheer mockery of the people—are useless, or of little use for agitation among the masses, shall be

deemed deserving of condemnation and shall not be tolerated in the ranks of the illegal Party.

It shall be agreed that whereas the liberal press is broadcasting the idea of reformism, the idea that political freedom is compatible with the existence of the tsarist monarchy, and that the revolutionary overthrow of tsarism is unnecessary, harmful, and sinful—in view of this, agitation for a constitutional reform such as freedom of association must be conducted, and conducted on the widest possible scale, with a clear realisation, however, that the working class is hostile to the propaganda of the liberal reformists; and this agitation must be closely combined with the task of explaining and disseminating the slogan of a republic, as a slogan for the revolutionary onslaught of the masses against the tsarist monarchy.

3. It shall be agreed that it is absolutely impermissible and incompatible with membership in the Party for any section of our Party—the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—to enter into a bloc or alliance with *any other* party.

It shall be agreed that the bloc of the Bund and the liquidators with the Left-wing of the P.S.P., a *non*-Social-Democratic party, *against* the will and without the consent of the *Polish* Social-Democrats, and without a decision by the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., comes within the category of such prohibited blocs.

Deputy Jagiello, as a member of a *non*-Social-Democratic party, can be regarded only as being aligned with our Party group in the Duma, but not as a member of that group.

4. It shall be agreed that in every city and every locality there shall be only one united Social-Democratic organisation embracing workers of all nationalities, and conducting activities in all the languages spoken by the local proletariat.

The national-Jewish separatism of the Bund, which to this day, in spite of the decisions of the Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1906, which were reaffirmed by the Conference of December 1908, refuses to apply the principle of international unity among the Social-Democratic workers in the localities—a principle which has been applied with such outstanding success in the Caucasus since 1898[215]—shall be condemned.

5. It shall be agreed that the demand for "cultural-national autonomy", which divides the workers according to nationality and is a refined form of nationalism—a demand that was rejected by a formal decision of the Second (1903) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—contradicts the programme of the Party (as does also that pseudonym for cultural-national autonomy called "the establishment of institutions which will guarantee free national development").
All decisions by all local, national or special organisations of our Party (including the group in the Duma) that accept the principle of cultural-national autonomy shall be annulled and their re-adoption without a decision of the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. shall be considered incompatible with membership in the Party.

6. Social-Democratic workers of every shade of opinion shall forthwith be called upon by all Party organisations, and by all the Party's publications in all languages, immediately to bring about unity from below, i.e., to form local, illegal Social-Democratic units, organisations and centres, or to join such organisations where they already exist. In this connection, the principle of federation, or of equality for all "trends" shall be unreservedly rejected, and the only principle to be recognised shall be that of loyal submission of the minority to the majority. The number of financial contributions made by workers' groups to the newspapers of the various trends since 1913, as reported in the legal press, shall be taken as the most accurate though approximate index of the alignment of forces among the various trends in the working-class movement. Consequently, these figures shall be published in all Party publications, which shall advise all Social-Democrats in the localities to be guided by these figures in all practical steps they take, pending the next Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

In the matter of defining Party membership, the *sole* criterion shall be membership in an illegal unit, group, or other organisation (local, factory, district organisation, or Social-Democratic group in some legal society), illegal activities in organising meetings, discussing Party decisions and distributing illegal literature.

All groups and "trends" shall immediately issue absolutely clear and definite illegal announcements about this.

7. The existence of two rival newspapers in the same town or locality shall be absolutely forbidden. The minority shall have the right to discuss before the whole Party, disagreements on programme, tactics and organisation in a discussion journal specially published for the purpose, but shall not have the right to publish, in a rival newspaper, pronouncements disruptive of the actions and decisions of the majority.

Inasmuch as the liquidators' newspaper in St. Petersburg, which is supported chiefly by bourgeois, not proletarian funds, is published contrary to the will of the acknowledged and indisputable* majority of the class-conscious Social-Democratic workers in St. Petersburg, and causes extreme disorganisation by advocating disregard for the will of the majority, it shall be deemed necessary to close this newspaper immediately and to issue a discussion journal in its place.

8. The resolution of the Second Congress of 1903, as well as that of the London Congress of 1907, on the bourgeois-democratic character of the Narodnik trend in general, including the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, shall be most definitely and unreservedly confirmed.

Any blocs, alliances, or temporary agreements between any one section of the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (or Narodniks in general) against another section of the Social-Democrats, shall be absolutely prohibited.

The St. Petersburg liquidators, who even at their own "August Conference" proclaimed no new Social-Democratic line towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and have been entering into blocs and agreements with the Socialist-

* In their newspaper (*Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 34, for June 13, 1914) the liquidators estimate the relative proportion of Pravdists and liquidators in St. Petersburg at 72 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. This queer calculation is based, not on the number of workers' groups, but on the sum of money collected from both workers and bourgeois, so that 10,000 workers who contribute 10 kopeks each are equivalent to one bourgeois who has contributed 1,000 rubles. In fact, between January 1 and May 13, 1914, the Pravdists received 2,024 contributions from workers' groups in St. Petersburg, while the liquidators received 308, making the percentages 86 and 14 respectively.

Revolutionaries against the overwhelming majority of the Social-Democratic workers in St. Petersburg, as was the case during the elections to the Insurance Boards, shall be definitely and unreservedly condemned.

A publicists' bloc shall be forbidden between outstanding liquidators and prominent Social-Democrats belonging to groups that defend the liquidators (Plekhanov, Trotsky, and others), and the Socialist-Revolutionaries who in their St. Petersburg journal *Sovremennik* assert that "the old cleavage, at all events, has disappeared" and that "it is impossible to tell where Marxism ends and Narodism begins". (*Sovremennik* No. 7, p. 76.)

Publicists who wish to become members of the Social-Democratic Party, but who contribute to that journal for reasons other than the necessity of seeking a livelihood by writing for bourgeois publications, shall be called upon to withdraw from the journal and make a public announcement to this effect.

9. In view of the extreme disorganisation introduced into the working-class movement of Russia by various detached groups abroad, which act without a mandate from any Party organisation in Russia, and without any agreement with such an organisation, it shall be deemed necessary to pass and put into effect a resolution that all groups resident abroad shall without exception communicate with organisations operating in Russia only through the Central Committee of the Party.

Groups abroad which do not submit to the Russian centre of Social-Democratic activity, i.e., the Central Committee, and which cause disorganisation by communicating with Russia independently of the Central Committee, shall have no right to speak on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P.

A Social-Democratic discussion journal shall be founded abroad, with funds collected there, for the purpose of discussing from all angles and free of the censorship, questions concerning the programme, tactics and organisation.

The Party rule (Clause 3) that only "endorsed organisations of the Party have a right to publish Party literature" shall be reaffirmed and strictly applied.

10. The resolution unanimously adopted at the beginning of January 1908 by the London Central Committee

shall be deemed absolutely binding on all Social-Democrats.

The resolution reads:

"more vigorous Social-Democratic activity in the trade union movement is prescribed by the entire present situation and must be carried on in keeping with the spirit of the London* and Stuttgart** resolutions, i.e., under no circumstances in the spirit of recognising the principle that trade unions are neutral or non-Party, but on the contrary, in the spirit of unswerving effort to establish the closest possible connection between the trade unions and the Social-Democratic Party."

It shall be agreed that attempts to conduct agitation in the trade unions against the illegal R.S.D.L.P. are incompatible with membership in the Party.

The liquidators shall undertake to refrain from calling for insubordination to the executives of the unions, to loyally submit to the Marxist majority of the unions, and under no circumstances form separatist duplicate unions.

The same shall apply to activities in all kinds of workers' societies—clubs and the like.

All Social-Democrats in every union, cultural and educational society and the like, shall join the illegal Social-Democratic unit in the respective organisation. The decisions of the illegal Party shall be binding on all such groups.

It shall be agreed that it is obligatory for all Social-Democrats to oppose the division of the trade unions according to nationality.

11. It shall be agreed that newspaper utterances against the representation elected by the St. Petersburg workers to the insurance bodies (the All-Russia Insurance Board, the Metropolitan Insurance Board, and so forth) and appeals for non-subordination to its direction, etc., *must be forbidden*. It shall be agreed that the insurance programme approved by this workers' representation *is obligatory*.

The journal *Strakhovanie Rabochikh*,[216] which is a rival to the official organ of the workers' insurance representation (*Voprosy Strakhovania*) shall close down.

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* The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., 1907.

** The International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart, 1907.

12. The Caucasian Social-Democrats must forbid agitation in favour of cultural-national autonomy, which has been rejected by the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.

The Caucasian Social-Democrats shall undertake not to violate the principle of a united international organisation in every city, and under no circumstances adopt the principle, either in political or industrial organisations, of dividing workers according to nationality.

13. The six members of the Duma (the Chkheidze group), and also deputy Buryanov, must accept all the above conditions.

The Chkheidze group must declare from the Duma rostrum that, in conformity with the Programme of the Russian Social-Democrats, it *withdraws* its support of "cultural-national autonomy" (and its pseudonym: "institutions" etc.).

The Chkheidze group must accept the leadership of the Party's Central Committee elected at the January Conference of 1912, and must recognise as binding all Party decisions, and also the Central Committee's right of veto.

Such are the terms on which the Central Committee of our Party considers unity possible, and on which it undertakes to launch a campaign in favour of unity. We consider it utterly impossible to have any negotiations or contacts with the liquidators' group which publishes *Nasha Zarya* and *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, as long as it pursues its *present* tactics. As far as their political role in the working-class movement in Russia is concerned; we regard all the other groups, trends, factions and bodies which defend the liquidators or advocate unity or compromise with them, as fictions.

We declare that to feed the working class of Russia with verbal assurances and promises that unity with the liquidationist group is possible and easy, means rendering very bad service to the cause, and passing off phrases for reality.

We therefore make the following practical proposal.

A year ago, the question was raised in our Party of convening a Party congress. This was announced in the resolutions of the 1913 Summer Conference of the Central Com-

mittee of the R.S.D.L.P. The arrangements for convening this congress are now almost completed. In all probability, a congress of our Party will be held in the very near future, immediately after the Vienna Congress, or even while it is being held. Of course, we ask the comrades not to announce this or speak of it. If arrests are very numerous, perhaps a conference will be held instead of a congress.

Thus, while refraining from any steps towards a rapprochement with the liquidationist group or its defenders *until the above terms are accepted and carried out*, we propose that all groups, trends and factions, which—unlike us—hold that unity, or peace, or compromise with the present liquidationist group such as it is, is possible considering its present tactics, we propose that these groups should take the opportunity provided by the Vienna Congress to organise a joint formal discussion of our terms.

Let those who advocate peace or compromise with the liquidators not confine themselves to propaganda, but prove *in deed* that unity with the present liquidators is possible.

For our part, we shall be very glad if we are able to inform the representatives of four-fifths of the workers of Russia gathered at the congress or conference of our Party as to the outcome of the conference between all groups that defend the liquidators, and the liquidationist group.

14. In conclusion, I must touch upon one other point which, although very unpleasant, cannot be avoided if we are to have a sincere and frank exchange of opinion on the question of Social-Democratic unity in Russia.

The point is the following:

In their press, our opponents, the liquidators, are conducting a bitter personal campaign against several members of our Party, accusing them publicly and before the masses, of a host of dishonourable, despicable and criminal actions, or else reporting in their newspaper "rumours" about such actions. Our Party press replies to these attacks and, in the name of the Central Committee of our Party, plainly and definitely calls the liquidators—and especially their two leaders, Dan and Martov—slanderers.

It is not difficult to realise the degree of disorganisation and demoralisation the liquidators are spreading among the masses by this sort of "campaign", to which we shall always

retaliate on the principle "*à corsaire—corsaire et demi*". We shall briefly quote four examples:

1. In 1911, L. Martov published in Paris a pamphlet entitled *Saviours or Destroyers*, devoted in the main to accusations against Lenin of having committed dishonourable and criminal acts. Martov sent a German translation of this pamphlet to Kautsky, who was then acting as arbiter in a controversial question affecting Russian Social-Democracy. In a letter to Lunacharsky (of the *Vperyod* group) Kautsky described Martov's pamphlet as "disgusting", and this opinion was published in the Russian Social-Democratic press by Plekhanov. The liquidators' newspaper is now beginning, in the form of insinuations, gradually to spread the contents of this pamphlet among the Russian public.

2. Since 1913 the liquidators' newspaper has been constantly accusing Dansky, a member of our Party and an insurance expert, of dishonesty. The pretext for these accusations is that Dansky works for an employers' organisation, thus serving the bourgeoisie. Our Party, as represented by a number of bodies (the editorial boards of *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma, several trade unions, etc.), examined these accusations and found that Dansky had gradually given up working for the employers and was serving the working-class movement, beginning as anonymous contributor to *Pravda*. When Dansky definitely joined our Party he was requested, in conformity with the resolutions of our Party, to sever all connections with the employers' organisation. Dansky did so and gave up his job. On behalf of the Central Committee, I repeat that our Party regards this man as an honest comrade, and it will not permit anybody to besmirch his honour with impunity. Our press, in accusing the liquidators of slandering Dansky, pointed out that in this case the liquidators were particularly dishonest, because Martov himself constantly writes for a bourgeois newspaper under a different pseudonym (here I will fully reveal the fact: *Yegorov*, in *Kievskaya Mysl*); *Yezhov*, one of the closest collaborators of the liquidationist newspaper, was on the staff of an employers' association, as was, or is, also the case with *Yermansky*.

3. Malinovsky, a Duma member, suddenly left the Duma and resigned without giving any reason. Our workers called together their local and central leading bodies and sentenced Malinovsky to expulsion from the Party, describing his unexplained resignation without consultation with his colleagues as disruptive, and as desertion from his post. The liquidationist newspaper then began to publish anonymous rumours to the effect that Malinovsky was an agent provocateur, and demanded a joint investigation by the different groups. Our Central Committee declared that it vouched for Malinovsky, had investigated the rumours, and was convinced that Dan and Martov were indulging in base slander. The Central Committee rejected the proposal for a joint commission with the liquidators and, following on the opinion expressed by the representatives of ten trade unions in Moscow, denounced as slanderers those people who dared to publish in the press anonymous "*rumours*" about agents provocateurs, instead of submitting these rumours in an organised manner to our Central Committee, *or to their own* Central Committee (their "O.C."), to the Bund and to groups that trust the liquidators, to have them investigated by *boards* and responsible bodies. Burtsev declared that he did not believe the rumours. The Committee of Investigation set up by our Central Committee declared that it would publish the facts about those who were circulating these rumours. I can only add that these rumours were circulated by the *liquidators*.

4. Some days ago the liquidationist newspaper published an open letter from ex-member of the Second Duma Alexinsky, accusing Comrade Antonov, a member of our Party who had served a term of penal servitude, of being a traitor. But Comrade Antonov's conduct was pronounced unimpeachable both by a special committee consisting of comrades who had served sentence with him, as well as by a decision of the Central Committee of the Party adopted in 1907-08 in Finland, when the Mensheviks (i.e., the present liquidators) and all the "national organisations" were represented on the Central Committee. The answer given in our press is again tantamount to accusing Dan and Martov of spreading slander.

On instructions from the Central Committee, I must submit to the Executive Committee of the International Social-

ist Bureau the following practical proposal on this matter. We regard the liquidators' procedure as a specific method of political struggle used by people who have been expelled from the Party. We therefore harbour no hope that this matter can be "rectified" with the aid of moral precepts. But when bodies which screen the liquidators (the "O.C." and the Bund, for example, as well as Trotsky), and the numerous groups abroad (including Plekhanov) talk to us about "*unity*" with these liquidators, we make them the following proposal before the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau:

let them declare openly and publicly, without equivocation, whether they approve or disapprove of the liquidators' "campaign" on all the four points enumerated (to which we are sure the liquidators will add another 44).

If they disapprove, let the workers of Russia know it.

If they approve, let *all* groups that offer us "unity" or compromise with the liquidators elect a joint commission and formulate a reasoned, business-like, and open charge of dishonest conduct against certain members of our Party. We shall submit this charge to our Party congress and invite representatives of this commission of all groups which defend the liquidators to attend our congress and produce their evidence.

We deem it our duty to declare that if this is not done, it will strengthen the opinion, already being expressed in the ranks of our Party, that all groups that advocate "unity" with the liquidators are *tacitly* supporting the slanderers.

In the name of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia, we shall defend the organisation of our Party from the disruptors, and we shall recognise no means of defence other than those we have applied, and which I have enumerated above (not to mention the bourgeois law court, to which we shall resort at the first opportunity).

The report I have been instructed to make on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is finished. Permit me to sum up in two brief theses:

Formally, the situation is as follows. Our Party, which was restored at the January 1912 Conference in the teeth of the resistance from the liquidators' group, expelled that group.

After this, after two-and-a-half years of the movement, the overwhelming majority, of the class-conscious workers of Russia have approved of our Party line. We therefore have every reason to be convinced more firmly than ever that our line is correct, *and we shall not depart from it*. If the liquidators and the groups defending them want us to rescind the resolution expelling the liquidators from the Party, our Central Committee is prepared to submit a motion to that effect to our Party congress and to support it *only* on the terms I have mentioned.

Materially, i.e., in substance, the position is as follows. Russia is passing through a period of bourgeois revolutions, during which small and unstable groups of intellectuals are sometimes inclined to regard themselves as Social-Democrats, or to support the opportunist trend in the Social-Democratic movement, which our Party has been fighting against for the past twenty years (Economism in 1895-1902, Menshevism in 1903-08, and liquidationism in 1908-14). The experience of the August (1912) bloc of liquidators and its break-down have shown that the liquidators and their defenders are absolutely incapable of forming any kind of party or organisation. The genuine workers' Social-Democratic Party of Russia which, in spite of enormous difficulties, has already united eight-tenths of the class-conscious workers (counting only Social-Democrats) or seven-tenths (counting Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries) can be built up, and is being built up, only in the struggle against these groups.

Appendix

INSTRUCTIONS

I. NOTES PRIVÉES

On the question as to the connection existing between the figures on whether the majority or the minority of workers follow the lead of the Pravdists, or rather, are themselves Pravdists, in Russia, and the question of "unity", it should be noted:

1. If a party or group definitely and concretely advances a programme or tactics with which our Party cannot agree in principle, then the question of a majority is of course of no significance. If, for example, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (Left Narodniks), whose programme and tactics differ from ours, were to win over the majority of workers in Russia, that would not in the least induce us to depart from our line. The same applies to the straightforward and definite repudiation of the "underground" (= illegal Party) in present-day Russia.

However, certain Social-Democratic groups and some liquidators assert that there are no irreconcilable disagreements on principle between us. We are obliged to point out their inconsistency to these groups and individuals, when they refuse to submit to the majority.

2. We have been convinced of the correctness of our line on tactics and organisation primarily by our long years of acquaintance with the workers' Social-Democratic movement in Russia, and by our participation in it, as well as by our theoretical Marxist convictions. But we are of the opinion that the practical experience of the *mass* working-class movement is no less important than theory, and that this experience alone can serve as a serious *test* of our principles. "Theory, my friend, is grey, but the tree of life is eternally green" (Faust). Therefore, the fact that, after two-and-a-half

years of struggle against liquidationism and its allies, four-fifths of the class-conscious workers have expressed themselves in favour of Pravdism, strengthens our conviction that our line is correct and makes this conviction unshakable.

3. In Russia, nearly every group, or "faction" (to use the old terminology), accuses the other of being *not* a workers' group, but a bourgeois intellectualist group. We consider this accusation or rather argument, this reference to the social significance of a particular group, *extremely important in principle*. But precisely because we consider it extremely important, we deem it our duty not to make sweeping statements about the social significance of other groups, but to back *our* statements with *objective* facts. For the objective facts prove absolutely and irrefutably that Pravdism *alone* is a *workers'* trend in Russia, whereas liquidationism and Socialist-Revolutionism are *in fact* bourgeois intellectualist trends.

II. NOTES PRIVÉES

Should an attempt be made (whether by any member of the International Socialist Bureau, or by our opponents) to "dismiss" or *set aside* the evidence, the objective proofs, that we are the majority, then be sure to ask for the floor so as to make a formal statement on behalf of the entire delegation and enter a formal protest of the following nature:

We categorically protest against the statement (or hints, inferences, etc.) that our objective evidence as to the side which the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia are supporting, cannot be examined by the Executive Committee on the grounds that it has not verified them (or on the grounds that they are irrelevant to the question of unity). On the contrary, we consider that it is in the indubitable interest of the entire International, and in accordance with the will of the International Socialist Bureau, as clearly expressed in the resolution of the I.S.B. (December 1913), to receive the fullest, most precise, and documented information on the actual state of the working-class movement in Russia.

We are of the opinion that our opponents, who are aware of the December decision of the I.S.B., have failed to perform their duty in not yet having independently collected objective data on the working-class movement in Russia.

We declare that after Comrade Vandervelde's successful visit to Russia, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. could, through Comrade Vandervelde, quite legally have addressed an open letter to the editors of all the working-class (or would-be working-class) newspapers in Russia, and to all the members of the executives of all the legal workers' societies in Russia, for the purpose of obtaining from direct sources data showing how the class-conscious workers of Russia are divided into Pravdists, liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left Narodniks), and other trends.

Without such objective data, the subjective statements of the representatives of individual "groups" are entirely worthless.

III. NOT FOR THE REPORT

Judging from certain fragmentary statements by the liquidators at the Lettish Congress and from hints in the press, one of the fraudulent plans for "unity" they propose is that of a "general congress".

This plan, whose obvious object is to dupe credulous foreigners, is roughly as follows: either set up a "federated" organising committee for the purpose of convening a general congress, or "supplement" the Central Committee of our Party with representatives of one of the liquidationist organisations for the purpose of convening this congress.

In whatever the form it is presented, this plan is wholly unacceptable to us, and if it nevertheless comes up at the "conference" in Brussels, our delegation of the Central Committee must declare the following:

It is absolutely impossible for us to take any step towards a general congress or federation, or even towards the slightest rapprochement, until the liquidators' group complies with the terms we propose. For *unless* that group fulfils these terms, it will be impossible for us to place *the slightest* confidence in the liquidators' group which has been expelled

from the Party, and, in its paper, is daily continuing its disruptive activities.

If we placed any confidence in this group, it would *encourage* it to continue its disruptive work. On the basis of decisions of our congresses, conferences and our Central Committee, we demand the *cessation* of these activities of the liquidators as a *canditio sine qua non* of "peace".

The fact that the liquidators are shielded by groups or organisations which have not been formally expelled from the Party (for example, the Bund, or the Caucasian Regional Bureau, or the six deputies, etc.) does not in the least alter the case. As far as work in Russia is concerned, *only* one thing really matters, i.e., that this group of liquidators and their newspaper advocate flouting the will of the majority.

Let the Bund, Chkheidze's six deputies and the others—or the Caucasian Regional Committee, or Trotsky, or the O.C., or anybody else who desires rapprochement with us, first of all *induce* the liquidators' group to accept our terms, or else emphatically condemn it and break with it. Unless this is done, we *cannot take the slightest* step that might in any way indicate confidence in the liquidators' group.

Let those who really want to see Russian Social-Democracy united harbour no illusions and yield to no subjective assurances, promises and the like. There is one and only one way to unity, and that is to induce the minority which has left the illegal Party and is trying to thwart and disrupt its activities and the will of the majority, to abandon its present practices and *prove in deed* that it is willing to respect the will of the majority.

No direct or indirect encouragement of the liquidators' group in its *present* conduct, or attempts to inspire it with hopes of the possibility of "federation", "conciliation", a "general congress","rapprochement", or the like with that group, *as long as* it continues its present activities and refuses to submit *in deed* to the will of the majority, will lead to anything. The Party of the Social-Democratic workers in Russia, which unites four-fifths of the class-conscious workers, *will not allow* its will to be thwarted.

Let those groups or bodies which "assure" themselves and others that the liquidators are not so bad (the Bund,

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the O.C., the Caucasian Regional Committee) realise that we want not words but deeds. If they trust the liquidators let *them* organise *their own* congress with them, submit *our* terms to that congress, and induce the liquidators to give a favourable reply to these terms and faithfully carry them out. We shall wait and see the results; we shall wait and see their *actions*; we shall not believe promises.

Only after our terms have been faithfully complied with wiII a general congress, and steps towards it, be possible.

Our foreign socialist comrades are sometimes most sadly mistaken when they think that the cause of unity can be promoted by inspiring the liquidators with the hope that we will agree to co-operate with them even if they do *not* completely and radically change their conduct, and even if they do *not* submit to the will of the majority. Objectively, such tactics amount to helping, not the cause of unity, but the splitters.

Our terms constitute a draft of a *pacte d'unité*, and until this pact is signed by the liquidators and until they have carried it out in practice, there can be no talk of taking any steps towards a rapprochement.

IV

Re the demonstration of 4.4. 1914.* 1) I have ordered from St. Petersburg (in Popov's name) issue No. 18 of *Stoikaya Mysl* (Socialist-Revolutionary) and bourgeois papers for 4-5.4.1914. If it arrives it should be used to supplement the documents of the report.

We do *not* assert that the liquidators never issued leaflets. They had one in May *1913* (the Vienna leaflet); in 1914, the *St. Petersburg people say*, they had none. They are said to have had one about the strike.

But 4.4. 1914 is a typical case of the wrecking of illegal work.

If Plekhanov or Rubanovich wish to ask publicly whether we vote *for* their attendance, I would reply: "We would vote *against*, because Rubanovich is not a Social-Democrat, and Plekhanov *does not represent anything in Russia. But*

* See pp. 509-13 of this volume.—*Ed.*

since our report contains a direct attack on Plekhanov's group and Rubanovich's trend, we do not wish to vote against, and shall *abstain*.

Guarantees for the minority?— we may be asked.

"No, we can discuss no guarantees whatever either with the group of liquidators expelled from the Party, or concerning that group. We ourselves demand guarantees from the liquidators and their friends."

N.B. The general spirit of our terms: fight against departures from the *old*, *against a swing towards a new party*. *Nous ne marchons pas*! Cf. Axelrod on "party reform, *or rather on a party revolution*".*

N.B. ||| A person who writes like this is ridiculous, if he complains about a split!

Is an "*All-Russia* S.D.L.P." legitimate without the non-Russian nationalities?

It is, because it was an *All-Russia* party from 1898 to 1903 without the Poles and Letts, and from 1903 to 1906 without the Poles, Letts and the Bund!

We did not exclude the non-Russian nationalities. They themselves left on account of the liquidators. *Tant pis pour eux*!

Fight *with all our might* to have the Conference Minutes published. Submit a *written* protest in the event of refusal (in case of a general refusal, demand that our resolutions be published—*we shall publish them in any case*—as well as *counter-resolutions* (the Executive Committee may eliminate personal attacks)).

We have one aim—to make the liquidators+Bund+P.S.P.+Plekhanov *formulate* counter-resolutions and counter-proposals. As for us, we agree *to nothing*, and walk out,

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 175-86.—*Ed*.

promising to submit the "counter-proposals" of our dear comrades to our congress.

The most important thing is to emphasise (best of all in a reply) that our "terms" were *in the main published long ago by the workers*. I am sending Popov the appropriate issues of *Pravda*.

What procedure is desirable, from our point of view, for the conference in Brussels?

First, the reports of *all* organisations and groups—this will take up a fairly long time. Then brief comments followed by a *formulation* of *concrete* proposals made by *all* organisations and groups.

When all the participants at the conference have formulated their concrete proposals, each of them should express his opinion whether he considers *these* proposals a *basis* for possible further steps towards a rapprochement or talks on rapprochement, or, if he considers that impossible, he will submit *all* the proposals to his organisation.

Clearly, we, *in any case*, *shall not accept* the proposals of the liquidators, the Bund, Rosa and Plekhanov (as well as of Kautsky and Vandervelde), and shall submit them to our congress or conference.

Our task is only to make our terms clear, *make a note* of "their" terms, and walk out.

Are not our terms in the nature of an ultimatum?—we may be asked. They are not. We shall see what counter-proposals are made to us before saying whether we agree to continued talks on this basis or not (we should let *everyone* have his say, ask *everyone* for counter-proposals on *all* questions, and go away. *Voilà notre programme*!

Should Polish affairs be kept apart from Russian? I think we ought to be opposed to separation. We shall consult our Polish comrade on this.

Obviously, people will go out of their way to attack us for our "monstrous" demands. We should calmly refer to the resolutions of our conferences and meetings and the resolutions on unity adopted by the St. Petersburg, Moscow,

Caucasian and other comrades. I shall send a collection of them. We *sum up* the opinions of our organisations. If anybody chooses to disregard them, that is their business. *Nous n'y pouvons rien.*

According to the liquidators' newspaper, Vandervelde threw out a feeler in St. Petersburg as to whether we would agree to the Executive Committee acting, *not as mediator* but *as arbiter*, that is, as *supreme* "judge" in our disagreements.

The answer is this. When Bebel proposed this in 1905 our congress rejected it with thanks, declaring that we were an autonomous party."[217] I think today our congress will give the same reply. (Such, at any rate, is the opinion of the Central Committee.)

On "slanderous" affairs "they" will probably propose a *general withdrawal of all accusations*. Ask this to be put to the vote! *We are against*. We shall submit their proposal to our congress. (They will be in a proper mess if they make and carry through such a proposal.) [[We do not equate the guilt of a spreader of slander with the conduct of a person who has called a slanderer a slanderer.]]

Generally speaking, there is no doubt that "they" will all seek "half-way" and "conciliatory" formulas. We shall point out that this attempt was made with regard to us in January 1910 and with regard to the Letts in August 1912, and we *shall not repeat it*. Let the conference divide into two clear camps: those who consider rapprochement with the *present* liquidators possible, and those who turn down the idea of rapprochement unless the liquidators *radically change their tactics and behaviour*.

"Conciliatory" formulas should be *carefully recorded* (this is most important), then slightly criticised, and——everything rejected.

HOW THE WORKERS RESPONDED TO THE FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR GROUP IN THE DUMA[218]

It was natural that the *open* struggle against the liquidators should flare up more strongly than ever with the formation of the independent Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma. A more convenient and plausible excuse for the liquidators of the Party (and for their overt and covert defenders) to shout about "unity" could not be imagined. From the point of view of the man in the street, the whole issue would seem to centre on the question whether one or two Duma groups want to call themselves Social-Democratic. As to whose will one or the other group is carrying out, what decisions the majority of the class-conscious and organised workers have adopted, or what is the "underground"—the man in the street is incapable of grasping this, and indeed shrinks from doing so.

Therefore, if there was any point on which the liquidators could count on the sympathy of the man in the street and philistines, who do not care a hang about parties, it was precisely on the point of what is known as the "split" in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The outcries from philistines who would call themselves Social-Democrats have never been so loud and so piteous. The open nature of all these events made it much easier for the workers and the public at large to appraise them, and *Pravda*, in unison with the liquidators' newspaper, has called upon the class-conscious proletariat to express its opinion.

Letters, statements and resolutions from workers have begun to fill the columns of both newspapers.

Many months have passed since the independent Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma was formed (at the end of October 1913). The campaign of resolutions in the respective newspapers, in favour of the Six (Russian Social-Democratic Labour group) or of the Seven (the liquidators) is now over.

The question arises, what are the results of this campaign?

On this point we have first of all the following statement by Mr. L. Martov in *Nasha Zarya* No. 10-11:

> "What," writes Mr. L. Martov, "was the proletariat's attitude towards the split in the Duma group which it had come to look up as a united whole? It is difficult [!?] to judge of this from the figures given in the press. Over ten thousand workers expressed their opinion on this question in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* and in *Za Pravdu*. Of this number, *slightly more than half* [italics ours] approved of the way the Six had acted. But the significance of this preponderance is diminished [listen to this!] by the fact that opposition to the split and, consequently, support for the majority in the Social-Democratic Duma group, was expressed by numerous Party groups, including several which unite a relatively large number of workers." (*Nasha Zarya*, 1913, No. 10-11, p. 97.)

So much for Mr. Martov's argument, which for the thousandth time glaringly reveals the truly Burenin methods[219] he employs in distorting the truth! "Slightly more than half"! Can anything be more evasive? Fifty-one and ninety-nine out of a hundred would both be "slightly more than half".

How can the preponderance be "diminished" by the fact that there were numerous Party groups? In the first place, no figures are given. The term "numerous" can be interpreted in whatever way one pleases. One would think Mr. Martov had deliberately invented the term in order to *conceal* the truth. Secondly, *and most important*: if it is true that numerous Party groups are supported by a *minority* of the workers, then it is obvious that these groups are *fictitious*, for only the totally uninformed or inattentive reader will believe Mr. L. Martov's suggestion that it is possible for a *non-fictitious* group to *fail to collect* in a newspaper *the opinions of all* the workers it represents on an important and burning issue.

Mr. L. Martov has overreached himself. He has not only admitted that the *majority* of the workers have condemned the *liquidationist* section of the Duma Social-Democratic

group, i.e., the Seven, but also that the liquidators claim to have groups which are actually *fictitious* and are *not* supported by the workers.

While acknowledging defeat, Mr. Martov, by his reference to fictitious "groups", tried to conceal, *à la* Burenin, the *magnitude* of this defeat. And that is the crux of the matter. As regards the magnitude of this defeat, *exact figures* were published and reported to Martov's friends at the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau *as far back as* December 1 (14), 1913! Why did not the liquidators ever say *a single word* in the press about these figures? Was it because their conscience was not clear?

These figures gave the results up to November 20, 1913. Only the *signatures* attached to pronouncements by workers were taken, i.e., data of the most precise kind, which have *never* been challenged. These figures show 4,850 signatures in favour of the Six, and only 2,539 (of which 1,086 came from the Bund and 636 from the Caucasus) in favour of the liquidators, i.e., of the Seven.

Now ask yourselves how the methods of a writer should be qualified who tries to assure the public that the preponderance of the opponents of liquidationism is "diminished" by the fact that there were "numerous" (fictitious) groups, which *together* succeeded in obtaining all over Russia the support of only *one-third* of the workers who expressed their opinions!

Below we give the number of *signatures* attached to definitely expressed resolutions published in both newspapers during the *whole period* of the campaign (which ended at the beginning of January);

	Number of signatures to published resolutions and statements		
	In favour of the Six (of the Party)	In favour of the Seven (of the liquidators)	Total
St. Petersburg	5,003	621	5,624
The rest of Russia . . .	1,511	559	2,070
The Caucasus	208	719	927
The Bund	—	1,086	1,086
Total . .	6,722	2,985	9,707

The liquidators have so corrupted their readership with their incredibly brazen reiteration of false, absolutely unsupported and absolutely unverifiable statements, that we cannot stress the importance of the above-quoted figures too strongly. They have been taken from both rival newspapers, and any literate person can verify our calculation, and make his own.

These figures give us a highly illuminating picture of the state of Party affairs among Marxists in Russia. No other political party in Russia can show, for the whole period of the counter-revolution in general and for 1913 in particular, a similar *open and mass opinion poll of all its members* on a most important issue of Party life. None of the legalised parties in Russia, none of the wealthy liberal and democratic parties, which have a host of intellectualist forces and all sorts of publications at their command, has done as much as the party of the working class, the party of propertyless proletarians, who have been driven underground and maintain their newspaper with the kopeks they collect.

The workers' party has set *all* parties in Russia an example of *how* the *masses* of the rank-and-file members should be drawn into an open and all-round discussion of controversial issues. The liberals and philistines of all parties, of all ages and of all types, are fond of bewailing the "splits" in the ranks of the Social-Democrats. These good souls do not realise that it is impossible to carry out the will of the majority without a struggle; and unless the will of the majority is carried out there is no use talking about the Party spirit, or even of organised political action in general.

By "unity", foolish people mean a "system" under which thirteen members of the Duma act *in defiance of* the will of the *majority* of the organised and class-conscious Marxist workers of Russia; by a "split" they mean the formation, by the six Duma members, of an independent group acting *in harmony* with this majority of workers, *with the purpose* of carrying out its will.

Do not these foolish people cut a ridiculous figure? Are they not contemptible?

It should now be clear to everybody, except to those who are out to deceive the workers, that the much bruited "unity" of the thirteen deputies (about which the liquidators and

conciliators talk so much) was actually the *flouting* of the will of the Party, *mockery* of the will of the majority of the workers.

And vice versa. Consider the matter from another angle. No person in his right mind has ever attempted to question the fact that in the summer of 1913 a conference of Marxists (*far from open*) was held, whose decision, endorsed by the leading body of the Party, became the Party's will and decision. This decision demanded that the Six should act independently.* You vilify this conference, Messrs. liquidators and conciliators? You call it a circle, a packed meeting, a piece of fiction, etc.? Very well! But your abuse only expresses your impotence, for the objective facts are indisputable: by a decision of this "circle", two-thirds of the class-conscious workers of Russia came out to the man *in favour* of the conference, *in favour* of carrying out its will.

This is precisely what we call a *party*, you gentlemen who babble about "unity", but, by "unity", mean *permitting* the liquidators to *flout* the will of the Party.

Note that with two rival dailies there could be no question of anybody trying to prevent even a single class-conscious worker from expressing his opinion if he desired to do so. As it turned out, less than a third supported the liquidators; and of the total number of votes cast for the liquidators, more than half came from the Bund and the Caucasus. Moreover, the figures we have quoted contain hardly any *signatures* of Lettish workers (there were 98 signatures for the Six and 70 for the liquidators, whereas, among the Lettish workers who voted on this question without giving their signatures, 863 voted for the Six and 347 for the liquidators); nor do they contain the votes of over 800 Polish Social-Democratic workers who also voted for the Six but did not give their signatures (in the same way, about 400 supporters of the Left wing voted for the liquidators).

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* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 424-25.—*Ed.*

WHAT IS SHOWN BY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TWO GROUPS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER

We cannot dwell here upon the *political* content of these activities. This most interesting question of how the activities of the Six *have gained* from the needs, demands, views and will of the *majority* of the workers now being proclaimed from the Duma rostrum must regretfully be left for another occasion. We shall merely state briefly that in the speeches they delivered on March 4, 1914, Badayev and Malinovsky, spokesmen of the *Six* in the Duma, formulated *for the first time* the question of freedom of the press, *not* in a liberal manner, but in a manner worthy of the proletariat, whereas the liquidators, both in the literary world and in the columns of their newspapers, as well as in the speeches delivered in the Duma by their Seven floundered on this question in a purely liberal manner. One may read in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* of as recent a date as March 13, on p. 2 of that issue, an argument to the effect that "advertising the illegal press can only weaken the workers' struggle for their legal press". How important it was in *principle* to form an independent Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma to combat shameful renegade statements and opinions of the kind just quoted, has already been stressed in this volume and will be stressed again more than once.

For the moment, we shall undertake the more modest task of drawing our readers' attention to the "external", if one may so express it, evidence showing *what* the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma at once became *as distinct* from the seven liquidators.

Each Duma group publishes in its newspaper the financial reports of its treasurer, showing the sums that have passed through its hands. These sums, designated for the relief of comrades in prison or in exile, for aid to strikers in different factories and industries, and for various other needs of the working-class movement, reveal to us a number of aspects of *working-class life*; they strikingly reveal—by exact, indisputable and impartial figures—what *links* each of the groups in the Duma has with the working-class movement.

In both newspapers and in both Duma groups, the latest report of this kind covers the period *up to* January 21, 1914. Thus, we have reports for only *three* months of the period during which the two groups have existed separately, viz. from the end of October to the end of January. The following is a summary of the reports of the two groups for the quarter mentioned:

Collections handled by the Duma groups
(*in rubles*)

	Total collections	From *non-*workers	From workers	Number of workers' groups
1) By the R.S.D.L. group . .	6,173.00	71.31	6,101.69	719
2) By the S.D. group	2,212.78	765.80	1,446.98	94*

These bare figures give us a remarkably striking picture of the *organisational* contacts and of the whole life of the two Duma groups. The number of workers' groups which addressed the Duma group of liquidators during the quarter is almost *one-eighth* of the number that addressed the Duma group of Party men.

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* The above figures cover the period only up to January 21, 1914 (from the time the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group was formed, i.e., from the end of October 1913).

We consider it our duty to quote fuller figures from the calculations made by Comrade V.A.T. for the whole period beginning from the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group to June 1914.

The following are the figures (in rubles) of the collections (for relief for comrades in prison or in exile, etc.), which, according to reports in the Marxist and liquidationist newspapers, were handled by the respective Duma groups between October 1913 and June 6, 1914:

	Total collections	From *non-*workers	From workers	Number of workers' groups
By the R.S.D.L. group	12,891.24	828.63	12,062.61	*1,295*
By the S.D. group	6,114.87	2,828.04	3,286.83	*215*

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group received from non-workers six per cent of the total sum collected, whereas the liquidationist ("S.D.") group received 46 per cent from this source. The number of workers' groups that addressed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group is 85.7 per cent of the total (1,295 out of 1,510), while the number that addressed the "S.D." group is 14.3 per cent of the total.

On the other hand, the amount received by the liquidationist group from *non*-workers* is *ten times* as much as that received by the R.S.D.L. group from this source: 765 rubles as against 71 rubles. Collections from *non*-workers* received by the Party men are *one* per cent of the total sum collected (71 rubles out of 6,173 rubles). Collections from this source received by the liquidators are *thirty-four* per cent of the total sum collected (765 rubles out of 2,213 rubles).

These figures enable the general public, who are unfamiliar with the activities of the Duma groups, to weigh up exactly and give thorough thought to facts which people familiar with the life of the groups have gleaned from a thousand and one "trifles" of everyday life, namely:

that the liquidationist group (the Seven) is a group without workers.

that the liquidationist group has thirty times as many contacts with *non*-worker circles than the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group.

These facts were commented on long ago and from different angles. The liberal newspaper *Rech* rightly called the liquidationist group a group of "intellectuals", and the entire liberal press has endorsed this over and over again. Plekhanov long ago pointed out that the liquidators have taken into their ranks quite a number of petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, in addition to Mr. Potresov. The numerous contributors to liberal *newspapers* in the ranks of the liquidators and vice versa (Enzis, Yegorov, S. Novich, Y. Smirnov, Antid Oto, Nevedomsky, Lvov-Rogachevsky, Cherevanin,[220] and many others) have been named by *Put Pravdy*.

In point of social significance, the liquidators are essentially a branch of the liberal-bourgeois party, whose aim is to instil into the proletarian midst the ideas of liberal-labour policy and to *flout* the will of the majority of the organised and class-conscious workers of Russia.

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* These include collections from private persons, from abroad, and from students.

CLARITY FIRST AND FOREMOST!

(ON THE QUESTION OF UNITY)

1. PEOPLE HOLDING TWO OPINIONS

Can people obviously incapable of taking serious problems seriously, themselves he taken seriously? It is difficult to do so, comrades, very difficult! But the question which certain people cannot treat seriously is in itself so serious that it will do no harm to examine even patently frivolous replies to it.

This serious question is that of the unity of the Russian working-class movement. Contributors to *Yedinstvo* are people incapable of treating this question seriously.

Here is the first example. In issue No. 4, *Yedinstvo* has published an interview with deputy Chkheidze. The editors of *Yedinstvo* have expressed the hope that this interview will help "to unite the Russian working class". Very good. But let us see what Chkheidze has said about the organisational and tactical questions that interest the Russian workers.

Chkheidze has expressed himself as follows: "I am personally in full agreement with the views on tactics and organisation lately expounded in the press by Comrade An."

What views has Comrade An lately expounded in the press?

What, for example, has he said about the views of the Luchists, *alias* the liquidators?

An, a prominent Menshevik and opponent of Pravdism, "has lately expounded in the press" the view that "the liquidators are steering a course towards reforms", that their

views on the "underground", strikes, "uncurtailed slogans", and so forth, are inseparably connected with their general reformism; that if the workers heeded their advice, the workers in the provinces would have to refrain from organising strikes, and so forth.

These views have indicated that An is beginning to free himself from captivity to the liquidators, and we have welcomed this.

Now Chkheidze says that he is "in full" agreement with these views. We are very glad to hear it. An understanding of the nature of liquidationism and emphatic renunciation of it is the beginning of wisdom, is it not? And we would be ready to welcome deputy Chkheidze's long-delayed awakening to the role played by liquidationism as a trend.

But serious questions should be treated seriously, and it will be useful therefore to examine, not only Chkheidze's statements in *Yedinstvo*, but his actions as well.

The reply of the Social-Democratic Duma group (of which deputy Chkheidze is chairman) to the terms of unity proposed by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group might have been of vast importance to the *cause* of unity.

That reply appeared not very long ago in *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, issue No. 2, in the form of an appeal to the workers.

In this appeal to the workers, deputy Chkheidze and his fellow-thinkers reply, among others, to the question of their attitude towards liquidationism as represented by the latter's organ, at that time *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*.

> "As for the Marxist *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*," deputy Chkheidze and his friends write, "our attitude towards it can be defined as *complete solidarity with this trend*."

Thus, in an official appeal to the workers, deputy Chkheidze has announced his "*complete solidarity*" with the trend of the liquidationist newspaper, and in the interview published in *Yedinstvo* he has stated that he is in "*full agreement*" with the views of An, who has criticised this newspaper as an organ of the reformists who are hampering the present-day working-class movement.

Is such a thing permissible? Does this indicate a serious attitude towards a serious question? Has deputy Chkheidze anything serious to say on the question of unity with the liquidators, considering that in the space of two months he has contrived to express two diametrically opposite views on the liquidators?

But, we may be told, when the "Open Reply of the Social-Democratic Group" was being drafted, deputy Chkheidze was probably not yet aware of An's views, and was therefore unable as yet to appreciate the significance of liquidationism.

Alas, this will not be in keeping with the truth, for An's article was published long before the "Open Reply" appeared.

Another thing that must be borne in mind is this.

Several days after An's articles appeared, L. M. in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, came out strongly in defence of the liquidators against An's criticism. And what about Chkheidze? Did he utter a single word in defence of views with which he now appears to be in "full agreement"? No. Chkheidze kept quiet, while deputy Tulyakov, a fellow-member of his group, chose that very moment to come forward as publisher of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*....

We repeat: is it permissible for the Chairman of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma to adopt such an attitude towards a question that is agitating the broad masses of the workers and has been repeatedly discussed at meetings, conferences, etc.? Has Chkheidze made any contribution to the solution of the problem of unity? Is this not an attempt to obscure the question of unity by means of parochial diplomatic considerations designed to save the liquidators?

This is the common failing of our "uniters": they cannot give a clear answer to questions of the day; they do not themselves know what they want.

One thing is clear from their writings: they want to save the liquidators, and must therefore avoid clarity and precision in the formulation and solution of problems.

To the liquidators clarity and precision are the most dangerous things at the present time. Other articles in *Yedinstvo* bring this home to us still more forcibly.

But the workers want clarity, and they will get it, for they want to build up the unity of their organisation, not on the basis of diplomacy and equivocation, but on the basis of a precise appraisal of the political significance of the different "trends". People who have two or even more opinions on this question are poor counsellors.

Trudovaya Pravda No. 30,
July 2, 1914

Published according to
the text in *Trudovaya Pravda*

THE RESULTS OF WORKERS' PRESS DAY SUMMED UP

FROM THE REPORT PUBLISHED IN *PUT PRAVDY*

It is only now that we are able to sum up some of the results of Workers' Press Day of April 22.[221]

The second anniversary of the newspaper *Pravda* became a day of review of the Marxist forces.

On that day all class-conscious workers came to the assistance of their working-class newspapers, and hundreds and thousands of rubles were collected kopek by kopek.

The latest report on sums collected on Workers' Press Day was published only on June 14, in issue No. 15 of *Trudovaya Pravda*. Press Day lasted nearly two months.

"Better late than never," many comrades wrote, contributing their mite after April 22.

Resolutions received by the editors have been so numerous that it has been impossible to list them all, let alone publish them.

But they have had the desired effect. They have convinced us that we are on the right road, and that the vast majority of the workers have accepted the slogans of consistent Marxism.

As is well known, the liquidators proclaimed the second anniversary of the newspapers of the *Pravda* trend as Press Day for their own newspaper, too. They raised a hullaballoo at the time to prove that they had a right to participate in Press Day precisely on April 22. Already at that time they proposed federation, an equal sharing of all the money collected. April 22 showed that the liquidationist newspaper had spoken too soon about "federation" and "equality".

The workers of St. Petersburg flatly rejected the proposal for "general collections". This call on the part of the liqui-

dationist newspaper evoked a certain response only among a section of the students, and in a few factories in the provinces.

The sums obtained by general collections hardly affected the total amount of Press Day collections. *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, issue No. 34, for June 13, already attempted to compare the collections made for that newspaper with those made for *Put Pravdy*. We say an attempt, because the comparison made by *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* cannot possibly be regarded as final and complete. If we wanted to obtain such a complete comparison from *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* we should have to wait till doomsday, for it is greatly to the liquidators' advantage to quote general figures without going into a detailed analysis of the amounts, and without ascertaining the sources they came from.

Consequently, we must ourselves undertake the task of analysing the liquidators' reports.

Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta has arrived at highly gratifying conclusions, namely, (1) that the Pravdists have the backing of somewhat under three-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia, and (2) that the Pravdists predominate strongly only in St. Petersburg, whereas in the provinces the reverse is the case; there the supporters of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* predominate.

First of all, we must make a slight addition to the figures of our total collections which *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* has quoted from *Trudovaya Pravda* of June 11. In that issue, the total figures were given up to June 1, but as *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* gives the total of its collections up to June 10, we must, to make a fair comparison, add the amounts collected from June 1 to June 10, reported in issue No. 15, of June 14. Moreover, the figures up to June 10 were not quite accurate, as certain small contributions received from the provinces were included in the figures for St. Petersburg.

After making these corrections we obtain the following final amounts, which we shall quote in the course of this article.

Collected in St. Petersburg	R. 11,680.96
" in the provinces	R. 6,325.28
" abroad	R. 104.97
Total	R. *18,111.21*

Corresponding figures for "Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta"

Collected in St. Petersburg	R.	4,446.13
" in the provinces	R.	6,409.12
" abroad	R.	946.55
Total	R.	*11,801.80*

At first sight the difference is not very great and would seem to show that *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* has the backing of two-fifths of the class-conscious workers. But as soon as these figures are distributed by source, namely, contributions from workers and non-workers, the picture changes completely.

The country-wide response to the appeal by *Put Pravdy* on Workers Press Day was: *1,915 workers' groups, which collected R.16,163.71.*

The response to the appeal by *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* was: *588 workers' groups, which collected R.5,651.78.*

From non-workers, *Put Pravdy* received R.1,842.53, whereas *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* received from this source R.6,062.02, i.e., more than it received from workers.

These figures on the collections made for Workers' Press Day reveal much the same thing as the figures of the collections and groups during the period commencing January 1,1914. Of the total number of workers' groups which responded on Workers' Press Day, only a little over one-fifth responded to the liquidationist newspaper's appeal, this despite the liquidators' efforts to change the balance of forces in their favour on the eve of Workers' Press Day. In this they failed. Four-fifths of the class-conscious workers support Pravdism. This fact, deduced from the figures covering the entire period of two years that the legal newspapers have been in existence, was also *confirmed* on Workers' Press Day.

Let us now examine the situation in St. Petersburg and in the provinces. In St. Petersburg the number of collections (groups) made for the Pravdist newspaper amounted to *1,276*, and the sum collected totalled R.10,762.46. The corresponding figures for the liquidators' newspaper were *224* and R.2,306.27. The difference is so striking that even the liquidators do not dare deny that the Pravdists predom-

inate among the most advanced, energetic, organised and politically experienced proletariat of the capital city.

But they claim the provinces.

"In the provinces," wrote *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, "we see the reverse of things in St. Petersburg. In the provinces *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* alone collected *more* than the Pravdist organ."

This is a sample of *deception*, which we strongly advise our comrades, the workers, to examine very closely. What is true is true: in the provinces the Pravdists collected R.6,325.28 and the liquidators R.6,409.12. More, is it not? But please look at the following figures.

In the provinces, the Pravdist newspaper received *R.5,401.25* from *639* workers' groups and R.924.03 from non-workers.

But the liquidationist newspaper received *R.3,345.51* from *364* workers' groups and *R.3,004.89* from 78 groups of non-workers and from individuals.

Yes, in the provinces the liquidators undoubtedly *predominate*, only not among the workers, but among wealthy "friends and sympathisers".

The liquidators did a very simple thing. To prove that they "*predominate*" in the provinces they lumped the workers' kopeks with the large sums contributed by their friends among the bourgeoisie, and thereby "squashed" the Pravdists!

A clever move, perhaps, but in doing so, good gentlemen, you have not proved your preponderance in the provinces, but merely that you are no less divorced from the workers in the provinces than you are from the St. Petersburg workers.

What counts in establishing a *working-class* press and a *working-class* body is not big contributions from wealthy "friends", but the activities of the workers themselves.

The fact that in building up a working-class newspaper and a working-class body the liquidators received nearly as much from non-workers as they did from workers (R.5,115 and R.5,651) is, in our opinion, not an advantage, but a shortcoming; it is only further proof of the close connection between liquidationism and bourgeois intellectualist circles.

We, on our part, are proud that our "cast-iron reserve" consists almost entirely of kopeks from workers who, in the course of six weeks, collected over R.16,000 for their newspaper.

How was this sum made up? Workers of which trades and areas helped in one degree or another to establish a consistently Marxist newspaper?

The answer to this is given in the following table, a document highly characteristic of the present state of the working-class movement. This table shows the sums received by *Put Pravdy* from various industries (trades). The list is headed by the metalworkers, of course. Greetings to you, comrades!

	St. Petersburg		Provinces	
	Groups	Amount (rubles)	Groups	Amount (rubles)
Metalworkers	393	5,304.95	108	1,319.02
Woodworkers	116	1,014.73	24	172.10
Printers	113	966.34	37	236.47
Railwaymen	24	165.93	34	345.24
Shop assistants	59	238.11	18	132.76
Inn employees	27	107.58	3	68.73
Tailors	49	203.21	28	245.82
Tanners	36	271.50	5	23.89
Electricians	31	275.35	6	39.76
Textile workers	41	303.88	24	130.32
Municipal employees (tramway, etc.)	32	340.93	11	132.14
Builders	12	57.14	4	15.71
Plumbers	10	27.10	1	3.00
Gold- and silversmiths	29	128.45	2	16.50
Bakers	39	124.06	11	28.60
Miners	—	—	14	71.44
Workers' organisations	9	79.97	9	112.04
House painters	12	50.20	3	14.60
Sausage makers	8	31.45	2	5.63
Chemical workers	22	92.59	6	32.04
Coach builders	16	78.62	1	5.00
Confectioners	12	79.76	3	14.25
Pasteboard makers	5	13.45	—	—
Tobacco workers	12	83.63	—	—
Baku oil workers	—	—	12	83.98
Salaried employees (office and other)	38	273.11	18	123.65
Exiles	—	—	23	67.72
Servants (janitors)	12	27.90	—	—
Miscellaneous and unspecified	99	422.52	232	1,960.84
Total	1,276	10,762.46	639	5,401.25

ST. PETERSBURG

During the past few years St. Petersburg has been at the head of the working-class movement. While the proletariat in some (now few) parts of the provinces cannot yet rouse themselves from the lethargy of 1907-11, and in other parts are only just taking the first steps to fall into line with the St. Petersburg proletariat, the latter has developed tremendous activity and, like a delicate barometer, has reacted to all events of concern to the working-class movement. The St. Petersburg proletariat is in the forefront. Even *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* will scarcely attempt to deny this.

And this is how the St. Petersburg proletariat responded to Workers' Press Day.

Collections for *Put Pravdy* were made here by 1,276 groups, which gave R.10,762.46; for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* collections were made by 224 groups, which gave R.2,306.27.

Counting by the number of groups, the liquidators in the working-class movement in St. Petersburg are supported not by one-fifth but by one-seventh of the class-conscious workers; their collections amount only to a little over one-sixth of those made by the Pravdists.

These figures show that the bulk of the St. Petersburg proletariat, which stands at the head of the working-class movement, has turned away from the liquidators and supports the old and uncurtailed slogans.

Even among the printers, that sole refuge of the liquidators among the organised workers, nearly five times as much was collected for the Pravdist press as was collected for the liquidationist press (R.966.34 for *Put Pravdy*, as against R.201.21 for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*).

The same thing is shown by the collections among the metalworkers. Here, *Put Pravdy* collected R.5,075.49 as against R.1,283.66 collected for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, i.e., four times as much; during the union's existence this was confirmed by the constant defeats of the liquidators at elections, general meetings, etc.

Among other trades in St. Petersburg, the position of the liquidators is still worse. Woodworkers, for example, con-

tributed R.1,014.73 to *Put Pravdy*, but only *R.38.14** to *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*.

The liquidationist press has often proclaimed from the house-tops that only the most ignorant masses, who do not understand serious questions, follow the lead of *Pravda*. In the recently published June issue of *Nasha Zarya*, the overzealous liquidator, Mr. A. Gorev, asserts that the collections and resolutions in support of *Pravda* "come from those sections of the workers who, for the first time in the history of the Russian working-class movement, are being drawn into the sphere of interests and controversies of Social-Democracy"—from the midst of the ignorant, non-class-conscious youth and backward workers.

Do the liquidators dare include in those "sections" the metalworkers and printers, who have always been in the forefront of the working-class movement? Mr. Gorev, of course, has no evidence whatever in support of his argument, which is based entirely on subjective assumptions. Well, let him keep to them. We have however proved with the aid of irrefutable figures that even among advanced trades like the printers and metalworkers of St. Petersburg, the liquidators have the support of barely one-fifth of the workers.

Lack of space prevents us from quoting the comparative figures of the collections in all the other trades. We shall therefore quote only the total figures for these trades.

In addition to the trades already enumerated, *Put Pravdy* received R.3,700 from workers, and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* R.500.00 (in round figures). These sums were contributed by shop assistants, tailors, tanners, textile workers, bakers, and other workers engaged in small industry.

Here, too, *Put Pravdy* received seven times as much as *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* did. Not a single trade contributed more to *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* than it did to *Put Pravdy*. Even office and other salaried employees collected R.273.11 for *Put Pravdy*, whereas for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* the office employees and shop assistants

* We ask *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* in advance to excuse us if, in examining its reports, we omitted one or two workshops whose trades were not specified. This would not have happened had *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* tabulated its figures in greater detail.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

combined (figures quoted by *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*) collected R.262.32. The shop assistants collected R.238.11 for *Put Pravdy*.

In addition, we give below a list of the factories that were most active in collecting funds for their workers' newspaper:

1) the Novy Aivaz Works—R.791.37 (for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*—R.464.67); 2) the Putilov Works—R.335.46 (for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*—R.59.38); 3) the St. Petersburg Metalworks—R.273.36 (for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*—R.116.92); 4) the Tubing Works—R.243.80 (for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*—R.113.41); 5) Siemens-Schuckert—R.229.26; 6) Erickson—R.228.82 (for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*—R.55.13); 7) Perviainen—R.183.93; 8) the Old Lessner Works—R.168.30; 9) the Franco-Russian Works—R.148.82; 10) the New Lessner Works—R.116.25; 11) the Cable Works—R.112.62; 12) Siemens-Halske—R.104.30; 13) the Obukhov Works—R.91.02; 14) the Stationery Office—R.79.12 (for *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*—R.54.00).[222]

Trudovaya Pravda No. 30 and 31, July 2 and 3, 1914

Published according to the text in *Trudovaya Pravda*

THE POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION AT THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

The fact that the Polish Social-Democratic opposition at the Brussels Conference sided with the liquidators came as a surprise to many Party people and as a shock to all of them. The Polish Social-Democratic opposition was believed to be as close to the Pravdists as the Letts were. And suddenly we and the Letts at their post against the liquidators, while the Polish Social-Democrats played us false!

What is the reason?

The reason is that there are two trends among the Polish Social-Democrats: some of them want to remove Tyszka and Rosa Luxemburg in order to continue Tyszka's policy themselves. This is a policy of unprincipled diplomacy and "playing" between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, between the Party and its liquidators. Voting for one side today, for another tomorrow. Under the guise of "impartiality", betrayal of all in turn, driving a bargain and securing "advantages and privileges" for oneself. The clauses of a federative character in the Stockholm (1906) agreement between the Polish and Russian Social-Democrats[223] were a useful weapon for this nasty policy, which Tyszka and Rosa Luxemburg were conducting with such consummate skill.

The other trend stands for a complete breakaway from the liquidators, from federalism, from "playing" the role of "pendulum" between the two conflicting sides: it stands for a sincere and close alliance with the Pravdists, with the Party.

In Brussels the former trend among the Polish Social-Democrats won the day. As a result, there can obviously be nothing but absolute mistrust on our part towards the Polish Social-Democrats. The future will show whether the other

trend will succeed in rallying itself and in raising a clear, precise and definite banner of a consistent, high-principled policy, a policy aimed, not only against the group of Tyszka but against the essence of Tyszka's methods. Needless to say, the unity of the Polish Social-Democratic proletariat is possible only on the basis of such a policy.

The forthcoming steps towards such unity will definitely reveal the true state of affairs among the Polish Social-Democrats and will thereby determine our own attitude towards them.

Written after July 7 (20), 1914

First published in 1937 in the *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

Published according to the manuscript

REPLY TO THE ARTICLE IN *LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG*[224]

Leipziger Volkszeitung, issue No. 157 for July 11, 1914, published an article over the signature of Z. L. entitled "On the Question of Unity in Russia". The writer's lack of objectivity compels us to draw the attention of the German comrades to certain facts. For the sake of graphic illustration, we quote the following table which was published in *Pravda*.*

Collections for Marxist (Pravdist) and liquidationist newspapers in St. Petersburg from January 1 to May 13, 1914

	Pravdists		Liquidators	
	Number of collections	Sum collected	Number of collections	Sum collected
Workers' groups . .	2,873	18,934.10	671	5,296.12
Total from non-workers	713	2,650.01	453	6,759.77
including:				
Student and youth groups	54	650.92	45	630.22
Groups of "adherents", "friends", etc.	42	458.82	54	2,450.60
Other groups	33	125.29	30	186.12
Individuals.	531	1,046.62	266	1,608.32
Unspecified	43	318.57	24	175.34
From abroad	10	49.79	34	1,709.17
Total . .	3,586	21,584.11	1,124	12,055.89

* See pp. 364-65 of this volume.—*Ed.*

1. We gave the exact dates for which these figures were calculated (from January I to May 13, 1914). The liquidators gave no dates. Would it be honest, in such a case, to compare facts that are incomparable and unauthentic?

2. The liquidators themselves stated and published in the press (*Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 34) that all their groups, i.e., not the workers' groups alone, totalled 948. Our statistics, on the other hand, specified that the figures 2,873 and 671 referred to workers' groups *alone*. The total number of groups *is given* in our table, and that number *does not coincide* with the number of workers' groups. Is it honest to pass this over in silence?

3. Our newspaper reported that we gave the contributions made by the workers' groups for both newspapers and that we had no information about recurrent contributions by the same groups. The information was the same for both newspapers. It is absolutely incomprehensible how any honest critic could discover an "error" here!

4. We quoted *parallel* figures, that is, figures covering the same period for both newspapers, and the information for both papers was tabulated *by the same method*.

The liquidators quoted no parallel figures at all, thus violating the most elementary and well-known rules of statistical work. Anyone who is interested in this question can easily get both newspapers and verify our information.

We are sure that no open-minded person can call the methods used by the "critic" Z. L. honest.

Leipziger Volkszeitung No. 165,
for July 21, 1914
Signed: Editors of *Pravda*

Published according to
the text in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*
Translated from the German

B L A N K

PUT PRAVDY

PUT PRAVDY

PUT PRAVDY

NOTES

[1] The article "*Critical Remarks on the National Question*" was written by Lenin in October-December 1913 and published the same year in the Bolshevik legal journal *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 10, 11 and 12.

The article was preceded by lectures on the national question which Lenin delivered in a number of Swiss cities—Zurich, Geneva, Lausanne and Berne—in the summer of 1913.

In the autumn of 1913 Lenin made a report on the national question at the "August" ("Summer") Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers. A resolution on the report drafted by Lenin was adopted. After the Conference Lenin started work on his article "Critical Remarks on the National Question". p. 17

[2] *Severnaya Pravda* (*Northern Truth*)—one of the names of the newspaper *Pravda*. *Pravda*—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg. Founded on the initiative of the St. Petersburg workers in April 1912.

Pravda was a popular working-class newspaper, published with money collected by the workers themselves. A wide circle of worker-correspondents and worker-publicists formed around the newspaper. Over eleven thousand correspondence items from workers were published in a single year. *Pravda* had an average circulation of 40,000, with some issues running into 60,000 copies.

Lenin directed *Pravda* from abroad, where he was living. He wrote for the paper almost daily, gave instructions to the editorial board and rallied the Party's best literary forces around the newspaper.

Pravda was subjected to constant police persecution. During the first year of its existence it was confiscated forty-one times, and thirty-six legal actions were brought against its editors, who served prison sentences totalling forty-seven and a half months. In the course of two years and three months *Pravda* was closed down eight times by the tsarist government, but reissued under new names: *Rabochaya Pravda*, *Severnaya Pravda*, *Pravda Truda*, *Za Pravdu*, *Proletarskaya Pravda*, *Put Pravdy*, *Rabochy*, and *Trudovaya Pravda*. On July 8 (21), 1914, on the eve of the First World War, the paper was closed down.

Publication was not resumed until after the February Revolution. Beginning from March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* appeared as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin joined the editorial board on April 5 (18), on his return from abroad, and took over the

paper's management. In July-October 1917 *Pravda* changed its name frequently owing to persecution by the Provisional Government, appearing successively as *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy,* and *Rabochy Put*. On October 27 (November 9) the newspaper began to appear under its old name—*Pravda*. p. 19

[3] *Zeit* (*Time*)—a weekly, organ of the Bund, published in Yiddish in St. Petersburg from December 20, 1912 (January 2, 1913) to May 5 (18), 1914. p. 19

[4] *Dzvin* (*The Bell*)—a monthly legal nationalist journal of Menshevik trend published in the Ukrainian language in Kiev from January 1913 to the middle of 1914. p. 19

[5] *The Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals and organised pogroms. p. 20

[6] *Russkoye Slovo* (*Russian Word*)—a daily, published in Moscow from 1895 (the first trial issue appeared in 1894) to July 1918. Formally non-party, the paper defended the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie from a moderate-liberal platform. News was given a wide coverage in the paper which was the first in Russia to send special correspondents to all the large cities at home and to many foreign capitals. p. 20

[7] *Purishkevich*, *V. M.*—(1870-1920)—a big landlord and rabid reactionary (a Black-Hundred monarchist). p. 21

[8] *The Bund* (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) came into being in 1897 at the Inaugural Congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilna. It consisted mainly of semi-proletarian, Jewish artisans of Western Russia. At the First Congress R.S.D.L.P. in 1898 the Bund joined the latter "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in respect of questions affecting the Jewish proletariat specifically". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses*, *Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Russ. ed., Part I, 1954, p. 14.)

The Bund was a vehicle of nationalist and separatist ideas in Russia's working-class movement. In April 1901 the Bund's Fourth Congress resolved to alter the organisational ties with the R.S.D.L.P. as established by the latter's First Congress. In its resolution, the Bund Congress declared that it regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federation of national organisations, of which the Bund was a federal member.

Following the rejection by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. of the Bund's demand for recognition as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party, but rejoined it in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bund constantly supported the Party's opportunist wing (the Economists, Mensheviks, and liquidators), and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. To the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination the Bund contraposed the demand for autonomy of national culture. During the years of the Stolypin reaction and the new revolutionary upsurge, the Bund adopted a liquidationist stand and played an active part in the formation of the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) the Bundists took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917 the Bund supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and sided with the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War, the Bundist leaders made common cause with the forces of counter-revolution. At the same time a tendency towards co-operation with the Soviets became apparent among the Bund rank and file. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself, part of the membership joining the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in accordance with the general rules of admission. p. 23

[9] *Pale of Settlement*—districts in tsarist Russia where Jews were permitted permanent residence. p. 29

[10] *Numerus clausus*—the numerical restriction imposed in tsarist Russia on admission of Jews to the state secondary and higher educational establishments, to employment at factories and offices, and the professions. p. 29

[11] This refers to the Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party held in Brünn (Austria) from September 24 to 29, 1899 (new style). The national question was the chief item on the agenda. Two resolutions expressing different points of view were submitted to the Congress: (1) the resolution of the Party's Central Committee supporting the idea of the territorial autonomy of nations, and (2) the resolution of the Committee of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party supporting the idea of extra-territorial cultural-national autonomy.

The Congress unanimously rejected the programme of cultural-national autonomy, and adopted a compromise resolution recognising national autonomy within the boundaries of the Austrian state. (See Lenin's article "A Contribution to the History of the National Programme in Austria and in Russia", pp. 99-101 of this volume.) p. 36

[12] *J.S.L.P.* (Jewish Socialist Labour Party)—a petty-bourgeois nationalist organisation, founded in 1906. Its programme was based on the demand for national autonomy for the Jews—the creation of extra-territorial Jewish parliaments authorised to settle questions concerning the political organisation of Jews in Russia. The J.S.L.P. stood close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, with whom it waged a struggle against the R.S.D.L.P. p. 36

[13] *The Beilis case*—a provocative trial engineered by the tsarist government in 1913 in Kiev. Beilis, a Jew, was falsely accused of having murdered a Christian boy named Yushchinsky for ritual purposes (actually, the murder was organised by the Black Hundreds). The aim of this frame-up was to fan anti-Semitism and incite pogroms so as to divert the masses from the mounting revolutionary movement. The trial excited great public feeling. Workers' protest demonstrations were held in a number of cities Beilis was acquitted. p. 37

[14] *Socialist-Revolutionaries*—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which came into being at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 as a result of a merger of various Narodnik groups and circles. The S.R.s saw no class distinctions between the proletarian and the petty proprietor, played down the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and refused to recognise the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism. In Lenin's words, they tried, to mend "the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism." (See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310.)

The Socialist-Revolutionaries' agrarian programme envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land, which was to be transferred to the village commune on the basis of the "labour principle" and "equalised land tenure", and also the development of co-operatives. This programme, which the S.R.s called "socialisation of the land", had nothing socialist about it. In his analysis of this programme, Lenin showed that the preservation of commodity production and private farming on communal land would not do away with the domination of capital or free the toiling peasantry from exploitation and impoverishment. Neither could the co-operatives be a remedy for the small farmers under capitalism, as they served only to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time, as Lenin pointed out, the demand for equalised land tenure, though not socialistic, was of a progressive, revolutionary-democratic character, inasmuch as it was directed against reactionary landlordism.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the attempts of the S.R.s to pass themselves off as socialist. It waged a stubborn fight against them for influence over the peasantry, and revealed the damage their tactic of individual terrorism was causing the working-class movement. At the same time, the Bolsheviks, on definite terms, entered into temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries to combat tsarism.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party's political and ideological instability and organisational incohesion, as well as its constant vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat, were due to the absence of class homogeneity among the peasantry. During the first Russian revolution, the Right wing of the S.R.s broke away from the party and formed the legal Labour Popular Socialist Party, whose views were close to those of the Constitu-

tional-Democrats (Cadets), while the Left wing split away and formed a semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the period of the Stolypin reaction, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party suffered a complete break-down ideologically and organisationally. During the First World War most of its members took a social-chauvinist stand.

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks and the Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and landlords. The leaders of the S.R. Party—Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov—were members of this Cabinet. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of landlordism, and stood for the preservation of landlord ownership. The S.R. members of the Provisional Government authorised punitive action against peasants who had seized landed estates.

At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the S.R. Party formed an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, in an endeavour to preserve their influence among the peasant masses, formally recognised Soviet rule and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. Shortly, however, they began a struggle against the Soviets.

During the years of foreign intervention and the Civil War the S.R.s carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activities. They actively supported the interventionists and whiteguards, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terroristic acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the Civil War, the S.R.s continued their anti-Soviet activities within the country and in the camp of the White émigrés. p. 38

[15] *The Polish Socialist Party* (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)—a reformist nationalist organisation founded in 1892. Adopting the slogan of struggle for an independent Poland, the P.S.P., under Pilsudski and his adherents, carried on separatist nationalist propaganda among the Polish workers, whom they tried to divert from the joint struggle with the Russian workers against the autocracy and capitalism. Throughout the history of the P.S.P. Left-wing groups kept springing up within the party, as a result of the activities of the rank-and-file workers. Some of these groups eventually joined the revolutionary wing of the Polish working-class movement.

In 1906 the party split up into the P.S.P. Left-wing and the Right, chauvinist wing (the so-called "revolutionary faction"). Under the influence of the Bolsheviks and the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Left wing gradually adopted a consistent revolutionary stand.

During the First World War some of the P.S.P. Left-wing adopted an internationalist stand. In December 1918 it united with the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania to form the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (as the Communist Party of Poland was known up to 1925).

During the First World War, the P.S.P. Right wing continued its policy of national chauvinism, organising Polish legions on the territory of Galicia to fight on the side of Austro-German imperialism. With the formation of the Polish bourgeois state, the Right P.S.P. in 1919 united with the P.S.P. organisations existing on Polish territories formerly seized by Germany and Austria, and resumed the name of the P.S.P. At the head of the government, it arranged for the transfer of power to the Polish bourgeoisie, systematically carried on anti-communist propaganda, and supported a policy of aggression against the Soviet Union, a policy of conquest and oppression against Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Various groups in the P.S.P. who disagreed with this policy joined the Communist Party of Poland.

After Pilsudski's fascist coup d'état (May 1926), the P.S.P. was nominally a parliamentary opposition but actually it did not carry on any active fight against the fascist regime, and continued its anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. During that period the Left-wing elements of the P.S.P. collaborated with the Polish Communists and supported united-front tactics in a number of campaigns.

During the Second World War the P.S.P. again split up. Its reactionary and chauvinist faction, which assumed the name "Wolność, Równosc, Niepodłeglość," (Liberty, Equality, Independence), took part in the reactionary Polish émigré "government" in London. The Left faction, which called itself the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists, under the influence of the Polish Workers' Party, which was founded in 1942, joined the popular front against the Nazi invaders, fought for Poland's liberation, and pursued a policy of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

In 1944, after the liberation of Poland's eastern territories and the formation of a Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists resumed the name of P.S.P. and together with the P.W.P. participated in the building up of a people's democratic Poland. In December 1948 the P.W.P. and the P.S.P. amalgamated and formed the Polish United Workers' Party. p. 38

[16] *Luch* (*Ray*)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from September 16 (29), 1912 to July 5 (18), 1913. Put out 237 issues. The newspaper was maintained chiefly by contributions from the liberals. Ideological leadership was in the hands of P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov, and A. S. Martynov. The liquidators used the columns of this newspaper to oppose the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks, advocate the opportunist slogan of an "open party", attack the revolutionary mass strikes of the workers, and attempt to revise the most important points of the Party Programme. Lenin wrote that Luch was "enslaved by a liberal policy" and called the paper a mouthpiece of the renegades. p. 38

[17] *Prosveshcheniye* (*Enlightenment*)—a Bolshevik, legal theoretical monthly published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914, with a circulation of up to five thousand copies.

The journal was founded on Lenin's initiative to replace the Moscow-published *Mysl*, a Bolshevik journal which was closed down by the tsarist government. Other workers on the new journal were V. V. Vorovsky, A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, N. K. Krupskaya and others. Lenin enlisted the services of Maxim Gorky to run the journal's literary section. Lenin directed *Prosveshcheniye* from Paris and subsequently from Cracow and Poronin. He edited articles and regularly corresponded with the editorial staff. The journal published the following articles by Lenin: "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "Critical Remarks on the National Question", "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity" and others.

The journal exposed the opportunists—the liquidators, otzovists, and Trotskyists, as well as the bourgeois nationalists. It highlighted the struggle of the working class under conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge, propagandised Bolshevik slogans in the Fourth Duma election campaign, and came out against revisionism and centrism in the parties of the Second International. The journal played an important role in the Marxist internationalist education of the advanced workers of Russia.

On the eve of World War I, *Prosveshcheniye* was closed down by the tsarist government. It resumed publication in the autumn of 1917, but only one issue (a double one) appeared, containing Lenin's "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and "A Review of the Party Programme". p. 38

[18] *Bernsteinism*—an anti-Marxist trend in international Social-Democracy. It arose towards the close of the nineteenth century in Germany and bore the name of the German opportunist Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein. After the death of F. Engels, Bernstein publicly advocated revision of Marx's revolutionary theory in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism (see his article "Problems of Socialism" and his book *The Premises of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy*) in an attempt to convert the Social-Democratic Party into a petty-bourgeois party of social reforms. In Russia this trend was represented by the "legal Marxists", the Economists, the Bundists, and the Mensheviks. p. 39

[19] Lenin refers to Stalin's article "Marxism and the National Question" published in the legal Bolshevik journal *Prosveshcheniye*, Nos. 3, 4 and 5 for 1913 under the title "The National Question and Social-Democracy". Chapter 4 of Stalin's article quotes the text of the national programme adopted at the Brünn Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. p. 39

[20] *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (*New Workers' Paper*)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from

August 1813. From January 30 (February 12), 1914 it was superceded by *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Northern Workers' Paper*) and subsequently by *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Our Workers' Paper*). Lenin repeatedly referred to this newspaper as the *Novaya Likvidatorskaya Gazeta* (*New Liquidationist Paper*). p. 40

21 *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the principal party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. It was formed in October 1905 and consisted of representatives of the bourgeoisie, landlord members of the Zemstvos, and bourgeois intellectuals. Prominent leaders of the Cadets were: P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. To mislead the masses the Cadets called themselves the "party of people's freedom", but actually they went no further than the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered the fight against the revolutionary movement their chief aim, and strove to share power with the tsar and the feudalist landlords. During World War I the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's aggressive foreign policy, and during the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution they tried to save the monarchy. Holding key posts in the bourgeois Provisional Government, the Cadets pursued an anti-popular and counter-revolutionary policy. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Cadets came out as the avowed enemies of Soviet rule, taking part in all armed counter-revolutionary acts and campaigns of the interventionists. Living abroad as émigrés after the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards, the Cadets continued their anti-Soviet activities. p. 41

22 Lenin obtained these figures from the statistical handbook *One-Day Census of Elementary Schools in the Empire, Made on January 18, 1911. Issue I, Part 2, St. Petersburg Educational Area. Gubernias of Archangel, Vologda, Novgorod, Olonets, Pskov and St. Petersburg*. St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 72. p. 44

23 *Dragomanov, M. P.* (1841-1895)—Ukrainian historian, ethnographer and publicist. Exponent of Ukrainian bourgeois national-liberalism. p. 46

24 *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny* (*Social-Democratic Review*)—a journal published by the Polish Social-Democrats in close co-operation with Rosa Luxemburg in Cracow from 1902 to 1904 and from 1908 to 1910. p. 46

25 *Vestnik Yevropy* (*European Messenger*)—a monthly historico-political and literary magazine of a bourgeois-liberal trend. Appeared in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. The magazine published articles against the revolutionary Marxists. p. 49

26 Lenin is referring to an article he was planning on "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination". The article was written in

February-May 1914 and published in April-June in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 4, 5 and 6. (See pp. 393-454 of this volume.) p. 51

[27] *The International Socialist Bureau*—the Executive of the Second International set up in accordance with the decision of the Paris Congress in 1900. On December 14 (new style), 1913 the I.S.B. resolved to convene a conference "of all sections of the working-class movement in Russia" in order to ascertain existing disagreements by means of "a general exchange of opinions" with the alleged purpose of restoring unity in the R.S.D.L.P. This question was raised at a meeting of the I.S.B. on the initiative of Rosa Luxemburg with the aim of supporting the Russian liquidators who had suffered defeat in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. In connection with this decision of the I.S.B. the liquidationist *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* published a telegram from London reporting that the Bolsheviks' demand that a representative of the Social-Democratic Labour Party group in the Duma (the Six) should be sent to the interparliamentary section of the Second International was rejected at a meeting of the I.S.B. On instructions from Lenin, the representative of the Central Committee in Brussels asked. I.S.B. Secretary Huysmans what he thought of this liquidationist trick. Huysmans was obliged publicly to refute this false report of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*. p. 52

[28] *D.*—F. I. Dan, a leader of the Menshevik liquidators. p. 52

[29] *The Six*—the Bolshevik deputies forming the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 52

[30] See Note 15 for details. p. 53

[31] *L. S.* (Koltsov, L. Sedov)—pseudonyms of B. A. Ginsburg, the Menshevik liquidator. p. 53

[32] Lenin is referring to the "Resolution Concerning the Decision of the Socialist Bureau", signed by "a group of organised Marxists", published in *Proletarskaya Pravda*, issue No. 9, December 17, 1913. p. 53

[33] *The three pillars*—a term used in the legal Bolshevik press and at open, legal meetings to denote the three basic ("uncurtailed") revolutionary slogans: a democratic republic; confiscation of all landed estates; an eight-hour day. p. 54

[34] *August bloc people*—a name applied by Lenin to participants and adherents of the anti-Party August bloc, organised by Trotsky at the Conference of the liquidators held in Vienna in August 1912. The Conference was attended by representatives of the Bund, the Caucasian Regional Committee, the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region and the liquidators' groups resident abroad, namely, the

editorial boards of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda* and the *Vperyod* group. Delegates from Russia were sent by the St. Petersburg and Moscow "sponsor groups" of the liquidators and the editorial boards of the liquidationist publications *Nasha Zarya* and *Nevsky Golos*. A representative of the *Spilki* Committee Abroad was also present. The overwhelming majority of delegates were resident abroad and out of touch with the working class in Russia.

The Conference adopted anti-Party liquidationist decisions on all questions of Social-Democratic tactics, and declared against the existence of an illegal Party. Unable to elect a Central Committee, the liquidators confined themselves to setting up an Organising Committee. The August bloc, which consisted of ill-assorted elements, began to fall apart at the Conference itself, and soon broke down completely. (For details about the August bloc see pp. 158-61 of this volume.) p. 54

[35] The term *uncurtailed slogans* refers to the three basic revolutionary slogans: a democratic republic, confiscation of all landed estates, and an eight-hour day. p. 55

[36] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily published in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906, as the central organ of the Cadet Party. Its actual editors were P. N. Milyukov and I. V. Hessen, and its close collaborators were M. M. Vinaver, P. D. Dolgorukov, P. B. Struve. The newspaper was closed down on October 26 (November 8), 1917 by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Later (till August 1918) it resumed publication under the names of *Nasha Rech* (*Our Speech*), *Svobodnaya Rech* (*Free Speech*), *Vek* (*Century*), *Novaya Rech* (*New Speech*), and *Nash Vek* (*Our Century*). p. 56

[37] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a reactionary, Black-Hundred daily, published in St. Petersburg from November 1905 to April 1914. In 1906 it became the organ of the Ministry of the Interior, being subsidised out of the government's secret ("reptile") funds. Lenin called *Rossiya* "a venal police rag".

Novoye Vremya (*New Times*)—daily published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917. Owned by various publishers, it frequently changed its political trend. It was moderately liberal at the outset, but, after 1876, when it was published by A. S. Suvorin, it became the organ of reactionary circles of the nobility and the bureaucracy. After 1905 it became a mouthpiece of the Black Hundreds. Following the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 the newspaper supported the counter-revolutionary policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and hounded the Bolsheviks. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917.

Zemshchina—a Black-Hundred daily, published in St. Petersburg from June 1909 to February 1917. Organ of the extreme Right-wing deputies of the Duma. p. 57

[38] "*Grab 'em and hold 'em*"—an expression used by the Russian writer Gleb Uspensky to describe police tyranny. p. 57

[39] *Severnaya Mysl* (*Northern Thought*)—one of the names of the Left-Narodnik (Socialist-Revolutionary) legal newspaper *Zhivaya Mysl* (*Living Thought*) published in St. Petersburg twice, then three times a week, from August 1913 to July 1914. During that period the newspaper changed its name ten times: *Zavetnaya Mysl* (*Cherished Thought*), *Volnaya Mysl* (*Free Thought*), *Vernaya Mysl* (*True Thought*), etc. p. 59

[40] *Insurance campaign* refers to the struggle which developed in connection with the elections to the insurance agencies. The campaign started in the autumn of 1912 following the introduction by the tsarist government on June 23, 1912, of a workers' insurance law affecting only twenty per cent of the workers. The Bolsheviks used these elections for revolutionary propaganda and launched a campaign for the winning over of legal workers' organisations and legal workers' associations. By combining legal and illegal activities, the Bolsheviks succeeded in winning influence in the insurance bodies. Elections to the Insurance Board were held in March 1914, and a workers' group on insurance affairs was formed under the Board, which recognised as its official organ the Bolshevik journal *Voprosy Strakhovania* (*Insurance Questions*). p. 59

[41] Lenin is referring here to the *Joint Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee and Party officials*, held in the village of Poronin on September 23-October 1 (October 6-14), 1913, and called, for reasons of secrecy, the "August" ("Summer") Conference. The resolution on "The Narodniks" referred to here was drafted by Lenin. (See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 429-31.) p. 59

[42] On *June 3* (*16*), *1907* the tsar issued a manifesto dissolving the Second Duma and modifying the electoral law. The new law considerably increased the representation of the landlords and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the Duma, and made great cuts in the number of peasants' and workers' representatives, which was small enough as it is. This was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 and the Fundamental Law of 1906 by which no laws could be passed by the government without approval by the Duma. The Third Duma, which was elected on the basis of this law and met on November 1 (14), 1907, was a Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma.

The coup d'état of June 3 ushered in the period of the Stolypin reaction. p. 60

[43] *Zavety* (*Behests*)—a legal literary and political monthly of a Socialist-Revolutionary trend, published in St. Petersburg from April 1912 to July 1914. p. 60

[44] *Trotsky, L. D.* (1879-1940)—a bitter enemy of Leninism. During the years of reaction and the new revolutionary upswing, he took what was virtually a liquidator stand under the guise of "non-factionalism". In 1912 he organised the anti-Party August bloc. During the First World War he took a centrist stand. Joined the Bolshevik Party on the eve of the October Socialist Revolution, but continued his factional activity. In 1918 he opposed the signing of the Peace of Brest. In 1920-21 he opposed Lenin's policy on the trade unions and the trade union movement. In 1923 he led the opposition against the general line of the Party. The Communist Party denounced Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation within the Party and defeated it ideologically and organisationally. In 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Party. In 1929 he was deported from the U.S.S.R. for anti-Soviet activity and subsequently deprived of Soviet citizenship. p. 61

[45] *Tyszka, J.* (1867-1919)—a prominent leader of the Polish and German labour movement. During the years of reaction Tyszka denounced the liquidators, but on a number of occasions took a conciliatory stand towards them. In 1912 he came out against the decisions of the Prague Conference. Lenin sharply criticised Tyszka's activities during that period. During World War I Tyszka took an Internationalist stand. In 1918 he helped to found the Communist Party of Germany and was elected Secretary of its Central Committee. He was murdered in a Berlin prison in 1919. p. 61

[46] This paragraph is a comment on Kautsky's letter published in *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the German Social-Democrats, No. 339, December 24, 1913 (new style), dealing with the report of the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau and reprinted in Russian in the newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda*, issue No. 12, December 20, 1913 (old style). Kautsky's letter was a reply to Rosa Luxemburg's letter to *Vorwärts*. p. 63

[47] See Note 15. p. 63

[48] *Vorwärts*—a daily newspaper, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. In accordance with a decision of the Halle Congress of the Party, it was published in Berlin from 1891 as a continuation of the newspaper *Berliner Volksblatt* issued since 1884 under the name of *Vorwärts. Berliner Volksblatt*. F. Engels used the columns of this paper to combat all manifestations of opportunism. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* was controlled by the Right wing of the Party and regularly published articles by opportunists. The paper was tendentious in reporting the struggle against opportunism and revisionism within the R.S.D.L.P., and supported the Economists, and subsequently, after the split in the Party the Mensheviks. During the years of reaction *Vorwärts* published Trotsky's slanderous articles, but did not give Lenin and the Bolsheviks any opportunity to refute them and give an objective appraisal of the true state of affairs within the Party.

During World War I *Vorwärts* took a social-chauvinist stand. After the Great October Socialist Revolution it carried on anti-Soviet propaganda. Ceased publication in 1933. p. 64

[49] *Dyen* (*The Day*)—a daily newspaper of a liberal-bourgeois trend, published in St. Petersburg from 1912. Among its contributors were Menshevik liquidators, who took over complete control of the paper after February 1917. Closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 72

[50] *Russkaya Mysl* (*Russian Thought*)—a monthly journal of the liberal bourgeoisie published in Moscow from 1880. After the 1905 Revolution it became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. During that period Lenin called the *Russkaya Mysl* "*Chernosotennaya Mysl*" (*Black-Hundred Thought*). The journal closed down in the middle of 1918. p. 72

[51] Lenin is referring to *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*), the fortnightly journal of the bourgeois liberals, published abroad from 1902 to 1905 and edited by P. B. Struve. In January 1904 it became the organ of the liberal-monarchist *Osvobozhdeniye* League. Later the *Osvobozhdeniye* people formed the core of the Cadet Party. p. 74

[52] Lenin is referring to the decisions of the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.) and the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910.

The *Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Paris on December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909). It was attended by 16 voting delegates: 5 Bolsheviks, 3 Mensheviks, 5 Polish Social-Democrats and 3 Bundists. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was represented by Lenin, who made a report at the Conference on "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party", as well as speeches on the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, on the organisational and other questions. At this Conference the Bolsheviks waged a struggle against the two types of opportunism within the Party—the liquidators and the otzovists. On a motion by Lenin the Conference denounced liquidationism and called upon all Party organisations to fight resolutely against any attempts to liquidate the Party.

For an appraisal of the Conference's decisions see Lenin's articles "On the Road" and "The Liquidation of Liquidationism". (See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 345-55, 452-60.)

The *Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held on January 2-23 (January 15-February 5), 1910 in Paris. It was convened despite Lenin, with the help of Trotsky's secret allies—Zinoviev, Kamenev and Rykov. Besides the Bolsheviks, it was attended by representatives of all sections and group, as well as by representatives of the national Social-Democratic organisations. In opposition to Lenin's plan of a rapprochement with the pro-Party Mensheviks (the Plekhanovites) for the purpose of fighting liqui-

dationism, the conciliators, secret Trotskyists, demanded that all groups should be dissolved and that the Bolsheviks should unite with the liquidators and Trotskyists. The conciliators preponderated at the meeting and were able to get a number of anti-Leninist decisions adopted. Only after Lenin's insistent demands did the Plenum adopt a resolution condemning liquidationism and otzovism. p. 74

[53] See Note 34. p. 75

[54] The Copenhagen Congress of the Second International was held on August 28-September 3 (new style), 1910. Following the discussion of the Czech-Austrian split, the Congress declared against the "Bundist-nationalist" principles of the Czech separatists. p. 76

[55] *Zemstvos*—local self-government bodies, dominated by the nobility, set up in the central regions of tsarist Russia in 1864. Their powers were restricted to purely local economic affairs (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.), their activities being controlled by the provincial governors and the Ministry of the Interior, who could veto any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 82

[56] *F. D.*, *Gamma*, *L. M.*, *Em-El*, *Rakitin*—pseudonyms of Mensheviks, viz. *F. D.*—F. I. Dan; *Gamma* and *L. M.*—L. Martov (Y. O. Tsederbaum); *Em-El*—M. Y. Lukomsky, and *Rakitin*—V. Levitsky (V. O. Tsederbaum). p. 91

[57] *The Vperyod group*—an anti-Party group including otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders, and empirio-monists (adherents of the reactionary, idealistic philosophy of Mach and Avenarius), organised abroad in December 1909 and headed by A. Bogdanov and G. Alexinsky. It had several small circles, consisting mostly of intellectuals, in Paris, Geneva and Tiflis. In Lenin's words, the views of the *Vperyod* group were "a caricature of Bolshevism". With no support among the workers, the group fell apart in 1913. For further details about this group see pp. 487-93 of this volume. p. 93

[58] *The Seven*—seven Menshevik liquidator deputies forming part of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 96

[59] *An*—pseudonym of N. N. Jordania, leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks. p. 96

[60] *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a legal monthly of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. The liquidators' centre in Russia formed around this journal. p. 98

[61] The reference is to *Byelorussian Socialist Hromada*—a nationalist organisation which came into being in 1902 under the name of

"Byelorussian Revolutionary Hromada". It defended the interests of the Byelorussian bourgeoisie, landlords and kulaks, denied the revolutionary class struggle, and tried to keep the Byelorussian people away from the Russian revolutionary working class. These attempts met with no support among the working masses of the Byelorussian people. In the national question, the Hromada stood for "cultural-national autonomy". After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 the Hromada supported the policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government. Following the October Socialist Revolution it split up into three counter-revolutionary groups who joined the whiteguards and foreign interventionists in an active struggle against the Soviets.

Dashnaktsutyun—a bourgeois-nationalist party founded in the early nineties of the nineteenth century in Turkish Armenia with the aim of liberating the Armenians from the Turkish yoke. The party was a bourgeois-democratic conglomerate of representatives of various classes. Alongside the bourgeoisie, a prominent place in it was occupied by the national intelligentsia, as well as by peasants and workers unaffected by Social-Democratic propaganda, and part of the lumpenproletariat forming the zinvors squads.

On the eve of the 1905-07 Revolution this party transferred its activities to the Caucasus and aligned itself with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The party's Left wing formed the Young Dashnaktsutyun group, which joined the S. R. Party in 1907.

The activities of the Dashnaktsutyun were of an anti-popular nature. Its nationalist propaganda was greatly detrimental to the internationalist education of the proletariat and the masses of Armenia and the entire Transcaucasia.

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, the Dashnaks supported the policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution they entered into a counter-revolutionary bloc with the Mensheviks, S.R.s and Musavatists against the Bolsheviks. In 1918-20 the Dashnaks stood at the head of the bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolutionary government of Armenia. Their action was designed to convert Armenia into a colony of the foreign imperialists and a stronghold of the Anglo-French interventionists and Russian whiteguards in their struggle against the Soviet government. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and with the help of the Red Army, the working people of Armenia overthrew the Dashnak government in November 1920. With the victory of the Soviets, the Dashnaktsutyun organisations in Transcaucasia were smashed and liquidated.

Georgian Socialists-Federalists—a bourgeois-nationalist party founded in April 1906, demanded national autonomy for Georgia within the framework of the Russian bourgeois-landlord state. During the period of reaction, the Socialists-Federalists became open opponents of the revolution. In concert with the Mensheviks and anarchists, this party tried to smash the united international front of the working people of Transcaucasia against tsarism and

capitalism. After the Great October Socialist Revolution the S.F.s, together with the Georgian Mensheviks, the Dashnaks and Musavatists, organised a counter-revolutionary bloc, which was supported by the Germano-Turkish, and later, by the Anglo-French interventionists p. 101

[62] *Stolypin's agrarian policy* aimed at using the kulaks as a bulwark of the regime in the countryside. The tsarist government issued a Ukase on November 9 (22), 1906 regulating the peasants' withdrawal from the communes and the establishment of their proprietary rights on the allotment lands. After its approval, with slight modifications by the Duma and the Council of State, this Ukase became known as the Law of June 14, 1910. Under this Stolypin law (which got its name from P. A. Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers) the peasant was free to withdraw from the village commune, take possession of his allotment on a proprietorship basis, and sell it. The rural community was obliged to give the peasants who withdrew from the commune an allotment of land in one place (an *otrub*, homestead). The Stolypin reform speeded up the development of capitalism in the countryside and the process of differentiation among the peasantry, and sharpened the class struggle in the village.

The Stolypin reform is characterised and evaluated in a number of works by Lenin, notably in his *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*. (See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217- 429.) p. 102

[63] *Pugachovism*—a non-scientific term used by bourgeois historians for the peasant uprising of 1773-75 led by Yemelyan Pugachov. p. 102

[64] *Manilov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, whose name has become a synonym for unprincipled philistinism, sentimentality and day-dreaming. p. 102

[65] The reference is to the book *Statistics of Landownership for 1905. Returns for Fifty Gubernias of European Russia*. St. Petersburg. Published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior, 1907. p. 104

[66] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly journal published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918. In the early nineties it passed into the hands of the liberal Narodniks headed by N. K. Mikhailovsky. A group of publicists formed around the journal, who eventually became prominent members of the Socialist-Revolutionary, the "Popular Socialist" and Trudovik parties in the Duma. In 1906 it became the organ of the semi-Cadet Labour Popular Socialist Party. p. 105

[67] *Nikolai—on*—pseudonym of N. F. Danielson, an ideologist of liberal Narodism in the eighties and nineties of the last century. p. 105

[68] *Mazeppa, J. S.* (1644-1709)—Hetman of the Ukraine in 1687-1709. For a number of years conducted treasonable negotiations with the king of Poland and subsequently with the king of Sweden for the secession of the Ukraine from Russia. In 1708 he openly sided with Charles XII. After the defeat of the Swedes at Poltava in 1709, Mazeppa escaped to Turkey with Charles XII. p. 109

[69] *Stolypin, P. A.* (1862-1911)—an extreme reactionary, Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1906-11. His name is associated with the suppression of the first Russian revolution (1905-07) and the ensuing period of harsh political reaction. p. 114

[70] *Octobrists*—members of the "Union of October Seventeenth" Party formed in Russia after the promulgation of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party, representing the interests of the big bourgeoisie and landlords who had gone over to capitalist forms of ownership. Its leaders were the well-known industrialist and Moscow house-owner A. I. Guchkov, and the big landowner M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists wholly supported the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. p. 114

[71] *Vekhists*—participants of the symposium *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*)—a collection of articles by prominent Cadet publicists representing the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie: N. A. Berdayev, S. N. Bulgakov, M. O. Herschensohn, A. S. Izgoyev, B. A. Kistyakovsky, P. B. Struve and S. L. Frank. Issued in Moscow in the spring of 1909.

In articles on the Russian intelligentsia the Vekhists tried to malign the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the Russian nation's finest sons, among them V. G. Belinsky and N. G. Chernyshevsky. They vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905 and thanked the tsarist government for having saved the bourgeoisie from "the fury of the people" "with its bayonets and jails". The symposium called upon the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared the *Vekhi* programme in philosophy and journalism with that of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, and called the symposium "an encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy", "nothing but a flood of reactionary mud poured on democracy". (See present edition, Vol. 16, p. 453.) p. 114

[72] See Note 39. p. 118

[73] *Trudoviks* (the Trudovik group)—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Russian Duma consisting of peasants and intellectuals of a Narodnik trend. The Trudovik group was formed in April 1906 of peasant deputies to the First Duma.

The Trudoviks demanded abolition of all social-estate and national restrictions, democratisation of rural and urban self-government, and universal franchise in Duma elections. Their agrarian programme was based on the Narodnik principles of

"equalised" land tenure, all the state, crown, and church lands being united in a national land fund, inclusive of all privately owned lands whose size exceeded the established labour norm; the owners of lands thus alienated were to receive compensation. Lenin pointed out in 1906 that the typical Trudovik was a peasant who "is not averse to a compromise with the monarchy, to settling down quietly on his *own* plot of land under the bourgeois system; but at the present time his main efforts are concentrated on the fight against the landlords for land, on the fight against the feudal state and for democracy." (See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 229.)

In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. This vacillation was conditioned by the very class nature of the petty proprietors—the peasants. Since the Trudoviks to a certain extent represented the peasant masses, the Bolsheviks in the Duma pursued the tactic of agreement with them on various issues for joint struggle against tsarism and the Cadets. In 1917 the Trudovik group merged with the "Popular Socialist" Party and actively supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Socialist Revolution the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 119

[74] *Popular Socialists*—a petty-bourgeois party formed in 1906 from the breakaway Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Their political views were close to those of the Cadets. After the February Revolution of 1917 the P.S.s supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, and after the October Socialist Revolution they joined forces with the counter-revolution to fight the Soviets. p. 119

[75] Lenin is referring to the *conference of the extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"* held in Paris on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909, and attended by nine members of the Bolshevik Centre (elected by the Bolshevik group of the Fifth [London] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907), headed by Lenin, and by representatives of the St. Petersburg, Moscow regional and Urals organisations.

The meeting was called to discuss the conduct of the otzovists and ultimatumists. It dealt with the following questions: (1) otzovism and ultimatumism; (2) god-building tendencies among the Social-Democrats; (3) the attitude to Duma activities among other fields of Party work; (4) the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party; (5) the Party school being set up abroad (on Capri); (6) agitation for a Bolshevik congress or Bolshevik conference separate from the Party; (7) the breakaway of Comrade Maximov, and other questions.

In the chair was Lenin, who spoke on the main items of the agenda. Otzovism and ultimatumism at the meeting were represented and defended by A. Bogdanov (Maximov) and V. Shantser (Marat). Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and Tomsky took a conciliatory stand.

The meeting condemned otzovism and ultimatumism as being "liquidationism inside out". The Capri "Party" school organised by the otzovists was declared to be "the centre of the breakaway faction". A. Bogdanov refused to accept the rulings of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* and was expelled from the Bolshevik organisation.

The meeting also condemned god-building and resolved to wage a determined struggle against it by exposing its anti-Marxist character. (See present edition, Vol. 15 "Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*".) p. 121

[76] *Ilyin*—a pseudonym of Lenin. His book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* appeared in 1909 under the pseudonym of VI. Ilyin. p. 122

[77] *God-building*—a philosophical trend, hostile to Marxism, which arose in the period of the Stolypin reaction among a section of the Party intellectuals, who had departed from Marxism after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905-07 . The "god-builders" (A. V. Lunacharsky, V. Bazarov, and others) advocated the creation of a new "socialist" religion, attempting to reconcile Marxism with religion. At one time they were joined by Maxim Gorky.

The reactionary nature of god-building was revealed by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and in his letters to Gorky during February-April 1908 and November-December 1913. p. 124

[78] *Veteran*—P. I. Stučka, one of the oldest leaders of the Social-Democratic movement. p. 125

[79] This refers to the *Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party workers* held on September 23-October 1 (October 6-14), 1913 in the village of Poronin, near Cracow. For reasons of secrecy it was called the "August" ("Summer") Conference. p. 125

[80] *Marxism and Liquidationism. A Symposium of Articles on the Fundamental Issues of the Modern Labour Movement. Part II* appeared in 1914, published by Priboi, the Party's publishing house. Lenin's manuscript plan for this publication list the articles he thought should be included in this symposium, and mentions the various issues of the newspapers from which these articles were to be taken (Lenin changed the headings of some of the articles for the symposium). According to this plan, the symposium was to be in two parts, whose contents were announced in the newspaper *Put Pravdy* No. 42 for March 21, 1914.

Part I of the symposium did not appear. Several dozen copies of Part II, which the publishers were late in taking delivery of from the printers, were confiscated. The bulk of the edition, however, was distributed.

Part II of the symposium contained, in addition to the Preface dated February 1914 and Concluding Remarks, fourteen articles by Lenin, namely: "The Legal Party and the Marxists", "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto", "How P. B. Axelrod Exposes the Liquidators", "The Separatism of the Bund", "Marxism and Reformism", "The Liberal Bourgeoisie and Reformism", "Liberal Blindness", "A Necessary Explanation", "Economic and Political Strikes", "A Talk on 'Cadet-Eating'", "The Nature and Significance of Our Polemics Against the Liberals", "The Liberal Bourgeoisie and the Liquidators", "The Working Class and Its Press", and "Material on the History of the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Duma".

The latter article has a supplement specially written for the symposium—an article entitled "How the Workers Responded to the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Duma". (See pp. 536-43 of this volume.) In June 1914, Lenin, in a footnote to this article (see p. 542 of this volume), gave new figures concerning monetary contributions to the Marxist and liquidationist newspapers made through the Duma groups. p. 126

[81] See Note 52. p. 126

[82] See Note 71. p. 129

[83] Lenin refers to *The Economico-Statistical Handbook*, *Issue VII. Vegetable and Fruit Cultivation in Moscow Uyezd*. Moscow, 1913. p. 132

[84] *Shcheglovitov*, *I. G.* (1861-1918)—a big landlord, extreme reactionary. Minister of Justice from 1906 to 1915. Pursued a Black-Hundred Policy and openly subjected the law courts to control by the police authorities. Was one of the organisers of the military tribunals, the trial of the Social-Democratic members of the Second and Fourth Dumas, the Beilis case, etc. The term "Shcheglovitov justice" became generic for legal frame-up and tyranny in tsarist Russia. p. 137

[85] See Note 39. p. 138

[86] *Metallist*—weekly organ of the Metalworkers' Trade Union published in St. Petersburg from September 26 (October 9) 1911 to June 12 (25), 1914. Forty-five issues were put out. Till 1913 the Union's Executive and the Editorial Board were controlled by the liquidators, but after the re-election of the Union's Executive in May 1913 control of the Union and the journal passed over to the Bolsheviks. Issues No. 7 (31), No. 8 (3-2) and No. 10 (34) for 1913 published the article by Lenin "Metalworkers' Strikes in 1912". M. S. Olminsky, A. Y. Badayev, and G. I. Petrovsky were contributors to the journal. *Metallist* was closely linked with the working-class masses and played an important part in rallying them around the Bolshevik Party. The tsarist government perse-

cuted the journal. Several of its issues were seized by the police; and after issue No. 24 the journal was suspended for four months. For reasons of censorship the journal changed its name several times to *Kuznets* (*The Smith*), *Nadezhda* (*Hope*), *Yedinstvo* (*Unity*), *Nash Put* (*Our Way*), etc.

Lenin is referring to the editorials in the journals *Nash Put* No. 20 for August 11, 1911 and *Metallist* No. 3 for October 27, 1911. p. 140

[87] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards. Expressed the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia. In the eighties and nineties writers of the democratic camp contributed to it (among them V. G. Korolenko, Saltykov-Shchedrin, Gleb Uspensky) and the paper published articles by liberal Narodniks. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democrats. Lenin commented on the fact that *Russkiye Vedomosti* was an unusual combination of "*Right* Cadetism and Narodnik overtones". (See present edition. Vol. 19, p. 135.) In 1918 the paper was closed down together with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 143

[88] *Saltychikha* (*Saltykova*, *D. I.*) (1730-1801)—a landowner, notorious for her brutal treatment of her serfs. She was responsible for the death of 139 peasants. The name Saltychikha became a synonym for bestial treatment of the peasants by the feudalist squirearchy. p. 148

[89] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 236. p. 149

[90] Lenin is referring to the *Sixth* (*Prague*) *All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* held in Prague on January 5-17 (18-30), 1912, which virtually played the role of a Party congress.

Over twenty Party organisations were represented at the Conference, which was also attended by representatives of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Editorial Board of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, the Committee of the Organisation Abroad, and the Transport Group of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. With the exception of two pro-Party Mensheviks, the delegates were Bolsheviks. Among the delegates were G. K. Orjonikidze of the Tiflis organization, S. S. Spandaryan of Baku, Y. P. Onufriev of St. Petersburg, and F. I. Goloshchokin of Moscow. The Committee of the Organisation Abroad was represented by N. A. Semashko, and the Transport Group of the C.C. by I. A. Pyatnitsky.

Lenin represented the Editorial Board of the Central Organ.

The Conference was conducted by Lenin, who, at the opening, spoke on the constitution of the Conference, made reports on the current situation and the tasks of the Party, and the work of the International Socialist Bureau, and took part in the debates on the work of the Central Organ, the tasks of the Social-Democrats

in combating famine, on the organisational question, the work of the Party organisation abroad, and other questions. Lenin drafted resolutions on all the important questions standing on the agenda.

Lenin's report on "The Tasks of the Party in the Present Situation" and the corresponding resolution of the Conference gave a profound analysis of the political situation within the country, and showed that revolutionary sentiment among the masses was running high. The Conference emphasised that the task of the conquest of power by the proletariat, who led the peasantry remained that of a democratic revolution in Russia.

The most important task of the Conference was to rid the Party of the opportunists. Its resolutions on "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators" and on "The Party Organisation Abroad" were of tremendous significance in point of principle and practice. The liquidators were grouped around two legal journals—*Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*. The Conference declared that, "by their behaviour, the *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni* group had placed themselves irretrievably beyond the pale of the Party". The liquidators were expelled from the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference condemned the activities of the anti-Party groups abroad—the Menshevik *Golos* group, the *Vperyod* group and the Trotskyists. The existence abroad of a united Party organisation working for the Party under the control and guidance of the Central Committee was recognised as an absolute necessity by the Conference, which pointed out that the groups abroad "which do not submit to the Social-Democratic centre in Russia, that is, the Central Committee, and which introduce disorganisation by establishing special contacts with Russia over the head of the C.C. cannot speak on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P." These resolutions played a tremendous role in strengthening the unity of the Marxist party in Russia.

One of the highlights of the Conference was the question of participation in the Fourth Duma election campaign. The Conference stressed that the chief task of the Party at the elections and of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma itself was socialist class propaganda and the organisation of the working class. Basic minimum-programme demands for a democratic republic, an eight-hour day, and confiscation of all landed estates were advanced by the Conference as the Party's principal election slogans.

The Conference adopted a resolution on "The Character and Organisational Forms of Party Work", endorsed the changes in the Party Rules proposed by Lenin, confirmed *Sotsial-Demokrat* in its status of the Party's Central Organ, elected a Central Committee of the Party, and set up a Russian Bureau of the Central Committee.

The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. played an outstanding part in building up the Bolshevik Party, a party of a new type. It summed up the entire historical phase of the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks, and consolidated the Bolsheviks' victory. The Menshevik liquidators were expelled from the Party. The

local Party organisations rallied around the decisions of the Conference, which strengthened the Party as an all-Russia organisation. The political line and tactics of the Party under the conditions of a new revolutionary upswing were laid down. Purged of the opportunists, the Bolshevik Party took the lead in the new powerful upsurge of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. Of great international significance, the Prague Conference gave the revolutionary elements in the parties of the Second International an example of determined struggle against opportunism, which it conducted to the extent of a complete organisational break with the opportunists. p. 158

[91] See Note 20. p. 159

[92] *Yezhov*—the Menshevik liquidator S. O. Tsederbaum. p. 159

[93] *Against two of the "pillars"*, i.e., against the Bolshevik slogans of a democratic republic and confiscation of all landed estates. p. 160

[94] Lenin is referring to the speech made by the millionaire merchant A. S. Salazkin, President of the Nizhni-Novgorod Fair and Exchange Committee, at a special meeting of the Committee held on August 16 (29), 1913 in connection with the visit to the Fair of Prime Minister Kokovtsov. On behalf of all Russia's merchants Salazkin urged upon Kokovtsov the "vital necessity" of radical political reforms on the basis of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, and expressed the desire of the commercial and industrial world "to take a direct part in the affairs of public self-government and state organisation".

Lenin repeatedly referred to this speech in his articles. (See "The Russian Bourgeoisie and Russian Reformism", "The Merchant Salazkin and the Writer F. D." and "Questions of Principle in Politics", present edition, Vol. 19.) p. 167

[95] *Otrub peasants*—those who received an *otrub* (a homestead). Under Stolypin's Law of Novembor 9, 1906, the village communes were obliged to endow the peasants leaving the commune with an allotment in one place. p. 168

[96] *The National Equality Bill* (official title of the "Bill for the Abolition of All Disabilities of the Jews and of all Restrictions on the Grounds of Origin or Nationality") was drafted by Lenin for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Fourth Duma. This Bill was to have been introduced in the Duma, apparently in connection with the discussion of the Ministry of the Interior's budget.

In publishing this Bill on behalf of the R.S.D.L. group, Lenin considered it a point of honour on the part of the Russian workers to support it with tens of thousands of signatures and declarations. "This," said Lenin, "will be the best means of consolidating *complete* unity, amalgamating all the workers of Russia, irrespective

of nationality. (See the article "National Equality", pp. 237-38 of this volume.) p. 172

[97] Lenin is referring to the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region held on January 13-26 (January 26-February 8), 1914, in Brussels.

Lenin, who took an active part In organising and conducting the Congress, carried on a busy pre-congress correspondence with the Bolsheviks of Latvia and went to Berlin and Paris to meet them to settle questions pertaining to preparations for the Congress, its composition, the possible outcome of the struggle at the Congress, etc. At the Congress Lenin made a report on the Lettish Social-Democrats' attitude to the R.S.D.L.P. and the split in the Duma group, and took part in the meeting of the Bolshevik delegates, whom he helped with the drafting of resolutions. On the evening of January 12 (25), 1914, the day before the Congress, Lenin gave a lecture on the national question to the Congress delegates in Brussels, in which he expounded the theory and tactics of Bolshevism in the national question. Lenin called upon the Marxists of Latvia to strengthen real, not imaginary, unity of the Party, and defend its ranks against the vacillators and the liquidators, who were openly betraying the cause the working class.

Lenin drew extensively upon the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats in his struggle against the liquidators and Trotskyists. (See the articles in this volume: "The Lettish Workers and the Split in the Social-Democratic Group In the Duma", "The 'August' Fiction Exposed", "The Liquidators and the Lettish Working-Class Movement" and others.) As a result of the stiff struggle against conciliatory tendencies waged at the Congress by Lenin and the Lettish Bolsheviks they succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the Lettish Social-Democrats from the August bloc. Lenin called this withdrawal a "deadly blow" at the Trotskyist alliance. p. 178

[98] Lenin is quoting from the resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats "with the unavoidable changes", necessitated by the tsarist censorship. Thus, instead of the words "Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region", he uses the phrase "representatives of all the Lettish Marxist workers"; instead of "the R.S.D.L.P." he uses the words "the Marxist body"; instead of "the Fifth All-Russia Conference of 1908 and the Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1910" he says "the all-Russia representative body of the Marxist of December 1908 and January 1910'; instead of "C.C. of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region" he uses the phrase "their leading body". p. 178

[99] Lenin is referring to the decisions of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1907, the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the

R.S.D.L.P. of 1908 and the Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1910. p. 178

[100] The article."Socialism Demolished Again" was published in the journal *Sovremenny Mir* No. 3 in March 1914.

Sovremenny Mir (*Contemporary World*)—a literary, scientific and political monthly published in St. Pbtersburg from October 1906 to 1918. Its chief contributors were Mensheviks, including Plekhanov. Bolsheviks contributed to the journal during the bloc with the Plekhanovites and at the beginning of 1914. During World War I (1914-18) it became the organ of the social-chauvinists. p. 187

[101] Leo Tolstoy speaks of this in his preface to N. Orlov's picture album "Russian Muzhiks", 1909. p. 189

[102] *Zhizn* (*Life*)—a literary, scientiflc and political journal published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901. Among its contributors were "legal Marxists" (M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky and P. B. Struve), and leading writers and critics (Gorky, Chekhov, Veresayev, Skitalets, Bunin, and Solovyov [Andreyevich]). Karl Marx's *Wages, Price and Profit* was published in this journal, as well as Lenin's articles "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" and "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov". (See present edition, Vol. 4.) p. 192

[103] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 179. p. 194

[104] The article "*Forms of the Working-Class Movement* (*The Lockout and Marxist Tactics*) " was written in connection with the lockout declared by St. Petersburg factory owners on March 20 (April 2), 1914.

In March 1914 mass cases of poisoning occurred among the women employed at the Treugolnik Mills in St. Petersburg, evoking general indignation and strikes of protest on the part of the workers in the capital. The St. Petersburg factory owners retorted by a lockout, as many as 70,000 workers being thrown out in a single day. The aim was to provoke the workers to a mass strike, the better to be able to make short work of the labour movement. But, led by the Bolsheviks, the workers refused to be provoked. In view of the lockout, the declaration of a mass strike was considered inadvisable, and *Pravda* called the workers to other forms of struggle, such as mass meetings at the factories and revolutionary demonstrations in the streets. The St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issued a leaflet calling upon the workers to take part in a demonstration to be held on April 4, 1914, the second anniversary of the Lena shootings.

On the appointed day the newspaper *Put Pravdy* came out with an editorial by Lenin—"Forms of the Working-Class Movement". This article, in a form adapted to the conditions of the

existing censorship, urged the workers to carry out the decisions of the Cracow meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. held jointly with Party workers, which mentioned the need to discover "new forms of struggle against lockouts" and to replace political strikes "by revolutionary meetings and revolutionary street demonstrations". Lenin laid special emphasis on the importance of revolutionary demonstrations as a time-tested form of struggle.

The workers responded to the Party's appeal with a powerful revolutionary demonstration, which was reported by all the bourgeois newspapers. Reporting the demonstration, the liquidationist *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* made no mention of the leaflets distributed by the St. Petersburg Committee, and even attacked Lenin's article "Forms of the Working-Class Movement". At a time when the workers were engaged in a sharp struggle against the capitalists, the liquidators called upon the workers to "calm down" and attacked the Bolsheviks for organising the revolutionary demonstration. Lenin called the liquidators' behaviour monstrous, and described their attitude to the Fourth of April demonstration as a typical instance of wrecking illegal work. In the report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference, Lenin devoted a good deal of space to exposing the activities of the liquidators. (See pp. 495-535 of this volume.) p. 209

[105] The reference is to the *Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers*, called, for reasons of secrecy, the "February" meeting. It was held in Cracow on December 26, 1912-January 1, 1913 (January 8-14, 1913), and was attended by Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya, the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma A. Y. Badayev, G. I. Petrovsky, N. R. Shagov, and others. The illegal Party organisations of St. Petersburg, the Moscow region, the South, the Urals and the Caucasus were represented at the meeting. In the chair was Lenin, who made reports on the subjects "The Revolutionary Upswing, Strikes and the Tasks of the Party", "The Attitude to the Liquidators and Unity" (the texts of these reports are missing), drafted and edited all the resolutions, and wrote the "Report" of the meeting by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

The Conference adopted decisions on the most important issues of the working-class movement, namely: the tasks of the Party in connection with the new revolutionary upswing and the growing strike movement, the building-up of the illegal organisation, the work of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, the insurance campaign, the Party press, the national Social-Democratic organisations, the struggle against liquidationism, and the unity of the proletarian party.

The Conference's decisions played an important part in strengthening the Party and its unity, in extending and consolidating the Party's contacts with the masses, and evolving new forms of Party work adapted to the rising wave of the working-class movement. p. 211

[106] See Note 40. p. 211

[107] *Batrak*—the Socialist-Revolutionary, M. Zatonsky. p. 213

[108] The MS. "*On the Question of National Policy*" is the draft of a speech that was to have been delivered in the Fourth Duma by the Bolshevik deputy G. I. Petrovsky. As the Left deputies were expelled from the Duma on April 22 (May 5), 1914 and suspended for fifteen sessions (cf. pp. 274-76 of this volume for further details) this speech was not delivered. Parts of the MS. of this draft speech are missing. Appropriate footnotes are given in such cases. p. 217

[109] *Grazhdanin* (*The Citizen*)—a reactionary newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1872 to 1914. From the eighties of the nineteenth century it was the organ of the extreme monarchists. It existed largely on government subsidies. From 1906 it appeared as a weekly. p. 217

[110] *Progressists*—a political group of the Russian liberal-monarchist boureeoisie, which, during the elections to the Duma and within the Duma, attempted to unite elements of the various bourgeois-landlord parties and groups under the nag of "non-partisanship".

In November 1912 the Progressists formed an independent political party with the following programme: a moderate constitution with restricted electoral qualiflcations, petty reforms, a responsible Ministry, i.e., a government accountable to the Duma, and suppression of the revolutionary movement. Lenin pointed out that in composition and ideology the Progressists were "*a cross between Octobrists and Cadets*" and described the programme of the Progressist Party as being a national-liberal programme.

During World War I the Progressists became more active and demanded a change of military leadership, the gearing of industry to the needs of the front, and a "responsible Ministry" with the participation of representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution some of the party's leaders were members of the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Progressist Party waged an active struggle against the Soviet government. p. 218

[111] *Shevchenko*, *Taras* (1814-1861)—the great Ukrainian poet, painter and revolutionary democrat, who fought against tsarism and serfdom. His works, which are imbued with hatred of the oppressors, reflected the struggle of the revolutionary Ukrainian peasantry and the conditions of life of the Ukrainian people. p. 219

[112] *Kievskaya Mysl* (*Kiev Thought*)—a daily of a bourgeois-democratic trend published in Kiev from 1906 to 1918. Until 1915 the paper came out with a weekly illustrated supplement, and from 1917 in two editions, morning and evening. p. 221

[113] *Polish koło*—an association of Polish deputies in the Duma. The leading core of this association in the First and Second Dumas

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were the national-democrats—members of the reactionary nationalist party of Polish landlords and bourgeoisie. On all basic questions of Duma tactics the Polish koło supported the Octobrists. p. 224

[114] This article is an abridged version of the reply of the Party's Central Committee, which agreed to attend the Conference called by the International Socialist Bureau. This reply is the "official report" of the C.C. to the Executive of the I.S.B., of the dispatch of which Lenin informed C. Huysmans, the Secretary of the I.S.B., in his letter dated January 18-19 (January 31-February 1), 1914. (See pp. 74-81 of this volume.) p. 233

[115] The reference is to the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in January 1912. (See Note 90.) p. 233

[116] *Winter hiring*—the hiring of peasants for summer work, practised by the landlords and kulaks during the winter, when the peasants were badly in need of money and would accept extortionate terms. p. 242

[117] *Decembrists*—Russian revolutionaries of the nobility who fought against serfdom and the autocracy. They raised an armed revolt on December 14, 1825. p. 245

[118] *Kolokol* (*The Bell*)—a political journal published under the motto *Vivos voco!* (I call on the living!) by A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogaryov from July 1, 1857 to April 1865 in London, and from May 1865 to July 1867 in Geneva. Published as a monthly and for some time as a fortnightly, it put out 245 issues. In 1868 the journal was published in French (15 issues in all) with an occasional supplement in Russian. *Kolokol*, which was published in 2,500 copies and circulated throughout Russia, exposed the tyranny of the autocracy, the extortion and embezzlement practised by the government officials, and the ruthless exploitation of the peasants by the landlords. *Kolokol* addressed revolutionary calls to the masses rousing them to the struggle against the tsarist government and the ruling classes.

The leading organ of the revolutionary uncensored press and the precursor of the working-class press in Russia, *Kolokol* played an important role in the development of the general democratic and revolutionary movement, in the struggle against the autocracy and serfdom. p. 245

[119] Belinsky's *Letter to Gogol* was written in July 1847, and first published in 1855 in Herzen's *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (*The Pole Star*). p. 246

[120] *Narodism*—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement, which arose between the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. The Narodniks were out to abolish the autoc-

racy and hand over the landed estates to the peasantry. At the same time they denied the tendency towards the development of capitalist relations in Russia, and consequently, considered the peasantry, not the proletariat, the principal revolutionary force. They regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. In their endeavour to rouse the peasants to the struggle against the autocracy, the Narodniks went into the villages, "among the people", but they met no support there.

In the eighties and nineties the Narodniks adopted a policy of conciliation with tsarism. They expressed the interests of the kulaks and waged a fierce struggle against Marxism. p. 246

[121] The reference is to the *First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* held in Minsk on March 1-3 (13-15), 1898. The Congress was attended by nine delegates from six organisations: the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav and Kiev Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, from the Kiev *Rabochaya Gazeta* group and from the Bund. The Congress elected a Central Committee of the Party, confirmed *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the Party's official organ, published a Manifesto, and proclaimed the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad the foreign representative of the Party.

The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was significant in that it adopted decisions and a Manifesto proclaiming the establishment of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, thereby playing an important role in the matter of revolutionary propaganda. The Congress, however, did not adopt a Programme or draft Party Rules. The Central Committee elected at the Congress was soon arrested and the printing-press of *Rabochaya Gazeta* was seized, thus making it impossible for the Congress to unite and establish contact between the various Marxist circles and organisations. There was no single central leadership and no single line in the work of the local organisations. p. 248

[122] *St. Petersburg Rabochy Listok* (*St. Petersburg Workers' Bulletin*)—organ of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Two issues appeared—No. 1 in February (dated January) 1897 mimeographed in Russia in 300—400 copies, and No. 2 in September 1897 in Geneva in printed form.

The newspaper put forward the task of combining the economic struggle of the working class with broad political demands, and stressed the need for creating a workers' party. p. 248

[123] *Rabotnik* (*The Worker*)—a non-periodical symposium published abroad in 1896-99 by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats under the editorship of the Emancipation of Labour group. The symposium was issued on the initiative of Lenin who, during his journey abroad in 1895, made arrangements with Plekhanov and Axelrod for the symposium to be edited and published by the Emancipation of Labour group. On his return to Russia Lenin did much to organise support for this publication and have articles and cor-

respondence sent to it from Russia. Before his arrest in December 1895 Lenin had prepared and forwarded to *Rabotnik* an obituary article "Frederick Engels' and several items of correspondence, some of which (those from A. A. Vaneyev, M. A. Silvin, and S. P. Shesternin) were published in No. 1-2 and No. 5-6 of the symposium.

Altogether six issues of *Rabotnik* were published in three books and 10 issues of *Listok Rabotnika*. p. 249

124 *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen issues were put out. Its organiser, manager and guiding spirit was Lenin. Other members of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, A. V Lunacharsky, and M. S. Olminsky. All correspondence, including that of the local committees in Russia, was handled by N. K. Krupskaya. Lenin defined the content of the newspaper in the following words: "The line of *Vperyod* is the *line of the old* '*Iskra*'. In the name of the old *Iskra*, *Vperyod* resolutely combats the new *Iskra*." (See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 130.) Besides leading articles, Lenin wrote numerous paragraphs for *Vperyod* and rewrote items of correspondence. Some articles were written by Lenin in co-operation with other members of the editorial board (Vorovsky, Olminsky and others). Over sixty articles and minor items by Lenin were published in *Vperyod*. Some issues of the newspaper, e.g., Nos. 4 and 5, which dealt with the events of January 9 (22), 1905, and the beginning of the revolution in Russia, were written almost entirely by Lenin. His articles in *Vperyod* were often reprinted in the local Bolshevik press and published in the form of leaflets and pamphlets.

The outstanding role which the newspaper played in combating Menshevism, reasserting the Party principle, formulating and elucidating the issues posed by the rising revolution, and fighting for a congress to be convened, was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress which recorded a vote of thanks to the editorial board. By a decision of the Third Congress the newspaper *Vperyod* was superceded by *Proletary*.

Proletary (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., founded in accordance with a resolution of the Third Party Congress. By a decision of the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee of April 27 (May 10), 1905, Lenin was appointed Editor-in-Chief. *Proletary* was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25), 1905. Twenty-six issues were put out.

Proletary carried on the line of the old, Leninist, *Iskra* and preserved complete continuity with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

Lenin wrote about ninety articles and paragraphs for the newspaper. His articles determined the paper's political character, its ideological message and Bolshevik trend. Lenin bore a heavy burden of the work on the newspaper as manager and editor, receiving regular assistance from the other members of the editorial board—Vorovsky, Lunacharsky and Olminsky.

Proletary reacted immediately to all important events in the Russian and international labour movement, and waged a relentless struggle against the Mensheviks and other opportunist revisionist elements. The newspaper did a great deal to propagandise the decisions of the Third Party Congress, and played an important part in rallying the Bolsheviks organisationally and ideologically. *Proletary* consistently advocated revolutionary Marxism and formulated all the basic issues involved in the rising revolution in Russia. The newspaper highlighted the events of 1905 and roused the broad masses of the working people to the struggle for the victory of the revolution.

Proletary gave a good deal of attention to the local Social-Democratic organisations. Some of Lenin's articles in this newspaper were reprinted by the local Bolshevik newspapers and distributed in leaflet form. *Proletary* suspended publication shortly after Lenin's departure for Russia early in November 1905. The last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26) were edited by Vorovsky, but even these contained several articles by Lenin, which were published after his departure from Geneva. p. 251

[125] *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper, published as a St. Petersburg daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. Lenin took over the editorship upon his return to Russia early in November. *Novaya Zhizn* was virtually the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Closely associated with the paper were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and others. Maxim Gorky was an active contributor to the paper, to which he gave substantial financial aid.

Issue No. 9 of the paper for November 10, 1905 carried Lenin's first article "The Reorganisation of the Party", which was followed by more than ten articles from his pen. The paper's circulation reached 80,000, despite constant persecution. Fifteen of the paper's twenty-seven issues were confiscated and destroyed. It was banned after publication of issue No. 27 on December 2 (15), No. 28 being put out illegally. p. 251

[126] *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*)—a legal Menshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from November 13 (26) to December 2 (15), 1905. Sixteen issues came out. The editors and publishers of the newspaper were D. M. Herzenstein and S. N. Saltykov, and among the contributors were P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. G. Deutsch, N. I. Yordansky, L. Martov, and A. N. Potresov. p. 251

[127] *Volna* (*The Wave*)—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from April 26 (May 9) to May 24 (June 6), 1906. Twenty-five issues were put out. Beginning with No. 9 for May 5 (18), 1906 (after the close of the Fourth Congress and Lenin's arrival from Stockholm) the paper was virtually edited by Lenin. Some twenty-five articles by him were published in the paper. Others on the editorial staff were V. V. Vorovsky and M. S. Olminsky. *Volna* was subjected to frequent police repressions and was eventually

closed down by the tsarist government. Its place was taken by the legal Bolshevik paper *Vperyod*.

Ekho (*The Echo*)—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from June 22 (July 5) to July 7 (20), 1906 in place of the suppressed newspaper *Vperyod*. Fourteen issues were put out. Actually the paper was edited by Lenin, whose articles appeared in every issue. Lenin also conducted the "Book and Magazine" section.

Almost every issue of the newspaper was subjected to repressions, twelve of the fourteen issues being seized by the police. p. 251

[128] *Narodnaya Duma* (*People's Duma*)—a Menshevik daily published in St. Petersburg in March-April 1907 in place of the suppressed *Russkaya Zhizn*. Twenty-one issues of the paper came out. p. 251

[129] Lenin is referring to the tsarist bureaucracy's attitude towards the democratic Zemstvo personnel—doctors, technicians, statisticians, teachers, agriculturists, etc., called the "third element" in a speech made in 1900 by the Samara Deputy Governor-General Kondoidi. The expression was subsequently used in literature to designate the Zemstvo democratic intelligentsia. p. 256

[130] Lenin refers to the *International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart* (the Seventh Congress of the Second International) held in August 1907. One of the principal items on the agenda was the colonial question, over which a sharp struggle was waged at the Congress. The opportunist section of the Congress moved a resolution justifying colonial conquests. The Dutch "socialist" Van Kol made a statement to the effect that in future socialists should go to "the savage peoples" not only with machines and other achievements of culture, but with weapons in their hands. The opportunist draft resolution was supported by the majority of the German delegation. Only as a result of the efforts of the Russian and Polish socialists, a small part of the German, French and British socialists, as well as of all the socialists of the small countries owning no colonies, was this resolution defeated, and amendments adopted to it which practically changed its whole tenor. The resolution on the colonial question adopted by the Congress plainly and unreservedly condemned every kind of colonial policy. p. 256

[131] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist Monthly*)—the chief organ of the German opportunists and a mouthpiece of international revisionism, published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During World War I (1914-18) it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 257

[132] *The theory of "marginal utility"* was advanced by the Austrian school at the end of the nineteenth century in opposition to the Marxian theory of labour value. This school was a species of vulgar political economy, but unlike some of the latter's exponents, it determined the value of a commodity, not simply by its utility, but by the utility of the final (marginal) unit of stock of the given

commodity which satisfies the least urgent needs of a person. In substance, the theory of "marginal utility", like the sum total of the economic and philosophical tenets of the Austrian school was merely an attempt to gloss over the essential nature of exploitation under capitalism. p. 260

[133] *Otzovism* (from the Russian word meaning "withdrawal")—an opportunist trend which arose among the Bolsheviks after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905-07. The otzovists believed that under the prevailing conditions of reaction the Party should conduct only illegal activities. They demanded the withdrawal of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Duma, and refused to take part in the work of the trade unions and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations. The otzovists' policy tended towards divorcing the Party from the masses and turning in into a sectarian organisation. p. 266

[134] *Pochin* (*Initiative*)—a journal of the Narodnik-liquidationist trend run by a group of Socialist-Revolutionaries. Only a single issue was published in June 1912 in Paris. p. 266

[135] In the autumn of 1904 the editors of the Menshevik *Iskra* published a letter stating that the chief task of the Social-Democrats was to bring "organised pressure to bear on the bourgeois opposition" by presenting demands to the government through the bourgeois liberals and Zemstvo people. This "Zemstvo campaign plan" clearly revealed the Mensheviks' lack of faith in the proletariat's strength, in its ability to wage a political struggle and take independent revolutionary action. From organisational opportunism the Mensheviks passed on to tactical opportunism, the "Zemstvo campaign plan" being the first step in this direction. A detailed analysis and criticism of the Mensheviks' plan is given by Lenin in "The Zemstvo Campaign and *Iskra*'s Plan". (See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516.) p. 269

[136] *The Bulygin Duma*—a consultative Duma, the law for the convocation of which was drafted by A. G. Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, on instructions from the tsar. The tsar's Manifesto introducing the State Duma and the regulations governing the elections to it was published on August 6 (19), 1905. Only landlords, capitalists and a limited number of peasant householders were granted the right to vote in the Duma elections. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Bulygin Duma. The government failed to convene it—it was swept away by the October general political strike.

The Witte Duma—the First Duma convened on April 27 (May 10), 1906, under the regulations drawn up by S. Y. Witte, Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Four hundred and seventy-eight deputies were elected to the First Duma, of whom 179 were Cadets, 63 Autonomists (including members of the Polish koło, and Ukrainian, Estonian, Lettish,

Lithuanian and other bourgeois-national groups), 16 Octobrists 105 non-party people, 97 Trudoviks and 18 Social-Democrats. Thus, over a third of the seats in the Duma were held by the Cadets.

The high point of the First Duma deliberations was the agrarian question. Two basic agrarian programmes were put forward in the Duma—the Cadets' Bill signed by 42 deputies, and the Trudoviks' Bill known as the "Bill of the 104". In contrast with the Trudoviks, the Cadets wanted to preserve landlordism, allowing alienation with compensation "at a fair price" of only those landed estates which were chiefly cultivated by the peasants' implements or were rented out.

The First Duma was dissolved by the tsarist government on July 8 (21), 1906. p. 270

[137] *Tovarishch* (*Comrade*)—a bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from March 15 (28), 1906 to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908). Though formally the organ of no particular party it was in fact the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets. Mensheviks also contributed to the paper. p. 270

[138] *Za Partiyu* (*For the Party*)—a paper of the pro-Party Mensheviks and conciliators published non-periodically in Paris from April 16 (29), 1912, to February 1914. Five issues were published. Among the contributors were G. V. Plekhanov, S. A. Lozovsky, and A. I. Lyubimov. The paper, which was circulated chiefly abroad, expressed the views, in the main, of the Paris group of Plekhanovites. p. 271

[139] *Buryanov*, *A. F.*—member of the Fourth Duma, and one of the Menshevik Seven. p. 271

[140] *Vperyod* groups—see Lenin's article "The Vperyodists and the *Vperyod* group". (See pp. 487-93 of this volume.) p. 272

[141] See Note 33. p. 273

[142] At the session of the Duma on April 22 (May 5), 1914, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group (the Bolshevik Six), the Social-Democratic Group (the Mensheviks) and the Trudoviks moved that the budget debates should be adjourned pending the adoption of the Bill on the freedom of speech for deputies.

This motion was defeated by a majority of the Duma. Thereupon the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Trudoviks used obstructionist tactics during the speech of Goremykin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Rodzyanko, Chairman of the Duma, retorted by suspending all the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks from the Duma for fifteen sessions. In reply St. Petersburg and Moscow workers held strikes of protest. p. 274

[143] This refers to the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the All-Russia Conference 1908). (See Note 52.) p. 277

[144] *Proletary* (*The Proletarian*)—a Bolshevik illegal newspaper, published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909 under the editorship of Lenin. Fifty issues were published. Active collaborators on the paper were M. F. Vladimirsky, V. V. Vorovsky, I. F. Dubrovinsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, and others. The first twenty issues were prepared for the press and set up in Vyborg, but as conditions for the publication of an illegal organ in Russia became extremely difficult, further publication was transferred abroad (Geneva and Paris).

Proletary was virtually the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. Most of the work on the paper was done by Lenin, several of whose articles appeared in almost every issue. *Proletary* published over a hundred articles and paragraphs by Lenin on the most important issues of the revolutionary struggle of the working class. The paper dealt with tactical and political questions of general interest and carried reports on the activities of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the decisions of conferences and plenary meetings of the C.C., letters of the C.C. on various questions of Party activities, and a number of other documents. A supplement to No. 46 of the newspaper published a report on the conference of the extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*, as well as the resolutions of that meeting, which was held in Paris on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909. The newspaper was in close touch with the local Party organisations.

During the years of the Stolypin reaction *Proletary* played an outstanding role in safeguarding and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations, in fighting the liquidators, otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders.

Publication of the newspaper ceased in 1910 in accordance with the decision of the January Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

p. 279

[145] *Bill on the Equality of Nations and the Safeguarding of the Rights of National Minorities* was drafted by Lenin for introduction to the Fourth Duma by the Bolshevik group.

The plan of the Bill was outlined in a letter to S. G. Shahumyan, dated May 6 (19), 1914, from Lenin who attached special importance to the introduction of this Bill in the Duma. "In this way", he wrote, "I believe we can popularly explain the stupidity of cultural-national autonomy and *crush* the votaries of this folly once for all."

The Bill was not introduced. p. 281

[146] See Note 39. p. 286

[147] See Note 20. p. 288

[148] *V. O.*—author of the article "The Deterioration of School Education" published in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 35, March 21, 1914.

p. 291

[149] *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary*)—a literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg in 1911-15. A group of Menshevik liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists, and Left liberals formed around the journal, which had no contacts whatever with the working-class masses. A. V. Amfiteatrov played an important role in it at the beginning of its existence, and in 1913-15 it was headed by N. Sukhanov (N. N. Himmer). p. 293

[150] A reference to the wilful resignation of R. Malinovsky, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. Duma group, from the Fourth Duma. For this act of disorganisation and for deserting his post, Malinovsky was expelled from the Party. Eventually, it was discovered that Malinovsky was an agent provocateur. He was tried by the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in 1918 and sentenced to be shot. p. 302

[151] *Khrustalev-Nosar, G. S.* (1877-1918)—a Menshevik lawyer. During the years of reaction and the mounting revolutionary movement he was a liquidator, and contributed to the Menshevik newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. He resigned from the Party in 1909, and engaged in shady financial operations. p. 304

[152] *Voprosy Strakhovania* (*Insurance Question*)—a Bolshevik legal journal, published at intervals in St. Petersburg from October 1913 to March 1918. It worked not only for the achievement of workers' insurance but for the Bolshevik "uncurtailed slogans" of an eight-hour day, confiscation of the landed estates, and a democratic republic. Prominent insurance campaigners—the Bolsheviks N. A. Skripnik, P. I. Stučka, A. N. Vinokurov, N. M. Shvernik and others—contributed to the journal. p. 308

[153] *Yedinstvo* (*Unity*)—a legal newspaper published by a group of pro-Party Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov and Bolshevik-conciliators in St. Petersburg from May to June 1914. Four issues appeared. p. 309

[154] Lenin is referring to the resolution "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators" adopted by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912. The resolution was drafted by Lenin. (See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 480-81.) p. 310

[155] *The Estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture*—a speech drafted by Lenin for delivery in the Duma by a Bolshevik deputy. It was made by G. I. Petrovsky on May 28 (June 10), 1914, during the debate on the Budget Commission report on the estimates of the Department of State Landed Properties for 1914.

The concluding part of the M.S. is missing. p. 313

[156] *Rural superintendent*—an office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to give the landlords more power over the peasantry. Appointed from among the local landed nobility, the rural

superintendents were vested with immense powers, juridical as well as administrative, including the right to arrest peasants, and order corporal punishment. p. 313

[157] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of the feudalist landowners, which took shape in May 1906 at the First Congress of Representatives of Gubernia Assemblies of the Nobility and existed until October 1917. The organisation's main object was to protect the autocratic system, the big landed estates, and the privileges of the nobility. Lenin called the Council of the United Nobility "a council of united feudalists". The Council virtually became a semi-government body, which dictated to the government legislative measures aimed at protecting the interests of the feudalists. A considerable number of its members were members of the Council of State and of the leading centres of the Black-Hundred organisations. p. 313

[158] This refers to the "Party unity" resolution adopted at the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International in August 1904. p. 319

[159] *Der Kampf*—monthly organ of the Austrian Social-Democrats, published in Vienna from 1907 to 1934. Took an opportunist, centrist stand under the guise of Left-wing phrases.

F. A .—Friedrich Adler, leader of the Austrian Social-Democrats. p. 322

[160] *Le Peuple*—a daily, central organ of the Belgian Labour Party, published in Brussels since 1885: at present the mouthpiece of the Belgian Socialist Party. p. 323

[161] This refers to *Prosveshcheniye*. (See Note 17.) p. 327

[162] *Pro-Party Bolsheviks*—conciliators with leanings towards the liquidators. (For further details see Lenin's article "Adventurism", pp. 356-59 of this volume.)

Pro-Party Mensheviks—headed by Plekhanov, came out against the liquidators during the period of reaction. While taking a Menshevik stand, the Plekhanovites at the same time stood for the preservation and strengthening of the illegal Party organisation and therefore stood for a bloc with the Bolsheviks. Plekhanov broke the bloc with the Bolsheviks at the end of 1911. Under the guise of fighting "factionalism" and the split in the R.S.D.L.P. he attempted to reconcile the Bolsheviks with the opportunists. In 1912 the Plekhanovites, together with the Trotskyists, Bundists and liquidators, came out against the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 330

[163] *Nozdrev*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls* typifying a self-assured, impudent, and mendacious person. p. 335

[164] "*Judas*" *Golovlyov*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's book *The Golovlyov Family* typifying the spiritual and physical

disintegration of the historically doomed class of feudalist landlords, social parasites, treacherous hypocrites. p. 335

165 At the December meeting of the International Socialist Bureau (held in London on December 13-14, 1913) a resolution was adopted instructing the Executive of the International Socialist Bureau to call a meeting of representatives of "all factions of the labour movement in Russia, including Russian Poland, who recognise the Party Programme or whose programme corresponds with that of the Social-Democrats, for a mutual exchange of opinions (*Aussprache*) on points of disagreement". In seconding this resolution, Kautsky, in his speech of December 14, stated that the old Social-Democratic Party in Russia was dead. It had to be re-established on the basis of the Russian workers' urge for unity. In his article "A Good Resolution and a Bad Speech", Lenin examined this resolution and called Kautsky's speech monstrous. (See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 528-30.) p. 341

166 *The Troublous Times*—a term used in pre-revolutionary Russian historiography to denote the period of ths peasant war and the struggle of the Russian people against the Polish and Swedish intervention in the early seventeenth century.

In 1608 the Polish troops under Pseudo-Dmitry II, a henchman of the Polish landed gentry who posed as the younger son of the Russian tsar Ivan the Terrible, invaded Russia, and reached the outskirts of Moscow, where they encamped in Tushino. A government headed by Pseudo-Dmitry was formed in Tushino in opposition to the government of Moscow. Some of the Russian nobles and boyar aristocracy deserted one camp for another in an effort to keep in with the winning side. These deserters were called "Tushino turncoats". p. 346

167 *Put Pravdy* No. 50, for March 30 (April 12), 1914 published the resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region concerning the split in the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. The resolution stressed the need for unity of the Duma Social-Democratic Group on the basis of acceptance of the Programme and Rules of the Party and the Party decisions. (See pp. 177-81 of this volume.)

In connection with this resolution of the Lettish Congress, the same issue of *Put Pravdy* published an "Open Enquiry" to the Menshevik deputies as to their attitude towards the principles advanced by the Lettish workers. This enquiry of the Bolshevik newspaper was ignored by the Mensheviks. Thereupon, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma published an "Open Letter' in *Put Pravdy* No. 63 for April 17, 1914 in which they demanded from the Mensheviks a clear and definite reply to the question put to them.

The "Open Letter" evoked an "Open Reply" by the Mensheviks, which was published in *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, May 4 (17). This reply is dealt with in the present article. p. 351

[168] Lenin is quoting the resolution of the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.—the "All-Russia Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. (In December 1908.)" It was published by newspaper *Proletary*, Paris, 1909, p. 38. p. 353

[169] The *Svoboda* (*Freedom*) group was founded by Y. O. Zelensky (Nadezhdin) in May 1901. It called itself the "revolutionary-socialist" group, and published the journal *Svoboda* in Switzerland (of which two issues appeared—No. 1 in 1901, and No. 2 in 1902). The group also published: *Eve of the Revolution. A Review of Questions of Theory and Tactics* No. 1, a periodical *Otkitki* (*Comments*) No. 1, a programmatic pamphlet *The Revival of Revolutionism in Russia* and others. The *Svoboda* group preached the ideas of terrorism and Economism, acted in concert with the St. Petersburg Economists against *Iskra* and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The group ceased to exist in 1903.

The *Borba* (*Struggle*) group was formed in Paris in the summer of 1900 and consisted of D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov, and E. L. Gurevich. The name *Borba* was adopted by the group in May 1901. In its publications the group distorted the revolutionary theory of Marxism, which it interpreted in a doctrinaire and scholastic spirit, and was opposed to Lenin's organisational principles of Party building. In view of its deviations from Social-Democratic views and tactics, its disruptive activities and lack of contact with the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the group was not allowed to attend the Second Congress. By a decision of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the *Borba* group was dissolved. p. 356

[170] *V. A. T.*—initials of V. A. Tikhomirnov, a member of the *Pravda* staff. p. 363

[171] The article "*Objective Data on the Strength of the Various Trends in the Working-Class Movement*" was written by Lenin on the basis of a wide range of facts and figures, carefully collected and analysed, concerning money collections for the workers' press, which served as objective evidence of the strength of the various trends in the working-class movement in Russia. The Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee the C.P.S.U. has in its possession the manuscripts of Lenin's computations of the collections made by the newspaper *Pravda*, number of workers' groups united by the newspaper *Zeit* and their contributions, the computations to the table given in the article (See pp. 382-85 of this volume), and tabulated figures showing what collections were made for the various newspapers and where they were made. The original draft conspectus and a synopsis of the article are also to be found in the Archive. The figures quoted in this article were used by Lenin in subsequent articles. p. 381

[172] This refers to *Töö Hääl* (*The Voice of Labour*), an Estonian newspaper of a Pravdist trend, which appeared in Narva three times a

week from January to May 1914, and the Lithuanian weekly *Vilnis* (*The Wave*), published in Riga in 1913-14. p. 385

[173] This refers to the legal workers' newspaper *Nash Put* (*Our Way*) published in Moscow, the first issue appearing on August 25 (September 7), 1913. Lenin took an active part in the newspaper, sending his articles simultaneously to *Pravda* and *Nash Put*. The latter published a number of articles by Lenin, namely: "The Russian Bourgeoisie and Russian Reformism", "The Role of Social Estates and Classes in the Liberation Movement", "Class War in Dublin", "A Week After the Dublin Massacre", "Questions of Principle in Politics", "Harry Quelch" and others.

Other contributors to the newspaper were Maxim Gorky, Demyan Bedny, M. S. Olminsky, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, and the Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma A. Y. Badayev, F. N. Samoilov, and N. R. Shagov.

Nash Put was very popular among the workers, as many as 395 workers' groups supporting the newspaper with money contributions. The newspaper was persistently persecuted by the police and closed down on September 12 (25), 1913, after publishing 16 issues. The Moscow workers struck in protest against its suppression, but the paper was unable to resume publication. p. 385

[174] The newspaper *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 12 for June 11, 1914, published a paragraph entitled "How Does It Happen?", in which it quoted a number of instances of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, the organ of the liquidators, reprinting, under the guise of workers, correspondence, information from the bourgeois newspapers which distorted the facts of reality in working-class life. p. 387

[175] *Sputnik Rabochego for 1914* (*Worker's Companion for 1914*)—a pocket calendar issued by the Priboi Party Publishes in December 1913, and sold out in a single day. A second revised edition was issued in February 1914. The calendar contained the article by Lenin "Strikes in Russia". (See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 534-538.) p. 387

[176] Lenin is referring to the resolution of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903 "On the Socialist-Revolutionaries"; the resolution of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1907) on "Attitude Towards the Bourgeois Parties", the resolution of the Poronin meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on "The Narodniks". (See *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Russ. ed., Part I, 1954, pp. 49-50; 158-60; 316-17.) p. 388

[177] This refers to the Tenth International Congress, which was to have been held in Vienna. The question of the Vienna Congress was discussed at the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau held in December 1913. It was resolved to convene the Congress

in August 1914, to coincide with the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the First International. The agenda was to have been as follows: 1) The high cost of living, 2) Imperialism and the fight against militarism—including the subordinate questions: (a) the Eastern question, (b) compulsory courts of arbitration among nations, and c) the United States of Europe; 3) Alcoholism, 4) Unemployment, 5) The position of political prisoners and exiles in Russia, and 6) Miscellanea.

The number of delegates was not to exceed the number of votes of the given country by more than sixfold. Russia had 20 votes, consequently not more than 120 delegates for both subsections of the Social-Democrats and the Left Narodniks and for the trade unions.

The question of the International Socialist Congress in Vienna was discussed at the Poronin meeting of the C.C. and Party workers. Lenin made a report on this question, and proposed that every effort be made to send a majority of Social-Democratic worker delegates to the Vienna Congress.

Election of delegates to the International Socialist Congress was practically completed by the end of July 1914, but the outbreak of war prevented the Congress from convening. p. 390

[178] *Die Neue Zeit*—theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. It was edited by K. Kautsky until October 1917, and then by H. Cunow. Some of the writings of the founders of Marxism were first published in this journal, among them K. Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and Engels's "Criticism of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891". Engels often gave pointers to the editors of *Die Neue Zeit* and criticised their deviations from Marxism. Other prominent leaders of the German and international labour movement who contributed to the journal at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries were A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, R. Luxemburg, F. Mehring, Clara Zetkin, G. V. Plekhanov and P. Lafargue. Beginning with the late nineties, after the death of Engels, the journal regularly published articles by revisionists, including a series of articles by E. Bernstein "Problems of Socialism", which launched a revisionists' campaign against Marxism. During World War I the journal took a centrist stand and supported the social-chauvinists. p. 397

[179] *Nauchnaya Mysl* (*Scientific Thought*)—a journal of a Menshevik trend, published in Riga in 1908. p. 397

[180] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 765. p. 399

[181] See Note 11. p. 408

[182] *L. Vl.*—L. Vladimirov (pseudonym of M. K. Sheinfinkel)—a Social-Democrat. p. 413

[183] This refers to the *Second All-Ukraine Students' Congress* held in Lvov on June 19-22 (July 2-5), 1913, to coincide with anniversary celebrations in honour of Ivan Franko, the great Ukrainian writer, scholar, public figure, and revolutionary democrat. A report, "The Ukrainian Youth and the Present Status of the Nations," was made at the Congress by the Ukrainian Social-Democrat Dontsov, who supported the slogan of an "independent" Ukraine. p. 416

[184] *Shlyakhi* (*Paths*)—organ of the Ukrainian Students' Union (nationalistic trend), published in Lvov from April 1913 to March 1914. p. 416

[185] Lenin is quoting from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 423

[186] *Naprzód* (*Forward*)—central organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia, published in Cracow beginning with 1892. The newspaper, which was a vehicle of petty-bourgeois nationalist ideas, was described by Lenin as "a very bad, and not at all Marxist organ". p. 425

[187] This refers to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 433

[188] Lenin is referring to the Polish national liberation insurrection of 1863-64 against the yoke of the tsarist autocracy. The original cause of the rising was the tsarist government's decision to carry out a special recruitment aimed at removing the revolutionary-minded youth *en masse* from the cities. At first the rising was led by a Central National Committee formed by the petty-nobles' party of the "Reds" in 1862. Its programme demanding national independence for Poland, equal rights for all men in the land, irrespective of religion or birth, transfer to the peasants of the land tilled by them with full right of ownership and without redemption payments, abolition of the corvée, compensation for the landlords for the alienated lands out of the state funds, etc., attracted to the uprising diverse sections of the Polish population—artisans, workers, students, intellectuals from among the gentry, part of the peasantry and the clergy.

In the course of the insurrection, elements united around the party of the "Whites" (the party of the big landed aristocracy and the big bourgeoisie) joined it with the intention of using it in their own interests and, with the help of Britain and France, securing a profitable deal with the tsarist government.

The attitude of the revolutionary democrats of Russia towards the rebels was one of deep sympathy, the members of *Zemlya i Volya* secret society associated with N. G. Chernyshevsky trying to give them every possible assistance. The Central Committee of *Zemlya i Volya* issued an appeal "To the Russian Officers and Soldiers", which was distributed among the troops sent to suppress the insurrection. A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogaryov published a

number of articles in *Kolokol* devoted to the struggle of the Polish people, and rendered material aid to the rebels.

Owing to the inconsistency of the party of the "Reds", which failed to hold the revolutionary initiative, the leadership of the uprising passed into the hands of the "Whites", who betrayed it. By the summer of 1864, the insurrection was brutally crushed by the tsarist troops.

Marx and Engels, who regarded the Polish insurrection of 1863-64 as a progressive movement, were fully in sympathy with it and wished the Polish people victory in its struggle for national liberation. On behalf of the German emigrant colony in London, Marx wrote an appeal for aid to the Poles. p. 433

[189] Lenin refers to W. Liebknecht's reminiscences of Marx. (See the symposium *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels*, Moscow, 1957, p. 98.) p. 435

[190] See Marx's letter to Engels dated July 5, 1870. p. 435

[191] *The New York Daily Tribune*—an American newspaper published from 1841 to 1924. Until the middle fifties it was the organ of the Left wing of the American Whigs, and thereafter the organ of the Republican Party. Karl Marx contributed to the paper from August 1851 to March 1862, and at his request Frederick Engels wrote numerous articles for it. During the period of reaction that set in in Europe, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels used this widely circulated and at that time progressive newspaper to publish concrete material exposing the evils of capitalist society. During the American Civil War Marx's contributions to the newspaper stopped. His break with *The New York Daily Tribune* was largely due to the growing influence on the editorial board of the advocates of compromise with the slave-owners, and the papers's departure from progressive positions. Eventually the newspaper swung still more to the right. p. 439

[192] Lenin is quoting from G. V. Plekhanov's article "The Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Party" published in *Zarya* No. 4, 1902.

Zarya—a Marxist scientific and political journal published legally in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the Editorial Board of *Iskra*. Altogether four numbers (three issues) of *Zarya* appeared: No. 1 in April 1901 (actually on March 23, new style); No. 2-3 in December 1901, and No. 4 in August 1902. The aims of the publication were set forth in the "Draft of a Declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*" written by Lenin in Russia. (See present edition, Vol. 4.) In 1902, during the disagreement and conflicts that arose on the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, Plekhanov proposed a plan for separating the newspaper from the journal (with *Zarya* remaining under his editorship), but this proposal was not accepted, and the two publications continued under a single editorial board.

Zarya criticised international and Russian revisionism, and defended the theoretical principles of Marxism. The following articles by Lenin were published in this journal: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question" (the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'"), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", as well as Plekhanov's articles "Criticism of Our Critics. Part I. Mr. P. Struve in the Role of Critic of the Marxian Theory of Social Development", "Cant versus Kant, or the Testament of Mr. Bernstein" and others. p. 443

[193] A quotation from the sketch "Abroad" by the Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 448

[194] Lenin quotes an expression from *Seminary Sketches* by the Russian writer N. G. Pomyalovsky. p. 448

[195] Lenin quotes the words of a Sevastopol soldiers' song written by Leo Tolstoy. The song is about the unsuccessful operation of the Russian troops at the river Chornaya on August 4, 1855, during the Crimean War. In that action General Read commanded two divisions. p. 450

[196] Lenin is referring to the attack by the bourgeois counter-revolution against the working class and the democratic petty bourgeoisie in France, after the latter's defeat in June 1849.

The reference to 1871 is about the rising of the Paris workers on March 18, 1871, as a result of which a government of the proletarian dictatorship—the Paris Commune—was created for the first time in history. The Commune was defeated. "The entire bourgeoisie of France all the landlords, stockbrokers, factory owners, all the robbers great and small all the exploiters—united against it in savage fury. (See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 140-41.) With active aid from Bismarck, this coalition started military operations against insurgent Paris, and, on winning victory, flooded the streets of the city with the blood of the people. No less than 30,000 Communards were killed and 50,000 arrested. Many of these were executed and thousands were condemned to penal servitude or exile.

The Paris Commune is dealt with in Lenin's articles: "Plan of a Lecture on the Commune", "Lessons of the Commune", "In Memory of the Commune", *The State and Revolution*, Ch. III. (See present edition, Vols. 8, 13, 17, 25.) p. 455

[197] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1952, pp. 54-64. p. 456

[198] *The Peasant Union* (The All-Russia Peasant Union)—a revolutionary-democratic organisation, which arose in 1905. Influenced by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and liberals, the Peasant Union

displayed a half-way policy, vacillations and indecision typical of the petty-bourgeoisie. While demanding the abolition of landlordism, the Union agreed to partial compensation for the landlords. In the words of Lenin, this was "organisation, sharing, of course, in a number of peasant prejudices, and susceptible to the petty-bourgeois illusions of the peasants (just like our Socialist-Revolutionaries); but it was undoubtedly a real organisation of the masses, of 'men of the soil', unquestionably revolutionary at bottom, capable of employing genuinely revolutionary methods of struggle." (See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 258-59.) From the very outset of its activities the Peasant Union was subject to police repression and discontinued its activities early in 1907.
p. 462

[199] *L'Humanité*—a daily newspaper founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. The newspaper hailed the beginning of the revolution in Russia in 1905 and expressed the sympathy of the French people "with the Russian nation, which was effecting its 1789". The newspaper organised collections in support of the Russian revolution. During the First World War (1914-18) the paper was controlled by the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party and took a chauvinist stand.

In 1918, Marcel Cachin, a prominent leader of the French and international labour movement, became political director and head of the newspaper. In 1918-20, the paper came out against the imperialist policy of the French Government and its sending of armed forces against the Soviet Republic. In December 1920, after the split in the French Socialist Party and the formation of the Communist Party of France, the newspaper became the latter's Central Organ.

At the beginning of World War II, in August 1939, the newspaper was banned by the French authorities and went underground. During the Nazi occupation of France (1940-44) the newspaper appeared illegally, and played a tremendous role in the liberation of France.

In the-post-war period the newspaper has been waging a ceaseless struggle for the country's national independence, for unity of working-class action, for strengthening peace and friendship among the nations, and for democracy and social progress. p. 464

[200] Lenin's telegram demanding that Martov and Dan should make a signed and open accusation and not engage in spreading dark rumours was published in the newspaper *Rabochy* No. 4, May 25, 1914. p. 476

[201] Lenin, with slight modifications, is quoting from the poem The *Man of the Forties* by the Russian poet Nekrasov. p. 481

[202] Following the slanderous anti-Bolshevik attacks by the liquidationist *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, a group of Marxists asked Plekhanov to make a statement to the International Socialist Bureau

condemning the newspaper's behaviour. Though he strongly disapproved of this behaviour, Plekhanov refused to make the required statement, thereby justifying the slanderers. Thereupon, the "Group of Marxists" published a "Statement" in the newspaper *Trudovaya Pravda* on June 5 (18), 1914, in which Plekhanov's conduct was characterised as "an act of high diplomacy". p. 482

[203] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 121. p. 485

[204] *N. Maximov* and *A. Bogdanov*—pseudonyms of A. A. Malinovsky; *Voinov*—A. V. Lunacharsky; *Lyadov*—M. N. Mandelshtam; *S. A. Volsky*—A. V. Sokolov; *Domov*—M. N. Pokrovsky. p. 488

[205] *V. Ilyin*—V. I. Lenin. p. 489

[206] *Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.*—the illegal newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published from February 1908 to January 1917. Prepared by the Bolsheviks and partially printed in Vilna at a private press, the first issue was confiscated by the tsarist Okhranka (Secret Political Police). Shortly afterwards another attempt to issue the newspaper was made in St. Petersburg, but the bulk of the edition fell into the hands of the security police. Further publication was arranged abroad. Issues Nos. 2-32 (February 1909 to December 1913) appeared in Paris, Nos. 35-58 (November 1914 to January 1917) in Geneva. Altogether fifty-eight issues were published, five of them with supplements.

According to the decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. elected at the Fifth (London) Congress, the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* consisted of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and the Polish Social-Democrats. Actually, the paper was conducted by Lenin, whose articles were a central feature in it. Over eighty articles and paragraphs by Lenin were published in the newspaper.

Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line against the Menshevik liquidators on the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Some of its members (Kamenev and Zinoviev) adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and opposed Lenin's line. The Menshevik members of the editorial board—Martov and Dan—obstructed the work of the editorial staff of the Central Organ while at the same time openly defending liquidationism in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*; they prevented the pro-Party Mensheviks from taking part in the work of the Central Organ. Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan resigning from the editorial board in June 1911. From December 1911 *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin.

During the grim years of reaction and the period of a new upswing in the revolutionary movement *Sotsial-Demokrat* was a factor of tremendous importance in the Bolsheviks' struggle against the liquidators, Trotskyists, and otzovists for the preservation of the illegal Marxist party, and strengthening its unity and contacts with the masses.

During World War I *Sotsial-Demokrat* was the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party, in which capacity it played a vital part in propagating Bolshevik slogans on the issues of war, peace and revolution. The newspaper published Lenin's article "The Slogan of a United States of Europe", in which for the first time he formulated the conclusion that it was possible for socialism to win initially in a few or even in a single capitalist country. The circulation of *Sotsial-Demokrat* in Russia and the reprinting of its most important articles in the local Bolshevik Papers contributed to the political enlightenment and international education of the Russian proletariat, and the preparation of the masses for the revolution.

Lenin highly appreciated the services that *Sotsial-Demokrat* rendered during World War I, and wrote later that "no class-conscious worker who wishes to *understand* the evolution of the idea of the international socialist revolution and its first victory of October 25, 1917" can dispense with a study of the articles published in it. (See present edition, Vol. 27, "Foreword to the symposium *Against the Stream*".) p. 490

[207] "*Appeal to the Ukrainian Workers*", in the Ukrainian language signed by Ocksen Lola, and published in the newspaper *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 28 for June 29, 1914, called upon the workers to unite irrespective of nation in order to fight capital and to arrange for the publication under the auspices of *Trudovaya Pravda* of a "Ukrainian Workers' Leaflet".

The "Appeal" was drafted by Lenin in Russian in the spring of 1914 and forwarded to O. N. Lola through Inessa Armand. The "Appeal" was intended for the *Miners' Leaflet*—a supplement to the newspaper *Put Pravdy*. Lenin considered it important for the "Appeal" to be issued by Lola in Ukrainian in order that a voice be raised precisely among the Ukrainian Social-Democrats calling for unity against the division of the workers by nation. The "*Ukrainian Workers' Leaflet*" was not published. p. 494

[208] *Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.* exists in the shape of two (incomplete) manuscripts, one of them Lenin's, the other a handwritten copy made by N. K. Krupskaya's mother, Y. V. Krupskaya, with corrections by Lenin. Other existing manuscripts are Lenin's instructions to the C.C. delegation to the conference, namely, "Notes *Privées*", notes "Not for the Report" and letters on this question. These documents illustrate Lenin's struggle against Russian and international opportunism. The Report marks an epoch in the development of Bolshevism in the period of reaction and the years of a new revolutionary upswing.

Concerned about the victory of the Bolsheviks over all the opportunist trends and groups in the Russian working-class movement, the leadership of the Second International hastened to the assistance of these trends and groups. With this aim in view the Brussels Conference was convened, ostensibly "to exchange opinions" on the question of the possibility of restoring unity in the

R.S.D.L.P. Under the guise of establishing "peace" within the R.S.D.L.P., the leaders of the International planned the liquidation of the independent Bolshevik Party, a party of a new type, which was conducting an irreconcilable struggle against opportunism in the Russian and international labour movement.

The *Brussels "Unity" Conference*, convened by the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. in accordance with the December 1913 decision of the Bureau's meeting, was held on July 16-18, 1914. The following were represented at the Conference: the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks); the Organising Committee (Mensheviks) and its affiliated organisations (the Caucasian Regional Committee and the *Borba* group (Trotskyists)); the Duma Social-Democratic group (Mensheviks); Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* group; the *Vperyod* group; the Bund; the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region; the Social-Democrats of Lithuania, the Polish Social-Democrats; the Polish Social-Democratic opposition; and the P.S.P. (Left wing).

The C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. sent a delegation to the Conference, consisting of Inessa Armand (Petrova), M. F. Vladimirsky (Kamsky), and I. F. Popov (Pavlov). Lenin thoroughly prepared the delegation of the C.C. for the Conference. He wrote for it the Report and detailed instructions, and supplied it with the necessary materials, documents and factual data revealing the Russian opportunists and their inspirers in their true colours.

Lenin was in the closest touch with the delegation, whose work he directed from Poronin.

From the very outset the Conference was marked by a very sharp struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Russian and international opportunists.

At Kautsky's proposal the Conference adopted the following agenda: 1. Programmatic differences; 2. Tactical differences; 3. The organisational question. Although the Conference was to have been confined only to an exchange of opinions, Vandervelde warned the delegates that the Conference would adopt decisions on all three items of the agenda. On Lenin's instructions, the C.C.'s delegation proposed that the Conference should hear reports by the delegations and the concrete terms which each of them considered essential for unity. Because of the Bolsheviks' persistence it was decided to waive the agenda and proceed to the reports on the questions at issue, and to the formulation by the delegations of concrete conditions for unity.

The highlight of the Conference was the Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., as written by Lenin, which was read by Inessa Armand in French at the morning session on July 17. The leaders of the I.S.B. did not allow the full text of the Report to be read so that Armand was obliged to set forth only part of it and proceed to the terms for unity. As formulated by Lenin these terms met with indignant protests from the opportunists, Plekhanov declaring that these were not terms for unity, "but articles of a new criminal code". Martov, Alexinsky, Yonov, Semkovsky and others shouted that the report of the C.C. characterised the "intolerance

of the Leninists", that "the Leninists had no right to call themselves 'Bolsheviks'", that the "terms" were "a mockery of the International", and so on.

On behalf of the I.S.B., Kautsky proposed a resolution for the unification of the R.S.D.L.P. which affirmed that within Russian Social-Democracy there were no essential disagreements standing in the way of unity. Kautsky was supported by the Organising Committee and by Plekhanov, who violently attacked the C.C. and Lenin. Rosa Luxemburg took an erroneous stand by joining Plekhanov, Vandervelde, Kautsky and others in advocating unity between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Since the Conference was not authorised to pass resolutions, the Bolsheviks and the Lettish Social-Democrats refused to take part in the voting, but the resolution of the I.S.B, was carried by a majority. The Polish opposition, which joined the Bolsheviks and Lettish Social-Democrats at the Conference, voted for the resolution of the I.S.B.

Guided by Lenin, the Bolsheviks refused to accept the decisions of the Brussels Conference. The attempt by the Second International's opportunist leaders to liquidate the Bolshevik Party met with failure. In the sight of the international proletariat, Lenin and the Bolsheviks exposed the true aims of the leaders of the International, who wore the mask of peacemakers. For their capable and vigorous defence of the Party line, the Central Committee passed a vote of thanks to the C.C. delegation at the Brussels Conference.

At a private meeting of the liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, Plekhanovites, Bundists and representatives of the Caucasian Regional organisation held after the Brussels Conference, these groups formed a bloc against the Bolsheviks. The Brussels ("Third of July") bloc served as a hypocritical screen concealing the politically rotten position of all its participants. The bloc shortly afterwards fell apart, showing how false the policy of the Russian and West-European "uniters" of the R.S.D.L.P. was. p. 495

209 *The Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878 by the Bismarck government with the object of combating the labour and socialist movement. The law banned all Social-Democratic Party and mass working-class organisations, and the labour press; socialist literature was confiscated, and Social-Democrats were hounded and deported. These repressions, however, did not break the Social-Democratic Party, which readjusted its activities to the conditions of illegal existence: the Party's central organ *Sozial-Demokrat* was published abroad and Party congresses were held regularly there (1880, 1883, and 1887); in Germany, Social-Democratic underground organisations and groups headed by an illegal Central Committee were rapidly restored. Simultaneously, the Party made wide use of legal opportunities to strengthen contact with the masses, and its influence steadily grew. The number of votes cast for the Social-Democrats in the Reichstag elections increased more than threefold between 1878 and 1890.

Tremendous assistance to the German Social-Democrats was given by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Anti-Socialist Law was repealed in 1890 as a result of pressure from the mounting mass labour movement. p. 500

[210] "*Trusted agents*"—leading workers chosen to maintain constant contact between the C.C. and the local Social-Democratic groups, and create flexible forms of leadership for local activities in the large centres of the labour movement.

The task of establishing a system of trusted agents was set by the Cracow Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1913. p. 500

[211] *The Technical Commission of the Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee* (the Technical Commission Abroad—T.C.) was set up by the June Conference of members of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. at its sitting of June 1 (14), 1911, with the aim of carrying out technical functions in connection with Party publications, transport, etc. As a temporary body pending the plenary session of the C.C., the Technical Commission was subordinated to a group of C.C. members who had attended the June Conference. The T.C. consisted of one representative each from the Bolsheviks, the conciliators, and the Polish Social-Democrats. The conciliator majority on the T.C., namely, M. K. Vladimirov, supported by V. L. Leder, held up the payment of money to the Organising Commission Abroad for the Party Conference Convocation Fund, as well as appropriations for the publication of the Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda*. They tried to hold up the publication of the Party's Central Organ—the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. In their organ—*Information Bulletin*—the T.C. attacked Lenin and the Bolsheviks. During the discussion of the "Report" and resolutions of the Russian Organising Commission at the meeting of the T.C. on October 19 (November 1) the Bolshevik representative M. F. Vladimirsky moved a resolution accepting decisions of the Russian Organising Commission, but his proposal was rejected. Vladimirsky walked out of the Commission, and the Bolsheviks broke off all contact with it. p. 502

[212] *Russian Organising Committee* (R.O.C.) for convening the All-Russia Party Conference was set up in accordance with the decision of the June 1911 Conference of members of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee. It was constituted at the end of September at a meeting of representatives of the local Party organisations, and functioned until the opening of the Sixth (Prague), All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 502

[213] Lenin is referring to the resolution of the "February" 1913 meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.: "The Revolutionary Upswing, Strikes and Tasks of the Party", published in the pamphlet *Report and Resolutions of the Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party Workers. February 1913*. Published by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 509

[214] The reference is to the shooting down of unarmed workers by the tsarist troops at the Lena gold-fields in Siberia on April 4 (17), 1912. p. 510

[215] The Social-Democratic Bolshevik organisations in the Caucasus were set up on the basis of internationalism, uniting within their ranks the advanced proletarians of different nationalities. Lenin thought very highly of the activities of the Bolshevik organisations in the Caucasus, and repeatedly held them up as an example of unity among the workers of all nations. p. 517

[216] *Strakhovanie Rabochikh* (*Workers' Insurance*)—a journal of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from 1912 to 1918. p. 521

[217] On behalf of the German Social-Democratic Party Executive, A. Bebel wrote a letter to Lenin in February 1905, offering himself as arbiter between the supporters of the Menshevik *Iskra* and the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*. Lenin replied "that neither he nor any other *Vperyod* supporters within his knowledge had the right to take any action binding upon the whole Party, and that Bebel's proposal would therefore have to be submitted to the Party Congress that was being called by the Russian Bureau". (See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 178.) The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected Bebel's offer. p. 535

[218] The article "*How the Workers Responded to the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group In the Duma*" was written as a supplement to Lenin's work "Material on the History of the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Duma" reprinted in the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism*, Part II, from the newspaper *Za Pravdu*. Lenin wrote the article in March-April 1914, and supplemented it in June with fresh material concerning money contributions to the Marxist and liquidationist newspapers handled by the Duma groups. (See p. 542 of this volume.) The article contains a number of preparatory materials. The Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. is in possession of Lenin's manuscript calculations of the signatures in favour of the Bolshevik Six and the Menshevik Seven, calculations of the contributions that passed through the hands of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group and the Social-Democratic group in the Duma between October 1913 and June 6 (19), 1914. p. 536

[219] "*Burenin methods of distorting the truth*"—unscrupulous polemical methods characteristic of Burenin, a contributor to the Black-Hundred monarchist newspaper *Novoye Vremya*. p. 537

[220] This refers to the Menshevik liquidators: *Enzis*—V. N. Rozanov; *Yegorov*—L. Martov (Y. O. Tsederbaum); *S. Novich*—S. I. Portugeis; *Y. Smirnov*—E. L. Gurevich; *Antid Oto*—L. Trotsky; *Nevedomsky*—M. P. Miklashevsky; *Lvov-Rogachevsky*—V. L. Rogachevsky; *Cherevanin*—F. A. Lipkin. p. 543

[221] April 22 (May 5), 1912 was the date when the first issue of the mass working-class newspaper *Pravda* appeared. In its issue No. 42, of March 21 (April 3), 1914, the newspaper Put Pravdy published an open letter by "a group of Pravdists" calling for April 22, 1914 to be proclaimed Workers' Press Day in honour of the appearance of the daily Bolshevik newspaper.

The workers in Russia responded enthusiastically to this appeal, *Pravda*'s second birthday being commemorated by the Bolsheviks with a drive towards strengthening and extending contacts between the newspaper and the working-class masses. p. 548

[222] At the end of the article there is an editorial note: "To be continued". The promised sequel, however, was not given in succeeding issues, and on July 8 (21), 1914, the paper closed down. The day after this article was published "A Correction to the Report" was given in *Trudovaya Pravda* for July 4, 1914, stating that "in yesterday's issue of the paper the article 'The Results of Worker's Press Day Summed Up' gave the figure 79 rubles 12 kopeks from the Stationery Office. This should read 133 rubles 32 kopeks." p. 555

[223] This refers to the conditions for the amalgamation of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania with the R.S.D.L.P. adopted at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908 in Stockholm. p. 558

[224] *Leipziger Volkszeitung*—a German Social-Democratic daily, published from 1894 to 1933. Until World War I it was the organ of the Left-wing German Social-Democrats. For a number of years it was edited by F. Mehring. Among contributors to the paper were Rosa Luxemburg, and J. Marchlewski.

Lenin's article was published in the newspaper under the editorial heading: "An objection. Letters to the Editors", p. 558

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*December 1913-August 1914*)

1913

October-December	Lenin's article "Critical Remarks on the National Question" published in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 10, 11 and 12.
December 19 (January 1, 1914)	The newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda*, issue No. 11, publishes Lenin's article "Once More About the International Socialist Bureau and the Liquidators".
December 20 (January 2, 1914)	Lenin's articles "National-Liberalism and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "Narodism and Liquidationism as Disintegrating Elements in the Working-Class Movement" and "Comment on Kautsky's Letter" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 12.
	In reply to an invitation to take part in the proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region, Lenin writes for information concerning the composition, place and time of convening the Congress.
December 25 (January 7, I914)	In a letter to the Lettish Bolsheviks Lenin poses the task of rallying them for the forthcoming Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats.
	Lenin's article "*Novoye Vremya* and *Rech* on the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 16.
December 26-27 (January 8-9 1914)	Lenin travels from Cracow to Berlin to meet the Lettish Bolsheviks regarding the convening of the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region.
December 27-29 (January 9-11, 1914)	In Cracow Lenin holds a meeting of members of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on questions concerning the activities of the Bolshevik Duma group.

1914

January 1 (14)	Lenin's article "Four Thousand Rubles a Year and a Six-Hour Day" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 19.
January, prior to 5th (18th)	Lenin arrives in Paris.
January 5 (18th)	At a meeting of Bolsheviks in Paris Lenin reports on the International Socialist Bureau's intervention in the affairs of the R.S.D.L.P. with the purpose of reconciling the Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks.
January 9 (22)	Lenin addresses two meetings of the Social-Democrats in Paris marking the anniversary of the Ninth of January 1905.
January 10 (23)	In the assembly hall of the Geographical Society in Paris Lenin lectures on the subject of "The National Question".
January, prior to 12th (25th)	Lenin arrives in Brussels.
January 13 (26)	Lenin forwards to Paris edited copy for the *Bulletin of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.* No. 1. The *Bulletin* appeared in Paris on January 28 (new style).
January 13-20 (January 26-February 2)	Lenin attends the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region and makes a report criticising the activities of the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democrats, which took an opportunist stand.
January 18 (31)	Lenin's article "Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed?" published in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 14 (32).
January 18-19 (January 31-February 1)	Lenin writes a brief report to Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, concerning the main points of difference between the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the liquidators' Organising Committee.
January 20 (February 2)	In Liége Lenin delivers a lecture on "The National Question".

Between January 21 and 24 (February 3 and 6)	In Leipzig Lenin delivers a lecture on "The National Question".
January 24 (February 6)	Lenin returns to Cracow.
January 25 (February 7)	Issue No. 1 of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* appears with an article by Lenin entitled "The Purpose of Zemstvo Statistics", and a review of the book *Labour Protection Exhibits at the All-Russia Hygiene Exhibition in St. Petersburg in 1913*.
January 31 (February 13)	Lenin's article "The Liberals' Corruption of the Workers" and "Letter to the Editor" published in the newspaper *Put Pravdy* No. 9.
February 4 (17)	*Put Pravdy* No. 12 publishes Lenin's article "The Liquidators' Leader on the Liquidators' Terms of 'Unity'".
February 5 (18)	Lenin's articles "A Contribution to the History of the National Programme in Austria and in Russia" and "A Highborn Liberal Landlord on the 'New Zemstvo Russia'" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 13.
February 18 (March 3)	Lenin's article "Narodism and the Class of Wage-Workers" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 15.
February 20 (March 5)	Lenin's articles "More About 'Nationalism" and "The Peasantry and Hired Labour" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 17.
February 21 (March 6)	*Put Pravdy* No. 18 publishes Lenin's article "Mr. Struve on the Need to 'Reform the Government'".
February 22 (March 7)	Lenin's article "The Narodniks on N. K. Mikhailovsky" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 19.
February 25 (March 10)	Lenin's article "Concerning A. Bogdanov" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 21.
	Issue No. 2 of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* appears with an article by Lenin "Editorial Comment on Veteran's Article: 'The National Question and the Lettish Proletariat'".
February-April	Lenin draws up the plan for the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism*, and writes the Preface and Concluding Remarks to it.

February-May	Lenin writes the article "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination".
March 1 (*14*)	Lenin's article "Political Disputes Among the Liberals" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 25.
March 2 (*15*)	Lenin's article "The 'Labouring' Peasantry and the Trade in Land" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 26.
March 6 (*19*)	*Put Pravdy* No. 29 publishes Lenin's article "What is Worrying the Liberals".
March 7 (*20*)	Lenin's article "Narodniks and Liquidators in the Trade Union Movement (A Valuable Admission)" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 30.
March 8 (*210*)	In Cracow Lenin delivers a lecture on the subject "Russian Social-Democracy and the National Question".
March 9 (*22*)	Lenin's article "Pious Wishes" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 32.
March 11 (*24*)	Lenin declines an invitation from the editors of Sovremennik to contribute to their journal, on the grounds that he does not agree with their programme.
	Put Pravdy No. 33 publishes Lenin's article "A Liberal Professor on Equality".
March 12 (*25*)	Lenin's article "The British Liberals and Ireland" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 34.
March 13 (*26*)	Issue No. 35 of *Put Pravdy* publishes Lenin's article "The Taylor System—Man's Enslavement by the Machine".
March 14 (*27*)	Lenin's article "A 'Responsible Opposition', and the Participation of the Constitutional-Democrats in the March 1 Conference" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 36.
March 15 (*28*)	Lenin's article "The Break-up of the 'August' Bloc" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 37.
March 19 (*April 1*)	Lenin forwards the draft of his "Appeal to the Ukrainian Workers" for Ocksen Lola.

March 20 (April 2)	Lenin's article "Capitalism and the Press" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 41.
March 22 (April 9)	Issue No. 3 of *Prosveshcheniye* appears with Lenin's articles "A Radical Bourgeois on the Russian Workers" and "Political Lessons".
March 28 (April 10)	Lenin's draft of "The National Equality Bill published in *Put Pravdy* No. 48.
March 29 (April 11)	*Put Pravdy* No. 49 publishes Lenin's article "Farm Labourers' Wages".
March 30 (April 12)	Lenin's articles "The Lettish Workers and the Split in the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" and "The 'August' Fiction Exposed" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 50.
March	Lenin's article "Socialism Demolished Again" published in the journal *Sovremenny Mir* No. 3.
March-April	Lenin writes his article "How the Workers Responded to the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Duma".
April 4 (17)	*Put Pravdy* No. 54 publishes Lenin's article "Forms of the Working-Class Movement (The Lockout and Marxist Tactics)".
April 6 (19)	Lenin's article "The Left Narodniks Whitewash the Bourgeoisie" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 56.
April, after 6th (19th)	Lenin writes the draft of the speech "On the Question of National Policy" for the Bolshevik group in the Duma.
April 10 (23)	Lenin's article "Constitutional Crisis in Britain" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 57.
April 12 (25)	*Put Pravdy* No. 59 publishes Lenin's article "Unity".
April 15 (28)	Lenin's article "Organised Marxists on Intervention by the International Bureau" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 61.
April 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "National Equality" and "The Liquidators and the Lettish Working-Class Movement" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 62.

April 20 (May 3)	*Put Pravdy* No. 66 publishes Lenin's article "Serf Economy in the Rural Areas".
April 22 (May 5)	Lenin's article "From the History of the Workers' Press in Russia" published in the newspaper *Rabochy* No. 1.
	Issue No. 4 of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* appears with Lenin's articles: "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", and "What Should Not Be Copied From the German Labour Movement", and a review of the book *Among Books* by N. A. Rubakin.
April prior to 26th (May 9th)	Lenin conducts a joint meeting of members of the Central Committee and of the Bolshevik Duma group to discuss participation in the Vienna Congress of the Second International and preparations for a Party congress.
April 26 (May 9)	Lenin moves from Cracow to Poronin.
April 29 (May 12)	Lenin's article "Liquidationism Defined" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 73.
May 3 (16)	Lenin's article "More About the Political Crisis" published in *Put Pravdy*, issue No. 76.
May 4 (17)	Lenin's article "The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 77.
May, after 6th (19th)	Lenin drafts the "Bill on the Equality of Nations and the Safeguarding of the Rights of National Minorities".
May 8 (21)	Lenin's article "Neighbouring Squires" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 80.
May 9 (22)	Lenin's article "The Narodniks and 'Factional Coercion'" published in issue No. 81 of *Put Pravdy*.
May 10 (23)	Lenin's article "Corrupting the Workers with Refined Nationalism" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 82.
May 18 (26)	Lenin's articles "The Political Situation" and "Workers' Unity and Intellectualist 'Trends'" published in *Put Pravdy* No. 85.

May 14 (27)	Lenin's article "The Left Narodniks" published in issue No. 86 of *Put Pravdy*.
May 24 (June 6)	Lenin's article "Two Paths" published in the newspaper *Rabochy* No. 3.
May 25 (June 7)	Issue No. 4 of *Rabochy* appears containing Lenin's article "Plekhanov, Who Knows Not What He Wants".
May, prior to 28th (June 10th)	Lenin writes the draft of a speech on "The Estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture" for the Bolshevik group in the Duma.
May 30 (June 12)	Lenin's article "Unity" published in the newspaper *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 2.
June 1 (14)	Issue No. 5 of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* appears featuring Lenin's articles "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (continued), "A Fool's Haste Is No Speed", "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity" and the review of I. Drozdov's book *The Wages of Farm Labourers in Russia in Connection With the Agrarian Movement in 1905-06*.
June 5 (18)	Lenin's article "Clarity Has Been Achieved. Class-Conscious Workers, Please Note" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 7.
June 9 (22)	Issue No. 7 of *Rabochy* appears containing articles by Lenin "Adventurism", and "The Liquidators and the Decisions of the Lettish Marxists".
June 13 and 14 (26 and 27)	Lenin's article "The Working Class and Its Press" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* Nos. 14 and 15.
June 19 (July 2)	Lenin's article "Left-Wing Narodism and Marxism" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 19.
June 22 (July 5)	Lenin's article "The Agrarian Question in Russia" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 22.
June 23 (July 6)	Lenin determines the make-up of the delegation of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee to the Brussels Conference convened by the International Socialist Bureau and representing all trends in Russian Social-Democracy.

June 23-30 (*July 6-13*)	Lenin writes the Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference and Instructions to the C.C. Delegation.
June 24 (*July 7*)	Lenin's article "The Political Significance of Vituperation (On the Question of Unity)" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 23.
June 26 (*July 9*)	*Trudovaya Pravda*, issue No. 25, publishes Lenin's article "Objective Data on the Strength of the Various Trends in the Working-Class Movement".
June 28 (*July 11*)	Lenin's article "How Strong Is the Left-Narodnik Trend Among the Workers" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 27.
	Issue No. 6 of *Prosveshcheniye* appears featuring Lenin's articles "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (concluded), "The Bourgeois Intelligentsia's Methods of Struggle Against the Workers" and "The Vperyodists and the *Vperyod* Group".
June 29 (*July 12*)	Lenin's "Editorial Comment on Ocksen Lola's 'Appeal to the Ukrainian Workers'" published in *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 28.
June 30 (*July 13*)	Lenin sends the Report of the Central Committee, written by him, to the delegation of Bolsheviks at the Brussels Conference.
July 2 (*15*)	*Trudovaya Pravda* No. 30 publishes Lenin's article "Clarity First and Foremost! (On the Question of Unity)".
July 2 and 3 (*15 and 16*)	Lenin's article "The Results of Workers' Press Day Summed Up. From the Report Published in *Put Pravdy*" published in Nos. 30 and 31 of *Trudovaya Pravda*.
July 3-5 (*16-18*)	From Poronin (Galicia), Lenin directs the activities of the Bolshevik delegation at the Brussels Conference.
July 5 (*18*)	The symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism*, Part II, prepared by Lenin, is published.
July, after 5th (*18th*)	Lenin writes a letter to V. M. Kasparov in Berlin asking for information about revolutionary developments in Russia.

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July prior to 6ih (19th)	Lenin chairs a meeting of C.C. members with Party workers newly arrived from Russia concerning the activities of the Duma group and preparations for the Party congress.
July, after 6th (19th)	Lenin drafts the plan of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee report to the Vienna Congress.
July, after 7th (20th)	Lenin writes the article "The Polish Social-Democratic Opposition at the Parting of the Ways".
July 8 (21)	Lenin's reply to the article in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* published in issue No. 165 of that newspaper.
July 15 (28)	Lenin agrees to complete the article on "Karl Marx" for the Granat Encyclopaedic Dictionary.
Between July 15 and 17 (28 and 30)	Lenin outlines the contents of the current issue of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, drafts the plan of the leading article "Revolution and War", and deals with the technical details of publication (format, number of characters, etc.).
July 25 (August 7)	Lenin's rooms in Poronin (Galicia) are searched by Austrian authorities.
July 26 (August 8)	Lenin arrested in Nowy Targ (Galicia).
August 6 (19)	Lenin released from prison.
August 13-16 (26-29)	Lenin receives permission in Poronin and subsequently in Cracow to leave Austria-Hungary for Switzerland. Lenin goes to Switzerland.
August 23 (September 5)	Lenin arrives in Berne (Switzerland).

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 20

На английском языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

21

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
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OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.S.R.

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

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PREFACE

Volume 21 contains Lenin's works of the period between August 1914 and December 1915. In these writings, Lenin raised the banner of struggle against the imperialist war and international social-chauvinism, and laid the foundations of the Bolshevik Party's theory and tactics on questions of war, peace and revolution.

A group of these works, viz., "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War", "The European War and International Socialism", "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", "The Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War", "Socialism and War", deal, in the main, with an appraisal of the war, and provide a definition of the tasks confronting the proletarian party and the world working-class movement.

A considerable part of the volume consists of works that expose international social-chauvinism and centrism, and reveal the causes that brought about the collapse of the Second International. Among these works are: "The Collapse of the Second International", "On the Struggle Against Chauvinism", "The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International", and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915".

A number of the works in this volume are directed against social-chauvinism in Russia, viz.: "The Russian Brand of Südekum", "Under a False Flag", "The State of Affairs in Russian Social-Democracy", "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis", and "On the Two Lines in the Revolution".

In the article "On the Slogan of a United States of Europe", which was written in August 1915, Lenin formulated

his masterly conclusion on the possibility of victory for socialism, initially in several countries, or even in a single country.

Also in this volume is the work entitled "Karl Marx", which gives a concise yet exhaustive characterisation of the Marxist doctrine.

Four hitherto unpublished works have been included in this volume. In the articles "To the International Socialist Committee, I.S.C." and "Letter to *Vorwärts* and Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung*" Lenin exposes the imperialist nature of World War I and the betrayal of the working class's interests by the leaders of the Second International. The following works: "The Kind of 'Unity' Larin Proclaimed at the Swedish Congress" and "Letter from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Editors of *Nashe Slovo*" are directed against liquidationism and social-chauvinism in Russia.

THE TASKS OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN WAR[1]

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ON THE EUROPEAN WAR

Reports have reached us from most reliable sources, regarding a conference recently held by leaders of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, on the question of the European war. The conference was not of a wholly official nature, since the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. has as yet been unable to gather, as a result of the numerous arrests and unprecedented persecution by the tsarist government. We do, however, have precise information that the conference gave expression to views held by the most influential circles of the R.S.D.L.P.

The conference adopted the following resolution, whose full text we are quoting below as a document:

RESOLUTION OF A GROUP OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

1. The European and world war has the clearly defined character of a bourgeois, imperialist and dynastic war. A struggle for markets and for freedom to loot foreign countries, a striving to suppress the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and democracy in the individual countries, a desire to deceive, disunite, and slaughter the proletarians of all countries by setting the wage slaves of one nation

against those of another so as to benefit the bourgeoisie—these are the only real content and significance of the war.

2. The conduct of the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party, the strongest and the most influential in the Second International (1889-1914), a party which has voted for war credits and repeated the bourgeois-chauvinist phrases of the Prussian Junkers and the bourgeoisie, is sheer betrayal of socialism. Under no circumstances can the conduct of the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party be condoned, even if we assume that the party was absolutely weak and had temporarily to bow to the will of the bourgeois majority of the nation. This party has in fact adopted a national-liberal policy.

3. The conduct of the Belgian and French Social-Democratic party leaders, who have betrayed socialism by entering bourgeois governments,[2] is just as reprehensible.

4. The betrayal of socialism by most leaders of the Second International (1889-1914) signifies the ideological and political bankruptcy of the International. This collapse has been mainly caused by the actual prevalence in it of petty-bourgeois opportunism, the bourgeois nature and the danger of which have long been indicated by the finest representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of all countries. The opportunists had long been preparing to wreck the Second International by denying the socialist revolution and substituting bourgeois reformism in its stead, by rejecting the class struggle with its inevitable conversion at certain moments into civil war, and by preaching class collaboration; by preaching bourgeois chauvinism under the guise of patriotism and the defence of the fatherland, and ignoring or rejecting the fundamental truth of socialism, long ago set forth in the *Communist Manifesto*, that the workingmen have no country; by confining themselves, in the struggle against militarism, to a sentimental philistine point of view, instead of recognising the need for a revolutionary war by the proletarians of all countries, against the bourgeoisie of all countries; by making a fetish of the necessary utilisation of bourgeois parliamentarianism and bourgeois legality, and forgetting that illegal forms of organ-

isation and agitation are imperative at times of crises. One of the organs of international opportunism, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*,[3] which has long taken a national-liberal stand, is very properly celebrating its victory over European socialism. The so-called Centre of the German and other Social-Democratic parties has in actual fact faint-heartedly capitulated to the opportunists. It must be the task of the future International resolutely and irrevocably to rid itself of this bourgeois trend in socialism.

5. With reference to the bourgeois and chauvinist sophisms being used by the bourgeois parties and the governments of the two chief rival nations of the Continent—the German and the French—to fool the masses most effectively, and being copied by both the overt and covert socialist opportunists, who are slavishly following in the wake of the bourgeoisie, one must particularly note and brand the following:

When the German bourgeois refer to the defence of the fatherland and to the struggle against tsarism, and insist on the freedom of cultural and national development, they are lying, because it has always been the policy of Prussian Junkerdom, headed by Wilhelm II, and the big bourgeoisie of Germany, to defend the tsarist monarchy; whatever the outcome of the war, they are sure to try to bolster it. They are lying because, in actual fact, the Austrian bourgeoisie have launched a robber campaign against Serbia, and the German bourgeoisie are oppressing Danes, Poles, and Frenchmen (in Alsace-Lorraine); they are waging a war of aggression against Belgium and France so as to loot the richer and freer countries; they have organised an offensive at a moment which seemed best for the use of the latest improvements in military matériel, and on the eve of the introduction of the so-called big military programme in Russia.

Similarly, when the French bourgeois refer to the defence of the fatherland, etc., they are lying, because in actual fact they are defending countries that are backward in capitalist technology and are developing more slowly, and because they spend thousands of millions to hire Russian tsarism's Black-Hundred[4] gangs for a war of aggression, i.e., the looting of Austrian and German lands.

Neither of the two belligerent groups of nations is second to the other in cruelty and atrocities in warfare.

6. It is the first and foremost task of Russian Social-Democrats to wage a ruthless and all-out struggle against Great-Russian and tsarist-monarchist chauvinism, and against the sophisms used by the Russian liberals, Cadets,[5] a section of the Narodniks, and other bourgeois parties, in defence of that chauvinism. From the viewpoint of the working class and the toiling masses of all the peoples of Russia, the defeat of the tsarist monarchy and its army, which oppress Poland, the Ukraine, and many other peoples of Russia, and foment hatred among the peoples so as to increase Great-Russian oppression of the other nationalities, and consolidate the reactionary and barbarous government of the tsar's monarchy, would be the lesser evil by far.

7. The following must now be the slogans of Social-Democracy:

First, all-embracing propaganda, involving the army and the theatre of hostilities as well, for the socialist revolution and the need to use weapons, not against their brothers, the wage slaves in other countries, but against the reactionary and bourgeois governments and parties of all countries; the urgent necessity of organising illegal nuclei and groups in the armies of all nations, to conduct such propaganda in all languages; a merciless struggle against the chauvinism and "patriotism" of the philistines and bourgeoisie of all countries without exception. In the struggle against the leaders of the present International, who have betrayed socialism, it is imperative to appeal to the revolutionary consciousness of the working masses, who bear the entire burden of the war and are in most cases hostile to opportunism and chauvinism.

Secondly, as an immediate slogan, propaganda for republics in (Germany, Poland, Russia, and other countries, and for the transforming of all the separate states of Europe into a republican United States of Europe.[6]

Thirdly and particularly, a struggle against the tsarist monarchy and Great-Russian, Pan-Slavist chauvinism, and advocacy of a revolution in Russia, as well as of the liberation of and self-determination for nationalities oppressed by Russia, coupled with the immediate slogans of a demo-

cratic republic, the confiscation of the landed estates, and an eight-hour working day.

A group of Social-Democrats,
members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

Written not later than August 24 (September 6), 1914

The introduction *The Russian Social-Democrats on the European War* is published for the first time

The theses (resolution) were first published in full in 1929 in the second and third editions of the works of V. I. Lenin, Volume 18

The introduction is published according to the manuscript; the theses (resolution) according to a copy made by N. K. Krupskaya

THE EUROPEAN WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

To the socialist it is not the horrors of war that are the hardest to endure—we are always for "*santa guerra di tutti gli oppressi per la conquista delle* loro *patrie!*"*—but the horrors of the treachery shown by the leaders of present-day socialism, the horrors of the collapse of the present-day International.

Is it not treachery to Social-Democracy when we see the German socialists' amazing change of front (after Germany's declaration of war); the false phrases about a war of liberation against tsarism; forgetfulness of German imperialism, forgetfulness of the rape of Serbia; the bourgeois interests involved in the war against Britain, etc., etc.? Chauvinist patriots vote for the Budget!

Have the socialists of France and Belgium not shown the same kind of treachery? They are excellent at exposing German imperialism, but, unfortunately they are amazingly purblind with regard to British, French, and particularly the barbarous Russian imperialism. They fail to see the disgraceful fact that, for decades on end, the French bourgeoisie have been paying out thousands of millions for the hire of the Black-Hundred gangs of Russian tsarism, and that the latter has been crushing the non-Russian majority in our country, robbing Poland, oppressing the Great-Russian workers and peasants, and so on.

At such a time, the socialist feels refreshed when he reads of the bitter truth so courageously and straightforwardly told by *Avanti!*[7] to *Südekum*,[8] the truth that paper

* "a holy war of all the oppressed, for the conquest of their *own* fatherland!"—*Ed.*

told the German socialists, namely, that they are *imperialists*, i.e., chauvinists. One feels even more refreshed on reading the article by Zibordi (*Avanti!*, Sept. 2) exposing not only the German and the Austrian brands of chauvinism (which is to the advantage of the *Italian* bourgeoisie), but also the *French*, an article which shows that this war is a war of the bourgeoisie of *all* lands!

Avanti!'s stand and the Zibordi article—[as well as the resolution of the group of revolutionary Social-Democrats (at a recent conference in a Scandinavian country)*]—shows us what is right and what is wrong in the usual phrase about the collapse of the International. This phrase is reiterated with malicious relish by the bourgeois and the opportunists (*riformisti di destra***), and with bitterness by socialists (*Volksrecht*[9] in Zurich, and *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*[10]). There is a great deal of truth in the phrase! The downfall of the *leaders* and of most of the parties in the *present-day* International is a *fact*. (Compare *Vorwärts*,[11] Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung*[12] and *Hamburger Echo*[13] versus *l'Humanité*,[14] and the appeals of the Belgian and the French socialists versus the "reply" of the German *Vorstand*.[15]) The masses have *not yet* spoken out!

However, Zibordi is a thousand times right in saying that it is not a matter of "*dottrina è sbagliata*", or of the "*rimedio*" of socialism being "*errato*", but "*semplicemente non erano in dose bastante*", "*gli altri socialisti non sono 'abbastanza socialisti'*".***

It is not socialism that has collapsed, in the shape of the *present-day European* International, but an insufficient socialism, i.e., *opportunism* and *reformism*. It is this "tendency"—which exists *everywhere*, in all countries, and has found such vivid expression in Bissolati and Co. in Italy—that has collapsed, for it has for years been *teaching* forgetfulness of the class struggle, *etc.*, *etc.—from the resolution*.[16]

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* See pp. 15-19 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** the reformists of the Right.—*Ed.*

*** ...it is not a matter of "theory being wrong", or of the "remedy" of socialism being "wrong" but "simply of its not being available in sufficient doses" and of "certain socialists not being 'sufficiently socialist'".—*Ed.*

Zibordi is right when he sees the European socialists' main guilt in "*cercano nobilitare con postumi motivi la loro incapacità a prevenire*, *la loro necessità di partecipare al macello*", in the fact that they "*preferisce fingere di fare per amore ciò ch'è* [European socialism]* *costretto a fare per forza*", that the socialists "solidarizzarono *ciascuno con la propria nazione*, *col Governo* borghese *della propria nazione ... in una misura da formare una delusione per noi* [also in all socialists who are *not* opportunists] *e un compiacimento per tutti i non socialisti d'Italia*"** (and not of Italy alone, but of all countries; cf., for instance, with Russian liberalism).

Even given the total *incapacità* and impotence of the European socialists, the behaviour of their leaders reveals treachery and baseness: the workers have been driven into the slaughter, while their leaders vote *in favour* and join *governments*! Even with their total impotence, they should have voted *against*, should *not have joined* their governments and uttered chauvinistic infamies; should *not* have shown solidarity with their "nation", and should *not* have defended their "own" bourgeoisie, they should have unmasked its vileness.

Everywhere there is the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, everywhere the ignoble preparations for carnage; if Russian tsarism is particularly infamous and barbarous (and more reactionary than all the rest), then German imperialism too is monarchist: its aims are feudal and dynastic, and its gross bourgeoisie are less free than the French. The Russian Social-Democrats were right in saying that *to them* the defeat of tsarism was the lesser evil, for *their* immediate enemy was, first and foremost, *Great-Russian*

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed*.

** ...their attempts to backdate their justification, with plausible excuses, both of their inability to prevent the carnage and their need to take part in the latter", ... they "prefer to create the semblance of doing voluntarily [European socialism] what they are forced to do of necessity", that the socialists have "*lined up* with their own particular nation, with the latter's *bourgeois* government ... in a measure capable of engendering disappointment in us [also in all socialists who are *not* opportunists] and delight all non-socialists in Italy".—*Ed*.

chauvinism, but that in each country the socialists (who are not opportunists) ought to see their main enemy in their "own" ("home-made") chauvinism.

Is it true, however, that the "*incapacità*" is so very absolute? Is that so? *Fucilare*?* *Heldentod*** and a miserable death? All this *in vantaggio di* un altra patria?*** Not always!! The *initiative* was possible and even obligatory. Illegal propaganda and civil war would be more *honest*, and obligatory for socialists (*this* is what the Russian socialists are calling for).

For Instance, they take comfort in the illusion that the war will end and things will settle down. ... But no! For the collapse of the present-day (1889-1914) International not to turn into the collapse of socialism, for the *masses* not to turn away, and to prevent the domination of anarchism and syndicalism (just as shamefully [as] in France), the truth must be looked in the face. Whoever wins, Europe is threatened by the *growth* of chauvinism, by "*revenge-seeking*". etc. Militarism, whether German or Great-Russian, fosters counter-chauvinism and the like.

It is our duty to draw the conclusion of the complete collapse of the opportunism, the reformism, so impressively proclaimed in Italy (and so decisively rejected by the Italian comrades[17] and ****

N. B. insert: the contemptuous and scornful attitude of *Die Neue Zeit*[18] towards the Italian socialists and *Avanti!*: petty concessions to opportunism! "The golden mean." |The so-called "Centre"=lackeys of the opportunists.|

Written in late August-September 1914

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Published according to the manuscript

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* Shoot down?—*Ed.*

** A hero's death.—*Ed.*

*** For the sake of another country?—*Ed.*

**** The manuscript breaks off here. The next two sentences are marginal notes.—*Ed.*

THE WAR AND RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

Written prior to September 28
(October 11), 1914

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Published according to
the newspaper text,
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THE WAR AND RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

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The European war, which the governments and the bourgeois parties of all countries have been preparing for decades, has broken out. The growth of armaments, the extreme intensification of the struggle for markets in the latest—the imperialist—stage of capitalist development in the advanced countries, and the dynastic interests of the more backward East-European monarchies were inevitably bound to bring about this war, and have done so. Seizure of territory and subjugation of other nations, the ruining of competing nations and the plunder of their wealth, distracting the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, Britain and other countries, disuniting and nationalist stultification of the workers, and the extermination of their vanguard so as to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—these comprise the sole actual content, importance and significance of the present war.

It is primarily on Social-Democracy that the duty rests of revealing the true meaning of the war, and of ruthlessly exposing the falsehood, sophistry and "patriotic" phrase-mongering spread by the ruling classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, in defence of the war.

One group of belligerent nations is headed by the German bourgeoisie. It is hoodwinking the working class and the toiling masses by asserting that this is a war in defence of the fatherland, freedom and civilisation, for the liberation of the peoples oppressed by tsarism, and for the destruction of reactionary tsarism. In actual fact, however, this bourgeoisie, which servilely grovels to the Prussian Junkers, headed by Wilhelm II, has always been a most faithful ally of tsarism, and an enemy of the revolutionary movement of Russia's workers and peasants. In fact, whatever the outcome of the war, this bourgeoisie will together with the

Junkers, exert every effort to support the tsarist monarchy against a revolution in Russia.

In fact, the German bourgeoisie has launched a robber campaign against Serbia, with the object of subjugating her and throttling the national revolution of the Southern Slavs, at the same time sending the bulk of its military forces against the freer countries, Belgium and France, so as to plunder richer competitors. In fact, the German bourgeoisie, which has been spreading the fable that it is waging a war of defence, chose the moment it thought most favourable for war, making use of its latest improvements in military matériel and forestalling the rearmament already planned and decided upon by Russia and France.

The other group of belligerent nations is headed by the British and the French bourgeoisie, who are hoodwinking the working class and the toiling masses by asserting that they are waging a war for the defence of their countries, for freedom and civilisation and against German militarism and despotism. In actual fact, this bourgeoisie has long been spending thousands of millions to hire the troops of Russian tsarism, the most reactionary and barbarous monarchy in Europe, and prepare them for an attack on Germany.

In fact, the struggle of the British and the French bourgeoisie is aimed at the seizure of the German colonies, and the ruining of a rival nation, whose economic development has been more rapid. In pursuit of this noble aim, the "advanced" "democratic" nations are helping the savage tsarist regime to still more throttle Poland, the Ukraine, etc., and more thoroughly crush the revolution in Russia.

Neither group of belligerents is inferior to the other in spoiliation, atrocities and the boundless brutality of war; however, to hoodwink the proletariat and distract its attention from the only genuine war of liberation, namely, a civil war against the bourgeoisie both of its "own" and of "foreign" countries—to achieve so lofty an aim—the bourgeoisie of each country is trying, with the help of false phrases about patriotism, to extol the significance of its "own" national war, asserting that it is out to defeat the enemy, not for plunder and the seizure of territory, but for the "liberation" of all other peoples except its own.

But the harder the governments and the bourgeoisie of all countries try to disunite the workers and pit them against one another, and the more savagely they enforce, for this lofty aim, martial law and the military censorship (measures which even now, in wartime, are applied against the "internal" foe more harshly than against the external), the more pressingly is it the duty of the class-conscious proletariat to defend its class solidarity, its internationalism, and its socialist convictions against the unbridled chauvinism of the "patriotic" bourgeois cliques in all countries. If class-conscious workers were to give up this aim, this would mean renunciation of their aspirations for freedom and democracy, to say nothing of their socialist aspirations.

It is with a feeling of the most bitter disappointment that we have to record that the socialist parties of the leading European countries have failed to discharge this duty, the behaviour of these parties' leaders, particularly in Germany, bordering on downright betrayal of the cause of socialism. At this time of supreme and historic importance, most of the leaders of the present Socialist International, the Second (1889-1914), are trying to substitute nationalism for socialism. As a result of their behaviour, the workers' parties of these countries did not oppose the governments' criminal conduct, but called upon the working class to *identify* its position with that of the imperialist governments. The leaders of the International committed an act of treachery against socialism by voting for war credits, by reiterating the chauvinist ("patriotic") slogans of the bourgeoisie of their "own" countries, by justifying and defending the war, by joining the bourgeois governments of the belligerent countries, and so on and so forth. The most influential socialist leaders and the most influential organs of the socialist press of present-day Europe hold views that are chauvinist, bourgeois and liberal, and in no way socialist. The responsibility for thus disgracing socialism falls primarily on the German Social-Democrats, who were the strongest and most influential party in the Second International. But neither can one justify the French socialists, who have accepted ministerial posts in the government of that very bourgeoisie which betrayed its country and allied itself with Bismarck so as to crush the Commune.

The German and the Austrian Social-Democrats are attempting to justify their support for the war by arguing that they are thereby fighting against Russian tsarism. We Russian Social-Democrats declare that we consider such justification sheer sophistry. In our country the revolutionary movement against tsarism has again assumed tremendous proportions during the past few years. This movement has always been headed by the working class of Russia. The political strikes of the last few years, which have involved millions of workers, have had as their slogan the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of a democratic republic. During his visit to Nicholas II on the very eve of the war, Poincaré, President of the French Republic, could see for himself, in the streets of St. Petersburg, barricades put up by Russian workers. The Russian proletariat has not flinched from any sacrifice to rid humanity of the disgrace of the tsarist monarchy. We must, however, say that if there is anything that, under certain conditions, can delay the downfall of tsarism, anything that can help tsarism in its struggle against the whole of Russia's democracy, then that is the present war, which has placed the purses of the British, the French and the Russian bourgeois at the disposal of tsarism, to further the latter's reactionary aims. If there is anything that can hinder the revolutionary struggle of the Russia's working class against tsarism, then that is the behaviour of the German and the Austrian Social-Democratic leaders, which the chauvinist press of Russia is continually holding up to us as an example.

Even assuming that German Social-Democracy was so weak that it was compelled to refrain from all revolutionary action, it should not have joined the chauvinist camp, or taken steps which gave the Italian socialists reason to say that the German Social-Democratic leaders were dishonouring the banner of the proletarian International.

Our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has made, and will continue to make great sacrifices in connection with the war. The whole of our working-class legal press has been suppressed. Most working-class associations have been disbanded, and a large number of our comrades have been arrested and exiled. Yet our parliamentary representatives—the Russian Social-Democratic Labour

group in the Duma—considered it their imperative socialist duty not to vote for the war credits, and even to walk out of the Duma, so as to express their protest the more energetically; they considered it their duty to brand the European governments' policy as imperialist. Though the tsar's government has increased its tyranny tenfold, the Social-Democratic workers of Russia are already publishing their first illegal manifestos against the war, thus doing their duty to democracy and to the International.

While the collapse of the Second International has given rise to a sense of burning shame in revolutionary Social-Democrats—as represented by the minority of German Social-Democrats and the finest Social-Democrats in the neutral countries; while socialists in both Britain and France have been speaking up against the chauvinism of most Social-Democratic parties; while the opportunists, as represented, for instance, by the German *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which have long held a national-liberal stand, are with good reason celebrating their victory over European socialism—the worst possible service is being rendered to the proletariat by those who vacillate between opportunism and revolutionary Social-Democracy (like the "Centre" in the German Social-Democratic Party), by those who are trying to hush up the collapse of the Second International or to disguise it with diplomatic phrases.

On the contrary, this collapse must be frankly recognised and its causes understood, so as to make it possible to build up a new and more lasting socialist unity of the workers of all countries.

The opportunists have wrecked the decisions of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle congresses,[19] which made it binding on socialists of all countries to combat chauvinism in all and any conditions, made it binding on socialists to reply to any war begun by the bourgeoisie and governments, with intensified propaganda of civil war and social revolution. The collapse of the Second International is the collapse of opportunism, which developed from the features of a now bygone (and so-called "peaceful") period of history, and in recent years has some practically to dominate the International. The opportunist have long been preparing the ground for this collapse by denying the socialist

revolution and substituting bourgeois reformism in its stead; by rejecting the class struggle with its inevitable conversion at certain moments into civil war, and by preaching class collaboration; by preaching bourgeois chauvinism under the guise of patriotism and the defence of the fatherland, and ignoring or rejecting the fundamental truth of socialism, long ago set forth in the *Communist Manifesto*, that the workingmen have no country; by confining themselves, in the struggle against militarism, to a sentimental, philistine point of view, instead of recognising the need for a revolutionary war by the proletarians of all countries, against the bourgeoisie of all countries; by making a fetish of the necessary utilisation of bourgeois parliamentarianism and bourgeois legality, and forgetting that illegal forms of organisation and propaganda are imperative at times of crises. The natural "appendage" to opportunism—one that is just as bourgeois and hostile to the proletarian, i.e., the Marxist, point of view—namely, the anarcho-syndicalist trend, has been marked by a no less shamefully smug reiteration of the slogans of chauvinism, during the present crisis.

The aims of socialism at the present time cannot be fulfilled, and real international unity of the workers cannot be achieved, without a decisive break with opportunism, and without explaining its inevitable fiasco to the masses.

It must be the primary task of Social-Democrats in every country to combat that country's chauvinism. In Russia this chauvinism has overcome the bourgeois liberals (the "Constitutional-Democrats"), and part of the Narodniks—down to the Socialist-Revolutionaries[20] and the "Right" Social-Democrats. (In particular, the chauvinist utterances of E. Smirnov, P. Maslov and G. Plekhanov, for example, should be branded; they have been taken up and widely used by the bourgeois "patriotic" press.)

In the present situation, it is impossible to determine, from the standpoint of the international proletariat, the defeat of which of the two groups of belligerent nations would be the lesser evil for socialism. But to us Russian Social-Democrats there cannot be the slightest doubt that, from the standpoint of the working class and of the toiling masses of all the nations of Russia, the defeat of the tsarist

monarchy, the most reactionary and barbarous of governments, which is oppressing the largest number of nations and the greatest mass of the population of Europe and Asia, would be the lesser evil.

The formation of a republican United States of Europe should be the immediate political slogan of Europe's Social-Democrats. In contrast with the bourgeoisie, which is ready to "promise" anything in order to draw the proletariat into the mainstream of chauvinism, the Social-Democrats will explain that this slogan is absolutely false and meaningless without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, the Austrian and the Russian monarchies.

Since Russia is most backward and has not yet completed its bourgeois revolution, it still remains the task of Social-Democrats in that country to achieve the three fundamental conditions for consistent democratic reform, viz., a democratic republic (with complete equality and self-determination for all nations), confiscation of the landed estates, and an eight-hour working day. But in all the advanced countries the war has placed on the order of the day the slogan of socialist revolution, a slogan that is the more urgent, the more heavily the burden of war presses upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its future role must become in the re-creation of Europe, after the horrors of the present "patriotic" barbarism in conditions of the tremendous technological progress of large-scale capitalism. The bourgeoisie's use of wartime laws to gag the proletariat makes it imperative for the latter to create illegal forms of agitation and organisation. Let the opportunists "preserve" the legal organisations at the price of treachery to their convictions—revolutionary Social-Democrats will utilise the organisational experience and links of the working class so as to create illegal forms of struggle for socialism, forms appropriate to a period of crisis, and to unite the workers, not with the chauvinist bourgeoisie of their respective countries, but with the workers of all countries. The proletarian International has not gone under and will not go under. Notwithstanding all obstacles, the masses of the workers will create a new International. Opportunism's present triumph will be short-lived. The greater the sacrifices imposed by the war the clearer will it become to the mass of the workers

that the opportunists have betrayed the workers' cause and that the weapons must be turned against the government and the bourgeoisie of each country.

The conversion of the present imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan, one that follows from the experience of the Commune, and outlined in the Basle resolution (1912); it has been dictated by all the conditions of an imperialist war between highly developed bourgeois countries. However difficult that transformation may seem at any given moment, socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent and undeviating preparatory work in this direction now that war has become a fact.

It is only along this path that the proletariat will be able to shake off its dependence on the chauvinist bourgeoisie, and, in one form or another and more or less rapidly, take decisive steps towards genuine freedom for the nations and towards socialism.

Long live the international fraternity of the workers against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeoisie of all countries!

Long live a proletarian International, freed from opportunism!

Central Committee
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour
Party

THE POSITION AND TASKS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

The gravest feature of the present crisis is that the majority of official representatives of European socialism have succumbed to bourgeois nationalism, to chauvinism. It is with good reason that the bourgeois press of all countries writes of them now with derision, now with condescending praise. To anyone who wants to remain a socialist there can be no more important duty than to reveal the causes of this crisis in socialism and analyse the tasks of the International.

There are such that are afraid to admit that the crisis or, to put it more accurately, the collapse of the Second International is the collapse of opportunism.

Reference is made to the unanimity, for instance, among French socialists, and to the fact that the old groups in socialism have supposedly changed their stands in the question of the war. Such references, however, are groundless.

Advocacy of class collaboration; abandonment of the idea of socialist revolution and revolutionary methods of struggle; adaptation to bourgeois nationalism; losing sight of the fact that the borderlines of nationality and country are historically transient; making a fetish of bourgeois legality; renunciation of the class viewpoint and the class struggle, for fear of repelling the "broad masses of the population" (meaning the petty bourgeoisie)—such, doubtlessly, are the ideological foundations of opportunism. And it is from such soil that the present chauvinist and patriotic

frame of mind of most Second International leaders has developed. Observers representing the most various points of view have long noted that the opportunists are in fact prevalent in the Second International's leadership. The war has merely brought out, rapidly and saliently, the true measure of this prevalence. There is nothing surprising in the extraordinary acuteness of the crisis having led to a series of reshufflings within the old groups. On the whole, however, such changes have affected only individuals. The trends within socialism have remained the same.

Complete unanimity does not exist among French socialists. Even Vaillant, who, with Guesde, Plekhanov, Hervé and others, is following a chauvinist line, has had to admit that he has received a number of letters of protest from French socialists, who say that the war is imperialist in character and that the French bourgeoisie is to blame for its outbreak no less than the bourgeoisie of any other country. Nor should it be overlooked that these voices of protest are being smothered, not only by triumphant opportunism, but also by the military censorship. With the British, the Hyndman group (the British Social-Democrats—the British Socialist Party[21]) has completely sunk into chauvinism, as have also most of the semi-liberal leaders of the trade unions. Resistance to chauvinism has come from MacDonald and Keir Hardie of the opportunist Independent Labour Party.[22] This, of course, is an exception to the rule. However, certain revolutionary Social-Democrats who have long been in opposition to Hyndman have now left the British Socialist Party. With the Germans the situation is clear: the opportunists have won; they are jubilant, and feel quite in their element. Headed by Kautsky, the "Centre" has succumbed to opportunism and is defending it with the most hypocritical, vulgar and smug sophistry. Protests have come from the revolutionary Social-Democrats—Mehring, Pannekoek, Karl Liebknecht, and a number of unidentified voices in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. In Italy, the line-up is clear too: the extreme opportunists, Bissolati and Co. stand for "fatherland", for Guesde-Vaillant-Plekhanov-Hervé. The revolutionary Social-Democrats (the Socialist Party), with *Avanti!* at their head, are combating chauvinism and are exposing the bourgeois and selfish nature of the calls for

war. They have the support of the vast majority of progressive workers.[23] In Russia, the extreme opportunists of the liquidators' camp[24] have already raised their voices, in public lectures and the press, in defence of chauvinism. P. Maslov and Y. Smirnov are defending tsarism on the pretext that the fatherland must be defended. (Germany, you see, is threatening to impose trade agreements on "us" at swordpoint, whereas tsarism, we are expected to believe, has *not* been using the sword, the knout and the gallows to stifle the economic, political and national life of nine-tenths of Russia's population!) They justify socialists participating in reactionary bourgeois governments, and their approval of war credits today and more armaments tomorrow! Plekhanov has slid into nationalism, and is endeavouring to mask his Russian chauvinism with a Francophile attitude, and so has Alexinsky. To judge from the Paris *Golos*,[25] Martov is behaving with more decency than the rest of this crowd, and has come out in opposition to both German and French chauvinism, to *Vorwärts*, Mr. Hyndman and Maslov, but is afraid to come out resolutely against international opportunism as a whole, and against the German Social-Democratic Centrist group, its most "influential" champion. The attempts to present volunteer service in the army as performance of a socialist duty (see the Paris declaration of a group of Russian volunteers consisting of Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and also a declaration by Polish Social-Democrats, Leder, and others) have had the backing of Plekhanov alone. These attempts have been condemned by the majority of our Paris Party group.[26] The leading article in this issue* will inform readers of our Party Central Committee's stand. To preclude any misunderstanding, the following facts relating to the history of our Party's views and their formulation must be stated here. After overcoming tremendous difficulties in re-establishing organisational contacts broken by the war, a group of Party members first drew up "theses" and on September 6-8 (New Style) had them circulated among the comrades. Then they were sent to two delegates to the Italo-Swiss Conference in Lugano (September 27), through Swiss Social-Democrats. It was only in

* See pp. 25-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

mid-October that it became possible to re-establish contacts and formulate the viewpoint of the Party's Central Committee. The leading article in this issue represents the final wording of the "theses".

Such, briefly, is the present state of affairs in the European and the Russian Social-Democratic movement. The collapse of the International is a fact. It has been proved conclusively by the polemic, in the press, between the French and German socialists, and acknowledged, not only by the Left Social-Democrats (Mehring and *Bremer Bürger Zeitung*), but by moderate Swiss papers (*Volksrecht*). Kautsky's attempts to cover up this collapse are a cowardly subterfuge. The collapse of the International is clearly the collapse of opportunism, which is now captive to the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie's stand is clear. It is no less clear that the opportunists are simply echoing bourgeois arguments. In addition to what has been said in the leading article, we need only mention the insulting statements in *Die Neue Zeit*, suggesting that internationalism consists in the workers of one country shooting down the workers of another country, allegedly in defence of the fatherland!

The question of the fatherland—we shall reply to the opportunists—cannot be posed without due consideration of the concrete historical nature of the present war. This is an imperialist war, i.e., it is being waged at a time of the highest development of capitalism, a time of its approaching end. The working class must first "constitute itself within the nation", the *Communist Manifesto* declares, emphasising the *limits and conditions* of our recognition of nationality and fatherland as essential forms of the bourgeois system, and, consequently, of the bourgeois fatherland. The opportunists distort that truth by extending to the period of the end of capitalism that which was true of the period of its rise. With reference to the former period and to the tasks of the proletariat in its struggle to destroy, not feudalism but capitalism, the *Communist Manifesto* gives a clear and precise formula: "The workingmen have no country." One can well understand why the opportunists are so afraid to accept this socialist proposition, afraid even, in most cases, openly to reckon with it. The socialist movement cannot triumph within the old framework of the fatherland. It creates new

and superior forms of human society, in which the legitimate needs and progressive aspirations of the working masses of *each* nationality will, for the first time, be met through international unity, provided existing national partitions are removed. To the present-day bourgeoisie's attempts to divide and disunite them by means of hypocritical appeals for the "defence of the fatherland" the class-conscious workers will reply with ever new and persevering efforts to unite the workers of various nations in the struggle to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie of all nations.

The bourgeoisie is duping the masses by disguising imperialist rapine with the old ideology of a "national war". This deceit is being shown up by the proletariat, which has brought forward its slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war. This was the slogan of the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions, which had in mind, not war in general, but precisely the present war and spoke, not of "defence of the fatherland", but of "hastening the downfall of capitalism", of utilising the war-created crisis for this purpose, and of the example provided by the Paris Commune. The latter was an instance of a war of nations being turned into a civil war.

Of course, such a conversion is no easy matter and cannot be accomplished at the whim of one party or another. That conversion, however, is inherent in the objective conditions of capitalism in general, and of the period of the end of capitalism in particular. It is in that direction, and that direction alone, that socialists must conduct their activities. It is not their business to vote for war credits or to encourage chauvinism in their "own" country (and allied countries), but primarily to strive against the chauvinism of their "own" bourgeoisie, without confining themselves to legal forms of struggle when the crisis has matured and the bourgeoisie has itself taken away the legality it has created. Such is the *line* of action that *leads* to civil war, and will bring about civil war at one moment or another of the European conflagration.

War is no chance happening, no "sin" as is thought by Christian priests (who are no whit behind the opportunists in preaching patriotism, humanity and peace), but an inevitable stage of capitalism, just as legitimate a form of the

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

capitalist way of life as peace is. Present-day war is a people's war. What follows from this truth is not that we must swim with the "popular" current of chauvinism, but that the class contradictions dividing the nations continue to exist in wartime and manifest themselves in conditions of war. Refusal to serve with the forces, anti-war strikes, etc., are sheer nonsense, the miserable and cowardly dream of an unarmed struggle against the armed bourgeoisie, vain yearning for the destruction of capitalism without a desperate civil war or a series of wars. It is the duty of every socialist to conduct propaganda of the class struggle, in the army as well; work directed towards turning a war of the nations into civil war is the only socialist activity in the era of an imperialist armed conflict of the bourgeoisie of all nations. Down with mawkishly sanctimonious and fatuous appeals for "peace at any price"! Let us raise high the banner of civil war! Imperialism sets at hazard the fate of European culture: this war will soon be followed by others, unless there are a series of successful revolutions. The story about this being the "last war" is a hollow and dangerous fabrication, a piece of philistine "mythology" (as *Golos* aptly puts it). The proletarian banner of civil war will rally together, not only hundreds of thousands of class-conscious workers but millions of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeois, now deceived by chauvinism, but whom the horrors of war will not only intimidate and depress, but also enlighten, teach, arouse, organise, steel and prepare for the war against the bourgeoisie of their "own" country and "foreign" countries. And this will take place, if not today, then tomorrow, if not during the war, then after it, if not in this war then in the next one.

The Second International is dead, overcome by opportunism. Down with opportunism, and long live the Third International, purged not only of "turncoats" (as *Golos* wishes), but of opportunism as well.

The Second International did its share of useful preparatory work in preliminarily organising the proletarian masses during the long, "peaceful" period of the most brutal capitalist slavery and most rapid capitalist progress in the last third of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. To the Third International falls the task

of organising the proletarian forces for a revolutionary onslaught against the capitalist governments, for civil war against the bourgeoisie of all countries for the capture of political power, for the triumph of socialism!

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 33
November 1, 1914

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checked against the manuscript

LETTER TO *VORWÄRTS* AND WIENER *ARBEITER-ZEITUNG*

Dear Comrades:

Some days ago, *Vorwärts* published a brief item regarding the paper I read in Zurich, on the subject of war and socialism, and conveying an entirely false impression of that paper. The impression is created that I limited myself to a polemic against tsarism. In actual fact, however, as one who is convinced that it is the duty of the socialists of every country to wage an unrelenting struggle against the chauvinism and patriotism of their own country (and not only of the enemy), I vehemently attacked tsarism, and, in that connection, I spoke of freedom for the Ukraine. However, the sense of my argument may be utterly distorted if no mention is made of what I said of opportunism and the collapse of the Second International, and against the stand taken by the Social-Democrats of Germany and Austria. Nine-tenths of my paper, whose reading lasted two hours, dealt with that criticism.

I would be grateful for publication, in *Vorwärts*, of the omissions I have named (or...).[27]

With Social-Democratic greetings

Written between October 29 and November 8 (November 11 and 21), 1914

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

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Translated from the German

KARL MARX[28]

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH WITH AN EXPOSITION OF MARXISM

Written in July-November 1914

First published in 1915,
in the *Granat Encyclopaedia*,
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over the signature of *V. Ilyin*

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of the pamphlet of 1918

PREFACE

This article on Karl Marx, which now appears in a separate printing, was written in 1913 (as far as I can remember) for the *Granat Encyclopaedia*. A fairly detailed bibliography of literature on Marx, mostly foreign, was appended to the article. This has been omitted in the present edition. The editors of the *Encyclopaedia*, for their part, have, for censorship reasons, deleted the end of the article on Marx, namely, the section dealing with his revolutionary tactics. Unfortunately, I am unable to reproduce that end, because the draft has remained among my papers somewhere in Cracow or in Switzerland. I only remember that in the concluding part of the article I quoted, among other things, the passage from Marx's letter to Engels of April 16, 1856, in which he wrote: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War. Then the affair will be splendid." That is what our Mensheviks, who have now sunk to utter betrayal of socialism and to desertion to the bourgeoisie, have failed to understand since 1905.

N. Lenin

Moscow, May 14, 1918

Published in 1918
in the pamphlet:
N. Lenin, *Karl Marx*,
Priboi Publishers, Moscow

Published according to
the manuscript

Marx, *Karl*, was born on May 5, 1818 (New Style), in the city of Trier (Rhenish Prussia). His father was a lawyer, a Jew, who in 1824 adopted Protestantism. The family was well-to-do, cultured, but not revolutionary. After graduating from a *Gymnasium* in Trier, Marx entered the university, first at Bonn and later in Berlin, where he read law, majoring in history and philosophy. He concluded his university course in 1841, submitting a doctoral thesis on the philosophy of Epicurus. At the time Marx was a Hegelian idealist in his views. In Berlin, he belonged to the circle of "Left Hegelians" (Bruno Bauer and others) who sought to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

After graduating, Marx moved to Bonn, hoping to become a professor. However, the reactionary policy of the government, which deprived Ludwig Feuerbach of his chair in 1832, refused to allow him to return to the university in 1836, and in 1841 forbade young Professor Bruno Bauer to lecture at Bonn, made Marx abandon the idea of an academic career. Left Hegelian views were making rapid headway in Germany at the time. Ludwig Feuerbach began to criticise theology, particularly after 1836, and turn to materialism, which in 1841 gained the ascendancy in his philosophy (*The Essence of Christianity*). The year 1843 saw the appearance of his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*. "One must oneself have experienced the liberating effect" of these books, Engels subsequently wrote of these works of Feuerbach. "We [i.e., the Left Hegelians, including Marx] all became at once Feuerbachians." At that time, some radical bourgeois in the Rhineland, who were in touch with the Left Hegelians, founded, in Cologne, an opposition paper called *Rheinische Zeitung* (the first issue appeared on January 1, 1842). Marx

Карл Маркс родился 5/V н.ст. 1818 г. в городе Трире (прусская Рейнская провинция). Отец его был адвокатом-евреем, в 1824 г. принявшим христианство. Семья была зажиточная, культурная, но не революционная. Окончив гимназию в Трире, М. поступил в университет, сначала в Бонн, потом в Берлин, изучал юридические науки и философию. Защитил курс в 1841 г., представив университету курс диссертацию о философии Эпикура. По выходе своем М. был уже решительным идеалистом. В Берлине он примкнул к кружку „левых гегельянцев" (Бруно Бауэр и др.), которые стремились делать из философии Гегеля атеистические и революционные выводы.

По окончании университета М. переселился в Бонн, рассчитывая стать профессором. Но реакционная политика министерства, отправившего профессора Бруно Бауэра, заставила М. отказаться от этого выбора. В это время ближайшие родственники Бруно, имевшие тесные сношения с Марксом, основали в Кёльне оппозиционную газету „Рейнскую газету" (Rheinische Zeitung, 1 янв. 1842 г.), М. и Бруно Бауэр были приглашены в качестве главных сотрудников, а в октябре 1842 г. М. сделался главным редактором и переселился из Бонна в Кёльн. Революционно-демократическое направление газеты определяет М. стремиться к ее закрытию, и правительство сначала подвергнуло газету двойной и тройной цензуре, а затем прямо было запретило ее 1 янв. 1843 г. М. [illegible] и другому другу передает редакторство, но его усилия не могли спасти газету, и она была закрыта в марте 1843 г. [В ранних трудах М. в „Рейн. газ." имеется отрывок, который упоминается выше (см. Лафарг), сам сообщает о интересе к вопросам хозяйственным.] Тяжелая работа за пером М., т. е. от непосредственного знакомства с политическими экономами, и он чрезвычайно пригодился для его изучения (в тюрьмах).

В 1843 г. М. женился на дочери барона фон Вестфалена, старшего друга его отца, сверстницы его сестры. Жена его принадлежала к прусской реакционной дворянской семье. За прусским правительством в 1850-1858 гг. [illegible] в числе самых реакционных лиц. Осенью 1843 г. М. уехал в Париж, чтобы изучать французский, вместе с Арнольдом Руге (1802-1880, видный гегельянец, 1825-1830 в тюрьме, политик 1848 г. [illegible]; политик 1866-70 [illegible] радикальной буржуазии. Можно видеть первый номер „Немецко-французского журнала" Руге. Он [illegible] от [illegible] из-за разногласий с Руге. В своих [illegible] М. Во-

First page
of Lenin's manuscript,
"Karl Marx"
July-November 1914

and Bruno Bauer were invited to be the chief contributors, and in October 1842 Marx became editor-in-chief and moved from Bonn to Cologne. The newspaper's revolutionary-democratic trend became more and more pronounced under Marx's editorship, and the government first imposed double and triple censorship on the paper, and then on January 1, 1843, decided to suppress it. Marx had to resign the editorship before that date, but his resignation did not save the paper, which suspended publication in March 1843. Of the major articles Marx contributed to *Rheinische Zeitung*, Engels notes, in addition to those indicated below (see *Bibliography*), an article on the condition of peasant vine-growers in the Moselle Valley. Marx's journalistic activities convinced him that he was insufficiently acquainted with political economy, and he zealously set out to study it.

In 1843, Marx married, at Kreuznach, Jenny von Westphalen, a childhood friend he had become engaged to while still a student. His wife came of a reactionary family of the Prussian nobility, her elder brother being Prussia's Minister of Interior during a most reactionary period—1850-58. In the autumn of 1843, Marx went to Paris in order to publish a radical journal abroad, together with Arnold Ruge (1802-1880; Left Hegelian; in prison in 1825-30; a political exile following 1848, and a Bismarckian after 1866-70). Only one issue of this journal, *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, appeared; publication was discontinued owing to the difficulty of secretly distributing it in Germany, and to disagreement with Ruge. Marx's articles in this journal showed that he was already a revolutionary, who advocated "merciless criticism of everything existing", and in particular the "criticism by weapon",[29] and appealed to the *masses* and to the *proletariat*.

In September 1844 Frederick Engels came to Paris for a few days, and from that time on became Marx's closest friend. They both took a most active part in the then seething life of the revolutionary groups in Paris (of particular importance at the time was Proudhon's doctrine, which Marx pulled to pieces in his *Poverty of Philosophy*, 1847); waging a vigorous struggle against the various doctrines of petty-bourgeois socialism, they worked out the theory and tactics of revolutionary *proletarian socialism*, or communism

(Marxism). See Marx's works of this period, 1844-48, in the *Bibliography*. At the insistent request of the Prussian Government, Marx was banished from Paris in 1845, as a dangerous revolutionary. He went to Brussels. In the spring of 1847 Marx and Engels joined a secret propaganda society called the Communist League; they took a prominent part in the League's Second Congress (London, November 1847), at whose request they drew up the celebrated *Communist Manifesto* which appeared in February 1848. With the clarity and brilliance of genius, this work outlines a new world-conception, consistent materialism, which also embraces the realm of social life; dialectics, as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development; the theory of the class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat—the creator of a new, communist society.

On the outbreak of the Revolution of February 1848, Marx was banished from Belgium. He returned to Paris, whence, after the March Revolution, he went to Cologne, Germany, where *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was published from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849, with Marx as editor-in-chief. The new theory was splendidly confirmed by the course of the revolutionary events of 1848-49, just as it has been subsequently confirmed by all proletarian and democratic movements in all countries of the world. The victorious counter-revolutionaries first instigated court proceedings against Marx (he was acquitted on February 9, 1849), and then banished him from Germany (May 16, 1849). First Marx went to Paris, was again banished after the demonstration of June 13, 1849, and then went to London, where he lived till his death.

His life as a political exile was a very hard one, as the correspondence between Marx and Engels (published in 1913) clearly reveals. Poverty weighed heavily on Marx and his family; had it not been for Engels's constant and selfless financial aid, Marx would not only have been unable to complete *Capital* but would have inevitably been crushed by want. Moreover, the prevailing doctrines and trends of petty-bourgeois socialism, and of non-proletarian socialism in general, forced Marx to wage a continuous and merciless struggle and sometimes to repel the most savage and mon-

strous personal attacks (*Herr Vogt*). Marx, who stood aloof from circles of political exiles, developed his materialist theory in a number of historical works (see *Bibliography*), devoting himself mainly to a study of political economy. Marx revolutionised this science (see "The Marxist Doctrine", below) in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (Vol. I, 1867).

The revival of the democratic movements in the late fifties and in the sixties recalled Marx to practical activity. In 1864 (September 28) the International Workingmen's Association—the celebrated First International—was founded in London. Marx was the heart and soul of this organisation, and author of its first Address and of a host of resolutions, declarations and manifestos. In uniting the labour movement of various countries, striving to channel into joint activity the various forms of non-proletarian, pre-Marxist socialism (Mazzini, Proudhon, Bakunin, liberal trade-unionism in Britain, Lassallean vacillations to the right in Germany, etc.), and in combating the theories of all these sects and schools, Marx hammered out a uniform tactic for the proletarian struggle of the working class in the various countries. Following the downfall of the Paris Commune (1871)—of which Marx gave such a profound, clear-cut, brilliant, *effective* and revolutionary analysis (*The Civil War in France*, 1871)—and the Bakuninist-caused cleavage in the International, the latter organisation could no longer exist in Europe. After the Hague Congress of the International (1872), Marx had the General Council of the International transferred to New York. The First International had played its historical part, and now made way for a period of a far greater development of the labour movement in all countries in the world, a period in which the movement grew in *scope*, and *mass* socialist working-class parties in individual national states were formed.

Marx's health was undermined by his strenuous work in the International and his still more strenuous theoretical occupations. He continued work on the refashioning of political economy and on the completion of *Capital*, for which he collected a mass of new material and studied a number of languages (Russian, for instance). However, ill-health prevented him from completing *Capital*.

His wife died on December 2, 1881, and on March 14, 1883, Marx passed away peacefully in his armchair. He lies buried next to his wife at Highgate Cemetery in London. Of Marx's children some died in childhood in London, when the family were living in destitute circumstances. Three daughters married English and French socialists: Eleanor Aveling, Laura Lafargue and Jenny Longuet. The latter's son is a member of the French Socialist Party.

THE MARXIST DOCTRINE

Marxism is the system of Marx's views and teachings. Marx was the genius who continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines in general. Acknowledged even by his opponents, the remarkable consistency and integrity of Marx's views, whose totality constitutes modern materialism and modern scientific socialism, as the theory and programme of the working-class movement in all the civilised countries of the world, make it incumbent on us to present a brief outline of his world-conception in general, prior to giving an exposition of the principal content of Marxism, namely, Marx's economic doctrine.

PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIALISM

Beginning with the years 1844-45, when his views took shape, Marx was a materialist and especially a follower of Ludwig Feuerbach, whose weak points he subsequently saw only in his materialism being insufficiently consistent and comprehensive. To Marx Feuerbach's historic and "epoch-making" significance lay in his having resolutely broken with Hegel's idealism and in his proclamation of materialism, which already "in the eighteenth century, particularly French materialism, was not only a struggle against the existing political institutions and against ... religion and

theology, but also ... against all metaphysics" (in the sense of "drunken speculation" as distinct from "sober philosophy"). (*The Holy Family*, in *Literarischer Nachlass*.) "To Hegel..." wrote Marx, "the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos (the creator, the maker) of the real world.... With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" (*Capital*, Vol. I, Afterword to the Second Edition). In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in *Anti-Dühring* (read by Marx in the manuscript): "The unity of the world does not consist in its being.... The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved ... by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science...." "Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be.... But if the ... question is raised: what thought and consciousness really are, and where they come from; it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of Nature, which has developed in and along with its environment; hence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature's interconnections but are in correspondence with them....

"Hegel was an idealist, that is to say, the thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or less abstract images [*Abbilder*, reflections; Engels sometimes speaks of "imprints"] of real things and processes, but, on the contrary, things and their development were to him only the images, made real, of the 'Idea' existing somewhere or other before the world existed." In his *Ludwig Feuerbach*—which expounded his own and Marx's views on Feuerbach's philosophy, and was sent to the printers after he had re-read an old manuscript Marx and himself had written in 1844-45 on Hegel, Feuerbach and the materialist conception of history—Engels wrote: "The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is the relation of thinking and being ... spirit to Nature ... which

is primary, spirit or Nature.... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to Nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other ... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded Nature as primary, belonged to the various schools of materialism." Any other use of the concepts of (philosophical) idealism and materialism leads only to confusion. Marx decidedly rejected, not only idealism, which is always linked in one way or another with religion, but also the views—especially widespread in our day—of Hume and Kant, agnosticism, criticism, and positivism in their various forms; he considered that philosophy a "reactionary" concession to idealism, and at best a "shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world". On this question, see, besides the works by Engels and Marx mentioned above, a letter Marx wrote to Engels on December 12, 1868, in which, referring to an utterance by the naturalist Thomas Huxley which was "more materialistic" than usual, and to his recognition that "as long as we actually observe and think, we cannot possibly get away from materialism", Marx reproached Huxley for leaving a "loop-hole" for agnosticism, for Humism. It is particularly important to note Marx's view on the relation between freedom and necessity: "Freedom is the appreciation of necessity. 'Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood'" (Engels in *Anti-Dühring*). This means recognition of the rule of objective laws in Nature and of the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom (in the same manner as the transformation of the uncognised but cognisable "thing-in-itself" into the "thing-for-us", of the "essence of things" into "phenomena"). Marx and Engels considered that the "old" materialism, including that of Feuerbach (and still more the "vulgar" materialism of Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott), contained the following major shortcomings: (1) this materialism was "predominantly mechanical", failing to take account of the latest developments in chemistry and biology (today it would be necessary to add: and in the electrical theory of matter); (2) the old materialism was non-historical and non-dialectical (metaphysical, in the meaning

of anti-dialectical), and did not adhere consistently and comprehensively to the standpoint of development; (3) it regarded the "human essence" in the abstract, not as the "complex of all" (concretely and historically determined) "social relations", and therefore merely "interpreted" the world, whereas it was-a question of "changing" it, i.e., it did not understand the importance of "revolutionary practical activity".

DIALECTICS

As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. They thought that any other formulation of the principle of development, of evolution, was one-sided and poor in content, and could only distort and mutilate the actual course of development (which often proceeds by leaps, and via catastrophes and revolutions) in Nature and in society. "Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics [from the destruction of idealism, including Hegelianism] and apply it in the materialist conception of Nature.... Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich [this was written before the discovery of radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements, etc.!] and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis Nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical.

"The great basic thought," Engels writes, "that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away ... this great fundametal thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things.... For dialectical philosophy nothing is

final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendency from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain." Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought".

This revolutionary aspect of Hegel's philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "does not need any philosophy standing above the other sciences". From previous philosophy there remains "the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics". Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which, too, must regard its subject matter historically, studying and generalising the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *non*-knowledge to knowledge.

In our times the idea of development, of evolution, has almost completely penetrated social consciousness, only in other ways, and not through Hegelian philosophy. Still, this idea, as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel's philosophy, is far more comprehensive and far richer in content than the current idea of evolution is. A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ("the negation of negation"), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; "breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between *all* aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that

is richer than the conventional one. (Cf. Marx's letter to Engels of January 8, 1868, in which he ridicules Stein's "wooden trichotomies", which it would be absurd to confuse with materialist dialectics.)

THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

A realisation of the inconsistency, incompleteness, and one-sidedness of the old materialism convinced Marx of the necessity of "bringing the science of society ... into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon". Since materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of being, and not conversely, then materialism as applied to the social life of mankind has to explain *social* consciousness as the outcome of *social* being. "Technology," Marx writes (*Capital*, Vol. I), "discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the immediate process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them." In the preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx gives an integral formulation of the fundamental principles of materialism as applied to human society and its history, in the following words:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces.

"The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a regal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations

within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

"Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we cannot judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production.... In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society" (cf. Marx's brief formulation in a letter to Engels dated July 7, 1866 "Our theory that the organisation of labour is determined by the means of production").

The discovery of the materialist conception of history, or more correctly, the consistent continuation and extension of materialism into the domain of social phenomena, removed the two chief shortcomings in earlier historical theories. In the first place, the latter at best examined only the ideological motives in the historical activities of human beings without investigating the origins of those motives, or ascertaining the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations, or seeing the roots of these relations in the degree of development reached by material production; in the second place, the earlier theories did not embrace the activities of the *masses* of the population whereas historical materialism made it possible for the first time to study with scientific accuracy the social conditions of the life of the masses, and the changes in those conditions. *At best*, pre-Marxist "sociology" and historiography brought forth an accumulation of raw facts, collected at random, and

a description of individual aspects of the historical process. By examining the *totality* of opposing tendencies, by reducing them to precisely definable conditions of life and production of the various *classes* of society, by discarding subjectivism and arbitrariness in the choice of a particular "dominant" idea or in its interpretation, and by revealing that, without exception, all ideas and all the various tendencies *stem* from the condition of the material forces of production, Marxism indicated the way to an all-embracing and comprehensive study of the process of the rise, development, and decline of socio-economic systems. People make their own history, but what determines the motives of people, of the mass of people, i.e., what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas and strivings? What is the sum total of all these clashes in the mass of human societies? What are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all of man's historical activity? What is the law of development of these conditions? To all these Marx drew attention and indicated the way to a scientific study of history as a single process which, with all its immense variety and contradictoriness, is governed by definite laws.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

It is common knowledge that, in any given society, the strivings of some of its members conflict with the strivings of others, that social life is full of contradictions, and that history reveals a struggle between nations and societies, as well as within nations and societies, and, besides, an alternation of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline. Marxism has provided the guidance, i.e., the theory of the class struggle, for the discovery of the laws governing this seeming maze and chaos. It is only a study of the sum of the strivings of all the members of a given society or group of societies that can lead to a scientific definition of the result of those strivings. Now the conflicting strivings stem from the difference in the position and mode of life of the *classes* into which each society is divided. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," Marx wrote in the *Communist Manifesto* (with the exception of the history of the primitive

community, Engels added subsequently). "Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.... The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat." Ever since the Great French Revolution, European history has, in a number of countries, tellingly revealed what actually lies at the bottom of events—the struggle of classes. The Restoration period in France already produced a number of historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet, and Thiers) who, in summing up what was taking place, were obliged to admit that the class struggle was the key to all French history. The modern period—that of the complete victory of the bourgeoisie, representative institutions, extensive (if not universal) suffrage, a cheap daily press, that is widely circulated among the masses, etc., a period of powerful and ever-expanding unions of workers and unions of employers, etc.—has shown even more strikingly (though sometimes in a very one-sided, "peaceful", and "constitutional" form) the class struggle as the mainspring of events. The following passage from Marx's *Communist Manifesto* will show us what Marx demanded of social science as regards an objective analysis of the position of each class in modern society, with reference to an analysis of each class's conditions of development: "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product. The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the

bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat." In a number of historical works (see *Bibliography*), Marx gave brilliant and profound examples of materialist historiography, of an analysis of the position of *each* individual class, and sometimes of various groups or strata within a class, showing plainly why and how "every class struggle is a political struggle". The above-quoted passage is an illustration of what a complex network of social relations and *transitional* stages from one class to another, from the past to the future, was analysed by Marx so as to determine the resultant of historical development.

Marx's economic doctrine is the most profound, comprehensive and detailed confirmation and application of his theory.

MARX'S ECONOMIC DOCTRINE

"It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society", i.e., capitalist, bourgeois society, says Marx in the preface to *Capital*. An investigation into the relations of production in a given, historically defined society, in their inception, development, and decline—such is the content of Marx's economic doctrine. In capitalist society the production of *commodities* is predominant, and Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of commodity.

VALUE

A commodity is, in the first place, a thing that satisfies a human want; in the second place, it is a thing that can be exchanged for another thing. The utility of a thing makes it a *use-value*. Exchange-value (or simply, value) is first of all the ratio, the proportion, in which a certain number of

use-values of one kind can be exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another kind. Daily experience shows us that millions upon millions of such exchanges are constantly equating with one another every kind of use-value, even the most diverse and incomparable. Now, what is there in common between these various things, things constantly equated with one another in a definite system of social relations? Their common feature is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products, people equate the most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relations in which individual producers create diverse products (the social division of labour), and in which all these products are equated to one another in the process of exchange. Consequently, what is common to all commodities is not the concrete labour of a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind but *abstract* human labour—human labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, as represented in the sum total of the values of all commodities, is one and the same human labour power. Thousands upon thousands of millions of acts of exchange prove this. Consequently, each particular commodity represents only a certain share of the *socially necessary* labour time. The magnitude of value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially necessary for the production of a given commodity, of a given use-value. "Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it." As one of the earlier economists said, value is a relation between two persons; only he should have added: a relation concealed beneath a material wrapping. We can understand what value is only when we consider it from the standpoint of the system of social relations of production in a particular historical type of society, moreover, of relations that manifest themselves in the mass phenomenon of exchange, a phenomenon which repeats itself thousands upon thousands of times. "As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour time." After making a detailed analysis of the twofold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on

to analyse the *form of value* and *money*. Here, Marx's main task is to study the *origin* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of the development of exchange, beginning with individual and incidental acts of exchange (the "elementary or accidental form of value", in which a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another), passing on to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same particular commodity, and ending with the money form of value, when gold becomes that particular commodity, the universal equivalent. As the highest product of the development of exchange and commodity production, money masks, conceals, the social character of all individual labour, the social link between individual producers united by the market. Marx analyses the various functions of money in very great detail; it is important to note here in particular (as in the opening chapters of *Capital* in general) that what seems to be an abstract and at times purely deductive mode of exposition deals in reality with a gigantic collection of factual material on the history of the development of exchange and commodity production. "If we consider money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as means of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the process of social production" (*Capital*, Vol. I).

SURPLUS VALUE

At a certain stage in the development of commodity production money becomes transformed into capital. The formula of commodity circulation was C—M—C (commodity—money—commodity), i.e., the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. The general formula of capital, on the contrary, is M—C—M, i.e., purchase for the purpose of selling (at a profit). The increase over the original value of the money that is put into circulation is called

by Marx surplus value. The fact of this "growth" of money in capitalist circulation is common knowledge. Indeed, it is this "growth" which transforms money into *capital*, as a special and historically determined social relation of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of commodity circulation, for the latter knows only the exchange of equivalents; neither can it arise out of price increases, for the mutual losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalise one another, whereas what we have here is not an individual phenomenon but a mass, average and social phenomenon. To obtain surplus value, the owner of money "must ... find ... in the market a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value"—a commodity whose process of consumption is at the same time a process of the creation of value. Such a commodity exists—human labour power. Its consumption is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which, like the value of every other commodity, is determined by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (i.e., the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work for a whole day—twelve hours, let us say. Yet, in the course of six hours ("necessary" labour time) the worker creates product sufficient to cover the cost of his own maintenance; in the course of the next six hours ("surplus" labour time), he creates "surplus" product, or surplus value, for which the capitalist does not pay. Therefore, from the standpoint of the process of production, two parts must be distinguished in capital: constant capital, which is expended on means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials, etc.), whose value, without any change, is transferred (immediately or part by part) to the finished product; secondly, variable capital, which is expended on labour power. The value of this latter capital is not invariable, but grows in the labour process, creating surplus value. Therefore, to express the degree of capital's exploitation of labour power surplus value must be compared, not with the entire capital but only with the variable capital. Thus, in the example just given, the rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this ratio, will be 6 : 6, i.e., 100 per cent.

There were two historical prerequisites for capital to arise: first, the accumulation of certain sums of money in the hands of individuals under conditions of a relatively high level of development of commodity production in general; secondly, the existence of a worker who is "free" in a double sense: free of all constraint or restriction on the sale of his labour power, and freed from the land and all means of production in general, a free and unattached labourer, a "proletarian", who cannot subsist except by selling his labour power.

There are two main ways of increasing surplus value: lengthening the working day ("absolute surplus value"), and reducing the necessary working day ("relative surplus value"). In analysing the former, Marx gives a most impressive picture of the struggle of the working class for a shorter working day and of interference by the state authority to lengthen the working day (from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth) and to reduce it (factory legislation in the nineteenth century). Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working-class movement in all civilised countries of the world has provided a wealth of new facts amplifying this picture.

Analysing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigates the three fundamental historical stages in capitalism's increase of the productivity of labour: (1) simple co-operation; (2) the division of labour, and manufacture; (3) machinery and large-scale industry. How profoundly Marx has here revealed the basic and typical features of capitalist development is shown incidentally by the fact that investigations into the handicraft industries of Russia furnish abundant material illustrating the first two of the mentioned stages. The revolutionising effect of large-scale machine industry, as described by Marx in 1867, has revealed itself in a number of "new" countries (Russia, Japan, etc.), in the course of the half-century that has since elapsed.

To continue. New and important in the highest degree is Marx's analysis of the **accumulation of capital**, i.e., the transformation of a part of surplus value into capital, and its use, not for satisfying the personal needs or whims of the capitalist, but for new production. Marx revealed the error made by all earlier classical political economists (beginning

with Adam Smith), who assumed that the entire surplus value which is transformed into capital goes to form variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* and variable capital. Of tremendous importance to the process of development of capitalism and its transformation into socialism is the more rapid growth of the constant capital share (of the total capital) as compared with the variable capital share.

By speeding up the supplanting of workers by machinery and by creating wealth at one extreme and poverty at the other, the accumulation of capital also gives rise to what is called the "reserve army of labour", to the "relative surplus" of workers, or "capitalist overpopulation", which assumes the most diverse forms and enables capital to expand production extremely rapidly. In conjunction with credit facilities and the accumulation of capital in the form of means of production, this incidentally is the key to an understanding of the *crises* of overproduction which occur periodically in capitalist countries—at first at an average of every ten years, and later at more lengthy and less definite intervals. From the accumulation of capital under capitalism we should distinguish what is known as primitive accumulation: the forcible divorcement of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants off the land, the stealing of communal lands, the system of colonies and national debts, protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates the "free" proletarian at one extreme, and the owner of money, the capitalist, at the other.

The "**historical tendency of capitalist accumulation**" is described by Marx in the following celebrated words: "The expropriation of the immediate producers is accomplished with merciless vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property [of the peasant and handicraftsman], that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others.... That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself,

but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production, by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under, it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated" (*Capital*, Vol. I).

Also new and important in the highest degree is the analysis Marx gives, in Volume Two of *Capital*, of the reproduction of aggregate social capital. Here, too, Marx deals, not with an individual phenomenon but with a mass phenomenon; not with a fractional part of the economy of society, but with that economy as a whole. Correcting the aforementioned error of the classical economists, Marx divides the whole of social production into two big sections: (I) production of the means of production, and (II) production of articles of consumption, and examines in detail, with numerical examples, the circulation of the aggregate social capital—both when reproduced in its former dimensions and in the case of accumulation.

Volume Three of *Capital* solves the problem of how the **average rate of profit** is formed on the basis of the law of value. The immense stride forward made by economic science in the person of Marx consists in his having conducted an analysis, from the standpoint of mass economic phenomena, of the social economy as a whole, not from the standpoint of individual cases or of the external and superficial aspects of competition, to which vulgar political economy and the modern "theory of marginal utility" frequently restrict themselves. Marx first analyses the origin of surplus value, and then goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit is the ratio between surplus value and the total capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a "high organic composition" (i.e., with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital in excess of the social average) yields a rate of profit below the average; capital with a "low organic composition" yields a rate of profit above the average. Competition among capitalists, and their freedom to transfer their capital from one branch to another, will in both cases reduce the rate of profit to the average. The sum total of the values of all the commodities in a given society coincides with the sum total of the prices of the commodities, but, in individual undertakings and branches of production, as a result of competition, commodities are sold, not at their values but at the *prices of production* (or production prices), which are equal to the capital expended plus the average profit.

In this way, the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values and of the equalisation of profits is fully explained by Marx on the basis of the law of value, since the sum total of values of all commodities coincides with the sum total of prices. However, the equating of (social) value to (individual) prices does not take place simply and directly, but in a very complex way. It is quite natural that in a society of separate producers of commodities, who are united only by the market, a conformity to law can be only an average, social, mass manifestation, with individual deviations in either direction mutually compensating one another.

A rise in the productivity of labour implies a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable

capital. Inasmuch as surplus value is a function of variable capital alone, it is obvious that the rate of profit (the ratio of surplus value to the whole capital, not to its variable part alone) tends to fall. Marx makes a detailed analysis of this tendency and of a number of circumstances that conceal or counteract it. Without pausing to deal with the extremely interesting sections of Volume Three of *Capital* devoted to usurer's capital, commercial capital and money capital, we must pass on to the most important section—the theory of **ground rent**. Since the area of land is limited and, in capitalist countries, the land is all held by individual private owners, the price of production of agricultural products is determined by the cost of production, not on soil of average quality but on the worst soil; not under average conditions but under the worst conditions of delivery of produce to the market. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soil (or in better conditions) constitutes *differential* rent. Analysing this in detail, and showing how it arises out of the difference in fertility of different plots of land, and out of the difference in the amount of capital invested in land, Marx fully reveals (see also *Theories of Surplus Value*, in which the criticism of Rodbertus is most noteworthy) the error of Ricardo, who considered that differential rent is derived only when there is a successive transition from better land to worse. On the contrary, there may be inverse transitions, land may pass from one category into others (owing to advances in agricultural techniques, the growth of towns, and so on), and the notorious "law of diminishing returns", which charges Nature with the defects, limitations and contradictions of capitalism, is profoundly erroneous. Further, the equalisation of profit in all branches of industry and the national economy in general presupposes complete freedom of competition and the free flow of capital from one branch to another. However, the private ownership of land creates monopoly, which hinders that free flow. Because of that monopoly, the products of agriculture, where a lower organic composition of capital obtains, and consequently an individually higher rate of profit, do not enter into the quite free process of the equalisation of the rate of profit. As a monopolist, the landowner can keep the price above the average, and this monopoly

price gives rise to *absolute* rent. Differential rent cannot be done away with under capitalism, but absolute rent *can*—for instance, by the nationalisation of the land, by making it state property. That would undermine the monopoly of private landowners, and would mean the more consistent and full operation of freedom of competition in agriculture. That is why, as Marx points out, bourgeois radicals have again and again in the course of history advanced this progressive bourgeois demand for nationalisation of the land, a demand which, however, frightens most of the bourgeoisie, because it would too closely affect another monopoly, one that is particularly important and "sensitive" today—the monopoly of the means of production in general. (A remarkably popular, concise, and clear exposition of his theory of the average rate of profit on capital and of absolute ground rent is given by Marx himself in a letter to Engels, dated August 2, 1862. See *Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, pp. 77-81; also the letter of August 9, 1862, ibid., pp. 86-87.)

With reference to the history of ground rent it is also important to note Marx's analysis showing how labour rent (the peasant creates surplus product by working on the lord's land) is transformed into rent paid in produce or in kind (the peasant creates surplus product on his own land and hands it over to the landlord because of "non-economic constraint"), then into money-rent (rent in kind, which is converted into money—the *obrok** of old Russia—as a result of the development of commodity production), and finally into capitalist rent, when the peasant is replaced by the agricultural *entrepreneur*, who cultivates the soil with the help of hired labour. In connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalistic ground rent", note should be taken of a number of profound ideas (of particular importance to backward countries like Russia) expressed by Marx regarding the evolution of capitalism in agriculture. "The transformation of rent in kind into money-rent is furthermore not only inevitably accompanied, but even anticipated, by the formation of a class of propertyless day-labourers, who hire themselves out for money. During their genesis, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom

* Quit-rent.—*Ed.*

necessarily develops among the more prosperous peasants, subject to rent payments, of exploiting agricultural wage-labourers for their own account, much as in feudal times, when the more well-to-do peasant serfs themselves also held serfs. In this way, they gradually acquire the possibility of accumulating a certain amount of wealth and themselves becoming transformed into future capitalists. The old self-employed possessors of land themselves thus give rise to a nursery school for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned by the general development of capitalist production beyond the bounds of the countryside" (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 332). "The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital, the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home market" (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. 778). In their turn, the impoverishment and ruin of the rural population play a part in the creation, for capital, of a reserve army of labour. In every capitalist country "part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing [i.e., non-agricultural] proletariat.... This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing.... The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism" (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. 668). The peasant's private ownership of the land he tills is the foundation of small-scale production and the condition for its prospering and achieving the classical form. But such small-scale production is compatible only with a narrow and primitive framework of production and society. Under capitalism the "exploitation of the peasants differs only in form from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The exploiter is the same: capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury; the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the state taxes" (*The Class Struggles in France*). "The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages" (*The Eighteenth Brumaire*). As a rule the peasant cedes to capitalist society, i.e., to the

capitalist class, even a part of the wages, sinking "to the level of the Irish tenant farmer—all under the pretence of being a private proprietor" (*The Class Struggles in France*). What is "one of the reasons why grain prices are lower in countries with predominant small-peasant land proprietorship than in countries with a capitalist mode of production"? (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 340.) It is that the peasant hands over gratis to society (i.e., the capitalist class) a part of his surplus product. "This lower price [of grain and other agricultural produce] is consequently a result of the producers' poverty and by no means of their labour productivity" (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 340). Under capitalism the small-holding system, which is the normal form of small-scale production, degenerates, collapses, and perishes. "Proprietorship of land parcels, by its very nature, excludes the development of social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, large-scale cattle raising, and the progressive application of science. Usury and a taxation system must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite fragmentation of means of production, and isolation of the producers themselves." (Co-operative societies, i.e., associations of small peasants, while playing an extremely progressive bourgeois role, only weaken this tendency, without eliminating it; nor must it be forgotten that these co-operative societies do much for the well-to-do peasants, and very little—next to nothing—for the mass of poor peasants; then the associations themselves become exploiters of hired labour.) "Monstrous waste of human energy. Progressive deterioration of conditions of production and increased prices of means of production—an inevitable law of proprietorship of parcels." In agriculture, as in industry, capitalism transforms the process of production only at the price of the "martyrdom of the producer". "The dispersion of the rural labourers over larger areas breaks their power of resistance, while concentration increases that of the town operatives. In modern agriculture, as in the urban industries, the increased productiveness and quantity of the labour set in motion are bought at the cost of laying waste and consuming by disease labour power itself. Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture

is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil.... Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the labourer" (*Capital*, Vol. I, end of Chapter 13).

SOCIALISM

From the foregoing it is evident that Marx deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of the development of contemporary society. The socialisation of labour, which is advancing ever more rapidly in thousands of forms and has manifested itself very strikingly, during the half-century since the death of Marx, in the growth of large-scale production, capitalist cartels, syndicates and trusts, as well as in the gigantic increase in the dimensions and power of finance capital, provides the principal material foundation for the inevitable advent of socialism. The intellectual and moral motive force and the physical executor of this transformation is the proletariat, which has been trained by capitalism itself. The proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie, which finds expression in a variety of forms ever richer in content, inevitably becomes a political struggle directed towards the conquest of political power by the proletariat ("the dictatorship of the proletariat"). The socialisation of production cannot but lead to the means of production becoming the property of society, to the "expropriation of the expropriators". A tremendous rise in labour productivity, a shorter working day, and the replacement of the remnants, the ruins, of small-scale, primitive and disunited production by collective and improved labour—such are the direct consequences of this transformation. Capitalism breaks for all time the ties between agriculture and industry, but at the same time, through its highest development, it prepares new elements of those ties, a union between industry and agriculture based on the conscious application of science and the concentration of collective labour, and on a redistribution of the human population (thus putting an end both to

rural backwardness, isolation and barbarism, and to the unnatural concentration of vast masses of people in big cities). A new form of family, new conditions in the status of women and in the upbringing of the younger generation are prepared by the highest forms of present-day capitalism: the labour of women and children and the break-up of the patriarchal family by capitalism inevitably assume the most terrible, disastrous, and repulsive forms in modern society. Nevertheless, "modern industry, by assigning as it does, an important part in the socially organised process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is, of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, taken together form a series in historic development. Moreover, it is obvious that the fact of the collective working group being composed of individuals of both sexes and all ages, must necessarily, under suitable conditions, become a source of humane development; although in its spontaneously developed, brutal, capitalistic form, where the labourer exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the labourer, that fact is a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery" (*Capital*, Vol. I, end of Chap. 13). The factory system contains "the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of social production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings" (*ibid.*). Marx's socialism places the problems of nationality and of the state on the same historical footing, not only in the sense of explaining the past but also in the sense of a bold forecast of the future and of bold practical action for its achievement. Nations are an inevitable product, an inevitable form, in the bourgeois epoch of social development. The working class could not grow strong, become mature and take shape without "constituting itself within the nation", without being "national"

("though not in the bourgeois sense of the word"). The development of capitalism, however, breaks down national barriers more and more, does away with national seclusion, and substitutes class antagonisms for national antagonisms. It is, therefore, perfectly true of the developed capitalist countries that "the workingmen have no country" and that "united action" by the workers, of the civilised countries at least, "is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat" (*Communist Manifesto*). The state, which is organised coercion, inevitably came into being at a definite stage in the development of society, when the latter had split into irreconcilable classes, and could not exist without an "authority" ostensibly standing above society, and to a certain degree separate from society. Arising out of class contradictions, the state becomes "...the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave-owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital" (Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, *Private Property and the State*, a work in which the writer expounds his own views and Marx's). Even the democratic republic, the freest and most progressive form of the bourgeois state, does not eliminate this fact in any way, but merely modifies its form (the links between the government and the stock exchange, the corruption—direct and indirect—of officialdom and the press, etc.). By leading to the abolition of classes, socialism will thereby lead to the abolition of the state as well. "The first act," Engels writes in *Anti-Dühring*, "by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. The state interference in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the direction of the processes

of production. The state is not 'abolished', it withers away." "The society that will organise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe" (Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).

Finally, as regards the attitude of Marx's socialism towards the small peasantry, which will continue to exist in the period of the expropriation of the expropriators, we must refer to a declaration made by Engels, which expresses Marx's views: "...when we are in possession of state power we shall not even think of forcibly expropriating the small peasants (regardless of whether with or without compensation), as we shall have to do in the case of the big landowners. Our task relative to the small peasant consists, in the first place, in effecting a transition of his private enterprise and private possession to co-operative ones, not forcibly but by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose. And then of course we shall have ample means of showing to the small peasant prospective advantages that must be obvious to him even today" (Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany*,* p. 17, published by Alexeyeva; there are errors in the Russian translation. Original in *Die Neue Zeit*).

TACTICS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

After examining, as early as 1844-45, one of the main shortcomings in the earlier materialism, namely, its inability to understand the conditions or appreciate the importance of practical revolutionary activity, Marx, along with his theoretical work, devoted unremitting attention, throughout his lifetime, to the tactical problems of the proletariat's class struggle. An immense amount of material bearing on this is contained in *all* the works of Marx, particularly in the four volumes of his correspondence with Engels, published

* See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. II, p. 433.

in 1913. This material is still far from having been brought together, collected, examined and studied. We shall therefore have to confine ourselves here to the most general and brief remarks, emphasising that Marx justly considered that, without *this* aspect, materialism is incomplete, one-sided, and lifeless. The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with all the postulates of his materialist-dialectical *Weltanschauung*. Only an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations between absolutely all the classes in a given society, and consequently a consideration of the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies, can serve as a basis for the correct tactics of an advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are regarded, not statically, but dynamically, i.e., not in a state of immobility, but in motion (whose laws are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class). Motion, in its turn, is regarded from the standpoint, not only of the past, but also of the future, and that not in the vulgar sense it is understood in by the "evolutionists", who see only slow changes, but dialectically: "...in developments of such magnitude twenty years are no more than a day," Marx wrote to Engels, "though later on there may come days in which twenty years are embodied" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, p. 127).[30] At each stage of development, at each moment, proletarian tactics must take account of this objectively inevitable dialectics of human history, on the one hand, utilising the periods of political stagnation or of sluggish, so-called "peaceful" development in order to develop the class-consciousness, strength and militancy of the advanced class, and, on the other hand, directing all the work of this utilisation towards the "ultimate aim" of that class's advance, towards creating in it the ability to find practical solutions for great tasks in the great days, in which twenty years are embodied". Two of Marx's arguments are of special importance in this connection: one of these is contained in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and concerns the economic struggle and economic organisations of the proletariat; the other is contained in the *Communist Manifesto* and concerns the political tasks of the proletariat. The former runs as follows: "Large-scale industry concentrates in one place

a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—combination.... Combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups ... and in face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them [i.e., the workers] than that of wages.... In this struggle—a veritable civil war—all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character." Here we have the programme and tactics of the economic struggle and of the trade union movement for several decades to come, for all the lengthy period in which the proletariat will prepare its forces for the "coming battle". All this should be compared with numerous references by Marx and Engels to the example of the British labour movement, showing how industrial "prosperity" leads to attempts "to buy the proletariat" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 1, p. 136),[31] to divert them from the struggle; how this prosperity in general "demoralises the workers" (Vol. 2, p. 218); how the British proletariat becomes "bourgeoisified"—"this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie" (Vol. 2, p. 290)[32]; how its "revolutionary energy" oozes away (Vol. 3, p. 124); how it will be necessary to wait a more or less lengthy space of time before "the British workers will free themselves from their apparent bourgeois infection" (Vol. 3, p. 127); how the British labour movement "lacks the mettle of the Chartists" (1866; Vol. 3, p. 305)[33]; how the British workers' leaders are becoming a type midway between "a radical bourgeois and a worker" (in reference to Holyoak, Vol. 4, p. 209); how, owing to Britain's monopoly, and as long as that monopoly lasts, "the British workingman will not budge" (Vol. 4, p. 433).[34] The tactics of the economic struggle, in connection with the general course (*and outcome*) of the working-class movement, are considered here from a remarkably broad, comprehensive, dialectical, and genuinely revolutionary standpoint.

The *Communist Manifesto* advanced a fundamental Marxist principle on the tactics of the political struggle: "The

Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class, but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement." That was why, in 1848, Marx supported the party of the "agrarian revolution" in Poland, "that party which brought about the Cracow insurrection in 1846". In Germany, Marx, in 1848 and 1849, supported the extreme revolutionary democrats, and subsequently never retracted what he had then said about tactics. He regarded the German bourgeoisie as an element which was "inclined from the very beginning to betray the people" (only an alliance with the peasantry could have enabled the bourgeoisie to completely achieve its aims) "and compromise with the crowned representatives of the old society". Here is Marx's summing-up of the German bourgeoisie's class position in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—an analysis which, incidentally, is a sample of a materialism that examines society in motion, and, moreover, not only from the aspect of a motion that is *backward*: "Without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below ... intimidated by the world storm ... no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect ... without initiative ... an execrable old man who saw himself doomed to guide and deflect the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests...." (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 1848; see *Literarischer Nachlass*, Vol. 3, p. 212.)[35] About twenty years later, Marx declared, in a letter to Engels (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, p. 224), that the Revolution of 1848 had failed because the bourgeoisie had preferred peace with slavery to the mere prospect of a fight for freedom. When the revolutionary period of 1848-49 ended, Marx opposed any attempt to play at revolution (his struggle against Schapper and Willich), and insisted on the ability to work in the new phase, which in a quasi-"peaceful" way was preparing new revolutions. The spirit in which Marx wanted this work to be conducted is to be seen in his appraisal of the situation in Germany in 1856, the darkest period of reaction: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War" (*Briefwechsel*,

Vol. 2, p. 108).[36] While the democratic (bourgeois) revolution in Germany was uncompleted, Marx focussed every attention, in the tactics of the socialist proletariat, on developing the democratic energy of the peasantry. He held that Lassalle's attitude was "objectively ... a betrayal of the whole workers' movement to Prussia" (Vol. 3, p. 210), incidentally because Lassalle was tolerant of the Junkers and Prussian nationalism. "In a predominantly agricultural country,"? Engels wrote in 1865, in exchanging views with Marx on their forthcoming joint declaration in the press, "...it is dastardly to make an exclusive attack on the bourgeoisie in the name of the industrial proletariat but never to devote a word to the patriarchal exploitation of the rural proletariat under the lash of the great feudal aristocracy" (Vol. 3, p. 217).[37] From 1864 to 1870, when the period of the consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany was coming to an end, a period in which the Prussian and Austrian exploiting classes were struggling to complete that revolution in one way or another *from above*, Marx not only rebuked Lassalle, who was coquetting with Bismarck, but also corrected Liebknecht, who had lapsed into "Austrophilism" and a defence of particularism; Marx demanded revolutionary tactics which would combat with equal ruthlessness both Bismarck and the Austrophiles, tactics which would not be adapted to the "victor"—the Prussian Junker—but would immediately renew the revolutionary struggle against him *also in the conditions* created by the Prussian military victories (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, pp. 134, 136, 147, 179, 204, 210, 215, 418, 437, 440-41). In the celebrated Address of the International of September 9, 1870, Marx warned the French proletariat against an untimely uprising, but when an uprising nevertheless took place (1871), Marx enthusiastically hailed the revolutionary initiative of the masses, who were "storming heaven" (Marx's letter to Kugelmann). From the standpoint of Marx's dialectical materialism, the defeat of revolutionary action in that situation, as in many others, was a lesser evil, in the general course *and outcome* of the proletarian struggle, than the abandonment of a position already occupied, than surrender without battle. Such a surrender would have demoralised the proletariat and weakened its militancy. While fully

appreciating the use of legal means of struggle during periods of political stagnation and the domination of bourgeois legality, Marx, in 1877 and 1878, following the passage of the Anti-Socialist Law,[38] sharply condemned Most's "revolutionary phrases"; no less sharply, if not more so, did he attack the opportunism that had for a time come over the official Social-Democratic Party, which did not at once display resoluteness, firmness, revolutionary spirit and a readiness to resort to an illegal struggle in response to the Anti-Socialist Law (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 4, pp. 397, 404, 418, 422, 424; cf. also letters to Sorge).

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No complete collection of Marx's works and letters has yet been published. More works by Marx have been translated into Russian than into any other language. The following list of Marx's writings is arranged in chronological order. In 1841 Marx wrote his thesis on Epicurus's philosophy. (It was included in *Literarischer Nachlass*, of which more will be said later.) In this thesis, Marx still fully adhered to the Hegelian idealist point of view. In 1842 Marx wrote articles for *Rheinische Zeitung* (Cologne), among them a criticism of the free-press debate in the Sixth Rhenish Diet, an article on the laws concerning the stealing of timber, another in defence of divorcing politics from theology, etc. (partly included in *Literarischer Nachlass*). Here we see signs of Marx's transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democracy to communism. In 1844, under the editorship of Marx and Arnold Ruge, there appeared in Paris *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, in which this transition was finally made. Among Marx's articles published in that magazine, the most noteworthy are *A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right* (besides *Literarischer Nachlass*, also published as a separate pamphlet) and *On the Jewish Question* (likewise in *Literarischer Nachlass*; issued as a pamphlet brought out by the *Znaniye* Publishers in their Cheap Library, No. 210). In 1845, Marx and Engels jointly published, in Frankfort on Main, a pamphlet entitled *The Holy Family. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.* (besides *Literarischer Nachlass*, there are two Russian editions as pamphlets: one published by *Novy Golos* in St. Petersburg, 1906, the other by Ves*tnik Znaniya*, St. Petersburg, 1907). In the spring of 1845, Marx

wrote his theses on Feuerbach (published as an appendix to Frederick Engels's pamphlet entitled *Ludwig Feuerbach* (there is a Russian translation). In 1845-47 Marx wrote a number of articles (most of which have not been collected, republished, or translated into Russian) in the papers *Vorwärts*, *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* (1847); *Westphälisches Dampfboot* (Bielefeld, 1845-48); *Der Gesellschaftsspiegel* (Elberfeld, 1846). In 1847 Marx wrote his fundamental work against Proudhon, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, a reply to Proudhon's work *The Philosophy of Poverty*. The book was published in Brussels and Paris (there have been three publications in Russian by *Novy Mir*, one by G. Lvovich, one by Alexeyeva, and one by *Prosveshcheniye*, all in 1905-06). In 1848 the *Speech on Free Trade* was published in Brussels (Russian translation available), followed by the publication in London, in collaboration with Frederick Engels, of the celebrated *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, which has been translated into probably all the languages of Europe and into a number of other languages (there are about eight Russian publications referring to 1905 and 1906; by *Molot*, *Kolokol*, Alexeyeva, etc., most of which were confiscated. These appeared under various titles: *The Communist Manifesto*, *On Communism*, *Social Classes and Communism*, *Capitalism and Communism*, *The Philosophy of History*. A complete and most accurate translation of this, as well as of other works by Marx, will be found in the editions of the Emancipation of Labour group, issued abroad[39]). From June 1, 1848, to May 19, 1849, *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was published in Cologne with Marx as the actual editor-in-chief. His numerous articles for that paper, which to this very day remains the finest and unsurpassed organ of the revolutionary proletariat, have not been collected and republished in full. The most important of them were included in *Literarischer Nachlass*. *Wage-Labour and Capital*, published in that paper, has been repeatedly issued as a pamphlet (four Russian editions, by Kozman, *Molot*; Myagkov, and Lvovich, 1905 and 1906); also from the same paper *The Liberals at the Helm* (published by *Znaniye* Publishers in their Cheap Library, No. 272, St. Petersburg, 1906). In 1849 Marx published, in Cologne, *Two Political Trials* (two speeches in his own defence by Marx, who was acquitted by a jury when facing trial

on the charge of having violated the press law and called for armed resistance to the government. Russian translations are available in five publications brought out in 1905 and 1906 by Alexeyeva, *Molot*, Myagkov, *Znaniye*, and *Novy Mir*). In 1850 Marx published, in Hamburg, six issues of the magazine *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. The most important articles published therein were later included in *Literarischer Nachlass*. Especially noteworthy are Marx's articles, republished by Engels in 1895 in a pamphlet entitled *Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850* (Russian translation, published by M. Malykh, Library, No. 59-60; also in the *Collection of Historical Works*, translated by Bazarov and Stepanov and published by Skirmunt, St. Petersburg, 1906; also *Thoughts and Views of the 20th Century*, St. Petersburg, 1912). In 1852 a pamphlet by Marx was published in New York under the title of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Russian translation in publications just mentioned). In the same year a pamphlet was published in London under the title of *Enthüllungen über den Communistenprozess in Köln* (Russian translation entitled *The Cologne Trial of the Communards*, Popular Science Library, No. 43, St. Petersburg, 1906, Oct. 28). From August 1851 until 1862,* Marx was a regular contributor to the *New York Tribune*, where many of his articles appeared unsigned, as editorials. Most outstanding among these is a series of articles, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, which were republished after the death of Marx and Engels in a German translation (a Russian translation is available in collections translated by Bazarov and Stepanov, and then, in pamphlet form, in five editions brought out in 1905-06 by Alexeyeva, *Obshchestvennaya Polza*, *Novy Mir*, *Vseobshchaya Biblioteka* and *Molot*). Some of Marx's articles in the *Tribune* were later published in London as separate pamphlets, as, for instance, the one on Palmerston, published in 1856; *Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century* (regarding the constant venal dependence on Russia of the British

* Engels, in his article on Marx in the *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Band VI, S. 603, and Bernstein, in his article on Marx in the Eleventh Edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1911, erroneously give the dates as 1853-60. See *Briefwechsel* of Marx and Engels published in 1913.

Liberal Ministers), and others. After Marx's death, his daughter, Eleanor Aveling, published a number of his *Tribune* articles on the Oriental question, under the title of *The Eastern Question*, London, 1897. Part has been translated into Russian: *War and Revolution*, Issue I, Marx and Engels: *Unpublished Articles* (*1852*, *1853*, *1854*), Kharkov, 1919 (*Our Thought* Library). From the end of 1854, and during 1855, Marx contributed to the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* and in 1861-62 to the Viennese paper *Presse*. These articles have not been collected, and only a few of them were reprinted in *Die Neue Zeit*, as were also Marx's numerous letters. The same is true about Marx's articles from *Das Volk* (London, 1859) on the diplomatic history of the Italian War of 1859. In 1859 Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* appeared in Berlin (Russian translations: Moscow, 1896, edited by Manuilov; St. Petersburg, 1907, translated by Rumyantsev). In 1860 a pamphlet by Marx, entitled *Herr Vogt*, appeared in London.

In 1864 the *Address of the International Workingmen's Association*, which was written by Marx, came out in London (Russian translation available). Marx was the author of numerous manifestos, appeals and resolutions of the International's General Council. This material is far from having been analysed or even collected. The first approach to this work is Gustav Jaeckh's book, *Die Internationale* (in the Russian translation: St. Petersburg, 1906, *Znaniye* Publishers), which includes several of Marx's letters and draft resolutions. Among the documents of the International that Marx wrote was the Address of the General Council on the Paris Commune. The document appeared in 1871 in London, as a pamphlet entitled *The Civil War in France* (Russian translations: one edited by Lenin, *Molot* Publishers, and others). Between 1862 and 1874 Marx corresponded with Kugelmann, a member of the International (two Russian translations: one by A. Goikhbarg, the other edited by Lenin). In 1867 Marx's main work, *Capital*: *A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, appeared in Hamburg. Volumes 2 and 3 were published by Engels in 1885 and 1894, after the death of Marx. The Russian translations: Vol. 1, in five editions (two in a translation by Danielson, 1872 and 1898; two in a translation by E. A. Gurvich and L. M. Zak, edited

by Struve; 1st ed.—1899, 2nd ed.—1905; another edited by Bazarov and Stepanov). Volumes 2 and 3 appeared in a translation by Danielson (less satisfactory) and in another under the editorship of Bazarov and Stepanov (the better). In 1876 Marx took part in the writing of Engels's *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (*Anti-Dühring*); he went over the manuscript of the whole work and wrote an entire chapter dealing with the history of political economy. The following works by Marx were published posthumously: *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (St. Petersburg, 1906, and in German in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1890-91, No. 18); *Value, Price and Profit* (a lecture delivered on June 26, 1865; *Die Neue Zeit*, XVI, 1897-98- Russian translations, brought out by *Molot*, 1906, and Lvovich, 1905); *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*, three volumes, Stuttgart, 1902 (Russian translation, edited by Axelrod and others, 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1908: Vol. 1 also edited by E. Gurvich, Moscow, 1907. Lassalle's letters to Marx, published separately, are included in *Literarischer Nachlass*); *Letters from K. Marx and F. Engels and Others to F. A. Sorge and Others* (two editions in Russian; one edited by Axelrod, another published by Dauge, with a preface by Lenin); *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, three volumes in four parts, Stuttgart, 1905-10, which is the manuscript of the fourth volume of *Capital* and published by Kautsky (only the first volume translated into Russian; in three editions; St. Petersburg, 1906, edited by Plekhanov; Kiev, 1906, edited by Zheleznov, and Kiev, 1907, edited by Tuchapsky). In 1913 four big volumes of *Marx-Engels Correspondence* came out in Stuttgart, with 1,386 letters written between September 1844 and January 10, 1883, and providing a mass of highly valuable material for a study of Marx's biography and views. In 1917, two volumes of Marx's and Engels's works appeared, containing their articles for 1852-62 (in German). This list of Marx's works must conclude with a note that many of Marx's shorter articles and letters, published, for the most part, in *Die Neue Zeit*, *Vorwärts*, and other German-language Social-Democratic periodicals, have not been enumerated. The list of Russian translations of Marx is no doubt incomplete especially with reference to pamphlets that appeared in 1905-06.

The literature on Marx and Marxism is very extensive. We shall mention only what is most outstanding, and divide the authors into three main groups: Marxists who, in important matters, adhere to Marx's point of view; bourgeois writers, in essence hostile to Marxism; and revisionists, who, while claiming to accept certain fundamentals of Marxism, in fact replace it with bourgeois conceptions. The Narodnik attitude towards Marx should be considered a peculiarly Russian variety of revisionism. In his *Ein Beitrag zur Bibliographie des Marxismus* (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XX, 2. Heft,* 1905, pp. 413-30), Werner Sombart gives some three hundred titles in a list that is far from complete. More can be found in the indexes to *Die Neue Zeit*, 1883-1907, et seq., also in Josef Stammhammer's *Bibliographie des Sozialismus und Kommunismus*, Bd. I-III,** Jena (1893-1909). For a detailed bibliography on Marxism see also *Bibliographie der Sozialwissenschaften*, Berlin. Jahrgang 1, 1905, u. ff.*** See also N. A. Rubakin, *Among Books* (Vol. 2, 2nd ed.). We mention here only the most important bibliographies. On the subject of Marx's biography, attention must be called first of all to Frederick Engels's articles in *Volkskalender*,**** published by Bracke in Brunswick in 1878 and in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Bd. 6, S. 600-03*****; W. Liebknecht, *Karl Marx zum Gedächtniss*,****** Nuremberg, 1896; Lafargue, *Karl Marx. Persönliche Erinnerungen*********; W. Liebknecht, *Karl Marx*, 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1906; P. Lafargue, *My Recollections of Karl Marx*, Odessa, 1905 (see original in *Die Neue Zeit*, IX, 1); *Karl Marx*: *In Memoriam*, St. Petersburg, 1908, 410 pages, a collection of articles by Y. Nevzorov, N. Rozhkov. V. Bazarov, Y. Steklov, A. Finn-Yenotayevsky, P. Rumyantsev, K. Renner, H. Roland-Holst,

* "A Contribution to the Bibliography of Marxism" published in *Archive for Social Science and Social Politics*, Vol. 20, Book 2.—*Ed.*

** *Bibliography of Socialism and Communism*, Vols. 1-3.—*Ed.*

*** *Bibliography of the Social Sciences*, Berlin, the first year of publication, 1905, and the following years.—*Ed.*

**** *People's Calendar.—Ed.*

***** *Dictionary of the Political Sciences*, Vol. 6, pp. 600-03.—*Ed.*

****** W. Liebknecht, *Karl Marx*, *Biographical Memoirs.—Ed.*

******* Paul Lafargue, *Personal Recollections of Karl Marx.—Ed.*

V. Ilyin, R. Luxemburg, G. Zinoviev, Y. Kamenev, P. Orlovsky, M. Tagansky; Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx*. The extensive biography of Marx written in English by the American socialist, Spargo (John Spargo, *Karl Marx*, *His Life and Work*, London, 1911), is unsatisfactory. For a general review of Marx's activities, see Karl Kautsky, *Die historische Leistung von Karl Marx. Zum 25. Todestag des Meisters*,* Berlin, 1908. The Russian translation is entitled *Karl Marx and His Historical Importance*, St. Petersburg, 1908. See also a popular pamphlet by Clara Zetkin, *Karl Marx und sein Lebenswerk*** (1913). Reminiscences of Marx: those by Annenkov in *Vestnik Yevropy*, 1880, No. 4 (also in his *Reminiscences*, Vol. 3, *A Remarkable Decade*, St. Petersburg, 1882), those by Karl Schurz in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1906, No. 12: by M. Kovalevsky in *Vestnik Yevropy*, 1909, No . 6, et seqq.

On the question of Marxist philosophy and historical materialism the best exposition is given by G. V. Plekhanov, *For Twenty Years*, St. Petersburg, 1909, 3rd ed.; *From Defence to Attack*, St. Petersburg, 1910; *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, St. Petersburg, 1908; *A Critique of Our Critics*, St. Petersburg, 1906; *The Development of the Monist View of History*, St. Petersburg, 1908, and other works. Antonio Labriola, *On the Materialist View of History* [in Russian], St. Petersburg, 1898; also his *Historical Materialism and Philosophy*, St. Petersburg, 1906, Franz Mehring, *On Historical Materialism* [in Russian] (two editions, by *Prosveshcheniye* and *Molot*), St. Petersburg, 1906, and *The Lessing Legend* [in Russian], St. Petersburg, 1908 (*Znaniye*); see also Charles Andler (non-Marxist), *The Communist Manifesto. History*, *Introduction*, *Comments* [in Russian], St. Petersburg, 1906. See also *Historical Materialism*, St. Petersburg, 1908, a collection of articles by Engels, Kautsky, Lafargue, and many others; L. Axelrod, *Philosophical Sketches. A Reply to Philosophic Critics of Historical Materialism*, St. Petersburg, 1906. A special defence of Dietzgen's unsuccessful deviations from Marxism is contained in E. Untermann's *Die logischen Mängel des*

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* Karl Kautsky, *The Historical Contribution of Karl Marx. On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Master's Death.—Ed.*

** Clara Zetkin, *Karl Marx and His Life Work.—Ed.*

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engeren Marxismus,* Munich, 1910, 753 pages (an extensive but none too serious work). Hugo Riekes's *Die philosophische Wurzel des Marxismus*, in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 62. Jahrgang, 1906, 3. Heft, S. 407-32,** is an interesting piece of work by an opponent of the Marxist views, showing their philosophical integrity from the viewpoint of materialism. Benno Erdmann's *Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft* (*Schmollers Jahrbuch*), 1907, 3. Heft, S. 1-56,*** is a very useful formulation of some of the basic principles of Marx's philosophical materialism, and a summary of arguments against it from the current viewpoint of Kantianism, and agnosticism in general. Rudolph Stammler (a Kantian), *Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*,**** 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1906; Woltmann (also a Kantian), *Historical Materialism* (in a Russian translation. 1901); Vorländer (also a Kantian), *Kant and Marx*, [in Russian], St. Petersburg, 1909. See also the polemic between A. Bogdanov, V. Bazarov and others, on the one hand, and V. Ilyin,***** on the other (the views of the former being contained in *An Outline of the Philosophy of Marxism*, St. Petersburg, 1908; A. Bogdanov, *The Downfall of a Great Fetishism*, Moscow, 1909, and elsewhere, and the views of the latter, in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1909). On the question of historical materialism and ethics: Karl Kautsky, *Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History*, St. Petersburg, 1906, and numerous other works by Kautsky; Louis Boudin, *The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of Recent Criticism*; translated from the English under the editorship of V. Zasulich, St. Petersburg, 1908; Hermann

* E. Untermann, *The Logical Defects of Narrow Marxism*.—*Ed*.

** Hugo Riekes, "The Philosophical Roots of Marxism", in the *Journal of All Political Sciences*, 62nd year of publication, 1906, Book 3, pp. 407-32.—*Ed*.

*** Benno Erdmann, "The Philosophic Assumptions of the Materialist Conception of History" in the *Yearbook for Legislation, Administration and National Economy* (*Schmoller's Yearbook*), 1907, Book 3, pp. 1-56.—*Ed*.

**** Rudolph Stammler, *Economy and Law According to the Materialist Conception of History*.—*Ed*.

***** V. Ilyin—one of the literary pseudonyms of V. I. Lenin.—*Ed*.

Gorter, *Der historische Materialismus*,* 1909. Of works by opponents to Marxism, we would name Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Theoretical Fundamentals of Marxism*, St. Petersburg, 1907; S. Prokopovich, *A Critique of Marx*, St. Petersburg, 1901; Hammacher, *Das philosophisch-ökonomische System des Marxismus*,** Leipzig, 1910 (730 pages, collection of quotations); Werner Sombart, *Socialism and the Social Movement in the Nineteenth Century* [in Russian], St. Petersburg; Max Adler (a Kantian), *Kausalität und Teleologie*, Vienna, 1909, in *Marx-Studien*, also *Marx als Denker**** by the same author.

The book of an Hegelian idealist, Giovanni Gentile, *La filosofia di Marx*,**** Pisa, 1899, is noteworthy. The author deals with some important aspects of Marx's materialist dialectics which usually escape the attention of the Kantians, Positivists, etc. Likewise: Lévy, *Feuerbach*, a work about one of the main philosophical predecessors of Marx. A useful collection of quotations from a number of Marx's works is contained in Chernyshev's *Notebook of a Marxist*, St. Petersburg (*Dyelo*), 1908. On Marx's economic doctrine, the following books are outstanding: Karl Kautsky, *The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx* (numerous editions in Russian), *The Agrarian Question*, *The Erfurt Programme*, and numerous pamphlets. Cf. also: Eduard Bernstein, *The Economic Doctrine of Marx. The Third Volume of Capital* (Russian translation, 1905); Gabriel Deville, *Capital* (an exposition of the first volume of *Capital*, Russian translation, 1907). A representative of so-called revisionism among Marxists, as regards the agrarian question, is Eduard David, *Socialism and Agriculture* (Russian translation, St. Petersburg, 1902). For a critique of revisionism see V. Ilyin, *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, St. Petersburg, 1908. See also the following books by V. Ilyin: *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, second edition, St. Petersburg, 1908; *Economic Essays and Articles*, St. Petersburg, 1899; *New Data on the Laws of Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*,

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* Hermann Gorter, *Historical Materialism.—Ed.*

** Hammacher, *The Philosophic-Economic System of Marxism.—Ed.*

*** Max Adler, *Causality and Teleology and Marx as a Thinker.—Ed.*

**** Giovanni Gentile, *The Philosophy of Marx.—Ed.*

Book 1, 1917. An application of Marx's views, with some deviations, to the latest data concerning agrarian relations in France can be found in Compère-Morel, *La question agraire et le socialisme en France*,* Paris, 1912. 455 pages. For the further development of Marx's economic views as applied to recent phenomena in economic life see Hilferding's *Finance Capital* [in Russian], St. Petersburg, 1911 (outstanding inaccuracies in the author's views on the theory of value have been corrected by Kautsky in "Gold, Papier und Ware",—"Gold, Paper Money and Commodities"—in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXX, 1, 1912, pp. 837 and 886); and V. Ilyin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, 1917. Pyotr Maslov in his *Agrarian Question* (two volumes) and *The Theory of Economic Development*, St. Petersburg, 1910, deviates from Marxism on important points. A criticism of some of Maslov's deviations may be found in Kautsky's "*Malthusianism and Socialism*" in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXIX, 1, 1911.

A criticism of the economic doctrine of Marx, from the point of view of the so-called marginal utility theory that is widespread among bourgeois professors, is contained in the following works: Böhm-Bawerk, *Zum Abschluss des Marxschen Systems*** (Berlin, 1896, in *Staatswiss. Arbeiten, Festgabe für K. Knies*), Russian translation, St. Petersburg, 1897, *The Theory of Marx and Its Criticism*, and also his *Kapital und Kapitalzins*, 2nd ed., two volumes, Innsbruck, 1900-02 (Russian translation, *Capital and Profits*, St. Petersburg, 1909). See also: Riekes, *Wert und Tauschwert* (1899)***; von Bortkiewicz, *Wertrechnung und Preisrechnung im Marxschen System* (*Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, 1906-07)****; Leo von Buch, *Über die Elemente der politischen Ökonomie*. I. Th. *Die Intensität d. Arbeit, Wert u. Preis***** (published also in Russian). For an analysis of Böhm-Bawerk's critique from a Marxist point of view see

* Compère-Morel, *Agrarian Question and Socialism in France.—Ed.*

** Böhm-Bawerk, *Karl Marx and the Close of His System.—Ed.*

*** Riekes, *Value and Exchange Value* (1899).—*Ed.*

**** Von Bortkiewicz, *Calculation of Value and Calculation of Price in the Marxian System* (*Archive for Social Science, 1906-07*).—*Ed.*

***** Leo von Buch, *On the Elements of Political Economy. Intensity of Labour, Value and Price.—Ed.*

Hilferding's *Böhm-Bawerks Marx-Kritik** (*Marx-Studien*, I. Band, Vienna, 1904), and in shorter articles published in *Die Neue Zeit*.

On the question of the two main currents in the interpretation and development of Marxism—the "revisionist" and the radical ("orthodox")—see Eduard Bernstein's *Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (German original, Stuttgart, 1899; Russian translations: *Historical Materialism*, St. Petersburg, 1901, and *Social Problems*, Moscow, 1901); see also his *From the History and Theory of Socialism*, St. Petersburg, 1902. A reply to Bernstein is contained in Karl Kautsky's *Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm* (German original, Stuttgart, 1899; Russian translation in four editions; 1905-06) For French Marxist literature see Jules Guesde's *Quatre ans de lutte des classes*, *En garde!* and *Questions d'hier et d'auourd'hui* (Paris, 1911)**; Paul Lafargue, *Le déterminisme économique de K. Marx* (Paris, 1909)***; Anton Pannekoek, *Zwei Tendenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung*.****

On the question of the Marxist theory of the accumulation of capital there is a new work by Rosa Luxemburg. *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (Berlin, 1913),***** and an analysis of her incorrect interpretation of Marx's theory by Otto Bauer, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (*Die Neue Zeit*, XXXI, 1, 1913, S. 831 und 862).****** See also Eckstein in *Vorwärts* and Pannekoek in *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* for 1913.

Of the older Russian literature on Marxism the following should be noted: B. Chicherin, "The German Socialists", in Bezobrazov's *Collection of Political Science*, St. Petersburg, 1888, and *The History of Political Doctrines*, Part 5, Moscow, 1902, 156 pages; a reply to the above by Zieber, "The German Economists Through Mr. Chicherin's Glasses", in his *Collected*

* Hilferding, *Böhm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx*.—*Ed*.

** Jules Guesde, *Four Years of Class Struggle*, *On Guard! Questions of Today*, Paris, 1911.—*Ed*.

*** Paul Lafargue, *Economic Determinism. The Historical Method of Karl Marx*, Paris, 1909.—*Ed*.

**** Anton Pannekoek, *Two Tendencies in the Labour Movement*.—*Ed*.

***** Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, Berlin, 1913.—*Ed*.

****** Otto Bauer. *The Accumulation of Capital* (*Die Neue Zeit*, XXI. 1, 1913, pp. 831 and 862).—*Ed*.

Works, Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1900; L Slonimsky, *The Economic Doctrine of Karl Marx*, St. Petersburg, 1898; N. Zieber, *David Ricardo and Karl Marx in Their Socio-economic Investigations*, St. Petersburg, 1885, and his *Collected Works*, in two volumes, St. Petersburg, 1900. Also J. Kaufmann's (J. K—n) review of *Capital* in *Vestnik Yevropy* for 1872, No. 5—an article marked by the fact that, in his addendum to the second edition of *Capital*, Marx quoted J. K—n's arguments, recognising them as a correct exposition of his dialectical-materialist method.

The Russian Narodniks on Marxism: N. K. Mikhailovsky—in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1894, No. 10, and 1895, Nos. 1 and 2; also reprinted in his *Collected Works*—remarks on P. Struve's *Critical Notes* (St. Petersburg, 1894). Mikhailovsky's views were analysed from a Marxist point of view by K. Tulin (V. Ilyin) in his *Data Characterising Our Economic Development* (St. Petersburg, 1895, destroyed by the censor), later reprinted in V. Ilyin's *For Twelve Years*, St. Petersburg, 1908. Other Narodnik works: V. V., *Our Lines of Policy*, St. Petersburg, 1892, and *From the Seventies to the Twentieth Century*, St. Petersburg, 1907; Nikolai—on, *Outline of Our Post-Reform Social Economy*, St. Petersburg, 1893; V. Chernov, *Marxism and the Agrarian Problem*, St. Petersburg, 1906, and *Philosophical and Sociological Sketches*, St. Petersburg, 1907.

Besides the Narodniks, the following may also be mentioned: N. Kareyev, *Old and New Sketches on Historical Materialism*, St. Petersburg, 1896, 2nd edition in 1913 under the title *A Critique of Economic Materialism*; Masaryk, *Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism* [in Russian], Moscow, 1900; Croce, *Historical Materialism and Marxian Economy* [in Russian], St. Petersburg, 1902.

For a correct appraisal of Marx's views, an acquaintance is essential with the works of Frederick Engels, his closest fellow-thinker and collaborator. It is impossible to understand Marxism and to propound it fully without taking into account *all* the works of Engels.

For a critique of Marx from the point of view of anarchism, see V. Cherkezov, *The Doctrines of Marxism*, two parts, St. Petersburg, 1905, V. Tucker, *In Lieu of a Book* [in Russian], Moscow, 1907; Sorel (a syndicalist), *Social Studies of Modern Economy*, Moscow, 1908.

A GERMAN VOICE ON THE WAR

"In a single night the aspect of the world has changed.... Everyone puts the blame on his neighbour, everyone claims to be on the defensive, to act only in a state of urgent defence. Everyone, don't you see, is defending only his most sacred values, the hearth, the fatherland.... National vainglory and national aggressiveness triumph.... Even the great international working class obeys national orders, workers are killing one another on the battlefields.... Our civilisation has proved bankrupt.... Writers of European fame are not ashamed to come forth as ragingly blind chauvinists.... We had too much faith in the possibility of imperialist madness being curbed by the fear of economic ruin.... We are going through an undisguised imperialist struggle for mastery of the world. There is no trace anywhere of a struggle for great ideas, except perhaps the overthrow of the Russian Minotaur ... the tsar and his grand dukes who have delivered to the hangmen the noblest men of their country.... But do we not see how noble France, the bearer of ideals of liberty, has become the ally of the hangman tsar? How honest Germany ... is breaking its word and is strangling unhappy neutral Belgium? ... How will it all end? If poverty becomes too great, if despair gains the upper hand, if brother recognises his brother in the uniform of an enemy, then perhaps something very unexpected may still come, arms may perhaps be turned against those who are urging people into the war and nations that have been made to hate one another may perhaps forget that hatred, and suddenly unite. We do not want to be prophets, but should the European war bring us one step closer to a European social republic, then this war, after all, will not have been as senseless as it seems at present."

Whose voice is this? Perhaps one coming from a German Social-Democrat?

Far from it! Headed by Kautsky, the German Social-Democrats have become "wretched counter-revolutionary windbags",[40] as Marx called those Social-Democrats who, after the publication of the Anti-Socialist Law, behaved "in accord with the circumstances", in the manner of Haase, Kautsky, Südekum and Co. today.

No, our quotation is from a magazine of petty-bourgeois Christian democrats published by a group of kind-hearted little churchmen in Zurich (*Neue Wege*, *Blätter für religiöse Arbeit*,* September, 1914). That is the limit of humiliation we have come to: God-fearing philistines go as far as to say that it would not be bad to turn weapons against those who "are urging people into the war", while "authoritative" Social-Democrats like Kautsky "scientifically" defend the most despicable chauvinism, or, like Plekhanov, declare the propaganda of civil war against the bourgeoisie a harmful "utopia"!

Indeed, if such "Social-Democrats" wish to be in the majority and to form the official "International" (=an alliance for international justification of national chauvinism), then is it not better to give up the name of "Social-Democrats", which has been besmirched and degraded by them, and return to the old Marxist name of Communists? Kautsky once threatened to do that when the opportunist Bernsteinians[41] seemed to be close to conquering the German party officially. What was an idle threat from his lips will perhaps become *action* to others.

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* *New Ways, Pages for Religious Work.—Ed.*

DEAD CHAUVINISM AND LIVING SOCIALISM

HOW THE INTERNATIONAL CAN BE RESTORED

For decades, German Social-Democracy was a model to the Social-Democrats of Russia, even somewhat more than to the Social-Democrats of the whole world. It is therefore clear that there can be no intelligent, i.e., critical, attitude towards the now prevalent social-patriotism or "socialist" chauvinism, without a most precise definition of one's attitude towards German Social-Democracy. What was it in the past? What is it today? What will it be in the future?

A reply to the first of these questions may be found in *Der Weg zur Macht*, a pamphlet written by K. Kautsky in 1909 and translated into many European languages. Containing a most complete exposition of the tasks of our times it was most advantageous to the German Social-Democrats (in the sense of the promise they held out), and moreover came from the pen of the most eminent writer of the Second International. We shall recall the pamphlet in some detail-this will be the more useful now since those forgotten ideals are so often barefacedly cast aside.

Social-Democracy is a "revolutionary party" (as stated in the opening sentence of the pamphlet), not only in the sense that a steam engine is revolutionary, but "also in another sense". It wants conquest of political power by the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Heaping ridicule on "doubters of the revolution", Kautsky writes: "In any important movement and uprising we must, of course, reckon with the possibility of defeat. Prior to the struggle only a fool can consider himself quite certain of victory." However, to refuse to consider the possibility of victory

would be "a direct betrayal of our cause". A revolution in connection with a war, he says, is possible both during and after a war. It is impossible to determine at which particular moment the sharpening of class antagonisms will lead to revolution, but, the author continues, "I can quite definitely assert that a revolution that war brings in its wake, will break out either during or immediately after the war"; nothing is more vulgar, we read further, than the theory of "the peaceful growing into socialism". "Nothing is more erroneous," he continues, "than the opinion that a cognition of economic necessity means a weakening of the will.... The will, as a desire for struggle," he says, "is determined, first, by the price of the struggle, secondly, by a sense of power, and thirdly, by actual power." When an attempt was made, incidentally by *Vorwärts*, to interpret Engels's famous preface to *The Class Struggles in France* in the meaning of opportunism, Engels became indignant, and called shameful any assumption that he was a "peaceful worshipper of legality at any price".[42] "We have every reason to believe," Kautsky goes on to say, "that we are entering upon a period of struggle for state power." That struggle may last for decades; that is something we do not know, but "it will in all probability bring about, in the near future, a considerable strengthening of the proletariat, if not its dictatorship, in Western Europe". The revolutionary elements are growing, Kautsky declares: out of ten million voters in Germany in 1895, there were six million proletarians and three and a half million people interested in private property; in 1907 the latter grew by 0.03 million, and the former by 1.6 million! "The rate of the advance becomes very rapid as soon as a time of revolutionary ferment comes." Class antagonisms are not blunted but, on the contrary, grow acute; prices rise, and imperialist rivalry and militarism are rampant. "A new era of revolution" is drawing near. The monstrous growth of taxes would "long ago have led to war as the only alternative to revolution ... had not that very alternative of revolution stood closer after a war than after a period of armed peace...". "A world war is ominously imminent," Kautsky continues, "and war means also revolution." In 1891 Engels had reason to fear a premature revolution in Germany; since then, however, "the

situation has greatly changed". The proletariat "can no longer speak of a *premature* revolution" (Kautsky's italics). The petty bourgeoisie is downright unreliable and is ever more hostile to the proletariat, but in a time of crisis it is "capable of coming over to our side in masses". The main thing is that Social-Democracy "should remain unshakable, consistent, and irreconcilable". We have undoubtedly entered a revolutionary period.

This is how Kautsky wrote in times long, long past, fully five years ago. This is what German Social-Democracy was, or, more correctly, what it promised to be. This was the kind of Social-Democracy that could and had to be respected.

See what the selfsame Kautsky writes today. Here are the most important statements in his article "Social-Democracy in Wartime" (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 1, October 2, 1914): "Our Party has far more rarely discussed the question of how to behave in wartime than how to prevent war.... Never is government so strong, never are parties so weak, as at the outbreak of war.... Wartime is least of all favourable to peaceful discussion.... Today the practical question is: victory or defeat for one's own country." Can there be an understanding among the parties of the belligerent countries regarding anti-war action? "That kind of thing has never been tested in practice. We have always disputed that possibility...." The difference between the French and German socialists is "not one of principle" (as both defend their fatherlands).... "Social-Democrats of all countries have an equal right or an equal obligation to take part in the defence of the fatherland: no nation should blame the other for doing so...." "Has the International turned bankrupt?" "Has the Party rejected direct defence of its party principles in wartime?" (Mehring's questions in the same issue.) "That is an erroneous conception.... There are no grounds at all for such pessimism.... The differences are not fundamental.... Unity of principles remains.... To disobey wartime laws would simply lead to suppression of our press." Obedience to these laws "implies rejection of defence of party principles just as little as similar behaviour of our party press under that sword of Damocles—the Anti-Socialist Law."

We have purposely quoted from the original because it is hard to believe that such things could have been written. It is hard to find in literature (except in that coming from downright renegades) such smug vulgarity, such shameful departure from the truth, such unsavoury subterfuge to cover up the most patent renunciation both of socialism in general and of precise international decisions unanimously adopted (as, for instance, in Stuttgart and particularly in Basle) precisely in view of the possibility of a European war just like the present! It would be disrespectful towards the reader were we to treat Kautsky's arguments in earnest and try to analyse them: if the European war differs in many respects from a simple "little" anti-Jewish pogrom, the "socialist" arguments in favour of participation in such a war *fully* resemble the "democratic" arguments in favour of participation in an anti-Jewish pogrom. One does not analyse arguments in favour of a pogrom; one only points them out so as to put their authors to shame in the sight of all class-conscious workers.

But how *could* it have come to pass, the reader will ask, that the leading authority in the Second International, a writer who once defended the views quoted at the beginning of this article, has sunk to something that is worse than being a renegade? That will not be understood, we answer, only by those who, perhaps unconsciously, consider that nothing out of the ordinary has happened, and that it is not difficult to "forgive and forget", etc., i.e., by those who regard the matter from the renegade's point of view. Those, however, who have earnestly and sincerely professed socialist convictions and have held the views set forth in the beginning of this article will not be surprised to learn that "*Vorwärts* is dead" (Martov's expression in the Paris *Golos*) and that Kautsky is "dead". The political bankruptcy of individuals is not a rarity at turning points in history. Despite the tremendous services he has rendered, Kautsky has never been among those who, at great crises, immediately take a militant Marxist stand (recall his vacillations on the issue of Millerandism[43]).

It is such times that we are passing through. "You shoot first, Messieurs the Bourgeoisie!"[44] Engels wrote in 1891, advocating, most correctly, the use of bourgeois legality by

us, revolutionaries, in the period of so-called peaceful constitutional development. Engels's idea was crystal clear: we class-conscious workers, he said, will be the next to shoot; it is to our advantage to exchange ballots for bullets (to go over to civil war) at the moment the bourgeoisie itself has broken the legal foundation it has laid down. In 1909 Kautsky voiced the undisputed opinion held by all revolutionary Social-Democrats when he said that revolution in Europe cannot now be *premature* and that war means revolution.

"Peaceful" decades, however, have not passed without leaving their mark. They have of necessity given rise to opportunism in all countries, and made it prevalent among parliamentarian, trade union, journalistic and other "leaders". There is no country in Europe where, in one form or another, a long and stubborn struggle has not been conducted against opportunism, the latter being supported in a host of ways by the entire bourgeoisie, which is striving to corrupt and weaken the revolutionary proletariat. Fifteen years ago, at the outset of the Bernstein controversy, the selfsame Kautsky wrote that should opportunism turn from a sentiment into a trend, a split would be imminent. In Russia, the old *Iskra*,[45] which created the Social-Democratic Party of the working class, declared, in an article which appeared in its second issue early in 1901, under the title of "On the Threshold of the Twentieth Century", that the revolutionary class of the twentieth century, like the revolutionary class of the eighteenth century—the bourgeoisie, had its own *Gironde* and its own *Mountain*.[46]

The European war is a tremendous historical crisis, the beginning of a new epoch. Like any crisis, the war has aggravated deep-seated antagonisms and brought them to the surface, tearing asunder all veils of hypocrisy, rejecting all conventions and deflating all corrupt or rotting authorities. (This, incidentally, is the salutary and progressive effect of all crises, which only the dull-witted adherents of "peaceful evolution" fail to realise.) The Second International, which in its twenty-five or forty-five years of existence (according to whether the reckoning is from 1870 or 1889) was able to perform the highly important and useful work of expanding the influence of socialism and giving the socialist forces preparatory, initial and elementary

organisation, has played its historical role and has passed away, overcome, not so much by the von Klucks as by opportunism. Let the dead bury their dead. Let the empty-headed busy-bodies (if not the intriguing lackeys of the chauvinists and the opportunists) labour at the task of bringing together Vandervelde and Sembat with Kautsky and Haase, as though we had another Ivan Ivanovich, who has called Ivan Nikiforovich a "gander", and has to be urged by his friends to make it up with his enemy.[47] An International does not mean sitting at the same table and having hypocritical and pettifogging resolutions written by people who think that genuine internationalism consists in German socialists justifying the German bourgeoisie's call to shoot down French workers, and in French socialists justifying the French bourgeoisie's call to shoot down German workers in the name of the "defence of the fatherland"! The International consists in the coming together (first ideologically, then in due time organisationally as well) of people who, in these grave days, are capable of defending socialist internationalism in deed, i.e., of mustering their forces and "being the next to shoot" at the governments and the ruling classes of their *own respective* "fatherlands". This is no easy task; it calls for much preparation and great sacrifices and will be accompanied by reverses. However, for the very reason that it is no easy task, it must be accomplished only together with those who *wish* to perform it and are not afraid of a complete break with the chauvinists and with the defenders of social-chauvinism.

Such people as Pannekoek are doing more than anyone else for the sincere, not hypocritical restoration of a socialist, not a chauvinist, International. In an article entitled "The Collapse of the International", Pannekoek said: "If the leaders get together in an attempt to patch up their differences, that will be of no significance at all."

Let us frankly state the facts; in any case the war will *compel* us to do so, if not tomorrow, then the day after. Three currents exist in international socialism: (I) the chauvinists, who are consistently pursuing a policy of opportunism; (2) the consistent opponents of opportunism, who in all countries have already begun to make themselves heard (the opportunists have routed most of them, but

"defeated armies learn fast"), and are capable of conducting revolutionary work directed towards civil war; (3) confused and vacillating people, who at present are following in the wake of the opportunists and are causing the proletariat most harm by their hypocritical attempts to justify opportunism, something that they do almost scientifically and using the Marxist (*sic*!) method. Some of those who are engulfed in the latter current can be saved and restored to socialism, but only through a policy of a most decisive break and split with the former current, with all those who are capable of justifying the war credits vote, "the defence of the fatherland", "submission to wartime laws", a willingness to be satisfied with legal means only, and the rejection of civil war. Only those who pursue a policy like *this* are really building up a socialist International. For our part, we, who have established links with the Russian Collegium of the Central Committee and with the leading elements of the working-class movement in Petrograd, have exchanged opinions with them and become convinced that we are agreed on the main points, are in a position, as editors of the Central Organ, to declare in the name of our Party that only work conducted in this direction is Party work and Social-Democratic work.

The idea of a split in the German Social-Democratic movement may seem alarming to many in its "unusualness". The objective situation, however, goes to show that either the unusual will come to pass (after all, Adler and Kautsky did declare, at the last session of the International Socialist Bureau[48] in July 1914, that they did not believe in miracles, and therefore did not believe in a European war!) or we shall witness the painful decomposition of what was once German Social-Democracy. In conclusion, we would like to remind those who are too prone to "trust" the (*former*) German Social-Democrats that people who have been our opponents on a number of issues have arrived at the idea of such a split. Thus Martov has written in *Golos*; "*Vorwärts* is dead.... A Social-Democracy which publicly renounces the class struggle would do better to recognise the facts as they are, temporarily disband its organisation, and close down its organs." Thus Plekhanov is quoted by *Golos* as having said in a report: "I am very much against splits,

but if principles are sacrificed for the integrity of the organisation, then better a split than false unity." Plekhanov was referring to the German radicals: he sees a mote in the eye of the Germans, but not the beam in his own eye. This is an individual feature in him; over the past ten years we have all grown quite used to Plekhanov's radicalism in theory and opportunism in practice. However, if even persons with *such* "oddities" begin to talk of a split among the Germans, it is a sign of the times.

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ON THE NATIONAL PRIDE OF THE GREAT RUSSIANS

What a lot of talk, argument and vociferation there is nowadays about nationality and the fatherland! Liberal and radical cabinet ministers in Britain, a host of "forward-looking" journalists in France (who have proved in full agreement with their reactionary colleagues), and a swarm of official Cadet and progressive scribblers in Russia (including several Narodniks and "Marxists")—all have effusive praise for the liberty and independence of their respective countries, the grandeur of the principle of national independence. Here one cannot tell where the venal eulogist of the butcher Nicholas Romanov[49] or of the brutal oppressors of Negroes and Indians ends, and where the common philistine, who from sheer stupidity or spinelessness drifts with the stream, begins. Nor is that distinction important. We see before us an extensive and very deep ideological trend, whose origins are closely interwoven with the interests of the landowners and the capitalists of the dominant nations. Scores and hundreds of millions are being spent every year for the propaganda of ideas advantageous to those classes: it is a pretty big mill-race that takes its waters from all sources—from Menshikov, a chauvinist by conviction, to chauvinists for reason of opportunism or spinelessness such as Plekhanov and Maslov, Rubanovich and Smirnov, Kropotkin and Burtsev.

Let us, Great-Russian Social-Democrats, also try to define our attitude to this ideological trend. It would be unseemly for us, representatives of a dominant nation in the far east of Europe and a goodly part of Asia, to forget the immense significance of the national question—especially

in a country which has been rightly called the "prison of the peoples", and particularly at a time when, in the far east of Europe and in Asia, capitalism is awakening to life and self-consciousness a number of "new" nations, large and small; at a moment when the tsarist monarchy has called up millions of Great Russians and non-Russians, so as to "solve" a number of national problems in accordance with the interests of the Council of the United Nobility[50] and of the Guchkovs, Krestovnikovs, Dolgorukovs, Kutlers and Rodichevs.

Is a sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Certainly not! We love our language and our country, and we are doing our very utmost to raise *her* toiling masses (i.e., nine-tenths of *her* population) to the level of a democratic and socialist consciousness. To us it is most painful to see and feel the outrages, the oppression and the humiliation our fair country suffers at the hands of the tsar's butchers, the nobles and the capitalists. We take pride in the resistance to these outrages put up from our midst, from the Great Russians; in *that* midst having produced Radishchev,[51] the Decembrists[52] and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies[53]; in the Great-Russian working class having created, in 1905, a mighty revolutionary party of the masses; and in the Great-Russian peasantry having begun to turn towards democracy and set about overthrowing the clergy and the landed proprietors.

We remember that Chernyshevsky, the Great-Russian democrat, who dedicated his life to the cause of revolution, said half a century ago: "A wretched nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom—all slaves."[54] The overt and covert Great-Russian slaves (slaves with regard to the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love for our country, a love distressed by the absence of a revolutionary spirit in the masses of the Great-Russian people. There was none of that spirit at the time. There is little of it now, but it already exists. We are full of national pride because the Great-Russian nation, *too*, has created a revolutionary class, because it, *too*, has proved capable of providing mankind with great models of the struggle for freedom and socialism, and not only with great pogroms, rows of

gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility to priests, tsars, landowners and capitalists.

We are full of a sense of national pride, and for that very reason we *particularly* hate *our* slavish past (when the landed nobility led the peasants into war to stifle the freedom of Hungary, Poland, Persia and China), and our slavish present, when these selfsame landed proprietors, aided by the capitalists, are loading us into a war in order to throttle Poland and the Ukraine, crush the democratic movement in Persia and China, and strengthen the gang of Romanovs, Bobrinskys and Purishkeviches, who are a disgrace to our Great-Russian national dignity. Nobody is to be blamed for being born a slave; but a slave who not only eschews a striving for freedom but justifies and eulogises his slavery (e.g., calls the throttling of Poland and the Ukraine, etc., a "defence of the fatherland" of the Great Russians)—such a slave is a lickspittle and a boor, who arouses a legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt, and loathing.

"No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations," said Marx and Engels, the greatest representatives of consistent nineteenth century democracy, who became the teachers of the revolutionary proletariat. And, full of a sense of national pride, we Great-Russian workers want, come what may, a free and independent, a democratic, republican and proud Great Russia, one that will base its relations with its neighbours on the human principle of equality, and not on the feudalist principle of privilege, which is so degrading to a great nation. Just because we want that, we say: it is impossible, in the twentieth century and in Europe (even in the far east of Europe), to "defend the fatherland" otherwise than by using every revolutionary means to combat the monarchy, the landowners and the capitalists of one's *own* fatherland, i.e., the *worst* enemies of our country. We say that the Great Russians cannot "defend the fatherland" otherwise than by desiring the defeat of tsarism in any war, this as the lesser evil to nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Great Russia. For tsarism not only oppresses those nine-tenths economically and politically, but also demoralises, degrades, dishonours and prostitutes them by teaching them to oppress other nations and to cover up this shame with hypocritical and quasi-patriotic phrases.

The objection may be advanced that, besides tsarism and under its wing, another historical force has arisen and become strong, viz., Great-Russian capitalism, which is carrying on progressive work by economically centralising and welding together vast regions. This objection, however, does not excuse, but on the contrary still more condemns our socialist-chauvinists, who should be called tsarist-Purishkevich socialists[55] (just as Marx called the Lassalleans Royal-Prussian socialists).[56] Let us even assume that history will decide in favour of Great-Russian dominant-nation capitalism, and against the hundred and one small nations. That is not impossible, for the entire history of capital is one of violence and plunder, blood and corruption. We do not advocate preserving small nations at all costs; *other conditions being equal*, we are decidedly for centralisation and are opposed to the petty-bourgeois ideal of federal relationships. Even if our assumption were true, however, it is, firstly, not our business, or that of democrats (let alone of socialists), to help Romanov-Bobrinsky-Purishkevich throttle the Ukraine, etc. In his own Junker fashion, Bismarck accomplished a progressive historical task, but he would be a fine "Marxist" indeed who, on such grounds, thought of justifying socialist support for Bismarck! Moreover, Bismarck promoted economic development by bringing together the disunited Germans, who were being oppressed by other nations. The economic prosperity and rapid development of Great Russia, however, require that the country be liberated from Great-Russian oppression of other nations—that is the difference that our admirers of the true-Russian would-be Bismarcks overlook.

Secondly, if history were to decide in favour of Great-Russian dominant-nation capitalism, it follows hence that the *socialist* role of the Great-Russian proletariat, as the principal driving force of the communist revolution engendered by capitalism, will be all the greater. The proletarian revolution calls for a prolonged education of the workers in the spirit of the *fullest* national equality and brotherhood. Consequently, the interests of the Great-Russian proletariat require that the masses be systematically educated to champion—most resolutely, consistently, boldly and in a revolutionary manner—complete equality and the right to self-determination for all the nations oppressed

by the Great Russians. The interests of the Great Russians' national pride (understood, not in the slavish sense) coincide with the *socialist* interests of the Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians. Our model will always be Marx, who, after living in Britain for decades and becoming half-English, demanded freedom and national independence for Ireland in the interests of the socialist movement of the British workers.

In the second hypothetical case we have considered, our home-grown socialist-chauvinists, Plekhanov, etc., etc., will prove traitors, not only to their own country—a free and democratic Great Russia, but also to the proletarian brotherhood of all the nations of Russia, i.e., to the cause of socialism.

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WHAT NEXT?

ON THE TASKS CONFRONTING THE WORKERS' PARTIES WITH REGARD TO OPPORTUNISM AND SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM

The tremendous crisis created within European socialism by the world war has (as is always the case in great crises) resulted first in enormous confusion; it then led to a series of new groupings taking shape among representatives of various currents, shades and views in socialism; finally, it raised, with particular acuteness and insistence, the question of what changes in the *foundations* of socialist policy follow from the crisis and are demanded by it. Between August and December 1914, the socialists of Russia also passed through these three "stages" in a marked fashion. We all know that there was no little confusion at the beginning; the confusion was increased by the tsarist persecutions, by the behaviour of the "Europeans", and by the war alarm. In Paris and Switzerland, where there was the greatest number of political exiles, the greatest links with Russia, and the greatest degree of freedom, a new definite line of demarcation between the various attitudes towards problems raised by the war was being drawn, during September and October, at discussions, lectures, and in the press. It can safely be said that there is not a single shade of opinion in any current (or group) of socialism (and near-socialism) in Russia which has not found expression and been analysed. The general feeling is that the time has come for precise and positive conclusions capable of serving as the basis of systematic and practical activity, propaganda, agitation, and organisation. The situation is clear, all have expressed themselves. Let us now see *who is with whom, and whither the courses have been taken.*

On November 23 (N.S.), on the day following the publication in Petrograd of a government communiqué on the arrest of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma,[57] an event took place at the congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party in Stockholm, which finally and irrevocably placed on the order of the day the two questions just emphasised.[58] Readers will find below a description of this event, namely, a full translation, from the official Swedish Social-Democratic report, of the speeches both of Belenin (representing the Central Committee) and of Larin (representing the Organising Committee),[59] and also the debate on the question raised by Branting.

For the first time since the outbreak of war, a representative of our Party, of its Central Committee, and a representative of the liquidationist Organising Committee met at a congress of socialists of a neutral country. What did their speeches differ in? Belenin took a most definite stand regarding the grave, painful but momentous issues of the present-day socialist movement; quoting *Sotsial-Demokrat*,[60] the Party's Central Organ, he came out with a resolute declaration of war against opportunism, branding the behaviour of the German Social-Democratic leaders (and "many others") as *treachery*. Larin took no stand at all; he passed over the essence of the question in silence, confining himself to those hackneyed, hollow and moth-eaten phrases that always win hand-claps from opportunists and social-chauvinists in all countries. But then, Belenin said nothing at all about our attitude towards the other Social-Democratic parties or groups in Russia, as though intimating: "Such is our stand; as for the others, we shall not express ourselves as yet, but shall wait and see *which course* they will take." Larin, on the contrary, unfurled the banner of "unity", shed a tear over the "bitter fruit of the split in Russia", and depicted in gorgeous colours the "work of unification" carried on by the Organising Committee, which, be said, had united Plekhanov, the Caucasians, the Bundists, the Poles,[61] *and so forth*. Larin's intentions will be dealt with elsewhere (see below: "The Kind of Unity Larin Proclaimed"*). What interests us here is the fundamental question of unity.

* See pp. 115-17 of this volume.—*Ed.*

We have before us two slogans. One is: war against the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, who are traitors. The other is: unity in Russia, in particular with Plekhanov (who, we shall state parenthetically, is behaving with us in exactly the same way as Südekum* with the Germans, Hyndman with the British, etc.). Is it not obvious that, though he is afraid to call things by their proper names, Larin has in fact come out as advocate of the opportunists and social-chauvinists?

Let us, however, consider in general and in the light of present-day events the meaning of the "unity" slogan. The proletariat's unity is its greatest weapon in the struggle for the socialist revolution. From this indisputable truth it follows just as indisputably that, when a proletarian party is joined by a considerable number of petty-bourgeois elements capable of *hampering* the struggle for the socialist revolution, unity with such elements is harmful and perilous to the cause of the proletariat. Present-day events have shown that, on the one hand, the objective conditions are ripe for an imperialist war (i.e., a war reflecting the last and highest stage of capitalism), and, on the other hand, that decades of a so-called peaceful epoch have allowed an *accumulation* of petty-bourgeois and opportunist junk *within* the socialist parties of all the European countries. Some fifteen years ago, during the celebrated "Bernsteiniad" in Germany—and even earlier in many other countries—the question of the opportunist and *alien* elements within the proletarian parties had become a burning issue. There is hardly a single Marxist of note who has not recognised many times and on various occasions that the opportunists are in fact a non-proletarian element hostile to the socialist revolution. The particularly rapid growth of this social element of late years is beyond doubt: it includes officials of the legal labour unions, parliamentarians and the other intellectuals, who have got themselves easy and comfortable posts in the legal mass movement, some sections of the better paid workers, office employees, etc., etc. The

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* Plekhanov's pamphlet, *On the War* (Paris, 1914), which we have just received, confirms very convincingly the truth of the assertions made in the text. We shall return to this pamphlet later on.

war has clearly proved that at a moment of crisis (and the imperialist era will undoubtedly be one of all kinds of crises) a sizable mass of opportunists, supported and often directly guided by the bourgeoisie (this is of particular importance!), go over to the latter's camp, betray socialism, damage the workers' cause, and attempt to ruin it. In every crisis the bourgeoisie will always aid the opportunists, will always try to suppress the revolutionary section of the proletariat, stopping short of nothing and employing the most unlawful and savage *military* measures. The opportunists are bourgeois enemies of the proletarian revolution, who in peaceful times carry on their bourgeois work in secret, concealing themselves within the workers' parties, while in times of crisis they *immediately* prove to be open allies of the *entire* united bourgeoisie, from the conservative to the most radical and democratic part of the latter, from the free thinkers, to the religious and clerical sections. Anyone who has failed to understand this truth *after* the events we have gone through is hopelessly deceiving both himself and the workers. Individual desertions are inevitable under the present conditions, but their significance, it should be remembered, is determined by the existence of a *section* and *current* of petty-bourgeois opportunists. Such social-chauvinists, as Hyndman, Vandervelde, Guesde, Plekhanov and Kautsky, would be of no significance whatever if their spineless and banal speeches in defence of bourgeois patriotism were not taken up by the entire social strata of opportunists and by swarms of bourgeois papers and bourgeois politicians.

Typical of the socialist parties of the epoch of the Second International was one that tolerated in its midst an opportunism built up in decades of the "peaceful" period, an opportunism that kept itself secret, adapting itself to the revolutionary workers, *borrowing* their Marxist terminology, and evading any clear cleavage of principles. This type has outlived itself. If the war ends in 1915, will any thinking socialist be found willing to begin, in 1916, restoring the workers' parties *together* with the opportunists, *knowing from experience* that in any new crisis all of them *to a man* (plus many other spineless and muddle-headed people) will be for the bourgeoisie, who will of course find a pretext to ban any talk of class hatred and the class struggle?

In Italy, the party was the exception for the period of the Second International; the opportunists, headed by Bissolati, were expelled from the party. In the present crisis, the results have proved *excellent*: people of various trends of opinion have not deceived the workers or blinded them with pearls of eloquence regarding "unity"; each of them followed his own road. The opportunists (and deserters from the workers' party such as Mussolini) practised social-chauvinism, lauding (as Plekhanov did) "gallant Belgium", thereby shielding the policies, not of a gallant, but of a bourgeois Italy, which would plunder the Ukraine and Galicia ... I mean, Albania, Tunisia, etc., etc. Meanwhile, the socialists were waging *against them* a war against war, in preparation of a *civil* war. We are not at all idealising the Italian Socialist Party and in no way guarantee that it will stand firm should Italy enter the war. We are speaking not of the future of that party, but only of the present. We are stating the indisputable *fact* that the workers in most European countries have been *deceived by the fictitious unity* of the opportunists and the revolutionaries, Italy being the happy exception, a country where no such deception exists at present. What was a happy exception for the Second International should and *shall* become the rule for the Third International. While capitalism persists, the proletariat will always be a close neighbour to the petty bourgeoisie. It is sometimes unwise to reject temporary alliances with the latter, but *unity* with them, unity with the opportunists can be defended *at present* only by the enemies of the proletariat or by hoodwinked *traditionalists* of a bygone period.

Today, following 1914, unity of the proletarian struggle for the socialist revolution demands that the workers' parties separate themselves completely from the parties of the opportunists. What we understand by opportunism has been clearly said in the Manifesto of the Central Committee (No. 33, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy"*).

But what do we see in Russia? Is it good or bad for the working-class movement of our country to have unity between people who, in one way or another and with more or

* See pp. 25-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

less consistency, are combating chauvinism—of both the Purishkevich and the Cadet brand—and people who echo that chauvinism, like Maslov, Plekhanov and Smirnov? Is it good to have unity between people engaged in anti-war action and such that declare that they will not oppose the war, like-the influential authors of "Document" (No. 34)[62]? Only those who wish to turn a blind eye to things will find difficulty in answering this question.

The objection may be made that Martov has polemised with Plekhanov in *Golos* and, together with a number of other friends and partisans of the Organising Committee, has battled against social-chauvinism. We do not deny this, and had words of praise for Martov in No. 33 of the Central Organ. We would be very glad if Martov were not "turned about" (see the article, "Martov Turns About"); we would very much like a decisive anti-chauvinist line to become the line of the Organising Committee. That, however, does not depend upon our wishes, *or upon any one else's*. What are the objective facts? First, Larin, the Organising Committee's official representative, is for some reason silent about *Golos*, while naming the social-chauvinist Plekhanov, and also Axelrod, who wrote an article (in *Berner Tagwacht*[63]) so as not to say a single definite word there. Moreover, Larin, apart from his official position, is *more* than geographically close to the influential central group of the liquidators in Russia. Secondly, there is the European press. In France and Germany, the papers are saying nothing about *Golos*, while speaking of Rubanovich, Plekhanov, and Chkheidze. (In its issue of December 12, *Hamburger Echo*, one of the most jingoist organs of the jingoist "Social-Democratic" press of Germany, called Chkheidze an adherent of Maslov and Plekhanov; this has also been hinted at by certain papers in Russia. It is clear that all fellow-thinkers of the Südekums fully appreciate the ideological aid Plekhanov has given to the Südekums.) In Russia, millions of copies of bourgeois papers have brought the "people" tidings of Maslov-Plekhanov-Smirnov—but no news of the trend represented by *Golos*. Thirdly, the experience of the legal workers' press of 1912-14 has definitely proved that the source of a certain degree of social strength and influence enjoyed by the liquidationist movement lies, not in the working class, but in that

section of bourgeois-democratic intelligentsia, which has brought the central group of legalist writers to the fore. The national-chauvinist temper of this section *as a section* is testified to by the entire press of Russia, as revealed in the letters of the Petrograd worker (*Sotsial-Demokrat* Nos. 33 and 35) and in the "Document" (No. 34). Considerable personal re-groupings within that section are quite possible, but it is absolutely improbable that, as a section, it should *not* be "patriotic" and opportunist.

Such are the objective facts. Since we take them into account and are aware that it is to the advantage of all bourgeois parties that wish for influence over the workers, to have a Left wing for display (particularly when that wing is unofficial), we must declare the idea of unity with the Organising Committee an illusion detrimental to the workers' cause.

The policy of the Organising Committee who, in far-away Sweden, on November 23, proclaimed their unity with Plekhanov and spoke words sweet to the hearts of all social-chauvinists, while in Paris and in Switzerland they did not bother to make their existence known either on September 13 (when *Golos* appeared) or on November 23 or to this day (December 23), strongly resembles political chicanery of the worst kind. The hope that *Otkliki*,[64] scheduled to appear in Zurich, would be of an official Party nature has been destroyed by a forthright statement in *Berner Tagwacht* (December 12), to the effect that this paper will not be of *such* a nature. (Incidentally, the editors of *Golos* declared in issue No. 52 that to continue at present the rift with the liquidators would be "nationalism" of the worst kind. This phrase, which is devoid of grammatical meaning, has only political meaning that the editors of *Golos* prefer having unity with the social-chauvinists to drawing closer to those who are irreconcilably hostile to social-chauvinism. The editors of *Golos* have made a bad choice.)

To make the picture complete, it remains for us to add a few words about *Mysl*,[65] organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, which is published in Paris. This paper *also* lauds "unity", while it shields (cf. *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 34) the social-chauvinism of Rubanovich, its party leader, defends the Franco-Belgian opportunists and ministerialists, says

nothing of the patriotic motives of the speech by Kerensky, one of the extreme radicals among the Russian Trudoviks,[66] and prints well-worn petty-bourgeois vulgarities on the revision of Marxism, in a Narodnik and opportunist spirit. What the resolution of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party's summer conference of 1913[67] said of the Socialist-Revolutionaries has been fully and particularly proved by this behaviour of *Mysl*.

Some Russian socialists seem to think that internationalism consists in a readiness to welcome a resolution containing an international vindication of social-chauvinism in all countries, such as is to be drawn up by Plekhanov and Südekum, Kautsky and Hervé, Guesde and Hyndman, Vandervelde and Bissolati, etc. We permit ourselves the thought that internationalism consists only in an unequivocal internationalist policy within one's party. A genuinely proletarian internationalist policy cannot be pursued, active opposition to the war cannot be preached, and forces for such action cannot be mustered while we are in the company of the opportunists and the social-chauvinists. To find refuge in silence, or to wave this truth aside which, though bitter, is necessary to the socialist, is detrimental and ruinous to the working-class movement.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 36,
January 9, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

THE KIND OF "UNITY" LARIN PROCLAIMED AT THE SWEDISH CONGRESS[68]

In the speech cited by us (No. 36), Larin could have been referring only to the well-known "July Third" bloc,[69] i.e., the alliance concluded in Brussels, on 3.7.1914, between the Organising Committee, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Alexinsky, Plekhanov, the Bundists, the Caucasians, the Lithuanians, the Left wing,[70] the Polish opposition and so on. Why did Larin confine himself to hints? That is strange, to say the least. We are of the opinion that, if the O.C. lives on, and likewise the alliance, it is bad to make a secret of this truth.

The Central Committee of our Party and the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democrats did *not* join the alliance. Our Central Committee advanced 14 precise conditions of unity, these being *rejected* by the Organising Committee and the "bloc", who limited themselves to a diplomatic and evasive resolution which, *in fact*, did not promise or signify any decisive turn in the previous liquidationist policy.

Here is the *gist* of our fourteen points: (1) The December 1908 and January 1910 resolutions on liquidationism should be unambiguously confirmed, viz., in a way that will recognise as incompatible with Social-Democratic Party membership statements against the underground, against publicity for the illegal press, for an "open" party (or a struggle for one), against revolutionary meetings, etc. (in the way *Nasha Zarya*[71] and *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*[72] have come out); (2) the same, with reference to statements

against the slogan of a republic, etc.; (3) the same, with reference to statements against a bloc with *non*-S.D. Left-wing party; (4) in each locality there must be a united S.D. organisation, one that is not divided according to nationality; (5) "cultural-national autonomy" to be rejected; (6) the workers are called upon to show "unity from below"; only one who belongs to an illegal organisation can be a member of the party; in the legal press, only figures concerning workers' group contributions since 1913 are to be used in order to ascertain a majority; (7) rival newspapers cannot be permitted in one and the same city; *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* should close down, and a discussion journal to be founded; (8) the resolutions of the 1903 and the 1907 congresses regarding the bourgeois character of the S.R.s are to be confirmed; agreements between part of the S.D. Party and the S.R.s are impermissible; (9) groups abroad are to be subordinated to the Central Committee in Russia; (10) regarding work in the trade unions, the resolution of the London Central Committee (Jan. 1908) should be confirmed; illegal nuclei are necessary; (11) statements against the Insurance Council[73] and other insurance institutions are indefeasible; as a competing publication, *Strakhovaniye Rabochikh*[74] should close down; (12) the Caucasian S.D.s should give special confirmation for points 5 and 4; (13) the Chkheidze group[75] should withdraw "cultural-national autonomy" and recognise the conditions enumerated above; (14) on matters pertaining to "slander" (Malinovsky, X, etc.), the Organising Committee and their friends should either retract their accusations and slander, or else send a representative to the forthcoming congress of our Party, so as to vindicate all their accusations.

It will readily be seen that, without these conditions and with numerous verbal "promises" to renounce liquidationism (as took place at the 1910 Plenary Meeting), nothing will change; "unity" would be a fiction and a recognition of "equality" for the liquidators.

The mighty crisis of socialism as a result of the world war has evoked a supreme effort in all groups of S.D.s and a striving to muster the forces of all who *can* draw together on the fundamental issues of the attitude towards the war. The "July Third" bloc, of which Larin was so boastful

(while reluctant to call it by its own name), at once revealed its fictitiousness.

What is necessary is unflagging caution against fictitious "unity", as long as there is an irreconcilable cleavage in practice.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 37,
February 1, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

THE RUSSIAN BRAND OF SÜDEKUM

The word Südekum has come to be used in a generic sense to denote a type of smug and unscrupulous opportunist and social-chauvinist. It is a good sign that the Südekums are held in general contempt. There is, however, only one way for us to avoid falling into chauvinism ourselves in so doing: we must do everything we can to help unmask the Russian Südekums.

By his pamphlet *On the War*, Plekhanov has definitely placed himself at the head of the latter. His arguments are a substitution of sophistry for dialectics all along the line. He sophistically denounces German opportunism so as to shield French and Russian opportunism. The result is not a struggle against international opportunism, but support for it. He sophistically bemoans the fate of Belgium, while saying nothing about Galicia. He sophistically confuses the period of imperialism (i.e., one in which, as all Marxists hold, the objective conditions are ripe for the collapse of capitalism, and there are masses of socialist proletarians) and the period of bourgeois-democratic national movements in other words, he confuses a period in which the destruction of bourgeois fatherlands by an international revolution of the proletariat is imminent, and the period of their inception and consolidation. He sophistically accuses the German bourgeoisie of having broken the peace, while remaining silent about the lengthy and elaborate preparations for a war against Germany by the bourgeoisie of the "Triple Entente".[76] He sophistically evades the Basle resolution. He sophistically substitutes national-liberalism for social-democracy: the desirability of tsarism's victory is ascribed to the interests of Russia's economic progress, while the nationalities in Russia, or tsarism's stunting Russian economic

growth, or the relatively far more rapid and successful growth of Germany's productive forces, and so on and so forth, are all questions that are shied away from. To analyse all of Plekhanov's sophisms would require a series of articles, and many of his ridiculous absurdities are hardly worth going into. We shall touch upon only one of his alleged arguments. In 1870 Engels wrote to Marx that Wilhelm Liebknecht was mistaken in making anti-Bismarckism his *sole* guiding principle.[77] Plekhanov was glad to have discovered the quotation: the same is true, he argues, with regard to anti-tsarism! Let us, however, try to replace sophistry (i.e., the method of clutching at the outward similarity of instances, without considering the nexus between events) with dialectics (i.e., the method of studying all the concrete circumstances of an event and of its development). The unification of Germany was a necessity which Marx recognised as such both prior to and following 1848. As early as 1859, Engels called forthright upon the German people to fight for unification.[78] When unification through revolution failed, Bismarck achieved it in a counter-revolutionary, Junker fashion. Anti-Bismarckism became absurd as a *sole* principle, since the necessary unification was an accomplished fact. But what about Russia? Did our brave Plekhanov formerly have the courage to declare that Russia's development demanded the conquest of Galicia, Constantinople, Armenia, Persia, etc.? Has he the courage to say so now? Has he considered that Germany had to progress from the national disunity of the Germans (who had been oppressed both by France and Russia in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century) to a unified nation, whereas in Russia the Great Russians have crushed rather than united a number of other nations? Without giving thought to such things, Plekhanov has simply masked his chauvinism by distorting the meaning of the Engels quotation of 1870 in the same fashion as Südekum has distorted an 1891 quotation from Engels to the effect that the Germans must wage a life-and-death struggle against the allied armies of France and Russia.

In a different kind of language and in quite different circumstances, the selfsame chauvinism is defended by *Nasha Zarya* Nos. 7-8-9, wherein Mr. Cherevanin predicts and evokes

"the defeat of Germany", asserting that "Europe [!!] has risen up" against that country; Mr. A. Potresov berates the German Social-Democrats for their "blunder", which "is worse than any crime", etc., claiming that German militarism is guilty of "special, extraordinary sins", and that it is "not the Pan-Slavic dreams of certain Russian circles which have been a menace to European peace", etc.

When the legal press thus depicts Germany's "extraordinary" guilt and advocates the necessity of her defeat is it not echoing Purishkevich and the social-chauvinists? The pressure of the tsar's censors imposes silence about "extraordinary" sins a hundred times greater in number, committed by Russian militarism. Is it not obvious that, in a situation such as this, people who do not wish to be chauvinist should at least *refrain* from speaking of Germany's defeat and her extraordinary sins?

Nasha Zarya is not merely pursuing the line of "non-resistance to war"; it is doing much more—bringing grist to the mill of Great-Russian, tsarist-Purishkevich chauvinism by using "Social-Democratic" arguments for the preachment of Germany's defeat, and shielding the Pan-Slavists. It was none other than the *Nasha Zarya* writers who in 1912-14 conducted mass propaganda of liquidationism among the workers.

Finally, there is Axelrod, whom Martov is trying so angrily and so unsuccessfully to cover up, defend and shield in exactly the same way as he has been doing for the *Nasha Zarya* writers.

With Axelrod's consent, his views were set forth in Nos. 86 and 87 of *Golos*. These views are social-chauvinist. He used the following arguments to defend the French and Belgian socialists joining the bourgeois governments: (1) "To Marx, historical necessity, which is often inappropriately cited nowadays, did not mean a passive attitude towards a concrete evil—in expectation of the socialist revolution." What muddled reasoning! What has this got to do with it all? Everything that takes place in history takes place of necessity. That is elementary. The opponents of social-chauvinism have cited, not historical necessity but the *imperialist* nature of the war. Axelrod pretends that he does not understand this, or the consequent appraisal

of the "concrete evil", viz., bourgeois domination in all lands, and the *timeliness* of launching revolutionary action leading to a "social revolution". It is the social-chauvinists who are "passive" by denying this. (2) It is impossible "to ignore the question of who actually started" the war, '~hereby imposing upon all attacked countries the necessity of defending their independence". On the same page, however, Axelrod admits that "of course the French imperialists were out to provoke a war in two or three years' time"! During that period, he maintains, the proletariat would grow stronger, thereby enhancing the chances of peace! We know, however, that during that period, opportunism, which is so dear to Axelrod's heart, would grow stronger, thereby enhancing the chances of its even more shameful betrayal of socialism. We know that, for *decades*, three robbers (the bourgeoisie and the governments of Britain, Russia and France) were arming to pillage Germany. Is there anything surprising that two robbers began the attack before the other *three* got the new knives they had ordered? Is it not a sophism for phrases about "who started the war" to be used to gloss over the *equal* "*guilt*" of the bourgeoisie of all countries, which was unanimously recognised without question by all socialists at Basle? (3) "To blame the Belgian socialists for defending their country" is "not Marxism, but cynicism". This was exactly how Marx termed Proudhon's attitude towards the Polish uprising (of 1863).[79] Beginning with 1848, Marx constantly stressed the historical progressiveness of the Polish uprising against tsarism. That was something no one dared deny. The concrete conditions consisted in an unresolved national problem in the east of Europe, i.e., in a bourgeois-democratic, not imperialist, nature of the war against tsarism. That is elementary.

If one's attitude towards the socialist revolution is negative, scoffing or negligent (like that of the Axelrods), then one *cannot* help the Belgian "country" in the present and concrete war otherwise than by helping tsarism to throttle the Ukraine. That is a fact, which it is cynical for a Russian socialist to evade. It is just as cynical to raise a clamour over Belgium while remaining silent about Galicia.

What ought the Belgian socialists to have done? Since they were unable to accomplish a social revolution together with the French, etc., they had to submit to the majority of the nation at the time, and go to war. But, while submitting to the will of the slave-owning class, they should have placed the responsibility on the latter, and not have voted for war credits; they should have sent Vandervelde, not to engage in ministerial missions to the exploiters, but to organise (together with the revolutionary Social-Democrats of *all* countries) illegal revolutionary propaganda in favour of the "socialist revolution" and civil war; in the army too such work should have been conducted (experience having shown that even "fraternisation" between workingmen clad in uniforms is possible in the trenches of the fighting armies!). Prattling about dialectics and Marxism while revealing inability to combine the temporary need to submit to the majority with revolutionary work under all conditions means scoffing at the workers and jeering at socialism. "Citizens of Belgium! Our country has met with a great calamity brought about by the bourgeoisie of *all* countries, including Belgium. You do not wish to overthrow that bourgeoisie? You do not believe in an appeal to the socialists of Germany? We are in the minority; so I must submit to you and go to war, but even then I shall call and prepare for civil war by the proletariat of all countries, because there is no other salvation for the peasants and workers of Belgium and other countries!" For a speech like this, a Belgian or French deputy would have been sent to prison, not given the post of minister, but he would have been a socialist, not a traitor; in the trenches, both the French and German workingmen in military uniforms would have spoken of him as their *own* leader, not as a traitor to the working class. (4) "While fatherlands exist, while, as at present, the proletariat's life and its movement are compressed into the framework of the fatherlands, and while the proletariat does not feel another and international soil under its feet, the question of patriotism and self-defence will continue to exist for the working class." Bourgeois fatherlands will exist until they are destroyed by the international revolution of the proletariat. The existence of conditions suitable for a revolution was recognised even by Kautsky

as early as 1909; just as it was unanimously recognised later by the Basle Congress, and is now proved by the *fact* of the deep sympathy on the part of the workers of all countries for those who do not vote for war credits, and are not afraid of prison and the other sacrifices connected with any revolution, by virtue of "historical necessity". Axelrod's phrase is nothing but a *pretext* to avoid revolutionary activity, merely a repetition of the arguments used by the chauvinist bourgeoisie. (5) The same is true about his assertions that the conduct of the Germans was *not* treachery, and that their behaviour was dictated by "a keen sentiment, the consciousness of an organic bond with that piece of land, the fatherland, on which the German proletarians live and work". In reality, the behaviour of the Germans, as well as that of Guesde and the rest, is undoubtedly treachery; to mask and to shield it is a disgrace. In reality, it is the bourgeois fatherlands that mutilate, cripple, crush and destroy the "living bond" between the German workers and the German land by creating a "bond" between the slave and the slave-owner. In reality, *only* the destruction of the bourgeois fatherlands can give the workers of all countries a "bond with the land", freedom of their own language, bread, and the benefits of civilisation. Axelrod is simply an apologist for the bourgeoisie. (6) To persuade the workers to be "cautious in accusing of opportunism" such "tested Marxists as Guesde", etc., means to induce the workers to be servile towards their leaders. We would advise the worker to learn from the example of Guesde's whole life, with the *exception* of his patent betrayal of socialism in 1914. Private and other circumstances may be found that mitigate his guilt, but this is not a question of the guilt of *individuals*; what we are interested in is the socialist significance of *events*. (7) To refer to the "*formal*" permissibility of joining government on the ground that there exists some minute point somewhere in a resolution, mentioning "exceptionally important cases", is tantamount to the most dishonest pettifogging, since this minor point was obviously intended to *aid* the international revolution of the proletariat, not to *counteract* it. (8) Axelrod's assertion that "the defeat of Russia, while unable to hamper the organic development of the country, would

help liquidate the old regime", is true if taken by itself, but when it is used to justify the German chauvinists, it is nothing but an attempt to *curry favour* with the Südekums. Recognition of the usefulness of Russia's defeat, without openly accusing the German and Austrian Social-Democrats of having betrayed socialism means *in reality* helping them justify themselves, wriggle out of a difficult situation, and deceive the workers. Axelrod's article is a double obeisance—one to the German social-chauvinists, the other to the French. Taken together, these obeisances constitute typical "Russo-Bundist" social-chauvinism.

Let the readers now judge for themselves the consistency displayed by the *Golos* editors who, in publishing these most disgraceful arguments of Axelrod's, have expressed their disagreement only with "some of his ideas" while in the editorial of No. 96 of their paper, they advocate a "sharp rupture with the elements of active social-patriotism". Are the editors of *Golos* so naïve or so inattentive that they do not see the truth? Do they not see that Axelrod's reasonings are, *from beginning to end*, "elements of active [his writings being the writer's activity] social-patriotism"? And what about the *Nasha Zarya* writers: Messrs. Cherevanin, A. Potresov and Co.; are they not elements of active social-patriotism?

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 37,
February 1, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

TO THE EDITORS OF *NASHE SLOVO*[80]

Berne, 9.2.1915

Dear Comrades:

In your letter of February 6 you proposed to us a plan of struggle against "official social-patriotism", in connection with the proposed London conference of socialists of the "allied countries" of the Triple Entente.[81] As you have, of course, seen from our newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, we support that struggle in general, and are conducting it. That is why we are very glad to have received your message, and accept with pleasure your proposal for a discussion of a plan of joint action.

The conference, which is said to have been planned for February 15 (we have not yet received a single document regarding it), will perhaps be postponed until February 25 or later [judging from a letter from Huysmans, who wrote of the sitting of the Executive Commission for February 20 and of the plan for personal talks between members (the Secretary) of the Executive Commission and socialists of France, Britain and Russia]. The conference may possibly be contemplated as one, not of official members of the International Socialist Bureau, but as *private* meetings between individual "prominent" socialists.

That is why the contraposition to "official social-patriotism" of a "clear, revolutionary and internationalist" point of view, a contraposition which you write of and which has our full sympathy, should be prepared *for all possible contingencies* (both for a conference of the official representatives of parties and for a private meeting in all its forms, both for February 15 and for any later date).

For our part and in view of the desire you have expressed, we propose the following draft declaration which contains such a contraposition (so that the declaration may be read and printed):

"The undersigned representatives of the Social-Democratic organisations of Russia (Britain, etc.) proceed from the conviction:

"that the present war is, on the part, not only of Germany and Austro-Hungary, but of Britain and France (acting in alliance with tsarism), an imperialist war, i.e., a war of the epoch of the final stage in the development of capitalism, an epoch in which bourgeois states, with their national boundaries, have outlived themselves; a war aimed exclusively at the grabbing of colonies, the plundering of rival countries, and the weakening of the proletarian movement by setting the proletarians of one country against those of another.

"Consequently it is the absolute duty of the socialists of all belligerent countries immediately and resolutely to carry out the Basle resolution, viz.:

"(1) the break-up of all national blocs and the *Burgfrieden** in all countries;

"(2) a call to the workers of all the belligerent countries to wage an energetic class struggle, both economic and political, against the bourgeoisie of their country, a bourgeoisie that is amassing unparalleled profits from war deliveries and makes use of the military authorities' backing so as to gag the workers and intensify oppression of the latter;

"(3) decisive condemnation of any voting for war credits;

"(4) withdrawal from the bourgeois governments of Belgium and France, and recognition that entry into governments and voting for war credits are the same kind of treachery to the cause of socialism as is the entire behaviour of the German and Austrian Social-Democrats;

"(5) that the hand be stretched out to internationalist elements in German Social-Democracy that refuse to vote for war credits, and that an international committee be set up, together with them, for the conduct of agitation for the cessation of the war, not in the spirit of the paci-

* class truce.—*Ed.*

fists, the Christians, and the petty-bourgeois democrats, but in inseparable connection with the propaganda and organisation of mass revolutionary action by the proletarians of each country, against the governments and the bourgeoisie of that country;

"(6) support for any attempts by the socialists of the belligerent countries to bring about contacts and fraternisation in the fighting forces and the trenches, despite the bans imposed by the military authorities of Britain, Germany, etc.;

"(7) a call to women socialists of the belligerent countries to intensify agitation in the direction indicated above;

"(8) a call for support by the entire world proletariat of the struggle against tsarism, and for support for those Social-Democrats of Russia who have not only refused to vote for credits, but have shown disregard of the danger of persecution and are conducting socialist work in the spirit of internationalist and revolutionary Social-Democracy."

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As for certain Social-Democratic men of letters in Russia who have come out in defence of the official social-patriotism (as, for instance, Plekhanov, Alexinsky, Maslov, and others), the undersigned disclaim all responsibility for any action or statements by them, energetically protest against the latter, and declare that, according to all available information, the Social-Democratic workers of Russia do not hold that point of view.

It goes without saying that Comrade Litvinov, our Central Committee's official representative in the International Socialist Bureau (his address*: We are sending him your letter and a copy of our reply to you. Please address him directly on all urgent matters), as he has been authorised to use his own judgement in the matter of all particular amendments, special steps in negotiations, etc.; we can merely state our *complete* solidarity with this comrade on *all* essential points.

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* M. M. Litvinov's address is not given in the MS.—*Ed.*

As for the Organising Committee and the Bund, who are both represented in the International Socialist Bureau, we have grounds for apprehension that they stand *for* "official social-patriotism" (in its Francophile or Germanophile form, or in any other that would reconcile these two tendencies). At any rate we would appreciate your kindness in sending us both your reply (your amendments, your counter-draft of the resolution, etc.) and the reply of those organisations (the Organising Committee, the Bund, etc.) that you have already addressed or intend doing so.

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

My address is:*

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*

Published according to
the manuscript

* No address is given in the MS.—*Ed.*

HOW THE POLICE AND THE REACTIONARIES PROTECT THE UNITY OF GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

In its issue of January 9, the German Social-Democratic *Gothaer Volksblatt* published an article entitled, "Police Protection for the Policy of the Social-Democratic Parliamentary Group".

"The first two days of the operation of the censorship," says the paper, which has been placed under the gratifying guardianship of the military authorities, "show with full clarity that the central authorities are particularly anxious to gag the undesirable critics of the policy of the Social-Democratic group within our own ranks. The censorship is designed to preserve 'party peace' within the ranks of the Social-Democrats, in other words, to preserve a 'united', 'cemented' and powerful German Social-Democratic Party. Social-Democracy under governmental tutelage—such is the most important event in the internal policies of our 'great' time, of the era of the rebirth of the German nation.

"Several weeks have passed since the politicians who make up our Social-Democratic parliamentary group began an energetic propaganda campaign of their views. They have come up against strong opposition in several very large party centres. Their propaganda has put the workers in a frame of mind unfavourable rather than favourable to those who vote for war credits, which is why the military authorities have sought to help the latter now by means of the censorship, now by abolishing freedom of assembly. With us in Gotha, this help is coming from the military censor, in Hamburg, from the ban on meetings."

In quoting these words, the Swiss Social-Democratic paper, which is published in Berne, adds that a number of Social-Democratic papers in Germany have been placed under censorship, and continues with the comment: "Very soon there will be nothing to disturb the unanimity of the German press. If anybody attempts to affect it, the military dictatorship will firmly and rapidly put an end to that, acting on information supplied directly or indirectly by 'Social-Democrats' that stand for party peace".

The opportunist Social-Democratic papers do indeed, directly or indirectly, pass on information about the radical press!

Consequently, the facts go to show that we were perfectly right in writing in No. 36 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*: "The opportunists are bourgeois enemies of the proletarian revolution.... In times of crisis they *immediately* prove to be open allies of the *entire* united bourgeoisie."* As a slogan of the Social-Democratic Party, unity today means unity with the opportunists and submission to them (or to their bloc with the bourgeoisie). This is a slogan which *in actual fact* aids the police and the reactionaries, and is disastrous to the labour movement.

We might, incidentally, mention the appearance of a splendid pamphlet by Borchardt (in German) entitled *Vor und nach dem 4. August 1914*,[82] with the sub-title, *Hat die deutsche Sozialdemokratie abgedankt?* Indeed, it has repudiated itself, says the author, revealing the glaring contrast between party declarations *prior to* August 4 and the policies of "August 4". We shall stop at no sacrifice in the war against war, the Social-Democrats of Germany (and other countries) said prior to August 4, 1914, whereas, on September 28, 1914, Otto Braun, member of the Central Committee, made reference to the 20 millions of marks invested in legal papers, and their 11,000 employees. The tens of thousands of leaders, officials and privileged workers, who have been demoralised by legalism, have disorganised the million-strong army of the Social-Democratic proletariat.

The lesson to be derived is as clear as clear can be: a decisive break with chauvinism and opportunism. Yet,

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* See p. 110 of this volume.—*Ed.*

vapid Social-Revolutionary babblers (J. Gardenin[83] and Co.) have, in the vapid Paris *Mysl*, repudiated Marxism, in favour of petty-bourgeois ideas! Forgotten are the elementary truths provided by political economy, and the world-wide development of capitalism, which produces only one revolutionary class—the proletariat. Forgotten are Chartism, June 1848, the Paris Commune, and October and December, 1905. The workers can advance towards their world-wide revolution only through a series of defeats and errors, failures and weaknesses, but they are advancing towards it. One must be blind not to see bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence on the proletariat as the main and fundamental cause of the International's disgrace and collapse in 1914. However, windbags like Gardenin and Co. would apply a remedy to socialism by completely repudiating its only socio-historical foundation—the class struggle of the proletariat—and by diluting Marxism with philistine and intellectualist-Narodnik verbiage. The call is not for strenuous work towards a rupture between the proletarian revolutionary movement and opportunism, but for unification of this movement with the opportunists of the Ropshin[84] and Chernov type, who were bomb-throwing liberals the day before yesterday, renegades in the toga of liberals yesterday, and today delight in saccharine bourgeois phrases about the "labour" principle! The Gardenins are no better than the Südekums and the Socialist-Revolutionaries no better than the liquidators. This is why they all meet so lovingly in *Sovremennik*,[85] a journal that advocates a programme of a merger between the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

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THE LONDON CONFERENCE

Below we quote, with abbreviations, a letter from the R.S.D.L.P. representative:

"London, Feb. 14, 1915.

"It was only last night that I received from the secretary of the British section of the International the address of the Conference, this in reply to my letter, in which I informed him of my address, without asking for an invitation. I decided to go there so as to try to read the declaration. Present were: from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Rubanovich (from the social-chauvinists), Chernov and Bobrov from *Mysl*; Maisky from the Organising Committee, he being delegated together with Martov, who failed to appear, as he had received no pass. There were eleven delegates from Britain (Keir Hardie as Chairman, MacDonald and others); sixteen from France (Sembat, Vaillant and others); three from Belgium (Vandervelde and others).

"The Chairman opened the Conference by declaring that its aim was to exchange opinions, not to adopt resolutions. A French delegate proposed an amendment, asking why a resolution should not be passed registering the opinion of the *majority*. This was accepted without discussion.

"The agenda: (1) the rights of nations—Belgium and Poland; (2) colonies; (3) guarantees of peace. A Credentials Committee was elected (Rubanovich and others). It was decided that one representative from each country should make a brief report on the attitude to the war.

"I took the floor and protested against the failure to invite our Party's official representative in the International Socialist Bureau [Comrade Maximovich,[86] who has for over a year been a member of the I. S. Bureau as representa-

tive of our Party, and is permanently resident in London]. The Chairman interrupted me, referring to the invitation of all 'whose names are known'. I once more protested against the failure to inform the genuine representatives. Then I referred to our Manifesto [see *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy"*], which shows our over-all attitude towards the war, and has been *sent* to the I. S. Bureau. Prior to speaking of the conditions of peace, I said, it was necessary to establish the means by which we would endeavour to achieve peace; with that end, the existence of a general revolutionary Social-Democratic basis should be ascertained, and also whether we were conferring as chauvinists, as pacifists, or as Social-Democrats. I was reading our declaration, but the Chairman interrupted me, declaring that my standing as a delegate had not yet been established [!] and that they had gathered, 'not for criticism of various parties' [!]. I stated that I would continue my speech after the report of the Credentials Committee. [The text of the declaration we were not allowed to read appears in the next issue.]

"Brief statements on the general situation were made by Vaillant, Vandervelde, MacDonald, and Rubanovich. Then, following the report of the Credentials Committee, Maisky was asked to himself decide whether he could alone represent the Organising Committee, and I was 'permitted' to attend. I thanked the Conference for their 'courtesy' and was about to continue reading out the declaration so as to ascertain whether I could remain. The Chairman interrupted me, saying he would not allow me to present 'conditions' to the Conference. Then I asked for permission to say why I would *not* take part in the Conference. This was rejected. I then asked for permission to state that the R.S.D.L.P. was not taking part in the Conference. As for the reasons, I was leaving a written statement with the Chairman. I gathered my papers and left....

"The Chairman was given a statement from the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democrats [Berzin] to the effect that he fully agreed with our declaration."

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* See pp. 25-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The delegates to the Conference were not allowed to give any information to the press. This, of course, did not apply to Comrade Maximovich's leaving the Conference, and the *Labour Leader*,[87] in which Keir Hardie collaborates, made some general comments on Maximovich's having left the Conference and on his point of view.

Owing to lack of space, we shall have to deal with the London Conference and its resolutions in our next issue. We shall however note the utter uselessness of its resolutions, which merely cover up social-chauvinism.

The following is the set-up of the Russian representation: the Central Committee and the Lettish Social-Democrats are resolutely and clearly opposed to social-chauvinism. The liquidators' Organising Committee either stay away or else get in the way. As for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the "party" (Rubanovich) is *for* social-chauvinism, while *Mysl* (Bobrov and Chernov) form the opposition, which we shall give an appraisal of when we learn the kind of statement they have made.

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UNDER A FALSE FLAG[88]

Written not earlier than
February 1915

First published in 1917,
in the first *Collection*
of the *Priliv* Publishers, Moscow

Signed: *N. Konstantinov*

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Issue No. 1 of *Nashe Dyelo* (Petrograd, January 1915)[89] published a highly characteristic programmatic article by Mr. A. Potresov, entitled "At the Juncture of Two Epochs". Like an earlier magazine article by the same author, the present article sets forth the ideas underlying an entire bourgeois trend of public thought in Russia—the liquidationist—regarding the important and burning problems of the times. Strictly speaking, we have before us not articles but the manifesto of a definite trend, and anyone who reads them carefully and gives thought to their content will see that only fortuitous considerations, i.e., such that have nothing in common with purely literary interests, have prevented the author's ideas (and those of his friends, since the author does not stand alone) from being expressed in the more appropriate form of a declaration or credo.

Potresov's main idea is that present-day democracy stands at the juncture of two epochs, the fundamental difference between the old epoch and the new consisting in a transition from national isolation to internationalism. By present-day democracy, Potresov understands the kind that marked the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, as distinct from the old bourgeois democracy that marked the end of the eighteenth century and the first two-thirds of the nineteenth.

At first glance it may seem that the author's idea is absolutely correct, that we have before us an opponent to the national-liberal tendency predominant in present-day democracy, and that the author is an "internationalist", not a national-liberal.

Indeed, this defence of internationalism, this reference to national narrow-mindedness and national exclusiveness as features of an outworn and bygone epoch—is it not a breakaway from the wave of national-liberalism, that bane

of present-day democracy or, rather, of its official representatives?

That, at first glance, is not only the possible but the almost inevitable impression. Yet it would be a gross error to think so. The author is transporting his cargo under a false flag. Consciously or otherwise—that does not matter in this instance—he has resorted to a stratagem by hoisting the flag of "internationalism" so as the more securely to transport under this flag his contraband cargo of national-liberalism. After all, Potresov is a most undeniable national-liberal. The gist of his article (and of his programme, platform, and credo) is in the employment of this little—and if you wish even innocent—stratagem, in carrying opportunism under the flag of internationalism. One must go into all the details of this manoeuvre, for the matter is of prime and tremendous importance. Potresov's use of a false flag is the more dangerous since he not only cloaks himself with the principle of "internationalism" but also assumes the title of an adherent of "Marxist methodology". In other words, Potresov pretends to be a true follower and exponent of Marxism, whereas in actual fact he substitutes national-liberalism for Marxism. Potresov tries to "amend" Kautsky, accusing him of "playing the advocate", i.e., of defending liberalism now of one shade, now of another, that is to say, the liberalism of shades peculiar to various nations. Potresov is out to contrast national-liberalism (for it is absolutely indubitable and indisputable that Kautsky has become a national-liberal) with internationalism and Marxism. In reality, Potresov is contrasting *particoloured* national-liberalism with national-liberalism of a *single* colour, whereas Marxism is hostile—and in the present historical situation, absolutely hostile—to any kind of national-liberalism.

We shall now go on to show that such is the case, and why.

I

The highlight of Potresov's misadventures, which led to his setting out under a national-liberal flag, can be best understood if the reader examines the following passage in his article:

"With their characteristic temperament, they [Marx and his comrades] attacked the problem, no matter how difficult it was; they diagnosed the conflict, and attempted to determine *the success of which side* opened up broader vistas for possibilities desirable from their point of view; thus they laid down a certain basis on which to build their tactics" (p. 73, our italics in excerpts).

"The success of which side is more desirable"—this is what has to be determined, and that from an international, not a national point of view. This is the essence of the Marxist methodology. This is what Kautsky does not do, thus turning from a "judge" (a Marxist) into an "advocate" (a national-liberal). Such is Potresov's line of argument. Potresov himself is most deeply convinced that he is not "playing the advocate" when he defends the desirability of success for one side (namely, his own) and that, conversely, he is guided by truly international considerations with regard to the egregious sins of the other side.

Potresov, Maslov, Plekhanov, etc., who are all guided by truly international considerations, have reached the same conclusions as Potresov has. This is a simple-mindedness that borders on—well, we shall not make undue haste, but shall first complete an analysis of the purely theoretical question.

"The success of which side is more desirable" was established by Marx in the Italian war of 1859, for instance. Potresov dwells on this particular instance, which, he says, "has a special interest for us because of certain of its features". We too, for our part, are willing to take the instance chosen by Potresov.

In 1859 Napoleon III declared war on Austria, allegedly for the liberation of Italy, but in reality for his own dynastic aims.

"Behind the back of Napoleon III," says Potresov, "could be discerned the figure of Gorchakov, who had just signed a secret agreement with the Emperor of the French." What we have here is a tangle of contradictions: on the one side, the most reactionary European monarchy, which has been oppressing Italy; on the other, the representatives of revolutionary Italy, including Garibaldi, fighting for her liberation, side by side with the ultra-reactionary Napoleon III, etc.

"Would it not have been simpler," Potresov writes, "to step aside and to say that the two are equally bad? However, neither Engels, Marx, nor Lassalle were attracted by the 'simplicity' of such a solution, but started to search the problem [Potresov means to say, to study and explore the problem], of the particular outcome of the conflict which might provide the greatest opportunities for a cause dear to all three."

Lassalle notwithstanding, Marx and Engels came to the conclusion that Prussia must intervene. Among their considerations, as Potresov himself admits, was that "of the possibility, as a result of a conflict with the enemy coalition, of a national movement in Germany, which might develop over the heads of its numerous rulers; there was also the consideration as to which Power in the Concert of Europe was the main evil: the reactionary Danubian monarchy, or other outstanding representatives of this Concert".

"To us, it is not important who was right, Marx or Lassalle," Potresov concludes; "what is important is that all were agreed on the necessity of determining, from an international point of view, the success of which side was more desirable."

This is the instance cited by Potresov, and the way our author pursues the argument. If Marx was then able "to appraise international conflicts" (Potresov's expression), notwithstanding the highly reactionary character of the governments of *both* belligerent sides, then Marxists too are at present obliged to make a *similar* appraisal, Potresov concludes.

This conclusion is either naïve childishness or crass sophistry, since it boils down to the following: since, in 1859, Marx was working on the problem of the desirability of success for which particular bourgeoisie, we, over half a century later, must solve the problem in exactly the same way.

Potresov *has failed to notice* that, to Marx in 1859 (as well as in a number of later cases), the question of "the success of which side is more desirable" meant asking "the success of which *bourgeoisie* is more desirable". Potresov *has failed to notice* that Marx was working on the problem at a time when there existed indubitably *progressive bourgeois* movements, which moreover did not merely exist, but were

in the forefront of the historical process in the leading states of Europe. Today, it would be ridiculous even to imagine a progressive bourgeoisie, a progressive bourgeois movement, in, for instance, such key members of the "Concert" of Europe, as Britain and Germany. The old bourgeois "democracy" of these two key states has turned reactionary. Potresov has "forgotten" this, and has substituted the standpoint of the *old* (bourgeois) so-called democracy for that of *present-day* (non-bourgeois) democracy. This shift to the standpoint of another class, and moreover of an old and outmoded class, is sheer opportunism. There cannot be the least doubt that a shift like this cannot be justified by an analysis of the objective content of the historical process in the old and the new epochs.

It is the bourgeoisie—for instance in Germany, and in Britain too, for that matter—that endeavours to effect the kind of substitution accomplished by Potresov, viz., replacing of the imperialist epoch by that of bourgeois-progressive, national and democratic movements for liberation. Potresov is uncritically following in the wake of the bourgeoisie. This is the more unpardonable, since, in the instance he has selected, Potresov has himself been obliged to recognise and specify the considerations guiding Marx, Engels, and Lassalle in those bygone days.*

First of all, these were considerations on the *national* movement (in Germany and Italy)—on the latter's development over the heads of the "representatives of medievalism"; secondly, these were considerations on the "main evil" of

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* Incidentally Potresov refuses to make up his mind as to whether Marx or Lassalle was right in appraising the conditions of the war of 1859. We think that (Mehring notwithstanding) Marx was right, whereas Lassalle was then an opportunist, just as he was during his flirtation with Bismarck. Lassalle was adapting himself to the victory of Prussia and Bismarck, to the lack of sufficient strength in the democratic national movements of Italy and Germany. Thus Lassalle deviated towards a national-liberal labour policy, whereas Marx encouraged and developed an independent, consistently democratic policy hostile to national-liberal cowardice (Prussia's intervention in 1859 against Napoleon would have stimulated the popular movement in Germany). Lassalle was casting glances, not downwards but upwards, as he was fascinated by Bismarck. Bismarck's "success" was no justification of Lassalle's opportunism.

the reactionary monarchies (the Austrian, the Napoleonic, etc.) in the Concert of Europe.

These considerations are perfectly clear and indisputable. Marxists have never denied the progressiveness of bourgeois national-liberation movements against feudal and absolutist forces. Potresov cannot but know that *nothing like this* does or can exist in the major, i.e., the leading rival states of today. In those days there existed, both in Italy and in Germany, popular national-liberation movements with *decades* of struggle behind them. In those days the Western bourgeoisie did not give financial support to certain other states; on the contrary, those states were *really* "the main evil". Potresov cannot but know—as he admits in the same article—that today *none* of the other states is or can be the "main evil".

The bourgeoisie (in Germany, for instance, though not in that country alone) is, for selfish reasons, encouraging the ideology of national movements, attempting to translate that ideology into the epoch of imperialism, i.e., an entirely different epoch. As usual, the opportunists are plodding along in the rear of the bourgeoisie, *abandoning* the standpoint of *present-day* democracy and shifting over to that of the *old* (bourgeois) democracy. That is the chief shortcoming in all the articles, as well as in the entire position and the entire line of Potresov and his liquidationist fellow-thinkers. At the time of the *old* (bourgeois) democracy Marx and Engels were working on the problem of the desirability of success for which particular bourgeoisie; they were concerned with a modestly liberal movement developing into a tempestuously democratic one. In the period of *present-day* (non-bourgeois) democracy, Potresov is preaching bourgeois national-liberalism at a time when one cannot even imagine bourgeois progressive movements, whether modestly liberal or tempestuously democratic, in Britain, Germany, or France. Marx and Engels were *ahead* of *their* epoch, that of bourgeois-national progressive movements; they wanted to give an impetus to *such* movements so that they might develop "over the heads" of the representatives of medievalism.

Like all social-chauvinists, Potresov is moving backwards, away from his *own* period, that of present-day democ-

racy, and skipping over to the outworn, dead, and therefore intrinsically false viewpoint of the old (bourgeois) democracy.

That is why Potresov's following appeal to democracy reveals his muddled thinking and is highly reactionary:

"Do not retreat, but advance, not towards individualism, but towards internationalist consciousness in all its integrity and all its vigour. To advance means, in a certain sense, to go also back—back to Engels, Marx, and Lassalle, to their method of appraising international conflicts, and to their finding it possible to utilise inter-state relations for democratic purposes."

Potresov drags present-day democracy *backwards*, not "in a certain sense" but in all senses; he drags it back to the slogans and the ideology of the old bourgeois democracy, to the dependence of the masses upon the bourgeoisie.... Marx's method consists, first of all, in taking due account of the *objective* content of a historical process at a given moment, in definite and concrete conditions; this in order to realise, in the first place, the movement of *which* class is the mainspring of the progress possible in those concrete conditions. In 1859, it was not imperialism that comprised the objective content of the historical process in continental Europe, but national-bourgeois movements for liberation. The mainspring was the movement of the bourgeoisie against the feudal and absolutist forces. Fifty-five years later, when the place of the old and reactionary feudal lords has been taken by the not unsimilar finance capital tycoons of the decrepit bourgeoisie, the knowledgeable Potresov is out to appraise international conflicts from the standpoint of the *bourgeoisie*, *not of the new class*.*

Potresov has not given proper thought to the significance of the truth he uttered in the above words. Let us suppose that two countries are at war in the epoch of bourgeois, national-liberation movements. Which country should we wish success to from the standpoint of present-day

* "Indeed," Potresov writes, "it was during that period of seeming stagnation that tremendous molecular processes were taking place in every country; the international situation too was gradually changing, the policy of colonial acquisitions, of militant imperialism becoming its *determining* feature."

democracy? Obviously, to that country whose success will give a greater impetus to the bourgeoisie's liberation movement, make its development more speedy, and undermine feudalism the more decisively. Let us further suppose that the *determining* feature of the objective historical situation has changed, and that the place of capital striving for national liberation has been taken by international, reactionary and imperialist finance capital. The former country, let us say, possesses three-fourths of Africa, whereas the latter possesses one-fourth. A repartition of Africa is the objective content of their war. To which side should we wish success? It would be absurd to state the problem in its previous form, since we do not possess the old criteria of appraisal: there is neither a bourgeois liberation movement running into decades, nor a long process of the decay of feudalism. It is not the business of present-day democracy either to help the former country to assert its "right" to three-fourths of Africa, or to help the latter country (even if it is developing economically more rapidly than the former) to take over those three-fourths.

Present-day democracy will remain true to itself only if it joins neither one nor the other imperialist bourgeoisie, only if it says that the two sides are equally bad, and if it wishes the defeat of the imperialist bourgeoisie in every country. Any other decision will, in reality, be national-liberal and have nothing in common with genuine internationalism.

The reader should not let himself be deceived by the pretentious terminology Potresov employs to conceal his switch over to the standpoint of the bourgeoisie. When Potresov exclaims: "...not towards individualism, but towards internationalist consciousness in all its integrity and all its vigour", his aim is to contrast his own point of view with that of Kautsky. He calls the latter's view (and that of others like him) "individualism", because of Kautsky's refusal to decide "the success of which side is more desirable", and his justification of the workers' national-liberalism in each "individual" country. We, on the contrary, he, as it were, says, we—Potresov, Cherevanin, Maslov,

Plekhanov, and others—appeal to "internationalist consciousness in all its integrity and all its vigour", for we stand for national-liberalism of a definite shade, in no way from the standpoint of an individual state (or an individual nation) but from a standpoint that is genuinely internationalist. This line of reasoning would be ridiculous if it were not so—disgraceful.

Both Potresov and Co. and Kautsky, who have betrayed the standpoint of the class which they are trying hard to represent, are following in the wake of the bourgeoisie.

II

Potresov has entitled his article "At the Juncture of Two Epochs". We are undoubtedly living at the juncture of two epochs, and the historic events that are unfolding before our eyes can be understood only if we analyse, in the first place, the objective conditions of the transition from one epoch to the other. Here we have important historical epochs; in each of them there are and will always be individual and partial movements, now forward now backward; there are and will always be various deviations from the average type and mean tempo of the movement. We cannot know how rapidly and how successfully the various historical movements in a given epoch will develop, but we can and do know *which class* stands at the hub of one epoch or another, determining its main content, the main direction of its development, the main characteristics of the historical situation in that epoch, etc. Only on that basis, i.e., by taking into account, in the first place, the fundamental distinctive features of the various "epochs" (and not single episodes in the history of individual countries), can we correctly evolve our tactics; only a knowledge of the basic features of a given epoch can serve as the foundation for an understanding of the specific features of one country or another.

It is to this region that both Potresov's and Kautsky's main sophism, or their fundamental historical error, pertains (Kautsky's article was published in the same issue of *Nashe Dyelo*), an error which has led both of them to national-liberal, not Marxist, conclusions.

The trouble is that the instance chosen by Potresov, which has presented a "special interest" to him, namely, the instance of the Italian campaign of 1859, as well as a number of *similar* historical instances quoted by Kautsky, "*in no way pertain to those* historical epochs", "at the juncture" of which we are living. Let us call the epoch we are entering (or have entered, and which is in its initial stage) the present-day (or third) epoch. Let us call that which we have just emerged from the epoch of yesterday (or the second). In that case we shall have to call the epoch from which Potresov and Kautsky cite their instances, the day-before-yesterday (or first) epoch. Both Potresov's and Kautsky's revolting sophistry, the intolerable falseness of their arguments, consist in their substituting for the conditions of the present-day (or third) epoch the conditions of the day-before-yesterday (or first) epoch.

I shall try to explain what I mean.

The usual division into historical epochs, so often cited in Marxist literature and so many times repeated by Kautsky and adopted in Potresov's article, is the following: (1) 1789-1871; (2) 1871-1914; (3) 1914—? Here, of course, as everywhere in Nature and society, the lines of division are conventional and variable, relative, not absolute. We take the most outstanding and striking historical events only approximately, as milestones in important historical movements. The first epoch from the Great French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian war is one of the rise of the bourgeoisie, of its triumph, of the bourgeoisie on the upgrade, an epoch of bourgeois-democratic movements in general and of bourgeois-national movements in particular, an epoch of the rapid breakdown of the obsolete feudal-absolutist institutions. The second epoch is that of the full domination and decline of the bourgeoisie, one of transition from its progressive character towards reactionary and even ultra-reactionary finance capital. This is an epoch in which a new class—present-day democracy—is preparing and slowly mustering its forces. The third epoch, which has just set in, places the bourgeoisie in the same "position" as that in which the feudal lords found themselves during the first epoch. This is the epoch of imperialism and imperialist upheavals, as well as of upheavals stemming from the nature of imperialism.

It was none other than Kautsky who, in a series of articles and in his pamphlet *Der Weg zur Macht* (which appeared in 1909), outlined with full clarity the basic features of the third epoch that has set in, and who noted the fundamental differences between this epoch and the second (that of yesterday), and recognised the change in the immediate tasks as well as in the conditions and forms of struggle of present-day democracy, a change stemming from the changed objective historical conditions. Kautsky is now burning that which he worshipped yesterday; his change of front is most incredible, most unbecoming and most shameless. In the above-mentioned pamphlet, he spoke forthrightly of symptoms of an approaching war, and specifically of the kind of war that became a fact in 1914. It would suffice simply to place side by side for comparison a number of passages from that pamphlet and from his present writings to show convincingly how Kautsky has betrayed his own convictions and solemn declarations. In this respect Kautsky is not an individual instance (or even a German instance); he is a typical representative of the entire upper crust of present-day democracy, which, at a moment of crisis, has deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie.

All the historical instances quoted by Potresov and Kautsky belong to the first epoch. The main objective content of the historical wartime phenomena, not only of 1855, 1859, 1864, 1866, or 1870, but also of 1877 (the Russo-Turkish war) and 1896-1897 (the wars between Turkey and Greece and the Armenian disturbances) were bourgeois-national movements or "convulsions" in a, bourgeois society ridding itself of every kind of feudalism. At that time there could have been no possibility of really independent action by present-day democracy, action of the kind befitting the epoch of the over-maturity, and decay of the bourgeoisie, in a number of leading countries. The bourgeoisie was then the chief class, which was on the upgrade as a result of its participation in those wars; it alone could come out with overwhelming force against the feudal-absolutist institutions. Represented by various strata of *propertied* producers of commodities, this bourgeoisie was progressive in various degrees in the different countries,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

sometimes (like part of the Italian bourgeoisie in 1859) being even revolutionary. The general feature of the epoch, however, was the progressiveness of the bourgeoisie, i.e., its unresolved and uncompleted struggle against feudalism. It was perfectly natural for the elements of present-day democracy, and for Marx as their representative, to have been guided at the time by the unquestionable principle of support for the progressive bourgeoisie (i.e., capable of waging a struggle) against feudalism, and for them to be dealing with the problem as to "the success of which side", i.e., of *which* bourgeoisie, was more desirable. The popular movement in the principal countries affected by the war was generally democratic at that time, i.e., bourgeois-democratic in its economic and class content. It is quite natural that *no other* question could have been posed at the time except the following: the success of *which* bourgeoisie, the success of which combination of forces, the failure of which reactionary forces (the feudal-absolutist forces which were hampering the rise of the bourgeoisie) promised contemporary democracy more "elbow room".

As even Potresov has had to admit, Marx was guided, in his "appraisal" of international conflicts springing from bourgeois national and liberation movements, by considerations as to whose success was more capable of contributing to the "development" (p. 74 of Potresov's article) of national and, in general, popular democratic movements. That means that, during military conflicts stemming from the bourgeoisie's rise to power within the various nationalities, Marx was, as in 1848, most of all concerned with extending the scope of the bourgeois-democratic movement and bringing it to a head through the participation of broader and more "plebeian" masses, the petty bourgeoisie in general, the peasantry in particular, and finally of the poor classes as a whole. This concern of Marx for the extension of the movement's social base and its development is the fundamental distinction between Marx's consistently democratic tactics and Lassalle's inconsistent tactics, which veered towards an alliance with the national-liberals.

The international conflicts in the third epoch have, in *form*, remained the same kind of international conflicts as those of the first epoch, but their social and class *content* has

changed radically. The objective historical situation has grown quite different.

The place of the struggle of a rising capital, striving towards national liberation from feudalism, has been taken by the struggle waged against the new forces by the most reactionary finance capital, the struggle of a force that has exhausted and outlived itself and is heading downward towards decay. The bourgeois-national state framework, which in the first epoch was the mainstay of the *development* of the productive forces of a humanity that was liberating itself from feudalism, has now, in the third epoch, become a *hindrance* to the further development of the productive forces. From a rising and progressive class the bourgeoisie has turned into a declining, decadent, and reactionary class. It is quite another class that is now on the upgrade on a broad historical scale.

Potresov and Kautsky have abandoned the standpoint of that class; they have turned back, repeating the false bourgeois assertion that *today too* the objective content of the historical process consists in the bourgeoisie's progressive movement against feudalism. In reality, there can now be no talk of *present-day* democracy following in the wake of the *reactionary* imperialist bourgeoisie, no matter of what "shade" the latter may be.

In the first epoch, the objective and historical task was to ascertain how, in its struggle against the *chief* representatives of a dying feudalism, the progressive bourgeoisie should "utilise" international conflicts so as to bring the greatest possible advantage to the entire democratic bourgeoisie of the world. In the first epoch, over half a century ago, it was natural and inevitable that the bourgeoisie, enslaved by feudalism, should wish the defeat of its "own" feudal oppressor, all the more so that the principal and central feudal strongholds of all-European importance were not so numerous at the time. This is how Marx "appraised" the conflicts: he ascertained in which country, in a given and concrete situation, the success of the bourgeois-liberation movement was more *important* in undermining the *all-European* feudal stronghold.

At present, in the third epoch, no feudal fortresses of all-European significance remain. Of course, it is the task of

present-day democracy to "utilise" conflicts, but—despite Potresov and Kautsky—this *international* utilisation must be directed, not against individual national finance capital, but against international finance capital. The utilisation should not be effected by a class which was on the ascendant fifty or a hundred years ago. At that time it was a question of "international action" (Potresov's expression) by the most advanced bourgeois democracy; today it is another class that is confronted by a similar task created by history and advanced by the objective state of affairs.

III

The second epoch or, as Potresov puts it, "a span of forty-five years" (1870-1914), is characterised very inconclusively by him. The same incompleteness is the shortcoming in Trotsky's characterisation of the same period, given in his German work, although he does not agree with Potresov's practical conclusions (this, of course, standing to the former's credit). Both writers hardly realise the reason for their standing so close to each other, in a certain sense.

Here is what Potresov writes of this epoch, which we have called the second, that of yesterday:

"A detailed restriction of work and the struggle and an all-pervading gradualism—these signs of the times, which by some have been elevated to a principle, have become to others an ordinary fact in their lives, and, as such, have become part of their mentality, a shade of their ideology" (p. 71). "Its [this epoch's] talent for a smooth and cautious advance had, as its reverse, firstly, a pronounced non-adaptability to any break in gradualness and to catastrophic phenomena of any kind and secondly, an exceptional isolation within the sphere of national action—the national milieu..." (p. 72). "Neither revolution, nor war..." (p. 70). "Democracy became the more effectively nationalist, the longer the period of its 'position warfare' was protracted and the longer there lingered on the stage that spell of European history which ... knew of no international conflicts in the heart of Europe, and consequently

experienced no unrest extending beyond the boundaries of national state territories, and felt no keen interest on a general European or world scale" (75-76).

The chief shortcoming in this characterisation, as in Trotsky's characterisation of the same epoch, is a reluctance to discern and recognise the deep contradictions in modern democracy, which has developed on the foundation described above. The impression is produced that the democracy contemporary with the epoch under review remained a single whole, which, generally speaking, was pervaded with gradualism, turned nationalist, was by degrees weaned away from breaks in gradualness and from catastrophes, and grew petty and mildewed.

In reality this could not have happened, since, side by side with the aforesaid tendencies, other and reverse tendencies were undoubtedly operating: the day-by-day life of the working masses was undergoing an internationalisation—the cities were attracting ever more inhabitants, and living conditions in the large cities of the whole world were being levelled out; capital was becoming internationalised, and at the big factories townsmen and countryfolk, both native and alien, were intermingling. The class contradictions were growing ever more acute; the employers' associations were exercising ever greater pressure on the workers' unions; sharper and more bitter forms of struggle were arising, as, for instance, mass strikes; the cost of living was rising; the pressure of finance capital was becoming intolerable, etc., etc.

In actual fact, events *did not follow* the pattern described by Potresov. This we know definitely. In the period under discussion, none, literally not one, of the leading capitalist countries of Europe was spared by the struggle between the two mutually opposed currents within contemporary democracy. In each of the big countries, this struggle at times assumed most violent forms, including splits, this despite the general "peaceful", "sluggish", and somnolent character of the epoch. These contradictory currents have affected all the various fields of life and all problems of modern democracy without exception, such as the attitude towards the bourgeoisie, alliances with the liberals, the voting for war credits, the attitude towards such matters as

colonial policies, reforms, the character of economic struggle, the neutrality of the trade unions, etc.

"All-pervading gradualism" was in no way the predominant sentiment in all contemporary democracy, as the writings of Potresov and Trotsky imply. No, this gradualism was taking shape as a definite political trend, which at the time often produced individual groups, and sometimes even individual parties, of modern democracy in Europe. That trend had its own leaders, its press organs, its policy, and its own particular—and specially organised—method of influencing the masses of the population. Moreover, this trend was more and more basing itself—and ultimately based itself solidly—on the interests of a definite social stratum *within* the democracy of the time.

"All-pervading gradualism" naturally attracted into the ranks of that democracy a number of petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers; furthermore, the specifically petty-bourgeois conditions, and consequently, a petty-bourgeois political orientation, became the rule with a definite stratum of parliamentarians, journalists, and trade union officials; a kind of bureaucracy and aristocracy of the working class was arising in a manner more or less pronounced and clear-cut.

Take, for instance, the possession of colonies and the expansion of colonial possessions. These were undoubted features of the period dealt with above, and with the majority of big states. What did that mean in the economic sense? It meant a sum of super-profits and special privileges for the bourgeoisie. It meant, moreover, the possibility of enjoying crumbs from this big cake for a small minority of the petty bourgeois, as well as for the better-placed employees, officials of the labour movement, etc. The enjoyment of crumbs of advantage from the colonies, from privileges, by an insignificant minority of the working class in Britain, for instance, is an established fact, recognised and pointed out by Marx and Engels. Formerly confined to Britain alone, this phenomenon became common to all the great capitalist countries of Europe, as their colonial possessions expanded, and in general as the imperialist period of capitalism grew and developed.

In a word, the "all-pervading gradualism" of the second epoch (the one of yesterday) has created, not only a certain

"non-adaptability to any break in gradualness", as Potresov thinks, not only certain "possibilist" tendencies, as Trotsky supposes, but an entire opportunist *trend* based on a definite social stratum within present-day democracy, and linked with the bourgeoisie of its own national "shade" by numerous ties of common economic, social, and political interests—a trend directly, openly, consciously, and systematically hostile to any idea of a "break in gradualness".

A number of Trotsky's tactical and organisational errors (to say nothing of Potresov's) spring from his fear, or his reluctance, or inability to recognise the fact of the "maturity" achieved by the opportunist trend, and also its intimate and unbreakable link with the national-liberals (or social-nationalists) of our times. In practice, this failure to recognise this "maturity" and this unbreakable link leads, at least, to absolute confusion and helplessness in the face of the predominant social-nationalist (or national-liberal) evil.

The link between opportunism and social-nationalism is, generally speaking, denied by Potresov, by Martov, Axelrod, V. Kosovsky (who has talked himself into defending the German democrats' national-liberal vote for war credits) and by Trotsky.

Their main "argument" is that no full coincidence exists between yesterday's division of democracy "along the line of opportunism" and today's division "along the line of social-nationalism". This argument is, firstly, incorrect in point of fact, as we shall presently show; secondly, it is absolutely one-sided, incomplete and untenable from the standpoint of Marxist principles. Persons and groups may shift from one side to the other; that is not only possible, but even inevitable in any great social upheaval; however, it does not at all affect the nature of a definite *trend*, or the ideological links between definite trends, or their *class* significance. All these considerations might seem so generally known and indisputable that one feels almost embarrassed at having to lay such emphasis on them. Yet the above-mentioned writers have lost sight of these very considerations. The fundamental class significance of opportunism—or, in other words, its social-economic content—lies in certain elements of present-day democracy

having gone over (in fact, though perhaps unconsciously) to the bourgeoisie, on a number of individual issues. Opportunism is tantamount to a liberal-labour policy. Anyone who is fearful of the "factional" look of these words would do well to go to the trouble of studying the opinions of Marx, Engels, and Kautsky (is the latter not an "authority" highly suitable to the opponents of "factionalism"?) on, let us say, British opportunism. There cannot be the slightest doubt that such a study would lead to a recognition of the coincidence of fundamentals between opportunism and a liberal-labour policy. The basic class significance of today's social-nationalism is exactly the same. The fundamental idea of opportunism is an alliance or a drawing together (sometimes an agreement, bloc, or the like) between the bourgeoisie and its antipode. The fundamental idea of social-nationalism is exactly the same. The ideological and political affinity, connection, and even identity between opportunism and social-nationalism are beyond doubt. Naturally, we must take as our basis, not individuals or groups, but a *class* analysis of the content of social *trends*, and an ideological and political examination of their essential and main principles.

Approaching the same subject from a somewhat different angle, we shall ask: *whence* did social-nationalism appear? How did it grow and mature? *What* gave it significance and strength? He who has been unable to find answers to these questions has completely failed to understand what social-nationalism is, and is consequently quite incapable of drawing an "ideological line" between himself and social-nationalism, no matter how vehemently he may assert that he is ready to do so.

There can be only one answer to this question: social-nationalism has developed from opportunism, and it was the latter that gave it strength. How could social-nationalism have appeared "all of a sudden"? In the same fashion as a babe appears "all of a sudden" if nine months have elapsed since its conception. Each of the numerous manifestations of opportunism during the entire second (or yesterday) epoch in all the European countries was a rivulet, which now flowed "all of a sudden" into a big though very shallow (and, we might add parenthetically, muddy and dirty)

river of social-nationalism. Nine months after conception the babe must separate from its mother; many decades after opportunism was conceived, social-nationalism, its ripe fruit, will have to separate from present-day democracy within a period that is more or less brief (as compared with decades). No matter how good people may scold, rage or vociferate over such ideas and words, this is inevitable, since it follows from the entire social development of present-day democracy and from the objective conditions in the third epoch.

But if division "along the line of opportunism" and division "along the line of social-nationalism" do not fully coincide, does that not prove that no substantial link exists between these two facts? It does not, in the first place, just as the fact that individual bourgeois at the end of the eighteenth century went over either to the side of the feudal lords or that of the people does not prove that there was "no link" between the growth of the bourgeoisie and the Great French Revolution of 1789. Secondly, taken by and large, there *is* such a coincidence (and we are speaking only in a general sense and of movements as a whole). Take, not one individual country but a number of them, let us say ten European countries: Germany, *Britain*, *France*, *Belgium*, Russia, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, and Bulgaria. Only the three countries given in italics may seem the exceptions. In the others, the *trends* of uncompromising antagonists to opportunism have given birth to *trends* hostile to social-nationalism. Compare the well-known *Monatshefte* and its opponents in Germany, *Nashe Dyelo* and its opponents in Russia, the party of Bissolati and its opponents in Italy, the adherents of Greulich and Grimm in Switzerland, Branting and Höglund in Sweden, and Troelstra, Pannekoek and Gorter in Holland, and finally the *Obshcho Dyelo* adherents and the *Tesnyaki* in Bulgaria.[90] The general coincidence between the old and the new division is a fact; as for complete coincidences, they do not occur even in the simplest of natural phenomena, any more than there is complete coincidence between the Volga before the Kama joins it, and the Volga below that point; neither is there full similarity between a child and its parents. Britain only seems the exception; in reality, there

were two main currents in Britain prior to the war, these being identified with two *dailies*—which is the truest objective indication of the mass character of these currents—namely, the *Daily Citizen*,[91] the opportunists' newspaper, and the *Daily Herald*,[92] the organ of the opponents of opportunism. Both papers have been swamped by the wave of nationalism; yet, opposition has been expressed by under one-tenth of the former's adherents and by some three-sevenths of the adherents of the latter. The usual method of comparison, whereby only the British Socialist Party is compared with the Independent Labour Party, is erroneous because it overlooks the existence of an *actual* bloc of the latter with the Fabians[93] and the Labour Party. It follows, then, that only two out of the ten countries are exceptions, but even here the exceptions are not complete, since the trends have not changed places; only (for reasons so obvious that they need not be dwelt on) the wave has swamped almost all the opponents of opportunism. This undoubtedly proves the strength of the wave, but it does not in any way disprove coincidence between the old division and the new for all Europe.

We are told that division "along the line of opportunism" is outmoded, and that only one division is of significance, namely, that between the adherents of internationalism and the adherents of national self-sufficiency. This opinion is fundamentally wrong. The concept of "adherents of internationalism" is devoid of all content and meaning, if we do not *concretely* amplify it; any step towards such concrete amplification, however, will be an enumeration of features of hostility to opportunism. In practice, this will prove truer still. An adherent of internationalism who is not at the same time a most consistent and determined adversary of opportunism is a phantom, nothing more. Perhaps certain individuals of this type will honestly consider themselves "internationalists". However, people are judged, not by what they think of themselves but by their political behaviour. The political behaviour of "internationalists" who are not consistent and determined adversaries of opportunism will always aid and abet the nationalist trend. On the other hand, nationalists, too, call themselves "internationalists" (Kautsky, Lensch, Haenisch, Vandervelde,

Hyndman, and others); not only do they call themselves so, but they fully acknowledge an international *rapprochement*, an agreement, a union of persons sharing their views. The opportunists *are not against* "internationalism"; they are only in favour of international approval for and international agreement among the opportunists.

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THE CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. GROUPS ABROAD[94]

Held in Switzerland, a conference of the R.S.D.L.P. groups whose members are resident abroad concluded its work several days ago. Besides discussing purely foreign affairs, which we shall try briefly to comment on in the next issues of the Central Organ, the conference framed resolutions on the important and burning question of the war. We are publishing these resolutions forthwith, in the hope that they will prove of use to all Social-Democrats who are earnestly seeking the way towards live work from the present-day welter of opinions which boil down to an acknowledgement of internationalism in word, and an urge to come to terms at any cost with social-chauvinism in deed. We might add that, on the question of the "United States of Europe" slogan, the discussion was purely political, it being decided that the question be deferred pending a discussion, in the press, of the *economic* aspect of the matter.

THE CONFERENCE'S RESOLUTIONS

The conference, which stands on the basis of the Central Committee's Manifesto, as published in No. 33,* lays down the following principles designed to bring system into propaganda:

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* See pp. 25-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ON THE CHARACTER OF THE WAR

The present war is imperialist in character. This war is the outcome of conditions in an epoch in which capitalism has reached the highest stage in its development; in which the greatest significance attaches, not only to the export of commodities, but also to the export of capital; an epoch in which the cartelisation of production and the internationalisation of economic life have assumed impressive proportions, colonial policies have brought about the almost complete partition of the globe, world capitalism's productive forces have outgrown the limited boundaries of national and state divisions, and the objective conditions are perfectly ripe for socialism to be achieved.

THE "DEFENCE OF THE FATHERLAND" SLOGAN

The present war is, in substance, a struggle between Britain, France and Germany for the partition of colonies and for the plunder of rival countries; on the part of tsarism and the ruling classes of Russia, it is an attempt to seize Persia, Mongolia, Turkey in Asia, Constantinople, Galicia, etc. The national element in the Austro-Serbian war is an entirely secondary consideration and does not affect the general imperialist character of the war.

The entire economic and diplomatic history of the last few decades shows that both groups of belligerent nations were systematically preparing the very kind of war such as the present. The question of which group dealt the first military blow or first declared war is immaterial in any determination of the tactics of socialists. Both sides' phrases on the defence of the fatherland, resistance to enemy invasion, a war of defence, etc., are nothing but deception of the people.

At the bottom of genuinely national wars, such as took place especially between 1789 and 1871, was a long process of mass national movements, of a struggle against absolutism and feudalism, the overthrow of national oppression, and the formation of states on a national basis, as a prerequisite of capitalist development.

The national ideology created by that epoch left a deep impress on the mass of the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the proletariat. This is now being utilised in a totally different and imperialist epoch by the sophists of the bourgeoisie, and by the traitors to socialism who are following in their wake, so as to split the workers, and divert them from their class aims and from the revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie.

The words in the *Communist Manifesto* that "the workingmen have no country" are today truer than ever before. Only the proletariat's international struggle against the bourgeoisie can preserve what it has won, and open to the oppressed masses the road to a better future.

THE SLOGANS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

"The conversion of the present imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan, one that follows from the experience of the Commune, and outlined in the Basle resolution (1912); it has been dictated by all the conditions of an imperialist war between highly developed bourgeois countries."*

Civil war, for which revolutionary Social-Democracy today calls, is an armed struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, for the expropriation of the capitalist class in the advanced capitalist countries, and for a democratic revolution in Russia (a democratic republic, an eight-hour working day, the confiscation of the landowners' estates), for a republic to be formed in the backward monarchist countries in general, etc.

The appalling misery of the masses, which has been created by the war, cannot fail to evoke revolutionary sentiments and movements. The civil war slogan must serve to co-ordinate and direct such sentiments and movements.

The organisation of the working class has been badly damaged. Nevertheless, a revolutionary crisis is maturing. After the war, the ruling classes of all countries will make a still greater effort to throw the proletariat's emancipation movement back for decades. The task of the revolu-

* See p. 34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tionary Social-Democrats—both in the event of a rapid revolutionary development and in that of a protracted crisis, will not consist in renouncing lengthy and day-by-day work, or in discarding any of the old methods of the class struggle. To direct both the parliamentary and the economic struggle against opportunism, in the spirit of revolutionary struggle of the masses—such will be the task.

The following should be indicated as the first steps towards converting the present imperialist war into a civil war: (1) an absolute refusal to vote for war credits, and resignation from bourgeois governments; (2) a complete break with the policy of a class truce (*bloc national*, *Burgfrieden*); (3) formation of an underground organisation wherever the governments and the bourgeoisie abolish constitutional liberties by introducing martial law; (4) support for fraternisation between soldiers of the belligerent nations, in the trenches and on battlefields in general; (5) support for every kind of revolutionary mass action by the proletariat in general.

OPPORTUNISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

The collapse of the Second International is the collapse of socialist opportunism. The latter has grown as a product of the preceding "peaceful" period in the development of the labour movement. That period taught the working class to utilise such important means of struggle as parliamentarianism and all legal opportunities, create mass economic and political organisations, a widespread labour press, etc.; on the other hand, the period engendered a tendency to repudiate the class struggle and to preach a class truce, repudiate the socialist revolution, repudiate the very principle of illegal organisations, recognise bourgeois patriotism, etc. Certain strata of the working class (the bureaucracy of the labour movement and the labour aristocracy, who get a fraction of the profits from the exploitation of the colonies and from the privileged position of their "fatherlands" in the world market), as well as petty-bourgeois sympathisers within the socialist parties, have proved the social mainstay of these tendencies and channels of bourgeois influence over the proletariat.

The baneful influence of opportunism has made itself felt most strongly in the policies of most of the official Social-Democratic parties of the Second International during the war. Voting for war credits, participation in governments, the policy of a class truce, the repudiation of an illegal organisation when legality has been rescinded—all this is a violation of the International's most important decisions, and a downright betrayal of socialism.

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

The war-created crisis has exposed the real essence of opportunism as the bourgeoisie's accomplice against the proletariat. The so-called Social-Democratic "Centre", headed by Kautsky, has in practice completely slid into opportunism, behind a cover of exceedingly harmful and hypocritical phrases and a Marxism falsified to resemble imperialism. Experience shows that in Germany, for instance, a defence of the socialist standpoint has been possible only by resolute opposition to the will of the majority of the Party leadership. It would be a harmful illusion to hope that a genuinely socialist International can be restored without a full organisational severance from the opportunists.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party must support all and every international and revolutionary mass action by the proletariat, and strive to bring together all anti-chauvinist elements in the International.

PACIFISM AND THE PEACE SLOGAN

Pacifism, the preaching of peace in the abstract, is one of the means of duping the working class. Under capitalism, particularly in its imperialist stage, wars are inevitable. On the other hand, however, Social-Democrats cannot overlook the positive significance of revolutionary wars, i.e., not imperialist wars, but such as were fought, for instance, between 1789 and 1871, with the aim of doing away with national oppression, and creating national capitalist states out of the feudal decentralised states, or such wars

that may be waged to defend the conquests of the proletariat victorious in its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

At the present time, the propaganda of peace unaccompanied by a call for revolutionary mass action can only sow illusions and demoralise the proletariat, for it makes the proletariat believe that the bourgeoisie is humane, and turns it into a plaything in the hands of the secret diplomacy of the belligerent countries. In particular, the idea of a so-called democratic peace being possible without a series of revolutions is profoundly erroneous.

THE DEFEAT OF THE TSARIST MONARCHY

In each country, the struggle against a government that is waging an imperialist war should not falter at the possibility of that country's defeat as a result of revolutionary propaganda. The defeat of the government's army weakens the government, promotes the liberation of the nationalities it oppresses, and facilitates civil war against the ruling classes.

This holds particularly true in respect of Russia. A victory for Russia will bring in its train a strengthening of reaction, both throughout the world and within the country, and will be accompanied by the complete enslavement of the peoples living in areas already seized. In view of this, we consider the defeat of Russia the lesser evil in all conditions.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER PARTIES AND GROUPS

The war, which has engendered a spate of chauvinism, has revealed that the democratic (Narodnik) intelligentsia, the party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (with complete instability of the oppositional trend, which is centred in *Mysl*), and the main group of liquidators (*Nasha Zarya*) which is supported by Plekhanov, are all in the grip of chauvinism. In practice, the Organising Committee is also on the side of chauvinism, beginning with Larin and Martov's camouflaged support of chauvinism and ending with Axelrod's defence of the principle of patriotism; so is the Bund, in which a Germanophile chauvinism prevails. The Brussels bloc (of July 3, 1914) has disintegrated, while the elements

that are grouped around *Nashe Slovo* are vacillating between a Platonic sympathy with internationalism and a striving for unity, at any price, with *Nasha Zarya* and the Organising Committee. The same vacillation is manifest in Chkheidze's Social-Democratic group. The latter has, on the one hand, expelled the Plekhanovite, i.e., the chauvinist, Mankov; on the other hand, it wishes to cover up, by all possible means, the chauvinism of Plekhanov, *Nasha Zarya*, Axelrod, the Bund, etc.

It is the task of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia to consolidate the proletarian unity created in 1912-14, mainly by *Pravda*,[95] and to re-establish the Social-Democratic Party organisations of the working class, on the basis of a decisive organisational break with the social-chauvinists. Temporary agreements are possible only with those Social-Democrats who stand for a decisive organisational rupture with the Organising Committee, *Nasha Zarya* and the Bund.

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LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TO THE EDITORS OF *NASHE SLOVO*[96]

Dear Comrades:

We fully agree with you that the rallying of all genuine Social-Democratic internationalists is one of the most pressing tasks of the moment.... Before replying to your practical proposal, we consider it necessary to clarify with frankness certain preliminary questions, so as to know whether we are at one in the main issue. You are quite right in feeling indignant about Alexinsky, Plekhanov and the like having come out in the foreign press, claiming that theirs is "the voice of the Russian proletariat or of influential groups therein". This *must* be fought against. To carry on the struggle, the root of the evil has to be got at. There cannot be the least doubt that there has not been, and there is not, any greater vice than the so-called system of representation of the notorious "trends" abroad. In this we can hardly lay the blame on the foreigners. Let us recall the recent past. Were not Alexinsky and Plekhanov (and not these two alone) given the opportunity, at the selfsame Brussels Conference (July 3, 1914), to depict themselves as "trends"? After this, can it be surprising that even now foreigners take them for representatives of "trends"? This evil cannot be countered with the aid of some declaration or another. What is needed is a long struggle. For that struggle to be successful, we must say to ourselves, once and for all, that we recognise only those *organisations* which for years have been linked up with the working masses, and have been empowered by recognised committees, etc., and

that we brand, as deception of the workers, a system under which a half-dozen intellectuals who have brought out two or three issues of a newspaper or journal declare themselves a "trend", or lay claim to "equal rights" with the Party.

Does agreement exist between us on this, comrades?

Then, about the internationalists. In one of your recent editorials, you enumerated those organisations which, in your opinion, hold an internationalist stand. High on that list is—the Bund. We would like to know what grounds you have to number the Bund among the internationalists. The resolution of its Central Committee does not contain a single definite word on the major problems of socialism. It breathes a most unprincipled eclecticism. The Bund's organ (*Information Bulletin*[97]) indubitably adheres to the standpoint of Germanophile chauvinism, or else gives a "synthesis" of French and German chauvinism. It was with good reason that an article by Kosovsky adorned the pages of *Die Neue Zeit*, a journal which (we hope you agree with us on this) is now among the most disreputable of the so-called "socialist" press organs.

We stand heart and soul for unity among all internationalists. We would very much like their number to be greater. We must not, however, go in for self-deception; we cannot count among the internationalists people and organisations whose internationalism exists only on paper.

What should be understood by internationalism? Is it, for instance, possible to number among the internationalists those who stand for the International being restored on the principle of a mutual "amnesty"? As you know, Kautsky is the leading representative of the "amnesty" theory. Victor Adler has come out in the same vein. We consider the adherents of an amnesty the most dangerous opponents of internationalism. Restored on the basis of an "amnesty", the International would cheapen socialism. All concessions and all agreements with Kautsky and Co. are inexcusable. A most determined struggle against the "amnesty" theory is a *conditio sine qua non* of internationalism. It is vain to speak of internationalism if there is no desire and no readiness to make a complete break with the defenders of an "amnesty". The question arises: does agreement on this fundamental issue exist between us? A negative attitude towards

the "amnesty" policy seems to have been hinted at in your newspaper. You will, however, agree that before any practical steps can be made we are entitled to ask you to let us know in detail how you regard this issue.

Connected with this is the question of the attitude towards the Organising Committee. In our very first letter to you,* we considered it necessary to tell you quite frankly that there are serious grounds to doubt the internationalism of that body. You have not made any attempt to dispel that opinion. We again ask you: what facts do you possess to consider that the Organising Committee adheres to an internationalist stand? It cannot be positively denied that Axelrod's stand, set forth on several occasions in print; is patently chauvinist (almost Plekhanovite). Axelrod is without doubt the Organising Committee's leading representative. Further, consider the Organising Committee's official statements. Its report to the Copenhagen Conference[98] was couched in a vein that led to its being published by the most extreme chauvinists in Germany. Statements by the Organising Committee's "Secretariat Abroad" are much the same. At best, they say nothing that is definite. On the other hand, Larin—officially, on behalf of the Organising Committee and not of some kind of secretariat abroad—has made statements designed to defend chauvinism. What is there internationalist about this? Is it not clear that the Organising Committee adheres completely to the standpoint of a mutual "amnesty"?

Furthermore, what guarantees are there that the Organising Committee represents some force in Russia? Today, following the statement in *Nasha Zarya*, this question is most pertinent. For years, the *Nasha Zarya* group conducted their line; they brought out a daily paper, and went in for mass agitation of their own brand. But what about the Organising Committee?

We all acknowledge that the issue will be settled, not by the alignment of forces in groups abroad—in Zurich, Paris, etc.—but by the influence enjoyed among the workers of St. Petersburg and of all Russia. This should be kept in view, whatever the steps we take.

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* See pp. 125-28 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Such are the considerations we have wanted to inform you of. We shall be very glad to get a detailed and clear reply to all these questions. Then we shall be able to think of what is to come next.

Written on March 10 (23), 1915

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Российская Социал-Демократическая Рабочая Партия. LE SOCIAL-DÉMOCRATE Пролетарии всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТЪ

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ ОРГАНЪ РОССІЙСКОЙ СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ

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ЧТО ДОКАЗАЛЪ СУДЪ НАДЪ Р.С.-Д.Р. ФРАКЦІЕЙ?

Цѣлый судъ надъ пятью членами Р. С. Д. Р. Фр. и шестью другими, т. е. шестнадцати депутатами III Государственной Думы (1914 г., ноябрьскій). Всѣ пролетаріи это знаютъ не хуже меня. Большинство газетъ сообщало судебныя отчеты, хотя многія газеты получили предупрежденіе, что за рабочихъ требованіемъ. Это тоже достоверно. Для достовѣрности и вторая половина бумаги пусть будетъ не этой данной и официально рекомендованной партіей прессы — отчаянно чего стоящей. Не старается ли кто-нибудь сказать свою правду? Г. Бобровскій, напр., сообщилъ, что Рижанинъ, или одна изъ газетъ С. Д. Р., есть прямо контрабандой въ Россію. Не отвѣтъ ли это тому „Дѣлу" (№ 40) — официальному и полуофиціальному отчету о судѣ не имѣется — тонъ. Интересный показатель. Не хотѣть не спорить противъ того, что могутъ и могутъ рассказать Центральному Комитету, а хотѣть тонъ мы были представителями рассказа работать въ этомъ отчетѣ отмѣтить, что отношенія рабочихъ къ войнѣ „сочувствуютъ Центральному Комитету".

Это выяснили дѣлать тонъ Петроградскаго Комитета прочитать бумагу можно, сказать. Вопросъ въ значимой Петроградскаго комитета бумаги — тонъ, что „Дѣло" — официальная и полуофиціальная говорить объ „исключительной" войнѣ. Этому противорѣчитъ фактамъ Р. С. Д. Р. Фракціи — тонъ, когда она была на судѣ, не отмѣчаетъ это есть тонъ или нѣтъ, а не сущей.

Газетовщикъ „Рѣчь" (кадетъ „Голосъ") — тонъ Г. Бобровскій — тонъ, что „мы слышали всѣхъ" и тонъ, что г. д. получили молодыхъ, тонъ одинаковъ рабочаго. Допустимъ тонъ, что г. д. Гиппіусъ сказалъ не отдѣлъ и вообще, напечатанъ тонъ, будто прочитывать въ первой половинѣ „свободности" между партіей и фракціей. Гиппіусъ, что подготовленныя данныя стенографическаго протокола по стороны рабочихъ, тонъ, что „мы слышали всѣхъ" — тонъ, что „мы слышали всѣхъ" — тонъ, что „мы слышали всѣхъ" —

First page of Sotsial-Demokrat No. 40, March 29, 1915, in which Lenin's articles "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group" and "On the London Conference" were published

Reduced

WHAT HAS BEEN REVEALED BY THE TRIAL OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR DUMA GROUP[99]

The trial, by the tsar's court, of five members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group and six other Social-Democrats seized on November 4, 1914 at a conference near Petrograd has ended. They have all been sentenced to life exile in Siberia. The censor has deleted from accounts of the trial published in the legal press all the passages that may be unpleasant to tsarism and the patriots. The "internal enemies" have been rapidly dealt with and again nothing is to be seen or heard on the surface of public life except the savage howling of a pack of bourgeois chauvinists, echoed by some handfuls of social-chauvinists.

What, then, has the trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group proved?

First of all, it has shown that this advance contingent of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Russia failed to display sufficient firmness at the trial. It was the aim of the accused to prevent the State Prosecutor from finding out the names of the members of the Central Committee in Russia and of the Party's representatives in its contacts with workers' organisations. That aim has been achieved. To continue achieving that aim in the future, we muse resort to a method long recommended officially by the Party, i.e., refuse to give evidence. However, to attempt to prove one's solidarity with the social-patriot Mr. Yordansky, as Rosenfeld did, or one's disagreement with the Central Committee, is a wrong method, one that is inexcusable from the standpoint of a revolutionary Social-Democrat.

We shall note that, according to a *Dyen* report (No. 40)[100]—there is no official or complete record of the trial—Comrade Petrovsky stated: "In the same period [November] I received the Central Committee resolution ... and besides I was given resolutions adopted by workers in seven various places concerning their attitude towards the war, resolutions *coinciding with the Central Committee's attitude*."

This declaration does Petrovsky credit. The tide of chauvinism was running high on all sides. In Petrovsky's diary there is an entry to the effect that *even* the radical-minded Chkheidze spoke with enthusiasm of a war for "liberty". This chauvinism was resisted by the R.S.D.L. group deputies when they were free, but it was also their duty, at the trial, to draw a line of distinction between themselves and chauvinism.

The Cadet *Rech*[101] had servilely "thanked" the tsar's court for "dispelling the legend" that the Russian Social-Democratic deputies wanted the defeat of the tsar's armies. Taking advantage of the fact that in Russia the Social-Democrats are tied hand and foot in their activities, the Cadets are pretending to take seriously the so-called "conflict" between the Party and the Duma group, and declare that the accused gave their evidence without the least compulsion. What innocent babes? They pretend ignorance of the threat of a court-martial and the death sentence that hung over the deputies in the early stage of the trial.

The comrades should have refused to give evidence concerning the illegal organisation, and, in view of the historic importance of the moment, they should have taken advantage of a public trial to openly set forth the Social-Democratic views, which are hostile, not only to tsarism in general, but also to social-chauvinism of all and every shade.

Let the government and bourgeois press wrathfully attack the R.S.D.L. group; let the Social-Revolutionaries, liquidators and social-chauvinists (who must fight us somehow, if they cannot fight us on the issue of principles!) with gleeful malice "discover" signs of weakness or of fictitious "disagreement with the Central Committee". The Party of the revolutionary proletariat is strong enough to openly criticise itself, and unequivocally call mistakes and weaknesses by their proper names. The class-conscious

workers of Russia have created a party and have placed in the forefront an advance contingent which, during a world war and the world-wide collapse of international opportunism have revealed more than anyone else the ability to perform their duty as internationalist revolutionary Social-Democrats. The road we have been travelling has been tested by the greatest of all crises, and has proved, over and over again, the only correct road. We shall follow it still more firmly and resolutely; we shall throw out fresh advance contingents, and shall see to it that they not only carry out the same work, but carry it through more correctly.

Secondly, the trial has revealed a picture without precedent in world socialism—that of *revolutionary* Social-Democracy making use of parliamentarianism. More than any speeches, this example will appeal to the minds and hearts of the proletarian masses; more convincingly than any arguments, it will refute the legalist opportunists and anarchist phrase-mongers. The report on Muranov's illegal work and Petrovsky's notes will long remain a model of *that* kind of work carried out by our deputies, which we have had diligently to conceal, and the meaning of which will give all class-conscious workers in Russia more and more food for thought. At a time when nearly all "socialist" (forgive the debasement of the word!) deputies in Europe have proved chauvinists and servants of chauvinists, when the famous "Europeanism" that once charmed our liberals and liquidators has proved an obtuse habitude of slavish legality, there was to be found in Russia a workers' party whose deputies excelled, not in high-flown speech, or being "received" in bourgeois, intellectualist salons, or in the business acumen of the "European" lawyer and parliamentarian, but in ties with the working masses, in dedicated work among those masses, in carrying on modest, unpretentious, arduous, thankless and highly dangerous duties of illegal propagandists and organisers. To climb higher, towards the rank of a deputy or minister influential in "society" such has been the *actual* meaning of "European" (i.e., servile) "socialist" parliamentarism. To go into the midst of the masses, to help enlighten and unite the exploited and the oppressed—such is the slogan advanced by the examples set by Muranov and Petrovsky.

This slogan will acquire historic significance. In no country in the world will a single thinking worker agree to confine himself to the old legality of bourgeois parliamentarism, when that legality has been abolished with a stroke of the pen in all the advanced countries, and has led to merely a closer actual alliance between the opportunists and the bourgeoisie. Whoever dreams of "unity" between revolutionary Social-Democratic workers and the "European" Social-Democratic legalists of yesterday, and *of today*, has learned nothing and forgotten everything, and is in fact an ally of the bourgeoisie and an enemy of the proletariat. Whoever has to this day failed to realise why the R.S.D.L. group broke away from the Social-Democratic group that was making its peace with legalism and opportunism can now learn a lessen from the activities of Muranov and Petrovsky as described in the report on the trial. It was *not only* by these two deputies that this work was conducted, and only hopelessly naïve people can dream of a compatibility between such work and a "friendly and tolerant attitude" towards *Nasha Zarya* or *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*,[102] towards *Sovremennik*, the Organising Committee, or the Bund.

Do the government hope to intimidate the workers by sending the members of the R.S.D.L. group to Siberia? They will find themselves mistaken. The workers will not be intimidated, but will the better understand their aims, those of a workers' party as distinct from the liquidators and the social-chauvinists. The workers will learn to elect to the Duma only men such as the members of the R.S.D.L. group, and for similar and ever more extensive work, such that will be conducted among the masses with still more *secrecy*. Do the government intend to do away with "illegal parliamentarianism" in Russia? They will merely consolidate the links between the proletariat *exclusively* with that kind of parliamentarism.

Thirdly, and most important, the court proceedings against the R.S.D.L. group have, for the first time, produced open and objective material, disseminated all over Russia in millions of copies, concerning the most fundamental, the most significant and most vital question of the attitude of the *various classes* in Russian society towards

the war. Have we not had enough of nauseating intellectualist jabber about the compatibility between "defence of the fatherland" and internationalism "in principle" (i.e., purely verbal and hypocritical internationalism)? Has not the time come to examine the *facts* that bear upon *classes*, i.e., millions of living people, not some dozens of phrase-mongers?

Over half a year has passed since the outbreak of war. The press, both legal and illegal, and expressing all trends, has had its say; all the party groups in the Duma have defined their stands—a highly insufficient index of our class groupings, but the only objective one. The trial of the R.S.D.L. group and the press comment on it have summed up all this material. The trial has shown that the finest representatives of the proletariat in Russia are not only hostile to chauvinism in general but, in particular, share the stand of our Central Organ. The deputies were arrested on November 4, 1914. Consequently, they had been conducting their work for over two months. How and with whom did they carry it on? Which currents in the working class did they reflect and express? The answer is found in the fact that the "theses" and *Sotsial-Demokrat* provided the material for the conference, and that, on several occasions, the Petrograd Committee of our Party issued leaflets of the same nature. There was no other material at the conference. The deputies had no intention of reporting to the conference on other currents in the working class, because no other currents existed.

Perhaps the members of the R.S.D.L. group were expressing the opinion of a mere minority of, the workers? We have no grounds to suppose so, since, in the two and a half years, between the spring of 1912 and the autumn of 1914, four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia rallied around *Pravda*, with which these deputies were working in complete ideological solidarity. That is a fact. Had there been a more or less appreciable protest among the workers against the Central Committee's stand, that protest would have surely found expression in the resolutions proposed. Nothing of the kind emerged at the trial, though the latter, it might be said, did "reveal" much of the work done by the R.S.D.L. group. The corrections

made in Petrovsky's handwriting do not reveal even the slightest hint at any difference of opinion.

The facts show that, in the very first months after the outbreak of the war, the class-conscious vanguard of the workers of Russia rallied, *in deed*, about the Central Committee and the Central Organ. However unpleasant this fact may be to certain "groups", it is undeniable. Thanks to the trial, the words cited in the indictment: "The guns should be directed, not against our brothers, the wage slaves of other countries, but against the reactionary and bourgeois governments and parties of all countries"—these words will spread—and have already done so—all over Russia as a call for proletarian internationalism, for the proletarian revolution. Thanks to the trial, the class slogan of the vanguard of the workers of Russia has reached the masses.

An epidemic of chauvinism among the bourgeoisie and a certain section of the petty bourgeoisie, vacillation in the other section of the latter, and a working class call of this nature—such is the actual and objective picture of our political divisions. It is to this actual situation, not to the pious wishes of intellectuals and founders of grouplets, that one must gear one's "prospects", hopes, and slogans.

The Pravdist papers and the "Muranov type" of work have brought about the unity of four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia. About forty thousand workers have been buying *Pravda*; far more read it. Even if war, prison, Siberia, and hard labour should destroy five or even ten times as many—this section of the workers *cannot* be annihilated. It is alive. It is imbued with the revolutionary spirit, is anti-chauvinist. It *alone* stands in the midst of the masses, with deep roots in the latter, as the champion of the internationalism of the toilers, the exploited, and the oppressed. It *alone* has held its ground in the general *débâcle*. It alone is leading the semi-proletarian elements away from the social-chauvinism of the Cadets, the Trudoviks, Plekhanov and *Nasha Zarya*, and *towards* socialism. Its existence, its ideas, its work, and its call for the "brotherhood of wage slaves of other countries" have been revealed to the whole of Russia by the trial of the R.S.D.L. group.

It is with this section that we must work, and its unity must be defended against social-chauvinists. That is the only road along which the working-class movement of Russia can develop towards social revolution, and not towards national-liberalism of the "European" type.

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ON THE LONDON CONFERENCE

The declaration by Comrade Maximovich, representative of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee, which we are publishing here, fully expresses our Party's views on this Conference. The French bourgeois press has excellently revealed its significance as an expedient or a stratagem of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie. The roles have been distributed as follows: *Le Temps* and *L'Echo de Paris*[103] have attacked the French socialists for their allegedly excessive concessions to internationalism. These attacks have been merely a stratagem designed to pave the way for Premier Viviani's well-known declaration in the Chamber, which was marked by an aggressive patriotism. On the other hand, *Journal des Débats*[104] laid the cards on the table by stating that the whole point was in getting the British socialists, under Keir Hardie, who had hitherto been opposed to the war and to conscription, to vote, at the Conference, for the war to be prosecuted until victory is won over Germany. This is tangible and important as the political outcome of the British and French socialists having been won over to the side of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie. As for the phrases on internationalism, socialism, a referendum, etc., these are *merely* phrases, idle words of no significance whatever.

No doubt, the clever reactionaries of the French bourgeoisie have blurted out the real truth. The war is being conducted by the Anglo-French bourgeoisie, plus their Russian counterpart, with the aim of ravaging and plundering Germany, Austria and Turkey. It stands in need of recruiting officers, as well as of socialist consent to fight on until victory over Germany is won. The rest is idle and shameful

phrase-mongering, which prostitutes such great words as socialism, internationalism, etc. To follow the bourgeoisie and help it plunder other countries in deed, and to regale the masses with hypocritical recognition of "socialism and the International" in word—such is opportunism's cardinal sin and the main reason why the Second International has collapsed.

The task confronting the opponents of social-chauvinism at the London Conference was therefore clear: in the name of clear-cut anti-chauvinist principles, they had to walk out from the Conference, *without* at the same time *falling into* Germanophilism, since, for no other motive but *chauvinism*, the pro-Germans are decidedly opposed to the London Conference. Comrade Maximovich accomplished that task when he spoke in definite terms of the *treachery* of the German socialists.

The Bundists and the adherents of the Organising Committee are unable to grasp this simple and obvious fact. The former are Germanophiles, in the way Kosovsky is, who *frankly justifies* the German Social-Democrats' vote for war credits (see *Information Bulletin* of the Bund No. 7, January 1915, p. 7, beginning of § 5). The editors of the bulletin made no mention of their disagreeing with Kosovsky, although they did emphasise that they were in disagreement with Borisov, that champion of Russian patriotism. The Manifesto of the Bund's Central Committee (ibid., p. 3) does not contain a single explicit word against social chauvinism.

The Organising Committee's supporters want a reconciliation between the Germanophile and the Francophile brands of chauvinism as can be seen from Axelrod's statements (*Golos* Nos. 86 and 87 and from the first issue of *Izvestia* of the Organising Committee's secretariat abroad,[105] Feb. 22, 1915). When the editors of *Nashe Slovo* proposed that we take joint action against "official social-chauvinism", we replied *outright* that the Organising Committee and the Bund had themselves sided with official social-patriotism. In our reply we enclosed our draft declaration and referred to Comrade Maximovich's decisive vote.

Why is *Nashe Slovo* trying to deceive itself and others in *failing to mention* this in its editorial of No. 32? Why is

it silent about our declaration having also spoken of the German Social-Democrats' *treachery*? The *Nashe Slovo* declaration *omitted* this most important and fundamental point: neither we nor Comrade Maximovich adopted that declaration, or could have done so. That was why joint action by the Organising Committee and ourselves did *not* result. Why, then, is *Nashe Slovo* deceiving itself and others in asserting that a basis exists for unity of action?

"Official social-patriotism" is the main evil in present-day socialism. To combat that evil (and not to become reconciled to it, or to declare a mutual international "amnesty" on this point), all forces must be prepared and mustered. Kautsky and others have produced a clear-cut programme for an "amnesty" and a peace with social-chauvinism. We have tried to give a clear-cut programme for the struggle against it: see, in particular, No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and the resolutions published therein. It remains for us to express the wish that *Nashe Slovo* go over to something more definite than vacillation between "platonic sympathy with internationalism", and peace with social-chauvinism.

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THE SLOGAN OF CIVIL WAR ILLUSTRATED

On January 8 (New Style), Swiss papers received the following message from Berlin: "Of late the press has repeatedly carried reports of peaceable attempts made by men in the German and French trenches to enter into friendly relations. According to *Tägliche Rundschau*,[106] an army order dated December 29 bans any fraternisation and any kind of intercourse with the enemy in the trenches. Disregard of this order is punishable as high treason."

Thus, fraternisation and attempts to enter into friendly relations with the enemy are a fact. The German military authorities are showing concern over the matter, which means that they attach considerable importance to it. The British *Labour Leader* of January 7, 1915, published *a series* of quotations from the British bourgeois press on instances of fraternisation between British and German soldiers, who arranged a "forty-eight-hour truce" at Christmas, met amicably in no-man's land, and so on. The British military authorities issued a *special order forbidding* fraternisation. And yet, with the utmost complacency and the comfortable feeling that the military censorship will protect them against any denials, the socialist opportunists and their vindicators (or lackeys?) have assured the workers, through the press (as Kautsky has done), that *no* understanding on anti-war action by the socialists of the belligerent countries is possible (the expression literally used by Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*)!

Try to imagine Hyndman, Guesde, Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Kautsky and the rest—instead of aiding the bourgeoisie (something they are now engaged in)—forming an international committee to agitate for "fraternisation and attempts

to establish friendly relations" between the socialists of the belligerent countries, both in the "trenches" and among the troops in general. What would the results be several months from now, if today, only six months after the outbreak of the war and *despite* all the political bosses, leaders and luminaries who have betrayed socialism, opposition is mounting on all sides against those who have voted for war credits and those who have accepted ministerial jobs, and the military authorities are threatening that "fraternisation" carries the death sentence?

"There is only one practical issue—victory or defeat for one's country," Kautsky, lackey of the opportunists, has written, in concord with Guesde, Plekhanov and Co. Indeed, if one were to forget socialism and the class struggle, that would be the truth. However, if one does not lose sight of socialism, that is untrue. Then there is another *practical* issue: should we perish as blind and helpless slaves, in a war between slave-holders, or should we fall in "attempts at fraternisation" between the slaves, with the aim of casting off slavery?

Such, *in reality*, is the "practical" issue.

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THE SOCIAL-CHAUVINISTS' SOPHISMS

Nashe Dyelo (No. 1, 1915), which is published in Petrograd by the liquidators, is bringing out a translation of *Internationalism and War*, a pamphlet by Kautsky. At the same time, Mr. A. Potresov says he does not agree with Kautsky who, in his opinion, acts now like an "advocate" (i.e., a pleader for German social-chauvinism, who denies recognition of the Franco-Russian brand of the species), now like a "judge" (i.e., a Marxist who tries to apply the Marxist method without prejudice).

In actual fact, both Mr. A. Potresov and Kautsky have betrayed Marxism in the main issues, defending as they do national liberal-labour policies, by using obvious sophisms. Mr. A. Potresov is distracting his readers' attention from the fundamentals, while arguing with Kautsky over details. According to Mr. Potresov, the "solution" of the problem of the attitude of the British and the French "democracies" towards the war (the author is referring to working-class democracy) is "on the whole a good solution" (p. 69); these democracies, he says, "have acted correctly", although their solution has been, not so conscious as "in accord with a national solution, through a happy coincidence".

The meaning of these words is clear. Under Anglo-French cover, Mr. A. Potresov, is defending Russian chauvinism, and justifying the patriotic tactics used by the socialists of the Triple Entente. Mr. Potresov argues against Kautsky, not in the way a Marxist should argue against a chauvinist, but like a Russian chauvinist against a German counterpart. This is an old and threadbare method; it should, however, be noted that Mr. A. Potresov disguises and confuses in every possible way the clear and simple import of his words.

The points on which Mr. A. Potresov and Kautsky *agree* are the gist of the matter. For instance they agree that: "the present-day proletariat's internationalism is compatible with defence of country" (K. Kautsky, p. 34 in the German edition of his pamphlet). Mr. A. Potresov speaks of the special situation of a country "that has been subjected to an attack". "The people fear nothing more than an enemy invasion...", Kautsky writes. "If the inhabitants of a country see the cause of war, not in their own government, but in the evil designs of a neighbouring state—and what government does not attempt to inculcate such a view upon the masses through the press, etc.!—then ... the unanimous desire to defend the borders against the enemy flares up in the entire population.... The infuriated mob would kill those who would attempt to hamper the dispatch of armies to the borders" (K. Kautsky, p. 33 in the article of 1911).

This is a would-be Marxist defence of the fundamental idea of all social-chauvinists.

As early as 1911, Kautsky saw very clearly that the government (and the bourgeoisie) would *deceive* "the people, the population, the mob" by placing the blame on the "evil designs" of another country. The question arises whether support for such deception—whether by voting for war credits or by speeches, articles, etc.—is compatible with internationalism and socialism, or whether it is tantamount to a national liberal-labour policy! Kautsky is behaving like a most shameless "advocate", like the worst kind of sophist, when he substitutes for this question another one namely, whether it is reasonable for "individuals" to "hamper the dispatch of armies", in the teeth of the will of the majority of a people that have been deceived by their government. That is not the point at issue. That is not the gist of the matter. Deceived petty bourgeois must be dissuaded, and the deception made clear to them. It is sometimes necessary to go with them to the battleground and be able to wait until they have been sobered by the experience of war. Not this is under discussion but the question whether it is permissible for socialists to participate in the bourgeoisie's deception of the "people". Kautsky and Potresov justify such deception, though they know perfectly well that the guilt for the imperialist war of 1914 falls equally on

the "evil designs" of the governments and the bourgeoisie of all the "Great" Powers—Britain and France, Germany and Russia. This is clearly stated, for instance, in the Basle resolution of 1912.

There can be no doubt that the "people", i.e., the mass of petty bourgeois and part of the deceived workers, believe in the bourgeois fable of the enemy's "evil designs". Yet it is the duty of Social-Democrats to combat this deception, not support it. Long before the war, all Social-Democrats in all countries said that *any* Great Power strives in fact to build up and extend its domination over the colonies, oppress small nations, etc. This was reiterated at Basle. The war is being waged for the partitioning of colonies and for the plunder of other lands; thieves have fallen out, and it is a brazen bourgeois lie to claim that, at this particular moment, some thief is getting the worse of it; to do so is to present the thieves' interests as those of the people or the fatherland. We must speak the *truth* to the "people", who are suffering from the war; that truth is that no defence can be put up against sufferings of wartime unless the government and the bourgeoisie of every belligerent country are overthrown. To defend Belgium *by means* of throttling Galicia or Hungary is no "defence of the fatherland".

However, Marx himself, who condemned wars, as, for instance, in 1854-76, took sides with one of the belligerents when, despite the will of the socialists, war had become a fact. That is the main contention and the chief trump card in Kautsky's pamphlet. It is also the stand of Mr. Potresov, who by "internationalism" understands finding out the *success of which side* in the war is more desirable or less harmful from the standpoint of the interests of the proletariat, not in a particular country but *the world over*. The war, he says, is being conducted by governments and the bourgeoisie, it is for the proletariat to decide *which* government's victory presents the least danger to the workers of the world.

The sophistry of this reasoning consists in a bygone period of history being substituted for the present. The following were the main features of the old wars referred to by Kautsky: (1) they dealt with the problems of bourgeois-democratic reforms and the overthrow of absolutism or foreign oppression; (2) the objective prerequisites for a socialist revolution had

not yet matured, and *prior to the war*, no socialist could speak of utilising it to "hasten the downfall of capitalism", as the Stuttgart (1907) and Basle (1912) resolutions do; (3) in the countries of *neither* of the belligerent groups were there any socialist parties of any strength or mass appeal, and tested in the struggle.

In short, it is not surprising that Marx and the Marxists confined themselves to determining *which* bourgeoisie's victory would be more harmless to (or more favourable to) the world proletariat, at a time when one could not speak of a general proletarian movement against the governments and the bourgeoisie of all the belligerent countries.

Long before the war and for the first time in world history the socialists of all the countries now engaged in hostilities gathered together and declared that they would make use of the war "to hasten the downfall of capitalism" (the Stuttgart resolution, 1907). In other words, they recognised that objective conditions had matured for that "hastening of the downfall", i.e., for a socialist revolution. That is to say, they threatened the governments with a revolution. In Basle (1912) they said the same thing in still clearer terms, referring to the Commune and to October-December 1906,[107] i.e., civil war.

When war broke out, the socialists who had threatened the governments with revolution and had called upon the proletariat to bring about that revolution began to refer to what had happened half a century before, and today are justifying socialist support for the governments and the bourgeoisie! The Marxist Gorter is absolutely right in comparing, in his Dutch brochure, *Imperialism, the World War and Social-Democracy* (p. 84), "radicals" of the Kautsky type with the liberals of 1848, who were courageous in word and traitors in deed.

For decades, a conflict between revolutionary Social-Democratic and the opportunist elements was developing within European socialism. The crisis has come to a head. The abscess has burst as a result of the war. Most official parties have yielded to the national liberal-labour politicians, who defend the privileges of their "own" bourgeoisie, and *the latter*'s privilege to possess colonies, oppress small nations, etc. Both Kautsky and Potresov defend and justify

the national liberal-labour policy instead of exposing it to the proletariat. That is the essence of the social-chauvinists' sophisms.

Mr. A. Potresov has inadvertently let the cat out of the bag by his assertion that "the Stuttgart formula was untenable in principle" (p. 79). What of that? To the proletariat, open renegades are better than covert ones. Carry on, Mr. A. Potresov; to repudiate Stuttgart and Basle is the more honest course.

Kautsky, the diplomat, is more wily than Mr. A. Potresov; he does not repudiate Stuttgart and Basle. He merely—"merely"!—quotes the Basle Manifesto, *omitting* all references to revolution! Can it be that the censor has been using his blue pencil on both Potresov and Kautsky? Potresov and Kautsky seem ready to speak of revolution when that is permitted by the censor.

Let us hope that Potresov, Kautsky and their adherents will propose that the Stuttgart and the Basle resolutions be replaced by something like the following: "Should war break out despite our efforts, we must decide, from the standpoint of the world proletariat, what is most to its advantage: that India be plundered by Britain or by Germany; that the Negroes of Africa be taught the use of 'firewater' and pillaged by the French or by the Germans; that Turkey be oppressed by the Austro-Germans or by the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance; that the Germans should throttle Belgium or the Russians, Galicia; that China be partitioned by the Japanese or by the Americans", etc.

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THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONALISTS

The war has led to a grave crisis in the whole of international socialism. Like any other crisis, the present crisis of socialism has revealed ever more clearly the inner contradictions lying deep within it; it has torn off many a false and conventional mask, and has shown up in the sharpest light what is outmoded and rotten in socialism, and what its further growth and advance towards victory will depend on.

Practically all Social-Democrats in Russia realise that the old divisions and groupings are, if not obsolescent, then at least undergoing a transformation. In the forefront is the division on the main issue raised by the war, viz., the division into "internationalists" and "social-patriots". We have taken these terms from the editorial in *Nashe Slovo* No. 42, and for the time being shall not deal with the question of whether they should be supplemented by contrasting revolutionary Social-Democrats with national liberal-labour politicians.

It is not a matter of names, to be sure; the gist of the main present-day division has been correctly indicated in *Nashe Slovo*. The internationalists, it says, are "united in their negative attitude towards social-patriotism as represented by Plekhanov". The editors call upon the "now disunited groups" "to come to an understanding and unite for at least a single act—expressing the attitude of Russian Social-Democrats towards the present war and Russian social-patriotism".

Besides this appeal through the press, the editors of *Nashe Slovo* have sent a letter to us and the Organising

Committee, proposing that, with their participation, a conference be called to discuss the matter. In our reply we spoke of the necessity "to clarify certain preliminary questions, so as to know whether we are at one in the main issue". We stressed two such preliminary questions: (1) no declaration would help unmask the "social-patriots" (the editors naming Plekhanov, Alexinsky, and the well-known group of Petrograd liquidationist writers who support the *XYZ* journal[108]) who "falsify the will of the advanced proletariat of Russia" (the expression used by the editors of *Nashe Slovo*); to unmask the social-patriots, a protracted struggle is necessary; (2) what grounds were there to count the Organising Committee among the "internationalists"?

On the other hand, the Organising Committee's secretariat abroad sent us a copy of its reply to *Nashe Slovo*, which, in short, asserted that a "*preliminary*" selection of certain groups and the "exclusion of others" were out of the question; and that "invitations to the conference should be sent to the representatives abroad of all party centres and groups that attended ... the Brussels Conference of the International Socialist Bureau before the war" (letter of March 25, 1915).

Thus, the Organising Committee has declined on principle to confer with the *internationalists* alone, since it wishes also to confer with the social-patriots (the Plekhanov and the Alexinsky trends are known to have been represented at Brussels). The same spirit marked the resolution of the Social-Democrats gathered in Nervi (*Nashe Slovo* No. 53), which was adopted following Yonov's report (and obviously expressed the views of this representative of the most radical and internationalist elements in the Bund).

This resolution, which is highly characteristic and valuable in helping us specify the "middle road" being sought by many socialists living abroad, expresses sympathy with *Nashe Slovo*'s "principles", but at the same time expresses disagreement with *Nashe Slovo*'s stand "which consists in creating organisational divisions, uniting internationalist socialists alone, and defending the necessity of splits within socialist proletarian parties that have historically come into being". In the opinion of the gathering, *Nashe Slovo*'s "one-sided handling" (of these questions) is "highly

detrimental to clarification of problems connected with the restoration of the International".

We have already pointed out that the views of Axelrod, the Organising Committee's official representative, are social-chauvinist. Neither in the press nor in its correspondence has *Nashe Slovo* made any reply to this. We have pointed out that the Bund's stand is the same, with a bias towards Germanophile chauvinism. The Nervi resolution has born this out in a manner which, if indirect, is highly significant: it has declared that unification of internationalists *alone* is harmful and schismatic. The question has been presented with a clarity that is most praiseworthy.

Still clearer is the Organising Committee's reply, which expresses, not an oblique attitude towards the issue, but one that is straightforward and formal. We must confer, it says, not *without* the social-patriots, but *with them*.

We should be thankful to the Organising Committee for its letter to *Nashe Slovo*, confirming the correctness of our opinion of that body.

Does that mean that *Nashe Slovo's entire idea* of uniting the internationalists has been wrecked? No, it does not. While there exist ideological solidarity and a sincere desire to combat social-patriotism, no failure of any conferences can check unity among internationalists. At the disposal of the editors of *Nashe Slovo* is the great instrument of a daily paper. They can do something immeasurably more business-like and serious than calling conferences and issuing declarations; they can invite *all* groups, and themselves start: (I) to immediately evolve full, precise, unequivocal and perfectly clear definitions of the content of internationalism (it being a fact that Vandervelde, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lensch, and Haenisch also call themselves internatiollalists!), of opportunism, the collapse of the Second International, the tasks and the methods of combating social-patriotism, etc.; (2) to rally forces for a severe struggle for certain principles, not only abroad, but mainly in Russia.

Indeed, can anyone deny that there is no *other* way towards the victory of internationalism over social-patriotism, and that there can be none? Half a century of Russian political emigration (and thirty years of *Social-Democratic* emigration)—have these not shown that all declarations,

conferences, etc., abroad are powerless, insignificant, and empty, *unless* they are supported by a *lasting* movement of some social stratum in Russia? Does not the present war also teach us that everything that is immature or decaying, everything that is conventional or diplomatic, will collapse at the first blow?

During the eight months of war, *all* Social-Democratic centres, groups, currents, and shades of opinion have held conferences with all and sundry, and have come out with "declarations", i.e., made their opinions known to the public. Today the task is different, and *closer to action*: more distrust of *resonant* declarations and *spectacular* conferences; more energy in evolving precise replies and advice to writers, propagandists, agitators, and all thinking workers, written in a way that *cannot but be* understood; more clarity and purposefulness in mustering the forces for a long-term effort to give effect to such advice.

Much has been given to the editors of *Nashe Slovo*—after all, they are a daily paper!— and they will have much to answer for if they fail to carry out even this "minimum programme".

A final remark: in May 1910, exactly five years ago, we made mention, in our press abroad, of a highly outstanding political fact, of "far greater significance" than the conferences and declarations of many *very* "powerful" Social-Democratic centres, i.e., the fact of the formation in Russia of a group of legalist writers working in the *selfsame XYZ* journal. What has been shown by the *facts* during these five years, so eventful in the history of the labour movement in Russia and the whole world? Have not the facts shown that in Russia we have a certain *social* nucleus to rally the elements of a *national liberal-labour party* (after the "European" pattern)? What are the conclusions forced on all Social-Democrats by the circumstance that, with the exception of *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*,[109] we see, in Russia, the *open* expression *only* of this current, *Nashe Dyelo*, *Strakhovaniye Rabochikh*, *Severny Golos*,"[110] Maslov and Plekhanov?

So we repeat: more distrust of resonant declarations, and more courage in facing grave political realities.

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BOURGEOIS PHILANTHROPISTS AND REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

The Economist,[111] a journal that speaks for the British millionaires, is pursuing a very instructive line in relation to the war. Representatives of advanced capital in the oldest and richest capitalist country, are shedding tears over the war and incessantly voicing a wish for peace. Those Social-Democrats who, together with the opportunists and Kautsky, think that a socialist programme consists in the propaganda of peace, will find proof of their error if they read *The Economist*. Their programme is not socialist, but bourgeois-pacifist. Dreams of peace, without propaganda of revolutionary action, express only a horror of war, but have nothing in common with socialism.

Moreover, *The Economist* stands for peace just because it is afraid of revolution. For instance, its issue for February 13, 1915, contains the following passage:

"Philanthropists profess to hope that the peace settlement will bring with it a great international reduction of armies.... But those who know the forces which really control the diplomacy of Europe see no Utopias. The outlook is for bloody revolutions and fierce wars between labour and capital, or between the masses and the governing classes of Continental Europe...."

In the issue of March 27, 1915, we again find expression of a desire for a peace that will guarantee freedom of nationalities, etc., as promised by Sir Edward Grey. If this hope is not realised, the paper says, the war "will end in revolutionary chaos, beginning no one can say where, and ending in no one can say what".

The British pacifist millionaires have a better understanding of present-day politics than the opportunists, the

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

followers of Kautsky and similar socialist whimperers after peace. The bourgeois know, first, that phrases about a democratic peace are an idle and foolish Utopia while the old "forces ... really control the diplomacy", i.e., until the class of capitalists has been expropriated. Secondly, the bourgeoisie have made a sober appraisal of the outlook, foreseeing "bloody revolutions" and "revolutionary chaos". To the bourgeoisie a socialist revolution always seems "revolutionary chaos".

In the realistic politics of the capitalist countries, three kinds of peace sympathies can be seen:

(1) The more enlightened millionaires wish an early peace because they are afraid of revolutions. They have soberly and correctly described any "democratic" peace (without annexations, but with limited armaments, etc.) as Utopian under capitalism.

This philistine Utopia is being advocated by the opportunists, the adherents of Kautsky, and the like.

(2) The unenlightened masses of the people (the petty bourgeois, semi-proletarians, part of the workers, etc.) whose desire for peace is very vague, are thereby expressing a growing protest against the war and a growing but as yet vague revolutionary sentiment.

(3) The revolutionary Social-Democrats, the enlightened advance guard of the proletariat, are attentively studying the sentiments of the masses, utilising the latter's growing striving for peace, not in order to bolster the vulgar utopias of a "democratic" peace under capitalism, not in order to encourage hopes being placed in the philanthropists, the authorities, and the bourgeoisie, but to bring clarity into vague revolutionary sentiments, to enlighten the masses with a thousand facts of pre-war politics; basing that work on the experience of the masses and on their sentiments, they are out to *prove* systematically, steadfastly and unswervingly the need for mass revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie and the governments of their respective countries as the *only* road towards democracy and socialism.

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THE COLLAPSE OF PLATONIC INTERNATIONALISM

We have already pointed out (see *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 41)* that *Nashe Slovo* should at least come out with a definite platform if it wishes its internationalism to be taken seriously. As though in reply to us, No. 85 of *Nashe Slovo* (May 9) published the resolution passed at a meeting of its Paris staff and contributors. "Two members of the editorial staff," we are informed, "while in agreement with the general content of the resolution, declared they would submit a dissenting opinion on the organisational methods of the Party's internal policy in Russia." This resolution is a most noteworthy document of political bewilderment and ineptness.

The word internationalism is reiterated time and again "complete ideological divorcement from all the varieties of socialist nationalism" is announced, and the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions are quoted. The intentions are of the best, no doubt, but—it is all a mere phrase, since it is impossible and unnecessary to have a really "complete" divorcement from "all" extant varieties of social-nationalism, just as it is impossible and unnecessary to have a complete list of all the varieties of capitalist exploitation in order to become an enemy of capitalism. But it is necessary and possible to have an unmistakable line of cleavage with the main varieties for instance, with that of Plekhanov, Potresov (*Nashe Dyelo*), the Bund, Axelrod, and Kautsky. The resolution promises too much, but gives nothing; it threatens a complete cleavage with all varieties, but is afraid to mention by name at least the most significant of them.

In the British Parliament it is considered a discourtesy to call a man by his name, the practice being to speak only

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* See pp. 188-91 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the respective "Noble Lord" or of the "Honourable Member" for whatever constituency he may represent. What excellent Anglomaniacs, what highly refined diplomats these *Nashe Slovo* people are! They evade the gist of the issue so gracefully, and are so polite when they provide their readers with formulas that serve to conceal their thoughts. They avow "friendship" ("Guizot in the flesh", as one of Turgenev's characters puts it[112]) for all organisations "inasmuch as they apply ... the principles of revolutionary internationalism", but manifest "friendship" for those who do not apply those principles.

The "ideological divorcement" the *Nashe Slovo* people proclaim the more solemnly, the less willing and able they are to carry it out, must consist in explaining the *origin* of social-nationalism, the *source* of its strength, and the *means* to combat it. The social-nationalists do not call themselves, and do not admit to being, social-nationalists. They are bending, and are compelled to bend, every effort to hide behind a pseudonym, to throw dust in the eyes of the working masses, to cover up the traces of their links with opportunism, to conceal their betrayal, i.e., their having gone over in fact to the side of the bourgeoisie, and their alliance with the governments and the General Staffs. Grounding themselves on this alliance, and in control of all the important positions, the social-nationalists are, more than anybody else, clamouring for "unity" between the Social-Democratic parties and levelling the accusation of splitting tendencies, against all those who are opposed to opportunism. Consider, for instance, the latest official circular released by the Executive (*Vorstand*) of the German Social-Democratic Party and directed against journals that stand for *genuine* internationalism—*Lichtstrahlen*[113] and *Die Internationale*[114]. These journals did not have to avow either "friendship" for the revolutionaries or "complete ideological divorcement from all varieties of social-nationalism". They just began with the divorcement, and did that in such a way that indeed "*all* varieties" of opportunists have raised a savage outcry, thus proving how squarely the arrows have hit the mark.

But what about *Nashe Slovo*?

It is rising up against social-nationalism, while still on bended knees before it, since it has failed to unmask the most

dangerous defenders of this bourgeois current (such as Kautsky); it has not declared war against opportunism, but on the contrary, has kept silent about it; it has not taken or indicated any real steps towards liberating socialism from its disgraceful patriotic fetters. By stating that neither unity nor a break with those who joined the bourgeoisie is imperative, *Nashe Slovo* has in fact surrendered to the opportunists, while at the same time making a fine gesture, which can be interpreted as meaning either that it is threatening the opportunists with its dreadful ire, or that it is waving a hand to them. Were the really deft opportunists, who have a fine appreciation of a blend of Left phrases and moderate practice, compelled to make reply to the *Nashe Slovo* resolution, they would most probably say something similar to the statement made by the two staff members, namely, that they are in agreement with the "general content" (because they are certainly not social-nationalists, Oh, no!); as for the "organisational methods of the Party's internal policy" they will, in due course, submit, a "dissenting opinion". They run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

When it had to deal with Russia, however, *Nashe Slovo*'s subtle diplomacy proved abortive.

"Party unification in the conditions of the previous period proved impossible in Russia," says the resolution, which should be understood as meaning that unification of the working-class party with a group of legalist liquidators proved impossible. This is oblique recognition of the collapse of the Brussels bloc, which was formed to save the liquidators. Why is *Nashe Slovo* afraid openly to recognise this collapse? Why is it afraid openly to make the causes of this collapse clear to the workers? Is it not because the bloc's collapse has proved the actual falseness of the policy pursued by all its members? Is it not because *Nashe Slovo* wishes to preserve "friendship" with two (at least two) "varieties" of social-nationalism, namely, with the Bundists and the Organising Committee (Axelrod) both of whom have made press statements about their plans and their hopes to resurrect the Brussels bloc?

"The new conditions ... are cutting the ground from under the feet of the old groups...."

Is not the reverse true? Far from eliminating liquidationism, the new conditions have not even shaken its basic

nucleus (*Nasha Zarya*), notwithstanding all personal vacillations and changes of front. They have deepened and aggravated differences with that nucleus, since, besides being liquidationist, it has also turned social-nationalist! *Nashe Slovo* evades the question of liquidationism, which it finds so unpleasant; the old is being undermined by the new, it asserts, but it is silent about the *new ground*, the social-nationalist, *under the feet of the old* ... liquidationism! What ridiculous shiftiness! We shall say nothing about *Nasha Zarya* because it is no more, and nothing about *Nashe Dyelo*, probably because Potresov, Cherevanin, Maslov and Co. may be regarded in the political sense, as babes in arms.

It is not only Potresov and Co., but themselves as well that the *Nashe Slovo* editors would regard as babes in arms. Listen to this:

"Faced by the fact that the factional and inter-factional groupings created in the past serve, even at the present transitional moment, as the only [!] centres for the organisational unification, however imperfect, of the advanced workers, *Nashe Slovo* is of the opinion that the interests of its main activities in uniting the internationalists exclude both organisational submission of the paper, directly or indirectly, to any one of the old party groupings, and artificial unification of its fellow-thinkers into a separate group politically opposed to the old groupings."

What does this mean? How is it to be taken? *Inasmuch as* the new conditions are undermining the old groupings, they recognise the latter as the *only* genuine ones! *Inasmuch as* the new conditions demand a new grouping, not on liquidationist principles, but on internationalism, they reject as "artificial" any unification of internationalists. This is the very acme of political impotence!

After two hundred days of propaganda of internationalism, *Nashe Slovo* has acknowledged its complete political bankruptcy. It wants neither "submission" to the old groupings (why so fear-stricken a word as "submission"? Why not "adhesion", "support", "solidarity with"?), nor the creation of new ones. We shall go on living in the old way, it says, in liquidationist groupings; we shall "submit" to them, while using *Nashe Slovo* as a blatant signboard, or regarding it as a promenade through the leafy gardens of

internationalist phraseology. The *Nashe Slovo* writers will do the writing, while *Nashe Slovo* readers will do the reading.[115]

For two hundred days these people were talking of uniting the internationalists, only to arrive at conclusion that they could unite nobody, not even themselves, the editors and staff of *Nashe Slovo*, and to proclaim that unification "artificial". What a fillip for Potresov, the Bundists, and Axelrod! And what adroit deception of the workers! On the surface, resonant internationalist phrases from a truly non-factional *Nashe Slovo* that has thrown off the old and outworn groupings; in fact, however, the old groupings are the "only" points of unity.

Nashe Slovo's ideological and political bankruptcy which it now admits, is no accident, but the inevitable result of vain attempts to shrug off, in word, the actual alignment of forces. In the working-class movement of Russia this alignment expresses itself in the struggle of the liquidationist and social-patriotic trend (*Nashe Dyelo*) against the Marxist Social-Democratic Labour Party, which has been restored by the January 1912 Conference,[116] strengthened by the elections, in the worker curia, to the Fourth Duma, consolidated by the Pravdist papers of 1912-14, and represented by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma. This Party *has continued* its struggle against the bourgeois trend of liquidationism by combating the no less bourgeois trend of social-patriotism. The correctness of the line of this Party, our Party, has been borne out by the vast and historic experience of the European war, and by the exiguous and slender experience of the latest, the one thousand and first non-factional attempt at unification on the part of *Nashe Slovo*: this attempt has suffered a fiasco, thereby confirming the resolution of the Berne Conference (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40) concerning "platonic" internationalists.*

Genuine internationalists will wish neither to remain in the old liquidationist groupings (concealing this from the workers) nor to stand outside of the groupings. They will come to our Party.

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* See pp. 163-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM

The most interesting and most recent material for this topical problem has been provided by the International Conference of Socialist Women, which adjourned recently in Berne.[117] The readers will find below an account of the Conference and the texts of two resolutions—the one adopted and the one rejected. In the present article we would like to discuss only one aspect of the question.

Representatives of the women's organisations attached to the Organising Committee; women members of Troelstra's party in Holland; women from the Swiss organisations that are hostile to *Berner Tagwacht* for its allegedly excessive Leftist leanings; the French representative, who is unwilling to disagree on any important point with the official party, which is known to adhere to the social-chauvinist point of view; the women of Britain, who are hostile to the idea of a clear line of division between pacifism and revolutionary proletarian tactics—all these agreed with the "Left" German Social-Democrat women on one resolution. The representatives of women's organisations connected with our Party's Central Committee disagreed with them, preferring to remain in isolation for the time being rather than join a bloc of *this* kind.

What is the gist of this disagreement? What principles and general political significance are involved in this conflict?

At first glance, the middle-of-the-road resolution, which has united the opportunists and part of the Left wing looks very fitting and correct in principle. The war has been declared an imperialist one, the "defence of the fatherland" idea has been condemned, the workers have been called

upon to hold mass demonstrations, etc., etc. It might seem that our resolution was different *only* in the use of several sharper *expressions* such as "betrayal", "opportunism" "withdrawal from bourgeois governments", etc.

It is undoubtedly from this standpoint that criticism will be levelled against the withdrawal of the representatives of the women's organisations connected with our Party's Central Committee.

However, if we give the matter more attention, without confining ourselves to a purely "formal" recognition of one truth or another, we will realise that such criticism is quite groundless.

Two world-outlooks, two appraisals of the war and the tasks of the International, two tactics of the proletarian parties clashed at the Conference. One view holds that there has been no collapse of the International; no deep and grave obstacles to a return from chauvinism to socialism; no strong "internal enemy" in the shape of opportunism; no direct and obvious betrayal of socialism by opportunism. The conclusion to be drawn might be worded as follows: let us condemn nobody; let us "amnesty" those who have violated the Stuttgart and the Basle resolutions; let us merely advise that the course followed should be more to the left and that the masses be called upon to hold demonstrations.

The other view is diametrically opposed to the former on each of the points enumerated above. Nothing is more harmful or more disastrous to the proletarian cause than a continuation of inner-Party *diplomacy* towards the opportunists and social-chauvinists. The majority resolution proved acceptable to the opportunist delegates and to the adherents of the present-day official parties just because it is imbued with the spirit of diplomacy. Such diplomacy is being used to throw dust in the eyes of the working masses, which *at present* are led by the official social-patriots. An absolutely erroneous and harmful idea is being inculcated upon the working masses, the idea that the present-day Social-Democratic parties, with their present Executives, *are capable of* changing their course from an erroneous to a correct one.

That is not the case. It is a most egregious and pernicious illusion. The present-day Social-Democratic parties and

their Executives are *incapable* of seriously changing their course. *In practice* everything will remain as before; the "Left" wishes expressed in the majority resolution will remain innocent wishes; an unerring political instinct prompted this in the adherents of Troelstra's party and of the present Executive of the French party, when they voted for such a resolution. It is only when it is most actively supported by the present Executives of the Social-Democratic parties that an appeal for mass demonstrations can acquire a serious and practical significance.

Can one expect such support? Obviously not. It is common knowledge that such an appeal will meet, not with support, but with stubborn (and mostly *covert*) resistance from the Executives.

If the workers were told this in a straightforward way, they would know the *truth*; they would know that to give *effect to* "Left" wishes, a radical change is necessary in the line of the Social-Democratic parties; a most stubborn struggle is necessary against the opportunists with their "Centrist" friends. As it is, the workers have been *lulled* by "Left" wishes, while the Conference *refused* to call by name, loudly and clearly, the evil which must be combated if those wishes are to be realised.

The diplomatic leaders, who are at present conducting a chauvinist policy within the Social-Democratic parties, will make excellent use of the weakness, the indecision and the insufficient clarity of the majority resolution. Astute parliamentarians that they are, they will distribute the roles among themselves: some of them will say that the "serious" arguments of Kautsky and Co. were not appreciated or analysed, and that therefore they must be discussed in a wider gathering; others will say, "Were we not right when we said that no deep-seated differences existed, if the women adherents of the Troelstra and Guesde-Sembat parties were able to agree with the Left-wing German women?"

The Women's Conference should not have aided Scheidemann, Haase, Kautsky, Vandervelde, Hyndman, Guesde, Sembat, Plekhanov and others to blunt the vigilance of the working masses. On the contrary, it should have tried to rouse them and declared a decisive war against opportunism. Only in that case would the result have been, not a hope

that the "leaders" named above would "reform", but a mustering of forces for an arduous and bitter struggle.

Consider the way the opportunists and the "Centrists" violated the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions. That is the *crux* of the matter. Try to visualise, clearly and without diplomacy, what has actually taken place.

Foreseeing war, the International convenes and unanimously decides, should war break out, to work "*to hasten the downfall of capitalism*"; to work in the spirit of the *Commune*, *of October and December 1905* (the exact words of the Basle resolution!); to work in a spirit that will consider it a "*crime*" if "the workers of one country shoot at the workers of another country".

A line of action in an internationalist, proletarian, and revolutionary spirit is indicated here with perfect clarity, a clarity that cannot be improved within the limits of legality.

Then war broke out—the very kind of war and exactly along the lines foreseen at Basle. The official parties acted in an absolutely contrary spirit: not like internationalists but like nationalists; not in a proletarian but in a bourgeois way; not in a revolutionary direction but in the direction of ultra-opportunism. If we say to the workers that this was downright *treachery* to the socialist cause, we thereby reject all evasions and subterfuges, all sophisms *à la* Kautsky and Axelrod. We clearly indicate the extent and the power of the evil; we clearly call for a struggle against that evil, not for conciliation with it.

What about the majority resolution? It does not contain a word of censure for the traitors, or a single word about opportunism, but merely a simple *repetition* of the ideas expressed in the Basle resolution! One might think that nothing serious has happened, that an accidental and minor error has been made which calls merely for a *repetition* of the old decision, or that a disagreement has arisen which is inconsequent and not of principle, and can be *papered over*!

This is downright *mockery of* the International's decisions, mockery of the workers. As a matter of fact, the social-chauvinists wish nothing else but a simple *repetition* of the old decisions, if only nothing changes in practice. This is, in fact, a tacit and hypocritically disguised *amnesty* for the social-chauvinist adherents of most of the present

parties. We know that there are many who would follow this path and confine themselves to several Left phrases. However, their road is not for us. We have followed *a different* road, and will go on following it; we want to help the working-class movement and the *actual* construction of a working class party, in the spirit of irreconcilability towards opportunism and social-chauvinism.

Part of the German women delegates seem to have been afraid of a very clear resolution, for reasons relating only to the *tempo* of the development of the struggle against chauvinism within a single party, namely, their own. Such reasoning was obviously out of place and erroneous, since the international resolution did not and could not deal with either the speed or the concrete conditions of the struggle against social-chauvinism within the *individual* countries; in this respect, the autonomy of the various parties is beyond dispute. The proclamation was needed, from an international tribune, of an irrevocable break with social-chauvinism in the entire direction and character of Social-Democratic work. Instead of that, the majority resolution once more reiterated the old error, that of the Second International, which diplomatically veiled opportunism and the gap between word and deed. We repeat: *this* is a road we shall not take.

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

Written in the second half of May
and the first half of June 1915

Published in 1915 in the
journal *Kommunist* No. 1-2
Signed: *N. Lenin*

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The collapse of the International is sometimes taken to mean simply the formal aspect of the matter, namely, the interruption in international communication between the socialist parties of the belligerent countries, the impossibility of converting either an international conference or the International Socialist Bureau, etc. This is the point of view held by certain socialists in the small neutral countries, probably even by the majority of the official parties in those countries, and also by the opportunists and their defenders. With a frankness that deserves profound gratitude, this position was defended in the Russian press by Mr. V. Kosovsky, in No. 8 of the Bund's *Information Bulletin*, whose editors said nothing to indicate that they disagreed with the author. Let us hope that Mr. Kosovsky's defence of nationalism, in which he went so far as to justify the German Social-Democrats who voted for war credits, will help many a worker at last to realise the bourgeois-nationalist-character of the Bund.

To the class-conscious workers, socialism is a serious conviction, not a convenient screen to conceal petty-bourgeois conciliatory and nationalist-oppositional strivings. By the collapse of the International they understand the disgraceful treachery to their convictions which was displayed by most of the official Social-Democratic parties, treachery to the most solemn declarations in their speeches at the Stuttgart and Basle international congresses, and in the resolutions of these congresses, etc. Only those can fail to see this treachery who *do not wish* to do so or do not find it to their advantage to see it. If we would formulate the question in a scientific fashion, i.e., from the standpoint of class relations in modern society, we will have to state that most of the Social-Democratic parties, and at their head the German Party

first and foremost—the biggest and most influential party in the Second International—have taken sides with their General Staffs, their governments, and their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. This is an event of historic importance, one that calls for a most comprehensive analysis. It has long been conceded that, for all the horror and misery they entail, wars bring at least the following more or less important benefit—they ruthlessly reveal, unmask and destroy much that is corrupt, outworn and dead in human institutions. The European war of 1914-15 is doubtlessly beginning to do some good by revealing to the advanced class of the civilised countries what a foul and festering abscess has developed within its parties, and what an unbearably putrid stench comes from some source.

I

Is it a fact that the principal socialist parties of Europe have forsaken all their convictions and tasks? This, of course, is something that is readily discussed neither by the traitors nor those who are fully aware—or surmise—that they will have to be friendly and tolerant towards them. However unpleasant that may be to various "authorities" in the Second International or to their fellow-thinkers among the Russian Social-Democrats, we must face the facts and call things by their right names; we must tell the workers the truth.

Do any facts exist that show how the socialist parties regarded their tasks and their tactics before the present war and in anticipation of it? They undoubtedly do. There was the resolution adopted at the Basle International Socialist Congress of 1912, which we are reprinting together with the resolution adopted at the Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held in the same year,[118] as a reminder of socialism's forgotten ideals. This resolution, which summarises the vast anti-war propagandist and agitational literature in all countries, is a most complete and precise, a most solemn and formal exposition of socialist views on war and tactics towards war. One cannot but qualify as treachery the fact that none of the authorities of yesterday's

International and of today's social-chauvinism—neither Hyndman and Guesde, nor Kautsky and Plekhanov—dare remind their readers of that resolution. They are either silent about it, or (like Kautsky) quote excerpts of secondary importance and evade everything that is really of significance. On the one hand, the most "Left" and arch-revolutionary resolutions, and on the other, the most shameless forgetfulness or renunciation of these resolutions—this is one of the most striking manifestations of the International's collapse, and at the same time a most convincing proof that at present only those whose rare simplicity borders on a cunning desire to perpetuate the former hypocrisy can believe that socialism can be "rectified" and "its line straightened out" by means of resolutions alone.

Only yesterday, one might say, when, before the war, Hyndman turned towards a defence of imperialism, all "respectable" socialists considered him an unbalanced crank, of whom nobody spoke otherwise than in a tone of disdain. Today the most prominent Social-Democratic leaders of all countries have sunk entirely to Hyndman's position, differing from one another only in shades of opinion and in temperament. We are quite unable to find some more or less suitable parliamentary expression in appraising or characterising the civic courage of such persons as, for instance, the *Nashe Slovo* authors, who write of "Mr." Hyndman with contempt, while speaking—or saying nothing—of "Comrade" Kautsky with deference (or obsequiousness?). Can such an attitude be reconciled with a respect for socialism, and for one's convictions in general? If you are convinced that Hyndman's chauvinism is false and destructive, does it not follow that you should direct your criticism and attacks against Kautsky, the *more influential* and more dangerous defender of such views?

In perhaps greater detail than anywhere else, Guesde's views have recently been expressed by the Guesdist Charles Dumas, in a pamphlet entitled *The Peace That We Desire*. This "Chef du Cabinet de Jules Guesde", as he styles himself on the title-page of the pamphlet, naturally "quotes" the former patriotic declarations of the socialists (David, the German social-chauvinist, does the same in his latest pamphlet on defence of the fatherland), but he fails to refer to the

Basle Manifesto! Plekhanov, who utters chauvinist banalities with an extraordinarily smug air, is likewise silent on the Manifesto. Kautsky behaves just like Plekhanov: in quoting from the Basle Manifesto, he *omits* all the revolutionary passages (i.e., all the vital content!), probably on the pretext of the censorship regulations.... The police and the military authorities, whose censorship regulations forbid any mention of the class struggle or revolution, have rendered timely aid to the traitors to socialism!

Perhaps the Basle Manifesto is just an empty appeal, which is devoid of any definite content, either historical or tactical, with a direct bearing on the concrete war of today?

The reverse is true. The Basle resolution has less idle declamation and more definite content than other resolutions have. The Basle resolution speaks of the *very same* war that has now broken out, of the *imperialist* conflicts that have flared up in 1914-15. The conflicts between Austria and Serbia over the Balkans, between Austria and Italy over Albania, etc., between Britain and Germany over markets and colonies in general, between Russia and Turkey, etc., over Armenia and Constantinople—all this is what the Basle resolution speaks of in anticipation of the present war. It follows from that resolution that the *present* war between "the Great Powers of Europe" "*cannot be justified on the slightest pretext of being in the least in the interests of the people*".

And if Plekhanov and Kautsky—to take two of the most typical and authoritative socialists, who are well known to us, one of whom writes in Russian while the other is translated into Russian by the liquidators are now (with the aid of Axelrod) seeking all sorts of "popular justifications" for the war (or, rather, vulgar ones taken from the bourgeois gutter press) if, with a learned mien and with a stock of false quotations from Marx, they refer to "precedents", to the wars of 1813 and 1870 (Plekhanov), or of 1854-71, 1876-77, 1897 (Kautsky), then, in truth, only those without a shadow of socialist conviction, without a shred of socialist conscience, can take such arguments in earnest, can *fail* to call them otherwise than unparalleled Jesuitism, hypocrisy and the prostitution of socialism! Let the Executive (*Vorstand*) of the German Party anathematise Mehring and Rosa Luxem-

burg's new magazine (*Die Internationale*) for its honest criticism of Kautsky; let Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Hyndman and Co. treat their opponents in the same manner, with the aid of the police of the Allied Powers. We shall reply by simply reprinting the Basle Manifesto, which will show that the leaders have chosen a course that can only be called treachery.

The Basle resolution does not speak of a national or a people's war—examples of which have occurred in Europe, wars that were even typical of the period of 1789-1871—or of a revolutionary war, which Social-Democrats have never renounced, but of the *present* war, which is the outcome of "capitalist imperialism" and "dynastic interests", the outcome of "the policy of conquest" pursued by *both* groups of belligerent powers—the Austro-German and the Anglo-Franco-Russian. Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. are flagrantly deceiving the workers by repeating the selfish lie of the bourgeoisie of all countries, which is striving with all its might to depict this imperialist and predatory war for colonies as a people's war, a war of defence (for any side); when they seek to justify this war by citing historical examples of *non*-imperialist wars.

The question as to the imperialist, predatory and anti-proletarian character of the present war has long outgrown the purely theoretical stage. All the main features of imperialism have been theoretically assessed, as a struggle being waged by the senile and moribund bourgeoisie for the partition of the world and the enslavement of "small" nations; these conclusions have been repeated thousands of times in the vast socialist press in *all* countries; in his pamphlet *The Impending War* (*1911!*), for example, the Frenchman Delaisi, a representative of one of our "Allied" nations, has explained in simple terms the predatory character of the present war, with reference to the French bourgeoisie as well. But that is far from all. At Basle, representatives of the proletarian parties of all countries gave unanimous and formal expression to their unshakable conviction that a war of an imperialist character was impending, and drew *tactical* conclusions therefrom. For this reason, among others, we must flatly reject, as sophistry, all references to an inadequate discussion on the difference between national and international tactics

(see Axelrod's latest interview in *Nashe Slovo* Nos. 87 and 90), etc., etc. This is sophistry, because a comprehensive scientific analysis of imperialism is one thing—that analysis is only under way and, in essence, is as infinite as science itself. The principles of socialist tactics against capitalist imperialism, which have been set forth in millions of copies of Social-Democratic newspapers and in the decision of the International, are a quite different thing. Socialist parties are not debating clubs, but organisations of the fighting proletariat; when a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy, they must be named and branded as traitors; we must not allow ourselves to be taken in by hypocritical assertions that "not everybody understands imperialism in the same way", or that the chauvinist Kautsky and the chauvinist Cunow can write volumes about it, or that the question has not been "adequately discussed", etc., etc. Capitalism will *never* be completely and *exhaustively* studied in *all* the manifestations of its predatory nature, and in all the most minute ramifications of its historical development and national features. Scholars (and especially the pedants) will never stop arguing over-details. It would be ridiculous to give up the socialist struggle against capitalism and to desist from opposing, on such grounds, those who have betrayed that struggle. But what else are Kautsky, Cunow, Axelrod and their like inviting us to do?

Now, when war has broken out, no one has even attempted to examine the Basle resolution and prove that it is erroneous.

II

But perhaps sincere socialists supported the Basle resolution in the anticipation that war would create a revolutionary situation, the events rebutting them, as revolution has proved impossible?

It is by means of sophistry like this that Cunow (in a pamphlet *Collapse of the Party?* and a series of articles) has tried to justify his desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie. The writings of nearly all the other social-chauvinists, headed by Kautsky, hint at similar "arguments". Hopes for a revolution have proved illusory, and it is not

the business of a Marxist to fight for illusions, Cunow argues. This Struvist,[119] however, does not say a word about "illusions" that were shared by all signatories to the Basle Manifesto. Like a most upright man, he would put the blame on the extreme Leftists, such as Pannekoek and Radek!

Let us consider the substance of the argument that the authors of the Basle Manifesto sincerely expected the advent of a revolution, but were rebutted by the events. The Basle Manifesto says: (1) that war will create an economic and political crisis; (2) that the workers will regard their participation in war as a crime, and as criminal any "shooting each other down for the profit of the capitalists, for the sake of dynastic honour and of diplomatic secret treaties", and that war evokes "indignation and revolt" in the workers; (3) that it is the duty of socialists to take advantage of this crisis and of the workers' temper so as to "rouse the people and hasten the downfall of capitalism"; (4) that all "governments" without exception can start a war only at "their own peril"; (5) that governments '"are afraid of a proletarian revolution"; (6) that governments "should remember" the Paris Commune (i.e., civil war), the 1905 Revolution in Russia, etc. All these are perfectly clear ideas; they do not *guarantee* that revolution will take place, but lay stress on a precise characterisation of *facts* and *trends*. Whoever declares, with regard to these ideas and arguments, that the anticipated revolution has proved illusory, is displaying not a Marxist but a Struvist and police-renegade attitude towards revolution.

To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the "upper classes", a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for "the lower classes not to want" to live in the old

way; it is also necessary that "the upper classes should be unable" to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in "peace time", but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis *and by the "upper classes" themselves* into independent historical action.

Without these objective changes, which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation. Such a situation existed in 1905 in Russia, and in all revolutionary periods in the West; it also existed in Germany in the sixties of the last century, and in Russia in 1859-61 and 1879-80, although no revolution occurred in these instances. Why was that? It was because it is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary *class* to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, "falls", if it is not toppled over.

Such are the Marxist views on revolution, views that have been developed many, many times, have been accepted as indisputable by all Marxists, and for us, Russians, were corroborated in a particularly striking fashion by the experience of 1905. What, then, did the Basle Manifesto assume in this respect in 1912, and what took place in 1914-15?

It assumed that a revolutionary situation, which it briefly described as "an economic and political crisis", would arise. Has such a situation arisen? Undoubtedly, it has. The social-chauvinist Lensch, who defends chauvinism more candidly, publicly and honestly than the hypocrites Cunow, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co. do, has gone so far as to say: "What we are passing through is a kind of *revolution*" (p. 6 of his pamphlet, *German Social-Democracy and the War*, Berlin, 1915). A political crisis exists; no government is sure of the morrow,

not one is secure against the danger of financial collapse, loss of territory, expulsion from its country (in the way the Belgian Government was expelled). All governments are sleeping on a volcano; all are *themselves* calling for the masses to display initiative and heroism. The entire political regime of Europe has been shaken, and hardly anybody will deny that we have entered (and are entering ever deeper—I write this on the day of Italy's declaration of war) a period of immense political upheavals. When, two months after the declaration of war, Kautsky wrote (October 2, 1914, in *Die Neue Zeit*) that "never is government so strong, never are parties so weak as at the outbreak of a war", this was a sample of the falsification of historical science which Kautsky has perpetrated to please the Südekums and other opportunists. In the first place, never do governments stand in such need of agreement with all the parties of the ruling classes, or of the "peaceful" submission of the oppressed classes to that rule, as in the time of war. Secondly, even though "at the beginning of a war", and especially in a country that expects a speedy victory, the government *seems* all-powerful, nobody in the world has ever linked expectations of a revolutionary situation exclusively with the "beginning" of a war, and still less has anybody ever identified the "seeming" with the *actual*.

It was generally known, seen and admitted that a European war would be more severe than any war in the past. This is being borne out in ever greater measure by the experience of the war. The conflagration is spreading; the political foundations of Europe are being shaken more and more; the sufferings of the masses are appalling, the efforts of governments, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists to hush up these sufferings proving ever more futile. The war profits being obtained by certain groups of capitalists are monstrously high, and contradictions are growing extremely acute. The smouldering indignation of the masses, the vague yearning of society's downtrodden and ignorant strata for a kindly ("democratic") peace, the beginning of discontent among the "lower classes"—all these are facts. The longer the war drags on and the more acute it becomes, the more the governments themselves foster—and must foster—the activity of the masses, whom they call upon to make extraordinary effort and

self-sacrifice. The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and breaks some people, *but enlightens and tempers others*. Taken by and large, and considering the history of the world as a whole, the number and strength of the second kind of people have—with the exception of individual cases of the decline and fall of one state or another—proved greater than those of the former kind.

Far from "immediately" ending all these sufferings and all this enhancement of contradictions, the conclusion of peace will, in many respects, make those sufferings more keenly and immediately felt by the most backward masses of the population.

In a word, a revolutionary situation obtains in most of the advanced countries and the Great Powers of Europe. In this respect, the prediction of the Basle Manifesto has been *fully* confirmed. To deny this truth, directly or indirectly, or to ignore it, as Cunow, Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. have done, means telling a big lie, deceiving the working class, and serving the bourgeoisie. In *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Nos. 34, 40 and 41)* we cited facts which prove that those who *fear* revolution—petty-bourgeois Christian parsons, the General Staffs and millionaires' newspapers—are compelled to admit that symptoms of a revolutionary situation exist in Europe.

Will this situation last long; how much more acute will it become? Will it lead to revolution? This is something we do not know, and nobody can know. The answer can be provided only by the *experience* gained during the development of revolutionary sentiment and the transition to revolutionary action by the advanced class, the proletariat. There can be no talk in this connection about "illusions" or their repudiation, since no socialist has ever guaranteed that this war (and not the next one), that today's revolutionary situation (and not tomorrow's) will produce a revolution. What we are discussing is the indisputable and fundamental duty of all socialists—that of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat's revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over

* See pp. 92-93, 181-82 and 192-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

to revolutionary action, and forming, for that purpose, organisations suited to the revolutionary situation.

No influential or responsible socialist has ever dared to feel doubt that this is the duty of the socialist parties. Without spreading or harbouring the least "illusions", the Basle Manifesto spoke specifically of this duty of the socialists—to rouse and to stir up the people (and not to lull them with chauvinism, as Plekhanov, Axelrod and Kautsky have done), to take advantage of the crisis so as to *hasten* the downfall of capitalism, and to be guided by the *examples* of the Commune and of October-December 1905. The present parties' failure to perform that duty meant their treachery, political death, renunciation of their own role and desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie.

III

But how *could* it have happened that the most prominent representatives and leaders of the Second International have betrayed socialism? We shall deal with this question in detail later, after we have examined the attempts being made to give this treachery "theoretical" justification. We shall try to characterise the principal theories of social-chauvinism, of which Plekhanov (who in the main reiterates the arguments of the Anglo-French chauvinists, Hyndman and his new adherents) and Kautsky (who advances much more "subtle" arguments) with their semblance of far greater theoretical profundity may be regarded as representatives.

Perhaps the most primitive of these is the "who-started-it?" theory, which may be worded as follows: we have been attacked and are defending ourselves; the interests of the proletariat demand that the violators of the peace in Europe should be properly dealt with. This is merely a rehash of the declarations made by all governments and of the outcries of the bourgeois and the gutter press all over the world. Plekhanov embellishes even this threadbare piece of vulgarity with his inevitable Jesuitical reference to "dialectics": to be able to assess the concrete situation, he says, we must first of all find out who started it and punish him; all other problems will have to wait until another situation arises. (See Plekhanov's pamphlet, *The War*, Paris, 1914, and Axel-

rod's repetition of its arguments, in (*Golos* Nos. 86 and 87.) Plekhanov has set a new record in the noble sport of substituting sophistry for dialectics. The sophist grabs at one of many "arguments"; it was Hegel who long ago very properly observed that "arguments" can be found to prove anything in the world. Dialectics calls for a many-sided investigation into a given social phenomenon in its development, and for the external and the seeming to be reduced to the fundamental motive forces, to the development of the productive forces and to the class struggle. Plekhanov has plucked out a quotation from the German Social-Democratic press: the Germans themselves, before the war, admitted that Austria and Germany had "started it", he says, and there you are. He does not mention the fact that the Russian socialists repeatedly exposed the tsarist plans of conquest of Galicia, Armenia, etc. He does not make the slightest attempt to study the economic and diplomatic history of at least the past three decades, which history proves conclusively that the conquest of colonies, the looting of foreign countries, the ousting and ruining of the more successful rivals have been the backbone of the politics of *both* groups of the now belligerent powers.*

* Very instructive is *The War of Steel and Gold* (London 1914, a book dated March 1914!) by the British pacifist Brailsford, who is not averse to posing as a socialist. The author clearly realises that national problems are now in the background, and have been solved (p. 35), that this is not the issue of the day, that "the typical question of modern diplomacy" (p. 36) is the Baghdad railway, the contracts for rails for it, the Moroccan mines, and the like. The author correctly considers as one of the "most instructive incidents in the recent history of European diplomacy" the fact that French patriots and British imperialists fought against Caillaux's attempts (in 1911 and 1913) to come to terms with Germany on the basis of an agreement on the division of spheres of colonial influence and the quotation of German securities on the Paris Bourse. The *British* and the *French* bourgeoisie *frustrated* such an agreement (pp. 38-40). The aim of imperialism is the export of capital to the weaker countries (p. 74). In Britain, the profits from such capital totalled between £90,000,000 and £100,000,000 in 1899 (Giffen), and £140,000,000 in 1909 (Paish); we would add that, in a recent speech, Lloyd George calculated it at £200,000,000, which is almost 2,000 million rubles. Unsavoury machinations and bribing of high-ranking Turks, and cushy jobs in India and Egypt for the younger sons of the British aristocracy, such are the main features (pp. 85-87). An insignificant minority gains from armaments and wars, he says, but that minority is backed by "society" and the financiers, whereas behind the adherents

With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics, which has been so shamelessly distorted by Plekhanov to please the bourgeoisie, is that "*war is simply the continuation of politics by other* [i.e., violent] *means*". Such is the formula of Clausewitz,* one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose thinking was stimulated by Hegel. And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded *any* war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned—and the *various classes* within these countries—in a definite period.

Plekhanov's crude chauvinism is based on exactly the same theoretical stand as the more subtle and saccharo-conciliatory chauvinism of Kautsky, who uses the following arguments when he gives his blessing to the desertion of the socialists of all countries to the side of their "own" capitalists:

> It is the right and duty of everyone to defend his fatherland; true internationalism consists in this right being recognised for the socialists of all nations, including those who are at war with my nation.... (See *Die Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914, and other works by the same author.)

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of peace there is a disunited population (p. 93). A pacifist who today talks about peace and disarmament tomorrow proves to be a member of a party wholly dependent on the war contractors (p. 161). If the Triple Entente wins, it will grab Morocco and partition Persia; if the Triple Alliance wins, it will take over Tripoli, strengthen its hold on Bosnia and subordinate Turkey (p. 167). In March 1906, London and Paris provided Russia with thousands of millions, and helped tsarism crush the movement for freedom (pp. 225-28); today Britain is helping Russia to throttle Persia (p. 229). Russia instigated the Balkan War (p. 230).

There is nothing novel about this, is there? All this is common knowledge and has been reiterated a thousand times in Social-Democratic newspapers all over the world. On the eve of the war, a British bourgeois sees all this as clearly as can be. Against the background of these simple and universally known facts, what drivelling nonsense, what smug hypocrisy, what glib lies are the theories advanced by Plekhanov and Potresov concerning Germany's guilt, or Kautsky's theory concerning the "prospects" of disarmament and a lasting peace under capitalism!

* Karl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Werke, I. Bd., S. 28. Cf. III. Bd., S. 139-40: "All know that wars are caused only by the political relations of governments and of nations; but ordinarily one pictures the situation as if, with the beginning of the war, these relations cease and a totally new situation is created, which follows its own laws. We assert, on the contrary, that war is nothing but the continuation of political relations, with the intervention of other means."

This matchless reasoning is such an unutterable travesty of socialism that the best answer to it would be to strike a medal with the portraits of Wilhelm II and Nicholas II on one side and of Plekhanov and Kautsky on the other. True internationalism, we are told, means that we must justify German workers firing at French workers, and French workers firing at German workers, in the name of "defence of the fatherland"!

However, closer examination of the theoretical premises in Kautsky's reasoning will reveal the selfsame idea that Clausewitz ridiculed about eighty years ago, viz., that when war breaks out, all historically created political relations between nations and classes cease and that a totally new situation arises! There are "simply" those that attack and those that are defending themselves, "simply" the warding off of the "enemies of the fatherland"! The oppression of a number of nations which comprise over half the population of the globe, by the dominant imperialist nations; the rivalry between the bourgeoisie of these countries for a share of the loot; the desire of the capitalists to split and suppress the working-class movement—all these have suddenly disappeared from the pen of Plekhanov and Kautsky, although they themselves were describing these very "politics" for decades before the war.

In this connection, false references to Marx and Engels are the crowning argument of these two chieftains of social-chauvinism; Plekhanov recalls Prussia's national war of 1813 and Germany's national war of 1870, while Kautsky argues, with a most learned air, that Marx examined the question of whose success (i.e., the success of which bourgeoisie) was more desirable in the wars of 1854-55, 1859 and 1870-71, and that the Marxists did likewise in the wars of 1876-77 and 1897. In all times the sophists have been in the habit of citing instances that refer to situations that are dissimilar in principle. The wars of the past, to which they make references, were a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeoisie's national movements of many years' standing, movements against an alien yoke and against absolutism (Turkish or Russian). At that time the only question was: the success of which bourgeoisie was to be preferred; for wars of this type, the Marxists could *rouse* the peoples *in advance*,

fostering national hatred, as Marx did in 1848 and later, when he called for a war against Russia, and as Engels in 1859 fostered German national hatred of their oppressors—Napoleon III and Russian tsarism.*

Comparing the "continuation of the politics" of combating feudalism and absolutism—the politics of the bourgeoisie in its struggle for liberty—with the "continuation of the politics" of a decrepit, *i.e.*, imperialist, bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, of a bourgeoisie which has plundered the entire world, a reactionary bourgeoisie which, in alliance with feudal landlords, attempts to crush the proletariat, means comparing chalk and cheese. It is like comparing the "representatives of the bourgeoisie", Robespierre, Garibaldi and Zhelyabov, with such "representatives of the bourgeoisie" as Millerand, Salandra and Guchkov. One cannot be a Marxist without feeling the deepest respect for the great bourgeois revolutionaries who had an historic right to speak for their respective bourgeois "fatherlands", and, in the struggle against feudalism, led tens of millions of people in the new nations towards a civilised life. Neither can one be a Marxist without feeling contempt for the sophistry of Plekhanov and Kautsky, who speak of the "defence of the fatherland" with regard to the throttling of Belgium by the German imperialists, or with regard to the pact between the imperialists of Britain, France, Russia and Italy on the plundering of Austria and Turkey.

There is another "Marxist" theory of social-chauvinism, which runs as follows: socialism is based on the rapid development of capitalism; the development of capitalism in my

* Mr. Gardenin in *Zhizn*[120] labels as "revolutionary chauvinism"—but chauvinism—Marx's stand in 1848 for revolutionary war against the European nations which in fact had shown themselves to be counter-revolutionary, viz., "the Slavs and the Russians in particular". This reproof of Marx reveals once again the opportunism (or—properly speaking *and*—the inconsequence) of this "Left" Socialist-Revolutionary. We Marxists have always stood, and still stand, for a *revolutionary* war against *counter-revolutionary* nations. For instance, if socialism is *victorious* in America or in Europe in 1920, and Japan and China, let us say, *then* move their Bismarcks against us—if only diplomatically at first—we certainly would be *in favour* of an offensive revolutionary war against them. It seems strange to you, Mr. Gardenin? But then you are a revolutionary of the Ropshin type!

country, and consequently the advent of socialism there will be speeded up by her victory; my country's defeat will retard her economic development and consequently the advent of socialism. In Russia this Struvist theory has been developed by Plekhanov, and among the Germans by Lensch and others. Kautsky argues against this crude theory—against Lensch, who defends it overtly, and against Gunow, who defends it covertly; his sole purpose, however, is to reconcile the social-chauvinists of all countries on the basis of a more subtle and more Jesuitical chauvinist theory.

We need not dwell on this crude theory. Struve's *Critical Notes* appeared in 1894, and during the past twenty years Russian Social-Democrats have become thoroughly familiar with this habit of the enlightened Russian bourgeois of advancing their ideas and advocating their desires under the cloak of a "Marxism" *purged* of revolutionary content. Struvism is not merely a Russian, but, as recent events clearly prove, an international striving on the part of the bourgeois theoreticians to kill Marxism with "kindness", to crush it in their embraces, kill it with a feigned acceptance of "all" the "truly scientific" aspects and elements of Marxism *except* its "agitational", "demagogic", "Blanquist-utopian" aspect. In other words, they take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, including the struggle for reforms, the class struggle (without the proletarian dictatorship), the "general" recognition of "socialist ideals" and the substitution of a "new order" for capitalism; they cast aside "only" the living soul of Marxism, "only" its revolutionary content.

Marxism is the theory of the proletarian movement for emancipation. It is clear, therefore, that the class-conscious workers must pay the utmost attention to any substitution of Struvism for Marxism. The motive forces in this process are varied and manifold. We shall indicate only the three main forces: (1) the development of science is providing more and more material that proves that Marx was right. This makes it necessary to fight against him hypocritically—not to oppose the principles of Marxism openly, but to pretend to accept Marxism, while emasculating it by sophistry and turning it into a holy "icon" that is harmless to the bourgeoisie. (2) The development of opportunism among the Social-Democratic parties fosters such a re-fashioning of

Marxism, and adjusts it for a justification of all kinds of concessions to opportunism. (3) The epoch of imperialism is one in which the world is divided among the "great" privileged nations that oppress all other nations. Morsels of the loot obtained as a result of these privileges and this oppression undoubtedly fall to the share of certain sections of the petty bourgeoisie and to the working-class aristocracy and bureaucracy. These strata, which form an insignificant minority of the proletariat and of the toiling masses, gravitate towards "Struvism", because it provides them with a justification of their alliance with their "own" national bourgeoisie, against the oppressed masses of *all* nations. We shall have occasion to deal with this later, in connection with the causes of the collapse of the International.

IV

The most subtle theory of social-chauvinism; one that has been most skilfully touched up to look scientific and international, is the theory of "ultra-imperialism" advanced by Kautsky. Here is the clearest, most precise and most recent exposition of this theory in the words of the author himself:

"The subsiding of the Protectionist movement in Britain, the lowering of tariffs in America; the trend towards disarmament; the rapid decline in the export of capital from France and Germany in the years immediately preceding the war; finally, the growing international interweaving between the various cliques of finance capital—all this has caused me to consider whether the present imperialist policy cannot be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capital. Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question..." (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 5, April 30, 1915, p. 144).

"The course and the outcome of the present war may prove decisive in this respect. It may entirely crush the weak beginnings of ultra-imperialism by fanning to the highest degree national hatred also among the finance capitalists, by intensifying the armaments race, and by making a second world war inevitable. Under such conditions, the thing I foresaw and formulated in my pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, would come true in horrifying dimensions; class antagonisms would become sharper and sharper and with it would come the moral decay

[literally: "going out of business, *Abwirtschaftung*", bankruptcy] of capitalism.... [It must be noted that by this pretentious word Kautsky means simply the "hatred" which the "strata intermediary between the proletariat and finance capital", namely, "the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeois, even small capitalists", feel towards capitalism.] But the war may end otherwise. It may lead to the strengthening of the weak beginnings of ultra-imperialism.... Its lessons [note this!] may hasten developments for which we would have to wait a long time under peace conditions. If it does lead to this, to an agreement between nations, disarmament and a lasting peace, then the worst of the causes that led to the growing moral decay of capitalism before the war may disappear." The new phase will, of course, bring the proletariat "new misfortunes", "perhaps even worse", but "for a time", "ultra-imperialism" "could create an era of new hopes and expectations within the framework of capitalism" (p. 145).

How is a justification of social-chauvinism deduced from this "theory"?

In a way rather strange for a "theoretician", namely as follows:

The Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany say that imperialism and the wars it engenders are not accidental, but an inevitable product of capitalism, which has brought about the domination of finance capital. It is therefore necessary to go over to the revolutionary mass struggle, as the period of comparatively peaceful development has ended. The "Right"-wing Social-Democrats brazenly declare: since imperialism is "necessary", we too must be imperialists. Kautsky, in the role of the "Centre", tries to reconcile these two views.

"The extreme Lefts," he writes in his pamphlet, *The National State, the Imperialist State and the League of States* (Nuremberg, 1915), wish to "contrapose" socialism to inevitable imperialism, i.e., "not only the propaganda for socialism that we have been carrying on for half a century in contraposition to all forms of capitalist domination, but the immediate achievement of socialism. This seems very radical, but it can only serve *to drive* into the camp of imperialism *anyone* who *does not believe* in the immediate practical achievement of socialism" (p. 17, italics ours).

When he speaks of the immediate achievement of socialism, Kautsky is resorting to a subterfuge, for he takes advantage of the fact that in Germany, especially under the military censorship, revolutionary action cannot be spoken of. Kautsky is well aware that the Left wing is demanding of the Party *immediate* propaganda in favour of and prepara-

tion for, revolutionary action, not the "immediate practical achievement of socialism".

From the necessity of imperialism the Left wing deduces the necessity of revolutionary action. The "theory of ultra-imperialism", however, serves Kautsky as a means *to justify the opportunists*, to present the situation in such a light as to create the impression that they have not gone over to the bourgeoisie but simply "do not believe" that socialism can arrive immediately, and expect that a new "era" of disarmament and lasting peace "may be" ushered in. This "theory" boils down, and can *only* boil down, to the following: Kautsky is exploiting the *hope* for a *new* peaceful era of capitalisms as to justify the adhesion of the opportunists and the official Social-Democratic parties to the bourgeoisie, and their rejection of revolutionary, i.e., proletarian, tactics in the *present stormy era*, this despite the solemn declarations of the Basle resolution!

At the same time Kautsky does not say that this new phase follows, and necessarily so, from certain definite circumstances and conditions. On the contrary, he states quite outspokenly that he cannot yet even decide whether or not this new phase is "*achievable*". Indeed, consider the "trends" towards the new era, which have been indicated by Kautsky. Astonishingly enough, the author has included among the economic facts "the trend towards disarmament"! This means that, behind innocent philistine talk and pipe-dreaming, Kautsky is trying to hide from indisputable facts that do not at all fit in with the theory of the mitigation of contradictions. Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism"—this term, incidentally does not at all express what the author wants to say—implies a tremendous *mitigation* of the contradictions of capitalism. We are told that Protectionism is subsiding in Britain and America. But where is there the least trend towards a new era? Extreme Protectionism is now subsiding in America, but Protectionism remains, just as the privileges, the preferential tariffs favouring Britain, have remained in that country's colonies. Let us recall what the passage from the previous and "peaceful" period of capitalism to the present and imperialist period has been based on: free competition has yielded to monopolist capitalist combines, and the world has been partitioned. Both these facts (and

factors) are obviously of world-wide significance: Free Trade and peaceful competition were possible and necessary as long as capital was in a position to enlarge its colonies without hindrance, and seize unoccupied land in Africa, etc., and as long as the concentration of capital was still weak and no monopolist concerns existed, i.e., concerns of a magnitude permitting domination in an *entire* branch of industry. The appearance and growth of such monopolist concerns (has this process been stopped in Britain or America? Not even Kautsky will dare deny that the war has accelerated and intensified it) have rendered the free competition of former times *impossible*; they have cut the ground from under its feet, while the partition of the world *compels* the capitalists to go over from peaceful expansion to an armed struggle for the *repartitioning* of colonies and spheres of influence. It is ridiculous to think that the *subsiding* of Protectionism in two countries can change anything in this respect.

Let us further examine the fall in capital exports from two countries in the course of a few years. In 1912 these two countries, France and Germany, each had about 35,000 million marks (about 17,000 million rubles) of foreign investments, this according to Harms's statistics, while Britain alone had twice that sum.* The increase in exports of capital has never proceeded evenly under capitalism, nor could that have been so. Kautsky dares not even suggest that the accumulation of capital has decreased, or that the capacity of the home market has undergone any important change, say through a big improvement in the conditions of the masses. In these circumstances, the fall in capital exports from two countries over several years cannot imply the advent of a new era.

"The growing international interweaving between the cliques of finance capital" is the only really general and indubitable tendency, not during the last few years and in two countries, but throughout the whole capitalist world. But

* See Bernhard Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena, 1912; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments in the Colonies, etc." in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910/11, p. 167. Lloyd George, in a speech early in 1915, estimated British capital invested abroad at £4,000,000,000, i.e., about 80,000,000,000 marks.

why should this trend engender a striving towards disarmament, not armaments, as hitherto? Take any one of the world-famous cannon (and arms) manufacturers, Armstrong, for instance. The British *Economist* (May 1, 1915) published figures showing that this firm's *profits* rose from £606,000 (about 6,000,000 rubles) in 1905/6 to £856,000 in 1913, and to £940,000 (*9,000,000 rubles*) in 1914. Here, the intertwining of finance capital is most pronounced, and is on the increase, German capitalists have "holdings" in British firms; British firms build submarines for Austria, and so on. Interlinked on a world-wide scale, capital is thriving on armaments and wars. To think that the fact of capital in the individual states combining and interlinking on an international scale must of necessity produce an economic trend towards disarmament means, in effect, allowing well-meaning philistine expectations of an easing of class contradictions take the place of the actual intensification of those contradictions.

V

It is in a wholly philistine spirit that Kautsky speaks of the "lessons" of the war, presenting those lessons in the light of a moral abhorrence at the misery it causes. Here, for instance, is how he argues in the pamphlet entitled *The National State*, *etc.*:

> "It stands beyond doubt and needs no proof that there are strata of the population that are greatly interested in universal peace and disarmament. The petty bourgeoisie and the small peasants, and even many capitalists and intellectuals, are not tied to imperialism by any interests that outweigh the damage suffered by these strata as a result of war and armaments" (p. 21).

This was written in February 1915! The facts show that all the propertied classes, down to the petty bourgeoisie and the "intelligentsia", have joined the imperialists *en masse*, and yet Kautsky, like Chekhov's man in a muffler[121] shrugs off the facts with an air of extraordinary smugness and with the aid of saccharine phrases. He judges of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, not by their *conduct*, but by the *words* of certain petty bourgeois, although at every step

such words are refuted by the deeds. It is exactly like judging of the "interests" of the bourgeoisie in general, not by their deeds, but by the benevolent speeches made by bourgeois clergymen who avow that the present-day system is imbued with the ideals of Christianity. Kautsky applies Marxism in a way that voids it of all content, so that what remains is the catchword of "interests", in a kind of supernatural, otherworldly meaning, for it implies, not real economics, but pious wishes for the common weal.

Marxism appraises "interests" according to the class antagonisms and the class struggle which find expression in millions of facts of daily life. The petty bourgeoisie prattle and dream of the abatement of antagonisms, whose aggravation, they "argue", leads to "harmful consequences". Imperialism means the subjugation of all strata of the propertied classes to finance capital, and the partition of the world among five or six "Great" Powers, most of which are now involved in the war. The partition of the world among the Great Powers means that all their propertied classes *are interested* in possessing colonies and spheres of influence, in oppressing other nations, and in securing the more or less lucrative posts and privileges that stem from belonging to a "Great" Power and an oppressor nation.*

Life *cannot* go on in the old way, in the comparatively tranquil, cultured and peaceful conditions of a capitalism that is smoothly developing and gradually spreading to new countries. A new epoch has arrived. Finance capital *ousts*, and will completely oust, a particular country from the

* E. Schultze states that by 1915 the value of securities in the whole world was calculated at 732,000 million francs, including state and municipal loans, the mortgages and shares of commercial and manufacturing corporations, etc. Of this sum, Britain's share was 130,000 million francs, that of the United States 115,000 million, France 100,000 million and Germany 75,000 million, i.e., the share of all four Great Powers being 420,000 million francs, over half the total. From this one can realise the advantages and privileges accruing to the leading Great Powers, which have outstripped other nations oppressing and plundering the latter. (Dr. Ernst Schultze, *Das französische Kapital in Russland* in *Finanz-Archiv*, Berlin, 1915, 32nd year of publication, p. 127.) To a Great Power "defence of the fatherland" means defence of the right to share in the plundering of foreign countries. In Russia, as is common knowledge, capitalist imperialism is weaker than military-feudal imperialism is.

ranks of Great Powers, will deprive it of its colonies and spheres of influence (as Germany, which has gone to war with Britain, threatens to do), and it will deprive the petty bourgeoisie of their dominant-nation privileges and additional incomes. This has been proved by the war. It is the *outcome* of that aggravation of antagonisms which has long been admitted by all, including Kautsky, in his pamphlet *The Road to Power*.

Now that the armed conflict for Great-Power privileges has become a fact, Kautsky wants to *persuade* the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie to believe that war is horrible, while disarmament is beneficial, in exactly the same way and with exactly the same results as the Christian churchman, speaking from the pulpit, would persuade the capitalist to believe that love of one's fellow-men is a Divine commandment, as well as the spiritual yearning and the moral law of civilisation. What Kautsky calls an economic trend towards "ultra-imperialism" is just a petty-bourgeois *exhortation* to the financiers that they should refrain from doing evil.

The export of capital? *But* more capital is exported to independent countries such as the United States of America, than to the colonies. The seizure of colonies? *But* they have all been seized, and nearly all of them are striving for liberation. "India may cease to be a British possession, but as an integral empire it will never fall under the sway of another foreign power" (p. 49 in the pamphlet quoted). "Any attempt on the part of any industrial capitalist state to acquire for itself a colonial empire sufficient to make it independent of other countries in regard to raw materials must cause all other capitalist states to unite against it and involve it in endless and exhausting wars, without bringing it nearer to its goal. Such a policy would be the surest road towards the bankruptcy of the entire economic life of that state" (pp. 72-73).

Is not this a philistine attempt to persuade financiers to renounce imperialism? Any attempt to frighten capitalists with the prospect of bankruptcy is like advising against speculating in shares on the Stock Exchange because many fortunes have been lost in this way. Capital *gains* from the bankruptcy of a rival capitalist or of a rival

nation, because in this way capital becomes more concentrated. Hence the keener and "closer" economic competition becomes, i.e., the economic driving of a competitor towards bankruptcy, the more the capitalists strive to add *military* pressure in order to drive the competitor in that direction. The fewer the countries to which capital can still be exported as advantageously as to colonies or to such dependent states as Turkey—since in *such* cases the financier reaps a triple profit as against capital exports to a free, independent and civilised country like the United States of America—the *fiercer* is the struggle for the subjugation and partition of Turkey, China, etc. That is what economic theory reveals about the period of finance capital and imperialism. That is what the facts reveal. But Kautsky turns everything into a trite petty-bourgeois "moral": it is not worth while getting worked up and certainly not worth while going to war over the partition of Turkey, or the seizure of India, since they cannot be held for long anyway, and, moreover, it would be better to develop capitalism peacefully.... It would be better still, of course, to develop capitalism and expand the home market by increasing wages; this is quite "conceivable" and it is a very fitting topic for a churchman to preach on to the financiers.... The good Kautsky has almost succeeded in persuading the German financiers that it is not worth while waging war against Britain for the colonies, because these colonies will soon secure their liberation in any case!

Britain's exports to and imports from Egypt between 1872 and 1912 have not kept pace with the overall growth of British exports and imports, whence the "Marxist" Kautsky draws the following moral: "We have no reason to suppose that British trade with Egypt would have been less developed as a result of the mere operation of economic factors, without military occupation" (p. 72). "Capital's urge to expand ... can be *best* promoted, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but *by peaceful democracy*" (p. 70).

What a remarkably serious, scientific and "Marxist" analysis! Kautsky has splendidly "rectified" unreasonable history; he has "proved" that there was no need for the British to have taken Egypt from the French, that it was absolutely not worth the German financiers' while to have started the war, organised the Turkish campaign, and taken other meas-

ures to drive the British out of Egypt! All this is merely a misunderstanding—it has not yet dawned upon the British that it would be "best" to give up forcible methods in Egypt, and adopt "peaceful democracy" (so as to increase exports of capital *à la Kautsky*!).

"Of course it was an illusion on the part of the bourgeois Free-Traders to think that Free Trade would entirely eliminate the economic antagonisms generated by capitalism. Neither Free Trade nor democracy can eliminate these. We, in all respects are interested in having these antagonisms eliminated by a struggle waged in such forms as will impose the least amount of suffering and sacrifice on the masses" (p. 73)

The Lord help us, the Lord have mercy on us! "What is a philistine?" Lassalle used to ask, and answered by quoting the words of the well-known poet: "A philistine is a gut void of everything but fear and hope that God will have mercy on him."[122]

Kautsky has degraded Marxism to unparalleled prostitution and has turned into a real churchman. The latter tries to *persuade* the capitalists to adopt peaceful democracy—and calls this dialectics: if at first, he argues, there was Free Trade, and then arrived the monopolies and imperialism, why should there not he "ultra-imperialism", and then Free Trade again? The churchman *consoles* the oppressed masses by depicting the blessings this "ultra-imperialism" will bring, although he has not even the courage to say whether it can be "achieved"! Feuerbach was right when, in reply to those who defended religion on the ground that it consoles the people, he indicated the reactionary significance of consolation: whoever consoles the slave instead of arousing him to rise up against slavery is aiding the slave-owner.

All oppressing classes stand in need of two social functions to safeguard their rule: the function of the hangman and the function of the priest. The hangman is required to quell the protests and the indignation of the oppressed; the priest is required to console the oppressed, to depict to them the prospects of their sufferings and sacrifices being mitigated (this is particularly easy to do without guaranteeing that these prospects will be "achieved"), while preserving class rule, and thereby to reconcile them to class rule, win them away

from revolutionary action, undermine their revolutionary spirit and destroy their revolutionary determination. Kautsky has turned Marxism into a most hideous and stupid counter-revolutionary theory, into the lowest kind of clericalism.

In 1909, he acknowledged, in his *The Road to Power*, the fact of the unrefuted and irrefutable intensification of antagonisms within capitalism, the approach of a period of wars and revolutions, of a new "revolutionary period". There can be no "premature" revolution, he said, and branded as "a direct betrayal of our cause" any refusal to count on the possibility of victory in an uprising, even though, before the fighting began, the prospect of defeat could not be denied.

With the advent of war, the antagonisms have become *still* more bitter. The sufferings of the masses have assumed tremendous proportions. The end of the war is not in sight and the hostilities are spreading more and more. Kautsky is writing pamphlet after pamphlet and, meekly submitting to the dictates of the censorship, refrains from quoting the facts on the land-grabbing, the horrors of war, the scandalous profiteering of the war contractors, the high cost of living and the actual slavery of the workers mobilised in the munitions industries; instead, he keeps on consoling the proletariat. He does so by quoting the instance of wars in which the bourgeoisie was revolutionary and progressive, in regard to which "Marx himself" desired victory for one bourgeoisie or the other; he consoles it by quoting rows and columns of figures to prove that capitalism is "possible" without colonies, without the plundering of others, without wars and armaments, and to prove that "peaceful democracy" is preferable. Not daring to deny that the sufferings of the masses are becoming more acute and that a revolutionary situation is arising before our very eyes (one must not talk about this, since it is not permitted by the censor!), Kautsky, in his servility to the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, depicts the "prospect" (he does *not guarantee* that it can be "achieved") of forms of struggle in a new phase, which will entail "less sacrifice and suffering".... Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg were quite right when, for this very reason, they called Kautsky a street-walker (*Mädchen für alle*).

* * *

In August 1905 a revolutionary situation existed in Russia. The tsar had promised convocation of the Bulygin Duma[123] in order to "console" the masses who were in a state of unrest. If the abandoning of armaments by the financiers and their agreeing to a "lasting peace" can be called "ultra-imperialism", then the Bulygin regime of consultative parliamentary representation may be described as "ultra-autocracy". Let us assume for a moment that tomorrow a hundred of the world's biggest financiers, "interwoven" as they are in hundreds of colossal enterprises, will *promise* the peoples that they will stand for disarmament after the war (we make this assumption only for a moment in order to draw political conclusions from Kautsky's foolish little theory). Even if that happened, it would be downright treachery to the proletariat to dissuade it from taking revolutionary action, without which all promises and all fine prospects are only a mirage.

The war has not only brought the capitalist class huge profits and splendid prospects of fresh plunder (Turkey, China, etc.), new contracts worth thousands of millions and new loans at increased rates of interest; it has also brought the capitalist class still greater political advantages in that it has split and corrupted the proletariat. Kautsky is encouraging this corruption; he sanctifies this international *split* among the militant proletarians *in the name of unity* with the opportunists of their "own" nations, with the Südekums! And yet there are people who fail to understand that the unity slogan of the old parties means the "unity" of the proletariat of a given nation with the bourgeoisie of that nation, and a *split* among the proletariat of the various nations....

VI

The preceding lines had already been written when *Die Neue Zeit* of May 28 (No. 9) appeared with Kautsky's concluding arguments on the collapse of Social-Democracy" (Section 7 of his reply to Cunow). Kautsky sums up all his old sophisms, and a new one, in defence of social-chauvinism as follows:

"It is simply untrue to say that the war is a purely imperialist one, that at the outbreak of the war the alternative was either imperialism or socialism, that the socialist parties and the proletarian masses of Germany, France and, in many respects, also of Britain, unthinkingly and at the mere call of a handful of parliamentarians, threw themselves into the arms of imperialism, betrayed socialism and thus caused a collapse unexampled in history."

A new sophism and a new deception of the workers: the war, if you please, is not a "purely" imperialist one!

Kautsky vacillates amazingly on the question of the character and significance of the present war; this party leader evades the precise and formal declarations of the Basle and Chemnitz congresses, as studiedly as a thief keeps away from the place where he has just committed a theft. In his pamphlet, *The National State*, *etc.*, written in February 1915, Kautsky asserted that "still, in the final analysis", the war is an "imperialist one" (p. 64). Now a fresh reservation is introduced: it is not a *purely* imperialist war. What else can it he?

It appears that it is also a national war! Kautsky arrives at this monstrous conclusion by means of the following "Plekhanovist" pseudo-dialectic:

"The present war is not only the child of imperialism, but also of the Russian revolution." As early as 1904, he, Kautsky, foresaw that the Russian revolution would revive Pan-Slavism in a new form, that "democratic Russia would, inevitably, greatly fan the desire of the Austrian and Turkish Slavs for national independence.... Then the Polish question would also become acute.... Austria would fall apart because, with the collapse of tsarism, the iron band which at present binds the centrifugal elements together would be destroyed" (Kautsky himself quotes this last phrase from his 1904 article). "The Russian revolution ... gave a new and powerful impetus to the national aspirations of the East, adding Asia's problems to those of Europe. *All these problems* are making themselves very strongly felt in the *present* war and are acquiring very decisive significance for the mood of the masses *of the people*, including the *proletarian* masses, whereas among the ruling classes imperialist tendencies are predominant" (p. 273, italics ours).

This is another sample of the prostitution of Marxism! *Inasmuch as* a "democratic Russia" would foster a striving towards freedom in the nations of Eastern Europe (this is indisputable), the present war, which will not liberate a single nation, but, whatever the outcome, will enslave many nations, is not a "purely" imperialist war. *Inasmuch as* the "collapse of tsarism" would mean the disintegration of Austria,

owing to its undemocratic national structure, a temporarily strengthened, and counter-revolutionary tsarism, which is plundering Austria and is bringing *still greater* oppression to the nations inhabiting Austria, has given "the present war", not a purely imperialist character but, to a certain degree, a national character. *Inasmuch as* "the ruling classes" are deluding the stupid petty bourgeois and browbeaten peasants with fables about the national aims of the imperialist war, a man of science, an authority on "Marxism", and representative of the Second International, is entitled to reconcile the masses to this deception by means of a "formula" which claims that the ruling classes reveal imperialist tendencies, while the "people" and the proletarian masses reveal "national" aspirations.

Dialectic is turned into the meanest and basest sophistry!

In the present war the national element is represented *only* by Serbia's war against Austria (which, by the way, was noted in the resolution of our Party's Berne Conference).* It is only in Serbia and among the Serbs that we can find a national-liberation movement of long standing, embracing millions, "the masses of the people", a movement of which the present war of Serbia against Austria is a "continuation". If this war were an isolated one, i.e., if it were not connected with the general European war, with the selfish and predatory aims of Britain, Russia, etc., it would have been the *duty* of all socialists to desire the success of the Serbian *bourgeoisie*—this is the only correct and absolutely inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the national element in the present war. However it is this conclusion that the sophist Kautsky, who is now in the service of the Austrian bourgeoisie, clericals and militarists, has failed to draw.

Further, Marxist dialectics, as the last word in the scientific-evolutionary method, excludes any isolated examination of an object, i.e., one that is one-sided and monstrously distorted. The national element in the Serbo-Austrian war is not, and cannot be, of *any* serious significance in the general European war. If Germany wins, she will throttle Belgium, one more part of Poland, perhaps part of France, etc. If Russia wins, she will throttle Galicia, one more part of

* See p. 159 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Poland, Armenia, etc. If the war ends in a "draw", the old national oppression will remain. To Serbia, i.e., to perhaps one per cent or so of the participants in the present war, the war is a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeois-liberation movement. To the other ninety-nine per cent, the war is a continuation of the politics of imperialism, i.e., of the decrepit bourgeoisie, which is capable only of raping nations, not freeing them. The Triple Entente, which is "liberating" Serbia, is *selling* the interests of Serbian liberty to Italian imperialism in return for the latter's aid in robbing Austria.

All this, which is common knowledge, has been unblushingly distorted by Kautsky to justify the opportunists. There are *no* "pure" phenomena, nor can there be, either in Nature or in society—that is what Marxist dialectics teaches us, for dialectics shows that the very concept of purity indicates a certain narrowness, a one-sidedness of human cognition, which cannot embrace an object in all its totality and complexity. There is no "pure" capitalism in the world, nor can there be; what we always find is *admixtures* either of feudalism, philistinism, or of something else. Therefore, if anyone recalls that the war is not "purely" imperialist, when we are discussing the flagrant deception of "the masses of the people" by the imperialists, who are deliberately concealing the aims of undisguised robbery with "national" phraseology, then such a person is either an infinitely stupid pedant, or a pettifogger and deceiver. The whole point is that Kautsky is *supporting* the deception of the people by the imperialists when he asserts that to "the masses of the people, including the proletarian masses", the problems of national liberation were "of decisive significance" *whereas* to the ruling classes the decisive factors were "imperialist tendencies" (p. 273), and when he "reinforces" this with an alleged dialectical reference to the "infinite variety of reality" (p. 274). Certainly, reality is infinitely varied. That is absolutely true! But it is equally indubitable that amidst this infinite variety there are two main and fundamental strains: the objective content of the war is a "continuation of the politics" of imperialism, i.e., the plunder of other nations by the decrepit bourgeoisie of the "Great Powers" (and their governments), whereas the prevailing "subjective"

ideology consists of "national" phraseology which is being spread to fool the masses.

Kautsky's old sophism, repeated time and again, claiming that "at the outbreak of war" the "Lefts" regarded the situation as presenting an alternative between imperialism or socialism, has already been analysed. This is a shameless subterfuge, for Kautsky knows very well that the Lefts advanced a *different* alternative, viz., either that the party join in the imperialist plunder and deception, or else propagate and prepare for revolutionary action. Kautsky knows also that it is the censorship *alone* that prevents the Lefts in Germany from exposing the stupid fable that his servility to the Südekums makes him spread.

As for the relation between the "proletarian masses" and a "handful of parliamentarians", Kautsky advances a most threadbare objection:

> "Let us disregard the Germans, so as not to plead in our own behalf; who would seriously assert that men like Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov became imperialists overnight and betrayed socialism? Let us disregard the parliamentarians and the 'leading bodies' ... [Kautsky is obviously hinting at *Die Internationale*, the journal issued by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring, in which the policy of the leading bodies, i.e., the official bodies of the German Social-Democratic Party, its Executive, the "*Vorstand*", its parliamentary group, etc., is treated with deserved contempt] ... who would dare assert that an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class-conscious German proletarians turn right-about-face within twenty-four hours, in direct opposition to their former aims? If this were true, it would, of course, be evidence of a terrible collapse, not only of our Party, but also of the *masses*. [Kautsky's italics.] If the masses were such a spineless flock of sheep, we might just as well allow ourselves to be buried" (p. 274).

Politically and scientifically, Karl Kautsky, the great authority, gave himself a burial long ago through his conduct and his collection of pitiful evasions. Those who fail to understand or at least to feel this, are hopeless as far as socialism is concerned; it is for this very reason that the tone adopted, in *Die Internationale*, by Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and their adherents, in treating Kautsky and Co. as most despicable creatures, was the only correct one in the circumstances.

Consider: the *only* people *in a position* to express their attitude to the war more or less freely (i.e., without being

immediately seized and dragged to the barracks, or the immediate risk of being shot) were a "handful of parliamentarians" (who were free to vote, with the right to do so; they were quite able to vote in opposition. Even in Russia, no one was beaten up or even arrested for this), a handful of officials, journalists, etc. And now, Kautsky nobly places on the *masses* the blame for the treachery and the spinelessness of that social *stratum* of whose *links* with the tactics and ideology of opportunism Kautsky himself has written scores of times over a number of years! The first and most fundamental demand of scientific research in general and of Marxist dialectic in particular is that a writer should examine the *link* between the present struggle of *trends* in the socialist movement—between the trend that is doing the talking, vociferating, and raising a hullabaloo about treachery, and the trend which sees no treachery—and the struggle that preceded it for *whole decades*. Kautsky, however, does not say a word about this; he does not even wish to raise the question of trends and *tendencies*. Till now there have been tendencies, but now there are none! Today, there are only the resonant names of "authorities", which the servile spirits always invoke as their trump card. In this connection it is most convenient for one to refer to the other and to cover up one's "peccadilloes" in a friendly fashion, according to the rule: you roll my log and I'll roll yours. "How can this be called opportunism," Martov exclaimed at a lecture in Berne (see No. 36 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*), "when Guesde, Plekhanov and Kautsky..."! "We must be more careful in accusing men like Guesde of opportunism," Axelrod wrote (*Golos* Nos. 86 and 87). "I will not defend myself," Kautsky echoed in Berlin, "but Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov..."! What a mutual admiration society!

In his writings, Kautsky has revealed such servile zeal as to fawn upon even Hyndman and to make it appear that it was only yesterday that the latter deserted to the side of imperialism. And yet the selfsame *Neue Zeit* and scores of Social-Democratic papers all over the world have been writing about Hyndman's imperialism *for many years*. Had Kautsky gone to the trouble of thoroughly studying the political biographies of the *persons* he mentions, he would have recalled whether or not those biographies contained traits

and events which paved the way for their desertion to imperialism, not "overnight", but over decades; whether Vaillant had been held captive by the Jaurèsists, and Plekhanov by the Mensheviks and liquidators; whether the Guesdist *trend* had been publicly giving up the ghost in that typically lifeless and insipid Guesdist magazine, *Le Socialisme*,[124] which was incapable of taking an independent stand on any important issue; whether Kautsky himself (we add this for the benefit of those who very properly put him alongside Hyndman and Plekhanov) had been supine in the question of Millerandism, in the early stage of the struggle against Bernsteinism, etc.

But Kautsky does not display the slightest shadow of interest in any scientific examination of these leaders' biographies. He does not even attempt to see whether these leaders are defending themselves with their *own* arguments or by repeating the arguments of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie; whether the actions of these leaders have acquired serious political significance because of their own extraordinary influence, or because they have adhered to some other really "influential" trend which is supported by a military organisation, namely, the bourgeois trend. Kautsky has not even set about examining this question; his only concern is to throw dust in the eyes of the masses, dumbfound them with the sound of authoritative names, prevent them from raising a clear issue and examining it from all sides.*

"...an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class-conscious proletarians turn right-about-face...."

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* Kautsky's references to Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov are characteristic also in another connection. The outspoken imperialists of the Lensch and Haenisch variety (to say nothing of the opportunists) refer to Hyndman and Plekhanov so as to justify *their own* policy, and they have a *right* to do so. They are speaking the *truth* when they say it is one and the same policy. Kautsky, however, speaks with disdain of Lensch and Haenisch, radicals who have turned towards imperialism. Kautsky thanks God that he is unlike such sinners, that he disagrees with them, and has remained a revolutionary (*sic*!). *As a matter of fact*, Kautsky's stand is the same as theirs. Kautsky, the hypocritical chauvinist who employs sentimental phrases, is much more odious than the chauvinist simpletons, David and Heine, Lensch and Haenisch.

Every word uttered here is a lie. The German Party organisation had a membership of one million, not four million. As is the case with any organisation, the united will of this mass organisation was expressed *only* through its united political centre, the "handful", who betrayed socialism. It was this handful who were asked to express their opinion; it was this handful who were called upon to vote, they were in a position to vote; they were in a position to write articles, etc. The masses were not consulted. Not only were they not permitted to vote, but they were disunited and coerced "*by orders*", not from a handful of parliamentarians, but from the military authorities. A military organisation existed; there was no treachery among the leaders of *this* organisation. It called up the "masses" *one by one*, confronted the individual with the ultimatum: either join the army, as your leaders advise you to, or be shot. The masses could not act in an organised fashion because their previously created organisation, an organisation embodied in a "handful" of Legiens, Kautskys and Scheidemanns, had betrayed them. It takes time to create a *new* organisation, as well as a determination to consign the old, rotten, and obsolete organisation to the scrap heap.

Kautsky tries to defeat his opponents, the Lefts, by ascribing to them the nonsensical idea that the "masses", "in retaliation" to war, should make a revolution "within twenty-four hours", and institute "socialism" as opposed to imperialism, or otherwise the "masses" would be revealing "spinelessness and treachery". But this is sheer nonsense, which the compilers of illiterate bourgeois and police booklets have hitherto used to "defeat" the revolutionaries, and Kautsky now flaunts in our faces. Kautsky's Left opponents know perfectly well that a revolution cannot be "made", that revolutions *develop* from objectively (i.e., independently of the will of parties and classes) mature crises and turns in history, that without organisation the masses lack unity of will, and that the struggle against a centralised state's powerful terrorist military organisation is a difficult and lengthy business. Owing to the treachery of their leaders, the masses *could not* do anything at the crucial moment, whereas this "handful" of leaders *were in an excellent position* and in duty bound to vote against the war credits, take a stand against

a "class truce" and justification of the war, express themselves in favour of the defeat of *their own* governments, set up an international apparatus for the purpose of carrying on propaganda in favour of fraternisation in the trenches, organise the publication of illegal literature* on the necessity of starting revolutionary activities, etc.

Kautsky knows perfectly well that it is precisely such or rather *similar* actions that the German "Lefts" have in mind, and that under a military censorship they cannot talk about these things *directly*, openly. Kautsky's desire to defend the opportunists at all costs has led him into unparalleled infamy: taking cover behind the military censors, he attributes patent absurdities to the Lefts, in the confidence that the censors will protect him from exposure.

VII

The serious scientific and political question, which Kautsky has deliberately evaded by means of subterfuges of all kinds, thereby giving enormous pleasure to the opportunists, is this: how was it *possible* for the most prominent representatives of the Second International to betray socialism?

This question should not, of course, be considered from the standpoint of the biographies of the individual leaders. Their future biographers will have to analyse the problem from this angle as well, but what interests the socialist movement today is not that, but a study of the historical

* Incidentally, it would not have been at all necessary to close *all* Social-Democratic papers in reply to the government's ban on writing about class hatred and class struggle. To agree not to write about this, as *Vorwärts* did was mean and cowardly. *Vorwärts* died *politically* when it did this and Martov was right when he said so. It was, however, possible to retain the legal papers by declaring that they were non-Party and *non-Social-Democratic*, and served the technical needs of a section of the workers, i.e., that they were *non-political papers*. Underground Social-Democratic literature containing an *assessment* of the war, and legally published working-class literature *without that assessment*, a literature that does not say what is not true, but keeps silent about the truth—why should this not have been possible?

origins, the conditions, the significance and the strength of the social-chauvinist *trend*. (1) Where did social-chauvinism spring from? (2) What gave it strength? (3) How must it be combated? Only such an approach to the question can be regarded as serious, the "personal" approach being in practice an evasion, a piece of sophistry.

To answer the first question we must see, first, whether the ideological and political content of social-chauvinism is *connected* with some previous trend in socialism; and second, in what relation—from the standpoint of actual political divisions—the present division of socialists into opponents and defenders of social-chauvinism stands to divisions which historically preceded it.

By social-chauvinism we mean acceptance of the idea of the defence of the fatherland in the present imperialist war, justification of an alliance between socialists and the bourgeoisie and the governments of their "own" countries in this war, a refusal to propagate and support proletarian-revolutionary action against one's "own" bourgeoisie, etc. It is perfectly obvious that social-chauvinism's basic ideological and political content fully coincides with the foundations of opportunism. It is *one and the same* tendency. In the conditions of the war of 1914-15, opportunism leads to social-chauvinism. The idea of class collaboration is opportunism's main feature. The war has brought this idea to its logical conclusion, and has augmented its usual factors and stimuli with a number of extraordinary ones; through the operation of special threats and coercion it has compelled the philistine and disunited masses to collaborate with the bourgeoisie. This circumstance has naturally multiplied adherents of opportunism and fully explains why many radicals of yesterday have deserted to that camp.

Opportunism means sacrificing the fundamental interests of the masses to the temporary interests of an insignificant minority of the workers or, in other words, an alliance between a section of the workers and the bourgeoisie, directed against the mass of the proletariat. The war has made such an alliance particularly conspicuous and inescapable. Opportunism was engendered in the course of decades by the special features in the period of the development of capitalism, when the comparatively peaceful and cultured life of

a stratum of privileged workingmen "bourgeoisified" them, gave them crumbs from the table of their national capitalists, and isolated them from the suffering, misery and revolutionary temper of the impoverished and ruined masses. The imperialist war is the direct continuation and culmination of this state of affairs, because this is a war for the *privileges* of the Great-Power nations, for the repartition of colonies, and domination over other nations. To defend and strengthen their privileged position as a petty-bourgeois "upper stratum" or aristocracy (and bureaucracy) of the working class—such is the natural wartime continuation of petty-bourgeois opportunist hopes and the corresponding tactics, such is the economic foundation of present-day social-imperialism.* And, of course, the force of habit, the routine of relatively "peaceful" evolution, national prejudices, a fear of sharp turns and a disbelief in them—all these were additional circumstances which enhanced both opportunism and a hypocritical and a craven reconciliation with opportunism —ostensibly only for a time and only because of extraordinary causes and motives. The war has changed this opportunism, which had been fostered for decades, raised it to a higher stage, increased the number and the variety of its shades, augmented the ranks of its adherents, enriched their arguments with a multitude of new sophisms, and has

* Here are several examples showing how highly the imperialists and the bourgeoisie value the importance of "Great-Power" and national privileges as a means of dividing the workers and diverting them from socialism. In a book entitled *Greater Rome and Greater Britain* (Oxford, 1912), the British imperialist Lucas acknowledges the legal disabilities of coloured people in the present British Empire (pp. 96-97), and remarks that "in our own Empire, where white workers and coloured workers are side by side, ... they do not work on the same level, and that the white man is rather the overseer of ... the coloured man. In a pamphlet entitled *Social-Democracy after the War* (1915), Erwin Belger, a former secretary of the Imperial Alliance against Social-Democrats, praises the conduct of the Social-Democrats and declares that they must become a "purely labour party" (p. 43), a "national", a "German labour party" (p. 45), without "internationalist, Utopian", and "revolutionary" ideas (p. 44). In a book dealing with capital investments abroad (1907), the German imperialist Sartorius von Waltershausen blames the German Social-Democrats for ignoring the "national welfare" (p. 438)—which consists in the seizure of colonies—and praises the British workers' "realism", for instance, their struggle against immigration. In a book on the

merged, so to say, many new streams and rivulets with the mainstream of opportunism. However, the mainstream has not disappeared. Quite the reverse.

Social-chauvinism is an opportunism which has matured to such a degree that the *continued* existence of this bourgeois abscess within the socialist parties has become impossible.

Those who refuse to see the closest and unbreakable link between social-chauvinism and opportunism clutch at individual instances—this opportunist or another, they say, has turned internationalist; this radical or another has turned chauvinist. But this kind of argument carries no weight as far as the development of *trends* is concerned. Firstly, chauvinism and opportunism in the labour movement have the same economic basis: the alliance between a numerically small upper stratum of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie—who get but morsels of the privileges of their "own" national capital—against the masses of the proletarians, the masses of the toilers and the oppressed in general. Secondly, the two trends have the same ideological and political content. Thirdly, the old division of socialists into an opportunist trend and a revolutionary, which was characteristic of the period of the Second International (1889-1914), *corresponds*, by and large, to the new division into chauvinists and internationalists.

To realise the correctness of the latter statement, one must remember that social science (like science generally) usually deals with *mass* phenomena, not with individual cases.

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principles of world politics, the German diplomat Ruedorffer stresses the generally known fact that the internationalisation of capital by no means eliminates the national capitalists' intensified struggle for power and influence, for "majority share-holding" (p. 161). The author notes that the workers become involved in this intensified struggle (p. 175). The book is dated October 1913, and the author speaks with perfect clarity of the "interests of capital" (p. 157) as the cause of modern wars. He says that the question of the "national tendency" becomes the kingpin of socialism (p. 176), and that the governments have nothing to fear from the internationalist manifestos of the Social-Democrats (p. 177), who in reality are turning more and more national (pp. 103, 110, 176). International socialism will be victorious, he says, if it extricates the workers from national influence, since nothing can be achieved through violence alone; however, it will suffer defeat if national sentiments gain the upper hand (pp. 173-74).

Let us take ten European countries: Germany, Britain, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France and Belgium. In the first eight countries, the new division of socialists (according to internationalism) corresponds to the old division (according to opportunism): in Germany the magazine *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which was a stronghold of opportunism, has become a stronghold of chauvinism. The ideas of internationalism have the support of the extreme Lefts. In Britain about three-sevenths of the British Socialist Party are internationalists (66 votes for an internationalist resolution and 84 against it, as shown by the latest counts), while in the opportunist *bloc* (the Labour Party plus the Fabians, plus the Independent Labour Party) *less* than one-seventh are internationalists.* In Russia, the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*, the mainstay of the opportunists, has become the mainstay of chauvinism. Plekhanov and Alexinsky are making more noise, but we know from five years' experience (1910-14) that they are incapable of conducting systematic propaganda among the masses in Russia. The nucleus of the internationalists in Russia is made up of "Pravdism"[125] and the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma as representing the advanced workers who restored the Party in January 1912.

In Italy, the party of Bissolati and Co., which was purely opportunist, has turned chauvinist. Internationalism is represented by the *workers*' party. The *masses* of the workers are for this party; the opportunists, the parliamentarians and the petty bourgeoisie are for chauvinism. In the course of several months a free choice could be made and indeed was made in Italy, not fortuitously but in conformity with the difference in the class stand of rank-and-file proletarians and the petty-bourgeois groups.

In Holland, Troelstra's opportunist party is reconciled to chauvinism in general (one must not be deceived by the

* The Independent Labour Party *alone* is usually compared with the British Socialist Party. That is wrong. The essentials should be considered, not the forms of organisation. Take the daily newspapers: there were *two* of them—one, the *Daily Herald*, mouthpiece of the British Socialist Party, the other, the *Daily Citizen*, mouthpiece of the opportunist bloc. The dailies do the actual work of propaganda, agitation and organisation.

fact that in Holland the petty bourgeoisie, like the big bourgeoisie, have a particular hatred of Germany, because the latter can "swallow" them up easiest of all). It is the Marxist party, led by Gorter and Pannekoek, that has produced consistent, sincere, ardent and convinced internationalists. In Sweden, Branting, the opportunist leader, is indignant at the German socialists being accused of treachery, while Höglund, leader of the Lefts, has declared that this is precisely the opinion of some of his adherents (see *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36). In Bulgaria, the "Tesnyaki", who are opposed to opportunism, have, in their press (the paper *Novo Vreme*[126]), accused the German Social-Democrats of having "perpetrated a foul act". In Switzerland, the adherents of the opportunist Greulich are inclined to justify the German Social-Democrats (see their organ, the Zurich *Volksrecht*, whereas those who support the much more radical R. Grimm have turned the Berne paper, *Berner Tagwacht*, into an organ of the German Lefts. Only two countries out of the ten—France and Belgium—are exceptions, but even here, strictly speaking, we see, not an absence of internationalists, but their excessive weakness and dejection (due in part to causes that can be readily understood); let us not forget that Vaillant himself has admitted, in *l'Humanité*, that he has received from his readers letters of an internationalist character, letters which, however, he has not published in full, *not a single one* of them!

By and large, if we take the trends and tendencies, we must admit that it was the opportunist wing of European socialism that betrayed socialism and deserted to chauvinism. What is the source of its strength and its seeming omnipotence within the official parties? Now that he himself is involved, Kautsky, who is well versed in raising questions of history, especially with reference to ancient Rome or similar matters that do not have a direct bearing on problems of our times, hypocritically pretends a lack of understanding. But the whole thing is crystal-clear. The immense strength of the opportunists and the chauvinists stems from *their alliance* with the bourgeoisie, with the governments and the General Staffs. This is often overlooked in Russia, where it is assumed the opportunists are a *section* of the socialist parties, that there always have been and will be two

extreme wings within those parties, that "extremes" should be avoided, etc., etc.—and plenty of similar philistine copy book maxims.

In reality, the opportunists' formal membership in workers' parties by no means disproves their objectively being a political detachment of the bourgeoisie, conductors of its influence, and its agents in the labour movement. When the opportunist Südekum, whose claim to fame is like that of Herostratus, convincingly demonstrated this social and class truth, many good people gasped with amazement. The French socialists and Plekhanov pointed the finger of scorn at Südekum—although had Vandervelde, Semhat or Plekhanov looked into a mirror they would have seen *nothing but a Südekum*, with slightly different national features. The members of the German Executive (*Vorstand*), who now praise Kautsky and are praised by Kautsky, have made haste to declare—cautiously, modestly and politely (without naming Südekum)—that they "do not agree" with Südekum's line.

This is ridiculous, because, at the crucial moment, Südekum alone, actually proved stronger in the policies of the German Social-Democratic Party than a hundred Haases and Kautskys (just as *Nasha Zarya* alone is stronger than all the Brussels bloc trends, which are afraid to break away from that paper).

Why is that so? It is because behind Südekum are the bourgeoisie, the government, and the General Staff of a Great Power. These support Südekum's policy in a thousand ways, whereas his opponents' policy is frustrated by every means, including prison and the firing squad. Südekum's voice reaches the public in millions of copies of bourgeois newspapers (as do the voices of Vandervelde, Sembat, and Plekhanov), whereas the voices of his opponents *cannot* be heard in the legal press because of the military censorship!

It is generally agreed that opportunism is no chance occurrence, sin, slip, or treachery on the part of individuals, but a social product of an entire period of history. The significance of this truth is not always given sufficient thought. Opportunism has been nurtured by legalism. The workers' parties of the period between 1889 and 1914 had to take advantage of bourgeois legality. When the crisis

came, they should have adopted illegal methods of work (but this could not be done otherwise than with the greatest vigour and determination, combined with a number of stratagems). A *single* Südekum was sufficient to prevent the adoption of illegal methods, because, speaking in a historico-philosophical sense, he had the whole of the "old world" behind him, and because he, Südekum, has always betrayed, and will always betray, to the bourgeoisie all the military plans of its class enemy, speaking in the sense of practical politics.

It is a fact that the entire German Social-Democratic Party (and the same holds for the French and *other* parties) does *only* that which pleases Südekum or can be tolerated by Südekum. *Nothing else* can be done legally. Anything *honest* and really socialist that takes place in the German Social-Democratic Party, is done in *opposition* to its centres, by *circumventing* its Executive and Central Organ, by *violating* organisational discipline, in a *factional* manner, on behalf of new and anonymous centres of a new party, as was the case, for instance, with the German Lefts' manifesto published in *Berner Tagwacht* on May 31 of this year.[127] As a matter of fact, a *new* party is growing up, gaining strength and being organised, a real workers' party, a genuinely revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, unlike the old and corrupt national-liberal party of Legien, Südekum, Kautsky, Haase, Scheidemann and Co.*

* What happened before the historic voting of August 4 [for war credits.—*Ed.*] is extremely characteristic. The official party has cast the cloak of bureaucratic hypocrisy over this event, saying that the majority decided and that all voted unanimously *in favour*. But this hypocrisy was exposed by Ströbel who told the truth in the journal *Die Internationale*. The Social-Democratic members of the Reichstag split into *two* groups, each of whom came with an *ultimatum*, i.e., a dissentient decision, i.e., one signifying a split. One group, the opportunists, who were about thirty strong, decided to vote *in favour*, *under all circumstances*; the other and Left group numbering about fifteen, decided—less resolutely—to vote against. When the "Centre" or the "Marsh", who never take a firm stand, voted with the opportunists, the Lefts sustained a crushing defeat and—submitted! Talk about the "unity" of the German Social-Democrats is sheer hypocrisy, which actually covers up the inevitable submission of the Lefts to ultimatums from the opportunists.

It was, therefore, a profound historical truth that the opportunist "Monitor" blurted out in the conservative *Preussische Jahrbücher*[128] when he said it would be bad for the opportunists (*i.e.*, *the bourgeoisie*) if present-day Social-Democracy were to *swing to the right*—because in that case the workers would desert it. The opportunists (and the bourgeoisie) need the party as it is today, a party *combining* the Right and the Left wings and officially represented by Kautsky, who will be able to reconcile everything in the world by means of smooth, "thoroughly Marxist" phrases. In word, socialism and the revolutionary spirit for the people, the masses, the workers; indeed, Südekumism, adhering to the bourgeoisie in any grave crisis. We say: *any* crisis, because in any serious political strike, and not only in time of war, "feudalist" Germany like "free and parliamentary" Britain or France will *immediately* introduce martial law under one name or another. No one of sound mind and judgement can have any doubt about this.

Hence logically follows the reply to the question raised above, viz., how is social-chauvinism to be combated? Social-chauvinism is an opportunism which has matured to such a degree, grown so strong and brazen during the long period of comparatively "peaceful" capitalism, so definite in its political ideology, and so closely associated with the bourgeoisie and the governments, that the existence of *such a trend within* the Social-Democratic workers' parties *cannot* be tolerated. Flimsy, thin-soled shoes may be good enough to walk in on the well-paved streets of a small provincial town, but heavy hob-nailed boots are needed for walking in the hills. In Europe socialism has emerged from a comparatively peaceful stage that is confined within narrow and national limits. With the outbreak of the war of 1914-15, it entered the stage of revolutionary action; there can be no doubt that the time has come for a complete break with opportunism, for its expulsion from the workers' parties.

This definition of the tasks the new era of international development confronts socialism with does not, of course, immediately show how rapidly and in what definite forms the process of separation of the workers' revolutionary Social-Democratic parties from the petty-bourgeois opportunist parties will proceed in the various countries. It does,

however, reveal the need clearly to realise that such a separation is inevitable, and that the entire policy of the workers' parties must be directed from this standpoint. The war of 1914-15 is such a great turn in history that the attitude towards opportunism *cannot* remain the same as it has been. What has happened cannot be erased. It is impossible to obliterate from the minds of the workers, or from the experience of the bourgeoisie, or from the political lessons of our epoch in general, the fact that, at a moment of crisis, the opportunists proved to be the nucleus of those elements within the workers' parties that deserted to the bourgeoisie. Opportunism—to speak on a European scale—was in its adolescent stage, as it were, before the war. With the outbreak of the war it grew to manhood and its "innocence" and youth cannot be restored. An entire social stratum, consisting of parliamentarians, journalists, labour officials, privileged office personnel, and certain strata of the proletariat, has sprung up and has become *amalgamated* with its own national bourgeoisie, which has proved fully capable of appreciating and "adapting" it. The course of history cannot be turned back or checked—we can and must go fearlessly onward, from the preparatory legal working-class organisations, which are in the grip of opportunism, to revolutionary organisations that know how *not* to confine themselves to legality and are capable of safeguarding themselves against opportunist treachery, organisations of a proletariat that is beginning a "struggle for power", a struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

This, incidentally, proves how wrong are the views of those who befog both their own minds and those of the workers with the question as to what should he done with such outstanding authorities of the Second International as Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky, etc. In fact, no such question arises. If these persons fail to understand the new tasks, they will have to stand aside or remain as they are at present, in captivity to the opportunists. If these persons free themselves from "captivity" they are hardly likely to encounter *political* obstacles to their return to the camp of the revolutionaries. At all events, it is absurd to substitute the question of the role of individuals for the question of the struggle between trends and of the new period in the working-class movement.

VIII

Legal mass organisations of the working class are perhaps the most important feature of the socialist parties in the epoch of the Second International. They were the strongest in the German Party, and it was here that the war of 1914-15 created a most acute crisis and made the issue a most pressing one. The initiation of revolutionary activities would obviously have led to the dissolution of these legal organisations by the police, and the old party—from Legien to Kautsky inclusively—sacrificed the revolutionary aims of the proletariat for the sake of preserving the present legal organisations. No matter how much this may be denied, it is a fact. The proletariat's right to revolution was sold for a mess of pottage—organisations permitted by the present police law.

Take the pamphlet by Karl Legien, leader of the German Social-Democratic trade unions, entitled *Why Trade Union Officials Must Take a More Active Part in the Internal Life of the Party* (Berlin, 1915). This is a paper read by the author to a gathering of trade union officials on January 27, 1915. In the course of this lecture Legien read—and reproduced in his pamphlet—a most interesting document that would not otherwise have been passed by the military censor. This document—the so-called *Notes for Speakers in the District of Niederbarnim* (a suburb of Berlin)—is an exposition of the views of the German Left-wing Social-Democrats, of their protest against the Party. The revolutionary Social-Democrats, says the document, did not and could not foresee a certain factor, viz.:

> "That the whole of the organised power of the German Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions would take the side of the war government, and that the whole of this power would be used for the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary energy of the masses" (p. 34 of Legien's pamphlet).

This is the absolute truth. Also true is the following statement contained in the same document:

> "The vote of the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag on August 4 proved that a different attitude, even had it been deeply rooted in the masses, could not have asserted itself under the leadership of a tested party. It could have asserted itself only against the will of the

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leading party bodies, only by overcoming the resistance of the party and the trade unions" (*ibid.*).

This is the absolute truth.

"Had the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag done its duty on August 4, the external form of organisation would probably have been destroyed, but the spirit would have remained, the spirit that animated the Party under the Anti-Socialist Law and helped it to overcome all difficulties" (*ibid.*).

It is pointed out in Legien's pamphlet that the "leaders", brought together to listen to his lecture and styling themselves leading trade union officials, *laughed* when they heard this. The idea that it was possible and necessary to organise illegal revolutionary organisations at a moment of crisis (as was done under the Anti-Socialist Law) seemed *ridiculous* to them. Legien, that most faithful watchdog of the bourgeoisie, exclaimed, beating his breast:

"This is an obviously anarchist idea: to wreck the organisation in order to bring about a solution of the problem by the masses. There is no doubt in my mind that this is an anarchist idea!"

"Hear, hear!" came a chorus of exclamations (*ibid.*, p. 37) from the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, who style themselves leaders of the Social-Democratic organisations of the working class.

An edifying picture. People are so degraded and stultified by bourgeois legality that they cannot even *conceive* of the need for organisations of *another* kind, *illegal* organisations, for the purpose of guiding the revolutionary struggle. So low have people fallen that they imagine that legal unions existing with the permission of the police are a kind of ultima Thule—as though the *preservation* of such unions as *leading* bodies is at all conceivable at a time of crisis! Here you have the living dialectic of opportunism: the mere growth of legal unions and the mere habit that stupid but conscientious philistines have of confining themselves to bookkeeping, have created a situation in which, during a crisis, these conscientious philistines have proved to be traitors and betrayers, who would *smother* the revolutionary energy of the masses. This is no chance occurrence. The building of a revolutionary organisation must be begun—that is demanded by the new historical situation, by the epoch

of proletarian revolutionary action—but it can be begun only *over the heads* of the old leaders, the stranglers of revolutionary energy, *over the heads* of the old party, through its *destruction*.

Of course, the counter-revolutionary philistines cry out "anarchism!", just as the opportunist Eduard David cried "anarchism" when he denounced Karl Liebknecht. In Germany, only those leaders seem to have remained honest socialists whom the opportunists revile as anarchists....

Take the army of today. It is a good example of organisation. This organisation is good only because it is *flexible* and is able at the same time to give millions of people *a single will*. Today these millions are living in their homes in various parts of the country; tomorrow mobilisation is ordered, and they report for duty. Today they lie in the trenches, and this may go on for months; tomorrow they are led to the attack in another order. Today they perform miracles in sheltering from bullets and shrapnel; tomorrow they perform miracles in hand-to-hand-combat. Today their advance detachments lay minefields; tomorrow they advance scores of miles guided by airmen flying overhead. When, in the pursuit of a single aim and animated by a single will, millions alter the forms of their communication and their behaviour, change the place and the mode of their activities, change their tools and weapons in accordance with the changing conditions and the requirements of the struggle—all this is genuine organisation.

The same holds true for the working-class struggle against the bourgeoisie. Today there is no revolutionary situation, the conditions that cause unrest among the masses or heighten their activities do not exist; today you are given a ballot paper—take it, learn to organise so as to use it as a weapon against your enemies, not as a means of getting cushy legislative jobs for men who cling to their parliamentary seats for fear of having to go to prison. Tomorrow your ballot paper is taken from you and you are given a rifle or a splendid and most up-to-date quick-firing gun—take this weapon of death and destruction, pay no heed to the mawkish snivellers who are afraid of war; too much still remains in the world that *must* be destroyed with fire and sword for the emancipation of the working class; if anger and desperation grow

among the masses, if a revolutionary situation arises, prepare to create new organisations and *use* these useful weapons of death and destruction *against* your *own* government and your *own* bourgeoisie.

That is not easy, to be sure. It will demand arduous preparatory activities and heavy sacrifices. This is a *new* form of organisation and struggle that also *has to be learnt*, and knowledge is not acquired without errors and setbacks. This form of the class struggle stands in the same relation to participation in elections as an assault against a fortress stands in relation to manoeuvring, marches, or lying in the trenches. It *is not so often* that history places this form of struggle on the order of the day, but then its significance is felt for decades to come. *Days* on which *such* method of struggle can and must be employed are equal to *scores of years* of other historical epochs.

Compare K. Kautsky and K. Legien. Kautsky writes:

> "As long as the party was small, every protest against war had propaganda value as an act of bravery.... the conduct of the Russian and Serbian comrades has met with general appreciation. The stronger a party becomes, the more are the propaganda considerations, in the motives of its decisions, interwoven with the calculation of practical consequences, the more difficult does it become to give due regard equally to both motives, and yet neither of them must be neglected. Therefore, the stronger we become, the more easily differences arise between us in every new and complex situation" (*Internationalism and the War*, p. 30).

These arguments of Kautsky's differ from Legien's only in that they are hypocritical and cowardly. In substance, Kautsky supports and justifies the Legien's despicable renunciation of revolutionary activities, but he does so stealthily, without committing himself; he makes shift with hints, and confines himself to complimenting both Legien and the revolutionary behaviour of the Russians. We Russians are used to witnessing this kind of attitude towards revolutionaries only among the liberals; the latter are always ready to acknowledge the "courage" of the revolutionaries, but at the same time they will on no account renounce their ultra-opportunist tactics. Self-respecting revolutionaries will not accept Kautsky's "expressions of appreciation" and will indignantly reject such a presentation of the question. Were there no revolutionary situation, were it not obligatory

to propagate revolutionary action, the conduct of the Russians and Serbians would be *incorrect*, and their tactics would be wrong. Let such knightly persons as Legien and Kautsky at least have the courage of their convictions; let them say this openly.

If, however, the tactics of the Russian and Serbian socialists deserve "appreciation", then it is wrong and criminal to justify the *contrary* tactics of the "strong" parties, the German, the French, etc. By means of an intentionally vague expression—"practical consequences"—Kautsky has *concealed* the plain truth that the great and strong parties were *frightened* by the prospect of their organisations being dissolved, their funds sequestered and their leaders arrested by the government. This means that Kautsky justifies betrayal of socialism by pleading the unpleasant "practical consequences" that follow from revolutionary tactics. Is this not a prostitution of Marxism?

"We would have been arrested," one of the Social-Democratic deputies who voted for the war credits on August 4 is alleged to have declared at a workers' meeting in Berlin. The workers shouted in reply: "Well, what would have been bad about that?"

If there was no other *signal* that would instil in the German *and the French* working masses revolutionary sentiments and the need to prepare for revolutionary action, the arrest of a member of parliament for a courageous speech would have been useful as a call for *unity* of the proletarians of the various countries in their revolutionary work. It is *not easy* to bring about such unity; all the more was it the duty of members of parliament, whose high office made their purview of the entire political scene so extensive, *to take the initiative*.

Not only in wartime but positively in any acute political situation, to say nothing of periods of revolutionary mass action of any kind, the governments of even the *freest* bourgeois countries will threaten to dissolve the legal organisations, seize their funds, arrest their leaders, and threaten other "practical consequences" of the same kind. What are we to do then? Justify the opportunists on these grounds, as Kautsky does? But this would mean sanctifying the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national liberal-labour parties.

There is only one conclusion a socialist can draw, namely, that pure legalism, the legalism-and-nothing-but-legalism of the "European" parties, is now obsolete and, as a result of the development of capitalism in the pre-imperialist stage, has become the foundation for a bourgeois labour policy. It must be augmented by the creation of an illegal basis, an illegal organisation, illegal Social-Democratic work, without, however, surrendering a single legal position. Experience will show *how* this is to be done, if only the desire to take this road exists, as well as a realisation that it is necessary. In 1912-14, the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia proved that this problem can be solved. Muranov, the workers' deputy in the Duma, who at the trial behaved better than the rest and was exiled to Siberia, clearly demonstrated that—besides "*ministeriable*" parliamentarism (from Henderson, Sembat and Vandervelde down to Südekum and Scheidemann, the latter two are also being completely "ministeriable", although they are not admitted further than the anteroom!)—there can be *illegal and revolutionary* parliamentarism. Let the Kosovskys and Potresovs admire the "European" parliamentarism of the lackeys or accept it—we shall not tire of telling the workers that *such* legalism, *such* Social-Democracy of the Legien, Kautsky, Scheidemann brand, deserves nothing but contempt.

IX

To sum up.

The collapse of the Second International has been most strikingly expressed in the flagrant betrayal of their convictions and of the solemn Stuttgart and Basle resolutions by the majority of the official Social-Democratic parties of Europe. This collapse, however, which signifies the complete victory of opportunism, the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national liberal-labour parties, is merely the result of the entire historical epoch of the Second International—the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The objective conditions of this epoch—transitional from the consummation of West-European bourgeois and national revolutions to the beginning of socialist revolutions—engendered and fostered

opportunism. During this period we see a split in the working-class and socialist movement in some European countries, which, in the main, was cleavage along the line of opportunism (Britain, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria and Russia); in other countries, we see a long and stubborn struggle of trends along the same line (Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland). The crisis created by the great war has torn away all coverings, swept away conventions, exposed an abscess that has long come to a head, and revealed opportunism in its true role of ally of the bourgeoisie. The complete organisational severance of this element from the workers' parties has become imperative. The epoch of imperialism cannot permit the existence, in a single party, of the revolutionary proletariat's vanguard and the semi-petty-bourgeois aristocracy of the working class, who enjoy morsels of the privileges of their "own" nation's "Great-Power" status. The old theory that opportunism is a "legitimate shade" in a single party that knows no "extremes" has now turned into a tremendous deception of the workers and a tremendous hindrance to the working-class movement. Undisguised opportunism, which immediately repels the working masses, is not so frightful and injurious as this theory of the golden mean, which uses Marxist catchwords to justify opportunist practice, and tries to prove, with a series of sophisms, that revolutionary action is premature, etc. Kautsky, the most outstanding spokesman of this theory, and also the leading authority in the Second International, has shown himself a consummate hypocrite and a past master in the art of prostituting Marxism. All members of the million-strong German party who are at all honest, class-conscious and revolutionary have turned away in indignation from an "authority" of this kind so ardently defended by the Südekums and the Scheidemanns.

The proletarian masses—probably about nine-tenths of whose former leaders have gone over to the bourgeoisie—have found themselves disunited and helpless amid a spate of chauvinism and under the pressure of martial law and the war censorship. But the objective war-created revolutionary situation, which is extending and developing, is inevitably engendering revolutionary sentiments; it is tempering and enlightening all the finest and most class-conscious prole-

tarians. A sudden change in the mood of the masses is not only possible, but is becoming more and more probable, a change similar to that which was to be seen in Russia early in 1905 in connection with the "Gaponade",[129] when, in the course of several months and sometimes of several weeks, there emerged from the backward proletarian masses an army of millions, which followed the proletariat's revolutionary vanguard. We cannot tell whether a powerful revolutionary movement will develop immediately after *this* war, or during it, etc., but at all events, it is *only* work in this direction that deserves the name of socialist work. The slogan of a civil war is the one that summarises and directs this work, and helps unite and consolidate those who wish to aid the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against its own government and its own bourgeoisie.

In Russia, the complete severance of the revolutionary Social-Democratic proletarian elements from the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements has been prepared by the entire history of the working-class movement. Those who disregard that history, and, by declaiming against "factionalism", make themselves incapable of understanding the real process of the formation of a proletarian party in Russia, which has developed in the course of many years of struggle against various varieties of opportunism, are rendering that movement the worst possible service. Of all the "Great" Powers engaged in the present war, Russia is the only one that recently experienced a revolution. The bourgeois content of that revolution, in which the proletariat nevertheless played a decisive part, could not but cause a split between the bourgeois and proletarian trends in the working-class movement. In the approximately twenty years (1894-1914) that Russian Social-Democracy has existed as an organisation linked with the mass working-class movement (and not only as an ideological trend, as in 1883-94), there was a struggle between the proletarian-revolutionary trends and the petty-bourgeois, opportunist trends. The Economism[130] of 1894-1902 was undoubtedly a trend of the latter kind. A number of its arguments and ideological features—the "Struvist distortion of Marxism, references to the "masses' in order to justify opportunism, and the like—bear a striking resemblance to the present vulgarised Marxism of Kautsky,

Cunow, Plekhanov, etc. It would be a very grateful task to remind the present generation of Social-Democrats of the old *Rabochaya Mysl*[131] and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, as[132] a parallel to the Kautsky of today.

The "Menshevism" of the next period (1903-08) was the direct successor, both ideological and organisational, to Economism. During the Russian revolution, it pursued tactics that objectively meant the dependence of the proletariat upon the liberal bourgeoisie, and expressed petty-bourgeois, opportunist trends. When, in the ensuing period (1908-14), the mainstream of the Menshevik trend produced liquidationism, the class significance of that trend became so apparent that the best representatives of Menshevism were continually protesting against the policy of *Nasha Zarya* group. It is that very group—the only one which, during the past five or six years, has conducted systematic work among the masses in *opposition* to the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class—that has proved to be *social-chauvinist* in the war of 1914-15! And this in a country where absolutism still exists, the bourgeois revolution is far from consummated, and forty-three per cent of the population oppresses a majority consisting of non-Russian nations. The "European" type of development, in which certain strata of the petty bourgeoisie, especially the intelligentsia and an insignificant section of the labour aristocracy can share in the "Great-Power" privileges of their "own" nation, could not but have its Russian counterpart.

All their history has prepared the working class and the workers' Social-Democratic Party of Russia for "internationalist" tactics, i.e., such that are truly revolutionary and consistently revolutionary.

P.S. This article had already been set when a manifesto appeared in the press, jointly issued by Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein, who, seeing that the masses are swinging to the left, are therefore now prepared to "make peace" with the Left wing—naturally, at the price of maintaining "peace" with the Südekums. Verily, *Mädchen für alle*!

BRITISH PACIFISM AND THE BRITISH DISLIKE OF THEORY

Political freedom has hitherto been far more extensive in Britain than elsewhere in Europe. Here, more than anywhere else, the bourgeoisie are used to governing and know how to govern. The relations between the classes are more developed and in many respects clearer than in other countries. The absence of conscription gives the people more liberty in their attitude towards the war *in the sense* that anyone may refuse to join the colours, which is why the government (which in Britain is a committee, in its purest form, for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie) are compelled to bend every effort to rouse "popular" enthusiasm for the war. That aim could never be attained without a radical change in the laws, had the mass of proletarians not been completely disorganised and demoralised by the desertion to a Liberal, i.e., bourgeois, policy, of a minority of the best placed, skilled and unionised workers. The British trade unions comprise about one-fifth of all wage workers. Most trade union leaders are Liberals; Marx long ago called them agents of the bourgeoisie.

All these features of Britain help us, on the one hand, better to understand the essence of present-day social-chauvinism, that essence being *identical* in autocratic and democratic countries, in militarist and conscription-free countries; on the other hand, they help us to appreciate, on the basis of facts, the significance of that compromise with social-chauvinism which is expressed, for instance, in the extolling of the slogan of peace, etc.

The Fabian Society is undoubtedly the most consummate expression of opportunism and of Liberal-Labour policy.

The reader should look into the correspondence of Marx and Engels with Sorge (two Russian translations of which have appeared). There he will find an excellent characterisation of that society given by Engels, who treats Messrs. Sidney Webb & Co. as a gang of bourgeois rogues who would demoralise the workers, influence them in a counter-revolutionary spirit. One may vouch for the fact that no Second International leader with any responsibility and influence has ever attempted to refute this estimation of Engels's, or even to doubt its correctness.

Let us now compare the *facts*, leaving *theory* aside for a moment. You will see that the Fabians' *behaviour* during the war (see, for instance, their weekly paper, *The New Statesman*[133]), and that of the German Social-Democratic Party, including Kautsky, are *identical*. The same direct and indirect defence of social-chauvinism; the same combination of that defence with a readiness to utter all sorts of kindly, humane and near-Left phrases about peace, disarmament, etc., etc.

The fact stands, and the conclusion to be drawn—however unpleasant it may be to various persons—is inescapably and undoubtedly the following: in practice the leaders of the present-day German Social-Democratic Party, including Kautsky, are exactly the same kind of agents of the bourgeoisie that Engels called the Fabians long ago. The Fabians' non-recognition of Marxism and its "recognition" by Kautsky and Co. make no difference whatever in the essentials, in the facts of politics; the only thing proved is that some writers, politicians, etc., have converted Marxism into Struvism. Their hypocrisy is *not* a private vice with them; in individual cases they may be highly virtuous heads of families; their hypocrisy is the result of the objective falseness of their social status: they are supposed to represent the revolutionary proletariat, whereas they are actually agents charged with the business of inculcating bourgeois, chauvinist ideas in the proletariat.

The Fabians are more sincere and honest than Kautsky and Co., because they have not promised to stand for revolution; politically, however, they are of the *same* kidney.

The long history of Britain's political freedom and the developed condition of her political life in general, and of her

bourgeoisie in particular, have resulted in various *shades* of bourgeois opinion being able to find rapid, free and open expression in that country's new political organisations. One such organisation is the Union of Democratic Control, whose secretary and treasurer is E. D. Morel, now a regular contributor to *The Labour Leader*, the Independent Labour Party's central organ. This individual was for several years the Liberal Party's nominee for the Birkenhead constituency. When Morel came out *against* the war, shortly after its outbreak, the committee of the Birkenhead Liberal Association notified him, in a letter dated October 2, 1914, that his candidature would no longer be acceptable, i.e., he was simply expelled from the Party. Morel replied to this in a letter of October 14, which he subsequently published as a pamphlet entitled *The Outbreak of the War*. Like a number of other articles by Morel, the pamphlet exposes *his* government, proving the falseness of assertions that the rape of Belgium's neutrality caused the war, or that the war is aimed at the destruction of *Prussian* imperialism, etc., etc. Morel defends the programme of the Union of Democratic Control—peace, disarmament, all territories to have the right of self-determination by plebiscite, and the democratic control of foreign policy.

All this shows that as an individual, Morel undoubtedly deserves credit for his sincere sympathy with democracy, for turning away from the jingoist bourgeoisie to the pacifist bourgeoisie. When Morel cites the facts to prove that *his* government duped the people when it denied the existence of secret treaties although such treaties actually existed; that the British bourgeoisie, as early as 1887, fully realised that Belgium's neutrality would inevitably be violated in the event of a Franco-German war, and emphatically rejected the idea of interfering (Germany not yet being a dangerous competitor!); that in a number of books published before the war French militarists such as Colonel Boucher quite openly acknowledged the existence of plans for an *aggressive* war by France and Russia against Germany; that the well-known British military authority, Colonel Repington, admitted *in 1911* in the press, that the growth of Russian armaments after 1905 had been a threat to Germany —when Morel reveals all this, we cannot but admit that

we are dealing with an exceptionally honest and courageous bourgeois, who is not afraid to break with his own party.

Yet anyone will at once concede that, after all, Morel is a bourgeois, whose talk about peace and disarmament is a lot of empty phrases, since without revolutionary action by the proletariat there can be neither a democratic peace nor disarmament. Though he has broken with the Liberals on the question of the present war, Morel remains a Liberal on all other economic and political issues. Why is it, then, that when Kautsky, in Germany, gives a Marxist guise to the *selfsame bourgeois phrases* about peace and disarmament, this is not considered hypocrisy on his part, but stands to his merit? Only the undeveloped character of political relations and the absence of political freedom prevent the formation in Germany, as rapidly and smoothly as in Britain, of a bourgeois league for peace and disarmament, with Kautsky's programme.

Let us, then, admit the truth that Kautsky's stand is that of a pacifist bourgeois, not of a revolutionary Social-Democrat.

The events we are living amidst are great enough for us to be courageous in recognising the truth, no matter whom it may concern.

With their dislike of abstract theory and their pride in their practicality, the British often pose political issues *more directly*, thus helping the socialists of other countries to discover the actual content *beneath* the husk of wording of every-kind (including the "Marxist"). Instructive in this respect is the pamphlet *Socialism and War*,* published before the war by the jingoist paper, *The Clarion*. The pamphlet contains an anti-war "manifesto" by Upton Sinclair, the U.S. socialist, and also a reply to him from the jingoist Robert Blatchford, who has long adopted Hyndman's imperialist viewpoint.

Sinclair is a socialist of the emotions, without any theoretical training. He states the issue in "simple" fashion; incensed by the approach of war, he seeks salvation from it in socialism.

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* *Socialism and War*. The Clarion Press, 44 Worship Street, London, E. C.

"We are told," Sinclair writes, "that the socialist movement is yet too weak so that we must wait for its evolution. But evolution is working in the hearts of men; we are its instruments, and if we do not struggle, there is no evolution. We are told that the movement [against war] would be crushed out; but I declare my faith that the crushing out of any rebellion which sought, from motive of sublime humanity, to prevent war, would be the greatest victory that socialism has ever gained—would shake the conscience of civilisation and rouse the workers of the world as nothing in all history has yet done. Let us not be too fearful for our movement, nor put too much stress upon numbers and the outward appearances of power. A thousand men aglow with faith and determination are stronger than a million grown cautious and respectable; and there is no danger to the socialist movement so great as the danger of becoming an established institution."

This, as can be seen, is a naïve, theoretically unreasoned, but profoundly correct warning against any vulgarising of socialism, and a call to revolutionary struggle.

What does Blatchford say in reply to Sinclair?

"It is capitalists and militarists who make wars. That is true...," he says. Blatchford is as anxious for peace and for socialism taking the place of capitalism as any socialist in the world. But Sinclair will not convince him, or do away with the facts with "rhetoric and fine phrases". "Facts, my dear Sinclair, are obstinate things, and the German danger is a fact." Neither the British nor the German socialists are strong enough to prevent war, and "Sinclair greatly exaggerates the power of British socialism. The British socialists ... are not united; they have no money, no arms, no discipline". The only thing they can do is *to help* the British Government build up the navy; there is not, nor can there be, any other guarantee of peace.

Neither before nor since the outbreak of the war have the chauvinists ever been so outspoken in Continental Europe. In Germany it is not frankness that is prevalent, but Kautsky's hypocrisy and playing at sophistry. The same is true of Plekhanov. That is why it is so instructive to cast a glance at the situation in a more advanced country, where nobody will be taken in with sophisms or a travesty of Marxism. Here

issues are stated in a more straightforward and truthful manner. Let us learn from the "advanced" British.

Sinclair is naïve in his appeal, although fundamentally it is a very correct one; he is naïve because he ignores the development of mass socialism over the last fifty years and the struggle of trends within socialism; he ignores the conditions for the growth of revolutionary action when an objectively revolutionary situation and a revolutionary organisation exist. The "emotional" approach cannot make up for that. The intense and bitter struggle between powerful trends in socialism, between the opportunist and revolutionary trends, cannot be evaded by the use of rhetoric.

Blatchford speaks out undisguisedly, revealing the most covert argument of the Kautskyites and Co., who are afraid to tell the truth. We are still weak, that is all, says Blatchford; but his outspokenness at once lays bare his opportunism, his jingoism. It at once becomes obvious that he serves the bourgeoisie and the opportunists. By declaring that socialism is "*weak*" he *himself weakens* it by preaching an anti-socialist, bourgeois, policy.

Like Sinclair, but conversely, like a coward and not like a fighter, like a traitor and not like the recklessly brave, he, too, ignores the conditions making for a revolutionary situation.

As for his practical conclusions, his policy (the rejection of revolutionary action, of propaganda for such action and preparation of it), Blatchford, the vulgar jingoist, is in *complete* accord with Plekhanov and Kautsky.

Marxist words have in our days become a cover for a total renunciation of Marxism; to be a Marxist, one must expose the "Marxist hypocrisy" of the leaders of the Second International, fearlessly recognise the struggle of the two trends in socialism, and get to the bottom of the problems relating to that struggle. Such is the conclusion to be drawn from British relationships, which show us the *Marxist* essence of the matter, *without* Marxist words.

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HOW SERVILITY TO REACTION IS BLENDED WITH PLAYING AT DEMOCRACY

The Cadet collection of articles entitled *What Russia Expects of the War* (Petrograd, 1915) is a very useful book for those wishing to acquaint themselves with the politics of the liberal intelligentsia. The extent to which our Cadets and liberals have turned chauvinist is sufficiently known. The present issue of our magazine contains a special article on this question. However, the assembly, in one book of the works of various Cadets dealing with a variety of subjects bearing on the war shows concretely the role, not only of the Constitutional-Democratic Party in present-day imperialist politics, but also of the liberal intelligentsia as a whole.

The specific function of such an intelligentsia and of this particular party is to disguise reaction and imperialism with all kinds of democratic phrases, assurances, sophisms, and subterfuges. The principal article in the book, entitled "Russia's Territorial Acquisitions", is by Milyukov, the Cadet leader. An article like this could not but set forth the *actual significance* of the present war, as far as Russia is concerned: her desire to seize Galicia, and take part of Poland from Austria and Germany, and Constantinople, the Straits, and Armenia from Turkey. To provide a democratic screen, phrases are pronounced about "Slav unity", the interests of "small nationalities", and the "menace to European peace" presented by Germany. Only in passing, almost casually as it were, does Milyukov blurt out the truth in one of his sentences

"To unite Eastern Galicia with Russia has long been the aim of a Russian political party which has the backing of

one of the political parties in Galicia, the so-called Moscowphiles" (p. 49). Exactly! The Russian party referred to is the most reactionary in Russia, that of Purishkevich and Co., a party of the feudalist-minded landowners led by tsarism. This "party"—tsarism, the Purishkeviches and the rest—have long been intriguing both in Galicia and Armenia, etc. spending millions on bribing the "Moscowphiles", stopping at no crime to achieve the lofty aim of "uniting" Eastern Galicia with Russia. War is a "continuation of the politics" of *this* party. The war has been useful in having brushed aside all conventions, torn away all veils, let the people see the full truth with their own eyes: preservation of the tsarist monarchy means the need to sacrifice millions of lives (and thousands of millions of the people's money) so as to enslave other nations. In practice, it is these policies that have been backed and served by the Constitutional-Democratic Party.

This truth is unpalatable to the liberal intellectual, who considers himself humane, freedom-loving, and democratic, and is deeply indignant at the "calumny" that asserts he is a servant to the Purishkeviches. The war, however, has shown this "calumny" to be the most obvious truth.

Let us cast a glance at other articles in the book.

"Our future can be happy and bright only when international politics rest on a foundation of justice. Faith in life and its value will at the same time be the triumph of peace... [215]. Russian women, and with them all thinking humanity..." hope that "when peace is concluded, all the belligerent states will simultaneously sign a pact according to which all international misunderstandings [what a word! As if what has happened among states were merely "misunderstandings"!] ... shall be settled by arbitration" (216).

"Russian women, who represent the people, will carry into the people the ideas of Christian love and the brotherhood of nations ... [216]. [Here the censor has deleted one line and a half, apparently super-"humanitarian" expressions such as liberty, equality, fraternity.] ... Those who know that the writer of these lines can least of all be suspected of nationalism, do not need to be persuaded that the ideas propounded here have nothing whatsoever in common

with any kind of national exclusiveness... [83]. Only now do we realise and actually feel that in modern wars we are threatened, not by the loss of colonies, however precious, or by failure to free other nations, but by disintegration of the state itself..." (147).

Read and give thought to *how it is being done*! Learn how an allegedly democratic party conducts its politics, i.e., leads the *masses*!

To serve the class of the Purishkeviches, one must, at the decisive moments of history (at times when the aims of that class are to be achieved by war), help that class, or at least "*offer no resistance to the war*". At the same time, one must *console* the "people", the "masses", and "democracy", with fine words such as justice, peace, national liberation, settling international conflicts by arbitration, the brotherhood of nations, liberty, reforms, democracy, universal suffrage, etc. In doing so, one must beat one's breast in token of sincerity, aver and swear that "we" "can least of all be suspected of nationalism", that "our" ideas have "nothing whatsoever in common with any kind of national exclusiveness", and that we are only fighting against "disintegration of the state"!

That is how "it is being done".

That is how the liberal intellectuals make politics.

The liberal-labour politicians are behaving essentially in exactly the same way, but in a different environment and in a slightly modified form. These range from *Nasha Zarya*, which teaches the people and the proletariat "to offer no resistance to the war", continuing with *Nashe Dyelo*, which identifies itself with the views of Messrs. Potresov and Co. (No. 2, p. 19) and Plekhanov (No. 2, p. 103) and which reprints without a single dissenting remark similar ideas of Axelrod (No. 2, pp. 107-10), continuing further with Semkovsky, who battles in *Nashe Slovo* and in *Izvestia* of the Organising Committee against "disintegration", to Chkheidze's group, the Organising Committee and the Bund, who are fighting tooth and nail against a "split" (with the *Nashe Dyelo* group). Moreover, they all stand for the brotherhood of the workers, peace, internationalism, and whatever you please; they will sign whatever you wish; they will renounce "nationalism" millions of times, on the

single and "minor" condition—that "unity" should not be sundered with that Russian political group which alone (of the entire company) has some weight and, in journal and newspaper, has been teaching the workers opportunism, nationalism, and non-resistance to the war.

That is how "it is being done".

Written in June 1915

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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THE MAIN GERMAN OPPORTUNIST WORK ON THE WAR

Eduard David's book *Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkrieg* (*Vorwärts* Publishers, Berlin, 1915) provides a good collection of facts and arguments on the tactics pursued by the official German Social-Democratic Party in the present war. Those who follow opportunist literature and that of the German Social-Democrats in general will find nothing new in this book. It is, however, quite useful, and not only for purposes of reference. Anyone who would gain a deeper insight into the historic collapse of German Social-Democracy, anyone who really wishes to understand the reasons why a leading Social-Democratic party has "suddenly" (allegedly all of a sudden) become a party of lackeys of the German bourgeoisie and the Junkers, anyone who wishes to inquire into the meaning of the commonplace sophisms which serve to justify or conceal that collapse, will find David's dull book far from tedious. As a matter of fact, there is an integral quality in David's opinions; he has the conviction of a liberal-labour politician, something that is entirely missing in the works of Kautsky, for instance, that hypocrite who trims his sails to the wind.

David is an opportunist through and through, a contributor of long standing to *Sozialistische Monatshefte*—the German counterpart of *Nashe Dyelo*; he is the author of a big volume on the agrarian question, which contains not even a grain of socialism or Marxism. The very fact that a person like this, whose entire life has been devoted to corrupting the working-class movement in the bourgeois spirit, has become one of many just as opportunist party *leaders*, a Deputy, and even a member of the Executive (*Vorstand*)

of the German Social-Democratic parliamentary party, is a serious enough indication of the extent, depth and violence of the process of putrefaction within the German Social-Democracy.

David's book is of no scientific value whatever, since the author cannot or will not even pose the question of how the principal classes of present-day society have for decades been preparing, encouraging and building up their present attitude towards the war, this through *definite* politics that stem from *definite* class interests. Even the thought that, without an examination like the one just mentioned, no Marxist attitude towards the war can exist, and that only an examination such as this can provide the basis for a study of the *ideology* of the various classes in their attitude towards the war, is entirely alien to David. He is an *advocate* of a liberal-labour policy, who adapts all his exposition and all his arguments to the task of influencing *working-class* audiences, concealing from them the weak points in his stand, making liberal tactics acceptable to them, and stifling proletarian revolutionary instincts with the aid of the greatest possible number of authoritative examples from "The Socialists' Tactics in the West-European States" (Chapter 7 in David's book), etc., etc.

From the ideological standpoint David's book is therefore interesting only inasmuch as it provides an opportunity to analyse how the bourgeoisie *should* speak to the workers *in order to influence them*. The essence of Eduard David's ideological stand, considered from this angle, the only correct one, is contained in the following proposition: "The significance of our vote [for war credits] = *We voted*, *not for war but against defeat*" (p. 3, table of contents, and many passages in the book). This is the theme of the entire book. To back this main thesis, David has hand-picked examples of the way Marx, Engels and Lassalle regarded Germany's national wars (Chapter 2), data on the Triple Entente's vast plans of conquest (Chapter 4), as well as facts from the diplomatic history of the war (Chapter 5), the latter being nothing more than an attempt to whitewash Germany by referring to the ridiculously trivial and no less ridiculously insincere official exchange of telegrams on the eve of the war, etc. A special chapter (6) entitled "The Magnitude of

the Danger" contains considerations and figures on the Triple Entente's preponderance of might, the reactionary nature of tsarism, etc. Of course, David is fully in favour of peace. The preface to the book, dated May 1, 1915, winds up with the slogan, "Peace on Earth!" David, of course, considers himself an internationalist: the German Social-Democratic Party, he says, "has not betrayed the spirit of the International" (p. 8); it has "fought against the sowing of poisonous hatred among the peoples" (p. 8); it "has declared since the very first day of the war that in principle it is ready for peace as soon as the security of the country has been achieved" (p. 8).

David's book strikingly reveals that, to influence the workers and the masses in general, the liberal bourgeoisie (and their agents in the labour movement, i.e., the opportunists) are prepared to swear allegiance to internationalism any number of times, accept the peace slogan, renounce the annexationist aims of the war, condemn chauvinism, and so on and so forth—anything *except* revolutionary action against their own government, anything in the world, if only they can come out "against defeat". In point of fact, this ideology, in terms of mathematics, is both *necessary and sufficient* to fool the workers. One cannot offer them less because the masses cannot be rallied unless they are promised a just peace, and scared with the danger of invasion, and unless allegiance to internationalism is sworn to; one *need not* offer them more because all that is "more", i.e., the seizure of colonies, the annexation of foreign territories, the pillaging of conquered countries, the conclusion of advantageous trade agreements, etc., will be effected, *not* directly by the liberal bourgeoisie, but by the imperialist-militarist governmental war clique *after* the war.

The roles are well distributed; while the government and the military clique—with the support of the multi-millionaires and all bourgeois "men of affairs"—are waging the war, the liberals console and dupe the masses with the nationalist ideology of a defensive war, with promises of a democratic peace, etc. Eduard David's ideology is that of the liberal and humanitarian pacifist bourgeois; so is the ideology of the Russian opportunists in the Organising Committee, who are waging a struggle against the desirability

of defeat, against the disintegration of Russia, for the peace slogan, etc.

A non-liberal brand of tactics, one that differs in principle from the above, begins with the onset of a decisive break with *any* attempts to justify participation in the war, with the *practical* conduct of a policy of propaganda and preparation for revolutionary action, in wartime and with the full exploitation of wartime difficulties, against the respective governments. David does *approach* this borderline, the real line between bourgeois and proletarian politics, but he approaches it only with the purpose of glossing over an unpleasant subject. He mentions the Basle Manifesto several times, but he carefully steers clear of all its revolutionary passages; he recalls how Vaillant appealed in Basle "for a military strike and social revolution" (p. 119), but does so only to *defend* himself by using the example of the chauvinist Vaillant, not in order to cite and analyse the revolutionary directives of the resolution of the Basle Congress.

David quotes a considerable portion of our Central Committee's Manifesto, including its main slogan—the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war—but he does it only to declare that these "Russian" tactics are nothing short of "madness" and "gross distortion of the decisions of the International" (pp. 169, 172). This, he says, is Hervéism (p. 176); Hervé's book, he says "contains the whole theory of Lenin, Luxemburg, Radek, Pannekoek, etc." But, my dear David, is not there some Hervéism in the revolutionary passages of the Basle resolution and the *Communist Manifesto*? The mention of the latter document is just as unpleasant to David as the name of our journal, which is reminiscent of that very document, is unpleasant to Semkovsky. The thesis of the *Communist Manifesto* to the effect that "the workingmen have no country" has, as David is convinced, "long been disproved" (p. 176 ff.). As to the question of nationalities, the entire concluding chapter of David's book offers us the most unmitigated bourgeois nonsense about the "biological law of differentiation" (!), etc.

What is international is not at all anti-national; we stand for the right of nations to self-assertion; we are

against the browbeating of weak nations, David asserts, failing to understand (or rather pretending not to understand) that justifying participation in the imperialist war and advancing the "against-defeat" slogan in this war means acting, not only as an anti-socialist, but also as an anti-national politician. For the present-day imperialist war is a war between Great Powers (i.e., powers that oppress a number of other nations), conducted *for the purpose* of oppressing new nations. One cannot be "national" in an imperialist war otherwise than by being a socialist politician, i.e., by recognising the right of oppressed nations to liberation, to secession from the Great Powers that oppress them. In the era of imperialism, there can be no other *salvation* for *most* of the world's nations than through revolutionary action undertaken by the proletariat of the Great Powers, spreading beyond the boundaries of nationality, smashing those boundaries, and overthrowing the international bourgeoisie. Until the bourgeoisie is overthrown, there will remain nations known as "Great Powers", i.e., the oppression will remain of nine-tenths of the nations of the whole world. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie will enormously accelerate the downfall of national *partitions* of every kind, this without decreasing but, on the contrary, increasing a millionfold the "differentiation" of humanity, in the meaning of the wealth and the variety in spiritual life, ideological trends, tendencies, and shades.

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THE DEFEAT OF ONE'S OWN GOVERNMENT IN THE IMPERIALIST WAR

During a reactionary war a revolutionary class cannot but desire the defeat of its government.

This is axiomatic, and disputed only by conscious partisans or helpless satellites of the social-chauvinists. Among the former, for instance, is Semkovsky of the Organising Committee (No. 2 of its *Izvestia*), and among the latter, Trotsky and Bukvoyed,[134] and Kautsky in Germany. To desire Russia's defeat, Trotsky writes, is "an uncalled-for and absolutely unjustifiable concession to the political methodology of social-patriotism, which would replace the revolutionary struggle against the war and the conditions causing it, with an orientation—highly arbitrary in the present conditions—towards the lesser evil" (*Nashe Slovo* No. 105).

This is an instance of high-flown phraseology with which Trotsky always justifies opportunism. A "revolutionary struggle against the war" is merely an empty and meaningless exclamation, something at which the heroes of the Second International excel, *unless* it means revolutionary action against *one's own government* even in wartime. One has only to do some thinking in order to understand this. Wartime revolutionary action against one's own government indubitably means, not only desiring its defeat, but really facilitating such a defeat. ("Discerning reader": note that this does not mean "blowing up bridges", organising unsuccessful strikes in the war industries, and in general helping the government defeat the revolutionaries.)

The phrase-bandying Trotsky has completely lost his bearings on a simple issue. It seems to him that to desire

Russia's defeat *means* desiring the victory of Germany. (Bukvoyed and Semkovsky give more direct expression to the "thought", or rather want of thought, which they share with Trotsky.) But Trotsky regards this as the "methodology of social-patriotism"! To help people that are unable to think for themselves, the Berne resolution (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40)* made it clear that in *all* imperialist countries the proletariat must now desire the defeat of its own government. Bukvoyed and Trotsky preferred to avoid this truth, while Semkovsky (an opportunist who is more useful to the working class than all the others, thanks to his naïvely frank reiteration of bourgeois wisdom) blurted out the following: "This is nonsense, because either Germany or Russia can win" (*Izvestia* No. 2).

Take the example of the Paris Commune. France was defeated by Germany but the workers were defeated by Bismarck and Thiers! Had Bukvoyed and Trotsky done a little thinking, they would have realised that *they* have adopted the viewpoint on the war held by *governments and the bourgeoisie*, i.e., that they cringe to the "political methodology of social-patriotism", to use Trotsky's pretentious language.

A revolution in wartime means civil war; the *conversion* of a war between governments into a civil war is, on the one hand, facilitated by military reverses ("defeats") of governments; on the other hand, one *cannot* actually strive for such a conversion without thereby facilitating defeat.

The reason why the chauvinist (including the Organising Committee and the Chkheidze group) repudiate the defeat "slogan" is that *this slogan alone* implies a consistent call for revolutionary action against one's own government in wartime. Without such action, millions of ultra-revolutionary phrases such as a war against "the war and the conditions, etc." are not worth a brass farthing.

Anyone who would in all earnest refute the "slogan" of defeat for one's own government in the imperialist war should prove one of three things: (1) that the war of 1914-15 is not reactionary, or (2) that a revolution stemming from that war is impossible, or (3) that co-ordination and mutual aid are possible between revolutionary movements in *all* the

* See p. 163 of this volume.—*Ed.*

belligerent countries. The third point is particularly important to Russia, a most backward country, where an immediate socialist revolution is impossible. That is why the Russian Social-Democrats had to be the first to advance the "theory and practice" of the defeat "slogan". The tsarist government was perfectly right in asserting that the agitation conducted by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma—the *sole* instance in the International, not only of parliamentary opposition but of genuine revolutionary anti-government agitation among the masses—that this agitation has weakened Russia's "military might" and is likely to lead to its defeat. This is a fact to which it is foolish to close one's eyes.

The opponents of the defeat slogan are simply afraid of themselves when they refuse to recognise the very obvious fact of the inseparable link between revolutionary agitation against the government and helping bring about its defeat.

Are co-ordination and mutual aid possible between the Russian movement, which is revolutionary in the bourgeois-democratic sense, and the socialist movement in the West? No socialist who has publicly spoken on the matter during the last decade has doubted this, the movement among the Austrian proletariat after October 17, 1905,[135] *actually* proving it possible.

Ask any Social-Democrat who calls himself an internationalist whether or not he approves of an understanding between the Social-Democrats of the various belligerent countries on joint revolutionary action against all belligerent governments. Many of them will reply that it is impossible, as Kautsky has done (*Die Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914), thereby *fully proving* his social-chauvinism. This, on the one hand, is a deliberate and vicious lie, which clashes with the generally known facts and the Basle Manifesto. On the other hand, if it were true, *the opportunists would be quite right in many respects*!

Many will voice their approval of such an understanding. To this we shall say: if this approval is not hypocritical, it is ridiculous to think that, in wartime and for the conduct of a war, some "formal" understanding is necessary, such as the election of representatives, the arrangement of a meeting, the signing of an agreement, and the choice of the day

and hour! Only the Semkovskys are capable of thinking so. An understanding on revolutionary action even in a *single* country, to say nothing of a number of countries, can be achieved *only* by the force of the *example* of serious revolutionary action, by *launching* such action and *developing* it. However, such action cannot be launched without desiring the defeat of the government, and without contributing to such a defeat. The conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war cannot be "made", any more than a revolution can be "made". It *develops* out of a number of diverse phenomena, aspects, features, characteristics and consequences of the imperialist war. That development is *impossible* without a series of military reverses and defeats of governments that receive blows from their *own* oppressed classes.

To repudiate the defeat slogan means allowing one's revolutionary ardour to degenerate into an empty phrase, or sheer hypocrisy.

What is the substitute proposed for the defeat slogan? It is that of "neither victory nor defeat" (Semkovsky in *Izvestia* No. 2; also the *entire* Organising Committee in No. 1). This, however, is nothing but a paraphrase of the "*defence of the fatherland*" slogan. It means shifting the issue to the level of a war between governments (who, according to the content of this slogan, are to *keep* to their old stand, "retain their positions"), and not to the level of the *struggle* of the oppressed classes against their governments! It means justifying the chauvinism of *all* the imperialist nations, whose bourgeoisie are always ready to say—*and do say to the people*—that they are "only" fighting "against defeat". "The significance of our August 4 vote was that we are not for war *but against defeat*," David, a leader of the opportunists, writes in his book. The Organising Committee, together with Bukvoyed and Trotsky, stand on *fully* the same ground as David when they defend the "neither-victory-nor-defeat" slogan.

On closer examination, this slogan will be found to mean a "class truce", the renunciation of the class struggle by the oppressed classes in all belligerent countries, since the class struggle is impossible without dealing blows at one's "own" bourgeoisie, one's "own" government, whereas dealing a

blow at one's own government in wartime *is* (for Bukvoyed's information) high treason, *means* contributing to the defeat of one's own country. Those who accept the "neither-victory-nor-defeat" slogan can only be hypocritically in favour of the class struggle, of "disrupting the class truce"; *in practice*, such people are renouncing an independent proletarian policy because they subordinate the proletariat of all belligerent countries to the *absolutely bourgeois* task of safeguarding the imperialist governments against defeat. The only policy of actual, not verbal disruption of the "class truce", of acceptance of the class struggle, is for the proletariat *to take advantage* of the *difficulties* experienced by its government and its bourgeoisie *in order to overthrow them*. This, however, cannot be achieved or *striven for*, without desiring the defeat of one's own government and without contributing to that defeat.

When, before the war, the Italian Social-Democrats raised the question of a mass strike, the bourgeoisie replied, no doubt correctly from their *own* point of view, that this would be high treason, and that Social-Democrats would be dealt with as traitors. That is true, just as it is true that fraternisation in the trenches is high treason. Those who write against "high treason", as Bukvoyed does, or against the "disintegration of Russia", as Semkovsky does, are adopting the bourgeois, not the proletarian point of view. A proletarian *cannot* deal a class blow at his government or hold out (in fact) a hand to his brother, the proletarian of the "foreign" country which is at war with "our side", *without committing* "high treason", *without contributing* to the defeat, to the *disintegration* of his "own", imperialist "Great" Power.

Whoever is in favour of the slogan of "neither victory nor defeat" is consciously or unconsciously a chauvinist; at best he is a conciliatory petty bourgeois but in any case he is an *enemy* to proletarian policy, a partisan of the existing governments, of the present-day ruling classes.

Let us look at the question from yet another angle. The war cannot but evoke among the masses the most turbulent sentiments, which upset the usual sluggish state of mass mentality. Revolutionary tactics are *impossible* if they are not adjusted to these new turbulent sentiments.

What are the main currents of these turbulent sentiments? They are: (1) Horror and despair. Hence, a growth of religious feeling. Again the churches are crowded, the reactionaries joyfully declare. "Wherever there is suffering there is religion," says the arch-reactionary Barres. He is right, too. (2) Hatred of the "enemy", a sentiment that is carefully fostered by the bourgeoisie (not so much by the priests), and is of economic and political value *only to the bourgeoisie*. (3) Hatred of one's *own* government and one's *own* bourgeoisie—the sentiment of all class-conscious workers who understand, on the one hand, that war is a "continuation of the politics" of imperialism, which they counter by a "continuation" of their hatred of their class enemy, and, on the other hand, that "a war against war" is a banal phrase unless it means a revolution against their *own* government. Hatred of one's own government and one's own bourgeoisie cannot be aroused unless their defeat is desired; one *cannot* be a sincere opponent of a civil (i.e., class) truce without arousing hatred of one's own government and bourgeoisie!

Those who stand for the "neither-victory-nor-defeat" slogan are in fact on the side of the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, for they do not believe in the possibility of international revolutionary action by the working class against their own governments, and *do not wish* to help develop such action, which, though undoubtedly difficult, is the only task worthy of a proletarian, the only socialist task. It is the proletariat in the most backward of the belligerent Great Powers which, through the medium of their party, have had to adopt—especially in view of the shameful treachery of the German and French Social-Democrats—revolutionary tactics that are quite unfeasible unless they "contribute to the defeat" of their own government, but which alone lead to a European revolution, to the permanent peace of socialism, to the liberation of humanity from the horrors, misery, savagery and brutality now prevailing.

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THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

The second issues of the Organising Committee's *Izvestia* and of *Nashe Dyelo* reveal this state of affairs in a most instructive and illuminating way. Both papers, each in its own way, and in accordance with their places of publication and their political aim, are purposefully directing their efforts towards strengthening social-chauvinism.

Nashe Dyelo has not only failed to inform the readers of any differences or shades of opinion among its editors, has not only failed to raise the faintest objection to "Potresovism", but has voiced, in a special "editorial" statement (p. 19), its solidarity with Potresovism by declaring that "internationalism" calls for an "orientation in the international situation" which will help decide the success of *which* bourgeoisie in the present war is more desirable to the proletariat. This means that *all* the editors are basically and essentially social-chauvinists. Besides, it is only on shades of social-chauvinism that the editors disagree with Kautsky, whose pamphlet, entirely devoted to justification of international social-chauvinism, they have endowed with such epithets as "brilliant", "exhaustive" and "theoretically valuable". Whoever has eyes to see cannot but notice that the *Nashe Dyelo*'s editors are, firstly, thereby sanctioning Russian chauvinism, and secondly, have expressed readiness to amnesty international social-chauvinism and reconcile themselves to it.

In the section "In Russia and Abroad", the paper quotes the views of Plekhanov and Axelrod, which the editors (with good reason) do not distinguish between. A special note, again *editorial* (p. 103), declares that Plekhanov's "views coincide in many respects" with those of *Nashe Dyelo*.

The picture could not be clearer. That legalist "current" which finds expression in *Nashe Dyelo* and, thanks to a thousand links with the liberal bourgeoisie, has, alone out of the entire "Brussels bloc", been a reality in Russia in 1910-15, has fully consolidated and completed its opportunist development, supplementing liquidationism with social-chauvinism. The actual programme of that group, which was expelled from our Party[136] in January 1912, has been augmented with a new and very important item: the propagation in the working class of ideas which call for the preservation and enlargement, even at the price of war if necessary, of the dominant-nation advantages and privileges of the Great-Russian landowners and bourgeoisie.

An attempt to conceal this political reality with "Left" phrases and quasi-Social-Democratic ideology—such is the actual political significance of the legal activities of the Chkheidze group and of the Organising Committee's illegal activities. In the realm of ideology the "neither-victory-nor-defeat" slogan; in the realm of practice—an anti-"split" struggle which permeates literally *all* the articles in *Izvestia*'s second issue, particularly those by Martov, Yonov, and Mashinadze—such is the businesslike and (from the opportunists' standpoint) perfectly correct programme of "peace" with *Nashe Dyelo* and Plekhanov. Read the letter of Mr. Alexinsky, the "former revolutionary", in *Rech* No. 143 (May 27, 1915), on "defence of the country" as the "task of democracy", and you will see that this zealous henchman of Plekhanov, the chauvinist of today, will get fully reconciled to the slogan of "neither victory nor defeat". In fact, this is a slogan *common* to Plekhanov, *Nashe Dyelo*, Axelrod and Kosovsky, Martov and Semkovsky, who will of course (no doubt about that!) keep their "quite legitimate shades" and "differences on details". In the ideological sense and on the fundamentals, this fraternity are content with accepting as common ground the slogan of "neither victory nor defeat" (speaking parenthetically; *whose* victories or defeats? Obviously, those of the *existing governments*, of the present-day ruling classes!). In the sphere of practical policies, they are content with the "unity" slogan, i.e., *unity* with *Nashe Dyelo*, which means acceptance of the fact that, in Russia, *Nashe Dyelo* will, with the aid of the Chkheidze

group, continue to conduct serious policies and do serious work among the masses ("serious" in the bourgeois sense), while abroad and underground, the Organising Committee and Co. will permit themselves "Left" petty reservations and near-revolutionary phrases, and so on and so forth. Let us harbour no illusions: the Brussels bloc which immediately fell apart, thus proving that it contained nothing but hypocrisy, is, for that very reason, highly suited to covering up a politically unsavoury situation. In July 1914, it covered up *Nasha Zarya* and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* with non-committal near-Left resolutions. In July 1915, there is as yet no "meeting of friends" and no "Minutes", but there is already an agreement, in principle, between the chief "actors" regarding joint concealment of the social-chauvinism of *Nashe Dyelo*, Plekhanov and Axelrod by using the same kind of near-Left phrases. A year has passed, a grave and important year in the history of Europe. It has become apparent that the abscess of national liberal-labour politics has *asphyxiated* most of the Social-Democratic parties of Europe and that it has come to a head within liquidationism too—but the "friends", like the musicians in Krylov's fable "The Quartet"[137] have only changed seats to strike up in chorus and in false tones the same old song. Unity, unity—(with *Nashe Dyelo*)!

The example of *Nashe Slovo*, which comes out in Paris, is particularly instructive to sincere adherents of "unity". Issue No. 2 of the Organising Committee's *Izvestia* has dealt *Nashe Slovo* a mortal blow so that the latter's demise (political or "physical", it does not matter very much) is now only a matter of time. Issue No. 2 of the Organising Committee's *Izvestia* has "killed" *Nashe Slovo* simply by declaring that Martov (who found himself a member of the Organising Committee's secretariat, evidently having been "unanimously" co-opted by Semkovsky and Axelrod, probably in exchange for his consent to repeat no more unguarded phrases about the "death" of *Vorwärts*) and "a good half of the contributors to *Nashe Slovo*, who are organisationally attached to the Organising Committee", have *admitted their error*, they have admitted that they "*naïvely*" (Martov in the role of an *ingénu*, quite an eyeful!) considered *Nashe Slovo* the "joint organ of the Russian internation-

alists", whereas in reality *Nashe Slovo* proved to be both "factional" and "pursuing splitting [for his part, Semkovsky has added "anarcho-syndicalist"] tendencies", and also "making excuses to Lenin's *Sotsial-Demokrat*".

The public have seen three *Nashe Slovo* elements, which for seven or eight months have been unsuccessfully trying to unite. These are: (1) two Left-wing members of the editorial staff (*Nashe Slovo* No. 107) who sincerely sympathise with internationalism and gravitate towards *Sotsial-Demokrat* (see the resolution of greeting addressed to them by the Paris group of our Party, in *Nashe Slovo* No. 122), (2) Martov and the Organising Committee members ("a good half"); (3) Trotsky, who as always entirely disagrees with the social-chauvinists in principle, but agrees with them *in everything in practice* (incidentally, thanks to the "felicitous mediation"—is that what they call it in diplomatic language?—of the Chkheidze group).

Sincere friends of unity must be asking themselves: why did *Nashe Slovo* collapse and split? It is customary to explain splits by the misanthropic "splitting policy" of the horrible "Leninists" (the articles by Semkovsky in *Izvestia* No. 2, by Axelrod in *Nashe Slovo*, etc., etc.). These horrible people, however, took no part at all in *Nashe Slovo* and for this simple reason they *could not* have split away or left it.

What, then, is the reason? Was it accidental? Or was it because unity between Social-Democratic workers and the conductors of bourgeois influence (in reality agents of liberal and chauvinist bourgeoisie) who are centred in *Nashe Dyelo* is impossible and damaging?

Let the friends of "unity" ponder over this.

Of the European Social-Democrats, Kautsky and Haase jointly with Bernstein himself, have come out—in somewhat different surroundings and form—in favour of "unity". Sensing that the masses are swinging towards the Left, these "authorities" are proposing peace to the Left Social-Democrats, on the tacit condition of peace with the Südekums. To renounce, in word, the "policy of August 4"; to paper over the rift between the national liberal-labour policies and the Social-Democratic working-class policies, with the aid of some non-committal (in certain respects not unfavourable even to Hindenburg and Joffre) "peace" phrases

(the peace slogan being highly suited to the purpose), and by platonically denouncing annexations, etc.—such, approximately, is Kautsky's and Bernstein's programme, which the French social-chauvinists would not be loath to join, as may be seen from the tone of some statements in *l'Humanité*. The British in the Independent Labour Party will, of course, heartily support such an amnesty for social-chauvinism if only it is concealed by a number of compliments for the Left. The Organising Committee members and Trotsky seem to be predestined to hang on to the coat-tails of Kautsky and Bernstein, at the present juncture.

We consider this leftward turn by the leader of the opportunists and the leader of the hypocritical chauvinists of the "radical" camp a farce designed to *save what is rotten* in Social-Democracy, by means of a bow towards the Left, with the aim of bolstering the national liberal-labour policies at the price of petty verbal concessions to the "Lefts".

The objective situation in Europe is such that, among the masses, disappointment, dissatisfaction, protest, indignation, and revolutionary temper are mounting, which, at a certain stage of that temper's development, may turn into action with incredible speed. Either aid the growth and development of revolutionary action against one's *own* bourgeoisie and one's own government, or else hamper, soothe and extinguish the revolutionary temper—this is the only practical way in which the issue now stands. To achieve the latter of these alternatives, the liberal bourgeoisie and the opportunists will agree (and, from the standpoint of *their* interests, *must* agree) to any verbal concessions to the Left, to any number of promises concerning disarmament, peace, the repudiation of annexations, reforms of every kind, anything under the sun, if only a rupture between the masses and their opportunist leaders, and a resumption of more and more serious revolutionary action can be averted.

Do not trust any high-sounding programmes, we say to the masses; rely on your own mass revolutionary action against your governments and your bourgeoisie and try to build up such action; there is no escape from barbarism, no possibility of progress in Europe, without a civil war for socialism.

P.S. This article had already been set when we received a collection of articles under the title of *The War*, by Mr. Plekhanov and the "former revolutionary" G. Alexinsky and Co. This is an assortment of sophisms and lies by social-chauvinists, who would make the tsarism's reactionary war of plunder appear "just", "defensive", etc.! We would bring this disgraceful sheaf of servility to tsarism to the attention of all those who honestly wish to understand why the Second International has collapsed. It is, incidentally noteworthy that these outspoken social-chauvinists are *entirely* satisfied both with Chkheidze and his entire group. The Organising Committee, Trotsky, Plekhanov, and Alexinsky and Co. are naturally also satisfied with the Chkheidze group because for years the latter have proved their skill in shielding the opportunists and serving them.

Messrs. Plekhanov and Alexinsky are shamelessly lying about the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma, now exiled to Siberia. The time is probably at hand when it will be possible to cite documents to refute these lies.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 43,
July 26, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

THE "PEACE" SLOGAN APPRAISED

In its issue of June 27, 1915, the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, central organ of the Austrian Social-Democrats, cites a very instructive declaration contained in the German governmental *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The declaration deals with an article by one of the best known (and vilest) opportunists of the "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany named Quarck, who said *inter alia*:

"We German Social-Democrats and our Austrian comrades have repeatedly declared ourselves ready to establish contacts (with the British and French Social-Democrats) for the purpose of beginning peace talks. *The German Imperial Government know of this, and have not placed the slightest obstacle in our way.*"

Nationalliberale Korrespondenz, a German national-liberal paper, has said that the concluding words permit of a double interpretation. The first is that the government have put no obstacles in the way of "international political action" by the Social-Democrats, insofar as it does not transgress the limits of legality and "is not dangerous to the State". This, the paper says, is perfectly intelligible from the angle of "political freedom".

The second interpretation is that the German Government "at least tacitly approve of the Social-Democratic internationalist peace propaganda, and even consider it a suitable means of laying down the initial basis for exploring the possibility of peace".

The national-liberal paper naturally considers this latter interpretation out of the question. In this it has the official support of the government newspaper, which goes on to say that "the government have nothing in common with

internationalist peace propaganda and have authorised neither Social-Democratic nor any other intermediaries to conduct that propaganda".

An edifying farce, is it not? Will anybody believe that the German Government, who have forbidden *Vorwärts* to write about the class struggle, have introduced harsh military laws against popular meetings and veritable "military slavery" for the proletariat—that this government have, *out of sheer liberalism*, "put no obstacles" in the way of Messrs. Quarck and Südekum, or that they are not in constant communication with the latter gentlemen?

Is it not a thousand times more likely that Quarck *inadvertently* told the truth (namely, that the peace propaganda was started by the German Social-Democrats when they had reached a direct or indirect understanding with their government), and that he was "officially refuted" only for the purpose of concealing the truth.

This is a lesson to those phrase-lovers who, like Trotsky (see No. 105 of *Nashe Slovo*), defend—in opposition to us—the peace slogan, alleging among other things that "all Left-wingers" have united for the purpose of "action" under this very slogan! The Junker government have now demonstrated the correctness of our Berne resolution (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40), which says that the propaganda of peace "unaccompanied by a call for revolutionary mass action' can only "sow illusions" and "turn the proletariat into a plaything in the hands of the *secret diplomacy* of the belligerent countries".*

This has been literally proved!

In a few years diplomatic history will prove that *there was* an understanding, direct or indirect, between the opportunists and the governments on peace palaver and this, *not in Germany alone*! Diplomacy may conceal such things, but murder will out!

When the Lefts began to unite under the peace slogan, this deserved encouragement, *provided* it was the *first step* in protest against the chauvinists, in the same fashion as the Caponade was the Russian worker's first timid protest against the tsar. But since the Lefts are even

* See p. 163 of this volume.—*Ed.*

now confining themselves to this *slogan* (slogans are the business of *intelligent* political leaders), they are shoddy Lefts, there is consequently *not a grain of* "*action*" in their resolutions, and they are consequently a plaything in the hands of the Südekums, Quarcks, Sembats, Hyndmans, Joffres, and Hindenburgs.

Anyone who fails to understand this even today, when the peace slogan ("unaccompanied by a call for revolutionary mass action") has been prostituted by the Vienna Conference[138] of Bernstein, Kautsky and Co. with the Scheidemanns (the German *Vorstand*, their Executive), is simply an unwitting participant in the social-chauvinist humbugging of the people.

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THE QUESTION OF PEACE

The question of peace as an immediate programme of action for the socialists, and in this connection the question of peace terms, presents a universal interest. One can only be grateful to *Berner Tagwacht* for its efforts to pose the question, not from the usual petty-bourgeois national angle, but from one that is genuinely proletarian and internationalist. The editorial note in No. 73 ("*Friedenssehnsucht*"), that the German Social-Democrats who wish for peace must break (*sich lossagen*) with the policies of the Junker government, was excellent. Also excellent was Comrade A. P.'s[139] attack (Nos. 73 and 75) on the "pompous airs of impotent phrase-mongers" (*Wichtigtuerei machtloser Schönredner*), who are vainly attempting to solve the peace question from the petty-bourgeois point of view.

Let us see how this question should be posed by socialists.

The peace slogan can be advanced either in connection with definite peace terms, or without any conditions at all, as a struggle, not for a definite kind of peace, but for peace in general (*Frieden ohne weiters*). In the latter case, we obviously have a slogan that is not only non-socialist but entirely devoid of meaning and content. Most people are definitely in favour of peace in general, including even Kitchener, Joffre, Hindenburg, and Nicholas the Bloodstained, for *each* of them wants an end to the war. The trouble is that every one of them advances peace terms that are imperialist (i.e., predatory and oppressive, towards other peoples), and to the advantage of his "own" nation. Slogans must be brought forward so as to enable the masses, through propaganda and agitation, to see the unbridgeable distinction between socialism and capitalism (imperialism), and *not*

for the purpose of *reconciling* two hostile classes and two hostile political lines, with the aid of a formula that "unites" the most different things.

To continue: can the socialists of different countries be united on definite *terms* of peace? If so, such terms must undoubtedly include the recognition of the right to self-determination for all nations, and also renunciation of all "annexations", i.e., infringements of that right. If, however, that right is recognised only for *some* nations, then you are defending the *privileges* of certain nations, i.e., you are a nationalist and imperialist, not a socialist. If, however, that right is recognised for *all* nations, then you cannot single out Belgium alone, for instance; you must take *all* the oppressed peoples, both in Europe (the Irish in Britain, the Italians in Nice, the Danes in Germany, fifty-seven per cent of Russia's population, etc.) *and outside of Europe*, i.e., all colonies. Comrade A. P. has done well to remind us of them. Britain, France, and Germany have a total population of some one hundred and fifty million, whereas the populations they oppress in the colonies number over four hundred million! The essence of the imperialist war, i.e., a war waged for the interests of the capitalists, consists, not only in the war being waged with the aim of oppressing new nations, of carving up the colonies, but also in its being waged primarily by the advanced nations, which *oppress* a number of other peoples comprising the *majority* of the earth's population.

The German Social-Democrats, who justify the seizure of Belgium or reconcile themselves to it, are actually imperialists and nationalists, not Social-Democrats, since they defend the "right" of the German bourgeoisie (partly also of the German workers) to oppress the Belgians, the Alsatians, the Danes, the Poles, the Negroes in Africa, etc. They are not socialists, but *menials* to the German bourgeoisie, whom they are aiding to rob other nations. The Belgian socialists who demand the liberation and indemnification of Belgium *alone* are also actually defending a demand of the Belgian bourgeoisie, who would go on plundering the 15,000,000 Congolese population and obtaining concessions and privileges in other countries. The Belgian bourgeoisie's foreign investments amount to something like three thousand

million francs. Safeguarding the profits from these investments by using every kind of fraud and machinations is the *real* "national interest" of "gallant Belgium". The same applies in a still greater degree to Russia, Britain, France and Japan.

It follows that if the demand for the freedom of nations is not to be a false phrase covering up the imperialism and the nationalism of *certain individual* countries, it must be extended to *all* peoples and to *all* colonies. Such a demand however, is obviously meaningless *unless* it is accompanied by a series of revolutions in *all* the advanced countries. Moreover, it cannot be accomplished without a successful *socialist* revolution.

Should this be taken to mean that socialists can remain indifferent to the peace demand that is coming from ever greater masses of the people? By no means. The slogans of the workers' class-conscious vanguard are one thing, while the spontaneous demands of the masses are something quite different. The yearning for peace is one of the most important *symptoms* revealing the beginnings of *disappointment* in the bourgeois lie about a war of "liberation", the "defence of the fatherland", and similar falsehoods that the class of capitalists beguiles the mob with. This symptom should attract the closest attention from socialists. All efforts must be bent towards *utilising* the masses' desire for peace. But *how* is it to be utilised? To recognise the peace *slogan* and repeat it would mean encouraging "pompous airs of impotent [and frequently what is worse: *hypocritical*] phrase-mongers"; it would mean *deceiving* the people with illusion that the existing governments, the present-day master classes, are *capable*—without being "taught" a lesson (or rather without being eliminated) by a series of revolutions—of granting a peace in any way satisfactory to democracy and the working class. Nothing is more harmful than such deception. Nothing throws more dust in the eyes of the workers, nothing imbues them with a more deceptive idea about the *absence of deep* contradiction between capitalism and socialism, nothing *embellishes* capitalist slavery more than this deception does. No, we must make use of the desire for peace so as to explain to the masses that the benefits they expect from peace cannot be obtained without a series of revolutions.

An end to wars, peace among the nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence—such is our ideal, but only bourgeois sophists can seduce the masses with this ideal, if the latter is divorced from a direct and immediate call for revolutionary action. The ground for such propaganda is prepared; to practice that propaganda, one need only break with the opportunists, those allies of the bourgeoisie, who are hampering revolutionary work both directly (even to the extent of passing information to the authorities) and indirectly.

The slogan of self-determination of nations should also be advanced *in connection* with the imperialist era of capitalism. We do not stand for the *status quo*, or for the philistine Utopia of *standing aside* in great wars. We stand for a revolutionary struggle against imperialism, i.e., capitalism. Imperialism consists in a striving of nations that oppress a number of other nations to extend and increase that oppression and to repartition the colonies. That is why the question of self-determination of nations today *hinges* on the conduct of socialists of the *oppressor* nations. A socialist of any of the *oppressor* nations (Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United States of America, etc.) who does not recognise and does not struggle for the right of oppressed nations to self-determination (i.e., the right to secession) is in reality a chauvinist, not a socialist.

Only this point of view can lead to a sincere and consistent struggle against imperialism, to a proletarian, not a philistine approach (today) to the national question. Only this point of view can lead to a consistent application of the principle of combating any form of the oppression of nations; it removes mistrust among the proletarians of the oppressor and oppressed nations, makes for a united international struggle for the socialist revolution (i.e., for the only accomplishable regime of complete national equality), as distinct from the philistine Utopia of freedom for all small states in general, under capitalism.

This is the point of view adopted by our Party, i.e., by those Social-Democrats of Russia who have rallied around the Central Committee. This was the point of view adopted by Marx when he taught the proletariat that "no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations". It was from this point of view that Marx demanded the separation of Ireland from

Britain, this in the interests of the freedom movement, not only of the Irish, but especially of the *British* workers.

If the socialists of Britain do not recognise and uphold Ireland's right to secession, if the French do not do the same for Italian Nice, the Germans for Alsace-Lorraine, Danish Schleswig, and Poland, the Russians for Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, etc., and the Poles for the Ukraine—if all the socialists of the "Great" Powers, i.e., the great robber powers, do not uphold that right in respect of the colonies, it is solely because they are in fact imperialists, not socialists. It is ridiculous to cherish illusions that people who do *not* fight for "the right to self-determination" of the oppressed nations, while they themselves belong to the oppressor nations, are capable of practising socialist policies.

Instead of leaving it to the hypocritical phrase-mongers to deceive the people by phrases and promises concerning the possibility of a democratic peace, socialists must explain to the masses the impossibility of anything resembling a democratic peace, unless there are a series of revolutions and unless a revolutionary struggle is waged in every country against the *respective* government. Instead of allowing the bourgeois politicians to deceive the peoples with talk about the freedom of nations, socialists must explain to the masses in the *oppressor* nations that they cannot hope for their liberation, as long as they help oppress other nations, and do not recognise and uphold the right of those nations to self-determination, i.e., the freedom to secede. That is the socialist, as distinct from the imperialist, policy to be applied to all countries, on the question of peace and the national question. True, this line is in most cases incompatible with the laws punishing high treason—but so is the Basle resolution, which has been so shamefully betrayed by almost all the socialists of the oppressor nations.

The choice is between socialism and submission to the laws of Joffre and Hindenburg, between revolutionary struggle and servility to imperialism. There is no middle course. The greatest harm is caused to the proletariat by the hypocritical (or obtuse) authors of the "middle-course" policy.

Written in July-August 1915 Signed: *Lenin*

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Published according to the manuscript

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

SOCIALISM AND WAR

THE ATTITUDE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TOWARD THE WAR[140]

Written in July-August 1915

Published in pamphlet form
in the autumn of 1915
by the *Sotsial-Demokrat*
Editorial Board in Geneva

Published according to
the pamphlet text

SOCIALISM AND WAR

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PREFACE
TO THE FIRST (FOREIGN) EDITION

The war has been in progress for already a year. At the very outset of the war, our Party's attitude towards it was defined in the Central Committee's manifesto drawn up in September 1914 and (after it had been sent to the members of the C.C. and to our Party's responsible representatives in Russia, and had received their consent) published on November 1, 1914, in No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*,* our Party's Central Organ. Later, in No. 40 (March 29, 1915), the resolutions of the Berne Conference** were published, in which our principles and tactics were set forth more precisely.

At present there is an obvious growth of revolutionary temper among the masses. In other countries, symptoms of the same phenomenon are to be seen on all sides, despite the suppression of the revolutionary aspirations of the proletariat by most of the official Social-Democratic parties, which have taken sides with their governments and their bourgeoisie. This state of affairs makes particularly urgent the publication of a pamphlet that sums up Social-Democratic tactics in relation to the war. In reprinting in full the above-mentioned Party documents, we have provided them with brief comment, endeavouring to take due stock of all the main arguments in favour of bourgeois and of proletarian tactics that have been expressed in the appropriate literature and at Party meetings.

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* See pp. 25-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 158-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This pamphlet was written in the summer of 1915, just before the Zimmerwald Conference.[141] It also appeared in German and French, and was reprinted in full in Norwegian in the organ of the Norwegian Social-Democratic Youth League. The German edition of the pamphlet was secretly brought to Germany—Berlin, Leipzig, Bremen and other cities, where it was secretly distributed by supporters of the Zimmerwald Left and by the Karl Liebknecht group. The French edition was secretly printed in Paris and distributed there by the French Zimmerwaldists. The Russian-language edition reached Russia in a very limited number of copies, and in Moscow was copied out in handwriting by workers.

We are now reprinting this pamphlet in full, as a document. The reader should all the time remember that the pamphlet was written in August 1915. This must be kept in view particularly in connection with those passages which refer to Russia: Russia at that time was still tsarist, Romanov Russia.

Published in the 1918 edition of the pamphlet

Published according to the pamphlet text

CHAPTER I
THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALISM AND THE WAR OF 1914-1915

THE ATTITUDE OF SOCIALISTS TOWARDS WARS

Socialists have always condemned wars between nations as barbarous and brutal. Our attitude towards war, however, is fundamentally different from that of the bourgeois pacifists (supporters and advocates of peace) and of the anarchists. We differ from the former in that we understand the inevitable connection between wars and the class struggle within a country; we understand that wars cannot be abolished unless classes are abolished and socialism is created; we also differ in that we regard civil wars, i.e., wars waged by an oppressed class against the oppressor class, by slaves against slaveholders, by serfs against landowners, and by wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as fully legitimate, progressive and necessary. We Marxists differ from both pacifists and anarchists in that we deem it necessary to study each war historically (from the standpoint of Marx's dialectical materialism) and separately. There have been in the past numerous wars which, despite all the horrors, atrocities, distress and suffering that inevitably accompany all wars were progressive, i.e., benefited the development of mankind by helping to destroy most harmful and reactionary institutions (e.g., an autocracy or serfdom) and the most barbarous despotisms in Europe (the Turkish and the Russian). That is why the features historically specific to the present war must come up for examination.

THE HISTORICAL TYPES OF WARS IN MODERN TIMES

The Great French Revolution ushered in a new epoch in the history of mankind. From that time down to the Paris Commune, i.e., between 1789 and 1871, one type of war was of a bourgeois-progressive character, waged for national

liberation. In other words, the overthrow of absolutism and feudalism, the undermining of these institutions, and the overthrow of alien oppression, formed the chief content and historical significance of *such* wars. These were therefore progressive wars; during such wars, all honest and revolutionary democrats, as well as all socialists, always wished success to that country (i.e., that bourgeoisie) which had helped to overthrow or undermine the most baneful foundations of feudalism, absolutism and the oppression of other nations. For example, the revolutionary wars waged by France contained an element of plunder and the conquest of foreign territory by the French, but this does not in the least alter the fundamental historical significance of those wars, which destroyed and shattered feudalism and absolutism in the whole of the old, serf-owning Europe. In the Franco-Prussian war, Germany plundered France, but this does not alter the fundamental historical significance of that war, which liberated tens of millions of German people from feudal disunity and from the oppression of two despots, the Russian tsar and Napoleon III.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WARS OF AGGRESSION AND OF DEFENCE

The period of 1789-1871 left behind it deep marks and revolutionary memories. There could be no development of the proletarian struggle for socialism prior to the overthrow of feudalism, absolutism and alien oppression. When, in speaking of the wars of *such* periods, socialists stressed the legitimacy of "defensive" wars, they always had these aims in mind, namely revolution against medievalism and serfdom. By a "defensive" war socialists have always understood a "*just*" war in this particular sense (Wilhelm Liebknecht once expressed himself precisely in this way). It is only in this sense that socialists have always regarded wars "for the defence of the fatherland", or "defensive" wars, as legitimate, progressive and just. For example, if tomorrow, Morocco were to declare war on France, or India on Britain, or Persia or China on Russia, and so on, these would be "just", and "defensive" wars, *irrespective* of who would be the first to attack; any socialist would wish the oppressed, dependent

and unequal states victory over the oppressor, slave-holding and predatory "Great" Powers.

But imagine a slave-holder who owns 100 slaves warring against another who owns 200 slaves, for a more "just" redistribution of slaves. The use of the term of a "defensive" war, or a war "for the defence of the fatherland", would clearly be historically false in such a case and would in practice be sheer deception of the common people, philistines, and the ignorant, by the astute slave-holders. It is in this way that the peoples are being deceived with "national" ideology and the term of "defence of the fatherland", by the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie, in the war now being waged between slave-holders with the purpose of consolidating slavery.

THE WAR OF TODAY IS AN IMPERIALIST WAR

It is almost universally admitted that this war is an imperialist war. In most cases, however, this term is distorted, or applied to one side, or else a loophole is left for the assertion that this war may, after all, be bourgeois-progressive, and of significance to the national-liberation movement. Imperialism is the highest stage in the development of capitalism, reached only in the twentieth century. Capitalism now finds that the old national states, without whose formation it could not have overthrown feudalism, are too cramped for it. Capitalism has developed concentration to such a degree that entire branches of industry are controlled by syndicates, trusts and associations of capitalist multi-millionaires and almost the entire globe has been divided up among the "lords of capital" either in the form of colonies, or by entangling other countries in thousands of threads of financial exploitation. Free trade and competition have been superseded by a striving towards monopolies, the seizure of territory for the investment of capital and as sources of raw materials, and so on. From the liberator of nations, which it was in the struggle against feudalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage has turned into the greatest oppressor of nations. Formerly progressive, capitalism has become reactionary; it has developed the forces of production to such a degree that mankind is faced with the alternative of adopting socialism or of experiencing years and

even decades of armed struggle between the "Great" Powers for the artificial preservation of capitalism by means of colonies, monopolies, privileges and national oppression of every kind.

A WAR BETWEEN THE BIGGEST SLAVE-HOLDERS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF SLAVERY

To make the significance of imperialism clear, we will quote precise figures showing the partition of the world among the so-called "Great" Powers (i.e., those successful in great plunder).

Partition of the World Among the "Great" Slave-holding Powers

"Great" Powers	Colonies 1876		Colonies 1914		Metropolis 1914		Total	
	Square kilometres	Population	Square kilometres	Population	Square kilometres	Population	Square kilometres	Population
	millions		millions		millions		millions	
Britain	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5	0.3	46.5	33.8	440.0
Russia	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2	5.4	136.2	22.8	169.4
France	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5	0.5	39.6	11.1	95.1
Germany	—	—	2.9	12.3	0.5	64.9	3.4	77.2
Japan	—	—	0.3	19.2	0.4	53.0	0.7	72.2
United States of America . . .	—	—	0.3	9.7	9.4	97.0	9.7	106.7
Total for the six "Great" Powers	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4	16.5	437.2	81.5	960.6
Colonies belonging to *other* than Great Powers (Belgium, Holland and other states)			9.9	45.3			9.9	45.3
Three "semi-colonial" countries (Turkey, China and Persia)							14.5	361.2
						Total	105.9	1,367.1
Other states and countries							28.0	289.9
Entire globe (exclusive of Arctic and Antarctic regions)						*Grand Total*	133.9	1,657.0

Hence it will be seen that, since 1876, most of the nations which were foremost fighters for freedom in 1789-1871, have, on the basis of a highly developed and "over-mature" capitalism, become oppressors and enslavers of most of the population and the nations of the globe. From 1876 to 1914, six "Great" Powers grabbed 25 million square kilometres, i.e., an area two and a half times that of Europe! Six Powers have enslaved *523 million* people in the colonies. For every four inhabitants in the "Great" Powers there are five in "their" colonies. It is common knowledge that colonies are conquered with fire and sword, that the population of the colonies are brutally treated, and that they are exploited in a thousand ways (by exporting capital, through concessions, etc., cheating in the sale of goods, subjugation by the authorities of the "ruling" nation, and so on and so forth). The Anglo-French bourgeoisie are deceiving the people when they say that they are waging a war for the freedom of nations and of Belgium; in fact they are waging a war for the purpose of retaining the colonies they have grabbed and robbed. The German imperialists would free Belgium, etc., at once if the British and French would agree to "fairly" share their colonies with them. A feature of the situation is that in this war the fate of the colonies is being decided by a war on the Continent. From the standpoint of bourgeois justice and national freedom (or the right of nations to existence), Germany might be considered absolutely in the right as against Britain and France, for she has been "done out" of colonies, her enemies are oppressing an immeasurably far larger number of nations than she is, and the Slavs that are being oppressed by her ally, Austria, undoubtedly enjoy far more freedom than those of tsarist Russia, that veritable "prison of nations". Germany, however, is fighting, not for the liberation of nations, but for their oppression. It is not the business of socialists to help the younger and stronger robber (Germany) to plunder the older and overgorged robbers. Socialists must take advantage of the struggle between the robbers to overthrow all of them. To be able to do this, socialists must first of all tell the people the truth, namely, that this war is, in three respects, a war between slave-holders with the aim of consolidating slavery. This is a war, firstly, to increase the enslavement of the colo-

nies by means of a "more equitable" distribution and subsequent more concerted exploitation of them; secondly, to increase the oppression of other nations within the "Great" Powers, since *both* Austria *and* Russia (Russia in greater-degree and with results far worse than Austria) maintain their rule only by such oppression, intensifying it by means of war; and thirdly, to increase and prolong wage slavery, since the proletariat is split up and suppressed, while the capitalists are the gainers, making fortunes out of the war, fanning national prejudices and intensifying reaction, which has raised its head in all countries, even in the freest and most republican.

WAR IS THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY OTHER (I.E.: VIOLENT) "MEANS"[142]

This famous dictum was uttered by Clausewitz, one of the profoundest writers on the problems of war. Marxists have always rightly regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis of views on the significance of any war. It was from this viewpoint that Marx and Engels always regarded the various wars.

Apply this view to the present war. You will see that far decades, for almost half a century, the governments and the ruling classes of Britain and France, Germany and Italy, Austria and Russia have pursued a policy of plundering colonies, oppressing other nations, and suppressing the working-class movement. It is this, and only this, policy that is being continued in the present war. In particular, the policy of both Austria and Russia, in peacetime as well as in wartime, is a policy of enslaving nations, not of liberating them. In China, Persia, India and other dependent countries, on the contrary, we have seen during the past decades a policy of rousing tens and hundreds of millions of people to a national life, of their liberation from the reactionary "Great" Powers' oppression. A war waged on such a historical basis can even today be a bourgeois-progressive war of national liberation.

If the present war is regarded as a continuation of the politics of the "Great" Powers and of the principal classes within them, a glance will immediately reveal the glaring anti-historicity, falseness and hypocrisy of the view that the "defence-of-the-fatherland" idea can be justified in the present war.

THE CASE OF BELGIUM

The favourite plea of the social-chauvinists of the Triple (now Quadruple) Entente[143] (in Russia, Plekhanov and Co.) is the case of Belgium. This instance, however, speaks against them. The German imperialists have brazenly violated the neutrality of Belgium, as belligerent states have done always and everywhere, trampling upon *all* treaties and obligations if necessary. Let us suppose that all states interested in the observance of international treaties should declare war on Germany with the demand that Belgium be liberated and indemnified. In that case, the sympathies of socialists would, of course, be with Germany's enemies. But the whole point is that the Triple (and Quadruple) Entente is waging war, *not* over Belgium; this is common knowledge and only hypocrites will disguise the fact. Britain is grabbing at Germany's colonies and Turkey, Russia is grabbing at Galicia and Turkey, France wants Alsace-Lorraine and even the left bank of the Rhine; a treaty has been concluded with Italy for the division of the spoils (Albania and Asia Minor); bargaining is going on with Bulgaria and Rumania, also for the division of the spoils. In the present war waged by the governments of today, it is *impossible* to help Belgium *otherwise* than by helping to throttle Austria or Turkey, etc.! Where does "defence of the fatherland" come in here? Herein lies the specific feature of imperialist war, a war between reactionary-bourgeois and historically outmoded governments, waged for the purpose of oppressing other nations. Whoever justifies participation in the present war is perpetuating the imperialist oppression of nations. Whoever advocates taking advantage of the present embarrassments

of the governments so as to fight for the social revolution is championing the real freedom of really all nations, which is possible only under socialism.

WHAT RUSSIA IS FIGHTING FOR

In Russia, capitalist imperialism of the latest type has fully revealed itself in the policy of tsarism towards Persia, Manchuria and Mongolia, but, in general, military and feudal imperialism is predominant in Russia. In no country in the world are the majority of the population oppressed so much as in Russia; Great Russians constitute only 43 per cent of the population, i.e., less than half; the non-Russians are denied all rights. Of the 170 million inhabitants of Russia, *about 100 million* are oppressed and denied their rights. Tsarism is waging a war to seize Galicia and finally crush the liberties of the Ukrainians, and to obtain possession of Armenia, Constantinople, etc. Tsarism regards the war as a means of diverting attention from the mounting discontent within the country and of suppressing the growing revolutionary movement. To every two Great Russians in Russia today there are two or three non-Russians without even elementary rights: tsarism is striving, by means of the war, to increase the number of nations oppressed by Russia, to perpetuate this oppression, and thereby undermine the struggle for freedom which the Great Russians themselves are waging. The possibility of oppressing and robbing other nations perpetuates economic stagnation, because the source of income is frequently, not the development of productive forces, but the semi-feudal exploitation of non-Russians. Thus on the part of Russia, the war is marked by its profoundly reactionary character, its hostility to national liberation.

WHAT SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM IS

Social-chauvinism is advocacy of the idea of "defence of the fatherland" in the present war. This idea logically leads to the abandonment of the class struggle during the

war, to voting for war credits, etc. In fact, the social-chauvinists are pursuing an anti-proletarian bourgeois policy, for they are actually championing, not "defence of the fatherland" in the sense of combating foreign oppression, but the "right" of one or other of the "Great" Powers to plunder colonies and to oppress other nations. The social-chauvinists reiterate the bourgeois deception of the people that the war is being waged to protect the freedom and existence of nations, thereby taking sides with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Among the social-chauvinists are those who justify and varnish the governments and bourgeoisie of *one* of the belligerent groups of powers, as well as those who, like Kautsky, argue that the socialists of *all* the belligerent powers are equally entitled to "defend the fatherland". Social-chauvinism, which is, in effect, defence of the privileges, the advantages, the right to pillage and plunder, of one's "own" (or any) imperialist bourgeoisie, is the utter betrayal of all socialist convictions and of the decision of the Basle International Socialist Congress.

THE BASLE MANIFESTO

The Manifesto on war unanimously adopted in Basle in 1912 has in view the very kind of war between Britain and Germany and their present allies, which broke out in 1914. The Manifesto openly declares that no interests of the people can serve to justify such a war waged for the sake of the profits of the capitalists and the ambitions of dynasties", on the basis of the imperialist, predatory policy of the Great Powers. The Manifesto openly declares that war is dangerous to "governments" (all of them without exception), notes their fear of "a proletarian revolution", and very definitely points to the example set by the Commune of 1871, and by October-December 1905, i.e., *to the examples of revolution and civil war*. Thus, the Basle Manifesto lays down, precisely for the present war, the tactics of the workers' revolutionary struggle on an international scale against their governments, the tactics of proletarian revolution. The Basle Manifesto repeats the words in the Stuttgart resolution that, in the event of war, socialists must take advantage of the "economic and political crisis" it will cause so as to "hasten

the downfall of capitalism", i.e., take advantage of the governments' wartime difficulties and the indignation of the masses, to advance the socialist revolution.

The social-chauvinists' policy, their justification of the war from the bourgeois-liberation standpoint, their sanctioning of "defence of the fatherland", their voting for credits, membership in governments, and so on and so forth, are downright treachery to socialism, which can be explained only, as we will soon show, by the victory of opportunism and of the national liberal-labour policy in the majority of European parties.

FALSE REFERENCES TO MARX AND ENGELS

The Russian social-chauvinists (headed by Plekhanov) make references to Marx's tactics in the war of 1870; the German (of the type of Lensch, David and Co.)—to Engels's statement in 1891 that, in the event of war against Russia and France combined, it would be the duty of the German socialists to defend their fatherland; finally, the social-chauvinists of the Kautsky type, who want to reconcile and legitimatise international chauvinism, refer to the fact that Marx and Engels, while condemning war, nevertheless, from 1854-55 to 1870-71 and 1876-77, always took the side of one belligerent state or another, once war had broken out.

All these references are outrageous distortions of the views of Marx and Engels, in the interest of the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, in just the same way as the writings of the anarchists Guillaume and Co. distort the views of Marx and Engels so as to justify anarchism. The war of 1870-71 was historically progressive on the part of Germany, until Napoleon III was defeated: the latter, together with the tsar, had oppressed Germany for years, keeping her in a state of feudal disunity. But as soon as the war developed into the plundering of France (the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine), Marx and Engels emphatically condemned the Germans. Even at the beginning of the war, Marx and Engels approved of the refusal of Bebel and Liebknecht to vote for war credits, and advised Social-Democrats not to merge with the bourgeoisie, but to uphold the independent class interests of the proletariat. To apply to the present

imperialist war the appraisal of this bourgeois-progressive war of national liberation is a mockery of the truth. The same applies with still greater force to the war of 1854-55, and to all the wars of the nineteenth century, when there existed *no* modern imperialism, *no* mature objective conditions for socialism, and *no* mass socialist parties *in any* of the belligerent countries, i.e., none of the conditions from which the Basle Manifesto deduced the tactics of a "proletarian revolution" *in connection* with a war between Great Powers.

Anyone who today refers to Marx's attitude towards the wars of the epoch of the *progressive* bourgeoisie, and forgets Marx's statement that "the workingmen have no country"—a statement that applies *precisely* to the period of the reactionary and outmoded bourgeoisie, to the epoch of the socialist revolution, is shamelessly distorting Marx, and is substituting the bourgeois point of view for the socialist.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

Socialists of all the world solemnly declared in Basle, in 1912, that they regarded the impending war in Europe as the "criminal" and most reactionary deed of *all* the governments, which must hasten the downfall of capitalism by inevitably engendering a revolution against it. The war came, the crisis was there. Instead of revolutionary tactics, most of the Social-Democratic parties launched reactionary tactics, and went over to the side of their respective governments and bourgeoisie. This betrayal of socialism signifies the collapse of the Second (1889-1914) International, and we must realise what caused this collapse, what brought social-chauvinism into being and gave it strength.

SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM IS THE ACME OF OPPORTUNISM

Throughout the existence of the Second International, a struggle was raging within all the Social-Democratic parties, between their revolutionary and the opportunist wings. In a number of countries a split took place along this line (Britain, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria). Not one Marxist has ever doubted that opportunism expresses bourgeois policies

within the working-class movement, expresses the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the alliance of a tiny section of bourgeoisified workers with their "*own*" bourgeoisie, against the interests of the proletarian masses, the oppressed masses.

The objective conditions at the close of the nineteenth century greatly intensified opportunism, converted the utilisation of bourgeois legality into subservience to the latter, created a thin crust of a working-class officialdom and aristocracy and attracted numerous petty-bourgeois "fellow travellers" to the Social-Democratic parties.

The war has speeded up this development and transformed opportunism into social-chauvinism, transformed the secret alliance between the opportunists and the bourgeoisie into an open one. Simultaneously, the military authorities have everywhere instituted martial law and have muzzled the mass of the workers, whose old leaders have nearly all gone over to the bourgeoisie.

Opportunism and social-chauvinism stand on a common economic basis—the interests of a thin crust of privileged workers and of the petty bourgeoisie, who are defending their privileged position, their "right" to some modicum of the profits that their "own" national bourgeoisie obtain from robbing other nations, from the advantages of their Great-Power status, etc.

Opportunism and social-chauvinism have the same politico-ideological content—class collaboration instead of the class struggle, renunciation of revolutionary methods of struggle, helping one's "own" government in its embarrassed situation, instead of taking advantage of these embarrassments so as to advance the revolution. If we take Europe as a whole and if we pay attention, not to individuals (even the most authoritative), we will find that it is the opportunist *trend* that has become the bulwark of social-chauvinism, whereas from the camp of the revolutionaries, more of less consistent protests against it are heard from almost all sides. And if we take, for example, the grouping of trends at the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress in 1907, we shall find that international Marxism was opposed to imperialism, while international opportunism was already in favour of it at the time.

UNITY WITH THE OPPORTUNISTS MEANS AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND THEIR "OWN" NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, AND SPLITTING THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY WORKING CLASS

In the past, before the war, opportunism was often looked upon as a legitimate, though "deviationist" and "extremist", component of the Social-Democratic Party. The war has shown the impossibility of this in the future. Opportunism has "matured", and is now playing to the full its role as emissary of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement. Unity with the opportunists has become sheer hypocrisy, exemplified by the German Social-Democratic Party. On every important occasion (e.g., the August 4 vote), the opportunists present an ultimatum, to which they give effect through their numerous links with the bourgeoisie, their majority on the executives of the trade unions, etc. Today *unity* with the opportunists *actually* means subordinating the working class to their "own" national bourgeoisie, and an alliance with the latter for the purpose of oppressing other nations and of fighting for dominant-nation privileges; it means *splitting* the revolutionary proletariat of all countries.

No matter how hard, in individual instances, the struggle may be against the opportunists, who predominate in many organisations, whatever the specific nature of the purging of the workers' parties of opportunists in individual countries, this process is inevitable and fruitful. Reformist socialism is dying; regenerated socialism "will be revolutionary, uncompromising and insurrectionary", to use the apt expression of the French Socialist Paul Golay.

"KAUTSKYISM"

Kautsky, the leading authority in the Second International, is a most typical and striking example of how a verbal recognition of Marxism has led in practice to its conversion into "Struvism" or into "Brentanoism".[144] Another example is Plekhanov. By means of patent sophistry, Marxism is stripped of its revolutionary living spirit; *everything* is recognised in Marxism *except* the revolutionary

methods of struggle, the propaganda and preparation of those methods, and the education of the masses in this direction. Kautsky "reconciles" in an unprincipled way the fundamental idea of social-chauvinism, recognition of defence of the fatherland in the present war, with a diplomatic sham concession to the Lefts—his abstention from voting for war credits, his verbal claim to be in the opposition, etc. Kautsky, who in 1909 wrote a book on the approaching epoch of revolutions and on the connection between war and revolution, Kautsky, who in 1912 signed the Basle Manifesto on taking revolutionary advantage of the impending war, is outdoing himself in justifying and embellishing social-chauvinism and, like Plekhanov, joins the bourgeoisie in ridiculing any thought of revolution and all steps towards the immediate revolutionary struggle.

The working class cannot play its world-revolutionary role unless it wages a ruthless struggle against this backsliding, spinelessness, subservience to opportunism, and unparalleled vulgarisation of the theories of Marxism. Kautskyism is not fortuitous; it is the social product of the contradictions within the Second International, a blend of loyalty to Marxism in word, and subordination to opportunism in deed.

This fundamental falseness of "Kautskyism" manifests itself in different ways in different countries. In Holland, Roland-Holst, while rejecting the idea of defending the fatherland, defends unity with the opportunists' party. In Russia, Trotsky, while rejecting this idea, also defends unity with the opportunist and chauvinist *Nasha Zarya* group. In Rumania, Rakovsky, while declaring war on opportunism as being responsible for the collapse of the International, is at the same time ready to recognise the legitimacy of the idea of defending the fatherland. All this is a manifestation of the evil which the Dutch Marxists (Gorter and Pannekoek) have called "passive radicalism", and which amounts to replacing revolutionary Marxism with eclecticism in theory, and servility to or impotence towards opportunism, in practice.

THE MARXISTS' SLOGAN IS A SLOGAN OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

The war has undoubtedly created a most acute crisis and has immeasurably increased the distress of the masses. The reactionary nature of this war, and the unblushing lies told by the bourgeoisie of *all* countries to conceal their predatory aims with "national" ideology are, on the basis of an objectively revolutionary situation, inevitably creating revolutionary moods among the masses. It is our duty to help the masses become conscious of these moods, deepen them and give them shape. This task finds correct expression only in the slogan: convert the imperialist war into a civil war; *all* consistently waged class struggles in wartime and all seriously conducted "mass-action" tactics inevitably lead to this. It is impossible to foretell whether a powerful revolutionary movement will flare-up in connection with, during or after the first or the second imperialist war of the Great Powers; in any case it is our bounden duty to work systematically and unswervingly in this direction.

The Basle Manifesto makes direct reference to the example set by the Paris Commune, i.e., the conversion of a war between governments into a civil war. Half a century ago, the proletariat was too weak; the objective conditions for socialism had not yet matured, there could be no co-ordination and co-operation between the revolutionary movements in all the belligerent countries; the "national ideology" (the traditions of 1792), with which a section of the Parisian workers were imbued, was a petty-bourgeois weakness, which Marx noted at the time, and was one of the causes of the downfall of the Commune. Half a century since that time, the conditions that then weakened the revolution have ceased to operate, and today it is unpardonable for a socialist to resign himself to a renunciation of activities in the spirit of the Paris Communards.

THE EXAMPLE SET BY THE FRATERNISATION IN THE TRENCHES

Cases of fraternisation between the soldiers of the belligerent nations, even in the trenches, have been reported in the bourgeois newspapers of all the belligerent countries.

The grave importance attached to the matter by the governments and the bourgeoisie is evidenced by the harsh orders against such fraternisation issued by the military authorities (of Germany and Britain). If such cases of fraternisation have proved possible even when opportunism reigns supreme in the top ranks of the Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe, and when social-chauvinism has the support of the entire Social-Democratic press and all the authorities of the Second International, then that shows us how possible it would be to shorten the present criminal, reactionary and slave-holders' war and to organise a revolutionary international movement, if systematic work were conducted in this direction, at least by the Left-wing socialists in all the belligerent countries.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AN UNDERGROUND ORGANISATION

No less than the opportunists, leading anarchists all over the world have disgraced themselves with social-chauvinism (in the spirit of Plekhanov and Kautsky) in this war. One of the useful results of this war will undoubtedly be that it will kill both anarchism and opportunism.

While under no circumstances or conditions refraining from utilising all legal opportunities, however small, for organising the masses and for the propaganda of socialism, the Social-Democratic parties must break with subservience to legality. "You shoot first, Messieurs the Bourgeoisie," wrote Engels, hinting at civil war and at the necessity of our violating legality *after* the bourgeoisie had done so. The crisis has shown that the bourgeoisie violate it in all countries, even the freest, and that it is impossible to lead the masses to a revolution unless an underground organisation is set up for the purpose of advocating, discussing, appraising and preparing revolutionary methods of struggle. In Germany, for example, all the *honest* things that socialists are doing, are being done despite despicable opportunism and hypocritical "Kautskyism", and moreover are being done secretly. In Britain, people are being sentenced to penal servitude for printing appeals against joining up.

It is a betrayal of socialism to consider compatible with membership in the Social-Democratic Party any repudiation of underground methods of propaganda, and ridicule of those methods, in the legally published press.

ON THE DEFEAT OF ONE'S "OWN" GOVERNMENT IN THE IMPERIALIST WAR

The standpoint of social-chauvinism is shared equally by both advocates of victory for their governments in the present war and by advocates of the slogan of "neither victory nor defeat". A revolutionary class cannot but wish for the defeat of its government in a reactionary war, and cannot fail to see that the latter's military reverses must facilitate its overthrow. Only a bourgeois who believes that a war started by governments must necessarily end as a war between governments, and wants it to end as such, can regard as "ridiculous" and "absurd" the idea that the socialists of *all* the belligerent countries should express their wish that *all* their "own" governments should be defeated. On the contrary, it is a statement of this kind that would be in keeping with the innermost thoughts of every class-conscious worker, and be in line with our activities for the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war.

The serious anti-war agitation being conducted by a section of the British, German and Russian socialists has undoubtedly "weakened the military might" of the respective governments, but that agitation stands to the credit of the socialists. The latter must explain to the masses that they have no other road of salvation except the revolutionary overthrow of their "own" governments, whose difficulties in the present war must be taken advantage of precisely for that purpose.

PACIFISM AND THE PEACE SLOGAN

The temper of the masses in favour of peace often expresses the beginning of protest, anger and a realisation of the reactionary nature of the war. It is the duty of all Social-Democrats to utilise that temper. They will take a most ardent part in any movement and in any demonstration motivated by that sentiment, but they will not deceive the

people with admitting the idea that a peace without annexations, without oppression of nations, without plunder, and without the embryo of new wars among the present governments and ruling classes, is possible in the absence of a revolutionary movement. Such deception of the people would merely mean playing into the hands of the secret diplomacy of the belligerent governments and facilitating their counter-revolutionary plans. Whoever wants a lasting and democratic peace must stand for civil war against the governments and the bourgeoisie.

THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The most widespread deception of the people by the bourgeoisie in the present war consists in their using the ideology of "national liberation" to cloak their predatory aims. The British have promised the liberation of Belgium, the Germans—of Poland, etc. Actually, as we have seen, this is a war waged by the oppressors of most of the world's nations for the purpose of increasing and expanding that oppression.

Socialists cannot achieve their great aim without fighting against all oppression of nations. They must, therefore, unequivocally demand that the Social-Democratic parties of the *oppressor* countries (especially of the so-called "Great" Powers) should recognise and champion the *oppressed* nation's right to self-determination, in the specifically political sense of the term, i.e., the right to political secession. The socialist of a ruling or a colonial nation who does not stand for that right is a chauvinist.

The championing of this right, far from encouraging the formation of petty states, leads, on the contrary, to the freer, fearless and therefore wider and more universal formation of large states and federations of states, which are more to the advantage of the masses and are more in keeping with economic development.

In their turn, the socialists of the *oppressed* nations must unfailingly fight for complete unity of the *workers* of the oppressed and oppressor nationalities (this including organisational unity). The idea of the juridical separation of one nation from another (the so-called "cultural-national

autonomy" advocated by Bauer and Renner) is reactionary.

Imperialism is the epoch of the constantly increasing oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of "Great" Powers; it is therefore impossible to fight for the socialist international revolution against imperialism unless the right of nations to self-determination is recognised. "No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations" (Marx and Engels). A proletariat that tolerates the slightest coercion of other nations by its "own" nation cannot be a socialist proletariat.

CHAPTER II

CLASSES AND PARTIES IN RUSSIA

THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE WAR

In one respect, the Russian Government has not lagged behind its European *confrères*; like them, it has succeeded in deceiving its "own" people on a grand scale. A huge and monstrous machine of falsehood and cunning has been set going in Russia as well, to infect the masses with chauvinism, and create the impression that the tsarist government is waging a "just" war, and is disinterestedly defending its "Slav brothers", etc.

The landowning class and the upper stratum of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie have ardently supported the tsarist government's bellicose policy. They are rightly expecting enormous material gains and privileges for themselves from the carving up of the Turkish and the Austrian legacy. A series of their congresses have already voiced anticipation of the profits that will flow into their pockets should the tsarist army be victorious. Moreover, the reactionaries are very well aware that if anything can stave off the downfall of the Romanov monarchy and delay the new revolution in Russia, it can only be a foreign war ending in victory for the tsar.

Broad strata of the urban "middle" bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois intelligentsia, professional people, etc., have also been infected with chauvinism—at all events at the beginning of the war. The Cadets—the party of the Russian

liberal bourgeoisie—have given the tsar's government full and unconditional support. In the sphere of foreign policy, the Cadets have long been a government party. Pan-Slavism—with the aid of which tsarist diplomacy has more than once carried out its grand political swindles—has become the official ideology of the Cadets. Russian liberalism has degenerated into *national* liberalism. It is vying in "patriotism" with the Black Hundreds; it always willingly votes for militarism on land and at sea, etc. Approximately the same thing is to be seen in the camp of Russian liberalism as in Germany in the seventies of the last century, when "free-thinking" liberalism decayed and from it arose a national-liberal party. The Russian liberal bourgeoisie has definitely taken to the path of counter-revolution. The R.S.D.L.P.'s point of view on this question has been fully confirmed. The facts have shattered the view held by our opportunists that Russian liberalism is still a motive force of a revolution in Russia.

The ruling clique has also succeeded, with the aid of the bourgeois press, the clergy, etc., in rousing chauvinist sentiments among the peasantry. With the return of the soldiers from the field of slaughter, however, sentiment in the rural areas will undoubtedly turn against the tsarist monarchy. The bourgeois-democratic parties that come into contact with the peasantry have failed to withstand the chauvinist wave. The Trudovik party in the Duma refused to vote for war credits, but through its leader Kerensky it made a "patriotic" declaration which played into the hands of the monarchy. In general, the entire legally published Narodnik press followed the liberals' lead. Even the Left wing of bourgeois democracy—the so-called Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which is affiliated to the International Socialist Bureau—is swimming with the same tide. Mr. Rubanovich, that party's representative on the I.S.B., has come out as a self-confessed social-chauvinist. Half of the number of this party's delegates to the London Conference of Socialists of the Entente countries voted for a chauvinist resolution (while the other half abstained from voting). Chauvinists predominate in the illegally published press of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the newspaper *Novosti*[145] and others). The revolutionaries from "bourgeois circles", i.e.,

bourgeois revolutionaries who are not connected with the working class, have come to a dead end in this war. The sad fate of Kropotkin, Burtsev and Rubanovich is highly significant.

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE WAR

The proletariat is the only class in Russia that nobody has been able to infect with chauvinism. Only the most ignorant strata of the workers were involved in the few excesses that occurred in the early days of the war. The part played by workers in the Moscow anti-German riots has been greatly exaggerated. By and large, the working class of Russia has proved immune to chauvinism.

The explanation lies in the revolutionary situation in the country and in the Russian proletariat's general conditions of life.

The years 1912-14 marked the beginning of a great new revolutionary upswing in Russia. We again witnessed a great strike movement, the like of which the world has never known. The number involved in the mass revolutionary strike in 1913 was, at the very lowest estimate, one and a half million, and in 1914 it rose to over two million, approaching the 1905 level. The first barricade battles took place in St. Petersburg, on the eve of the war.

The underground Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has performed its duty to the International. The-banner of internationalism has not wavered in its hands. Our Party long ago severed all organisational ties with the opportunist groups and elements; its feet were not weighed down with the fetters of opportunism and of "legalism at any price", this circumstance helping it perform its revolutionary duty—just as the break with Bissolati's opportunist party has helped the Italian comrades.

The general situation in our country does not favour any efflorescence of "socialist" opportunism among the masses of the workers. In Russia we see a series of shades of opportunism and reformism among the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie, etc., but it has affected an insignificant minority among the politically active sections of the workers. The privileged stratum of factory workers and clerical staff is

very thin in our country. The fetishism of legality could not appear here. Before the war, the liquidators (the party of the opportunists led by Axelrod, Potresov, Cherevanin, Maslov, and others) found no serious support among the masses of the workers. The elections to the Fourth Duma resulted in the return of *all* six of the anti-liquidationist working-class candidates. The circulation of the legally published workers' press in Petrograd and Moscow and the collection of funds for it have incontrovertibly proved that four-fifths of the class-conscious workers are opposed to opportunism and liquidationism.

Since the beginning of the war, the tsar's government has arrested and exiled thousands and thousands of advanced workers, members of our underground R.S.D.L.P. This circumstance, together with the establishment of martial law in the country, the suppression of our newspapers, and so forth, has retarded the movement. But for all that, our Party is continuing its underground revolutionary activities. In Petrograd, our Party Committee is publishing the underground newspaper *Proletarsky Golos*.[146]

Articles from *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ published abroad, are reprinted in Petrograd and sent out to the provinces. Leaflets are secretly printed, and are circulated even in army barracks. In various secluded places outside the city, secret workers' meetings are held. Of late, big strikes of metalworkers have begun in Petrograd. In connection with these strikes, our Petrograd Committee has issued several appeals to the workers.

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR GROUP IN THE DUMA, AND THE WAR

In 1913 a split took place among the Social-Democratic deputies to the Duma. On one side were the seven supporters of opportunism, led by Chkheidze; they had been returned by seven non-proletarian gubernias, where the workers totalled 214,000. On the other side were six deputies, *all* from the workers' curia, elected for the most industrialised centres in Russia, in which the workers number 1,008,000.

The chief issue in the split was the *alternative* between the tactics of revolutionary Marxism and the tactics of op-

portunist reformism. In practice, the disagreement manifested itself mainly in the sphere of *extra*-parliamentary work among the masses. In Russia this work had to be conducted secretly, if those conducting it wished to remain on a revolutionary basis. The Chkheidze group remained a faithful ally of the liquidators (who repudiated underground work) and defended them in all talks with workers and at all meetings. Hence the split. The six deputies formed the R.S.D.L. Duma group, which, as a year's work has incontrovertibly shown, has the support of the vast majority of Russian workers.

On the outbreak of the war the disagreement stood out in glaring relief. The Chkheidze group confined itself to parliamentary action. It did not vote for war credits, for that would have roused a storm of indignation among the workers (we have seen that in Russia even the petty-bourgeois Trudoviks did not vote for war credits); neither did it utter any protest against social-chauvinism.

Expressing the political line of our Party, the R.S.D.L. Duma group acted quite differently. It carried into the midst of the working class a protest against the war, and conducted anti-imperialist propaganda among the masses of the Russian proletarians.

It met with a very sympathetic response from the workers—which frightened the government, compelling it, in flagrant violation of its own laws, to arrest our deputy comrades and exile them to Siberia for life. In its very first official announcement of the arrest of our comrades, the tsarist government wrote:

"An entirely exceptional position in this respect was taken by some members of Social-Democratic societies, the object of whose activities was to shake the military might of Russia by agitating against the war, by means of underground appeals and verbal propaganda."

Only our Party, through its Central Committee, gave a negative reply to Vandervelde's well-known appeal for a "temporary" cessation of the struggle against tsarism. Moreover, it has now become known, from the testimony of Prince Kudashev, the tsar's envoy to Belgium, that Vandervelde did not draw up this appeal alone, but in collaboration with the above-mentioned envoy. The guiding centre

of the liquidators agreed with Vandervelde and officially stated in the press that "in its activities *it does not oppose the war*".

The principal accusation levelled by the tsar's government against our deputy comrades was that they distributed this negative reply to Vandervelde among the workers.

At the trial, the Prosecutor for the Crown, Mr. Nenarokomov, set up the German and French socialists as examples to our comrades. "The German Social-Democrats," he said, "voted for war credits and proved to be friends of the government. That is how the German Social-Democrats acted, but the dismal knights of Russian Social-Democracy did not act in this way.... The socialists of Belgium and France unanimously forgot their quarrels with the other classes, forgot party strife, and unhesitatingly rallied about the flag." But the members of the R.S.D.L. group, on instructions from the Party's Central Committee, did not act in this way, he complained....

The trial revealed an imposing picture of the extensive underground anti-war agitation our Party was conducting among the masses of the proletariat. It goes without saying, that the tsar's court "uncovered" only a fraction of the activities our comrades were conducting in this field, but even what was revealed showed how much had been done within the brief span of a few months.

At the trial the underground manifestos issued by our groups and committees, against the war and for international tactics, were read out. The members of the R.S.D.L. group were in touch with the class-conscious workers all over Russia and did everything in their power to help the workers appraise the war from the Marxist standpoint.

Comrade Muranov, the deputy of the workers of Kharkov Gubernia, stated at the trial:

"Realising that the people did not return me to the Duma just to warm my seat there, I travelled about the country to ascertain the mood of the working class." He admitted that he had undertaken the functions of a secret agitator of our Party, that in the Urals he had organised workers' committees at the Verkhneisetsky Works and elsewhere. The trial showed that, after the outbreak of war, members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group travelled, for propaganda

purposes, throughout almost the whole of Russia and that Muranov, Petrovsky, Badayev and others arranged numerous workers' meetings, at which anti-war resolutions were passed, and so on.

The tsar's government threatened the accused with capital punishment. That was why they did not all behave at the trial as courageously as Comrade Muranov. They tried to make it difficult for the Prosecutors to secure convictions. This is being unworthily utilised by the Russian social-chauvinists so as to obscure the crux of the issue, viz., the kind of parliamentarianism the working class needs.

Parliamentarianism is recognised by Südekum and Heine, Sembat and Vaillant, Bissolati and Mussolini, Chkheidze and Plekhanov; it is also recognised by our comrades in the R.S.D.L. group, as well as by the Bulgarian and Italian comrades who have broken with the chauvinists. There are different kinds of parliamentarianism. Some utilise the parliamentary arena in order to curry favour with their governments, or, at best, to wash their hands of everything, as the Chkheidze group has done. Others utilise parliamentarianism in order to remain revolutionary to the end, to perform their duty as socialists and internationalists even under the most difficult circumstances. The parliamentary activities of some give them ministerial posts; the parliamentary activities of others take them to prison, exile, and penal servitude. Some serve the bourgeoisie, others—the proletariat. Some are social-imperialists. Others are revolutionary Marxists.

CHAPTER III

THE RESTORATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL

How should the International be restored? But first, a few words about how the International *should not* be restored.

THE METHOD OF THE SOCIAL-CHAUVINISTS AND OF THE "CENTRE"

Of course, the social-chauvinists of all countries are great "internationalists"! Since the very beginning of the war they have been weighed down with concern over the International. On the one hand, they assure us that the

talk about the *collapse* of the International is "exaggerated". Actually, nothing out of the common has happened. Listen to Kautsky: the International is simply a "peacetime instrument"; naturally, this instrument has not proved quite up to the mark in wartime. On the other hand, the social-chauvinists of all countries have found a very simple, and, what is most important, an international way out of the situation that has arisen. The solution is simple: it is only necessary to wait till the war ends, but until then the socialists of each country must defend their "fatherland" and support their "own" government. When the war ends, there will be a mutual "amnesty", the admission that *everybody* was right and that in peacetime we live like brothers; in wartime, however, we stick to such-and-such resolutions, and call upon the German workers to exterminate their French brothers, and vice versa.

Kautsky, Plekhanov, Victor Adler and Heine are all equally agreed on this. Victor Adler writes that "when we have passed through this difficult time, our first duty will be to refrain from pointing to the mote in each other's eye". Kautsky asserts that "till now no serious socialists from any side have spoken in a way to arouse apprehension" concerning the fate of the International. "It is unpleasant to grasp hands [of the German Social-Democrats] that reek of the blood of the innocently slaughtered," Plekhanov says, but at once goes on to propose an "amnesty". "It will here be quite appropriate," he writes, "to subordinate *the heart to the mind*. For the sake of the great cause, the International will have to take into consideration even belated remorse." In *Sozialistische Monatshefte* Heine describes Vandervelde's behaviour as "courageous and dignified", and sets him up as an example to the German Lefts.

In short, when the war ends, appoint a commission consisting of Kautsky and Plekhanov, Vandervelde and Adler, and a "unanimous" resolution in the spirit of a mutual amnesty will be drawn up in a trice. The dispute will be nicely hushed up. Instead of being helped to understand what has taken place, the workers will be deceived with a sham and paper "unity". A union of the social-chauvinists and hypocrites of all countries will be described as restoration of the International.

We must not close our eyes to the great danger inherent in such a "restoration". The social-chauvinists of all countries are equally interested in that outcome. All of them are equally unwilling that the masses of the workers of their respective countries should themselves try to understand the issue: socialism *or* nationalism? All of them are equally interested in concealing one other's sins. None of them are able to propose anything except what has already been proposed by Kautsky, that past master of "international" hypocrisy.

Yet this danger has scarcely been realised. During a year of war, we have seen a number of attempts to restore international ties. We shall not speak of the London and Vienna conferences, at which outspoken chauvinists got together to help the General Staffs and the bourgeoisie of their "fatherlands". We are referring to the Lugano and Copenhagen conferences,[147] the International Women's Conference, and the International Youth Conference.[148] These assemblies were animated by the best intentions, but they wholly failed to discern the above-mentioned danger. They neither laid down a militant internationalist line, nor indicated to the proletariat the danger threatening it from the social-chauvinists' method of "restoring" the International. At best, they confined themselves to repeating the old resolutions, without telling the workers that the cause of socialism is lost unless a struggle is waged against the social-chauvinists. At best they were *marking time*.

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AMONG THE OPPOSITION

There cannot be the least doubt that what interests all internationalists most is the state of affairs among the German Social-Democratic opposition. The official German Social-Democratic Party, the strongest and the foremost in the Second International, has dealt the international workers' organisation the most telling blow. At the same time, however, it was among the German Social-Democrats that the strongest opposition arose. Of all the big European parties, it is in the German party that a loud voice of protest was first raised by comrades who have remained loyal to the banner of socialism. We were delighted to read

the journals *Lichtstrahlen* and *Die Internationale*. It gave us still greater pleasure to learn of the distribution in Germany of secretly printed revolutionary manifestos, as for example the one entitled: "The Main Enemy Is Within the Country". This showed that the spirit of socialism is alive among the German workers, and that there are still people in Germany capable of upholding revolutionary Marxism.

The split in the present-day socialist movement has most strikingly revealed itself within the German Social-Democratic movement. Three trends can be clearly distinguished here: the opportunist chauvinists, who have nowhere sunk to such foul apostasy as in Germany; the Kautskian "Centre", which have here proved totally incapable of playing any other role than that of menials to the opportunists; the Lefts, who are the only Social-Democrats in Germany.

Naturally, the state of affairs among the German Lefts is what interests us most. In them we see our comrades, the hope of all the internationalist elements.

What is the state of affairs among them?

The journal *Die Internationale* was quite right in writing that the German Lefts are still in a state of ferment, that considerable regroupings still await them, and that within them some elements are more resolute and others less resolute.

Of course, we Russian internationalists do not in the least claim the right to interfere in the internal affairs of our comrades, the German Lefts. We understand that they alone are fully competent to determine their methods of combating the opportunists, according to the conditions of time and place. Only we consider it our right and our duty to express our frank opinion on the state of affairs.

We are convinced that the author of the leading article in the journal *Die Internationale* was perfectly right in stating that the Kautskian "Centre" is doing more harm to Marxism than avowed social-chauvinism. Anyone who plays down differences, or, in the guise of Marxism, now teaches the workers that which Kautskyism is preaching, is in fact lulling the workers, and doing more harm than the Südekums and Heines, who are putting the issue

squarely and are compelling the workers to try to make up their own minds.

The Fronde against the "official bodies" which Kautsky and Haase have of late been permitting themselves should mislead nobody. The disagreements between them and the Scheidemanns are not on fundamentals. The former believe that Hindenburg and Mackensen are *already* victorious and that they can already permit themselves the luxury of protesting against annexations. The latter believe that Hindenburg and Mackensen are not *yet* victorious and that, therefore, it is necessary "to hold out to the end".

Kautskyism is waging only a sham struggle against the "official bodies" just to be able, after the war, to conceal from the workers the clash of principles and to paper over the issue with a thousand and one padded resolutions drawn up in a vaguely "Leftist" spirit, in the drafting of which the diplomats of the Second International are such experts.

It is quite understandable that, in their difficult struggle against the "official bodies", the German opposition should also make use of this unprincipled Fronde raised by Kautskyism. However, to any internationalist, hostility towards neo-Kautskyism must remain the touchstone. Only he is a genuine internationalist who combats Kautskyism, and understands that, *even after* its leaders' pretended change of intention, the centre remains, on all fundamental issues, an *ally of the chauvinists and the opportunists*.

In general, our attitude towards wavering elements in the International is of tremendous importance. These elements—mainly socialists of a *pacifist* shade—are to be found both in the neutral countries and in some of the belligerent countries (in Britain, for example, the Independent Labour Party). Such elements can be our fellow-travellers. Ties with them for a struggle against the social-chauvinists are necessary. It should, however, be remembered that they are *merely* fellow-travellers, and that on all main and fundamental issues, these elements will march against us, not with us, when the International is being restored; they will side with Kautsky, Scheidemann, Vandervelde, and Sembat. At international conferences we must not restrict our programme to what is acceptable to these elements. If we do, we shall fall captive to the

wavering pacifists. This is what happened, for example, at the International Women's Conference in Berne. There the German delegation, which supported Comrade Clara Zetkin's point of view, actually played the part of the "Centre". The Women's Conference said only that which was acceptable to the delegates of the opportunist Dutch party led by Troelstra, and to the delegates of the Independent Labour Party; we shall always remember that, at the London conference of "Entente" chauvinists, the I.L.P. voted in favour of Vandervelde's resolution. We would like to express our greatest esteem for the I.L.P. for the courageous struggle it has been waging against the British Government during the war. We know, however, that this party has never taken a Marxist stand. For our part, we hold that today it is the main task of the Social-Democratic opposition to raise the banner of revolutionary Marxism, to tell the workers firmly and definitely how we regard imperialist wars, and to advance a call for mass revolutionary action, i.e., convert the period of imperialist wars into the beginning of a period of civil wars.

Despite everything, revolutionary Social-Democratic elements exist in many countries. They are to be found in Germany, Russia, Scandinavia (where Comrade Höglund represents an influential trend), the Balkans (the party of the Bulgarian "Tesnyaki"), Italy, Britain (part of the British Socialist Party), France (Vaillant himself has admitted in *l'Humanité* that he has received letters of protest from internationalists, but he has not published any one of them in full), Holland (the Tribunists[149]), and so on. To rally these Marxist elements, however small their numbers may be at the outset; to reanimate, in their name, the now forgotten ideals of genuine socialism, and to call upon the workers of all lands to break with the chauvinists and rally about the old banner of Marxism—such is the task of the day.

Conferences with so-called programmes of "action" have till now confined themselves to announcing a more or less outspoken programme of sheer pacifism. Marxism is not pacifism. Of course, the speediest possible termination of the war must be striven for. However, the "peace" demand acquires a proletarian significance only if a *revolutionary*

struggle is called for. Without a series of revolutions, what is called a democratic peace is a philistine Utopia. The purpose of a real programme of action can be served only by a *Marxist* programme which gives the masses a full and clear explanation of what has taken place, explains what imperialism is and how it should be combated, declares openly that the collapse of the Second International was brought about by opportunism, and openly calls for a Marxist International to be built up without and *against* the opportunists. Only a programme that shows that we have faith in ourselves and in Marxism and that we have proclaimed a life-and-death struggle against opportunism will sooner or later win us the sympathy of the genuinely proletarian masses.

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY AND THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has long parted company with its opportunists. Besides, the Russian opportunists have now become chauvinists. This only fortifies us in our opinion that a split with them is essential in the interests of socialism. We are convinced that the Social-Democrats' present differences with the social-chauvinists are in no way less marked than the socialists' differences with the anarchists when the Social-Democrats parted company with the latter. The opportunist Monitor was right when he wrote, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, that the unity of today is to the advantage of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie, because it has compelled the Lefts to submit to the chauvinists and prevents the workers from understanding the controversy and forming their own genuinely working-class and genuinely socialist party. We are firmly convinced that, in the present state of affairs, a split with the opportunists and chauvinists is the prime duty of revolutionaries, just as a split with the yellow trade unions, the anti-Semites, the liberal workers' unions, etc., was essential in helping speed up the enlightenment of backward workers and draw them into the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party.

In our opinion, the Third International should be built up on that kind of revolutionary basis. To our Party, the

question of the expediency of a break with the social-chauvinists does not exist, it has been answered with finality. The only question that exists for our Party is whether this can be achieved on an international scale in the immediate future.

It is perfectly obvious that to create an *international* Marxist organisation, there must be a readiness to form independent Marxist parties in the *various* countries. As a country with the oldest and strongest working-class movement, Germany is of decisive importance. The immediate future will show whether the conditions are mature for the formation of a new and Marxist International. If they are, our Party will gladly join such a Third International, purged of opportunism and chauvinism. If they are not, then that will show that a more or less protracted period of evolution is needed for that purging to be effected. Our Party will then form the extreme opposition within the old International, pending the time when the conditions in the various countries make possible the formation of an international workingmen's association standing on the basis of revolutionary Marxism.

We do not and cannot know what road world developments will take in the next few years. What we do know for certain and are unshakably convinced of is that *our* Party will work indefatigably in the above-mentioned direction, in *our* country and among *our* proletariat, and through its day-by-day activities will build up the Russian section of the *Marxist* International.

In Russia too there is no lack of avowed social-chauvinists and Centrist groups. These people will fight against the formation of a Marxist International. We know that, in principle, Plekhanov shares the standpoint of Südekum and is already holding out a hand to the latter. We know that, under Axelrod's leadership, the so-called Organising Committee is preaching Kautskyism on Russian soil. Under a cloak of working-class unity, these people are calling for unity with the opportunists and, through the latter, with the bourgeoisie. Everything we know about the present-day working-class movement in Russia, however, gives us full assurance that the class-conscious proletariat of Russia will, as hitherto, remain *with our Party*.

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORY OF THE SPLIT, AND THE PRESENT STATE OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

The tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. in relation to the war, as outlined above, are the inevitable outcome of the thirty years' development of Social-Democracy in Russia. These tactics, as well as the present state of Social-Democracy in our country, cannot be properly understood without going deeper into the history of our Party. That is why here, too, we must remind the reader of the major facts in that history.

As an ideological trend, the Social-Democratic movement arose in 1883, when Social-Democratic views, as applied to Russia, were for the first time systematically expounded abroad by the Emancipation of Labour group. Until the early nineties, Social-Democracy was an ideological trend without links with the mass working-class movement in Russia. At the beginning of the nineties, the growth of public consciousness and the unrest and strike movement among the workers, turned Social-Democracy into an active political force inseparably connected with the struggle (both economic and political) of the working class. It was from that time too that the split into Economists and Iskrists began in the Social-Democratic movement.

THE ECONOMISTS AND THE OLD *ISKRA* (1894-1903)

Economism was an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy. Its political essence was summed up in the programme: "for the workers—the economic struggle; for the liberals—the political struggle". Its theoretical mainstay was so-called "legal Marxism" or "Struvism", which "recognised" a "Marxism" that was completely devoid of any revolutionary spirit and adapted to the needs of the liberal bourgeoisie. Pleading the backwardness of the mass of workers in Russia, and wishing to "march with the masses", the Economists restricted the tasks and scope of the working-class movement to the economic struggle and to political support for liberalism; they set themselves no independent political or revolutionary tasks.

The old *Iskra* (1900-03) waged a victorious struggle against Economism, for the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. The finest elements in the class-conscious proletariat sided with *Iskra*. Several years before the revolution, the Social-Democrats came out with a most consistent and uncompromising programme, whose correctness was borne out by the class struggle and by the action of the masses during the 1905 Revolution. Whereas the Economists adapted themselves to the backwardness of the masses, *Iskra* was educating the workers' vanguard that was capable of leading the masses onward. The present-day arguments of the social-chauvinists (i.e., the need to reckon with the masses; the progressiveness of imperialism; the "illusions" harboured by the revolutionaries, etc.), were *all* advanced by the Economists. It was twenty years ago that the Russian Social-Democrats made their first acquaintance with the opportunist modification of Marxism into Struvism.

MENSHEVISM AND BOLSHEVISM (1903-1908)

The period of bourgeois-democratic revolution gave rise to a fresh struggle between Social-Democratic trends; this was a direct continuation of the previous struggle. Economism developed into Menshevism. The defence of the old *Iskra* revolutionary tactics gave rise to Bolshevism.

In the turbulent years of 1905-07, Menshevism was an opportunist trend backed by the bourgeois liberals, which brought liberal-bourgeois tendencies into the working-class movement. Its essence lay in an adaptation of the working-class struggle to suit liberalism. Bolshevism, on the contrary, set the Social-Democratic workers the task of rousing the democratic peasantry for the revolutionary struggle, despite the vacillation and treachery of the liberals. As the Mensheviks themselves admitted on more than one occasion, the mass of workers followed the Bolshevik lead in all the most important actions of the revolution.

The 1905 Revolution tested, developed and steeled the uncompromisingly revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics in Russia. The direct action of classes and parties repeatedly revealed the link between Social-Democratic opportunism (Menshevism) and liberalism.

MARXISM AND LIQUIDATIONISM (1908-1914)

The period of counter-revolution again placed on the order of the day—this time in an entirely new form—the question of the opportunist and revolutionary tactics of the Social-Democrats. The mainstream in Menshevism, regardless of protests from many of its finest representatives, brought forth the liquidationist trend, a renunciation of the struggle for another revolution in Russia, a renunciation of underground organisation and activities, contempt for and ridicule of the "underground", of the slogan for a republic, etc. The group of legal contributors to the journal *Nasha Zarya* (Messrs. Potresov, Cherevanin, and others) formed a core—independent of the old Social-Democratic Party—which in a thousand ways has been supported, publicised and nurtured by the liberal bourgeoisie of Russia, who are out to win the workers away from the revolutionary struggle.

This group of opportunists was expelled from the Party by the January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which restored the Party, in the teeth of furious resistance from a number of groups and coteries abroad. For over two years (the beginning of 1912 until mid-1914) a stubborn struggle was in progress between the two Social-Democratic parties: the Central Committee, which was elected in January 1912, and the Organising Committee, which refused to recognise the January Conference and wanted to restore the Party in a different way, by maintaining unity with the *Nasha Zarya* group. A stubborn struggle raged between the two workers' dailies (*Pravda*, and *Luch*[150] and their successors), and between the two Social-Democratic groups in the Fourth Duma (the R.S.D.L. group of Pravdists or Marxists, and the "Social-Democratic group" of the liquidators led by Chkheidze).

The Pravdists, who championed loyalty to the Party's revolutionary principles, encouraged the incipient revival of the working-class movement (especially after the spring of 1912), combined underground and legal organisation, the press and agitation, and rallied about themselves the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers, whereas the liquidators—who as a political force operated

exclusively through the *Nasha Zarya* group—banked on the all-round support of the liberal-bourgeois elements.

The open money contributions made by workers' groups to the newspapers of the two parties—a form of payment of S.D. *membership dues* adapted to the Russian conditions of the time (and the only one legally possible and easily verifiable by the public)—strikingly confirmed the proletarian source of the strength and influence of the Pravdists (Marxists), and the bourgeois-liberal source of the liquidators (and their O.C.). Here are the brief figures of these contributions, which are given in full in the book *Marxism and Liquidationism*[151] and summarised in the German Social-Democratic *Leipziger Volkszeitung*[152] of July 21, 1914.

The number and sums of contributions to the St. Petersburg daily newspapers, Marxist (Pravdist) and liquidationist, from January 1 to May 13, 1914 were the following:

	Pravdists		Liquidators	
	Number of contributions	Sum in rubles	Number of contributions	Sum in rubles
From workers' groups	2,873	18,934	671	5,296
From non-workers' groups	713	2,650	453	6,760

Thus by 1914 our Party had united four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia around revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics. For the whole of 1913 the Pravdists received contributions from 2,181 workers' groups, the liquidators from 661. The figures from January 1, 1913 to May 13, 1914 were: 5,054 contributions from workers' groups for the Pravdists (i.e., for our Party), and 1,332, i.e., 20.8 per cent, for the liquidators.

MARXISM AND SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM (1914-1915)

The great European war of 1914-15 has given all the European Social-Democrats, as well as the Russian, an opportunity of putting their tactics to the test of a crisis of a world-wide scale. The reactionary and predatory nature of this war between slave-holders stands out in far more striking relief in the case of tsarism than it does in the

case of the other governments. Yet the liquidators' main group (the only one which, besides ours, exerts serious influence in Russia, thanks to its liberal connections) has turned towards social-chauvinism! With its fairly lengthy monopoly of legality, this *Nasha Zarya* group has conducted propaganda among the masses, in favour of "non-resistance to the war", and victory for the Triple (and now Quadruple) Entente; it has accused German imperialism of extraordinary sins, etc. Plekhanov, who, since 1903, has given numerous examples of his utter political spinelessness and his desertion to opportunism, has taken this stand even more emphatically (which has won him praise from the entire bourgeois press of Russia). Plekhanov has sunk so low as to declare that tsarism is waging a just war, and to grant interviews to Italian government newspapers, urging that country to enter the war!

The correctness of our appraisal of liquidationism and of the expulsion of the main group of liquidators from our Party has thus been fully confirmed. The liquidators' real programme and the real significance of their trend today consist, not only in opportunism in general, but in a defence of the dominant-nation privileges and advantages of the Great-Russian landowners and bourgeoisie. Liquidationism is a trend of *national liberal*-labour policy. It is an alliance of a section of the radical petty bourgeoisie and a tiny section of privileged workers, with their "own" national bourgeoisie, against the mass of the proletariat.

THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE RANKS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

As we have already said, our January 1912 Conference has not been recognised by the liquidators, or by a number of groups abroad (those of Plekhanov, Alexinsky, Trotsky, and others), or by the so-called "national" (i.e., non-Great Russian) Social-Democrats. Among the numberless epithets hurled against us, "usurpers" and "splitters" have been most frequently repeated. We have replied by quoting precise and objectively verifiable figures showing that our Party has united four-fifths of the class-conscious workers in Russia. This is no small figure, considering the

difficulties of underground activities in a period of counter-revolution .

If "unity" were possible in Russia on the basis of Social-Democratic tactics, without expelling the *Nasha Zarya* group, why have our numerous opponents not achieved it *even among themselves*? Three and a half years have elapsed since January 1912, and all this time our opponents, much as they have desired to do so, have failed to form a Social-Democratic party in opposition to us. This fact is our Party's best defence.

The entire history of the Social-Democratic groups that are fighting against our Party has been a history of collapse and disintegration. In March 1912, all of them, without exception, "united" in reviling us. But already in August 1912, when the so-called August bloc* was formed against us, disintegration set in among them. Some of the groups defected from them. They were unable to form a party and a Central Committee; what they set up was only an Organising Committee "for the purpose of restoring unity". Actually, this O.C. proved an ineffective cover for the liquidationist group in Russia. Throughout the tremendous upswing of the working-class movement in Russia and the mass strikes of 1912-14, the only group in the entire August bloc to conduct work among the masses was the *Nasha Zarya* group, whose strength lay in its links with the liberals. Early in 1914, the Lettish Social-Democrats officially withdrew from the August bloc (the Polish Social-Democrats did not join it), while Trotsky, one of the leaders of the bloc, left it unofficially, again forming his own separate group. At the Brussels Conference of July 1914, at which the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau, Kautsky and Vandervelde participated, the so-called Brussels bloc was formed against us, which the Letts did not join, and from which the Polish opposition Social-Democrats forthwith withdrew. On the outbreak of war, this bloc collapsed. *Nasha Zarya*, Plekhanov, Alexinsky and An,[153] leader of the Caucasian Social-Democrats, became open social-chauvinists, who came out for the desirability of Germany's defeat. The

* See Note 180.—*Tr.*

O.C. and the Bund defended the social-chauvinists and the principles of social-chauvinism. Although it voted against the war credits (in Russia, even the bourgeois democrats, the Trudoviks, voted against them), the Chkheidze Duma group remained *Nasha Zarya*'s faithful ally. Plekhanov, Alexinsky and Co., our extreme social-chauvinists, were quite pleased with the Chkheidze group. In Paris, the newspaper *Nashe Slovo* (the former *Golos*) was launched, with the participation mainly of Martov and Trotsky, who wanted to combine a platonic defence of internationalism with an absolute demand for unity with *Nasha Zarya*, the O.C. or the Chkheidze group. After 250 issues, this newspaper was itself compelled to admit its disintegration: one section of the editorial board gravitated towards our Party, Martov remained faithful to the O.C. which publicly censured *Nashe Slovo* for its "anarchism" (just as the opportunists in Germany, David and Co., *Internationale Korrespondenz*[154] and Legien and Co. have accused Comrade Liebknecht of anarchism); Trotsky announced his rupture with the O.C., but wanted to stand with the Chkheidze group. Here are the programme and the tactics of the Chkheidze group, as formulated by one of its leaders. In No. 5, 1915, of *Sovremenny Mir*,[155] journal of the Plekhanov and Alexinsky trend, Chkhenkeli wrote: "*To say that German Social-Democracy was in a position to prevent its country from going to war and failed to do so would mean either secretly wishing that it should not only have breathed its last at the barricades, but also have the fatherland breathe its last, or looking at nearby things through an anarchist's telescope.*"*

These few lines express the sum and substance of social-chauvinism: both the justification, in principle, of the idea of "defence of the fatherland" in the present war, and mockery—with the permission of the military censors—of the preachment of and preparation for revolution. It is not at all a question of whether the German Social-Demo-

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* *S. M.* No. 5, 1915, p. 148. Trotsky recently announced that he deemed it his task to enhance the prestige of the Chkheidze group in the International. No doubt Chkhenkeli will with equal energy enhance Trotsky's prestige in the International....

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

crats were or were not in a position to prevent war, or whether, in general, revolutionaries can guarantee the success of a revolution. The question is: shall socialists behave like socialists or really breathe their last in the embrace of the imperialist bourgeoisie?

OUR PARTY'S TASKS

Social-Democracy in Russia arose before the bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905) in our country, and gained strength during the revolution and counter-revolution. The backwardness of Russia explains the extraordinary multiplicity of trends and shades of petty-bourgeois opportunism in our country; whereas the influence of Marxism in Europe and the stability of the legally existing Social-Democratic parties before the war converted our exemplary liberals into near-admirers of "reasonable", "European" (non-revolutionary), "legal" "Marxist" theory and Social-Democracy. The working class of Russia could not build up its party otherwise than in a resolute thirty-year struggle against all the varieties of opportunism. The experience of the world war, which has brought about the shameful collapse of European opportunism and has strengthened the alliance between our national-liberals and social-chauvinist liquidationism, has still further fortified our conviction that our Party must follow the same consistently revolutionary road.

ON THE SLOGAN FOR A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

In No. 40 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* we reported that a conference of our Party's groups abroad had decided to defer the question of the "United States of Europe" slogan pending a discussion, in the press, on the *economic* aspect of the matter.*

At our conference the debate on this question assumed a purely political character. Perhaps this was partly caused by the Central Committee's Manifesto having formulated this slogan as a forthright political one ("the immediate *political* slogan...", as it says there); not only did it advance the slogan of a republican United States of Europe, but expressly emphasised that this slogan is meaningless and false "without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies".

It would be quite wrong to object to such a presentation of the question *within the limits* of a political appraisal of this slogan—e.g., to argue that it obscures or weakens, etc., the slogan of a socialist revolution. Political changes of a truly democratic nature, and especially political revolutions, can under no circumstances whatsoever either obscure or weaken the slogan of a socialist revolution. On the contrary, they always bring it closer, extend its basis, and draw new sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses into the socialist struggle. On the other hand, political revolutions are inevitable in the course of the socialist revolution, which should not be regarded as a single act, but as a period of turbulent political and

* See p. 158 of this volume.—*Ed.*

economic upheavals, the most intense class struggle, civil war, revolutions, and counter-revolutions.

But while the slogan of a republican United States of Europe—if accompanied by the revolutionary overthrow of the three most reactionary monarchies in Europe, headed by the Russian—is quite invulnerable as a political slogan there still remains the highly important question of its economic content and significance. From the standpoint of the economic conditions of imperialism—i.e., the export of capital and the division of the world by the "advanced" and "civilised" colonial powers—a United States of Europe, under capitalism, is either impossible or reactionary.

Capital has become international and monopolist. The world has been carved up by a handful of Great Powers, i.e., powers successful in the great plunder and oppression of nations. The four Great Powers of Europe—Britain, France, Russia and Germany, with an aggregate population of between 250,000,000 and 300,000,000, and an area of about 7,000,000 square kilometres—possess colonies with a population of *almost 500 million* (494,500,000) and an area of 64,600,000 square kilometres, i.e., almost half the surface of the globe (133,000,000 square kilometres exclusive of Arctic and Antarctic regions). Add to this the three Asian states—China, Turkey and Persia, now being rent piecemeal by thugs that are waging a war of "liberation", namely, Japan, Russia, Britain and France. Those three Asian states, which may be called semi-colonies (in reality they are now 90 per cent colonies), have a total population of 360,000,000 and an area of 14,500,000 square kilometres (almost one and a half times the area of all Europe).

Furthermore, Britain, France and Germany have invested capital abroad to the value of no less than 70,000 million rubles. The business of securing "legitimate" profits from this tidy sum—these exceed 3,000 million rubles annually—is carried out by the national committees of the millionaires, known as governments, which are equipped with armies and navies and which provide the sons and brothers of the millionaires with jobs in the colonies and semi-colonies as viceroys, consuls, ambassadors, officials of all kinds, clergymen, and other leeches.

That is how the plunder of about a thousand million of the earth's population by a handful of Great Powers is organised in the epoch of the highest development of capitalism. No other organisation is possible under capitalism. Renounce colonies, "spheres of influence", and the export of capital? To think that it is possible means coming down to the level of some snivelling parson who every Sunday preaches to the rich on the lofty principles of Christianity and advises them to give the poor, well, if not millions, at least several hundred rubles yearly.

A United States of Europe under capitalism is tantamount to an agreement on the partition of colonies. Under capitalism, however, no other basis and no other principle of division are possible except force. A multi-millionaire cannot share the "national income" of a capitalist country with anyone otherwise than "in proportion to the capital invested" (with a bonus thrown in, so that the biggest capital may receive more than its share). Capitalism is private ownership of the means of production, and anarchy in production. To advocate a "just" division of income on such a basis is sheer Proudhonism, stupid philistinism. No division can be effected otherwise than in "proportion to strength", and strength changes with the course of economic development. Following 1871, the rate of Germany's accession of strength was three or four times as rapid as that of Britain and France, and of Japan about ten times as rapid as Russia's. There is and there can be no other way of testing the real might of a capitalist state than by war. War does not contradict the fundamentals of private property—on the contrary, it is a direct and inevitable outcome of those fundamentals. Under capitalism the smooth economic growth of individual enterprises or individual states is impossible. Under capitalism, there are no other means of restoring the periodically disturbed equilibrium than crises in industry and wars in politics.

Of course, *temporary* agreements are possible between capitalists and between states. In this sense a United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the *European* capitalists ... but to what end? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty *against* Japan and America, who

have been badly done out of their share by the present partition of colonies, and the increase of whose might during the last fifty years has been immeasurably more rapid than that of backward and monarchist Europe, now turning senile. Compared with the United States of America, Europe as a whole denotes economic stagnation. On the present economic basis, i.e., under capitalism, a United States of Europe would signify an organisation of reaction to retard America's more rapid development. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone for ever.

A United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is the state form of the unification and freedom of nations which we associate with socialism—until the time when the complete victory of communism brings about the total disappearance of the state, including the democratic. As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with socialism; second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of socialism in a single country is impossible, and it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to the others.

Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone. After expropriating the capitalists and organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise *against* the rest of the world—the capitalist world—attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, and in case of need using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. The political form of a society wherein the proletariat is victorious in overthrowing the bourgeoisie will be a democratic republic, which will more and more concentrate the forces of the proletariat of a given nation or nations, in the struggle against states that have not yet gone over to socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without a dictatorship of the oppressed class, of the proletariat. A free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn

struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.

It is for these reasons and after repeated discussions at the conference of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad, and following that conference, that the Central Organ's editors have come to the conclusion that the slogan for a United States of Europe is an erroneous one.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 44,
August 23, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

ON THE SLOGAN FOR THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

EDITORIAL COMMENT BY *SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT* ON THE MANIFESTO ON WAR ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The demand for a United States of Europe, as advanced by the Central Committee's Manifesto, which accompanied it with a call for the overthrow of the monarchies in Russia, Austria, and Germany, is distinct from the pacifist interpretation of this slogan by Kautsky and others.

Issue No. 44 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, our Party's Central Organ, carries an editorial proving the economic erroneousness of the United States of Europe slogan.* Either this is a demand that cannot be implemented under capitalism, inasmuch as it presupposes the establishment of a planned world economy, with a partition of colonies, spheres of influence, etc., among the individual countries, or else it is a reactionary slogan, one that signifies a temporary union of the Great Powers of Europe with the aim of enhancing the oppression of colonies and of plundering the more rapidly developing countries—Japan and America.

Written in late August 1915

Published in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*, Geneva, 1915

Published according to the pamphlet

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* See pp. 339-43 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE LEFT WING AT ZIMMERWALD

The present war has been engendered by imperialism. Capitalism has already achieved that highest stage. Society's productive forces and the magnitudes of capital have outgrown the narrow limits of the individual national states. Hence the striving on the part of the Great Powers to enslave other nations and to seize colonies as sources of raw material and spheres of investment of capital. The whole world is merging into a single economic organism; it has been carved up among a handful of Great Powers. The objective conditions for socialism have fully matured, and the present war is a war of the capitalists for privileges and monopolies that might delay the downfall of capitalism.

The socialists, who seek to liberate labour from the yoke of capital and who defend the world-wide solidarity of the workers, are struggling against any kind of oppression and inequality of nations. When the bourgeoisie was a progressive class, and the overthrow of feudalism, absolutism and oppression by other nations stood on the historical order of the day, the socialists, as invariably the most consistent and most resolute of democrats, recognised "defence of the fatherland" in the meaning implied by those aims, and in that meaning alone. Today too, should a war of the oppressed nations against the oppressor Great Powers break out in the east of Europe or in the colonies, the socialists' sympathy would be wholly with the oppressed.

The war of today, however, has been engendered by an entirely different historical period, in which the bourgeoisie, from a progressive class, has turned reactionary. With

both groups of belligerents, this war is a war of slave-holders, and is designed to preserve and extend slavery; it is a war for the repartitioning of colonies, for the "right" to oppress other nations, for privileges and monopolies for Great-Power capital, and for the perpetuation of wage slavery by splitting up the workers of the different countries and crushing them through reaction. That is why, on the part of both warring groups, all talk about "defence of the fatherland" is deception of the people by the bourgeoisie. Neither the victory of any one group nor a return to the *status quo* can do anything either to protect the freedom of most countries in the world from imperialist oppression by a handful of Great Powers, or to ensure that the working class keep even its present modest cultural gains. The period of a relatively peaceful capitalism has passed, never to return. Imperialism has brought the working class unparalleled intensification of the class struggle, want, and unemployment, a higher cost of living, and the strengthening of oppression by the trusts, of militarism, and the political reactionaries, who are raising their heads in all countries, even the freest.

In reality, the "defence of the fatherland" slogan in the present war is tantamount to a defence of the "right" of one's "own" national bourgeoisie to oppress other nations; it is in fact a national liberal-labour policy, an alliance between a negligible section of the workers and their "own" national bourgeoisie, against the mass of the proletarians and the exploited. Socialists who pursue such a policy are in fact chauvinists, social-chauvinists. The policy of voting for war credits, of joining governments, of *Burgfrieden*,* and the like, is a betrayal of socialism. Nurtured by the conditions of the "peaceful", period which has now come to an end, opportunism has now matured to a degree that calls for a break with socialism; it has become an open enemy to the proletariat's movement for liberation. The working class cannot achieve its historic aims without waging a most resolute struggle against both forthright opportunism and social-chauvinism (the majorities in the Social-Demo-

* A class truce.—*Ed.*

cratic parties of France, Germany and Austria; Hyndman, the Fabians and the trade unionists in Britain; Rubanovich, Plekhanov and *Nasha Zarya* in Russia, etc.) and the so-called Centre, which has surrendered the Marxist stand to the chauvinists.

Unanimously adopted by socialists of the entire world in anticipation of that very kind of war among the Great Powers which has now broken out, the Basle Manifesto of 1912 distinctly recognised the imperialist and reactionary nature of that war, declared it criminal for workers of one country to shoot at workers of another country, and proclaimed the approach of the *proletarian revolution* in connection with that very war. Indeed, the war is creating a revolutionary situation, is engendering revolutionary sentiments and unrest in the masses, is arousing in the finer part of the proletariat a realisation of the perniciousness of opportunism, and is intensifying the struggle against it. The masses' growing desire for peace expresses their disappointment, the defeat of the bourgeois lie regarding the defence of the fatherland, and the awakening of their revolutionary consciousness. In utilising that temper for their revolutionary agitation, and not shying away in that agitation from considerations of the defeat of their "own" country, the socialists will not deceive the people with the hope that, without the revolutionary overthrow of the present-day governments, a possibility exists of a speedy democratic peace, which will be durable in some degree and will preclude any oppression of nations, a possibility of disarmament, etc. Only the social revolution of the proletariat opens the way towards peace and freedom for the nations.

The imperialist war is ushering in the era of the social revolution. All the objective conditions of recent times have put the proletariat's revolutionary mass struggle on the order of the day. It is the duty of socialists, while making use of every means of the working class's legal struggle, to subordinate each and every of those means to this immediate and most important task, develop the workers' revolutionary consciousness, rally them in the international revolutionary struggle, promote and encourage any revolutionary action, and do everything possible to

turn the imperialist war between the peoples into a civil war of the oppressed classes against their oppressors, a war for the expropriation of the class of capitalists, for the conquest of political power by the proletariat, and the realisation of socialism.

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Published according to the manuscript

THE VOICE OF AN HONEST FRENCH SOCIALIST

In French-speaking Switzerland, where Francophile chauvinism is raging with only a little less intensity than in France, the voice of an honest socialist has been heard. In our despicable times this is quite an event. We must pay all the more attention to this voice because in this instance we have here to do with a socialist of typically French (or rather Romance, because the Italians, for instance, are the same) temperament and frame of mind.

We are referring to a little pamphlet by Paul Golay, the editor of a minor socialist paper published in Lausanne. It was in that city that on March 11, 1915, the author delivered a lecture on the subject: "The Socialism That Is Dying and the Socialism That Must Be Reborn", the contents of which he later published separately.*

"On August 1, 1914, war broke out. During the weeks preceding this now famous date, and after it, millions of people were waiting." That is how the author begins. Millions of people were waiting, he says, to see whether the resolutions and the declarations of the leaders of socialism would not lead "to a mighty uprising, whose whirlwind would sweep away the criminal governments". However, the expectations of millions were thwarted. "We attempted," says Golay, "in a comradely fashion" to exonerate the socialists by referring to the "lightning suddenness of the war", and to the lack of information, but these excuses did not satisfy us. "We felt ill at ease, as if our conscience were steeped in the filthy waters of equivocation and lies." From

* Paul Golay, *Le socialisme qui meurt et le socialisme qui doit renaître*, Lausanne, 1915, 22 pages, 15 centimes. En vente à l'Administration du "Grutleen", Maison du Peuple, Lausanne.

this the reader will have concluded that Golay is sincere, a quality almost extraordinary in our times.

Golay recalls the "revolutionary traditions" of the proletariat. Perfectly aware of the fact that "for each situation fitting action is required", he reminds us that "for exceptional situations exceptional measures are necessary. *Aux grands maux les grands remèdes*".* He recalls "congress decisions" "addressed directly to the masses and urging them to start revolutionary and insurrectionary action". There come excerpts from the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions. The author emphasises that "these various resolutions do not contain any argument as to a defensive or offensive war; consequently they do not propose any special nationalist tactics to supersede the generally accepted fundamental principles".

After reading this, the reader sees that Golay is not only a sincere socialist, but also an honest, convinced socialist, a quality quite exceptional among leaders of the Second International!

"The proletariat was congratulated by military commanders, and the bourgeois press warmly praised the resurrection of what it called 'the soul of the nation'. This resurrection has cost us three million corpses.

"And yet never has a workers' organisation had such a large number of dues-paying members, never has there been such an abundance of parliamentarians, such a splendidly organised press. And never has there been a more hideous cause against which one should have risen up.

"In the circumstances so tragic, when the lives of millions are at stake, all revolutionary actions are not only permissible, but legitimate. They are more than legitimate—they are sacred. The imperative duty of the proletariat demanded an attempt to achieve the impossible so as to save our generation from events which are turning Europe into a shambles.

"There have been no energetic steps, no attempts at a revolt, nothing leading to an uprising....

"Our opponents cry out about the collapse of socialism. They are too hasty. Still, who will dare assert that they are wrong in all respects? What is dying at this hour is not socialism in general, but a brand of socialism, a saccharine socialism without the spirit of idealism and without passion, with the manners of a governmental office-holder, and with the paunch of a respectable *paterfamilias*; a socialism without audacity or frenzy, a devotee of statistics, up to its neck in amicable agreements with capitalism; a socialism preoccupied only with

* Great evils call for strong remedies.—*Ed.*

reforms, a socialism that has sold its birthright for a mess of pottage; a socialism that controls people's impatience in order to aid the bourgeoisie—a sort of automatic brake on audacious proletarian action.

"This socialism, which threatens to contaminate the entire International, is in certain measure responsible for the impotence we are reproached with."

Elsewhere in the pamphlet Golay is outspoken about "reformist socialism" and "opportunism" as a distortion of socialism.

In referring to that distortion, recognising the "general responsibility" of the proletariat of *all* the belligerent countries, and emphasising that "this responsibility falls on the heads of the leaders whom the masses trusted and from whom they expected a slogan", Golay correctly takes as an example German socialism, which was "the best organised, best formed, the most indoctrinated", to show "its numerical strength and its revolutionary feebleness".

"Inspired with revolutionary fervour, German Social-Democracy could have confronted militarist undertakings with a resistance sufficiently definite and stubborn to make the proletariat of the other countries of central Europe follow it on this, the only road to salvation....

"German socialism enjoyed great influence in the International. It could have done more than all other parties. The greatest effort was expected of it. But numbers are nothing if individual energy is paralysed by too rigorous discipline and if the 'leaders' utilise ... their influence to achieve the least effort. [Much as the second part of the sentence is correct, the first is wrong: discipline is a splendid and necessary thing, for instance, the discipline of a party that expels opportunists and opponents of revolutionary action.] The German proletariat, owing to its responsible leaders, obeyed the call of the military camarilla ... the other sections of the International took fright and acted likewise; in France, two socialists found it necessary to join a bourgeois government! Thus, several months after the solemn declaration at a congress that socialists considered it a crime to shoot at each other, millions of workers were called to the colours and began to commit that crime with a persistency and a zeal which won them repeated tribute from the capitalist bourgeoisie and governments."

Golay, however, does not confine himself to mercilessly branding "the socialism that is dying". He also manifests a full understanding of the cause of that dying, and the kind of socialism that should supersede the dying one. "The working masses in every country," he writes, "submit

in some measure to the influence of ideas current in bourgeois circles." "When, under the name of revisionism, Bernstein formulated a kind of democratic reformism," he writes, "Kautsky shattered him with the aid of relevant facts." "But when appearances had been preserved, the party nevertheless continued its *Realpolitik*. The Social-Democratic Party became what it is today. An excellent organisation. A powerful body, from which the soul has gone." Not only German Social-Democracy, but all sections of the International reveal the same tendencies. "The growing number of officials" leads to certain consequences; attention is focussed only on the regular payment of membership dues; strikes are looked upon as "manifestations aiming at securing better conditions of agreement" with the capitalists. It becomes customary to link the interests of the workers with those of the capitalists; "to subordinate the fate of the workers to that of capitalism itself", "to wish an intensive development of one's 'own' 'national' industry to the detriment of foreign industry".

In one of his articles, R. Schmiedt, a Reichstag deputy, says that regulation of working conditions by the trade unions is also advantageous to the capitalists, since it "introduces order and stability in economic life" and since it "makes the capitalists' calculations easier, and counteracts unfair competition".

In quoting these words, Golay exclaims:

"It appears that the trade union movement must consider it an honour to make the capitalist profits more stable! It is apparently the aim of socialism to demand, within the framework of capitalist society, the maximum of advantages compatible with the existence of the capitalist system itself. In that case, we have here a renunciation of all principles. The proletariat strives, not to consolidate the capitalist regime, not to obtain minimal conditions for hired labour, but to eliminate the system of private property and to destroy the system of hired labour....

"The secretaries of large organisations become important personages. In the political movement, deputies, men of letters, scientists, lawyers, all those who, together with their science, bring with themselves certain personal ambitions, wield an influence which is at times dangerous.

"The powerful organisation of the trade unions and their substantial treasuries have developed a corporative spirit among their members. One of the negative aspects of the trade union movement, which is reformist in essence, is that the condition of various categories of

wage workers is improved by placing one above the other. This destroys their fundamental unity and creates among the most favoured an apprehension which compels them sometimes to fear a 'movement' that might undermine their condition, their treasury and their balance sheet. Thus a certain division between the various categories of the proletariat comes into existence, categories artificially created by the trade union movement itself."

This, of course, is no argument against strong organisations, says the author, obviously to counter arguments from a certain kind of "critic". This, he says, only proves that organisations must have a "soul", must have "enthusiasm".

"What are the chief characteristics that must distinguish the socialism of tomorrow? It will be international, intransigent, and rebellious."

"Intransigence is a force," Golay says with good reason, inviting the reader to cast a glance at the "history of doctrines". "When did they exercise an influence? When they were tamed by the authorities, or when they remained intransigent? When did Christianity lose its value? Was it not on the day Constantine promised it revenues and offered it, not persecution and executions but the gold-braided vestment of Court servants?...

"A French philosopher has said: 'Dead ideas are those that appear in elegant garments, with no asperity or daring. They are dead because they are put into general circulation and become part of the ordinary intellectual baggage of the great army of philistines. Strong ideas are those that shock and scandalise, evoke indignation, anger, and animosity in some, and enthusiasm in others.'" The author finds it necessary to call this truth to the minds of present-day socialists, among whom he very often finds an absence of any kind of "ardent convictions": "They believe in nothing," he says, "neither in reforms that are belated, nor in a revolution that has not yet arrived."

Intransigence, a readiness for rebellion, the author says, "lead, not to dreaminess but to action. A socialist will neglect no form of action. He will find new ones according to the demands and the circumstances of the moment.... He demands immediate reforms; he gets them, not by bickering with the opponent, but he takes them by force, as a concession by a bourgeoisie intimidated by the enthusiasm and audacity of the masses."

After the most bare-faced vulgarising of Marxism and degrading of socialism by Plekhanov, Kautsky, and Co., Golay's pamphlet is really refreshing. However, the two following shortcomings must be noted.

First, Golay, in common with most socialists in the Romance countries, not excluding the present-day Guesdists, pays insufficient attention to "doctrine", i.e., to the *theory* of socialism. He has a certain prejudice against Marxism, which can be explained, though not justified, by the present prevalence of the most vicious caricature of Marxism in the writings of Kautsky, in *Die Neue Zeit*, and among the Germans in general. A man like Golay, who has recognised the necessity of the *death* of reformist socialism and the *revival* of a revolutionary, "rebellious" socialism, i.e., one who understands the necessity of an uprising, who advocates it, and is capable of seriously preparing himself and others for it, is *in deed* a thousand times closer to Marxism than those gentlemen who know the "tests" by heart but are now busy (for instance, in *Die Neue Zeit*) justifying social-chauvinism of every kind, including that which says that one must at present "make peace" with the chauvinist *Vorstand* and "forget the past".

Much as Golay's disdain for Marxism is explainable and much as he can be cleared of the blame, which can be placed on the moribund or *dead* trend of the French Marxists (Guesdists), the blame is still there. The world's greatest movement for liberation of the oppressed class, the most revolutionary class in history, is impossible without a revolutionary theory. That theory cannot be thought up. It *grows out* of the sum total of the revolutionary experience and the revolutionary thinking of all countries in the world. Such a theory *has developed* since the second half of the nineteenth century. It is known as Marxism. One cannot be a socialist, a revolutionary Social-Democrat, without participating, in the measure of one's powers, in developing and applying that theory, and without waging a ruthless struggle today against the mutilation of this theory by Plekhanov, Kautsky, and Co.

Inattention to theory has led Golay to make a number of erroneous or hasty attacks against, for instance, centralism or discipline in general, or against "historical mate-

rialism", which, the author alleges, is not sufficiently "idealistic", etc. Hence also a remarkable lack of completeness in the question of slogans. For instance, the demand that socialism should become "rebellious" is full of profound content and is the sole correct thought, without which all talk about internationalism, the revolutionary spirit, and Marxism is sheer stupidity, and, as often as not, hypocrisy. However, this idea, that of civil war, should have been developed, and made the pivot of tactics, whereas Golay confines himself to *stating* it. This is a lot for our days, but it is insufficient from the standpoint of the demands of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle. For instance, Golay's treatment of the problem of revolution as a reply to war is, if one may put it so, far too narrow. He fails to consider the fact that, though a revolutionary *reply* to the war has not been given, yet, the war itself has begun to teach, and is teaching, the masses the lesson of revolution, by creating a revolutionary situation and by expanding and deepening it.

Golay's second shortcoming is best illustrated by the following argument in his pamphlet:

> "We blame nobody. To be reborn, the International needs a fraternal spirit to animate the various sections; but it is permissible to affirm that, in the sight of the great task placed before it by the capitalist bourgeoisie in July and August 1914, reformist, centralist[?] and hierarchical socialism cut a poor figure."

"We blame nobody...." This is where you are mistaken, Comrade Golay! You yourself have admitted that "the socialism that is dying" is tied up to bourgeois ideas (which means that it is nurtured and supported by the bourgeoisie), to a certain ideological current in socialism ("reformism"), to the interests and the specific position of certain strata (parliamentarians, officials, intellectuals, some of the better-off sections or groups of workers), etc. From this follows an *inevitable* conclusion, which you fail to draw. Individuals "die" what is called a natural death; *ideological and political* trends, however, *cannot die in that way*. Just as the bourgeoisie will not die until it is overthrown, a trend nurtured and supported by the bourgeoisie, and expressing the interests of a small group of intellectuals and members of the labour aristocracy that have joined hands

with the bourgeoisie, will not die unless it is "killed", i.e., overthrown, deprived of *all* influence on the socialist proletariat. This trend is strong in its links with the bourgeoisie. Because of the objective conditions of the "peaceful" period of 1871-1914, it has become a kind of commanding, parasitic *stratum* in the working-class movement.

In such conditions, it is our duty, not only to "blame", but to ring the tocsin, ruthlessly unmask, overthrow, and oust this parasitic stratum from their posts, and destroy *their* "unity" with the working-class movement, because such "unity" means, in practice, unity of the proletariat with the national bourgeoisie and a *split* in the international proletariat, the unity of lackeys and a split among the revolutionaries.

"Intransigence is a force," Golay says with justice; he demands that "the socialism that must be reborn" should be intransigent. But is it not all the same to the bourgeoisie whether the proletariat practises reconciliation with it *directly*, or *indirectly* through bourgeois adherents, defenders, and agents *within* the working-class movement, i.e., through the opportunists? The latter is even *more advantageous* to the bourgeoisie, because it secures for it a stronger influence over the workers.

Golay is a thousand times right when he says that there is a socialism that is dying and a socialism that must be reborn; this death and this rebirth, however, comprise a ruthless struggle against the trend of opportunism—not merely an ideological struggle, but the removal of that hideous excrescence from the body of the working-class parties, the expulsion from those organisations of certain representatives of this tactic, which is alien to the proletariat, a definite break with them. They will die neither physically nor politically, but the workers will break with them, will throw them into the cesspool of the servitors of the bourgeoisie. The example of their corruption will educate a new generation, or, more correctly, new proletarian armies capable of an uprising.

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IMPERIALISM AND SOCIALISM IN ITALY

NOTE

To clarify the problems presented to socialism as a result of the present imperialist war, it is useful to cast a glance at the various European countries, so as to learn to distinguish between national modifications and details of the general picture, and the fundamental and essential. Distance lends clarity to the view. The less the resemblance between Italy and Russia, the more interesting it is, in certain respects, to compare imperialism and socialism in the two countries.

In the present note, we intend only to call attention to material on this problem, as provided by a bourgeois professor, Roberto Michels, in his book *Italian Imperialism*, and by a socialist, T. Barboni, in a book entitled *Internationalism or Class Nationalism?* (*The Italian Proletariat and the European War*),* both of which have been published since the outbreak of the war. The garrulous Michels, who is just as superficial as he is in his other writings, hardly touches upon the economic aspect of imperialism. His book, however, contains a collection of valuable material on the origin of Italian imperialism and on the transition that comprises the essence of the times and is so manifest in Italy, namely, the transition from a period of wars for national liberation to a period of imperialist and reactionary wars of plunder. Revolutionary-democratic Italy, i.e., revolutionary-bourgeois Italy, the Italy that

* Roberto Michels, *L'imperialismo italiano*, Milano, 1914; T. Barboni, *Internazionalismo o nazionalismo di classes?* (*Il proletariato d'Italia e la guerra europea*). Edito dall'autore a Campione d'Intelvi (provincia di Como), 1915.

cast off the yoke of Austria, the Italy of the times of Garibaldi, is changing before our very eyes into an Italy that is oppressing other peoples and plundering Turkey and Austria, an Italy of a crude, repulsively reactionary and rapacious bourgeoisie whose mouth waters at the prospect of a share in the loot. Like any respectable professor, Michels, of course, considers that his servility to the bourgeoisie is "scientific objectivism"; he calls this sharing of the loot "partitioning of that part of the world which still remains in the hands of debilitated peoples" (p. 179). Disdainfully rejecting as "Utopian" the viewpoint of socialists hostile towards colonial policies of any kind, Michels repeats the arguments of those who think that Italy, judging by the density of her population and the intensity of emigration from that country, "should have been the second colonial power", second only to Britain. Michels repudiates by a reference to Britain the argument that forty per cent of the Italian people are illiterate, and that even today cholera riots, etc., take place there. Was not Britain, he asks, a country of unparalleled poverty, humiliation, famine among the working masses, and widespread drunkenness, misery, and squalor in the city slums, in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the British bourgeoisie were so successfully laying the foundations of their present colonial power?

It must be admitted that, from the bourgeois standpoint, this argument is unassailable. Colonial policies and imperialism are not unsound but curable disorders of capitalism (the way philistines think, together with Kautsky); they are an inevitable consequence of the very foundations of capitalism. Competition among individual enterprises inevitably leads either to their becoming ruined or ruining others; competition between individual countries confronts each of them with the alternative of falling behind, ever running the risk of becoming a second Belgium, or else ruining and conquering other countries, thus elbowing their way to a place among the "Great" Powers.

Italian imperialism has been called "poor people's imperialism" (*l'imperialismo della povera gente*), because of the country's poverty and the utter destitution of the masses of Italian emigrants. Arturo Labriola, the Italian chauvinist,

who differs from his former opponent, G. Plekhanov, only in that he somewhat sooner revealed his social-chauvinism, which he reached *via* petty-bourgeois semi-anarchism, not petty-bourgeois opportunism, wrote in his booklet on the Tripolitanian war (1912):

"It is obvious that we are fighting, not only against the Turks ... but also against the intrigues, the intimidations, the money, and the armies of plutocratic Europe, which cannot tolerate that small nations should dare to make a single gesture or to say a single word that will compromise its iron hegemony" (p. 92). Corradini, leader of the Italian nationalists, declared at the same time: "Just as socialism was a method of freeing the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, nationalism will be for us Italians a method of freeing ourselves from the French, the Germans, the British, the North and South Americans, who are our bourgeoisie.

Any country which has more colonies, capital and armies than "we" have, deprives "us" of certain privileges, certain profits or super-profits. Just as among individual capitalists super-profits go to the one whose machinery is superior to the average or who owns certain monopolies, so among nations the one that is economically better off than the others gets super-profits. It is the business of the bourgeoisie to fight for privileges and advantages for its national capital, and to fool the nation or the common folk (with the aid of Labriola and Plekhanov) by passing off for a war of national liberation the imperialist struggle for the "right" to plunder others.

Prior to the Tripolitanian war, Italy did not plunder other nations, at least to no large extent. Is this not an intolerable slight to the national pride? The Italians are oppressed and humiliated as compared with other nations. Italian emigration was 100,000 annually in the seventies of the last century; it now stands at between 500,000 and 1,000,000. All these people are paupers, driven from their country by starvation in the literal sense of the word. All of them provide labour power for the worst paid branches of industry; this mass inhabit the most crowded, poverty-stricken, and squalid sections of the American and European cities. From 1,000,000 in 1881, the number of Italians abroad rose to 5,500,000 in 1910, the vast majority

of this mass living in the rich and "great" countries, for whom the Italians are the crudest, most unskilled, poor and defenceless labouring mass. Here are the main countries using cheap Italian labour: France—400,000 Italians in 1910 (240,000 in 1881); Switzerland—135,000 (41,000 in 1881); Austria—80,000 (40,000); Germany—180,000 (7,000); the United States of America— 1,779,000 (170,000); Brazil—1,500,000 (82,000); Argentina— 1,000,000 (254 000). "Glorious" France, which 125 years ago fought for freedom, and therefore calls its present war for her own and the British slave-holders' "colonial rights" a war of liberation, houses hundreds of thousands of Italian workers in areas that are virtually ghettos. The petty-bourgeois *canaille* of this "great" nation do all they can to keep these people at a distance, and, insult and humiliate them in every possible way. The Italians are contemptuously dubbed "Macaroni" (the Great-Russian reader should recall how many contemptuous nicknames are current in our country for non-Russians whose birth does not entitle them to the noble dominant-nation privileges that serve the Purishkeviches as a means of oppressing *both* the Great-Russian *and* the other peoples of Russia). In 1896 France, that great nation, concluded a treaty with Italy, by which the latter undertook not to increase the number of Italian schools in Tunisia! Since then the Italian population of Tunisia has increased sixfold. There are 105,000 Italians in Tunisia, as against 35,000 Frenchmen, but there are only 1,167 holders of land among the former, with an aggregate of 83,000 hectares, whereas the latter include 2,395 landowners who have grabbed 700,000 hectares in that colony. How can one fail to agree with Labriola and other Italian "Plekhanovites" that Italy is "entitled" to possess its colony in Tripoli, oppress Slavs in Dalmatia, carve up Asia Minor, etc.?*

* It is highly instructive to note the connection between Italy's transformation into an imperialist country and the government's agreeing to electoral reform. The latter increased the number of voters from 3,219,000 to 8,562,000, in other words, it introduced "almost" universal suffrage. Prior to the Tripolitanian war, Giolitti, who carried out the reform, was bitterly opposed to it. "The motivation of the change of line by the government" and the moderate

Just as Plekhanov supports the Russian war of "liberation" against the German striving to turn Russia into a colony, Bissolati, leader of the Reformist Party, has raised an outcry against the "invasion of Italy by foreign capital" (p. 97), namely, German capital in Lombardy, British in Sicily, French in Piacentino, Belgian in the street-car enterprises, etc., etc., etc.

The question has been squarely put and one must acknowledge that the European war has done humanity enormous good by actually confronting hundreds of millions of people of various nationalities with an alternative: *either* defend, with rifle or pen, directly or indirectly, in any form whatever, the dominant-nation and national privileges in general, as well as the prerogative or the claims of one's "own" bourgeoisie, that is to say, be its adherent or lackey; *or* else utilise any struggle, particularly the clash of arms for dominant-nation privileges, so as to unmask and overthrow every government, in the first place *one*'s own, by means of the revolutionary action of an internationally united proletariat. There is no middle road; in other words, the attempt to take a middle stand means, in effect, covertly taking the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Barboni's booklet is, in substance, entirely devoted to covering up this latter act. Barboni poses as an internationalist exactly as our Mr. Potresov does; he argues that,

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parties, says Michels, "was essentially patriotic. Notwithstanding their long-standing theoretical aversion from a colonial policy, the industrial workers, and more so the lower strata, fought against the Turks with perfect discipline and obedience, contrary to all expectations. Such slavish behaviour towards the government's policy merited a reward to induce the proletariat to persevere along this new road. The President of the Council of Ministers declared in Parliament that, by his patriotic behaviour on the battlefield of Libya, the Italian worker had proved to the country that he had reached the highest stage of political maturity. He who is capable of sacrificing his life for a noble cause is also capable of defending the interests of the country as a voter, and he therefore has a right that the state should consider him worthy of full political rights" (p. 177). The Italian Ministers are good talkers! Still better are the German "radical" Social-Democrats who are repeating the following servile argument: "We have done 'our' duty by helping 'you' to loot foreign countries, but 'you' do not wish to give 'us' universal suffrage in Prussia...."

from the internationalist point of view, it is necessary to ascertain the success of which side will be more useful or harmless to the proletariat, and, of course, he has decided this question against ... Austria and Germany. In a perfectly Kautskyist spirit, Barboni proposes to the Italian Socialist Party solemnly to proclaim the solidarity of the workers of all countries—in the first place, of course, of the belligerent countries—to proclaim internationalist convictions, a programme of peace on the basis of disarmament and national independence of all nations, including the formation of a "league of all nations for a reciprocal guarantee of their integrity and independence" (p. 126). It is in the name of these principles that Barboni declares that militarism is a "parasitic" phenomenon in capitalism, something "not at all necessary"; that Germany and Austria are imbued with "militarist imperialism"; that their aggressive policies have been a "standing threat to European peace"; that Germany has "constantly rejected the proposals for a restriction of armaments advanced by Russia [sic!] and Britain", etc., etc., and that the Socialist Party of Italy should declare itself in favour of Italy's intervention on the side of the Triple Entente at the opportune moment.

What remains unknown is the principles that make the bourgeois imperialism of Britain preferable to that of Germany. Germany's economic development in the twentieth century has been more rapid than that of the other European countries; in the partition of colonies, she was badly "wronged". Britain, on the other hand, has developed far more slowly; she has grabbed a host of colonies, where, far from Europe, she often uses methods of oppression no less brutal than the Germans. With her great wealth, she hires millions of soldiers of various continental powers to plunder Austria, Turkey, etc. In essence, Barboni's internationalism, like that of Kautsky, is nothing but a verbal defence of socialist principles, behind which hypocritical cover his own bourgeoisie, the Italian, is actually defended. One cannot fail to notice that Barboni, who has published his book in free Switzerland (where the censor deleted only half a line on p. 75, evidently criticising Austria), has not deemed it necessary, in its 143 pages, to mention the main principles of the Basle Manifesto, or conscientiously to analyse them.

On the other hand, our Barboni quotes with deep sympathy two former Russian revolutionaries who are now being publicised by the entire Francophile bourgeoisie: the petty-bourgeois anarchist Kropotkin, and the Social-Democratic philistine Plekhanov (p. 103). No wonder! Plekhanov's sophisms do not differ in substance from Barboni's. In Italy, however, political freedom more easily tears the veil from such sophisms, revealing more clearly Barboni's actual stand as an agent of the bourgeoisie in the workers' camp.

Barboni regrets the "absence of a real and actual revolutionary spirit" within German Social-Democracy (exactly in Plekhanov's way); he warmly greets Karl Liebknecht (just as he is greeted by the *French* social-chauvinists, who do not see the beam in their own eye), but he decidedly declares that "we cannot speak of the bankruptcy of the International" (p. 92), that the Germans "did not betray the spirit of the International" (p. 111), inasmuch as they were prompted by a "*bona fide*" conviction that they were defending the fatherland. In Kautsky's sanctimonious vein, but with an admixture of Romance eloquence, Barboni declares that the International is prepared (after a victory over Germany) to "forgive the Germans as Christ forgave Peter a moment of distrust, to heal by oblivion the deep wounds inflicted by a militarist imperialism, and to extend a hand for an honourable and brotherly peace" (p. 113).

A moving scene: Barboni and Kautsky—probably with aid from our Kosovsky and Axelrod—forgiving each other!

While quite pleased with Kautsky and Guesde, with Plekhanov and Kropotkin, Barboni is displeased with his own Socialist Labour Party in Italy. He complains that in this party, which before the war was fortunate enough to rid itself of the reformists Bissolati and Co., an atmosphere has been created which "cannot be breathed" (p. 7) by those who, like Barboni, do not agree to the slogan of "absolute neutrality" (i.e., to a determined struggle against those who stand for Italy joining the war). Poor Barboni complains bitterly that in the Italian Socialist Labour Party men like him are labelled "intellectuals", "individuals who have lost contact with the masses", "people hailing

from the bourgeoisie", who have "strayed from the straight path of socialism and internationalism" (p. 7). "Our party," says Barboni indignantly, "fanaticises more than it educates the multitude" (p. 4).

An old song! It is the Italian variation of the well-known theme of Russian liquidators and opportunists, decrying the "demagogy" of the wicked Bolsheviks who "incite" the masses against the dear socialists of *Nasha Zarya*, the Organising Committee, and Chkheidze's Duma group! But what an invaluable admission this is by an Italian social-chauvinist: in the only country where, for several months, the platforms of the social-chauvinists and of the revolutionary internationalists could be freely discussed, the *working masses*, the *class-conscious proletariat*, have sided with the latter, whereas the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and opportunists have lined up with the former.

Neutrality is a narrow-minded egoism, a non-understanding of the international situation; it is baseness towards Belgium, and "absenteeism", and "the absent are always wrong", says Barboni, entirely in the spirit of Plekhanov and Axelrod. But since there are two legal parties in Italy, one reformist and the other a Social-Democratic labour party, and since in that country it is impossible to fool the public by covering up the nudity of the Potresovs, Cherevanins, Levitskys and Co. with the fig-leaf of Chkheidze's Duma group or of the Organising Committee, Barboni frankly admits the following:

"From this point of view I see more revolutionism in the activities of the reformist socialists, who have been quick to realise the enormous importance that such a change in the political situation [in consequence of a victory over German militarism] will have for the future anti-capitalist struggle, and who, with perfect consistency, have espoused the cause of the Triple Entente, than there is in the tactics of the official revolutionary socialists who, like a tortoise, have hidden under a shell of absolute neutrality" (p. 81).

In connection with this valuable admission, it remains for us only to express the wish that some comrade familiar with the Italian movement should collect and systematically analyse the vast and most interesting material furnished by Italy's *two parties*, as to which social strata and which

elements, with whose aid, and with which arguments, have defended the revolutionary policy of the Italian proletariat on the one hand, and servility to the Italian imperialist bourgeoisie on the other. The more such material is gathered in various countries, the more clearly will the class-conscious workers see the *truth* as to the causes and significance of the Second International's collapse.

In conclusion, we would like to note that, confronted by a workers' party, Barboni attempts to use sophistry so as to play up to the workers' *revolutionary* instincts. The internationalist socialists of Italy, who are opposed to a war which *in fact* is being waged for the imperialist interests of the Italian bourgeoisie, are depicted by him as adherents of a cowardly abstinence, a selfish desire to hide from the horrors of war. "A people educated in a fear of the horrors of war," he says, "will probably also be afraid of the horrors of a revolution" (p. 83). Together with this disgusting attempt to assume the guise of a revolutionary, we find a crudely practical reference to the "clear" words of Minister Salandra, who said that "order will be maintained at any cost", and that attempts to hold a general strike directed against mobilisation will only lead to "useless carnage". "We could not prevent the Libyan [Tripolitanian] war; less so will we be able to prevent the war against Austria" (p. 82).

Like Kautsky, Cunow and all the other opportunists, Barboni, with the basest intention of fooling a definite section of the masses, deliberately ascribes to the revolutionaries the silly plan to "frustrate the war" "immediately" and to allow themselves to be shot down at a moment most opportune for the bourgeoisie. He thus attempts to evade the task clearly formulated at Stuttgart and Basle, namely, to utilise the revolutionary crisis for systematic revolutionary propaganda and preparations for revolutionary mass action. Barboni sees quite clearly that Europe is living through a revolutionary moment.

"There is one point on which I deem it necessary to insist, even at the risk of becoming irksome to the reader, because without a clear idea of that point one cannot correctly estimate the present political situation. The point is that the period we are living through is a catastrophic

one, a period of action, when there is no longer any question of propounding ideas, formulating programmes, or defining a line of political behaviour for the future, but of applying a live and active force to achieve results within months, possibly within weeks. Under such conditions, it is no longer a question of philosophising over the future of the proletarian movement, but of consolidating the point of view of the proletariat, in face of the present situation" (pp. 87-88).

Another sophism under the guise of revolutionism! Forty-four years after the Paris Commune, after half a century of the mustering and preparation of mass forces, the revolutionary class of Europe must, at the present moment, when Europe is passing through a *catastrophic* period, think of how to quickly become the lackey of its national bourgeoisie, how to help it plunder, violate, ruin, and conquer other peoples, and how to refrain from launching, on a mass scale, direct revolutionary propaganda and preparation for revolutionary action.

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APPEAL ON THE WAR

Worker Comrades:

The European war has been in progress for over a year. All things considered, it will last for a long time, because, while Germany is best prepared and at present the strongest, the Quadruple Entente (Russia, Britain, France, and Italy) has more men and money, and besides, freely gets war material from the United States of America, the world's richest country.

What is this war being fought for, which is bringing mankind unparalleled suffering? The government and the bourgeoisie of each belligerent country are squandering millions of rubles on books and newspapers so as to lay the blame on the foe, arouse the people's furious hatred of the enemy, and stop at no lie so as to depict themselves as the side that has been unjustly attacked and is now "defending" itself. In reality, this is a war between two groups of predatory Great Powers, and it is being fought for the partitioning of colonies, the enslavement of other nations, and advantages and privileges of the world market. This is a most reactionary war, a war of modern slave-holders aimed at preserving and consolidating capitalist slavery. Britain and France are lying when they assert that they are warring for Belgium's freedom. In reality, they have long been preparing the war, and are waging it with the purpose of robbing Germany and stripping her of her colonies; they have signed a treaty with Italy and Russia on the pillage and carving up of Turkey and Austria. The tsarist monarchy in Russia is waging a predatory war aimed at seizing Galicia, taking territory away from Turkey, enslaving Persia, Mongolia, etc. Germany is waging war with the purpose of grabbing British, Belgian, and French

colonies. Whether Germany or Russia wins, or whether there is a "draw", the war will bring humanity fresh oppression of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people in the colonies, in Persia, Turkey and China, a fresh enslavement of nations, and new chains for the working class of all countries.

What are the tasks of the working class with regard to this war? The answer to this question is provided in a resolution unanimously adopted by the socialists of the whole world, at the Basle International Socialist Congress of 1912. This resolution was adopted in anticipation of a war of the very kind as started in 1914. This resolution says that the war is reactionary, that it is being prepared in the interests of "capitalist profits", that the workers consider it "a crime to shoot each other down", that the war will lead to "a proletarian revolution", that an example for the workers' tactics was set by the Paris Commune of 1871, and by October-December 1905, in Russia, i.e., by a revolution.

All class-conscious workers in Russia are on the side of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma whose members (Petrovsky, Badayev, Muranov, Samoilov and Shagov) have been exiled by the tsar to Siberia for revolutionary propaganda against the war and against the government. It is only in such revolutionary propaganda and in revolutionary activities leading to a revolt of the masses, that the salvation of humanity from the horrors of the present and the future wars lies. Only the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois governments, in the first place of the most reactionary, brutal, and barbarous tsarist government, will open the road to socialism and peace among nations.

The conscious or unwitting servants of the bourgeoisie are lying when they wish to persuade the people that the revolutionary overthrow of the tsarist monarchy can lead only to victories for and consolidation of the German reactionary monarchy and the German bourgeoisie. Although the leaders of the German socialists, like many leading socialists in Russia, have gone over to the side of their "own" bourgeoisie and are helping to deceive the people with fables of a war of "defence", there is mounting among the working masses of Germany an ever stronger protest

and indignation against their government. The German socialists who have not gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie have declared in the press that they consider the tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma "heroic". In Germany, calls against the war and against the government are being published illegally. Tens and hundreds of the finest socialists of Germany, including Clara Zetkin, the well-known representative of the women's labour movement, have been thrown into prison by the German Government for propaganda in a revolutionary spirit. In all the belligerent countries without exception, indignation is mounting in the working masses, and the example of revolutionary activities set by the Social-Democrats of Russia, and even more so any success of the revolution in Russia, will not fail to advance the great cause of socialism, of the victory of the proletariat over the blood-stained bourgeois exploiters.

The war is filling the pockets of the capitalists, into whose pockets gold is pouring from the treasuries of the Great Powers. The war is provoking a blind bitterness against the enemy, the bourgeoisie doing its best to direct the indignation of the people into such channels, to divert their attention from the *chief* enemy—the government and the ruling classes of their *own* country. However, the war which brings in its train endless misery and suffering for the toiling masses, enlightens and steels the finest representatives of the working class. If perish we must, let us perish in the struggle for our own cause, for the cause of the workers, for the socialist revolution, and not for the interests of the capitalists, the landowners, and tsars—this is what every class-conscious worker sees and feels. Revolutionary Social-Democratic work may be difficult at present, but it is possible. It is advancing throughout the world, and in this alone lies salvation.

Down with the tsarist monarchy, which has drawn Russia into a criminal war, and which oppresses the peoples! Long live the world brotherhood of the workers, and the international revolution of the proletariat!

Written in August 1915

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WE ARE THANKFUL FOR SUCH FRANKNESS

"The inane idea of the necessity of forming an International of 'internationalist Social-Democrats' ... [of] opposition elements picked at random from all the socialist parties.... The International can be restored only from the same elements it has consisted of till now.... A restored International will not be the 'third' in succession, as is desired by a handful of sectarians and experts in the business of arranging splits, but the selfsame Second International, which has not died, but has been temporarily paralysed by a world disaster...."

This is what Mr. V. Kosovsky writes in issue No. 8 of the Bund's *Information Bulletin*. We are deeply thankful for the frankness shown by this Bundist, who is not the brightest of the lot. This is not the first time he has defended opportunism with an outspokenness that must be displeasing to the Bund's diplomatists. This time again, he will be helping the struggle against opportunism, by revealing to the workers how hopelessly far the Bund stands from proletarian socialism. Mr. V. Kosovsky does not see the link between opportunism and social-chauvinism. To discern that link, one must be able to ask oneself the following questions: what are the fundamental ideas in the two currents? How has opportunism developed in Europe during the last few decades? What is the attitude towards social-chauvinism revealed by the opportunist and the revolutionary wing in a number of European countries, as, for instance, in Russia, Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, and Bulgaria?

Has Mr. V. Kosovsky given thought to this? If he attempted to reply to at least the first question, he would soon see his mistake.

Incidentally, in issue No. 7 of the *Information Bulletin* Mr. V. Kosovsky has displayed a Germanophile chauvinism, for, while accusing the French Social-Democrats, he defends the German Social-Democrats' voting for war credits. A certain W. (writing in issue No. 8, pp. 11-12) defends Mr. V. Kosovsky against the accusation of chauvinism, asserting that there can be no Germanophile chauvinism in an organisation that operates in Russia. Perhaps Mr. V. Kosovsky will explain to Mr. W. why it is that a Ukrainian or a Polish bourgeois in Russia, a Danish or an Alsatian bourgeois in France, or an Irish bourgeois in Britain often reveals a chauvinism hostile to the nations that oppress them.

Written in the summer of 1915

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in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*

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TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST COMMITTEE (I.S.C.)

Dear Comrades:

We have received your letter of September 25, and hereby express our full sympathy with the plan to set up a permanent international "enlarged committee" (*erweiterte Kommission*) in Berne. In the confidence that the idea of such a plan is shared by the other organisations adhering to the I.S.C., we appoint Comrade Zinoviev member of that enlarged committee from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., and, as his assistants or candidates (*suppléant*, *Stellvertreter*) (1) Comrade Petrova[156] and (2) Comrade Lenin. The address for communications is: *Herrn Radomislsky* (*bei Frau Aschwanden*). *Hertenstein* (*Ks. Luzern*). *Schweiz*.*

To continue. As for the other questions raised in your letter of September 25 we, for our part, hold the following opinion:

1. We are in complete agreement with you that the "common points of view" (*allgemeine Gesichtspunkte*) as established by the Conference of September 5-8 are "insufficient" (*nicht genügen*). A further, far more detailed and specified development of these principles is an imperative necessity. This is necessary from the viewpoint of both principle and common practice, since giving effect to *united action* on an international scale calls for both clarity of fundamental ideological views and a precise definiteness in all practical methods of action. The great crisis that Europe as a whole and the European working-class movement are living

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* Mr. Radomislsky, c/o Mme. Aschwanden, Hertenstein, Lucerne Canton. Switzerland.—*Ed*.

through can indubitably lead to both aspects of the matter being understood by the masses only by degrees, but it is the task of the I.S.C. and the parties adhering to it to help bring about that very understanding. Without waiting for the impossible to happen—the speedy unification of all on a platform of commonly accepted and precisely formulated views—we must strive for a *precise* definition of the *basic currents* and *trends* in present-day internationalist socialism, and then for the working masses to get a knowledge of those currents, discuss them comprehensively, and test them in the experience of their practical movement. In our opinion, the I.S.C. should consider this its principal task.

2. The letter of September 25 defines the proletariat's tasks either as the struggle for peace (should the war continue) or as the "concrete and detailed formulation of the proletariat's international viewpoint towards the various proposals and programmes for peace" (*den internationalen Standpunkt des Proletariats zu den verschiedenen Friedensvorschlägen und Programmen konkret und ins einzelne gehend zu umschreiben*). Special emphasis is placed, in this connection, on the national question (Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Armenia, etc.).

We consider that the two documents unanimously adopted by the Conference of September 5-8, viz., both the manifesto and the resolution of sympathy (*Sympathieerklärung*), give expression to the idea of the connection between the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism ("the struggle for peace ... is a struggle for socialism"—"*dieser Kampf ist der Kampf ... für den Sozialismus*", to quote the manifesto), and the "irreconcilable proletarian class struggle" (*unversöhnlicher proletarischer Klassenkampf*; the text of the resolution voted on by the Conference reads, not the "irreconcilable" class struggle, but the "revolutionary" class struggle. If the change was made for considerations of legality, the meaning should not have been changed thereby). The resolution on sympathy speaks forthright of the Conference's need and "solemn promise" "to arouse the revolutionary spirit in the masses of the international proletariat".

Unless it is linked up with the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat, the struggle for peace is merely a

pacifist phrase of bourgeois who are either sentimental or are deceiving the people.

We cannot and must not strike a pose of "statesmen" and draw up "concrete" programmes of peace. On the contrary, we must explain to the masses the delusiveness of all hopes of a democratic peace (without annexations, violence or plunder), *without* a development of the revolutionary class struggle. In the very beginning of the manifesto we told the masses firmly, clearly and resolutely that imperialism is the cause of war, and that imperialism means the "enslavement" of nations, of all the nations of the world, by a handful of "Great Powers". Consequently, we must help the masses to overthrow imperialism, without the overthrow of which there can be no peace without annexations. Of course, the struggle for the overthrow of imperialism is an arduous one, but the masses must know the *truth* about that arduous but necessary struggle. The masses should not be lulled with the hope that peace is possible without the overthrow of imperialism.

3. Proceeding from these considerations, we propose:

that the following questions be put on the agenda of forthcoming sessions of the enlarged committee (to work out either a summary and publication of theses, or drafts of a resolution), and then on the agenda of the next international conference (for the final adoption of a resolution):

(a) the connection between the struggle for peace and mass revolutionary action or the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat;

(b) the self-determination of nations;

(c) the connection between social-patriotism and opportunism.

We emphasise that the manifesto adopted by the conference specifically *touches upon all* these questions, that they are of vital significance both in principle and in practice, and that *not a single* practical step in the proletarian struggle *is conceivable* without socialists and syndicalists stumbling upon these questions.

Elaboration of these questions is necessary so as to promote the mass struggle for peace, the self-determination of nations, and socialism, and against the "capitalists'

PROMETHEUS TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

lies" (to quote the manifesto) about "defence of the fatherland" in the present war.

If, as is very correctly pointed out in the letter of September 25, the fault or the misfortune of the Second International lies in the vagueness and the incomplete development of important problems, it is our task to help the masses pose those problems with clarity and resolve them with exactness.

4. Regarding the publication of the bulletin in three languages, experience has, in our opinion, shown that the plan is ill-advised. If issued monthly, such a publication will cost between two and three thousand francs a year, a sum that cannot easily be raised. Incidentally almost everything to be found in the bulletin is published by two Swiss newspapers—*Berner Tagwacht* and *La Sentinelle*.[157] We propose to the I.S.C.:

> that an attempt be made to reach an understanding with the editorial boards of the above newspapers and with some U.S. newspaper, regarding publication in these newspapers both of the bulletin and of all reports and materials of the I.S.C. (either textually in the name of the I.S.C., or in separate supplements).

This will not only be cheaper but will make it possible to keep the working class far better, more fully and more frequently informed of the I.S.C.'s activities. We are interested in a greater number of workers reading I.S.C. reports, and in all draft resolutions being published for the workers' information and to help them evolve their own attitude towards the war.

We hope that there will be no objections to the need to publish both the draft resolution (for whose acceptance as a basis 12 delegates, i.e., about 40 per cent of the total number, cast their votes, with 19 against) and the letter from a prominent German socialist[158] (with omission of his name and of everything that does *not* refer to tactics).

We hope that the I.S.C. will receive systematic information from the various countries regarding persecution and arrests for participation in the anti-war struggle, the course of the class struggle against the war, fraternising in the trenches, the closing down of newspapers, the banning of publication of calls for peace, etc. We also hope that

all this information will periodically appear in the newspapers mentioned above, on behalf of the I.S.C.

An agreement with an American daily or weekly paper could probably be reached by Mrs. Kollontai, who works in *Nashe Slovo* and other Social-Democratic newspapers, and has just left for the U.S.A. on a lecture tour. We could get in touch with Kollontai, or let you know her address.

5. Regarding the mode of representation of *sections* of parties (particularly in Germany and France, and also, probably, in Britain), we propose:

> that the I.S.C. suggest to the comrades in those parties that they discuss the advisability of setting up groups, under various names, whose appeals to the masses (in the form of leaflets, resolutions, etc.) will be published by the I.S.C., with the mention of the particular group in question.

If this method is followed, the masses, in the first place, would be kept informed of the internationalists' tactics and views, this despite the military censorship; secondly, it would be possible to discern the development and the successes achieved in the propaganda of internationalist views, in the degree that workers' meetings, organisations, etc., adopt resolutions of sympathy with one group or another; thirdly, it would become possible to give expression to various shades of opinion (i.e., the B.S.P.,* its *minority*, and the I.L.P.** in Britain; socialists like Bourderon and others, and syndicalists like Merrheim and others, in France; as the Conference has shown, there are shades *among* the opposition in Germany).

It goes without saying that these groups, as is pointed out in the letter of September 25, would not set up separate organisational units, but would exist within the old bodies *only* for contacts with the I.S.C. and for propaganda of the struggle for peace.

These groups would be represented in the "enlarged committee" and at conferences.

6. In the question of the number of members on the "enlarged committee", and of voting procedure, we propose the following:

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* The British Socialist Party.—*Ed.*

** The Independent Labour Party.—*Ed.*

that the number of members should not be limited to a maximum of three, but, instead, *fractions of votes* ½, ⅓, etc.) should be introduced for small groups. This would be convenient, since to deprive of representation groups that have their own shades of opinion is just impossible, and injurious to the development and propaganda among the masses of the principles established in the manifesto.

7. With reference to the danger of the "enlarged committee" acquiring a "Russo-Polish character", we think that (however unpleasant that may be to the Russians) this apprehension is *justified*, since representation is possible of groups in emigration, which have no serious links with Russia. In our opinion, only those organisations and groups should be represented which have proved, *by no less than three years of work*, their ability to represent the movement in Russia. We propose to the I.S.C. that it discuss and establish that principle, and also request all groups to send in information and figures on their work in Russia.

8. Finally, we would take advantage of this opportunity to indicate an inaccuracy in No . 1 of the *Bulletin*[159] and ask that it be rectified in No. 2 (or in *Berner Tagwacht* and *La Sentinelle*). Issue No. 1 of the *Bulletin*, p. 7, the top of column 1, speaks of the draft resolution having been signed by the Central Committee, the Polish Social-Democrats (*Landesvorstand*), the Letts, Swedes, and Norwegians. Omitted in this enumeration are:

one German delegate (whose name is not given for reasons readily understood), and one Swiss—Platten.

Written not earlier than September 12 (25), 1915

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THE DEFEAT OF RUSSIA AND THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS

The dissolution of the Fourth Duma in retaliation for the formation of an Opposition bloc consisting of liberals, Octobrists and nationalists, is one of the most vivid manifestations of the revolutionary crisis in Russia. The defeat of the armies of the tsarist monarchy; the growth of the strike movement and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat; the discontent of the masses and the formation of the liberal-Octobrist bloc for the purpose of reaching an understanding with the tsar on a programme of reforms and mobilising industry for the victory over Germany—such is the sequence and texture of events at the end of the first year of war.

There is obviously a revolutionary crisis in Russia, but its significance and the attendant tasks of the proletariat are not correctly understood by all.

History seems to be repeating itself: again there is a war, as in 1905, a war tsarism has dragged the country into with definite, patently annexationist, predatory and reactionary aims. Again there is military defeat, and a revolutionary crisis accelerated by it. Again the liberal bourgeoisie—in this case even in conjunction with large sections of the conservative bourgeoisie and the landowners—are advocating a programme of reform and of an understanding with the tsar. The situation is almost like that in the summer of 1905, prior to the Bulygin Duma, or in the summer of 1906, after the dissolution of the First Duma.

There is, however, actually a vast difference, viz., that this war has involved all Europe, all the most advanced countries with mass and powerful socialist movements.

The imperialist war has *linked up* the Russian revolutionary crisis, which stems from a bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the growing crisis of the proletarian socialist revolution in the West. This link is so direct that no individual solution of revolutionary problems is possible in any single country—the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution is now not only a prologue to, but an indivisible and integral part of, the socialist revolution in the West.

In 1905, it was the proletariat's task to consummate the bourgeois revolution in Russia so as to kindle the proletarian revolution in the West. In 1915, the second part of this task has acquired an urgency that puts it on a level with the first part. A new political division has arisen in Russia on the basis of new, higher, more developed and more complex international relations. This new division is between the chauvinist revolutionaries, who desire revolution so as to defeat Germany, and the proletarian internationalist revolutionaries, who desire a revolution in Russia *for the sake of* the proletarian revolution in the West, and simultaneously with that revolution. This new division is, in essence, one between the urban and the rural petty bourgeoisie in Russia, and the socialist proletariat. The new division must be clearly understood, for the impending revolution makes it the prime duty of a Marxist, i.e., of any class-conscious socialist, to realise the position of the *various classes*, and to interpret general differences over tactics and principles as differences in the positions of the various classes.

There is nothing more puerile, contemptible and harmful, than the idea current among revolutionary philistines, namely, that differences should be "forgotten" "in view" of the immediate common aim in the approaching revolution. People whom the experience of the 1905-14 decade has not taught the folly of this idea are hopeless from the revolutionary standpoint. Those who confine themselves, at this stage, to revolutionary exclamations, without analysing which classes have *proved* their ability to adopt, and have indeed adopted, a definite revolutionary programme do not really differ from "revolutionaries" like Khrustalyov, Aladyin and Alexinsky.

We have before us the clear-cut stand of the monarchy and the feudal-minded landowners—"no surrender" of Russia to the liberal bourgeoisie; better an understanding with the German monarchy. Equally clear is the liberal bourgeoisie's stand—exploit the defeat and the mounting revolution in order to wrest concessions from a frightened monarchy and compel it to share power with the bourgeoisie. Just as clear, too, is the stand of the revolutionary proletariat, which is striving to consummate the revolution by exploiting the vacillation and embarrassment of the government and the bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie, however, i.e., the vast mass of the barely awakening population of Russia, is groping blindly in the wake of the bourgeoisie, a captive to nationalist prejudices, on the one hand, prodded into the revolution by the unparalleled horror and misery of war, the high cost of living, impoverishment, ruin and starvation, but on the other hand, glancing *backward* at every step towards the idea of defence of the fatherland, towards the idea of Russia's state integrity, or towards the idea of small-peasant prosperity, to be achieved through a victory over tsarism and over Germany, but without a victory over capitalism.

This vacillation of the petty bourgeois, of the small peasant, is no accident, but the inevitable outcome of his economic position. It is foolish to shut one's eyes to this bitter but profound truth; it must be understood and traced back in the existing *political currents and groupings*, so as not to deceive ourselves and the people, and not to weaken and paralyse the revolutionary party of the Social-Democratic proletariat. The proletariat will debilitate itself if it permits its party to vacillate as the petty bourgeoisie does. The proletariat will accomplish its task only if it is able to march unfalteringly towards its great goal, pushing the petty bourgeoisie forward, letting the latter learn from its mistakes when it wavers to the right, and utilising all the petty bourgeoisie's forces to the utmost when life compels it to move to the left.

The Trudoviks, the S.R.s, and the Organising Committee's liquidationist supporters—these are the political *trends* in Russia which have taken shape during the past decade, have proved their links with the various groups, elements and

strata in the petty bourgeoisie, and shown vacillation from extreme revolutionism in word, to an alliance with the chauvinist Popular Socialists, or with *Nasha Zarya*, in deed. On September 3, 1915, for instance, the five secretaries of the Organising Committee abroad issued a manifesto on the tasks of the proletariat, which said not a word about opportunism and social-chauvinism, but called for a "revolt" in the rear of the German army (this after a whole year of struggle against the slogan of civil war!) and proclaimed a slogan praised so highly in 1905 by the Cadets, viz., a "constituent assembly for the liquidation of the war and for the abolition of the autocratic [June 3[160]] regime"! People who have failed to understand the need for a cleavage between the party of the proletariat and these petty-bourgeois trends so that the revolution may be successful, have assumed the name of Social-Democrats in vain.

No, in the face of the revolutionary crisis in Russia, which is being accelerated by defeat—and this is what the motley opponents of "defeatism" are afraid to admit—it will be the proletariat's duty to carry on the struggle against opportunism and chauvinism, or otherwise it will be impossible to develop the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, and to assist their movement by means of straightforward revolutionary slogans. Not a constituent assembly, but the overthrow of the monarchy, a republic, the confiscation of landed estates, and an eight-hour day will, as hitherto, be the slogans of the Social-Democratic proletariat, the slogans of our Party. In direct connection with this, and to make it possible really to single out the socialist tasks and contrast them with the tasks of bourgeois chauvinism (including the Plekhanov and the Kautsky brands) in all its propaganda and agitation, and in all working-class action, our Party will preserve the slogan of "transform the imperialist war into a civil war", i.e., the slogan of the socialist revolution in the West.

The lessons of the war are compelling even our opponents to recognise in practice both the stand of "defeatism" and the necessity of issuing—at first as a spirited phrase in a manifesto, but later more seriously and thoughtfully—the slogan of "a revolt in the rear" of the German militarists,

in other words, the slogan of a civil war. The lessons of the war, it appears, are knocking into their heads that which we have been insisting on since the very outset of the war. The defeat of Russia *has proved* the lesser evil, for it has tremendously enhanced the revolutionary crisis and has aroused millions, tens and hundreds of millions. Moreover, in conditions of an imperialist war, a revolutionary crisis in Russia could not but lead people's thoughts to the only salvation for the peoples—the idea of "a revolt in the rear" of the German army, i.e., the idea of a civil war in *all* the belligerent countries.

Life teaches. Life is *advancing*, through the defeat of Russia, towards a revolution in Russia and, through that revolution and in connection with it, towards a civil war in Europe. Life has taken this direction. And, drawing fresh strength from these lessons of life, which have justified its position, the party of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia will, with ever greater energy, follow the path it has chosen.

Written in the second half
of September 1915

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THE FIRST STEP

The development of the international socialist movement is slow during the tremendous crisis created by the war. Yet it is moving towards a break with opportunism and social-chauvinism, as was clearly shown by the International Socialist Conference held at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, between September 5 and 8, 1915.

For a whole year, the socialists of the warring and the neutral countries vacillated and temporised. Afraid to admit to themselves the gravity of the crisis, they did not wish to look reality in the face, and kept deferring in a thousand ways the inevitable break with the opportunism and Kautskyism prevalent in the official parties of Western Europe.

However, the analysis of events which we gave a year ago in the Manifesto of the Central Committee (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33)* has proved correct; the events have borne out its correctness. They *took* a course that resulted in the first International Socialist Conference being attended by representatives of the protesting elements of the minorities in Germany, France, Sweden, and Norway, who acted *against* the decisions of the official parties, i.e., in fact acted schismatically.

The work of the Conference was summed up in a manifesto and a resolution expressing sympathy with the arrested and the persecuted. Both documents appear in this issue of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. By nineteen votes to twelve, the Conference refused to submit to a committee the draft resolution proposed by us and other revolutionary Marxists;

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* See pp. 25-34 of this volume.—*Ed.*

our draft manifesto was passed on to the committee together with two others, for a joint manifesto to be drawn up. The reader will find elsewhere in this issue our two drafts; a comparison of the latter with the manifesto adopted clearly shows that a number of fundamental ideas of revolutionary Marxism were adopted.

In practice, the manifesto signifies a step towards an ideological and practical break with opportunism and social-chauvinism. At the same time, the manifesto, as any analysis will show, contains inconsistencies, and does not say everything that should be said.

The manifesto calls the war imperialist and emphasises two features of imperialism: the striving of the capitalists of *every* nation for profits and the exploitation of others, and the striving of the Great Powers to partition the world and "enslave" weaker nations. The manifesto repeats the most essential things that should be said of the imperialist nature of the war, and were said in our resolution. In this respect, the manifesto merely *popularises* our resolution. Popularisation is undoubtedly a useful thing. However, if we want clear thinking in the working class and attach importance to systematic and unflagging propaganda, we must accurately and fully define the principles to be popularised. If that is not done, we risk repeating the error, the fault of the Second International which led to its collapse, viz., we shall be leaving room for ambiguity and misinterpretations. Is it, for instance, possible to deny the signal importance of the idea, expressed in our resolution, that the objective conditions are mature for socialism? The "popular" exposition of the manifesto omitted this idea; failure has attended the attempt to combine, in one document, a clear and precise resolution based on principle, and an appeal.

"The capitalists of all countries ... claim that the war serves to defend the fatherland.... They are lying...", the manifesto continues. Here again, this forthright statement that the fundamental idea of opportunism in the present war—the "defence-of-the-fatherland" idea—is a lie, is a repetition of the kernel of the revolutionary Marxists' resolution. Again, the manifesto regrettably fails to say everything that should be said; it is half-hearted, afraid to

speak the whole truth. After a year of war, who today is not aware of the actual damage caused to socialism, not only by the capitalist press *repeating and endorsing* the capitalists' *lies* (it is its business as a capitalist press to repeat the capitalists' lies), but also by the greater part of the socialist press doing so? Who does not know that European socialism's greatest crisis has been brought about not by the "capitalists' lies", but by the *lies* of Guesde, Hyndman, Vandervelde, Plekhanov and *Kautsky*? Who does not know that the *lies* spoken by such leaders suddenly revealed all the strength of the opportunism that swept them away at the decisive moment?

Let us take a look at what has come about: To make the masses see things in a clearer light, the manifesto says that in the present war the defence of the fatherland idea is a capitalist lie. The European masses, however, are not illiterate, and almost all who have read the manifesto have heard, and still hear *that same lie* from hundreds of socialist papers, journals, and pamphlets, echoing them [it?] after Plekhanov, Hyndman, Kautsky and Co. What will the readers of the manifesto think? What thoughts will arise in them after this display of timidity by the authors of the manifesto? Disregard the capitalists' lie about the defence of the fatherland, the manifesto tells the workers. Well and good. Practically all of them will say or think: the *capitalists*' lie has long stopped bothering us, but the lie of Kautsky and Co. ...

The manifesto goes on to repeat another important idea in our resolution, viz., that the socialist parties and the workers' organisations of the various countries "have *flouted* obligations stemming from the decisions of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle congresses"; that the International Socialist Bureau too has *failed to do its duty*; that this failure to do its duty consisted in voting for war credits, joining governments, recognising "a class truce" (submission to which the manifesto calls *slavish*; in other words, it accuses Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. of substituting for propaganda of socialism the propaganda of *slavish* ideas).

Is it consistent, we shall ask, to speak, in a "popular" manifesto, of the failure of a number of parties to do their

duty (it is common knowledge that the reference is to the strongest parties and the workers' organisations in the most advanced countries: Britain, France and Germany), without giving any explanation of this startling and unprecedented fact? The greater part of the socialist parties and the International Socialist Bureau itself have failed to do their duty! What is this—an accident and the failure of individuals, or the turning-point of an entire epoch? If it is the former, and *we* circulate that idea among the masses, it is tantamount to *our* renouncing the fundamentals of socialist doctrine. If it is the latter, how can we fail to say so forthright? We are facing a moment of historic significance—the collapse of the International as a whole, a turning-point of an entire epoch—and yet we are *afraid* to tell the masses that the whole truth must be sought for and found, and that we must do our thinking to the very end. It is preposterous and ridiculous to suppose that the International Socialist Bureau and a number of parties could have collapsed, *without* linking up this event with the long history of the origin, the growth, the maturing and *over*-maturity of the general European opportunist movement, with its deep economic roots—deep, not in the sense that it is intimately linked with the masses, but in the sense that it is connected with a certain stratum of society.

Passing on to the "struggle for peace", the manifesto states that: "This struggle is a struggle for freedom, the brotherhood of peoples, and socialism". It goes on to explain that in wartime the workers make sacrifices "in the service of the ruling classes", whereas they must learn to make sacrifices "*for their own cause*" (doubly underscored in the manifesto), "for the sacred aims of socialism". The resolution which expresses sympathy with arrested and persecuted fighters says that "the Conference solemnly undertakes to honour the living and the dead by *emulating their example*" and that its aim will be to "arouse the revolutionary spirit in the international proletariat".

All these ideas are a reiteration of our resolution's fundamental idea that a struggle for peace *without* a revolutionary struggle is a hollow and false phrase, and that a revolutionary struggle for socialism is the only way to put an end to the horror of war. But here too we find inconsist-

ency, timidity, and a failure to say everything that ought to be said: it calls upon the masses to *emulate the example* of the revolutionary fighters; it declares that the five members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma group who have been sentenced to exile in Siberia have carried on "the glorious revolutionary tradition of Russia"; it proclaims the necessity of "arousing the revolutionary spirit", but *it does not specify* forthright and clearly the revolutionary methods of struggle.

Was our Central Committee right in signing this manifesto, with all its inconsistency and timidity? We think it was. Our non-agreement, the non-agreement, not only of our Central Committee but of the entire *international* Left-wing section of the Conference, which stands by the principles of *revolutionary Marxism*, is openly expressed both in a special resolution, a separate draft manifesto, and a separate declaration on the vote for a compromise manifesto. We did not conceal a jot of our views, slogans, or tactics. A German edition of our pamphlet, *Socialism and War*,* was handed out at the Conference. We have spread, are spreading, and shall continue to spread our views with no less energy than the manifesto will. It is a fact that this manifesto is a *step forward* towards a real struggle against opportunism, towards a rupture with it. It would be sectarianism to refuse to take this step forward *together* with the minority of German, French, Swedish, Norwegian, and Swiss socialists, when we retain full freedom and full opportunity to criticise inconsistency and to work for greater things.** It would be poor war tactics to refuse to adhere to the mounting international protest movement against social-chauvinism just because this movement is slow, because it takes "only" a single step forward and because it is ready and willing to take a step backward tomorrow

* See pp. 295-338 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** We are not frightened by the fact that the Organising Committee and the Social-Revolutionaries signed the manifesto diplomatically, retaining all their links with—*and all their attachment* to *Nasha Zarya*, Rubanovich, and the July 1915 Conference of the Popular Socialists and the Social-Revolutionaries in Russia.[161] We have means enough to combat corrupt diplomacy and unmask it. It is more and more unmasking itself. *Nasha Zarya* and Chkheidze's group are *helping* us unmask Axelrod and Co.

and make peace with the old International Socialist Bureau. Its readiness to make peace with the opportunists is so far merely wishful thinking. Will the opportunists agree to a peace? Is peace *objectively* possible between *trends* that are dividing more and more deeply—social-chauvinism and Kautskyism on the one hand, and on the other, revolutionary internationalist Marxism? We consider it impossible, and we shall continue our line, encouraged as we are by its *success* at the Conference of September 5-8.

The success of our line is beyond doubt. Compare the facts: In September 1914, our Central Committee's Manifesto seemed almost isolated. In March 1915, an international women's conference adopted a miserable pacifist resolution, which was blindly followed by the Organising Committee. In September 1915, we rallied in a whole group of the international Left wing. We came out with our own tactics, voiced a number of our fundamental ideas in a joint manifesto, and took part in the formation of an I.S.C. (International Socialist Committee), i.e., a practically new International Socialist Bureau, against the wishes of the old one, and on the basis of a manifesto that openly condemns the tactics of the latter.

The workers of Russia, whose overwhelming majority followed our Party and its Central Committee even in the years 1912-14, will now, from the experience of the international socialist movement, see that our tactics are being confirmed in a wider area, and that our fundamental ideas are shared by an ever growing and finer part of the proletarian International.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 45-46,
October 11, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

REVOLUTIONARY MARXISTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 5-8, 1915

The ideological struggle at the Conference was waged between a compact group of internationalists, revolutionary Marxists, and the vacillating near-Kautskyites, who formed the Right wing of the Conference. The unitedness of the former group is one of the most important facts and greatest achievements of the Conference. After a year of war, the trend represented by our Party proved the *only* trend in the International to adopt a fully definite resolution as well as a draft manifesto based on the latter, and to unite the consistent Marxists of Russia, Poland, the Lettish territory, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Holland.

What arguments did the vacillating elements advance against us? The Germans admitted that we were advancing towards revolutionary battles, but, they said, we do not have to proclaim from the house-tops such things as fraternisation in the trenches, political strikes, street demonstrations and civil war. Such things are done, they said, but not spoken of. Others added: this is childishness, verbal pyrotechnics.

The German semi-Kautskyites castigated themselves for these ridiculously, indecently contradictory and evasive speeches by passing a resolution of sympathy and a declaration on the need to "follow the example" of the members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group, who distributed *Sotsial-Demokrat*, our Central Organ, which proclaimed civil war from the house-tops.

You are following the bad example set by Kautsky, we replied to the Germans; in word, you recognise the impending revolution; in deed, you refuse to tell the masses about it openly, to call for it, and indicate the most concrete means of struggle which the masses are to test and legitimise in the course of the revolution. In 1847, Marx and Engels, who were living *abroad*—the German philistines were horrified at revolutionary methods of struggle being spoken of from abroad!—called for revolution, in their celebrated *Manifesto of the Communist Party*; they spoke forthright of the use of force, and branded as contemptible any attempt to conceal the revolutionary aims, tasks and methods of the struggle. The Revolution of 1848 proved that Marx and Engels *alone* had applied the correct tactics to the events Several years prior to the 1905 Revolution in Russia Plekhanov, who was then still a Marxist, wrote an unsigned article in the old *Iskra* of 1901, expressing the editorial board's views on the coming insurrection, on ways of preparing it, such as street demonstrations; and even on technical devices, such as using wire in combating cavalry. The Russian revolution proved that the old Iskrists alone had approached the events with the correct tactics. We are now faced with the following alternative: either we are really and truly convinced that the war is creating a revolutionary situation in Europe, and that all the economic and socio-political circumstances of the imperialist period are leading up to a revolution of the proletariat—in which case we are in duty bound to explain to the masses the need for revolution, call for it, create the necessary organisations, and speak fearlessly and most concretely of the various methods of the forcible struggle and its "technique". This duty of ours does not depend upon whether the revolution will be strong enough, or whether it will arrive with a first or a second imperialist war, etc. Or else we are not convinced that the situation is revolutionary, in which case there is no sense in our just talking about a war against war. In that case, we are, in fact, national liberal-labour politicians of the Südekum-Plekhanov or Kautsky variety.

The French delegates also declared that the present situation in Europe, as they saw it, would lead to revolution. But, they said, first, "we have not come here to pro-

vide a formula for a Third International"; secondly, the French worker "believes nobody and nothing"; he is demoralised and satiated with anarchist and Hervéist phrases. The former argument is unreasonable, because the joint compromise manifesto *does* "provide a formula" for a Third International, though it is inconsistent, incomplete and not given sufficient thought. The latter argument is very important as a very serious factual argument, which takes the specific situation in France into account, not in the meaning of defence of the fatherland, or the enemy invasion, but in taking note of the "sore points" in the French labour movement. The only thing that logically follows from this, however, is that the French socialists would perhaps join general European revolutionary action by the proletariat *more slowly* than others, and not that such action is unnecessary. The question as to *how rapidly*, in which way and in- which particular forms, the proletariat of the various countries are capable of taking revolutionary action was not raised at the Conference and could not have been. The conditions for this are not yet ripe. For the present it is our task to jointly *propagandise* the correct tactics and leave it to events to indicate the *tempo* of the movement, and the modifications in the mainstream (according to nation, locality and trade). If the French proletariat has been demoralised by anarchist phrases, it has been demoralised by Millerandism too, and it is not our business to *increase* this demoralisation by *leaving things unsaid* in the manifesto.

It was none other than Merrheim who uttered the characteristic and profoundly correct phrase: "The [Socialist] Party, Jouhaux [secretary of the General Confederation of Labour[162]] and the government are three heads under one bonnet." This is the truth, a fact proved by the experience of the year of struggle waged by the French internationalists against the Party and Messrs. Jouhaux. There is, however, only one conclusion to be drawn: the government cannot be fought unless the opportunist parties and the leaders of anarcho-syndicalism are fought against. Unlike our resolution, the joint manifesto merely indicated the tasks in the struggle but did not say everything that should have been said about them.

Arguing against our tactics, one of the Italians said: "Your tactics come either too late [since the war has already begun] or too soon [because the war has not yet created the conditions for revolution]; besides, you propose to 'change the programme' of the International, since all our propaganda has always been conducted 'against violence'." It was very easy for us to reply to this by quoting Jules Guesde in *En garde!* to the effect that not a single influential leader of the Second International ever rejected the use of violence and direct revolutionary methods of the struggle in general. It has always been argued that the legal struggle, parliamentarism and insurrection are interlinked, and *must inevitably* pass into each other according to the changes in the conditions of the movement. From the same book, *En garde!*, we quoted a passage in a speech delivered by Guesde in 1899, in which he spoke of the possibility of a war for markets, colonies, etc., and went on to say that if there were any French, German and British Millerands in such a war, then "what would become of international working-class solidarity?" In this speech Guesde condemned himself in advance. As for declaring propaganda of revolution "inopportune", this objection rests on a confusion of concepts usual among socialists in the Romance countries: they confuse the beginning of a revolution with open and direct propaganda for revolution. In Russia, nobody places the beginning of the 1905 Revolution before January 9, 1905,[163] whereas revolutionary propaganda, in the very narrow sense of the word, the propaganda and the preparation of mass action, demonstrations, strikes, barricades, had been conducted *for years* prior to that. The old *Iskra*, for instance, began to propagandise the matter at the end of 1900, as Marx did in 1847, when nobody thought as yet of the *beginning of a revolution* in Europe.

After a revolution has begun, it is "recognised" even by the liberals and its other enemies; they often recognise it so as to deceive and betray it. *Before* the revolution, revolutionaries foresee it, realise its inevitability, make the masses understand its necessity, and explain its course and methods to the masses.

By the irony of history, Kautsky and his friends, who tried to take out of Grimm's hands the initiative of con-

vening the Conference, and attempted to disrupt the Conference of the Left wing (Kautsky's closest friends even went *on a tour* for this purpose, as Grimm disclosed at the Conference), were *the very ones* who pushed the Conference *to the left*. By *their* deeds, the opportunists and the Kautskyites have proved the correctness of the stand taken by our Party.

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KAUTSKY, AXELROD, AND MARTOV — TRUE INTERNATIONALISTS

Shortly before the Zimmerwald Conference, a pamphlet by P. Axelrod came out in Zurich in the German language, under the title of *The Crisis and the Tasks of International Social-Democracy*.* The Zurich *Volksrecht* subsequently published two articles by L. Martov in praise of the pamphlet. We do not know whether the two authors will bring out these works in Russian. It would be hard to find a better illustration of the way the leaders of the Organising Committee are defending opportunism and social-chauvinism.

The struggle against "dangers threatening party unity" runs through the whole pamphlet. "A rupture and dissension"—this is what Axelrod is afraid of, and endlessly repeats *ad nauseam*. Do not imagine, however, that it is the present state of affairs in Social-Democracy, the present alliance between its leaders and their respective national bourgeoisie, that Axelrod considers dissension and a rupture. Oh, no! In Axelrod's opinion, dissension means drawing a clear line of distinction between true socialists and social-chauvinists. Kautsky is numbered by Axelrod among the comrades "whose internationalist sentiments and consciousness are beyond any doubt". Yet, in all the forty-six pages of the pamphlet there is not the slightest attempt to bring Kautsky's views together, quote them correctly, and ascertain whether recognition of the defence of the fatherland idea in the present war does not imply chauvinism.

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* *Die Krise und die Aufgaben der internationalen Sozial-demokratie.—Ed.*

Not a word on the issue, or about our arguments. What we find is a "report to the authorities". In the course of a lecture delivered in Zurich, Lenin, he writes, called Kautsky chauvinist, philistine, traitor (p. 21). Dear Martov and Axelrod, this is no longer literature, but a desk-sergeant's report.

"In the West," the pamphlet says, "we do not find that variety of supermen who utilise each party crisis, any difficult situation, to step forth in the role of the Party's sole saviours from destruction, and light-heartedly conduct an inner-party policy of chaos and disorganisation" (p. 22). Is this literature?

But if there are no such super-monsters "in the West" who dare consider Kautsky and Axelrod chauvinists and opportunists, and at the very thought of whom dear Axelrod trembles with rage and emits a spate of such elegant and choice language, how could Axelrod have written two pages earlier:

"If one considers the indignation that is mounting in ever broader party circles, especially in Germany and France, against the policy of 'seeing it through' that is followed by our responsible party organs, it is by no means impossible that the practical tendencies of the Leninist propaganda may, through various channels, penetrate into the ranks of Western Social-Democracy."

That being the case, the fault does not seem to lie with the genuinely Russian super-monsters who are flaying dear Axelrod! It would appear that the *international* chauvinism of the official parties—both in Germany and France, as Axelrod himself admits (note this!)—is evoking indignation in and resistance from *international* revolutionary Social-Democrats. Consequently, we have *two trends*, both international. The angry Axelrod is abusive because he does not realise the inevitability of both trends, of a decisive struggle between them; another reason is that it pains his conscience and sensibilities, and that it is not to his advantage openly to show his own stand, which consists in a desire to *appear* internationalist while being chauvinist.

"The problem of internationalising the working-class movement is not identical with the question of revolutionising our forms and methods of struggle," he says; it is, as

you see, "an ideological explanation" when one reduces everything to opportunism and ignores the "tremendous force" of "patriotic ideas" which are "the product of thousand-year-old historical processes". "One must therefore strive," he continues, "to create within the framework of this bourgeois society an actual *reality* [italics by Axelrod], objective conditions of existence, at least for the struggling masses of workers, which can weaken the above-mentioned dependence", namely, "the dependence of the masses upon the historically evolved national and territorial social formations". "For instance," Axelrod goes on to illustrate his profound idea, "labour protection and insurance legislation, as well as various other important political demands, and, finally, the cultural and educational needs and strivings of the workers, must become the object of their *international* [italics by Axelrod] action and organisations." Everything, he says, reduces itself to "internationalising the day-by-day struggle for the demands of the moment".

This is certainly enticing and so unlike the struggle against opportunism invented by some super-monsters! True internationalism in italics and a true "Marxism" that is not satisfied with "ideological" explanations consist in concern over the internationalisation of insurance legislation! Wonderful! The idea of a genius. Without any "struggle, rupture or dissension", all international opportunists or international liberals, from Lloyd George to Friedrich Naumann and from Leroy Beaulieu to Milyukov, Struve and Guchkov, will eagerly subscribe to the scientific, profound and objective "internationalism" of Axelrod, Martov, and Kautsky.

Here are some real gems of "internationalism"! Kautsky says: If I defend my fatherland in an imperialist war, i.e., a war to plunder and enslave other countries, and recognise that the workers of the other belligerent countries are entitled to defend their fatherland, this is true internationalism. Axelrod says: One must not be carried away by "ideological" attacks on opportunism but must carry on a practical struggle against thousand-year-old nationalism by means of (also a thousand-year-old) internationalisation of day-by-day work in the field of insurance laws. Martov agrees with Axelrod.

Axelrod's phrases about the thousand-year-old roots of nationalism, etc., have about as much political sense as the declarations of the Russian serf-owners prior to 1861,* about the thousand-year-old roots of serfdom. Such phrases are grist to the mill of the reactionaries and the bourgeoisie, since Axelrod fails to mention—modestly fails to mention—that decades of capitalist development, particularly after 1871, have created those *objective* international links between the proletarians of all countries which today, at the present juncture, must find expression in international revolutionary action. Axelrod is opposed to such action. He is in favour of referring to the thousand-year-old roots of the knout, but he is opposed to action aimed at destroying the knout!

But what about the proletarian revolution? The 1912 Basle Manifesto spoke of it in connection with the impending war, which actually broke out two years later. Perhaps Axelrod considers that this manifesto is also frivolous "ideology"—an expression quite in the spirit of Struve's and Cunow's "Marxism"!—for he *does not say a word* about it. As for the revolution, he dismisses it as follows:

"The tendency to view stormy and revolutionary mass action or uprisings as the sole way of overcoming nationalism would have some justification if we were on the eve of a social revolution, in the very same way, for instance, as was the case in Russia beginning with the students' demonstrations of 1901, which were the precursors of the approaching decisive battles against absolutism. But even those comrades who place all their hopes on the speedy beginning of a stormy revolutionary period will not risk stating definitely that the decisive conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is imminent. On the contrary, they too count on a period lasting decades" (p. 41). This, of course, is followed by fulmination against the "Utopia" and the "Bakuninists" among Russian émigrés.

This example, chosen by Axelrod, exposes our opportunist in peerless fashion. Could anybody in his right mind

* The year of the abolition of serfdom in Russia.—*Ed.*

have "definitely stated" in 1901 that the decisive struggle against absolutism in Russia was "imminent"? Nobody could have done so and nobody did say so. Nobody could have known at the time that *four years later one* of the decisive clashes (December 1905) was to come, and that the next "decisive" battle against absolutism would take place perhaps in 1915-16, or even later.

If nobody asserted in 1901, either definitely or in any other way, that a decisive battle was "imminent"; if we declared at the time that the "hysterical" outcries of Krichevsky, Martynov and Co. about an "imminent" battle were lacking in seriousness, then we revolutionary Social-Democrats were at that time *positively* affirming something else: we affirmed that only hopeless opportunists could fail to understand in 1901 the task of *actively supporting* the revolutionary demonstrations of 1901, encouraging and developing them, and providing them with the most determined revolutionary slogans. History has proved that we, and only we, were right; history has condemned the opportunists, and has thrown them out of the working-class movement, although no decisive battle was "imminent" at the time, and the first decisive battle took place *only* four years later and yet did not prove to be the last battle, i.e., the final and decisive battle.

Today Europe is going through quite the same experience, literally the same experience. There cannot be the slightest doubt that a revolutionary situation exists in the Europe of 1915, as in the Russia of 1901. We cannot tell whether the proletariat's first "decisive" battle against the bourgeoisie will take place in four years or two, within a decade or more; we cannot tell whether the second "decisive" battle will take place a decade after that, but we do know firmly and we declare "positively" that at present it is our immediate and bounden duty to support the growing unrest and the demonstrations which have *already* begun. It is a fact that in Germany a crowd has booed Scheidemann, and that in many countries crowds have demonstrated against the high cost of living. Axelrod is evading this immediate and imperative duty of Social-Democrats; Axelrod would dissuade the workers from performing that duty. If one weighs the political sum and substance of Axelrod's arguments, one

will see that he is *with* the leaders of social-patriotism and social-chauvinism, and *against* the immediate propaganda of and preparations for revolutionary action. This is the gist of the matter. All the rest is just words.

We are *undoubtedly* on the eve of a socialist revolution. This was recognised by ultra-cautious theorists, like Kautsky, as early as 1909 (*Der Weg zur Macht*); it was recognised in the unanimously adopted Basle Manifesto of 1912. Just as in 1901 we did not know whether the "eve" of the first Russian revolution would last four years, we do not know that today. The revolution may and probably will consist of many years of fighting, of several periods of onslaught with intervals of counter-revolutionary convulsions of the bourgeois system. The main issue of the present political situation boils down to the question of whether the already existing revolutionary situation should be exploited by supporting and developing *revolutionary* movements. Yes or no? That is the question that at present politically divides social-chauvinists and revolutionary internationalists. Despite the revolutionary phrases of all three, as well as of the five secretaries of the Organising Committee abroad, Kautsky, Axelrod, and Martov are, on this issue, on the side of the social-chauvinists.

Axelrod makes use of a profusion of phrases to cover up his defence of social-chauvinism. His pamphlet may serve as an example of *how* opinions can be concealed and *how* language and print can be used to disguise ideas. Axelrod harps on the word internationalism. He censures both the social-patriots and their friends for not wanting to shift to the left, hints that he stands left of Kautsky, and speaks of the need for a Third International, which, he says, should be strong enough to reply to attempts by the bourgeoisie to kindle a world war conflagration "not with threats but by unleashing a revolutionary storm" (p. 14), and so on and so forth *ad infinitum*. In word, Axelrod is prepared to recognise anything, including a revolutionary storm; in deed, he wants unity with Kautsky and consequently with Scheidemann in Germany, with the chauvinist and counter-revolutionary *Nache Dyelo* and with Chkheidze's group in Russia, in deed, he is *against* supporting and furthering *at present the incipient revolutionary movement*. In word,

everything; in deed, nothing. In word, he vehemently avows that he is an "internationalist" and a revolutionary; in deed, he supports the social-chauvinists and opportunists of the whole world in their struggle against the revolutionary internationalists .

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SEVERAL THESES

PROPOSED BY THE EDITORS

The material published in this issue shows the tremendous scope of the work being done by the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party. To Russia, and indeed to the entire International, this is indeed a model of Social-Democratic work during a reactionary war and in most difficult conditions. The workers of St. Petersburg and Russia will bend every effort to give support to that work and will continue it along the same road ever more energetically and extensively.

Complying with advice from comrades in Russia, we have drawn up several theses on current problems of Social-Democratic work:

(1) The slogan of a "constituent assembly" is wrong as an independent slogan, because the question *now* is: who will convene it? The liberals accepted that slogan in 1905 because it *could* have been interpreted as meaning that a "constituent assembly" would be convened by the tsar and would be in agreement with him. The most correct slogans are the "three pillars" (a democratic republic, confiscation of the landed estates and an eight-hour working day), with the addition (cf. No. 9) of a call for the workers' international solidarity in the struggle for socialism and the revolutionary overthrow of the belligerent governments, and against the war.

(2) We are opposed to participation in the war industries committees,[164] which help prosecute the imperialist and reactionary war. We are in favour of utilising the election campaign; for instance, we are for participation

in the first stage of the elections for the *sole* purpose of agitation and organisation. There can be no talk of boycotting the Duma. Participation in the second ballot is *essential*. While we have no Duma deputies from our Party, we must utilise everything that happens in the Duma so as to advance the aims of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

(3) We consider that the consolidation and extension of Social-Democratic work among the proletariat and its extension to the rural proletariat, the rural poor and the army are the immediate and pressing tasks. It is revolutionary Social-Democracy's most pressing task to develop the incipient strike movement, and to conduct it under the slogan of the "three pillars". The demand for the immediate cessation of the war should be given due attention. Among other demands, the workers must not lose sight of the demand for the immediate reinstatement of the workers' deputies, members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group.

(4) Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar institutions must be regarded as organs of insurrection, of revolutionary rule. It is only in connection with the development of a mass political strike and with an insurrection, and in the measure of the latter's preparedness, development and success that such institutions can be of lasting value.

(5) Only a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry can form the social content of the impending revolution in Russia. The revolution cannot be victorious in Russia unless it overthrows the monarchy and the feudal-minded landowners, and these cannot be overthrown unless the proletariat is supported by the peasantry. The step forward made in the differentiation of the rural population into wealthy "homestead farmers" and rural proletarians has not done away with the oppression of the rural areas by the Markovs and Co.[165] We have urged and still urge the absolute need, in all and any circumstances, for a *separate* organisation for rural *proletarians*.

(6) The task confronting the proletariat of Russia is the consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia *in order* to kindle the socialist revolution in Europe. The latter task now stands very close to the former, yet it remains a special and second task, for it is a ques-

tion of the *different classes* which are collaborating with the proletariat of Russia. In the former task, it is the petty-bourgeois peasantry of Russia who are collaborating; in the latter, it is the proletariat of other countries.

(7) As hitherto, we consider it admissible for Social-Democrats to join a provisional revolutionary government together with the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but *not* with the revolutionary chauvinists.

(8) By revolutionary chauvinists we mean those who want a victory over tsarism so as to achieve victory over Germany, plunder other countries, consolidate Great-Russian rule over the other peoples of Russia, etc. Revolutionary chauvinism is based on the class position of the petty bourgeoisie. The latter always vacillates between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. At present it is vacillating between chauvinism (which prevents it from being consistently revolutionary, even in the meaning of a democratic revolution), and proletarian internationalism. At the moment the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *Nasha Zarya*, Chkheidze's Duma group, the Organising Committee, Mr. Plekhanov and the like are political spokesmen for this petty bourgeoisie in Russia.

(9) If the revolutionary chauvinists won in Russia, we would be opposed to a defence of *their* "fatherland" in the present war. Our slogan is: against the chauvinists, even if they are revolutionary and republican—*against* them, and *for* an alliance of the international proletariat for the socialist revolution.

(10) To the question of whether it is possible for the proletariat to assume the leadership in the bourgeois Russian revolution, our answer is: yes, it is possible, *if* the petty bourgeoisie swings to the left at the decisive moment; it is being pushed to the left, not only by our propaganda, but by a number of objective factors, economic, financial (the burden of war), military, political, and others.

(11) To the question of what the party of the proletariat would do if the revolution placed power in its hands in the present war, our answer is as follows: we would propose peace to *all* the belligerents on the condition that freedom is given to the colonies and *all* peoples that are dependent,

oppressed and deprived of rights. Under the present governments, neither Germany, nor Britain and France would accept this condition. In that case, we would have to prepare for and wage a revolutionary war, i.e., not only resolutely carry out the whole of our minimum programme,[166] but work systematically to bring about an uprising among all peoples now oppressed by the Great Russians, all colonies and dependent countries in Asia (India, China, Persia, etc.), and also, and first and foremost, we would raise up the socialist proletariat of Europe for an insurrection against their governments and despite the social-chauvinists. There is no doubt that a victory of the proletariat in Russia would create extraordinarily favourable conditions for the development of the revolution in both Asia and Europe. *Even* 1905 proved that. The international solidarity of the revolutionary proletariat is a *fact*, despite the scum of opportunism and social-chauvinism.

We now present these theses for discussion among the comrades, and shall develop our views in the next issues of the Central Organ.

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

1826 Das revolutionäre Proletariat und
24 das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen.

Das Zimmerwalder Manifest, wie auch die Mehrheit der Programme oder der taktischen Resolutionen der sozdem. Parteien, proclamiert das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen. Gen. Parabellum in dem Art. 252-3 der „Berner Tagwacht" erklärt für illusorisch" den Kampf um das nicht existierende Selbstbestimmungsrecht für Russland und stellt demselben den „revolutionären Klassenkampf des Proletariats gegen den Kapitalismus" entgegen, indem er versichert, daß „wir gegen die Annexionen" sein (diese Versicherung ist fünf Mal im Artikel des Gen. P. wiederholt worden) sowie auch gegen alle „nationale Gewaltakte".

Die Motivierung des Standpunktes des Gen. P. lau-

First page of Lenin's manuscript "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", 1915 (in German)

Reduced

First page of Lenin's manuscript "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", 1915 (in German)

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THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Like most programmes or tactical resolutions of the Social-Democratic parties, the Zimmerwald Manifesto proclaims the "right of nations to self-determination". In Nos. 252 and 253 of *Berner Tagwacht*, Parabellum[167] has called "illusory" "the struggle for the non-existent right to self-determination", and *has contraposed* to it "the proletariat's revolutionary mass struggle against capitalism", while at the same time *assuring* us that "we are against annexations" (an assurance is repeated *five* times in Parabellum's article), and against all violence against nations.

The arguments advanced by Parabellum in support of his position boil down to an assertion that today all national problems, like those of Alsace-Lorraine, Armenia, etc., are problems of imperialism; that capital has outgrown the framework of national states; that it is impossible to turn the clock of history back to the obsolete ideal of national states, etc.

Let us see whether Parabellum's reasoning is correct.

First of all, it is Parabellum who is looking backward, not forward, when, in opposing working-class acceptance "of the ideal of the national state", he looks towards Britain, France, Italy, Germany, i.e., countries where the movement for national liberation is a thing of the past, and not towards the East, towards Asia, Africa, and the colonies, where this movement is a thing of the present and the future. Mention of India, China, Persia, and Egypt will be sufficient.

Furthermore, imperialism means that capital has outgrown the framework of national states; it means that national oppression has been extended and heightened on a new historical foundation. Hence, it follows that, despite Parabellum, we must *link* the revolutionary struggle for socialism with a revolutionary programme on the national question.

From what Parabellum says, it appears that, *in the name of* the socialist revolution, he scornfully rejects a consistently revolutionary programme in the sphere of democracy. He is wrong to do so. The proletariat cannot be victorious except through democracy, i.e., by giving full effect to democracy and by linking with each step of its struggle democratic demands formulated in the most resolute terms. It is absurd to *contrapose* the socialist revolution and the revolutionary struggle against capitalism to a *single* problem of democracy, in this case, the national question. We must *combine* the revolutionary struggle against capitalism with a revolutionary programme and tactics on *all* democratic demands: a republic, a militia, the popular election of officials, equal rights for women, the self-determination of nations, etc. While capitalism exists, these demands—all of them—can only be accomplished as an exception, and even then in an incomplete and distorted form. Basing ourselves on the democracy already achieved, and exposing its incompleteness under capitalism, we demand the overthrow of capitalism, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, as a necessary basis both for the abolition of the poverty of the masses and for the *complete* and *all-round* institution of *all* democratic reforms. Some of these reforms will be started before the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, others *in the course* of that overthrow, and still others after it. The social revolution is not a single battle, but a period covering a series of battles over all sorts of problems of economic and democratic reform, which are consummated only by the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. It is for the sake of this final aim that we must formulate *every one* of our democratic demands in a consistently revolutionary way. It is quite conceivable that the workers of some particular country will overthrow the bourgeoisie *before* even a single fundamental democratic reform has been fully achieved. It is, however, quite

inconceivable that the proletariat, as a historical class, will be able to defeat the bourgeoisie, unless it is prepared for that by being educated in the spirit of the most consistent and resolutely revolutionary democracy.

Imperialism means the progressively mounting oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers; it means a period of wars between the latter to extend and consolidate the oppression of nations; it means a period in which the masses of the people are deceived by hypocritical social-patriots, i.e., individuals who, *under the pretext* of the "freedom of nations", "the right of nations to self-determination", and "defence of the fatherland", justify and defend the oppression of the majority of the world's nations by the Great Powers.

That is why the focal point in the Social-Democratic programme must be that division of nations into oppressor and oppressed which forms the *essence* of imperialism, and is *deceitfully* evaded by the social-chauvinists and Kautsky. This division is not significant from the angle of bourgeois pacifism or the philistine Utopia of peaceful competition among independent nations under capitalism, but it is most significant from the angle of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism. It is from this division that *our* definition of the "right of nations to self-determination" must follow, a definition that is consistently democratic, revolutionary, and *in accord* with the general task of the immediate struggle for socialism. It is for that right, and in a struggle to achieve sincere recognition for it, that the Social-Democrats of the oppressor nations must demand that the oppressed nations should have the right of secession, for otherwise recognition of equal rights for nations and of international working-class solidarity would in fact be merely empty phrase-mongering, sheer hypocrisy. On the other hand, the Social-Democrats of the oppressed nations must attach prime significance to the unity and the merging of the workers of the oppressed nations with those of the oppressor nations; otherwise these Social-Democrats will involuntarily become the allies of their own national *bourgeoisie*, which *always* betrays the interests of the people and of democracy, and is *always* ready, in its turn, to annex territory and oppress other nations.

The way in which the national question was posed at the end of the sixties of the past century may serve as an instructive example. The petty-bourgeois democrats, to whom any thought of the class struggle and of the socialist revolution was wholly alien, pictured to themselves a Utopia of peaceful competition among free and equal nations, under capitalism. In examining the immediate tasks of the social revolution, the Proudhonists totally "negated" the national question and the right of nations to self-determination. Marx ridiculed French Proudhonism and showed the affinity between it and French chauvinism. ("All Europe must and will sit quietly on their hindquarters until the gentlemen in France abolish 'poverty'.... By the negation of nationalities they appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption by the model French nation.") Marx demanded *the separation of Ireland* from Britain "although after the separation there may come federation", demanding it, not from the standpoint of the petty-bourgeois Utopia of a peaceful capitalism, or from considerations of "justice for Ireland",[168] but from the standpoint of the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of the *oppressor*, *i.e.*, *British*, *nation* against capitalism. The freedom of *that* nation has been cramped and mutilated by the fact that it has oppressed another nation. The *British* proletariat's internationalism would remain a hypocritical phrase if *they* did not demand the separation of Ireland. Never in favour of petty states, or the splitting up of states in general, or the principle of federation, Marx considered the separation of an oppressed nation to be a step towards federation, and consequently, not towards a split, but towards concentration, both political and economic, but concentration on the basis of democracy. As Parabellum sees it, Marx was probably waging an "illusory struggle" in demanding separation for Ireland. Actually, however, this demand *alone* presented a consistently revolutionary programme; it alone was in accord with internationalism; it alone advocated concentration along *non*-imperialist lines.

The imperialism of our days has led to a situation in which the Great-Power oppression of nations has become general. The view that a struggle must be conducted against the social-chauvinism of the dominant nations, who are

now engaged in an imperialist war to enhance the oppression of nations, and are oppressing most of the world's nations and most of the earth's population—this view must be decisive, cardinal and basic in the national programme of Social-Democracy.

Take a glance at the present trends in Social-Democratic thinking on this subject. The petty-bourgeois Utopians, who dreamt of equality and peace among nations under capitalism, have been succeeded by the social-imperialists. In combating the former, Parabellum is tilting at windmills, thereby unwittingly playing in the hands of the social-imperialists. What is the social-chauvinists' programme on the national question?

They either entirely deny the right to self-determination, using arguments like those advanced by Parabellum (Cunow, Parvus, the Russian opportunists Semkovsky, Liebman, and others), or they recognise that right in a patently hypocritical fashion, namely, without applying it to those very nations that are oppressed by their own nation or by her military allies (Plekhanov, Hyndman, all the pro-French patriots, then Scheidemann, etc., etc.). The most plausible formulation of the social-chauvinist lie, one that is therefore most dangerous to the proletariat, is provided by Kautsky. In word, he is *in favour* of the self-determination of nations; in word, he is for the Social-Democratic Party "*die Selbständigkeit der Nationen allseitig* [!] *und rückhaltlos* [?] *achtet und fordert*"* (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 33, II, S. 241, May 21, 1915). *In deed*, however, he has adapted the national programme to the prevailing social-chauvinism, distorted and docked it; he gives no precise definition of the duties of the socialists in the oppressor nations, and patently falsifies the democratic principle itself when he says that to demand "state independence" (*staatliche Selbständigkeit*) for every nation would mean demanding "too much" ("*zu viel*", *Die Neue Zeit* No. 33, II, S. 77, April 16, 1915). "National autonomy", if you please, is enough! The principal question, the one the imperialist bourgeoisie will not permit discussion of, namely, the question of the

* "comprehensively [!] and unreservedly [?] respecting and demanding the independence of nations"—*Ed.*

boundaries of a state that is built upon the oppression of nations, is evaded by Kautsky, who, to please that bourgeoisie, has thrown out of the programme what is most essential. The bourgeoisie are ready to promise all the "national equality" and "national autonomy" you please, so long as the proletariat remain within the framework of legality and "peacefully" submit to them on the question of the state *boundaries*! Kautsky has formulated the national programme of Social-Democracy in a reformist, not a revolutionary manner.

Parabellum's national programme, or, to be more precise, his *assurances* that "we are against annexations", has the wholehearted backing of the *Parteivorstand*,* Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co., for the very reason that the programme does not expose the dominant social-patriots. Bourgeois pacifists would also endorse that programme. Parabellum's splendid *general* programme ("a revolutionary mass struggle against capitalism") serves him—as it did the Proudhonists of the sixties—not for the drawing up, in conformity with it and in its spirit, of a programme on the national question that is uncompromising and equally revolutionary, but in order to leave the way open to the social-patriots. In our imperialist times most socialists throughout the world are members of nations that oppress other nations and strive to extend that oppression. That is why our "struggle against annexations" will be meaningless and will not scare the social-patriots in the least, unless we declare that a socialist of an oppressor nation who does not conduct both peacetime and wartime propaganda in favour of freedom of secession for oppressed nations, is no socialist and no internationalist, but a chauvinist! The socialist of an oppressor nation who fails to conduct such propaganda in defiance of government bans, i.e., in the free, i.e., in the illegal press, is a hypocritical advocate of equal rights for nations!

Parabellum has *only* a single sentence on Russia, which has not yet completed its bourgeois-democratic revolution:

"*Selbst das wirtschaftlich sehr zurückgebliebene Russland hat in der Haltung der Polnischen, Lettischen, Armeni-*

* The Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party—*Ed.*

schen Bourgeoisie gezeigt, dass nicht nur die militärische Bewachung es ist, die die Völker in diesem 'Zuchthaus der Völker' zusammenhält, sondern Bedürfnisse der kapitalistischen Expansion, für die das ungeheure Territorium ein glänzender Boden der Entwicklung ist."*

That is not a "Social-Democratic standpoint" but a liberal-bourgeois one, not an internationalist, but a Great-Russian chauvinist standpoint. Parabellum, who is such a fine fighter against the German social-patriots, seems to have little knowledge of Russian chauvinism. For Parabellum's wording to be converted into a Social-Democratic postulate and for Social-Democratic conclusions to be drawn from it, it should be modified and supplemented as follows:

Russia is a prison of peoples, not only because of the military-feudal character of tsarism and not only because the Great-Russian bourgeoisie support tsarism, but also because the Polish, etc., bourgeoisie have sacrificed the freedom of nations and democracy in general for the interests of capitalist expansion. The Russian proletariat cannot march at the head of the people towards a victorious democratic revolution (which is its immediate task), or fight alongside its brothers, the proletarians of Europe, for a socialist revolution, without immediately demanding, fully and "*rückhaltlos*",** for all nations oppressed by tsarism, the freedom to secede from Russia. This we demand, not independently of our revolutionary struggle for socialism, but because this struggle will remain a hollow phrase if it is not linked up with a revolutionary approach to all questions of democracy, including the national question. We demand freedom of self-determination, *i.e.*, independence, *i.e.*, freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we have dreamt of splitting up the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of

* "Even economically very backward Russia has proved, in the stand taken by the Polish, Lettish and Armenian bourgeoisie that it is not only the military guard that keeps together the peoples in that 'prison of peoples', but also the need for capitalist expansion, for which the vast territory is a splendid ground for development."—*Ed.*

** "unreservedly".—*Ed.*

nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is *inconceivable* without the freedom to secede. Just as Marx, in 1869, demanded the separation of Ireland, not for a split between Ireland and Britain, but for a subsequent free union between them, not so as to secure "justice for Ireland", but in the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the British proletariat, we in the same way consider the refusal of Russian socialists to demand freedom of self-determination for nations, in the sense we have indicated above, to be a direct betrayal of democracy, internationalism and socialism.

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ON THE TWO LINES IN THE REVOLUTION

In *Prizyv*[169] (No. 3), Mr. Plekhanov attempts to present the fundamental theoretical problem of the impending revolution in Russia. He quotes a passage from Marx to the effect that the 1789 Revolution in France followed an ascending line, whereas the 1848 Revolution followed a descending line. In the first instance, power passed gradually from the moderate party to the more radical—the Constitutionalists, the Girondists, the Jacobins. In the second instance, the reverse took place—the proletariat, the petty-bourgeois democrats, the bourgeois republicans, Napoleon III. "It is desirable," our author infers, "that the Russian revolution should be directed along an ascending line", i.e., that power should first pass to the Cadets and Octobrists, then to the Trudoviks, and then to the socialists. The conclusion to be drawn from this reasoning is, of course, that the Left wing in Russia is unwise in not wishing to support the Cadets and in prematurely discrediting them.

Mr. Plekhanov's "theoretical" reasoning is another example of the substitution of liberalism for Marxism. Mr. Plekhanov reduces the matter to the question of whether the "strategic conceptions" of the advanced elements were "right" or wrong. Marx's reasoning was different. He noted a fact: in each case the revolution proceeded in a different fashion; he did *not* however seek *the explanation* of this difference in "strategic conceptions". From the Marxist point of view it is ridiculous to seek it in conceptions. It should be sought in the difference in the *alignment of classes*. Marx himself wrote that in 1789 the French bourgeoisie united with the peasantry and that in 1848 petty-bourgeois democracy

betrayed the proletariat. Mr. Plekhanov knows Marx's opinion on the matter, but he does not mention it, because he wants to depict Marx as looking like Struve. In the France of 1789, it was a question of overthrowing absolutism and the nobility. At the then prevalent level of economic and political development, the bourgeoisie believed in a harmony of interests; it had no fears about the stability of its rule and was prepared to enter into an alliance with the peasantry. That alliance secured the complete victory of the revolution. In 1848 it was a question of the proletariat overthrowing the bourgeoisie. The proletariat was unable to win over the petty bourgeoisie, whose treachery led to the defeat of the revolution. The ascending line of 1789 was a form of revolution in which the mass of the people defeated absolutism. The descending line of 1848 was a form of revolution in which the betrayal of the proletariat by the mass of the petty bourgeoisie led to the defeat of the revolution.

Mr. Plekhanov is substituting vulgar idealism for Marxism when he reduces the question to one of "strategic conceptions", not of the alignment of classes.

The experience of the 1905 Revolution and of the subsequent counter-revolutionary period in Russia teaches us that in our country *two* lines of revolution could be observed, in the sense that there was a struggle between two classes—the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie—for leadership of the masses. The proletariat advanced in a revolutionary fashion, and was leading the democratic peasantry towards the overthrow of the monarchy and the landowners. That the peasantry revealed revolutionary tendencies in the democratic sense was proved on a *mass* scale by *all* the great political events: the peasant insurrections of 1905-06, the unrest in the army in the same years, the "Peasants' Union" of 1905, and the first two Dumas, in which the *peasant* Trudoviks stood not only "to the left of the Cadets", *but were also more revolutionary* than the intellectual *Social-Revolutionaries* and Trudoviks. Unfortunately, this is often forgotten, but still it is a fact. Both in the Third and in the Fourth Dumas the *peasant* Trudoviks, despite their weakness, showed that the peasant masses were *opposed* to the landed proprietors.

The first line of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution, as deduced from the facts and not from "strategic" prattle, was marked by a resolute struggle of the proletariat, which was irresolutely followed by the peasantry. Both these classes fought against the monarchy and the landowners. The lack of strength and resolution in these classes led to their defeat (although a partial breach was made in the edifice of the autocracy).

The behaviour of the liberal bourgeoisie was the second line. We Bolsheviks have always affirmed, especially since the spring of 1906, that this line was represented by the Cadets and Octobrists as a *single* force. The 1905-15 decade has proved the correctness of our view. At the decisive moments of the struggle, the Cadets, together with the Octobrists, betrayed democracy and went to the aid of the tsar and the landowners. The "liberal" line of the Russian revolution was marked by the "pacification" and the fragmentary character of the masses' struggle so as to enable the bourgeoisie to make peace with the monarchy. The international background to the Russian revolution and the strength of the Russian proletariat rendered this behaviour of the liberals inevitable.

The Bolsheviks helped the proletariat consciously to follow the first line, to fight with supreme courage and to lead the peasants. The Mensheviks were constantly slipping into the second line; they demoralised the proletariat by adapting its movement to the liberals—from the invitation to enter the Bulygin Duma (August 1905), to the Cadet Cabinet in 1906 and the bloc with the Cadets *against* democracy in 1907. (From Mr. Plekhanov's point of view, we will observe parenthetically, the "correct strategic conceptions" of the Cadets and the Mensheviks suffered A defeat at the time. Why was that? Why did the masses not pay heed to the wise counsels of Mr. Plekhanov and the Cadets, which were publicised a hundred times more extensively than the advice from the Bolsheviks?)

Only these trends—the Bolshevik and the Menshevik—manifested themselves in the politics of the *masses* in 1904-08, and later, in 1908-14. Why was that? It was because only these trends had firm class roots—the former in the proletariat, the latter in the liberal bourgeoisie.

Today we are again advancing towards a revolution. Everybody sees that. *Khvostov himself* says that the mood of the peasants is reminiscent of 1905-06. And again we see the *same* two lines in the revolution, the *same* alignment of classes, only modified by a changed international situation. In 1905, the entire European bourgeoisie supported tsarism and helped it either with their thousands of millions (the French), or by training a counter-revolutionary army (the Germans). In 1914 the European war flared up. Everywhere the bourgeoisie vanquished the proletariat for a time, and swept them into the turbid spate of nationalism and chauvinism. In Russia, as hitherto, the petty-bourgeois masses of the people, primarily the peasantry, form the majority of the population. They are oppressed first and foremost by the landowners. Politically, part of the peasantry are dormant, and part vacillate between chauvinism ("the defeat of Germany", "defence of the fatherland") and revolutionary spirit. The political spokesmen of these masses—and of their vacillation—are, on the one hand, the Narodniks (the Trudoviks and Social-Revolutionaries), and on the other hand, the opportunist Social-Democrats (*Nashe Dyelo*, Plekhanov, the Chkheidze group, the Organising Committee), who since 1910, have been determinedly following the road of liberal-labour politics, and in 1915 have achieved the social-chauvinism of Potresov, Cherevanin, Levitsky, and Maslov, or have demanded "unity" with them.

This state of affairs patently indicates the task of the proletariat. That task is the waging of a supremely courageous revolutionary struggle against the monarchy (utilising the slogans of the January Conference of 1912, the "three pillars"), a struggle that will sweep along in its wake all the democratic masses, i.e., mainly the peasantry. At the same time, the proletariat must wage a ruthless struggle against chauvinism, a struggle in alliance with the *European* proletariat for the socialist revolution in Europe. The vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie is no accident; it is inevitable, for it logically follows from their class stand. The war crisis has *strengthened* the economic and political factors that are impelling the petty bourgeoisie, including the peasantry, to the left. Herein lies the objective foundation of the full possibility of victory for the democratic

revolution in Russia. There is no need here for us to prove that the objective conditions in Western Europe are ripe for a socialist revolution; this was admitted before the war by all influential socialists in all advanced countries.

To bring clarity into the alignment of classes in the impending revolution is the main task of a revolutionary party. This task is being shirked by the Organising Committee, which within Russia remains a faithful ally to *Nashe Dyelo*, and abroad utters meaningless "Left" phrases. This task is being wrongly tackled in *Nashe Slovo* by Trotsky, who is repeating his "original" 1905 theory and refuses to give some thought to the reason why, in the course of ten years, life has been bypassing this splendid theory.

From the Bolsheviks Trotsky's original theory has borrowed their call for a decisive proletarian revolutionary struggle and for the conquest of political power by the proletariat, while from the Mensheviks it has borrowed "repudiation" of the peasantry's role. The peasantry, he asserts, are divided into strata, have become differentiated; their potential revolutionary role has dwindled more and more; in Russia a "national" revolution is impossible; "we are living in the era of imperialism," says Trotsky, and "imperialism does not contrapose the bourgeois nation to the old regime, but the proletariat to the bourgeois nation."

Here we have an amusing example of playing with the word "imperialism". If, *in Russia*, the proletariat already stands contraposed to the "bourgeois nation", then Russia is facing a *socialist* revolution (!), and the slogan "Confiscate the landed *estates*" (repeated by Trotsky in 1915, following the January Conference of 1912), is incorrect; in that case we must speak, not of a "revolutionary workers'" government, but of a "workers' *socialist*" government! The length Trotsky's muddled thinking goes to is evident from his phrase that by their resoluteness the proletariat will attract the "*non*-proletarian [!] popular masses" as well (No. 217)! Trotsky has not realised that if the proletariat induce the non-proletarian masses to confiscate the landed estates and overthrow the monarchy, then that will be the consummation of the "national bourgeois revolution" in Russia; it will be a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry!

A whole decade—the great decade of 190-15—has shown the existence of two and only two class lines in the Russian revolution. The differentiation of the peasantry has enhanced the class struggle within them; it has aroused very many hitherto politically dormant elements. It has drawn the rural proletariat closer to the urban proletariat (the Bolsheviks have insisted ever since 1906 that the former should be *separately* organised, and they included this demand in the resolution of the Menshevik congress in Stockholm). However, the antagonism between the peasantry, on the one hand, and the Markovs, Romanovs and Khvostovs, on the other, has become stronger and more acute. This is such an obvious truth that not *even* the thousands of phrases in scores of Trotsky's Paris articles will "refute" it. Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal-labour politicians in Russia, who by "repudiation" of the role of the peasantry understand a *refusal* to raise up the peasants for the revolution!

That is the crux of the matter today. The proletariat are fighting, and will fight valiantly, to win power, for a republic, for the confiscation of the land, *i.e.*, to win over the peasantry, make *full* use of their revolutionary powers, and get the "*non*-proletarian masses of the people" to take part in liberating *bourgeois* Russia from *military-feudal* "imperialism" (tsarism). The proletariat will at once utilise this ridding of bourgeois Russia of tsarism and the rule of the landowners, not to aid the rich peasants in their struggle against the rural workers, but to bring about the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe.

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AT THE UTTERMOST LIMIT

The transformation of individuals from radical Social-Democrats and revolutionary Marxists into social-chauvinists is a phenomenon common to all the belligerents. The spate of chauvinism is so overwhelming that on all sides it has carried along with it a number of Left-wing Social-Democrats who are spineless or have outlived themselves. Parvus, who showed himself to be an adventurer as far back as the Russian revolution, has now really reached the uttermost limit, this in his little magazine, *Die Glocke*[170]. With an incredibly brazen air of self-satisfaction, he has taken the German opportunists under his wing. He flouts the beliefs he once cherished, and has forgotten the struggle between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends, and their history in the international Social-Democratic movement. With the bounce of a columnist confident of the bourgeoisie's approval, he pats Marx on the shoulder, "correcting" him, without a vestige of conscientious or attentive criticism. He treats a certain Engels with undisguised contempt, and defends Britain's pacifists and internationalists and Germany's nationalists and jingoists. Rebuking the British social-patriots, whom he calls chauvinists and toadies to the bourgeoisie, he at the same time lauds the German social-patriots as revolutionary Social-Democrats and exchanges embraces with Lensch, Haenisch, Grunwald. He fawns upon Hindenburg, assuring his readers that "the German General Staff has taken a stand for a revolution in Russia", and publishing servile paeans to this "embodiment of the German people's soul", its "mighty revolutionary sentiment". He promises Germany a painless transition to socialism through an alliance between the

conservatives and part of the socialists, and through "bread ration cards". Like the petty coward he is, he condescendingly semi-approves of the Zimmerwald Conference, pretending not to have noticed in its manifesto the expressions directed against all shades of social-chauvinism, from the Parvus and Plekhanov variety, to that of Kolb and Kautsky.

In all six issues of his little journal there is not a single honest thought or earnest argument or sincere article. It is nothing but a cesspool of German chauvinism covered over with a coarsely painted signboard, which alleges it represents the interests of the Russian revolution! It is perfectly natural for this cesspool to come in for praise from such opportunists as Kolb and the editors of the *Chemnitz Volksstimme*.[171]

Mr. Parvus has the effrontery to publicly declare it his "mission" "to serve as an ideological link between the armed German proletariat and the revolutionary Russian proletariat". It is enough to expose this clownish phrase to the ridicule of the Russian workers. If *Prizyv* of Messrs. Plekhanov, Bunakov and Co. has won full approval from the chauvinists and the Khvostovs in Russia, then Mr. Parvus's *Die Glocke* is the organ of apostasy and grovelling flunkeyism in Germany.

In this connection another useful aspect of the present war should be noted. Not only are its quick-firing guns killing opportunism and anarchism, but the war itself is stripping the mask off the adventurers and renegades of socialism. It is to the proletariat's advantage that history has started this preliminary purge of its movement on the eve of the socialist revolution, not during its course.

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LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA LEAGUE[172]

Dear Comrades!*

We are extremely glad to get your leaflet. Your appeal to the members of the Socialist Party to struggle for a new International, for clear-cut revolutionary socialism as taught by Marx and Engels, and against the opportunism, especially against those who are in favor of working class participation in a war of defence, corresponds fully with the position our party (Social-Democratic Labor Party of Russia, *Central Committee*) has taken from the beginning of this war and has always taken during more than ten years.

We send you our sincerest greetings & best wishes of success in our fight for true internationalism.

In our press & in our propaganda we differ from your programme in several points & we think it is quite necessary that we expose you briefly these points in order to make immediate & serious steps for the coordination of the international strife of the incompromisingly revolutionary Socialists especially Marxists in all countries.

We criticise in the most severe manner the old, Second (1889-1914) International, we declare it dead & not worth to be restored on old basis. But we never say in our press that too great emphasis has been heretofore placed upon so-called "Immediate Demands", and that thereby the socialism can be diluted: we say & we prove that all bourgeois parties, all parties except the working-class revolutionary Party, are liars & hypocrites when they speak about reforms. We try to help the working class to get the smallest possible but

* This letter was written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

real improvement (economic & political) in their situation & we add always that *no* reform can be durable, sincere, serious if not seconded by revolutionary methods of struggle of the masses. We preach always that a socialist party not uniting this struggle for reforms with the revolutionary methods of working-class movement can become a sect, can be severed from the masses, & that that is the most pernicious menace to the success of the clear-cut revolutionary socialism.

We defend always in our press the democracy in the party. But we never speak against the centralization of the party. We are for the democratic centralism. We say that the centralization of the German Labor movement is not a feeble but a strong and good feature of it. The vice of the present Social-Democratic Party of Germany consists not in the centralization but in the preponderance of the opportunists, which should be excluded from the party especially now after their treacherous conduct in the war. If in any given crisis the small group (for instance our Central Committee is a small group) can act for directing the mighty mass *in a revolutionary direction*, it would be very good. And in *all* crises the masses can not act immediately, the masses want to be helped by the small groups of the central institutions of the parties. Our Central Committee quite at the beginning of this war, in September 1914, has directed the masses not to accept the lie about "the war of defence" & to break off with the opportunists & the "would-be-socialists-jingoes" (we call so the "Socialists" who are *now* in favor of the war of defence). We think that this centralistic measure of our Central Committee was useful & necessary.

We agree with you that we must be against craft Unionism & in favor of industrial Unionism, i.e. of big, centralized Trade Unions & in favor of the most active participation of *all* members of party in *all* economic struggles & in *all* trade union & cooperative organizations of the working class. But we consider that such people as Mr. Legien in Germany & Mr. Gompers in the U. St. are bourgeois and that their policy is not a socialist but a nationalistic, middle class policy. Mr. Legien, Mr. Gompers & similar persons are not the representatives of working class, they represent the aristocracy & bureaucracy of the working class.



To the Secretary of the "Socialist Propaganda League"
Mr C. W. Fitzgerald, 20 Baker St, Beverly, Mass.

Dear comrades!

We are extremely glad to get your leaflet. Your appeal to the members of the Socialist Party to struggle for a new International, for clear-cut revolutionary tactics as taught by Marx & Engels, and against the opportunists, especially against those who are in favor of working class participation in a war of defence, corresponds fully with the position our party (Social Democratic Labor Party of Russia, Central Committee) has taken from the beginning of this war & has always taken during more than ten years.

We send you our sincerest greetings

First page of Lenin's letter to the Secretary of the Socialist Propaganda League. November 1915 (in English)

Reduced

First page of Lenin's letter to the Secretary of the Socialist Propaganda League. November 1915 (in English)

Reduced

We entirely sympathize with you when in political action you claim the "mass action" of the workers. The German revolutionary & internationalist Socialists claim it also. In our press we try to define with more details what must be understood by political mass action, as f. i. political strikes (very usual in Russia), street demonstrations and civil war prepared by the present imperialist war between nations.

We do not preach unity in the *present* (prevailing in the Second International) socialist parties. On the contrary we preach *secession* with the opportunists. The war is the best object-lesson. In *all* countries the opportunists, their leaders, their most influential dailies & reviews are *for* the war, in other words, they have in reality *united* with "their" national bourgeoisie (middle class, capitalists) against the proletarian masses. You say, that in America there are also Socialists who have expressed themselves in favor of the participation in a war of defence. We are convinced, that unity with such men is an evil. *Such* unity is unity with the national middle class & capitalists, and a *division* with the international revolutionary working class. And we are for secession with nationalistic opportunists and unity with international revolutionary Marxists & working-class parties.

We never object in our press to the unity of S.P. & S.L.P. in America.[173] We always quote letters from Marx & Engels (especially to Sorge, active member of American socialist movement), where both condemn the sectarian character of the S.L.P.

We fully agree with you in your criticism of the old International. We have participated in the conference of Zimmerwald (Switzerland) 5-8.IX. 1915. We have formed there a *left wing*, and have proposed *our resolution* & our draught of a manifesto. We have just published these documents in German & I send them to you (with the German translation of our small book about "Socialism & War"), hoping that in your League there are probably comrades, that know German. If you could help us to publish these things in English (it is possible only in America and later on we should send it to England), we would gladly accept your help.

In our struggle for true internationalism & against "jingo-socialism" we always quote in our press the example of the opportunist leaders of the S.P. in America, who are in favor of restrictions of the immigration of Chinese and Japanese workers (especially after the Congress of Stuttgart, 1907, & *against* the decisions of Stuttgart). We think that one can not be internationalist & be at the same time in favor of such restrictions. And we assert that Socialists in America, especially English Socialists, belonging to the ruling, and *oppressing* nation, who are not against any restrictions of immigration, against the possession of colonies (Hawaii) and for the entire freedom of colonies, that such Socialists are in reality jingoes.

For conclusion I repeat once more best greetings & wishes for your League. We should be very glad to have a further information from you & to *unite* our struggle against opportunism & for the true internationalism.

Yours *N. Lenin*

N.B. There are *two* Soc.-Dem. parties in Russia. Our party ("*Central* Committee") is against opportunism. The other party ("*Organization* Committee") is opportunist. We are *against* the unity with them.

You can write to our official address (Bibliothèque russe. For the C. K. 7 rue Hugo de Senger. 7. Geneve. Switzerland). But better write to my personal address: Wl. Ulianow. Seidenweg 4a, III *Berne*. Switzerland.

Written in English before November 9 (23), 1915

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Published according to the manuscript

SOCIAL-CHAUVINIST POLICY BEHIND A COVER OF INTERNATIONALIST PHRASES

How are political facts related to political literature, political events to political slogans, and political reality to political ideology? This question is now of fundamental significance for an understanding of the entire crisis of the International, since any crisis, even any turning point, in a development inevitably leads to a discrepancy between the old form and the new content. We say nothing of the fact that bourgeois society is continually producing politicians who love to assert they belong to no class, and opportunists who love to call themselves socialists, both of whom deliberately and systematically deceive the masses with the most florid and "radical" words. In times of crisis, however, even well-meaning participants therein very often reveal a discrepancy between word and deed. The great and progressive significance of all crises, even the gravest, most arduous and painful, lies in the tremendous speed, force and clarity with which they expose and sweep aside rotten phrases, even if well meaning, and rotten institutions even if they are built on the best of intentions.

The outstanding fact in the life of Russian Social-Democracy today is the elections of St. Petersburg workers to the war industries committees. For the first time during the war, these elections have drawn *masses* of the proletarians into a discussion and solution of basic problems of present-day politics; they have revealed the real picture of the *state of affairs* within Social-Democracy as a mass party. What has been revealed is that there are two currents and only two: one is revolutionary and internationalist,

genuinely proletarian, organised by our Party, and *against defence* of the fatherland; the other is the "*defence*" or social-chauvinist current, a bloc of the *Nashe Dyelo* people (i.e., the backbone of the liquidators), the Plekhanovites, Narodniks and non-partisans, this bloc being backed by the entire bourgeois press and all the Black Hundreds in Russia, which proves the bourgeois and non-proletarian essence of the bloc's policy.

Such are the facts, the reality. But what about slogans and ideology? The St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Utro* No. 2 (October 22),[174] the collection of articles issued by the Organising Committee crowd (*The International and War* No. 1, November 30, 1915), and the latest issues of *Nashe Slovo* provide an answer which should give food for hard thinking by anyone interested in politics in a way different from the interest Gogol's Petrushka[175] took in reading.

Let us examine the content and significance of *this* ideology.

The St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Utro* is the most important document. It is here that the leaders of liquidationism and social-chauvinism get together with Mr. Gvozdev, the informer. Those people know well what preceded the September 27 elections, and what took place at the elections. They were able to throw a veil over their bloc with the Plekhanovites, the Narodniks and non-partisans, and they did so. They said not a word about the bloc's significance, or about the relative *numerical strength* of its various elements. It was to their advantage to conceal such a "trifle" (Mr. Gvozdev and his *Rabocheye Utro* friends undoubtedly possessed the relevant information), and they concealed it. But even they were unable to invent a *third* group apart from the Ninety and the Eighty-one. It is impossible to lie on the spot, in St. Petersburg, in face of the workers, by trumping up a "third" group, fiction about which comes from an "anonymous contributor in Copenhagen"[176] writing in the German press and *Nashe Slovo*. This is impossible, because sane people will never lie if they know that they cannot escape summary exposure. That is why *Rabocheye Utro* has published the article by K. Oransky[177] (an old acquaintance!) entitled "Two Stands", in which he gives a detailed analysis of the stands taken by the Ninety and the Eighty-

one groups, without saying a word about the third stand. We shall note, in passing, that the censor mutilated issue No. 2 of *Rabocheye Utro* almost throughout; there are almost more blank columns than printed ones, but of the articles only two were spared: "Two Stands", and another which distorts in the spirit of liberalism the history of 1905; in both the Bolsheviks were abused for "anarchism" and "boycottism". It is to the tsarist government's *advantage* that such things should be written and published! It is not fortuitous that this kind of writing enjoys the monopoly of legality everywhere, from despotic Russia to republican France!

What, then, are the arguments used by *Rabocheye Utro* to defend its stand of "defence of the country" or "social-chauvinism"? These are, without exception, examples of evasion and of internationalist phrases! Our stand, they assert, is not at all "national", not at all in favour of "defence"; we are merely expressing "what is not at all expressed in the attitude of the first group" (the Ninety group), viz., a "not indifferent attitude to the state of the country", to its "salvation" "from defeat and ruin". Our stand, they claim, has been "genuinely internationalist", while showing the methods and means of "liberating" the country, we were "in agreement [with the first stand!] in appraising the origin of the war and its socio-political substance", we were "in agreement [with the first stand!] in posing the general problem of the international organisation and international work of the proletariat [all this is in dead earnest!] and of democracy in wartime, during literally all periods of the development of the world conflict". We declared in our instructions, they say, that, "in the present socio-political circumstances, the working class cannot assume any responsibility for the defence of the fatherland"; we, "firmly identified ourselves, in the first place, with the international tasks of democracy", and "made our contribution to the current of aspirations whose milestones were Copenhagen and Zimmerwald". (That's the kind of people we are!) We stand, they claim, for the slogan of "peace *without annexations*" (italics in *Rabocheye Utro*); "to the abstract nature and the cosmopolitan anarchism of the first current, we have counterposed the realism and internationalism of our stand and our tactics".

Each of these claims is a gem, to say the least. Besides ignorance and Repetilov-like[178] lying, however, all these gems contain a diplomacy that is perfectly sober and correct from the bourgeois point of view. To influence the workers, the bourgeois must assume the guise of socialists, Social-Democrats, internationalists, and the like, for otherwise they can exert no influence. The *Rabocheye Utro* group disguise themselves; they apply plenty of paint and powder, prettify themselves, cast sheep eyes all around, and go the limit! They are ready to sign the Zimmerwald Manifesto a hundred times (a slap in the face for those Zimmerwaldists who signed the Manifesto without combating its timidity or making reservations!) or any other resolution on the imperialist nature of the war, or take any oath of allegiance to "internationalism" and "revolutionism" ("liberation of the country" in the censored press being the equivalent of "revolution" in the underground press), if only—if only they are not prevented from calling upon the workers to participate in the war industries committees, i.e., *in practice* to participate in the reactionary war of plunder ("a war of defence").

Only this is action; all the rest is words. Only this is reality; all the rest is phrases. *Only this is needed* by the police, by the tsarist monarchy, Khvostov and the bourgeoisie. The clever bourgeois in countries that are cleverer are more tolerant of internationalist and socialist phrases if only participation in defence is assured, as is evidenced by comment in the French reactionary press regarding the London Conference of the socialists of the "Triple Entente". With the socialist gentry, one of these papers said, it's a kind of *tic douloureux*, a species of nervous malady which forces people involuntarily to repeat the same gesture, the same muscular movement, the same word. It is for that reason, the paper said, that "our own" socialists cannot speak about anything without repeating the words, "We are internationalists; we stand for social revolution". This is not dangerous, the bourgeois paper concludes, only a "tic"; what is important to "us" is their stand *for the defence* of the country.

That is how the clever French and British bourgeois reason. If participation in a war of plunder is defended with phrases about democracy, socialism, etc., is this not to

the advantage of rapacious governments, the imperialist bourgeoisie? Is it not to the master's advantage to keep a lackey who swears to all and sundry that his master loves them, and has dedicated his life to their welfare?

The *Rabocheye Utro* people swear by Zimmerwald, and in *word* separate themselves from the Plekhanovites by declaring (No. 2) that they "disagree in many things" with them; *in practice*, however, they agree with them *on the fundamentals*, *participate* with them and with their bourgeoisie, in the "defence" institutions of the chauvinist bourgeoisie.

The Organising Committee not only swear by Zimmerwald, but "sign" formal declarations; they not only stand aside from the Plekhanovites, but also delegate a certain anonymous A. M.,[179] who, sheltering behind his anonymity, declares: "We, who have adhered to the August bloc[180] [perhaps A. M. is not one, but two "adherents"?], consider it necessary to state that the *Prizyv* organisation has greatly exceeded the limits which can be tolerated in our Party, as we understand them, and that there can be no room within the August bloc organisations for members of groups that are bolstering *Prizyv*". What bold people these "adhering" A. M.s are, who so unflinchingly speak the naked truth!

Of the five persons comprising the "Secretariat Abroad" of the Organising Committee, which has published the collection of articles quoted, none wished to come out with so courageous a statement! It follows that the five secretaries are against a break with Plekhanov (not so very long ago Axelrod said that the Menshevik Plekhanov was closer to him than the internationalist Bolsheviks) but, afraid of the workers and unwilling to injure their "reputations", they prefer to keep it dark; however, they have put forward a couple of anonymous "adherents" so as to make a splash with a cheap and safe internationalism....

On the one hand, some of the secretaries—Martynov, Martov and Astrov—have engaged *Nashe Dyelo* in a polemic, Martov even coming out with a private opinion opposed to participation in the war industries committees. On the other hand, the Bundist Yonov, who considers himself "Left" of Kosovsky—a man who reflects the Bund's actual policy—is willingly advanced by the Bundists to cover up their nationalism; he advocates the "further development of the

old tactics [of the Second International, which led to its collapse] but by no means its liquidation". The editors have supplied Yonov's article with ambiguous, vapid and diplomatically evasive reservations, but they do not object to its *substance*, to a defence of the rotten and opportunist in the "old tactics". The anonymous A. M.s, who have "adhered" to the August bloc, openly *defend Nasha Zarya*; even if it did "deviate" from the internationalist stand, yet it "rejected [?] the *Burgfrieden* policy for Russia; it recognised the necessity of immediately re-establishing international links and, to the best of our knowledge [i.e., of the adhering anonymous A. M.s], it approved of Mankov's expulsion from the Duma group". An excellent defence! The petty-bourgeois Narodniks favour the re-establishment of links, Kerensky is opposed to Mankov, but to say that those who have come out in favour of "non-resistance to the war" are opposed to a policy of a class truce (*Burgfrieden*) means deceiving the workers with empty words.

The editors of the Organising Committee's journal have come out in a body with an article entitled "Dangerous Tendencies". This is a model of political evasiveness! On the one hand, here are clamorous Left phrases against the authors of calls for defence of the country (i.e., the Moscow and Petrograd social-chauvinists); on the other hand, they write: "*It is difficult to judge which party circles both declarations emanated from*"! In reality, there is not the slightest doubt that they emanated "*from the circles*" of *Nashe Dyelo*, although the contributors to this legally published journal are, of course, not guilty of having drawn up an underground declaration. Instead of dealing with the ideological roots of these declarations, and with the full identity between these roots and the liquidationist, social-chauvinist and *Nashe Dyelo trends*, the Organising Committee crowd have busied themselves with a ridiculous pettifogging that is of no value for anybody but the police, namely, the *personal* authorship of members of one *circle* or another. On the one hand, the editors bluster out threats: we internationalists of the August bloc, they say, will close our ranks for "the most energetic resistance to defence tendencies" (p. 129), for "an uncompromising struggle" (p. 126); on the other hand, we find right next to such declarations the following piece

of skulduggery: "The line of the Duma group, which has the support of the Organising Committee, has met [hitherto!] with no open opposition" (p. 129)!

As the authors themselves are well aware, this line consists in an absence of any line, and is a covert defence of *Nashe Dyelo* and *Rabocheye Utro*.

Take the most "Left" and the most "principled" article in the collection, the one written by Martov. It will suffice to quote a single sentence expressing the author's main idea, to see what his adherence to principles is like. "It is self-evident," he writes, "that if the present crisis should lead to the victory of a democratic revolution, to a republic, then the character of the war would radically change" (p. 116). All this is a shameless lie. Martov could not but have known that a democratic revolution and a republic mean a bourgeois-democratic revolution and a bourgeois-democratic republic. The character of this war between the bourgeois *and imperialist* Great Powers would not change *a jot* were the military-autocratic and feudal imperialism to be swept away in one of these countries. That is because, in such conditions, a purely bourgeois imperialism would not vanish, but would only *gain strength*. It is for that reason that our paper, issue No. 47, declared, in Thesis 9,* that the party of Russia's proletariat will not defend, in the present war, even a fatherland of republicans and revolutionaries, whilst they are chauvinists like Plekhanov, the Narodniks, Kautsky, the *Nashe Dyelo* people, Chkheidze, the Organising Committee, etc.

Martov's evasive phrase in a footnote to p. 118 will do him no good. Here, in contradiction to what he says, on p. 116, he "doubts" whether bourgeois democracy can fight "against international imperialism" (of course it cannot); he expresses "doubt" whether the bourgeoisie will not turn a 1793 republic into a Gambetta and Clemenceau republic. Here the basic theoretical error remains: in 1793 the foremost class in a French *bourgeois* revolution fought against European *pre-revolutionary* monarchies, whereas the Russia of 1915 is fighting, not more backward countries, but more advanced countries, which are on the eve of a *socialist*

* See p. 403 of this volume.—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

revolution. It follows that, in the war of 1914-15, only a proletariat that is carrying out a victorious socialist revolution, can play the part of the Jacobins of 1793. Consequently, in the present war, the Russian proletariat could "defend the fatherland" and consider "the character of the war radically changed", only and exclusively *if* the revolution were to put the party of the proletariat in power, and were to permit only that party to guide the entire force of a revolutionary upheaval and the entire machinery of state towards an instant and direct conclusion of an alliance with the socialist proletariat of Germany and Europe (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47, Thesis 11).*

Martov concludes his article, in which he juggles with sonorous phrases, by dramatically appealing to "Russian Social-Democracy" to "take a clear-cut revolutionary-internationalist stand at the outset of the political crisis". The reader who wants to find out whether these dramatic words do not conceal something rotten at the core should ask himself what a political stand is usually taken to mean. It means (1) bringing forward a formulated appraisal of the moment and the tactics to be used, and a series of resolutions, all this on behalf of an organisation (at least on behalf of a "quintet of secretaries"); (2) advancing a militant slogan for the current moment; (3) linking up these two points with *action* by the proletarian *masses* and their class-conscious vanguard Martov and Axelrod, the ideological leaders of the "quintet", have not only failed to do any of these three things, but on all of these points have given practical *support to the social-chauvinists*, have shielded them! During the sixteen months of war, the five secretaries abroad have not taken a "clear-cut stand", or any stand at all on the question of programme and tactics. Martov vacillates now to the left, now to the right. Axelrod's urge is only to the right (see his German pamphlet particularly). Here there is nothing clear, formulated or organised, no stand whatever! "The central militant slogan for the Russian proletariat at the current moment," Martov writes in his own name, "must be a national constituent assembly for the liquidation of both tsarism and the war." This is neither a central nor a militant slogan.

* See pp. 403-04 of this volume.—*Ed.*

It is quite useless because it does not reveal the basic social and class content, or the clear-cut political content of the concept of this dual "liquidation". It is a cheap bourgeois-democratic phrase, not a central, or militant, or proletarian slogan.

Finally, on the main issue, i.e., connections with the *masses* in Russia, what Martov and Co. have to offer, is not merely a zero, but a negative quantity. They have nothing and nobody behind them. The elections have shown that only the bourgeoisie's bloc with *Rabocheye Utro* has some of the masses behind it, whereas reference to the Organising Committee and the Chkheidze group means only shielding that bourgeois bloc with falsehoods.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 49,
December 21, 1915

Published according to
the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

OPPORTUNISM, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

It is instructive to compare the attitudes of the various classes and parties towards the collapse of the International, which has been revealed by the 1914-15 war. On one hand, the bourgeoisie extols to the sky those socialists who have expressed themselves in favour of "defending the fatherland", i.e., in favour of the war and of aiding the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie's more outspoken or less diplomatic representatives are expressing malicious joy over the collapse of the International, the collapse of the "illusions" of socialism. Among socialists who are "defending the fatherland" there are also two shades: the "extremists" like the Germans W. Kolb and W. Heine, who admit the collapse of the International, for which they blame the "revolutionary illusions"; these are out to restore a *still more* opportunist International. In practice, however, they agree with the "moderates", the cautious socialist "defenders of the fatherland", such as Kautsky, Renaudel, and Vandervelde, who stubbornly deny that the International has collapsed, consider it merely suspended temporarily, and defend the Second International's viability and right to exist. Revolutionary Social-Democrats in the various countries recognise the collapse of the Second International and the need to create a Third International.

To decide who is right, let us examine an historic document which bears upon the present war, and carries the unanimous and official signatures of *all* socialist parties in the world. That document is the Basle Manifesto of 1912. Noteworthy enough, no socialist would, in theory, dare deny the need for a concretely historical analysis of every war.

Today, however, none but the "Left" Social-Democrats, who are but few in number, would be so bold as to publicly and definitely repudiate the Basle Manifesto, or declare it erroneous, or analyse it carefully, comparing its decisions with the conduct of the socialists after the outbreak of the war.

Why is that so? It is because the Basle Manifesto ruthlessly exposes the wrong reasoning and conduct of the majority of official socialists. There is *not a single word* in this Manifesto on either the "defence of the fatherland" or the difference between a war of aggression and a war of defence! *Not a syllable* on a subject the official S.D. leaders both in Germany and in the Quadruple Entente have been talking and vociferating about most. In a perfectly clear, precise, and definite manner, the Basle Manifesto analyses the concrete clashes of interests which led towards war in 1912 and brought about war in 1914. The Manifesto says that these are clashes arising on the basis of "capitalist imperialism", clashes between Austria and Russia for domination over the Balkans, clashes between Britain, France, and Germany over their "policies of conquest in Asia Minor" (the policies of *all of them!*), clashes between Austria and Italy over their attempt to "draw Albania into their sphere of influence", subject her to their "rule", and clashes between Britain and Germany because of their mutual "antagonism", and further, because of "tsarism's attempts to grab Armenia, Constantinople, etc." It will be seen that this applies in full to the present war. The undisguised predatory, imperialist and reactionary character of this war, which is being waged for the enslavement of nations, is most clearly recognised in the Manifesto, which draws the necessary conclusion that war "cannot be justified on the slightest pretext of being in the least in the interests of the people", that war is prepared "for the sake of the profits of capitalists and ambitions of dynasties", and that on the part of the workers it would be "a crime to fire at one another".

These propositions contain the fundamentals for an understanding of the radical distinction between two great historical periods. One was the period between 1789 and 1871, when, in most cases, wars in Europe were indubitably connected with the *most important* "interests of the people", namely, a powerful bourgeois-progressive movement for

national liberation which involved millions of people, with the destruction of feudalism, absolutism, and foreign oppression. It was on this basis alone that there arose the concept of "defence of the fatherland", defence of a bourgeois nation that is liberating itself from medievalism. Only in this sense did socialists recognise "defence of the fatherland". Even today it must be recognised *in this sense*; for instance, the defence of Persia or China against Russia or Britain, of Turkey against Germany or Russia, of Albania against Austria and Italy, etc.

The 1914-15 war, as clearly expressed in the Basle Manifesto, pertains to an entirely different historical period and is of an entirely different character. This is a war among predators for division of the loot, for the enslavement of other countries. Victory for Russia, Britain, and France means the strangulation of Armenia, Asia Minor, etc.—this is *stated* in the Basle Manifesto. Germany's victory means the strangulation of Asia Minor, Serbia, Albania, etc. This is *stated* in the selfsame Manifesto, and has been recognised by all socialists! All phrases about a war of defence or about the defence of the fatherland by the Great Powers (i.e., the great predators), who are fighting for world domination, markets and "spheres of influence", and the enslavement of nations, are false, meaningless and hypocritical! It is not surprising that "socialists" who are in favour of defending the fatherland *are afraid* to recall or to exactly quote the Basle Manifesto, for it *exposes* their hypocrisy. The Basle Manifesto *proves* that socialists who stand for the "defence of the fatherland" in the 1914-15 war are socialists only in word and chauvinists in deed. They are social-chauvinists.

Recognition of this war as connected with national liberation leads to one line of socialist tactics; recognition of a war as imperialist, predatory and aggressive, leads to another line. The latter has been clearly defined in the Basle Manifesto. The war, it says, will evoke an "economic and political crisis", which, it continues, must be "utilised" to "hasten the collapse of the rule of capital". These words *recognise* that social revolution is *ripe*, that it is *possible*, that it is *approaching* in connection with the war. The "ruling classes" are afraid of a "proletarian revolution", says the Manifesto, quoting the example of the Paris Commune and

of 1905, i.e., the examples of revolutions, strikes, and civil war. It is a lie for anybody to say that the socialists "have not discussed", or "have not decided" the question of their attitude towards the war. The Basle Manifesto *has decided* this question; it has mapped out the line of tactics—that of proletarian revolutionary action and civil war.

It would be erroneous to think that the Basle Manifesto is a piece of empty declamation, a bureaucratic phrase, a none-too-serious threat. Those whom the Manifesto exposes are prepared to say such things. But that is not the truth! The Basle Manifesto sums up the vast amount of propaganda and agitation material of the entire epoch of the Second International, namely, the period between 1889 and 1914. This Manifesto *summarises*, without any exaggeration, *millions upon millions* of leaflets, press articles, books, and speeches by socialists of all lands. To declare this Manifesto erroneous means declaring the entire Second International erroneous, the work done in decades and decades by all Social-Democratic parties. To brush aside the Basle Manifesto means brushing aside the entire history of socialism. The Basle Manifesto says nothing *unusual* or *out of the ordinary*. It provides only and exclusively that *which* enabled the socialists *to lead the masses*—recognition of "peaceful" work as *preparation* for a proletarian revolution. The Basle Manifesto repeated what Guesde said at the 1899 Congress, where he ridiculed socialists' ministerialism manifesting itself *in the event* of a war for markets, "*brigandages capitalistes*" (*En garde!* pp. 175-76), or what Kautsky said in 1909, in his pamphlet *Der Weg zur Macht*, in which he spoke of the end of the "peaceful epoch" and the advent of an epoch of wars, revolutions, and the proletariat's struggle for power.

The Basle Manifesto incontestably proves the complete betrayal of socialism by those socialists who voted for war credits; joined governments, and recognised the defence of the fatherland in 1914-15. This betrayal is undeniable. It will be denied by hypocrites alone. The only question is: how is it *to be explained*.

It would be unscientific, absurd and ridiculous to reduce the question to *personalities*, to refer to Kautsky, Guesde, Plekhanov (and say: "even" such persons!). That would be a

wretched subterfuge. Any serious explanation calls, in the first place, for an *economic* analysis of the significance of present-day politics, then for an analysis of their fundamental *ideas*, and, finally, for a study of the historic *trends* within socialism.

What is the *economic* implication of "defence of the fatherland" in the 1914-15 war? The answer to this question has been given in the Basle Manifesto. The war is being fought by all the Great Powers for the purpose of plunder, carving up the world, acquiring markets, and enslaving nations. To the bourgeoisie it brings higher profits; to a thin crust of the labour bureaucracy and aristocracy, and also to the petty bourgeoisie (the intelligentsia, etc.) which "travels" with the working-class movement, it promises *morsels* of those profits. The economic basis of "social-chauvinism" (this term being more precise than the term social-patriotism, as the latter embellishes the evil) and of opportunism is the same, namely, an alliance between an insignificant section at the "top" of the labour movement, and its "own" national bourgeoisie, directed *against* the masses of the proletariat, an alliance between the *servants* of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, directed against the *class* that is exploited by the bourgeoisie. Social-chauvinism is a consummated opportunism.

Social-chauvinism and opportunism are the same in their political essence; class collaboration, repudiation of the proletarian dictatorship, rejection of revolutionary action, obeisance to bourgeois legality, non-confidence in the proletariat, and confidence in the bourgeoisie. The political ideas are identical, and so is the political content of their tactics. Social-chauvinism is the direct continuation and consummation of Millerandism, Bernsteinism, and British liberal-labour policies, their sum, their total, their highest achievement.

Throughout the entire period between 1889 and 1914, two lines in socialism—the opportunist and the revolutionary—are to be seen. Today there are also two lines in socialism. Let us not follow the method of referring to *persons*, which is practised by the bourgeois and opportunist liars, and let us take the *trends* to be seen in a number of countries. Let us take ten European coun-

tries: Germany, Britain, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Belgium and France. In the first eight countries, the division into the opportunist and revolutionary *trends* coincides with the division into social-chauvinists and revolutionary internationalists. The main *nuclei* of social-chauvinism in the social and political sense are: *Sozialistische Monatshefte* and Co. in Germany; the Fabians and the Labour Party in Britain (the Independent Labour Party entered in a *bloc* with both, the influence of social-chauvinism in the latter being considerably stronger than in the British Socialist Party, in which about three-sevenths are internationalists, namely, 66 to 84); *Nasha Zarya* and the Organising Committee (as well as *Nashe Dyelo*) in Russia; Bissolati's party in Italy; Troelstra's party in Holland; Branting and Co. in Sweden; the "Shiroki"[181] in Bulgaria; Greulich and "his" people* in Switzerland. It is from revolutionary Social-Democrats in *all* these countries that a more or less sharp protest has emanated against social-chauvinism. Two countries out of the ten are the exception, but even there internationalists are *weak*, but not absent; the facts are rather unknown (Vaillant has admitted having received letters from internationalists, which he did not publish) than non-existent.

Social-chauvinism is a consummated opportunism. That is beyond doubt. The alliance with the bourgeoisie used to be ideological and secret. It is now public and unseemly. Social-chauvinism draws its strength from nowhere else but this alliance with the bourgeoisie and the General Staffs. It is a falsehood for anybody (including Kautsky) to say that the "masses" of proletarians have turned towards chauvinism; *nowhere* have the masses been asked (with the exception, perhaps, of Italy, where a discussion went on for nine months prior to the declaration of war, and where the masses also were *against* the Bissolati party). The masses were dumbfounded, panic-stricken, disunited, and crushed by the state of martial law. The free vote was a privilege of the leaders *alone*—and they voted *for* the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat! It is ridiculous and monstrous to consider opportunism an *inner*-party phenomenon! All

* In the MS. Lenin wrote "wing" above the word "people".—*Ed.*

Marxists in Germany, France, and other countries have always stated and insisted that opportunism is a manifestation of the bourgeoisie's influence over the proletariat; that it is a bourgeois labour policy, an alliance between an insignificant section of near-proletarian elements and the bourgeoisie. Having for decades to mature in conditions of "peaceful" capitalism, opportunism was so mature by 1914-15 that it proved an open ally of the bourgeoisie. Unity with opportunism means unity between the proletariat and its national bourgeoisie, i.e., submission to the latter, a split in the international revolutionary working class. We do not say that an immediate split with the opportunists in all countries is desirable, or even possible at present; we do say that such a split has come to a head, that it has become inevitable, is progressive in nature, and necessary to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, and that history, having turned away from "peaceful" capitalism towards imperialism, has thereby turned towards such a split. *Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt.**

Since the onset of the war, the bourgeoisie of all countries, the belligerents in the first place, have united in lauding socialists who recognise the "defence of the fatherland", i.e., the defence of the bourgeoisie's predatory interests in the imperialist war, *against the proletariat*. See how this basic interest of the international bourgeoisie is making its way into the socialist parties, into the working-class movement, to find expression there! The example of Germany is particularly instructive in this respect, since the epoch of the Second International saw the growth of the greatest party in that country, but *the very same thing* is to be seen in other countries, with only minor variations in form, aspect and outward appearance.

In its issue of April 1915, *Preussische Jahrbücher*, a conservative German journal, published an article by a *Social-Democrat*, a member of the Social-Democratic Party, who concealed his identity behind the pseudonym of Monitor. This opportunist blurted out the truth regarding the *substance* of the policy pursued by the *entire* world bourgeoisie towards the working-class movement of the twentieth cen-

* Fate leads the willing, but drags the unwilling (Lat.).—*Ed.*

tury. The latter can neither be brushed aside nor suppressed by brute force, he says. It must be demoralised from within, by *buying* its top section. It was exactly in this manner that the Anglo-French bourgeoisie has been acting for decades, by buying up the trade-union leaders, the Millerands, the Briands and Co. It is in this manner that the German bourgeoisie is now acting. The Social-Democratic Party's behaviour, Monitor says to (and in essence *in the name of*) the bourgeoisie, is "irreproachable" in the present war (i.e., it is irreproachably *serving* the bourgeoisie against the proletariat). The process of the transformation" of the Social-Democratic Party into a national liberal-labour party is proceeding excellently. It would, however, be *dangerous* to the bourgeoisie, Monitor adds, if the party *were to turn to the right*; "it must retain the character of a workers' party with socialist ideals. On the day it gives that up, a new party will arise to take up the rejected programme, giving it a still more radical formulation" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1915, No. 4, pp. 50-51).

These words openly express that which the bourgeoisie has always and everywhere done covertly. "Radical" *words* are *needed* for the masses to believe in. The opportunists are prepared to reiterate them hypocritically. *Such* parties as the Social-Democratic parties of the Second International used to be are useful and necessary to the opportunists because they engendered the socialists' *defence* of the bourgeoisie during the 1914-15 crisis. Exactly the same kind of policy as that of the German Monitor is being pursued by the Fabians and the liberal trade-union leaders in Britain, and the opportunists and the Jaurèsists in France. Monitor is an outspoken and cynical opportunist. Then there is another shade, a covert or "honest" opportunist (Engels was right when he once said that the "honest" opportunists are the most dangerous to the working-class movement). Kautsky is an example of such an opportunist.

In *Die Neue Zeit* No. 9, of November 26, 1915, he wrote that the majority of the official party was violating its programme (Kautsky himself upheld the policy of the majority for a whole year after the outbreak of the war, justifying the "defence of the fatherland" lie!). "Opposition to the

majority is growing," he said (p. 272). ("*Die Opposition gegen die Mehrheit im Wachsen ist.*) The masses are "in opposition" (*oppositionell*). "*Nach dem Kriege* [*nur* nach *dem Kriege*?] ... *werden die Klassengegensätze sich so verschärfen, dass der Radikalismus in den Massen die Oberhand gewinnt*" (p. 272). *Es* "*droht uns nach dem Kriege* [*nur* nach *dem Kriege*?] ... *die Flucht der radikalen Elemente aus der Partei und ihr Zustrom zu einer Richtung antiparlamentarischer* [?? *soll heissen*: *ausserparlamentarischer*] *Massenaktionen.... So zerfällt unsere Partei in zwei Extreme, die nichts Gemeinsames haben.*"*

Kautsky wants to represent the golden mean, and to reconcile the "two extremes" which "*have nothing in common*"! Today (sixteen months after the outbreak of war) he admits that the masses are revolutionary. Condemning in the same breath revolutionary action, which he calls "*Abenteuer*" "*in den Strassen*"** (p. 272), Kautsky wants to "reconcile" the revolutionary masses with the opportunist leaders, who have "nothing in common" with them—*but on what basis*? On the basis of mere words! On the basis of "Left-wing" words of the "Left-wing" minority in the Reichstag! Let the minority, like Kautsky, condemn revolutionary *action*, calling it *adventurism*, but it must feed the masses with Left-wing *words*. Then there will be peace in the Party, unity with the Südekums, Legiens, Davids, and Monitors!

But that is Monitor's selfsame programme in its entirety, a programme of the bourgeoisie, only expressed in dulcet tones and in honeyed phrases! The same programme was carried out by Wurm as well, when at the session of the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag, March 18, 1915, "*er die Fraktion 'warnte', den Bogen zu überspannen*; *in den Arbeitermassen wachse die Opposition gegen die Fraktions-*

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* "After the war [only *after* the war?] the class antagonisms will become so sharpened that radicalism will gain the upper hand among the masses [p. 272].... We are threatened with the flight of the radical element from the Party after the war [only *after* the war?] ... and with their rushing to join the current of anti-parliamentary [?? should be: extra-parliamentary] mass action.... Thus our Party is divided into two extremes which have nothing in common."—*Ed.*

** Street adventurism.—*Ed.*

taktik; *es gelte*, *beim marxistischen Zentrum zu verharren*" (*Klassenkampf gegen den Krieg! Material zum "Fall Liebknecht". Als Manuskript gedruckt*, *S.* 67).*

Let us note the acknowledgement, on behalf of the "Marxist Centre" (including Kautsky), that the masses were in a revolutionary temper! This was March 18, 1915! *Eight and a half months later*, on November 26, 1915, Kautsky again proposed that the revolutionary masses be appeased with Left phrases!

Kautsky's opportunism differs from Monitor's only in the wording, in shades, and the methods of achieving the same end: *preservation* of the opportunists' influence (i.e., the bourgeoisie's) over the masses, preservation of the proletariat's *submission* to the opportunists (i.e., *the bourgeoisie*)! Pannekoek and Gorter have very properly dubbed Kautsky's stand "passive radicalism". (It is *verbiage*, to quote the French who have had occasion to make a thorough study of *this* variety of revolutionism, from their "home-made" models!) I would rather prefer to call it covert, timid, saccharine and hypocritical opportunism.

In substance, the two trends in Social-Democracy now disagree, not in words or in phrases. When it comes to the art of blending "defence of the fatherland" (i.e., defence of bourgeois plundering) with phrases on socialism, internationalism, freedom for the peoples, etc., Vandervelde, Renaudel, Sembat, Hyndman, Henderson, and Lloyd George are in no wise inferior to Legien, Südekum, Kautsky, or Haase! The actual difference begins with a complete rejection of defence of the fatherland in the present war, and with acceptance of revolutionary action in connection with the war, *during* and *after* it. In this question, the only serious and business-like one, Kautsky is at one with Kolb and Heine.

Compare the Fabians in Britain and the Kautskyites in Germany. The former are almost liberals, who have never recognised Marxism. Engels wrote of the Fabians on

* "He warned the group not to test the patience of the masses too far, as opposition is growing among the masses against the group's tactics; one must remain with the Marxist Centre." (*The Class Struggle Against the War! Material on the Liebknecht Case*. Published as a manuscript, p. 67).—*Ed*.

January 18, 1893: "A gang of place hunters, shrewd enough to understand the inevitability of the social revolution, but totally unwilling to entrust this gigantic work to the immature proletariat alone.... Their fundamental principle is fear of revolution...." And on November 11, 1893, he wrote: "Haughty bourgeois, benevolently descending to the proletariat to liberate it from above, if only it is willing to understand that such a raw, uneducated mass cannot liberate itself, and can attain nothing without the charity of those clever attorneys, litterateurs, and sentimental females."[182] How far from these the Kautskyites seem to be in their "theory"! In practice, however, in their attitude towards the war, they are *quite identical*! This is convincing proof of how the Marxism of the Kautskyites has withered, turned into a dead letter, a piece of cant.

The following instances will reveal the kind of obvious sophisms used by the Kautskyites since the outbreak of war, to refute the tactics of revolutionary proletarian action, as unanimously adopted by the socialists in Basle. Kautsky advanced his theory of "ultra-imperialism". By this he meant the substitution of "joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital, for the struggle of capital of some nations against that of other countries" (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 5, April 30, 1915, p. 144). At the same time, Kautsky himself added: "Can such a new phase of capitalism be at all achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question!" On the ground that a new phase is "conceivable", though he himself lacks the courage even to declare it "achievable", he *now* rejects the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat at a time when the *phase* of crisis and war has obviously arrived! Revolutionary action is rejected by the selfsame leader of the Second International who, in 1909, wrote a book entitled *Der Weg zur Macht*. Translated into almost all the principal European languages, the book revealed the *connection* between the impending war and the revolution, and proved that "revolution *cannot* be premature"!

In 1909, Kautsky proved that the epoch of "peaceful" capitalism had passed, and that the epoch of wars and revolutions was at hand. In 1912, the Basle Manifesto made this view the basis of the entire tactic of the world socialist

parties. In 1914 war came, followed by the "economic and political crisis" foreseen at Stuttgart and Basle. At this juncture Kautsky invented theoretical "subterfuges" to be used *against* revolutionary tactics!

Axelrod has advanced the same ideas, only clothed in a phraseology a little more to the "Left". He writes in free Switzerland, and it is his desire to exert an influence on Russian revolutionary workers. In his pamphlet, *Die Krise und die Aufgaben der internationalen Sozialdemokratie*, Zurich, 1915, we find a discovery that is so pleasing to the opportunists and the bourgeois of the whole world, namely, that "*das Internationalisierungsproblem der Arbeiterbewegung ist mit der Frage der Revolutionisierung unserer Kampfesformen und Methoden nicht identisch*" (p. 37) and that "*der Schwerpunkt des Internationalisierungsproblems der proletarischen Befreiungsbewegung liegt in der weiteren Entwicklung und Internationalisierung eben jener Alltagspraxis* [p. 40] ... beispielsweise *müssen die Arbeiterschutz- und Versicherungsgesetzgebung ... zum Objekt ihrer* [*der Arbeiter*] internationalen *Aktionen und Organisationen werden*" (p. 39).*

It goes without saying that such "internationalism" has the full approval, not only of the Südekums, Legiens and Hyndmans, together with the Vanderveldes, but also of the Lloyd Georges, Naumanns and Briands! Axelrod defends Kautsky's "internationalism" without even quoting or analysing any of the latter's arguments for defence of the fatherland. Like the Francophile social-chauvinists, Axelrod is even afraid to mention that it is revolutionary tactics that the Basle Manifesto speaks of. Against the future—the uncertain and unknown future—Axelrod is prepared to advance the most Left-wing and blatantly revolutionary phrases, such as saying that the future International will meet, *entgegentreten wird* (*den Regierungen im Falle der Kriegs-*

* "The problem of internationalising the labour movement is not identical with the question of revolutionising the forms and methods of our struggle" (p. 37) and that "the gist of the problem of internationalising the proletarian movement for freedom lies in the future development and internationalisation of everyday practices [p. 40] ... *for instance*, labour protection and insurance legislation must become the object of their [workers'] *international* action and organisations" (p. 39).—*Ed.*

gefahr) "*mit der Entfachung eines revolutionären Sturmes. ... Einleitung der sozialistischen Revolution*" (p. 14).* No joking here! When, however, it is a matter of applying revolutionary tactics right now, during the present crisis, Axelrod says *ganz à la Kautsky***: "*Revolutionäre Massenaktionen*"—such tactics "*hätte noch eine gewisse Berechtigung, wenn wir unmittelbar am Vorabend der sozialen Revolution ständen, ähnlich wie es etwa in Russland seit den Studentendemonstrationen des Jahres 1901 der Fall war, die das Herannahen entscheidender Kämpfe gegen den Absolutismus ankündigten*"*** (pp. 40-41), and then he fulminates against the "*Utopien*", "*Bakunismus*", quite in the spirit of Kolb, Heine, Südekum, and Legien. The example of Russia exposes Axelrod most strikingly. Four years elapsed between 1901 and 1905, and nobody could guarantee, in 1901, that the revolution in Russia (the first revolution against absolutism) would take place four years later. Prior to the social revolution, Europe is in exactly the same situation. Nobody can tell whether the first revolution of this kind will come about in four years. That a revolutionary situation, however, *actually exists* is a fact that was predicted in 1912 and became a reality in 1914. The 1914 demonstrations of workers and starving citizens in Russia and Germany also undoubtedly "*ankündigen das Herannahen entscheidender Kämpfe*".**** It is the bounden duty of socialists to support and develop *such* demonstrations and every kind of "revolutionary mass action" (economic and political strikes, unrest among the troops, right up to insurrection and civil war); furnish them with clear slogans; create an underground organisation and publish underground literature, without which the masses *cannot* be called upon to rise up in revolution; help them get a clear understanding of the revolution,

* will meet (the governments in case of a war danger) "with the release of a revolutionary storm ... the inauguration of the socialist revolution."—*Ed.*

** "quite in the Kautsky spirit".—*Ed.*

*** "Revolutionary mass action"—such tactics "would have a certain justification if we were immediately on the eve of a social revolution in the very same way, for instance, as, was the case in Russia beginning with the student demonstrations of 1901, which were the forerunners of approaching decisive battles against absolutism".—*Ed.*

**** "proclaims the approaching decisive battles".—*Ed.*

and organise for it. It is in this way that the Social-Democrats acted in Russia in 1901, on the eve ("*am Vorabend*") of the bourgeois revolution which began in 1905, but has not ended even in 1915. In the very same way, the Social-Democrats are obliged to act in Europe in 1914-15 "*am Vorabend der sozialistischen Revolution*". Revolutions are never born ready-made; they do not spring out of Jupiter's head; they do not kindle at once. They are always preceded by a process of unrest, crises, movements, revolts, the *beginnings* of revolution, the latter *not always* developing to the very end (if, for instance, the revolutionary class is not strong enough). Axelrod invents pretexts so as to distract Social-Democrats from their *duty* of helping develop the revolutionary movements burgeoning within the existing revolutionary situation. Axelrod defends the tactics of David and the Fabians, while masking his own opportunism with Left-wing phrases.

"*Den Weltkrieg in einen Bürgerkrieg umwandeln zu wollen wäre Wahnsinn gewesen*,"* writes David, leader of the opportunists (*Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkrieg*,** Berlin, 1915, p. 172), in objecting to the manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which was published on November 1, 1914. The manifesto advanced the civil war slogan, adding: "*Wie gross die Schwierigkeiten dieser Umwandlung zur gegebenen Zeit auch sein mögen—die Sozialisten werden niemals ablehnen, die Vorarbeiten in der bezeichneten Richtung* systematisch, unbeugsam, *und energisch auszuführen, falls der Krieg zur Tatsache geworden ist.*"*** (Quoted by David, p. 171.) It is noteworthy that a month before David's book appeared (May 1, 1915), our Party published (in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40, March 29) resolutions on the war, which advocate systematic "steps towards turning the present imperialist war into a civil war", these steps being defined in

* "It would be madness to wish to turn the world war into a civil war."—*Ed.*

** *Social-Democracy in the World War.—Ed.*

*** "However difficult such a transformation may seem at any given moment, socialists will never relinquish *systematic*, *persistent*, and undeviating preparatory work in this direction, once war has become a fact."—*Ed.*

the following way: (1) refusal to vote for war credits, etc.; (2) rejection of "*Burgfrieden*"*; (3) formation of an underground organisation; (4) support for fraternisation by the men in the trenches; (5) support for every kind of revolutionary mass action by the proletariat in general.

O brave David! In 1912 he did not think it "madness" to refer to the example of the Paris Commune. In 1914, however, he was echoing the bourgeois outcry of "madness".

Plekhanov, a typical representative of the social-chauvinists of the Quadruple Entente, has given an appraisal of revolutionary tactics, which is fully in accord with David's. He has called the idea on** ... to wit, the *Vorabend**** of the social revolution, from which a period of four years or more may elapse before the *entscheidende Kämpfe*.**** These are, in fact, the first beginnings—weak as yet, but beginnings, nevertheless—of the "proletarian revolution" which the Basle resolution spoke of and which will *never* become strong suddenly, but will inevitably pass through the stages of relatively *weak* beginnings.

Support for and the development, extension and intensification of revolutionary mass action and the revolutionary movement; the creation of an illegal organisation for propaganda and agitation in this direction, so as to help the masses understand the movement and its tasks, methods and aims—these are the two points that any practical programme of Social-Democratic activity in the present war must inevitably boil down to. All the rest is opportunist and counter-revolutionary phrases, no matter what Leftist, pseudo-Marxist and pacifist contortions those phrases may be disguised with.

Whenever exclamations like the following are made in protest to us—all this in the usual fashion of the diehards in the Second International: "O those 'Russian' methods!" ("*Die russische Taktik*"—Kap. VIII bei David),***** we reply

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* "a class truce".—*Ed.*

** The page breaks off here. Several words are missing from the beginning of the next page of the manuscript. This is the first publication of the continuation of the article.—*Ed.*

*** "the eve".—*Ed.*

**** "decisive battles".—*Ed.*

***** "The Russian tactics". Chapter 8 in David's book.—*Ed.*

merely by referring to the facts. On October 30, 1915, several hundred women (*einiger Hundert*) demonstrated in front of the *Parteivorstand*, and sent it the following message through a deputation: "*Die Verbreitung von* unzensierten Flugblättern und Druckschriften *und die Abhaltung* nicht genehmigter Versammlungen *wäre bei dem grossen Organisationsapparat heute leichter möglich als zur Zeit des Sozialistengesetzes. Es fehlt nicht an Mitteln und Wegen, sondern offensichtlich an dem Willen*"* (my italics). (*Berner Tagwacht* No. 271.)

I suppose these Berlin women workers must have been led astray by the "Bakuninist" and "adventurist", "sectarian" (see Kolb and Co.) and "reckless" manifesto of the Russian Party's Central Committee, dated November 1.

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* "Today, with the existence of a big machine of organisation, it would be far easier to distribute *illegal leaflets and pamphlets* and to hold *banned meetings* than it was during the Anti-Socialist Law. There is no shortage of means and methods, but there seems to be a lack of determination."—*Ed.*

NOTES

[1] These theses on the war were drawn up by Lenin not later than August 24 (September 6), 1914 after he had come to Berne from Poronin (Galicia). They were discussed at a meeting of the Bolshevik group in Berne on August 24-26 (September 6-8). Approved by the group, the theses were circulated among Bolshevik groups abroad. To throw the police off the scent, the copy of the theses made out by N. K. Krupskaya, carried the inscription: "Copy of the manifesto issued in Denmark."

The theses were smuggled into Russia for discussion by the Russian section of the Central Committee, Party organisations, and the Bolshevik Duma group.

Through Swiss Social-Democrats the theses were submitted to the conference of the Swiss and Italian Socialists held in Lugano on September 27, 1914. Many of the ideas contained in the theses were incorporated in the conference's resolution.

On learning of the approval of the theses in Russia, Lenin used them as a basis for writing the manifesto of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" (see this volume, pp. 25-34).

The introduction to the theses ("The Russian Social-Democrats on the European War", which was written on a separate sheet) was discovered only later, and was first published in the 4th Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*. p. 15

[2] Among those who joined the bourgeois government of Belgium was Vandervelde, and in France Jules Guesde, Marcel Sembat and Albert Thomas. p. 16

[3] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly)—the principal organ of the German opportunists, and one of the organs of international opportunism. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During the First World War it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 17

[4] *The Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals and organised pogroms. p. 17

[5] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in 1905, the party represented the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo

landowner leaders and bourgeois intellectuals. Prominent among its members were Milyukov, Muromtsev, Maklakov, Shingaryov, Struve, and Rodichev.

The Cadets were active in Russia's war preparations. They stood solidly behind the tsarist government's predatory designs, hoping to batten on war contracts, strengthen the bourgeoisie's positions, and suppress the revolutionary movement in the country.

With the outbreak of the war the Cadets advanced the slogan of "War to the victorious end!" When, in 1915, the tsarist forces suffered a defeat at the front, which led to the aggravation of the revolutionary crisis, the Cadet members of the State Duma, headed by Milyukov, and the other representatives of the bourgeoisie and the landowners formed a "Progressist" bloc aimed at checking the revolution, preserving the monarchy and bringing the war to a "victorious end". The Cadets actively helped to set up war-industries committees. p. 18

[6] See Lenin's articles "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" and "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe. Editorial Comment by *Sotsial-Demokrat* on the Manifesto on War Issued by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." (see this volume, pp. 339-43, 344). p. 18

[7] *Avanti!*—a daily and central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, was founded in December 1896. During the First World War its policy was not consistently internationalist, and it failed to break with the reformists. At present *Avanti!* is the central organ of the Italian Communist Party. p. 20

[8] *Südekum*, *Albert*—a German Social-Democrat, who was an extreme social-chauvinist during the First World War. His name has come to denote social-chauvinism. p. 20

[9] *Volksrecht* (The People's Right)—a Swiss Social-Democratic daily, published in Zurich since 1898. During the First World War it published articles by Left Zimmerwaldists, including Lenin's articles "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence", "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Russian Revolution" and "Tricks of the Republican Chauvinists". p. 21

[10] *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*—a daily published by the Bremen Social-Democrats from 1890 to 1919. In 1914-15 it was actually the organ of the Left Social-Democrats, and in 1916 it was taken over by the social-chauvinists. p. 21

[11] *Vorwärts*—a daily, central organ of the German Social-Democrats, published in Berlin from 1876 by Wilhelm Liebknecht and other editors. Through this newspaper Engels fought against all manifestations of opportunism. In the latter half of the 1890s, following Engels's death, the newspaper systematically published articles

by opportunists, who had become dominant among German Social-Democrats and in the Second International. During the First World War (1914-18) the paper pursued a social-chauvinist policy, and after the October Socialist Revolution it became a mouthpiece of anti-Soviet propaganda. It ceased publication in 1933. p. 21

[12] *Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung*—a daily newspaper, central organ of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, published in Vienna from 1889. During the First World War it took a social-chauvinist stand, Lenin describing it as the newspaper of "Vienna betrayers of socialism". Suppressed in 1934, it resumed publication in 1945 as the central organ of the Austrian Socialist Party. p. 21

[13] *Hamburger Echo*—German Social-Democratic daily newspaper published from 1887; took a social-chauvinist stand during the First World War. p. 21

[14] *l'Humanité*—a daily founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War the newspaper became a mouthpiece of the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party, and pursued a social-chauvinist policy. Shortly after the split in the Socialist Party at the Tours Congress in December 1920, and the formation of the Communist Party, it became the organ of the Communist Party. p. 21

[15] The reference is to the appeal addressed to the German people by the French and Belgian delegations to the International Socialist Bureau, and published in *l'Humanité* on September 6, 1914. It accused the German Government of pursuing predatory designs and the German troops of perpetrating atrocities in the occupied areas. Vorwärts of September 10, 1914 carried a protest by the German Social-Democratic Party's Executive against this appeal. This started off a press polemic between French and German social-chauvinists, each side seeking to justify its own government's participation in the war and put the blame on the other side. p. 21

[16] Lenin is referring to the resolution adopted by the Bolshevik group at its meeting in Berne, August 24-26 (September 6-8) 1914 (see this volume, pp. 15-19). p. 21

[17] Ever since its foundation in 1892, a sharp ideological struggle was conducted in the Italian Socialist Party between the opportunist and revolutionary wings, which differed on the question of the Party's policy and tactics. Under pressure from the Lefts, the most outspoken reformists (Bonomi, Bissolati), who supported the war and advocated collaboration with the government and the bourgeoisie, were expelled from the Party at its congress in Reggio Emilia in 1912. After the outbreak of the war, and before Italy's entry into it, the Party took an anti-war stand under the slogan: "Against the war, for neutrality!" In December 1914, the Party expelled a group of renegades (Mussolini and others) who defended the imperialist

policy of the bourgeoisie and favoured Italy's participation in the war. The Italian Socialists met in a joint conference with the Swiss Socialists at Lugano (1914) and took an active part in the international socialist conferences in Zimmerwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916). On the whole however, the Italian Socialist Party followed a Centrist policy. With Italy's entry into the war in May 1915, the Party renounced its anti-war stand and issued a slogan "neither participate in the war, nor sabotage it", which in practice meant support for the war. p. 23

[18] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Until October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky and afterwards by Heinrich Cunow. Several works by Marx and Engels were first published in it. Engels helped the journal with advice, frequently criticising it for its deviations from Marxism. In the latter half of the nineties, following Engels's death, it systematically published articles by revisionists, including a series of Bernstein's articles called "Problems of Socialism", which launched a revisionist crusade against Marxism. During the First World War *Die Neue Zeit* held a Centrist position, which in practice supported social-chauvinists. p. 23

[19] *The Stuttgart Congress of the Second International* was held on August 18-24, 1907. The R.S.D.L.P. delegation consisted of 37 members, the Bolshevik delegates including Lenin, Lunacharsky and Litvinov.

The Congress conducted its main work in committees set up to draft resolutions for the plenary meetings. Lenin worked on the committee which drafted a resolution on "Militarism and International Conflicts". Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg introduced into Bebel's draft the historic amendment on the duty of the socialists to use the war-created crisis to arouse the masses for the overthrow of capitalism. The amendment was adopted by the Congress (concerning the Congress, see Lenin's articles "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" in Volume 13 of the present edition, pp. 75-81 and 82-93).

The Copenhagen Congress of the Second International was held between August 28 and September 3, 1910, the R.S.D.L.P: being represented by Lenin, Plekhanov, Lunacharsky, Kollontai, Pokrovsky and others. The Congress appointed, several committees for preliminary discussion and drafting of resolutions on the agenda items. Lenin worked on the co-operative committee.

The Congress's resolution "The Struggle Against Militarism and War" confirmed the Stuttgart Congress's resolution on "Militarism and International Conflicts" and listed the demands to be advanced by the socialist parliamentary deputies: (a) all conflicts between states to be unfailingly submitted for settlement by international courts of arbitration, (b) general disarmament; (c) abolition of secret diplomacy; (d) autonomy for all nations and their protection against military attacks and oppression.

The Basle Congress of the Second International was held on November 24-25, 1912. It was the extraordinary congress called in connection with the Balkan War and the imminent European war. The Congress adopted a manifesto emphasising the imperialist nature of the approaching world war, and called on the socialists of all countries to wage a vigorous struggle against war. (The Basle Manifesto is discussed on pp. 208-17, 307-08 in this volume.) p. 31

[20] *Socialist-Revolutionaries*—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, founded at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the union of various Narodnik groups and circles (Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, etc.). The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia) (1900-05) and the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (Herald of the Russian Revolution) (1901-05) became its official organs. The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not recognise the class differences between the proletariat and the petty proprietors, glossed over the class contradictions within the peasantry, and rejected the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionaries' views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to patch up "the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310).

The Bolshevik Party exposed the Socialist-Revolutionaries' attempts to masquerade as socialists, conducted a determined struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries for influence over the peasantry, and showed how dangerous their tactic of individual terrorism was to the working-class movement. At the same time the Bolsheviks were prepared, on definite conditions, to enter into temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the struggle against tsarism. As early as the first Russian revolution (1905-07), the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party broke away and formed the legal Popular-Socialist Party, whose outlook was close to that of the Cadets, the Left wing forming the semi-anarchist league of Maximalists. In the period of reaction between 1907 and 1910, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party suffered a complete ideological and organisational breakdown. During the First World War most of its members took a social-chauvinist position. p. 32

[21] *The British Socialist Party* was founded in 1911, in Manchester, as a result of the Social-Democratic Federation merging with other socialist groups. The B.S.P. carried on its propaganda in the Marxist spirit, was "not opportunist, and ... was *really* independent of the Liberals" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 273). Its small membership, however, and its isolation from the masses gave it a somewhat sectarian character.

During the First World War, a sharp struggle flared up in the party between the internationalist trend (William Gallacher, Albert Inkpin, John Maclean, Thomas Rothstein and others) and the social-chauvinist trend led by Hyndman. On a number of

questions a section of the internationalists held Centrist views. In February 1916 a group of party members founded the newspaper *The Call*, which was instrumental in uniting the internationalist elements. When, at its Salford conference in April 1916, the Party denounced the social-chauvinist stand held by Hyndman and his followers, the latter broke away from the Party.

The British Socialist Party acclaimed the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, its members playing a prominent role in the British working people's movement in support of Soviet Russia, and against the foreign intervention. In 1919 the majority of the local Party branches (98 against 4) declared for affiliation to the Communist International.

The British Socialist Party and the Communist unity group played the leading part in founding the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the first Unity Congress of 1920 the overwhelming majority of the B.S.P. branches merged in the newly founded Communist Party. p. 36

[22] *The Independent Labour Party*—a reformist party founded by the leaders of "new trade unions" in 1893, when the strike struggle revived and there was a mounting drive for a labour movement independent of the bourgeois parties. The Party included members of the "new trade unions" and a number of the old trade unions, representatives of the professions and the petty bourgeoisie, who were under Fabian influence. The Party's leader was James Keir Hardie.

From its early days the Independent Labour Party held a bourgeois-reformist stand, concentrating on the parliamentary forms of struggle and parliamentary deals with the Liberals. Characterising this party, Lenin wrote that it was "actually an opportunist party that has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie" (V. I. Lenin, *On Britain*, Moscow, p. 401).

When the First World War broke out, the Party issued an anti-war manifesto, but shortly afterwards took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 36

[23] See Note 17. p. 37

[24] For liquidators see pp. 333-34 of this volume. p. 37

[25] *Golos* (The Voice)—a daily Menshevik-Trotskyist paper, published in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915, which followed a Centrist line.

In the early days of the war of 1914-18 *Golos* published several of Martov's articles directed against social-chauvinists. After Martov's swing to the Right, the newspaper came out in defence of the social-chauvinists, preferring "unity with the social-chauvinists to drawing closer to those who are irreconcilably hostile to social-chauvinism" (p. 113 in this volume).

In January 1915 *Golos* ceased publication and was replaced by *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word). p. 37

[26] *The Paris group* or group for aid the R.S.D.L.P. was formed on November 5 (18), 1908. It separated from the common Menshevik and Bolshevik Paris group, to unite Bolsheviks alone. It was later joined by pro-Party Mensheviks and *Vperyod* supporters.

During the war the group consisted of N. A. Semashko, M. F. Vladimirsky, I. F. Armand, S. I. Gopner, L. N. Stal, V. K. Taratuta, A. S. Shapovalov and others. Led by Lenin, the group took an internationalist stand and waged a vigorous struggle against the imperialist war and the opportunists. p. 37

[27] The notes on Lenin's report referred to in the article were published in *Vorwärts* No. 308 of November 10 and in *Wienner Arbeiter-Zeitung* No. 309 of November 7, 1914. On November 22, 1914, the *Vorwärts* editorial board published a brief note replying to Lenin's letter, claiming that the report had criticised the stand taken by the German and Austrian Social-Democrats and gave an appraisal of the Second International's collapse. p. 42

[28] Lenin began his article "Karl Marx", which was intended for the Granat Encyclopaedic Dictionary, in Poronin (Galicia) in the spring of 1914 and finished it in Berne in November 1914. In the preface to the 1918 edition of the article, which was published as a pamphlet, Lenin himself said he recollected 1913 as the year it was written in.

The article was published in 1915 in the Dictionary, over the signature of V. I. Lenin, and was followed by a supplement "Bibliography of Marxism". Because of the censorship, the editors of the Dictionary omitted two chapters, "Socialism" and "Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat", and made a number of changes in the text.

In 1918 *Priboi* Publishers published the original article as a separate pamphlet, with a preface written specially for it by Lenin, but without the "Bibliography of Marxism" supplement.

The article was first published in full according to the manuscript in 1925 in the collection "Marx-Engels-Marxism" prepared by the Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). p. 43

[29] These words are from Marx's "Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right. Introduction". The relevant passage reads: "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapon, material force must be overthrown by a material force; but theory, too, becomes a material force, as soon as it grips the masses." p. 47

[30] See Marx's letter to Engels of April 9, 1863. p. 75

[31] See Engels's letter to Marx of February 5, 1851. p. 76

[32] See Engels's letters to Marx of December 17, 1857, and October 7, 1858. p. 76

[33] See Engels's letter to Marx of April 8, 1863, and Marx's letters to Engels of April 9, 1863 and April 2, 1866. p. 76

[34] See Engels's letters to Marx of November 19, 1869 and August 11, 1881. p. 76

[35] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 69. p. 77

[36] See Marx's letter to Engels of April 16, 1856. p. 78

[37] See Engels's letters to Marx of January 27 and February 5, 1865. p. 78

[38] *The Anti-Socialist Law* was passed by the Bismarck government in 1878 to check the working-class and socialist movement. It banned all Social-Democratic and mass working-class organisations, and the workers' press; socialist literature was confiscated and Social-Democrats were persecuted and exiled. The law was repealed in 1890 under pressure from the mounting working-class movement. p. 79

[39] *The Emancipation of Labour group* was the first Russian Marxist group; it was founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva in 1883. Besides Plekhanov, its members included P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, Vera Zasulich and V. N. Ignatov. The group set itself the task of propaganda of scientific socialism in Russia, criticism of Narodism and theoretical analysis of developments in Russia from the standpoint of Marxism. The group translated into Russian and widely circulated Marx's and Engels's *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx's *Wage-Labour and Capital*, Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, as well as a number of Plekhanov's works, handbooks for generations of Russian Marxists (*Socialism and the Political Struggle*, *Our Differences*, and others).

In drafting the programme of the Russian Social-Democrats the group fell into a number of errors. It advocated individual terrorism, denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry, overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie, etc. While he had a high opinion of Plekhanov and the Emancipation of Labour group, Lenin pointed out that it "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement". The group existed until the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903). p. 81

[40] See Marx's letter to F. A. Sorge of September 19, 1879. p. 92

[41] This refers to the followers of the revisionist Bernstein, leader of the opportunist trend in German Social-Democracy, which arose at the end of the nineteenth century. p. 93

[42] In its issue of March 30, 1895, *Vorwärts* published a summary and several extracts from Engels's preface to Marx's "The Class Struggles

in France, 1848 to 1850", omitting very important propositions on the revolutionary role of the proletariat, which evoked a vehement protest from Engels. In his letter to Kautsky of April 1, 1895, he wrote: "To my astonishment I see in the *Vorwärts* today an extract from my 'Introduction', printed *without my prior knowledge* and trimmed in such a fashion that I appear as a peaceful worshipper of legality at any price" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 568).

Engels insisted on the "Introduction" being published in full. In 1895 it was published in the journal *Die Neue Zeit*, but with considerable deletions, these at the instance of the German Social-Democratic Party leadership. Seeking to justify their reformist tactics, the leaders of German Social-Democracy subsequently began to interpret their version of the "Introduction" as Engels's renunciation of revolution, armed uprisings and barricade fighting. The original text of the "Introduction" was first published in the Soviet Union in 1955 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 118-38). p. 95

[43] *Millerandism*—an opportunist trend named after the French "socialist" Millerand, who in 1899 joined the reactionary bourgeois government of France and helped the bourgeoisie in conducting its policy.

The admissibility of socialists' participation in bourgeois governments was discussed at the Paris Congress of the Second International in 1900. The Congress adopted Kautsky's conciliatory resolution condemning socialists' participation in bourgeois governments but permitting it in certain "exceptional" cases. The French socialists used this proviso to justify their joining the bourgeois government at the beginning of the First World War. p. 97

[44] See F. Engels, *Socialism in Germany*, Section 1. p. 97

[45] *Iskra* (The Spark)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900. It played a decisive part in the establishment of the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class. The first issue appeared in Leipzig in December 1900; it was subsequently published in Munich, in London (from July 1902) and in Geneva (from the spring of 1903). On Lenin's initiative and with his direct participation, the *Iskra* editorial board drew up the Party programme which was published in *Iskra* No. 21, and prepared the second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which marked the beginning of a revolutionary Marxist party in Russia. Soon after the Congress, the Mensheviks, helped by Plekhanov, gained control of *Iskra*, so that, beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* ceased being an organ of revolutionary Marxism. p. 98

[46] *The Mountain (Montagne) and the Gironde*—the two political groups of the bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution of 1789. The Montagnards, or Jacobins, was the name given to the more resolute representatives of the bourgeoisie, the revolution-

ary class of the time, who stood for the abolition of absolutism and the feudal system. Unlike the Jacobins, the Girondists vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution, and sought agreement with the monarchy.

Lenin called the opportunist trend in Social-Democracy the "socialist Gironde", and the revolutionary Social-Democrats the "proletarian Jacobins", "the Mountain". After the R.S.D.L.P. split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin frequently stressed that the Mensheviks represented the Girondist trend in the working-class movement. p. 98

[47] *Ivan Ivanovich* and *Ivan Nikiforovich*—characters in Gogol's *Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich*. The quarrel between these two provincial landowners, whose names have become proverbial, started on a most insignificant pretext, and dragged on endlessly. p. 99

[48] *The International Socialist Bureau*—the executive body of the Second International, established by decision of the Paris Congress of 1900. From 1905 Lenin was member of the I.S.B. as representative of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 100

[49] Nicholas II (1868-1918)—tsar of Russia (1894-1917). p. 102

[50] *The Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary landowners' organisation, which was founded in May 1906. The Council exercised considerable influence over the policy of the tsarist government. Lenin called it the "Council of the United Feudalists". p. 103

[51] *Radishchev, A. N.* (1749-1802)—Russian writer and revolutionary. In his famous work *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*, he launched the first public attack on serfdom in Russia. By order of Catherine II he was sentenced to death for the book, but the sentence was commuted to 10 years' exile in Siberia. He returned from exile under an amnesty, but committed suicide when faced with the threat of fresh persecution. Lenin regarded Radishchev an outstanding representative of the Russian people. p. 103

[52] *Decembrists*—Russian revolutionary noblemen, who in December 1825 rose in revolt against the autocracy and the serf-owning system. p. 103

[53] *Commoners* (*raznochintsi* in Russian)—the Russian commoner-intellectuals, drawn from the petty townsfolk, the clergy, the merchant classes and the peasantry, as distinct from those coming from the nobility. p. 103

[54] A quotation from Chernyshevsky's novel *The Prologue*. p. 103

[55] *Purishkevich, V. M.* (1870-1920)—big landowner, Black-Hundred reactionary, and monarchist. p. 105

[56] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, p. 201. p. 105

[57] The Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma were arrested on the night of November 5-6 (18-19),1914. The pretext for their arrest was their participation in a conference they convened in the village of Ozerki, near Petrograd.

Held on November 2-4 (15-17), the conference was attended by representatives of the Bolshevik organisations of Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kharkov and Riga, as well as by the Duma Bolshevik deputies.

Warned by an agent provocateur the police swooped down on Ozerki when the conference had just completed its work. During the search of G. I. Petrovsky, A. Y. Badayev and other Duma Bolshevik deputies, the police found Lenin's theses on the war and the newspaper Sotsial-Demokrat No. 33, which carried the manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian-Social-Democracy". All participants in the conference were arrested, but the Duma Bolshevik deputies, who enjoyed parliamentary immunity, escaped arrest. Two days later, however, they too were arrested, tried and exiled for life to Eastern Siberia. Lenin devoted to the trial of the Bolshevik deputies the article "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group", which was published in Sotsial-Demokrat No. 40, March 29, 1915 (see this volume, pp. 171-77). p. 108

[58] The Congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party was held in Stockholm on November 23,1914. The main item on the agenda dealt with the attitude towards the war. A. G. Shlyapnikov, who brought the Congress a message of greetings from the R.S.D.L.P's Central Committee, read a declaration calling for a struggle to be waged against the imperialist war and branding the treachery of the leaders of the German Social-Democrats and the socialist parties of other countries, who had turned social-chauvinist. Branting, leader of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party's Right wing, moved that regret be expressed at the section of the declaration condemning the conduct of German Social-Democracy, asserting that "it does not befit" the Congress "to reprehend other parties". Höglund, leader of the Left Social-Democrats, came out against Branting's proposal, and declared that many Swedish Social-Democrats shared the view expressed in the declaration of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee. However, Branting's proposal was carried by a majority of votes. Y. Larin addressed the Congress on behalf of the Menshevik Organising Committee. A report on the Congress was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36, January 9, 1915. p. 108

[59] *The Organizing Committee*—the Menshevik guiding centre, was established at a conference of the Menshevik liquidators and all anti-Party groups and trends, held in August 1912. It existed until the election of the Central Committee of the Menshevik party in August 1917.

Belenin—A. G. Shlyapnikov. p. 108

[60] *Sotsial-Demokrat*—Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., published illegally from February 1908 to January 1917. In all, 58 issues appeared. The first issue was published in Russia, and the rest abroad, first in Paris and then in Geneva. According to the decision of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee, the editorial board was composed of representatives of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats.

The newspaper published over 80 articles and items by Lenin. While on the editorial board, Lenin maintained a consistent Bolshevik stand. Some editors (including Kamenev and Zinoviev) took a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and tried to disrupt Lenin's line. The Menshevik editors Martov and Dan sabotaged the work of the editorial board and openly defended liquidationism in their factional newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*.

Because of Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators Martov and Dan walked out of the editorial board, in June 1911. Beginning with December 1911 Lenin became editor of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 108

[61] Lenin is referring to the Caucasian Menshevik liquidators, the Bund (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia), and representatives of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, who supported the liquidators. p. 108

[62] The reference is to the reply of the St. Petersburg liquidators (Potresov, Maslov, Cherevanin and others) to Vandervelde's telegram urging Russian Social-Democrats to abstain from opposing the war. In their reply, the Russian liquidators approved Belgian, French and English socialists joining bourgeois governments, and declared that in their activities in Russia they were not opposed to the war. p. 112

[63] *Berner Tagwacht*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, founded in Berne in 1893. In the early days of the First World War, it published articles by Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and other Left Social-Democrats. Following 1917 the newspaper openly supported social-chauvinists.

Today the newspaper's line coincides on the main issues with that of the bourgeois press. p. 112

[64] The Menshevik Organising Committee announced the forthcoming publication of its organ *Otkliki* (Echoes), which, however, never appeared. p. 113

[65] *Mysl* (Thought)—a daily Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper published in Paris from November 1914 to March 1915. p. 113

[66] *Trudoviks*—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the State Duma consisting of peasants and intellectuals of a Narodnik trend. The Trudovik group was formed in April 1906 of peasant deputies

to the First Duma. In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats.

During the First World War, most of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 114

[67] Lenin is referring to the resolution "The Narodniks" which he wrote and which was adopted by the joint Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee and Party officials held between September 23 and October 1 (October 6-14), 1913, in the village of Poronin (near Cracow). For reasons of secrecy, the conference was called the "Summer" or "August" Conference. See the resolution in Volume 19 of the present edition, pp. 429-31. p. 114

[68] Lenin wrote this article in connection with the speech delivered by the Menshevik Y. Larin on November 23 (New Style), 1914, at the Congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party in Stockholm.

The fourteen conditions of unity listed by Lenin are taken from his "Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference and Instructions to the C.C. Delegation" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 495-535). p. 115

[69] *The "July Third" (Brussels) bloc* was formed at the Brussels "Unity" Conference called by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau on July 16-18, 1914, for an "exchange of opinions" on the restoration of unity within the R.S.D.L.P. The delegates represented the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), the Organising Committee (Mensheviks), and the affiliated organisations—the Caucasian Regional Committee and the *Borba* group, that is, the Trotskyites, the Duma Social-Democratic group (Mensheviks), Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* group, the *Vperyod* group, the Bund, the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Area, the Social-Democrats of Lithuania, the Polish Social-Democrats, the Polish Social-Democratic opposition and the P.S.P. (the Left wing).

Though the Conference had been called only for an exchange of opinions and was not intended to adopt any binding decisions, Kautsky's resolution on the unification of the R.S.D.L.P. was put to the vote. Though the Bolsheviks and the Lettish Social-Democrats refused to vote, the resolution was carried by a majority. p. 115

[70] The Left wing of the petty-bourgeois nationalist Polish Socialist Party arose as an independent faction in 1906, after the split in the P.S.P. Though it did not fully reject nationalism, the Left wing renounced a number of the P.S.P.'s nationalist demands and terrorist methods of struggle. On questions of tactics it stood close to the Russian Menshevik liquidators and joined forces with the latter against the Bolsheviks. During the First World War most of the Left wingers adopted an internationalist stand and drew close to the Polish Social-Democratic Party. In December 1918, the Left wing of the P.S.P. and the Polish Social-Democratic Party founded the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. p. 115

[71] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal monthly of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. The liquidators in Russia centred around this journal. p. 115

[72] *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* (Our Workers' Newspaper)—a daily newspaper of the Menshevik liquidators, published legally in St. Petersburg from May to July 1914. p. 115

[73] The Menshevik liquidators came out against the legal Insurance Council, calling upon the workers to defy its decisions. The Council was elected by the St. Petersburg workers in March 1914 according to lists submitted by the Bolsheviks (Pravdists). p. 116

[74] *Strakhovaniye Rabochikh* (Workers' Insurance)—a journal published by the Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg from December 1912 to June 1918. p. 116

[75] *The Chkheidze group*—the Menshevik group in the Fourth Duma led by N. S. Chkheidze. During the First World War the group took a Centrist stand, but actually gave full support to the policy of the Russian social-chauvinists. p. 116

[76] *The Triple Entente*—the imperialist bloc of Britain, France and tsarist Russia which took final shape in 1907, and was opposed to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The emergence of the Triple Entente was preceded by the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-93 and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. The formation of the Entente was concluded by the signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. During the First World War the military and political alliance between Britain, France and Russia was joined by the United States, Japan, Italy and other countries. p. 118

[77] See Engels's letter to Marx of August 15, 1870. p. 119

[78] Lenin is referring to Engels's work "The Po and the Rhine". p. 119

[79] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 227. p. 121

[80] *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word)—a Menshevik Trotskyite daily published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916, instead of the newspaper *Golos*.

Lenin's letter to the newspaper was written in reply to the *Nashe Slovo* editors' proposal for joint action against social-patriotism, in connection with the forthcoming London conference of Entente Socialists. Lenin agreed to the proposal and submitted a draft declaration addressed to the London Conference. He criticised the social-chauvinist position of the Menshevik Organising Committee and the Bund, whom the *Nashe Slovo* editors had approached with the same proposal. *Nashe Slovo*'s editors did not accept Lenin's declaration, but drew up one of their own.

Following the London Conference, the *Nashe Slovo* editors again proposed to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. that a joint conference of "internationalists" be held so as to define the attitude towards the war and the social-chauvinists. In his reply to the *Nashe Slovo* editors dated March 10 (23), 1915 (see pp. 165-68 of this volume), Lenin laid down a number of fundamental conditions for a union of genuine internationalists. Since the *Nashe Slovo* editors came out in defence of the Organising Committee and the Bund, Lenin discontinued the talks.

Nashe Slovo's attempts at unification ended in an "ideological-political fiasco", as Lenin put it. Lenin discussed this question in the following works published herein: "On the London Conference" (pp. 178-80), "The Question of the Unity of Internationalists" (pp. 188-91), "The Collapse of Platonic Internationalism" (pp. 194-98), "The State of Affairs in Russian Social-Democracy" (pp. 281-86) and "Socialism and War" (pp. 335-38). p. 125

[81] The London Conference of Socialists of the "allied countries" of the Triple Entente met on February 14, 1915. Its delegates represented the social-chauvinists and the pacifist groups of the Socialist parties of Britain, France, Belgium, as well as the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries

Though the Bolsheviks were not invited to the Conference, Litvinov (Maximovich) presented to the Conference the declaration of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which was based on Lenin's draft. The declaration demanded the withdrawal of socialists from bourgeois governments and a complete rupture with the imperialists; it called for an end to co-operation with the imperialist governments, a resolute struggle against the latter, and condemnation of voting for war credits. The chairman interrupted Litvinov as he was reading the declaration, and deprived him of the right to speak. The latter handed the declaration over to the presidium and left the Conference hall.

See Lenin's articles "The London Conference" and "On the London Conference" (pp. 132-34, 178-80 of this volume). p. 125

[82] On August 4, 1914, the German Social-Democratic parliamentary party voted for war credits for the Kaiser's Government. p. 130

[83] *J. Gardenin*—leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' party V. Chernov. p. 131

[84] *Ropshin*—the Socialist-Revolutionary B. Savinkov. p. 131

[85] *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary)—a literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg in 1911-15. A group of Menshevik liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular-Socialists, and Left liberals formed around the journal, which had no roots whatever in the working-class masses. In 1914, Lenin defined its trend as a blend of Narodism and Marxism. p. 131

[86] *Maximovich*—M. M. Litvinov. p. 132

[87] *Labour Leader*—a weekly published since 1891; since 1893, organ of the Independent Labour Party of Britain. As from 1922, the newspaper appeared under the name of *New Leader* and in 1946 it became the *Socialist Leader*. p. 134

[88] A number of changes were made in Lenin's article "Under a False Flag" by the editors of the *Collection* issued in March 1917 by *Priliv* Publishers. p. 135

[89] *Nashe Dyelo* (Our Cause)—a monthly of the Menshevik liquidators; mouthpiece of social-chauvinists in Russia. It began publication in 1915 in Petrograd to replace *Nasha Zarya*, which had been suppressed in October 1914. p. 137

[90] *Obshcho Dyelo* (The Common Cause) adherents (also known as *Shiroki* socialists)—an opportunist trend in Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party. The journal *Obshcho Dyelo* was published from 1900 onwards. After a split at the Tenth Congress of the Social-Democratic Party in 1903 in Ruse they formed a reformist Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party (of *Shiroki* socialists). During the world imperialist war of 1914-18 the *Obshcho Dyelo* adherents took a chauvinist stand.

Tesnyaki—a revolutionary trend in the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party, which in 1903 took shape as an independent Bulgarian Workers' Social-Democratic Party. The founder and leader of *Tesnyaki* was D. Blagoyev, his followers, Georgy Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov, among others, later heading that Party. In 1914-18 the *Tesnyaki* came out against the imperialist war. In 1919 they joined the Communist International and formed the Communist Party of Bulgaria. p. 155

[91] *The Daily Citizen*—originally organ of the opportunist bloc—the Labour Party, Fabians and the Independent Labour Party of Britain, published in London from 1912 to 1915. p. 156

[92] *The Daily Herald*—organ of the British Socialist Party, published in London since 1912. p. 156

[93] *The Fabians*—members of the Fabian Society, a British reformist organisation founded in 1884. The name is an allusion to the Roman commander Quintus Fabius Maximus (d. 203), called Cunctator, i.e., the Delayer, for his tactics of harassing Hannibal's army without risking a pitched battle. Most of the Society's members were bourgeois intellectuals: scholars, writers, politicians (such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw, Ramsay MacDonald), who denied the need for the class struggle of the proletariat and a socialist revolution, and insisted that the transition from capitalism to socialism lay only through petty reform and a gradual transformation of society. Lenin said it was "an *extremely opportunist* trend" (see present edition, Vol. 13, p. 358. The Fabian Society, which was

affiliated to the Labour Party in 1900, is one of the ideological sources of Labour Party policy.

During World War I, the Fabians took a social-chauvinist stand. For Lenin's description of the Fabians, see "British Pacifism and the British Dislike of Theory" (the present volume, pp. 260-65). p. 156

[94] The reference is to the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad, held in Berne on February 27-March 4, 1915. Convened on Lenin's initiative, it was in fact a general conference of the Party, since neither a party congress nor an all-Russia conference could be convened during the war.

The Conference was attended by representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the R.S.D.L.P. Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and delegates from R.S.D.L.P. (Bolshevik) groups in Paris, Zurich, Geneva, Berne, Lausanne and from the Baugy group. Lenin was delegated by the Central Committee and the Central Organ, directed the work of the Conference, and made a report on the main item on the agenda, "The War and the Tasks of the Party". The Conference adopted resolutions on war as drafted by Lenin. p. 158

[95] *Pravda*—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg. Founded in April 1912, on the initiative of the St. Petersburg workers.

Pravda was a popular working-class newspaper, published with money collected by the workers themselves. A wide circle of worker-correspondents and worker-publicists formed around the newspaper. Over eleven thousand correspondence items from workers were published in a single year. *Pravda* had an average daily circulation of 40,000, with some issues running into 60,000 copies.

Lenin directed *Pravda* from abroad, where he was living. He wrote for the paper almost daily, gave instructions to the editorial board, and rallied the Party's best literary forces around the newspaper.

Pravda was constantly persecuted by the police. During its first year of existence it was confiscated forty-one times, and thirty-six legal actions were brought against its editors, who served prison sentences totalling forty-seven and a half months. In the course of twenty-seven months *Pravda* was banned eight times by the tsarist government, but reissued under the new names of *Rabochaya Pravda*, *Severnaya Pravda*, *Pravda Truda*, *Za Pravdu*, *Proletarskaya Pravda*, *Put Pravdy*, *Rabochy*, and *Trudovaya Pravda*. The paper was closed down on July 8 (21), 1914, on the eve of World War I.

Publication was not resumed until after the February Revolution. Beginning from March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* appeared as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin joined the editorial board on April 5 (18), on his return from abroad, and took over the paper's management. On July 5 (18), 1917, the *Pravda* editorial office was raided by military cadets and Cossacks. In July-October 1817 *Pravda* frequently changed its name as a result of persecution by the Provisional Government. It appeared successively under the names

of *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy*, and *Rabochy Put*. On October 27 (November 9) the newspaper began to appear under its former name—*Pravda*. p. 164

[96] The document has no heading. The title has been provided by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U. p. 165

[97] This refers to the *Information Bulletin*, an organ of the Bund Organisation Abroad. It was published in Geneva from June 1911 to June 1916. In all eleven issues appeared.

It was succeeded by the *Bulletin of the Bund Committee Abroad*. Only two issues appeared, in September and December 1916. p. 166

[98] The reference is to the Copenhagen Conference of Socialists of Neutral Countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland), which took place on January 17-18, 1915, with the aim of restoring the Second International. The Conference resolved to appeal, through the socialist parties' members of parliaments, to the respective governments, offering to act as mediators between the belligerent countries and attempt to bring about the termination of the war. p. 167

[99] The trial of the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma (A. E. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov, N. R. Shagov) and other Social-Democrats, who took part in the illegal Party Conference in Ozerki, took place on February 10 (23), 1915. The case was tried by the Special Court in Petrograd. They were charged under Article 102, i.e., accused of participation in an organisation aiming at the overthrow of the existing state system. The main circumstantial evidence against the Bolshevik deputies was Lenin's theses "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War" and the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. manifesto "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", which were confiscated during the search. (These documents are published in this volume, pp. 15-19, 25-34.)

The five Bolshevik deputies were exiled for life to Turukhansk Territory (Eastern Siberia). p. 171

[100] *Dyen* (Day)—a daily of a bourgeois-liberal trend, which began publication in St. Petersburg in 1912. Among its contributors were Menshevik liquidators, who took over complete control of the paper after February 1917. Closed down by the Revolutionary-Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 172

[101] *Rech* (Speech)—the central daily newspaper of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906 onwards. It was suppressed by the Revolutionary-Military Committee of the

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Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917, but continued to appear under other names until August 1918. p. 172

[102] *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Northern Gazette)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from January to May 1914. p. 174

[103] *L'Echo de Paris*—an extremely reactionary bourgeois daily, published in Paris from 1884 to 1938.

Le Temps—a bourgeois daily, published in Paris from 1861 to 1942. Lenin is referring to the two articles on the London Conference, published in this newspaper on February 15 and 16, 1915. p. 178

[104] *Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires*—a bourgeois weekly published in Paris from 1894 to 1934. Lenin is referring to the article "The London Conference of Socialists" published in its issue of Febuary 19, 1915. p. 178

[105] *Izvestia of the Secretariat Abroad of the O.C. R.S.D.L.P.* was published in Switzerland by the Menshevik Organising Committee from February 1915 to March 1917. p. 179

[106] *Tägliche Rundschau* (Daily Review)—a daily of a bourgeois nationalist trend, published in Berlin from October 1880 onwards. In 1922 it was sold to *Deutsche Allgemeine-Zeitung*. From December 1924 to 1928 it appeared under the name of Neue Tägliche Rundschau. It ceased publication in 1933. p. 181

[107] This refers to the October all-Russia political strike and the December armed uprising in Moscow, in 1905. p. 186

[108] Lenin is referring to Nasha Zarya, a journal of the Menshevik liquidators. p. 189

[109] *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* (Problems of Insurance)—a Bolshevik legal journal, published at intervals in St. Petersburg from October 1913 to March 1918. It worked, not only for the achievement of workers' insurance, but also for the Bolshevik "uncurtailed slogans" of an eight-hour day, confiscation of the landed estates, and a democratic republic. The Bolsheviks A. N. Vinokurov, N. A. Skripnik, P. I. Stučka, N. M. Shvernik and others contributed to the journal. p. 191

[110] *Severny Golos* (Voice of the North)—Menshevik weekly, published in Petrograd from January to March 1915. p. 191

[111] *The Economist*—a bourgeois weekly published in London since 1843. p. 192

[112] The reference is to the Governor of the town of S., a character in Turgenev's story *Virgin Soil*. p. 195

[113] *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays)—a monthly, organ of the Left Social-Democrats in Germany (International Socialists of Germany), published at intervals from 1913 to 1921 in Berlin. Its editor-in-chief was J. Borhardt. p. 195

[114] *Die Internationale*—a journal founded by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring. Only one issue appeared, in Berlin, April 1915. It resumed publication in Munich in 1922 under the name of *Futurus*. p. 195

[115] This refers to the phrase in Saltykov-Shchedrin's "Miscellaneous Letters"—the writing is the business of the writer; the reader's job is to do the reading. p. 198

[116] This refers to the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which took place in Prague on January 5-17 (18-30), 1912. p. 198

[117] The International Conference of Socialist Women held in Berne on March 26-28, 1915, dealt with the attitude to the war. It was convened on the initiative of the women organisations attached to the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., with the active participation of Clara Zetkin, leader of the international women's movement. Twenty-nine delegates from Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Switzerland, Russia and Poland attended the Conference, the Russian delegation including N. K. Krupskaya and Inessa Armand.

The report on the International Conference of Socialist Women was published in the Supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 42 of June 1, 1915. p. 199

[118] The Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party, held on September 15-21, 1912, passed a resolution "On Imperialism", which said that the imperialist states were pursuing "a policy of shameless plunder and annexations" and called upon the party "to fight imperialism with greater energy".

During World War I leaders of the Second International treacherously violated the decisions of the international socialist congresses, in particular, those adopted in Chemnitz. p. 208

[119] On Struvism, see this volume, pp. 221-23. p. 213

[120] *Zhizn* (Life)—a newspaper of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published between March 1915 and January 1916, first in Paris and later in Geneva taking the place of newspaper *Mysl* which was closed down in 1915. p. 221

[121] *The man in a muffler*—a character in Chekhov's story of the same name, typifying a narrow-minded philistine who is afraid of innovations and any initiative. p. 227

[122] The quotation is from Goethe. p. 231

[123] *The Bulygin Duma*—a consultative Duma, the laws for the elections and convocation of which were drafted by a commission headed by A. G. Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, and published on August 6 (19),1905. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Bulygin Duma, and the government failed to convene it. The Duma was swept away by the October general political strike. p. 233

[124] *Le Socialisme*—a journal edited and published in Paris between 1907 and June 1914 by the French socialist Jules Guesde. p. 239

[125] *Pravdism*, i.e., Bolshevism (from the name of the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*). p. 245

[126] *Novo Vreme* (New Times)—a scientific and theoretical journal of the revolutionary wing of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaki), founded by Dimitr Blagoyev in 1897 in Plovdiv and later published in Sofia. In 1903 the journal became the organ of the Bulgarian Workers' Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaki). Its publication ceased in February 1916 but was resumed in 1919. The editor was Dimitr Blagoyev, its contributors including Georgiyev, Kirkov, Kabakchiev, Kolarov and Petrov. In 1923 the journal was suppressed by the Bulgarian reactionary government. Since 1947 Novo Vreme—the monthly theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. p. 246

[127] This refers to the manifesto "The Chief Enemy Is in Our Own Country", written by Karl Liebknecht. p. 248

[128] *Preussische Jahrbücher*—a monthly of a conservative trend, organ of the German capitalists and landowners, published in Berlin from 1858 to 1935. p. 249

[129] *Gaponade*—derived from the name of Gapon, a priest of the Orthodox Church. On the eve of the first Russian revolution he founded the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers, with the aim of distracting the workers from the revolutionary struggle. In so doing he acted on instructions from the tsarist secret police. On January 9, 1905, Gapon, taking advantage of the growing unrest, provoked the workers into demonstrating before the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg for the purpose of presenting a petition to the tsar. By order of Nicholas II, troops fired at the unarmed demonstrators. This act destroyed the naïve faith of workers throughout the country in the tsar, and served as the starting-point of the first Russian revolution. The political consciousness of the proletariat was aroused and a wave of protest strikes swept Russia. p. 258

[130] On Economism, see this volume, pp. 331-32. p. 258

[131] *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought)—an Economists' paper, published from 1897 to 1902. In his *Iskra* articles and his book

What Is To Be Done? Lenin criticised *Rabochaya Mysl* views as a Russian variety of international opportunism. p. 259

[132] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (The Workers' Cause)—a journal of the Economists, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It was published at irregular intervals in Geneva from 1899 to 1902. Lenin criticised the views voiced by the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group, in a number of articles published in *Iskra* and in his book *What Is To Be Done?* p. 259

[133] *The New Statesman*—a Fabian weekly, founded in 1913 in London. Since 1931, published under the name of *New Statesman and Nation*. p. 261

[134] *Bukvoyed*—D. Ryazanov. p. 275

[135] This refers to the tsar's manifesto promulgated on October 17 (30), 1905. It promised "civil liberties" and a "legislative Duma". The manifesto was a concession wrested from the tsarist regime by the revolution, but that concession by no means decided the fate of the revolution as the liberals and Mensheviks claimed. The Bolsheviks exposed the real meaning of the Manifesto and called upon the masses to continue the struggle and overthrow the autocracy.

The first Russian revolution exerted a great revolutionising influence on the working-class movement in other countries, in particular in Austria-Hungary. Lenin pointed out that the news about the tsar's concession and his manifesto, with its promise of "liberties", "played a decisive part in the final victory of universal suffrage in Austria".

Mass demonstrations took place in Vienna and other industrial cities in Austria-Hungary. In Prague barricades were put up. As a result, universal suffrage was introduced in Austria. p. 277

[136] Lenin is referring to the Menshevik liquidators expelled from the R.S.D.L.P. at the Prague Conference, in January 1912. p. 282

[137] The allusion is to Krylov's fable "The Quartet". p. 283

[138] The reference is to the Conference of socialists of Germany and Austria-Hungary, held in Vienna in April 1915. The Conference approved of the social-chauvinist stand taken by the leadership of the German and Austrian socialist parties, which justified the war and stated, in their resolutions, that this did not run counter to proletarian unity and to the workers' international solidarity in the struggle for peace. p. 289

[139] *A. P.*—Anton Pannekoek, the Dutch Left socialist. p. 290

[140] Lenin decided to write the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. Towards the War*) in connection with the preparations for the First International Socialist Conference.

G. Y. Zinoviev helped write the pamphlet though most of it was drawn up by Lenin, who, moreover, edited the entire text.

The pamphlet was published in German in September 1915 and distributed among delegates to the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference. In 1916 it was published in French. p. 295

[141] *The International Socialist Conference*, held in Zimmerwald on September 5-8,1915, was the first conference of internationalists in wartime. Attended by 38 delegates from 11 European countries the Conference discussed the following questions: (1) reports of delegates from the various countries, (2) the joint declaration of delegates from Germany and France, (3) the motion tabled by the Zimmerwald Left that a resolution be adopted on basic principles, (4) the Manifesto, (5) the election of the International Socialist Committee (I.S.C.), (6) a resolution of sympathy with war victims and the persecuted.

A struggle flared up at the Conference between the revolutionary internationalists headed by Lenin, and the Kautskyite majority. Lenin formed the Left group at the Conference, in which the Bolsheviks alone adhered to the only correct and consistently internationalist stand against the war. For Lenin's appraisal of the Conference, see his articles "The First Step" and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Conference, September 5-8, 1915" (in the present volume, pp. 383-88, 389-93). p. 298

[142] See Karl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Bd. 1, S. 28, Berlin, 1902. p. 304

[143] *The Quadruple Entente*—an imperialist alliance of Britain, France, Russia and Italy. The latter joined the Triple Entente after breaking away from the Triple Alliance. p. 305

[144] *Brentanoism*—a bourgeois reformist teaching of the German economist Lujo Brentano, a variety of the bourgeois distortion of Marxism. Brentano advocated a "class truce" in capitalist society, insisted on the possibility of the social contradictions of capitalism being overcome without resorting to class struggle, and maintained that the solution of the working-class problem lay in the organisation of reformist trade unions and the introduction of factory legislation and that the interests of workers and capitalists could be reconciled.

Under the guise of Marxist phrases, Brentano and his followers tried to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. p. 311

[145] *Novosti* (News)—a Socialist-Revolutionary daily published in Paris between August 1914 and May 1915. p. 318

[146] *Proletarsky Golos* (The Proletarian Voice)—an illegal paper published by the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., between

February 1915 and December 1916. Four issues appeared, the Manifesto of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", being published in Issue No. 1. p. 320

[147] See Note 98. p. 325

[148] This refers to the International Socialist Youth Conference on the attitude towards the war, held on April 4-6, 1915, in Berne. The Conference was attended by representatives of youth organisation from ten countries: Russia, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, Bulgaria Germany, Poland, Italy, Denmark and Sweden. The Conference passed a decision to celebrate International Youth Day annually, and elected the International Bureau of Socialist Youth, which began publication of *Jugend-Internationale* (The Youth International) in compliance with Conference decisions. V. I. Lenin and Karl Liebknecht contributed to this journal. p. 325

[149] *The Tribunists*—members of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, whose mouthpiece was the newspaper *De Tribune*. Their leaders were D. Wijnkoop, Anton Pannekoek, Herman Gorter and Henriette Roland-Holst. Though not a consistent revolutionary party, the Tribunists formed the Left wing of the labour movement in Holland, and during the world imperialist war (1914-18) they adhered to internationalist principles . In 1918 the Tribunists founded the Dutch Communist Party. p. 328

[150] *Luch* (Ray)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from September 1912 to July 1913.

The newspaper was maintained chiefly by contributions from the liberals. p. 333

[151] *Marxism and Liquidationism. A Symposium of Articles on the Fundamental Issues of the Modern Labour Movement*. Part II was published in July 1914, by Priboi, the Party's publishing house.

A number of articles by Lenin directed against liquidators were published in this symposium. Lenin is referring to the following articles in the symposium: "The Working Class and Its Press", and "How the Workers Responded to the Formation of the R.S.D.L. Group in the Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 363-71 and 536-43). p. 334

[152] *Leipziger Volkszeitung*—a daily of the Left German Social-Democrats, published from 1894 to 1933. For many years Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg were its editors. From 1917 to 1922 it was the organ of the German Independents. After 1922 it became the organ of the Right-wing Social-Democrats. p. 334

[153] *An*—leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks N. N. Jordania. p. 336

[154] *Internationale Korrespondentz*—a weekly of a social-chauvinist trend dealing with problems of world politics and the working-class movement, published in Berlin from 1914 to 1917. p. 337

[155] *Sovremenny Mir* (The Contemporary World)—a literary, scientific and political journal published in St. Petersburg from 1906 to 1918. Its chief contributors were Mensheviks, including Plekhanov. Bolsheviks contributed to the journal during the bloc with the Plekhanovites, and in early 1914. During World War I (1914-18) it became the organ of the social-chauvinists. p. 337

[156] *Petrova*—Inessa Armand. p. 372

[157] *La Sentinelle*—organ of the Social-Democratic organisation of Neuchâtel Canton, French-speaking Switzerland, published at Chaux-de-Fonds from 1890 onwards. Pursued an internationalist policy in the first years of World War I (1914-18) and its November 13, 1914 issue (No. 265) carried an abridged version of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Manifesto, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" (see pp. 27-34 of this volume). p. 375

[158] Lenin is referring to Karl Liebknecht's letter of September 2, 1915, addressed to the Zimmerwald International Socialist Conference, which was not published at the time. Liebknecht was unable to take part in the Conference because he was called to the colours as a private, early in 1915. In his letter, Liebknecht called upon the delegates to strive, not for a "class truce" but for civil war, the international unity of socialists of all belligerent countries, a struggle against the imperialist war and a break with the social-chauvinists. The letter was welcomed by most of the delegates. p. 375

[159] Lenin is referring to the Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee in Berne ("*Bulletin*" *Internationale sozialistische Kommission zu Bern*), the Executive of the Zimmerwald organisation. The *Bulletin* was published from September 1915 to January 1917 in English, French and German. Six issues appeared. p. 377

[160] This refers to the period of the Stolypin reaction ushered in by the coup d'état of June 3.

On June 3 (16), 1907, the tsar issued a manifesto dissolving the Second Duma and modifying the electoral law. The new law considerably increased the Duma representation of the landowners and of the trade and industrial bourgeoisie, and greatly reduced the number of peasants' and workers' representatives, which was small enough as it was. This was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 and the Fundamental Law of 1906 by which no laws could be passed by the government without approval by the Duma. The Third Duma, which was elected on the basis of this law and convened on November 1 (14), 1907, was a Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma. p. 381

[161] The Conference of the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia met in July 1915 in Petrograd. The Conference discussed the question of the attitude towards the war and adopted a resolution which called for active participation in the war on the side of tsarism. p. 387

[162] *The French General Confederation of Labour* (Conféderation Général du Travail) was founded in 1895 and strongly influenced by anarcho-syndicalists and reformists. Its leaders recognised only the economic struggle, and opposed the proletarian Party's leadership of the trade union movement. During World War I its leaders sided with the imperialist bourgeoisie. p. 391

[163] See Note 129. p. 392

[164] *War industries committees* were established in Russia in 1915 by the imperialist bourgeoisie. In an attempt to bring the workers under their influence and inculcate defencist sentiments, the bourgeoisie decided to organise "workers' groups" in these committees. It was to the bourgeoisie's advantage to have workers' representatives in these groups, who would call upon the workers to raise labour productivity in the war industries. The Mensheviks took an active part in this pseudo-patriotic measure initiated by the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks' boycott of the committees was supported by the majority of workers. At a worker delegates' meeting in Petrograd on September 27 (October 10), 1915, the Bolshevik resolution calling for a boycott and for a revolutionary way out of the war obtained 95 votes to the Mensheviks' 81. Only at a second meeting, held without the pro-Bolshevik delegates, were the Mensheviks, led by Gvozdev and an *agent provocateur* Abrosimov, able to elect a "workers' group" of ten.

As a result of Bolshevik propaganda, elections to the "workers' groups" were held in only 70 areas out of a total of 239, and workers representatives were actually elected only in 36 areas. p. 401

[165] *Markov, N. E.*— a reactionary politician of tsarist Russia, big landowner and Deputy from Kursk Gubernia to the Third and Fourth Dumas. p. 402

[166] The programme of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted at the Second Congress of the Party in 1903 consisted of two parts: a minimum programme calling for the overthrow of tsarism, for a democratic republic, the eight-hour day and other demands attainable under capitalism and a maximum programme, formulating the ultimate goal of the working class, viz., socialist revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, the building of a socialist society. p. 404

[167] *Parabellum*—K. Radek. p. 407

[168] See Marx's letters to Engels of June 7 and 20, 1866 and of November 2, 1867. p. 410

[169] *Prizyv* (The Call)—a weekly published in Paris by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, from October 1915 to March 1917. The reference is to Plekhanov's article "Two Lines in the Revolution", published in this newspaper on October 17, 1915. p. 415

[170] *Die Glocke* (The Bell)—a fortnightly journal published in Munich and later in Berlin 1915-25 by Parvus (Alexander Gelfand), a social-

chauvinist member of the German Social-Democratic Party and an agent of German imperialism. p. 421

[171] *Volksstimme* (The People's Voice)—an organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Chemnitz from 1891 onwards. p. 422

[172] The letter is a reply to the league's leaflet received by Lenin in November 1915. The letter is published in full for the first time. p. 423

[173] *The Socialist Party of America* was formed in July 1901 at the congress in Indianapolis as a result of a merger of groups that had broken away from the Socialist Labour Party and the Social-Democratic Party in the U.S.A., among whose founders was Eugene Debs, the popular American labour leader. He was one of the founders of the new party. The social composition of the party was motley: native-born and immigrant workers, small farmers, and people with a petty-bourgeois background. The Centrist and Right-opportunist leaders of the party (V.-L. Berger, Morris Hillquit and others) denied the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, refrained from revolutionary methods of struggle and confined the Party's activities to participation in elections. During World War I three trends formed within the Socialist Party: the social-chauvinists, who supported the government's imperialist policy, the Centrists, who opposed the imperialist war only in word, and the revolutionary minority, who held an internationalist stand and fought against the war. Led by Charles Ruthenberg, William Foster, Bill Haywood and others and with the support of proletarian elements, the Left wing of the Socialist Party waged a struggle against the opportunist leadership of the party, for the workers' independent political activity, and for the formation of industrial trade unions based on the principles of the class struggle. In 1919 the Left-wing split away from the S.P., initiated the formation of the American Communist Party, and became its core.

At present the Socialist Party is a small sectarian organisation.

The Socialist Labour Party of America was formed in 1876 at a congress in Philadelphia, as a result of a merger of the American Sections of the First International and other socialist organisations. The work of the congress was guided by F. A. Sorge, an associate of Marx and Engels. Most of the Party's members were immigrants who had weak links with the American workers. During the first years its leadership was dominated by Lassalleans, who made mistakes of a sectarian and dogmatic nature. Some of the party's leaders considered parliamentary activity the main party task, and underestimated the significance of party guidance of the economic struggle of the masses, while others fell into trade-unionism and anarchism. The ideological and tactical vacillations of its leadership resulted in a number of groups splitting away from the party. Marx and Engels severely criticised the sectarian tactics of American socialists.

In the nineties the leadership of the S.L.P. was taken over by its Left wing under D. De Leon who committed anarcho-syndicalist errors. The S.L.P. refused to fight for working-class partial demands, refused to work in the reformist trade unions, and continued losing its ties with the mass working-class movement, weak as they were. During World War I the Socialist Labour Party inclined towards internationalism. Under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution its more revolutionary section actively participated in forming the Communist Party of the U.S.A. At present the S.L.P. is a small organisation without any influence on the U.S. labour movement in the U.S.A. p. 427

[174] *Rabocheye Utro* (The Workers' Morning)—a Menshevik legal daily published in Petrograd from October to December 1915. p. 430

[175] *Petrushka*—a character in Gogol's novel, Dead Souls, who enjoy the process of reading printed matter, without troubling to understand the meaning of what he reads. He keeps on marvelling at the way letters make up words. p. 430

[176] This refers to Trotsky, who in 1910 contributed an anonymous and slanderous article on the state of affairs in the R.S.D.L.P. to the German Social-Democratic *Vorwärts*. At the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International Lenin, Plekhanov and a representative of Polish Social-Democrats exposed this slander in a special statement and protested to the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party against its publication. p. 430

[177] *K. Oransky*—the Menshevik liquidator G. D. Kuchin, a contributor to *Nasha Zarya*. p. 430

[178] *Repetilov*—a character in Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 432

[179] *A. M.*—A. S. Martynov. p. 433

[180] *The August bloc*—an anti-Party bloc of liquidators, Trotskyists and other opportunists directed against the Bolsheviks. It was founded by Trotsky at a conference of anti-Party groups and trends held in Vienna in August 1912. The overwhelming majority of delegates were resident abroad and out of touch with the working class in Russia; they had no direct links with the Party work in Russia. The conference passed anti-Party liquidationist decisions on all questions of Social-Democratic tactics, and declared against the existence of an illegal Party.

The August bloc, which consisted of ill-assorted elements, soon fell apart at the impact of the Bolsheviks, who defended the illegal workers' party. p. 433

[181] See Note 90. p. 443

[182] See Engels's letters to F. A. Sorge of January 18 and November 11, 1893. p. 448

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*August 1914-December 1915*)

1914

August 23 (*September 5*)	Lenin arrives in Berne (Switzerland) from Poronin (Galicia).
August 24-26 (*September 6-8*)	Lenin reports on the attitude towards the war at a conference of the Bolsheviks, in Berne. His theses on the war are adopted as a resolution of the Social-Democratic group.
Late August-September	Lenin writes the draft of the article "The European War and International Socialism". The article was not completed.
	Lenin sends his theses on the war to Bolshevik groups abroad and to Russia for discussion by the Russian section of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Party organisations and the Duma group.
August-November 1	Lenin continues writing the article "Karl Marx" for the Granat Encyclopaedia. The article was not completed.
September 1 (*27*)	Lenin's theses on the war are discussed at the Conference of Italian and Swiss Socialists in Lugano (Switzerland). A number of the propositions contained in the theses are incorporated in the Conference resolution.
Prior to September 27 (*October 10*)	Lenin delivers a lecture on the war, in Berne.
September 27 (*October 10*)	In Berne, Lenin takes part in the discussion on V. Kosovsky's report "The War and Social-Democracy".
Prior to September 28 (*October 11*)	Lenin draws up the manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", and instructs the Geneva Bolshevik group to publish it as a pamphlet.
September 28 (*October 11*)	In Lausanne, Lenin takes part in the discussion on Plekhanov's report "The Attitude of the

	Socialists Towards the War", and criticises his chauvinist stand.
September-October	Lenin works on his pamphlet "The European War and European Socialism", collects material, makes extracts from books and articles in the Russian and foreign press, makes notes, draws up a conspectus and plan of the pamphlet. It was not written.
October 1 (14)	Lenin delivers a lecture on "The Proletariat and the War" in Lausanne.
October 2 (15)	Lenin makes a report "The European War and Socialism", in Geneva.
October 3 (16)	Lenin returns to Berne where he learns that the Russian section of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee supports his theses on the war.
October 4 (17)	Lenin decides to resume publication of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., and gives the Bolshevik group in Geneva practical instructions for its publication.
October 13 (26)	At Clarens, near Montreux (Switzerland), Lenin delivers a lecture on the war.
Not earlier than October 14 (27)	Lenin delivers a lecture "The War and Social-Democracy", in Zurich.
October 19 (November 1)	After one year's interval, publication of *Sotsial-Demokrat* is resumed under Lenin's editorship. No. 33 of the newspaper carries the manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" and the article "The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International".
Between October 29 and November 8 (November 11-21)	Lenin writes a letter to the editors of *Vorwärts* and the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* protesting against the distorted reports of his Zurich lecture on the war.
October 31 (November 13)	The manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" is published in abridged form in the Swiss newspaper *La Sentinelle*.
November 4 (17)	Lenin sends the "Karl Marx" manuscript to the publishers of the Granat Encyclopaedia in Russia.
Not later than November 5 (18)	Lenin sends the manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" to French, English and German Social-Democratic newspapers.

November 8 (21)	Lenin instructs the Bolshevik group in Geneva to arrange for Inessa Armand's lecture in French: "Various Trends Among Russian Socialists on the Question of the War".
November 22 (December 5)	Lenin's article "A German Voice on the War" is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 34.
After November 23 (December 6)	Lenin replies to a question from the British Independent Labour Party concerning the Bolsheviks' attitude towards the war and the peace programme.
November 29 (December 12)	Lenin's articles "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism (How the International Can be Restored?)" and "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 35.
December 3 (16)	Lenin criticises Martov's report "The War and the Crisis of Socialism" in Berne.
December 25 (January 7 1915)	Lenin writes a letter on behalf of the Bureau Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee condemning the separatist actions of the anti-Party Baugy group of Bukharin and Pyatakov, who intended publishing their own newspaper without a decision by the Central Committee.
December 27 (January 9, 1915)	Lenin's article "What Next? (On the Tasks Confronting the Workers' Parties with Regard to Opportunism and Social-Chauvinism)" appears in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36.
September 1914-May 1915	At the Berne Library, Lenin studies the works of Feuerbach, Hegel, Aristotle and other philosophers, collects material for his "Notebooks on Philosophy", draws up conspectuses, and writes notes on materialist dialectics.

1915

January 19 (February 1)	Lenin's articles "The Kind of 'Unity' Larin Proclaimed at the Swedish Congress" and "The Russian Brand of Südekum" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 37.
January 27 (February 9)	Lenin writes a letter to the *Nashe Slovo* editors, and a draft declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee for the London Conference of the Socialists of the Entente countries. He sends to M. M. Litvinov, the Russian representative on the International Socialist Bureau, a copy of the declaration to be read at the Conference.
February 10 (23)	Lenin addresses a joint protest meeting held in Berne by the Social-Democrats and trade union

	members, denouncing the arrest of the Bolshevik Duma deputies in Russia.
February 14-19 (February 27-March 4)	Lenin directs the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad held in Berne, makes a report on the central item of the agenda: "The War and the Tasks of the Party", and drafts the Conference resolutions.
February 18 (March 3)	Lenin's articles "How the Police and the Reactionaries Protect the Unity of German Social-Democracy" and "On the London Conference" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 39.
Not earlier than February	Lenin writes the article "Under a False Flag", which is first published in 1917 in the *Collection* of the *Priliv* Publishers in Moscow.
March 10 (23)	Lenin sends a letter to the editors of Nashe Slovo exposing the social-chauvinist views of the Menshevik Organising Committee and the Bund.
March 13-15 (26-28)	Lenin directs the work of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee's delegation to the International Socialist Women's Conference in Berne.
March 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad", "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group?", "On the London Conference" and "The Slogan of Civil War Illustrated" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40.
March 22-24 (April 4-6)	Lenin directs the work of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee's delegation to the International Socialist Youth Conference in Berne.
Not earlier than April 1 (27)	Lenin writes a conspectus of the report "May Day and the War".
April 18 (May 1)	Lenin's articles "The Social-Chauvinists' Sophisms", "The Question of the Unity of Internationalists" and "Bourgeois Philanthropists and Revolutionary Social-Democracy" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 41.
Prior to April 19 (May 2)	Lenin gives directives to the Paris Bolshevik group on setting up a club of internationalist Social-Democrats to fight social-chauvinism.
April 22 (May 5)	Lenin approves the Dutch Socialists' plan to bring out an international socialist magazine and gives practical advice concerning the publication, in foreign languages, of pamphlets against international social-chauvinism.

May 8 (21)	Lenin's article "The Collapse of Platonic Internationalism" appears in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 42.
Prior to May 9 (22)	Lenin takes part in preparations for the publication of the magazine *Kommunist*.
May 12 (25)	The Committee Abroad of Social-Democracy of the Lettish Area invites Lenin to represent Lettish Social-Democrats at a conference of socialist parties of neutral countries.
May 19 (June 1)	Lenin's article "On the Struggle Against Social-Chauvinism" appears in the Supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 42.
Prior to May 24 (June 6)	Lenin leaves Berne and goes to the mountain village of Sörenberg (Switzerland).
Second half of May-first half of June	Lenin writes the article "The Collapse of the Second International".
June-July	Lenin writes the articles "British Pacifism and the British Dislike of Theory" and "How Servility to Reaction Is Blended with Playing at Democracy".
July 13 (26)	Lenin writes the article "The Main German Opportunist Works on the War".
July-August	Lenin's articles "The Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War" and "The State of Affairs in Russian Social-Democracy" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 43.
August 7 (20)	Lenin establishes contacts, by correspondence, with Left internationalists and Social-Democrats in different countries with a view to uniting them for the forthcoming International Socialist Conference and instructs Bolshevik groups to get in touch with internationalists in different countries; he issues directives on the translation and publication of the Party's main documents—the manifesto of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee on the war, Berne Conference resolutions, etc.; he forwards to Scandinavia his "Draft Declaration of the Zimmerwald Left" for translation into the Swedish and Norwegian languages and subsequent distribution among Left Social-Democrats in Sweden and Norway; he writes the articles "The 'Peace' Slogan Appraised" and "The Question of Peace", and the pamphlet "Socialism and War".
	Lenin receives his mandate as the Lettish Social-Democratic Party's delegate to the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference.

FROM MARX TO MAO
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August 10 (23)	Lenin's article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 44.
Prior to August 20 (September 2)	Lenin arranges for the publication of the pamphlet "Socialism and War" in German, and writes the "Draft Declaration of the Zimmerwald Left".
August 20-22 (September 2-4)	Lenin comes to Zimmerwald to attend the International Socialist Conference.
August 22 (September 4)	Lenin directs a private conference of the Left Social-Democratic delegates to the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference, and speaks at the Conference on the character of the war and the tactics of international Social-Democracy.
August 23-26 (September 5-8)	Lenin takes part in the work of the Zimmerwald Conference, and organises and rallies its Left wing,
Between August 23 and 26 (September 5-8)	Lenin's pamphlet "Socialism and War" comes out in German, and is circulated among delegates to the Zimmerwald Conference.
August 29-30 (September 11-12)	*Kommunist* No. 1-2 carries Lenin's articles "The Collapse of the Second International", "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist" and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy (A Note)".
August	Lenin writes "An Appeal on the War".
Summer	Lenin writes the article "We Are Thankful for Such Frankness".
Not earlier than September 12 (25)	Lenin sends a letter to the International Socialist Committee.
Second half of September	Lenin writes the article "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis".
Between September 18 and 23 (October 1-6)	Lenin returns to Berne from Sörenberg.
September 28 (October 11)	Lenin's articles "The First Step" and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 45-46.
Autumn, not earlier than September 28 (October 11)	Lenin writes the article "Kautsky, Axelrod, and Martov—True Internationalists".

September 30 (October 13)	Lenin's article "Several Theses. Proposed by the Editors" appears in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47.
September	Lenin draws up a plan for the publication of a series of anti-war leaflets; edits Alexandra Kollontai's pamphlet "Who Needs the War", sends 500 copies of "Socialism and War" in German to Kollontai in Scandinavia for distribution there and instructs her to arrange for the English-language publication of the pamphlet in America.
Not earlier than October 16 (29)	Lenin writes the article "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination".
Late October	Lenin arranges for the publication of the draft resolution and the Manifesto of the Zimmerwald Left in German and French, and instructs Kollontai to get them published in America in English.
November 2 (15)	Lenin is invited to attend the meeting of the Executive of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, held on November 20, 1915.
November 7 (20)	Lenin's articles "On the Two Lines in the Revolution" and "At the Uttermost Limit" appear in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 48.
Prior to November 9 (22)	Lenin sends a letter to the secretary of the Socialist Propaganda League in the U.S.A.
December 8 (21)	Lenin's article "Social-Chauvinist Policy Behind a Cover of Internationalist Phrases" appears in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 49.
1915	Lenin writes the book "New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America".
End of 1915	Lenin writes the article "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International".

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 21

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

22

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From Marx to Mao

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PREFACE

Volume 22 contains works written by Lenin between December 1915 and July 1916. They include his paper, *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America*, a critique of the non-Marxist theory of the non-capitalist evolution of agriculture under capitalism.

A considerable part of the volume consists of articles substantiating and explaining Bolshevik slogans and the tasks of the proletariat during the imperialist world war of 1914-18, and exposing the avowed social-chauvinists, and also the Centrists, who were actually social-chauvinists. Among them are "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International", "The Tasks of the Opposition in France", "Peace Without Annexations and the Independence of Poland as Slogans of the Day in Russia", "Wilhelm Kolb and Georgy Plekhanov", "The Peace Programme", "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference", "German and Non-German Chauvinism", etc.

The present volume includes Lenin's famous work, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which gives a Marxist analysis of imperialism, as the final stage of capitalism, and shows that "imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat". On the strength of this analysis, Lenin put forward the new theoretical proposition that initially socialism could triumph in one single capitalist country, and could not triumph in all at once. Lenin formulated his brilliant proposition in two articles: "Slogan for a United States of Europe", written in August 1915, and "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", written in the autumn of 1916.

This was a new theory of socialist revolution which enriched Marxism and developed it.

In his theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", and the article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", Lenin elaborated the basic propositions of the Bolshevik programme on the national question. In "The Junius Pamphlet" Lenin criticised the political mistakes of the Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany.

Documents published for the first time in an edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* are "Draft Resolution on the Convocation of the Second Socialist Conference", "For the Conference to Be Held on April 24, 1916. Proposal of the Delegation", and "Letter from the Committee of Organisations Abroad to the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P."; these are a reflection of Lenin's struggle against Russian and West-European social-chauvinists and his efforts to strengthen the Bolshevik Party and rally the internationalists in the working-class movement of all countries.

NEW DATA ON THE LAWS GOVERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN AGRICULTURE

PART ONE
CAPITALISM AND AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA[1]

Written in 1915

First published in 1917 as a separate pamphlet by the *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers

Published according to the manuscript

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НОВЫЯ ДАННЫЯ О ЗАКОНАХЪ РАЗВИТІЯ КАПИТАЛИЗМА ВЪ ЗЕМЛЕДѢЛІИ.

ВЫПУСКЪ I.

Капитализмъ и земледѣліе въ Соед. Штатахъ Америки.

ПЕТРОГРАДЪ.
1917.

Cover of *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America.* 1917

Reduced

Cover of New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America. 1917

Reduced

A leading country of modern capitalism is of especial interest to the study of the socio-economic structure and evolution of present-day agriculture. The U.S.A. is unrivalled either in the rate of development of capitalism at the turn of the century, or in the record level of capitalist development already attained; nor has it any rival in the vastness of the territory developed with the use of the most up-to-date machinery, which is adapted to the remarkable variety of natural and historical conditions or in the extent of the political liberty and the cultural level of the mass of the population. That country, indeed, is in many respects the model for our bourgeois civilisation and is its ideal.

The study of the forms and laws of agricultural evolution is made easier in the U.S.A. by its decennial censuses of population, which are coupled with remarkably detailed descriptions of all industrial and agricultural enterprises. This yields a wealth of exact information that is unavailable in any other country; it helps to verify many popular notions, most of which are very loosely formulated and repeated without criticism, and usually serve to funnel bourgeois views and prejudices.

Mr. Himmer in the June (1913) issue of *Zavety*[2] gives some data from the latest, Thirteenth (1910) Census, and on this basis reiterates the most popular and thoroughly bourgeois contention—bourgeois both as regards its theoretical basis and political significance—that "the vast majority of farms in the United States employ only family labour"; that "in the more highly developed areas agricultural capitalism is disintegrating"; that "in the great majority of areas ... small-scale farming by owner-operators is becoming ever more dominant"; that it is precisely "in the older cultivated

areas with a higher level of economic development" that "capitalist agriculture is disintegrating and production is breaking up into smaller units"; that "there are no areas where colonisation is no longer continuing, or where large-scale capitalist agriculture is not decaying and is not being replaced by family-labour farms", and so on and so forth.

All these assertions are monstrously untrue. They are in direct contradiction to reality. They are a sheer mockery of the truth. Their incorrectness ought to be explained in detail for a very good reason: Mr. Himmer is not the man in the street, he is not a casual contributor of a casual magazine article, but one of the most prominent economists representing the most democratic, extreme Left-wing *bourgeois* trend in Russian and European social thinking. That is precisely why Mr. Himmer's views may have, and indeed already have among some non-proletarian sections of the population, particularly wide circulation and influence. They are not merely his personal views, nor his individual mistakes, but are rather an expression—couched in the most democratic terms and heavily embellished with pseudo-socialist phraseology—of *general* bourgeois views which in the atmosphere of a capitalist society are most readily accepted both by the smug professor, treading the beaten path, and the small farmer who is more intelligent than millions of his fellows.

The theory of the non-capitalist evolution of agriculture in capitalist society, which Mr. Himmer advocates, is really the theory of the great majority of bourgeois professors and bourgeois democrats and also of opportunists in the labour movement of the whole world who are the latest variety of those selfsame bourgeois democrats. It is no exaggeration to say that this theory is an illusion, a dream, a delusion under which the whole of bourgeois society is labouring. In devoting my further exposition to the refutation of this theory, I shall try to give a complete picture of capitalism in American agriculture, because one of the main mistakes made by bourgeois economists is to isolate facts and figures, major and minor, from the general context of politico-economic relations. All my data are taken from official statistical publications of the United States of North America, including above all the volumes *Five*, devoted to agriculture, of the Twelfth and Thirteenth censuses taken in

1900 and 1910 respectively,* and also the *Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1911*. Having mentioned these sources, I shall not give references to pages or tables for each separate figure, as this would only burden the reader and needlessly encumber the text; anyone interested enough will easily find the data in question from the tables of contents in these publications.

1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE THREE MAIN SECTIONS. THE HOMESTEAD WEST

The vast area of the United States, which is only slightly smaller than the whole of Europe, and the great diversity of farming conditions in the various parts of the country make absolutely imperative a separate study of the major divisions, each with its peculiar economic status. American statisticians adopted five geographical divisions in 1900, and nine in 1910. (1) New England—six states on the Atlantic coast in the north-east (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut); (2) Middle Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania)—in 1900 these two divisions formed the North Atlantic division; (3) East North Central (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin); (4) West North Central (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas)—in 1900, the last two made up the North Central division; (5) South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida)—unchanged from 1900; (6) East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi); (7) West South Central (Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas)—in 1900, the last two made up the South Central division; (8) Mountain (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada); and (9) Pacific (Washington, Oregon, and California)—in 1900, the last two made up the Western division.

* *Census Reports. Twelfth Census 1900*. Vol. V. Agriculture, Wash. 1902.—*Thirteenth Census of the United States, Taken in the Year 1910*. Vol. V. Agriculture, Wash. 1913.

The excessive patchwork of these divisions prompted American statisticians in 1910 to compress them into three main sections—the North (1-4), the South (5-7) and the West (8-9). We shall presently see that this division into three main sections is really most important and vital, although here, too, as in everything else, there are transitional types, so that on some basic points New England and the Middle Atlantic states will have to be considered separately.

In order to define the fundamental distinction between the three main sections, let us designate them as the *industrial* North, the *former slave-owning* South and the *homestead* West.

Here are the figures on their area, percentage of improved* land, and population:

Sections	Total Land Area (000,000 acres)	Percentage of improved land	Population (1910) (000,000)
The North	588	49	56
The South	562	27	29
The West	753	5	7
The U.S.A.	1,903	25	92

The North and the South have approximately the same area, while the West is nearly half as large again as either. The population of the North, however, is eight times that of the West, which, one might say, is hardly populated. How rapidly it is being settled is evident from the fact that in the 10 years between 1900 and 1910, the population in the North increased by 18 per cent; the South, by 20 per cent; and the West, by 67 per cent! There is hardly any increase in the number of farms in the North: 2,874,000 in 1900, and 2,891,000 in 1910 (+0.6 per cent); in the South the number increased by 18 per cent, from 2,600,000 to 3,100,000; and in the West, by 54 per cent, i.e., more than half as much again, from 243,000 to 373,000.

* The 1910 Census defined farmland as consisting of (1) improved land, (2) woodlands and (3) all other unimproved land. Improved land includes all land regularly tilled or mowed, land pastured and cropped in rotation, land lying fallow, land in gardens, orchards, vineyards, and nurseries, and land occupied by farm buildings.—*Tr.*

How land is being settled in the West is seen from the data on *homesteads*, which are parcels of land, mostly of 160 acres, i.e., about 65 dessiatines, allocated by the government free of charge or at a nominal price. In the 10 years between 1901 and 1910, the area occupied by homesteads in the North was 55.3 million acres (including 54.3 million, i.e., more than 98 per cent, in one division alone, namely the West North Central); the area in the South was 20 million acres (including 17.3 million in one division, the West South Central), and in the West, it was 55.3 million acres spread over both divisions. This means that the West is a solid homestead area, i.e., one where unoccupied land is given away practically free—somewhat similar to the squatter land tenure in the outlying districts of Russia, except that it is not regulated by a feudal state, but in a democratic manner (I very nearly said: in a Narodnik manner; the American Republic has implemented in a capitalist way the "Narodnik" idea of distributing unoccupied land to all applicants). The North and the South, however, *each* have only *one* homestead division, which may be regarded as a transitional type from the unsettled West to the settled North and South. Let us note, by the way, that only in two divisions of the North—the New England and the Middle Atlantic—were there absolutely no homestead grants made in the last decade. We shall later have to return to these two most highly industrialised divisions, where there is no longer any homesteading at all.

The above figures on homesteads refer only to claims that have been staked and not to those actually settled; we have no figures on the latter for the various divisions. But even if these returns are somewhat exaggerated as absolute magnitudes, they are, at any rate, a faithful reflection of the relative importance of homesteads in the various divisions. In the North in 1910 the farms totalled 414 million acres, so that homestead claims in the last 10 years came to about one-eighth of the total; in the South, about one-seventeenth (20 out of 354); and in the West, *one-half* (55 out of 111)! To lump together data on areas with hardly any land ownership at all, and data on areas where all the land is occupied, would be to make nonsense of scientific investigation.

America provides the most graphic confirmation of the truth emphasised by Marx in *Capital*,[3] Volume III, that capitalism in agriculture does not depend on the *form* of land ownership or land tenure. Capital finds the most diverse types of medieval and patriarchal landed property—feudal, "peasant allotments" (i.e., the holdings of bonded peasants); clan, communal, state, and other forms of land ownership. Capital takes hold of all these, employing a variety of ways and methods. For agricultural statistics to be properly and rationally compiled, the methods of investigation, tabulation, etc., would have to be modified to correspond to the *forms* of capitalist penetration into agriculture; for instance, the homesteads would have to be put into a special group and their economic fate traced. Unfortunately, however, the statistics are all too often dominated by routine and meaningless, mechanical repetition of the same old methods.

How extensive agriculture is in the West, as compared with the other sections, is evident, by the way, from the data on expenditures for artificial fertilisers. In 1909, the expenditure per acre of improved land was 13 cents ($0.13) in the North; 50 cents, in the South, and only 6 cents in the West. The South has the highest figure because cotton demands great quantities of fertilisers, and the South is primarily a cotton-growing area: cotton and tobacco account for 46.8 per cent of the total value of all its farm crops; grain, only 29.3 per cent; hay and forage, 5.1 per cent. By contrast, grain leads in the North with 62.6 per cent, followed by 18.8 per cent of hay and forage, most of which is cultivated. In the West, grain accounts for 33.1 per cent of the total value of all farm crops; hay and forage, with wild grasses predominating, 31.7 per cent, while fruits, a special branch of commercial farming rapidly developing on the Pacific coast, account for 15.5 per cent of the total value.

2. THE INDUSTRIAL NORTH

By 1910, the urban population in the North reached 58.6 per cent of the total, as compared with 22.5 per cent in the South and 48.8 per cent in the West. The role of industry is evident from these figures:

	Value of products ($000,000,000)				Workers in industry (000,000)
	Crops	Live-stock	Total	Manufactures less cost of raw materials	
The North	3.1	2.1	5.2	6.9	5.2
The South	1.9	0.7	2.6	1.1	1.1
The West	0.5	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.3
The U.S.A.	5.5	3.1	8.6	8.5	6.6

The total crop value is here overstated because a part of the crops, such as feed, recurs in the value of the livestock products. But in any case these figures show conclusively that almost five-sixths of American manufacture is concentrated in the North, and that manufacture prevails over agriculture in that section. The South and the West, on the contrary, are predominantly agricultural.

The above table shows that the North differs from the South and the West by a comparatively greater development of industry, which creates a market and makes for the intensification of agriculture. The North—"industrial" in that sense—nevertheless still remains the largest producer of agricultural products. More than one-half, actually about three-fifths, of agricultural production, is concentrated in the North. How much more intensive farming is in the North, as compared with the other sections, will be seen from the following figures on the per-acre value of all farm property—land, buildings, implements and machinery, and livestock. In 1910, it was $66 in the North, as compared with $25 in the South, and $41 in the West. The per-acre value of implements and machinery alone was $2.07 in the North, $0.83 in the South, and $1.04 in the West.

The New England and Middle Atlantic divisions stand out in this picture. As I have already pointed out there is no new homesteading in these parts. From 1900 to 1910, there was an absolute decrease in the number of farms, and in the total and in the improved acreage of the farms. Employment returns show that only 10 per cent of the population there is engaged in farming, as compared with a 33 per cent average for the U.S.A., 25 to 41 per cent for the other divisions of the North, and 51 to 63 per cent for the South. Only 6 to 25 per cent of the improved acreage in these two divisions

is under cereal crops (the average for the U.S.A. is 40 per cent, and for the North, 46 per cent); 52 to 29 per cent is under grasses, mostly cultivated (as against 15 per cent and 18 per cent); and 4.6 to 3.8 per cent is under vegetables (as against 1.5 and 1.5 per cent). This is the area of the most intensive agriculture. The average expenditure for fertilisers per acre of improved land in 1909 was $1.30 and $0.62 respectively; the former being the U.S. maximum, and the latter, second only to that of one division in the South. The average value of implements and machinery per acre of improved land was $2.58, and $3.88—the maximum figures for the U.S.A. We shall later see that in these most industrialised divisions of the industrial North, agriculture is the most intensive and has the most pronounced capitalist character.

3. THE FORMER SLAVE-OWNING SOUTH

The United States of America, writes Mr. Himmer, is a "country which has never known feudalism and is free from its economic survivals" (p. 41 of his article). This is the very opposite of the truth, for the economic survivals of *slavery* are not in any way distinguishable from those of feudalism, and in the former slave-owning South of the U.S.A. these survivals *are still very powerful*. It would not be worth while to dwell on Mr. Himmer's mistake if it were merely one in a hastily written article. But all liberal and all Narodnik writings in Russia show that the very same "mistake" is being made regularly and with unusual stubbornness with regard to the Russian *labour-service* system, our own survival of feudalism.

The South of the U.S.A. was slave-owning until slavery was swept away by the Civil War of 1861-65. To this day, the Negroes, who make up no more than from 0.7 to 2.2 per cent of the population in the North and the West, constitute from 22.6 to 33.7 per cent of the population in the South. For the U.S.A. as a whole, the Negroes constitute 10.7 per cent of the population. There is no need to elaborate on the degraded social status of the Negroes: the American bourgeoisie is in no way better in this respect than the bourgeoisie of any other country. Having "freed" the Negroes,

it took good care, under "free", republican-democratic capitalism, to restore everything possible, and do everything possible and impossible for the most shameless and despicable oppression of the Negroes. A minor statistical fact will illustrate their cultural level. While the proportion of illiterates in 1900 among the white population of the U.S.A. of 10 years of age and over was 6.2 per cent, among the Negroes it was as high as 44.5 per cent! More than seven times as high! In the North and the West illiteracy amounted from 4 to 6 per cent (1900), while in the South it was from 22.9 to 23.9 per cent! One can easily imagine the complex of legal and social relationships that corresponds to this disgraceful fact from the sphere of popular literacy.

What then is the economic basis that has produced and continues to support this fine "superstructure"?

It is the typically Russian, "purely Russian" *labour-service system*, which is known as *share-cropping*.

In 1910, Negroes owned 920,883 farms, i.e., 14.5 per cent of the total. Of the total number of farmers, 37 per cent were tenants; 62.1 per cent, owners; the remaining 0.9 per cent of the farms were run by managers. But among the whites 39.2 per cent were tenant farmers, and among the Negroes—75.3 per cent! The typical white farmer in America is an owner, the typical Negro farmer is a tenant. The proportion of tenants in the West was only 14 per cent: this section is being settled, with new lands unoccupied, and is an El Dorado (a short-lived and unreliable El Dorado, to be sure) for the small "independent farmer". In the North, the proportion of tenant farmers was 26.5 per cent, and in the South, 49.6 per cent! Half of the Southern farmers were tenants.

But that is not all. These are not even tenants in the European, civilised, modern-capitalist sense of the word. They are chiefly semi-feudal or—which is the same thing in economic terms—semi-slave *share-croppers*. In the "free" West, share-croppers were in the minority (25,000 out of a total of 53,000 tenants). In the old North, which was settled long ago, 483,000 out of 766,000 tenant farmers, i.e., 63 per cent, were share-croppers. In the South, *1,021,000* out of 1,537,000 tenant farmers, *i.e.*, *66 per cent*, were *share-croppers*.

In 1910, free, republican-democratic America had 1,500,000 share-croppers, of whom *more than 1,000,000 were Negroes.* And the proportion of share-croppers to the total number of farmers is not decreasing, but is on the contrary steadily and rather rapidly increasing. In 1880, 17.5 per cent of the farmers in the U.S.A. were share-croppers, in 1890, 18.4 per cent; in 1900, 22.2 per cent; and in 1910, 24 per cent.

American statisticians draw the following conclusions from the 1910 returns:

"In the South the conditions have at all times been somewhat different from those in the North, and many of the tenant farms are parts of plantations of considerable size which date from before the Civil War." In the South, "the system of operation by tenants—chiefly coloured tenants—has succeeded the system of operation by slave labour.... The development of the tenant system is most conspicuous in the South, where the large plantations formerly operated by slave labour have in many cases been broken up into small parcels or tracts and leased to tenants.... These plantations are in many cases still operated substantially as agricultural units, the tenants being subjected to a degree of supervision more or less similar to that which hired farm labourers are subjected to in the North" (op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 102, 104).

To show what the South is like, it is essential to add that its population is fleeing to other capitalist areas and to the towns, just as the peasantry in Russia is fleeing from the most backward central agricultural gubernias, where the survivals of serfdom have been most greatly preserved, in order to escape the rule of the notorious Markovs, to those areas of Russia which have a higher level of capitalist development, to the metropolitan cities, the industrial gubernias and the South (see *The Development of Capitalism in Russia**). The share-cropping area, both in America and in Russia, is the most stagnant area, where the masses are subjected to the greatest degradation and oppression. Immigrants to America, who have such an outstanding role to play in the country's economy and all its social life, shun the

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 586-91.—*Ed.*

South. In 1910, the foreign-born formed 14.5 per cent of the total population of America. But in the South the figure was only 1 to 4 per cent for the several divisions, whereas in the other divisions the proportion of incomers ranged from not less than 13.9 per cent to 27.7 per cent (New England). For the "emancipated" Negroes, the American South is a kind of prison where they are hemmed in, isolated and deprived of fresh air. The South is distinguished by the immobility of its population and by the greatest "attachment to the land": with the exception of that division of the South, which still has considerable homesteading (West South Central), 91 to 92 per cent of the population in the two other divisions of the South resided in the same division where they were born, whereas for the United States as a whole the figure was 72.6 per cent, i.e., the mobility of the population is much greater. In the West, which is a solid homestead area, only 35 to 41 per cent of the population lived in the division of their birth.

Negroes are in full flight from the two Southern divisions where there is no homesteading: in the 10 years between the last two censuses, these two divisions provided other parts of the country with almost 600,000 "black" people. The Negroes flee mainly to the towns: in the South, 77 to 80 per cent of all the Negroes live in rural communities; in other areas, only 8 to 32 per cent. Thus it turns out that there is a startling similarity in the economic status of the Negroes in America and the peasants in the heart of agricultural Russia who "*were formerly landowners' serfs*".

4. AVERAGE SIZE OF FARMS, "DISINTEGRATION OF CAPITALISM" IN THE SOUTH

Having examined the chief distinctive features of the three main sections of the U.S.A., as well as the general nature of their economic conditions, we can now proceed to an analysis of the data most commonly referred to. These are primarily data on the average acreage of farms. It is on the basis of these data that a great many economists, including Mr. Himmer, draw the most categorical conclusions.

Years	Average acreage per farm in the U.S.A. All farmland	Improved land
1850	202.6	78.0
1860	199.2	79.8
1870	153.3	71.0
1880	133.7	71.0
1890	136.5	78.3
1900	146.2	72.2
1910	138.1	75.2

On the whole, there seems at first glance to be a reduction in the average acreage of all farmland and an uncertain fluctuation—upward and downward—in the average improved acreage. But there is a distinct break in the 1860-70 period and this I have indicated by a line. During that period there was an enormous *decrease* in the average acreage of all farmland by 46 acres (from 199.2 to 153.3) and the greatest change (from 79.8 to 71.0), also a reduction, in the average acreage of improved land.

What was the reason? Obviously, the Civil War of 1861-65 and the abolition of slavery. A decisive blow was dealt at the latifundia of the slave-owners. Further on we shall see repeated confirmation of this fact, but it is so generally known that it is surprising that it needs any proof at all. Let us separate the returns for the North and those for the South.

Years	Average acreage per farm South All farmland	South Improved land	North All farmland	North Improved land
1850	332.1	101.1	127.1	65.4
1860	335.4	101.3	126.4	68.3
1870	214.2	69.2	117.0	69.2
1880	153.4	56.2	114.9	76.6
1890	139.7	58.8	123.7	87.8
1900	138.2	48.1	132.2	90.9
1910	114.4	48.6	143.0	100.3

We find that in the South the average improved acreage per farm between 1860 and 1870 greatly *decreased* (from 101.3 to 69.2), and that in the North it slightly *increased* (from 68.3 to 69.2). This means that the cause lay in the specific conditions of evolution in the South. There we find even

after the abolition of slavery, a reduction in the average acreage of farms, although the process is slow and not continuous.

Mr. Himmer's deduction is that in the South "the small-scale family farms are extending their domination, while capital is leaving agriculture for other spheres of investment.... Agricultural capitalism is rapidly disintegrating in the South Atlantic states...".

This is an amusing assertion likely to be matched only in the arguments of our Narodniks on the "disintegration of capitalism" in Russia after 1861 in consequence of the landlords abandoning corvée for the labour-service (i.e., semi-corvée!) system of economy. The break-up of the slave-worked latifundia is called the "disintegration of capitalism". The transformation of the unimproved land of yesterday's slave-owners into the small farms of Negroes, half of whom are share-croppers (it should be borne in mind that the proportion of share-croppers has been steadily *growing* from census to census!), is called the "disintegration of capitalism". It is hardly possible to go any further in distorting the fundamental concepts of economics!

Chapter Twelve of the 1910 Census supplies information on typical Southern "plantations"—not of the old slave period, but of our own day. On the 39,073 plantations there are 39,073 "landlord farms" and 398,905 tenant farms, or an average of 10 tenants per landlord or "master". Plantations average 724 acres, of which only 405 acres is improved, more than 300 acres being unimproved, not a bad reserve for the gentlemen who were the slave-owners of yesterday to draw on in extending their plans of exploitation....

Land on the average plantation is distributed as follows: "landlord" farm—331 acres, of which 87 is improved. "Tenant" farms, i.e., the parcels of the Negro share-croppers, who continue to work for the master and under his eye, average 38 acres, of which 31 is improved land.

As the population and the demand for cotton increase, the former slave-owners of the South begin to parcel out their vast latifundia, nine-tenths of the land on which is still unimproved, into small tracts which are either sold to the Negroes or, more frequently, leased to them on a half-crop basis. (From 1900 to 1910, the number of farmers in the

South who were full owners of all their farmland increased from 1,237,000 to 1,329,000, i.e., 7.5 per cent, while the number of share-croppers went up from 772,000 to 1,021,000, i.e., 32.2 per cent.) And yet an economist has appeared who says this is "disintegration of capitalism"....

I designate as latifundia farms with an area of 1,000 acres and over. In 1910, the proportion of such farms in the U.S.A. was 0.8 per cent (50,135 farms), and they added up to 167.1 million acres, or 19.0 per cent of the total amount of land. This is an average of 3,332 acres per latifundium. Only 18.7 per cent of their acreage was improved while for all farms the figure was 54.4 per cent. The capitalist North has the *smallest* number of latifundia: 0.5 per cent of the total number of farms accounting for 6.9 per cent of the land, 41.1 per cent of which is improved. The West has the greatest number of latifundia: 3.9 per cent of the total number of farms accounting for 48.3 per cent of the land; 32.3 per cent of the land in the latifundia is improved. But it is in the former slave-owning South that the latifundia have the *highest* proportion of unimproved land: 0.7 per cent of the farms are latifundia; they account for 23.9 per cent of the land; *only 8.5 per cent of the land* in the latifundia is improved! Incidentally, these detailed statistics clearly show that there is really no foundation for the common practice of classifying the latifundia as *capitalist* enterprises, without a detailed analysis of the specific data for each country and each area.

During the 10 years from 1900 to 1910, the total acreage of the latifundia, but only of the latifundia, showed a *decrease*. The reduction was quite substantial: from 197.8 million to 167.1 million acres, i.e., 30.7 million acres. In the South, there was a reduction of 31.8 million acres (in the North, an increase of 2.3 million, and in the West, a reduction of 1.2 million). Consequently, it is in the South, and in the slave-owning South alone, that the latifundia, with their negligible proportion (8.5 per cent) of improved land, are being broken up on a really vast scale.

The inescapable conclusion is that the only exact definition of the economic process under way is—a transition from the slave-holding latifundia, nine-tenths of which remained unimproved, to small *commercial* agriculture. It is a transi-

tion to commercial farms and not to farms worked by family labour, as Mr. Himmer and the Narodniks, together with all the bourgeois economists who sing cheap hymns to "labour", love to say. The term "family labour" has no politico-economic meaning and is indirectly misleading. It is devoid of meaning because the small farmer "labours" under any social system of economy, be it slavery, serfdom or capitalism. The term "family labour" is just an empty phrase, pure oratory which serves to cover up the *confusion* of entirely different social forms of economic organisation—a confusion from which the bourgeoisie alone stands to gain. The term "family labour" is misleading and deceives the public, for it creates the impression that *hired* labour is not employed.

Mr. Himmer, like all bourgeois economists, evades just these statistics on hired labour, although they are the most important data on the question of capitalism in agriculture and although they are to be found in the 1900 Census report, as well as in the 1910 *Abstract—Farm Crops, by States*, which Mr. Himmer himself quotes (note on p. 49 of his article).

The nature of the staple crop of the South shows that the growth of small-scale agriculture in the South is nothing but the growth of commercial farming. That crop is cotton. Cereals yield 29.3 per cent of the total crop value in the South; hay and forage, 5.1 per cent; and cotton, 42.7 per cent. From 1870 to 1910, the production of wool in the U.S.A. went up from 162 million lbs. to 321 million lbs., i.e., it doubled; wheat, increased from 236 million to 635 million bushels, i.e., less than threefold; corn, from 1,094 million to 2,886 million bushels, also less than threefold; and cotton, from 4,000,000 bales (of 500 lbs. each) to 12,000,000, i.e., threefold. The growth of the crop that is primarily commercial was faster than that of other, less commercialised, crops. In addition, there was in the main division of the South, the South Atlantic, a rather substantial development of tobacco production (12.1 per cent of the crop value in the State of Virginia); vegetables (20.1 per cent of the total crop value in the State of Delaware, 23.2 per cent in the State of Florida); fruits (21.3 per cent of the total crop value in the State of Florida); etc. The nature

of all these crops implies an intensification of farming, a larger scale of operations on smaller acreages, and greater employment of hired labour.

I shall now proceed to a detailed analysis of the returns on hired labour; let us note only that the employment of hired labour is also growing in the South, although in this respect it lags behind the other sections—*less* hired labour is employed because of the *wider* practice of semi-slave share-cropping.

5. THE CAPITALIST NATURE OF AGRICULTURE

Capitalism in agriculture is usually gauged by the data on the size of farms or the number and importance of big farms (in terms of acreage). I have examined some of these data and shall return to the problem later on, but it must be said that all these are, after all, indirect indications, for acreage is not always an indication, and not by any means a direct indication, that a farm is really big as *an economic enterprise*, or that it is capitalist in character.

In this respect the data on hired labour are far more indicative and offer better proof. Agricultural censuses taken in recent years, such as the Austrian of 1902 and the German of 1907, which I shall examine elsewhere, show that the employment of hired labour in present-day agriculture—and especially in small-scale farming—is much greater than is generally believed. Nothing so obviously and categorically refutes the petty-bourgeois myth about small "family" farms as do these figures.

American statisticians have collected very extensive material on this, for each farmer's individual census form asks whether he spends anything on hired labour, and, if he does, exactly how much. In contrast to European statistics—such as those of the two countries just named—no record is made in American statistics of the number of hired labourers employed at the time by each farmer, although that could be easily discovered, and the scientific value of such information, in addition to the returns on the total expenditure on hired labour, would indeed be very great. But the worst thing is the very poor tabulation of these returns in the 1910 Census, which is in general presented much more poorly than the 1900 Census. The 1910 Census groups all

farms by acreage (as does the 1900 Census) but, by contrast, it does not give any figures on the employment of hired labour by these groups. This makes it impossible for us to compare the employment of hired labour by farms with small and with large acreages. The Census merely gives the average figures for the states and the sections, i.e., data lumping together capitalist and non-capitalist farms.

I shall make a special point of going into the more elaborate data for 1900 later on; meanwhile, here are the figures for 1910; in fact they relate to 1899 and 1909.

Sections	Percentage of farm hiring labour (1909)	Increase of expenditure on hired labour 1899-1909 (per cent)	Expenditure on hired labour per acre of improved land ($)	
			1909	1899
The North . .	55.1	+ 70.8	1.26	0.82
The South . .	36.6	+ 87.1	1.07	0.69
The West . .	52.5	+119.0	3.25	2.07
The U.S.A.	45.9	+ 82.3	1.36	0.86

The first thing that is made obvious by these figures is that agriculture is most capitalistic in the North (55.1 per cent of farms employ hired labour); then, follows the West (52.5 per cent) and, lastly, the South (36.6 per cent). That is just as it should be when any densely populated and industrial area is being compared with an area still undergoing colonisation and with an area of share-cropping. It goes without saying that figures on the proportion of farms employing hired labour are more suitable for a precise comparison of the sections than data on the expenditure on hired labour per acre of improved land. For the latter type of data to be comparable, the level of wages in the sections would have to be the same. No information on farm wages in the U.S.A. is available but in the light of the basic distinctions between the sections it is inconceivable that their wage levels are the same.

Thus, in the North and in the West—the two sections which together have two-thirds of the improved land and two-thirds of the livestock—*more than one-half* the farmers cannot manage without hired labour. The proportion is smaller in the South only because there the semi-feudal (alias

semi-slave) system of exploitation in the form of share-cropping is still strong. There is no doubt that in America, as in all the other capitalist countries, a part of the handicapped farmers have to sell their labour-power. Unfortunately, American statistics do not contain any information about this, in contrast, for example, to the 1907 German statistics, in which these data have been collected and worked out in detail. According to the German statistics, hiring themselves out as labourers is the *main* occupation of 1,940,867 persons, i.e., over 30 per cent, of the 5,736,082 owners of farms (a total which includes the very small "'owners"). To be sure, the mass of these farm-hands and day-labourers with a bit of land of their own belong to the poorest groups of farmers.

Let us assume that in the U.S.A., where the smallest farms (of less than three acres) are as a general rule not registered at all, only 10 per cent of the farmers sell their labour-power. Even then we find that *more than one-third* of the farmers are *directly* exploited by the landlords and capitalists (24 per cent share-croppers who are exploited by former slave-owners in feudal or semi-feudal fashion, plus 10 per cent who are exploited by the capitalists, or altogether 34 per cent). This means that of the total number of farmers a *minority*, hardly more than *one-fifth or one-quarter*, neither hire labourers nor hire themselves out or sell themselves into bondage.

Such is the actual state of affairs in the country of "model and advanced" capitalism, in the country with free distribution of millions of dessiatines of land. Here again the famous non-capitalist, small-scale "family" farming proves to be a myth.

How many hired labourers are engaged in American agriculture? Is their number increasing or decreasing in proportion to the total number of farmers and the total rural population?

It is regrettable that American statistics do not provide a direct answer to these highly important questions. Let us find an approximate answer.

Firstly, we can obtain an approximate answer from the returns on occupations (Volume IV of the Census reports). These statistics are not an American "success". They are

compiled in such a routine, mechanical, incongruous manner that they contain no information on the status of the persons employed, i.e., no distinction is made between farmers, family workers, and hired labourers. Instead of making a precise economic classification, the compilers were content to use "popular" terminology, absurdly bracketing members of farmers' families and hired labourers under the head of farm workers. As we know it is *not* only in American statistics that there is complete chaos on this question.

The 1910 Census makes an attempt to bring some order into this chaos, to correct the obvious mistakes and to separate at least a part of the hired labourers (those working out) from members of the family working on the home farm. In a series of calculations the statisticians correct the total number of persons engaged in farming, reducing it by 468,100 (Vol. IV, p. 27). The number of *females* working out is set at 220,048 for 1900, and 337,522 for 1910 (an increase of 53 per cent). The number of males working out in 1910 was 2,299,444. Assuming that in 1900 the proportion of hired labourers to the total number of farm workers was the same as in 1910, the number of males working out in 1900 must have been 1,798,165. We then obtain this picture:

	1900	*1910*	Increase (per cent)
Total engaged in agriculture .	10,381,756	12,099,825	+ 16
Number of farmers	5,674,875	5,981,522	+ 5
Number of hired labourers . .	2,018,213	2,566,966	+ 27

That is, the percentage increase in the number of hired labourers was over five times greater than in that of farmers (27 per cent and 5 per cent). The proportion of farmers in the rural population *decreased*; the proportion of hired labourers *increased*. The proportion of independent farm operators to the total farming population dropped; the number of dependent, exploited persons, increased.

In 1907, hired farm labourers in Germany numbered 4.5 million out of a total of 15 million persons working on the home farm and working out. Consequently, 30 per cent were hired labourers. In America, according to the estimate given above, the figure was 2.5 million out of 12 million, i.e., 21 per cent. It is possible that the availability of vacant

land distributed free, and the high percentage of share-cropping tenants tended to lower the percentage of hired labourers in America.

Secondly, an approximate answer may be provided by the figures on expenditure on hired labour in 1899 and 1909. During the same period, the number of industrial wage-workers increased from 4.7 million to 6.6 million, i.e., 40 per cent, and their wages from $2,008 million to $3,427 million, i.e., 70 per cent. (It should be borne in mind that the rise in the cost of living cancelled out this nominal increase in wages.)

On the strength of this we may assume that the 82 per cent increase in expenditure on hired farm labour corresponds to an increase of approximately 48 per cent in the number of hired labourers. Making a similar assumption for the three main sections we obtain the following picture:

Sections	Percentage increase from 1900 to 1910		
	Total rural population	Number of farms	Number of hired labourers
The North	+ 3.9	+ 0.6	+40
The South	+14.8	+18.2	+50
The West	+49.7	+53.7	+66
The U.S.A.	+11.2	+10.9	+48

These figures also show that for the country as a whole the increase in the number of farmers is not keeping pace with the growth of the rural population, while the increase in the number of hired labourers is outstripping the growth of the rural population. In other words: the proportion of independent farm operators is decreasing, and the proportion of dependent farm workers is increasing.

It should be noted that the great difference between the increase in the number of hired labourers obtained in the first estimate (+27 per cent) and in the second (+48 per cent) is quite possible because in the former only the *professional* farm labourers were enumerated, and in the latter, *every instance* of employment of hired labour was taken into account. In farming, seasonal hired labour is highly important, and it should be the rule, therefore, that it is never enough to determine the number of hired labourers, permanent

and seasonal, but that an effort must also be made to determine, as far as possible, the total expenditure on hired labour.

At any rate, both estimates definitely show a *growth* of capitalism in agriculture in the U.S.A., and an *increase* in the employment of hired labour, which is proceeding at a faster pace than the growth of the rural population and of the number of farmers.

6. AREAS OF THE MOST INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE

Having examined the general data on hired labour as the most direct indicator of capitalism in agriculture, we can now go on to a more detailed analysis of the specific *forms* assumed by capitalism in this particular branch of the economy.

We have taken a look at one area with a shrinking average acreage of farms, namely, the South, where the process signifies a transition from latifundia worked by slaves to small-scale commercial farms. There is another area where the average acreage of farms is diminishing—a part of the North: New England and the Middle Atlantic states. Here are the figures for these divisions:

Average acreage per farm (improved land)

	New England	Middle Atlantic States
1850	66.5	70.8
1860	66.4	70.3
1870	66.4	69.2
1880	63.4	68.0
1890	56.5	67.4
1900	42.4	63.4
1910	38.4	62.6

The average farm in New England is smaller than in any other division of the U.S.A. In two Southern divisions the average is 42 to 43 acres, and in the third, the West South Central, where homesteading is still going on, it is 61.8 acres, i.e., almost as much as in the Middle Atlantic states. It is the reduction in the average size of farms in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, "the areas with an older culture and a higher level of economic development" (Mr. Himmer, p. 60), where homesteading is no longer taking place, that has led Mr. Himmer, as it has very many

other bourgeois economists, to draw the conclusion that "capitalist agriculture is disintegrating", that "production is breaking up into smaller units", that there are "no areas where colonisation is no longer continuing, or where large-scale capitalist agriculture is not decaying and is not being replaced by family-labour farms".

Mr. Himmer arrived at these conclusions, which are the very opposite of the truth, because he forgot a mere "trifle": the intensification of agriculture! It is incredible, but it is a fact. This matter requires a particularly thorough analysis because quite a few bourgeois economists, almost all in fact, contrive to forget this "trifle" when dealing with small and large-scale production in agriculture, although "in theory" they are all "aware" of and accept the intensification of farming. This is indeed one of the basic sources of all the misadventures of bourgeois (including Narodnik and opportunist) economics on the question of small "family" farms. The "trifle" they forget is this: owing to the technical peculiarities of agriculture, the process of its intensification frequently leads to a *reduction* in the improved acreage on the farm, and at the same time expands it as an *economic unit*, increasing its *output*, and making it more and more of a *capitalist* enterprise.

Let us first see whether or not there is any fundamental difference in farming techniques, in the general character of farming and degree of its intensification between New England and the Middle Atlantic states, on the one hand, and between the rest of the North and the country's other divisions, on the other.

The differences in the crops grown are shown in the following table:

Divisions	Percentage of the total crop value (1910)		
	Cereals	Hay and forage	Vegetables, fruits and similar special crops
New England	7.6	41.9	33.5
Middle Atlantic	29.6	31.4	31.8
East North Central	65.4	16.5	11.0
West North Central	75.4	14.6	5.9

The difference in farming conditions is fundamental. In the first two divisions agriculture is highly intensive; in the other two it is extensive. In the latter, cereals account for the bulk of the total crop value; in the former, they contribute not only a minor part, but sometimes a negligible part (7.6 per cent), while the special "commercial" crops (vegetables, fruits, etc.) yield a *greater* part of the crop value than cereals. Extensive agriculture has given way to intensive agriculture. Grass cultivation has become widespread. Of the 3.8 million acres under hay and forage in New England, 3.3 million acres were under *cultivated* grasses. The figures for the Middle Atlantic states are 8.5 and 7.9 million respectively: By contrast, of the 27.4 million acres under hay and forage in the West North Central states (an area of colonisation and extensive agriculture), 14.5 million, i.e., the greater part, were unimproved grasslands, etc.

Yields are considerably higher in the "intensive" states:

Divisions	Per-acre yield in bushels			
	Corn		Wheat	
	1909	1899	1909	1899
New England	45.2	39.4	23.5	18.0
Middle Atlantic	32.2	34.0	18.6	14.9
East North Central	38.6	38.3	17.2	12.9
West North Central	27.7	31.4	14.8	12.2

The same is true of commercial livestock and dairy farming, which are especially highly developed in these divisions:

Divisions	Average number of dairy cows per farm (1900)	Average production of milk per cow (gallons)	
		1909	*1899*
New England	5.8	476	548
Middle Atlantic	6.1	490	514
East North Central	4.0	410	487
West North Central	4.9	325	371
The South (3 divisions)	1.9-3.1	232-286	290-395
The West (2 divisions)	4.7-5.1	339-475	334-470
The U.S.A.	3.8	362	424

This table shows that in the "intensive" states dairy farming is on a considerably *larger* scale than in all the others. The areas with the *smallest* farms (in terms of improved acreage) have the *largest* dairies. This fact is of tremendous importance, for, as everyone knows, dairy farming develops most rapidly in suburban localities and in very highly industrialised countries (or areas). Statistics from Denmark, Germany and Switzerland, which are dealt with elsewhere,* also show a *growing concentration* of dairy cattle.

As we have seen, hay and forage in the "intensive" states constitute a considerably greater proportion of the total crop value than cereals. Accordingly, livestock farming there develops largely on the basis of *purchased feed*. Here are the relevant figures for 1909:

Division	Receipts from sale of feed	Outlays on feed	Excess of receipts or outlays
		($000,000)	
New England	+ 4.3	−34.6	−30.3
Middle Atlantic	+ 21.6	−54.7	−33.1
East North Central	+195.6	−40.6	+155.0
West North Central	+174.4	−76.2	+ 98.2

The extensive states of the North sell feed. The intensive states buy it. It is clear that if feed is purchased *large-scale* operations of a highly capitalistic nature can be conducted on a *small* tract of land.

Let us make a comparison between the two intensive divisions of the North, New England and the Middle Atlantic states, and the most extensive division of the North, the West North Central:

Division	Improved land ($000,000 acres)	Value of livestock ($000,000)	Receipts from sale of feed ($000,000)	Outlays on feed ($000,000)
New England + +Middle Atlantic	36.5	447	26	89
West North Central	164.3	1,552	174	76

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 205-22, and Vol. 13, pp. 169-216.—*Ed*.

We find that there is more livestock per acre of improved land in the intensive states (447 : 36 = $12 per acre) than in the extensive states (1,552 : 164 = $9). More capital in the form of livestock is invested in a unit of land area. And the total per-acre turnover of the feed trade (purchases + + sales) is also very much greater in the intensive states (26 + 89 = $115 million for 36 million acres) than in the extensive states (174 + 76 = $250 million for 164 million acres). In the intensive states farming is obviously much more *commercialised* than in the extensive states.

Expenditure on fertilisers and the value of implements and machinery are the most exact statistical expression of the degree of intensification of agriculture. Here are the figures:

	Divisions	Percentage of farms with outlays on fertilisers	Average outlays per farm ($)	Average outlays per acre of improved land ($)		Average improved acreage per farm
				1909	1899	(1909)
The North	New England	60.9	82	1.30	0.53	38.4
	Middle Atlantic	57.1	68	0.62	0.37	62.6
	East North Central	19.6	37	0.09	0.07	79.2
	West North Central	2.1	41	0.01	0.01	148.0
The South	South Atlantic	69.2	77	1.23	0.49	43.6
	East South Central	33.8	37	0.29	0.13	42.2
	West South Central	6.4	53	0.06	0.03	61.8
The West	Mountain	1.3	67	0.01	0.01	86.8
	Pacific	6.4	189	0.10	0.05	116.1
	The U.S.A.	28.7	63	0.24	0.13	75.2

This fully brings out the difference between the extensive divisions of the North, with an insignificant proportion of farms using purchased fertilisers (2-19 per cent), and with negligible expenditure on fertilisers per acre of improved land ($0.01-$0.09)—and the intensive states, where the *majority* of farms (57-60 per cent) use purchased fertilisers and where expenditure on fertilisers is substantial. In New England, for example, the per-acre expenditure is $1.30—the *maximum* figure for all divisions (once again a case of

farms with the smallest acreage and the largest expenditure on fertilisers!), which exceeds the figure for one of the divisions of the South (South Atlantic). It should be noted that in the South especially large quantities of artificial fertilisers are required by cotton, on which, as we have seen, the labour of Negro share-croppers is most widely employed.

In the Pacific states, we find a very small percentage of farms using fertilisers (6.4 per cent) but the maximum average per farm expenditure ($189)—calculated, of course, only for the farms which used fertilisers. Here we have another example of the growth of *large-scale* and capitalist agriculture with a simultaneous *reduction* of the farm acreage. In two of the three Pacific states—Washington and Oregon—the use of fertilisers is quite insignificant, a mere $0.01 per acre. It is only in the third state, California, that the figure is relatively high: $0.08 in 1899, and $0.19 in 1909. In this state, the fruit crop plays a special role, and is expanding at an extremely rapid rate along purely capitalist lines; in 1909, it accounted for 33.1 per cent of the total crop value, as against 18.3 per cent for cereals, and 27.6 per cent for hay and forage. The typical fruit-growing farm has a *smaller-than-average* acreage but the use of fertilisers and hired labour is *much greater* than average. We shall later have occasion to dwell on relationships of this type, which are typical of capitalist countries with an intensive agriculture and which are most stubbornly ignored by statisticians and economists.

But let us return to the "intensive" states of the North. Not only is expenditure on fertilisers—$1.30 per acre—in New England the highest and the average farm acreage the smallest (38.4 acres); expenditure on fertilisers is increasing at an especially rapid rate. In the 10 years between 1899 and 1909, this expenditure increased from $0.53 per acre to $1.30, i.e., two and one-half times. Consequently, here intensification of agriculture, technical progress and improvement of farming techniques are extremely rapid. To get a more graphic picture of what this means let us compare New England, the most intensive division of the North, with West North Central, the most extensive division. In the latter division, scarcely any artificial fertilisers are

used at all (2.1 per cent of the farms and $0.01 per acre); its farm acreage is larger than that of any other division of America (148 acres), and is growing at a faster rate. This particular division is usually taken as the model of capitalism in American agriculture—and this Mr. Himmer also does. As I shall show in detail later on, this is incorrect. It is due to the crudest, most primitive form of extensive agriculture being confused with technically progressive intensive agriculture. In the West North Central division, the average farm is four times as big as in New England (148 acres as against 38.4), while average expenditure on fertilisers per user is only half as great: $41 as against $82.

Hence, in actual practice there are instances of a substantial *reduction* in farm acreage being accompanied by a substantial *increase* in expenditure on artificial fertilisers, so that "small" production—if we continue, as a matter of routine, to regard it as being small in terms of acreage—turns out to be "large" in terms of the capital invested in the land. This is not an exception, but the rule for any country where extensive agriculture is giving way to intensive agriculture. And this applies to *all* capitalist countries, so that when this typical, essential and fundamental characteristic of agriculture is ignored, the result is the common error of the votaries of small-scale agriculture who base their judgement only on farm acreage.

7. MACHINERY AND HIRED LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE

Let us consider another form of capital investment in land which is technically different from the form examined above—implements and machinery. All European agricultural statistics provide irrefutable evidence that the larger the farm acreage, the greater is the proportion of farms using all types of machines and the greater the number of machines used. The superiority of big farms in this highly important respect has been established beyond doubt. In this field, too, American statisticians have a rather unconventional approach: neither implements nor farm machinery are recorded separately, only their total value being given. Such data may, of course, be less exact in each individual case, but taken as a whole they allow definite comparisons

between divisions and between groups of farms—comparisons which are impossible with other kinds of data.

Below are the figures for farm implements and machinery by divisions:

	Divisions	Value of implements and machinery (1909) Average per farm ($)	Average per acre of all farmland ($)
The North	New England	269	2.58
	Middle Atlantic	358	3.88
	East North Central	239	2.28
	West North Central	332	1.59
	The South (three divisions)	72-88-127	0.71-0.92-0.95
	The West (two divisions)	269-350	0.83-1.29
	The U.S.A.	199	1.44

The former slave-owning South, the area of share-cropping, occupies a bottom place in the use of machinery. The value of implements and machinery per acre—for its three divisions—is one-third, one-quarter, one-fifth of the figures for the intensive states of the North. The latter lead the rest and, in particular, are far ahead of the West North Central states, America's most agricultural area and her granary, which superficial observers still frequently regard as a model area of capitalism and of the use of machinery.

It should be noted that the American statistical method of determining the value of machinery, as well as of land, livestock, buildings, etc., per acre of *all* farmland and not per acre of improved land, understates the superiority of the "intensive" areas of the North and cannot, in general, be considered correct. The difference between the divisions in regard to the proportion of improved acreage is very great: in the West, it is as low as 26.7 per cent for the Mountain states, and as high as 75.4 per cent for the East North Central states in the North. For the purposes of economic statistics, improved land is undoubtedly of much greater importance than total acreage. In New England, improved acreage in farms and its proportion of the total has decreased substantially, especially since 1880, probably

under the impact of competition from the free lands of the West (i.e., free from ground-rent, from tribute to the land-owning gentry). At the same time, the use of machinery in this division is very extensive and the value of machinery per acre of *improved land* is especially high. In 1910, it amounted to $7 per acre, while in the Middle Atlantic states it was about $5.50 and not more than $2-3 in the other divisions.

Again, the division with the *smallest* farms, in terms of acreage, turns out to have the *largest* capital investments in land in the form of machinery.

Comparing the Middle Atlantic, one of the "intensive" divisions of the North, with the most extensive region of the North, the West North Central, we discover that as far as improved acreage per farm is concerned, that of the former is *less than half that of the latter*—62.6 acres as against 148.0—while the value of machinery used is *greater*—$358 per farm as against $332. The smaller farms are thus larger enterprises in terms of machinery used.

We still have to compare the data on the intensive nature of agriculture with the data on the employment of hired labour. I already gave these figures in brief above, in Chapter 5. We must now examine them in greater detail by divisions.

	Divisions	Percentage of farms hiring labour in 1909	Average outlays on hired labour per hiring farm ($)	Outlays on labour per acre of improved land		Increase of outlays from 1899 to 1909 (per cent)
				1909	*1899*	
The North	New England	66.0	277	4.76	2.55	+86
	Middle Atlantic	65.8	253	2.66	1.64	+62
	East North Central	52.7	199	1.33	0.78	+71
	West North Central	51.0	240	0.83	0.56	+48
The South	South Atlantic	42.0	142	1.37	0.80	+71
	East South Central	31.6	107	0.80	0.49	+63
	West South Central	35.6	178	1.03	0.75	+37
The West	Mountain	46.8	547	2.95	2.42	+22
	Pacific	58.0	694	3.47	1.92	+80
	The U.S.A.	45.9	223	1.36	0.86	+58

This shows, firstly, that capitalism is undoubtedly much more developed in the agriculture of the Northern intensive states than in that of the extensive states; secondly, that in the former, capitalism is developing faster than in the latter; thirdly, that the division with the smallest farms, New England, has both the highest level of development of capitalism in agriculture and the highest rate of its development. There the increase of expenditure on hired labour per acre of improved land is 86 per cent; the Pacific states come second in this respect. California, where, as I have said, "small-scale" capitalist fruit-raising is rapidly developing, is also the leader in this respect among the Pacific states.

The West North Central division, with the largest farm acreages (an average of 148 acres in 1910, counting improved land only) and with the most rapid and steady growth of farm acreages since 1850, is commonly regarded as the "model" capitalist region of American agriculture. We have now seen that this contention is profoundly erroneous. The extent to which hired labour is used is certainly the best and most direct indicator of the development of capitalism. And it tells us that America's "granary", the region of the much vaunted "wheat factories", which attract so much attention, is *less* capitalist than the industrial and intensively farmed region, where the indication of agricultural progress is not an increase in improved acreage but an *increase* in capital investments in the land, together with a simultaneous *reduction* of the acreage.

It is quite possible to imagine that with the use of machinery the improvement of the "black soil" or unploughed virgin lands in general can proceed very rapidly despite a small increase in the employment of hired labour. In the West North Central states expenditure on hired labour per acre of improved land was $0.56 in 1899, and $0.83 in 1909, an increase of only 48 per cent. In New England, where the improved area is decreasing and not increasing and where the average size of farms is decreasing and not increasing, expenditure on hired labour was not only very much higher both in 1899 ($2.55 per acre) and in 1909 ($4.76 per acre), but had grown during the period at a much faster rate (+86 per cent).

The average farm in New England is *one-fourth* the size of farms in the West North Central states (38.4 as against 148 acres), yet its average expenditure on hired labour is *greater*: $277 as against $240. Consequently, the reduction in the size of farms means in such cases that a greater amount of capital is invested in agriculture, and that the capitalist nature of agriculture is intensified; it signifies a growth of capitalism and capitalist production.

While the West North Central states, which comprise 34.3 per cent of the total improved acreage in the U.S.A., are the most typical division of "extensive" capitalist agriculture, the *Mountain* states offer an example of similar extensive farming in conditions of the most rapid colonisation. Here less hired labour is employed, in terms of the proportion of farms employing labour, but the average expenditure on hired labour is very much higher than in the West North Central division. But in the former the employment of hired labour increased at a slower rate than in any other division of America (only +22 per cent). This type of evolution was apparently due to the following conditions. In this division, colonisation and the distribution of homesteads are extremely widespread. The area under crops increased more than in any other division: by 89 per cent from 1900 to 1910. The settlers, the owners of the homesteads, naturally employ little hired labour, at any rate when starting their farms. On the other hand, hired labour must be employed on a very large scale, firstly, by some latifundia, which are especially numerous in this division as in the West in general; and secondly, by farms raising special and highly capitalist crops. In some states of this division, for instance, a very high proportion of the total crop value comes from fruits (Arizona—6 per cent, Colorado—10 per cent), and vegetables (Colorado—11.9 per cent, Nevada—11.2 per cent), and so forth.

In summing up, I must say the following: Mr. Himmer's assertion that "there are no areas where colonisation is no longer continuing, or where large-scale capitalist agriculture is not decaying and is not being replaced by family-labour farms", is a mockery of the truth, and entirely contrary to the actual facts. The New England division, where there is no colonisation at all, where farms are smallest, where

farming is most intensive, shows the highest level of capitalism in agriculture and the highest rate of capitalist development. This conclusion is most essential and basic for an understanding of the process of capitalist development in agriculture in general, because the intensification of agriculture and the reduction in the average farm acreage that goes with it is not some accidental, local, casual phenomenon, but one that is *common* to all civilised countries. Bourgeois economists of every stripe make a host of mistakes when considering data on the evolution of agriculture (as in Great Britain, Denmark, and Germany) because they are not familiar enough with this general phenomenon, they have not given it enough thought and have not understood or analysed it.

8. DISPLACEMENT OF SMALL BY BIG ENTERPRISES. QUANTITY OF IMPROVED LAND

We have examined the major forms of the development of capitalism in agriculture, and have seen how extremely varied they are. The most important are: the break-up of the slave-holding latifundia in the South; the growth of large-scale extensive farming operations in the extensive area of the North; the most rapid development of capitalism in the intensive area of the North, where farms are, on the average, the smallest. The facts incontrovertibly prove that in some cases the development of capitalism is indicated by an increase in farm acreage and in others by an increase in the number of farms. In view of such a state of affairs we learn nothing from the returns on average farm acreages summarised for the country as a whole.

What then is the net result of the various local and agricultural peculiarities? An indication is given by the data on hired labour. The growing employment of hired labour is a general process transcending *all* these peculiarities. But in the vast majority of civilised countries agricultural statistics, paying tribute, intentionally or otherwise, to prevailing bourgeois notions and prejudices, either fail to furnish any systematic information on hired labour at all, or give it only for the most recent period (e.g., German Agricultural Census of 1907), so that it is impossible

to make a comparison with the past. I shall show in detail elsewhere that in the elaboration and tabulation of the returns of hired labour American statistics changed markedly for the worse between 1900 and 1910.

The most common and most popular method of presenting statistical summaries in America and most other countries is to compare big and small farms by acreage. I shall now proceed to a consideration of these data.

In grouping farms by acreage, American statisticians take total acreage and not just the improved area, which would, of course, be the more correct method, and is the one employed by German statisticians. No reason is given why *seven* groups (under 20 acres, 20 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 174, 175 to 499, 500 to 999, 1,000 and over) are used to tabulate the returns of the 1910 Census in the United States. Statistical routine must apparently have been of paramount consideration. I shall call the 100-to-174-acre group—medium, because it consists mostly of homesteads (the official size of a homestead is 160 acres), and also because landholdings of this size usually give the farmer the greatest degree of "independence" and require the least employment of hired labour. The groups above that I shall call large or capitalistic because, as a general rule, they do not manage without hired labour. Farms with 1,000 acres and over I shall regard as latifundia—of which three-fifths is unimproved land in the North, nine-tenths, in the South, and two-thirds, in the West. Small farms are those with less than 100 acres; how much economic independence they have is evident from the fact that in three groups, from the bottom up, 51 per cent, 43 per cent and 23 per cent of the farms respectively, are recorded as having no horses. It goes without saying that this characteristic should not be taken in an absolute sense and should not he applied to all divisions or to localities with specific conditions without a special analysis.

I am unable to give here the returns for all the seven groups in the main sections of the United States, for this would overload the text with an excessive number of figures. I shall, therefore, merely outline the basic distinctions between the North, the South and the West, and give the full returns only for the United States as a whole. We should

not lose sight of the fact that three-fifths (60.6 per cent) of all the improved land, is in the North; less than one-third (31.5 per cent), in the South; and under one-twelfth (7.9 per cent), in the West.

The most striking distinction between the three main sections is that the capitalist North has the *smallest* number of latifundia, although their number, their total acreage, and their improved acreage are on the increase. In 1910, 0.5 per cent of the farms in the North were of 1,000 acres and over; these big farms had 6.9 per cent of all the land and 4.1 per cent of the improved land. The South had 0.7 per cent of such farms, with 23.9 per cent of the total acreage and 4.8 per cent of the improved acreage. In the West there were 3.9 per cent of such farms, owning 48.3 per cent of the total acreage, and 32.3 per cent of the improved acreage. This is a familiar picture: the slave-holding latifundia of the South, and the even vaster latifundia of the West, the latter being partly the foundation of the most extensive stock-raising, and partly reserve tracts of land occupied by "settlers" and resold or (less often) leased to real farmers improving the "Far West".

America demonstrates clearly that it would be imprudent to confuse the latifundia with large-scale capitalist agriculture, and that the latifundia are frequently survivals of pre-capitalist relationships—slave-owning, feudal or patriarchal. A break-up, a parcelling out of the latifundia, is taking place both in the South and in the West. In the North, the total farm acreage increased by 30.7 million acres, of which only 2.3 million is accounted for by latifundia, while 22 million belongs to big, capitalist farms (175 to 999 acres). In the South, the total acreage was reduced by 7.5 million. The latifundia *decreased* by 31.8 million acres. On the small farms there was an increase of 13 million, and on the medium farms, 5 million acres. In the West, the total acreage increased by 17 million; among the latifundia there was a decrease of 1.2 million; on the small farms, an increase of 2 million; medium, 5 million; large, 11 million acres.

The *improved* acreage increased in the latifundia of all three sections: substantially in the North (+3.7 million acres = +47.0 per cent), very slightly in the South (+0.3

million = +5.5 per cent), and more in the West (+2.8 million = +29.6 per cent). But in the North, the maximum increase in the improved acreage-occurred on the *large* farms (175 to 999 acres); in the South, on the *small* and *medium*; in the West, on the *large* and *medium*. Hence, it is the large farms that are increasing their *share* of the improved land in the North, and the small and in part the medium farms, in the South and the West. This picture fully corresponds to what we already know about the different conditions in these sections. In the South, there is a growth of small-scale commercial farming at the expense of the disintegrating slave-holding latifundia; the process is similar in the West, except that the break-up of even larger latifundia, which had their origin *not* in slave-holding but in extensive stock ranches and pre-empted tracts, is not as pronounced. Moreover, American statisticians say the following about the Pacific division:

"The great development of small fruit and other farms on the Pacific coast, due, in part at least, to irrigation projects organised in recent years, is reflected in the increase in small farms of less than 50 acres in the Pacific division" (Vol. V, p. 264).

The North has neither slave-holding nor "primitive" latifundia, there is no disintegration of them, no growth of the small farms at the expense of the large.

The process for the United States as a whole appears as follows:

Size group (acres)	Number of farms (000)		Ditto (per cent)		Increase or decrease
	1900	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	
Under 20	674	839	11.7	13.2	+1.5
20 to 49	1,258	1,415	21.9	22.2	+0.3
50 to 99	1,366	1,438	23.8	22.6	—1.2
100 to 174	1,422	1,516	24.8	23.8	—1.0
175 to 499	868	978	15.1	15.4	+0.3
500 to 999	103	125	1.8	2.0	+0.2
1,000 and over	47	50	0.8	0.8	—
Totals	5,739	6,361	100.0	100.0	—

Thus, the number of latifundia in proportion to the total number of farms remains unchanged. The most characteristic change in the relationship between the other groups is the *reduction in the number of medium-size* farms and the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

strengthening of the farms at both ends. The medium-size group (100 to 174 acres) and its smaller neighbour have lost ground. The smallest and the small farms show the greatest gains, and are followed by the large-scale capitalist farms (175 to 999 acres).

Let us take a look at the total acreage.

Size group (acres)	All farmland (000 acres)		Ditto (per cent)		Increase or decrease
	1900	1910	1900	1910	
Under 20	7,181	8,794	0.9	1.0	+0.1
20 to 49	41,536	45,378	5.0	5.2	+0.2
50 to 99	98,592	103,121	11.8	11.7	—0.1
100 to 174	192,680	204,481	23.0	23.4	+0.4
175 to 499	232,955	265,289	27.8	30.2	+2.4
500 to 999	67,864	83,653	8.1	9.5	+1.4
1,000 and over . . .	197,784	167,082	23.6	19.0	+4.6
Totals	838,592	878,798	100.0	100.0	—

Here we find above all a very substantial reduction in the share of total acreage held by the latifundia. It should be borne in mind that an absolute reduction is taking place only in the South and the West, where the proportion of *un*improved land in the latifundia in 1910 was 91.5 per cent and 77.1 per cent respectively. There was also an insignificant decrease in the share of the top small group in the total acreage (—0.1 per cent in the 50-to-99-acre size group). The greatest increase was shown by the large-scale capitalist groups, the 175-to-499-acre and the 500-to-999-acre groups. There was a relatively small increase in the share of the very small groups in the acreage. The medium group (100 to 174 acres) was practically stagnant (+0.4 per cent).

Let us now take a look at the improved acreage.

Size group (acres)	Improved land in farms (000 acres)		Ditto (per cent)		Increase or decrease
	1900	1910	1900	1910	
Under 20	6,440	7,992	1.6	1.7	+0.1
20 to 49	33,001	36,596	8.0	7.6	—0.4
50 to 99	67,345	71,155	16.2	14.9	—1.3
100 to 174	118,391	128,854	28.6	26.9	—1.7
175 to 499	135,530	161,775	32.7	33.8	+1.1
500 to 999	29,474	40,817	7.1	8.5	+1.4
1,000 and over . . .	24,317	31,263	5.9	6.5	+0.6
Totals	414,498	478,452	100.0	100.0	—

The size of the *farming enterprise* is indicated with some degree of approximation and allowing for certain exceptions to which I have referred and shall refer again below—only by the improved and not the total acreage. Once again we find that while the share of the total acreage held by the latifundia substantially decreased, their share of the improved acreage *increased*. In general, all the capitalistic groups gained ground, and most of all the 500-to-999-acre group. The largest reduction was in the medium-size group (—1.7 per cent), followed by all the small groups, with the exception of the smallest, the group under 20 acres, which showed a negligible increase (+0.1 per cent).

Let us note in advance that the smallest-size group (under 20 acres) includes farms of less than 3 acres, which are not included in American statistics unless they raise at least $250 worth of products a year. For that reason these tiny farms (of less than 3 acres) have a greater volume of production and a more highly developed capitalist character than the next group up the scale. To illustrate this point here are the returns for 1900—unfortunately the corresponding returns for 1910 are not available:

Size groups (1900) (acres)	Average per farm: Improved land (acres)	Value of all products ($)	Outlays on hired labour ($)	Value of implements and machinery ($)	Value of livestock ($)
Under 3	1.7	592	77	53	867
3 to 10	5.6	203	18	42	101
10 to 20	12.6	236	16	41	116
20 to 50	26.2	324	18	54	172

Even the 3-to-10-acre farms, to say nothing of farms with less than 3 acres, turn out in some respects to be "larger" (outlays on hired labour, value of implements and machinery) than the 10-to-20-acre farms.* Consequently,

* For 1900 we have returns by size groups for the number of high income farms, i.e., farms with a product valued over $2,500. Here are these figures: among farms of less than 3 acres, the proportion of high-income farms was 5.2 per cent; 3 to 10 acres—0.6 per cent; 10 to 20 acres—0.4 per cent; 20 to 50 acres—0.3 per cent; 50 to 100—0.6 per cent; 100 to 175—1.4 per cent; 175 to 260—5.2 per cent; 260 to 500—12.7 per cent; 500 to 1,000—24.3 per cent; 1,000 and

there is good reason to attribute the increase in the share of the total improved land held by farms under 20 acres to an increase in the improved land of the pronounced capitalist-type farms of the smallest-size group.

On the whole, the returns for 1900 and 1910 on the distribution of improved land in the U.S.A. between small and large farms warrant this absolutely definite and indubitable conclusion: *the large farms are becoming stronger, the medium and the small farms, weaker*. Hence, *insofar* as the capitalist or non-capitalist character of agriculture can be deduced from the data relating to farms grouped by acreage, the United States in the last decade shows, as a general rule, a growth of the large-scale, capitalist farms and the obliteration of small farms.

The statistics on the increase in the number of farms and the improved acreage in each group will confirm this conclusion:

Size group (acres)	Increase for 1900-10 (per cent)	
	Number of farms	Improved acreage
Under 20	+24.5	+24.1
20 to 49	+12.5	+10.9
50 to 99	+ 5.3	+ 5.7
100 to 174	+ 6.6	+ 8.8
175 to 499	+12.7	+19.4
500 to 999	+22.2	+38.5
1,000 and over	+ 6.3	+28.6
Overall increase	+10.9	+15.4

The largest percentage increase in the improved acreage took place in the two topmost groups. The least increase occurred in the medium-size group and the next smaller group (50 to 99 acres). In the two smallest groups the percentage increase in the improved acreage was less than the percentage increase in the number of farms.

over—39.5 per cent. We find the proportion of high-income farms in all the under-20-acre groups to be *greater* than in the 20-to-50-acre group.

9. CONTINUED. STATISTICS ON THE VALUE OF FARMS

American statistics, unlike European statistics, determine, for each farm and each group of farms, the value of the various elements making up the farming enterprise—the land, buildings, implements, livestock and the enterprise as a whole. These data are probably not quite as accurate as the data relating to acreage, but generally speaking they are equally reliable, and in addition give some idea of the general state of capitalism in agriculture.

In order to supplement the above analysis I shall now take the data relating to the total value of farms with all their agricultural property, and also the data on the value of implements and machinery. I single out implements and machinery from among the various elements of the enterprise because they are a direct indication of the agricultural operations being conducted, and of how they are being conducted i.e., whether more or less intensively, and whether they employ technical improvements to a greater or lesser extent. Here are the figures for the U.S.A.:

Size group (acres)	Percentage distribution of value					
	All property on farms		Increase or decrease	Implements and machinery		Increase or decrease
	1900	1910		1900	1910	
Under 20	3.8	3.7	— 0.1	3.8	3.7	— 0.1
20 to 49	7.9	7.3	— 0.6	9.1	8.5	— 0.6
50 to 99	16.7	14.6	— 2.1	19.3	17.7	— 1.6
100 to 174	28.0	27.1	— 0.9	29.3	28.9	— 0.4
175 to 499	30.5	33.3	+ 2.8	27.1	30.2	+ 3.1
500 to 999	5.9	7.1	+ 1.2	5.1	6.3	+ 1.2
1,000 and over . . .	7.3	6.9	— 0.4	6.2	4.7	— 1.5
Totals	100.0	100.0	—	100.0	100.0	—

The absolute figures show that from 1900 to 1910 the value of all farm property more than doubled; it increased from $20,440 million to $40,991 million, i.e., 100.5 per cent. The rise in the prices of farm products and rents put millions and thousands of millions of dollars into the pockets of the landowners at the expense of the working class. What were the comparative gains of the small and the big farms? The above figures supply the answer. They show that the latifundia declined (their total acreage fell from 23.6

per cent to 19.0 per cent, or 4.6 per cent), and that the *small and medium-size farms are being displaced by the large*, capitalist farms (175 to 999 acres). Adding up the figures for the small and medium farms we find that their share in the total property *decreased* from 56.4 to 52.7 per cent. Adding up the figures for the large farms and the latifundia we find that their share *increased* from 43.7 per cent to 47.3 per cent. There were absolutely identical changes in the distribution of the total value of implements and machinery between the small and large farms.

We also observe the phenomenon noted above in the figures relating to the latifundia. Their decline is limited to two sections: the South and the West. It is a decline, on the one hand, of the slave-holding latifundia, and on the other, of the primitive-squatter and the primitive-extensive latifundia. We find a *growth* of latifundia in the populated industrial North: this applies to the number of farms of this type, their total acreage, their improved acreage, their share in the total value of all farm property (2.5 per cent in 1900; 2.8 per cent in 1910), and their share in the total value of all implements and machinery.

There is moreover a growth of the role of the latifundia not only throughout the North in general but also in *both* the intensive divisions of the North in particular, where there is absolutely no colonisation, namely New England and the Middle Atlantic states. These divisions must be analysed in greater detail because, for one thing, they have misled Mr. Himmer and many others by the particularly small average size of their farms and a reduction of that size, and, for another, these most intensive divisions are most typical of the older, long settled, civilised countries of *Europe*.

Between 1900 and 1910, the number of farms, the total acreage and the improved acreage decreased in both these divisions. In New England, there was an increase only in the number of the *smallest* farms, those under 20 acres, by 22.4 per cent (the improved land on them increased by 15.5 per cent), and in the number of latifundia—by 16.3 per cent, and their improved acreage by 26.8 per cent. In the Middle Atlantic states there was an increase in the *smallest* farms (+7.7 per cent in the number, and +2.5 per cent in the improved acreage) and also in the number of the 175-to-499

acre farms (+1.0 per cent) and the improved land on the 500-to-999-acre farms (+3.8 per cent). In both divisions, there was an *increase* in the share of the smallest farms and the share of the latifundia in the total value of all farm property and also of implements and machinery. Here are some figures which give a clearer and fuller picture of each of these divisions:

Size groups (acres)	Percentage increase from 1900 to 1910			
	New England		Middle Atlantic	
	Value of all farm property	Value of implements and machinery	Value of all farm property	Value of implements and machinery
Under 20	60.9	48.9	45.8	42.9
20 to 49	31.4	30.3	28.3	37.0
50 to 99	27.5	31.2	23.8	39.9
100 to 174	30.3	38.5	24.9	43.8
175 to 499	33.0	44.6	29.4	54.7
500 to 999	53.7	53.7	31.5	50.8
1,000 and over . . .	102.7	60.5	74.4	65.2
Totals	35.6	39.0	28.1	44.1

This makes it clear that in both divisions *it was the latifundia* that gained most ground, showed the greatest economic gains, and made the greatest technical advance. Here the largest capitalist enterprises are *displacing* the others, the smaller farms. A minimum increase in the value of all property and also of implements and machinery is evident in the medium-size group and in the small group, but not in the smallest. Hence, it is the medium and small farms that mostly lag behind.

As for the smallest farms (under 20 acres), their advance in both divisions is *above the average*, and second only to the latifundia. We already know the reason: 31 to 33 per cent of the crop value in both these intensive divisions comes from the highly capitalist crops (vegetables, and also fruits, flowers, etc.) which yield extremely great values on very small acreages. In these divisions, cereal crops account for only 8 to 30 per cent of the crop value; and hay and forage, 31 to 42 per cent; there is a growth of dairy farming which is characterised by *smaller*-than-average acreages, but a *greater*-than-average value of produce and capital outlays on hired labour.

In the most intensive divisions, there is a decrease in the average improved acreage in farms because the average is obtained by combining the acreage of the latifundia and that of the smallest farms, the number of which is increasing more rapidly than that of the medium-size farms. The smallest farms are increasing in number faster than the latifundia. But there is a dual growth of capitalism: it increases the size of farms worked by old technical methods; and creates new enterprises raising special commercial crops on very small and tiny acreages, with an extremely great volume of production and employment of hired labour.

The net result is the greatest gains by the latifundia and the giant farms, the obliteration of the medium and small farms, and the growth of the smallest highly capitalist enterprises.

We shall presently see how the net result of such contradictory—seemingly contradictory—phenomena of capitalism in agriculture can be expressed in statistical terms.

10. DEFECTS OF CONVENTIONAL METHODS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. MARX ON THE PECULIARITIES OF AGRICULTURE

The grouping of farms by acreage, total or improved, is the only kind of grouping which was used in the American Census reports for 1910, and which is used in the great majority of European countries. Generally speaking, it is indisputable that apart from fiscal, bureaucratic and administrative reasons there are scientific considerations arguing the need and correctness of this kind of grouping. Still it is obviously inadequate for it completely fails to take account of the intensification of agriculture, the increasing expenditure of capital per unit of area in the form of livestock, machinery, improved seeds, better methods of crop cultivation, etc. Meanwhile, with the exception of a very few areas and countries with a primitive or purely extensive agriculture, it is this very process that is most typical for capitalist countries everywhere. For this reason the grouping of farms by acreage in the vast majority of cases gives an oversimplified and entirely inadequate picture of agricultural development in general, and of capitalist development in agriculture in particular.

When the verbose economists and statisticians who express the most popular bourgeois views hold forth on the dissimilarity of conditions in agriculture and industry, the specific nature of the former, and so on and so forth, one is always tempted to say: Gentlemen! You yourselves are most to blame for maintaining and spreading oversimplified and crude notions of evolution in agriculture! Remember Marx's *Capital*. In it you will find references to the extreme variety of forms of land ownership, such as feudal, clan, communal (and primitive-squatter), state, etc., which capitalism encounters when it makes its appearance on the historical scene. Capital subordinates to itself all these varied forms of land ownership and remoulds them after its own fashion, and if one is to understand, evaluate and express this process in statistical terms, one must learn to modify the formulation of the question and the methods of investigation in accordance with the changing *form* of the process. Capitalism subordinates to itself all these forms of land ownership: communal-allotment holdings in Russia; squatter tracts or holdings regulated by free distribution in a democratic or a feudal state, as in Siberia or the American Far West; the slave-holding estates in the American South, and the semi-feudal landholdings of the "purely Russian" gubernias. In all these cases, the development and victory of capitalism is similar, though not identical in form. In order to study and understand the precise nature of the process one must go beyond the trite petty-bourgeois phrases about "family farming" or the routine methods of comparing acreage alone.

You will also find that Marx analyses the origin of the capitalist type of ground-rent and its relationship to its forerunners in history, such as rent in kind, labour service (corvée and its survivals); money-rent (quit-rent, etc.). But who among the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois, Narodnik, economists or statisticians has given any serious thought to applying these theoretical guiding principles of Marx's to an investigation of the rise of capitalism *from* the slave-holding economy of the American South, or *from* the corvée economy in central Russia?

Finally, you will find throughout Marx's analysis of ground-rent systematic references to the varied conditions of

agriculture engendered not only by the differences in quality and location of the land, but also by the differences in the amount of capital invested in it. Now what does application of capital to land imply? It implies technical changes in agriculture, its intensification, the transition to higher systems of field cropping, increased use of artificial fertilisers, the wider use and improvement of implements and machinery, greater employment of hired labour, etc. A record of the acreage alone will not express all these complex and varied processes, which all combine to make up the general process of the development of capitalism in agriculture.

Russian Zemstvo statisticians,[4] especially those of the "good old" pre-revolutionary days, won universal respect because they avoided the routine approach and took a certain scientific interest in their business, going beyond its purely fiscal, bureaucratic and administrative aspects. They were probably the first statisticians to notice the inadequacy of grouping farms by acreage alone, and, accordingly, introduced other methods of classification, such as by sown area, number of draught animals, employment of hired labour, etc. Unfortunately, the sporadic and scattered operations of our Zemstvo statistics—in the past ever what you might call an oasis in the desert of feudal obscurity, bureaucratic routine, and every kind of stupid red-tapism—have not yielded any long-term results either for Russian or European economics.

It should be noted that the grouping of the returns canvassed in modern agricultural censuses is not such a purely technical or highly specialised question as may appear at first sight. The returns contain an immense wealth of complete information on each enterprise as a unit, but due to the clumsy, thoughtless, routine approach to tabulation and grouping, this extremely valuable material is all lost, wasted, and discoloured, which often makes it practically useless for any study of the laws of agricultural evolution. The returns make it possible to say quite categorically whether a farm is a capitalist enterprise, and to what extent; whether its farming operations are intensive, and to what degree, etc.; but when data relating to millions of farms are tabulated the most essential distinctions, features and characteristics—which ought to be most *effectively*

brought out, determined and taken into account—tend to disappear, so that all the economist gets, instead of a sensible statistical review, is routine, meaningless columns of figures, a kind of statistical "game of digits".

The American Census of 1910 with which we are now concerned is an excellent example of how first-class material of surpassing wealth and completeness has been devalued and spoiled by the routine approach and scientific ignorance of the statisticians. The processing is very much worse than in the 1900 Census, and even the traditional grouping of farms by acreage has not been fully carried out, so that we have no possibility of making a comparison between the enterprises in the various groups, say, as regards their employment of hired labour, the difference in their systems of field cropping, the use of fertilisers, etc.

I am compelled, therefore, to turn to the 1900 Census. It gave, to my knowledge, the world's only example of the use of *three* different methods, instead of one, to group or "classify" (as the Americans say) the great abundance of material on more than five and a half million farms, collected in a single country, at a single time, and under a single programme.

It is true that here, too, no classification gives all the essential characteristics of the type and size of farm. Still the resultant picture of capitalist agriculture and the capitalist evolution of agriculture is, as I hope to show, very much fuller, and reflects the real situation much more correctly than can ever be the case when the conventional, one-sided and inadequate single method of classification is used. Given the opportunity for a fuller study of facts and trends, which may be safely considered common to all the capitalist countries of the world, the most serious errors and dogmas of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, Narodnik political economy are shown up and exposed.

Since the data in question are so important I shall have to examine them in greater detail and employ statistical tables more frequently than hitherto. Realising fully that statistical tables burden the text and make reading more difficult, I have tried to keep them down to a minimum, and hope the reader will be lenient with me if I now have to increase that minimum, for on the analysis of the points

examined here depends not only the general conclusion on the principal question—the trend, type, character and law of evolution of modern agriculture—but also the general assessment of the data furnished by modern agricultural statistics which are so often cited and just as often distorted.

The first grouping—"by acreage"—gives the following picture of American agriculture in 1900:

Size group (acres)	Percentage of farms	Percentage of total acreage	Average per farm: Improved acreage	Outlays on hired labour ($)	Value of produce** ($)	Value of implements and machinery ($)
Under 3	0.7	—*	1.7	77	592	53
3 to 10	4.0	0.2	5.6	18	203	42
10 to 20	7.1	0.7	12.6	16	236	41
20 to 50	21.9	4.9	26.2	18	324	54
50 to 100	23.8	11.7	49.3	33	503	106
100 to 175	24.8	22.9	83.2	60	721	155
175 to 260	8.5	12.3	129.0	109	1,054	211
260 to 500	6.6	15.4	191.4	166	1,354	263
500 to 1000	1.8	8.1	287.5	312	1,913	377
1,000 and over	0.8	23.8	520.0	1,059	5,334	1,222
Average for all farms	—	—	72.3	—	656	133

It is safe to say that the statistics of any capitalist country—the inessential particulars apart—would present an absolutely similar picture. This is confirmed by the latest censuses in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland and Denmark. As total farm acreage increases from group to group, there is also an increase in the average improved acreage, the average value of the produce, the value of implements and machinery, the value of livestock (I have omitted these figures) and the expenditure on hired labour (earlier on I pointed out the significance of the slight exception of the under-3-acre farms and in part of the 3-to-10-acre farms).

It would seem that it could not be otherwise. The increase in expenditure on hired labour appears to confirm beyond any doubt that the division of farms into large and small on

* Less than 0.1 per cent.
** Excluding produce used as feed.

the strength of acreage is entirely in accord with their division into capitalist and non-capitalist enterprises. Nine-tenths of the usual arguments about "small-scale" agriculture are based on identification in this way and on such data.

Let us now consider the average per acre of (all) land, instead of per farm:

Size group (acres)	Per acre of all land in dollars			
	Outlays on hired labour	Outlays on fertilisers	Value of livestock	Value of implements and machinery
Under 3	40.30	2.36	456.76	27.57
3 to 10	2.95	0.60	16.32	6.71
10 to 20	1.12	0.33	8.30	2.95
20 to 50	0.55	0.20	5.21	1.65
50 to 100	0.46	0.12	4.51	1.47
100 to 175	0.45	0.07	4.09	1.14
175 to 260	0.52	0.07	3.96	1.00
260 to 500	0.48	0.04	3.61	0.77
500 to 1000	0.47	0.03	3.16	0.57
1,000 and over	0.25	0.02	2.15	0.29

Allowing for some absolutely negligible exceptions we find a uniform decline in the characteristics of intensive farming from the lower groups to the higher.

The conclusion appears to be incontrovertible that "small-scale" production in agriculture is more intensive than large-scale production, that the smaller the "scale" of production, the greater the intensity and productivity of agriculture, and that, "consequently", capitalist production in agriculture is maintained only by the extensive, primitive nature of the economy, etc.

In fact, the same conclusions are being drawn all the time, on every hand, in all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois (opportunist-"Marxist" and Narodnik) writings, for when farms are grouped by acreage (which is not only the most common but practically the only kind of grouping done) the picture will be similar for any capitalist country, that is, it will show the same decline in the characteristics of intensive agriculture from the lower groups to the higher. There is, for instance, the celebrated work of the celebrated Eduard David—*Socialism and Agriculture*—a collection of bourgeois prejudices and bourgeois lies under the cover

of quasi-socialist catchwords. It uses just that kind of data to prove the "superiority", "viability", etc., of "small-scale" production.

One factor has especially facilitated such conclusions. It is that data similar to the above are ordinarily available on the quantity of livestock; but practically nowhere are data collected on hired labour—especially in such a summarised form as expenditure on hired labour. But it is precisely the data on hired labour that reveal the incorrectness of all such conclusions. In effect, if the increase, say, in the value of livestock (or the total number of animals, which is the same thing) per unit of area down the scale is taken as evidence of the "superiority" of "small-scale" agriculture, it should be borne in mind that as we go down the scale this "superiority" turns out to be *connected* with *increasing* expenditure on hired labour! But such an increase in the expenditure on hired labour—notice that we have all along been dealing with values per unit of area, per acre, per hectare, per dessiatine—signifies a growth of the *capitalist* nature of the enterprise! But the capitalist nature of the enterprise clashes with the popular notion of "small-scale" production because small-scale production implies enterprise which is *not* based on hired labour.

This seems to create a knot of contradictions. The overall acreage returns for the size groups indicate that the "small" farms are non-capitalist, whereas the big farms are. Yet the very same data show that the "smaller" the enterprise, the more intensive it is, and the larger its expenditure on hired labour per unit of land area!

In order to explain this let us consider another type of grouping.

11. A MORE EXACT COMPARISON OF SMALL AND LARGE ENTERPRISES

As I have already said, American statisticians in this case take the value of the products raised on the farm, less those used as feed. Taken alone, these data, which appear to be available only in American statistics, are, of course, less exact than the figures for acreage or livestock, and the like. But considered as a whole, in relation to several million

farms, and especially for the purpose of determining the *relative standing* of the various groups of farms in the country, these data undoubtedly cannot be regarded as less suitable than the rest. At any rate, these data are a much more direct indication than any others of the scale of *production*, especially commercial operations, i.e., the value of the produce raised for the market. It should be borne in mind that any discussion of agricultural evolution and its laws centres on a consideration of small-scale and large-scale *production*.

What is more, in such cases the point is always the evolution of agriculture under capitalism, in connection with capitalism, under its impact, or the like. To evaluate this impact the greatest efforts must above all be made to draw a line of distinction between "natural" and commercial economy in agriculture. It is well known that "natural" economy, i.e., production for consumption on the home farm and not for the market, has a relatively important part to play in agriculture, and is giving way to commercial farming at an extremely slow pace. If the accepted principles of political economy are not to be applied mechanically but intelligently, the law of the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production, for instance, can be applied *only* to commercial agriculture. It is hardly likely that anyone will object to this proposition from the theoretical standpoint. However, it is the rare economist or statistician who will make a special effort to bring out, trace and as far as possible take into account, the characteristics indicative of the transformation of natural into commercial agriculture. A great step towards meeting this most important theoretical requirement is made by the classification of farms according to the money value of produce not used for feed.

Let us note that, when considering the undeniable fact that small-scale production is being displaced by large-scale production in industry, enterprises are always grouped according to the value of their product or the number of wage-workers employed. In industry, due to its technical peculiarities, the matter is much simpler. In agriculture, because relationships are so much more complicated and intertwined, it is a great deal harder to determine the scale of operations, the value of the product and the extent to

which hired labour is employed. For the last-named item, it is necessary to take account of the total annual employment of hired labour and not merely the amount on hand when a census is taken, for agricultural operations are of an especially "seasonal" nature; in addition, it is necessary to list not only the permanent hired labourers but also the day-labourers who play a most important part in farming. To say that this is difficult is not to say that it is impossible. Rational methods of investigation adapted to the technical peculiarities of agriculture, including classification by output, the money value of the product, and the frequency and amount of hired labour employed, will have to be used on a much wider scale, in spite of the thick maze of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois prejudices and the efforts to embellish bourgeois realities. And it may be safely said that any step forward in the use of rational methods of investigation will serve to confirm the truth that in capitalist society small-scale production is being displaced by large-scale production both in industry and agriculture.

Let us take the 1900 returns for the groups of farms in America classified according to the value of their product:

Farms classified by value of product ($)	Number of farms (percentage of total)	Acreage of farms (percentage of total)	Average per farm: Improved acreage	Average per farm: Hired labour ($)	Average per farm: Implements and machinery ($)
0	0.9	1.8	33.4	24	54
1 and under 50	2.9	1.2	18.2	4	24
50 and under 100	5.3	2.1	20.0	4	28
100 and under 250	21.8	10.1	29.2	7	42
250 and under 500	27.9	18.1	48.2	18	78
500 and under 1,000	24.0	23.6	84.0	52	154
1000 and under 2,500	14.5	23.2	150.5	158	283
Over 2,500	2.7	19.9	322.3	786	781
Average for all farms	—	—	72.3	—	133

The farms reporting no income, i.e., with a $0 value of product, probably consist primarily of newly occupied homesteads on which their owners had not yet had time to erect buildings, acquire livestock or sow and raise a crop. In a country like America, where colonisation is still in progress on such a vast scale, special importance attaches

to the question of how long a farmer has been in possession of his farm.

Leaving aside the zero-income farms, we get a picture quite similar to the one obtained above by grouping the same data according to total farm acreage. As the value of the product raised on a farm increases, there is also an increase in the average improved acreage, the average expenditure on hired labour, and the average value of implements and machinery. By and large, the more profitable farms—in terms of gross income, i.e., the value of their total product—turn out to have the larger acreage. It would appear that the new method of grouping has not yielded anything new-at all.

But now let us take the averages (the value of livestock and implements, expenditure on hired labour and fertilisers) per acre instead of per farm:

Farms classified by value of product ($)	Per acre of all land ($)			
	Outlays on hired labour	Outlays on fertilisers	Value of livestock	Value of implements and machinery
0	0.08	0.01	2.97	0.19
1 and under 50	0.06	0.01	1.79	0.38
50 and under 100	0.08	0.03	2.01	0.48
100 and under 250	0.11	0.05	2.46	0.62
250 and under 500	0.19	0.07	3.00	0.82
500 and under 1,000	0.36	0.07	3.75	1.07
1000 and under 2,500	0.67	0.08	4.63	1.21
Over 2,500	0.72	0.06	3.98	0.72

The exceptions in some respects are the zero-income farms, which in general are in a very special position, and the farms with the highest incomes, which turn out to be less intensive than the next group, judging by three out of the four characteristics we have chosen. But on the whole we find a uniform *increase* in the intensity of agriculture *with the increase* in the value of the farm product.

This result is the very opposite of the one obtained when farms were grouped by acreage.

The same figures yield diametrically different conclusions, depending on the method of grouping.

As the enterprise grows in size the intensity of agriculture *declines*—if the criterion is acreage, and *increases*—if the criterion is the value of the product.

Which of these two conclusions is the correct one?

It is clear that if the land is not being improved, acreage gives *no idea at all* of the scale of agricultural operations (we must not forget that in America farms are grouped not only according to the improved acreage, but also by the total acreage and that in that country the proportion of the improved acreage ranges from 19 to 91 per cent in the farm groups, and from 27 to 75 per cent, in the geographical divisions); it gives *no correct* idea at all if besides this there are so many substantial differences between farms in the methods of cultivation, the intensity of agriculture, the methods of field cropping, quantities of fertilisers, the use of machinery, the character of livestock farming, etc.

This is known to apply to *all* capitalist countries and even to all those whose agriculture is affected by capitalism.

We see here one of the most profound and general reasons why mistaken notions about the "superiority" of small-scale agriculture are so tenacious, and why bourgeois and petty-bourgeois prejudices of this type prove to be compatible with the great progress made in the last few decades by social statistics in general, and agricultural statistics in particular. To be sure, the tenacity of these mistakes and prejudices is also a matter of the *interests* of the bourgeoisie, who seek to cover up the depth of class contradictions in contemporary bourgeois society; and everyone knows that when it comes to interests, the most incontrovertible truths are liable to be questioned.

But we are here concerned only with an examination of the theoretical sources of the erroneous notion of the "superiority" of small-scale agriculture. There is no doubt at all that of all these sources the most important one is the uncritical, routine attitude to the hackneyed methods of comparing enterprises only by their total acreage or the improved acreage.

The U.S.A. is an exception among capitalist countries in that it alone has a great deal of unoccupied, unsettled land, which is given away free. Agriculture still can and indeed does develop here through the occupation of vacant land, through the cultivation of virgin lands never before put to the plough—here it does develop in the form of the

most primitive and extensive livestock and crop raising. There is nothing of the kind in the old, civilised countries of capitalist Europe. In these countries, agriculture develops *mainly* through intensive methods, not by increases in the *quantity* of land under cultivation, but by improvement in the *quality* of cultivation, by increases in the amount of capital invested in the original acreage. Those who compare farms by acreage alone lose sight of this principal trend in capitalist agriculture, a trend which is gradually becoming the principal one in the United States as well.

The principal trend in capitalist agriculture is the conversion of *small-scale* enterprise, *which remains small* in terms of acreage, *into large-scale* enterprise in terms of output, in the development of livestock raising, the quantity of fertilisers, the scale on which machinery is used, and the like.

That is why the conclusion drawn from the comparison of the various groups of enterprises by acreage—that the intensity of agriculture declines with the greater size of enterprise—is entirely incorrect. The only correct conclusion, on the contrary, is to be drawn from the comparison of the various farms by the value of their product—the bigger the enterprise, the greater is the intensity of agriculture.

For acreage is only circumstantial evidence of the scale of agricultural operations, and the broader and more rapid the intensification of agriculture, the less authentic is this "evidence". The value of the product of an enterprise is not circumstantial but direct evidence of the scale of its operations. Moreover, it is true in every case. By small-scale agriculture is always meant the kind that is *not* based on hired labour. But the transition to the exploitation of hired labour does not depend only on the extension of the acreage of an enterprise on its old technical basis—this occurs only in primitive, extensive enterprises—but also on an improvement of equipment and techniques and their modernisation, investment in the same acreage of additional capital in the form of, say, new machinery or artificial fertilisers, or of increased and improved livestock, etc.

The classification of farms by the value of their product brings together enterprises which really have the same scale of production, regardless of acreage. Accordingly, a highly

intensive enterprise on a small tract of land falls into the same group as a relatively extensive enterprise on a large tract; both are actually large-scale in terms of production and the employment of hired labour.

On the contrary, the classification by acreage throws together large and small enterprises, because they happen to have a similar acreage; it puts into the same group enterprises with an entirely different scale of operations, those in which family labour predominates, and those in which hired labour predominates. The result is a picture of *blunted class contradictions* within capitalism, a picture which is basically incorrect and entirely misleading as to the actual state of affairs, but one the bourgeoisie is very fond of. This leads to an equally fallacious *embellishment of the condition of the small farmers*, which the bourgeoisie is just as fond of. The net result is a vindication of capitalism.

In effect, the fundamental and principal trend of capitalism is the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production, both in industry and in agriculture. But this displacement should not be interpreted *merely* as immediate expropriation. Displacement also implies the ruin of the small farmers and a worsening of conditions on their farms, a process that may go on for years and decades. This deterioration assumes a variety of forms, such as the small farmer's overwork or malnutrition, his heavy debts, worse feed and poorer care of livestock in general, poorer husbandry—cultivation, fertilisation and the like—as well as technical stagnation on the farm, etc. If the researcher is to be absolved from the charge of wittingly or otherwise playing up to the bourgeoisie by giving a false impression of the condition of the small farmer, who is being ruined and oppressed, his task is, first and foremost, to give a precise definition of the symptoms of this ruination, which are not at all simple or uniform; his next task is to determine these symptoms, to analyse and, as far as possible, to define the extent to which they have spread and how they change with time. But present-day economists and statisticians hardly pay any attention to this vital aspect of the matter.

Just imagine that to a group of 90 small farmers who have no capital to improve their farms, who lag behind the times and are gradually being ruined the statistician adds 10 farm-

ers who have all the capital they need and on equally small tracts of land start large-scale operations based on hired labour. The net result would be an embellished picture of the condition of all the hundred small farmers.

The U.S. Census of 1910 produced just that kind of embellished picture—and one that, objectively, favoured the bourgeoisie—primarily because it discarded the method used in 1900 of comparing the acreage grouping and the value-of-product grouping. We learn, for instance, only that expenditure on fertilisers increased immensely, namely, by 115 per cent, i.e., more than double the previous figure, while the expenditure on hired labour went up by only 82 per cent, and the total crop value by 83 per cent. This is tremendous progress. It is the progress of national agriculture as a whole. And, I dare say, some economist is likely to draw—if indeed has not yet drawn—the conclusion that this is the progress of small-scale family farming, for, generally speaking, the returns for the size groups by acreage indicate that "small-scale" agriculture has a much higher per-acre expenditure on fertilisers.

But we now know that such a conclusion would be fallacious, because the one thing the grouping of farms by acreage does is to lump together farmers on the way to ruin, or at any rate the indigent small farmers who cannot afford to buy fertilisers, and *capitalists* (even if they are small-time capitalists) who, on small tracts of land, start large-scale farming operations with the use of up-to-date, intensive methods and the employment of hired labour.

If small-scale agriculture is being generally displaced by large-scale agriculture, as the figures for the total value of farm property in 1900 and 1910 show; if, as we shall presently see, the raising of highly capitalist crops on small tracts developed at an especially fast rate in this period; if, according to the general statistics on small and large enterprises grouped by the value of their product, expenditures for fertilisers increased proportionately with the scale of the enterprise—then the conclusion inevitably follows that the "progress" in the use of fertilisers from 1900 to 1910 went to increase the preponderance of capitalist agriculture over small agriculture, which was displaced and suppressed to an even greater extent.

12. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ENTERPRISES IN AGRICULTURE

What I have said above about the intensive, large-scale capitalist enterprises on small tracts raises this question: is there any reason to believe that the intensification of agriculture leads to a reduction of farm acreage? In other words, are there any conditions relating to modern farming techniques as such that require smaller farm acreage for greater intensity of farming?

No answer is provided either by general theoretical reasoning or by examples. In each case it is a matter of the concrete technical level of agriculture under a given set of conditions, and the actual amount of capital required by a given system of farming. In theory, any amount of capital can be invested in any acreage in any possible way, but it is obvious that "this depends" on the existing economic, technical, and cultural conditions, etc., and the whole point is the kind of conditions prevalent in a given country at a given time. Examples serve no purpose at all, because in the sphere of such complex, varied, interwoven and contradictory trends in the economics of modern agriculture, any number of examples will be found to support opposite views. What this calls for above all—and more so than in any other sphere—is a picture of the process *as a whole*, with all the trends taken into account and summed up in the form of a resultant.

The third method of grouping used by American statisticians in 1900 helps to find an answer to this question. It is classification according to the *principal source of income*. Accordingly, farms fall into one of the following groups: (1) hay and grain as the principal source of income; (2) miscellaneous; (3) livestock; (4) cotton; (5) vegetable; (6) fruit; (7) dairy produce; (8) tobacco; (9) rice; (10) sugar; (11) flowers and plants; (12) nursery products; (13) taro; and (14) coffee. The last seven groups (8-14) together make up only 2.2 per cent of the total number of farms, i.e., such an insignificant share, that I shall not consider them separately. These groups (8-14) are similar to the preceding three groups (5-7) in economic characteristics and significance and constitute a single type.

Here are the data characterising the various types of farms:

Groups of farms by principal source of income	Percentage of total number of farms	Average acreage per farm Total	Average acreage per farm improved	Average per acre of all land ($) Outlays on labour	Outlays on fertilisers	Value of implements and machinery	Value of livestock
Hay and grain	23.0	159.3	111.1	0.47	0.04	1.04	3.17
Miscellaneous	18.5	106.9	46.5	0.35	0.08	0.94	2.73
Hay and grain	23.0	159.3	111.1	0.47	0.04	1.04	3.17
Miscellaneous	18.5	106.9	46.5	0.35	0.08	0.94	2.73
Vegetables	2.7	65.1	33.8	1.62	0.59	2.12	3.74
Fruits	1.4	74.8	41.6	2.46	0.30	2.34	3.35
Dairy produce	6.2	121.9	63.2	0.86	0.09	1.66	5.58
Average for all farms . . .	100.0	146.6	72.3	0.43	0.07	0.90	3.66

It is clear that the first two groups of enterprises (hay and grain, and miscellaneous) may be classified as average both as regards the degree of their capitalist development (their expenditures for hired labour are nearest the average—0.35 to 0.47, as against an average of 0.43 for the U.S.A.) and the intensiveness of agriculture. All the characteristics of intensive operations—expenditures for fertilisers, the per-acre value of machinery and livestock—are nearest to the general average for the U.S.A.

There is no doubt that these two groups are especially typical of the majority of agricultural enterprises in general. Hay and grain, followed by a combination of various farm products ("miscellaneous" sources of income), are the chief types of agricultural enterprises in all countries. It would be extremely interesting to have more detailed data about these groups, such, for instance, as a breakdown into more and less commercialised enterprises, etc. But, as we have seen, the American Census, having made one step in that direction, did not go forward, but went back.

The next two groups, livestock and cotton, are an example of farms with the least capitalistic development (the expenditures for hired labour: 0.29 to 0.30 as against the average of 0.43), and the least intensive methods of agriculture. Their values of implements and machinery are the lowest and considerably lower than the average (0.66 and 0.53 as against 0.90). Farms whose principal source of income is livestock naturally have more livestock per acre than the average for the U.S.A. (4.45 as against 3.66), but appear to be engaged in extensive livestock raising: their expenditures for fertilisers are the minimum, they have the largest average acreage (226.9 acres) and the smallest proportion of improved acreage (86.1 out of 226.9). The cotton farms have a higher-than-average figure for fertilisers, but other indexes indicative of intensive agriculture (the per-acre value of livestock and machinery) are very low.

Finally, the last three groups—vegetables, fruit, and dairy produce—include farms which are, first, the smallest in acreage (33 to 63 acres of improved land, as against 42 to 86 and 46 to 111 in the other groups); secondly, the most capitalist: they have the heaviest expenditure of hired labour,

from 2 to 6 times the average; and thirdly, the most intensive. Almost all the indexes of intensive agriculture are above the average: the expenditure on fertilisers, the value of machinery, the value of livestock (a minor exception are the fruit-growing farms which lag behind the average, but are well ahead of the farms which derive their income chiefly from hay and grain).

Let us now see what is the share of these highly capitalist farms in the country's economy. But we must first examine their intensive character in somewhat greater detail.

Take the farms whose main income is derived from vegetables. It is well known that in all capitalist countries the development of towns, factories, industrial settlements, railway stations, ports, etc., stimulates a demand for this type of product, it pushes up their prices, and increases the number of agricultural enterprises raising them for the market. The average "vegetable" farm has *less than one-third* of the improved acreage of an "ordinary" farm deriving income chiefly from hay and grain: the former is 33.8 acres, and the latter, 111.1. This means that this particular technical level with this particular accumulation of capital in agriculture requires "vegetable" farms of smaller acreage; in other words, if capital invested in agriculture is to yield a not less-than-average profit, a vegetable-raising farm should have, technology being what it is, a *smaller acreage* than a hay-and-grain farm.

But that is not all. The growth of capitalism in agriculture consists above all in a transition from natural agriculture to commercial agriculture. This is being constantly forgotten, and must be brought up again and again. Commercial agriculture, it should be noted, does not develop along the "simple" lines imagined or projected by bourgeois economists, namely, through an ever greater output of *the same* products. Not at all. Commercial agriculture very frequently develops by shifting from one type of product to another, and the shift from hay and grain to vegetables is very common. But what bearing does it have on the question before us, that of farm acreage and the growth of capitalism in agriculture?

Such a shift signifies the *split-up* of a "large" 111.1-acre farm into more than three "small" 33.8-acre farms. The old farm produced a value of $760—the average value of its products, less the feed raised on the farm, whose chief source of income is hay and grain. Each of the new farms produces a value of $665, or a total of $665×3=$1,995, i.e., more than double the original figure.

As large-scale production displaces small-scale production, farm acreage is *reduced*.

The average expenditure on hired labour on the old farm was $76; on the new farm it is $106, or almost half as much again, while acreage is one-third or even less. Expenditure on fertilisers has gone up from $0.04 per acre to $0.59, an increase of almost 15 times; the value of implements and machinery has doubled from $1.04 to $2.12, etc.

There will, of course, be the usual objection that the number of such highly capitalist farms with specialised "commercial" crops is negligible, as compared with the total. The answer is that, first, the number and the *role*, the economic role of such farms, are much greater than is generally rea lised; and secondly—and this is the most important point—*it is such crops* that are developed *more rapidly* than others in the capitalist countries. That is just why a reduction in farm acreage with the intensification of agriculture so often implies an increase and not a reduction in the scale of operations, an increase and not a decrease in the exploitation of hired labour.

Here are the exact American statistics for the country as a whole. Let us take *all* the special, or "commercial", crops listed above under heads 5-14, namely, vegetables, fruit, dairy produce, tobacco, rice, sugar, flowers, nursery products, taro, and coffee. In 1900, these products were the *principal* source of income for 12.5 per cent of all farms in the U.S.A. This is one-eighth, a very small minority. Their acreage was 8.6 per cent, or one-twelfth, of the total. But to continue. Let us take the total value of the products of American agriculture (less feed). Of this value the farms in question accounted for as much as 16 per cent, i.e., their share of the value was almost double their share of the acreage.

This means that the productivity of labour and land on these farms was almost double the average.

Let us take the sum total of expenditure on hired labour in American agriculture. Of this total, 26.6 per cent, i.e., over one-quarter, fell to the farms in question. This is more than three times their share of the acreage, and more than three times the average. This means that these farms are very much more capitalist than the average.

Their share of the total value of implements and machinery is 20.1 per cent, and of the expenditures for fertilisers, 31.7 per cent, i.e., slightly less than *one-third* of the total, and nearly *four times* the average.

Consequently, an incontrovertible fact is established for the country as a whole. It is that the especially intensive farms have an especially small acreage, especially great employment of hired labour, and especially high productivity of labour; that the economic role of these farms in the nation's agriculture is two, three and more times greater than their proportion of the total number of farms, to say nothing of their share of the total acreage.

As time goes on, does the role of these highly capitalist and highly intensive crops and farms increase or decrease in comparison with other crops and farms?

The answer is provided by a comparison of the last two census reports: their role is unquestionably *increasing*. Let us take the acreage planted to the various crops. From 1900 to 1910, the acreage under grain increased by only 3.5 per cent for the U.S.A.; under beans, peas, and the like, 26.6 per cent; hay and forage, 17.2 per cent; cotton, 32 per cent; vegetables, 25.5 per cent; sugar-beets, sugar-cane, etc., 62.6 per cent.

Let us examine the crop returns. From 1900 to 1910, the grain crop went up only 1.7 per cent; beans, 122.2 per cent; hay and forage, 23 per cent; sugar-beets, 395.7 per cent; sugar-cane, 48.5 per cent; potatoes, 42.4 per cent; grapes, 97.6 per cent; there was a poor crop of berries, apples, etc., in 1910, but the orange and lemon crops, etc., were treble those of 1900.

Thus, the apparently paradoxical but nevertheless proven fact has been shown to apply to U.S. agriculture as a whole

that, generally speaking, small-scale production is not only being displaced by large scale production, but also that this displacement is taking place in the following form:

Small-scale production is being crowded out by large-scale production through the displacement of farms which are "larger" in acreage, but are less productive, less intensive and less capitalist, by farms which are "smaller" in acreage, but are more productive, more intensive, and more capitalist.

13. HOW THE DISPLACEMENT OF SMALL-SCALE BY LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE IS MINIMISED

The objection may be raised that if the displacement of small-scale *production* "also" proceeds in the form of the intensification (and "capitalisation") of operations on the smaller-size *farms*, is the grouping by acreage of any use at all? Is this not a case of two contradictory tendencies which make any general conclusion impossible?

This objection can be met by a *complete* picture of American agriculture and its evolution; to meet it we must try to compare all three methods of grouping which present, as it were, the maximum of information social statistics has produced in the sphere of agriculture in recent years.

Such a comparison is possible. All it calls for is a table which may at first sight appear to be so abstract and complex that it may "scare" the reader away. However, it takes only a little bit of concentration to "read", understand and analyse the table.

To compare the three different groupings we need take only their *percentage ratios*. All the necessary calculations are given in the American Census report for 1900. Each grouping is tabulated under *three* main heads. By acreage we have: (1) small farms (under 100 acres), (2) medium (100 to 175 acres), and (3) large (175 and over). By value of product we have: (1) non-capitalist farms (under $500), (2) medium

($500 to 1,000), and (3) capitalist ($1,000 and over). By the principal source of income we take (1) slightly capitalist (livestock, cotton), (2) medium (hay and grain; and miscellaneous), and (3) highly capitalist (the special "commercial" crops listed above, in Chapter 12, under heads 5 to 14).

For every group we first take the percentage of farms, i.e., the number of farms in a given group expressed as a percentage ratio of the total number of farms in the U.S.A. We then take the percentage of all land, i.e., the total acreage in a given group expressed as a percentage ratio of the total acreage of all farms in the U.S.A. The acreage serves as an indicator of the extensive character of the enterprise (unfortunately, the only figures available are for total acreage, instead of the improved acreage only, which would have been more exact). If the percentage share of the *total* acreage is *higher* than the percentage share of the number of farms, for example, if 17.2 per cent of the farms have 43.1 per cent of the land, it is evident that we are dealing with large farms, larger-than-average farms, which are besides more than double the size of the average farm. The reverse is true if the percentage of land is *lower* than the percentage of farms.

Next come the indexes of *intensiveness* of agriculture: the value of implements and machinery, and the total expenditure on fertilisers. Here, too, we take the value and the expenditure in the given group expressed as a percentage share of the totals for the country as a whole. Here again, if the percentage is *higher* than the percentage of *land*, the conclusion is that intensiveness is *above* the average, etc.

Finally, in order to determine exactly the capitalist character of the enterprises, the same method is applied to the total expenditure on hired labour; while in order to determine the scale of production this is done in relation to the total value of the agricultural product for the entire country.

This has produced the following table, which I shall now proceed to explain and analyse:

Comparison of the Three Groupings
(figures are percentages of total, sum total of each horizontal row of three figures=100)

		By principle source of income			By farm acreage			By value of product			
		Slightly capitalist	Medium	Highly capitalist	Small	Medium	Large	Non-capitalist	Medium	Capitalist	
Number of farms		46.0	41.5	12.5	57.5	24.8	17.7	58.8	24.0	17.2	Index of extensiveness of agriculture
Total acreage		52.9	38.5	8.6	17.5	22.9	59.6	33.3	23.6	43.1	
Constant capital	Value of implements and machinery	37.2	42.7	20.1	31.7	28.9	39.4	25.3	28.0	46.7	Index of intensiveness of agriculture
	Outlays on fertilisers	36.5	31.8	31.7	41.9	25.7	32.4	29.1	26.1	44.8	
Variable capital	Outlays on hired labour	35.2	38.2	26.6	22.3	23.5	54.2	11.3	19.6	69.1	Index of capitalist character of enterprise
Scale of production	Value of product	45.0	39.0	16.0	33.5	27.3	39.2	22.1	25.6	52.3	

Let us consider the first grouping—according to the principal source of income. Here farms are grouped, so to say, according to their line of farming, which is to some extent similar to the grouping of industrial enterprises by branches of industry. But the picture is immensely more complex in agriculture.

The first column shows the group of slightly capitalist farms. It comprises almost one-half the total number of farms—46 per cent. They own 52.9 per cent of the total acreage, i.e., they are larger than average (this group includes both the very large, extensive, livestock farms and the smaller-than-average cotton farms). Their shares of the value of machinery (37.2 per cent) and the expenditure on fertilisers (36.5 per cent) are lower than their acreage percentages, which means that their intensiveness is lower than the average. The same thing is true of the capitalist character of the enterprise (35.2 per cent) and the value of the product (45 per cent). Hence, their productivity of labour is lower than the average.

The second column shows the medium farms. Because farms which are "medium" in *every* respect fall into the medium group by *all* three methods of grouping, we find here that *all* their percentage ratios are closer to each other than in any of the other groups. The fluctuations are relatively small.

The third column shows the highly capitalist farms. I gave above a detailed analysis of what the figures in this column mean. Be it noted that *only* for this type of farm do we have accurate and comparable data both for 1900 and 1910—data testifying that these highly capitalist crops have a faster-than-average rate of development.

In what way is this more rapid development evident in the ordinary classification in use in most countries? This is shown in the next column: the small farms grouped by acreage.

This group consists of a great number of farms (57.5 per cent of the total). Its acreage is only 17.5 per cent of the total, i.e., less than one-third of the average. Hence, this is the "poorest" group, the most "land-starved" group. But then we and that it has a higher-than-average intensiveness of agriculture (the value of machinery and expenditures for

fertilisers); that it is more capitalist (expenditures for hired labour); and that it has a *higher*-than-average-productivity of labour (value of product): 22.3 to 41.9 per cent with 17.5 per cent of the acreage.

What is the explanation? Obviously that an especially large number of *highly capitalist* farms—see the preceding vertical column—fall into this "small"-acreage group. A *minority* of rich, capital-owning farmers conducting large-scale capitalist operations on small tracts of land are added to a majority of really small farmers who have little land and little capital. Such farmers make up only 12.5 per cent (=the percentage of highly capitalist farms) of the total in America, which means that even if they were all to be put into this one group of small-acreage farms, 45 per cent of the farmers in that group (57.5—12.5) would still be short of land and capital. Actually, of course, a part of the highly capitalist farms, even if only a small one, consists of medium and large-acreage farms, so that the figure of 45 per cent in fact *understates* the actual number of farmers who have little land and no capital.

It will be easily seen how the condition of these 45 per cent—a minimum of 45 per cent—of the farmers who are poor in land and capital is *embellished* by the inclusion into the same group of some 12,10 or so per cent of farmers who are supplied with higher-than-average amounts of capital, machinery, money to buy fertilisers, hire labour, and the rest of it.

I shall not dwell separately on the medium and large farms of this grouping, for this would be to repeat, in slightly different words what has been said about the small farms. For instance, if the data on the small-acreage farms put a better complexion on the oppressed condition of small-scale *production*, the data on the large-acreage farms obviously *minimise* the actual *concentration* of agriculture by large-scale production. We shall presently see an exact statistical expression of this minimised concentration.

We thus arrive at the following general proposition which may be formulated as a law applicable to the grouping of farms by acreage in any capitalist country:

The broader and more rapid the intensification of agriculture, the more the classification by acreage serves to *give*

a rosy picture of the oppressed condition of small-scale production in agriculture, the condition of the small farmer who is short of *both* land *and* capital; the more it serves to *blunt* the real sharpness of the class contradiction between the prospering large-scale producer and the small-scale producer going to the wall; the more it serves to *minimise* the concentration of capital in the hands of big operators and the displacement of the small.

This is graphically confirmed by the third, and last, classification, according to the value of product. The percentage of non-capitalistic farms (or not very profitable farms in terms of gross income) is 58.8 per cent, i.e., even somewhat more than the "small" farms (57.5 per cent). They have much *more* land than the group of "small" farmers (33.3 per cent as against 17.5 per cent). But their share of the total value of the product is *one-third smaller*: 22.1 per cent as against 33.5 per cent!

What is the explanation? It is that this group does not include the highly capitalistic farms on small tracts which have *artificially and falsely* inflated the small farmers' share of the *capital* in the form of machinery, fertilisers, etc.

Thus, the oppression and dispossession—and hence the ruin—of the small *producer* in agriculture turn out to be *much more advanced* than one would suppose from the data on small *farms*.

The returns for the small and large farms, grouped by acreage, take no account of *the role of capital*, and the failure to reckon with this "trifle" in capitalist enterprise distorts the condition of the small producer, puts a false colour on it, for it "could be" tolerable "but for" the existence of capital, i.e., the power of money, and the relationship between the hired labourer and the capitalist, between the farmer and the merchant and creditor, etc.!

For that reason the concentration of agriculture as shown by the large farms is much lower than its concentration as shown by large-scale, *i.e.*, capitalist, production: 39.2 per cent of the value of the product (slightly more than double the average) is concentrated on 17.7 per cent of "large" farms, while 52.3 per cent of the total value of the product, i.e., more than *three* times the average, is concentrated on 17.2 per cent *capitalist* farms.

In the country which practises the free distribution of vast tracts of unoccupied land, and which the Manilovs[5] consider a country of "family" farms, *more than one-half* of the total agricultural production is concentrated in about one-sixth of the *capitalist* enterprises, whose expenditure on hired labour is four times greater than the per-farm average (69.1 per cent on 17.2 per cent of the total number of farms), and are half as great again as the per-acre average (69.1 per cent of the expenditure on hired labour on farms owning 43.1 per cent of the total amount of land).

At the other pole, more than one-half, almost three-fifths, of the total number of farms (58.8 per cent) are non-capitalist. They have one-third of the land (33.3 per cent) but on it they have less than the average quantity of machinery (25.3 per cent of the value of machinery); they use less fertilisers than the average (29.1 per cent of the expenditures for fertilisers) and so its productivity is only *two-thirds of the average*. With one-third of the total acreage, this immense number of-farms, which suffer the greatest oppression under the yoke of capital, produce less than one-quarter (22.1 per cent) of the total product and of its total value.

Consequently, we arrive at a general conclusion concerning the significance of classification by acreage, namely, that it is not entirely useless. The one thing that should never be forgotten is that it understates the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production, and that the understatement increases with the pace and scope of intensification of agriculture, and with the gap between the amounts of capital invested by the farms per unit of land. With modern methods of research, which produce an abundance of sound information about each farm, it would, for instance, be sufficient to combine two methods of classification—say, each of the five acreage groups could bo broken down into two or three subgroups according to the employment of hired labour. If this is not done it is largely because of the fear of giving a much too naked picture of reality, a much too striking picture of the oppression, impoverishment, ruin, expropriation of the mass of small farmers, whose condition is so "conveniently" and "unnoticeably" made to look better by the "model" capitalist enterprises, which are also "small" in acreage and which are a small minority within the mass of

the dispossessed. From the scientific standpoint no one would dare deny that not only land, but also capital has a part to play in modern agriculture. From the standpoint of statistical techniques, or the amount of statistical work involved, a total number of 10 to 15 groups is not at all excessive in comparison, for instance, with the 18 plus 7 groups based on acreage given in the German statistical report of 1907. This report, which classifies an abundance of material about 5,736,082 farms into the above number of acreage groups, is an example of bureaucratic routine, scientific rubbish, a meaningless juggling of figures, for there is *not a shadow* of any reasonable, rational, theoretical or practical ground for accepting such a number of groups as typical.

14. THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE SMALL FARMERS

The question of the expropriation of the small farmers is immensely important to an understanding and assessment of capitalism in agriculture in general, and it is highly characteristic of modern political economy and statistics, which are saturated through and through with bourgeois notions and prejudices, that this question is either practically not considered at all or is given the least attention.

The general statistics in all capitalist countries show that the urban population is growing at the expense of the rural, that the population is abandoning the countryside. In the U.S.A., this process is steadily advancing. The proportion of the urban population increased from 29.5 per cent in 1880, to 36.1 per cent in 1890, 40.5 per cent in 1900, and 46.3 per cent in 1910. In every part of the country the urban population is growing more rapidly than the rural population: from 1900 to 1910, the rural population in the industrial North-went up by 3.9 per cent and the urban by 29.8 per cent; in the former slave-holding South, the rural population increased by 14.8 per cent, and the urban, by 41.4 per cent; in the homestead West, the figures were 49.7 and 89.6 per cent, respectively.

One should think that such a universal process would also have to be studied in the taking of agricultural censuses. A most important question from the scientific standpoint naturally arises as to what sections, strata or groups of the

rural population provide the fugitives from the countryside and in what circumstances. Since highly detailed information about each agricultural enterprise and about each animal in it is collected every ten years, it would be no trouble at all to include questions as to how many and what kind of farms were sold or rented with an eye to moving into town, and how many members of households abandoned farming temporarily or for good, and in what circumstances. But no such questions are asked: the investigation does not go beyond the official stereotyped statement: "The rural population decreased from 59.5 per cent in 1900 to 53.7 per cent in 1910." The census-takers seem to have no inkling of the mass of misery, oppression and ruin concealed behind these routine figures. As a general rule, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists turn a blind eye to the obvious connection between the flight of the population from the countryside and the ruin of the small producers.

There is no alternative, therefore, but to try and bring together the relatively meagre and very badly compiled data on the expropriation of the small farmers gleaned from the 1910 Census report.

There are the figures on the forms of farm tenure: the number of owners, subdivided into *full* and *part* owners; and the number of share-cropping tenants and cash-paying tenants. These figures are tabulated for the various divisions but not the farm groups.

Here is the first picture we get from the totals for 1900 and 1910:

Total rural population increase	11.2	per cent
Total number of farms increased . . .	10.9	” ”
Total number of owners increased. . .	8.1	” ”
Total number of *full* owners increased.	4.8	” ”

This picture is a clear indication of the growing expropriation of small-scale agriculture. The rural population is increasing more slowly than the urban. The number of farmers is increasing more slowly than the rural population; the number of owners is increasing more slowly than the number of farmers; the number of *full* owners—more slowly than the number of owners in general.

The proportion of owners in the total number of farmers has been decreasing steadily over a period of several decades, as follows:

1880	74.0	per cent
1890	71.6	” ”
1900	64.7	” ”
1910	63.0	” ”

There is a corresponding growth in the proportion of tenants, with the number of share-cropping tenants going up faster than that of cash-paying tenants. The number of share-cropping tenants was 17.5 per cent in 1880; then it rose to 18.4 per cent and 22.2 per cent, and finally to 24 per cent in 1910.

It is evident from the following figures that the decrease in the proportion of owners and the increase in the proportion of tenants is, on the whole, an indication of the dispossession and displacement of the small farmers:

Class of farm	Percentage of farms owning domestic animals			Percentage of farms owning horses		
	1900	1910	+/-	1900	1910	+/-
Owners	96.7	96.1	— 0.6	85.0	81.5	— 3.5
Tenants	94.2	92.9	— 1.3	67.9	60.7	— 7.2

According to all the returns for both census years the owners are economically stronger. The condition of the tenants is deteriorating *more rapidly* than that of the owners.

Let us examine separately the figures for the sections.

The greatest number of tenants, as I have already said, is in the South, and there tenancy has the fastest rate of growth: it rose from 47 per cent in 1900, to 49.6 per cent in 1910. Capital defeated slavery half a century ago, merely to *restore* it now in a new form as share tenancy.

In the North, the number of tenants is considerably smaller and is growing at a much slower rate: it went up from 26.2 per cent in 1900, to only 26.5 per cent in 1910. The West has the smallest number of tenants, and it is the *only* section where tenancy, instead of increasing, decreased: it fell from 16.6 per cent in 1900 to 14.0 per cent in 1910. “A very low proportion of tenant farms,” says the Census report for 1910, “is also shown for the Mountain and Pacific divisions [the two divisions constituting “The West”]*, where it is

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

doubtless attributable mainly to the fact that those divisions have been only recently settled and that many of the farmers in them are homesteaders who have obtained their land from the Government" free or for a very small price (Vol. V, p. 104).

This is a striking example of the peculiar characteristic of the U.S.A., to which I have repeatedly referred, namely, the availability of unoccupied, free land. This explains, on the one hand, the extremely rapid and extensive development of capitalism in America. The absence of private property in land in some parts of a vast country does not exclude capitalism—our Narodniks should make a note of this!—on the contrary, it broadens its base, and accelerates its development. Upon the other hand, this peculiarity, which is entirely unknown in the old, long-settled capitalist countries of Europe, serves in America to *cover up* the expropriation of the small farmers—a process already under way in the settled and most industrialised parts of the country.

Let us take the North. We get the following picture:

	1900	1910	+ or — percent
Total rural population (000,000) . .	22.2	23.1	+ 3.9
Total number of farms (000) . . .	2,874	2,891	+ 0.6
Total number of owners (000) . . .	2,088	2,091	+ 0.1
Total number of *full* owners (000) .	1,794	1,749	— 2.5

We see not only a relative reduction in the number of owners, not only a decline in their proportion of the total number of farmers, etc., but even an *absolute decrease* in the number of owners, against a background of growing production in the main section of the U.S.A., which embraces 60 per cent of the country's improved acreage!

It should, besides, be borne in mind that in *one* of the four divisions making up the North, namely, the West North Central, *the allotment of homesteads continues to this very day*, and that 54 million acres were allotted in the 10 years from 1901 to 1910.

The tendency of capitalism to expropriate small-scale agriculture is so strong that the American "North" shows an *absolute decrease* in the number of landowners, *in spite of* the distribution of tens of millions of acres of unoccupied, free land.

Only two factors still serve to paralyse this tendency in the U.S.A.: (1) the existence of the still unparcelled slave-holding plantations in the South, with its oppressed and downtrodden Negro population; and (2) the fact that the West is still partly unsettled. Both these factors tend to widen the future base of capitalism, and so prepare the conditions for its even more extensive and more rapid development. The sharpening of contradictions and the displacement of small-scale production are not removed but are transferred to a larger arena. The capitalist fire appears to be "damped down"—but at the price of an even greater accumulation of new and more inflammable material.

Furthermore, on the question of the expropriation of small-scale agriculture, we have the returns for the number of farms owning livestock. Here are the figures for the U.S.A.

Percentage of farms owning	1900	1910	+ or —
Domestic animals in general	95.8	94.9	—0.9
Dairy cows	78.7	80.8	+2.1
Horses	79.0	73.8	—5.2

These figures show, on the whole, a reduction in the number of owners in proportion to the total number of farmers. The increase in the percentage of those who owned dairy cows was smaller than the drop in the percentage of those who owned horses.

Let us now examine the figures for farms grouped in relation to the two major kinds of livestock.

Size group (acres)	Percentage of farms owning dairy cows		+ or —
	1900	1910	
Under 20	49.5	52.9	+ 3.4
20 to 49	65.9	71.2	+ 5.3
50 to 99	84.1	87.1	+ 3.0
100 to 174	88.9	89.8	+ 0.9
175 to 499	92.6	93.5	+ 0.9
500 to 999	90.3	89.6	— 0.7
1,000 and over	82.9	86.0	+ 3.1
Average for the U.S.A. . . .	78.7	80.8	+ 2.1

We find that the greatest increase was in the number of *small* farms with dairy cows, then came the latifundia, and then the medium-size farms. There was a decrease in the

percentage of farms reporting dairy cows among the big owners, with 500 to 999 acres of land.

On the whole, this seems to indicate a gain for small-scale agriculture. Let us recall, however, that in farming the ownership of dairy cattle has a twofold significance: on the one hand, it may generally indicate a higher living standard and better conditions of nutrition. On the other hand, it signifies—and rather more frequently—a development of one branch of commercial farming and cattle-breeding: the production of milk for the market in the towns and industrial centres. We saw above that farms of this type, the "dairy" farms, were classified by American statisticians under a special head, according to the principal source of income. A characteristic of this group is that it has a *smaller*-than-average total and improved acreage, but a *greater*-than-average value of output, and a *double-the-average* employment of hired labour per acre. The increasing importance of small farms in dairy farming may simply mean—and most likely does mean—a growth of *capitalist* dairy farms of the type described, on small tracts of land. For the sake of comparison here are some figures on the *concentration* of dairy cattle in America:

Sections	Average number of dairy cows per farm 1900	1910	Increase
The North	4.8	5.3	+0.5
The South	2.3	2.4	+0.1
The West	5.0	5.2	+0.2
Overall average	3.8	4.0	+0.2

We find that the North, which is richest of all in dairy cattle, also showed the greatest increase in wealth. Here is a distribution of this increase among the groups:

The North Size group (acres)	Percentage increase or decrease in number of dairy cows from 1900 to 1910
Under 20	— 4 (+10.0 in the number of farms)
20 to 49	— 3 (—12.6 " " " " ")
50 to 99	+ 9 (— 7.3 " " " " ")
100 to 174	+14 (+ 2.2 " " " " ")
175 to 499	+18 (+12.7 " " " " ")
500 to 999	+29 (+40.4 " " " " ")
1,000 and over	+18 (+15.4 " " " " ")
Overall increase . . .	+14 (+ 0.6 in the number of farms)

The more rapid growth in the *number* of small farms with dairy cattle did not prevent its more rapid *concentration* in the large enterprises.

Let us now turn to the figures on the number of farms reporting horses. This information about draught animals is an indication of the general pattern of farming and not of any special branch of commercial farming.

Size group (acres)	Percentage of farms reporting horses		Decrease
	1900	1910	
Under 20	52.4	48.9	—3.5
20 to 49	66.3	57.4	—8.9
50 to 99	82.2	77.6	—4.6
100 to 174	88.6	86.5	—2.1
175 to 499	92.0	91.0	—1.0
500 to 999	93.7	93.2	—0.5
1,000 and over	94.2	94.1	—0.1
Average for the U.S.A.	79.0	73.8	—5.2

We find that as we go down the size-group scale there is a rising number of farms not reporting horses. With the exception of the smallest farms (under 20 acres) which, as we know, include a comparatively greater number of capitalistic farms than the neighbouring groups, we observe a rapid decrease in the number of horseless farms and a much slower increase in their number. The use of steam ploughs and other engines on the rich farms may partly compensate for the reduction in draught animals, but such an assumption is out of the question for the mass of the poorer farms.

Finally, the growth of expropriation is also evident from the returns on the number of mortgaged farms:

Sections	Percentage of mortgaged farms		
	1890	1900	1910
The North	40.3	40.9	41.9
The South	5.7	17.2	23.5
The West	23.1	21.7	28.6
Average for the U.S.A.	28.2	31.0	33.6

The percentage of mortgaged farms is on a steady increase in all sections, and it is highest in the most populous industrialised and capitalist North. American statisticians point out (Vol. V, p. 159) that the growth in the number of mortgaged

farms in the South is probably due to the "parcelling out" of the plantations, which are sold in lots to Negro and white farmers, who pay only a part of the purchase price, the rest being covered by a mortgage on the property. Consequently a peculiar *buying-up operation* is under way in the slave-holding South. Let us note that in 1910 Negroes in the U.S.A. owned only 920,883 farms, i.e., 14.5 per cent of the total; between 1900 and 1910, the number of white farms increased 9.5 per cent, and that of Negro farms, twice as fast—19.6 per cent. The Negro urge to emancipation from the "plantation owners" half a century after the "victory" over the slave-owners is still marked by an exceptional intensity.

The American statisticians also point out that the mortgaging of a farm does not always indicate lack of prosperity; it is sometimes a way of obtaining capital for land improvement; and the like. This is indisputable, but this indisputable observation should not conceal the fact—as is much too often the case with bourgeois economists—that only a well-to-do minority are in a position to obtain capital for improvements, etc., in this way, and to employ it productively; the majority are further impoverished and fall into the clutches of finance capital assuming this particular form.

Researchers could—and should—have paid much more attention to the dependence of farmers on finance capital. But although this aspect of the matter is immensely important, it has remained in the background.

The growth in the number of mortgaged farms in any case means that the actual control over them is transferred to the capitalists. It stands to reason that apart from officially recorded and notarised mortgages, a considerable number of farms are steeped in private debt, which is not covered by strict legal instruments and is not recorded by the census.

15. A COMPARATIVE PICTURE OF EVOLUTION IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

American census statistics, for all their shortcomings, compare favourably with those of other countries because of the completeness and uniformity of the methods used.

This makes it possible to compare the returns for industry and agriculture for 1900 and 1910, and to contrast the overall picture of the structure of both sectors of the economy and the evolution of this structure. One of the most popular ideas in bourgeois economics—an idea, incidentally, which Mr. Himmer repeats—is to *contrast* industry and agriculture. Let us see, in the light of a mass of precise data, what truth there is in such a contrast.

Let us begin with the number of enterprises in industry and in agriculture.

	Number of enterprises (000)		Increase (per cent)	Growth of urban and rural population (per cent)
	1900	1910		
Industry	207.5	268.5	+29.4	+34.8
Agriculture	5,737	6,361	+10.9	+11.2

The enterprises in agriculture are much more numerous and much smaller. That is an expression of its backwardness, parcellisation, and dispersion.

The number of enterprises increases much more slowly in agriculture than in industry. There are two factors in the United States which do not exist in other leading countries, and which greatly intensify and accelerate the growth in the number of enterprises in agriculture. They are, first, the continued parcelling out of the slave-holding latifundia in the South and "buying-up" by Negro and also by white farmers of small parcels from the "planters"; secondly, the availability of an immense quantity of unoccupied, free land, which is distributed by the government to all applicants. Nevertheless the number of enterprises in agriculture is increasing at a slower rate than in industry.

The reason is twofold. On the one hand, agriculture to a rather large extent retains the character of a "natural" economy, and various operations once performed by members of a peasant household are gradually branching off from agriculture—for example, the making and repair of various implements, utensils, etc.—and now constitute separate industries. On the other hand, there is a monopoly which is peculiar to agriculture and unknown to industry, and which cannot be eliminated under capitalism—the monopoly of land ownership. Even when there is no private property in

land—in the United States none actually exists on very large areas to this very day—monopoly is created by the ownership of land and its occupation by individual private operators. In the country's most important regions all the land is occupied, and an increase in the number of agricultural enterprises is possible only when existing enterprises are broken up; the free formation of new enterprises alongside the old is impossible. The monopoly of land ownership is a drag on the development of agriculture, and this monopoly retards the development of capitalism in agriculture, which, therefore, is unlike industry in this respect.

We are unable to make an accurate comparison of the amounts of capital invested in industrial and in agricultural enterprises because ground-rent forms a part of the value of the land. Accordingly, we have to compare the capital invested in industry and the value of industrial products with the total value of all farm property and the value of the major farm product. Only the percentages showing increases in the total values on both sides are strictly comparable.

		$000,000 1900	$000,000 1910	Increase (per cent)
Industry	Capital of all enterprises .	8,975	18,428	105.3
	Value of products	11,406	20,671	81.2
Agriculture	Value of all farm property	20,440	40,991	100.5
	Value of all cereal crops .	1,483	2,665	79.8
	Production of cereals in bushels (000,000) . . .	4,439	4,513	1.7

We find that during the 10 years from 1900 to 1910 the value of capital invested in industry and the value of all farm property have *doubled*. The great and fundamental difference between the two is that in agriculture the major product, cereals, increased by an insignificant 1.7 per cent—while the total population increased 21 per cent.

Agriculture lags behind industry in development; this is a feature of *all* capitalist countries constituting one of the most profound causes of disproportion between the various branches of the economy, of crises and soaring prices.

Capital liberated agriculture from feudalism and drew it into commodity circulation and thereby into world

economic development, lifting it from medieval backwardness and patriarchal stagnation. But capital, instead of eliminating the oppression, exploitation and poverty of the masses, produces these calamities in a new guise and restores their old forms on a "modern" basis. The contradiction between industry and agriculture, far from being eliminated by capitalism, is, on the contrary, further extended and sharpened by it. The oppression of capital, seen primarily in the sphere of trade and industry, weighs more and more heavily on agriculture.

The insignificant increase in the quantity of agricultural produce (+1.7 per cent) and the enormous increase in its value (+79.8 per cent) shows clearly, on the one hand, the role of ground-rent, the tribute extorted from society by the landowners. Because of their monopolist position, they are able to take advantage of the backwardness of agriculture, which does not keep pace with industry, and to fill their pockets with millions and millions of dollars. In the 10 years, the value of all farm property increased by $20,500 *million*, of which only $5,000 million constituted the increase in the value of buildings, livestock and equipment. The value of land—capitalised ground-rent—increased in the 10 years by $*15,000 million* (+118.1 per cent).

On the other hand, the difference in the class status of the small farmers and the hired labourers is here thrown into especially sharp relief. To be sure, both labour; to be sure, both are subject to exploitation by capital, though in entirely different forms. But only vulgar bourgeois democrats will for this reason put the two different classes together and speak of small-scale operations by family farms. To do so is to cover up and disguise the *social* system of the economy—its bourgeois nature—and push into the foreground a feature common to *all* earlier formations, namely, the necessity for the petty farmer to work, to engage in personal, physical labour, if he is to survive.

Under capitalism, the small farmer—whether he wants to or not, whether he is aware of it or not—becomes a commodity producer. And it is this change that is fundamental, for it alone, even when he does not as yet exploit hired labour, makes him a petty bourgeois and converts him into an antagonist of the proletariat. He sells his product, while

the proletarian sells his labour-power. The small farmers, as a class, cannot but seek a rise in the prices of agricultural products, and this is tantamount to their joining the big landowners in sharing the ground-rent, and siding with the landowners against the rest of society. As commodity production develops, the small farmer, in accordance with his *class* status, inevitably becomes a *petty landed proprietor*.

There are cases even among wage-workers when a small part of them side with their masters against the whole class of wage-earners. But this is merely a *small fraction* of a class uniting with its antagonists, against the *entire* class. It is impossible to imagine any improvement of the condition of wage-earners as a class, without an improvement in the living standard of the masses, or without a sharpening of the antagonism between them and capital, which rules contemporary society, the antagonism between them and the entire class of capitalists. But it is quite possible, on the contrary, to imagine a state of affairs—indeed, such a situation is even typical of capitalism—where an improvement in the condition of the small farmers, as a class, results from their alliance with the big landlords, their participation in exacting a higher ground-rent from society as a whole, the contradictions arising between them and the mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians, who depend, entirely or at least mostly, on the sale of their labour-power.

Here is a comparison of American statistics on the number and position of wage-earners and of small farmers:

		1900	*1910*	Increase (per cent)
Industry	Number of wage-earners (000) . .	4,713	6,615	40.4
	Their wages ($000,000)	2,008	3,427	70.6
Agriculture	Number of wage-earners (000) . .	?	?	c. 47.1
	Their wages ($000,000)	357	652	82.3
	Number of farmers (000) . . .	5,737	6,361	10.9
	Value of their major product, cereal crops ($000,000)	1,483	2,665	79.8

The workers in industry *lost*, for their wages went up by only 70.6 per cent ("only", because almost the same quantity

of cereals, 101.7 per cent of the old quantity, is now 179.8 per cent of the old price!), while the number of workers increased all of 40 per cent.

The small farmers *gained*, in their capacity of petty landowners, at the expense of the proletariat. The number of small farmers increased by only 10.9 per cent (even if the small commercial farms are singled out, the increase is still only 11.9 per cent), and while the quantity of their product hardly increased at all (+1.7 per cent), its value went up 79.8 per cent.

Naturally, commercial and finance capital took the lion's share of this ground-rent, but the class status of the small farmer and the wage-earner, vis-à-vis each other, is entirely akin to the status of petty bourgeois and proletarian.

The numerical growth of wage-earners *outstrips* the growth of population (+40 per cent for the former as against +21 per cent for the latter). There is growing expropriation of the petty producers and small farmers. There is growing proletarisation of the population.*

The increase in the number of farmers—and to an even greater extent, as we already know, in the number of proprietors among them—*lags* behind the growth of the population (10.9 per cent, as against 21 per cent). The small farmers are increasingly converted into monopolists, into petty landed proprietors.

Let us now take a look at the relationship between small-scale and large-scale production in industry and in agriculture. In respect of industry the figures are not for 1900 and 1910, but for 1904 and 1910.

Industrial enterprises are divided into three main groups depending on the value of their products, the small being those with an output of less than $20,000; the medium, from $20,000 to $100,000, and the large $100,000 and over. We have no way of grouping agricultural enterprises except by acreage. Accordingly, small farms are those up to 100 acres; medium, from 100 to 175; and large, 175 and over.

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* The number of wage-earners in agriculture, or rather the growth in their number, is obtained from the following ratio: $82.3:70.6 = x:40.4$, hence $x = 47.1$.

	Groups	Number of enterprises (000) *1900*	per cent	*1910*	per cent	Increase (per cent)
Industry	Small	144	66.6	180	67.2	25.0
	Medium	48	22.2	57	21.3	18.7
	Large	24	11.2	31	11.5	29.1
	Total	216	100.0	268	100.0	24.2
Agriculture	Small	3,297	57.5	3,691	58.0	11.9
	Medium	1,422	24.8	1,516	23.8	6.6
	Large	1,018	17.7	1,154	18.2	13.3
	Total	5,737	100.0	6,361	100.0	10.9

The uniformity of evolution proves to be remarkable.

Both in industry and agriculture the proportion of medium establishments is reduced, for their number grows more slowly than that of the small and large enterprises.

Both in industry and agriculture the small enterprises increase in number at a slower rate than the large.

What are the changes in the economic strength or economic role of the various types of enterprises? For the industrial enterprises we have the returns on the value of their products, and for the agricultural, on the total value of all farm property.

	Groups	$000,000 1900	per cent	$000,000 1910	per cent	Increase (per cent)
Industry	Small	927	6.3	1,127	5.5	21.5
	Medium	2,129	14.4	2,544	12.3	19.5
	Large	11,737	79.3	17,000	82.2	44.8
	Total	14,793	100.0	20,671	100.0	39.7
Agriculture	Small	5,790	28.4	10,499	25.6	81.3
	Medium	5,721	28.0	11,089	27.1	93.8
	Large	8,929	43.6	19,403	47.3	117.3
	Total	20,440	100.0	40,991	100.0	100.5

Once again the uniformity of evolution is remarkable.

Both in industry and agriculture the relative number of, small and medium enterprises is decreasing, and only the relative number of the large enterprises is increasing.

In other words, the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production is under way both in industry and in agriculture.

The difference between industry and agriculture in this case is that the proportion of small enterprises in industry increased somewhat more than the proportion of medium enterprises (+21.5 per cent, as against +19.5 per cent), while the reverse was true for agriculture. Of course, this difference is not great, and no general conclusions can be drawn from it. But the fact remains that in the world's leading capitalist country small-scale production in industry gained more ground in the last decade than medium-scale production, whereas the reverse was true for agriculture. This fact shows how little importance is to be attached to the current assertions of bourgeois economists that the law of the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production is confirmed, unconditionally and without any exception, by industry, and refuted by agriculture.

In the agriculture of the U.S.A. the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production is not merely under way, but is proceeding with greater uniformity than in industry.

In considering this, the fact demonstrated above should not be forgotten, namely, that the grouping of farms by acreage *understates* the process of displacement of small-scale by large-scale production.

As for the *degree* of concentration already achieved, agriculture is very far behind. In industry, more than eight-tenths of all production is in the hands of the large enterprises that constitute only 11 per cent of the total number. The role of the small enterprises is insignificant: two-thirds of the total number of enterprises account for only 5.5 per cent of the total production! By comparison, agriculture is still in a state of dispersion: small enterprises, comprising 58 per cent of the total number, account for one-quarter of the total value of all farm property; while 18 per cent large enterprises account for less than one-half (47 per cent). The total number of agricultural enterprises is over 20 times greater than the number in industry.

This confirms the old conclusion—if the evolution of agriculture is compared with that of industry, capitalism in agriculture is at a stage more akin to the manufactory stage than to the stage of large-scale machine industry. Manual labour still prevails in agriculture, and the use of machinery is relatively very limited. But the data given

above do not in any way prove the impossibility of socialising agricultural production, even at the present stage of its development. Those who control the banks *directly* control one-third of America's farms, and indirectly dominate the lot. In view of the modern development of associations of every kind and of communications and transport, it is undoubtedly possible to organise production under a single general plan on a million farms raising more than one-half the total value of the product.

16. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The agricultural censuses taken in the United States in 1900 and 1910 are the last word in social statistics in this sphere of the economy. It is the best material of any available in the advanced countries, covering millions of farms and allowing precise well-founded conclusions on the evolution of agriculture under capitalism. One other particular reason why this material can be used to study the laws of the evolution is that the U.S.A. has the largest size, the greatest diversity of relationships, and the greatest range of nuances and forms of capitalist agriculture.

We find here, on the one hand, a transition from the slave-holding—or what is in this case the same, from the feudal—structure of agriculture to commercial and capitalist agriculture; and, on the other hand, capitalism developing with unusual breadth and speed in the freest and most advanced bourgeois country. We observe alongside of this remarkably extensive colonisation conducted on democratic-capitalist lines.

We find here areas which have long been settled, highly industrialised, highly intensive, and similar to most of the areas of civilised, old-capitalist Western Europe; as well as areas of primitive, extensive cropping and stock-raising, like some of the outlying areas of Russia or parts of Siberia. We find large and small farms of the most diverse types: great latifundia, plantations of the former slave-holding South, and the homestead West, and the highly capitalist North of the Atlantic seaboard; the small farms of the Negro share-croppers, and the small capitalist farms producing milk and vegetables for the market in the industrial North

or fruits on the Pacific coast; "wheat factories" employing hired labour and the *homesteads* of "independent" small farmers, still full of naïve illusions about living by the "labour of their own hands".

This is a remarkable diversity of relationships, embracing both past and future, Europe and Russia. The comparison with Russia is especially instructive, by the way, in regard to the question of the consequences of a possible transfer of all land to the peasants without compensation, a measure that is progressive but undoubtedly capitalist.

The U.S.A. offers the most convenient example for the study of the general laws of capitalist development in agriculture and the variety of forms these laws assume. A study of this kind leads up to conclusions which may be summed up in the following brief propositions.

In agriculture, as compared with industry, manual labour predominates over machinery to an immeasurably greater extent. But the machine is steadily advancing, improving farming techniques, extending the scale of operations and making them more capitalist. In modern agriculture, machinery is used in the capitalist way.

Hired labour is the chief sign and indicator of capitalism in agriculture. The development of hired labour, like the growing use of machinery, is evident in *all* parts of the country, and in every branch of agriculture. The growth in the number of hired labourers outstrips the growth of the country's rural and total population. The growth in the number of farmers lags behind that of the rural population. Class contradictions are intensified and sharpened.

The displacement of small-scale by large-scale production in agriculture is going forward. This is fully proved by a comparison of the returns for 1900 and 1910 on total farm property.

However, this displacement is understated, and the condition of the small farmers is shown in bright colours because statisticians in America in 1910 confined themselves—as in fact they did almost everywhere in Europe—to grouping the farms by acreage. The wider and faster the intensification of agriculture, the higher is the degree of this understatement and the brighter the colours.

Capitalism grows not only by accelerating the development of large-acreage farms in extensive areas, but also by creating in the intensive areas enterprises on smaller tracts whose operations are on a much larger scale and are much more capitalist.

As a result, the concentration of production in the large enterprises is actually much greater—and the displacement of small-scale production actually goes farther and deeper—than is indicated by ordinary data about farms grouped by acreage. The returns of the 1900 Census, compiled with greater care and in greater detail, are more scientific and leave no doubt at all on this score.

The expropriation of small-scale agriculture is advancing. In the last few decades, the proportion of owners to the total number of farmers declined steadily, while the growth in the number of farmers lagged behind population increase. The number of full owners is declining absolutely in the North, the most important section, which yields the largest volume of farm products and has neither any vestiges of slavery nor any extensive homesteading. In the last decade, the proportion of farmers reporting livestock in general decreased; in contrast to the increased proportion of owners reporting dairy cattle there was an even greater increase in the proportion of operators without horses, especially among the small farmers.

On the whole, a comparison of corresponding data on industry and agriculture for the same period shows that although the latter is incomparably more backward, there is a remarkable similarity in the laws of evolution, and that small-scale production is being ousted from both.

PREFACE TO N. BUKHARIN'S PAMPHLET, IMPERIALISM AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

There is no need for any special explanation to show that the subject dealt with in Bukharin's paper is topical and important. The question of imperialism is not only one of the most essential but is probably *the* most essential question in that sphere of economic science which traces the change in the forms of capitalism in modern times. Anyone interested not only in economics but in any aspect of contemporary social life must certainly acquaint himself with the facts pertaining to this sphere which the author has collected in such abundance from the latest material. It goes without saying that there can be no concrete historical assessment of the current war, unless it is based on a thorough analysis of the nature of imperialism, both in its economic and political aspects. Otherwise, it would be impossible to arrive at a correct understanding of the economic and diplomatic history of the last few decades without which it would be ridiculous to expect to work out a correct view of the war. From the standpoint of Marxism, which states most definitely the requirements of modern science on this question in general, one can merely smile at the "scientific" value of such methods as taking the concrete historical assessment of the war to mean a random selection of facts which the ruling classes of the country find gratifying or convenient, facts taken at random from diplomatic "documents", current political developments, etc. Plekhanov, for instance, must have completely parted with Marxism to substitute the angling after a couple of little facts which delighted Purishkevich as much as Milyukov, for an analysis of the essential properties and tendencies of imperialism, as the system of economic relations of modern highly developed, mature and rotten-ripe capitalism. The scientific concept of imperialism, moreover, is reduced to a sort of term of abuse applied to the immediate competitors, rivals and opponents

of the two imperialists mentioned, each of whom holds exactly the same class position as his rivals and opponents! This is not at all surprising in this day of words forgotten, principles lost, philosophies overthrown, and resolutions and solemn promises discarded.

N. I. Bukharin's paper has especially high scientific value because he examines the main facts of the world economy relating to imperialism as a whole, as a definite stage of development of the most highly developed capitalism. There was an epoch of relatively "peaceful" capitalism, when it had completely defeated feudalism in the leading European countries and was free to develop with the utmost—*relative*—tranquillity and smoothness, expanding "peacefully" over the vast expanses of the as yet unsettled lands and the countries not yet irrevocably drawn into the capitalist maelstrom. Of course, even in that period, roughly between 1871 and 1914, "peaceful" capitalism created conditions of life that were a very far cry from actual "peace", both in the military and the class sense. For nine-tenths of the population of the leading countries, for hundreds of millions in the colonies and backward countries, that epoch was not one of "peace" but of oppression, suffering and horror, which was the more terrible, possibly, for appearing to be a "horror without end". This epoch is gone for good, it has given way to an epoch which is relatively much more violent, spasmodic, disastrous and conflicting, an epoch which for the mass of the population is typified not so much by a "horror without end" as by a "horrible end".

In all this it is extremely important to bear in mind that this change has been brought about in no other way but the immediate development, expansion and continuation of the most profound and basic trends in capitalism and in commodity production in general. These main trends, which have been in evidence all over the world for centuries, are the growth of exchange and the growth of large-scale production. At a definite stage in the development of exchange, at a definite stage in the growth of large-scale production, namely, at the stage which was attained towards the turn of the century, exchange so internationalised economic relations and capital, and large-scale production assumed such proportions that monopoly began to replace free competition.

Monopoly associations of entrepreneurs, trusts, instead of enterprises, "freely" competing with each other—at home and *in relations between the countries*—became typical. Finance capital took over as the typical "lord" of the world; it is particularly mobile and flexible, particularly interknit at home and internationally, and particularly impersonal and divorced from production proper; it lends itself to concentration with particular ease, and has been concentrated to an unusual degree already, so that literally a few hundred multimillionaires and millionaires control the destiny of the world.

Abstract theoretical reasoning may lead to the conclusion at which Kautsky has arrived—in a somewhat different fashion but also by abandoning Marxism—namely, that the time is not too far off when these magnates of capital will unite on a world scale in a single world trust, substituting an internationally united finance capital for the competition and struggle between sums of finance capital nationally isolated. This conclusion is, however, just as abstract, simplified and incorrect as the similar conclusion drawn by our Struvists and Economists of the nineties, when they drew conclusions from the progressive nature of capitalism, its inevitability and its final victory in Russia that ranged from the apologetic (admiration for capitalism, reconciliation with it, and glorification instead of struggle), and the apolitical (that is, a denial of politics or a denial of the importance of politics, the probability of general political upheavals, etc., a mistake specifically Economist), to the outrightly "strike-ist" (the "general strike", as the apotheosis of the strike movement, brought up to a point where other forms of movement are forgotten or ignored and capitalism is overcome solely by a "leap" from it to a strike, pure and simple). There is evidence that even today the indisputable fact that capitalism is progressive, when compared with the semi-philistine "paradise" of free competition, and that imperialism and its final victory over "peaceful" capitalism in the leading countries of the world are inevitable—that this fact is still capable of producing an equally great and varied number of political and apolitical mistakes and misadventures.

With Kautsky, in particular, his clear break with Marxism has not taken the form of a denial or neglect of politics, or of a "leap" *over* the political conflicts, upheavals and

transformations, so numerous and varied in the imperialist epoch; it has not taken the form of an apology of imperialism but of a *dream of "peaceful" capitalism*. That "peaceful" capitalism has given way to non-peaceful, aggressive, cataclysmic imperialism Kautsky is forced to admit, because that is something he had admitted as far back as 1909 in the paper[6] in which he last produced some integrated conclusions as a Marxist. But if it is impossible to toy in rude, simple fashion with the dream of a straightforward retreat from imperialism to "peaceful" capitalism, why not let these dreams, which are essentially petty-bourgeois, take the form of innocent speculation on "*peaceful*" "ultra-imperialism"? If the international integration of national (rather nationally isolated) imperialisms is to be called ultra-imperialism, which "could" remove the conflicts, such as wars, political upheavals, etc., which the petty bourgeois finds especially unpalatable, disquieting, and alarming, why not, in that case, make an escape from the present highly conflicting and cataclysmic epoch of imperialism, which is the here and now, by means of innocent dreams of an "ultra-imperialism" which is relatively peaceful, relatively lacking in conflict and relatively uncataclysmic? Why not try to escape the acute problems that have been and are being posed by the epoch of imperialism that has dawned for Europe by dreaming up the possibility of it soon passing away and being followed by a relatively "peaceful" epoch of "ultra-imperialism" that will not require any "abrupt" tactics? Kautsky says precisely that "such a [ultra-imperialist] new phase of capitalism is at any rate imaginable", but that "there are not yet enough prerequisites to decide whether or not it is feasible" (*Die Neue Zeit*,[7] April 30, 1915, p. 144).

There is not a whit of Marxism in this urge to ignore the imperialism which is here and to escape into the realm of an "ultra-imperialism" which may or may not arrive. In this formulation, Marxism is recognised in that "new phase of capitalism" which its inventor himself does not warrant *can be realised*, while in the present stage (which is already here) the petty-bourgeois and profoundly reactionary desire to blunt the contradictions is substituted for Marxism. Kautsky *swore* to be a Marxist in this coming, acute and cataclysmic epoch, which he was forced to predict and recognise

very definitely in his 1909 paper on this coming epoch. Now that this epoch has most definitely arrived, Kautsky once again swears to be a Marxist in the coming epoch of ultra-imperialism, which may or may not arrive! In short, any number of promises to be a Marxist in another epoch, not now, not under present conditions, not in this epoch! Marxism on credit, Marxism in promises, Marxism tomorrow, a petty-bourgeois, opportunist theory—and not only a theory—of blunting contradictions today. This is something like the internationalism for export which is very popular today with ardent—oh, so ardent!—internationalists and Marxists who sympathise with every manifestation of internationalism—in the enemy camp, anywhere, but not at home, not among their allies; they sympathise with democracy—when it remains an "allied" promise; they sympathise with "the self-determination of nations", but only not of those dependent on the nation which has the honour of having the sympathiser among its citizens. In a word, it is one of the 1,001 varieties of hypocrisy.

Can it be denied, however, that a new phase of capitalism is "imaginable" in the abstract after imperialism, namely, ultra-imperialism? No, it cannot. Such a phase can be imagined. But in practice this means becoming an opportunist, turning away from the acute problems of the day to dream of the unacute problems of the future. In theory this means refusing to be guided by actual developments, forsaking them arbitrarily for such dreams. There is no doubt that the trend of development is towards a single world trust absorbing all enterprises without exception and all states without exception. But this development proceeds in such circumstances, at such a pace, through such contradictions, conflicts and upheavals—not only economic but political, national, etc.—that inevitably imperialism will burst and capitalism will be transformed into its opposite long before one world trust materialises, before the "ultra-imperialist", world-wide amalgamation of national finance capitals takes place.

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OPPORTUNISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL[8]

I

Has the Second International really ceased to exist? This is being stubbornly denied by its most authoritative representatives, like Kautsky and Vandervelde. Their point of view is that, save for the rupture of relations, nothing has really happened; all is quite well.

To get at the truth of the matter, let us turn to the *Manifesto of the Basle Congress* of 1912, which applies particularly to the present imperialist world war and which was accepted by all the socialist parties of the world. No socialist, be it noted, will dare in theory deny the necessity of making a concrete, historical appraisal of every war.

Now that war has broken out, neither the avowed opportunists nor the Kautskyites dare repudiate the Basle Manifesto or compare its demands with the conduct of the socialist parties during the war. Why? Because the Manifesto completely exposes both.

There is not a single word in the Basle Manifesto about the defence of the fatherland, or about the difference between a war of aggression and a war of defence; there is nothing in it at all about what the opportunists and Kautskyites* of Germany and of the Quadruple Alliance[9] at all crossroads are now dinning into the ears of the world. Nor could it have said anything of the sort, because what it does say absolutely rules out the use of such concepts. It makes a highly concrete reference to the series of political

* This does not refer to the personalities of Kautsky's followers in Germany, but to the international type of pseudo-Marxist who vacillates between opportunism and radicalism, but is in reality only a fig-leaf for opportunism.

and economic conflicts which had for decades been preparing the ground for the present war, and which had become quite apparent in 1912, and which brought about the war in 1914. The Manifesto recalls the Russo-Austrian conflict for "hegemony in the Balkans"; the conflicts between Britain, France and Germany (between *all* these countries!) over their "policy of conquest in Asia Minor"; the Austro-Italian conflict over the "striving for domination" in Albania, etc. In short, the Manifesto defines all these as conflicts emanating from "capitalist imperialism". Thus, the Manifesto very clearly recognises the predatory, imperialist, reactionary, slave-driving character of the present war, i.e., a character which makes the idea of defending the fatherland theoretical nonsense and a practical absurdity. The big sharks are fighting each other to gobble up other peoples' "fatherlands". The Manifesto draws the inevitable conclusions from undisputed historical facts: the war "cannot be justified on the slightest pretext of its being in the interest of the people"; it is being prepared "for the sake of the capitalists' profits and the ambitions of dynasties". It would be a "crime" for the workers to "shoot each other down". That is what the Manifesto says.

The epoch of capitalist imperialism is one of ripe and rotten-ripe capitalism, which is about to collapse, and which is mature enough to make way for socialism. The period between 1789 and 1871 was one of progressive capitalism, when the overthrow of feudalism and absolutism, and liberation from the foreign yoke were on history's agenda. "Defence of the fatherland", i.e., defence against oppression, was permissible on these grounds, and on these *alone*. The term would be applicable even now in a war *against* the imperialist Great Powers, but it would be absurd to apply it to a war *between* the imperialist Great Powers, a war to decide who gets the biggest piece of the Balkan countries, Asia Minor, etc. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "socialists" who advocate "defence of the fatherland" in the present war shun the Basle Manifesto as a thief shuns the scene of his crime. For the Manifesto proves them to be social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in words, but chauvinists in deeds, who are helping "their own" bourgeoisie to rob other countries and enslave other nations. That is the

very substance of chauvinism—to defend one's "own" fatherland even when its acts are aimed at enslaving other peoples' fatherlands.

Recognition that a war is being fought for national liberation implies one set of tactics; its recognition as an imperialist war, another. The Manifesto clearly points to the latter. The war, it says, "will bring on an economic and political crisis", which must be "utilised", not to lessen the crisis, not to defend the fatherland, but, on the contrary, to "*rouse*" the masses and "hasten the downfall of capitalist rule". It is impossible to hasten something for which historical conditions are not yet mature. The Manifesto declares that social revolution is *possible*, that the conditions for it *have matured*, and that it will break out precisely *in connection* with war. Referring to the examples of the *Paris Commune and the Revolution of 1905* in Russia, i.e., examples of mass strikes and of civil war, the Manifesto declares that "the ruling classes" fear "a proletarian revolution". It is sheer falsehood to claim, as Kautsky does, that the socialist attitude to the *present* war has not been defined. This question was not merely discussed, but decided in Basle, where the tactics of revolutionary proletarian mass struggle were recognised.

It is downright hypocrisy to ignore the Basle Manifesto altogether, or in its most essential parts, and to quote instead the speeches of leaders, or the resolutions of various parties, which, in the first place, *antedate* the Basle Congress, secondly, were not decisions adopted by the parties of the whole world, and thirdly, applied to various *possible* wars, but never to the present war. The point is that the epoch of national wars between the big European powers has been superseded by an epoch of imperialist wars between them, and that the Basle Manifesto had to recognise this fact officially for the first time.

It would be a mistake to regard the Basle Manifesto as an empty threat, a collection of platitudes, as so much hot air. Those whom the Manifesto exposes would like to have it that way. But it is not true. The Manifesto is but the fruit of the great propaganda work carried on throughout the entire epoch of the Second International; it is but the summary of all that the socialists had disseminated among

the masses in the hundreds of thousands of speeches, articles and manifestos in all languages. It merely reiterates what *Jules Guesde*, for example, wrote in 1899, when he castigated socialist ministerialism in the event of war: he wrote of war provoked by the "capitalist pirates" (*En Garde!*, p. 175); it merely repeats what *Kautsky* wrote in 1909 in his *Road to Power*, where he admitted that the "peaceful" epoch was over and that the epoch of wars and revolutions was on. To represent the Basle Manifesto as so much talk, or as a mistake, is to regard as mere talk, or as a mistake, everything the socialists have done in the last twenty-five years. The opportunists and the Kautskyites find the contradiction between the Manifesto and its non-application so intolerable because it lays bare the profound contradictions in the work of the Second International. The relatively "peaceful" character of the period between 1871 and 1914 served to foster opportunism first as a *mood*, then as a *trend*, until finally it formed a *group or stratum* among the labour bureaucracy and petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers. These elements were able to gain control of the labour movement only by paying lip-service to revolutionary aims and revolutionary tactics. They were able to win the confidence of the masses only by their protestations that all this "peaceful" work served to *prepare* the proletarian revolution. This contradiction was a boil which just had to burst, and burst it has. Here is the question: is it worth trying, as Kautsky and Co. are doing, to force the pus back into the body for the sake of "unity" (with the pus), or should the pus be removed as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, regardless of the pang of pain caused by the process, to help bring about the complete recovery of the body of the labour movement.

Those who voted for war credits, entered cabinets and advocated defence of the fatherland in 1914-15 have patently betrayed socialism. Only hypocrites will deny it. This betrayal must be explained.

II

It would be absurd to regard the whole question as one of personalities. What has opportunism to do with it when men like *Plekhanov* and *Guesde*, etc.?—asks *Kautsky* (*Die Neue Zeit*, May 28, 1915). What has opportunism to do with

it when *Kautsky*, etc.?—replies *Axelrod* on behalf of the opportunists of the Quadruple Alliance (*Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie*, Zurich, 1915, p. 21). This is a complete farce. *If the crisis of the whole movement is to be explained, an examination must be made, firstly, of the economic significance of the present policy; secondly, its underlying ideas; and thirdly, its connection with the history of the various trends in the socialist movement.*

What is the economic substance of defencism in the war of 1914-15? The bourgeoisie of *all* the big powers are waging the war to divide and exploit the world, and oppress other nations. A few crumbs of the bourgeoisie's huge profits may come the way of the small group of labour bureaucrats, labour aristocrats, and petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers. Social-chauvinism and opportunism have the same class basis, namely, the alliance of a small section of privileged workers with "their" national bourgeoisie *against* the working-class masses; the alliance between the lackeys of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie *against* the class the latter is exploiting.

Opportunism and social-chauvinism have the same political content, namely, class collaboration, repudiation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, repudiation of revolutionary action, unconditional acceptance of bourgeois legality, confidence in the bourgeoisie and lack of confidence in the proletariat. *Social-chauvinism is the direct continuation and consummation of British liberal-labour politics, of Millerandism and Bernsteinism.*[10]

The struggle between the two main trends in the labour movement—revolutionary socialism and opportunist socialism—fills the entire period from 1889 to 1914. Even today there are two main trends on the attitude to war in every country. Let us drop the bourgeois and opportunist habit of referring to personalities. Let us take the *trends* in a number of countries. Let us take ten European countries: Germany, Britain, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Belgium and France. In the first eight the division into opportunist and revolutionary trends corresponds to the division into social-chauvinists and internationalists. In Germany the strongholds of social-chauvinism are *Socialistische Monatshefte*[11] and Legien and Co., in

Britain the Fabians[12] and the Labour Party[13] (the I.L.P.[14] has always been allied with them and has supported their organ, and in this bloc it has always been weaker than the social-chauvinists, whereas three-sevenths of the B.S.P.[15] are internationalists); in Russia this trend is represented by *Nasha Zarya*[16] (now *Nashe Dyelo*), by the Organising Committee,[17] and by the Duma group led by Chkheidze; in Italy it is represented by the reformists with Bissolati at their head; in Holland, by Troelstra's party; in Sweden, by the majority of the Party led by Branting; in Bulgaria, by the so-called "Shiroki"[18] socialists; in Switzerland by Greulich and Co. In *all* these countries it is the revolutionary Social-Democrats who have voiced a more or less vigorous protest against social chauvinism. France and Belgium are the two exceptions; there internationalism also exists, but is very weak.

Social-chauvinism is opportunism in its finished form. It is quite ripe for an open, frequently vulgar, alliance with the bourgeoisie and the general staffs. It is this alliance that gives it great power and a monopoly of the legal press and of deceiving the masses. *It is absurd to go on regarding opportunism as an inner-party phenomenon*. It is ridiculous to think of carrying out the Basle resolution together with David, Legien, Hyndman, Plekhanov and Webb. Unity with the social-chauvinists means unity with one's "own" national bourgeoisie, which exploits other nations; it means splitting the international proletariat. This does not mean that an immediate break with the opportunists is possible everywhere; it means only that historically this break is imminent; that it is necessary and inevitable for the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat; that history, which has led us from "peaceful" capitalism to imperialist capitalism, has paved the way for this break. *Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt.**

III

This is very well understood by the shrewd representatives of the bourgeoisie. That is why they are so lavish in their praise of the present socialist parties, headed by the "de-

* The fates lead the willing, drag the unwilling.—*Ed.*

fenders of the fatherland", i.e., the defenders of imperialist plunder. That is why the social-chauvinist leaders are rewarded by their governments either with ministerial posts (in France and Britain), or with a monopoly of unhindered legal existence (in Germany and Russia). That is why in Germany, where the Social-Democratic Party was strongest and where its transformation into a national-liberal *counter-revolutionary* labour party has been most obvious, things have got to the stage where the public prosecutor qualifies the struggle between the "minority" and the "majority" as "incitement to class hatred"! That is why the greatest concern of the clever opportunists is to retain the former "unity" of the old parties, which did the bourgeoisie so many good turns in 1914 and 1915. The views held by these opportunists in all countries of the world were expounded with commendable frankness by a German Social-Democrat in an article signed "Monitor" which appeared in April 1915, in the reactionary magazine *Preussische Jahrbücher*.[19] Monitor thinks that it would be very dangerous for the bourgeoisie if the Social-Democrats were to move *still further to the right*. "It must preserve its character as a labour party with socialist ideals; for the day it gives this up a new party will arise and adopt the programme the old party had disavowed, giving it a still more radical formulation" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1915, No. 4, pp. 50-51).

Monitor hit the nail on the head. That is just what the British Liberals and the French Radicals have always wanted—phrases with a revolutionary ring to deceive the masses and induce them to place their trust in the Lloyd Georges, the Sembats, the Renaudels, the Legiens, and the Kautskys, in the men capable of preaching "defence of the fatherland" in a predatory war.

But Monitor represents only one variety of opportunism, the frank, crude, cynical variety. Others act with stealth, subtlety, and "honesty". Engels once said that for the working class "honest" opportunists were the greatest danger.[20] Here is one example.

Kautsky wrote in *Die Neue Zeit* (November 26, 1915) as follows: "The opposition against the majority is growing; the masses are in an opposition mood.... After the war [only *after* the war?—*N. L.*] class antagonisms will become

so sharp that radicalism will gain the upper hand among the masses.... After the war [only *after* the war?—*N. L.*] we shall be menaced with the desertion of the radical elements from the Party and their influx into the party of anti-parliamentary [?? meaning extra-parliamentary] mass action.... Thus, our Party is splitting up into two extreme camps which have nothing in common." To preserve unity, Kautsky tries to persuade the majority in the Reichstag to allow the minority to make a few radical parliamentary speeches. That means Kautsky wants to use a few radical parliamentary speeches to reconcile the revolutionary masses with the opportunists, who have "nothing in common" with revolution, who have long had the leadership of the trade unions, and now, relying on their close alliance with the bourgeoisie and the government, have also captured the leadership of the Party. What essential difference is there between this and Monitor's "programme"? There is none, save for the sugary phrases which prostitute Marxism.

At a meeting of the Reichstag group on March 18, 1915, *Wurm*, a Kautskyite, "warned" against "pulling the strings too taut. There is growing opposition among the workers' masses to the majority of the group, we must keep to the Marxist [?! probably a misprint: this should read "the Monitor"] Centre" (*Klassenkampf gegen den Krieg*! *Material zum Fall Liebknecht*. Als Manuskript gedruckt,* p. 67). Thus we find that the revolutionary sentiment of the *masses* was admitted as a *fact* on behalf of all the Kautskyites (the so-called Centre) *as early as March*, *1915*!! But eight and a half months later, Kautsky again comes forward with the proposal to "reconcile" the militant masses with the opportunist, counter-revolutionary party—and he wants to do this with a few revolutionary-sounding phrases!!

War is often useful in exposing what is rotten and discarding the conventionalities.

Let us compare the British Fabians with the German Kautskyites. Here is what a *real* Marxist, Frederick Engels, wrote about the former on January 18, 1893: "...a band of careerists who have understanding enough to realise the inevi-

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* *The Class Struggle Against the War. Material on the Liebknecht Case*. Printed for private circulation only.—*Ed.*

tability of the social revolution, but who could not possibly entrust this gigantic task to the raw proletariat alone.... Fear of the revolution is their fundamental principle" (Letters to Sorge, p. 390).[21]

And on November 11, 1893, he wrote: "...these haughty bourgeois who kindly condescend to emancipate the proletariat from above if only it would have sense enough to realise that such a raw, uneducated mass cannot liberate itself and can achieve nothing without the kindness of these clever lawyers, writers and sentimental old women" (ibid., p. 401).[22]

In theory Kautsky looks down upon the Fabians with the contempt of a Pharisee for a poor sinner, for he swears by "Marxism". But what actual difference is there between the two. Both signed the Basle Manifesto, and both treated it as Wilhelm II treated Belgian neutrality. But Marx all his life castigated those who strove to quench the revolutionary spirit of the workers.

Kautsky has put forward his new theory of "'ultra-imperialism" in opposition to the revolutionary Marxists. By this he means that the "rivalries of national finance capitals" are to be superseded by the "joint exploitation of the world by international finance capital" (*Die Neue Zeit*, April 30, 1915). But he adds: "We do not as yet have sufficient data to decide whether this new phase of capitalism is possible." On the grounds of the mere assumption of a "new phase", which he does not even dare declare definitely "possible", the inventor of this "phase" rejects his own revolutionary declarations as well as the revolutionary tasks and revolutionary tactics of the proletariat—rejects them *now*, in the "phase" of a crisis, which *has already broken out*, the phase of war and the unprecedented aggravation of class antagonisms! Is this not Fabianism at its most abominable?

Axelrod, the leader of the Russian Kautskyites, says, "The centre of gravity of the problem of internationalising the proletarian movement for emancipation is the internationalisation of everyday practice"; for example, "labour protection and insurance legislation must become the object of the workers' international organisation and action" (Axelrod, *The Crisis of Social-Democracy*, Zurich, 1915, pp. 39 40). Not only Legien, David and the Webbs, but even

Lloyd George himself, and Naumann, Briand and Milyukov would quite obviously subscribe to such "internationalism". As in 1912, Axelrod is quite prepared to utter the most revolutionary phrases for the very distant future, if the future International "comes out [against the governments in the event of war] and raises a revolutionary storm". How brave we are! But when it comes to supporting and developing the incipient revolutionary ferment among the masses *now*, Axelrod says that these tactics of revolutionary mass action "would be justified to some extent if we were on the very eve of the social revolution, as was the case in Russia, for example, where the student demonstrations of 1901 heralded the approaching decisive battles against absolutism". At the present moment, however, all that is "utopia", "Bakuninism", etc. This is fully in the spirit of Kolb, David, Südekum and Legien.

What dear old Axelrod forgets is that in 1901 nobody in Russia knew, or could have known, that the first "decisive battle" would take place four years later—please note, *four* years later—and that it would be "*in*decisive". Nevertheless, we revolutionary Marxists alone were right at that time: we ridiculed the Krichevskys and Martynovs, who called for an immediate assault. We merely advised the workers to kick out the opportunists everywhere and to exert every effort to support, sharpen and extend the demonstrations and other mass revolutionary action. The present situation in Europe is absolutely similar. It would be absurd to call for an "immediate" assault; but it would be a shame to call oneself a Social-Democrat and not to advise the workers to break with the opportunists and exert all their efforts to strengthen, deepen, extend and sharpen the incipient revolutionary movement and demonstrations. Revolution never falls ready-made from the skies, and when revolutionary ferment starts no one can say whether and when it will lead to a "real", "genuine" revolution. Kautsky and Axelrod are giving the workers old, shop-worn, counter-revolutionary advice. Kautsky and Axelrod are feeding the masses with hopes that the *future* International will surely be revolutionary, but they are doing this for the sole purpose of protecting, camouflaging and prettifying the *present* domination of the counter-revolutionary elements—the

Legiens, Davids, Vanderveldes and Hyndmans. Is it not obvious that "unity" with Legien and Co. is the best means of preparing the "future" revolutionary International?

"It would be folly to strive to convert the world war into civil war," declares *David*, the leader of the German opportunists (*Die Sozialdemokratie und der Weltkrieg*, 1915, p. 172), in reply to the manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party, November 1, 1914. This manifesto says, *inter alia*:

> "However difficult such a transformation may seem at any given moment, socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent and undeviating preparatory work in this direction now that war has become a fact."*

(This passage is also quoted by David, p. 171.) A month before David's book appeared our Party published its resolutions defining a systematic preparation" as follows: (1) refusal to vote for credits; (2) disruption of the class truce; (3) formation of illegal organisations; (4) support for solidarity manifestations in the trenches; (5) support for all revolutionary mass action.**

David is almost as brave as Axelrod. In 1912, he did not think that reference to the Paris Commune in anticipation of the war was a folly".

Plekhanov, a typical representative of the Entente social-chauvinists, takes the same view of revolutionary tactics as David. He calls them a "farcical dream". But listen to Kolb, an avowed opportunist, who wrote: "The consequence of the tactics of Liebknecht's followers would be that the struggle within the German nation would be brought up to boiling point" (*Die Sozialdemokratie am Scheidewege*, p. 50).

But what is a struggle brought up to boiling point if not civil war?

If our Central Committee's tactics, which broadly coincide with those of the Zimmerwald Left,[23] were "folly", "dreams", "adventurism", "Bakuninism"—as David, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Kautsky and others have asserted—they

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* See present edition, Vol, 21, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy".—*Ed*.

** Ibid.; Vol 21, "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad".—*Ed*.

could never lead to a "struggle within a nation", let alone to a struggle brought up to boiling point. Nowhere in the world have anarchist phrases brought about a struggle within a nation. But the facts indicate that precisely in 1915, as a result of the crisis produced by the war, revolutionary ferment among the masses is on the increase, and there is a spread of strikes and political demonstrations in Russia, strikes in Italy and in Britain, and hunger demonstrations and political demonstrations in Germany. Are these not the beginnings of revolutionary mass struggles?

The sum and substance of Social-Democracy's practical programme in this war is to support, develop, extend and sharpen mass revolutionary action, and to set up illegal organisations, for without them there is no way of telling the truth to the masses of people even in the "free" countries. The rest is either lies or mere verbiage, whatever its trappings of opportunist or pacifist theory.*

When we are told that these "Russian tactics" (David's expression) are not suitable for Europe, we usually reply by pointing to the facts. On October 30, a delegation of Berlin women comrades called on the Party's Presidium in Berlin, and stated that "now that we have a large organising apparatus it is much easier to distribute illegal pamphlets and leaflets and to organise 'banned meetings' than it was under the Anti-Socialist Law.... Ways and means are not lacking, but the will evidently is" (*Berner Tagwacht*,[25] 1915, No. 271).

Had these bad comrades been led astray by the Russian "sectarians", etc.? Is it these comrades who represent the real *masses*, or is it Legien and Kautsky? Legien, who in his report on January 27, 1915, fumed against the "anarchistic" idea of forming underground organisations; or Kautsky,

* At the International Women's Congress held in Berne in March 1915, the representatives of the Central Committee of our Party urged that it was absolutely necessary to set up illegal organisations. This was rejected. The British women laughed at this proposal and praised British "liberty". But a few months later British newspapers, like the *Labour Leader*,[24] reached us with blank spaces, and then came the news of police raids, confiscation of pamphlets, arrests, and Draconian sentences imposed on comrades who had spoken in Britain about peace, nothing but peace!

who has become such a counter-revolutionary that on November 26, *four* days before the 10,000-strong demonstration in Berlin, he denounced street demonstrations as "adventurism"!!

We've had enough of empty talk, and of prostituted "Marxism" *à la* Kautsky! After twenty-five years of the Second International, after the Basle Manifesto, the workers will no longer believe fine words. Opportunism is rotten-ripe; it has been transformed into social-chauvinism and has definitely deserted to the bourgeois camp. It has severed its spiritual and political ties with Social-Democracy. It will also break off its organisational ties. The workers are already demanding "illegal" pamphlets and "banned" meetings, i.e., underground organisations to support the revolutionary mass movement. Only when "war against war" is conducted on these lines does it cease to be empty talk and becomes Social-Democratic work. In spite of all difficulties, set-backs, mistakes, delusions and interruptions, this work will lead humanity to the victorious proletarian revolution.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONVOCATION OF THE SECOND SOCIALIST CONFERENCE[26]

The Bureau (I.S.C.[27]), having conferred with a number of representatives of several countries, resolves:

to convene the second *conference* of socialists supporting the Zimmerwald decisions.

Agenda:

(1) struggle against war;

(2) international unification of socialists opposing war and nationalism;

(3) practical measures of organisation, propaganda and struggle against governments;

(4) development of Zimmerwald decisions.

To set the date of its convocation for April 15, 1916.

To publish the present decision (altering the date to March 15 in the notice).

To call on all socialist organisations supporting the Zimmerwald decisions to discuss all the items on the agenda and the draft resolutions.[28] The drafts (signed by 2-3 delegates) to be published in *Berner Tagwacht*.

Written between January 23 and 26 (February 5 and 8), 1916
Published for the first time

Published according to the manuscript

FOR THE CONFERENCE TO BE HELD ON APRIL 24, 1916

PROPOSAL OF THE DELEGATION[29]

1. Only representatives of political or trade union organisations or individuals supporting the decisions of the Zimmerwald Conference shall be allowed to attend.

2. From countries where official parties or trade union organisations are affiliated with the I.S.C., only representatives appointed by these organisations shall be allowed to attend.

3. From countries where official parties or trade union organisations are not affiliated with the I.S.C., representatives shall be allowed to attend only from organisations and groups which:

(a) in the given country campaign orally or in writing in the spirit of the Zimmerwald decisions;

(b) support the I.S.C. by their activities.

4. Individuals shall be admitted only as an exception and only with voice but no vote.

5. Final decisions in disputes over the validity of credentials shall be made, after hearing the motives and taking account of the circumstances, by a 9-man commission elected by the conference, which shall include 4 members of the I.S.C.

6. The conference shall establish the voting procedure. [Amendment, not to be published; entered in the minutes:

Comrades who were present at Zimmerwald have *the right* ("le droit"—in the French text) to participate in the second conference with a voice but no vote.]

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Translated from the German

SPEECH DELIVERED AT AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING IN BERNE, FEBRUARY 8, 1916[30]

Comrades! The European war has been raging for more than eighteen months. With every passing day, and month, it becomes clearer and clearer to the mass of the workers that the Zimmerwald Manifesto[31] expressed the truth when it declared that talk about "defence of the fatherland" and suchlike phrases are nothing but a capitalist fraud. It is becoming more evident every day that this is *a war between capitalists*, *between big robbers*, who are quarrelling over who is to get the largest slice, who is to plunder the greatest number of countries, and to suppress and enslave the greatest number of nations.

It may sound incredible, especially to Swiss comrades, but it is true, nevertheless, that *in Russia*, too, it is not only murderous tsarism, or the capitalists, but also a section of the so-called, or former, socialists who are saying that Russia is fighting a "defensive war", that she is only fighting against the German invasion. But the whole world knows that for decades tsarism has been oppressing more than a hundred million people belonging to other nationalities in Russia, and that for decades Russia has been pursuing a predatory policy towards China, Persia, Armenia and Galicia. *Neither Russia*, *nor Germany*, *nor any other Great Power for that matter has any right to claim that it is waging a "defensive war"*; all the Great Powers are waging a capitalist imperialist war, a predatory war, a war for the oppression of small and foreign nations, a war for the profits of the capitalists, who have been converting proletarian blood and the horrible sufferings of the masses into the pure gold of their immense fortunes.

Four years ago, in November 1912, when it had become quite clear that war was in the offing, representatives of the socialist parties of the world met at the International Socialist Congress in Basle. Even at that time there was no room for doubt that the impending war would be a war between the Great Powers, between these great plunderers and that the responsibility would fall upon the governments and the capitalist class of *all* the Great Powers. This truth was openly stated in the Basle Manifesto, which was adopted *unanimously* by the socialist parties of the world. *The Basle Manifesto says nothing at all about a "defensive war" or "defence of the fatherland"*. It castigates the governments and the bourgeoisie of *all* the Great Powers, without exception. It says openly that war would be the greatest of crimes, that the workers consider it a crime to shoot at each other, and that the horrors of war and the indignation these would rouse among the workers would inevitably lead to a *proletarian revolution*.

When the war actually broke out it became evident that its character had been correctly defined at Basle. But the socialist and labour organisations were not unanimous in carrying out the Basle decisions; they split. We find that the socialist and labour organisations are now split into two big camps in all countries of the world. The smaller section, the leaders, functionaries and officials, have betrayed socialism and have sided with their governments. The other section, to which the mass of class-conscious workers belong, continues to gather its forces and to fight against the war and for the proletarian revolution.

The views of this latter section were expressed in the Zimmerwald Manifesto, to mention one document.

In Russia, from the very beginning of the war, the workers' *deputies* in the Duma waged a determined revolutionary struggle against the war and the tsarist monarchy. Five workers' deputies—Petrovsky, Badayev Muranov, Shagov and Samoilov—distributed revolutionary leaflets against the war and carried on persistent revolutionary agitation. The tsarist government ordered the arrest of these five deputies; they were tried and sentenced to exile in Siberia for life. The leaders of the working class of Russia have languished in Siberia for months, but their cause has not been

defeated; their work is being continued along the same lines by the class-conscious workers of all Russia.

Comrades! You have heard speakers from various countries who have told you about the workers' revolutionary struggle against the war. I merely want to add another example, that of the United States of America, the biggest and richest country. Its capitalists are now making enormous profits out of the European war. And they are also campaigning for war. They are saying that America, too, must prepare to enter the war, and that hundreds of millions of the people's dollars must be siphoned off into new armaments, into armaments without end. A section of the socialists in America have also responded to this false, criminal call. Let me read a statement by Comrade *Eugene Debs*, a most popular leader of the American socialists, and the presidential candidate of the American Socialist Party.

In the September 11, 1915, issue of the American weekly, *Appeal to Reason*,[32] he says: "*I am not a capitalist soldier*; *I am a proletarian revolutionist. I do not belong to the regular army of the plutocracy, but to the irregular army of the people. I refuse to obey any command to fight from the ruling class.... I am opposed to every war but one*; *I am for that war with heart and soul, and that is the world-wide war of the social revolution. In that war I am prepared to fight in any way the ruling class may make necessary....*"

This is what *Eugene Debs*, the American Bebel, the beloved leader of the American workers, is telling them.

This goes to show once again, comrades, that *the rallying of the working class forces is truly under way in all countries of the world*. War inflicts horrible sufferings on the people, but we must not, and we have no reason at all, to despair of the future.

The millions of victims who will fall in the war, and as a consequence of the war, will not have died in vain. The millions who are starving, the millions who are sacrificing their lives in the trenches, are not only suffering, they are also gathering strength; they are pondering over the real causes of the war; they are becoming more determined and are acquiring a clearer revolutionary understanding. In *all* countries of the world there is growing discontent among the masses and greater ferment; there are strikes, demonstrations

and protests against the war. *This is an earnest of the proletarian revolution against capitalism that is bound to follow the European war.*

Berner Tagwacht No. 33,
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THE TASKS OF THE OPPOSITION IN FRANCE

LETTER TO COMRADE SAFAROV

February 10, 1916

Dear Comrade,

I was forcefully reminded of the burning question of the situation and the tasks of the opposition in France by your deportation from that country, reported, by the way, with a protest even by the chauvinist paper, *La Bataille*,[33] which, however, did not care to tell the truth, namely, that you were deported for sympathising with the opposition.

I saw Bourderon and Merrheim in Zimmerwald. I heard their reports and read about their work in the newspapers. I cannot in the least doubt their sincerity and devotion to the cause of the proletariat. Nevertheless, it is obvious that their tactics are mistaken. Both fear a split more than anything else. The slogan of both Bourderon and Merrheim is not a step, not a word that might lead to a split in the Socialist Party or in the trade unions in France, that might lead to a split in the Second International, to the creation of the Third International.

Nevertheless, the split in the labour and socialist movements throughout the world is a fact. We have two irreconcilable working-class tactics and policies in respect of the war. It is ridiculous to close your eyes to this fact. Any attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable will make all our work futile. In Germany, even Deputy Otto Rühle, a comrade of Liebknecht's, has openly admitted that a split in the party is inevitable, because its present majority, the official "leaders" of the German party, have gone over to the bourgeoisie. The arguments advanced against Rühle and against a split by the so-called representatives of the "Centre" or "marsh" (*le marais*), by Kautsky and *Vorwärts*,[34] are nothing but lies and hypocrisy, however "well-intentioned"

such hypocrisy may be. Kautsky and *Vorwärts* cannot deny, and do not even attempt to deny, that the majority of the German party is in fact carrying out the policy of the *bourgeoisie*. Unity with such a majority is doing harm to the working class. It means subordinating the working class to the bourgeoisie of its "own" nation; it means a split in the international working class. Actually Rühle is quite right; there are *two parties* in Germany. One, the official party, is carrying out the policy of the bourgeoisie. The other, the minority, is publishing illegal leaflets, organising demonstrations, etc. We see the same thing all over the world, and the impotent diplomats, or the "marsh", such as Kautsky in Germany, Longuet in France, and Martov and Trotsky in Russia, are doing the labour movement great harm by their insistence upon a *fictitious* unity, thereby *hindering* the now imminent unification of the *opposition* in all countries and the creation of the Third International. In Britain even a moderate paper like the *Labour Leader* publishes Russell Williams' letters urging the necessity for a split with the trade union "leaders" and with the Labour Party, which, he says, has sold out the interests of the working class. A number of members of the Independent Labour Party have declared in the press that they sympathise with Russell Williams. In Russia, even Trotsky, the "conciliator", is now compelled to admit that a split is inevitable with the "patriots", i.e., the party of the Organising Committee, the O.C., who approve of workers' participating in the war industries committees.[35] It is only false pride that compels Trotsky to continue to defend "unity" with Chkheidze's Duma group, which is the best friend, shield and protector of the "patriots" and the O.C.

Even in the United States of America there is actually a complete split. Some socialists in that country want an army, and "preparedness", and war. Others, including Eugene Debs, the most popular leader of the workers and the Socialist Party's presidential candidate, want civil war against the war of nations!

Look at what Bourderon and Merrheim are doing! They say they are opposed to a split. But read the resolution which Bourderon moved at the Congress of the French Socialist Party.[36] It demands the withdrawal of the socialists

from the Cabinet!! The resolution bluntly "disapproves" of the C.A.P. and the G.P. (C.A.P.=Com. Adm. Perm., G.P.=Groupe Parlem.*)!!! It is as clear as daylight that the adoption of such a resolution would cause a split in both the Socialist Party *and* the trade unions, because Messrs. Renaudel, Sembat, Jouhaux and Co. would never accept that.

Bourderon and Merrheim share the error, the weakness and the timidity of the *majority* of the Zimmerwald Conference. On the one hand, this majority *indirectly* calls for *revolutionary* struggle in its Manifesto, but is afraid to do so openly. On the one hand, it declares that the capitalists of *all* countries are *lying* when they talk about "defence of the fatherland" in the present war. On the other hand, the majority was afraid to add the obvious truth which, in any case, every thinking worker will add for himself, that not only are the capitalists *lying*, but so also are Renaudel, Sembat, Longuet, Hyndman, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co.! Once again the majority of the Zimmerwald Conference *wants* to make peace with Vandervelde, Huysmans, Renaudel and Co. This is *harmful* to the working class, and the Zimmerwald Left did the right thing in *openly* telling the workers the truth.

Look at the hypocrisy of *les socialistes-chauvins*: in France they praise the *German minorité*, in Germany, the *French*!!

What enormous significance there would be in the action of the French opposition if it straightforwardly, fearlessly, openly told the world: We are in agreement *only* with the *German* opposition, *only with Rühle* and his associates!! Only with those who fearlessly sever all connections with overt and covert social-chauvinism, *socialisme chauvin*, i.e., with all the "defenders of the fatherland" in the present war!! We ourselves *are not afraid* to break with the French "patriots" who call the defence of colonies "defence of the fatherland", and we urge socialists and syndicalists in all countries *to do the same*!! We extend our hand to Otto Rühle and Liebknecht, *only* to them and their associates; and we denounce the French and the German *majorité* and *le marais*. We proclaim a great international unification

* The French abbreviations for Permanent Administrative Commission and parliamentary group.—*Ed.*

of socialists all over the world who in this war repudiate "defence of the fatherland" as a fraud, and who are engaged in campaigning and preparing for the world proletarian revolution!

Such an appeal would be of tremendous importance. It would disperse the hypocrites, expose and unmask the international fraud, and would give a great impetus to the rallying of workers all over the world who have *really* remained loyal to internationalism.

Anarchist phrase-mongering has always done a lot of harm in France. But now the anarchist-patriots, the anarchist-*chauvins*, like Kropotkin, Grave, Cornelissen and the other knights of *La Bataille Chauviniste* will help to cure very many workers of anarchist phrase-mongering. Down with the socialist-patriots and socialist-*chauvins* and down also with anarchist-patriots and anarchist-*chauvins*! This call *will* be echoed in the hearts of the workers of France. Not anarchist phrase-mongering about revolution, but sustained, earnest, tenacious, persistent, systematic work of *everywhere* creating illegal organisations among the *workers*, of spreading *uncensored*, i.e., illegal, literature, of preparing the movement of the *masses* against their governments. This is what the working class of all countries needs!

It is not true to say that "the French are incapable" of carrying on illegal work regularly. It is *not* true! The French quickly learned to hide in the trenches; they will soon learn to do illegal work in the *new* conditions and systematically to build up a *revolutionary mass* movement. I have faith in the French revolutionary proletariat. It will also stimulate the French opposition.

With best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I suggest that the French comrades publish a translation of this letter (in full) as *a separate leaflet*.[37]

Published in French as a separate leaflet in 1916

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HAVE THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE AND THE CHKHEIDZE GROUP A POLICY OF THEIR OWN?

In their magazine,[38] and more definitely in their report to the International Socialist Committee (No. 2 of the *Bulletin* which appeared in German on November 27, 1915[39]), the adherents of the Organising Committee (O.C.) assure the public that the Chkheidze group[40] and the O.C. have a policy of their own, which is completely internationalist and differs from the policy of *Nashe Dyelo*. This is flagrantly untrue. First of all, since the formation of the O.C. (August 1912), we have witnessed for *many years* the most complete political agreement on all fundamental points, and the closest political co-operation, between the Chkheidze group and the O.C., and the *Nasha Zarya* group; and *only* this group has carried on any systematic work among the masses (the liquidators' daily papers). If there are any real differences between such close "friends", they must be proved, not by words but by weighty facts. *Not a single fact of this kind can be produced*. Secondly, for a *number of years*, from 1912 to 1914, the Chkheidze group and the O.C. have been *Nasha Zarya*'s pawns and have systematically defended its policy (a fact very well known to workers in St. Petersburg and elsewhere) but *never* have they used their influence in any way to change the policy of *Nasha Zarya*, *Luch*,[41] etc.

Nasha Zarya was the only group to act independently on policies concerning the *masses*—for example, the struggle against the "strike fever", the election of leaders of the biggest trade unions (metalworkers and others) and of the most important insurance organisations (the All-Russia Insurance Council); the O.C. and the Chkheidze group merely assisted it, and served it most loyally. Thirdly, there is *not a single*

fact in the last eighteen months of the war to testify to any change in the long established relationship between the Chkheidze group and the O.C., and *Nasha Zarya*. On the contrary, the opposite is proved by facts, even of the kind that may be given publicity (most facts of this kind may not). It is a fact that in Russia there is *not a single instance* of either the O.C. or the Chkheidze group opposing the policy of *Nashe Dyelo*; and it would take more than one protest, in fact, a prolonged and victorious struggle, to effect a real change of policy; for *Nashe Dyelo* is a political magnitude fostered by liberal connections, whereas the O.C. and the Chkheidze group are merely political decor. It is a fact that *Utro* and *Rabocheye Utro*,[42] which follow the *Nashe Dyelo* line most faithfully, demonstrate their political proximity to the Chkheidze group even outwardly and speak in the name of the entire August bloc. It is a fact that the Chkheidze group has been collecting funds for *Rabocheye Utro*. It is a fact that the whole of the Chkheidze group has become a contributor of the Samara social-chauvinist paper *Nash Golos* (see No. 17). It is a fact that Chkhenkeli, a most prominent member of the Chkheidze group, has come out in the press, in the "defencist" or social-chauvinist magazine *Sovremenny Mir*,[43] the magazine published by Plekhanov and Alexinsky, with a declaration of principles quite in the spirit of Plekhanov, *Nashe Dyelo*, Kautsky and Axelrod. We quoted Chkhenkeli's declaration a long time ago, and yet neither the adherents of the O.C. in their magazine, nor Trotsky in his *Nashe Slovo*[44] have dared to defend this declaration, although they have defended and advertised the Chkheidze group. Fourthly, our points are proved by the direct political statements made on behalf of the whole of the Chkheidze group and of the whole of the O.C. Take the most important pronouncements, which have been reprinted in the O.C.'s magazine: the declaration of Chkheidze and Co. and the manifesto of the O.C. Their approach is *identical*, their attitude is the same. Since the O.C. is the supreme governing body of the "August bloc" against our Party, and since the O.C.'s manifesto was printed illegally, which means that it could speak more freely and directly than Chkheidze could in the Duma, let us examine the O.C.'s manifesto.

It is interesting to note, by the way, that this manifesto has already been the subject of a controversy in the German Social-Democratic press, in the Berne Social-Democratic paper. A contributor described the manifesto as "patriotic". This aroused the indignation of the Secretariat of the O.C. Abroad, which published a refutation, declaring that "we, the Secretariat Abroad, are guilty of such patriotism" too, and invited the editors of the paper to act as arbiter, as it were; for this purpose it submitted to them a full German translation of the manifesto. Let us note that the paper's editors are notoriously partial to the O.C. to the point of giving it publicity. What then did these sympathising editors say?

"We have read a manifesto issued by the O.C.," they said (No. 250), "and we must admit that the text may undoubtedly give rise to a misunderstanding and impart to the whole a meaning which was perhaps alien to the authors of the manifesto."

Why have the adherents of the O.C. not reprinted in their magazine this opinion of the editors, whom they had themselves invited to act as arbiters? Because it is the opinion of their friends who have publicly refused to defend them! The opinion was couched in terms of exquisite diplomatic courtesy, which makes it particularly evident that the editors desired to say something "pleasant" to Axelrod and Martov. It turned out that the "pleasantest" thing they could say is: "Perhaps [*only* "perhaps"!] the O.C. did not say what it meant to say; but what it did say 'may undoubtedly give rise to a misunderstanding'"!!

We strongly urge our readers to read the O.C.'s manifesto, which is reproduced in the *Bund's Bulletin* (No. 9). The cereful reader will note the following clear and simple facts: (1) the manifesto does not contain a single statement repudiating national defence in the present war as a matter of principle; (2) there is absolutely nothing in the manifesto which "defencists" or social-chauvinists would find unacceptable in principle; (3) there are a number of statements in the manifesto which are completely identical with "defencism", such as "The proletariat cannot remain indifferent to the impending defeat" (repeating almost word for word what *Rabocheye Utro* said in No. 2: "not indifferent" to "saving the country from defeat"); "the proletariat is vitally interested

in national self-preservation"; "a popular revolution" must save the country "from external defeat", etc. Anyone really hostile to social-chauvinism would have said *instead*: The landowners, the tsar and the bourgeoisie are lying; by national self-preservation they mean preserving the Great-Russian oppression of Poland and retaining her by force; they are lying, their talk about saving the "country" from defeat being designed to conceal their desire to "save" their Great-Power privileges and divert the proletariat from the tasks of fighting the *international* bourgeoisie. To admit in one breath the need for the international solidarity of the proletariat of the belligerent countries in this predatory imperialist war and the permissibility of phrases about "saving" *one* of these countries from "defeat" is sheer hypocrisy and signifies that one's declarations are nothing more than idle talk and false oratory. The implication there is that the tactics of the proletariat depend on the military situation of a given country at a given time; if that is the case the French social-chauvinists would also be right in helping to "save" Austria or Turkey from "defeat".

The O.C. Secretariat Abroad writing in the *German* Social-Democratic press (the Berne paper) has put forward yet another sophism which is so shameless, so crude, and so deliberately "set" to catch the Germans in particular, that the adherents of the O.C. wisely refrained from repeating it before the Russian public.

"If it is patriotism," they write *for the benefit of the Germans* in a tone of noble indignation, "to tell the proletariat that revolution is the only means of saving the country from disaster", then we, too, are "patriots", and "we wish the International had many more 'patriots' like this in every Socialist Party; we are sure that Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Merrheim would be very glad to have many more 'patriots' like these around them to appeal to the German and French workers with manifestos of *this* kind".

This is deliberate misrepresentation, the five secretaries know perfectly well that there is not a hint of any *bourgeois* revolutionary mood or any *bourgeois* social movement striving for revolution for the sake of *victory over the enemy* either in France or Germany, both of which are headed for socialist revolution; in Russia, however, just because she

is headed for a *bourgeois*-democratic revolution, *such* a movement does exist, as everybody knows. The five secretaries are trying to deceive the Germans by an amusing sophism: the O.C. and Chkheidze and Co. cannot be *revolutionary chauvinists* in Russia, they argue, because in Europe a combination of revolutionism with chauvinism is an absurdity!

Indeed, it would be an absurdity in Europe. But in Russia it is a fact. You may reproach the *Prizyv*[45] crowd for being bad bourgeois revolutionaries, but you cannot deny that in their own way they combine chauvinism with revolutionism. The July Conference of the Narodniks in Russia,[46] *Nashe Dyelo* and *Rabocheye Utro* most faithfully take the *Prizyv* attitude in this respect; they, too, combine chauvinism with revolutionism.

The same stand is taken by the Chkheidze group in its declaration (pp. 141-43 of the O.C.'s magazine). Chkheidze uses the same chauvinist phrases about the "danger of defeat", he admits the imperialist character of the war, stands for "peace without annexations", "the general tasks of the entire international proletariat", "the struggle for peace", etc., etc., but so does *Rabocheye Utro*; and so do the petty-bourgeois Russian Narodniks. We read on page 146 of this very magazine of the O.C. that the petty-bourgeois Narodniks have admitted the imperialist character of the war, have adopted the demand for "peace without annexations" and have admitted that socialists (the Narodniks, as well as the *Rabocheye Utro* group wish to be known as socialists) "must strive for an early restoration of the international solidarity of socialist organisations in order to stop the war", etc. The petty-bourgeois Narodniks use all these phrases to camouflage the slogan of "national defence", which they have openly advanced, whereas Chkheidze, the O.C., and *Rabocheye Utro* spell out the same slogan as "save the country from defeat"!

The net result is that Chkheidze and the O.C. have poured out a string of revolutionary phrases, which commit them to nothing at all and which in no way hinder the practical policies of *Prizyv* and *Nashe Dyelo*, but have *hushed up these policies*. In one way or another they support participation in the war industries committees.

What is needed, gentlemen, is less talk about revolution and more clarity, straightforwardness and honesty in the practical policies of today. You *promise* to be revolutionaries, but for the time being you are helping the chauvinists, the bourgeoisie and tsarism: either you openly advocate workers' participation in the war industries committees, or you tacitly defend those who do participate by not fighting them.

Martov may wriggle as much as he likes. Trotsky may shout against our factionalism to cover up his own "expectations" (an old trick of Turgenev's hero![47]), which are surely non-factional, that someone in Chkheidze's group is "in agreement" with him and swears that he is a Leftist, an internationalist, etc. But facts are facts. There is *not* a hint of any serious political difference not only between the O.C. and the Chkheidze group; there is none even between them and *Rabocheye Utro* or *Prizyv*.

That is why they are all together in opposing our Party *in practice*; that is why they all stand *for* the bourgeois policy of workers' participating in the war industries committees, and are together in siding with the non-party workers and the Narodniks. The verbal reservations and the avowals of "disagreement" made by the "secretaries abroad" is idle talk, which does not affect the real policy of the masses in much the same way as the vows of Südekum, Legien and David that they are "for peace" and "against war" do not absolve them of chauvinism.

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PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXATIONS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF POLAND AS SLOGANS OF THE DAY IN RUSSIA

The Berne resolution of our Party declared: "Pacifism, the preaching of peace in the abstract is one of the means of duping the working class.... At the present time, the propaganda of peace unaccompanied by a call for revolutionary mass action can only sow illusions and demoralise the proletariat, for it makes the proletariat believe that the bourgeoisie is humane and turns it into a plaything in the hands of the secret diplomacy of the belligerent countries" (see *Sotsial-Demokrat*[48] No. 40, and "Socialism and War").*

The opponents of our point of view on the question of peace, who are numerous among Russian political émigrés, but not among the Russian workers, have never taken the trouble to analyse these propositions. Theoretically irrefutable, these propositions have now received striking and practical confirmation from the turn of events in our country.

Rabocheye Utro, the organ of the Petersburg legalist-liquidators, which is ideologically supported by the Organising Committee, is known to have adopted a social-chauvinist, "defencist" position from its very first issue. It published the "defencist" manifestos of the Petersburg and Moscow social-chauvinists. Both manifestos express, *inter alia*, the idea of "peace without annexations", and *Rabocheye Utro* No. 2, which particularly stresses that slogan, prints it in italics and calls it "a line which provides the country with a way out of the impasse". It is calumny to call us chauvinists, the paper seems to say; we fully accept the most "democratic", even "truly socialist" slogan of "peace without annexations".

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad".—*Ed.*

No doubt Nicholas the Bloody finds it to his advantage to have his loyal subjects put forward such a slogan at the present time. Tsarism, supported by the landowners and the bourgeoisie, led its armies to rob and enslave Galicia (not to mention the treaty to carve up Turkey, etc.). The armies of the no less predatory German imperialists repulsed the Russian robbers and expelled them, not only from Galicia, but also from "Russian Poland". (In this struggle for the interests of both these cliques, hundreds of thousands of Russian and German workers and peasants fell on the field of battle.) The peace-without-annexations slogan thus turned out to be an excellent "plaything in the hands of the secret diplomacy" of tsarism; the latter can now say: Look, we are the aggrieved; we have been robbed, deprived of Poland; we are opposed to annexations!

How much the *Rabocheye Utro* social-chauvinists "relish" the part of lackeys to tsarism is particularly evident from an article in the first issue of that paper, entitled "Polish Emigration". "The months of the war," we read, "have engendered in the minds of broad sections of the Polish people a strong urge to independence." The implication is that there was no such thing before the war. "The mass [this seems to be a misprint and ought to read "the idea, the thought", etc.] of Poland's national independence has triumphed in the social consciousness of broad sections of Polish democrats.... The Polish question looms relentlessly in all its magnitude before Russian democrats...." "The Russian liberals" refuse to give straightforward answers to the vexed questions "of Poland's independence".

Nicholas the Bloody, Khvostov, Chelnokov, Milyukov and Co. are, of course, entirely in favour of Poland's independence—they are heart and soul in favour of it *now*, when this slogan, *put into practice*, means *victory* over Germany, the country which has deprived Russia of Poland. Let us not forget that *before the war*, the creators of "the Stolypin labour party"[49] were wholly and unreservedly opposed to the slogan of the self-determination of nations and Poland's right to secede, putting up the opportunist Semkovsky for the noble purpose of defending the tsarist oppression of Poland. Now that Poland has been taken from Russia they are *in favour* of the "independence" of Poland

(from Germany; but on this point they maintain a discreet silence).

You social-chauvinist gentlemen will not deceive the class-conscious workers of Russia! Your *1915* "Octobrist"[50] slogan on independence for Poland and peace without annexations is in practice servility to tsarism, which at the present time, in February 1916 to be precise, is sorely in need of camouflaging *its* war with fine words about "peace without annexations" (driving Hindenburg out of Poland) and independence for Poland (independence from Wilhelm, but dependence upon Nicholas II).

The Russian Social-Democrat who has not forgotten his Programme argues differently. Russian democracy, he will say, having Great-Russian democracy in mind first of all and most of all, for it alone in Russia has always enjoyed freedom of language—this democracy has undoubtedly *gained* from the fact that *at present* Russia does not oppress Poland and hold it by force. The Russian proletariat has undoubtedly gained from the fact that it no longer oppresses a people it had helped to oppress yesterday. German democracy has undoubtedly lost, for as long as the German proletariat tolerates Germany's oppression of Poland it will remain in a position which is worse than that of a slave it is the position of a flunkey helping to keep others enslaved. Only the German Junkers and the bourgeoisie have really gained.

Hence, Russian Social-Democrats must expose the *deception* of the people by tsarism, *now that* the slogans of "peace without annexations" and "independence for Poland" are being played up in Russia, for in the present situation both these slogans express and justify the desire to continue the war. We must say, No war over Poland! The Russian people do not want to become Poland's oppressor again!

But how can we help liberate Poland from Germany? Isn't it our duty to do so? Of course it is, though never by supporting the imperialist war waged by Russia, be it tsarist, or bourgeois, or even bourgeois-republican, but by *supporting* the revolutionary proletariat of Germany, by supporting those elements in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany who are fighting against the *counter-revolutionary*

labour party of the Südekums, and Kautsky and Co. Kautsky very recently demonstrated his counter-revolutionary nature in a most flagrant manner; on November 26, 1915, he described street demonstrations as "*adventurism*" (just as Struve said on the eve of January 9, 1905, that there were no revolutionary people in Russia), and yet, on November 30, 1915, ten thousand working women demonstrated in Berlin!

All those who do not want to back the freedom of nations, the right of nations to self-determination, *hypocritically*, in the Südekum, Plekhanov, Kautsky fashion, but want to do this *sincerely*, must *oppose* the war over the oppression of Poland, they must stand *for* the right of the nations Russia is *now* oppressing, namely, the Ukraine, Finland, etc., to secede from Russia. Those who do not wish to be social-chauvinists *in deed* must support only those elements in the socialist parties of all countries which are working, directly, immediately, right now, for the proletarian revolution in their own countries.

Not "peace without annexations", but peace to the cottages, war on the palaces; peace to the proletariat and the working people, war on the bourgeoisie!

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WILHELM KOLB AND GEORGY PLEKHANOV

The pamphlet by the avowed German opportunist, Wilhelm Kolb, entitled *Social-Democracy at the Crossroads* (Karlsrühe, 1915), appeared opportunely after the publication of Plekhanov's symposium, *War*. The Kautskyite Rudolf Hilferding wrote a very feeble reply to Kolb in *Die Neue Zeit*, in which he evaded the main issue and snivelled over Kolb's correct assertion that the unity of the German Social-Democrats was "purely formal".

Whoever wishes to give serious thought to the significance of the collapse of the Second International would do well to compare Kolb's *ideological* position with Plekhanov's. Like Kautsky, both agree on the fundamental issue; both reject and ridicule the idea of revolutionary action in connection with the present war; both accuse the revolutionary Social-Democrats of "defeatism", to use the pet expression of Plekhanov's followers. Plekhanov, who describes the idea of a revolution in connection with the present war as a "farcical dream", rails against "revolutionary phraseology". Kolb at every step curses "revolutionary phrases", the "revolutionary fantasies", the "petty radical (*Radikalinski*) hystericals", "sectarianism", etc. Kolb and Plekhanov agree on the main issue; both are opposed to revolution. The fact that Kolb is generally opposed to revolution, whereas Plekhanov and Kautsky are "generally in favour", is only a difference in shade, in words; in reality, Plekhanov and Kautsky are Kolb's underlings.

Kolb is more honest, not in a personal, but in a political sense, that is, being consistent in his stand, he is not a hypocrite. Hence, he is not afraid to admit the truth that, from his point of view, the entire International had been imbued

with "the spirit of revolutionary fantasy", that it had uttered "threats" (threats of revolution, Messrs. Plekhanov and Kolb!) in connection with the war. Kolb is right when he says that it is ridiculous to "repudiate" capitalist society "in principle" after the Social-Democratic parties of Europe had risen in its defence at the very moment when the capitalist state was cracking from top to bottom, when "its very existence was in question". This admission of the objective revolutionary situation is the truth.

"The consequence" (of the tactics of Liebknecht's followers), writes Kolb, "would be that the *internal* struggle within the German nation would be brought up to boiling point and this would weaken its military and political power" ...*to the advantage and victory* "of the imperialism of the Triple Entente"!! Here you have the crux of the opportunist railing against "defeatism"!!

This is really the crux of the whole question. "Internal struggle which has been brought up to boiling point" is civil war. Kolb is right when he says that the tactics of the Left *lead* to this; he is right when he says that they mean the "military weakening" of Germany, i.e., desiring and aiding its defeat, defeatism. Kolb is wrong only—only!—in that he refuses to see the international character of these tactics of the Left. For it is *possible* "to bring the internal struggle up to boiling point", "weaken the military power" of the imperialist bourgeoisie and (by virtue of this, in connection with it, by means of it) transform the imperialist war into civil war in all the belligerent countries. This is the crux of the whole matter. We thank Kolb for his good wishes, admissions and illustrations; since all this comes from a most consistent, honest and avowed enemy of the revolution, it is particularly useful as a means of exposing to the workers the hideous hypocrisy and the shameful spinelessness of the Plekhanovs and Kautskys.

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THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

THESES

1. IMPERIALISM, SOCIALISM AND THE LIBERATION OF OPPRESSED NATIONS

Imperialism is the highest stage in the development of capitalism. In the foremost countries capital has outgrown the bounds of national states, has replaced competition by monopoly and has created all the objective conditions for the achievement of socialism. In Western Europe and in the United States, therefore, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of capitalist governments and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie is on the order of the day. Imperialism forces the masses into this struggle by sharpening class contradictions on a tremendous scale, by worsening the conditions of the masses both economically —trusts, high cost of living—and politically—the growth of militarism, more frequent wars, more powerful reaction, the intensification and expansion of national oppression and colonial plunder. Victorious socialism must necessarily establish a full democracy and, consequently, not only introduce full equality of nations but also realise the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to free political separation. Socialist parties which did not show by all their activity, both now, during the revolution, and after its victory, that they would liberate the enslaved nations and build up relations with them on the basis of a free union—and free union is a false phrase without the right to secede—these parties would be betraying socialism.

Democracy, of course, is also a form of state which must disappear when the state disappears, but that will only take place in the transition from conclusively victorious and consolidated socialism to full communism.

2. THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

The socialist revolution is not a single act, it is not one battle on one front, but a whole epoch of acute class conflicts, a long series of battles on all fronts, i.e., on all questions of economics and politics, battles that can only end in the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. It would be a radical mistake to think that the struggle for democracy was capable of diverting the proletariat from the socialist revolution or of hiding, overshadowing it, etc. On the contrary, in the same way as there can be no victorious socialism that does not practise full democracy, so the proletariat cannot prepare for its victory over the bourgeoisie without an all-round, consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy.

It would be no less a mistake to remove one of the points of the democratic programme, for example, the point on the self-determination of nations, on the grounds of it being "impracticable" or "illusory" under imperialism. The contention that the right of nations to self-determination is impracticable within the bounds of capitalism can be understood either in the absolute, economic sense, or in the conditional, political sense.

In the first case it is radically incorrect from the standpoint of theory. First, in that sense, such things as, for example, labour money, or the abolition of crises, etc., are impracticable under capitalism. It is absolutely untrue that the self-determination of nations is *equally* impracticable. Secondly, even the one example of the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905 is sufficient to refute "impracticability" in that sense. Thirdly, it would be absurd to deny that some slight change in the political and strategic relations of, say, Germany and Britain, might today or tomorrow make the formation of a new Polish, Indian and other similar state fully "practicable". Fourthly, finance capital, in its drive to expand, can "freely" buy or bribe the freest

democratic or republican government and the elective officials of any, even an "independent", country. The domination of finance capital and of capital in general is not to be abolished by *any* reforms in the sphere of political democracy; and self-determination belongs wholly and exclusively to this sphere. This domination of finance capital, however, does not in the least nullify the significance of political democracy as a freer, wider and clearer *form* of class oppression and class struggle. Therefore all arguments about the "impracticability", in the economic sense, of one of the demands of political democracy under capitalism are reduced to a theoretically incorrect definition of the general and basic relationships of capitalism and of political democracy as a whole.

In the second case the assertion is incomplete and inaccurate. This is because not only the right of nations to self-determination, but *all* the fundamental demands of political democracy are only partially "practicable" under imperialism, and then in a distorted form and by way of exception (for example, the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905). The demand for the immediate liberation of the colonies that is put forward by all revolutionary Social-Democrats is also "impracticable" under capitalism without a series of revolutions. But from this it does not by any means follow that Social-Democracy should reject the immediate and most determined struggle for *all* these demands—such a rejection would only play into the hands of the bourgeoisie and reaction—but, on the contrary, it follows that these demands must be formulated and put through in a revolutionary and not a reformist manner, going beyond the bounds of bourgeois legality, breaking them down, going beyond speeches in parliament and verbal protests, and drawing the masses into decisive action, extending and intensifying the struggle for every fundamental democratic demand up to a direct proletarian onslaught on the bourgeoisie, i.e., up to the socialist revolution that expropriates the bourgeoisie. The socialist revolution may flare up not only through some big strike, street demonstration or hunger riot or a military insurrection or colonial revolt, but also as a result of a political crisis such as the Dreyfus case[51] or the Zabern incident,[52] or in connection with a referendum on the secession of an oppressed nation, etc.

Increased national oppression under imperialism does not mean that Social-Democracy should reject what the bourgeoisie call the "utopian" struggle for the freedom of nations to secede but, on the contrary, it should make greater use of the conflicts that arise in this sphere, *too*, as grounds for mass action and for revolutionary attacks on the bourgeoisie.

3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS RELATION TO FEDERATION

The right of nations to self-determination implies exclusively the right to independence in the political sense, the right to free political separation from the oppressor nation. Specifically, this demand for political democracy implies complete freedom to agitate for secession and for a referendum on secession by the seceding nation. This demand, therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression. The closer a democratic state system is to complete freedom to secede the less frequent and less ardent will the desire for separation be in practice, because big states afford indisputable advantages, both from the standpoint of economic progress and from that of the interests of the masses and, furthermore, these advantages increase with the growth of capitalism. Recognition of self-determination is not synonymous with recognition of federation as a principle. One may be a determined opponent of that principle and a champion of democratic centralism but still prefer federation to national inequality as the only way to full democratic centralism. It was from this standpoint that Marx, who was a centralist, preferred even the federation of Ireland and England to the forcible subordination of Ireland to the English.[53]

The aim of socialism is not only to end the division of mankind into tiny states and the isolation of nations in any form, it is not only to bring the nations closer together but to integrate them. And it is precisely in order to achieve this aim that we must, on the one hand, explain to the masses the reactionary nature of Renner and Otto Bauer's idea of

so-called "cultural and national autonomy"[54] and, on the other, demand the liberation of oppressed nations in a clearly and precisely formulated political programme that takes special account of the hypocrisy and cowardice of socialists in the oppressor nations, and not in general nebulous phrases, not in empty declamations and not by way of "relegating" the question until socialism has been achieved. In the same way as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, it can arrive at the inevitable integration of nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed nations, i.e., their freedom to secede.

4. THE PROLETARIAN-REVOLUTIONARY PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS

The petty bourgeoisie had put forward not only the demand for the self-determination of nations but *all* the points of our democratic minimum programme long *before*, as far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They are still putting them *all* forward in a utopian manner because they fail to see the class struggle and its increased intensity under democracy, and because they believe in "peaceful" capitalism. That is the exact nature of the utopia of a peaceful union of equal nations under imperialism which deceives the people and which is defended by Kautsky's followers. The programme of Social-Democracy, as a counter-balance to this petty-bourgeois, opportunist utopia, must postulate the division of nations into oppressor and oppressed as basic, significant and inevitable under imperialism.

The proletariat of the oppressor nation's must not confine themselves to general, stereotyped phrases against annexation and in favour of the equality of nations in general, such as any pacifist bourgeois will repeat. The proletariat cannot remain silent on the question of the *frontiers* of a state founded on national oppression, a question so "unpleasant" for the imperialist bourgeoisie. The proletariat must struggle against the enforced retention of oppressed nations within the bounds of the given state, which means that they must fight for the right to self-determination. The proletariat

must demand freedom of political separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by "their own" nation. Otherwise, the internationalism of the proletariat would be nothing but empty words; neither confidence nor class solidarity would be possible between the workers of the oppressed and the oppressor nations, the hypocrisy of the reformists and Kautskyites, who defend self-determination but remain silent about the nations oppressed by "their own" nation and kept in "their own" state by force, would remain unexposed.

On the other hand, the socialists of the oppressed nations must, in particular, defend and implement the full and unconditional unity, including organisational unity, of the workers of the oppressed nation and those of the oppressor nation. Without this it is impossible to defend the independent policy of the proletariat and their class solidarity with the proletariat of other countries in face of all manner of intrigues, treachery and trickery on the part of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations persistently utilise the slogans of national liberation to deceive the workers; in their internal policy they use these slogans for reactionary agreements with the bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (for example, the Poles in Austria and Russia who come to terms with reactionaries for the oppression of the Jews and Ukrainians); in their foreign policy they strive to come to terms with one of the rival imperialist powers for the sake of implementing their predatory plans (the policy of the small Balkan states, etc.).

The fact that the struggle for national liberation against one imperialist power may, under certain conditions, be utilised by another "great" power for its own, equally imperialist, aims, is just as unlikely to make the Social-Democrats refuse to recognise the right of nations to self-determination as the numerous cases of bourgeois utilisation of republican slogans for the purpose of political deception and financial plunder (as in the Romance countries, for example) are unlikely to make the Social-Democrats reject their republicanism.*

* It would, needless to say, be quite ridiculous to reject the right to self-determination on the grounds that it implies "defence of the fatherland". With equal right, i.e., with equal lack of seriousness the social-chauvinists of 1914-16 refer to any of the demands of de-

5. MARXISM AND PROUDHONISM ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

In contrast to the petty-bourgeois democrats, Marx regarded every democratic demand without exception not as an absolute, but as an historical expression of the struggle of the masses of the people, led by the bourgeoisie, against feudalism. There is not one of these demands which could not serve and has not served, under certain circumstances, as an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie for deceiving the workers. To single out, in this respect, one of the demands of political democracy, specifically, the self-determination of nations, and to oppose it to the rest, is fundamentally wrong in theory. In practice, the proletariat can retain its independence only by subordinating its struggle for all democratic demands, not excluding the demand for a republic, to its revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, in contrast to the Proudhonists who "denied" the national problem "in the name of social revolution", Marx, mindful in the first place of the interests of the proletarian class struggle in the advanced countries, put the fundamental principle of internationalism and socialism in the foreground—namely, that no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.[55] It was from the standpoint of the interests of the German workers' revolutionary movement that Marx in 1848 demanded that victorious democracy in Germany should proclaim and grant freedom to the nations oppressed by the Germans.[56] It was from the standpoint of the revolutionary struggle of the English workers that Marx, in 1869, demanded the separation of Ireland from England, and added: "...even if federation should follow upon separation."[57] Only by putting forward this demand was Marx really educating the English workers in the spirit

mocracy (to its republicanism, for example) and to any formulation of the struggle against national oppression in order to justify "defence of the fatherland". Marxism deduces the defence of the fatherland in wars, for example, in the great French Revolution or the wars of Garibaldi, in Europe, and the renunciation of defence of the fatherland in the imperialist war of 1914-16, from an analysis of the concrete historical peculiarities of each individual war and never from any "general principle", or any one point of a programme.

of internationalism. Only in this way could he counterpose the opportunists and bourgeois reformism—which even to this day, half a century later, has not carried out the Irish "reform"—with a revolutionary solution of the given historical task. Only in this way could Marx maintain—in contradiction to the apologists of capital who shout that the freedom of small nations to secede is utopian and impracticable and that not only economic but also political concentration is progressive—that this concentration is progressive when it is *non*-imperialist, and that nations should not be brought together by force, but by a free union of the proletarians of all countries. Only in this way could Marx, in opposition to the merely verbal, and often hypocritical, recognition of the equality and self-determination of nations, advocate the revolutionary action of the masses in the settlement of national questions *as well*. The imperialist war of 1914-16, and the Augean stables of hypocrisy on the part of the opportunists and Kautskyites that it has exposed, have strikingly confirmed the correctness of Marx's policy, which should serve as a model for all advanced countries, for all of them are now oppressing other nations.*

6. THREE TYPES OF COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS

In this respect, countries must be divided into three main types.

First, the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe and the United States. In these countries progressive bourgeois national movements came to an end long ago. Every

* Reference is often made—e.g., recently by the German chauvinist Lensch in *Die Glocke*[58] Nos. 8 and 9—to the fact that Marx's objection to the national movement of certain peoples, to that of the Czechs in 1848, for example, refutes the necessity of recognising the self-determination of nation from the Marxist standpoint. But this is incorrect for in 1848 there were historical and political grounds for drawing a distinction between "reactionary" and revolutionary-democratic nations. Marx was right to condemn the former and defend the latter.[59] The right to self-determination is one of the demands of democracy which must naturally be subordinated to its general interests. In 1848 and the following years these general interests consisted primarily in combating tsarism.

one of these "great" nations oppresses other nations both in the colonies and at home. The tasks of the proletariat of these ruling nations are the same as those of the proletariat in England in the nineteenth century in relation to Ireland.*

Secondly, Eastern Europe: Austria, the Balkans and particularly Russia. Here it was the twentieth century that particularly developed the bourgeois-democratic national movements and intensified the national struggle. The tasks of the proletariat in these countries, both in completing their bourgeois-democratic reforms, and rendering assistance to the socialist revolution in other countries, cannot be carried out without championing the right of nations to self-determination. The most difficult and most important task in this is to unite the class struggle of the workers of the oppressor nations with that of the workers of the oppressed nations.

Thirdly, the semi-colonial countries, such as China, Persia and Turkey, and all the colonies, which have a combined population of 1,000 million. In these countries the bourgeois-democratic movements either have hardly begun, or have still a long way to go. Socialists must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without compensation—and this demand in its political expression signifies nothing else than the recognition of the right to self-determination; they must also render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation

PROMETEA ROMA NON FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* In some small states which have kept out of the war of 1914-16—Holland and Switzerland, for example—the bourgeoisie makes extensive use of the "self-determination of nations" slogan to justify participation in the imperialist war. This is a motive inducing the Social-Democrats in such countries to repudiate self-determination. Wrong arguments are being used to defend a correct proletarian policy, the repudiation of "defence of the fatherland" in an *imperialist* war. This results in a distortion of Marxism in theory, and in practice leads to a peculiar small-nation narrow-mindedness, neglect of the *hundreds of millions* of people in nations that are enslaved by the "dominant" nations. Comrade Gorter, in his excellent pamphlet *Imperialism, War and Social-Democracy* wrongly rejects the principle of self-determination of nations, but correctly *applies* it, when he demands the *immediate* granting of "political and *national* independence" to the Dutch Indies and exposes the Dutch opportunists who refuse to put forward this demand and to fight for it.

in these countries and assist their uprising—or revolutionary war, in the event of one—*against* the imperialist powers that oppress them.

7. SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS

The imperialist epoch and the war of 1914-16 has laid special emphasis on the struggle against chauvinism and nationalism in the leading countries. There are two main trends on the self-determination of nations among the social-chauvinists, that is, among the opportunists and Kautskyites, who hide the imperialist, reactionary nature of the war by applying to it the "defence of the fatherland" concept.

On the one hand, we see quite undisguised servants of the bourgeoisie who defend annexation on the plea that imperialism and political concentration are progressive, and who deny what they call the utopian, illusory, petty-bourgeois, etc., right to self-determination. This includes Cunow, Parvus and the extreme opportunists in Germany, some of the Fabians and trade union leaders in England, and the opportunists in Russia: Semkovsky, Liebman, Yurkevich, etc.

On the other hand, we see the Kautskyites, among whom are Vandervelde, Renaudel, many pacifists in Britain and France, and others. They favour unity with the former and in practice are completely identified with them; they defend the right to self-determination hypocritically and by words alone; they consider "excessive" ("*zu viel verlangt*"; Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, May 21, 1915) the demand for free political separation, they do not defend the necessity for revolutionary tactics on the part of the socialists of the oppressor nations in particular but, on the contrary, obscure their revolutionary obligations, justify their opportunism, make easy for them their deception of the people, and avoid the very question of the *frontiers* of a state forcefully retaining underprivileged nations within its bounds, etc.

Both are equally opportunist, they prostitute Marxism, having lost all ability to understand the theoretical significance and practical urgency of the tactics which Marx explained with Ireland as an example.

As for annexations, the question has become particularly urgent in connection with the war. But what is annexation? It is quite easy to see that a protest against annexations either boils down to recognition of the self-determination of nations or is based on the pacifist phrase that defends the *status quo* and is hostile to *any*, even revolutionary, violence. Such a phrase is fundamentally false and incompatible with Marxism.

8. THE CONCRETE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

The socialist revolution may begin in the very near future. In this case the proletariat will be faced with the immediate task of winning power, expropriating the banks and effecting other dictatorial measures. The bourgeoisie—and especially the intellectuals of the Fabian and Kautskyite type—will, at such a moment, strive to split and check the revolution by foisting limited, democratic aims on it. Whereas *any* purely democratic demands are in a certain sense liable to act as a hindrance to the revolution, provided the proletarian attack on the pillars of bourgeois power has begun, the necessity to proclaim and grant liberty to *all* oppressed peoples (i.e., their right to self-determination) will be as urgent in the socialist revolution as it was for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in, say, Germany in 1848, or Russia in 1905.

It is possible, however, that five, ten or more years will elapse before the socialist revolution begins. This will be the time for the revolutionary education of the masses in a spirit that will make it impossible for socialist-chauvinists and opportunists to belong to the working-class party and gain a victory, as was the case in 1914-16. The socialists must explain to the masses that British socialists who do not demand freedom to separate for the colonies and Ireland, German socialists who do not demand freedom to separate for the colonies, the Alsatians, Danes and Poles, and who do not extend their revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary mass activity directly to the sphere of struggle against national oppression, or who do not make use of such incidents as that at Zabern for the broadest illegal propaganda among the proletariat of the oppressor nation, for

street demonstrations and revolutionary mass action—Russian socialists who do not demand freedom to separate for Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, etc., etc.—that such socialists act as chauvinists and lackeys of bloodstained and filthy imperialist monarchies and the imperialist bourgeoisie.

9. THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIAN AND POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The differences between the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia and the Polish Social-Democrats on the question of self-determination came out into the open as early as 1903, at the Congress which adopted the Programme of the R.S.D.L. Party, and which, despite the protest by the Polish Social-Democrat delegation, inserted Clause 9, recognising the right of nations to self-determination. Since then the Polish Social-Democrats have on no occasion repeated, in the name of their party, the proposal to remove Clause 9 from our Party's Programme, or to replace it by some other formula.

In Russia, where the oppressed nations account for no less than 57 per cent of the population, or over 100 million, where they occupy mostly the border regions, where some of them are more highly cultured than the Great Russians, where the political system is especially barbarous and medieval, where the bourgeois-democratic revolution has not been consummated—there, in Russia, recognition of the right of nations oppressed by tsarism to free secession from Russia is absolutely obligatory for Social-Democrats, for the furtherance of their democratic and socialist aims. Our Party, re-established in January 1912, adopted a resolution in 1913[60] reaffirming the right to self-determination and explaining it in precisely the above concrete sense. The rampage of Great-Russian chauvinism in 1914-16 both among the bourgeoisie and among the opportunist socialists (Rubanovich, Plekhanov, *Nashe Dyelo*, etc.) has given us even more reason to insist on this demand and to regard those who deny it as actual supporters of Great-Russian chauvinism and tsarism. Our Party declares that it most emphatically declines to accept any responsibility for such actions against the right to self-determination.

The latest formulation of the position of the Polish Social-Democrats on the national question (the declaration of the Polish Social-Democrats at the Zimmerwald Conference) contains the following ideas:

The declaration condemns the German and other governments that regard the "Polish regions" as a pawn in the forthcoming compensation game, "*depriving the Polish people of the opportunity of deciding their own fate themselves*". "Polish Social-Democrats resolutely and solemnly protest against the *carving up and parcelling out of a whole country*" .... They flay the socialists who left it to the Hohenzollerns "*to liberate the oppressed peoples*". They express the conviction that only participation in the approaching struggle of the international revolutionary proletariat, the struggle for socialism, "*will break the fetters of national oppression* and destroy *all forms of foreign* rule, will ensure for *the Polish people* the possibility of free all-round development as an *equal* member of a concord of nations". The declaration recognises that "*for the Poles*" the war is "*doubly* fratricidal". (*Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee* No. 2, September 27, 1915, p. 15. Russian translation in the symposium *The International and the War*, p. 97.)

These propositions do not differ in substance from recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, although their political formulations are even vaguer and more indeterminate than those of most programmes and resolutions of the Second International. Any attempt to express these ideas as precise political formulations and to define their applicability to the capitalist system or only to the socialist system will show even more clearly the mistake the Polish Social-Democrats make in denying the self-determination of nations.

The decision of the London International Socialist Congress of 1896, which recognised the self-determination of nations, should be supplemented on the basis of the above theses by specifying: (1) the particular urgency of this demand under imperialism, (2) the political conventionalism and class content of all the demands of political democracy, the one under discussion included, (3) the necessity to distinguish the concrete tasks of the Social-Democrats of the oppressor nations from those of the Social-Democrats of the

oppressed nations, (4) the inconsistent, purely verbal recognition of self-determination by the opportunists and the Kautskyites, which is, therefore, hypocritical in its political significance, (5) the actual identity of the chauvinists and those Social-Democrats, especially those of the Great Powers (Great Russians, Anglo-Americans, Germans, French, Italians, Japanese, etc.), who do not uphold the freedom to secede for colonies and nations oppressed by "their own" nations, (6) the necessity to subordinate the struggle for the demand under discussion and for all the basic demands of political democracy directly to the revolutionary mass struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois governments and for the achievement of socialism.

The introduction into the International of the viewpoint of certain small nations, especially that of the Polish Social-Democrats, who have been led by their struggle against the Polish bourgeoisie, which deceives the people with its nationalist slogans, to the incorrect denial of self-determination, would be a theoretical mistake, a substitution of Proudhonism for Marxism implying in practice involuntary support for the most dangerous chauvinism and opportunism of the Great-Power nations.

Editorial Board of Sotsial-Demokrat,
Central Organ of R.S.D.L.P.

Postscript. In *Die Neue Zeit* for March 3, 1916, which has just appeared, Kautsky openly holds out the hand of Christian reconciliation to Austerlitz, a representative of the foulest German chauvinism, rejecting freedom of separation for the oppressed nations of Hapsburg Austria but recognising it for *Russian* Poland, as a menial service to Hindenburg and Wilhelm II. One could not have wished for a better self-exposure of Kautskyism!

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LETTER FROM THE COMMITTEE OF ORGANISATIONS ABROAD TO THE SECTIONS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrades,

The recent No. 25 issue (the second to come out during the war) of *Gazeta Robotnicza*,[61] the organ of the opposition of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, carries the resolutions of their conference (a conference of the Editorial Board) adopted back in *June* 1915.

These resolutions clearly show that *as a body* (we say nothing of its members as individuals, some of whom are doing extremely useful work in the German Social-Democratic press), the Polish Social-Democrats are *once again* vacillating in a *most* spineless manner.

There's not a word against *Kautskyism*, not a word about any determined and resolute struggle against *opportunism*, as the *source* and *buttress* of social-chauvinism!! This can be read in one way only: they are prepared once again (as in Brussels, July 3-16, 1914[62]) "to play ball" with the Kautskyites.

We quote the main (IV) resolution in full. Here it is:

Gazeta Robotnicza P.S.D. (of the opposition) No. 25 (January 1916). "Resolutions of the Editorial Board conference held on June 1-2, 1915."

IV. *The Attitude of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania to the R.S.D.L.P.**

"The Polish revolutionary Social-Democrats regard the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. as a body consisting

* The *Gazeta Robotnicza* resolution was translated by N. K. Krupskaya. The words in bold-face type here are Lenin's additions and corrections to the translation from the Polish.—*Ed.*

of the most resolute revolutionary internationalist elements in Russia, and, while leaving it to the regional organisation to settle its organisational relations with it in the future, will give it political support and co-ordinate their activity with it.

"The common revolutionary stand of the Polish Social-Democrats and the Central Committee on the main essential [*wytycznych* (**definite?**)] points of their policy makes it incumbent on the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania to continue taking a critical attitude to its obvious tactical exaggerations [*wybujałości* ("**wild**" **growth of corn**, **etc.**)].

"While justly desiring to emphasise the proletariat's unquestionably hostile attitude to tsarism's **plunderous** policy, the Central Committee puts forward the slogan of *Russia's defeat*, basing it on the especially reactionary part tsarism has to play in Europe and the specific significance of a Russian revolution; however, this brings the Central
!! Committee into contradiction with the method of internationalism, which does not allow proletarian hopes and tasks
!! to be pinned on any definite outcome of the war, and even provides the German social-patriots with arguments.

"While justly noting the need for revolutionary action to build a new International, while justly opposing every attempt to **gloss over** the conflict, and piece together the broken old International, the C.C., however, overrate the
!!! importance of automatically fencing themselves off from all less resolute elements which do not accept their standpoint *a priori*, and **forget** [*przeocza*] that the task of the revolutionary **camp** [*obozu*] must not be to repulse these elements but to draw them into the struggle against the **fraud** [*szalbierstwem*] of social-patriotism, and to promote their radicalisation by sharply criticising their ideological instability.

"As for the O.C. (R.S.D.L.P), the **conference** [*narada*] **reaffirms** that its main **group**, which is in Russia, and also its **literary representative** [*ekspozytura literacka*] take the social-patriotic standpoint, and that its weak internationalist wing has neither the strength nor the courage to break with the social-patriots, and that the O.C. Centre takes the pacifist standpoint; the **conference** considers that the attitude of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania to

the O.C. can consist exclusively of criticism of its position, promoting its disintegration [*rozkładu*] and separating from the O.C. **its** internationalist **elements** grouped around *Nashe Slovo*, an organ which has done a great deal to elaborate [crystallise] internationalist-revolutionary views in the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P.

"The same applies, in particular, also to the Bund, which is a part of the O.C., for its attitude is an even greater chaotic mixture of social-patriotic and pacifist, Russophile and Germanophile elements."

The Polish Social-Democrats say here that they wish to "co-ordinate" their activity with the Central Committee.

We believe it to be our unquestionable duty to tell the Central Committee this: the Central Committee must not and *cannot* "co-ordinate" their activity with the P.S.D.

Why not?

Because the P.S.D. is *vacillating* again and again, for the nth time (or playing a game, which is objectively the same thing) on our Party's *cardinal* question. There is no doubt that the key issue in the Russian Social-Democratic movement today is that of the *split*.

On this point we are adamant, because the *entire* experience of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia, especially in the 1903-09 period, and even more between 1910 and 1914, and most of all in the years 1915 and 1916, *has served to convince* us that unity with the O.C. (or with the Chkheidze group, which is the same thing) is *harmful* to the working-class movement, and *ensures* its subjugation to the bourgeoisie.

The war and Gvozdyovism[63] have provided the final proof.

But it is on this chief, basic and fundamental issue that the Polish Social-Democrats are again *equivocating*.

They say *not a word* about the war having convinced them of the need for a split and of the *erroneousness* of their tactics at Brussels (July 3-16, 1914).

On the contrary, they have inserted in the resolution a *phrase* which looks as if it had been deliberately worded to justify and do another "Brussels" desertion to the O.C. or Chkheidze. Here it is:

"The Central Committee overrate the importance of automatically fencing themselves off...."

That is the whole point. The rest is just rhetoric. If the Central Committee "overrate" the need for a split, it is clear that the P.S.D. are entitled today or tomorrow to vote *again* for another Brussels-Kautskyite "unity" resolution.

It is the same old Tyszka trick,[64] the old game between the C.C. and the O.C., the old eclectical (to put it mildly) use of the pendulum position.

We have no objection at all to *working with* the P.S.D., either in general, or in the Zimmerwald Left in particular; nor do we defend every *letter* of our resolutions; but *we are adamant* on (1) the split in Russia and (2) that there be no reconciliation with Kautskyism in Europe. We consider it to be our duty to warn all comrades that the Polish Social-Democrats are *unreliable*, and to insist that the C.C. must not let itself be drawn once again into a repetition of "Brussels" experiments, or trust the authors of these experiments or participants in them.

With comradely greetings, *C.O.A.*

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THE PEACE PROGRAMME

The question of the Social-Democratic peace programme is one of the most important on the agenda of the Second International Conference of the Zimmerwald group.[65] In order to bring home to the reader its *essentials* let us quote a pertinent declaration by Kautsky, a most authoritative representative of the Second International and a most authoritative champion of the social-chauvinists in all countries.

"The International is not a fit war-time instrument; it is, essentially, an instrument of peace.... The fight for peace, class struggle in peace time...." (*Die Neue Zeit*, November 27, 1914). "All peace programmes formulated by the International, the programmes of the Copenhagen, London and Vienna congresses, all demand, and quite rightly, recognition of the independence of nations. This demand must also serve as our compass in the present war" (ibid., May 21, 1915).

These few words excellently express the "programme" of international social-chauvinist unity and conciliation. Everybody knows that Südekum's friends and adherents met in Vienna and acted entirely in his spirit, championing the cause of German imperialism under the cloak of "defence of the fatherland". The French, English and Russian Südekums met in London and championed the cause of "their" national imperialisms under the same cloak. The real policy of the London and Vienna heroes of social-chauvinism is to justify participation in the imperialist war, to justify the killing of German workers by French workers, and vice versa, over which national bourgeoisie shall have the advantage in robbing other countries. And to conceal their real policy, to deceive the workers, both the London and

the Vienna heroes resort to the *phrase*, we "recognise" the "independence of nations" or in other words, recognise the self-determination of nations, repudiate annexations, etc., etc.

It is as clear as daylight that this "recognition" is a flagrant lie and foul hypocrisy, for it justifies participation in a war waged by *both* sides to enslave nations, not to make them independent. Instead of exposing, unmasking and condemning this hypocrisy, Kautsky, the great authority, *sanctifies* it. To Kautsky, the unanimous desire of the chauvinists who have betrayed socialism to deceive the workers, is proof of the "unanimity" and viability of the International on the question of peace!!! Kautsky converts crude, patent, flagrant, nationalist hypocrisy, which is so obvious to the workers, into subtle, disguised, internationalist hypocrisy, designed to blind the workers. Kautsky's policy is a hundred times more harmful and dangerous to the labour movement than Südekum's policy; Kautsky's hypocrisy is a hundred times more repulsive.

This does not apply to Kautsky alone. The policy pursued by Axelrod, Martov and Chkheidze in Russia, by Longuet and Pressemane in France, Treves in Italy, etc., is essentially the same. Objectively, this policy means fostering bourgeois lies among the working class; it means inculcating bourgeois ideas upon the proletariat. That both Südekum and Plekhanov merely repeat the bourgeois lies of the capitalists of "their" respective nations is obvious; but it is not so obvious that Kautsky sanctifies *these* lies and ranks them as the "supreme truth" of a "unanimous" International. That the workers should regard the Südekums and Plekhanovs authoritative and unanimous "socialists" who have temporarily fallen out is exactly what the bourgeoisie wants. That's the very thing the bourgeoisie wants; it wants the workers *diverted* from the revolutionary struggle in war-time by means of hypocritical, idle and non-committal phrases about peace; it wants them lulled and soothed by hopes of "peace without annexations", a democratic peace, etc., etc.

Huysmans has merely popularised Kautsky's peace programme, adding courts of arbitration, democratisation of foreign policies, etc., whereas the first and fundamental

point of a socialist peace programme must be *to unmask the hypocrisy* of the Kautskyist peace programme, which *strengthens* bourgeois influence on the proletariat.

Let us recall the fundamental postulates of socialist doctrine distorted by the Kautskyites. War is the continuation, by violent means, of the politics pursued by the ruling classes of the belligerent powers long before the outbreak of war. Peace is a continuation of the *very same* politics, with a *record* of the changes brought about in the relation of the rival forces by the military operations. War does not alter the direction of pre-war policies, but only *accelerates* their development.

The war of 1870-71 was a continuation of the progressive bourgeois policy (which had been pursued for decades) of liberating and uniting Germany. The debacle and overthrow of Napoleon III hastened that liberation. The peace programme of the socialists of that epoch took this progressive bourgeois result into account and advocated support for the democratic bourgeoisie, urging no plunder of France and an honourable peace with the republic.

What a clownish attempt to ape this example in the atmosphere of the imperialist war of 1914-16! This war is a continuation of the politics of a rotten-ripe reactionary bourgeoisie, which has plundered the world, seized colonies, etc. Owing to the objective situation, the present war *cannot*, on the basis of bourgeois relations, lead to any democratic "progress"; whatever its outcome, this war can do nothing but intensify and extend oppression in general, and national oppression in particular.

That war accelerated development in a democratic bourgeois-progressive direction; it resulted in the overthrow of Napoleon III and in the unification of Germany. *This* war is accelerating development *only* in the direction of the socialist revolution. *At that time*, the programme of a democratic (bourgeois) peace had an *objective* historical basis. *Now*, there is *no* such basis, and all phrases about a democratic peace are a bourgeois lie, the objective purpose of which is to divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle for socialism! *At that time*, the socialists, with their programme of a democratic peace, supported a deep-going bourgeois-democratic movement of the *masses* (for the over-

throw of Napoleon III and the unification of Germany), which had been in evidence for decades. *Now*, with their programme of a democratic peace on the basis of bourgeois relations, the socialists are helping the bourgeoisie to *deceive* the people so as to divert the proletariat from the *socialist* revolution.

Just as phrases about "defence of the fatherland" fraudulently inculcate upon the masses the ideology of a national liberation war, so phrases about a democratic peace *smuggle in* that very same bourgeois lie.

"That means that you have no peace programme, that you are opposed to democratic demands," the Kautskyites argue, hoping that inattentive people will not notice that this objection substitutes non-existent bourgeois-democratic tasks for the existing socialist tasks.

Oh no, gentlemen, we reply to the Kautskyites. We are *in favour* of democratic demands, we *alone* are fighting for them *sincerely*, for because of the objective historical situation they cannot be advanced except in connection with the socialist revolution. Take, for example, the "compass" used by Kautsky and Co. for the bourgeois deception of the workers.

Südekum and Plekhanov are "unanimous" in their "peace programme". Down with annexations! Support the independence of nations! And note this . The Südekums are *right* when they say that Russia's attitude towards Poland, Finland, etc., is annexationist. Plekhanov is right, too, when he says that Germany's attitude towards Alsace-Lorraine, Serbia, Belgium, etc., is also annexationist. Both are right, are they not? And in this way Kautsky "reconciles" the German Südekums with the Russian Südekums!!!

But every alert worker will see at once that Kautsky and *both types* of Südekum are hypocrites. This is obvious. The duty of a socialist is not to make peace with hypocritical democracy, but to *unmask* it. How can it be unmasked? Very simply. "Recognition" of the independence of nations can be regarded as sincere *only* where the representative of the oppressor nation has demanded, both before and during the war, freedom of secession for the nation which is oppressed by *his own* "fatherland".

This demand alone is in accord with Marxism. Marx advanced it in the interests of the British proletariat when he demanded freedom for Ireland, although he assumed the probability of a federation following upon secession. In other words, he did not demand the right of secession for the sake of splitting and isolating countries, but to create more durable and democratic ties. In all cases where there are oppressed and oppressing nations, where no special circumstances distinguish revolutionary-democratic nations from reactionary nations (as was the case in the forties of the nineteenth century), Marx's policy in relation to Ireland must serve as a model for proletarian policy. But imperialism is the epoch in which the division of nations into oppressors and oppressed is essential and typical, and it is quite impossible to draw any distinction between reactionary and revolutionary nations in Europe.

As early as 1913, our Party, in a resolution on the national question, made it the duty of Social-Democrats to apply the concept of self-determination in the sense here indicated. We have been fully vindicated by the war of 1914-16.

Take Kautsky's latest article in *Die Neue Zeit* of March 3, 1916. He makes no bones about being *in agreement* with Austerlitz, the notorious, German ultra-chauvinist in Austria, the editor of the chauvinist Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*,[66] when he says that "a nation's independence must not be confused with its sovereignty". In other words, national autonomy within a "state of nationalities" is good enough for the oppressed nations, and it is not necessary to demand for them an equal right to political independence. In this very article, however, Kautsky asserts that it is impossible to prove that "it is essential for the Poles to belong to the Russian state"!!!

What does he mean? He means that to please Hindenburg, Südekum, Austerlitz and Co., he recognises Poland's *right to secede* from Russia, although Russia is a "state of nationalities" but not a word does he say about freedom for the Poles to secede from Germany!!! In this very same article Kautsky declares that the French socialists had departed from internationalism by wanting to achieve the freedom of Alsace-Lorraine *by means of war*. But he says nothing about the German Südekums and Co. having deviated

from internationalism by refusing to demand freedom for Alsace-Lorraine to secede *from Germany*!

Kautsky employs "state of nationalities"—a catchword that can be applied both to Britain in relation to Ireland and to Germany in relation to Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.—for the obvious purpose of defending social-chauvinism. He has converted the fight-against-annexations" slogan into a "programme of *peace*" ... with the chauvinists, and a glaring hypocrisy. In this same article, mealy-mouthed Kautsky reiterates, "The International has never ceased to demand the consent of the population concerned, when state frontiers are moved." Is it not clear that Südekum and Co. demand the "consent" of the Alsatians and Belgians to be annexed to Germany, and that Austerlitz and Co. demand the "consent" of the Poles and Serbs to be annexed to Austria?

And what about the Russian Kautskyite, Martov? He wrote to the Gvozdyovist journal, *Nash Golos*[67] (Samara), to prove the indisputable truth that the self-determination of nations does not necessarily imply defence of the fatherland in an imperialist war. But Martov says nothing about the fact that a Russian Social-Democrat betrays the principle of self-determination if he does not demand the *right of secession* for the nations oppressed by the Great Russians, and in this way Martov extends the hand of peace to the Alexinskys, the Gvozdyovs, the Potresovs, and the Plekhanovs! Nor has Martov said anything on this point in the illegal press ! He argues against the Dutchman Gorter, although Gorter, while wrongly repudiating the principle of self-determination of nations, *applies* it correctly by demanding *political independence* for the Dutch Indies and by unmasking the betrayal of socialism by the Dutch opportunists who disagree with this demand. Martov, however, does not argue against his co-secretary, Semkovsky, who from 1912 to 1915 was the *only* writer in the liquidationist press who dealt with this issue and *repudiated* the right of secession and self-determination in general!

Is it not plain that Martov "advocates" self-determination just as hypocritically as Kautsky does, that he, too, covers up his desire *to make peace* with the chauvinists?

What about Trotsky? He is body and soul *for* self-determination, but in his case, too, it is an empty phrase, for he does not demand freedom of secession for nations oppressed by the "fatherland" of the socialist of the *given* nationality; he is *silent* about the hypocrisy of Kautsky and his followers!

This kind of "struggle against annexations" serves to deceive the workers and not *to explain* the programme of the Social-Democrats, it is an *evasion* of the problem and not a concrete indication of the duty of internationalists; it is not a struggle against nationalism but a concession to nationalist prejudices and to the selfish interests of nationalism ("we" all, bourgeois and social-chauvinists alike, derive "benefits" from "our" fatherland's oppression of other nations!).

The "peace programme" of Social-Democracy must, in the first place, unmask the hypocrisy of the bourgeois, social-chauvinist and Kautskyite talk about peace. This is the first and fundamental thing. Unless we do that we shall be, willy-nilly, helping to *deceive* the masses. Our "peace programme" demands that the principal democratic point of this question—the repudiation of annexations—should be applied in practice and not in words, that it should serve to promote the propaganda of internationalism and not of national hypocrisy. To do this, we must explain to the masses that the repudiation of annexations, *i.e.*, the recognition of self-determination, is sincere only when the socialists of *every* nation demand the right of secession for nations oppressed by their own nations. As a positive slogan, drawing the masses into the revolutionary struggle and explaining the necessity for revolutionary measures to attain a "democratic" peace, we must advance this slogan: repudiation of debts contracted by states.

Finally, our "peace programme" must explain that the imperialist powers and the imperialist bourgeoisie *cannot* grant a democratic peace. Such a peace *must* be sought for and fought for, not in the *past*, *not* in a reactionary utopia of a *non*-imperialist capitalism, not in a league of equal nations *under* capitalism, but *in the future*, in the socialist revolution of the proletariat. Not a single fundamental democratic demand can be achieved to any considerable

extent, or with any degree of permanency, in the advanced imperialist states, except through revolutionary battles under the banner of socialism.

Whoever promises the nations a "democratic" peace, without at the same time preaching the socialist revolution, or while repudiating the struggle for it—a struggle now, during the war—is deceiving the proletariat.

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March 25, 1916

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PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P TO THE SECOND SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

(*Theses* on points 5, 6, 7a, 7b, and 8 of the agenda: the struggle to end the war; the attitude towards the problems of peace, parliamentary action and mass struggles, and the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau.[68])

(The International Socialist Committee, in its notice convening the Second Conference, invited the affiliated organisations to discuss the above questions, and to send in their proposals. In reply to this invitation our Party submits the following theses.)

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1. Just as all war is but a continuation by violent means of the politics which the belligerent states and their ruling classes had been conducting for many years, sometimes for decades, before the outbreak of war, so the peace that ends any war can be nothing but a consideration and a record of the actual changes brought about in the relation of forces in the course of and as a result of the war.

2. As long as the foundations of present, i.e., bourgeois, social relations remain intact, an imperialist war can lead only to an imperialist peace, i.e., to greater, more extensive and more intense oppression of weak nations and countries by finance capital, which grew to gigantic proportions not only in the period prior to the war, but also during the war. The objective content of the policies pursued by the bourgeoisie and the governments of *both* groups of Great Powers before and during the war leads to intensified economic oppression, national enslavement and political reaction. Therefore, provided the bourgeois social system remains,

the peace that follows upon the war, whatever its outcome, must perpetuate this worsening of the economic and political condition of the masses.

To assume that a democratic peace may emerge from an imperialist war is, in theory, to substitute vulgar phrases for an historical study of the policies conducted before and during that war. In practice, it is to deceive the masses of the people by beclouding their political consciousness, by covering up and prettifying the real policies pursued by the ruling classes to prepare the ground for the coming peace, by concealing from the masses the main thing, namely, that a democratic peace is impossible without a whole series of revolutions.

3. Socialists do not refuse to fight for reform. Even now, for example, they must vote in parliament for improvements, however slight, in the condition of the masses, for increased relief to the inhabitants of the devastated areas, for the lessening of national oppression, etc. But it is sheer bourgeois deception to preach reforms as a solution for problems for which history and the actual political situation demand revolutionary solutions. That is precisely the kind of problems the present war has brought to the fore. These are the fundamental questions of imperialism, i.e., the very existence of capitalist society, the questions of postponing the collapse of capitalism by a redivision of the world to correspond to the new relation of forces among the "Great" Powers, which in the last few decades have developed, not only at fantastic speed, but—and this is particularly important—also with extreme unevenness. Real political activity working a change in the relation of social forces, and not merely deceiving the masses with words, is now possible only in one of two forms—either helping "one's own" national bourgeoisie to rob other countries (and calling this "defence of the fatherland" or "saving the country"), or assisting the proletarian socialist revolution, fostering and stirring up the ferment which is beginning among the masses in all the belligerent countries, aiding the incipient strikes and demonstrations, etc., extending and sharpening these as yet feeble expressions of revolutionary mass struggle into a general proletarian assault to overthrow the bourgeoisie.



First page of manuscript, “Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference”, February-March 1916

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First page of manuscript, "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference", February-March 1916

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Just as all the social-chauvinists are at present deceiving the people by covering up the real, i.e., imperialist, policy of the capitalists, which is being continued in the present war with hypocritical phrases about the "dishonest" attack and "honest" defence on the part of this or that group of predatory capitalists, so phrases about a "democratic peace" serve only to deceive the people, as if the coming peace, which is already being prepared by the capitalists and diplomats, could "simply" abolish "dishonest" attacks and restore "honest" relations, and as if it would not be a continuation, a development, and a perpetuation of this very imperialist policy, i.e., a policy of financial looting, colonial robbery, national oppression, political reaction and intensified capitalist exploitation in every form. What the capitalists and their diplomats now need is "socialist" servants of the bourgeoisie to deafen, dupe and drug the people with talk about a "democratic peace" so as to cover up the real policy of the bourgeoisie, making it difficult for the masses to realise the real nature of this policy and diverting them from the revolutionary struggle.

4. The "democratic" peace programme, in drafting which prominent representatives of the Second International are now engaged, is precisely such a piece of bourgeois deception and hypocrisy. For example, Huysmans at the Arnhem Congress[69] and Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, the most authoritative, official, and "theoretical" spokesmen of this International, formulated this programme as suspension of the revolutionary struggle until the imperialist governments have concluded peace; in the meantime, there are verbal repudiation of annexations and indemnities, verbal recognition of the self-determination of nations, democratisation of foreign politics, courts of arbitration to examine international conflicts between states, disarmament, a United States of Europe,[70] etc., etc. The real political significance of this "peace programme" was revealed with particular force by Kautsky, when, to prove the "unanimity of the International" on this question, he cited the unanimous adoption by the London Conference (February 1915) and the Vienna Conference (April 1915) of the main point of this programme, namely, the "independence of nations". Kautsky, before the whole world, thus openly gave his sanction to the

deliberate deception of the people perpetrated by the social-chauvinists, who combine verbal, hypocritical recognition of "independence" or self-determination of nations, recognition that binds no one and leads nowhere, with support for "their own" governments in the imperialist war, notwithstanding the fact that on *both* sides the war is *accompanied by* systematic violations of the "independence" of weak nations and is being waged *for the purpose* of consolidating and extending their oppression.

Objectively, this cheap "peace programme" reinforces the subjection of the working class to the bourgeoisie by "reconciling" the workers, who are beginning to develop a revolutionary struggle, with their chauvinist leaders, by underplaying the gravity of the crisis in the socialist movement to bring back the pre-war state of affairs in the socialist parties which led the majority of the leaders to desert to the bourgeoisie. The fact that this "Kautskyite" policy is clothed in plausible phrases and that it is being conducted not only in Germany but in all countries, makes it all the more dangerous for the proletariat. In Britain, for instance, this policy is being pursued by the majority of the leaders; in France, by Longuet, Pressemane and others; in Russia, by Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze and others; Chkheidze is screening the chauvinist idea of "defence of the country" in the present war with the "save the country" phrase, paying lip-service to Zimmerwald, on the one hand, and on the other, praising Huysmans's notorious Arnhem speech in an official declaration by his group; but neither from the floor of the Duma nor in the press has he actually opposed the participation of the workers in the war industries committees, and remains on the staff of newspapers advocating such participation. In Italy, a similar policy is being pursued by Treves: see the threat made by *Avanti!*,[71] the Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party, of March 5, 1916, to expose Treves and other "reformist-possibilists", to expose those "who resorted to every means to prevent the Party Executive and Oddino Morgari from taking action to secure unity at Zimmerwald and to create a new International", etc., etc.

5. The chief of the "peace questions" at the present time is that of annexations. It most strikingly reveals the now

prevailing socialist hypocrisy and the tasks of real socialist propaganda and agitation.

It is necessary to explain the meaning of annexations, and why and how socialists must fight against them. Not *every* appropriation of "foreign" territory can be described as an annexation, for, generally speaking, socialists favour the abolition of frontiers between nations and the formation of larger states; nor can every disturbance of the *status* quo be described as an annexation, for this would be extremely reactionary and a mockery of the fundamental concepts of the science of history; nor can every military seizure of territory be called annexation, for socialists cannot repudiate violence and wars in the interests of the majority of the population. Annexation must apply only to the appropriation of territory *against the will* of the population of that territory; in other words, the concept of annexation is inseparably bound up with the concept of self-determination of nations.

The present war, however—precisely because it is an imperialist war insofar as *both* groups of belligerent powers are concerned—inevitably had to and did give rise to the phenomenon of the bourgeoisie and the social-chauvinists "fighting" violently against annexations when this is done by an enemy state. This kind of "struggle against annexations" and this kind of "unanimity" of the question of annexation is plainly sheer hypocrisy. Obviously, the French socialists who defend war over Alsace-Lorraine, and the German socialists who do not demand freedom for Alsace-Lorraine, for German Poland, etc., to separate from Germany, and the Russian socialists who describe the war being waged to return Poland to tsarist bondage as a war to "save the country", and who demand that Polish territory be annexed to Russia in the name of "peace without annexations", etc., etc., are *in fact annexationists*.

To prevent the struggle against annexations from being mere hypocrisy, or an empty phrase, to make it really educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism, the question must be presented in such a way as to open the eyes of the masses to the fraud in this matter of annexations, instead of covering it up. It is not enough for the socialists of each country to pay lip-service to the equality of nations

or to orate, swear and invoke the name of God to witness their opposition to annexations. The socialists of every country must demand immediate and unconditional f*reedom to secede* for the colonies and nations oppressed by *their own* "fatherland".

Without this condition, recognition of the self-determination of nations and principles of internationalism would even in the Zimmerwald Manifesto, remain a dead letter, at best.

6. The socialists' "peace programme", and their programme of "struggle to end the war", must proceed from the exposure of the lie of the "democratic peace", the pacific intentions of the belligerents, etc., now being spread among the people by demagogic ministers, pacifist bourgeois, social-chauvinists, and Kautskyites in all countries. Any "peace programme" will deceive the people and be a piece of hypocrisy, unless its principal object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, and to support, aid, and develop the mass revolutionary struggles breaking out everywhere (ferment among the masses, protests, fraternisation in the trenches, strikes, demonstrations, letters from the front to relatives—for example, in France—urging them not to subscribe to war loans, etc., etc.).

It is the duty of socialists to support, extend and intensify every popular movement to end the war. But it is actually being fulfilled only by those socialists who, like Liebknecht, in their parliamentary speeches, call upon the soldiers to lay down their arms, and preach revolution and transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism.

The positive slogan we must put forward to draw the masses into revolutionary struggle and to explain the necessity for revolutionary measures to make a "democratic" peace possible, is that of repudiation of debts incurred by states.

It is not enough to hint at revolution, as the Zimmerwald Manifesto does, by saying that the workers must make sacrifices for their own and not for someone else's cause. The masses must be shown their road clearly and definitely. They must know where to go and why. That mass revolutionary actions during the war, if successfully developed.

can lead only to the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism is obvious, and it is harmful to conceal this from the masses. On the contrary, this aim must be indicated clearly, no matter how difficult its attainment may appear now, while we are still at the beginning of the road. It is not enough to say, as the Zimmerwald Manifesto does, that "the capitalists lie when they speak about defence of the fatherland" in the present war, and that the workers in their revolutionary struggle must ignore their country's military situation; it is necessary to state clearly what is merely hinted at here, namely, that not only the capitalists, but also the social-chauvinists and the Kautskyites lie when they allow the term "defence of the fatherland" to be applied in the present, imperialist war and that revolutionary action during the war is impossible unless "one's own" government is threatened with defeat; it must be stated clearly that every defeat of the government in a reactionary war facilitates revolution, which alone is capable of bringing about a lasting and democratic peace. Finally, the masses must be told that unless they themselves create illegal organisations and a press that is free from military censorship, i.e., an illegal press, it will be quite impossible to render serious support to the incipient revolutionary struggle, to develop it, to criticise some of its steps, to correct its errors and systematically to extend and sharpen it.

7. On the question of socialist parliamentary action, it must be borne in mind that the Zimmerwald resolution not only expresses sympathy for the five Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma, who belong to our Party, and who have been sentenced to exile to Siberia, but also expresses its solidarity with their tactics. It is impossible to recognise the revolutionary struggle of the masses while resting content with exclusively legal socialist activity in parliament. This can only arouse legitimate dissatisfaction among the workers, cause them to desert Social-Democracy for anti-parliamentary anarchism or syndicalism. It must be stated clearly and publicly that Social-Democratic members of parliament must use their position not only to make speeches in parliament, but also to render all possible aid outside parliament to the underground organisation and the

revolutionary struggle of the workers, and that the masses themselves, through their illegal organisation, must supervise these activities of their leaders.

8. The question of the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau boils down to a fundamental question of principle, i.e., whether the old parties and the Second International can be united. Every step forward taken by the international labour movement along the road mapped out by Zimmerwald shows more and more clearly the inconsistency of the position adopted by the Zimmerwald majority; for, on the one hand, it identifies the policy of the old parties and of the Second International with *bourgeois* policy in the labour movement, with a policy which does not pursue the interests of the proletariat, but of the bourgeoisie (for example, the statement in the Zimmerwald Manifesto that the "capitalists" lie when they speak of "defence of the fatherland" in the present war; also the still more definite statements contained in the circular of the International Socialist Committee of February 10, 1916[72]); on the other hand, the International Socialist Committee is afraid of a break with the International Socialist Bureau and has promised officially to dissolve when the Bureau reconvenes.[73]

We state that not only was such a promise never voted on, but it was never even discussed in Zimmerwald.

The six months since Zimmerwald have proved that *actual* work in the spirit of Zimmerwald—not empty phrases but work—is bound up throughout the world with the split that is becoming deeper and wider. In Germany, illegal anti-war leaflets are being printed despite the Party's decisions, i.e., schismatically. When Deputy Otto Rühle, Karl Liebknecht's closest friend, said openly that there were actually two parties in existence, one helping the bourgeoisie, and the other fighting against it, many, including the Kautskyites, reviled him, but no one refuted him. In France, Bourderon, a member of the Socialist Party, is a determined opponent of a split, but at the same time he submits a resolution to his Party disapproving of the Party's Central Committee and of the parliamentary group (*désapprouver Comm. Adm. Perm. et Gr. Parl.*), which, if adopted, would certainly have caused an immediate split. In Britain, T. Rus-

sell Williams, a member of the I.L.P., writing in the moderate *Labour Leader*, openly admits that a split is inevitable and finds support in letters written by local functionaries. The example of America is perhaps still more instructive, because even there, in a neutral country, two irreconcilably hostile trends in the Socialist Party have become revealed: on the one hand, the adherents of so-called "preparedness",* i.e., war, militarism, and navalism, and on the other, socialists like Eugene Debs, former presidential candidate from the Socialist Party, who openly preaches civil war for socialism, precisely in connection with the coming war.

Actually, there is already a split throughout the world; two entirely irreconcilable working-class policies in relation to the war have crystallised. We must not close our eyes to this fact; to do so would only result in confusing the masses of the workers, in befogging their minds, in hindering the revolutionary mass struggle with which all Zimmerwaldists officially sympathise, and in strengthening the influence over the masses of those leaders whom the International Socialist Committee, in its circular of February 10, 1916, openly accuses of "misleading" the masses and of hatching a "plot" (*Pakt*) *against* socialism.

It is the social-chauvinists and Kautskyites of all countries who will undertake the task of restoring the bankrupt International Socialist Bureau. The task of the socialists is to explain to the masses the inevitability of a split with those who pursue a bourgeois policy under the flag of socialism.

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* The word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

SPLIT OR DECAY?

That was how *Sotsial-Demokrat* posed the alternative with regard to the German Social-Democratic Party, back in its issue No. 35,* when it elaborated the fundamental ideas of the Manifesto on war issued by our Party's Central Committee.** Notice how *the facts* bear out this conclusion.

The German Social-Democratic Party is clearly disintegrating. *Otto Rühle*, Karl Liebknecht's closest associate quite apart from the I.S.D. group (International Socialists of Germany),[74] which has been *consistently* fighting the hypocritical Kautskyites, has *openly* come out for a split. *Vorwärts* had no serious, honest answer. There are actually *two* workers' parties in Germany.

Even in Britain, a statement was made by T. Russell Williams in the moderate, pacifist *Labour Leader* (the Central Organ of the Independent Labour Party), and he was supported by many local functionaries. Comrade Ornatsky,[75] who has done very good internationalist work in Britain came out in the conciliatory *Nashe Slovo* in Paris for an immediate split there. We are naturally in full agreement with *Ornatsky* in his polemic with T. Rothstein, a correspondent of *Kommunist*,[76] who takes a Kautskyite attitude.

In France, Bourderon is a fervent opponent of any split *but*—has proposed to the Party Congress a resolution calling for outright disapproval both of the Party's Central Committee and the parliamentary group! Adoption of such a resolution would mean an immediate split in the Party.

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* See present edition. Vol. 21, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy".—*Ed.*

** Ibid., "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism".—*Ed.*

In America, the Socialist Party appears to be united. Actually, some of its members, like Russell and others, preach "preparedness", stand for war, and want an army and navy. Others, like Eugene Debs, the Party's presidential candidate, openly preach *civil war* "in the event" of an imperialist war, rather, in connection with one.

There are now actually two parties all over the world. There are in fact already two Internationals. And if the Zimmerwald majority are afraid to recognise this, if they dream of unity with the social-chauvinists, and declare their readiness to have such unity, these "pious hopes" in practice remain nothing but hopes, expressive of inconsistency and timidity of thought. Consciousness lags behind reality.

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Published according
to the manuscript

GERMAN AND NON-GERMAN CHAUVINISM[77]

The German chauvinists, as we know, have succeeded in imposing their influence upon the overwhelming majority of the leaders and officers of the so-called Social-Democratic —now, in fact, National-Liberal—Labour Party. We shall see presently how far this applies also to the non-German chauvinists like Potresov, Levitsky and Co. At the moment we must deal with the German chauvinists, among whom, in fairness, Kautsky must also be included, notwithstanding the fact that P. B. Axelrod, in his German pamphlet for example, very assiduously and very incorrectly defends Kautsky and calls him an "internationalist".

One of the characteristics of German chauvinism is that "socialists"—socialists in quotation marks—talk about the independence of nations, except those which are oppressed by their own nation. It does not make very much difference whether they say so directly, or whether they defend, justify and shield those who say it.

The German chauvinists (who include Parvus, the publisher of a little magazine, called *Die Glocke*, among whose contributors are Lensch, Haenisch, Grünwald and all the rest of the crew of "socialist" lackeys of the German imperialist bourgeoisie) speak at great length and very eagerly, for example, about independence for the peoples oppressed by Britain. It is not only the social-chauvinists of Germany, i.e., socialists in words, and chauvinists in deeds, but the whole bourgeois press of Germany that is trumpeting with all its might about the shameful, brutal and reactionary, etc., fashion in which Britain rules her colonies. The German newspapers write about the liberation movement in India with great gusto, malicious glee, delight and rapture.

It is easy to see why the German bourgeoisie is full of malicious joy: it hopes to improve its military position by fanning the discontent and the anti-British movement in India. These hopes are silly, of course, because it is simply impossible seriously to entertain the idea of influencing the life of a multi-million people, and a very peculiar people at that, from outside, from afar, in a foreign language, particularly when the influence is not systematic, but casual, only for the duration of the war. Rather than the desire to influence India the efforts of the German imperialist bourgeoisie are more of an attempt at self-consolation, more of a desire to fool the German people and to divert their attention from home to foreign parts.

But this general, theoretical question automatically arises: What is at the root of the falsehood of such arguments; how can the hypocrisy of the German imperialists be exposed with unerring certainty? The correct theoretical answer pointing to the root of falsehood always serves as a means of exposing the hypocrites who, for reasons all too obvious, are inclined to cover up their falsehood, to obscure it, to clothe it in flowery phrases, all sorts of phrases, phrases about everything in the world, even about internationalism. Even the Lensches, Südekums and Scheidemanns, all these agents of the German bourgeoisie, who, unfortunately, belong to the so-called "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany, insist that they are internationalists. Men must not be judged by their words, however, but by their deeds. This is a home truth. Will anyone in Russia judge Potresov, Levitsky, Bulkin and Co. by their words? Of course, not.

The falsehood of the German chauvinists has its roots in their shouting their sympathy for the independence of the peoples oppressed by Britain, their enemy in the war, and modestly, sometimes much too modestly, keeping silent about the independence of the peoples oppressed by *their own* nation.

Take the Danes. When Prussia annexed Schleswig she also seized, as all "Great" Powers are wont to do, a part inhabited by Danes. The violation of the rights of this population was so patent that when Austria ceded to Prussia her "rights" to Schleswig under the Peace of Prague, August 23-30, 1866, the treaty stipulated that the population of the

northern part of the province was to be asked in a plebiscite whether they wished to join Denmark and were to be joined to Denmark in the event of a vote to that effect. This condition, however, was not fulfilled by Prussia who, in 1878, had this "unpleasant" clause deleted.

Frederick Engels, who was never indifferent to the chauvinism of Great-Power nations, specifically pointed to this violation of the rights of a small nation by Prussia.[78] But the present-day German social-chauvinists, while recognising the right to self-determination of nations in words, as Kautsky also does, have never carried on any consistently-democratic and resolutely-democratic agitation in favour of liberating an oppressed nation when that oppression was exercised by "their own" nation. That is the whole secret, the kernel of the question of chauvinism and of its exposure.

A once popular pun in Russia was that *Russkoye Znamya*[79] frequently behaved like *Prusskoye Znamya*.* But this does not apply to *Russkoye Znamya* alone; for Potresov, Levitsky and Co. reason in Russia in the very same way as Lensch, Kautsky and Co. reason in Germany. Take a look in the liquidationist *Rabocheye Utro*, for example, and you will find similar "Prussian", or rather, international-chauvinist arguments and methods of reasoning. Chauvinism remains true to itself, whatever its national brand, whatever its pacifist cover-up phrase.

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to the manuscript

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* *Russkoye Znamya*—Russian Banner, *Prusskoye Znamya*—Prussian Banner.—*Ed.*

IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM[80]

A POPULAR OUTLINE

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Petrograd

Published according to the
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the text of the pamphlet

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PREFACE

The pamphlet here presented to the reader was written in the spring of 1916, in Zurich. In the conditions in which I was obliged to work there I naturally suffered somewhat from a shortage of French and English literature and from a serious dearth of Russian literature. However, I made use of the principal English work on imperialism, the book by J. A. Hobson, with all the care that, in my opinion, that work deserves.

This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an exclusively theoretical, specifically economic analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language—in that accursed Aesopian language—to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up the pen to write a "legal" work.

It is painful, in these days of liberty, to re-read the passages of the pamphlet which have been distorted, cramped, compressed in an iron vice on account of the censor. That the period of imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution; that social-chauvinism (socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is the utter betrayal of socialism, complete desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie; that this split in the working-class movement is bound up with the objective conditions of imperialism, etc.—on these matters I had to speak in a "slavish" tongue, and I must refer the reader who is interested in the subject to the articles I wrote abroad in 1914-17, a new edition of which is soon to appear. Special attention should be drawn to a passage on pages 119-20.*

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* See pp. 297-98 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In order to show the reader, in a guise acceptable to the censors, how shamelessly untruthful the capitalists and the social-chauvinists who have deserted to their side (and whom Kautsky opposes so inconsistently) are on the question of annexations; in order to show how shamelessly they screen the annexations of their capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example—Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan, and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians, for Korea.

I trust that this pamphlet will help the reader to understand the fundamental economic question, that of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied it will be impossible to understand and appraise modern war and modern politics.

Author

Petrograd, April 26, 1917

PREFACE TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN EDITIONS[81]

I

As was indicated in the preface to the Russian edition, this pamphlet was written in 1916, with an eye to the tsarist censorship. I am unable to revise the whole text at the present time, nor, perhaps, would this be advisable, since the main purpose of the book was, and remains, to present, on the basis of the summarised returns of irrefutable bourgeois statistics, and the admissions of bourgeois scholars of all countries, a *composite picture* of the world capitalist system in its international relationships at the beginning of the twentieth century—on the eve of the first world imperialist war.

To a certain extent it will even be useful for many Communists in advanced capitalist countries to convince themselves by the example of this pamphlet, *legal from the standpoint of the tsarist censor*, of the possibility, and necessity, of making use of even the slight remnants of legality which still remain at the disposal of the Communists, say, in contemporary America or France, after the recent almost wholesale arrests of Communists, in order to explain the utter falsity of social-pacifist views and hopes for "world democracy". The most essential of what should be added to this censored pamphlet I shall try to present in this preface.

II

It is proved in the pamphlet that the war of 1914-18 was imperialist (that is, an annexationist, predatory, war of plunder) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the

division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies and spheres of influence of finance capital, etc.

Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the *objective* position of the ruling *classes* in *all* the belligerent countries. In order to depict this objective position one must not take examples or isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of the phenomena of social life it is always possible to select any number of examples or separate data to prove any proposition), but *all* the data on the *basis* of economic life in *all* the belligerent countries and the *whole* world.

It is precisely irrefutable summarised data of this kind that I quoted in describing the *partition of the world* in 1876 and 1914 (in Chapter VI) and the division of the world's *railways* in 1890 and 1913 (in Chapter VII). Railways are a summation of the basic capitalist industries, coal, iron and steel; a summation and the most striking index of the development of world trade and bourgeois-democratic civilisation. How the railways are linked up with large-scale industry, with monopolies, syndicates, cartels, trusts, banks and the financial oligarchy is shown in the preceding chapters of the book. The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development—sums up, as it were, modern monopolist capitalism on a world-wide scale. And this summary proves that imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under *such* an economic system, *as long as* private property in the means of production exists.

The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilising enterprise; that is what it is in the opinion of the bourgeois professors who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colours, and in the opinion of petty-bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in the means of production in general, have converted this railway construction into an instrument for oppressing *a thousand million* people (in the colonies and semi-colonies), that is, more than half the population of the globe that inhabits the dependent countries, as well as the wage-slaves of capital in the "civilised" countries.

Private property based on the labour of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants—are things of the distant past. Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries. And this "booty" is shared between two or three powerful world plunderers armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan), who are drawing the whole world into *their* war over the division of *their* booty.

III

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk dictated by monarchist Germany, and the subsequent much more brutal and despicable Treaty of Versailles dictated by the "democratic" republics of America and France and also by "free" Britain, have rendered a most useful service to humanity by exposing both imperialism's hired coolies of the pen and petty-bourgeois reactionaries who, although they call themselves pacifists and socialists, sang praises to "Wilsonism", and insisted that peace and reforms were possible under imperialism.

The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the war —a war to decide whether the British or German group of financial plunderers is to receive the most booty—and those two "peace treaties", are with unprecedented rapidity opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped by the bourgeoisie. Thus, out of the universal ruin caused by the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which, however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot end otherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its victory.

The Basle Manifesto of the Second International, which in 1912 gave an appraisal of the very war that broke out in 1914 and not of war in general (there are different kinds of wars, including revolutionary wars)—this Manifesto is now a monument exposing to the full the shameful bankruptcy and treachery of the heroes of the Second International.

That is why I reproduce this Manifesto as a supplement to the present edition, and again and again I urge the reader

to note that the heroes of the Second International are as assiduously avoiding the passages of this Manifesto which speak precisely, clearly and definitely of the connection between that impending war and the proletarian revolution, as a thief avoids the scene of his crime.

IV

Special attention has been devoted in this pamphlet to a criticism of Kautskyism, the international ideological trend represented in all countries of the world by the "most prominent theoreticians", the leaders of the Second International (Otto Bauer and Co. in Austria, Ramsay MacDonald and others in Britain, Albert Thomas in France, etc., etc.) and a multitude of socialists, reformists, pacifists, bourgeois-democrats and parsons.

This ideological trend is, on the one hand, a product of the disintegration and decay of the Second International, and, on the other hand, the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, whose entire way of life holds them captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices.

The views held by Kautsky and his like are a complete renunciation of those same revolutionary principles of Marxism that writer has championed for decades, especially, by the way, in his struggle against socialist opportunism (of Bernstein, Millerand, Hyndman, Gompers, etc.). It is not a mere accident, therefore, that Kautsky's followers all over the world have now united in practical politics with the extreme opportunists (through the Second, or Yellow International) and with the bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which socialists take part).

The growing world proletarian revolutionary movement in general, and the communist movement in particular, cannot dispense with an analysis and exposure of the theoretical errors of Kautskyism. The more so since pacifism and "democracy" in general, which lay no claim to Marxism whatever, but which, like Kautsky and Co., are obscuring the profundity of the contradictions of imperialism and the inevitable revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise, are

FROM MARX TO MAO
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

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ (ВЛ. ИЛЬИНЪ).

ИМПЕРІАЛИЗМЪ,

КАКЪ НОВѢЙШІЙ ЭТАПЪ

КАПИТАЛИЗМА.

(Популярный очеркъ).

СКЛАДЪ ИЗДАНІЯ:
Книжный складъ и магазинъ „Жизнь и Знаніе"
Петроградъ, Поварской пер., 2, кв. 9 и 10. Тел. 227—42.
1917 г.

Cover of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. 1917
Reduced

Cover of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. 1917
Reduced

still very widespread all over the world. To combat these tendencies is the bounden duty of the party of the proletariat, which must win away from the bourgeoisie the small proprietors who are duped by them, and the millions of working people who enjoy more or less petty-bourgeois conditions of life.

V

A few words must be said about Chapter VIII, "Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism". As already pointed out in the text, Hilferding, ex-"Marxist", and now a comrade-in-arms of Kautsky and one of the chief exponents of bourgeois, reformist policy in the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany[82] has taken a step backward on this question compared with the *frankly* pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson. The international split of the entire working-class movement is now quite evident (the Second and the Third Internationals). The fact that armed struggle and civil war is now raging between the two trends is also evident—the support given to Kolchak and Denikin in Russia by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Bolsheviks; the fight the Scheidemanns and Noskes have conducted in conjunction with the bourgeoisie against the Spartacists[83] in Germany; the same thing in Finland, Poland, Hungary, etc. What is the economic basis of this world-historical phenomenon?

It is precisely the parasitism and decay of capitalism, characteristic of its highest historical stage of development, i.e., imperialism. As this pamphlet shows, capitalism has now singled out a *handful* (less than one-tenth of the inhabitants of the globe; less than one-fifth at a most "generous" and liberal calculation) of exceptionally rich and powerful states which plunder the whole world simply by "clipping coupons". Capital exports yield an income of eight to ten thousand million francs per annum, at pre-war prices and according to pre-war bourgeois statistics. Now, of course, they yield much more.

Obviously, out of such enormous *superprofits* (since they are obtained over and above the profits which capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their "own" country) it is

possible to bribe the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour aristocracy. And that is just what the capitalists of the "advanced" countries are doing: they are bribing them in a thousand different ways, direct and indirect, overt and covert.

This stratum of workers-turned-bourgeois, or the labour aristocracy, who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and in our days, the principal *social* (not military) *prop of the bourgeoisie*. For they are the real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class, real vehicles of reformism and chauvinism. In the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie they inevitably, and in no small numbers, take the side of the bourgeoisie, the "Versaillais" against the "Communards".

Unless the economic roots of this phenomenon are understood and its political and social significance is appreciated, not a step can be taken toward the solution of the practical problems of the communist movement and of the impending social revolution.

Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat. This has been confirmed since 1917 on a world-wide scale.

N. Lenin

July 6, 1920

During the last fifteen to twenty years, especially since the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the economic and also the political literature of the two hemispheres has more and more often adopted the term "imperialism" in order to describe the present era. In 1902, a book by the English economist J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, was published in London and New York. This author, whose point of view is that of bourgeois social-reformism and pacifism which, in essence, is identical with the present point of view of the ex-Marxist, Karl Kautsky, gives a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of imperialism. In 1910, there appeared in Vienna the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital* (Russian edition, Moscow, 1912). In spite of the mistake the author makes on the theory of money, and in spite of a certain inclination on his part to reconcile Marxism with opportunism, this work gives a very valuable theoretical analysis of "the latest phase of capitalist development", as the subtitle runs. Indeed, what has been said of imperialism during the last few years, especially in an enormous number of magazine and newspaper articles, and also in the resolutions, for example, of the Chemnitz and Basle congresses which took place in the autumn of 1912, has scarcely gone beyond the ideas expounded, or more exactly, summed up by the two writers mentioned above....

Later on, I shall try to show briefly, and as simply as possible, the connection and relationships between the *principal* economic features of imperialism. I shall not be able to deal with the non-economic aspects of the question,

however much they deserve to be dealt with. References to literature and other notes which, perhaps, would not interest all readers, are to be found at the end of this pamphlet.[84]

I. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES

The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern production censuses give most complete and most exact data on this process.

In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed this group of enterprises employed 22, 30 and 37, respectively. Concentration of production, however, is much more intense than the concentration of workers, since labour in the large enterprises is much more productive. This is shown by the figures on steam-engines and electric motors. If we take what in Germany is called industry in the broad sense of the term, that is, including commerce, transport, etc we get the following picture. Large-scale enterprises, 30,588 out of a total of 3,265,623, that is to say, 0.9 per cent. These enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a total of 14,400,000, i.e., 39.4 per cent, they use 6,600,000 steam horse power out of a total of 8,800,000 i.e., 75.3 per cent and 1,200,000 kilowatts of electricity out of a total of 1,500,000, i.e., 77.2 per cent.

Less than one-hundredth of the total number of enterprises utilise *more than three-fourths* of the total amount of steam and electric power! Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers), constituting 91 per cent of the total, utilise only 7 per cent of the total amount of steam and electric power! Tens of thousands of huge enterprises are everything, millions of small ones are nothing.

In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments employing one thousand and more workers, nearly *one-tenth*

Имперіализмъ, какъ высшая стадія капитализма.

(Популярный очеркъ).

За послѣднія 15-20 лѣтъ, особенно послѣ испано-американской (1898) и англо-бурской (1899-1902) войны, экономическая, а также политическая, литература стараго и новаго свѣта все чаще и чаще останавливается на понятіи „имперіализмъ" для характеристики переживаемой нами эпохи. Въ 1902 году в Лондонѣ и Нью-Іоркѣ вышло въ свѣтъ сочиненіе англійскаго экономиста Дж. А. Гобсона: „Имперіализмъ". Авторъ, стоящій на точкѣ зрѣнія буржуазнаго соціалъ-реформизма и пацифизма — однородной, в сущности, съ теперешней позиціей бывшаго маркиста К. Каутскаго, — далъ очень хорошее и обстоятельное описаніе основныхъ экономическихъ и политическихъ особенностей имперіализма. Въ 1910 году в Вѣнѣ вышло въ свѣтъ сочиненіе австрійскаго марксиста Рудольфа Гильфердинга: „Финансовый капиталъ" (рус.

First page of manuscript,
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.
January-June 1916

Reduced

(1,380,000) of the total number of workers employed in industry, and they consumed *almost one-third* (32 per cent) of the total amount of steam and electric power.* As we shall see, money capital and the banks make this superiority of a handful of the largest enterprises still more overwhelming, in the most literal sense of the word, i.e., millions of small, medium and even some big "proprietors" are in fact in complete subjection to some hundreds of millionaire financiers.

In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United States of America, the growth of the concentration of production is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the narrow sense of the word and classify enterprises according to the value of their annual output. In 1904 large-scale enterprises with an output valued at one million dollars and over numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, i.e., 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of 5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and the value of their output amounted to $5,600,000,000 (out of $14,800,000,000, i.e., 38 per cent). Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per cent) employing 2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e., 30.5 per cent) with an output valued at $9,000,000,000 (out of $20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8 per cent.)**

Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the country was carried on by *one-hundredth part* of these enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 258 branches of industry. From this it can be seen that, at a certain stage of its development concentration itself, as it were, leads straight to monopoly, for a score or so of giant enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement, and on the other hand, the hindrance to competition, the tendency towards monopoly, arises from the huge size of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most important—if not the most important—phenomena of modern capitalist economy, and we must deal with it in greater detail. But first we must clear up one possible misunderstanding.

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* Figures taken from *Annalen des deutschen Reichs*, 1911, Zahn.
** *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1912*, p. 202.

American statistics speak of 3,000 giant enterprises in 250 branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen enterprises of the largest scale for each branch of industry.

But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry are there large-scale enterprises; and moreover, a very important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is so-called *combination* of production, that is to say, the grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry, which either represent the consecutive stages in the processing of raw materials (for example, the smelting of iron ore into pig-iron, the conversion of pig-iron into steel, and then, perhaps, the manufacture of steel goods)—or are auxiliary to one another (for example, the utilisation of scrap, or of by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.).

"Combination," writes Hilferding, "levels out the fluctuations of trade and therefore assures to the combined enterprises a more stable rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of eliminating trade. Thirdly, it has the effect of rendering possible technical improvements, and, consequently, the acquisition of superprofits over and above those obtained by the 'pure' [i.e., non-combined] enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens the position of the combined enterprises relative to the 'pure' enterprises, strengthens them in the competitive struggle in periods of serious depression, when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in prices of manufactured goods."*

The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a book especially on "mixed", that is, combined enterprises in the German iron industry, says: "Pure enterprises perish, they are crushed between the high price of raw material and the low price of the finished product." Thus we get the following picture: "There remain, on the one hand the big coal companies, producing millions of tons yearly strongly organised in their coal syndicate, and on the other the big steel plants, closely allied to the coal mines, having their own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a tremendous output of ore and coal and producing finished steel goods, employing

* *Finance Capital*, Russ, ed., pp. 286-87.

10,000 workers quartered in company houses, and sometimes owning their own railways and ports, are the typical representatives of the German iron and steel industry. And concentration goes on further and further. Individual enterprises are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises in one, or in several different industries, join together in giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a dozen big Berlin banks. In relation to the German mining industry, the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is definitely proved; true, this applies to a country where industry is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining industry is ripe for expropriation."*

Such is the conclusion which a bourgeois economist who, by way of exception is conscientious, had to arrive at. It must be noted that he seems to place Germany in a special category because her industries are protected by high tariffs. But this is a circumstance which only accelerates concentration and the formation of monopolist manufacturers' associations, cartels, syndicates, etc. It is extremely important to note that in free-trade Britain, concentration *also* leads to monopoly, although somewhat later and perhaps in another form. Professor Hermann Levy, in his special work of research entitled *Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts*, based on data on British economic development, writes as follows:

"In Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its high technical level which harbour a monopolist tendency. This, for one thing, is due to the great investment of capital per enterprise, which gives rise to increasing demands for new capital for the new enterprises and thereby renders their launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to be the more important point), every new enterprise that wants to keep pace with the gigantic enterprises that have been formed by concentration would here produce such an enormous quantity of surplus goods that it could dispose of them only by being able to sell them profitably as a result of an enormous increase in demand; otherwise, this surplus

* Hans Gideon Heymann, *Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe*, Stuttgart, 1904 (S. 256, 278).

would force prices down to a level that would be unprofitable both for the new enterprise and for the monopoly combines." Britain differs from other countries where protective tariffs facilitate the formation of cartels in that monopolist manufacturers' associations, cartels and trusts arise in the majority of cases only when the number of the chief competing enterprises has been reduced to "a couple of dozen or so". "Here the influence of concentration on the formation of large industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out with crystal clarity."*

Half a century ago, when Marx was writing *Capital*, free competition appeared to the overwhelming majority of economists to be a "natural law". Official science tried by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism had proved that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. Economists are writing mountains of books in which they describe the diverse manifestations of monopoly, and continue to declare in chorus that "Marxism is refuted". But facts are stubborn things, as the English proverb says, and they have to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. The facts show that differences between capitalist countries, e.g., in the matter of protection or free trade, only give rise to insignificant variations in the form of monopolies or in the moment of their appearance; and that the rise of monopolies, as the result of the concentration of production, is a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism.

For Europe, the time when the new capitalism *definitely* superseded the old can be established with fair precision it was the beginning of the twentieth century. In one of the latest compilations on the history of the "formation of monopolies", we read:

"Isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period preceding 1860; in these could be discerned the embryo of the forms that are so common today; but

* Hermann Levy, *Monopole, Kartelle und Trusts*, Jena, 1909, S. 286, 290, 298.

all this undoubtedly represents the prehistory of the cartels. The real beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the sixties. The first important period of development of monopoly commenced with the international industrial depression of the seventies and lasted until the beginning of the nineties." "If we examine the question on a European scale, we will find that the development of free competition reached its apex in the sixties and seventies. It was then that Britain completed the construction of her old-style capitalist organisation. In Germany, this organisation had entered into a fierce struggle with handicraft and domestic industry, and had begun to create for itself its own forms of existence."

"The great revolution, commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather, the depression which followed it and which, with hardly discernible interruptions in the early eighties, and the unusually violent, but short-lived boom round about 1889, marks twenty-two years of European economic history." "During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was widely resorted to in order to take advantage of favourable business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices up still more rapidly and still higher than would have been the case if there had been no cartels, and nearly all these cartels perished ingloriously in the smash. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit reigned in industry; the depression was no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted; it was regarded as nothing more than a pause before another boom.

"The cartel movement entered its second epoch: instead of being a transitory phenomenon, the cartels have become one of the foundations of economic life. They are winning one field of industry after another, primarily, the raw materials industry. At the beginning of the nineties the cartel system had already acquired—in the organisation of the coke syndicate on the model of which the coal syndicate was later formed—a cartel technique which has hardly been improved on. For the first time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03 occurred entirely—in the mining and iron industries at least—under the aegis of the cartels. And while at that time it appeared to be something novel, now the general public takes it for

granted that large spheres of economic life have been, as a general rule, removed from the realm of free competition."*

Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: (1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. (2) After the crisis of 1873, a lengthy period of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon. (3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.

Cartels come to an agreement on the terms of sale, dates of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc.

The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about 250 in 1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000 firms participating.** But it is generally recognised that these figures are underestimations. From the statistics of German industry for 1907 we quoted above, it is evident that even these 12,000 very big enterprises probably consume more than half the steam and electric power used in the country. In the United States of America, the number of trusts in 1900 was estimated at 185 and in 1907, 250. American statistics divide all industrial enterprises into those belonging to individuals, to private firms or to corporations. The latter in 1904 comprised 23.6 per cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent, i.e., more than one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the country. These employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909, 75.6 per cent, i.e., more than three-

* Th. Vogelstein, "Die finanzielle Organisation der kapitalistischen Industrie und die Monopolbildungen" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, VI. Abt., Tübingen, 1914. Cf., also by the same author: *Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika*, Bd. I, Lpz., 1910.

** Dr. Riesser, *Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhange mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland*, 4. Aufl., 1912, S. 149; Robert Liefmann, *Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation*, 2, Aufl., 1910, S. 25.

fourths of the total wage-earners. Their output at these two dates was valued at $10,900,000,000, and $16,300,000,000, i.e., 73.7 per cent and 79.0 per cent of the total, respectively.

At times cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands seven- or eight-tenths of the total output of a given branch of industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the total coal output of the area, and in 1910 it already concentrated 95.4 per cent.* The monopoly so created assures enormous profits, and leads to the formation of technical production units of formidable magnitude. The famous Standard Oil Company in the United States was founded in 1900: "It has an authorised capital of $150,000,000. It issued $100,000,000 common and $106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following dividends were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all, $367,000,000. From 1882 to 1907, out of total net profits amounting to $889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in dividends, and the rest went to reserve capital."** "In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel Corporation employed no less than 210,180 people. The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft, in 1908 had a staff of 46,048 workers and office employees."*** In 1902, the United States Steel Corporation already produced 9,000,000 tons of steel.**** Its output constituted in 1901, 66.3 per cent, and in 1908, 56.1 per cent of the total output of steel in the United States.***** The output of ore was 43.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent, respectively.

The report of the American Government Commission on Trusts states: "Their superiority over competitors is due

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* Dr. Fritz Kestner, *Der Organisationszwang. Eine Untersuchung über die Kämpfe zwischen Kartellen und Aussenseitern*, Berlin, 1912, S. 11.

** R. Liefmann, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen*, 1. Aufl., Jena. 1909. S. 212.

*** Ibid.. S. 218.

**** Dr. S. Tschierschky, *Kartell und Trust*, Göttingen, 1903, S. 13.

***** Th. Vogelstein, *Organisationsformen*, S. 275.

to the magnitude of their enterprises and their excellent technical equipment. Since its inception, the Tobacco Trust has devoted all its efforts to the universal substitution of mechanical for manual labour. With this end in view it has bought up all patents that have anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and has spent enormous sums for this purpose. Many of these patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same object in view, the trust has built its own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the average 300 workers, here experiments are carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots, snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected."* "Other trusts also employ what are called development engineers whose business it is to devise new methods of production and to test technical improvements. The United States Steel Corporation grants big bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions that raise technical efficiency or reduce cost of production."**

In German large-scale industry, e.g., in the chemical industry, which has developed so enormously during these last few decades, the promotion of technical improvement is organised in the same way. By 1908 the process of concentration of production had already given rise to two main "groups" which, in their way, were also in the nature of monopolies. At first these groups constituted "dual alliances" of two pairs of big factories, each having a capital of from twenty to twenty-one million marks—on the one hand, the former Meister Factory in Höchst and the Casella Factory in Frankfurt am Main; and on the other hand, the aniline and soda factory at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer Factory at Elberfeld. Then, in 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the other group, each concluded an

* *Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry*, Washington, 1909, p. 266, cited according to Dr. Paul Tafel, *Die nordamerikanischen Trusts und ihre Wirkungen auf den Fortschritt der Technik*, Stuttgart, 1913, S. 48.

** Dr. P. Tafel, ibid., S. 49.

agreement with yet another big factory. The result was the formation of two "triple alliances", each with a capital of from forty to fifty million marks. And these "alliances" have already begun to "approach" each other, to reach "an understanding" about prices, etc."*

Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialisation of production. In particular, the process of technical invention and improvement becomes socialised.

This is something quite different from the old free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with one another, and producing for an unknown market. Concentration has reached the point at which it is possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw materials (for example, the iron ore deposits) of a country and even, as we shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such estimates made, but these sources are captured by gigantic monopolist associations. An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets is also made, and the associations "divide" them up amongst themselves by agreement. Skilled labour is monopolised, the best engineers are engaged; the means of transport are captured—railways in America, shipping companies in Europe and America. Capitalism in its imperialist stage leads directly to the most comprehensive socialisation of production; it, so to speak, drags the capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social order, a transitional one from complete free competition to complete socialisation.

Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognised free competition remains, and the yoke of a few monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable.

The German economist, Kestner, has written a book especially devoted to "the struggle between the cartels and outsiders", i.e., the capitalists outside the cartels. He

* Riesser, op. cit., third edition, p. 547 et seq. The newspapers (June 1916) report the formation of a new gigantic trust which combines the chemical industry of Germany.

entitled his work *Compulsory Organisation*, although, in order to present capitalism in its true light, he should of course, have written about compulsory submission to monopolist associations. It is instructive to glance at least at the list of the methods the monopolist associations resort to in the present-day, the latest, the civilised struggle for "organisation": (1) stopping supplies of raw materials (..."one of the most important methods of compelling adherence to the cartel"); (2) stopping the supply of labour by means of "alliances" (i.e., of agreements between the capitalists and the trade unions by which the latter permit their members to work only in cartelised enterprises); (3) stopping deliveries; (4) closing trade outlets; (5) agreements with the buyers, by which the latter undertake to trade only with the cartels; (6) systematic price cutting (to ruin "outside" firms, i.e., those which refuse to submit to the monopolists. Millions are spent in order to sell goods for a certain time below their cost price; there were instances when the price of petrol was thus reduced from 40 to 22 marks, i.e., almost by half!); (7) stopping credits; (8) boycott.

Here we no longer have competition between small and large, between technically developed and backward enterprises. We see here the monopolists throttling those who do not submit to them, to their yoke, to their dictation. This is how this process is reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:

"Even in the purely economic sphere," writes Kestner, "a certain change is taking place from commercial activity in the old sense of the word towards organisational-speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to the merchant whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to estimate the needs of the buyer, and who is able to discover and, so to speak, 'awaken' a latent demand; it goes to the speculative genius [?!] who knows how to estimate, or even only to sense in advance, the organisational development and the possibilities of certain connections between individual enterprises and the banks...."

Translated into ordinary human language this means that the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage when, although commodity production still "reigns" and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality

been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the "geniuses" of financial manipulation. At the basis of these manipulations and swindles lies socialised production; but the immense progress of mankind, which achieved this socialisation, goes to benefit ... the speculators. We shall see later how "on these grounds" reactionary, petty-bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism dream of going *back* to "free", "peaceful", and "honest" competition.

"The prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation of cartels," says Kestner, "has hitherto been observed only in respect of the most important means of production, particularly coal, iron and potassium, but never in respect of manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting from this raising of prices has been limited only to the industries which produce means of production. To this observation we must add that the industries which process raw materials (and not semi-manufactures) not only secure advantages from the cartel formation in the shape of high profits, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but have also secured a *dominating position* over the latter, which did not exist under free competition."*

The words which I have italicised reveal the essence of the case which the bourgeois economists admit so reluctantly and so rarely, and which the present-day defenders of opportunism, led by Kautsky, so zealously try to evade and brush aside. Domination, and the violence that is associated with it, such are the relationships that are typical of the "latest phase of capitalist development"; this is what inevitably had to result, and has resulted, from the formation of all-powerful economic monopolies.

I shall give one more example of the methods employed by the cartels. Where it is possible to capture all or the chief sources of raw materials, the rise of cartels and formation of monopolies is particularly easy. It would be wrong, however, to assume that monopolies do not arise in other industries in which it is impossible to corner the sources of raw materials. The cement industry, for instance, can find its raw materials everywhere. Yet in Germany this industry too is strongly cartelised. The cement manufac-

* Kestner, op. cit., S. 254.

turers have formed regional syndicates: South German Rhine-Westphalian, etc. The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230 to 280 marks a car-load, when the cost price is 180 marks! The enterprises pay a dividend of from 12 to 16 per cent—and it must not be forgotten that the "geniuses" of modern speculation know how to pocket big profits besides what they draw in dividends. In order to prevent competition in such a profitable industry, the monopolists even resort to various stratagems: they spread false rumours about the bad situation in their industry; anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the following: "Capitalists, don't invest your capital in the cement industry!"; lastly, they buy up "outsiders" (those outside the syndicates) and pay them compensation of 60,000, 80,000 and even 150,000 marks.* Monopoly hews a path for itself everywhere without scruple as to the means, from paying a "modest" sum to buy off competitors, to the American device of employing dynamite against them.

The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to place capitalism in a favourable light. On the contrary, the monopoly created in *certain* branches of industry increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production *as a whole*. The disparity between the development of agriculture and that of industry, which is characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased. The privileged position of the most highly cartelised, so-called *heavy* industry, especially coal and iron, causes "a still greater lack of co-ordination" in other branches of industry—as Jeidels, the author of one of the best works on "the relationship of the German big banks to industry", admits.**

"The more developed an economic system is," writes Liefmann, an unblushing apologist of capitalism, "the more it resorts to risky enterprises, or enterprises in other countries, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally, to those which are only of local importance." *** The

* L. Eschwege, "Zement" in *Die Bank*, 1909, 1, S. 115 et seq.

** Jeidels, *Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Eisenindustrie*, Leipzig, 1905, S. 271.

*** Liefmann, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften*, S. 434.

increased risk is connected in the long run with a prodigious increase of capital, which, as it were, overflows the brim, flows abroad, etc. At the same time the extremely rapid rate of technical progress gives rise to increasing elements of disparity between the various spheres of national economy, to anarchy and crises. Liefmann is obliged to admit that: "In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the organisation of the economic system"... electricity and aviation.... "As a general rule, in such periods of radical economic change, speculation develops on a large scale."...*

Crises of every kind—economic crises most frequently, but not only these—in their turn increase very considerably the tendency towards concentration and towards monopoly. In this connection, the following reflections of Jeidels on the significance of the crisis of 1900, which, as we have already seen, marked the turning-point in the history of modern monopoly, are exceedingly instructive:

"Side by side with the gigantic plants in the basic industries, the crisis of 1900 still found many plants organised on lines that today would be considered obsolete, the 'pure' (non-combined) plants, which were brought into being at the height of the industrial boom. The fall in prices and the falling off in demand put these 'pure' enterprises in a precarious position, which did not affect the gigantic combined enterprises at all or only affected them for a very short time. As a consequence of this the crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater concentration of industry than the crisis of 1873: the latter crisis also produced a sort of selection of the best-equipped enterprises, but owing to the level of technical development at that time, this selection could not place the firms which successfully emerged from the crisis in a position of monopoly. Such a durable monopoly exists to a high degree in the gigantic enterprises in the modern iron and steel and electrical industries owing to their very complicated technique, far-reaching organisation and magnitude of capital, and, to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry, certain branches of the metallurgical industry, transport, etc."**

* Ibid., S. 465-66.
** Jeidels, op. cit., S. 108.

Monopoly! This is the last word in the "latest phase of capitalist development". But we shall only have a very insufficient, incomplete, and poor notion of the real power and the significance of modern monopolies if we do not take into consideration the part played by the banks.

II. BANKS AND THEIR NEW ROLE

The principal and primary function of banks is to serve as middlemen in the making of payments. In so doing they transform inactive money capital into active, that is, into capital yielding a profit; they collect all kinds of money revenues and place them at the disposal of the capitalist class.

As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks grow from modest middlemen into powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the capitalists and small businessmen and also the larger part of the means of production and sources of raw materials in any one country and in a number of countries. This transformation of numerous modest middlemen into a handful of monopolists is one of the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalism into capitalist imperialism; for this reason we must first of all examine the concentration of banking.

In 1907-08, the combined deposits of the German joint-stock banks, each having a capital of more than a million marks, amounted to 7,000 million marks; in 1912-13, these deposits already amounted to 9,800 million marks, an increase of 40 per cent in five years; and of the 2,800 million increase, 2,750 million was divided among 57 banks, each having a capital of more than 10 million marks. The distribution of the deposits between big and small banks was as follows:*

* Alfred Lansburgh, "Fünf Jahre deutsches Bankwesen" in *Die Bank*, 1913, No. 8, S. 728.

Percentage of Total Deposits

	In 9 big Berlin banks	In the other 48 banks with a capital of more than 10 million marks	In 115 banks with a capital of 1-10 million marks	In small banks (with a capital of less than million marks)
1907-08	47	32.5	16.5	4
1912-13	49	36	12	3

The small banks are being squeezed out by the big banks, of which only nine concentrate in their hands almost half the total deposits. But we have left out of account many important details, for instance, the transformation of numerous small banks into actual branches of the big banks, etc. Of this I shall speak later on.

At the end of 1913, Schulze-Gaevernitz estimated the deposits in the nine big Berlin banks at 5,100 million marks, out of a total of about 10,000 million marks. Taking into account not only the deposits, but the total bank capital, this author wrote: "At the end of 1909, the nine big Berlin banks, *together with their affiliated banks*, controlled 11,300 million marks, that is, about 83 per cent of the total German bank capital. The Deutsche Bank, which *together with its affiliated banks* controls nearly 3,000 million marks, represents, parallel to the Prussian State Railway Administration, the biggest and also the most decentralised accumulation of capital in the Old World."*

I have emphasised the reference to the "affiliated" banks because it is one of the most important distinguishing features of modern capitalist concentration. The big enterprises, and the banks in particular, not only completely absorb the small ones, but also "annex" them, subordinate them, bring them into their "own" group or "concern" (to use the technical term) by acquiring "holdings" in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by a system of credits etc., etc. Professor Liefmann has written a voluminous "work" of about 500 pages describing modern "holding

* Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Die deutsche Kreditbank" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Tübingen, 1915, S. 12, 137.

and finance companies"* unfortunately adding very dubious "theoretical" reflections to what is frequently undigested raw material. To what results this "holding" system leads in respect of concentration is best illustrated in the book written on the big German banks by Riesser, himself a banker. But before examining his data, let us quote a concrete example of the "holding" system.

The Deutsche Bank "group" is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, of the big banking groups. In order to trace the main threads which connect all the banks in this group, a distinction must be made between holdings of the first and second and third degree, or what amounts to the same thing, between dependence (of the lesser banks on the Deutsche Bank) in the first, second and third degree. We then obtain the following picture**:

The Deutsche Bank has holdings	Direct or 1st degree dependence	2nd degree dependence	3rd degree dependence
Permanently . .	in 17 other banks	9 of the 17 have holdings in 34 other banks	4 of the 9 have holdings in 7 other banks
For an indefinite period . .	in 5 other banks	—	—
Occasionally . .	in 8 other banks	5 of the 8 have holdings in 14 other banks	2 of the 5 have holdings in 2 other banks
Totals . . .	in 30 other banks	14 of the 30 have holdings in 48 other banks	6 of the 14 have holdings in 9 other banks

Included in the eight banks "occasionally" dependent on the Deutsche Bank in the "first degree", are three foreign banks: one Austrian (the Wiener Bankverein) and two Russian (the Siberian Commercial Bank and the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade). Altogether, the Deutsche Bank group

* R. Liefmann, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen*, 1 Aufl., Jena, 1909, S. 212.

** Alfred Lansburgh, "Das Beteiligungssystem im deutschen Bankwesen" in *Die Bank*, 1910, 1, S. 500.

comprises, directly and indirectly, partially and totally, 87 banks; and the total capital—its own and that of others which it controls—is estimated at between two and three thousand million marks.

It is obvious that a bank which stands at the head of such a group, and which enters into agreement with half a dozen other banks only slightly smaller than itself for the purpose of conducting exceptionally big and profitable financial operations like floating state loans, has already outgrown the part of "middleman" and has become an association of a handful of monopolists.

The rapidity with which the concentration of banking proceeded in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century is shown by the following data which we quote in an abbreviated form from Riesser:

Six Big Berlin Banks

Year	Branches in Germany	Deposit banks and exchange offices	Constant holdings in German joint-stock banks	Total establishments
1895	16	14	1	42
1900	21	40	8	80
1911	104	276	63	450

We see the rapid expansion of a close network of channels which cover the whole country, centralising all capital and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy. The "decentralisation" that Schulze-Gaevernitz, as an exponent of present-day bourgeois political economy, speaks of in the passage previously quoted, really means the subordination to a single centre of an increasing number of formerly relatively "independent", or rather, strictly local economic units. In reality it is *centralisation*, the enhancement of the role, importance and power of monopolist giants.

In the older capitalist countries this "banking network" is still more close. In Great Britain and Ireland, in 1910, there were in all 7,151 branches of banks. Four big banks had more than 400 branches each (from 447 to 689); four had more than 200 branches each, and eleven more than 100 each.

In France, *three* very big banks, Crédit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National and the Société Générale, extended their operations and their network of branches in the following manner.*

	Number of branches and offices			Capital (000,000 francs)	
	In the provinces	In Paris	Total	Own capital	Deposits used as capital
1870	47	17	64	200	427
1890	192	66	258	265	1,245
1909	1,033	196	1,229	887	4,363

In order to show the "connections" of a big modern bank, Riesser gives the following figures of the number of letters dispatched and received by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, one of the biggest banks in Germany and in the world (its capital in 1914 amounted to 300 million marks):

	Letters received	Letters dispatched
1852	6,135	6,292
1870	85,800	87,513
1900	533,102	626,043

The number of accounts of the big Paris bank, the Crédit Lyonnais, increased from 28,535 in 1875 to 633,539 in 1912.**

These simple figures show perhaps better than lengthy disquisitions how the concentration of capital and the growth of bank turnover are radically changing the significance of the banks. Scattered capitalists are transformed into a single collective capitalist. When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, a bank, as it were, transacts a purely technical and exclusively auxiliary operation. When, however, this operation grows to enormous dimensions we find that a handful of monopolists subordinate to their will all the operations, both commercial and industrial, of the whole of capitalist society; for they are enabled—by means of their banking connections, their current accounts and other financial operations—first, to

* Eugen Kaufmann, *Das französische Bankwesen*, Tübingen, 1911, S. 356 und 362.

** Jean Lescure, *L'épargne en France*, Paris, 1914, p. 52.

ascertain exactly the financial position of the various capitalists, then to *control* them, to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering credits, and finally to *entirely determine* their fate, determine their income, deprive them of capital, or permit them to increase their capital rapidly and to enormous dimensions, etc.

We have just mentioned the 300 million marks capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft of Berlin. This increase of the capital of the bank was one of the incidents in the struggle for hegemony between two of the biggest Berlin banks—the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto. In 1870, the first was still a novice and had a capital of only 15 million marks, while the second had a capital of 30 million marks. In 1908, the first had a capital of 200 million, while the second had 170 million. In 1914, the first increased its capital to 250 million and the second, by merging with another first-class big bank, the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, increased its capital to 300 million. And, of course, this struggle for hegemony went hand in hand with the more and more frequent conclusion of "agreements" of an increasingly durable character between the two banks. The following are the conclusions that this development forces upon banking specialists who regard economic questions from a standpoint which does not in the least exceed the bounds of the most moderate and cautious bourgeois reformism.

Commenting on the increase of the capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft to 300 million marks, the German review, *Die Bank*, wrote: "Other banks will follow this same path and in time the three hundred men, who today govern Germany economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this latest move towards concentration will be confined to banking. The close relations that exist between individual banks naturally lead to the bringing together of the industrial syndicates which these banks favour.... One fine morning we shall wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before our eyes, and to find ourselves faced with the necessity of substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except that we have

allowed things to follow their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of stocks.”*

This is an example of the impotence of bourgeois journalism which differs from bourgeois science only in that the latter is less sincere and strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to hide the forest behind the trees. To be “surprised” at the results of concentration, to “reproach” the government of capitalist Germany, or capitalist “society” (“ourselves”), to fear that the introduction of stocks and shares might “accelerate” concentration in the same way as the German “cartel” specialist Tschierschky fears the American trusts and “prefers” the German cartels on the grounds that they “may not, like the trusts, excessively accelerate technical and economic progress”**—is not all this a sign of impotence?

But facts remain facts. There are no trusts in Germany; there are “only” cartels—but Germany is *governed* by not more than three hundred magnates of capital, and the number of these is constantly diminishing. At all events, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies in all capitalist countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws.

The banking system “possesses, indeed, the form of universal book-keeping and distribution of means of production on a social scale, but solely the form”, wrote Marx in *Capital* half a century ago (Russ. trans., Vol. III, part II, p. 144[85]). The figures we have quoted on the growth of bank capital, on the increase in the number of the branches and offices of the biggest banks, the increase in the number of their accounts, etc., present a concrete picture of this “universal book-keeping” of the *whole* capitalist class; and not only of the capitalists, for the banks collect, even though temporarily, all kinds of money revenues—of small businessmen, office clerks, and of a tiny upper stratum of the working class. “Universal distribution of means of production”—that, from the formal aspect, is what *grows* out of the modern banks, which, numbering some three to six of the biggest

* A. Lansburgh, “Die Bank mit den 300 Millionen” in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 426.

** S. Tschierschky, op. cit., S. 128.

in France, and six to eight in Germany, control millions and millions. In *substance*, however, the distribution of means of production is not at all "universal", but private, i.e., it conforms to the interests of big capital, and primarily, of huge, monopoly capital, which operates under conditions in which the masses live in want, in which the whole development of agriculture hopelessly lags behind the development of industry, while within industry itself the "heavy industries" exact tribute from all other branches of industry.

In the matter of socialising capitalist economy the savings-banks and post-offices are beginning to compete with the banks; they are more "decentralised", i.e., their influence extends to a greater number of localities, to more remote places, to wider sections of the population. Here is the data collected by an American commission on the comparative growth of deposits in banks and savings-banks*:

Deposits (000,000,000 marks)

	Britain		France		Germany		
	Banks	Savings-banks	Banks	Savings-banks	Banks	Credit societies	Savings-banks
1880	8.4	1.6	?	0.9	0.5	0.4	2.6
1888	12.4	2.0	1.5	2.1	1.1	0.4	4.5
1908	23.2	4.2	3.7	4.2	7.1	2.2	13.9

As they pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent and 4¼ per cent on deposits, the savings-banks must seek "profitable" investments for their capital, they must deal in bills, mortgages, etc. The boundaries between the banks and the savings-banks "become more and more obliterated". The Chambers of Commerce of Bochum and Erfurt, for example, demand that savings-banks be "prohibited" from engaging in "purely" banking business, such as discounting bills; they demand the limitation of the "banking" operations of the post-office.** The banking magnates seem to be afraid that state monopoly will steal upon them from an unexpected quarter. It goes without saying, however, that this fear is

* *Statistics of the National Monetary Commission*, quoted in *Die Bank*, 1910, 1, S. 1200.

** *Die Bank*, 1913, S. 811, 1022; 1914, S. 713.

no more than an expression of the rivalry, so to speak, between two department managers in the same office; for, on the one hand, the millions entrusted to the savings-banks are in the final analysis actually controlled by *these very same* bank capital magnates, while, on the other hand, state monopoly in capitalist society is merely a means of increasing and guaranteeing the income of millionaires in some branch of industry who are on the verge of bankruptcy.

The change from the old type of capitalism, in which free competition predominated, to the new capitalism, in which monopoly reigns, is expressed, among other things, by a decline in the importance of the Stock Exchange. The review, *Die Bank*, writes: "The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable medium of circulation that it formerly was when the banks were not yet able to place the bulk of new issues with their clients."*

"'Every bank is a Stock Exchange', and the bigger the bank, and the more successful the concentration of banking, the truer does this modern aphorism ring."** "While formerly, in the seventies, the Stock Exchange, flushed with the exuberance of youth" (a "subtle" allusion to the Stock Exchange crash of 1873, the company promotion scandals,[86] etc.), "opened the era of the industrialisation of Germany, nowadays the banks and industry are able to 'manage it alone'. The domination of our big banks over the Stock Exchange ... is nothing else than the expression of the completely organised German industrial state. If the domain of the automatically functioning economic laws is thus restricted, and if the domain of conscious regulation by the banks is considerably enlarged, the national economic responsibility of a few guiding heads is immensely increased," so writes the German Professor Schulze-Gaevernitz,*** an apologist of German imperialism, who is regarded as an authority by the imperialists of all countries, and who tries to gloss over the "mere detail" that the "conscious regulation" of economic life by the banks consists in the fleecing of the public by a handful of "completely organised" monop-

* *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 316.

** Dr. Oscar Stillich, *Geld- und Bankwesen*, Berlin, 1907, S. 169.

*** Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Die deutsche Kreditbank" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Tübingen, 1915, S. 101.

olists. The task of a bourgeois professor is not to lay bare the entire mechanism, or to expose all the machinations of the bank monopolists, but rather to present them in a favourable light.

In the same way, Riesser, a still more authoritative economist and himself a banker, makes shift with meaningless phrases in order to explain away undeniable facts: "...the Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for national economy as a whole and for the circulation of securities in particular—that of being not only a most exact measuring-rod, but also an almost automatic regulator of the economic movements which converge on it."*

In other words, the old capitalism, the capitalism of free competition with its indispensable regulator, the Stock Exchange, is passing away. A new capitalism has come to take its place, bearing obvious features of something transient, a mixture of free competition and monopoly. The question naturally arises: *into what* is this new capitalism "developing"? But the bourgeois scholars are afraid to raise this question.

"Thirty years ago, businessmen, freely competing against one another, performed nine-tenths of the work connected with their business other than manual labour. At the present time, nine-tenths of this 'brain work' is performed by *employees*. Banking is in the forefront of this evolution."** This admission by Schulze-Gaevernitz brings us once again to the question: into what is this new capitalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage, developing?

Among the few banks which remain at the head of all capitalist economy as a result of the process of concentration, there is naturally to be observed an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements, towards a *bank trust*. In America, not nine, but *two* very big banks, those of the multimillionaires Rockefeller and Morgan, control a capital of eleven thousand million marks.*** In Germany the absorption of the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein by

* Riesser, op. cit., 4th ed., S. 629.

** Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Die deutsche Kreditbank" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Tübingen, 1915, S. 151.

*** *Die Bank*, 1912, 1, S. 435.

the Disconto-Gesellschaft to which I referred above, was commented on in the following terms by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*,[87] an organ of Stock Exchange interests:

"The concentration movement of the banks is narrowing the circle of establishments from which it is possible to obtain credits, and is consequently increasing the dependence of big industry upon a small number of banking groups. In view of the close connection between industry and the financial world, the freedom of movement of industrial companies which need banking capital is restricted. For this reason, big industry is watching the growing trustification of the banks with mixed feelings. Indeed, we have repeatedly seen the beginnings of certain agreements between the individual big banking concerns, which aim at restricting competition."*

Again and again, the final word in the development of banking is monopoly.

As regards the close connection between the banks and industry, it is precisely in this sphere that the new role of the banks is, perhaps, most strikingly felt. When a bank discounts a bill for a firm, opens a current account for it, etc., these operations, taken separately, do not in the least diminish its independence, and the bank plays no other part than that of a modest middleman. But when such operations are multiplied and become an established practice, when the bank "collects" in its own hands enormous amounts of capital, when the running of a current account for a given firm enables the bank—and this is what happens—to obtain fuller and more detailed information about the economic position of its client, the result is that the industrial capitalist becomes more completely dependent on the bank.

At the same time a personal link-up, so to speak, is established between the banks and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, the merging of one with another through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of bank directors to the Supervisory Boards (or Boards of Directors) of industrial and commercial enterprises, and vice versa. The German economist, Jeidels, has compiled most detailed data on this form of concentration of capital

* Quoted by Schulze-Gaevernitz, op. cit., S. 155.

and of enterprises. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in *344* industrial companies; and by their board members in *407* others, making a total of *751* companies. In *289* of these companies they either had two of their representatives on each of the respective Supervisory Boards, or held the posts of chairmen. We find these industrial and commercial companies in the most diverse branches of industry: insurance, transport, restaurants, theatres, art industry, etc. On the other hand, on the Supervisory Boards of these six banks (in 1910) were fifty-one of the biggest industrialists, including the director of Krupp, of the powerful "Hapag" (Hamburg-Amerika Line), etc., etc. From 1895 to 1910 each of these six banks participated in the share and bond issues of many hundreds of industrial companies (the number ranging from 281 to 419).*

The "personal link-up" between the banks and industry is supplemented by the "personal link-up" between both of them and the government. "Seats on Supervisory Boards," writes Jeidels, "are freely offered to persons of title, also to ex-civil servants, who are able to do a great deal to facilitate [!!] relations with the authorities." ... "Usually, on the Supervisory Board of a big bank, there is a member of parliament or a Berlin city councillor."

The building and development, so to speak, of the big capitalist monopolies is therefore going on full steam ahead in all "natural" and "supernatural" ways. A sort of division of labour is being systematically developed amongst the several hundred kings of finance who reign over modern capitalist society:

"Simultaneously with this widening of the sphere of activity of certain big industrialists [joining the boards of banks, etc.] and with the assignment of provincial bank managers to definite industrial regions, there is a growth of specialisation among the directors of the big banks. Generally speaking, this specialisation is only conceivable when banking is conducted on a large scale, and particularly when it has widespread connections with industry. This division of labour proceeds along two lines: on the one hand, relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one director,

* Jeidels, op. cit.; Riesser, op. cit.

as his special function; on the other, each director assumes the supervision of several separate enterprises, or of a group of enterprises in the same branch of industry or having similar interests.... [Capitalism has already reached the stage of organised *supervision* of individual enterprises.] One specialises in German industry, sometimes even in West German industry alone [the West is the most industrialised part of Germany], others specialise in relations with foreign states and foreign industry, in information on the characters of industrialists and others, in Stock Exchange questions, etc. Besides, each bank director is often assigned a special locality or a special branch of industry- one works chiefly on Supervisory Boards of electric companies, another, on chemical, brewing, or beet sugar plants, a third, in a few isolated industrial enterprises, but at the same time works on the Supervisory Boards of insurance companies.... In short, there can be no doubt that the growth in the dimensions and diversity of the big banks operations is accompanied by an increase in the division of labour among their directors with the object (and result) of, so to speak, lifting them somewhat out of pure banking and making them better experts, better judges of the general problems of industry and the special problems of each branch of industry, thus making them more capable of acting within the respective bank's industrial sphere of influence. This system is supplemented by the banks' endeavours to elect to their Supervisory Boards men who are experts in industrial affairs, such as industrialists, former officials, especially those formerly in the railway service or in mining," etc.*

We find the same system only in a slightly different form in French banking. For instance, one of the three biggest French banks, the Crédit Lyonnais, has organised a financial research service (*service des études financières*), which permanently employs over fifty engineers, statisticians, economists, lawyers, etc. This costs from six to seven hundred thousand francs annually. The service is in turn divided into eight departments: one specialises in collecting information on industrial establishments, another studies

* Jeidels, op. cit., S. 157.

general statistics, a third, railway and steamship companies, a fourth, securities, a fifth, financial reports, etc.*

The result is, on the one hand, the ever-growing merger, or, as N. I. Bukharin aptly calls it, coalescence, of bank and industrial capital and, on the other hand, the growth of the banks into institutions of a truly "universal character". On this question I find it necessary to quote the exact terms used by Jeidels, who has best studied the subject:

"An examination of the sum total of industrial relationships reveals the universal *character* of the financial establishments working on behalf of industry. Unlike other kinds of banks, and contrary to the demand sometimes expressed in the literature that banks should specialise in one kind of business or in one branch of industry in order to prevent the ground from slipping from under their feet—the big banks are striving to make their connections with industrial enterprises as varied as possible in respect of the locality or branches of industry and are striving to eliminate the unevenness in the distribution of capital among localities and branches of industry resulting from the historical development of individual enterprises." "One tendency is to make the connections with industry general; another tendency is to make them durable and close. In the six big banks both these tendencies are realised, not in full, but to a considerable extent and to an equal degree."

Quite often industrial and commercial circles complain of the "terrorism" of the banks. And it is not surprising that such complaints are heard, for the big banks "command", as will be seen from the following example. On November 19, 1901, one of the big, so-called Berlin "D" banks (the names of the four biggest banks begin with letter D) wrote to the Board of Directors of the German Central Northwest Cement Syndicate in the following terms: "As we learn from the notice you published in a certain newspaper of the 18th inst., we must reckon with the possibility that the next general meeting of your syndicate, to be held on the 30th of this month, may decide on measures which are likely

* An article by Eug. Kaufmann on French banks in *Die Bank*, 1909, 2, S. 851 et seq.

to effect changes in your enterprise which are unacceptable to us. We deeply regret that, for these reasons, we are obliged henceforth to withdraw the credit which had hitherto been allowed you.... But if the said next general meeting does not decide upon measures which are unacceptable to us, and if we receive suitable guarantees on this matter for the future, we shall be quite willing to open negotiations with you on the grant of a new credit."*

As a matter of fact, this is small capital's old complaint about being oppressed by big capital, but in this case it was a whole syndicate that fell into the category of "small" capital! The old struggle between small and big capital is being resumed at a new and immeasurably higher stage of development. It stands to reason that the big banks' enterprises, worth many millions, can accelerate technical progress with means that cannot possibly be compared with those of the past. The banks, for example, set up special technical research societies, and, of course, only "friendly" industrial enterprises benefit from their work. To this category belong the Electric Railway Research Association, the Central Bureau of Scientific and Technical Research, etc.

The directors of the big banks themselves cannot fail to see that new conditions of national economy are being created; but they are powerless in the face of these phenomena.

"Anyone who has watched, in recent years," writes Jeidels, "the changes of incumbents of directorships and seats on the Supervisory Boards of the big banks, cannot fail to have noticed that power is gradually passing into the hands of men who consider the active intervention of the big banks in the general development of industry to be necessary and of increasing importance. Between these new men and the old bank directors, disagreements on this subject of a business and often of a personal nature are growing. The issue is whether or not the banks, as credit institutions, will suffer from this intervention in industry, whether they are sacrificing tried principles and an assured profit to engage in a field of activity which has nothing in common

* Dr. Oscar Stillich, *Geld- und Bankwesen*, Berlin, 1907, S. 148.

with their role as middlemen in providing credit, and which is leading the banks into a field where they are more than ever before exposed to the blind forces of trade fluctuations. This is the opinion of many of the older bank directors, while most of the young men consider active intervention in industry to be a necessity as great as that which gave rise, simultaneously with big modern industry, to the big banks and modern industrial banking. The two parties are agreed only on one point: that there are neither firm principles nor a concrete aim in the new activities of the big banks."*

The old capitalism has had its day. The new capitalism represents a transition towards something. It is hopeless of course, to seek for "firm principles and a concrete aim" for the purpose of "reconciling" monopoly with free competition. The admission of the practical men has quite a different ring from the official praises of the charms of "organised" capitalism sung by its apologists, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and similar "theoreticians".

At precisely what period were the "new activities" of the big banks finally established? Jeidels gives us a fairly exact answer to this important question:

"The connections between the banks and industrial enterprises, with their new content, their new forms and their new organs, namely, the big banks which are organised on both a centralised and a decentralised basis, were scarcely a characteristic economic phenomenon before the nineties; in one sense, indeed, this initial date may be advanced to the year 1897, when the important 'mergers' took place and when, for the first time, the new form of decentralised organisation was introduced to suit the industrial policy of the banks. This starting-point could perhaps be placed at an even later date, for it was the crisis of 1900 that enormously accelerated and intensified the process of concentration of industry and of banking, consolidated that process, for the first time transformed the connection with industry into the actual monopoly of the big banks, and made this connection much closer and more active."**

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* Jeidels, op. cit., S. 183-84.
** Ibid., S. 181.

Thus, the twentieth century marks the turning-point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital.

III. FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY

"A steadily increasing proportion of capital in industry," writes Hilferding, "ceases to belong to the industrialists who employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the medium of the banks which, in relation to them, represent the owners of the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to sink an increasing share of its funds in industry. Thus, to an ever greater degree the banker is being transformed into an industrial capitalist. This bank capital, i.e., capital in money form, which is thus actually transformed into industrial capital, I call 'finance capital'." "Finance capital is capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists."*

This definition is incomplete insofar as it is silent on one extremely important fact—on the increase of concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that concentration is leading, and has led, to monopoly. But throughout the whole of his work, and particularly in the two chapters preceding the one from which this definition is taken, Hilferding stresses the part played by *capitalist monopolies*.

The concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry—such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of that concept.

We now have to describe how, under the general conditions of commodity production and private property, the "business operations" of capitalist monopolies inevitably lead to the domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be noted that German—and not only German—bourgeois scholars, like Riesser, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and others, are all apologists of imperialism and of finance capital.

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* R. Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, Moscow, 1912 (in Russian), pp. 338-39.

Instead of revealing the "mechanics" of the formation of an oligarchy, its methods, the size of its revenues "impeccable and peccable", its connections with parliaments, etc., etc., they obscure or gloss over them. They evade these "vexed questions" by pompous and vague phrases, appeals to the "sense of responsibility" of bank directors, by praising "the sense of duty" of Prussian officials, giving serious study to the petty details of absolutely ridiculous parliamentary bills for the "supervision" and "regulation" of monopolies, playing spillikins with theories, like, for example, the following "scholarly" definition, arrived at by Professor Liefmann: ***"Commerce*** is ***an occupation having for its object the collection, storage and supply of goods."**** (The Professor's bold-face italics.) ...From this it would follow that commerce existed in the time of primitive man, who knew nothing about exchange, and that it will exist under socialism!

But the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so glaring that in all capitalist countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung up, written from the *bourgeois* point of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly truthful picture and criticism—petty-bourgeois, naturally—of this oligarchy.

Paramount importance attaches to the "holding system", already briefly referred to above. The German economist, Heymann, probably the first to call attention to this matter, describes the essence of it in this way:

"The head of the concern controls the principal company [literally: the "mother company"]; the latter reigns over the subsidiary companies ["daughter companies"] which in their turn control still other subsidiaries ["grandchild companies"], etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of production. Indeed, if holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the head of the concern needs only one million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And if this 'interlocking' is extended,

* R. Liefmann, op. cit., S. 476.

it is possible with one million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million, etc.”*

As a matter of fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order to direct its affairs,** since in practice a certain number of small, scattered shareholders find it impossible to attend general meetings, etc. The “democratisation” of the ownership of shares, from which the bourgeois sophists and opportunist so-called “Social-Democrats” expect (or say that they expect) the “democratisation of capital”, the strengthening of the role and significance of small-scale production, etc., is, in fact, one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial oligarchy. Incidentally, this is why, in the more advanced, or in the older and more “experienced” capitalist countries, the law allows the issue of shares of smaller denomination. In Germany, the law does not permit the issue of shares of less than one thousand marks denomination, and the magnates of German finance look with an envious eye at Britain, where the issue of one-pound shares (= 20 marks, about 10 rubles) is permitted. Siemens, one of the biggest industrialists and “financial kings” in Germany, told the Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that “the one-pound share is the basis of British imperialism”.*** This merchant has a much deeper and more “Marxist” understanding of imperialism than a certain disreputable writer who is held to be one of the founders of Russian Marxism[88] and believes that imperialism is a bad habit of a certain nation....

But the “holding system” not only serves enormously to increase the power of the monopolists; it also enables them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to cheat the public, because formally the directors of the “mother company” are not legally responsible for the “daughter company”, which is supposed to be “independent”, and *through the medium* of which they can “pull off” *any-*

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* Hans Gideon Heymann, *Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisengewerbe*, Stuttgart, 1904, S. 268-69.

** Liefmann, *Beteiligungsgesellschaften*, etc., S. 258 of the first edition.

*** Schulze-Gaevernitz in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomie*, V, 2, S. 110.

thing. Here is an example taken from the German review, *Die Bank*, for May 1914:

"The Spring Steel Company of Kassel was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the Board, without consulting the shareholders, had loaned *six million marks* to one of its 'daughter companies', the Hassia Company, which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble the capital of the 'mother company' was never mentioned in its balance-sheets. This omission was quite legal and could be hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any point of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who as the responsible head had signed the false balance-sheets, was, and still is, the president of the Kassel Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders only heard of the loan to the Hassia Company, long afterwards, when it had been proved to be a mistake" ... (the writer should put this word in inverted commas) ... "and when Spring Steel shares dropped nearly 100 per cent, because those in the know were getting rid of them....

"*This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery*, *quite common* in joint-stock companies, explains why their Boards of Directors are willing to undertake risky transactions with a far lighter heart than individual businessmen. Modern methods of drawing up balance-sheets not only make it possible to conceal doubtful undertakings from the ordinary shareholder, but also allow the people most concerned to escape the consequence of unsuccessful speculation by selling their shares in time when the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he does....

"The balance-sheets of many joint-stock companies put us in mind of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath it another inscription giving the real meaning of the document. [Palimpsests are parchment documents from which the original inscription has been erased and another inscription imposed.]

"The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making balance-sheets indecipherable is to divide a single

business into several parts by setting up 'daughter companies'—or by annexing them. The advantages of this system for various purposes—legal and illegal—are so evident that big companies which do not employ it are quite the exception."*

As an example of a huge monopolist company that extensively employs this system, the author quotes the famous General Electric Company (the A.E.G., to which I shall refer again later on). In 1912, it was calculated that this company held shares in *175* to *200* other companies, dominating them, of course, and thus controlling a total capital of about *1,500 million marks*.**

None of the rules of control, the publication of balance-sheets, the drawing up of balance-sheets according to a definite form, the public auditing of accounts, etc., the things about which well-intentioned professors and officials—that is, those imbued with the good intention of defending and prettyfying capitalism—discourse to the public, are of any avail; for private property is sacred, and no one can be prohibited from buying, selling, exchanging or hypothecating shares, etc.

The extent to which this "holding system" has developed in the big Russian banks may be judged by the figures given by E. Agahd, who for fifteen years was an official of the Russo-Chinese Bank and who, in May 1914, published a book, not altogether correctly entitled *Big Banks and the World Market*.*** The author divides the big Russian banks into two main groups: (*a*) banks that come under the "holding system", and (*b*) "independent" banks—"independence", however, being arbitrarily taken to mean independence of *foreign* banks. The author divides the first group into three subgroups: (1) German holdings, (2) British holdings, and (3) French holdings, having in view the

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* L. Eschwege, "Tochtergesellschaften" in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 545.

** Kurt Heinig, "Der Weg des Elektrotrusts" in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912, 30. Jahrg., 2, S. 484.

*** E. Agahd, *Grossbanken und Weltmarkt. Die wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung der Grossbanken im Weltmarkt unter Berücksichtigung ihres Einflusses auf Russlands Volkswirtschaft und die deutsche-russischen Beziehungen*, Berlin, 1914.

"holdings" and domination of the big foreign banks of the particular country mentioned. The author divides the capital of the banks into "productively" invested capital (industrial and commercial undertakings), and "speculatively" invested capital (in Stock Exchange and financial operations), assuming, from his petty-bourgeois reformist point of view, that it is possible, under capitalism, to separate the first form of investment from the second and to abolish the second form.

Here are the figures he supplies:

Bank Assets

(*According to Reports for October-November 1913*)
000,000 rubles

Groups of Russian banks	Capital invested: Productively	Capital invested: Speculatively	Capital invested: Total
a 1) Four banks: Siberian Commercial, Russian, International, and Discount Bank	413.7	859.1	1,272.8
a 2) Two banks: Commercial and Industrial, and Russo-British	239.3	169.1	408.4
a 3) Five banks: Russian-Asiatic, St. Petersburg Private, Azov-Don, Union Moscow, Russo-French Commercial	711.8	661.2	1,373.0
(11 banks) *Total*: . . . . . a) =	1,364.8	1,689.4	3,054.2
b) Eight banks: Moscow Merchants Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St. Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow (formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial, Moscow Private	504.2	391.1	895.3
(19 banks) *Total*	1,869.0	2,080.5	3,949.5

According to these figures, of the approximately 4,000 million rubles making up the "working" capital of the big banks, *more than three-fourths*, more than 3,000 million, belonged to banks which in reality were only "daughter companies" of foreign banks, and chiefly of Paris banks (the famous trio: Union Parisienne, Paris et Pays-Bas

and Société Générale), and of Berlin banks (particularly the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft). Two of the biggest Russian banks, the Russian (Russian Bank for Foreign Trade) and the International (St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank), between 1906 and 1912 increased their capital from 44 to 98 million rubles, and their reserves from 15 million to 39 million "employing three-fourths German capital". The first bank belongs to the Berlin Deutsche Bank "concern" and the second to the Berlin Disconto-Gesellschaft. The worthy Agahd is deeply indignant at the majority of the shares being held by the Berlin banks, so that the Russian shareholders are, therefore, powerless. Naturally, the country which exports capital skims the cream; for example, the Berlin Deutsche Bank, before placing the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market, kept them in its portfolio for a whole year, and then sold them at the rate of 193 for 100, that is, at nearly twice their nominal value, "earning" a profit of nearly six million rubles, which Hilferding calls "promoter's profits".

Our author puts the total "capacity" of the principal St. Petersburg banks at 8,235 million rubles, well over 8,000 million, and the "holdings", or rather, the extent to which foreign banks dominated them, he estimates as follows: French banks, 55 per cent; British, 10 per cent; German, 35 per cent. The author calculates that of the total of 8,235 million rubles of functioning capital, 3,687 million rubles, or over 40 per cent, fall to the share of the Produgol and Prodamet syndicates[89] and the syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. Thus, owing to the formation of capitalist monopolies, the merging of bank and industrial capital has also made enormous strides in Russia.

Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., strengthens the domination of the financial oligarchy and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of monopolists. Here is an example, taken from a multitude of others, of the "business" methods of the American trusts, quoted by Hilferding. In 1887,

Havemeyer founded the Sugar Trust by amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted to 6,500,000 dollars. Suitably "watered", as the Americans say, the capital of the trust was declared to be 50 million dollars. This "over-capitalisation" anticipated the monopoly profits, in the same way as the United States Steel Corporation anticipates its monopoly profits in buying up as many iron ore fields as possible. In fact, the Sugar Trust set up monopoly prices, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per cent dividend on capital "watered" *sevenfold*, *or about 70 per cent on the capital actually invested at the time the trust was formed*! In 1909, the capital of the Sugar Trust amounted to 90 million dollars. In twenty-two years, it had increased its capital more than tenfold.

In France the domination of the "financial oligarchy" (*Against the Financial Oligarchy in France*, the title of the well-known book by Lysis, the fifth edition of which was published in 1908) assumed a form that was only slightly different. Four of the most powerful banks enjoy, not a relative, but an "absolute monopoly" in the issue of bonds. In reality, this is a "trust of big banks". And monopoly ensures monopoly profits from bond issues. Usually a borrowing country does not get more than 90 per cent of the sum of the loan, the remaining 10 per cent goes to the banks and other middlemen. The profit made by the banks out of the Russo-Chinese loan of 400 million francs amounted to 8 per cent; out of the Russian (1904) loan of 800 million francs the profit amounted to 10 per cent; and out of the Moroccan (1904) loan of 62,500,000 francs it amounted to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, which began its development with petty usury capital, is ending its development with gigantic usury capital. "The French," says Lysis, "are the usurers of Europe." All the conditions of economic life are being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. With a stationary population, and stagnant industry, commerce and shipping, the "country" can grow rich by usury. "Fifty persons, representing a capital of eight million francs, can control *2,000 million* francs deposited in four banks." The "holding system", with which we are already familiar, leads to the same result. One of the biggest banks, the Société Générale, for instance, issues 64,000

bonds for its "daughter company", the Egyptian Sugar Refineries. The bonds are issued at 150 per cent, i.e., the bank gains 50 centimes on the franc. The dividends of the new company were found to be fictitious, the "public" lost from 90 to 100 million francs. "One of the directors of the Société Générale was a member of the board of directors of the Sugar Refineries." It is not surprising that the author is driven to the conclusion that "the French Republic is a financial monarchy"; "it is the complete domination of the financial oligarchy; the latter dominates over the press and the government."*

The extraordinarily high rate of profit obtained from the issue of bonds, which is one of the principal functions of finance capital, plays a very important part in the development and consolidation of the financial oligarchy. "There is not a single business of this type within the country that brings in profits even approximately equal to those obtained from the flotation of foreign loans," says *Die Bank*.**

"No banking operation brings in profits comparable with those obtained from the issue of securities!" According to the *German Economist*, the average annual profits made on the issue of industrial stock were as follows:

	Per cent
1895	38.6
1896	36.1
1897	66.7
1898	67.7
1899	66.9
1900	55.2

"In the ten years from 1891 to 1900, *more than a thousand million* marks were 'earned' by issuing German industrial stock."***

During periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance capital are immense, but during periods of depression,

* Lysis, *Contre l'oligarchie financière en France*, 5 éd., Paris, 1908, pp. 11, 12, 26, 39, 40, 48.

** *Die Bank*, 1913, No. 7, S. 630.

*** Stillich, op. cit., S. 143, also W. Sombart. *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert*, 2. Aufl., 1909, S. 526, Anlage 8.

small and unsound businesses go out of existence, and the big banks acquire "holdings" in them by buying them up for a mere song, or participate in profitable schemes for their "reconstruction" and "reorganisation". In the "reconstruction" of undertakings which have been running at a loss, "the share capital is written down, that is, profits are distributed on a smaller capital and continue to be calculated on this smaller basis. Or, if the income has fallen to zero, new capital is called in, which, combined with the old and less remunerative capital, will bring in an adequate return. "Incidentally," adds Hilferding, "all these reorganisations and reconstructions have a twofold significance for the banks: first, as profitable transactions; and secondly, as opportunities for securing control of the companies in difficulties."*

Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund was founded in 1872. Share capital was issued to the amount of nearly 40 million marks and the market price of the shares rose to 170 after it had paid a 12 per cent dividend for its first year. Finance capital skimmed the cream and earned a trifle of something like 28 million marks. The principal sponsor of this company was that very big German Disconto-Gesellschaft which so successfully attained a capital of 300 million marks. Later, the dividends of the Union declined to nil; the shareholders had to consent to a "writing down" of capital, that is, to losing some of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of "reconstructions", more than 73 million marks were written off the books of the Union in the course of thirty years. "At the present time, the original shareholders of the company possess only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares"** but the banks "earned something" out of every "reconstruction".

Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of rapidly growing big towns is a particularly profitable operation for finance capital. The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly of ground-rent and with monopoly of the means of communication, since the rise in the price of land and the possibility of selling it profitably in lots, etc., is mainly

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* *Finance Capital*, p. 172.

** Stillich, op. cit., S. 138 and Liefmann, S. 51.

dependent on good means of communication with the centre of the town; and these means of communication are in the hands of large companies which are connected with these same banks through the holding system and the distribution of seats on the boards. As a result we get what the German writer, L. Eschwege, a contributor to *Die Bank* who has made a special study of real estate business and mortgages, etc., calls a "bog". Frantic speculation in suburban building lots; collapse of building enterprises like the Berlin firm of Boswau and Knauer, which acquired as much as 100 million marks with the help of the "sound and solid" Deutsche Bank—the latter, of course, acting through the holding system, i.e., secretly, behind the scenes —and got out of it with a loss of "only" 12 million marks, then the ruin of small proprietors and of workers who get nothing from the fictitious building firms, fraudulent deals with the "honest" Berlin police and administration for the purpose of gaining control of the issue of cadastral certificates, building licences, etc., etc.*

"American ethics", which the European professors and well-meaning bourgeois so hypocritically deplore, have, in the age of finance capital, become the ethics of literally every large city in any country.

At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of the formation of a "transport trust", i.e., of establishing "community of interests" between the three Berlin transport undertakings: the city electric railway, the tramway company and the omnibus company. "We have been aware," wrote *Die Bank*, "that this plan was contemplated ever since it became known that the majority of the shares in the bus company had been acquired by the other two transport companies.... We may fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services, they will secure economies, part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the transport trust that is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can subordinate the means of

* In *Die Bank*, 1913, S. 952, L. Eschwege, *Der Sumpf*; ibid., 1912, 1, S. 223 et seq.

transportation, which they have monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need only recall that the interests of the big bank that encouraged the formation of the Electric Railway Company were already involved in it at the time the company was formed. That is to say: the interests of this transport undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was to run across land which this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself and for several partners in the transactions when it became certain the line was to be laid down."*

A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of millions, inevitably penetrates into *every* sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and all other "details". In German economic literature one usually comes across obsequious praise of the integrity of the Prussian bureaucracy and allusions to the French Panama scandal[90] and to political corruption in America. But the fact is that *even* bourgeois literature devoted to German banking matters constantly has to go far beyond the field of purely banking operations; it speaks, for instance, about "the attraction of the banks" in reference to the increasing frequency with which public officials take employment with the banks, as follows: "How about the integrity of a state official who in his innermost heart is aspiring to a soft job in the Behrenstrasse?"** (The Berlin street where the head office of the Deutsche Bank is situated.) In 1909, the publisher of *Die Bank*, Alfred Lansburgh, wrote an article entitled "The Economic Significance of Byzantinism", in which he incidentally referred to Wilhelm II's tour of Palestine, and to "the immediate result of this journey, the construction of the Baghdad railway, that fatal 'great product of German enterprise', which is more responsible for the 'encirclement' than all our political blunders put together".*** (By encirclement is meant the policy of Edward VII

* "Verkehrstrust" in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 89.
** "Der Zug zur Bank" in *Die Bank*, 1909, 1, S. 79.
*** Ibid., S. 301.

to isolate Germany and surround her with an imperialist anti-German alliance.) In 1911, Eschwege, the contributor to this same magazine to whom I have already referred, wrote an article entitled "Plutocracy and Bureaucracy", in which he exposed, for example, the case of a German official named Völker, who was a zealous member of the Cartel Committee and who, it turned out some time later, obtained a lucrative post in the biggest cartel, the Steel Syndicate. Similar cases, by no means casual, forced this bourgeois author to admit that "the economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution has become in many departments of economic life, a meaningless phrase" and that under the existing rule of the plutocracy, "even the widest political liberty cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree people".*

As for Russia, I shall confine myself to one example. Some years ago, all the newspapers announced that Davydov, the director of the Credit Department of the Treasury, had resigned his post to take employment with a certain big bank at a salary which, according to the contract, would total over one million rubles in the course of several years. The Credit Department is an institution, the function of which is to "co-ordinate the activities of all the credit institutions of the country" and which grants subsidies to banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow amounting to between 800 and 1,000 million rubles.**

It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from the application of capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance of the rentier and

* Ibid., 1911, 2, S. 825; 1913, 2, S. 962.
** E. Agahd, op. cit., S. 202.

of the financial oligarchy; it means that a small number of financially "powerful" states stand out among all the rest. The extent to which this process is going on may be judged from the statistics on emissions, i.e., the issue of all kinds of securities.

In the *Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute*, A. Neymarck* has published very comprehensive, complete and comparative figures covering the issue of securities all over the world, which have been repeatedly quoted in part in economic literature. The following are the totals he gives for four decades:

Total Issues in Francs per Decade
(000,000,000)

1871- 80	76.1
1881- 90	64.5
1891-1900	100.4
1901- 10	197.8

In the 1870s the total amount of issues for the whole world was high, owing particularly to the loans floated in connection with the Franco-Prussian War, and the company-promotion boom which set in in Germany after the war. On the whole, the increase was relatively not very rapid during the three last decades of the nineteenth century, and only in the first ten years of the twentieth century is an enormous increase of almost 100 per cent to be observed. Thus the beginning of the twentieth century marks the turning-point, not only in the growth of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts), of which we have already spoken, but also in the growth of finance capital.

Neymarck estimates the total amount of issued securities current in the world in 1910 at about 815,000 million francs. Deducting from this sum amounts which might have been duplicated, he reduces the total to 575,000-600,000 million,

* *Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique*, t. XIX, livr. II, La Haye, 1912. Data concerning small states, second column, are estimated by adding 20 per cent to the 1902 figures.

which is distributed among the various countries as follows (I take 600,000 million):

Financial Securities Current in 1910
(000,000,000 francs)

Great Britain	142	479	Holland	12.5
United States	132		Belgium	7.5
France	110		Spain	7.5
Germany	95		Switzerland	6.25
Russia	31		Denmark	3.75
Austria-Hungary	24		Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc.	2.5
Italy	14			
Japan	12		*Total*	600

From these figures we at once see standing out in sharp relief four of the richest capitalist countries, each of which holds securities to amounts ranging approximately from 100,000 to 150,000 million francs. Of these four countries, two, Britain and France, are the oldest capitalist countries, and, as we shall see, possess the most colonies; the other two, the United States and Germany, are capitalist countries leading in the rapidity of development and the degree of extension of capitalist monopolies in industry. Together, these four countries own 479,000 million francs, that is, nearly 80 per cent of the world's finance capital. In one way or another, nearly the whole of the rest of the world is more or less the debtor to and tributary of these international banker countries, these four "pillars" of world finance capital.

It is particularly important to examine the part which the export of capital plays in creating the international network of dependence on and connections of finance capital.

IV. EXPORT OF CAPITAL

Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway, was the export of *goods*. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of *capital*.

Capitalism is commodity production at its highest stage of development, when labour-power itself becomes a commodity. The growth of internal exchange, and, particularly,

of international exchange, is a characteristic feature of capitalism. The uneven and spasmodic development of individual enterprises, individual branches of industry and individual countries is inevitable under the capitalist system. England became a capitalist country before any other, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free trade, claimed to be the "workshop of the world", the supplier of manufactured goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her provided with raw materials. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, *this* monopoly was already undermined; for other countries, sheltering themselves with "protective" tariffs, developed into independent capitalist states. On the threshold of the twentieth century we see the formation of a new type of monopoly: firstly, monopolist associations of capitalists in all capitalistically developed countries; secondly, the monopolist position of a few very rich countries, in which the accumulation of capital has reached gigantic proportions. An enormous "surplus of capital" has arisen in the advanced countries.

It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today is everywhere lagging terribly behind industry, if it could raise the living standards of the masses, who in spite of the amazing technical progress are everywhere still half-starved and poverty-stricken, there could be no question of a surplus of capital. This "argument" is very often advanced by the petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism. But if capitalism did these things it would not be capitalism; for both uneven development and a semi-starvation level of existence of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and constitute premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilised not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries having already been drawn into

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been or are being built in those countries, elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The need to export capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become "overripe" and (owing to the backward state of agriculture and the poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for "profitable" investment.

Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital invested abroad by the three principal countries*:

Capital Invested Abroad

(000,000,000 francs)

Year	Great Britain	France	Germany
1862	3.6	—	—
1872	15.0	10 (1869)	—
1882	22.0	15 (1880)	?
1893	42.0	20 (1890)	?
1902	62.0	27-37	12.5
1914	75-100.0	60	44.0

This table shows that the export of capital reached enormous dimensions only at the beginning of the twentieth century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the three principal countries amounted to between 175,000 million and 200,000 million francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent, the income from this sum should reach from 8,000 to 10,000 million francs a year—a sound basis for the imperialist oppression and exploitation of most of the countries and nations of the world, for the capitalist parasitism of a handful of wealthy states!

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* Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902, p. 58; Riesser, op. cit., S. 395 und 404; P. Arndt in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 7, 1916, S. 35; Neymarck in *Bulletin*; Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, p. 492; Lloyd George, Speech in the House of Commons, May 4, 1915, reported in the *Daily Telegraph*, May 5, 1915; B. Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena, 1912, S. 235 et seq.; Dr. Siegmund Schilder, *Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1912, Band I, S. 150; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments, etc.", in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910-11, p. 167 et seq.; Georges Diouritch, *L'Expansion des banques allemandes à l'étranger, ses rapports avec le développement économique de l'Allemagne*, Paris, 1909, p. 84.

How is this capital invested abroad distributed among the various countries? *Where* is it invested? Only an approximate answer can be given to these questions, but it is one sufficient to throw light on certain general relations and connections of modern imperialism.

Distribution (Approximate) of Foreign Capital in Different Parts of the Globe (circa 1910)

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Total
	(000,000,000 marks)			
Europe	4	23	18	45
America	37	4	10	51
Asia, Africa and Australia . . .	29	8	7	44
Total . . .	70	35	35	140

The principal spheres of investment of British capital are the British colonies, which are very large also in America (for example, Canada), not to mention Asia, etc. In this case, enormous exports of capital are bound up most closely with vast colonies, of the importance of which for imperialism I shall speak later. In the case of France the situation is different. French capital exports are invested mainly in Europe, primarily in Russia (at least ten thousand million francs). This is mainly *loan* capital, government loans, and not capital invested in industrial undertakings. Unlike British colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism. In the case of Germany, we have a third type; colonies are inconsiderable, and German capital invested abroad is divided most evenly between Europe and America.

The export of capital influences and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capital-exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world.

The capital-exporting countries are nearly always able to obtain certain "advantages", the character of which throws light on the peculiarity of the epoch of finance capital and

monopoly. The following passage, for instance, appeared in the Berlin review, *Die Bank*, for October 1913:

"A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being played on the international capital market. Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming into the big money market with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans. The money markets are not very bright at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a loan for fear that its neighbour may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so secure some reciprocal service. In these international transactions the creditor nearly always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favourable clause in a commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract to construct a harbour, a fat concession, or an order for guns."*

Finance capital has created the epoch of monopolies, and monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist principles: the utilisation of "connections" for profitable transactions takes the place of competition on the open market. The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country, particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. In the course of the last two decades (1890-1910), France has very often resorted to this method. The export of capital thus becomes a means of encouraging the export of commodities. In this connection, transactions between particularly big firms assume a form which, as Schilder** "mildly" puts it, "borders on corruption". Krupp in Germany, Schneider in France, Armstrong in Britain are instances of firms which have close connections with powerful banks and governments and which cannot easily be "ignored" when a loan is being arranged.

France, when granting loans to Russia, "squeezed" her in the commercial treaty of September 16, 1905, stipulating for certain concessions to run till 1917. She did the same in the commercial treaty with Japan of August 19, 1911. The tariff war between Austria and Serbia, which lasted,

* *Die Bank*, 1913, 2, S. 1024.
** Schilder, op. cit., S. 346, 350, 371.

with a seven months' interval, from 1906 to 1911, was partly caused by Austria and France competing to supply Serbia with war materials. In January 1912, Paul Deschanel stated in the Chamber of Deputies that from 1908 to 1911 French firms had supplied war materials to Serbia to the value of 45 million francs.

A report from the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Sao-Paulo (Brazil) states: "The Brazilian railways are being built chiefly by French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial operations connected with the construction of these railways the countries involved stipulate for orders for the necessary railway materials."

Thus finance capital, literally, one might say, spreads its net over all countries of the world. An important role in this is played by banks founded in the colonies and by their branches. German imperialists look with envy at the "old" colonial countries which have been particularly "successful" in providing for themselves in this respect. In 1904, Great Britain had 50 colonial banks with 2,279 branches (in 1910 there were 72 banks with 5,449 branches); France had 20 with 136 branches; Holland, 16 with 68 branches; and Germany had "only" 13 with 70 branches.* The American capitalists, in their turn, are jealous of the English and German: "In South America," they complained in 1915, "five German banks have forty branches and five British banks have seventy branches.... Britain and Germany have invested in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the last twenty-five years approximately four thousand million dollars, and as a result together enjoy 46 per cent of the total trade of these three countries."**

The capital-exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But finance capital has led to the *actual* division of the world.

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* Riesser, op. cit., 4th ed., S. 375, Diouritch, p. 283.

** *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. LIX, May 1915, p. 301. In the same volume on p. 331, we read that the well-known statistician Paish, in the last issue of the financial magazine *The Statist*, estimated the amount of capital exported by Britain, Germany, France, Belgium and Holland at $40,000 million, i.e., 200,000 million francs.

V. DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST ASSOCIATIONS

Monopolist capitalist associations, cartels, syndicates and trusts first divided the home market among themselves and obtained more or less complete possession of the industry of their own country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial connections and "spheres of influence" of the big monopolist associations expanded in all ways, things "naturally" gravitated towards an international agreement among these associations, and towards the formation of international cartels.

This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding stages. Let us see how this supermonopoly develops.

The electrical industry is highly typical of the latest technical achievements and is most typical of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. This industry has developed most in the two leaders of the new capitalist countries, the United States and Germany. In Germany, the crisis of 1900 gave a particularly strong impetus to its concentration. During the crisis, the banks, which by that time had become fairly well merged with industry, enormously accelerated and intensified the ruin of relatively small firms and their absorption by the large ones. "The banks," writes Jeidels, "refused a helping hand to the very firms in greatest need of capital, and brought on first a frenzied boom and then the hopeless failure of the companies which have not been connected with them closely enough."*

As a result, after 1900, concentration in Germany progressed with giant strides. Up to 1900 there had been seven or eight "groups" in the electrical industry. Each consisted of several companies (altogether there were 28) and each was backed by from 2 to 11 banks. Between 1908 and 1912 all these groups were merged into two, or one. The following diagram shows the process:

* Jeidels, op. cit., S. 232.

Groups in the Electrical Industry

Prior to 1900	Felten & Guillaume	Lahmeyer	Union A.E.G.	Siemens & Halske	Schuckert & Co.	Berg-mann	Kum-mer
	Felten & Lahmeyer		A.E.G. (G.E.C.)	Siemens & Halske-Schuckert		Berg-mann	Failed in 1900
By 1912:	A.E.G. (G.E.C.) Siemens & Halske-Schuckert						
	(In close "co-operation" since 1908)						

The famous A.E.G. (General Electric Company), which grew up in this way, controls 175 to 200 companies (through the "holding" system), and a total capital of approximately *1,500* million marks. Of direct agencies abroad alone, it has thirty-four, of which twelve are joint-stock companies, in more than ten countries. As early as 1904 the amount of capital invested abroad by the German electrical industry was estimated at 233 million marks. Of this sum, 62 million were invested in Russia. Needless to say, the A.E.G. is a huge "combine"—its manufacturing companies alone number no less than sixteen—producing the most diverse articles, from cables and insulators to motor-cars and flying machines.

But concentration in Europe was also a component part of the process of concentration in America, which developed in the following way:

	General Electric Company	
United States:	Thomson-Houston Co. establishes a firm in Europe	Edison Co. establishes in Europe the French Edison Co. which transfers its patents to the German firm
Germany:	Union Electric Co.	General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)
	General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)	

Thus, *two* electrical "great powers" were formed: "there are no other electrical companies in the world *completely* independent of them," wrote Heinig in his article "The Path of the Electric Trust". An idea, although far from complete, of the turnover and the size of the enterprises of the two "trusts" can be obtained from the following figures:

		Turnover (000,000 marks)	Number of employees	Net profits (000,000 marks)
America: General Electric Co. (G.E.C.)	1907	252	28,000	35.4
	1910	298	32,000	45.6
Germany: General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)	1907	216	30,700	14.5
	1911	362	60,800	21.7

And then, in 1907 the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world between them. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company (G.E.C.) "got" the United States and Canada. The German General Electric Company (A.E.G.) "got" Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the penetration of "daughter companies" into new branches of industry, into "new" countries formally not yet allotted. The two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments.*

The difficulty of competing against this trust, actually a single world-wide trust controlling a capital of several thousand million, with "branches", agencies, representatives, connections, etc., in every corner of the world, is self-evident. But the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude *redivision* if the relation of forces changes as result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.

An instructive example of an attempt at such a redivision, of the struggle for redivision, is provided by the oil industry.

"The world oil market," wrote Jeidels in 1905, "is even today still divided between two great financial groups—Rockefeller's American Standard Oil Co., and Rothschild and Nobel, the controlling interests of the Russian oilfields in Baku. The two groups are closely connected. But for several years five enemies have been threatening their monopoly"**: (1) the exhaustion of the American oilfields;

* Riesser, op cit.; Diouritch, op. cit., p. 239; Kurt Heinig, op. cit.

** Jeidels, op. cit., S. 193.

(2) the competition of the firm of Mantashev of Baku; (3) the Austrian oilfields; (4) the Rumanian oilfields; (5) the overseas oilfields, particularly in the Dutch colonies (the extremely rich firms, Samuel, and Shell, also connected with British capital). The three last groups are connected with the big German banks, headed by the huge Deutsche Bank. These banks independently and systematically developed the oil industry in Rumania, for example, in order to have a foothold of their "own". In 1907, the foreign capital invested in the Rumanian oil industry was estimated at 185 million francs, of which 74 million was German capital.*

A struggle began for the "division of the world", as, in fact, it is called in economic literature. On the one hand, the Rockefeller "oil trust" wanted to lay its hands on *everything*; it formed a "daughter company" *right in* Holland, and bought up oilfields in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other hand, the Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at "retaining" Rumania "for themselves" and at uniting her with Russia against Rockefeller. The latter possessed for more capital and an excellent system of oil transportation and distribution. The struggle had to end, and did end in 1907, with the utter defeat of the Deutsche Bank, which was confronted with the alternative: either to liquidate its "oil interests" and lose millions, or submit. It chose to submit, and concluded a very disadvantageous agreement with the "oil trust". The Deutsche Bank agreed "not to attempt anything which might injure American interests". Provision was made, however, for the annulment of the agreement in the event of Germany establishing a state oil monopoly.

Then the "comedy of oil" began. One of the German finance kings, von Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche Bank, through his private secretary, Stauss, launched a campaign *for* a state oil monopoly. The gigantic machine of the huge German bank and all its wide "connections" were set in motion. The press bubbled over with "patriotic" indignation against the "yoke" of the American trust, and, on March 15, 1911, the Reichstag, by an almost unanimous vote, adopted

* Diouritch, op. cit., p. 245.

a motion asking the government to introduce a bill for the establishment of an oil monopoly. The government seized upon this "popular" idea, and the game of the Deutsche Bank, which hoped to cheat its American counterpart and improve its business by a state monopoly, appeared to have been won. The German oil magnates already saw visions of enormous profits, which would not be less than those of the Russian sugar refiners.... But, firstly, the big German banks quarrelled among themselves over the division of the spoils. The Disconto-Gesellschaft exposed the covetous aims of the Deutsche Bank; secondly, the government took fright at the prospect of a struggle with Rockefeller, for it was very doubtful whether Germany could be sure of obtaining oil from other sources (the Rumanian output was small); thirdly, just at that time the 1913 credits of a thousand million marks were voted for Germany's war preparations. The oil monopoly project was postponed. The Rockefeller "oil trust" came out of the struggle, for the time being, victorious.

The Berlin review, *Die Bank*, wrote in this connection that Germany could fight the oil trust only by establishing an electricity monopoly and by converting water-power into cheap electricity. "But," the author added, "the electricity monopoly will come when the producers need it, that is so say, when the next great crash in the electrical industry is imminent, and when the gigantic, expensive power stations now being put up at great cost everywhere by private electrical concerns, which are already obtaining certain franchises from towns, from states, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water-power will then have to be used. But it will be impossible to convert it into cheap electricity at state expense; it will also have to be handed over to a 'private monopoly controlled by the state', because private industry has already concluded a number of contracts and has stipulated for heavy compensation.... So it was with the nitrate monopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly, so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by a beautiful principle, understood, at last, that in Germany the monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result, of benefiting the consumer, or even of handing over to the state part of the promoter's profits; they have served

only to facilitate, at the expense of the state, the recovery of private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy."*

Such are the valuable admissions which the German bourgeois economists are forced to make. We see plainly here how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the epoch of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world.

In merchant shipping, the tremendous development of concentration has ended also in the division of the world. In Germany two powerful companies have come to the fore: the Hamburg-Amerika and the Norddeutscher Lloyd, each having a capital of 200 million marks (in stocks and bonds) and possessing shipping tonnage to the value of 185 to 189 million marks. On the other hand, in America, on January 1, 1903, the International Mercantile Marine Co., known as the Morgan trust was formed; it united nine American and British steamship companies, and possessed a capital of 120 million dollars (480 million marks). As early as 1903, the German giants and this American-British trust concluded an agreement to divide the world with a consequent division of profits. The German companies undertook not to compete in the Anglo-American traffic. Which ports were to be "allotted" to each was precisely stipulated; a joint committee of control was set up, etc. This agreement was concluded for twenty years, with the prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war.**

Extremely instructive also is the story of the formation of the International Rail Cartel. The first attempt of the British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers to form such a cartel was made as early as 1884, during a severe industrial depression. The manufacturers agreed not to compete with one another in the home markets of the countries involved, and they divided the foreign markets in the following quotas: Great Britain, 66 per cent; Germany, 27 per cent; Belgium, 7 per cent. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain. Joint war was declared against a British firm which remained outside the cartel, the cost of which

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* *Die Bank*, 1912, 1, S. 1036; 1912, 2, S. 629; 1913, 1, S. 388.
** Riesser, op. cit., S. 125.

was met by a percentage levy on all sales. But in 1886 the cartel collapsed when two British firms retired from it. It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved during subsequent boom periods.

At the beginning of 1904, the German steel syndicate was formed. In November 1904, the International Rail Cartel was revived, with the following quotas: Britain, 53.5 per cent, Germany, 28.83 per cent; Belgium, 17.67 per cent. France came in later and received 4.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 6.4 per cent in the first, second and third year respectively, over and above the 100 per cent limit, i.e., out of a total of 104.8 per cent, etc. In 1905, the United States Steel Corporation entered the cartel; then Austria and Spain. "At the present time," wrote Vogelstein in 1910, "the division of the world is complete, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways—since the world has been parcelled out without consideration for their interests—can now dwell like the poet in the heavens of Jupiter."*

Let me also mention the International Zinc Syndicate which was established in 1909 and which precisely apportioned output among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish and British; and also the International Dynamite Trust, which, Liefmann says, is "quite a modern, close alliance of all the German explosives manufacturers who, with the French and American dynamite manufacturers, organised in a similar manner, have divided the whole world among themselves, so to speak".**

Liefmann calculated that in 1897 there were altogether about forty international cartels in which Germany had a share, while in 1910 there were about a hundred.

Certain bourgeois writers (now joined by Karl Kautsky, who has completely abandoned the Marxist position he had held, for example, in 1909) have expressed the opinion that international cartels, being one of the most striking expressions of the internationalisation of capital, give the hope of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically, this opinion is absolutely absurd, while in practice it is sophistry and a dishonest defence of the worst opportunism.

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* Vogelstein, *Organisationsformen*, S. 100.

** Liefmann, *Kartelle und Trusts*, 2. A., S. 161.

International cartels show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed, and *the object* of the struggle between the various capitalist associations. This last circumstance is the most important; it alone shows us the historico-economic meaning of what is taking place; for the *forms* of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with varying, relatively specific and temporary causes, but the *substance* of the struggle, its class *content*, positively *cannot* change while classes exist. Naturally, it is in the interests of, for example, the German bourgeoisie, to whose side Kautsky has in effect gone over in his theoretical arguments (I shall deal with this later), to obscure the *substance* of the present economic struggle (the division of the world) and to emphasise now this and now another *form* of the struggle. Kautsky makes the same mistake. Of course, we have in mind not only the German bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie all over the world. The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it "in proportion to capital", "in proportion to strength", because there cannot be any other method of division under commodity production and capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength. The question as to whether these changes are "purely" economic or *non*-economic (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which cannot in the least affect fundamental views on the latest epoch of capitalism. To substitute the question of the form of the struggle and agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow warlike, the next day warlike again) for the question of the *substance* of the struggle and agreements between capitalist associations is to sink to the role of a sophist.

The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, *based* on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for spheres of influence".

VI. DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS

In his book, on "the territorial development of the European colonies", A. Supan,* the geographer, gives the following brief summary of this development at the end of the nineteenth century:

Percentage of Territory Belonging to the European Colonial Powers (Including the United States)

	1876	1900	Increase or decrease
Africa	10.8	90.4	+79.6
Polynesia	56.8	98.9	+42.1
Asia	51.5	56.6	+ 5.1
Australia	100.0	100.0	—
America	27.5	27.2	— 0.3

"The characteristic feature of this period," he concludes, "is, therefore, the division of Africa and Polynesia." As there are no unoccupied territories—that is, territories that do not belong to any state—in Asia and America, it is necessary to amplify Supan's conclusion and say that the characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partitioning of the globe—final, not in the sense that *repartition* is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and inevitable—but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has *completed* the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future *only* redivision is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one "owner" to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an "owner".

Hence, we are living in a peculiar epoch of world colonial policy, which is most closely connected with the "latest stage in the development of capitalism", with finance capital. For this reason, it is essential first of all to deal in greater detail with the facts, in order to ascertain as exactly as possible what distinguishes this epoch from those preceding it, and what the present situation is. In the first

* A. Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien*, 1906, S. 254.

place, two questions of fact arise here: is an intensification of colonial policy, a sharpening of the struggle for colonies, observed precisely in the epoch of finance capital? And how, in this respect, is the world divided at the present time?

The American writer, Morris, in his book on the history of colonisation,* made an attempt to sum up the data on the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Germany during different periods of the nineteenth century. The following is a brief summary of the results he has obtained:

Colonial Possessions

	Great Britain		France		Germany	
Year	Area (000,000 sq. m.)	Pop. (000,000)	Area (000,000 sq. m.)	Pop. (000,000)	Area (000,000 sq. m.)	Pop. (000,000)
1815-30	?	126.4	0.02	0.5	—	—
1860	2.5	145.1	0.2	3.4	—	—
1880	7.7	267.9	0.7	7.5	—	—
1899	9.3	309.0	3.7	56.4	1.0	14.7

For Great Britain, the period of the enormous expansion of colonial conquests was that between 1860 and 1880, and it was also very considerable in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. For France and Germany this period falls precisely in these twenty years. We saw above that the development of pre-monopoly capitalism, of capitalism in which free competition was predominant, reached its limit in the 1860s and 1870s. We now see that it is *precisely after that period* that the tremendous "boom" in colonial conquests begins, and that the struggle for the territorial division of the world becomes extraordinarily sharp. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that capitalism's transition to the stage of monopoly capitalism, to finance capital, *is connected* with the intensification of the struggle for the partitioning of the world.

Hobson, in his work on imperialism, marks the years 1884-1900 as the epoch of intensified "expansion" of the chief European states. According to his estimate, Great Britain during these years acquired 3,700,000 square miles

* Henry C. Morris, *The History of Colonization*, New York, 1900, Vol. II, p. 88; Vol. I, p. 419; Vol. II, p. 304.

of territory with 57,000,000 inhabitants; France, 3,600,000 square miles with 36,500,000; Germany, 1,000,000 square miles with 14,700,000; Belgium, 900,000 square miles with 30,000,000; Portugal, 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants. The scramble for colonies by all the capitalist states at the end of the nineteenth century and particularly since the 1880s is a commonly known fact in the history of diplomacy and of foreign policy.

In the most flourishing period of free competition in Great Britain, i.e., between 1840 and 1860, the leading British bourgeois politicians were *opposed* to colonial policy and were of the opinion that the liberation of the colonies, their complete separation from Britain, was inevitable and desirable. M. Beer, in an article, "Modern British Imperialism",* published in 1898, shows that in 1852, Disraeli, a statesman who was generally inclined towards imperialism, declared: "The colonies are millstones round our necks." But at the end of the nineteenth century the British heroes of the hour were Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, who openly advocated imperialism and applied the imperialist policy in the most cynical manner!

It is not without interest to observe that even then these leading British bourgeois politicians saw the connection between what might be called the purely economic and the socio-political roots of modern imperialism. Chamberlain advocated imperialism as a "true, wise and economical policy", and pointed particularly to the German, American and Belgian competition which Great Britain was encountering in the world market. Salvation lies in monopoly, said the capitalists as they formed cartels, syndicates and trusts. Salvation lies in monopoly, echoed the political leaders of the bourgeoisie, hastening to appropriate the parts of the world not yet shared out. And Cecil Rhodes, we are informed by his intimate friend, the journalist Stead, expressed his imperialist views to him in 1895 in the following terms: "I was in the East End of London [a working-class quarter] yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which

* *Die Neue Zeit*, XVI, I, 1898, S. 302.

were just a cry for 'bread! bread!' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism.... My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists."*

That was said in 1895 by Cecil Rhodes, millionaire, a king of finance, the man who was mainly responsible for the Anglo-Boer War. True, his defence of imperialism is crude and cynical, but in substance it does not differ from the "theory" advocated by Messrs. Maslov, Südekum, Potresov, David, the founder of Russian Marxism and others. Cecil Rhodes was a somewhat more honest social-chauvinist....

To present as precise a picture as possible of the territorial division of the world and of the changes which have occurred during the last decades in this respect, I shall utilise the data furnished by Supan in the work already quoted on the colonial possessions of all the powers of the world . Supan takes the years 1876 and 1900, I shall take the year 1876—a year very aptly selected, for it is precisely by that time that the pre-monopolist stage of development of West-European capitalism can be said to have been, in the main, completed—and the year 1914, and instead of Supan's figures I shall quote the more recent statistics of Hübner's *Geographical and Statistical Tables*. Supan gives figures only for colonies; I think it useful, in order to present a complete picture of the division of the world, to add brief data on non-colonial and semi-colonial countries, in which category I place Persia, China and Turkey: the first of these countries is already almost completely a colony, the second and third are becoming such.

We thus get the following result:

* Ibid., S. 304.

Colonial Possessions of the Great Powers
(000,000 square kilometres and 000,000 inhabitants)

	Colonies				Metropolitan countries		Total	
	1876		1914		1914		1914	
	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.
Great Britain .	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5	0.3	46.5	33.8	440.0
Russia. . . .	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2	5.4	136.2	22.8	169.4
France. . . .	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5	0.5	39.6	11.1	95.1
Germany. . .	—	—	2.9	12.3	0.5	64.9	3.4	77.2
United States .	—	—	0.3	9.7	9.4	97.0	9.7	106.7
Japan	—	—	0.3	19.2	0.4	53.0	0.7	72.2
Total for 6 Great Powers	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4	16.5	437.2	81.5	960.0

Colonies of other powers (Belgium, Holland, etc.)	9.9	45.3
Semi-colonial countries (Persia, China, Turkey)	14.5	361.2
Other countries	28.0	289.9
Total for the world	133.9	1,657.0

We clearly see from these figures how "complete" was the partition of the world at the turn of the twentieth century. After 1876 colonial possessions increased to enormous dimensions, by more than fifty per cent, from 40,000,000 to 65,000,000 square kilometres for the six biggest powers; the increase amounts to 25,000,000 square kilometres, fifty per cent more than the area of the metropolitan countries (16,500,000 square kilometres). In 1876 three powers had no colonies, and a fourth, France, had scarcely any. By 1914 these four powers had acquired colonies with an area of 14,100,000 square kilometres, i.e., about half as much again as the area of Europe, with a population of nearly 100,000,000. The unevenness in the rate of expansion of colonial possessions is very great. If, for instance, we compare France, Germany and Japan, which do not differ very

much in area and population, we see that the first has acquired almost three times as much colonial territory as the other two combined. In regard to finance capital, France at the beginning of the period we are considering, was also, perhaps, several times richer than Germany and Japan put together. In addition to, and on the basis of, purely economic conditions, geographical and other conditions also affect the dimensions of colonial possessions. However strong the process of levelling the world, of levelling the economic and living conditions in different countries, may have been in the past decades as a result of the pressure of large-scale industry, exchange and finance capital, considerable differences still remain; and among the six countries mentioned we see, firstly, young capitalist countries (America, Germany, Japan) whose progress has been extraordinarily rapid; secondly, countries with an old capitalist development (France and Great Britain), whose progress lately has been much slower than that of the previously mentioned countries, and thirdly, a country most backward economically (Russia), where modern capitalist imperialism is enmeshed, so to speak, in a particularly close network of pre-capitalist relations.

Alongside the colonial possessions of the Great Powers, we have placed the small colonies of the small states, which are, so to speak, the next objects of a possible and probable "redivision" of colonies. These small states mostly retain their colonies only because the big powers are torn by conflicting interests, friction, etc., which prevent them from coming to an agreement on the division of the spoils. As to the "semi-colonial" states, they provide an example of the transitional forms which are to be found in all spheres of nature and society. Finance capital is such a great, such a decisive, you might say, force in all economic and in all international relations, that it is capable of subjecting, and actually does subject, to itself even states enjoying the fullest political independence; we shall shortly see examples of this. Of course, finance capital finds most "convenient", and derives the greatest profit from, a *form* of subjection which involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries and peoples. In this respect, the semi-colonial countries provide a typical example of the "middle

stage". It is natural that the struggle for these semi-dependent countries should have become particularly bitter in the epoch of finance capital, when the rest of the world has already been divided up.

Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism. But "general" disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: "Greater Rome and Greater Britain."* Even the capitalist colonial policy of *previous* stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital.

The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist associations of big employers. These monopolies are most firmly established when *all* the sources of raw materials are captured by one group, and we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist associations exert every effort to deprive their rivals of all opportunity of competing, to buy up, for example, ironfields, oilfields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle against competitors, including the case of the adversary wanting to be protected by a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.

"It may be asserted," writes Schilder, "although it may sound paradoxical to some, that in the more or less foreseeable future the growth of the urban and industrial population is more likely to be hindered by a shortage of raw materials for industry than by a shortage of food." For example, there is a growing shortage of timber—the price of

* C. P. Lucas, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, Oxford, 1912, or the Earl of Cromer's *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*. London, 1910.

which is steadily rising—of leather, and of raw materials for the textile industry. "Associations of manufacturers are making efforts to create an equilibrium between agriculture and industry in the whole of world economy; as an example of this we might mention the International Federation of Cotton Spinners' Associations in several of the most important industrial countries, founded in 1904, and the European Federation of Flax Spinners' Associations, founded on the same model in 1910."*

Of course, the bourgeois reformists, and among them particularly the present-day adherents of Kautsky, try to belittle the importance of facts of this kind by arguing that raw materials "could be" obtained in the open market without a "costly and dangerous" colonial policy; and that the supply of raw materials "could be" increased enormously by "simply" improving conditions in agriculture in general. But such arguments become an apology for imperialism, an attempt to paint it in bright colours, because they ignore the principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism: monopolies. The free market is becoming more and more a thing of the past; monopolist syndicates and trusts are restricting it with every passing day, and "simply" improving conditions in agriculture means improving the conditions of the masses, raising wages and reducing profits. Where, except in the imagination of sentimental reformists, are there any trusts capable of concerning themselves with the condition of the masses instead of the conquest of colonies?

Finance capital is interested not only in the already discovered sources of raw materials but also in potential sources, because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and land which is useless today may be improved tomorrow if new methods are devised (to this end a big bank can equip a special expedition of engineers, agricultural experts, etc.), and if large amounts of capital are invested. This also applies to prospecting for minerals, to new methods of processing up and utilising raw materials, etc., etc. Hence, the inevitable striving of finance capital to enlarge its spheres of influence and even its actual territory.

* Schilder, op. cit.. S. 38-42.

In the same way that the trusts capitalise their property at two or three times its value, taking into account its "potential" (and not actual) profits and the further results of monopoly, so finance capital in general strives to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds in all places, and by every means, taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be left behind in the fierce struggle for the last remnants of independent territory, or for the repartition of those territories that have been already divided.

The British capitalists are exerting every effort to develop cotton growing in *their* colony, Egypt (in 1904, out of 2,300,000 hectares of land under cultivation, 600,000, or more than one-fourth were under cotton); the Russians are doing the same in *their* colony, Turkestan, because in this way they will be in a better position to defeat their foreign competitors, to monopolise the sources of raw materials and form a more economical and profitable textile trust in which *all* the processes of cotton production and manufacturing will be "combined" and concentrated in the hands of one set of owners.

The interests pursued in exporting capital also give an impetus to the conquest of colonies, for in the colonial market it is easier to employ monopoly methods (and sometimes they are the only methods that can be employed) to eliminate competition, to ensure supplies, to secure the necessary "connections", etc.

The non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulates the striving for colonial conquest. "Finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination," as Hilferding very truly says. And a French bourgeois writer, developing and supplementing, as it were, the ideas of Cecil Rhodes quoted above,* writes that social causes should be added to the economic causes of modern colonial policy: "owing to the growing complexities of life and the difficulties which weigh not only on the masses of the workers, but also on the middle classes, 'impatience, irritation and hatred are accumulating in all the countries of the old civilisation

* See pp. 256-57 of this volume.—Ed.

and are becoming a menace to public order; the energy which is being hurled out of the definite class channel must be given employment abroad in order to avert an explosion at home'."*

Since we are speaking of colonial policy in the epoch of capitalist imperialism, it must be observed that finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of *transitional* forms of state dependence. Not only are the two main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch. We have already referred to one form of dependence—the semi-colony. An example of another is provided by Argentina.

"South America, and especially Argentina," writes Schulze-Gaevernitz in his work on British imperialism, "is so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost a British commercial colony."** Basing himself on the reports of the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Buenos Aires for 1909, Schilder estimated the amount of British capital invested in Argentina at 8,750 million francs. It is not difficult to imagine what strong connections British finance capital (and its faithful "friend", diplomacy) thereby acquires with the Argentine bourgeoisie, with the circles that control the whole of that country's economic and political life.

A somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accompanied by political independence, is presented by Portugal. Portugal is an independent sovereign state, but actually, for more than two hundred years, since the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), it has been a British protectorate. Great Britain has protected Portugal

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* Wahl, *La France aux colonies* quoted by Henri Russier, *Le Partage de l'Océanie*, Paris, 1905, p. 165.

** Schulze-Gaevernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus und englischer Freihandel zu Beginn des 20-ten Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig, 1906, S. 318 Sartorius v. Waltershausen says the same in *Das volkswirtschaftliche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande*, Berlin, 1907, S. 46.

and her colonies in order to fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and France. In return Great Britain has received commercial privileges, preferential conditions for importing goods and especially capital into Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, her telegraph cables, etc., etc.* Relations of this kind have always existed between big and little states, but in the epoch of capitalist imperialism they become a general system, they form part of the sum total of "divide the world" relations and become links in the chain of operations of world finance capital.

In order to finish with the question of the division of the world, I must make the following additional observation. This question was raised quite openly and definitely not only in American literature after the Spanish-American War, and in English literature after the Anglo-Boer War, at the very end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, not only has German literature, which has "most jealously" watched "British imperialism", systematically given its appraisal of this fact. This question has also been raised in French bourgeois literature as definitely and broadly as is thinkable from the bourgeois point of view. Let me quote Driault, the historian, who, in his book, *Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century*, in the chapter "The Great Powers and the Division of the World", wrote the following: "During the past few years, all the free territory of the globe, with the exception of China, has been occupied by the powers of Europe and North America. This has already brought about several conflicts and shifts of spheres of influence, and these foreshadow more terrible upheavals in the near future. For it is necessary to make haste. The nations which have not yet made provision for themselves run the risk of never receiving their share and never participating in the tremendous exploitation of the globe which will be one of the most essential features of the next century [i.e., the twentieth]. That is why all Europe and America have lately been afflicted with the fever of colonial expansion, of 'imperialism', that most noteworthy feature of the

* Schilder, op. cit., Vol. I, S. 160-61.

end of the nineteenth century." And the author added: "In this partition of the world, in this furious hunt for the treasures and the big markets of the globe, the relative strength of the empires founded in this nineteenth century is totally out of proportion to the place occupied in Europe by the nations which founded them. The dominant powers in Europe, the arbiters of her destiny, are *not* equally preponderant in the whole world. And, as colonial might, the hope of controlling as yet unassessed wealth, will evidently react upon the relative strength of the European powers, the colonial question—'imperialism', if you will—which has already modified the political conditions of Europe itself, will modify them more and more."*

VII. IMPERIALISM, AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM

We must now try to sum up, to draw together the threads of what has been said above on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. Free competition is the basic feature of capitalism, and of commodity production generally; monopoly is the exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes, creating large-scale industry and forcing out small industry, replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and carrying concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital

* J.-E. Driault, *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, Paris, 1907, p. 299.

of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate thousands of millions. At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist above it and alongside it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.

If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.

But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate, since we have to deduce from them some especially important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined. And so, without forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the concatenations of a phenomenon in its full development, we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five of its basic features:

(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital", of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in

which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.

We shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind not only the basic, purely economic concepts—to which the above definition is limited—but also the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the two main trends in the working-class movement. The thing to be noted at this point is that imperialism, as interpreted above, undoubtedly represents a special stage in the development of capitalism. To enable the reader to obtain the most well-grounded idea of imperialism, I deliberately tried to quote as extensively as possible *bourgeois* economists who have to admit the particularly incontrovertible facts concerning the latest stage of capitalist economy. With the same object in view, I have quoted detailed statistics which enable one to see to what degree bank capital, etc., has grown, in what precisely the transformation of quantity into quality, of developed capitalism into imperialism, was expressed. Needless to say, of course, all boundaries in nature and in society are conventional and changeable, and it would be absurd to argue, for example, about the particular year or decade in which imperialism "definitely" became established.

In the matter of defining imperialism, however, we have to enter into controversy, primarily, with Karl Kautsky, the principal Marxist theoretician of the epoch of the so-called Second International—that is, of the twenty-five years between 1889 and 1914. The fundamental ideas expressed in our definition of imperialism were very resolutely attacked by Kautsky in 1915, and even in November 1914, when he said that imperialism must not be regarded as a "phase" or stage of economy, but as a policy, a definite policy "preferred" by finance capital; that imperialism must not be "identified" with "present-day capitalism"; that if imperialism is to be understood to mean "all the phenomena of present-day capitalism"—cartels, protection, the domination of the financiers, and colonial policy—then the

question as to whether imperialism is necessary to capitalism becomes reduced to the "flattest tautology", because, in that case, "imperialism is naturally a vital necessity for capitalism", and so on. The best way to present Kautsky's idea is to quote his own definition of imperialism, which is diametrically opposed to the substance of the ideas which I have set forth (for the objections coming from the camp of the German Marxists, who have been advocating similar ideas for many years already, have been long known to Kautsky as the objections of a definite trend in Marxism).

Kautsky's definition is as follows:

"Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex all large areas of *agrarian* [Kautsky's italics] territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit it."*

This definition is of no use at all because it one-sidedly, i.e., arbitrarily, singles out only the national question (although the latter is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism), it arbitrarily and *inaccurately* connects this question *only* with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions.

Imperialism is a striving for annexations—this is what the *political* part of Kautsky's definition amounts to. It is correct, but very incomplete, for politically, imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction. For the moment, however, we are interested in the *economic* aspect of the question, which Kautsky *himself* introduced into *his* definition. The inaccuracies in Kautsky's definition are glaring. The characteristic feature of imperialism is *not* industrial *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that from the eighties onwards, gave rise to the extreme intensification of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely

* *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, 2 (B. 32), S. 909, Sept. 11, 1914; cf. 1915, 2, S. 107 et seq.

that it strives to annex *not only* agrarian territories, but even most highly industrialised regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine), because (1) the fact that the world is already partitioned obliges those contemplating a *redivision* to reach out for *every kind* of territory, and (2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine *his* hegemony. (Belgium is particularly important for Germany as a base for operations against Britain; Britain needs Baghdad as a base for operations against Germany, etc.)

Kautsky refers especially—and repeatedly—to English writers who, he alleges, have given a purely political meaning to the word "imperialism" in the sense that he, Kautsky, understands it. We take up the work by the English writer Hobson, *Imperialism*, which appeared in 1902, and there we read:

"The new imperialism differs from the older, first, in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire the theory and the practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political aggrandisement and commercial gain; secondly, in the dominance of financial or investing over mercantile interests."*

We see that Kautsky is absolutely wrong in referring to English writers generally (unless he meant the vulgar English imperialists, or the avowed apologists for imperialism). We see that Kautsky, while claiming that he continues to advocate Marxism, as a matter of fact takes a step backward compared with the *social-liberal* Hobson, who *more correctly* takes into account two "historically concrete" (Kautsky's definition is a mockery of historical concreteness!) features of modern imperialism: (1) the competition between *several* imperialisms, and (2) the predominance of the financier over the merchant. If it is chiefly a question of the annexation of agrarian countries by industrial countries, then the role of the merchant is put in the forefront.

* Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902, p. 324.

Kautsky's definition is not only wrong and un-Marxist. It serves as a basis for a whole system of views which signify a rupture with Marxist theory and Marxist practice all along the line. I shall refer to this later. The argument about words which Kautsky raises as to whether the latest stage of capitalism should be called imperialism or the stage of finance capital is not worth serious attention. Call it what you will, it makes no difference. The essence of the matter is that Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy "preferred" by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of finance capital. It follows, then, that monopolies in the economy are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics. It follows then, that the territorial division of the world, which was completed during this very epoch of finance capital, and which constitutes the basis of the present peculiar forms of rivalry between the biggest capitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist policy. The result is a slurring-over and a blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism, instead of an exposure of their depth; the result is bourgeois reformism instead of Marxism.

Kautsky enters into controversy with the German apologist of imperialism and annexations, Cunow, who clumsily and cynically argues that imperialism is present-day capitalism; the development of capitalism is inevitable and progressive; therefore imperialism is progressive; therefore, we should grovel before it and glorify it! This is something like the caricature of the Russian Marxists which the Narodniks drew in 1894-95. They argued: if the Marxists believe that capitalism is inevitable in Russia, that it is progressive, then they ought to open a tavern and begin to implant capitalism! Kautsky's reply to Cunow is as follows: imperialism is not present-day capitalism; it is only one of the forms of the policy of present-day capitalism. This policy we can and should fight, fight imperialism, annexations, etc.

The reply seems quite plausible, but in effect it is a more subtle and more disguised (and therefore more dangerous) advocacy of conciliation with imperialism, because a

"fight" against the policy of the trusts and banks that does not affect the economic basis of the trusts and banks is mere bourgeois reformism and pacifism, the benevolent and innocent expression of pious wishes. Evasion of existing contradictions, forgetting the most important of them, instead of revealing their full depth—such is Kautsky's theory, which has nothing in common with Marxism. Naturally, such a "theory" can only serve the purpose of advocating unity with the Cunows!

"From the purely economic point of view," writes Kautsky, "it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go through a new phase, that of the extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism,"* i.e., of a superimperialism, of a union of the imperialisms of the whole world and not struggles among them, a phase when wars shall cease under capitalism, a phase of "the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital".**

We shall have to deal with this "theory of ultra-imperialism" later on in order to show in detail how decisively and completely it breaks with Marxism. At present, in keeping with the general plan of the present work, we must examine the exact economic data on this question. "From the purely economic point of view", is "ultra-imperialism" possible, or is it ultra-nonsense?

If the purely economic point of view is meant to be a "pure" abstraction, then all that can be said reduces itself to the following proposition: development is proceeding towards monopolies, hence, towards a single world monopoly, towards a single world trust. This is indisputable, but it is also as completely meaningless as is the statement that "development is proceeding" towards the manufacture of foodstuffs in laboratories. In this sense the "theory" of ultra-imperialism is no less absurd than a "theory of ultra-agriculture" would be.

If, however, we are discussing the "purely economic" conditions of the epoch of finance capital as a historically concrete epoch which began at the turn of the twentieth

* *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, 2 (B. 32), S. 921, Sept. 11, 1914. Cf. 1915. 2, S. 107 et seq.

** *Die Neue Zeit*, 1915, 1, S. 144, April 30, 1915.

century, then the best reply that one can make to the lifeless abstractions of "ultra-imperialism" (which serve exclusively a most reactionary aim: that of diverting attention from the depth of *existing* antagonisms) is to contrast them with the concrete economic realities of the present-day world economy. Kautsky's utterly meaningless talk about ultra-imperialism encourages, among other things, that profoundly mistaken idea which only brings grist to the mill of the apologists of imperialism, i.e., that the rule of finance capital *lessens* the unevenness and contradictions inherent in the world economy, whereas in reality it *increases* them.

R. Calwer, in his little book, *An Introduction to the World Economy*,* made an attempt to summarise the main, purely economic, data that enable one to obtain a concrete picture of the internal relations of the world economy at the turn of the twentieth century. He divides the world into five "main economic areas", as follows: (1) Central Europe (the whole of Europe with the exception of Russia and Great Britain); (2) Great Britain; (3) Russia; (4) Eastern Asia; (5) America; he includes the colonies in the "areas" of the states to which they belong and "leaves aside" a few countries not distributed according to areas, such as Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia in Asia, Morocco and Abyssinia in Africa, etc.

Here is a brief summary of the economic data he quotes on these regions:

Principal economic areas	Area (000,000 sq. km.)	Population (000,000)	Transport: Railways (000 km.)	Transport: Mercantile fleet (000,000 tons)	Trade: Imports and exports (000,000,000 marks)	Industry: Output (000,000 tons): Coal	Industry: Output (000,000 tons): Iron	Industry: Number of cotton spindles (000,000)
1) Central Europe	27.6 (23.6)**	388 (146)	204	8	41	251	15	26
2) Britain	28.9 (28.6)**	398 (355)	140	11	25	249	9	51
3) Russia	22	131	63	1	3	16	3	7
4) Eastern Asia	12	389	8	1	2	8	0.02	2
5) America	30	148	379	6	14	245	14	19

* R. Calwer, *Einführung in die Weltwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1906.

** The figures in parentheses show the area and population of the colonies.

We see three areas of highly developed capitalism (high development of means of transport, of trade and of industry): the Central European, the British and the American areas. Among these are three states which dominate the world: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Imperialist rivalry and the struggle between these countries have become extremely keen because Germany has only an insignificant area and few colonies; the creation of "Central Europe" is still a matter for the future, it is being born in the midst of a desperate struggle. For the moment the distinctive feature of the whole of Europe is political disunity. In the British and American areas, on the other hand, political concentration is very highly developed, but there is a vast disparity between the immense colonies of the one and the insignificant colonies of the other. In the colonies, however, capitalism is only beginning to develop. The struggle for South America is becoming more and more acute.

There are two areas where capitalism is little developed: Russia and Eastern Asia. In the former, the population is extremely sparse, in the latter it is extremely dense; in the former political concentration is high, in the latter it does not exist. The partitioning of China is only just beginning, and the struggle for it between Japan, the U.S., etc., is continually gaining in intensity.

Compare this reality—the vast diversity of economic and political conditions, the extreme disparity in the rate of development of the various countries, etc., and the violent struggles among the imperialist states—with Kautsky's silly little fable about "peaceful" ultra-imperialism. Is this not the reactionary attempt of a frightened philistine to hide from stern reality? Are not the international cartels which Kautsky imagines are the embryos of "ultra-imperialism" (in the same way as one "can" describe the manufacture of tablets in a laboratory as ultra-agriculture in embryo) an example of the division *and the redivision* of the world, the transition from peaceful division to non-peaceful division and vice versa? Is not American and other finance capital, which divided the whole world peacefully with Germany's participation in, for example, the international rail syndicate, or in the international mercantile

shipping trust, now engaged in *redividing* the world on the basis of a new relation of forces that is being changed by methods *anything but* peaceful?

Finance capital and the trusts do not diminish but increase the differences in the rate of growth of the various parts of the world economy. Once the relation of forces is changed, what other solution of the contradictions can be found *under capitalism* than that of *force*? Railway statistics* provide remarkably exact data on the different rates of growth of capitalism and finance capital in world economy. In the last decades of imperialist development, the total length of railways has changed as follows:

	Railways (000 kilometres)				
	1890		1913	+	
Europe	224		346	+122	
U.S	268		411	+143	
All colonies	82	125	210	+128	+222
Independent and semi-independent states of Asia and America	43		137	+ 94	
Total	617		1,104		

Thus, the development of railways has been most rapid in the colonies and in the independent (and semi-independent) states of Asia and America. Here, as we know, the finance capital of the four or five biggest capitalist states holds undisputed sway. Two hundred thousand kilometres of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of Asia and America represent a capital of more than 40,000 million marks newly invested on particularly advantageous terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.

Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in overseas countries. Among the latter, *new* imperialist powers are emerging (e.g., Japan). The struggle

* *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich*, *1915*; *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, *1892*. Minor details for the distribution of railways among the colonies of the various countries in 1890 had to be estimated approximately.

among the world imperialisms is becoming more acute. The tribute levied by finance capital on the most profitable colonial and overseas enterprises is increasing. In the division of this "booty", an exceptionally large part goes to countries which do not always stand at the top of the list in the rapidity of the development of their productive forces. In the case of the biggest countries, together with their colonies, the total length of railways was as follows:

	(000 kilometres)		
	1890	*1913*	
U.S.	268	413	+145
British Empire	107	208	+101
Russia	32	78	+ 46
Germany	43	68	+ 25
France	41	63	+ 22
Total for 5 powers	491	830	+339

Thus, about 80 per cent of the total existing railways are concentrated in the hands of the five biggest powers. But the concentration of the *ownership* of these railways, the concentration of finance capital, is immeasurably greater since the French and British millionaires, for example, own an enormous amount of shares and bonds in American, Russian and other railways.

Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased the length of "her" railways by 100,000 kilometres, four times as much as Germany. And yet, it is well known that the development of productive forces in Germany, and especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been incomparably more rapid during this period than in Britain—not to speak of France and Russia. In 1892, Germany produced 4,900,000 tons of pig-iron and Great Britain produced 6,800,000 tons; in 1912, Germany produced 17,600,000 tons and Great Britain, 9,000,000 tons. Germany, therefore, had an overwhelming superiority over Britain in this respect.* The question is: what means other

* Cf. also Edgar Crammond, "The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires" in *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, July 1914, p. 777 et seq.

than war could there be *under capitalism* to overcome the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and spheres of influence for finance capital on the other?

VIII. PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM

We now have to examine yet another significant aspect of imperialism to which most of the discussions on the subject usually attach insufficient importance. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist Hilferding is that on this point he has taken a step backward compared with the non-Marxist Hobson. I refer to parasitism, which is characteristic of imperialism.

As we have seen, the deepest economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is capitalist monopoly, i.e., monopoly which has grown out of capitalism and which exists in the general environment of capitalism, commodity production and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. Nevertheless, like all monopoly, it inevitably engenders a tendency to stagnation and decay. Since monopoly prices are established, even temporarily, the motive cause of technical and, consequently, of all other progress disappears to a certain extent and, further, the *economic* possibility arises of deliberately retarding technical progress. For instance, in America, a certain Owens invented a machine which revolutionised the manufacture of bottles. The German bottle-manufacturing cartel purchased Owens's patent, but pigeon-holed it, refrained from utilising it. Certainly, monopoly under capitalism can never completely, and for a very long period of time, eliminate competition in the world market (and this, by the by, is one of the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is so absurd). Certainly, the possibility of reducing the cost of production and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements operates in the direction of change. But the *tendency* to stagnation and decay, which is characteristic of monopoly, continues to operate, and in some branches of industry, in some countries, for certain periods of time, it gains the upper hand.

The monopoly ownership of very extensive, rich or well-situated colonies, operates in the same direction.

Further, imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries, amounting, as we have seen, to 100,000-150,000 million francs in securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a stratum of rentiers, i.e., people who live by "clipping coupons", who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.

"In 1893," writes Hobson, "the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth of the United Kingdom."* Let me remind the reader that by 1915 this capital had increased about two and a half times. "Aggressive imperialism," says Hobson further on, "which costs the tax-payer so dear, which is of so little value to the manufacturer and trader ... is a source of great gain to the investor.... The annual income Great Britain derives from commissions in her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated by Sir. R. Giffen at £18,000,000 [nearly 170 million rubles] for 1899, taken at 2½ per cent, upon a turnover of £800,000,000." Great as this sum is, it cannot explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain, which is explained by the income of £90 million to £100 million from "invested" capital, the income of the rentiers.

The income of the rentiers is *five times greater* than the income obtained from the foreign trade of the biggest "trading" country in the world! This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.

For that reason the term "rentier state" (Rentnerstaat), or usurer state, is coming into common use in the economic literature that deals with imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states. "At the top of the list of foreign investments," says Schulze-Gaevernitz, "are those placed

* Hobson, op. cit., pp. 59, 60.

in politically dependent or allied countries: Great Britain grants loans to Egypt, Japan, China and South America. Her navy plays here the part of bailiff in case of necessity. Great Britain's political power protects her from the indignation of her debtors."* Sartorius von Waltershausen in his book, *The National Economic System of Capital Investments Abroad*, cites Holland as the model "rentier state" and points out that Great Britain and France are now becoming such.** Schilder is of the opinion that five industrial states have become "definitely pronounced creditor countries": Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and, Switzerland. He does not include Holland in this list simply because she is "industrially little developed".*** The United States is a creditor only of the American countries.

"Great Britain," says Schulze-Gaevernitz, "is gradually becoming transformed from an industrial into a creditor state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, there is an increase in the relative importance of income from interest and dividends, issues of securities, commissions and speculation in the whole of the national economy. In my opinion it is precisely this that forms the economic basis of imperialist ascendancy. The creditor is more firmly attached to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer."**** In regard to Germany, A. Lansburgh, the publisher of the Berlin *Die Bank*, in 1911, in an article entitled "Germany—a Rentier State", wrote the following: "People in Germany are ready to sneer at the yearning to become rentiers that is observed in France. But they forget that as far as the bourgeoisie is concerned, the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like that in France."*****

The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the socio-political conditions of the countries concerned, in general, and the two fundamental trends in the working-

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* Schulze-Gaevernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus*, S. 320 et seq.

** Sartorius von Waltershausen, *Das volkswirtschaftliche System, etc.* Berlin, 1907, Buch IV.

*** Schilder, op. cit., S. 393.

**** Schulze-Gaevernitz, op. cit., S. 122.

***** *Die Bank*, 1911, 1, S. 10-11.

class movement, in particular. To demonstrate this in the clearest possible manner let me quote Hobson, who is a most reliable witness, since he cannot be suspected of leaning towards Marxist orthodoxy; on the other hand, he is an Englishman who is very well acquainted with the situation in the country which is richest in colonies, in finance capital, and in imperialist experience.

With the Anglo-Boer War fresh in his mind, Hobson describes the connection between imperialism and the interests of the "financiers", their growing profits from contracts, supplies, etc., and writes: "While the directors of this definitely parasitic policy are capitalists, the same motives appeal to special classes of the workers. In many towns most important trades are dependent upon government employment or contracts; the imperialism of the metal and shipbuilding centres is attributable in no small degree to this fact." Two sets of circumstances, in this writer's opinion, have weakened the old empires: (1) "economic parasitism", and (2) the formation of armies recruited from subject peoples. "There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence." And I shall add that the economic possibility of such bribery, whatever its form may be, requires high monopolist profits.

As for the second circumstance, Hobson writes: "One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire has been done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives."

Hobson gives the following economic appraisal of the prospect of the partitioning of China: "The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the

South of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a larger body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa.... We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western states, a European federation of great powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilisation, might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory [it would be better to say: prospect] as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England today which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors, and political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe today are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards some such consummation."*

The author is quite right: *if* the forces of imperialism had not been counteracted they would have led precisely to what he has described. The significance of a "United States of Europe" in the present imperialist situation is

* Hobson, op. cit., pp. 103, 205, 144, 335, 386.

correctly appraised. He should have added, however, that, also *within* the working-class movement, the opportunists, who are for the moment victorious in most countries, are "working" systematically and undeviatingly in this very direction. Imperialism, which means the partitioning of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, makes it economically possible to bribe the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives shape to, and strengthens opportunism. We must not, however, lose sight of the forces which counteract imperialism in general, and opportunism in particular, and which, naturally, the social-liberal Hobson is unable to perceive.

The German opportunist, Gerhard Hildebrand, who was once expelled from the Party for defending imperialism, and who could today be a leader of the so-called "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany, supplements Hobson well by his advocacy of a "United States of Western Europe" (without Russia) for the purpose of "joint" action ... against the African Negroes, against the "great Islamic movement", for the maintenance of a "powerful army and navy", against a "Sino-Japanese coalition",* etc.

The description of "British imperialism" in Schulze-Gaevernitz's book reveals the same parasitical traits. The national income of Great Britain approximately doubled from 1865 to 1898, while the income "from abroad" increased *ninefold* in the same period. While the "merit" of imperialism is that it "trains the Negro to habits of industry" (you cannot manage without coercion...), the "danger" of imperialism lies in that "Europe will shift the burden of physical toil—first agricultural and mining, then the rougher work in industry—on to the coloured races, and itself be content with the role of rentier, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic, and later, the political emancipation of the coloured races".

An increasing proportion of land in England is being taken out of cultivation and used for sport, for the diversion

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* Gerhard Hildebrand, *Die Erschütterung der Industrieherrschaft und des Industriesozialismus*, 1910, S. 229 et seq.

of the rich. As far as Scotland—the most aristocratic place for hunting and other sports—is concerned, it is said that "it lives on its past and on Mr. Carnegie" (the American multimillionaire). On horse racing and fox hunting alone England annually spends £14,000,000 (nearly 130 million rubles). The number of rentiers in England is about one million. The percentage of the productively employed population to the total population is declining:

	Population England and Wales (000,000)	Workers in basic industries (000,000)	Per cent of total population
1851	17.9	4.1	23
1901	32.5	4.9	15

And in speaking of the British working class the bourgeois student of "British imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century" is obliged to distinguish systematically between the "*upper stratum*" of the workers and the "*lower stratum of the proletariat proper*". The upper stratum furnishes the bulk of the membership of co-operatives, of trade unions, of sporting clubs and of numerous religious sects. To this level is adapted the electoral system, which in Great Britain is still "*sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower stratum of the proletariat proper*"! In order to present the condition of the British working class in a rosy light, only this upper stratum—which constitutes a *minority* of the proletariat—is usually spoken of. For instance, "the problem of unemployment is mainly a London problem and that of the lower proletarian stratum, *to which the politicians attach little importance*...."* He should have said: to which the bourgeois politicians and the "socialist" opportunists attach little importance.

One of the special features of imperialism connected with the facts I am describing, is the decline in emigration from imperialist countries and the increase in immigration into these countries from the more backward countries where lower wages are paid. As Hobson observes, emigration from Great Britain has been declining since 1884. In that year the number of emigrants was 242,000,

* Schulze-Gaevernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus*, S. 301.

while in 1900, the number was 169,000. Emigration from Germany reached the highest point between 1881 and 1890, with a total of 1,453,000 emigrants. In the course of the following two decades, it fell to 544,000 and to 341,000. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of workers entering Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries. According to the 1907 census, there were 1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 agricultural workers.* In France, the workers employed in the mining industry are, "in great part", foreigners: Poles, Italians and Spaniards.** In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the most poorly paid jobs, while American workers provide the highest percentage of overseers or of the better-paid workers.*** Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat.

It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to split the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important distinguishing features of imperialism were already observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century—vast colonial possessions and a monopolist position in the world market. Marx and Engels traced this connection between opportunism in the working-class movement and the imperialist features of British capitalism systematically, during the course of several decades. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx: "The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *alongside* the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable."[91] Almost a quarter of a century later, in

* *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Bd. 211.

** Henger, *Die Kapitalsanlage der Franzosen*, Stuttgart, 1913.

*** Hourwich, *Immigration and Labour*, New York, 1913.

a letter dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks of the "worst English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by, the middle class". In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies."* (Engels expressed similar ideas in the press in his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, which appeared in 1892.)

This clearly shows the causes and effects. The causes are: (1) exploitation of the whole world by this country; (2) its monopolist position in the world market; (3) its colonial monopoly. The effects are: (I) a section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois; (2) a section of the proletariat allows itself to be led by men bought by, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie. The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the division of the world among a handful of states, each of which today exploits (in the sense of drawing superprofits from) a part of the "whole world" only a little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858; each of them occupies a monopolist position in the world market thanks to trusts, cartels, finance capital and creditor and debtor relations; each of them enjoys to some degree a colonial monopoly (we have seen that out of the total of 75,000,000 sq. km., which comprise the *whole* colonial world, *65,000,000* sq. km., or 86 per cent, belong to six powers; *61,000,000* sq. km., or 81 per cent, belong to three powers).

The distinctive feature of the present situation is the prevalence of such economic and political conditions that are bound to increase the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working-class movement: imperialism has grown from an embryo into the predominant system; capitalist monopolies occupy

* Briefwechsel von Marx und Engels, Bd. II, S. 290, IV, 433.—Karl Kautsky, *Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik*, Berlin, 1907, S. 79; this pamphlet was written by Kautsky in those infinitely distant days when he was still a Marxist.

first place in economics and politics; the division of the world has been completed; on the other hand, instead of the undivided monopoly of Great Britain, we see a few imperialist powers contending for the right to share in this monopoly, and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the early twentieth century. Opportunism cannot now be completely triumphant in the working-class movement of one country for decades as it was in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century; but in a number of countries it has grown ripe, overripe, and rotten, and has become completely merged with bourgeois policy in the form of "social-chauvinism".*

IX. CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM

By the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, we mean the attitude of the different classes of society towards imperialist policy in connection with their general ideology.

The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extraordinarily dense and widespread network of relationships and connections which subordinates not only the small and medium, but also the very small capitalists and small masters, on the one hand, and the increasingly intense struggle waged against other national state groups of financiers for the division of the world and domination over other countries, on the other hand, cause the propertied classes to go over entirely to the side of imperialism. "General" enthusiasm over the prospects of imperialism, furious defence of it and painting it in the brightest colours—such are the signs of the times. Imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes. The leaders of the present-day, so-called, "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany are justly called "social-imperialists", that is, socialists in words and imperialists in deeds; but

* Russian social-chauvinism in its overt form, represented by the Potresovs, Chkhenkelis, Maslovs, etc., and in its covert form (Chkheidze, Skobelev, Axelrod, Martov, etc.), also emerged from the Russian variety of opportunism, namely, liquidationism.

as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence in Britain of "Fabian imperialists" who belonged to the opportunist Fabian Society.

Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defence of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they obscure its complete domination and its deep-going roots, strive to push specific and secondary details into the forefront and do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for "reform", such as police supervision of the trusts or banks, etc. Cynical and frank imperialists who are bold enough to admit the absurdity of the idea of reforming the fundamental characteristics of imperialism are a rarer phenomenon.

Here is an example. The German imperialists attempt, in the magazine *Archives of World Economy*, to follow the national emancipation movements in the colonies, particularly, of course, in colonies other than those belonging to Germany. They note the unrest and the protest movements in India, the movement in Natal (South Africa), in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them, commenting on an English report of a conference held on June 28-30, 1910, of representatives of various subject nations and races, of peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe who are under foreign rule, writes as follows in appraising the speeches delivered at this conference: "We are told that we must fight imperialism; that the ruling states should recognise the right of subject peoples to independence; that an international tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the great powers and weak peoples. Further than the expression of these pious wishes they do not go. We see no trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is inseparably bound up with capitalism in its present form and that, therefore [!!], an open struggle against imperialism would be hopeless, unless, perhaps, the fight were to be confined to protest against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses."* Since the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a "pious wish", since the bourgeois representatives of the oppressed nations go no

* *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. II, S. 193.

"further" forward, the bourgeois representative of an oppressing nation goes "further" *backward*, to servility towards imperialism under cover of the claim to be "scientific". That is also "logic"!

The questions as to whether it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backward, towards allaying these antagonisms, are fundamental questions in the critique of imperialism. Since the specific political features of imperialism are reaction everywhere and increased national oppression due to the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, a petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism arose at the beginning of the twentieth century in nearly all imperialist countries. Kautsky not only did not trouble to oppose, was not only unable to oppose this petty-bourgeois reformist opposition, which is really reactionary in its economic basis, but became merged with it in practice, and this is precisely where Kautsky and the broad international Kautskian trend deserted Marxism.

In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the "anti-imperialists", the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy, who declared this war to be "criminal", regarded the annexation of foreign territories as a violation of the Constitution, declared that the treatment of Aguinaldo, leader of the Filipinos (the Americans promised him the independence of his country, but later landed troops and annexed it), was "Jingo treachery", and quoted the words of Lincoln: "When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism."* But as long as all this criticism shrank from recognising the inseverable bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the foundations of capitalism, while it shrank from joining the forces engendered by large-scale capitalism and its development—it remained a "pious wish".

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* J. Patouillet, *L'impérialisme américain*, Dijon, 1904, p. 272.

This is also the main attitude taken by Hobson in his critique of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in protesting against the "inevitability of imperialism" argument, and in urging the necessity of "increasing the consuming capacity" of the people (under capitalism!). The petty-bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism the omnipotence of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is adopted by the authors I have often quoted, such as Agahd, A. Lansburgh, L. Eschwege, and among the French writers Victor Berard, author of a superficial book entitled *England and Imperialism* which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to be Marxists, contrast imperialism with free competition and democracy, condemn the Baghdad railway scheme, which is leading to conflicts and war, utter "pious wishes" for peace, etc. This applies also to the compiler of international stock and share issue statistics, A. Neymarck, who, after calculating the thousands of millions of francs representing "international" securities, exclaimed in 1912: "Is it possible to believe that peace may be disturbed ... that, in the face of these enormous figures, anyone would risk starting a war?"*

Such simple-mindedness on the part of the bourgeois economists is not surprising; moreover, *it is in their interest* to pretend to be so naïve and to talk "seriously" about peace under imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky's Marxism, when, in 1914, 1915 and 1916, he takes up the same bourgeois-reformist point of view and affirms that "everybody is agreed" (imperialists, pseudo-socialists and social-pacifists) on the matter of peace? Instead of an analysis of imperialism and an exposure of the depths of its contradictions, we have nothing but a reformist "pious wish" to wave them aside, to evade them.

Here is a sample of Kautsky's economic criticism of imperialism. He takes the statistics of the British export and import trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912; it seems that this export and import trade has grown more slowly than British foreign trade as a whole. From this Kautsky concludes that "we have no reason to suppose that without

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* *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique*, T. XIX. livr. II, p. 225.

military occupation the growth of British trade with Egypt would have been less, simply as a result of the mere operation of economic factors". "The urge of capital to expand ... can be best promoted, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by peaceful democracy."*

This argument of Kautsky's, which is repeated in every key by his Russian armour-bearer (and Russian shielder of the social-chauvinists), Mr. Spectator,[92] constitutes the basis of Kautskian critique of imperialism, and that is why we must deal with it in greater detail. We will begin with a quotation from Hilferding, whose conclusions Kautsky on many occasions, and notably in April 1915, has declared to have been "unanimously adopted by all socialist theoreticians".

"It is not the business of the proletariat," writes Hilferding, "to contrast the more progressive capitalist policy with that of the now bygone era of free trade and of hostility towards the state. The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade, but socialism. The aim of proletarian policy cannot today be the ideal of restoring free competition—which has now become a reactionary ideal—but the complete elimination of competition by the abolition of capitalism."**

Kautsky broke with Marxism by advocating in the epoch of finance capital a "reactionary ideal", "peaceful democracy", "the mere operation of economic factors", for *objectively* this ideal drags us back from monopoly to non-monopoly capitalism, and is a reformist swindle.

Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semi-colony) "would have grown more" *without* military occupation, without imperialism, and without finance capital. What does this mean? That capitalism would have developed more rapidly if free competition had not been restricted by monopolies in general, or by the "corrections", yoke (i.e., also the monopoly) of finance capital, or by the monopolist possession of colonies by certain countries?

Kautsky's argument can have no other meaning; and

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* Kautsky, *Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund*, Nürnberg, 1915, S. 72, 70.

** *Finance Capital*, p. 567.

this "meaning" is meaningless. Let us assume that free competition, without any sort of monopoly, *would* have developed capitalism and trade more rapidly. But the more rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which *gives rise* to monopoly. And monopolies have *already* arisen—precisely *out of* free competition! Even if monopolies have now begun to retard progress, it is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible after it has given rise to monopoly.

Whichever way one turns Kautsky's argument, one will find nothing in it except reaction and bourgeois reformism.

Even if we correct this argument and say, as Spectator says, that the trade of the colonies with Britain is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries, it does not save Kautsky; for it is *also* monopoly, *also* imperialism that is beating Great Britain, only it is the monopoly and imperialism of another country (America, Germany). It is known that the cartels have given rise to a new and peculiar form of protective tariffs, i.e., goods suitable for export are protected (Engels noted this in Vol. III of *Capital*[93]). It is known, too, that the cartels and finance capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of "exporting goods at cut-rate prices", or "dumping", as the English call it: within a given country the cartel sells its goods at high monopoly prices, but sells them abroad at a much lower price to undercut the competitor, to enlarge its own production to the utmost, etc. If Germany's trade with the British colonies is developing more rapidly than Great Britain's, it only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger and better organised than British imperialism, is superior to it; but it by no means proves the "superiority" of free trade, for it is not a fight between free trade and protection and colonial dependence, but between two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is more potent than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs: to use this as an "argument" in favour of free trade and "peaceful democracy" is banal, it means forgetting the essential features and characteris-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

tics of imperialism, substituting petty-bourgeois reformism for Marxism.

It is interesting to note that even the bourgeois economist, A. Lansburgh, whose criticism of imperialism is as petty-bourgeois as Kautsky's, nevertheless got closer to a more scientific study of trade statistics. He did not compare one single country, chosen at random, and one single colony with the other countries; he examined the export trade of an imperialist country: (1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, and borrow money from it; and (2) with countries which are financially independent. He obtained the following results:

Export Trade of Germany (000,000 marks)

		1889	1908	Per cent increase
To countries financially independent of Germany	Rumania	48.2	70.8	47
	Portugal	19.0	32.8	73
	Argentina	60.7	147.0	143
	Brazil	48.7	84.5	73
	Chile	28.3	52.4	85
	Turkey	29.9	64.0	114
	Total	*234.8*	*451.5*	*92*
To countries financially dependent on Germany	Great Britain	651.8	997.4	53
	France	210.2	437.9	108
	Belgium	137.2	322.8	135
	Switzerland	177.4	401.1	127
	Australia	21.2	64.5	205
	Dutch East Indies	8.8	40.7	363
	Total	*1,206.6*	*2,264.4*	*87*

Lansburgh did not draw *conclusions* and therefore, strangely enough, failed to observe that *if* the figures prove anything at all, they prove that *he is wrong*, for the exports to countries financially dependent on Germany have grown *more rapidly*, if only slightly, than exports to the countries which are financially independent. (I emphasise the "if", for Lansburgh's figures are far from complete.)

Tracing the connection between exports and loans, Lansburgh writes:

"In 1890-91, a Rumanian loan was floated through the German banks, which had already in previous years made

advances on this loan.. It was used chiefly to purchase railway materials in Germany. In 1891, German exports to Rumania amounted to 55 million marks. The following year they dropped to 39.4 million marks and, with fluctuations, to 25.4 million in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891, thanks to two new loans.

"German exports to Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000 (1890); then, in the two following years, they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000, and regained their former level only in 1903.

"The figures of German trade with Argentina are still more striking. Loans were floated in 1888 and 1890; German exports to Argentina reached 60,700,000 marks (1889). Two years later they amounted to only 18,600,000 marks, less than one-third of the previous figure. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889, and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations, and with other credit operations.

"Exports to Chile, as a consequence of the loan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks (in 1892), and a year later dropped to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of exports to 84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908."*

From these facts Lansburgh draws the amusing petty-bourgeois moral of how unstable and irregular export trade is when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of "naturally" and "harmoniously" developing home industry, how "costly" are the millions in bakhshish that Krupp has to pay in floating foreign loans, etc. But the facts tell us clearly: the increase in exports is connected with *just these* swindling tricks of finance capital, which is not concerned with bourgeois morality, but with skinning the ox twice—first, it pockets the profits from the loan; then it pockets other profits from the *same* loan which the borrower uses to make purchases from Krupp, or to purchase railway material from the Steel Syndicate, etc.

* *Die Bank*, 1909, 2, S. 819 et seq.

I repeat that I do not by any means consider Lansburgh's figures to be perfect; but I had to quote them because they are more scientific than Kautsky's and Spectator's and because Lansburgh showed the correct way to approach the question. In discussing the significance of finance capital in regard to exports, etc., one must be able to single out the connection of exports especially and solely with the tricks of the financiers, especially and solely with the sale of goods by cartels, etc. Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism, one semi-colony or colony (Egypt) with all other countries, is to evade and to obscure the very *essence* of the question.

Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves only as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that it evades and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital and "honest" trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and non-cartelised industry, on the other, etc.

The notorious theory of "ultra-imperialism", invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. Compare his arguments on this subject in 1915, with Hobson's arguments in 1902.

Kautsky: "...Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question."*

Hobson: "Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilised dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present

* *Die Neue Zeit*, April 30, 1915, S. 144.

tendencies, and one which would offer the best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism."

Kautsky called ultra-imperialism or super-imperialism what Hobson, thirteen years earlier, described as inter-imperialism. Except for coining a new and clever catchword, replacing one Latin prefix by another, the only progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of "scientific" thought is that he gave out as Marxism what Hobson, in effect, described as the cant of English parsons. After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural for this highly honourable caste to exert their main efforts to *console* the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the battlefields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay higher taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism, which can ensure permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the English parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance of Kautsky's "theory" is this: it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary "ultra-imperialism" of the future. Deception of the masses—that is all there is in Kautsky's "Marxist" theory.

Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semi-colonial countries, with a population of six to seven hundred million, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers: Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. Let us assume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one another in order to protect or enlarge their possessions, their interests and their spheres of influence in these Asiatic states; these alliances will be "inter-imperialist", or "ultra-

imperialist" alliances. Let us assume that *all* the imperialist countries conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" division of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of "internationally united finance capital". There are actual examples of alliances of this kind in the history of the twentieth century—the attitude of the powers to China, for instance. We ask, is it "conceivable", assuming that the capitalist system remains intact—and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make—that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?

The question has only to be presented clearly for any other than a negative answer to be impossible. This is because the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is a calculation of the *strength* of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the *even* development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, if her capitalist strength is compared with that of the Britain of that time; Japan compared with Russia in the same way. Is it "conceivable" that in ten or twenty years' time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained *un*changed? It is out of the question.

Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal philistine fantasies of English parsons, or of the German "Marxist", Kautsky, "inter-imperialist" or "ultra-imperialist" alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing *all* the imperialist powers, are *inevitably* nothing more than a "truce" in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one conditions the other, producing alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle on *one and the same* basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and world politics. But in order to pacify the workers and reconcile them with the social-chauvinists who have

deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie, over-wise Kautsky *separates* one link of a single chain from another, separates the present peaceful (and ultra-imperialist, nay, ultra-ultra-imperialist) alliance of *all* the powers for the "pacification" of China (remember the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion[94]) from the non-peaceful conflict of tomorrow, which will prepare the ground for another "peaceful" general alliance for the partition, say, of Turkey, on the day after tomorrow, *etc.*, *etc.* Instead of showing the living connection between periods of imperialist peace and periods of imperialist war, Kautsky presents the workers with a lifeless abstraction in order to reconcile them to their lifeless leaders.

An American writer, Hill, in his *A History of the Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* refers in his preface to the following periods in the recent history of diplomacy: (1) the era of revolution; (2) the constitutional movement; (3) the present era of "commercial imperialism".* Another writer divides the history of Great Britain's "world policy" since 1870 into four periods: (1) the first Asiatic period (that of the struggle against Russia's advance in Central Asia towards India); (2) the African period (approximately 1885-1902): that of the struggle against France for the partition of Africa (the "Fashoda incident" of 1898 which brought her within a hair's breadth of war with France); (3) the second Asiatic period (alliance with Japan against Russia); and (4) the "European" period, chiefly anti-German.** "The political patrol clashes take place on the financial field," wrote the banker, Riesser, in 1905, in showing how French finance capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance of these countries, and how a conflict was developing between Germany and Great Britain over Persia, between all the European capitalists over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, the living reality of peaceful "ultra-imperialist" alliances in their inseverable connection with ordinary imperialist conflicts!

Kautsky's obscuring of the deepest contradictions of

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* David Jayne Hill, *A History of the Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, Vol. I, p. x.

** Schilder, op. cit., S. 178.

imperialism, which inevitably boils down to painting imperialism in bright colours, leaves its traces in this writer's criticism of the political features of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. Whatever the political system the result of these tendencies is everywhere reaction and an extreme intensification of antagonisms in this field. Particularly intensified become the yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing but the violation of the right of nations to self-determination). Hilferding rightly notes the connection between imperialism and the intensification of national oppression. "In the newly opened-up countries," he writes, "the capital imported into them intensifies antagonisms and excites against the intruders the constantly growing resistance of the peoples who are awakening to national consciousness; this resistance can easily develop into dangerous measures against foreign capital. The old social relations become completely revolutionised, the age-long agrarian isolation of 'nations without history' is destroyed and they are drawn into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjugated with the means and resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the goal which once seemed highest to the European nations: the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national independence threatens European capital in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation, and European capital can maintain its domination only by continually increasing its military forces."*

To this must be added that it is not only in newly opened-up countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently, also to increasing resistance. While objecting to the intensification of political reaction by imperialism, Kautsky leaves in the shade a question that has become particularly urgent, viz., the impossibility of unity with the opportunists in the epoch of imperialism. While object-

* *Finance Capital*, p. 487.

ing to annexations, he presents his objections in a form that is most acceptable and least offensive to the opportunists. He addresses himself to a German audience, yet he obscures the most topical and important point, for instance, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. In order to appraise this "mental aberration" of Kautsky's I shall take the following example. Let us suppose that a Japanese condemns the annexation of the Philippines by the Americans. The question is: will many believe that he does so because he has a horror of annexations as such, and not because he himself has a desire to annex the Philippines? And shall we not be constrained to admit that the "fight" the Japanese is waging against annexations can be regarded as being sincere and politically honest only if he fights against the annexation of Korea by Japan, and urges freedom for Korea to secede from Japan?

Kautsky's theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political critique of imperialism, are permeated *through and through* with a spirit, absolutely irreconcilable with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the fundamental contradictions of imperialism and with a striving to preserve at all costs the crumbling unity with opportunism in the European working-class movement.

X. THE PLACE OF IMPERIALISM IN HISTORY

We have seen that in its economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This in itself determines its place in history, for monopoly that grows out of the soil of free competition, and precisely out of free competition, is the transition from the capitalist system to a higher socio-economic order. We must take special note of the four principal types of monopoly, or principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the epoch we are examining.

Firstly, monopoly arose out of the concentration of production at a very high stage. This refers to the monopolist capitalist associations, cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important part these play in present-day economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century,

monopolies had acquired complete supremacy in the advanced countries, and although the first steps towards the formation of the cartels were taken by countries enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany, America), Great Britain, with her system of free trade, revealed the same basic phenomenon, only a little later, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.

Secondly, monopolies have stimulated the seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for the basic and most highly cartelised industries in capitalist society: the coal and iron industries. The monopoly of the most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the antagonism between cartelised and non-cartelised industry.

Thirdly, monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from modest middleman enterprises into the monopolists of finance capital. Some three to five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist countries have achieved the "personal link-up" between industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the control of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and income of entire countries. A financial oligarchy, which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception—such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.

Fourthly, monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence, i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopoly profits and so on, economic territory in general. When the colonies of the European powers, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of the territory of Africa (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly—by the "free grabbing" of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly possession of colonies and, consequently, of particularly

intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.

The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began from the time of the final victory of world finance capital.

Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination and not for freedom, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the "rentier state", the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever-increasing degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping coupons". It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (Britain).

In regard to the rapidity of Germany's economic development, Riesser, the author of the book on the big German banks, states: "The progress of the preceding period (1848-70), which had not been exactly slow, compares with the rapidity with which the whole of Germany's national economy, and with it German banking, progressed during this period (1870-1905) in about the same way as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days compares with the speed of the present-day automobile ... which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but also the occupants of the car." In its turn, this finance capital which has grown with such extraordi-

nary rapidity is not unwilling, precisely because it has grown so quickly, to pass on to a more "tranquil" possession of colonies which have to be seized—and not only by peaceful methods—from richer nations. In the United States, economic development in the last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, *and for this very reason*, the parasitic features of modern American capitalism have stood out with particular prominence. On the other hand, a comparison of, say, the republican American bourgeoisie with the monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced political distinction diminishes to an extreme degree in the epoch of imperialism—not because it is unimportant in general, but because in all these cases we are talking about a bourgeoisie which has definite features of parasitism.

The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a time a fairly considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given nation against all the others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world increases this urge. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself first and most clearly in Great Britain, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there much earlier than in other countries. Some writers, L. Martov, for example, are prone to wave aside the connection between imperialism and opportunism in the working-class movement—a particularly glaring fact at the present time—by resorting to "official optimism" *(à la* Kautsky and Huysmans) like the following: the cause of the opponents of capitalism would be hopeless if it were progressive capitalism that led to the increase of opportunism, or, if it were the best-paid workers who were inclined towards opportunism, etc. We must have no illusions about "optimism" of this kind. It is optimism in respect of opportunism; it is optimism which serves to conceal opportunism. As a matter of fact the extraordinary rapidity and the particularly revolting character of the development of

opportunism is by no means a guarantee that its victory will be durable: the rapid growth of a painful abscess on a healthy body can only cause it to burst more quickly and thus relieve the body of it. The most dangerous of all in this respect are those who do not wish to understand that the fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism

From all that has been said in this book on the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that we must define it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ catchwords and phrases like "interlocking", "absence of isolation", etc.; "in conformity with their functions and course of development", banks are "not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business regulation". And this very Riesser, whose words I have just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the "prophecy" of the Marxists concerning "socialisation" has "not come true"!

What then does this catchword "interlocking" express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees, but cannot see the wood. It slavishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one who is overwhelmed by the mass of raw material and is utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares, the relations between owners of private property "interlock in a haphazard way". But underlying this interlocking, its very base, are the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the basis of an exact computation of mass data, organises according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent of two-thirds, or three-fourths, of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are transported in a systematic and organised manner to the most suitable places of production, sometimes situated hundreds or thousands of miles from each other;

when a single centre directs all the consecutive stages of processing the material right up to the manufacture of numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens and hundreds of millions of consumers (the marketing of oil in America and Germany by the American oil trust)—then it becomes evident that we have socialisation of production, and not mere "interlocking"; that private economic and private property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably decay if its removal is artificially delayed, a shell which may remain in a state of decay for a fairly long period (if, at the worst, the cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed.

The enthusiastic admirer of German imperialism, Schulze-Gaevernitz, exclaims:

"Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of the Ministers of State.... [The "interlocking" of bankers, ministers, magnates of industry and rentiers is here conveniently forgotten.] If we imagine the development of those tendencies we have noted carried to their logical conclusion we will have: the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined into cartels; the investment capital of the nation cast in the shape of securities. Then the forecast of that genius Saint-Simon will be fulfilled: 'The present anarchy of production, which corresponds to the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation, must make way for organisation in production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated manufacturers, independent of each other and ignorant of man's economic needs; that will be done by a certain public institution. A central committee of management, being able to survey the large field of social economy from a more elevated point of view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will put the means of production into suitable hands, and above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist which have assumed as part of their functions a certain

organisation of economic labour, the banks.' We are still a long way from the fulfilment of Saint-Simon's forecast, but we are on the way towards it: Marxism, different from what Marx imagined, but different only in form."*

A crushing "refutation" of Marx, indeed, which retreats a step from Marx's precise, scientific analysis to Saint-Simon's guess-work, the guess-work of a genius, but guess-work all the same.

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* *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, S. 146.

THE JUNIUS PAMPHLET

At last there has appeared in Germany, illegally, without any adaptation to the despicable Junker censorship, a Social-Democratic pamphlet dealing with questions of the war! The author, who evidently belongs to the "Left-radical" wing of the Party, takes the name of Junius[95] (which in Latin means junior) and gives his pamphlet the title: *The Crisis of Social-Democracy*. Appended are the "Theses on the Tasks of International Social-Democracy", which have already been submitted to the Berne I.S.C. (International Socialist Committee) and published in No. 3 of its *Bulletin*; the theses were drafted by the *Internationale* group, which in the spring of 1915 published one issue of a magazine under that title (with articles by Zetkin, Mehring, R. Luxemburg, Thalheimer, Duncker, Ströbel and others), and which in the winter of 1915-16 convened a conference of Social-Democrats from all parts of Germany[96] where these theses were adopted.

The pamphlet, the author says in the introduction dated January 2, 1916, was written in April 1915, and published "without any alteration". "Outside circumstances" had prevented its earlier publication. The pamphlet is devoted not so much to the "crisis of Social-Democracy" as to an analysis of the war, to refuting the legend of it being a war for national liberation, to proving that it is an imperialist war on the part of Germany as well as on the part of the other Great Powers, and to a revolutionary criticism of the behaviour of the official party. Written, in a very lively style, Junius's pamphlet has undoubtedly played and will continue to play an important role in the struggle against the ex-Social-Democratic Party of Germany, which has deserted to the bourgeoisie and the Junkers, and we extend our hearty greetings to the author.

To the Russian reader who is familiar with the Social-Democratic literature in Russian published abroad in 1914-16, the Junius pamphlet does not offer anything new in principle. In reading this pamphlet and comparing the arguments of this German revolutionary Marxist with what has been stated, for example, in the Manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party (September-November 1914),* in the Berne resolutions (March 1915)** and in the numerous commentaries on them, it only becomes clear that Junius's arguments are very incomplete and that he makes two mistakes. Before proceeding with a criticism of Junius's faults and errors we must strongly emphasise that this is done for the sake of self-criticism, which is so necessary to Marxists, and of submitting to an all-round test the views which must serve as the ideological basis of the Third International. On the whole, the Junius pamphlet is a splendid Marxist work, and its defects are, in all probability, to a certain extent accidental.

The chief defect in Junius's pamphlet, and what marks a definite step backward compared with the legal (although immediately suppressed) magazine, *Internationale*, is its silence regarding the connection between social-chauvinism (the author uses neither this nor the less precise term social-patriotism) and opportunism. The author rightly speaks of the "capitulation" and collapse of the German Social-Democratic Party and of the "treachery" of its official leaders", but he goes no further. The *Internationale*, however, did criticise the "Centre", i.e., Kautskyism, and quite properly poured ridicule on it for its spinelessness, its prostitution of Marxism and its servility to the opportunists. This same magazine *began* to expose the true role of the opportunists by revealing, for example, the very important fact that on August 4, 1914, the opportunists came out with an ultimatum, a ready-made decision to vote *for* war credits in *any* case. Neither the Junius pamphlet nor the theses say *anything* about opportunism or about Kautskyism! This is wrong from the standpoint of theory, for it

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy"—*Ed.*

** Ibid., "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad".—*Ed.*

is impossible to *account for* the "betrayal" without linking it up with opportunism as a *trend* with a long history behind it, the history of the whole Second International. It is a mistake from the practical political standpoint, for it is impossible either to understand the "crisis of Social-Democracy", or overcome it, without clarifying the meaning and the role of *two trends*—the openly opportunist trend (Legien, David, etc.) and the tacitly opportunist trend (Kautsky and Co.). This is a step backward compared with the historic article by Otto Rühle in *Vorwärts* of January 12, 1916, in which he directly and openly pointed out that a split in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany was *inevitable* (the editors of *Vorwärts* replied by repeating honeyed and hypocritical Kautskyite phrases, for they were unable to advance a single material argument to disprove the assertion that there were *already* two parties in existence, and that these two parties could not be reconciled). It is astonishingly inconsistent, because the *Internationale*'s thesis No. 12 *directly* states that it is necessary to create a "new" International, owing to the "treachery" of the "official representatives of the socialist parties of the leading countries" and their "adoption of the principles of bourgeois imperialist policies". It is clearly quite absurd to suggest that the old Social-Democratic Party of Germany, or the party which tolerates Legien, David and Co., would participate in a "new" International.

We do not know why the *Internationale* group took this step backward. A very great defect in revolutionary Marxism in Germany as a whole is its lack of a compact illegal organisation that would systematically pursue its own line and educate the masses in the spirit of the new tasks; such an organisation would also have to take a definite stand on opportunism and Kautskyism. This is all the more necessary now, since the German revolutionary Social-Democrats have been deprived of their last two daily papers; the one in Bremen (*Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*),[97] and the one in Brunswick (*Volksfreund*),[98] both of which have gone over to the Kautskyites. The International Socialists of Germany (I.S.D.) group *alone* clearly and definitely remains at its post.

Some members of the *Internationale* group have evidently once again slid down into the morass of unprincipled

Kautskyism. Ströbel, for instance, went so far as to drop a curtsey in *Die Neue Zeit* to Bernstein and Kautsky! And only the other day, on July 15, 1916, he had an article in the papers entitled "Pacifism and Social-Democracy", in which he defends the most vulgar type of Kautskyite pacifism. As for Junius, he strongly opposes Kautsky's fantastic schemes like "disarmament", "abolition of secret diplomacy", etc. There may be two trends within the *Internationale* group: a revolutionary trend and a trend inclining to Kautskyism.

The first of Junius's erroneous propositions is embodied in the fifth thesis of the *Internationale* group. "National wars are no longer possible in the epoch (era) of this unbridled imperialism. National interests serve only as an instrument of deception, in order to place the working masses at the service of their mortal enemy, imperialism." The beginning of the fifth thesis, which concludes with the above statement, discusses the nature of the *present* war as an imperialist war. It may be that this negation of national wars generally is either an oversight, or an accidental overstatement in emphasising the perfectly correct idea that the *present* war is an imperialist war, not a national war. This is a mistake that must be examined, for various Social-Democrats, in view of the false assertions that the *present* war is a national war, have likewise mistakenly denied the possibility of *any* national war.

Junius is perfectly right in emphasising the decisive influence of the "imperialist atmosphere" of the *present* war, in maintaining that behind Serbia stands Russia, "behind Serbian nationalism stands Russian imperialism", and that the participation of, say, Holland in the war would *likewise* be imperialist, for, first, Holland would be defending her colonies and, second, would be allied with one of the *imperialist* coalitions. That is irrefutable in respect to the *present* war. And when Junius stresses what for him is most important, namely, the struggle against the "phantom of national war", "which at present holds sway over Social-Democratic policies" (p. 81), then it must be admitted that his views are both correct and fully to the point.

The only mistake, however, would be to exaggerate this truth, to depart from the Marxist requirement of concrete-

ness, to apply the appraisal of this war to all wars possible under imperialism, to ignore the national movements *against* imperialism. The sole argument in defence of the thesis, "national wars are no longer possible", is that the world has been divided among a small group of "great" imperialist powers and for that reason any war, even if it starts as a national war, is *transformed* into an imperialist war involving the interest of one of the imperialist powers or coalitions (Junius, p. 81).

The fallacy of this argument is obvious. That all dividing lines, both in nature and society, are conventional and dynamic, and that *every* phenomenon might, under certain conditions, be transformed into its opposite, is, of course, a basic proposition of Marxist dialectics. A national war *might* be transformed into an imperialist war *and vice versa*. Here is an example: the wars of the Great French Revolution began as national wars and indeed were such. They were revolutionary wars—the defence of the great revolution against a coalition of counter-revolutionary monarchies. But when Napoleon founded the French Empire and subjugated a number of big, viable and long-established national European states, these national wars of the French became imperialist wars and *in turn* led to wars of national liberation *against* Napoleonic imperialism.

Only a sophist can disregard the difference between an imperialist and a national war on the grounds that one *might* develop into the other. Not infrequently have dialectics served—and the history of Greek philosophy is an example—as a bridge to sophistry. But we remain dialecticians and we combat sophistry not by denying the possibility of all transformations in general, but by analysing the *given* phenomenon in its concrete setting and development.

Transformation of the present imperialist war of 1914-16 into a national war is highly improbable, for the class that represents *progressive* development is the proletariat which is objectively striving to transform it into a civil war against the bourgeoisie. Also this: there is no very considerable difference between the forces of the two coalitions, and international finance capital has created a reactionary bourgeoisie everywhere. But such a transformation should *not*

be proclaimed *impossible*: *if* the *European* proletariat remains impotent, say, for twenty years; *if* the present war *ends* in victories like Napoleon's and in the subjugation of a number of viable national states; *if* the transition to socialism of non-European imperialism (primarily Japanese and American) is also held up for twenty years by a war between these two countries, for example, then a great national war in Europe would be possible. It would hurl Europe *back* several decades. That is improbable. But *not* impossible, for it is undialectical, unscientific and theoretically wrong to regard the course of world history as smooth and always in a forward direction, without occasional gigantic leaps back.

Further. National wars waged by colonies and semi-colonies in the imperialist era are not only probable but *inevitable*. About 1,000 million people, or *over half* of the world's population, live in the colonies and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia). The national liberation movements there are either already very strong, or are growing and maturing. Every war is the continuation of politics by other means. The continuation of national liberation politics in the colonies will *inevitably* take the form of national wars *against* imperialism. Such wars *might* lead to an imperialist war of the present "great" imperialist powers, but on the other hand they might not. It will depend on many factors.

Example: Britain and France fought the Seven Years' War for the possession of colonies. In other words, they waged an imperialist war (which is possible on the basis of slavery and primitive capitalism as well as on the basis of modern highly developed capitalism). France suffered defeat and lost some of her colonies. Several years later there began the national liberation war of the North American States against Britain alone. France and Spain, then in possession of some parts of the present United States, concluded a friendship treaty with the States in rebellion against Britain. This they did out of hostility to Britain, i.e., in their own imperialist interests. French troops fought the British on the side of the American forces. What we have here is a national liberation war in which imperialist rivalry is an auxiliary element, one that has no serious importance. This is the very opposite to what we see in the

war of 1914-16 (the national element in the Austro-Serbian War is of no serious importance compared with the all-determining element of imperialist rivalry). It would be absurd, therefore, to apply the concept imperialism indiscriminately and conclude that national wars are "impossible". A national liberation war, waged, for example, by an alliance of Persia, India and China against one or more of the imperialist powers, is both possible and probable, for it would follow from the national liberation movements in these countries. The transformation of such a war into an imperialist war between the present-day imperialist powers would depend upon very many concrete factors, the emergence of which it would be ridiculous to guarantee.

Third, even in Europe national wars in the imperialist epoch cannot be regarded as impossible. The "epoch of imperialism" made the present war an imperialist one and it inevitably engenders new imperialist wars (until the triumph of socialism). This "epoch" has made the policies of the present great powers thoroughly imperialist, but it by no means precludes national wars on the part of, say, small (annexed or nationally-oppressed) countries *against* the imperialist powers, just as it does not preclude large-scale national movements in Eastern Europe. Junius takes a very sober view of Austria, for example, giving due consideration not only to "economic" factors, but to the peculiar political factors. He notes "Austria's intrinsic lack of cohesion" and recognises that the "Hapsburg monarchy is not the political organisation of a bourgeois state, but only a loose syndicate of several cliques of social parasites", and that "the liquidation of Austria-Hungary is, from the historical standpoint, only the continuation of the disintegration of Turkey and, at the same time, a requirement of the historical process of development". Much the same applies to some of the Balkan countries and Russia. And if the "great" powers are altogether exhausted in the present war, or if the revolution in Russia triumphs, national wars and even victorious national wars, are quite possible. Practical intervention by the imperialist powers is *not* always feasible. That is one point. Another is that the superficial view that the war of a small state against a giant is hopeless should be countered by the observation that even a hopeless

war is a war just the same. Besides, certain factors operating within the "giant" countries—the outbreak of revolution, for example—can turn a "hopeless" war into a very hopeful" one.

We have dwelt in detail on the erroneous proposition that "national wars are no longer possible" not only because it is patently erroneous from the theoretical point of view—it would certainly be very lamentable if the "Left" were to reveal a light-hearted attitude to Marxist theory at a time when the establishment of the Third International is possible only on the basis of unvulgarised Marxism. But the mistake is very harmful also from the standpoint of practical politics, for it gives rise to the absurd propaganda of "disarmament", since it is alleged that there can be no wars except reactionary wars. It also gives rise to the even more ludicrous and downright reactionary attitude of indifference to national movements. And such an attitude becomes chauvinism when members of the "great" European nations, that is, the nations which oppress the mass of small and colonial peoples, declare with a pseudo-scientific air: "national wars are no longer possible"! National wars *against* the imperialist powers are not only possible and probable; they are inevitable, *progressive* and *revolutionary though* of course, to be *successful*, they require either the concerted effort of huge numbers of people in the oppressed countries (hundreds of millions in our example of India and China), or a *particularly* favourable conjuncture of international conditions (e.g., the fact that the imperialist powers cannot interfere, being paralysed by exhaustion, by war, by their antagonism, etc.), or the *simultaneous* uprising of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in one of the big powers (this latter eventuality holds first place as the most desirable and favourable for the victory of the proletariat).

It would be unfair, however, to accuse Junius of indifference to national movements. At any rate, he remarks that among the sins of the Social-Democratic parliamentary group was its silence on the death sentence passed on a native leader in the Cameroons on charges of "treason" (evidently he attempted to organise an uprising against the war). Elsewhere Junius especially emphasises (for the benefit of the Legiens, Lensches and the other scoundrels

who are still listed as "Social-Democrats") that colonial peoples must be regarded as nations along with all the others. Junius clearly and explicitly states: "Socialism recognised the right of every nation to independence and freedom, to independent mastery of its destinies"; "international socialism recognises the right of free, independent and equal nations, but it is only socialism that can create such nations, and only it can realise the right of nations to self-determination. And this socialist slogan," Junius justly remarks, "serves, like all other socialist slogans, not to justify the existing order of things, but to indicate the way forward, and to stimulate the proletariat in its active revolutionary policy of transformation" (pp. 77-78). It would be a grave mistake indeed to believe that all the German Left Social-Democrats have succumbed to the narrow-mindedness and caricature of Marxism now espoused by certain Dutch and Polish Social-Democrats who deny the right of nations to self-determination even under socialism. But the *specific*, Dutch-Polish, roots of *this* mistake we shall discuss elsewhere.

Another fallacious argument is advanced by Junius on the question of defence of the fatherland. This is a cardinal political question during an imperialist war. Junius has strengthened us in our conviction that our Party has indicated the only correct approach to this question; the proletariat is opposed to defence of the fatherland in this imperialist war *because* of its predatory, slave-owning, reactionary character, *because* it is possible and necessary to oppose to it (and to strive to convert it into) civil war for socialism. Junius, however, while brilliantly exposing the imperialist character of the present war as distinct from a national war, makes the very strange mistake of trying to drag a national programme into the *present*, *non*-national, war. It sounds almost incredible, but there it is.

The official Social-Democrats, both of the Legien and of the Kautsky stripe, in their servility to the bourgeoisie (who have been making the most noise about foreign "invasion" in order to deceive the mass of the people as to the imperialist character of the war), have been particularly assiduous in repeating this "invasion" argument. Kautsky, who now assures naïve and credulous people (incidentally,

through Spectator, a member of the Russian Organising Committee) that he joined the opposition at the end of 1914, continues to use this "argument"! To refute it, Junius quotes extremely instructive examples from history, which prove that "invasion and class struggle are not contradictory in bourgeois history, as official legend has it, but that one is the means and the expression of the other". For example, the Bourbons in France invoked foreign invaders against the Jacobins; the bourgeoisie in 1871 invoked foreign invaders against the Commune. In his *Civil War in France*, Marx wrote:

"The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer the struggle of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle bursts out into civil war."[99]

"The classical example for all times," says Junius, referring to 1793, "is the Great French Revolution." From all this, he draws the following conclusion: "The century of experience thus proves that it is not a state of siege, but relentless class struggle, which rouses the self-respect, the heroism and the moral strength of the mass of the people, and serves as the country's best protection and defence against the external enemy."

Junius's practical conclusion is this: "Yes, it is the duty of the Social-Democrats to defend their country during a great historical crisis. But the grave guilt that rests upon the Social-Democratic Reichstag group consists in their having given the lie to their own solemn declaration, made on August 4, 1914, 'In the hour of danger we will not leave our fatherland unprotected'. They *did* leave the fatherland unprotected in the hour of its greatest peril. For their first duty to the fatherland in that hour was to show the fatherland what was really behind the present imperialist war; to sweep away the web of patriotic and diplomatic lies covering up this encroachment on the fatherland; to proclaim loudly and clearly that both victory and defeat in the present war are equally fatal for the German people; to resist to the last the throttling of the fatherland due to the state of siege; to proclaim the necessity of immediately arming the people and of allowing the people to decide the question

of war and peace; resolutely to demand a permanent session of the people's representatives for the whole duration of the war in order to guarantee vigilant control over the government by the people's representatives, and control over the people's representatives by the people; to demand the immediate abolition of all restrictions on political rights, for only a free people can successfully defend its country; and finally, to oppose the imperialist war programme, which is to preserve Austria and Turkey, i.e., perpetuate reaction in Europe and in Germany, with the old, truly national programme of the patriots and democrats of 1848, the programme of Marx, Engels and Lassalle—the slogan of a united, Great German Republic. This is the banner that should have been unfurled before the country, which would have been a truly national banner of liberation, which would have been in accord with the best traditions of Germany and with the international class policy of the proletariat.... Hence, the grave dilemma—the interests of the fatherland or the international solidarity of the proletariat—the tragic conflict which prompted our parliamentarians to side, 'with a heavy heart', with the imperialist war, is purely imaginary, it is a bourgeois nationalist fiction. On the contrary, there is complete harmony between the interests of the country and the class interests of the proletarian International, both in time of war and in time of peace; both war and peace demand the most energetic development of the class struggle, the most determined fight for the Social-Democratic programme."

This is how Junius argues. The fallacy of his argument is strikingly evident, and since the tacit and avowed lackeys of tsarism, Plekhanov and Chkhenkeli, and perhaps even Martov and Chkheidze, may gloatingly seize upon Junius's words, not for the purpose of establishing theoretical truth, but for the purpose of wriggling, covering up their tracks and throwing dust into the eyes of the workers, we must in greater detail elucidate the *theoretical* source of Junius's error.

He suggests that the imperialist war should be "opposed" with a national programme. He urges the advanced class to turn its face to the past and not to the future! In France, in Germany, and in the whole of Europe it was a *bourgeois-*

democratic revolution that, *objectively*, was on the order of the day in 1793 and 1848. Corresponding to this *objective* historical situation was the "truly national", i.e., the national *bourgeois* programme of the then existing democracy; in 1793 this programme was carried out by the most revolutionary elements of the bourgeoisie and the plebeians, and in 1848 it was proclaimed by Marx in the name of the whole of progressive democracy. *Objectively*, the feudal and dynastic wars were then opposed by revolutionary-democratic wars, by wars for national liberation. This was the content of the historical tasks of that epoch.

At the present time, the *objective* situation in the biggest advanced states of Europe is different. Progress, if we leave out for the moment the possibility of temporary steps backward, can be made only in the direction of *socialist* society, only in the direction of the *socialist revolution*. From the standpoint of progress, from the standpoint of the progressive class, the imperialist bourgeois war, the war of highly developed capitalism, can, *objectively*, be opposed only with a war *against* the bourgeoisie, i.e., primarily civil war for power between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; for *unless* such a war is waged, serious progress is *impossible*; this may be followed—only under certain special conditions—by a war to defend the socialist state against bourgeois states. That is why the Bolsheviks (fortunately, very few, and quickly handed over by us to the *Prizyv* group) who were ready to adopt the point of view of conditional defence, i.e., defence of the fatherland on condition that there was a victorious revolution and the victory of a republic in Russia, were true to the *letter* of Bolshevism, but betrayed its *spirit*; for being drawn into the imperialist war of the leading European powers, Russia would *also* be waging an imperialist war, even under a republican form of government!

In saying that the class struggle is the best means of defence against invasion, Junius applies Marxist dialectics only half way, taking one step on the right road and immediately deviating from it. Marxist dialectics call for a concrete analysis of each specific historical situation. It is true that class struggle is the best means of defence against invasion *both* when the bourgeoisie is overthrowing

feudalism, and when the proletariat is overthrowing the bourgeoisie Precisely because it is true with regard to *every* form of class oppression, it is *too general*, and therefore, *inadequate* in the present *specific* case. Civil war against the bourgeoisie is *also* a form of class struggle, and only this form of class struggle would have saved Europe (the whole of Europe, not only one country) from the peril of invasion. The "Great German Republic", had it existed in 1914-16, would *also* have waged an *imperialist* war.

Junius came very close to the correct solution of the problem and to the correct slogan: civil war against the bourgeoisie for socialism; but, as if afraid to speak the whole truth, he turned *back*, to the fantasy of a "national war" in 1914, 1915 and 1916. If we examine the question not from the theoretical angle but from the purely practical one, Junius's error remains just as evident. The whole of bourgeois society, all classes in Germany, including the peasantry, were *in favour* of war (in all probability *the same* was the case in Russia—at least a majority of the well-to-do and middle peasantry and a very considerable portion of the poor peasants were evidently under the spell of bourgeois imperialism). The bourgeoisie was armed to the teeth. Under such circumstances to "proclaim" the programme of a republic, a permanent parliament, election of officers by the people (the "armed nation"), etc., would have meant, *in practice*, "*proclaiming*" *a revolution* (with the *wrong* revolutionary programme!).

In the same breath Junius quite rightly says that a revolution cannot be "made". Revolution was on the order of the day in the 1914-16 period, it was hidden in the depths of the war, was *emerging* out of the war. This should have been "*proclaimed*" in the name of the revolutionary class, and *its* programme should have been fearlessly and fully announced, socialism is impossible in time of war without civil war against the arch-reactionary, criminal bourgeoisie, which condemns the people to untold disaster. Systematic, consistent, practical measures should have been planned, which *could be carried out no matter at what* pace the revolutionary crisis might develop, and which would be in line with the maturing revolution. These measures are indicated in our Party's resolution: (1) voting against war credits;

(2) violation of the "class truce"; (3) creation of an illegal organisation; (4) fraternisation among the soldiers, (5) support for all the revolutionary actions of the masses.* The success of *all* these steps *inevitably* leads to civil war.

The promulgation of a great historical programme was undoubtedly of tremendous significance; not the old national German programme, which became obsolete in 1914, 1915 and 1916, but the proletarian internationalist and socialist programme. "You, the bourgeoisie, are fighting for plunder; we, the workers of *all* the belligerent countries, declare war upon you for, socialism"—that's the sort of speech that should have been delivered in the parliaments on August 4, 1914, by socialists who had not betrayed the proletariat, as the Legiens, Davids, Kautskys, Plekhanovs, Guesdes, Sembats, etc., had done.

Evidently Junius's error is due to two kinds of mistakes in reasoning. There is no doubt that Junius is decidedly opposed to the imperialist war and is decidedly *in favour* of revolutionary tactics; and all the gloating of the Plekhanovs over Junius's "defencism" cannot wipe out this *fact*. Possible and probable calumnies of this kind must be answered promptly and bluntly.

But, first, Junius has not completely rid himself of the "environment" of the German Social-Democrats, even the Leftists, who are afraid of a split, who are afraid to follow revolutionary slogans to their logical conclusions.** This is a false fear, and the Left Social-Democrats of Germany must and *will* rid themselves of it. They *are sure to do so* in the course of their struggle against the social-chauvinists. The fact is that they are fighting against *their own* social-chauvinists resolutely, firmly and *sincerely*, and this is the tremendous, the fundamental difference in prin-

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Group Abroad."—*Ed.*

** We find the same error in Junius's arguments about which is better, victory or defeat? His conclusion is that both are equally bad (ruin, growth of armaments, etc.). This is the point of view not of the revolutionary proletariat, but of the pacifist petty bourgeoisie. If one speaks about the "revolutionary intervention" of the proletariat—of this both Junius and the theses of the *International* group speak, although unfortunately in terms that are too general—one *must* raise the question from *another* point of view, namely: (1) Is

ciple between them and the Martovs and Chkheidzes, who, with one hand (*à la* Skobelev) unfurl a banner bearing the greeting, "To the Liebknechts of All Countries", and with the other hand tenderly embrace Chkhenkeli and Potresov!

Secondly, Junius apparently wanted to achieve something in the nature of the Menshevik "theory of stages", of sad memory; he wanted to *begin* to carry out the revolutionary programme from the end that is "more suitable", "more popular" and more acceptable to the *petty bourgeoisie*. It is something like a plan "to outwit history", to outwit the philistines. He seems to say, surely, nobody would oppose a *better* way of defending the real fatherland; and the real fatherland is the Great German Republic, and the best defence *is* a militia, a permanent parliament, etc. Once it was accepted, that programme would automatically lead to the next stage—to the socialist revolution.

Probably, it was reasoning of this kind that consciously or semi-consciously determined Junius's tactics. Needless to say, such reasoning is fallacious. Junius's pamphlet conjures up in our mind the picture of a *lone* man who has no comrades in an illegal organisation accustomed to thinking out revolutionary slogans to their conclusion and systematically educating the masses in their spirit. But this shortcoming—it would be a grave error to forget this—is not Junius's personal failing, but the result of the weakness of *all* the German Leftists, who have become entangled in the vile net of Kautskyite hypocrisy, pedantry and "friendliness" for the opportunists. Junius's adherents have managed, *in spite* of their isolation, to *begin* the publication of illegal leaflets and to start the war against Kautskyism. They will succeed in going further along the right road.

Written in July 1916

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Sbornik*

"revolutionary intervention" possible without the risk of defeat? (2) Is it possible to scourge the bourgeoisie and the government of one's *own* country without taking that risk? (3) Have we not always asserted, and does not the historical experience of reactionary wars prove, that defeats help the cause of the revolutionary class?

THE DISCUSSION ON SELF-DETERMINATION SUMMED UP

Issue No. 2 of the *Herald* (*Vorbote* No. 2, April 1916), the Marxist journal of the Zimmerwald Left, published theses for and against the self-determination of nations, signed by the Editorial Board of our Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and by the Editorial Board of the organ of the Polish Social-Democratic opposition, *Gazeta Robotnicza*. Above the reader will find a reprint of the former* and a translation of the latter theses.[100] This is practically the first time that the question has been presented so extensively in the international field: it was raised only in respect of Poland in the discussion carried on in the German Marxist journal *Neue Zeit* twenty years ago, 1895-96, before the London International Socialist Congress of 1896, by Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky and the Polish "independents" (champions of the independence of Poland, the Polish Socialist Party), who represented three different views.[101] Since then, as far as we know, the question of self-determination has been discussed at all systematically only by the Dutch and the Poles. Let us hope that the *Herald* will succeed in promoting the discussion of this question, so urgent today, among the British, Americans, French, Germans and Italians. Official socialism, represented both by direct supporters of "their own" governments, the Plekhanovs, Davids and Co., and the undercover defenders of opportunism, the Kautskyites (among them Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze and others), has told so many lies on this question that for a long time there will inevitably be efforts, on the one hand, to maintain

* See pp. 143-56 of this volume.—*Ed.*

silence and evade the issue, and, on the other, workers' demands for "direct answers" to these "accursed questions". We shall try to keep our readers informed of the struggle between the trends among socialists abroad.

This question is of specific importance to us Russian Social-Democrats; the present discussion is a continuation of the one that took place in 1903 and 1913[102]; during the war this question has been the cause of some wavering in the thinking of Party members; it has been made more acute by the trickery of such prominent leaders of the Gvozdyov or chauvinist workers' party as Martov and Chkheidze, in their efforts to evade the substance of the problem. It is essential, therefore, to sum up at least the initial results of the discussion that has been started in the international field.

It will be seen from the theses that our Polish comrades provide us with a direct answer to some of our arguments, for example, on Marxism and Proudhonism. In most cases, however, they do not answer us directly, but indirectly, by opposing *their* assertions to ours. Let us examine both their direct and indirect answers.

1. SOCIALISM AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS

We have affirmed that it would be a betrayal of socialism to refuse to implement the self-determination of nations under socialism. We are told in reply that "the right of self-determination is not applicable to a socialist society". The difference is a radical one. Where does it stem from?

"We know," runs our opponents' reasoning, "that socialism will abolish every kind of national oppression since it abolishes the class interests that lead to it...." What has this argument about the *economic* prerequisites for the abolition of national oppression, which are very well known and undisputed, to do with a discussion of *one* of the forms of *political* oppression, namely, the forcible retention of one nation within the state frontiers of another? This is nothing but an attempt to evade political questions! And

subsequent arguments further convince us that our judgement is right: "We have no reason to believe that in a socialist society, the nation will exist as an economic and political unit. It will in all probability assume the character of a cultural and linguistic unit only, because the territorial division of a socialist cultural zone, if practised at all, can be made only according to the needs of production and, furthermore, the question of such a division will naturally not be decided by individual nations alone and in possession of full sovereignty [as is required by "the right to self-determination"], but will be *determined jointly* by all the citizens concerned...."

Our Polish comrades like this last argument, on *joint* determination instead of *self*-determination, so much that they repeat it *three times* in their theses! Frequency of repetition, however, does not turn this Octobrist and reactionary argument into a Social-Democratic argument. All reactionaries and bourgeois grant to nations forcibly retained within the frontiers of a given state the right to "determine jointly" their fate in a common parliament. Wilhelm II also gives the Belgians the right to "determine jointly" the fate of the German Empire in a common German parliament.

Our opponents try to evade precisely the point at issue, the only one that is up for discussion—the right to secede. This would be funny if it were not so tragic!

Our very first thesis said that the liberation of oppressed nations implies a dual transformation in the political sphere: (1) the full equality of nations. This is not disputed and applies only to what takes place within the state; (2) freedom of political separation.* This refers to the demarcation of state frontiers. This *only* is disputed. But it is precisely this that our opponents remain silent about. They do not want to think either about state frontiers or even about the state as such. This is a sort of "imperialist Economism" like the old Economism of 1894-1902, which argued in this way: capitalism is victorious, *therefore* political questions are a waste of time. Imperialism is

* See p. 143 of this volume.—*Ed.*

victorious, *therefore* political questions are a waste of time! Such an apolitical theory is extremely harmful to Marxism.

In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx wrote: "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."[103] Up to now this truth has been indisputable for socialists and it includes the recognition of the fact that the *state* will exist until victorious socialism develops into full communism. Engels's dictum about the *withering away* of the state is well known. We deliberately stressed, in the first thesis, that democracy is a form of state that will also wither away when the state withers away. And until our opponents replace Marxism by some sort of "non-state" viewpoint their arguments will constitute one big mistake.

Instead of speaking about the state (which *means*, about the demarcation of its *frontiers*!), they speak of a "socialist cultural zone", i.e., they deliberately choose an expression that is indefinite in the sense that all state questions are obliterated! Thus we get a ridiculous tautology: if there is no state there can, of course, be no question of frontiers. In that case the *whole* democratic-political programme is unnecessary. Nor will there be any republic, when the state "withers away".

The German chauvinist Lensch, in the articles we mentioned in Thesis 5 (footnote),* quoted an interesting passage from Engels's article "The Po and the Rhine". Amongst other things, Engels says in this article that in the course of historical development, which swallowed up a number of small and non-viable nations, the "frontiers of great and viable European nations" were being increasingly determined by the "language and sympathies" of the population. Engels calls these frontiers "natural".[104] Such was the case in the period of progressive capitalism in Europe, roughly from 1848 to 1871. Today, these democratically determined

* See p. 150 of this volume.—*Ed.*

frontiers are more and more often being *broken down* by reactionary, imperialist capitalism. There is every sign that imperialism will leave its successor, socialism, a heritage of *less* democratic frontiers, a number of annexations in Europe and in other parts of the world. Is it to be supposed that victorious socialism, restoring and implementing full democracy all along the line, will refrain from *democratically* demarcating state frontiers and ignore the "sympathies" of the population? These questions need only be stated to make it quite clear that our Polish colleagues are sliding down from Marxism towards imperialist Economism.

The old Economists, who made a caricature of Marxism, told the workers that "only the economic" was of importance to Marxists. The new Economists seem to think either that the democratic state of victorious socialism will exist without frontiers (like a "complex of sensations" without matter) or that frontiers will be delineated "only" in accordance with the needs of production. In actual fact its frontiers will be delineated democratically, i.e., in accordance with the will and "sympathies" of the population. Capitalism rides roughshod over these sympathies, adding more obstacles to the rapprochement of nations. Socialism, by organising production *without* class oppression, by ensuring the well-being of *all* members of the state, gives *full play* to the "sympathies" of the population, thereby promoting and greatly accelerating the drawing together and fusion of the nations.

To give the reader a rest from the heavy and clumsy Economism let us quote the reasoning of a socialist writer who is outside our dispute. That writer is Otto Bauer, who also has his own "pet little point"—"cultural and national autonomy"—but who argues quite correctly on a large number of most important questions. For example, in Chapter 29 of his book *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, he was doubly right in noting the use of national ideology to cover up *imperialist* policies. In Chapter 30, "Socialism and the Principle of Nationality", he says:

"The socialist community will never be able to include whole nations within its make-up by the use of force. Imagine the masses of the people, enjoying all the blessings of national culture, taking a full and active part in legisla-

tion and government, and, finally, supplied with arms—would it be possible to subordinate such a nation to the rule of an alien social organism by force? All state power rests on the force of arms. The present-day people's army, thanks to an ingenious mechanism, still constitutes a tool in the hands of a definite person, family or class exactly like the knightly and mercenary armies of the past. The army of the democratic community of a socialist society is nothing but the people armed, since it consists of highly cultured persons, working without compulsion in socialised workshops and taking full part in all spheres of political life. In such conditions any possibility of alien rule disappears."

This is true. It is *impossible* to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism, since this *requires* the abolition of classes, i.e., the introduction of socialism. But while being based on economics, socialism cannot be reduced to economics alone. A foundation—socialist production—is essential for the abolition of national oppression, but this foundation must *also* carry a democratically organised state, a democratic army, etc. By transforming capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates the *possibility* of abolishing national oppression; the possibility becomes *reality* "only"—"only"!—with the establishment of full democracy in all spheres, including the delineation of state frontiers in accordance with the "sympathies" of the population, including complete freedom to secede. And this, in turn, will serve as a basis for developing the *practical* elimination of even the slightest national friction and the least national mistrust, for an accelerated drawing together and fusion of nations that will be completed when the state *withers away*. This is the Marxist theory, the theory from which our Polish colleagues have mistakenly departed.

2. IS DEMOCRACY "PRACTICABLE" UNDER IMPERIALISM?

The old polemic conducted by Polish Social-Democrats against the self-determination of nations is based entirely on the argument that it is "impracticable" under capitalism. As long ago as 1903 we, the *Iskra* supporters, laughed at this argument in the Programme Commission of the Second

Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and said that it was a repetition of the distortion of Marxism preached by the (late lamented) Economists. In our theses we dealt with this error in particular detail and it is precisely on this point, which contains the theoretical kernel of the whole dispute, that the Polish comrades did not wish to (or could not?) answer *any* of our arguments.

To prove the economic impossibility of self-determination would require an economic analysis such as that used to prove the impracticability of prohibiting machines or introducing labour-money, etc. No one has even attempted to make such an analysis. No one will maintain that it has been possible to introduce "labour-money" under capitalism "by way of exception" in even one country, in the way it was possible for one small country to realise this impracticable self-determination, even without war or revolution, "by way of exception", in the era of the most rabid imperialism (Norway, 1905).

In general, political democracy is merely one of the possible *forms* of superstructure *above* capitalism (although it is theoretically the normal one for "pure" capitalism). The facts show that both capitalism and imperialism develop within the framework of *any* political form and subordinate them *all*. It is, therefore, a basic theoretical error to speak of the "impracticability" of *one* of the forms and of *one* of the demands of democracy.

The absence of an answer to these arguments from our Polish colleagues compels us to consider the discussion closed on this point. To make it graphic, so to say, we made the very concrete assertion that it would be "ridiculous" to deny the "practicability" of the restoration of Poland today, making it dependent on the strategic and other aspects of the present war. No reply was forthcoming!

The Polish comrades simply *repeated* an obviously incorrect assertion (§ II, 1), saying that "in questions of the annexation of foreign territories, forms of political democracy are pushed aside; sheer force is decisive.... Capital will never allow the people to decide the question of their state frontiers...". As though "capital" could "allow the people" to select *its* civil servants, the servants of imperialism! Or as though weighty decisions on important demo-

cratic questions, such as the establishment of a republic in place of a monarchy, or a militia in place of a regular army, were, *in general*, conceivable without "sheer force". Subjectively, the Polish comrades want to make Marxism "more profound" but they are doing it altogether unsuccessfully. *Objectively*, their phrases about impracticability are opportunism, because their tacit assumption is: this is "impracticable" without a series of revolutions, in the same way as democracy *as a whole*, *all* its demands taken together, is impracticable under imperialism.

Once only, at the very end of § II, 1, in the discussion on Alsace, our Polish colleagues abandoned the position of imperialist Economism and approached the question of one of the forms of democracy with a concrete answer and not with general references to the "economic". And it was precisely this approach that was wrong! It would, they wrote, be "particularist, undemocratic" if *some* Alsatians, without asking the French, were to "impose" on them a union with Alsace, although part of Alsace was German-oriented and this threatened war!!! The confusion is amusing: self-determination presumes (this is in itself clear, and we have given it special emphasis in our theses) freedom to *separate* from the oppressor state; but the fact that *union* with a state presumes the consent of *that state* is something that is "not customarily" mentioned in politics any more than the "consent" of a capitalist to receive profit or of a worker to receive wages is mentioned in economics! It is ridiculous even to speak of such a thing.

If one wants to be a Marxist politician, one should, in speaking of Alsace, attack the German socialist scoundrels for not fighting for Alsace's freedom to secede and attack the French socialist scoundrels for making their peace with the French bourgeoisie who want to annex the whole of Alsace by force—and both of them for serving the imperialism of "their own" country and for fearing a separate state, even if only a little one—the thing is to show *how* the socialists who recognise self-determination would solve the problem in a few weeks without going against the will of the Alsatians. To argue, instead, about the horrible danger of the French Alsatians "forcing" themselves on France is a real pearl.

3. WHAT IS ANNEXATION?

We raised this question in a most definite manner in our theses (Section 7).* The Polish comrades did *not* reply to it: they evaded it, insisting (1) that they are against annexations and explaining (2) why they are against them. It is true that these are very important questions. But they are questions of *another kind*. If we want our principles to be theoretically sound at all, if we want them to be clearly and precisely formulated, we cannot *evade* the question of what an annexation is, since this concept is used in our political propaganda and agitation. The evasion of the question in a discussion between colleagues cannot be interpreted as anything but desertion of one's position.

Why have we raised this question? We explained this when we raised it. It is because "a protest against annexations is nothing but recognition of the right to self-determination". The concept of annexation usually includes: (1) the concept of force (joining by means of force); (2) the concept of oppression by another nation (the joining of "*alien*" regions, etc.), and, sometimes (3) the concept of violation of the *status quo*. We pointed this out in the theses and this did not meet with any criticism.

Can Social-Democrats be against the use of force in general, it may be asked? Obviously not. This means that we are against annexations not because they constitute force, but for some other reason. Nor can the Social-Democrats be for the *status quo*. However you may twist and turn, annexation is *violation of the self-determination* of a nation, it is the establishment of state *frontiers contrary to the will of the population*.

To be against annexations *means* to be in favour of the right to self-determination. To be "against the forcible retention of any nation within the frontiers of a given state" (we deliberately employed this slightly changed formulation of the same idea in Section 4 of our theses,** and the Polish comrades *answered* us with *complete* clarity at the beginning of their § I, 4, that they "are against the

* See pp. 152-53 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See p. 147 of this volume.—*Ed.*

forcible retention of oppressed nations within the frontiers of the annexing state")—is *the same* as being in favour of the self-determination of nations.

We do not want to haggle over words. If there is a party that says in its programme (or in a resolution binding on all—the form does not matter) that it is against annexations,* against the forcible retention of oppressed nations within the frontiers of *its* state, we declare our complete agreement in principle with that party. It would be absurd to insist on the *word* "self-determination". And if there are people in our Party who want to change *words* in this spirit, who want to amend Clause 9 of our Party Programme, we should consider our differences with *such* comrades to be anything but a matter of principle!

The only thing that matters is political clarity and theoretical soundness of our slogans.

In verbal discussions on this question—the importance of which nobody will deny, especially now, in view of the war—we have met the following argument (we have not come across it in the press): *a protest against* a known evil does not necessarily mean recognition of a positive concept that precludes the evil. This is obviously an unfounded argument and, apparently, as such has not been reproduced in the press. If a socialist party declares that it is "against the forcible retention of an oppressed nation within the frontiers of the annexing state", it is *thereby committed to renounce retention by force* when it comes to power.

We do not for one moment doubt that if Hindenburg were to accomplish the semi-conquest of Russia tomorrow and this semi-conquest were to be expressed by the appearance of a new Polish state (in connection with the desire of Britain and France to weaken tsarism somewhat), something that is quite "practicable" from the standpoint of the economic laws of capitalism and imperialism, and if, the day after tomorrow, the socialist revolution were to be victorious in Petrograd, Berlin and Warsaw, the Polish socialist government, like the Russian and German socialist governments, would renounce the "forcible retention" of, say, the,

* Karl Radek formulated this as "against old and new annexations" in one of his articles in *Berner Tagwacht*.

Ukrainians, "within the frontiers of the Polish state". If there were members of the *Gazeta Robotnicza* Editorial Board in that government they would no doubt sacrifice their "theses", thereby disproving the "theory" that "the right of self-determination is not applicable to a socialist society". If we thought otherwise we should not put a comradely discussion with the Polish Social-Democrats on the agenda but would rather conduct a ruthless struggle against them as chauvinists.

Suppose I were to go out into the streets of any European city and make a public "protest", which I then published in the press, against my not being permitted to purchase a man as a slave. There is no doubt that people would have the right to regard me as a slave-owner, a champion of the principle, or system, if you like of slavery. No one would be fooled by the fact that my sympathies with slavery were expressed in the negative form of a protest and not in a positive form ("I am for slavery"). A political "protest" is *quite* the equivalent of a political programme; this is so obvious that one feels rather awkward at having to explain it. In any case, we are firmly convinced that on the part of the Zimmerwald Left, at any rate—we do not speak of the Zimmerwald group as a whole since it contains Martov and other Kautskyites—we shall not meet with any "protest" if we say that in the Third International there will be no place for people capable of separating a political protest from a political programme, of counterposing the one to the other, etc.

Not wishing to haggle over words, we take the liberty of expressing the sincere hope that the Polish Social-Democrats will try soon to formulate, officially, their proposal to delete Clause 9 from our Party Programme (which is also *theirs*) and also from the Programme of the International (the resolution of the 1896 London Congress), as well as *their own* definition of the relevant political concepts of "old and new annexations" and of "the forcible retention of an oppressed nation within the frontiers of the annexing state".

Let us now turn to the next question.

4. FOR OR AGAINST ANNEXATIONS?

In §3 of Part One of their theses the Polish comrades declare very definitely that they are against any kind of annexation. Unfortunately, in §4 of the same part we find an assertion that must be considered annexationist. It opens with the following ... how can it be put more delicately?... the following strange phrase:

"The starting-point of Social-Democracy's struggle against annexations, against the forcible retention of oppressed nations within the frontiers of the annexing state is *renunciation of any defence of the fatherland* [the authors' italics], which, in the era of imperialism, is defence of the rights of one's own bourgeoisie to oppress and plunder foreign peoples...."

What's this? How is it put?

"The starting-point of the struggle against annexations is renunciation of *any* defence of the fatherland...." But any national war and any national revolt can be called "defence of the fatherland" and, until now, has been *generally* recognised as such! We are against annexations, but ... we mean by this that we are against the annexed waging a war *for* their liberation from those who have annexed them, that we are against the annexed revolting to liberate themselves from those who have annexed them! Isn't that an annexationist declaration?

The authors of the theses motivate their ... strange assertion by saying that "in the era of imperialism" defence of the fatherland amounts to defence of the right of one's own bourgeoisie to oppress foreign peoples. This, however, is true *only* in respect of an imperialist war, i.e., in respect of a war *between* imperialist powers or groups of powers, when *both* belligerents not only oppress "foreign peoples" but are fighting a war *to decide* who shall have a *greater share* in oppressing foreign peoples!

The authors seem to present the question of "defence of the fatherland" very differently from the way it is presented by our Party. We renounce "defence of the fatherland" in an *imperialist* war. This is said as clearly as it can be in the Manifesto of our Party's Central Committee and in

the Berne resolutions* reprinted in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*, which has been published both in German and French. We stressed this *twice* in our theses (footnotes to Sections 4 and 6).** The authors of the Polish theses seem to renounce defence of the fatherland *in general*, i.e., *for a national war as well*, believing, perhaps, that in the "era of imperialism" national wars *are impossible*. We say "perhaps" because the Polish comrades have *not* expressed this view in their theses.

Such a view is clearly expressed in the theses of the German *Internationale* group and in the Junius pamphlet which is dealt with in a special article.*** In addition to what is said there, let us note that the national revolt of an annexed region or country against the annexing country may be called precisely a revolt and not a war (we have heard this objection made and, therefore, cite it here, although we do not think this terminological dispute a serious one). In any case, hardly anybody would risk denying that annexed Belgium, Serbia, Galicia and Armenia would call their "revolt" against those who annexed them "defence of the fatherland" *and would do so in all justice*. It looks as if the Polish comrades are *against* this type of revolt on the grounds that there is *also* a bourgeoisie in these annexed countries which *also* oppresses foreign peoples or, more exactly, could oppress them, since the question is one of the "*right* to oppress". Consequently, the given war or revolt is not assessed on the strength of its *real* social content (the struggle of an oppressed nation for its liberation from the oppressor nation) but the possible exercise of the "*right* to oppress" by a bourgeoisie which is at present itself oppressed. If Belgium, let us say, is annexed by Germany in 1917, and in 1918 revolts to secure her liberation, the Polish comrades will be against her revolt on the grounds that the Belgian bourgeoisie possess "the right to oppress foreign peoples"!

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", "The Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad".—*Ed.*

** See pp. 148 and 151 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** See p. 305 of this volume.—*Ed.*

There is nothing Marxist or even revolutionary in this argument. If we do not want to betray socialism we *must* support *every* revolt against our chief enemy, the bourgeoisie of the big states, provided it is not the revolt of a reactionary class. By refusing to support the revolt of annexed regions we become, objectively, annexationists. It is precisely in the "era of imperialism", which is the era of nascent social revolution, that the proletariat will today give especially vigorous support to any revolt of the annexed regions so that tomorrow, or simultaneously, it may attack the bourgeoisie of the "great" power that is weakened by the revolt.

The Polish comrades, however, go further in their annexationism. They are not only against any revolt by the annexed regions; they are against *any* restoration of their independence, even a peaceful one! Listen to this:

"Social-Democracy, rejecting all responsibility for the consequences of the policy of oppression pursued by imperialism, and conducting the sharpest struggle against them, *does not by any means favour the erection of new frontier posts in Europe or the re-erection of those swept away by imperialism*" (the authors' italics).

Today "imperialism has swept away the frontier posts" between Germany and Belgium and between Russia and Galicia. International Social-Democracy, if you please, ought to be against their re-erection in general, whatever the means. In 1905, "in the era of imperialism", when Norway's autonomous Diet proclaimed her secession from Sweden, and Sweden's war against Norway, as preached by the Swedish reactionaries, did not take place, what with the resistance of the Swedish workers and the international imperialist situation—Social-Democracy ought to have been against Norway's secession, since it undoubtedly meant "the erection of new frontier posts in Europe"!!

This is downright annexationism. There is no need to refute it because it refutes itself. No socialist party would risk taking this stand: "We oppose annexations in general but we sanction annexations for Europe or tolerate them once they have been made"....

We need deal only with the theoretical sources of the error that has led our Polish comrades to such a patent ...

"impossibility". We shall say further on why there is no reason to make exceptions for "Europe". The following two phrases from the theses will explain the other sources of the error:

"Wherever the wheel of imperialism has rolled over and crushed an already formed capitalist state, the political and economic concentration of the capitalist world, paving the way for socialism, takes place in the brutal form of imperialist oppression...."

This justification of annexations is not Marxism but Struveism. Russian Social-Democrats who remember the 1890s in Russia have a good knowledge of this manner of distorting Marxism, which is common to Struve, Cunow, Legien and Co. In another of the theses (II, 3) of the Polish comrades we read the following, specifically about the German Struvists, the so-called "social-imperialists":

(The slogan of self-determination) "provides the social-imperialists with an opportunity, by demonstrating the illusory nature of that slogan, to represent our struggle against national oppression as historically unfounded sentimentality, thereby undermining the faith of the proletariat in the scientific validity of the Social-Democratic programme...."

This means that the authors consider the position of the German Struveists "scientific"! Our congratulations.

One "trifle", however, brings down this amazing argument which threatens to show that the Lensches, Cunows and Parvuses are *right* in comparison to us: it is that the Lensches are consistent people in their own way and in issue No. 8-9 of the chauvinist German *Glocke*—we deliberately quoted it in our theses—Lensch demonstrates *simultaneously* both the "scientific invalidity" of the self-determination slogan (the Polish Social-Democrats apparently believe that *this* argument of Lensch's is irrefutable, as can be seen from their arguments in the theses we have quoted) *and* the "scientific invalidity" of the slogan against annexations!

For Lensch had an excellent understanding of that simple truth which we pointed out to those Polish colleagues who showed no desire to reply to our statement: there is no difference "either political or economic", or even logical, between the "recognition" of self-determination and the

"protest" against annexations. If the Polish comrades regard the arguments of the Lensches against self-determination to be irrefutable, there is one *fact* that has to be accepted: the Lensches also use *all* these arguments to oppose the struggle against annexations.

The theoretical error that underlies all the arguments of our Polish colleagues has led them to the point of becoming *inconsistent annexationists*.

5. WHY ARE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AGAINST ANNEXATIONS?

In our view the answer is obvious: because annexation violates the self-determination of nations, or, in other words, is a form of national oppression.

In the view of the Polish Social-Democrats there have to be *special* explanations of why we are against annexations, and it is these (I, 3 in the theses) that inevitably enmesh the authors in a further series of contradictions.

They produce two reasons to "justify" our opposition to annexations (the "scientifically valid" arguments of the Lensches notwithstanding):

First: "To the assertion that annexations in Europe are essential for the military security of a victorious imperialist state, the Social-Democrats counterpose the fact that annexations only serve to sharpen antagonisms, thereby increasing the danger of war...."

This is an inadequate reply to the Lensches because their chief argument is not that annexations are a military necessity but that they are *economically* progressive and under imperialism mean concentration. Where is the logic if the Polish Social-Democrats in the same breath recognise the progressive nature of *such* a concentration, refusing to re-erect frontier posts in Europe that have been swept away by imperialism, and protest *against* annexations?

Furthermore, the danger of *what* wars is increased by annexations? Not imperialist wars, because they have other causes; the chief antagonisms in the present imperialist war are undoubtedly those between Germany and Britain, and between Germany and Russia. These antagonisms have nothing to do with annexations. It is the danger of *national*

wars and national revolts that is increased. But how can one declare national wars to be *impossible* in "the era of imperialism", on the one hand, and then speak of the "danger" of national wars, on the other? This is not logical.

The second argument: Annexations "create a gulf between the proletariat of the ruling nation and that of the oppressed nation ... the proletariat of the oppressed nation would unite with its bourgeoisie and regard the proletariat of the ruling nation as its enemy. Instead of the proletariat waging an international class struggle against the international bourgeoisie it would be split and ideologically corrupted...."

We fully agree with these arguments. But is it logical to put forward simultaneously two arguments on the same question which cancel each other out. In § 3 of the first part of the theses we find the above arguments that regard annexations as causing a *split* in the proletariat, and next to it, in § 4, we are told that we must oppose the annulment of annexations already effected in Europe and favour "the education of the working masses of the oppressed and the oppressor nations in a spirit of solidarity in struggle". If the annulment of annexations is reactionary "sentimentality", annexations *must not* be said to create a "gulf" between sections of the "proletariat" and cause a "split", but should, on the contrary, be regarded as a condition for the *bringing together* of the proletariat of different nations.

We say: In order that we may have the strength to accomplish the socialist revolution and overthrow the bourgeoisie, the workers must unite more closely and this close union is promoted by the struggle for self-determination, i.e., the struggle against annexations. We are consistent. But the Polish comrades who say that European annexations are "non-annullable" and national wars, "impossible", defeat themselves by contending "against" annexations with the use of arguments *about* national wars! These arguments are to the effect that annexations *hamper* the drawing together and fusion of workers of different nations!

In other words, the Polish Social-Democrats, in order to contend against annexations, have to draw for arguments on the theoretical stock *they themselves* reject in principle.

The question of colonies makes this even more obvious.

6. IS IT RIGHT TO CONTRAST "EUROPE" WITH THE COLONIES IN THE PRESENT QUESTION?

Our theses say that the demand for the immediate liberation of the colonies is as "impracticable" (that is, it cannot be effected without a number of revolutions and is not stable without socialism) under capitalism as the self-determination of nations, the election of civil servants by the people, the democratic republic, and so on—and, furthermore, that the demand for the liberation of the colonies is nothing more than "the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination".

The Polish comrades have not answered a single one of these arguments. They have tried to differentiate between "Europe" and the colonies. For Europe alone they become inconsistent annexationists by refusing to annul any annexations once these have been made. As for the colonies, they demand unconditionally: "Get out of the colonies!"

Russian socialists must put forward the demand: "Get out of Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara, etc.", but, it is alleged, they would be guilty of "utopianism", "unscientific sentimentality" and so on if they demanded a similar freedom of secession for Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, etc. British socialists must demand: "Get out of Africa, India, Australia", but not out of Ireland. What are the theoretical grounds for a distinction that is so patently false? This question cannot be evaded.

The chief "ground" of those opposed to self-determination is its "impracticability?". The same idea, with a nuance, is expressed in the reference to "economic and political concentration".

Obviously, concentration *also* comes about with the annexation of colonies. There was formerly an economic distinction between the colonies and the European peoples—at least, the majority of the latter—the colonies having been drawn into *commodity* exchange but not into capitalist *production*. Imperialism changed this. Imperialism is, among other things, the export of *capital*. Capitalist production is being transplanted to the colonies at an ever increasing rate. They cannot be extricated from dependence on European finance capital. From the military standpoint,

as well as from the standpoint of expansion, the separation of the colonies is practicable, as a general rule, only under socialism; under capitalism it is practicable only by way of exception or at the cost of a series of revolts and revolutions both in the colonies and the metropolitan countries.

The greater part of the dependent nations in Europe are capitalistically more developed than the colonies (though not all, the exceptions being the Albanians and many non-Russian peoples in Russia). But it is just this that generates greater resistance to national oppression and annexations! Precisely because of this, the development of capitalism is *more secure* in Europe under any political conditions, including those of separation, than in the colonies.... "There," the Polish comrades say about the colonies (I, 4), "capitalism is still confronted with the task of developing the productive forces independently...." This is even more noticeable in Europe: capitalism is undoubtedly developing the productive forces more vigorously, rapidly and independently in Poland, Finland, the Ukraine and Alsace than in India, Turkestan, Egypt and other straightforward colonies. In a commodity-producing society, no independent development, or development of any sort whatsoever, is possible without capital. In Europe the dependent nations have both *their own* capital and easy access to it on a wide range of terms. The colonies have no capital of *their own*, or none to speak of, and under finance capital no colony can obtain any except on terms of political submission. What then, in face of all this, is the significance of the demand to liberate the colonies immediately and unconditionally? Is it not clear that it is more "utopian" in the vulgar, caricature-"Marxist" sense of the word, "utopian", in the sense in which it is used by the Struves, Lensches, Cunows, with the Polish comrades unfortunately following in their footsteps? Any deviation from the ordinary, the commonplace, as well as everything that is revolutionary, is here labelled "utopianism", But revolutionary movements of *all* kinds—including national movements—are more possible, more practicable, more stubborn, more conscious and more difficult to defeat in Europe than they are in the colonies.

Socialism, say the Polish comrades (I, 3), "will be able to give the underdeveloped peoples of the colonies *unselfish cultural aid without ruling* over them". This is perfectly true. But what grounds are there for supposing that a great nation, a great state that goes over to socialism, will not be able to attract a small, oppressed European nation by means of "unselfish cultural aid"? It is the freedom to secede "*granted*" to the colonies by the Polish Social-Democrats that will attract the small but cultured and politically *exacting* oppressed nations of Europe to union with great socialist states, because under socialism a great state will mean so many hours *less* work a day and so much more *pay* a day. The masses of working people, as they liberate themselves from the bourgeois yoke, *will gravitate* irresistibly towards union and integration with the great, advanced socialist nations for the sake of that "cultural aid", provided yesterday's oppressors do not infringe on the long-oppressed nations' highly developed democratic feeling of self-respect, and provided they are granted equality in everything, including state construction, that is, experience in organising "their own" state. Under capitalism this "experience" means war, isolation, seclusion, and the narrow egoism of the small privileged nations (Holland, Switzerland). Under socialism the working people themselves will nowhere consent to seclusion merely for the above-mentioned purely economic motives, while the variety of political forms, freedom to secede, and experience in state organisation—there will be all this until the state in all its forms withers away—will be the basis of a prosperous cultured life and an earnest that the nations will draw closer together and integrate at an ever faster pace.

By setting the colonies aside and contrasting them to Europe the Polish comrades step into a contradiction which immediately brings down the whole of their fallacious argument.

7. MARXISM OR PROUDHONISM?

By way of an exception, our Polish comrades parry our reference to Marx's attitude towards the separation of Ireland directly and not indirectly. What is their objection?

References to Marx's position from 1848 to 1871, they say, are "not of the slightest value". The argument advanced in support of this unusually irate and peremptory assertion is that "at one and the same time" Marx opposed the strivings for independence of the "Czechs, South Slavs, etc."[105]

The argument is so very irate because it is so very unsound. According to the Polish Marxists, Marx was simply a muddlehead who "in one breath" said contradictory things! This is altogether untrue, and it is certainly not Marxism. It is precisely the demand for "concrete" analysis, which our Polish comrades insist on, *but do not themselves apply*, that makes it necessary for us to investigate whether Marx's different attitudes towards different concrete "national" movements did not spring from *one and the same* socialist outlook.

Marx is known to have favoured Polish independence in the interests of *European* democracy in its struggle against the power and influence—or, it might be said, against the omnipotence and predominating reactionary influence—of tsarism. That this attitude was correct was most clearly and practically demonstrated in 1849, when the Russian serf army crushed the national liberation and revolutionary-democratic rebellion in Hungary. From that time until Marx's death, and even later, until 1890, when there was a danger that tsarism, allied with France, would wage a reactionary war against a *non-imperialist* and nationally independent Germany, Engels stood first and foremost for a struggle against tsarism. It was for this reason, and exclusively for this reason, that Marx and Engels were opposed to the national movement of the Czechs and South Slavs. A simple reference to what Marx and Engels wrote in 1848 and 1849 will prove to anyone who is interested in Marxism in real earnest and not merely for the purpose of brushing Marxism aside, that Marx and Engels at that time drew a clear and definite *distinction* between "whole reactionary nations" serving as "Russian outposts" in Europe, and "revolutionary nations", namely, the Germans, Poles and Magyars. This is a fact. And it was indicated *at the time with incontrovertible* truth: in 1848 revolutionary nations fought for liberty, whose principal enemy was tsarism,

whereas the Czechs, etc., were in fact reactionary nations, and outposts of tsarism.

What is the lesson to be drawn from this concrete example which must be analysed *concretely* if there is any desire to be true to Marxism? Only this: (1) that the interests of the liberation of a number of big and very big nations in Europe rate higher than the interests of the movement for liberation of small nations; (2) that the demand for democracy must not be considered in isolation but on a European—today we should say a world—scale.

That is all there is to it. There is no hint of any repudiation of that elementary socialist principle which the Poles forget but to which Marx was *always* faithful—that no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations. If the concrete situation which confronted Marx when tsarism dominated international politics were to repeat itself, for instance, in the form of a few nations starting a socialist revolution (as a bourgeois-democratic revolution was started in Europe in 1848), and *other* nations serving as the chief bulwarks of bourgeois reaction—then we too would have to be in favour of a revolutionary war against the latter, in favour of "crushing" them, in favour of destroying all their outposts, no matter what small-nation movements arose in them. Consequently, instead of rejecting any examples of Marx's tactics—this would mean professing Marxism while abandoning it in practice—we must analyse them concretely and draw invaluable lessons for the future. The several demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but only a *small part* of the general-democratic (now: general-socialist) *world* movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected. It is possible that the republican movement in one country may be merely an instrument of the clerical or financial-monarchist intrigues of other countries; if so, we must *not* support this particular, concrete movement, but it would be ridiculous to delete the demand for a republic from the programme of international Social-Democracy on these grounds.

In what way has the concrete situation changed between the periods of 1848-71 and 1898-1916 (I take the most important landmarks of imperialism as a period: from the

Spanish-American imperialist war to the European imperialist war)? Tsarism has manifestly and indisputably ceased to be the chief mainstay of reaction, first, because it is supported by international finance capital, particularly French, and, secondly, because of 1905. At that time the system of big national states—the democracies of Europe—was bringing democracy and socialism to the world in spite of tsarism.* Marx and Engels did not live to see the period of imperialism. The system now is a handful of imperialist "Great" Powers (five or six in number), each oppressing other nations: and this oppression is a source for artificially retarding the collapse of capitalism, and artificially supporting opportunism and social-chauvinism in the imperialist nations which dominate the world. At that time, West European democracy, liberating the big nations, was opposed to tsarism, which used certain small-nation movements for reactionary ends. Today, the socialist proletariat, split into chauvinists, "social-imperialists", on the one hand, and revolutionaries, on the other, is confronted by an *alliance* of tsarist imperialism and advanced capitalist, European, imperialism, which is based on their common oppression of a number of nations.

Such are the concrete changes that have taken place in the situation, and it is just these that the Polish Social-Democrats ignore, in spite of their promise to be concrete! Hence the concrete change in the *application* of the same socialist principles: *formerly* the main thing was to fight "against tsarism" (and against certain small-nation move-

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* Ryazanov has published in Grünberg's *Archives of the History of Socialism* (1916, I) a very interesting article by Engels on the Polish question, written in 1866. Engels emphasises that the proletariat must recognise the political independence and "self-determination" ("right to dispose of itself" [These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*]) of the great, major nations of Europe, and points to the absurdity of the "principle of nationalities" (particularly in its Bonapartist application), i.e., of placing any small nation on the same level as these big ones. "And as to Russia," says Engels, "she could only be mentioned as the detainer of an immense amount of stolen property [i.e., oppressed nations] which would have to be disgorged on the day of reckoning."[106] Both Bonapartism and tsarism *utilise* the small-nation movements for *their own* benefit, *against* European democracy.

ments that *it* was using for undemocratic ends), and for the greater revolutionary peoples of the West; the main thing *today* is to stand against the united, aligned front of the imperialist powers, the imperialist bourgeoisie and the social-imperialists, and *for* the utilisation of *all* national movements against imperialism for the purposes of the socialist revolution. The *more purely* proletarian the struggle against the general imperialist front now is, the more vital, obviously, is the internationalist principle: "No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations".

In the name of their doctrinaire concept of social revolution, the Proudhonists ignored the international role of Poland and brushed aside the national movements. Equally doctrinaire is the attitude of the Polish Social-Democrats, who *break up* the international front of struggle against the social-imperialists, and (objectively) help the latter by their vacillations on the question of annexations. For it is precisely the international front of proletarian struggle that has changed in relation to the concrete position of the small nations: at that time (1848-71) the small nations were important as the potential allies either of "Western democracy" and the revolutionary nations, or of tsarism; now (1898-1914) that is no longer so; today they are important as one of the nutritive media of the parasitism and, consequently, the social-imperialism of the "dominant nations". The important thing is not whether one-fiftieth or one-hundredth of the small nations are liberated before the socialist revolution, but the fact that in the epoch of imperialism, owing to objective causes, the proletariat has been split into two international camps, one of which has been corrupted by the crumbs that fall from the table of the dominant-nation bourgeoisie—obtained, among other things, from the double or triple exploitation of small nations—while the other cannot liberate itself without liberating the small nations, without educating the masses in an anti-chauvinist, i.e., anti-annexationist, i.e., "self-determinationist", spirit.

This, the most important aspect of the question; is ignored by our Polish comrades, who do *not* view things from the key position in the epoch of imperialism, the standpoint of the division of the international proletariat into two camps.

Here are some other concrete examples of their Proudhonism: (1) their attitude to the Irish rebellion of 1916, of which later; (2) the declaration in the theses (II, 3, end of § 3) that the slogan of socialist revolution "must not be overshadowed by anything". The idea that the slogan of socialist revolution can be "overshadowed" by *linking* it up with a consistently revolutionary position on all questions, including the national question, is certainly profoundly anti-Marxist.

The Polish Social-Democrats consider our programme "national-reformist". Compare these two practical proposals: (1) for autonomy (Polish theses, III, 4), and (2) for freedom to secede. It is in this, and in this alone, that our programmes differ! And is it not clear that it is precisely the first programme that is reformist and not the second? A reformist change is one which leaves intact the foundations of the power of the ruling class and is merely a concession leaving its power unimpaired. A revolutionary change undermines the foundations of power. A reformist national programme does *not* abolish *all* the privileges of the ruling nation; it does *not* establish complete equality; it does *not* abolish national oppression *in all its forms*. An "autonomous" nation does not enjoy rights equal to those of the "ruling" nation; our Polish comrades could not have failed to notice this had they not (like our old Economists) obstinately avoided making an analysis of *political* concepts and categories. Until 1905 autonomous Norway, as a part of Sweden, enjoyed the widest autonomy, but she was not Sweden's equal. Only by her free secession was her equality manifested *in practice* and proved (and let us add in parenthesis that it was this free secession that created the basis for a more intimate and more democratic association, founded on equality of rights). As long as Norway was merely autonomous, the Swedish aristocracy had *one* additional privilege; and secession did not "mitigate" this privilege (the essence of reformism lies in *mitigating* an evil and not in destroying it), but *eliminated* it *altogether* (the principal criterion of the revolutionary character of a programme).

Incidentally, autonomy, as a reform, differs in principle from freedom to secede, as a revolutionary measure. This is unquestionable. But as everyone knows, in practice a reform

is often merely a step towards revolution. It is autonomy that enables a nation forcibly retained within the boundaries of a given state to crystallise into a nation, to gather, assess and organise its forces, and to select the most opportune moment for a *declaration* ... in the "Norwegian" spirit: We, the autonomous diet of such-and-such a nation, or of such-and-such a territory, declare that the Emperor of all the Russias has ceased to be King of Poland, etc. The usual "objection" to this is that such questions are decided by wars and not by declarations. True: in the vast majority of cases they are decided by wars (just as questions of the form of government of big states are decided, in the vast majority of cases, only by wars and revolutions). However, it would do no harm to reflect whether *such* an "objection" to the political programme of a revolutionary party is logical. Are we opposed to wars and revolutions *for* what is just and beneficial to the proletariat, *for* democracy and socialism?

"But we cannot be in favour of a war between great nations, in favour of the slaughter of twenty million people for the sake of the problematical liberation of a small nation with a population of perhaps ten or twenty millions!" Of course not! And it does not mean that we throw complete national equality out of our Programme; it means that the democratic interests of *one* country must be subordinated to the democratic interests of *several and all* countries. Let us assume that between two great monarchies there is a little monarchy whose kinglet is "bound" by blood and other ties to the monarchs of both neighbouring countries. Let us further assume that the declaration of a republic in the little country and the expulsion of *its* monarch would in practice lead to a war between the two neighbouring big countries for the restoration of that or another monarch in the little country. There is no doubt that all international Social-Democracy, as well as the really internationalist section of Social-Democracy in the little country, *would be against substituting a republic for the monarchy* in this case. The substitution of a republic for a monarchy is not an absolute, but one of the democratic demands, subordinate to the interests of democracy (and still more, of course, to those of the socialist proletariat) as a whole. A case like this would in all probability not give rise to the slightest

disagreement among Social-Democrats in any country. But if any Social-Democrat were to propose on *these* grounds that the demand for a republic be deleted altogether from the programme of international Social-Democracy, he would certainly be regarded as quite mad. He would be told that after all one must not forget the elementary logical difference between the *general* and the *particular*.

This example brings us, from a somewhat different angle, to the question of the *internationalist* education of the working class. Can such education—on the necessity and urgent importance of which differences of opinion among the Zimmerwald Left are inconceivable—be *concretely identical* in great, oppressor nations and in small, oppressed nations, in annexing nations and in annexed nations?

Obviously not. The way to the common goal—complete equality, the closest association and the eventual *amalgamation of all* nations—obviously runs along different routes in each concrete case, as, let us say, the way to a point in the centre of this page runs left from one edge and right, from the opposite edge. If a Social-Democrat from a great, oppressing, annexing nation, while advocating the amalgamation of nations in general, were for one moment to forget that "his" Nicholas II, "his" Wilhelm, George, Poincaré, etc., *also stand for amalgamation* with small nations (by means of annexations)—Nicholas II for "amalgamation" with Galicia, Wilhelm II for "amalgamation" with Belgium, etc.—such a Social-Democrat would be a ridiculous doctrinaire in theory and an abettor of imperialism in practice.

In the internationalist education of the workers of the oppressor countries, emphasis must necessarily be laid on their advocating freedom for the oppressed countries to secede and their fighting for it. Without this there can be no internationalism. It is our right and duty to treat every Social-Democrat of an oppressor nation who *fails* to conduct such propaganda as a scoundrel and an imperialist. This is an absolute demand, even where the *chance* of secession being possible and "practicable" before the introduction of socialism is only one in a thousand.

It is our duty to teach the workers to be "indifferent" to national distinctions. There is no doubt about that. But it must not be the indifference of the *annexationists*.

A member of an oppressor nation must be "indifferent" to whether small nations belong to *his* state *or to a neighbouring* state, or to themselves, according to where their sympathies lie: without such "indifference" he is *not* a Social-Democrat. To be an internationalist Social-Democrat one must *not* think only of one's own nation, but place *above it* the interests of all nations, their common liberty and equality. Everyone accepts this in "theory" but displays an annexationist indifference in practice. There is the root of the evil.

On the other hand, a Social-Democrat from a small nation must emphasise in his agitation the *second* word of our general formula: "voluntary *integration*" of nations. He may, without failing in his duties as an internationalist, be in favour of *both* the political independence of his nation and its integration with the neighbouring state of X, Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must fight *against* small-nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest.

People who have not gone into the question thoroughly think that it is "contradictory" for the Social-Democrats of oppressor nations to insist on the "freedom to *secede*", while Social-Democrats of oppressed nations insist on the "freedom to *integrate*". However, a little reflection will show that there is not, and cannot be, any *other* road to internationalism and the amalgamation of nations, any other road *from the given* situation to this goal.

And now we come to the *specific* position of Dutch and Polish Social-Democrats.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

8. THE SPECIFIC AND THE GENERAL IN THE POSITION OF THE DUTCH AND POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT INTERNATIONALISTS

There is not the slightest doubt that the Dutch and Polish Marxists who oppose self-determination are among the best revolutionary and internationalist elements in international Social-Democracy. How *can* it be then that their theoretical arguments as we have seen, are a mass of errors? There is not a single correct general argument, nothing but imperialist Economism!

It is not at all due to the especially bad subjective qualities of the Dutch and Polish comrades but to the *specific* objective conditions in their countries. Both countries are: (1) small and helpless in the present-day "system" of great powers; (2) both are geographically situated between tremendously powerful imperialist plunderers engaged in the most bitter rivalry with each other (Britain and Germany; Germany and Russia); (3) in both there are terribly strong memories and traditions of the times when they *themselves* were great powers: Holland was once a colonial power greater than England, Poland was more cultured and was a stronger great power than Russia and Prussia; (4) to this day both retain their privileges consisting in the oppression of other peoples: the Dutch bourgeois owns the very wealthy Dutch East Indies; the Polish landed proprietor oppresses the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasant; the Polish bourgeois, the Jew, etc.

The particularity comprised in the combination of these four points is not to be found in Ireland, Portugal (she was at one time annexed to Spain), Alsace, Norway, Finland, the Ukraine, the Lettish and Byelorussian territories or many others. And it is this very peculiarity that is the *real essence* of the matter! When the Dutch and Polish Social-Democrats reason against self-determination, using *general* arguments, i.e., those that concern imperialism in general, socialism in general, democracy in general, national oppression in general, we may truly say that they wallow in mistakes. But one has only to discard this obviously erroneous *shell* of general arguments and examine the *essence* of the question from the standpoint of the *specific* conditions obtaining in Holland and Poland for their particular position to become *comprehensible* and quite legitimate. It may be said, without any fear of sounding paradoxical, that when the Dutch and Polish Marxists battle against self-determination they do not say quite what they mean, or, to put it another way, mean quite what they say.*

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* Let us recall that *all* the Polish Social-Democrats *recognised* self-determination *in general* in their Zimmerwald declaration, although their formulation was slightly different.

We have already quoted one example in our theses.* Gorter is against the self-determination of *his own* country but *in favour* of self-determination for the Dutch East Indies, oppressed as they are by "his" nation! Is it any wonder that we see in him a more sincere internationalist and a fellow-thinker who is closer to us than those who recognise self-determination *as* verbally and hypocritically as Kautsky in Germany, and Trotsky and Martov in Russia? The general and fundamental principles of Marxism undoubtedly imply the duty to struggle for the freedom to secede for nations that are oppressed by "one's own" nation, but they certainly do not require the independence specifically of Holland to be made a matter of paramount importance—Holland, which suffers most from her narrow, callous, selfish and stultifying seclusion: let the whole world burn, we stand aside from it all, "we" are satisfied with our old spoils and the rich "left-overs", the Indies, "we" are not concerned with anything else!

Here is another example. Karl Radek, a Polish Social-Democrat, who has done particularly great service by his determined struggle for internationalism in German Social-Democracy since the outbreak of war, made a furious attack on self-determination in an article entitled "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (*Lichtstrahlen*[107]—a Left Radical monthly prohibited by the Prussian censor, edited by J. Borchardt—1915, December 5, Third Year of Publication, No. 3). He quotes, incidentally, *only* Dutch and Polish authorities in his support and propounds, amongst others, the argument that self-determination fosters the idea that "it is allegedly the duty of Social-Democrats to support any struggle for independence".

From the standpoint of *general* theory this argument is outrageous, because it is clearly illogical: first, no democratic demand can fail to give rise to abuses, unless the specific is subordinated to the general; we are not obliged to support either "any" struggle for independence or "any" republican or anti-clerical movement. Secondly, *no* formula for the struggle against national oppression can fail to suffer from

* See p. 150 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the *same* "shortcoming". Radek himself in *Berner Tagwacht* used the formula (1915, Issue 253): "Against old and new annexations." Any Polish nationalist will legitimately "deduce" from this formula: "Poland is an annexment, I am against annexations, *i.e.*, I am for the independence of Poland." Or I recall Rosa Luxemburg saying in an article written in 1908,[108] that the formula: "against national oppression" was quite adequate. But any Polish nationalist would say—*and quite justly*—that annexation is *one* of the forms of national oppression, *consequently*, etc.

However, take Poland's *specific* conditions in place of these general arguments: her independence *today* is "impracticable" without wars or revolutions. To be in favour of an all-European war merely for the sake of restoring Poland is to be a nationalist of the worst sort, and to place the interests of a small number of Poles above those of the hundreds of millions of people who suffer from war. Such, indeed, are the "Fracy" (the Right wing of the P.S.P.)[109] who are socialists only in word, and compared with whom the Polish Social-Democrats are a thousand times right. To raise the question of Poland's independence *today*, with the *existing* alignment of the *neighbouring* imperialist powers, is really to run after a will-o'-the-wisp, plunge into narrow-minded nationalism and forget the necessary premise of an all-European or at least a Russian and a German revolution. To have put forward in 1908-14 freedom of coalition in Russia as an independent slogan would also have meant running after a will-o'-the-wisp, and would, objectively, have helped the Stolypin labour party (now the Potresov-Gvozdyov party, which, incidentally, is the same thing). But it would be madness to remove freedom of coalition in general from the programme of Social-Democracy!

A third and, perhaps, the most important example. We read in the Polish theses (III, end of § 2) that the idea of an independent Polish buffer state is opposed on the grounds that it is an "inane utopia of small impotent groups. Put into effect, it would mean the creation of a tiny fragment of a Polish state that would be a military colony of one or another group of Great Powers, a plaything of their military or economic interests, an area exploited by foreign capital, and a battlefield in future wars". This is all very *true*

when used as an argument *against* the slogan of Polish independence *today*, because even a revolution in Poland alone would change nothing and would only divert the attention of the masses in Poland from *the main thing*—the connection between their struggle and that of the Russian and German proletariat. It is not a paradox but a fact that today the Polish proletariat as such can help the cause of socialism and freedom, *including the freedom of Poland*, only by *joint* struggle with the proletariat of the neighbouring countries, against the *narrow Polish* nationalists. The great historical service rendered by the Polish Social-Democrats in the struggle against the nationalists cannot possibly be denied.

But these same arguments, which are true from the standpoint of Poland's *specific* conditions in the *present* epoch, are manifestly untrue in the *general* form in which they are presented. So long as there are wars, Poland will always remain a battlefield in wars between Germany and Russia, but this is no argument against greater political liberty (and, therefore, against political independence) in the periods between wars. The same applies to the arguments about exploitation by foreign capital and Poland's role as a plaything of foreign interests. The Polish Social-Democrats cannot, at the moment, raise the slogan of Poland's independence, for the Poles, as proletarian internationalists, can do *nothing* about it without stooping, like the "Fracy", to humble servitude to *one* of the imperialist monarchies. But it is *not* indifferent to the Russian and German workers whether Poland is independent, or they take part in annexing her (and that would mean educating the Russian and German workers and peasants in the basest turpitude and their consent to play the part of executioner of other peoples).

The situation is, indeed, bewildering, but there is a way out in which *all* participants would remain internationalists: the Russian and German Social-Democrats by demanding for Poland unconditional "*freedom* to secede"; the Polish Social-Democrats by working for the unity of the proletarian struggle in both small and big countries without putting forward the slogan of Polish independence for the given epoch or the given period.

9. ENGELS'S LETTER TO KAUTSKY

In his pamphlet *Socialism and Colonial Politics* (Berlin, 1907), Kautsky, who was then still a Marxist, published a letter written to him by Engels, dated September 12, 1882, which is extremely interesting in relation to the question under discussion. Here is the principal part of the letter.

"In my opinion the colonies proper, i.e., the countries occupied by a European population—Canada, the Cape, Australia—will all become independent; on the other hand, the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated—India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions—must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence. How this process will develop is difficult to say. India will perhaps, indeed very probably, make a revolution, and as a proletariat in process of self-emancipation cannot conduct any colonial wars, it would have to be allowed to run its course; it would not pass off without all sorts of destruction, of course, but that sort of thing is inseparable from all revolutions. The same might also take place elsewhere, e.g., in Algeria and Egypt, and would certainly be the best thing *for us*. We shall have enough to do at home. Once Europe is reorganised, and North America, that will furnish such colossal power and such an example that the semi-civilised countries will of themselves follow in their wake; economic needs, if anything, will see to that. But as to what social and political phases these countries will then have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organisation, I think we today can advance only rather idle hypotheses. One thing alone is certain: *the victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing*. Which of course by no means excludes defensive wars of various kinds...."[110]

Engels does not at all suppose that the "economic" alone will directly remove all difficulties. An economic revolution will be a stimulus to *all* peoples to *strive* for socialism; but at the same time revolutions—against the socialist state—and wars are possible. Politics will inevitably adapt themselves to the economy, but not immediate-

ly or smoothly, not simply, not directly. Engels mentions as "certain" only one, absolutely internationalist, principle, and this he applies to *all* "foreign nations", i.e., not to colonial nations only: to force blessings upon them would mean to undermine the victory of the proletariat.

Just because the proletariat has carried out a social revolution it will not become holy and immune from errors and weaknesses. But it will be inevitably led to realise this truth by possible errors (and selfish interest—attempts to saddle others).

We of the Zimmerwald Left all hold the same conviction as Kautsky, for example, held before his desertion of Marxism for the defence of chauvinism in 1914, namely, that the socialist revolution is quite possible *in the very near* future—"any day", as Kautsky himself once put it. National antipathies will not disappear so quickly: the hatred—and perfectly legitimate hatred—of an oppressed nation for its oppressor *will last* for a while; it will evaporate only *after* the victory of socialism and *after* the final establishment of completely democratic relations between nations. If we are to be faithful to socialism we must even now educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism, which is impossible in oppressor nations without advocating freedom of secession for oppressed nations.

10. THE IRISH REBELLION OF 1916

Our theses were written before the outbreak of this rebellion, which must be the touchstone of our theoretical views.

The views of the opponents of self-determination lead to the conclusion that the vitality of small nations oppressed by imperialism has already been sapped, that they cannot play any role against imperialism, that support of their purely national aspirations will lead to nothing, etc. The imperialist war of 1914-16 has provided *facts* which refute such conclusions.

The war proved to be an epoch of crisis for the West-European nations, and for imperialism as a whole. Every crisis discards the conventionalities, tears away the outer

wrappings, sweeps away the obsolete and reveals the underlying springs and forces. What has it revealed from the standpoint of the movement of oppressed nations? In the colonies there have been a number of attempts at rebellion, which the oppressor nations, naturally did all they could to hide by means of a military censorship. Nevertheless, it is known that in Singapore the British brutally suppressed a mutiny among their Indian troops; that there were attempts at rebellion in French Annam (see *Nashe Slovo*) and in the German Cameroons (see the Junius pamphlet*); that in Europe, on the one hand, there was a rebellion in Ireland, which the "freedom-loving" English, who did not dare to extend conscription to Ireland, suppressed by executions, and, on the other, the Austrian Government passed the death sentence on the deputies of the Czech Diet "for treason", and shot whole Czech regiments for the same "crime".

This list is, of course, far from complete. Nevertheless, it proves that, *owing* to the crisis of imperialism, the flames of national revolt have flared up *both* in the colonies and in Europe, and that national sympathies and antipathies have manifested themselves in spite of the Draconian threats and measures of repression. All this before the crisis of imperialism hit its peak; the power of the imperialist bourgeoisie was yet to be undermined (this may be brought about by a war of "attrition" but has not yet happened) and the proletarian movements in the imperialist countries were still very feeble. What will happen when the war has caused complete exhaustion, or when, in one state at least, the power of the bourgeoisie has been shaken under the blows of proletarian struggle, as that of tsarism in 1905?

On May 9, 1916, there appeared in *Berner Tagwacht*, the organ of the Zimmerwald group, including some of the Leftists, an article on the Irish rebellion entitled "Their Song Is Over" and signed with the initials K. R."[111] It described the Irish rebellion as being nothing more nor less than a "putsch", for, as the author argued, "the Irish question was an agrarian one", the peasants had been pacified by reforms, and the nationalist movement remained

* See pp. 305-19 of this volume.—*Ed.*

only a "purely urban, petty-bourgeois movement, which, notwithstanding the sensation it caused, had not much social backing".

It is not surprising that this monstrously doctrinaire and pedantic assessment coincided with that of a Russian national-liberal Cadet, Mr. A. Kulisher (*Rech*[112] No. 102, April 15, 1916), who also labelled the rebellion "the Dublin putsch".

It is to be hoped that, in accordance with the adage, "it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good", many comrades, who were not aware of the morass they were sinking into by repudiating "self-determination" and by treating the national movements of small nations with disdain, will have their eyes opened by the "accidental" coincidence of opinion held by a Social-Democrat and a representative of the imperialist bourgeoisie!!

The term "putsch", in its scientific sense, may be employed only when the attempt at insurrection has revealed nothing but a circle of conspirators or stupid maniacs, and has aroused no sympathy among the masses. The centuries-old Irish national movement, having passed through various stages and combinations of class interest, manifested itself, in particular, in a mass Irish National Congress in America (*Vorwärts*, March 20, 1916) which called for Irish independence; it also manifested itself in street fighting conducted by a section of the urban petty bourgeoisie *and a section of the workers* after a long period of mass agitation, demonstrations, suppression of newspapers, etc. Whoever calls *such* a rebellion a "putsch" is either a hardened reactionary, or a doctrinaire hopelessly incapable of envisaging a social revolution as a living phenomenon.

To imagine that social revolution is *conceivable* without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, without revolutionary outbursts by a section of the petty bourgeoisie *with all its prejudices*, without a movement of the politically non-conscious proletarian and semi-proletarian masses against oppression by the landowners, the church, and the monarchy, against national oppression, etc.—to imagine all this is to *repudiate social revolution*. So one army lines up in one place and says, "We are for socialism", and another, somewhere else and says, "We are

for imperialism", and that will be a social revolution! Only those who hold such a ridiculously pedantic view could vilify the Irish rebellion by calling it a "putsch".

Whoever expects a "pure" social revolution will *never* live to see it. Such a person pays lip-service to revolution without understanding what revolution is.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It consisted of a series of battles in which *all* the discontented classes, groups and elements of the population participated. Among these there were masses imbued with the crudest prejudices, with the vaguest and most fantastic aims of struggle; there were small groups which accepted Japanese money, there were speculators and adventurers, etc. But *objectively*, the mass movement was breaking the back of tsarism and paving the way for democracy; for this reason the class-conscious workers led it.

The socialist revolution in Europe *cannot be* anything other than an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all and sundry oppressed and discontented elements. Inevitably, sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the backward workers will participate in it—without such participation, *mass* struggle is *impossible*, without it *no* revolution is possible—and just as inevitably will they bring into the movement their prejudices, their reactionary fantasies, their weaknesses and errors. But *objectively* they will attack *capital*, and the class-conscious vanguard of the revolution, the advanced proletariat, expressing this objective truth of a variegated and discordant, motley and outwardly fragmented, mass struggle, will be able to unite and direct it, capture power, seize the banks, expropriate the trusts which all hate (though for different reasons!), and introduce other dictatorial measures which in their totality will amount to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the victory of socialism, which, however, will by no means immediately "purge" itself of petty-bourgeois slag.

Social-Democracy, we read in the Polish theses (I, 4), "must utilise the struggle of the young colonial bourgeoisie against European imperialism *in order to sharpen the revolutionary crisis in Europe*". (Authors' italics.)

Is it not clear that it is least of all permissible to contrast Europe to the colonies in *this* respect. The struggle of the

oppressed nations *in Europe*, a struggle capable of going all the way to insurrection and street fighting, capable of breaking down the iron discipline of the army and martial law, will "sharpen the revolutionary crisis in Europe" to an infinitely greater degree than a much more developed rebellion in a remote colony. A blow delivered against the power of the English imperialist bourgeoisie by a rebellion in Ireland is a hundred times more significant politically than a blow of equal force delivered in Asia or in Africa.

The French chauvinist press recently reported the publication in Belgium of the eightieth issue of an illegal journal, *Free Belgium*.[113] Of course, the chauvinist press of France very often lies, but this piece of news seems to be true. Whereas chauvinist and Kautskyite German Social-Democracy has failed to establish a free press for itself during the two years of war, and has meekly borne the yoke of military censorship (only the Left Radical elements, to their credit be it said, have published pamphlets and manifestos, in spite of the censorship)—an oppressed civilised nation has reacted to a military oppression unparalleled in ferocity by establishing an organ of revolutionary protest! The dialectics of history are such that small nations, powerless as an *independent* factor in the struggle against imperialism, play a part as one of the ferments, one of the bacilli, which help the *real* anti-imperialist force, the socialist proletariat, to make its appearance on the scene.

The general staffs in the current war are doing their utmost to utilise any national and revolutionary movement in the enemy camp: the Germans utilise the Irish rebellion, the French—the Czech movement, etc. They are acting quite correctly from their own point of view. A serious war would not be treated seriously if advantage were not taken of the enemy's slightest weakness and if every opportunity that presented itself were not seized upon, the more so since it is impossible to know beforehand at what moment, where, and with what force some powder magazine will "explode". We would be very poor revolutionaries if, in the proletariat's great war of liberation for socialism, we did not know how to utilise *every* popular movement against *every single* disaster imperialism brings in order to intensify and extend the crisis. If we were, on the one

hand, to repeat in a thousand keys the declaration that we are "opposed" to all national oppression and, on the other, to describe the heroic revolt of the most mobile and enlightened section of certain classes in an oppressed nation against its oppressors as a "putsch", we should be sinking to the same level of stupidity as the Kautskyites.

It is the misfortune of the Irish that they rose prematurely, before the European revolt of the proletariat had *had time* to mature. Capitalism is not so harmoniously built that the various sources of rebellion can immediately merge of their own accord, without reverses and defeats. On the other hand, the very fact that revolts do break out at different times, in different places, and are of different kinds, guarantees wide scope and depth to the general movement; but it is only in premature, individual, sporadic and therefore unsuccessful, revolutionary movements that the masses gain experience, acquire knowledge, gather strength, and get to know their real leaders, the socialist proletarians, and in this way prepare for the general onslaught, just as certain strikes, demonstrations, local and national, mutinies in the army, outbreaks among the peasantry, etc., prepared the way for the general onslaught in 1905.

11. CONCLUSION

Contrary to the erroneous assertions of the Polish Social-Democrats, the demand for the self-determination of nations has played no less a role in our Party agitation than, for example, the arming of the people, the separation of the church from the state, the election of civil servants by the people and other points the philistines have called "utopian". On the contrary, the strengthening of the national movements after 1905 naturally prompted more vigorous agitation by our Party, including a number of articles in 1912-13, and the resolution of our Party in 1913 giving a precise "anti-Kautskian" definition (i.e., one that does not tolerate purely verbal "recognition") of the *content* of the point.*

* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 427-29.—*Ed.*

It will not do to overlook a fact which was revealed at that early date: opportunists of various nationalities, the Ukrainian Yurkevich, the Bundist Liebman, Semkovsky, the Russian myrmidon of Potresov and Co., all spoke *in favour* of Rosa Luxemburg's arguments *against* self-determination! What for Rosa Luxemburg, the Polish Social-Democrat, had been merely an incorrect theoretical generalisation of the *specific* conditions of the movement in Poland, became *objective* opportunist support for Great-Russian imperialism when actually applied to more extensive circumstances, to conditions obtaining in a big state instead of a small one, when applied on an international scale instead of the narrow Polish scale. The history of *trends* in political thought (as distinct from the views of individuals) has proved the correctness of our programme.

Outspoken social-imperialists, such as Lensch, still rail both against self-determination and the renunciation of annexations. As for the Kautskyites, they hypocritically recognise self-determination—Trotsky and Martov are going the same way here in Russia. *Both of them*, like Kautsky, say they favour self-determination. What happens in practice? Take Trotsky's articles "The Nation and the Economy" in *Nashe Slovo*, and you will find his usual eclecticism: on the one hand, the economy unites nations and, on the other, national oppression divides them. The conclusion? The conclusion is that the prevailing hypocrisy remains unexposed, agitation is dull and does not touch upon what is most important, basic, significant and closely connected with practice—one's attitude to the nation that is oppressed by "one's own" nation. Martov and other secretaries abroad simply preferred to forget—a profitable lapse of memory!—the struggle of their colleague and fellow-member Semkovsky against self-determination. In the legal press of the Gvozdyovites (*Nash Golos*) Martov spoke *in favour* of self-determination, pointing out the indisputable truth that during the imperialist war it does not *yet* imply participation, etc., but evading the main thing—he also evades it in the illegal, free press!—which is that *even in peace time* Russia set a world record for the oppression of nations with an imperialism that is much more crude, medieval, economically backward and militarily bureaucratic. The Russian Social-

Democrat who "recognises" the self-determination of nations more or less as it is recognised by Messrs. Plekhanov, Potresov and Co., that is, without bothering to fight for the freedom of secession for nations oppressed by tsarism, is *in fact* an imperialist and a lackey of tsarism.

No matter what the subjective "good" intentions of Trotsky and Martov may be, their evasiveness objectively supports Russian social-imperialism. The epoch of imperialism has turned all the "great" powers into the oppressors of a number of nations, and the development of imperialism will inevitably lead to a more definite division of trends in this question in international Social-Democracy as well.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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NOTES

[1] Written in 1915. In early 1916, Lenin, while in Berne, sent the manuscript to Maxim Gorky for the *Parus* Publishers, but it did not appear at that time. It was published in Petrograd in 1917 by *Zhizn i Znaniye*.

The material for the book—variants of the plan and statistical extracts from the U.S. Census reports for 1900 and 1910—was published in *Lenin Miscellany XIX* in 1932.

Lenin did not realise his intention of writing the second part of the book, which was to have dealt with Germany. p. 13

[2] *Zavety* (Behests)—a legal literary and political monthly of a Socialist-Revolutionary orientation; published in Petersburg from April 1912 to July 1914. p. 17

[3] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 600. p. 22

[4] *Zemstvo*—so-called local self-government bodies headed by the nobility. They were set up in the central gubernias of Russia in 1864. Their powers were restricted to purely local economic affairs (hospitals, roads, statistics, insurance, etc.), and they were subordinated to the provincial governors and the Minister of the Interior, who could overrule any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 60

[5] *Manilov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, who had a very fertile imagination and loved to talk; a prattling self-complacent dreamer. p. 84

[6] Kautsky's pamphlet, *Der Weg Zur Macht* (The Way to Power), published in Berlin in 1909. p. 106

[7] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—the journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. In 1885-95, it carried some articles by Engels, who often gave advice to its editors and sharply criticised them for any departures from Marxism. Beginning with the late nineties, after Engels's death, it made a regular practice of publishing articles by revisionists. During the First World War, it adopted a Centrist, Kautskyite stand, and supported the social-chauvinists. p. 106

[8] The article was written by Lenin in German and published in January 1916 in the first issue of the theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left, the magazine *Vorbote* (Herald). Earlier, Lenin had written an article in Russian under the same title; it was first

published in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* (Proletarian Revolution) No. 5 (28) in 1924, and is included in Volume 21 of the present edition, where the text is not quite identical with the one in *Vorbote*. p. 108

9 *The Quadruple Alliance*—the imperialist alliance of Britain, France, Russia and Italy, which in 1915 withdrew from the Dreibund and joined the Triple Entente. p. 108

10 An opportunist trend in German and International Social-Democracy hostile to Marxism. It emerged in Germany at the end of the 19th century, and got its name from Eduard Bernstein, a German Social-Democrat, who tried to revise Marx's revolutionary theory on the lines of bourgeois liberalism. Among his supporters in Russia were the legal Marxists, the Economists, the Bund and the Mensheviks. p. 112

11 *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly)—the chief organ of the German Social-Democratic opportunists and an organ of international opportunism; during the First World War it took a social-chauvinist stand; published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. p. 112

12 Members of the Fabian Society, a British reformist organisation founded in 1884; It got its name from the Roman commander, Fabius Maximus (d. 203 B.C.), surnamed Cunctator, that is, the Delayer, for his tactics of harassing Hannibal's army without risking a pitched battle. Most of the Society's members were bourgeois intellectuals: scholars, writers, politicians (such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw, Ramsay MacDonald, etc.); they denied the need for the class struggle of the proletariat and a socialist revolution, and insisted that the transition from capitalism to socialism lay only through petty reform and a gradual transformation of society. Lenin said it was "an *extremely opportunist* trend" (see present edition, Vol. 13, p. 358). In 1900, the Fabian Society was affiliated to the Labour Party. Fabian socialism is one of the ideological sources of the Labour Party policy.

During the First World War, the Fabians took a social-chauvinist stand. For Lenin's description of the Fabians, see "British Pacifism and the British Dislike of Theory" (present edition, Vol. 21). p. 113

13 Founded in 1900 as an amalgamation of trade unions, socialist organisations and groups to seat workers' representatives in Parliament (Committee for Labour Representation). In 1906, it took the name of Labour Party. Trade-unionists are automatically members of the Party provided they pay membership dues. It is headed by an Executive Committee which together with the Trade Union General Council and the Executive Committee of the Co-operative Party constitute the so-called National Labour Council. The Co-operative Party and the I.L.P. are corporate members of the Labour Party.

Initially a working men's party (it was subsequently joined by considerable numbers of petty-bourgeois elements), the Labour

FROM MARX TO MAO NOTES & COMMENTARIES DISTRIBUTED

Party is opportunist in ideology and tactics. Since its emergence its leaders have been conducting a policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie. "The Labour Party is an out-and-out bourgeois party, for although it does consist of workers it is led by reactionaries—the worst reactionaries who operate in the spirit of the bourgeoisie...." (See present edition, Vol. 31, "Speech on the Membership in the British Labour Party, Delivered on August 6, 1920, at the Second Congress of the Communist International".) During the First World War, its leaders took a social-chauvinist stand.

Labour Governments (1924, 1929, 1945 and 1950) have conducted the policy of British imperialism. Dissatisfaction with the leadership's policy among the British working people has led to a Left-wing trend in the Party opposing the leadership's official policy. p. 113

[14] *The Independent Labour Party* (I.L.P.) is a reformist organisation founded by the leaders of the "new trade unions" in 1893, during the upswing in the strike movement and the working-class movement for independence from the bourgeois parties. The I.L.P. included members of the "new trade unions" and a number of old ones, and also intellectuals and petty-bourgeois elements influenced by the Fabians. The Party was headed by Keir Hardie. From the outset it took a bourgeois-reformist stand, concentrating on the parliamentary forms of struggle and parliamentary deals with the Liberal Party. Lenin said it was "in practice an opportunist party which has always depended on the bourgeoisie" (see present edition, Vol. 29, "The Tasks of the Third International")

At the outbreak of the First World War, the I.L.P. issued an anti-war manifesto, but soon slid down to social-chauvinist positions. p. 113

[15] *The British Socialist Party* was founded in Manchester in 1911 by a merger of the Social-Democratic Party with other socialist groups. It spread Marxist ideas and was a party that was "not opportunist and was *really* independent of the Liberals" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 273). But its small membership and weak ties with the masses lent it a somewhat sectarian character. During the First World War, a struggle broke out within it between the internationalist trend (William Gallacher, Albert Inkpin, John McLean, Theodore Rothstein, and others) and the social-chauvinist trend led by Hyndman. Some in the internationalist trend took a Centrist stand on a number of issues. In February 1916, a group of B.S.P. members founded *The Call*, a newspaper which played a great part in rallying the internationalists. The B.S.P. annual conference at Salford in April 1916 condemned the social-chauvinist stand of Hyndman and his supporters, and they left the Party.

The B.S.P. welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution. Its members took a leading part in the British working people's movement in defence of Soviet Russia against foreign intervention. In 1919, the majority of its local organisations (98 against 4)

voted in favour of joining the Communist International. Together with the Communist Unity Group, the B.S.P. played the decisive role in founding the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the first unity congress held in 1920, the overwhelming majority of local B.S.P. organisations joined the Communist Party. p. 113

[16] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal monthly of the Menshevik liquidators published in Petersburg from January 1910 to September 1914. It was the liquidators' centre in Russia. With the outbreak of the First World War the journal took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 113

[17] *Organising Committee* (O.C.)—the Mensheviks' governing centre, formed at the August conference of Menshevik liquidators and all anti-Party groups and trends in 1912. p. 113

[18] *Shiroki* (Broad) *Socialists*—an opportunist trend within the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party. p. 113

[19] *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Prussian Yearbook)—a conservative monthly of the German capitalists and landowners published in Berlin from 1858 to 1935. p. 114

[20] Friedrich Engels, "Zur Kritik des sozial-demokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (published in *Die Neue Zeit*, Jg. XX, 1901, B. II, No. 1). p. 114

[21] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 537. p. 116

[22] Engels's letter to Friedrich Albert Sorge of November 11, 1893. (No English translation available.) p. 116

[23] *The Zimmerwald Left* was formed by Lenin at the first socialist conference of internationalists at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in early September 1915; it was, Lenin said, the first step in the development of the internationalist movement against the war. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were the only group within the Zimmerwald Left to take a consistently correct stand. The group also included a number of inconsistent internationalists, whose mistakes Lenin criticised in "The Junius Pamphlet", and "The Discussion of Self-Determination Summed Up" (see pp. 305-19, 32-60 of this volume). p. 118

[24] A weekly founded in 1891. From 1893 it was an organ of the I.L.P.; from 1922, it was called the *New Leader*, and since 1946 it has been known as the *Socialist Leader*. p. 119

[25] *Berner Tagwacht* (Berne Reveille)—the organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland, published in Berne from 1893. In 1909-18, it was edited by R. Grimm. At the outbreak of the First World War it carried articles by Liebknecht, Mehring and other Left-wing Social-Democrats. From 1917 the newspaper gave open support to the social-chauvinists. The paper's present stand on the key domestic and foreign policy issues coincides with that of bourgeois newspapers. p. 119

[26] Written by Lenin for the enlarged meeting of the International Socialist Commission (I.S.C.) in Berne which was held on February 5-8, 1916. It adopted several of Lenin's points but under the pressure of the Right-wingers rejected his proposal for "international unification of socialists opposing war and nationalism". It set the Second International Socialist Conference for April 24, 1916. The document had no title, the present one having been supplied by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, C.C., C.P.S.U. p. 121

[27] The *I.S.C.* was the executive of the Zimmerwald group elected at the Zimmerwald Conference in September 1915. p. 121

[28] The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee submitted proposals to the Second Socialist Conference on all the key items of the agenda. For the draft proposals written by Lenin, see pp. 169-79 of this volume. p. 121

[29] Written during the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. in Berne. It was discussed and adopted. p. 122

[30] This speech was delivered at an international rally during the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. in Berne. p. 123

[31] Adopted by the Zimmerwald Conference of internationalists in September 1915 (see present edition, "First Step", Vol. 21). p. 123

[32] The newspaper of the American socialists founded in Girard, Kansas, in 1895. While not officially connected with the American Socialist Party, the newspaper spread socialist ideas and was very popular among the workers. p. 125

[33] *La Bataille* (The Battle)—the organ of the French anarchist syndicalists, published in Paris from 1915 to 1920 in place of *La Bataille Syndicaliste*, which was closed down in September 1915; during the First World War, took a chauvinist stand. p. 127

[34] *Vorwärts* (Forward)—a daily, the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Berlin from 1891 in accordance with a resolution of the Party's Halle Congress as a continuation of the *Berliner Volksblatt* (Berlin People's Newspaper), which had been published from 1884. On its pages Engels fought every manifestation of opportunism. In the late nineties, after Engels's death, the paper fell into the hands of the Party's Right wing and regularly printed articles by opportunists. It gave a biased account of the struggle against opportunism and revisionism within the R.S.D.L.P., supported the Economists, and after the Party split, the Mensheviks. During the years of reaction, *Vorwärts* published Trotsky's slanderous articles but refused to print refutations by Lenin and the Bolsheviks or fair accounts of the state of affairs in the Party.

During the First World War, it took a social-chauvinist stand. After the Great October Socialist Revolution it engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda. It was published in Berlin until 1933. p. 127

[35] *War industries committees* were set up in Russia in 1915 by imperialist Big Business. In its efforts to control the workers and

spread defencist sentiments among them, the bourgeoisie attached workers' groups" to these committees which were to exhort the masses to increase munitions output. The Mensheviks were active in this pseudo-patriotic undertaking. The Bolsheviks successfully boycotted them with the aid of the majority of the workers. p.128

[36] Founded in 1902. In 1905, the F.S.P. and the Socialist Party of France founded the United Socialist Party, which included all socialist parties and groups (Guesdists, Blanquists, Jaurèsists, etc.). The leadership of the F.S.P. passed into the hands of socialist-reformists (led by Jaurès), who constituted the majority. During the First World War, it took a social-chauvinist stand, its parliamentary group voted for war credits and its members were in the bourgeois government. The F.S.P. split at its Tours Congress, December 25-30, 1920; the majority formed the Communist Party of France, while the Right-wing opportunist minority, led by Léon Blum, left the Congress and formed their own party, retaining the old name of the French Socialist Party.

The resolution motioned by Bourderon at the F.S.P. Congress in December 1915 was rejected by a majority. At that time, Bourderon belonged to the Right wing of the Zimmerwald group. p. 128

[37] It was published in French as a leaflet in Geneva. p. 130

[38] The Menshevik magazine, *The International and the War*, only one issue of which was published in late 1915. p. 131

[39] *Die Internationale Sozialistische Kommission zu Bern. Bulletin* —the I.S.C. organ from September 1915 to January 1917. It was published in English, French, and German. There were six issues in all. p. 131

[40] The Menshevik group in the Fourth State Duma. p. 131

[41] *Luch* (The Ray)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in Petersburg from September 1912 to July 1913; financed from funds donated by "*rich friends from among the bourgeoisie*" (Vol. 20, p. 368). p. 131

[42] Legal Menshevik newspapers published in Petrograd: *Utro* (Morning), in August 1915; and *Rabocheye Utro* (Workers' Morning), in October-December 1915. p. 132

[43] *Sovremenny Mir* (The Contemporary World)—a literary, scientific and political monthly published in Petersburg from 1906 to 1918. Among its contributors were Mensheviks, including Plekhanov. Bolsheviks also contributed to the magazine during the bloc with the Plekhanov group of pro-Party Mensheviks and in early 1914. In March 1914, it carried Lenin's article "Socialism Demolished Again" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 187).

During the First World War the magazine was an organ of the social-chauvinists. p. 132

[44] *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word)—a Menshevik-Trotskyist daily, published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916, in place of *Golos* (Voice). p. 132

[45] *Prizyv* (The Call), published in Paris between 1915 and 1917 by a social-chauvinist group of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 135

[46] The conference was organised by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Petrograd in July 1915. It adopted a resolution calling for active support of tsarism in the war. p. 135

[47] In Turgenev's prose poem "An Everyday Rule to Follow". p. 136

[48] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Social-Democrat)—the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., an illegal newspaper published from February 1908 to January 1917, a total of 58 issues. The first was published in Russia, and the rest abroad, first in Paris, then in Geneva. Under an R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee decision, its Editorial Board was composed of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats.

It carried more than 80 articles and notes by Lenin, who worked to make the Editorial Board conduct a consistent Bolshevik line. Some of the editors (Kamenev and Zinoviev) took a conciliatory attitude to the liquidators and tried to thwart the implementation of Lenin's line . The Mensheviks Martov and Dan, while hampering the work of the Central Organ's Editorial Board, openly defended the liquidators in their factional newspaper, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (The Voice of a Social-Democrat). Lenin's resolute struggle against the liquidators finally forced Martov and Dan to resign from the Editorial Board in June 1911. From December 1911, the newspaper was edited by Lenin.

At the outbreak of the First World War, after an interval of one year, Lenin succeeded in resuming its publication. Issue No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, dated November 1, 1914, carried a manifesto of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, which was written by Lenin. His articles in the newspaper during the war were outstanding in implementing the Bolshevik Party's strategy and tactics on war, peace, and revolution, and in exposing overt and covert social-chauvinists and rallying the internationalist elements in the international working-class movement. p. 137

[49] The name given by workers to the Menshevik liquidators who adapted themselves to the Stolypin regime, accepted it and tried to obtain the tsarist government's permission to set up a legal "labour" party, at the price of having to abandon the Programme and tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 138

[50] Lenin said it was "Octobrist" because it dove-tailed with the stand of the counter-revolutionary Octobrist Party.

Octobrists or the *League of October Seventeenth* was a counter-revolutionary party of big merchants and industrialists and big landowners who ran their estates on capitalist lines. It was formed

in November 1905. The Octobrists supported the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905 and gave full backing to his government's domestic and foreign policy. They were led by the industrialist A. Guchkov and landed proprietor M. Rodzyanko. p. 139

[51] A frame-up trial instituted in 1894 by reactionary royalist circles among the French militarists against Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the General Staff, who was falsely accused of espionage and high treason. A court martial sentenced him to life imprisonment. The public movement for a review of the case took the form of a fierce struggle between the republicans and the royalists and led to his eventual release in 1906.

Lenin said the Dreyfus case was "one of the many thousands of fraudulent tricks of the reactionary military caste". p. 145

[52] The incident was caused by the brutality of a Prussian officer towards Alsatians in Zabern, Alsace, in November 1913, and resulted in a burst of indignation among the local, mainly French, population against the Prussian militarists (see Lenin's article "Zabern" in the present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 513-15). p. 145

[53] Marx's letters to Engels of November 2 (no English translation available) and November 30, 1867 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 234-37). p. 146

[54] For a critique of Renner and Bauer's reactionary idea of "cultural and national autonomy" see Lenin's "'Cultural-National' Autonomy" (present edition, Vol. 19) and "Critical Remarks on the National Question" (Vol. 20). p. 147

[55] Karl Marx, "Konfidentielle Mitteilung", quoted from the manuscript kept in the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U. p. 149

[56] Friedrich Engels, "Der Prager Aufstand", in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* No. 18, June 18, 1848. p. 149

[57] Marx's proposition on the Irish question was stated in his letters to Kugelmann on November 29 and to Engels on December 10, 1869 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 276-78 and pp. 279-81). Lenin quotes from Marx's letter to Engels on November 2, 1867 (no English translation available). p. 149

[58] *Die Glocke* (The Bell)—a magazine published in Munich and later in Berlin from 1915 to 1925 by the social-chauvinist Parvus (A. L. Helfand), a member of the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 150

[59] Friedrich Engels, "Der demokratische Panslawismus". Lenin used *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*, hrsg. von Franz Mehring, Stuttgart, 1902, Bd. III, S. 246-64, in which the author of the article is not named. p. 150

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[60] The resolution was on the national question; it was written by Lenin and adopted by the meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee and Party officials, which was held at Poronin, near Cracow, on October 6-14, 1913. For reasons of secrecy it was known as the "Summer" or "August" Meeting. For the text of the resolution, see Vol. 19, pp. 427-29. p. 154

[61] *Gazeta Robotnicza* (Workers' Gazette)—the illegal organ of the Warsaw Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, published from May to October 1906. Its publication was resumed in 1912 and continued until January 1916. Parallel committees were established after the split among the Polish Social-Democrats in 1912: there were two Warsaw Committees and two organs of the same name, one published by the supporters of the Executive Committee in Warsaw and the other, by the Opposition Warsaw Committee in Cracow. The Opposition Warsaw Committee published two issues, Nos. 24 and 25 (with supplement), in Zurich in 1915-16. p. 157

[62] This refers to the Brussels "Unity" Conference, July 16-18, 1914, called by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau (I.S.B.) for an exchange of opinion on the prospects of reuniting the R.S.D.L.P. The following were represented: R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee (Bolsheviks), Organising Committee (Mensheviks); Plekhanov's Unity group; the *Vperyod* group; the Bund; the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Territory, the Social-Democrats of Lithuania; the Polish Social-Democrats; the Polish Social-Democratic Opposition; the Polish Socialist Party (The Left wing). The I.S.B. Executive was represented by Vandervelde, Huysmans, Kautsky, Nemetz and others. Long before the Conference, the I.S.B. leaders made a secret arrangement with the liquidators on joint action against the Bolsheviks.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks were aware of the real aims pursued by the organisers of the Conference, but deemed it necessary to attend, because a refusal to do so would not have been understood by the workers of Russia. The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee sent its delegation—I. F. Armand (Petrova), M. F. Vladimirsky (Kamsky) and I. F. Popov (Pavlov). Lenin briefed the delegates, wrote the report, gave detailed instructions, and provided them with the necessary material, documents and facts exposing the opportunism of the Menshevik liquidators and their allies. Lenin was living in Poronin and directed the delegation from day to day by his advice and instructions.

The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee report was delivered by Armand. The I.S.B. leaders would not let her read the full text and she had to summarise only a part of the report and set out the Bolsheviks' terms for unity, which the Mensheviks and the leaders of the Second International met with cries and threats against the Bolsheviks. Kautsky, on behalf of the I.S.B., motioned a unity resolution, asserting that there were no substantial contradictions within the Russian Social-Democratic Party which could be an obstacle to unity. He was supported by Plekhanov

and the representatives of the O.C., who fiercely attacked Lenin and the C.C. delegation. Rosa Luxemburg also took an erroneous stand and joined Plekhanov, Vandervelde, Kautsky and the other who supported the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Since the Conference was not empowered to adopt any resolutions—it was to confine itself to an exchange of opinion—the Bolsheviks and the Latvian Social-Democrats refused to take part in the voting, but the resolution was passed by a majority.

The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, refused to abide by the decisions of the Brussels Conference and exposed the true aims of the "unifiers" before the international proletariat. The opportunist leaders of the Second International failed to eliminate the Bolshevik Party. p. 157

[63] After the Menshevik *K. A. Gvozdyov*—a policy of collaborating with the imperialist bourgeoisie. p. 159

[64] *L. Tyszka* (Jogiches), was a leader of the Polish Social-Democrats, at times unprincipled and vacillating in his political activity. During the First World War he joined the internationalists; worked with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liehknecht to found the Spartacus League in Germany; in March 1919 was arrested and killed in prison. For a characteristic of Tyszka, see Lenin's "The Split among the Polish Social-Democrats" (present edition Vol. 18), "Would-be Uniters", "Coteries Abroad and Russian Liquidators" (Vol. 19), *et. al.* p. 160

[65] The Second International Socialist Conference held in Kienthal, Switzerland, on April 24-30 1916.

It was attended by 43 delegates from 10 countries—Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Switzerland and Russia. A delegate from Britain and a delegate from the Secretariat of the Youth International attended as guests. The delegates of the Independent Labour Party of Britain, the United States, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, and Sweden were refused passports and were unable to attend. Some Left-wing bodies delegated their powers to other parties: the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Territory transferred their credentials to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee the delegate of the Dutch Lefts, H. Roland-Holst, to the Territorial Executive of the Social-Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania.

Russia was represented at the Conference by three R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee delegates headed by Lenin, two delegates from the Menshevik O.C. and three delegates from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. From Germany there were seven delegates from the Centrist Haase-Ledebour group, two delegates from the *Internationale* group and one from the Bremen Left-wing radicals. Italy was represented by seven delegates, France, by three Centrists and one syndicalist (Guilbeaux); Poland, by four, and Switzerland, by five.

The Conference discussed the following questions: (1) the struggle to end the war; (2) the attitude of the proletariat to questions of peace; (3) agitation and propaganda; (4) parliamentary activities; (5) mass struggle; and (6) convocation of the International Socialist Bureau.

Lenin started making extensive preparations for the Second International Socialist Conference immediately after the enlarged meeting of the International Socialist Committee in Berne (February 5-9, 1916). Without waiting for the Conference to be called officially, he sent to all the Bolshevik sections abroad and Left-wing socialists in various countries a letter, written with his participation, about the enlarged I.S.C. meeting and the convocation of the Conference, pointing to the need for immediate preparations for it and the election of delegates. His "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference" were also circulated for discussion among all Bolshevik organisations and among Left-wing Social-Democrats in France, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, Italy, Holland, Norway, Sweden and other countries. In some of his letters Lenin stressed that the Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left should prepare a report and theses for the Conference and hold a number of Left-wing meetings before and during the Conference.

As a result of the work done by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the Left wing at the Conference was stronger than at Zimmerwald. It was joined by the delegate of the International Socialists of Germany group, two delegates of the *Internationale* group, the French syndicalist Guilbeaux, the representative of the Serbian Social-Democrats, Kaclerović, and the Italian socialist Giacinto Serrati. Thus, the Zimmerwald Left, which had 12 delegates at the Kienthal Conference, on some points obtained from 12 to 19 votes, or almost one-half. This reflected the shift to internationalism in the international working-class movement. During the Kienthal Conference, Lenin called several meetings of the Left to discuss "The Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference". He rallied the Left-wing forces for joint and organised action at the Conference against its Kautskyite majority. The Zimmerwald Left worked out and laid before the Conference a draft resolution on the question of peace, which contained Lenin's key propositions. To avoid complete exposure, the Right-wing majority at the Conference was forced to follow the Left on a number of questions, but continued to oppose the break with the social-chauvinists.

Lenin took an active part in the Conference: he was a member of the commission on the convocation of the I.S.B., spoke several times, talked with delegates and exchanged notes with them at the sittings.

The struggle centred on the convocation of the I.S.B.; the Left got in an addendum to the resolution, which censured the activity of the I.S.B. but did not reject the possibility of its convocation, to the effect that in the event of its being convened an enlarged International Socialist Committee was to be called to

discuss joint action by the representatives of the Zimmerwald group. The Conference adopted a resolution on the struggle for peace and an "Appeal to the Peoples Being Ruined and Slaughtered".

In view of the vote for war credits cast by the minority of the French parliamentary group, the Zimmerwald Left tabled a motion stating that such acts are incompatible with socialism and the anti-war struggle. Lenin said the Kienthal Conference was a step forward, although it failed to adopt the key Bolshevik propositions on turning the imperialist war into civil war, the defeat of one's own imperialist government, and the establishment of the Third International. It helped to crystallise and rally the internationalist elements on the ideological foundation of Marxism-Leninism. On the initiative of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, these elements subsequently constituted the nucleus of the Communist (Third) International. p. 161

[66] *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Workers' Newspaper)—a daily, the Central Organ of the Austrian Social-Democrats, published in Vienna from 1889. During the First World War it took a social-chauvinist stand. Lenin called it the newspaper of the "Viennese traitors to socialism".

It was closed down in 1934 and resumed publication in 1945 as the Central Organ of the Socialist Party of Austria. p. 165

[67] *Nash Golos* (Our Voice)—a social-chauvinist Menshevik newspaper, published in Samara in 1915 and 1916. p. 166

[68] *The International Socialist Bureau* (I.S.B.) was the permanent executive and information body of the Second International located at Brussels. It was founded by a decision taken at the Paris Congress of the Second International (1900). It consisted of two delegates from each national party, and was to meet four times a year, the Executive Committee of the Belgian Labour Party being charged with its direction in between sessions. Vandervelde was its Chairman, and Huysmans, its Secretary. Lenin was a member of the Bureau, as a representative of the R.S.D.L.P., from 1905. From June 1914, on Lenin's proposal, M. M. Litvinov was appointed to represent the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. When the First World War broke out the I.S.B. became a pliable tool in the hands of the social-chauvinists. p. 169

[69] A congress of the Dutch Social-Democratic Party held at Arnhem on January 8-9, 1916. p. 173

[70] See "The United States of Europe Slogan" in the present edition, Vol. 21. p. 173

[71] *Avanti!* (Forward!)—a daily, the Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in December 1896. During the First World War it was inconsistently internationalist, and retained its ties with the reformists. It is now the Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party. p. 174

[72] An I.S.C. "Appeal to All Affiliated Parties and Groups", adopted unanimously by the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. in Berne on February 5-9, 1916. The delegation of the R.S.D.L.P, Central Committee, led by Lenin, stated that it regarded the Appeal as a step forward as compared with the decisions of the First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald but did not find it satisfactory on all points. The Appeal was published in No. 3 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin* on February 29, 1916, and in No. 52 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* on March 25, 1916. p. 178

[73] The official I.S.C. statement dated September 29, 1915, and published in No. 2 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin* on November 27, 1915, which said, contrary to the decisions of the First Zimmerwald Conference, that the I.S.C. was prepared to consider itself dissolved as soon as the I.S.B. resumed its activities at The Hague. This was helping to restore the Second International. p. 178

[74] A group of German Left-wing Social-Democrats which emerged during the First World War. Its organ, *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays of Light), was published in Berlin from 1913 to 1921. The I.S.D. openly opposed war and opportunism and took the most consistent stand in Germany on separation from the social-chauvinists and Centrists. Borchardt, representing the group at the Zimmerward Conference, alone of the 10 German delegates signed the draft resolution and draft manifesto of the Zimmerwald Left. Soon after the Conference, the Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left was informed that the I.S.D. group had joined it, and this was reported in *Internationale Flugblatt* (International Leaflets) No. 1. The group had no extensive ties with the masses and soon broke up. p. 180

[75] G. V. Chicherin. p. 180

[76] A magazine founded by Lenin and published by the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* jointly with G. L. Pyatakov and E. B. Bosch, who financed it; Bukharin was one of the editors. Only one (double) issue was published. It carried, apart from the article "The Honest Voice of a French Socialist", two other articles by Lenin: "The Collapse of the Second International" and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy".

The publication plan was worked out by Lenin in the spring of 1915. The organisational meeting of the Editorial Board was held under his guidance. Lenin planned to make *Kommunist* an international organ of the Left-wing Social-Democrats, but it soon transpired that there were grave contradictions between the Editorial Board and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosch, which were aggravated after the publication of the No. 1-2 issue. The Bukharin-Pyatakov-Bosch group took an incorrect stand on a number of points of principle in the Party's Programme and tactics—the right of nations to self-determination, the role of democratic demands and the minimum programme in general, etc.—and tried to make use of the magazine for factional purposes. On the Edito-

rial Board Lenin fought the Bukharin-Pyatakov-Bosch group, exposed their anti-Bolshevik views and factional activities, and sharply criticised the conciliatory attitude to the group on the part of G. Y. Zinoviev and A. G. Shlyapnikov.

In view of the group's anti-Party attitude, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* Editorial Board declared, on Lenin's proposal, that it considered it impossible to continue publication. Lenin wrote the draft resolution of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee terminating the publication of *Kommunist*. The Central Committee Bureau in Russia, having heard a report on the contradictions on the *Kommunist* Editorial Board, declared its full solidarity with the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and expressed the wish that "all publications of the Central Committee should be edited on lines strictly in conformity with the Central Committee's policy adopted before the outbreak of war". From October 1916 the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* began publication of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. p. 180

[77] This article first appeared in *Voprosy Strakhovania* (Insurance Questions), 1916, No. 5, that was intermittently published in Petersburg from October 1913 to March 1918. During the First World War, it was the only legal Bolshevik periodical in Petersburg. It fought not only for workers' insurance, but also for full-blooded Bolshevik slogans: the eight-hour day, confiscation of big landed estates and a democratic republic. p. 182

[78] Engels, "The Role of Violence in History", in *Die Neue Zeit* (1895/96, Vol. 1) under the title, "Gewalt und Oekonomie bei der Herstellung des neuen Deutschen Reiches" ("Violence and the Economy in the Establishment of the New German Empire"). p. 184

[79] *Russkoye Znamya* (Russian Banner)—a reactionary newspaper, organ of the Union of the Russian People, published in Petersburg from November 1905 to 1917. p. 184

[80] Written in Zurich in January-June 1916.

Lenin began to take note of new developments in capitalism long before the outbreak of the First World War. In several of his writings from 1895 to 1913—"Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party" (1895-96); "The War in China" (1900); "The Lessons of the Crisis" (1901), "Review of Home Affairs" (1901); "Concentration of Production in Russia" (1912); "The Growth of Capitalist Wealth" (1913) "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia" (1913); "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx" (1913); "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies" (1912), and others—Lenin pointed out and analysed some characteristic aspects of the imperialist epoch—the concentration of production and the growth of monopoly; the export of capital; the struggle for new markets and spheres of influence; the internationalisation of economic relations; the parasitism and decay of capitalism; the growth of contradictions between labour and capital and the sharpening of the class struggle;

and the creation of the material conditions for the transition to socialism. He devoted special attention to exposing predatory colonial policy, the fight for a division and redivision of the world, and the preparation of imperialist wars of aggrandisement. In his article, "Marxism and Revisionism", written in 1908, he came out against the attempts to revise Marxism and undermine it from inside under the pretext of amending and correcting the theory in particular, Marx's theory of crises. Lenin wrote: 'The forms, the sequence, the picture of particular crises changed, but crises remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. While uniting production, the cartels and trusts at the same time and in a way that was obvious to all, aggravated the anarchy of production, the insecurity of existence of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thereby intensifying class antagonisms to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is heading for a breakdown—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system—has been made particularly clear, and on a particularly large scale, precisely by the new giant trusts" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 35-36).

Lenin kept abreast of all the latest writings on capitalism, as will be seen from his review of Hobson's *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*. In August 1904, Lenin began a translation of Hobson's *Imperialism*, the manuscript of which has not yet been found.

It was on the outbreak of the First World War that Lenin undertook a comprehensive study of the monopoly stage of capitalist development This was required by the working-class revolutionary struggle in Russia and other capitalist countries. In order to provide correct leadership for the revolutionary movement and combat the ideology of imperialist reaction and the reformist policy of conciliation with imperialists, it was necessary to see one's way in the key economic question without a study of which there was no understanding of the assessment of modern war or modern politics, namely: the economic essence of imperialism".

Lenin must have started his close study of the writings on imperialism in mid-1915, when he was in Berne, for his first indexes of literature, plans, extracts, notes and summaries date to that period. The preparatory materials for *Imperialism*, *the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (*Notebooks on Imperialism*) make up about 800 printed pages. They contain extracts from 148 books (including 106 in German, 23 in French, 17 in English, and 2 translations into Russian), and 232 articles (of them 206 in German, 13 in French, and 3 in English) from 49 periodicals (34 German, 7 French and 8 English).

In early January 1916, Lenin accepted an order for a book on imperialism from the legal *Parus* Publishers, founded in Petrograd in December 1915. Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky on December 29, 1915 (January 11, 1916): "I am getting down to the writing of a pamphlet on imperialism" (see present edition, Vol. 35). In the early part of February 1916, he left Berne for Zurich, where

he continued to collect and work on materials on imperialism. He worked at the Zurich Cantonal Library and ordered books from other towns.

On June 19 (July 2), 1916 Lenin wrote to M. N. Pokrovsky, who was then living in France and editing for *Parus* a series of pamphlets about West-European countries during the First World War: "Today, I sent you a manuscript by registered mail" (see present edition, Vol. 35). The manuscript, which was mailed with the letter, did not reach Pokrovsky, and another copy had to be sent. Besides, the publishers suggested that the finished manuscript should be shortened from eighty to fifty pages, but Lenin objected because "it is absolutely impossible to cut it down once again and squeeze it into fifty pages" (ibid.).

When the book reached the publishers, Menshevik elements among the management deleted from the book parts sharply criticising Kautsky and Martov, and made corrections in the text which not only distorted Lenin's style but also his ideas. Thus, Lenin's terms *pererastaniye* (capitalism *growing into* imperialism) was altered to *prevrashcheniye* (transformation); *reaktstonny kharakter* (*reactionary nature* of the theory of ultra-imperialism) to *otstaly kharakter* (backward character), etc. In mid-1917, the book was published under the title *Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism* (*A Popular Outline*) with a preface by Lenin, dated April 26, 1917. p. 185

[81] This preface was first published under the title "Imperialism and Capitalism" in *Communist International* No. 18, dated October, 1921. p. 189

[82] A Centrist party set up at an inaugural congress at Gotha in April 1917. Owing to the revolutionary upswing, which was greatly intensified by the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in February 1917, the opportunist leadership of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany was losing ground among the rank and file. To overcome their discontent, divert attention from the revolutionary struggle and prevent the establishment of a revolutionary working-class party, the Centrist leaders tried to set up a party which would give them continued control of the masses. It was intended to make the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany such a party. The Independents used Centrist phrases to cover up their call for unity with the social-chauvinists and desertion of the class struggle. The bulk of the party consisted of the Kautskyite Labour Commonwealth.

The Spartacus group remained in the party for a time but was organisationally and politically independent, continuing its illegal work and struggle to rid the masses of the influence of Centrist leaders. In 1918, the Spartacus League withdrew from the Independent Party and became the core of the Communist Party of Germany.

In October 1920, a split took place at the congress in Halle. In December 1920, a considerable part of the Independent S.D. Party merged with the Communist Party of Germany. The Right-

wing elements formed a separate party and took the old name of I.S.D.P.G., which existed until 1922. p. 193

[83] *The Spartacists*—members of a revolutionary organisation of German Left-wing Social-Democrats; formed in January 1916 under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, J. Marchlewski, L. Jogiches (Tyszka) and Wilhelm Pieck. In April 1915, Luxemburg and Mehring founded *Die Internationale*, a magazine which rallied the main group of the Left-wing Social-Democrats of Germany. From 1916, the *Internationale* group, apart from the political leaflets they had been printing since 1915, began the illegal publication and circulation of *Political Letters* which were signed Spartacus (issued regularly until October 1918); this gave the group its name of Spartacus League. They conducted revolutionary propaganda among the masses, organised massive anti-war action, led strikes, exposed the imperialist nature of the world war and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. But they made serious theoretical and political mistakes: they denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the imperialist epoch, they took an inconsistent stand on the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war, underestimated the role of the proletarian party as the vanguard of the working class, underestimated the peasantry as the ally of the proletariat and were afraid to break with the opportunists. Lenin repeatedly criticised their mistakes (see "The Junius Pamphlet", "A Caricature of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economism'", etc.).

In April 1917, the Spartacus League joined the Centrist I.S.D.P.G. (see Note 82), but remained organisationally independent. During the revolution in Germany in November 1918, they issued their own programme (December 14) and broke with the Independents. On December 30, 1918-January 1, 1919, they founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 193

[84] In the present edition, the author's references and notes are given as footnotes. p. 196

[85] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 593. p. 216

[86] These occurred during the widespread establishment of joint-stock companies in the early seventies, which was accompanied by all manner of fraudulent operations by bourgeois businessmen, who were making a great deal of money, and by wild speculation in real estate and securities. p. 218

[87] *Frankfurter Zeitung* (Frankfort Newspaper)—a German bourgeois newspaper published in Frankfort-on-Main from 1856. p. 220

[88] G. V. Plekhanov. p. 228

[89] *Produgol*—an abbreviation for the Russian Society for Trade in Mineral Fuel of the Donets Basin, founded in 1906. *Prodamet*—Society for Marketing Russian Metallurgical Goods. p. 232

[90] The exposure in France in 1892-93 of incredible abuses, corruption of politicians, officials and the press bribed by the French Panama Canal company. p. 237

[91] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 132-33. p. 283

[92] The Menshevik S. M. Nakhimson. p. 289

[93] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 117-18. p. 290

[94] *Boxer* (more precisely: I Ho T'uan) *Rebellion*—a popular anti-imperialist uprising In China in 1899-1901 organised by the I Ho Ch'üan (Righteous Harmony Fists) society, which later became known as I Ho T'uan (Alliance for Righteous Harmony). It was ruthlessly crushed by an expeditionary corps of the imperialist powers under the command of the German General Waldersee, with the German, Japanese, British, American and Russian imperialists taking part. China was forced to sign the Peking (Final) Protocol which turned her into a semi-colony of the foreign imperialists. p. 296

[95] Rosa Luxemburg. p. 305

[96] The all-Germany conference of Left-wing Social-Democrats held at Karl Liebknecht's home in Berlin on January 1, 1916. The conference adopted the theses of the Internationale group which were worked out by Rosa Luxemburg. p. 305

[97] *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* (Bremer Citizens' Newspaper)—a daily the organ of the Bremen group of German Social-Democrats. It was published from 1890 to 1919; in 1914-15, it was in fact an organ of the German Left-wing Social-Democrats; in 1916 it fell into the hands of the Kautskyites. p. 307

[98] *Volksfreund* (People's Friend)—a daily Social-Democratic newspaper, founded in Brunswick in 1871; in 1914 and 1915 it was the organ of the German Left-wing Social-Democrats, but in 1916 it fell into the hands of the Kautskyites. p. 307

[99] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 540. p. 314

[100] The theses were compiled by the Editorial Board of *Gazeta Robotnicza* and published in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1 in October 1916. p. 320

[101] For an assessment of the three views on Poland's independence, see Lenin's article, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (Vol. 20). p. 320

[102] The 1903 discussion on the R.S.D.L.P. draft Programme, later adopted at the Party's Second Congress [see "Material for the Preparation of the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.", "Concerning the Statement of the Bund'?, "On the Manifesto of the Armenian Social-Democrats", "Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an 'Independent Political Party'?", and "The National Question in Our Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 6)], and the 1913 discus-

sion on cultural and national autonomy between the Bolsheviks on the one hand, and, the liquidators, Trotskyites and Bundists on the other (see "The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.", present edition, Vol. 19 and "Critical Remarks on the National Question" and "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", Vol. 20). p. 321

[103] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1955, pp. 32-33. p. 323

[104] See pamphlet by Engels, *Po und Rhein*, Section IV, M/E/L, Zur deutschen Geschichte, Bd. II, 1, S. 689 (no English translation available). p. 323

[105] Friedrich Engels, "Der demokratische Panslawismus", in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* Nos. 222 and 223, February 15 and 16, 1849 (no English translation available). p. 340

[106] See article by Engels, "What Have the Working Classes to Do with Poland?", Section II, in *Commonwealth*, of March 24 and 31 and May 5, 1866. p. 342

[107] *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays of Light)—a monthly, the organ of the Left-wing Social-Democrats of Germany, edited by Borchardt. It appeared in Berlin irregularly from 1913 to 1921. p. 349

[108] Rosa Luxemburg's article, "The National Question and Autonomy", in Nos. 6, 7, 8-9, 10, 12 and 14-15 of the magazine *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny* (Social-Democratic Review) for 1908 and 1909. p. 350

[109] The Right wing of the Polish Socialist Party, a petty-bourgeois nationalist party founded in 1892. p. 350

[110] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 423. p. 352

[111] Karl Radek. p. 354

[112] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily, the Central Organ of the Cadet Party published in Petersburg from February 1906; closed down by the Petrograd Soviet's Revolutionary Military Committee on October 26 (November 8), 1917; publication continued under another title until August 1918. p. 355

[113] *Libre Belgique* (Free Belgium)—an illegal journal of the Belgian Labour Party, Brussels (1915-18). p. 357

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*December 1915-July 1916*)

1915

December 1915-late January 1916	Lenin lives in Berne, Switzerland.
Mid-December 1915	Lenin holds a meeting of Social-Democrat internationalists to discuss preparations for the Second International Socialist Conference.
December 29, 1915 (*January 11, 1916*)	Lenin sends Maxim Gorky the manuscript of his book, *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*, for publication in Petrograd.
December 29, 1915-June 19, 1918 (*January 11-July 2, 1916*)	Lenin works on his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* at the Berne and Zurich libraries.
December 1916	Lenin writes a preface to Bukharin's pamphlet, *Imperialism and the World Economy*. In a letter to the Geneva section of the Bolsheviks Lenin points out the need for a special resolution condemning the Mensheviks' fraudulent elections to the "workers' groups" under the war industries committees in Petrograd.
December 1916-January 1917	Lenin is editor of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

1916

January 2 (*15*)	Lenin directs the sitting of the Zimmerwald Left Bureau to discuss the representation of the Dutch Left-wing Social-Democrats on the Bureau, and the publication of *Vorbote* (Herald) as the organ of the Zimmerwald Left.
January 12 (*25*)	Lenin directs the sitting of the Zimmerwald Left Bureau to discuss measures in connection with the forthcoming publication of the first issue of *Vorbote*.
January, later than 12 (*25*)	Lenin's article "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International" is published in *Vorbote* No. 1.

January 17 (30)	Lenin writes a letter of instructions to the Zurich section of the Bolsheviks about the work to be done among young people in view of the forthcoming meeting of the International Socialist Bureau of Youth Organisations.
January 23-26 (February 5-8)	Lenin takes part in the work of the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. in Berne, writes the draft resolution on the convocation of the Second International Socialist Conference and the terms of representation.
January 26 (February 8)	Lenin speaks at an international meeting in Berne on the imperialist war and the tasks facing the proletariat.
January 28 (February 10)	Lenin writes the letter, "The Tasks of the Opposition in France'.
January 28 or 29 (February 10 or 11)	Lenin leaves Berne for Zurich.
January-February	Lenin writes his theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", which are published in *Vorbote* No. 2, in April 1916.
February 3 (16)	Lenin sends the Bolshevik sections abroad a communication on the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. held on January 23-26 (February 5-8); he instructs them to start immediate preparations to mobilise the forces of the Zimmerwald Left for the elections to the Second International Socialist Conference scheduled for April.
February 4 (17)	In Zurich, Lenin reads his paper, "Two Internationals".
February 5 (18)	Lenin's article, "Have the O.C. and the Chkheidze Group a Policy of Their Own?", is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 50.
February 13 (26)	In Zurich, Lenin reads his paper, "The 'Terms of Peace' in Connection with the National Question".
February 16 (29)	Lenin's articles, "Peace Without Annexations and the Independence of Poland as Slogans of the Day in Russia", and "Wilhelm Kolb and Georgy Plekhanov", are carried in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 51.
February 17 (March 1)	In Geneva, Lenin reads his paper, "The 'Terms of Peace' in Connection with the National Question".
February 27 (March 11)	Lenin issues instructions to stop publication of *Kommunist* in view of the anti-Party position of the Bukharin-Pyatakov group, who tried

to use the journal for their own factional ends, and plans the publication of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, under the editorship of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

February-March — Lenin writes his "Letter from the Committee of Organisations Abroad to the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P."

End of February-March — Lenin writes the "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference" (theses), has them translated into German and French and circulates them among the Bolshevik sections abroad and the Left-wing internationalists of various countries. The theses are published in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 4, on April 9 (22).

End of February-April — Lenin writes his article "Split or Decay?".

March 6 (19) — In a letter to A. M. Kollontai in Norway, Lenin asks her to have *Internationale Flugblatt* No. 1, carrying the draft resolution and manifesto of the Zimmerwald Left, translated into English and published in Norway, and to take measures to circulate it in America, Britain, Sweden, Norway and other countries.

Lenin sends his theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", to Norway to allow Swedish and Norwegian Left-wing socialists to study them.

March 12 (25) — Lenin's article, "The Peace Programme", is carried by *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 52.

March-June — In his works and letters to Bolsheviks abroad, Lenin exposes the anti-Party views of the Bukharin-Pyatakov group on the key questions of Marxist theory and tactics, and their double-dealing in respect of the Party centre. He also exposes the double-dealing of Zinoviev, who in fact supports the Bukharin-Pyatakov group.

April 5 (18) — Lenin delivers his report, "The Immediate Tasks of the Social-Democrats in Russia", at a joint meeting of the Zurich section of the Bolsheviks with Polish and Latvian Social-Democrat internationalists.

April 11-17 (24-30) — Lenin takes part in the work of the Second International Socialist Conference in Kienthal, organises and rallies its Left, directs the commission on resolutions (criticising the pacifism and activity of the I.S.B.) and secures their adoption.

April, not earlier than 16 (29)	Lenin makes an outline of an article or report on the results of the Second International Socialist Conference.
May 20 (June 2)	In Geneva, Lenin reads his paper, "Two Trends in the International Working-Class Movement".
May 31 (June 13)	Lenin's article, "German and Non-German Chauvinism", is printed in *Voprosy Strakhovania* No. 5 (54).
May-July	In letters to Left-wing Social-Democrat internationalists in the Scandinavian countries, Lenin gives directives on preparations for a conference of socialists of the neutral countries and defines the tactics of the Left-wing delegates.
June 19 (July 2)	Lenin completes his work on *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, and mails the manuscript to the *Parus* Publishers.
Between July 4 and 7 (17 and 20)	Lenin goes to live at Flums, a mountain village near Zurich.
July 12 (25)	Lenin's mother, M. A. Ulyanova, dies in Petrograd.
First half of July	Lenin writes his articles, "The Junius Pamphlet", and "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up". Both are published in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1 in October 1916.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

23

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PREFACE

Volume 23 contains works written by V. I. Lenin in Switzerland between August 1916 and March 1917.

Most of the articles are expressive of the struggle Lenin and the Bolsheviks waged against the imperialist war and the treasonous policy of the avowed social-chauvinist and Centrist leaders of the Second International parties. In this category belong "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", "Ten 'Socialist' Ministers!", "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism", "To the Workers Who Support the Struggle Against the War and Against the Socialists Who Have Sided with Their Governments".

The volume includes Lenin's famous article "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", in which, using the data on imperialist capitalism contained in his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, he elaborates the new theoretical proposition on the *impossibility* of the simultaneous triumph of socialism in all countries and the *possibility* of its triumph in one single capitalist country. In this article, Lenin also substantiates the theory of just and unjust wars.

Articles defining the tasks of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in the imperialist war of 1914-18 hold an important place in Lenin's writings of this period. These include "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party", "Principles Involved in the War Issue", "On the Defence of the Fatherland Issue" and "Defence of Neutrality".

In "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism", "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)", "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", Lenin criticises the attitude

of the anti-Party Bukharin-Pyatakov group as being hostile to Marxism, and elaborates the Bolshevik programme on the national question in adaptation to the new conditions of history.

The volume also includes the "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution", delivered at a gathering of young workers in Zurich. In it Lenin gives a profound interpretative generalisation of the first Russian revolution.

"Draft Theses, March 4 (17), 1917", "Letters from Afar", "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Russian Revolution", "The Revolution in Russia and the Tasks of the Workers of All Countries", and several other articles, written in the early days of the February Revolution, analyse the alignment of class forces and outline the prospect for transition from bourgeois-democratic to socialist revolution.

Six items are here published for the first time as part of the *Collected Works*. "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue" and "The Story of One Short Period in the Life of One Socialist Party" discuss the fight waged by the Left forces within the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. *Statistics and Sociology* brings out the part played by national movements in the international labour movement. "Telegram to the Bolsheviks Leaving for Russia" and "Letter to *Volksrecht*" explain the Bolshevik tactics in the revolution. "Decision of the Collegium Abroad, the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" is directed against Menshevik attempts to prevent Lenin and the other Bolsheviks returning to Russia.

V. I. LENIN
1917

NASCENT TREND OF IMPERIALIST ECONOMISM[1]

The old Economism[2] of 1894-1902 reasoned thus: the Narodniks[3] have been refuted; capitalism has triumphed in Russia. Consequently, there can be no question of political revolution. The practical conclusion: either "economic struggle be left to the workers and political struggle to the liberals"—that is a curvet to the right—or, instead of political revolution, a general strike for socialist revolution. That curvet to the left was advocated in a pamphlet, now forgotten, of a Russian Economist of the late nineties.[4]

Now a new Economism is being born. Its reasoning is similarly base on the two curvets: Right—we are against the "right to self-determination" i.e., against the liberation of oppressed peoples, the struggle against annexations—that has not yet been fully thought out or clearly stated). "Left"—we are opposed to a minimum programme (i.e., opposed to struggle for reforms and democracy) as "contradictory" to socialist revolution.

It is more than a year now since this nascent trend was revealed to several comrades at the Berne Conference in the spring of 1915. At that time, happily, only one comrade, who met with *universal* disapproval, insisted on these ideas of imperialist Economism right up to the end of the Conference and formulated them in writing in special "theses". *No one* associated himself with these theses.[5]

Subsequently two others associated themselves with this comrade's theses against self-determination (unaware that the question was inextricably linked with the general line of the afore-mentioned "theses").[6] But the appearance of the "Dutch programme" in February 1916, published in No. 3 of the *Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee*,[7]

immediately brought out this "misunderstanding" and *again* compelled the author of the original theses to *restate* his imperialist Economism, this time, too, as a whole, and not merely in application to one allegedly "partial" issue.

It is absolutely necessary again and again to *warn* the comrades concerned that they have *landed themselves in a quagmire*, that their "ideas" have *nothing in common either with Marxism or revolutionary Social-Democracy*. We can no longer leave the matter "in the dark": that would only encourage ideological confusion and direct it into the *worst possible channel* of equivocation, "private" conflicts, incessant "friction", etc. Our duty, on the contrary, is to insist, in the most emphatic and categorical manner, on the *obligation* thoroughly to think out and analyse questions raised for discussion.

In its theses on self-determination* (which appeared in German as a reprint from No. 2 of *Vorbote*[8]), the *Sotsial-Demokrat*[9] editorial board purposely brought the matter into the press in an *impersonal*, but most detailed, form, emphasising in particular the *link* between self-determination and the *general* question of the struggle for reforms, for democracy, the impermissibility of ignoring the *political* aspect, etc. In his comments on the editorial board's theses, the author of the original theses (imperialist Economism) comes out in *solidarity with the Dutch programme*, thereby clearly demonstrating that self-determination is by no means a "partial" question, as exponents of the nascent trend maintain, but a general and basic one.

The Dutch programme was laid before representatives of the Zimmerwald Left[10] on February 5-8, 1916, at the Berne meeting of the International Socialist Committee.[11] Not a single member of the Zimmerwald Left, *not even Radek*, spoke in favour of the programme, for it combines, indiscriminately, such points as "expropriation of the banks" and "repeal of customs tariffs", "abolition of the first Senate chamber", etc. The Zimmerwald Left unanimously, with practically no comment, in fact merely with a shrug of the shoulders, dismissed the Dutch programme as patently and wholly unsuitable.

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 143-56.—*Ed.*

However, the author of the original theses, written in the spring of 1915, was so fond of the programme that he declared: "Substantially, that is all I said, too [in the spring of 1915],* the Dutch have *thought things out*": "*with them the economic aspect is expropriation of the banks and large-scale production* [enterprises], *the political aspect is a republic and so on. Absolutely correct!*"

The fact, however, is that the Dutch did not "think things out", but produced an *unthought out* programme. It is the sad fate of Russia that some among us grasp at precisely what is not thought out in the newest novelty....

The author of the 1915 theses believes that the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors lapsed into a contradiction when they "themselves" urged "expropriation of the banks", and even added the word "immediately" (plus "dictatorial measures") in § 8 ("Concrete Measures"). "And how I was reproached for this very thing in Berne!" the author of the 1915 theses exclaims indignantly, recalling the Berne debates in the spring of 1915.

He forgets or fails to see this "minor" point: in § 8 the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors clearly distinguish *two* eventualities: I. The socialist revolution has *begun*. In that event, they say: "immediate expropriation of the banks", etc. II. The socialist revolution has *not* begun, and in that event we shall have to postpone talking about these good things.

Since the socialist revolution, in the above-mentioned sense, has obviously not *yet* begun, the Dutch programme is incongruous. And the author of the theses adds his bit of "*profundity*" by reverting (he always seems to slip on the same spot!) to his old mistake of turning political demands (like "abolition of the first chamber"?) into a "*political formula for social revolution*".

Having marked time for a whole year, the author returned to his old mistake. That is the "crux" of his misadventures: he cannot solve the problem of *how to link the advent of imperialism with the struggle for reforms and democracy*—just as the Economism of blessed memory could not link the advent of capitalism with the struggle for democracy.

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Hence—complete confusion concerning the "unachievability" of democratic demands under imperialism.

Hence—ignoring of the political struggle now, at present, immediately, and at all times, which is impermissible for a Marxist (and permissible only for a *Rabochaya Mysl*[12] Economist).

Hence—the knack of persistently "sliding" from *recognition* of imperialism to *apology* for imperialism (just as the Economists of blessed memory slid from recognition of capitalism to apology for capitalism).

And so on, and so forth.

A detailed examination of the errors the author of the 1915 theses commits in his comments on the *Sotsial-Demokrat* self-determination theses is impossible, for *every line is wrong*! After all, you cannot write pamphlets or books in reply to "comments" if the initiators of imperialist Economism spend a whole year marking time and stubbornly refuse to concern themselves with what ought to be their direct party duty if they want to take a serious attitude to political issues, namely: a considered and articulate statement of what they designate as "our differences".

I am therefore obliged to confine myself to a brief review of how the author applies his basic error and how he "supplements" it.

He believes that I contradict myself: in 1914 (in *Prosveshcheniye*[13]) I wrote that it was absurd to look for self determination "in the *programmes of West-European socialists*",* but in 1916 I proclaim self-determination to be especially urgent.

It did not occur (!!) to the author that these "programmes" were drawn up in 1875, 1880, 1891![14]

Now let us take his objections (to the *Sotsial-Demokrat* self-determination theses) point by point.

§1. The same Economist refusal to see and pose *political* questions. *Since* socialism creates the economic basis for the abolition of national oppression in the political sphere, *therefore* our author refuses to formulate our *political tasks* in this sphere! That's ridiculous!

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* See present edition, Vol. 20, p. 406.—*Ed.*

Since the victorious proletariat does not negate wars against the bourgeoisie of other countries, *therefore* the author refuses to formulate our political tasks in relation to national oppression!! These are all examples of downright violation of Marxism and logic, or, if you like, manifestations of the *logic* of the fundamental errors of imperialist Economism.

§2. The opponents of self-determination are hopelessly confused in their references to its being "unachievable".

The *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors explain to them *two* possible interpretations of unachievability and their error in *both* cases.

Yet the author of the 1915 theses, without even trying to give *his* interpretation of "unachievability", i.e., *accepting* our explanation that two different things are confused here, *persists in that confusion*!!

He ties crises to "imperialist" "policy": our expert on political economy *has forgotten* that there were crises *before* imperialism!

To maintain that self-determination is unachievable economically is to confuse the issue, the editors explain. The author does *not* reply, does *not* state that he considers self-determination unachievable *economically*; he abandons his dubious position and jumps over to politics (unachievable "all the same") though he has been told with the utmost clarity that *politically* a republic is just as "unachievable" under imperialism as self-determination.

Cornered, the author "jumps" again: he accepts a republic and the whole minimum programme only as a "political formula for social revolution"!!!

He refuses to defend the "economic" unachievability of self-determination and jumps to politics, maintaining that political unachievability applies to the minimum programme as a whole. Here, again there is not a grain of Marxism, not a grain of logic, save the *logic of imperialist Economism*.

The author wants *imperceptibly* (without stopping to think, without producing anything articulate, without making any effort to work out his programme) to jettison the Social-Democratic Party minimum programme! No wonder he has been marking time for a whole year!!

The question of combating *Kautskyism* is again not a partial, but a *general* and *basic* question of modern times:

the author does *not understand* this struggle. Just as the Economists turned the struggle against the Narodniks into an apology for capitalism, so the author turns the struggle against Kautskyism into an apology for imperialism (that applies also to § 3).

The mistake of the Kautskyites lies in the fact that they present in a reformist manner such demands, and at such a time, that can be presented only in a revolutionary manner (but the author lapses into the position that their mistake is to advance these demands altogether, just as the Economists "understood" the struggle against Narodism to mean that the slogan "Down with the autocracy" was Narodism).

The mistake of the Kautskyism lies in projecting *correct* democratic demands into the past, to peaceful capitalism, and not into the future, to the social revolution (the author, however, falls into the position of regarding these demands as incorrect).

§ 3. See above. The author bypasses *also* the question of "federation". The same old fundamental mistake of the same old Economism: inability to pose *political* questions.*

§ 4. "From self-determination follows defence of the fatherland," the author obstinately repeats. His mistake here is to make negation of defence of the fatherland a *shibboleth*, deduce it *not* from the concrete historical features of a *given* war, but apply it "in general". That is not Marxism.

The author has been told long ago—try to think up a formula of struggle against national oppression or inequality which (formula) does *not* justify "defence of the fatherland". You cannot devise such a formula, and the author has not challenged that.

Does that mean that we reject the fight against national oppression if it *could* be interpreted to imply defence of the fatherland?

No, for we are opposed not to "defence of the fatherland" "in general" (see our Party resolutions**), but to using

* "We are not afraid of disintegration," the author writes, "we do not defend national boundaries." Now, just try to give that a precise political formulation!! *You simply cannot do it* and that's where the trouble lies; you are hampered by Economist blindness on questions of *political democracy*.

** See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 159-60.—*Ed.*

this fraudulent slogan to *embellish* the present *imperialist* war.

The author *wants* to pose the question of "defence of the fatherland" in a *basically incorrect* and *unhistorical* way (but he cannot; he has been trying in vain for a whole year...). His reference to "dualism" shows that he does *not understand* the difference between monism and dualism.

If I "unite" a shoe brush and a mammal, will that be "monism"?

If I say that to reach goal *a* we must

$$(c) \longrightarrow a \longleftarrow (b)$$

travel to the left from point (b) and to the right from point (c), will that be "dualism"?

Is the position of the proletariat with regard to national oppression the same in oppressing and oppressed nations? No, it is not the same, not the same *economically*, *politically*, *ideologically*, *spiritually*, *etc.*

Meaning?

Meaning that some will approach in *one* way, others in *another* way *the same* goal (the merger of nations) from *different* starting-points. Denial of that is the "monism" that unites a shoe brush and a mammal.

"It is *not* proper to say this [i.e., to *urge* self-determination] to the proletarians of an oppressed nation"—that is how the author "interprets" the editors' theses.

That's amusing!! There is *nothing of the kind* in the theses. The author has either not read them to the end or has not given them any thought at all.

§5. See above on Kautskyism.

§6. The author is told there are three *types* of countries in the world. He "objects" and snatches out "cases". That is casuistry, not politics.

You want a concrete "case": "How about Belgium"?

See the Lenin and Zinoviev pamphlet[15]: it says that we would be *for* the defence of Belgium (even *by war*) if this concrete war were different.*

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 305-06.—*Ed.*

You do not agree with that?

Then say so!!

You have *not properly thought out* the question of *why* Social-Democrats are against "defence of the fatherland".

We are not against it for the reasons you believe, because your presentation of the question (vain efforts, not really a presentation) goes against history. That is my reply to the author.

To describe as "sophistry" the fact that while *justifying wars for the elimination of national oppression*, we do not justify the present imperialist war, which on *both* sides is being waged to *increase* national oppression—is to use "strong" words without giving the matter *the least bit of thought*.

The author *wants* to pose the question of "defence of the fatherland" from a more "Left" position, but the result (for a whole year now) is utter confusion!

§7. The author *criticises*: "The question of 'peace terms' is not touched upon at all."

Strange criticism: failure to deal with a question we did not even raise!!

But what is "touched upon" and discussed is the question of *annexations*, on which the imperialist Economists are utterly confused, this time *together* with the Dutch and Radek.

Either you reject the immediate slogan *against old and new annexations*—(no less "unachievable" under imperialism than self-determination, in Europe as well as in the colonies)—and in that case you pass from concealed to open apology for imperialism.

Or you accept the slogan (as Radek has done in the press)—and in that case you accept self-determination of nations under a different name!!

§8. The author proclaims "Bolshevism on a West-European scale" ("not your position," he adds).

I attach no importance to this desire to cling to the word "Bolshevism", for I know *such* "old Bolsheviks" from whom God save us. I can only say that the author's proclamation of "Bolshevism on a West-European scale" is, I am deeply convinced, neither Bolshevism nor Marxism, but a minor variant of the same old Economism.

In my view it is highly intolerable, flippant and non-Party to proclaim for a whole year the *new Bolshevism* and leave things at that. Is it not time to *think* matters out and give the comrades an articulate and integrated *exposé* of "Bolshevism on a West-European scale"?

The author has not proved and will not prove the difference between colonies and oppressed nations in Europe (as applied to the question under discussion).

The Dutch and the P.S.D.* rejection of self-determination is *not only*, and even not so much, the result of confusion, for Gorter factually accepts it, and so does the Zimmerwald statement of the Poles,[16] but rather the result of the *special* position of their *nations* (small nations with *centuries-old* traditions and pretentions to *Great-Power status*).

It is extremely thoughtless and naïve to take over and mechanically and uncritically repeat what in others has developed over decades of struggle against the nationalist bourgeoisie and its deception of the people. Here we have a case of people taking over *precisely* what should not be taken over.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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* Polish Social-Democratic Party.—*Ed.*

REPLY TO P. KIEVSKY (Y. PYATAKOV)[17]

Like every crisis in the life of individuals or in the history of nations, war oppresses and breaks some, steels and enlightens others.

The truth of that is making itself felt in Social-Democratic thinking on the war and in connection with the war. It is one thing to give serious thought to the causes and significance of an imperialist war that grows out of highly developed capitalism, Social-Democratic tactics in connection with such a war, the causes of the crisis within the Social-Democratic movement, and so on. But it is quite another to allow the war to *oppress* your thinking, to stop thinking and analysing *under the weight* of the terrible impressions and tormenting consequences or features of the war.

One such form of *oppression* or *repression* of human thinking caused by the war is the contemptuous attitude of imperialist Economism towards *democracy*. P. Kievsky does not notice that running like a red thread through all his arguments is this war-inspired oppression, this fear, this refusal to analyse. What point is there in discussing defence of the fatherland when we are in the midst of such a terrible holocaust? What point is there in discussing nations' rights when outright strangulation is everywhere the rule? Self-determination and "independence" of nations—but look what they have done to "independent" Greece! What is the use of talking and thinking of "rights", when rights are everywhere being trampled upon in the interests of the militarists! What sense is there in talking and thinking of a republic, when there is absolutely no difference whatsoever between the most democratic republics and the most reactionary monarchies, when the war has obliterated every trace of difference!

Kievsky is very angry when told that he has given way to fear, to the extent of rejecting democracy in general. He is angry and objects: I am not against democracy, only against *one* democratic demand, which I consider "bad". But though Kievsky is offended, and though he "*assures*" us (and himself as well, perhaps) that he is not at all "against" democracy, his *arguments*—or, more correctly, the endless *errors* in his arguments—*prove* the very opposite.

Defence of the fatherland is a lie in an imperialist war, but not in a democratic and revolutionary war. All talk of "rights" seems absurd during a war, because *every* war replaces rights by direct and outright violence. But that should not lead us to forget that history has known in the past (and very likely will know, must know, in the future) wars (democratic and revolutionary wars) which, while replacing every kind of "right", every kind of democracy, by violence during the war, nevertheless, in their social content and implications, *served* the cause of democracy, and *consequently* socialism. The example of Greece, it would seem, "refutes" all national self-determination. But if you stop to think, analyse and weigh matters, and do not allow yourself to be deafened by the sound of words or frightened and oppressed by the nightmarish impressions of the war, then this example is no more serious or convincing than ridiculing the republican system because the "democratic" republics, the most democratic—not only France, but also the United States, Portugal and Switzerland—have already introduced or are introducing, in the course of this war, exactly the same kind of militarist arbitrariness that exists in Russia.

That imperialist war obliterates the difference between republic and monarchy is a fact. But to therefore reject the republic, or even be contemptuous towards it, is to allow oneself to be frightened by the war, and one's thinking to be *oppressed* by its horrors. That is the mentality of many supporters of the "disarmament" slogan (Roland-Holst, the younger element in Switzerland, the Scandinavian "Lefts"[18] and others). What, they imply, is the use of discussing revolutionary utilisation of the army or a militia when there is no difference in this war between a republican militia and a monarchist standing army, and when militarism is *everywhere* doing its horrible work?

That is all *one* trend of thought, *one and the same* theoretical and practical political error Kievsky unwitting, makes at every step. He *thinks* he is arguing only against self-determination, he *wants* to argue only against self determination, but the *result*—against his will and conscience, and that is the curious thing!—is that he has adduced *not a single* argument which could not be just as well applied to democracy in general!

The real source of all his curious logical errors and confusion—and this applies not only to self-determination, but also to defence of the fatherland, divorce, "rights" in general—lies in the *oppression* of his thinking by the war, which makes him completely distort the Marxist position on democracy.

Imperialism is highly developed capitalism; imperialism is progressive; imperialism *is* the negation of democracy—"hence", democracy is "unattainable" under capitalism. Imperialist war is a flagrant violation of all democracy, whether in backward monarchies or progressive republics—"hence", there is no point in talking of "rights" (i.e., democracy!) . The "only" thing that can be "opposed" to imperialist war is socialism; socialism alone is "the way out"; "hence", to advance democratic slogans in our minimum programme, i.e., under capitalism, is a deception or an illusion, befuddlement or postponement, etc., of the slogan of socialist revolution.

Though Kievsky does not realise it, that is the real source of all his mishaps. That is his *basic* logical error which, precisely because it is basic and is not realised by the author, "*explodes*" at every step like a punctured bicycle tire. It "bursts out" now on the question of defending the fatherland, now on the question of divorce, now in the phrase about "rights", in this remarkable phrase (remarkable for its utter contempt for "rights" and its utter failure to understand the issue): we shall discuss *not* rights, *but* the destruction of age-old slavery!

To say that is to show a lack of understanding of the relationship between capitalism and democracy, between socialism and democracy.

Capitalism in general, and imperialism in particular, turn democracy into an illusion—though at the same time capi-

talism engenders democratic aspirations in the masses, creates democratic institutions, aggravates the antagonism between imperialism's denial of democracy and the mass striving for democracy. Capitalism and imperialism can be overthrown only by economic revolution. They cannot be overthrown by democratic transformations, even the most "ideal". But a proletariat not schooled in the struggle for democracy is incapable of performing an economic revolution. Capitalism cannot be vanquished without *taking over the banks*, without repealing *private ownership* of the means of production. These revolutionary measures, however, cannot be implemented without organising the entire people for democratic administration of the means of production captured from the bourgeoisie, without enlisting the entire mass of the working people, the proletarians, semi-proletarians and small peasants, for the democratic organisation of their ranks, their forces, their participation in state affairs. Imperialist war may be said to be a triple negation of democracy (*a*. every war replaces "rights" by violence; *b*. imperialism as such is the negation of democracy; *c*. imperialist war fully equates the republic with the monarchy), but the awakening and growth of socialist revolt against imperialism are *indissolubly* linked with the growth of democratic resistance and unrest. Socialism leads to the withering away of *every* state, consequently also of every democracy, but socialism can be implemented only *through* the dictatorship of the proletariat, which combines violence against the bourgeoisie, i.e., the minority of the population, with *full* development of democracy, i.e., the genuinely equal and genuinely universal participation of the *entire* mass of the population in all *state* affairs and in all the complex problems of abolishing capitalism.

It is in these "contradictions" that Kievsky, having forgotten the Marxist teaching on democracy, got himself confused. Figuratively speaking, the war has so oppressed his thinking that he uses the agitational slogan "break out of imperialism" to replace all thinking, just as the cry "get out of the colonies" is used to replace analysis of what, properly speaking, is the *meaning*—economically and politically—of the civilised nations "getting out of the colonies".

The Marxist solution of the problem of democracy is for the proletariat to *utilise all* democratic institutions and aspirations in its class struggle against the bourgeoisie in order to prepare for its overthrow and assure its own victory. Such utilisation is no easy task. To the Economists, Tolstoyans, etc., it often seems an unpardonable concession to "bourgeois" and opportunist views, just as to Kievsky defence of national self-determination "in the epoch of finance capital" seems an unpardonable concession to bourgeois views. Marxism teaches us that to "fight opportunism" by renouncing utilisation of the democratic institutions created and distorted by the bourgeoisie of the *given*, capitalist, society is to *completely surrender* to opportunism!

The slogan of *civil war* for socialism indicates the quick[ ]est way out of the imperialist war and *links* our struggle against the war with our struggle against opportunism. It is the only slogan that correctly takes into account both war-time peculiarities—the war is dragging out and threatening to grow into a whole "epoch" of war—and the general character of our activities as distinct from opportunism with its pacifism, legalism and adaptation to one's "own" bourgeoisie. In addition, civil war against the bourgeoisie is a *democratically* organised and *democratically* conducted war of the propertyless mass against the propertied minority. But civil war, like every other, must inevitably replace rights by violence. However, violence in the name of the interests and rights of the majority is of a different nature: it tramples on the "rights" of the exploiters, the bourgeoisie, it is *unachievable* without democratic organisation of the army and the "rear". Civil war forcibly expropriates, immediately and first of all, the banks, factories, railways, the big estates, etc. But *in order* to expropriate all this, we shall have to introduce election of all officials and officers by the people, *completely merge* the army conducting the war against the bourgeoisie with the mass of the population, completely democratise administration of the food supply, the production and distribution of food, etc. The object of civil war is to seize the banks, factories, etc., destroy all possibility of resistance by the bourgeoisie, destroy *its* armed forces. But that aim cannot be achieved *either* in its purely military, *or* economic, *or* political aspects, unless we, during the

war, simultaneously introduce and extend democracy among *our* armed forces and in *our* "rear". We tell the masses now (and they instinctively feel that we are right): "They are deceiving you in making you fight for imperialist capitalism in a war disguised by the great slogans of democracy. You must, you shall wage a *genuinely* democratic war *against* the bourgeoisie for the achievement of genuine democracy and socialism." The present war unites and "merges" nations into coalitions by means of violence and financial dependence. In our civil war against the bourgeoisie, *we* shall unite and merge the nations *not* by the force of the ruble, *not* by the force of the truncheon, not by violence, but by *voluntary* agreement and solidarity of the working people against the exploiters. For the bourgeoisie the proclamation of equal rights for all nations has become a deception. For us it will be the truth that will facilitate and accelerate the winning over of all nations. Without effectively organised *democratic* relations between nations—and, consequently, without freedom of secession—civil war of the workers and working people generally of all nations against the bourgeoisie is *impossible*.

Through utilisation of bourgeois democracy to socialist and consistently democratic organisation of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and against opportunism. There is no other path. There is *no* other way out. Marxism, just as life itself, knows no other way out. In this path we must include free secession and free merging of nations, we must not fight shy of them, not fear that they will "defile" the "purity" of our economic aims.

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A CARICATURE OF MARXISM AND IMPERIALIST ECONOMISM[19]

"No one can discredit revolutionary Social-Democracy as long as it does not discredit itself." That maxim always comes to mind, and must always be borne in mind, when any major theoretical or tactical proposition of Marxism is victorious, or even placed on the order of the day, and when, *besides* outright and resolute opponents, it is assailed by friends who hopelessly discredit and disparage it and turn it into a caricature. That has happened time and again in the history of the Russian Social-Democratic movement. In the early nineties, the victory of Marxism in the revolutionary movement was attended by the emergence of a caricature of Marxism in the shape of Economism, or "strikeism". The Iskrists[20] would not have been able to uphold the fundamentals of proletarian theory and policy, either against petty-bourgeois Narodism or bourgeois liberalism, without long years of struggle against Economism. It was the same with Bolshevism, which triumphed in the mass labour movement in 1905 due, among other things, to correct application of the boycott of the tsarist Duma[21] slogan in the autumn of 1905, when the key battles of the Russian revolution were being fought. Bolshevism had to face—and overcome by struggle—another caricature in 1908-10, when Alexinsky and others noisily opposed participation in the Third Duma.[22]

It is the same today too. Recognition of the *present* war as imperialist and emphasis on *its* close connection with the imperialist era of capitalism encounters not only resolute opponents, but also irresolute friends, for whom the word "imperialism" has become all the rage. Having *memorised*

the word, they are offering the workers hopelessly confused theories and reviving many of the old mistakes of the old Economism. Capitalism has triumphed—*therefore* there is no need to bother with political problems, the old Economists reasoned in 1894-1901, falling into rejection of the political struggle in Russia. Imperialism has triumphed—*therefore* there is no need to bother with the problems of political democracy, reason the present-day imperialist Economists. Kievsky's article, printed above, merits attention as a sample of these sentiments, as one such caricature of Marxism, as the first attempt to provide anything like an integral literary exposition of the vacillation that has been apparent in certain circles of our Party abroad since early 1915.

If imperialist Economism were to spread among the Marxists, who in the present great crisis of socialism have resolutely come out against social-chauvinism and for revolutionary internationalism, that would be a very grave blow to our trend—and to our Party. For it would discredit it from within, from its own ranks, would make it a vehicle of caricaturised Marxism. It is therefore necessary to thoroughly discuss at least the most important of Kievsky's numerous errors, regardless of how "uninteresting" this may be, and regardless of the fact, also, that all too often we shall have to tediously explain elementary truths which the thoughtful and attentive reader has learned and understood long since from our literature of 1914 and 1915.

We shall begin with the "central" point of Kievsky's disquisitions in order to immediately bring to the reader the very "substance" of this new trend of imperialist Economism.

1. THE MARXIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS WAR AND "DEFENSE OF THE FATHERLAND"

Kievsky is convinced, and wants to convince his reader, that he "disagrees" *only* with § 9 of our Party Programme dealing with national self-determination. He is very angry and tries to refute the charge that on the question of democracy he is departing from the fundamentals of Marxism

in general, that he has "betrayed" (the angry quotation marks are Kievsky's) Marxism on basic issues. But the point is that the moment our author begins to discuss his allegedly partial disagreement on an individual issue, the moment he adduces his arguments, considerations, etc., he immediately reveals that he is deviating from Marxism all along the line. Take §b (Section 2) of his article. "This demand [i.e., national self-determination] directly [!!] leads to social-patriotism," our author proclaims, explaining that the "treasonous" slogan of fatherland defence follows "quite [!] logically [!] from the right of nations to self-determination".... In his opinion, self-determination implies "sanctioning the treason of the French and Belgian social-patriots, who are defending this independence [the national independence of France and Belgium] with arms in hand! They are *doing* what the supporters of 'self-determination' only advocate...." "Defence of the fatherland belongs to the arsenal of our worst enemies...." "We categorically refuse to understand how one can *simultaneously* be against defence of the fatherland and for self-determination, against the fatherland and for it."

That's Kievsky. He obviously has not understood our resolutions against the fatherland defence slogan in the present war. It is therefore necessary again to explain the meaning of what is so clearly set out in our resolutions.

The resolution our Party adopted at its Berne Conference in March 1915, "On the Defence of the Fatherland Slogan",* begins with the words: "*The present war is*, *in substance*"....

That the resolution deals with the *present* war could not have been put more plainly. The words "in substance" indicate that we must distinguish between the apparent and the real, between appearance and substance, between the word and the deed. The purpose of all talk about defence of the fatherland in this war is mendaciously to present as national the imperialist war of 1914-16, waged for the division of colonies, the plunder of foreign lands, etc. And to obviate even the slightest possibility of distorting our views, we added to the resolution a special paragraph on "*genuinely* national wars", which "took place *especially* (especially does not mean exclusively!) between 1789 and 1871".

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64—*Ed.*

The resolution explains that the "basis" of these "genuinely" national wars was a "long process of mass national movements, of a struggle against absolutism and feudalism, the overthrow of national oppression"....

Clear, it would seem. The present imperialist war stems from the general conditions of the imperialist era and is not accidental, not an exception, not a deviation from the general and typical. Talk of defence of the fatherland is therefore a deception of the people, for this war is *not* a national war. In a *genuinely* national war the words "defence of the fatherland" are *not* a deception and *we are not opposed to it*. Such (genuinely national) wars took place "especially" in 1789-1871, and our resolution, while not denying by a single word that they are possible now too, explains how we should distinguish a genuinely national from an imperialist war covered by deceptive national slogans. Specifically, in order to distinguish the two we must examine whether the "basis" of the war is a "long process of mass national movements", the "overthrow of national oppression". The resolution on "pacifism" expressly states: "Social-Democrats cannot overlook the positive significance of revolutionary wars, i.e., not imperialist wars, but such as were conducted, for instance [note: "for instance"], between 1789 and 1871 with the aim of doing away with national oppression...." Could our 1915 Party resolution speak of the national wars waged from 1789 to 1871 and say that we do not deny the positive significance of such wars if they were not considered possible today too? Certainly not.

A commentary, or popular explanation, of our Party resolutions is given in the Lenin and Zinoviev pamphlet *Socialism and War*. It plainly states, on page 5, that "socialists have regarded wars 'for the defence of the fatherland', or 'defensive' wars, as legitimate, progressive and just" *only* in the sense of "overthrowing alien oppression". It cites an example: Persia against Russia, "*etc.*", and says: "These would be just, and defensive wars, irrespective of who would be the first to attack; any socialist would wish the oppressed, dependent and unequal states victory over the oppressor, slave-holding and predatory 'Great' Powers."*

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 300-01.—*Ed.*

The pamphlet appeared in August 1915 and there are German and French translations. Kievsky is fully aware of its contents. And never, on no occasion, has he or anyone else challenged the resolution on the defence of the fatherland slogan, or the resolution on pacifism, or their interpretation in the pamphlet. Never, not once! We are therefore entitled to ask: are we slandering Kievsky when we say that he has absolutely failed to understand Marxism if, beginning with March 1915, he has not challenged our Party's views on the war, whereas now, in August 1916, in an article on self-determination, i.e., on a supposedly partial issue, he reveals an amazing lack of understanding of a *general* issue?

Kievsky says that the fatherland defence slogan is "treasonous". We can confidently assure him that *every* slogan is and always will be "treasonous" *for those* who mechanically repeat it without understanding its meaning, without giving it proper thought, *for those* who merely memorise the words without analysing their implications.

What, generally speaking, is "defence of the fatherland"? Is it a scientific concept relating to economics, politics, etc.? No. It is a much bandied about current expression, sometimes simply a philistine phrase, intended to *justify the war*. Nothing more. Absolutely nothing! The term "treasonous" can apply only in the sense that the philistine is capable of justifying *any* war by pleading "we are defending our fatherland", whereas Marxism, which does not degrade itself by stooping to the philistine's level, requires an historical analysis of each war in order to determine whether or not *that particular* war can be considered progressive, whether it serves the interests of democracy and the proletariat and, in *that sense*, is legitimate, just, etc.

The defence of the fatherland slogan is all too often unconscious philistine justification of war and reveals inability to analyse the meaning and implications of a particular war and see it in historical perspective.

Marxism makes that analysis and says: *if* the "substance" of a war is, *for example*, the overthrow of alien oppression (which was *especially* typical of Europe in 1789-1871), then such a war is progressive as far as the oppressed state or nation is concerned. *If*, however, the "substance" of a war is redivision of colonies, division of booty, plunder of foreign

lands (and such is the war of 1914-16), then all talk of defending the fatherland is "sheer deception of the people".

How, then, can we disclose and define the "substance" of a war? War is the continuation of policy. Consequently, we must examine the policy pursued prior to the war, the policy that led to and brought about the war. If it was an imperialist policy, i.e., one designed to safeguard the interests of finance capital and rob and oppress colonies and foreign countries, then the war stemming from that policy is imperialist. If it was a national liberation policy, i.e., one expressive of the mass movement against national oppression, then the war stemming from that policy is a war of national liberation.

The philistine does not realise that war is "the continuation of policy", and consequently limits himself to the formula that "the enemy has attacked us", "the enemy has invaded my country", without stopping to think *what issues* are at stake in the war, *which* classes are waging it, and with *what* political objects. Kievsky stoops right down to the level of such a philistine when he declares that Belgium has been occupied by the Germans, and hence, from the point of view of self-determination, the "Belgian social-patriots are right", or: the Germans have occupied part of France, hence, "Guesde can be satisfied", for "what is involved is territory populated by his nation" (and not by an alien nation).

For the philistine the important thing is *where* the armies stand, who is winning *at the moment*. For the Marxist the important thing is *what issues* are at stake in *this* war, during which first one, then the other army may be on top.

What is the present war being fought over? The answer is given in our resolution (based on the policy the belligerent powers pursued for decades prior to the war). England, France and Russia are fighting to keep the colonies they have seized, to be able to rob Turkey, etc. Germany is fighting to take over these colonies and to be able herself to rob Turkey, etc. Let us suppose even that the Germans take Paris or St. Petersburg. Would that change the nature of the present war? Not at all. The Germans' purpose—and more important, the policy that would bring it to realisation if they were to win—is to seize the colonies, establish

domination over Turkey, annex areas populated by other nations, for instance, Poland, etc. It is definitely not to bring the French or the Russians under foreign domination. The real nature of the present war is not national but imperialist. In other words, it is not being fought to enable one side to overthrow national oppression, which the other side is trying to maintain. It is a war between two groups of oppressors, between two freebooters over the division of their booty, over who shall rob Turkey and the colonies.

In short: a war *between* imperialist Great Powers (i.e., powers that oppress a whole number of nations and enmesh them in dependence on finance capital, etc.), or *in alliance* with the Great Powers, is an imperialist war. Such is the war of 1914-16. And in *this* war "defence of the fatherland" is a deception, an attempt to justify the war.

A war *against* imperialist, i.e., oppressing, powers by oppressed (for example, colonial) nations is a genuine national war. It is possible today too. "Defence of the fatherland" in a war waged by an oppressed nation against a foreign oppressor is not a deception. Socialists are *not* opposed to "defence of the fatherland" in *such* a war.

National self-determination is the same as the struggle for complete national liberation, for complete independence, against annexation, and socialists *cannot*—without ceasing to be socialists—reject *such* a struggle in whatever form, right down to an uprising or war.

Kievsky thinks he is arguing against Plekhanov: it was Plekhanov who pointed to the link between self-determination and defence of the fatherland! Kievsky *believed* Plekhanov that the link was *really* of the kind Plekhanov made it out to be. And having believed him, Kievsky took fright and decided that he must reject self-determination so as not to fall into Plekhanov's conclusions.... There is great trust in Plekhanov, and great fright, but there is no trace of *thought* about the substance of Plekhanov's mistake!

The social-chauvinists plead self-determination in order to present this war as a national war. There is only one correct way of combating them: we must show that the war is being fought not to liberate nations, but to determine which of the great robbers will oppress *more* nations. To fall into

negation of wars *really* waged for liberating nations is to present the worst possible caricature of Marxism. Plekhanov and the French social-chauvinists harp on the republic in France in order to justify its "defence" against the German monarchy. If we were to follow Kievsky's line of reasoning, we would have to oppose either the republic or a war *really* fought to preserve the republic!! The German social-chauvinists point to universal suffrage and compulsory primary education in their country to justify its "defence" against tsarism. If we were to follow Kievsky's line of reasoning, we would have to oppose either universal suffrage and compulsory primary education or a war *really* fought to safeguard political freedom against attempts to abolish it!

Up to the 1914-16 war Karl Kautsky was a Marxist, and many of his major writings and statements will always remain models of Marxism. On August 26, 1910, he wrote in *Die Neue Zeit*,[23] in reference to the imminent war:

"In a war between Germany and England the issue is not democracy, but world domination, i.e., exploitation of the world. That is not an issue on which Social-Democrats can side with the exploiters of their nation" (*Neue Zeit*, 28. Jahrg., Bd. 2, S. 776).

There you have an excellent Marxist formulation, one that fully coincides with our own and fully exposes the *present-day* Kautsky, who has turned from Marxism to defence of social-chauvinism. It is a formulation (we shall have occasion to revert to it in other articles) that clearly brings out the principles underlying the Marxist attitude towards war. War is the continuation of policy. Hence, once there is a struggle for democracy, a war for democracy is *possible*. National self-determination is but one of the democratic demands and does not, in principle, differ from other democratic demands. "World domination" is, to put it briefly, the substance of imperialist policy, of which imperialist war is the continuation. Rejection of "defence of the fatherland" in a democratic war, *i.e.*, rejecting participation in such a war, is an absurdity that has nothing in common with Marxism. To embellish imperialist war by applying to it the concept of "defence of the fatherland", i.e., by presenting it as a democratic war, is to deceive the workers and side with the reactionary bourgeoisie.

2. "OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEW ERA"

The heading is Kievsky's. He constantly speaks of a "new era", but here, too, unfortunately his arguments are erroneous.

Our Party resolutions speak of the present war as stemming from the general conditions of the imperialist era. We give a correct Marxist definition of the relation between the "era" and the "present war": Marxism requires a concrete assessment of each separate war. To understand why an imperialist war, i.e., a war thoroughly reactionary and anti-democratic in its political implications, could, and inevitably did, break out between the Great Powers, many of whom stood at the head of the struggle for democracy in 1789-1871—to understand this we must understand the general conditions of the imperialist era, i.e., the transformation of capitalism in the advanced countries into imperialism.

Kievsky has flagrantly distorted the relation between the "era" and the "present war". In his reasoning, to consider the matter *concretely* means to examine the "era". That is precisely where he is wrong.

The era 1789-1871 was of special significance for Europe. That is irrefutable. We cannot understand a single national liberation war, and such wars were especially typical of that period, unless we understand the general conditions of the period. Does that mean that *all* wars of that period were national liberation wars? Certainly not. To hold that view is to reduce the whole thing to an absurdity and apply a ridiculous stereotype in place of a concrete analysis of each separate war. There were also colonial wars in 1789-1871, and wars between reactionary empires that oppressed many nations.

Advanced European (and American) capitalism has entered a new era of imperialism. Does it follow from that that only imperialist wars are now possible? Any such contention would be absurd. It would reveal inability to distinguish a given concrete phenomenon from the sum total of variegated phenomena possible in a given era. An era is called an era precisely because it encompasses the sum total of variegated phenomena and wars, typical and untypical, big and small, some peculiar to advanced countries, others

to backward countries. To brush aside these concrete questions by resorting to general phrases about the "era", as Kievsky does, is to abuse the very concept "era". And to prove that, we shall cite one example out of many. But first it should be noted that *one* group of Lefts, namely, the German *Internationale* group,[24] has advanced this manifestly erroneous proposition in § 5 of its theses, published in No. 3 of the *Bulletin of the Berne Executive Committee* (February 29, 1916): "National wars *are no longer possible* in the era of this unbridled imperialism." We analysed that statement* in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.[25] Here we need merely note that though everyone who has followed the internationalist movement is long acquainted with this theoretical proposition (we opposed it way back in the spring of 1916 at the extended meeting of the Berne Executive Committee), *not a single group* has repeated or accepted it. And there is not a single word in the spirit of this or any similar proposition in Kievsky's article, written in August 1916.

That should be noted, and for the following reason: if this or a similar theoretical proposition were advanced, then we could speak of theoretical divergencies. But since *no* such proposition has been advanced, we are constrained to say: what we have is not a different interpretation of the concept "era", not a theoretical divergency, but merely a carelessly uttered phrase, merely abuse of the word "era".

Here is an example. Kievsky starts his article by asking: "Is not this (self-determination) the same as the right to receive free of charge 10,000 acres of land on Mars? The question can be answered only in the most concrete manner, only in context with the nature of the present era. The right of nations to self-determination is one thing in the era of the formation of national states, as the best form of developing the productive forces at their then existing level, but it is quite another thing now that this form, the national state, fetters the development of the productive forces. A vast distance separates the era of the establishment of capitalism and the national state from the era of the collapse of the national state and the eve of the collapse of capitalism itself.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 308-13.—*Ed.*

To discuss things in 'general', out of context with time and space, does not befit a Marxist."

There you have a sample of caricaturing the concept "imperialist era". And its caricature must be fought precisely because it is a new and important concept! What do we mean when we say that national states have become fetters, etc.? We have in mind the advanced capitalist countries, above all Germany, France, England, whose participation in the present war has been the chief factor in making it an imperialist war. In *these* countries, which hitherto have been in the van of mankind, particularly in 1789-1871, the process of forming national states has been consummated. In *these* countries the national movement is a thing of an irrevocable past, and it would be an absurd reactionary utopia to try to revive it. The national movement of the French, English, Germans has long been completed. In *these* countries history's next step is a different one: liberated nations have become transformed into oppressor nations, into nations of imperialist rapine, nations that are going through the "eve of the collapse of capitalism".

But what of other nations?

Kievsky repeats, like a rule learned by rote, that Marxists should approach things "concretely", but he does *not* apply that rule. In our theses, on the other hand, we deliberately gave an example of a concrete approach, and Kievsky did not wish to point out our mistake, if he found one.

Our theses (§6) state that to be concrete not less than *three* different types of countries must be distinguished when dealing with self-determination. (It was clearly impossible to discuss each separate country in general theses.) First type: the advanced countries of Western Europe (and America), where the national movement is a thing of the *past*. Second type: Eastern Europe, where it is a thing of the *present*. Third type: semi-colonies and colonies, where it is largely a thing of the *future*.*

Is this correct or not? *This* is what Kievsky should have levelled his criticism at. But he does not see the *essence* of the theoretical problems! He fails to see that unless he refutes the above-mentioned proposition (in §6) of our

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 150-52 .—*Ed.*

theses—and it cannot be refuted because it is correct his disquisitions about the "era" resemble a man brandishing his sword but striking no blows.

"In contrast to V. Ilyin's opinion," he writes at the end of his article, "we assume that for the majority [!] of Western [!] countries the national problem has not been settled...."

And so, the national movements of the French, Spaniards, English, Dutch, Germans and Italians were not consummated in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and earlier? At the beginning of the article the concept "era of imperialism" is distorted to make it appear that the national movement has been consummated in general, and not only in the advanced Western countries. At the end of the same article the "national problem" is declared "not settled" in *precisely* the Western countries!! Is that not a muddle?

In the Western countries the national movement is a thing of the distant past. In England, France, Germany, etc., the "fatherland" is a dead letter, it has played its historical role, *i.e.*, the national movement cannot yield here anything progressive, anything that will elevate new masses to a new economic and political life. History's next step here is not transition from feudalism or from patriarchal savagery to national progress, to a cultured and politically free fatherland, but transition from a "fatherland" that has outlived its day, that is capitalistically overripe, to socialism.

The position is different in Eastern Europe. As far as the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, for instance, are concerned, only a Martian dreamer could deny that the national movement has not yet been consummated there, that the awakening of the masses to the full use of their mother tongue and literature (and this is an absolute condition and concomitant of the full development of capitalism, of the full penetration of exchange to the very last peasant family) is *still* going on there. The "fatherland" is historically not *yet* quite a dead letter there. There the "defence of the fatherland" can *still* be defence of democracy, of one's native language, of political liberty against oppressor nations, against medievalism, whereas the English, French, Germans and Italians lie when they speak of defending their fatherland in the present war, because actually what they are defending is *not* their native language, *not* their right to nation-

al development, but their rights as slave-holders, their colonies, the foreign "spheres of influence" of their finance capital, etc.

In the semi-colonies and colonies the national movement is, historically, still younger than in Eastern Europe.

What do the words "advanced countries" and imperialist era refer to? In *what* lies the "special" position of Russia (heading of § e in the second chapter of Kievsky's article), and not only Russia? *Where* is the national liberation movement a false phrase and *where* is it a living and progressive reality? Kievsky reveals no understanding on any of these points.

3. WHAT IS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS?

Central to all the disquisitions of the self-determination opponents is the claim that it is generally "unachievable" under capitalism or imperialism. The word "unachievable" is frequently used in widely different and inaccurately defined meanings. That is why in our theses we insisted on what is essential in any theoretical discussion: an explanation of what is meant by "unachievable". Nor did we confine ourselves to that. We tried to give such an explanation. *All* democratic demands are "unachievable" under imperialism in the sense that politically they are hard to achieve or totally unachievable without a series of revolutions.

It is fundamentally wrong, however, to maintain that self-determination is unachievable in the economic sense.

That has been our contention. It is the pivotal point of our theoretical differences, a question to which our opponents in any serious discussion should have paid due attention.

But just see how Kievsky treats the question.

He definitely rejects unachievable as meaning "hard to achieve" politically. He gives a direct answer in the sense of economic unachievability.

"Does this mean," Kievsky writes, "that self-determination under imperialism is just as unachievable as labour money under commodity production?" And he replies: "Yes, it means exactly that. For what we are discussing is the logical contradiction between two social categories: 'imperialism' and 'self-determination of nations', the same logical contra-

diction as that between two other categories: labour money and commodity production. Imperialism is the negation of self-determination, and no magician can reconcile the two."

Frightening as is the angry word "magician" Kievsky hurls at us, we must nevertheless point out that he simply fails to understand what economic analysis implies. There should be no "logical contradiction"—providing, of course, that there is proper logical thinking—*either* in an economic *or* political analysis. Hence, to plead a "logical contradiction" *in general* when what we are discussing is economic and *not* political analysis, is completely irrelevant. *Both* economic and political phenomena come within "social categories". Consequently, having first replied directly and definitely: "Yes, it means exactly that" (i.e., self-determination is *just as* unachievable as labour money under commodity production), Kievsky dismisses the whole matter by beating about the bush, without offering any economic analysis.

How do we prove that labour money is unachievable under commodity production? By economic analysis. And economic analysis, like every other, rules out "logical contradictions", takes economic and *only* economic categories (and not "social categories" in general) and from them concludes that labour money is unachievable. In the first chapter of *Capital* there is no mention whatever of politics, or political forms, or "social categories": the analysis applies *only* to economic phenomena, commodity exchange, its development. Economic analysis shows—needless to say, through "logical" arguments—that under commodity production labour money is unachievable.

Kievsky does not even attempt anything approximating an economic analysis! He *confuses* the economic substance of imperialism with its political tendencies, as is obvious from the very first phrase of the very first paragraph of his article. Here is that phrase:

"Industrial capital is the synthesis of pre-capitalist production and merchant-usurer capital. Usurer capital becomes the servant of industrial capital. Then capitalism subjects the various forms of capital and there emerges its highest, unified type—finance capital. The whole era can therefore be designated as the era of finance capital, of which imperialism is the corresponding foreign-policy system."

Economically, that definition is absolutely worthless: instead of precise economic categories we get mere phrases. However, it is impossible to dwell on that now. The important thing is that Kievsky proclaims imperialism to be a "foreign-policy system".

First, this is, essentially, a wrong repetition of Kautsky's wrong idea.

Second, it is a purely political, and only political, definition of imperialism. By defining imperialism as a "system of policy" Kievsky wants to avoid the *economic* analysis he promised to give when he declared that self-determination was "*just as*" unachievable, i.e., economically unachievable under imperialism as labour money under commodity production!*

In his controversy with the Lefts, Kautsky declared that imperialism was "merely a system of foreign *policy*" (namely, annexation), and that it would be wrong to describe as imperialism a definite economic stage, or level, in the development of capitalism.

Kautsky is wrong. Of course, it is not proper to argue about words. You cannot prohibit the use of the "word" imperialism in this sense or any other. But if you want to conduct a discussion you must define your terms precisely.

Economically, imperialism (or the "era" of finance capital—it is not a matter of words) is the highest stage in the development of capitalism, one in which production has assumed such big, immense proportions that *free competition gives way to monopoly*. That is the *economic* essence of imperialism. Monopoly manifests itself in trusts, syndicates, etc., in the omnipotence of the giant banks, in the buying up of raw material sources, etc., in the concentration of banking capital, etc. Everything hinges on economic monopoly.

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* Is Kievsky aware of the impolite word Marx used in reference to such "logical methods"? *Without applying* this impolite term to Kievsky, we nevertheless are obliged to remark that Marx described such methods as "fraudulent": arbitrarily inserting precisely what is at issue, precisely what has to be proved, in *defining* a concept.

We repeat, we do *not* apply Marx's impolite expression to Kievsky. We merely disclose the source of his mistake. (In the manuscript this passage is crossed out.—*Ed.*)

The political superstructure of this new economy, of monopoly capitalism (imperialism is monopoly capitalism), is the change *from* democracy *to* political reaction. Democracy corresponds to free competition. Political reaction corresponds to monopoly. "Finance capital strives for domination, not freedom," Rudolf Hilferding rightly remarks in his *Finance Capital.*

It is fundamentally wrong, un-Marxist and unscientific, to single out "foreign policy" from policy in general, let alone counterpose foreign policy to home policy. Both in foreign and home policy imperialism strives towards violations of democracy, towards reaction. In this sense imperialism is indisputably the "negation" of *democracy in general*, of *all democracy*, and not just of *one* of its demands, national self-determination.

Being a "negation" of democracy in general, imperialism is *also* a "negation" of democracy in the national question (i.e., national self-determination): it seeks to violate democracy. The achievement of democracy is, in the same sense, and to the same degree, harder under imperialism (compared with pre-monopoly capitalism), as the achievement of a republic, a militia, popular election of officials, etc. There can be no talk of democracy being "economically" unachievable.

Kievsky was probably led astray here by the fact (besides his general lack of understanding of the requirements of economic analysis) that the philistine regards annexation (i.e., acquisition of foreign territories against the will of their people, i.e., violation of self-determination) as equivalent to the "spread" (expansion) of finance capital to a larger economic territory.

But theoretical problems should not be approached from philistine conceptions.

Economically, imperialism is monopoly capitalism. To acquire full monopoly, all competition must be eliminated, and not only on the home market (of the given state), but also on foreign markets, in the whole world. Is it *economically* possible, "in the era of finance capital", to eliminate competition even in a foreign state? Certainly it is. It is done through a rival's financial dependence and acquisition of his sources of raw materials and eventually of all his enterprises.

The American trusts are the supreme expression of the economics of imperialism or monopoly capitalism. They do not confine themselves to economic means of eliminating rivals, but constantly resort to political, even criminal, methods. It would be the greatest mistake, however, to believe that the trusts cannot establish their monopoly by purely economic methods. Reality provides ample proof that this is "achievable": the trusts undermine their rivals' credit through the banks (the owners of the trusts become the owners of the banks: buying up shares); their supply of materials (the owners of the trusts become the owners of the railways: buying up shares); for a certain time the trusts sell below cost, spending millions on this in order to ruin a competitor and then *buy up* his enterprises, his sources of raw materials (mines, land, etc.).

There you have a purely economic analysis of the power of the trusts and their expansion. There you have the purely economic path to expansion: *buying up* mills and factories, sources of raw materials.

Big finance capital of one country can always buy up competitors in another, politically independent country and constantly does so. Economically, this is fully achievable. Economic "annexation" is *fully* "achievable" without political annexation and is widely practised. In the literature on imperialism you will constantly come across indications that Argentina, for example, is in reality a "trade colony" of Britain, or that Portugal is in reality a "vassal" of Britain, etc. And that is actually so: economic dependence upon British banks, indebtedness to Britain, British acquisition of their railways, mines, land, etc., enable Britain to "annex" these countries economically without violating their political independence.

National self-determination means political independence. Imperialism seeks to violate such independence because political annexation often makes economic annexation easier, cheaper (easier to bribe officials, secure concessions, put through advantageous legislation, etc.), more convenient, less troublesome—just as imperialism seeks to replace democracy generally by oligarchy. But to speak of the *economic* "unachievability" of self-determination under imperialism is sheer nonsense.

Kievsky gets round the theoretical difficulties by a very simple and superficial dodge, known in German as "*burschikose*" phraseology, i.e., primitive, crude phrases heard (and quite naturally) at student binges. Here is an example: "Universal suffrage," he writes, "the eight-hour day and even the republic are *logically* compatible with imperialism, though imperialism far from smiles [!!] on them and their achievement is therefore extremely difficult."

We would have absolutely no objections to the *burschikose* statement that imperialism far from "smiles" on the republic—a frivolous word can sometimes lend colour to a scientific polemic!—if in this polemic on a serious issue we were given, *in addition*, an economic and political analysis of the concepts involved. With Kievsky, however, the *burschikose* phrase does duty for such an analysis or serves to I conceal lack of it.

What can this mean: "Imperialism far from smiles on the republic"? And why?

The republic is one possible form of the political superstructure of capitalist society, and, moreover, under present-day conditions the most democratic form. To say that imperialism does not "smile" on the republic is to say that there is a contradiction between imperialism and democracy. It may very well be that Kievsky does not "smile" or even "far from smiles" on this conclusion. Nevertheless it is irrefutable.

To continue. What is the nature of this contradiction between imperialism and democracy? Is it a logical or illogical contradiction? Kievsky uses the word "logical" without stopping to think and therefore does not notice that in this particular case it serves to *conceal* (both from the reader's and author's eyes and mind) the *very question* he sets out to discuss! That question is the relation of economics to politics: the relation of economic conditions and the economic content of imperialism to a certain political form. To say that every "contradiction" revealed in human discussion is a logical contradiction is meaningless tautology. And with the aid of this tautology Kievsky evades the *substance* of the question: Is it a "logical" contradiction between two *economic* phenomena or propositions (1)? Or two *political* phenomena or propositions (2)? Or *economic* and *political* phenomena or propositions (3)?

FROM MARX TO MAO
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For that is the heart of the matter, once we are discussing economic unachievability or achievability under one or another political form!

Had Kievsky not evaded the heart of the matter, he would probably have realised that the contradiction between imperialism and the republic is a contradiction between the economics of latter-day capitalism (namely, monopoly capitalism) and political democracy in general. For Kievsky will never prove that any major and fundamental democratic measure (popular election of officials or officers, complete freedom of association and assembly, etc.) is less contradictory to imperialism (or, if you like, more "smiled" upon) than the republic.

What we have, then, is the proposition *we* advanced in our theses: imperialism contradicts, "logically" contradicts, *all* political democracy *in general*. Kievsky does not "smile" on this proposition for it demolishes all his illogical constructions. But what can we do about it? Are we to accept a method that is supposed to refute certain propositions, but instead secretly advances them by using such expressions as "imperialism far from smiles on the republic"?

Further. Why does imperialism far from smile on the republic? And how does imperialism "combine" its economics with the republic?

Kievsky has given no thought to that. We would remind him of the following words of Engels in reference to the democratic republic. Can wealth dominate under this form of government? The question concerns the "contradiction" between economics and politics.

Engels replies: "The democratic republic officially knows nothing any more of property distinctions [between citizens]. In it, wealth exercises its power indirectly, but all the more surely. On the one hand, in the form of the direct corruption of officials, of which America provides the classical example; on the other hand, in the form of an alliance between government and stock exchange...."[26]

There you have an excellent example of economic analysis on the question of the "achievability" of democracy under capitalism. And the "achievability" of self-determination under imperialism is part of that question.

The democratic republic "logically" contradicts capitalism, because "officially" it puts the rich and the poor on an equal footing. That is a contradiction between the economic system and the political superstructure. There is the same contradiction between imperialism and the republic, deepened or aggravated by the fact that the change-over from free competition to monopoly makes the realisation of political freedoms even more "difficult".

How, then, is capitalism reconciled with democracy? By indirect implementation of the omnipotence of capital. There are two economic means for that: (1) direct bribery; (2) alliance of government and stock exchange. (That is stated in our theses—under a bourgeois system finance capital "can freely bribe and buy any government and any official".)

Once we have the dominance of commodity production, of the bourgeoisie, of the power of money—bribery (direct or through the stock exchange) is "achievable" under any form of government and under any kind of democracy.

What, it can be asked, is altered in this respect when capitalism gives way to imperialism, i.e., when pre-monopoly capitalism is replaced by monopoly capitalism?

Only that the power of the stock exchange increases. For finance capital is industrial capital at its highest, monopoly level which has merged with banking capital. The big banks merge with and absorb the stock exchange. (The literature on imperialism speaks of the declining role of the stock exchange, but only in the sense that every giant bank is itself virtually a stock exchange.)

Further. If "wealth" in general is fully capable of achieving domination over any democratic republic by bribery and through the stock exchange, then how can Kievsky maintain, without lapsing into a very curious "logical contradiction", that the immense wealth of the trusts and the banks, which have thousands of millions at their command, cannot "achieve" the domination of finance capital over a foreign, i.e., politically independent, republic??

Well? Bribery of officials is "unachievable" in a foreign state? Or the "alliance of government and stock exchange" applies only to one's own government?

* * *

The reader will already have seen that it requires roughly ten pages of print to untangle and popularly explain ten lines of confusion. We cannot examine every one of Kievsky's arguments in the same detail. And there is not a single one that is not confused. Nor is there really any need for this once the main arguments have been examined. The rest will be dealt with briefly.

4. THE EXAMPLE OF NORWAY

Norway "achieved" the supposedly unachievable right to self-determination in 1905, in the era of the most rampant imperialism. It is therefore not only absurd, but ludicrous, from the theoretical standpoint, to speak of "unachievability".

Kievsky wants to refute that by angrily calling us "rationalists". (What has that to do with it? The rationalist confines himself to purely abstract disquisitions, while we have pointed to a very concrete fact! But perhaps Kievsky is using the foreign word "rationalist" in the same ... how to put it more mildly? ... in the same "unhappy" manner he used the word "extractive" at the beginning of his article, when he presented his arguments "in extractive form"?)

Kievsky reproaches us. For us, he says, "the important thing is the appearance of phenomena rather than the real substance". Well, let us examine the real substance.

His refutation begins with this example: enactment of a law against trusts does not prove that their prohibition is unachievable. True enough. But the example is an unhappy one, for it militates *against* Kievsky. Laws are political measures, politics. No political measure can prohibit economic phenomena. Whatever political form Poland adopts, whether she be part of tsarist Russia or Germany, or an autonomous region, or a politically independent state, there is no prohibiting or repealing her dependence on the finance capital of the imperialist powers, or preventing that capital from buying up the shares of her industries.

The independence Norway "achieved" in 1905 was only political. It could not affect its economic dependence, nor

was this the intention. That is exactly the point made in our theses. We indicated that self-determination concerns only politics, and it would therefore be wrong even to raise the question of its economic unachievability. But here is Kievsky "refuting" this by citing an example of political bans being powerless against the economy! What a "refutation"!

To proceed. "One or even many instances of small-scale industry prevailing over large-scale industry is not sufficient to refute Marx's correct proposition that the general development of capitalism is attended by the concentration and centralisation of production."

Again, the argument is based on an unfortunate *example*, chosen to divert the attention (of the reader and the author) from the substance of the issue.

We maintain that it would be wrong to speak of the economic unachievability of self-determination in the same sense as we speak of the unachievability of labour money under capitalism. Not a single "example" of *such* achievability can be cited. Kievsky tacitly admits we are correct on this point when he shifts to *another* interpretation of "unachievability".

Why does he not do so directly? Why does he not openly and precisely formulate *his* proposition: "self-determination, while achievable in the sense that it is economically possible under capitalism, contradicts development and is therefore either reactionary or merely an exception"?

He does not do so because a clear formulation of this counter-proposition would immediately expose its author, and he therefore tries to conceal it.

The law of economic concentration, of the victory of large-scale production over small, is recognised in our own and the Erfurt programmes. Kievsky conceals the fact that nowhere is the law of political or state concentration recognised. If it were the same kind of law—if there were such a law—then why should not Kievsky formulate it and suggest that it be added to our programme? Is it right for him to leave us with a bad, incomplete programme, considering that he has discovered this new law of state concentration, which is of practical significance since it would rid our programme of erroneous conclusions?

Kievsky does not formulate that law, does not suggest that it be added to our programme, because he has the hazy feeling that if he did he would be making himself a laughing-stock. Everyone would laugh at this amusing imperialist Economism if it were expressed openly and if, parallel with the law that small-scale production is ousted by large-scale production, there were presented another "*law*" (connected with the first or existing side by side with it) of small states being ousted by big ones!

To explain this we shall put only one question to Kievsky: Why is it that economists (without quotation marks) do not speak of the "disintegration" of the modern trusts or big banks? Or of the possibility and achievability of such disintegration? Why is it that even the "imperialist Economist" (in quotation marks) is obliged to admit that the disintegration of big states is both possible and achievable, and not only in general, but, for example, the secession of "small nationalities" (please note!) from Russia (§ e, Chapter II of Kievsky's article)?

Lastly, to show even more clearly the length to which our author goes, and to warn him, let us note the following: We all accept the law of large-scale production ousting small-scale production, but no one is afraid to describe a specific "instance" of "small-scale industry prevailing over large-scale industry" as a reactionary phenomenon. *No* opponent of self-determination has yet ventured to describe as reactionary Norway's secession from Sweden, although we raised the question in our literature as early as 1914.*

Large-scale production is unachievable if, for instance, hand-worked machines remain. The idea of a mechanical factory "disintegrating" into handicrafts production is utterly absurd. The imperialist tendency towards big empires is fully achievable, and in practice is often achieved, in the form of an imperialist alliance of sovereign and independent —politically independent—states. Such an alliance is possible and is encountered not only in the form of an economic merger of the finance capital of two countries, but also in the form of military "co-operation" in an imperialist war. National struggle, national insurrection, national secession

* See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 425-30.—*Ed.*

are fully "achievable" and are met with in practice *under* imperialism. They are even more pronounced, for imperialism does not halt the development of capitalism and the growth of democratic tendencies among the mass of the population. On the contrary, it *accentuates* the antagonism between their democratic aspirations and the anti-democratic tendency of the trusts.

It is only from the point of view of imperialist Economism, i.e., caricaturised Marxism, that one can ignore, for instance, this specific aspect of imperialist policy: on the one hand, the present imperialist war offers examples of how the force of financial ties and economic interests draws a small, politically independent state into the struggle of the Great Powers (Britain and Portugal). On the other hand, the violation of democracy with regard to small nations, much weaker (both economically and politically) than their imperialist "patrons", leads either to revolt (Ireland) or to defection of whole regiments to the enemy (the Czechs). In this situation it is not only "achievable", from the point of view of finance capital, but *sometimes* even *profitable* for the trusts, for *their* imperialist policy, for *their* imperialist war, to allow *individual* small nations as much democratic freedom as they can, right down to political independence, so as not to risk damaging their "own" military operations. To overlook the peculiarity of political and strategic relationships and to repeat indiscriminately a world learned by rote, "imperialism", is anything but Marxism.

On Norway, Kievsky tells us, firstly, that she "had always been an independent state". That is not true and can only be explained by the author's *burschikose* carelessness and his disregard of political issues. Norway was *not* an independent state prior to 1905, though she enjoyed a very large measure of autonomy. Sweden recognised Norway's political independence only *after* her secession. If Norway "had always been an independent state", then the Swedish Government would not have informed the other powers, on October 26, 1905, that it recognised Norway's independence.

Secondly, Kievsky cites a number of statements to prove that Norway looked to the West, and Sweden to the East, that in one country mainly British, and in the other German, finance capital was "at work", etc. From this he draws the

triumphant conclusion: "This example [Norway] neatly fits into our pattern."

There you have a sample of the logic of imperialist Economism! Our theses point out that finance capital can dominate in "any", "even independent country", and all the arguments about self-determination being "unachievable" from the point of view of finance capital are therefore sheer confusion. We are given data *confirming* our proposition about the part foreign finance capital played in Norway *before* and *after* her secession. And these data are supposed to *refute* our proposition!

Dilating on finance capital in order to *disregard* political issues—is that the way to discuss politics?

No. Political issues do not disappear because of Economism's faulty logic. British finance capital was "at work" in Norway before and after secession. German finance capital was "at work" in Poland prior to her secession from Russia and will continue to "work" there *no matter* what political status Poland enjoys. That is so elementary that it is embarrassing to have to repeat it. But what can one do if the ABC is forgotten?

Does this dispense with the political question of Norway's status? With her having been part of Sweden? With the attitude of the workers when the secession issue arose?

Kievsky evades these questions because they hit hard at the Economists. But these questions were posed, and are posed, by life itself. Life itself posed the question: Could a Swedish worker who did not recognise Norway's right to secession remain a member of the Social-Democratic Party? *He could not.*

The Swedish aristocrats wanted a war against Norway, and so did the clericals. That fact does not disappear because Kievsky has "forgotten" to read about it in the history of the Norwegian people. The Swedish worker could, while remaining a Social-Democrat, urge the Norwegians to vote against secession (the Norwegian referendum on secession, held on August 13, 1905, resulted in 368,200 votes for secession and 184 against, with about 80 per cent of the electorate taking part). But the Swedish worker who, like the Swedish aristocracy and bourgeoisie, would deny the Norwegians the right to decide this question themselves, without the

Swedes and irrespective of their will, would have been a *social-chauvinist* and *a miscreant the Social-Democratic Party could not tolerate in its ranks.*

That is how §9 of our Party Programme should be applied. But our imperialist Economist tries to *jump over* this clause. You cannot jump over it, gentlemen, without falling into the embrace of chauvinism!

And what of the Norwegian worker? Was it his duty, from the internationalist point of view, to vote *for* secession? Certainly not. He could have voted against secession and remained a Social-Democrat. He would have been betraying his duty as a member of the Social-Democratic Party only if he had proffered a helping hand to a Black-Hundred Swedish worker opposed to Norway's *freedom* of secession.

Some people refuse to see this elementary difference in the position of the Norwegian and Swedish worker. But they expose themselves when they *evade* this most concrete of political questions, which we squarely put to them. They remain silent, try to wriggle out and in that way surrender their position.

To prove that the "Norwegian" issue can arise in Russia, we deliberately advanced this proposition: in circumstances of a *purely* military and strategic nature a separate Polish state is fully achievable even *now*. Kievsky wants to "discuss" that—and remains silent!

Let us add this Finland too, out of *purely* military and strategic considerations, and given a certain outcome of the *present* imperialist war (for instance, Sweden joining the Germans and the latter's semi-victory), *can* become a separate state without undermining the "achievability" of even a single operation of finance capital, without making "unachievable" the buying up of Finnish railway and industrial shares.*

* Given one outcome of the present war the formation of new states in Europe (Polish, Finnish, etc.) is fully "achievable" without in any way disturbing the conditions for the development of imperialism and its power. On the contrary, this would *increase* the influence, contacts and pressure of finance capital. But given another outcome, the formation of new states of Hungary, Czechia, etc., is *likewise* "achievable". The British imperialists are already planning this second outcome in anticipation of their victory. The imperialist era does not destroy either the striving for national political independence or its

Kievsky seeks salvation from unpleasant political issues in an amazing phrase which is amazingly characteristic of all his "arguments": "At any moment... [that is literally what he says at the end of § c, Chapter I] the Sword of Damocles can strike and put an end to the existence of an 'independent' workshop" (a "hint" at little Sweden and Norway).

That, presumably, is genuine Marxism: a separate Norwegian state, whose secession from Sweden the *Swedish* Government described as a "revolutionary measure", has been in existence only some ten years. Is there any point in examining the *political* issues that follow from this if we have read Hilferding's *Finance Capital* and "understood" it in the sense that "at any moment"—if we are to exaggerate, then let's go the whole hog!—a small state might vanish? Is there any point in drawing attention to the fact that we have perverted Marxism into Economism, and that we have turned our policy into a rehash of the speeches of case-hardened Russian chauvinists?

What a mistake the Russian workers must have made in 1905 in seeking a republic: finance capital had already been mobilised against it in France, England, etc., and "at any moment" the "Sword of Damocles" could have struck it down, if it had ever come into being!

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"The demand for national self-determination is not ... utopian in the minimum programme: it does not contradict social development, inasmuch as its achievement would not halt that development." That passage from Martov is challenged by Kievsky in the section in which he cites the "statements" about Norway. They *prove*, again and again, the generally known fact that Norway's "self-determina-

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"achievability" *within the bounds* of world imperialist relationships. *Outside* these bounds, however, a republican Russia, or in general any major democratic transformations anywhere else in the world are "unachievable" without a series of revolutions and are unstable without socialism. Kievsky has wholly and completely failed to understand the relation of imperialism to democracy.

tion" and secession *did not halt either* the development of finance capital generally, *or* expansion of its operation in particular, *or* the buying up of Norway by the English!

There have been Bolsheviks among us, Alexinsky in 1908-10, for instance, who argued with Martov *precisely at a time* when Martov was right! God save us from such "allies"!

5. "MONISM AND DUALISM"

Reproaching us for "interpreting the demand dualistically", P. Kievsky writes:

"Monistic *action* of the International is replaced by dualistic *propaganda*."

That sounds quite Marxist and materialistic: monistic action is contrasted to "dualistic" propaganda. Unfortunately, closer examination reveals that it is *verbal* "monism", like the "monism" of Dühring. "If I include a shoe brush in the *unity* mammals," Engels wrote exposing Dühring's "monism", "this does not help it to get mammary glands."[27]

This means that only such things, qualities, phenomena and actions that are *a unity* in objective reality can be *declared* "a unity". It is this "*detail*" that our author overlooks!

He thinks we are "dualists", first, because what we demand, primarily, of the workers of the oppressed nations—this refers to the national question only—*differs* from what we demand of the workers of the oppressor nations.

To determine whether P. Kievsky's "monism" is the same as Dühring's, let us examine *objective realities*.

Is the *actual* condition of the workers in the oppressor and in the oppressed nations the same, from the standpoint of the national question?

No, it is not the same.

(1) *Economically*, the difference is that sections of the working class in the oppressor nations receive crumbs from the *superprofits* the bourgeoisie of these nations obtains by extra exploitation of the workers of the oppressed nations. Besides, economic statistics show that here a *larger* percentage of the workers become "straw bosses" than is the case in the oppressed nations, a *larger* percentage rise to the labour

aristocracy.* That is a fact. To a *certain degree* the workers of the oppressor nations are partners of *their own* bourgeoisie in plundering the workers (and the mass of the population) of the oppressed nations.

(2) *Politically*, the difference is that, compared with the workers of the oppressed nations, they occupy a *privileged* position in many spheres of political life.

(3) *Ideologically*, or spiritually, the difference is that they are taught, at school and in life, disdain and contempt for the workers of the oppressed nations. This has been *experienced*, for example, by every Great Russian who has been brought up or who has lived among Great Russians.

Thus, *all along the line* there are differences in objective reality, i.e., "dualism" in the objective world that is independent of the will and consciousness of individuals.

That being so, how are we to regard P. Kievsky's assertion about the "monistic action of the International"?

It is a hollow, high-sounding phrase, no more.

In *real life* the International is composed of workers *divided* into oppressor and oppressed nations. *If* its action is *to be monistic*, its propaganda must *not* be the same for both. That is how we should regard the matter in the light of real (not Dühringian) "monism", Marxist materialism.

An example? We cited the example of Norway (in the legal press over two years ago!), and no one has challenged it. In this concrete case taken from life, the *action* of the Norwegian and Swedish workers was "monistic", unified, internationalist *only* because and insofar as the Swedish workers *unconditionally* championed Norway's freedom to secede, while the Norwegian workers raised the question of secession only *conditionally*. Had the Swedish workers not supported Norway's freedom of secession *unconditionally*, they would have been *chauvinists*, accomplices of the chauvinist Swedish landlords, who wanted to "keep" Norway by force, by war. Had the Norwegian workers *not* raised the question of secession *conditionally*, i.e., allowing even Social-Democratic Party members to conduct propaganda and vote against secession, they would have failed in their internationalist duty and

* See, for instance, Hourwich's book on immigration and the condition of the working class in America, *Immigration and Labour*.—*Ed*.

would have sunk to narrow, *bourgeois* Norwegian nationalism. Why? Because the secession was being effected by the *bourgeoisie*, not by the proletariat! Because the Norwegian bourgeoisie (as every other) *always* strives to drive a wedge between the workers of its own and an "alien" country! Because for the class-conscious workers every democratic demand (including self-determination) is *subordinated* to the supreme interests of socialism. For example, if Norway's secession from Sweden had created the certainty or probability of war between Britain and Germany, the Norwegian workers, *for that reason alone*, would have had to oppose secession. The Swedish workers would have had the right and the opportunity, without ceasing to be socialists, to agitate against secession, but *only* if they had waged a systematic, consistent and constant struggle *against* the Swedish Government for Norway's *freedom* to secede. Otherwise the Norwegian workers and people *would not*, and *could not*, accept the advice of the Swedish workers as sincere.

The trouble with the opponents of self-determination is that they confine themselves to lifeless abstractions, *fearing* to analyse to the end a single concrete real-life instance. Our concrete statement in the theses that a new Polish state is quite "achievable" *now*, given a definite combination of purely military, strategic conditions,* has not been challenged either by the Poles or by P. Kievsky. But no one wanted to *ponder* the conclusions that follow from this tacit admission that we were right. And what follows, obviously, is that internationalist propaganda *cannot* be the same for the Russians and the Poles if it is to educate both for "monistic action". The Great-Russian (and German) worker is in duty bound unconditionally to insist on Poland's freedom to secede; otherwise he will, *in fact*, *now* be the lackey of Nicholas II or Hindenburg. The Polish worker *could* insist on secession *only* conditionally, because to speculate (as do the Fracy[28]) on the victory of one or the other imperialist bourgeoisie is tantamount to becoming *its* lackey. Failure to understand this difference, which is a prerequisite for "monistic action" of the International, is about the same as failing to understand why "monistic action" against the

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 143-56.—*Ed.*

tsarist army near Moscow, say, requires that the revolutionary forces march west from Nizhni-Novgorod and east from Smolensk.

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Second, our new exponent of Dühringian monism reproaches us for not striving to achieve "the closest organisational unity of the various national sections of the International" in the event of a social revolution.

Under socialism, P. Kievsky writes, self-determination becomes superfluous, since the state itself ceases to exist. That is meant as an argument against us! But in our theses we clearly and definitely say, in *three* lines, the last three lines of section one, that "democracy, too, is a form of state which must disappear when the state disappears". It is precisely this truism that P. Kievsky repeats—to "refute" us, of course!—on *several pages* of his § r (Chapter I), and repeats it in a *distorted way*. "We picture to ourselves," he writes, "and have always pictured the socialist system as a strictly democratic [!!?], centralised system of economy in which the state, as the apparatus for the domination of one part of the population over the other, disappears." This is confusion, because democracy *too* is domination "of one part of the population over the other"; it *too* is a form of state. Our author obviously does not understand what is meant by the *withering away* of the state after the victory of socialism and what this process requires.

The main point, however, is his "objections" regarding the era of the social revolution. He calls us "talmudists of self-determination"—what a frightening epithet—and adds: "We picture this process [the social revolution] as the united action of the proletarians of all [!] countries, who wipe out the frontiers of the bourgeois [!] state, who tear down the frontier posts [in addition to "wiping out the frontiers"?], who blow up [!] national unity and establish class unity."

The wrath of this stern judge of the "talmudists" notwithstanding, we must say: there are many words here, but no "ideas".

The social revolution cannot be the united action of the proletarians of *all* countries for the simple reason that most of the countries and the majority of the world's population

have not even reached, or have only just reached, the capitalist stage of development. We stated this in section six of our theses, but P. Kievsky, because of lack of attention, or inability to think, did "not notice" that we included this section for a definite purpose, namely, to refute caricature distortions of Marxism. *Only* the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America have matured for socialism, and in Engels's letter to Kautsky (*Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*)[29] Kievsky will find a concrete illustration of the real and not merely promised "*idea*" that to dream of the "united action of the proletarians of *all* countries" means postponing socialism to the Greek calends, i.e., for ever.

Socialism will be achieved by the united action of the proletarians, not of all, but of a minority of countries, those that have reached the *advanced* capitalist stage of development. The cause of Kievsky's error lies in failure to understand that. In *these* advanced countries (England, France, Germany, etc.) the national problem was solved long ago; national unity outlived its purpose long ago; *objectively*, there are no "general national tasks" to be accomplished. Hence, only in these countries is it possible *now* to "blow up" national unity and establish class unity.

The *un*developed countries are a different matter. They embrace the whole of Eastern Europe and all the colonies and semi-colonies and are dealt with in section six of the theses (second- and third-type countries). In those areas, as a rule, there *still* exist oppressed and capitalistically undeveloped nations. *Objectively*, these nations still have general national tasks to accomplish, namely, *democratic* tasks, the tasks of *overthrowing foreign oppression*.

Engels cited India as an example of such nations, stating that she might perform a revolution against victorious socialism, for Engels was remote from the preposterous imperialist Economism which imagines that having achieved victory in the advanced countries, the proletariat will "automatically", without definite *democratic* measures, abolish national oppression everywhere. The victorious proletariat will reorganise the countries in which it has triumphed. That cannot be done all at once; nor, indeed, can the bourgeoisie be "vanquished" all at once. We deliberately emphasised this in our theses, and Kievsky has again failed to

stop and think *why* we stressed this point in connection with the national question.

While the proletariat of the advanced countries is overthrowing the bourgeoisie and repelling its attempts at counter-revolution, the undeveloped and oppressed nations do not just wait, do not cease to exist, do not disappear. If they take advantage even of such a bourgeois imperialist crisis as the war of 1915-16—a minor crisis compared with social revolution—to rise in revolt (the colonies, Ireland), there can be no doubt that they will all the more readily take advantage of the *great crisis* of civil war in the advanced countries to rise in revolt.

The social revolution can come only in the form of an epoch in which are combined civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a *whole series* of democratic and revolutionary movements, including the national liberation movement, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations.

Why? Because capitalism develops unevenly, and objective reality gives us highly developed capitalist nations side by side with a number of economically slightly developed, or totally undeveloped, nations. P. Kievsky has absolutely failed to analyse the *objective* conditions of social revolution from the standpoint of the economic maturity of various countries. His reproach that *we* "invent" instances in which to apply self-determination is therefore an attempt to lay the blame at the wrong door.

With a zeal worthy of a better cause, Kievsky repeatedly quotes Marx and Engels to the effect that "one must not invent things out of his own head, but use his head to discover in the existing material conditions" the means that will free humanity of social evils. When I read those oft-repeated quotations I cannot help recalling the late and unlamented Economists who just as tediously ... harped on their "new discovery" that capitalism had triumphed in Russia. Kievsky wants to "smite" us with these quotations: he claims that we invent out of our own heads the conditions for applying self-determination in the epoch of imperialism! But we find the following "incautious admission" in his own article:

"The very fact that we are *opposed* [author's italics] to defence of the fatherland shows most clearly that we will

actively resist suppression of a national uprising, for we shall thereby be combating imperialism, our mortal enemy" (Chapter II, §r).

To criticise an author, to *answer* him, one has to quote in full at least the main propositions of his article. But in all of Kievsky's propositions you will find that every sentence contains two or three errors or illogicalities that distort Marxism!

1) He is unaware that a national uprising is *also* "defence of the fatherland"! A little thought, however, will make it perfectly clear that this is so, since *every* "nation in revolt" "defends" itself, its language, its territory, its fatherland, against the oppressor nation.

All national oppression calls forth the resistance of the *broad masses* of the people; and the resistance of a nationally oppressed population always *tends* to national revolt. Not infrequently (notably in Austria and Russia) we find the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations *talking* of national revolt, while in practice it enters into reactionary compacts with the bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation behind the backs of, *and against*, its own people. In such cases the criticism of revolutionary Marxists should be directed not against the national movement, but against its degradation, vulgarisation, against the tendency to reduce it to a petty squabble. Incidentally, very many Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats overlook this and in their *legitimate* hatred of the petty, vulgar and sordid national squabbles—disputes and scuffles over the question, for instance, of which language shall have precedence in two-language street signs—refuse to support the national struggle. We shall not "support" a republican farce in, say, the principality of Monaco, or the "republican" adventurism of "generals" in the small states of South America or some Pacific island. But that does not mean it would be permissible to abandon the republican slogan for serious democratic and socialist movements. We should, and do, ridicule the sordid national squabbles and haggling in Russia and Austria. But that does not mean that it would be permissible to deny support to a national uprising or a serious popular struggle against national oppression.

2) If national uprisings are impossible in the "imperialist era", Kievsky has no right to speak of them. If they are pos-

sible, *all* his fine-spun talk about "monism" and our "inventing" examples of self-determination under imperialism, etc., etc., falls to pieces. Kievsky defeats his own arguments.

If "we" "actively resist suppression" of a "national uprising"—a case which P. Kievsky "*himself*" considers possible —what does this mean?

It means that the *action* is twofold, or "dualistic", to employ the philosophical term as incorrectly as our author does: (a) first, it is the "action" of the nationally oppressed proletariat and peasantry *jointly* with the nationally oppressed bourgeoisie *against* the oppressor nation; (b) second, it is the "action" of the proletariat, or of its class-conscious section, in the oppressor nation *against* the bourgeoisie of that nation and all the elements that follow it.

The innumerable phrases against a "national bloc", national "illusions", the "poison" of nationalism, against "fanning national hatred" and the like, to which P. Kievsky resorts, prove to be meaningless. For when he advises the proletariat of the oppressor countries (which, be it remembered, he regards as a serious force) "actively to resist suppression of a national uprising", he thereby *fans* national hatred and *supports* the establishment of a "bloc with the bourgeoisie" by the workers of the oppressed nations.

3) If national uprisings are possible under imperialism, so are national wars. There is no material political difference between the two. Military historians are perfectly right when they put rebellions in the same category as wars. Kievsky has unwittingly refuted not only himself, but also Junius[30] and the *Internationale* group, who deny the *possibility* of national wars under imperialism. And this denial is the only conceivable theoretical ground for denying self-determination of nations under imperialism.

4) For what is a "national" uprising? It is an uprising aimed at the achievement of *political* independence of the oppressed nation, i.e., the establishment of a *separate* national state.

If the proletariat of the oppressor nation is a serious force (in the imperialist era, as our author rightly assumes), does not its determination "actively to resist suppression of a national uprising" *imply assistance* in creating a separate national state? Of course it does.

Though he denies the "achievability" of self-determination, our brave author now argues that the class-conscious proletariat of the advanced countries must *assist* in achieving this "unachievable" goal!

5) *Why* must "we" "actively resist" suppression of a national uprising? P. Kievsky advances only one reason: "...we shall thereby be combating imperialism, our mortal enemy." All the *strength* of the argument lies in the *strong* word "mortal". And this is in keeping with his penchant for strong words instead of strong arguments—high-sounding phrases like "driving a stake into the quivering body of the bourgeoisie" and similar Alexinsky flourishes.

But this Kievsky argument is *wrong*. Imperialism is as much our "mortal" enemy as is capitalism. That is so. No Marxist will forget, however, that capitalism is progressive compared with feudalism, and that imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence, it is *not* every struggle against imperialism that we should support. We will *not* support a struggle of the reactionary classes against imperialism; we will *not* support an uprising of the reactionary classes against imperialism and capitalism.

Consequently, once the author admits the need to support an uprising of an oppressed nation ("actively resisting" suppression means supporting the uprising), he also admits that a national uprising is *progressive*, that the establishment of a separate and new state, of new frontiers, etc., resulting from a successful uprising, is *progressive*.

In *none* of his political arguments is the author consistent!

The Irish Rebellion of 1916, which took place after our theses had appeared in No. 2 of *Vorbote*, proved, incidentally, that it was not idle to speak of the possibility of national uprisings even in Europe.

6. THE OTHER POLITICAL ISSUE RAISED AND DISTORTED BY P. KIEVSKY

Liberation of the colonies, we stated in our theses, means self-determination of nations. Europeans often forget that colonial peoples *too* are nations, but to tolerate this "forgetfulness" is to tolerate chauvinism.

P. Kievsky "objects":

In the pure type of colonies, "there is *no* proletariat in the proper sense of the term" (end of § r, Chapter II). "For whom, then, is the 'self-determination' slogan meant? For the colonial bourgeoisie? For the fellahs? For the peasants? Certainly not. It is absurd for *socialists* [Kievsky's italics] to demand self-determination for the colonies, for it is absurd in general to advance the slogans of a workers' party for countries where there are no workers."

P. Kievsky's anger and his denunciation of our view as "absurd" notwithstanding, we make bold to submit that his arguments are erroneous. Only the late and unlamented Economists believed that the "slogans of a workers' party" are issued *only* for workers.* No, these slogans are issued for the whole of the labouring population, for the entire people. The democratic part of our programme—Kievsky has given no thought to its significance "in general"—is addressed specifically to the whole people and that is why in it we speak of the "people".**

The colonial and semi-colonial nations, we said, account for 1,000 million people, and P. Kievsky has not taken the trouble to refute that concrete statement. Of these 1,000 million, more that 700 million (China, India, Persia, Egypt) live in countries where *there are* workers. But even with regard to colonial countries where there are no workers, only slave-owners and slaves, etc., the demand for "self-determination", far from being *absurd*, is *obligatory* for every Marxist. And if he gave the matter a little thought, Kievsky would probably realise this, and also that "self-determination" is always advanced "for" *two* nations: the oppressed and the *oppressing*.

Another of Kievsky's "objections":

"For that reason we limit ourselves, in respect to the colonies, to a negative slogan, i.e., to the demand socialists

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* P. Kievsky would do well to reread what A. Martynov and Co. wrote in 1899-1901. He would find many of his "own" arguments there.

** Some curious opponents of "self-determination of nations" try to refute our views with the argument that "nations" are divided into classes! Our customary reply to these caricature Marxists is that the democratic part of our programme speaks of "government by the people".

present to their governments—'get out of the colonies!' Unachievable within the framework of capitalism, this demand serves to intensify the struggle against imperialism, but does not contradict the trend of development, for a socialist society will not possess colonies."

The author's inability, or reluctance, to give the slightest thought to the theoretical contents of political slogans is simply amazing! Are we to believe that the use of a propaganda phrase instead of a theoretically precise political term alters matters? To say "get out of the colonies" is to evade a theoretical analysis and hide behind propaganda phrases! For every one of our Party propagandists, in referring to the Ukraine, Poland, Finland, etc., is fully entitled to demand of the tsarist government (his "own government"): "get out of Finland", etc. However, the intelligent propagandist will understand that we must not advance either positive or negative slogans for the sole purpose of "intensifying" the struggle. Only men of the Alexinsky type could insist that the "negative" slogan "get out of the Black-Hundred Duma" was justified by the desire to "intensify" the struggle against a certain evil.

Intensification of the struggle is an empty phrase of the subjectivists, who forget the Marxist requirement that every slogan be justified by a precise analysis of *economic* realities, the *political* situation and the *political* significance of the slogan. It is embarrassing to have to drive this home, but what can one do?

We know the Alexinsky habit of cutting short a theoretical discussion of a theoretical question by propaganda outcries. It is a bad habit. The slogan "get out of the colonies" has one and only one political and economic content: freedom of secession for the colonial nations, freedom to establish a separate state! If, as P. Kievsky believes, the *general* laws of imperialism prevent the self-determination of nations and make it a utopia, illusion, etc., then how can one, without stopping to think, make an exception from these general laws for *most* of the nations of the world? Obviously, P. Kievsky's "theory" is a caricature of theory.

Commodity production and capitalism, and the connecting threads of finance capital, exist in the vast majority of colonial countries. How, then, can we urge the imperialist

countries, their governments, to "get out of the colonies" if, *from the standpoint* of commodity production, capitalism and imperialism, this is an "unscientific" and "utopian" demand, "refuted" *even* by Lensch, Cunow and the rest?

There is not even a shadow of *thought* in the author's argumentation!

He has given no thought to the fact that liberation of the colonies is "unrealisable" *only* in the sense of being "unrealisable without a series of revolutions". He has given no thought to the fact that it is realisable *in conjunction* with a socialist revolution in Europe. He has given no thought to the fact that a "socialist society will not possess" *not only* colonies, but subject nations *in general*. He has given no thought to the fact that, on the question under discussion, there is *no* economic or political difference between Russia's "possession" of Poland or Turkestan. He has given no thought to the fact that a "socialist society" will wish to "get out of the colonies" *only* in the sense of granting them the free *right* to secede, but definitely *not* in the sense of *recommending secession*.

And for this differentiation between the right to secede and the recommendation to secede, P. Kievsky condemns us as "jugglers", and to "scientifically substantiate" that verdict in the eyes of the workers, he writes:

"What is a worker to think when he asks a propagandist how the proletariat should regard *samostiinost* [political independence for the Ukraine], and gets this answer: socialists are working for the right to secede, but their propaganda is against secession?"

I believe I can give a fairly accurate reply to that question, namely: every sensible worker will *think* that Kievsky is *not capable of thinking*.

Every sensible worker will "think": here we have P. Kievsky telling us workers to shout "get out of the colonies". In other words, we Great-Russian workers must demand from our government that it get out of Mongolia, Turkestan, Persia; English workers must demand that the English Government get out of Egypt, India, Persia, etc. But does this mean that *we* proletarians *wish* to separate ourselves from the Egyptian workers and fellahs, from the Mongolian, Turkestan or Indian workers and peasants? Does it

mean that *we* advise the labouring masses of the colonies to "separate" from the class-conscious European proletariat? Nothing of the kind. Now, as always, we stand and shall continue to stand for the closest association and merging of the class-conscious workers of the advanced countries with the workers, peasants and slaves of *all* the oppressed countries. We have always advised and shall continue to advise all the oppressed classes in all the oppressed countries, the colonies included, *not* to separate from us, but to form the closest possible ties and merge with us.

We demand from our governments that they quit the colonies, or, to put it in precise political terms rather than in agitational outcries—that they *grant* the colonies full *freedom* of secession, the genuine *right to self-determination*, and we ourselves are sure to implement this right, and grant this freedom, as soon as we capture power. We demand this from existing governments, and will *do* this when we are the government, *not* in order to "recommend" secession, but, on the contrary, in order to facilitate and accelerate the *democratic* association and merging of nations. We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with the Mongolians, Persians, Indians, Egyptians. We believe it is our duty and *in our interest* to do this, for otherwise socialism in Europe will *not be secure*. We shall endeavour to render these nations, more backward and oppressed than we are, "disinterested cultural assistance", to borrow the happy expression of the Polish Social-Democrats. In other words, we will help them pass to the use of machinery, to the lightening of labour, to democracy, to socialism.

If we demand freedom of secession for the Mongolians, Persians, Egyptians and *all* other oppressed and unequal nations without exception, we do so not because *we favour secession*, but *only* because we stand for *free*, *voluntary* association and merging as distinct from forcible association. That is the *only* reason!

And in this respect the *only* difference between the Mongolian or Egyptian peasants and workers and their Polish or Finnish counterparts is, in our view, that the latter are more developed, more experienced politically than the Great Russians, more economically prepared, etc., and for that reason will in all likelihood *very soon* convince their

peoples that it is unwise to extend their present legitimate hatred of the Great Russians, for their role of hangman, to the *socialist* workers and to a socialist Russia. They will convince them that economic expediency and internationalist and democratic instinct and consciousness demand the earliest association of all nations and their merging in a socialist society. And since the Poles and Finns are highly cultured people, they will, in all probability, very soon come to see the correctness ; of this attitude, and the possible secession of Poland and Finland after the triumph of socialism will therefore be only of short duration. The incomparably less cultured fellahs, Mongolians and Persians might secede- for a longer period, but we shall try to shorten it by disinterested cultural assistance as indicated above.

There is *no* other difference in our attitude to the Poles and Mongolians, nor can there be. There is *no* "contradiction", nor can there be, between our propaganda of freedom of secession and our firm resolve to implement that freedom when *we* are the government, and our propaganda of association and merging of nations. That is what, we feel sure, every sensible worker, every genuine socialist and internationalist will "think" of our controversy with P. Kievsky.*

Running through the article is Kievsky's basic doubt: why advocate and, when we are in power, implement the freedom of nations to *secede*, considering that the trend of

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* Evidently Kievsky simply *repeated* the slogan "get out of the colonies", advanced by certain German and Dutch Marxists, without considering not only its theoretical content and implications, but also the specific features of Russia. It is pardonable—to a certain extent—for a Dutch or German Marxist to confine himself to the slogan "get out of the colonies". For, first, the *typical* form of national oppression, in the case of most *West*-European countries, is oppression of the colonies, and, second, the very term "colony" has an especially clear, graphic and vital meaning for West-European countries.

But what of Russia ? Its peculiarity lies precisely in the fact that the difference between "*our*" "colonies" and "our" oppressed nations is not clear, not concrete and not vitally felt!

For a Marxist writing in, say, German it might be pardonable to overlook *this* peculiarity of Russia; for Kievsky it is unpardonable. The sheer absurdity of trying to discover some serious difference between oppressed nations and colonies in the case of Russia should be especially clear to a Russian socialist who wants not simply to *repeat*, but to *think*.

development is towards the *merging* of nations? For the same reason—we reply—that we advocate and, when in power, will implement the dictatorship of the proletariat, though the entire trend of development is towards abolition of coercive domination of one part of society over another. Dictatorship is domination of one part of society over the rest of society, and domination, moreover, that rests directly on coercion. Dictatorship of the proletariat, the only consistently revolutionary class, is necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie and repel its attempts at counter-revolution. The question of proletarian dictatorship is of such overriding importance that he who denies the need for such dictatorship, or recognises it only in words, cannot be a member of the Social-Democratic Party. However, it cannot be denied that in individual cases, by way of exception, for instance, in some small country after the social revolution has been accomplished in a neighbouring big country, peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie is *possible*, if it is convinced that resistance is hopeless and if it prefers to save its skin. It is much more likely, of course, that even in small states socialism will *not* be achieved without civil war, and for that reason the *only* programme of international Social-Democracy must be recognition of civil war, though violence is, of course, alien to our ideals. The same, *mutatis mutandis* (with the *necessary* alterations), is applicable to nations. We favour their merger, but *now* there can be no transition from forcible merger and annexation to voluntary merger without freedom of secession. We recognise—and quite rightly—the predominance of the economic factor, but to interpret it *à la* Kievsky is to make a caricature of Marxism. Even the trusts and banks of modern imperialism, though inevitable everywhere as part of developed capitalism, differ in their concrete aspects from country to country. There is a still greater difference, despite homogeneity in essentials, between political forms in the advanced imperialist countries—America, England, France, Germany. The same variety will manifest itself also in the path mankind will follow from the imperialism of today to the socialist revolution of tomorrow. All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of

democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life. There is nothing more primitive from the viewpoint of theory, or more ridiculous from that of practice, than to paint, "in the name of historical materialism", *this* aspect of the future in a monotonous grey. The result will be nothing more than Suzdal daubing. And even if reality were to show that *prior* to the first victory of the socialist proletariat only 1/500 of the nations now oppressed will win emancipation and secede, that *prior* to the final victory of the socialist proletariat the world over (i.e., during all the vicissitudes of the socialist revolution) also only 1/500 of the oppressed nations will secede for a very short time—*even* in that event we would be correct, both from the theoretical and practical political standpoint, in advising the workers, already now, not to permit into their Social-Democratic parties those socialists of the oppressor nations who do not recognise and do not advocate freedom of secession for *all* oppressed nations. For the fact is that we do not know, and cannot know, how many of the oppressed nations will in practice require secession in order to contribute something of their own to the different *forms* of democracy, the different *forms* of transition to socialism. And that the negation of freedom of secession now is theoretically false from beginning to end and in practice amounts to servility to the chauvinists of the oppressing nations—this we know, see and feel daily.

"We emphasise," P. Kievsky writes in a footnote to the passage quoted above, "that we fully support the demand 'against forcible annexation'...."

But he makes no reply, not even by a single word, to our perfectly clear statement that this "demand" is tantamount to recognising self-determination, that there can be no correct definition of the concept "annexation" unless it is seen in context with self-determination. Presumably Kievsky believes that in a discussion it is enough to present one's arguments and demands without any supporting evidence!

He continues: "...We fully accept, in their *negative* formulation, a number of demands that tend to sharpen proletarian consciousness against imperialism, but there is absolutely no possibility of working out corresponding *positive*

formulations on the basis of the existing system. Against war, yes, but not for a democratic peace....”

Wrong— from the first word to the last. Kievsky has read our resolution on “Pacifism and the Peace Slogan” (in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*, pp. 44-45*) and even approved it, I believe. But obviously he did not understand it. We are *for* a democratic peace, only we warn the workers against the deception that such a peace is possible under the present, bourgeois governments “without a series of revolutions”, as the resolution points out. We denounced as a deception of the workers the “abstract” advocacy of peace, i.e., one that does *not* take into account the real class nature, or, specifically, the imperialist nature of the *present* governments in the belligerent countries. We definitely stated in the *Sotsial-Demokrat* (No. 47) theses that if the revolution places our Party in power during the present war, it will immediately propose a democratic peace to all the warring countries.**

Yet, anxious to convince himself and others that he is opposed “only” to self-determination and not to democracy in general, Kievsky ends up by asserting that we are “not for a democratic peace”. Curious logic!

There is no need to dwell on all the other examples he cites, and no sense in wasting space on refuting them, for they are on the same level of naïve and fallacious logic and can only make the reader smile. There is not, nor can there be, such a thing as a “negative” Social-Democratic slogan that serves only to “sharpen proletarian consciousness against imperialism” without at the same time offering a positive answer to the question of *how* Social-Democracy will solve the problem when it assumes power. A “negative” slogan unconnected with a definite positive solution will not “sharpen”, but dull consciousness, for such a slogan is a hollow phrase, mere shouting, meaningless declamation.

P. Kievsky does not understand the difference between “negative” slogans that stigmatise *political* evils and *economic* evils. The difference lies in the fact that certain economic evils are part of capitalism as such, whatever the political

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 162-63.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 403-04.—*Ed.*

superstructure, and that it is *impossible* to eliminate them economically without eliminating capitalism itself. Not a single instance can be cited to disprove this. On the other hand, political evils represent a departure from democracy which, economically, is fully possible "on the basis of the existing system", i.e., capitalism, and by way of exception is being implemented under capitalism—certain aspects in one country, other aspects in another. Again, what the author fails to understand is precisely the fundamental conditions necessary for the implementation of democracy in general!

The same applies to the question of divorce. The reader will recall that it was first posed by Rosa Luxemburg in the discussion on the *national* question. She expressed the perfectly justified opinion that if we uphold autonomy within a state (for a definite region, area, etc.), we must, as centralist Social-Democrats, insist that all major national issues —and *divorce* legislation is one of them—should come within the jurisdiction of the central government and central parliament. This example clearly demonstrates that one cannot be a democrat and socialist without demanding full freedom of divorce now, because the lack of such freedom is additional oppression of the oppressed sex—though it should not be difficult to realise that recognition of the *freedom* to leave one's husband is not an *invitation* to all wives to do so!

P. Kievsky "objects":

"What would this right [of divorce] be like if in *such* cases [when the wife *wants* to leave the husband] she could *not* exercise her right? Or if its exercise depended on the will of *third* parties, or, worse still, on the will of claimants to her affections? Would we advocate the proclamation of *such* a right? Of course not!"

That objection reveals complete failure to understand the relation between democracy *in general* and capitalism. The conditions that make it impossible for the oppressed classes to "exercise" their democratic rights are not the exception under capitalism; they are typical of the system. In most cases the right of divorce will remain unrealisable under capitalism, for the oppressed sex is subjugated economically. No matter how much democracy there is under capitalism, the woman remains a "domestic slave", a slave locked up in the bedroom, nursery, kitchen. The right to

elect their "own" people's judges, officials, school-teachers, jurymen, etc., is likewise in most cases unrealisable under capitalism precisely because of the economic subjection of the workers and peasants. The same applies to the democratic republic: our programme defines it as "government by the people", though all Social-Democrats know perfectly well that under capitalism, even in the most democratic republic, there is bound to be bribery of officials by the bourgeoisie and an alliance of stock exchange and the government.

Only those who cannot think straight or have no knowledge of Marxism will conclude: so there is no point in having a republic, no point in freedom of divorce, no point in democracy, no point in self-determination of nations! But Marxists know that democracy does *not* abolish class oppression. It only makes the class struggle more direct, wider, more open and pronounced, and that is what we need. The fuller the freedom of divorce, the clearer will women see that the source of their "domestic slavery" is capitalism, not lack of rights. The more democratic the system of government, the clearer will the workers see that the root evil is capitalism, not lack of rights. The fuller national equality (and it is *not* complete without freedom of secession), the clearer will the workers of the oppressed nations see that the cause of their oppression is capitalism, not lack of rights, etc.

It must be said again and again: It is embarrassing to have to drive home the ABC of Marxism, but what is one to do if Kievsky does not know it?

He discusses divorce in much the same way as one of the secretaries of the Organising Committee abroad, Semkovsky, discussed it, if I remember rightly, in the Paris *Golos*.[31] His line of reasoning was that freedom of divorce is not, it is true, an invitation to all wives to leave their husbands, but if it is proved that all other husbands are better than yours, madame, then it amounts to one and the same thing!!

In taking that line of argument Semkovsky forgot that crank thinking is not a violation of socialist or democratic principles. If Semkovsky were to tell a woman that all other husbands were better than hers, no one would regard this as violation of democratic principles. At most people would

say: There are bound to be big cranks in a big party! But if Semkovsky were to take it into his head to defend as a democrat a person who opposed freedom of divorce and appealed to the courts, the police or the church to prevent his wife leaving him, we feel sure that *even* most of Semkovsky's colleagues on the Secretariat Abroad, though they are sorry socialists, would refuse to support him!

Both Semkovsky and Kievsky, in their "discussion" of divorce, fail to understand the issue and avoid its substance, namely, that under capitalism the right of divorce, as *all* other democratic rights without exception, is conditional, restricted, formal, narrow and extremely difficult of realisation. Yet no self-respecting Social-Democrat will consider anyone opposing the right of divorce a democrat, let alone a socialist. That is the crux of the matter. *All* "democracy" consists in the proclamation and realisation of "rights" which under capitalism are realisable only to a very small degree and only relatively. But without the proclamation of these rights, without a struggle to introduce them now, immediately, without training the masses in the spirit of this struggle, socialism is *impossible*.

Having failed to understand that, Kievsky bypasses the central question, that belongs to his special subject, namely, *how* will we Social-Democrats abolish national oppression? He shunts the question aside with phrases about the world being "drenched in blood", etc. (though this has no bearing on the matter under discussion). This leaves only one single argument: the socialist revolution will solve everything. Or, the argument sometimes advanced by people who share his views: self-determination is impossible under capitalism and superfluous under socialism.

From the theoretical standpoint that view is nonsensical; from the practical political standpoint it is chauvinistic. It fails to appreciate the significance of democracy. For socialism is impossible without democracy because: (1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy; (2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy. To claim that self-determination is superfluous under socialism is therefore just as nonsensical

and just as hopelessly confusing as to claim that democracy is superfluous under socialism.

Self-determination is *no more* impossible under capitalism, and *just* as superfluous under socialism, as democracy generally.

The economic revolution will create the necessary prerequisites for eliminating *all* types of political oppression. Precisely for that reason it is illogical and incorrect to reduce everything to the economic revolution, for the question is: *how* to eliminate national oppression? It cannot be eliminated without an economic revolution. That is incontestable. But to *limit* ourselves to this is to lapse into absurd and wretched imperialist Economism.

We must carry out national *equality*; proclaim, formulate and implement equal "rights" for all nations. *Everyone* agrees with that save, perhaps, P. Kievsky. But this poses a question which Kievsky avoids: is not negation of the *right* to form a national state negation of equality?

Of course it is. And consistent, i.e., socialist, democrats, proclaim, formulate and will implement this right, without which there is no path to complete, voluntary rapprochement and merging of nations.

7. CONCLUSION. ALEXINSKY METHODS

We have analysed only a fraction of P. Kievsky's arguments. To analyse *all* of them would require an article five times the length of this one, for there is not a single correct view in the whole of what Kievsky has to say. What is *correct*—if there are no mistakes in the figures—is the footnote data on banks. All the rest is an impossible tangle of confusion peppered with phrases like "driving a stake into the quivering body", "we shall not only judge the conquering heroes, but condemn them to death and elimination", "the new world will be born in agonising convulsions", "the question will not be one of granting charters and rights, nor of proclaiming the freedom of the nations, but of establishing genuinely free relationships, destroying age-old slavery and social oppression in general, and national oppression in particular", and so on and so forth.

These phrases are, at one and the same time, the cover and expression of two things: first, their underlying "idea" is *imperialist Economism*, which is just as ugly a caricature of Marxism, and just as complete a misinterpretation of the relationship between socialism and democracy, as was the late and unlamented Economism of 1894-1902.

Second, we have in these phrases a repetition of Alexinsky methods. This should be especially emphasised, for a whole section of Kievsky's article (Chapter II, § f, "The Special Position of the Jews") is based *exclusively* on these methods.

At the 1907 London Congress the Bolsheviks would dissociate themselves from Alexinsky when, in reply to theoretical arguments, he would pose as an agitator and resort to high-falutin, but entirely irrelevant, phrases against one or another type of exploitation and oppression. "He's begun his shouting again," our delegates would say. And the "shouting" did not do Alexinsky any good.

There is the same kind of "shouting" in Kievsky's article. He has no reply to the theoretical questions and arguments expounded in the theses. Instead, he poses as an agitator and begins shouting about the oppression of the Jews, though every thinking person will realise that his shouting, and the Jewish question in general, have no relation whatever to the subject under discussion.

Alexinsky methods can lead to no good.

Written August-October 1916

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Signed: *V. Lenin*

Published according to the manuscript, verified with the typewritten copy containing Lenin's corrections

THE MILITARY PROGRAMME OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION[32]

Among the Dutch, Scandinavian and Swiss revolutionary Social-Democrats who are combating the social-chauvinist lies about "defence of the fatherland" in the present imperialist war, there have been voices in favour of replacing the old Social-Democratic minimum-programme demand for a "militia", or "the armed nation", by a new demand: "disarmament". The *Jugend-Internationale*[33] has inaugurated a discussion on this issue and published, in No. 3, an editorial supporting disarmament. There is also, we regret to note, a concession to the "disarmament" idea in R. Grimm's latest theses.[34] Discussions have been started in the periodicals *Neues Leben*[35] and *Vorbote*.

Let us take a closer look at the position of the disarmament advocates.

I

Their principal argument is that the disarmament demand is the clearest, most decisive, most consistent expression of the struggle against all militarism and against all war.

But in this principal argument lies the disarmament advocates' principal error. Socialists cannot, without ceasing to be socialists, be opposed to all war.

Firstly, socialists have never been, nor can they ever be, opposed to revolutionary wars. The bourgeoisie of the imperialist "Great" Powers has become thoroughly reactionary, and the war *this* bourgeoisie is now waging we regard as a reactionary, slave-owners' and criminal war. But what about a war *against* this bourgeoisie? A war, for instance, waged by peoples oppressed by and dependent upon this

bourgeoisie, or by colonial peoples, for liberation. In § 5 of the *Internationale* group theses we read: "National wars are no longer possible in the era of this unbridled imperialism." That is obviously wrong.

The history of the twentieth century, this century of "unbridled imperialism", is replete with colonial wars. But what we Europeans, the imperialist oppressors of the majority of the world's peoples, with our habitual, despicable European chauvinism, call "colonial wars" are often national wars, or national rebellions of these oppressed peoples. One of the main features of imperialism is that it accelerates capitalist development in the most backward countries, and thereby extends and intensifies the struggle against national oppression. That is a fact, and from it inevitably follows that imperialism must often give rise to national wars. *Junius*, who defends the above-quoted "theses" in her pamphlet, says that in the imperialist era every national war against an imperialist Great Power leads to the intervention of a rival imperialist Great Power. Every national war is thus turned into an imperialist war. But that argument is wrong too. This *can* happen, but does not always happen. Many colonial wars between 1900 and 1914 did not follow that course. And it would be simply ridiculous to declare, for instance, that after the present war, if it ends in the utter exhaustion of all the belligerents, "there can be no" national, progressive, revolutionary wars "of any kind", waged, say, by China in alliance with India, Persia, Siam, etc., against the Great Powers.

To deny all possibility of national wars under imperialism is wrong in theory, obviously mistaken historically, and tantamount to European chauvinism in practice: we who belong to nations that oppress hundreds of millions in Europe, Africa, Asia, etc., are invited to tell the oppressed peoples that it is "impossible" for them to wage war against "our" nations!

Secondly, civil war is just as much a war as any other. He who accepts the class struggle cannot fail to accept civil wars, which in every class society are the natural, and under certain conditions inevitable, continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. That has been confirmed by every great revolution. To repudiate

civil war, or to forget about it, is to fall into extreme opportunism and renounce the socialist revolution.

Thirdly, the victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general. On the contrary, it presupposes wars. The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in different countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously *in all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois. This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state's victorious proletariat. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie. Engels was perfectly right when, in his letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882, he clearly stated that it was possible for *already victorious* socialism to wage "defensive wars". What he had in mind was defence of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries.

Only after we have overthrown, finally vanquished and expropriated the bourgeoisie of the whole world, and not merely of one country, will wars become impossible. And from a scientific point of view it would be utterly wrong—and utterly unrevolutionary—for us to evade or gloss over the most important thing: crushing the resistance of the bourgeoisie—the most difficult task, and one demanding the greatest amount of fighting in the *transition* to socialism. The "social" parsons and opportunists are always ready to build dreams of future peaceful socialism. But the very thing that distinguishes them from revolutionary Social-Democrats is that they refuse to think about and reflect on the fierce class struggle and class *wars* needed to achieve that beautiful future.

We must not allow ourselves to be led astray by words. The term "defence of the fatherland", for instance, is hateful to many because both avowed opportunists and Kautskyites use it to cover up and gloss over the bourgeois lie about the *present* predatory war. This is a fact. But it does not follow that we must no longer see through to the meaning

of political slogans. To accept "defence of the fatherland" in the present war is no more nor less than to accept it as a "just" war, a war in the interests of the proletariat—no more nor less, we repeat, because invasions may occur in any war. It would be sheer folly to repudiate "defence of the fatherland" *on the part* of oppressed nations in their wars *against* the imperialist Great Powers, or on the part of a victorious proletariat in *its* war against some Galliffet of a bourgeois state.

Theoretically, it would be absolutely wrong to forget that every war is but the continuation of policy by other means. The present imperialist war is the continuation of the imperialist policies of two groups of Great Powers, and those policies were engendered and fostered by the sum total of the relationships of the imperialist era. But this very era must also necessarily engender and foster policies of struggle against national oppression and of proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and, consequently, also the possibility and inevitability, first, of revolutionary national rebellions and wars; second, of proletarian wars and rebellions *against* the bourgeoisie; and, third, of a combination of both kinds of revolutionary war, etc.

II

To this must be added the following general consideration.

An oppressed class which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, only deserves to be treated like slaves. We cannot, unless we have become bourgeois pacifists or opportunists, forget that we are living in a class society from which there is no way out, nor can there be, save through the class struggle. In every class society, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at present, on wage-labour, the oppressor class is always armed. Not only the modern standing army, but even the modern militia—and even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, Switzerland, for instance—represent the bourgeoisie armed *against* the proletariat. That is such an elementary truth that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it. Suffice it to point to the use of troops against strikers in all capitalist countries.

A bourgeoisie armed against the proletariat is one of the

biggest, fundamental and cardinal facts of modern capitalist society. And in face of this fact, revolutionary Social-Democrats are urged to "demand" "disarmament"! That is tantamount to complete abandonment of the class-struggle point of view, to renunciation of all thought of revolution. Our slogan must be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie. These are the only tactics possible for a revolutionary class, tactics that follow logically from, and are dictated by, the whole *objective development* of capitalist militarism. Only *after* the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historic mission, to consign all armaments to the scrap-heap. And the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but *only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.*

If the present war rouses among the reactionary Christian socialists, among the whimpering petty bourgeoisie, *only* horror and fright, only aversion to all use of arms, to bloodshed, death, etc., then we must say: Capitalist society is and has always been *horror without end.* If this most reactionary of all wars is now preparing for that society an *end in horror*, we have no reason to fall into despair. But the disarmament "demand", or more correctly, the dream of disarmament, is, objectively, nothing but an expression of despair at a time when, as everyone can see, the bourgeoisie itself is paving the way for the only legitimate and revolutionary war—civil war against the imperialist bourgeoisie.

A lifeless theory, some might say, but we would remind them of two world-historical facts: the role of the trusts and the employment of women in industry, on the one hand, and the Paris Commune of 1871 and the December 1905 uprising in Russia, on the other.

The bourgeoisie makes it its business to promote trusts, drive women and children into the factories, subject them to corruption and suffering, condemn them to extreme poverty. We do not "demand" such development, we do not "support" it. We fight it. But *how* do we fight? We explain that trusts and the employment of women in industry are progressive. We do not want a return to the handicraft system, pre-monopoly capitalism, domestic drudgery for women. Forward through the trusts, etc., and beyond them to socialism!

With the necessary changes that argument is applicable also to the present militarisation of the population. Today the imperialist bourgeoisie militarises the youth as well as the adults; tomorrow, it may begin militarising the women. Our attitude should be: All the better! Full speed ahead! For the faster we move, the nearer shall we be to the armed uprising against capitalism. How can Social-Democrats give way to fear of the militarisation of the youth, etc., if they have not forgotten the example of the Paris Commune? This is not a "lifeless theory" or a dream. It is a fact. And it would be a sorry state of affairs indeed if, all the economic and political facts notwithstanding, Social-Democrats began to doubt that the imperialist era and imperialist wars must inevitably bring about a repetition of such facts.

A certain bourgeois observer of the Paris Commune, writing to an English newspaper in May 1871, said: "If the French nation consisted entirely of women, what a terrible nation it would be!" Women and teen-age children fought in the Paris Commune side by side with the men. It will be no different in the coming battles for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Proletarian women will not look on passively as poorly armed or unarmed workers are shot down by the well-armed forces of the bourgeoisie. They will take to arms, as they did in 1871, and from the cowed nations of today—or more correctly, from the present-day labour movement, disorganised more by the opportunists than by the governments—there will undoubtedly arise, sooner or later, but with absolute certainty, an international league of the "terrible nations" of the revolutionary proletariat.

The whole of social life is now being militarised. Imperialism is a fierce struggle of the Great Powers for the division and redivision of the world. It is therefore bound to lead to further militarisation in all countries, even in neutral and small ones. How will proletarian women oppose this? Only by cursing all war and everything military, only by demanding disarmament? The women of an oppressed and really revolutionary class will never accept that shameful role. They will say to their sons: "You will soon be grown up. You will be given a gun. Take it and learn the military art properly. The proletarians need this knowledge not to shoot your brothers, the workers of other countries, as is being done in the

present war, and as the traitors to socialism are telling you to do. They need it to fight the bourgeoisie of their own country, to put an end to exploitation, poverty and war, and not by pious wishes, but by defeating and disarming the bourgeoisie."

If we are to shun such propaganda, precisely such propaganda, in connection with the present war, then we had better stop using fine words about international revolutionary Social-Democracy, the socialist revolution and war against war.

III

The disarmament advocates object to the ''armed nation" clause in the programme also because it more easily leads, they allege, to concessions to opportunism. The cardinal point, namely, the relation of disarmament to the class struggle and to the social revolution, we have examined above. We shall now examine the relation between the disarmament demand and opportunism. One of the chief reasons why it is unacceptable is precisely that, together with the illusions it creates, it inevitably weakens and devitalises our struggle against opportunism.

Undoubtedly, this struggle is the main, immediate question now confronting the International. Struggle against imperialism that is not closely linked with the struggle against opportunism is either an empty phrase or a fraud. One of the main defects of Zimmerwald and Kienthal[36]—one of the main reasons why these embryos of the Third International may possibly end in a fiasco—is that the question of fighting opportunism was not even raised openly, let alone solved in the sense of proclaiming the need to break with the opportunists. Opportunism has triumphed—temporarily—in the European labour movement. Its two main shades are apparent in all the big countries: first, the avowed, cynical, and therefore less dangerous social-imperialism of Messrs. Plekhanov, Scheidemann, Legien, Albert Thomas and Sembat, Vandervelde, Hyndman, Henderson, et al.; second, the concealed, Kautskyite opportunism: Kautsky-Haase and the Social-Democratic Labour Group in Germany[37]; Longuet, Pressemane, Mayéras, et al., in France; Ramsay MacDonald and the other leaders of the Independent Labour

Party in England; Martov, Chkheidze, et al., in Russia; Treves and the other so-called Left reformists in Italy.

Avowed opportunism is openly and directly opposed to revolution and to incipient revolutionary movements and outbursts. It is in direct alliance with the governments, varied as the forms of this alliance may be—from accepting ministerial posts to participation in the war industries committees (in Russia).[38] The masked opportunists, the Kautskyites, are much more harmful and dangerous to the labour movement, because they hide their advocacy of alliance with the former under a cloak of plausible, pseudo-"Marxist" catchwords and pacifist slogans. The fight against both these forms of prevailing opportunism must be conducted in *all* fields of proletarian politics: parliament, the trade unions, strikes, the armed forces, etc. The main distinguishing feature of *both* these forms of prevailing opportunism is that the concrete question of the *connection between the present war and revolution*, *and the other concrete questions of revolution*, are hushed up, concealed, or treated with an eye to police prohibitions. And this despite the fact that before the war the connection between *this* impending war and the proletarian revolution was emphasised innumerable times, both unofficially, and officially in the Basle Manifesto.[39] The main defect of the disarmament demand is its evasion of all the concrete questions of revolution. Or do the advocates of disarmament stand for an altogether new kind of revolution, unarmed revolution?

To proceed. We are by no means opposed to the fight for reforms. And we do not wish to ignore the sad possibility—if the worst comes to the worst—of mankind going through a second imperialist war, if revolution does not come out of the present war, in spite of the numerous outbursts of mass unrest and mass discontent and in spite of our efforts. We favour a programme of reforms directed *also* against the opportunists. They would be only too glad if we left the struggle for reforms entirely to them and sought escape from sad reality in a nebulous "disarmament" fantasy. "Disarmament" means simply running away from unpleasant reality, not fighting it.

In such a programme we would say something like this: "To accept the defence of the fatherland slogan in the 1914-16

imperialist war is to corrupt the labour movement with the aid of a bourgeois lie." Such a concrete reply to a concrete question would be more correct theoretically, much more useful to the proletariat and more unbearable to the opportunists, than the disarmament demand and repudiation of "all and any" defence of the fatherland. And we could add: "The bourgeoisie of all the imperialist Great Powers—England, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, Japan, the United States—has become so reactionary and so intent on world domination, that *any* war waged by *the bourgeoisie of those* countries is bound to be reactionary. The proletariat must not only oppose all such wars, but must also wish for the defeat of its 'own' government in such wars and utilise its defeat for revolutionary insurrection, if an insurrection to prevent the war proves unsuccessful."

On the question of a militia, we should say: We are not in favour of a bourgeois militia; we are in favour only of a proletarian militia. Therefore, "not a penny, not a man", not only for a standing army, but even for a bourgeois militia, even in countries like the United States, or Switzerland, Norway, etc. The more so that in the freest republican countries (e.g., Switzerland) we see that the militia is being increasingly Prussianised, particularly in 1907 and 1911, and prostituted by being used against strikers. We can demand popular election of officers, abolition of all military law, equal rights for foreign and native-born workers (a point particularly important for those imperialist states which, like Switzerland, are more and more blatantly exploiting larger numbers of foreign workers, while denying them all rights). Further, we can demand the right of every hundred, say, inhabitants of a given country to form voluntary military-training associations, with free election of instructors paid by the state, etc. Only under these conditions could the proletariat acquire military training for *itself* and not for its slave-owners; and the need for such training is imperatively dictated by the interests of the proletariat. The Russian revolution showed that every success of the revolutionary movement, even a partial success like the seizure of a certain city, a certain factory town, or winning over a certain section of the army, inevitably *compels* the victorious proletariat to carry out just such a programme.

Lastly, it stands to reason that opportunism can never be defeated by mere programmes; it can only be defeated by deeds. The greatest, and fatal, error of the bankrupt Second International was that its words did not correspond to its deeds, that it cultivated the habit of hypocritical and unscrupulous revolutionary phrase-mongering (note the present attitude of Kautsky and Co. towards the Basle Manifesto). Disarmament as a social idea, i.e., an idea that springs from, and can affect, a certain social environment, and is not the invention of some crackpot, springs, evidently, from the peculiar "tranquil" conditions prevailing, by way of exception, in certain small states, which have for a fairly long time stood aside from the world's path of war and bloodshed, and hope to remain that way. To be convinced of this, we have only to consider the arguments advanced, for instance, by the Norwegian advocates of disarmament. "We are a small country," they say. "Our army is small; there is nothing we can do against the Great Powers [and, consequently, nothing we can do to resist forcible involvement in an imperialist *alliance* with one or the other Great-Power group].... We want to be left in peace in our backwoods and continue our backwoods politics, demand disarmament, compulsory arbitration, permanent neutrality, etc." ("permanent" after the Belgian fashion, no doubt?).

The petty striving of petty states to hold aloof, the petty-bourgeois desire to keep as far away as possible from the great battles of world history, to take advantage of one's relatively monopolistic position in order to remain in hidebound passivity—this is the *objective* social environment which may ensure the disarmament idea a certain degree of success and a certain degree of popularity in some of the small states. That striving is, of course, reactionary and is based entirely on illusions, for, in one way or another, imperialism draws the small states into the vortex of world economy and world politics.

In Switzerland, for instance, the imperialist environment objectively prescribes *two* courses to the labour movement: the opportunists, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, are seeking to turn the country into a republican-democratic monopolistic federation that would thrive on profits from imperialist bourgeois tourists, and to make this "tranquil"

monopolistic position as profitable and as tranquil as possible.

The genuine Swiss Social-Democrats are striving to use Switzerland's relative freedom and her "international" position to help the victory of the close alliance of the revolutionary elements in the European workers' parties. Switzerland, thank God, does not have "a separate language of her own", but uses three world languages, the three languages spoken in the adjacent belligerent countries.

If twenty thousand Swiss party members were to pay a weekly levy of two centimes as a sort of "extra war tax", we would have twenty thousand francs per annum, a sum more than sufficient periodically to publish in three languages and distribute among the workers and soldiers of the belligerent countries—in spite of the bans imposed by the general staffs—all the truthful evidence about the incipient revolt of the workers, their fraternising in the trenches, their hope that the weapons will be used for revolutionary struggle against the imperialist bourgeoisie of their "own" countries, etc.

That is not new. It is being done by the best papers, like *La Sentinelle*, *Volksrecht* and the *Berner Tagwacht*,[40] although, unfortunately, on an inadequate scale. Only through such activity can the splendid decision of the Aarau Party Congress[41] become something more than merely a splendid decision.

The question that interests us now is: Does the disarmament demand correspond to this revolutionary trend among the Swiss Social-Democrats? It obviously does not. Objectively, disarmament is an extremely national, a specifically national programme of small states. It is certainly not the international programme of international revolutionary Social-Democracy.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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LOST IN A WOOD OF THREE TREES

The first issue of the Bund *Bulletin*[42] (September 1916) contains a letter from a St. Petersburg Bundist dated February 26, 1916. He writes:

"Our difficulty in accepting the defence formula is greatly aggravated by the fact that we, of all people, cannot hush up the Polish question, as our Russian comrades have so far been doing." (Don't forget that this gentleman's "comrades" are Potresov[43] and Co.) "And the fact that even the defencists among us do not want to apply the "no annexations" formula in relation to Russia is a strong argument against defence in the eyes of those who are not at present prepared to accept it psychologically. For they ask, ironically: What are you defending? The idea of an independent Poland enjoys recognition in top circles" (which circles is not clear).

When we stated, in our 1915 resolution, that Germanophile chauvinism predominates in the Bund,* the only reply Kosovsky and Co. could give was abuse. Now our statement is corroborated in their own journal, and by their own party colleague! For, if the Bund "defencists" do not wish to apply the "no annexations" formula "in relation to *Russia*" (note that there is not a word about Germany!), then how does this differ, in substance, from Germanophile chauvinism?

If the Bundists wanted to think, and could do so, they would realise that on the question of annexations they are wandering in the dark. There is only one way out of their wanderings and confusion: accept the programme we expounded as early as 1913.** Namely, that a conscientious and

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 163-64.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 539-45.—*Ed.*

forthright anti-annexation policy requires that socialists and democrats of the oppressed nations, in all their propaganda and agitation, denounce as scoundrels those socialists of the oppressor nations (whether Great Russians or Germans, Poles in relation to the Ukrainians, etc.) who do not consistently and unreservedly stand for free secession of nations oppressed *by their own nation* (or forcibly held by it).

If the Bundists refuse to accept that conclusion, then it is *only* out of reluctance to quarrel with the Potresovs in Russia, the Legiens, Südekums, even the Ledebours (Ledebour does *not* favour the secession of Alsace-Lorraine) in Germany, with the nationalists, or to be more correct, the social-chauvinists, in Poland, etc.

What a valid reason!

Written September-October 1916

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GREETINGS TO THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS[44]

Dear Comrades,

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, I convey greetings to the Congress of the Italian Socialist Party and wish it every success in its work.

Yours is the *first* socialist party to do what all socialist parties of the warring countries could and should have done, had they not betrayed socialism and sided with the bourgeoisie, namely: convene a congress or conference in a free country, beyond the reach of their "native" military censorship and military authorities, in a country where the socialist attitude towards the war can be freely expressed and discussed. Permit me to express the hope that your Congress—free of patriotic muzzles—will accomplish as much or even more than your party has already accomplished in the struggle against the betrayal of socialism by nearly all the European socialist parties.

Representatives of our two parties worked together at Zimmerwald and Kienthal. The only serious difference dividing us was over the inevitability and necessity of breaking with the social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in words and chauvinists in deeds, namely, with all those who advocate or seek to justify "defence of the fatherland" in the present imperialist war, who directly or indirectly support their "own" government and their "own" bourgeoisie in this reactionary, predatory war for division of colonies and world domination. We believe that a break with the social-chauvinists is historically inevitable and necessary if the proletariat's revolutionary struggle for socialism is to be sincere,

and not confined merely to verbal protests. Your party's representatives believed there was still hope that proletarian victory over the social-chauvinists ("*sciovinisti*") could be achieved *without* a break.

We would like to hope that developments in world socialism will increasingly remove the grounds for this difference between us.

On the one hand, the workers' movement is increasingly developing towards a *factual* division into adherents and opponents of "defence of the fatherland" in this imperialist war and in subsequent imperialist wars, which are being prepared and instigated by the entire policy of all the modern so-called "Great" Powers. This applies to the whole world, not only to the belligerent countries, but also to the chief neutral powers—the United States of America, for instance, the foremost capitalist country.

On the other hand, we read with especial pleasure an editorial in a recent issue of *Avanti!*, the Central Organ of the Socialist Party, "La chiusura della conferenza socialista tedesca".* This Conference of the German Socialist Party was one of the most outstanding events in world socialism in recent months, for at it there clashed *three* principal trends not only in German, but in *world* socialism: first, avowed social-chauvinism represented by Legien, David and Co. in Germany, Plekhanov, Potresov, Chkhenkeli in Russia, Renaudel and Sembat in France, Bissolati and his party in Italy; second, the Haase-Kautsky trend which subscribes to the basic idea of social-chauvinism, namely, "defence of the fatherland" in the present war, and seeks to reconcile this idea with genuine socialism and internationalism; and, third, the genuine socialist and internationalist trend represented by the *Internationale* group and international socialists in Germany.[45]

Evaluating these three trends, *Avanti!* (No. 269, September 27, 1916) wrote in the above-mentioned editorial:

"...il proletariato tedesco finirà indubbiamente per trionfare contro i Legien, gli Ebert ed i David, che hanno preteso di compromettere la sua azione di classe nei tristi pattegiameni coi Bethmann-Hollweg e gli altri fautori della guerra. Di questo noi abbiamo la più schietta certezza."

* "Conclusion of the German Socialist Conference".—*Ed.*

Noi abbiamo la medesima certezza.

"Piuttosto"—continues *Avanti!*—"la conferenza dei socialisti tedeschi ci lascia incerti circa l'atteggiamento prossimo di una parte della opposizione, quella che ebbe per esponente principale l'Haase".

"Il gruppo 'Internazionale' con Liebknecht, con Mehring, con Clara Zetkin, con Rosa Luxemburg—con tutti gli altri 'sabotatori e traditori della patria' è perfettamente a posto."

..."*Meno conseguente ci è parso Haase*".*

And *Avanti!* explains what it considers to be the "inconsistency" of Haase and his group, which we in our press call the *Kautsky* trend in world socialism,

"*essi non accettano le logiche e naturali conseguenze cui sono giunti Liebknecht e compagni*".**

So writes *Avanti!*

We whole-heartedly welcome these statements of *Avanti!* We feel sure that the *Vorwärts*, Central Organ of the German Social-Democrats and chief organ of the Kautsky trend, is wrong when it writes, in its issue of October 7, 1916, in connection with this *Avanti!* statement,

"dass der *Avanti!* über die Parteiverhältnisse und Parteivorgänge in Deutschland *nicht ganz zutreffend informiert ist*".***

We feel sure that *Avanti!* is "ganz zutreffend"**** informed. That it considers the Haase group wrong and the Liebknecht group right is no accident. We therefore hope that, by its defence of Liebknecht's principles and tactics, the

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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* "Undoubtedly the German proletariat will, in the end, triumph over the Legiens, Eberts and Davids, who have sought to compromise its class struggle by wretched deals with the Bethmann-Hollwegs and other supporters of the war. We are fully convinced of that."

We, too, are convinced of that.

"Nevertheless," *Avanti!* continues, "the German Socialist Conference provides no indication of the future conduct of that section of the opposition of which Haase is the chief representative."

"The *Internationale* group of Liebknecht, Mehring, Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg—together with all the other 'saboteurs and traitors to the fatherland'—unfailingly remain at their posts."

"*Haase appears to us to be less consistent.*"—*Ed.*

** 'they do not accept the logical and natural conclusions drawn by Liebknecht and his comrades".—*Ed.*

*** "that *Avanti! is not quite correctly informed* about the affairs of and relations within the party in Germany".—*Ed.*

**** "quite correctly".—*Ed.*

Italian Socialist Party will occupy an outstanding place in international socialism.

Our Party finds itself in incomparably more difficult conditions than the Italian party. Our entire press has been clamped down. But even in emigration we have been able to assist our comrades' struggle in Russia. Two facts prove that our Party's anti-war struggle in Russia is the struggle of truly front-rank *workers* and the *masses* of workers. Firstly, our Party's deputies in the Duma—Petrovsky, Shagov, Badayev, Samoilov and Muranov—elected by the workers of the leading industrial gubernias, have been exiled to Siberia by the tsarist government for revolutionary propaganda against the war.[46] Secondly, long after their exile, the front-rank workers in St. Petersburg belonging to our Party categorically rejected participation in the war industries committees.

A conference of Entente socialists[47] is being convened in January 1917. We have already had one experience of participation in such a conference in London. Our representative was denied the floor the moment he dared tell the truth about the European socialists' betrayal.[48] We therefore consider that only the Bissolatis, Plekhanovs, Sembats and *tutti quanti* should share in these conferences. For that reason we do not intend to attend the conference, and we shall address a letter to the European workers exposing the social-chauvinists' deception of the people.

I once again convey greetings to the Congress of the Italian Socialist Party and best wishes for its success.

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THE "DISARMAMENT" SLOGAN

In a number of countries, mostly small and not involved in the present war—Sweden, Norway, Holland and Switzerland, for example—there have been voices in favour of replacing the old Social-Democratic minimum-programme demand for a "militia", or the "armed nation" by a new demand: "disarmament". An editorial article in favour of disarmament appeared in No. 3 of *Jugend-Internationale* (The Youth International), organ of the international youth organisation. In R. Grimm's "theses" on the military question drawn up for the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Congress we find a concession to the "disarmament" idea. In the Swiss magazine *Neues Leben* (New Life) for 1915, Roland-Holst, while ostensibly advocating "conciliation" between the two demands, actually makes the same concession. Issue No. 2 of *Vorbote* (The Herald), organ of the International Left, carried an article by the Dutch Marxist Wijnkoop in defence of the old armed-nation demand. The Scandinavian Lefts, as is evident from the articles printed below, accept "disarmament", though at times they admit that it contains an element of pacifism."[49]

Let us take a closer look at the position of the disarmament advocates.

I

One of the principal premises advanced, although not always definitely expressed, in favour of disarmament is this: we are opposed to war, to all war in general, and the demand for disarmament is the most definite, clear and unambiguous expression of this point of view.

We showed the fallacy of that idea in our review of Junius's pamphlet, to which we refer the reader.* Socialists cannot be opposed to all war in general without ceasing to be socialists. We must not allow ourselves to be blinded by the present imperialist war. Such wars between "Great" Powers are typical of the imperialist epoch; but democratic wars and rebellions, for instance, of oppressed nations against their oppressors to free themselves from oppression, are by no means impossible. Civil wars of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for socialism are inevitable. Wars are possible between one country in which socialism has been victorious and other, bourgeois or reactionary, countries.

Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. There will be no wars in socialist society; consequently, disarmament will be achieved But whoever expects that socialism will be achieved *without* a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a socialist. Dictatorship is state power based directly on *violence*. And in the twentieth century—as in the age of civilisation generally—violence means neither a fist nor a club, but *troops*. To put "disarmament" in the programme is tantamount to making the general declaration: We are opposed to the use of arms. There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say: We are opposed to violence!

It should be observed that the international discussion of this question was conducted mainly, if not exclusively, in the German language. The Germans, however, use two words, the difference between which is not easily rendered in Russian. One, strictly speaking, means "disarmament",** and is used by Kautsky and the Kautskyites, for instance, in the sense of reduction of armaments. The other, strictly speaking, means "disarming",*** and is used mainly by the Lefts in the sense of abolishing militarism, abolishing all militarist systems. In this article we speak of the *latter* demand, which is current among certain *revolutionary* Social-Democrats.

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19.—*Ed.*

** Abrüstung.—*Ed.*

*** Entwaffnung.—*Ed.*

The Kautskyite advocacy of "disarmament", which is addressed to the present governments of the imperialist Great Powers, is the most vulgar opportunism, it is bourgeois pacifism, which *actually*—in spite of the "good intentions" of the sentimental Kautskyites—serves to distract the workers from the revolutionary struggle. For this advocacy seeks to instil in the workers the idea that the present bourgeois governments of the imperialist powers are *not* bound to each other by thousands of threads of finance capital and by scores or hundreds of corresponding *secret treaties* (i.e., predatory, plundering treaties, preparing the way for imperialist war).

II

An oppressed class which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, only deserves to be treated like slaves. We cannot, unless we have become bourgeois pacifists or opportunists, forget that we are living in a class society from which there is no way out, nor can there be, save through the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the ruling class.

In every class society, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at present, on wage-labour, the oppressor class is always armed. Not only the modern standing army, but even the modern militia—and even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, Switzerland, for instance—represent the bourgeoisie armed *against* the proletariat. That is such an elementary truth that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it. Suffice it to recall that in all capitalist countries without exception troops (including the republican-democratic militia) are used against strikers. A bourgeoisie armed against the proletariat is one of the biggest, fundamental and cardinal facts of modern capitalist society.

And in face of this fact, revolutionary Social-Democrats are urged to "demand" "disarmament"! That is tantamount to complete abandonment of the class-struggle point of view, to renunciation of all thought of revolution. Our slogan must be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie. These are the only

tactics possible for a revolutionary class, tactics that follow logically from, and are dictated by, the whole *objective development* of capitalist militarism. Only *after* the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historic mission, to consign all armaments to the scrap-heap. And the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.

If the present war arouses among the reactionary Christian socialists, among the whimpering petty bourgeoisie, *only* horror and fright, only aversion to all use of arms, to bloodshed, death, etc., then we must say: Capitalist society is and has always been *horror without end*. And if this most reactionary of all wars is now preparing for that society an *end in horror*, we have no reason to fall into despair. But the disarmament "demand", or more correctly, the dream of disarmament, is, objectively, nothing but an expression of despair at a time when, as everyone can see, the bourgeoisie itself is paving the way for the only legitimate and revolutionary war—civil war against the imperialist bourgeoisie.

A lifeless theory, some might say, but we would remind them of two world-historical facts: the role of the trusts and the employment of women in industry, on the one hand, and the Paris Commune of 1871 and the December 1905 uprising in Russia, on the other.

The bourgeoisie makes it its business to promote trusts, drive women and children into the factories, subject them to corruption and suffering, condemn them to extreme poverty. We do not "demand" such development, we do not "support" it. We fight it. But *how* do we fight? We explain that trusts and the employment of women in industry are progressive. We do not want a return to the handicraft system, pre-monopoly capitalism, domestic drudgery for women. Forward through the trusts, etc., and beyond them to socialism!

That argument takes account of *objective* development and, with the necessary changes, applies also to the present militarisation of the population. Today the imperialist bourgeoisie militarises the youth as well as the adults; tomorrow it may begin militarising the women. Our

attitude should be: All the better! Full speed ahead! For the faster we move, the nearer shall we be to the armed uprising against capitalism. How can Social-Democrats give way to fear of the militarisation of the youth, etc., if they have not forgotten the example of the Paris Commune? This is not a "lifeless theory" or a dream. It is a fact. And it would be a sorry state of affairs indeed if, all the economic and political facts notwithstanding, Social-Democrats began to doubt that the imperialist era and imperialist wars must inevitably bring about a repetition of such facts.

A certain bourgeois observer of the Paris Commune, writing to an English newspaper in May 1871, said: "If the French nation consisted entirely of women, what a terrible nation it would be!" Women and teen-age children fought in the Paris Commune side by side with the men. It will be no different in the coming battles for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Proletarian women will not look on passively as poorly armed or unarmed workers are shot down by the well-armed forces of the bourgeoisie. They will take to arms, as they did in 1871, and from the cowed nations of today—or more correctly, from the present-day labour movement, disorganised more by the opportunists than by the governments—there will undoubtedly arise, sooner or later, but with absolute certainty, an international league of the "terrible nations" of the revolutionary proletariat.

The whole of social life is now being militarised. Imperialism is a fierce struggle of the Great Powers for the division and redivision of the world. It is therefore bound to lead to further militarisation in all countries, even in neutral and small ones. How will proletarian women oppose this? Only by cursing all war and everything military, only by demanding disarmament? The women of an oppressed and really revolutionary class will never accept that shameful role. They will say to their sons:

"You will soon be grown up. You will be given a gun. Take it and learn the military art properly. The proletarians need this knowledge not to shoot your brothers, the workers of other countries, as is being done in the present war, and as the traitors to socialism are telling you to do. They

need it to fight the bourgeoisie of their own country, to put an end to exploitation, poverty and war, and not by pious wishes, but by defeating and disarming the *bourgeoisie.*"

If we are to shun such propaganda, precisely such propaganda, in connection with the present war, then we had better stop using fine words about international revolutionary Social-Democracy, the socialist revolution and war against war.

III

The disarmament advocates object to the "armed nation" clause in the programme also because it more easily leads, they allege, to concessions to opportunism. The cardinal point, namely, the relation of disarmament to the class struggle and to the social revolution, we have examined above. We shall now examine the relation between the disarmament demand and opportunism. One of the chief reasons why it is unacceptable is precisely that, together with the illusions it creates, it inevitably weakens and devitalises our struggle against opportunism.

Undoubtedly, this struggle is the main, immediate question now confronting the International. Struggle against imperialism that is not closely linked with the struggle against opportunism is either an empty phrase or a fraud. One of the main defects of Zimmerwald and Kienthal—one of the main reasons why these embryos of the Third International may possibly end in a fiasco—is that the question of fighting opportunism was not even raised openly, let alone solved in the sense of proclaiming the need to break with the opportunists. Opportunism has triumphed—temporarily—in the European labour movement. Its two main shades are apparent in all the big countries: first, the avowed, cynical, and therefore less dangerous social-imperialism of Messrs. Plekhanov, Scheidemann, Legien, Albert Thomas and Sembat, Vandervelde, Hyndman, Henderson, et al.; second, the concealed, Kautskyite opportunism: Kautsky-Haase and the Social-Democratic Labour Group in Germany; Longuet, Pressemane, Mayéras et al., in France; Ramsay MacDonald and the other leaders of the Independent Labour Party in England; Martov,

Chkheidze, et al., in Russia; Treves and the other so-called Left reformists in Italy.

Avowed opportunism is openly and directly opposed to revolution and to incipient revolutionary movements and outbursts. It is in direct alliance with the governments, varied as the forms of this alliance may be—from accepting ministerial posts to participation in the war industries committees. The masked opportunists, the Kautskyites, are much more harmful and dangerous to the labour movement, because they hide their advocacy of alliance with the former under a cloak of plausible, pseudo-"Marxist" catchwords and pacifist slogans. The fight against both these forms of prevailing opportunism must be conducted in all fields of proletarian politics: parliament, the trade unions, strikes, the armed forces, etc.

What is the main distinguishing feature of *both* these forms of prevailing opportunism?

It is that the concrete question of the *connection between the present war and revolution*, *and the other concrete questions of revolution*, are hushed up, concealed, or treated with an eye to police prohibitions. And this despite the fact that before the war the connection between *this* impending war and the proletarian revolution was emphasised innumerable times, both unofficially, and officially in the Basle Manifesto.

The main defect of the disarmament demand is its evasion of all the concrete questions of revolution. Or do the advocates of disarmament stand for an altogether new kind of revolution, unarmed revolution?

IV

To proceed. We are by no means opposed to the fight for reforms. And we do not wish to ignore the sad possibility—if the worst comes to the worst—of mankind going through a second imperialist war, if revolution does not come out of the present war, in spite of the numerous outbursts of mass unrest and mass discontent and in spite of our efforts. We favour a programme of reforms directed *also* against the opportunists. They would be only too glad if we left the struggle for reforms entirely to them and sought

escape from sad reality in a nebulous "disarmament" fantasy. "Disarmament" means simply running away from unpleasant reality, not fighting it.

Incidentally, certain Lefts fail to give a sufficiently concrete answer on the defence of the fatherland issue, and that is a major defect of their attitude. Theoretically, it is much more correct, and in practice immeasurably more important, to say that in the *present* imperialist war defence of the fatherland is a bourgeois-reactionary deception, than to take a "general" stand against defence of the fatherland under "all" circumstances. That is wrong and, besides, does not "strike" at the opportunists, those direct enemies of the workers in the labour parties.

In working out a concrete and practically necessary answer on the question of a militia we should say: We are not in favour of a bourgeois militia; we are in favour only of a proletarian militia. Therefore, "not a penny, not a man", not only for a standing army, but even for a bourgeois militia, even in countries like the United States, or Switzerland, Norway, etc. The more so that in the freest republican countries (e.g., Switzerland) we see that the militia is being increasingly Prussianised, and prostituted by being used against strikers. We can demand popular election of officers, abolition of all military law, equal rights for foreign and native-born workers (a point particularly important for those imperialist states which, like Switzerland, are more and more blatantly exploiting larger numbers of foreign workers, while denying them all rights). Further, we can demand the right of every hundred, say, inhabitants of a given country to form voluntary military-training associations, with free election of instructors paid by the state, etc. Only under these conditions could the proletariat acquire military training for *itself* and not for its slave-owners; and the need for such training is imperatively dictated by the interests of the proletariat. The Russian revolution showed that every success of the revolutionary movement, even a partial success like the seizure of a certain city, a certain factory town, or winning over a certain section of the army, inevitably *compels* the victorious proletariat to carry out just such a programme.

Lastly, it stands to reason that opportunism can never be defeated by mere programmes; it can only be defeated by deeds. The greatest, and fatal, error of the bankrupt Second International was that its words did not correspond to its deeds, that it cultivated the habit of unscrupulous revolutionary phrase-mongering (note the present attitude of Kautsky and Co. towards the Basle Manifesto). In approaching the demand for disarmament from this aspect we must first of all raise the question of its *objective* significance. Disarmament as a social idea, i.e., an idea that springs from, and can affect, a certain social environment, and is not the invention of some crackpot or group, springs, evidently, from the peculiar "tranquil" conditions prevailing, by way of exception, in certain small states which have for a fairly long time stood aside from the world's path of war and bloodshed, and hope to remain that way. To be convinced of this, we have only to consider the arguments advanced, for instance, by the Norwegian advocates of disarmament. "We are a small country," they say. "Our army is small; there is nothing we can do against the Great Powers (and, consequently, nothing we can do to resist forcible involvement in an imperialist *alliance* with one or the other Great-Power group!). We want to be left in peace in our backwoods and continue our backwoods politics, demand disarmament, compulsory arbitration, permanent neutrality, etc." ("permanent" after the Belgian fashion, no doubt?).

The petty striving of petty states to hold aloof, the petty-bourgeois desire to keep as far away as possible from the great battles of world history, to take advantage of one's relatively monopolistic position in order to remain in hidebound passivity—this is the *objective* social environment which may ensure the disarmament idea a certain degree of success and a certain degree of popularity in some of the small states. That striving is, of course, reactionary and is based entirely on illusions, for, in one way or another, imperialism draws the small states into the vortex of world economy and world politics.

Let us cite the case of Switzerland. Her imperialist environment objectively prescribes *two* courses to the labour movement. The opportunists, in alliance with the

bourgeoisie, are seeking to turn the country into a republican-democratic monopolistic federation that would thrive on profits from imperialist bourgeois tourists, and to make this "tranquil" monopolistic position as profitable and as tranquil as possible. Actually, this is a policy of alliance between a small privileged stratum of the workers of a small privileged country and the bourgeoisie of that country *against* the mass of the proletariat. The genuine Swiss Social-Democrats are striving to use Switzerland's relative freedom, her "international" position (proximity to the most cultured countries, the fact that Switzerland, thank God, does not have "a separate language of her own", but uses three world languages) to extend, consolidate and strengthen the *revolutionary* alliance of the revolutionary elements of the proletariat of the whole of Europe. Let's help our own bourgeoisie retain as long as possible its monopoly of the supertranquil trade in the charms of the Alps; perhaps a penny or two will fall to our share—such is the *objective* content of the Swiss opportunists' policy. Let us help weld the alliance of the revolutionary sections of the French, German and Italian proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie—such is the objective content of the Swiss revolutionary Social-Democrats' policy. Unfortunately, it is still being carried out far from adequately by the Swiss "Lefts", and the splendid decision of the 1915 Aarau Party Congress (acceptance of the revolutionary mass struggle) is still largely a dead letter. But that is not the point we are discussing at the moment.

The question that interests us now is: Does the disarmament demand correspond to this revolutionary trend among the Swiss Social-Democrats? It obviously does not. Objectively, the "demand" for disarmament corresponds to the opportunist, narrow national line of a labour movement, a line that is restricted by the outlook of a small state. Objectively, "disarmament" is an extremely national, specifically national programme of small states; it is certainly not the international programme of international revolutionary Social-Democracy.

P. S. In the last issue of the English *Socialist Reviews*[50] (September 1916), organ of the opportunist Independent Labour Party, we find, on page 287, the resolution of the party's Newcastle Conference—refusal to support any war waged by *any* government even if "nominally" it is a war of "defence". And in an editorial on page 205 of the same issue we read the following declaration: "In no degree do we approve the Sinn Fein rebellion [the Irish Rebellion of 1916]. We do not approve armed rebellion at all, any more than any other form of militarism and war."

Is there any need to prove that *these* "anti-militarists", that *such* advocates of disarmament, not in a small, but in a big country, are the most pernicious opportunists? And yet, theoretically, they are quite right in regarding insurrection as one "form" of militarism and war.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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IMPERIALISM AND THE SPLIT IN SOCIALISM

Is there any connection between imperialism and the monstrous and disgusting victory opportunism (in the form of social-chauvinism) has gained over the labour movement in Europe?

This is the fundamental question of modern socialism. And having in our Party literature fully established, first, the imperialist character of our era and of the present war, and, second, the inseparable historical connection between social-chauvinism and opportunism, as well as the intrinsic similarity of their political ideology, we can and must proceed to analyse this fundamental question.

We have to begin with as precise and full a definition of imperialism as possible. Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is (1) monopoly capitalism; (2) parasitic, or decaying capitalism; (3) moribund capitalism. The supplanting of free competition by monopoly is the fundamental economic feature, the *quintessence* of imperialism. Monopoly manifests itself in five principal forms: (1) cartels, syndicates and trusts—the concentration of production has reached a degree which gives rise to these monopolistic associations of capitalists; (2) the monopolistic position of the big banks—three, four or five giant banks manipulate the whole economic life of America, France, Germany; (3) seizure of the sources of *raw material* by the trusts and the financial oligarchy (finance capital is monopoly industrial capital merged with bank capital); (4) the (economic) partition of the world by the international cartels has *begun*. There are already over *one hundred* such international cartels, which command

the *entire* world market and divide it "amicably" among themselves—until war *re*divides it. The export of capital, as distinct from the export of commodities under non-monopoly capitalism, is a highly characteristic phenomenon and is closely linked with the economic and territorial-political partition of the world; (5) the territorial partition of the world (colonies) *is completed.*

Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism in America and Europe, and later in Asia, took final shape in the period 1898-1914. The Spanish-American War (1898), the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the economic crisis in Europe in 1900 are the chief historical landmarks in the new era of world history.

The fact that imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism is manifested first of all in the tendency to decay, which is characteristic of *every* monopoly under the system of private ownership of the means of production. The difference between the democratic-republican and the reactionary-monarchist imperialist bourgeoisie is obliterated precisely because they are both rotting alive (which by no means precludes an extraordinarily rapid development of capitalism in individual branches of industry, in individual countries, and in individual periods). Secondly, the decay of capitalism is manifested in the creation of a huge stratum of *rentiers*, capitalists who live by "clipping coupons". In each of the four leading imperialist countries—England, U.S.A., France and Germany—capital in securities amounts to 100,000 or 150,000 *million* francs, from which each country derives an annual income of no less than five to eight thousand million. Thirdly, export of capital is parasitism raised to a high pitch. Fourthly, "finance capital strives for domination, not freedom". Political reaction *all along* the line is a characteristic feature of imperialism. Corruption, bribery on a huge scale and all kinds of fraud. Fifthly, the exploitation of oppressed nations—which is inseparably connected with annexations—and especially the exploitation of colonies by a handful of "Great" Powers, increasingly transforms the "civilised" world into a parasite on the body of hundreds of millions in the uncivilised nations. The

Roman proletarian lived at the expense of society. Modern society lives at the expense of the modern proletarian. Marx specially stressed this profound observation of Sismondi.[51] Imperialism somewhat changes the situation. A privileged upper stratum of the proletariat in the imperialist countries lives partly at the expense of hundreds of millions in the uncivilised nations.

It is clear why imperialism is *moribund* capitalism, capitalism in *transition* to socialism: monopoly, which grows *out of* capitalism, is *already* dying capitalism, the beginning of its transition to socialism. The tremendous *socialisation* of labour by imperialism (what its apologists—the bourgeois economists—call "interlocking") produces the same result.

Advancing this definition of imperialism brings us into complete contradiction to K. Kautsky, who refuses to regard imperialism as a "phase of capitalism" and defines it as a *policy* "preferred" by finance capital, a tendency of "industrial" countries to annex "agrarian" countries.* Kautsky's definition is thoroughly false from the theoretical standpoint. What distinguishes imperialism is the rule *not* of industrial capital, but of finance capital, the striving to annex *not* agrarian countries, particularly, but *every kind* of country. Kautsky divorces imperialist politics from imperialist economics, he *divorces* monopoly in politics from monopoly in economics in order to pave the way for his vulgar bourgeois reformism, such as "disarmament", "ultra-imperialism" and similar nonsense. The whole purpose and significance of this theoretical falsity is to obscure the *most profound* contradictions of imperialism and thus justify the theory of "unity" with the apologists of imperialism, the outright social-chauvinists and opportunists.

We have dealt at sufficient length with Kautsky's break with Marxism on this point in *Sotsial-Demokrat* and *Kommunist*.[52] Our Russian Kautskyites, the supporters

* "Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to subjugate and annex ever larger *agrarian* territories, irrespective of the nations that inhabit them" (Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, September 11, 1914).

of the Organising Committee (O.C.), headed by Axelrod and Spectator, including even Martov, and to a large degree Trotsky, preferred to maintain a discreet silence on the question of Kautskyism as a trend. They did not dare defend Kautsky's war-time writings, confining themselves simply to praising Kautsky (Axelrod in his German pamphlet, which the Organising Committee has *promised* to publish in Russian) or to quoting Kautsky's private letters (Spectator), in which he says he belongs to the opposition and jesuitically tries to nullify his chauvinist declarations.

It should be noted that Kautsky's "conception" of imperialism—which is tantamount to embellishing imperialism—is a retrogression not only compared with Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (no matter how assiduously Hilferding now defends Kautsky and "unity" with the social-chauvinists!) but also compared with the *social-liberal* J. A. Hobson. This English economist, who in no way claims to be a Marxist, defines imperialism, and reveals its contradictions, much more profoundly in a book published in 1902*. This is what Hobson (in whose book may be found nearly all Kautsky's pacifist and "conciliatory" banalities) wrote on the highly important question of the parasitic nature of imperialism:

Two sets of circumstances in Hobson's opinion, weakened the power of the old empires: (1) "economic parasitism", and (2) formation of armies from dependent peoples. "There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence". Concerning the second circumstance, Hobson writes:

"One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism [this song about the "blindness" of imperialists comes more appropriately from the social-liberal Hobson than from the "Marxist" Kautsky] is the reckless indifference with which (Great Britain, France, and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting

* J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902.

by which we have won our Indian Empire has been done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives."

The prospect of partitioning China elicited from Hobson the following economic appraisal: "The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a larger body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods: all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and semi-manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa.... We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western states, a European federation of Great Powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilisation, might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory [he should have said: prospect] as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England today which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors [rentiers] and political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex,

the play of world forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe today are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards such a consummation."

Hobson, the social-liberal, fails to see that this "counter-action" can be offered *only* by the revolutionary proletariat and *only* in the form of a social revolution. But then he is a social-liberal! Nevertheless, as early as 1902 he had an excellent insight into the meaning and significance of a "United States of Europe" (be it said for the benefit of Trotsky the Kautskyite!) and of all that is now being glossed over by the *hypocritical Kautskyites* of various countries, namely, that the *opportunists* (social-chauvinists) are working hand in glove with the imperialist bourgeoisie *precisely* towards creating an imperialist Europe on the backs of Asia and Africa, and that objectively the *opportunists* are a section of the petty bourgeoisie and of certain strata of the working class who *have been bribed* out of imperialist superprofits and converted into *watchdogs* of capitalism and *corrupters* of the labour movement.

Both in articles and in the resolutions of our Party, we have repeatedly pointed to this most profound connection, the economic connection, between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the opportunism which has triumphed (for long?) in the labour movement. And from this, incidentally, we concluded that a split with the social-chauvinists was inevitable. Our Kautskyites preferred to evade the question! Martov, for instance, uttered in his lectures a sophistry which in the *Bulletin of the Organising Committee, Secretariat Abroad*[53] (No. 4, April 10, 1916) is expressed as follows:

"...The cause of revolutionary Social-Democracy would be in a sad, indeed hopeless, plight if those groups of workers who in mental development approach most closely to the 'intelligentsia' and who are the most highly skilled fatally drifted away from it towards opportunism...."

By means of the silly word "fatally" and a certain sleight-of-hand, the *fact* is *evaded* that *certain* groups of

workers *have already drifted away* to opportunism and to the imperialist bourgeoisie! And that is the very fact the sophists of the O.C. want to *evade*! They confine themselves to the "official optimism" the Kautskyite Hilferding and many others now flaunt: objective conditions guarantee the unity of the proletariat and the victory of the revolutionary trend! We, forsooth, are "optimists" with regard to the proletariat!

But in reality all these Kautskyites—Hilferding, the O.C. supporters, Martov and Co.—are *optimists* ... with regard to *opportunism*. That is the whole point!

The proletariat is the child of capitalism—of world capitalism, and not only of European capitalism, or of imperialist capitalism. On a world scale, fifty years sooner or fifty years later—measured on a *world* scale this is a minor point—the "proletariat" of course "will be" united, and revolutionary Social-Democracy will "inevitably" be victorious within it. But that is not the point, Messrs. Kautskyites. The point is that at the present time, in the imperialist countries of Europe, *you are fawning* on the opportunists, who are *alien* to the proletariat as a class, who are the servants, the agents of the bourgeoisie and the vehicles of its influence, and *unless* the labour movement *rids* itself of them, it will remain a *bourgeois labour movement*. By advocating "unity" with the opportunists, with the Legiens and Davids, the Plekhanovs, the Chkhenkelis and Potresovs, etc., you are, objectively, defending the *enslavement* of the workers by the imperialist bourgeoisie with the aid of its best agents in the labour movement. The victory of revolutionary Social-Democracy on a world scale is absolutely inevitable, only it is moving and will move, is proceeding and will proceed, *against* you, it will be a victory *over* you.

These two trends, one might even say *two* parties, in the present-day labour movement, which in 1914-16 so obviously parted ways all over the world, were *traced by Engels and Marx in England* throughout the course of *decades*, roughly from 1858 to 1892.

Neither Marx nor Engels lived to see the imperialist epoch of world capitalism, which began not earlier than 1898-1900. But it has been a peculiar feature of England

that even in the middle of the nineteenth century she already revealed at least *two* major distinguishing features of imperialism: (1) vast colonies, and (2) monopoly profit (due to her monopoly position in the world market). In both respects England at that time was an exception among capitalist countries, and Engels and Marx, analysing this exception, quite clearly and definitely indicated its *connection* with the (temporary) victory of opportunism in the English labour movement.

In a letter to Marx, dated October 7, 1858, Engels wrote: "...The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *alongside* the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable."[54] In a letter to Sorge, dated September 21, 1872, Engels informs him that Hales kicked up a big row in the Federal Council of the International and secured a vote of censure on Marx for saying that "the English labour leaders had sold themselves". Marx wrote to Sorge on August 4, 1874: "As to the urban workers here [in England], it is a pity that the whole pack of leaders did not get into Parliament. This would be the surest way of getting rid of the whole lot." In a letter to Marx, dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks about "those very worst English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie". In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies."[55]

On December 7, 1889, Engels wrote to Sorge: "The most repulsive thing here [in England] is the bourgeois 'respectability', which has grown deep into the bones of the workers.... Even Tom Mann, whom I regard as the best of the lot, is fond of mentioning that he will be lunching with the Lord Mayor. If one compares this with

the French, one realises what a revolution is good for after all."[56] In a letter, dated April 19, 1890: "But *under* the surface the movement [of the working class in England] is going on, is embracing ever wider sections and mostly just among the hitherto stagnant *lowest* [Engels's italics] strata. The day is no longer far off when this mass *will* suddenly *find itself*, when it will dawn upon it that it itself is this colossal mass in motion." On March 4, 1891: "The failure of the collapsed Dockers' Union; the 'old' conservative trade unions, *rich* and therefore cowardly, remain lone on the field...." September 14, 1891: at the Newcastle Trade Union Congress the old unionists, opponents of the eight-hour day, were defeated "and the bourgeois papers recognise the defeat of the *bourgeois labour party*" (Engels's italics throughout)....

That these ideas, which were repeated by Engels over the course of decades, were also expressed by him publicly, in the press, is proved by his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, 1892.[57] Here he speaks of an "aristocracy among the working class", of a "privileged minority of the workers", in contradistinction to the "great mass of working people". "A small, privileged, protected minority" of the working class alone was "permanently benefited" by the privileged position of England in 1848-68, whereas "the great bulk of them experienced at best but a temporary improvement".... "With the break-down of that [England's industrial] monopoly, the English working class will lose that privileged position...." The members of the "new" unions, the unions of the unskilled workers, "had this immense advantage, that their minds were virgin soil, entirely free from the inherited 'respectable' bourgeois prejudices which hampered the brains of the better situated 'old unionists'"..... "The so-called workers' representatives" in England are people "who are forgiven their being members of the working class because they themselves would like to drown their quality of being workers in the ocean of their liberalism"....

We have deliberately quoted the direct statements of Marx and Engels at rather great length in order that the reader may study them *as a whole*. And they should be studied, they are worth carefully pondering over. For

they are the *pivot* of the tactics in the labour movement that are dictated by the objective conditions of the imperialist era.

Here, too, Kautsky has tried to "befog the issue" and substitute for Marxism sentimental conciliation with the opportunists. Arguing against the avowed and naïve social-imperialists (men like Lensch) who justify Germany's participation in the war as a means of destroying England's monopoly, Kautsky "*corrects*" this obvious falsehood by another equally obvious falsehood. Instead of a cynical falsehood he employs a suave falsehood! The *industrial* monopoly of England, he says, has long ago been broken, has long ago been destroyed, and there is nothing left to destroy.

Why is this argument false?

Because, firstly, it overlooks England's *colonial* monopoly. Yet Engels, as we have seen, pointed to this very clearly as early as 1882, thirty-four years ago! Although England's industrial monopoly may have been destroyed, her colonial monopoly not only remains, but has become extremely accentuated, for the whole world is already divided up! By means of this suave lie Kautsky smuggles in the bourgeois pacifist and opportunist-philistine idea that "there is nothing to fight about". On the contrary not only have the *capitalists* something to fight about now, but they *cannot help* fighting if they want to preserve capitalism, for without a forcible redivision of colonies the *new* imperialist countries cannot obtain the privileges enjoyed by the older (*and weaker*) imperialist powers.

Secondly, why does England's monopoly explain the (temporary) victory of opportunism in England? Because monopoly yields *superprofits*, i.e., a surplus of profits over and above the capitalist profits that are normal and customary all over the world. The capitalists *can* devote a part (and not a small one, at that!) of these superprofits to bribe *their own* workers, to create something like an alliance (recall the celebrated "alliances" described by the Webbs of English trade unions and employers) between the workers of the given nation and their capitalists *against* the other countries. England's industrial monopoly

was already destroyed by the end of the nineteenth century. That is beyond dispute. But *how* did this destruction take place? Did *all* monopoly disappear?

If that were so, Kautsky's "theory" of conciliation (with the opportunists) would to a certain extent be justified. But it is *not* so, and that is just the point. Imperialism *is* monopoly capitalism. Every cartel, trust, syndicate, every giant bank *is* a monopoly. Superprofits have not disappeared; they still remain. The exploitation of *all* other countries by one privileged, financially wealthy country remains and has become more intense. A handful of wealthy countries—there are only four of them, if we mean independent, really gigantic, "modern" wealth: England, France, the United States and Germany—have developed monopoly to vast proportions, they obtain *super*profits running into hundreds, if not thousands, of millions, they "ride on the backs" of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people in other countries and fight among themselves for the division of the particularly rich, particularly fat and particularly easy spoils.

This, in fact, is the economic and political essence of imperialism, the profound contradictions of which Kautsky glosses over instead of exposing.

The bourgeoisie of an imperialist "Great" Power *can economically* bribe the upper strata of "its" workers by spending on this a hundred million or so francs a year, for its *super*profits most likely amount to about a thousand million. And how this little sop is divided among the labour ministers, "labour representatives" (remember Engels's splendid analysis of the term), labour members of war industries committees, labour officials, workers belonging to the narrow craft unions, office employees, etc., etc., is a secondary question.

Between 1848 and 1868, and to a certain extent even later, only England enjoyed a monopoly: *that is why* opportunism could prevail there for decades. *No* other countries possessed either very rich colonies or an industrial monopoly.

The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital *not* of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers

enjoys a monopoly. (In Japan and Russia the monopoly of military power, vast territories, or special facilities for robbing minority nationalities, China, etc., partly supplements, partly takes the place of, the monopoly of modern, up-to-date finance capital.) This difference explains why England's monopoly position *could* remain *unchallenged* for decades. The monopoly of modern finance capital is being frantically challenged; the era of imperialist wars has begun. It was possible in those days to bribe and corrupt the working class of *one* country for decades. This is now improbable, if not impossible. But on the other hand, *every* imperialist "Great" Power can and does bribe *smaller* strata (than in England in 1848-68) of the "labour aristocracy". Formerly a "*bourgeois labour party*", to use Engels's remarkably profound expression, could arise only in one country, because it alone enjoyed a monopoly, but, on the other hand, it could exist for a long time. Now a "*bourgeois labour party*" *is inevitable* and typical in *all* imperialist countries; but in view of the desperate struggle they are waging for the division of spoils, it is improbable that such a party can prevail for long in a number of countries. For the trusts, the financial oligarchy, high prices, etc., while *enabling* the bribery of a handful in the top layers, are increasingly oppressing, crushing, ruining and torturing the *mass* of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat.

On the one hand, there is the tendency of the bourgeoisie and the opportunists to convert a handful of very rich and privileged nations into "eternal" parasites on the body of the rest of mankind, to "rest on the laurels" of the exploitation of Negroes, Indians, etc., keeping them in subjection with the aid of the excellent weapons of extermination provided by modern militarism. On the other hand, there is the tendency of the *masses*, who are more oppressed than before and who bear the whole brunt of imperialist wars, to cast off this yoke and to overthrow the bourgeoisie. It is in the struggle between these two tendencies that the history of the labour movement will now inevitably develop. For the first tendency is not accidental; it is "substantiated" economically. In *all* countries the bourgeoisie has already begotten, fostered and secured

for itself "bourgeois labour parties" of social-chauvinists. The difference between a definitely formed party, like Bissolati's in Italy, for example, which is fully social-imperialist, and, say, the semi-formed near-party of the Potresovs, Gvozdyovs, Bulkins, Chkheidzes, Skobelevs and Co., is an immaterial difference. The important thing is that, economically, the desertion of a stratum of the labour aristocracy to the bourgeoisie has matured and become an accomplished fact; and this economic fact, this shift in class relations, will find political form, in one shape or another, without any particular "difficulty".

On the economic basis referred to above, the political institutions of modern capitalism—press, parliament, associations, congresses, etc.—have created *political* privileges and sops for the respectful, meek, reformist and patriotic office employees and workers, corresponding to the economic privileges and sops. Lucrative and soft jobs in the government or on the war industries committees, in parliament and on diverse committees, on the editorial staffs of "respectable", legally published newspapers or on the management councils of no less respectable and "bourgeois law-abiding" trade unions—this is the bait by which the imperialist bourgeoisie attracts and rewards the representatives and supporters of the "bourgeois labour parties".

The mechanics of political democracy works in the same direction. Nothing in our times can be done without elections; nothing can be done without the masses. And in this era of printing and parliamentarism it is *impossible* to gain the following of the masses without a widely ramified, systematically managed, well-equipped system of flattery, lies, fraud, juggling with fashionable and popular catchwords, and promising all manner of reforms and blessings to the workers right and left—as long as they renounce the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. I would call this system Lloyd-Georgism, after the English Minister Lloyd George, one of the foremost and most dexterous representatives of this system in the classic land of the "bourgeois labour party". A first-class bourgeois manipulator, an astute politician, a popular orator who will deliver any speeches you like, even r-r-revolutionary ones, to a labour audience, and a

man who is capable of obtaining sizable sops for docile workers in the shape of social reforms (insurance, etc.), Lloyd George serves the bourgeoisie splendidly,* and serves it precisely *among* the workers, brings its influence *precisely* to the proletariat, to where the bourgeoisie needs it most and where it finds it most difficult to subject the masses morally.

And is there such a great difference between Lloyd George and the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Hendersons and Hyndmans, Plekhanovs, Renaudels and Co.? Of the latter, it may be objected, some will return to the revolutionary socialism of Marx. This is possible, but it is an insignificant difference in degree, if the question is regarded from its political, i.e., its mass aspect. Certain individuals among the present social-chauvinist leaders may return to the proletariat. But the social-chauvinist or (what is the same thing) opportunist *trend* can neither disappear nor "return" to the revolutionary proletariat. Wherever Marxism is popular among the workers, this political trend, this "bourgeois labour party", will swear by the name of Marx. It cannot be prohibited from doing this, just as a trading firm cannot be prohibited from using any particular label, sign or advertisement. It has always been the case in history that after the death of revolutionary leaders who were popular among the oppressed classes, their enemies have attempted to appropriate their names so as to deceive the oppressed classes.

The fact is that "bourgeois labour parties", as a political phenomenon, have already been formed in *all* the foremost capitalist countries, and that unless a determined and relentless struggle is waged all along the line against these parties—or groups, trends, etc., it is all the same—there can be no question of a struggle against imperialism, or of Marxism, or of a socialist labour movement. The Chkheidze faction,[58] *Nashe Dyelo* and *Golos Truda*[59] in Russia, and the O.C. supporters abroad are nothing but

* I recently read an article in an English magazine by a Tory, a political opponent of Lloyd George, entitled "Lloyd George from the Standpoint of a Tory". The war opened the eyes of this opponent and made him realise what an excellent servant of the bourgeoisie this Lloyd George is! The Tories have made peace with him!

varieties of one *such* party. There is not the slightest reason for thinking that these parties will disappear *before* the social revolution. On the contrary, the nearer the revolution approaches, the more strongly it flares up and the more sudden and violent the transitions and leaps in its progress, the greater will be the part the struggle of the revolutionary mass stream against the opportunist petty-bourgeois stream will play in the labour movement. Kautskyism is not an independent trend, because it has no roots either in the masses or in the privileged stratum which has deserted to the bourgeoisie. But the danger of Kautskyism lies in the fact that, utilising the ideology of the past, it endeavours to reconcile the proletariat with the "bourgeois labour party", to preserve the unity of the proletariat with that party and thereby enhance the latter's prestige. The masses no longer follow the avowed social-chauvinists: Lloyd George has been hissed down at workers' meetings in England; Hyndman has left the party; the Renaudels and Scheidemanns, the Potresovs and Gvozdyovs are protected by the police. The Kautskyites' masked defence of the social-chauvinists is much more dangerous.

One of the most common sophistries of Kautskyism is its reference to the "masses". We do not want, they say, to break away from the masses and mass organisations! But just think how Engels put the question. In the nineteenth century the "mass organisations" of the English trade unions were on the side of the bourgeois labour party. Marx and Engels did not reconcile themselves to it on this ground; they exposed it. They did not forget, firstly, that the trade union organisations directly embraced a *minority of the proletariat*. In England then, as in Germany now, not more than one-fifth of the proletariat was organised. No one can seriously think it possible to organise the majority of the proletariat under capitalism. Secondly—and this is the main point—it is not so much a question of the size of an organisation, as of the real, objective significance of its policy: does its policy represent the masses, does it serve them, i.e., does it aim at their liberation from capitalism, or does it represent the interests of the minority, the minority's reconciliation with capitalism? The

latter was true of England in the nineteenth century, and it is true of Germany, etc., now.

Engels draws a distinction between the "bourgeois labour party" of the *old* trade unions—the privileged minority—and the "*lowest* mass", the real majority, and appeals to the latter, who are *not* infected by "bourgeois respectability". This is the essence of Marxist tactics!

Neither we nor anyone else can calculate precisely what portion of the proletariat is following and will follow the social-chauvinists and opportunists. This will be revealed only by the struggle, it will be definitely decided only by the socialist revolution. But we know for certain that the "defenders of the fatherland" in the imperialist war *represent* only a minority. And it is therefore our duty, if we wish to remain socialists, to go down *lower* and *deeper*, to the real masses; this is the whole meaning and the whole purport of the struggle against opportunism. By exposing the fact that the opportunists and social-chauvinists are in reality betraying and selling the interests of the masses, that they are defending the temporary privileges of a minority of the workers, that they are the vehicles of bourgeois ideas and influences, that they are really allies and agents of the bourgeoisie, we teach the masses to appreciate their true political interests, to fight for socialism and for the revolution through all the long and painful vicissitudes of imperialist wars and imperialist armistices.

The only Marxist line in the world labour movement is to explain to the masses the inevitability and necessity of breaking with opportunism, to educate them for revolution by waging a relentless struggle against opportunism, to utilise the experiences of the war to expose, not conceal, the utter vileness of national-liberal labour politics.

In the next article, we shall try to sum up the principal features that distinguish this line from Kautskyism.

Written in October 1916

Printed in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2, December 1916
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Sbornik* text

SPEECH AT THE CONGRESS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SWITZERLAND, NOVEMBER 4, 1916[60]

The Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland recently had the honour of rousing the ire of the leader of the official Danish Social-Democratic Party, Herr Minister Stauning. In a letter to another quasi-socialist Minister, Vandervelde, dated September 15 of this year, Stauning proudly declared that "we [the Danish party] have sharply and definitely disassociated ourselves from the organisationally pernicious splitting activities conducted on the initiative of the Italian and Swiss parties under the name of the Zimmerwald movement".

In greeting the Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, I do so in the hope that this party will continue to support the effort to unite the revolutionary Social-Democrats internationally, which began at Zimmerwald and which must end in a complete rupture between socialism and its ministerial and social-patriotic betrayers.

This split is maturing in all countries of developed capitalism. In Germany, Karl Liebknecht's colleague, Comrade Otto Rühle, was attacked by the opportunists and by the so-called Centre when he declared in the Central Organ of the German party that the split had become inevitable (*Vorwärts*, January 12, 1916). The facts, however, make it increasingly clear that Comrade Rühle was right,

that in reality there are two parties in Germany, one helping the bourgeoisie and the government wage the predatory war, the other, which for the most part is working illegally, spreading really socialist manifestos among the real masses and organising mass demonstrations and political strikes.

In France, the Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts[61] recently published a pamphlet, *The Zimmerwald Socialists and the War*, in which we read that three main trends have developed within the French party. The first, comprising the majority and branded in the pamphlet as socialist-nationalists, social-patriots, has entered into a "holy alliance" with our class enemies. The second, according to the pamphlet, represents a minority and consists of followers of Members of Parliament Longuet and Pressemane, who on key issues go hand in hand with the majority and unconsciously bring grist to the mill of the majority by attracting the discontented elements, lulling their socialist conscience and inducing them to follow the party's official policy. The third trend, the pamphlet says, are the Zimmerwaldists. They maintain that France was involved in the war not because Germany declared war on her, but because she pursued an imperialist policy which, through treaties and loans, bound her to Russia. This third trend unambiguously proclaims that "*defence of the fatherland is not a socialist cause*".

Practically the same three trends have arisen in Russia, as well as in England and in the neutral United States of America—in fact, all over the world. The struggle of these trends will determine the course of the labour movement in the immediate future.

Permit me to say a few words on another point which is being very much discussed these days and on which we Russian Social-Democrats are particularly rich in experience, namely, the question of terrorism.

We have no information yet about the Austrian revolutionary Social-Democrats. We know that there are revolutionary Social-Democrats in Austria, but information about them is very meagre anyway. Consequently, we do not know whether the assassination of Stürgkh by Comrade Fritz

Adler[62] was the application of terrorism as tactics, i.e., systematic organisation of political assassinations unconnected with the mass revolutionary struggle; or whether it was a single act in the transition from the opportunist, non-socialist defence of the fatherland tactics of the official Austrian Social-Democrats to the tactics of revolutionary mass struggle. The latter assumption seems to fit in more with the circumstances. The message of greeting to Fritz Adler proposed by the Central Committee of the Italian party and published in *Avanti!* of October 29, therefore, deserves the fullest sympathy.

At all events, we are convinced that the experience of revolution and counter-revolution in Russia has proved the correctness of our Party's more than twenty-year struggle against terrorism as tactics. We must not forget, however, that this struggle was closely connected with a ruthless struggle against opportunism, which was inclined to repudiate the use of all violence by the oppressed classes against their oppressors. We have always stood for the use of violence in the mass struggle and in connection with it. Secondly, we linked the struggle against terrorism with many years of propaganda, started long before December 1905, for an armed uprising. We have regarded the armed uprising not only as the best means by which the proletariat can retaliate to the government's policy, but also as the inevitable result of the development of the class struggle for socialism and democracy. Thirdly, we have not confined ourselves to accepting violence in principle and to propaganda for armed uprising. For example, four years before the revolution we supported the use of violence by the masses against their oppressors, particularly in street demonstrations. We sought to bring to the whole country the lesson taught by every such demonstration. We began to devote more and more attention to organising sustained and systematic mass resistance against the police and the army, to winning over, through this resistance, as large as possible a part of the army to the side of the proletariat in its struggle against the government, to inducing the peasantry and the army to take a conscious part in this struggle. These are the tactics we have applied in the struggle against terrorism, and

it is our firm conviction that they have proved successful.

I conclude, comrades, by once again greeting the Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland and by wishing you success in your work (*applause*).

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A SEPARATE PEACE

Russia and Germany are already negotiating a separate peace. The negotiations are official, and the two powers have already reached agreement on the main points.

A statement to that effect appeared recently in the Berne socialist paper and is based on information in its possession.[63] The Russian Embassy in Berne hastened to issue an official denial, and the French chauvinists ascribed these rumours to "German dirty work", but the socialist paper refused to attach any importance whatsoever to these denials. In support of its statement it pointed to the presence in Switzerland of German (Bülow) and Russian "statesmen" (Stürmer, Giers and a diplomat who arrived from Spain), and to the fact that Swiss commercial circles were in possession of similar reliable information obtained from Russian commercial circles.

Of course, deception on both sides is quite possible. Russia cannot very well admit that she is negotiating a separate peace, and Germany cannot miss an opportunity to create discord between Russia and England, irrespective of whether or not there are negotiations, and if so, how successfully they are proceeding.

To understand the question of a separate peace we must proceed not from rumours and reports about what is taking place in Switzerland, which cannot be effectively verified, but from indisputably established *political facts* of the last few decades. Let Messrs. Plekhanov, Chkhenkeli, Potresov and Co., now cast in the role of Marxist-liveried lackeys or jesters of Purishkevich and Milyukov, try as they will to prove "Germany's war guilt" and that Russia is fighting a "war of defence"—the class-conscious workers

have not listened and will not listen to these clowns. The war was engendered by the Great Power imperialist relations, i.e., by their struggle for division of the loot, a struggle to decide which of them is to gobble up this or that colony or small state. *Two* conflicts are in the foreground in this war. First, between England and Germany. Second, between Germany and Russia. These three Great Powers, these three great freebooters, are the principal figures in the present war. The rest are dependent allies.

Both conflicts were prepared by the *whole* policy these powers pursued for *several decades* before the war. England is fighting to rob Germany of her colonies and to ruin her principal competitor, who has ruthlessly outrivalled her by his superior technique, organisation and commercial drive—and so thoroughly that England *could not* retain her world domination without war. Germany is fighting because her capitalists consider themselves—and rightly so—entitled to the "sacred" bourgeois right to world supremacy in looting and plundering colonies and dependent countries. In particular, Germany is fighting to subjugate the Balkan countries and Turkey. Russia is fighting for possession of Galicia, which she needs, in particular, to throttle the Ukrainian people (for Galicia is the only place where the Ukrainians have, or can have, liberty—relatively speaking, of course), Armenia and Constantinople, and also to subjugate the Balkan countries.

Parallel with the Russo-German conflict of predatory "interests" is another no less—if not more—profound conflict between Russia and England. The aim of Russia's imperialist policy, determined by the age-long rivalry and objective international strength-ratio of the Great Powers, may be briefly defined as follows: smash Germany's power in Europe with the aid of England and France in order to rob Austria (by annexing Galicia) and Turkey (by annexing Armenia and, especially, Constantinople); and, after that, smash England's power in Asia with the aid of Japan *and Germany* in order to seize the *whole* of Persia, complete the partition of China, etc.

For centuries tsarism has been striving to conquer Constantinople and a larger and larger part of Asia. It

has systematically shaped its policy accordingly and has exploited every antagonism and conflict between the Great Powers. England has resisted these efforts longer, and with more persistence and vigour, than Germany. From 1878, when the Russian armies were approaching Constantinople and the English fleet appeared at the Dardanelles and threatened to bombard the Russians if they dared enter "Tsargrad",* to 1885, when Russia was on the verge of war with England over division of the spoils in Central Asia (Afghanistan; the Russian army's advance into the heart of Central Asia threatened British rule in India), and down to 1902, when England concluded a treaty with Japan, in preparation for the latter's war against Russia—throughout all these years. England was the most resolute opponent of Russia's predatory policies, because Russia threatened to undermine British domination over a number of other nations.

And now? Just see what is happening in the present war. One loses patience with the "socialists", who have deserted the proletariat to go over to the bourgeoisie and talk about Russia waging a "war of defence", or to "save the country" (Chkheidze). One loses patience with sentimental Kautsky and Co. and their talk of a democratic peace, as if the present governments, or any bourgeois government for that matter, *could* conclude such a peace. As a matter of fact, they are enmeshed in a net of *secret treaties* with each other, with their allies, and *against* their allies. And the content of these treaties is not accidental, it was not determined merely by "malice", but by the whole course and development of imperialist foreign policy. Those "socialists" who hoodwink the workers with banal phrases about nice things in general (defence of the fatherland, democratic peace) *without* exposing the *secret* treaties *their own* governments have concluded to rob foreign countries—such "socialists" are downright traitors to socialism.

The German, the English, and the Russian governments only stand to gain from speeches in the socialist camp about a nice little peace, because, firstly, they

* Tsargrad is the old Russian name for Constantinople.—*Ed.*

instil belief in the possibility of such a peace under the present governments, and, secondly, divert attention from these governments' predatory policies.

War is the continuation of policy. But policy also "continues" *during* war! Germany has secret treaties with Bulgaria and Austria on the division of spoils and continues to conduct secret negotiations on the subject. Russia has secret treaties with England, France, etc., and *all* of them concern *plunder* and *robbery*, robbing Germany of her colonies, robbing Austria, partitioning Turkey, etc.

The "socialist" who under such circumstances delivers speeches to the people and the governments about a nice little peace resembles the clergyman who, seeing before him in the front pews the mistress of a brothel and a police officer, who are working hand in glove, "preaches" to them, and to the people, love of one's neighbour and observance of the Christian commandments.

There is undoubtedly a secret treaty between Russia and England, and among other things it concerns Constantinople. That Russia hopes to get Constantinople, and that England does not want to give it to her is well known. If England does give Russia Constantinople, she will either attempt to take it from her later, or else will make this "concession" on terms directed against Russia. The text of the secret treaty is unknown, but that the struggle between England and Russia centres around precisely this question, that this struggle is going on even now, is not only known, but beyond the slightest doubt. It is also known that, in addition to the old treaties between Russia and Japan (the 1910 treaty, for instance, which allowed Japan to "gobble up" Korea and Russia to gobble up Mongolia), a *new* secret treaty was concluded during the present war, directed not only against China, but, *to a certain extent*, *also against England*. That is beyond doubt, although the text of the treaty is unknown. In 1904-05 Japan defeated Russia with England's aid; now she is carefully preparing to defeat England with Russia's aid.

There is a pro-German party in Russian "governing circles"—the Court gang of Nicholas the Bloody, the nobility, army, etc. In Germany, the bourgeoisie (followed by

the socialist-chauvinists) has of late markedly turned towards a pro-Russian policy, towards a separate peace with Russia, towards placating Russia in order to strike with full force against England. As far as Germany is concerned, this plan is clear and leaves no room for doubt. As for Russia, the situation is that tsarism would, of course, prefer to smash Germany first in order to "take" as much as possible—the whole of Galicia, the whole of Poland, Armenia, Constantinople—"crush" Austria, etc. It would then be much easier, with the aid of Japan, to turn against England. But, apparently, Russia has not the strength for that. That's at the bottom of it.

Mr. Plekhanov, the ex-socialist, has tried to make out that the Russian reactionaries are generally in favour of peace with Germany, whereas the "progressive bourgeoisie" are in favour of crushing "Prussian militarism" and support friendship with "democratic" England. That is a fairy-tale suitable to the mental level of political infants. The fact is that tsarism *and* all the Russian reactionaries *and* the "progressive" bourgeoisie (Octobrists and Cadets) want the *same thing*: rob Germany, Austria and Turkey in Europe, and defeat England in Asia (so as to take the whole of Persia, Mongolia, Tibet, etc.). These "dear friends" disagree only as to *when and how* to turn from a struggle against Germany to a struggle against England. Only about when and how!

This question, the only one on which the dear friends differ, will be determined by *military and diplomatic considerations* known in full *only* to the tsarist government: the Milyukovs and Guchkovs know only a quarter of them.

Take the whole of Poland from Germany and Austria! Tsarism is *in favour* of that, but has it the strength? And will England allow it?

Take Constantinople and the Straits! Crush and dismember Austria! Tsarism is entirely in favour of that. But has it the strength? And will England allow it?

Tsarism knows just how many millions of soldiers have been slaughtered and how many *more* may be drawn from the people; it knows just how many shells are being expended and how many more can be obtained (in the event of

war with China, which is threatening, and which is quite possible, Japan will *not* supply any more ammunition!). Tsarism knows how its secret negotiations with England concerning Constantinople have been and are progressing; it knows the strength of the British forces in Salonika, Mesopotamia, etc. Tsarism knows all this. It has all the cards in its hands and is making exact calculations—insofar as exact calculations are possible in such matters where that very doubtful and elusive element, the "fortune of war", plays so great a part.

As for the Milyukovs and Guchkovs, the less they know the more they talk. And the Plekhanovs, the Chkhenkelis, the Potresovs know nothing at all of tsarism's secret pacts; they are forgetting even what they knew before, do not study what can be learned from the foreign press, do not examine the course of tsarism's foreign policy before the war, do not trace *its* course during the war, and are consequently playing the part of socialist Simple Simons.

If tsarism has become convinced that even with all the aid of liberal society, with all the zeal of the war industries committees, with all the help the Plekhanovs, Gvozdyovs, Potresovs, Bulkins, Chirkins, Chkheidzes ("Save the country", don't laugh!), Kropotkins, and the whole of that menial crowd are giving to the noble cause of producing more shells—that even with all this help and with the present state of military strength (or military impotence) of all the allies it can possibly drag and has dragged into the war, it *cannot* achieve more, it cannot hit Germany *harder*, or that it can do so only at excessive cost (for example, the loss of ten million *more* Russian soldiers, the recruiting, training and equipment of whom would cost so many more billions of rubles and so many more years of war), then tsarism *cannot but seek* a separate peace with Germany.

If "we" go after too much booty in Europe, "we" run the risk of utterly exhausting "our" military resources, of gaining almost nothing in Europe and of losing the opportunity of getting "our share" in Asia. This is how tsarism argues, and it argues *correctly* from the standpoint of imperialist interests. It argues *more correctly* than the

bourgeois and opportunist chatterboxes, the Milyukovs, Plekhanovs, Guchkovs and Potresovs.

If no more can be obtained in Europe even after Rumania and Greece (from which "we" have taken all we could) have joined in, then let us take what can still be had! England *cannot* give "us" anything just now. Germany will perhaps return to us Courland and a part of Poland, certainly Eastern Galicia—which "we" particularly need for the purpose of throttling the Ukrainian movement, the movement of historically hitherto dormant people numbering many millions, for freedom and the right to use their native-language—and, very likely, Turkish Armenia also. If we take this *now*, we may emerge from the war *with increased strength*, and *tomorrow* we may, with the aid of Japan and Germany, with a wise policy and with the further aid of the Milyukovs, Plekhanovs and Potresovs in "saving" the beloved "fatherland", get a good slice of Asia in a war against England (the whole of Persia and the Persian Gulf with an outlet to the ocean much better than Constantinople, which is an outlet only to the Mediterranean and is guarded by islands which England can easily take and fortify, thus depriving "us" of every outlet to the open sea), etc.

This is exactly how tsarism argues, and, we repeat, it argues correctly, not only from the narrow monarchist point of view, but also from the general imperialist point of view. It knows more and sees farther than the liberals, the Plekhanovs and the Potresovs.

It is quite possible, therefore, that tomorrow, or the day after we shall wake up and hear the three monarchs proclaim: "Hearkening to the voices of our beloved peoples, we have resolved to endow them with the blessings of peace, to sign an armistice and to convene a general European Peace Congress." The three monarchs may even display their sense of humour by quoting fragments of the speeches of Vandervelde, Plekhanov and Kautsky, such as: we "promises"—promises are the only thing that is cheap, even in this period of soaring prices—"to discuss the question of reducing armaments and of a 'lasting' peace", etc. Vandervelde, Plekhanov and Kautsky will run along and arrange their "socialist" congress in the same city

as the Peace Congress; and there will be no end of pious wishes, sentimental phrases and talk of the need to "defend the fatherland" in all languages. The stage will be well set for concealing the transition from an imperialist Anglo-Russian alliance against Germany to an imperialist Russo-German alliance against England!

But whether the war ends in this way in the very near future, or whether Russia "holds out" a little longer in her effort to vanquish Germany and rob Austria more; whether the separate peace negotiations will prove a shrewd blackmailer's trick (tsarism showing England a draft of a treaty with Germany and saying: "Either so many billion rubles and such-and-such concessions or guarantees, or I sign this treaty tomorrow"), *in all cases* the imperialist war *cannot* end otherwise than in an imperialist peace, *unless* it is transformed into a civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for socialism. In all cases, unless this happens, the imperialist war will result in the strengthening of one or two of the three strongest imperialist powers—England, Germany and Russia—at the expense of the weak (Serbia, Turkey, Belgium, etc.), and it is quite possible that *all* three robbers will become stronger after the war, having divided the booty among themselves (the colonies, Belgium, Serbia, Armenia). The only argument will be over the share each should get.

In all cases, both the full-fledged and avowed social-chauvinists, i.e., the individuals who openly accept "defence of the fatherland" in the present war, and the disguised, half-way social-chauvinists, i.e., the Kautskyites with their preachment of "peace" *in general*, "without victors or vanquished", etc., will inevitably, unavoidably and undoubtedly be fooled and discredited. For any peace concluded by the same, or similar, bourgeois governments that started the war will glaringly show the peoples what a servile role both these types of socialists played in relation to imperialism.

Whatever the outcome of the present war, those who maintained that the only possible socialist way out of it is through civil war by the proletariat for socialism, will have been proved correct. The Russian Social-Democrats

who maintained that the defeat of tsarism, its complete military smash-up, is, "in all cases", the lesser evil, will have been proved correct. For history never stands still; it continues its forward movement during this war too. And if the European proletariat cannot advance to socialism now, cannot cast off the social-chauvinist and Kautskyite yoke in the course of this first great imperialist war, then East Europe and Asia can advance to democracy with seven-league strides only if tsarism is utterly smashed and deprived of *all* possibility to pursue its semi-feudal type imperialist policy.

The war will kill and destroy everything weak, social-chauvinism and Kautskyism included. An imperialist peace would further accentuate *these* weaknesses, show them up in a still more despicable and abhorrent light.

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TEN "SOCIALIST" MINISTERS!

Huysmans, the Secretary of the International Social-Chauvinist Bureau,[64] has sent a telegram of greetings to Danish Minister without portfolio Stauning, the leader of the Danish quasi-"Social-Democratic" Party. The telegram reads: "I learn from the newspapers that you have been appointed Minister. My heartiest congratulations. And so, we now have ten socialist Cabinet Ministers in the world. Things are moving. Best wishes."

Things are indeed moving. The Second International is rapidly moving—towards complete merger with national-liberal politics. Quoting this telegram, the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*,[65] militant organ of the extreme German opportunists and social-chauvinists, remarks, somewhat venomously: "The Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau unreservedly welcomes the acceptance by a Social-Democrat of a ministerial post. And yet only shortly before the war all party congresses, and international congresses, expressed sharp opposition to this! Times and views change—on this issue as on others."

The Heilmanns, Davids and Südekums are quite justified in their condescending praise of the Huysmans, Plekhanovs and Vanderveldes....

Stauning recently published a letter he wrote to Vandervelde. It is full of the stinging remarks a pro-German social-chauvinist would write about a French social-chauvinist. Among other things, Stauning boasts of the fact that "we [the Danish Party] have sharply and definitely disassociated ourselves from the organisationally pernicious splitting activities conducted on the initiative of the Italian and Swiss parties under the name of the Zimmerwald movement". This is literally what he says!

The formation of a national state in Denmark dates back to the sixteenth century. The masses of the Danish people passed through the bourgeois liberation movement long ago. More than 96 per cent of the population are Danes. The number of Danes in Germany is less than two hundred thousand. (The population of Denmark is 2,900,000.) This alone proves what a crude bourgeois deception is the talk of the Danish bourgeoisie about an "independent national state" being the task of the day! This is being said in the twentieth century by the bourgeoisie and the monarchists of Denmark, who *possess colonies* with a population nearly equal to the number of Danes in Germany, and over which the Danish Government is trying to *strike a bargain*.

Who says that in our day there is no trade in human beings? There is quite a brisk trade. Denmark is selling to America for so many millions (not yet agreed upon) three islands, all populated, of course.

In addition, a specific feature of Danish imperialism is the superprofits it obtains from its monopolistically advantageous position in the meat and dairy produce market: using cheap maritime transport, she supplies the world's biggest market, London. As a result, the Danish bourgeoisie and the rich Danish peasants (bourgeois of the purest type, in spite of the fables of the Russian Narodniks) have become "prosperous" satellites of the British imperialist bourgeoisie, sharing their particularly easy and particularly fat profits.

The Danish "Social-Democratic" Party completely succumbed to this international situation, and staunchly supported and supports the Right wing, the opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party. The Danish Social-Democrats voted credits for the bourgeois-monarchist government to "preserve neutrality"—that was the euphemistic formula. At the Congress of September 30, 1916, there was a nine-tenths' majority in favour of joining the Cabinet, in favour of a deal with the government! The correspondent of the Berne socialist paper reports that the opposition to ministerialism in Denmark was represented by Gerson Trier and the editor J. P. Sundbo. Trier defended revolutionary Marxist views in a splendid speech, and when the party decided to

go into the government, he resigned from the Central Committee and from the party, declaring that he would not be a member of a *bourgeois* party. In the past few years the Danish "Social-Democratic" Party has in no way differed from the bourgeois radicals.

Greetings to Comrade G. Trier! "Things are moving", Huysmans is right—moving towards a precise, clear, politically honest, socialistically necessary division between the revolutionary Marxists, the representatives of the *masses* of the revolutionary proletariat, and the Plekhanov-Potresov-Huysmans allies and agents of the imperialist bourgeoisie, who have the majority of the "*leaders*", but who represent the interests, not of the oppressed masses, but of the minority of privileged workers, who are deserting to the side of the bourgeoisie.

Will the Russian class-conscious workers, those who elected the deputies now exiled to Siberia, those who voted against participation in the war industries committees to support the imperialist war, wish to remain in the "International" of the *ten* Cabinet Ministers? In the International of the *Staunings*? In the International which men like *Trier* are leaving?

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TASKS OF THE LEFT ZIMMERWALDISTS IN THE SWISS SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY[66]

The Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party at Zurich (November 4-5, 1916) definitely proved that the decision to join Zimmerwald and accept *revolutionary mass struggle* (resolution of the 1915 Aarau Congress) remains on paper, and that within the party there has been definitely formed a "Centre", i.e., a trend similar to that of Kautsky-Haase and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft[67] in Germany, and of Longuet-Pressemane and Co. in France. This "Centre", of which R. Grimm has become the head, combines "Left" declarations with "Right", i.e., opportunist, tactics.

It is therefore the task of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party immediately and effectively to consolidate their forces in order systematically to influence the party so that the Aarau Congress decision shall not remain a dead letter. Consolidation of their forces is all the more urgent since both the Aarau and Zurich congresses have left no doubt whatever as to the revolutionary and internationalist sympathies of the Swiss proletariat. Resolutions of sympathy for Liebknecht are not enough; there must be serious acceptance of his slogan that the Social-Democratic parties of today need *regeneration*.[68]

The platform of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland should be, approximately, as follows:

I. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WAR AND TOWARDS THE BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL

1. "Defence of the fatherland" on the part of Switzerland in the present imperialist war as well as in the new imperialist wars now in preparation is nothing but a bourgeois

deception of the people. For, actually, Switzerland's participation in the present or similar wars would only be participation in a predatory and reactionary war on the side of* *one* of the imperialist coalitions; it would definitely not be a war for "freedom", "democracy", "independence", etc.

2. The attitude of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party towards the bourgeois Swiss Government and towards all the Swiss bourgeois parties must be one of utter distrust. For that government (a) is closely bound up, economically and financially, with the bourgeoisie of the imperialist "Great" Powers and is completely dependent upon them; (b) has long ago turned towards political reaction all along the line in international and domestic affairs (political police, servility towards European reaction and European monarchies, etc.); (c) its whole policy over a period of many years (military reorganisation in 1907, etc., the Egli "case", the de Loys "case",[69] etc., etc.) has proved that it is increasingly becoming a pawn in the hands of the most reactionary Swiss military party and military clique.

3. In view of the above, it is the urgent task of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party to expose the true character of the government, which is cringing before the imperialist bourgeoisie and the militarists, expose its deception of the people by means of phrases about democracy, etc., show the very real possibility of this government (with the approval of the whole of the ruling bourgeoisie in Switzerland) bartering away the interests of the Swiss people to one or the other imperialist coalition.

4. Therefore, in the event of Switzerland's involvement in the present war, it will be the duty of the Social-Democrats absolutely to repudiate "defence of the fatherland" and to expose the use of that slogan to deceive the people. In such a war the workers and peasants would lay down their lives not in their own interests, and not for democracy, but in the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The socialists of Switzerland, as of all other advanced countries, can and must accept military defence of the fatherland *only* when this fatherland has been reorganised

* In the manuscript the words "in alliance with" are written over the words "on the side of".—*Ed.*

along socialist lines, i.e., defence of the proletarian socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie.

5. Neither in peace nor in war can the Social-Democratic Party and its deputies vote war credits under any circumstances, no matter what deceitful speeches about "defending neutrality", etc., are made to justify such voting.

6. The proletariat's answer to war must be propaganda and the preparation and carrying out of revolutionary mass actions for the overthrow of bourgeois rule, the conquest of political power and the achievement of socialist society, which alone will save mankind from wars. The determination to achieve it is maturing in the minds of the workers of *all* countries with unprecedented rapidity.

7. Revolutionary action must include demonstrations and mass strikes, but under no circumstances refusal of military service. On the contrary, not refusal to take up arms, but turning these arms against *one's own* bourgeoisie is the only action that can correspond to the tasks of the proletariat and to the slogans of the best representatives of internationalism, for example, Karl Liebknecht.

8. The Social-Democratic workers must counter the slightest government action, either before entering or during the war, towards abolishing or curtailing political liberties by forming illegal organisations to conduct systematic, persistent propaganda, undaunted by any sacrifices, for war against war, and explain to the masses the real character of the war.

II. THE HIGH COST OF LIVING AND THE INTOLERABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE MASSES

9. Not only in the belligerent countries, but in Switzerland too, the war has led to the unprecedented and scandalous enrichment of a handful of rich people and to incredible want among the masses, resulting from high prices and food shortages. The Social-Democratic Party's main task must be a revolutionary, not reformist, struggle against this calamity: systematic and persistent propaganda and preparation for such a struggle, undeterred by inevitable temporary difficulties and set-backs.

10. In reply to the numerous bourgeois projects of financial reforms, the Social-Democratic Party must make it its main task to expose attempts by the bourgeoisie to shift the burden of mobilisation and war on to the workers and poor peasants.

Under no circumstances, and under no pretext, can Social-Democrats agree to indirect taxation. The decision of the Aarau Congress (1915), and the Huber-Grimm resolution adopted at the Zurich Congress (1916), which permit Social-Democrats to agree to indirect taxes, must be rescinded. All Social-Democratic organisations must forthwith begin most energetically to prepare for the Party Congress in Berne in February 1917, and must elect only delegates who favour rescinding these resolutions.

It is the job of liberal officials, and certainly not of revolutionary Social-Democrats, to help the bourgeois government extricate itself from the present difficulties and preserve the capitalist system, i.e., perpetuate want among the masses.

11. Social-Democrats must propagate as widely as possible among the masses the urgent necessity of introducing a uniform federal property and income tax, with high and progressive scales *not lower* than the following:

Property	Income	Rate of Taxation (per cent)
20,000 francs	5,000 francs	exempt
50,000 ”	10,000 ”	10
100,000 ”	25,000 ”	40
200,000 ”	60,000 ”	60, etc.

Tax on persons living in *pensions*:

Paying	up	to	4	francs	per day	—exempt
”	”	”	5	”	”	” — 1%
”	”	”	10	”	”	” —20%
”	”	”	20	”	”	” —25%, etc.

12. Social-Democrats must ruthlessly combat the bourgeois lie, spread also by many opportunists in the Social-Democratic Party, that it is “impractical” to advocate revolutionary-high rates of property and income taxation. On the contrary, this is the only practical and the only Social-Democratic policy. First, because we must not adapt ourselves to what is “acceptable” to the rich; we must appeal

to the broad masses of the poor and propertyless who are indifferent to, or suspicious of, the Social-Democratic Party, largely owing to its reformist and opportunist character. Secondly, the only way of wresting concessions from the bourgeoisie is not by "bargaining" with it, not by "adapting" ourselves to its interests or prejudices, but by preparing the revolutionary *forces* of the masses *against* it. The larger the section of people we convince of the justice of revolutionary-high taxation rates and of the need to fight to secure such rates, the sooner will the bourgeoisie make concessions. And we will utilise every concession, however small, in the unswerving struggle for the complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

13. The fixing of a maximum salary for all salaried employees and officials, Bundesräte,* etc., of 5,000 to 6,000 francs per annum, according to size of family. The prohibition of the accumulation of all other incomes under penalty of imprisonment and confiscation of such incomes.

14. Compulsory alienation of the factories and works—in the first instance of those that are indispensable for supplying the necessities of life to the population—and also of all agricultural enterprises of over fifteen hectares (over 40 "*Jucharten*") in area (in Switzerland there are only 22,000 enterprises of this size out of a total of 252,000, i.e., less than one-tenth of all agricultural enterprises). Systematic measures, on the basis of these reforms, to increase food output and ensure the people a supply of cheap food.

15. Immediate and compulsory alienation by the state of all water power in Switzerland; this, as well as other alienated property, to be subject to the above-mentioned scales of property and income tax.

III. PRESSING DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND UTILISATION OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND PARLIAMENTARISM

16. Utilisation of the parliamentary tribune and the right of initiative and referendum, not in a reformist manner,

* Members of the Federal Council.—*Ed.*

in order to advocate reforms "acceptable" to the bourgeoisie, and therefore powerless to remove the principal and fundamental evils suffered by the masses. The aim should be propaganda in favour of Switzerland's socialist transformation, which is quite feasible economically, and is becoming more and more urgently necessary because of the intolerably high cost of living and the oppression of finance capital, and also because the international relations created by the war are impelling the proletariat of the whole of Europe on to the path of revolution.

17. Abolition of *all* restrictions without exception on the political rights of women compared with those of men. It must be explained to the masses why this reform is particularly urgent at the present time, when the war and the high cost of living are agitating the minds of the broad masses and, in particular, are rousing the interest and the attention of women towards politics.

18. Compulsory naturalisation (*Zwangseinbürgerung*) of all foreigners, free of charge. Every foreigner shall become a Swiss citizen after three months' residence in the country, unless he, on very good grounds, applies for a postponement, which may be granted for not more than three months. It must be explained to the masses that such a reform is particularly urgent for Switzerland, not only from the general democratic standpoint, but also because, owing to its imperialist environment, Switzerland has a larger percentage of foreigners than any other European country. Nine-tenths of these foreigners speak one of the three languages used in Switzerland. The disfranchisement and alienation of foreign workers serve to increase political reaction, which is already mounting, and weaken international proletarian solidarity.

19. Immediate propaganda for Social-Democratic candidates in the 1917 Nationalrat* elections to be nominated only on the basis of a political platform that has been previously widely discussed by the electors. This applies in particular to the question of the attitude towards the war and defence of the fatherland, and the question of reformist or revolutionary struggle against the high cost of living.

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* National Council.—*Ed.*

IV. THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF PARTY PROPAGANDA, AGITATION AND ORGANISATION

20. Effective operation of the Aarau decision on the revolutionary mass struggle is impossible without systematic and persistent efforts to extend Social-Democratic influence over the masses, without drawing into the movement *new* strata of the toiling and exploited masses. Propaganda and agitation for the social revolution must be conducted more concretely, more explicitly, and on pressing practical issues. This will make it understood not only by the organised workers, who under capitalism will always remain a minority of the proletariat and of the oppressed classes in general, but also by the majority of the exploited, who are incapable of systematic organisation because of the terrible oppression of capitalism.

21. To influence broader masses, the party must organise more systematic publication of leaflets for free distribution. These should explain to the masses that the revolutionary proletariat is fighting for the socialist transformation of Switzerland, which is necessary for and in the interests of nine-tenths of the population. Open competitions should be organised between all party branches, particularly the youth organisations, for the best distribution of such leaflets, and street and house-to-house propaganda. More attention and effort must be devoted to propaganda among the rural workers, agricultural labourers and day-labourers, and also among the poor section of peasants who do not exploit hired labour and do not profit, but suffer, from the high cost of living. The party should demand of its parliamentary representatives (National-, Kantons-, Gross-, and other Räte) that they utilise their particularly advantageous political position, not for idle reformist parliamentary talk, which naturally only bores the workers and rouses their suspicion, but for propaganda for the socialist revolution among the *most backward* strata of the proletariat and semi-proletariat in urban, and particularly rural, areas.

22. A decisive break with the theory of "neutrality" of the industrial organisations of the working class, office

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

employees, etc. A truth most strikingly confirmed by the war should be brought home to the masses, namely, that so-called "neutrality" is bourgeois deception or hypocrisy, that in fact it means *passive* submission to the bourgeoisie and to such of its particularly disgusting undertakings as imperialist war. Social-Democratic activity in every organisation of the working class and of the poor strata of the petty bourgeoisie or office workers must be intensified. Special Social-Democratic groups must be formed within all such organisations; systematic efforts must be made to create a situation in which revolutionary Social-Democracy shall have the majority in and leadership of these organisations. The special importance of this condition for the success of the revolutionary struggle must be explained to the masses.

23. Social-Democratic work among the troops must be extended and intensified, both before and after the call-up. Social-Democratic groups must be formed in all military units. The historical inevitability and legitimacy, from the standpoint of socialism, of using arms in the only legitimate war, namely, the proletarian war against the bourgeoisie to liberate humanity from wage-slavery, must be explained. There must be propaganda against isolated *terrorist actions* and for linking up the struggle of the revolutionary section of the army with the broad movement of the proletariat and of the exploited population generally. There must be more intensive propaganda in support of the section of the Olten decision urging soldiers to refuse to obey when troops are used against strikers, and it should be explained that passive disobedience alone is not enough.[70]

24. To explain to the masses the inseparable connection between the practical, consistent, revolutionary Social-Democratic work, as outlined above, and the systematic struggle over *principles* among the *three main* trends in the present-day labour movement that have arisen in *all* civilised countries, and have taken definite shape also in Switzerland (particularly at the 1916 Zurich Congress). These three trends are: (1) the social-patriots who frankly accept "defence of the fatherland" in the present imperialist war of 1914-16; this is an opportunist trend of the agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement; (2) the Left Zimmerwald-

ists, who, in principle, reject "defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war. They favour a break with the social-patriots as agents of the bourgeoisie and mass revolutionary struggle, combined with *complete* reorganisation of Social-Democratic tactics to conform with the propaganda and preparation for such struggle; (3) the so-called "Centre" (Kautsky-Haase, Arbeitsgemeinschaft in Germany; Longuet-Pressemane in France),* which stands for unity between the first and the second trends. Such "unity" only ties the hands of revolutionary Social-Democracy, prevents the development of its activity and corrupts the masses by failure inseparably and completely to link up Party principles and Party practice.

At the 1916 Zurich Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, in three speeches on the question of the Nationalratsfraktion** delivered by Platten, Naine and Greulich, there was the very clearly expressed admission that the struggle between the different policy trends within the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland *has long since become a fact*. The sympathies of the majority of the delegates were obviously with Platten when he spoke of the need consistently to work in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Naine openly, precisely and definitely declared that two trends were continuously fighting each other within the Nationalratsfraktion, and that the workers' organisations must themselves see to it that adherents of the revolutionary trend who were in complete agreement with each other be elected to the Nationalrat. When Greulich said that the Party had cast off its old "favourites" (*Lieblinge*) and had found new "favourites", he too thereby admitted the existence and struggle of different trends. But no class-conscious and thinking worker will agree with this "favourites" theory. It is precisely in order to prevent the inevitable and necessary struggle between trends from degenerating into a contest between "favourites", into personal conflicts, petty suspicions and petty scandals that all members of the Social-Democratic Party must see to it that the struggle between the different policy trends is fought *openly and on principles*.

* In the German Social-Democratic press the "Centre" is sometimes identified, and rightly so, with the *Right* wing of the "Zimmerwaldists".

** The Socialist Group in the National Council.—*Ed*.

25. An intensified *principled* struggle must be waged against the Grütli-Verein[71] as a glaring manifestation on Swiss soil of the tendencies of *bourgeois* labour politics, namely, opportunism, reformism, social-patriotism and corruption of the masses by bourgeois-democratic illusions. The mistaken and pernicious character of social-patriot and "Centre" policies must be explained to the masses, using the concrete activities of the Grütli-Verein as an example.

26. Preparations must be immediately started for the elections to the February (1917) Party Congress in Berne to ensure that they are held only after every Party organisation has discussed the principles and concrete policies set forth in the various platforms. The platform outlined here shou]d serve as the platform of the consistent, revolutionary, internationalist Social-Democrats.

The election of all leading Party officials, to the Press Commission, to all representative bodies, to all management committees, etc., must take place only on the basis of such a discussion of platforms.

Every local organisation must carefully control the local Party press organ to ensure that it pursues the views and the tactics, not merely of Social-Democracy in general, but of a *precisely defined platform* of Social-Democratic policy.

V. INTERNATIONAL TASKS OF THE SWISS SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

27. In order that acceptance of internationalism by the Swiss Social-Democrats shall not remain an empty and non-committal phrase—to which the adherents of the "Centre", and Social-Democrats of the epoch of the Second International generally, always confine themselves—it is necessary, first, consistently and unswervingly to fight for organisational rapprochement between foreign and Swiss workers bringing them together in the same unions, and for their complete equality (civic and political). The specific feature of imperialism in Switzerland is precisely the increasing exploitation of disfranchised foreign workers by the Swiss bourgeoisie, which bases its hopes on estrangement between these two categories of workers.

Second, every effort must be made to create a united *internationalist* trend among the German, French and Italian workers of Switzerland, a trend that will make for genuine *unity* in all *practical* activity in the labour movement and will combat, with equal determination and on principle, French (in Latin Switzerland), German and Italian social-patriotism. The present platform should be made the basis of a common and united platform of the workers of *all three* main nationalities or languages in Switzerland. Unless worker supporters of revolutionary Social-Democracy belonging to all the nationalities of Switzerland are united in this way, internationalism will remain an idle word.

To facilitate this amalgamation, the publication should be started of supplements (even if weekly [monthly] and only two pages at first) to all Social-Democratic newspapers (and to all periodicals put out by workers', office employees', etc., trade unions). The supplements should be published *in three languages* and should explain the present platform in the light of current political developments.

28. The Swiss Social-Democrats must support in all other socialist parties *only* the revolutionary-internationalist forces, the forces that accept the Zimmerwald Left. This support must not remain platonic. It is particularly important to reprint in Switzerland the anti-government manifestos secretly issued in Germany, France and Italy, translate them into all three languages and distribute them among the workers in Switzerland and all the neighbouring countries.

29. At the Berne (February 1917) Congress the Swiss Social-Democratic Party must not only unreservedly accept the Kienthal Conference decisions, but must also demand an immediate and complete organisational break with the International Socialist Bureau at The Hague, that bulwark of opportunism and social-patriotism, which are irreconcilably hostile to the interests of socialism.

30. The Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland is in a particularly favourable position to keep in touch with developments in the labour movement in the advanced European countries and unite its revolutionary elements. The Party must not, therefore, wait passively for an internal struggle to develop within that movement, but must *keep in*

advance of that struggle. In other words, it must follow the road of the Zimmerwald Left, the correctness of which is being proved more clearly every day by the course of events in the socialist movements of Germany, France, England, the United States and all civilised countries in general.

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THESES ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SWISS SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY TOWARDS THE WAR[72]

1. The present world war is an imperialist war waged for the political and economic exploitation of the world, for markets, raw material sources and new spheres of capital investment, oppression of weak nations, etc.

The "defence of the fatherland" phraseology of the two warring coalitions is no more than a bourgeois deception of the peoples.

2. The Swiss Government is the steward of the Swiss bourgeoisie, which is wholly dependent upon international finance capital and intimately associated with the imperialist bourgeoisie of the Great Powers.

It is therefore no accident, but an inevitable result of these economic facts, that the Swiss Government is from day to day—and this has been so for decades—conducting an increasingly reactionary policy and secret diplomacy, hampering and violating the people's democratic rights and freedoms, kow-towing to the military clique and systematically and shamelessly sacrificing the interests of the broad masses to the interests of a handful of financial magnates.

Switzerland may at any moment be drawn into the present war as a result of this dependence of her bourgeois government on the interests of the financial oligarchy, and of powerful pressure by one or another of the imperialist coalitions.

3. Consequently, in relation to Switzerland, too, "defence of the fatherland" is now no more than a hypocritical phrase. For in reality it is not a question of defending democracy, independence or the interests of the broad popular masses,

etc., but, on the contrary, of preparing to hurl the workers and small peasants into the holocaust in order to maintain the monopoly and privileges of the bourgeoisie, of strengthening capitalist domination and political reaction.

4. Proceeding from these facts, the Swiss Social-Democratic Party rejects "defence of the fatherland" on principle, demands immediate demobilisation and calls on the working class to reply to the bourgeoisie's war preparations and to war itself, should it break out, with the sharpest methods of proletarian class struggle.

Among these methods the following should be especially urged:

(a) Rejection of civil peace, sharper principled struggle against all bourgeois parties, and also against the Grütli-Verein as an organisation of agents of the bourgeoisie within the workers' movement, and against Grütli trends within the Socialist Party.

(b) Rejection of all war credits, no matter under what pretext requested, both in peace-time and war-time.

(c) Support of all revolutionary movements and every struggle of the working class of the belligerent countries against the war and against their own governments.

(d) Assistance to the revolutionary mass struggle within Switzerland—strikes, demonstrations, armed rising against the bourgeoisie.

(e) Systematic propaganda among the armed forces, establishment for this purpose of special Social-Democratic groups in the army and among conscription-age youth.

(f) Establishment by the working class of illegal organisations in retaliation to every government curtailment or repeal of political freedoms.

(g) Systematic preparation, through regular and consistent explanatory work among the workers, of a situation in which the leadership of all workers' and office employees' organisations without exception would pass into the hands of persons who accept and are capable of conducting this struggle against the war.

5. The Party's aim in the revolutionary mass struggle, adopted at the 1915 Party Congress in Aarau, is a socialist revolution in Switzerland. Economically, this can be carried out immediately. Socialist revolution offers the only

effective means of liberating the masses from the horror of high prices and hunger. It is being brought nearer as a result of the crisis that has gripped the whole of Europe. It is absolutely necessary for the complete elimination of militarism and war.

The Party declares that all bourgeois pacifist and socialist pacifist phrases against militarism and war that fail to accept this goal and the revolutionary means of achieving it, are illusions or lies and can only have the effect of diverting the working class from any serious struggle against the foundations of capitalism.

Without ceasing its fight to improve the position of the wage-slaves, the Party calls upon the working class and its representatives to put on the order of the day propaganda for an immediate socialist revolution in Switzerland. This should be done through mass agitation, speeches in Parliament, legislative proposals, etc., proving the need to replace the bourgeois government by a proletarian government relying on the support of the mass of the propertyless population, and explaining the imperative need for such measures as expropriation of the banks and big industries, repeal of all indirect taxes, introduction of a single direct tax with revolutionary-high tax-rates for big incomes, etc.

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PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE WAR ISSUE

Swiss Left Social-Democrats are unanimous in rejecting the defence of the fatherland principle in the present war. The proletariat, at any rate its best elements, is likewise opposed to defence of the fatherland.

Hence, on this most burning issue confronting contemporary socialism in general and the Swiss Socialist Party in particular, it would appear that necessary unity has been achieved. Closer examination, however, is bound to lead us to the conclusion that it is only *seeming* unity.

For there is absolutely no clarity, let alone unanimity, that a declaration against defence of the fatherland places *exceptionally high demands* on the revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary viability of the party that makes such a declaration, providing, of course, that it is not reduced to a hollow phrase. And such a declaration does become a hollow phrase if we merely reject defence of the fatherland without being fully aware of, i.e., without appreciating, the demands implied, without realising that *all propaganda*, *agitation*, *organisation*, in short, the sum total of party activity, must be radically changed, "regenerated" (to use Karl Liebknecht's expression) and adapted to the *supreme* revolutionary tasks.

Let us carefully consider what rejection of fatherland defence implies, if we approach it as a *serious* political slogan that must really be *carried out*.

First. We call on the proletarians and the exploited of all the belligerent countries, and of all countries faced with the danger of war, to reject defence of the fatherland. We definitely know now, from the experience of several of the warring countries, what this *actually* implies in the present

war. It implies rejection of all the foundations of modern bourgeois society, the undermining of the very roots of the modern social system, and not only in theory, not only "in general", but in practice, directly and immediately. Is it not clear that this can be accomplished *only* if we go beyond the firm theoretical conviction that capitalism has fully matured for its transformation into socialism and accept the practical, direct and immediate carrying out of such transformation, i.e., the socialist revolution?

Yet that is nearly always lost sight of in discussing refusal to defend the fatherland. At best there is "theoretical" acceptance of the fact that capitalism is ripe for transformation into socialism. But *immediate*, *radical change* of all aspects of party activity *in the spirit of the directly imminent socialist revolution—that is shunned*!

The people, it is alleged, are not prepared for that!

But that is ridiculously inconsistent. Either, or. Either we do not proclaim immediate rejection of defence of the fatherland—or we *immediately* develop, or begin to develop, systematic propaganda for immediate socialist revolution. In a certain sense the "people", of course, are "not prepared" *either* to reject fatherland defence *or* accept socialist revolution. But that does not justify two years—two years!—of procrastination and delay in starting to systematically prepare them!

Second. What is being opposed to the policy of defence of the fatherland and civil peace? Revolutionary struggle against the war, "revolutionary mass actions", as recognised by the 1915 Aarau Party Congress resolution. No doubt a very good decision, but ... but the party's record since that congress, the party's *actual* policy, show that it has remained a *paper* decision.

What is the *aim* of revolutionary mass struggle? The party has made no official statement, nor is the question being discussed in general. It is either taken for granted, or frankly admitted, that the aim is "*socialism*". Socialism is being opposed to capitalism (or imperialism).

That, however, is absolutely illogical (theoretically) and void of all practical meaning. Illogical because it is *too* general, too nebulous. "Socialism" in general, as an aim, as the opposite of capitalism (or imperialism), is accepted

now not only by the Kautsky crowd and social-chauvinists, but by many bourgeois social politicians. However, it is no longer a matter of contrasting two social systems, but of formulating the *concrete* aim of the *concrete* "revolutionary mass struggle" against a *concrete* evil, namely, the *present* high cost of living, the *present* war danger or the *present* war.

The whole Second International of 1889-1914 opposed socialism to capitalism in general, and it was *precisely* this too general "generalisation" that brought on its bankruptcy. It ignored the specific evil of its age, which Frederick Engels nearly thirty years ago, on January 10, 1887, characterised in the following words:

"...a certain petty-bourgeois socialism finds representation in the Social-Democratic Party itself, and even in the ranks of the Reichstag group. This is done in the following way: while the fundamental views of modern socialism and the demand for the transformation of all the means of production into social property are recognised as justified, the *realisation of this is declared possible only in the distant future, a future which for all practical purposes is quite out of sight. Thus, for the present one has to have recourse to mere social patchwork...*" (*The Housing Question*, Preface).[73]

The concrete aim of "revolutionary mass struggle" can only be *concrete* measures of socialist *revolution*, and *not* "socialism" in general. The Dutch comrades have given a precise definition of these concrete measures in their programme (published in the *Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee* No. 3, Berne, February 29, 1916): annulment of the national debt, expropriation of the banks and big industry. When we suggest that these absolutely concrete measures be included in an official party resolution, and be systematically explained in the most popular form, in day-to-day party propaganda at public meetings, in parliamentary speeches, in legislative proposals—we get the same procrastinating, evasive and thoroughly sophistical reply that the people are not yet prepared for this, and so on and so forth!

The point is, however, that we should begin preparing them right now, and firmly stick to this work!

Third, the party has "accepted" revolutionary mass struggle. Very well. But is the party *capable* of waging it? Is it

preparing for it? Is it studying *these* problems, gathering together the necessary material, setting up the *proper* bodies and organisations? Is it discussing the issues among the people and with the people?

Nothing of the kind! The party clings to its old line—a thoroughly parliamentarian, thoroughly trade union, thoroughly reformist and thoroughly legalistic line. The party remains manifestly *incapable* of facilitating the revolutionary mass struggle and leading it. It is obviously making no preparations whatever for this. The old routine rules supreme and the "new" words (rejection of fatherland defence, revolutionary mass struggle) remain *mere words*! And the Lefts, failing to realise this, are not mustering their forces, systematically, perseveringly and in all fields of party activity, to combat the evil.

One can only shrug one's shoulders on reading, for instance, the following phrase (the last) in Grimm's theses on the war issue:

> "In conjunction with trade union organisations, party bodies must in this event [i.e., the calling of a mass railway strike if there is a danger of war, etc.] take all the necessary measures."

The theses were published in the summer, and on September 16, the *Schweizerische Metallarbeiter-Zeitung*,[74] issued over the names of its editors, O. Schneeberger and K. Dürr, contained the following phrase (I was on the verge of saying, the following *official reply* to Grimm's theses or pious wishes):

> "...The phrase 'the worker has no fatherland' is in very poor taste at a time when the workers of all Europe, in their overwhelming majority, have for two years been standing shoulder to shoulder with the bourgeoisie on the battlefields against the 'enemies' of their fatherland, while those who remain at home want to 'live through it' despite all the poverty and hardship. *Should we be attacked by a foreign power we shall doubtlessly see the same picture in Switzerland too!!!*"

What is this if not "Kautsky" policy, the policy of the impotent phrase, Left declaration and opportunist practice when, on the one hand, resolutions are proposed urging the party, "in conjunction with trade union organisations", to call for revolutionary mass strikes, and, on the other, no struggle is waged against the *Grütli*, i.e., social-patriot,

reformist and thoroughly legalistic, *trend* and its supporters within the party and the trade unions?

Are we "educating" the masses or corrupting and demoralising them if we fail *daily* to say and prove that "leading" comrades like O. Schneeberger, K. Dürr, P. Pflüger, H. Greulich, Huber and *many* others hold *exactly the same* social-patriot views and pursue *exactly the same* social-patriot policy as the one Grimm so "courageously" exposes and castigates ... when it concerns the Germans (*in Germany*) and not the Swiss? Rail against the foreigners, but protect one's "own" "fellow-citizens".... Is that "internationalist"? Is that "democratic"?

This is how Hermann Greulich describes the position of the Swiss workers, the crisis of Swiss socialism and also the *substance* of Grütli policy *within* the Socialist Party:

"...The standard of living has risen insignificantly and only for the top strata [hear! hear!] of the proletariat. The mass of workers continue to live in poverty, beset by worry and hardship. That is why, from time to time, doubts arise as to the correctness of the path we have been following. The critics are looking for new paths and place special hope on more resolute action. Efforts are being made in that direction, but as a rule [?] they fail [??] and this increases the urge to revert to the old tactics [a case of the wish being father to the thought?].... And now the world war ... drastic decline in the standard of living, amounting to outright poverty for those sections which in the past still enjoyed tolerable conditions. Revolutionary sentiments are spreading. [Hear! hear!] In truth, the party leadership has not been equal to the tasks confronting it and all too often succumbs [??] to the influence of hotheads [??].... The Grütli-Verein Central Committee is committed to a 'practical national policy' which it wants to operate outside the party.... Why has it not pursued it within the party? [Hear! hear!] Why has it nearly always left it to me to fight the ultra-radicals?" (Open Letter to the Hottingen Grütli-Verein, September 26, 1916.)

So speaks Greulich. It is not at all, therefore, a matter (as the Grütlians in the party think, and hint in the press, while the Grütlians outside the party say so openly) of a few "evil-minded foreigners' wanting, in a fit of personal impatience, to inject a revolutionary spirit into the labour movement, which they regard through "foreign spectacles". No, it is none other than Hermann Greulich—whose political role is tantamount to that of a bourgeois Labour Minister in a small democratic republic—who tells us that only the upper strata of the workers are somewhat better off now,

while the *mass* is steeped in poverty, and that "revolutionary sentiments are spreading" not because of the accursed foreign "instigators", but because of "the drastic decline in the standard of living".

And so?

And so, we shall be absolutely right if we say:

> *Either* the Swiss people will suffer hardships that will increase with every passing week and they will be faced daily with the threat of involvement in the imperialist war, i.e., of being killed in the capitalists' interests, *or* they will follow the advice of the finest part of their proletariat, muster all their forces and carry out a socialist revolution.

Socialist revolution? Utopia! "A remote and practically indefinable" possibility!...

It is no more a utopia than rejection of fatherland defence in the present war or revolutionary mass struggle against it. One should not be deafened by one's own words or frightened by the words of others. Nearly everyone is prepared to accept revolutionary struggle against the war. But one must visualise the magnitude of the task of ending the war by revolution! No, it is not a utopia. The revolution is *maturing* in all countries and the question *now* is not whether to continue to live in tranquillity and tolerable conditions, or plunge into some reckless adventure. On the contrary, the question is whether to continue to suffer hardship and be thrown into the holocaust to fight for *alien interests*, or to make great sacrifices for socialism, for the interests of nine-tenths of mankind.

Socialist revolution, we are told, is a utopia! The Swiss people, thank God, have no "separate" or "independent" language, but speak the three world languages of the neighbouring warring countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are in such close touch with developments in these countries. In Germany, things have reached a point where the economic life of *66 million people* is directed *from one centre*. The national economy of a country of 66 million is run from this one centre. Tremendous sacrifices are imposed on the vast majority of the people in order that the "upper

30,000" can pocket thousands of millions in war profits, and that millions die in the shambles for the enrichment of these "finest and noblest" representatives of the nation. And in the face of these *facts*, of this *experience*, is it "utopian" to believe that a small nation, with no monarchy or Junkers, with a very high level of capitalism and perhaps better organised in various unions than in any other capitalist country, will try to *save itself from hunger and the danger of war* by doing the *very same thing* that has already been practically tested in Germany? With the difference, of course, that in Germany millions are being killed and maimed to enrich a few, open the road to Baghdad, conquer the Balkans, whereas in Switzerland it is merely a matter of expropriating a maximum of 30,000 bourgeois, i.e., not condemning them to perish, but to the "horrible fate" of receiving "*only*" 6,000-10,000 francs income and giving the rest to the socialist workers' government in order to ward off hunger and the war danger.

The Great Powers, however, will never tolerate a socialist Switzerland and will use their immensely superior strength to crush the socialist revolution at the very beginning!

That, undoubtedly, would be so if, first, the beginnings of a revolution in Switzerland did *not* generate a class movement of solidarity in neighbouring countries, and, second, if these Great Powers were not tied up in a "war of attrition" which has practically exhausted the patience of the most patient peoples. Military intervention by the mutually hostile Great Powers would, in present circumstances, only be the prelude to revolution flaring up throughout the whole of Europe.

Perhaps you think I am so naïve as to believe that such issues as socialist revolution can be resolved by "persuasion"?

No. I only wish to *illustrate*, and, what is more, merely one *partial issue*, the *change* that must take place in all party propaganda if we want to approach the question of *rejection of fatherland defence* with all the seriousness it deserves. That is *only* an illustration, and it concerns *only* one partial issue. I lay claim to no more.

It would be absolutely wrong to believe that immediate struggle for socialist revolution implies that we can, or

should, abandon the fight for reforms. Not at all. We cannot know beforehand how soon we shall achieve success, how soon the objective conditions will make the rise of *this* revolution possible. We should support every improvement, every real economic and political improvement in the position of the masses. The difference between us and the reformists (i.e., the Grütlians in Switzerland) is not that we oppose reforms while they favour them. Nothing of the kind. They confine themselves to reforms and as a result stoop—in the apt expression of one (rare!) revolutionary writer in the *Schweizerische Metallarbeiter-Zeitung* (No. 40)—to the role of "hospital orderly for capitalism". We tell the workers: vote for proportional representation, etc., but don't stop at that. Make it your prime duty systematically to spread the idea of immediate socialist revolution, prepare for this revolution and radically reconstruct every aspect of party activity. The conditions of bourgeois democracy very often compel us to take a certain stand on a multitude of small and petty reforms, but we must be able, or learn, to take *such* a position on these reforms (in such a manner) that—to oversimplify the matter for the sake of clarity—five minutes of every half-hour speech are devoted to reforms and twenty-five minutes to the coming revolution.

Socialist revolution is impossible without a hard revolutionary mass struggle in which many sacrifices have to be made. But we would be inconsistent if we accepted the revolutionary mass struggle and the desire for an immediate end to the war while, at the same time, rejecting immediate socialist revolution! The former without the latter is nil, a hollow sound.

Nor can we avoid hard *struggle within the party*. It would be sheer make-believe, hypocrisy, philistine "head-in-the-sand" policy to imagine that "internal peace" *can* rule within the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. The choice is not between "internal peace" and "inner-party struggle". Suffice it to read Hermann Greulich's letter mentioned above and examine developments in the party over the past several years to appreciate the utter fallacy of any such supposition.

The real choice is this: *either* the *present* concealed *forms* of inner-party struggle, with their demoralising effect on the masses, *or* open principled struggle between the

internationalist revolutionary trend and the Grütli trend inside and outside the party.

An "inner struggle" in which Hermann Greulich attacks the "ultra-radicals" or the "hotheads", without naming these monsters and without precisely defining their policy, and Grimm publishes articles in the *Berner Tagwacht* larded with hints and only comprehensible to one out of a hundred readers, articles in which he castigates those who see things through "foreign spectacles", or those "actually responsible" for the draft resolutions he finds so annoying—that kind of inner struggle *demoralises* the masses, who see, or guess, that it is a "quarrel among leaders" and *do not understand what it is really all about*.

But a struggle in which the Grütli trend *within* the party—and it is much more important and dangerous than outside the party—will be forced *openly* to combat the Left, while both *trends* will everywhere come out with their own independent views and policies, will fight each other on matters of *principle*, allowing the *mass* of party comrades, and not merely the "leaders", to settle fundamental issues—such a struggle is both necessary and useful, for it *trains in the masses* independence and ability to carry out their epoch-making revolutionary mission.

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ON THE DEFENCE OF THE FATHERLAND ISSUE

The bourgeoisie and its supporters in the labour movement, the Grütlians, usually pose the question thus:

Either we recognise in principle our duty to defend the fatherland, or we leave our country defenceless.

That presentation is fundamentally wrong.

This is how the question stands in reality:

Either we allow ourselves to be killed in the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie, or we systematically prepare the majority of the exploited, and ourselves, for seizure—at the price of less sacrifice—of the banks and expropriation of the bourgeoisie in order to put an end to the high cost of living and war.

* * *

The first presentation of the question is thoroughly bourgeois, not socialist. It disregards the fact that we are living in the imperialist era, that the present war is an imperialist war, that in this war Switzerland will under no circumstances be ranged *against* imperialism, but *on the side* of one or the other imperialist coalition, i.e., will in fact become an accomplice of one or another group of the big robber powers, that the Swiss bourgeoisie has long been tied to imperialist interests by thousands of threads. It is of no concern whether this is implemented by a system of inter-relationships and "mutual participation" of the big banks through export of capital, or through the tourist trade, which thrives on the patronage of foreign millionaires, or through unscrupulous exploitation of disfranchised foreign workers, etc.

In short, all the fundamental tenets of socialism, all the socialist ideas, have been forgotten. The predatory nature of the imperialist war is being embellished. One's "own" bourgeoisie is being depicted as an innocent lamb and the case-hardened bank directors of present-day Switzerland as heroic William Tells, and, furthermore, the secret agreements between Swiss and foreign banks and between Swiss and foreign diplomats are overlooked. And this incredible hotchpotch of bourgeois lies is covered up by a fine-sounding and "popular" phrase meant to deceive the people: "defence of the fatherland!"

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THE YOUTH INTERNATIONAL

A REVIEW

A German-language publication bearing the above title has been appearing in Switzerland since September 1, 1915. It carries the subtitle: "Militant and Propaganda Organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations". Altogether six issues have appeared so far. The magazine merits our attention and should be strongly recommended to all Party members in a position to contact foreign Social-Democratic parties and youth organisations.

Most of the official European Social-Democratic parties are advocating the foulest and vilest social-chauvinism and opportunism. This applies to the German and French parties, the Fabian Society and the Labour Party in England, the Swedish, Dutch (Troelstra's party), Danish, Austrian parties, etc. In the Swiss party, notwithstanding the withdrawal (to the great benefit of the labour movement) of the extreme opportunists, now organised in the *non*-party "Grütli-Verein", there still remain within the Social-Democratic Party numerous opportunist, social-chauvinist and Kautskyite leaders who exercise *tremendous* influence on its affairs.

With this state of affairs in Europe, there falls on the League of Socialist Youth Organisations the tremendous, grateful but difficult task of fighting *for* revolutionary internationalism, *for* true socialism and against the prevailing opportunism which has deserted to the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The *Youth International* has published a number of good articles in defence of revolutionary internationalism, and the magazine as a whole is permeated with a fine spirit of intense hatred for the betrayers of

socialism, the "defenders of the fatherland" in the present war, and with an earnest desire to wipe out the corroding influence of chauvinism and opportunism in the international labour movement.

Of course, the youth organ *still* lacks theoretical clarity and consistency. Perhaps it may never acquire them, precisely because it is the organ of seething, turbulent, inquiring youth. However, our attitude towards the lack of theoretical clarity on the part of *such* people must be entirely different from what our attitude is and should be towards the theoretical muddle in the heads, and the lack of revolutionary consistency in the hearts, of our "O.C.-ists", "Socialist-Revolutionaries",[75] Tolstoyans, anarchists, the European Kautskyites ("Centre"), etc. Adults who lay claim to lead and teach the proletariat, but actually mislead it, are one thing: against such people a *ruthless* struggle must be waged. Organisations of *youth*, however, which openly declare that they are still learning, that their main task is to train party workers for the socialist parties, are quite another thing. Such people must be given every assistance. We must be patient with their faults and strive to correct them gradually, mainly by *persuasion*, and not by fighting them. The middle-aged and the aged often *do not know how* to approach the youth, for the youth must of necessity advance to socialism *in a different way*, *by other paths*, *in other forms*, *in other circumstances* than their fathers. Incidentally, that is why we must decidedly *favour organisational independence* of the Youth League, *not only* because the opportunists fear such independence, but because of the very nature of the case. For unless they have complete independence, the youth *will be unable* either to train good socialists from their midst or prepare themselves to lead socialism *forward*.

We stand for the complete independence of the Youth Leagues, but also for complete freedom of comradely criticism of their errors! We must not flatter the youth.

Of the errors to be noted in this excellent magazine, reference must first of all be made to the following three:

1) The incorrect position on the question of disarmament (or "disarming"), which we criticised in a preceding article.*

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* See pp. 94-104 in this volume.—*Ed.*

There is reason to believe that this error arises entirely out of the laudable desire to emphasise the need to strive for the "complete destruction of militarism" (which is perfectly correct); but the role of civil wars in the socialist revolution is forgotten.

2) On the question of the differences between socialists and anarchists in their attitude towards the state, Comrade Nota-Bene[76] in his article (issue No. 6) falls into a very serious error (as he also does on several other questions, for instance, our *reasons* for combating the "defence of the fatherland" slogan). The author wishes to present "a clear picture of the state in general" (together with that of the imperialist predatory state). He quotes several statements by Marx and Engels, and arrives at the following two conclusions, among others:

a) "...It is absolutely wrong to seek the difference between socialists and anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to organise social production on new lines, as centralised, i.e., technically the most progressive, method of production, whereas decentralised, anarchist production would mean retrogression to obsolete techniques, to the old form of enterprise." This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the socialists' and anarchists' attitude *towards the state*. However, he answers *not* this question, but *another*, namely, the difference in their attitude towards the economic foundation of future society. That, of course, is an important and necessary question. But that is no reason to ignore the *main* point of difference between socialists and anarchists in their attitude towards the state. Socialists are in favour of utilising the present state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, maintaining also that the state should be used for a specific form of transition from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is *also* a state.

The anarchists want to "abolish" the state, "blow it up" (*sprengen*) as Comrade Nota-Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the socialists. The socialists—unfortunately the author quotes Engels's relevant

words rather incompletely—hold that the state will "wither away", will gradually "fall asleep" *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated.

b) "Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasise its hostility to the state in principle.... The present war has shown how deeply the state idea has penetrated the souls of workers," writes Comrade Nota-Bene. In order to "emphasise" our "hostility" to the state "in principle" we must indeed understand it "clearly", and it is this clarity that our author lacks. His remark about the "state idea" is entirely muddled. It is un-Marxist and un-socialist. The point is not that the "state idea" has clashed with the repudiation of the state, but that opportunist policy (i.e., the opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (i.e., the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude towards the bourgeois state and towards utilising it against the bourgeoisie to overthrow the bourgeoisie). These are entirely different things. We hope to return to this very important subject in a separate article.[77]

3) The "declaration of principles of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations", published in issue No. 6 as the "Secretariat's draft", contains not a few inaccuracies, and does not contain the *main* thing: a clear comparison of the *three* fundamental trends (social-chauvinism, "Centre" and Left) now contending against each other in the socialist movement of all countries.

We repeat, these errors must be refuted and explained. At the same time we must make every effort to find points of contact and closer relations with youth organisations and help them in every way, but we must find the *proper* manner of approach to them.

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EFFORTS TO WHITEWASH OPPORTUNISM

The Paris *Nashe Slovo*,[78] recently suppressed by the French Government to oblige tsarism (the excuse being that copies of *Nashe Slovo* were found on the Russian soldiers who had mutinied in Marseilles!), was indignant over the "lamentable" role of Deputy Chkheidze. With the permission of the authorities, Chkheidze addressed public meetings in the Caucasus, appealing to the population not to create "disorder" (accompanied by looting of shops, etc.), but to organise co-operative societies, etc. A nice trip for an *alleged* Social-Democrat to make "under the protection of a governor, a colonel, a priest and a police captain" (*Nashe Slovo* No. 203).

L. Martov forthwith hastened to enter a noble protest in the Bund's *Bulletin* against "representing Chkheidze as a sort of [?? not "a sort of", but "the same sort as all the liquidators"[79]] extinguisher of the awakening revolutionary spirit". Martov's defence of Chkheidze proceeds along two lines: fact and principle.

He challenges the fact by declaring that *Nashe Slovo* quotes from a Caucasian Black-Hundred paper, and that those who spoke at the meeting with Chkheidze were Mikoladze, a retired officer "known in his uyezd as a radical public personality", and the priest Khundadze, who "in 1905 was prosecuted for participating in the Social-Democratic movement". ("It is well known," adds Martov, "that participation of village priests in the Georgian Social-Democratic movement is quite common.")

Such is Martov's "defence" of Chkheidze. And it is a very feeble defence. Even if Chkheidze's appearance on the same platform with a priest was reported by a Black-Hundred

paper it does not refute the *fact*, and Martov himself admits that the fact did occur.

That Khundadze "was prosecuted in 1905" proves absolutely nothing, for Gapon and Alexinsky were also "prosecuted" at that time. What party do Khundadze and Mikoladze belong to, or sympathise with, *now*? Are they *defencists*? That is what Martov ought to have ascertained if he were seeking the truth and not doing a cheap lawyer's job. In our press, a man "known in his uyezd as a radical public personality" ordinarily means simply a liberal landowner.

By shouting that *Nashe Slovo* has presented an "entirely false picture", Martov wishes to conceal the *truth*, which he has not refuted one iota.

But that is not the main thing. We have only the blossoms, the fruit is to come. Having failed to disprove Chkheidze's "lamentable" conduct by denying the fact, Martov *confirms* it by his defence of the *principle*.

"It remains beyond doubt," says Martov, "that Comrade [?? of Potresov and Co.?] Chkheidze found it necessary to speak out not only against the reactionary direction taken by the Caucasian disorders insofar as it fell [? they fell?] under the influence of the Black Hundreds, but also against those of its destructive forms (looting of shops, violence against merchants) which, generally speaking, popular discontent may assume even regardless of reactionary influences." Note the words: "It remains beyond doubt"!

Martov sings like a nightingale; V. Maklakov could do no better: the helplessness, disunity, "consternation and even ignorance" of the masses ... "'revolts' of this kind is not the path that leads to the goal, and in the final analysis are harmful from the standpoint of proletarian interests...." On the one hand, "it would be a bad revolutionary party that turned its back upon an incipient movement because it was accompanied by spontaneous and inexpedient excesses." On the other hand, "it would be a bad party that considered it its revolutionary duty to refrain from combating such excesses as inexpedient actions".... "Inasmuch as in Russia ... an organised campaign of struggle against the war has not yet begun [?], inasmuch as the scattered state of the class-conscious elements of the proletariat makes it impossible to compare our present position, not only with

1904-05, but even with 1914-15 [?], the popular unrest which flares up as a consequence of the high cost of living, etc., although a very important *symptom*, cannot [?] *directly* [?] become the source of that movement for which we are striving. The only way in which it may be 'utilised' expediently is by guiding the discontent that breaks out into the channels of some kind of organised struggle, without which there can be no question of the masses setting themselves revolutionary aims. For this reason, even [!!] appeals to organise co-operative societies, to compel municipal councils to fix prices, and for similar palliatives based on the development of the initiative of the masses, are more revolutionary [ha! ha!] and more fruitful than flirting.... Frivolous speculation is 'positively criminal'," etc.

It is difficult to keep calm when reading outrageous speeches like these. Even the Bundist editors appear to have realised that Martov was behaving dishonestly, and added an ambiguous promise to "return to the subject in a future issue"....

The question is as clear as clear can be. Let us assume that Chkheidze had to deal with a form of unrest which he considered inexpedient. Obviously it was his right and duty as a revolutionary to combat the *inexpedient* form—for the sake of what? For the sake of expedient *revolutionary* actions? Or for the sake of an expedient *liberal* struggle?

That is the whole point! And this is what Martov muddles up!

Mr. Chkheidze was "guiding" the rising revolutionary "mass discontent" "*into the channel*" of a *liberal* struggle (only peaceful co-operative societies, only legal pressure on the municipal councils, with the approval of the Governor, etc.), and not into the channel of an expedient *revolutionary* struggle. This is the crux of the question; but Martov goes on spouting in defence of a liberal policy.

A revolutionary Social-Democrat would say: "It is inexpedient to loot small shops. Let us organise a more impressive demonstration, simultaneously, say, with the Baku, Tiflis and Petrograd workers. Let us direct our hatred against the government; let us win over the part of the army that wants peace. Is *this* what Mr. Chkheidze said? No. He called for a "struggle" *acceptable to the liberals*!

Martov signed a "platform" recommending "revolutionary mass actions"[80]—one has to show oneself a revolutionary before the workers!—but when the first symptoms of such actions appear in Russia, he begins, by fair means or foul, to defend the "Left"-*liberal* Chkheidze.

"In Russia an organised campaign of struggle against the war has not yet begun...." In the first place, this is not true. It has begun, at any rate, in Petrograd, with manifestos, meetings, strikes, demonstrations. Secondly, *if* it has not begun in some other parts of the country, *it must be begun*. But Martov claims that the liberal campaign "begun" by Mr. Chkheidze is "more revolutionary".

What is this, if not whitewashing abominable opportunism?

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THE CHKHEIDZE FACTION AND ITS ROLE

We have maintained all along that Messrs. Chkheidze and Co. do *not* represent the Social-Democratic proletariat and that a genuine Social-Democratic Labour Party will never be reconciled or united with this faction. Our contention was based on the following incontrovertible facts: (1) Chkheidze's "save the country" formula does not in substance differ from defencism; (2) the Chkheidze faction has never opposed Mr. Potresov and Co., not even when Martov did; (3) the decisive fact: the faction has never opposed participation in the war industries committees.

Nobody has attempted to deny these facts. Chkheidze's adherents simply evade them.

The pressure of facts has increasingly compelled *Nashe Slovo* and Trotsky, who reproach us for our "factionalism", to take up the struggle against the O.C. and Chkheidze. The trouble, however, is that it was only "under pressure" (of our criticism and the criticism of the facts) that the *Nashe Slovo* supporters retreated from position to position; but they *have not yet said* the decisive word. Unity or a split with the Chkheidze faction? They are still afraid to decide!

No. 1 of the *Bulletin of the Bund Committee Abroad* (September 1916) contains a letter from Petrograd dated February 26, 1916. It is a valuable document and fully confirms our view. Its author declares unequivocally that there is "a definite crisis in the Menshevik camp itself", and what is particularly characteristic, he *says nothing* about the *Mensheviks opposed* to participation in the war industries committees! He has not seen or heard of them in Russia!

Three out of the five members of the Chkheidze faction, he writes, are opposed to the "defencist position" (like the O.C.) and *two are in favour of it*.

"Those who serve the faction," he writes, "are unable to shift the majority from the position it has taken. The local 'initiating group'[81], which rejects the defencist position, comes to the aid of the faction majority."

Those who serve the faction are liberal intellectuals of the type of Potresov, Maslov, Orthodox[82] and Co., who call themselves Social-Democrats. Our repeated assertions that this group of *intellectuals* is a "hotbed" of opportunism and of liberal-labour politics *have now been confirmed by a Bundist.*

He writes further: "Life [and not Purishkevich and Guchkov?] has brought to the fore ... a new organ, the workers group, which is more and more becoming the centre of the labour movement. [The writer means the Guchkov, or, to use an older term, the Stolypin labour movement; he recognises no other!] *A compromise was reached in the elections to the workers' group: not defence and self-defence, but salvation of the country, by which something broader was implied.*"

This is how a *Bundist* exposes Chkheidze and Martov's lies about him! *At the election* of the Guchkov gang (Gvozdyov, Breido, etc.) to the war industries committees, Chkheidze and the O.C. *entered into a compromise*. The Chkheidze formula is: a *compromise* with the Potresovs and the Gvozdyovs!

Martov concealed and is now concealing this.

The compromise did not end there. The policy statement was also drawn up on the basis of a compromise, which the *Bundist* characterises in this way:

"*Definiteness disappeared.*" "The representatives of the faction majority and of the 'initiating group' were dissatisfied because, after all, the statement is a big step towards formulation of a defencist position.... *In essence, the compromise is the position of German Social-Democracy, in application to Russia.*"

So writes a Bundist.

Clear enough, it would seem? There is a party, that of the O.C., Chkheidze and Potresov. Within it there are two contending wings; they *come to an agreement*, they compromise and remain in one party. The compromise is concluded *on the basis* of participation in the war industries committees. The only point of disagreement is how to formulate the "mo-

tives" (i.e., how to dupe the workers). As a result of the compromise we have, "in essence, the position of German Social-Democracy".

Well, were we not right when we said that the O.C. party was social-chauvinist, that, as a party, the O.C. and Chkheidze were the same as the Südekums in Germany?

Even a Bundist is compelled to admit their identity with the Südekums!

Neither Chkheidze and Co., nor the O.C. have ever expressed opposition to the compromise, although they are "dissatisfied" with it.

That was the position in February 1916. In April 1916, Martov appeared in Kienthal with a mandate from the "initiating group" to represent the *whole* O.C., the O.C. *in general*.

Is this not deceiving the International?

And see what we have now! Potresov, Maslov and Orthodox establish *their own* organ, *Dyelo*,[83] which is openly defencist; they *invite* Plekhanov *to contribute*; they enlist Messrs. Dmitriev, Cherevanin, Mayevsky, G. Petrovich, etc., the whole crowd of intellectuals who were formerly the mainstay of liquidationism. What I said on behalf of the Bolsheviks in *May 1910* (*Diskussionny Listok*[84]) about the final consolidation of the *independent-legalists' group** has been fully confirmed.

Dyelo takes up a brazenly chauvinist and reformist position. See how Mme. Orthodox falsifies Marx and by misquoting him makes him appear to be an ally of Hindenburg (all on "philosophical" grounds, mind you!), how Mr. Maslov (especially in *Dyelo* No. 2) champions reformism all along the line, how Mr. Potresov accuses Axelrod and Martov of "maximalism" and anarcho-syndicalism, how the magazine generally tries to palm off advocacy of defence as the cause of "democracy" while modestly evading the unpleasant question as to whether or not this reactionary war is being waged by tsarism for a predatory purpose, for throttling Galicia, Armenia, etc.

The Chkheidze faction and the O.C. are silent. Skobelev sends greetings to the "Liebknechts of all countries". The *real* Liebknecht has ruthlessly exposed and condemned

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* See present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 238-51.—*Ed.*

his own Scheidemanns and Kautskyites, whereas Skobelev remains in permanent harmony and friendship with the Russian Scheidemanns (Potresov and Co., Chkhenkeli, *et al.*) and with the Russian Kautskyites (Axelrod *et al.*)

On behalf of himself and of his friends abroad, Martov announces in *Golos*[85] No. 2 (Samara, September 20, 1916) a refusal to contribute to *Dyelo*, but *at the same time* he whitewashes Chkheidze; *at the same time* (*Izvestia* No. 6, September 12, 1916) he asserts that he has parted with Trotsky and *Nashe Slovo* because of the "Trotsky" idea of repudiating the bourgeois revolution in Russia. But everybody knows that this is a lie, that Martov left *Nashe Slovo* because the latter could not tolerate Martov's *whitewashing* of the O.C.! In the same *Izvestia* Martov *defends* his deception of the German public, which even roused the indignation of Roland-Holst. He published a pamphlet in German from which he omitted *the very part* of the Petrograd and Moscow Mensheviks' policy statement in which they announced their *willingness to participate* in the war industries committees![86]

Recall the controversy between Trotsky and Martov in *Nashe Slovo* prior to the latter's resignation from the Editorial Board. Martov reproached Trotsky for not having made up his mind whether or not he would follow Kautsky at the decisive moment. Trotsky retorted that Martov was playing the part of a "bait", a "decoy", trying to entice the revolutionary workers into the opportunist and chauvinist party of the Potresovs, then the O.C., etc.

Both sides repeated *our* arguments. And both were right.

However much the truth about Chkheidze and Co. may be concealed, it will come to light. Chkheidze's role is to compromise with the Potresovs, to *camouflage* opportunist and chauvinist politics by vague or near-"Left" phrases. And Martov's role is to whitewash Chkheidze.

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BOURGEOIS PACIFISM AND SOCIALIST PACIFISM[87]

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BOURGEOIS PACIFISM AND SOCIALIST PACIFISM[57]

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ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) I

THE TURN IN WORLD POLITICS

There are symptoms that such a turn has taken place, or is about to take place, namely, a turn from imperialist war to imperialist peace.

The following are the outstanding symptoms: both imperialist coalitions are undoubtedly severely exhausted; continuing the war has become difficult; the capitalists generally, and finance capital in particular, find it difficult to skin the people substantially more than they have done already in the form of outrageous "war" profits; finance capital in the neutral countries, the United States, Holland, Switzerland, etc., which has made enormous profits out of the war, is satiated; the shortage of raw materials and food supplies makes it difficult for it to continue this "profitable" business; Germany is making strenuous efforts to induce one or another ally of England, her principal imperialist rival, to desert her; the German Government has made pacifist pronouncements, followed by similar pronouncements by a number of neutral governments.

Are there any chances for a speedy end to the war?

It is very hard to give a positive reply to this question. In our opinion, two possibilities present themselves rather definitely.

First, conclusion of a separate peace between Germany and Russia, though perhaps not in the usual form of a formal written treaty. Second, no such peace will be concluded; England and her allies are still in a position to hold out for another year or two, etc. If the first assumption is correct the war will come to an end, if not immediately, then in the very near future, and no important changes in its course can be expected. If the second assumption is correct, then the war may continue indefinitely.

Let us examine the first possibility.

That negotiations for a separate peace between Germany and Russia were conducted quite recently, that Nicholas II himself, or the top Court clique, favour such a peace, that a turn has taken place in world politics from a Russo-British imperialist alliance against Germany to a no less imperialist Russo-German alliance against England—all that is beyond doubt.

The replacement of Stürmer by Trepov, the tsarist government's public declaration that Russia's "right" to Constantinople has been recognised by all the Allies, and the setting up by Germany of a separate Polish state—these seem to indicate that the separate peace negotiations have ended in failure. Perhaps tsarism entered into them *solely* to blackmail England, obtain formal and unambiguous recognition of Nicholas the Bloody's "right" to Constantinople and certain "weighty" guarantees of that right?

There is nothing improbable in that assumption, considering that the main, fundamental purpose of the present imperialist war is the division of the spoils among the three principal imperialist rivals, the three robbers, Russia, Germany and England.

On the other hand, the clearer it becomes to tsarism that there is no practical, military possibility of regaining Poland, winning Constantinople, breaking Germany's iron front, which she is magnificently straightening out, shortening and strengthening by her recent victories in Rumania, the more tsarism is finding itself *compelled* to conclude a separate peace with Germany, *that is*, to abandon its imperialist alliance with England against Germany for an imperialist alliance with Germany against England. And why not? Was not Russia on the verge of war with England as a result of their imperialist rivalry over the division of the spoils in Central Asia? And did not England and Germany negotiate in 1898 for an alliance *against* Russia? They secretly agreed then to divide up the Portuguese colonies "in the event" of Portugal failing to meet her financial obligations!

The growing trend among leading imperialist circles in Germany towards an alliance with Russia against England was already clearly defined several months ago. The basis of

this alliance, apparently, is to be the partition of Galicia (it is very important for tsarism to strangle the centre of Ukrainian agitation and Ukrainian liberty), Armenia and *perhaps Rumania*! In fact there was a "hint" in a German newspaper that Rumania might be divided among Austria, Bulgaria and Russia! Germany could agree to other minor concessions to tsarism if only she could achieve an alliance with Russia, and perhaps also with Japan, against England.

A separate peace between Nicholas II and Wilhelm II could have been concluded secretly. There have been instances in diplomatic history of treaties known only to two or three persons and kept secret from everyone else, even Cabinet Ministers. Diplomatic history knows instances of the "Great Powers" gathering at "European" congresses after the principal rivals had secretly decided the main questions among themselves (for example, the secret agreement between Russia and England to plunder Turkey, prior to the Berlin Congress of 1878). It would not be at all surprising if tsarism rejected a formal separate peace between the governments for the reason, among others, that the present situation in Russia might result in Milyukov and Guchkov, or Milyukov and Kerensky, taking over the government, while at the same time, it may have concluded a secret, informal, but none the less "durable" treaty with Germany to the effect that the two "high contracting parties" undertake jointly to pursue *such-and-such* a policy at the forthcoming peace congress!

It is impossible to say whether or not this assumption is correct. At any rate, it is a thousand times nearer the *truth*, is a far better description of *things as they actually are* than are the pious phrases about peace between the present governments, or between any bourgeois governments for that matter, on the basis of no annexations, etc. These phrases either express innocent desires or are hypocrisy and lies meant to conceal the truth. And the truth of the present time, of the present war, of the present attempts to conclude peace, is the *division of the imperialist spoils*. That is at the bottom of it all; and to understand this truth, to express it, "to show things as they actually are", is the fundamental task of socialist policy as distinct from bourgeois policy, the principal aim of which is to conceal, to gloss over this truth.

Both imperialist coalitions have grabbed a certain amount of loot, and the two principal and most powerful of the robbers, Germany and England, have grabbed most. England has not lost an inch of her territory or of her colonies; but she has "acquired" the German colonies and part of Turkey (Mesopotamia). Germany has lost nearly all her colonies, but has acquired immeasurably more valuable territory in Europe, having seized Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, part of France, part of Russia, etc. The fight now is over the division of the loot, and the "chieftain" of each of the robber gangs, i.e., England and Germany, must to some degree reward his allies, who, with the exception of Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Italy, have lost a great deal. The weakest of the allies have lost most: in the English coalition, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania have been crushed; in the German coalition, Turkey has lost Armenia and part of Mesopotamia.

So far Germany has secured undoubtedly far more loot than England. So far Germany has won; she has proved to be far stronger than anyone anticipated before the war. Naturally, therefore, it would be to Germany's advantage to conclude peace as speedily as possible, for her rival might still be able, given the most favourable opportunity conceivable (although not very probably), to mobilise a larger reserve of recruits, etc.

Such is the *objective* situation. Such is the present position in the struggle for the division of the imperialist loot. It is quite natural that *this* situation should give rise to pacifist strivings, declarations and pronouncements, mainly on the part of the bourgeoisie and governments of the German coalition and of the neutral countries. It is equally natural that the bourgeoisie and *its* governments are compelled to exert every effort to hoodwink the people, to cover up the hideous nakedness of an imperialist peace—the division of the loot—by phrases, utterly false phrases about a democratic peace, the liberty of small nations, armaments reduction, etc.

But while it is natural for the bourgeoisie to try to hoodwink the people, how are the socialists fulfilling their duty? This we shall deal with in the next article (or chapter).

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) II
THE PACIFISM OF KAUTSKY AND TURATI

Kautsky is the most authoritative theoretician of the Second International, the most prominent leader of the so-called "Marxist centre" in Germany, the representative of the opposition which organised a separate group in the Reichstag, the Social-Democratic Labour Group (Haase, Ledebour and others). A number of Social-Democratic newspapers in Germany are now publishing articles by Kautsky on the terms of peace, which paraphrase the official Social-Democratic Labour Group declaration on the German Government's well-known note proposing peace negotiations. The declaration, which calls on the German Government to propose definite terms of peace, contains the following characteristic statement:

"...In order that this [German Government] note may lead to peace, all countries must unequivocally renounce all thought of annexing foreign territory, of the political, economic or military subjection of any people whatsoever...."

In paraphrasing and concretising this, Kautsky set out to "prove" in his lengthy articles that Constantinople must not go to Russia and that Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone.

Let us take a closer look at these political slogans and arguments of Kautsky and his associates.

In a matter that affects Russia, i.e., Germany's imperialist rival, Kautsky advances, not abstract or "general" demands, but a very concrete, precise and definite demand: Constantinople must not go to Russia. He thereby *exposes* the *real* imperialist designs ... of Russia. In a matter that affects Germany, however, i.e., the country where the majority of the party, which regards Kautsky as its member (and appointed him editor of its principal, leading theoretical organ, *Die Neue Zeit*), is helping the bourgeoisie and the government to conduct an imperialist war, Kautsky does *not* expose the *concrete* imperialist designs of *his own* government, but confines himself to a "general" desideratum or proposition: Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone!!

How, in substance, does Kautsky's policy differ from that of the militant, so to speak, social-chauvinists (i.e., socialists in words but chauvinists in deeds) of France and England? While frankly exposing the concrete imperialist actions of Germany, they make shift with "general" desiderata or propositions when it is a matter of countries or nations conquered by England and Russia. They shout about the seizure of Belgium and Serbia, but are silent about the seizure of Galicia, Armenia, the African colonies.

Actually, both the policy of Kautsky and that of Sembat and Henderson help *their* respective imperialist governments by focusing attention on the wickedness of their rival and enemy, while throwing a veil of vague, general phrases and sentimental wishes around the *equally* imperialist conduct of "*their own*" bourgeoisie. We would cease to be Marxists, we would cease to be socialists in general, if we confined ourselves to the Christian, so to speak, contemplation of the benignity of benign general phrases and refrained from exposing their *real* political significance. Do we not constantly see the diplomacy of all the imperialist powers flaunting magnanimous "general" phrases and "democratic" declarations in order to *conceal* their robbery, violation and strangulation of small nations?

"Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone...." If I say no more than that, the impression is that I favour Turkey's complete freedom. As a matter of fact, I am merely repeating a phrase usually uttered by German, diplomats who are *deliberately* lying and deceiving, and employ that phrase to conceal the *fact* that Germany *has already* converted Turkey into her financial *and* military vassal! And if I am a German socialist, my "general" phrases can only be to the *advantage* of German diplomacy, for their real significance is that they put German imperialism *in a good light*.

"All countries must renounce all thought of annexations... of the economic subjection of any people whatsoever...." What magnanimity! A thousand times the imperialists have "renounced all thought" of annexations and of the financial strangulation of weak nations. But should we not compare these renunciations with the *facts*, which show that any one of the big banks of Germany, England, France and the United States *does hold* small nations "*in subjection*"?

Can the present bourgeois government of a wealthy country *really* renounce annexations and the economic subjugation of alien peoples when millions and millions have been invested in the railways and other enterprises of weak nations?

Who is really fighting annexations, etc.? Those who bandy magnanimous phrases, which, objectively, have the same significance as the Christian holy water sprinkled on the crowned and capitalist robbers? Or those who explain to the workers the impossibility of eliminating annexations and financial strangulation without overthrowing the imperialist bourgeoisie and its governments?

Here is an Italian illustration of the kind of pacifism Kautsky preaches.

Avanti!, the Central Organ of the Socialist Party of Italy, of December 25, 1916, contains an article by the well-known reformist, Filippo Turati, entitled "Abracadabra". On November 22, 1916, he writes, the socialist group tabled a peace resolution in the Italian Parliament. It declared that "the principles proclaimed by the representatives of England and Germany were identical, and these principles should be made the basis of a possible peace"; and it invited "the government to start peace negotiations through the mediation of the United States and other neutral countries". This is Turati's own account of the socialist proposal.

On December 6, 1916, the Chamber "buries" the socialist resolution by "adjourning" the debate on it. On December 12, the German Chancellor proposes in the Reichstag the very thing the Italian socialists proposed. On December 22, Wilson issues his Note which, in the words of Turati, "paraphrases and repeats the ideas and arguments of the socialist proposal". On December 23, other neutral countries come on the scene and paraphrase Wilson's Note.

We are accused of having sold ourselves to the Germans, exclaims Turati. Have Wilson and the neutral countries also sold themselves to Germany?

On December 17, Turati delivered a speech in Parliament, one passage of which caused an unusual and deserved sensation. This is the passage, quoted from the report in *Avanti!*:

"Let us assume that a discussion similar to the one proposed by Germany is able, in the main, to settle such

questions as the evacuation of Belgium and France, the restoration of Rumania, Serbia and, if you will, Montenegro; I will add the rectification of the Italian frontiers in regard to what is indisputably Italian and corresponds to guarantees of a strategical character".... At this point the bourgeois and chauvinist Chamber interrupts Turati, and from all sides the shout goes up: "Excellent! So you too want all this! Long live Turati! Long live Turati!"...

Apparently, Turati realised that there was something wrong about this bourgeois enthusiasm and tried to "correct" himself and "explain".

"Gentlemen," he said, "there is no occasion for irrelevant jesting. It is one thing to admit the relevance and right of national unity, which we have always recognised, but it is quite another thing to provoke, or justify, war for this aim."

But neither Turati's "explanation", nor the articles in *Avanti!* in his defence, nor Turati's letter of December 21, nor the article by a certain "B.B." in the Zurich *Volksrecht* can "correct" or explain away the fact that *Turati gave himself away*!... Or, more correct, not Turati, but the whole of socialist pacifism represented by Kautsky, and, as we shall see below, the French "Kautskyites", gave itself away. The Italian bourgeois press was right in seizing upon and exulting over this passage in Turati's speech.

The above-mentioned "B.B." tried to defend Turati by arguing that the latter referred only to "the right of nations to self-determination".

Poor defence! What has this to do with "the right of nations to self-determination", which, as everyone knows, the Marxist programme regards—and the programme of international democracy has always regarded—as referring to the defence of *oppressed* nations? What has it to do with the imperialist war, i.e., a war for the division of colonies, a war for the *oppression* of foreign countries, a war *among* predatory and oppressing powers to decide *which* of them shall oppress *more* foreign nations?

How does this argument about self-determination of nations, used to justify an imperialist, not national, war, differ from the speeches of Alexinsky, Hervé and Hyndman? They argue that *republican* France is opposed to monarchist

Germany, though everyone knows that this war is not due to the conflict between republican and monarchist principles, but is a war between two imperialist coalitions for the division of colonies, etc.

Turati explained and pleaded that he does *not* "justify" the war.

We will take the reformist, Kautskyite Turati's word for it that he did not *intend* to justify the war. But who does not know that in politics it is not intentions that count, but deeds, not good intentions, but facts, not the imaginary, but the real?

Let us assume that Turati did not want to justify the war and that Kautsky did not want to justify Germany's placing Turkey in the position of a vassal to German imperialism. But the *fact* remains that these two benign pacifists *did justify the war*! That is the point. Had Kautsky declared that "Constantinople must not go to Russia, Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone" not in a magazine which is so dull that nobody reads it, but in parliament, before a lively, impressionable bourgeois audience, full of southern temperament, it would not have been surprising if the witty bourgeois had exclaimed: "Excellent! Hear, hear! Long live Kautsky!"

Whether he intended to or not, deliberately or not, the fact is that Turati expressed the point of view of a bourgeois broker proposing a friendly deal between imperialist robbers. The "liberation" of Italian areas belonging to Austria would, *in fact*, be a concealed reward to the Italian bourgeoisie for participating in the imperialist war of a gigantic imperialist coalition. It would be a small sop thrown in, in addition to the share of the African colonies and spheres of influence in Dalmatia and Albania. It is natural, perhaps, for the reformist Turati to adopt the bourgeois standpoint; but Kautsky really differs in no way from Turati.

In order not to embellish the imperialist war and help the bourgeoisie falsely represent it as a national war, as a war for the liberation of nations, in order to avoid sliding into the position of bourgeois reformism, one must speak not in the language of Kautsky and Turati, but in the language of Karl Liebknecht: tell *one's own* bourgeoisie that they are hypocrites when they talk about national liberation, that

this war cannot result in a democratic peace unless the proletariat "turns its guns" against *its own* governments.

That is the only possible position of a genuine Marxist, of a genuine socialist and not a bourgeois reformist. Those who repeat the general, meaningless, non-committal, goody-goody desires of pacifism are not really working for a democratic peace. Only he is working for such a peace who exposes the imperialist nature of the present war and of the imperialist peace that is being prepared and calls upon the peoples to rise in revolt against the criminal governments.

At times some try to defend Kautsky and Turati by arguing that, legally, they could no more than "hint" at their opposition to the government, and that the pacifists of this stripe do make such "hints". The answer to that is, first, that the impossibility of legally speaking the truth is an argument not in favour of concealing the truth, but in favour of setting up an illegal organisation and press that would be free of police surveillance and censorship. Second, that moments occur in history when a socialist *is called upon* to break with all legality. Third, that even in the days of serfdom in Russia, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky managed to speak the truth, for example, by their silence on the Manifesto of February 19, 1861,[88] and their ridicule and castigation of the liberals, who made exactly the same kind of speeches as Turati and Kautsky.

In the next article we shall deal with French pacifism, which found expression in the resolutions passed by the two recently held congresses of French labour and socialist organisations.

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) III

THE PACIFISM OF THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND SYNDICALISTS

The congresses of the French General Confederation of Labour (Confédération générale du Travail)[89] and of the French Socialist Party[90] have just been held. The true significance and true role of socialist pacifism at the present moment were quite definitely revealed at these congresses.

This is the resolution passed *unanimously* at the trade union congress. The majority of the ardent chauvinists headed by

the notorious Jouhaux, the anarchist Broutchoux and ... the "Zimmerwaldist" Merrheim all voted for it:

"This Conference of National Corporative Federations, trade unions and labour exchanges, having taken cognisance of the Note of the President of the United States which 'invites all nations now at war with each other to publicly expound their views as to the terms upon which the war might be brought to an end'—

"requests the French Government to agree to this proposal;

"invites the government to take the initiative in making a similar proposal to its allies in order to speed the hour of peace;

"declares that the federation of nations, which is one of the guarantees of a final peace, can be secured only given the independence, territorial inviolability and political and economic liberty of all nations, big and small.

"The organisations represented at this conference pledge themselves to support and spread this idea among the masses of the workers in order to put an end to the present indefinite and ambiguous situation, which can only benefit secret diplomacy, against which the working class has always protested."

There you have a sample of "pure" pacifism, entirely in the spirit of Kautsky, a pacifism approved by an official labour organisation which has nothing in common with Marxism and is composed chiefly of chauvinists. We have before us an outstanding document, deserving the most serious attention, of the *political unity* of the chauvinists and the "Kautskyites" on a platform of hollow pacifist phrases. In the preceding article we tried to explain the *theoretical* basis of the unity of ideas of the chauvinists and the pacifists, of the bourgeois and the socialist reformists. Now we see this unity achieved *in practice* in another imperialist country.

At the Zimmerwald Conference, September 5-8, 1915, Merrheim declared: "Le parti, les Jouhaux, le gouvernement, ce ne sont que trois têtes sous un bonnet" ("The party, the Jouhaux and the government are three heads under one bonnet", i.e., they are all one). At the C.G.T. Conference, on December 26, 1916, Merrheim voted *together with Jouhaux* for a pacifist resolution. On December 23, 1916, one of the frankest and most extreme organs of the German social-

imperialists, the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, published a leading article entitled "The Disintegration of the Bourgeois Parties and the Restoration of Social-Democratic Unity". Needless to say, it praises peace-loving Südekum, Legien, Scheidemann and Co., the whole German Social-Democratic Party majority and, also, the peace-loving German Government. It proclaims: "The first party congress convened after the war must restore party unity, with the exception of the few fanatics who refuse to pay party dues [i.e., the adherents of Karl Liebknecht!]; ... Party unity based on the policy of the Party Executive, the Social-Democratic Reichstag group and the trade unions."

This is a supremely clear expression of the idea, and a supremely clear proclamation of the policy of "unity" between the avowed German social-chauvinists on the one hand and Kautsky and Co. and the Social-Democratic Labour Group on the other—unity on the basis of pacifist phrases—"unity" as achieved in France on December 26, 1916, between Jouhaux and Merrheim!

The Central Organ of the Socialist Party of Italy, *Avanti!*, writes in a leading article in its issue of December 28, 1916:

"Although Bissolati and Südekum, Bonomi and Scheidemann, Sembat and David, Jouhaux and Legien have deserted to the camp of bourgeois nationalism and have betrayed [*hanno tradito*] internationalist ideological unity, which they promised to serve faithfully and loyally, we shall stay together with our German comrades, men like Liebknecht, Ledebour, Hoffmann, Meyer, and with our French comrades, men like Merrheim, Blanc, Brizon, Raffin-Dugens, who have not changed and have not vacillated."

Note the confusion expressed in that statement:

Bissolati and Bonomi were *expelled* from the Socialist Party of Italy as reformists and chauvinists before the war. *Avanti!* puts them on the same level as Südekum, and Legien, and quite rightly, of course. But Südekum, David and Legien are at the head of the alleged Social-Democratic Party of Germany, which, in fact, is a social-chauvinist party, and yet this very *Avanti!* is opposed to their expulsion, opposed to a rupture with them, and opposed to the formation of a Third International. *Avanti!* quite correctly describes Legien and Jouhaux as deserters to the camp or

bourgeois nationalism and contrasts their conduct with that of Liebknecht, Ledebour, Merrheim and Brizon. But we have seen that Merrheim *votes on the same side as Jouhaux*, while Legien, in the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, declares his confidence that party unity will be restored, with the *single* exception, however, of Liebknecht supporters, i.e., "unity" *with* the Social-Democratic Labour Group (including Kautsky) to which Ledebour belongs!!

This confusion arises from the fact that *Avanti!* confuses bourgeois pacifism with revolutionary Social-Democratic internationalism, while experienced politicians like Legien and Jouhaux understand perfectly well that socialist and bourgeois pacifism are *identical*.

Why, indeed, should not M. Jouhaux and his organ, the chauvinist *La Bataille*,[91] rejoice at the "unanimity" between Jouhaux and Merrheim when, *in fact*, the unanimously adopted resolution, which we have quoted in full above, contains nothing but bourgeois pacifist phrases; *not a shadow* of revolutionary consciousness, *not a single* socialist idea!

Is it not ridiculous to talk of the "economic liberty of all nations, big and small", and yet not say a word about the fact that, until the bourgeois governments are overthrown and the bourgeoisie expropriated, this talk of "economic liberty" is just as much a *deception* of the people as talk of the "economic liberty" of the individual *in general*, of the small peasants and rich, workers and capitalists, in modern society?

The resolution Jouhaux and Merrheim unanimously voted for is thoroughly imbued with the very ideas of "bourgeois nationalism" that Jouhaux expresses, as *Avanti!* quite rightly points out, while, strangely enough, *failing* to observe that Merrheim expresses the same ideas.

Bourgeois nationalists always and everywhere flaunt "general" phrases about a "federation of nations" *in general* and about "economic liberty of all nations, big and small". But socialists, unlike bourgeois nationalists, always said and now say: rhetoric about "economic liberty of all nations, big and small", is disgusting hypocrisy as long as *certain* nations (for example, England and France) invest abroad, that is to say, lend at usurious interest to small and backward nations, *billions of francs*, and as long as the small and weak nations are in bondage to them.

Socialists could not have allowed a *single sentence* of the resolution, for which Jouhaux and Merrheim unanimously voted, to pass without strong protest. In direct contrast to that resolution, socialists would have declared that Wilson's pronouncement is a downright lie and sheer hypocrisy, because Wilson represents a bourgeoisie which has made billions out of the war, because he is the head of a government that has frantically armed the United States obviously in preparation for a *second* great imperialist war. Socialists would have declared that the French bourgeois government is tied hand and foot by finance capital, whose slave it is, and by the secret, imperialist, thoroughly predatory and reactionary treaties with England, Russia, etc., and therefore cannot do or say anything except utter the same lies about a democratic and a "just" peace. Socialists would have declared that the struggle for such a peace cannot be waged by repeating general, vapid, benign, sentimental, meaningless and non-committal pacifist phrases, which merely serve to embellish the foulness of imperialism. It can be waged only by telling the people the *truth*, by telling the people that in order to obtain a democratic and just peace the bourgeois governments of all the belligerent countries must be overthrown, and that for this purpose advantage must be taken of the fact that millions of workers are armed and that the high cost of living and the horrors of the imperialist war have roused the anger of the masses.

This is what socialists should have said instead of what is said in the Jouhaux-Merrheim resolution.

The Congress of the French Socialist Party, which took place in Paris simultaneously with that of the C.G.T., not only refrained from saying this, but passed a resolution that is *even worse* than the one mentioned above. It was adopted by 2,838 votes against 109, with 20 abstentions, that is to say, by a bloc of the social-chauvinists (Renaudel and Co., the so-called "*majoritaires*") and the *Longuet-ists* (supporters of Longuet, the French Kautskyites)!! Moreover, the Zimmerwaldist Bourderon and the Kienthalian Raffin-Dugens voted for this resolution!!

We shall not quote the resolution—it is inordinately long and totally uninteresting: it contains benign, sentimental phrases about peace, *immediately followed* by declara-

tions of readiness to continue to support the so-called "national defence" of France, i.e., the imperialist war France is waging in alliance with bigger and more powerful robbers like England and Russia.

In France, unity of the social-chauvinists with pacifists (or Kautskyites) and a section of the Zimmerwaldists has become a fact, not only in the C.G.T., but also in the Socialist Party.

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) IV

ZIMMERWALD AT THE CROSSROADS

The French newspapers containing the report of the C.G.T. Congress were received in Berne on December 28, and on December 30, Berne and Zurich socialist newspapers published another manifesto by the Berne I.S.K. (Internationale Sozialistische Kommission), the International Socialist Committee, the executive body of Zimmerwald. Dated the end of December 1916, the manifesto refers to the peace proposals advanced by Germany and by Wilson and the other neutral countries, and all these governmental pronouncements are described, and quite rightly described, of course, as a "farcical game of peace", "a game to deceive their own peoples", "hypocritical pacifist diplomatic gesticulations".

As against this farce and falsehood the manifesto declares that the "only force" capable of bringing about peace, etc., is the "firm determination" of the international proletariat to "turn their weapons, not against their brothers, but against the enemy in their own country".

The passages we have quoted clearly reveal the two fundamentally distinct policies which have lived side by side, as it were, up to now in the Zimmerwald group, but which have now finally parted company.

On the one hand, Turati quite definitely and correctly states that the proposals made by Germany, Wilson, etc., were merely a "*paraphrase*" of Italian "socialist" pacifism; the declaration of the German social-chauvinists and the voting of the French have shown that both fully appreciate the value for *their* policy of the pacifist screen.

On the other hand, the International Socialist Committee manifesto describes the pacifism of all belligerent and neutral governments as a farce and hypocrisy.

On the one hand, Jouhaux joins with Merrheim; Bourderon, Longuet and Raffin-Dugens join with Renaudel, Sembat and Thomas, while the German social-chauvinists, Südekum, David and Scheidemann, announce the forthcoming "restoration of Social-Democratic Unity" with Kautsky and the Social-Democratic Labour Group.

On the other hand, the International Socialist Committee calls upon the "socialist minorities" vigorously to fight "their own governments" and "their social-patriot hirelings" (*Söldlinge*).

Either one thing, or the other.

Either expose the vapidity, stupidity and hypocrisy of bourgeois pacifism, *or* "paraphrase" it into "socialist" pacilism. Fight the Jouhaux, Renaudels, Legiens and Davids as the "hirelings" of the governments, *or* join with them in empty pacifist declamations on the French or German models.

That is now the dividing line between the Zimmerwald Right, which has always strenuously opposed a break with the social-chauvinists, and the Left, which at the Zimmerwald Conference had the foresight publicly to dissociate itself from the Right and to put forward, at the Conference and after it in the press, its own platform. It is no accident that the approach of peace, or even the intense discussion by certain bourgeois elements of the peace issue, has led to a very marked divergence between the two policies. To bourgeois pacifists and their "socialist" imitators, or echoers, peace has always been a fundamentally distinct concept, for neither has ever understood that "war is the continuation of the policies of peace and peace the continuation of the policies of war". Neither the bourgeois nor the social-chauvinist wants to see that the imperialist war of 1914-17 is the continuation of the imperialist policies of 1898-1914, if not of an even earlier period. Neither the bourgeois pacifists nor the socialist pacifists realise that without the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois governments, peace *now* can only be an imperialist peace, a continuation of the imperialist war.

In appraising the present war, they use meaningless, vulgar, philistine phrases about aggression or defence in general, and use the same philistine commonplaces in appraising the peace, disregarding the concrete historical situa-

tion, the actual concrete struggle between the imperialist powers. And it was quite natural for the social-chauvinists, these agents of the governments and the bourgeoisie in the workers' parties, to seize upon the approach of peace in particular, or even upon mere peace talk, in order to *gloss over* the depth of their reformism and opportunism, exposed by the war, and restore their undermined influence over the masses. Hence, the social-chauvinists in Germany and in France, as we have seen, are making strenuous efforts to "unite" with the flabby, unprincipled pacifist section of the "opposition".

Efforts to gloss over the divergence between the two irreconcilable lines of policy will certainly be made also in the Zimmerwald group. One can foresee that they will follow two lines. A "practical business" conciliation by mechanically combining loud revolutionary phrases (like those in the International Socialist Committee manifesto) with opportunist and pacifist practice. That is what happened in the Second International. The arch-revolutionary phrases in the manifestos of Huysmans and Vandervelde and in certain congress resolutions merely served as a screen for the arch-opportunist practice of the majority of the European parties, but they did not change, disrupt or combat this practice. It is doubtful whether these tactics will again be successful in the Zimmerwald group.

The "conciliators in principle" will try to falsify Marxism by arguing, for example, that reform does not exclude revolution, that an imperialist peace with certain "improvements" in nationality frontiers, or in international law, or in armaments expenditure, etc., is possible side by side with the revolutionary movement, as "one of the aspects of the development" of that movement, and so on and so forth.

This would be a falsification of Marxism. Reforms do not, of course, exclude revolution. But that is not the point at issue. The point is that revolutionaries must not exclude *themselves*, not give way to reformism, i.e., that socialists should not substitute reformist work for their revolutionary work. Europe is experiencing a revolutionary situation. The war and the high cost of living are aggravating the situation. The transition from war to peace will not necessarily eliminate the revolutionary situation, for there are no grounds

whatever for believing that the millions of workers who now have excellent weapons in their hands will necessarily permit themselves to be "peacefully disarmed" by the bourgeoisie instead of following the advice of Karl Liebknecht, i.e., turning their weapons against *their own* bourgeoisie.

The question is not, as the pacifist Kautskyites maintain: either a reformist political campaign, or else the renunciation of reforms. That is a bourgeois presentation of the question. The question is: either revolutionary struggle, the by-product of which, in the event of its not being fully successful, is reforms (the whole history of revolutions throughout the world has proved this), or nothing but talk about reforms and the promise of reforms.

The reformism of Kautsky, Turati and Bourderon, which now comes out in the form of pacifism, not only leaves aside the question of revolution (this *in itself* is a betrayal of socialism), not only abandons in practice all systematic and persistent revolutionary work, but even goes to the length of declaring that street demonstrations are adventurism (Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, November 26, 1915). It goes to the length of advocating and implementing unity with the outspoken and determined opponents of revolutionary struggle, the Südekums, Legiens, Renaudels, Thomases, etc., etc.

This reformism is absolutely irreconcilable with revolutionary Marxism, the duty of which is to take the utmost possible advantage of the present revolutionary situation in Europe in order openly to urge revolution, the overthrow of the bourgeois governments, the conquest of power by the armed proletariat, while at the same time not renouncing, and not refusing to utilise, reforms in developing the revolutionary struggle and in the course of that struggle.

The immediate future will show what course events in Europe will follow, particularly the struggle between reformist pacifism and revolutionary Marxism, including the struggle between the two Zimmerwald sections.

Zurich, January 1, 1917

AN OPEN LETTER TO BORIS SOUVARINE[92]

Citizen Souvarine says his letter is addressed also to me. I take all the greater pleasure in replying, since his article touches on vital problems of international socialism.

Souvarine believes that those who consider "defence of the fatherland" to be incompatible with socialism are taking an "unpatriotic" view. As for himself, he "defends" the view of Turati, Ledebour, Brizon who, while voting against war credits, declare that they accept "defence of the fatherland"; in other words, he defends the trend known as the "Centre" (the "marsh", I would say), or as Kautskyism—after its chief theoretical and literary exponent, Karl Kautsky. I might remark, in passing, that Souvarine is wrong in maintaining that "they [i.e., the Russian comrades who speak of the collapse of the Second International] equate men like Kautsky, Longuet, etc... with nationalists of the Scheidemann and Renaudel type". Neither I nor the Party to which I belong (the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee) have ever equated the social-chauvinist viewpoint with that of the "Centre". In our official Party statements, in the Central Committee manifesto published November 1, 1914*, and in the resolutions adopted in March 1915** (both documents are reproduced *in extenso* in our pamphlet *Socialism and War*,*** which is known to Souvarine), we have always drawn a dividing line between the social-chauvinists and the "Centre". The former, in our opinion, have defected to the bourgeoisie. With regard to them we demand not merely struggle, but a split. The latter hesitate, vacillate, and their efforts to unite the socialist

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338.—*Ed.*

masses with the chauvinist leaders cause the greatest damage to the proletariat.

Souvarine says he wants to "examine the facts from a Marxist viewpoint".

But from a Marxist viewpoint, such general and abstract definitions as "unpatriotic" are of absolutely no value. The fatherland, the nation are historical categories. I am not at all opposed to wars waged in defence of democracy or against national oppression, nor do I fear such words as "defence of the fatherland" in reference to these wars or to insurrections. Socialists always side with the oppressed and, consequently, cannot be opposed to wars whose purpose is democratic or socialist struggle against oppression. It would therefore be absurd to deny the legitimacy of the wars of 1793, of France's wars against the reactionary European monarchies, or of the Garibaldi wars, etc.... And it would be just as absurd not to recognise the legitimacy of wars of oppressed nations against their oppressors, wars that might break out today—rebellion of the Irish against England, for instance, rebellion of Morocco against France, or the Ukraine against Russia, etc....

The Marxist viewpoint requires that in each individual case we define the political content of the war.

But what determines the political content of a war?

Every war is only the continuation of policy. What kind of policy is being continued in the present war? The policy of the proletariat, which from 1871 to 1914 was the sole exponent of socialism and democracy in France, England and Germany? Or imperialist policy, the policy of colonial rapine and oppression of weak nations by the reactionary, decadent and moribund bourgeoisie?

The question has only to be squarely put and we get a perfectly clear answer: the present war is an imperialist war. It is a war of slave-owners quarrelling over their chattels and eager to consolidate and perpetuate slavery. It is the "capitalist brigandage" of which Jules Guesde spoke in 1899, thereby condemning in advance his own betrayal. Guesde said at the time:

"There are other wars ... they arise every day, wars for the acquisition of markets. This kind of war does not disappear, but, on the contrary, bids fair to become continuous. It is chiefly a war between the

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capitalists of all countries for profits and possession of the world market, and it is fought at the price of our blood. Now, just imagine that in each of the capitalist countries of Europe, this mutual slaughter for the sake of plunder is directed by a socialist! Just imagine an English Millerand, an Italian Millerand a German Millerand, in addition to a French Millerand, working to embroil the proletarians in this capitalist brigandage and make them fight each other! What would remain, I ask you, comrades, of international solidarity? On the day the Millerands became a common phenomenon, we would have to say 'farewell' to all internationalism and become nationalists, and this neither you nor I will ever agree to (Jules Guesde, *En Garde!*, Paris, 1911, pp. 175-76).

It is not true that France is waging this 1914-17 war for freedom, national independence, democracy, and so on.... She is fighting to retain her colonies, and for England to retain hers, colonies to which Germany would have had a much greater right—from the standpoint of bourgeois law, of course. She is fighting to give Russia Constantinople, etc.... Consequently, this war is being waged not by democratic and revolutionary France, not by the France of 1792, nor the France of 1848, nor the France of the Commune. It is being waged by bourgeois France, reactionary France, that ally and friend of tsarism, the "world usurer" (the expression is not mine, it belongs to Lysis, a contributor to *l'Humanité*[93]), who is defending his booty, his "sacred right" to possess colonies, his "freedom" to exploit the entire world with the help of the millions loaned to weaker or poorer nations.

Do not tell me it is hard to distinguish between revolutionary and reactionary wars. You want me to indicate a purely practical criterion that would be understood by all, in addition to the scientific criterion indicated above?

Here it is: Every fair-sized war is prepared beforehand. When a revolutionary war is being prepared, democrats and socialists *are not afraid to state in advance* that they favour "defence of the fatherland" in this war. When however, in contrast, a reactionary war is being prepared, no socialist will *venture to state in advance*, that is, before war is declared, meaning that he will favour "defence of the fatherland".

Marx and Engels were not afraid to urge the German people to fight Russia in 1848 and 1859.

In contrast, at their Basle Congress in 1912 the socialists

did not venture to speak of "defence of the fatherland" in the war they could see was maturing and which broke out in 1914.

Our Party is not afraid to declare publicly that it will sympathise with wars or uprisings which Ireland might start against England; Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia against France; Tripoli against Italy; the Ukraine, Persia, China against Russia, etc.

But what of the social-chauvinists? And the "Centrists"? Will they have the courage openly and officially to state that they favour, or will favour, "defence of the fatherland" in the event of war breaking out between, say, Japan and the United States, a clearly imperialist war prepared over the course of many years, and one which would imperil many hundreds of millions of people? I dare them! I am prepared to wager that they will not, for they know only too well that if they make such a statement, they will become a laughing-stock in the eyes of the workers, they will be jeered at and driven out of the socialist parties. That is why the social-chauvinists and those in the "Centre" will avoid any open statement and will continue to wriggle, lie and confuse the issue, seeking refuge in all manner of sophisms, like this one in the resolution of the last, 1915 French party congress: "An attacked country has the right to defence."

As if the question were: *Who was the first to attack*, and not: *What are the causes of the war? What are its aims? Which classes are waging it?* Could one imagine, for example, a sane-minded socialist recognising England's right to "defence of the fatherland" in 1796, when the French revolutionary troops began to fraternise with the Irish? And yet it was the French who had attacked England and were actually preparing to land in Ireland. And could we, tomorrow, recognise the right to "defence of the fatherland" for Russia and England, if, after they had been taught a lesson by Germany, they were attacked by Persia in alliance with India, China and other revolutionary nations of Asia performing their 1789 and 1793?

That is my reply to the really ludicrous charge that we share Tolstoy's views. Our Party has rejected both the Tolstoy doctrine and pacifism, declaring that socialists must seek to transform the present war into a civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, for socialism.

Should you object that this is utopian, I will answer that the bourgeoisie of France, England, etc., do not, apparently, subscribe to that opinion. They would not play so vile and ridiculous a role, going to the length of jailing or conscripting "pacifists", had they not felt and foreseen the inevitable and steady rise of revolution and its early approach.

This leads me to the question of a split, raised also by Souvarine. A split! That is the bogy with which the socialist leaders are trying to frighten others, and which they themselves fear so much! "What useful purpose could *now* be served by the foundation of a new International?"—Souvarine asks. "Its activity would be blighted by sterility, for numerically it would be very weak."

But the day-to-day facts show that, *precisely because they are afraid of a split*, the "activity" of Pressemane and Longuet in France, Kautsky and Ledebour in Germany, is blighted by sterility! And precisely because Karl Liebknecht and Otto Rühle in Germany were not afraid of a split, openly declaring that a split was *necessary* (cf. Rühle's letter in *Vorwärts*, January 12, 1916), and did not hesitate to carry it out—their activity is of vast importance for the proletariat, *despite their numerical weakness*. Liebknecht and Rühle are only two against 108. But these two represent millions, the exploited mass, the overwhelming majority of the population, the future of mankind, the revolution that is mounting and maturing with every passing day. The 108, on the other hand, represent only the servile spirit of a handful of bourgeois flunkies within the proletariat. Brizon's activities, when he shares the weaknesses of the Centre or the marsh, are blighted by sterility. And, conversely, they cease to be sterile, help to awaken, organise and stimulate the proletariat, when Brizon really demolishes "unity", when he courageously proclaims in parliament "Down with the war!", or when he publicly speaks the truth, declaring that the Allies are fighting to give Russia Constantinople.

The genuine revolutionary internationalists are numerically weak? Nonsense! Take France in 1780, or Russia in 1900. The politically-conscious and determined revolutionaries, who in France represented the bourgeoisie—the revolutionary class of that era—and in Russia today's revolutionary class—the proletariat, were extremely weak

numerically. They were only a few, comprising at the most only 1/10,000, or even 1/100,000, of their class. Several years later, however, these few, this allegedly negligible minority, led the masses, millions and tens of millions of people. Why? Because this minority really represented the interests of these masses, because it believed in the coming revolution, because it was prepared to serve it with supreme devotion.

Numerical weakness? But since when have revolutionaries made their policies dependent on whether they are in a majority or minority? In November 1914, when our Party called for a split with the opportunists,* declaring that the split was the only correct and fitting reply to their betrayal in August 1914, to many that seemed to be a piece of insensate sectarianism coming from men who had completely lost all contact with real life. Two years have passed, and what is happening? In England, the split is an accomplished fact. The social-chauvinist Hyndman has been forced to leave the party. In Germany, a split is developing before everyone's eyes. The Berlin, Bremen and Stuttgart organisations have even been accorded the honour of being expelled from the party ... from the party of the Kaiser's lackeys, the party of the German Renaudels, Sembats, Thomases, Guesdes and Co. And in France? On the one hand, the party of these gentlemen states that it remains true to "fatherland defence". On the other, the Zimmerwaldists state, in their pamphlet *The Zimmerwald Socialists and the War*, that "defence of the fatherland" is unsocialist. Isn't this a split?

And how can men who, after two years of this greatest world crisis, give diametrically opposite answers to the supreme question of modern proletarian tactics, work faithfully side by side, within one and the same party?

Look at America—apart from everything else a neutral country. Haven't we the beginnings of a split there, too: Eugene. Debs, the "American Bebel", declares in the socialist press that he recognises only one type of war, civil war for the victory of socialism, and that he would sooner be shot than vote a single cent for American war expenditure (see *Appeal to Reason*[94] No. 1032, September 11, 1915). On the

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34.—*Ed.*

other hand, the American Renaudels and Sembats advocate "national defence" and "preparedness". The American Longuets and Pressemanes—the poor souls!— are trying to bring about a reconciliation between social-chauvinists and revolutionary internationalists.

Two Internationals already exist. One is the International of Sembat-Südekum-Hyndman-Plekhanov and Co. The other is the International of Karl Liebknecht, MacLean (the Scottish school-master whom the English bourgeoisie sentenced to hard labour for supporting the workers' class struggle), Höglund (the Swedish M. P. and one of the founders of the Zimmerwald Left sentenced to hard labour for his revolutionary propaganda against the war), the five Duma members exiled to Siberia for life for their propaganda against the war, etc. On the one hand, there is the International of those *who are helping their own governments wage the imperialist war*, and on the other, the International of those *who are waging a revolutionary fight against the imperialist war*. Neither parliamentary eloquence nor the "diplomacy" of socialist "statesmen" can unite these two Internationals. The Second International has outlived itself. The Third International has already been born. And if it has not yet been baptised by the high priests and Popes of the Second International but, on the contrary, has been anathemised (see Vandervelde's and Stauning's speeches), this is not preventing it from gaining strength with every passing day. The Third International will enable the proletariat to rid itself of opportunists and will lead the masses to victory in the maturing and approaching social revolution.

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words in reply to Souvarine's personal polemics. He asks (the socialists now residing in Switzerland) to moderate their personal criticism of Bernstein, Kautsky, Longuet, etc.... For my part, I must say that I cannot accept that. And I would point out to Souvarine, first of all, that my criticism of the "Centre" is political, not personal. Nothing can restore the mass influence of the Südekums, Plekhanovs, etc.: their authority has been so undermined that everywhere the police have to protect them. But by their propaganda of "unity" and "fatherland defence", by their striving to bring about a compromise, by their efforts to draw a verbal veil over

the deep-seated differences, the "Centrists" are causing the greatest damage to the labour movement, because they are impeding the final break-down of the social-chauvinists' moral authority, and in that way are bolstering their influence on the masses and galvanising the corpse of the opportunist Second International. For all these reasons I consider it my socialist duty to fight Kautsky and other "Centre" spokesmen.

Souvarine "appeals", among others, to "Guilbeaux, to Lenin, to all those who enjoy the advantage of being 'outside the battle', an advantage that often enables one to take a reasonable view of men and affairs in socialism, but one that, perhaps, is fraught also with certain inconveniences."

A transparent hint. In Zimmerwald, Ledebour expressed the same thought without any ambiguity. He accused us "Left Zimmerwaldists" of addressing revolutionary appeals to the masses from abroad. I repeat to Citizen Souvarine what I told Ledebour in Zimmerwald. It is 29 years since I was arrested in Russia. And throughout these 29 years I have never ceased to address revolutionary appeals to the masses. I did so from prison, from Siberia, and later from abroad. And I frequently met in the revolutionary press "hints" similar to those made in the speeches of tsarist prosecutors—"hints" that I was lacking in honesty, because, while living abroad, I addressed revolutionary appeals to the Russian people. Coming from tsarist prosecutors these "hints" surprise no one. But I must admit that I expected arguments of another kind from Ledebour. Apparently he has forgotten that when they wrote their famous *Communist Manifesto* in 1847, Marx and Engels likewise addressed revolutionary appeals to the German workers from abroad! The revolutionary struggle is often impossible without revolutionaries emigrating abroad. That has repeatedly been the experience in France. And I Citizen Souvarine would have done better not to follow the bad example of Ledebour and ... the tsarist prosecutors.

Souvarine also says that Trotsky, "whom we [the French minority] consider one of the most extreme elements of the extreme Left in the International, is simply branded as a chauvinist by Lenin. It has to be admitted that there is a certain exaggeration here".

Yes, of course, "there is a certain exaggeration", but on Souvarine's part, not mine. For I have never branded Trotsky's position as chauvinistic. What I have reproached him with is that all too often he has represented the "Centre" policy in Russia. Here are the facts. The split in the R.S.D.L.P. has existed officially since January 1912.[95] Our Party (grouped around the Central Committee) accused of opportunism the other group, the Organising Committee, of which Martov and Axelrod are the most prominent leaders. Trotsky belonged to Martov's party and left it only in 1914. By that time the war had started. Our five Duma deputies (Muranov, Petrovsky, Shagov, Badayev and Samoilov) were exiled to Siberia. In Petrograd, our workers voted *against* participation in the war industries committees (the most important practical issue for us, just as important in Russia as the question of participation in the government in France). On the other hand, the most prominent and most influential Organising Committee writers—Potresov, Zasulich, Levitsky and others—have come out for "defence of the fatherland" and participation in the war industries committees. Martov and Axelrod have protested and advocated non-participation in the committees. But they have not broken with their party, one faction of which has turned chauvinist and accepts participation. That is why at Kienthal we reproached Martov with having wanted to represent the Organising Committee as a whole, whereas in fact he can represent only one of its two factions. This party's Duma group (Chkheidze, Skobelev and others) is divided, with some of its members for and others against "fatherland defence". But all of them favour participation in the war industries committees, resorting to the ambiguous formula of "saving the country", which, essentially, is but another wording of the Südekum and Renaudel "fatherland defence" slogan. More, they have in no way protested against Potresov's position (which is actually identical to Plekhanov's; Martov publicly protested against Potresov and declined to contribute to his journal because Plekhanov had been invited to contribute).

And Trotsky? Having broken with Martov's party, he continues to accuse us of being splitters. Little by little he is moving to the Left, and even calls for a break with

the Russian social-chauvinist leaders. But he has not definitely said whether he wants unity or a break with the Chkheidze faction. And that is one of the key issues. For, indeed, if peace comes tomorrow, we shall be having Duma elections the day after tomorrow, and the question will immediately arise of siding with or opposing Chkheidze. We oppose such an alliance. Martov favours it. And Trotsky? His attitude is unknown. There has been no definite indication of it in the 500 issues of the Paris Russian-language newspaper *Nashe Slovo*, of which Trotsky is one of the editors. These are the reasons why we do not agree with Trotsky.

We are not the only ones. In Zimmerwald, Trotsky refused to join the Zimmerwald Left. Together with Comrade Henriette Roland-Holst he represented the "Centre". And this is what Comrade Roland-Holst now writes in the Dutch socialist paper *Tribune*[96] (No. 159, August 23, 1916): "Those who, like Trotsky and his group, want to wage a revolutionary struggle against imperialism must overcome the consequences of émigré differences—largely of a personal nature—which disunite the extreme Left, and join the Leninists. A 'revolutionary centre' is impossible."

I must apologise for having dwelt at such length on our relations with Trotsky and Martov, but the French socialist press refers to this quite frequently and the information it gives its readers is often very inaccurate. The French comrades must be better informed of the facts concerning the Social-Democratic movement in Russia.

Lenin

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THESES FOR AN APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST COMMITTEE AND ALL SOCIALIST PARTIES[97]

ROUGH DRAFT

1. The turn in world politics, from imperialist war to open appeals by a number of bourgeois governments for an imperialist peace, coincides with a turn in the development of world socialism.

2. The first turn has produced a spate of pious and sentimental pacifist phrases, promises and pledges, with which the imperialist bourgeoisie and the imperialist governments seek to deceive the peoples and "peacefully" condition them to obediently bear the whole cost of the predatory war, peacefully disarm the millions of proletarians and cover up, by paltry concessions, the preparation for a deal to divide up the colonies and financially (also politically if possible) strangle weak nations. This deal comprises the sum and substance of the projected imperialist peace and is a direct continuation of the existing secret predatory agreements, particularly those concluded during the war, between *all* the powers of *both* warring imperialist coalitions.

3.* The second turn consists in a "reconciliation" between the social-chauvinists, who have betrayed socialism and defected to bourgeois nationalism or imperialism, and the *Zimmerwald Right wing*, as represented by Kautsky and Co. in Germany, Turati and Co. in Italy, Longuet-Pressemane-Merrheim in France, etc. By uniting on a basis of empty, meaningless and non-committal pacifist phrases,

* Combine with §4.

which in practice serve to *disguise* imperialist policy and imperialist peace, *embellish* them instead of exposing them, these two trends are taking a decisive step towards the greatest deception of the workers, towards consolidating the domination in the labour movement of a bourgeois labour policy veiled by socialist phraseology, the domination of leaders and privileged sections of the working class that have helped the governments and the bourgeoisie wage this predatory imperialist war on the plea of "defending the fatherland".

4. Social-pacifist policy, or the policy of social-pacifist phraseology, now predominates in the socialist parties of the chief European countries (see Kautsky's five pacifist articles in the German Social-Democratic press and, appearing at the same time, the statement of the social-imperialist leaders in the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* that they are fully prepared for peace and unity with the Kautskyites on a basis of pacifist phrases; the January 7, 1917 pacifist manifesto of the German Kautskyite opposition; the Longuetists and Renaudel and Co. voting together at the French Socialist Party Congress, and Jouhaux and Merrheim, also Broutchoux, at the General Confederation of Labour Congress, *for* resolutions composed of misleading pacifist phrases; a similar pacifist statement by Turati on December 17, 1916, and the defence of his position by the entire Socialist Party of Italy). *Whatever the terms* of the peace now being prepared between the present, i.e., *bourgeois*, governments of *both* imperialist coalitions, this policy signifies the conversion of socialist and syndicalist (Jouhaux and Merrheim) organisations into a *tool* of government intrigue and secret imperialist diplomacy.

5. The possible terms of the peace now being prepared by the bourgeois governments of both imperialist coalitions are in reality determined by the *altered* balance of *forces* which the war has already produced and might still produce. In their basic and principal features the changes are as follows: (a) the German imperialist coalition has up to now proved much stronger than its adversary. The territories occupied by German and German-allied forces are its *guarantee* in a new imperialist division of the world colonies, weak countries, finance capital's spheres of

influence, etc.), which will merely be formalised by the peace treaty; (b) the British imperialist coalition hopes to improve its military position in the spring; but (c) the exhaustion caused by the war and, *chiefly*, the fact that it is hard for the financial oligarchy to rob the peoples *still more* than it has already done through unparalleled "war profits", is giving rise, in connection with the fear of proletarian revolution, to attempts by some bourgeois circles to end the war as soon as possible through a deal between the two groups of imperialist freebooters; (d) there is a noticeable shift in world politics from the Anglo-Russian coalition against Germany towards a coalition (just as imperialist in nature) of Germany and Russia against England. The basis for this is that tsarism has not the strength to seize Constantinople, promised it in the secret treaties with France, England, Italy, etc., and is therefore seeking compensation in a division of Galicia, Armenia and, possibly, Rumania, etc., and also in an alliance with Germany against England for the plunder of Asia; (e) another major change in world politics is the tremendous enrichment, at Europe's expense, of United States finance capital, which has latterly increased its armaments (just like Japanese imperialism, which is much weaker) to unprecedented proportions, and which would be only too glad to divert the attention of "its" workers from these armaments by cheap pacifist phraseology ... *relating* to *Europe*!

6. Out of fear of proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie finds itself compelled in every possible way to conceal and embellish this objective political situation, this imperialist reality. It is trying to dupe the workers, divert their attention, and the best means to that end is the customary diplomatic duplicity of non-committal, hypocritical phrases about a "democratic" peace, freedom for small nations "in general", "armaments restriction", etc. This duping of the people comes all the easier to the imperialist bourgeoisie because, when it speaks of, say, "peace without annexations" *every* bourgeoisie has in view annexations by its *adversary*, and is "modestly reticent" about annexations it *itself* has *already* made. The Germans "forget" that they have *factually* annexed not only Constantinople, Belgrade, Bucharest, Brussels, but also Alsace-Lorraine, part of

Schleswig, Prussian Poland, etc. Tsarism and its flunkeys, the Russian imperialist bourgeois (Plekhanov, Potresov and their ilk included, i.e., the majority of the Organising Committee party in Russia), "forget" that Russia has annexed not only Erserum and part of Galicia, but also Finland, the Ukraine, etc. The French bourgeoisie "forgets" that, together with the English, it has robbed Germany of her colonies. The Italian bourgeoisie "forgets" that it is robbing Tripoli, Dalmatia, Albania, and so on without end.

7. That being the objective state of affairs, it is the obvious and imperative task of every sincere socialist policy, every honest proletarian policy (not to speak of conscious Marxist policy) first of all and above all consistently, systematically, boldly and unreservedly to *expose the pacifist and democratic hypocrisy of one's own government and one's own bourgeoisie*. Lacking that, all talk of socialism, syndicalism, internationalism is a sheer deception of the people. For exposure of annexations by one's imperialist rivals (regardless of whether they are named or merely implied, by denouncing annexations "generally" or by similar "diplomatic" methods of concealing one's thoughts) is the direct concern, the direct business, of *all* venal journalists, all imperialists, including those that parade as socialists, such as Scheidemann and Co., Sembat and Co., Plekhanov and Co., etc.

8. Turati and Co., Kautsky and Co., Longuet and Merrheim and Co. utterly fail to understand that this is their direct duty. They represent a definite trend in international socialism and, *objectively*, *in practice*—regardless of how supremely virtuous their intentions may be—are simply helping their "own" imperialist bourgeoisie to *dupe* the people, *embellish* its imperialist aims. These social-pacifists, i.e., socialists in words and vehicles of bourgeois-pacifist hypocrisy in deeds, now play exactly the same part as the Christian priests, who for centuries sought to embellish the policy of the oppressing classes—the slave-owners, feudals and capitalists—and make their rule *acceptable* to the oppressed classes by preaching Christian love of one's neighbour and Christ's commandments.

9. A policy designed not to mislead the workers, but to open their eyes to reality, should consist in the following:

(a) Socialists in every country must now, when the question of peace is so directly posed, unfailingly and more vigorously than usual expose their *own* government and their *own* bourgeoisie. They must expose the secret agreements *they* have concluded, and are concluding, with *their* imperialist allies for the division of colonies, spheres of influence, joint financial undertakings in other countries, buying up of shares, monopoly arrangements, concessions, etc.

For in this, and in this *alone*, lies the real, not deceptive, *basis* and substance of the imperialist peace now being prepared. Everything else is meant to deceive the people. Those who vow and swear by these catchwords are not really supporting a democratic peace without annexations, etc., for *real* support means exposing, *in practice*, one's *own* bourgeoisie, which by its *actions* is destroying these great principles of true socialism and true democracy.

For every member of parliament, every editor, every secretary of a labour union, every journalist and public leader *can always* gather the information kept secret by the government and the financiers that reveals the *truth* about the real basis of imperialist deals. A socialist's *failure* to fulfil this duty is a *betrayal* of socialism. There need be no doubt that *no* government will allow, especially now, free publication of exposures of its real policy, its treaties, financial deals, etc. That is no reason to renounce such exposures. Rather it is a reason to renounce servile submission to the censorship and publish the facts freely, i.e., uncensored, illegally.

For the Socialist of *another* country cannot expose the government and bourgeoisie of a country at war with "his own" nation, and not only because he does not know that country's language, history, specific features, etc., but also because *such* exposure is part of *imperialist* intrigue, and not an *internationalist* duty.

He is not an internationalist who vows and swears by internationalism. Only he is an internationalist who in a really internationalist way combats his *own* bourgeoisie, his *own* social-chauvinists, his *own* Kautskyites.

(b) In every country the Socialist must above all emphasise in all his propaganda the need to distrust not only every political phrase of his *own* government, but also every

political phrase of his *own* social-chauvinists, who *in reality* serve that government.

(c) In every country the Socialists must above all explain to the masses the indisputable truth that a genuinely enduring and genuinely democratic peace (without annexations, etc.) can now be achieved *only* if it is concluded *not* by the present bourgeois governments, or by *bourgeois* governments in general, but by *proletarian* governments that have overthrown the rule of the bourgeoisie and are proceeding to expropriate it.

The war has reaffirmed clearly enough and in a very practical way a truth which prior to the war was repeated by all the socialist leaders who have now gone over to the bourgeoisie, namely, that modern capitalist society, particularly* in the advanced countries, has fully matured for the transition to socialism. If, for instance, Germany can direct the economic life of 66 million people *from a single centre*, and strain the people's energies to wage a predatory war in the interests of 100 or 200 financial magnates or aristocrats, the monarchy, etc., then the *same* can be done, in the interests of nine-tenths of the population, by the non-propertied masses if their struggle is directed by class-conscious workers, liberated from social-imperialist and social-pacifist influence.

All propaganda for socialism must be refashioned from abstract and general to concrete and directly practical: expropriate the banks and, relying on the masses, carry out in their interests the *very same thing* the W.U.M.B.A.** is carrying out in Germany!

(d) In every country the socialist must explain to the masses the indisputable truth that, if the phrase "democratic peace" is to be taken seriously, sincerely and honestly, and not merely used as a false *Christian* phrase meant to conceal an *imperialist* peace, then the workers have *only* one means of really achieving such a peace *right now*. That means is to *turn their weapons against their own government* (i.e., follow the advice of Karl Liebknecht, for which he has been

* In the manuscript, the words "at any rate" are written over the word "particularly".—*Ed.*

** Waffen- und Munitionsbeschaffungsamt—Weapons and Ammunition Supply Department.—*Ed.*

sentenced to hard labour. He urged, in other words, what our Party manifesto of November 1, 1914* defined as turning the imperialist war into a civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and for socialism).

The Basle Manifesto of November 24, 1912, signed by *all* the socialist parties, had in view the *very war that is now raging*. And when it threatened the governments with "*proletarian revolution*" in connection with the imminent war, when it referred to the Paris Commune, it spoke the truth, a truth from which the betrayers of socialism are now cowardly retreating. For if in 1871 the Paris workers could utilise the excellent weapons given them by Napoleon III in pursuance of his ambitious plans, to make their heroic attempt, admired by socialists the world over, to overthrow bourgeois rule and capture power for the introduction of socialism—then a similar attempt is a thousand times more achievable, possible and likely to succeed now, when a much larger number of better organised and more class-conscious workers of several countries are in possession of much better weapons, and when with every passing day the course of the war is enlightening and revolutionising the masses. In all countries the chief obstacle to initiating systematic propaganda and agitation in this spirit is definitely not the "fatigue of the masses", as the Scheidemanns plus Kautsky, etc., falsely plead. The "masses" are not yet tired of shooting and will continue to shoot even more in the spring, unless their class enemies come to some arrangement about dividing up Turkey, Rumania, Armenia, Africa, etc. The chief obstacle is the *faith* part of the class-conscious workers have in the social-imperialists and social-pacifists. Today's major task must be to destroy the faith in these trends, *ideas*, methods of *policy*.

To what extent such an attempt is feasible, from the standpoint of the *sentiment* of the broad masses, can only be *proved* by launching this type of agitation and propaganda everywhere and in the most resolute and energetic way; by giving the most sincere and devoted support to all revolutionary manifestations of the mounting mass resentment, to the strikes and demonstrations that are forcing the Russian

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34.—*Ed.*

bourgeoisie frankly to admit that the revolution is on the march, and have forced Helfferich to declare in the Reichstag: "Better to keep the Left Social-Democrats in prison than to have Potsdam Square littered with corpses," i.e., to admit that the masses *are* responding to agitation by the Left.

In any case, the alternative which socialists must clearly place before the masses is this: either continue to kill each other for capitalist profits, put up with the high cost of living, hunger, the burden of a debt running into billions, and accept the farce of an imperialist *truce* veiled by democratic and reformist promises, or rise in revolt against the bourgeoisie.

A revolutionary party which openly, before the whole world, threatened the governments with "proletarian revolution" in the event of *such* a war as is now being waged, would be committing moral suicide if it did not urge the workers, and the masses generally, to direct all thought and effort towards revolt, now that the masses are so excellently armed, so excellently trained in the art of warfare, and fed up with the absurdity of this criminal imperialist shambles, which up to now they have been helping.

(e) Socialists must centre their activity on the struggle against reformism, which has always corrupted the revolutionary labour movement by injecting bourgeois ideas, and has now assumed a somewhat special form, namely: "reliance" on the reforms the bourgeoisie is supposed to carry out after the war! Reformists argue that in urging, popularising and preparing the socialist revolution of the proletariat, we are "losing sight" of the "practical" aspect, "forfeiting" our chances to win reforms.

That argument, customary both to social-chauvinists and supporters of Kautsky, who has even denounced street demonstrations as "adventuristic", is thoroughly unscientific, fundamentally false, a bourgeois lie.

In the course of the war world capitalism has taken a forward step not only towards concentration in general, but also towards transition from monopoly in general to *state capitalism* on a much broader scale than before. Economic reforms in this direction are inevitable.

In the political sphere, the imperialist war has demon-

strated that from the imperialists' standpoint it is *sometimes* much more advantageous to have as war ally a politically independent but financially dependent small nation rather than risk Irish or Czech "incidents" (i.e., uprisings or the defection of whole regiments) during a war. It is quite possible, therefore, that parallel with its policy of strangling small nations—a policy it can never wholly abandon—imperialism will in individual cases follow a policy of "voluntary" alliance (i.e., resulting exclusively from financial strangulation) with new small national states, or with mongrel states, such as Poland.

However, it does not follow from this that Social-Democrats can, without betraying their cause, "vote" for or support such imperialist "reforms".

Only bourgeois reformism, which *in substance* is the position of Kautsky, Turati and Merrheim, poses the question thus: *either* renunciation of revolution and that means reforms, *or* no reforms at all.

Yet all the experience of world history, like the experience of the 1905 Russian Revolution, teaches us the very opposite: *either* revolutionary class struggle, of which reforms are *always* a by-product (when the revolution is not completely successful), *or* no reforms at all.

For the *only effective* force that compels change is popular revolutionary energy, providing it does not remain on paper, as has been the case in the Second International, but finds expression in comprehensive mass revolutionary propaganda, agitation and organisation conducted by parties marching at the head of the revolution, not limping along in its tail.

Only by openly proclaiming revolution, by purging the workers' parties of all who oppose revolution or "sceptically" accept it—only by giving *every* aspect of party activity a revolutionary content, can Social-Democracy, in such "*critical*" eras of world history as the present one, guarantee the masses either complete success of their cause if the revolution is supported by very broad masses, or reforms, i.e., concessions by the bourgeoisie, if the revolution is only partially successful.

Otherwise, if the Scheidemann and Kautsky policy prevails, there is *no* guarantee that the reforms will not be

reduced to naught, or carried out with police and reactionary restrictions that will *rule out* the very possibility of the proletariat using them in a repeated fight for the revolution.

(f) Socialists must make a serious effort to bring to reality Karl Liebknecht's slogan. The popularity that name enjoys among the masses is a *guarantee* that revolutionary activity is both possible and likely to succeed. The attitude of Scheidemann and Co., Kautsky and Co. towards that name is an example of hypocrisy: *in words* they swear by the "Liebknechts of all countries"; *in deeds* they combat Liebknecht's tactics.

Liebknecht broke not only with the Scheidemanns (Renaudels, Plekhanovs, Bissolatis), but also with the Kautsky *trend* (Longuet, Axelrod, Turati).

Liebknecht declared, as early as *October 2, 1914*, in his letter to the Party Executive:

"Ich habe erklärt, dass die deutsche Partei, nach meiner innersten Überzeugung, von der Haut bis zum Mark *regeneriert* werden muss, wenn sie das Recht nicht verwirken will, sich sozialdemokratisch zu nennen, wenn sie sich die jetzt gründlich verscherzte Achtung der Welt wiedererwerben will." (*Klassenkampf gegen den Krieg!* Material zum "Fall Liebknecht". Seite 22.) (Geheim gedruckt in Deutschland: "Als Manuskript gedruckt".)*

All parties should take up Liebknecht's slogan and it would certainly be ridiculous to even think of being able to turn it into effect without ridding the party of the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Renaudels, Sembats, Plekhanovs, Vanderveldes and Co., or without denouncing the policy of concessions to the trend represented by Kautsky, Turati, Longuet and Merrheim.

* * *

10. We therefore suggest a conference of Zimmerwald supporters to discuss the following proposals:

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* I have declared my deep conviction that, if it does not want to forfeit the right to call itself a Social-Democratic party, if it wants to restore its prestige in the eyes of the world, now so thoroughly undermined, the German party must be *regenerated* from top to bottom. (*Class Struggle After the War!* Materials in the "Liebknecht Case", p. 22.) (Printed secretly in Germany: Published as a manuscript.)—*Ed.*

(1) Socialist pacifism of a definite trend—Longuet-Merrheim, Kautsky, Turati, etc.,—already rejected in principle at Kienthal, and its concrete defence by these representatives of the afore-mentioned *trends* should be decisively and unconditionally rejected as bourgeois reformism (on the basis of the theses formulated above).

(2) A similarly decisive organisational break with social-chauvinism.

(3) Explain to the working class its immediate and urgent revolutionary tasks, precisely in connection with the fact that the masses have lost patience with the war and the lying milk-and-water pacifist phrases of the bourgeoisie.

(4) Openly brand as a complete break with the spirit and decisions of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and condemn as such, the policy of the Italian Socialist Party, which is following a patently pacifist path, and the policy of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, which on November 4, 1916 in Zurich voted to permit indirect taxes, and on January 7, 1917, through an alliance between the "Centrist" R. Grimm and the social-patriots Greulich, G. Müller and Co., secured indefinite postponement of the special party congress called for February 11, 1917 to discuss the war issue, and which now meekly accepts the outright ultimatum of these same social-patriot leaders, who openly threaten to resign from parliament if the party rejects fatherland defence.

The sad experience of the Second International has clearly demonstrated the immense damage caused by combining, in *actual practice*, "general" revolutionary decisions, formulated in general phrases, with reformist actions—when professions of internationalism are attended by refusal *jointly* to discuss, in a truly internationalist manner, fundamental problems of the tactics of each individual party as a component part of the international union.

Prior to the Zimmerwald Conference and at the Conference itself, our Party considered it its duty to acquaint the comrades with our irrevocable condemnation of pacifism and abstract preachment of peace as a bourgeois deception (a German translation of our Party's resolution, in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*,* and a French translation, in a separate

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338.—*Ed.*

leaflet, were circulated at the Conference). The *Zimmerwald Left*, in whose organisation we shared, was formed as a separate group at the Conference for the express purpose of showing that we support the Zimmerwald group *insofar* as it combats social-chauvinism.

It has now been definitely established—of this we are profoundly convinced—that the Zimmerwald majority, or the Zimmerwald Right, has made a *roundabout turn* not towards struggle against social-chauvinism, but towards complete surrender to it, towards merger with it on a platform of empty pacifist phrases. And we consider it our duty openly to state that to support, in these circumstances, the illusion of Zimmerwald unity and Zimmerwald struggle for the Third International would cause the greatest damage to the labour movement. We declare, not as a "threat" or "ultimatum", but as an open notification of our decision, that unless the situation changes we shall not remain a member of the Zimmerwald group.

Written before December 26, 1916
(January 7, 1917)

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Published according to
the manuscript

A LETTER TO V. A. KARPINSKY[98]

Dear Comrades!

I am sending you a *most important* communication.

Discuss it and pass it on to Brilliant[99] and Guilbeaux: then we shall know *whom* they support and *who* they are: cowards or men capable of fighting.

The *whole* struggle will now be shifted here.

Let me know how they reacted and if there are any chances of publishing a protest or an open letter.

We should take advantage of the fact that *Naine* enjoys undisputed authority in French Switzerland.

Best wishes, Yours

The Executive (Parteivorstand) of the Swiss Socialist Party met in Zurich on Sunday, January 7, 1917.

It adopted a disgraceful decision—to postpone indefinitely the party congress, which was to have met in Berne on February 11, 1917 for the express purpose of discussing the war issue. The excuse: the need to fight the high cost of living; the workers are not yet ready; there was no unanimity in the commission, and similar excuses that are an outright insult to the party. (Two drafts have already been drawn up in the commission and *published confidentially*: one, *against* fatherland defence, prepared by Affolter, Nobs, Schmid, Naine and Graber; the other, *for* fatherland defence, prepared by G. Müller, Pflüger, *Huber* and Klöti.)

The January 7 meeting was very stormy. *Grimm* led the Rights, i.e., the opportunists, i.e., the nationalists, shouting the most vile things against the "foreigners", against

the *youth*, accusing them of a "split" (!!!), and so on. Naine, Platten, Nobs and Münzenberg *firmly* opposed postponing the congress. Naine told Grimm outright that he was destroying himself as an "international secretary"!

Adoption of this decision signifies complete betrayal by Grimm and is an *insult to the party* on the part of the opportunist leaders, the social-nationalists. The *entire* Zimmerwald-Kienthal group and action have been *factually* reduced to an empty phrase by a handful of leaders (Grimm included) who threaten to resign (*sic!!*) if defence of the fatherland is rejected. They are determined *not to allow* this issue to be discussed by the party "mob" until the end of the war. The *Grütlianer*[100] (January 4 and 8) is speaking the *truth* and is giving *this* party a slap in the face.

The whole struggle of the Left, the whole struggle *for* Zimmerwald and Kienthal, has now been shifted to other ground: struggle against this gang of leaders defiling the party. We must everywhere rally the Left and discuss methods of struggle. Hurry!

Would not the best method be (not a minute must be lost) to secure immediate adoption in La Chaux-de-Fonds and Geneva of protest resolutions, plus open letters to Naine, and publish them without delay? There can be no doubt that the "leaders" will bring every lever into motion to prevent protests appearing in the press.

The open letter should frankly state everything recounted here and squarely put the question: (I) Does Naine refute these facts? (2) Does he consider it *permissible*, in a democratic party of socialists, for the Executive to repeal congress decisions?—(3) *Permissible* to hide from the party the way the betrayers of socialism voted at the meeting of January 7, 1917, and the *speeches* they made there?—(4) *Permissible* to accept a chairman of the International Socialist Committee (Grimm) who combines Left phrases with *assistance* to the Swiss nationalists, opponents of Zimmerwald, "fatherland defenders" Pflüger, *Huber* and Co., in virtually *disrupting* the Zimmerwald decisions?—(5) Permissible to abuse, in the *Berner Tagwacht*, the German social-patriots, while *secretly* helping the Swiss Social-patriots? etc.

I repeat: this will not be allowed to appear in the newspapers. That is clear. Publication of an open letter to Naine on behalf of one or another group is the best method. If that is possible, lose no time and reply without delay.

Written on December 26, 1916
(January 8, 1917)

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in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to
the manuscript

AN OPEN LETTER TO CHARLES NAINE, MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST COMMITTEE IN BERNE

Dear Comrade,

The stand taken by Mr. National Councillor Robert Grimm at the meeting of the Party Executive on January 7, jointly with all the social-nationalists and to a considerable degree as their leader, *in favour* of the resolution to postpone the party congress fills the cup of patience to overflowing and utterly exposes Mr. National Councillor Grimm in his true colours.

The chairman of the International Socialist Committee elected at Zimmerwald, the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, the most "authoritative" representative, in the eyes of the whole world, of the entire Zimmerwald group, comes out together with, and at the head of, the social-patriots as a downright traitor to Zimmerwald. He puts forth a proposal designed to disrupt the party congress, appointed long ago for the express purpose of deciding, in the freest and—considering the place and time—most internationally influential European country, the question of defending the fatherland in an imperialist war!!

Can one remain silent? Can one remain calm in the face of such a fact, which would have for ever disgraced the entire Zimmerwald movement, and converted it into a farce, had not the mark been torn from the face of Mr. National Councillor Grimm?

The Socialist Party of Switzerland is the only European socialist party which openly and officially, in open congress unhindered by military censorship and the military authori-

ties, joined Zimmerwald, supported it, appointed two members of the International Socialist Committee and appeared before the whole world as the principal representative of the Zimmerwald movement, if we do not count the Italian party, which is in an immeasurably more difficult position owing to the oppressive war conditions. At its Zurich Congress of November 4-5, 1916, after delays caused, among other things, by the struggle against the avowed social-patriots who only in the autumn of 1916 broke away from the party to form a separate Grütli-Verein, the Socialist Party finally decided to convene a special party congress in Berne, in February 1917, to decide the questions of war and of fatherland defence. But now some individuals in the party are determined to prevent the congress, to disrupt it, to prevent the workers *themselves* from discussing and deciding, during the war, their attitude towards militarism and defence of the fatherland.

At the head of those individuals, whose policy is an outrage to the whole Zimmerwald movement, we find the chairman of the International Socialist Committee!

Is this not the utter betrayal of Zimmerwald? Is it not the *spurning* of all the Zimmerwald decisions?

We have only to glance at some of the official arguments to justify postponing the congress to understand the point and purpose of this move.

"The workers," we are told, "are not yet ready" to decide this question!

All the Zimmerwald and Kienthal manifestos and resolutions declare over and over again that fatherland defence in an imperialist war, a war between two imperialist coalitions, a war for robbing colonies and throttling weak nations, is a betrayal of socialism, irrespective of whether this relates to the "Great Powers" or to small nations, which for the time being have retained their neutrality. In dozens of ways this idea is repeated in all the official Zimmerwald and Kienthal documents. It has been presented and argued over and over again in hundreds of articles and reports in all Swiss socialist papers, notably in the *Berner Tagwacht*, of which Mr. National Councillor Grimm is editor. The declarations of sympathy for Karl Liebknecht, Höglund, MacLean, etc., emphasised hundreds of times the conviction common to

all the Zimmerwaldists, namely, that these men have *rightly* understood the position and interests of the *masses*, that the sympathy of the *masses*, i.e., of the majority of the oppressed and exploited, is on *their* side, that by its class instinct the proletariat everywhere, in "Great" belligerent Germany, as well as in small neutral Sweden, is coming to see that defence of the fatherland in an imperialist war is the *betrayal of socialism*.

And now the chairman of the International Socialist Committee, with the enthusiastic approval and warm support of all the *pronounced* representatives of social-patriotism in the Socialist Party of Switzerland—H. Greulich, P. Pflüger, Huber, Manz-Schäppi, etc., etc.—comes forth with the hypocritical and false argument that the party congress is being postponed because "the workers are not yet ready".

This is a lie; it is disgusting, intolerable hypocrisy. Everyone knows—and the *Grütlianer* openly publishes this bitter truth—that the congress is being postponed because these social-patriots are *afraid* of the workers, *afraid* that the workers will decide against defence of the fatherland; that they *threaten* to resign their seats in the Nationalrat, if a decision against defence of the fatherland is carried. The social-patriot "leaders" of the Socialist Party of Switzerland, who even now, two and a half years after the beginning of the war, favour "defence of the fatherland", i.e., *defence* of the imperialist bourgeoisie of one or the other coalition, have decided to *disrupt the congress*, to sabotage the will of the Swiss socialist workers, to prevent them from discussing and determining, during the war, their attitude towards the war, towards the "defenders of the fatherland", i.e., towards the lackeys of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

This is the real reason, which everyone knows perfectly well, why the congress has been postponed; this is a betrayal of Zimmerwald by the chairman of the International Socialist Committee, who has deserted to the side of the social-patriots in the Socialist Party of Switzerland, *against* the class-conscious workers of Switzerland!

Such is the bitter truth. It has already been told by the avowedly social-patriot *Grütlianer*, which, incidentally, is always best informed about what the *Grütlian* leaders,

Greulich, Pflüger, Hubar, Manz-Schäppi and Co., *inside* the Socialist Party are thinking and doing. Incidentally, *three days* before the meeting of January 7, 1917, this paper wrote:*

Another "official" reason for postponing the congress is that the commission specially elected in December, or even November, 1916, to frame the resolution on the war question, "failed to arrive at a unanimous decision"!!

As if Grimm and Co. did not know beforehand that unanimity on such a question was *impossible* in the Socialist Party of Switzerland as long as there remained such "leaders" as Greulich, Pflüger, G. Müller, Huber, Manz-Schäppi, Otto Lang and others, who while not joining the social-patriot Grütli party *fully share* the social-patriot views of the Grütli-Verein, and who only *deceive* the socialist workers by belonging to the *Socialist* Party!

As if Grimm and Co. did not clearly see in the summer of 1916 that there was no unity, nor could there be, on the defence of the fatherland issue: for the *social-patriot* theses of Pflüger, G. Müller and others were published in the summer of 1916, and Grimm, being a member of the Nationalrat, naturally *could not help noting thousands of times* the *social-patriot* views at least of Greulich and Co., if not of the majority of the Nationalrat Social-Democratic group.

Grimm and Co. want to deceive the socialist workers of Switzerland. That is why, in appointing a commission, they *did not publish* the names of its members. But the *Grütlianer* told the *truth* when it published those names and added, as something taken for granted, as a generally accepted truth, that *such* a commission could not arrive at a unanimous decision!

To deceive the workers, Grimm and Co. decided *not* to publish the commission resolutions *immediately*; they *concealed* the truth from the workers. Yet the resolutions have been available for a long time, and have *even been printed confidentially*!!

As was only to be expected, the resolution *accepting* "defence of the fatherland", i.e., justifying the *betrayal of socialism* during a war whose imperialist character has been exposed a thousand times, is signed by Huber. Pflüger,

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* In Lenin's manuscript space is left for a quotation.—*Ed.*

Klöti and G. Müller; the resolution *rejecting* "defence of the fatherland" is signed by Nobs, Affolter, Schmid, Naine and Graber.

Grimm and the social-patriots are playing a disgraceful, unscrupulous game with the socialist workers.

The workers are not yet ready, they shout, and yet at the very same time, these *leaders conceal* from the workers *available* resolutions which definitely place before the workers two sets of ideas, *two* irreconcilable policies, the social-patriot and the Zimmerwald policies!!

Grimm and the social-patriots are brazen deceivers of the workers, for it is they who have decided to disrupt the congress, withhold publication of the resolutions, deny the workers the opportunity openly to weigh and discuss the two policies—and yet they shout that the workers "are not yet ready"!

Other "official" arguments for postponing the congress: the need to combat the high cost of living, conduct the election campaign, etc.

These arguments are a sheer insult to the workers. Who does not know that we Social-Democrats are *not* against the struggle for reforms, that, unlike the social-patriots, unlike the opportunists and reformists, *we do not confine ourselves* to the struggle for reforms, but *subordinate* it to the struggle for revolution? Who does not know that this is exactly the policy repeatedly formulated in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal manifestos? We are not opposed to elections and reforms aimed at reducing the high cost of living, but our first concern is openly to tell the masses the *truth*, namely, that it is *impossible* to eliminate high living costs without expropriating the banks and big industry, i.e., without social revolution.

What does *every* Zimmerwald manifesto call upon the proletariat to do in *retaliation* to the war, in *connection* with the war?

It calls for revolutionary mass struggle, for the workers to turn their weapons against the enemy in their own country (see the last International Socialist Committee manifesto: *An die Arbeiterklasse*,* end of December 1916), i.e., to turn

* *To the Working Class.—Ed.*

their weapons against *their own* bourgeoisie, *their own* government.

Should this not make it clear to every thinking person that the policy of *repudiating* defence of the fatherland is *linked* with the really revolutionary and really socialist struggle against the high cost of living, with a really socialist, and not bourgeois-reformist, utilisation of the election campaign?

Is it not clear that the social-patriot policy, the "fatherland defence" policy in the imperialist war, is the policy of *reformism*, i.e., a bourgeois-reformist and *not* a socialist struggle against high prices, merely an election campaign struggle?

How is it possible to "*postpone*" a congress which is to decide the "defence of the fatherland" issue (i.e., to choose *between* social-patriot and socialist policy) "on the plea" that it is necessary to combat high prices, etc.?? Grimm and the social-patriots advance this false and fraudulent argument to *obscure* from the workers the truth that they want to combat high living costs, conduct the election campaign, etc., in a bourgeois-reformist spirit and not in the Zimmerwald spirit.

On August 6, 1916, Grimm addressed a meeting in Zurich of 115 Arbeitervertrauensleute aus der ganzen Schweiz.* His speech was a plea for a bourgeois-reformist, purely reformist, struggle against the high cost of living! Grimm is marching "with sure stop" to *his* goal, i.e., to rapprochement with the social-patriots *against* the socialist workers, *against* Zimmerwald.

Particularly disgusting in all this is the fact that Grimm *covers up* his desertion to the social-patriots by *roundly* abusing the *non-Swiss* social-patriots. And in this lies one of the deepest roots of Grimm's treachery, one of the deepest sources of the whole policy of deception which was revealed on January 7, 1917.

Look at the *Berner Tagwacht*. It has heaped every manner of abuse on the Russian, French, English, German and Austrian social-patriots—in short, on everyone ... except the Swiss! Grimm has even called the German social-patriot

* Workers delegates from all parts of Switzerland.[101]—*Ed.*

Ebert, a member of the German Social-Democratic Party Executive, "einen Rausschmeisser in einem Bordell"* (*Berner Tagwacht* No. ...).

Brave fellow, this Grimm, a knightly warrior! Sitting in Berne, he bravely attacks the social-patriots ... in Berlin! But this knight maintains a noble *reticence* about the social-patriots ... *in Berne and Zurich*!

But is there any difference between Ebert in Berlin and Greulich, Manz-Schäppi and Pflüger in Zurich, and Gustav Müller, Schneeberger and Dürr in Berne? *None whatever. They are all social-patriots*. They all share exactly the same views. The ideas they bring the masses are "*Grütlian*", i.e., reformist, nationalist, bourgeois, ideas, *not* socialist ideas.

When Grimm drew up his theses on the war issue in the summer of 1916, he deliberately made them long and vague in the hope that this would deceive both the Left and the Right and enable him to "cash in" on their differences. He concluded the theses with the following sentence:

"The party and trade union organs should reach agreement" (in the event of a war danger and the need for revolutionary mass action).

But who is at the head of the trade unions in Switzerland? Among others, the very Schneeberger and Dürr who in the summer of 1916 were the editors of the *Schweizerische Metallarbeiterzeitung*.** They conducted this payer in a reactionary, reformist, social-patriot spirit, *openly* declaring that they stood *for* "defence of the fatherland", and *openly* protesting against the *whole* policy of Zimmerwald.

And at the head of the Socialist Party of Switzerland, as the events of January 7, 1917 reaffirmed, are the social-patriots Greulich, Pflüger, Manz-Schäppi, Huber, etc., etc.

And so, what is the net result?

It amounts to this: in his theses Grimm proposed that the party place the leadership of revolutionary mass actions *against the war* in the hands of *none other* than the social-patriots Schneeberger, Dürr, Greulich, Pflüger and Co.! In the hands of the very people who are *opposed* to such actions, in the hands of *reformists*!!

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* A "bouncer" in a brothel—*Ed.*

** Swiss Metalworkers Gazette.—*Ed.*

Now, after January 7, 1917, Grimm's "tactics" have been fully exposed.

He wants to be regarded as leader of the Left, as chairman of the International Socialist Committee, representative and leader of the Zimmerwaldists. He is trying to deceive the workers with the most "r-r-revolutionary" phrases, using them, in *reality*, to *conceal* the party's old, social-patriot, bourgeois-reformist practice.

He vows and swears that he sympathises with Karl Liebknecht, Höglund, etc., that he is *their* supporter, that he is pursuing *their* policy.

But Karl Liebknecht in Germany, Höglund in small neutral Sweden, fought not against *foreign*, but against their *own* social-patriots. They attacked the reformists and nationalists at home, in Berlin, in Stockholm, not in other countries. Their ruthless exposure of the social-patriots won them the honour of being hated by the *Berlin* and *Stockholm* Greulichs, Pflügers, Schneebergers and Dürrs.

Is it so difficult to realise that when the French chauvinists laud the German Liebknecht, and when the German chauvinists laud the Englishman MacLean, they are behaving like swindlers—using "internationalist" phrases in praise of *other people*'s internationalism to cover up *their own* nationalism? Is it so difficult to realise that Grimm is behaving in the very same manner when he pours abuse on the social-patriots of all countries *except* Switzerland, that he does this for the express purpose of covering up his desertion to the Swiss social-patriots?

Grimm denounced the German social-patriot Ebert as a "Rausschmeisser in einem Bordell" for having stolen the *Vorwärts* from the German workers, for *ejecting* Left wingers from the party while shouting about a split.

But what is Grimm doing at home, in Switzerland, in company with the dismal heroes of dismal January 7, 1917?

Did he not steal from the Swiss workers the solemnly promised special congress to discuss the fatherland defence issue? And is he not preparing to expel Zimmerwaldists from the party while shouting about a split?

Let us not be childishly naïve, let us squarely face the truth!

At the January 7 meeting, Grimm's new friends and patrons, the social-patriots, joined him in protesting against a

split. They especially accused the youth organisation of splitting activities. One of them shouted to the party secretary, Platten, "Er sei kein Parteisekretär, er sei Parteiverräter."*

Can one remain silent when such things are being said and when the "leaders" want to hide them from the party? Can it be that the Swiss socialist workers will not protest against such methods?

What crime have the Youth League and Platten committed? Their only crime is that they are sincere adherents of Zimmerwald, sincere Zimmerwaldists, and not careerists. Their only crime is that they are *opposed* to postponing the congress. And if scandal-mongers say that only the Zimmerwald Left, acting as a separate faction, is opposed to the postponement of the congress, "opposed to His Majesty Grimm" in general, has not January 7, 1917 proved that this is nothing but idle gossip? Have not you, Comrade Naine, spoken in opposition to Grimm, although you have never, either directly or indirectly, formally or informally, adhered to the Zimmerwald Left?

Causing a split! That is the truly threadbare accusation the social-patriots in all countries are making in order to cover up the fact that *they* are ejecting the Liebknechts and the Höglunds from the party.

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(January 8-9, 1917)

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* "He is not a party secretary, he is a party traitor."—*Ed.*

TO THE WORKERS WHO SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WAR AND AGAINST THE SOCIALISTS WHO HAVE SIDED WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS

The international situation is becoming increasingly clear and increasingly menacing. Both belligerent coalitions have latterly revealed the imperialist nature of the war in a very striking way. The more assiduously the capitalist governments and the bourgeois and socialist pacifists spread their empty, lying pacifist phrases—the talk of a democratic peace, a peace without annexations, etc.—the sooner are they exposed. Germany is crushing several small nations under her iron heel with the very evident determination not to give up her booty except by exchanging part of it for enormous colonial possessions, and she is using hypocritical pacifist phrases as a cover for her readiness to conclude an immediate imperialist peace.

England and her allies are clinging just as tightly to the colonies seized from Germany, part of Turkey, etc., claiming that in endlessly continuing the slaughter for possession of Constantinople, strangulation of Galicia, partition of Austria, the ruin of Germany, they are fighting for a "just" peace.

The truth, of which only a few were theoretically convinced at the beginning of the war, is now becoming palpably evident to an increasing number of class-conscious workers, namely, that a serious struggle against the war, a struggle to abolish war and establish lasting peace, is out of the question unless there is a mass revolutionary struggle led by the proletariat against the government in every country, unless bourgeois rule is overthrown, unless a socialist revolution is brought about. And the war itself, which is imposing an unprecedented strain upon the peoples, is bringing man-

kind to this, the only way out of the impasse, is compelling it to take giant strides towards state capitalism, and is demonstrating in a practical manner how planned social economy can and should be conducted, not in the interests of the capitalists, but by expropriating them, under the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat, in the interests of the masses who are now perishing from starvation and the other calamities caused by the war.

The more obvious this truth becomes, the wider becomes the gulf separating the two irreconcilable tendencies, policies, trends of socialist activity, which we indicated at Zimmerwald, where we acted as a separate Left wing, and in a manifesto to all socialist parties and to all class-conscious workers issued on behalf of the Left wing immediately after the conference. This is the gulf that lies between the attempts to conceal the obvious bankruptcy of official socialism and its representatives' desertion to the bourgeoisie and their governments, as well as the attempts to reconcile the masses with this complete betrayal of socialism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the efforts to expose this bankruptcy in all its magnitude, to expose the bourgeois policy of the "social-patriots", who have deserted the proletariat for the bourgeoisie, to destroy their influence over the masses and to create the possibility and the organisational basis for a genuine struggle against the war.

The Zimmerwald Right wing, which was in the majority at the conference, fought the idea of breaking with the social-patriots and founding the Third International tooth and nail. Since then the split has become a definite fact in England; and in Germany the last conference of the "opposition", on January 7, 1917, revealed to all who do not wilfully shut their eyes to the facts, that in that country too there are two irreconcilably hostile labour parties, working in opposite directions. One is a socialist party, working for the most part underground, and with Karl Liebknecht one of its leaders. The other is a thoroughly bourgeois, social-patriot party, which is trying to reconcile the workers to the war and to the government. The same division is to be observed in every country of the world.

At the Kienthal Conference the Zimmerwald Right wing did not have so large a majority as to be able to continue its

own policy. It voted for the resolution against the social-patriot International Socialist Bureau, a resolution which condemned the latter in the sharpest terms, and for the resolution against social-pacifism, which warned the workers against lying pacifist phrases, regardless of socialist trimmings. Socialist pacifism, which refrains from explaining to the workers the illusory nature of hopes for peace *without* overthrowing the bourgeoisie and organising socialism, is merely an echo of bourgeois pacifism, which instils in the workers faith in the bourgeoisie, presents the imperialist governments and the deals they make with each other in a good light and distracts the masses from the maturing socialist revolution, which events have put on the order of the day.

But what transpired? After the Kienthal Conference, the Zimmerwald Right, in a number of important countries, in France, Germany and Italy, slid wholly and entirely into the very social-pacifism Kienthal had condemned and rejected! In Italy, the Socialist Party has tacitly accepted the pacifist phrases of its parliamentary group and its principal speaker, Turati, though, precisely now, when absolutely the same phrases are being used by Germany and the Entente and by representatives of the bourgeois governments of a number of neutral countries, where the bourgeoisie has accumulated and continues to accumulate enormous war profits—precisely now their utter falsehood has been exposed. In fact, pacifist phrases have proved to be a cover for the new turn in the fight for division of imperialist spoils!

In Germany, Kautsky, the leader of the Zimmerwald Right, issued a similar meaningless and non-committal pacifist manifesto, which merely instils in the workers hope in the bourgeoisie and faith in illusions. Genuine socialists, the genuine internationalists in Germany, the *Internationale* group and the International Socialists of Germany, who are applying Karl Liebknecht's tactics in practice, were obliged formally to dissociate themselves from this manifesto.

In France, Merrheim and Bourderon, who took part in the Zimmerwald Conference, and Raffin-Dugens, who took part in the Kienthal Conference, have voted *for* meaningless and, objectively, thoroughly false pacifist resolutions, which, in the present state of affairs, are so much to the *advantage* of

the imperialist bourgeoisie that even Jouhaux and Renaudel, denounced as betrayers of socialism in all the Zimmerwald and Kienthal declarations, voted for them!

That Merrheim voted with Jouhaux and Bourderon and Raffin-Dugens with Renaudel is no accident, no isolated episode. It is a striking symbol of the imminent *merger* everywhere of the social-patriots and social-pacifists *against* the international socialists.

The pacifist phrases in the notes of a long list of imperialist governments, the same pacifist phrases uttered by Kautsky, Turati, Bourderon and Merrheim—Renaudel extending a friendly hand to the one and the other—all this exposes pacifism in *actual* politics as a means of *placating* the people, as a means of *helping* the governments to condition the masses to continuation of the imperialist slaughter!

This complete bankruptcy of the Zimmerwald Right has been still more strikingly revealed in Switzerland, the only European country where the Zimmerwaldists could meet freely, and which served as their base. The Socialist Party of Switzerland, which has held its congresses during the war without interference from the government and is in a better position than any other party to promote international solidarity between the German, French and Italian workers against the war, has officially affiliated to Zimmerwald.

And yet, on a decisive question affecting a proletarian party, one of this party's leaders, the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, a prominent member and representative of the Berne International Socialist Committee, National Councillor R. Grimm, *deserted* to the social-patriots of *his country*. At the meeting of the Parteivorstand* of the Socialist Party of Switzerland on January 7, 1917, he secured the adoption of a decision to *postpone* indefinitely the party congress, which was to be convened for the express purpose of deciding the fatherland defence issue and the party's attitude towards the Kienthal Conference decisions condemning social-pacifism.

In a manifesto signed by the International Socialist Committee and dated December 1916, Grimm describes as hypo-

* Executive.—*Ed.*

critical the pacifist phrases of the governments, but says not a word about the socialist pacifism that unites Merrheim and Jouhaux, Raffin-Dugens and Renaudel. In this manifesto Grimm urges the socialist minorities to fight the governments and their social-patriot hirelings, but at the same time, jointly with the "social-patriot hirelings" in the Swiss party, he endeavours to *bury* the party congress, thus rousing the just indignation of all the class-conscious and sincerely internationalist Swiss workers.

No excuses can conceal the fact that the Parteivorstand decision of January 7, 1917 signifies the complete victory of the Swiss social-patriots *over* the Swiss socialist workers, the victory of the Swiss opponents of Zimmerwald *over* Zimmerwald.

The *Grütlianer*, that organ of the consistent and avowed servants of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement, said what everyone knows is true when it declared that social-patriots of the Greulich and Pflüger type, to whom should be added Seidel, Huber, Lang, Schneeberger, Dürr, etc., want to prevent the congress from being held, want to prevent the workers from deciding the fatherland defence issue, and threaten to *resign* if the congress is held and a decision in the spirit of Zimmerwald is adopted.

Grimm resorted to an outrageous and intolerable falsehood at the Parteivorstand and in his newspaper, the *Berner Tagwacht*, of January 8, 1917, when he claimed that the congress had to he postponed because the workers were not ready, that it was necessary to campaign against the high cost of living, that the "Left" were themselves in favour of postponement, etc.[102]

In reality, it was the Left, i.e., the sincere Zimmerwaldists, who, anxious to choose the lesser of two evils and also to expose the real intentions of the social-patriots and their new friend, Grimm, proposed postponing the congress until *March*, voted to postpone it until *May*, and suggested that the meetings of the cantonal committees he held before *July*; but *all* these proposals were voted down by the "fatherland defenders", led by the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, Robert Grimm!!

In reality, the question was: shall the Berne International Socialist Committee and Grimm's paper be allowed to

hurl abuse at *foreign* social-patriots and, at first by their silence and then by Grimm's desertion, *shield* the *Swiss* social-patriots; or shall an honest internationalist policy be pursued, a policy of fighting primarily the social-patriots *at home*?

In reality, the question was: shall the domination of the social-patriots and reformists in the Swiss party be concealed by revolutionary phrases; or shall we oppose to them a *revolutionary* programme and tactics on the question of combating the high cost of living, as well as of combating the war, of putting on the order of the day the fight for the socialist revolution?

In reality, the question was: shall the *worst* traditions of the ignominiously bankrupt Second International be continued in Zimmerwald; shall the workers be kept ignorant of the things the party leaders do and say at the Parteivorstand; shall-revolutionary phrases be allowed to cover up the vileness of social-patriotism and reformism, or shall we be internationalists *in deeds*?

In reality, the question was: shall we in Switzerland too, where the party is of primary importance for the whole of the Zimmerwald group, insist upon a clear, principled and politically honest division between the social-patriots and the internationalists, between the bourgeois reformists and the revolutionaries; between the counsellors of the proletariat, who are helping it carry out the socialist revolution, and the bourgeois agents or "hirelings", who want to divert the workers from revolution by means of reforms or promises of reforms: between the Grütlians and the Socialist Party—*or* shall we confuse and corrupt the minds of the workers by conducting in the Socialist Party the "Grütlian" policy of the Grütlians, i.e., the social-patriots in the ranks of the Socialist Party?

Let the Swiss social-patriots, those "Grütlians" who want to operate their Grütlian policy, i.e., the policy of their national bourgeoisie, abuse the foreigners, let them defend the "inviolability" of the Swiss party from criticism by other parties, let them champion the old bourgeois-reformist policy, i.e., the very policy that brought on the collapse of the German and other parties on August 4, 1914—we, who adhere to Zimmerwald in deeds and not merely in words, interpret internationalism differently.

We are not prepared passively to regard the efforts, now definitely revealed, and sanctified by the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, to leave everything unchanged in decaying European socialism and, by means of hypocritical professions of solidarity with Karl Liebknecht, to *bypass* the real slogan of this leader of the international workers, his appeal to work for the "regeneration" of the old parties from "top to bottom". We are convinced that on our side are all the class-conscious workers in all countries, who enthusiastically greeted Karl Liebknecht and his tactics.

We openly expose the Zimmerwald Right, which has deserted to bourgeois-reformist pacifism.

We openly expose Grimm's betrayal of Zimmerwald and demand convocation of a conference to remove him from his post on the International Socialist Committee.

The word Zimmerwald is the slogan of international socialism and revolutionary struggle. This word must not serve to shield social-patriotism and bourgeois reformism.

Stand for true internationalism, which calls for the struggle, *first of all*, against the social-patriots in your own country! Stand for true revolutionary tactics, which are impossible if there is a compromise with the social-patriots *against* the revolutionary socialist workers!

Written at the close of
December (old style) 1916

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LECTURE ON THE 1905 REVOLUTION[103]

My young friends and comrades,

Today is the twelfth anniversary of "Bloody Sunday", which is rightly regarded as the beginning of the Russian revolution.

Thousands of workers—not Social-Democrats, but loyal God-fearing subjects—led by the priest Gapon, streamed from all parts of the capital to its centre, to the square in front of the Winter Palace, to submit a petition to the tsar. The workers carried icons. In a letter to the tsar, their then leader, Gapon, had guaranteed his personal safety and asked him to appear before the people.

Troops were called out. Uhlans and Cossacks attacked the crowd with drawn swords. They fired on the unarmed workers, who on their bended knees implored the Cossacks to allow them to go to the tsar. Over one thousand were killed and over two thousand wounded on that day, according to police reports. The indignation of the workers was indescribable.

Such is the general picture of January 22, 1905—"Bloody Sunday".

That you may understand more clearly the historic significance of this event, I shall quote a few passages from the workers' petition. It begins with the following words:

"We workers, inhabitants of St. Petersburg, have come to Thee. We are unfortunate, reviled slaves, weighed down by despotism and tyranny. Our patience exhausted, we ceased work and begged our masters to give us only that without which life is a torment. But this was refused; to the employers everything seemed unlawful. We are here, many thousands of us. Like the whole of the Russian people, we have no

human rights whatever. Owing to the deeds of Thy officials we have become slaves."

The petition contains the following demands: amnesty, civil liberties, fair wages, gradual transfer of the land to the people, convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal and equal suffrage. It ends with the following words:

"Sire, do not refuse aid to Thy people! Demolish the wall that separates Thee from Thy people. Order and promise that our requests will be granted, and Thou wilt make Russia happy; if not, we are ready to die on this very spot. We have only two roads: freedom and happiness, or the grave."

Reading it *now*, this petition of uneducated, illiterate workers, led by a patriarchal priest, creates a strange impression. Involuntarily one compares this naïve petition with the present peace resolutions of the social-pacifists, the would-be socialists who in reality are bourgeois phrasemongers. The unenlightened workers of pre-revolutionary Russia did not know that the tsar was the head of the *ruling class*, the class, namely, of big landowners, already bound by a thousand ties with the big bourgeoisie and prepared to defend their monopoly, privileges and profits by every means of violence. The social-pacifists of today, who pretend to be "highly educated" people—no joking—do not realise that it is just as foolish to expect a "democratic" peace from bourgeois governments that are waging an imperialist predatory war, as it was to believe that peaceful petitions would induce the bloody tsar to grant democratic reforms.

Nevertheless, there is a great difference between the two—the present-day social-pacifists are, to a large extent, hypocrites, who strive by gentle admonitions to divert the people from the revolutionary struggle, whereas the uneducated workers in pre-revolutionary Russia proved by their deeds that they were straightforward people awakened to political consciousness for the first time.

It is in this awakening of tremendous masses of the people to political consciousness and revolutionary struggle that the historic significance of January 22, 1905 lies.

"There is not yet a revolutionary people in Russia," wrote Mr. Pyotr Struve, then leader of the Russian liberals

and publisher abroad of an illegal, uncensored organ, *two days* before "Bloody Sunday". The idea that an illiterate peasant country could produce a revolutionary people seemed utterly absurd to this "highly educated", supercilious and extremely stupid leader of the bourgeois reformists. So deep was the conviction of the reformists of those days—as of the reformists of today—that a real revolution was impossible!

Prior to January 22 (or January 9, old style), 1905, the revolutionary party of Russia consisted of a small group of people, and the reformists of those days (exactly like the reformists of today) derisively called us a "sect". Several hundred revolutionary organisers, several thousand members of local organisations, half a dozen revolutionary papers appearing not more frequently than once a month, published mainly abroad and smuggled into Russia with incredible difficulty and at the cost of many sacrifices—such were the revolutionary parties in Russia, and the revolutionary Social-Democracy in particular, prior to January 22, 1905. This circumstance gave the narrow-minded and overbearing reformists formal justification for their claim that there was not yet a revolutionary people in Russia.

Within a few months, however, the picture changed completely. The hundreds of revolutionary Social-Democrats "suddenly" grew into thousands; the thousands became the leaders of between two and three million proletarians. The proletarian struggle produced widespread ferment, often revolutionary movements among the peasant masses, fifty to a hundred million strong; the peasant movement had its reverberations in the army and led to soldiers' revolts, to armed clashes between one section of the army and another. In this manner a colossal country, with a population of 130,000,000, went into the revolution; in this way, dormant Russia was transformed into a Russia of a revolutionary proletariat and a revolutionary people.

It is necessary to study this transformation, understand why it was possible, its methods and ways, so to speak.

The principal factor in this transformation was the *mass strike*. The peculiarity of the Russian revolution is that it was a *bourgeois-democratic* revolution in its social content, but a *proletarian* revolution in its methods of struggle. It

was a bourgeois-democratic revolution since its immediate aim, which it could achieve directly and with its own forces, was a democratic republic, the eight-hour day and confiscation of the immense estates of the nobility—all the measures the French bourgeois revolution in 1792-93 had almost completely achieved.

At the same time, the Russian revolution was also a proletarian revolution, not only in the sense that the proletariat was the leading force, the vanguard of the movement, but also in the sense that a specifically proletarian weapon of struggle—the strike—was the principal means of bringing the masses into motion and the most characteristic phenomenon in the wave-like rise of decisive events.

The Russian revolution was the *first*, though certainly not the last, great revolution in history in which the mass political strike played an extraordinarily important part. It may even be said that the events of the Russian revolution and the sequence of its political forms cannot be understood without a study of the *strike statistics* to disclose the *basis* of these events and this sequence of forms.

I know perfectly well that dry statistics are hardly suitable in a lecture and are likely to bore the hearer. Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from quoting a few figures, in order that you may be able to appreciate the real objective basis of the whole movement. The average annual number of strikers in Russia during the ten years preceding the revolution was 43,000, which means 430,000 for the decade. In January 1905, the first month of the revolution, the number of strikers was 440,000. In other words, there were *more* strikers *in one month* than in the whole of the preceding decade!

In no capitalist country in the world, not even in the most advanced countries like England, the United States of America, or Germany, has there been anything to match the tremendous Russian strike movement of 1905. The total number of strikers was 2,800,000, more than two times the number of factory workers in the country! This, of course, does not prove that the urban factory workers of Russia were more educated, or stronger, or more adapted to the struggle than their brothers in Western Europe. The very opposite is true.

But it does show how great the dormant energy of the proletariat can be. It shows that in a revolutionary epoch—I say this without the slightest exaggeration, on the basis of the most accurate data of Russian history—the proletariat *can* generate fighting energy *a hundred times greater* than in ordinary, peaceful times. It shows that up to 1905 mankind did not yet know what a great, what a tremendous exertion of effort the proletariat is, and will be, capable of in a fight for really great aims, and one waged in a really revolutionary manner!

The history of the Russian revolution shows that it was the vanguard, the finest elements of the wage-workers, that fought with the greatest tenacity and the greatest devotion. The larger the mills and factories involved, the more stubborn were the strikes, and the more often did they recur during the year. The bigger the city, the more important was the part the proletariat played in the struggle. Three big cities, St. Petersburg, Riga and Warsaw, which have the largest and most class-conscious working-class element, show an immeasurably greater number of strikers, in relation to all workers, than any other city, and, of course, much greater than the rural districts.*

In Russia—as probably in other capitalist countries—the metalworkers represent the vanguard of the proletariat. In this connection we note the following instructive fact: taking all industries, the number of persons involved in strikes in 1905 was 160 per hundred workers employed, but in the *metal industry* the number was 320 per hundred! It is estimated that in consequence of the 1905 strikes every Russian factory worker lost an average of ten rubles in wages—approximately 26 francs at the pre-war rate of exchange—sacrificing this money, as it were, for the sake of the struggle. But if we take the metalworkers, we find that the loss in wages was *three times as great*! The finest elements of the working class marched in the forefront, giving leadership to the hesitant, rousing the dormant and encouraging the weak.

A distinctive feature was the manner in which economic strikes were interwoven with political strikes during the

* In the manuscript this paragraph is crossed out.—*Ed.*

revolution. There can be no doubt that only this very close link-up of the two forms of strike gave the movement its great power. The broad masses of the exploited could not have been drawn into the revolutionary movement had they not been given daily examples of how the wage-workers in the various industries were forcing the capitalists to grant immediate, direct improvements in their conditions. This struggle imbued the masses of the Russian people with a new spirit. Only then did the old serf-ridden, sluggish, patriarchal, pious and obedient Russia cast out the old Adam; only then did the Russian people obtain a really democratic and really revolutionary education.

When the bourgeois gentry and their uncritical echoers, the social-reformists, talk priggishly about the "education" of the masses, they usually mean something schoolmasterly, pedantic, something that demoralises the masses and instils in them bourgeois prejudices.

The real education of the masses can never be separated from their independent political, and especially revolutionary, struggle. Only struggle educates the exploited class. Only struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will. That is why even reactionaries had to admit that the year 1905, the year of struggle, the "mad year", definitely buried patriarchal Russia.

Let us examine more closely the relation, in the 1905 strike struggles, between the metalworkers and the textile workers. The metalworkers are the best paid, the most class-conscious and best educated proletarians. The textile workers, who in 1905 were two and a half times more numerous than the metalworkers, are the most backward and the worst paid body of workers in Russia, and in very many cases have not yet definitely severed connections with their peasant kinsmen in the village. This brings us to a very important circumstance.

Throughout the whole of 1905, the metalworkers' strikes show a preponderance of political over economic strikes, though this preponderance was far greater toward the end of the year than at the beginning. Among the textile workers, on the other hand, we observe an overwhelming preponderance of economic strikes at the beginning of 1905, and it is

only at the end of the year that we get a preponderance of political strikes. From this it follows quite obviously that the economic struggle, the struggle for immediate and direct improvement of conditions, is alone capable of rousing the most backward strata of the exploited masses, gives them a real education and transforms them—during a revolutionary period—into an army of political fighters within the space of a few months.

Of course, for this to happen, it was necessary for the vanguard of the workers not to regard the class struggle as a struggle in the interests of a thin upper stratum—a conception the reformists all too often try to instil—but for the proletariat to come forward as the real vanguard of the majority of the exploited and draw that majority into the struggle, as was the case in Russia in 1905, and as must be, and certainly will be, the case in the impending proletarian revolution in Europe.*

The beginning of 1905 brought the first great wave of strikes that swept the entire country. As early as the spring of that year we see the rise of the first big, not only economic, but also political *peasant movement* in Russia. The importance of this historical turning-point will be appreciated if it is borne in mind that the Russian peasantry was liberated from the severest form of serfdom only in 1861, that the majority of the peasants are illiterate, that they live in indescribable poverty, oppressed by the landlords, deluded by the priests and isolated from each other by vast distances and an almost complete absence of roads.

Russia witnessed the first revolutionary movement against tsarism in 1825, a movement represented almost exclusively by noblemen. Thereafter and up to 1881, when Alexander II was assassinated by the terrorists, the movement was led by middle-class intellectuals. They displayed supreme self-sacrifice and astonished the whole world by the heroism of their terrorist methods of struggle. Their sacrifices were certainly not in vain. They doubtlessly contributed—directly or indirectly—to the subsequent revolutionary education of the Russian people. But they did not, and could

* In the manuscript the four preceding paragraphs are crossed out.—*Ed.*

not, achieve their immediate aim of generating a people's revolution.

That was achieved only by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. Only the waves of mass strikes that swept over the whole country, strikes connected with the severe lessons of the imperialist Russo-Japanese War, roused the broad masses of peasants from their lethargy. The word "striker" acquired an entirely new meaning among the peasants: it signified a rebel, a revolutionary, a term previously expressed by the word "student". But the "student" belonged to the middle class, to the "learned", to the "gentry", and was therefore alien to the people. The "striker", on the other hand, was of the people; he belonged to the exploited class. Deported from St. Petersburg, he often returned to the village where he told his fellow villagers of the conflagration which was spreading to all the cities and would destroy both the capitalists and the nobility. A new type appeared in the Russian village—the class-conscious young peasant. He associated with "strikers", he read newspapers, he told the peasants about events in the cities, explained to his fellow-villagers the meaning of political demands, and urged them to fight the landowning nobility, the priests and the government officials.

The peasants would gather in groups to discuss their conditions, and gradually they were drawn into the struggle. Large crowds attacked the big estates, set fire to the manor-houses and appropriated supplies, seized grain and other foodstuffs, killed policemen and demanded transfer to the people of the huge estates.

In the spring of 1905, the peasant movement was only just beginning, involving only a minority, approximately one-seventh, of the uyezds.

But the combination of the proletarian mass strikes in the cities with the peasant movement in the rural areas was sufficient to shake the "firmest" and last prop of tsarism. I refer to the *army*.

There began a series of *mutinies* in the navy and the army. During the revolution, every fresh wave of strikes and of the peasant movement was accompanied by mutinies in all parts of Russia. The most well-known of these is the mutiny on the Black Sea cruiser *Prince Potemkin*, which was

seized by the mutineers and took part in the revolution in Odessa. After the defeat of the revolution and unsuccessful attempts to seize other ports (Feodosia in the Crimea, for instance), it surrendered to the Rumanian authorities in Constantsa.

Permit me to relate in detail one small episode of the Black Sea mutiny in order to give you a concrete picture of events at the peak of the movement.

"Gatherings of revolutionary workers and sailors were being organised more and more frequently. Since servicemen were not allowed to attend workers' meetings, large crowds of workers came to military meetings. They came in thousands. The idea of joint action found a lively response. Delegates were elected from the companies where political understanding among the men was higher.

"The military authorities thereupon decided to take action. Some of the officers tried to deliver 'patriotic' speeches at the meetings but failed dismally: the sailors, who were accustomed to debating, put their officers to shameful flight. In view of this, it was decided to prohibit meetings altogether. On the morning of November 24, 1905, a company of sailors, In full combat kit, was posted at the gates of the naval barracks. Rear-Admiral Pisarevsky gave the order in a loud voice: 'No one is to leave the barracks! Shoot anyone who disobeys!' A sailor named Petrov, of the company that had been given that order, stepped forth from the ranks, loaded his rifle in the view of all, and with one shot killed Captain Stein of the Belostok Regiment, and with another wounded Rear-Admiral Pisarevsky. 'Arrest him!' one of the officers shouted. No one budged. Petrov threw down his rifle, exclaiming: 'Why don't you move? Take me!' He was arrested. The sailors, who rushed from every side, angrily demanded his release, declaring that they vouched for him. Excitement ran high.

"'Petrov, the shot was an accident, wasn't it?' asked one of the officers, trying to find a way out of the situation.

"'What do you mean, an accident? I stepped forward, loaded and took aim. Is that an accident?'

"'They demand your release....'

"And Petrov was released. The sailors, however, were not content with that; all officers on duty were arrested, disarmed, and locked up at headquarters.... Sailor delegates, about forty in number, conferred the whole night. The decision was to release the officers, but not to permit them to enter the barracks again."

This small incident clearly shows you how events developed in most of the mutinies. The revolutionary ferment among the people could not but spread to the armed forces. It is indicative that the leaders of the movement came from *those elements* in the army and the navy who had been recruited mainly from among the industrial workers

and of whom more technical training was required, for instance, the sappers. The broad masses, however, were still too naïve, their mood was too passive, too good-natured, too Christian. They flared up rather quickly; any instance of injustice, excessively harsh treatment by the officers, bad food, etc., could lead to revolt. But what they lacked was persistence, a clear perception of aim, a clear understanding that only the most vigorous continuation of the armed struggle, only a victory over all the military and civil authorities, only the overthrow of the government and the seizure of power throughout the country could guarantee the success of the revolution.

The broad masses of sailors and soldiers were easily roused to revolt. But with equal light-heartedness they foolishly released arrested officers. They allowed the officers to pacify them by promises and persuasion: in this way the officers gained precious time, brought in reinforcements, broke the strength of the rebels, and then followed the most brutal suppression of the movement and the execution of its leaders.

A comparison of these 1905 mutinies with the Decembrist uprising of 1825 is particularly interesting. In 1825 the leaders of the political movement were almost exclusively officers, and officers drawn from the nobility. They had become infected, through contact, with the democratic ideas of Europe during the Napoleonic wars. The mass of the soldiers, who at that time were still serfs, remained passive.

The history of 1905 presents a totally different picture. With few exceptions, the mood of the officers was either bourgeois-liberal, reformist, or frankly counter-revolutionary. The workers and peasants in military uniform were the soul of the mutinies. The movement spread to all sections of the people, and for the first time in Russia's history involved the majority of the exploited. But what it lacked was, on the one hand, persistence and determination among the masses—they were too much afflicted with the malady of trustfulness—and, on the other, organisation of revolutionary Social-Democratic workers in military uniform—they lacked the ability to take the leadership into their own hands, march at the head of the revolutionary army and launch an offensive against the government.

I might remark, incidentally, that these two shortcomings will—more slowly, perhaps, than we would like, but surely—be eliminated not only by the general development of capitalism, but also by the present war...*

At any rate, the history of the Russian revolution, like the history of the Paris Commune of 1871, teaches us the incontrovertible lesson that militarism can never and under no circumstances be defeated and destroyed, except by a victorious struggle of one section of the national army against the other section. It is not sufficient simply to denounce, revile and "repudiate" militarism, to criticise and prove that it is harmful; it is foolish peacefully to refuse to perform military service. The task is to keep the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat tense and train its best elements, not only in a general way, but concretely, so that when popular ferment reaches the highest pitch, they will put themselves at the head of the revolutionary army.

The day-to-day experience of any capitalist country teaches us the same lesson. Every "minor" crisis that such a country experiences discloses to us in miniature the elements, the rudiments, of the battles that will inevitably take place on a large scale during a big crisis. What else, for instance, is a strike if not a minor crisis of capitalist society? Was not the Prussian Minister for Internal Affairs, Herr von Puttkammer, right when he coined the famous phrase: "In every strike there lurks the hydra of revolution"? Does not the calling out of troops during strikes in all, even the most peaceful, the most "democratic"—save the mark—capitalist countries show *how* things will shape out in a really *big* crisis?

But to return to the history of the Russian revolution.

I have tried to show you how the workers' strikes stirred up the whole country and the broadest, most backward strata of the exploited, how the peasant movement began, and how it was accompanied by mutiny in the armed forces.

The movement reached its zenith in the autumn of 1905. On August 19 (6), the tsar issued a manifesto on the introduction of popular representation. The so-called Bulygin

* In the manuscript the three preceding paragraphs are crossed out.—*Ed.*

Duma was to be created on the basis of a suffrage embracing a ridiculously small number of voters, and this peculiar "parliament" was to have no legislative powers whatever, only *advisory*, consultative powers!

The bourgeoisie, the liberals, the opportunists were ready to grasp with both hands this "gift" of the frightened tsar. Like all reformists, our reformists of 1905 could not understand that historic situations arise when reforms, and particularly promises of reforms, pursue only one aim: to allay the unrest of the people, force the revolutionary class to cease, or at least slacken, its struggle.

The Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy was well aware of the real nature of this grant of an illusory constitution in August 1905. That is why, without a moment's hesitation, it issued the slogans: "Down with the advisory Duma! Boycott the Duma! Down with the tsarist government! Continue the revolutionary struggle to overthrow it! Not the tsar, but a provisional revolutionary government must convene Russia's first real, popular representative assembly!"

History proved that the revolutionary Social-Democrats were right, for the *Bulygin Duma* was never convened. It was swept away by the revolutionary storm before it could be convened. And this storm forced the tsar to promulgate a new electoral law, which provided for a considerable increase in the number of voters, and to recognise the legislative character of the Duma.*

October and December 1905 marked the highest point in the rising tide of the Russian revolution. All the wellsprings of the people's revolutionary strength flowed in a wider stream than ever before. The number of strikers—which in January 1905, as I have already told you, was 440,000—reached over half a million in October 1905 (in a single month!). To this number, which applies *only* to factory workers, must be added several hundred thousand railway workers, postal and telegraph employees, etc.

The general railway strike stopped all rail traffic and paralysed the power of the government in the most effective

* In the manuscript the four preceding paragraphs are crossed out.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

manner. The doors of the universities were flung wide open, and the lecture halls, which in peace time were used solely to befuddle youthful minds with pedantic professorial wisdom and to turn the students into docile servants of the bourgeoisie and tsarism, now became the scene of public meetings at which thousands of workers, artisans and office workers openly and freely discussed political issues.

Freedom of the press was won. The censorship was simply ignored. No publisher dared send the obligatory censor copy to the authorities, and the authorities did not dare take any measure against this. For the first time in Russian history, revolutionary newspapers appeared freely in St. Petersburg and other towns. In St. Petersburg alone, three Social-Democratic daily papers were published, with circulations ranging from 50,000 to 100,000.

The proletariat marched at the head of the movement. It set out to win the eight-hour day by revolutionary action. "*An Eight-Hour Day and Arms*!" was the fighting slogan of the St. Petersburg proletariat. That the fate of the revolution could, and would, be decided only by armed struggle was becoming obvious to an ever-increasing mass of workers.

In the fire of battle, a peculiar mass organisation was formed, the famous *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*, comprising delegates from all factories. In several cities these *Soviets of Workers' Deputies* began more and more to play the part of a provisional revolutionary government, the part of organs and leaders of the uprising. Attempts were made to organise Soviets of Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies and to combine them with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

For a time several cities in Russia became something in the nature of small local "republics". The government authorities were deposed and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies actually functioned as the new government. Unfortunately, these periods were all too brief, the "victories" were too weak, too isolated.

The peasant movement in the autumn of 1905 reached still greater dimensions. *Over one-third* of all the uyezds were affected by the so-called "peasant disorders" and regular peasant uprisings. The peasants burned down no less than

two thousand estates and distributed among themselves the food stocks of which the predatory nobility had robbed the people.

Unfortunately, this work was not thorough enough! Unfortunately, the peasants destroyed only one-fifteenth of the total number of landed estates, only one-fifteenth part of what they *should have* destroyed in order to wipe the shame of large feudal landownership from the face of the Russian earth. Unfortunately, the peasants were too scattered, too isolated from each other in their actions; they were not organised enough, not aggressive enough, and therein lies one of the fundamental reasons for the defeat of the revolution.

A movement for national liberation flared up among the oppressed peoples of Russia. *Over one-half*, *almost three-fifths* (*to be exact*, *57 per cent*) of the population of Russia is subject to national oppression; they are not even free to use their native language, they are forcibly Russified. The Moslems, for instance, who number tens of millions, were quick to organise a Moslem League—this was a time of rapid growth of all manner of organisations.

The following instance will give the audience, particularly the youth, an example of how at that time the movement for national liberation in Russia rose in conjunction with the labour movement.

In December 1905, Polish children in hundreds of schools burned all Russian books, pictures and portraits of the tsar, and attacked and drove out the Russian teachers and their Russian schoolfellows, shouting: "Get out! Go back to Russia!" The Polish secondary school pupils put forward, among others, the following demands: (1) all secondary schools must be under the control of a Soviet of Workers' Deputies; (2) joint pupils' and workers' meetings to be held in school premises; (3) secondary school pupils to be allowed to wear red blouses as a token of adherence to the future proletarian republic.

The higher the tide of the movement rose, the more vigorously and decisively did the reaction arm itself to fight the revolution. The Russian Revolution of 1905 confirmed the truth of what Karl Kautsky wrote in 1902 in his book *Social Revolution* (he was still, incidentally, a revolutionary

Marxist and not, as at present, a champion of social-patriotism and opportunism). This is what he wrote:

"...The impending revolution ... will be less like a spontaneous uprising against the government and more like a protracted *civil war*."

That is how it was, and undoubtedly that is how it will be in the coming European revolution!

Tsarism vented its hatred particularly upon the Jews. On the one hand, the Jews furnished a particularly high percentage (compared with the total Jewish population) of leaders of the revolutionary movement. And now, too, it should be noted to the credit of the Jews, they furnish a relatively high percentage of internationalists, compared with other nations. On the other hand, tsarism adroitly exploited the basest anti-Jewish prejudices of the most ignorant strata of the population in order to organise, if not to lead directly, *pogroms*—over 4,000 were killed and more than 10,000 mutilated in 100 towns. These atrocious massacres of peaceful Jews, their wives and children roused disgust throughout the civilised world. I have in mind, of course, the disgust of the truly democratic elements of the civilised world, and these are *exclusively* the socialist workers, the proletarians.

Even in the freest, even in the republican countries of Western Europe, the bourgeoisie manages very well to combine its hypocritical phrases about "Russian atrocities" with the most shameless financial transactions, particularly with financial support of tsarism and imperialist exploitation of Russia through export of capital, etc.

The climax of the 1905 Revolution came in the December uprising in Moscow. For nine days a small number of rebels, of organised and armed workers—there were not more than *eight thousand*—fought against the tsar's government, which dared not trust the Moscow garrison. In fact, it had to keep it locked up, and was able to quell the rebellion only by bringing in the Semenovsky Regiment from St. Petersburg.

The bourgeoisie likes to describe the Moscow uprising as something artificial, and to treat it with ridicule. For instance, in German so-called "scientific" literature, Herr Professor Max Weber, in his lengthy survey of Russia's political development, refers to the Moscow uprising as a

"putsch". "The Lenin group," says this "highly learned" Herr Professor, "and a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries had long prepared for this *senseless* uprising."

To properly assess this piece of professorial wisdom of the cowardly bourgeoisie, one need only recall the strike statistics. In January 1905, only 123,000 were involved in purely political strikes, in October the figure was 330,000, and *in December the maximum was reached—370,000* taking part in purely political strikes in a single month! Let us recall, too, the progress of the revolution, the peasant and soldier uprisings, and we shall see that the bourgeois "scientific" view of the December uprising is not only absurd. It is a subterfuge resorted to by the representatives of the cowardly bourgeoisie, which sees in the proletariat its most dangerous class enemy.

In reality, the inexorable trend of the Russian revolution was towards an armed, decisive battle between the tsarist government and the vanguard of the class-conscious proletariat.

I have already pointed out, in my previous remarks, wherein lay the weakness of the Russian revolution that led to its temporary defeat.

The suppression of the December uprising marked the beginning of the ebb of the revolution. But in this period, too, extremely interesting moments are to be observed. Suffice it to recall that twice the foremost militant elements of the working class tried to check the retreat of the revolution and to prepare a new offensive.

But my time has nearly expired, and I do not want to abuse the patience of my audience. I think, however, that I have outlined the most important aspects of the revolution—its class character, its driving forces and its methods of struggle—as fully as so big a subject can be dealt with in a brief lecture.*

A few brief remarks concerning the world significance of the Russian revolution.

Geographically, economically and historically, Russia belongs not only to Europe, but also to Asia. That is why the Russian revolution succeeded not only in finally

* In the manuscript this sentence is crossed out.—*Ed.*

awakening Europe's biggest and most backward country and in creating a revolutionary people led by a revolutionary proletariat.

It achieved more than that. The Russian revolution engendered a movement throughout the whole of Asia. The revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China prove that the mighty uprising of 1905 left a deep imprint, and that its influence, expressed in the forward movement of *hundreds and hundreds* of millions, is ineradicable.

In an indirect way, the Russian revolution influenced also the countries of the West. One must not forget that news of the tsar's constitutional manifesto, on reaching Vienna on October 30, 1905, played a decisive part in the final victory of universal suffrage in Austria.

A telegram bearing the news was placed on the speaker's rostrum at the Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party just as Comrade Ellenbogen—at that time he was not yet a social-patriot, but a comrade—was delivering his report on the political strike. The discussion was immediately adjourned. "Our place is in the streets!"—was the cry that resounded through the hall where the delegates of the Austrian Social-Democracy were assembled. And the following days witnessed the biggest street demonstrations in Vienna and barricades in Prague. The battle for universal suffrage in Austria was won.

We very often meet West-Europeans who talk of the Russian revolution as if events, the course and methods of struggle in that backward country have very little resemblance to West-European patterns, and, therefore, can hardly have any practical significance.

Nothing could he more erroneous.

The forms and occasions for the impending battles in the coming European revolution will doubtlessly differ in many respects from the forms of the Russian revolution.

Nevertheless, the Russian revolution—precisely because of its proletarian character, in that particular sense of which I have spoken—is the *prologue* to the coming European revolution. Undoubtedly, this coming revolution can only be a proletarian revolution, and in an even more profound sense of the word: a proletarian, socialist revolution also in its content. This coming revolution will show to

an even greater degree, on the one hand, that only stern battles, only civil wars, can free humanity from the yoke of capital, and, on the other hand, that only class-conscious proletarians can and will give leadership to the vast majority of the exploited.

We must not be deceived by the present grave-like stillness in Europe. Europe is pregnant with revolution. The monstrous horrors of the imperialist war, the suffering caused by the high cost of living everywhere engender a revolutionary mood; and the ruling classes, the bourgeoisie, and its servitors, the governments, are more and more moving into a blind alley from which they can never extricate themselves without tremendous upheavals.

Just as in Russia in 1905, a popular uprising against the tsarist government began under the leadership of the proletariat with the aim of achieving a democratic republic, so, in Europe, the coming years, precisely because of this predatory war, will lead to popular uprisings under the leadership of the proletariat against the power of finance capital, against the big banks, against the capitalists; and these upheavals cannot end otherwise than with the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, with the victory of socialism.

We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution. But I can, I believe, express the confident hope that the youth which is working so splendidly in the socialist movement of Switzerland, and of the whole world, will be fortunate enough not only to fight, but also to win, in the coming proletarian revolution.

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TWELVE BRIEF THESES ON H. GREULICH'S DEFENCE OF FATHERLAND DEFENCE[104]

1. Greulich begins his first article with the statement that there are now "socialists" (he probably means *pseudo*-socialists) who "trust Junker and bourgeois governments".

That accusation of *one* trend in present-day socialism, namely, social-patriotism, is, of course, correct. But what do all Comrade Greulich's four articles show if not that he, too, *blindly* "trusts" the Swiss "bourgeois government"?? He even overlooks the fact that the Swiss "bourgeois government", because of the numerous ties of Swiss banking capital, is not merely a "bourgeois government", but an *imperialist* bourgeois government.

2. In his first article, Greulich admits the existence of two main trends in the international Social-Democratic movement. He defines one (*social-patriotism*, of course) absolutely correctly by branding its supporters "as agents" of bourgeois governments.

But Greulich is strangely oblivious to the facts, first, that the Swiss social-patriots, too, are agents of the Swiss bourgeois government; second, that just as Switzerland in general cannot break out of the network of world-market ties, present-day, highly developed and immensely rich bourgeois Switzerland cannot break out of the network of world-imperialist relationships; third, that it would be well worth while examining the arguments for and against defence of the fatherland as presented throughout the international Social-Democratic movement, particularly in context with these world-imperialist, finance-capital relationships; fourth, that there is no reconciling these two main trends in the international Social-Democratic movement, and, consequent-

ly, the Swiss party *must choose* which trend it wants to follow.

3. In the second article Greulich says: "Switzerland cannot wage an offensive war."

Greulich strangely overlooks the irrefutable and obvious fact that in *both* possible eventualities—namely, if Switzerland joins Germany against England, or England against Germany—in *either* case Switzerland will be participating in an imperialist war, in a predatory war, in an offensive war.

Bourgeois Switzerland can under no circumstances either alter the nature of the present war or, in general, wage an anti-imperialist war.

Is it permissible for Greulich to depart from the "realm of facts" (see his fourth article) and discuss some hypothetical war instead of discussing the *present* one?

4. Greulich states in his second article:

"For Switzerland, neutrality and defence of the fatherland are identical. Whoever rejects defence of the fatherland endangers neutrality. One must appreciate that."

Two modest questions to Comrade Greulich.

First, shouldn't one appreciate the fact that faith in proclamations of neutrality and intentions to maintain it in the present war is tantamount not only to blind faith in one's *own* "bourgeois government" and *other* "bourgeois governments", but is simply absurd?

Second, shouldn't one appreciate that in reality the position is as follows?

Whoever in this war accepts defence of the fatherland becomes an accomplice of his "*own*" national bourgeoisie, which, in Switzerland, too, is a thoroughly imperialist bourgeoisie, since it is financially tied to the Great Powers and is involved in imperialist world politics.

Whoever in this war rejects defence of the fatherland destroys the proletariat's faith in the bourgeoisie and *helps* the international proletariat wage its struggle *against* the bourgeoisie's domination.

5. At the close of his second article Greulich says:

"Abolishing the Swiss militia would not yet mean eliminating war between the Great Powers."

Why does Comrade Greulich overlook the fact that the Social-Democrats conceive abolition of *every* army (and,

consequently, militia) as taking place only *after* a victorious social revolution? That precisely now it is necessary to fight for social revolution in alliance with the internationalist revolutionary minorities in *all* the Great Powers?

From *whom* does Greulich expect elimination of "war between the Great Powers"? From the militia of a small bourgeois state with a four million population?

We Social-Democrats expect elimination of "war between the Great Powers" to result from the revolutionary actions of the proletariat of all the powers, *great* and *small*.

6. In the third article Greulich contends that the Swiss workers must "defend" "democracy"!!

Is Comrade Greulich really unaware that in this war *not a single* European state is defending, nor can defend, democracy? On the contrary, for *all* states, big and small, participation in this imperialist war means *strangling* democracy, the triumph of reaction over democracy. England, Germany, France, etc., offer a thousand examples. Can it really be that Greulich is unaware of them? Or does Comrade Greulich so implicitly trust the Swiss, i.e., his own, "bourgeois government", that he regards all Swiss bank directors and millionaires as veritable William Tells?

Revolutionary struggle against *all* bourgeois governments—that, and that alone, and not participation in the imperialist war, or in national mobilisation allegedly to defend the country's neutrality, can lead to socialism, and without socialism there is no *guarantee* of democracy.

7. Comrade Greulich writes in the third article:

"Does Switzerland expect the proletariat to 'fight against itself in imperialist battles'?"

That question shows that Comrade Greulich has his feet securely planted on national soil, but, unfortunately, in the present war there is *no* such soil for Switzerland.

It is not Switzerland that "expects" this of the proletariat, but capitalism, which in Switzerland, as in all civilised countries, has become *imperialist* capitalism. Today, the ruling bourgeoisie "expects" the proletariat of *all* countries to "fight against itself in imperialist battles". That is what Greulich overlooks. And today there is no means of protecting ourselves against that eventuality save

international revolutionary class struggle against the bourgeoisie!

Why does Greulich forget that, way back in 1912, the Basle Manifesto of the International directly stated, first, that the basic character of the future war is determined by *imperialist* capitalism, and, second, spoke of *proletarian revolution precisely* in connection with *this* war?

8. In the third article Greulich writes:

Revolutionary mass struggle "instead of utilising democratic rights" is a "very vague concept".

This proves that Greulich accepts only the bourgeois-reformist path and rejects or ignores *revolution*. That befits a Grütlian, but it certainly does not befit a Social-Democrat.

Revolution without "revolutionary mass struggle" is impossible. There have never been such revolutions. In the imperialist era that has now begun, revolutions are inevitable in Europe too.

9. In the fourth article Comrade Greulich frankly says he will "naturally" resign from the National Council if the party rejects defence of the fatherland *in principle*, adding that such a rejection would imply "violation of our unity".

That is not open to misinterpretation: it is a clear ultimatum to the party on the part of the social-patriot National Council members. *Either* the party accepts these social-patriot views, *or* "we" (Greulich, Müller, etc.) will resign.

But, frankly, what kind of "unity" can we speak of? Only, of course, of "unity" of the social-patriot leaders with *their* seats on the National Council?!

Principled proletarian unity implies something quite different: the social-patriots, i.e., the defenders of the "fatherland", should "unite" with the social-patriot, thoroughly bourgeois Grütli-Verein. The Social-Democrats, who reject fatherland defence, should "unite" with the socialist proletariat. That is perfectly obvious.

We firmly hope that Comrade Greulich will not wish to disgrace himself by trying to disprove (despite the experience of England, Germany, Sweden, etc.) that "unity" of the social-patriots, those "agents" of bourgeois governments, with the socialist proletariat can lead only to sheer disorganisation, demoralisation, hypocrisy and lies.

10. The "pledge" of National Council members to defend the country's independence is "incompatible", in Greulich's view, with refusal to defend the country.

Very well! But what revolutionary activity is "compatible" with "pledges" to uphold the laws of capitalist states?? The Grütlians, i.e., servants of the bourgeoisie, recognise only legal methods as a matter of principle. So far, not a single Social-Democrat has rejected revolution, or accepted only such revolutions as were "compatible" with "pledges" to uphold bourgeois laws.

11. Greulich denies that Switzerland is a "bourgeois class state" "in the absolute meaning of the term". He defines socialism (at the end of his fourth article) in a way that wholly precludes both social revolution and all revolutionary action. Social revolution is "utopian"—that is the short meaning of all Greulich's long speeches and articles.

Very well! But that is the most blatant Grütlianism, not socialism. It is bourgeois reformism, not socialism.

Why does not Comrade Greulich openly propose that the words about "proletarian revolution" be deleted from the 1912 Basle Manifesto? Or the words about "revolutionary mass action" from the 1915 Aarau resolution? Or that all the Zimmerwald and Kienthal resolutions be burned?

12. Comrade Greulich has both feet planted on national soil—on bourgeois-reformist, Grütli soil.

He obstinately ignores the imperialist character of the present war and the imperialist ties of the present-day Swiss bourgeoisie. He ignores the fact that the socialists of the whole world are split into social-patriots and revolutionary internationalists.

He forgets that, in reality, *only* two paths are open to the Swiss proletariat:

First path. Help its own national bourgeoisie to arm, support mobilisation for the alleged purpose of defending neutrality, and face the daily menace of being inveigled into the imperialist war. In the event of "victory" in this war—be reduced to semi-starvation, record the loss of 100,000 killed, put more billions of war profits into the pockets of the Swiss bourgeoisie, assure it more profitable investments abroad, and fall into more financial dependence on its imperialist "allies"—the Great Powers.

Second path. In close alliance with the internationalist revolutionary minority in all the Great Powers, wage a resolute struggle against all "bourgeois governments", and primarily against its *own* "bourgeois government", placing no "trust" whatever in its own bourgeois government, or in its talk of defending neutrality, and politely invite the social-patriots to move over to the Grütli-Verein.

In the event of victory—be for ever rid of high costs of living, hunger and war and, together with the French, German and other workers, stage the socialist revolution.

Both paths are difficult, both entail sacrifices.

The Swiss proletariat must choose—does it want to make these sacrifices for the sake of the Swiss imperialist bourgeoisie and one of the Great-Power coalitions, or to deliver humanity from capitalism, hunger and war.

The proletariat must choose.

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Signed: —e—

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DEFENCE OF NEUTRALITY

Acceptance of the proposition that the present war is imperialist, i.e., a war between two big freebooters for world domination and plunder, does not yet prove that we should reject defence of the Swiss fatherland. We, Swiss, are defending our neutrality; we have stationed troops on our boundaries for the express purpose of avoiding participation in this robber war!

This is the argument of the social-patriots, the Grütlians, both within the Socialist Party and outside it.

It is based on the following tacitly accepted or dexterously manipulated promises.

Uncritical repetition of what the bourgeoisie says, and what it has to say, to maintain its class domination.

Complete trust in the bourgeoisie and complete distrust of the proletariat.

Disregard of the real, rather than imaginary, international situation resulting from the imperialist pattern of European relationships and the imperialist "tie-up" of the Swiss capitalist class.

Did not the Rumanian and Bulgarian bourgeoisie give the most solemn assurances, over a period of many months, that their military preparations were dictated "solely" by the need to safeguard their neutrality?

Is there any serious, scientific basis for drawing a *fundamental* distinction, on this issue, between the bourgeoisie of the afore-mentioned countries and that of Switzerland?

Certainly not. The Rumanian and Bulgarian bourgeoisie, we are told, are notoriously obsessed by a lust for conquest and annexation, and this does not apply to the Swiss bourgeoisie. But that cannot be considered a *fundamental* distinction. Imperialist interests are manifested, as everyone knows, not only in territorial, but also in *financial* acqui-

sitions. It should be borne in mind that the Swiss bourgeoisie exports capital, no less than 3,000 million francs a year, i.e., imperialistically exploits backward nations. That is a fact, and another fact is that Swiss banking capital is intimately associated and intertwined with the banking capital of the Great Powers, that the Swiss Fremdenindustrie,* etc., represent a permanent *division* of imperialist wealth between the Great Powers and Switzerland. Moreover, Switzerland has reached a much higher level of capitalist development than Rumania and Bulgaria. There can be no question whatever of a popular "national" movement in Switzerland: that period in its historical development ended many centuries ago. This cannot be said of either of the Balkan states referred to above.

It therefore befits the bourgeois to try to instil in the people, in the exploited, faith in the bourgeoisie of his own country and use plausible phrases to conceal the *realities* of its imperialist policies.

Something quite different, however, is expected of the socialist, namely: merciless exposure that leaves no room for illusions about the real policies of his "own" bourgeoisie. And continuation of these real policies by the Swiss bourgeoisie, such as *selling* the nation to one of the imperialist coalitions of states, is much more probable and much more "natural" (i.e., more in conformity with the nature of this bourgeoisie) than defence of democracy in the true sense of the word, which would be contrary to its profit interests.

"To each his own": let the Grütlians, as servants and agents of the bourgeoisie, deceive the people with phrases about "defending neutrality".

Socialists, on the other hand, as fighters against the bourgeoisie, must open the people's eyes to the very real danger, proved by the whole history of Swiss bourgeois politics, of being *sold* by their "own" bourgeoisie!

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* Industries catering to foreigners.—*Ed.*

A TURN IN WORLD POLITICS

There is something of a holiday atmosphere in the pacifist camp. The virtuous bourgeois of the neutral countries are rejoicing: "We've made our little pile out of war profits and high prices; isn't it time to stop? We can't make more profits anyway, and the people's patience may not last to the very end."

Why shouldn't they rejoice when Wilson "himself" "paraphrases" the pacifist declaration of the Italian Socialist Party, which only just recently passed an official and solemn resolution in Kienthal to the effect that social-pacifism is utterly unsound?

Is it surprising that in *Avanti!* Turati exults at Wilson's having paraphrased *their*, Italian, "pseudo-socialist" pacifist phrases? Is it surprising that, in *Le Populaire*,[105] the French social-pacifists and Kautskyites lovingly "unite" with Turati and Kautsky, who published in the German Social-Democratic press five particularly foolish pacifist articles, which also, of course, "paraphrase" the talk events have brought to the fore about a nice little democratic peace?

And the present talk does differ from the previous talk in that there is some *objective* ground for it. This ground was created by the turn in world politics from *imperialist war*, which brought the peoples utter misery and the greatest betrayal of socialism by Messrs. Plekhanov, Albert Thomas, Legien, Scheidemann, etc., towards an *imperialist peace*, which will bring the peoples the greatest deception in the form of pious phrases, semi-reforms, semi-concessions, etc.

This turn has taken place.

One cannot know at the present moment—even those who direct imperialist policy, the financial kings and the crowned

robbers, are not in a position to determine this exactly—when this imperialist peace will come, what changes in the course of the war will precede it, what the details of that peace will be. Nor is that important. What is important is the *fact* that a turn towards peace has been made; the important thing is the *fundamental character* of that peace. And these two circumstances have been made sufficiently clear by the preceding development of events.

In the twenty-nine months of war, the extent of the resources of both imperialist coalitions has become sufficiently evident. All, or nearly all, possible allies of any importance among the nearest "neighbours" have been drawn into the slaughter; the strength of the armies and navies has been tested and re-tested, measured and re-measured. Finance capital has made billions: the mountain of war debts shows the extent of the tribute the proletariat and the propertyless masses "must" now pay for decades to the international bourgeoisie for having graciously permitted them to kill off millions of their fellow wage-slaves in a war for the division of imperialist booty.

It is probably impossible, in the *present* war, to skin the oxen of wage-labour any more than has been done already—this is one of the profound economic reasons for the turn we now observe in world politics. It is impossible, because all resources in general are becoming exhausted. The American multimillionaires and their younger brethren in Holland, Switzerland, Denmark and other neutral countries are beginning to notice that the gold mine is giving out. That is behind the growth of neutral pacifism, and not noble humanitarian sentiments, as the naïve, wretched and ridiculous Turati, Kautsky and Co. think.

Added to this is the growing discontent and anger among the masses. In our last issue we quoted the evidence of Guchkov and Helfferich,[106] showing that both *dread* revolution. Is it not about time to stop the first imperialist slaughter?

The objective conditions compelling cessation of the war are thus supplemented by the influence of the class instinct and class interests of the profit-glutted bourgeoisie.

The political turn based on this economic turn follows two main lines: victorious Germany is *driving a wedge*

between her main enemy, England, and England's allies. She is able to do this because it is these allies and not England who have sustained (and may yet sustain) the heaviest blows, and also because German imperialism, having amassed a considerable amount of loot, is in a position to make minor concessions to England's allies.

It is possible that a separate peace between Germany and Russia *has been concluded* after all. Only the *form* of the political pact between those two freebooters may have been changed. The tsar may have told Wilhelm: "If I openly sign a separate peace, then tomorrow, you, my august partner, may have to deal with a government of Milyukov and Guchkov, if not of Milyukov and Kerensky. For the revolution is growing, and I cannot answer for the army, whose generals are in correspondence with Guchkov and whose officers are mainly yesterday's high-school boys. Is there any point in my risking my throne and your losing a good partner?"

"Of course not," Wilhelm must have replied, if such a suggestion was put to him, directly or indirectly. "Indeed, why should we conclude an open separate peace, or any written peace treaty? Can't we achieve the same results by other, more subtle means? I will openly appeal to all humanity, offering to bestow upon it the blessings of peace. At the same time I will drop a quiet hint to the French, to let them know that I am prepared to give back all, or nearly all of France and Belgium in return for a 'fair' share of their African colonies. I will let the Italians know that they can count on scraps of Austria's Italian lands and, in addition, on a few scraps in the Balkans. And I can bring these proposals and plans to the knowledge of the peoples: will the English be able to retain their West-European allies after that? You and I will then divide Rumania, Galicia, Armenia. As for Constantinople, my august brother, you stand as much chance of seeing it as of seeing your own ears! And Poland too, my august brother—you stand as much chance of seeing it as of seeing your own ears!"

Whether or not such a conversation actually took place it is impossible to say. Nor does it matter very much. What does matter is that events have taken *precisely* this turn. If the arguments of the German diplomats were unable to

convince the tsar, the "*arguments*" of Mackensen's army in Rumania must have been more convincing.

The plan to divide Rumania between Russia and the "Quadruple Alliance" (i.e., Germany's allies, Austria and Bulgaria) is already being *openly* discussed in the German imperialist press! Loquacious Hervé is already blurting out: It will be impossible to compel the people to fight any longer if they learn that we can get back Belgium and France *immediately*. The pacifist simpletons of the neutral bourgeoisie have already been put "into action": Wilhelm has loosened their tongues! And the pacifist ... wiseacres among the socialists, Turati in Italy, Kautsky in Germany, etc., etc., are exerting all their humanitarianism, their love of humanity, their celestial virtue (and their high intellect) to *embellish* the coming imperialist peace!

In general, how well things are arranged in this best of all possible worlds! We, the financial kings and crowned robbers, got ourselves entangled in the politics of imperialist plunder; we had to fight. Well, what of it? We are making as good a thing out of war as we make out of peace; a much better thing, in fact! And we have lackeys in plenty, all the Plekhanovs, Albert Thomases, Legiens, Scheidemanns and Co., to proclaim ours a "liberation" war! The time is coming to conclude an imperialist peace? Well, suppose it is? There are the war debts. Aren't they obligations guaranteeing our sacred right to exact a hundredfold tribute from the peoples? And aren't there simpletons to *glorify* this imperialist peace, to fool the peoples by sentimental speeches? We have them in plenty—Turati, Kautsky and the other "leaders" of world socialism.

The tragicomedy of Turati's and Kautsky's utterances is precisely that they *do not understand* the *real* objective, political role they are playing, the role of parsons to *console* the people instead of rousing them to revolution, the role of *bourgeois advocates*, who by means of flamboyant phrases about good things in general, and a democratic peace in particular, obscure, cover up, embellish and cloak the hideous nakedness of an imperialist peace that trades in nations and carves up countries.

What *unites* the social-chauvinists (the Plekhanovs and Scheidemanns) and the social-pacifists (Turati and Kautsky)

in principle is that *objectively* both are *servants* of imperialism. The former serve it by glorifying the imperialist war, describing it as a war for "defence of the fatherland"; the latter serve the *same* imperialism by glorifying, with their talk of a democratic peace, the imperialist peace that is maturing and being prepared.

The imperialist bourgeoisie needs lackeys of both species and varieties: the Plekhanovs, to encourage the continuation of the slaughter by shouting "Down with the conquerors"; the Kautskys, to console and placate the embittered masses by sweet songs of peace.

Hence the general amalgamation of the social-chauvinists of all countries with the social-pacifists—the general "conspiracy against socialism" referred to in the manifesto of the Berne International Socialist Committee,[107] the "general amnesty" to which we have more than once referred—will not be an accident, but an expression of the unity on principle of *both these* trends of world pseudo-"socialism". It is no accident that Plekhanov, while shouting frantically about the "treachery" of the Scheidemanns, hints at peace and unity with those gentry when the time is ripe for it.

The reader may argue, can we forget that an imperialist peace is "after all better" than imperialist war? that, if not the whole, then at least "parts" of the democratic peace programme might possibly be achieved? that an independent Poland is better than a Russian Poland? that integration in Italy of Austrian-held Italian territory is a step forward?

But these are exactly the arguments defenders of Turati and Kautsky use as a cover, failing to see that this transforms them from revolutionary Marxists into ordinary bourgeois reformists.

Can anyone in his right mind deny that Bismarck Germany and her social laws are "better" than pre-1848 Germany? that the Stolypin reforms[108] are "better" than pre-1905 Russia? Did the German Social-Democrats (they were still Social-Democrats at that time) vote for Bismarck's reforms on these grounds? Were Stolypin's reforms extolled, or even supported, by the Russian Social-Democrats, except, of course, for Messrs. Potresov, Maslov and Co., from whom even Martov, a member of *their own party*, now turns away with contempt?

History does not stand still even in times of counter-revolution. History has been advancing even during the imperialist slaughter of 1914-16, which is a *continuation* of the imperialist policies of preceding decades. World capitalism, which in the sixties and seventies of the last century was an advanced and progressive force of free competition, and which at the beginning of the twentieth century grew into *monopoly* capitalism, i.e., imperialism, took a big step *forward* during the war, not only towards greater concentration of finance capital, but also towards transformation into *state capitalism*. The force of national cohesion, the significance of national sympathies, were revealed in this war, for example, by the conduct of the Irish in one imperialist coalition, and of the Czechs in the other. The intelligent leaders of imperialism say to themselves: Of course, we cannot achieve our aims without throttling the small nations; but there are two ways of doing that. Sometimes the more reliable and profitable way is to obtain the services of sincere and conscientious advocates of "fatherland defence" in an imperialist war by creating *politically* independent states; "we", of course, will see to it that they are *financially dependent*! It is more profitable (when imperialist powers are engaged in a major war) to be an ally of an independent Bulgaria than the master of a dependent Ireland! To complete what has been left undone in the realm of national reforms may sometimes internally strengthen an imperialist coalition—this is properly taken into account by, for instance, one of the most servile lackeys of German imperialism, Karl Renner, who, of course, is a staunch supporter of "unity" in the Social-Democratic parties in general, and of unity with Scheidemann and Kautsky in particular.

The objective course of events is having its effect, and just as the executioners of the 1848 and 1905 revolutions were, in a certain sense, their executors, so the stage managers of the imperialist slaughter are *compelled* to carry out certain state-capitalist, certain national reforms. Moreover, it is necessary, by throwing out a few sops, to *pacify* the masses, angered by the war and the high cost of living: why not promise (and partly carry out, for it does not commit one to anything!) "reduction of armaments"? After all, war is a "branch of industry" similar to forestry: it takes decades

for trees of proper size—that is to say, for a sufficiently abundant supply of adult "cannon fodder"—to grow up. During these decades, we hope, new Plekhanovs, new Scheidemanns, new sentimental conciliators like Kautsky will grow up from the depths of "united" international Social-Democracy.

Bourgeois reformists and pacifists are people who, as a general rule, are *paid*, in one form or another, to strengthen the rule of capitalism by patching it up, to lull the masses and divert them from the revolutionary struggle. When socialist "leaders" like Turati and Kautsky try to convince the masses, either by direct statements (Turati "blurted" one out in his notorious speech of December 17, 1916[109]), or by *silent evasions* (of which Kautsky is a past master), that the present imperialist war can result in a democratic peace, while the bourgeois governments *remain in power* and without a revolutionary insurrection against the whole network of imperialist world relations, it is our duty to declare that such propaganda is a deception of the people, that it has nothing in common with socialism, that it amounts to the embellishment of an *imperialist* peace.

We are *for* a democratic peace; and that is precisely why we do not want to lie to the peoples as Turati and Kautsky do—of course with the best intentions, and for the most virtuous motives! We shall tell the *truth*, namely, that a democratic peace is impossible unless the revolutionary proletariat of England, France, Germany and Russia overthrows the bourgeois governments. We think it would be the height of absurdity for revolutionary Social-Democrats to refrain from fighting for reforms in general, including "constitutional reform". But at the present moment, Europe is going through a period in which it is more than ever necessary to bear in mind the truth that *reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle*; for the task of the day—not because we want it, not because of anybody's plans, but because of the objective course of events—is to solve the great historical problems by means of direct mass violence, which will create new foundations, and not by means of agreements on the basis of the old, decaying and moribund.

It is precisely at the present time, when the ruling bourgeoisie is preparing peacefully to disarm millions of prole-

tarians and to transfer them safely—under cover of a plausible ideology, and sprinkling them with the holy water of sentimental pacifist phrases!—from the filthy, stinking, fetid trenches, where they were engaged in slaughter, to the penal servitude of the capitalist factories, where by their "honest toil" they must repay the hundreds of millions of national debt, it is precisely at this time that the slogan, which our Party issued to the people in the autumn of 1914,* viz., transform the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism, acquires still greater significance than it had at the beginning of the war. Karl Liebknecht, now sentenced to hard labour, adopted that slogan when he said from the Reichstag tribune: "Turn your weapons against your class enemies within the country!" The extent to which present-day society has matured for the transition to socialism has been demonstrated by this war, in which the exertion of national effort called for the direction of the economic life of over fifty million people from a *single* centre. If this is possible under the leadership of a handful of Junker aristocrats in the interests of a handful of financial magnates, it is certainly no less possible under the leadership of class-conscious workers in the interests of nine-tenths of the population, exhausted by starvation and war.

But to lead the masses, the class-conscious workers must understand the utter corruption of such socialist leaders as Turati, Kautsky and Co. These gentlemen imagine they are revolutionary Social-Democrats, and they are very indignant when they are told that their place is in the party of Messrs. Bissolati, Scheidemann, Legien and Co. But Turati and Kautsky wholly fail to realise that only a revolution of the masses can solve the great problems of the day. They have not a grain of faith in the revolution, they do not pay the slightest attention to, or display the slightest interest in, the way it is maturing in the minds and moods of the masses precisely in connection with the war. Their attention is entirely absorbed in reforms, in pacts between sections of the ruling classes; it is to them that they address themselves, it is them they seek to "persuade", it is to them they wish to adapt the labour movement.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34.—*Ed.*

But the whole thing now is to get the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to direct its thoughts to, and muster its forces for, a revolutionary struggle to overthrow their governments. Revolutions such as Turati and Kautsky are "prepared" to accept, i.e., revolutions for which the date and the chances of success can be set in advance, never happen. The revolutionary situation in Europe is a fact. The extreme discontent, the unrest and anger of the masses are facts. It is on strengthening *this* torrent that revolutionary Social-Democrats must concentrate all their efforts. Upon the strength of the revolutionary movement, in the event of its not being entirely successful, will depend what portion of the "promised" reforms will be realised in practice, and what use they will be for the further struggle of the working class. Upon the strength of the revolutionary movement, in the event of its being entirely successful, will depend the victory of socialism in Europe and the achievement not of an imperialist armistice in Germany's struggle against Russia and England, or in Russia's and Germany's struggle against England, or the United States' struggle against Germany and England, etc., but of a really lasting and really democratic peace.

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STATISTICS AND SOCIOLOGY[110]

FOREWORD

Of the essays here presented for the reader's attention, some are published for the first time, others appeared in various periodicals before the war. They deal with a question which now, naturally, arouses especial interest—the significance and role of national movements, the relationship between the national and the international. The biggest drawback, one most frequently encountered in all the arguments on this question, is lack of concreteness and historical perspective. It has become customary to smuggle in every manner of contraband under cover of general phrases. We believe, therefore, that a few statistics will prove anything but superfluous. A comparison with the lessons of the war of what we said before the war is not, in our view. unuseful. Unity of theory and perspective gives the essays continuity.

January 1917

The Author

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

Facts are stubborn things, runs the English saying. It comes to mind, in particular, when a certain author waxes enthusiastic about the greatness of the "nationality principle" in its different implications and relationships. What is more, in most cases the "principle" is applied just as aptly, and is just as much in place, as the exclamation "many happy

returns of the day," by a certain folk-tale character at the sight of a funeral.

Precise facts, indisputable facts—they are especially abhorrent to this type of author, but are especially necessary if we want to form a proper understanding of this complicated, difficult and often deliberately confused question. But how to gather the facts? How to establish their connection and interdependence?

The most widely used, and most fallacious, method in the realm of social phenomena is to tear out *individual* minor facts and juggle with examples. Selecting chance examples presents no difficulty at all, but is of no value, or of purely negative value, for in each individual case everything hinges on the historically concrete situation. Facts, if we take them in their *entirety*, in their *interconnection*, are not only stubborn things, but undoubtedly proof-bearing things. Minor facts, if taken out of their entirety, out of their interconnection, if they are arbitrarily selected and torn out of context, are merely things for juggling, or even worse. For instance, when an author who was once a serious author and wishes to be regarded as such now too takes the fact of the Mongolian yoke and presents it as an example that explains certain events in twentieth-century Europe, can this be considered merely juggling, or would it not be more correct to consider it political chicanery? The Mongolian yoke is a fact of history, and one doubtlessly connected with the national question, just as in twentieth-century Europe we observe a number of facts likewise doubtlessly connected with this question. But you will find few people—of the type the French describe as "national clowns"—who would venture, while claiming to be serious, to use this fact of the Mongolian yoke as an illustration of events in twentieth-century Europe.

The inference is clear: we must seek to build a reliable foundation of precise and indisputable facts that can be confronted to any of the "general" or "example-based" arguments now so grossly misused in certain countries. And if it is to be a real foundation, we must take not individual facts, but the *sum total* of facts, without *a single* exception, relating to the question under discussion. Otherwise there will be the inevitable, and fully justified, suspicion that the facts were selected or compiled arbitrarily, that instead of his-

torical phenomena being presented in objective interconnection and interdependence and treated as a whole, we are presenting a "subjective" concoction to justify what might prove to be a dirty business. This does happen ... and more often than one might think.

Proceeding from these considerations, we have decided to begin with statistics, fully aware of course that statistics are deeply antipathetic to certain readers, who prefer "flattering deception" to "base truths", and to certain authors, who are prone to smuggle in political contraband under cover of "general" disquisitions about internationalism, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, patriotism, etc.

CHAPTER 1
A FEW STATISTICS

I

For a proper survey of the *whole* complex of data on national movements, we must take the *whole* population of the earth. And in so doing, two criteria must be established with the utmost accuracy and examined with the utmost fullness: first, national homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population of various states; second, division of states (or of state-like formations in cases where there is doubt that we are really dealing with a state) into politically independent and politically dependent.

Let us take the very latest data, published in 1916, and rely on two sources: one German, the *Geographical Statistical Tables* compiled by Otto Hübner, and one English, *The Statesman's Year-Book*. The first source will have to serve as a basis, for it contains much more comprehensive data on the question that interests us; the second we shall use to check and in some, mostly minor, cases to correct the first.

We shall begin our survey with the politically independent and nationally most homogeneous states. First and foremost among these is a group of *West*-European states, i.e., situated to the west of Russia and Austria.

Here we have 17 states of which five, however, though very homogeneous in national composition, are Lilliputian in size and population. These are Luxembourg, Monaco, San

Marino, Liechtenstein and Andorra, with a combined population of only 310,000. Doubtlessly, it would be much more correct not to include them among the states under examination. Of the remaining 12 states, seven are absolutely homogeneous in national composition: in Italy, Holland, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway, 99 per cent of the population are of one and the same nationality; in Spain and Denmark the proportion is 96 per cent. Then come three states with a nearly homogeneous national composition: France, England and Germany. In France, the Italians make up only 1.3 per cent, in areas annexed by Napoleon III by violating and falsifying the will of their people. England's annexed territory, Ireland, has a population of 4.4 million, which is less than one-tenth of the total (46.8 million). In Germany, out of a population of 64.9 million, the non-German element, which in practically all cases is just as nationally oppressed as the Irish in England, is represented by the Poles (5.47 per cent), Danes (0.25 per cent) and the population of Alsace-Lorrain (1.87 million). However, part of the latter (the exact proportion is not known) undoubtedly incline towards Germany, due not only to language, but also to economic interests and sympathies. All in all, about 5 million of Germany's population belong to alien, unequal and even oppressed nations.

Only two small states in Western Europe are of mixed national composition: Switzerland, whose population of somewhat less than four million consists of Germans (69 per cent), French (21 per cent) and Italians (8 per cent)—and Belgium (population less than 8 million; probably about 53 per cent Flemings and about 47 per cent French). It should be observed, however, that in spite of the high national heterogeneity in these countries, there can be no question of national oppression. In both countries all nationalities are equal under the constitution; in Switzerland this equality is fully implemented in practice; in Belgium there is inequality in relation to the Flemish population, though they make up the majority, but this inequality is insignificant compared, for instance, with what the Poles have to put up with in Germany, or the Irish in England, not to mention what has become customary in countries outside this group. That is why, incidentally, the term "state of

nationalities", to which the Austrian authors Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, opportunists on the national question, have given such wide currency, is correct only in a very restricted sense. Namely, if, on the one hand, we remember the special historical place of the majority of the countries of this type (which we shall discuss later) and, on the other, if we do not allow this term to obscure the fundamental difference between genuine national equality and national oppression.

Taking all the countries we have discussed, we get a group of 12 West-European states with a total population of 242 million. Of these 242 million only about 9.5 million, i.e., only 4 per cent, represent oppressed nations (in England and Germany). If we add together those sections of the population in all these countries that do not belong to the principal nationalities, we get about 15 million, i.e., 6 per cent.

On the whole, consequently, this group of states is characterised by the following: they are the most advanced capitalist countries, the most developed both economically and politically. Their cultural level, too, is the highest. In national composition most of these countries are homogeneous or nearly homogeneous. National inequality, as a specific political phenomenon, plays a very insignificant part. What we have is the type of "national state" people so often refer to, oblivious, in most cases, to the historically conditional and transitory character of this type in the general capitalist development of mankind. But that will be dealt with in its proper place.

It might be asked: Is this type of state confined to Western Europe? Obviously not. All its basic characteristics—economic (high and particularly rapid capitalist development), political (representative government), cultural and national—are to be observed also in the advanced states of America and Asia: the United States and Japan. The latter's national composition took shape long ago and is absolutely homogeneous: Japanese make up more than 99 per cent of the population. In the United States, the Negroes (and also the Mulattos and Indians) account for only 11.1 per cent. They should be classed as an oppressed nation, for the equality won in the Civil War of 1861-65 and guaranteed by the Constitution of the republic was in many respects increasingly curtailed in the chief Negro areas (the South) in

connection with the transition from the progressive, pre-monopoly capitalism of 1860-70 to the reactionary, monopoly capitalism (imperialism) of the new era, which in America was especially sharply etched out by the Spanish-American imperialist war of 1898 (i.e., a war between two robbers over the division of the booty).

The white population of the United States makes up 88.7 per cent of the total, and of this figure 74.3 per cent are Americans and only 14.4 per cent foreign-born, i.e., immigrants. We know that the especially favourable conditions in America for the development of capitalism and the rapidity of this development have produced a situation in which vast national differences are speedily and fundamentally, as nowhere else in the world, smoothed out to form a single "American" nation.

Adding the United States and Japan to the West-European countries enumerated above, we get 14 states with an aggregate population of 394 million, of which 26 million, i.e., 7 per cent, belong to unequal nationalities. Though this will be dealt with later, I might observe that at the turn of the century, i.e., in the period when capitalism was being transformed into imperialism, the majority of precisely these 14 advanced states made especially great strides in colonial policy, with the result that they now "dispose" of a population of over 500 million in dependent and colonial countries.

II

The group of East-European states—Russia, Austria, Turkey (which geographically should now be considered among the Asian states, and economically a "semi-colony"), and the six small Balkan states—Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania—clearly reveal a fundamentally different picture. Not a *single* nationally fully homogeneous state! Only the small Balkan countries can be described as national states, though we should not forget that here, too, other nationalities comprise from 5 to 10 per cent, that very great numbers (compared with the total number of people belonging to the given nation) of Rumanians and Serbs live outside their "own" states, and that, in general, the bourgeois-national development of Balkan statehood

was not completed even by "yesterday's" wars of 1911-12. There is not a *single* national state like Spain, Sweden, etc., among the small Balkan countries. And in the big East-European states, in all three, the proportion of their "own", principal nationality is only 43 per cent. More than half the population of each of these three big states, 57 per cent, is made up of other nationalities (or, to use the official Russian term, of "aliens"). Statistically, the difference between the West-European and East-European groups of states can be expressed as follows:

In the first group we have ten homogeneous or near homogeneous national states with an aggregate population of 231 million. There are only two heterogeneous states, but without national oppression and with constitutional and factual equality; their population is 11.5 million.

In the second group 6 states, with a population of 23 million, are nearly homogeneous; *three* states, with a population of 249 million, are heterogeneous or "mixed" and without national equality.

On the whole, the proportion of the foreign-nationality population (i.e., not belonging to the principal nation* of the given state) is 6 per cent in Western Europe, and 7 per cent if we add the United States and Japan. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the proportion is 53 per cent!**

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* The Great Russians in Russia, the Germans and Hungarians in Austria, the Turks in Turkey.

** The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

IMAGINARY OR REAL MARSH?[111]

In his article on the majority and minority (*Berner Tagwacht* and *Neues Leben*) Comrade R. Grimm maintains that "we too invented" "the marsh, an imaginary Centrist trend in the party".

We shall prove that the stand taken by Grimm in this article is a typically Centrist one.

In his polemic with the majority, Grimm writes:

"*No party* that subscribes to Zimmerwald and Kienthal has advocated refusal to serve in the army and simultaneously obligated its members to put that slogan into effect. Liebknecht himself donned military uniform and entered the army. The Italian party has confined itself to rejecting war credits and civil peace. The French minority has done likewise."

We rub our eyes in sheer astonishment. We reread this important passage in Grimm's article and advise the reader to ponder on it.

Incredible but true! To prove that we invented the Centrist trend, a representative of this very Centre, Grimm, lumps together the Left internationalists (Liebknecht) and the Zimmerwald Right or Centre!!!

Does Grimm really think that he can deceive the Swiss workers and convince them that Liebknecht and the Italian party belong to one and the same trend? That they are not separated by the *very difference* that distinguishes the Left from the Centre?

Let us set out *our* arguments:

First, let us hear a witness who does not belong either to the Centre or to the Left. The German social-imperialist Ernst Heilmann wrote in *Die Glocke*[112] of August 12, 1916,

p. 772: ... "Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft,* *or the Zimmerwald Right*, of which Kautsky is the theoretician and Haase and Ledebour the political leaders...." Can Grimm challenge the fact that Kautsky, Haase and Ledebour are typical men of the Centre?

Second, can Grimm be unaware of the fact that in present-day socialism the Zimmerwald Right or Centre is *opposed* to an immediate break with the I.S.B., the International Socialist Bureau in The Hague, the *bureau of social-patriots*? That the Left *favours* such a break? That at Kienthal representatives of the *Internationale* group—the group to which Liebknecht belongs—fought against convocation of the I.S.B. and insisted on a break with it?

Third, has Grimm forgotten that social-pacifism, directly condemned by the Kienthal resolution, has now become the platform of the Centre in France, Germany and Italy? That the whole Italian party, which did not protest either against the numerous social-pacifist resolutions and statements of its parliamentary group, or against Turati's disgraceful December 17 speech, subscribes to social-pacifism? That both Left groups in Germany, the I.S.D. (International Socialists of Germany) and the *Internationale* (or Spartacus group to which Liebknecht belongs), have *forthrightly rejected* the social-pacifism of the Centre? Nor should it be forgotten that the worst social-imperialists and social-patriots in France, led by Sembat, Renaudel and Jouhaux, *likewise* voted for social-pacifist resolutions, thereby strikingly demonstrating and exposing the real, objective meaning of social-pacifism.

Fourth ... but enough! Grimm is expounding precisely the Centrist-view when he advises the Swiss party to "satisfy itself" with rejection of credits and civil peace, as the Italian party has done. Grimm criticises the majority proposal precisely from the Centrist standpoint, because the majority wants to move nearer to *Liebknecht*'s standpoint.

Grimm calls for clarity, frankness and honesty. Very well! But don't these virtuous qualities call for a clear, frank and honest distinction between the views and tactics

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* Commonwealth of Labour.—*Ed.*

of Liebknecht and those of the Centre, which should not be lumped together?

To side with Liebknecht implies: (1) attacking the main enemy in your own country; (2) exposing the social-patriots of your own country and (with your permission, Comrade Grimm!) not merely of *other* countries; combating them, and not uniting with them—as you do—against the Left Radicals; (3) openly criticising and exposing the weaknesses not only of the social-patriots, but also of the social-pacifists and Centrists of your own country; (4) utilising the parliamentary tribune to summon the proletariat to revolutionary struggle, urging it to turn its weapons against its enemy; (5) circulating illegal literature and organising illegal meetings; 6) organising proletarian demonstrations such as, for instance, the demonstration on Potsdam Square in Berlin at which Liebknecht was arrested; (7) calling on the workers in the war industries to strike, as the *Internationale* group has done through its illegal leaflets; (8) openly demonstrating the need for complete "regeneration" of the present parties, which confine themselves to reformist activity; acting as Liebknecht acted; (9) unreservedly rejecting defence of the fatherland in an imperialist war; (10) fighting reformism and opportunism within the Social-Democratic movement all along the line; (11) just as relentlessly combating the trade union leaders, who in all countries, particularly Germany, England and Switzerland, are the vanguard of social-patriotism and opportunism, etc.

Clearly, from *this* point of view much in the majority draft is subject to criticism. But that can be discussed only in a separate article. Here it is necessary to emphasise that the majority at any rate proposes certain steps in *this* direction, while Grimm attacks the majority not from the Left, but from the *Right*, not from Liebknecht's positions, but from those of the Centre.

Throughout his article Grimm confuses two fundamentally different questions: first, the question of *when*, at what precise moment, should one or another revolutionary action be carried out. Attempts to decide that question in advance are meaningless, and Grimm is only throwing dust in the workers' eyes when he reproaches the majority on this point.

Second question: *how* to refashion, transform a party now *incapable* of conducting a systematic, persistent and, under any concrete conditions, genuinely revolutionary struggle into a party *capable* of waging this struggle.

And that is the cardinal question. Here we have the very *root* of the whole controversy, of the whole struggle of trends, both on the war issue and on defence of the fatherland! But that is the very question Grimm tries to pass over in silence, gloss over, obscure. More: Grimm's explanations boil down to *denying* the very existence of this question.

Everything remains as of old—that idea runs through his whole article. In this lies the most profound justification of the contention that the article speaks for the *Centre*. Everything remains as of old: *only* rejection of war credits and civil peace! Every intelligent bourgeois is bound to admit that, in the final analysis, this is *not unacceptable* to the bourgeoisie too: this does not threaten its domination, does not prevent it from prosecuting the war ("we submit" as the "minority of the country"—these words of Grimm's have very far-reaching political implications, much more than would appear at first sight!).

And isn't it an international fact that the bourgeoisie itself, and its governments in the warring countries, primarily England and Germany, are *persecuting only* supporters of Liebknecht and are *tolerating* men of the Centre?

Forward, to the Left, even if this means the resignation of certain social-patriot leaders! This, in a few words, is the political point and purpose of the majority proposals.

Retreat from Zimmerwald to the Right, to social-pacifism, to positions of the Centre, to "peace" with the social-patriot leaders, no mass action, no revolutionising of the movement, no regeneration of the party! That is Grimm's point of view.

It is to be hoped that, at long last, it will open the eyes of the Swiss Left Radicals to his Centrist position.

Written (in German)
in late January 1917

First published in 1931
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Published according to
the manuscript
Translated from the German

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE WAR ISSUE[113]

1. Party parliamentary deputies shall be under obligation to reject, stating their principled grounds, all war demands and credits and insist on demobilisation.
2. No civil peace; intensification of principled struggle against all bourgeois parties, also against nationalist-Grütli ideas in the labour movement and the party.
3. Systematic revolutionary propaganda in the army.
4. Support of all revolutionary movements and of the struggle against the war and against one's own government in every warring country.
5. Assistance to every revolutionary mass action in Switzerland—strikes, demonstrations—and their development into open armed struggle.
6. The party shall proclaim the socialist transformation of Switzerland to be the aim of the revolutionary mass struggle decided upon at the 1915 Party Congress at Aarau. This revolution is the only, and really effective, way of liberating the working class from the horror of high prices and hunger, and is essential for the complete elimination of militarism and war.

Written between January 27 and 29 (February 9 and 11), 1917

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*

Published according to a typewritten copy
Translated from the German

THE STORY OF ONE SHORT PERIOD IN THE LIFE OF ONE SOCIALIST PARTY

Jan. 7, 1917. Meeting of the Swiss Socialist Party Executive. Centrist leader R. Grimm unites with social-patriot leaders to postpone indefinitely the party congress (originally appointed for Feb. 11, 1917 to discuss the war issue).

Nobs, Platten, Naine and others protest and vote against.

Postponement rouses the greatest indignation among class-conscious workers.

Jan. 9, 1917. Publication of majority and minority resolutions.[114] Clear statement *against* fatherland defence *totally lacking* in majority draft (Affolter and Schmid were against this), but § 3 does contain this demand: "Party parliamentary deputies shall be under obligation to reject, stating their principled grounds, all war demands and credits." That should be especially noted!

Jan. 23, 1917. The Zurich *Volksrecht* puts the case for a referendum[115]. Sharply, but quite correctly, it characterises the postponement as a victory of Grütlianism over socialism.

Leaders infuriated by referendum proposal. *Grimm* in the *Berner Tagwacht*, *Jacques Schmid* (Olten) in the *Neue Freie Zeitung*,[116] *F. Schneider* in the *Basler Vorwärts*,[117] and, besides these "Centrists", social-patriot *Huber* in the St. Gallen *Volksstimme*—all heap abuse and threats on the referendum initiators.

R. Grimm stands at the head of this unholy crusade, making a special effort to intimidate the "youth organisation" and promising to come out against it at the next party congress.

Hundreds and hundreds of workers in German and French Switzerland eagerly sign referendum papers. Naine wires

Münzenberg that one cantonal secretariat will, in all probability, support referendum.

Jan. 22, 1917. The *Berner Tagwacht* and *Volksrecht* carry a statement by National Council member *Gustav Müller*. He presents the party a veritable ultimatum, stating on behalf of his group (he writes: "our group") that he will resign from the National Council because he *cannot accept* "the principle of rejecting war credits".

Jan. 26, 1917. In his fourth *Volksrecht* article, *Greulich* presents the same ultimatum to the party, saying that he will "naturally" resign if the party congress approves *paragraph 3 of the majority resolution*.[118]

Jan. 27, 1917. E. Nobs says in an editorial comment ("On the Referendum") that *under no circumstances* can he endorse the referendum motivation.[119]

Platten is silent.

Jan. 31, 1917. The Secretariat decides to convene the party congress on June 2 and 3, 1917 (it will be remembered that the Secretariat had earlier decided to convene it on Feb. 11, 1917, but the decision was repealed by the Party Executive!).

Feb. 1, 1917. Part of the Zimmerwald Conference meets at Olten, attended by representatives of organisations invited to the conference of Entente socialists (March 1917).

Radek, Zinoviev, Münzenberg, one member of the *Internationale* (the Spartacus group in Germany, of which Karl Liebknecht was a member) publicly castigate R. Grimm, stating that his alliance with the social-patriots *against* the Swiss socialist workers makes him a "political corpse".

Press is silent about this conference.

Feb. 1, 1917. Platten publishes his first article on the war issue.[120] Attention should be drawn to the following two of his statements.

First, Platten writes, literally: "Of course, the absence was felt in the commission of the cool-headed, courageous and consistent Zimmerwald champion who would have insisted on *pigeon-holing* the war issue till the end of the war."

No name was mentioned, but it should not be hard to guess against whom this blow was aimed.

Second, Platten makes this statement of principle:

"The war issue is not only a battle of opinions around *this* question, but is indicative also of a definite trend in

the further development of the party; it is a struggle against opportunism within the party, and an act of opposition to the reformists and in favour of revolutionary class struggle."

Feb. 3, 1917. A private meeting of Centrists (Grimm, Schneider, Rimathe and others) attended also by Nobs and Platten. Münzenberg and Dr. Bronski are invited but decline.

A decision is adopted to "amend" the majority resolution in a way that materially *worsens* it and turns it into a "Centrist resolution", especially because *paragraph 3* is deleted and replaced by a deliberately indefinite and hazy expression.

Feb. 6, 1917. General meeting of Social-Democratic Party members in Zurich. Main item: committee elections.

Poor attendance, especially on the part or workers.

Platten suggests postponing the meeting. Social-patriots and Nobs object. Proposal is defeated.

Elections are held. When it turns out that Dr. Bronski is elected, social-patriot *Baumann* announces on behalf of four committee members that he refuses to work with Dr. Bronski.

Platten suggests accepting this ultimatum (submitting to it), proposing (absolutely undemocratically and unlawfully) that the elections be declared invalid. That proposal is carried!!!

Feb. 9, 1917. Publication of a "new" majority resolution. The signatures: the "Centrists" Grimm, Rimathe, Schneider, Jacques Schmid, etc., also Nobs and Platten. The resolution has been greatly worsened and *paragraph 3*, as indicated above, deleted.[121]

The resolution does *not even hint* at combating opportunism and reformism, or at a firm decision to follow Karl Liebknecht's tactics!

It is a typical Centrist resolution, in which "general", supposedly "theoretical" disquisitions predominate, while practical demands are deliberately couched in such feeble and hazy language that, it can be hoped, not only Greulich and G. Müller, but even Baumann—Zurich will probably deign to withdraw their ultimatum and ... amnesty the party.

To sum up: the leaders of the Swiss party have solemnly buried Zimmerwaldism in the "marsh".

Addition:

The St. Gallen *Volksstimme* of Jan. 25, 1917 (to which *Huber*—Rorschach frequently contributes):

"It suffices to oppose to this shamelessness [i.e., the referendum motivation] the fact that the postponement proposal (Jan. 7) was made by Comrade *Grimm* and energetically supported, among others, by Comrades *Manz*, *Greulich*, *Müller*, *Affolter and Schmid*."

The *Basler Vorwärts* of Jan. 16, 1917 reports that the postponement proposal (Jan. 7) was tabled by the following comrades:

"Grimm, Rimathe, Studer, Münch, Lang—Zurich, Schneider—Basel, Keel—St. Gallen and Schnurrenberger (!!? obviously a misprint for Schneeberger?).

The workers have every reason to be grateful to the two papers for listing these *names*!...

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DRAFT THESES, MARCH 4 (17), 1917[122]

Information reaching Zurich from Russia at this moment, March 17, 1917, is so scanty, and events in our country are developing so rapidly, that any judgement of the situation must of needs be very cautious.

Yesterday's dispatches indicated that the tsar had already abdicated and that the new, Octobrist-Cadet government[123] had already made an agreement with other representatives of the Romanov dynasty. Today there are reports from England that the tsar has not yet abdicated, and that his whereabouts are unknown. This suggests that he is trying to put up resistance, organise a party, perhaps even an armed force, in an attempt to restore the monarchy. If he succeeds in fleeing from Russia or winning over part of the armed forces, the tsar might, to mislead the people, issue a manifesto announcing immediate conclusion of a separate peace with Germany!

That being the position, the proletariat's task is a pretty complex one. There can be no doubt that it must organise itself in the most efficient way, rally all its forces, arm, strengthen and extend its alliance with all sections of the working masses of town and country in order to put up a stubborn resistance to tsarist reaction and crush the tsarist monarchy once and for all.

Another factor to bear in mind is that the new government that has seized power in St. Petersburg, or, more correctly, wrested it from the proletariat, which has waged a victorious, heroic and fierce struggle, consists of liberal bourgeois and landlords whose lead is being followed by Kerensky, the spokesman of the democratic peasants and, possibly, of that part of the workers who have forgotten their interna-

tionalism and have been led on to the bourgeois path. The new government is composed of avowed advocates and supporters of the imperialist war with Germany, i.e., a war in alliance with the English and French imperialist governments, a war for the plunder and conquest of foreign lands—Armenia, Galicia, Constantinople, etc.

The new government cannot give the peoples of Russia (and the nations tied to us by the war) either peace, bread, or full freedom. The working class must therefore continue its fight for socialism and peace, utilising for this purpose the new situation and explaining it as widely as possible among the masses.

The new government cannot give the people peace, because it represents the capitalists and landlords and because it is tied to the English and French capitalists by treaties and financial commitments. Russian Social-Democracy must therefore, while remaining true to internationalism, first and foremost explain to the people who long for peace that it cannot be won under the present government whose first appeal to the people (March 17) does not as much as mention the chief and basic issue of the time, peace. It is keeping secret the predatory treaties tsarism concluded with England, France, Italy, Japan, etc. It wants to conceal from the people the truth about its war programme, the fact that it stands for continuation of the war, for victory over Germany. It is not in a position to do what the people so vitally need: directly and frankly propose to all belligerent countries an immediate ceasefire, to be followed by peace based on complete liberation of all the colonies and dependent and unequal nations. That requires a workers' government acting in alliance with, first, the poorest section of the rural population, and, second, the revolutionary workers of all countries in the war.

The new government cannot give the people bread. And no freedom can satisfy the masses suffering from hunger due to shortages and inefficient distribution of available stocks, and, most important, to the seizure of these stocks by the landlords and capitalists. It requires revolutionary measures against the landlords and capitalists to give the people bread, and such measures can be carried out only by a workers' government.

Lastly, the new government is not in a position to give the people full freedom, though in its March 17 manifesto it speaks of nothing but political freedom and is silent on other, no less important, issues. The new government has already endeavoured to reach agreement with the Romanov dynasty, for it has suggested recognising the Romanovs, in defiance of the people's will, on the understanding that Nicholas II would abdicate in favour of his son, with a member of the Romanov family appointed regent. In its manifesto, the new government promises every kind of freedom, but has failed in its direct and unconditional duty immediately to implement such freedoms as election of officers, etc., by the soldiers, elections to the St. Petersburg, Moscow and other City Councils on a basis of genuinely universal, and not merely male, suffrage, make all government and public buildings available for public meetings, appoint elections to all local institutions and Zemstvos, likewise on the basis of genuinely universal suffrage, repeal all restrictions on the rights of local government bodies, dismiss all officials appointed to supervise local government bodies, introduce not only freedom of religion, but also freedom from religion, immediately separate the school from the church and free it of control by government officials, etc.

The new government's March 17 manifesto arouses the deepest distrust, for it consists entirely of promises and does not provide for the immediate carrying out of a single one of the vital measures that can and should be carried out right now.

The new government's programme does not contain a single word on the eight-hour day or on any other economic measure to improve the worker's position. It contains not a single word about land for the peasants, about the uncompensated transfer to the peasants of all the estates. By its silence on these vital issues the new government reveals its capitalist and landlord nature.

Only a workers' government that relies, first, on the overwhelming majority of the peasant population, the farm labourers and poor peasants, and, second, on an alliance with the revolutionary workers of all countries in the war, can give the people peace, bread and full freedom.

The revolutionary proletariat can therefore only regard the revolution of March 1 (14) as its initial, and by no means complete, victory on its momentous path. It cannot but set itself the task of continuing the light for a democratic republic and socialism.

To do that, the proletariat and the R.S.D.L.P. must above all utilise the relative and partial freedom the new government is introducing, and which can be guaranteed and extended only by continued, persistent and persevering revolutionary struggle.

The truth about the present government and its real attitude on pressing issues must be made known to all working people in town and country, and also to the army. Soviets of Workers' Deputies must be organised, the workers must be armed. Proletarian organisations must be extended to the army (which the new government has likewise promised political rights) and to the rural areas. In particular there must be a separate class organisation for farm labourers.

Only by making the truth known to the widest masses of the population, only by organising them, can we guarantee full victory in the next stage of the revolution and the winning of power by a workers' government.

Fulfilment of this task, which in revolutionary times and under the impact of the severe lessons of the war can be brought home to the people in an immeasurably shorter time than under ordinary conditions, requires the revolutionary proletarian party to be ideologically and organisationally independent. It must remain true to internationalism and not succumb to the false bourgeois phraseology meant to dupe the people by talk of "defending the fatherland" in the present imperialist and predatory war.

Not only this government, but even a democratic bourgeois republican government, were it to consist exclusively of Kerensky and other Narodnik and "Marxist" social-patriots, cannot lead the people out of the imperialist war and guarantee peace.

For that reason we cannot consent to any blocs, or alliances, or even agreements with the defencists among the workers, nor with the Gvozdyov-Potresov-Chkhenkeli-Kerensky, etc., trend, nor with men who, like Chkheidze and others, have taken a vacillating and indefinite stand on this

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crucial issue. Those agreements would not only inject an element of falseness in the minds of the masses, making them dependent on the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie, but would also weaken and undermine the leading role of the proletariat in ridding the people of imperialist war and guaranteeing a genuinely durable peace between the workers' governments of all countries.

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TELEGRAM TO THE BOLSHEVIKS LEAVING FOR RUSSIA[124]

Our tactics: no trust in and no support of the new government; Kerensky is especially suspect; arming of the proletariat is the only guarantee; immediate elections to the Petrograd City Council; no rapprochement with other parties. Telegraph this to Petrograd.

Ulyanov

Written on March 6 (19), 1917

First published in 1930
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the manuscript
Translated from the French

LETTER TO *VOLKSRECHT*[125]

Various German newspapers have published a *distorted version* of the telegram I sent on Monday, March 19, to certain members of our Party in Scandinavia who were leaving for Russia and who asked my advice about the tactics Social-Democrats should follow.

My telegram reads:

"Our tactics: no trust in and no support of the new government; Kerensky is especially suspect; arming of the proletariat is the only guarantee; immediate elections to the Petrograd City Council; no rapprochement with other parties. Telegraph this to Petrograd."

I sent the telegram in the name of Central Committee members *living abroad*, not in the name of the Central Committee itself. Reference is not to the Constituent Assembly, but to elections to *municipal* bodies. Elections to the Constituent Assembly are, so far, merely an empty promise. Elections to the Petrograd City Council could and should be held *immediately*, if the government is really capable of introducing its promised freedoms. These elections could help the proletariat organise and strengthen its revolutionary positions.

N. Lenin

Written after March 6 (19), 1917

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Translated from the German

LETTERS FROM AFAR[126]

LETTERS FROM AFAR

FIRST LETTER

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE FIRST REVOLUTION[127]

The first revolution engendered by the imperialist world war has broken out. The first revolution but certainly not the last.

Judging by the scanty information available in Switzerland, the first stage of this first revolution, namely, of the Russian revolution of March 1, 1917, has ended. This first stage of our revolution will certainly not be the last.

How could such a "miracle" have happened, that in only eight days—the period indicated by Mr. Milyukov in his boastful telegram to all Russia's representatives abroad—a monarchy collapsed that had maintained itself for centuries, and that in spite of everything had managed to maintain itself throughout the three years of the tremendous, nation-wide class battles of 1905-07?

There are no miracles in nature or history, but every abrupt turn in history, and this applies to every revolution, presents such a wealth of content, unfolds such unexpected and specific combinations of forms of struggle and alignment of forces of the contestants, that to the lay mind there is much that must appear miraculous.

The combination of a number of factors of world-historic importance was required for the tsarist monarchy to have collapsed in a few days. We shall mention the chief of them.

Without the tremendous class battles and the revolutionary energy displayed by the Russian proletariat during the three years 1905-07, the second revolution could not possibly have been so rapid in the sense that its *initial stage* was

completed in a few days. The first revolution (1905) deeply ploughed the soil, uprooted age-old prejudices, awakened millions of workers and tens of millions of peasants to political life and political struggle and revealed to each other—and to the world—*all* classes (and all the principal parties) of Russian society in their true character and in the true alignment of their interests, their forces, their modes of action, and their immediate and ultimate aims. This first revolution, and the succeeding period of counter-revolution (1907-14), laid bare the very essence of the tsarist monarchy, brought it to the "utmost limit", exposed all the rottenness and infamy, the cynicism and corruption of the tsar's clique, dominated by that monster, Rasputin. It exposed all the bestiality of the Romanov family—those pogrom-mongers who drenched Russia in the blood of Jews, workers and revolutionaries, those *landlords*, "first among peers", *who own millions* of dessiatines of land and are prepared to stoop to any brutality, to any crime, to ruin and strangle any number of citizens in order to preserve the "sacred right of property" for themselves *and their class*.

Without the Revolution of 1905-07 and the counter-revolution of 1907-14, there could not have been that clear "self-determination" of all classes of the Russian people and of the nations inhabiting Russia, that determination of the relation of these classes to each other and to the tsarist monarchy, which manifested itself during the eight days of the February-March Revolution of 1917. This eight-day revolution was "performed", if we may use a metaphorical expression, as though after a dozen major and minor rehearsals; the "actors" knew each other, their parts, their places and their setting in every detail, through and through, down to every more or less important shade of political trend and mode of action.

For the first great Revolution of 1905, which the Guchkovs and Milyukovs and their hangers-on denounced as a "great rebellion", led, after the lapse of twelve years, to the "brilliant", the "glorious" Revolution of 1917—the Guchkovs and Milyukovs have proclaimed it "glorious" because it has put them in power (*for the time being*). But this required a great, mighty and all-powerful "stage manager", capable, on the one hand, of vastly accelerating the course of world

history, and, on the other, of engendering world-wide crises of unparalleled intensity—economic, political, national and international. Apart from an extraordinary acceleration of world history, it was also necessary that history make particularly abrupt turns, in order that at one such turn the filthy and blood-stained cart of the Romanov monarchy should be overturned at *one stroke*.

This all-powerful "stage manager", this mighty accelerator was the imperialist world war.

That it is a world war is now indisputable, for the United States and China are already half-involved today, and will be fully involved tomorrow.

That it is an imperialist war on *both* sides is now likewise indisputable. Only the capitalists and their hangers-on, the social-patriots and social-chauvinists, or—if instead of general critical definitions we use political names familiar in Russia—only the Guchkovs and Lvovs, Milyukovs and Shingaryovs on the one hand, and only the Gvozdyovs, Potresovs, Chkhenkelis, Kerenskys and Chkheidzes on the other, can deny or gloss over this fact. *Both* the German and the Anglo-French bourgeoisie are waging the war for the plunder of foreign countries and the strangling of small nations, for financial world supremacy and the division and redivision of colonies, and in order to save the tottering capitalist regime by misleading and dividing the workers of the various countries.

The imperialist war was bound, with objective inevitability, immensely to accelerate and intensify to an unprecedented degree the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; it was bound to turn into a civil war between the hostile classes.

This *transformation has been started* by the February-March Revolution of 1917, the first stage of which has been marked, firstly, by a joint blow at tsarism struck by two forces: one, the whole of bourgeois and landlord Russia, with all her unconscious hangers-on and all her conscious leaders, the British and French ambassadors and capitalists, and the other, *the Soviet of Workers' Deputies*, which has begun to win over the soldiers' and peasants' deputies.[128]

These three political camps, these three fundamental political forces—(1) the tsarist monarchy, the head of the feudal

landlords, of the old bureaucracy and the military caste; (2) bourgeois and landlord-Octobrist-Cadet Russia, behind which trailed the petty bourgeoisie (of which Kerensky and Chkheidze are the principal representatives); (3) the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which is seeking to make the entire proletariat and the entire mass of the poorest part of the population its allies—these three *fundamental* political forces fully and clearly revealed themselves even in the eight days of the "first stage" and even to an observer so remote from the scene of events as the present writer, who is obliged to content himself with the meagre foreign press dispatches.

But before dealing with this in greater detail, I must return to the part of my letter devoted to a factor of prime importance, namely, the imperialist world war.

The war shackled the belligerent powers, the belligerent groups of capitalists, the "bosses" of the capitalist system, the slave-owners of the capitalist slave system, to each other with *chains of iron. One bloody clot*—such is the social and political life of the present moment in history.

The socialists who deserted to the bourgeoisie on the outbreak of the war—all these Davids and Scheidemanns in Germany and the Plekhanovs, Potresovs, Gvozdyovs and Co. in Russia—clamoured loud and long against the "illusions" of the revolutionaries, against the "illusions" of the Basle Manifesto, against the "farcical dream" of turning the imperialist war into a civil war. They sang praises in every key to the strength, tenacity and adaptability allegedly revealed by capitalism—*they*, who had aided the capitalists to "adapt", tame, mislead and divide the working classes of the various countries!

But "he who laughs last laughs best". The bourgeoisie has been unable to delay for long the revolutionary crisis engendered by the war. That crisis is growing with irresistible force in all countries, beginning with Germany, which, according to an observer who recently visited that country, is suffering "brilliantly organised famine", and ending with England and France, where *famine is also* looming, but where organisation is far less "brilliant".

It was natural that the revolutionary crisis should have broken out *first of all* in tsarist Russia, where the disorganisation was most appalling and the proletariat most revolu-

tionary (not by virtue of any special qualities, but because of the living traditions of 1905). This crisis was precipitated by the series of extremely severe defeats sustained by Russia and her allies. They shook up the old machinery of government and the old order and roused the anger of *all* classes of the population against them; they embittered the army, wiped out a very large part of the old commanding personnel, composed of die-hard aristocrats and exceptionally corrupt bureaucratic elements, and replaced it by a young, fresh, mainly bourgeois, commoner, petty-bourgeois personnel. Those who, grovelling to the bourgeoisie or simply lacking backbone, howled and wailed about "defeatism", are now faced by the fact of the historical connection between the defeat of the most backward and barbarous tsarist monarchy and the *beginning* of the revolutionary conflagration.

But while the defeats early in the war were a negative factor that precipitated the upheaval, the *connection* between Anglo-French finance capital, Anglo-French imperialism, and Russian Octobrist-Cadet capital was a factor that hastened this crisis by the direct *organisation of a plot* against Nicholas Romanov.

This highly important aspect of the situation is, for obvious reasons, hushed up by the Anglo-French press and maliciously emphasised by the German. We Marxists must soberly face the truth and not allow ourselves to be confused either by the lies, the official sugary diplomatic and ministerial lies, of the first group of imperialist belligerents, or by the sniggering and smirking of their financial and military rivals of the other belligerent group. The whole course of events in the February-March Revolution clearly shows that the British and French embassies, with their agents and "connections", who had long been making the most desperate efforts to prevent "separate" agreements and a separate peace between Nicholas II (and last, we hope, and we will endeavour to make him that) and Wilhelm II, directly organised a plot in conjunction with the Octobrists and Cadets, in conjunction with a section of the generals and army and St. Petersburg garrison officers, with the express object of *deposing* Nicholas Romanov.

Let us not harbour any illusions. Let us not make the mistake of those who—like certain O.C. supporters or Men-

sheviks who are oscillating between Gvozdyov-Potresov policy and internationalism and only too often slip into petty-bourgeois pacifism—are now ready to extol "agreement" between the workers' party and the Cadets, "support" of the latter by the former, etc. In conformity with the old (and by no means Marxist) doctrine that they have learned by rote, they are trying to veil the plot of the Anglo-French imperialists and the Guchkovs and Milyukovs aimed at deposing the "chief warrior", Nicholas Romanov, and putting more energetic, fresh and more capable *warriors* in his place.

That the revolution succeeded so quickly and—seemingly, at the first superficial glance—so radically, is only due to the fact that, as a result of an extremely unique historical situation, *absolutely dissimilar currents*, *absolutely heterogeneous* class interests, *absolutely contrary* political and social strivings have *merged*, and in a strikingly "harmonious" manner. Namely, the conspiracy of the Anglo-French imperialists, who impelled Milyukov, Guchkov and Co. to seize power *for the purpose of continuing the imperialist war*, for the purpose of conducting the war still more ferociously and obstinately, for the purpose of *slaughtering fresh millions* of Russian workers and peasants in order that the Guchkovs might obtain Constantinople, the French capitalists Syria, the British capitalists Mesopotamia, and so on. This on the one hand. On the other, there was a profound proletarian and mass popular movement of a revolutionary character (a movement of the entire poorest section of the population of town and country) for *bread*, for *peace*, for *real freedom*.

It would simply be foolish to speak of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia "supporting" the Cadet-Octobrist imperialism, which has been "patched up" with English money and is as abominable as tsarist imperialism. The revolutionary workers were destroying, have already destroyed to a considerable degree and will destroy to its foundations the infamous tsarist *monarchy*. They are neither elated nor dismayed by the fact that at certain brief and exceptional historical conjunctures *they were aided* by the struggle of Buchanan, Guchkov, Milyukov and Co. to *replace* one monarch by *another monarch*, also preferably a Romanov!

Such, and only such, is the way the situation developed. Such, and only such, in the view that can be taken by a poli-

tician who does not fear the truth, who soberly weighs the balance of social forces in the revolution, who appraises every "current situation" not only from the standpoint of all its present, current peculiarities, but also from the standpoint of the more fundamental motivations, the deeper interest-relationship of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, both in Russia and throughout the world.

The workers of Petrograd, like the workers of the whole of Russia, self-sacrificingly fought the tsarist monarchy—fought for freedom, land for the peasants, and *for peace*, against the imperialist slaughter. To continue and intensify that slaughter, Anglo-French imperialist capital hatched Court intrigues, conspired with the officers of the Guards, incited and encouraged the Guchkovs and Milyukov, and fixed up a *complete new government*, which in fact *did seize power* immediately the proletarian struggle had struck the first blows at tsarism.

This new government, in which Lvov and Guchkov of the Octobrists and Peaceful Renovation Party,[129] yesterday's abettors of Stolypin the Hangman, control *really important* posts, vital posts, decisive posts, the army and the bureaucracy—this government, in which Milyukov and the other Cadets[130] are more than anything decorations, a signboard—they are there to deliver sentimental professorial speeches—and in which the Trudovik[131] Kerensky is a balalaika on which they play to deceive the workers and peasants—this government is not a fortuitous assemblage of persons.

They are representatives of the new class that has risen to political power in Russia, the class of capitalist landlords and bourgeoisie which has long been *ruling* our country economically, and which during the Revolution of 1905-07, the counter-revolutionary period of 1907-14, and finally—and with especial rapidity—the war period of 1914-17, was quick to organise itself politically, taking over control of the local government bodies, public education, congresses of various types, the Duma, the war industries committees, etc. This new class was already "almost completely" *in* power by 1917, and therefore it needed only the first blows to bring tsarism to the ground and clear the way for the bourgeoisie. The imperialist war, which required an incredible exertion of effort, so accelerated the course of backward

Russia's development that we have "at one blow" (*seemingly* at one blow) *caught up* with Italy, England, and almost with France. We have obtained a "coalition", a "national" (i.e., adapted for carrying on the imperialist slaughter and for fooling the people) "parliamentary" government.

Side by side with this government—which as regards the *present* war is but the agent of the billion-dollar "firm" "England and France"—there has arisen the chief, unofficial, as yet undeveloped and comparatively weak *workers' government*, which expresses the interests of the proletariat and of the entire poor section of the urban and rural population. This is the *Soviet of Workers' Deputies* in Petrograd, which is seeking connections with the soldiers and peasants, and also with the agricultural workers, with the latter particularly and primarily, of course, more than with the peasants.

Such is the *actual* political situation, which we must first endeavour to define with the greatest possible objective precision, in order that Marxist tactics may be based upon the only possible solid foundation—the foundation of *facts*.

The tsarist monarchy has been smashed, but not finally destroyed.

The Octobrist-Cadet bourgeois government, which wants to fight the imperialist war "to a finish", and which in reality is the agent of the financial firm "England and France", is *obliged to promise* the people the maximum of liberties and sops compatible with the maintenance of its power over the people and the possibility of continuing the imperialist slaughter.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is an organisation of the workers, the embryo of a workers' government, the representative of the interests of the entire mass of the *poor* section of the population, i.e., of nine-tenths of the population, which is striving for *peace*, *bread* and *freedom*.

The conflict of these three forces determines the situation that has now arisen, a situation that is *transitional* from the first stage of the revolution to the second.

The antagonism between the first and second force is *not* profound, it is temporary, the result *solely* of the present conjuncture of circumstances, of the abrupt turn of events in the imperialist war. The *whole* of the new government is monarchist, for Kerensky's *verbal* republicanism simply

cannot be taken seriously, is not worthy of a statesman and, *objectively*, is political chicanery. The new government, which has not dealt the tsarist monarchy the final blow, has already *begun to strike a bargain* with the landlord Romanov dynasty. The bourgeoisie of the Octobrist-Cadet type *needs* a monarchy to serve as the head of the bureaucracy and the army in order to protect the privileges of capital against the working people.

He who says that the workers must *support* the new government in the interests of the struggle against tsarist reaction (and apparently this is being said by the Potresovs, Gvozdyovs. Chkhenkelis and also, all *evasiveness* notwithstanding, by *Chkheidze*) is a traitor to the workers, a traitor to the cause of the proletariat, to the cause of peace and freedom. For actually, *precisely* this new government is *already* bound hand and foot by imperialist capital, by the imperialist policy of *war* and plunder, has *already* begun to strike a bargain (without consulting the people!) with the dynasty, *is already working to restore the tsarist monarchy*, is already soliciting the candidature of Mikhail Romanov as the new kinglet, is already taking measures to prop up the throne, to substitute for the legitimate (lawful, ruling by virtue of the old law) monarchy a Bonapartist, plebiscite monarchy (ruling by virtue of a fraudulent plebiscite).

No, if there is to be a real struggle against the tsarist monarchy, if freedom is to be guaranteed in fact and not merely in words, in the glib promises of Milyukov and Kerensky, the workers must *not* support the new government; the government must "support" the workers! For the only *guarantee* of freedom and of the complete destruction of tsarism lies in *arming the proletariat*, in strengthening, extending and developing the role, significance and power of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

All the rest is mere phrase-mongering and lies, self-deception on the part of the politicians of the liberal and radical camp, fraudulent trickery.

Help, or at least do not hinder, the arming of the workers, and freedom in Russia will be invincible, the monarchy irrestorable, the republic secure.

Otherwise the Guchkovs and Milyukovs will restore the monarchy and grant *none*, absolutely none of the "liberties"

they promised. All bourgeois politicians in *all* bourgeois revolutions "fed" the people and fooled the workers with promises.

Ours is a bourgeois revolution, *therefore*, the workers must support the bourgeoisie, say the Potresovs, Gvozdyovs and Chkheidzes, as Plekhanov said yesterday.

Ours is a bourgeois revolution, we Marxists say, *therefore* the workers must open the eyes of the people to the deception practised by the bourgeois politicians, teach them to put no faith in words, to depend entirely on their *own* strength, their *own* organisation, their *own* unity, and their own *weapons*.

The government of the Octobrists and Cadets, of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, *cannot*, even if it sincerely wanted to (only infants can think that Guchkov and Lvov are sincere), *cannot* give the people *either peace*, *bread*, *or freedom*.

It cannot give peace because it is a war government, a government for the continuation of the imperialist slaughter, a government of *plunder*, out to plunder Armenia, Galicia and Turkey, annex (Constantinople, reconquer Poland, Courland, Lithuania, etc. It is a government bound hand and foot by Anglo-French imperialist capital. Russian capital is merely a branch of the world-wide "firm" which manipulates *hundreds of billions* of rubles and is called "England and France".

It cannot give bread because it is a bourgeois government. *At best*, it can give the people "brilliantly organised famine", as Germany has done. But the people will not accept famine. They will learn, and probably very soon, that there is bread and that it can be obtained, but only by methods that *do not respect the sanctity of capital and landownership*.

It cannot give freedom because it is a landlord and capitalist government which *fears* the people and has already begun to strike a bargain with the Romanov dynasty.

The tactical problems of our immediate attitude towards this government will be dealt with in another article. In it, we shall explain the peculiarity of the present situation, which is a *transition* from the first stage of the revolution to the second, and why the slogan, the "task of the day", at *this* moment must be: *Workers*, *you have performed miracles of proletarian heroism*, *the heroism of the people*, *in the*

civil war against tsarism. You must perform miracles of organisation, organisation of the proletariat and of the whole people, to prepare the way for your victory in the second stage of the revolution.

Confining ourselves for the *present* to an analysis of the class struggle and the alignment of class forces at this stage of the revolution, we have still to put the question: who are the proletariat's *allies* in *this* revolution?

It has *two* allies: first, the broad mass of the semi-proletarian and partly also of the small-peasant population, who number scores of millions and constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. For this mass peace, bread, freedom and land are *essential*. It is inevitable that to a certain extent this mass will be under the influence of the bourgeoisie, particularly of the petty bourgeoisie, to which it is most akin in its conditions of life, vacillating between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The cruel lessons of war, and they will be *the more* cruel the more vigorously the war is prosecuted by Guchkov, Lvov, Milyukov and Co., will *inevitably* push this mass towards the proletariat, compel it to follow the proletariat. We must now take advantage of the relative freedom of the new order and of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies to *enlighten* and *organise* this mass first of all and above all. Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and Soviets of Agricultural Workers—that is one of our most urgent tasks. In this connection we shall strive not only for the agricultural workers to establish their own separate Soviets, but also for the propertyless and poorest peasants to organise *separately* from the well-to-do peasants. The special tasks and special forms of organisation urgently needed at the present time will be dealt with in the next letter.

Second, the ally of the Russian proletariat is the proletariat of all the belligerent countries and of all countries in general. At present this ally is to a large degree repressed by the war, and all too often the European social-chauvinists speak in its name—men who, like Plekhanov, Gvozdyov and Potresov in Russia, have deserted to the bourgeoisie. But the liberation of the proletariat from their influence has progressed with every month of the imperialist war, and the Russian revolution will *inevitably* immensely hasten this process.

With these two allies, the proletariat, *utilising the peculiarities* of the present transition situation, can and will proceed, first, to the achievement of a democratic republic and complete victory of the peasantry over the landlords, instead of the Guchkov-Milyukov semi-monarchy, and then to *socialism*, which alone can give the war-weary people *peace*, *bread* and *freedom*.

N. Lenin

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П. 2

Для Правды

Письма изъ далека.

Письмо 2.

Новое правительство и провозаріатъ.

Главный документъ, которымъ я располагаю по сегодняшнее число (8/21 марта), это — номеръ англійской консервативнѣйшей и буржуазнѣйшей газеты „Times" (Таймсъ) отъ 16/3 со сводкой сообщеній о революціи въ Россіи. Ясно, что источника, болѣе благонріятно — выражаясь мягко — настроеннаго къ правительству Гучкова и Милюкова, найти нелегко.

Корреспондентъ этой газеты сообщаетъ изъ Петербурга отъ среды 1(14) марта, когда существовало еще только первое временное правительство т. е. думскій Исполнительный Комитетъ изъ 13 человѣкъ, съ Родзянкой во главѣ и съ двумя, по выраженію газеты, „соціалистами" Керенскимъ и Чхеидзе в числѣ членовъ, — слѣдующее:

„Группа изъ 22 выборныхъ членовъ Гос. Совѣта, Гучков, Стаховичъ, Трубецкой, проф. Васильев, Гримм, Вернадскій и др., отправила вчера телеграмму царю", умоляя его для спасенія „династіи" и пр. и пр. созвать думу и назначить главу правительства, пользующагося „довѣріем нації". „Каково будетъ рѣшеніе Императора, которой сегодня доигрен пріѣхать, еще неизвѣстно в данный момент, — пишет корреспондент — но одна вещь совершенно несомнѣнна. Если его Величество не удовлетворитъ немедленно желаній самых умѣренных элементов

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Letters from Afar. Second Letter.
The New Government and the Proletariat"
March 22 (9), 1917

Reduced

LETTERS FROM AFAR

SECOND LETTER

THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE PROLETARIAT

The principal document I have at my disposal at today's dated (March 8/21) is a copy of that most conservative and bourgeois English newspaper *The Times* of March 16, containing a batch of reports about the revolution in Russia. Clearly, a source more favourably inclined—to put it mildly—towards the Guchkov and Milyukov government it would not be easy to find.

This newspaper's correspondent reports from St. Petersburg on Wednesday, March 1 (14), when the *first* Provisional (government still existed, i.e., the thirteen-member Duma Executive Committee,[132] headed by Rodzyanko and including two "socialists", as the newspaper puts it, Kerensky and Chkheidze:

"A group of 22 elected members of the Upper House [State Council] including M. Guchkov, M. Stakhovich, Prince Trubetskoi, and Professor Vassiliev, Grimm, and Vernadsky, yesterday addressed a telegram to the Tsar" imploring him in order to save the "dynasty", etc., etc., to convoke the Duma and to name as the head of the government some one who enjoys the "confidence of the nation". "What the Emperor may decide to do on his arrival today is unknown at the hour of telegraphing," writes the correspondent, "but one thing is quite certain. Unless His Majesty immediately complies with the wishes of the most moderate elements among his loyal subjects, the influence at present exercised by the Provisional Committee of the Imperial Duma will pass wholesale into the hands of the socialists, who want to see a republic established, but who are unable to institute any kind

of orderly government and would inevitably precipitate the country into anarchy within and disaster without....”

What political sagacity and clarity this reveals. How well this Englishman, who thinks like (if he does not guide) the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, understands the alignment of class forces and interests! “The most moderate elements among his loyal subjects”, i.e., the monarchist landlords and capitalists, want to take power into their hands, fully realising that otherwise “influence” will pass into the hands of the “socialists”. Why the “socialists” and not somebody else? Because the English Guchkovite is fully aware that there is *no* other social force in the political arena, *nor can there be*. The revolution was made by the proletariat. It displayed heroism; it shed its blood; it swept along with it the broadest masses of the toilers and the poor; it is demanding bread, peace and freedom; it is demanding a republic; it sympathises with socialism. But the handful of landlords and capitalists headed by the Guchkovs and Milyukovs want to betray the will, or strivings, of the vast majority and conclude *a deal with the tottering monarchy*, bolster it up, save it: appoint Lvov and Guchkov, Your Majesty, and we will be with the monarchy against the people. Such is the entire meaning, the sum and substance of the new government’s policy!

But how to justify the deception, the fooling of the people, the violation of the will of the overwhelming majority of the population?

By slandering the people—the old but eternally new method of the bourgeoisie. And the English Guchkovite slanders, scolds, spits and splutters: “anarchy within and disaster without”, no “orderly government”!!

That is not true, Mr. Guchkovite! The workers want a republic; and a republic represents far more “orderly” government than monarchy does. What guarantee have the people that the second Romanov will not get himself a second Rasputin? Disaster will be brought on precisely by continuation of the war, i.e., precisely by the new government. Only a proletarian republic, backed by the rural workers and the poorest section of the peasants and town dwellers, can secure peace, provide bread, order and freedom.

All the shouts about anarchy are merely a screen to conceal the selfish interests of the capitalists, who want to make profit out of the war, out of war loans, who want to restore the monarchy *against* the people.

"...Yesterday," continues the correspondent, "the Social-Democratic Party issued a proclamation of a most seditious character, which was spread broadcast throughout the city. They [i.e., the Social-Democratic Party] are mere doctrinaires, but their power for mischief is enormous at a time like the present. M. Kerensky and M. Chkheidze, who realise that without the support of the officers and the more moderate elements of the people they cannot hope to avoid anarchy, have to reckon with their less prudent associates, and are insensibly driven to take up an attitude which complicates the task of the Provisional Committee...."

O great English, Guchkovite diplomat! How "imprudently" you have blurted out the truth!

"The Social-Democratic Party" and their less prudent associates" with whom Kerensky and Chkheidze have to reckon", evidently mean the Central or the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party, which was restored at the January 1912 Conference,[133] those very same Bolsheviks at whom the bourgeoisie always hurl the abusive term "doctrinaires", because of their faithfulness to the "doctrine", i.e., the fundamentals, the principles, teachings, aims of *socialism*. Obviously, the English Guchkovite hurls the abusive terms seditious and doctrinaire at the manifesto[134] and at the conduct of our Party in urging a fight for a republic, peace, complete destruction of the tsarist monarchy, bread for the people.

Bread for the people and peace—that's sedition, but ministerial posts for Guchkov and Milyukov—that's "order". Old and familiar talk!

What, then, are the tactics of Kerensky and Chkheidze as characterised by the English Guchkovite?

Vacillation: on the one hand, the Guchkovite praises them: they 'realise" (Good boys! Clever boys!) that without the "support" of the army officers and the more moderate elements, anarchy cannot be avoided (we, however, have always thought, in keeping with our doctrine, with our socialist teachings, that it is the capitalists who introduce anarchy and war into human society, that only the transfer

of *all* political power to the proletariat and the poorest people can rid us of war, of anarchy and starvation!). On the other hand, they "have to reckon with their less prudent associates", i.e., the Bolsheviks, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, restored and united by the Central Committee.

What is the force that compels Kerensky and Chkheidze to "reckon" with the Bolshevik Party to which they have *never* belonged, which they, or their literary representatives (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists,[135] the Menshevik O.C. supporters, and so forth), have always abused, condemned, denounced as an insignificant underground circle, a sect of doctrinaires, and so forth? Where and when has it ever happened that in time of revolution, at a time of predominantly *mass* action, sane-minded politicians should "reckon" with "doctrinaires"??

He is all mixed up, our poor English Guchkovite; he has failed to produce a logical argument, has failed to tell either a whole lie or the whole truth, he has merely given himself away.

Kerensky and Chkheidze are compelled to reckon with the Social-Democratic Party of the Central Committee by the influence it exerts on the proletariat, on the masses. Our Party was found to be with the masses, with the revolutionary proletariat, *in spite of* the arrest and deportation of our Duma deputies to Siberia, as far back as 1914, in spite of the fierce persecution and arrests to which the St. Petersburg Committee was subjected for its underground activities during the war, *against* the war and against tsarism.

"Facts are stubborn things," as the English proverb has it. Let me remind you of it, most esteemed English Guchkovite! That our Party guided, or at least rendered devoted assistance to, the St. Petersburg workers in the great days of revolution is a fact the English Guchkovite "*himself*" was *obliged* to admit. And he was equally obliged to admit the fact that Kerensky and Chkheidze are oscillating *between* the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The Gvozdyovites, the "defencists", i.e., the social-chauvinists, i.e., the defenders of the imperialist, predatory war, are now completely following the bourgeoisie; Kerensky, by entering the ministry,

i.e., the second Provisional Government, has also completely deserted to the bourgeoisie; Chkheidze has not; he continues to *oscillate* between the Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie, the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, and the "provisional government" of the proletariat and the poorest masses of the people, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party united by the Central Committee.

Consequently, the revolution has confirmed what we especially insisted on when we urged the workers clearly to realise the class difference between the principal parties and principal trends in the working-class movement and among the petty bourgeoisie—what we wrote, for example, in the Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 41, nearly eighteen months ago, on October 13, 1915.

"As hitherto, we consider it admissible for Social-Democrats to join a provisional revolutionary government together with the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but *not* with the revolutionary chauvinists. By revolutionary chauvinists we mean those who want a victory over tsarism so as to achieve victory over Germany—plunder other countries—consolidate Great-Russian rule over the other peoples of Russia, etc. Revolutionary chauvinism is based on the class position of the petty bourgeoisie. The latter always vacillates between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. At present it is vacillating between chauvinism (which prevents it from being consistently revolutionary, even in the meaning of a democratic revolution) and proletarian internationalism. At the moment the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *Nasha Zarya* (now *Dyelo*), Chkheidze's Duma group, the Organising Committee, Mr. Plekhanov and the like are political spokesmen for this petty bourgeoisie in Russia. If the revolutionary chauvinists won in Russia, we would be opposed to a defence of *their* "fatherland" in the present war. Our slogan is: against the chauvinists, even if they are revolutionary and republican—*against* them and *for* an alliance of the international proletariat for the socialist revolution."*

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 403.—*Ed.*

But let us return to the English Guchkovite.

"...The Provisional Committee of the Imperial Duma," he continues, "appreciating the dangers ahead, have purposely refrained from carrying out the original intention of arresting Ministers, although they could have done so yesterday without the slightest difficulty. The door is thus left open for negotiations, thanks to which we ["we" = British finance capital and imperialism] may obtain all the benefits of the new regime without passing through the dread ordeal of the Commune and the anarchy of civil war...."

The Guchkovites were *for* a civil war from which *they* would benefit, but they are *against* a civil war from which the people, i.e., the actual majority of the working people, would benefit.

"...The relations between the Provisional Committee of the Duma, which represents the whole nation [imagine saying this about the committee of the landlord and capitalist Fourth Duma!], and the Council of Labour Deputies, representing purely class interests [this is the language of a diplomat who has heard learned words with one ear and wants to conceal the fact that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies represents the proletariat and the poor, i.e., nine-tenths of the population], but in a crisis like the present wielding enormous power, have aroused no small misgivings among reasonable men regarding the possibility of a conflict between them—the results of which might be too terrible to describe.

"Happily this danger has been averted, at least for the present [note the "at least"!], thanks to the influence of M. Kerensky, a young lawyer of much oratorical ability, who clearly realises [unlike Chkheidze, who also "realised", but evidently less clearly in the opinion of the Guchkovite?] the necessity of working with the Committee in the interests of his Labour constituents [i.e., to catch the workers' votes, to flirt with them]. A satisfactory Agreement[136] was concluded today [Wednesday, March 1/14], whereby all unnecessary friction will be avoided."

What this agreement was, whether it was concluded with the *whole* of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and on what terms, we do not know. On this *chief* point, the English Guchkovite says nothing at all this time. And no wonder!

It is not to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to have these terms made clear, precise and known to all, for it would then be more difficult for it to violate them!

The preceding lines were already written when I read two very important communications. First, in that most conservative and bourgeois Paris newspaper *Le Temps*[137] of March 20, the text of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies manifesto appealing for "support" of the new government[138]; second, excerpts from Skobelev's speech in the State Duma on March 1 (14), reproduced in a Zurich newspaper (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1 Mit.-bl., March 21) from a Berlin newspaper (*National-Zeitung*[139]).

The manifesto of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, if the text has not been distorted by the French imperialists, is a most remarkable document. It shows that the St. Petersburg proletariat, at least at the time the manifesto was issued, was under the predominating influence of petty-bourgeois politicians. You will recall that in this category of politicians I include, as has been already mentioned above, people of the type of Kerensky and Chkheidze.

In the manifesto we find two political ideas, and two slogans corresponding to them:

Firstly. The manifesto says that the government (the new one) consists of "moderate elements". A strange description, by no means complete, of a purely liberal, not of a Marxist character. I too am prepared to agree that in a certain sense—in my next letter I will show in precisely what sense—now, with the first stage of the revolution completed, every government must be "moderate". But it is absolutely impermissible to conceal from ourselves and from the people that this government wants to continue the imperialist war, that it is an agent of British capital, that it wants to restore the monarchy and strengthen the rule of the landlords and capitalists.

The manifesto declares that all democrats must "support" the new government and that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies requests and authorises Kerensky to enter the Provisional Government. The conditions—implementation of the promised reforms already during the war, guarantees for the "free

cultural" (only??) development of the nationalities (a purely Cadet, wretchedly liberal programme), and the establishment of a special committee consisting of members of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and of "military men"[140] to supervise the activities of the Provisional Government.

This Supervising Committee, which comes within the second category of ideas and slogans, we will discuss separately further on.

The appointment of the Russian Louis Blanc, Kerensky, and the appeal to support the new government is, one may say, a classical example of betrayal of the cause of the revolution and the cause of the proletariat, a betrayal which doomed a number of nineteenth-century revolutions, irrespective of how sincere and devoted to socialism the leaders and supporters of such a policy may have been.

The proletariat cannot and must not support a war government, a restoration government. To fight reaction, to rebuff all possible and probable attempts by the Romanovs and their friends to restore the monarchy and muster a counter-revolutionary army, it is necessary not to support Guchkov and Co., but to *organise*, expand and strengthen a *proletarian* militia, to arm the people under the leadership of the workers. Without this principal, fundamental, radical measure, there can be no question either of offering serious resistance to the restoration of the monarchy and attempts to rescind or curtail the promised freedoms, or of firmly taking the road that will give the people bread, *peace* and freedom.

If it is true that Chkheidze, who, with Kerensky, was a member of the first Provisional Government (the Duma committee of thirteen), refrained from entering the second Provisional Government out of principled considerations of the above-mentioned or similar character, then that does him credit. That must be said frankly. Unfortunately, such an interpretation is contradicted by the facts, and primarily by the speech delivered by Skobelev, who has always gone hand in hand with Chkheidze.

Skobelev said, if the above-mentioned source is to be trusted, that "the social [? evidently the Social-Democratic] group and the workers are only slightly in touch (have little contact) with the aims of the Provisional Government",

that the workers are demanding peace, and that if the war is continued there will be disaster in the spring anyhow, that "the workers have concluded with society [liberal society] a temporary agreement [*eine vorläufige Waffenfreundschaft*], although their political aims are as far removed from the aims of society as heaven is from earth", that "the liberals must abandon the senseless [*unsinnige*] aims of the war", etc.

This speech is a sample of what we called above, in the excerpt from *Sotsial-Demokrat*, "oscillation" between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The liberals, while remaining liberals, *cannot* "abandon" the "senseless" aims of the war, which, incidently, are not determined by them alone, but by Anglo-French finance capital, a world-mighty force measured by hundreds of billions. The task is not to "coax" the liberals, but to *explain* to the workers why the liberals find themselves in a blind alley, why *they* are bound hand and foot, why they *conceal* both the treaties tsarism concluded with England and other countries and the deals between Russian and Anglo-French capital, and so forth.

If Skobelev says that the workers have concluded an agreement with liberal society, no matter of what character, and since he does not protest against it, does not explain from the Duma rostrum how harmful it is for the workers, he thereby *approves* of the agreement. And that is exactly what he should not do.

Skobelev's direct or indirect, clearly expressed or tacit, approval of the agreement between the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Provisional Government is Skobelev's swing towards the bourgeoisie. Skobelev's statement that the workers are demanding peace, that their aims are as far removed from the liberals' aims as heaven is from earth, is Skobelev's swing towards the proletariat.

Purely proletarian, truly revolutionary and profoundly correct in design is the second political idea in the manifesto of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies that we are studying, namely, the idea of establishing a "Supervising Committee" (I do not know whether this is what it is called in Russian; I am translating freely from the French), of proletarian-soldier supervision over the Provisional Government.

Now, that's something real! It is worthy of the workers who have shed their blood for freedom, peace, bread for the people! It is a *real step* towards *real guarantees* against tsarism, against a monarchy and against the monarchists Guchkov, Lvov and Co.! It is a sign that the Russian proletariat, in spite of everything, has made progress compared with the French proletariat in 1848, when it "authorised" Louis Blanc! It is proof that the instinct and mind of the proletarian masses are not satisfied with declamations, exclamations, promises of reforms and freedoms, with the title of "minister authorised by the workers", and similar tinsel, but are seeking support *only* where it is to be found, in the *armed* masses of the people organised and led by the proletariat, the class-conscious workers.

It is a step along the right road, but *only* the first step.

If this "Supervising Committee" remains a purely political-type parliamentary institution, a committee that will "put questions" to the Provisional Government and receive answers from it, then it will remain a plaything, will amount to nothing.

If, on the other hand, it leads, immediately and despite all obstacles, to the formation of a *workers' militia*, or *workers' home guard*, extending to the whole people, to all men and women, which would not only replace the exterminated and dissolved police force, not only make the latter's restoration *impossible* by *any* government, constitutional-monarchist or democratic-republican, *either* in St. Petersburg *or* anywhere else in Russia—then the advanced workers of Russia will really take the road towards new and great victories, the road to victory over war, to the realisation of the slogan which, as the newspapers report, adorned the colours of the cavalry troops that demonstrated in St. Petersburg, in the square outside the State Duma:

"Long Live Socialist Republics in All Countries!"

I will set out my ideas about this workers' militia in my next letter.

In it I will try to show, on the one hand, that the formation of a militia embracing the entire people and led by the workers is the correct slogan of the day, one that corresponds to the tactical tasks of the peculiar transitional moment through which the Russian revolution (and the world

revolution) is passing; and, on the other hand, that to be successful, this workers' militia must, firstly, embrace the entire people, must be a mass organisation to the degree of being *universal*, must really embrace the *entire* able-bodied population of both sexes; secondly, it must proceed to combine not only purely police, but general state functions with military functions and with the control of social production and distribution.

N. Lenin

Zurich, March 22 (9), 1917

P.S. I forgot to date my previous letter March 20 (7).

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LETTERS FROM AFAR

THIRD LETTER

CONCERNING A PROLETARIAN MILITIA

The conclusion I drew yesterday about Chkheidze's vacillating tactics has been fully confirmed today. March 10 (23), by two documents. First—a telegraphic report from Stockholm in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*[141] containing excerpts from the manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, in St. Petersburg. In this document there is not a word about either supporting the Guchkov government or overthrowing it; the workers and soldiers are called upon to organise around the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, to elect representatives to it for the fight against tsarism and for a republic, for an eight-hour day, for the confiscation of the landed estates and grain stocks, and chiefly, for an end to the predatory war. Particularly important and particularly urgent in this connection is our Central Committee's absolutely correct idea that to obtain peace relations must be established with *the proletarians of all the belligerent countries*.

To expect peace from negotiations and relations between the bourgeois governments would be self-deception and deception of the people.

The second document is a Stockholm report, also by telegraph, to another German newspaper (*Vossische Zeitung*[142]) about a conference between the Chkheidze group in the Duma, the workers' group (? Arbeiterfraction) and representatives of fifteen workers' unions on March 2 (15) and a manifesto published next day. Of the eleven points of this manifesto, the telegram reports only three; the first, the demand for a republic; the seventh, the demand for peace and

immediate peace negotiations; and the third, the demand for "adequate participation in the government of representatives of the Russian working class".

If this point is correctly reported, I can understand why the bourgeoisie is praising Chkheidze. I can understand why the praise of the English Guchkovites in *The Times* which I quoted elsewhere has been supplemented by the praise of the French Guchkovites in *Le Temps*. This newspaper of the French millionaires and imperialists writes on March 22: "The leaders of the workers' parties, particularly M. Chkheidze, are exercising all their influence to moderate the wishes of the working classes."

Indeed, to demand workers' "participation" in the Guchkov-Milyukov government is a theoretical and political absurdity: to participate as a minority would mean serving as a pawn; to participate on an "equal footing" is impossible, because the demand to continue the war cannot be reconciled with the demand to conclude an armistice and start peace negotiations; to "participate" as a majority requires the strength to *overthrow* the Guchkov-Milyukov government. In practice, the demand for "participation" is the worst sort of Louis Blanc-ism, i.e., oblivion to the class struggle and the actual conditions under which it is being waged, infatuation with a most hollow-sounding phrase, spreading illusions among the workers, loss, in negotiations with Milyukov or Kerensky, of *precious* time which must be used to create a *real* class and revolutionary force, a proletarian militia that will *enjoy the confidence of all* the poor strata of the population, and they constitute the vast majority, and will *help them to organise*, help *them* to fight for bread, peace, freedom.

This mistake in the manifesto issued by Chkheidze and his group (I am not speaking of the O.C., Organising Committee *party*, because in the sources available to me there is not a word about the O.C.)—this mistake is all the more strange considering that at the March 2 (15) conference, Chkheidze's closest collaborator, Skobelev, said, according to the newspapers: "Russia is on the eve of a second, real [*wirklich*] revolution."

Now that is the truth, from which Skobelev and Chkheidze have forgotten to draw the practical conclusions. I cannot

judge from here, from my accursed afar, how near this second revolution is. Being on the spot, Skobelev can see things better. Therefore, I am not raising for myself problems, for the solution of which I have not and cannot have the necessary concrete data. I am merely emphasising the confirmation by Skobelev, an "outside witness", i.e., one who does not belong to our Party, of the *factual* conclusion I drew in my first letter, namely: that the February-March Revolution was merely the *first stage* of the revolution. Russia is passing through a peculiar historical moment of *transition* to the next stage of the revolution, or, to use Skobelev's expression, to a "second revolution".

If we want to be Marxists and learn from the experience of revolution in the whole world, we must strive to understand in what, precisely, lies the *peculiarity* of this *transitional* moment, and what tactics follow from its objective specific features.

The peculiarity of the situation lies in that the Guchkov-Milyukov government gained the first victory with extraordinary ease due to the following three major circumstances: (1) assistance from Anglo-French finance capital and its agents; (2) assistance from part of the top ranks of the army; (3) the already existing organisation of the entire Russian bourgeoisie in the shape of the rural and urban local government institutions, the State Duma, the war industries committees, and so forth.

The Guchkov government is held in a vise: bound by the interests of capital, it is compelled to strive to continue the predatory, robber war, to protect the monstrous profits of capital and the landlords, to restore the monarchy. Bound by its revolutionary origin and by the need for an abrupt change from tsarism to democracy, pressed by the bread-hungry and peace-hungry masses, the government is compelled to lie, to wriggle, to play for time, to "proclaim" and promise (promises are the only things that are very cheap even at a time of madly rocketing prices) as much as possible and do as little as possible, to make concessions with one hand and to withdraw them with the other.

Under certain circumstances, the new government can at best postpone its collapse somewhat by leaning on all the organising ability of the entire Russian bourgeoisie and bour-

geois intelligentsia. But even in that case it is *unable* to avoid collapse, because it is *impossible* to escape from the claws of the terrible monster of imperialist war and famine nurtured by world capitalism unless one renounces bourgeois relationships, passes to revolutionary measures, appeals to the supreme historic heroism of both the Russian and world proletariat.

Hence the conclusion: we cannot overthrow the new government at one stroke, or, if we can (in revolutionary times the limits of what is possible expand a thousandfold), we will not be able to maintain power *unless we counter* the magnificent organisation of the entire Russian bourgeoisie and the entire bourgeois intelligentsia with an equally magnificent *organisation of the proletariat*, which must lead the entire vast mass of urban and rural poor, the semi-proletariat and small proprietors.

Irrespective of whether the "second revolution" has already broken out in St. Petersburg (I have said that it would be absolutely absurd to think that it is possible from abroad to assess the actual tempo at which it is maturing), whether it has been postponed for some time, or whether it has already begun in individual areas (of which some signs are evident)—in *any* case, the slogan of the moment on the eve of the new revolution, during it, and on the morrow of it, must be *proletarian organisation*.

Comrade workers! You performed miracles of proletarian heroism yesterday in overthrowing the tsarist monarchy. In the more or less near future (perhaps even now, as these lines are being written) you will again have to perform the same miracles of heroism to overthrow the rule of the landlords and capitalists, who are waging the imperialist war. You will not achieve *durable victory* in this next "real" revolution if you do not perform *miracles of proletarian organisation*!

Organisation is the slogan of the moment. But to confine oneself to that is to say nothing, for, on the one hand, organisation is *always* needed; hence, mere reference to the necessity of "organising the masses" explains absolutely nothing. On the other hand, he who confines himself solely to this becomes an abettor of the liberals, for the *very thing* the *liberals* want in order to strengthen their rule is

that the workers *should not go beyond their ordinary* "legal" (from the standpoint of "normal" bourgeois society) organisations, i.e., that they should *only* join their party, their trade union, their co-operative society, etc., etc.

Guided by their class instinct, the workers have realised that in revolutionary times they need *not only* ordinary, but an entirely different organisation. They have rightly taken the path indicated by the experience of our 1905 Revolution and of the 1871 Paris Commune; they have set up a *Soviet of Workers' Deputies*; they have begun to develop, expand and strengthen it by drawing in *soldiers'* deputies, and, undoubtedly, deputies from rural *wage*-workers, and then (in one form or another) from the entire peasant poor.

The prime and most important task, and one that brooks no delay, is to set up organisations of this kind in all parts of Russia without exception, for all trades and strata of the proletarian and semi-proletarian population without exception, i.e., for all the working and exploited people, to use a less economically exact but more popular term. Running ahead somewhat, I shall mention that for the entire mass of the peasantry our Party (its *special* role in the new type of proletarian organisations I hope to discuss in one of my next letters) should especially recommend Soviets of wage-workers and Soviets of small tillers who do not sell grain, to be formed *separately* from the well-to-do peasants. Without this, it will be impossible either to conduct a truly proletarian policy in general,* or correctly to approach the extremely important practical question which is a matter of life and death for millions of people: the proper distribution of *grain*, increasing its production, etc.

It might be asked: What should be the function of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.? They "must be regarded as organs of insurrection, of revolutionary rule", we wrote in No. 47 of the Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat*, of October 13, 1915.**

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* In the rural districts a struggle will now develop for the small and, partly, middle peasants. The landlords, leaning on the well-to-do peasants, will try to lead them into subordination to the bourgeoisie. Leaning on the rural wage-workers and rural poor, we must lead them into the closet alliance with the urban proletariat.

** See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 402.—*Ed.*

This theoretical proposition, deduced from the experience of the Commune of 1871 and of the Russian Revolution of 1905, must be explained and concretely developed on the basis of the practical experience of precisely the present stage of the present revolution in Russia.

We need revolutionary *government*, we need (for a certain transitional period) a *state*. This is what distinguishes us from the anarchists. The difference between the revolutionary Marxists and the anarchists is not only that the former stand for centralised, large-scale communist production, while the latter stand for disconnected small production. The difference between us precisely on the question of government, of the state, is that we are *for*, and the anarchists *against*, utilising revolutionary forms of the state in a revolutionary way for the struggle for socialism.

We need a state. But *not the kind* of state the bourgeoisie has created everywhere, from constitutional monarchies to the most democratic republics. And in this we differ from the opportunists and Kautskyites of the old, and decaying, socialist parties, who have distorted, or have forgotten, the lessons of the Paris Commune and the analysis of these lessons made by Marx and Engels.*

We need a state, but *not* the kind the bourgeoisie needs, with organs of government in the shape of a police force, an army and a bureaucracy (officialdom) separate from and opposed to the people. All bourgeois revolutions merely perfected *this* state machine, merely transferred *it* from the hands of one party to those of another.

The proletariat, on the other hand, if it wants to uphold the gains of the present revolution and proceed further, to win peace, bread and freedom, must "*smash*", to use Marx's expression, this "ready-made" state machine and substitute a new one for it by *merging* the police force, the army and the bureaucracy with *the entire armed people*. Follow-

* In one of my next letters, or in a special article, I will deal in detail with this analysis, given in particular in Marx's *The Civil War in France*, in Engels's preface to the third edition of that work, in the letters: Marx's of April 12, 1871, and Engels's of March 18-28, 1875, and also with the utter distortion of Marxism by Kautsky in his controversy with Pannekoek in 1912 on the question of the so-called "destruction of the state".[143]

ing the path indicated by the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Russian Revolution of 1905, the proletariat must organise and arm *all* the poor, exploited sections of the population in order that they *themselves* should take the organs of state power directly into their own hands, in order that *they themselves should constitute* these organs of state power.

And the workers of Russia have already *taken* this path in the first stage of the first revolution, in February-March 1917. The whole task now is clearly to understand what this new path is, to proceed along it further, boldly, firmly and perseveringly.

The Anglo-French and Russian capitalists wanted "only" to remove, or only to "frighten", Nicholas II and to leave intact the old state machine, the police force, the army and the bureaucracy.

The workers went further and smashed it. And now, not only the Anglo-French, but also the German capitalists are *howling* with rage and horror as they see, for example, Russian soldiers shooting their officers, as in the case of Admiral Nepenin, that supporter of Guchkov and Milyukov.

I said that the workers have smashed the old state machine. It will be more correct to say: *have begun* to smash it.

Let us take a concrete example.

In St. Petersburg and in many other places the police force has been partly wiped out and partly dissolved. The Guchkov-Milyukov government *cannot* either restore the monarchy or, in general, maintain power *without restoring* the police force as a special organisation of armed men under the command of the bourgeoisie, separate from and opposed to the people. That is as clear as daylight.

On the other hand, the new government must reckon with the revolutionary people, must feed them with half-concessions and promises, must play for time. That is why it resorts to half-measures: it establishes a "people's militia" with elected officials (this sounds awfully respectable, awfully democratic, revolutionary and beautiful!)—*but* ... *but*, firstly, it places this militia under the control of the rural and urban local government bodies, i.e., under the command of landlords and capitalists who have been elect-

ed in conformity with laws passed by Nicholas the Bloody and Stolypin the Hangman!! Secondly, although calling it a "people's militia" in order to throw dust in the eyes of the "people", it does *not* call upon the *entire* people to join this militia, *and does not compel* the employers and capitalists to *pay* workers and office employees their ordinary wages *for the hours and days* they spend in the *public service*, i.e., in the militia.

That's their trick. That is how the landlord and capitalist government of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs manages to have a "people's militia" on paper, while in reality, it is restoring, gradually and on the quiet, the *bourgeois*, anti-people's militia. At first it is to consist of "eight thousand students and professors" (as foreign newspapers describe the present St. Petersburg militia)—an obvious plaything!—and will gradually be built up of the old and new *police force*.

Prevent restoration of the police force! Do not let the local government bodies slip out of your hands! Set up a militia that will really embrace the entire people, be really universal, and be led by the proletariat!—such is the task of the day, such is the slogan of the moment which equally conforms with the properly understood interests of furthering the class struggle, furthering the revolutionary movement, and the democratic instinct of every worker, of every peasant, of every exploited toiler who cannot help hating the policemen, the rural police patrols, the village constables, the command of landlords and capitalists over armed men with power over the people.

What kind of police force do *they* need, the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, the landlords and capitalists? The same kind as existed under the tsarist monarchy. After the briefest revolutionary periods *all* the bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic republics in the world set up or restored *precisely such* a police force, a special organisation of armed men subordinate to the bourgeoisie in one way or another, separate from and opposed to the people.

What kind of militia do we need, the proletariat, all the toiling people? A genuine *people's* militia, i.e., one that, first, consists of the *entire* population, of all adult citizens of *both* sexes; and, second, one that combines the

functions of a people's army with police functions, with the functions of the chief and fundamental organ of public order and public administration.

To make these propositions more comprehensible I will take a purely schematic example. Needless to say, it would be absurd to think of drawing up any kind of a "plan" for a proletarian militia: when the workers and the entire people set about it practically, on a truly mass scale, they will work it out and organise it a hundred times better than any theoretician. I am not offering a "plan", I only want to illustrate my idea.

St. Petersburg has a population of about two million. Of these, more than half are between the ages of 15 and 65. Take half—one million. Let us even subtract an entire fourth as physically unfit, etc., taking no part in public service at the present moment for justifiable reasons. There remain 750,000 who, serving in the militia, say one day in fifteen (and receiving their pay for this time from their employers), would form an army of 50,000.

That's the type of "state" we need!

That's the kind of militia that would be a "people's militia" in deed and not only in words.

That is how we must proceed in order to *prevent* the restoration either of a special police force, or of a special army separate from the people.

Such a militia, 95 hundredths of which would consist of workers and peasants, would express the *real* mind and will, the strength and power of the vast majority of the people. Such a militia would really arm, and provide military training for, the entire people, would be a safeguard, but *not* of the Guchkov or Milyukov type, against all attempts to restore reaction, against all the designs of tsarist agents. Such a militia would be the executive organ of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, it would enjoy the *boundless* respect and confidence of the people, for it itself would be an organisation of the entire people. Such a militia would transform democracy from a beautiful signboard, which covers up the enslavement and torment of the people by the capitalists, into a means of actually *training the masses* for participation in *all* affairs of state. Such a militia would draw the young people into political life and teach

them not only by words, but also by action, by *work*. Such a militia would develop those functions which, speaking in scientific language, come within the purview of the "welfare police", sanitary inspection, and so forth, and would enlist for such work all adult women. If women are not drawn into public service, into the militia, into political life, if women are not torn out of their stupefying house and kitchen environment, it will be *impossible* to guarantee real freedom, it will be *impossible* to build even democracy let alone socialism.

Such a militia would be a proletarian militia, for the industrial and urban workers would exert a guiding influence on the masses of the poor as naturally and inevitably as they came to hold the leading place in the people's revolutionary struggle both in 1905-07 and in 1917.

Such a militia would ensure absolute order and devotedly observed comradely discipline. At the same time, in the severe crisis that all the belligerent countries are experiencing, it would make it possible to combat this crisis in a very democratic way, properly and rapidly to distribute grain and other supplies, introduce "universal labour service", which the French now call "civilian mobilisation" and the (Germans "civilian service" and without which *it is impossible—it has proved to be impossible*—to heal the wounds that have been and are being inflicted by the predatory and horrible war.

Has the proletariat of Russia shed its blood only in order to receive fine promises of political democratic reforms and nothing more? Can it be that it will not demand, and secure, that *every* toiler should *forthwith* see and feel some improvement in his life? That every family should have bread? That every child should have a bottle of good milk and that not a single adult in a rich family should dare take extra milk until children are provided for? That the palaces and rich apartments abandoned by the tsar and the aristocracy should not remain vacant, but provide shelter for the homeless and the destitute? Who can carry out these measures except a people's militia, to which women must belong equally with men?

These measures do *not yet* constitute socialism. They concern the distribution of consumption, not the reorganisa-

tion of production. They would not yet constitute the "dictatorship of the proletariat", only the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry". It is not a matter of finding a theoretical classification. We would be committing a great mistake if we attempted to force the complete, urgent, rapidly developing practical tasks of the revolution into the Procrustean bed of narrowly conceived "theory" instead of regarding theory primarily and predominantly as a *guide to action*.

Do the masses of the Russian workers possess sufficient class-consciousness, fortitude and heroism to perform "miracles of proletarian organisation" after they have performed miracles of daring, initiative and self-sacrifice in the direct revolutionary struggle? That we do not know, and it would be idle to indulge in guessing, for practice *alone* furnishes the answers to such questions.

What we do know definitely, and what we, as a party, I must explain to the masses is, on the one hand, the immense power of the locomotive of history that is engendering an unprecedented crisis, starvation and incalculable hardship. That locomotive is the war, waged for predatory aims by the capitalists of *both* belligerent camps. This "locomotive" has brought a number of the richest, freest and most enlightened nations to the brink of doom. It is *forcing* the peoples to strain to the utmost all their energies, placing them in unbearable conditions, putting on the order of the day not the application of certain "theories" (an illusion against which Marx always warned socialists), but implementation of the most extreme practical measures; for *without* extreme measures, death—immediate and certain death from starvation—awaits millions of people.

That the revolutionary enthusiasm of the advanced class can do a *great deal* when the objective situation *demands* extreme measures from the entire people, needs no proof. *This* aspect is clearly seen and *felt* by everybody in Russia.

It is important to realise that in revolutionary times the objective situation changes with the same swiftness and abruptness as the current of life in general. And we must *be able to adapt* our tactics and immediate tasks to the *specific features* of every given situation. Before February

1917, the immediate task was to conduct bold revolutionary-internationalist propaganda, summon the masses to fight, rouse them. The February-March days required the heroism of devoted struggle to crush the immediate enemy—tsarism. Now we are in *transition* from that first stage of the revolution to the second, from "coming to grips" with tsarism to "coming to grips" with Guchkov-Milyukov landlord and capitalist imperialism. The immediate task is *organisation*, not only in the stereotyped sense of working to form stereotyped organisations, but in the sense of drawing unprecedentedly broad masses of the oppressed classes into an organisation that would take over the military, political and economic functions of the state.

The proletariat has approached, and will approach, this singular task in different ways. In some parts of Russia the February-March Revolution puts nearly complete power in its hands. In others the proletariat may, perhaps, in a "usurpatory" manner, begin to form and develop a proletarian militia. In still others, it will probably strive for immediate elections of urban and rural local government bodies on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage, in order to turn them into revolutionary centres, etc., until the growth of proletarian organisation, the coming together of the soldiers with the workers, the movement among the peasantry and the disillusionment of very many in the war-imperialist government of Guchkov and Milyukov bring near the hour when this government will be replaced by the "government" of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

Nor ought we to forget that close to St. Petersburg we have one of the most advanced, factually republican, countries, namely, Finland, which, from 1905 to 1917, shielded by the revolutionary battles of Russia, has in a relatively peaceful way developed democracy and has won the *majority* of the people for socialism. The Russian proletariat will guarantee the Finnish Republic complete freedom, including freedom to secede (it is doubtful now whether a single Social-Democrat will waver on this point when the Cadet Rodichev is so meanly haggling in Helsingfors for bits of privileges for the Great Russians[144])—and precisely in this way will win the *complete* confidence and comradely assistance of the Finnish workers for the all-Russian proletarian

cause. In a difficult and big undertaking mistakes are inevitable, nor will we avoid them. The Finnish workers are better organisers, they will help us in this sphere, they will, *in their own way*, push forward the establishment of the socialist republic.

Revolutionary victories in Russia proper—peaceful organisational successes in Finland shielded by these victories—the Russian workers' transition to revolutionary organisational tasks on a new scale—capture of power by the proletariat and poorest strata of the population—encouragement and development of the socialist revolution in the West—this is the road that will lead us to *peace* and *socialism*.

N. Lenin

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LETTERS FROM AFAR

FOURTH LETTER
HOW TO ACHIEVE PEACE

I have just (March 12/25) read in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (No. 517 of March 24) the following telegraphic dispatch from Berlin:

"It is reported from Sweden that Maxim Gorky has sent the government and the Executive Committee greetings couched in enthusiastic terms. He greats the people's victory over the lords of reaction and calls upon all Russia's sons to help erect the edifice of the new Russian state. At the same time he urges the government to crown the cause of emancipation by concluding peace. It must not, he says, be peace at any price; Russia now has less reason than ever to strive for peace at any price. It must be a peace that will enable Russia to live in honour among the other nations of the earth. Mankind has shed much blood; the new government would render not only Russia, but all mankind, the greatest service if it succeeded in concluding an early peace."

That is how Maxim Gorky's letter is reported.

It is with deep chagrin that one reads this letter, impregnated through and through with stock philistine prejudices. The author of these lines has had many occasions, in meetings with Gorky in Capri, to warn and reproach him for his political mistakes. Gorky parried these reproaches with his inimitable charming smile and with the ingenuous remark: "I know I am a bad Marxist. And besides, we artists are all somewhat irresponsible." It is not easy to argue against that.

There can be no doubt that Gorky's is an enormous artistic talent which has been, and will be, of great benefit to the world proletarian movement.

But why should Gorky meddle in politics?

In my opinion, Gorky's letter expresses prejudices that are exceedingly widespread not only among the petty bourgeoisie, but also among a section of the workers under its influence. *All* the energies of our Party, all the efforts of the class-conscious workers, must be concentrated on a persistent, persevering, all-round struggle against these prejudices.

The tsarist government began and waged the present war as an *imperialist*, predatory war to rob and strangle weak nations. The government of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, which is a landlord and capitalist government, is forced to continue, and wants to continue, *this very same kind* of war. To urge that government to conclude a democratic peace is like preaching virtue to brothel keepers.

Let me explain what is meant.

What is imperialism?

In my *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, the manuscript of which was delivered to the Parus Publishers some time before the revolution, was accepted by them and announced in the magazine *Letopis*,[145] I answered this question as follows:

"Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed" (Chapter VII of the above-mentioned book, the publication of which was announced in *Letopis*, when the censorship still existed, under the title: "Modern Capitalism", by V. Ilyin).*

The whole thing hinges on the fact that capital has grown to huge dimensions. Associations of a small number of the biggest capitalists (cartels, syndicates, trusts) manipulate *billions* and divide the whole world among themselves.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 266-67.—*Ed.*

The world has been *completely* divided up. The war was brought on by the clash of the two most powerful groups of multimillionaires, Anglo-French and German, for the *redivision* of the world.

The Anglo-French group of capitalists wants first to rob Germany, deprive her of her colonies (nearly all of which have already been seized), and then to rob Turkey.

The German group of capitalists wants to seize Turkey for *itself* and to compensate itself for the loss of its colonies by seizing neighbouring small states (Belgium, Serbia, Rumania).

This is the real truth; it is being concealed by all sorts of bourgeois lies about a "liberating", "national" war, a "war for right and justice", and similar jingle with which the capitalists always fool the common people.

Russia is waging this war with foreign money. Russian capital is a *partner* of Anglo-French capital. Russia is waging the war in order to rob Armenia, Turkey, Galicia.

Guchkov, Lvov and Milyukov, our present ministers, are not chance comers. They are the representatives and leaders of the entire landlord and capitalist class. They are *bound* by the interests of capital. The capitalists can no more renounce their interests than a man can lift himself by his bootstraps.

Secondly, Guchkov-Milyukov and Co. are *bound* by Anglo-French capital. They have waged, and are still waging, the war with foreign money. They have borrowed billions, promising to pay *hundreds of millions* in interest *every year*, and to squeeze this *tribute* out of the Russian workers and Russian peasants.

Thirdly, Guchkov-Milyukov and Co. are *bound* to England, France, Italy, Japan and other groups of robber capitalists by direct *treaties* concerning the predatory aims of this war. These treaties were concluded by *Tsar Nicholas II*. Guchkov-Milyukov and Co. took advantage of the workers' struggle against the tsarist monarchy to seize power, and *they have confirmed the treaties* concluded by the tsar.

This was done by the whole of the Guchkov-Milyukov government in a Manifesto which the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency circulated on March 7(20): "The government

[of Guchkov and Milyukov] will faithfully abide by all the treaties that bind us with other powers," says the manifesto. Milyukov, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the *same thing* in his telegram of March 5 (18), 1917 to all Russian representatives abroad.

These are all *secret* treaties, and Milyukov and Co. *refuse* to make them public for two reasons: (1) they fear the people, who are opposed to the predatory war; (2) they are bound by Anglo-French capital which insists that the treaties remain secret. But every newspaper reader who has followed events knows that these treaties envisage the robbery of China by Japan; of Persia, Armenia, Turkey (especially Constantinople) and Galicia by Russia; of Albania by Italy; of Turkey and the German colonies by France and England, etc.

This is how things stand.

Hence, to urge the Guchkov-Milyukov government to conclude a speedy, honest, democratic and good-neighbourly peace is like the good village priest urging the landlords and the merchants to "walk in the way of God", to love their neighbours and to turn the other cheek. The landlords and merchants listen to these sermons, continue to oppress and rob the people and praise the priest for his ability to console and pacify the "muzhiks".

Exactly the same role is played—consciously or unconciously—by all those who in the present imperialist war address pious peace appeals to the bourgeois governments. The bourgeois governments either refuse to listen to such appeals and even prohibit them, or they allow them to be made and assure all and sundry that they are only fighting to conclude the speediest and "justest" peace, and that all the blame lies with the enemy. Actually, talking peace *to bourgeois* governments turns out to be *deception of the people*.

The groups of capitalists who have drenched the world in blood for the sake of dividing territories, markets and concessions *cannot* conclude an "honourable" peace. They can conclude only a *shameful* peace, a peace based *on the division of the spoils*, *on the partition of Turkey and the colonies*.

Moreover, the Guchkov-Milyukov government is in general opposed to peace at the present moment, because the

"*only*" "loot" it would get *now* would be Armenia and part of Galicia, whereas it *also* wants to get Constantinople *and* regain from the Germans Poland, which tsarism has always so inhumanly and shamelessly oppressed. Further, the Guchkov-Milyukov government is, in essence, only the agent of Anglo-French capital, which wants to retain the colonies it has wrested from Germany and, *on top of that*, compel Germany hand back Belgium and part of France. Anglo-French capital helped the Guchkovs and Milyukovs remove Nicholas II in order that they might help it to "vanquish" Germany.

What, then, is to be done?

To achieve peace (and still more to achieve a really democratic, a really honourable peace), it is necessary that political power be in the hands of *the workers and poorest peasants*, not the landlords and capitalists. The latter represent an insignificant minority of the population, and the capitalists, as everybody knows, are making fantastic profits out of the war.

The workers and poorest peasants are the *vast* majority of the population. They are not making profit out of the war; on the contrary, they are being reduced to ruin and starvation. They are bound neither by capital nor by the treaties between the predatory groups of capitalists; they *can* and sincerely want to end the war.

If political power in Russia were in the hands of the *Soviets* of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, these Soviets, and the *All-Russia Soviet* elected by them, could, and no doubt would, agree to carry out the peace programme which our Party (the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) outlined as early as October 13, 1915, in No. 47 of its Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat** (then published in Geneva because of the Draconic tsarist censorship).

This programme would probably be the following:

1) The All-Russia Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies (or the St. Petersburg Soviet temporarily acting for it) would forthwith declare that it is *not* bound by *any* treaties concluded *either* by the tsarist monarchy *or* by the bourgeois governments.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04.—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

2) It would forthwith publish *all* these treaties in order to hold up to public shame the predatory aims of the tsarist monarchy and of *all* the bourgeois governments without exception.

3) It would forthwith publicly call upon *all* the belligerent powers to conclude an *immediate armistice*.

4) It would immediately bring to the knowledge of all the people our, the workers' and peasants' *peace terms*:

liberation of *all* colonies;

liberation of *all* dependent, oppressed and unequal nations.

5) It would declare that it expects nothing good from the bourgeois governments and calls upon the workers of all countries to overthrow them and to transfer all political power to Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

6) It would declare that the *capitalist gentry themselves* can repay the billions of debts contracted by the bourgeois governments to wage this criminal, predatory war and that the workers and peasants *refuse to recognise* these debts. To pay the interest on these loans would mean paying the capitalists *tribute* for many years for having graciously allowed the workers to kill one another in order that the capitalists might divide the spoils.

Workers and peasants!—the Soviet of Workers' Deputies would say—are you willing to pay these gentry, the capitalists, *hundreds of millions* of rubles *every year* for a war waged for the division of the African colonies, Turkey, etc.?

For *these* peace terms the Soviet of Workers' Deputies would, in my opinion, agree to *wage war* against *any* bourgeois government and against *all* the bourgeois governments of the world, because this would really be a just war, because *all* the workers and toilers in *all* countries would *work for its success*.

The German worker now sees that the bellicose monarchy in Russia is being replaced by a *bellicose* republic, a republic of capitalists who want to continue the imperialist war, and who have confirmed the predatory treaties of the Tsarist monarchy.

Judge for yourselves, can the German worker trust *such* a republic?

Judge for yourselves, can the war continue, can the capitalist domination continue on earth, if the Russian people, always sustained by the living memories of the great Revolution of 1905, win complete freedom and transfer all political power to the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies?

N. Lenin

Zurich, March 12 (25), 1917

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LETTERS FROM AFAR

FIFTH LETTER

THE TASKS INVOLVED IN THE BUILDING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAN STATE

In the preceding letters, the immediate tasks of the revolutionary proletariat in Russia were formulated as follows: (1) to find the surest road to the next stage of the revolution, or to the second revolution, which (2) must transfer political power from the government of the landlords and capitalists (the Guchkovs, Lvovs, Milyukovs, Kerenskys) to a government of the workers and poorest peasants. (3) This latter government must be organised on the model of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, namely, (4) it must smash, completely eliminate, the old state machine, the army, the police force and bureaucracy (officialdom), that is common to *all* bourgeois states, and substitute for this machine (5) not only a mass organisation, but a universal organisation of the entire armed people. (6) *Only* such a government, of "such" a class composition ("revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry") and such organs of government ("proletarian militia") *will be capable* of successfully carrying out the extremely difficult and absolutely urgent *chief* task of the moment, namely: to achieve *peace*, not an imperialist peace, not a deal between the imperialist powers concerning the division of the booty by the capitalists and their governments, but a really lasting and democratic peace, which cannot be achieved without a proletarian revolution in a number of countries. (7) In Russia the victory of the proletariat can be achieved in the very near future

only if, from the very first step, the workers are supported by the vast majority of the peasants fighting for the confiscation of the landed estates (and for the nationalisation of all the land, if we assume that the agrarian programme of the "104" is still essentially the agrarian programme of the *peasantry*[146]). (8) In connection with such a peasant revolution, and on its basis, the proletariat can and must, in alliance with the *poorest* section of the peasantry, take further steps towards *control* of the production and distribution of the basic products, towards the introduction of "universal labour service", etc. These steps are dictated, with absolute inevitability, by the conditions created by the war, which in many respects will become still more acute in the post-war period. In their entirety and in their development these steps will mark the *transition to socialism*, which cannot be achieved in Russia directly, at one stroke, without transitional measures, but is quite achievable and urgently necessary as a result of such transitional measures. (9) In this connection, the task of immediately organising special Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the *rural districts*, i.e., Soviets of agricultural *wage*-workers *separate* from the Soviets of the other peasant deputies, comes to the forefront with extreme urgency.

Such, briefly, is the programme we have outlined, based on an appraisal of the class forces in the Russian and world revolution, and also on the experience of 1871 and 1905.

Let us now attempt a general survey of this programme as a whole and, in passing, deal with the way the subject was approached by K. Kautsky, the chief theoretician of the "Second" (1889-1914) International and most prominent representative of the "Centre", "marsh" trend that is now to be observed in all countries, the trend that oscillates between the social-chauvinists and the revolutionary internationalists. Kautsky discussed this subject in his magazine *Die Neue Zeit* of April 6, 1917 (new style) in an article entitled, "The Prospects of the Russian Revolution".

"First of all," writes Kautsky, "we must ascertain what tasks confront the revolutionary proletarian regime" (state system).

"Two things," continues the author, "are urgently needed by the proletariat: democracy and socialism."

Unfortunately, Kautsky advances this absolutely incontestable thesis in an exceedingly general form, so that in essence he says nothing and explains nothing. Milyukov and Kerensky, members of a bourgeois and imperialist government, would readily subscribe to this general thesis, one to the first part, and the other to the second....*

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* The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

TO OUR COMRADES IN WAR-PRISONER CAMPS[147]

Comrades, a revolution has taken place in Russia.

The Petrograd and Moscow workers were again in the vanguard of the great freedom movement. They staged a political strike. They demonstrated in the streets under the Red Flag. They fought like lions against the tsarist police, gendarmerie and the small section of the army that did not immediately side with the people. More than 2,000 were killed and wounded in Petrograd alone. The Russian workers bought our country's freedom at the price of their blood.

The workers' demands were: *bread*, *freedom*, *peace*.

Bread—because, as in nearly every other country involved in this robber war, the Russian people are suffering from hunger.

Freedom—because the tsarist government, taking advantage of the war, finally turned the whole of Russia into one big prison.

Peace—because the Russian workers, like class-conscious workers in all other countries, do not want to go on dying for the interests of a handful of the rich, do not want to continue this criminal war, started by crowned and uncrowned freebooters.

The insurgent workers were joined by most of the men of the Petrograd and Moscow garrisons. The workers and peasants in soldier's uniform extended a hand of brotherhood to the workers and peasants not in uniform. The honest-minded part of the officer corps joined the revolution. Officers who tried to go against the people were shot down by the soldiers.

The revolution was carried out by the workers and soldiers. But, as has often been the case in other revolutions,

power was at once seized by the bourgeoisie. The state Duma, with its overwhelming majority of landlords and capitalists, did everything it could to come to terms with Tsar Nicholas II. Even at the last moment, when civil war was raging in the streets of Petrograd, the State Duma sent the tsar one telegram after another imploring him to consent to minor concessions in order to save his crown. *The tsar was overthrown by the insurgent workers and soldiers*, not by the State Duma—the Duma of the landlords and the rich. But the State Duma appointed the new, Provisional Government.

It consists of representatives of the liberal capitalists and the big landowners. The chief posts in the government have gone to Prince Lvov (a big landowner and ultra-moderate liberal), A. Guchkov (an associate of Stolypin; he approved the court-martialling of revolutionaries), Tereshchenko (millionaire sugar king), Milyukov (always supported, and continues to support, the predatory war into which our country was embroiled by Tsar Nicholas and his gang). The "democrat" Kerensky has been brought in only to create the semblance of a "people's" government and to have a "democratic" stump speaker to feed the people high-falutin but empty *phrases*, while the Guchkovs and Lvovs *work against* the people.

The new government wants to continue the robber war. It is the agent of the Russian, English and French capitalists who—like the German capitalists—are determined to "fight it out" and secure for themselves the best part of the booty. The new government cannot give Russia peace, nor does it want to.

It does not want to turn the landed estates over to the people, nor does it want to make the rich hear the burden of the war. For that reason it cannot give the people bread. The workers and the poor population generally are being forced to suffer hunger just as before.

The new government consists of capitalists and landlords. It does not want to give Russia full freedom. Under pressure from the insurgent workers and soldiers it has promised to convene a constituent Assembly to decide how Russia should be governed. But it is delaying elections to the constituent assembly in an attempt to win time and

Россійская Соціаль-Демократическая Рабочая Партія

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

ТОВАРИЩАМЪ, ТОМЯЩИМСЯ ВЪ ПЛѢНУ.

Товарищи! Въ Россіи произошла революція.

Рабочіе Петрограда и Москвы снова выступили застрѣльщиками великаго освободительнаго движенія. Они объявили политическую забастовку. Они вышли на улицу съ красными знаменами. Они дрались, какъ львы, съ царской полиціей, жандармеріей и той небольшой частью войскъ, которая не сразу перешла на сторону народа. Убитыхъ и раненыхъ въ одномъ Петроградѣ насчитываютъ болѣе 2000 человѣкъ. Своею кровью русскіе рабочіе купили свободу нашей странѣ.

Требованія рабочихъ были: *хлѣба, свободы, мира.*

Хлѣба — потому что народъ въ Россіи голодаетъ, какъ и во всѣхъ почти странахъ, участвующихъ въ нынѣшней грабительской войнѣ.

Свободы — потому что царское правительство, пользуясь войной, окончательно превратило всю Россію въ одну сплошную тюрьму.

Мира — потому, что рабочіе Россіи, какъ и болѣе сознательные рабочіе другихъ странъ, не хотятъ больше умирать за интересы кучки богачей, не хотятъ болѣе вести преступную войну, начатую коронованными и не-коронованными разбойниками.

Большинство солдатъ петербургскаго и московскаго гарнизоновъ перешли на сторону возставшихъ рабочихъ. Рабочіе и крестьяне въ солдатскихъ мундирахъ братски подали руку рабочимъ и крестьянамъ безъ мундировъ. Лучшая часть офицерства примкнула къ революціи. Офицеровъ, пожелавшихъ идти противъ народа, солдаты разстрѣляли.

Революцію сдѣлали рабочіе и солдаты. Но власть, какъ это бывало и въ другихъ революціяхъ, на первыхъ порахъ захватила буржуазія. Государственная Дума, въ которой огромное большинство принадлежитъ помѣщикамъ и капиталистамъ, всѣми силами старалась помириться съ царемъ Николаемъ II. Еще въ послѣднюю минуту, когда на улицахъ Петрограда уже кипѣла гражданская война, Государственная Дума посылала царю телеграмму за телеграммой, умоляя его пойти на маленькія уступки и тѣмъ сохранить свою корону. Не Государственная Дума — Дума помѣщиковъ и богачей — а *восставшіе рабочіе и солдаты низвергли царя.* Но новое временное правительство назначено Государственной Думой.

Это временное правительство состоитъ изъ представителей либеральныхъ капиталистовъ и крупныхъ земельныхъ собственниковъ. Главные посты въ немъ принадлежатъ: князю Львову (крупный помѣщикъ и умѣреннѣйшій либералъ), А. Гучкову (соратникъ Столыпина, въ свое время одобрявшій военные суды противъ революціонеровъ), Терещенко (крупнѣйшій сахарозаводчикъ-милліонеръ), Милюкову (всегда защищалъ и защищаетъ теперь грабительскую войну, въ которую нашу страну втравилъ царь Николай съ его шайкой). «Демократъ» Керенскій приглашенъ въ новое правительство только для того, чтобы создать видимость «народнаго» правительства, чтобы имѣть «демократическаго» краснобая, который говорилъ-бы народу громкія, но пустыя, *слова*, въ то время, какъ Гучковы и Львовы будутъ дѣлать анти-народное *дѣло*.

Новое правительство хочетъ продолженія разбойничьей войны. Оно является приказчикомъ русскихъ, англійскихъ и французскихъ капиталистовъ, которые — какъ и нѣмецкіе капиталисты — хотятъ непремѣнно «ограбиться» и выторговать себѣ лучшіе куски добычи. Оно не хочетъ и не можетъ дать Россіи мира.

Новое правительство не хочетъ отнять у помѣщиковъ ихъ земли въ пользу народа, оно не хочетъ возложить тяготъ войны на богачей. Оно не можетъ поэтому дать народу хлѣба. Рабочіе и бѣдное населеніе вообще вынуждены попрежнему голодать.

Новое правительство состоитъ изъ капиталистовъ и помѣщиковъ. Оно не хочетъ дать Россіи полной свободы. Подъ давленіемъ возставшихъ рабочихъ и солдатъ оно обѣщало созвать Учредительное Собраніе, которое рѣшило-бы какъ устроить Россію. Но оно оттягиваетъ назначеніе выборовъ въ Учредительное Собраніе, желая выиграть время и потомъ обмануть народъ, какъ это не разъ въ исторіи дѣлали подобныя правительства. Оно не хочетъ созданія въ Россіи демократической республики. Оно хочетъ только, вмѣсто плохого царя Николая II, посадить на престолъ якобы «хорошаго» царя Михаила. Оно хочетъ, чтобы власть въ Россіи имѣлъ не самъ народъ, а новый царь вмѣстѣ съ буржуазіей.

Такое новое правительство.

Но въ Петроградѣ рядомъ съ этимъ правительствомъ постепенно организуется другое правительство. Рабочіе и солдаты образовали Совѣтъ рабочихъ и солдатскихъ депутатовъ. Каждая тысяча рабочихъ или солдатъ выбираютъ одного депутата. Этотъ совѣтъ засѣдаетъ теперь въ Таврическомъ дворцѣ въ числѣ болѣе чѣмъ 1000 уполномоченныхъ. И онъ является дѣйствительно народнымъ представительствомъ.

First page of the leaflet,
"To Our Comrades in War-Prisoner Camps". 1917
Reduced

First page of the leaflet,
"To Our Comrades in War-Prisoner Camps". 1917
Reduced

then deceive the people, as similar governments have done many times before. It does not want Russia to be a democratic republic. All it wants is to replace the bad Tsar Nicholas II with an allegedly good Tsar, Mikhail. It wants Russia to be ruled not by her people, but by a new tsar together with the bourgeoisie.

Such is this new government.

But alongside it another government is gradually taking shape in Petrograd—the workers and soldiers have set up their Soviet, with one elected deputy from each thousand workers or soldiers. It meets in the Taurida Palace and now has more than 1,000 members. And it is genuinely representative of the people.

The Soviet might make certain mistakes at first. But it is coming to demand, in a loud and powerful voice, peace, bread and a democratic republic.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies insists on *immediate* convocation of the Constituent Assembly and soldier participation in the elections and in deciding the issue of war and peace. It insists on the transfer to the peasants of land belonging to the tsar and the landlords. It insists on a republic and will not hear of a new, "good" tsar. It demands universal and equal suffrage for all men and women. It has secured the arrest of the tsar and tsarina. The Soviet wants to appoint a watch committee which would check on every step of the new government and would itself become the factual government. The Soviet is working for alliance with the workers of all other countries for joint attack on the capitalists. Many revolutionary workers have gone to the front in order, taking advantage of the newly won freedom, to arrange with the soldiers for united action to end the war, assure the people their rights and consolidate Russia's freedom. The Social-Democratic paper *Pravda*[148] has resumed publication in Petrograd and is helping the workers carry out all these great tasks.

Such, comrades, is the position today.

You war prisoners cannot remain indifferent. You must be prepared for the great task that will fall to you, and perhaps very soon.

The enemies of Russian freedom sometimes count on you. They say: there are about two million Russian war prisoners;

if they side with the tsar when they return home, we could again put Nicholas or his "beloved" brother back on the throne. History knows instances when yesterday's enemies, having made peace with an overthrown tsar, returned to him his imprisoned soldiers in order that they may help him fight his own people....[149]

Comrades, wherever you have the opportunity, discuss the great events taking place in our country. Declare with full voice that you stand together with the best part of the Russian soldiers, that you do not want a tsar, that you demand a free republic, uncompensated transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, an eight-hour day, immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Declare that you stand on the side of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' deputies, that on your return to Russia you will be not with the tsar, but against him, not with the landlords and the rich, but against them.

Organise wherever you have the chance, adopt resolutions endorsing the above demands, explain to your more backward comrades the meaning of the great events taking place in our country.

You have gone through enough torment before and during the war and as war prisoners. Now we are advancing towards better days. The dawn of freedom has risen.

Return to Russia as an army of the revolution, an army of the people, not an army of the tsar. In 1905, too, the prisoners of war returning from Japan were the best fighters for freedom.

When you return home you will go to every part of the country. And you must carry a message of freedom to every remote corner, to every Russian village that has suffered so much from hunger, taxes and humiliation. Enlighten your peasant brothers, banish ignorance from the villages, call on the peasant poor to support the workers of town and country in their glorious struggle.

Having won a republic, the Russian workers will unite with the workers of all other countries and will boldly lead the whole of mankind to *socialism*, a system in which there will be neither rich nor poor, and in which a handful of rich will no longer be able to convert millions into their wage-slaves.

Comrades, at the very first opportunity we shall return to Russia to join our brothers, the workers and soldiers, in their struggle. But in Russia, too, we shall not forget you. From free Russia we will try to send you books, newspapers, and news of what is happening in our country. We will demand that you be adequately supplied with money and food. And we shall tell the insurgent workers and soldiers: You can rely on your brothers languishing in war-prisoner camps; they are sons of the people and they will stand shoulder to shoulder with you in the battle for freedom, for a republic and against the tsar.

Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*

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THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES

Comrade workers,

The prediction of the socialists who have remained faithful to socialism and have not succumbed to the savage and beastly war hysteria has proved correct. The first revolution, caused by the world-wide predatory war among the capitalists of various countries, has broken out. The imperialist war, that is, a war for the capitalist division of spoils, for the strangling of weak nations, has *begun* to turn into civil war, that is, a war of the workers against the capitalists, of the toilers and the oppressed against their oppressors, against tsars and kings, landowners and capitalists, a war for mankind's complete liberation from wars, from poverty of the masses, from oppression of man by man!

To the Russian workers has fallen the honour and the good fortune of being the *first* to start the revolution—the great and only legitimate and just war, the war of the oppressed against the oppressors.

The St. Petersburg workers have vanquished the tsarist monarchy. Having started the uprising unarmed in face of machine-guns, in their heroic struggle against the police and the tsar's armies, the workers won over the majority of the soldiers of the St. Petersburg garrison. The same thing occurred in Moscow and in other cities. Abandoned by his armies, the tsar had to capitulate: he signed an abdication on behalf of himself and his son. He suggested that the throne be transferred to his brother Mikhail.

Owing to the great rapidity of the revolution, the direct assistance of the Anglo-French capitalists, insufficient class-consciousness of the *mass* of the workers and the people

in St. Petersburg, the organisation and preparedness of the Russian landowners and capitalists, *they* succeeded in seizing power. The key posts, the premiership and the Ministries of the Interior and War, in the new Russian government, the "Provisional Government", have gone to Lvov and Guchkov, the Octobrists who had done their best to help Nicholas the Bloody and Stolypin the Hangman crush the Revolution of 1905, shoot down and hang workers and peasants fighting for land and freedom. The less important, ministerial posts have gone to the Cadets: Foreign Affairs to Milyukov, Education to Manuilov, Agriculture to Shingaryov. One quite insignificant post, that of Minister of Justice, has gone to the glib-tongued Trudovik Kerensky, whom the capitalists need to pacify the people with empty promises, fool them with high-sounding phrases, reconcile them to the government of landlords and capitalists who, in union with the capitalists of England and France, want to continue the predatory war, a war for the seizure of Armenia, Constantinople, Galicia, a war to enable the Anglo-French capitalists to *retain* the booty they have taken from the German capitalists (all Germany's African colonies), and, at the same time, *recover* the spoils seized by the German capitalist robbers (part of France, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, etc.).

The workers could not, of course, trust such a government. They had overthrown the tsarist monarchy in their fight for *peace*, *bread* and *freedom*. They immediately saw why Guchkov, Milyukov and Co. succeeded in wresting victory from the hands of the working people. The reason was that the Russian landlords and capitalists were well prepared and organised; that they had on their side the power of capital, the *wealth* both of the Russian capitalists and of the richest capitalists in the world, the English and the French. The workers realised from the very start that in order to fight for peace, bread, and freedom, the labouring classes, the workers, soldiers and peasants, must *organise*, close their ranks, unite *independently* of the capitalists and *against* the capitalists.

Thus the St. Petersburg workers, having overthrown the tsarist monarchy, immediately set up their *own* organisation, the *Soviet of Workers' Deputies*, immediately proceeded

to strengthen and extend it, to organise *independent* Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Only a few days after the revolution, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies comprised *over 1,500* deputies of workers and peasants dressed in soldier's uniform. It enjoyed such wide confidence among the railway workers and the entire mass of the labouring population that it began to develop into a real *people's government.*

And even the most faithful friends and patrons of Guchkov-Milyukov, even the most faithful watchdogs of Anglo-French predatory capital, the staff correspondent of the richest newspaper of the English capitalists, Robert Wilson of *The Times*, and the staff correspondent of the richest paper of the French capitalists, Charles Rivet of *Le Temps*, even they, while hurling curses at the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, have been obliged to admit that *there are two governments in Russia.* One—recognised by "everybody" (actually, by everybody among the *wealthy*), the landlord and capitalist government of the Guchkovs and the Milyukovs. The other—recognised by "nobody" (of the wealthy classes), the government of the workers and the peasants—the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that is trying to establish Soviets of Workers' and Soviets of Peasants' Deputies *throughout Russia.*

Let us see, now, what each of these two governments is saying and doing.

1. *What is the landlord and capitalist government of Lvov-Guchkov-Milyukov doing?*

It is handing out the most glowing promises right and left. It promises the Russian people the fullest freedom. It promises to convoke a national Constituent Assembly to determine Russia's form of government. Kerensky and the Cadet leaders declare themselves in favour of a democratic republic. The Guchkovs-Milyukovs are unsurpassed masters of theatrical revolutionism. Their publicity machine is working at top speed. But what about their *deeds*?

While promising freedom, the new government actually negotiated with the tsar's family, with the dynasty, with a view to restoring the monarchy. It invited Mikhail Romanov to become regent, that is, temporary tsar. The monarchy of Russia would have been restored, had not the Guchkovs

and the Milyukovs been stopped by the workers, who marched through the streets of St. Petersburg and inscribed on their banners: "Land and Freedom! Death to the Tyrants!"—who, together with the cavalry regiments, assembled on the square in front of the Duma and unfurled banners with the inscription: "Long Live Socialist Republics in All Countries!" Mikhail Romanov, the ally of the Guchkovs-Milyukovs, realised that in this situation it would be wiser to decline the offer, pending his election to the throne by the constituent assembly, and Russia has—temporarily—remained a republic.

The government did not deprive the former tsar of his freedom. The workers compelled his arrest. The government wanted to hand over the command of the army to Nikolai Nikolayevich Romanov. The workers forced his removal. Obviously, were there no Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the landlords, the Lvovs-Guchkovs, would come to terms with a Romanov or with some other landowner.

In its manifesto to the people and in Milyukov's telegram to all Russian representatives abroad, the government declared that it *would abide by all* the international treaties entered into by Russia. These treaties had been concluded by the deposed tsar. The government does not dare to publish them—first, because it is bound hand and foot by Russian, English and French capital; second, because it fears that the people would tear the Guchkovs and the Milyukovs to pieces if they discovered that the capitalists were ready to sacrifice another five or ten million workers and peasants in order to win Constantinople, strangle Galicia, etc.

What, then, is the value of these promises of freedom, if the people are not allowed to know the truth about the treaties of the landowner tsar, for which the capitalists are prepared to shed more and more soldiers' blood?

And what is the value of the promises of various freedoms, and even of a democratic republic, to a people threatened with famine, a people whom they wish to lead blindfold to the slaughter in order that the Russian, English, and French capitalists may rob the German capitalists?

At the same time the government of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs is suppressing by sheer force every attempt of the Russian workers to come to an understanding with their

brothers, the workers of other countries: the government does *not permit Pravda*, which resumed publication in St. Petersburg after the revolution, the manifesto issued in St. Petersburg by the Central Committee of our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, or the proclamations of Duma Deputy Chkheidze and his group, to be sent abroad.

Workers and peasants! You can rest assured: you have been promised freedom—freedom for the dead, freedom for those who have died of hunger, who have been slaughtered in the war!

In none of its programmes has the new government said a *single word* about land for the peasants or higher wages for the workers. No date has as yet been set for convocation of the constituent assembly. No elections to the St. Petersburg City Council have as yet been appointed. The people's militia is being placed under the supervision of rural and urban local government bodies which, in accordance with the Stolypin law, were elected only by capitalist and the richest landowners. Governors are being appointed from the landowning class—and this is "freedom"!

2. *What is the government of the workers and peasants doing, and what should it do?...**

Written on March 12 (25), 1917

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Published according to the manuscript

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* The manuscript break off here.—*Ed.*

THE TASKS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION[150]

REPORT OF A LECTURE

Lenin's two-and-a-half-hour lecture consisted of two parts. In the first, Lenin surveyed the historical conditions which could, and did, produce such a "miracle" as the collapse of the tsarist monarchy in a matter of eight days. The most important of these was the "great rebellion" of 1905-07, so vilely denounced by the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, the present masters of the situation, who are moved to admiration by the "glorious revolution" of 1917. But had the really profound Revolution of 1905 not "ploughed up the ground", had it not exposed to view all the parties and classes in action, had it not exposed the tsarist clique in all its barbarism and savagery, the swift victory of 1917 would not have been possible.

In 1917 a very exceptional conjuncture of circumstances made it possible to merge together the attacks of the most diverse social forces against tsarism. First, Anglo-French finance capital, which more than any other dominates and robs the whole world, opposed the Revolution in 1905 and helped the tsar crush it (the 1906 loan). But it took a very active and direct part in the present revolution, organising the conspiracy of the Guchkovs, Milyukovs and part of the army high command to depose Nicholas II or force him to make concessions. From the standpoint of world politics and international finance capital, the Guchkov-Milyukov government is no more than an agent of the banking firm "England and France", an instrument for continuing the

imperialist slaughter. Second, as a result of the military defeats sustained by tsarism, the old officer corps was replaced by new, young, predominantly bourgeois, officers. Third, the entire Russian bourgeoisie, which between 1905 and 1914, and particularly between 1914 and 1917, had intensively organised its forces, joined with the landlords in a common struggle against the decadent tsarist regime in the hope of enriching itself by seizing Armenia, Constantinople, Galicia, etc. Fourth, to these *imperialist* forces was added the deep-going and rapidly unfolding proletarian movement. The proletariat, which performed the revolution, demanded *peace*, *bread* and *freedom*. It had nothing in common with the imperialist bourgeoisie, and it gave leadership to the *majority* of the army, composed of workers and peasants. The conversion of the imperialist war into civil war has *begun*.

Hence, the basic contradiction of the present revolution—one that reveals it merely as the *first* stage of the first revolution brought about by the imperialist war. The Guchkov-Milyukov landlord and capitalist government can give the people neither peace, bread, nor freedom. It is a government for continuing the predatory war. It has openly declared that it will abide by the tsar's international treaties, and these are all predatory treaties. At best, it might *postpone* the crisis, but it *cannot* ward off famine. Nor can it give the country freedom, no matter how many "promises" it makes (promises are cheap), because it is bound by the interests of landlordism and capital. From the very start it tried to arrange a *deal* with the dynasty, the object being to restore the monarchy.

That is why it would be the height of folly to adopt tactics of "supporting" the new government in the interests, supposedly, of "combating reaction". That struggle requires the *arming of the proletariat*—the only serious, effective guarantee both against tsarism and attempts by the Guchkovs and Milyukovs to restore the monarchy.

Deputy Skobelev is therefore right in saying that Russia is "on the eve of a second, real [*wirklich*] revolution".

The people's organisation for this revolution already exists and is growing. That organisation is the Soviet

of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. And it is not for nothing that the agents of Anglo-French capital, the correspondents of *The Times* and *Le Temps*, are so anxious to discredit it.

A close study of the press reports relating to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies led Lenin to conclude that there were three distinct trends in it. The first comes nearest to social-patriotism. It puts its trust in Kerensky, that hero of the empty phrase, that pawn in the hands of Guchkov and Milyukov, that representative of the worst type of "Louis Blanc politics", past master of the empty promise and of the sonorous phrase in the spirit of the European social-patriots and social-pacifists *à la* Kautsky and Co. In reality, however, he "reconciles" the workers to the continuation of the predatory war. Through Kerensky the imperialist bourgeoisie tells the workers: We shall give you a republic, the eight-hour day (which has *already* been established in St. Petersburg), we promise you all the freedoms—but all this for the express purpose that you will help us rob Turkey and Austria, snatch from German imperialism *its* booty, and assure Anglo-French imperialism its booty.

The second trend is represented by the Central Committee of our Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The papers have published an extract from the Manifesto of our Central Committee, issued in St. Petersburg on March 18. It demands a democratic republic, the eight-hour day, confiscation of the landed estates and their transfer to the peasants, confiscation of grain stocks, immediate peace negotiations, conducted *not* by the government of Guchkov and Milyukov, but by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. This Soviet, in the view of the Manifesto, *is* the real revolutionary government (Lenin added that *The Times* correspondent, too, speaks of *two governments* in Russia). Peace negotiations are to be conducted *not* with the bourgeois governments, but with the *proletariat* of all the warring countries. The Manifesto calls upon all workers, peasants and soldiers to elect delegates to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

These are the only really socialist, really revolutionary tactics.

The third trend is represented by Chkheidze and his friends. They are *vacillating*, and this is reflected in remarks of *The Times* and *Le Temps*, one minute praising, the next execrating them. When Chkheidze refused to enter the *second* Provisional Government, when he declared that the war was an imperialist war on *both* sides, etc., he was pursuing a proletarian policy. When, however, Chkheidze took part in the *first* Provisional Government (the Duma Committee); when, in § 3 of his proclamation, he demanded "ausreichende Teilnahme der Vertreter der russischen Arbeiterschaft an der Regierung" (participation of internationalists in the government of the imperialist war!); when (together with Skobelev) he invited this *imperialist* government to open peace negotiations (instead of explaining to the workers that the *bourgeoisie* is bound hand and foot by the interests of finance capital which cannot break with imperialism); when friends of Chkheidze—Tulyakov and Skobelev—on the instructions of the Guchkov and Milyukov government try to "pacify" the soldiers who are rising against the liberal generals (the murder of Admiral Nepenin, *bemoaned* even by the German imperialists!)—then Chkheidze and his friends fall into the worst kind of "Louis Blanc politics", follow a *bourgeois* policy and harm the revolution.

Lenin also attacked Gorky's social-pacifist appeal and deplored the fact that the great writer was indulging in politics and reiterating petty-bourgeois prejudices.

The second part of his lecture Lenin devoted to an exposition of proletarian tactics. He described the peculiar historical situation of the *present* moment as a moment of *transition* from the first to the second stage of the revolution, from revolt against tsarism to revolt against the bourgeoisie, against the imperialist war, or transition to a Convention, into which the Constituent Assembly might be turned, *if* the government keeps its "promise" to convene it.

The special task of the moment, one that conforms to this *transitional* situation, is *organisation of the proletariat*. Not the routine type of organisation, to which the betrayers of socialism, the social-patriots and opportunists of all countries, as well as the Kautskyites, confine themselves

but a *revolutionary organisation*. It must, first, embrace the *entire* people and, second, combine *military and government* functions.

The opportunists, who hold sway in the Second International, have distorted the doctrine of Marx and Engels on the state in the period of revolution. Kautsky likewise departed from Marx's views[151] in his debate with Pannekoek (1912). Marx teaches us, on the basis of the experience of the Commune of 1871, that "die Arbeiterklasse nicht die fertige Staatsmaschine einfach in Besitz nehmen und sie für ihre eigenen Zwecke in Bewegung setzen kann". Das Proletariat soll (muß?) diese Maschine (Armee, Polizei, Bürokratie) *zerbrechen*[152]. Das ist es, was die Opportunisten (Sozialpatrioten) und Kautskyaner (Sozialpazifisten) entweder bestreiten oder vertuschen. Das ist die *wichtigste* praktische Lehre der Pariser Kommune und der russischen Revolution von 1905.

Wir unterscheiden uns vonden Anarchisten dadurch, daß wir die Notwendigkeit des *Staates* für die revolutionäre Umwälzung anerkennen. Wir unterscheiden uns aber von den Opportunisten und Kautskyanern dadurch, daß wir sagen: Wir brauchen nicht die "fertige" Staatsmaschinerie, wie sie in den demokratischsten bürgerlichen Republiken existiert, sondern die *unmittelbare Macht bewaffneter und organisierter Arbeiter. Das* ist der Staat, den *wir* brauchen. Das sind, ihrem Wesen nach, die Kommune von 1871 und die *Arbeiterdelegiertenräte* von 1905 und 1917. Auf diesem Fundament müssen wir weiterbauen.* *Prevent* the

* "The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machine and wield it for its own purposes." The proletariat must smash this machine (the army, the police, the bureaucracy). It is this that the opportunists (the social-patriots) and Kautskyites (social-pacifists) are denying or minimising. This is the *most important* practical lesson to be learned from the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution of 1905.

We differ from the anarchists in that we recognise that the *state* is necessary to carry out revolutionary transformations. But we differ from the opportunists and the Kautskyites in that we say: we do not need a "ready-made" state machine, such as exists in the most democratic bourgeois republics, but *direct power of the armed and organized workers. That* is the state that *we* need. In their essence the Commune of 1871 and the *Soviets of Workers' Deputies* in 1905 and 1917 are just such a state. On this foundation we must build further.—*Ed.*

re-establishment of the police! Build up the people's militia into a genuine *all people's militia* led by the proletariat, into "our state", with the capitalists paying the workers for time served in the militia. *Supplement the "miracles of proletarian heroism"* which the proletariat displayed *yesterday* in battle with tsarism and will display *tomorrow* in battle with the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, with "*miracles of proletarian organisation*". That is the slogan of the moment! That is the earnest of success!

The workers are being impelled onto that path by *objective* conditions: famine, the need to distribute grain stocks, the inevitability of "Zivildienstpflicht"*, the need to secure peace. Our peace terms, Lenin said, are as follows: (1) The Soviet of Workers' Deputies, as a revolutionary government, declares forthwith that it is *not* bound by *any* treaties concluded by the tsarist government or the bourgeoisie; (2) it publishes at once all these vile, predatory treaties; (3) it openly proposes an immediate truce to *all* countries in the war; (4) it proposes the liberation of *all* colonies and of *all* oppressed nations as a condition of peace; (5) it declares that it has no confidence in any of the bourgeois governments and calls on the workers of all countries to overthrow them; (6) it declares that, since the war loans were contracted by the bourgeoisie, they must be paid by the *capitalists*.

This policy would attract to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies the majority of workers and poor peasants. Confiscation of the landed estates would be assured. *This would not yet be socialism*. It would signify the victory of the workers and poor peasants, one that would assure peace, freedom and bread. For *such* peace terms *we*, *too*, would be prepared to fight a *revolutionary* war! Lenin recalled the statement made in No. 47 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (October 13, 1915) that the Social-Democratic movement does not in advance *renounce* such a revolutionary war.** Assistance from the socialist proletariat of all countries would be assured. The foul appeals of the social-patriots (such as Guesde's

* Civilian-service duty.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04.—*Ed.*

disgraceful letter: "First victory, then a republic") would vanish like smoke.

The lecturer concluded with the words: "Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the world workers' revolution, which has already *begun*!"

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TRICKS OF THE REPUBLICAN CHAUVINISTS[153]

March 30, 1917

I have just read the following in today's early morning edition of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* No. 557, March 30:

"Milan, March 29. Our St. Petersburg correspondent reports the, arrest of a certain *Chernomazov*, editor of the socialist paper *Pravda* which began publication during the revolution. Under the old regime Chernomazov was as a secret-police agent and was paid a monthly salary of two hundred rubles. The newspaper he edited has been clamouring for a socialist republic and bitterly attacking the Provisional Government, with the obvious purpose of serving reaction. In general, anti-government agitation by irresponsible groups leads one to suspect collusion with the old regime and the enemy. Even the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which is decidedly radical compared with the Provisional Government, has turned away from these groups."

This report is a paraphrase of a telegram appearing in the chauvinist Italian paper, *Corriere della Sera*,[154] Milan, March 29, and sent there from St. Petersburg on March "6, at 10:30 p. m. To explain to the reader the falsification, a thing quite usual among the chauvinists, I must go back a bit.

Under the "old regime", i.e., from April 1912 to July 1914, there was published in St. Petersburg a daily Social-Democratic paper, *Pravda*. It was, in fact, the organ of the *Central Committee* of our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. I used to contribute to it almost daily from Cracow, where I then lived as a political émigré. The Social-Democratic Duma members, Badayev, Muranov, Petrovsky, Shagov, Samoilov (up to the summer of 1914 the group included also Malinovsky), who belonged to our Party and whom the tsar later exiled to Siberia for agitation against the imperialist war, regularly came to Cracow, and we discussed the policies of the paper.

The tsarist government naturally tried not only to surround *Pravda*, whose circulation reached as much as 60,000, with spies, but also to plant provocateurs on its staff. Among these provocateurs was Chernomazov, known in the Party as Miron. He managed to gain the confidence of the Party, and in 1913 became the secretary of *Pravda*.

Having observed, together with the group of Duma members, Chernomazov's activities, we came to the conclusion, first, that his articles compromised our political line, and, second, that his political integrity was open to suspicion.

However, finding a substitute was not easy, all the more so since communication between the Duma group and Cracow was maintained illegally, or through the Duma members visiting Cracow, which they could not do very often. Finally, in the spring of 1914, we succeeded in bringing Rosenfeld (Kamenev) over to St. Petersburg, but toward the end of 1914, he was exiled to Siberia together with our Duma group.

Rosenfeld (Kamenev) was instructed to *remove* Chernomazov, and he did *remove* him from all the affairs of the paper. Chernomazov was dismissed. Our Central Committee ordered an *investigation*, but since it was impossible to find accurate evidence to substantiate the suspicions against Chernomazov, the St. Petersburg comrades did not venture *openly* to brand him as a provocateur. We had to confine ourselves to discharging him from *Pravda*.

That Chernomazov, and of course other provocateurs, helped the tsar banish our Duma members to Siberia, of that there can be no doubt.

A communication from our Party's St. Petersburg "Central Committee Bureau" of November 13, 1916 said Chernomazov was again trying to get into the illegal organisation, that the "Bureau" had removed Miron and an individual connected with him from the organisation, and would "take similar action against anyone who continued to have any dealings with him".

Our reply, of course, was that Chernomazov should not be allowed in the Party, for he had been removed by a decision adopted by the Central Committee and the Duma group.

Such is the story of the *old Pravda*, published under the *old* regime and suppressed by the tsar before the war, in July 1914.

The question arises: Was not Chernomazov, directly or indirectly, connected with the *new Pravda*, which began publication in St. Petersburg *after* the revolution? About this I know nothing, for from the first day of the revolution the Guchkov-Milyukov government does not allow my telegrams to reach *Pravda*, and, of course, *Pravda*'s telegrams to reach me. I do not even know whether the C.C. Bureau is still in existence, or whether Kamenev and the Duma members have returned to St. Petersburg. They know Miron and would have immediately removed him if he had again wormed his way into the organisation by taking advantage of the fact that new people were in charge.[155]

The French social-chauvinist paper *l'Humanité* of March 25 quoted a telegram supposedly received from St. Petersburg by the *Petit Parisien*.[156] In this telegram Chernomazov is referred to as the "*former* editor of the extremist Social-Democratic paper *Pravda*".

The reader will, I hope, now understand the perfidy and the foul methods employed by the government of Guchkov-Milyukov and its friends in their attempt to cast a shadow on our Party by alleging that it is working in collusion with the old regime and the enemy. The government and its friends hate our Party and slander it, because we declared, as far back as October 13, 1915, in No. 47 of our paper *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Geneva), that we were *unconditionally* opposed to the imperialist war, even if it were to be conducted not by the tsarist government, but by a *chauvinist-revolutionary*, *chauvinist-republican* Russian government.*

The Guchkov-Milyukov government is *such* a government, for it has confirmed the *predatory* treaties tsarism concluded with Anglo-French imperialism and in this war is pursuing *predatory* aims (the conquest of Armenia, Galicia, Constantinople, etc.).

(Tomorrow I shall forward this to *Volksrecht* and *Avanti!*)

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04.—*Ed.*

DECISION OF THE COLLEGIUM ABOARD, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[157]

The Collegium Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee resolves to accept Comrade Robert Grimm's proposal concerning the return to Russia via Germany of émigrés desiring to return home.[158]

The Collegium Abroad places on record:

1) That Comrade R. Grimm negotiated with a member of the government of a neutral country, Minister Hoffmann, who did not consider it possible for Switzerland officially to intervene for the only reason that the English Government would doubtlessly interpret this as a breach of neutrality, since England refuses to permit the passage of internationalists;

2) That R. Grimm's proposal is fully acceptable since it guarantees free passage irrespective of political affiliation, or attitude on the "fatherland defence" issue, or on Russia continuing the war or concluding peace, etc.;

3) That the proposal is based on a plan envisaging the exchange of Russian émigrés for German internees in Russia, and that the émigrés have no reason to decline to campaign for such an exchange in Russia;

4) That Comrade R. Grimm has submitted this proposal to representatives of all the trends among the political émigrés, pointing out that in the situation that has arisen this is the only way and that it is fully acceptable under present conditions;

5) That, for our part, we have done everything possible to convince representatives of the different trends of the

need to accept the proposal and of the absolute impermissibility of delay;

6) That the representatives of certain trends have, unfortunately, urged further delay—a decision which we cannot but regard as a grave mistake, and one that does immense damage to the revolutionary movement in Russia.

In accordance with these considerations, the Collegium Abroad of the Central Committee resolves to notify all members of our Party of the acceptance of the proposal and of our immediate departure, and to invite them to register all who wish to make the journey, and send a copy of this decision to the representatives of all other trends.

Zurich, March 31, 1917

First published in 1923

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FAREWELL LETTER TO THE SWISS WORKERS[159]

Comrades, Swiss workers,

Leaving Switzerland for Russia, to continue revolutionary-internationalist activity in our country, we, members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party united under the Central Committee (as distinct from *another* party bearing the *same* name, but united under the Organising Committee), wish to convey to you our fraternal greetings and expression of our profound comradely gratitude for your comradely treatment of the political émigrés.

If the *avowed* social-patriots and opportunists, the Swiss Grütlians who, like the social-patriots of all countries, have deserted the camp of the proletariat for the camp of the bourgeoisie; if these people have *openly* called upon you to fight the harmful influence of foreigners upon the Swiss labour movement; if the *disguised* social-patriots and opportunists who constitute a majority among the leaders of the Swiss Socialist Party[160] have been pursuing similar tactics *under cover*, we consider it our duty to state that on the part of the revolutionary, internationalist socialist workers of Switzerland we have met with warm sympathy, and have greatly benefited from comradely relations with them.

We have always been particularly careful in dealing with questions, acquaintance with which requires prolonged participation in the Swiss movement. But those of us—and there were hardly more than 10 or 15—who have been members of the Swiss Socialist Party have considered it our duty steadfastly to maintain our point of view, the point of view of the Zimmerwald Left, on general and fundamental questions of the international socialist movement. We considered

it our duty determinedly to fight not only social-patriotism, but also the so-called "Centrist" trend to which belong R. Grimm, F. Schneider, Jacques Schmid and others in Switzerland, Kautsky, Haase, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft in Germany, Longuet, Pressemane and others in France, Snowden, Ramsay MacDonald and others in England, Turati, Treves and their friends in Italy, and the abovementioned party headed by the Organising Committee (Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze, Skobelev and others) in Russia.

We have worked hand in hand with the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Switzerland grouped, in particular, around the magazine *Freie Jugend*[161]. They formulated and circulated (in the German and French languages) the proposals for a referendum in favour of a party congress in April 1917 to discuss the party's attitude on the war. At the Zurich cantonal congress in Töss they tabled a resolution on behalf of the youth and the "Lefts" on the war issue,[162] and in March 1917 issued and circulated in certain localities of French Switzerland a leaflet in the German and French languages, entitled "Our Peace Terms", etc.

To these comrades, whose views we share, and with whom we worked hand in hand, we convey our fraternal greetings.

We have never had the slightest doubt that the imperialist government of England will under no circumstances permit the Russian internationalists, who are implacable opponents of the imperialist government of Guchkov-Milyukov and Co. and of Russia continuing the *imperialist* war, to return to Russia.

In this connection, we must briefly explain our understanding of the tasks of the Russian revolution. We believe this all the more necessary because through the Swiss workers we can and must address ourselves to the German, French and Italian workers, who speak the same languages as the population of Switzerland, a country that still enjoys the benefits of peace and relatively, the largest measure of political freedom.

We abide unconditionally by our declaration, which appeared in the Central Organ of our Party, *Sotsial-Democrat* (No. 47, October 13, 1915), published in Geneva. In it we stated that, should the revolution prove victorious in Russia, and should a *republican* government come to power, a

government intent on continuing the *imperialist* war, a war in alliance with the imperialist bourgeoisie of England and France, a war for the seizure of Constantinople, Armenia, Galicia, etc.,—we would most resolutely oppose such a government and would be *against* the "defence of the fatherland" in *such* a war.*

A contingency approaching the above has now arisen. The new government of Russia, which has negotiated with the brother of Nicholas II for restoration of the monarchy, and in which the most important and influential posts are held by the *monarchists* Lvov and Guchkov, this government is trying to deceive the Russian workers with the slogan, "the Germans must overthrow Wilhelm" (correct! but why not add: the English, the Italians, etc., must overthrow their kings, and the Russians their monarchists, Lvov and Guchkov??). By issuing this slogan, but *refusing* to publish the imperialist, predatory treaties concluded by the tsar with France, England, etc., and *confirmed by the government of Guchkov-Milyukov-Kerensky*, this government is trying to represent its *imperialist* war with Germany as a war of "defence" (i.e., as a just war, legitimate even from the standpoint of the proletariat). It is trying to represent a war for the defence of the rapacious, imperialist, predatory aims of capital—Russian, English, etc., as "defence" of the Russian republic (which does *not* yet exist, and which the Lvovs and the Guchkovs have *not* even *promised*!).

If there is any truth in the latest press reports about a rapprochement between the avowed Russian social-patriots (such as Plekhanov, Zasulich, Potresov, etc.) and the "Centre party", the party of the "Organising Committee", the party of Chkheidze, Skobelev, etc., based on the common slogan: "Until the Germans overthrow Wilhelm, our war remains a defensive war,"—if this is true, then we shall redouble our energy in combating the party of Chkheidze, Skobelev, etc., which we have *always* fought for its opportunist, vacillating, unstable political behaviour.

Our slogan is: No support for the Guchkov-Milyukov government! He who says that such support is necessary to prevent restoration of the monarchy is deceiving the people.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04.—*Ed.*

On the contrary, the Guchkov government has *already* conducted negotiations for restoration of the monarchy in Russia. *Only* the arming and organisation of the proletariat can *prevent* Guchkov and Co. from *restoring* the monarchy in Russia. Only the revolutionary proletariat of Russia and the *whole of Europe*, remaining loyal to internationalism, is capable of ridding humanity of the horrors of the imperialist war.

We do not close our eyes to the tremendous difficulties facing the revolutionary-internationalist vanguard of the Russian proletariat. The most abrupt and swift changes are possible in times such as the present. In No. 47 of *Sotsial-Democrat* we gave a clear and direct answer to the question that naturally arises: What would our Party do, if the revolution *immediately* placed it in power? Our answer was: (1) We would forthwith offer peace to *all* the warring nations; (2) we would announce our peace terms—immediate liberation of *all* the colonies and *all* the oppressed and non-sovereign peoples; (3) we would immediately begin and carry out the liberation of all the peoples oppressed by the Great Russians; (4) we do not deceive ourselves for one moment, we know that these terms would be *unacceptable* not only to the monarchist, but also to the republican bourgeoisie of Germany, and *not only* to Germany, but also to the capitalist governments of England and France.

We would be forced to wage a revolutionary war against the German—and not only the German—bourgeoisie. *And we would wage this war*. We are not pacifists. We are opposed to imperialist wars over the division of spoils among the capitalists, but we have always considered it absurd for the revolutionary proletariat to disavow revolutionary wars that *may* prove necessary *in the interests of socialism*.

The task we outlined in No. 47 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* is a gigantic one. It can be accomplished only by a long series of great class battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, it was not our impatience, nor our wishes, but the *objective conditions* created by the imperialist war that brought the *whole* of humanity to an impasse, that placed it in a dilemma: either allow the destruction of more millions of lives and utterly ruin European civilisation or hand over power in *all* the civilised countries to the revo-

lutionary proletariat, carry through the socialist revolution.

To the Russian proletariat has fallen the great honour of *beginning* the series of revolutions which the imperialist war has made an objective inevitability. But the idea that the Russian proletariat is the chosen revolutionary proletariat among the workers of the world is absolutely alien to us. We know perfectly well that the proletariat of Russia is less organised, less prepared and less class-conscious than the proletariat of other countries. It is not its special qualities, but rather the special conjuncture of historical circumstances that *for a certain*, *perhaps very short*, *time* has made the proletariat of Russia the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world.

Russia is a peasant country, one of the most backward of European countries. Socialism *cannot* triumph there *directly* and *immediately*. But the peasant character of the country, the vast reserve of land in the hands of the nobility, *may*, to judge from the experience of 1905, give tremendous sweep to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia and *may* make our revolution the *prologue* to the world socialist revolution, a *step* toward it.

Our Party was formed and developed in the struggle for these ideas, which have been fully confirmed by the experience of 1905 and the spring of 1917, in the uncompromising struggle against all the other parties; and we shall continue to fight for these ideas.

In Russia, socialism cannot triumph directly and immediately. But the peasant mass *can* bring the inevitable and matured agrarian upheaval to the point of *confiscating* all the immense holdings of the nobility. This has always been our slogan and it has now again been advanced in St. Petersburg by the Central Committee of our Party and by *Pravda*, our Party's newspaper. The proletariat will fight for *this* slogan, without closing its eyes to the inevitability of cruel class conflicts between the agricultural labourers and the poorest peasants closely allied with them, on the one band, and the *rich peasants*, whose position has been strengthened by Stolypin's agrarian "reform" (1907-14), on the other. The fact should not be overlooked that the 104 peasant deputies in the First (1906) and Second (1907) Dumas

introduced a revolutionary agrarian bill demanding the nationalisation of all lands and their distribution by local committees elected on the basis of complete democracy.

Such a revolution would not, in itself, be socialism. But it would give a great impetus to the world labour movement. It would immensely strengthen the position of the socialist proletariat in Russia and its influence on the agricultural labourers and the poorest peasants. It would enable the city proletariat to develop, on the strength of this influence, such revolutionary organisations as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies to replace the old instruments of oppression employed by bourgeois states, the army, the police, the bureaucracy; to carry out—under pressure of the unbearably burdensome imperialist war and its consequences—a series of revolutionary measures to *control* the production and distribution of goods.

Single-handed, the Russian proletariat cannot bring the socialist revolution to a *victorious conclusion*. But it can give the Russian revolution a mighty sweep that would create the most favourable conditions for a socialist revolution, and would, in a sense, *start* it. It can facilitate the rise of a situation in which its *chief*, its most trustworthy and most reliable collaborator, the *European* and American *socialist* proletariat, could join the decisive battles.

Let the sceptics despair because of the temporary triumph within the European socialist movement of such disgusting lackeys of the imperialist bourgeoisie as the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co. in Germany; Sembat, Guesde, Renaudel and Co. in France; the Fabians and the Labourites in England. We are firmly convinced that this filthy froth on the surface of the world labour movement will be soon swept away by the waves of revolution.

In Germany there is already a *seething* unrest of the proletarian masses, who contributed so much to humanity and socialism by their persistent, unyielding, sustained organisational work during the long decades of European "calm", from 1871 to 1914. The future of German socialism is represented not by the traitors, the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co., nor by the vacillating and spineless politicians, Haase, Kautsky and their ilk, who have been enfeebled by the routine of the period of "peace".

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The future belongs to the trend that has given us Karl Liebknecht, created the Spartacus group, has carried on its propaganda in the Bremen *Arbeiterpolitik*.[163]

The objective circumstances of the imperialist war make it certain that the revolution will not be limited to the *first* stage of the Russian revolution, that the revolution will *not* be limited to Russia.

The German proletariat is the most trustworthy, the most reliable ally of the Russian and the world proletarian revolution.

When, in November 1914, our Party put forward the slogan: "Turn the imperialist war into a civil war" of the oppressed against the oppressors for the attainment of socialism, the social-patriots met this slogan with hatred and malicious ridicule, and the Social-Democratic "Centre", with incredulous, sceptical, meek and expectant silence. David, the German social-chauvinist and social-imperialist, called it "insane", while Mr. Plekhanov, the representative of Russian (and Anglo-French) social-chauvinism, of socialism in words, imperialism in deeds, called it a "farcical dream" (*Mittelding zwischen Traum und Komödie**). The representatives of the Centre confined themselves to silence or to cheap little jokes about this "straight line drawn in empty space".

Now, after March 1917, only the blind can fail to see that it is a correct slogan. Transformation of the imperialist war into civil war is *becoming* a fact.

Long live the proletarian revolution that is *beginning* in Europe!

On behalf of the departing comrades, members of the R.S.D.L.P. (united under the Central Committee), who approved this letter at a meeting held April 8 (new style), 1917.

N. Lenin

Written on March 26 (April 8) 1917

Published in the magazine *Jugend-Internationale* No. 8, May 1917

Published according to the manuscript

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* Something between a dream and a comedy.—*Ed.*

NOTES

[1] This article and the two that follow it were directed against the un-Marxist and anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Bukharin-Pyatakov-Bosh group which began to take shape in the spring of 1915, when preparations were being made for publication of the magazine *Kommunist*. It was to be put out in co-operation with *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Y. L. Pyatakov (P. Kievsky) and Y. B. Bosh undertook to finance the magazine and N. I. Bukharin was made one of its editors. Lenin's differences with the group were accentuated after the appearance of No. 1-2 of *Kommunist* in September 1915. In their theses "On the Self-Determination Slogan", which they sent to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh opposed Lenin's theory of socialist revolution, rejected the struggle for democracy in the imperialist era and insisted on the Party withdrawing its demand for national self-determination.

The group did not confine itself to theoretical differences and openly attacked the Party's policy and slogans. It sought to use *Kommunist* in furtherance of its factional aims and tried to dictate terms to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Pyatakov and Bosh insisted on the Central Committee Bureau Abroad recognising them as a separate group not accountable to it and authorised to maintain independent connections with Central Committee members in Russia and publish leaflets and other literature. Though this demand was turned down, the group attempted to establish contact with the Central Committee Bureau in Russia.

Lenin was sharply opposed to the Pyatakov-Bosh-Bukharin theses, saying that "we can take no responsibility for them, either direct or indirect—even for harbouring them in the Party, let alone granting them equality". In letters to N. I. Bukharin, Y. L. Pyatakov, G. Y. Zinoviev and A. G. Shlyapnikov, Lenin trenchantly criticised the group's views and anti-Party, factional actions and condemned the conciliatory attitude of Zinoviev and Shlyapnikov. On his proposal, joint publication of *Kommunist* by the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors and the group was discontinued.

The "Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism" was written when the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors had received Bukharin's comments on the theses "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination". The article was not published at the time. p. 13

[2] *Economism* was an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international

opportunism. The Economists limited the tasks of the working-class movement to the economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc., maintaining that the political struggle should be left to the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the working-class party. Making a fetish of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, they belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and, by denying the need for a Marxist party to bring socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. They championed the existing disunity, confusion and parochial amateurish approach in the Social-Democratic ranks, and opposed the creation of a centralised working-class party.

Comprehensive criticism by Lenin of the Economist standpoint will be found in his "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats", "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the *Profession de Foi*" and "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96, and Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* brought about the ideological rout of Economism (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). A major part in the struggle against the Economists was also played by the newspaper *Iskra*. p. 13

[3] *Narodniks*—followers of a petty-bourgeois trend, Narodism, in the Russian revolutionary movement, which arose in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century. The Narodniks stood for the abolition of the autocracy and the transfer of the landed estates to the peasantry. At the same time, they believed capitalism in Russia to be a temporary phenomenon with no prospect of development and they therefore considered the peasantry, not the proletariat, to be the main revolutionary force in Russia. They regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. With the object of rousing the peasantry to struggle against the autocracy, the Narodniks "went among the people", to the villages, but found no support there.

In the eighties and nineties the Narodniks adopted a policy of conciliation to tsarism, expressed the interests of the kulak class and waged a bitter fight against Marxism. p. 13

[4] Reference is to the article "Who Will Perform the Political Revolution?" in the symposium *Proletarian Struggle* No. 1, published by the Urals Social-Democratic Group in 1899. The article was republished as a pamphlet by the Kiev Committee. The author, A. A. Sanin, an Economist, was opposed to an independent working-class political party and political revolution, believing that Russia's socialist transformation, which he considered an immediate task, could be accomplished through a general strike. p. 13

[5] Reference is to the *Conference of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad*, held in Berne between February 14 and 19 (February 27-March 4), 1915. Convened on Lenin's initiative, it assumed the character of a

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general Party conference, since neither a Party congress nor an all-Russia conference could be convened during the war.

The Conference was attended by representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the R.S.D.L.P. Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Social-Democrat Women's Organisation and delegates from R.S.D.L.P. groups in Paris, Zurich, Berne, Lausanne, Geneva, London and Baugy. All members of the Berne group and several members of the Lausanne and Baugy groups attended as guests. Lenin was delegated by the Central Committee and Central Organ and directed the work of the Conference.

The main item on the agenda, the war and the tasks of the Party, was introduced by Lenin, who amplified the propositions set out in the Central Committee Manifesto, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy". The resolutions tabled by the Montpellier, and especially the Baugy, groups and adopted by the Conference revealed that some Party members had failed to grasp the implications of Lenin's proposition on civil war. They objected to the slogan of the defeat of one's "own" government and advanced their own slogan of peace, and failed to appreciate the need and importance of combating Centrism. All these questions were thrashed out in the debate, and Lenin's theses were unanimously approved. Only Bukharin persistently supported the erroneous views of the Baugy resolution and objected to the slogans Lenin had formulated for the Party and the international Social-Democratic movement. Bukharin opposed the right of nations to self-determination and the minimum-programme demands in general, contending that they were "contrary" to socialist revolution. However, no one supported Bukharin at the conference. p. 13

[6] Reference is to Bukharin's theses "On the Self-Determination Slogan", written in November 1915 and submitted to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* over the signatures of Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh. p. 13

[7] This refers to the ''Programm-Entwurf der R.S.V. und der S.D.A.P. Hollands" ("Draft Programme of the Revolutionary-Socialist League and the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Holland") compiled by Henriette Roland-Holst and published on February 29, 1916 in No. 3 of the *Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee* over the signatures of Henriette Roland-Holst, J. Visscher, D. Wijnkoop and J. Ceton.

The International Socialist Committee—the executive body of the Zimmerwald group elected at the first International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald, September 5-8, 1915, and composed of Robert Grimm, Oddino Morgari, Charles Naine and A. Balabanova. Its headquarters were in Berne. Shortly after the Zimmerwald Conference, on Grimm's suggestion, a larger International Socialist Committee was formed, composed of representatives of all the parties subscribing to the Zimmerwald decisions. The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee was represented on it by Lenin, Inessa Armand and Zinoviev. It published the *Internationale Sozialistische*

Kommission zu Bern. Bulletin (*Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee in Berne*) in German, French and English language editions. Six issues appeared between September 1915 and January 1917. p. 13

8 *Vorbote* (The Herald)—theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left, published in German in Berne. Two issues appeared, in January and April 1916. The official publishers were Roland-Holst and Pannekoek.

Lenin had an active share in founding the magazine and, after the appearance of its first issue, in organising a French edition to reach a wider readership. A keen discussion was conducted on its pages by Left Zimmerwaldists on the right of nations to self-determination and the "disarmament" slogan. p. 14

9 *Sotsial-Demokrat*—illegal Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. published from February 1908 to January 1917. After unsuccessful attempts to issue the first number of the paper in Russia, publication was arranged abroad. Nos. 2-32 (February 1909-December 1913) were put out in Paris and Nos. 33-58 (November 1914-January 1917) in Geneva. Altogether, 58 issues appeared, five of which had supplements. From December 1911, *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin and carried more than 80 of his articles and shorter items.

Lenin directed all the affairs of the paper, decided on the contents of the current issue, edited the various contributions and looked after the production side.

During the First World War, *Sotsial-Demokrat* played an outstanding part in combating international opportunism, nationalism and chauvinism, in popularising the Bolshevik slogans and in awakening the working class and the working people generally for struggle against the imperialist war and its instigators, against the tsarist autocracy and capitalism. *Sotsial-Demokrat* also played a major part in uniting the internationalist forces in the Social-Democratic movement. p. 14

10 *The Zimmerwald Left* was formed on Lenin's initiative at the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald in September 1915. The group consisted of eight of the Conference delegates, representing the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, Left Social-Democrats in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Germany, the Polish Social-Democratic opposition and the Latvian Social-Democrats. Led by Lenin, it combated the Centrist conference majority. Its draft resolutions and draft Manifesto condemning the war, exposing the treachery of the social-chauvinists and emphasising the need for active struggle against the war were rejected by the Centrist majority. However, the Zimmerwald Left did succeed in including in the adopted Manifesto a number of important points from its draft resolution. Regarding the Manifesto as a first step in the struggle against the imperialist war, the Zimmerwald Left voted for it, but in a special statement pointed out its inadequacy and inconsistency. At the same time, the group stated that while it would remain part

of the Zimmerwald movement, it would continue to disseminate its views and conduct independent work internationally. It elected a Bureau, which included Lenin, Zinoviev and Radek, and published its own organ, *Vorbote* (see Note No. 8).

The Bolsheviks, the only ones to take a correct and consistently internationalist position, were the leading force in the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin combated Radek's opportunist vacillations and criticised the mistakes of other members of the group.

The Zimmerwald Left became the rallying point for internationalist elements in the world Social-Democratic movement (see also Note No. 36). p. 14

[11] This meeting, held in Berne, February 5-9, 1916, was attended by 22 representatives of internationalist socialists in Germany, Russia, Italy, Norway, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Rumania and several more countries. The composition of the meeting was indicative of the changed alignment of forces in favour of the Left, though most of the delegates, as at the original Zimmerwald Conference, were Centrists.

The meeting adopted an appeal to all affiliated parties and groups (Rundschreiben an alle angeschlossen Parteien und Gruppen), in which were included, as a result of pressure from the Bolsheviks and other Left forces, amendments in line with the Zimmerwald Left policy. The appeal condemned socialist participation in bourgeois governments, denounced the slogan of "fatherland defence" in an imperialist war and approval of war credits. It stressed the need to support the labour movement and prepare for mass revolutionary actions against the imperialist war. However, the appeal was inconsistent, since it did not call for a break with social-chauvinism and opportunism. Not all of Lenin's amendments were adopted. The Zimmerwald Lefts declared that though they did not consider the appeal satisfactory in all its points, they would vote for it as a step forward compared with the decisions of the first Zimmerwald Conference. p. 14

[12] *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought)—a newspaper published by a group of Economists in Russia from October 1897 to December 1902. A critique of the paper as representative of the Russian variety of international opportunism will be found in Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* p. 16

[13] *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—a monthly theoretical, legal Bolshevik magazine, published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. Its circulation reached 5,000 copies. While in Paris, and later in Cracow and Poronin, Lenin directed the magazine, edited articles published in it and regularly corresponded with the members of the editorial board. Among his own articles published in *Prosveshcheniye* are the following: "Fundamental Problems of the Election Campaign", "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "Critical Remarks on the National Question", "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "Disruption

of Unity Concealed by Shouts for Unity" and "The Methods of Struggle of the Bourgeois Intellectuals Against the Workers". p. 16

[14] Lenin is here referring to the programme of the French Workers' Party adopted in 1880, and to the programmes of the German Social-Democratic Party adopted in Gotha in 1875 and in Erfurt in 1891. p. 16

[15] Reference is to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338). p. 19

[16] Reference is to the *Declaration of the Polish Social-Democrats at the 1915 Zimmerwald Conference*. The Declaration protested against the oppressive policy of the tsarist and German and Austrian governments which "deprive the Polish people of the opportunity to shape their own destiny, regard the Polish lands as a pawn in future bargaining over compensation...." "And this," the Declaration said, "brings out with especial crudity the very essence of the policy of the capitalist governments which, in sending the masses to the slaughter, are at the same time arbitrarily shaping the destinies of nations for generations to come." The Polish Social-Democrats, the Declaration said, are convinced that only participation in the impending struggle of the international revolutionary proletariat for socialism—"in the struggle that will tear the fetters of national oppression and destroy alien domination in whatever form or shape—will assure the Polish people, too, the opportunity for all-round development as an equal member of the alliance of the nations". p. 21

[17] This article was written in reply to one by Y. L. Pyatakov (P. Kievsky), "The Proletariat and the "Right of Nations to Self-Determination, in the Era of Finance Capital" (August 1916). The manuscript bears Lenin's marginal note: "Kievsky's article on self-determination and Lenin's reply." Both articles were meant for No. 3 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. Somewhat later, Lenin wrote another article in reply to Kievsky, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (see pp. 28-76 of this volume). Due to financial difficulties, No. 3 was not published and the articles did not appear in print. Lenin's article, however, was widely known in manuscript to Bolsheviks living abroad and to a number of Left Social-Democrats. p. 22

[18] Lenin is alluding to the article "Miliz oder Abrüstung?" ("Militia or Disarmament?") by Henriette Roland-Holst, a Left-wing Dutch Social-Democrat, in the Swiss Social-Democratic journal *Neues Leben* (New Life) No. 10-11 (October-November) and No. 12 (December) 1915.

In referring to the Swiss young Social-Democrats, Lenin had in view chiefly the magazine *Jugend-Internationale* (The Youth International), organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organ-

isations, published in Switzerland; it spoke for the Left forces in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. Issue No. 3 of the magazine carried an editorial "Volksheer oder Entwaffnung?" ("A People's Army or Disarmament?").

The attitude of the Scandinavian (Swedish and Norwegian) Left Social-Democrats on this issue was set out in articles by Karl Kilbom, "Swedish Social-Democracy and the World War", and Arvid Hansen, "Certain Aspects of the Present-Day Norwegian Labour Movement", both of which appeared in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2.

Lenin discusses the "disarmament" slogan in "The Military Programmme of the Proletarian Revolution" and "The 'Disarmament' Slogan" (see pp. 77-78, 94-104 of this volume). p. 23

[19] See Note No. 17. p. 28

[20] *Iskrists*—supporters of Lenin's newspaper *Iskra*, the most consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats.

Iskra—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper founded in December 1900, published abroad and secretly sent into Russia. It was taken over by the Mensheviks in 1903, and beginning with No. 52 ceased to be the organ of revolutionary Marxism. It came to be known as the new *Iskra* as distinct from the old, Bolshevik *Iskra*. p. 28

[21] The Bulygin Duma derived its name from Minister of the Interior A. C. Bulygin, who drafted the act for its convocation and the regulations governing the elections. The Duma was intended to be an advisory body under the tsar. The Bolsheviks called for an active boycott of the Duma and concentrated their propaganda on the following slogans: armed uprising, revolutionary army, provisional revolutionary government. They used the boycott campaign to mobilise all the revolutionary forces carry out mass political strikes and prepare an armed uprising. The nation-wide general political strike of October 1905 and the mounting wave of revolution prevented the elections and the Duma was never convened. Lenin discusses the Bulygin Duma in his articles: "The Constitutional Market-Place", "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and Insurrection", "Oneness of the Tsar and the People, and of the People and the Tsar", "In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie, or in the Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry?" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 352-56; Vol. 9, pp. 179-87, 191-99, 212-29). p. 28

[22] Reference is to the *otzovists* and *ultimatumists*.

Otzovists—an opportunist group composed of A. A. Bogdanov, G. A. Alexinsky, A. V. Sokolov (S. Volsky), A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Lyadov and others, which emerged among a section of the Bolsheviks in 1908. Under cover of revolutionary phrases they demanded the recall (the Russian word *otozvat* means recall) of the

Social-Democratic members of the Third Duma. They also refused to work in legal organisations—the trade unions, co-operatives and other mass organisations—contending that in conditions of rampant reaction the Party must confine itself exclusively to illegal activity. The otzovists did immense damage to the Party. Their policy would have isolated the Party from the masses and, in the end, would have turned it into a sectarian organisation.

Ultimatumism—a variety of otzovism, from which it differed only in form. The ultimatumists proposed that the Social-Democratic Duma members be presented with an ultimatum—either they fully submit to the decisions of the Party Central Committee or be recalled from the Duma. The ultimatumists failed to appreciate the need for painstaking work to help the Social-Democratic deputies overcome their mistakes and adopt a consistent revolutionary line. Ultimatumism was, in fact, disguised otzovism. Lenin called the ultimatumists "bashful otzovists". p. 28

[23] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—theoretical organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923; edited by Karl Kautsky up to October 1917 and after that by H. Cunow. *Die Neue Zeit* was the first to publish several works of Marx and Engels. Engels helped the magazine by his advice and not infrequently criticised it for deviating from Marxism. After Engels's death in 1895, *Die Neue Zeit* threw its pages open to articles by Eduard Bernstein and other revisionists. It published Bernstein's "Problems of Socialism", which became the starting-point of a revisionist campaign against Marxism. In the First World War *Die Neue Zeit* took a Centrist position and gave factual support to the social-chauvinists. p. 35

[24] *The Internationale Group*—a revolutionary organisation of Left German Social-Democrats, founded in the early days of the First World War by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Léon Jogiches (Tyszka) and Wilhelm Pieck. In April 1915, Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring started the *Internationale* magazine, which served to unite the core of the Left forces in Germany. A national conference of these forces was held in Berlin on January 1, 1916, and of officially inaugurated the *Internationale* group. It also adopted its platform of "Basic Principles" ("Leitsätze"), drawn up by Rosa Luxemburg in co-operation with Liebknecht, Mehring and Clara Zetkin. In 1915 the group issued a number of political leaflets and in 1916 began illegal publication of its Political Letters signed Spartacus (they appeared regularly up to October 1918), and the group came to be known by that name.

It conducted mass revolutionary propaganda, organised mass anti-war demonstrations, directed strike struggles and exposed the imperialist nature of the world war and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. However, the Spartacus group made serious mistakes on questions of theory and policy: they negated the possibility of national liberation wars in the imperialist

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era, were inconsistent on the question of turning the imperialist war into a civil war, underestimated the vanguard role of the proletarian party, and did not work for a decisive break with the opportunists.

In April 1917 the group joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany as an organisationally autonomous unit, but broke with the Independents following the November 1918 Revolution in Germany and organised the Spartacus League. It published its programme on December 14, 1918 and at its inaugural Congress (December 30, 1918-January 1, 1919) founded the Communist Party of Germany. Lenin repeatedly criticised the errors and inconsistency of the German Left Social-Democrats, but had a high regard for their revolutionary activity. p. 37

[25] *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* was founded by Lenin and published by the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Two issues appeared, in October and December 1916 (see also Note 17). p. 37

[26] The quotation is from Engels's *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 321). p. 46

[27] This is from Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 63-64. p. 55

[28] *Fracy* ("Revolutionary Faction")—the Right wing of the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.), a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892 and led by Pilsudski. While advocating independence for Poland, the P.S.P. conducted separatist nationalist propaganda among the Polish workers, endeavouring to discourage them from joint struggle with the Russian workers against the autocracy and capitalism.

In 1906 the party split into the Left P.S.P. and Right P.S.P. or Fracy. The latter continued the P.S.P. nationalist and chauvinist policy before, during and after the First World War. p. 57

[29] Reference is to Engels's letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882. Lenin cites it in his article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 352-53). p. 59

[30] *Junius* was the pen-name of Rosa Luxemburg. p. 62

[31] *Golos* (The Voice)—a Menshevik daily paper published in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915, with Trotsky playing a leading part in its editorship. The first five issues appeared under the title *Nash Golos* (Our Voice). Followed a Centrist policy and in the early days of the First World War published L. Martov's articles against the social-chauvinists. Subsequently Martov shifted to the right and the paper's policy changed in favour of the social-chauvinists. In January 1915 it was replaced by *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word).

The Organising Committee—the leading Menshevik centre inauguarated at the August 1912 Conference of liquidators. In the First World War the Organising Committee followed a social-chauvinist policy, justified tsarist Russia's part in the war and carried on jingoist propaganda. Published a magazine *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn) and, after its closure, *Nashe Dyelo* (Our Cause), later renamed *Dyelo*, and the newspaper *Rabocheye Utro* (Workers' Morning), later renamed *Utro*. The O.C. functioned up to the elections of the Menshevik Central Committee in August 1917. Besides the O.C. which operated inside Russia, there was a Secretariat Abroad composed of five secretaries—P. B. Axelrod, I. S. Astrov-Poves, Y. O. Martov, A. S. Martynov and S. Y. Semkovsky. It followed a pro-Centrist line and used internationalist phraseology to cover up its support of the Russian social-chauvinists. The Secretariat Abroad published a newspaper, *Izvestia* (News), which appeared from February 1915 to March 1917.

Semkovsky's article "Russia Disintegrating?", to which Lenin evidently refers, appeared in *Nashe Slovo* No. 45, March 21. 1915. p. 73

[32] The "Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" (in a letter Lenin refers to it as an article "On Disarmament") was written in German and meant for publication in the Swiss, Swedish and Norwegian Left Social-Democratic press. However, it was not published at the time. Lenin somewhat re-edited it for publication in Russian. The article "The 'Disarmament' Slogan" appeared in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2, December 1916 (see pp. 94-104 of this volume).

The original, German text appeared in *Jugend-International*, organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations, Nos. 9 and 10, September and October 1917 under the heading "Das Militärprogramm der proletarischen Revolution". The article was printed with this editorial foreword: "In our day, when Lenin is one of the most spoken-of leaders of the Russian revolution, the following article by this veteran revolutionary stalwart, in which he sets out a large part of his political programme, is of especial interest. We received it shortly before his departure from Zurich in April 1917." The heading was apparently given by the editors of *Jugend-International*. p. 77

[33] See Note No. 18. p. 77

[34] Reference is to Robert Grimm's *theses on the war question*, published in the *Grütlianer* Nos. 162 and 164, July 14 and 17, 1916. With the growing danger of Switzerland being drawn into the war, a discussion on the war issue arose in the Social-Democratic Party. In April 1916, the Executive instructed Grimm, Müller, Naine, Pflüger and several other prominent party leaders to state their views in the press and their articles were published in the *Berner Tagwacht*, *Volksrecht* and *Grütlianer*. p. 77

[35] *Neues Leben* (New Life)—a monthly journal of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party published in Berne from January 1915 to December 1917. Spoke for the Zimmerwald Right and early in 1917 took up a social-chauvinist position. p. 77

[36] Reference is to the international socialist conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal.

The first, Zimmerwald Conference, met on September 5-8, 1915 and was attended by 38 delegates from 11 European countries—Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Sweden, Norway, Holland and Switzerland. Lenin led the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee delegation.

The Conference discussed: (1) reports from the various countries; (2) a joint declaration by the German and French representatives; (3) the Zimmerwald Left proposal for a policy resolution; (4) the Zimmerwald Manifesto; (5) elections to the International Socialist Committee; (6) a message of sympathy with war victims.

It adopted the Manifesto "To the European Proletariat" in which, at the insistence of Lenin and the Left Social-Democrats, several basic propositions of revolutionary Marxism were included. The Conference also adopted a joint declaration by the German and French delegations, a message of sympathy with war victims and fighters persecuted for their political activities, and elected the International Socialist Committee (I.S.C.).

The Zimmerwald Left group was formed at this Conference.

Lenin's appraisal of the Conference and the Bolshevik tactics will be found in his articles "The First Step" and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915".

The second International Conference was held between April 24 and 30, 1916 in *Kienthal*, a village near Berne, and was attended by 43 delegates from 10 countries—Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Poland, Norway, Austria, Serbia, Portugal. In addition there was a fraternal delegate from Britain and a representative of the Youth International Secretariat. Representatives of the British Independent Labour Party, the U.S. socialists, and delegates from Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece and Sweden were denied passports and could not therefore attend. Some Left groups were represented by delegates of other parties: the Latvian Social-Democrats transferred their mandate to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee: Henriette Roland-Holst, delegated by the Dutch Lefts, gave her mandate to the Polish and Lithuanian Social-Democratic representative. The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee was represented by Lenin and two other delegates.

The Conference discussed: (1) the struggle to end the war, (2) attitude of the proletariat on the peace issue, (3) agitation and propaganda, (4) parliamentary activity, (5) mass struggle, (6) convocation of the International Socialist Bureau.

Led by Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left was much stronger, both in influence and representation, than at the earlier, Zimmerwald Conference. At Kienthal it united 12 delegates and some of its

proposals obtained as much as 20 votes, or nearly half of the total. This was indicative of how the relation of forces in the world labour movement had changed in favour of internationalism.

The Conference adopted a Manifesto to the "Peoples Suffering Ruination and Death" and a resolution criticising pacifism and the International Socialist Bureau. Lenin regarded the Conference decisions as a further step in uniting the internationalist forces against the imperialist war.

The Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences helped to unite the Left elements in the West-European Social-Democratic movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. p. 83

[37] *The Social-Democratic Labour Group* (Arbeitsgemeinschaft)—an organisation of German Centrists founded in March 1916 by Reichstag members who had broken with the Social-Democratic Reichstag group. Its leaders were Hugo Haase, Georg Ledebour and Wilhelm Dittmann. It published *Lose Blätter* (Leaflets) and up to April 1916 dominated the editorial board of *Vorwärts*. Expelled from the editorial board, the group started its own publication, *Mitteilungsblätter* (Information Leaflets), in Berlin. It had the support of the majority of the Berlin organisation and became the backbone of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, founded in April 1917. The new party sought to justify avowed social-chauvinists and advocated preservation of unity with them. p. 83

[38] *The war industries committees* were established in Russia in May 1915 by the imperialist bourgeoisie to help the tsarist government in the prosecution of the war. The Central War Industry Committee was headed by one of Russia's biggest capitalists, Guchkov, leader of the Octobrists, and included manufacturer Konovalov, banker and sugar king Tereshchenko and other big capitalists. In an attempt to bring the workers under their influence, foster chauvinist sentiments, and create the impression that a "civil peace" had been achieved, the bourgeoisie decided to organise "workers' groups" in these committees. The Bolshevik boycott of the committees was supported by the workers. At a worker delegates' meeting in Petrograd on September 27 (October 10), 1915, the Bolshevik resolution calling for a boycott and for a revolutionary withdrawal from the war obtained 95 votes to the Mensheviks' 81. Only at the second meeting, held without the pro-Bolshevik delegates, were the Mensheviks able to elect a "workers' group" of ten, led by K. A. Gvozdyov.

As a result of Bolshevik propaganda, elections to the "workers' groups" were held in only 70 areas out of a total of 239, and workers' representatives were actually elected only in 36 areas. p. 84

[39] *The Basle Manifesto* on the war issue was adopted at the emergency International Socialist Congress held in Basle, Switzerland, on November 24-25, 1912, to discuss the struggle against the imminent danger of a world imperialist war, heightened by the first Balkan War. The Congress was attended by 555 delegates. The R.S.D.L.P.

Central (Committee had six delegates. A huge anti-war demonstration and international anti-war rally were held on the opening day.

The Manifesto was unanimously endorsed on November 25. It warned the peoples against the mounting danger of world war. It said that "the great nations of Europe are always on the point of being driven at each other, without the slightest reason of real national interests for such attempts on reason and humanity.... It would be madness if the governments did not comprehend that the mere notion of a world war will call forth indignation and passion among the workers. The latter consider it a crime to shoot each other in the interest and for the profit of capitalism, for the sake of dynastic honour and of diplomatic secret treaties."

The Manifesto disclosed the predatory aims of the war the imperialists were preparing and urged workers everywhere resolutely to combat the war danger, "to pit against the might of capitalist imperialism the international solidarity of the working class" and in the event of imperialist war breaking out, to take advantage of the economic and political crisis to hasten the socialist revolution.

Kautsky, Vandervelde and the other Second International leaders voted for the Manifesto, but as soon as the world war broke out, they went back on it, as on other anti-war decisions of international socialist congresses, and sided with their imperialist governments. p. 84

[40] *La Sentinelle*—organ of the Social-Democratic organisation of Neuchâtel Canton, French Switzerland, published at La Chaux-de-Fonds from 1890 to 1906 and resumed in 1910. Followed an internationalist policy in the First World War and in its November 13, 1914 issue (No. 265) carried an abridged version of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Manifesto. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy".

Volksrecht (People's Right)—daily Social-Democratic newspaper founded in Zurich in 1898 and edited during the First World War by Ernst Nobs. Published articles of Left Zimmerwaldists, and Lenin's "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence", "Tasks of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Russian Revolution", "Tricks of the Republican Chauvinists" and others. At present *Volksrecht*'s policy on principal home and international issues is practically identical with that of the bourgeois press.

Berner Tagwacht—Social-Democratic newspaper founded in 1893 in Berne. Published articles by Liebknecht, Mehring and other Left socialists in the early days of the First World War. In 1917 came out in open support of the social-chauvinists. p. 87

[41] The *Aarau Congress* of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party met on November 20-21, 1915: The central issue was the party's attitude towards the Zimmerwald internationalist group, and the struggle developed between three following trends (1) anti-Zimmerwaldists (H. Greulich, P Pflüger and others), (2) supporters of the Zimmerwald Right (R. Grimm, P. Graber and others), and (3) supporters of the Zimmerwald Left (F. Platten, E. Nobs and others). Grimm

tabled a resolution urging the party to affiliate with Zimmerwald and endorse the political programme of the Zimmerwald Right. The Left forces, in an amendment moved by the Lausanne branch, called for mass revolutionary struggle against the war, declaring that only a victorious proletarian revolution could put an end to imperialist war. Under Grimm's pressure, the amendment was withdrawn, but it was again proposed by M. M . Kharitonov, a Bolshevik delegated by one of the party's branches. Out of tactical considerations Grimm and his supporters were obliged to approve the amendment and it was carried by 258 votes to 141. p. 87

[42] *Bund* (*General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia*) was composed mainly of semi-proletarian elements, Jewish artisans in Russia's Western areas. Was a vehicle of nationalism and separatism in the labour movement.

Bulletin of the Bund Committee Abroad, successor to the *Information Letter of the Bund Organisation Abroad*, published in Geneva. Two issues appeared, in September and December 1916. Followed a social-chauvinist policy. The "Letter from Russia" here quoted by Lenin appeared in No. 1 of the *Bulletin* and is analysed in more detail in Lenin's article "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role" (see pp. 171-74 of this volume). p. 88

[43] *Potresov, A. N.* (1869-1934)—prominent Menshevik leader and theoretician of liquidationism. Played a leading part in the magazines *Vozrozhdeniye* (Regeneration), *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn) and other publications of the Menshevik liquidators. Took a social-chauvinist stand in the First World War. p. 88

[44] The *Italian Socialist Party* was founded in 1892 and from the very start became the scene of a sharp struggle on all basic political and tactical issues between the opportunist and revolutionary forces. At its Congress in Reggio-Emilia (1912), the more outspoken reformists, who supported the war and co-operation with the government and the bourgeoisie, were expelled under pressure from the Left. Prior to Italy's entry into the First World War, the party opposed war and advocated neutrality. In December 1914 it expelled a group of renegades (among them Mussolini) for supporting the imperialist policy of the bourgeoisie and urging Italy's entry into the war. When Italy did enter, in May 1915, the party split into three distinct factions: (1) the Right wing, which helped the bourgeoisie prosecute the war, (2) the Centrists, who made up the majority of the party and pursued a policy of "no participation in the war and no sabotage of the war" and (3) the Left wing which took a more resolute stand, but failed to organise a consistent struggle against the war. The Lefts did not realise the need to turn the imperialist war into a civil war, or to break with the reformists, who were cooperating with the bourgeoisie.

The Italian socialists held a joint conference with the Swiss socialists in Lugano (1914), took an active part in the international socialist conferences at Zimmerwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916).

The party leaders, Lazzari and Serrati, exposed the imperialist and predatory plans of the bourgeoisie and actively facilitated the restoration of international Social-Democratic contacts.

Lenin's message of greetings was addressed to the party Congress held in Zurich on October 15-16, 1916, and was read at its opening session on October 15. A brief report of the Congress appeared in *Avanti!* No. 290, October 18, 1916.

Towards the end of 1916, the reformists gained the upper hand and the party shifted to social-pacifism. p. 90

[45] *International Socialists of Germany* (*Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands*, *I.S.D.*)—a group of Left-wing German Social-Democrats who during the First World War united around the magazine *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays), published in Berlin from 1913 to 1921. The I.S.D. openly opposed war and opportunism, were the most consistent advocates of a break with the social-chauvinists and Centrists. Their leader, Julian Borhardt, signed the draft resolutions and manifesto of the Zimmerwald Left, to which the group affiliated shortly after the Zimmerwald Conference, an announcement to that effect appeared in its *Internationale Flügblätter* (International Leaflets) No. 1, 1915. The I.S.D. had no substantial mass support and soon fell apart. p. 91

[46] From the very outbreak of the war, the Bolshevik Duma members A. Y. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov and N. R. Shagov, came out in energetic support of working-class interests. In compliance with Party policy, they refused to vote for war credits, exposed the imperialist and anti-popular nature of the war, brought the true facts to the knowledge of the workers and roused them to struggle against tsarism, the bourgeoisie and the landlords. They were tried for their revolutionary activities and exiled to Siberia. Lenin discusses the trial in his article "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 171-77). p. 93

[47] The *Conference of Entente Socialists* was sponsored by the French social-chauvinists Albert Thomas, Pierre Renaudel and Marcel Sembat. On Lenin's advice, the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee issued a statement exposing the treasonous aims of the conference and urging all internationalists to steer clear of it. The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee asked the Executive Socialist Committee in Berne to call together conference delegates from Zimmerwald organisations in order to work out a joint policy. The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee statement was published in December 1916, in No. 2 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. The conference was postponed and was finally held in London on August 28, 1917. p. 93

[48] Reference is to the *Conference of Entente Socialists* held in London on February 14, 1915 and attended by representatives of social-chauvinist and pacifist groups in England, France, Belgium and Russia.

The Bolsheviks were not invited, but on Lenin's instructions Litvinov attended the Conference and read a statement of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, based on a draft drawn up by Lenin. It demanded that socialists resign from bourgeois governments, renounce alliance and co-operation with the imperialists, wage an energetic struggle against imperialist governments and refuse to vote war credits. The statement was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the R.S.D.L.P. Central Organ, March 29, 1915, No. 40. Lenin discusses the Conference in his articles "The London Conference" and "On the London Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 132-34, 178-80). p. 93

[49] This refers to Karl Kilbom's article "Swedish Social-Democracy and the World War" and Arvid Hansen's "Certain Features of the Contemporary Labour Movement in Norway", both of which appeared in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2, December 1916. p. 94

[50] *The Socialist Review*—a monthly magazine published in London by the reformist Independent Labour Party of England from 1908 to 1934. During the First World War its contributors included Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden, Algernon Lee and others. p. 104

[51] K. Marx, Preface to the second edition of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 244). p. 107

[52] *Kommunist*—a magazine founded by Lenin and published in Geneva in 1915 jointly by *Sotsial-Demokrat* and Y. L. Pyatakov and Y. B. Bosh, who financed it. N. I. Bukharin was one of the editors. Only one double issue appeared, in September 1915. It contained three of Lenin's articles: "The Collapse of the Second International," "The Honest Voice of a French Socialist", and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy". (See also Note No. 1.) p. 107

[53] *Bulletin of the R.S.D.L.P. Organising Committee, Secretariat Abroad*—a Menshevik Centrist organ, published in Geneva from February 1915 to March 1917. Altogether ten issues appeared. p. 110

[54] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 132. p. 112

[55] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 422-23. p. 112

[56] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 491. p. 113

[57] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 406-19. p. 113

[58] *Chkheidze faction*—the Menshevik group in the Fourth Duma led by N. S. Chkheidze. Officially followed a Centrist policy in the First World War, but factually supported the Russian social-chauvinists. In 1916 the group was composed of M. I. Skobelev, I. N. Tulyakov, V. I. Khaustov, N. S. Chkheidze and A. I. Chkhenkeli. Lenin criticises their opportunist policy in several articles, including "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role", "Have the Organising Committee and the Chkheidze Group a Policy of Their Own?" p. 118

[59] *Nashe Dyelo* (Our Cause)—a Menshevik monthly, chief mouthpiece of the liquidators and Russian social-chauvinists. Published in Petrograd in 1915 in place of *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn) which was closed in October 1914. Contributors included Y. Mayevsky, P. P. Maslov, A. N. Potresov, and N. Cherevanin. Six issues appeared altogether.

Golos Truda (Voice of Labour)—a legal Menshevik paper published in Samara in 1916 after the closure of *Nash Golos* (Our Voice). Three issues appeared. p. 118

[60] The *Swiss Social-Democratic Party Congress* in Zurich, November 4-5, 1916, discussed the work of the Social-Democratic group in the National Council, the financial reform, attitude on the Kienthal resolutions and the Grütli-Verein, revision of the party constitution.

Lenin attended all the sessions, and addressed the opening session on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. His speech, delivered in German, was followed with close attention. There was a sharp struggle between the diverse trends in the party on practically every agenda item.

A positive feature of the Congress, in Lenin's view, was the vigorous fight the Left waged against the Right and Centre. The resolution on the Social-Democratic group in the National Council urged it to set an example of struggle for working-class interests and insisted that it be guided in all its activities by party decisions. The resolution on the financial reform, tabled by Grimm and Huber, approved direct taxation and allowed for indirect taxes on tobacco, alcoholic beverages, stamp duty, etc. Two resolutions were submitted on the attitude towards Kienthal, one by the party Executive and the other by the Left wing; the question was referred to an emergency congress. On the Grütli-Verein—an affiliated organisation enjoying special status, which took an extreme chauvinist stand in the war—the Congress declared membership in it to be incompatible with membership in the party. Revision of the party constitution was referred to an emergency congress.

The Zurich Congress, Lenin wrote, "definitely proved that the decision to join Zimmerwald and accept *revolutionary mass struggle* (resolution of the 1915 Aarau Congress) remains on paper, and that within the party there has been definitely formed a 'Centre'....

This 'Centre', of which R. Grimm has become the head, combines 'Left' declarations with 'Right', i.e., opportunist, tactics" (see p. 137 of this volume). p. 121

[61] *The Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts* was formed in Paris in January 1916 by French internationalists. This was the first attempt to set up in France a revolutionary socialist organisation as a counterweight to the official social-chauvinist organisations. The Committee conducted propaganda against the imperialist war, published a number of pamphlets and leaflets, exposing the predatory aims of the imperialists and the social-chauvinists' betrayal of the working class. It did not, however, appreciate the need for a decisive break with the opportunists, and had no clear-cut and consistent programme of revolutionary struggle. Nevertheless Lenin regarded the Committee as a factor in rallying the internationalist forces in France and in extending the Left Zimmerwaldist influence. Inessa Armand participated in the Committee on Lenin's instructions.

Under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia and the growth of the French labour movement, the Committee became the centre of the revolutionary internationalist forces in France, and in 1920 merged with the Communist Party. p. 122

[62] The allusion is to the assassination of Austrian Prime Minister Stürgkh by Friedrich Adler, the Austrian Social-Democratic leader. p. 123

[63] Lenin is here referring to the *Berner Tagwacht*, which published the following articles on the Russo-German negotiations for a separate peace: "Die Vorbereitung des Separatfriedens" ("Preparation of a Separate Peace") in its issue of October 11, 1916, No. 230; an editorial, "Die Friedensgerüchte" ("Peace Rumors"), in No. 241 of October 13, and a shorter item, "Zum Separatfrieden" ("On a Separate Peace"), in No. 242 of October 14. p. 125

[64] Reference is to the *International Socialist Bureau* (I.S.B.)—the permanent executive and information body of the Second International, founded by decision of the Paris International Congress (1900) and headquartered in Brussels. Each national affiliate had two members on the Bureau, which was to meet four times a year, with the Executive of the Belgian Labour Party acting for it in the intervals. Emile Vandervelde was Chairman of the Bureau and Camille Huysmans Secretary. Lenin was elected R.S.D.L.P. representative in 1905 and re-elected in 1912 at the Sixth All-Russia Party Conference in Prague. M. M. Litvinov was appointed R.S.D.L.P. representative in June 1914 at Lenin's suggestion.

With the outbreak of the First World War the I.S.B. become a pliant tool of the social-chauvinists. Its headquarters were moved to The Hague and its activities were directed by Huysmans. p. 134

[65] *Volksstimme* (People's Voice)—organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Chemnitz from January 1891 to February 1933. Followed a social-chauvinist line in the First World War. p. 134

[66] During the First World War Lenin lived in Switzerland from where he directed the activities of the Bolshevik Party . He was also a member of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party and shared in the activities of its Left wing, attending its meetings and helping it with his advice. Dr. F. Brupbacher, a Zurich Social-Democrat who frequently met Lenin in that period, wrote:

"Lenin was in close touch with the Zurich labour organisations, attending their meetings every time an important issue was discussed . For instance, he was present when a report on Youth Day was made to a meeting of woodworkers, at meetings of the Zurich Labour Union when the war question was debated, a youth meeting in Hottingen at which Platten spoke on refusal to do military service and on revolutionary propaganda in the army, a meeting of the Unterstrasse branch which I addressed on the war issue.... Lenin displayed the patience of Job in his relations with the Swiss comrades (Maurice Pianzola, "Lenin in Switzerland").

The theses "The Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party" were written in Russian and German and translated into French. They were circulated to Bolshevik groups in Switzerland, to Swiss Left Social-Democrats and were discussed at their meetings. p. 137

[67] See Note No. 37. p. 137

[68] The slogan was advanced by Karl Liebknecht in his letter of October 2, 1914 to the German Social-Democratic Party Executive. Lenin quotes this letter in his rough draft of "Theses for an Appeal to the International Socialist Committee and All Socialist Parties" (see pp. 205-16 of this volume).

This is the background to Liebknecht's letter: In August 1914, Liebknecht asked the party Executive to arrange a number of anti-war rallies and issue a manifesto in the name of the Reichstag group urging all party members to oppose the war. The proposal was rejected. In September 1914, Liebknecht toured Belgium and Holland, informing internationalist socialists of the situation in the German party, for which he was disciplined by the Executive. The letter was a reply to this disciplinary action. p. 137

[69] *Egli*, *Karl Heinrich*—Swiss colonel. Spied for Germany and her allies during the First World War, when he was deputy chief of the Swiss General Staff. Tried early in 1916 at the insistence of the Social-Democratic press and parliamentary group, he was acquitted, due to pressure from the bourgeoisie and the military clique, but was obliged to leave the army.

De Lohs (*Loys*, *Treytorrens*)—Swiss colonel. In August 1916 published several articles urging Swiss participation in the war.

Was exposed by the Social-Democratic press, which demanded his dismissal from the service, but the military command confined itself to a reprimand. p. 138

[70] The *Olten resolution* on the war question was adopted by the emergency congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party at Olten, February 10-11, 1906. p. 144

[71] *Grütli-Verein*—a bourgeois reformist organisation founded in Switzerland in 1838, long before the organisation of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. The name derives from the sixteenth-century Union of Grütlians (conspirators), who rose against Austrian rule. In 1901 the Grütli-Verein affiliated with the Social-Democratic Party but remained organisationally independent. Its newspaper, *Grütlianer*, followed a bourgeois-nationalist policy. In the First World War the Grütli-Verein took up an extreme chauvinist position and became the mainstay of the Right-wing social-chauvinists. This led the Zurich Congress of the Social-Democratic Party (November 1916) to declare that membership in the Grütli-Verein was incompatible with membership in the party. p. 146

[72] These theses and several other items in this volume ("Principles Involved in the War Issue"; "An Open Letter to Charles Naine"; "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence"; "Imaginary or Real Marsh?"; "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue"; "The Story of One Short Period in the Life of One Socialist Party") were written in connection with the discussion of the war issue in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party.

In August 1916 the party Executive decided to call an emergency congress for February 11-12, 1917 to discuss the war issue. The Zurich Congress (November 4-5, 1916) endorsed that decision and appointed a commission to draw up draft resolutions for the emergency congress.

The commission framed two drafts: the majority draft, based on Grimm's Centrist theses, published in July 1916, and the minority social-chauvinist draft which called on Social-Democrats to "defend the fatherland" in the event of Switzerland entering the war.

Lenin, who was closely associated with the Swiss Left, was well informed of the commission's activities. His "Theses on the Attitude of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Towards the War" were written to help the Swiss Left. Lenin drew up several variants and drafts, devoting special attention to practical proposals, before working out the final text. p. 149

[73] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 549-50. p. 154

[74] *Schweizerische Metallarbeiter-Zeitung* (Swiss Metalworkers' Gazette)—a weekly paper founded in Berne in 1902; adopted a social-chauvinist position during the First World War. p. 155

[75] *Socialist-Revolutionaries*—members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 as a result of the merger of various Narodnik groups and circles. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were oblivious to the class differences between the proletariat and petty proprietors, glossed over the class differentiation and contradictions within the peasantry and negated the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The views of the Socialist-Revolutionaries were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism. The Bolshevik Party exposed their attempts to masquerade as socialists, carried out a determined struggle against them for influence over the peasantry and showed the danger to the working-class movement of their tactics of individual terrorism.

The fact that the peasantry, to which the Socialist-Revolutionaries appealed, was not a homogeneous class determined their political and ideological instability and organisational disunity and their constant waverings between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As early as the first Russian revolution (1905-07) the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party broke away and formed the legal Trudovik Popular Socialist Party whose outlook was close to that of the Cadets, and the Left wing formed the semi-anarchist League of Maximalists. The majority of Socialist-Revolutionaries adopted a social-chauvinist position during the First World War.

O.C.-ists—See Note No 31. p. 164

[76] *Nota-Bene*—pen-name used by Bukharin. p. 165

[77] Towards the end of 1916 and early in 1917 Lenin devoted much of his time to intensive research on the problem of the state, studying the works of Marx and Engels and other sources. His copious notes, comments and conclusions were recorded in a notebook, the famous Blue Notebook, under the general heading "Marxism and the State". In a letter to Alexandra Kollontai dated February 4 (17), 1917 he wrote: "I'm working on an article (have already prepared nearly all the material) on the Marxist position on the state." The article was meant for No. 4 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, and Lenin had apparently drawn up the plan for it. However, the article was not written at the time. The materials collected for it were made the basis of Lenin's celebrated *The State and Revolution*, written in the summer of 1917. p. 166

[78] See Note No 31. p. 167

[79] *Liquidators*—exponents of an opportunist trend that spread among the Menshevik Social-Democrats after the defeat of the 190-07 Revolution.

The liquidators demanded the dissolution of the illegal revolutionary working-class party. They urged the workers to abandon the revolutionary struggle against tsarism and intended to establish a broad opportunist party, which would renounce revolutionary slo-

gans and engage only in the legal activity permitted by the tsarist government. Lenin and other Bolsheviks ceaselessly exposed this betrayal of the revolution by the liquidators. The policy of the liquidators was not supported by the workers. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) expelled them from the Party. p. 167

[80] Reference is to the draft platform which the Menshevik Organising Committee Secretariat Abroad issued in Zurich in 1915 and circulated to organisations affiliated to the August bloc. It was in the form of a letter headed "The Proletariat and the War" and signed by L. Martov and four other Organising Committee secretaries. p. 170

[81] The "*initiating groups*" were formed by the Menshevik liquidators from the end of 1910 onwards as a counterweight to the illegal Party organisations. They were meant to be the nuclei of a new, broad legal party, functioning within the framework of the June 3, Stolypin regime. The liquidators succeeded in forming "initiating groups" in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav and Konstantinovka (Donets coalfield) in the shape of small groups of intellectuals dissociated from the working class. In the First World War they followed a social-chauvinist policy. p. 172

[82] *Orthodox*—the pen-name of Lyubov Axelrod, a Menshevik. p. 172

[83] *Dyelo* (The Cause)—a fortnightly Menshevik magazine published in Moscow from August 1916 to January 1917 under the editorship of A. N. Potresov, P. P. Maslov and Lyubov Axelrod (Orthodox). Ten issues, including three double issues, appeared in 1916 and one issue in 1917. The magazine followed a chauvinist policy. p. 173

[84] *Diskussionny Listok* (Discussion Bulletin)—a supplement to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published in Paris from March 6 (19), 1910 to April 29 (May 12), 1911. Three issues appeared. The editorial board was composed of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, ultimatumists, Bundists, Plekhanovites and of the Polish and Latvian Social-Democratic organisations. p. 173

[85] *Golos* (Voice)—a Menshevik social-chauvinist newspaper published in Samara in 1916, continuer of the Menshevik papers *Nash Golos* (Our Voice) and *Golos Truda* (Voice of Labour). Altogether four issues appeared. p. 174

[86] Reference is to the Menshevik pamphlet *Kriegs und Friedensprobleme der Arbeiterklasse* (War and Peace Issues Facing the Working Class), a reprint of the draft resolutions and Manifesto of the second Zimmerwald Conference on the tasks of the proletariat in the struggle for peace, submitted to the Conference by P. Axelrod, S. Lapinsky and L. Martov. p. 174

[87] Lenin intended this article for the newspaper *Novy Mir* (New World) published in New York by Russian socialist émigrés. The article did not appear in *Novy Mir* and Lenin re-edited the first two sections, which were published in the last issue (No. 58) of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, January 31, 1917, under the heading "A Turn in World Politics" (see pp. 262-70 of this volume). p. 175

[88] *The Manifesto of February 19, 1861* abolished serfdom in Russia. p. 186

[89] The French *Confédération générale du Travail* (General Confederation of Labour) was founded in 1895 and was strongly influenced by anarcho-syndicalists and reformists. Its leaders recognised only economic struggle, opposed proletarian party leadership of the trade union movement, sided with the imperialist bourgeoisie in the First World War and advocated class collaboration and "defence of the fatherland".

The congress mentioned by Lenin met in Paris on December 24-26, 1916 and discussed: (1) report of the Executive for the period from August 1914, and (2) industrial issues. At the concluding session the Executive informed the congress of President Wilson's peace appeal to the belligerent nations, and the congress adopted, by a nearly unanimous vote, the resolution cited by Lenin. p. 186

[90] The *French Socialist Party* was founded in 1905 by the merger of the Socialist Party of France led by Guesde and the French Socialist Party led by Jaurès. Dominated by reformists, the party adopted a chauvinist position from the very start of the imperialist war. Its leaders openly supported the war and justified participation in the bourgeois government. The Centrist wing, led by Longuet, took a social-pacifist line and a conciliatory attitude towards the social-chauvinists. The Left, revolutionary wing adhered to internationalist positions and drew its support mainly from the party rank and file.

The party congress mentioned by Lenin met on December 25-30, 1916, the chief agenda item being the question of peace. A number of resolutions were adopted, including one opposing propaganda of the Zimmerwald principles, and another moved by Renaudel, approving socialist participation in the war-time government. p. 186

[91] *La Bataille* (The Battle)—organ of the French anarcho-syndicalists, published in Paris from 1915 to 1920 in place of the banned *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. Leading contributors included Grave, Jouhaux, and Cornelissen. Adopted a social-chauvinist position in the First World War. p. 189

[92] This article was written in reply to an open letter by Boris Souvarine, the French Centrist, "A nos amis qui sont en Suisse" ("To Our Friends in Switzerland"), published in *Le Populaire du Centre*, December 10, 1916.

Lenin sent the article to Souvarine who in January 1918 turned it over to the socialist *La Vérité* for publication, together with his preface. The article was to have appeared on January 24, in No 45 of the paper, but was banned by the censor. *La Vérité* came out with a blank space, over which was the heading "Un document inédit. Une lettre de Lénine" ("Unpublished document. A Letter from Lenin") with the signature "Lénine". Three days later, on January 27, *La Vérité* published the article, with many cuts and with its own subheadings, in No. 48. The full text was published in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* (Proletarian Revolution) No. 7, 1929 from the *La Vérité* galleys. p. 195

[93] *l'Humanité*—daily French socialist newspaper founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès. During the First World War was controlled by the socialist Right wing and followed a chauvinist policy.

In 1918 Marcel Cachin, an outstanding leader of the French and international workers' movement, became its political editor. In 1918-20 *l'Humanité* campaigned against the French Government's imperialist policy of armed intervention in Soviet Russia. In December 1920, following the split in the Socialist Party and the founding of the Communist Party, *l'Humanité* became the Communist Central Organ. p. 197

[94] *Appeal to Reason*—a newspaper published by the American socialists, founded in Girard, Kansas, in 1895. Had no official connections with the U.S. Socialist Party but propagated socialist ideas and enjoyed wide popularity among the workers. Took up an internationalist position in the First World War.

Lenin's reference is to Eugene Debs' article "When I Shall Fight", in the issue of September 11, 1915 (No. 1032). p. 200

[95] In January 1912 the Mensheviks were expelled from the Party by decision of the Sixth (Prague) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

The Sixth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. met from January 5 to January 17 (18-30), 1912 in Prague and actually assumed the character of a Party congress.

Lenin was the leading figure at the Conference. He delivered the reports on the current situation and the tasks of the Party, the work of the International Socialist Bureau, and took part in the discussions. He also drafted the resolutions on all major agenda items.

The Conference resolutions on "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators and on "The Party Organisation Abroad" were of tremendous theoretical and practical significance. The Conference declared that by their conduct the liquidators had definitely placed themselves outside the Party and expelled them from the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference condemned the activities of the anti-Party groups abroad—the Menshevik *Golos* group, the *Vperyod* and Trotsky groups, and recognised the absolute necessity for a single Party organisation abroad, conducting its work under the supervision and guidance of the C.C., and pointed out that Party groups abroad "which refuse to submit to the Russian centre of Social-Democratic

activity, i.e., to the Central Committee, and which cause disorganisation by communicating with Russia independently and ignoring the Central Committee, have no right to use the name of the R.S.D.L.P.". The Conference adopted a resolution on "The Character and Organisational Forms of Party Work", approved Lenin's draft Organisational Rules, made the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* the Party Central Organ, elected a Party Central Committee and set up the Bureau of the C.C. in Russia.

The Prague Conference played an outstanding part in building the Bolshevik Party, a party of a new type, and in strengthening its unity. It summed up a whole historical period of struggle against the Mensheviks, consolidated the victory of the Bolsheviks and expelled the Menshevik liquidators from the Party. Local Party organisations rallied still closer round the Party on the basis of the Conference decisions. The Conference strengthened the Party as an all-Russian organisation and defined its political line and tactics in the conditions of the new revolutionary upsurge. The Prague Conference was of great international significance. It showed the revolutionary elements of the parties of the Second International how to conduct a decisive struggle against opportunism by carrying the fight to a complete organisational break with the opportunists. p. 203

[96] *De Tribune*—organ of the Left wing of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Holland. Founded in 1907 by A. Pannekoek H. Gorter, D. Wijnkoop and Henriette Roland-Holst. In 1909, following the expulsion of the Left wing, became the official organ of the new, Social-Democratic Party, and in 1918 of the Dutch Communist Party. It appeared under this name until 1940. p. 204

[97] This "rough draft" was written early in January 1917. The manuscript bears this note by Lenin: (for the I.S.C. and publication in the press)".

On January 7, 1917, Robert Grimm, the Kautskyite Chairman of the International Socialist Committee, induced the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Executive to postpone indefinitely the emergency party congress on the war issue, despite objections from the Left. On the same day the Centrist opposition in the German Social-Democratic Party held a conference in Berlin and adopted a pacifist manifesto framed by Kautsky, "Ein Friedensmanifest der deutschen Parteiopposition" ("Peace Manifesto of the German Party Opposition"), later published in a number of German newspapers and in the Swiss Socialist *Volksrecht* of January 11. Since this signified an open alliance of the Right Zimmerwaldists with the social-chauvinists, Lenin altered his draft but decided to postpone its publication. The manuscript bears his note: "Written before January 7, 1917 and therefore partly obsolete." Later, using the draft as a basis, Lenin wrote his appeal "To the Workers Who Support the Struggle Against the War and Against the Socialists Who Have Sided with Their Governments" (see pp. 229-35 of this volume). p. 205

[98] This letter was written in Zurich and sent to V. A. Karpinsky in Geneva. It was meant for discussion in R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad. p. 217

[99] *Brilliant*—G. Y. Sokolnikov (1888-1939), joined the Party in 1905. During the war contributed to Trotsky's paper *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word). p. 217

[100] *Grütlianer*—organ of the Swiss bourgeois-reformist Grütli-Verein; founded in Zurich in 1851. Became a social-chauvinist mouthpiece during the war. Lenin described it as the organ of "the consistent and avowed servants of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement". p. 218

[101] The allusion is to the conference of 115 representatives of Swiss labour organisations held in Zurich on August 6, 1916 to discuss the situation created by rising living costs. The main report was made by Grimm. The resolution and a brief account of the conference were published in *Volksrecht*, August 8, 1916 (No. 183), under the heading "Die schweizerische Arbeiterschaft und die Teuerung" ("The Swiss Workers and Rising Living Costs"). The conference appeal to the National Council was published in *Volksrecht* of August 10 (No. 185) under the heading "Massnahmen gegen die Teuerung" ("Measures Against Rising Living Costs"). p. 225

[102] The allusion, apparently, is to the editorial "Parteibeschlüsse" ("Party Decisions") in the *Berner Tagwacht* of January 8, 1917 (No. 6). p. 233

[103] The *Lecture on the 1905 Revolution* was delivered in German on January 9 (22), 1917 a the meeting of young workers in the Zurich People's House. Lenin began working on the lecture in the closing days of 1916. He referred to the lecture in a letter to Y. A. Karpinsky dated December 7 (20), asking for literature on the subject. p. 236

[104] "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence" was written in reply to a series of articles by Greulich, a Swiss social-chauvinist, "Zur Landesverteidigung" ("Defence of the Fatherland Issue"), which appeared in *Volksrecht*, January 23-26, 1917 (Nos. 19-22).

Lenin's theses, signed "—e—", appeared in the same paper on January 31-February 1 (Nos. 26-27). *Volksrecht* editor Ernst Nobs deleted several paragraphs and inserted the word Genosse (Comrade) before the name Greulich. Nobs deleted the following passages: (1) in Section 9, from the third paragraph beginning with the words "But, frankly, what kind of unity...", and up to the end of the Section; (2) in Section 11, the whole of the second paragraph from the words "Very well! But that is..." and to the words "...not socialism"; (3) in Section 12, the concluding words of the fifth paragraph "...and politely invite the social-patriots to move over to the Grütli-Verein". p. 254

[105] *Le Populaire*—a French Centrist newspaper published in Limoges from 1916 and in Paris from July 1917. Edited in 1916 by Jean Longuet; contributors included Pierre Brizon, Adrien Pressemane, Jean-Pierre Raffin-Dugens, Boris Souvarine and Paul Faure. Became the official organ of the French Socialist Party in 1921; at present is controlled by the party's Right wing. p. 262

[106] Reference is to A. I. Guchkov's letter of August 15 (28), 1916 to General M. V. Alexeyev, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander of the Russian Forces, published in No. 57 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and excerpts from a Reichstag speech by Interior Minister Helfferich in reply to an opposition question about the wholesale arrests of Social-Democrats.

The Guchkov letter was sent to *Sotsial-Demokrat* from Russia along with other materials. In a letter to Inessa Armand dated December 5 (18), 1916, Lenin wrote: "Received another letter from St. Petersburg today. Of late they have been writing frequently.

"In addition to the Guchkov letter, which is being published in No. 57 of the Central Organ ... we have also received letters by Lvov and Chelnokov on the same subject (resentment against the traitors who are negotiating a separate peace), etc."

The Guchkov letter was expressive of the fear inspired in the Russian bourgeoisie by the maturing revolution and of its dissatisfaction with the government for its inability to prevent revolution. The substance of Helfferich's speech was that, it was better to arrest the leaders of the revolution than to allow the revolution to break out. p. 263

[107] This refers to the appeal *To Affiliated Parties and Groups* adopted at an enlarged meeting of the International Socialist Committee in February 1916. It sharply criticised the social-chauvinists and the social-chauvinist position of the International Socialist Bureau, denouncing its attempts to re-establish the Second International through "mutual amnesty" of socialists as a "plot against socialism". Socialists, the appeal said should refuse to vote war credits, should organise strikes, demonstrations, fraternisation at the front and other revolutionary actions against the imperialist war. The appeal was published in the *International Socialist Committee Bulletin* of February 29 (No. 3) and in *Sotsial-Demokrat* of March 25, 1916 (No. 52). p. 266

[108] On November 9 (22), 1906, the tsarist government issued a decree authorising the withdrawal of peasants from the commune and making their plots their personal property.

Amended by the Duma and Council of State, the decree came into force on June 14, 1910. Known as the Stolypin law, after Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin, it enabled the peasant to withdraw from the commune, take over his land as personal property and sell it if he so chose. The commune was under obligation to allot him land in one place. The Stolypin reform accelerated the development of

capitalism in agriculture and differentiation of the peasantry, and aggravated the class struggle in the rural areas. p. 266

[109] Reference is to a speech by F. Turati in the Italian Parliament on December 17, 1916, in which he sought to justify the imperialist war. The speech appeared on the next day in *Avanti!* (No. 345), and comment in the socialist press of various countries was summarised in *Volksrecht* (December 23, No. 301) under the heading "Eine Rede Turatis über das Friedensangebot" ("Turati Speech on Peace Proposals").

Lenin quotes and criticises the speech in his article "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism" (see pp. 175-94 of this volume). p. 268

[110] *Statistics and Sociology* was meant for publication, legally, as a separate pamphlet under the pen-name P. Piryuchov. The article was never finished. p. 271

[111] This article was written in reply to one by Robert Grimm, "Mehrheit und Minderheit in der Militärfrage" ("Majority and Minority on the War Issue"), in the *Berner Tagwacht* of January 23-27, 1917 (Nos. 19-23) and the magazine *Neues Leben* (New Life) No. 1 for 1917. p. 278

[112] *Die Glocke* (The Bell)—a fortnightly magazine published in Munich and later in Berlin in 1915-25 by Parvus (Alexander Gelfand), a social-chauvinist member of the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 278

[113] These amendments were proposed by the Swiss Lefts at the Zurich cantonal party congress in Töss, February 11-12, 1917.

The congress had before it two draft resolutions: (1) a social-chauvinist draft submitted by minority members of the commission on the war issue, and (2) a Centrist draft from the commission majority. The latter was adopted with the amendments formulated by Lenin by 93 votes to 65. The Lefts voted for the resolution in order to prevent adoption of the social-chauvinist draft. The typewritten copy of the amendments has this note by Lenin on the results of the voting:

"For the Right-wing Klöti and Co. resolution	— 65	— 82	
		32 + 32 for this	
" " Grimm Centrist resolution	— 93	+ resolution	
		61 out of 158	
	Total 158"		

The amendments were published in No. 1 of the leaflet "Gegen die Lüge der Vaterlandsverteidigung" ("Against the Fatherland Defence Lie") issued by the Swiss Left in February 1917 in close cooperation with Lenin.

Lenin discusses the struggle within the Swiss Social-Democratic Party in his article "The Story of One Short Period in the Life of One Socialist Party" (see pp. 283-86 of this volume). p. 282

[114] Reference is to the majority and minority draft resolutions published in *Volksrecht* of January 9, 1917 (No. 7) under the heading "Anträge der Militärkommission" ("Proposals of the Commission on the War Issue"). p. 283

[115] Lenin here refers to the referendum on the convocation of an emergency congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party to discuss its attitude towards the war. The referendum was initiated by the Left forces following the party Executive's decision to postpone the congress indefinitely.

On January 23, 1917, *Volksrecht* (No. 19) published in the "Party Life" column an appeal of the initiating group under the heading "Das Referendum gegen den Parteivorstandbeschluss ergriffen") ("Referendum Against Executive's Decision Begins"). p. 283

[116] *Neue Freie Zeitung*—a newspaper published in Olten by the Solothurn cantonal organisation of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party from 1905 to 1920. Took a Centrist stand in the First World War. p. 283

[117] *Basler Vorwärts*—organ of the Basle organisation of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, founded in 1898; followed a Centrist policy in the First World War. p. 283

[118] Reference is to H. Greulich's article "Zur Landesverteidigung" ("Defence of the Fatherland Issue") in *Volksrecht*, January 26, 1917 (No. 22). Lenin quotes §3 of the majority resolution at the beginning of this article. p. 284

[119] The editorial "Zum Referendum" ("On the Referendum") appeared in the "Party Life" section of *Volksrecht*, January 27, 1917 (No. 23). p. 284

[120] This refers to Fritz Platten's article "Die Militärfrage" ("The Military Question"), published as an editorial in *Volksrecht*, February 1, 1917 (No. 27), and continued in the paper's issues of February 2, 5 and 6 (Nos. 28, 30 and 31). p. 284

[121] Lenin here alludes to "Abänderungsanträge zu der Resolution der Militärkommission" ("Amendments to the Majority Resolution on the War Issue") published in *Volksrecht*, February 9, 1917 (No. 34). p. 285

[122] The first news of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia reached Lenin on March 2 (15), 1917. Reports of the victory of the revolution and the advent to power of an Octobrist-Cadet government of capitalists and landlords appeared in the *Zürcher Post* and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* by the evening of March 4 (17). Lenin had drawn up a rough draft of theses, not meant for publication, on the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution. The theses were immediately sent via Stockholm to Oslo for the Bolsheviks leaving for Russia. p. 287

[123] Lenin uses the appellation *Octobrist-Cadet* to describe the bourgeois Provisional Government formed at 3 p. m. on March 2 (15) 1917 by agreement between the Provisional Committee of the State Duma and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The government was made up of Prince G. Y. Lvov (Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior), the Cadet leader P. N. Milyukov (Minister of Foreign Affairs) the Octobrist leader A. I. Guchkov (Minister of War and Acting Minister of the Navy) and other representatives of the big bourgeoisie and landlords. It also included A. F. Kerensky, of the Trudovik group, who was appointed Minister of Justice.

The manifesto of March 4 (*17*) mentioned by Lenin later on was originally drawn up by Menshevik members of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee. It set out the terms on which the Executive was prepared to support the Provisional Government. In the course of negotiations with the Duma Committee, it was revised by P. N. Milyukov and became the basis of the Provisional Government's first appeal to the people. p. 287

[124] The telegram was sent to Stockholm, addressed to Lundström, a Swedish Social-Democrat, for communication to the Bolsheviks returning to Russia from Stockholm and Oslo. It reached Petrograd on March 13 (26) and was read out by Y. B. Bosh at a meeting of the C.C. Bureau in Russia and, on the same day, at a meeting of the Executive Commission of the Petrograd Party Committee. p. 292

[125] The letter was published in *Volksrecht* under the heading "Feststellung" ("Factual Note"), and began with the words: "Comrade Lenin writes...." p. 293

[126] The first four *Letters from Afar* were written between March 7 and 12 (20 and 25), the fifth, unfinished letter was written on the eve of Lenin's departure from Switzerland, on March 26 (April 8), 1917.

As soon as the first news reached him of the revolutionary events in Russia and the composition of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, Lenin began work on an article for *Pravda*—he regarded the press as an important vehicle of propaganda and organisation. "The press is now the main thing", he wrote to Alexandra Kollontai on March 3 (16). "I cannot deliver lectures or attend meetings, for I must write daily for *Pravda*," he wrote to V. A. Karpinsky on March 8 (21), in reply to the latter's invitation to deliver a lecture on the tasks of the Party in the revolution to Russian émigrés and Swiss socialists in Geneva.

The first and second "Letters from Afar" were sent to Alexandra Kollontai in Oslo on March 9 (22) for forwarding to Petrograd. On March 17 (30) Lenin asked J. S. Hanecki whether the first four letters had reached *Pravda* in Petrograd, adding that if they had not, he would send copies. The letters were brought to Petrograd by

Alexandra Kollontai, who handed them over to *Pravda* on March 19 (April 1).

The first letter appeared in Nos. 14 and 15 of *Pravda*, March 21 and 22 (April 3 and 4), with considerable abridgements and certain changes by the editorial board, which, beginning with mid-March, included L. B. Kamenev and J. V. Stalin. The full text of the letter was first published in 1949, in the fourth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*.

The second, third and fourth letters were not published in 1917. The basic ideas of the unfinished fifth letter were developed by Lenin in his "Letters on Tactics" and "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution".

Before leaving for Russia, Lenin took measures to circulate the first and second letters among Bolsheviks living in France and Switzerland. p. 295

[127] The *Pravda* editors deleted about one fifth of the first letter. The cuts concern chiefly Lenin's characterisation of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders as conciliators and flunkeys of the bourgeoisie, their attempts to hide from the people the fact that representatives of the British and French governments helped the Cadets and Octobrists secure the abdication of Nicholas II, and also Lenin's exposure of the monarchist and imperialist proclivities of the Provisional Government, which was determined to continue the predatory war. p. 297

[128] Lenin here refers to the *Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies*, which emerged in the very early days of the February Revolution. Elections to the Soviet began spontaneously at individual factories and within a few days spread to all the factories in the capital. On February 27 (March 12), before the Soviet had assembled for its first meeting, the Menshevik liquidators K. A. Gvozdyov and B. O. Bogdanov, and Duma members N . S. Chkheidze, M. I. Skobelev and others proclaimed themselves the Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet in an attempt to bring it under their complete control. At its first meeting in the evening of the same day, the Soviet formed a Presidium composed of Chkheidze, Kerensky and Skobelev who, together with A. G. Shlyapnikov, N. N. Sukhanov and Y. M. Steklov, made up the Executive Committee. Provision was made for inclusion of representatives of the central and Petrograd committees of the socialist parties. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were at first opposed to the organisation of the Soviet, but subsequently delegated their representatives, V. A. Alexandrovich, V. M. Zenzinov and others.

The Soviet proclaimed itself the organ of the workers and soldiers, and up to the first Congress of Soviets (June 1917) was factually an all-Russian centre. On March 1 (14) the Executive Committee was extended to include soldiers' deputies, among them F. F. Linde, A. I. Paderin and A. D. Sadovsky.

The Bureau of the Executive Committee was composed among others, of N. S. Chkheidze, Y. M. Steklov, B. O. Bogdanov,

P. I. Stučka, P. A. Krasikov, K. A. Gvozdyov. N. S. Chkheidze and A. F. Kerensky were delegated to represent the Soviet on the Duma Committee.

On February 28 (March 13), the Soviet issued its Manifesto to the Population of Petrograd and Russia. It called on the people to rally around the Soviet and take over the administration of local affairs. On March 3 (14), the Soviet appointed several commissions—on food, military affairs, public order and the press. The latter commission provided the first editorial board of *Izvestia*, composed of N. D. Sokolov, Y. M. Steklov, N. N. Sukhanov and K. S. Grinevich; V. A. Bazarov and B. V. Avilov were added somewhat later.

Meetings of the Executive Committee were attended, in a consultative capacity, by the Social-Democratic members of all the four State Dumas, five representatives of the Soldiers' Commission, two representatives of the Central Trade Union Bureau, representatives of the district Soviets, the *Izvestia* editorial board, and other organisations.

The Soviet appointed special delegates to organise district Soviets and began the formation of a militia (100 volunteers for every 1,000 workers).

Though leadership of the Soviet was in the hands of compromising elements, the pressure of the militant workers and soldiers compelled it to take a number of revolutionary measures—the arrest of tsarist officials, release of political prisoners, etc.

On March 1 (14), the Soviet issued its "Order No. 1 to the Petrograd Garrison". It played a very big part in revolutionising the army. Henceforth all military units were to be guided in their political actions solely by the Soviet, all weapons were to be placed at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion soldiers' committees, orders issued by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma were to be obeyed only if they did not conflict with the orders of the Soviet, etc.

But at the crucial moment, on the night following March 1 (14), the compromising leaders of the Soviet Executive voluntarily turned over power to the bourgeoisie: they endorsed the Provisional Government composed of representatives of the bourgeoisie and landlords. This was not known abroad, since papers standing to the left of the Cadets were not allowed out of the country. Lenin learned of the surrender of power only when he returned to Russia.

p. 299

[129] *Octobrists*—members of the Union of October Seventeen, a counter-revolutionary party formed after promulgation of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17 (30) 1905. It represented and upheld the interests of the big bourgeoisie and of the landlords who ran their estates on capitalist lines. Its leaders were A. I. Guchkov, a big Moscow manufacturer and real estate owner, and M. V. Rodzyanko, a rich landlord. The Octobrists gave their full support to the tsar's home and foreign policy and in the First World War joined the "Progressist bloc", a sham opposition group demanding responsible government, in other words, a government that would enjoy the

confidence of the bourgeoisie and landlords. The Octobrists became the ruling party after the February Revolution and did everything they could to ward off socialist revolution. Their leader, Guchkov, was War Minister in the First Provisional Government. Following the Great October Socialist Revolution, the party became one of the main forces in the battle against Soviet power.

The party of *Peaceful Renovation* was a constitutional-monarchist organisation of the big bourgeoisie and landlords. It took final shape in 1906 following the dissolution of the First Duma. It united the "Left" Octobrists and "Right" Cadets and its chief leaders were P. A. Heiden, N. N. Lvov, P. P. Ryabushinsky, M. A. Stakhovich, Y. N. and G. N. Trubetskoi, D. N. Shipov. Like the Octobrists, it sought to safeguard and promote the interests of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and of the landlords who ran their estates along capitalist lines. In the Third Duma the party joined with the so-called Party of Democratic Reforms to form the Progressist group. p. 303

[130] *Cadets*—the name derives from the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. Founded in October 1905, it was composed chiefly of capitalists, Zemstvo leaders, landlords and bourgeois intellectuals. Prominent in the leadership were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. The Cadets became the party of the imperialist bourgeoisie and in the First World War actively supported the tsarist government's predatory policies and in the February Revolution tried to save the monarchy. The dominant force in the Provisional Government, they followed a counter-revolutionary policy inimical to the people but advantageous to U.S., British and French imperialism. Implacable enemies of Soviet power, the Cadets had an active part in all the armed counter-revolutionary actions and foreign intervention campaigns. Most of their leaders emigrated after the defeat of the counter-revolutionary forces and continued their anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary work abroad. p. 303

[131] *Trudovik*—member of the Trudovik group in the State Dumas, formed in April 1906 by petty-bourgeois democrats—peasants and intellectuals of the Narodnik persuasion. The group wavered between the Cadets and the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and in the First World War most of its members adopted a social-chauvinist position.

The Trudoviks spoke for the rich peasants, the kulaks, and after the February Revolution actively supported the Provisional Government. One of their representatives, Zarudny, became Minister of Justice following the July events and directed the police campaign against the Bolsheviks. After the October Revolution the Trudoviks sided with the counter-revolutionary forces. p. 303

[132] The *first Provisional Government*, or the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, was formed on February 27 (March 12), 1917.

On that day the Duma Council of Doyens sent a telegram to the tsar drawing his attention to the critical situation in the capital and urging immediate measures "to save the fatherland and the dynasty". The tsar replied by sending the Duma President, M. V. Rodzyanko, a decree dissolving the Duma. By this time the insurgent people had surrounded the Duma building, the Taurida Palace, where Duma members were meeting in private conference, and blocked all the streets leading to it. Soldiers and armed workers were in occupation of the building. In this situation the Duma hastened to elect A Provisional Committee to "maintain order in Petrograd and for communication with various institutions and individuals".

The Provisional Committee was composed of V. V. Shulgin and V. N. Lvov, both of the extreme Right, Octobrists S. I. Shidlovsky, I. I. Dmitryukov, M. V. Rodzyanko (chairman), Progressists V. A. Rzhevsky and A. I. Konovalov, Cadets P. N . Milyukov and N. V. Nekrasov, the Trudovik A. F. Kerensky, and the Menshevik N. S. Chkheidze. p. 309

[133] The composition of the C.C. Bureau in Russia on March 9 (22), 1917 was as follows: A. I. Yelizarova, K. S. Yeremeyev, V. N. Zalezhsky, P. A. Zalutsky, M. I. Kalinin, V. M. Molotov, M. S. Olminsky, A. M. Smirnov, Y. D. Stasova, M. I. Ulyanova, M. I. Khakharev, K. M. Shvedchikov, A. C. Shlyapnikov and K. I. Shutko. On March 12 (25). G. I. Bokii and M. K. Muranov were added, also J. V. Stalin, with voice but no vote.

The *Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.* was formed at a meeting on March 2 (15), 1917, and was composed of all those who had served on the illegal committees and newly co-opted members. The composition was: B. V. Avilov, N. K. Antipov, B. A. Zhemchuzhin, V. N. Zalezhsky, M. I. Kalinin, N. P. Komarov, L. M. Mikhailov, V. M. Molotov, K. Orlov, N. 1. Podvoisky, P. I. Stučka, V. V. Schmidt, K. I. Shutko and A. G. Shlyapnikov, representing the Central Committee Bureau.

For the January (Prague) Conference, to which Lenin refers, see Note No. 95. p. 311

[134] This refers to the *Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to All Citizens of Russia*, issued by the Central Committee and published as a supplement to *Izvestia* of February 28 (March 13), 1917 (No. 1). Lenin learned of the Manifesto from an abridged version in the morning edition of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 9 (22), 1917. On the following day he wired *Pravda* in Petrograd via Oslo: "Have just read excerpts from the Central Committee Manifesto. Best wishes. Long live the proletarian militia, harbinger of peace and socialism!" p. 311

[135] See Note No. 75. p. 312

[136] Reference is to the agreement concluded on the night following March 1 (14), 1917 between the Duma Provisional Committee and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders of the Petro-

grad Soviet Executive Committee. The latter voluntarily surrendered power to the bourgeoisie and authorised the Duma Provisional Committee to form a Provisional Government of its own choice. p. 314

[137] *Le Temps*—a daily paper published in Paris from 1861 to 1942. Spoke for the ruling element and was the factual organ of the French Foreign Ministry. p. 315

[138] The Manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was published in *Izvestia* on March 3 (16), 1917 (No. 4), simultaneously with the announcement of the formation of a Provisional Government under Prince Lvov. Drawn up by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik members of the Executive Committee, it declared that the democratic forces would support the new government "to the extent that it carries out its undertakings and wages a determined struggle against the old regime".

The Manifesto did not mention the fact that the Soviet had authorised Kerensky to join the new government, inasmuch as on March 1 (14) the Executive Committee had decided "not to delegate democratic representatives to the government". *Le Temps* reported this in a despatch from its correspondent. On March 2 (15) the Soviet, "defying the protest of the minority", approved Kerensky's entry into the government as Minister of Justice. p. 315

[139] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*—a bourgeois newspaper, founded in Zurich in 1780 and until 1821 published under the name *Zürcher Zeitung*, now the most influential paper in Switzerland.

National-Zeitung—a capitalist newspaper published in Berlin from 1848 to 1938; beginning with 1914 appeared under the name *Acht-Uhr Abendsblatt. National-Zeitung*. p. 315

[140] The foreign press reported the appointment by the Petrograd Soviet of a special body to keep check on the Provisional Government. On the basis of this report, Lenin at first welcomed the organisation of this control body, pointing out, however, that only experience would show whether it would live up to expectations. Actually, this so-called Contact Committee, appointed by the Executive on March 8 (21) to "influence" and "control" the work of the Provisional Government, only helped the latter exploit the prestige of the Soviet as a cover for its counter-revolutionary policy. The Contact Committee consisted of M. I. Skobelev, Y. M. Steklov, N. N. Sukhanov, V. N. Filippovsky, N S. Chkheidze and, later V. M. Chernov and I. G. Tsereteli. It helped keep the masses from active revolutionary struggle for the transfer of power to the Soviets. The committee was dissolved in April 1917, when its functions were taken over by the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee Bureau. p. 316

[141] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—an influential German capitalist daily paper, published in Frankfurt-on-Main, from 1856 to 1943. Resumed

publication in 1949 under the name *Frarkfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; speaks for West German monopoly interests. p. 320

[142] *Vossische Zeitung*—a moderate liberal newspaper published in Berlin from 1704 to 1934. p. 320

[143] See Lenin's *The State and Revolution* (present edition, Vol. 25). p. 325

[144] Soon after its formation, the Provisional Government appointed the Octobrist M. A. Stakhovich Governor-General of Finland and the Cadet F. I. Rodichev Minister (or Commissioner) for Finnish Affairs. On March 8 (21), the Provisional Government issued its Manifesto "On Approval and Enforcement of the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland". Under this Finland was allowed autonomy with the proviso that laws promulgated by the Finnish Diet would be subject to confirmation by the Russian Government. Laws that ran counter to Finnish legislation were to remain in force for the duration of the war.

The Provisional Government wanted the Finnish Diet to amend the Constitution to give "Russian citizens equal rights with Finnish citizens in commerce and industry", for under the tsarist government such equality was imposed in defiance of Finnish laws. At the same time, the Provisional Government refused to discuss self-determination for Finland "pending convocation of the constituent assembly". This led to a sharp conflict, resolved only after the Great October Socialist Revolution when, on December 18 (31), 1917, the Soviet Government granted Finland full independence. p. 331

[145] *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* was written in the first half of 1916, and on June 19 (July 2) was sent to Petrograd via Paris. It was to have been published by the Parus publishing house which, on Maxim Gorky's initiative, was putting out a series of popular surveys of West-European countries involved in the war. Lenin maintained contact with the publishers through the editor of the series, M. N. Pokrovsky. On September 29, 1916, Gorky wrote Pokrovsky in Paris that Lenin's book was "really excellent" and would be put out in addition to the regular series. However, the Parus editors strongly objected to Lenin's criticism of Kautsky's renegade position and substantially altered the text, deleting all criticism of Kautsky's theory of ultra-imperialism and distorting a number of Lenin's formulations. The book was finally published in mid-1917 with a preface by Lenin, dated April 26.

Parus (Sail) and *Letopis* (Annals)—the names of the publishing house and magazine founded by Gorky in Petrograd.

Letopis—a magazine of literature, science and politics whose contributors included former Bolsheviks (the Machists V. A. Bazarov and A. A. Bogdanov) and Mensheviks. Gorky was literary editor, and among the other prominent writers contributing to *Letopis* were Alexander Blok, Valeri Bryusov, Fyodor Gladkov, Sergei Yesenin.

A. V. Lunacharsky, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Vyacheslav Shishkov and A. Chaplygin. *Letopis* appeared from December 1915 to December 1917. The Parus publishing house existed from 1915 through 1918. p. 334

146 The *agrarian programme of the "104"*—the land reform bill the Trudovik members submitted to the 13th meeting of the First State Duma on May 23 (June 5) 1906. Its purpose was to "establish a system under which all the land, with its deposits and waters, would belong to the entire people, and farmlands would be allowed only those tilling them by their own labour" (*Documents and Materials of the State Duma*, Moscow, 1957, p. 172). The Trudoviks advocated organisation of a "national land fund" that would include all state, crown, monastery and church lands, also part of privately owned lands, which were to be alienated if the size of the holding exceeded the labor norm fixed for the given area. Partial compensation was to be paid for such alienated land. Small holdings were to remain the property of the owner, but would eventually be brought into the national fund. Implementation of the reform was to be supervised by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage and by secret ballot. p. 341

147 This was written early in March 1917 and published in Berne over the signature: "Editorial Board, *Sotsial-Demokrat*", with the following note: "Comrades, continue to write to the Prisoners' Relief Committee at the following address: Schweiz, Bern, Falkenweg 9, Dr. Schklowsky . The comrades will try to keep on sending books, etc."

Contact with Russian war prisoners in German and Austrian camps began in 1915, when the Committee of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad set up in Berne the Social-Democratic Commission for Contact with War Prisoners. Nearly 250 letters a month were sent to and received from war prisoners in more than 20 camps. Communication was established with Social-Democrats in these camps, mostly Bolsheviks and Bolshevik sympathisers, and through them camp libraries were built up, diverse propaganda work conducted, May Day celebrations organised, etc.

Sotsial-Demokrat, the Bolshevik Central Organ, *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, *Kommunist*, Alexandra Kollontai's pamphlet *Who Needs This War?* (in two editions) a leaflet on the land question, Gorky's leaflet "The Black-Hundred Pogrom-Mongers and the Jews", various textbooks and other literature were supplied to the camps.

In February 1917, No. 1 of the magazine *In War Prison* was put out, financed by collections among war prisoners. Issue No. 2 was prepared for publication at the end of March 1917, on the eve of the Bolsheviks departure for Russia, but did not appear in print.

Lenin attached great importance to work among war prisoners who, on returning home, would be drawn into the revolutionary struggle. Regular personal contacts were out of the question, but two war prisoners who had escaped from German camps visited Lenin in Zurich towards the close of January 1917.

Through the war prisoners the Bolshevik ideas penetrated to the population. In 1917-18, Russian war prisoners look an active part in the revolutionary struggle of the German working class. p. 343

[148] *Pravda* (Truth)—daily legal Bolshevik newspaper, started publication in St. Petersburg on April 22 (May 5), 1912 in pursuance of a decision of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin directed *Pravda*, wrote for it nearly every day, advised its editors and saw to it that the paper was conducted in a militant, revolutionary spirit. Much of the Party's organisation work was centered in *Pravda*, which organised meetings with representatives of Party nuclei, collected information on Party activity in the factories, and transmitted to local organisations directives of the Central and St. Petersburg committees.

Pravda was subjected to constant police harassment and persecution and was closed shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, on July 8 (21), 1914.

Publication was resumed after the February Revolution, on March 5 (18), 1917, as the R.S.D.L.P. Central and St. Petersburg organ.

Lenin joined the editorial board on his return to Petrograd, and from that day *Pravda* began to popularise his plan for transition from bourgeois-democratic to socialist revolution.

In July-October 1917, *Pravda* was persecuted by the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and frequently had to change its name. It appeared as *Listok Pravdy* (Pravda Bulletin), *Proletary* (Proletarian), *Rabochy* (Worker), *Rabochy Put* (Worker's Path), resuming its original name after the victory of the October Revolution.

Pravda played a very special part in the history of the Bolshevik Party and the revolution. It was a major medium of mass propaganda and organisation in the struggle to achieve the Party's aims. It waged a determined fight for the Party principles against the Menshevik liquidators, otzovists and Trotskyites and exposed their treasonous role. It fought international opportunism and Centrism and educated the workers in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism. It played a cardinal role also in building up the Party, achieving close cohesion of its ranks and strengthening its contacts with the masses. The generation of front-rank workers trained by *Pravda* had a conspicuous part in the Great October Socialist Revolution and in the building of socialism.

Pravda holds a special place in the history of the Bolshevik press. The first legally published Russian mass working-class paper, it ushered in a new stage in the development of the Russian and world Proletarian press. The day of its foundation, May 5, has since 1914 been celebrated as Workers' Press Day. p. 347

[149] Lenin points to the lessons of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, when Prussia handed over French war prisoners to the counter-

revolutionary Versailles government to help suppress the Paris Commune. p. 348

[150] The lecture "*The Tasks of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Russian Revolution*" ("The Russian Revolution, Its Significance and Tasks") was delivered in German on March 14 (27), 1917 at a meeting of Swiss workers in the Zurich People's House. Lenin gave a summary to *Volksrecht*, and later, on March 31 (April 13), when he was passing through Stockholm en route to Russia, also to the editors of the Swedish Left Social-Democratic *Politiken*, in which it appeared, slightly abridged, on April 15 (No. 86) under the heading: "Lenin on the Russian Revolution. Direct Peace Negotiations Between Peoples, Not Governments". p. 355

[151] This is discussed in more detail in *The State and Revolution*, Chapter VI, §3, "Kautsky's Controversy with Pannekoek" (see present edition, Vol. 25). p. 359

[152] See Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, *The Civil War in France*, *Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association*, and Engels's Letter to L. Kugelmann, April 12, 1871; Marx and Engels, Preface to the German edition of the *Communist Manifesto* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 332-33, 516-17; Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 463-64; Vol. I, p. 22). p. 359

[153] This article appeared in *Volksrecht*, April 5 (No. 81) and in abridged form in *Avanti!*, April 10 (No: 99). Judging from J. S. Hanecki's letter of March 24 (April 6) to the Bureau in Russia of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the article was sent to Petrograd on March 22 (April 4). It did not appear in *Pravda*, presumably because the role played by the police agent Chernomazov had already been explained in the press. p. 362

[154] *Corriere della Sera*—an influential Italian capitalist newspaper, founded in Milan in 1876. p. 362

[155] Upon his return to Petrograd on March 12 (25), 1917, M. K. Muranov, a Bolshevik member of the Fourth State Duma, immediately wrote to the newspaper *Dyen* stating the facts about Chernomazov and his connection with *Pravda*. The letter was published on March 14 (27). Muranov wrote that Chernomazov had worked on *Pravda* from May 1913 to February 1914 and was dismissed on suspicion of being a police informer. The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau instructed Party organisations and members to discontinue all contact with him. Muranov wrote: "M Chernomazov had never been, nor could have been, the chief and sole director of *Pravda*, which was edited by a board composed of R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee members and R.S.D.L.P. Duma deputies." p. 364

[156] *Petit Parisien*—a daily mass-circulation yellow sheet published in Paris from 1876 to 1944. During the First World War its pages were devoted to jingoist propaganda of the very worst kind.

p. 364

[157] The decision was signed by Lenin, and also by G. Y. Zinoviev.

p. 365

[158] Lenin began to make arrangements for returning to Russia as soon as the news of the February Revolution was confirmed. "I'm beside myself at the thought that I cannot go to Scandinavia! I cannot forgive myself for not having risked going there in 1915," he wrote to Inessa Armand on March 2 (15), 1917. Both the Provisional Government and the Allies, England and France, took measures to prevent the internationalists returning to Russia. The Russian police drew up a black list of persons subject to arrest at the frontier Most of the names were those of Zimmerwald internationalists; opponents of the imperialist war. Only defencists were allowed to enter the country. Knowing that his return would encounter formidable obstacles, Lenin weighed the possibility of travelling on someone else's passport. He discussed this in letters to V. A. Karpinsky in Geneva and J. S. Hanecki in Stockholm.

At a private meeting of the Russian Party centres in Berne on March 6 (19), Martov suggested travelling via Germany in exchange for Germans interned in Russia. The plan was eagerly supported by Lenin, all the more so that, on March 11 (24), the Russian Legation in Berne had held up permits for the return of a number of émigrés.

Robert Grimm, a Social-Democratic member of the Swiss Federal Council, negotiated with the German Minister in Berne permission for Russian political émigrés to make the trip through Germany. In view of Grimm's ambiguous attitude, the Bolsheviks asked Fritz Platten, a Left Zimmerwaldist and Secretary of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, to take over the negotiations. The German Government agreed to the terms proposed by Platten and drawn up by Lenin: the group would be accorded ex-territorial rights on German soil, would not be subjected to customs inspection or political verification; the German authorities would deal only with Platten, who was to accompany the Russians throughout the journey.

The group left only on March 27 (April 9). The delay was caused by the Mensheviks demanding prior agreement by the Provisional Government or the Petrograd Soviet to exchange Russian émigrés for German internees. Yet, it was perfectly clear that the Provisional Government, taking its cue from the British Government, would do everything to impede the return of these determined revolutionary opponents of the imperialist war. The Bolsheviks therefore decided to leave immediately.

The terms and procedures agreed upon were only recorded in a protocol which was communicated to Left Zimmerwaldists in Germany—Paul Levi (Hartstein), France—Fernand Loriot and

Henri Guilbeaux, Poland—M. Bronski, and Switzerland—Fritz Platten.

In addition, a Statement for the press was drawn up in their name and signed in Stockholm by Swedish Left Social-Democrats Carl Lindhagen, Fredrik Ström, C. N. Carleson, Karl Kilbom and Ture Nerman, and by the Norwegian Left Social-Democrat Arvid Hansen. The statement read in part:

"We the undersigned are aware of the obstacles the Entente governments have created to the return of the Russian internationalists. We are aware of the terms on which the German Government has permitted their journey to Sweden.... The undersigned internationalists of France, Switzerland, Poland, Germany, Sweden and Norway believe that our Russian comrades not only have the right, but also the obligation to avail themselves of this opportunity to return to Russia. We wish them every success in their struggle against the imperialist policy of the Russian bourgeoisie—a struggle that is part of our common fight for the emancipation of the working class and for the socialist revolution." The statement appeared in the Swedish left Social-Democratic *Politiken* of April 15, 1917 (No. 86).

In view of French press reports that Foreign Minister Milyukov threatened to have the émigrés arrested on charges of high treason, Lenin and all the other members of the group, irrespective of pollitical affiliation, signed the following statement:

"I hereby certify,

"1. that I have been informed of the conditions laid down by Platten and the German Legation;

"2. that I submit to all the instructions of Platten as leader of the group;

"3. that I have been told of the report in *Petit Parisien* that the Russian Provisional Government has threatened to try all Russian citizens travelling through Germany on charges of high treason;

"4. that I assume full political responsibility for my participation in the journey;

"5. that Platten has guaranteed my trip only to Stockholm.

"April 9, 1917,

"Berne-Zurich."

(Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.)

Lenin was the first to sign the statement, during the train journey from Berne to Zurich. The possibility was thus precluded of anyone pleading ignorance of the consequences of his participation in the journey and laying the blame on its organisers. The text of the statement suggests that Lenin had a share in drafting it.

The group left on March 27 (April 9), on March 31 (April 13) they arrived in Stockholm, and on the same day Lenin left for Russia via Finland. p. 365

[159] This letter was written in mid-March 1917 before it became known, on March 19 (April 1), that Grimm had taken an ambiguous attitude

in the negotiations with the German representatives. The original text was written while Grimm was still negotiating, and the passages referring to this were deleted by Lenin after all the arrangements had been turned over to Platten.

The letter was discussed and approved on March 26 (April 8), at a meeting of Bolsheviks returning to Russia. After that Lenin added the opening lines: "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (united by the *Central Committee*)", "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" and the concluding paragraph.

Lenin was associated with a number of Swiss Social-Democratic leaders, whom he had contacted upon his arrival in Berne from Poronin in 1914.

It was through them that his famous theses "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War", adopted by the Berne Bolshevik Conference, August 24-26 (September 6-8, 1914, were transmitted to the Conference of Italian and Swiss Socialists in Lugano on September 27, 1914. Members of the Zurich Bolshevik group who belonged to Swiss trade unions recall that Lenin emphasised the need to work in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, and they joined its Zurich organisation.

Lenin had a prominent part in the inner-party struggle first in Berne and later in Zurich, against the Right wing led by social-patriot Greulich, and against the Centrists led by Grimm. He used all his influence on the side of the Left Zimmerwaldists (Platten, Nobs and others), helping them to overcome indecision in the fight against the Centrists. The numerous documents the Lefts issued against opportunism were drafted in close co-operation with Lenin. Written chiefly in German, some of them were published in the Swiss socialist press ("Speech at the Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, November 4, 1916"; "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence"); but most of them were circulated to party organisations opposed to social-patriotism, which had gained the upper hand in January 1917.

At the Zurich Cantonal Party Congress at Töss (February 11-12, 1917) the Left tabled Lenin's amendments to the Centrist resolution on the war issue (see p. 282 of this volume). Though the Centrist resolution was adopted a fifth of the Congress voted for Lenin's amendments. Immediately after the Congress Lenin helped the Swiss Zimmerwaldists put out No. 1 of their bulletin ("*Gegen die Lüge der Vaterlandsverteidigung*", published under the signature: "Gruppe der Zimmerwalder linken in der Schweiz". Lenin edited the bulletin and was instrumental in circulating it outside Switerland. It contained the full text of his amendments and also his remarks on the annexation issue.

The official party leaders viciously attacked Lenin as a "foreigner" and tried to prevent his influence on Social-Democratic workers.

However, in 1915 there were already elements among the Swiss socialists who favoured a break with the Second International and formation of the Third International. There was also the Swiss Zimmerwald Left group which included émigrés from Russia, Poland, France and Germany. p. 367

[160] Lenin here refers to the *Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland* (known as the Socialist Party in the French and Italian cantons) founded in the 1870s and affiliated to the First International and re-established in 1888. The party was strongly influenced by opportunists, who assumed a social-chauvinist position in the First World War. The Right wing broke away from the party in the autumn of 1916 and founded its own organisation. The party majority, led by Robert Grimm, followed a Centrist, social-pacifist policy; the Left, internationalist wing, which became much more influential after the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, withdrew from the party in December 1920, and in 1921 merged with the Swiss Communist Party (now the Swiss Party of Labour) formed in 1919. p. 367

[161] *Freie Jugend*—organ of the Swiss Social-Democratic youth organisation published in Zurich from 1906 to February 1918. Was affiliated to the Zimmerwald Left. p. 368

[162] Reference is to the amendments to the resolution on the war issue, written by Lenin (see p. 282 of this volume). p. 368

[163] *Arbeiterpolitik*—a weekly journal of scientific socialism published in Bremen from 1916 to 1919 by the Bremen Left Radical Group led by J. Kniff and P. Froelich. The group joined the Communist Party of Germany in 1919. *Arbeiterpolitik* fought social-chauvinism in the German and international labour movement. Its contributors included N. I. Bukharin, A. Guilbeaux, Alexandra Kollontai, Nadezhda Krupskaya, A. Pannekoek, K. Radek and Y. M. Steklov.

After the October Socialist Revolution *Arbeiterpolitik* widely publicised revolutionary progress in Soviet Russia. In 1917-18 it printed several of Lenin's articles and speeches ("The Crisis Has Matured", "Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government", "Speech at a Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, April 23, 1918"). In November 1918, during the revolution in Germany, it published chapters I and II of Lenin's article "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" and passages from *The State and Revolution* (§§ 1, 3, 4 of Chapter 1, §3 of Chapter III, and §1 of Chapter IV). p. 373

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*August 1916-March 1917*)

1916

End of August-beginning of September	Lenin returns to Zurich from Flums.
August-September	Lenin writes "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism" and "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)".
August-October	Lenin writes "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism".
September 17 (30)	Lenin attends a conference of the International Socialist Committee in Berne.
September	Lenin writes "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", published in *Jugend-Internationale* Nos. 9 and 10, 1917.
First half of October	Lenin writes a message of greetings from the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee to the Italian Socialist Party Congress in Zurich. The message is read at the Congress session of October 2 (15).
October	Lenin writes "The 'Disarmament' Slogan" and "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", both of which appear in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2, December 1916.
October 21 and 22 (November 3 and 4	Lenin attends meetings of Left delegates to the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Congress and shares in drafting the Congress resolution on the attitude towards Kienthal.
October 22 (November 4)	Lenin addresses the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Congress in Zurich on behalf of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee.
October 24 (November 6)	Lenin's articles "A Separate Peace" and "Ten 'Socialist' Ministers!" are published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 56.

October	Publication of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1, with Lenin's articles "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", "The Junius Pamphlet" and the theses "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination".
End of October-beginning of November	Lenin writes the theses "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party" and arranges for their circulation and translation into French. The French translation was published as a separate pamphlet in 1918.
November 7 (20)	Lenin discusses these theses with a group of Left Zimmerwaldists.
November 17 (30	Second discussion of the theses and of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party's attitude towards the war with a group of Left Zimmerwald supporters.
November 1916-February 1917	In Letters to Inessa Armand, Lenin substantiates and amplifies the principal Marxist propositions on the war and fatherland defence.
	Lenin trenchantly criticises the views and factional activity of the Pyatakov-Bosh-Bukharin group, exposes the political intrigue of Radek and Zinoviev's unprincipled, conciliatory attitude, discloses and criticises the errors and inconsistency of the Left Social-Democrats.
Beginning of December	Lenin works on his "Theses on the Attitude of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Towards the War".
December 19 (January 1, 1917)	Lenin writes "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism".
Second half of December	Lenin writes "An Open Letter to Boris Souvarine" published, in abridged form, in *La Vérité* No. 48, January 27, 1918.
Before December 25 (January 7, 1917)	Lenin draws up rough draft of "Theses for an Appeal to the International Socialist Committee and All Socialist Parties".
December 26-27 (January 8-9, 1917)	Lenin writes "An Open Letter to Charles Naine, Member of the International Socialist Committee in Berne".
End of December	Lenin writes his appeal "To the Workers Who Support the Struggle Against the War and Against the Socialists Who Have Sided with Their Governments".

December	Publication of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No 2, with Lenin's articles "The 'Disarmament' Slogan", "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", "The Youth International", "Efforts To Whitewash Opportunism" and "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role".
	Lenin writes "Principles Involved in the War Issue" and "On the Defence of the Fatherland Issue".
December 1916-February 1917	Lenin works in the Zurich Library on the Marxist attitude towards the state. His Notes from Marx and Engels, together with his own comments and conclusions, are gathered together under the title "Marxism on the State".

1917

January 1-2 (14-15)	Lenin presides at a meeting of Swiss Left Social-Democrats to discuss a statement against Grimm.
January 6 (19)	Lenin circulates to Bolshevik organisations abroad the resolution of the Swiss Left Social-Democrats initiating a referendum on convocation of the emergency party congress indefinitely postponed by the party Executive.
January 9 (22)	Lenin delivers a lecture on the 1905 Revolution at a youth gathering in Zurich.
January 13-17 (26-30)	Lenin writes his article "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence". It appeared in *Volksrecht* Nos. 26 and 27.
January 18 (31)	Lenin's article "A Turn in World Politics" is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 58
January	Lenin works on his unfinished pamphlet *Statistics and Sociology*, writes the articles "Imaginary or Real Marsh?" and "Defence of Neutrality".
January 24 (February 6)	Lenin attends a general meeting of the Zurich Social-Democratic organisation at which a new committee is elected.
January 27-29 (February 9-11)	Lenin writes "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue" (or submission on behalf of the Left Social-Democrats, to the Zurich Cantonal Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party.

February 4 (17)	Lenin writes to Alexandra Kollontai in Stockholm, asking her to sound out the possibility of contact with the Swedish Left Social-Democrats and participation in their press organ.
February 20 (March 5)	In a letter to Alexandra Kollontai in Stockholm, Lenin indicates concrete measures to unite the Left and suggests a plan for theses in connection with the Social-Democratic Youth Congress.
End of February	Lenin writes "The Story of One Short Period in the Life of One Socialist Party".
February-March	Lenin shares in editing *Bulletin* No. 1 of the Swiss Zimmerwald Lefts and arranges for its translation and circulation.
March 2 (16)	Lenin receives the first news of the February Revolution and takes measures for an immediate return to Russia.
March 3 and 4 (16 and 17)	In a letter to Alexandra Kollontai in Oslo Lenin gives his appraisal of the February Revolution and outlines Bolshevik tactics.
March 4 (17)	Lenin writes his "Draft Theses, March 4 (17) 1917" and sends them to Stockholm for the guidance of the Bolsheviks returning to Russia.
March 5 (18)	Lenin delivers a lecture on the Paris Commune and the prospects of the Russian revolution at La Chaux-de-Fonds, Switzerland.
March 6 (19)	Lenin wires (via Stockholm) to the Bolsheviks in Oslo about to leave for Russia, giving concrete advice on the Party's tactics in the revolution.
March 7 (20)	Lenin writes his first "Letter from Afar"—"The First Stage of the First Revolution". It appears in *Pravda* Nos. 14 and 15.
March 8-9 (21-22)	Lenin writes his second "Letter from Afar"—"The New Government and the Proletariat".
March 10 (23)	Lenin sends the first and second "Letters from Afar" to Bolshevik organisations in other countries.
March 10-11 (23-24)	Lenin writes the third "Letter from Afar"—"Concerning a Proletarian Militia".

March 12 (25)	Lenin writes the fourth "Letter from Afar"—"How To Achieve Peace" and the article "The Revolution in Russia and the Tasks of the Workers of All Countries".
Mid-March	Lenin writes the appeal "To Our Comrades in War-Prisoner Camps", published as a leaflet over the signature of the Sotsial-Demokrat Editorial Board.
March 14 (27)	Lenin delivers a lecture at a meeting of Swiss workers in Zurich on "The Russian Revolution, Its Significance and Tasks".
March 17 (30)	Lenin writes "Tricks of the Republican Chauvinists", published in *Volksrecht* No. 81 and, in abridged form, in *Avanti!* No. 99.
March 18 (31)	Collegium Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee approves Lenin's draft of rules for the émigrés returning to Russia.
March 22 (April 9)	Lenin attends a meeting in Zurich to discuss organisation of the journey to Russia.
	Lenin goes to Berne to sign the Protocol on the return journey from Switzerland to Russia.
March 26 (April 8)	Lenin writes the fifth (unfinished) "Letter from Afar"—"The Tasks Involved in the Building of the Revolutionary Proletarian State".
	Lenin writes his "Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers", which is approved in Berne by a meeting of R.S.D.L.P. members returning to Russia.
March 27 (April 9)	Lenin and Krupskaya leave Berne for Zurich, where they join a group of émigrés returning to Russia.
March 27-30 (April 9-12)	During the journey Lenin works on his theses on the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution (the "April Theses").
March 31 (April 13)	En route to Russia, Lenin makes a one-day stop in Stockholm, attends a meeting of Swedish Social-Democrat internationalists, organises the Bureau Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

В. И. ЛЕНИН

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

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

24

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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V. I. LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME 24

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PREFACE

Volume 24 contains the works of Lenin written between April 3 and June 3, 1917.

It includes the famous April Theses, in which Lenin gave the Party and the proletariat a concrete, theoretically elaborated plan of struggle for transition from the bourgeois-democratic to the socialist revolution, and put forward the slogan of setting up a republic of the Soviets as the best political form of proletarian dictatorship.

The ideas set forth in the April Theses are elaborated in the articles: "Letters on Tactics", "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution" and "Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat".

The materials of the Petrograd City and Seventh (April) All-Russia conferences of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) contain Lenin's speeches and resolutions on all the cardinal issues affecting the war and the revolution—the current situation, the war, the attitude towards the Provisional Government, the Soviets and the agrarian and national questions.

Lenin's articles and paragraphs in *Pravda* ("The Dual Power", "The War and the Provisional Government", "The Significance of Fraternisation", "Frightening the People with Bourgeois Terrors", "On the 'Unauthorised Seizure' of Land", and others) aim at bringing home to the masses the significance of the momentous events in the country's political life and the class struggle, at rallying the masses behind the Bolshevik Party and preparing them for the socialist revolution.

The volume contains material concerning the revision of the Party Programme, in which Lenin elaborated the basic principles of the Party's new programme.

Nineteen documents never before included in the *Collected Works* of Lenin have been given in this volume. The bulk of these documents consists of materials of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), namely: nine resolutions (on the war, on the attitude towards the Provisional Government, on the agrarian question, on the revision of the Party Programme, on the Soviets, on the national question, on the current situation, on the question of Borgbjerg's proposal, on uniting the internationalists against the petty-bourgeois defencist bloc), and "Introduction to the Resolutions of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)".

The materials of the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) published in previous collections of Lenin's works have been supplemented by "A Draft Resolution on the Attitude Towards the Parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Menshevik Social-Democrats, the 'Non-Factional' Social-Democrats and Other Kindred Political Trends".

The "Notes for an Article or Speech in Defence of the April Theses" is another document belonging to the series of articles in which the ideas of the April Theses are expounded and elaborated.

The leaflet "Appeal to the Soldiers of All the Belligerent Countries" and the "Speech at a Meeting at the Putilov Works. May 12 (25), 1917" deal with the causes and aims of the continuing imperialist war and set forth the Bolsheviks' views on the revolutionary ways and means of stopping it.

The "Resolution of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) of April 20 (May 3), 1917 on the Crisis Caused by the Provisional Government's Note of April 18 (May 1), 1917" exposes the imperialist nature of the policy pursued by the Provisional Government.

The volume also includes "A Letter to the Editors" and three articles published in *Pravda*: "Still More Lies", "The Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest Link", "The Laugh Is on You!" in which Lenin exposes the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries as hirelings of imperialism.

THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE PRESENT REVOLUTION[1]

Published April 7, 1917
in *Pravda* No. 26,
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the newspaper text

THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE PRESENT REVOLUTION[1]

Published April 7, 1917
in Pravda No. 26,
Signed: N. Lenin

Published according
to the newspaper text

I did not arrive in Petrograd until the night of April 3, and therefore at the meeting on April 4 I could, of course, deliver the report on the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat only on my own behalf, and with reservations as to insufficient preparation.

The only thing I could do to make things easier for myself—and for *honest* opponents—was to prepare the theses *in writing*. I read them out, and gave the text to Comrade Tsereteli. I read them *twice* very slowly: first at a meeting of Bolsheviks and then at a meeting of both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

I publish these personal theses of mine with only the briefest explanatory notes, which were developed in far greater detail in the report.

THESES

1) In our attitude towards the war, which under the new government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia's part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession to "revolutionary defencism" is permissible.

The class-conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: (a) that the power pass to the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants aligned with the proletariat; (b) that all annexations be renounced in deed and not in word; (c) that a complete break be effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests.

In view of the undoubted honesty of those broad sections of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity, and not as a means of con-

quest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with particular thoroughness, persistence and patience to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection existing between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that without overthrowing capital *it is impossible* to end the war by a truly democratic peace, a peace not imposed by violence.

The most widespread campaign for this view must be organised in the army at the front.

Fraternisation.

2) The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is *passing* from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its *second* stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants.

This transition is characterised, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognised rights (Russia is *now* the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence towards the masses, and, finally, by their unreasoning trust in the government of capitalists, those worst enemies of peace and socialism.

This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the *special* conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life.

3) No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion-breeding "demand" that *this* government, a government of capitalists, should *cease* to be an imperialist government.

4) Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our Party is in a minority, so far a small minority, as against *a bloc of all* the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries down to the Organising Committee[2] (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence among the proletariat.

The masses must be made to see that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the *only possible* form of revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is, as long as *this* government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic, and persistent *explanation* of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.

As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticising and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the people may overcome their mistakes by experience.

5) Not a parliamentary republic—to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step—but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.

Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy.*

The salaries of all officials, all of whom are elective and displaceable at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker.

6) The weight of emphasis in the agrarian programme to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

Confiscation of all landed estates.

Nationalisation of *all* lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organisation of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and for the public account.

7) The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

---

* I.e., the standing army to be replaced by the arming of the whole people.

8) It is not our *immediate* task to "introduce" socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the *control* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

9) Party tasks:
   (a) Immediate convocation of a Party congress;
   (b) Alteration of the Party Programme, mainly:
      (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war;
      (2) On our attitude towards the state and *our* demand for a "commune state"*;
      (3) Amendment of our out-of-date minimum programme;
   (c) Change of the Party's name.**

10) A new International.

We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International against the *social-chauvinists* and against the "Centre".***

In order that the reader may understand why I had especially to emphasise as a rare exception the "case" of honest opponents, I invite him to compare the above theses with the following objection by Mr. Goldenberg: Lenin, he said, "has planted the banner of civil war in the midst of revolutionary democracy" (quoted in No. 5 of Mr. Plekhanov's *Yedinstzo*[3]).

Isn't it a gem?

I write, announce and elaborately explain: "In view of the undoubted honesty of those *broad* sections of the *mass* believers in revolutionary defencism ... in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with *particular* thoroughness, persistence and *patience* to explain their error to them...."

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* I.e., a state of which the Paris Commune was the prototype.

** Instead of "Social-Democracy", whose official leaders *throughout* the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the "defencists" and the vacillating "Kautskyites"), we must call ourselves the *Communist Party*.

*** The "Centre" in the international Social-Democratic movement is the trend which vacillates between the chauvinists (= "defencists") and internationalists, i.e., Kautsky and Co. in Germany, Longuet and Co. in France, Chkheidze and Co. in Russia, Turati and Co. in Italy, MacDonald and Co. in Britain, etc.

Yet the bourgeois gentlemen who call themselves Social-Democrats, who *do not* belong either to the *broad* sections or to the *mass* believers in defencism, with serene brow present my views thus: "The banner [!]* of civil war" (of which there is not a word in the theses and not a word in my speech!) has been planted (!) "in the midst [!!] of revolutionary democracy...".

What does this mean? In what way does this differ from riot-inciting agitation, from *Russkaya Volya*[4]?

I write, announce and elaborately explain: "The Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the *only possible* form of revolutionary government, and therefore our task is to present a patient, systematic, and persistent *explanation* of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses."

Yet opponents of a certain brand present my views as a call to "civil war in the midst of revolutionary democracy!

I attacked the Provisional Government for *not* having appointed an early date, or any date at all, for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and for confining itself to promises. I argued that *without* the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies the convocation of the Constituent Assembly is not guaranteed and its success is impossible.

And the view is attributed to me that I am opposed to the speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly!

I would call this "raving", had not decades of political struggle taught me to regard honesty in opponents as a rare exception.

Mr. Plekhanov in his paper called my speech "raving". Very good, Mr. Plekhanov! But look how awkward, uncouth, and slow-witted you are in your polemics. If I delivered a raving speech for two hours, how is it that an audience of hundreds tolerated this "raving"? Further, why does your paper devote a whole column to an account of the "raving"? Inconsistent, highly inconsistent!

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

It is, of course, much easier to shout, abuse, and howl than to attempt to relate, to explain, to recall *what* Marx and Engels said in 1871, 1872 and 1875 about the experience of the Paris Commune[5] and about the *kind* of state the proletariat needs.

Ex-Marxist Mr. Plekhanov evidently does not care to recall Marxism.

I quoted the words of Rosa Luxemburg, who on August 4, 1914,[6] called *German* Social-Democracy a "stinking corpse". And the Plekhanovs, Goldenbergs and Co. feel "offended". On whose behalf? On behalf of the *German* chauvinists, because they were called chauvinists!

They have got themselves in a mess, these poor Russian social-chauvinists—socialists in word and chauvinists in deed.

HOW WE ARRIVED[7]

The news that the British and French governments have refused to grant the emigrant internationalists passage to Russia has already made its way into the socialist press.

The thirty-two political emigrants of various party affiliations (among them 19 Bolsheviks, 6 Bundists,[8] 3 adherents of the Paris internationalist paper *Nashe Slovo*[9]) who have arrived here consider it their duty to make known the following:

We are in possession of a number of documents which we shall publish as soon as we receive them from Stockholm (we left them behind because the Swedish-Russian border is under the full control of agents of the British Government), and which will give everyone a clear picture of the deplorable role the above-named "Allied" governments are playing in this connection. On this point we shall add only the following: The Zurich Emigrants' Repatriation Committee, which consists of representatives of twenty-three groups (including the Central Committee, the Organising Committee, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Bund), unanimously passed a resolution stating publicly that the British Government decided to prevent the emigrant internationalists from returning to their native land and taking part in the struggle against the imperialist war.

From the first days of the revolution this intention on the part of the British Government had become quite clear to the emigrants. At a conference of representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (M. A. Natanson), the Organising Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (L. Martov), and the Bund (Kosovsky), a plan was conceived (it was proposed

by L. Martov) to obtain for these emigrants passage through Germany in exchange for German and Austrian prisoners interned in Russia.

A number of telegrams to this effect were sent to Russia, while steps were taken through the Swiss socialists to get this plan put through.

The telegrams sent to Russia were held up, apparently by our Provisional "Revolutionary Government" (or its supporters).

After waiting two weeks for an answer from Russia, we decided to carry out the above-mentioned plan by ourselves (other emigrants decided to wait a little longer, being still unconvinced that the Provisional Government would do nothing to ensure the passage of all emigrants).

The whole business was handled by Fritz Platten, a Swiss internationalist socialist. He concluded a carefully worded agreement with the German Ambassador in Switzerland. The text of this agreement will be published later. Its main points are: (1) All emigrants, regardless of their opinions on the war, shall be allowed passage. (2) The railway coach in which the emigrants will travel shall have the privileges of extraterritoriality; no one shall have the right to enter the coach without Platten's permission; there shall be no control either of passports or luggage. (3) The travellers agree to agitate in Russia that the emigrants who have been granted passage be exchanged for a corresponding number of Austro-German internees.

All attempts on the part of the German Social-Democratic majority to communicate with the travellers were firmly repelled by the latter. The coach was accompanied by Platten all the way. He had decided to travel with us to Petrograd but he has been detained at the Russian border (Tornio)—let us hope, only temporarily. All negotiations were conducted with the participation of and in complete accord with a number of foreign internationalist socialists. The protocol of the journey was signed by two French socialists, Loriot and Guilbeaux, and by a socialist from the Liebknecht group (Hartstein), by the Swiss socialist Platten, the Polish Social-Democrat Broński, the Swedish Social-Democrat deputies Lindhagen, Carleson, Ström, Ture Nerman and others.

"Were Karl Liebknecht in Russia now, the Milyukovs would readily let him out to go to Germany; the Bethmann-Hollwegs let you Russian internationalists out to go to Russia. Your business is to go to Russia and fight there against both German and Russian imperialism." That is what these internationalist comrades told us. We think they were right. We shall make a report of our journey to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. We hope that the latter will obtain the release of a corresponding number of internees, first and foremost the prominent Austrian socialist, Otto Bauer, and that it will obtain a permit for all emigrants, not only the social-patriots, to return to Russia. We hope that the Executive Committee will put an end also to the unheard-of state of affairs, where no newspapers left of *Rech*[10] are allowed to be sent out of the country, and even the Manifesto of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies[11] to the workers of the world is not allowed to get into the foreign press.

Written April 4 (17), 1917

Published April 5, 1917
in the newspapers *Pravda*
No. 24, and *Izvestia* No. 32

Published according
to the text in *Pravda* verified
with that in *Izvestia*

TWO WORLDS

Capitalist newspapers like *Rech* and *Novoye Vremya*[12] have published articles attacking our passage through Germany and insinuating that the new arrivals were aiding the German imperialists.*

Izvestia of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies[13] reprints *in full* the report published in yesterday's *Pravda***[14] which was presented to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on the *very first* day after our arrival. In addition to the report, *Izvestia* publishes the resolution of the Executive Committee, which it gives in the following words:

> "Having heard the report of Comrades Zurabov and Zinoviev, the Executive Committee decided to take the matter up immediately with the Provisional Government and to take steps towards securing the immediate return to Russia of all emigrants, irrespective of their political views and their attitude towards the war. The results of the negotiations with the government will be published in the near future.—*Editors*."

Here you have a small—a very small, but very characteristic—picture of two worlds. One, the world of the capitalists, *Rech*, *Russkaya Volya*, *Novoye Vremya*, dark hints, vile insinuations against the socialists; the other, the world of the revolutionary democrats, of the workers' and soldiers' deputies, who in a calm, consistent, and dignified manner have decided to "*take steps*". Steps leading to what? Steps leading to what was *not* done by the Provisional Government!

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* The famous—notoriously famous—*Russkaya Volya* in its article against us provides "incriminating" material quite in the vein of *Rech*. Won't Milyukov and Co. be ashamed of such a neighbour?

** Will *Rech* dare to publish it?

Is this not tantamount to a censure of the Provisional Government?

And is not this censure warranted?

Mind you, the Executive Committee, in passing this resolution was fully aware of the *political* dissensions that existed between it and the Bolsheviks. For capitalists this would be a pretext for insinuations. Human dignity is something one need not look for in the world of capitalists.

Pravda No. 25, April 6, 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

NOTES FOR AN ARTICLE OR SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF THE APRIL THESES

(1) Economic debacle is imminent. *Therefore* removal of the bourgeoisie is a mistake.

(This is the conclusion of the bourgeoisie. The more imminent the debacle, the more essential is it that the bourgeoisie be removed.)

(2) Proletariat is unorganised, weak, lacking class-consciousness.

(True. Therefore, the whole task is to fight those *petty-bourgeois* leaders, the so-called Social-Democrats—Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov—who lull the masses, encourage them to put their trust in the bourgeoisie.

Not unity with these petty bourgeois—Chkheidze, Steklov, Tsereteli—but *utter defeat* of these Social-Democrats, who are *ruining* the revolution of the proletariat.)

(3) Revolution is bourgeois at the present stage. Therefore no need for "socialist experiment".

(This argument is an out-and-out bourgeois argument. No one talks about a "socialist experiment" The concrete Marxist proposition requires that institutions now as well as classes be taken into account.)

Stranglers of the revolution, by honeyed phrases—Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov—are dragging the revolution back, *away from* the Soviets of Workers' Deputies *towards* the undivided sway of the bourgeoisie, towards the usual bourgeois parliamentary republic.

We must ably, carefully, clear people's minds and lead the proletariat and poor peasantry *forward*, away from "dual power" *towards the full power* of the Soviets of

Workers' Deputies, and this is the commune in Marx's sense, in the sense of the experience of 1871.

The question is not how fast to move, but where to move.

The question is not whether the workers are prepared, but *how* and *for what* they should be prepared.

Since the manifestos and appeals of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies on the war, etc., are sheer petty-bourgeois humbug designed merely to lull the people to sleep, it is our business above all, as I have said, to clear people's minds, to rid the masses of the *bourgeois* influence of Chkheidze, Steklov, Tsereteli and Co.

The "revolutionary defencism" of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, i.e., of Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Steklov, is a chauvinist trend a hundred times more harmful for being cloaked in honeyed phrases, an *attempt* to reconcile the masses with the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

The dull, unenlightened masses duped by Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and Co. do not realise that the war is a continuation of policy, that wars are waged by *governments*.

It must be made clear that the "people" can stop the war or change its character only by changing the *class character* of the government.

Written between April 4 and 12 (17 and 25), 1917

First published on January 21, 1933 in *Pravda* No. 21

Published according to the manuscript

BLANCISM

Louis Blanc, the French socialist, won unenviable notoriety during the revolution of 1848 by changing his stand from that of the class struggle to that of petty-bourgeois illusions, illusions adorned with would-be "socialist" phraseology, but in reality tending to strengthen the influence of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. Louis Blanc looked to the bourgeoisie for assistance, hoped, and inspired hopes in others, that the bourgeoisie *could* help the workers in the matter of "labour organisation"—this vague term purporting to express "socialist" tendencies.

Blancism has now gained the upper hand in Right-wing "Social-Democracy", in the Organising Committee party in Russia. Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, and many others, who are now leaders of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and were also leaders of the recent All-Russia Conference of Soviets,[15] have taken the same stand as Louis Blanc.

On all major issues of present-day political life these leaders, who occupy approximately the position of the international Centrist trend represented by Kautsky, Longuet, Turati, and many others, have embraced the petty-bourgeois views of Louis Blanc. Take, for instance, the question of war.

The proletarian standpoint in this matter consists of a definite *class* characterisation of war, and of an irreconcilable hostility to imperialist war—that is, to a war *between* groups of capitalist countries (*no matter* whether monarchies or *republics*) *for* a division of capitalist spoils.

The petty-bourgeois viewpoint differs from the bourgeois one (outright justification of the war, outright "defence of

the fatherland", i.e., defence of the *interests* of *one's own* capitalists, defence of *their* "right" to annexations) in that the petty bourgeois "renounces" annexations, "condemns" imperialism, "demands" from the bourgeoisie that it cease to be imperialistic while keeping within the framework of world-imperialist relations and the capitalist system of economy. Confining himself to this mild, innocuous, wishy-washy declamation, the petty bourgeois, *in practice*, trails helplessly *behind* the bourgeoisie, "sympathising" in some things with the proletariat in words, remaining dependent on the bourgeoisie in deeds, unable or unwilling to understand the path leading to the overthrow of the capitalist yoke, the only path that can rid the world of imperialism.

To "demand" of the bourgeois governments that they make a "*solemn declaration*" in the spirit of renouncing annexations is the height of audacity on the part of the petty bourgeois, and an example of anti-imperialist "Zimmerwaldist" consistency. It is not difficult to see that this is Blancism of the worst type. For one thing, no bourgeois politician with any experience will ever have difficulty in mouthing any number of glib, "brilliant", high-sounding phrases against annexations "in general", as meaningless as they are non-committal. But when it comes to *deeds*, one can always do a conjuring trick after the manner of *Rech*, which had the deplorable courage to declare that Kurland[16] (now annexed by the imperialist predators of bourgeois Germany) was *not* annexed by Russia!

This is trickery of the most disgusting kind, the most shameless deception of the workers by the bourgeoisie, for anybody the least familiar with politics must know that Kurland *had always been annexed* to Russia.

We openly and directly challenge *Rech*: (1) to present to the people such a political definition of the concept "annexation" as would apply equally to *all* annexations in the world, German, British, and Russian, past and present, to all without exception; (2) to state clearly and definitely what, in its opinion, is meant by *renunciation of annexations*, not in word, but in deed. To give such a political definition of the concept "renunciation of annexations in deed" as would apply not only to the Germans, but also to the English and all other nations who have ever practised annexations.

We maintain that *Rech* will either decline to accept our challenge or it will be exposed by us before the whole nation. And it is precisely because of this question of Kurland touched upon by *Rech* that our dispute is not a theoretical one but a practical one of the greatest urgency and vital interest.

Second, let us assume, if only for a moment, that the bourgeois ministers are the ideal of honesty, that the Guchkovs, Lvovs, Milyukovs and Co. sincerely *believe* in the possibility of renouncing annexations, while preserving capitalism, and that they really *want* to renounce them.

Let us, for a moment, assume even this, let us make this Blancist assumption.

One is entitled to ask: Can a grown-up person be content with what people *think* of themselves, without comparing it with what they *do*? Is it possible for a Marxist *not* to distinguish good wishes and declarations from objective realities?

No. It is not.

Annexations are maintained by the bonds of finance capital, banking capital, imperialist capital. *Herein* is the modern, the economic foundation of annexations. From this angle, annexations are politically guaranteed *profits* on thousands of millions of capital "invested" in thousands upon thousands of enterprises in the annexed countries.

It is *impossible*, even given the wish to do so, to renounce annexations *without taking* decisive steps towards throwing off the yoke of capitalism.

Does that mean, as *Yedinstvo*, *Rabochaya Gazeta*,[17] and the other "Louis Blancs" of our petty bourgeoisie are ready to conclude and actually do conclude, that we must *not* take any decisive steps towards overthrowing capitalism, that we must accept at least a modicum of annexations?

No. Decisive steps *must* be taken towards the overthrow of capitalism. They must be taken ably and gradually, relying *only* on the class-consciousness and organised activity of the overwhelming majority of the workers and poor peasants. But taken they must be. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies have *already* started to take them in a number of places in Russia.

The order of the day now is a decisive and irrevocable parting of the ways with the Louis Blancs—the Chkheidzes, Tseretelis, Steklovs, the party of the O.C., the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., etc. The masses must be made to see that Blancism is ruining and will utterly ruin the further success of the revolution, even the success of freedom, unless the masses realise how harmful these petty-bourgeois illusions are and join the class-conscious workers in their cautious, gradual, well-considered, yet firm and direct steps towards socialism.

Outside of socialism there is *no* deliverance of humanity from wars, from hunger, from the destruction of still more millions and millions of human beings.

Pravda No. 27, April 8, 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

THE DUAL POWER

The basic question of every revolution is that of state power. Unless this question is understood, there can be no intelligent participation in the revolution, not to speak of guidance of the revolution.

The highly remarkable feature of our revolution is that it has brought about a *dual power*. This fact must be grasped first and foremost: unless it is understood, we cannot advance. We must know how to supplement and amend old "formulas", for example, those of Bolshevism, for while they have been found to be correct on the whole, their concrete realisation *has turned out to be* different. *Nobody* previously thought, or could have thought, of a dual power.

What is this dual power? Alongside the Provisional Government, the government of the *bourgeoisie*, *another government* has arisen, so far weak and incipient; but undoubtedly a government that actually exists and is growing—the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

What is the class composition of this other government? It consists of the proletariat and the peasants (in soldiers' uniforms). What is the political nature of this government? It is a revolutionary dictatorship, i.e., a power directly based on revolutionary seizure, on the direct initiative of the people from below, and *not on a law* enacted by a centralised state power. It is an entirely different kind of power from the one that generally exists in the parliamentary bourgeois-democratic republics of the usual type still prevailing in the advanced countries of Europe and America. This circumstance is often overlooked, often not given enough thought, yet it is the crux of the matter. *This* power is of *the same type* as the Paris Commune of 1871. The funda-

mental characteristics of this type are: (1) the source of power is not a law previously discussed and enacted by parliament, but the direct initiative of the people from below, in their local areas—direct "seizure", to use a current expression; (2) the replacement of the police and the army, which are institutions divorced from the people and set against the people, by the direct arming of the whole people; order in the state under such a power is maintained by the armed workers and peasants *themselves*, by the armed people *themselves*; (3) officialdom, the bureaucracy, are either similarly replaced by the direct rule of the people themselves or at least placed under special control; they not only become elected officials, but are also *subject to recall* at the people's first demand; they are reduced to the position of simple agents; from a privileged group holding "jobs" remunerated on a high, bourgeois scale, they become workers of a special "arm of the service", whose remuneration *does not exceed* the ordinary pay of a competent worker.

This, and this *alone*, constitutes the *essence* of the Paris Commune as a special type of state. This essence has been forgotten or perverted by the Plekhanovs (downright chauvinists who have betrayed Marxism), the Kautskys (the men of the "Centre", i.e., those who vacillate between chauvinism and Marxism), and generally by all those Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., etc., who now rule the roost.

They are trying to get away with empty phrases, evasions, subterfuges; they congratulate each other a thousand times upon the revolution, but refuse to *consider what* the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies *are*. They refuse to recognise the obvious truth that inasmuch as these Soviets exist, *inasmuch* as they are a power, we have in Russia a state of the *type* of the Paris Commune.

I have emphasised the words "inasmuch as", for it is only an incipient power. By direct agreement with the bourgeois Provisional Government and by a series of actual concessions, it has itself *surrendered and is surrendering* its positions to the bourgeoisie.

Why? Is it because Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and Co. are making a "mistake"? Nonsense. Only a philistine can think so—not a Marxist. The reason is *insufficient class-*

consciousness and organisation of the proletarians and peasants. The "mistake" of the leaders I have named lies in their petty-bourgeois position, in the fact that instead of clarifying the minds of the workers, they are *befogging* them; instead of dispelling petty-bourgeois illusions, they are *instilling* them; instead of freeing the people from bourgeois influence, they are *strengthening* that influence.

It should be clear from this why our comrades, too, make so many mistakes when putting the question "simply": Should the Provisional Government be overthrown immediately?

My answer is: (1) it should be overthrown, for it is an oligarchic, bourgeois, and not a people's government, and *is unable* to provide peace, bread, or full freedom; (2) it cannot be overthrown just now, for it is being kept in power by a direct and indirect, a formal and actual *agreement* with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and primarily with the chief Soviet, the Petrograd Soviet; (3) generally, it cannot be "overthrown" in the ordinary way, for it rests on the "*support*" given to the bourgeoisie by the *second* government—the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and that government is the only possible revolutionary government, which directly expresses the mind and will of the majority of the workers and peasants. Humanity has not yet evolved and we do not as yet know a type of government superior to and better than the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies.

To become a power the class-conscious workers must win the majority to their side. *As long as* no violence is used against the people there is no other road to power. We are not Blancists, we do not stand for the seizure of power by a minority. We are Marxists, we stand for proletarian class struggle against petty-bourgeois intoxication, against chauvinism-defencism, phrase-mongering and dependence on the bourgeoisie.

Let us create a proletarian Communist Party; its elements have already been created by the best adherents of Bolshevism; let us rally our ranks for proletarian class work; and larger and larger numbers from among the proletarians, from among the *poorest* peasants will range themselves on our side. For *actual experience* will from day to day shatter the petty-bourgeois illusions of those "Social-Democrats",

the Chkheidzes, Tseretelis, Steklovs and others, the "Socialist-Revolutionaries", the petty bourgeois of an even purer water, and so on and so forth.

The bourgeoisie stands for the undivided power of the bourgeoisie.

The class-conscious workers stand for the undivided power of the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies—for undivided power made possible not by adventurist acts, but by *clarifying* proletarian minds, by *emancipating* them from the influence of the bourgeoisie.

The petty bourgeoisie—"Social-Democrats", Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., etc.—vacillate and, thereby, *hinder* this clarification and emancipation.

This is the actual, the *class* alignment of forces that determines our tasks.

Pravda No. 28, April 9, 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

LETTERS ON TACTICS[18]

FOREWORD

On April 4, 1917, I had occasion to make a report on the subject indicated in the title, first, at a meeting of Bolsheviks in Petrograd. These were delegates to the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, who had lo leave for their homes and therefore could not allow me to postpone it. After the meeting, the chairman, Comrade G. Zinoviev, asked me on behalf of the whole assembly to repeat my report immediately at a joint meeting of Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates, who wished to discuss the question of unifying the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Difficult though it was for me immediately to repeat my report I felt that I had no right to refuse once this was demanded of me by *my comrades-in-ideas* as well as by the Mensheviks, who, because of their impending departure, really could not grant me a delay.

In making my report, I read the theses which were published in No. 26 of *Pravda*, on April 7, 1917.*

Both the theses and my report gave rise to differences of opinion among the Bolsheviks themselves and the editors of *Pravda*. After a number of consultations, we unanimously concluded that it would be advisable *openly* to discuss our differences, and thus provide material for the All-Russia Conference of our Party (the Russian Social-Democratic

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* I reprint these theses together with the brief comment from the same issue of *Pravda* as an appendix to this letter. (See pp. 21-24 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

Labour Party, united under the Central Committee) which is to meet in Petrograd on April 20, 1917.

Complying with this decision concerning a discussion, I am publishing the following *letters* in which I do not claim to have made an *exhaustive* study of the question, but wish merely to outline the principal arguments, which are especially essential for the *practical* tasks of the working-class movement.

FIRST LETTER

ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

Marxism requires of us a strictly exact and objectively verifiable analysis of the relations of classes and of the concrete features peculiar to each historical situation. We Bolsheviks have always tried to meet this requirement, which is absolutely essential for giving a scientific foundation to policy.

"Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action,"[19] Marx and Engels always said, rightly ridiculing the mere memorising and repetition of "formulas", that at best are capable only of marking out *general* tasks, which are necessarily modifiable by the *concrete* economic and political conditions of each particular *period* of the historical process.

What, then, are the clearly established objective *facts* which the party of the revolutionary proletariat must now be guided by in defining the tasks and forms of its activity?

Both in my first *Letter from Afar* ("The First Stage of the First Revolution") published in *Pravda* Nos. 14 and 15, March 21 and 22, 1917, and in my theses, I define "the specific feature of the present situation in Russia" as a period of *transition* from the first stage of the revolution to the second. I therefore considered the basic slogan, the "task of the day" at *this* moment to be: "Workers, you have performed miracles of proletarian heroism, the heroism of the people, in the civil war against tsarism. You must perform miracles of organisation, organisation of the proletariat and of the whole people, to prepare the way for your

victory in the second stage of the revolution" (*Pravda* No. 15).*

What, then, is the first stage?

It is the passing of state power to the bourgeoisie.

Before the February-March revolution of 1917, state power in Russia was in the hands of one old class, namely, the feudal landed nobility, headed by Nicholas Romanov.

After the revolution, the power is in the hands of a *different* class, a new class, namely, the *bourgeoisie*.

The passing of state power from one *class* to another is the first, the principal, the basic sign of a *revolution*, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical political meaning of that term.

To this extent, the bourgeois, or the bourgeois-democratic, revolution in Russia is *completed*.

But at this point we hear a clamour of protest from people who readily call themselves "old Bolsheviks". Didn't we always maintain, they say, that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is completed only by the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry"? Is the agrarian revolution, which is also a bourgeois-democratic revolution, completed? Is it not a fact, on the contrary, that it has *not even* started?

My answer is: The Bolshevik slogans and ideas *on the whole* have been confirmed by history; but *concretely* things have worked out *differently*; they are more original, more peculiar, more variegated than anyone could have expected.

To ignore or overlook this fact would mean taking after those "old Bolsheviks" who more than once already have played so regrettable a role in the history of our Party by reiterating formulas senselessly *learned by rote* instead of *studying* the specific features of the new and living reality.

"The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" has *already* become a reality** in the Russian revolution, for this "formula" envisages only a *relation of classes*, and not a *concrete political institution implementing* this relation, this co-operation. "The Soviet

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 306-07.—*Ed.*

** In a certain form and to a certain extent.

of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies"—there you have the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" already accomplished in reality.

This formula is already antiquated. Events have moved it from the realm of formulas into the realm of reality, clothed it with flesh and bone, concretised it and *thereby* modified it.

A new and different task now faces us: to effect a split *within* this dictatorship between the proletarian elements (the anti-defencist, internationalist, "Communist" elements, who stand for a transition to the commune) and the *small-proprietor* or *petty-bourgeois* elements (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the other revolutionary defencists, who are opposed to moving towards the commune and are in favour of "supporting" the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois government).

The person who *now* speaks only of a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is behind the times, consequently, he has in effect *gone over* to the petty bourgeoisie against the proletarian class struggle; that person should be consigned to the archive of "Bolshevik" pre-revolutionary antiques (it may be called the archive of "old Bolsheviks").

The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has already been realised, but in a highly original manner, and with a number of extremely important modifications. I shall deal with them separately in one of my next letters. For the present, it is essential to grasp the incontestable truth that a Marxist must take cognisance of real life, of the true facts of *reality*, and not cling to a theory of yesterday, which, like all theories, at best only outlines the main and the general, only *comes near* to embracing life in all its complexity.

"Theory, my friend, is grey, but green is the eternal tree of life."[20]

To deal with the question of "completion" of the bourgeois revolution *in the old way* is to sacrifice living Marxism to the dead letter.

According to the old way of thinking, the rule of the bourgeoisie could and should be *followed* by the rule of the proletariat and the peasantry, by their dictatorship.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In real life, however, things have *already* turned out *differently*; there has been an extremely original, novel and unprecedented *interlacing of the one with the other*. We have side by side, existing together, simultaneously, *both* the rule of the bourgeoisie (the government of Lvov and Guchkov) and a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which is *voluntarily* ceding power to the bourgeoisie, voluntarily making itself an appendage of the bourgeoisie.

For it must not be forgotten that actually, in Petrograd, the power is in the hands of the workers and soldiers; the new government is *not* using and cannot use violence against them, because *there is no* police, *no* army standing apart from the people, *no* officialdom standing all-powerful *above* the people. This is a fact, the kind of fact that is characteristic of a state of the Paris Commune type. This fact does not fit into the old schemes. One must know how to adapt schemes to facts, instead of reiterating the now meaningless words about a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" *in general*.

To throw more light on this question let us approach it from another angle.

A Marxist must not abandon the ground of careful analysis of class relations. The bourgeoisie is in power. But is not the mass of the peasants *also* a bourgeoisie, only of a different social stratum, of a different kind, of a different character? Whence does it follow that *this* stratum *cannot* come to power, thus "completing" the bourgeois-democratic revolution? Why should this be impossible?

This is how the old Bolsheviks often argue.

My reply is that it is quite possible. But, in assessing a given situation, a Marxist must proceed *not* from what is possible, but from what is real.

And the reality reveals the *fact* that freely elected soldiers' and peasants' deputies are freely joining the second, parallel government, and are freely supplementing, developing and completing it. And, just as freely, they are *surrendering* power to the bourgeoisie—a fact which does not in the least "contravene" the theory of Marxism, for we have always known and repeatedly pointed out that the bourgeoisie maintains itself in power *not* only by force but

also by virtue of the lack of class-consciousness and organisation, the routinism and downtrodden state of the masses.

In view of this present-day reality, it is simply ridiculous to turn one's back on the fact and talk about "possibilities".

Possibly the peasantry may seize all the land and all the power. Far from forgetting this possibility, far from confining myself to the present, I definitely and clearly formulate the agrarian programme, taking into account the *new* phenomenon, i.e., the deeper cleavage between the agricultural labourers and the poor peasants on the one hand, and the peasant proprietors on the other.

But there is also another possibility; it is possible that the peasants will take the advice of the petty-bourgeois party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, which has yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie, has adopted a defencist stand, and which advises waiting for the Constituent Assembly, although not even the date of its convocation has yet been fixed.*

It is possible that the peasants will *maintain* and prolong their deal with the bourgeoisie, a deal which they have now concluded through the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies not only in form, but in fact.

Many things are possible. It would be a great mistake to forget the agrarian movement and the agrarian programme. But it would be no less a mistake to forget the *reality*, which reveals the *fact* that an *agreement*, or—to use a more exact, less legal, but more class-economic term—*class collaboration* exists between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry.

When this fact ceases to be a fact, when the peasantry separates from the bourgeoisie, seizes the land and power despite the bourgeoisie, that will be a new stage in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; and that matter will be dealt with separately.

* Lest my words be misinterpreted, I shall say at once that I am positively in favour of the *Soviets* of Agricultural Labourers and Peasants *immediately* taking over *all* the land, but they should *themselves* observe the strictest order and discipline, not permit the slightest damage to machines, structures, or livestock, and in no case disorganise agriculture and grain production, but rather *develop* them, for the soldiers need *twice* as much bread, and the people must not be allowed to starve.

A Marxist who, in view of the possibility of such a future stage, were to forget his duties in *the present*, when the peasantry is *in agreement* with the bourgeoisie, would turn petty bourgeois. For he would in practice be preaching to the proletariat *confidence* in the petty bourgeoisie ("this petty bourgeoisie, this peasantry, must separate from the bourgeoisie while the bourgeois-democratic revolution is still on"). Because of the "possibility" of so pleasing and sweet a future, in which the peasantry would *not* be the tail of the bourgeoisie, in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Chkheidzes, Tseretelis, and Steklovs would *not* be an appendage of the bourgeois government—because of the "possibility" of so pleasing a future, he would be forgetting *the unpleasant present*, in which the peasantry still forms the tail of the bourgeoisie, and in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats have not yet given up their role as an appendage of the bourgeois government, as "His Majesty" Lvov's Opposition.[21]

This hypothetical person would resemble a sweetish Louis Blanc, or a sugary Kautskyite, but certainly not a revolutionary Marxist.

But are we not in danger of falling into subjectivism, of wanting to arrive at the socialist revolution by "skipping" the bourgeois-democratic revolution—which is not yet completed and has not yet exhausted the peasant movement?

I might be incurring this danger if I said: "No Tsar, but a *workers*' government."[22] But I did *not* say that, I said something else. I said that there *can be no* government (barring a bourgeois government) in Russia *other than* that of the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. I said that power in Russia now can pass from Guchkov and Lvov *only* to these Soviets. And in these Soviets, as it happens, it is the peasants, the soldiers, i.e., petty bourgeoisie, who preponderate, to use a scientific, Marxist term, a class characterisation, and not a common, man-in-the-street, professional characterisation.

In my theses, I absolutely ensured myself against skipping over the peasant movement, which has not outlived itself, or the petty-bourgeois movement in general, against any *playing* at "seizure of power" by a workers' government, against any kind of Blanquist adventurism; for I pointedly

referred to the experience of the Paris Commune. And this experience, as we know, and as Marx proved at length in 1871 and Engels in 1891,[23] absolutely excludes Blanquism, absolutely ensures the direct, immediate and unquestionable rule of the *majority* and the activity of the masses only to the extent that the majority itself acts *consciously*.

In the theses, I very definitely reduced the question to one of *a struggle for influence within* the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. To leave no shadow of doubt on this score, I *twice* emphasised in the theses the need for patient and persistent "explanatory" work "adapted to the *practical* needs of the *masses*".

Ignorant persons or renegades from Marxism, like Mr. Plekhanov, may shout about anarchism, Blanquism, and so forth. But those who want to think and learn cannot fail to understand that Blanquism means the seizure of power by a minority, whereas the Soviets are *admittedly* the direct and immediate organisation of the *majority* of the people. Work confined to a struggle for influence *within* these Soviets cannot, simply *cannot*, stray into the swamp of Blanquism. Nor can it stray into the swamp of anarchism, for anarchism denies *the need for a state and state power* in the period of *transition* from the rule of the bourgeoisie to the rule of the proletariat, whereas I, with a precision that precludes any possibility of misinterpretation, *advocate* the need for a state in this period, although, in accordance with Marx and the lessons of the Paris Commune, I advocate not the usual parliamentary bourgeois state, but a state *without* a standing army, *without* a police opposed to the people, *without* an officialdom placed above the people.

When Mr. Plekhanov, in his newspaper *Yedinstvo*, shouts with all his might that this is anarchism, he is merely giving further proof of his break with Marxism. Challenged by me in *Pravda* (No. 26) to tell us what Marx and Engels taught on the subject in 1871, 1872 and 1875,* Mr. Plekhanov can only preserve silence on the question at issue and shout out abuse after the manner of the enraged bourgeoisie.

Mr. Plekhanov, the ex-Marxist, has *absolutely* failed to understand the Marxist doctrine of the state. Incidentally,

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* See p. 26 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the germs of this lack of understanding are also to be found in his German pamphlet on anarchism.[24]

* * *

Now let us see how Comrade Y. Kamenev, in *Pravda* No. 27, formulates his "disagreements" with my theses and with the views expressed above. This will help us to grasp them more clearly.

"As for Comrade Lenin's general scheme," writes Comrade Kamenev, "it appears to us unacceptable, inasmuch as it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is *completed*, and builds on the immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution."

There are two big mistakes here.

First. The question of "completion" of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is *stated* wrongly. The question is put in an abstract, simple, so to speak one-colour, way, which does *not* correspond to the objective reality. To put the question *this way*, to ask *now* "whether the bourgeois-democratic revolution is completed" and say *no more*, is to prevent oneself from seeing the exceedingly complex reality, which is at least two-coloured. This is in theory. In practice, it means surrendering helplessly to *petty-bourgeois revolutionism*.

Indeed, reality shows us *both* the passing of power into the hands of the bourgeoisie (a "completed" bourgeois-democratic revolution of the usual type) and, side by side with the real government, the existence of a parallel government which represents the "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". This "second-government" has *itself* ceded the power to the bourgeoisie, has chained *itself* to the bourgeois government.

Is this reality covered by Comrade Kamenev's old-Bolshevik formula, which says that "the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed"?

It is not. The formula is obsolete. It is no good at all. It is dead. And it is no use trying to revive it.

Second. A practical question. Who knows whether it is still possible at present for a *special* "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", *de-*

tached from the bourgeois government, to emerge in Russia? Marxist tactics cannot be based on the unknown.

But *if* this is still possible, then there is one, and only one, way towards it, namely, an immediate, resolute, and irrevocable separation of the proletarian Communist elements from the petty-bourgeois elements.

Why?

Because the entire petty bourgeoisie has, not by chance but of necessity, turned towards chauvinism (= defencism), towards "support" of the bourgeoisie, towards dependence on it, towards the *fear* of having to do without it, etc., etc.

How can the petty bourgeoisie be "pushed" into power, if even now it can take the power, but *does not want to*?

This can be done only by separating the proletarian, the Communist, party, by waging a proletarian class struggle *free from* the timidity of those petty bourgeois. Only the consolidation of the proletarians who are free from the influence of the petty bourgeoisie in deed and not only in word can make the ground so hot under the feet of the petty bourgeoisie that it will be *obliged* under certain circumstances to take the power; it is even within the bounds of possibility that Guchkov and Milyukov—again under certain circumstances—will be for giving full and sole power to Chkheidze, Tsereteli, the S.R.s, and Steklov, since, after all, these are "*defencists*".

To separate the proletarian elements of the Soviets (i.e., the proletarian, Communist, party) from the petty-bourgeois elements right now, immediately and irrevocably, is to give correct expression to the interests of the movement in *either* of two possible events: in the event that Russia will yet experience a special "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" independent of the bourgeoisie, and in the event that the petty bourgeoisie will not be able to tear itself away from the bourgeoisie and will oscillate eternally (that is, until socialism is established) between us and it.

To be guided in one's activities merely by the simple formula, "the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed", is like taking it upon oneself to guarantee that the petty bourgeoisie is definitely capable of being independent of the bourgeoisie. To do so is to throw oneself at the given moment on the mercy of the petty bourgeoisie.

Incidentally, in connection with the "formula" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, it is worth mentioning that, in *Two Tactics* (July 1905), I made a point of emphasising (*Twelve Years*, p. 435[25]) this:

"Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy, and privilege.... Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle of the wage-worker against the employer, the struggle for socialism...."*

Comrade Kamenev's mistake is that even in 1917 he sees only *the past* of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. As a matter of fact its *future* has already begun, for the interests and policies of the wage-worker and the petty proprietor have *actually* diverged already, even in such an important question as that of "defencism", that of the attitude towards the imperialist war.

This brings me to the second mistake in Comrade Kamenev's argument quoted above. He criticises me, saying that my scheme "builds" on "the immediate transformation of this [bourgeois-democratic] revolution into a socialist revolution".

This is incorrect. I not only do not "build" on the "immediate transformation" of our revolution into a *socialist* one, but I actually warn against it, when in Thesis No. 8, I state: "It is *not* our *immediate* task to 'introduce' socialism...".**

Is it not clear that no person who builds on the immediate transformation of our revolution into a socialist revolution could be opposed to the immediate task of introducing socialism?

Moreover, even a "commune state" (i.e., a state organised along the lines of the Paris Commune) *cannot* be introduced in Russia "immediately", because to do that it would be necessary for the *majority* of the deputies in all (or in most) Soviets to clearly recognise all the erroneousness and harm of the tactics and policy pursued by the S.R.s, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, etc. As for me, I declared unmistakably that in this respect I "build" only on "patient" explaining

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 84-85.—*Ed.*

** See p. 24 of this volume.—*Ed.*

(does one have to be patient to bring about a change which can be effected "immediately"?).

Comrade Kamenev has somewhat overreached himself in his eagerness, and has repeated the bourgeois prejudice about the Paris Commune having wanted to introduce socialism "immediately". This is not so. The Commune, unfortunately, was too slow in introducing socialism. The real essence of the Commune is not where the bourgeois usually looks for it, but in the creation of a *state* of a special type. Such a state has *already* arisen in Russia, it is the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!

Comrade Kamenev has not pondered on the *fact*, the significance, of the *existing* Soviets, their identity, in point of type and socio-political character, with the commune state, and instead of studying the *fact*, he began to talk about something I was supposed to be "building" on for the "immediate" future. The result is, unfortunately, a repetition of the method used by many bourgeois: from the question as to *what are* the Soviets, whether they are of a *higher* type than a parliamentary republic, whether they are *more useful* for the people, *more democratic*, *more convenient* for the struggle, for combating, for instance, the grain shortage, etc.—from this real, urgent, vital issue, attention is diverted to the empty, would-be scientific, but actually hollow, professorially dead question of "building on an immediate transformation".

An idle question falsely presented. I "build" *only* on this, *exclusively* on this—that the workers, soldiers and peasants will deal better than the officials, better than the police, with the difficult *practical*, problems of producing more grain, distributing it better and keeping the soldiers better supplied, etc., etc.

I am deeply convinced that the Soviets will make the independent activity of the *masses* a reality more quickly and effectively than will a parliamentary republic (I shall compare the two types of state in greater detail in another letter) They will more effectively, more practically and more correctly decide what *steps* can be taken towards socialism and how these steps should be taken. Control over a bank, the merging of all banks into one, is *not yet* socialism, but it is *a step towards* socialism. Today such steps are being

taken in Germany by the Junkers and the bourgeoisie against the people. Tomorrow the Soviet will be able to take these steps more effectively for the benefit of the people if the whole state power is in its hands.

What *compels* such steps?

Famine. Economic disorganisation. Imminent collapse. The horrors of war. The horrors of the wounds inflicted on mankind by the war.

Comrade Kamenev concludes his article with the remark that "in a broad discussion he hopes to carry his point of view, which is the only possible one for revolutionary Social-Democracy if it wishes to and should remain to the very end the party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat and not turn into a group of Communist propagandists".

It seems to me that these words betray a completely erroneous estimate of the situation. Comrade Kamenev contraposes to a "party of the masses" a "group of propagandists". But the "masses" have now succumbed to the craze of "revolutionary" defencism. Is it not more becoming for internationalists at this moment to show that they can resist "mass" intoxication rather than to "wish to remain" with the masses, i.e., to succumb to the general epidemic? Have we not seen how in all the belligerent countries of Europe the chauvinists tried to justify themselves on the grounds that they wished to "remain with the masses"? Must we not be able to remain for a time in the minority against the "mass" intoxication? Is it not the work of the propagandists at the present moment that forms the key point for *disentangling* the proletarian line from the defencist and petty-bourgeois "mass" intoxication? It was this fusion of the masses, proletarian and non-proletarian, regardless of class differences within the masses, that formed one of the conditions for the defencist epidemic. To speak contemptuously of a "group of propagandists" advocating a *proletarian* line does not seem to be very becoming.

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THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN OUR REVOLUTION

DRAFT PLATFORM FOR THE PROLETARIAN PARTY

First published September 1917
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The moment of history through which Russia is now passing is marked by the following main characteristics:

THE CLASS CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE

1. The old tsarist power, which represented only a handful of feudalist landowners who commanded the entire state machinery (the army, the police, and the bureaucracy), has been overthrown and removed, but not completely destroyed. The monarchy has not been formally abolished; the Romanov gang continues to hatch monarchist intrigues. The vast landed possessions of the feudalist squirearchy have not been abolished.

2. State power in Russia has passed into the hands of a new *class*, namely, the bourgeoisie and landowners who had become bourgeois. *To this extent* the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia is completed.

Having come to power, the bourgeoisie has formed a bloc (an alliance) with the overt monarchists, who are notorious for their exceptionally ardent support of Nicholas the Bloody and Stolypin the Hangman in 1906-14 (Guchkov and other politicians to the right of the Cadets[26]). The new bourgeois government of Lvov and Co. has attempted and has begun to negotiate with the Romanovs for the restoration of the monarchy in Russia. Behind a screen of revolutionary phrases, this government is appointing partisans of the old regime to key positions. It is striving to reform the whole machinery of state (the army, the police, and the bureaucracy) as little as possible, and has turned it over to the bourgeoisie. The new government has already begun to hinder

in every way the revolutionary initiative of mass action and the seizure of power by the people *from below*, which is the *sole* guarantee of the real success of the revolution.

Up to now this government has not even fixed a date for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. It is not laying a finger on the landed estates, which form the material foundation of feudal tsarism. This government does not even contemplate starting an investigation into, and making public, the activities of the monopolist financial organisations, the big banks, the syndicates and cartels of the capitalists, etc., or instituting control over them.

The key positions, the decisive ministerial posts in the new government (the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry, i.e., the command over the army, the police, the bureaucracy—the entire apparatus for oppressing the people) are held by outright monarchists and supporters of the system of big landed estates. The Cadets, those day-old republicans, republicans against their own will, have been assigned minor posts, having no direct relation to the *command* over the people or to the apparatus of state power. A. Kerensky, a Trudovik[27] and "would-be socialist", has no function whatsoever, except to lull the vigilance and attention of the people with sonorous phrases.

For all these reasons, the new bourgeois government does not deserve the confidence of the proletariat even in the sphere of internal policy, and no support of this government by the proletariat is admissible.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

3. In the field of foreign policy, which has now been brought to the forefront by objective circumstances, the new government is a government for the continuation of the imperialist war, a war that is being waged in alliance with the imperialist powers—Britain, France, and others—for division of the capitalist spoils and for subjugating small and weak nations.

Subordinated to the interests of Russian capitalism and its powerful protector and master—Anglo-French imperialist capitalism, the wealthiest in the world, the new govern-

ment, notwithstanding the wishes expressed in no uncertain fashion on behalf of the obvious majority of the peoples of Russia through the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, has taken no real steps to put an end to the slaughter of peoples for the interests of the capitalists. It has not even published the secret treaties of an obviously predatory character (for the partition of Persia, the plunder of China, the plunder of Turkey, the partition of Austria, the annexation of Eastern Prussia, the annexation of the German colonies, etc.), which, as everybody knows, bind Russia to Anglo-French predatory imperialist capital. It has *confirmed* these treaties concluded by tsarism, which for centuries robbed and oppressed more nations than other tyrants and despots, and which not only oppressed, but also disgraced and demoralised the Great-Russian nation by making it an executioner of other nations.

The new government has confirmed these shameful depredatory treaties and has not proposed an immediate armistice to all the belligerent nations, in spite of the clearly expressed demand of the majority of the peoples of Russia, voiced through the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It has evaded the issue with the help of solemn, sonorous, bombastic, but absolutely empty declarations and phrases, which, in the mouths of bourgeois diplomats, have always served, and still serve, to deceive the trustful and naïve masses of the oppressed people.

4. Not only, therefore, is the new government unworthy of the slightest confidence in the field of foreign policy, but to go on demanding that it should proclaim the will of the peoples of Russia for peace, that it should renounce annexations, and so on and so forth, is in practice merely to deceive the people, to inspire them with false hopes and to retard the clarification of their minds. It is indirectly to reconcile them to the continuation of a war the true social character of which is determined not by pious wishes, but by the class character of the government that wages the war, by the connection between the class represented by this government and the imperialist finance capital of Russia, Britain, France, etc., by *the real and actual policy* which that class is pursuing.

THE PECULIAR NATURE OF THE DUAL POWER AND ITS CLASS SIGNIFICANCE

5. The main feature of our revolution, a feature that most imperatively demands thoughtful consideration, is the *dual power* which arose in the very first days after the triumph of the revolution.

This dual power is evident in the existence of *two* governments: one is the main, the real, the actual government of the bourgeoisie, the "Provisional Government" of Lvov and Co., which holds in its hands all the organs of power; the other is a supplementary and parallel government, a "controlling" government in the shape of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which holds no organs of state power, but directly rests on the support of an obvious and indisputable majority of the people, on the armed workers and soldiers.

The class origin and the class significance of this dual power is the following: the Russian revolution of March 1917 not only swept away the whole tsarist monarchy, not only transferred the entire power to the bourgeoisie, but also *moved close towards* a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The Petrograd and the other, the local, Soviets constitute precisely such a dictatorship (that is, a power resting not on the law but directly on the force of armed masses of the population), a dictatorship precisely of the above-mentioned classes.

6. The second highly important feature of the Russian revolution is the fact that the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, which, as everything goes to show, enjoys the confidence of most of the local Soviets, is *voluntarily* transferring state power to the bourgeoisie and *its* Provisional Government, is voluntarily *ceding* supremacy to the latter, having entered into an agreement to support it, and is limiting its own role to that of an observer, a supervisor of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (the date for which has not even been announced as yet by the Provisional Government).

This remarkable feature, unparalleled in history in such a form, has led to the *interlocking of two* dictatorships: the

dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (for the government of Lvov and Co. is a dictatorship, i.e., a power based not on the law, not on the previously expressed will of the people, but on seizure by force, accomplished by a definite class, namely, the bourgeoisie) and the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies).

There is not the slightest doubt that such an "interlocking" *cannot* last long. Two powers *cannot exist* in a state. One of them is bound to pass away; and the entire Russian bourgeoisie is already trying its hardest everywhere and in every way to keep out and weaken the Soviets, to reduce them to nought, and to establish the undivided power of the bourgeoisie.

The dual power merely expresses a *transitional* phase in the revolution's development, when it has gone farther than the ordinary bourgeois-democratic revolution, *but has not yet reached* a "pure" dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The class significance (and the class explanation) of this transitional and unstable situation is this: like all revolutions, our revolution required the greatest heroism and self-sacrifice on the part of the people for the struggle against tsarism; it also immediately *drew* unprecedentedly vast numbers of ordinary citizens *into the movement*.

From the point of view of science and practical politics, one of the chief symptoms of *every* real revolution is the unusually rapid, sudden, and abrupt increase in the number of "ordinary citizens" who begin to participate actively, independently and effectively in political life and in the *organisation of the state*.

Such is the case in Russia. Russia at present is seething. Millions and tens of millions of people, who had been politically dormant for ten years and politically crushed by the terrible oppression of tsarism and by inhuman toil for the landowners and capitalists, *have awakened and taken eagerly* to politics. And who are these millions and tens of millions? For the most part small proprietors, petty bourgeois, people standing midway between the capitalists and the wage-workers Russia is the most petty-bourgeois of all European countries.

A gigantic petty-bourgeois wave has swept over everything and overwhelmed the class-conscious proletariat, not only by force of numbers but also ideologically; that is, it has infected and imbued very wide circles of workers with the petty-bourgeois political outlook.

The petty bourgeoisie are in real life dependent upon the bourgeoisie, for they live like masters and not like proletarians (from the point of view of their *place* in social *production*) and follow the bourgeoisie in their outlook.

An attitude of unreasoning trust in the capitalists—the worst foes of peace and socialism—characterises the politics of the *popular masses* in Russia at the present moment; this is the fruit that has *grown* with revolutionary rapidity on the social and economic soil of the most petty-bourgeois of all European countries. This is the *class* basis for the "*agreement*" between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (I emphasise that I am referring not so much to the formal agreement as to *actual* support, a tacit agreement, the surrender of power inspired by unreasoning trust), an agreement which has given the Guchkovs a fat piece—real power—and the Soviet merely promises and honours (for the time being), flattery, phrases, assurances, and the bowings and scrapings of the Kerenskys.

On the other side we have the inadequate numerical strength of the proletariat in Russia and its insufficient class-consciousness and organisation.

All the Narodnik parties, including the Socialist-Revolutionaries, have always been petty-bourgeois. This is also true of the party of the Organising Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.). The non-party revolutionaries (Steklov and others) have similarly yielded to the tide, or have not been able to stand up to it, have not had the time to do it.

THE PECULIAR NATURE OF THE TACTICS WHICH FOLLOW FROM THE ABOVE

7. For the Marxist, who must reckon with objective facts, with the masses and classes, and not with individuals and so on, the peculiar nature of the actual situation as

described above must determine the peculiar nature of the tactics for the *present* moment.

This peculiarity of the situation calls, in the first place, for the pouring of vinegar and bile into the sweet water of revolutionary-democratic phraseology" (as my fellow member on the Central Committee of our Party, Teodorovich, so aptly put it at yesterday's session of the All-Russia Congress of Railwaymen in Petrograd). Our work must be one of criticism, of *explaining* the mistakes of the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic parties, of preparing and welding the elements of a *consciously* proletarian, Communist Party, and of *curing* the proletariat of the "general" petty-bourgeois intoxication.

This *seems* to be "nothing more" than propaganda work, but in reality it is most *practical revolutionary* work; for there is no advancing a revolution that has come to a standstill, that has choked itself with phrases, and that keeps 'marking time", *not because* of external obstacles, *not because of the violence* of the bourgeoisie (Guchkov is still only threatening to employ violence against the soldier mass), but *because* of the unreasoning trust of the people.

Only by overcoming this unreasoning trust (and we can and should overcome it only ideologically, by comradely persuasion, by pointing to the *lessons of experience*) can we set ourselves free from the prevailing *orgy of revolutionary phrase-mongering* and really stimulate the consciousness both of the proletariat and of the mass in general, as well as their bold and determined initiative *in the localities*—the independent realisation, development and consolidation of liberties, democracy, and the principle of people's ownership of all the land.

8. The world-wide experience of bourgeois and landowner governments has evolved *two* methods of keeping the people in subjection. The first is violence. Nicholas Romanov I, nicknamed Nicholas of the Big Stick, and Nicholas II, the Bloody, demonstrated to the Russian people the maximum of what can and cannot he done in the way of these hangmen's practices. But there is another method, best developed by the British and French bourgeoisie, who "learned their lesson" in a series of great revolutions and revolutionary movements of the masses. It is the method of deception,

flattery, fine phrases, promises by the million, petty sops, and concessions of the unessential while retaining the essential.

The peculiar feature of the present situation in Russia is the transition at a dizzy speed from the first method to the second, from violent oppression of the people to *flattering* and deceiving the people by promises. Vaska the Cat listens, but goes on eating.[28] Milyukov and Guchkov are holding power, they are protecting the profits of the capitalists, conducting an imperialist war in the interests of Russian and Anglo-French capital, and trying to get away with promises, declamation and bombastic statements in reply to the speeches of "cooks" like Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Steklov, who threaten, exhort, conjure, beseech, demand and proclaim.... Vaska the Cat listens, but goes on eating.

But from day to day trustful lack of reasoning and unreasoning trust will be falling away, especially among the proletarians and *poor* peasants, who are being taught by experience (by their social and economic position) to distrust the capitalists.

The leaders of the petty bourgeoisie "must" teach the people to trust the bourgeoisie. The proletarians must teach the people to distrust the bourgeoisie.

REVOLUTIONARY DEFENCISM AND ITS CLASS SIGNIFICANCE

9. *Revolutionary defencism* must be regarded as the most important, the most striking manifestation of the petty-bourgeois wave that has swept over "nearly everything". It is the worst enemy of the further progress and success of the Russian revolution.

Those who have yielded on this point and have been unable to extricate themselves are lost to the revolution. But the masses yield in a different way from the leaders, and they extricate themselves *differently*, by a different course of development, by different means.

Revolutionary defencism is, on the one hand, a result of the deception of the masses by the bourgeoisie, a result of the trustful lack of reasoning on the part of the peasants

and a section of the workers; it is, on the other, an expression of the interests and point of view of the small proprietor, who is to some extent interested in annexations and bank profits, and who "sacredly" guards the traditions of tsarism, which demoralised the Great Russians by making them do a hangman's work against the other peoples.

The bourgeoisie deceives the people by working on their noble pride in the revolution and by pretending that the *social and political* character of the war, as far as Russia is concerned, underwent a change because of this stage of the revolution, because of the substitution of the near-republic of Guchkov and Milyukov for the tsarist monarchy. And the people believed it—for a time—largely owing to age-old prejudices, which made them look upon the other peoples of Russia, i.e., the non-Great Russians, as something in the nature of a property and private estate of the Great Russians. This vile demoralisation of the Great-Russian people by tsarism which taught them to regard the other peoples as something inferior, something belonging "by right" to Great Russia, could not disappear *instantly*.

What is required of us is the *ability* to explain to the masses that the social and political character of the war is determined not by the "good will" of individuals or groups, or even of nations, but by the position of the *class* which conducts the war, by the class *policy* of which the war is a continuation, by the *ties* of capital, which is the dominant economic force in modern society, by the *imperialist character* of international capital, by Russia's dependence in finance, banking and diplomacy upon Britain, France, and so on. To explain this skilfully in a way the people would understand *is not easy*; none of us would be able to do it at once without committing errors.

But this, and only this, must be the aim or, rather, the message of our propaganda. The slightest concession to revolutionary defencism is *a betrayal of socialism*, a complete renunciation of *internationalism*, no matter by what fine phrases and "practical" considerations it may be justified.

The slogan "Down with the War!" is, of course, correct. But it fails to take into account the specific nature of the tasks of the present moment and the necessity of *approach-*

ing the broad mass of the people *in a different way*. It reminds me of the slogan "Down with the Tsar!" with which the inexperienced agitator of the "good old days" went simply and directly to the countryside—and got a beating for his pains. The mass believers in revolutionary defencism are *honest*, not in the personal, but in the class sense, i.e., they belong to *classes* (workers and the peasant poor) which *in actual fact* have nothing to gain from annexations and the subjugation of other peoples. This is nothing like the bourgeois and the "intellectual" fraternity, who know very well that you *cannot* renounce annexations without renouncing the rule of capital, and who unscrupulously deceive the people with fine phrases, with unlimited promises and endless assurances.

The rank-and-file believer in defencism regards the matter in the simple way of the man in the street: "I don't want annexations, but the Germans are 'going for' *me*, therefore I'm defending a just cause and not any kind of imperialist interests at all." To a man like this it must be explained again and again that it is not a question of his personal wishes, but of mass, *class*, political relations and conditions, of the connection between the war and the interests of capital and the international network of banks, and so forth. Only such a struggle against defencism will be serious and will promise success—perhaps not a very rapid success, but one that will be real and enduring.

HOW CAN THE WAR BE ENDED?

10. The war cannot be ended "at will". It cannot be ended by the decision of one of the belligerents. It cannot be ended by "sticking your bayonet into the ground", as one soldier, a defencist, expressed it.

The war cannot be ended by an "agreement" among the socialists of the various countries, by the "action" of the proletarians of all countries, by the "will" of the peoples, and so forth. All the phrases of this kind, which fill the articles of the defencist, semi-defencist, and semi-internationalist papers as well as innumerable resolutions, appeals, manifestos, and the resolutions of the Soviet of Soldiers.'

Россійская Соціалъ-Демократическая Рабочая Партія.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Н. Ленинъ.

Задачи пролетаріата въ нашей революціи.

(ПРОЕКТЪ ПЛАТФОРМЫ ПРОЛЕТАРСКОЙ ПАРТІИ).

Петербургъ.
1917.—Сентябрь.

Типографія „Трудъ", Т-во „Рабочая Печать". Кавалергардская, 40.

The cover of Lenin's pamphlet
The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution, 1917

Reduced

and Workers' Deputies—all such phrases are nothing but idle, innocent and pious wishes of the petty bourgeois. There is nothing more harmful than phrases like "ascertaining the will of the peoples for peace", like the *sequence* of revolutionary actions of the proletariat (after the Russian proletariat comes the turn of the German), etc. All this is Blancism, fond dreams, a playing at "political campaigning", and in reality just a repetition of the fable of Vaska the Cat.

The war is not a product of the evil will of rapacious capitalists, although it is undoubtedly being fought *only* in their interests and they alone are being enriched by it. The war is a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of its billions of threads and connections. It is *impossible* to slip out of the imperialist war and achieve a democratic, non-coercive peace without overthrowing the power of capital and transferring state power to *another* class, the proletariat.

The Russian revolution of February-March 1917 was the beginning of the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war. This revolution took the *first* step towards ending the war; but it requires a *second* step, namely, the transfer of state power to the proletariat, to make the end of the war a *certainty*. This will be the beginning of a "break-through" on a world-wide scale, a break-through in the front of capitalist interests; and only by breaking through *this* front *can* the proletariat save mankind from the horrors of war and endow it with the blessings of peace.

It is directly to such a "break-through" in the front of capitalism that the Russian revolution has *already* brought the Russian proletariat by creating the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

A NEW TYPE OF STATE EMERGING FROM OUR REVOLUTION

11. The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and other Deputies are not understood, not only in the sense that their class significance, their role in the *Russian* revolution, is not clear to the majority. They are not understood also in the sense that they constitute a new form or rather a new *type of state*.

The most perfect, the most advanced type of bourgeois state is the *parliamentary democratic republic*: power is vested in parliament; the state machine, the apparatus and organ of administration, is of the customary kind: the standing army, the police, and the bureaucracy—which in practice is undisplaceable, is privileged and stands *above* the people.

Since the end of the nineteenth century, however, revolutionary epochs have advanced a *higher* type of democratic state, a state which in certain respects, as Engels put it, ceases to be a state, is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word".[29] This is a state of the Paris Commune type, one in which a standing army and police divorced from the people are *replaced* by the direct arming of the people themselves. It is *this feature* that constitutes the very essence of the Commune, which has been so misrepresented and slandered by the bourgeois writers, and to which has been erroneously ascribed, among other things, the intention of immediately "introducing" socialism.

This is the type of state which the Russian revolution *began* to create in 1905 and in 1917. A Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies, united in an All-Russia Constituent Assembly of people's representatives or in a Council of Soviets, etc., is what is *already being realised* in our country now, at this juncture. It is being realised by the initiative of the nation's millions, who are creating a democracy on their own, *in their own way*, without waiting until the Cadet professors draft their legislative bills for a parliamentary bourgeois republic, or until the pedants and routine-worshippers of petty-bourgeois "Social-Democracy", like Mr. Plekhanov or Kautsky, stop distorting the Marxist teaching on the state.

Marxism differs from anarchism in that it recognises the *need* for a state and for state power in the period of revolution in general, and in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism in particular.

Marxism differs from the petty-bourgeois, opportunist "Social-Democratism" of Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. in that it recognises that what is required during these two periods is *not* a state of the usual parliamentary bourgeois republican type, but a state of the Paris Commune type.

The main distinctions between a state of the latter type and the old state are as follows.

It is quite easy (as history proves) to revert from a parliamentary bourgeois republic to a monarchy, for all the machinery of oppression—the army, the police, and the bureaucracy—is left intact. The Commune and the Soviet *smash* that machinery and do away with it.

The parliamentary bourgeois republic hampers and stifles the independent political life of the *masses*, their direct participation in the *democratic* organisation of the life of the state from the bottom up. The opposite is the case with the Soviets.

The latter reproduce the type of state which was being evolved by the Paris Commune and which Marx described as "the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour".[30]

We are usually told that the Russian people are not yet prepared for the "introduction" of the Commune. This was the argument of the serf-owners when they claimed that the peasants were not prepared for emancipation. The Commune, i.e., the Soviets, does not "introduce", does not intend to "introduce", and must not introduce *any* reforms which have not absolutely matured both in economic reality and in the minds of the overwhelming majority of the people. The deeper the economic collapse and the crisis produced by the war, the more urgent becomes the need for the most perfect political form, which will *facilitate* the healing of the terrible wounds inflicted on mankind by the war. The less the organisational experience of the Russian people, the more resolutely must we *proceed* to organisational development by the *people themselves* and not merely by the bourgeois politicians and "well-placed" bureaucrats.

The sooner we shed the old prejudices of pseudo-Marxism, a Marxism falsified by Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co., the more actively we set about helping the people to organise Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies everywhere and immediately, and helping the latter to take life *in its entirety* under their control, and the longer Lvov and Co. delay the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the easier will it be for the people (through the medium of the Constituent

Assembly, or independently of it, if Lvov delays its convocation too long) to cast their decision in favour of a republic of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. Errors in the new work of organisational development by the people themselves are at first inevitable; but it is better to make mistakes and go forward than to *wait* until the professors of law summoned by Mr. Lvov draft their laws for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, for the perpetuation of the parliamentary bourgeois republic and for the strangling of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies.

If we organise ourselves and conduct our propaganda skilfully, not only the proletarians, but nine-tenths of the peasants will be opposed to the restoration of the police, will be opposed to an undisplaceable and privileged bureaucracy and to an army divorced from the people. And that is all the new type of state stands for.

12. The substitution of a people's militia for the police is a reform that follows from the entire course of the revolution and that is now being introduced in most parts of Russia. We must explain to the people that in most of the bourgeois revolutions of the usual type, this reform was always extremely short-lived, and that the bourgeoisie—even the most democratic and republican—restored the police of the old, tsarist type, a police divorced from the people, commanded by the bourgeoisie and capable of oppressing the people in every way.

There is only one way to *prevent* the restoration of the police, and that is to create a people's militia and to fuse it with the army (the standing army to be replaced by the arming of the entire people). Service in this militia should extend to all citizens of both sexes between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five without exception, if these tentatively suggested age limits may be taken as indicating the participation of adolescents and old people. Capitalists must pay their workers, servants, etc., for days devoted to public service in the militia. Unless women are brought to take an independent part not only in political life generally, but also in daily and universal public service, it is no use talking about full and stable democracy, let alone socialism. And such "police" functions as care of the sick and of

homeless children, food inspection, etc., will never be satisfactorily discharged until women are on an equal footing with men, not merely nominally but in reality.

The tasks which the proletariat must put before the people in order to safeguard, consolidate and develop the revolution are prevention of the restoration of the police and enlistment of the organisational forces of the entire people in forming a people's militia.

THE AGRARIAN AND NATIONAL PROGRAMMES

13. At the present moment we cannot say for certain whether a mighty agrarian revolution will develop in the Russian countryside in the near future. We cannot say exactly how profound the class cleavage is among the peasants, which has undoubtedly grown more profound of late as a division into agricultural labourers, wage-workers and poor peasants ("semi-proletarians"), on the one hand, and wealthy and middle peasants (capitalists and petty capitalists), on the other. Such questions will be, and can be, decided only by experience.

Being the party of the proletariat, however, we are unquestionably in duty bound not only immediately to advance an agrarian (land) programme but also to advocate practical measures which can be immediately realised *in the interests* of the peasant agrarian revolution in Russia.

We must demand the nationalisation of *all* the land, i.e., that all the land in the state should become the property of the central state power. This power must fix the size, etc., of the resettlement land fund, pass legislation for the conservation of forests, for land improvement, etc., and absolutely prohibit any middlemen to interpose themselves between the owner of the land, i.e., the state, and the tenant, i.e., the tiller (prohibit all subletting of land). However, the *disposal* of the land, the determination of the *local regulations* governing ownership and tenure of land, must in no case be placed in the hands of bureaucrats and officials, but wholly and exclusively in the hands of the regional and local *Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.*

In order to improve grain production techniques and increase output, and in order to develop rational cultivation on a large scale under public control, we must strive within the peasants' committees to secure the transformation of every confiscated landed estate into a large model farm controlled by the *Soviet of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies*.

In order to counteract the petty-bourgeois phrase-mongering and the policy prevailing among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, particularly the idle talk about "subsistence" standards or "labour" standards, "socialisation of the land", etc., the party of the proletariat must make it clear that small-scale farming under commodity production *cannot* save mankind from poverty and oppression.

Without necessarily splitting the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies at once, the party of the proletariat must explain the need for organising separate Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and separate Soviets of deputies from the poor (semi-proletarian) peasants, or, at least, for holding regular separate conferences of deputies of *this class status* in the shape of separate groups or parties within the general Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. Otherwise all the honeyed petty-bourgeois talk of the Narodniks[31] regarding the peasants in general will serve as a shield for the deception of the propertyless mass by the wealthy peasants, who are merely a variety of *capitalists*.

To counteract the bourgeois-liberal or purely bureaucratic sermons preached by many Socialist-Revolutionaries and Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, who advise the peasants not to seize the landed estates and not to start the agrarian reform pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the party of the proletariat must urge the peasants to carry out the agrarian reform at once on their own, and to confiscate the landed estates immediately, upon the decisions of the peasants' deputies in the localities.

At the same time, it is most important to insist on the necessity of *increasing* food production for the soldiers at the front and for the towns, and on the absolute inadmissibility of causing any damage or injury to livestock, implements, machinery, buildings, etc.

14. As regards the national question, the proletarian party first of all must advocate the proclamation and immediate realisation of complete freedom of secession from Russia for all the nations and peoples who were oppressed by tsarism, or who were forcibly joined to, or forcibly kept within the boundaries of, the state, i.e., annexed.

All statements, declarations and manifestos concerning renunciation of annexations that are not accompanied by the realisation of the right of secession in practice, are nothing but bourgeois deception of the people, or else pious petty-bourgeois wishes.

The proletarian party strives to create as large a state as possible, for this is to the advantage of the working people; it strives to *draw* nations *closer together*, and bring about their *further fusion*; but it desires to achieve this aim not by violence, but exclusively through a free fraternal union of the workers and the working people of all nations.

The more democratic the Russian republic, and the more successfully it organises itself into a Republic of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the more powerful will be the force of *voluntary* attraction to such a republic on the part of the working people of *all* nations.

Complete freedom of secession, the broadest local (and national) autonomy, and elaborate guarantees of the rights of national minorities—this is the programme of the revolutionary proletariat.

NATIONALISATION OF THE BANKS AND CAPITALIST SYNDICATES

15. Under no circumstances can the party of the proletariat set itself the aim of "introducing" socialism in a country of small peasants so long as the overwhelming majority of the population has not come to realise the need for a socialist revolution.

But only bourgeois sophists, hiding behind "near-Marxist" catchwords, can deduce from this truth a justification of the policy of postponing immediate revolutionary measures, the time for which is fully ripe; measures which

have been frequently *resorted to during the war by a number of bourgeois states*, and which are absolutely indispensable in order to combat impending total economic disorganisation and famine.

Such measures as the nationalisation of the land, of all the banks and capitalist syndicates, or, at least, the *immediate* establishment of the *control* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc., over them—measures which do not in any way constitute the "introduction" of socialism—must be absolutely insisted on, and, whenever possible, carried out in a revolutionary way. Without such measures, which are only steps towards socialism, and which are perfectly feasible economically, it will be impossible to heal the wounds caused by the war and to avert the impending collapse; and the party of the revolutionary proletariat will never hesitate to lay hands on the fabulous profits of the capitalists and bankers, who are enriching themselves on the war in a particularly scandalous manner.

THE SITUATION WITHIN THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

16. The international obligations of the working class of Russia are precisely now coming to the forefront with particular force.

Only lazy people do not swear by internationalism these days. Even the chauvinist defencists, even Plekhanov and Potresov, even Kerensky, call themselves internationalists. It becomes the duty of the proletarian party all the more urgently, therefore, to clearly, precisely and definitely counterpose internationalism in deed to internationalism in word.

Mere appeals to the workers of all countries, empty assurances of devotion to internationalism, direct or indirect attempts to fix a "sequence" of action by the revolutionary proletariat in the various belligerent countries, laborious efforts to conclude "agreements" between the socialists of the belligerent countries *on the question* of the revolutionary struggle, all the fuss over the summoning of socialist congresses *for the purpose* of a peace campaign, etc., etc.—no

matter how sincere the authors of such ideas, attempts, and plans may be—amount, as far as their *objective*-significance is concerned, to mere phrase-mongering, and *at best* are innocent and pious wishes, fit only to conceal the *deception* of the people by the chauvinists. The *French* social-chauvinists, who are the most adroit and accomplished in methods of parliamentary hocus-pocus, have long since broken the record for ranting and resonant pacifist and internationalist phrases *coupled with* the incredibly brazen betrayal of socialism and the International, the acceptance of posts in governments which conduct the imperialist war, the voting of credits *or loans* (as Chkheidze, Skobelev, Tsereteli and Steklov have been doing recently in Russia), opposition to the revolutionary struggle in *their own country*, etc., etc.

Good people often forget the brutal and savage setting of the imperialist world war. This setting does not tolerate phrases, and mocks at innocent and pious wishes.

There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism, and that is—working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in *one's own* country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy, and material aid) *this struggle*, this, *and only this*, line, in *every* country without exception.

Everything else is deception and Manilovism.[32]

During the two odd years of the war the international socialist and working-class movement in *every* country has evolved three trends. Whoever ignores *reality* and refuses to recognise the existence of these three trends, to analyse them, to fight consistently for the trend that is really internationalist, is doomed to impotence, helplessness and errors.

The three trends are:

1) The social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in word and chauvinists in deed, people who recognise "defence of the fatherland" in an imperialist war (and above all in the present imperialist war).

These people are our *class* enemies. They have gone over to the bourgeoisie.

They are the majority of the official leaders of the official Social-Democratic parties in *all* countries—Plekhanov

and Co. in Russia, the Scheidemanns in Germany, Renaudel, Guesde and Sembat in France, Bissolati and Co. in Italy, Hyndman, the Fabians[33] and the Labourites (the leaders of the "Labour Party") in Britain, Branting and Co. in Sweden, Troelstra and his party in Holland, Stauning and his party in Denmark, Victor Berger and the other "defenders of the fatherland" in America, and so forth.

2) The second trend, known as the "Centre", consists of people who vacillate between the social-chauvinists and the true internationalists.

The "Centre" all vow and declare that they are Marxists and internationalists, that they are for peace, for bringing every kind of "pressure" to bear upon the governments, for "demanding" in every way that their own government should "ascertain the will of the people for peace", that they are for all sorts of peace campaigns, for peace without annexations, etc., etc.—*and for peace with the social-chauvinists*. The "Centre" is for "unity", the Centre is opposed to a split.

The "Centre" is a realm of honeyed petty-bourgeois phrases, of internationalism in word and cowardly opportunism and fawning on the social-chauvinists in deed.

The crux of the matter is that the "Centre" is not convinced of the necessity for a revolution against one's own government; it does not preach revolution; it does not carry on a whole-hearted revolutionary struggle; and in order to evade such a struggle it resorts to the tritest ultra-"Marxist"-sounding *excuses*.

The social-chauvinists are our *class enemies*, they are *bourgeois* within the working-class movement. They represent a stratum, or groups, or sections of the working class which *objectively* have been bribed by the bourgeoisie (by better wages, positions of honour, etc.), and which help *their own* bourgeoisie to plunder and oppress small and weak peoples and to fight *for* the division of the capitalist spoils.

The "Centre" consists of routine-worshippers, eroded by the canker of legality, corrupted by the parliamentary atmosphere, etc., bureaucrats accustomed to snug positions and soft jobs. Historically and economically speaking, they are not a *separate* stratum but represent only a *transition* from a past phase of the working-class movement—the phase

between 1871 and 1914, which gave much that is valuable to the proletariat, particularly in the indispensable art of slow, sustained and systematic organisational work on a large and very large scale—to a new *phase* that became *objectively* essential with the outbreak of the first imperialist world war, which inaugurated *the era of social revolution*.

The chief leader and spokesman of the "Centre" is Karl Kautsky, the most outstanding authority in the Second International (1889-1914), since August 1914 a model of utter bankruptcy as a Marxist, the embodiment of unheard-of spinelessness, and the most wretched vacillations and betrayals. This "Centrist" trend includes Kautsky, Haase, Ledebour and the so-called workers' or labour group[34] in the Reichstag; in France it includes Longuet, Pressemane and the so-called minoritaires[35] (Mensheviks) in general; in Britain, Philip Snowden, Ramsay MacDonald and many other leaders of the Independent Labour Party,[36] and some leaders of the British Socialist Party[37]; Morris Hillquit and many others in the United States; Turati, Trèves, Modigliani and others in Italy; Robert Grimm and others in Switzerland; Victor Adler and Co. in Austria; the party of the Organising Committee, Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze, Tsereteli and others in Russia, and so forth.

Naturally, at times individuals unconsciously drift from the social-chauvinist to the "Centrist" position, and vice versa. Every Marxist knows that classes are distinct, even though individuals may move freely from one class to another; similarly, *trends* in political life are distinct in spite of the fact that individuals may change freely from one trend to another, and in spite of all attempts and efforts to *amalgamate* trends.

3) The third trend, that of the true internationalists, is best represented by the "Zimmerwald Left".[38] (We reprint as a supplement its manifesto of September 1915, to enable the reader to learn of the inception of this trend at first hand.)

Its distinctive feature is its complete break with both social-chauvinism and "Centrism", and its gallant revolutionary struggle against *its own* imperialist government and *its own* imperialist bourgeoisie. Its principle is: "Our chief enemy is at home." It wages a ruthless struggle against

honeyed social-pacifist phrases (a social-pacifist is a socialist in word and a bourgeois pacifist in deed; bourgeois pacifists dream of an everlasting peace *without* the overthrow of the yoke and domination of capital) and against all *subterfuges* employed to deny the possibility, or the appropriateness, or the timeliness of a proletarian revolutionary struggle and of a proletarian socialist revolution *in connection* with the present war.

The most outstanding representative of this trend in Germany is the Spartacus group or the *Internationale* group,[39] to which Karl Liebknecht belongs. Karl Liebknecht is a most celebrated representative of this trend and of the *new*, and genuine, proletarian International.

Karl Liebknecht called upon the workers and soldiers of Germany to *turn their guns* against *their own* government. Karl Liebknecht did that openly from the rostrum of parliament (the Reichstag). He then went to a demonstration in Potsdamer Platz, one of the largest public squares in Berlin, with illegally printed leaflets proclaiming the slogan "Down with the Government!" He was arrested and sentenced to *hard labour*. He is now serving his term in a German convict prison, like *hundreds*, if not thousands, of other *true* German socialists who have been imprisoned for their anti-war activities.

Karl Liebknecht in his speeches and letters mercilessly attacked not only *his own* Plekhanovs and Potresovs (Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co.), *but also his own Centrists*, his own Chkheidzes and Tseretelis (Kautsky, Haase, Ledebour and Co.).

Karl Liebknecht and his friend Otto Rühle, two out of one hundred and ten deputies, violated discipline, destroyed the "unity" with the "Centre" and the chauvinists, and *went against all of them*. Liebknecht *alone* represents socialism, the proletarian cause, the proletarian revolution. *All* the rest of German Social-Democracy, to quote the apt words of Rosa Luxemburg (also a member and one of the leaders of the Spartacus group), is a "*stinking corpse*".

Another group of true internationalists in Germany is that of the Bremen paper *Arbeiterpolitik*.

Closest to the internationalists in deed are: in France, Loriot and his friends (Bourderon and Merrheim have

slid down to social-pacifism), as well as the Frenchman Henri Guilbeaux, who publishes in Geneva the journal *Demain*; in Britain, the newspaper *The Trade Unionist*, and *some* of the members of the British Socialist Party and of the Independent Labour Party (for instance, Russel Williams, who openly called for a break with the leaders who have *betrayed* socialism), the Scottish socialist schoolteacher *MacLean*, who was sentenced to *hard labour* by the bourgeois government of Britain for his revolutionary fight against the war, and hundreds of British socialists who are in jail for the same offence. They, and they alone, are internationalists *in deed*. In the United States, the Socialist Labour Party[40] and those within the opportunist Socialist Party[41] who in January 1917 began publication of the paper, *The Internationalist*; in Holland, the Party of the "Tribunists"[42] which publishes the paper *De Tribune* (Pannekoek, Herman Gorter, Wijnkoop, and Henriette Roland-Holst, who, although Centrist at Zimmerwald, has now joined our ranks); in Sweden, the Party of the Young, or the Left,[43] led by Lindhagen, Ture Nerman, Carleson, Ström and Z. Höglund, who at Zimmerwald was personally active in the organisation of the "Zimmerwald Left", and who is now in prison for his revolutionary fight against the war; in Denmark, Trier and his friends who have left the now purely *bourgeois* "Social-Democratic" Party of Denmark, headed by the *Minister* Stauning; in Bulgaria, the "Tesnyaki"[44]; in Italy, the nearest are Constantino Lazzari, secretary of the party, and Serrati, editor of the central organ, *Avanti!*[45]; in Poland, Radek, Hanecki and other leaders of the Social-Democrats united under the "Regional Executive", and Rosa Luxemburg, Tyszka and other leaders of the Social-Democrats united under the "Chief Executive"[46]; in Switzerland, those of the Left who drew up the argument for the "referendum" (January 1917) in order to fight the social-chauvinists and the "Centre" in *their own* country and who at the Zurich Cantonal Socialist Convention, held at Töss on February 11, 1917, moved a consistently revolutionary resolution against the war; in Austria, the young Left-wing friends of Friedrich Adler, who acted partly through the Karl Marx Club in Vienna, now closed by the arch-reactionary Austrian Government, which is ruining

Adler's life for his heroic though ill-considered shooting at a minister, and so on.

It is not a question of shades of opinion, which certainly exist even among the Lefts. It is a question of *trend*. The thing is that it is not easy to be an internationalist in deed during a terrible imperialist war. Such people are few; but it is on such people *alone* that the future of socialism depends; they *alone* are *the leaders of the people*, and not their corrupters.

The distinction between the reformists and the revolutionaries, among the Social-Democrats, and socialists generally, was objectively bound to undergo a change under the conditions of the imperialist war. Those who confine themselves to "demanding" that the bourgeois governments should conclude peace or "ascertain the will of the peoples for peace", etc., are *actually* slipping into reforms. For, objectively, *the problem of the war* can be solved only in a *revolutionary way*.

There is no possibility of this war ending in a democratic, non-coercive peace or of the people being relieved of the burden of *billions* paid in interest to the capitalists, who have made fortunes out of the war, except through a revolution of the proletariat.

The most varied reforms can and must be demanded of the bourgeois governments, but one cannot, without sinking to Manilovism and reformism, demand that people and classes entangled by the thousands of threads of imperialist capital should *tear* those threads. And unless they are torn, all talk of a war against war is idle and deceitful prattle.

The "Kautskyites", the "Centre", are revolutionaries in word and reformists in deed, they are internationalists in word and accomplices of the social-chauvinists in deed.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE ZIMMERWALD INTERNATIONAL.— THE NEED FOR FOUNDING A THIRD INTERNATIONAL

17. From the very outset, the Zimmerwald International adopted a vacillating, "Kautskyite", "Centrist" position, which immediately compelled the *Zimmerwald Left* to dissociate itself, to separate itself from the rest, and to

issue *its own* manifesto (published in Switzerland in Russian, German and French).

The chief shortcoming of the Zimmerwald International, and the cause of its *collapse* (for politically and ideologically it has already collapsed), was its vacillation and indecision on such a momentous issue of *crucial* practical significance as that of breaking completely with social-chauvinism and the old social-chauvinist International, headed by Vandervelde and Huysmans at The Hague (Holland), etc.

It is not as yet known in Russia that the Zimmerwald majority *are nothing but Kautskyites*. Yet this is the fundamental fact, one which cannot be ignored, and which is now generally known in Western Europe. Even that chauvinist, that extreme German chauvinist, Heilmann, editor of the ultra-chauvinistic *Chemnitzer Volksstimme* and contributor to Parvus's ultra-chauvinistic *Glocke*[47] (a "Social-Democrat", of course, and an ardent partisan of Social-Democratic "unity"), was compelled to acknowledge in the press that the Centre, or "Kautskyism", and the *Zimmerwald majority* were one and the same thing.

This fact was definitely established at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917. Although social-pacifism was condemned by the Kienthal Manifesto,[48] the *whole* Zimmerwald Right, the *entire* Zimmerwald majority, sank to social-pacifism: Kautsky and Co. in a series of utterances in January and February 1917; Bourderon and Merrheim in France, who cast their votes *in unanimity* with the social-chauvinists for the pacifist resolutions of the Socialist Party (December 1916) and of the Confédération Générale du Travail (the national organisation of the French trade unions, also in December 1916); Turati and Co. in Italy, where the entire party took up a social-pacifist position, while Turati himself, in a speech delivered on December 17, 1916, "slipped" (not by accident, of course) into *nationalist* phrases whitewashing the imperialist war.

In January 1917, the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, Robert Grimm, joined the social-chauvinists in *his own* party (Greulich, Pflüger, Gustav Müller and others) *against* the internationalists in deed.

At two conferences of *Zimmerwaldists* from various countries in January and February 1917, this equivocal, double-

faced behaviour of the Zimmerwald majority was formally stigmatised by the Left internationalists of several countries: by Münzenberg, secretary of the international youth organisation and editor of the excellent internationalist publication *Die Jugendinternationale*[49]; by Zinoviev, representative of the Central Committee of our Party; by K. Radek of the Polish Social-Democratic Party (the "Regional Executive"), and by Hartstein, a German Social-Democrat and member of the Spartacus group.

Much is given to the Russian proletariat; nowhere in the world has the working class yet succeeded in developing so much revolutionary energy as in Russia. But to whom much is given, of him much is required.

The Zimmerwald bog can no longer be tolerated. We must not, for the sake of the Zimmerwald "Kautskyites", continue the semi-alliance with the chauvinist International of the Plekhanovs and Scheidemanns. We must break with this International immediately. We must remain in Zimmerwald *only* for purposes of information.

It is we who must found, and right now, without delay, a *new*, revolutionary, proletarian International, or rather, we must not fear to acknowledge publicly that this new International is *already established* and operating.

This is the International of those "internationalists in deed" whom I precisely listed above. They and they alone are representatives of the revolutionary, internationalist mass, and not their corrupters.

And if socialists *of that type* are few, let every Russian worker ask himself whether there were many really class-conscious revolutionaries in Russia *on the eve* of the February-March revolution of 1917.

It is not a question of numbers, but of giving correct expression to the ideas and policies of the truly revolutionary proletariat. The thing is not to "proclaim" internationalism, but to be able to be an internationalist in deed, even when times are most trying.

Let us not deceive ourselves with hopes of agreements and international congresses. As long as the imperialist war is on, international intercourse is held in the iron vise of the military dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie. If even the "republican" Milyukov, who is obliged to

tolerate the parallel government of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, *did not allow Fritz Platten*, the Swiss socialist, secretary of the party, an internationalist and participant in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, to enter Russia in April 1917, in spite of the fact that Platten has a Russian wife and was on his way to visit his wife's relatives, and in spite of the fact that he had taken part in the revolution of 1905 in Riga, for which he had been confined in a Russian prison, had given bail to the tsarist government for his release and wished to recover that bail—if the "republican" Milyukov could *do* such a thing in April 1917 in Russia, one can judge what value can be put on the promises and assurances, the phrases and declarations of the bourgeoisie on the subject of peace without annexations, and so on.

And the arrest of Trotsky by the British Government? And the refusal to allow Martov to leave Switzerland, and the attempt to lure him to Britain, where Trotsky's fate awaits him?

Let us harbour no illusions. We must not deceive ourselves.

To "wait" for international congresses or conferences is simply to *betray* internationalism, since it has been shown that even from Stockholm neither socialists loyal to internationalism *nor even their letters* are allowed to come here, although this is quite possible and although a ferocious military censorship exists.

Our Party must not "wait", but must immediately *found* a Third International. Hundreds of socialists imprisoned in Germany and Britain will then heave a sigh of relief, thousands and thousands of German workers who are now holding strikes and demonstrations that are frightening that scoundrel and brigand, Wilhelm, will learn from *illegal* leaflets of our decision, of our fraternal confidence in Karl Liebknecht, and in him alone, of *our* decision to fight "revolutionary defencism" *even now*; they will read this and be strengthened in their revolutionary internationalism.

To whom much is given, of him much is required. No other country in the world is as free as Russia is *now*. Let us make use of this freedom, not to advocate support for the bourgeoisie, or bourgeois "revolutionary defencism", but in a bold, honest, proletarian, Liebknecht way *to*

found the Third International, an International uncompromisingly hostile both to the social-chauvinist traitors and to the vacillating "Centrists".

18. After what has been said, there is no need to waste many words explaining that the amalgamation of Social-Democrats in Russia is out of the question.

It is better to remain with one friend only, like Liebknecht, and *that means remaining with the revolutionary proletariat*, than to entertain even for a moment any thought of amalgamation with the party of the Organising Committee, with Chkheidze and Tsereteli, who can tolerate a bloc with Potresov in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, who voted for the loan in the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies,[50] and who have sunk to "defencism".

Let the dead bury their dead.

Whoever wants to *help* the waverers must first stop wavering himself.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE NAME OF OUR PARTY—ONE THAT WILL BE CORRECT SCIENTIFICALLY AND HELP TO CLARIFY THE MIND OF THE PROLETARIAT POLITICALLY?

19. I now come to the final point, the name of our Party. We must call ourselves the *Communist Party*—just as Marx and Engels called themselves.

We must repeat that we are Marxists and that we take as our basis the *Communist Manifesto*, which has been distorted and betrayed by the Social-Democrats on two main points: (1) the working men have no country: "defence of the fatherland" in an imperialist war is a betrayal of socialism; and (2) the Marxist doctrine of the state has been distorted by the Second International.

The name "Social-Democracy" is *scientifically* incorrect, as Marx frequently pointed out, in particular, in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* in 1875, and as Engels reaffirmed in a more popular form in 1894.[51] From capitalism mankind can pass directly only to socialism, i.e., to the social ownership of the means of production and the distribution of products according to the amount of work

performed by each individual. Our Party looks farther ahead: socialism must inevitably evolve gradually into communism, upon the banner of which is inscribed the motto, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs".

That is my first argument.

Here is the second: the second part of the name of our Party (Social-*Democrats*) is also scientifically incorrect. Democracy is a form of *state*, whereas we Marxists are opposed to *every kind* of state.

The leaders of the Second International (1889-1914), Plekhanov, Kautsky and their like, have vulgarised and distorted Marxism.

Marxism differs from anarchism in that it recognises *the need for a state* for the purpose of the transition to socialism; but (and here is where we differ from Kautsky and Co.) *not a state of the type* of the usual parliamentary bourgeois-democratic republic, but a state like the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Soviets of Workers' Deputies of 1905 and 1917.

My third argument: *living reality*, the revolution, has *already actually* established in our country, albeit in a weak and embryonic form, precisely this new type of "state", which is not a state in the proper sense of the word.

This is *already* a matter of the practical action of the people, and not merely a theory of the leaders.

The state in the proper sense of the term is domination over the people by contingents of armed men divorced from the people.

Our *emergent*, new state is also a state, for we too need contingents of armed men, we too need the *strictest* order, and must *ruthlessly* crush by force all attempts at either a tsarist or a Guchkov-bourgeois counter-revolution.

But our *emergent*, new state is *no longer* a state in the proper sense of the term, for in some parts of Russia these contingents of armed men are *the masses themselves*, the entire people, and not certain privileged persons placed over the people, and divorced from the people, and for all practical purposes undisplaceable.

We must look forward, and not backward to the usual bourgeois type of democracy, which consolidated the rule of the bourgeoisie with the aid of the old, *monarchist*

organs of administration, the police, the army and the bureaucracy.

We must look forward to the emergent new democracy, which is already ceasing to be a democracy, for democracy means the domination of the people, and the armed people cannot dominate themselves.

The term democracy is not only scientifically incorrect when applied to a Communist Party; it has now, since March 1917, simply become *blinkers* put on the eyes of the revolutionary people and *preventing* them from boldly and freely, on their own initiative, building up the new: the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and all other Deputies, as *the sole power* in the "state" and as the harbinger of the "withering away" of the state *in every form*.

My fourth argument: we must reckon with the actual situation in which socialism finds itself internationally.

It is not what it was during the years 1871 to 1914, when Marx and Engels knowingly put up with the inaccurate, opportunist term Social-Democracy". For *in those days*, after the defeat of the Paris Commune, history made slow organisational and educational work the task of the day. Nothing else was possible. The anarchists were then (as they are now) fundamentally wrong not only theoretically, but also economically and politically. The anarchists misjudged the character of the times, for they failed to understand the world situation: the worker of Britain corrupted by imperialist profits, the Commune defeated in Paris, the recent (1871) triumph of the bourgeois national movement in Germany, the age-long sleep of semi-feudal Russia.

Marx and Engels gauged the times accurately; they understood the international situation; they understood that the approach to the beginning of the social revolution must be *slow*.

We, in our turn, must also understand the specific features and tasks of the new era. Let us not imitate those sorry Marxists of whom Marx said: "I have sown dragon's teeth and harvested fleas."[52]

The objective inevitability of capitalism which grew into imperialism brought about the imperialist war. The war has brought mankind to the *brink of a precipice*, to the brink of the destruction of civilisation, of the brutalisation

and destruction of more millions, countless millions, of human beings.

The *only* way out is through a proletarian revolution.

At the very moment when such a revolution is beginning, when it is taking its first hesitant, groping steps, steps betraying too great a confidence in the bourgeoisie, at such a moment the majority (that is the truth, that is a fact) of the "Social-Democratic" leaders, of the "Social-Democratic" parliamentarians, of the "Social-Democratic" newspapers—and these are precisely the *organs* that influence the people—have *deserted* socialism, have *betrayed* socialism and have gone over to the side of "their own" national bourgeoisie.

The people have been confused, led astray and deceived by *these* leaders.

And we shall aid and abet that deception if we retain the old and out-of-date Party name, which is as decayed as the Second International!

Granted that "many" workers *understand* Social-Democracy in an honest way; but it is time to learn how to distinguish the subjective from the objective.

Subjectively, such Social-Democratic workers are most loyal leaders of the proletarians.

Objectively, however, the world situation is such that the old name of our Party *makes it easier* to fool the people and *impedes* the onward march; for at every step, in every paper, in every parliamentary group, the masses see *leaders*, i.e., people whose voices carry farthest and whose actions are most conspicuous; yet they are all "would-be Social-Democrats", they are all "for unity" with the betrayers of socialism, with the social-chauvinists; and they are all presenting for payment the old bills issued by "Social-Democracy"....

And what are the arguments against?... We'll be confused with the Anarchist-Communists, they say....

Why are we not afraid of being confused with the Social-Nationalists, the Social-Liberals, or the Radical-Socialists, the foremost bourgeois party in the French Republic and the most adroit in the bourgeois deception of the people?... We are told: The people are used to it, the workers have come to "love" *their* Social-Democratic Party.

That is the only argument. But it is an argument that dismisses the science of Marxism, the tasks of the morrow in the revolution, the objective position of world socialism, the shameful collapse of the Second International, and the harm done to the practical cause by the packs of "would-be Social-Democrats" who surround the proletarians.

It is an argument of routinism, an argument of inertia, an argument of stagnation.

But we are out to rebuild the world. We are out to put an end to the imperialist world war into which hundreds of millions of people have been drawn and in which the interests of billions and billions of capital are involved, a war which cannot end in a truly democratic peace without the greatest proletarian revolution in the history of mankind.

Yet we are afraid of our own selves. We are loth to cast off the "dear old" soiled shirt....

But it is time to cast off the soiled shirt and to put on clean linen.

Petrograd, April 10, 1917

POSTSCRIPT

My pamphlet has become out of date owing to the general economic disorganisation and the inefficiency of the St. Petersburg presses. The pamphlet was written on April 10, 1917, today is May 28, and it has not come out yet!

It was written as a *draft* platform to propagandise my views *before* the All-Russia Conference of our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party of Bolsheviks. The pamphlet was typed in several copies and handed out to Party members before and during the Conference so that it did its job in part. But the Conference took place from April 24 to April 29, 1917, its resolutions have long since been published (see supplement to *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 13[53]) and the attentive reader will have noticed that my pamphlet often served as the original draft of those resolutions.

It is left for me to express the hope that the pamphlet will still be of some value because of its connection with those resolutions and because it explains them, and to deal here with two points.

I suggested on page 27 that we remain in Zimmerwald only for purposes of information.* The Conference did not agree with me on this point, and I had to vote against the resolution on the International. It is now becoming obvious that the Conference made a mistake and that the course taken by events will soon correct it. By remaining in Zimmerwald we (even against our will) are helping delay the creation of the Third International; we are indirectly hampering its foundation, being burdened with the dead ballast of the ideologically and politically dead Zimmerwald.

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* See p. 82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In the eyes of the working-class parties of the whole world, our Party's position is now such that it is our *duty* to *found* a Third International without delay. *Today* there is nobody but us to do it, and procrastination can only do harm. If we remain in Zimmerwald for information only, we shall have our hands freed to establish the new International (and at the same time be able to *use* Zimmerwald should circumstances make it possible).

Because of the mistake made by the Conference, we must now wait passively, at least until July 5, 1917 (the date set for the Zimmerwald Conference, provided it is not postponed *again*! It has already been postponed once...).

The decision unanimously adopted by the Central Committee of our Party after the Conference and published in *Pravda* No. 55, on May 12, has, however, gone half-way towards correcting the mistake; it has been resolved that we shall walk out of Zimmerwald if they decide to confer with ministers.* I express the hope that the other half of the mistake will be speedily remedied, as soon as we convene the first international conference of Lefts (the "third trend", the "internationalists in deed", see above, pp. 23-25**).

The second point I must deal with is the formation of the "coalition cabinet" on May 6, 1917.[54] On this point the pamphlet may *seem* to be particularly out of date.

But actually on this of all points it is not out of date at all. It is based *wholly* on the *class* analysis, a thing that the Mensheviks and Narodniks, who have provided six ministers as hostages to the ten capitalist ministers, stand in deadly fear of. And it is because the pamphlet is based wholly on a class analysis that it is not out of date—the only change made by Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. joining the cabinet was an *insignificant* one in the *form* of the agreement between the Petrograd Soviet and the capitalist government, and I deliberately stressed in my pamphlet (on page 8) that "I am referring not so much to the formal agreement as to actual support".***

With each passing day it is becoming clearer that Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. are nothing more than hostages to

* See p. 388 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 77-80 of this volume.—*Ed.*
*** See p. 62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the capitalists, that the "renewed" government is neither willing nor able to carry out any of its abundant promises either in foreign or domestic policies. Chernov, Tsereteli and Co. have committed political suicide by turning into assistants of the capitalists, into people who are actually strangling the revolution; Kerensky has come so low as to use force against the masses (cf. p. 9 of the pamphlet: "Guchkov is still only threatening to employ violence against the mass"* but Kerensky *had* to carry out those threats[55]). Chernov, Tsereteli and Co. have killed themselves and their parties—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—politically. The people will realise this more and more clearly as the days go by.

The coalition cabinet is only a passing moment in the development of the fundamental class contradictions of our revolution briefly analysed in the pamphlet. This situation cannot last long—we must either go backward to counter-revolution all along the line or forward to the transfer of state power to other classes. At a time of revolution, when the imperialist world war is in progress, we cannot stand still.

N. Lenin

St. Petersburg, May 28, 1917

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* See p. 63 of this volume.—*Ed.*

POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT[56]

Published May 6, 9 and 10
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Nos. 20, 22 and 23

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Published according
to the pamphlet text, 1917
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This pamphlet was written at the beginning of April 1917, before the coalition cabinet was formed. Since then much water has flown under the bridge, but the principal characteristics of the major political parties have held true in the course of all subsequent stages of the revolution—both during the coalition cabinet, which came into being on May 6, 1917, during the union between the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in June (and July) 1917 against the Bolsheviks, during the Kornilov events, and during the October Revolution of 1917 and after it.

The Correctness of the characteristic given to the principal parties and their *class foundations* has been borne out by the whole course of the Russian revolution. Today the progress of the revolution in Western Europe shows that there, too, the line-up of the principal parties is the same. The role of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is being played by the social-chauvinists of all countries (socialists in word and chauvinists in deed) as well as by the Kautskyites in Germany, the Longuetists in France, and so on.

N. Lenin

Moscow, October 22, 1918

Published in 1918 in the pamphlet:
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Kommunist Publishing House, Moscow

Published according to the pamphlet text

The following is an attempt to formulate, first, the more important and then the less important questions and answers characterising the present political situation in Russia and the way it is understood by the various parties.

QUESTIONS:

1) WHAT ARE THE CHIEF POLITICAL PARTY GROUPINGS IN RUSSIA?

ANSWERS:

A. (to the right of the C.D.). Parties and groups to the right of the Constitutional-Democrats.

B. (C.D.). The Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets, or the people's freedom party) and kindred groups.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). The Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and kindred groups.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). The party which properly should be called the Communist Party, but which at present is named the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party united under the Central Committee or, popularly, the "Bolsheviks".

2) WHAT CLASSES DO THESE PARTIES REPRESENT? WHAT CLASS STANDPOINT DO THEY EXPRESS?

A. (to the right of the C.D.). The feudalist landowners and the most backward sections of the bourgeoisie (capitalists).

B. (C.D.). The bourgeoisie as a whole, that is, the capitalist class, and the landowners who have become bourgeois, i.e., who have become capitalists.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Small proprietors, small and middle peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and that section of the workers which has come under the influence of the bourgeoisie.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Class-conscious proletarians, wage-workers and the poor peasantry (semi-proletarians) standing close to them.

3) WHAT IS THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOCIALISM?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). Decidedly hostile, since it threatens the profits of the capitalists and landowners.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). For socialism, but it is too early to think of it or to take any immediate practical steps for its realisation.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). For socialism. The Soviets must immediately take all possible practicable steps for its realisation.*

4) WHAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT DO THEY WANT AT PRESENT?

A. (to the right of the C.D.). A constitutional monarchy, the absolute power of the bureaucracy and the police.

B. (C.D.). A bourgeois parliamentary republic, i.e., the consolidation of the rule of the capitalists, while retaining the old bureaucracy and the police.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). A bourgeois parliamentary republic, with reforms for the workers and peasants.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). A republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies. Abolition of the standing army and the police, who are to be replaced by the arming of the whole people; officials to be not only elective, but also displaceable; their pay not to exceed that of a competent worker.

5) WHAT IS THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESTORATION OF THE ROMANOV MONARCHY?

A. (to the right of the C.D.). They are for it, but act covertly and cautiously, for they are afraid of the people.

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* For the nature of these steps, see questions 20 and 22.

B. (C.D.). When the Guchkovs seemed to be a power, the Cadets were for putting a brother or the son of Nicholas on the throne; but when the people began to seem a power, the Cadets became anti-monarchist.

C. (S.D. and S.R.) and D. ("Bolsheviks"). Decidedly opposed to restoration of the monarchy in any form.

6) WHAT IS THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SEIZURE OF POWER? WHAT DO THEY REGARD AS ORDER, AND WHAT AS ANARCHY?

A. (to the right of the C.D.). If a tsar or some gallant general seizes power, that is God-given, that is order. All else is anarchy.

B. (C.D.). If the capitalists seize power, even by force, that is order; to seize power against the capitalists would be anarchy.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). If the Soviets alone seize all the power, that means a threat of anarchy. Let the capitalists keep the power for the time being, and the Soviets keep the "Contact Commission".[57]

D. ("Bolsheviks"). All power must be in the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', Agricultural Labourers' and other Deputies. All propaganda, agitation and the organisation of the millions must immediately be *directed* towards this end.*

7) SHOULD THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT BE SUPPORTED?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B, (C.D.). Unquestionably, since it is the only government capable at this moment of safeguarding the interests of the capitalists.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). It should, but on condition that it carries out its agreement with the Soviet and attends the meetings of the Contact Commission.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). No; let the capitalists support it. Our job is to *prepare* the people for full and undivided power wielded by the Soviets.

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* Anarchy is the complete negation of state power, whereas the Soviets are *themselves* a state power.

8) FOR UNDIVIDED POWER OR DUAL POWER?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). For the undivided power of the capitalists and landowners.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). For dual power. The Soviets to exercise "control" over the Provisional Government. It is bad to reflect whether control can be effective without power.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). For the undivided power of the Soviets from the bottom up all over the country.

9) SHOULD A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BE CONVENED?

A. (to the right of the C.D.). No, for it might prejudice the landowners. You never know—the peasants in the Constituent Assembly may decide that the landowners ought to have their estates taken away from them.

B. (C.D.). Yes, but without fixing a date. As much time as possible should be spent consulting professors of law; first, because, as Bebel said, jurists are the most reactionary people in the world; and, second, because the experience of all revolutions has shown that the cause of popular freedom is lost when it is entrusted to professors.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Yes, and as quickly as possible. A date must be fixed; we have already said so two hundred times at the meetings of the Contact Commission, and shall say so again tomorrow, for the last and two-hundred-and-first time.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Yes, and as soon as possible. But there is only one way to assure its convocation and success, and that is by increasing the number and *strength* of the Soviets and organising and *arming* the working-class masses. That is the only guarantee.

10) DOES THE STATE NEED THE USUAL TYPE OF POLICE AND A STANDING ARMY?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). It certainly does, for they are the only firm guarantee of the rule of the capitalists; in case of need, as the experience of all countries has shown, the return from a republic to a monarchy is thus greatly facilitated.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). On the one hand, they are perhaps not necessary. On the other hand, is not so radical a change premature? However, we shall raise the matter in the Contact Commission.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). It definitely does not. The arming of the entire people must be proceeded with everywhere immediately and unreservedly, and they must be merged with the militia and the army. The capitalists must pay the workers for days served in the militia.

11) DOES THE STATE NEED A BUREAUCRACY OF THE USUAL TYPE?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). Most decidedly. Nine-tenths of them are the sons and brothers of landowners and capitalists. They must continue to remain a privileged and, in practice, permanent body of people.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). It is hardly fitting to raise so hastily a question that was raised practically by the Paris Commune.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). It certainly does not. All officials and all and every kind of deputy must not only be elective, but displaceable at any moment. Their pay must not exceed that of a competent worker. They must be replaced (gradually) by the people's militia and its detachments.

12) SHOULD OFFICERS BE ELECTED BY THE SOLDIERS?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). No. That would be detrimental to the landowners and capitalists. If the soldiers cannot be pacified otherwise, they must be temporarily promised this reform, but it must be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). *Yes, they should.*

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Not only must they be elected, but every step of every officer and general must be supervised by persons specially elected for the purpose by the soldiers.

13) IS IT DESIRABLE FOR THE SOLDIERS ON THEIR OWN DECISION, TO DISPLACE THEIR SUPERIORS?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). It is distinctly harmful. Guchkov has already forbidden it. He has already threatened to use force. Guchkov must be supported.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). It is. But it is not clear whether they should be replaced before the matter is taken up with the Contact Commission, or vice versa.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). It is desirable and essential in every way. The soldiers will obey and *respect* only elected authorities.

14) FOR OR AGAINST THE PRESENT WAR?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). Decidedly for, because it yields the capitalists untold profits and promises to consolidate their rule by disuniting the workers and setting them against one another. We shall fool the workers by calling the war a war for national defence, the real object of which is to dethrone Wilhelm.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). In general we are opposed to imperialist wars, but we are willing to be fooled, and are prepared to call the support given to the imperialist war waged by the imperialist government of Guchkov, Milyukov and Co. "revolutionary defencism".

D. ("Bolsheviks"). We are decidedly against all imperialist wars and *all* bourgeois governments waging such wars, including our own Provisional Government; we are decidedly against "revolutionary defencism" in Russia.

15) FOR OR AGAINST THE PREDATORY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES BETWEEN THE TSAR, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ETC. (FOR THE SUBJUGATION OF PERSIA, THE PARTITION OF CHINA, TURKEY, AUSTRIA, ETC.)?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). Absolutely and entirely *for*. At the same time, we must not publish these treaties, both because Anglo-French imperialist capital and its governments will not permit it, and because Russian capital cannot afford to reveal its shady affairs to the public.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Against, but we still hope that with the aid of the Contact Commission and a series of "campaigns" among the masses, it may be possible to "influence" the capitalist government.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Against. The whole point is to enlighten the masses as to the utter hopelessness of expecting any-

thing in this respect from capitalist governments, and as to the necessity of the power being transferred to the proletariat and the poor peasants.

16) FOR OR AGAINST ANNEXATIONS?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). If it is a question of annexations by the German capitalists and their robber chieftain, Wilhelm, we are against. If by the British, we are not against, for they are "our" Allies. If by our capitalists, who are forcibly keeping within the boundaries of Russia the peoples who were oppressed by the tsar, we are *in favour*; we do *not* call that annexation.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Against annexations, but we still hope it will be possible to secure even from the capitalist government a promise to renounce annexations.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Against annexations. All promises on the part of capitalist governments to renounce annexations are a sheer fraud. There is only one method of exposing it, namely, to demand the liberation of the peoples oppressed by *their own capitalists*.

17) FOR OR AGAINST THE LIBERTY LOAN?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). Decidedly for, since it facilitates the conduct of the imperialist war, that is, a war to *determine* which group of capitalists shall rule the world.

C. (S.D. and S.R.); *For*, since the incorrect stand of "revolutionary defencism" forces us into this obvious departure from internationalism.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Against, since the war remains an imperialist war, waged by the capitalists in alliance with the capitalists and in the interests of the capitalists.

18) FOR OR AGAINST THE CAPITALIST GOVERNMENTS ASCERTAINING THE PEOPLES' WILL TO PEACE?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). For, since the experience of the French republican social-chauvinists was excellent proof that the people can be fooled in this way; we can say anything we like, but in practice we shall keep the

spoils seized from the Germans (their colonies), while depriving the German robbers of the spoils *they* have seized.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). *For*, since we have not yet relinquished a good many of the unfounded hopes placed by the petty bourgeoisie in the capitalists.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Against, since the class-conscious workers place *no hopes whatever* in the capitalists, and it is our task to open the eyes of the masses to the futility of such hopes.

19) MUST ALL MONARCHIES BE ABOLISHED?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). No; the British, Italian and Allied monarchies generally must not be abolished, but only the German, Austrian, Turkish, and Bulgarian, since victory over them will multiply our profits.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). A certain "sequence" must be observed, and in any case we should begin with Wilhelm; as to the Allied monarchies, we had perhaps better wait a bit.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). No sequence can be established for revolutions. We must help *only* the revolutionaries *in deed* to abolish *all* monarchies in all countries without exception.

20) SHALL THE PEASANTS TAKE ALL THE LANDED ESTATES IMMEDIATELY?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.) By no means. We must wait for the Constituent Assembly. Shingaryov has already explained that when the capitalists seize power from the tsar, that is a great and glorious revolution; but when the peasants take the land away from the landowners, that is arbitrary action.[58] Conciliation commissions must be appointed on which landowners and peasants shall be equally represented, while the chairmen shall be officials, that is, people drawn from among the capitalists and landowners.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Better the peasants waited for the Constituent Assembly.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). All the land must be taken over immediately. Order must be strictly maintained by the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. More grain and meat must be produced,

and the soldiers better fed. Injury and damage to livestock, implements, etc., must in no case be permitted.

21) CAN WE LEAVE LAND DISPOSAL AND ALL RURAL AFFAIRS IN THE HANDS OF THE SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES ALONE?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). The landowners and capitalists are generally opposed to full and undivided power being vested in the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies in the countryside; but if these Soviets are unavoidable, then we had better confine ourselves to them alone, for the rich peasants are also capitalists.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). For the present, perhaps, yes, although Social-Democrats "in principle" do not deny the necessity of a separate organisation for the agricultural wage-workers.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). We cannot confine ourselves to the general Soviets of Peasants' Deputies alone, for the wealthy peasants are also capitalists and are always liable to wrong or cheat the agricultural labourers, day-labourers, and poor peasants. Therefore separate organisations for these groups of the rural population must be set up immediately both within the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and as separate Soviets of deputies from the agricultural labourers.

22) SHALL THE PEOPLE TAKE OVER THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL CAPITALIST MONOPOLIES, THE BANKS, THE SYNDICATES OF MANUFACTURERS, ETC.?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). On no account, as this might injure the landowners and capitalists.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Generally speaking, we are in favour of transferring such organisations to the entire people, but it is too early just now to think of this or prepare for it.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). We must at once start *preparing* the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Councils of Bank Employees' Deputies, etc., for taking practical and practicable steps towards merging all banks into a single national bank, to be followed by the establishment of control by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies over the banks and syndicates, and then by their nationalisation, i.e., their transfer to the possession of the whole people.

23) WHAT KIND OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL IMPLEMENTING A FRATERNAL UNION OF THE WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES DO THE PEOPLES NOW NEED?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). Generally speaking, any kind of Socialist International is harmful and dangerous to the capitalists and landowners; but if the German Plekhanov, that is, Scheidemann, comes to an agreement and understanding with the Russian Scheidemann, that is, Plekhanov, and if they discover in each other vestiges of a socialist conscience, then it were perhaps better for us capitalists to welcome *such* an International of *such* socialists who take the side of *their own* respective governments.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). We need a Socialist International that will unite everybody: the Scheidemanns, the Plekhanovs and the "Centrists", i.e., those who vacillate between social-chauvinism and internationalism. The greater the hotchpotch, the greater the "unity". Long live the great socialist unity!

D. ("Bolsheviks"). The peoples need only such an International as will unite the really revolutionary workers, who are capable of putting an end to this frightful, criminal slaughter of the peoples and of delivering humanity from the yoke of capital. Only people (groups, parties, etc.) like the German Socialist Karl Liebknecht, who is now in a convict prison, only people who are resolutely fighting their *own* government, their *own* bourgeoisie, their *own* social-chauvinists, their *own* "Centre", can and must establish immediately the International which the peoples need.

24) SHOULD FRATERNISATION AT THE FRONT BETWEEN SOLDIERS OF THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES BE ENCOURAGED?

A. (to the right of the C.D.) and B. (C.D.). No, it is bad for the interests of the landowners and capitalists, as it is likely to hasten the liberation of humanity from their yoke.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Yes, it is desirable. But we are not all fully convinced that such an encouragement of fraternisation should be started immediately in all the belligerent countries.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Yes, it is desirable and essential. It is absolutely essential to encourage immediately in all the belligerent countries attempts at fraternisation between the soldiers of *both* warring groups.

25) WHAT COLOUR BANNER WOULD BE IN CHARACTER WITH THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES?

A. (to the right of the C.D.). Black, for they are the real Black Hundreds.[59]

B. (C.D.). Yellow, for that is the international banner of workers who serve capitalism willingly, heart and soul.

C. (S.D. and S.R.). Pink, for their whole policy is a rose-water one.

D. ("Bolsheviks"). Red, for this is the banner of the international proletarian revolution.

This pamphlet was written at the beginning of April 1917. To the question whether it is out of date now, after May 6, 1917, after the formation of the "new", coalition, government, my answer is: No, for the Contact Commission has not really disappeared, it has merely moved to another room, which it shares with the gentlemen of the cabinet. The fact that the Chernovs and the Tseretelis have moved to another room has not changed their policy, nor the policy of their parties.

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF SOLDIERS OF THE IZMAILOVSKY REGIMENT APRIL 10 (23), 1917

Comrade soldiers! The question of the state system is now on the order of the day. The capitalists, in whose hands the state power now rests, desire a parliamentary bourgeois republic, that is, a state system where there is no tsar, but where power remains in the hands of the capitalists who govern the country by means of the old institutions, namely: the police, the bureaucracy, and the standing army.

We desire a different republic, one more in keeping with the interests of the people, more democratic. The revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd have overthrown tsarism, and have cleaned out all the police from the capital. The workers of all the world look with pride and hope to the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Russia as the vanguard of the world's liberating army of the working class. The revolution, once begun, must be strengthened and carried on. We shall not allow the police to be re-established! All power in the state, from the bottom up, from the remotest little village to every street block of Petrograd, must belong to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants' and other Deputies. The central state power uniting these local Soviets must be the Constituent Assembly, National Assembly, or Council of Soviets—no matter by what name you call it.

Not the police, not the bureaucracy, who are unanswerable to the people and placed above the people, not the standing army, separated from the people, but *the people themselves*, *universally armed* and united in the Soviets,

must run the state. It is they who will establish the necessary order, it is they whose authority will not only be obeyed, but *also respected*, by the workers and peasants.

Only this power, only the Soviets of Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, can solve the great question of the land in a non-bureaucratic way and not in the interests of the landowners. The land must not belong to the landowners. The peasant committees must take the land away at once from the landowners, while carefully guarding all the property against damage, and seeing to it that grain production is *increased* in order that the soldiers at the front be better supplied. All the land must belong to the whole nation, and its disposal must be the concern of the local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. In order that the rich peasants—who are themselves capitalists—may not wrong and deceive the agricultural labourers and the poor peasants, it will be necessary for the latter either to confer, to combine, to unite separately, or to set up Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies of their own.

Do not allow the police to be re-established, do not let the state power or the administration of the state pass into the hands of the bureaucracy, who are non-elective, undisplaceable, and paid on a bourgeois scale; get together, unite, organise yourselves, trusting no one, depending only on your own intelligence and experience—and Russia will be able to move with a firm, measured, unerring tread toward the liberation of both our own country and of all humanity from the yoke of capital as well as from the horrors of war.

Our government, a government of the capitalists, is continuing the war in the interests of the capitalists. Like the German capitalists, headed by their crowned brigand Wilhelm, the capitalists of *all* the other countries are carrying on the war only for a division of capitalist profits, for domination over the world. Hundreds of millions of people, almost all the countries in the world, have been dragged into this criminal war. Hundreds of billions of capital have been invested in "profitable" undertakings, bringing death, hunger, ruin, and barbarism to the peoples and staggering, scandalously high profits to the capitalists. There is only one way to get out of this frightful war and conclude a truly democratic peace not imposed by force, and that is

by transferring all the state power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The workers and poor peasants, who are not interested in preserving the profits of the capitalists and robbing the weaker nations, will be able to do effectively what the capitalists only promise, namely, end the war by concluding a lasting peace that will assure liberty to all peoples without exception.

Pravda No. 30, April 12, 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

A SHAMELESS LIE OF THE CAPITALISTS

It is not enough that the capitalist newspapers lie and carry on a riot-mongering campaign against *Pravda*, that *Rech* vies in this respect with *Russkaya Volya*—a paper which it cannot but despise.

Now the ministers of the capitalist government, too, have begun to speak in the language of *Russkaya Volya*. *Rech* quotes today Minister Nekrasov's statement made before a meeting of the Cadet Party in Moscow on April 9:

> "The preaching of violence that comes from the Kamennoostrovsky Prospekt is a terrible thing."

Re-echoing *Russkaya Volya*, the worthy Minister lies shamelessly, deceives the people, and aids the riot-mongers while hiding behind their backs. He dares not name directly a single person, a single newspaper, a single orator, or a single party.

The worthy Minister prefers dark hints—hoping that someone will fall for it!

But all politically minded people will understand that the worthy Minister is referring to the organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., *Pravda*, and its followers.

You are lying, Mr. Minister, worthy member of the "people's freedom" party. It is Mr. Guchkov who is preaching violence when he threatens to punish the soldiers for dismissing the authorities. It is *Russkaya Volya*, the riot-mongering newspaper of the riot-mongering "republicans", a paper that is friendly to you, that preaches violence.

Pravda and its followers do not preach violence. On the contrary, they declare most clearly, precisely, and definitely that our main efforts should now be concentrated on

explaining to the proletarian masses their proletarian problems, as distinguished from the petty bourgeoisie which has succumbed to chauvinist intoxication.

So long as *you*, capitalist gentlemen, Guchkov and Co., confine yourselves only to threats of violence, so long as you have not yet resorted to violence, so long as the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies exist, *so long as* you have not yet carried out your threats against the Soviets (such threats, for example, have actually been printed by Mr. Milyukov's associate, Mr. Wilson, the *Times* correspondent), so long as you have not yet perpetrated violence upon the masses, we Pravdists declare and reiterate that we regard the Soviets as the *only possible* form of government.

So long as *you*, capitalist gentlemen, who are in control of the army command, *have not yet begun to use violence*, it is our tactics, the tactics of all Pravdists and of all our Party, to fight for influence among the proletarian masses, to fight for influence among the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, to *show up* the errors in their tactics, to show up all the falsity of the chauvinist (=revolutionary-defencist) intoxication.

The worthy Minister Nekrasov knows this perfectly well, if only from the quotations which *Rech* itself was forced to print. The worthy Minister re-echoes *Russkaya Volya*; he is bent on *preventing* a calm demonstration of the truth by resorting to lies, slander, baiting, and threats.

It won't work, Messrs. Nekrasovs!

The workers and soldiers want to know the truth, they want to clear up for themselves the questions of war and peace, and state systems, and they will certainly do so.

Written April 11 (24), 1917

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to the newspaper text

THE WAR AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

"We have nevertheless compelled the Provisional Government to renounce annexations."—From a speech by Y. Steklov, delivered at the Taurida Palace on April 4.

"Whatever our attitude towards the slogan 'peace without annexations' may be, the principles accepted by all the Allies cannot be ignored."—From a speech by P. Milyukov (*Rech*, April 11).

Step by step the leaders of the Provisional Government are revealing the true nature of their policy in regard to the war. The notorious declaration of the Provisional Government contained, along with a verbal "renunciation" of annexations, a statement to the effect that "our" treaties with the British and the French governments remain valid. A couple of weeks later *Rech*, the organ of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Milyukov, prints the following:

MILYUKOV'S STATEMENT

While in Moscow, P. N. Milyukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made the following statement at a meeting of members of the people's freedom party:

The declaration of the Provisional Government concerning the aims of the war contains not peace terms, but merely general principles which have already been repeatedly enunciated by various statesmen of our Allies. The peace terms can be worked out only with the consent of our Allies and in accordance with the London Convention. Whatever our attitude towards the slogan "peace without annexations" may be, the principles accepted by all the Allies concerning the reunifica-

tion of Poland and Armenia and the gratification of the national aspirations of the Austrian Slavs, cannot be ignored. (*Rech* No. 83, April 11 (24), 1917.)

This statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milyukov, will, without doubt, make the round of the whole foreign press and *intensify* the military spirit in Germany. Milyukov is helping the German imperialists to work up chauvinist feeling in Germany; *Milyukov is helping Wilhelm II to go through with this predatory war "to the end"*.

Let us examine Mr. Milyukov's statement. The Provisional Government's declaration concerning the aims of the war (the same declaration which Y. Steklov, by a deplorable misunderstanding, calls renunciation of annexations) contains, says Milyukov, not peace terms, but "merely *general principles* which have already been repeatedly enunciated by various statesmen of our Allies". In plain language, this means that renunciation of annexations is merely a fine phrase, "general principles", words, words, words. These words have also been repeated any number of times by "our" Allies. The actual "peace" terms, however, are a different matter entirely.

A statesman—Bismarck, if I am not mistaken—once said that to accept a thing "*in principle*" means, in the language of diplomacy, to reject it *in effect*. The same with Milyukov. "In principle" he is against annexations, in effect he is for annexations. That is why he stands for war "to the end".

Fine phrases are not yet peace terms, Mr. Milyukov tells us.

What, then, are his peace terms?

These terms are covered by the London Convention. Mr. Milyukov refers us to it.

But who concluded that Convention? Tsar Nicholas II concluded it with the British and French capitalists! That means that the treaties concluded by the tsarist clique still remain in force. That means we are fighting for the sake of these predatory treaties concluded by the tsarist clique and the "Allied" bankers.

Seizure of Polish, Armenian, and Austrian territories (this time Mr. Milyukov makes no mention of Constantinople)—this is what Mr. Milyukov's peace programme amounts to.

What will the leaders of the majority of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies say regarding this latest statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milyukov? All they will do is "reprove" Milyukov for this statement of his in the name of the "Contact" Commission.... What has become of the "Provisional Governments renunciation of annexations", which Y. Steklov and N. Chkheidze claim to have obtained from it?

There is no dual power in Russia. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies merely exercises a benevolent control over the Provisional Government. This, if we are to believe the newspaper reports, is what N. Chkheidze said at the military conference in Minsk.[60]

This is what we have come to with this benevolent control! People who fan the flames of war are continuing to speak in the name of Russia. The workers and soldiers are being fed with platitudes about peace without annexations, while on the quiet a policy is being pursued which benefits only a small clique of millionaires who thrive on war.

Comrades, workers and soldiers! Read this statement of Milyukov and expose it at all your meetings! Make it understood that you do not wish to die for the sake of secret conventions concluded by Tsar Nicholas II, and which are still sacred to Milyukov!

Pravda No. 31, April 13, 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF *RUSSKAYA VOLYA*

The methods of *Russkaya Volya*, a paper from which even the Cadets turn away in disgust, find an increasing number of imitators. Look at Mr. Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo*. Intent on "exposing" *Pravda*, Mr. Plekhanov takes Lenin's first thesis, quotes the words saying that the war on Russia's part remains a predatory imperialist war, and then triumphantly asks:

"And how about Germany? Lenin says nothing about that."

This, literally, is what he writes. The reader can scarcely believe the evidence of his own eyes. Can it be that Mr. Plekhanov has sunk to the level of *Novoye Vremya* and *Russkaya Volya*? Believe it or not, but the fact stares you in the face.

Mr. Plekhanov's shamelessness knows no bounds. He is perfectly familiar with the Bolshevik literature published abroad. He knows perfectly well that all Bolsheviks, times without number, in their speeches, articles, and resolutions, have always declared that the war on the part of Germany was *just as* predatory and imperialist as it was on the part of the other belligerent "Great" Powers. The German capitalists, and their chieftain, the crowned brigand Wilhelm, are the same imperialist predators as the capitalists of other countries are.

We repeat: no intelligent person who knows anything at all about the Bolsheviks can help knowing that this is our point of view. Mr. Plekhanov, too, knows this perfectly well. He knows that Zinoviev's and Lenin's pamphlet, *Socialism and War*.* was published in Switzerland also in the German

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338.—*Ed.*

language, and smuggled into Germany. And that pamphlet states as blunt as blunt can be that Germany is carrying on a predatory war for the purpose of "plundering competitor countries", that Germany is "*a young and strong robber*", that "*the German imperialists have brazenly violated the neutrality of Belgium*, as belligerent states have done always and everywhere, trampling upon all treaties and obligations if necessary"; that "Kautsky reconciles in an unprincipled way the fundamental idea of social-chauvinism—recognition of defence of the fatherland in the present war—with a sham concession to the Lefts"; that "opportunist-chauvinists have *nowhere* sunk to such foul apostasy as in Germany".

Mr. Plekhanov knows all this perfectly well, yet he sinks to the methods of *Novoye Vremya* and *Russkaya Volya*, and tries to paint the followers of *Pravda* as Germanophiles.

Making a mockery of Marxism, Mr. Plekhanov further quibbles over the question as to who *declared* war on whom.

Mr. Plekhanov has forgotten that Marxists regard war as a *continuation of the policies* pursued by definite governments representing definite classes.

That both Nicholas II and Wilhelm II represented the reactionary and capitalist classes of their respective countries, that during the last few decades both had been pursuing a policy of plundering foreign countries, plundering China, subjugating Persia, carving up and partitioning Turkey, is a well-known fact. Had Mr. Plekhanov touched, however lightly, upon the history of diplomacy and foreign policies during the last few decades, he could not have failed to see this, and would not have dared to deny it.

The war waged by Nicholas II and Wilhelm II has been just the *continuation* of this predatory imperialist policy, which is so closely bound up with the banking capital of the two countries.

And when war is waged between two groups of predators and oppressors merely for division of the spoils of plunder, merely to see *who* will strangle *more* peoples, *who* will grab *more*, the question as to who began this war, who was the first to declare it and so forth, is of no economic or political significance.

Mr. Plekhanov, just like the German Plekhanovs, the Scheidemanns and Co., has descended to the level of the

most vulgar and ordinary bourgeois chauvinist who refuses to see (if he ever did see) that war is a continuation of policy, that war and policy are bound up with the interests of definite classes, and that one must be able to understand who these classes are and what they are fighting for.

A vicious, shameless lie, a screen for the predatory policy of Nicholas II—a policy which has not been abandoned by Lvov and Co. (they have even confirmed the tsar's treaties!)—that is what Mr. Plekhanov's great wisdom amounts to.

This lie will mislead neither the class-conscious workers nor the class-conscious soldiers.

Pravda No. 31, April 13, 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

A PARTNERSHIP OF LIES

A popular method always used by the bourgeois press in every country with unerring effect is to lie, scream, raise a hullabaloo, and keep on reiterating lies on the off-chance that "something may stick".

"Lenin makes a great noise in the Kshesinskaya mansion," writes *Rech*. "Lenin addresses a meeting from the roof of the Modern," a number of newspapers report.

All this is untrue. Lenin was not present at the Modern meeting. Lenin made no noise at all; he delivered only *one* report to a gathering of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks,[61] and published a number of short articles in the small newspaper *Pravda*.

It is the capitalists and the capitalist press who are making a great noise, who are trying to *shout down* the truth, to prevent it from being heard, to drown it in a torrent of invective and shouts, to *prevent* an earnest *elucidation* of the facts.

This is what the efforts of the capitalists add up to at the present moment, as do also the efforts of those so-called socialists who, like Mr. Plekhanov, have completely deserted to the capitalist side.

In an editorial of special "national importance", today's Rech again fulminates against the "preaching of anarchy", and while doing so, most strikingly confutes itself. This is clear to anyone who ponders what he has read or heard.

"The great revolution has swept away all the old organisation of power...." This is not true. Not all of it, far from it. "It can be restored only by a change in the national psychology (in a broad sense of the word)—or rather, by the new psychology which recognises the need for authority and the duty of submission."

We have here a patent lie, a patent partnership of lies contracted by the capitalists, on the one hand, and the Plekhanovs, Cherevanins and Co., who are shouting about anarchy, on the other.

In conversational usage as well as in science it is accepted without question that anarchism means the *negation of the state* in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

That socialism leads to the "withering away" of the state is one of the tenets of Marxism. The Milyukovs, Plekhanovs, Cherevanins and others, who are partners in lies, know this very well.

Do the Pravdists or Lenin deny the need for *the state now*? Do they deny the need for an "organisation of power", the "duty of submission" to it?

Anybody who knows his politics, anybody except the partnership of liars, is perfectly well aware that they do not.

Both *Pravda* and Lenin have stated and repeated as clear as clear can be that all of us unreservedly recognise the need for the state and for an organisation of power not only for the present, but also for the later historical period when the transition from capitalism to socialism will be taking place.

Only the partnership of lies can deny this, or fail to see it.

The question is *what* "organisation of power" we *propose to the nation*.

Not the old organisation of power, not the police, not the bureaucracy, not the standing army, but a new organisation—*the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and other Deputies*.

Such Soviets already exist; they have been brought forth by the revolution; they are already *recognised* by everyone, even by the capitalist government, as a *semi-government*.

And we have stated as clear as clear can be that *these* Soviets are the *only possible* form of a revolutionary government.

Can there be anything less ambiguous?

Since it is the "only possible" form, that means we must act *only* through propaganda, unless someone begins to practise violence upon the masses.

"The need for authority and the duty of submission" has

been recognised by *all* the Pravdists, who are preaching it to the people.

The Milyukovs, Plekhanovs, Cherevanins and Co. lie in order to conceal the truth from the people; they lie in order to suppress the *most important thing of all*—the question of the class character of *any given* organisation of power.

That is the crux of the matter.

The capitalist calls the Soviets *anarchy*, because *such* an organisation of power does not commit the people beforehand and unconditionally to capitalist subjection, but provides liberty and order together with the possibility of a peaceful and gradual transition to socialism.

This and this alone is what rouses the displeasure, the indignation and resentment of the capitalists. Hence the partnership of lies. Hence the torrent of slander and the howl of rage.

Hence, the underhand *riot*-mongering which *Rech* resorts to in the above-mentioned editorial when it calls for "counteraction", for "renunciation of passivity, indifference", and so on.

If you have the majority of the nation behind you, if your alliance with the Soviet is a lasting one (and we frankly admit that at the present moment the majority in the Soviet is not with us), then what do you fear, gentlemen, why do you lie?

All we want is to *make clear* to the workers and to the poor peasants the errors of their tactics. We recognise the *Soviets* as the only possible authority. We advocate the need for authority and the duty of submitting to it.

Why, then, are you afraid? Why do you lie?

It is the truth that you fear. You lie in order to *prevent* this truth from *emerging*, prevent it by means of riot-mongering, slander, violence, and filth.

Even some of our opponents now see this. Read today's *Dyelo Naroda*,[62] organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, an organ to which Minister Kerensky contributes.

This is what that organ says about Plekhanov, the most faithful ally of *Russkaya Volya* and *Rech*:

"We are accustomed to see such words and such a method of struggle is the columns of *Russkaya Volya*. But to see

them employed in articles written by socialists is, frankly speaking, painful and depressing...."

Thus write our opponents.

Thus write democrats whose democratic conscience has been awakened.

It is hopeless trying to put the Milyukovs, Plekhanovs and Cherevanins to shame. But when even a newspaper to which Minister Kerensky is a contributor turns away in disgust from the madly chauvinistic, infamously slanderous, riot-mongering methods employed by Plekhanov, then we may safely say:

They are dead people, the heroes of such methods.

Written April 13 (26), 1917

Published April 14, 1917 in *Pravda* No. 32

Published according to the newspaper text

BANKS AND MINISTERS

N. N. Pokrovsky, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the present Vice-Chairman of the Central War Industries Committee, has become a member of the Board of the Russian Bank for Foreign Commerce. Count V. N. Kokovtsov, the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers, has also become a member of the Board.

These happy tidings were brought to us by last night's papers.

A minister today, a banker tomorrow; a banker today, a minister tomorrow. It is "war to the end"—both today and tomorrow.

This state of affairs prevails not only in Russia, but in every other country where Capital rules. A handful of bankers, who have the whole world in their grip, are making a fortune out of the war.

But Pokrovsky and Kokovtsov, we may be told, were ministers during the old regime, and we are now living in a regenerated Russia.

We will answer with a question:

In how many banks do the present ministers, Guchkov, Tereshchenko, and Konovalov—have an interest (in the capacity of directors, shareholders, or actual owners)?

Our Comrades, the bank employees (who, by the way, should organise a union of their own as soon as possible), would do well to gather material on this subject and publish it in the labour press.

Pravda No. 32, April 14, 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

AN IMPORTANT EXPOSURE

Today's editorial in *Dyelo Naroda*, a newspaper which lists Minister Kerensky among its most active contributors, contains a forthright statement to the effect that "according to information this paper has received from people whom we consider quite competent in this matter, the above-mentioned note [namely, the diplomatic note proclaiming renunciation of the policy of annexations and indemnities] has not yet been forwarded".

And so those members and supporters of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies who say and think that "we have made the government renounce annexations" are mistaken.

Comrades and citizens! Read and reread this statement by *Dyelo Naroda*, ponder its meaning!

The editorial goes on to say:

> "And here Mr. Guchkov, echoing his bellicose Palace Square colleague who covets and lusts after Constantinople and the Straits, in his appeal to the army on the Rumanian front throws out slogans calling for the utter defeat of Germany and Austria...."

If *Dyelo Naroda knows* that Milyukov covets and lusts after annexations, then why not tell us more about it? Does not the people's cause require that *Dyelo Naroda** speak out more clearly and frankly?

The editorial ends by calling attention to the "bellicose *members* of our Provisional Government".

Once more: Does not the people's cause require that the paper bearing that title make known names and facts, facts and names?

Written April 13 (26), 1917

Published April 14, 1917 in *Pravda* No. 32

Published according to the newspaper text

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* A play on words: *Dyelo Naroda* means the people's cause.—*Ed.*

TO THE SOLDIERS AND SAILORS

Comrades, soldiers! Comrades, sailors!

The capitalist newspapers, from *Rech* down to *Russkaya Volya*, are carrying on a most shameless campaign of lies and slander concerning the passage through Germany of myself and thirty other emigrants.

The capitalist newspapers shamelessly lie when they assert or insinuate that we enjoyed certain inadmissible or unusual favours from the German Government, a government which we consider just as predatory, just as criminal, as all the other capitalist governments who are carrying on the present war.

Rich men having "connections" with high-ranking officials of the tsarist monarchy, men like the liberal professor Kovalevsky, friend of Milyukov and Co., have been constantly negotiating with the German Government through the agency of the tsarist Russian Government with a view to arranging for an exchange of Russians captured by the Germans, and Germans captured by the Russians.

Why then should emigrants, who have been compelled to live abroad because of their struggle against the tsar, not have the right to arrange for an exchange of Russians for Germans *without* the government's aid?

Why has the government of Milyukov and Co. not admitted into Russia Fritz Platten, the Swiss socialist, who travelled with us and who had negotiated the agreement with the German Government concerning the exchange?

The government lies when it spreads rumours that Platten is a friend of the Germans. This is sheer slander. Platten is the friend of the workers and the enemy of the capitalists of *all* countries.

The capitalists lie when they circulate rumours that we are for a separate peace with the Germans, that we conferred or wanted to confer in Stockholm with those German socialists who sided with *their own* government.

This is a libellous lie. We did not participate and shall not participate in any conferences with such socialists. We look upon the socialists of all countries who are helping *their own* respective capitalists to carry on this criminal war as traitors to the cause of socialism.

Only those socialists are our friends who, like Karl Liebknecht, condemned to hard labour by the predatory German Government, rise against *their own* capitalists.

We do not want a separate peace with Germany, we want peace for *all* nations, we want the victory of the workers of *all* countries over the capitalists of *all* countries.

The Russian capitalists are lying about us and slandering us, just as the German capitalists are slandering Liebknecht. The capitalists lie when they say that we want discord and enmity between the workers and the soldiers.

It is not true! We want the workers and the soldiers to *unite*. We want to *make it clear* to the members of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that it is *these* Soviets that must wield *full* state power.

The capitalists are slandering us. They have sunk so low in their shamelessness that not a single bourgeois newspaper has reprinted from *Izvestia* our report concerning our journey and the decision of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Every worker and every soldier knows *his* Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It was to the Executive Committee of this Soviet that we made our report the day after our arrival. The report appeared in *Izvestia*.* Why is it that *not a single* capitalist paper has reprinted this report?

Because these papers are spreading lies and slander and are afraid that our report to the Executive Committee will expose the deceivers.

Why is it that not a single paper has reprinted the *decision* of the Executive Committee concerning our report, a decision which was published in the same issue of *Izvestia*?

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* See pp. 27-29 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Because this decision nails the lies of the capitalists and their newspapers, in that it demands that the government take steps for the return of the emigrants.

Izvestia has published a protest against Trotsky's arrest by the English; it has published a letter by Zurabov exposing Milyukov's lies; it has also published a telegram from Martov on the same subject.

Soldiers and sailors! Do not believe the lies and slander of the capitalists! Expose the deceivers, who are trying to suppress the truth published in *Izvestia*!

Written between April 11 and 14 (24 and 27), 1917

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Published according to the manuscript

AGAINST THE RIOT-MONGERS[63]

TO THE WORKERS, SOLDIERS, AND THE WHOLE POPULATION OF PETROGRAD

Citizens! The paper *Russkaya Volya*, founded by the tsar's Minister Protopopov and despised even by the Cadets, is carrying a riot-provoking campaign against our Party, against the paper *Pravda*, against our Comrades Lenin and Zinoviev, against the Petrograd Committee of our Party housed in the Kshesinskaya mansion. We have received a number of reports, written as well as oral, concerning threats of violence, bomb threats, etc.

From the very first days of the revolution, the capitalists, masking as "republicans", have been trying to sow enmity between the workers and the soldiers. First they lied about the workers wanting to leave the army without bread. Now they are trying to inflame feeling against *Pravda*.

We appeal to the sense of honour of the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petrograd, and declare:

We not only have not been guilty, directly or indirectly, of any threats of violence against individuals, but, on the contrary, we have always maintained that our task is to *explain* our views to all the people, that we regard the *Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*, elected by all the workers and the soldiers, as *the only possible* revolutionary government.

On the very next day after their arrival the comrades, members of *different* parties, who passed through Germany, made a *report* to the trusted representatives of *all* the workers and soldiers, namely, to the *Executive Committee* of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. On this Executive Committee were Chkheidze, Tsereteli. Skobelev, Steklov, and others.

Comrades! These leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies differ with us on many questions pertaining to the organisation of the state. They could be anything but biased in our favour.

Now what did the Executive Committee do?

In its *Izvestia* No. 32, for April 5, 1917, it *published* the *full* report dealing with the passage through Germany.

This report gives all the facts, and the *names* of the foreign socialists from two neutral countries, Switzerland and Sweden, who *checked* our protocols.

And what was the decision of the Executive Committee? Did it express condemnation or even disapproval of the fact that Lenin and others travelled through Germany?

It did not. This is how the editors of *Izvestia*, in the same issue, reported the resolution of the Executive Committee:

> "Having heard the report of Comrades Zurabov and Zinoviev, the Executive Committee decided to take the matter up immediately with the Provisional Government and to take steps towards securing the immediate return to Russia of all emigrants, irrespective of their political views and their attitude towards the war. The results of the negotiations with the government will be published in the near future.—*Editors*."

As anyone can see, *not* a single word is said here against Lenin and his comrades. What we have is a *warning* to the Provisional Government, a decision to *take steps* to prevent it from hindering return to Russia.

Following this, *Martov*'s telegram and *Trotsky*'s arrest in Britain have shown that Milyukov is either powerless against Britain and France, who keep their own internationalist socialists imprisoned, or that he *does not want* to take serious measures.

The Germans and Russians have made exchanges dozens of times throughout the war. Kovalevsky member of the Council of State, was exchanged for an Austrian, etc. For wealthy people such exchanges have been arranged by the governments many a time. Then why doesn't the present government want to arrange such an exchange for the emigrants? Because it wants to prevent a number of fighters from taking part in the revolutionary struggle.

What does *Russkaya Volya* do, and papers like *Rech* and *Yedinstvo* that follow in its footsteps?

They continue their hounding campaign, thereby inciting ignorant people to acts of violence against individuals. They *refuse to publish* either the report or the resolution of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has been given the names of various socialists who verified and approved every step taken by the emigrants in connection with their journey. They are the *French* socialists Loriot and Guilbeaux, the *Swiss* socialist Platten, the *Swedish* socialists Lindhagen (Mayor of Stockholm), Carleson, Ström, Nerman, the *German* socialist Hartstein of *Karl Liebknecht*'s group, the *Polish* socialist Broński.

By acting this way *Russkaya Volya*, *Rech* and *Yedinstvo* are aiding and abetting the dark forces which threaten violence, bombs, and riots.

Comrades, soldiers and workers!

We warn you against these gentlemen of *Russkaya Volya*, *Rech* and *Yedinstvo*, and declare over and over again that we stand for *explaining* to the whole nation the views of *all* the parties, we stand for *respecting* the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies.

If the Provisional Government, if *Rech*, if Mr. Plekhanov are displeased with the way the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has acted, why *do they not say so openly*? *Why do they not demand a re-examination of the case?* Why are they afraid to reprint what was published in *Izvestia* No. 32? Why? Because they are out to sow discord!

If violence in any form is resorted to, we shall place the responsibility on the editors and contributors of *Russkaya Volya*, *Rech*, *Yedinstvo*, and others, who have dared to keep the report and the resolution of the Executive Committee out of the press, and to carry on an insidious propaganda.

The paper *Dyelo Naroda*, to which Minister A. F. Kerensky is an active contributor, has already pointed out that the methods used by these newspapers are helping the riot-mongers (*Dyelo Naroda* No. 23).

We want the Milyukovs, Amfiteatrovs, Plekhanovs and Co. to know that if their baiting leads to violence they will be the first to suffer the consequences.

Down with riot-mongering! Down with the heroes of

baiting and deception, who suppress the resolution of the Executive Committee!

Comrades, soldiers and workers! You will not allow the people's freedom to be marred by riots! You will see to it that the decisions of *your* Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies are *respected*.

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Written before April 14 (27), 1917
Published April 15, 1917 in *Pravda* No. 33

Published according to the newspaper text

CITIZENS! SEE WHAT METHODS THE CAPITALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES ARE USING!

Today's *Rech* concludes its editorial with the following words:

> "The German Government is endeavouring to preserve the inner unity of Germany and sow discord among the Allies. Our 'Pravdists' are making every effort to undermine unity in revolutionary Russia and to set the Russian Government upon the governments of our Allies, Britain and France. Are we not entitled to say that the Lenin crew is working for von Bethmann-Hollweg and Wilhelm II?"

No, gentlemen of the capitalist fold, you are not entitled to say it. It is we Pravdists, and we alone, who, far from preserving the inner unity of Germany, are, *on the contrary*, *actually engaged in destroying it*.

This is a fact which no lies of the Russian capitalists can ever obliterate.

It is a fact that we Pravdists, and we alone, demand that the German socialists should unconditionally and immediately break with the German Plekhanovs, i.e., the Scheidemanns, and with the German "Centre", i.e., those vacillating people who cannot make up their minds to break away, definitely, on principle, from the Scheidemanns.

It is a fact that we Pravdists, and we alone, stand for unity with *only* two German socialist groups (the Spartacus and the Arbeiterpolitik) which support the policy of Karl Liebknecht, i.e., *the policy of destroying the inner unity of Germany*. The policy of Karl Liebknecht, a policy of *deeds*, not words, is to destroy the "inner unity" of the capitalists and workers in *Germany*.

Clearly realising that the German capitalists and their Wilhelm are imperialists, i.e., brigands, Karl Liebknecht

as far back as September 1915 sent a letter to the Zimmerwald Conference, which was not published, because Liebknecht was then still a legal person. But everyone who was at Zimmerwald knew about this letter.

The letter called, not for a civil truce, but for a civil war.

That was how *our* comrade-in-idea, Karl Liebknecht, preached "inner unity" in Germany. That is what we ourselves have preached in the German translation of our Pravdist pamphlet *Socialism and War* (by Zinoviev and Lenin).*

Karl Liebknecht not only spoke this way, he acted this way. From the platform of the German parliament, he called upon the German soldiers to turn their guns against *their own* German Government. Then he joined a street demonstration with revolutionary proclamations reading: "Down with the Government."

That is how Karl Liebknecht, an adherent of our Pravdist policy, has been "endeavouring to preserve the inner unity of Germany". That is why he has been thrown into a convict prison.

And Karl Liebknecht is denounced as a Judas and a traitor not only by the entire press of the German capitalists, but by all the papers of the German Plekhanovs, who accuse him more or less directly of treason or anarchism.

In *all* countries the capitalists are spewing out a torrent of lies, slander, abuse and accusations of treason against those socialists who are behaving the way Karl Liebknecht is behaving in Germany, or the way the Pravdists are behaving in Russia, i.e., who are *destroying* the "inner unity" between the workers and the capitalists, the workers and the Plekhanovs, the workers and the "Centrists" in *every* country, and who are *creating unity among the workers of all countries* in order to put an end to the predatory, murderous imperialist war, in order to rid mankind of the yoke of capitalism.

In Germany the capitalists are hounding Karl Liebknecht and his friends as traitors. In Germany, too, our comrade Karl Liebknecht has been repeatedly threatened with mob violence. This has been mentioned even by that German Plekhanov, the social-chauvinist David. In Russia the

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 313-16.—*Ed.*

capitalists hound the Pravdists as traitors. In Britain the capitalists hound the Scotch public school-teacher MacLean as a traitor. He, too, has been thrown into a convict prison for the *same* kind of crime, for the same kind of "treason" as that which Karl Liebknecht and we Pravdists are guilty of.

In France the republican capitalist government is keeping in prison the Frenchman Content and the Russian Rayev for issuing a proclamation entitled "Impose peace".

Gentlemen of *Rech*, ministers, members of the revolutionary government, put us Pravdists in a convict prison, or tell the Russian people to shut us up in a convict prison! Then you will be actually following in the footsteps of capitalist Britain, our "Ally" (the ally of Tsar Nicholas II, for it was *he* who concluded the treaty with the Allies), which is keeping the British Pravdists in a convict prison.

Down with the "inner unity" of the workers and capitalists in *all* countries, for this "unity" has condemned and is still condemning humanity to the horrors of the predatory imperialist war waged in the interests of the capitalists!

Long live unity among *those* socialists and workers in *all* countries who not only sympathise with Karl Liebknecht in words, but actually pursue the Liebknecht policy against *their own* capitalists!

Written April 14 (27), 1917

Published April 15, 1917
in *Pravda* No. 33

Published according
to the newspaper text

A "VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT" BETWEEN LANDOWNERS AND PEASANTS?

Here is the text of the telegram from Minister Shingaryov, mentioned in yesterday's editorial of our paper, and printed in today's *Dyen*[64]:

"On acquainting myself with the decision of the Ranenburg Committee relating to the grain sowing, I deem it my duty to declare that an independent solution of the land question in the absence of a general state law is inadmissible. Arbitrary action will lead to a national calamity and will jeopardise the cause of freedom by provoking discord. The lawful solution of the land question is the business of the Constituent Assembly. At the present time agricultural conciliation chambers will be set up in each local area under the rural supply committees for the purpose of effecting voluntary agreements between the tillers of the land and the landowners. The question of leaseholds on vacant lands is also being urgently considered. For the sake of general order I request that everybody be guided by the decisions of the Provisional Government and refrain from establishing self-made laws."

Can you call it "democracy", "people's freedom", when the peasants, who clearly constitute the overwhelming *majority* of the population, have no right to adopt and carry out their own decision, but must wait for a "*voluntary agreement*" between the tillers of the land and the landowners?

One landowner having two thousand dessiatines of land—and *three hundred* peasant families having two thousand dessiatines. That, on the average, is how things stand in Russia. Three hundred peasants must wait for the "voluntary" consent of *one* landowner!

Is this right, comrade soldiers?

Written April 14 (27), 1917

Published April 15, 1917 in *Pravda* No. 33

Published according to the newspaper text

AN HONEST VOICE IN A CHORUS OF SLANDERERS

Today's *Malenkaya Gazeta*[65] publishes an appeal by a group of soldiers of the Fourth Motor Ambulance Unit to all comrades in the army, demanding an investigation into the circumstances connected with the passage through Germany of Lenin and others.

Here we have an honest voice standing out from the torrent of filthy lies, foul slander, and riot-mongering agitation. Indeed, it is the right and *duty* of every citizen to demand an investigation into any fact that is of social importance.

Here we have an honest method of honest people, not of riot-mongers.

And it is this method that Lenin and *all the adherents of various parties* who had come with him adopted *immediately* upon their arrival. They made a *report* of their passage to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,* giving the *names* of the socialists from two neutral countries, Switzerland and Sweden, who had signed the official protocol of the journey, and had examined *all* the documents. The Executive Committee had Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Skobelev, Steklov, and others on it. They decided to publish in *Izvestia* both the report and the resolution of the Executive Committee.

Following the consideration of the report it was resolved: "Having heard the report of Comrades Zurabov and Zinoviev, the Executive Committee decided to take the matter up immediately with the Provisional Government and to take steps towards securing the immediate return to Russia

* See pp. 27-29 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of all emigrants, irrespective of their political views and their attitude towards the war."

Both documents were published in *Izvestia* No. 32, for April 5, 1917.

Is it fair, is it sensible *not* to reprint the report and the resolution, and to conduct a riot-mongering agitation?

Have the comrades of the Fourth Motor Ambulance Unit acted rightly in hastening to "brand" and denounce the newly arrived comrades as "traitors", to heap "curses" upon them, and to revile them *without having discussed* the documents printed in *Izvestia*?

What is this if not anarchism, if not an *appeal to defy* the members of the Executive Committee elected by the workers and soldiers?

Written April 14 (27), 1917

Published April 15, 1917
in *Pravda* No. 33
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the newspaper text

THE SOLDIERS AND THE LAND

Most of the soldiers come from the peasantry. Every peasant knows how the landowners have been oppressing the people. But wherein lies the power of the landowners?

In the land.

The landowners have tens of millions of dessiatines of land. That is why millions of peasant families have no choice but to enslave themselves to the landowners.

No "liberties" can help the peasants so long as the landowners are in possession of tens of millions of dessiatines of land.

All the landed estates must be taken over by the people. All the land in the country must become the property of the whole people, and be disposed of by the local Soviets of Peasants' and Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

How is this to be accomplished? We must immediately set up all over Russia, in every village without exception, Soviets of Peasants' and Agricultural Labourers' Deputies modelled after the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the cities. Unless the peasants and agricultural labourers *themselves* unite, unless they *themselves* take their fate into their own hands, no one in the world will help them, no one will free them from their bondage to the landowners.

To enable the peasants to take over all the land from the landowners in their own districts immediately and to dispose of it properly, while preserving perfect order and guarding against any damage to property, the peasants must be supported by the soldiers.

The peasants, soldiers, and workers constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. This majority *wants*

all the land to pass immediately into the hands of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. No one can stop the majority, *if* it is well organised (solidly united), *if* it is class-conscious, *if* it is armed.

Soldiers! Help to unite and arm all the workers and the peasants!

Soldiers! You, too, unite more solidly, and form closer ties with the workers and the peasants! Do not allow your armed power to be taken away from you!

Then, and only then, will the people get all the land, and free themselves from their bondage to the landowners.

Soldatskaya Pravda No. 1,
April 15, 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the text in *Soldatskaya Pravda*

THE PETROGRAD CITY CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)[66]

APRIL 14-22 (APRIL 27-MAY 5), 1917

1

REPORT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
APRIL 14 (21)

Our political line, embodied in resolutions, was worked out in advance with far greater precision than that of any other party. Events, however, have created an entirely new situation. The chief mistake made by revolutionaries is that they look backward at the old revolutions, whereas life gives us too many new things that have to be fitted into the general pattern of events.

The motive forces of the revolution were defined by us quite correctly. Events have justified our old Bolshevik premises, but the trouble with us is that comrades have wished to remain "old" Bolsheviks. Mass movement had been confined to the proletariat and the peasantry. The West-European bourgeoisie had always been opposed to revolution. Such was the situation to which we had been accustomed. But things turned out differently. The imperialist war split the European bourgeoisie, and this created a situation where the Anglo-French capitalists, for imperialist reasons, became supporters of a Russian revolution. The British capitalists actually entered into a conspiracy with Guchkov, Milyukov, and the high commanding officers of the army. The Anglo-French capitalists sided with the revolution. The European newspapers report many instances of British and French emissaries making trips to have talks with "revolutionaries" like Guchkov. The revolution has thus gained an unexpected ally. As a result, the revolution has turned out to be different from what anyone expected. We have found allies not only

in the Russian bourgeoisie but also among the Anglo-French capitalists. When I mentioned this in a lecture delivered abroad,* I was told by a Menshevik that we had been wrong, for events had proved that the bourgeoisie was necessary for the success of the revolution. I replied that it was "necessary" only insofar as it helped the revolution triumph in eight days. Did not Milyukov declare before the revolution that if victory lay through revolution, then he was against victory? We must not forget these words of Milyukov.

And so, the revolution in its first stage developed in a way that no one had expected. The Bolsheviks' reply to the question as to the possibility of "defending the fatherland" was this: if a bourgeois-chauvinist revolution triumphed (*Sotsial-Demokrat*[67] No. 47), then defence of the fatherland would be impossible.** The situation is unique in that we now have a dual power. Abroad, where no paper more Left than *Rech* ever penetrates, and where the English and French bourgeois papers speak of an all-powerful Provisional Government and the "chaos" represented by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, nobody has any clear idea of this dual power. Only here on the spot did we learn that the Soviet had surrendered power to the Provisional Government. The Soviet is the implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the soldiers; among the latter the majority are peasants. It is therefore a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But this "dictatorship" has entered into an agreement with the bourgeoisie. And this is where the "old" Bolshevism needs revising. The situation that has arisen shows that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is interlocked with the power of the bourgeoisie. An amazingly unique situation. The past contains no instances of a revolution where the representatives of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry, though fully armed, concluded an alliance with the bourgeoisie, and though having the power, ceded it to the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie wields the power of capital and the power of organisation. It is a wonder the workers have shown themselves to be as well organised as they are. The bour-

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, p. 355.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 403.—*Ed.*

geois revolution in Russia is completed insofar as power has come into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Here the "old Bolsheviks" argue: "It is not completed—for there is no dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." But the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is that very dictatorship.

The agrarian movement can go two ways. The peasants may take the land, but no struggle may develop between the rural proletariat and the prosperous peasants. This is unlikely, however, for the class struggle does not wait. To repeat now what we said in 1905, and omit mention of the class struggle in the countryside, is a betrayal of the proletarian cause.

Already we can discern in the decisions of a number of peasant congresses a tendency to wait with the solution of the agrarian question until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. This is a victory for the well-to-do peasants who lean towards the Cadets. The peasants are already taking possession of the land. The Socialist-Revolutionaries are trying to hold them back, suggesting that they wait until the Constituent Assembly meets. We must combine the demand for the immediate seizure of the land with propaganda for the setting up of Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. The bourgeois-democratic revolution is completed. The agrarian programme must be carried out in a new way. The same struggle for power that is going on here between the large and small proprietors will take place in the village too. The peasants will not be content with land alone. The number of horseless peasants has increased greatly. We alone are at present developing the agrarian revolution, when we tell the peasants to take the land immediately. The land must be taken in an organised manner. Property must not be damaged. The agrarian movement, consequently, is only a prevision, and not a fact. It is the task of Marxists to make the question of an agrarian programme clear to the peasants; the weight of emphasis on this issue must be shifted to the Soviet of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. We must be prepared, however, for the peasantry uniting with the bourgeoisie, just as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has done. It follows that the agrarian movement still has to be developed. The well-to-do peasantry will, naturally, gravitate towards the bourgeoisie,

towards the Provisional Government. It may prove even more Right than Guchkov.

For the time being, the victory of bourgeois power is an accomplished fact. The economic position of the peasants separates them from the landowners. What the peasants need is not a legal right to the land. They need Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. Those who advise the peasants to wait until the Constituent Assembly meets are deceiving them.

Our task is to separate the class line from this petty-bourgeois bog. The bourgeoisie does its job splendidly; it makes all sorts of promises, but in effect pursues only its class policy.

In the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies the alignment of forces is such that power is passed to the Provisional Government, while the socialists content themselves with "contact commissions". True, this government is composed of the most trusted and best people of their class, but still of a definite class. The petty bourgeoisie has surrendered to them completely. Unless we mark out a proletarian line, we shall be betraying the cause of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie rules either by deception or by violence. Just now flattery and deception prevail, and this lulls the revolution. The bourgeoisie makes concessions on minor issues, but in matters of primary importance (the agrarian revolution, for example) they make none. One must be blind to the facts not to see that in Russia, apart from the Bolsheviks, there is nothing but revolutionary defencism, and that it has triumphed everywhere. Revolutionary defencism means the surrender of all socialist principles in the predatory interests of capitalism, interests which are screened behind the phrase "defence of the fatherland"; it means surrendering one's positions to the petty bourgeoisie. When I spoke of the "honest" mass of revolutionary defencists, I had in mind not a moral category, but a class definition. The classes represented in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies have no interest in the predatory war. In Europe it is different. There the people are oppressed, and the most opportunistic pacifists are often hounded worse than we Pravdists are. In our country the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies pursues its policy of revolutionary defencism, not by

violence, but because the masses trust it. Europe is one vast military prison. Capitalism rules cruelly there. All over Europe the bourgeoisie should be overthrown, and not argued with. In Russia the soldiers are armed; by agreeing only to "defend themselves" against Wilhelm they allowed themselves to be peacefully deceived. In Europe, there is no "honest" revolutionary defencism like we have in Russia, where the people have handed over the power to the bourgeoisie through ignorance, inertia, tradition, and the habit of suffering the rod. Steklov and Chkheidze are leaders in word, but tailpieces of the bourgeoisie in deed; for all their virtues, their knowledge of Marxism, etc., they are politically dead. Here in Russia the power is in the hands of the soldiers, who are defencist-minded. The objective class position of the capitalists is one thing. They are conducting the war in their own interests. The soldiers are proletarians and peasants. This is another thing. Are they interested in seizing Constantinople? No, their class interests are opposed to war! That is why they can be made to see light, made to change their minds. The crux of the political situation at this moment is to be able to make the masses see the truth. We cannot talk about having the "backing" of the revolutionary mass, etc., until we have brought home to the soldiers or to the uneducated masses the meaning of the slogan "Down with war".

What is the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies? Its class meaning is direct power. We do not have complete political liberty, of course. But nowhere else is there such freedom as exists in Russia today. "Down with war" does not mean flinging the bayonet away. It means the transfer of power to another class. Everything must now be focused on making that clear. Blanquism was a striving to seize power with the backing of a minority. With us it is quite different. We are still a minority and realise the need for winning a majority. Unlike the anarchists, we need the state for the transition to socialism. The Paris Commune furnished an example of a state of the Soviet type, an example of direct power wielded by the organised and armed workers, an example of the dictatorship of workers and peasants. The role of the Soviets, the significance of such a dictatorship, is that they apply organised force against the counter-revolution,

safeguard the gains of the revolution for the benefit of the majority and with the support of the majority. There can be no dual power in a state. The Soviets are a type of state where the existence of a police is impossible. Here the people are their own rulers, and there can be no return to the monarchy. The army and the people must merge into one—therein lies the triumph of liberty! Everyone must learn to use arms. To safeguard freedom, all the people to a man must be armed. This is the essence of the commune. We are not anarchists who deny the need for an organised state, i.e., for force in general, particularly a state maintained by the organised and armed workers themselves through the Soviets. Events have led to the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry being interlocked with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The next stage is the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the proletariat is not yet sufficiently organised and enlightened; it must be enlightened. Such Soviets of Workers' and other Deputies should be organised all over the country—life itself demands it. There is no other way. This is the Paris Commune! The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is not an organisation of the trade union type, as the bourgeoisie would like it to be. The people see it differently and more correctly—they see it as a government power. They see that the way out of the war lies through the victory of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. This is the type of state under which it is possible to advance towards socialism. Should a group seize power, it would not mean much. The Russian revolution has risen higher: any government other than the Soviet is impossible, and this is what the bourgeoisie fears. So long as the Soviets have not seized power, we shall not take it. A living force, however, must impel the Soviets to seize power. Otherwise we shall never get out of the war which the capitalists are carrying on by deceiving the people. All countries are on the brink of ruin; people must realise this; there is no way out except through a socialist revolution. The government must be overthrown, but not everybody understands this correctly. So long as the Provisional Government has the backing of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, you cannot "simply" overthrow it. The only way it can and must be overthrown is by winning over the majority in the Soviets. It is either forward towards

the undivided power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, or back to the imperialist war—there is no other alternative. Kautsky denied that a revolution was possible in time of war. Events have shown him to be wrong.

As regards nationalisation of the banks and control over them—economically this is feasible, economically nothing can interfere with it, once the power is in the hands of the workers. Obviously, in viewing the tasks of the proletariat as we do, there can be no question of any alliance with the "defencists".

Concerning a new name for the Party: the word "Social-Democracy" is incorrect; it is scientifically wrong. Marx and Engels said as much on many occasions. If they "put up with" the word, it was because after the year 1871 a special situation was created: a *slow* preparation of the masses was needed, revolution was not on the order of the day. Democracy, too, means a form of state, but the Paris Commune had risen above it. Now the whole world is faced with the practical issue—that of the transition to socialism. The Social-Democrat Plekhanov and the rest of the social-chauvinists throughout the world have betrayed socialism. We should call ourselves the "Communist Party".

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CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE REPORT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION APRIL 14 (27)

The discussion has shown that opinion is divided. I cannot answer all the questions.

The question of old Bolshevism. Kalinin defended old Bolshevism. But he also came to the conclusion that our present tactics were correct. Another opinion is that there is a marked tendency towards the tactics of the petty bourgeoisie.

There is a time-honoured expression: to go through with the revolution. But which revolution? The objective situation in 1905 was this: the proletariat and the peasantry were the only revolutionary element, while the Cadets stood for the monarchy. Now defencism represents the adoption by the peasants of petty-bourgeois tactics. Going through with the revolution under these circumstances has no meaning. The revolution has united the petty bourgeoisie with other revolutionary elements upon the ground of defencism.

The future of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. A petty-bourgeois peasantry holding defencist views may even be in favour of a monarchy.

A new line follows from the policy of Bolshevism. The petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie have united. We take as our point of departure conflicting class interests. The labourer peasants ought to be against the imperialist war. The proprietor peasants are for defencism.

Defencism has shown that the petty bourgeoisie has moved away from the working class and gone over to the big bour-

geoisie. The poor peasant who earns a part of his living in the city has no need for this war. This class ought to be opposed to the war.

Old Bolshevism should be discarded. The line of the petty bourgeoisie must be separated from that of the wage-earning proletariat. Fine phrases about the revolutionary people are suitable to a man like Kerensky, but not to the revolutionary proletariat. To be revolutionaries, even democrats, with Nicholas removed, is no great merit. Revolutionary democracy is no good at all; it is a mere phrase. It covers up rather than lays bare the antagonisms of class interests. A Bolshevik must open the eyes of the workers and peasants to the existence of these antagonisms, not gloss them over. If the imperialist war hits the proletariat and the peasants economically, these classes will have to rise against it.

To create a network of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies—that is our task today. The whole of Russia is already being covered with a network of organs of local self-government. A commune may exist also in the form of organs of self-government. The abolition of the police and the standing army, and the arming of the whole people—all this can be accomplished through the organs of local self-government. I have taken the Soviet of Workers' Deputies simply because it already exists.

It is said, we must "interest" the proletariat. This is what Chkheidze, the Provisional Government and others are doing when they use high-sounding words about revolutionary democracy. A Bolshevik must differentiate between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, and leave such words as "revolutionary democracy" and "revolutionary people" to Kerensky. Democracy in Russia is imperialistic. It is argued that we are reducing our activities to cultural work. That is not true. Passing resolutions about the Constituent Assembly, etc., would mean "interesting" the proletariat.

The real work is to bring about the abolition of the standing army, the bureaucracy, and the police, and to arm the whole people.

The Constituent Assembly will not kill the revolution, for nothing is heard of it now, and no one is planning to

convene it. We leave it to the Socialist-Revolutionaries to "demand" its convocation.

This war is a world war. It is waged by definite classes, and was brought on by banking capital. It can be stopped by transferring power to another class. So long as the power remains in the hands of the ruling classes, peace can alter nothing.

The proletariat must be shown how the revolution can be carried forward by concrete measures. To carry the revolution forward means to achieve self-government by independent action. The growth of democracy does not stand in the way of self-government, it helps us to realise our aims. The war can be terminated only by the transfer of power to another class—and Russia has come closest of all to that—but never by a truce among the capitalists of all countries on the basis of an exchange of subjugated nationalities. A commune is quite suitable to the peasantry. A commune means complete self-government, the absence of any supervision from above. Nine-tenths of the peasantry should be for it.

The bourgeoisie may reconcile itself to the nationalisation of the land, should the peasants take over the land. As a proletarian party, we must declare that the land alone will not feed people. To cultivate it one will therefore have to set up the commune. We must be for centralisation, but there are times when things can best be done locally; we should allow a maximum of initiative in the local areas. The Cadets are already acting like officials. They tell the peasants: "Wait for the Constituent Assembly." Our Party alone provides slogans that really carry the revolution forward. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies are fully capable of establishing communes in the local areas. The question is whether the proletariat will be well enough organised for the task, but this is a thing we cannot estimate in advance, we must learn by doing.

Trotskyism: "No tsar, but a workers' government." This is wrong. A petty bourgeoisie exists, and it cannot be dismissed. But it is in two parts. The poorer of the two is with the working class.

War. To end the war by pacifist means is utopia. It may be terminated by an imperialist peace. But the masses do

not want such a peace. War is a continuation of the policies of a class; to change the character of the war one must change the class in power.

The name Communist Party is theoretically sound. The Left socialists of other countries are too weak. We must take the initiative.

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3

TWO REMARKS DURING THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT APRIL 15 (28)

I

After yesterday's debate I can confine myself to brief remarks. The resolution shows a way out. The situation is determined not only by the fact that definite classes are represented in the Provisional Government, but also by the fact that the latter leans upon the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The inference is not that we must yield to this petty bourgeoisie, but that we must form independent groups, not in order to separate ourselves from the petty bourgeoisie, but in order to impel it to go forward. The seizure of all the land is a step forward on the part of the revolutionary people. The replacement of the standing army by a militia is a step forward.

II

Comrade Kamenev is shifting to the policy of Chkheidze and Steklov. Of course, no one will say that the Provisional Government is putting off the Constituent Assembly, if we do not say it. Everybody wants to carry on the war. The point at issue is the organisation of counter-revolution. In revolutionary times control means deception. The date for the elections could be arranged in three days. By

listing "sins", we provide ammunition for propaganda. To seek the truth in the Contact Commission is impossible. There can be no control without power. To control by means of resolutions, etc., is sheer nonsense. Control means dispelling the petty-bourgeois illusions, fog.

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RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Considering:

(1) that the Provisional Government, by its class character, is the organ of landowner and bourgeois domination;

(2) that the Provisional Government and the classes it represents are bound with indissoluble economic and political ties to Russian and Anglo-French imperialism;

(3) that the Provisional Government is carrying out its proclaimed programme only partially, and only under pressure of the revolutionary proletariat and, to some extent, of the petty bourgeoisie;

(4) that the forces of bourgeois and landowner counter-revolution, now being organised, have already, under cover of the Provisional Government and with the latter's obvious connivance, launched an attack on revolutionary democracy;

(5) that the Provisional Government is avoiding fixing the date for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, preventing the arming of the people as a whole, opposing the transfer of all the land to the people, foisting upon it the landowners' way of settling the agrarian question, obstructing the introduction of an eight-hour workday, condoning counter-revolutionary propaganda in the army (by Guchkov and Co.), rallying the high-ranking officers against the soldiers, etc.;

(6) that this government, at the same time, is relying at present on the confidence of, and, to a certain extent, on an actual agreement with, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers'

and Soldiers' Deputies, which now unites an obvious majority of workers and soldiers, i.e., peasants;

(7) that every step of the Provisional Government, in both its domestic and foreign policies, is bound to open the eyes, not only of the proletarians in town and country and semi-proletarians, but also of the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, to the real nature of this government,

the Conference resolves that:

(1) in order to ensure all the state power passing into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies or other bodies directly expressing the will of the people, prolonged work is necessary to develop proletarian class-consciousness and to unite the urban and rural proletarians against the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie, for only work of this nature can guarantee real advance on the part of the whole revolutionary people;

(2) this calls for many-sided activity within the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for work aimed at increasing the number of these Soviets, consolidating their power, and welding together our Party's proletarian internationalist groups in the Soviets;

(3) we must organise our Social-Democratic forces more effectively, so as to be able to direct the new wave of the revolutionary movement under the banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

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5

TWO REMARKS DURING THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

I

Since we have proportional representation, there is no need for a bloc; the minority is protected. I emphatically disagree with Comrade Kalinin, because a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie, with the chauvinists, is unthinkable. The very idea of a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie, who are supported by the capitalists, is a betrayal of socialism. With whom are we to form blocs, with the editors of *Internatsional*[68]? But this paper has not been published yet, and therefore we do not know them. Chkheidze is defencism's worst mask. Trotsky, when editing his paper in Paris, never made it clear whether he was for or against Chkheidze. We have always spoken against Chkheidze, because he is a subtle mask for chauvinism. Trotsky has never made himself clear. How do we know that Larin, the editor of *Internatsional*, does not follow the same tactics?

We must come forward with a definite programme. A struggle is now on among three parties: the first is the party of robbers and killers; the second is the party that shields these robbers with fine words, and finally, the third party, the party that refuses to support the robbers and stands for exposing the mistakes made by everybody, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies included.

The fault of the Soviet is not that it didn't assume power, but that it teaches the people the wrong things, it shouts about its victory over the government.

II

I am decidedly in favour of placing on our tickets the names of the Menshevik candidates who are breaking with chauvinism. This is no bloc. As far as parties are concerned, Russia is remarkably well organised. About a programme: the question of a paid militia, the question of food supply, the question of taxes—all these are important.

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RESOLUTION ON THE MUNICIPAL QUESTION

Under no circumstances can the municipal platform, particularly at the present revolutionary time, be reduced only to communal questions.

It must also contain a definite answer to all present-day key issues, especially those concerning the war and the tasks of the proletariat in regard to the central power.

Even in municipal questions, such as that of the militia, food supply, housing, and taxes, we cannot expect the petty-bourgeois parties to agree to revolutionary measures necessary to combat war and its consequences.

For all these reasons we must go to the elections without blocs, upon a straight issue of principles announced in the programme of the proletarian party, and explain to the people the fundamental differences between the three main party divisions, namely, (1) the Cadets and those to the right of them; (2) the parties of the petty bourgeoisie (Narodniks) and a section of workers who have fallen under the influence of the bourgeoisie (the Menshevik defencists); (3) the party of the revolutionary proletariat (the Bolsheviks).

The technical arrangements for the elections based on the system of proportional representation make blocs technically unnecessary.

It is advisable in every way to encourage closer relations and mutual exchange of opinions, on the basis of practical work, with those Mensheviks who are really breaking with revolutionary defencism and with support of the Provisional Government. With such comrades it is permissible to run a joint ticket, on condition that there be sufficient agreement on fundamentals. A concrete municipal programme should be worked out, particularly on the question of a proletarian militia to be paid for by the capitalists.

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7

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PARTIES OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES, THE MENSHEVIK SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS, THE "NON-FACTION" SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND OTHER KINDRED POLITICAL TRENDS

Taking into consideration:

(1) that the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Menshevik Social-Democrats, etc., have, in the great majority of cases, adopted the stand of "revolutionary defencism" and voted for the loan, that is, in support of the imperialist war waged by the imperialist government of the capitalists—Guchkov, Lvov and Co.;

(2) that these parties are *supporting* the Provisional Government, which represents the interests of Capital and which has taken a counter-revolutionary stand in domestic as well as foreign policy;

(3) that these parties have allowed themselves to be deceived by the capitalists, and, in their turn, are deceiving the people with false hopes of being able, by means of "demands" and "control" of the Provisional Government, and without wielding state power, to change the class nature of the government of the capitalists and wean it away from the imperialist policy now needed by the capitalists and from counter-revolutionary attempts against liberty;

(4) that the resultant attempt to obscure the class-consciousness of the proletarians and semi-proletarians, which these parties are encouraging, is, in view of the general attitude of unreasoning trust on the part of the masses towards the capitalists, who are now acting chiefly by deception and flattery, the principal reason for the revolution

hanging fire and for its possible defeat by the forces of the landowner and bourgeois counter-revolution,

the Conference resolves that:

(1) the voting in favour of the loan and advocacy of revolutionary defencism in general be considered a gross betrayal of socialism, of the proletarian class struggle and of the principles of internationalism, i.e., the fraternal union of the workers of all countries against the capitalists of all countries;

(2) the above-named parties be considered as acting in the interests and upholding the point of view of the petty bourgeoisie and corrupting the proletariat with bourgeois influence;

(3) unity with parties, as a whole, which are pursuing a policy of support for the Provisional Government, are advocating revolutionary defencism, etc., be considered absolutely impossible in view of the fact that these parties have abandoned the proletarian class position for a petty-bourgeois position;

(4) in regard to certain local groups of workers who are aligned with the Mensheviks, etc., but who strive to uphold the position of internationalism against "revolutionary defencism" and against voting for the loan, etc., the policy of our Party should be to support such workers and groups, to seek closer relations with them, and support unity with them on the basis of a definite break with the petty-bourgeois betrayal of socialism.

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8

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE WAR

FROM MARX TO MAO

I

The present war is, on the part of both groups of the belligerent powers, an imperialist war, i.e., one waged by the capitalists for world domination, for division of the capitalists' spoils, for profitable markets for finance and banking capital, and for the subjugation of the weaker nationalities.

The transfer of state power in Russia from Nicholas II to the government of Guchkov, Lvov, and others, to the government of the landowners and capitalists, did not and could not alter the class character and meaning of the war as far as Russia is concerned.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The fact that the new government is carrying on the same imperialist war, i.e., an aggressive war of conquest, became glaringly apparent when the government not only failed to publish the secret treaties between ex-Tsar Nicholas II and the capitalist governments of Britain, France, etc., but even formally confirmed these treaties. This was done without consulting the will of the people and with the express purpose of deceiving them, for it is well known that the secret treaties concluded by the ex-tsar are outrageously predatory treaties that give the Russian capitalists a free hand to rob China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc.

For this reason no proletarian party that does not wish to break completely with internationalism, i.e., with the fraternal solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggle against the yoke of Capital, can support the

present war, or the present government, or its loans, no matter in what glowing terms these loans may be described.

Nor can any trust be placed in the present government's promise to renounce annexations, i.e., the conquest of foreign countries or the forcible retention of any nationality within the confines of Russia. For, in the first place, the capitalists, bound together by the thousand threads of Russian and Anglo-French banking capital, and intent on protecting the interests of capital, cannot renounce annexations in this war without at the same time ceasing to be capitalists, without renouncing the profits from the thousands of millions invested in loans, concessions, war industries, etc. And secondly, the new government, after renouncing annexations to mislead the people, declared through Milyukov (Moscow, April 9, 1917) that it had no intention of renouncing them. Finally, as revealed by *Dyelo Naroda*, a newspaper in which Minister Kerensky co-operates, Milyukov has not even sent his statement on the renunciation of annexations to other countries.

Therefore, in warning the people against the capitalists' empty promises, the Conference declares that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between a renunciation of annexations in word and a renunciation of annexations in deed, i.e., the immediate publication of all the secret predatory treaties, of all acts of foreign policy, and the taking of immediate steps to fully liberate all peoples who are being oppressed, kept bound to Russia by force or kept in a state of subjection by the capitalist class, which is continuing the policy of ex-Tsar Nicholas II, a policy that is a disgrace to our nation.

II

The "revolutionary defencism", which in Russia has now permeated almost all the Narodnik parties (the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries), the opportunist party of the Menshevik Social-Democrats (the Organising Committee, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), and the majority of the non-party revolutionaries, reflects, in point of class significance, the interests and point of view of the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, and the well-to-

do peasants, who, like the capitalists, profit by oppressing weak peoples. On the other hand, it is a result of the deception of the masses by the capitalists, who instead of publishing the secret treaties confine themselves to promises and glib talk.

It must be admitted that the great mass of "revolutionary defencists" are honest, i.e., they are *really* opposed to annexations, to conquests, to oppressing weak peoples; they are *really* working for a democratic non-coercive peace among *all* the belligerents. This must be admitted for the reason that the class position of the urban and rural proletarians and semi-proletarians (i.e., of the people who earn their living, wholly or partly, by selling their labour-power to the capitalists) makes these classes uninterested in capitalist profits.

Therefore, while recognising that any concessions to "revolutionary defencism" are absolutely impermissible and virtually signify a complete break with internationalism and socialism, the Conference declares that our Party will preach abstention from violence as long as the Russian capitalists and their Provisional Government confine themselves to threats of violence against the people (for example, Guchkov's unhappily notorious decree threatening the soldiers with punishment for arbitrary displacement of superiors), as long as the capitalists have *not* started using violence against the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', Agricultural Labourers', and other Deputies, which organise themselves freely, and freely elect and dismiss *all* public officers. Our Party will fight against the profound and fatal error of "revolutionary defencism" solely by means of comradely persuasion, bringing home the truth that the attitude of unreasoning trust of the broad masses in the government of the capitalists, who are the worst enemies of peace and socialism, is, in present-day Russia, the chief obstacle to a speedy termination of the war.

III

As for that most important issue of all, namely, how to end the war—a criminal, predatory capitalist war that has brought mankind to the brink of ruin, famine and destruc-

tion—as quickly as possible, by a truly democratic, non-coercive peace, the Conference recognises and declares the following:

It is utterly senseless to suppose that this war can be ended by a unilateral refusal of the soldiers of *any one* country to continue the war, by a unilateral cessation of military operations, by the mere act of "sticking the bayonet into the ground".

Our Party will patiently but persistently explain to the people the truth that wars are waged by *governments*, that wars are always indissolubly bound up with the policies of definite classes, and, therefore, this war, started by crowned brigands, by monarchs like Nicholas II, and by uncrowned brigands—the capitalists, can be terminated by a truly democratic, non-coercive peace *only* when the entire state power passes to a *class* that is really not interested in safeguarding capitalist profits, to the class of the proletarians and semi-proletarians, which is really capable of putting an end to the oppressive rule of Capital.

This class alone is capable of *really* renouncing annexations, of breaking free from the meshes of finance and banking capital, and, under certain circumstances, not merely in word but *in deed*, converting this predatory war into a revolutionary proletarian war, a war aimed, not at crushing weak peoples, but to free the workers and peasants of the *whole world* from the yoke of Capital.

The Conference reiterates its protests against the base slander spread by the capitalists against our Party to the effect that we are in favour of a separate peace with Germany. We consider the German capitalists to be as predatory as the Russian, British, French, and other capitalists, and Emperor Wilhelm II to be as bad a crowned brigand as Nicholas II or the British, Italian, Rumanian, and all other monarchs. We have proclaimed this view of our Party not only in Russian but also in German, in the translation of Zinoviev's and Lenin's pamphlet *Socialism and War*.*

Moreover, as editors of the Central Organ of our Party, and in the name of the Party, the above-named comrades had declared (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, Geneva, October 13, 1915,

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 301-06.—*Ed.*

No. 47) that if the revolution placed our Party in power while the war was still on, we would forthwith propose openly to Germany, *together with all the other nations*, a non-coercive, i.e., democratic, peace, *and that in the event of the German*, *British*, *French and other capitalists declining such a peace*, *we would ourselves start a* revolutionary war, *and call upon the workers of all countries to join us*.*

The Conference fully endorses this declaration.

The Conference takes cognisance of the fact that in no other belligerent country in the world is there such freedom as there now is in Russia, or such revolutionary mass organisations as the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies; and that nowhere else in the world, therefore, can the transfer of the entire state power to the *actual* majority of the people, i.e., to the workers and poor peasants, be achieved so easily and *so peacefully*.

The Conference declares that the money for the soldiers' upkeep should be raised not by loans, which only enrich the capitalists, but by imposing high income and property taxes on the capitalists.

The Conference declares that so long as the majority of the people, though enjoying complete freedom of agitation and propaganda, have not yet come to realise how closely this war is bound up with capitalist interests, there is only one practical means of bringing this butchery of peoples to a speedy end.

This means is fraternisation at the front.

The Conference calls attention to the fact that even *Novoye Vremya*, that servile mouthpiece of the capitalist interests, admits in a telegram from Kiev dated April 12 that fraternisation has started at the front. Numerous reports from soldier delegates to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd confirm this.

By starting to fraternise, the Russian and German sol iers, the proletarians and peasants of both countries dressed in soldiers' uniforms, have proved to the whole world that intuitively the classes oppressed by the capitalists have discovered the right road to the cessation of the butchery of peoples.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 404.—*Ed.*

By fraternisation we understand, first, the publication of proclamations in the Russian and the German languages for distribution at the front; second, the holding of meetings between the Russian and the German soldiers at the front with the aid of interpreters, these to be arranged in such a way that the capitalists, and the generals and officers of *both* countries, who for the most part are of the capitalist class, will not dare to interfere with these meetings, will not dare even to attend them without the direct and special permission of the soldiers.

These proclamations and meetings must make clear the above-stated views on war and peace, must bring home the fact that if the state power in the two countries, Germany and Russia, were to pass wholly and exclusively into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the whole of humanity would heave a sigh of relief, for then we would really be assured of a speedy termination of the war, of a really lasting, truly democratic peace among all the nations, and, at the same time, the transition of all countries to socialism.

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CONGRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[69]

A Congress of representatives of peasants' organisations and Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, who have met to draw up regulations for the convocation of an All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies and to set up similar local Soviets, has been in session in the Taurida Palace since April 13.

According to *Dyelo Naroda*, representatives from more than 20 gubernias are attending the Congress.

Resolutions have been adopted urging the need for the speediest organisation of the "peasantry" from bottom to "top". "Soviets of Peasants' Deputies functioning in the various areas" have been declared to be the "best form of organisation of the peasantry".

Bykhovsky, a member of the provisional bureau for the convocation of the present Congress, has pointed out that a decision to organise the peasantry by setting up an All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies had been taken by the Moscow Co-operative Congress,[70] representing an organised membership of twelve million, or fifty million of the population.

This is an undertaking of tremendous importance, which must be given every support. If it is carried out without delay, if the peasantry, in spite of Shingaryov, takes over all the land immediately by a majority decision and not by "voluntary agreement" with the landowners as he would have it, then not only the soldiers, who would receive more bread and meat, but also the cause of freedom would gain by it.

For the organisation of the peasants, carried out from below without the officials and without the "control and supervision" of the landowners and their hangers-on, is the only reliable pledge of success for the revolution, for freedom,

for the liberation of Russia from the yoke and bondage of the landowners.

There is no doubt that all members of our Party, all class-conscious workers, will do their utmost to support the organisation of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, will see to it that their numbers are increased and their strength consolidated, and will exert every effort to work inside these Soviets along consistent and strictly proletarian class lines.

To carry on this work, it is necessary to organise separately the proletarian elements (agricultural labourers, day-labourers, etc.) *within* the general peasant Soviets, or (sometimes *and*) set up separate Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

Our object is not to scatter forces; on the contrary, in order to strengthen and broaden the movement, we must arouse the "*lowest*"—to use the terminology of the landowners and capitalists—section of society, or, more correctly, class.

To build up the movement, we must free it from the influence of the bourgeoisie; we must try to rid it of the inevitable weaknesses, vacillations, and mistakes of the petty bourgeoisie.

This work must be done by means of friendly persuasion, without anticipating events, without hurrying to "consolidate" organisationally that which the representatives of the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians have not yet fully realised, thought out, and digested for *themselves*. But it must be done, and a start must be made at once everywhere.

The practical demands and slogans, or, more properly, the proposals that have to be made to gain the *attention*: of the peasants, should be based on vital and urgent issues.

The first issue is that of the land. The rural proletarians will be for the complete and immediate transfer of *all* the land without exception to the whole people, and for its being taken over immediately by the local committees. But you cannot eat land. The millions of households that have no horses, implements, or seeds will gain nothing from the transfer of the land to the "people".

The question of continuing to run the big farms, wherever at all possible large-scale enterprises, directed by agri-

cultural experts and the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and using the best machines, seeds, and most efficient farming methods, must be discussed and practical measures taken without delay.

We cannot conceal from the peasants, least of all from the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, that small-scale farming under commodity economy and capitalism *cannot* rid humanity of mass poverty, that it is necessary to *think* about going over to large-scale farming conducted on public lines and to *tackle this job at once* by teaching the masses, and in turn *learning from the masses*, the practical expedient measures for bringing about such a transition.

Another vital and pressing issue is that of the organisation and administration of the state. It is not enough to preach democracy, not enough to proclaim it and decree it, not enough to entrust the people's "representatives" in representative institutions with its implementation. Democracy must be *built* at once, from below, through the initiative of the masses themselves, through their effective participation *in all* fields of state activity, without "supervision" from above, without the bureaucracy.

Replacement of the police, the bureaucracy, and the standing army by the universal arming of the whole people, by a universal *militia* of the entire people, women included, is a practical job that can and should be tackled immediately. The more initiative, variety, daring, and creativeness the masses contribute to this, the better. Not only the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, but nine-tenths of the peasantry probably will follow us if we explain our proposals clearly, simply, and intelligibly by demonstrating examples and lessons from real life. Our proposals are:

—not to allow the restoration of the police;

—not to allow the restoration of the absolute powers of officials who, in effect, are undisplaceable and who belong to the landowner or capitalist class;

—not to allow the restoration of a standing army separated from the people, for such an army is the surest guarantee that attempts of all kinds will be made to stamp out freedom and restore the monarchy;

—to teach the people, down to the very bottom, the art of government not only in theory but in practice, by begin-

ning to make immediate use everywhere of the experience of the masses.

Democracy from below, democracy without an officialdom, without a police, without a standing army; voluntary social duty by a *militia* formed from a universally armed people—this is a guarantee of freedom which no tsars, no swashbuckling generals, and no capitalists can take away.

Pravda No. 34, April 16, 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

ON THE RETURN OF THE EMIGRANTS

Today's papers have published a telegram over the signatures of P. B. Axelrod, L. Martov, Ryazanov, Lunacharsky, and Natanson, reading:

"*We find it absolutely impossible to return to Russia via England.*"

Another telegram signed by Mandelberg, member of the Second Duma, Professor Reichesberg, Felix Kon, Ustinov, Balabanova, Andronnikov, and others, reads:

> "We see A way out in an agreement between the Russian and German governments ... *for an exchange* of internees ... in return for the liberation of a corresponding number of *German civilians* interned in Russia."

Why shouldn't the gentlemen of *Russkaya Volya* and *Yedinstvo* declare these political emigrants, too, to be German agents?

Pravda No. 34, April 16, 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

OUR VIEWS

A REPLY TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET OF SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

The newspapers for April 16 carried the following resolution:

"Having discussed comrades' reports concerning the spread of disruptive propaganda carried on under a revolutionary and often even under a Social-Democratic banner, particularly propaganda by those who call themselves Leninists; regarding such propaganda to be no less harmful than any other counter-revolutionary propaganda from the right; and realising at the same time that it is impossible to take repressive measures against propaganda so long as it remains merely propaganda, the Executive Commission of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies considers it essential that measures should be taken to counteract this propaganda by our own propaganda and agitation. We must make our organisations strong enough to be able at any moment to meet any counter-revolutionary action, no matter where it comes from, by effective actions of our own. We express our earnest wish that the Executive Committee launch a systematic campaign in the press, and especially in the army units, against the disruptive propaganda."

If we compare this resolution with the statement made in *Izvestia*'s leading article (for April 17) against the "dishonourable and outrageous persecution", we see at once the political division on the subject which has made itself manifest *in practice*, namely: *Russkaya Volya*, the chief hounding agency; Mr. Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo*, which repeats "such a method of struggle"; both recognized as such by *Dyelo Naroda*.

A *different* stand is taken by the Executive Commission of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, which simply declares that "it is impossible to take repressive measures against propaganda so long as it remains merely propaganda".

That is why we reprint the resolution of the Executive Commission in full and consider it useful to examine it on its merits.

The resolution declares Lenin's propaganda to be "no less harmful than any other counter-revolutionary propaganda from the right".

Let us examine the gist of the differences between (1) counter-revolutionary propaganda from the right, (2) the propaganda *for* and in support of the Provisional Government, and (3) our own propaganda.

The Rights are out for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the restoration of the monarchy.

The Provisional Government has *promised* to act in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Our propaganda is: all power in the state to be turned over to the Soviets *alone*, because the Soviets unquestionably represent the overwhelming majority of the nation. To achieve this, we want by "explanation" (as Lenin distinctly stated in his theses* the very first day) to make the majority of the nation see the necessity for such a transfer of power.

The Rights, then, are for a monarchic government. The capitalists are for a capitalist government (for that is what the Provisional Government is); they promise to act in agreement with the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

We want to convince the majority of the people that power must reside *solely* in the Soviets.

It is perfectly obvious that *even* from the point of view of those who advocate an agreement with the Provisional Government, our propaganda cannot be regarded as "no less harmful than any other counter-revolutionary propaganda from the right". The advocates of an agreement now have the backing of the majority of the people! How then can they maintain that our propaganda *urging* the majority to take over all the power is "no less harmful than propaganda from the right"?

This is a glaring inconsistency.

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* See p. 23 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies can hardly uphold this view of its Executive Commission for long.

To proceed.

What essentially are our differences?

We differ mainly on three points:

1. On the question of the land. We are for the peasants taking *all* the land immediately by a decision of their own majority in each locality, thus increasing production of grain and meat for the soldiers.

The Provisional Government is for an "agreement" between the peasants and the landowners, i.e., an "agreement" between three hundred peasants and one landowner.

The future will show whether the majority of the people are with us or with the Provisional Government on this question.

2. We are for a republic where, from the bottom up, there will be no police, no standing army (instead of a standing army, we believe, there should be a universal arming of the whole people), no bureaucracy, who, in effect, are undisplaceable and privileged by high bourgeois, salaries. We want all public officers to be elective and displaceable at any time, and their pay to be on a proletarian scale.

The Provisional Government is for restoring the police of the usual type; it is for a standing army, for the usual kind of officials.

3. The Provisional Government is for continuing *the war* and *the kind* of war which Nicholas the Bloody started. The Provisional Government is for confirming the secret, predatory treaties concluded by him *without consulting the will of the people* and even without making them public.

We are against such a war, we are against the confirmation of the treaties, against their non-publication.

We urge all nations, without exception, to put an end to the war by concluding, not a coercive, but a truly democratic peace, that would give freedom to all nations and nationalities. We want to show the people that in order to end the war by a truly non-coercive peace it is necessary that the state power be placed wholly and exclusively in the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. For so long as the capitalists and landowners (Guchkov, Lvov, Milyukov) are in power, the war will remain a capitalist-directed one, all promises of peace without annexations

will remain mere promises, and distrust of the capitalists' government on the part of the world's working masses will continue; and that means the war will drag on.

Question: What if the state power in Russia passed to the Soviets but Germany *failed* to effect a revolution that would rid it of both Wilhelm II and the *German Guchkovs and Milyukovs* (for if the German Nicholas II were replaced by the German Guchkovs and Milyukovs, there would be no change whatever as far as the war is concerned)?

Our answer is: Power in the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies would be the power of the majority of the people, and that majority consists of workers and poor peasants. They are *really* not interested in annexations, they will renounce them not in word, but *in deed*; they will *really* stop being watchdogs of the capitalists' profits.

Under such conditions *we too would agree* to a revolutionary war against the capitalists of any country, because that would really be a war against the interests of Capital in general, and not a war in the interest of the capitalists of one particular country.

Question: How can we advance the cause of peace right now, immediately and practically, if it is impossible to end the war by simply sticking the bayonets into the ground?

Our answer is: The war cannot be terminated by the simple expedient of sticking the bayonets into the ground, or generally by the unilateral withdrawal of any of the warring nations. There is, and can be, only one practical and immediate way of hastening peace (apart from the victory of the workers' revolution over the capitalists), and that is the fraternisation of the soldiers at the front.

We must immediately, in the most energetic manner, and by all the means at our disposal encourage fraternisation of the soldiers of *both* warring groups at the front.

This fraternisation has already begun. Let us help it along.

These are our views. We are firmly convinced that the majority of the people will *not* say that they are "no less harmful than any other counter-revolutionary propaganda from the right".

Pravda No. 35, May 1 (April 18), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

HOW THEY TIED THEMSELVES TO THE CAPITALISTS

In its editorial of April 17, *Finansovaya Gazeta*,[71] organ of the big capitalists and banks, discloses a fact of stupendous importance, namely, how the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Menshevik Social-Democrats, etc., have bound themselves hand and foot by tying themselves to the capitalists through their notorious "agreement" with the Provisional Government.

Here is the full text of the article:

THE LEFTS AND THE LOAN

The Liberty Loan issued by the Provisional Government has not evoked in Left-wing circles the enthusiasm that it has met with among the population at large.

The Left-wing press has split up into three groups. Lenin's *Pravda* has come out definitely against the Loan, expressing the point of view of the Bolsheviks. Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* strongly supports the Loan. Finally, the other organs of the socialist press—*Rabochaya Gazeta*, *Zemlya i Volya*, and *Volya Naroda*—have taken a "middle" stand, neither here nor there; they are not exactly for the Loan, nor are they exactly against it. This is the position also of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, which decided to support the Loan in principle, but is now having its doubts and is wavering. *Dyen* was right when It recently reproved this central and most powerful group, which includes the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, for its uncertain and ambiguous stand.

As if to confirm the justice of this reproof, the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies yesterday again returned to the once settled question of the Loan and had a discussion about it. N. S. Chkheidze announced that the government was expected shortly to issue a new statement exhaustively explaining its stand on issues of foreign and domestic policy. Until then, N. S. Chkheidze proposed that consideration of the question of supporting the Loan be postponed.

This attitude of the Lefts is puzzling, to say the least. After all, someone has to run the government and carry out the reforms which suffering Russia has been craving for.

One of the two: either the present government enjoys the confidence of the Lefts, having so far done nothing to shirk the obligations it has assumed; or it does not enjoy such confidence. In the latter case, the Lefts, in withdrawing their support of the Provisional Government, must take upon themselves not only "control" over its activities, but the whole burden of government and responsibility before the people and history. If, however, they cannot blame the Provisional Government for anything that it has done up to now, then naturally, they have no right to wait for its future statements and should give it their full support. In any case, this equivocalness, this evasive reticence, these mental reservations on their part are quite intolerable. On the one hand, this does not in the least lighten the responsibility of the Provisional Government, which cannot even plead isolation against the verdict of history; on the other, this practically deprives the government of the support of the broad democratic masses and thus puts it in a difficult position.

Straightforwardness has always been a primary virtue of socialist trends. Socialist parties have always eschewed a policy of evasion, philistine spinelessness, and elastic opportunism. But now, in the question of the Loan, the central groups of Russian socialism have abandoned these traditional principles of theirs and taken to the path of Octobrist[72] pussyfooting. Public opinion has a right to ask that they make their attitude on the question of the Loan perfectly clear, that they honestly and openly declare their participation or non-participation in it and thus fulfil their moral obligation to the Provisional Government, which means, either to give it the backing of the Left groups or to make known their disagreement with it.

The bank bosses are men of business. They take a sane view of politics: once you've promised to support the capitalist government (which is conducting an imperialist war), then come across with the Loan.

Correct! Having bound themselves hand and foot, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks have meekly surrendered to the capitalists. The government's promise "shortly to issue a new statement exhaustively [!] explaining [it has been by now explained more than enough!] its stand on issues of foreign and domestic policy" is nothing but an empty phrase.

No "statements" in the form of declarations, assurances, or pronunciamentos will alter the fact of the matter. And the fact of the matter is that the capitalist government of Lvov, Guchkov, Milyukov and Co. represents the interests of capitalism, is bound up with those interests, and cannot

(even if it wanted to) break free from the imperialist, annexationist policies of conquest.

To gain the "*backing*" of the "Lefts" by means of empty non-committal phrases, that is, to use the authority of the Lefts to bolster up its imperialist policy without receding a step from it—this is what our imperialist government is trying to do, this is what, objectively, Chkheidze and his friends are helping it to do.

"Octobrist pussyfooting"—what a winged little phrase! This is not only a practical, but also a correct evaluation of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik political line by people who really know what it's all about.

Pravda No. 36, May 3 (April 20), 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

A PROLETARIAN MILITIA

On April 14 our paper published a report from a correspondent in Kanavino, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, to the effect that "*a workers' militia paid for by the factory managements has been introduced at practically all the factories*".

Kanavino district, our correspondent reports, has sixteen factories and about thirty thousand workers, not counting railway employees. The organisation of a workers' militia paid for by the capitalists therefore embraces a considerable number of the largest enterprises in the locality.

The organisation of a workers' militia to be paid for by the capitalists is a measure of tremendous—it will be no exaggeration to say, gigantic and decisive—importance, both practically and in principle. The revolution cannot be made safe, its gains cannot be assured, its further development is *impossible*, until this measure has become general, until it is carried through all over the country.

The bourgeois and landowner republicans, who turned republican after they saw that it was impossible to rule the people *otherwise*, are trying to establish a republic that would be as monarchical as possible; something like that in France, which Shchedrin called a republic without republicans.[73]

At the present time, when the landowners and capitalists have come to realise the strength of the revolutionary masses, the most important thing for them is to *safeguard* the most essential institutions of the old regime, to safeguard the old instruments of oppression: the police, the bureaucracy, the standing army. They are trying to reduce the "civil militia" to an institution of the old type, i.e., to small detachments of armed men standing apart from the people

and as close as possible to the bourgeoisie and under the command of men from among the bourgeoisie.

The minimum programme of the Social-Democrats calls for the replacement of the standing army by a universal arming of the people. Most of the official Social-Democrats in Europe and most of our own Menshevik leaders, however, have "forgotten" or put aside the Party's programme, substituting chauvinism ("defencism") for internationalism, reformism for revolutionary tactics.

Yet now of all times, at the present revolutionary moment, it is most urgent and essential that there be a universal arming of the people. To assert that, while we have a revolutionary army, there is no need to arm the proletariat, or that there would "not be enough" arms to go round, is mere deception and trickery. The thing is to begin organising a universal militia straight away, so that everyone should learn the use of arms even if there is "not enough" to go round, for it is not at all necessary that the people have enough weapons to arm everybody. The people must learn, one and all, how to use arms, they must belong, one and all, to the militia which is to replace the police and the standing army.

The workers do not want an army standing apart from the people; what they want is that the workers and soldiers should *merge* into a single militia consisting of all the people.

Failing this, the apparatus of oppression will remain in force, ready today to serve Guchkov and his friends, the counter-revolutionary generals, and tomorrow Radko Dmitriev or some pretender to the throne and builder of a plebiscite monarchy.

The capitalists need a republic now, because they cannot "manage" the people otherwise. But what they need is a "parliamentary" republic, i.e., one where democracy would be limited to democratic *elections*, to the right of sending to parliament individuals who, as Marx aptly remarked, *represent* the people and *oppress* the people.[74]

The opportunists of contemporary Social-Democracy, who have substituted Scheidemann for Marx, have memorised the rule that parliamentarism "should be utilised" (which is absolutely correct), but have forgotten what Marx taught concerning proletarian democracy as *distinguished* from bourgeois parliamentarism.

The people need a republic in order to educate the masses in the methods of democracy. We need *not only* representation along democratic lines, but the building of the entire state administration from the bottom up by the masses themselves, their effective participation in all of life's steps, their active role in the administration. *Replacement* of the old organs of oppression, the police, the bureaucracy, the standing army, by a universal arming of the people, by a really universal militia, is the only way to guarantee the country a maximum of security against the restoration of the monarchy and to *enable* it to go forward firmly, systematically and resolutely towards socialism, not by "introducing" it from above, but by raising the vast mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians to the art of state administration, to the use of the *whole* state power.

Public service through a police standing above the people, through bureaucrats, who are the most faithful servants of the bourgeoisie, and through a standing army under the command of landowners and capitalists—that is the ideal of the bourgeois parliamentary republic, which is out to perpetuate the rule of Capital.

Public service through a really universal people's militia, composed of men and women, a militia capable partly of replacing the bureaucrats—this, combined with the principle of elective office and displaceability of all public officers, with payment for their work according to proletarian, not "master-class", bourgeois standards, is the ideal of the working class.

This ideal has not only become a part of our programme, it has not only won a place in the history of the labour movement in the West, namely, in the experience of the Paris Commune; it has not only been evaluated, stressed, explained and recommended by Marx, but it was actually put into practice by the Russian workers in the years 1905 and 1917.

The Soviets of Workers' Deputies, in point of significance, in point of the type of government they create, are institutions of precisely that kind of democracy which does away with the old organs of oppression, and takes the road of a universal militia.

But how can the militia be made universal when the proletarians and semi-proletarians are herded in the factories,

crushed by unbearable labour for the landowners and the capitalists?

There is only one way: the workers' militia must be paid for by the capitalists.

The capitalists must pay the workers for the hours and days which they give to public service.

This reliable method is being adopted by the working masses themselves. The example of the Nizhni-Novgorod workers should become a model for all Russia.

Comrade workers, make the peasants and the rest of the people see the need for a universal militia in place of the police and the old bureaucracy! Introduce such and only such a militia! Introduce it through the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, through the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, through the organs of local self-government that fall into the hands of the working class. Do not under any circumstances be content with a bourgeois militia. Draw the women into public service on an equal footing with the men. See to it that the capitalists pay the workers for days devoted to public service in the militia!

Learn the methods of democracy by actual practice, right now, on your own, from the bottom up—rouse the masses to effective, immediate, universal participation in government—this and this alone will assure the full triumph of the revolution and its unswerving, purposeful and systematic advance.

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BANKRUPTCY?

We have been informed that the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has just received a Note which our Provisional Government forwarded to all its representatives abroad.

This Note, apparently, is that very "statement" which N. S. Chkheidze had expected to be issued within three days and which was to contain definite pronouncements against annexations.

But what do we find?

The Note contains a forthright declaration by the Provisional Government to the effect that Russia will fight to the end, that Russia remains true to her obligations to the Allies.

This Note has had the effect of a bombshell.

Among the majority of the Executive Committee, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, and others, there is complete bewilderment. The bankruptcy of the entire policy of "agreements" is obvious—and it has come much sooner than we expected.

Talk in the Contact Commission will not end the imperialist war.

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RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS) OF APRIL 20 (MAY 3), 1917 ON THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S NOTE OF APRIL 18 (MAY 1), 1917

The Provisional Government's Note has fully demonstrated the correctness of the position which our Party adopted in the resolution of the Petrograd City Conference, namely, (1) that the Provisional Government is an out-and-out imperialist government bound hand and foot by Anglo-French and Russian capital; (2) that all the promises it has made or may make (as to "ascertaining the will of the people for peace", etc.) are nothing but deceit; (3) that the Provisional Government, irrespective of its composition, *cannot* renounce annexations, because in this war, and especially at this moment, the capitalist class is tied by banking capital; (4) that the policy of the petty bourgeoisie pursued by the Narodniks, Mensheviks and most of the leaders of the present Soviet of Workers' Deputies, a policy of encouraging false hopes as to the possibility of "improving" the capitalists (i.e., the Provisional Government) by "corrective measures", has once again been exposed by this Note.

In view of this, the Central Committee finds:

1) that any change in the composition of the present government (the resignation of Milyukov, the recall of Kerensky, etc.) would only be imitating the worst methods of bourgeois parliamentary republicanism, which *substitutes* for the struggle of classes the rivalry of cliques and the reshuffling of individuals;

2) that the only means of salvation for the mass of the petty-bourgeois population, which vacillates between the capitalists and the working class, is to unreservedly join the revolutionary proletariat, which is the only class capable of really breaking the fetters of finance capital and the policy of annexation. Only by taking—with the support of the majority of the people—the whole power of state into its own hands, will the revolutionary proletariat, together with the revolutionary soldiers, create, in the shape of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a government which will be trusted by the workers of all countries and which will alone be capable of quickly putting an end to the war by means of a truly democratic peace.

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to the text in *Pravda*

APPEAL TO THE SOLDIERS OF ALL THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

Brothers, soldiers!

We are all worn out by this frightful war, which has cost millions of lives, crippled millions of people and caused untold misery, ruin, and starvation.

And more and more people are beginning to ask themselves: What started this war, what is it being waged for?

Every day it is becoming clearer to us, the workers and peasants, who bear the brunt of the war, that it was started and is being waged by the capitalists of all countries for the sake of the capitalists' interests, for the sake of world supremacy, for the sake of markets for the manufacturers, factory owners and bankers, for the sake of plundering the weak nationalities. They are carving up colonies and seizing territories in the Balkans and in Turkey—and for this the European peoples must be ruined, for this we must die, for this we must witness the ruin, starvation and death of our families.

The capitalist class in all countries is deriving colossal, staggering, scandalously high profits from contracts and war supplies, from concessions in annexed countries, and from the rising price of goods. The capitalist class has imposed contribution on all the nations for decades ahead in the shape of high interest on the billions lent in war loans. And we, the workers and peasants, must die, suffer ruin, and starve, must patiently bear all this and strengthen our oppressors, the capitalists, by having the workers of the different countries exterminate each other and feel hatred for each other.

Are we going to continue submissively to bear our yoke, to put up with the war between the capitalist classes? Are we going to let this war drag on by taking the side of our own national governments, our own national bourgeoisies, our own national capitalists, and thereby destroying the international unity of the workers of all countries, of the whole world?

No, brother soldiers, it is time we opened our eyes, it is time we took our fate into our own hands. In all countries popular wrath against the capitalist class, which has drawn the people into the war, is growing, spreading, and gaining strength. Not only in Germany, but even in Britain, which before the war had the reputation of being one of the freest countries, hundreds and hundreds of true friends and representatives of the working class are languishing in prison for having spoken the honest truth against the war and against the capitalists. The revolution in Russia is only the first step of the first revolution; it should be followed and will be followed by others.

The new government in Russia—which has overthrown Nicholas II, who was as bad a crowned brigand as Wilhelm II—is a government of the capitalists. It is waging just as predatory and imperialist a war as the capitalists of Germany, Britain, and other countries. It has endorsed the predatory secret treaties concluded by Nicholas II with the capitalists of Britain, France, and other countries; it is not publishing these treaties for the world to know, just as the German Government is not publishing its secret and equally predatory treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, and so on.

On April 20 the Russian Provisional Government published a Note re-endorsing the old predatory treaties concluded by the tsar and declaring its readiness to fight the war to a victorious finish, thereby arousing the indignation even of those who have hitherto trusted and supported it.

But, in addition to the capitalist government, the Russian revolution has given rise to spontaneous revolutionary organisations representing the vast majority of the workers and peasants, namely, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd and in the majority of Russia's cities. Most of the soldiers and some of the workers in Russia—like very many workers and soldiers in Germany—still

preserve an unreasoning trust in the government of the capitalists and in their empty and lying talk of a peace without annexations, a war of defence, and so on.

But, unlike the capitalists, the workers and poor peasants have no interest in annexations or in protecting the profits of the capitalists. And, therefore, every day, every step taken by the capitalist government, both in Russia and in Germany, will expose the deceit of the capitalists, will expose the fact that as long as capitalist rule lasts there can be no really democratic, non-coercive peace based on a real renunciation of all annexations, i.e., on the liberation of all colonies without exception, of all oppressed, forcibly annexed or underprivileged nationalities without exception, and the war will in all likelihood become still more acute and protracted.

Only if state power in both the, at present, hostile countries, for example, in both Russia and Germany, passes wholly and exclusively into the hands of the revolutionary Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which are really capable of rending the whole mesh of capitalist relations and interests, will the workers of both the belligerent countries acquire confidence in each other and be able to put a speedy end to the war on the basis of a really democratic peace that will really liberate *all* the nations and nationalities of the world.

Brothers, soldiers!

Let us do everything we can to hasten this, to achieve this aim. Let us not fear sacrifices—any sacrifice for the workers' revolution will be less painful than the sacrifices of war. Every victorious step of the revolution will save hundreds of thousands and millions of people from death, ruin, and starvation.

Peace to the hovels, war on the palaces! Peace to the workers of all countries! Long live the fraternal unity of the revolutionary workers of all countries! Long live socialism!

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
Editorial Board of Pravda

Pravda No. 37,
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THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S NOTE

The cards are on the table. We have every reason to be grateful to Guchkov and Milyukov for their Note, printed today in all the newspapers.

The majority of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Narodniks, Mensheviks, all those who until now have appealed for confidence in the Provisional Government, have received condign punishment. They hoped, expected, and believed that the Provisional Government, under the beneficent influence of "contact" with Chkheidze, Skobelev, and Steklov, would for ever repudiate annexations. Things have turned out somewhat differently....

In its Note of April 18, the Provisional Government speaks of "the desire of the whole nation [!] to fight the world war out *to a decisive victory*".

"Needless to say," the Note adds, "the Provisional Government ... will fully stand by its obligations towards our Allies."

Short and clear. War to a decisive victory. The alliance with the British and French bankers is sacred....

Who concluded this alliance with "our" Allies, i.e., with the British and French multimillionaires? The tsar, Rasputin, the tsar's gang, of course. But to Milyukov and Co. this treaty is sacred.

Why?

Some say: because Milyukov is insincere, he is a crafty person and so on.

But that is not the point. The point is that Guchkov, Milyukov, Tereshchenko, and Konovalov are spokesmen of the *capitalists*. And the seizure of foreign lands is necessary

to the capitalists. They will receive new markets, new places to export capital to, new opportunities to arrange profitable jobs for tens of thousands of their sons, etc. The point is that at the present moment the *interests* of the Russian capitalists are identical with those of the British and French capitalists. That, and that alone, is the reason why the tsar's treaties with the British and French capitalists are precious to the Provisional Government of the Russian capitalists.

The new Note of the Provisional Government will pour oil on the flames. It can only arouse a bellicose spirit in Germany. It will help Wilhelm the Brigand to go on deceiving "his own" workers and soldiers and drag them into a war "to a finish".

The new Note of the Provisional Government puts the issue squarely: what next?

From the very first moment of our revolution, the British and French capitalists have been assuring us that the Russian revolution was made solely and exclusively in order to fight the war out "to a finish". The capitalists want to plunder Turkey, Persia, and China. If this should entail the slaughter of another ten million or so Russian muzhiks—what of it? What we need is a "decisive victory".... And now the Provisional Government, with utter frankness, has adopted the same course.

"Fight—because we want to plunder."

"Die in your tens of thousands every day—because 'we' have not yet fought it out and have not yet got our share of the spoils!"

No class-conscious worker, no class-conscious soldier will support the policy of "confidence" in the Provisional Government any longer. The policy of confidence is bankrupt.

Our Social-Democratic City Conference stated in its resolution that the correctness of *our* view would be corroborated now every day*. But not even we had expected events to move so fast.

The present Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is faced with the alternative: either to swallow the pill offered

* See pp. 154-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

by Guchkov and Milyukov, which would mean renouncing an independent political role once and for all, for tomorrow Milyukov would put his "feet on the table" and reduce the Soviet to a mere cipher; or to reject Milyukov's Note, which would mean breaking with the old policy of confidence and adopting the course proposed by *Pravda*.

Naturally, a middle-of-the-road course might be found. But would it be for long?

Workers and soldiers, you must now loudly declare that there must be only one power in the country—the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Provisional Government, the government of a handful of capitalists, must make way for these Soviets.

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A BASIC QUESTION

A LINE OF ARGUMENT USED BY SOCIALISTS WHO HAVE GONE OVER TO THE BOURGEOISIE

Mr. Plekhanov gives an excellent illustration of this. In his First of May letter to the Association of Socialist Students published in today's *Rech*, *Dyelo Naroda*, and *Yedinstvo*, he writes:

> "It [the International Socialist Congress of 1889] understood that the social, or more exactly—the socialist, revolution presupposed prolonged educational and organisational work within the working class. This has now been forgotten here by people who call on the Russian working masses to seize political power, an act which would make sense only if the objective conditions necessary for a social revolution prevailed. These conditions do not exist yet...."

And so on in the same strain, ending with an appeal for "whole-hearted support" of the Provisional Government.

This argument of Mr. Plekhanov is the typical argument of a small group of "have-beens", who call themselves Social-Democrats. And because it is typical it is worth dealing with at length.

First of all, is it reasonable and honest to quote the First Congress of the Second International, and not the last one?

The First Congress of the Second International (1889-1914) took place in 1889, the last, in Basle, in 1912. The Basle Manifesto, which was adopted *unanimously*, speaks precisely, definitely, directly, and clearly (so that not even the Plekhanovs can twist the sense of it) of a *proletarian revolution*, and one, moreover, which is considered in *connection* with the very war which subsequently broke out (in 1914).

It is not difficult to understand why those socialists who have gone over to the bourgeoisie are prone to "forget" the Basle Manifesto as a whole, or this most important part of it.

Secondly, the seizure of political power by "the Russian working masses", writes our author, "would make sense only if the objective conditions necessary for a social revolution prevailed".

This is a muddle, not a thought.

Assuming *even* that the word "social" here is a misprint for "socialist", this is not the only muddle. What classes do the Russian working masses consist of? Everybody knows that they consist of workers and peasants. Which of these classes is in the majority? The peasants. Who are these peasants as far as their class position is concerned? Petty proprietors. The question arises: if the petty proprietors constitute the majority of the population and if the objective conditions for socialism are lacking, then how *can* the majority of the population declare in favour of socialism? Who *can* say anything or who says anything about establishing socialism against the will of the majority?

Mr. Plekhanov has got mixed up in the most ludicrous fashion at the very outset.

To find himself in a ridiculous position is not the worst punishment a man can suffer, who, following the example of the capitalist press, creates an "enemy" of his own imagination instead of quoting the exact words of this or that political opponent.

Further. In whose hands should "political power" be, *even* from the point of view of a vulgar bourgeois democrat from *Rech*? In the hands of the majority of the population. Do the "Russian working masses", so inaptly referred to by the muddled social-chauvinist, constitute the majority of the population in Russia? Undoubtedly they do—the overwhelming majority!

How then, without betraying democracy—even democracy as understood by Milyukov—*can* one be opposed to the "seizure of political power" by the "Russian working masses"?

The deeper you go into the wood, the thicker the trees. Each step in our analysis opens up new abysses of confusion in Mr. Plekhanov's ideas.

The social-chauvinist is against political power passing to the majority of the population in Russia!

Mr. Plekhanov doesn't know what he is talking about. He has also confused—though Marx as far back as 1875 made a point of warning against such confusion—the "working masses" with the mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians.[75] We shall explain the difference to the ex-Marxist, Mr. Plekhanov.

Can the majority of the peasants in Russia demand and carry out the nationalisation of the land? Certainly it can. Would this be a socialist revolution? It would not. It would *still* be a bourgeois revolution, for the nationalisation of the land is a measure that is not incompatible with the existence of capitalism. It is, however, a *blow* to private ownership of the most important means of production. Such a blow would *strengthen* the proletarians and semi-proletarians far more than was the case during the revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Further. Can the majority of the peasants in Russia declare for the merging of all the banks into one, for having a branch of a single nation-wide state bank in each village?

It can, because the convenience and advantage for the people of such a measure are unquestionable. *Even* the "defencists" could be for such a measure, as it would heighten Russia's capacity for "defence" enormously.

Is it economically possible to immediately effect such a merger of all the banks? Without a doubt, it is quite possible.

Would this be a socialist measure? No, this would *not yet* be socialism.

Further. Can the majority of the peasants in Russia declare in favour of the Sugar Manufacturers' Syndicate passing into the hands of the government, to be controlled by the workers and peasants, and the price of sugar being lowered ?

It certainly can, for that would benefit the majority of the people.

Is that possible economically? It is quite possible, since the Sugar Syndicate has not only developed economically into a single industrial organism on a national scale, but *had already* been subject to "state" control under tsarism

(i.e., control by government officials serving the capitalists).

Would the taking over of the syndicate by the democratic-bourgeois, peasant, state be a socialist measure?

No, that would not yet be socialism. Mr. Plekhanov could have easily convinced himself of that if he had recalled the commonly known axioms of Marxism.

The question is: Would such measures as the merging of the banks and turning over the Sugar Manufacturers' Syndicate to a democratic peasant government *enhance or diminish* the role, importance, and influence of the proletarians and semi-proletarians among the general mass of the population?

They would undoubtedly enhance them, for those measures *do not* grow out of a system of petty production; they were made possible by those "objective conditions" which were *still* lacking in 1889, but which *already* exist now.

Such measures would inevitably enhance the role, importance, and influence upon the population of the workers, especially the city workers, who are the vanguard of the proletarians and semi-proletarians of town and country.

After these measures will have been put into effect, further *progress* towards socialism in Russia would become fully possible, and given the aid of the more advanced and experienced workers of Western Europe, who have broken with their West-European Plekhanovs, Russia's *real* transition to socialism would be *inevitable*, and the success of such a transition would be *assured*.

This is the line of argument which every Marxist and socialist who has not gone over to the side of "his own" national bourgeoisie should use.

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ICONS VERSUS CANNONS, PHRASES VERSUS CAPITAL

The Note of the Provisional Government on war to a victorious finish has aroused indignation even among those who nourished illusory hopes for a possible renunciation of annexations on the part of the government of capitalists. The newspapers that have been acting as mouthpieces of this petty-bourgeois policy of illusory hopes are today either mumbling in dismay, like *Rabochaya Gazeta*, or are trying to turn this indignation against individuals.

Novaya Zhizn[76] writes: "There is no place in the government of democratic Russia for a champion of the interests of international capital! We are sure the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will act promptly in taking the most energetic measures towards rendering Mr. Milyukov harmless." And *Dyelo Naroda* expresses the same piece of philistine wisdom in the following words. Milyukov's Note, it says, "tries to reduce to nought a statement of the greatest international importance approved by the entire cabinet".

Icons versus cannons. Phrases versus capital. The government's statement renouncing annexations was a piece of utterly worthless diplomatic verbiage, which might deceive an ignorant muzhik, but could not "confuse" the leaders of the petty-bourgeois Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the writers of *Novaya Zhizn* and *Dyelo Naroda*, unless they were willing to be deceived. What empty phrases are these about there being "no place in the government of democratic Russia for a champion of the interests of international capital!" Educated people ought to be ashamed of themselves, writing such piffle.

The whole Provisional Government is a government of the capitalist class. It is a matter of class, not of persons. To attack Milyukov personally, to demand, directly or indirectly, his dismissal, is a silly comedy, for *no* change of personalities can change anything so long as the *classes* in power are unchanged.

To draw a line between the "democracy" of Russia, Britain, France, etc., and the championing of capital is to sink to the level of the economic and political wisdom of a Gapon.[77]

It is pardonable for ignorant muzhiks to demand of the capitalist a "promise" that he "live righteously" and not capitalistically, that he should *not* "champion the interests of capital". But for the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, for the writers of *Novaya Zhizn* and *Dyelo Naroda* to adopt such methods means to nourish the illusory hopes which the people place in the capitalists, hopes that are most harmful and ruinous to the cause of freedom, to the cause of the revolution.

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THE LOGIC OF CITIZEN V. CHERNOV

Citizen V. Chernov writes in *Dyelo Naroda* of April 16:

"He [Lenin] did not even think that, even from his own point of view, Britain's consent to his journey would have been better in that it would have been due to the pressure of the Russian revolution, whereas Germany's consent may appear more suspicious as to its motives."

Conclusion: Lenin is something of a maniac.

Very well. But what about the thirty arrivals who belong to *different* parties, including the Bund? Are they all maniacs? Did none of them "even think"?

Further. How about the telegram from Martov, *Natanson* (the leader of the S.R. Party, mark you), Axelrod, and others, saying: "We find it *absolutely* impossible to return to Russia via England"? (See *Rabochaya Gazeta* for April 15.)

Does this mean that both Martov and Natanson are maniacs, that they too "did not even think"?

But these witnesses, who *do not* belong to our Party—Natanson is a witness *belonging to V. Chernov's party*—confirm the *fact* that it was *absolutely* impossible to make the journey any other way!

What is the conclusion? It is this—either V. Chernov is a queer fellow who uses phrases to avoid the *facts*, or he has allowed himself to be so frightened by philistine-chauvinist gossip and slander that he has lost his head.

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MR. PLEKHANOV'S FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO EXTRICATE HIMSELF

In No. 15 of *Yedinstvo*, Mr. Plekhanov, with an abundance of abuse unusual even for that abusive publication, attacks *Pravda* in an attempt to suppress two incontestably established facts.

You won't succeed in hushing them up, gentlemen!

Fact number one. Mr. Plekhanov *did not reprint* our report, published in *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet No. 32, for April 5, 1917, *or the resolution* of the Executive Committee.

This is not only an expression of anarchist disrespect for the elected representatives of the *majority* of the soldiers? but the dishonest method of a riot-monger.

Fact number two. Mr. Plekhanov's hounding tactics has called forth a protest *not* from us, but from *Dyelo Naroda*, to which even such a colleague of Guchkov and Milyukov as Kerensky contributes. *Dyelo Naroda* for April 13, 1917, wrote of Mr. Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* in black and white:

> "We are accustomed to see such words and such a method of struggle in the columns of *Russkaya Volya*. But to see them employed in articles written by socialists is, frankly speaking, painful and depressing."

This is the testimony of defencist witnesses, who politically are a thousand times closer to Mr. Plekhanov than to us.

What sort of readers does Mr. Plekhanov count on when he *dismisses* the testimony of a *witness* by saying that *Dyelo Naroda* has made an "inept remark"?

The witness has exposed Mr. Plekhanov's riot-mongering methods.

There was a time when Mr. Plekhanov was a socialist, Now he has sunk to the level of *Russkaya Volya*.

No amount of abuse can do away with the fact that *even Dyelo Naroda* has exposed Mr. Plekhanov.

In an editorial reprinted in our issue for April 18 *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet (No. 43, April 17) called this hounding campaign "dishonest and disgusting".

This witness states bluntly that this dishonest and disgusting hounding campaign on the part of the dark forces and their newspapers was and is a fact. Mr. Plekhanov, fallen to the level of *Russkaya Volya*, stands hopelessly condemned.

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RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS) ADOPTED APRIL 21 (MAY 4), 1917

Having considered the situation which has arisen in Petrograd after the imperialist, annexationist, and predatory Note of the Provisional Government of April 18, 1917, and after a number of meetings and demonstrations of the people held in the streets of Petrograd on April 20, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:

1. Party propagandists and speakers must refute the despicable lies of the capitalist papers and of the papers supporting the capitalists to the effect that we are holding out the threat of *civil war*. This is a despicable lie, for only at the present moment, as long as the capitalists and their government cannot and dare not use force against the masses, as long as the mass of soldiers and workers are freely expressing their will and freely electing and displacing *all* authorities—*at such a moment* any thought of civil war would be naïve, senseless, preposterous; at such a moment *there must be compliance with the will of the majority of the population* and free criticism of this will by the discontented minority; should violence be resorted to, the responsibility will fall on the Provisional Government and its supporters.

2. By their outcries against civil war the government of the capitalists and its newspapers are only trying to conceal the reluctance of the capitalists, who admittedly constitute an insignificant minority of the people, to submit to the will of the majority.

3. In order to learn the will of the majority of the population in Petrograd, where there is now an unusually large number of soldiers who are familiar with the sentiment of

the peasants and correctly express it, a popular vote must at once be arranged in all the districts of Petrograd and its suburbs to ascertain what the attitude is towards the government's Note, what support the various parties enjoy, and what kind of Provisional Government is desired.

4. All Party propagandists must advocate these views and this proposal at factories, in regiments, in the streets, etc., by means of *peaceful* discussion and peaceful demonstrations, as well as meetings everywhere; we must endeavour to organise regular voting in factories and regiments, taking care that order and comradely discipline are strictly observed.

5. Party propagandists must again an d again protest against the despicable slander spread by the capitalists alleging that our Party stands for a separate peace with Germany. We consider Wilhelm II as bad a crowned brigand meriting execution as Nicholas II, and the German Guchkovs, i.e., the German capitalists, just as much annexationists, robbers, and imperialists as the Russian, British, and all other capitalists. We *are against* negotiating with the capitalists, we are for negotiating and fraternising *with the revolutionary workers and soldiers of all countries*. We are convinced that the reason why the Guchkov-Milyukov government is trying to aggravate the situation is because it knows that the workers' revolution in Germany is beginning, and that this revolution will be a blow to the capitalists of all countries.

6. When the Provisional Government spreads rumours about utter and unavoidable economic chaos, it is not only trying to frighten the people into leaving the power in the hands of this Provisional Government, but is also vaguely, fumblingly expressing the profound and indubitable truth that *all* the nations of the world have been led into a blind alley, that the war waged in the interests of the capitalists has driven them to the brink of an abyss, and that there is really no way out except through the transfer of power to the revolutionary class, i.e., to the revolutionary proletariat, which is capable of adopting revolutionary measures.

If there are any stocks of grain, etc., in the country, the new government of the workers and soldiers will know how to dispose of them too. But if the capitalist war has brought

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

economic ruin to a stage where there is no bread at all, the capitalist government will only aggravate the condition of the people instead of improving it.

7. We consider the policy of the present majority of leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, of the Narodnik and Menshevik parties, to be profoundly erroneous, since confidence in the Provisional Government, attempts to compromise with it, dickering over amendments, etc., would in fact mean only so many more useless scraps of paper and useless delays; and besides, this policy threatens to create a divergence between the will of the Soviet on the one hand, and that of the majority of revolutionary soldiers at the front and in Petrograd and of the majority of workers, on the other.

8. We call upon those workers and soldiers who believe that the Soviet must change its policy and renounce the policy of confidence in and compromise with the capitalist government, to hold new elections of delegates to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to send to that body only people who would steadfastly hold to a quite definite opinion consonant with the actual will of the majority.

Pravda No. 38,
May 5 (April 22), 1917

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HONEST DEFENCISM REVEALS ITSELF

Events in Petrograd during the last few days, especially yesterday, illustrate how right we were in speaking of the "honest" defencism of the *mass* as distinguished from the defencism of the leaders and parties.

The mass of the population is made up of proletarians, semi-proletarians, and poor peasants. They are the vast majority of the nation. *These* classes are not at all interested in annexations. Imperialist policies, the profits of banking capital, incomes from railways in Persia, lucrative jobs in Galicia and Armenia, putting restraints on the freedom of Finland—all these are things in which these classes are not interested.

But all these things taken together just go to make up what is known in science and the press as imperialist, annexationist, predatory policy.

The crux of the matter is that the Guchkovs, Milyukovs, and Lvovs—be they even all paragons of virtue, disinterestedness, and love of their fellow-man—are the spokesmen, leaders, and chosen representatives of the capitalist *class*, a class which has a vested interest in a predatory, annexationist policy. This class invested billions "in the war", and is making hundreds of millions "out of the war" and annexations (i.e., out of the subjugation or forced *incorporation* of alien nationalities).

To believe that the capitalist *class* will "mend its ways", will cease to be a capitalist class, will give up its profits, is a fatuous hope, an idle dream, and in effect a deception of the people. Only petty-bourgeois politicians, fluctuating between capitalist and proletarian policies, can entertain or encourage such fatuous hopes. Herein lies the mistake of

the present leaders of the Narodnik parties and the Mensheviks, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Chernov, and the others.

The mass representatives of defencism are not at all versed in politics. They have not been able to learn politics from books, from participation in the Duma, or from close observation of people engaged in politics.

The mass representatives of defencism still do not know that wars are waged by *governments*, that governments represent the interests of certain *classes*, that the present war, on the part of both belligerent groups, is waged by the capitalists in the predatory interests of and for the predatory aims of the capitalists.

Unaware as they are of this, the mass representatives of defencism argue quite simply: we do not want annexations, we demand a democratic peace, we do not want to fight for Constantinople, for putting down Persia, for plundering Turkey, and so on; we "demand" that the Provisional Government give up its policy of annexations.

The mass representatives of defencism are *sincere* in wishing this, not in a personal but in a class sense, because they speak for classes that are *not interested* in annexations. But what these representatives of the masses do not know is that the capitalists and their government may throw over the policy of annexations in words, may dangle promises and mouth fine phrases, but cannot *really* abandon the idea of annexations.

That is why the mass representatives of defencism were so strongly and legitimately shocked by the Provisional Government's Note of April 18.

People familiar with politics could not have been surprised by this Note, for they knew only too well that when the capitalists "renounce annexations" they do not really mean it. It is just the usual trick and phrase-mongering of diplomats.

But the "honest" mass representatives of defencism were surprised, shocked, indignant. They *felt*—they did not understand it quite clearly, but they felt that they had been tricked.

This is the *essence* of the crisis and it should be clearly distinguished from the opinions, expectations, and suppositions of single individuals and parties.

To patch up this crisis for a while with a new declaration, with a new Note (that is what Mr. Plekhanov's advice in *Yedinstvo* and the aspirations of Milyukov and Co., on the one hand, and those of Chkheidze and Tsereteli, on the other, amount to)—to paper over the cracks with a new promise is of course possible, but this can do nothing but harm. A new promise would inevitably mean a new deception of the masses; therefore a new outburst of indignation, and such an outburst, if lacking intelligent orientation, might easily become very harmful.

The masses should be told the whole truth. The government of the capitalists *cannot* abandon annexations; it is caught in its own meshes, and there is no escape. It feels, it realises, it sees that without revolutionary measures (of which only a revolutionary class is capable) *there is no way out*, and it is becoming panicky, losing its head; it promises one thing, but does another; at one minute it threatens the masses with violence (Guchkov and Shingaryov), at the next it proposes that the power be taken out of its hands.

Economic ruin, crisis, the horrors of war, an impasse from which there is no way out—this is what the capitalists have brought *all* the nations to.

Indeed there is no way out—*except* through the transfer of power to the revolutionary class, to the revolutionary proletariat, which alone, supported by the majority of the population, is capable of aiding the revolution to victory in *all* the belligerent countries and leading humanity to lasting peace and liberation from the yoke of capitalism.

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MAD CAPITALISTS OR WEAK-MINDED SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS?

Rabochaya Gazeta writes today:

"We have been strongly opposed to the civil warmongering by Lenin's followers. But now the signal for civil war no longer comes from Lenin's followers, but from the Provisional Government, which has published a statement that makes, a mockery of democratic aspirations. This is truly a mad stop, and immediate determined action by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is needed if we are to avert the dire consequences of this madness."

What can be more absurd and ridiculous, than this fairy-tale about "civil warmongering" on our part, when we have declared in the clearest, most formal and unequivocal manner that all our work should be focused on *patiently explaining* the proletarian policy as opposed to the petty-bourgeois, defencist craze with its faith in the capitalists?

Does *Rabochaya Gazeta* really fail to understand that these outcries about civil war are now raised by the capitalists in order to break the will of the majority of the people?

Is there a grain of Marxism in proclaiming the conduct of the capitalists "madness", when, caught in the vise of Russian and Anglo-French imperialist capital, they cannot act otherwise?

Mr. Plekhanov, in today's *Yedinstvo*, is more forthright in expressing the policy of the entire petty-bourgeois-defencist bloc when he calls upon the Soviet to come "*to an agreement*" with the Provisional Government. An amusing appeal, this. It is like serving mustard after dinner.

Don't we all know that an agreement was concluded long ago? That it has been in existence since the beginning of the revolution? The whole thing is that the present crisis

is due to the fact that the agreement has proved to be a scrap of paper, an empty promise! To answer the "accursed questions" with which the *failure* of the existing agreement has now squarely confronted the people by calling for an "agreement" in general, without saying a word about its terms or about *real* guarantees for it, to answer by sighing and crying "O ye Madmen!"—is this not a tragicomedy of the petty-bourgeois Louis Blancs? (Louis Blanc was a labour leader only in words, in reality he was the tail of the bourgeoisie.)

"Immediate determined action is needed," *Rabochaya Gazeta* importantly declares. What kind of "action", my dear fellow-citizens? You cannot say what, you do not know what yourselves. All you do know is to *declaim*, because, like Louis Blanc, you have forgotten about the class struggle, you have side-tracked the class struggle under cover of petty-bourgeois phraseology and declamation.

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Published according to the newspaper text

THE ADVICE OR ORDER OF SHINGARYOV, AND THE ADVICE OF A LOCAL SOVIET

The Petrograd *Gazeta-Kopeika*[78] in its issue of April 14 published the following report:

PRIVATELY-OWNED LANDS TO BE REQUISITIONED

Kishinev, April 13. In view of the fact that there are great tracts of uncultivated land in the uyezd that are not leased on account of the high rent, the Akkerman Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies *has recommended all village and volost committees to requisition all unused privately-owned lands for crop cultivation through the Commissar in cases where voluntary agreements are impossible.*

If this report is true, it is extremely important. Obviously, the Akkerman Soviet is guided by practical considerations, and is no doubt closely and intimately acquainted with local conditions. It considers correctly that the crops must be increased at all costs to the fullest possible extent. But how can this be done when the landowners have raised the rents scandalously?

By voluntary agreements with the landowners?

This is what Minister Shingaryov emphatically advises from Petrograd; he threatens the peasants, and protests vehemently against arbitrary action. It is all very well for Shingaryov to argue from Petrograd. It is all very well for him to defend the landowners in the name of the government of the capitalists.

But how about the situation of the peasants locally? Does not the Akkerman Soviet appraise the situation more correctly when it speaks of "voluntary agreements" being "impossible"?

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RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS) ADOPTED IN THE MORNING, OF APRIL 22 (MAY 5), 1917

The political crisis that developed between April 19 and 21 must be regarded, at least in its initial stage, as having passed.

The petty-bourgeois mass, angered by the capitalists, first swung *away from* them *towards* the workers; but two days later they again followed the Menshevik and Narodnik leaders, who stand for "confidence" in and "compromise" with the capitalists.

These leaders have compromised, completely surrendered all their positions, contenting themselves with the empty and purely verbal reservations of the capitalists.

The causes of the crisis have not been removed, and the recurrence of such crises is unavoidable.

The nature of the crisis is that the petty-bourgeois mass is vacillating between its age-old faith in the capitalists and its resentment against them, a tendency to place its faith in the revolutionary proletariat.

The capitalists are dragging out the war and covering up the fact by phrase-mongering. Only the revolutionary proletariat can put an end to, and is working towards putting an end to the war by means of a world revolution of the workers, a revolution which is obviously mounting in our country, ripening in Germany, and drawing closer in a number of other countries.

The slogan "Down with the Provisional Government!" is an incorrect one at the present moment because, in the

absence of a solid (i.e., a class-conscious and organised) majority of the people on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, such a slogan is either an empty phrase, or, objectively, amounts to attempts of an adventurist character.[79]

We shall favour the transfer of power to the proletarians and semi-proletarians only when the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopt our policy and are willing to take the power into their own hands.

The organisation of our Party, the consolidation of the proletarian forces, clearly proved inadequate at the time of the crisis.

The slogans of the moment are: (1) To *explain* the proletarian line and the proletarian way of ending the war; (2) To *criticise* the petty-bourgeois policy of placing trust in the government of the capitalists and compromising with it; (3) To carry on propaganda and agitation from group to group *in every regiment*, in *every* factory, and, particularly, among the most backward masses, such as domestic servants, unskilled labourers, etc., since it was their backing in the first place that the bourgeoisie tried to gain during the crisis; (4) To *organise*, *organise* and once more *organise* the proletariat, in every factory, in every district and in every city quarter.

The resolution of the Petrograd Soviet of April 21 banning all street meetings and demonstrations for two days must be unconditionally obeyed by every member of our Party. The Central Committee already distributed yesterday morning, and is today publishing in *Pravda*, a resolution which states that "at such a moment any thought of civil war would be senseless and preposterous", that all demonstrations must be peaceful ones, and that the responsibility for violence will fall on the Provisional Government and its supporters.* Our Party therefore considers that the abovementioned resolution of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as a whole (and especially the part banning armed demonstrations and shooting in the air) is entirely correct and must be *unconditionally obeyed*.

We call upon all the workers and soldiers to consider carefully the results of the crisis of the last two days and

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* See p. 201 of this volume.—*Ed.*

to send as delegates to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to the Executive Committee only such comrades as express the will of the majority. In all cases where a delegate does not express the opinion of the majority, new elections should be held in the factories and barracks.

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LESSONS OF THE CRISIS

Petrograd and the whole of Russia have passed through a serious political crisis, the first political crisis since the revolution.

On April 18 the Provisional Government issued its unhappily notorious Note, which confirmed the predatory aims of the war clearly enough to arouse the indignation of the masses, who had honestly believed in the desire (and ability) of the capitalists to "renounce annexations". On April 20-21 Petrograd was in a turmoil. The streets were crowded; day and night knots and groups of people stood about, and meetings of various sizes sprang up everywhere; big street processions and demonstrations went on without a break. Yesterday evening, April 21, the crisis, or, at any rate, the first stage of the crisis, apparently came to an end with the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and later the Soviet itself, declaring themselves satisfied with the "explanations", the amendments to the Note and the "elucidations" made by the government (which in fact boil down to empty phrases, saying absolutely nothing, changing nothing and committing the government to nothing). They considered the "incident settled".

Whether the masses consider the "incident settled", the future will show. Our task now is to make a careful study of the *forces*, the classes, that revealed themselves in the crisis, and to draw the relevant lessons for our proletarian party. For it is the great significance of all crises that they make manifest what has been hidden; they cast aside all that is relative, superficial, and trivial; they sweep away the political litter and reveal the real mainsprings of the *class struggle*.

Strictly speaking, the capitalist government on April 18 merely reiterated its previous notes, in which the imperialist war was invested with diplomatic equivocations. The soldiers were angry because they had honestly believed in the sincerity and peaceful intentions of the capitalists. The demonstrations began as *soldiers*' demonstrations, under the contradictory, misguided and ineffectual slogan: "Down with Milyukov" (as though a change of persons or groups could change the *substance* of policy!).

This means that the broad, unstable, and vacillating mass, which is closest to the peasantry and which by its scientific class definition is petty-bourgeois, swung *away from* the capitalists *towards* the revolutionary workers. It was the swing or movement of this mass, strong enough to be a *decisive* factor, that caused the crisis.

It was at this point that other sections began to stir: *not* the middle but the extreme elements, *not* the intermediary petty bourgeoisie but the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, started to come out on to the streets and organise.

The bourgeoisie seized Nevsky Prospekt—or "Milyukov" Prospekt as one paper called it—and the adjacent quarters of prosperous Petrograd, the Petrograd of the capitalists and the government officials. Officers, students, and "the middle classes" demonstrated *in favour* of the Provisional Government. Among the slogans, "Down with Lenin" frequently appeared on the banners.

The proletariat rallied in *its own* centres, the working-class suburbs, around the slogans and appeals of our Party's Central Committee. On April 20-21 the Central Committee adopted resolutions, which were immediately passed on to the proletariat through the Party organisations. The workers poured through the *poor*, less central districts, and then in groups got through to Nevsky. By their mass character and solidarity, these demonstrations were very different from those of the bourgeoisie. Many banners carried the inscription "All Power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies".

On Nevsky there were clashes. The "hostile" demonstrations tore down each other's banners. The Executive Committee received news by telephone from various places that there was shooting on both sides, that there were killed and

wounded; but the information was extremely contradictory and unconfirmed.

The bourgeoisie shouted about the "spectre of civil war", thus expressing its fear that the real masses, the actual majority of the nation, might seize power. The petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviet, the Mensheviks and Narodniks—who since the revolution in general, and during the crisis in particular, have had no definite party policy—allowed themselves to be intimidated. In the Executive Committee almost half the votes were cast against the Provisional Government on the eve of the crisis, but now thirty-four votes (with nineteen against) are cast *in favour* of returning to a policy of confidence in and agreement with the capitalists.

And the "incident" was considered "settled".

What is the *essence* of the class struggle? The capitalists are *for* dragging out the war under cover of empty phrases and false promises. They are caught in the meshes of Russian, Anglo-French and *American* banking capital. The proletariat, as represented by its class-conscious vanguard, stands *for* the transfer of power to the revolutionary class, the working class and the semi-proletarians, *for* the development of a world workers' revolution, a revolution which is clearly developing also in Germany, and *for* terminating the war by means of *such* a revolution.

The vast mass of people, chiefly the petty bourgeoisie, who still believe the Menshevik and Narodnik leaders and who have been absolutely intimidated by the bourgeoisie and are carrying out *its* policy, although with reservations, are swinging now to the right, now to the left.

The war is terrible; it has hit the vast mass of the people hardest of all; it is these people who are becoming aware, albeit still very vaguely, that the war is criminal, that it is being carried on through the rivalry and scramble of the capitalists, for the division of *their* spoils. The world situation is growing more and more involved. *The only way out* is a world workers' revolution, a revolution which is *now* more advanced in Russia than in any other country, but which is clearly mounting (strikes, fraternisation) in Germany too. And the people are wavering: wavering between confidence in their old masters, the capitalists, and bitterness towards them; between confidence in the new class, the

only consistently revolutionary class, which opens up the prospect of a bright future for all the working people—the proletariat—and a vague awareness of its role in world history.

This is not the first time the petty bourgeoisie and semi-proletarians have wavered *and it will not be the last*!

The lesson is clear, comrade workers! There is no time to be lost. The first crisis will be followed by others. You must devote *all* your efforts to enlightening the backward, to making extensive, comradely and direct contact (not only by meetings) with every regiment and with every group of working people who have not had their eyes opened yet! *All* your efforts must be devoted to consolidating your own ranks, to organising the workers from the bottom upwards, including every district, every factory, every quarter of the capital and its suburbs! Do *not* be misled by those of the petty bourgeoisie who "compromise" with the capitalists, by the defencists and by the "supporters", nor by individuals who are inclined to be in a hurry and to shout "Down with the Provisional Government!" before the majority of the people are solidly united. The crisis cannot be overcome by violence practised by individuals against individuals, by the local action of small groups of armed people, by Blanquist attempts to "seize power", to "arrest" the Provisional Government, etc.

Today's task is to explain more precisely, more clearly, more widely the proletariat's policy, *its* way of terminating the war. Rally more resolutely, more widely, wherever you can, to the ranks and columns of the proletariat! Rally round your Soviets; and within them endeavour to rally behind you a majority by comradely persuasion and by re-election of individual members!

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HOW A SIMPLE QUESTION CAN BE CONFUSED

Commenting on the resolution of the Central Committee of April 20 concerning the necessity of transferring power to the revolutionary proletariat "*with the support of the majority of the people*", today's *Dyen* writes:

> "Very simple, then what's the hitch? Instead of passing resolutions, come and take the power."

We have here a typical example of the methods used by the bourgeois press. People pretend not to understand the simplest thing, and ensure themselves—on paper—an easy victory. Anybody who says "take the power" should not have to think long to realise that an attempt to do so *without as yet* having the backing of the majority of the people would be adventurism or Blanquism (*Pravda* has made a special point of warning against this in the clearest, most unmistakable and unequivocal terms).

There is a degree of freedom now in Russia that enables the will of the majority to be gauged by the make-up of the Soviets. Therefore, to make a serious, not a Blanquist, bid for power, the proletarian party must *fight for influence* within the Soviets.

All this has been gone over and hammered out by *Pravda* again and again, and only stupidity or malice can fail to grasp it. Let the reader judge for himself to which of these two unenviable categories *Rabochaya Gazeta* belongs when it describes the "recommendation" (made to the Soviet) "to take power into its own hands" as "irresponsible provocation", as "demagogy, devoid of all sense of political responsibility,

light-heartedly urging democrats towards civil strife and war, and inciting the workers and soldiers not only against the government but against the Soviet itself" and so on.

Can one imagine a worse muddle than this, when the blame on the question of demagogy is laid at the wrong door?

Prime Minister Lvov is reported by the evening paper *Birzheviye Vedomosti*[80] for April 21 as having said literally the following:

> "Up till now the Provisional Government has invariably met with the support of the Soviet's leading organ. During the last fortnight these relations have changed. The Provisional Government is suspect. Under the circumstances it is in no position to administer the state, as it is difficult to do anything in an atmosphere of distrust and discontent. Under such circumstances it would be best for the Provisional Government to resign. It is fully alive to its responsibility towards the country, in whose interests it is prepared to resign immediately if need be."

Is this not clear? Is it possible not to understand why, *after* such a speech, our Central Committee proposed that a public opinion poll be held?

What have "civil war", "provocation", "demagogy" and similar frightening words to do with it, when the Prime Minister himself declares the government's readiness "to resign" and recognises the Soviet as the "leading organ"?

One or the other: either *Rabochaya Gazeta* believes that in making such statements Lvov is misleading the people, in which case it should not urge confidence in and support of the government, but *no confidence and no support*; or *Rabochaya Gazeta* believes that Lvov is really "prepared to resign", in which case, why all this outcry about civil war?

If *Rabochaya Gazeta* understands the situation correctly, understands that the *capitalists* are raising a hullabaloo about civil war in order to cover up *their* desire to flout the will of the majority by means of force, then why this outcry on the part of the newspaper?

Lvov is entitled to ask the Soviet to approve and accept his policy. Our Party is entitled to ask the Soviet to approve and accept our, proletarian, policy. To speak of "provocation"

and so on is to reveal an utter lack of understanding of what it is all about or to sink to base demagogy. We are entitled to fight for influence and for a majority in the Soviet and the Soviets, and we are going to fight for them. We repeat:

"*We shall favour the transfer of power to the proletarians and semi-proletarians only when the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopt our policy and are willing to take the power into their own hands.*"*

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* See p. 211 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"DISGRACE" AS THE CAPITALISTS AND THE PROLETARIANS UNDERSTAND IT

Today's *Yedinstvo* prints on its front page in bold type a proclamation signed by Plekhanov, Deutsch, and Zasulich. We read:

> "Every nation has a right freely to determine its own destiny. Wilhelm of Germany and Karl of Austria will never agree to this. In waging war against them, we are defending our own freedom, as well as the freedom of others. Russia cannot betray her Allies. That would bring disgrace upon her."

That is how all capitalists argue. To them non-observance of treaties *between* capitalists is a disgrace, just as to monarchs non-observance of treaties between monarchs is a disgrace.

What about the workers? Do they regard non-observance of treaties concluded by monarchs and capitalists a disgrace?

Of course not! Class-conscious workers are *for* scrapping *all* such treaties, they are for recognising only such agreements *between the workers and soldiers of all* countries as would benefit the people, i.e., not the capitalists, but the workers and poor peasants.

The workers of the world *have* a treaty of their own, namely, the Basle Manifesto of 1912 (signed, among others, by Plekhanov and betrayed by him). This workers' "treaty" calls it a "crime" for workers of different countries to shoot at each other for the sake of the capitalists' profits.

The writers in *Yedinstvo* argue like capitalists (so do *Rech* and others), and not like workers.

It is quite true that neither the German monarch nor the Austrian will agree to freedom for every nation, as

both these monarchs are crowned brigands, and so was Nicholas II. Nor, for one thing, are the English, Italian, and other monarchs (the "Allies" of Nicholas II) any better. To forget this is to become a monarchist or a defender of the monarchists.

Secondly, the *un*crowned brigands, i.e., the capitalists, have shown themselves in the present war to be no better than the monarchs. Has not American "democracy", i.e., the democratic capitalists, robbed the Philippines, and does it not rob Mexico?

The German Guchkovs and Milyukovs, if they were to take the place of Wilhelm II, would be brigands, *too*, no better than the British and Russian capitalists.

Third, will the Russian capitalists "agree" to "freedom" for nations which they themselves oppress: Armenia, Khiva, Ukraine, Finland?

By evading this question the *Yedinstvo* writers are, in effect, turning into defenders of "our own" capitalists in their predatory war with other capitalists.

The internationalist workers of the world stand for the overthrow of *all* capitalist governments, for the rejection of all agreements and understandings with any capitalists, for *universal peace* concluded by *the revolutionary workers of all* countries, a peace capable of giving real freedom to "every" nation.

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INTERVIEW GIVEN TO E. TORNIAINEN APRIL 23 (MAY 6), 1917[81]

We believe the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies at the present moment represents the majority of the workers and soldiers. On our part, we (Bolsheviks) are working for influence and a majority in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and in all the local Soviets. We advise the workers and soldiers to re-elect members of the Soviets who do not fully represent the will of the majority.

So far the majority of the Soviet follows the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders.

We have no doubt that the Soviet will be able to retain power so long as it is supported by a considerable and strong majority of workers and soldiers. The more so as that power, instead of dragging on the war, would bring it to a speedy end on terms most favourable to the masses. We also believe that the Soviet, being a body elected by the workers and soldiers, can definitely win over the overwhelming majority of workers and soldiers.

Whether or not the capitalist government will refuse to convoke the Constituent Assembly will depend upon the development and strength of the counter-revolution. The elements of such a counter-revolution without doubt already exist.

Ending the war by a truly democratic peace depends upon the course which the revolution of the world proletariat will take. This revolution has gained good ground now in Russia, and is undoubtedly gaining ground in Germany (mass strikes, fraternisation).

Työmies No. 122, May 8, 1917

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Translated from the Finnish

FOOLISH GLOATING

Rabochaya Gazeta gloats and crows over the recent resolution of the Central Committee which has revealed (in connection, be it noted, with the now published declaration of the representatives of the Bolshevik group in the Soviet) certain disagreements within our Party.

The Mensheviks may gloat and crow as much as they like. It does not worry us in the least. The Mensheviks have no organisation. Chkheidze and Tsereteli are one thing—they are ministers without portfolios; the Organising Committee is another thing—they are Social-Democrats without a policy; the "defencists" are a third thing—they support Plekhanov. Martov is a fourth thing—he will not support the loan. Small wonder that people who have neither an organisation nor a party crow and caper light-heartedly at discovering a fault in somebody else's organisation.

We have no reason to fear the truth. Yes, comrade workers, the crisis has revealed certain shortcomings in our organisation. We must set to work to correct them!

The crisis revealed a very feeble attempt to move "slightly leftward" of the Central Committee. Our Central Committee did not yield, and we do not doubt for a moment that harmony within our Party is already being restored, a harmony that is voluntary, intelligent, and complete.

Every day proves the soundness of our line. To put it through effectively, the proletarian masses must be *thrice* as well organised as they are now. Every district, every block, every factory, every military company must have a strong, close-knit organisation capable of acting *as one* man. Each such organisation must have direct ties with the centre, with the Central Committee, and those ties must be

strong, so that the enemy may not break them at the first blow; those ties must be permanent, must be strengthened and tested every day and every hour, *so that the enemy does not catch us unawares*.

Comrade workers! Let us build a strong proletarian mass organisation everywhere, from the bottom up, both among the working-class mass and in the army, and let us start it immediately. We shall not be put out by the malicious glee of our enemies, we shall not be daunted by occasional errors and shortcomings. We shall correct them. The future is working for us.

Pravda No. 40,
May 8 (April 25), 1917

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THE SEVENTH (APRIL) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)[82]

APRIL 24-29 (MAY 7-12), 1917

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1

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE APRIL 24 (MAY 7)

Comrades, we are assembled here as the first conference of the proletarian party, in conditions of the Russian revolution and a developing world revolution as well. The time is approaching when the assertion of the founders of scientific socialism, and the unanimous forecast of the socialists who gathered at the Basle Congress, that world war would inevitably lead to revolution, is being everywhere proved correct.

In the nineteenth century Marx and Engels, following the proletarian movements in various countries and analysing the possible prospects for a social revolution, repeatedly stated that the roles would, in general, be distributed among these countries in proportion to, and in accordance with, their historically conditioned national features. They expressed their idea briefly as: The French worker will begin, the German will finish it.

The great honour of beginning the revolution has fallen to the Russian proletariat. But the Russian proletariat must not forget that its movement and revolution are only part of a world revolutionary proletarian movement, which in Germany, for example, is gaining momentum with every passing day. Only from this angle can we define our tasks.

I declare the All-Russia Conference open. Please nominate your candidates for election to the Presiding Committee.

A brief report published May 12 (April 29), 1917 in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 43

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2

REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION
APRIL 24 (MAY 7)

Comrades, in evaluating the current situation I have to deal with an exceedingly broad subject, which, to my mind, falls into three parts. First, the estimate of the political situation proper here in Russia, our attitude towards the government and the dual power that has come into existence; second, our attitude towards the war; third, the international background to the working-class movement, a situation which has brought the workers of the world face to face with a socialist revolution.

I think, I shall have to deal only in brief with some of the points. Furthermore, I am going to submit to you a draft resolution on all these questions with this reservation, however, that, owing to the extreme lack of facilities and to the political crisis that has been created here in Petrograd, we were unable to have discussions of the resolution, or to communicate it in good time to the local comrades. I repeat, then, that these are only preliminary drafts, designed to make work easier in the committee and concentrate it on a few of the most essential questions.

I begin with the first question. If I am not mistaken, the Moscow Conference adopted the same resolution as the Petrograd City Conference. (*Interruption*: "With amendments.") I have not seen the amendments, and I cannot pass an opinion. But since the Petrograd resolution was published in *Pravda*, I shall take it for granted, if no one objects, that it is known to everybody here. I submit this as a draft resolution to the present All-Russia Conference.

Most of the parties in the petty-bourgeois bloc controlling the Petrograd Soviet represent our policy, in contrast

to their own, as a rash policy. What distinguishes our policy is our demand above all for a precise class analysis of current events. The chief sin of the petty-bourgeois bloc is that it resorts to empty phrases to conceal from the people the truth about the government's class character.

If the Moscow comrades have any amendments, they may present them now.

(*Reads the resolution of the Petrograd City Conference on the attitude towards the Provisional Government.*)

"Considering:

"(1) that the Provisional Government, by its class character, is the organ of landowner and bourgeois domination;

"(2) that the Provisional Government and the classes it represents are bound with indissoluble economic and political ties to Russian and Anglo-French imperialism;

"(3) that the Provisional Government is carrying out its proclaimed programme only partially, and only under pressure of the revolutionary proletariat and, to some extent, of the petty bourgeoisie;

"(4) that the forces of bourgeois and landowner counter-revolution, now being organised, have already, under cover of the Provisional Government and with the latter's obvious connivance, launched an attack on revolutionary democracy;

"(5) that the Provisional Government is avoiding fixing the date for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, preventing the arming of the people as a whole, opposing the transfer of all the land to the people, foisting upon it the landowners' way of settling the agrarian question, obstructing the introduction of an eight-hour workday, condoning counter-revolutionary propaganda in the army (by Guchkov and Co.), rallying the high-ranking officers against the soldiers, etc...."

I have read the first part of the resolution giving a class definition of the Provisional Government. There are scarcely any essential differences between this resolution and that of the Moscow comrades, as far as it is possible to judge from the latter's text alone. But the general definition of the government as counter-revolutionary is, in my opinion, incorrect. If we speak in general terms, we must specify which revolution we mean. As far as the bourgeois revolu-

tion is concerned, this cannot be said, because that revolution is already completed. As far as the proletarian and peasant revolution is concerned, such a statement is premature, for we cannot be sure that the peasants will necessarily go farther than the bourgeoisie. To express our confidence in the peasants, particularly now that they have turned to imperialism and defencism, i.e., to supporting the war, is, in my opinion, unsound. At the present moment the peasants have entered into a number of agreements with the Cadets. That is why I regard this clause in the Moscow resolution as politically incorrect. We want the peasants to go farther than the bourgeoisie, we want them to take the land from the landowners, but so far we can say nothing definite about their future conduct.

We studiously avoid the words "revolutionary democracy". We may use them when there is a question of an attack by the government, but at the present moment they are highly deceptive, for it is very difficult to distinguish the classes which have mingled in this chaos. Our task is to free those who are trailing behind. The Soviets are important to us not as a form; to us it is important what classes they represent. We must, therefore, do a great deal of work to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat....

(*Resumes reading the resolution.*)

"(6) that this government, at the same time, is relying at present on the confidence of, and, to a certain extent, on an actual agreement with, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which now unites an obvious majority of workers and soldiers, i.e., peasants;

"(7) that every step of the Provisional Government, in both its domestic and foreign policies, is bound to open the eyes, not only of the proletarians in town and country and the semi-proletarians, but also of the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, to the real nature of this government,

"*the Conference resolves that*:

"(1) in order to ensure all the state power passing into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies or other bodies directly expressing the will of the people, prolonged work is necessary to develop proletarian class-consciousness and to unite the urban and rural proletarians

against the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie, for only work of this nature can guarantee real advance on the part of the whole revolutionary people;

"(2) this calls for many-sided activity within the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for work aimed at in creasing the number of these Soviets, consolidating their power, and welding together our Party's proletarian internationalist groups in the Soviets;

"(3) we must organise our Social-Democratic forces more effectively, so as to be able to direct the new wave of the revolutionary movement under the banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy."

This is the sum and substance of our policy. The whole petty bourgeoisie is now wavering and trying to conceal this wavering behind the empty phrase about revolutionary democracy. We must contrapose these waverings with a proletarian line. The counter-revolutionaries wish to frustrate it by premature action. Our task is to increase the number of Soviets, to reinforce them and to consolidate the unity of our Party.

The Moscow comrades have added to Point 3 the demand for control. This control is represented by Chkheidze, Steklov, Tsereteli, and other leaders of the petty-bourgeois bloc. Control without power is an empty phrase. How can I control Britain? To control her, you would have to seize her fleet. I can understand the uneducated mass of workers and soldiers naïvely and unconsciously believing in control. You only have to think about the fundamental aspects of control, however, to realise that such a belief is a departure from the basic principles of the class struggle. What is control? If I write a paper, or a resolution, they will write a counter-resolution. To control, you must have power. If the broad mass of the petty-bourgeois bloc do not understand this, we must have the patience to explain it to them, but under no circumstances must we tell them a lie. If, however, I obscure this fundamental condition by speaking of control, then I am guilty of telling a lie and am playing into the hands of the capitalists and the imperialists. "You're welcome to your control, but we'll have the guns. Enjoy your control," they say. They know that at the moment the people cannot be denied their demand. Control without

power is an empty petty-bourgeois phrase that hampers the progress of the Russian revolution. That is why I object to the Moscow comrades' third point.

As for this peculiar interlocking of two powers, in which the Provisional Government, lacking power, guns, soldiers, and the armed mass of people, leans on the Soviets that are relying so far on promises and are carrying out a policy of upholding those promises, if you want to play this game, you are doomed to failure. Our task is to keep out of this game. We shall carry on our work of explaining to the proletariat the unsoundness of this policy, and events, at every turn, will prove the correctness of our position. So far we are in the minority; the masses still do not believe us. We can wait; they will side with us when the government shows its face. The government's vacillations may repel them and they will swing over to our side; and then, taking into consideration the balance of forces, we shall say: Our time has come.

I now pass on to the question of the war. This question actually united us when we came out against the loan, the attitude towards which showed immediately and clearly the alignment of political forces. As *Rech* has stated, everybody, except *Yedinstvo*, is wavering; the entire petty bourgeoisie is for the loan—with reservations. The capitalists make a wry face and pocket the resolution with a smile, saying: "You may do the talking, but we shall do the acting." All those now voting for the loan are known as social-chauvinists the world over.

I shall now proceed to read the resolution on the war. It is in three parts: (1) a characterisation of the war from the point of view of its class significance; (2) the revolutionary defencism of the masses, something that cannot be found in any other country; (3) how to end the war.

Many of us, myself included, have had occasion to address the people, particularly the soldiers, and it seems to me that when everything is explained to them from the class point of view, there is one thing in our stand on which they are most unclear, namely, in what way we intend to end the war, in what way we think it possible to stop it. The masses are in a maze of misunderstanding, there is complete ignorance about our stand; that is why we must express ourselves most clearly on this.

(*Reads the draft resolution on the war.*)

"The present war is, on the part of both groups of the belligerent powers, an imperialist war, i.e., one waged by the capitalists for world domination, for division of the capitalists' spoils, for profitable markets for finance and banking capital, and for the subjugation of the weaker nationalities.

"The transfer of state power in Russia from Nicholas II to the government of Guchkov, Lvov, and others, to the government of the landowners and capitalists, did not and could not alter the class character and meaning of the war as far as Russia is concerned.

"The fact that the new government is carrying on the same imperialist war, i.e., an aggressive war of conquest, became glaringly apparent when the government not only failed to publish the secret treaties between ex-Tsar Nicholas II and the capitalist governments of Britain, France, etc., but even formally confirmed these treaties. This was done without consulting the will of the people and with the express purpose of deceiving them, for it is well known that the secret treaties concluded by the ex-tsar are outrageously predatory treaties that give the Russian capitalists a free hand to rob China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc.

"For this reason no proletarian party that does not wish to break completely with internationalism, i.e., with the fraternal solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggle against the yoke of Capital, can support the present war, or the present government, or its loans, no matter in what glowing terms these loans may be described.

"Nor can any trust be placed in the present government's promise to renounce annexations, i.e., the conquest of foreign countries or the forcible retention of any nationality within the confines of Russia. For, in the first place, the capitalists, bound together by the thousand threads of Russian and Anglo-French banking capital, and intent on protecting the interests of capital, cannot renounce annexations in this war without at the same time ceasing to be capitalists, without renouncing the profits from the thousands of millions invested in loans, concessions, war industries, etc. And secondly, the new-government, after renounc-

ing annexations to mislead the people, declared through Milyukov (Moscow, April 9, 1917) that it had no intention of renouncing them. Finally, as revealed by *Dyelo Naroda*, a newspaper in which Minister Kerensky co-operates, Milyukov has not even sent his statement on the renunciation of annexations to other countries.

"Therefore, in warning the people against the capital sts' empty promises, the Conference declares that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between a renunciation of annexations in word and a renunciation of annexations in deed, i.e., the immediate publication of all the secret predatory treaties, of all acts of foreign policy, and the taking of immediate steps to fully liberate all peoples who are being oppressed, kept bound to Russia by force or kept in a state of subjection by the capitalist class, which is continuing the policy of ex-Tsar Nicholas II, a policy that is a disgrace to our nation."

The second half of this part of the resolution deals with the promises made by the government. For a Marxist, perhaps, this part is superfluous; for the people, however, it is important. That is why we must add the reasons why we do not believe those promises, why we must not trust the government. The present government's promises to abandon its imperialist policy are not to be trusted. Our policy in this respect should not be in saying that we demand that the government publish the treaties. This would be a vain hope. To demand this of a capitalist government would be like demanding an exposure of commercial swindling. When we say that it is necessary to renounce annexations and indemnities, we should indicate how this can be done; and if we are asked who can do it, our answer will be that this step is by its very nature a revolutionary one, a step which only the revolutionary proletariat can make. Otherwise these promises will remain empty pledges and wishes used by the capitalists to keep the people in leading-strings.

(*Continues reading the draft resolution.*)

"The 'revolutionary defencism', which in Russia has now permeated almost all the Narodnik parties (the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries), the opportunist party of the Menshevik Social-Democrats (the

Organising Committee, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), and the majority of the non-party revolutionaries, reflects, in point of class significance, the interests and point of view of the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, and the well-to-do peasants, who, like the capitalists, profit by oppressing weak peoples. On the other hand, it is a result of the deception of the masses by the capitalists, who instead of publishing the secret treaties confine themselves to promises and glib talk.

"It must be admitted that the great mass of 'revolutionary defencists' are honest, i.e., they are *really* opposed to annexations, to conquests, to oppressing weak peoples; they are *really* working for a democratic, non-coercive peace among *all* the belligerents. This must be admitted for the reason that the class position of the urban and rural proletarians and semi-proletarians (i.e., of the people who earn their living, wholly or partly, by selling their labour-power to the capitalists) makes these classes uninterested in capitalist profits.

"Therefore, while recognising that any concessions to 'revolutionary defencism' are absolutely impermissible and virtually signify a complete break with internationalism and socialism, the Conference declares that our Party will preach abstention from violence as long as the Russian capitalists and their Provisional Government confine themselves to threats of violence against the people (for example, Guchkov's unhappily notorious decree threatening the soldiers with punishment for arbitrary displacement of superiors), as long as the capitalists have *not* started using violence against the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', Agricultural Labourers', and other Deputies, which organise themselves freely, and freely elect and dismiss *all* public officers. Our Party will fight against the profound and fatal error of 'revolutionary defencism' solely by means of comradely persuasion, bringing home the truth that the attitude of unreasoning trust of the broad masses in the government of the capitalists, who are the worst enemies of peace and socialism, is, in present-day Russia, the chief obstacle to a speedy termination of the war."

Some of the petty bourgeoisie have an interest in this policy of the capitalists—of that there can be no doubt. That

is why it would be wrong for the proletarian party at present to place any hopes in the community of interests of the proletariat and the peasantry. We are fighting to win the peasants over to our side, but they are, to a certain extent, consciously on the side of the capitalists.

There is not the slightest doubt that, as a class, the proletariat and semi-proletariat are not interested in the war. They are influenced by tradition and deception. They still lack political experience. Therefore, our task is one of patient explanation. We make no concessions to them on matters of principle; yet we cannot look upon them as social-chauvinists. This section of the population has never been socialist, nor has it the slightest idea about socialism, it is only just awakening to political life. Nevertheless, its class-consciousness is growing and broadening with extraordinary rapidity. We must be able to bring our views home to it, and this is now the most difficult task of all, particularly for a party that only yesterday worked underground.

Some may ask: Have we not gone back on our own principles? We were advocating the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war, and now we are contradicting ourselves. But the first civil war in Russia has come to an end; we are now advancing towards the second war—the war between imperialism and the armed people. In this transitional period, as long as the armed force is in the hands of the soldiers, as long as Milyukov and Guchkov have not yet resorted to violence, this civil war, so far as we are concerned, turns into peaceful, prolonged, and patient class propaganda. To speak of civil war before people have come to realise the need for it is undoubtedly to lapse into Blanquism. We are for civil war, but only for civil war waged by a politically conscious class. He can be overthrown who is known to the people as an oppressor. There are no oppressors in Russia at present; it is the soldiers and not the capitalists who now have the guns and rifles; the capitalists are getting what they want now not by force but by deception, and to shout about violence now is senseless. One must be able to uphold the Marxist point of view, which says that this conversion of imperialist war into a civil war should be based on objective, and not subjective, conditions. For the time being we withdraw that slogan, but only for the time being. It is the

soldiers and the workers who possess the arms now, not the capitalists. So long as the government has not started war, our propaganda remains peaceful.

The government would like to see us make the first imprudent move towards revolutionary action, as this would be to its advantage. It is exasperated because our Party has put forward the slogan of peaceful demonstrations. We must not cede one iota of our principles to the petty bourgeoisie, which is now marking time. The proletarian party would be making a dangerous mistake if it based its tactics on subjective desires where organisation is required. We cannot say that the majority is with us; what we need in the present situation is caution, caution, caution. To base proletarian tactics on subjective desires means to condemn it to failure.

The third point deals with the question of how to end the war. The Marxist point of view is well known, but the difficulty is how to bring it home to the masses in the clearest form possible. We are not pacifists, and we cannot repudiate a revolutionary war. In what way does a revolutionary war differ from a capitalist war? The difference is, above all, a class difference: which class is interested in the war? What policy does the interested class pursue in that war?... In addressing the people we must give concrete answers to their questions. And so the first question is how to distinguish a revolutionary war from a capitalist war. The ordinary man in the street does not grasp the distinction, he does not understand that it is a matter of class distinction. We must not confine ourselves to theory alone, we must demonstrate in practice that we shall wage a really revolutionary war only when the proletariat is in power. I think that by presenting the question this way we are giving the clearest possible answer to the question as to what this war is about and who is waging it.

Pravda has published the draft of an appeal to the soldiers of all the belligerent countries.* We have received information that fraternisation is taking place at the front, but this fraternisation is as yet politically semi-conscious. What it lacks is a clear political idea. The soldiers have come to feel instinctively that action must come from below.

* See pp. 186-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The class instinct of these revolutionary-minded people has suggested this path to them as being the only correct path. For a revolution, however, this is insufficient. We want to give a clear-cut political answer. In order to put an end to this war, state power must pass to the revolutionary class. I suggest that an appeal to the soldiers of all the belligerent countries be drawn up in the name of the Conference and published in all the appropriate languages. If, instead of all these hard-worked phrases about peace conferences, half of whose members are secret or open agents of the imperialist governments, we send out this appeal, we shall achieve our purpose a thousand times quicker than we would by all those peace conferences. We refuse to have any dealings with the German Plekhanovs. When we were passing through Germany, those gentlemen, the social-chauvinists, the German Plekhanovs, tried to get into our carriage, but we told them that we would not allow a single one of them in and that if any of them did get in they would not get out again without our having a big row. Had a man like Karl Liebknecht been permitted to come to see us, we would certainly have talked matters over with him. When we issue our appeal to the working people of all countries, giving an answer to the question of how to end the war, and when the soldiers read our answer showing a political way out of the war, then fraternisation will make tremendous strides. This must be done in order to raise fraternisation from the level of an instinctive revulsion against war to a clear political understanding of how to get out of it.

I now pass on to the third question, namely, the analysis of the current situation with reference to the position of the international working-class movement and that of international capitalism. From the point of view of Marxism, in discussing imperialism it is absurd to restrict oneself to conditions in one country alone, since all capitalist countries are closely bound together. Now, in time of war, this bond has grown immeasurably stronger. All humanity is thrown into a tangled bloody heap from which no nation can extricate itself on its own. Though there are more and less advanced countries, this war has bound them all together by so many threads that escape from this tangle for any single country acting on its own is inconceivable.

We are all agreed that power must be wielded by the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. But what can and should they do if power passes to them, i.e., if power is in the hands of the proletarians and semi-proletarians? This is an involved and difficult situation. Speaking of the transfer of power, there is a danger—one that played a big part in previous revolutions, too—namely, the danger that the revolutionary class will not know what to do with state power when it has won it. The history of revolutions gives us examples of revolutions that failed for this very reason. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which cover the whole of Russia with their network, now stand at the centre of the revolution; it seems to me, however, that we have not sufficiently studied or understood them. Should they take over the power, it will no longer be a state in the ordinary sense of the word. The world has seen no such state power functioning for any considerable length of time, but the whole world's labour movement has been approaching it. This would be a state of the Paris Commune type. Such power is a dictatorship, i.e., it rests not on law, not on the formal will of the majority, but on direct, open force. Force is the instrument of power. How, then, will the Soviets apply this power? Will they return to the old way of governing by means of the police? Will they govern by means of the old organs of power? In my opinion they cannot do this. At any rate, they will be faced with the immediate task of creating a state that is not bourgeois. Among Bolsheviks, I have compared this state to the Paris Commune in the sense that the latter destroyed the old administrative organs and replaced them by absolutely new ones that were the direct organs of the workers. I am accused of having now used a word which the capitalists fear most of all, as they have begun to interpret it as a desire for the immediate introduction of socialism. I have used it, however, only in the sense of replacing the old organs by new, proletarian ones. Marx saw in this the greatest advance of the entire world proletarian movement.[83] The question of the social tasks of the proletariat is of the greatest practical significance to us, first, because we are now tied up with all the other countries, and are unable to disentangle ourselves—the proletariat will either break free as a whole

or it will be crushed secondly, the existence of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is a fact. No one doubts that they cover the whole of Russia, that they are a state power and that there can be no other power. If that is so, we should form a clear idea as to what use they can make of that power. Some people say that it is the same type of power as in France or America, but they have nothing of the kind there; such a direct power does not exist there.

The resolution on the current situation is in three parts. The first defines the objective situation created by the imperialist war, the position in which world capitalism finds itself; the second deals with the state of the international proletarian movement; the third deals with the tasks of the Russian working class when power passes into its hands. In the first part I formulate the conclusion that during the war capitalism has developed even more than before the war. It has already taken over entire fields of production. Twenty-seven years ago, in 1891, when the Germans adopted their Erfurt Programme,[84] Engels said that one could not continue to define capitalism as a system of production lacking planning.[85] This is now out of date; once there are trusts there can no longer be lack of planning. Capitalism has made gigantic strides, particularly in the twentieth century, and the war has done more than was done for twenty-five years. State control of industry has made progress in Britain as well as in Germany. Monopoly, in general, has evolved into state monopoly. The objective state of affairs has shown that the war has stepped up capitalist development, which has moved forward from capitalism to imperialism, from monopoly to state control. All this has brought the socialist revolution nearer and has created the objective conditions for it. Thus the socialist revolution has been brought closer as a result of the war.

Before the war Britain enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than any other country in the world, a point which politicians of the Cadet type have always stressed. There was freedom there because there was no revolutionary movement there. The war wrought an instant change. In a country where for decades no attempt was ever made to encroach upon the freedom of the socialist press, a typically tsarist censorship was immediately established, and all the prisons were

filled with socialists. For centuries the capitalists there had learned to rule the people without the use of force, and if they have resorted to force, it means that they feel that the revolutionary movement is growing, that they cannot act otherwise. When we said that Liebknecht represented the masses, although he was one against a hundred German Plekhanovs, we were told that that was a utopian idea, an illusion. Yet, anyone who has, if only once, attended workers' meetings abroad knows that the sympathy of the masses for Liebknecht is an undeniable fact. His bitterest opponents had to manoeuvre when facing the public, and if they did not pretend to be his supporters, neither did they dare to come out against him. Now things have gone still farther. We now have mass strikes, we have fraternisation at the front. To attempt prophecy in this respect would be a great mistake, but we cannot get away from the fact that sympathy for the International is growing, that revolutionary unrest is beginning in the German army. This is a fact which shows that the revolution in Germany is mounting.

What, then, are the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat? The main flaw, the main error, in all the socialists' arguments is that this question is put in too general a form, as the question of the transition to socialism. What we should talk about, however, are concrete steps and measures. Some of them are ripe, and some are not. We are now at a transition stage. Clearly, we have brought to the fore new forms, unlike those in bourgeois states. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are a form of state which does not exist and never did exist in any country. This form represents the first steps towards socialism and is inevitable at the beginning of a socialist society. This is a fact of decisive importance. The Russian revolution has created the Soviets. No bourgeois country in the world has or can have such state institutions. No socialist revolution can be operative with any other state power than this. The Soviets must take power not for the purpose of building an ordinary bourgeois republic, nor for the purpose of making a direct transition to socialism. This cannot be. What, then, is the purpose? The Soviets must take power in order to make the first concrete steps towards this transition, steps that can and should be made. In this respect fear is the worst enemy. The

masses must be urged to take these steps immediately, otherwise the power of the Soviets will have no meaning and will give the people nothing.

I shall now attempt to answer the question as to what concrete measures we can suggest to the people without running counter to our Marxist convictions.

Why do we want the power to pass to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?

The first measure the Soviets must carry out is the nationalisation of the land. All the peoples are talking about nationalisation. Some say it is a most utopian measure; nevertheless, everybody comes to accept it, because landownership in Russia is so complicated that the only way out is to remove all boundary lines dividing the land and make it the property of the state. Private ownership of land must be abolished. That is the task confronting us, because the majority of the people are in favour of it. To accomplish it we need the Soviets. This measure cannot be carried out with the help of the old government officials.

The second measure. We cannot be for "introducing" socialism—this would be the height of absurdity. We must preach socialism. The majority of the population in Russia are peasants, small farmers who can have no idea of socialism. But what objections can they have to a bank being set up in each village to enable them to improve their farming? They can say nothing against it. We must put over these practical measures to the peasants in our propaganda, and make the peasants realise that they are necessary.

Quite another thing is the Sugar Syndicate. This is a clear fact. Here our proposal must be direct and practical: these already fully developed syndicates must be taken over by the state. If the Soviets intend to assume power, it is only for such ends. There is no other reason why they should do so. The alternative is: either the Soviets develop further, or they die an ignominious death as in the case of the Paris Commune. If it is a bourgeois republic that is needed, this can very well be left to the Cadets.

I shall conclude by referring to a speech which impressed me most. I heard a coal miner deliver a remarkable speech. Without using a single bookish word, he told us how they had made the revolution. Those miners were not concerned with

the question as to whether or not they should have a president. They seized the mine, and the important question to them was how to keep the cables intact so that production might not be interrupted. Then came the question of bread, which was scarce, and the miners also agreed on the method of obtaining it. Now that is a real programme of the revolution, not derived from books. That is what I call really winning power locally.

Nowhere is the bourgeoisie so well established as in Petrograd. Here the capitalists have the power in their hands. But throughout the country, the peasants, without pursuing any socialist tasks, are carrying out purely practical measures. I think that only this programme of the revolutionary movement indicates the true path of the revolution. We are for these measures being started on with the greatest caution and circumspection. But it is only these measures that must be carried out; we should go ahead in this direction only. There is no other way out. Unless this is done the Soviets will be broken up and will die an ignominious death. But if the revolutionary proletariat should actually win power, it will only be for the sake of going forward. And to go forward means to take definite steps to get us out of the war—words alone won't do it. The complete success of these steps is only possible by world revolution, if the revolution kills the war, if the workers of the whole world support the revolution. Taking power is, therefore, the only practical measure and the only way out.

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3

SPEECH WINDING UP THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION APRIL 24 (MAY 7)

Comrade Kamenev was quick to seize on the talk of adventurism. I shall have to dwell on this. Comrade Kamenev is convinced and asserts that in opposing the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government", we showed vacillation. I agree with him; there certainly has been vacillation away from revolutionary policy, and this vacillation must be avoided. I think that our differences with Comrade Kamenev are not very great, because by agreeing with us he has changed his position. In what did our adventurism consist? It was the attempt to resort to forcible measures. We did not know to what extent the masses had swung to our side during that anxious moment. If it had been a strong swing things would have been different. We advanced the slogan for peaceful demonstrations, but several comrades from the Petrograd Committee issued a different slogan. We cancelled it, but were too late to prevent the masses from following the slogan of the Petrograd Committee. We say that the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government" is an adventurist slogan, that the government cannot be overthrown now. That is why we have advanced the slogan for peaceful demonstrations. All we wanted was a peaceful reconnoitring of the enemy's forces; we did not want to give battle. But the Petrograd Committee turned a trifle more to the left, which in this case is certainly a very grave crime. Our organisational apparatus proved weak—our decisions are not being carried out by everyone. Together with the correct slogan "Long Live the Soviets of Workers' and

Soldiers' Deputies!" stood the incorrect slogan "Down with the Provisional Government". At the time of action, to go a "trifle more to the left" was wrong. We regard this as a very serious crime, as disorganisation. Had we deliberately allowed such an act, we would not have remained in the Central Committee for one moment. It happened because of the weakness of our organisational apparatus. Yes, there were shortcomings in our organisation. We have raised the question of improving our organisation.

The Mensheviks and Co. are working the word "adventurism" as hard as they can. But it is they, of all people, who had neither an organisation nor a policy. We have both an organisation and a policy.

At that moment the bourgeoisie mobilised all its forces; the centre hid itself, and we organised a peaceful demonstration. We were the only ones who had a political line. Did we make mistakes? We did. Only he who does nothing never errs. Perfect organisation is a difficult thing.

Now about control.

We are at one with Comrade Kamenev, except on the question of control. He views control as a political act. Subjectively, however, he understands this word better than Chkheidze and others. We will not accept control. People tell us that we have isolated ourselves, that, by uttering a lot of terrible words about communism, we have frightened the bourgeoisie into fits.... Maybe! But it was not this that isolated us. It was the question of the loan that caused our isolation. It was on this question that we found ourselves in the minority. Yes, we are in the minority. Well, what of it? To be a socialist while chauvinism is the craze means to be in the minority. To be in the majority means to be a chauvinist. At the moment the peasant, together with Milyukov, is hitting socialism by means of the loan. The peasant follows Milyukov and Guchkov. This is a fact. The bourgeois-democratic dictatorship of the peasantry is an old formula.

If we want to draw the peasantry into the revolution we must keep the proletariat apart from it in a separate proletarian party, because the peasantry is chauvinistic. To attract the peasant now means to surrender to the mercies of Milyukov.

The Provisional Government must be overthrown, but not now, and not in the usual way. We agree with Comrade Kamenev. But we must explain. It is this word that Comrade Kamenev has been harping on. Nevertheless, this is the only thing we can do.

Comrade Rykov says that socialism must come from other countries with a more developed industry. But that is not so. Nobody can say who will begin it and who will end it. That is not Marxism; it is a parody of Marxism.

Marx said that France would begin it and Germany would finish it. But the Russian proletariat has achieved more than anybody else.

If we had said, "No tsar, but a dictatorship of the proletariat", well, this would have meant skipping over the petty bourgeoisie. But what we are saying is—help the revolution through the Soviets. We must not lapse into reformism. We are fighting to win, not to lose. At the worst we count on partial success. Even if we suffer defeat we shall achieve partial success. We shall get reforms. Reforms are an auxiliary instrument of the class struggle.

Further, Comrade Rykov says that there is no period of transition from capitalism to socialism. That is not so. It is a break with Marxism.

The line we have marked out is correct, and in future we shall make every effort to achieve an organisation in which there will be no Petrograd Committee-men to disobey the Central Committee. We are growing, and that is as it should be with a real party.

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4

SPEECH ON THE PROPOSAL TO CALL AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE APRIL 25 (MAY 8)[86]

I cannot agree with Comrade Nogin. We have here what I believe to be a fact of paramount political importance, and we are in duty bound to launch a vigorous campaign against the Russian and Anglo-French chauvinists who have turned down Borgbjerg's invitation to attend the conference. We must not forget the real issue, the motives underlying this whole affair. I am going to read to you Borgbjerg's proposal exactly as reported by *Rabochaya Gazeta*. I shall show you that behind this comedy of a so-called socialist congress we shall find the very real political manoeuvres of German imperialism. The German capitalists, through the medium of the German social-chauvinists, are inviting the social-chauvinists of all countries to the conference. That is why we must launch a big campaign.

Why do they do it through the socialists? Because they want to fool the working masses. These diplomats are subtle men; to say this thing openly would not do, so they send a Danish Plekhanov to do it for them. We have seen German social-chauvinists abroad hundreds of times; they must be exposed.

(*Reads an excerpt from "Rabochaya Gazeta" No. 39, for May 8* [*April 25*], *1917.*)

"On behalf of the joint committee of the three Scandinavian labour parties (the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish), Borgbjerg, editor of *Social-demokraten*, the Central Organ of the Danish Social-Democratic Party, has passed on to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of

Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies a message inviting all the socialist parties in Russia to attend an international socialist conference. Owing to Denmark's proximity to Germany, Borgbjerg was able to communicate with the German Social-Democrats, mainly with the 'majority' faction, and the committee learned from him the peace terms which the official Social-Democratic Party of Germany would consider acceptable, and which its representatives would propose to the conference.

"These terms are:

"First of all they subscribe to the principles laid down by the Scandinavian and Dutch socialists at the 1915 conference, namely, the self-determination of nations, an obligatory international court of arbitration, and the demand for gradual disarmament. To this they add that the German Social-Democrats will urge that:

"1. all territories seized by Germany and her allies be restored;

"2. Russian Poland be granted full freedom to declare its independence or to remain a part of Russia;

"3. Belgium be restored as a fully independent state;

"4. similarly, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania be restored to the status of independent states;

"5. Bulgaria be given the Bulgarian districts of Macedonia, and Serbia be given access to the Adriatic.

"As regards Alsace-Lorraine, a peaceful agreement could be envisaged to rectify Lorraine's frontiers; as far as the Poles of Poznan are concerned, the Germans will insist on their obtaining autonomy of national culture."

There is not a shadow of doubt that this proposal comes from the German Government, who does not act directly, but resorts to the services of the Danish Plekhanovs, since German agents are obviously no good for this purpose. That is what social-chauvinists are for—to carry out such commissions. Our job is, on behalf of the seventy thousand workers of the proletarian party represented at this conference, to show them up to the whole world and reveal the motives they are trying to conceal. We must publish a detailed resolution, have it translated into foreign languages, and thus give these gentlemen the rebuff they deserve for daring to approach a socialist party. (*Reads the draft resolution.*)

The socialist papers this morning are silent. They know what they are about. They know that silence is golden. Only *Rabochaya Gazeta* publishes an article, which manages to say nothing in many words.

The Russian Government, more than anyone else, may rest assured that we are dealing here with an agent of the German Government.

What with all this shouting about the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, we should remind those gentlemen that the whole question is simply one of lucre, since there is immense wealth in Alsace-Lorraine, and the German capitalists are fighting the French capitalists for the division of the booty. It is good for them to have the Plekhanovs say that the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine is a sacred cause. When the German social-chauvinists therefore talk about a peaceful rectification of the frontiers of Alsace-Lorraine, they mean a peaceful division of the spoil between the French and the German imperialists.

One thing more I must add. I forgot to mention that the German representatives of the "Centre"—Kautsky, Haase, and Ledebour—have agreed to this conference. This is a most shameful thing. The British and French socialists have refused to attend the conference. This shows that the Anglo-French chauvinists, who call themselves socialists, are really agents of the bourgeoisie, because they are instrumental in continuing the imperialist war despite the tremendous efforts made by the German socialist majority through Borgbjerg; for, without a doubt, the German Government is saying through Borgbjerg: the situation is such that I am forced to return your booty to you (the German colonies in Africa). This is confirmed by the fact that the situation in Germany is desperate; the country is on the brink of ruin; to carry on the war now is a hopeless task. That is why they say they are ready to give up almost all the booty, for they still hope to be able to carve something out for themselves. The diplomats communicate freely with each other, and the bourgeois papers, when writing of foreign affairs, fool the people with phrase-mongering.

There is no doubt that when the British and French social-chauvinists said they were not going to the conference, they already knew all about it. They must have gone to their Foreign Offices where they were told: Such and such is the state of affairs, we don't want you to go there. That, I am sure, is how matters stood.

If the Russian soldiers receive this resolution—and that, I think, should be done in the name of the seventy thousand members of our Party—they will really begin to see through the whole shady affair which has been concealed from

them. They will see then that Germany is unable to carry on her war of conquest, and that the Allies only aim at utterly crushing and robbing Germany. It cannot be denied that Borgbjerg is an agent of the German Government.

This, comrades, is the reason why I think we must expose this socialist congress comedy. All these congresses are nothing but comedies designed to cover up the deals made by the diplomats behind the backs of the masses. Once and for all we must tell the truth for all the soldiers at the front and all the workers of the world to hear. Our campaign with regard to such proposals will serve, on the one hand, to explain our proletarian policy, and, on the other, it will be mass action on a scale never heard of before. I ask you, therefore, to adopt this declaration, forward it to the Executive Committee, translate it into foreign languages, and publish it in tomorrow's *Pravda*.

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5

RESOLUTION ON BORGBJERG'S PROPOSAL

In connection with the arrival of the Danish "socialist" Borgbjerg and his invitation to attend a congress of socialists in support of peace, which the German socialists of the Scheidemann and Plekhanov orientation propose on the basis of Germany renouncing most of her annexed territories, the Conference resolves:

Borgbjerg speaks on behalf of three Scandinavian parties—the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian. He received his mandate from the Swedish party headed by Branting, a socialist who has gone over to the side of "his own" bourgeoisie and betrayed the revolutionary union of the world's workers. We cannot recognise this Swedish party as a socialist party. The only socialist party in Sweden we recognise is the youth party headed by Höglund, Lindhagen, Ström, Carleson, and others.

Neither do we consider the Danish party, from which Borgbjerg has his mandate, a socialist party, because it is headed by Stauning, a member of the bourgeois cabinet. Stauning's joining the bourgeois cabinet evoked a protest on the part of a group headed by Comrade Trier, which left the party, declaring that the Danish Socialist Party had become a bourgeois party.

Borgbjerg, on his own admission, is acting in accord with Scheidemann and other German socialists who have defected to the German Government and the German bourgeoisie.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that Borgbjerg, directly or indirectly, is really an agent of the German imperialist government.

In view of this, the Conference considers the idea of our Party's attendance at a conference which includes Borgbjerg and Scheidemann to be unacceptable in principle, since

our task is to unite, not direct or indirect agents of the various imperialist governments, but the workers of all countries, who, already during the war, have begun a revolutionary fight against their own imperialist governments.

Only a meeting and closer contact with these parties and groups are capable of effectively promoting the cause of peace.

We warn the workers against placing their trust in the conference which is being organised by Borgbjerg, because this conference of pseudo-socialists will merely be a comedy to cover up the deals the diplomats are clinching behind its back, deals which involve an interchange of annexations by which Armenia, for example, will be "given" to the Russian capitalists, and Britain will be "given" the colonies she has robbed Germany of, while probably "ceding" to the German capitalists by way of compensation part of the Lorraine ore-bearing territories containing immense wealth in excellent iron ores, etc.

The socialists cannot, without betraying the proletarian cause, take part directly or indirectly in this dirty huckstering and haggling among the capitalists of various countries over the division of the loot.

At the same time the Conference considers that the German capitalists have not, even through the mouth of Borgbjerg, renounced all their annexations, not to mention the immediate withdrawal of their troops from the territories which they have seized. Germany's Danish regions, her Polish territories, and her French part of Alsace are as much annexations of the German capitalists as Kurland, Finland, Poland, Ukraine, etc., are of the Russian tsars and the Russian capitalists.

As to restoring Poland's independence, this is deception on the part of the German and Austrian capitalists as well as the Russian Provisional Government, which speaks of a so-called "free" military alliance between Poland and Russia. To ascertain the real will of the people in all the annexed territories it is necessary that all troops should be withdrawn and the opinion of the population be given free expression. Only such a measure applied to the whole of Poland (that is, not only to the part the Russians have seized, but also the part the Germans and Austrians have seized) and to the

whole of Armenia, etc., would be a step towards translating the governments' promises into deeds.

The Conference, further, takes note of the fact that the British and French socialists, who have gone over to the side of their capitalist governments, have refused to attend the conference sponsored by Borgbjerg. This fact clearly demonstrates that the Anglo-French imperialist bourgeoisie, whose agents these pseudo-socialists are, *wish to continue*, *wish to drag out this* imperialist war without even desiring to discuss the concessions which the German imperialist bourgeoisie, under pressure of growing exhaustion, hunger, economic ruin, and—most important of all—the impending workers' revolution in Germany, are compelled to promise through the medium of Borgbjerg.

The Conference resolves to give all these facts the widest possible publicity, and, in particular, to bring them to the notice of the Russian soldiers at the front in the fullest possible detail. The Russian soldiers must learn that the Anglo-French capitalists, followed by the Russian, *are dragging out the war*, ruling out even such a conference to discuss peace terms.

The Russian soldiers must learn that the watchword "War to a victorious finish" now serves as a screen for Britain's bid to strengthen her domination in Baghdad and in Germany's African colonies, for the striving of the Russian capitalists to plunder and subdue Armenia and Persia, etc., for the striving to bring about Germany's complete defeat.

The Russian soldiers at the front must arrange voting in every military unit, in every regiment, in every company, on the question whether they want the war to be dragged out like this by the capitalists, or whether they want it to be speedily terminated by having all power in the state pass wholly and exclusively into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The party of the proletariat in Russia will attend a conference and enter into a fraternal union with only such workers' parties of other countries as are waging a revolutionary struggle in their own countries for all state power passing to the proletariat.

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6

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SOVIETS APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

BRIEF PRESS REPORT

Comrade Lenin pointed out that the French revolution passed through a phase of municipal revolution, that it drew its strength from the local organs of self-government, which became its mainstay. In the Russian revolution we observe a certain bureaucratism in the centres, and a greater exercise of power wielded by the Soviets locally, in the provinces. In the capital cities the Soviets are politically more dependent upon the bourgeois central authorities than those in the provinces. In the centres it is not so easy to take control of production; in the provinces this has already been carried out to some extent. The inference is—to strengthen the local Soviets. Progress in this respect is possible, coming primarily from the provinces.

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7

DRAFT THESES TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE SOVIETS

In a number of local, especially working-class, centres the role of the Soviets has proved to be a particularly important one. They hold undivided power. The bourgeoisie has been disarmed and reduced to complete submission; wages have been raised, and the hours of work reduced without lowering production; food supplies are ensured; control over production and distribution has been initiated; all the old authorities have been displaced; the revolutionary initiative of the peasants is encouraged both on the question of power (the dismissal of the old and setting up of new authorities) and on the question of the land.

In the capital and certain large centres a reverse tendency is to be observed. The Soviets are less proletarian in their make-up, the influence of the petty-bourgeois elements in the executive committees is incomparably wider, and there is—especially in the commissions—"co-operation with the bourgeoisie", who curbs the revolutionary initiative of the masses, *bureaucratises* the revolutionary movement of the masses and their revolutionary aims, and blocks all revolutionary measures that are liable to affect the capitalists.

It is quite natural and inevitable that after the fullest development of revolutionary energy in the capital, where the people and especially the workers had borne the greatest sacrifices in overthrowing tsarism—in the capital, where the central state power had been overthrown and the most centralised power of capital had given maximum power to the capitalists—the power of the Soviets (and the power of the proletariat) proved to be weak, the problem of developing the revolution very difficult, the transition to a new stage of the revolution extremely hard, and the resistance of the bourgeoisie stronger than anywhere else.

Hence: so long as the main effort in the capital cities and the large centres still has to be directed towards *building up* forces for *completing* the second stage of the revolution, in the local areas the revolution can and should be advanced by *direct* action, by the exercise of undivided power by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, by developing the revolutionary energy of the worker and peasant mass, by establishing control over the production and distribution of products, and so on.

The following trend of the revolution can be traced: (1) removal of the old government in the centre; (2) seizure of power by the bourgeoisie in view of the proletariat's unpreparedness for tackling *colossal* tasks of nation-wide importance; (3) development of the revolution locally; (4) in local areas and particularly in the proletarian centres—communes and development of revolutionary energy of the masses; (5) the land—seizure of it, etc.; (6) factories; control over them; (7) undivided power; (8) local, municipal revolution going forward; (9) bureaucratisation, submission to the bourgeoisie in the centre.

Conclusions: (α) *1*: build-up in the centre (build-up of forces for a new revolution); (β) *2*: *advance* the revolution (power? land? factories?) in the local areas; (γ) *3*: communes locally, i.e. (αα) complete local autonomy; self-established; (ββ) without police, without government officials, full power by armed worker and peasant masses; (δ) *4*: combat bureaucratising and bourgeois-placating influence of the petty-bourgeois elements; (ε) *5*: gather local experience for *prodding* the centre: *local areas* become a *model*.

(σ) *6*: bring home to the mass of workers, peasants, and soldiers that the reason for the revolution's success locally is undivided power and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

(η) *7*: in the centre, of course, it is *more difficult*, takes more time.

+ (ι) *8*: development of the revolution by way of *communes* formed out of suburbs and blocks in the large cities....

(χ) *9*: transformation (in the capital cities, etc.) into "servants of the bourgeoisie".

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8

SPEECH IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE WAR APRIL 27 (MAY 10)

Comrades, the original draft resolution on the war was read by me at the City Conference. Because of the crisis that absorbed the attention and energy of all our comrades in Petrograd, we were unable to amend the draft. Since yesterday, however, the committee working on it has made satisfactory progress: the draft has been changed, considerably shortened and, in our opinion, improved.

I wish to say a few words about the construction of this resolution. It consists of three parts. The first is devoted to a class analysis of the war; it also contains our statement of principles explaining why our Party warns against placing any trust in promises made by the Provisional Government, as well as against any support for that government. The second part of the resolution deals with the question of revolutionary defencism as an extremely broad mass movement which has now united against us the overwhelming majority of the nation. Our task is to define the class significance of this revolutionary defencism, its essence, and the real balance of forces, and find a way to fight this trend. The third part of the resolution deals with the question of how to end the war. This practical question, which is of supreme importance to our Party, required a detailed answer. We think that we have succeeded in meeting this requirement satisfactorily. The articles in *Pravda* and numerous articles on the war published in provincial newspapers (the latter reach us very irregularly) because the postal service is disorganised, and we have to take every convenient opportunity of getting them for the Central Committee) reveal a negative attitude

towards the war and the loan. I think that the vote against the loan settled the question as to our opposition to revolutionary defencism. I do not think it is possible to go into greater detail on this.

"The present war is, on the part of both groups of the belligerent powers, an imperialist war, i.e., one waged by the capitalists for the division of the profits obtained from world domination; for markets for finance (banking) capital, for the subjugation of the weaker nationalities, etc."

The primary and basic issue is the meaning of the war, a question of a general and political character, a moot question which the capitalists and the social-chauvinists carefully evade. This is why we must put this question first, with this addition to it:

"Each day of war enriches the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and impoverishes and saps the strength of the proletariat and the peasantry of all the belligerents, as well as of the neutral countries. In Russia, moreover, prolongation of the war involves a grave danger to the revolution's gains and its further development.

"The passing of state power in Russia to the Provisional Government, a government of the landowners and capitalists, did not and could not alter the character and meaning of the war as far as Russia is concerned."

The words I have just read to you are of great importance in all our propaganda and agitation. Has the class character of the war changed now? Can it change? Our reply is based on the fact that power has passed to the landowners and capitalists, the same government that had engineered this war. We then pass on to one of the facts that reveal most clearly the character of the war. Class character as expressed by the entire policy carried on for decades by definite classes is one thing, the obvious class character of the war is another.

"This fact was most strikingly demonstrated when the new government not only failed to publish the secret treaties between Tsar Nicholas II and the capitalist governments of Britain, France, etc., but even formally and without consulting the nation confirmed these secret treaties, which promise the Russian capitalists a free hand to rob China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc. By concealing these treaties

from the people of Russia the latter are being deceived as to the true character of the war."

And so, I emphasise again, we are pointing out one particularly striking confirmation of the character of the war. Even if there were no treaties at all, the character of the war would be the same because groups of capitalists can very often come to an agreement without any treaties. But the treaties exist and their implications are apparent. For the purpose of co-ordinating the work of our agitators and propagandists, we think this fact should be especially emphasised, and so we have made a special point of it. The people's attention is and should be called to this fact, all the more so as the treaties were concluded by the tsar, who has been overthrown. The people ought to be made aware that the present governments are carrying on the war on the basis of treaties concluded between the old governments. This, I feel, makes the contradictions between the capitalist interests and the will of the people stand out most strikingly, and it is for the propagandists to expose these contradictions, to draw the people's attention to them, to strive to explain them to the masses by appealing to their class-consciousness. The contents of these treaties leave no room for doubt that they promise enormous profits to the capitalists to be derived from robbing other countries. That is why they are always kept secret. There is not a republic in the world whose foreign policy is conducted in the open. It is fatuous, while the capitalist system exists, to expect the capitalists to open up their ledgers. While there is private ownership of the means of production, there is bound to be private ownership of shares and financial operations. The corner-stone of contemporary diplomacy is financial operations, which amount to robbing and strangling the weak nationalities. These, we believe, are the fundamental premises upon which the evaluation of the war rests. Proceeding from these premises we conclude that: "For this reason, no proletarian party that does not wish to break completely with internationalism, i.e., with the fraternal solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggle against the yoke of capital, can support the present war, or the present government, or its loans."

This is our chief and basic conclusion. It determines

our whole tactics and sets us apart from all the other parties, no matter how socialistic they claim to be. This proposition, which is irrefutable to all of us, predetermines our attitude towards all the other political parties.

The next point concerns the wide use which our government is making of promises. These promises are the object of a prolonged campaign by the Soviets, which have become muddled by these promises, and which are trying the people's patience. We, therefore, consider it necessary to add to our purely objective analysis of the class relations an analysis of those promises, promises which in themselves have, of course, no significance to a Marxist, but which mean a great deal to the people, and mean even more in politics. The Petrograd Soviet has become muddled by these promises, has given weight to them by promising its support. This is the reason why we add the following statement to this point:

"No trust can be placed in the present government's promises to renounce annexations, i.e., conquests of foreign countries or retention by force of any nationality within the confines of Russia."

"Annexation" being a foreign word, we give it an exact political definition, such as neither the Cadets nor the petty-bourgeois democratic parties (the Narodniks and Mensheviks) can give. Few words have been used so meaninglessly and slovenly.

"For, in the first place, the capitalists, bound together by the thousand threads of banking capital, cannot renounce annexations in this war without renouncing the profits from the thousands of millions invested in loans, concessions, war industries, etc. And secondly, the new government, after renouncing annexations to mislead the people, declared through Milyukov (Moscow, April 9, 1917) that it had no intention of renouncing them, and, in the Note of April 18 and its elucidation of April 22, confirmed the expansionist character of its policy.

"Therefore, in warning the people against the capitalists' empty promises, the Conference declares that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between a renunciation of annexations in word and a renunciation of annexations in deed, i.e., the immediate publication and abrogation of all the secret, predatory treaties and the immediate granting to

all nationalities of the right to determine by free voting whether they wish to be independent states or to be part of another state."

We have found it necessary to mention this, because the question of peace without annexations is the basic issue in all these discussions of peace terms. All parties recognise that peace will become the alternative, and that peace with annexations will be an unheard-of catastrophe for all countries. In a country where there is political liberty, the question of peace cannot be placed before the people otherwise than in terms of peace without annexations. It is therefore necessary to declare for peace without annexations, and so the only thing to do is to lie by wrapping up the meaning of annexations or evading the question altogether. *Rech*, for instance, cries that the return of Kurland means renunciation of annexations. When I was addressing the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a soldier handed me a slip of paper with the following question: "We have to fight to win back Kurland. Does winning back Kurland mean that you stand for annexations?" I had to reply in the affirmative. We are against Germany annexing Kurland, but we are also against Russia holding Kurland by force. For example, our government has issued a manifesto proclaiming the independence of Poland. This manifesto, chock-full of meaningless phrases, states that Poland must form a free military alliance with Russia. These three words contain the whole truth. A free military alliance of little Poland with huge Russia is, in point of fact, complete military subjection of Poland. Poland may be granted political freedom but her boundaries will be determined by the military alliance.

If we fight for the Russian capitalists keeping possession of the former annexed territories of Kurland and Poland, then the German capitalists have the right to rob Kurland. They may argue this way: we looted Poland together. At the end of the eighteenth century, when we began to tear Poland to pieces, Prussia was a very small and weak country while Russia was a giant, and therefore she grabbed more. Now we have grown and it is our intention, if you please, to snatch a larger share. You can say nothing against this capitalist logic. In 1863 Japan was a mere nothing in comparison with Russia,

but in 1905 Japan thrashed Russia. From 1863 to 1873 Germany was a mere nothing in comparison with Britain, but now Germany is stronger than Britain. The Germans may argue: we were weak when Kurland was taken from us, but we have now grown stronger than you, and we wish to take it back. Not to renounce annexations means to justify endless wars over the conquest of weaker nationalities. To renounce annexations means to let each nation determine freely whether it wants to live separately or together with others. Of course, for this purpose, armies must be withdrawn. To show the slightest hesitation on the question of annexations means to justify endless wars. It follows that we could allow no hesitation on this question. With regard to annexations, our answer is that nations must be free to make their own decisions. How can we secure economic freedom alongside this political freedom? To accomplish this, power must pass into the hands of the proletariat and the yoke of capital must be overthrown.

I now pass on to the second part of the resolution.

"The 'revolutionary defencism', which in Russia has now permeated all the Narodnik parties (the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries), the opportunist party of the Menshevik Social-Democrats (the Organising Committee, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), and the majority of the non-party revolutionaries, reflects, in point of class significance, the interests and point of view of the well-to-do peasants and a part of the small proprietors, who, like the capitalists, profit by oppressing weak peoples. On the other hand, revolutionary defencism is a result of the deception by the capitalists of a part of the urban and rural proletariat and semi-proletariat, who, by their class position, have no interest in the profits of the capitalists and in the imperialist war."

Consequently, our task here is to determine from what sections of society this defencist tendency could emerge. Russia is the most petty-bourgeois country in the world, and the upper sections of the petty bourgeoisie are directly interested in continuing the war. The well-to-do peasants, like the capitalists, are profiting by the war. On the other hand, the mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians have no interest in annexations because they make no profit on

banking capital. How, then, have these classes come to adopt the position of revolutionary defencism? Their attitude towards revolutionary defencism is due to the influence of capitalist ideology, which the resolution designates by the word "deception". They are unable to differentiate between the interests of the capitalists and the interests of the country. Hence we conclude:

"The Conference recognises that any concessions to revolutionary defencism are absolutely impermissible and virtually signify a complete break with internationalism and socialism. As for the defencist tendencies among the broad masses, our Party will fight against these tendencies by ceaselessly explaining the truth that the attitude of unreasoning trust in the government of the capitalists, at the moment, is one of the chief obstacles to a speedy termination of the war."

The last words express the specific feature that sharply distinguishes Russia from the other Western capitalist countries and from all capitalist democratic republics. For it cannot be said of those countries that the trustfulness of the unenlightened masses there is the chief cause of the prolongation of the war. The masses there are now in the iron grip of military discipline. The more democratic the republic, the stronger discipline is, since law in a republic rests on "the will of the people". Owing to the revolution there is no such discipline in Russia. The masses freely elect representatives to the Soviets, which is something that does not exist now anywhere else in the world. But the masses have unreasoning trust, and are therefore used for the purposes of the struggle. So far we can do nothing but explain. Our explanations must deal with the immediate revolutionary tasks and methods of action. When the masses are free, any attempts to act in the name of a minority, without explaining things to the masses, would be senseless Blanquism, mere adventurism. Only by winning over the masses, if they can be won, can we lay a solid foundation for the victory of the proletarian class struggle.

I now pass on to the third part of the resolution:

"In regard to the most important question of all, namely, how to end the present capitalist war as soon as possible, not by a coercive peace, but by a truly democratic peace, the Conference recognises and declares the following:

"This war cannot be ended by a refusal of the soldiers of one side only to continue the war, by a simple cessation of hostilities by one of the belligerents."

The idea of terminating the war in this way has been attributed to us over and over again by persons who wish to win an easy victory over their opponents by distorting the latter's views—a typical method used by the capitalists, who ascribe to us the absurd idea of wishing to end the war by a one-sided refusal to fight. They say "the war cannot be ended by sticking your bayonet in the ground", to quote a soldier, a typical revolutionary defencist. This is no argument, I say. The idea that the war can be terminated without changing the classes in power is an anarchist idea. Either this idea is anarchistic, in which case it has no meaning, no state significance, or it is a hazy pacifist idea that fails completely to appreciate the connection between politics and the oppressing class. War is an evil, peace is a blessing.... Certainly this idea must be made clear to the people, must be popularised. Incidentally, all our resolutions are being written for leading Party members, for Marxists, and do not make reading matter for the masses. But they must serve as unifying and guiding political principles for every propagandist and agitator. To meet this requirement, one more paragraph was added to the resolution:

"The Conference reiterates its protest against the base slander spread by the capitalists against our Party to the effect that we are in favour of a separate peace with Germany. We consider the German capitalists to be as predatory as the Russian, British, French, and other capitalists, and Emperor Wilhelm as bad a crowned brigand as Nicholas II or the British, Italian, Rumanian, and all other monarchs."

On this point there was some disagreement in the committee, some maintaining that in this passage our language became too popular, others, that the British, Italian, and Rumanian monarchs did not deserve the honour of being mentioned. After a detailed discussion, however, we all agreed that, since our present aim is to refute all the slanders which *Birzhevka** has tried to spread against us rather crudely,

* See Note No. 80.—*Ed.*

Rech more subtly, *Yedinstvo* by direct implication, we must, on a question of this nature, come out with a most sharp and trenchant criticism of these ideas, having in mind the broadest masses of the people. Asked why we do not help to overthrow Wilhelm if we consider him a brigand, we can say that the others, too, are brigands, that we ought to fight against them as well, that one must not forget the kings of Italy and Rumania, that brigands can also be found among our Allies. These two paragraphs are intended to combat the slander, which is meant to lead to riot-mongering and squabbling. This is the reason why we must now pass on to the serious practical question of how to terminate the war.

"Our Party will patiently but persistently explain to the people the truth that wars are waged by *governments*, that wars are always indissolubly bound up with the policies of definite *classes*, that this war can be terminated by a democratic peace *only* if the entire state power, in at least several of the belligerent countries, has passed to the class of the proletarians and semi-proletarians which is really capable of putting an end to the oppressive rule of capital."

To a Marxist these truths—that wars are waged by the capitalists and are bound up with the capitalists' class interests—are absolute truths. A Marxist need not dwell on that. But as far as the masses are concerned, skilful agitators and propagandists should be able to explain this truth simply, without using foreign words, for with us discussions usually degenerate into empty and futile squabbling. The explaining of this truth is what we have been trying to do in every part of the resolution. We say that in order to understand what the war is about, you must ask who gains by it; in order to understand how to put an end to the war, you must ask which classes do not gain by it. The connection here is clear, hence we conclude:

"In Russia, the revolutionary class, having taken state power, would adopt a series of measures that would lead to the destruction of the economic rule of the capitalists, as well as measures that would render them completely harmless politically, and would immediately and frankly offer to all nations a democratic peace on the basis of a complete renunciation of every possible form of annexation."

Once we speak in the name of the revolutionary class, the people have the right to ask: and what about you, what would you do in their place to end the war? This is an inevitable question. The people are electing us now as their representatives, and we must give a very precise answer. The revolutionary class, having taken power, would set out to undermine the rule of the capitalists, and would then offer to all nations well-defined peace terms, because, unless the economic rule of the capitalists is undermined, all we can have are scraps of paper. Only a victorious class can accomplish this, can bring about a change in policy.

I repeat: to bring this truth home to the uneducated mass, we need intermediate links that would help to introduce this question to them. The mistake and falsehood of popular literature on the war is the evasion of this question; it ignores this question and presents the matter as if there had been no class struggle, as if two countries had lived amicably until one attacked the other, and the attacked has been defending itself. This is vulgar reasoning in which there is not a shadow of objective truth, and which is a deliberate deception of the people by educated persons. If we approach this question properly, anyone would be able to grasp the essential point; for the interests of the ruling classes are one thing, and the interests of the oppressed classes are another.

What would happen if the revolutionary class took power?

"Such measures and such a frank offer of peace would bring about complete confidence of the workers of the belligerent countries in each other...."

Such confidence is impossible now, and the words of manifestos will not create it. Where the philosopher once said that speech has been given to man to enable him to conceal his thoughts, the diplomats always say: "Conferences are held to deceive the people." Not only the capitalists, but the socialists too reason this way. This particularly applies to the conference which Borgbjerg is calling.

"...and would inevitably lead to uprisings of the proletariat against those imperialist governments as might resist the offered peace."

Nobody now believes the capitalist government when it says: "We are for peace without annexations." The masses have the instinct of oppressed classes which tells them that

nothing has changed. Only if the policy were actually changed in one country, confidence would appear and attempts at uprisings would be made. We speak of "uprisings" because we are now discussing all countries. To say "a revolution has taken place in one country, so now it must take place in Germany"—is false reasoning. There is a tendency to form an order of sequence, but this cannot be done. We all went through the revolution of 1905. We all heard or witnessed how that revolution gave birth to revolutionary ideas throughout the world, a fact which Marx constantly referred to. Revolutions cannot be made, they cannot be taken in turns. A revolution cannot be made to order—it develops. This form of charlatanism is now frequently being practised in Russia. The people are told: You in Russia have made a revolution, now it is the Germans' turn. If the objective conditions change, then an uprising is inevitable, but we do not know whose turn it will be, when it will take place, and with what degree of success. We are asked: If the revolutionary class takes power in Russia, and if no uprisings break out in other countries, what will the revolutionary party do? What will happen then? This question is answered in the last paragraph of our resolution.

"Until the revolutionary class in Russia takes the entire state power, our Party will do all it can to support those proletarian parties and groups abroad that are in fact, already during the war, conducting a revolutionary struggle against their imperialist governments and their bourgeoisie."

This is all that we can promise and must do now. The revolution is mounting in every country, but no one knows to what extent it is mounting and when it will break out. In every country there are people who are carrying on a revolutionary struggle against their governments. They are the people, the only people, we must support. This is the real thing—all else is falsehood. And so we add:

"Our Party will particularly support the mass fraternisation of the soldiers of all the belligerent countries that has already begun at the front...."

This is to meet Plekhanov's argument: "What will come of it? Suppose you do fraternise, then what? Does this not suggest the possibility of a separate peace at the front?" This is jiggery-pokery, not a serious argument. We want

fraternisation on all fronts, and we are taking pains to encourage it. When we worked in Switzerland, we published an appeal in two languages, with French on one side and German on the other, urging those soldiers to do the same thing we are now urging the Russian soldiers to do. We do not confine ourselves to fraternisation between German and Russian soldiers, we call upon all to fraternise. This, then, is what we mean by fraternisation:

"...endeavouring to turn this instinctive expression of solidarity of the oppressed into a politically-conscious movement as well organised as possible for the transfer of all state power in all the belligerent countries to the revolutionary proletariat."

Fraternisation, so far, is instinctive, and we must not deceive ourselves on this score. We must admit this in order not to delude the people. The fraternising soldiers are actuated not by a clear-cut political idea but by the instinct of oppressed people, who are tired, exhausted and begin to lose confidence in capitalist promises. They say: "While you keep on talking about peace—we have been hearing it now for two and a half years—we shall start things moving ourselves." This is a true class instinct. Without this instinct the cause of the revolution would be hopeless. As you know, nobody would free the workers if they did not free themselves. But is instinct alone sufficient? You would not get far if you rely on instinct alone. This instinct must be transformed into political awareness.

In our "Appeal to the Soldiers of All the Belligerent Countries" we explain into what this fraternisation should develop—into the passing of political power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.* Naturally, the German workers will call their Soviets by a different name, but this does not matter. The point is that we undoubtedly recognise as correct that fraternisation is instinctive, that we do not simply confine ourselves to encouraging fraternisation, but set ourselves the task of turning this instinctive fraternisation of workers and peasants in soldiers' uniforms into a politically-conscious movement, whose aim is the transfer

* See p. 188 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of power in all the belligerent countries into the hands of the revolutionary proletariat. This is a very difficult task, but the position in which humanity finds itself under capitalist rule is tremendously difficult, too, and leads to destruction. This is why it will call forth that explosion of discontent which is the guarantee of proletarian revolution.

This is our resolution, which we submit for consideration to the Conference.

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9

RESOLUTION ON THE WAR

I

The present war is, on the part of both groups of the belligerent powers, an imperialist war, i.e., one waged by the capitalists for the division of the profits obtained from world domination, for markets for finance (banking) capital, for the subjugation of the weaker nationalities, etc. Each day of war enriches the financial and industrial bourgeoisie and impoverishes and saps the strength of the proletariat and the peasantry of all the belligerents, as well as of the neutral countries. In Russia, moreover, prolongation of the war involves a grave danger to the revolution's gains and its further development.

The passing of state power in Russia to the Provisional Government, a government of the landowners and capitalists, did not and could not alter the character and meaning of the war as far as Russia is concerned.

This fact was most strikingly demonstrated when the new government not only failed to publish the secret treaties between Tsar Nicholas II and the capitalist governments of Britain, France, etc., but even formally and without consulting the nation confirmed these secret treaties, which promise the Russian capitalists a free hand to rob China, Persia, Turkey, Austria, etc. By concealing these treaties from the people of Russia the latter are being deceived as to the true character of the war.

For this reason, no proletarian party that does not wish to break completely with internationalism, i.e., with the

fraternal solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggle against the yoke of capital, can support the present war, or the present government, or its loans.

No trust can be placed in the present government's promises to renounce annexations, i.e., conquests of foreign countries or retention by force of any nationality within the confines of Russia. For, in the first place, the capitalists, bound together by the thousand threads of banking capital, cannot renounce annexations in this war without renouncing the profits from the thousands of millions invested in loans, concessions, war industries, etc. And secondly, the new government, after renouncing annexations to mislead the people, declared through Milyukov (Moscow, April 9, 1917) that it had no intention of renouncing them, and, in the Note of April 18 and its elucidation of April 22, confirmed the expansionist character of its policy. Therefore, in warning the people against the capitalists' empty promises, the Conference declares that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between a renunciation of annexations in word and a renunciation of annexations in deed, i.e., the immediate publication and abrogation of all the secret, predatory treaties and the immediate granting to all nationalities of the right to determine by free voting whether they wish to be independent states or to be part of another state.

II

The "revolutionary defencism", which in Russia has now permeated all the Narodnik parties (the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries), the opportunist party of the Menshevik Social-Democrats (the Organising Committee, Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), and the majority of the non-party revolutionaries, reflects, in point of class significance, the interests and point of view of the well-to-do peasants and a part of the small proprietors, who, like the capitalists, profit by oppressing weak peoples. On the other hand, "revolutionary defencism" is a result of the deception by the capitalists of a part of the urban and rural proletariat and semi-proletariat, who, by their class position, have no interest in the profits of the capitalists and in the imperialist war.

The Conference recognises that any concessions to "revolutionary defencism" are absolutely impermissible and virtually signify a complete break with internationalism and socialism. As for the defencist tendencies among the broad masses, our Party will fight against these tendencies by ceaselessly explaining the truth that the attitude of unreasoning trust in the government of the capitalists, at the moment, is one of the chief obstacles to a speedy termination of the war.

III

In regard to the most important question of all, namely, how to end the present capitalist war as soon as possible, not by a coercive peace, but by a truly democratic peace, the Conference recognises and declares the following:

This war cannot be ended by a refusal of the soldiers of one side only to continue the war, by a simple cessation of hostilities by one of the belligerents.

The Conference reiterates its protest against the base slander spread by the capitalists against our Party to the effect that we are in favour of a separate peace with Germany. We consider the German capitalists to be as predatory as the Russian, British, French, and other capitalists, and Emperor Wilhelm as bad a crowned brigand as Nicholas II or the British, Italian, Rumanian, and all other monarchs.

Our Party will patiently but persistently explain to the people the truth that wars are waged by *governments*, that wars are always indissolubly bound up with the policies of definite *classes*, that this war can be terminated by a democratic peace *only* if the entire state power, in at least several of the belligerent countries, has passed to the class of the proletarians and semi-proletarians which is really capable of putting an end to the oppressive rule of capital.

In Russia, the revolutionary class, having taken state power, would adopt a series of measures that would undermine the economic rule of the capitalists, as well as measures that would render them completely harmless politically, and would immediately and frankly offer to all nations a democratic peace on the basis of a complete renunciation of every possible form of annexation and indemnity. Such

measures and such a frank offer of peace would bring about complete confidence of the workers of the belligerent countries in each other and would inevitably lead to uprisings of the proletariat against those imperialist governments as might resist the offered peace.

Until the revolutionary class in Russia takes the entire state power, our Party will do all it can to support those proletarian parties and groups abroad that are in fact, already during the war, conducting a revolutionary struggle against their imperialist governments and their bourgeoisie. Our Party will particularly support the mass fraternisation of the soldiers of all the belligerent countries that has already begun at the front, endeavouring to turn this instinctive expression of solidarity of the oppressed into a politically-conscious movement as well organised as possible for the transfer of all state power in all the belligerent countries to the revolutionary proletariat.

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10

RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. recognises that:

1. The Provisional Government, by its class character, is the organ of landowner and bourgeois domination;

2. The Provisional Government and the classes it represents are bound with indissoluble economic and political ties to Russian and Anglo-French imperialism;

3. The Provisional Government is carrying out its proclaimed programme only partially, and only under pressure of the revolutionary proletariat and, to some extent, of the petty bourgeoisie;

4. The forces of bourgeois and landowner counter-revolution, now being organised, have already, under cover of the Provisional Government and with the latter's obvious connivance, launched an attack on revolutionary democracy: thus the Provisional Government is avoiding fixing the date for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, preventing the arming of the people as a whole, opposing the transfer of all the land to the people, foisting upon it the landowners' way of settling the agrarian question, obstructing the introduction of an eight-hour workday, condoning counter-revolutionary propaganda in the army (by Guchkov and Co.), rallying the high-ranking officers against the soldiers, etc.;

5. The Provisional Government, protecting the profits of the capitalists and landowners, is incapable of taking a number of revolutionary economic measures (food supply, etc.)

which are absolutely and urgently necessary in view of the impending economic catastrophe;

6. This government, at the same time, is relying at present on the confidence of, and on an actual agreement with, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which is still the leading organisation for the majority of workers and soldiers, i.e., peasants;

7. Every step of the Provisional Government, in both its domestic and foreign policies, is bound to open the eyes of the urban and rural proletarians and semi-proletarians and force various sections of the petty bourgeoisie to choose between one and the other political line.

Considering the above, the Conference resolves that:

1. Extensive work has to be done to develop proletarian class-consciousness and to unite the urban and rural proletarians against the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie, for only work of this nature can serve as a sure guarantee of the successful transfer of the entire state power into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies or other organs directly expressing the will of the majority of the people (organs of local self-government, the Constituent Assembly, etc.);

2. This calls for many-sided activity within the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for work aimed at increasing the number of these Soviets, consolidating their power, and welding together our Party's proletarian internationalist groups in the Soviets;

3. In order immediately to consolidate and widen the gains of the revolution in the local areas, it is necessary, with the backing of a solid majority of the local population, in every way to develop, organise, and strengthen its independent actions aimed at implementing liberties, dismissing the counter-revolutionary authorities, introducing economic measures, such as control over production and distribution, etc.;

4. The political crisis of April 19-21 precipitated by the Note of the Provisional Government has shown that the government party of the Constitutional-Democrats, which is organising counter-revolutionary elements both in the army and in the streets, is now making attempts to shoot down the workers. In view of the unstable situation arising from the dual power, the repetition of such attempts is inevitable,

and it is the duty of the party of the proletariat to tell the people as forcibly as possible that, in order to avert the seriously threatening danger of such mass shootings of the proletariat as took place in Paris in the June days of 1848, it is necessary to organise and arm the proletariat, to establish the closest alliance between the proletariat and the revolutionary army, to break with the policy of confidence in the Provisional Government.

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May 10 (April 27), 1917

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11

REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF REVISING THE PARTY PROGRAMME APRIL 28 (MAY 11)[87]

Comrades, this is how the question of revising the Party Programme now stands. The first draft of proposed changes in the doctrinal part of our programme and in a number of basic points in its political part was submitted to the committee. The whole programme must be revised as being utterly obsolete—a fact that was pointed out in Party circles long before the war. It appears, however, that there is not the slightest hope for discussing the proposed changes of the programme as a whole. On the other hand, the committee has come to the unanimous conclusion that a revision of the programme is absolutely essential, and that in a number of questions it is possible and necessary to indicate the direction in which such revision should be made. We have therefore agreed on the following draft resolution which I am going to read to you now, making brief comments as I go along. We have decided not to put forward precisely formulated theses at the present time, but merely to indicate along what lines this revision should be carried out.

(*Reads the resolution.*)

"The Conference considers it necessary to revise the Party Programme along the following lines:

"1. Evaluating imperialism and the epoch of imperialist wars in connection with the approaching socialist revolution; fighting against the distortion of Marxism by the 'defencists', who have forgotten Marx's slogan—'The working men have no country'."[88]

This is so clear that it requires no explanation. As a matter of fact our Party's policy has advanced considerably and, practically speaking, has already taken the stand proposed in this formulation.

"2. Amending the theses and clauses dealing with the state; such amendment is to be in the nature of a demand for a democratic proletarian-peasant republic (i.e., a type of state functioning without police, without a standing army, and without a privileged bureaucracy), and not for a bourgeois parliamentary republic."

Other formulations of this point had been proposed. One of them mentioned the experience of the Paris Commune and the experience of the period between the seventies and the eighties, but such a formulation is unsatisfactory and too general; another spoke about a republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, but this formulation, too, was considered unsatisfactory by most of the comrades. A formulation, however, is needed; the point is not what an institution is called, but what its political character and structure is. By saying "proletarian-peasant republic", we indicate its social content and political character.

"3. Eliminating or amending what is out of date in the political programme."

Practically speaking, our general political activities in the Soviets have gone along these lines; therefore, there can hardly be room for doubt that the change in this particular point of the programme and the precise formulation of our estimate of the moment in which the revolution found our Party, is not likely to provoke any disagreements.

"4. Altering a number of points in the political minimum programme, so as to state more consistent democratic demands with greater precision.

"5. Completely changing the economic part of the minimum programme, which in very many places is out of date, and points relating to public education."

The main thing here is that these points have become out of date; the trade union movement has outstripped them.

"6. Revising the agrarian programme in accordance with the adopted resolution on the agrarian question.

"7. Inserting a demand for nationalisation of a number of syndicates, etc., now ripe for such a step."

A careful formulation has been chosen here, which can be narrowed or widened, depending upon what drafts will appear in print.

"8. Adding an analysis of the main trends in modern socialism."

An addendum like this was made to the *Communist Manifesto*.

"The Conference instructs the Central Committee to work out, within two months, on the basis of the above suggestions, a draft for the Party Programme which is to be submitted for approval to the Party congress. The Conference calls upon all organisations and all Party members to consider drafts of the programme, to correct them, and to work out counterdrafts."

It has been pointed out that it would be desirable to set up a scientific body and create a literature dealing with this subject, but we have neither the men nor the means for this. This is the resolution that should help in the speedy revision of our programme. This resolution will be forwarded abroad to enable our internationalist comrades to take part in revising the programme, which our Party has undertaken on the basis of the experience of the world war.

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12

RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF REVISING THE PARTY PROGRAMME

The Conference considers it necessary to revise the Party Programme along the following lines:

1. Evaluating imperialism and the epoch of imperialist wars in connection with the approaching socialist revolution; fighting against the distortion of Marxism by the "defencists", who have forgotten Marx's slogan—"The working men have no country";
2. Amending the theses and clauses dealing with the state; such amendment is to be in the nature of a demand for a democratic proletarian-peasant republic (i.e., a type of state functioning without police, without a standing army, and without a privileged bureaucracy), and not for a bourgeois parliamentary republic;
3. Eliminating or amending what is out of date in the political programme;
4. Altering a number of points in the political minimum programme, so as to state more consistent democratic demands with greater precision;
5. Completely changing the economic part of the minimum programme, which in very many places is out of date, and points relating to public education;
6. Revising the agrarian programme in accordance with the adopted resolution on the agrarian question;
7. Inserting a demand for nationalisation of a number of syndicates, etc., now ripe for such a step;
8. Adding an analysis of the main trends in modern socialism.

The Conference instructs the Central Committee to work out, within two months, on the basis of the above suggestions, a draft for the Party Programme which is to be submitted for approval to the Party congress. The Conference calls upon all organisations and all Party members to consider drafts of the programme, to correct them, and to work out counterdrafts.

Supplement to *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 13, May 16 (3), 1917

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13

REPORT ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION APRIL 28 (MAY 11)

Comrades, the agrarian question was threshed out so thoroughly by our Party during the first revolution that by this time, I think, our ideas on the subject are pretty well defined. Indirect proof of this is to be found in the fact that the committee of the Conference composed of comrades interested and fully versed in this subject have agreed on the proposed draft resolution without making any substantial corrections. I shall therefore confine myself to very brief remarks. And since all members have proof-sheets of the draft, there is no need to read it in full.

The present growth of the agrarian movement throughout Russia is perfectly obvious and undeniable. Our Party Programme, proposed by the Mensheviks and adopted by the Stockholm Congress in 1906, was refuted even in the course of the first Russian revolution. At that Congress the Mensheviks succeeded in getting their programme of municipalisation adopted. The essence of their programme was as follows: the peasant lands, communal and homestead, were to remain the property of the peasants while the landed estates were to be taken over by local self-government bodies. One of the Mensheviks' chief arguments in favour of such a programme was that the peasants would never understand the transfer of peasant land to anyone but themselves. Anyone acquainted with the Minutes of the Stockholm Congress will recollect that this argument was particularly stressed both by Maslov, who made the report, and by Kostrov. We should not forget, as is often done nowadays, that this happened before the First Duma, when there was no objec-

tive information about the character of the peasant movement and its strength. Everyone knew that Russia was aflame with the agrarian revolution, but no one knew how the agrarian movement would be organised, or in what direction the peasant revolution would develop. It was impossible to check whether the opinions expressed by the Congress were the real and practical views held by the peasants themselves. This was why the Mensheviks' argument had carried such weight. Soon after the Stockholm Congress, we received the first serious indication of how the peasants viewed this question. In both the First and the Second Dumas, the peasants themselves put forward the Trudovik "Bill of the 104".[89] I made a special study of the signatures to this bill, carefully studied the views of the various deputies, their class affiliations, and the extent to which they may be called peasants. I stated categorically in my book, which was burned by the tsarist censor but which I will republish,[90] that the overwhelming majority of these 104 signatories were peasants. That bill called for the nationalisation of the land. The peasants said that the entire land would become the property of the state.

How, then, are we to account for the fact that in both Dumas the deputies representing the peasants of all Russia preferred nationalisation to the measure proposed in both Dumas by the Mensheviks from the point of view of the peasants' interests? The Mensheviks proposed that the peasants retain the ownership of their own lands, and that only the landed estates should be given to the people; the peasants, however, maintained that the entire land should be given to the people. How are we to account for this? The Socialist-Revolutionaries say that owing to their commune organisation the Russian peasants favour socialisation, the labour principle. All this phraseology is absolutely devoid of common sense, it is nothing but words. But how are we to account for this? I think the peasants came to this conclusion because all landownership in Russia, both peasants' and landowners', communal and homestead, is permeated with old, semi-feudal relationships, and the peasants, considering market conditions, had to demand the transfer of the land to all the people. The peasants say that the tangle of old agrarian life can only be unraveled by nationalisation.

Their point of view is bourgeois; by equalitarian land tenure they mean the confiscation of the landed estates, but not the equalisation of individual proprietors. By nationalisation they mean an actual reallotment of all the land among the peasants. This is a grand bourgeois project. No peasant spoke about equalisation or socialisation; but they all said it was impossible to wait any longer, that all the land had to be cleared, in other words, that farming could not be carried on in the old way under twentieth-century conditions. The Stolypin Reform[91] has since then confused the land question still more. That is what the peasants have in mind when they demand nationalisation. It means a reallotment of all the land. There are to be no varied forms of landownership. There is not the slightest suggestion of socialisation. This demand by the peasants is called equalitarian because, as a brief summary of the statistics relating to land holdings in 1905 shows, 300 peasant families held as much land (2,000 dessiatines) as one landowner's family. In this sense it is, of course, equalitarian, but it does not imply that all small farms are to be equalised. The Bill of the 104 shows the opposite.

These are the essential points that have to be made in order to give scientific support to the view that nationalisation in Russia, as far as bourgeois democracy is concerned, is necessary. But it is also necessary for another reason—it deals a mighty blow at private ownership of the means of production. It is simply absurd to imagine that after the abolition of private property in land everything in Russia will remain as before.

Then follow some practical conclusions and demands. Of the minor amendments in the draft I shall call attention to the following. The first point reads: "The party of the proletariat will support with all its might the immediate and complete confiscation of all landed estates...." Instead of "will support" we ought to say "will fight for".... Our point of view is not that the peasants have not enough land and that they need more. That is the current opinion. We say that the landed estates are the basis of oppression that crushes the peasants and keeps them backward. The question is not whether the peasants have or have not enough land. Down with serfdom!—this is the way the issue should be stated from the point of view of the revolutionary class

struggle, and not from the point of view of those officials who try to figure out how much land they have and by what norms it should be allotted. I suggest that the order of points 2 and 3 should be reversed, because, to us, the thing that matters is revolutionary initiative, and the law must be the result of it. *If you wait until the law is written, and yourselves do not develop revolutionary initiative, you will have neither the law nor the land.*

People very often object to nationalisation because, they say, it requires a colossal bureaucratic apparatus. That is true, but state landownership implies that every peasant is leasing the land from the state. The subletting of leaseholds is prohibited. But the question of how much and what kind of land the peasant shall lease must be entirely settled by the proper democratic, not bureaucratic, organ of authority.

For "farm-hands" we substitute "agricultural labourers". Several comrades declared that the word "farm-hand" was offensive; objections were raised to this word. It should be deleted.

We should not speak now of proletarian-peasant committees or Soviets in connection with the settlement of the land question, for, as we see, the peasants have set up Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies, thus creating a division between the proletariat and the peasantry.

The petty-bourgeois defencist parties, as we know, stand for the land question being put off until the Constituent Assembly meets. We are for the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants in a highly organised manner. We are emphatically against anarchic seizing of land. You propose that the peasants enter into agreements with the landowners. We say that the land should be taken over and cultivated right now if we wish to avert famine, to save the country from the debacle which is advancing upon it with incredible speed. One cannot now accept the prescriptions offered by Shingaryov and the Cadets, who suggest waiting for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the date of which has not been fixed yet, or making arrangements with the landowners for renting land. The peasants are already seizing the land without paying for it, or paying only a quarter of the rent.

One comrade has brought a local resolution, from Penza Gubernia, saying that the peasants are seizing the landowners' agricultural implements, which however they do not divide among the households, but convert into common property. They are establishing a definite order of sequence, a rule, for using these implements to cultivate all the land. In resorting to such measures, they are guided by the desire to increase agricultural production. This is a matter of principle of tremendous significance, for all that the landowners and capitalists shout about it being anarchy. But if you are going to chatter and shout about this being anarchy, while the peasants sit back and wait, then you will indeed have anarchy. The peasants have shown that they understand farming conditions and social control better than the government officials, and apply such control a hundred times more efficiently. Such a measure, which is doubtless quite practicable in a small village, inevitably leads to more sweeping measures. When the peasant comes to learn this—and he has already begun to learn it—the knowledge of bourgeois professors will not be needed; he will himself come to the conclusion that it is essential to utilise the agricultural implements, not only in the small farms, but for the cultivation of all the land. How they do this is unimportant. We do not know whether they combine their individual plots for common ploughing and sowing or not, and it does not matter if they do it differently. What does matter is that the peasants are fortunate in not having to face a large number of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, who style themselves Marxists and Social-Democrats, and with a grave mien lecture the people about the time not yet being ripe for a socialist revolution and that therefore the peasants must not take the land immediately. Fortunately there are few such gentlemen in the Russian countryside. If the peasants contented themselves merely with taking the land by arrangement with the landowners, and failed to apply their experience collectively, failure would be inevitable, and the peasant committees would become a mere toy, a meaningless game. This is why we propose to add Point 8* to the draft resolution.

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* See p. 292 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Once we know that the local peasants have themselves taken this initiative, it is our duty to say that we approve and recommend this initiative. Only this can serve as a guarantee that the revolution will not be limited to formal measures, that the struggle against the crisis will not remain a mere subject for departmental discussion and Shingaryov's epistles, but that the peasants will actually go ahead in an organised way to combat famine and to increase production.

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14

REJOINDER TO N. S. ANGARSKY DURING THE DEBATE ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION APRIL 28 (MAY 11)

Comrades, it seems to me that Comrade Angarsky is indulging in several contradictions. I speak about the *material* foundation of the urge towards nationalisation. The peasants have no idea of nationalisation. I say that the conditions of an all-Russia and international market exist, and this is expressed in the high prices of grain. Every peasant sees, knows, and feels the fluctuations of these prices, and farming has to conform to these conditions, to these prices. I say that the old landownership and the new farming system have absolutely diverged and this divergence explains why the peasants are pressing onward. The peasant is a proprietor, Comrade Angarsky says. Quite right. Stolypin wanted to use this as a basis for changing agrarian relations, he tried his hardest, but he failed, because such changes cannot be brought about without a revolutionary break-up. This, then, is the material foundation of the peasants' urge towards the nationalisation of the land, although they are completely ignorant as to the real meaning of nationalisation. The peasant proprietor is instinctively inclined to maintain that the land is God's, because it has become impossible to live under the old conditions of landownership. What Comrade Angarsky is proposing is a sheer misunderstanding. The second paragraph says that peasant landownership is fettered all round, from top to bottom, by old semi-feudal ties and relationships. But does it say anything about the landed estates? It does not. Comrade Angarsky's amendment is based on a misapprehension. He has ascribed to me things I never said,

things the peasants have no idea about. The peasants know the world situation by the prices of grain and consumer goods, and if a railway runs through his village, the peasant feels its effect through his own farm. To live the old way is impossible—that's what the peasant feels, and he expresses this feeling in a radical demand for the abolition of the old system of landownership. The peasant wants to be a proprietor, but he wants to be one on reallocated land; he wants to farm land the ownership of which is conditioned by his present requirements, and not by those which were prescribed for him by officials. The peasant knows this perfectly well, but expresses it differently, of course, and it is this that forms the material foundation of his urge towards the nationalisation of the land.

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15

RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

The existence of landed estates in Russia is the material mainstay of the power of the feudalist landowners and a guarantee of the possible restoration of the monarchy. This system of landownership necessarily condemns the great mass of Russia's population, the peasantry, to pauperism, bondage, and a downtrodden existence, and the entire country to backwardness in every sphere of life.

Peasant landownership in Russia, both of allotment land (communal and homestead) and private land (leased or purchased), is fettered all round, from top to bottom, by old semi-feudal ties and relationships, by the division of the peasants into categories inherited from the time of serfdom, by the open field system, and so on, and so forth. The need for breaking down all these antiquated and harmful restrictions, for "clearing" the land; and reconstructing and readjusting all the relations of landownership and agriculture to the new conditions of Russian and world economy, forms the material foundation of the peasants' urge towards the nationalisation of *all* the land in the state.

Whatever the petty-bourgeois utopias in which all Narodnik parties and groups array the struggle of the peasant masses against feudalist big landownership and all the feudal fetters of the entire system of landownership and land tenure in Russia, that struggle is itself an expression of a thoroughly bourgeois-democratic, undoubtedly progressive, and economically essential striving resolutely to break all those fetters.

Nationalisation of the land, though being a bourgeois measure, implies freedom for the class struggle and freedom of land tenure from all non-bourgeois adjuncts to the greatest

possible degree conceivable in a capitalist society. Moreover, nationalisation of the land, representing as it does the abolition of private ownership of land, would, in effect, deal such a powerful blow to private ownership of all the means of production in general that the party of the proletariat must facilitate such a reform in every possible way.

On the other hand, the well-to-do peasants of Russia long ago evolved the elements of a peasant bourgeoisie, and the Stolypin agrarian reform has undoubtedly strengthened, augmented, and reinforced these elements. At the other pole of the rural population, the agricultural wage-workers, the proletarians, and the mass of semi-proletarian peasantry, who stand close to the proletarians, have likewise gained in strength and numbers.

The more determined and consistent the break-up and elimination of the landed estates and the more determined and consistent the bourgeois-democratic agrarian reform in Russia in general, the more vigorous and speedy will be the development of the class struggle of the agricultural proletariat against the well-to-do peasants (the peasant bourgeoisie).

The fate and the outcome of the Russian revolution—unless the incipient proletarian revolution m Europe exercises a direct and powerful influence on our country—will depend on whether the urban proletariat succeeds in rallying the rural proletariat together with the mass of rural semi-proletarians behind it, or whether this mass follows the lead of the peasant bourgeoisie, which is gravitating towards an alliance with Guchkov and Milyukov, with the capitalists and landowners, and towards the counter-revolution in general.

In view of this class situation and balance of forces the Conference resolves that:

1) The party of the proletariat will fight with all its might for the immediate and complete confiscation of all landed estates in Russia (and also crown lands, church lands, etc., etc.);

2) The party will vigorously advocate the immediate transfer of all lands to the peasantry organised in Soviets of Peasants Deputies, or in other organs of local self-government elected in a really democratic way and entirely independent of the landowners and officials;

3) The party of the proletariat demands the nationalisation of all the land in the country; nationalisation, which signifies the transfer of the right of ownership of all land to the state, vests the right of administering the land in local democratic institutions;

4) The party must wage a determined struggle, on the one hand, against the Provisional Government, which, both through the mouth of Shingaryov and by its collective utterances, is trying to force the peasants to come to a "voluntary agreement with the landowners", i.e., is trying virtually to impose upon them a reform which suits the interests of the landowners, and is threatening the peasants with punishment for "arbitrary action", that is, with the use of violence by a minority of the population (the landowners and capitalists) against the majority; on the other hand, against the petty-bourgeois vacillations of the majority of the Narodniks and the Menshevik Social-Democrats, who are advising the peasants not to take all the land pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly;

5) The party advises the peasants to take the land in an organised way, not allowing the slightest damage to property, and taking measures to increase production;

6) Agrarian reforms, by and large, can be successful and durable only provided the whole state is democratised, i.e., provided, on the one hand, the police, the standing army, and the privileged bureaucracy are abolished, and provided, on the other, there exists a system of broad local self-government completely free from supervision and tutelage from above;

7) The separate and independent organisation of the agricultural proletariat must be undertaken immediately and everywhere, both in the form of Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies (as well as of separate Soviets of deputies of the semi-proletarian peasantry) and in the form of proletarian groups or factions within the general Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, in all local and municipal government bodies, etc.,

8) The party must support the initiative of those peasant committees which in a number of localities in Russia are handing over the livestock and agricultural implements of the landowners to the peasants organised in those committees,

to be used in a socially regulated manner for the cultivation of all the land;

9) The party of the proletariat must advise the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians to strive to convert every landed estate into a fair-sized model farm to be run on public lines by the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies under the direction of agricultural experts and with the application of the best technique.

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16

RESOLUTION ON UNITING THE INTERNATIONALISTS AGAINST THE PETTY-BOURGEOIS DEFENCIST BLOC

Taking into consideration:

(1) that the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Menshevik Social-Democrats, etc., have, in the great majority of cases, adopted the stand of "revolutionary defencism", that is, support of the imperialist war (voting in favour of the loan and supporting the Provisional Government which represents the interests of Capital);

(2) that these parties in all their policies defend the interests and point of view of the petty bourgeoisie and corrupt the proletariat with bourgeois influence by trying to persuade it that it is possible, by means of agreements, "control", participation in the cabinet, etc., to change the government's imperialist policy and divert it from the path of counter-revolutionary encroachments on liberty;

(3) that this policy encourages and enhances the attitude of unreasoning trust on the part of the masses towards the capitalists, an attitude which constitutes the chief obstacle to the further development of the revolution, and a possible source of the revolution's defeat by the landowner and bourgeois counter-revolution,

the Conference resolves that:

(1) unity with parties and groups which are pursuing such a policy is absolutely impossible;

(2) closer relations and unity with groups and trends that have adopted a real internationalist stand are necessary on the basis of a definite break with the policy of petty-bourgeois betrayal of socialism.

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17

RESOLUTION ON THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

The Conference has discussed the reports and communications of comrades working in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in different parts of Russia and states that:

In many provincial areas the revolution is progressing in the following way: the proletariat and the peasantry, on their own initiative, are organising Soviets and dismissing the old authorities; a proletarian and peasant militia is being set up; all lands are being transferred to the peasants; workers' control over the factories and the eight-hour day have been introduced and wages have been increased; production is being maintained, and workers control the distribution of food, etc.

This growth of the revolution in the provinces in depth and scope is, on the one hand, the growth of a movement for transferring all power to the Soviets and putting the workers and peasants themselves in control of production. On the other hand, it serves as a guarantee for the build-up of forces, on a national scale, for the second stage of the revolution, which must transfer all state power to the Soviets or to other organs directly expressing the will of the majority of the nation (organs of local self-government, the Constituent Assembly, etc.).

In the capitals and in a few other large cities the task of transferring state power to the Soviets is particularly difficult and requires an especially long period of preparation of the proletariat's forces. This is where the largest forces of the bourgeoisie are concentrated, where a policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie is most strongly in evidence, a policy which often holds back the revolutionary initiative of the masses and

weakens their independence; this is particularly dangerous in view of the leading role of these Soviets for the provinces.

It is, therefore, the task of the proletarian party, on the one hand, to support in every possible way the indicated development of the revolution locally, and, on the other to conduct a systematic struggle within the Soviets (by means of propaganda and new elections) for the triumph of the proletarian line. The party must concentrate all its efforts and all its attention on winning over the mass of workers and soldiers, and must draw a line between the policy of the proletariat and that of the petty bourgeoisie, between the internationalist policy and the defencist policy, between the revolutionary and the opportunist policy. The party must organise and arm the workers and build up their forces for the next stage of the revolution.

The Conference repeats that it is necessary to carry out many-sided activity within the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, to increase the number of Soviets, to consolidate their power, and to weld together our Party's proletarian internationalist groups within the Soviets.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

18

SPEECH ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION
APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

Beginning from 1903, when our Party adopted its programme, we have been encountering violent opposition on the part of the Polish comrades. If you study the Minutes of the Second Congress you will see that they were using the same arguments then that they are using now, and that the Polish Social-Democrats walked out from that Congress because they held that recognition of the right of nations to self-determination was unacceptable to them. Ever since then we have been coming up against the same question. Though imperialism already existed in 1903, the Polish Social-Democrats made no mention of it in their arguments. They are making the same strange and monstrous error now as they were then. These people want to put our Party's stand on a par with that of the chauvinists.

Owing to long oppression by Russia Poland's policy is a wholly nationalist one, and the whole Polish nation is obsessed with one idea—revenge on the Muscovites. No one has oppressed the Poles more than the Russian people, who served in the hands of the tsars as the executioner of Polish freedom. In no nation does hatred of Russia sit so deep as with the Poles; no nation dislikes Russia so intensely as the Poles. As a result we have a strange thing. Because of the Polish bourgeoisie, Poland has become an obstacle to the socialist movement. The whole world could go to the devil so long as Poland was free. Of course, this way of putting the question is a mockery of internationalism. Of course, Poland is now a victim of violence, but for the Polish nationalists to count on Russia liberating Poland—that would be treason to the International. The Polish nationalists have

so imbued the Polish people with their views that this is how the situation is regarded in Poland.

The Polish Social-Democratic comrades have rendered a great historic service by advancing the slogan of internationalism and declaring that the fraternal union of the proletariat of all countries is of supreme importance to them and that they will never go to war for the liberation of Poland. This is to their credit, and this is why we have always regarded only these Polish Social-Democrats as socialists. The others are patriots, Polish Plekhanovs. But this peculiar position, when, in order to safeguard socialism, people were forced to struggle against a rabid and morbid nationalism, has produced a strange state of affairs: comrades come to us saying that we must give up the idea of Poland's freedom, her right to secession.

Why should we Great Russians, who have been oppressing more nations than any other people, deny the right to secession for Poland, Ukraine, or Finland? We are asked to become chauvinists, because by doing so we would make the position of Social-Democrats in Poland less difficult. We do not pretend to seek to liberate Poland, because the Polish people live between two states that are capable of fighting. Instead of telling the Polish workers that only those Social-Democrats are real democrats who maintain that the Polish people ought to be free, since there is no place for chauvinists in a socialist party, the Polish Social-Democrats argue that, just because they find the union with Russian workers advantageous, they are opposed to Poland's secession. They have a perfect right to do so. But people don't want to understand that to strengthen internationalism you do not have to repeat the same words. What you have to do is to stress, in Russia, the freedom of secession for oppressed nations and, in Poland, their freedom to unite. Freedom to unite implies freedom to secede. We Russians must emphasise freedom to secede, while the Poles must emphasise freedom to unite.

We notice here a number of sophisms involving a complete renunciation of Marxism. Comrade Pyatakov's stand repeats that of Rosa Luxemburg....* (Holland is an example.)

* A gap in the Minutes.—*Ed.*

This is how Comrade Pyatakov reasons, and this is how he refutes himself, for in theory he denies freedom of secession, but to the people he says that anyone opposing freedom of secession is not a socialist. Comrade Pyatakov has been saying things here that are hopelessly muddled. In Western Europe most countries settled their national questions long ago. It is Western Europe that is referred to when it is said that the national question has been settled. Comrade Pyatakov, however, puts this where it does not belong—to Eastern Europe, and we find ourselves in a ridiculous position.

Just think of the dreadful mess that results Finland is right next door to us. Comrade Pyatakov has no definite answer for Finland and gets all mixed up. In yesterday's *Rabochaya Gazeta* you read that the movement for separation is growing in Finland. Finns arriving here tell us that separatism is growing there because the Cadets refuse to grant the country complete autonomy. A crisis is approaching there, dissatisfaction with Governor-General Rodichev is rife, but *Rabochaya Gazeta* writes that the Finns should wait for the Constituent Assembly, because an agreement will there be reached between Finland and Russia. What do they mean by agreement? The Finns must declare that they are entitled to decide their destiny in their own way, and any Great Russian who denies this right is a chauvinist. It would be another thing if we said to the Finnish worker: Decide what is best for yourself....*

Comrade Pyatakov simply rejects our slogan, saying that it means giving no slogan for the socialist revolution, but he himself gives no appropriate slogan. The method of socialist revolution under the slogan "Down with frontiers" is all muddled up. We have not succeeded in publishing the article in which I called this view "imperialist Economism".** What does the "method" of socialist revolution under the slogan "Down with frontiers" mean? We maintain that the state is necessary, and a state presupposes frontiers. The state, of course, may hold a bourgeois government, but we need the Soviets. But even Soviets are confronted with the question of frontiers. What does "Down with frontiers"

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* A gap in the Minutes.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 28-76.—*Ed.*

mean? It is the beginning of anarchy.... The "method" of socialist revolution under the slogan "Down with frontiers" is simply a mess. When the time is ripe for socialist revolution, when it finally occurs, it will spread to other countries. We shall help it along, but in what manner, we do not know. "The method of socialist revolution" is just a meaningless phrase. We stand for the settlement of problems which the bourgeois revolution has left unsolved. Our attitude to the separatist movement is indifferent, neutral. If Finland, Poland or Ukraine secede from Russia, there is nothing bad in that. What is wrong with it? Anyone who says that is a chauvinist. One must be mad to continue Tsar Nicholas's policy. Didn't Norway secede from Sweden? Alexander I and Napoleon once bartered nations, the tsars once traded Poland. Are we to continue this policy of the tsars? This is repudiation of the tactics of internationalism, this is chauvinism at its worst. What is wrong with Finland seceding? After the secession of Norway from Sweden mutual trust increased between the two peoples, between the proletariat of these countries. The Swedish landowners wanted to start a war, but the Swedish workers refused to be drawn into such a war.

All the Finns want now is autonomy. We are for Finland receiving complete freedom, because then there will be greater trust in Russian democracy and the Finns will not separate. While Mr. Rodichev goes to Finland to haggle over autonomy, our Finnish comrades come here and say, "We want autonomy." But what they get is a broadside, and the answer: "Wait for the Constituent Assembly." But we say: "Any Russian socialist who denies Finland freedom is a chauvinist."

We say that frontiers are determined by the will of the population. Russia, don't you dare fight over Kurland! Germany, get your armies out of Kurland! That is how we solve the secession problem. The proletariat cannot use force, because it must not prevent the peoples from obtaining their freedom. Only when the socialist revolution has become a reality, and not a method, will the slogan "Down with frontiers" be a correct slogan. Then we shall say: Comrades, come to us....

War is a different matter entirely. If need be, we shall not draw the line at a revolutionary war. We are not pacifists....

When we have Milyukov sitting here and sending Rodichev to Finland to shamefully haggle with the Finnish people, we say to the Russian people: Don't you dare coerce Finland; no nation can be free that oppresses other nations.[92] In the resolution concerning Borgbjerg we say: Withdraw your troops and let the nation settle the question itself. But, if the Soviet takes over power tomorrow, that will not be a "method of socialist revolution", and we shall then say: Germany, get your troops out of Poland, and Russia, get your troops out of Armenia. If we did otherwise we should be deceiving people.

Comrade Dzerzhinsky tells us that in his oppressed Poland everybody is a chauvinist. But not a single Pole has said a word about Finland or Ukraine. We have been arguing over this so much since 1903 that it is becoming difficult to talk about it. Do as you please.... Anyone who does not accept this point of view is an annexationist and a chauvinist. We are for a fraternal union of all nations. If there is a Ukrainian republic and a Russian republic, there will be closer contact and greater trust between the two. If the Ukrainians see that we have a Soviet republic, they will not secede, but if we have a Milyukov republic, they will. When Comrade Pyatakov said in self-contradiction that he is against the forcible retention of nations within the frontiers, he actually recognised the right of nations to self-determination. We certainly do not want the peasant in Khiva to live under the Khan of Khiva. By developing our revolution we shall influence the oppressed people. Propaganda among the oppressed mass must follow only this line.

Any Russian socialist who does not recognise Finland's and Ukraine's right to freedom will degenerate into a chauvinist. And no sophisms or references to his "method" will ever help him to justify himself.

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19

RESOLUTION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The policy of national oppression, inherited from the autocracy and monarchy; is maintained by the landowners, capitalists, and petty bourgeoisie in order to protect their class privileges and to cause disunity among the workers of the various nationalities. Modern imperialism, which increases the tendency to subjugate weaker nations, is a new factor intensifying national oppression.

The elimination of national oppression, if at all achievable in capitalist society, is possible only under a consistently democratic republican system and state administration that guarantee complete equality for all nations and languages.

The right of all the nations forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states must be recognised. To deny them this right, or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realisation, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure or annexation. Only the recognition by the proletariat of the right of nations to secede can ensure complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations and help to bring the nations closer together on truly democratic lines.

The conflict which has arisen at the present time between Finland and the Russian Provisional Government strikingly demonstrates that denial of the right to free secession leads to a direct continuation of the policy of tsarism.

The right of nations freely to secede must not be confused with the advisability of secession by a given nation at a given moment. The party of the proletariat must decide the latter question quite independently in each particular

case, having regard to the interests of social development as a whole and the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism.

The Party demands broad regional autonomy, the abolition of supervision from above, the abolition of a compulsory official language, and the fixing of the boundaries of the self-governing and autonomous regions in accordance with the economic and social conditions, the national composition of the population, and so forth, as assessed by the local population itself.

The party of the proletariat emphatically rejects what is known as "national cultural autonomy", under which education, etc., is removed from the control of the state and put in the control of some kind of national diets. National cultural autonomy artificially divides the workers living in one locality, and even working in the same industrial enterprise, according to their various "national cultures"; in other words, it strengthens the ties between the workers and the bourgeois culture of their nations, whereas the aim of the Social-Democrats is to develop the international culture of the world proletariat.

The party demands that a fundamental law be embodied in the constitution annulling all privileges enjoyed by any one nation and all infringements of the rights of national minorities.

The interests of the working class demand that the workers of all nationalities in Russia should have common proletarian organisations: political, trade union, co-operative educational institutions, and so forth. Only the merging of the workers of the various nationalities into such common organisations will make it possible for the proletariat to wage a successful struggle against international Capital and bourgeois nationalism.

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SPEECH ON THE SITUATION WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE TASKS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

Comrade Zinoviev admitted that our visit to Stockholm would be the last one, and that we would only be there for the purpose of information.[93]

When Grimm invited us to the conference, I refused to go, because I realised that it would be useless to talk to people who stood for social-chauvinism. We say: "No participation with social-chauvinists." We come and address ourselves to the Zimmerwald Left. Grimm had a moral and formal right to draw up today's resolution. His right was based on Kautsky in Germany, on Longuet in France. This is how the matter stands officially: Grimm has announced, "We will disband our bureau, as soon as Huysmans organises a bureau." When we said that such a solution was not acceptable to Zimmerwald, he agreed, but said "this is the opinion of the majority"—and that was true.

As to our visit. "We shall get information, we shall get in touch with the Zimmerwald Left," it is claimed. There is very little hope of our winning over anybody else. Let us have no illusions; first, the visit will not take place; second, if it does, it will be our last; third, we cannot, for technical reasons, win over the elements that wish to break with the social-chauvinists. But let Comrade Nogin make the first and Comrade Zinoviev the last visit to Stockholm. As for me, I express the very legitimate wish that this "last-visit" attempt should be made as quickly and successfully as possible.

A brief report published May 15 (2), 1917 in *Pravda* No. 46

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SPEECH IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

In the resolution on the current situation it would be wrong to speak only of Russian conditions. The war has bound us together so inseparably that it would be a great mistake on our part to ignore the sum total of international relations.

The main question dealt with in the resolution is this: what tasks will confront the Russian proletariat in the event of the world movement raising the issue of a social revolution?

"The objective conditions for a socialist revolution, which undoubtedly existed even before the war in the more developed and advanced countries, have been ripening with tremendous rapidity as a result of the war. Small and middle enterprises are being squeezed out and ruined at a faster rate than ever. The concentration and internationalisation of capital are making gigantic strides; monopoly capitalism is developing into state monopoly capitalism. In a number of countries regulation of production and distribution by society is being introduced by force of circumstances. Some countries are introducing universal labour conscription."

Before the war we had the monopoly of trusts and syndicates; since the war we have had a state monopoly. Universal labour conscription is something new, something that constitutes part of a socialist whole—this is often overlooked by those who fear to examine the concrete situation.

The first part of the resolution concentrates on an analysis of the conditions of capitalist economy throughout the world. It is noteworthy that twenty-seven years ago Engels

pointed out that to describe capitalism as something that "is distinguished by its planlessness" and to overlook the role played by the trusts was unsatisfactory. Engels remarked that "when we come to the trust, then planlessness disappears", though there is capitalism. This remark is all the more pertinent today, when we have a military state, when we have state monopoly capitalism. Planning does not make the worker less of a slave, but it enables the capitalist to make his profits "according to plan". Capitalism is now evolving directly into its higher, regulated, form.

The second part of the resolution needs no explanations.

The third part requires more detailed comment. (*Reads the resolution.*)

"Operating as it does in one of the most backward countries of Europe amidst a vast population of small peasants, the proletariat of Russia cannot aim at immediately putting into effect socialist changes.

"But it would be a grave error, and in effect even a complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to infer from this that the working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that it must keep its activities within limits acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie, or that the proletariat must renounce its leading role in the matter of explaining to the people the urgency of taking a number of practical steps towards socialism for which the time is now ripe."

From the first premise it is customary to make the conclusion that "Russia is a backward country, a peasant, petty-bourgeois country, therefore there can be no question of a social revolution". People forget, however, that the war has placed us in extraordinary circumstances, and that side by side with the petty bourgeoisie we have Big Capital. But what are the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to do when they assume power? Should they go over to the bourgeoisie? Our answer is—the working class will continue its class struggle.

What is possible and what is necessary under the power of the Soviets?

First of all, the nationalisation of the land. Nationalisation of the land is a bourgeois measure, it does not exclude capitalism, nor does capitalism exclude it, but the blow it

will deal to private property will be a heavy one. Further (*reads on*):

"the establishment of state control over all banks, and their amalgamation into a single central bank; also control over the insurance agencies and big capitalist syndicates (for example, the Sugar Syndicate, the Coal Syndicate, the Metal Syndicate, etc.), and the gradual introduction of a more just progressive tax on incomes and properties. Economically, these measures are timely; technically, they can be carried out immediately; politically they are *likely* to receive the support of the overwhelming majority of the peasants, who have everything to gain by these reforms."

This point evoked discussion. I already had occasion to speak of this in *Pravda* in connection with Plekhanov's articles. "When they talk about socialism being impossible," I wrote, "they try to speak of the latter in a way most advantageous to themselves, they represent it vaguely, indefinitely, as some sort of a jump." Kautsky himself wrote: "No socialist speaks of the abolition of private property in the case of the peasants." But does that mean that existing large-scale capital must make it unnecessary for the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to control production, to control the sugar and other syndicates? This measure is not socialism—it is a transitional measure, but the carrying out of such measures together with the existence of the Soviets will bring about a situation in which Russia will have one foot in socialism—we say one foot because the peasant majority controls the other part of the country's economy. It cannot be denied that economically we are ripe for a change. To effect that change politically, we must have a majority, and the majority are peasants who are naturally interested in such changes. Whether they will prove sufficiently organised is another matter; we cannot speak for them.

An old and oft-repeated objection to socialism is that socialism means "barracks for the masses" and "mass bureaucracy". We must now put the issue of socialism differently; we must raise it from the level of the abstract to the level of the concrete, namely, the nationalisation of the land, control over the syndicates, etc. (*reads the resolution*).

"All these and other similar measures can and should be not only discussed and prepared for enforcement on a

national scale in the event of all power passing to the proletarians and semi-proletarians, but also implemented by the local revolutionary organs of power of the whole people when the opportunity arises.

"Great care and discretion should be exercised in carrying out the above measures; a solid majority of the population must be won over and this majority must be clearly convinced of the country's practical preparedness for any particular measure. This is the direction in which the class-conscious vanguard of the workers must focus its attention and efforts, because it is the bounden duty of these workers to help the peasants find a way out of the present debacle."

These last words are the crux of the whole resolution; we put the issue of socialism not as a jump, but as a practical way out of the present debacle.

"This is a bourgeois revolution, it is therefore useless to speak of socialism," say our opponents. But we say just the opposite: "Since the bourgeoisie cannot find a way out of the present situation, the revolution is bound to go on." We must not confine ourselves to democratic phrases; we must make the situation clear to the masses, and indicate a number of practical measures to them, namely, they must take over the syndicates—control them through the Soviets, etc. When all such measures are carried out, Russia will be standing with one foot in socialism. Our economic programme must show a way out of the debacle—this is what should guide our actions.

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RESOLUTION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

The world war, brought about by the struggle of world trusts and banking capital for domination over the world market, has already led to the mass destruction of material values, to exhaustion of productive forces, and to such a growth in the war industry that it is impossible to produce even the absolutely necessary minimum of consumer goods and means of production.

The present war, therefore, has brought humanity to an impasse and placed it on the brink of ruin.

The objective conditions for a socialist revolution, which undoubtedly existed even before the war in the more developed and advanced countries, have been ripening with tremendous rapidity as a result of the war. Small and middle enterprises are being squeezed out and ruined at a faster rate than ever. The concentration and internationalisation of capital are making gigantic strides; monopoly capitalism is developing into state monopoly capitalism. In a number of countries regulation of production and distribution by society is being introduced by force of circumstances. Some countries are introducing universal labour conscription.

Under private ownership of the means of production, all these steps towards greater monopolisation and control of production by the state are inevitably accompanied by intensified exploitation of the working people, by an increase in oppression; it becomes more difficult to resist the exploiters, and reaction and military despotism grow. At the same time these steps inevitably lead to a tremendous growth in the profits of the big capitalists at the expense of all other sections of the population. The working people for decades to come are forced to pay tribute to the capitalists in the form of

interest payments on war loans running into thousands of millions. But with private ownership of the means of production abolished and state power passing completely to the proletariat, these very conditions are a pledge of success for society's transformation that will do away with the exploitation of man by man and ensure the well-being of everyone.

* * *

On the other hand, the course of events is clearly confirming the forecast of the socialists of the whole world who, precisely in connection with the imperialist war, then impending and now raging unanimously declared in the 1912 Basle Manifesto that a *proletarian revolution* was inevitable.

The Russian revolution is only the first stage of the first of the proletarian revolutions which are the inevitable result of war.

In all countries a spirit of rebellion against the capitalist class is growing among the masses, and the proletariat is becoming aware that only the transfer of power to the proletariat and the abolition of private ownership of the means of production can save humanity from ruin.

In all countries, especially in the most advanced, Britain and Germany, hundreds of socialists who have not gone over to the side of "their own" national bourgeoisie have been thrown into prison by the capitalist governments. By this action the latter have clearly demonstrated their fear of the mounting proletarian revolution. In Germany the impending revolution is apparent both in the mass strikes, which have assumed particularly large proportions in recent weeks, and in the growth of fraternisation between the German and Russian soldiers at the front.

Fraternal trust and unity are gradually being restored among the workers of different countries, the very workers who are now killing each other in the interests of the capitalists. This, in turn, will create conditions for united revolutionary action by the workers of different countries. Only such action can guarantee the most systematic development and the most likely success of the world socialist revolution.

* * *

Operating as it does in one of the most backward countries of Europe amidst a vast population of small peasants, the proletariat of Russia cannot aim at immediately putting into effect socialist changes.

But it would be a grave error, and in effect even a complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to infer from this that the working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that it must keep its activities within limits acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie, or that the proletariat must renounce its leading role in the matter of explaining to the people the urgency of taking a number of practical steps towards socialism for which the time is now ripe.

These steps are: first, nationalisation of the land. This measure, which does not directly go beyond the framework of the bourgeois system, would, at the same time, be a heavy blow at private ownership of the means of production, and as such would strengthen the influence of the socialist proletariat over the semi-proletariat in the countryside.

The next steps are the establishment of state control over all banks, and their amalgamation into a single central bank; also control over the insurance agencies and big capitalist syndicates (for example, the Sugar Syndicate, the Coal Syndicate, the Metal Syndicate, etc.), and the gradual introduction of a more just progressive tax on incomes and properties. Economically, these measures are timely; technically, they can be carried out immediately; politically they are *likely* to receive the support of the overwhelming majority of the peasants, who have everything to gain by these reforms.

The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies, which now cover Russia with a dense and growing network, could also introduce, parallel with the above measures, universal labour conscription, for on the one hand the character of the Soviets guarantees that all these new reforms will be introduced only when an overwhelming majority of the people has clearly and firmly realised the practical need for them; on the other hand their character guarantees that the reforms will not be sponsored by the police and officials, but will be carried out by way of voluntary participation of the organised and armed masses of the proletariat and peasantry in the management of their own affairs.

All these and other similar measures can and should be not only discussed and prepared for enforcement on a national scale in the event of all power passing to the proletarians and semi-proletarians, but also implemented by the local revolutionary organs of power of the whole people when the opportunity arises.

Great care and discretion should be exercised in carrying out the above measures; a solid majority of the population must be won over and this majority must be clearly convinced of the country's practical preparedness for any particular measure. This is the direction in which the class-conscious vanguard of the workers must focus its attention and efforts, because it is the bounden duty of these workers to help the peasants find a way out of the present debacle.

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INCLUDING SPEECH AT THE CLOSING OF THE CONFERENCE APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

Owing to lack of time Lenin made no speech in favour of changing the name of the Party, but referred the delegates to his newly written pamphlet *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution*,* which will serve as material for discussion in the local Party organisations.

A word about the Conference.

We have had little time and a lot of work. The conditions in which our Party finds itself are difficult. The defencist parties are strong, but the proletarian masses look with disfavour upon defencism and the imperialist war. Our resolutions are not written with a view to the broad masses, but they will serve to unify the activities of our agitators and propagandists, and the reader will find in them guidance in his work. We have to speak to the millions; we must draw fresh forces from among the masses, we must call for more developed class-conscious workers who would popularise our theses in a way the masses would understand. We shall endeavour in our pamphlets to present our resolutions in a more popular form, and hope that our comrades will do the same thing locally. The proletariat will find in our resolutions material to guide it in its movement towards the second stage of our revolution.

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* See pp. 84-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*

INTRODUCTION TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SEVENTH (APRIL) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

Workers, comrades!

The All-Russia Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, united by its Central Committee and known simply as the Bolshevik Party, is over

The Conference has adopted very important resolutions on all the fundamental issues of the revolution and the full text of them is published below.

The revolution is passing through a crisis. This could be seen in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow between April 19 and April 21. This has been admitted by the Provisional Government. It has been admitted by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Still further confirmation of it has been given, as I pen these lines, by the resignation of Guchkov.

This crisis of state power, this crisis of the revolution, is no accident. The Provisional Government is a government of landowners and capitalists who are tied up with Russian and Anglo-French capital and compelled to continue the imperialist war. But the soldiers are worn out by the war, they are becoming more and more aware that the war is being fought in the interests of the capitalists; the soldiers do not want war. Furthermore, the grim spectre of an appalling debacle, of famine and complete economic ruin is advancing upon Russia and other countries.

The Petrograd Soviet has also got into a blind alley by entering into an agreement with the Provisional Government, by supporting it, by supporting the loan, and, consequently, supporting the war. The Soviet is responsible for the Provisional Government, and, seeing no way out of the situation, has also got itself into a muddle through this agreement with the capitalist government.

At this great historic moment, when the future of the revolution is at stake, when the capitalists are torn between despair and the thought of shooting down workers, our Party appeals to the people, saying in its Conference resolutions:

We must understand which *classes* are the motive force of the revolution. Their various aspirations must be soberly assessed. The capitalist cannot travel the same road as the worker. Petty proprietors can neither fully trust the capitalists nor all immediately agree on a close fraternal alliance with the workers. Only when we understand the difference between these classes shall we be able to find the correct road for the revolution.

The decisions of our Conference on all the basic issues of the people's life draw a clear line between the interests of the different classes and show that it is absolutely impossible to find a way out of the deadlock unless the policy of trust in and support of the capitalist government is abandoned.

The situation is one of unparalleled difficulty. There is one way out and only one—the transfer of all state power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies throughout Russia, from the bottom up. Only if state power passes to the working class supported by most of the peasantry, will it be possible to count on speedily regaining the confidence of the workers of other countries, to count on a mighty European revolution that will throw off the yoke of Capital and put an end to the criminal bloodshed in which the peoples are embroiled. Only if the power passes to the working class supported by most of the peasants shall we be able to cherish the firm hope that the working people will show complete confidence in that power and all, without exception, work selflessly to bring about a transformation of the entire way of life of the people in the

interests of those who labour and not in the interests of the capitalists and landowners. Without such selfless work, without a gigantic effort on the part of each and every individual, without firmness and the determination to rebuild life in a new way, without the strict organisation and comradely discipline of all workers and all poor peasants—*without all this there is no way out.*

The war has brought all mankind to the brink of destruction. The capitalists have become deeply involved in the war and are unable to extricate themselves. The whole world faces disaster.

Workers, comrades! The time is drawing near when events will demand new and still greater heroism—the heroism of millions and tens of millions—than you displayed in the glorious days of the revolution of February and March. Prepare yourselves.

Prepare yourselves and remember that if, together with the capitalists, you were able to achieve victory in a few days by a simple outburst of popular wrath, you will need more than that for victory against the capitalists, for victory over the capitalists. To achieve such a victory, to have the workers and poor peasants take the power, keep that power and make proper use of it, you will need organisation, organisation, and organisation.

Our Party is helping you as much as it can, primarily by bringing home to you the different positions of the different classes and their different strength. The decisions of our Conference are devoted to this, and unless you realise this clearly, organisation does not mean anything. And without organisation action by the millions is impossible, success is impossible.

Don't put your trust in words. Don't be misled by promises. Don't overestimate your strength. Organise at every factory, in every regiment and every company, in every residential block. Work at your organising every day, every hour; do that work yourselves, for this is something you cannot entrust to anybody else. Work to steadily, soundly and indestructibly build up full confidence in the advanced workers on the part of the masses. Such is the main content of all the decisions of our Conference. Such is the main lesson taught by the entire

development of the revolution. Such is the one guarantee of success.

Workers, comrades! We call upon you to carry out the hard, serious, untiring work of consolidating the class-conscious, revolutionary proletariat of all countries. This is the one and only way out, the only way to save mankind from the horrors of war and the yoke of Capital.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FRATERNISATION

The capitalists either sneer at the fraternisation of the soldiers at the front or savagely attack it. By lies and slander they try to make out that the whole thing is "deception" of the Russians by the Germans, and threaten—through *their* generals and officers—punishment for fraternisation.

From the point of view of safeguarding the "sacred right of property" in capital and the profits on capital, such policy of the capitalists is quite correct. Indeed, if the proletarian socialist revolution is to be *suppressed* at its inception it is *essential* that fraternisation be regarded the way the capitalists regard it.

The class-conscious workers, followed by the mass of semi-proletarians and poor peasants guided by the true instinct of oppressed classes, regard fraternisation with profound sympathy. Clearly, fraternisation is a path to peace. Clearly, this path does not run through the capitalist governments, through an alliance with them, but runs *against* them. Clearly, this path tends to develop, strengthen, and consolidate fraternal confidence between the workers of different countries. Clearly, this path is *beginning to wreck* the hateful discipline of the barrack prisons, the discipline of blind obedience of the soldier to "his" officers and generals, to his capitalists (for most of the officers and generals either belong to the capitalist class or protect its interests). Clearly, fraternisation is the revolutionary initiative of the masses, it is the awakening of the conscience, the mind, the courage of the oppressed classes; in other words, it is a rung in the ladder leading up to the socialist proletarian revolution.

Long live fraternisation! Long live the *rising* world-wide socialist revolution of the proletariat!

In order that fraternisation achieve the goal we set it more easily, surely and rapidly, we must see to it that it is well organised and has a clear political programme.

However much the enraged press of the capitalists and their friends may slander us, calling us anarchists, we shall never tire of repeating: we are not anarchists, we are ardent advocates of the best possible organisation of the masses and the firmest "state" power—only the state we want is not a bourgeois parliamentary republic, but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies.

We have always recommended that fraternisation be conducted in the most organised manner, taking care—with the help of the intelligence, experience and observation of the soldiers themselves—that there should be no catch in it, and that the officers and generals, who for the most part spread vicious slander against fraternisation, be kept away from the meetings.

Our aim is not to have fraternisation confine itself to talk about peace in general, but pass on to a discussion of a *clear* political programme, to a discussion of *how* to end the war, *how* to throw off the yoke of the capitalists, who started this war and are now dragging it out.

Our Party has therefore issued an appeal to the soldiers of all the belligerent countries (for the text of which see *Pravda* No. 37),* which gives a definite and precise answer to these questions and a clear political programme.

It is a good thing that the soldiers are cursing the war. It is a good thing that they are demanding peace. It is a good thing that they are beginning to realise that the war is advantageous to the capitalists. It is a good thing that they are wrecking the harsh discipline and beginning to fraternise on all the fronts. All this is good.

But it is not enough

The soldiers must now pass to a form of fraternisation in which a clear political programme is discussed. We are not anarchists. We do not think that the war can be ended by a simple "refusal", a refusal of individuals, groups or casual "crowds". We are for the war being ended, as it will be, by a *revolution* in a number of countries, i.e., by the conquest

* See pp. 186-88 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of *state* power by a new class, not the capitalists, not the small proprietors (who are always half-dependent on the capitalists), but by the proletarians and semi-proletarians.

And so, in our appeal to the soldiers of all the belligerent countries we have set forth our programme for a workers' revolution in all countries, namely, the transfer of all state power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Comrades, soldiers, discuss this programme among yourselves and with the German soldiers! Such a discussion will help you to find the true path, the most organised and shortest path, to end the war and overthrow the yoke of Capital.

* * *

A word about one of the servants of Capital, Plekhanov. It is pitiful to see how low this former socialist has sunk! He compares fraternisation to "treachery"! His argument is: will not fraternisation, if it succeeds, lead to a separate peace?

No, Mr. ex-socialist, fraternisation, which we have supported on *all* the fronts, will not lead to a "separate" peace between the capitalists of several countries, but to a universal peace between the revolutionary workers of all countries, *despite* the capitalists of all countries, *against* the capitalists, and for the overthrow of their yoke.

Pravda No. 43,
May 11 (April 28), 1917

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WHAT THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STEPS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT LEAD TO

We have received the following telegram:

"*Yeniseisk*. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has taken cognisance of Minister Lvov's telegram to the appointed Commissar of Yeniseisk Gubernia, Krutovsky, sent to Yeniseisk for guidance.

"We protest against the intention to reintroduce a bureaucracy. We declare, first, that we will not stand for being ruled by appointed officials. Second, there can be no return for officials who have been driven out by the peasants. Third, we recognise only such local bodies as have been set up in Yeniseisk Uyezd by the people themselves. Fourth, appointed officials can rule here only over our dead bodies.

"Yeniseisk Soviet of Deputies."

And so the Provisional Government appoints "commissars" from Petrograd to "direct" the activities of the Yeniseisk Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, or the Yeniseisk organ of self-government. What is more, this appointment is made in such a form as to evoke the protest of the Yeniseisk Soviet against "the intention to reintroduce a bureaucracy".

Moreover, the Yeniseisk Soviet declares that "appointed officials can rule here only over our dead bodies". The behaviour of the Provisional Government has brought this remote uyezd in Siberia, as represented by its popularly elected governing body, to a point when a direct threat of *armed resistance* is made against the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government bosses have certainly asked for it!

Yet they will go on thundering denunciations against those mischievous people who "preach" "civil war"!

What was the idea of appointing "commissars" from Petrograd or from any other centre to "direct" the activities of the *elected* local body? Are we to believe that a man from

outside is more familiar with local needs, more capable of "directing" the local population? What cause did the people of Yeniseisk give for such an absurd measure? Even *if* the people of Yeniseisk did run counter to the decisions of a majority of citizens in other localities, would it not have been better to try, for a start, to obtain *some information* instead of giving occasion for talk about "bureaucracy", and provoking legitimate dissatisfaction and resentment on the part of the local population?

To all these questions there can be only one answer. The representatives of the landowners and capitalists sitting in the Provisional Government are determined to *preserve* the old tsarist *machinery* of government: officials "appointed" from above. That is what all bourgeois parliamentary republics in the world have nearly always been doing, except for brief periods of revolution in some countries. That is what was done to prepare the ground for the return *from* a republic to a monarchy, for a return to the Napoleons, to the military dictators. And that is what the Cadets are bent on doing when they copy those unhappy examples,

This is a very serious matter. We should not deceive ourselves. By such measures the Provisional Government, whether it means to or not, is *preparing the ground* for a restoration of the monarchy in Russia.

The entire responsibility for any possible—and to a certain extent inevitable—attempt to restore the monarchy in Russia rests with the Provisional Government, which is undertaking such counter-revolutionary measures. Officials "appointed" from above to "direct" the local population have always been a sure step towards the restoration of the monarchy, in the same way as the standing army and the police.

The Yeniseisk Soviet is a thousand times right, both practically and in principle. The return of local officials who have been driven out by the peasants should not be allowed. The introduction of "appointed" officials should not be tolerated. Only such bodies in the local areas should be recognised as have been set up by the people themselves.

The idea of "direction" by officials "appointed" from above is essentially false and undemocratic, it is Caesarism, Blanquist *adventurism*. Engels was quite right when, in criticis-

ing in 1891 the draft programme of the German Social-Democrats who were badly infected with bureaucratism, he pressed the demand for no supervision from above over local self-government. Engels was right when he quoted the experience of France, which, governed between 1792 and 1798 by local elective bodies without any supervision from above, did not "fall apart", did not "disintegrate", but, on the contrary, gained strength, became democratically consolidated and organised.[94]

Foolish bureaucratic prejudices, tsarist red-tapism, reactionary professorial ideas as to the indispensability of bureaucratism, the counter-revolutionary tendencies and attempts of the landowners and capitalists—this is the soil which nourishes such measures of the Provisional Government as we have been discussing.

The healthy democratic feeling of the workers and peasants, roused by the insulting attempt of the Provisional Government to "appoint" officials from above to "direct" the activities of the adult local population, the overwhelming majority, who had elected their own representatives—this is what the Yeniseisk Soviet has revealed.

What the people need is a really democratic, workers' and peasants' republic, whose authorities have been elected by the people and are displaceable by the people any time they may wish it. And it is for *such* a republic that the workers and peasants should fight, resisting all attempts of the Provisional Government to restore the monarchist, tsarist methods and machinery of government.

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SOCIAL-CHAUVINISTS AND INTERNATIONALISTS

By betraying socialism and going over to the side of "their own" capitalists, the social-chauvinists have naturally split up in conformity with the capitalist groupings in the war. The split itself just as naturally, is a temporary one. Plekhanov refuses to confer with Scheidemann, but that does not prevent him from defending the "International" of the social-chauvinists, which has betrayed socialism. In other words, Plekhanov is for a split with the Scheidemanns *during the time* the capitalists, whose agents they both are, are split up among themselves. Plekhanov is for unity with the Scheidemanns when the "masters" (i.e., the capitalists of both countries) are reconciled. There is no denying a certain consistency in Plekhanov's position—the consistency of *betrayal* of socialism, the consistency of willing and faithful service to the capitalists.

No wonder the representatives of the international socialist "Centre" (Kautsky and others), being as they are in favour of "unity" with the social-chauvinists in general, agree to the conference organised by that agent of Scheidemann—Borgbjerg, or themselves organise (like the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet) an international "socialist" conference *together with* the Scheidemanns and Plekhanovs. No wonder our Russian representatives of the "Centre", through their mouthpiece *Rabochaya Gazeta*, are so angered at our Party's refusal to attend Borgbjerg's conference.

Yesterday evening we received a telegram from our Stockholm correspondent:

"*Haase*, *Longuet attending conference*. '*Spartacus*' *refused*."

The name "Spartacus" or "Internationale" is used in Germany for the group to which Karl Liebknecht belongs.

There has been a great hullabaloo lately, raised by people who are particularly interested in upsetting the apple-cart, about the Liebknecht group having supposedly united with the Kautskyites in a new Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany.[95] As a matter of fact, the Liebknecht group is only affiliated to the Kautskyites as an independent organisation and merely entered into a temporary and qualified bloc against the social-chauvinists.

The telegram quoted above is one more confirmation of this fact. When things came to a practical point and a clear and definite answer had to be given immediately on the question of making common cause with Scheidemann and his agents, the alliance between Liebknecht's group and the Kautsky group *crumbled at once*.

Some comrades feared that our resolution concerning Borgbjerg would "isolate" us.

No, comrades! It isolates us from the *waverers*. There is only one way of helping waverers; and that is by ceasing to be a waverer yourself.

The correctness of our resolution against Borgbjerg has been strikingly, fully and speedily confirmed by events. The Kautskyites of Germany (Haase) and Franco (Longuet) are still wavering. They have agreed to confer with the social-chauvinists and cannot make up their minds to dissociate themselves from them.

In taking upon itself the initiative in bringing about such a cleavage, our Party *has already started* to rally the elements of a Third International. The fact that our tactics coincide with those of the Liebknecht group is no accident. It is a step towards the inchoate Third International.

Pravda No. 44,
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I. G. TSERETELI AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE

All the papers have published, in full or in part, the speech which I. G. Tsereteli delivered on April 27 at the ceremonial session of the deputies of all the Dumas, past and present.

It was quite a ministerial speech. The speech of a minister without a portfolio. Still, we think there is no harm, even when ministers without portfolios make ministerial speeches, in sparing a thought for socialism, Marxism and the class struggle. To each his own. It behooves the bourgeoisie to shun all talk about the class struggle, to avoid analysing it, studying it, and making it a basis for determining policies. It behooves the bourgeoisie to dismiss these "disagreeable" and "tactless" subjects—as they say in parlours—and to sing the praises of "unity" of "all friends of freedom". It behooves the proletarian party not to forget the class struggle.

To each his own.

Two basic political ideas underlie I. G. Tsereteli's speech. First, that a line can and should be drawn between two "sections" of the bourgeoisie. One section "has come to an agreement with the democrats"; the position of this bourgeoisie is "secure". The other consists of "irresponsible elements of the bourgeoisie who are provoking civil war", or, as Tsereteli describes them, "many people from among the moderate elements of the property-owners".

The speaker's second political idea is this: "Any attempt right now to proclaim [!?] the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" would be a "desperate" attempt, and he, Tsereteli, would agree to such a desperate attempt only if he could believe for one minute that Shulgin's ideas were really "shared by all the property-owning bourgeoisie".

Let us examine these two political ideas of I. G. Tsereteli, who, as befits a minister without a portfolio or a candidate

for the ministry, has taken a middle-of-the-road stand—neither for reaction nor for revolution, neither with Shulgin nor with the adherents of "desperate attempts".

What class distinctions between the two indicated sections of the bourgeoisie did Tsereteli make? None at all. It did not even occur to Tsereteli that there would be no harm in shaping policies on the basis of the class struggle. Both "sections" of the bourgeoisie, in class substance, are landowners and capitalists. Tsereteli did not mention a word about Shulgin *not* representing the same classes or sub-classes as Guchkov represents—the latter a member of the Provisional Government and an important one at that. Tsereteli singles out the ideas of Shulgin from those of the "entire" property-owning bourgeoisie, but gives *no* reasons for doing so. Nor could he give any. Shulgin stands for the undivided power of the Provisional Government; he is against supervision of that government by the armed soldiers; he is against "anti-British propaganda", against the soldiers being "set on" the "officer class", against the propaganda of Petrogradskaya Storona,[96] etc. These ideas are to be found every day in the columns of *Rech*, in the speeches and manifestos of the ministers with portfolios, etc.

The only difference is that Shulgin speaks more "glibly", while the Provisional Government, being a government, *speaks* more discreetly; Shulgin speaks in a deep voice, Milyukov in a falsetto. Milyukov is for an agreement with the Soviet, and Shulgin, too, has *nothing against* such an agreement. Both Shulgin and Milyukov are for "other methods of control" (not control by armed soldiers).

Tsereteli has thrown overboard all ideas of the class struggle. He has made *no* mention of class distinctions or any serious political distinctions between "the two sections" of the bourgeoisie, nor did he think of mentioning them.

By "democrats", referred to in his speech, Tsereteli meant "the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry". Let us examine this class definition. The bourgeoisie has entered into an agreement with these democrats. One is entitled to ask, what forms the *basis* of this agreement, by what *class* interests is it upheld?

Not a word about this in Tsereteli's speech. All he speaks about is a "common democratic platform which has now

proved acceptable to the whole country", i.e., evidently to the proletarians and the peasants, since the "country" is really the workers and peasants minus the property-owners.

Does this platform exclude, say, the question of the land? It does not. The platform side-steps it. Do class interests and their conflicts disappear by being side-stepped in diplomatic documents, deeds of "agreement", and the speeches and statements of ministers?

Tsereteli "forgot" to raise this question, forgot a 'trivial detail"—he "merely" forgot the class interests and the class struggle....

All the problems of the Russian revolution," expatiates I. G. Tsereteli, "the very crux of it [!?] depend on whether the propertied classes [i.e., the landowners and capitalists] will understand that this is a national platform and not a specially proletarian platform."

Poor landowners and capitalists! They are so slow-witted. They "do not understand". They need a special minister of the democracy to teach them what's what.

Maybe this spokesman of the "democrats" has forgotten the class struggle, has adopted the stand of Louis Blanc, and is dismissing the conflict of class interests with mere phrases?

Is it Shulgin and Guchkov with Milyukov who "do not understand" that the peasant *can* be reconciled with the landowner on a platform that side-steps the land question? Or is it I. G. Tsereteli who "does not understand" that this *cannot* be done?

The workers and peasants must confine themselves to what is "acceptable" to the landowners and capitalists—that is the real gist (the class, not the verbal, gist) of the Shulgin-Milyukov-Plekhanov position. And they "understand" it better than Tsereteli does.

This brings us to Tsereteli's second political idea—that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (a dictatorship, by the way, is won, not "proclaimed") would be a desperate attempt. In the first place, to speak so simply of this dictatorship nowadays is likely to land Tsereteli in the archives of the "old Bolsheviks"* Secondly, and most

* See my "Letters on Tactics". (See pp. 45-46 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

important of all, the workers and peasants constitute the vast majority of the population. And does not "democracy," mean carrying out the will of the majority?

How then can one be a democrat, and yet be *opposed* to the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry"? How can one fear "civil war" from it? (What kind of civil war? That of a handful of landowners and capitalists *against* the workers and peasants? That of an insignificant minority against an overwhelming majority?)

I. G. Tsereteli is hopelessly muddled. He has even forgotten that if Lvov and Co. carry out their promise to convene the Constituent Assembly, the latter would become a "dictatorship" of the majority. Or must the workers and peasants, even in the Constituent Assembly, confine themselves to what is "acceptable" to the landowners and the capitalists?

The workers and peasants are the vast majority. All power to this majority is, if you please, a "desperate attempt"....

Tsereteli is in a muddle because he has completely overlooked the class struggle. He has abandoned the standpoint of Marxism for that of Louis Blanc, who talked himself out of the class struggle

The task of a proletarian leader is to clarify the difference in class interests and persuade certain sections of the petty bourgeoisie (namely, the poor peasants) to choose between the workers and the capitalists, to take sides with the workers.

The task of petty-bourgeois Louis Blancs is to play down the difference in class interests and persuade certain sections of the bourgeoisie (mainly the intellectuals and parliamentarians) to "agree with the workers, to persuade the workers to "agree" with the capitalists, and the peasants to "agree" with the landowners.

Louis Blanc tried hard to persuade the Paris bourgeoisie, and, as we know, all but persuaded it to refrain from the mass shootings of 1848 and 1871.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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ANXIETY

In connection with the report that several ex-ministers had accepted directorships of big banks, *Pravda* asked:

"In how many banks do the present ministers, Guchkov, Tereshchenko, and Konovalov—have an interest (in the capacity of directors, shareholders, or actual owners)?"

And added:

"Our comrades, the bank employees (who, by the way, should organise a union of their own as soon as possible), would do well to gather material on this subject and publish it in the labour press."*

Alarmed by this, *Birzheviye Vedomosti*, a paper which, as we know, savours strongly of banks, writes:

> "The 'comrades employees' are asked to organise a detective service, to rummage about in the tills of the bourgeois ministers for the purpose of checking the cash in them. With the same effrontery the Bolsheviks are rummaging about in other people's convictions. May we not soon see *Pravda* advising the comrades to set up a secret police department of their own. Room for it will be found in the Kshesinskaya mansion...."

Why are the gentlemen from *Birzheviye Vedomosti* so perturbed?

What has "detective service" got to do with it, gentlemen?

We have nothing whatever against the bank employees publishing lists of bank bosses of *all parties*. Why,

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* See p. 122 of this volume.—*Ed.*

gentlemen, shouldn't the people have a right to know who are the chief owners of such institutions as the banks—those powerful institutions on which the country's whole economic life depends, and which have such a say in deciding the issues of war and peace?

What are you afraid of, gentlemen?

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THE "CRISIS OF POWER"

The whole of Russia remembers the days of April 19-21, when civil war was about to break out in the streets of Petrograd.

On April 21 the Provisional Government penned a new reassuring missive[97] purporting to "explain" its predatory Note of the 18th.

After this the majority of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies decided to consider the "incident settled".

Another couple of days passed, and the question of a coalition cabinet cropped up. The Executive Committee was almost equally divided: 23 against a coalition cabinet, 22 for it. The incident had been "settled" only on paper.

Two more days passed, and we now have another "incident". War Minister Guchkov, one of the leaders of the Provisional Government, has resigned. There is talk of the whole Provisional Government having decided to resign. (At the time of writing, we still do not know for certain whether the government has resigned.) A new "incident" has occurred, one that throws all previous "incidents" into the shade.

Whence this spate of "incidents"? Is there no root cause which inevitably engenders "incident" upon "incident"?

There *is* such a cause. It is what we know as the dual power, that state of unstable equilibrium resulting from the agreement between the Soviet and the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government is a government of the capitalists. It cannot give up its dreams of conquests (annexations), it cannot end the predatory war by a democratic peace, it cannot but protect the profits of its own class (the capital-

ist class), it cannot but protect the estates of the landowners.

The Soviet represents other classes. Most of the workers and soldiers in the Soviet do not want this predatory war, they are not interested in the profits of the capitalists or in preserving the privileges of the landowners. At the same time, however, they still have faith in the Provisional Government of the capitalists, they are for having agreements with it, for keeping in contact with it.

The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are themselves a government in embryo. On some questions they attempt to exercise power parallel with the Provisional Government. We thus have an overlapping of power, or, as it is now called, a "crisis of power".

This cannot go on for long. Such a state of affairs is bound every day to cause new "incidents" and fresh complications. It is easy enough to inscribe on a bit of paper "the incident is settled". In real life, however, these incidents do not disappear. And this for the simple reason that they are not "incidents" at all, they are not chance happenings, not trifles. They are the outward signs of a deep-rooted inner crisis. They are a result of the impasse in which humanity now finds itself. There can be no way out of this predatory war unless we accept the measures proposed by the internationalist socialists.

The Russian people are offered three ways of ending this "crisis of power". Some say: Leave things as they are, put still greater trust in the Provisional Government. The threat to resign may be a trick calculated to make the Soviet say: We trust you still more. The Provisional Government wants the Soviet to beg it: Come and rule over us; what shall we do without you....

Others propose a coalition cabinet. Let us share the ministerial portfolios with Milyukov and Co., they say, let us get some of our own people into the cabinet; it will be quite another pair of shoes then.

We propose a third way: A complete change of the Soviets' policy, no confidence in the capitalists, and the *transfer of all power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*. A change of *personalities* will give nothing; the whole *policy* must be changed. Another class must assume power. A

government of workers and soldiers would be trusted by the whole world, for everyone knows that a worker and a poor peasant would want to rob no one. Only this can put a speedy end to the war, only this can help us through the economic debacle.

All power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies! *No confidence in the government of the capitalists!*

Every "incident", every day, every hour will confirm the *soundness* of this watchword.

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FINLAND AND RUSSIA

Finland's attitude to Russia has become the topic of the day. The Provisional Government has *failed* to meet the demand of the Finnish people, which, *so far*, is not for secession, but only for broad autonomy.

The Provisional Government's undemocratic, annexationist policy was formulated and "defended" the other day by *Rabochaya Gazeta*. It could not have made a more "damning" defence than it did. This is indeed a fundamental issue, an issue of state significance, which deserves the closest attention.

"The Organising Committee believes," writes *Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 42, "that the general problem of Finnish-Russian relations can and should be settled only by an agreement between the Finnish Diet and the Constituent Assembly. Pending this, the Finnish comrades [the Organising Committee has had talks with the Finnish Social-Democrats] should bear in mind that if separate tendencies in Finland were to increase, this would be likely to strengthen the centralist tendencies of the Russian bourgeoisie."

That is the point of view of the capitalists, the bourgeoisie, the Cadets, but not of the proletariat. The programme of the Social-Democratic Party, namely, § 9, which recognises the right of self-determination for all nation members of the state, has been thrown overboard by the Menshevik Social-Democrats. They have, in effect, renounced this programme and taken sides with the bourgeoisie, just as they did on the question of the replacement of the standing army by the universally armed people, and so on.

The capitalists, the bourgeoisie, including the Cadet Party, never did recognise the right of nations to political self-determination, i.e., *freedom to secede* from Russia.

The Social-Democratic Party *recognised* this right in §9 of its programme, adopted in 1903.

When the Organising Committee "recommended" to the Finnish Social-Democrats an "agreement" between the Finnish Diet and the Constituent Assembly, they were, on this question, taking sides with the bourgeoisie. One merely has to compare the positions of *all* the principal classes and parties to see the truth of this.

The tsar, the Rights, the monarchists are not for an agreement between the Diet and the Constituent Assembly—they are for subjecting Finland to the Russian nation. The republican bourgeoisie are for an *agreement* between the Finnish Diet and the Constituent Assembly. The class-conscious proletariat and the Social-Democrats, *true* to their programme, are for the *right* of Finland, as of all the other underprivileged nations, to *secede from* Russia. We have here a clear, precise, and indisputable picture. Under the guise of an "agreement", which cannot settle anything—for what are you going to do if an agreement is *not* reached?—the bourgeoisie is pursuing the same old tsarist policy of subjection and annexation.

For Finland was annexed by the Russian tsars as the result of a deal with the suppressor of the French revolution, Napoleon, etc. If we are really against annexations, we should say: *give Finland the right of secession*! Not until this has been said and accomplished can an "agreement" with Finland be a really free and voluntary agreement, a real agreement, and not just a fake.

Agreement is possible only between equals. If the agreement is to be a real agreement, and not a verbal screen for subjection, *both* parties to it must enjoy real equality of status, that is to say, both Russia *and Finland* must have the right to *disagree*. That is as clear as daylight.

Only by "freedom of secession" can that right be expressed. Only when she is free to secede will Finland really be in a position to enter into an "agreement" with Russia as to whether she should secede or not. *Without* this condition, without recognising the right of secession, all phrase-mongering about an "agreement" is self-deception and deception of the people.

The Organising Committee should have told the Finns

plainly whether it recognises the right of secession or not. It befogged the issue, like the Cadets, and thereby repudiated the right of secession. It should have attacked the Russian bourgeoisie for denying the oppressed nations the right to secede, a denial which is *tantamount to annexation*. Instead, the Organising Committee attacks the Finns and warns them that "separate" (they should have said separatist) tendencies would strengthen centralist inclinations! In other words, the Organising Committee threatens the Finns with the strengthening of the annexationist Great-Russian bourgeoisie—just what the Cadets have always done, the very guise under which Rodichev and Co. are pursuing *their* annexationist policy.

We have here a clear and practical commentary on the question of annexations, which "everybody" is now talking about, though afraid to face the issue squarely. *To be against the right of secession is to be for annexations.*

The tsars pursued a crude policy of annexation, bartering one nation for another by agreement with other monarchs (the partition of Poland, the deal with Napoleon over Finland, and so on), just like the landowners, who used to exchange peasant serfs. The bourgeoisie, on turning republican, is carrying on the *same* policy of annexation, only more subtly, less openly, by *promising* an "agreement" while *taking away* the only effective guarantee of real equality in the making of an agreement, namely, the right of secession. The Organising Committee is dragging at the tail-end of the bourgeoisie, and in practice taking its side. (*Birzhevka* was therefore quite right in reprinting all the salient points of the *Rabochaya Gazeta* article and approving the Organising Committee's reply to the Finns, which it called a "lesson by Russian democracy" to the Finns. *Rabochaya Gazeta* deserved this kiss from *Birzhevka*.)

At its conference, the party of the proletariat (the "Bolsheviks") once more confirmed the right of secession in its resolution on the national question.

The alignment of classes and parties is clear.

The petty bourgeois are letting themselves be frightened by the spectre of a frightened bourgeoisie—that is the whole crux of the policy of the Menshevik Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. They are "afraid" of secession.

The class-conscious proletarians are *not* afraid of it. Both Norway and Sweden gained from Norway's free secession from Sweden in 1905: it made for mutual trust between the two nations, it drew them closer together on a voluntary basis, it did away with the stupid and destructive friction, it strengthened the economic and political, the cultural and social *gravitation* of the two nations to each other, and strengthened the fraternal alliance between the workers of the two countries.

Comrades, workers and peasants, do not be influenced by the annexationist policy of the Russian capitalists, Guchkov, Milyukov, and the Provisional Government towards Finland, Kurland, Ukraine, etc.! Do not fear to recognise the right of all these nations to secede! Nations must be won over to the idea of an alliance with the Great Russians not by force, but by a really voluntary and really free agreement, which is *impossible* without the right of secession.

The freer Russia is, and the more resolutely our republic recognises the right of non-Great-Russian nations to secede, the more strongly will other nations be *attracted* towards an alliance with us, the less friction will there be, the more rarely will actual secession occur, the shorter the period of secession will last, and the closer and more enduring—in the long run—will the fraternal alliance be between the Russian proletarian and peasant republic and the republics of all other nations.

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A LETTER TO THE EDITORS

Yesterday the bourgeois papers again published misinformation about my promising to address a meeting of delegates from the front on Sunday, April 30. I gave *no* such promise. Owing to illness I *cannot* speak. I would ask that *only* information published in *Pravda* and only statements signed by me should be believed, otherwise it will be impossible for me to contend with falsehood, inaccuracies and misrepresentation.

N. Lenin

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DEFENCE OF IMPERIALISM CLOAKED WITH SPECIOUS PHRASES

That is what the proclamation of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to the socialists of the world, published in today's papers, amounts to. It has a lot to say against imperialism, but all these words are nullified by a single little phrase which reads:

"The Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia has adopted this platform" (i.e., peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of nations).

The gist of the matter is summed up in this one phrase. This phrase is a defence of *Russian* imperialism, which it cloaks and whitewashes. As a matter of fact, our Provisional Government, far from "adopting" a platform of peace without annexations, is trampling upon it daily and hourly.

Our Provisional Government has "diplomatically" renounced annexations, just as the government of the German capitalists, those brigands Wilhelm and Bethmann-Hollweg. have done. In words, *both* governments have renounced annexations. In practice, *both* continue the policy of annexations. The German capitalist government forcibly holds Belgium, a part of France, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Poland. Danish provinces, Alsace, etc.; the Russian capitalist government holds part of Galicia, Turkish Armenia, Finland, Ukraine, etc. The British capitalist government is the most annexationist government in the world, for it forcibly keeps the greatest number of nationalities within the British Empire: India (three hundred million), Ireland, Turkish Mesopotamia, the German colonies in Africa, etc.

The Executive Committee's proclamation covers up its lies about annexations with specious phrases, and thereby does great harm to the cause of the proletariat and the revolution. First of all, the proclamation does not differentiate between the renunciation of annexations in words (in this sense, *all* capitalist governments, without exception, have "adopted" the "platform of peace without annexations") and *renunciation of annexations in deeds* (in this sense, *not one* capitalist government in the world has renounced annexations). Secondly, the proclamation—without any justification, without any basis, contrary to the truth—whitewashes the *Russian* Provisional Government of the capitalists, which is not a bit better (and, probably, not worse) than any other capitalist government.

To cloak an unpleasant truth with a specious phrase is most harmful and most dangerous to the cause of the proletariat, to the cause of the toiling masses. The truth, however bitter, must be faced squarely. A policy that does not meet this requirement is a ruinous policy.

And the truth about annexations is that *all* capitalist governments, the Russian Provisional Government included, are deceiving the people with *promises*—they renounce the policy of annexations in words, but continue it *in deeds*. Any intelligent person can prove this truth for himself by simply making up a *full list* of the annexations of, say, only *three* countries: Germany, Russia, and Britain.

Just try it, gentlemen!

By refusing to do this, by whitewashing *one's own* government and blackening others, one becomes in effect a defender of imperialism.

In conclusion we would remark that at the end of the proclamation we have another fly in the ointment, namely, the assurance that "whatever the differences that have been rending socialism during the three years of war, no faction of the proletariat should decline to participate in the general struggle for peace".

This, too, we regret to say, is a specious phrase, an utterly empty and meaningless one. Plekhanov and Scheidemann both assert that they are "fighting for peace", a "peace without annexations" at that. But it is clear to everyone that they are both fighting to defend each his own imperialist

government of the capitalists. What good do we do the cause of the working classes by uttering sugar-coated lies, by playing down the fact that the Plekhanovs and the Scbeidemanns have gone over to the side of *their* respective capitalists? Is it not obvious that such glossing over of the truth amounts to whitewashing imperialism and its defenders?

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AN UNFORTUNATE DOCUMENT

The appeal of the Petrograd Soviet to the army published in yesterday's papers is a further defection of the Soviet's leaders, the Narodniks and Mensheviks, to the side of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie.

The incoherency of thought revealed by this appeal is astonishing. Only people whose heads are hopelessly stuffed with "revolutionary" phrases can fail to see this.

> "The working people had no need for the war. They did not start it. It was started by the tsars and the capitalists of all countries."

Quite right. So far so good. And when the appeal "calls upon the workers and peasants of Germany and Austria-Hungary to rise, and make a revolution", we approve wholeheartedly, for this is a correct slogan.

But how, with this indubitable truth, can one utter in the same breath the following *flagrant untruth*:

> "You [Russian soldiers] are staunchly defending not the tsar, not the Protopopovs and the Rasputins, *not the rich landowner and capitalists....*"

The words we have italicised are a patent and flagrant untruth.

If the working masses "have no need" for the war, if the war was started *not only* by the tsars, but by "the capitalists of *all* countries" (as was definitely stated in the appeal issued by the Soviet), then, obviously, any nation involved in this war who tolerates a government of the capitalists is *actually* "defending" the capitalists.

One or the other: *either* the Austrian and German capitalists alone are to "blame" for this war; if this is what the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders of the Petrograd Soviet think, then they are sinking to the level of Plekhanov, the

Russian Scheidemann—in that case, the words saying that the war was "started by the capitalists of all countries" should be erased as being untrue; in that case, the slogan "peace without annexations" should be thrown overboard as being untrue, because the appropriate slogan for such a policy would be: take the annexed territories away from the Germans, but keep (and extend) the territories annexed by the British and the Russians.

Or this war was really started by "the capitalists of all countries"; if the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders of the Soviet do *not* deny this unquestionable truth, then all the more revolting is the lie that the Russian soldiers, so long as they put up with their capitalist government, are "not" defending the capitalists.

In that case the Russian soldiers *too* (and not only the Austrian and the German) should be told the truth. Comrade soldiers, we should say to them, so long as we put up with our capitalist government, so long as the tsar's secret treaties are considered a holy of holies, we are carrying on an imperialist war of conquest, we are *defending* predatory treaties concluded by ex-Tsar Nicholas with the Anglo-French capitalists.

That is a bitter truth. But it is the truth. The people should be told the truth. Only then will their eyes be opened and they will *learn* to fight against untruth.

Look at this matter from another angle, and you will convince yourselves once more of the utter untruthfulness of the Soviet's appeal. It calls upon the German workers and peasants to "rise". Very well. But to rise *against* whom? Is it only against Wilhelm?

Imagine Wilhelm replaced by the German Guchkovs and Milyukovs, i.e., by the representatives of the German capitalist class—would this alter the predatory character of the war as far as Germany is concerned? Obviously, it would not. Everyone knows—and the Soviet's appeal admits it—that the war was "started by the tsars *and the capitalists* of all countries". Consequently, the overthrow of tsars, with power passing to the capitalists, alters nothing whatever as far as the nature of the war is concerned. The annexation of Belgium. Serbia, etc., will not cease being annexation if the German Cadets take the place of Wilhelm, just as the an-

nexation of Khiva, Bokhara, Armenia, Finland, Ukraine, etc., has not ceased being annexation because the Russian Cadets, the Russian capitalists, have taken the place of Nicholas.

And finally, let us assume that the Soviet's appeal calls upon the German workers and peasants to rise not only against Wilhelm but also against the German capitalists. We should then say that the appeal is correct and sound. We fully support it. But then we should ask our esteemed fellow-citizens, Chernov, Chkheidze, and Tsereteli: Is it right, is it reasonable, is it seemly to call upon the Germans to rise against their capitalists, while *you yourselves are supporting the capitalist government at home*?

Aren't you afraid, my dear fellow-citizens, that the German workers will accuse you of mendacity or even (God forbid) of hypocrisy?

Aren't you afraid that the German workers will turn round and say: Our revolution has not broken out yet, we have not yet reached the point where our Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies can openly make arrangements with the capitalists in the matter of power. If you, our Russian brothers, have already come to this, then why do you preach "revolt" to us (a thing that is painful, bloody, and difficult), while you yourselves *refuse to take over power peacefully* from Lvov and Co., who have expressed their willingness to relinquish it? You speak about the revolution in Russia, but, Citizens Chernov, Chkheidze, and Tsereteli, you have all studied socialism, and you realise only too well that *so far* your revolution has only put the *capitalists* in power. Is it not trebly insincere, when, in the name of the Russian revolution, which has given power to the Russian imperialist capitalists, you demand of us, Germans, a revolution against the German imperialist capitalists? Does it not look as if your "internationalism", your "revolutionism" are for foreign consumption only; as if revolution against the capitalists is only for the Germans, while for the Russians (despite the seething revolution in Russia) it is *agreement* with the capitalists?

Chernov, Chkheidze, and Tsereteli have sunk completely to the level of defending Russian imperialism.

It is a deplorable fact, but a fact nevertheless.

Pravda No. 47, May 16 (3), 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

FRIGHTENING THE PEOPLE WITH BOURGEOIS TERRORS

The capitalist newspapers, led by *Rech*, are falling over backwards in their attempt to scare the people with the bogy of "anarchy". Not a day passes without *Rech* screaming about anarchy, whipping up rumours and reports of casual and minor breaches of the law, and frightening the people with the bogy of a frightened bourgeoisie.

In the wake of *Rech* and other capitalist papers comes the press of the Narodniks (including the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the Mensheviks. They, too, have allowed themselves to be frightened. The editorial in today's *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet, whose leaders are all members of these parties, shows this paper to have definitely taken sides with the pedlars of "bourgeois terrors". It has talked itself into a statement, which, to put it mildly, is grossly exaggerating:

> "There is demoralisation in the army. In some places there is disorderly seizure of the land, and destruction and loosing of livestock and farm implements. Arbitrary action is on the increase."

By arbitrary action the Narodniks and Mensheviks, that is, the parties of the petty bourgeoisie, mean, among other things, the seizure by the peasants in the local areas of all the land without waiting for the Constituent Assembly. It was this bogy ("arbitrary action") that Minister Shingaryov once trotted out in his famous telegram, which was widely featured in the press (see *Pravda* No. 33).*

Arbitrary action, anarchy—what terrifying words! But let any Narodnik or Menshevik who wishes to *think for himself* consider for a minute the following question.

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* See p. 134 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Before the revolution the land belonged to the landowners. That was *not* called anarchy. And what did *that* lead to? It led to a break-down all along the line, to "anarchy" in the fullest sense of the word, i.e., to the utter ruin of the country, the ruin of the majority of the population.

Is a way out of this conceivable *other than* by the widest application of energy, initiative and determination on the part of the *majority* of the population? Obviously, it is not.

What does all this add up to?

1. The tsar's supporters stand for the absolute rule of the landowners in the countryside and for their keeping all the land. They are *not* afraid of the "anarchy" which this actually entailed.

2. The Cadet Shingaryov, representing all the capitalists and landowners (with the exception of a small group of tsarists), advocates "agricultural conciliation chambers under the rural supply committees for the purpose of effecting voluntary agreements between the tillers of the land and the landowners" (see his telegram). The petty-bourgeois politicians—the Narodniks and Mensheviks—are following in Shingaryov's footsteps when they advise the peasants "to wait" until the Constituent Assembly meets and when they call the immediate confiscation of the land by the peasants in the local areas "anarchy".

3. The party of the proletariat (the Bolsheviks) stands for the immediate seizure of the land by the peasants in the local areas and recommends the greatest possible degree of organisation. We see no "anarchy" in this, for it is this decision, and this decision alone, that happens to be a *majority* decision of the local population.

Since when has a majority decision come to be called "anarchy"? Would it not be more correct to apply this appellation to the *minority* decision which *both* the tsarists and Shingaryov are proposing in various forms?

When Shingaryov tries to force the peasants into a "voluntary" "reconciliation" with the landowners, he is imposing a minority decision, because there is an average of 300 peasant families in Russia to every one family of the big landowners. If I tell three hundred families to come to a "voluntary" "agreement" with *one* family of a rich exploiter,

I am offering a decision in favour of the minority, and that means anarchy.

In raising this hullabaloo about "anarchy", you capitalists are trying to disguise the fact that you stand for the interests of the one against those of the three hundred. This is the crux of the matter.

We may be told; But you want to have the matter decided by the local people alone, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly! And that is anarchy!

To this we reply: And what does Shingaryov want? He, too, wants the matter settled locally (by a "voluntary agreement" between the peasants and the landowners) without waiting for the Constituent Assembly!

On this point Shingaryov and we do not differ—we are both for a final decision by the Constituent Assembly and a preliminary decision—to be enforced—by the local people. We differ with Shingaryov only in saying that 300 shall decide and 1 shall submit, whereas Shingaryov says: if the 300 decide, that will be "arbitrary action", so let the 300 "agree" with the 1.

How low the Narodniks and Mensheviks must have fallen to help Shingaryov and Co. spread bourgeois terrors.

Fear of the people—that is what these alarmists and panic-mongers are actuated by.

There is no reason to fear the people. The decision of the majority of workers and peasants is *not* anarchy. Such a decision is the only possible guarantee of democracy in general, and of success in the search for effective ways of combating the debacle in particular.

Written May 3 (16), 1917
Published May 17 (4), 1917
in *Pravda* No. 48

Published according
to the newspaper text

ON THE EVE

The "conciliation" machine is working at full speed. The Narodniks and Mensheviks are toiling in the sweat of their brow, making up a new list of ministers. We are on the eve of a "new" cabinet....

Alas! It will not be very new. The government of the capitalists will have a few petty-bourgeois ministers tacked on to it in the shape of Narodniks and Mensheviks who have allowed themselves to be lured to the support of the imperialist war.

We shall have more phrase-mongering, more fireworks, more lavish promises and bombast about "peace without annexations"—but no desire whatever to even enumerate frankly, precisely and truthfully the *actual* annexations effected, say, by three countries: Germany, Russia, and Britain.

How long, gentlemen of the old and the new cabinets, can one deceive oneself with the utopia that the peasants will support the capitalists (the well-to-do peasants are not the whole of the peasantry), with the utopia of an "offensive" at the front (in the name of "peace without annexations")?

Pravda No. 49,
May 18 (5), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

THEY HAVE FORGOTTEN THE MAIN THING

THE MUNICIPAL PLATFORM OF THE PROLETARIAN PARTY

Elections to the district councils being close at hand, the two petty-bourgeois democratic parties, the Narodniks and the Mensheviks, have come out with high-sounding platforms. These platforms are exactly the same as those of the European bourgeois parties who are engaged in angling for the gullible uneducated mass of voters from among the petty proprietors, etc., such as, for instance, the platform of the Radical and Radical-Socialist Party of France.[98] The same specious phrases, the same lavish promises, the same vague formulations, the same silence on or forgetfulness of the main thing, namely, the *actual conditions* on which the practicability of these promises depends.

At present these conditions are: (1) the imperialist war; (2) the existence of a capitalist government; (3) the impossibility of seriously improving the condition of the workers and the whole mass of working people without revolutionary encroachment on the "sacred right of capitalist private property"; (4) the impossibility of carrying out the reforms promised by these parties while the old organs and machinery of government remain intact, while there exists a police force which is bound to back the capitalists and put a thousand and one obstacles in the way of such reforms.

For example: "House rents in war time to be controlled", "such stocks to be requisitioned for the public needs" (that is, stocks of foodstuffs kept in stores or by private individuals), "communal stores, bakeries, canteens, and kitchens to be organised"—write the Mensheviks. "Proper attention to be paid to sanitation and hygiene," echo the Narodniks (the Socialist-Revolutionaries).

Excellent wishes, to be sure. The trouble is that they cannot be carried out unless one *stops* supporting the imperialist war, stops supporting the loan (which is profitable to the capitalists), stops supporting the capitalist government, which safeguards capitalist profits, stops preserving the police, who are bound to obstruct, thwart, and kill any such reform, even if the government and the capitalists themselves did not present an ultimatum to the reformers (and they certainly will, once capitalist profits are involved).

The trouble is that once we forget the harsh and rigid conditions of capitalist domination, then all such platforms, all such lists of sweeping reforms are empty words, which in practice turn out to be either harmless "pious wishes", or simple hoodwinking of the masses by ordinary bourgeois politicians.

We must face the truth squarely. We must not gloss it over, we must tell it to people in a straightforward manner. We must not brush the class struggle under the carpet, but clarify what relation it bears to the high-sounding, specious, delightful "radical" reforms.

Comrade workers, and all other citizens of Petrograd! In order to give the people all those pressing and essential reforms of which the Narodniks and the Mensheviks speak, one must throw over the policy of support for the imperialist war and war loans, support for the capitalist government and for the principle of the inviolability of capitalist profits. To carry out those reforms, one must *not allow the police to be reinstated*, as the Cadets are now doing, but have it replaced by a people's militia. This is what the party of the proletariat should tell the people at elections, this is what it must say *against* the petty-bourgeois parties of the Narodniks and the Mensheviks. This is the essence of the proletarian municipal platform that is being glossed over by the petty-bourgeois parties.

Foremost in this platform, topping the list of reforms, there must be, as a basic condition for their actual realisation, the following three fundamental points:

1. No support for the imperialist war (either in the form of support for the war loan, or in any other form).
2. No support to the capitalist government.
3. No reinstatement of the police, which must be replaced by a people's militia.

Unless attention is focused on those cardinal questions, unless it is shown that all municipal reforms are contingent upon them, the municipal programme inevitably becomes (at best) a pious wish.

Let us examine point 3.

In all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic, the police (like the standing army) is the chief instrument of oppression of the masses, an instrument making for a possible restoration of the monarchy. The police beats up the "common people" in the police stations of New York, Geneva, and Paris; it favours the capitalists either because it is bribed to do so (America and other countries), or because it enjoys wealthy "patronage" and "protection" (Switzerland), or because of a combination of both (France). Separated as it is from the people, forming a professional caste of men trained in the practice of violence upon the poor, men who receive somewhat higher pay and the privileges that go with authority (to say nothing of "gratuities"), the police everywhere, in every republic, however democratic, where the bourgeoisie is in power, always remains the unfailing weapon, the chief support and protection of the bourgeoisie. No important radical reforms in favour of the working masses can be implemented through the police. That is objectively impossible.

A people's militia instead of the police force and the standing army is a *prerequisite* of effective municipal reforms in the interests of the working people. At a time of revolution this prerequisite is practicable. And it is on this that we must concentrate the whole municipal platform, for the other two cardinal conditions apply to the state as a whole, and not only to municipal governments.

Just how this people's militia can be brought into existence is something which experience will show. To enable the proletarians and semi-proletarians to serve in this militia, the employers must be made to pay them their full wages for the days and hours they spend in service. This is practicable. Whether we should *first* organise a workers' militia by drawing upon the workers employed at the large factories, i.e., the workers who are best organised and most capable of fulfilling the task of militiamen, or whether we should *immediately* organise general compulsory service for all adult men and women, who would devote to this service one

or two weeks a year and so on, is not a question of fundamental importance. There is no harm in the different districts adopting different procedures—in fact, it would make for richer experience, and the process of organisation would develop more smoothly and come closer to life's practical requirements.

A people's militia would mean education of the *masses* in the practices of democracy.

A people's militia would mean government of the poor by the people themselves, chiefly by the poor, and *not* by the rich, not through *their* police.

A people's militia would mean that control (over factories, dwellings, the distribution of products, etc.) would be *real* and not merely on paper.

A people's militia would mean distribution without any bread queues, *without any* privileges for the rich.

A people's militia would mean that quite a number of the serious and radical reforms listed also by the Narodniks and the Mensheviks would *not* remain mere pious wishes.

Comrades, working men and women of Petrograd! Go to the district council elections. Protect the interests of the poor population. Come out against the imperialist war, against support of the capitalist government, against the restoration of the police and for the immediate unqualified replacement of the police by a people's militia.

Pravda No. 49,
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to the text in *Pravda*

MANDATE TO DEPUTIES OF THE SOVIET ELECTED AT FACTORIES AND REGIMENTS

(1) Our Deputy must be unconditionally opposed to the present predatory imperialist war. This war is waged by the capitalists of all countries—Russia, Germany, Britain, etc.—for profits, and the subjugation of the weak nations.

(2) So long as a capitalist government is at the head of the Russian nation, there must be no support for the government, which is carrying on a predatory war—not by a single kopek!

(3) Our Deputy must stand for the immediate publication of the secret predatory treaties (relating to the subjugation of Persia, the partition of Turkey, Austria, etc.), which ex-Tsar Nicholas concluded with the capitalists of Britain, France, etc.

(4) Our Deputy must stand for the immediate abrogation of all these treaties. The Russian people, the workers and the peasants, do not wish to oppress and will not oppress any nation; they do not wish to and will not hold by force within the boundaries of Russia a single non-Russian (non-Great-Russian) nation. Freedom for all the peoples, a fraternal union of the workers and peasants of all nationalities!

(5) Our Deputy must stand for the Russian Government offering openly, immediately and unconditionally, without equivocation and without the least delay, terms of peace to *all* the belligerent countries on the basis of freedom for *all* the oppressed or underprivileged nationalities *without exception*.

This means that the Great Russians shall not forcibly retain either Poland, or Kurland, or Ukraine, or Finland, or Armenia, or any other nation. The Great Russians offer a fraternal union to all the nations and propose the formation of a common state by voluntary consent of each individual people, and under no circumstances by means of violence, direct or indirect. The Great Russians, under the terms of such a peace, undertake immediately to withdraw their troops from Galicia, from Armenia, and from Persia, and to allow these nations and *all* other nations without exception freely to decide whether they wish to live as a separate state, or in union with whomsoever they please.

Germany, by the terms of such a peace, must not only relinquish *all* the territories she has seized since the beginning of the war, but also release the peoples she is keeping by force within the boundaries of Germany, namely, the Danes (Schleswig), the French (part of Alsace and Lorraine), the Poles (Poznan), etc. Germany must undertake immediately, and simultaneously with Russia, to withdraw her troops from all the regions she has seized, as well as from all the regions mentioned above, and allow each nation to decide freely, by a popular vote, whether it wishes to live as a separate state, or in union *with whomsoever it pleases*. Germany must unconditionally and unequivocally relinquish all her colonies, for colonies are oppressed peoples.

Britain, by the terms of such a peace, must relinquish, immediately and unconditionally, not only the territories she has seized from others (the German colonies in Africa, etc., the Turkish lands, Mesopotamia, etc.), but *all her own colonies* as well. Britain, like Russia and Germany, must immediately withdraw her troops from all the territories she has seized, from her colonies, and also from Ireland, and let each nation decide by a free vote whether it wants to live as a separate state, or in union with whomsoever it wishes.

And so on: all the belligerent countries, without exception, must receive an offer to conclude an immediate peace on these clearly defined terms. The capitalists of *all* countries should no longer deceive the peoples by promising "peace without annexations" while holding on to *their own* annexed territories and continuing the war in order to wrest from the enemy "his own" annexed territories.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

(6) Our Deputy must not give any support, or vote for any loan, or give a kopek of the people's money to *any* government that does not solemnly undertake immediately to offer to all the nations these terms for an immediate peace and to publish this offer within *two days* for everybody's information.

Written before May 7 (20), 1917

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Published according to the manuscript

CLASS COLLABORATION WITH CAPITAL, OR CLASS STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITAL?

That is how history puts the issue—and not history in general, but the economic and political history of the Russia of *today*.

The Narodniks and Mensheviks, Chernov and Tsereteli, have transferred the Contact Commission from the room adjacent to the one the ministers used to meet in to the ministerial chamber itself. This, and this alone, is the purely political significance of the "new" cabinet.

Its economic and class significance is that, at the best (from the point of view of the stability of the cabinet and the preservation of capitalist domination), the leadership of the peasant bourgeoisie, headed since 1906 by Peshekhonov, and the petty-bourgeois "leaders" of the Menshevist workers have *promised* the capitalists their class collaboration. (At the worst—for the capitalists—the whole change has a purely personal or clique significance, but no class significance at all.)

Let us assume that the more favourable eventuality is the case. Even so, there is not a shadow of doubt that the promisers will be unable to fulfil their promises. "We shall—in co-operation with the capitalists—help the country out of its crisis, save it from ruin and get it out of the war"—that is what the action of the petty-bourgeois leaders, the Chernovs and Tseretelis, in joining the cabinet really amounts to. Our answer is: Your help is not enough. The crisis has advanced infinitely farther than you imagine. Only the revolutionary class, by taking revolutionary measures against

capital, can save the country—and not our country alone.

The crisis is so profound, so widespread, of such vast world-wide scope, and so closely bound up with Capital itself, that the class struggle against Capital must inevitably assume the form of political supremacy by the proletariat and semi-proletariat. There is no other way out.

You want to have revolutionary enthusiasm in the army, Citizens Chernov and Tsereteli? But you cannot create it, because the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses is not begotten by a change of "leaders" in cabinets, by florid declarations, or by promises to take steps to revise the treaty with the British capitalists; it can be aroused only by acts of revolutionary policy patent to all and undertaken daily and everywhere *against* almighty Capital and against its making profits out of the war, a policy that will make for a radical improvement in the standard of living of the mass of the poor.

Even if you were to hand over all the land to the people immediately, this would not end the crisis unless revolutionary measures were taken against Capital.

You want an offensive, Citizens Chernov and Tsereteli? But you cannot rouse the army to an offensive, because you cannot use force against the people today. And unless force is used *against* them the people would undertake an offensive only in the great interests of the great revolution against Capital in all countries; and not merely a revolution promised and proclaimed, but a revolution actually in process of realisation, a revolution which is being carried out in actual fact, and is tangible to all.

You want to organise supply, Citizens Peshekhonovs and Skobelevs, the supply of goods for the peasants, of bread and meat for the army, of raw material for industry, and so forth? You want control over, and partly even the organisation of, production?

You cannot do this without the revolutionary enthusiasm of the proletarian and semi-proletarian mass. This enthusiasm can be aroused only by taking revolutionary measures against the privileges and profits of Capital. Failing this, your promised control will remain a dead, capitalist, bureaucratic palliative.

The experiment at class collaboration with Capital is now being made by the Chernovs and Tseretelis, and by certain sections of the petty bourgeoisie, on a new, gigantic, all-Russia scale.

All the more valuable will be its lessons for the people, when the latter become convinced—and that apparently will be soon—of the futility and hopelessness of such collaboration.

Pravda No. 50,
May 19 (6), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

A STRONG REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

We are for a strong revolutionary government. Whatever the capitalists and their flunkeys may shout about us to the contrary, their lies will remain lies.

The thing is not to let phrases obscure one's consciousness, disorient one's mind. When people speak about "revolution", "the revolutionary people", "revolutionary democracy", and so on, *nine times out of ten* this is a lie or self-deception. The question is—*what class* is making this revolution? A revolution *against whom*?

Against tsarism? In that sense most of Russia's landowners and capitalists today are revolutionaries. When the revolution is an accomplished fact, even reactionaries come into line with it. There is no deception of the masses at present more frequent, more detestable, and more harmful than that which lauds the revolution against tsarism.

Against the landowners? In this sense most of the peasants, even most of the well-to-do peasants, that is, probably nine-tenths of the population in Russia, are revolutionaries. Very likely, some of the capitalists, too, are prepared to become revolutionaries on the grounds that the landowners cannot be saved anyway, so let us better side with the revolution and try to make things safe for capitalism.

Against the capitalists? Now that is the real issue. That is the crux of the matter, because without a revolution against the capitalists, all that prattle about "peace without annexations" and the speedy termination of the war by such a peace is either naïveté and ignorance, or stupidity and deception. But for the war, Russia could have gone on living for years and decades without a revolution against the capitalists. The war has made that objectively impossible. The alternatives are either utter ruin or a revolution against the capitalists. That is how the question stands. That is how the very trend of events poses it.

Instinctively, emotionally, and by attraction, the bulk of Russia's population, namely, the proletarians and semi-proletarians, i.e., the workers and poor peasants, are in sympathy with a revolution against the capitalists. So far, however, there is no clear consciousness of this, and, as a result, no determination. To develop these is our chief task.

The leaders of the petty bourgeoisie—the intellectuals, the prosperous peasants, the present parties of the Narodniks (the S.R.s included) and the Mensheviks—are *not* at present in favour of a revolution against the capitalists and some of them are even opposed to it, greatly to the detriment of the people's cause. The coalition cabinet is the kind of "experiment" that is going to help the people as a whole to quickly *discard* the illusion of petty-bourgeois conciliation with the capitalists.

The conclusion is obvious: only assumption of power by the proletariat, backed by the semi-proletarians, can give the country a really strong and really revolutionary government. It will be really strong because it will be supported by a solid and class-conscious majority of the people. It will be strong because it will not, of necessity, have to be based on a precarious "agreement" between capitalists and small proprietors, between millionaires and petty bourgeoisie, between the Konovalovs-Shingaryovs and the Chernovs-Tseretelis.

It will be a truly revolutionary government, the only one capable of showing the people that at a time when untold suffering is inflicted upon the masses it will not be awed and deterred by capitalist profits. It will be a truly revolutionary government because it alone will be capable of evoking and sustaining the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and increasing it tenfold, provided the masses, every day and every hour, see and feel that the government believes in the people, is not afraid of them, that it helps the poor to improve their lot right now, that it makes the rich bear an *equal share* of the heavy burden of the people's suffering.

We are for a strong revolutionary government.

We are for a strong revolutionary government because it is the only possible and the only reliable government.

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TITBITS FOR THE "NEWBORN" GOVERNMENT[99]

From a *Rech* editorial, penned with an air of heavy gravity:

"Let us hope that no great shocks to our relations with the Allies will be needed to prove to the supporters of the formula 'without annexations or indemnities' [read: to the new government] that it is impracticable."

They are right, the capitalists for whom *Rech* speaks. The formula is indeed "impracticable" ... unless a revolution against capital is put into practice!

* * *

From a speech by Milyukov, who didn't resign, but got the sack:

"Whatever noble formulas of friendship for the Allies we may devise, once our army remains inactive, we shall merely be shirking our obligations. And vice versa, whatever terrible formulas betraying our loyalties we may devise, once our army is actually fighting, then that, of course, will be actual fulfilment of our obligations towards the Allies."

Correct! He knows what he is talking about sometimes, does Citizen Milyukov! Citizens Chernov and Tsereteli, don't you realise what inference is to be drawn from this as regards your *actual* attitude towards the imperialist war?

* * *

From a speech by Shulgin at a meeting of the rallying counter-revolution:

"We prefer to be beggars, but beggars in our own country. If you can preserve that country and keep it safe for us, then take our last shirt from us, we shall shed no tear."

Don't try to frighten us, Mr. Shulgin. Even when *we* are in power we shall not take your "last shirt" from you, but shall see that you are provided with good clothes and good food, on condition that you do the job you are fit for and used to! You can frighten the Chernovs and the Tseretelis, but you can't frighten us.

* * *

From a speech by Maklakov at the same meeting (of "members of the Duma"):

"Russia has proved unworthy of the freedom she has won."

Read: the workers and peasants have failed to satisfy the Maklakovs. These gentlemen want the Chernovs and Tseretelis to "reconcile" the masses with the Maklakovs. It won't work!

* * *

From the same speech:

"Many people can be blamed, but we, in Russia, can't do without the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, without the various currents or the various individuals."

We beg your pardon, Citizen Maklakov, but "we" (the party of the proletariat) "can do without the bourgeoisie" "in Russia". Time will show you and make you admit that there was no other way out of the imperialist war.

* * *

From the same speech:

"We see a mass of evil instincts which have risen to the surface: we see a reluctance to work, reluctance to recognise one's duty to one's country. We see that at a time of cruel warfare this country has become a land of festivities, meetings and talk, a country that does not recognise authority and refuses to obey it."

Correct! A mass of "evil instincts", especially among the landowners and the capitalists. The petty bourgeois has evil instincts, too: for instance, the instinct that drives him into a coalition cabinet with capitalists. The proletarians and semi-proletarians have evil instincts, too: for example, they are slow in discarding petty-bourgeois illusions, slow

in coming to the conclusion that *all* "power" must be take over by this class, and this class alone.

* * *

From the same speech:

"The government will move steadily leftward, while the country will move farther and farther to the right."

By "the country" Maklakov means the capitalists. In this sense he is right. But "the country" of the workers and the poor peasants, I assure you, Citizen Maklakov, is a thousand times more leftward than the Chernovs and the Tseretelis, and a hundred times more leftward than we are. The future will prove this to you.

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ALREADY THE "NEW" GOVERNMENT IS LAGGING BEHIND EVEN THE PEASANT MASS, LEAVE ALONE THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS

Here is the evidence:

The evening edition of *Russkaya Volya** (Russian Freedom indeed!) for May 4 has this to report about the feeling prevailing among the delegates to the Peasant Congress, which is now in session.

> "The delegates' main grievance, voiced on behalf of the peasants, is that while all classes are already reaping the fruits of the revolution the peasants alone are still waiting for their share. The peasants alone are told to wait until the Constituent Assembly meets and settles the land question.
>
> "'We don't agree,' they say. 'We're not going to wait, just as others have not waited. We want the land now, at once.'"

There is no doubt that the reporter of *Russkaya Volya*, a paper that serves the worst of the capitalists, is not slandering the peasants in this case (there is no sense in lying), but is telling the truth, is *warning* the capitalists. *All* the news coming from the Congress confirms this truth.

Compare this truth with § 5 of the "new" government's draft declaration:

"While leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to settle the question of transferring the land to the working people, the Provisional Government will take ... measures," etc. (the "old" Provisional Government also kept on "taking measures"...).

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* *Russkaya Volya* means Russian Freedom. See Note No. 4.—*Ed.*

The "new" government is already lagging hopelessly behind even the Peasant Congress!

This is a fact, surprising though it may be to many.

And facts are stubborn things, as the English say.

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STEALING A MARCH ON THE WORKERS

Yesterday, May 5, two of the big dailies—*Dyelo Naroda* and *Rech*—carried an announcement on their front pages, later reprinted in the Guchkov-Suvorin evening paper *Vecherneye Vremya*,[100] which deserves serious attention.

The public is informed that "in accordance with an agreement between the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Union of Engineers, as authorised by the Provisional Government", there has been organised in Petrograd a "Central Committee for restoring and maintaining normal work in the industrial enterprises".

"The main task of the Central Committee," the announcement reads, "is to work out and co-ordinate all measures aimed at restoring and maintaining normal work in the industrial enterprises and to organise regular and active *public control* over all industrial enterprises."

The words "public control" were italicised in the announcement.

They remind one of the Senate and other bureaucratic committees of the good old tsarist days. No sooner had some knave of a tsar's minister, governor, marshal of the nobility, etc., been caught red-handed at some thievery, no sooner had some institution directly or indirectly connected with the tsar's government conspicuously disgraced itself throughout Russia or throughout Europe, than a high commission of "personages" notable and super-notable, high-ranking and super-ranking, rich and super-rich was appointed to "appease *public* opinion".

And these personages usually managed to "appease" public opinion with conspicuous success. The more high-sounding the phrases about our wise tsar salving "the popular

conscience" the more effectively did these men kill the idea of any "public control".

So it was, so it will be, one feels like saying as one reads the pompously worded announcement about the new Central Committee.

The capitalists have decided to steal a march on the workers. There is a growing consciousness among the workers that a *proletarian* control over factories and syndicates is necessary. The master minds of the business world from among ministerial and near-ministerial circles have had a "brain wave"—to forestall events and take the Soviet in tow. This should not be difficult, they thought, so long as the Narodniks and Mensheviks are still in control there. We'll fix up "public control", they said to themselves. It will look so important, so statesmanlike, so ministeriable, so solid. And it will kill all possible real control, all *proletarian* control so effectively, so quietly. A brilliant idea! The "popular conscience" will be completely "salved".

How is this new Central Committee to be composed?

Why, on democratic lines, of course. Are we not *all* "revolutionary democrats"? If anyone thinks that democracy requires 20 representatives from 200,000 workers and one representative from 10,000 engineers, capitalists, etc., that would be an "anarchist" delusion. No, true democracy consists in imitating the way in which "revolutionary democracy" has composed its "new" government, where the workers and peasants are "represented" by six Mensheviks and Narodniks while eight Cadets and Octobrists represent the landowners and the capitalists. Do not the latest statistical surveys now being completed by the new Ministry of Labour by arrangement with the old Ministry of Industry prove that the majority of Russia's population belongs to the class of landowners and capitalists?

Here, if you please, is a *complete* list of "representatives" of the organisations that have been included in the new Central Committee by agreement between "revolutionary democracy" and the government.

The Central Committee is composed of representatives from the following organisations: (1) The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; (2) The Provisional Committee of the Duma; (3) The All-Russia

Union of Zemstvos; (4) The All-Russia Union of Cities; (5) The Petrograd Municipal Administration; (6) The Union of Engineers; (7) The Soviet of Officers' Deputies; (8) The Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Commerce; (9) The Petrograd Society of Factory Owners; (10) The Central War Industries Committee; (11) The Central Committee of Zemstvo and City Unions for Army Supply; (12) The Committee of Technical War Aid; (13) The Free-Economic Society.

And that's all?

Yes, that's all.

Is that not sufficient for salving the popular conscience?

Yes, but what if some big bank or syndicate of capitalists is represented five or ten times through its shareholders in these ten or twelve institutions?

Oh, why quibble about "details", when the main thing is to secure "a regular and active *public control*"!

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AN OPEN LETTER TO THE DELEGATES TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES

Comrades, peasant deputies,

The Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), to which I have the honour to belong, wanted me to represent our Party at the Peasant Congress, but illness has prevented me from carrying out this commission. I therefore take the liberty of addressing this open letter to you in order to greet the all-Russia union of the peasantry and briefly to point out the deep-seated differences that divide our Party on the one hand and the party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Menshevik Social-Democrats on the other.

These profound differences, concern the three most important issues: the land, the war, and state organisation.

All the land must belong to the people. All the landed estates must be turned over to the peasants without compensation. This is clear. The dispute here is whether or not the peasants in the local areas should take all the land at once, without paying any rent to the landowners, or wait until the Constituent Assembly meets.

Our Party believes that they should, and advises the peasants locally to take over all the land without delay, and to do it in as organised a way as possible, under no circumstances allowing damage to property and exerting every effort to increase the production of grain and meat since the troops at the front are in dire straits. In any case, although the final decision on how to dispose of the land will be made by the Constituent Assembly, a preliminary settlement now, at once, in time for the spring sowing, can be made only by

local bodies, inasmuch as our Provisional Government, which is a government of the landowners and capitalists, is putting off the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and so far has not even fixed a date for it.

Only local bodies are able preliminarily to take charge of the land. The fields must be sown to crops. Most of the peasants in the local areas are quite capable of making use of the land in an organised way, of ploughing and putting it all under crops. This is essential if the supply of food to the soldiers at the front is to be improved. Hence, to wait for the Constituent Assembly is out of the question. We by no means deny the right of the Constituent Assembly finally to institute public ownership of the land and to regulate its disposal. In the meantime, however, right now, this spring, the peasants themselves must decide locally what to do with it. The soldiers at the front can and should send delegates to the villages.

Further. For all the land to pass over to the working people, a close alliance of the urban workers and the poor peasants (semi-proletarians) is essential. Unless such an alliance is formed, the capitalists cannot be defeated. And if they are not defeated, no transfer of the land to the people will deliver them from poverty. You cannot eat land, and without money, without capital, there is no way of obtaining implements, livestock, or seed. The peasants must trust not the capitalists or the rich muzhiks (who are capitalists too), but only the urban workers. Only in alliance with the latter can the poor peasants ensure that the land, the railways, the banks, and the factories become the property of all the working people; if this is not done, the mere transfer of the land to the people cannot abolish want and pauperism.

Workers in certain localities in Russia are already beginning to establish their supervision (control) over the factories. Such control by the workers is to the peasants' advantage, for it means increased production and cheaper products. The peasants must give their fullest support to this initiative on the part of the workers and not believe the slander which the capitalists spread against the workers.

The second question is the question of the war.

This war is a war of conquest. It is being waged by the capitalists of all countries with predatory aims, to increase

their profits. To the working people this war can spell only ruin, suffering, devastation, and brutalisation. That is why our Party, the party of class-conscious workers and poor peasants, emphatically and unqualifiedly condemns this war, refuses to justify the capitalists of the one country as against the capitalists of another, refuses to support the capitalists of any country whatever, and is working for the speediest termination of the war through the overthrow of the capitalists in all countries, through a workers' revolution in all countries.

In our new Provisional Government, there are ten ministers belonging to the landowner and capitalist parties and six to the Narodnik (Socialist-Revolutionary) and Menshevik Social-Democratic parties. In our opinion the Narodniks and Mensheviks have made a grave and fatal mistake in joining the capitalist government and in general agreeing to support it. Men like Tsereteli and Chernov are hoping to induce the capitalists to bring the present predatory war to a speedy and more honourable end. But these leaders of the Narodnik and Menshevik parties are mistaken: they are, in effect, helping the capitalists to prepare an offensive by the Russian troops against Germany, that is, to drag out the war, to add to the incredibly enormous sacrifices the Russian people have made in the war.

We are convinced that the capitalists in all countries are deceiving the people by promising an early and just peace when they are actually prolonging the war of conquest. The Russian capitalists, who controlled the old Provisional Government and continue to control the new one, did not even wish to publish the secret predatory treaties ex-Tsar Nicholas Romanov concluded with the capitalists of Britain, France, and other countries with the object of wresting Constantinople from the Turks, Galicia from the Austrians, Armenia from the Turks, and so on. The Provisional Government has confirmed these treaties.

Our Party maintains that these treaties are just as criminal and predatory as the treaties the German brigand-capitalists and their brigand-Emperor Wilhelm have with their allies.

The blood of the workers and peasants must-not be shed for the sake of such predatory aims of the capitalists.

This criminal war must be brought to a speedy end, *not* by a separate peace with Germany, *but by a universal peace*, not by a capitalist peace, but by a peace of the working masses *against* the capitalists. There is only one way to do this, and that is by transferring all state power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies both in Russia and in other countries. Only such Soviets will be able effectively to prevent the capitalists from deceiving the peoples, and prevent the war being dragged on by the capitalists.

This brings me to the third and last of the questions I have mentioned: the question of state organisation.

Russia must become a democratic republic. Even the majority of the landowners and capitalists, who have always stood for the monarchy but now see that the people of Russia will on no account allow it to be restored, are in agreement with this. The capitalists now have directed all their efforts at making the Russian republic as much like a monarchy as possible so that it might be changed back into a monarchy with the least difficulty (this has happened time and again in many countries). For this purpose the capitalists want to preserve the bureaucracy, which stands *above* the people, to preserve the police and the standing army, which is separated from the people and commanded by non-elective generals and other officers. And the generals and other officers, unless they are elected, will almost invariably be landowners and capitalists. That much we know from the experience of all the republics in the world.

Our Party, the party of class-conscious workers and poor peasants, is therefore working for a democratic republic of another kind. We want a republic where there is no police that browbeats the people; where all officials, from the bottom up, are elective and displaceable whenever the people demand it, and are paid salaries not higher than the wages of a competent worker; where all army officers are similarly elective and where the standing army separated from the people and subordinated to classes alien to the people is replaced by the universally armed people, by a people's militia.

We want a republic where all state power, from the bottom up, belongs wholly and exclusively to the

Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies.

The workers and peasants are the majority of the population. The power must belong to them, not to the landowners or the capitalists.

The workers and peasants are the majority of the population. The power and the functions of administration must belong to *their Soviets*, not to the bureaucracy.

Such are our views, comrade peasant deputies. We are firmly convinced that experience will soon show the broad masses how erroneous the policy of the Narodniks and Mensheviks is. Experience will soon show the masses that compromise with the capitalists cannot save Russia, which, like Germany and other countries, is standing on the brink of disaster, cannot save the war-wearied peoples. The transfer of all state power directly to the majority of the population alone can save the peoples.

Petrograd, May 7, 1917

N. Lenin

Published May 24 (11), 1917
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THE "VIRTUAL ARMISTICE"

Novaya Zhizn for May 7 publishes interviews with ministers of the "new" government. Prime Minister Lvov has declared that "the country must have its weighty say and send its army into battle".

This is the sum and substance of the new government's "programme". An offensive, an offensive, an offensive!

Defending this imperialist programme, now accepted by the Chernovs and the Tseretelis, Minister Lvov in tones of deepest moral indignation fulminates against the "*virtual armistice that has been established at the front*"!

Let every Russian worker, let every peasant give careful thought to this programme of *offensive*, to these violent ministerial diatribes against the "virtual armistice".

Millions of people have been killed and crippled in the war. Untold sufferings have fallen to the lot of the people, particularly the working masses, as a result of the war. The capitalists are making scandalously high profits out of the war. The soldiers are utterly worn out.

What is wrong with a virtual armistice? What is wrong with having the slaughter stopped? What is wrong with the soldiers getting at least a brief respite?

We are told that an armistice has been established only on one front, and therefore there is a danger of a separate peace. But this argument does not hold water. If *neither* the Russian Government nor the Russian workers and peasants *want* a separate peace with the German capitalists (our Party, as we know, through *Pravda* and in the resolution passed at our Conference,* which spoke in the name of the

* See p. 272 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Party as a whole, has repeatedly protested against such a peace)—if no one in Russia wants a separate peace with separate capitalists, how then, by what miracle, can such a peace come? Who can impose it?

The objection is clearly untenable. It is sheer invention, an attempt to throw dust in our eyes.

Further, why should a virtual armistice on one front imply the "danger" of a separate peace on that front, *and not the danger of such an armistice spreading to all fronts*?

A virtual armistice is an unstable transitional state of affairs. This is incontrovertible. Transitional to what? It cannot lead to a separate peace so long as there is *no* mutual agreement between the two governments or two nations. But why could not such an armistice lead to a virtual truce on *all* fronts? Surely this is what *all* nations agree with, despite all or most of their governments!

Fraternisation on one front can and should lead to fraternisation on all fronts. A virtual armistice on one front can and should lead to a virtual armistice on all fronts.

The nations would thus gain a respite from the carnage. The revolutionary workers in *all* the countries would raise their heads still higher; their influence would increase, and faith in the possibility and necessity of a workers' revolution in the advanced capitalist countries would become strengthened.

What is wrong with such a transition? Why should we not help to bring it about as far as it is in our power to do so?

We may be told that a virtual armistice today on all fronts would help the German capitalists, who have snatched more loot than anybody else. This is not true . For one thing, the British capitalists have grabbed more (the German colonies in Africa, German islands in the Pacific, Mesopotamia, part of Syria, etc.) and, unlike the German capitalists, have lost nothing. Secondly, if the German capitalists had shown greater obstinacy than the British capitalists, the growth of the revolution in Germany would have only been accelerated. The revolution in Germany is obviously mounting. An offensive by the Russian troops would check this growth. The "virtual armistice" hastens the rise of this revolution.

Thirdly, what with growing hunger, ruin, and disorganisation. Germany is in desperate straits, being worse off than any other country, especially since the United States has entered the war. A "virtual armistice" would not remove *this* fundamental source of Germany's weakness; on the contrary, it is likely to improve the position of the other countries (greater freedom for bringing up supplies) while worsening that of the German capitalists (who have nowhere to bring supplies up from and will have greater difficulty in hiding the truth from the people).

The Russian people have two programmes to choose from. One is the programme of the capitalists, adopted by the Chernovs and Tseretelis. This is the programme of offensive, the programme for dragging out the imperialist war, dragging out the carnage.

The other programme is that of the world's revolutionary workers, advocated in Russia by our Party. This programme says: stimulate fraternisation (but do not permit the Germans to deceive the Russians); fraternise by means of proclamations; extend fraternisation and a virtual armistice to all fronts; help to spread these in every possible way, thereby hastening the proletarian revolution in all the countries, giving at least a temporary respite to the soldiers of all the belligerent countries; hasten in Russia the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, and thereby hasten the conclusion of a really just, really universal peace in the interests of the working people, and not in the interests of the capitalists.

Our government, with the Chernovs and Tseretelis, the Narodniks and the Mensheviks, is for the first programme.

The majority of the Russian nation and of all the nations within Russia (and outside Russia), i.e., the majority of the workers and poor peasants, undoubtedly stand for the second programme.

The victory of *this* second programme is drawing nearer every day.

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SECRETS OF FOREIGN POLICY

What a pity that the masses cannot read books on the history of diplomacy, or the editorials in the capitalist newspapers. And an even greater pity—though in this case pity is too feeble a word—that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik ministers and their ministeriable colleagues should maintain such a discreet silence on certain facts of diplomatic history and on the utterances of the "great diplomatic minds", though these are only too well known to them.

Rech quotes what it claims to be a reliable report in *Birzhevka* to the effect that Britain is quite prepared to renounce the "dismemberment of Turkey and partitioning of Austria-Hungary". In other words, Britain readily consents to Russia *not* getting the annexations promised her under earlier treaties (Constantinople, Armenia, Galicia). In *this* sense—and in this sense alone—Britain is prepared to revise the treaties.

And *Rech* waxes indignant:

"So this is the first result of the triumph of the new slogan [the slogan of peace without annexations and indemnities]. The agreements will very likely be revised: our Allies—not we—are already taking 'preparatory steps' towards that end. The result of this revision, however, will be not a uniform [mark this!] renunciation of the major objectives of all the Allies, but a one-sided [isn't that a gem?] renunciation of the objectives in South-Eastern Europe [read: in Austria and Turkey, i.e., the plundering of Armenia, Constantinople, Galicia] in favour of objectives in other areas and in the colonies, formulated not by us but by our Allies.

"In particular, there have been press reports suggesting that our Allies might abandon their objectives in Asia Minor. True, there is so far no official confirmation of the statements to that effect said to have been made by Albert Thomas in the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and reported in the Moscow press. It would be difficult, however, to expect any such action as far as Britain is concerned.

For Britain takes the correct view that possession is nine-tenths of the law [mark this!] and her troops are already occupying parts of Mesopotamia and Palestine which are of vital interest to her [read: to her capitalists]. In these circumstances, Britain's refusal to fight for the vital interests of the *other* [*Rech*'s italics] Allies would, of course, likewise be a one-sided act advantageous to her alone."

Truly, Milyukov, or whoever it was wrote these lines, deserves to have a monument set up to him in his lifetime ... for frankness. Bravo, candid *Rech* diplomats! (And why are they candid? Because they were angered at Milyukov being deprived of his portfolio.)

Everything that has been said in the lines quoted above is the truth, a truth confirmed by the recent history of diplomacy *and the history of foreign investments*. Britain at any rate will not renounce the seizure (annexation) of Palestine and Mesopotamia, though she is prepared to punish the Russians (for the "virtual armistice" on the Russian-German front) by denying them Galicia, Constantinople, Armenia, etc. That, in plain, non-diplomatic language, is the meaning of these statements in *Rech*.

And the Russian capitalists for whom *Rech* speaks can barely hold back their anger. Foaming at the mouth, they are blurting out the secrets of foreign policy and taking digs at the British capitalists: what you are doing is "one-sided", it is to your "advantage", and to the disadvantage of *others*.

Comrades, workers and soldiers! Consider these strikingly frank and strikingly truthful statements of *Rech*, coming from *well*-informed diplomats and former ministers, consider this excellent exposure of the *real aims* which not only the Russian, but the British capitalists, too, are pursuing in the war.

Russian soldiers! Do you want to fight to help the British capitalists seize Mesopotamia and Palestine? Do you want to support the Russian Government of Lvov, Chernov, Tereshchenko, Tsereteli, a government bound by the interests of the capitalists and *afraid* openly to state the true facts which have been blurted out by *Rech*?

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to the text in *Pravda*

ONE OF THE SECRET TREATIES

We all know that the "revolutionary" Provisional Government's first word on foreign policy was the declaration that all secret treaties concluded by ex-Tsar Nicholas II with the "Allied" capitalists remained in force, and that the new Russia would regard them as sacred and inviolable.

We know, furthermore, that our "defencists" vehemently support the Milyukovs' refusal to publish the secret treaties. These so-called socialists have sunk so low as to defend secret diplomacy, and the secret diplomacy of the ex-tsar at that.

Why do the supporters of the imperialist war guard the secret of these treaties so zealously?

Do you want to know why, comrade workers and soldiers?

Familiarise yourselves with at least one of these noble treaties—"our" treaty with Italy (i.e., with the Italian capitalists) signed at the beginning of 1915.

On the basis of material published in *Novoye Vremya*, Mr. V. Vodovozov, a bourgeois democrat, reveals in *Dyen* (for May 6, 1917) the contents of that treaty:

"The Allies have guaranteed Italy Southern Tyrol with Trient, the entire coastline, and the northern part of Dalmatia with the towns of Zara and Spalato, the central part of Albania with Valona, the Aegean islands off the coast of Asia Minor, as well as a profitable railway concession in Asiatic Turkey—such is the price for which Italy has traded her blood. These annexations exceed any national claims ever advanced by Italy many times over. In addition to regions with an Italian population (Southern Tyrol and Trieste) of nearly 600,000, Italy, under this treaty, is to receive territories with a population of over a million who are absolutely alien to Italy ethnographically and in point of religion. These include, for instance, Dalmatia, 97 per cent of whose population are Serbs and only slightly over 2 per cent Italians. It is only natural that this treaty with Italy, concluded without

the knowledge or consent of Serbia, should have provoked such bitterness and resentment in that country. Pašić, speaking in the Skupshtina, expressed the hope that the rumours concerning the treaty were false, since Italy herself had united in the name of the principle of national unity, and could not therefore do anything that was likely to strike at the very roots of that principle. But Pašić was wrong; the treaty was concluded.

"This is the only treaty concerning the present war whose contents we know of, and this treaty is grossly predatory. Whether similar predatory instincts are or are not reflected in the other treaties, we do not know. At any rate, it is extremely important that democracy, on whose banner is inscribed 'peace without annexations', should know this."

"We do not know" to what extent the other secret treaties are predatory? No, Mr. Vodovozov, we know it very well: the secret treaties concerning the carve-up of Persia and Turkey, the seizure of Galicia and Armenia are just as dirty and predatory as the rapacious treaty with Italy.

Comrade soldiers and workers! You are told that you are defending "freedom" and the "revolution"! In reality you are defending the shady treaties of the tsar, which are concealed from you as one conceals a secret disease.

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May 23 (10), 1917

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to the text in *Pravda*

MINISTERIAL TONE

The editors of *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet have adopted a ministerial tone. They do not like *Pravda*; they condemn it for its "sharp attacks against the Provisional Government".

To criticise what he doesn't like is the sacred right of every publicist. But why make oneself ridiculous by dispensing ministerial censure for our "attacks" without criticising the issues we raise? Would it not be better to analyse our arguments, or at least one of our resolutions, or at least one of our statements on the class struggle?

"The country *today* is heading for ruin," says *Izvestia*'s editorial. Correct. For that very reason it would be unwise today to rely on the conciliatory policy of the petty bourgeoisie, the Narodniks and the Mensheviks, with regard to the capitalists. The country cannot be saved from ruin in that way.

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May 23 (10), 1917

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to the text in *Pravda*

IN SEARCH OF A NAPOLEON

The newspaper of ex-Minister Milyukov is so furious with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries for having forced certain individuals out of the cabinet that it lets itself be forced into making rather "indiscreet" statements.

"How can we tolerate such criminal propaganda?"— we read in an unsigned article of May 9 on the question of fraternisation. "Will this never be put a stop to? Must we have a Napoleon? Must we be content with more talk about iron discipline?"

A delicate, a very delicate hint alluding to Kerensky's notorious words about iron discipline.

Rech gives its readers a true and accurate picture of what is going on in "our" "new" government. We thank *Rech* from the bottom of our hearts for this truthfulness, which is exceptionally rare in such a newspaper and which has been called forth by exceptional circumstances.

In the "new" government Kerensky, supported by Chernov and Tsereteli, proclaims "iron discipline" for the army (in order to carry out the imperialist programme for an offensive).

And the landowners and capitalists, who have ten out of the sixteen posts in the cabinet, fume at Kerensky: "Must we be content with mere talk about iron discipline?"

Is it not clear that this phrase is calculated to inspire Kerensky or some "suitable" general to take upon himself the role of a Napoleon, the role of a strangler of freedom, the role of an executioner of the workers?

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NOTHING HAS CHANGED

Now that "socialists" have become members of the cabinet,[101] things will be different, the defencists have been assuring us. It did not take more than a few days to reveal the falsity of these assurances.

We all know what indignation was aroused among the soldiers and workers by ex-Minister Milyukov's statement that he had no intention of publishing the secret treaties which ex-Tsar Nicholas II had concluded with the British and French capitalists. And now, what does Mr. Tereshchenko, the *new* Minister of Foreign Affairs, the associate of Skobelev and Tsereteli, have to say on this question?

Tereshchenko admits that "this question [i.e., the secret treaties] arouses passions". But what does he do to cool these passions? He simply *repeats* what Milyukov, who has just been deposed, said before him.

"Immediate publication of the treaties would amount to a break with the Allies," Tereshchenko declared in a statement to the press.

And the "socialist" ministers are silent and condone the system of secret diplomacy.

The coalition cabinet has brought no changes. The tsar's secret treaties remain sacred to it.

And you, gentlemen, want this not to "arouse passions"? What do you take the class-conscious workers and soldiers for? Or do you really regard them as "rebellious slaves"?

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A REGRETTABLE DEVIATION FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY

Today's *Izvestia* carries a report of the meeting of the Soldiers' Section of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. This meeting, among other things,

"considered the question of whether *soldiers could perform the duties of militiamen*. The Executive Committee proposed to the meeting a resolution to the following effect;

"'In view of the fact that soldiers must perform their *direct* duty, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies *declares against the soldiers' participation* in the militia, and proposes that all soldiers serving in the militia be *immediately returned to their units*.'

"After a brief debate, the resolution was passed with an *amendment* permitting soldiers *discharged from active service as well as wounded soldiers* to perform militia duties."

It is to be regretted that the exact texts of the resolution and the amendment have not been published. More regrettable still is the fact that the Executive Committee proposed and the meeting adopted a resolution which is a complete abandonment of the fundamental principles of democracy.

There is hardly a democratic party in Russia that does not include in its programme a demand for the universal arming of the people as a substitute for the standing army. There is hardly a Socialist-Revolutionary or a Menshevik Social-Democrat who would dare oppose such a demand. The trouble is that it has become a "custom" "nowadays", under the cover of high-sounding phrases about "revolutionary democracy", to accept democratic (the more so socialist) programmes "in principle", but reject them in practice.

To oppose the participation of soldiers in the militia on the ground that "soldiers must perform their direct duty" is to forget completely the principles of democracy and

involuntarily, unconsciously, perhaps, to adopt the idea of a standing army. The soldier is a professional; his direct duty is *not* social service at all—such is the point of view of those who are for a standing army. It is not a democratic point of view. It is the point of view of the Napoleons. It is the point of view of the supporters of the old regime and the capitalists, who dream of an easy transition backward, from a republic to a constitutional monarchy.

A democrat is opposed to such a view on principle. Soldiers' participation in the militia amounts to breaking down the wall that separates the army from the people. It amounts to breaking with the accursed "barrack" past where a special group of citizens, detached from and opposed to the people, were trained, "knocked into shape" and drilled for the "direct task" of following only a military profession. Soldiers' participation in the militia is a cardinal issue involving the re-education of the "soldiers" into militiamen citizens, the re-education of the population into public-spirited armed citizens. Democracy will remain an idle deceitful phrase, or merely a half-measure, unless the *entire* people is given a chance immediately and unqualifiedly to learn how to handle arms. Without the systematic, regular, and widespread participation of the soldiers in the militia this will be impossible.

The objection may be raised that soldiers should not be *deflected* from their *direct* duties. No one said they should. To make a point of this is as ridiculous as saying that a physician engaged at the bedside of a patient who is dangerously ill has no right to leave that bedside in order to go and hand in his voting-paper, or that a worker engaged in production, which admittedly must not be interrupted, has no right to go away to exercise his political rights until he is relieved by another worker. Such arguments would simply be frivolous and even unscrupulous.

Participation in the militia is one of the cardinal and basic principles of democracy, one of the most important guarantees of freedom. (We might add, parenthetically, that there is no better way of enhancing the purely military strength and capacity of the army than by substituting the universal arming of the people for the standing army, and by using the soldiers to instruct the people; this method has always been

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

used and always will be used in every truly revolutionary war.) The immediate, unqualified, universal organisation of a people's militia and the widest participation of soldiers in that militia are in the vital interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, that is to say, the vast majority of the population, a majority that is not interested in safeguarding the profits of the landowners and the capitalists.

Written May 10 (23), 1917
Published May 25 (12), 1917 in *Pravda* No. 55

Published according to the newspaper text

ON THE QUESTION OF CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL, SO-CALLED SOCIALIST CONFERENCE JOINTLY WITH THE SOCIAL-CHAUVINISTS

Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet published today the Executive Committee's "Terms of Reference" for the organisation of a commission for convening an international conference. Our Party, among others, is asked to send a representative to the commission. Needless to say, our Party will take no part either in the commission or in any joint conference with so-called socialist ministers who have gone over to their bourgeoisie. This should be well known to anyone who has taken any interest in our Party, or who has read our resolution concerning the state of affairs in the International.

Our Party's Central Committee unanimously decided a few days ago to send a delegate to the forthcoming Zimmerwald Conference with instructions to immediately walk out of that Conference and withdraw from the Zimmerwald group in the event of the Conference declaring in favour of any association or joint discussion with the social-chauvinists.

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Published according
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SPEECH AT A MEETING AT THE PUTILOV WORKS MAY 12 (25), 1917

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin set forth the Bolsheviks' views on the war, on peace, and the coalition government.

In the first part of his speech Lenin briefly stated the reasons for his journey via Germany, then passed on to the war and made clear its predatory nature. He then dwelt on the question of how to end the war and developed the idea that the only way of doing this was by an alliance of the workers of all the belligerent countries.

Lenin next dealt with the question as to what stood in the way of such an alliance and outlined the road by which such an alliance of the workers could and should be achieved.

The way to this was not by an agreement between the workers and the capitalists, and between the soldier-peasants and the landowners, but by a struggle of the workers and peasants against their oppressors.

The coalition government was an agreement between the socialists and the capitalists, it meant suppression of the revolution.

Seizure of power by the workers and the peasants could solve our country's most pressing problems for her—the problem of the land, of its transfer to the peasants, and other questions connected with the war, such as food supply, improving the condition of the workers, etc.

Soldatskaya Pravda No. 26,
June 1 (May 19), 1917

Published according
to the newspaper text

THE PROLETARIAN PARTY AT THE DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS

Our Party is going to the polls with its own lists of candidates. According to preliminary reports received by the Secretariat of the Central Committee these lists have been made up without any blocs in 4 out of 12 districts (Moskovsky, Rozhdestvenskoye, Kolpino, and Porokhovo districts). In all the other districts we are forming blocs *only* with the internationalists, specifically, in 6 districts (Vtoroi Gorodskoi, Narvsky, Petrogradkaya Storona, Moskovsky, Pervy Gorodskoi and Vasilyevsky Ostrov districts) with the "Inter-District" Organisation[102] (who, as we know, have most emphatically condemned the Narodniks and Mensheviks for joining the capitalist cabinet); in 4 districts (Vyborgsky, Nevsky, Pervy Gorodskoi and Vasilyevsky Ostrov districts) with the internationalist Mensheviks opposed to "socialist" ministerialism[103]; and in 1 district (Nevsky) with internationalists from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, who condemn their party's "ministerialism".

This co-operation with internationalists from other parties is fully in keeping with the decisions of our conferences (the Petrograd and the All-Russia conferences) and with the basic policy of the proletarian party aimed against petty-bourgeois defencism and Menshevik and Narodnik ministerialism.

The "Left bloc" propaganda, carried on, among others, by *Novaya Zhizn*, obviously could not alter our Party's decision. The view that the municipal elections "are not of such a pronounced political character" (as the elections to the

Constituent Assembly) is wrong, basically wrong. It is just as wrong to maintain that "the municipal programmes of the different socialist [?] parties differ very little from one another". To repeat such odd statements without answering *Pravda*'s arguments is to dodge an important issue or simply to haul down the flag.

To narrow the elections in the capital down to a purely (or even predominantly) "municipal" programme at a time of revolution is grotesquely ridiculous. It flies in the face of all revolutionary experience. It is an insult to the common sense of the workers, who know only too well that Petrograd's is a leading role, sometimes a *decisive* one.

The Cadets unite all the Rights, the whole counter-revolution, all the landowners and capitalists. They support the government and want to see revolutionary Petrograd playing second fiddle to the government of the capitalists, who have ten ministers to the Narodniks' and Mensheviks' six.

Opposed to the Cadets, the chauvinists, the supporters of war for the Straits, there is the party of the proletariat, which, definitely hostile as it is to imperialism, is the only party capable of breaking with the interests of Capital and implementing serious revolutionary measures, without which it is *impossible* to help the working masses at a moment of imminent catastrophe of gigantic proportions. Without revolutionary measures there can be *no* salvation. Without a workers' militia as a step towards the immediate creation of a people's militia, it is *impossible*, even with the best will in the world, to carry out such measures, in particular to do away with queues and the disorganisation in the matter of food supply.

As for the middle-of-the-road line taken by the petty bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Narodniks, who proclaim good intentions and weaken themselves by making a deal with and submitting to the capitalists (6 ministers against 10!)—this line is a dead thing. The masses will soon learn this from experience, even if they do, for a time, believe in "agreements" with the capitalists.

All those who really stand for the interests of the working masses, for doing away with the police and having it

replaced by a people's militia, all those who stand for serious revolutionary measures to cope with the crisis and save the country from an unprecedented debacle, should vote for the lists of candidates of the proletarian party—the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks).

Pravda No. 56,
May 26 (13), 1917

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STATEMENTS ABOUT THE WAR MADE BY OUR PARTY BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

The statements dealing with the possible victory of a chauvinist (defencist) revolution are of particular interest. *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic. Labour Party published in Geneva under the editorship of Zinoviev and Lenin, carried the following statement of its editors in its issue No. 47 for October 13, 1915:

"(8) By revolutionary chauvinists we mean those who want a victory over tsarism so as to achieve victory over Germany, plunder other countries, consolidate Great-Russian rule over the other peoples of Russia, etc. Revolutionary chauvinism is based on the class position of the petty bourgeoisie. The latter always vacillates between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. At present it is vacillating between chauvinism (which prevents it from being consistently revolutionary, even within the meaning of a democratic revolution) and proletarian internationalism. At the moment the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *Nasha Zarya*,[104] Chkheidze's Duma group,[105] the Organising Committee, Mr. Plekhanov and the like are political spokesmen for this petty bourgeoisie in Russia.

"(9) If the revolutionary chauvinists won in Russia, we would be opposed to a defence of *their* 'fatherland' in the present war. Our slogan is: against the chauvinists, even if they are revolutionary and republican—*against* them, and *for* an alliance of the international proletariat for the socialist revolution.

"(10) To the question of whether it is possible for the proletariat to assume the leadership in the bourgeois Russian revolution, our answer is: yes, it is possible, *if* the petty

bourgeoisie swings to the left at the decisive moment; it is being pushed to the left, not only by our propaganda, but by a number of objective factors, economic, financial (the burden of war), military, political, and others.

"(11) To the question of what the party of the proletariat would do if the revolution placed power in its hands in the present war, our answer is as follows: we would propose peace to *all* the belligerents on the condition that freedom is given to the colonies and *all* peoples that are dependent, oppressed and deprived of rights. Under the present governments, neither Germany nor Britain and France would accept this condition. In that case, we would have to prepare for and wage a revolutionary war, i.e., not only resolutely carry out the whole of our minimum programme, but work systematically to bring about an uprising among all peoples now oppressed by the Great Russians, all colonies and dependent countries in Asia (India, China, Persia, etc.), and also, first and foremost, we would raise up the socialist proletariat of Europe for an insurrection against their governments and despite the social-chauvinists. There is no doubt that a victory of the proletariat in Russia would create extraordinarily favourable conditions for the development of the revolution in both Asia and Europe. *Even* 1905 proved that. The international solidarity of the revolutionary proletariat is a *fact*, despite the scum of opportunism and social-chauvinism."*

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 403-04.—*Ed.*

IMPENDING DEBACLE

News, speculation, apprehensions and rumours of an impending disaster are becoming more and more frequent. The capitalist newspapers are trying to frighten people; they are fulminating against the Bolsheviks and making play of Kutler's cryptic allusions to "a certain" factory, to "certain" factories, to "a certain" enterprise, and so forth. Peculiar methods, strange "proofs". Why not *name* a definite factory? Why not give the public *and the workers* a chance to verify these rumours, which are deliberately calculated to excite alarm?

It should not be difficult for the capitalists to understand that by withholding the exact facts about definite specified factories they are only making themselves ridiculous. Why, gentlemen—you capitalists are the government, you have ten out of the sixteen ministers, you bear the responsibility, you give the orders. Is it not ridiculous that people who run the government, people who have a majority in it, should confine themselves to Kutler's anonymous references, should be afraid to come out in the open and should try to shift responsibility to other parties that are not at the helm of the state?

The newspapers of the petty-bourgeois parties, the Narodniks and Mensheviks, are also complaining, though in a somewhat different tone. They do not so much level accusations against the terrible Bolsheviks (that, of course, is all in the day's work) as heap one good wish upon another. Most typical in this respect is *Izvestia*, which is run by a bloc of the two above-named parties. In its issue No. 63 for May 11 are two articles on the subject of combating economic chaos. The articles are identical in character. One of them,

to put it mildly, is injudiciously headed (altogether as "injudicious" as the very fact of the Narodniks and Mensheviks joining the imperialist cabinet): "What Does the Provisional Government Want?" It would have been more correct to say: "What the Provisional Government Does *Not* Want and What It Promises."

The other article is a "resolution of the Economic Department of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies". Here are some quotations from it, best illustrative of its contents:

> "Many branches of industry are ripe for a state trade monopoly (grain, meat, salt, leather), others are ripe for the organisation of state-controlled trusts (coal, oil, metallurgy, sugar, paper); and, finally, present conditions demand in the case of nearly all branches of industry state control of the distribution of raw materials and manufactures, as well as price fixing.... Simultaneously, it is necessary to place all banking institutions under state and public control in order to combat speculation in goods subject to state control.... At the same time, the most energetic measures should be taken against the workshy, even if labour conscription has to be introduced for that purpose.... The country is already in a state of catastrophe, and the only thing that can save it is the creative effort of the whole nation *headed by a government* which has consciously shouldered [hem, hem!] the stupendous task of rescuing a country ruined by war and the tsarist regime."

With the exception of the last phrase beginning with the words we have italicised, a phrase which with purely philistine credulity places on the "shoulders" of the capitalists tasks they are incapable of fulfilling, the programme is an excellent one. We have here control, state-controlled trusts, the combating of speculation, labour conscription—in what way does this differ from "terrible" Bolshevism, what more could these "terrible" Bolsheviks want?

That is just the point, that is the crux of the matter, that is just what petty bourgeois and philistines of all shades and colours stubbornly refuse to see. They are *forced* to accept the programme of "terrible" Bolshevism, because no other programme offers a way out of the really calamitous debacle that is impending. *But*—there is this but—the capitalists "accept" this programme (see the famous § 3 of the declaration of the "new" Provisional Government[106]) *in order not to carry it out*. And the Narodniks and Mensheviks trust the capitalists, and encourage the people to share this

fatal trust. That is the sum and substance of the political situation.

Control over the trusts, with publication of their full reports, with immediate conferences of their employees, with the unqualified participation in this control of the *workers themselves*, with independent control on the part of representatives of every important political party—all this can be introduced by decree which can be drafted in a *single day*.

What is the difficulty then, Citizens Shingaryovs, Tereshchenkos, Konovalovs? What is stopping you, citizens, near-socialist ministers Chernov and Tsereteli? What is stopping you, Citizens Narodnik and Menshevik leaders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?

Neither we nor anybody else could have proposed anything but the *immediate* establishment of such control over the trusts, banks, trade, food supply, and the *workshy* (a surprisingly good word to come from the pen of the *Izvestia* editors!). Nothing better could be devised than "the creative effort of the whole nation".

Only we must not trust the word of the capitalists; we must not believe the naïve (at best, naïve) hope of the Mensheviks and Narodniks that the capitalists can establish such control.

A debacle is impending. Disaster is imminent. The capitalists are heading all countries to destruction. There is only one way out: revolutionary discipline, revolutionary measures by the *revolutionary class*, the proletarians and semi-proletarians, the transfer of all power in the state to that class, a class that is really capable of instituting such control, that is able to cope effectively with the "workshy".

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WAR AND REVOLUTION

A LECTURE DELIVERED MAY 14 (27), 1917

The question of war and revolution has been dealt with so often lately in the press and at every public meeting that probably many of you are not only familiar with many aspects of the question but have come to find them tedious. I have not yet had a single opportunity to address or even attend any Party or for that matter any public meetings in this district, and therefore I run the risk, perhaps, of repetition or of not dealing in sufficient detail with those aspects of the question that interest you most.

It seems to me that the most important thing that is usually overlooked in the question of the war, a key issue to which insufficient attention is paid and over which there is so much dispute—useless, hopeless, idle dispute, I should say—is the question of the class character of the war: what caused that war, what classes are waging it, and what historical and historico-economic conditions gave rise to it. As far as I have been able to follow the way the question of the war is dealt with at public and Party meetings, I have come to the conclusion that the reason why there is so much misunderstanding on the subject is because, all too often, when dealing with the question of the war, we speak in entirely different languages.

From the point of view of Marxism, that is, of modern scientific socialism, the main issue in any discussion by socialists on how to assess the war and what attitude to adopt towards it is this: what is the war being waged for, and what classes staged and directed it. We Marxists do not belong to that category of people who are unqualified opponents of all war. We say: our aim is to achieve a socialist

system of society, which, by eliminating the division of mankind into classes, by eliminating all exploitation of man by man and nation by nation, will inevitably eliminate the very possibility of war. But in the war to win that socialist system of society we are bound to encounter conditions under which the class struggle within each given nation may come up against a war between the different nations, a war conditioned by this very class struggle. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility of revolutionary wars, i.e., wars arising from the class struggle, wars waged by revolutionary classes, wars which are of direct and immediate revolutionary significance. Still less can we rule this out when we remember that though the history of European revolutions during the last century, in the course of 125-135 years, say, gave us wars which were mostly reactionary, it also gave us revolutionary wars, such as the war of the French revolutionary masses against a united monarchist, backward, feudal and semi-feudal Europe. No deception of the masses is more widespread today in Western Europe, and latterly here in Russia, too, than that which is practised by citing the example of revolutionary wars. There are wars and wars. We must be clear as to what historical conditions have given rise to the war, what classes are waging it, and for what ends. Unless we grasp this, all our talk about the war will necessarily be utterly futile, engendering more heat than light. That is why I take the liberty, seeing that you have chosen war and revolution as the subject of today's talk, to deal with this aspect of the matter at greater length.

We all know the dictum of Clausewitz, one of the most famous writers on the philosophy and history of war, which says: "War is a continuation of policy by other means."[107] This dictum comes from a writer who reviewed the history of wars and drew philosophic lessons from it shortly after the period of the Napoleonic wars. This writer, whose basic views are now undoubtedly familiar to every thinking person, nearly eighty years ago challenged the ignorant man-in-the-street conception of war as being a thing apart from the policies of the governments and classes concerned, as being a simple attack that disturbs the peace, and is then followed by restoration of the peace thus disturbed, as much as to say: "They had a fight, then they made up!" This is a

grossly ignorant view, one that was repudiated scores of years ago and is repudiated by any more or less careful analysis of any historical epoch of wars.

War is a continuation of policy by other means. All wars are inseparable from the political systems that engender them. The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed.

War is a continuation of policy by other means. When the French revolutionary townspeople and revolutionary peasants overthrew the monarchy at the close of the eighteenth century by revolutionary means and established a democratic republic—when they made short work of their monarch, and short work of their landowners, too, in a revolutionary fashion—that policy of the revolutionary class was bound to shake all the rest of autocratic, tsarist, imperial, and semi-feudal Europe to its foundations. And the inevitable continuation of this policy of the victorious revolutionary class in France was the wars in which all the monarchist nations of Europe, forming their famous coalition, lined up against revolutionary France in a counter-revolutionary war. Just as within the country the revolutionary people of France had then, for the first time, displayed revolutionary energy on a scale it had never shown for centuries, so in the war at the close of the eighteenth century it revealed a similar gigantic revolutionary creativeness when it remodelled its whole system of strategy, broke with all the old rules and traditions of warfare, replaced the old troops with a new revolutionary people's army, and created new methods of warfare. This example, to my mind, is noteworthy in that it clearly demonstrates to us things which the bourgeois journalists are now always forgetting when they pander to the philistine prejudices and ignorance of the backward masses who do not understand this intimate economic and historical connection between every kind of war and the preceding policy of every country, every class that ruled before the war and achieved its ends by so-called "peaceful" means. So-called, because the brute force required to ensure "peaceful" rule in the colonies, for example, can hardly be called peaceful.

Peace reigned in Europe, but this was because domination over hundreds of millions of people in the colonies by the European nations was sustained only through constant, incessant, interminable wars, which we Europeans do not regard as wars at all, since all too often they resembled, not wars, but brutal massacres, the wholesale slaughter of unarmed peoples The thing is that if we want to know what the present war is about we must first of all make a general survey of the policies of the European powers as a whole. We must not take this or that example, this or that particular case, which can easily be wrenched out of the context of social phenomena and which is worthless, because an opposite example can just as easily be cited. We must take the whole policy of the entire system of European states in their economic and political interrelations if we are to understand how the present war steadily and inevitably grew out of this system.

We are constantly witnessing attempts, especially on the part of the capitalist press—whether monarchist or republican—to read into the present war an historical meaning which it does not possess. For example, no device is more frequently resorted to in the French Republic than that of presenting this war on France's part as a continuation and counterpart of the wars of the Great French Revolution of 1792. No device for hoodwinking the French masses, the French workers and the workers of all countries is more widespread than that of applying to our epoch the "jargon" of that other epoch and some of its watchwords, or the attempt to present matters as though now, too, republican France is defending her liberty against the monarchy. One "minor" fact overlooked is that then, in 1792, war was waged in France by a revolutionary class, which had carried out an unparalleled revolution and displayed unmatched heroism in utterly destroying the French monarchy and rising against a united monarchist Europe with the sole and single aim of carrying on its revolutionary struggle.

The war in France was a continuation of the policy of the revolutionary class which had carried out the revolution, won the republic, settled accounts' with the French capitalists and landowners with unprecedented vigour, and was waging a revolutionary war against a united monarchist Europe in continuation of that policy.

What we have at present is primarily two leagues, two groups of capitalist powers. We have before us all the world's greatest capitalist powers—Britain, France, America, and Germany—who for decades have doggedly pursued a policy of incessant economic rivalry aimed at achieving world suprermacy, subjugating the small nations, and making threefold and tenfold profits on banking capital, which has caught the whole world in the net of its influence. That is what Britain's and Germany's policies really amount to. I stress this fact. This fact can never be emphasised strongly enough, because if we forget this we shall never understand what this war is about, and we shall then be easy game for any bourgeois publicist who tries to foist lying phrases on us.

The real policies of the two groups of capitalist giants—Britain and Germany, who, with their respective allies, have taken the field against each other—policies which they were pursuing for decades before the war, should be studied and grasped in their entirety. If we did not do this we should not only be neglecting an essential requirement of scientific socialism and of all social science in general, but we should be unable to understand anything whatever about the present war. We should be putting ourselves in the power of Milyukov, that deceiver, who is stirring up chauvinism and hatred of one nation for another by methods which are applied everywhere without exception, methods which Clausewitz wrote about eighty years ago when he ridiculed the very view some people are holding today, namely, that the nations lived in peace and then they started fighting. As if this were true! How can a war be accounted for without considering its bearing on the preceding policy of the given state, of the given system of states, the given classes? I repeat: this is a basic point which is constantly overlooked. Failure to understand it makes nine-tenths of all war discussions mere wrangling, so much verbiage. We say: if you have not studied the policies of both belligerent groups over a period of decades—so as to avoid accidental factors and the quoting of random examples—if you have not shown what bearing this war has on preceding policies, then you don't understand what this war is all about.

These policies show us just one thing—continuous economic rivalry between the world's two greatest giants, capitalist

economies. On the one hand we have Britain, a country which owns the greater part of the globe, a country which ranks first in wealth, which has created this wealth not so much by the labour of its workers as by the exploitation of innumerable colonies, by the vast power of its banks which have developed at the head of all the others into an insignificantly small group of some four or five super-banks handling billions of rubles, and handling them in such a way that it can be said without exaggeration that there is not a patch of land in the world today on which this capital has not laid its heavy hand, not a patch of land which British capital has not enmeshed by a thousand threads. This capital grew to such dimensions by the turn of the century that its activities extended far beyond the borders of individual states and formed a group of giant banks possessed of fabulous wealth. Having begotten this tiny group of banks, it has caught the whole world in the net of its billions. This is the sum and substance of Britain's economic policy and of the economic policy of France, of which even French writers, some of them contributors to *L'Humanité*,[108] a paper now controlled by ex-socialists (in fact, no less a man than Lysis, the well-known financial writer), stated several years before the war: "France is a financial monarchy, France is a financial oligarchy, France is the world's money-lender."

On the other hand, opposed to this, mainly Anglo-French group, we have another group of capitalists, an even more rapacious, even more predatory one, a group who came to the capitalist banqueting table when all the seats were occupied, but who introduced into the struggle new methods for developing capitalist production, improved techniques, and superior organisation, which turned the old capitalism, the capitalism of the free-competition age, into the capitalism of giant trusts, syndicates, and cartels. This group introduced the beginnings of state-controlled capitalist production, combining the colossal power of capitalism with the colossal power of the state into a single mechanism and bringing tens of millions of people within the single organisation of state capitalism. Here is economic history, here is diplomatic history, covering several decades, from which no one can get away. It is the one and only guide-post to a proper solution of the problem of war; it leads you to the

conclusion that the present war, too, is the outcome of the policies of the classes who have come to grips in it, of the two supreme giants, who, long before the war, had caught the whole world, all countries, in the net of financial exploitation and economically divided the globe up among themselves. They were bound to clash, because a redivision of this supremacy, from the point of view of capitalism, had become inevitable.

The old division was based on the fact that Britain, in the course of several centuries, had ruined her former competitors. A former competitor was Holland, which had dominated the whole world. Another was France, which had fought for supremacy for nearly a hundred years. After a series of protracted wars Britain was able, by virtue of her economic power, her merchant capital, to establish her unchallenged sway over the world. In 1871 a new predator appeared, a new capitalist power arose, which developed at an incomparably faster pace than Britain. That is a basic fact. You will not find a book on economic history that does not acknowledge this indisputable fact—the fact of Germany's faster development. This rapid development of capitalism in Germany was the development of a young strong predator, who appeared in the concert of European powers and said: "You ruined Holland, you defeated France, you have helped yourself to half the world—now be good enough to let us have our fair share." What does "a fair share" mean? How is it to be determined in the capitalist world, in the world of banks? There power is determined by the number of banks, there power is determined in the way described by a mouthpiece of the American multimillionaires, which declared with typically American frankness and typically American cynicism: "The war in Europe is being waged for world domination. To dominate the world two things are needed: dollars and banks. We have the dollars, we shall make the banks and we shall dominate the world." This statement was made by a leading newspaper of the American multimillionaires. I must say, there is a thousand times more truth in this cynical statement of a blustering American multimillionaire than in thousands of articles by bourgeois liars who try to make out that this war is being waged for national interests, on national issues, and utter similar glaring-

ly patent lies which dismiss history completely and take an isolated example like the case of the German beast of prey who attacked Belgium. The case is undoubtedly a real one. This group of predators did attack Belgium with brutal ferocity, but it did the same thing the other group did yesterday by other means and is doing today to other nations.

When we argue about annexations—and this bears on the question I have been trying briefly to explain to you as the history of the economic and diplomatic relations which led up to the present war—when we argue about annexations we always forget that these, generally, are what the war is being waged for; it is for the carve-up of conquered territories, or, to put it more popularly, for the division of the plundered spoils by the two robber gangs. When we argue about annexations we constantly meet with methods which, scientifically speaking, do not stand up to criticism, and which, as methods of public journalism, are deliberate humbug. Ask a Russian chauvinist or social-chauvinist what annexation by Germany means, and he will give you an excellent explanation, because he understands that perfectly well. But he will never answer a request for a general definition of annexation that will fit them all—Germany, Britain, and Russia. He will never do that! And when *Rech* (to pass from theory to practice) sneered at *Pravda*, saying, "These Pravdists consider Kurland a case of annexation! How can you talk to such people!" and we answered: "Please give us such a definition of annexation as would apply to the Germans, the English, and the Russians, and we add that either you evade this issue or we shall expose you on the spot"*—*Rech* kept silent. We maintain that no newspaper, either of the chauvinists in general, who simply say that the fatherland must be defended, or of the social-chauvinists, has ever given a definition of annexation that would fit both Germany and Russia, that would be applicable to any side. It cannot do this for the simple reason that this war is the continuation of a policy of annexations, that is, a policy of conquest, of capitalist robbery on the part of both groups involved in the war. Obviously, the question of which of these two robbers was the first to draw the knife is of small account

* See pp. 35-36 of this volume.—*Ed.*

to us. Take the history of the naval and military expenditures of these two groups over a period of decades, take the history of the little wars they waged before the big war—"little" because few Europeans died in those wars, whereas hundreds of thousands of people belonging to the nations they were subjugating died in them, nations which from their point of view could not be regarded as nations at all (you couldn't very well call those Asians and Africans nations!); the wars waged against these nations were wars against unarmed people, who were simply shot down, machine-gunned. Can you call them wars? Strictly speaking they were not wars at all, and you could forget about them. That is their attitude to this downright deception of the masses.

The present war is a continuation of the policy of conquest, of the shooting down of whole nationalities, of unbelievable atrocities committed by the Germans and the British in Africa, and by the British and the Russians in Persia—which of them committed most it is difficult to say. It was for this reason that the German capitalists looked upon them as their enemies. Ah, they said, you are strong because you are rich? But we are stronger, therefore we have the same "sacred" right to plunder. That is what the real history of British and German finance capital in the course of several decades preceding the war amounts to. That is what the history of Russo-German, Russo-British, and German-British relations amounts to. There you have the clue to an understanding of what the war is about. That is why the story that is current about the cause of the war is sheer duplicity and humbug. Forgetting the history of finance capital, the history of how this war had been brewing over the issue of redivision, they present the matter like this: two nations were living at peace, then one attacked the other, and the other fought back. All science, all banks are forgotten, and the peoples are told to take up arms, and so are the peasants, who know nothing about politics. All they have to do is to fight back! The logical thing, following this line of argument, would he to close down all newspapers, burn all books and ban all mention of annexations in the press. In this way such a view of annexations could be justified. They can't tell the truth about annexations because the whole history of Rus-

sia, Britain, and Germany has been one of continuous, ruthless and sanguinary war over annexations. Ruthless wars were waged in Persia and Africa by the Liberals, who flogged political offenders in India for daring to put forward demands which were being fought for here in Russia. The French colonial troops oppressed peoples too. There you have the pre-history, the real history of unprecedented plunder! Such is the policy of these classes, of which the present war is a continuation. That is why, on the question of annexations, they cannot give the reply that we give, when we say that any nation joined to another one, not by the voluntary choice of its majority but by a decision of a king or government, is an annexed nation. To renounce annexation is to give each nation the right to form a separate state or to live in union with whomsoever it chooses. An answer like that is perfectly clear to every worker who is at all class-conscious.

In every resolution, of which dozens are passed, and published even in such a paper as *Zemlya i Volya*,[109] you will find the answer, poorly expressed: We don't want a war for supremacy over other nations, we are fighting for our freedom. That is what all the workers and peasants say, that is how they express the view of the workingman, his understanding of the war. They imply by this that if the war were in the interests of the working people against the exploiters they would be for such a war. So would we, and there is not a revolutionary party that could be against it. Where they go wrong, these movers of numerous resolutions, is when they believe that the war is being waged by them. We soldiers, we workers, we peasants are fighting for our freedom. I shall never forget the question one of them asked me after a meeting. "Why do you speak against the capitalists all the time?" he said. "I'm not a capitalist, am I? We're workers, we're defending our freedom." You're wrong, you are fighting because you are obeying your capitalist government; it's the governments, not the peoples, who are carrying on this war. I am not surprised at a worker or peasant, who doesn't know his politics, who has not had the good or bad fortune of being initiated into the secrets of diplomacy or the picture of this finance plunder (this oppression of Persia by Russia and Britain, say)—I am not surprised at him forgetting this history and saying naïvely: Who cares about the capitalists,

when it's me who's fighting! He doesn't understand the connection between the war and the government, he doesn't understand that the war is being waged by the government, and that he is just a tool in the hands of that government. He can call himself a revolutionary people and write eloquent resolutions—to Russians this means a lot, because this has come into their lives only recently. There has recently appeared a "revolutionary" declaration by the Provisional Government. This doesn't mean anything. Other nations, more experienced than we are in the capitalist art of hoodwinking the masses by penning "revolutionary" manifestos, have long since broken all the world's records in this respect. If you take the parliamentary history of the French Republic since it became a republic supporting tsarism, you will find dozens of examples during the decades of this history when manifestos full of the most eloquent phrases served to mask a policy of the most outrageous colonial and financial plunder. The whole history of the Third Republic in France is a history of this plunder. Such are the origins of the present war. It is not due to malice on the part of capitalists or the mistaken policy of some monarch. To think so would be incorrect. No, this war is an inevitable outgrowth of super-capitalism, especially banking capital, which resulted in some four banks in Berlin and five or six in London dominating the whole world, appropriating the world's funds, reinforcing their financial policy by armed force, and finally clashing in a savage armed conflict because they had come to the end of their free tether in the matter of conquests. One or the other side had to relinquish its colonies. Such questions are not settled voluntarily in this world of capitalists. This issue could only be settled by war. That is why it is absurd to blame one or another crowned brigand. They are all the same, these crowned brigands. That is why it is equally absurd to blame the capitalists of one or another country. All they are to blame for is for having introduced such a system. But this has been done in full keeping with the law, which is safeguarded by all the forces of a civilised state. "I am fully within my rights, I am a buyer of shares. All the law courts, all the police, the whole standing army and all the navies in the world are safeguarding my sacred right to these shares." Who's to blame for banks being set

up which handle hundreds of millions of rubles, for these banks casting their nets of plunder over the whole world, and for their being locked in mortal combat? Find the culprit if you can! The blame lies with half a century of capitalist development, and the only way out of this is by the overthrow of the rule of the capitalists and by a workers' revolution. That is the answer our Party has arrived at from an analysis of the war, and that is why we say: the very simple question of annexations has been so muddled up and the spokesmen of the bourgeois parties have uttered so many lies that they are able to make out that Kurland is not annexation by Russia. They have shared Kurland and Poland between them, those three crowned brigands. They have been doing this for a hundred years, carving up the living flesh. And the Russian brigand snatched most because he was then the strongest. And now that the young beast of prey, Germany, who was then a party to the carve-up, has grown into a strong capitalist power, she demands a redivision. You want things to stay as they were? she says. You think you are stronger? Let's try conclusions!

That is what the war boils down to. Of course, the challenge "let's try conclusions" is merely an expression of the decade-long policy of plunder, the policy of the big banks. That is why no one but we can tell this truth about annexations, a simple truth that every worker and peasant will understand. That is why the question of treaties, such a simple question, is deliberately and disgracefully confused by the whole press. You say that we have a revolutionary government, that there are ministers in that government who are well-nigh socialists—Narodniks and Mensheviks. But when they make declarations about peace without annexations, on condition that this term is not defined (because it means taking away German annexations and keeping our own), then we say: Of what value are your "revolutionary" cabinet, your declarations, your statements that you are not out for a war of conquest, if at the same time you tell the army to take the offensive? Don't you know that we have treaties, that these treaties were concluded by Nicholas the Bloody in the most predatory fashion? You don't know it? It is pardonable for the workers or peasants not to know that. They did not plunder, they read no clever books. But when

educated Cadets preach this sort of stuff they know perfectly well what these treaties are about. Although they are "secret" treaties, the whole diplomatic press in all countries talks about them, saying: "You'll get the Straits, you'll get Armenia, you'll get Galicia, you'll get Alsace-Lorraine, you'll get Trieste, and we'll make a final carve-up of Persia." And the German capitalist says: "I'll seize Egypt, I'll subjugate the European nations unless you return my colonies to me with interest." Shares are things that can't do without interest. That is why the question of treaties, itself a clear, simple question, has touched off such a torrent of barefaced outrageous lies as those that are now pouring from the pages of all the capitalist newspapers.

Take today's paper *Dyen*. Vodovozov, a man absolutely innocent of Bolshevism, but who is an honest democrat, states in it: I am opposed to secret treaties; let me say this about the treaty with Rumania. There *is* a secret treaty with Rumania and it says that Rumania will receive a number of foreign peoples if she fights on the side of the Allies. The treaties which the other Allies have are all the same. They wouldn't have started to subjugate nations if they had not had these treaties. To know their contents you do not have to burrow in special journals. It is sufficient to recollect the basic facts of economic and diplomatic history. For decades Austria has been after the Balkans with an eye to subjugation. And if they have clashed it is because they couldn't help clashing. That is why, when the masses demand that these treaties should be published, a demand that is growing more insistent every day, ex-Minister Milyukov and the present Minister Tereshchenko (one in a government without socialist ministers, the other in a government with a number of near-socialist ministers) declare that publication of the treaties would mean a break with the Allies.

Obviously, you can't publish the treaties because you are all participants in the same gang of robbers. We agree with Milyukov and Tereshchenko that the treaties cannot be published. Two different conclusions can be drawn from this. If we agree with Milyukov and Tereshchenko that the treaties cannot be published—what follows from this? If the treaties cannot be published, then we've got to help the

capitalist ministers continue the war. The other conclusion is this: since the capitalists cannot publish the treaties themselves, then the capitalists have got to be overthrown. Which of these two conclusions you consider to be correct, I leave it to you to decide, but be sure to consider the consequences. If we reason the way the Narodnik and Menshevik ministers reason, we come to this: once the government says that the treaties cannot be published, then we must issue a new manifesto. Paper is not so dear yet that we cannot write new manifestos. We shall write a new manifesto and start an offensive. What for? With what aims? Who is to set these aims? The soldiers are called upon to carry out the predatory treaties with Rumania and France. Send Vodovozov's article to the front and then complain that this is all the Bolsheviks' doing, the Bolsheviks must have invented this treaty-with-Rumania business. In that case you would not only have to make life a hell for *Pravda*, but even kick Vodovozov out for having studied history. You would have to make a bonfire of all Milyukov's books—terribly dangerous books those. Just open any book by the leader of the party of "people's freedom", by this ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs. They are good books. What do they say? They say that Russia has "a right" to the Straits, to Armenia, to Galicia, to Eastern Prussia. He has carved them all up, and even appends a map. Not only the Bolsheviks and Vodovozov will have to be sent to Siberia for writing such revolutionary articles, but Milyukov's books will have to be burnt too, because if you collected simple quotations from these books today and sent them to the front, no inflammatory leaflet would have such an inflammatory effect as this would have.

It remains for me now, according to the brief plan of this talk I have sketched for myself, to touch on the question of "revolutionary defencism". I believe, after what I have had the honour of reporting to you, that I may now be allowed to touch only briefly on this question.

By "revolutionary defencism" we mean vindication of the war on the plea that, after all, we have made the revolution, after all, we are a revolutionary people, a revolutionary democracy. But what answer do we give to that? What revolution did we make? We overthrew Nicholas. The revo-

lution was not so very difficult compared with one that would have overthrown the whole class of landowners and capitalists. Who did the revolution put in power? The landowners and capitalists—the very same classes who have long been in power in Europe. Revolutions like this occurred there a hundred years ago. The Tereshchenkos, Milyukovs, and Konovalovs have been in power there for a long time, and it doesn't matter a bit whether they have a civil list to pay their tsars or whether they do without this luxury. A bank remains a bank, whether capital is invested in concessions by the hundred or not; profits remain profits, be it in a republic or in a monarchy. If any savage country dares to disobey our civilised Capital, which sets up such splendid banks in the colonies, in Africa and Persia—if any savage nation should disobey our civilised bank, we send troops out who restore culture, order, and civilisation, as Lyakhov did in Persia,[110] and the French "republican" troops did in Africa, where they exterminated peoples with equal ferocity. What difference does it make? We have here the same "revolutionary defencism", displayed only by the unenlightened masses, who see no connection between war and the government, who do not know that this policy is sanctioned by treaties. The treaties have remained, the banks have remained, the concessions have remained. In Russia the best men of their class are in the government, but the nature of the war has not changed a bit because of this. The new "revolutionary defencism" uses the great concept of revolution merely as a cloak to cover up the dirty and bloody war waged for the sake of dirty and outrageous treaties.

The Russian revolution has not altered the war, but it has created organisations which exist in no other country and were seldom found in revolutions in the West. Most of the revolutions were confined to the emergence of governments of our Tereshchenko and Konovalov, type, while the country remained passive and disorganised. The Russian revolution has gone further than that. In this we have the germ of hope that it may overcome the war. Besides the government of "near-socialist" ministers, the government of imperialist war, the government of offensive, a government tied up with Anglo-French capital—besides this government and independent of it we have all over Russia a

network of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies. Here is a revolution which has not said its last word yet. Here is a revolution which Western Europe, under similar conditions, has not known. Here are organisations of those classes which really have no need for annexations, which have not put millions in the banks, and which are probably not interested in whether the Russian Colonel Lyakhov and the British Liberal ambassador divided Persia properly or not. Here is the pledge of this revolution being carried further, i.e., that the classes which have no interest in annexations, and despite the fact that they put too much trust in the capitalist government, despite the appalling muddle and appalling deception contained in the very concept "revolutionary defencism", despite the fact that they support the war loan, support the government of imperialist war—despite all this—have succeeded in creating organisations in which the mass of the oppressed classes are represented. These are the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, which, in very many local areas in Russia, have gone much further than the Petrograd Soviet in their revolutionary work. It is only natural, because in Petrograd we have the central authority of the capitalists.

And when Skobelev in his speech yesterday said: "We'll take all the profits, we'll take 100 per cent," he was just letting himself go with ministerial *élan*. If you take today's *Rech* you will see what the response is to this passage in Skobelev's speech. They write there: "Why, this means starvation, death! One hundred per cent means all!" Minister Skobelev goes farther than the most extreme Bolshevik. It's slandering the Bolsheviks to say that they are the extreme Left. Minister Skobelev is much more "Left". They called me all the ugly names they could think of, saying that I wanted to take their last shirt from the capitalists. At any rate, it was Shulgin who said: "Let them take our last shirt!" Imagine a Bolshevik going up to Citizen Shulgin and wanting to take his shirt from him. He could just as well and with greater justification accuse Minister Skobelev of this. We never went as far as that. We never suggested taking 100 per cent of profits. Nevertheless, it is a valuable promise. If you take the resolution of our Party you will see that we pro-

pose there, only in a more closely reasoned form, exactly what I have been proposing. Control must be established over the banks, followed by a fair tax on incomes.* And nothing more! Skobelev suggests taking a hundred kopeks in the ruble. We proposed and propose nothing of the sort. Skobelev doesn't really mean it, and if he does he would not be able to do it for the simple reason that to promise such things while making friends with Tereshchenko and Konovalov is somewhat ludicrous. You could take 80 or 90 per cent of a millionaire's income, but not arm in arm with such ministers. If the Soviets had the power they would really take it, but not all of it—they have no need to. They would take the bulk of the income. No other state authority could do that. Minister Skobelev may have the best of intentions. I have known those parties for several decades—I have been in the revolutionary movement for thirty years. I am the last person, therefore, to question their good intentions. But that is not the point. It is not a question of good intentions. Good intentions pave the road to hell. All the government offices are full of papers signed by our ministers, but nothing has changed as a result of it. If you want to introduce control, start it! Our programme is such that in reading Skobelev's speech we can say: we do not demand more. We are much more moderate than Minister Skobelev. He proposes both control and 100 per cent. We don't want to take 100 per cent, but we say: "Until you start doing things we don't believe you!" Here lies the difference between us: we don't believe words and promises and don't advise others to believe them. The lessons of parliamentary republics teach us not to believe in paper utterances. If you want control, you've got to start it. One day is enough to have a law on such control issued. The employees' council at every bank, the workers' council at every factory, and all the parties receive the right of control. But you can't do that, we shall be told. This is a commercial secret, this is sacred private property. Well, just as you like, make your choice. If you want to safeguard all those ledgers and accounts, all the transactions of the trusts, then don't chatter about control, about the country going to ruin.

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* See p. 311 of this volume.—*Ed.*

In Germany the situation is still worse. In Russia you can get grain but in Germany you can't. You can do a lot in Russia through organisation, but you can do nothing more in Germany. There is no more grain left, and the whole nation is faced with disaster. People today write that Russia is on the brink of ruin. If that is so, then it is a crime to safeguard "sacred" private property. Therefore, what do the words about control mean? Surely you haven't forgotten that Nicholas Romanov, too, wrote a good deal about control. You will find him repeating a thousand times the words "state control", "public control", "appointment of senators". In the two months following the revolution the industrialists have robbed the whole of Russia. Capitalists have made staggering profits; every financial report tells you that. And when the workers, two months after the revolution, had the "audacity" to say they wanted to live like human beings, the whole capitalist press throughout the country set up a howl. Every number of *Rech* is a wild howl about the workers wanting to rob the country, but all we promise is merely control over the capitalists. Can't we have less promises and more deeds? If what you want is bureaucratic control, control through the same organs as before, our Party declares its profound conviction that you cannot be given support in this, even if there were a dozen Narodnik and Menshevik ministers in your government instead of half a dozen. Control can only be exercised by the people. You must arrange control by bank employees' councils, engineers' councils, and workers' councils, and start that control right away, tomorrow. Every official should be made responsible, on pain of criminal persecution, for any wrong information he may give in any of these institutions. It is a matter of life and death to the country. We want to know how much grain there is, how much raw material, how many work hands there are and where they are to be placed.

This brings me to the last question—that of how to end the war. The ridiculous view is ascribed to us that we are out for a separate peace. The German robber capitalists are making peace overtures, saying: "We'll give you a piece of Turkey and Armenia if you give us ore-bearing lands. That is what the diplomats are talking about in every neutral city! Everybody knows it. Only it is veiled with conventional

diplomatic phrases. That's what diplomats are for—to speak in diplomatic language. What nonsense it is to allege that we are for ending the war by a separate peace! To end the war which is being waged by the capitalists of all the wealthiest powers, a war stemming from the decade-long history of economic development, by one-sided withdrawal from military operations is such a stupid idea that it would be absurd even to refute it. The fact that we specially drew up a resolution to refute it is because we wanted to explain things to the broad masses before whom we were being slandered. It is not a matter that can be seriously discussed. The war which the capitalists of all countries are waging cannot be ended without a workers' revolution against these capitalists. So long as control remains a mere phrase instead of deed, so long as the government of the capitalists has not been replaced by a government of the revolutionary proletariat, the government is doomed merely to reiterate: We are heading for disaster, disaster, disaster. Socialists are now being jailed in "free" Britain for saying what I am saying. In Germany Liebknecht has been imprisoned for saying what I am saying, and in Austria Friedrich Adler is in jail for saying the same thing with the help of a revolver (he may have been executed by now). The sympathy of the mass of workers in all countries is with these socialists and not with those who have sided with their capitalists. The workers' revolution is mounting throughout the world. In other countries it is a more difficult matter, of course. They have no half-wits there like Nicholas and Rasputin. There the best men of their class are at the head of the government. They lack conditions there for a revolution against autocracy. They have there a government of the capitalist class. The most talented representatives of that class have been governing there for a long time. That is why the revolution there, though it has not come yet, is bound to come, no matter how many revolutionaries, men like Friedrich Adler and Karl Liebknecht, may die in the attempt. The future belongs to them, and the workers of all countries follow their lead. The workers in all countries are bound to win.

On the question of America entering the war I shall say this. People argue that America is a democracy, America

has the White House. I say: Slavery was abolished there half a century ago. The anti-slave war ended in 1865. Since then multimillionaires have mushroomed. They have the whole of America in their financial grip. They are making ready to subdue Mexico and will inevitably come to war with Japan over a carve-up of the Pacific. This war has been brewing for several decades. All literature speaks about it. America's real aim in entering the war is to prepare for this future war with Japan. The American people do enjoy considerable freedom and it is difficult to conceive them standing for compulsory military service, for the setting up of an army pursuing any aims of conquest—a struggle with Japan, for instance. The Americans have the example of Europe to show them what this leads to. The American capitalists have stepped into this war in order to have an excuse, behind a smoke-screen of lofty ideals championing the rights of small nations, for building up a strong standing army.

The peasants refuse to give up their grain for money and demand implements, boots, and clothes. There is a great measure of profound truth in this decision. Indeed, the country has reached a stage of ruin when it now faces the same situation, although to a less intensive degree, that other countries have long been facing, a situation in which money has lost its value. The rule of capitalism is being so strongly undermined by the whole course of events that the peasants, for instance, refuse to accept money. They say: "What do we want money for?" And they are right. The rule of capitalism is being undermined not because somebody is out to seize power. "Seizure" of power would be senseless. It would be impossible to put an end to the rule of capitalism if the whole course of economic development in the capitalist countries did not lead up to it. The war has speeded up this process, and this has made capitalism impossible. No power could destroy capitalism if it were not sapped and undermined by history.

And now we see this clearly demonstrated. The peasant expresses what everybody sees—that the power of money has been undermined. The only way out is for the Soviets to agree to give implements, boots, and clothes in exchange for grain. This is what we are coming to, this is the answer

that life dictates. Without this, tens of millions of people will go hungry, without clothes and boots. Tens of millions of people are facing disaster and death; safeguarding the interests of the capitalists is the last thing that should bother us. The only way out is for all power to be transferred to the Soviets, which represent the majority of the population. Possibly mistakes may be made in the process. No one claims that such a difficult task can be disposed of offhand. We do not say anything of the sort. We are told that we want the power to be in the hands of the Soviets, but they don't want it. We say that life's experience will suggest this solution to them, and the whole nation will see that there is no other way out. We do not want a "seizure" of power, because the entire experience of past revolutions teaches us that the only stable power is the one that has the backing of the majority of the population. "Seizure" of power, therefore, would be adventurism, and our Party will not have it. If the government will be a government of the majority, it may perhaps embark on a policy that will prove, at first, to be erroneous, but there is no other way out. We shall then have a peaceful policy shift within the same organisations. No other organisations can be invented. That is why we say that no other solution of the question is conceivable.

How can the war be ended? If the Soviet were to assume power and the Germans continued the war—what would we do then? Anyone interested in the views of our Party could have read in *Pravda* the other day an exact quotation of what we said abroad as far back as 1915, namely, that if the revolutionary class in Russia, the working class, comes to power, it will have to offer peace. And if our terms are rejected by the German capitalists or by the capitalists of any other country, then that class will stand wholly for war.* We are not suggesting that the war be ended at one blow. We do not promise that. We preach no such impossible and impracticable thing as that the war can be ended by the will of one side alone. Such promises are easy to give but impossible to fulfil. There is no easy way out of this terrible war. It has been going on for three years. You will

* See p. 394 of this volume.—*Ed.*

go on fighting for ten years unless you accept the idea of a difficult and painful revolution. There is no other way out. We say: The war which the capitalist governments have started can only be ended by a workers' revolution. Those interested in the socialist movement should read the Basle Manifesto of 1912 adopted unanimously by all the socialist parties of the world, a manifesto that was published in our newspaper *Pravda*, a manifesto that can be published now in none of the belligerent countries, neither in "free" Britain nor in republican France, because it said the truth about war before the war. It said that there would be war between Britain and Germany as a result of capitalist competition. It said that so much powder had accumulated that the guns would start shooting of their own accord. It told us what the war would be fought for, and said that the war would lead to a proletarian revolution. Therefore, we tell those socialists who signed this Manifesto and then went over to the side of their capitalist governments that they have betrayed socialism. There has been a split among the socialists all over the world. Some are in ministerial cabinets, others in prison. All over the world some socialists are preaching a war build-up, while others, like Eugene Debs, the American Bebel, who enjoys immense popularity among the American workers, say: "I'd rather be shot than give a cent towards the war. I'm willing to fight only the proletariat's war against the capitalists all over the world." That is how the socialists have split throughout the world. The world's social-patriots think they are defending their country. They are mistaken—they are defending the interests of one band of capitalists against another. We preach proletarian revolution—the only true cause, for which scores of people have gone to the scaffold, and hundreds and thousands have been thrown into prison. These imprisoned socialists are a minority, but the working class is for them, the whole course of economic development is for them. All this tells us that there is no other way out. The only way to end this war is by a workers' revolution in several countries. In the meantime we should make preparations for that revolution, we should assist it. For all its hatred of war and desire for peace, the Russian people could do nothing against the war, so long as it was being waged by the tsar, except work for a revolu-

tion against the tsar and for the tsar's overthrow. And that is what happened. History proved this to you yesterday and will prove it to you tomorrow. We said long ago that the mounting Russian revolution must be assisted. We said that at the end of 1914. Our Duma deputies were deported to Siberia for this, and we were told: "You are giving no answer. You talk about revolution when the strikes are off, when the deputies are doing hard labour, and when you haven't a single newspaper!" And we were accused of evading an answer. We heard those accusations for a number of years. We answered: You can be indignant about it, but so long as the tsar has not been overthrown we can do nothing against the war. And our prediction was justified. It is not fully justified yet, but it has already begun to receive justification. The revolution is beginning to change the war on Russia's part. The capitalists are still continuing the war, and we say: Until there is a workers' revolution in several countries the war cannot be stopped, because the people who want that war are still in power. We are told: "In a number of countries everything seems to be asleep. In Germany all the socialists to a man are for the war, and Liebknecht is the only one against it." To this I say: This only one, Liebknecht, represents the working class. The hopes of all are in him alone, in his supporters, in the German proletariat. You don't believe this? Carry on with the war then! There is no other way. If you don't believe in Liebknecht, if you don't believe in the workers' revolution, a revolution that is coming to a head—if you don't believe this, then believe the capitalists!

Nothing but a workers' revolution in several countries can defeat this war. The war is not a game, it is an appalling thing taking toll of millions of lives, and it is not to be ended easily.

The soldiers at the front cannot tear the front away from the rest of the state and settle things their own way. The soldiers at the front are a part of the country. So long as the country is at war the front will suffer along with the rest. Nothing can be done about it. The war has been brought about by the ruling classes and only a revolution of the working class can end it. Whether you will get a speedy peace or not depends on how the revolution will develop.

Whatever sentimental things may be said, however much we may be told: Let us end the war immediately—this cannot be done without the development of the revolution. When power passes to the Soviets the capitalists will come out against us. Japan, France, Britain—the governments of all countries will be against us. The capitalists will be against, but the workers will be for us. That will be the end of the war which the capitalists started. There you have the answer to the question of how to end the war.

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in *Pravda* No. 23

Published according to
the shorthand report

DESPICABLE METHODS

A whole congress of delegates from the front,[111] in a resolution adopted unanimously on May 13, condemns the shabby methods which *Rech* uses to slander our Comrade Zinoviev and sow discord between the army and the Bolsheviks. The worthy gentlemen of *Rech* have no intention, of course, of publishing the resolution of the congress of front-line delegates, although a copy of it was forwarded to the paper by the congress. Instead, that disreputable newspaper is keeping up its smear campaign against our paper and Comrade Zinoviev in a deliberate attempt to provoke a minor riot.

"*Pravda* regularly publishes reports about Germany which are to be found in no other paper. Where, how does *Pravda* get its special [!] information?" *Rech* asks significantly in an article significantly entitled "Curious Sources of Information".

Where, Messrs. Slanderers?

From the telegrams and letters of our correspondent, Comrade Radek, the Polish Social-Democrat, who spent a number of years in tsarist prisons, who has been active for over ten years in the ranks of the German Social-Democrats, who has been expelled from Germany on account of his revolutionary agitation against Wilhelm and against the war, and who has gone specially to Stockholm to keep us supplied with information. From letters and telegrams, Messrs. Cadets, which your servants who rule the roost on the Russian-Swedish frontier are not always able to intercept, from newspaper cuttings and illegal German newspapers and leaflets, which our friends, the followers of Karl Liebknecht, send us, in exactly the same way as we receive similar mate-

rial about France from the *French* socialist-internationalist Henri Guilbeaux, friend of Romain Rolland and associate of the well-known French internationalist Comrade Loriot.

"The German General Staff has banned fraternisation," we wrote in *Pravda* on the basis of information recently published in all the Russian newspapers. The *Rech* slanderers make big eyes at this and counter it with the statement of the Russian War Minister that "all sectors of the front where fraternisation took place have been destroyed by the enemy's artillery".

We do not know, of course, whether this report about destroyed sectors is true or not. But *if* it is true, it *confirms* rather than refutes the report that the German General Staff is opposed to fraternisation. It is obvious that by destroying the sectors where fraternisation occurred, the German General Staff is *discouraging* fraternisation both on the part of the Russian soldiers and of those honest German soldiers who do not want to use fraternisation as a trap.

You are not very convincing, you gentlemen counterfeiters of the Cadet Party!

In conclusion, one more of their lies: "At the Peasant Congress, as we know, Zinoviev was not given a chance to finish his speech," writes Milyukov's mouthpiece. "As we know", you are lying again, gentlemen of the Cadet Party, just as you lied about the congress of front-line delegates. Things must be pretty bad for you, gentlemen, if you are compelled to resort to such shameless and despicable methods.

Pravda No. 58,
May 29 (16), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

INEVITABLE CATASTROPHE AND EXTRAVAGANT PROMISES

(ARTICLE ONE)

The inevitable debacle, the catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions that is facing us is of such importance that we must dwell on this question again and again if we are to fully grasp its implications. In the last issue of *Pravda* we said that the *programme* of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies no longer differs *in any way* from that of "terrible" Bolshevism.*

Today we must point out that the programme of the Menshevik Minister Skobelev goes even *further* than Bolshevism. Here is the programme, as reported in the ministerial paper, *Rech*:

"The Minister [Skobelev] declared that '...the country's economy is on the brink of disaster. We must intervene in all fields of economic life, as there is no money in the Treasury. We must improve the condition of the working masses, and to do that we must take the profits from the tills of the businessmen and bankers'. (*Voice in the audience*: 'How?') 'By ruthless taxation of property,' replied the Minister of Labour, Skobelev. 'It is a method known to the science of finance. The rate of taxation on the propertied classes must be increased to one hundred per cent of their profits.' (*Voice in the audience*: 'That means everything.') 'Unfortunately,' declared Skobelev, 'many corporations have already distributed their dividends among the shareholders, and we must therefore levy a progressive personal tax on the propertied classes. We will go even further, and, if the capitalists wish to preserve the bourgeois method of business, let them work without interest, so as not to lose their clients.... We must introduce compulsory labour service for the shareholders, bankers and factory

* See p. 396 of this volume.—*Ed.*

owners, who are in a rather slack mood because the incentive that formerly stimulated them to work is now lacking.... We must force the shareholders to submit to the state; they, too, must be subject to labour service.'"

We advise the workers to read and reread this programme, to discuss it and go into the matter of its practicability.

The important thing is the conditions necessary for its fulfilment, and the taking of immediate steps towards its fulfilment.

This programme in itself is an excellent one and coincides with the Bolshevik programme, except that in one particular it goes even *further* than our programme, namely, it promises to "take the profits from the tills of the bankers" to the extent of "one hundred per cent".

Our Party is much more moderate. Its resolution demands much less than this, namely, the mere establishment of control over the banks and the "gradual [just listen, the Bolsheviks are for gradualness!] introduction of a more just progressive tax on incomes and properties".

Our Party is more moderate than Skobelev.

Skobelev dispenses immoderate, nay, extravagant promises, *without understanding the conditions required for their practical realisation*.

That is the crux of the matter.

It is *impossible* not only to realise Skobelev's programme, but even to make any serious efforts towards its realisation, either arm in arm with ten ministers from the party of the landowners and capitalists, or with the bureaucratic, official-ridden machine to which the government of the capitalists (plus a few Mensheviks and Narodniks) is perforce limited.

Less promises, Citizen Skobelev, and more practicalness. Less rhetoric and more understanding as to *how* to get down to *business*.

And get down to business we can and should immediately, without a day's delay, if we are to save the country from an inevitable and terrible catastrophe. But the whole thing is that the "new" Provisional Government *does not want* to get down to business; and even if it wanted to, it *could not*, for it is fettered by a thousand chains which safeguard the interests of capital.

We can and should in a single day call upon the people to get down to business; we can and should in a single day issue a decree *immediately* convening:

1) Councils and congresses of bank employees, both of individual banks and on a national scale, to work out immediate practical measures for amalgamating all banks and banking houses into a single State Bank, and exercising precise control over all banking operations, the results of such control to be published forthwith;

2) Councils and congresses of employees of all syndicates and trusts to work out measures for control and accountancy; the results of such control to be published forthwith;

3) This decree should grant the right of control not only to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, but also to councils of the workers at every large factory, as well as to the representatives of every large political party (those parties should be regarded as large parties which, for example, on May 12 put forward independent lists of candidates in not less than two Petrograd districts); all ledgers and documents to be open to control;

4) The decree should call upon all shareholders, directors and members of the boards of all companies to publish the names of all shareholders owning stock to an amount of not less than 10,000 (or 5,000) rubles, together with a list of stocks and companies in which these persons are "interested"; false statements (made to the controlling bodies of the bank and other employees) shall be punished by confiscation of all property and by imprisonment for a term of not less than five years;

5) The decree should call upon the people to establish immediately, through the local organs of self-government, universal labour service, for the control and enforcement of which a universal people's militia should be established (in the rural districts directly, in the cities through the workers' militia).

Without universal labour service, the country *cannot be saved* from ruin; and without a people's militia, universal labour service cannot be effected. This will be obvious to everyone who has not reached a state of ministerial insanity or has not had his brain turned by putting too much trust in ministerial eloquence.

Every person is *bound* to stand for such measures if he really wishes to save tens of millions from ruin and disaster.

In the next article we shall deal with the question of the gradual introduction of a more equitable system of taxation, and also what should be done to advance from among the people and gradually place in ministerial positions really gifted organisers (both from among the workers and the capitalists) who have given a good account of themselves in this kind of work.

(ARTICLE TWO)

When Skobelev, with ministerial *élan*, talked himself into taking one hundred per cent of the capitalists' profits, he furnished us with a specimen of claptrap. This kind of phrase-mongering is always used in bourgeois parliamentary republics to hoodwink the people.

But here we have something worse than mere phrase-mongering. "If the capitalists wish to preserve the bourgeois method of business, let them work without interest, so as not to lose their clients," Skobelev said. This sounds like a "terrible" threat to the capitalists; but in fact, it is an attempt (unconscious probably on the part of Skobelev, but certainly conscious on the part of the capitalists) to *make safe the rule* of almighty capital by a temporary sacrifice of profits.

The workers are taking "too much", say the capitalists; let us make them responsible without giving them either power or the opportunity to effectively control production. Let us sacrifice our profits for a time; by "preserving the bourgeois method of business and not losing our clients", we shall hasten the collapse of this transitory stage in industry, we shall disorganise it in every possible way and lay the blame on the workers.

That such is the plan of the capitalists is proved by the facts. The colliery owners in the South are actually disorganising production, are "*deliberately neglecting and disorganising it*" (see *Novaya Zhizn* for May 16 reporting statements made by a *workers' delegation*[112]). The picture is clear: *Rech* is lying brazenly when it puts the blame on the workers. The colliery owners are "deliberately disorganising

production"; and Skobelev sings his song: "If the capitalists wish to preserve the bourgeois method of business, let them work without interest." The position is clear.

It is to the *advantage* of the capitalists and the bureaucrats to make "extravagant promises", diverting people's attention away from the *main thing*, namely, the transfer of real control to the workers.

The workers must sweep aside all high-sounding phrases, promises, declarations, project-mongering by bureaucrats in the centre, who are ever ready to draw up spectacular plans, rules, regulations, and standards. Down with all this lying! Down with all this hullabaloo of bureaucratic and bourgeois project-mongering which has everywhere ended in smoke. Down with this habit of shelving things! The workers must demand the *immediate* establishment of *genuine* control, to be exercised by the *workers themselves*.

That is the most important condition of success, success in averting catastrophe. If that is lacking, all else is sheer deception. If we have it, we need not be in a hurry to "take one hundred per cent of the profits". We can and should be more moderate; we should *gradually* introduce a more equitable system of taxation; we shall differentiate between the small and large shareholders; we shall take *very little* from the former, and a great deal (but *not* necessarily all) from the latter *only*. The number of large shareholders is insignificant; but the role they play, like the wealth they possess, is *tremendous*. It may safely be said that if one were to draw up a list of the *five or even three thousand* (or perhaps even one thousand) of Russia's wealthiest men, or if one were to trace (by means of control exercised from *below*, by bank, syndicate, and other employees) all the threads and ties of their finance capital, their banking connections, there would be revealed the whole complexus of capitalist domination, the vast body of wealth amassed at the expense of the labour of others, all the essential roots of "control" over the social production and distribution of goods.

It is *this* control that must be handed over to the workers. It is this complexus, these roots, that the interests of capital require to be concealed from the people. Better forego for time "all" our profits, or ninety-nine per cent of our income, than disclose to the people these roots of our power—thus

reason the capitalist class and its unconscious servant, the government official.

Under no circumstances shall *we* relinquish our right, our demand that this citadel of finance capital be disclosed to the people, that it be placed under workers' control—thus reasons the class-conscious worker. And every passing day will prove the correctness of this reasoning to growing masses of the poor, to a growing majority of the people, to a growing number of sincere people who are honestly seeking a way to avert disaster.

This citadel of finance capital has to be taken if aIl those phrases and projects for averting disaster are not to remain sheer deception. As far as individual capitalists, or even most of the capitalists, are concerned, the proletariat has no intention of "taking their last shirt from them" (as Shulgin has been "scaring" himself and his friends), has no intention of taking "everything" from them. On the contrary, it intends to put them on useful and honourable jobs—under the control of the workers.

The most useful and indispensable job for the people at this moment of impending catastrophe is that of *organisation*. Marvels of proletarian organisation—that is our slogan now, and will become our slogan and our demand doubly so when the proletariat is in power. Without the organisation of the masses it will be absolutely impossible either to introduce universal labour service, which is absolutely essential, or establish any at all serious control over the banks and syndicates and over the production and distribution of goods.

That is why it is necessary to begin, and begin immediately, with a workers' militia, in order that we may proceed gradually, but firmly and intelligently, to the creation of a people's militia and the replacement of the police and the standing army by the universally armed people. That is why it is necessary to advance talented organisers from among *all* sections of society, from among *all* classes, not excepting the capitalists, who *at present* have more of the required experience. There are many such talents among the people. Such forces lie dormant among the peasantry and the proletariat for lack of application. They must be advanced from below in the course of practical work, such as the efficient

elimination of queues in a given district, skilful organisation of house committees, domestic servants, and model farms, proper management of factories that have been taken over by the workers, and so on and so forth. When these have been advanced from below in the course of practical work, and their abilities tested in practice, they should all be promoted to "ministers"—not in the old sense of the term, not in the sense of giving them portfolios, but by appointing them national instructors, travelling organisers, assistants in the business of establishing *everywhere* the strictest order, the greatest economy in human labour, the strictest comradely discipline.

That is what the party of the proletariat must preach to the people as the means of averting disaster. That is what it must start carrying out now in part in those localities where it is gaining power. That is what it must carry out in full when it assumes state power.

Pravda No. 58 and 59,
May 29 and 30 (16 and 17), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

THE QUESTION OF UNITING THE INTERNATIONALISTS

The All-Russia Conference of our Party passed a resolution recognising that closer relations and unity with groups and trends that have adopted a real internationalist stand are necessary on the basis of a definite break with the policy of petty-bourgeois betrayal of socialism.*

The question of unity was also recently discussed at a conference of the Inter-District Organisation of the United Social-Democrats of Petrograd.

In compliance with the decision of the All-Russia Conference, the Central Committee of our Party, recognising the extreme desirability of union with the Inter-District Organisation, advanced the following proposals (they were first made to the Inter-District Organisation only in the name of Comrade Lenin and a few other members of the Central Committee, but were subsequently approved by the majority of the members of the Central Committee):

"Unity is desirable immediately.

"The Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will be asked to include a representative of the Inter-District Organisation on the staff of each of the two papers (the present *Pravda*, which is to be converted into an All-Russia *popular* newspaper, and the Central Organ to be established in the near future).

"The Central Committee will be asked to set up a special Organising Committee to summon a Party Congress (in six weeks' time). The Inter-District Conference will be entitled to appoint two delegates to this committee. If the Mensheviks, adherents of Martov, break with the 'defencists',

* See p. 294 of this volume.—*Ed.*

it would be desirable and essential to include their delegates on the above-mentioned committee.

"Free discussion of controversial issues shall be ensured by the publication of discussion leaflets by Priboi Publishers and by free discussion in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* (*Kommunist*),[113] publication of which is being resumed."

(Draft read by N. Lenin on May 10, 1917, in his own name and in the name of several members of the Central Committee.)

The Inter-District Organisation, for their part, passed a different resolution, which reads:

"On unity. Realising that only by the closest consolidation of all its revolutionary forces can the proletariat

"1) become the foremost fighter in clearing the way for socialism;

"2) become the leader of Russian democracy in its struggle against the survivals of the semi-feudal regime and the heritage of tsarism;

"3) fight out the revolution and finally settle the questions of war and peace, the confiscation of the land, the eight-hour day, etc.,

"the Conference is of the opinion

"a) that a consolidation of forces, so indispensable to the proletariat, can be achieved only under the banner of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and the programme and decisions of the Party of the years 1908 and 1910, 1912 and 1913;

"b) that not a single labour organisation, be it a trade union, an educational club, or a consumers' co-operative society, and not a single labour newspaper or periodical should refrain from enlisting under that banner;

"c) at the same time, the Conference declares itself to be decidedly and ardently in favour of unity on the basis of those decisions."

Which of these resolutions will be quicker in bringing about unity is a question for all internationalist workers to discuss and decide.

The political resolutions of the Inter-District Organisation have in general adopted the sound course of breaking with the "defencists".

Under the circumstances, any division of forces would, in our opinion, be utterly unjustifiable.

Pravda No. 60,
May 31 (18), 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda* verified with the manuscript

MUDDLEHEADEDNESS

MORE ON THE SUBJECT OF ANNEXATIONS

The editors of *Izvestia*, a paper controlled by the Narodnik and Menshevik bloc, are beating all records of muddledom. In that paper's issue No. 67 for May 16, they try to chop logic with *Pravda*, without, of course, mentioning its name—a usual ill-mannered "ministerial" practice. *Pravda*, we are told, has a foggy, misleading *idea* of annexations.

Begging your pardon, citizen-ministers and ministeriable editors, but facts are facts, and the fact is that our Party was the *only one* to give a definition of annexation in official and carefully worded resolutions. Annexation means keeping an alien people by force within the bounds of a given state. No person able to read and understand Russian *could fail* to understand that on reading the Supplement to No. 13 of *Soldatskaya Pravda* (resolutions of the All-Russia Conference of April 24-29, 1917).*

What exception do the Narodnik and Menshevik editors of *Izvestia* take to this? Simply this: that if our view were adopted it would be necessary to "keep on fighting until Germany is reduced to the Duchy of Brandenburg, and Russia to the Principality of Muscovy"! Annexation, the editors explain for the edification of their readers, "is the forcible seizure of territory which, on the day war was declared, belonged to another country" (in short: no annexations means status quo, that is, a return to the state of affairs that existed before the war).

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* See p. 271 of this volume.—*Ed.*

It is careless, most careless, on the part of the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders of the Soviet's Executive Committee to put such muddle-headed people in charge of a newspaper.

Let us apply to *their* definition the argument *they* used against us. Would we have to "keep on fighting until Russia recovered Poland, and Germany Togoland and her African colonies"? Palpable nonsense, nonsense from the practical as well as the theoretical point of view, since no soldier anywhere would think twice about dismissing any editors who argued in this way.

The flaw in their argument is this:

(1) The theoretical definition of annexation involves the conception of an "alien" people, that is, a people that has preserved its distinctive features and its will towards independent existence. Ponder this, fellow-citizens, and if it is still not clear to you, read what Engels and Marx had to say about Ireland, about Germany's Danish territories, and the colonies—and you will realise how confused you are. The Duchy of Brandenburg and the Principality of Muscovy have nothing to do with it. (2) To confuse the *idea* of annexation with the question of how long "to keep on fighting" is ridiculous; it means failure to grasp the connection that exists between war and the interests and rule of definite classes; it means abandoning the standpoint of the *class struggle* for the philistine "non-class" standpoint. *So long as* the capitalist class is in power the nations are bound "to keep on fighting" as long as that class wants it. To think that one can escape this by wishes, demands, or conferences is the illusion of a petty bourgeois. (3) *So long as* the capitalist class is in power, *their* peace *is bound* to be "an exchange of annexations"—Armenia for Lorraine, colony for colony, Galicia for Kurland, and so on. We can pardon an ignorant man for failing to see this, but not the editors of *Izvestia*. (4) When the proletariat comes to power—and that is what the war is leading up to everywhere—then and only then will "peace without annexations" *become possible*.

When our Party speaks of "peace without annexations" it always explains—as a warning to muddle-headed people—that this slogan must be *closely linked* with the proletarian revolution. Only in connection with this revolution is it true and useful; it pursues only the *revolution*'s line, and

works only for the revolution's growth and development. To vacillate weakly between hopes in the capitalists and hopes in the workers' revolution is to condemn oneself to impotence and muddle in the question of annexations.

P.S. *Dyelo Naroda* for May 17 agrees with *Izvestia* that "no annexations" is equivalent to status quo. Try and say that, gentlemen of the S.R. or Menshevik fold, say it clearly, precisely, and straightforwardly in the name of your party, your Petrograd Committee, your congress!

Pravda No. 60,
May 31 (18), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

COMBATING ECONOMIC CHAOS BY A SPATE OF COMMISSIONS

Izvestia for May 17 publishes a tiresomely lengthy and silly resolution of the Soviet's Economic Department concerning ways of combating economic chaos.

And what a combat that is! Splendid ideas and excellent plans are smothered in a net of dead, bureaucratic institutions. "The Economic Department shall be converted [mark this!] into a department for the organisation of the national economy."

Excellent! We are on the right track! The country can make its mind easy. The Department has been *renamed*.

But is it possible to "organise the national economy" without wielding state power? This the Executive Committee has overlooked.

The Department has *six* "sub-departments".... That is Point 1 of the resolution. Point 2 is about establishing "close organisational ties"; Point 3 is about working out the "basic principles" of regulation; Point 4 is about establishing "close organisational contact" with the cabinet ministers (upon my oath, this is not from a fable by Muzhik Vredny[114] but from *Izvestia* No. 68, for May 17, page 3, column 3, Point 4); Point 5 is about "the government forming commissions"; Point 6 is about "a bill to be drafted in the very near future"; Point 7 is about starting immediately "to draw up basic legislative proposals" on five sub-points....

O wise men! O lawgivers! O Louis Blancs!

Pravda No. 60,
May 31 (18), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

ONE MORE DEPARTURE FROM DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

The Narodniks and Mensheviks, who are editing *Izvestia*, wish to be considered socialists, but do not even know how to be democrats. In their issue No. 68, for May 17, they advise "caution" with regard to the "slogan of partial re-elections". They tell the workers that "deputies should be elected for a fixed term—two or three months, say—but never [!] for a week, from one meeting to another".

Is it proper for an official organ to worry about re-elections and to advise "caution"? ...Caution in what? In the expression of popular distrust in *that organ*!

That is the first question.

The second question is: Should not an intelligent democrat deal with the question of caution in the matter of re-elections (if it is to be dealt with at all) from the point of view of *partyism*? Is it not his duty, for instance, to say: We, Narodniks and Mensheviks, consider the line taken by our bloc to be correct on such-and-such grounds, and that of the Bolsheviks to be incorrect for such-and-such reasons? Why then do the editors depart from democratic principles and, instead of appealing to partyism, use such a strange argument as that mistakes at elections are an "exception"? Don't they know that the "mistake" of having the Skobelevs and Chernovs join the capitalist cabinet is being weighed and discussed by the workers everywhere, that it is *not* an "exception" *at all*?

The third question is this: Is it not the duty of a democrat, who wishes to raise the question of re-elections, to recognise and emphasise the principle of democracy—the right of the

population *at any time* to recall each and every representative, each and every person holding elected office?

Will not the editors of *Izvestia*, if they still reckon with the opinions of the founders of scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, recall what those real socialists said with regard to such a right?

Pravda No. 60,
May 31 (18), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

HOW THE CAPITALISTS ARE TRYING TO SCARE THE PEOPLE

In an editorial on May 17 *Finansovaya Gazeta* writes:

"The political upheaval, which everyone looked forward to, is assuming the form of a social revolution without precedent anywhere. The 'class struggle', which is a legitimate and natural thing in a free country, has taken on with us the character of a class war. A financial crash is imminent. An industrial crash is unavoidable.

"To effect a political revolution it was enough to make Nicholas II abdicate the throne and to arrest a dozen of his ministers. That was easily done in a single day. To effect a social revolution, however, tens of millions of citizens must be made to abdicate their property rights and all non-socialists must be arrested. This cannot be done in scores of years."

That is untrue, worthy fellow-citizens. It is a glaring lie! You choose to call *control* over industry by the workers "social revolution". In doing so you are committing three monstrous errors.

First, the revolution of February 27 was also a social revolution. Every political upheaval, if it is not a mere change of cliques, is a social revolution. The thing is—*what class* makes that social revolution. The revolution of February 27, 1917 took the power from the feudal landowners headed by Nicholas II and gave it to the bourgeoisie. It was a social revolution of the *bourgeoisie*.

By the use of clumsy unscientific terminology which confuses "social" with "socialist" revolution, *Finansovaya Gazeta* tries to *conceal* from the people the obvious fact that the workers and peasants cannot content themselves with seizure of power by the bourgeoisie.

By trying to ignore this clear and simple fact the capitalists are deceiving themselves and the people.

Secondly, "without precedent anywhere" is also applicable to the great imperialist war of 1914-17. Such a debacle, such bloody horrors, such a disaster, and such a *break-down of our*

entire civilisation are "without precedent anywhere". It is not anybody's impatience, not anybody's propaganda, but objective conditions and this unprecedented break-down of civilisation that necessitate this control over production and distribution, over the banks, factories, etc.

Failing this, tens of millions of people can be said without exaggeration to face inevitable ruin and death.

In view of the freedom created by the "political upheaval" of February 27, in view of the existence of the Soviets, such control is *impossible* unless the workers and peasants preponderate, unless the minority of the population bows to the majority. Nothing can alter this, protest as you may.

Third, and most important of all—even for the purpose of a socialist revolution there is *no* need at all for "tens of millions of citizens to abdicate their property rights". Not even socialism (and control over the banks and factories *does not yet* mean socialism) requires anything of the kind.

This is an infamous libel on socialism. No socialist has ever proposed that the "tens of millions", i.e., the small and middle peasants, should be deprived of their property (="made to abdicate their property rights").

Nothing of the kind!

Socialists everywhere have always denied such nonsense.

Socialists are out to make *only* the landowners and capitalists "abdicate". To deal a decisive blow at those who are defying the people the way the colliery owners are doing when they disrupt and ruin production, it is sufficient to make a *few hundred*, at the most one or two thousand, millionaires, bank and industrial and commercial bosses, "abdicate" their property rights.

This would be quite enough to break the resistance of capital. Even this *tiny group of wealthy people need not* have *all* their property rights taken away from them; they could be allowed to keep many possessions in the way of consumption articles and ownership of a certain modest income.

The question at issue is merely that of breaking down the resistance of a few hundred millionaires. Only in this way can disaster be averted.

Pravda No. 61,
June 1 (May 19), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

ONE MORE CRIME OF THE CAPITALISTS

The report made in Petrograd recently by a delegation of Donets workers exposed the Donets colliery owners, who are criminally *disrupting* and stopping production, and (for the sake of safeguarding their "sacred" right to enormous profits) are condemning the workers to unemployment, the country to starvation, and industry to a crisis through a coal shortage.

Today we have received a telegram reporting similar outrageous and criminal conduct on the part of the colliery owners at the other end of Russia. Here is the text of the telegram sent to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to three cabinet ministers (with our corrections in brackets):

"On April 29 the (Soviet) of Soldiers' Deputies and the Union of Employees at Michelson's Sudzhensk coal mines removed from office the nine-man administration owing to the criminally provocative manner in which they ran the business, which threatened to lead to a shutdown. The management has been placed (in) the hands of a Council of Engineers—a technical board directly controlled by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. A committee from the executive bodies in Tomsk has investigated and approved our decision.

"In a telegram dated May 11 Michelson refused to pay the workers. We demand full restoration. Restoration impossible.* The mines are facing anarchy, the workers—disaster. Take urgent steps to send half a million rubles, decide the fate of the mines, confiscate them. The mines are working for national defence, daily output is 135,000 poods. A stoppage may affect railway traffic and (operation of the) factories. So far work is normal. Wages for March and April not paid in full. Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and Union of Employees."

No more fitting expression than that used by the Soviet and the Employees' Union in their telegram could be found,

* The meaning is not clear. Does it mean that in case of a stoppage it will be difficult and almost impossible to get the mines restarted?

namely, that the capitalists are running the business in a "criminally provocative manner".

All the members, of the Provisional Government, the so-called socialist ministers included, will be accomplices in this crime if they continue to "grapple" with the impending debacle by means of resolutions, commissions, conferences with employers, if they continue "to waste words where they should use their power" (against the capitalists).

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STILL MORE LIES

Yedinstvo (unity with the bourgeoisie*) alleges today that "the Leninists contend that Kurland is a German province".

That is a lie. That is in the vein of *Russkaya Volya* and *Rech*, and it is a lie.

Pravda has challenged *Rech* and other papers to give a definition of annexation that would fit all annexations, German, British, and Russian.

The bourgeois newspapers (*Yedinstvo* included) are unable to answer this question and so they dismiss it by repeating the old lies. Shame!

Written May 18 (31), 1917

Published June 1 (May 19), 1917 in *Pravda* No. 61

Published according to the newspaper text

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* A play on words, *Yedinstvo* meaning "Unity".—*Ed.*

A LETTER TO THE EDITORS

The newspapers have again published a false report, alleging that for some unexplained reason I did not attend the Peasant Congress, evaded it, etc. As a matter of fact I was to have addressed the Congress on Wednesday and was prepared to do so when I was notified that on Wednesday the organisation question was to be discussed instead of the agrarian question, which was temporarily put off. The same thing occurred today, i.e., on Thursday. Once more I ask readers not to believe the papers, except *Pravda*.

N. Lenin

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to the newspaper text

HAS DUAL POWER DISAPPEARED?

It has not. Dual power still remains. The basic question of every revolution, that of state power, is still in an uncertain, unstable, and obviously transitory state.

Compare the papers of the cabinet, *Rech*, for instance, with *Izvestia*, *Dyelo Naroda*, and *Rabochaya Gazeta*. Scan the meagre—unfortunately all too meagre—official reports of what is going on at the meetings of the Provisional Government, of how the government "postpones" discussion of the most vital issues, because of its inability to take any definite course. Study the resolution of the Soviet's Executive Committee passed on May 16, which deals with such a crucial and momentous question as that of how to cope with economic chaos and avert imminent debacle—and you will see that dual power is absolutely intact.

Everyone admits that the country is swiftly heading for disaster—yet all that is done about it is to brush the question under the carpet.

Is it not side-stepping the issue, when a resolution on such a grave question as impending economic catastrophe, at such a grave moment, merely creates a spate of commissions, departments, and sub-departments; when the same Executive Committee passes a resolution expressing nothing but pious wishes on such a scandalous affair as that of the Donets colliery owners who were found guilty of deliberately disorganising production? Price fixing, profit regulation, the establishment of a minimum wage, and the formation of state-controlled trusts—yes, but how, through whom? "Through the central and local institutions in the Donets Krivoi Rog Basin. These institutions must be democratic in character and made up of representatives of the workers,

employers, the government, and democratic revolutionary organisations"!

This would be comic if the matter involved were not a tragedy.

It is common knowledge that such "democratic" institutions have existed and still exist locally and in Petrograd (the very same Executive Committee of the Soviet) but they are powerless to do anything. Meetings between the Donets workers and the employers have been going on since the end of March—March! Over six weeks have passed and the result is that the Donets workers have been forced to the conclusion that the colliery owners are deliberately disorganising production!

And again the people are fed with promises, commissions, meetings between representatives of the workers and employers (in equal numbers?), and the old rigmarole starts all over again.

The root of the evil is in the dual power. The root of the Narodniks' and Mensheviks' error is that they do not understand the class struggle, and want to replace or cloak it, reconcile it by means of phrases, promises, resolutions, commissions "with the participation" of representatives ... of the same dual government!

The capitalists have made fantastic, outrageous fortunes out of the war. They have the majority of the government on their side. They want to rule supreme; in view of their class position they are bound to make a bid for supreme power and fight for it.

The working masses constitute the vast majority of the population, they control the Soviets, they are aware of their power as a majority, they see everywhere the promise of a "democratised" life, they know that democracy is the rule of the majority over the minority (*and not the reverse*—which is what the capitalists want), they have been striving to better their lives only since the revolution (and then not everywhere), and not since the beginning of the war—therefore they cannot but aspire towards supreme rule by the people, i.e., the majority of the population, towards affairs being managed according to the will of the worker majority as opposed to the capitalist minority, and not according to "an agreement" between the majority and the minority.

Dual power still remains. The government of the capitalists remains a government of the capitalists, despite the appended tag of Narodniks and Mensheviks in a minority capacity. The Soviets remain the organisation of the majority. The Narodnik and Menshevik leaders are floundering helplessly in an attempt to straddle two stools.

Meanwhile the crisis is growing. Things have reached a point where the capitalists—the colliery owners—are brazenly committing outrageous *crimes*—they are *disorganising and stopping* production. Unemployment is spreading. There is talk of lockouts. Actually they have *started* in the form of disorganisation of production by the capitalists (for coal is the *bread of industry*!), in the form of growing unemployment.

Sole responsibility for this crisis, for the impending catastrophe, rests with the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders. For it is they who are at present the leaders of the Soviets, i.e., of the majority. That the minority (the capitalists) should be unwilling to submit to the majority is inevitable. No person who has not forgotten the lessons which science and the experience of all countries teach us, no person who has not forgotten the class struggle, will look trustfully towards "an agreement" with the capitalists on such an essential, burning question.

The majority of the population, i.e., the Soviets, the workers and peasants, would be fully able to save the situation, prevent the capitalists from disorganising and stopping production, establish *their own* immediate and effective control over production if it were not for the "conciliatory" policy of the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders. They bear full responsibility for the crisis and the catastrophe.

There is *no* way out, however, other than by the worker and peasant majority deciding to act against the capitalist minority. Playing for time will not help, it will only make matters worse.

Viewed from a Marxist angle, the "conciliatory" attitude of the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois indecision. The petty bourgeoisie is afraid to trust the workers, and is afraid to break with the capitalists. Such wavering is inevitable, as inevitable as our struggle, the struggle of the proletarian party, to overcome

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

indecision, and to make the people see the necessity for rehabilitating, organising, and increasing production in the teeth of capitalist opposition.

There is no other way out. Either we go back to supreme rule by the capitalists, or forward towards real democracy, towards majority decisions. This dual power cannot last long.

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ON THE "UNAUTHORIZED SEIZURE" OF LAND

FLIMSY ARGUMENTS OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

Izvestia of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies,[115] in its issue No. 10 for May 19, publishes a report by S. Maslov who discourses on the subject of "land seizures".

"In some places," says S. Maslov, "the peasants are endeavouring to assert their right to the land by unauthorised seizure of lands belonging to the local landowners. The question arises: is such a procedure advisable?"

S. Maslov considers it inadvisable, and gives four reasons for thinking so. Let us examine his arguments.

Argument 1. Russia's lands are distributed unevenly in the various regions and gubernias. In pointing out this incontestable fact. S. Maslov says:

> "It is not difficult to imagine how complicated the proper settlement of the land question would become if every gubernia or region laid claim only to its own lands and seized them for its own use. It is not difficult to foresee what would happen if the peasants of some villages seized the land of the local landowners and left the other peasants without any land."

This argument is an obvious, a gross deviation from the truth. It would hold good against anybody who might take it into his head to advise the peasants to seize the land—and seize it in an unorganised way at that—as *private property*. Take it, share it—and that's that.

That would indeed be the height of anarchism, the height of absurdity.

We do not know what party, if any, proposed such nonsense. If that is what S. Maslov had in mind, then he is tilting at windmills. It is ludicrous.

Our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party of the Bolsheviks, has proposed in a carefully worded resolution that *property* in the land be vested in the people as a whole. Consequently, *we are opposed to any* seizure of land as private property.

But this is not the question at issue, and S. Maslov has betrayed himself by mentioning what is really the essential and cardinal point, namely, the seizure of the *landed estates*. That is the crux of the matter. It is on this question that S. Maslov is beating about the bush.

The landed estates must be confiscated *immediately*, that is, private ownership of them must be abolished *immediately* and *without compensation*.

And what about the *possession* of these lands? Who is to take immediate possession of them and cultivate them? The local peasants are to do this in an organised way, that is, in accordance with the decision of the majority. That is the advice of our Party. The local peasants are to have the *immediate* use of these lands, which are to become the *property* of the people as a whole. Ownership will be *finally* decided by the Constituent Assembly (or the All-Russia Council of Soviets, should the people choose to make it the Constituent Assembly).

What has the uneven distribution of lands in the various regions got to do with this? Obviously, nothing whatever. Pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly this uneven distribution will remain under *all* plans, be it the landowners' plan, S. Maslov's plan or our own plan.

S. Maslov is simply drawing the attention of the peasants away from the matter in hand. He has screened the real issue behind empty words that have no bearing upon the matter.

And the real issue is that of the landed estates. The landowners are for keeping them. We are for handing them over *immediately* to the peasants *without compensation*, *free of charge*. Maslov is for shelving the question by means of "conciliation chambers".

That is bad. Stalling tactics are bad. The landowners must submit at once to the will of the peasant majority without attempts at conciliation between this peasant majority and the landowner minority. This conciliation is an unlawful, unjust, undemocratic privilege for the landowners.

Maslov's second argument is this:

> "The peasants are for seizing the land in the hope that if they manage to raise a crop on it they will be able to keep it. But this can be done only by such peasant households as have the necessary number of work hands and horses. Horseless families or families that have given most of their labour-power to the army will not be able to get land by this seizure method. Obviously, those who will gain by this method are those who are the stronger, or even those who are more land-prosperous, and not those who are most in need of land."

This argument, too, is a downright falsehood. Again S. Maslov tries to draw the attention of the peasants away from the real issue—that of the landed estates. If the peasants were to take the landed estates not by "seizure' (i.e., free of charge, as we propose), *but on lease*, that is, *paying rent* for the land (as the landowners and S. Maslov propose)—would anything be altered? Are not horses and work hands needed to till the land rented from the landowners? Can families that have given their working members to the army lease land on a par with large families?

The difference between our Party, the Bolsheviks, and Maslov on this point is that he proposes the land should be taken from the landowners for payment after a "conciliation" agreement has been arrived at, whereas we propose taking it immediately and free of charge.

The question of rich people *among* the peasants has nothing to do with it. What is more, to take the land free of charge is more in the interests of *the poor*. To pay rent is easier for *the rich*.

What measures are possible and necessary to prevent the rich peasant from wronging the poor one?

1. Majority decision (there are more poor than rich). This is what we propose;

2. A special organisation of poor peasants, where they can *specially* discuss their own *special* interests. This is what we propose;

3. Common cultivation of the landed estates by common draft animals and common implements under the direction of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. This is what we propose.

These last two measures—the most important—are just the ones the Party of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" does not support. It's a great pity.

The third argument is this:

> "At the beginning, during the early days of the revolution, when rumours were current among the soldiers that back there, at home, a division of the land was taking place, many of them were eager to go home for fear of being done out of their share. Cases of desertion became more frequent."

This argument concerns the immediate *division* of the land as *private property*. No one has proposed any such thing. S. Maslov is wide of the mark again.

The fourth argument:

> "Finally, land seizures simply threaten to reduce the crops. There have been cases when the peasants, after seizing the landed estates, have done the sowing poorly, using insufficient seeds or leaving their own land uncultivated. Now that the country is so badly in need of food such a situation is absolutely intolerable."

This is such a flimsy argument that people can only laugh at it. We are asked to believe that if the land taken from the landowners is paid for it will be cultivated better!

You ought to be ashamed of yourself to use such arguments, Citizen Maslov!

If the peasants sow the fields poorly, they should be helped—and this particularly applies to the *poor peasants*—by means of collective cultivation of the large estates. There is *no* other way of helping the poor peasants. And this, unfortunately, is just the remedy which S. Maslov does *not* propose.

In all justice it should be said that S. Maslov apparently realises the flimsiness of his arguments, for he hastens to add:

> "After what I have said I feel that some of you are ready to protest, saying, how can we be told to leave things as they were when we have suffered so much from this big landownership. I do not claim to propose anything."

Precisely! From what Maslov said it could be inferred that he wished to leave things as they were (although he does *not* want that). There is something wrong with his arguments then.

It is for the peasants to decide. It is for *parties* to propose. Our Party proposes what I have stated above. These proposals have been clearly elaborated in our resolutions,* for which see Supplement to No. 13 of *Soldatskaya Pravda*, price 5 kopeks.

Pravda No. 62, June 2 (May 20), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

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* See pp. 291-92 and 311 of this volume.—*Ed.*

MATERIALS RELATING TO THE REVISION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME

Written April-May 1917

Published June 1917
in the pamphlet *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*,
Priboi Publishers, Petrograd

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1

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *MATERIALS RELATING TO THE REVISION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME*

The Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party ("Bolsheviks") has instructed the undersigned to publish immediately the material at present in the possession of the Central Committee relating to the revision of the Party Programme.

This material consists of the following:

a) The initial draft of amendments to the theoretical and political sections of the programme which the present writer submitted to the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. on April 24-29, 1917, and which was examined so far only by the committee set up by the Conference for the detailed elaboration of this question.

b) Comments on the draft, or in connection with the draft, made by the committee or by its individual members.

c) My reply to these comments.

d) A complete draft of proposed changes in the economic minimum programme worked out at the Conference of April 24-29, 1917 by the sub-committee on the protection of labour.

e) A draft, supplied with brief explanatory notes, of changes to be made in the clauses of the Party Programme dealing with public education. This draft was drawn up by N. K. Krupskaya after the Conference.

I am appending brief notes to this material, for I consider that the chief purpose of the Party in publishing this material at the present time is to secure the active participation of the greatest possible number of comrades in the work of drawing up the Party Programme.

Taken together, the proposed changes above enumerated form the draft of the complete text of a new programme. I therefore give *both* the old and the new texts of the programme at the end of this pamphlet, arranged so as to present the reader with all the material in the form most convenient for comparison and for the insertion of amendments.

On behalf of the Central Committee, I ask all comrades, both members of the Party and sympathisers, to reprint this material in Party publications as widely as possible, to bring it to the attention of *every* member of the Party and to address all comments and proposals to the office of *Pravda* (32 Moika, Petrograd, marked: for the Central Committee, Material Relating to Programme Revision).

May 20, 1917

N. Lenin

2

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DOCTRINAL, POLITICAL AND OTHER SECTIONS OF THE PROGRAMME

At the end of the preamble (after the words "the standpoint of the proletariat") insert:

World capitalism has at the present time, i.e., about the beginning of the twentieth century, reached the stage of imperialism. Imperialism, or the epoch of finance capital, is a high stage of development of the capitalist economic system, one in which monopolist associations of capitalists—syndicates, cartels, and trusts—have assumed decisive importance; in which enormously concentrated banking capital has fused with industrial capital; in which the export of capital to foreign countries has assumed vast dimensions; in which the whole world has been divided up territorially among the richer countries, and the economic carve-up of the world among international trusts has begun.

Imperialist wars, i.e., wars for world domination, for markets for banking capital and for the subjugation of small and weaker nations, are inevitable under such a state of affairs. The first great imperialist war, the war of 1914-17, is precisely such a war.

The extremely high level of development which world capitalism in general has attained, the replacement of free competition by monopoly capitalism, the fact that the banks and the capitalist associations have prepared the machinery for the social regulation of the process of production and distribution of products, the rise in the cost of living and increased oppression of the working class by the syndicates due to the growth of capitalist monopolies, the tremendous

obstacles standing in the way of the proletariat's economic and political struggle, the horrors, misery, ruin, and brutalisation caused by the imperialist war—all these factors transform the present stage of capitalist development into an era of proletarian socialist revolution.

That era has dawned.

Only a proletarian socialist revolution can lead humanity out of the impasse which imperialism and imperialist wars have created. Whatever difficulties the revolution may have to encounter, whatever possible temporary setbacks or waves of counter-revolution it may have to contend with, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable.

Objective conditions make it the urgent task of the day to prepare the proletariat in every way for the conquest of political power in order to carry out the economic and political measures which are the sum and substance of the socialist revolution.

The fulfilment of this task, which calls for the fullest trust, the closest fraternal ties, and direct unity of revolutionary action on the part of the working class in all the advanced countries, is impossible without an immediate break in principle with the bourgeois perversion of socialism, which has gained the upper hand among the leadership of the great majority of the official Social-Democratic parties. Such a perversion is, on the one hand, the social-chauvinist trend, socialism in word and chauvinism in deed, the defence of the predatory interests of "one's own" national bourgeoisie under the guise of "defence of the fatherland"; and, on the other hand, the equally wide international trend of the so-called "Centre", which stands for unity with the social-chauvinists and for the preservation or correction of the bankrupt Second International, and which vacillates between social-chauvinism and the internationalist revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the achievement of a socialist system.

In the minimum programme, the whole beginning (from the words "On the path" down to §1) should be crossed out, and replaced by the following:

In Russia at the present moment, when the Provisional Government, which is part and parcel of the capitalist class and enjoys the confidence—necessarily unstable—of the broad mass of the petty-bourgeois population, has undertaken to convene a Constituent Assembly, the immediate duty of the party of the proletariat is to fight for a political system which will best guarantee economic progress and the rights of the people in general, and make possible the least painful transition to socialism in particular.

The party of the proletariat cannot rest content with a bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic, which throughout the world preserves and strives to perpetuate the monarchist instruments for the oppression of the masses, namely, the police, the standing army, and the privileged bureaucracy.

The party fights for a more democratic workers' and peasants' republic, in which the police and the standing army will be abolished and replaced by the universally armed people, by a people's militia; all officials will be not only elective, but also subject to recall at any time upon the demand of a majority of the electors; all officials, without exception, will be paid at a rate not exceeding the average wage of a competent worker; parliamentary representative institutions will be gradually replaced by Soviets of people's representatives (from various classes and professions, or from various localities), functioning as both legislative and executive bodies.

The constitution of the Russian democratic republic must ensure:

§1. The sovereignty of the people; supreme power in the state must be vested entirely in the people's representatives, who shall be elected by the people and be subject to recall at any time, and who shall constitute a single popular assembly, a single chamber.

§2. Add:

Proportional representation at all elections; all delegates and elected officials, without exception, to be subject to recall at any time upon the decision of a majority of their electors.

§3. Add:

The abolition of all state-appointed local and regional authorities.*

The last sentence in §8 to be worded as follows:

The native language to be used in all local public and state institutions; the obligatory official language to be abolished.

§9 to read:

The right of all member nations of the state to freely secede and form independent states. The republic of the Russian nation must attract other nations or nationalities not by force, but exclusively by voluntary agreement on the question of forming a common state. The unity and fraternal alliance of the workers of all countries are incompatible with the use of force, direct or indirect, against other nationalities.

§11 to read:

Judges and other officials, both civil and military, to be elected by the people with the right to recall any of them at any time by decision of a majority of their electors.

§12 to read:

The police and standing army to be replaced by the universally armed people; workers and other employees to receive regular wages from the capitalists for the time devoted to public service in the people's militia.

After the fiscal clause of the programme (following the words "on incomes and inheritances") insert:

The high level of development of capitalism already achieved in banking and in the trustified branches of industry, on the one hand, and the economic disruption caused by the imperialist war, everywhere evoking a demand for state and public control of the production and distribution of all staple products, on the other, induce the Party to demand the nationalisation of the banks, syndicates (trusts), etc.

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* See *Pravda* No. 68, May 28, 1917, F. Engels's discussion of the Marxist view—and consistently democratic view in general—on the question of the appointment and endorsement of officials elected by the local population.[116]

The agrarian programme to be formulated thus:

The beginning (from the words "In order to do away with the relics" to the words "the Party demands") to be retained; the continuation to be amended as follows:

1) Fights with all its strength for the immediate and complete confiscation of all landed estates in Russia (and also crown lands, church lands, etc.).

2) Stands for the immediate transfer of all land to the peasantry organised in Soviets of Peasants' Deputies or in other organs of local self-government elected on a truly democratic basis and completely independent of the landowners and bureaucrats.

3) Demands the nationalisation of all lands in the country; nationalisation implies that all property rights in land are vested in the state, while the right of disposal of the land is vested in the local democratic institutions.

4) Encourages the initiative of those peasant committees which, in various localities of Russia, are turning over the landowners' livestock and agricultural implements to the peasants organised in these committees for the purpose of their socially regulated utilisation in the cultivation of the land.

5) Advises the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians to strive towards turning every landed estate into a sufficiently large model farm, to be conducted on a communal basis by the local Soviet of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies under the direction of agricultural experts and with the aid of the best technical appliances.

The Party under all circumstances and whatever the conditions, etc.—to the end of the paragraph ("exploitation").

The conclusion of the agrarian programme, from the words "The Party under all circumstances, and whatever the conditions of democratic agrarian reform may be" to the words "poverty and exploitation", to remain unchanged.

The whole concluding part of the programme, the last two paragraphs (from the words "In the endeavour to achieve" to the end), to be entirely deleted.

3

COMMENTS ON THE REMARKS MADE BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE APRIL ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE

With regard to the remarks on the preamble to the programme, I must say the following.

In my opinion, there is no need for a revision of the entire preamble. The plan for such a revision proposed by the committee seems to me theoretically incorrect.

As now worded, the preamble contains a description and analysis of the main and essential features of capitalism as a social and economic system. Fundamentally, these features have *not* been changed by imperialism, by the era of finance capital. Imperialism is a continuation of the development of capitalism, its highest stage—in a sense, a transition stage to socialism.

I cannot therefore see how the addition of an analysis of imperialism to the general analysis of the basic features of capitalism can be regarded as "mechanical". Imperialism, in fact, does not *and cannot transform* capitalism from top to bottom. Imperialism complicates and sharpens the contradictions of capitalism, it "ties up" monopoly with free competition, but *it cannot do away* with exchange, the market, competition, crises, etc.

Imperialism is moribund capitalism, capitalism which is dying but not dead. The essential feature of imperialism, by and large, is not monopolies pure and simple, but monopolies in conjunction with exchange, markets, competition, crises.

It is therefore theoretically wrong to delete an analysis of exchange, commodity production, crises, etc., in general and to "replace" it by an analysis of imperialism *as a whole*.

There is no such whole. There is a *transition* from competition to monopoly, and therefore the programme would be much more correct, and much more true to reality, if it retained the general analysis of exchange, commodity production, crises, etc., and had a characterisation of the *growing* monopolies added to it. In fact it is this combination of antagonistic principles, viz., competition and monopoly, that is the essence of imperialism, it is this that is making for the final crash, i.e., the socialist revolution.

Furthermore, in the case of Russia it would be wrong to present imperialism as a coherent whole (imperialism in general is an incoherent whole), since in Russia there are no few fields and branches of labour that are still in a state of transition from natural or semi-natural economy to capitalism. Backward and poor though they are, they nevertheless exist, and given the conditions, may introduce an element of delay in the collapse of capitalism.

The programme proceeds—as it should proceed—from the simplest phenomena of capitalism to the more complex and "higher" ones, from exchange to commodity production, to the ousting of small industries by the large ones, to crises and so forth, ending up in imperialism, that highest stage of capitalism, which is only now being reached in the advanced countries. That is how matters stand in actual reality. To begin by placing "exchange" in general in juxtaposition with the export of capital is incorrect historically and theoretically.

These are the comments I have to make on the remarks of the committee.

4

DRAFT OF REVISED PROGRAMME

THE OLD AND NEW TEXTS OF THE PROGRAMME

To make it easier and more convenient for the reader to compare the old and new texts of the programme, both texts are printed together in the following manner:

Those parts of the old programme which remain unchanged in the new one are given in ordinary type.

Those parts of the old programme which are to be completely deleted from the new one are given in italics.

Those parts of the new programme which were not in the old programme are given in bold type.

PROGRAMME OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

The development of exchange has established such close ties between all the nations of the civilised world that the great movement of the proletariat towards emancipation was bound to become—and has long since become—international.

Russian Social-Democracy regards itself as a detachment of the world army of the proletariat, and is working towards the same ultimate goal as the Social-Democrats of all other countries. This ultimate goal is determined by the character of modern bourgeois society and by the trend of its development. The principal specific feature of this society is commodity production based on capitalist production relations, under which the most important and major part of the means of production and exchange of commodities belongs to a numerically small class of persons while the vast majority of the population is made up of proletarians and semi-

proletarians, who, owing to their economic position, are compelled permanently or periodically to sell their labour-power, i.e., to hire themselves out to the capitalists and to create by their labour the incomes of the upper classes of society.

The ascendancy of capitalist production relations extends its area more and more with the steady improvement of technology, which, by enhancing the economic importance of the large enterprises, tends to eliminate the small independent producers, converting some of them into proletarians and narrowing the role of others in the social and economic sphere, and in some places making them more or less completely, more or less obviously, more or less painfully dependent on capital.

Moreover, this technical progress enables the employers to make growing use of female and child labour in the process of production and exchange of commodities. And since, on the other hand, it causes a relative decrease in the employers' demand for human labour-power, the demand for labour-power necessarily lags behind its supply, as a result of which the dependence of wage-labour on capital is increased and exploitation of labour rises to a higher level.

This state of affairs in the bourgeois countries and the steadily growing competition among them in the world market make it more and more difficult for them to sell the goods which are produced in ever increasing quantities. Over-production, manifesting itself in more or less acute industrial crises followed by more or less protracted periods of industrial stagnation, is an inevitable consequence of the development of the productive forces in bourgeois society. Crises and periods of industrial stagnation, in their turn, still further ruin the small producers, still further increase the dependence of wage-labour on capital, and lead still more rapidly to the relative and sometimes to the absolute deterioration of the condition of the working class.

Thus, improvement in technology, signifying increased labour productivity and greater social wealth, becomes in bourgeois society the cause of greater social inequality, of widening gulfs between the rich and poor, of greater insecurity, unemployment, and various hardships of the mass of the working people.

However, in proportion as all these contradictions, which are inherent in bourgeois society, grow and develop, so also does the discontent of the toiling and exploited masses with the existing order of things grow; the numerical strength and solidarity of the proletarians increase and their struggle against their exploiters is sharpened. At the same time, by concentrating the means of production and exchange and socialising the process of labour in capitalist enterprises, the improvement in technology more and more rapidly creates the material possibility of capitalist production relations being superseded by socialist relations, i.e., the possibility of bringing about the social revolution, which is the ultimate aim of all the activities of international Social-Democracy as the conscious exponent of the class movement.

By introducing social in place of private ownership of the means of production and exchange, by introducing planned organisation of social production to ensure the well-being and many-sided development of all the members of society, the proletarian social revolution will do away with the division of society into classes and thereby emancipate the whole of oppressed humanity, for it will put an end to all forms of exploitation of one section of society by another.

A necessary condition for this social revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters. Aiming at making the proletariat capable of fulfilling its great historic mission, international Social-Democracy organises the proletariat in an independent political party opposed to all the bourgeois parties, guides all the manifestations of its class struggle, reveals to it the irreconcilable antagonism between the interests of the exploiters and those of the exploited, and explains to the proletariat the historical significance of and the necessary conditions for the impending social revolution. At the same time it reveals to all the other toiling and exploited masses the hopelessness of their position in capitalist society and the need for a social revolution if they are to free themselves from the yoke of capital. The Social-Democratic Party, the party of the working class, calls upon all sections of the toiling and exploited population to join its ranks insofar as they adopt the standpoint of the proletariat.

World capitalism has at the present time, i.e., about the beginning of the twentieth century, reached the stage of imperialism. Imperialism, or the epoch of finance capital, is a high stage of development of the capitalist economic system, one in which monopolist associations of capitalists—syndicates, cartels, and trusts—have assumed decisive importance; in which enormously concentrated banking capital has fused with industrial capital; in which the export of capital to foreign countries has assumed vast dimensions; in which the whole world has been divided up territorially among the richer countries, and the economic carve-up of the world among international trusts has begun.

Imperialist wars, i.e., wars for world domination, for markets for banking capital and for the subjugation of small and weaker nations, are inevitable under such a state of affairs. The first great imperialist war, the war of 1914-17, is precisely such a war.

The extremely high level of development which world capitalism in general has attained, the replacement of free competition by monopoly capitalism, the fact that the banks and the capitalist associations have prepared the machinery for the social regulation of the process of production and distribution of products, the rise in the cost of living and increased oppression of the working class by the syndicates due to the growth of capitalist monopolies, the tremendous obstacles standing in the way of the proletariat's economic and political struggle, the horrors, misery, ruin, and brutalisation caused by the imperialist war—all these factors transform the present stage of capitalist development into an era of proletarian socialist revolution.

That era has dawned.

Only a proletarian socialist revolution can lead humanity out of the impasse which imperialism and imperialist wars have created. Whatever difficulties the revolution may have to encounter, whatever possible temporary setbacks or waves of counter-revolution it may have to contend with, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable.

Objective conditions make it the urgent task of the day to prepare the proletariat in every way for the conquest

of political power in order to carry out the economic and political measures which are the sum and substance of the socialist revolution.

The fulfilment of this task, which calls for the fullest trust, the closest fraternal ties, and direct unity of revolutionary action on the part of the working class in all the advanced countries, is impossible without an immediate break in principle with the bourgeois perversion of socialism, which has gained the upper hand among the leadership of the great majority of the official Social-Democratic parties. Such a perversion is, on the one hand, the social-chauvinist trend, socialism in word and chauvinism in deed, the defence of the predatory interests of "one's own" national bourgeoisie under the guise of "defence of the fatherland"; and, on the other hand, the equally wide international trend of the so-called "Centre", which stands for unity with the social-chauvinists and for the preservation or correction of the bankrupt Second International, and which vacillates between social-chauvinism and the internationalist revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the achievement of a socialist system.

On the path to their ultimate common goal, which is conditioned by preponderance of the capitalist mode of production throughout the civilised world, the Social-Democrats of different countries are obliged to set themselves dissimilar immediate tasks, both because the capitalist system is not developed everywhere to the same degree, and because in different countries it develops in a different social and political setting.

In Russia, where capitalism has already become the prevailing mode of production, there are still numerous survivals of the old, pre-capitalist order, which was based on the enslavement of the working masses to the landowners, the state, or the head of the state.

While greatly hampering economic progress, these survivals also prevent the full development of the class struggle of the proletariat; they help to preserve and intensify the most barbarous forms of exploitation of the peasant millions by the state and the propertied classes and keep the people in a state of ignorance and subjection.

The most important of these relics of the past, and the most powerful bulwark of all this barbarism, is the tsarist autocracy. By its very nature it is hostile to every social movement and is bound to be the bitterest opponent of every aspiration towards freedom on the part of the proletariat.

In view of this, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party makes it its primary and immediate task to overthrow the tsarist autocracy and set up in its place a democratic republic whose constitution would guarantee the following:

In Russia at the present moment, when the Provisional Government, which is part and parcel of the capitalist class and enjoys the confidence—necessarily unstable—of the broad mass of the petty-bourgeois population, has undertaken to convene a Constituent Assembly, the immediate duty of the party of the proletariat is to fight for a political system which will best guarantee economic progress and the rights of the people in general, and make possible the least painful transition to socialism in particular.

The party of the proletariat cannot rest content with a bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic, which throughout the world preserves and strives to perpetuate the monarchist instruments for the oppression of the masses, namely, the police, the standing army, and the privileged bureaucracy.

The party fights for a more democratic workers' and peasants' republic, in which the police and the standing army will be abolished and replaced by the universally armed people, by a people's militia; all officials will be not only elective, but also subject to recall at any time upon the demand of a majority of the electors; all officials, without exception, will be paid at a rate not exceeding the average wage of a competent worker; parliamentary representative institutions will be gradually replaced by Soviets of people's representatives (from various classes and professions, or from various localities), functioning as both legislative and executive bodies.

The constitution of the Russian democratic republic must ensure:

1) The sovereignty of the people; supreme power in the state must be vested entirely in the people's representatives, who shall be elected by the people and be subject

to recall at any time, and who shall constitute a single popular assembly, a single chamber.

1) The sovereignty of the people, i.e., the concentration of supreme state power entirely in the hands of a legislative assembly, consisting of the representatives of the people and constituting a single chamber.

2) Universal, equal, and direct suffrage for all citizens, men and women, who have reached the age of twenty, in the elections to the legislative assembly and to the various bodies of local self-government; secret ballot; the right of every voter to be elected to any representative institution; biennial parliaments; salaries to be paid to the people's representatives; **proportional representation at all elections; all delegates and elected officials, without exception, to be subject to recall at any time upon the decision of a majority of their electors.**

3) Local self-government on a broad scale; regional self-government in localities where the composition of the population and living and social conditions are of a specific nature; **the abolition of all state-appointed local and regional authorities.**

4) Inviolability of person and domicile.

5) Unrestricted freedom of conscience, speech, the press, assembly, strikes, and association.

6) Freedom of movement and occupation.

7) Abolition of the social estates; equal rights for all citizens irrespective of sex, creed, race, or nationality.

8) The right of the population to receive instruction in their native tongue in schools to be established for the purpose at the expense of the state and local organs of self-government; the right of every citizen to use his native language at meetings; the native language to be used *on a level with the official language* in all local public and state institutions; **the obligatory official language to be abolished.**

9) The right of self-determination for all member nations of the state.

9) The right of all member nations of the state to freely secede and form independent states. The republic of the Russian nation must attract other nations or nationalities not by force, but exclusively by voluntary agreement on the question of forming a common state. The unity and

fraternal alliance of the workers, of all countries are incompatible with the use of force, direct or indirect, against other nationalities.

10) The right of all persons to sue any official in the regular way before a jury.

11) Election of judges by the people.

11) Judges and other officials, both civil and military, to be elected by the people with the right to recall any of them at any time by decision of a majority of their electors.

12) Replacement of the standing army by the universally armed people.

12) The police and standing army to be replaced by the universally armed people; workers and other employees to receive regular wages from the capitalists for the time devoted to public service in the people's militia.

13) Separation of the church from the state, and schools from the church; **schools to be absolutely secular**.

14) Free and compulsory general and vocational education for all children of both sexes up to the age of sixteen; poor children to be provided with food, clothing, and school supplies at the expense of the state.

14) Free and compulsory general and polytechnical education (familiarising the student with the theoretical and practical aspects of the most important fields of production) for all children of both sexes up to the age of sixteen; training of children to be closely integrated with socially productive work.

15) All students to be provided with food, clothing, and school supplies at the cost of the state.

16) Public education to be administered by democratically elected organs of local self-government; the central government not to be allowed to interfere with the arrangement of the school curriculum, or with the selection of the teaching staffs; teachers to be elected directly by the population with the right of the latter to remove undesirable teachers.

As a basic condition for the democratisation of our country's national economy, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party demands the abolition of all indirect taxes and the establishment of a progressive tax on incomes and inheritances.

The high level of development of capitalism already achieved in banking and in the trustified branches of industry, on the one hand, and the economic disruption caused by the imperialist war, everywhere evoking a demand for state and public control of the production and distribution of all staple products, on the other, induce the Party to demand the nationalisation of the banks, syndicates (trusts), etc.

To safeguard the working class from physical and moral deterioration, and develop its ability to carry on the struggle for emancipation, the Party demands:

1) An eight-hour working day for all wage-workers.

1) An eight-hour working day for all wage-workers, including a break of not less than one hour for meals where work is continuous. In dangerous and unhealthy industries the working day to be reduced to from four to six hours.

2) A statutory weekly uninterrupted rest period of not less than forty-two hours for all wage-workers of both sexes in all branches of the national economy.

3) Complete prohibition of overtime work.

4) Prohibition of night-work (from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m.) in all branches of the national economy except in cases where it is absolutely necessary for technical reasons endorsed by the labour organisations.

4) Prohibition of night-work (from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.) in all branches of the national economy except in cases where it is absolutely necessary for technical reasons endorsed by the labour organisations—provided, however, that night-work does not exceed four hours.

5) Prohibition of the employment of children of school age (under sixteen) and restriction of the working day of adolescents (from sixteen to eighteen) to six hours.

5) Prohibition of the employment of children of *school* **age (under sixteen), restriction of the working day of adolescents (from sixteen to twenty) to four hours, and prohibition of the employment of adolescents on night-work in unhealthy industries and mines.**

6) Prohibition of female labour in all branches of industry injurious to women's health; women to be released from work for four weeks before and six weeks after child-birth without loss of pay.

6) Prohibition of female labour in all branches of industry injurious to women's health; prohibition of night work for women; women to be released from work eight weeks before and eight weeks after child-birth without loss of pay and with free medical and medicinal aid.

7) Establishment of nurseries for infants and young children at all factories and other enterprises where women are employed; nursing mothers to be allowed recesses of at least half-hour duration at intervals of not more than three hours.

7) Establishment of nurseries for infants and young children and rooms for nursing mothers at all factories and other enterprises where women are employed; nursing mothers to be allowed recesses of at least half-hour duration at intervals of not more than three hours; such mothers to receive nursing benefit and their working day to be reduced to six hours.

8) State insurance for workers covering old age and total or partial disablement out of a special fund formed by a special tax on the capitalists.

8) Full social insurance of workers:

a) for all forms of wage-labour;

b) for all forms of disablement, namely, sickness, injury, infirmity, old age, occupational disease, child-birth, widowhood, orphanhood, and also unemployment, etc.

c) all insurance institutions to be administered entirely by the insured themselves;

d) the cost of insurance to be borne by the capitalists;

e) free medical and medicinal aid under the control of self-governing sick benefit societies, the management bodies of which are to be elected by the workers.

9) Payment of wages in kind to be prohibited; regular weekly pay-days to be fixed in all labour contracts without exception and wages to be paid in cash and during working hours.

10) Prohibition of deductions by employers from wages on any pretext or for any purpose whatsoever (fines, spoilage, etc.).

11) Appointment of an adequate number of factory inspectors in all branches of the national economy; factory inspection to be extended to all enterprises employing hired labour, including government enterprises (domestic service also to be liable to inspection); women inspectors to be appointed in industries where female labour is employed; representatives

elected by the workers and paid by the state to supervise the enforcement of the factory laws, the fixing of rates and the passing or rejection of raw materials and finished products.

9) The establishment of a labour inspectorate elected by the workers' organisations and covering all enterprises employing hired labour, as well as domestic servants; women inspectors to be appointed in enterprises where female labour is employed.

12) Local self-governing bodies, assisted by representatives elected by the workers, to inspect sanitary conditions at dwellings assigned to workers by employers, as well as the internal regulations in force in such dwellings and the renting conditions, in order to protect wage-workers against interference by employers in their life and activities as private citizens.

13) The establishment of properly organised sanitary control over all enterprises employing hired labour, the whole system of medical aid and sanitary inspection to be entirely independent of the employers; free medical aid to the workers at the expense of the employers, with full pay during sickness.

14) Employers violating the labour protection laws to be liable to criminal prosecution.

10) Sanitary laws to be enacted for improving hygienic conditions and protecting the life and health of workers in all enterprises where hired labour is employed; questions of hygiene to be handled by the sanitary inspectorate elected by the workers' organisations.

11) Housing laws to be enacted and a housing inspectorate elected by the workers' organisations to be instituted for the purpose of sanitary inspection of dwelling houses. However, only by abolishing private property in land and building cheap and hygienic dwellings can the housing problem be solved.

12) Industrial courts to be established in all branches of the national economy.

15) Industrial courts to be established in all branches of the national economy, composed of equal numbers of representatives from the workers' and employers' organisations.

16) Employment bureaux (labour exchanges) to be established by the organs of local self-government in all industries for the hire of local and non-local workers; representatives of

the workers and employers to participate in their administration.

13) Labour exchanges to be established for the proper organisation of work-finding facilities. These labour exchanges must be proletarian class organisations (organised on a non-parity basis), and must be closely associated with the trade unions and other working-class organisations and financed by the communal self-governing bodies.

In order to do away with the relics of serfdom, which are a heavy yoke on the necks of the peasants, and to enable the class struggle to develop freely in the countryside, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party *demands*:

1) The abolition of all personal and property restrictions imposed on the peasants by the existing system of social estates.

2) The abolition of all charges and duties involved in the social-estate status of the peasants, and the annulment of all debt obligations having the nature of a usurious contract.

3) The confiscation of church, monastery, and crown lands and their transfer (together with state lands) to the control of the higher organs of local self-government embracing urban and rural districts; resettlement lands and also forests and waters of national importance to be transferred to the democratic state.

4) The confiscation of privately-owned lands other than small holdings, and their transfer to the control of the higher, democratically elected organs of local self-government. The minimum size of a confiscatable land holding to be determined by the higher organs of local self-government.

While supporting revolutionary action on the part of the peasantry, including confiscation of the landed estates, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will always oppose any attempt to check the course of economic development. Though it stands for the transfer of confiscated lands to the democratic organs of local self-government in the event of a victorious development of the revolution, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will, if circumstances prove unfavourable for such a transfer, declare itself in favour of dividing among the peasants those lands belonging to the landowners on which small-scale farming has been conducted or which are made up of complement farm lands.

1) Fights with all its strength for the immediate and complete confiscation of all landed estates in Russia (and also crown lands, church lands, etc.).

2) Stands for the immediate transfer of all land to the peasantry organised in Soviets of Peasants' Deputies or in other organs of local self-government elected on a truly democratic basis and completely independent of the landowners and bureaucrats.

3) Demands the nationalisation of all lands in the country; nationalisation implies that all property rights in land are vested in the state, while the right of disposal of the land is vested in the local democratic institutions.

4) Encourages the initiative of those peasant committees which, in various localities of Russia, are turning over the landowners' livestock and agricultural implements to the peasants organised in these committees for the purpose of their socially regulated utilisation in the cultivation of the land.

5) Advises the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians to strive towards turning every landed estate into a sufficiently large model farm, to be conducted on a communal basis by the local Soviet of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies under the direction of agricultural experts and with the aid of the best technical appliances.

Furthermore, the Party under all circumstances, and whatever the conditions of democratic agrarian reform may be, will unswervingly work for the independent class organisation of the rural proletariat, will explain to the latter the irreconcilable antagonisms that exist between it and the peasant bourgeoisie, will warn it against the false attraction of the system of petty farming, which, while commodity production exists, can never do away with the poverty of the masses, and, finally, will urge the need for a complete socialist revolution as the only means of abolishing poverty and exploitation.

In the endeavour to achieve its immediate aims, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party supports every oppositional and revolutionary movement directed against the existing social and political set-up in Russia, but at the same time emphatically rejects all reformist projects involving any

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

expansion or consolidation of the guardianship of the police and bureaucracy over the labouring masses.

For its part, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is firmly convinced that the full, consistent, and firm realisation of all these political and social reforms can be achieved only by the overthrow of the autocracy and by the convocation of a Constituent Assembly freely elected by the entire people.

FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[117]

MAY 4-28 (MAY 17-JUNE 10), 1917

FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[111]

MAY 4-28 (MAY 17-JUNE 10), 1917

Проектъ резолюціи по аграрному вопросу

представленный К. Ленинымъ на Всероссійскій совѣтъ крестьянскихъ депутатовъ отъ имени с.-д. фракціи

1. Всѣ помѣщичьи и государственныя земли, а равно удѣльныя, церковныя и так далѣе, должны немедленно перейти къ народу безъ всякаго выкупа.

2. Крестьянство должно организоваться, чрезъ свои Совѣты Крестьянскихъ Депутатовъ, брать всю землю на мѣстахъ немедленно для хозяйственнаго распоряженія ею, нисколько не предрѣшая этимъ окончательнаго установленія земельныхъ распредѣленій Учредительнымъ Собраніемъ или Всероссійскимъ Совѣтомъ Совѣтовъ, если народъ передастъ центральную государственную власть въ руки такого Совѣта Совѣтовъ.

3. Частная собственность на землю вообще должна быть уничтожена то-есть право собственности на всю землю должно принадлежать только всему народу; распоряжаться же землею должны

The first page
of Lenin's manuscript
"Draft Resolution
on the Agrarian Question".
May 1917

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

1) All landed estates and privately-owned lands, as well as crown and church lands, etc., are to be turned over immediately to the people without any compensation.

2) The peasantry must in an organised manner, through their Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, immediately take over all the land in their localities for the purpose of its economic exploitation, without however in any way prejudicing thereby the final establishment of land regulations by the Constituent Assembly or by the All-Russia Council of Soviets, should the people decide to vest the central power of the state in such a Council of Soviets.

3) Private property in land must be abolished altogether, i.e., all the land shall belong only to the nation as a whole, and its disposal shall be placed in the hands of the local democratic institutions.

4) The peasants must reject the advice of the capitalists and landowners and their Provisional Government to come to "an agreement" with the local landowners on the immediate disposal of the land; the disposal of all the land must be governed by the organised decision of the majority of the local peasants, and not by an agreement between the majority, i.e., the peasants, and the minority, and an insignificant minority at that, i.e., the landowners.

5) Not only the landowners are fighting and will continue to fight as hard as they can against the transfer of all landed estates to the peasants without compensation, but also the capitalists, who wield great power both because of their money and because of their influence on the as yet unen-

lightened masses through the newspapers and the numerous officials, employees, etc., who are accustomed to the domination of capital. Hence, the transfer of all the landed estates to the peasantry without compensation cannot be carried through on a complete and secure basis unless the confidence of the peasant masses in the capitalists is destroyed, unless a close alliance is established between the peasantry and the urban workers, and unless state power is taken over completely by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants', and other Deputies. Only state power wielded by such Soviets and administering the state not through a police, or a bureaucracy, or a standing army isolated from the people, but through a nation-wide, universal and armed militia of the workers and peasants, can guarantee the realisation of the above-mentioned agrarian reforms, which are being demanded by the entire peasantry.

6) Agricultural labourers and poor peasants, i.e., those who, because of the lack of sufficient land, cattle, and implements, earn a living partly by working for hire, must strive their hardest to organise themselves independently into separate Soviets, or into separate groups within the general peasants' Soviets, in order to protect their interests against the rich peasants, who inevitably strive towards an alliance with the capitalists and landowners.

7) As a result of the war, Russia, like all other belligerent and many neutral (non-belligerent) countries, is facing an economic debacle, disaster and famine owing to the shortage of workers, coal, iron, etc. The only way to save the country is by the workers' and peasants' deputies assuming control and management of the entire production and distribution of goods. It is therefore necessary to proceed immediately to arrange agreements between Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and Soviets of Workers' Deputies on the exchange of grain and other rural products for implements, footwear, clothing, etc., without the medium of the capitalists, who must be removed from the management of the factories. With the same purpose in view, the peasant committees must be encouraged to take over the livestock and implements of the landowners, such livestock and implements to be used in common. Similarly, the conversion of all large landed estates into model farms must be encouraged, the

land to be cultivated collectively with the aid of the best implements under the direction of agricultural experts and in accordance with the decision of the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

Written before May 17 (30), 1917

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Material on the Agrarian Question,
Priboi Publishers

Published according
to the manuscript

2

SPEECH ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
MAY 22 (JUNE 4), 1917

Comrades, the resolution that I am privileged to present to you in the name of the Social-Democratic group of the Peasants' Soviet has been printed and distributed to the delegates. If any delegates have not received it we shall have more copies printed tomorrow for distribution to all who wish to have them.

In a short report I can, of course, deal only with the main, basic questions, those that are of greatest interest to the peasantry and the working class. To those interested in the question in greater detail, I can recommend the resolution of our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), published as a Supplement to *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 13, and repeatedly dealt with in our newspaper *Pravda*.* At the moment I shall have to confine myself to elucidating the more important points of my resolution and of our Party programme on the agrarian question that are most controversial or give rise to misunderstanding. One of the first of these moot points is that touched upon yesterday or the day before in the Chief Land Committee[118] at the session you have probably heard about or read about in the newspapers of yesterday or the day before. That session of the Chief Land Committee was attended by a representative of our Party, Comrade Smilga, a colleague of mine on

* See pp. 290-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the Central Committee. He proposed to the session that the Chief Land Committee should express itself in favour of the immediate organised seizure by the peasants of the landed estates, but a number of violent objections were raised to Comrade Smilga's proposal. (*Voice*: "Here, too.") I am now told that a number of comrades here will also speak against that proposal. All the more reason for my clarifying that point in our programme, because I believe that most of the objections against our programme are based on a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of our views.

What do all our Party resolutions, all the articles in our newspaper *Pravda* say? We say that all the land, without exception, must become the property of the whole nation. We have come to this conclusion after having studied, in particular, the peasant movement of 1905 and the statements made by peasant deputies to the First and Second Dumas, where many peasant deputies from all over Russia were able to speak with relative—*relative*, of course—freedom.

All the land must be the property of the whole nation. From this it follows that in advocating the immediate transfer, without payment, of the landed estates to the local peasants we do not by any means advocate the seizure of those estates as private property, we do not by any means advocate the division of those estates. We believe the land should be taken by the local peasantry for one sowing in accordance with a decision adopted by the majority of local peasant deputies. We do not by any means advocate the transfer of this land as private property to those peasants who are now taking it for one sowing. All objections of this kind to our proposal that I am constantly hearing and reading in the columns of the capitalist newspapers are based on a sheer misinterpretation of our views. Since we have said—and I repeat: we have said that in all our resolutions—that the land must be the property of the whole nation and must be taken over by it without payment—it is obvious that arrangements for the final disposal of the land, the final establishment of land regulations must be made only by a central state power, that is, by a Constituent Assembly or an All-Russia Council of Soviets, should the masses of peasants and workers establish such state power as a Council

of Soviets. On this score there are no differences of opinion.

The differences begin after this, when we are told: "If that is so, then any immediate uncompensated transfer of the landed estates to the peasantry would be an unauthorised act." That is the view that was expressed most exactly, most authoritatively and most weightily by Minister of Agriculture Shingaryov in his well-known telegram; we consider this view to be fallacious, unfair, most prejudicial to the peasantry, prejudicial to the farmers, and the least likely to ensure the country a supply of grain. Allow me to read that telegram to show you what we mostly object to.

"An independent solution of the land question in the absence of a general state law is inadmissible. Arbitrary action will lead to a national calamity . . . the lawful solution of the land question is the business of the Constituent Assembly. At the present time agricultural conciliation chambers have been set up by the tillers of the land and the landowners in each local area under the rural supply committees."

This is the chief passage from the government's statement on this question. If you acquaint yourselves with the resolution of the Chief Land Committee on this question adopted yesterday or the day before, and the resolution adopted, also the other day, at a private meeting of Duma deputies, you will see that the two resolutions proceed from the same viewpoint. The peasants who want land handed over immediately to the peasants without payment and distributed by local peasant committees are accused of unauthorised acts on the assumption that only a voluntary agreement between peasants and landowners, between the tillers and the owners of the land, would be in accordance with the needs and interests of the state. That is what we deny, that is what we dispute.

Let us examine the objections raised to our proposal. The usual objections are that the land in Russia is distributed very unevenly, both between individual small units such as villages and volosts and between the bigger units such as gubernias and regions. It is said that if the local population were to take over the land by a majority decision against the will of the landowners and without payment at that, the unevenness would remain and there would even be a danger of it becoming perpetuated. We say in reply that this argu-

ment is based on a misunderstanding. The uneven distribution will remain in any case until the Constituent Assembly or some other central state power finally establishes a new system. Until such a system is established the uneven distribution will remain whether the question is settled in the peasant's or in the landowner's way, whether in our way, with the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, or in the way of the landowners, who are prepared to lease their land out at a high rent provided the tenant farmer and the landowner each retains his own rights. This objection is obviously incorrect and unjust. We say that a central state power must be established as quickly as possible, one that not only relies on the will and the decision of the peasant majority, but also directly expresses the opinion of that majority. There are no differences on this score. When we hear objections to the Bolsheviks, attacks levelled against us in the capitalist newspapers accusing us of being anarchists, we repudiate such accusations most emphatically and regard them as an attempt to spread malicious lies and slander.

Anarchists are those who deny the need for a state power, whereas we say that a state power is absolutely necessary, not only for Russia today but for any state, even one that goes over directly to socialism. Without doubt the firmest possible authority is necessary. All we want is for that power to be wholly and exclusively in the hands of the majority of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies. That is where we differ from other parties. By no means do we deny the need for a firm state power; we only say that all landed estates must pass into the hands of the peasants without payment, in accordance with a decision of the local peasant committee adopted by the majority, and on the condition that no damage is done to property. This is stated most explicitly in our resolution. We emphatically reject any allegation that our view implies an arbitrary act.

In our opinion, on the contrary, if the landowners keep back the land for their own use or charge money for it, that is an arbitrary act, but if the majority of peasants say that the landed estates must not remain in the hands of their owners, and that the peasantry has known nothing but oppression by those landowners for decades, for centuries, that is not

arbitrary, that is the *restitution of justice*, and we cannot put off that restitution. If the land is transferred to the peasants immediately the unevenness among the regions cannot be eliminated, that is indisputable; but nobody can eliminate that unevenness until the Constituent Assembly meets. If you were to ask Shingaryov today—that same Shingaryov who raises objections to us and reviles the champions of our views in official papers for "arbitrary action"—if you were to ask him what he proposes to do about that unevenness, he would be unable to answer you. He does not and cannot propose anything.

He speaks about "voluntary agreement between peasants and landowners". What does that mean? I will cite two basic figures on landownership in European Russia. These figures show that at one end of the Russian village there are the most wealthy landowners, among them the Romanovs, the richest and the worst of landowners, and at the other end are the extremely poor peasants. I am citing two figures to show you the significance of the sermon preached by Shingaryov and all landowners and capitalists. These are the two figures: if we take the richest landowners of European Russia, we shall see that the biggest of them, numbering less than 30,000, own about 70,000,000 dessiatines of land. That works out at over 2,000 dessiatines each. If you take the upper crust of rich Russian landowners, irrespective of what social estate they belong to (most of them are nobles, but there are other landowners as well), you find that there are 30,000 of them and they own 70,000,000 dessiatines! And if you take the poor peasants according to the same 1905 Census, which is the latest available information gathered uniformly throughout Russia—information, which, like all statistics gathered in tsarist times by tsarist civil servants, is none too trustworthy, although it does give some approximation of the truth, some data can be compared—if you take the poor peasantry you get 10,000,000 households owning from 70,000,000 to 75,000,000 dessiatines of land. This means that one person has over 2,000 dessiatines and the other seven and a half-dessiatines per household! And they say the peasants are guilty of arbitrary acts if they do not enter into a voluntary agreement. What is meant by "voluntary agreement"? It means that the landowners may perhaps let

you have land for a good rent but will not give it up to anybody without payment. Is that just? Of course it is not. Is that profitable to the peasant population? Of course it is not. The form in which landed property will ultimately be established is for the future central state authority to decide, but at the present time the landed estates must be immediately transferred to the peasantry without compensation, provided the seizure is organised. Minister Chernov, opposing my colleague Smilga in the Chief Land Committee, said that the two words "organised seizure" are a contradiction in terms; if it's a seizure, then it is unorganised, and if it's organised, then it is not a seizure. I do not think this criticism is correct. I think that if the peasantry make a majority decision in any village or volost, any uyezd or gubernia—in some gubernias, if not all, the peasant congresses have set up local authorities representing the interests and will of the majority, the will of the population, i.e., of the majority of the tillers of the soil—once these authorities are set up in the localities the decision they make will be the decision of authorities recognised by the peasants. The local peasantry are certain to respect these authorities, for there is no doubt that these freely elected authorities will decide that the landed estates must immediately pass into the hands of the peasants. Let the peasant know that he is taking the estate of the landowner, and if he pays anything, let him pay it into a local peasant fund, and let him know that the money will go towards farm improvements, paving and road building, etc. Let him know that the land he is taking is not his land, *nor is it the landowner's*, but the common property of the people, which the Constituent Assembly will, in the end, dispose of. For this reason the landowners must have no right to the land from the very beginning of the revolution, from the moment the first land committee was set up, and no payment should be required for it.

The basic difference between ourselves and our opponents is in our respective understanding of what order is and what law is. Up to now law and order have been regarded as things that suited the landowners and bureaucrats, but we maintain that law and order are things that suit the majority of the peasantry. Until there is an All-Russia Council of Soviets,

until there is a Constituent Assembly, local authority—uyezd and gubernia committees—constitutes the supreme law and order! We call it lawlessness when one landowner, on the basis of ancient rights, demands a "voluntary" agreement with three hundred peasant families who have an average of seven and a half dessiatines of land each! We say: "Let a decision be taken by the majority; we want the peasants to obtain the landed estates now, without losing a single month, a single week or even a single day."

We are told: "If the peasants seize the land now, it is the richer peasants who will get it, those who have animals, implements, etc.; would this, therefore, not be dangerous from the point of view of the poor peasants?" Comrades, I must dwell on this argument, because our Party, in all our decisions, programmes and appeals to the people, declares: "We are the party of wage-workers and poor peasants; it is their interests we are out to protect; it is through them, and through them alone, through those classes, that mankind can escape the horrors into which the capitalists' war has plunged it."

To objections like these, claiming that our decisions are contrary to the interests of the poor peasants, we pay careful attention and invite a most careful study of them because they touch the very heart of the matter, the very root of the problem. And the heart of the matter is this: how can the interests of the wage-workers, both urban and rural, and the interests of the poor peasants be protected in the revolution, in the transformation of the political system, that is now taking place in Russia, how can and should their interests be protected against those of the landowners or rich peasants who are also capitalists? That, of course, is the crux of the matter, the nub of the whole problem. But we are told that if we advise the peasants to seize the land immediately, it is those who have implements and animals who will mostly do the seizing and the poor will be left out of the picture. And now I ask you—will a voluntary agreement with the landowners help?

You know very well that the landowners are not anxious to rent out land to those peasants who have not got a kopek in their pockets, but, on the contrary, resort to "voluntary" agreements where they are promised substantial payment.

Up to now the landowners do not seem to have been giving their land away for nothing—at least nobody in Russia ever noticed it.

To speak of voluntary agreements with the landowners means greatly increasing and consolidating the privileged, preferential position and the advantages enjoyed by the rich peasant, because the rich peasant can certainly pay the landowner and every landowner regards him as a person who is good for his money. The landowner knows that the rich peasant can pay and that he can be sued for the money, so that the rich peasant has more to gain by such "voluntary" deals with the landowners than the poor peasant. If there is any possibility of helping the poor peasant straight away, it is by a measure such as I propose—the land must go to the peasants immediately and without payment.

Landed estates always have been and will be a flagrant injustice. The free tenure of that land by the peasants, if the tenure is in accordance with the will of the majority, will not be an arbitrary act but a restitution of justice. That is our point of view, and that is why we consider the argument that the poor peasantry would lose by it to be a great injustice. The agreement is called "voluntary"—only Shingaryov could call it that—when one landowner has 2,000 dessiatines and 300 peasants have an average of seven and a half per family. To call such an agreement voluntary is sheer mockery of the peasants. For the peasant it is not a voluntary agreement, but a compulsory one, and will be such until every volost, gubernia or uyezd peasant Soviet or the All-Russia Council of Soviets declares that the landed estates are a gross injustice and that they must be abolished without losing a single hour, a single minute.

The land must be the property of the entire people, and must be declared such by a central state power. Until that power is established, the local authorities, I again repeat, should take over the landed estates and should do so in an organised manner according to the will of the majority. It is not true, as the newspapers assert, that disorder reigns in Russia! It isn't true—there is greater order in the countryside than ever before, because majority decisions are being

made; there have been scarcely any acts of violence against the landowners; unfair treatment of the landowners has occurred only in isolated cases; they are insignificant and in Russia as a whole are not more in number than those which formerly occurred.

Now I want to mention another argument that I have heard and had occasion to deal with in our newspaper *Pravda* in connection with the immediate transfer of the land to the peasantry.*

The argument is this: if we advise the peasants to take over the landed estates immediately and without payment, this will cause discontent, annoyance and anxiety and perhaps even indignation among the soldiers at the front who may say, "If the peasants take the land now and we have to stay at the front, we shall be left without land." Perhaps the soldiers would all leave the front and chaos and anarchy would result. But in answer to this we say that this objection has nothing to do with the real issue; whether the land is taken for payment, by agreement with the landowners, or by a decision of the majority of the peasantry, in either case the soldiers will remain at the front and will certainly remain there as long as the war lasts and will not be able to return to their villages. Why should the soldiers at the front not be anxious about the landowners imposing unfavourable terms in the form of a voluntary agreement, why should they be anxious about the peasants making a majority decision against the landowners? It is incomprehensible! Why should the soldier at the front place his trust in the landowner, in a "voluntary" agreement with the landowner? I can understand the political parties of the landowners and capitalists talking like this, but I do not believe that the Russian soldier at the front sees it that way. If there is a "voluntary" agreement with the landowner, the soldier will not call it good order, will not place his trust in it, he is more likely to see in it a continuation of the old disorder that existed under the landowners.

If the soldier is told that the land is being taken over by the people, that the local peasants are renting land and

* See pp. 449-53 of this volume.—*Ed.*

paying rent, not to the landowner but to their own committee for the common good, for those very soldiers at the front, and not for the landowner, he is more likely to have faith in this. If this is a majority decision, the soldier at the front will know that there cannot be any "voluntary" agreements with landowners, that the landowners are also citizens with equal rights whom nobody wishes to wrong; the land belongs to the entire nation, consequently it belongs also to the landowner, not as a privilege of the nobility, but in the same way as it belongs to any other citizen. From the day the power of the tsar was overthrown—a tsar who was the biggest landowner and oppressor of the masses—there must be no privileges for the landowners. With the establishment of liberty, the power of the landowners must be considered overthrown once and for all. The soldier at the front does not stand to lose anything from this point of view; on the contrary, he will have much greater faith in the state authorities, he will not worry about his household or about his family being treated unjustly or being neglected.

There remains one other objection that has been raised to our proposal. This argument is that if the peasants were to seize the landed estates immediately, such immediate, poorly prepared seizure might lead to a deterioration in the tilling and sowing of the land. I must say that a government of the majority, a central state power, has not yet been established, the peasants have not yet acquired sufficient confidence in themselves and have not lost their trust in the landowners and capitalists; I believe that we are drawing closer to this day by day, that the peasantry are day by day losing their confidence in the old state power and realising that only the peasants', soldiers', workers' and other elected deputies and nobody else can constitute the government in Russia; I believe that every passing day brings us closer to this, not because any political party has advised it—millions of people will never listen to the advice of parties if that advice does not fall in with their own experience. We are rapidly approaching the time when there will be no other state power in Russia except the power of the representatives of the peasants and workers. When I am told that the immediate seizure of the land is likely to lead to

its being poorly cultivated, that the sowing will be poor, I must say that our peasants cultivate the land very poorly because of their downtrodden condition, because of centuries of oppression by the landowners. There is, of course, a fearful crisis in Russia, a crisis that has hit her as it has other belligerent countries, and Russia can only weather it by better cultivation of the land and the greatest economy of manpower. But today, at the time of the first sowing of crops, can anything be changed by "voluntary" agreements with the landowners? Are we to understand that the landowners will better look after the cultivation of the soil, that the peasants will sow worse if they know they are sowing land which is the property of the whole people and not of the landowner? If they pay rent into their own peasant funds and not to the landowner? This is such nonsense that I am astonished to hear such arguments; it is absolutely unbelievable and is nothing but a ruse on the part of the landowners.

The landowners realise that they can no longer rule by means of the big stick; they realise that very well, and are adopting a form of rule that is new to Russia but which has existed for a long time in Western Europe, in the West-European countries. Two revolutions in Russia have shown that the rule of the stick is no longer possible, and in the West-European countries dozens of revolutions have demonstrated it. Those revolutions have taught the landowners and capitalists a lesson; they have taught them that they have to rule the people by deception, by flattery; that they have to adapt themselves, wear a red badge on their jackets, and, sharks though they are, declare: "We are revolutionary democrats, please wait a bit and we'll do everything for you." The argument that the peasants will make a worse job of the sowing now if they sow land which no longer belongs to the landowners but is national property, is simply making fun of the peasants, it is an attempt to maintain rule over them by means of deception.

I repeat—there must be no landed proprietorship at all; tenure is not proprietorship, tenure is a temporary measure and it changes from year to year. The peasant who rents a plot of land does not dare regard the land as his own. The land is not his nor the landowner's, it belongs to the people.

I repeat that this cannot make the sowing of crops this year, this spring, any worse. That assumption is so monstrous and improbable that there is only one thing for me to say—beware of the landowners, do not trust them, do not be taken in by fair words and promises. It must be remembered that a decision made by a majority of peasants, who are careful enough in making decisions, is a lawful decision of state significance. In this respect the peasants are to be relied upon. I have, for example, a decision passed by Penza peasants which is worded throughout with extraordinary caution; the peasants are not planning any immediate changes for the whole of Russia, but they do not want to place themselves in intolerable bondage, and in this they are right. The greatest bondage was that of the peasant to the landowner, and such it remains, bondage to the landowners and oppressors. The abolition of that bondage, therefore, must not be put off for a single week, even a single hour; but every seizure must be an organised seizure, not to make property of the seized land, not to divide it up, but to use it in common, as the property of the whole people.

I could finish with this question of the seizure of land by answering that the objections against our proposal are based on deception when they come from the landowners and capitalists, and on misunderstanding, on a too credulous belief in what the landowners and capitalists say untruthfully against us when they come from those who are neither landowners nor capitalists but people who have the interests of the working people at heart. If you examine our arguments you will see that the just demand that the landed estates be abolished immediately and similarly that property in land belong to the people cannot be put into effect until a central government is established, but what we do advise, and urge most insistently, is that the peasants themselves, right on the spot, in the localities, take over the land so as to avoid any breach of good order. We offer this advice in our resolutions, but perhaps it is superfluous, since the peasants are doing this without our advice.

I shall pass to the second question, the one to which the greatest attention should be drawn, the question of what we think should be done with the land in the best interests of the masses when it becomes the property of the whole people,

when private property is abolished. That time is close at hand in Russia. In fact, the landowners' power, if not destroyed, has been undermined. When all the peasants are in possession of the land, when there are no landowners, how are we to distribute the land? It seems to me that we must have some sort of common, basic view on this question, because, obviously, local arrangements will always be made by the peasantry. It cannot be otherwise in a democratic state; this is so obvious that there is no need even to talk about it. But in answer to the question of what must be done to secure the land for the working people, we say: 'We want to protect the interests of the wage-workers and poor peasants." Our Russian Social-Democratic Party of Bolsheviks regards this as its duty. We ask ourselves: If we say that the land will belong to the nation is that the same as saying the land will belong to the working people? Our answer is: No, it is not the same thing! By saying that the land will belong to the nation, we mean that landed property will be abolished; we mean that all the land will belong to the whole people; we mean that anyone who uses land will rent it from the nation. If such an arrangement is made no differences in land tenure will remain, all the land will be alike, and, as the peasants often say, "All the old bounds and barriers will fall away, the land will be unfenced—there will be free soil, and free labour."

Does that mean that the land will be handed over to all working people? No, it does not. Free labour on free soil means that all the old forms of land tenure will be abolished and there will be no other form of ownership than national ownership; everyone rents land from the state; there is a single state authority, that of all the workers and peasants; a peasant can rent land from it as a leaseholder; between the peasant and the state there are no middlemen; the terms on which land is rented are equal for all; that is free labour on free soil.

Does that mean that the land will be handed over to all the working people? No, it does not. You cannot eat land, and to farm it you need implements, animals, equipment, and money; without money, without implements, you cannot farm. And so, when you set up a system of free labour on free soil, there will be no landed estates, no categories on

the land.[119] There will be only land which is national property and free tenants renting land from the state. When you set up this system it will not mean the transfer of the land to all the working people, it will merely mean that every farmer will freely dispose of his land; anybody who wants land will be free to rent it from the state. That will be a big step forward compared with the Russia of the tsars and landowners. It will be a big step forward because Russia of the tsars and landowners was a country in which 70,000,000 dessiatines were given over to 30,000 Markovs, Romanovs and other such landowners; it will be a Russia in which there will be free labour on free soil. This has already been done in many places. Already now Russia is ahead of the Russia of the tsars and landowners, but this is not a transfer of land to the working people, it is the transfer of land to the farmer, because if the land belongs to the state, and those people take it who want to farm it, that is not enough; it is not enough to want to farm, the ability to farm is also needed, and even ability is not enough. Any farm labourer or day-labourer has that ability, but he does not have sufficient animals, implements, and capital, so that no matter how many decisions are taken, no matter how much we talk about it, we shall not establish free labour on free soil in that way. Even if we were to hang up notices about free soil in every volost administration, it would not improve matters as far as the working people are concerned, any more than the prisons in West-European republics would cease to be prisons because they had the words "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" inscribed on them. If the words "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" are written on a factory, as in America, the factory does not thereby cease to be a hell for the workers and a paradise for the capitalists.

And so we have to think of what to do further, how to ensure that there should not be merely free labour—that is a step forward, but it is still not a step towards protecting the interests of the working people; it is a step towards liberation from the landowner sharks, from exploitation by the landowners, liberation from the Markovs, from the police, etc., but it is not a step towards protecting the interests of the working people, because the poor, propertyless peasant cannot do anything with the land without animals,

implements, and capital. That is why I am very sceptical about the two so-called norms or standards of land tenure, the labour standard and the subsistence standard. I know that arguments about these two norms and explanations of them are always to be met with in the Narodnik parties. I know that those parties hold the view that these two norms, these two standards, must be established—the labour standard is the largest amount of land a family can till; the subsistence standard is one just sufficient to feed the family, less would mean hunger. I have said that I am very sceptical about this question of standards or norms and I believe it is a bureaucrat's plan that will not do any good; it can't be put into practice even if it were decided upon here. That is the crux of the whole matter! That plan cannot relieve the position of the hired labourers and poor peasants to any appreciable extent, and even if you accept it, it will remain on paper so long as capitalism dominates. That plan does not help us find the true road for the transition from capitalism to socialism.

When people speak of these two norms, these two standards, they imagine that only two things exist—the land and the citizen, as if there had never been anything else in the world. If that were so, the plan would be a good one. But that is not so—there exists the power of capital, the power of money; without money there cannot be any farming on the freest land, no matter what "standards" of it you have, because as long as money remains wage-labour will remain. And this means that the rich peasants—and there are no less than a million families of them in Russia—are oppressing and exploiting hired labourers, and will continue to oppress them on the "free" soil. Those rich peasants constantly, not by way of exception but as a general rule, resort to the hiring of workers by the year, by the season and by the day, that is, they resort to the exploitation of the poor peasants, the proletarians. Alongside this you have millions and millions of peasants who have no horses and cannot exist without selling their labour-power, without doing seasonal work for somebody else, etc. As long as the power of money, the power of capital, remains, no matter what "standards" of land tenure you establish they will at best be useless in practice because they do not take into consideration the chief factor—

that property in implements, animals, and money is distributed unevenly; they do not take into consideration the existence of the hired labour that is exploited. That is a basic fact in the present-day life of Russia, and there is no getting away from it; but if we establish any kind of "standards", life will bypass them and they will remain on paper. To protect the interests of the propertyless, poor peasants in this great transformation of Russia in which you are now engaged and which you will undoubtedly carry through, when private property in land will be abolished and a step forward will have been made towards the better, socialist future; to protect the interests of the workers and poor peasants in this great work of transformation that you are only just beginning, which will go a long way forward and which, it may be said without exaggeration, will undoubtedly be brought to completion in Russia because there is no power that can stop it, we must not take the road of establishing norms or standards, but must find some other way.

I and my Party comrades, in whose name I have the honour to speak, know of only two ways of protecting the interests of agricultural labourers and poor peasants, and we recommend these two ways to the Peasants' Soviet for its attention.

The first way is to organise the agricultural labourers and poor peasants. We should like, and we advise it, to have in each peasant committee, in each volost, uyezd and gubernia, a separate group of agricultural labourers and poor peasants who will have to ask themselves: "If the land becomes the property of the whole people tomorrow—and it certainly will, because the people want it to—then where do we come in? Where shall we, who have no animals or implements, get them from? How are we to farm the land? How must we protect our interests? How are we to make sure that the land, which will belong to the whole people, which will really be the property of the nation, should not fall *only* into the hands of *proprietors*? If it falls into the hands of those who own enough animals and implements, shall we gain anything by it? Is that what we made this great revolution for? Is that what we wanted?"

The "people" will have the land, but that is *not enough* to protect the interests of agricultural labourers. It is not

a matter of us here, from above, or the peasant committee, establishing a "standard" of land to be held by individuals. Such measures will not help as long as capital is dominant, and they will not offer deliverance from the domination of capitalism. There is only one way to escape the yoke of capitalism and ensure that the people's land goes to the *working people*, and that is by organising the agricultural labourers, who will be guided by their experience, their observations and their distrust of what the village sharks tell them, even though these sharks wear red rosettes in their buttonholes and call themselves "revolutionary democrats".

The poor peasants can only be taught by independent organisation in the localities, they can only learn from their own experience. That experience will not be easy, we cannot and do not promise them a land flowing with milk and honey. The landowners will be thrown out because the people wish it, but *capitalism* will remain. It is much more difficult to do away with capitalism, and the road to its overthrow is a different one. It is the road of independent, separate organisation of the agricultural labourers and the poor peasants. And that is what our Party proposes in the first instance.

Only this road promises a gradual, difficult, but real and certain transfer of the land to the working people.

The second step which our Party recommends is that every big economy, for example, every big landed estate, of which there are 30,000 in Russia, should be organised as soon as possible into a model farm for the *common* cultivation of the land jointly by agricultural labourers and scientifically trained agronomists, using the animals, implements, etc., of the landowner for that purpose. Without this *common* cultivation under the direction of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers the land will not go entirely to the *working people*. To be sure, joint cultivation is a difficult business and it would be madness of course for anybody to imagine that joint cultivation of the land can be decreed from above and imposed on people, because the centuries-old habit of farming on one's own cannot suddenly disappear, and because money will be needed for it and adaptation to the new mode of life. If this advice, this view, on the common cultivation

of the land with commonly owned animals and implements to be used to the best purpose jointly with agronomists—if this advice-were the invention of individual political parties, the case would be a bad one, because changes are not made in the life of a people on the advice of a party, because tens of millions of people do not make a revolution on the advice of a party, and such a change would be much more of a revolution than the overthrow of the weak-minded Nicholas Romanov. I repeat, tens of millions of people will not make a revolution to order, but will do so when driven to it by dire need, when their position is an impossible one, when the joint pressure and determination of tens of millions of people break down the old barriers and are actually capable of creating a new way of life. When we advise such a measure, and advise caution in the handling of it, saying that it is becoming necessary, we are not drawing that conclusion from our programme, from our socialist doctrine alone, but because we, as socialists, have come to this conclusion by studying the life of the West-European nations. We know that there have been many revolutions over there and that they have established democratic republics; we know that in America in 1865 the slave-owners were defeated and hundreds of millions of dessiatines of land were distributed among the peasantry for nothing or next to nothing, and nevertheless capitalism dominates there more than anywhere else and oppresses the mass of the working people as badly as, if not worse than, in other countries. This is the socialist teaching, this is our study of other nations that firmly convinces us that without the common cultivation of the land by agricultural labourers using the best machinery and guided by scientifically trained agronomists there is no escape from the yoke of capitalism. But if we were to be guided only by the experience of the West-European countries it would be very bad for Russia, because the Russian people in the mass are only capable of taking a serious step along that new path when the direst need arises. And we say to you: the time has now come when that dire need for the entire Russian people is knocking at the door. The dire need I speak of is precisely this—we cannot continue farming in the old way. If we continue as before on our small isolated farms, albeit as free citizens on free soil, we are still faced with imminent

ruin, for the debacle is drawing nearer day by day, hour by hour. Everyone is talking about it; it is a grim fact, due not to the malice of individuals but to the world war of conquest, to capitalism.

The war has exterminated millions of people, has drenched the world in blood, brought it to the brink of disaster. This is no exaggeration, nobody can vouch for what will happen tomorrow; everyone is talking about it. Take the newspaper *Izvestia* of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—everybody there is saying that the capitalists are resorting to slow-down tactics and lockouts. That means there is no work and the capitalists are laying off large numbers of workers. That is what this criminal war has brought all countries to, and not Russia alone.

That is why we say that farming on individual plots, even if it is "free labour on free soil", is no way out of the dreadful crisis, it offers no deliverance from the general ruin. A *universal labour service* is necessary, the greatest economy of manpower is necessary, an exceptionally strong and firm authority is necessary, an authority capable of effecting that universal labour service; it cannot be done by officials, it can be done only by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, because they are the people, they are the masses, because they are not a government of officials, because they, knowing the life of the peasant from top to bottom, can organise labour conscription, can organise that protection of human labour that would not permit the squandering of the peasant's labour, and the transition to common cultivation would, under these circumstances, be carried out gradually and with circumspection. It is a difficult business, but it is necessary to go over to common cultivation on big model farms; if that is not done it will be impossible for Russia to find a way out of the debacle, out of the truly desperate situation in which she finds herself, and it would be the greatest mistake to think that such a gigantic transformation in the life of the people can be made at a single stroke. That cannot be done, it requires the greatest labour effort, it requires concentration, determination and energy on the part of each peasant and worker at his own place, at his own particular job, which he knows and has been working at for years. It is not a thing that can

be done by any sort of decree, but it is a thing that must be done, because this war of conquest has brought all mankind to the brink of destruction; tens of millions of lives have been lost, and still more will be lost in this terrible war unless we strain our efforts, unless all organisations of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies take joint and determined action towards the common cultivation of the soil without the capitalists and without the landowners. That path is the only one that will lead to the real transfer of the land to the working people.

Published May 25, 1917
in *Izvestia* of the All-Russia Soviet
of Peasants' Deputies No. 14;
and in December 1917 in the
pamphlet *Material on the Agrarian Question*, Priboi Publishers

Published according
to the text of the pamphlet
verified with the newspaper text

PARTIES IN THE PETROGRAD DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS

The lists of candidates for members of the district councils have been published (in a free supplement to *Vedomosti Obshchestvennovo Gradonachalstva* for May 17[120]). Unfortunately, information is given only for ten districts. Nevertheless, we have a very clear and striking picture of *party alignments*, a picture that deserves close study on account of its electioneering value and the light it throws on the *class* ties of the different parties.

Partisanship, as we know, is both a condition for and index of political development. The more politically developed and enlightened the given population or given class is, the higher, as a general rule, is its party organisation. This rule is borne out by the experience of all civilised countries. From the point of view of the class struggle that is obviously how it should be. Non-partisanship or insufficient party crystallisation and party organisation implies at best class instability (at worst, this deficiency signifies deception of the masses by political charlatans—a thing that is only too well known in parliamentary countries).

What, then, do the published lists of candidates in Petrograd reveal to us in the matter of party alignments?

Altogether 71 lists have been put forward in 10 districts. The first thing we notice is that they fall into *five* major groups.

1. The R.S.D.L.P.—the *Bolsheviks*. Lists have been put forward in all 10 districts. Our Party has formed a bloc with two other groups—the Inter-District group and the internationalist Mensheviks. This bloc is strictly based on principles and is openly proclaimed in resolutions passed by our

Россійская Соціалъ-Демократическая Рабочая Партія.

ПРАВДА

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

ОРГАНЪ
Центральнаго Комитета
и
Петербургскаго Комитета
Р. С.-Д. Р. П.

Среда, 6-го Іюня (24 мая ст. ст.) 1917 г. ЕЖЕДНЕВНАЯ ГАЗЕТА. Цѣна № 8 коп. № 56.

Цѣна отдѣльного № 8 коп.

Вниманію подписчиковъ.

Къ выборамъ.

НЕДѢЛЯ ВЫБОРОВЪ.

Партіи на выборахъ въ районныя Думы Петрограда.

The front page of *Pravda* No. 64, for June 6 (May 24), 1917 featuring Lenin's article "Parties in the Petrograd District Council Elections"

Reduced

The front page of Pravda No. 64, for June 6 (May 24), 1917 featuring Lenin's article "Parties in the Petrograd District Council Elections"

Reduced

Party's Petrograd and All-Russia conferences.* The fundamental issue in contemporary political life both in Russia and the rest of the world is that of the struggle of proletarian internationalism against the chauvinism (or "defencism") of the big and petty bourgeoisie. Our Party has publicly declared its determination to work for closer relations and unity among all internationalists (see the resolution of the All-Russia Conference on uniting the internationalists against the petty-bourgeois defencist bloc).

The party of the proletariat has taken a clear, open and honest stand on the issues involved in the elections.

2. A no less clear class physiognomy is shown by the party of "people's freedom", namely, the Cadets, actually the party of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. They, too, have put forward 10 party lists in all 10 districts. As we know, *all* the parties of the landowners and capitalists are now *supporting* the Cadets, but for the time being they do so *on the quiet*.

3. Third as regards clearly defined party alignment comes the new-fledged Radical-Democratic Party, which has put forward its lists in only 6 out of the 10 districts. This unknown party is obviously another capitalist party which hopes to "pull" the votes of the men in the street by non-committal promises—something in the nature of Cadets in disguise.

4. Fourth comes a group that has put up 17 lists in 9 districts—a motley assortment of Narodniks (Trudoviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Popular Socialists) and Mensheviks with the addition of the notorious *Yedinstvo* group in varied combinations.[121]

A regular petty-bourgeois hodge-podge and petty-bourgeois lack of principles! *Not one* of these groups and parties has dared to come out in advance with an open statement of principles in support of their decision to work for closer relations and unity. They have been swept along by events, and are trailing after the chauvinists. They have all fallen into the same mire and are floundering in it like the true philistines they are. They are trying to worm themselves into each district in every way they can. If it can't be done by hook it will have to be done by crook—that is their motto.

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* See pp. 159-60 and 294 of this volume.—*Ed.*

If they are all of one mind on defencism or on supporting the coalition cabinet, then why don't they join forces to fight the elections in a united, open, political bloc recognising a set of definite principles?

The whole trouble is that the petty bourgeoisie, that is to say, the Narodniks and Mensheviks, lack principles and the spirit of party. They are all defencists and ministerialists. Yet they do not trust one another. In one district the Socialist-Revolutionaries run independently, in another they make common cause with the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks (with people who approve of compensation for the landowners! With parties whom the S.R.s Vikhlayev, Chernov and Co. in 1906-07 *openly* accused of worshipping at the shrine of *proprietary* instincts!). More often than not they make common cause with the Mensheviks, sometimes with *Yedinstvo*, that very same *Yedinstvo of* which *Dyelo Naroda* writes in either a hostile or contemptuous tone.

Never mind! The man in the street will swallow anything! The petty bourgeois does not bother his head about partyism or principles. In the newspaper "we" are against *Yedinstvo*, but in order to get into the District Councils "we" are *for* it....

Exactly like the Mensheviks. They too, in their paper, are against *Yedinstvo*, and at their All-Russia conference[122] they greeted the notorious Deutsch with shouts of disapproval—a fact of which *Yedinstvo* complained openly. Never mind, the man in the street has a short memory. We shall act in the man-in-the-street way! "In principle" we are against the Deutsches and the Jordanskys, we are ashamed of them in front of the workers, but when it comes to getting a political berth for ourselves we don't mind running with these gentlemen on the same tickets!

Let all the class-conscious workers know, and let them spread the news about it among the working-class masses, that the bloc of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and all the Narodniks with the Mensheviks is a bloc of people who are trying to sneak in the *Yedinstvo* heroes, a bloc of *people who are ashamed of their allies.*

In two districts, Kazansky and Spassky, there are no Mensheviks or S.R.s at all. Apparently they have *concealed* their identity in the lists of the District Soviets, i.e., in the

lists of *non-party* candidates (in each district the number of candidates is incomplete—38 and 28 respectively against 54 and 44 of the Cadet Party and 43 and 46 of our Party). In two districts, therefore, the petty-bourgeois parties found even their motley semi-partyism too much for them, and landed for good and all in the mire of non-partyism—"who cares for parties, the thing is to get elected!" That, always and everywhere, has been the motto of bourgeois parliamentarians.

5. In the fifth group non-partisanship reigns supreme. They have 28 lists in 10 districts, and most of these groups exist in one district only. This is philistinism at its local narrowest. And what a mixed crowd they are! We have here a "House Management", a "Group of Employees in Educational Institutions", an "Honesty, Accountancy, and Fairness Group" (believe it or not ...) and a group of "Democratic Republicans and Socialist Functionaries Nominated by Non-Party Toilers, Republican Democrats, Working in the House Committees"....

Comrade workers! Let us all get down to work, canvassing all the poorest homes, awakening and enlightening the domestic servants, the most backward workers, etc., etc. Let us campaign against the capitalists and the Cadets, disguised as "Radical Democrats", who hide behind the Cadets' backs. Let us campaign against the petty-bourgeois defencist mire of the Narodniks and Mensheviks, against their bloc, which stands for no parties and no principles, against their attempts to sneak into their joint lists the Trudoviks, the advocates of compensation, and the heroes of Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* with whom even such ministerial papers as *Dyelo Naroda* and *Rabochaya Gazeta* are ashamed to be seen in the same company!

Pravda No. 64, June 6 (May 24), 1917

Published according to the text in *Pravda*

TWO SHORTCOMINGS

In criticising other parties we should not forget to criticise ourselves. The published lists of candidates for members of the Petrograd District Councils have revealed two shortcomings in our Party organisation and Party work.

The first shortcoming is this. Our list for Liteiny District has only 33 candidates as against the 63 of the Cadets and the Menshevik bloc with *Yedinstvo* and the Narodniks. Apparently, our Party workers have not been able to find more than 33 candidates of the proletarian party in this wealthy district. But this is an obvious shortcoming in our work, an obvious indication that we have not gone down far enough into the midst of the working and exploited people. We must break with established custom. In the wealthy districts we must "go among the people" more energetically than ever, and waken more and more strata of the working and exploited people to political consciousness. We should get the non-party proletarian elements—especially the *domestic servants*, for instance—to take an active part in the elections and not hesitate to put the most reliable of them into our *proletarian* list. Why should we fear a minority of non-party proletarian elements, when the majority are class-conscious internationalist proletarians?...*

Written between May 23 and 27 (June 5 and 9), 1917

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Published according to the manuscript

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* The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

RESOLUTION ON MEASURES TO COPE WITH ECONOMIC DISORGANISATION[123]

1. The complete disruption of Russia's economic life has now reached a point where catastrophe is unavoidable, a catastrophe of such appalling dimensions that a number of essential industries will be brought to a standstill, the farmer will be prevented from conducting farming on the necessary scale, and railway traffic will be interrupted with a consequent stoppage of grain deliveries to the industrial population and the cities, involving millions of people. What is more, the break-down has already started, and has affected various industries. Only by the greatest exertion of all the nation's forces and the adoption of a number of immediate revolutionary measures, both in the local areas and at the centre of government, can this debacle be effectively coped with.

2. Neither by bureaucratic methods, i.e., the setting up of institutions in which the capitalists and officials preponderate, nor by preserving the profits of the capitalists, their supreme rule in industry, their supremacy over finance capital, and their commercial secrets as regards their banking, commercial, and industrial transactions, can the disaster be averted. This has been amply proved by the partial effects of the crisis as revealed in a number of industries.

3. The only way to avert disaster is to establish effectual workers' control over the production and distribution of goods. For the purpose of such control it is necessary, first of all, that the workers should have a majority of not less than three-fourths of all the votes in all the decisive institutions and that the owners who have not withdrawn from their business and the engineering staffs should be enlisted

without fail; secondly, that shop committees, the central and local Soviets, as well as the trade unions, should have the right to participate in this control, that all commercial and bank books be open to their inspection, and that the management supply them with all the necessary information; third, that a similar right should be granted to representatives of all the major democratic and socialist parties.

4. Workers' control, which the capitalists in a number of conflict cases have already accepted, should, by means of various well-considered measures introduced gradually but without any delay, be developed into full regulation of the production and distribution of goods by the workers.

5. Workers' control should similarly be extended to all financial and banking operations with the aim of discovering the true financial state of affairs; such control to be participated in by councils and conventions of bank, syndicate and other employees, which are to be organised forthwith.

6. To save the country from disaster the workers and peasants must first of all be inspired with absolute and positive assurance, conveyed by deeds and not by words, that the governing bodies both in the local areas and at the centre will not hesitate to hand over to the people the bulk of the profits, incomes, and property of the great banking, financial, commercial, and industrial magnates of capitalist economy. Unless this measure is carried out, it is futile to demand or expect real revolutionary measures or any real revolutionary effort on the part of the workers and peasants.

7. In view of the break-down of the whole financial and monetary system and the impossibility of rehabilitating it while the war is on, the aim of the state organisation should be to organise on a broad, regional, and subsequently country-wide, scale the exchange of agricultural implements, clothes, boots and other goods for grain and other farm products. The services of the town and rural co-operative societies should be widely enlisted.

8. Only when these measures have been carried out will it be possible and necessary to introduce general and compulsory labour service. This measure, in turn, calls for the establishment of a workers' militia, in which the workers are to serve without pay after their regular eight-hour day; this to be followed by the introduction of a nation-wide people's

militia in which the workers and other employees shall be paid by the capitalists. Only such a workers' militia and the people's militia that will grow out of it could and should introduce universal compulsory labour service, not by bureaucratic means and in the interests of the capitalists, but to save the country from the impending debacle. Only such a militia could and should introduce real revolutionary discipline and get the whole people to make that supreme effort necessary for averting disaster. Only universal compulsory labour service is capable of ensuring the maximum economy in the expenditure of labour-power.

9. Among the measures aimed at saving the country from disaster, one of the most important tasks is that of engaging a large labour force in the production of coal and raw materials, and for work in the transport services. No less important is it that the workers employed in producing ammunition should be gradually switched over to producing goods necessary for the country's economic rehabilitation.

10. The systematic and effective implementation of all these measures is possible only if all the power in the state passes to the proletarians and semi-proletarians.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 64,
May 25 (June 7), 1917

Published according
to the manuscript

A DEAL WITH THE CAPITALISTS OR OVERTHROW OF THE CAPITALISTS?

HOW TO END THE WAR

Everyone is thinking and talking about how to end the war.

Practically all the workers and peasants are agreed that the war was started by the capitalists and that it is the capitalists of *all* countries who need it. And that is what the resolutions of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and *Peasants*' Deputies say.

This is the undoubted truth.

Opinion differs when we come to the question of *what way* to end the war (*everyone* realises that it cannot be ended *abruptly*). Are we to go about it by way of a deal with the capitalists, and if so, what kind of deal? Or are we to go by way of a workers' revolution, i.e., by overthrowing the capitalists? That is the basic, cardinal issue.

On this question our Party disagrees with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and with the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, both of which *incline towards deciding this question in favour of the capitalists and through the capitalists.*

This has been strikingly confirmed by the resolution on the war adopted by the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. In keeping with the notorious—and no less muddled—appeal to the nations of the world (dated March 14), this resolution demands:

> "peace without annexations and indemnities, with the right of every nation, in whatever state boundaries it may be living, to decide its own destiny."

The question of annexations is formulated differently here compared with the way it was recently put in *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet and in *Dyelo Naroda* (see *Pravda* No. 60 for May 18*).

The two latter newspapers, controlled by the Narodnik Menshevik bloc, are in a hopeless muddle when they declare that peace "without annexations" means returning to the state of things that existed before the war (the Latin phrase used for this is *status quo ante bellum*).

Such a solution of the problem—let us not blink the truth—means making a deal with the capitalists and between the capitalists. It means: Let us keep the old annexations (made before the war), but let us have no new ones.

For one thing, no socialist who does not wish to betray socialism can accept such a solution. It is not a socialist's job to make peace between the capitalists on the basis of the old division of spoils, that is, annexations. That is obvious. Secondly, such a solution, in any event, is impracticable unless there is a revolution *against capital*, at least against Anglo-Japanese capital, since no man in his right senses can doubt that *without a revolution* Japan will never give up Kiaochow, nor Britain Baghdad and her African colonies.

The peasant resolution gives a *different* definition to annexations. It proclaims the right of *every* nation (meaning also those annexed *before* the war) to be free and "to decide its own destiny".

This is the only correct solution of the problem as far as any really consistent democrat, not to mention a socialist, is concerned. No true socialist can put the question of annexations in any other way or deny *any* nation the right to self-determination and secession.

Let us not deceive ourselves, however. Such a demand implies a revolution against the capitalists. And the first to turn down such a demand (unless there is a revolution) will be the British capitalists, who have more annexed territories than any other nation in the world.

Neither of these demands, these wishes, either that of renouncing annexations in the sense of restoring status quo,

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* See pp. 433-35 of this volume.—*Ed.*

or renouncing all annexations, both old and new, are realisable without a revolution against capital, without the overthrow of the capitalists. We must not deceive ourselves or the people on this score.

Either we advocate and look forward to a deal with the capitalists—and that would amount to inspiring the people with faith in their worst enemies—or we place our faith solely in the workers' revolution and concentrate all our efforts on overthrowing the capitalists.

We must make our *choice* between these *two* ways of *ending* the war.

Pravda No. 65,
June 7 (May 25), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

THE CHAIN IS NO STRONGER THAN ITS WEAKEST LINK

If an iron chain is needed to hold a weight, say, of 100 poods, what would happen if we replaced *one* of its links by a wooden one?

The chain would break.

No matter how strong and intact all the other links are, if the wooden link breaks the whole chain will burst.

The same is true in politics.

The Mensheviks and Narodniks, the ministerialist gentlemen of these petty-bourgeois parties, have joined forces with *Plekhanov's* "*Yedinstvo*" in the elections to the District Councils.

You have only yourselves to blame, gentlemen!

Your "iron" chain was poor and rusty enough as it is, and now it has several links made not even of wood, but of clay and paper.

You have only yourselves to blame!

Comrades, working men and working women, soldiers, toilers, do you realise that by voting for the Narodnik-Menshevik bloc *you will be voting for Plekhanov's* "*Yedinstvo*"?

You will be voting for that disgraceful *Yedinstvo* of Plekhanov's which even the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers *turn away from.*

You will be voting for that disgraceful *Yedinstvo* of Plekhanov's which, to the capitalists' delight, frankly advocates *war to a victorious finish.*

You will be voting for that disgraceful *Yedinstvo* of Plekhanov's which daily whitewashes the Russian capitalists by throwing all the blame on the German capitalists and tramples on the fraternal alliance of the workers of *all*

countries in their struggle against the capitalists of *all* countries.

If you stand for the working people against the capitalists, if you wish to fight for bread, peace and liberty—then *do not give a single vote to the bloc of the Narodniks and Mensheviks*, who are trying to hide *the rotten "Yedinstvo" in their lists*!

Vote only for the Bolshevik and internationalist Social-Democrats!

Pravda No. 67,
June 9 (May 27), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

THE CAPITALISTS MUST BE EXPOSED

V. Bazarov, admittedly an authority on the condition of our industries, wrote in *Novaya Zhizn* for May 24:

"The war and the resulting economic and financial break-down have created a state of affairs in which the private interest of private enterprise tends not towards strengthening and developing the productive forces of the country, but towards destroying them. It is much more profitable at the present moment—in expectation of higher prices—to keep all the material elements of capital inactive than to put them into circulation; it is more profitable to produce, on terms ruinous to the country, absolutely useless military supplies than to serve conscientiously the pressing needs of the people, and it is most profitable of all to build new munition factories which will never be utilised, and which would not be in a position to start work until two or three years hence. Is it any wonder that our so-called 'national economy' has degenerated into an orgy of wanton pillage, into industrial anarchy, into a systematic spoliation of the national wealth?... Why should an ignorant, and, for that matter, even a fully class-conscious worker, forego an 'excessive' increase in wages amounting to three or four rubles, when he sees hundreds of millions of rubles looted and squandered before his very eyes?"

No honest person can deny that V. Bazarov is speaking the exact truth.

An "*orgy of pillage*"—no other words can describe the behaviour of the capitalists during the war.

This orgy is leading to national disaster.

We cannot keep silent. We cannot put up with it.

Every worker who knows and understands what is going on at "his" factory, every office employee working in a bank, factory or commercial house, who cannot remain indifferent to his country's ruin, every engineer, statistician, accountant—all should do everything in their power to *collect* accurate, even fragmentary, and, if possible, documented

data concerning this orgy of pillage, i.e., concerning *prices and profits*.

We must not keep silent. We must not put up with it. After all, we are not children to let ourselves be lulled by promises made by near-socialist ministers or by commissions, departments, or sub-departments of government officials.

If the Russian Government were not a captive of the capitalists, if it were made up of people who could and would act decisively, act to save their country from ruin, it would immediately, without a day's, without an hour's delay, issue a decree ordering the publication of *all* prices charged on war contracts, of *all* data pertaining to *profits*.

To chatter about the impending debacle and about saving the country from ruin *without doing* this, means descending to the level of deceivers of the people, or of playthings in the hands of tricksters.

To expect a government of capitalists, of Lvov, Tereshchenko, Shingaryov and Co., and their impotent, toylike "appendage" in the persons of Chernov. Tsereteli, Peshekhonov and Skobelev, to issue such a decree, and thus expose the capitalists, would be childish and naïve. Only those suffering from "ministerialist softening of the brain" are likely to expect that.

All the more energetically therefore must we encourage private initiative. Comrades and citizens! All those who really wish to save the country from famine must immediately collect and publish all accessible data pertaining to *prices* and *profits*.

Exposing the capitalists is the first step towards curbing the capitalists.

Exposing the orgy of pillage is the first step in our fight against the pillagers.

Pravda No. 67,
June 9 (May 27), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

REPORTS ON THE ECONOMIC DEBACLE

The basic and cardinal issue of today is that of the impending catastrophe. We must collect the most accurate possible data on It. Here are some very informative quotations from the paper of our opponents, the united Narodniks and Mensheviks (*Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet No. 70, May 19):

> "The calamity of mass unemployment is drawing nearer. Resistance to the workers' demands on the part of the united employers is growing. The employers are resorting to slow-down tactics in production and to lockouts."

And further:

> "The capitalists are doing nothing to help the country out of economic difficulties....
>
> "The real disorganisers and counter-revolutionaries are the capitaliats, who are hanging on to their profits. But the revolution will not and should not be allowed to go under. If the capitalists do nothing to help it voluntarily, the revolution must lay hands on them."

This could hardly be expressed more eloquently. The situation must be critical indeed. "The revolution must lay hands on the capitalists." But *what* revolution? The revolution of *which* class? *How* should it lay hands on them?

Here are answers given by speakers who reported to the Executive Committee of the Soviet on May 16:

> "A number of speakers revealed a depressing picture of widespread economic disorganisation in the country ... the bourgeois press says nothing about the real causes of the trouble, i.e., the war and the selfish conduct of the bourgeoisie."

From the report of the Menshevik ministerialist Cherevanin:

"The present economic debacle is too grave to be cured by one or another palliative, by a number of separate concrete measures. What we need is a general plan, regulation of our whole economic life by the state....

"To carry out this plan a special Economic Council must be set up under the Ministry."

The mountain has brought forth a mouse. Instead of "the revolution laying hands on the capitalists" we are offered a purely bureaucratic remedy.

From the report of Avilov:

"The main cause of the present economic break-down is the shortage of the most essential industrial products....

"Owing to the rising cost of living the position of the workers of numerous grades verges on chronic starvation....

"Although they are making enormous profits, the employers refuse to meet the workers unless there is a simultaneous rise in the prices of their goods....

"The only way out of the present situation is price fixing. But this can only be carried out if there is public control of distribution.

"Given compulsory distribution of commodities at controlled prices, there must also be established control of production, which otherwise may sag or even be suspended....

"At the same time the state must institute control over the sources from which industry receives its circulating and fixed assets—the banking houses."

What Comrade Avilov seems to have forgotten is that the "state" is a machine which the working class and the capitalists are pulling different ways. Which class is now capable of wielding state power?

From Bazarov's report:

"Fixed prices are virtually evaded; the state monopolies exist only on paper; controlled supply of the factories with coal and metal has not only failed to organise production in the interests of the state, but has not even been able to cope with the market anarchy or eliminate the unrestrained speculation of the middlemen and dealers.

"What is needed is compulsory state trustification of industry.

"Only by drafting the managements of the various enterprises and the capitalists into compulsory state service can really effective measures be taken to combat the anarchy which the industrialists are deliberately creating in production."

To say that the government of the capitalists (who are deliberately creating anarchy) must draft the capitalists into compulsory state service is tantamount to forgetting the class struggle.

From the report by G. V. Shuba:

"Despite the ceaseless demands we have been making for the last two months, not an inch of progress has been made in the general question—the problem of organising the national economy and labour. The result is that we have been simply marking time. At present the situation is this: although we have succeeded, in the face of opposition, in getting a number of measures and laws passed—we already have a grain monopoly law—all this remains on paper....

"We have reached an agreement in principle on the municipalisation of agricultural machines, but we can do nothing about it because there are practically no machines to speak of. The factories built to produce agricultural machines are turning out absolutely unessential articles for the army. Apart from the fact that the whole economic life of the country must be subject to regulation, we must at last break up and remodel the whole executive machinery of government."

This is more to the point, closer to the heart of the matter! "Break up and remodel the whole executive machinery of government"—now that gets us down to bedrock. Obviously, the question of government *machinery* is only a fraction of the larger question as to which *class* is wielding the state power.

From Kukovetsky's report:

"The country's financial situation is appalling. We are heading rapidly for financial bankruptcy....

"Purely financial measures will do no good....

"Measures must be taken towards compulsory distribution of the government loan, and if this does not yield the desired results, we must introduce a compulsory loan.

"The second measure is the compulsory regulation of industry and the establishment of fixed prices on goods."

"Compulsory" measures are a good thing, but the question is—which class will be the compellers and which the compelled?

From the report of Groman:

"What is happening in all countries today may be described as a process of disintegration of the national economic organism. It is being countered everywhere by the organising principle. The state has everywhere begun to organise the economy and labour....

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"So far neither the government nor the country at large has a central organ which could regulate the country's economic life. There is no economic brain, as it were. It must be created.... An authoritative executive body must be organised. An Economic Council must be set up."

A new bureaucratic institution—that is what Groman's idea amounts to! Very sad.

They all admit that an unheard-of catastrophe is inevitable. But they do not understand the main thing—that *only the revolutionary class* can save the country.

Pravda No. 67,
June 9 (May 27), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

"SLEIGHT OF HAND" AND UNPRINCIPLED POLITICIANS

The expression "sleight of hand" has been taken from the editorial in today's *Dyelo Naroda*. This newspaper of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries", to which Kerensky and Chernov are contributors, exposes the tricks of the *French* spokesmen of "tamed socialism", saying:

"*These are old tricks, a very old sleight of hand, which in our country have been repeatedly and unsuccessfully practised by Mr. Plekhanov without deceiving anybody....*"

Are you sure they were practised only by Plekhanov, my dear sirs?

Are you not going to the elections in a bloc with *this very* Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo*? Are you not helping it to get in, are you not saving it?

It was in your paper (No. 44 for May 9) that S. Mstislavsky wrote of Plekhanov:

"When a recent leader of Russian Social-Democracy lends his hand to such counter-revolutionary attacks [as those of *Russkaya Volya* and *Novoye Vremya*], then it is with profound regret and sincere sorrow that we are compelled to recognise this fact, since we never really imagined that the degeneration of the International had gone so far."

We would add: and the degeneration of the Socialist-Revolutionaries who have joined forces with *this very* "*Yedinstvo*".

And in an unsigned, i.e., editorial, note in *Dyelo Naroda* No. 48, for May 13, we read:

"'*Yedinstvo's' political unity with the liberal bourgeoisie is common knowledge.*"

Mark that carefully! The "Socialist-Revolutionaries" and the Mensheviks are in unity with that very *Yedinstvo*

whose political unity with the liberal bourgeoisie is *common knowledge*. Do not forget this, comrades, men and women workers, and soldiers!

The Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta* for April 20 (No. 35) wrote in an editorial:

> "We are against the British imperialists. *Yedinstvo* is against the British socialists. Herein lies the whole difference. Herein lies the reason why *Yedinstvo* has to argue à la Hottentot.... The Russian workers remember only too well how Plekhanov, during the tsarist regime [there is a misprint in the text: it should read "during the tsarist-republican regime"], tried in all manner of ways to dissuade them from going on strike. Then, too, Plekhanov tried to scare us with things even more terrible; he tried to assure us that such conflicts only played into the hands of the German General Staff."

And in the issue of the same paper for May 16 (No. 57) the discreetly moderate ministerialist Cherevanin wrote:

> "Plekhanov and his *Yedinstvo* are doing everything they possibly can here to compromise the principle of defencism, which has been compromised enough on an international scale thanks to the efforts of the majority of the German, French and other socialists."

This is how *Yedinstvo* is estimated by the Narodniks and the Mensheviks, this is how they try to *dissociate themselves from it*, this is how *ashamed they are of it*!

Nevertheless they have entered into a bloc with it at the elections, and Plekhanov accepts seats from people who publicly call him names, such as "juggler", "tamed socialist", "Hottentot", "compromised", "in unity with the liberal bourgeoisie".

Which member of that bloc is the worst?

Workers and soldiers! Not one vote to the bloc of the Narodniks and Mensheviks, who are shielding and working for *Yedinstvo*, which is "*in unity with the liberal bourgeoisie*"!

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Published according to the text in *Pravda*

THE DARK FORCES ARE FOR THE CADETS, THE MENSHEVIKS AND NARODNIKS ARE IN ONE GOVERNMENT WITH THE CADETS

Who does not know the newspaper *Novoye Vremya*? Who does not know that in the course of many a decade this paper has "earned" for itself the name of defender of the tsarist regime, defender of the capitalists, Jew baiter and hounder of revolutionaries?

Who does not know that all that was honest in Russia always turned away from *Novoye Vremya* with indignation and contempt? That this paper, even now, after the revolution, has not changed its ways by one iota?

And now we have the first elections in a free Russia. On the first day of the elections *Novoye Vremya* comes out with the call: "Put forward the list of the people's freedom party".

The fact speaks for itself: all the landowners and capitalists, all the dark forces, all those who are trying to restore the tsar, are for the Cadets.

And the Mensheviks and Narodniks have given *six* ministers as hostages to the *Cadets' ten*.

The Mensheviks and Narodniks have allowed themselves to be taken in by empty promises, not one of which has been kept. *Not a single step has been taken* by the government to stop the war, to abandon annexations* and to curb the capitalists, who are making outrageous profits and heading the country for destruction.

The war is dragging on, a debacle is imminent, the capitalists are making fortunes, the Mensheviks and Narodniks

* To publish the secret treaties, to make an open, honest, frank offer of peace to all the nations on clearly defined terms.

are talking and threatening, threatening and talking.... But all this falls on deaf ears—Vaska the Cat (the capitalist) listens but goes on eating.*

Workers and soldiers, all tolling people! Not a single vote to the Cadets, not a single vote to the Mensheviks and Narodniks!

Vote for the Bolsheviks!

Pravda No. 68,
June 10 (May 28), 1917

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* See Note No. 28.—*Ed.*

THE SHAMEFUL MENSHEVIK-NARODNIK BLOC WITH *YEDINSTVO*

Today is the second and principal day of the elections. The most importunate in offering themselves to the electorate, besides the Cadets, are the united Mensheviks and Narodniks.

What answer did they have to our accusation concerning their shameful bloc with *Yedinstvo*? Are they prepared to defend this bloc on grounds of *principle*?

They are *not*.

In reply to our suggestion that the bloc with *Yedinstvo* was a disgrace, *Rabochaya Gazeta* quotes the example of—whom would you think?—of the agent provocateur Malinovsky and of his being smuggled into the Duma by the secret police!

The dishonesty of such a "method" of controversy is dealt with elsewhere in a separate paragraph.* Here we are concerned with "*Rabochaya Gazeta's*" *logic* rather than its dishonesty. Look what you do, gentlemen! You parry our reference to "your" *Yedinstvo* by a counter-reference to "our" agent provocateur Malinovsky! What is the inference? The inference is that you consider *Yedinstvo* on a par with an agent provocateur!

That is how the wise heads of *Rabochaya Gazeta* "defend" the bloc with *Yedinstvo*. Very clever of them, to be sure. When told that they *have* in *free* Russia such a disgraceful colleague as Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo*, they *answer*: And the Bolsheviks, in *tsarist* Russia, *had* the agent provocateur Malinovsky! Isn't this a gem of a defence?

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* See p. 539 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Dyelo Naroda, too, has put its foot into it in regard to *Yedinstvo*. On May 27, the first day of the elections, this paper of Kerensky, Chernov and Co. carried a front-page appeal to vote *for the lists in which "Yedinstvo" is smuggled in*.

And on the *second* page of the same issue of *Dyelo Naroda* we read a lengthy denunciation of the "social-patriot" Plekhanov and his *Yedinstvo*, containing, among others, the following "vitriolic remark":

"*We will gladly inform our readers what other liberal- and social-imperialists—'Rech', 'Russkaya Volya'* and *'Yedinstvo'—think about the Italian annexation* [*of Albania*]."

A gem, is it not?

The "Socialist-Revolutionaries" call on the people to vote for lists in which the candidates of *Yedinstvo* are concealed, the *very same "Yedinstvo"* which the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves, and on election day at that, call "social-imperialist", i.e., socialist in word and "imperialist in deed", the very same *Yedinstvo* which they identify with *Rech* and *Russkaya Volya*.

The wise *Rabochaya Gazeta*, *in a bloc* with the wise *Dyelo Naroda*, has certainly "defended" *Yedinstvo* today.

And Plekhanov accepts alms from people who "accidentally" compare him with Malinovsky, or, on election day, openly declare him to be a "social-imperialist".

Such is the exhibition which this disgraceful bloc of the Mensheviks plus Narodniks plus *Yedinstvo* is making of itself.

Workers and soldiers! All toiling people! Not a single vote to the Narodniks and Mensheviks, who are trying to drag in the "social-imperialists"!

Vote for the Bolsheviks!

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COUNTER-REVOLUTION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

"JACOBINS WITHOUT THE PEOPLE"

The counter-revolution has mustered strength enough to assume the offensive. With the aid of the Narodnik and Menshevik ministers the capitalists are organising an assault on liberty.

The decision to disband the "45th, 46th, 47th and 52nd regiments" of the 12th and 13th divisions, the decision to "prosecute" the "instigators" (what an odd word! Are "instigators" more important than "perpetrators" in war?), and side by side with this, the news of the *arrest* of Ensign Krusser *for a speech made at a meeting* in Skuliany, and finally, the Provisional Government's extremely insulting tone in regard to Kronstadt[124] (for example, that orders "must be obeyed without question"—is that the way to talk to citizens who, so far, have not been accused of anything, not of a *single* act of disobedience?)—all this, taken together, and highlighted by that gloating defender of the counter-revolutionary capitalists, *Rech* ("the government at last has spoken up in the language of authority")—all this clearly points to the fact that the counter-revolution is taking the offensive.

This "offensive" creates a strange impression. At the front the instigators, those guilty of "inciting to insubordination", are arraigned before the court, and four regiments are "disbanded" (four out of the two divisions' eight regiments mentioned in the telegram, although, according to the same telegram reported in *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet No. 76, only *one* regiment out of the eight "came out in full force" and another one "almost in full force"). If you gentlemen of the government inform the people that you are disbanding certain regiments, if you find this useful, if you allow a

telegram about it to go through, then why don't you tell us, clearly and plainly, in at least a few lines, what the reasons for insubordination were on the part of those you are prosecuting?

One of two things, gentlemen: either you work in silence—you have a military censorship—and do not bother about informing the public, or bothering it with your reports; or, if you do decide to keep the public informed, then tell it what it's all about, give it the why and the wherefore of the case, let it know whether the people you are prosecuting are guilty of insubordination on a particular or general point.

Vagueness is a bad thing.

In the case of Krusser's arrest, everything is quite clear. To hustle a man off to prison *for a speech he has made at a meeting* is hardly reasonable. Does it not signify that you have simply lost your heads? Why, you Cadets and Rights who share the cabinet with the Narodniks and Mensheviks have ten if not a hundred times more newspaper circulation than your opponents! And with such superiority in chief propaganda weapons, you hustle a man off to prison for "a speech at a meeting"! Have you gone berserk with fear, gentlemen?

We are not opposed to the use of revolutionary force in the interests of the nation's majority.

When Plekhanov the other day mentioned the Jacobins of 1793 and their *forthright* statement that "such-and-such persons are enemies of the people", we thought in this connection: *No party* should draw the line at imitating the Jacobins of 1793 on this point cited by Plekhanov.

The trouble is that there are Jacobins and Jacobins. A witty French saying, which Plekhanov was fond of quoting twenty years ago, when he was still a socialist, pokes fun at the "Jacobins without the people" (*jacobins moins le peuple*).

The historical greatness of the true Jacobins, the Jacobins of 1793, is that they were "Jacobins *with* the people", with the revolutionary *majority* of the nation, with the *revolutionary* advanced classes of *their* time.

They are ridiculous and pitiful, the "Jacobins without the people", they who merely pose as Jacobins, who are *afraid*

to declare clearly, openly and for all to hear that the exploiters, the oppressors of the people, the servants of the monarchy in all countries, the defenders of the landowners in all countries, are enemies of the people.

You have studied history, Messrs. Milyukovs and Plekhanovs—can you deny that the *great* Jacobins of 1793 were not afraid to denounce precisely the members of the reactionary exploiting *minority* of their time as enemies of the people? Precisely the members of the reactionary *classes* of their time?

You, the present government, its backers, its defenders, its servants—can you say openly, clearly, and officially which *classes* you consider "enemies of the people" *all over the world*?

But how can you! You are Jacobins without the people. You are merely posing as Jacobins. You look more like ordinary representatives of ordinary landowner and capitalist reaction.

Workers and soldiers! All toiling people! The counter-revolution of the landowners and capitalists is assuming the offensive. Not a single vote for a *single* government party, *for any parties participating in the government*!

Vote for the Bolsheviks!

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A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE

"FORGOTTEN WORDS" OF DEMOCRACY

The filthy torrent of lies and slander which the capitalist papers have spewed out against the Kronstadt comrades has revealed once more how dishonest these papers are. They have seized on a quite ordinary and unimportant incident and magnified it to the dimensions of a "state" affair, of "secession" from Russia and so on and so forth.

Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet No. 74 reports that the Kronstadt incident has been settled. As was to have been expected, Ministers Tsereteli and Skobelev easily came to an understanding with the Kronstadt people on the basis of a compromise resolution. Needless to say, we express our hope and confidence that this compromise resolution, provided *both* sides faithfully live up to it, will, for a sufficiently lengthy period of time, eliminate conflicts in the work of the *revolution* both in Kronstadt and the rest of Russia.

The Kronstadt incident is a matter of principle to us in two respects.

First, it has revealed a fact long ago observed by us and officially recognised in our Party's resolution (on the Soviets), namely, that in the *local areas* the revolution has gone farther than it has in Petrograd. Succumbing to the current craze for the revolutionary phrase, the Narodniks and Mensheviks as well as the Cadets did not wish to or could not grasp the significance of this fact.

Secondly, the Kronstadt incident raised an important fundamental issue of programmatic significance, which no honest democrat, to say nothing of a socialist, can afford to treat with indifference. It is the question of whether

the central authority has the right to *endorse* officials elected by the local population or not.

The Mensheviks, to whose party Ministers Tsereteli and Skobelev belong, still claim to be Marxists. Tsereteli and Skobelev got a resolution passed in favour of such endorsement. In doing so, did they stop to think of their duty as Marxists?

Should the reader find this question naïve and pass a remark to the effect that the Mensheviks now have really become a petty-bourgeois, even defencist (i.e., chauvinist) party, and therefore it would be ludicrous even to talk about Marxism, we shall not argue the point. All we shall say is that Marxism always gives close attention to questions of democratism, and the name of democrats can hardly be denied to citizens Tsereteli and Skobelev.

Did they stop to think of their duty as democrats, of their "title" as democrats, when they passed the resolution authorising the Provisional Government to "endorse" officials elected by the Kronstadt population?

Obviously, they did not.

In support of this conclusion, we shall quote the opinion of a writer who, we hope, even in the eyes of Tsereteli and Skobelev, is considered something of a scientific and Marxian authority. That writer is Frederick Engels.

In criticising the draft programme of the German Social-Democrats (now known as the Erfurt Programme) Engels wrote in 1891 that the German proletariat was in need of a single and united republic.

"But not," Engels added, "such a republic as the present French Republic, which is really an empire founded in 1798 but without an emperor. From 1792 to 1798 every French department, every commune enjoyed complete self-government after the American pattern. That is what we [the German Social-Democrats] should have too. How self-government can be organised and how a bureaucracy can be dispensed with has been demonstrated to us by America and the First French Republic, as well as by Australia, Canada and other British colonies even today. Such provincial and communal self-government is much freer than, for instance, Swiss federalism, where each canton is really independent of the confederation [i.e., the central government] but at the same time is

the supreme authority as far as the minor subdivisions of the canton are concerned—the Bezirk and the Commune. The cantonal governments appoint the Bezirkestatthalter and Prefects. This right of appointing local officers is entirely unknown in English-speaking countries, and in future we must politely abolish this right [i.e., appointment from above], just as we should the Prussian Landräthe and Regierungräthe."[125]

Such was Engels's opinion on questions of democracy as applied to the right of appointing officers from above. To express these views with greater precision and accuracy, he proposed that the German Social-Democrats should insert in their programme the following demand:

"Complete self-government in the communes, districts, and regions through officers elected by universal suffrage; *abolition of all state-appointed local and regional authorities.*"

The italicised words leave nothing to be desired in the way of clarity and definiteness.

Worthy citizens, Ministers Tsereteli and Skobelev! You are probably flattered to have your names mentioned in history books. But will it be flattering to have every Marxist—and every honest democrat—say that Ministers Tsereteli and Skobelev helped the Russian capitalists to build such a republic in Russia as would turn out to be not a republic at all, but *a monarchy without a monarch*?

P.S. This article was written *before* the Kronstadt incident entered its last stage, as reported in today's papers. The Kronstadt people have *not* broken the compromise agreement. *Not a single fact* remotely suggesting a breach of this agreement has been cited. *Rech*'s reference to newspaper articles is mere subterfuge, since you can only break an agreement by deeds and not by newspaper articles. The fact then remains, that Ministers Tsereteli, Skobelev and Co. have allowed themselves to be scared for the hundredth and thousandth time by the screams of the frightened bourgeoisie and have resorted to *gross threats* against the people of Kronstadt. Crude, absurd threats, that merely serve the counter-revolution.

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FOR LACK OF A CLEAN PRINCIPLED WEAPON THEY SNATCH AT A DIRTY ONE

Rabochaya Gazeta, the organ of the Menshevik ministerialists, takes a dig at us by recalling the fact that the secret police arrested the Bolshevik conciliator Rykov in 1911 in order to give the Bolsheviks of our Party "freedom" of action "on the eve of the elections to the Fourth Duma" (*Rabochaya Gazeta* rubs this in).

But what does this fact prove? It proves that the secret police were clearing the way to the Duma for Malinovsky, who turned out to be an agent provocateur. Naturally, the secret police looked after their undercover agents.

Is our Party to be blamed for this? It is not, no more than any *honest* man would think of blaming Chernov and Co. for mistakenly vindicating Azef, or blaming Yonov and Co. (member of the Bund and colleague of *Rabochaya Gazeta*) for exonerating the agent provocateur Zhitomirsky ("Otsov") in 1910 in the name of the united Central Committee, or blaming those Mensheviks who, in 1904, tried for a time to defend the agent provocateur Dobroskokov, or blaming those Cadets who also had agent provocateurs in their midst, whose names have now been made public.

All parties without exception have made mistakes in failing to detect agent provocateurs. This is a fact. *Rabochaya Gazeta*, which has entered into a bloc with Minister Chernov, chooses to ignore *his* old mistakes and mentions only those of its present opponents. Such a method is clearly dishonest, clearly unscrupulous. The blow which *Rabochaya Gazeta* aimed at us has fallen upon itself, for it will never dare to admit to the world that it is honest to keep silent about Azef while shouting about a similar agent provocateur, Malinovsky, for selfish factional motives.

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MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)

MAY 30 (JUNE 12), 1917

First published in 1925
in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis*
(Red Annals) No. 3 (14)

Published according
to the typewritten copy
of the Minutes

MEETING
OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE
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1

SPEECH CONCERNING AN ORGAN OF THE PRESS FOR THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE

The desire of the Petrograd Committee to have a press organ of its own is something new as far as the Central Committee is concerned. It is difficult to understand how such a question could have arisen at a time when arrangements are being made for a printing-press of our own and an agreement is about to be reached with the Inter-District group for getting Comrade Trotsky to edit a popular organ.

In the West, in the capitals or big industrial centres, there is no division of the press into local and central organs. Such a division is wasteful and harmful. It is not advisable to have a Petrograd Committee organ apart from the Central Organ. Petrograd, as a separate locality, does not exist. Petrograd is the geographical, political and revolutionary centre of all Russia. The life of Petrograd is being followed by the whole of Russia. Every step of Petrograd's is a guideline for the whole of Russia. In view of this the life of the Petrograd Committee cannot be treated as a local affair.

Why not accept the Central Committee's suggestion that a Press Committee be formed? In the history of the press in the West, where such committees have existed, there have of course been occasional misunderstandings between the editorial board and the committee, but these were due entirely to disagreements on policy. What grounds are there for any disagreements on policy between the Petrograd Committee and the Central Committee? Whether we want it or not the organ of the Petrograd Committee will always be the leading organ of the Party.

The experience gained in establishing an organ of its own would quickly convince the Petrograd Committee that it is impossible to confine the paper to local affairs. The Central Committee does not deny the need for giving more space to the Petrograd branch in the newspapers. The Central Committee does not deny the need for a popular organ that would bring our slogans home to the masses. But the establishment of a popular newspaper is a difficult job that calls for considerable experience. That is why the Central Committee is enlisting the services of Comrade Trotsky, who has succeeded in establishing his own popular organ—*Russkaya Gazeta*.[126]

In the history of the West the question of a popular organ has never been so acute as it is with us. The level of the masses there rose more evenly as a result of the cultural and educational work done by the Liberals. In countries like Bohemia there are such popular organs. The purpose of a popular organ is to elevate the reader to an understanding of the leading party organ. If we do not establish a popular organ other parties will win the masses and use them to speculate with. The popular organ should not be of a local type, but owing to postal difficulties it is bound primarily to serve the needs of Petrograd. In order that local needs be adequately served the Petrograd Committee should secure proper representation on the editorial board of the paper.

2

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED AT THE MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE

FIRST RESOLUTION

The Central Committee is to issue two newspapers in Petrograd—the Central Organ and a popular paper with a single editorial board. The Petrograd Committee is to receive a consultative voice on the editorial board of the Central Organ, and a vote in the popular organ. The Central Committee is to devote a definite number of columns in both papers to items of local interest.

SECOND RESOLUTION

The Petrograd Committee resolves to co-operate in both papers published by the Central Committee on the conditions proposed by the latter, and to make every effort to serve the needs of local activities more fully and widely and to work out in greater detail the general line of the Party. Having reason to fear that the Central Committee or the editorial board appointed by it may place too much trust in the internationalist comrades who have disagreed with Bolshevism in the past, that the Central Committee may cramp the freedom and independence of action of the local comrades, that the Central Committee may not give them the influence they are entitled to as leaders of local activities, the Petrograd Committee is to elect a committee to formulate precise guarantees of the rights of the Petrograd Committee in the local department of both papers.

THE HARM OF PHRASE-MONGERING

The answers of the French and the British governments clearly demonstrate the soundness of our repeated assertions that neither the Russian, nor the French, nor the British, nor the German capitalist government can throw over the policy of annexations, and that all such promises are designed to deceive the peoples.[127]

We are fighting to seize Alsace-Lorraine, we are fighting for victory, the French replied. Be good enough to comply with the treaty and fight for Russian and German Poland, the British replied.

The bitter truth that capitalism cannot be reconciled to a non-annexationist policy has been exposed once more. The policy of the "conciliators", of those who wish to reconcile the capitalists and the proletariat, the policy of the Narodnik and Menshevik ministerialists, is an obvious failure. All their hopes on a coalition government have been shattered, all their promises have been exposed as mere verbiage.

And most harmful of all, as far as the cause of the revolution and the interests of the toiling masses are concerned, is the attempt to cover up the whole thing with phrases. Two shadings stand out in this torrent of phrases, one as bad as the other.

Rabochaya Gazeta, the organ of the Menshevik ministerialists, brings grist to the Cadet mill. On the one hand, it says: "On this basis [on the basis of the answers of the two Allied powers] there can be no agreement between them and us...." When they say "us", do they mean the Russian *capitalists*? The theory of the class struggle is thrown overboard; it is much more profitable to spout phrases about "democracy" in the abstract, while trampling underfoot the elementary

truth of Marxism, namely, that it is precisely *within* a "democracy" that the gulf between the capitalists and the proletarians is widest.

On the other hand, *Rabochaya Gazeta* wishes to make "an attempt at revision [of the agreements and the treaties] through a conference of representatives of the Allied governments to be specially convened". The same old story: agreement with the capitalists, which, in fact, signifies *deception of the workers* by playing at negotiations with their class foes.

"The pressure of the rank and file of the French and British democracies, even pressure by the French and British proletariat alone upon their respective governments..." writes *Rabochaya Gazeta*. In Russia the Mensheviks are supporting *their own* imperialist government, but in other countries they want *pressure* to be brought to bear.... What is this, if not sheer phrase-mongering and humbug from beginning to end?

"We are working for it [for world peace] by convening an international socialist conference" ... to be attended by ministers from among those ex-socialists who have sided with *their* governments! This is "working" with a vengeance to deceive the people on a major scale by means of a series of minor deceptions.

We have *Dyelo Naroda* phrase-mongering "à la Jacobin". That stern tone, those spectacular revolutionary exclamations: "we know enough" ... "faith in the victory of our Revolution" (with a capital letter, of course), "upon this or that step ... of the Russian revolutionary democracy ... depend the destinies ... of the *entire* Uprising [with a capital letter, of course] which the working people have so happily and so victoriously begun."

Obviously, if you write the words Revolution and Uprising with capital letters it makes the thing look "awfully" frightening, just like the Jacobins. Plenty of effect at small expense. For the people who write this are virtually helping to crush the revolution and impede the uprising of the working people by supporting the *Russian* government of the imperialists, by supporting *their* methods of concealing from the people the secret treaties, *their* tactics of putting off the immediate abolition of the landed estates, by supporting *their* war

policy of "offensive", *their* high-handed insulting behaviour towards the local representative bodies, *their* presumption to appoint or endorse the local officers elected by the local population, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Gentlemen, heroes of the phrase, knights of revolutionary bombast! Socialism demands that we distinguish, between capitalist democracy and proletarian democracy, between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution, between a rising of the rich against the tsar and a rising of the working people *against the rich*. Socialism demands that we distinguish our bourgeois revolution, which has ended (the bourgeoisie now is counter-revolutionary), from the mounting revolution of the proletarians and poor peasants. The former revolution is *for* war, *for* preserving the landed estates, *for* "subordinating" the local organs of self-government to the central government, *for* secret treaties. The latter revolution has *begun* to throttle the war by revolutionary fraternisation, by abolishing the power of the landowners in the local areas, by increasing the number and the power of the Soviets, and by introducing everywhere the elective principle.

The Narodnik and Menshevik ministerialists are spouting phrases about "democracy" in the abstract, about "Revolution" in the abstract in order to *cover up* their agreement with the imperialist, now definitely counter-revolutionary, bourgeoisie of their own country—an agreement which, in effect, is turning into a struggle *against* the revolution of the proletarians and semi-proletarians.

Pravda No. 69,
June 13 (May 31), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

CAPITALIST MOCKERY OF THE PEOPLE

The meeting of representatives of the capitalists and workers of the southern mining industry ended on May 23.

The meeting came to *nothing*. The capitalists found all the demands of the workers unacceptable. The workers' delegation attending the meeting read a statement *disclaiming all responsibility for possible complications*.

The case is as clear as clear can be. The crisis has not been averted in the least. The employers have not been curbed.

And now we read—it would be amusing, were it not so sad—that it has been decided to appoint a committee made up of representatives of the government and the two conflicting parties (!) and that the employers have asked for an *immediate* increase in prices!

To give the reader an idea to what lengths the capitalists go in defying the people, we quote a few passages from a *ministerial* newspaper (i.e., the mouthpiece of a party that has representatives in the cabinet):

"The workers' delegation [from the southern mining industry] informed the Economic Department of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies about the actual state of affairs. On the basis of this information, we can declare that the employers' figures quoted by N. N. Kutler are absolutely untrustworthy.

"The colliery owners had been making enormous profits before the revolution, and yet, just before its outbreak, they were haggling with the old government for a rise in the requisition prices on coal. In addition to the three kopeks which the government was willing to grant, the colliery owners were asking five more kopeks. From the revolutionary Provisional Government, on the other hand, they succeeded, during the very first days of the revolution, in obtaining a rise of eight kopeks, this new rate being extended to the old deliveries to the railways, and to requisitions dating back to January. Afterwards they managed to get three kopeks more, making a total of eleven kopeks.

"Before the revolution the requisition price was eighteen kopeks; now it is twenty-nine. Government contracts at that time brought twenty two kopeks per pood, while now the prices are thirty-three and thirty-four and even more."

What is this if not the most outrageous *mockery* of the people on the part of the capitalists?

Taking advantage of the revolution, the capitalist government, styling itself a "revolutionary" government and using this "noble" name to hoodwink the ignorant people, is putting more and more money into the pockets of the capitalists, helping them to amass more and more millions!

The country is on the verge of ruin, and the ten capitalist members of the Provisional Government are accommodating the employers who are looting the land, robbing the people, and *swelling* the colossal profits of capital.

"The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is under the beck and call of the congress of the South Russian mine owners. Faced by the catastrophe towards which industry in the South is heading, it does nothing to avert it; on the contrary, it systematically submits to the pressure of the southern industrialists."

Thus wrote the very same ministerial paper, the organ of the Mensheviks, *Rabochaya Gazeta*, on May 14, 1917, a week after the coalition cabinet was formed.

Since then absolutely nothing has changed.

But the ministerial paper has been forced to admit even more damaging facts. Listen to this:

"The owners are sabotaging. They are deliberately letting things slide. If a pump is needed, no one looks for it. If wire gauze is needed for the miners' safety lamps, it is not supplied. The owners do not want to increase production. Nor do they want to spend any money on essential repairs, or on replacing worn-out equipment. The machines are getting old, and will soon be out of commission. Frequently the workers themselves, when told that this or that article cannot be obtained, go out to buy the necessary tools, and they generally find what they need. The employers do nothing to ship their products, such as coal, cast-iron, etc. Products to the value of tens and hundreds of millions of rubles lie idle, while the country is in dire need of them."

Thus wrote the ministerial paper, mouthpiece of that same Menshevik party to which Tsereteli and Skobelev belong.

This is sheer mockery of the people on the part of the capitalists. It's like a madhouse, with the capitalists acting

in collusion with the bourgeois section of the Provisional Government (among the members of which are Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), with the capitalists using *obstruction* and *wrecking* tactics, and *doing nothing* to ship their products, without which the country is facing *ruin*.

Without coal, the factories and railways are coming to a stand. Unemployment is spreading. There is a shortage of goods. The peasants cannot part with their grain without getting anything in return. Famine is imminent.

And all this because of the capitalists, who are in collusion with the government!

And all this is tolerated by the Narodniks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Mensheviks! They dismiss the matter with phrases. They wrote about these crimes of the capitalists *on May 14*. It is now May 31. Over a fortnight has passed. But nothing has changed. Famine is steadily approaching.

To cover up the crimes of the capitalists and distract the attention of the people, all the capitalist newspapers—*Rech*, *Dyen*, *Novoye Vremya*, *Russkaya Volya*, *Birzheviye Vedomosti* and *Yedinstvo*—vie with each other in daily emptying their slop pails of lies and calumny over the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks are to blame for the colliery owners acting in collusion with the government, for their stopping and wrecking production!

This would indeed resemble a madhouse, were it not for the theory and world-wide experience of the class struggle which have shown us that the capitalists and *their* government (supported by the Mensheviks) will stop at nothing when it comes to safeguarding their profits.

When is this going to stop? Must we wait until disaster sweeps the land, and people begin to die of starvation by the hundred and the thousand?

Pravda No. 69,
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to the text in *Pravda*

LETTER TO THE DISTRICT COMMITTEES OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

Dear comrades,

I enclose a resolution of the Petrograd Committee concerning the establishment of a paper of its own, and two resolutions introduced by me on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party at a meeting of the P.C. held on Tuesday, May 30.* Will you please discuss these three resolutions and give us your well-considered opinion on them in the fullest possible detail.

On the question as to whether a separate paper for the Petrograd organisation is needed or not, the P.C. and the C.C. hold conflicting views. It is essential and desirable that the greatest possible number of Party members in Petrograd should take an active part in the discussion of this growing conflict and help, by their decision, to settle it.

The Executive of the P.C. has expressed itself unanimously in favour of a separate press organ for the Petrograd Committee, despite the C.C.'s decision to establish *two* newspapers in place of *Pravda*, the size of which is obviously inadequate. These two papers are: the old *Pravda*, as the Party's Central Organ, and a small *Narodnaya Pravda* (the names of the two papers have not yet been definitely decided

* See p. 545 of this volume.—*Ed.*

upon), as a popular organ for the masses. The two papers, according to the decision of the C.C., are to have a single editorial board, and the P.C. is to have a representative on each paper (one with a consultative voice on the Central Organ, and a voting representative on the popular organ). A Press Committee is to be set up (consisting of workers from the districts who are in close touch with the masses) and a definite number of columns in *both* papers are to be set aside for the needs of the local labour movement.

That is the plan of the C.C.

The Executive of the P.C., on the other hand, wants a special paper *of its own*. The Executive has decided upon this unanimously.

At the meeting of the P.C. held on May 30, after the report by Comrade M. Tomsky and his speech winding up the debate, after my own speech and the discussion in which many comrades participated, there was an equal division of votes—fourteen in favour of the Executive and fourteen against it. My motion was rejected by sixteen votes to twelve.

My own view is that there is no fundamental need for a special organ of the P.C. In view of the *capital*'s leading role and country-wide influence, only *one* organ of the Party is needed there, namely, the Central Organ, and a popular paper to be put out in a *specially* popular form by the *same* editorial board.

A special organ of the P.C. is bound to create obstacles towards harmonious work and may even give rise to different lines (or shadings) of policy, which would be extremely harmful, especially at a time of revolution.

Why should we split up our forces?

We are all terribly overworked and have few people to do the work; the party writers are siding more and more with the defencists. Under the circumstances we cannot afford any dispersion of efforts.

We must concentrate our efforts, not disperse them.

Are there any grounds for mistrusting the C.C., for believing that it will not select the editorial board properly, or not give sufficient space in both papers to local activities, or that it will "bully" the P.C.'s editors, who will be in the minority, and so on?

In my second draft resolution I specially listed some of these arguments (which I heard mentioned at the P.C. meeting on May 30) in order to put the issue frankly before all members of the Party so as to make them weigh *each* of the two arguments carefully and arrive at a well-considered decision.

If you, comrades, have weighty and serious reasons for not trusting the C.C., then say so openly. It is the duty of every member of our democratically organised Party to do so, and then it would be the duty of our Party's C.C. to give special consideration to this distrust of yours, report it to the Party congress and enter into special negotiations with a view to overcoming this deplorable lack of confidence in the C.C. on the part of the local organisation.

If there is no such lack of confidence, then it is unfair and wrong to challenge the C.C.'s right, vested in it by the Party congress, to *direct the activities* of the Party in general and its activities in the capital in particular.

Is our C.C. asking too much in wanting to direct the Petrograd papers? It is not. In the German Social-Democratic Party, in its best days, when Wilhelm Liebknecht stood at the head of the party for scores of years, he was the editor of the party's Central Organ. The C.O. was published in Berlin. The Berlin organisation *never* had a special Berlin paper of its own. There was a Press Committee of workers, and there was a *local section* in the party's Central Organ. Why should we depart from this good example which our comrades in other countries have set us?

If you, comrades, desire *special guarantees* from the C.C., if you want changes made in one or another point of the C.C.'s plan for the establishment of two papers, I would ask you on behalf of the C.C. to carefully consider the matter and present your views.

I believe that the decision of the P.C.'s Executive to establish a *special* newspaper in Petrograd is utterly wrong and undesirable, because it splits up our forces and introduces into our Party the elements of conflict. In my opinion—and on this point I merely voice the view of the C.C.—it is desirable that the Petrograd organisation should support the

decision of the C.C., give itself time to check results from the *experience* of the two papers working according to the C.C.'s plan, and then, if need be, pass a special decision on the results of that experiment.

With comradely Social-Democratic greetings,

May 31, 1917 *N. Lenin*

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SPEECH MADE AT THE FIRST PETROGRAD CONFERENCE OF SHOP COMMITTEES MAY 31 (JUNE 13), 1917

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Avilov's resolution shows a complete disregard for the class stand. B. V. Avilov would seem to have made up his mind in this resolution to collect together and concentrate all the faults common to all the resolutions of the petty-bourgeois parties.

Avilov's resolution starts with the postulate, by now indisputable to any socialist, that capitalism's robber economy has reduced Russia to complete economic and industrial ruin, but then goes on to propose the hazy formula of control of industry by "the state authorities" with the co-operation of the broad democratic mass.

Everybody nowadays is having a good deal to say about control. Even people who used to scream "murder" at the very mention of the word "control" now admit that control is necessary.

By using the term "control" in the abstract, however, they want to reduce the idea of control to naught.

The coalition government, which "socialists" have now joined, has done nothing yet in the way of putting this control into effect, and therefore it is quite understandable that the shop committees are demanding real workers' control, and not control on paper.

In dealing with the idea of control and the question of when and by whom this control is to be effected, one must not for a single moment forget the class character of the modern state, which is merely an organisation of class rule.

A similar class analysis should be applied to the concept "revolutionary democracy", and this analysis should be based on the actual balance of social forces.

Avilov's resolution starts with a promise to give everything, but ends, in effect, with a proposition to leave everything as it was. There is not a shadow of revolutionism in the whole resolution.

In revolutionary times of all times it is necessary accurately to analyse the question as to the very essence of the state, as to whose interests it shall protect, and as to how it should be constructed in order effectively to protect the interests of the working people. In Avilov's resolution this has not been dealt with at all.

Why is it that our new coalition government, which "socialists" have now joined, has not carried out control in the course of three months, and, what is more, in the conflict between the colliery owners and the workers of Southern Russia, the government has openly sided with the capitalists?

For control over industry to be effectively carried out it must be a *workers' control* with a workers' majority in all the leading bodies, and the management must give an account of its actions to all the authoritative workers' organisations.

Comrades, workers, see that you get real control, not fictitious control, and reject in the most resolute manner all resolutions and proposals for establishing such a fictitious control existing only on paper.

Pravda No. 72,
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INFAMY JUSTIFIED

The International Relations Department of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet has sent a letter to Huysmans, well-known as Secretary of the bankrupt Second International, whose members went over to the side of "their" national governments.

This letter, published in issue No. 78 of *Izvestia*, tries to prove that the Russian Narodniks and Mensheviks, who joined the bourgeois and imperialist government, cannot be "compared" to the West-European betrayers of socialism, who joined "their" governments. The "Department's" case is so feeble and pitiful, so ludicrously impotent that it needs to be shown up again and again in all its unsightly futility.

Argument 1. In other countries these people joined the government "under entirely different conditions". This is not true. The difference between Britain, France, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, etc., on the one hand, and present-day Russia, on the other, is "entirely" *negligible*. Everyone who has *not* betrayed socialism knows that the question at issue is the class *rule* of the bourgeoisie. In *this* respect conditions in all the countries mentioned above are the same, and not "different". National peculiarities do not in the least affect the basic issue of bourgeois class rule.

Argument 2. "Our" ministers have joined a "revolutionary" government. This is a disgraceful method of hoodwinking the people by means of the great word "revolution", which the Mensheviks and Narodniks use to cover up their betrayal of it. Everyone knows that ten of the sixteen ministers in today's "revolutionary" government belong to the parties of the landowners and capitalists, who stand for the imperial-

ist war and non-publication of the secret treaties, and that these parties are now pursuing a *counter-revolutionary* policy. This was clearly demonstrated by the elections to the District Councils of Petrograd on May 27-29, when *all* the Black-Hundred elements rallied to *support* the majority in our "revolutionary" government.

Argument 3. "Our" ministers joined "with a definite mandate to achieve world peace by agreement among the nations and not to drag out the imperialist war for the sake of liberating the nations by force of arms". For one thing, this mandate is not "definite" at all, since it implies neither a definite *programme* nor any definite *action*. These are mere words. It is like the secretary of a labour union becoming an executive member of a capitalist association at a salary of 10,000 rubles "with a definite mandate" to work for the welfare of labour and not drag out the rule of capitalism. Second, *all* imperialists, including Wilhelm and Poincaré, are out for "an agreement among the nations". This, too, is an empty phrase. Third, the war on Russia's part, since May 6, 1917, is obviously being "dragged out", among other reasons, because our imperialist government has so far failed to announce or propose clear and precise terms of peace, terms of an agreement.

Argument 4. "Our" ministers' aim "is not cessation of the class struggle, but its continuation by means of the instruments of political power". Splendid! All you need to do is to cloak vileness with a good aim or a good excuse for participation in vileness—and the trick is done! Participation in a bourgeois imperialist government, which is *actually* waging an imperialist war, may, it appears, be called "continuation of the class struggle by means of instruments of political power". This is a perfect gem. We suggest that at every workers' and public meeting three cheers should be raised for Chernov, Tsereteli, Peshekhonov and Skobelev, who are waging "*a class struggle*" against Tereshchenko, Lvov and Co.

You will be laughed to scorn, gentlemen of the "Department", for defending ministerialism with such arguments. You are not original, though. The famous Vandervelde, friend of Plekhanov (whom you scold, although, since you have joined the cabinet, you have no moral right to do so),

said long ago that he, too, had joined the cabinet "to continue the class struggle".

Argument 5. "Our" ministers joined the cabinet after the overthrow of tsarism and the expulsion of "the enemies of the Russian proletariat [i.e., Milyukov and Guchkov] by the movement of the revolutionary mass on April 20-21".

You can hardly blame the French for having overthrown their autocracy 122 years ago, instead of 100 days ago, or the English for having done it over 260 years ago, or the Italians for having done it decades ago. April 20 saw Milyukov ejected and replaced by Tereshchenko, i.e., absolutely nothing has changed as far as class or party relations are concerned. New promises do not imply a new policy.

You could dismiss the Metropolitan and put the Pope in his place, but that does not mean you would cease to be a clerical.

Argument 6. In Russia "there is full freedom for the proletariat and the army". That is untrue—it is *not* full. It is fuller than in other countries, and all the more shameful therefore is it to *soil* this young unsullied freedom with the dirt of participation in a bourgeois imperialist government.

The Russian betrayers of socialism differ from their European namesakes no more than the rapist differs from the ravisher.

Argument 7. "Moreover the Russian proletariat has the means of exercising complete control over those it elects."

That is untrue. Partyism in Russia is so young and disintegration among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is so evident (Martov's semi-breakaway, Kamkov's protests and his forming a bloc with us at the elections against *his own* party, the Menshevik-S.R. bloc with *Yedinstvo*, which *they themselves* call *imperialist*, etc.) that there can be *no* question of any serious, not to say "complete", control of the ministers on the part of the proletariat.

Besides, proletariat is a *class* concept, which the Mensheviks and Narodniks have no right to use, because they rely mostly on the support of the *petty bourgeoisie*. Once *you* speak of classes, be precise!

Argument 8. "The fact that representatives of the Russian socialist [?] proletariat [?] have joined the government does

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not imply any weakening of its bonds with the socialists of all countries who are fighting against imperialism. On the contrary, it signifies a strengthening of those bonds in the joint struggle for world peace."

That is untrue. A mere phrase.

Everyone knows that their joining the government in Russia has strengthened the *bonds* that unite the *adherents* of imperialism, the social-chauvinists, the *social-imperialists* of all countries—Henderson and Co., Thomas and Co., *Scheidemann* and Co.

Yes, Scheidemann, tool For he realises that *German* social-imperialism will be *safe* to continue exercising its baneful influence on the world's labour movement, since *even* the Russians, their great measure of freedom and their revolution *notwithstanding*, have entered into a shameful alliance with *their* imperialist bourgeoisie.

Pravda No. 70,
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THE PETTY-BOURGEOIS STAND ON THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC DISORGANISATION

Novaya Zhizn today publishes a resolution introduced by Comrade Avilov at a meeting of shop committees. Unfortunately, this resolution must be regarded as an example of a petty-bourgeois attitude that is neither Marxist nor socialist. Because this resolution accentuates in sharp focus all the weaknesses peculiar to the Menshevik and Narodnik Soviet resolutions, it is typical and worthy of attention.

The resolution begins with an excellent general statement, with a splendid indictment of the capitalists: "The present economic debacle ... is a result of the war and the *predatory anarchic rule of the capitalists and the government.*" Correct! That capital is oppressive, that it is a predator, that it is the original source of anarchy—in this the petty bourgeois is ready to agree with the proletariat. But there the similarity ends. The proletarian regards capitalist economy as a robber economy, and therefore wages a class struggle against it, shapes his whole policy on unconditional distrust of the capitalist class, and in dealing with the question of the state his first concern is to distinguish which class the "state" serves, whose class interests it stands for. The petty bourgeois, at times, gets "furious" with capital, but as soon as the fit of anger is over he goes back to his old faith in the capitalists, to the hopes placed in the "state" ... of the capitalists!

The same thing has happened with Comrade Avilov.

After a splendid, strongly worded, formidable introduction accusing the capitalists and even the government of the capitalists of running a "robber" economy, Comrade Avilov, throughout his resolution, in all its concrete sub-

stance and all its practical proposals, *forgets the class standpoint*, and, like the Mensheviks and Narodniks, lapses into bombast about the "state" in general, about "revolutionary democracy" in the abstract.

Workers! Predatory capital is creating anarchy and economic chaos, and the government of the capitalists, too, is ruling by anarchy. Salvation lies in control on the part of "the state with the co-operation of revolutionary democracy". This is the substance of Avilov's resolution.

What are you talking about, Comrade Avilov! How can a Marxist forget that the state is an organ of class rule? Is it not ridiculous to appeal to a *capitalist state* to take action against "predatory capitalists"?

How can a Marxist forget that in the history of all countries the capitalists, too, have often been "revolutionary democrats", as in England in 1649, in France in 1789, in 1830, 1848, and 1870, and in Russia in February 1917?

Can you have forgotten that the revolutionary democracy of the capitalists, of the petty bourgeoisie and of the proletariat must be distinguished one from the other? Does not the *whole* history of *all* the revolutions I have just mentioned show a distinction of classes *within* "revolutionary democracy"?

To continue in Russia to speak of "revolutionary democracy" in general after the experience of February, March, April and May 1917 is to deceive the people knowingly or unknowingly, consciously or unconsciously. The "moment" of general fusion of classes against tsarism has come and gone. The very first agreement between the first "Provisional Committee" of the Duma and the Soviet marked the *end* of the class fusion and the beginning of the class struggle.

The April crisis (April 20), followed by that of May 6, then May 27-29 (the elections), etc., etc., have brought about a definite cleavage of *classes* in the Russian revolution within the Russian "revolutionary democracy". To ignore this is to sink to the helpless level of the petty bourgeois.

To appeal now to the "state" and to "revolutionary democracy" on the matter of predatory capitalism of all questions, is to drag the working class backward. *In effect* it means preaching complete stoppage of the revolution. For our "state" *today*, after April, after May, is a state of "predator" capital-

ists, who, in the persons of Chernov, Tsereteli and Co., have *tamed* a fairly considerable portion of "revolutionary (petty-bourgeois) democracy".

This state is hindering the revolution everywhere, in all fields of home and foreign policy.

To hand over to *this* state the job of fighting the capitalist "predators" is like *throwing the pike into the river.**

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* The offending pike, in Krylov's fable, was sentenced to be drowned by being thrown into the river.—*Ed.*

A MOTE IN THE EYE

Algeria let them down.... Our ministeriable "Socialist-Revolutionaries" had almost succeeded in stunning the public—and themselves—into believing all their talk about "peace without annexations", but ... Algeria let them down. *Dyelo Naroda*, a newspaper to which two Socialist-Revolutionary ministers, Kerensky and Chernov, contribute, was ... incautious enough to invite the views of three Allied cabinet ministers (belonging to the same near-socialist camp) on Algeria. How terribly careless this was on the part of the newspaper of the Kerenskys and Chernovs will be seen from the following.

The three Allied ministers—Henderson, Thomas and Vandervelde of Britain, France and Belgium, stated that they did not want "annexation", but only "liberation of territories". The paper of the Kerenskys and Chernovs described this—quite rightly—as a "sleight of hand" on the part of the "tamed-socialists", and poured out on them the following angry and sarcastic tirade:

"'True, they [the three ministers] demand the liberation of territories' only 'in conformity with the will of the population'. Very well! But in that case we ought to demand that they, and we, be consistent and recognise the 'liberation' of Ireland and Finland on the one hand, and Algeria or Siam on the other. It would be very interesting to hear the opinion of, say, the socialist Albert Thomas on 'self-determination' for Algeria."

Indeed, "it would be very interesting to bear the opinion" also of Kerensky, Tsereteli, Chernov and Skobelev on "self-determination" for Armenia, Galicia, Ukraine, and Turkestan.

Don't you see, you Narodnik and Menshevik members of the Russian Government, that by citing the example of

Ireland and Algeria you have exposed the whole lie and falsity of your own position and behaviour. You have shown that "annexation" *cannot* be interpreted merely as the seizure of territory *in this war*. In other words, you have refuted yourselves and *Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet which only the other day declared with proud ignorance that the term annexation could be applied only to territories seized in the present war. But who does not know that Ireland and Algeria were annexed decades and centuries before the outbreak of this war?

Careless, very careless of *Dyelo Naroda*! It has exposed its utter confusion of ideas, and that of the Mensheviks and *Izvestia*, on such a key issue as annexations.

Nor is that all. You question Henderson about Ireland, and Albert Thomas about Algeria; you contrast the views on annexation of the "French *bourgeoisie* now in power" with the views of the French *people*; you call Henderson and Albert Thomas "tamed socialists"—but what about yourselves?

What are you, Kerensky, Tsereteli, Chernov, Skobelev, if not "tamed socialists"? Did *you* raise the question of the *Russian* Ireland and the *Russian* Algeria, i.e., of Turkestan, Armenia, Ukraine, Finland, etc., before the government of the "Russian *bourgeoisie* now in power"? When did you raise this question? Why don't you tell the Russian "people" about it? Why don't you qualify as "sleight of hand" the *Russian* Narodniks' and Mensheviks' blether about "peace without annexations" in the Soviet, in the government and before the people, *without raising*, clearly and unambiguously, the question of *all Russian* annexations of the same type as Ireland and Algeria?

The Russian ministeriable Narodniks and Mensheviks are in a hopeless muddle; every passing day adds to their self-exposure.

Their "final" stock argument is that we are having a revolution. But that argument is false from beginning to end. For our revolution *so far* has only brought the *bourgeoisie* to power, and in France and Britain, with a "harmless minority" of "tamed socialists", as in France and Britain. What our revolution will produce tomorrow—whether a return to the monarchy, the strengthening of the bourgeoisie, or the trans-

fer of power to more advanced classes—neither we nor anyone else knows. Consequently, the plea of "revolution" in general is a gross deception of the people and of oneself.

The annexation issue is a good touchstone for the Narodniks and Mensheviks, who are entangled in a web of lies. They are *just as* muddled as Plekhanov, Henderson, Scheidemann and Co.; they are distinguishable from each other *only in words*, for as far as *deeds* are concerned they are all alike—dead to socialism.

Pravda No. 70,
June 14 (1), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

IT IS UNDEMOCRATIC, CITIZEN KERENSKY!

The Petrograd Telegraph Agency reports:

"*Kiev*, May 30. A telegram from War Minister Kerensky read at the All-Ukraine Peasant Congress stated that for military reasons the convocation of the second Ukrainian army congress was considered untimely. The Congress held the Minister's order to be an infringement of the Ukrainians' right of assembly and sent the following telegram to the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

"'We call your attention to this first case of infringement of the right of assembly on the part of Minister Kerensky in respect of the Ukrainian army congress. We decline all responsibility for the possible consequences of this infringement of democratic principles of the new life in respect of the Ukrainians. We lodge an emphatic protest and await the Provisional Government's immediate reply to the demands submitted by the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada.'"

This report will undoubtedly cause great concern among the socialist workers.

The War Minister deems the congress of Ukrainians "untimely" and uses his power to ban it! Not so long ago citizen Kerensky tried to bring Finland to heel, and now he has decided to bring the Ukrainians to heel. And all this is done in the name of "democracy"!

A. I. Herzen once said that when you look at the antics of Russia's ruling classes you feel ashamed of being a Russian.[128] This was said at a time when Russia was groaning under the yoke of serfdom, when the land was ruled by the knout and the rod.

Today Russia has overthrown the tsar. Today the Kerenskys and the Lvovs speak in the name of Russia. Russia of the Kerenskys and Lvovs treats her subject nations in such a way that one cannot help recalling these bitter words of Herzen's.

We say nothing of the fact that by his "dominant-nation" policy Citizen Kerensky is merely augmenting and bolstering the very tendencies towards "separatism" which the Kerenskys and the Lvovs are trying to smother.

We ask: Is such treatment of the oppressed nationalities compatible with plain democracy, let alone socialism? We ask: Is there a limit to the "antics" of Citizen Kerensky and his followers?

We ask the Party of the ''Socialist-Revolutionaries" whether it subscribes to this step taken by its honourable member, Citizen Kerensky, in banning the Ukrainian congress.

* * *

We are informed that the Executive Committee of the Soviet yesterday decided to invite Citizen Kerensky specially to discuss with him the question of self-determination of nations and the question of national policy in general.

Yet people had been saying that the Contact Commission was dead. Nothing of the sort, gentlemen! Dual power still exists. The only way out of the present situation is to have all power pass to the Soviets.

Pravda No. 71,
June 15 (2), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

BOLSHEVIKS AND "DEMORALISATION" OF THE ARMY

Everybody is screaming for "strong government". The only salvation is in a dictatorship, in "iron discipline", in silencing and reducing to obedience all the refractory members of the Right and Left. We know *whom* they wish to silence. The Rights are making no noise, they are *working*. Some of them in the government, others at the factories, all of them with threats of lockouts, orders for the disbanding of regiments, and the threat of penal servitude. The Konovalovs and the Tereshchenkos, with the help of the Kerenskys and the Skobelevs, are working in an *organised* manner for their own good. And they don't have to be silenced.

All we have is the *right of speech*.

And of this right they want to deprive us.

Pravda is barred from the front. The Kiev "agents" have decided not to distribute *Pravda*. The Zemstvo Union is not selling *Pravda* in its newspaper stands. And now we are promised a "systematic fight against the preaching of Leninism" (*Izvestia*). On the other hand, every spontaneous protest, every excess, wherever it comes from, is *blamed on us*.

This, too, is a method for combating Bolshevism.

A well-tried method.

Unable as they are to get clear guidelines, aware instinctively how false and unsatisfactory is the position of the official leaders of democracy, the masses are compelled to *grope a way out for themselves*.

The result is that every dissatisfied, class-conscious revolutionary, every angered fighter who yearns for his village home and sees no end to the war, and sometimes simply men

who are out to save their own skins, rally to the banner of Bolshevism.

Where Bolshevism has a chance to air its views openly, there we find no disorganisation.

Where there are no Bolsheviks or where they are not allowed to speak, there we find excesses, demoralisation, and pseudo-Bolsheviks.

And that is just what our enemies need.

They need a pretext for saying: "*The Bolsheviks are demoralising the army*" *and then shutting the Bolsheviks' mouths.*

To dispose once for all of "enemy" slander and the ridiculous distortions of Bolshevism, we quote the concluding part of a leaflet distributed in the army by one of our delegates on the eve of the All-Russia Congress.

Here it is:

"*Comrades, you must have your say.*

"*Do not let us have any agreements with the bourgeoisie!*

"*All power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!*

"This does not mean that we must immediately overthrow the present government or disobey it. So long as the majority of the people support it and believe that five socialists can cope with all the rest, we cannot afford to fritter away our forces in desultory uprisings.

"Never!

"Husband your strength! Get together at meetings! Pass resolutions! Demand that all power be handed over to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies! Convince those who disagree with us! Send your resolution to me at the Congress in Petrograd in the name of your regiment, so that I can quote your voice there!

"But beware of those who, posing as Bolsheviks, will try to provoke you to riots and disturbances as a screen for their own cowardice! Know that though they are with you now, they will sell you out to the old regime at the first hint of danger.

"The real Bolsheviks call you to conscious revolutionary struggle, and not to riots.

"Comrades! The All-Russia Congress will elect representatives, to whom, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government will be accountable.

"Comrades! At that Congress I shall demand:

"First, that *all power be handed over to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.*

"Second, that *a proposal for peace without annexations or indemnities* be made immediately in the name of our people *to the peoples and governments of all the belligerent nations, both our Allies and our enemies.* If any government tries to turn it down it will be *overthrown by its own people.*

"Third, that the money which people have made out of the war should be converted to state needs *by way of confiscation of the capitalists' war profits.*

"Comrades! Only by the transfer of power to the democracy in Russia, Germany, and France, only *by the overthrow of the bourgeois governments in all countries, can the war be ended.*

"*Our revolution has started this, and it is our task now to give a further impetus to the world revolution by having a fully authorised popular Russian government make an offer of peace to all the governments of Europe and by strengthening our alliance with the revolutionary democrats of Western Europe.*

"*Woe betide the bourgeois government that will persist in continuing the war after this.*

"*Together with its people we shall make revolutionary war upon that government.*

"It is to say all this to our government in Petrograd in your name that I have been elected to the Congress in Petrograd.

"Member of the Army Committee of the 11th Army, Delegate of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) to the Congress of the South-Western Front, Ensign *Krylenko.*

No one who has taken the trouble to read our Party's resolutions can fail to see that the *gist* of them has been correctly expressed by Comrade Krylenko.

The Bolsheviks are calling the proletariat, the poor peasants and all the toiling and exploited people to a conscious revolutionary struggle, and not to riots and disturbances.

Only a genuine government of the people, a government belonging to the *majority* of the nation, is capable of following the *right* path leading mankind to the overthrow of the capitalist yoke, to deliverance from the horrors and misery of the imperialist war, and to a just and lasting peace.

Pravda No. 72,
June 16 (3), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

THE LAUGH IS ON YOU!

"King Constantine [of Greece] signed the act of abdication under pressure from Allied diplomacy," writes the newspaper of Mr. Milyukov, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional "revolutionary" Government.

The Allied diplomats have completed the subjugation of Greece by first sparking off the Venizelos movement (Venizelos is a former minister of Constantine's who entered the service of the British capitalists), causing a split in the army, seizing part of Greek territory, and finally using "pressure" to force the abdication of the "lawful" monarch, i.e., to force a revolution from above. What kind of "pressure" that was and is everybody knows. It was pressure by *starvation*. Greece was blockaded by the warships of the Anglo-French and Russian imperialists and left *without bread*. The "pressure" on Greece was of the same order as that recently applied in Russia by the ignorant peasants of some out-of-the-way village, who, if we are to believe the newspapers, condemned a citizen to death by starvation for having allegedly insulted the Christian religion.

The ignorant peasants in some godforsaken hole in Russia starved a "criminal" to death. The "civilised" imperialists of Britain, France, Russia, etc., *starved* a whole country, a whole nation, to force it, by "pressure", to change its policy.

There we have the *reality* of the imperialist war. There we have the real state of international relations at the present time. The S.R. gentlemen laugh at this. It is really funny, very funny....

Dyelo Naroda, the ministerial paper of Kerensky, Chernov and Co., publishes a laughing editorial entitled: "'Self-determination' for Greece". The S.R.s' gibe at Greek "self-determination" would have been admirable *had it been sincere*.

Sincerity in politics does not mean that Kerensky, Chernov and Co. have to prove their personal sincerity—we readily take that for granted. That is not the point. Sincerity in politics, that is, in that sphere of human relations which involves, not individuals, but the *millions*, is a *correspondence between word and deed* that lends itself to verification.

The editorial in *Dyelo Naroda* is insincere because it is precisely the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, precisely the Kerenskys and the Chernovs, *as its leaders*, who support the Ministry of subjugation ... I beg your pardon, the Ministry of Greek "self-determination", together with citizens Tsereteli and Skobelev.

"It is clear to everyone," writes *Dyelo Naroda*, "that there is no essential difference between imperialist Germany's robber attack on Belgium, Austria's attack on Serbia and the present 'advance into the interior of Greece' on the part of the Allies governments."

Yes, this is clear, and this is not at all a question of "ethics", as the S.R.s believe, but a matter of pure politics. A robber attack—*that is what you* are participating in, citizens S.R.s, citizens Mensheviks, *as members of the government*. The robber attack is an established fact, and "pressure from Allied diplomacy"—from all the Allies, including *Russia*—was apparently applied *also after* Chernov, Tsereteli and Co. joined the cabinet.

And what about the platforms of "peace without annexations"? What about the "demands" of "revolutionary democracy" from the new government? What about the declarations? Surely it is clear by this time that all these platforms, declarations, promises, statements, pledges, vows, etc., etc., are a *sheer mockery* of the people.

The laugh is on you, gentlemen of the S.R. and Menshevik fold! You are laughing at your own policy of trust in the capitalists and the government of the capitalists! You are laughing at your own role of eloquent and bombastic servants of capitalism and imperialism, servants in the rank of ministers!

Pravda No. 72,
June 16 (3), 1917

Published according
to the text in *Pravda*

NOTES

[1] Published in *Pravda* No. 26, for April 7, 1917, over the signature N. Lenin, this article contains Lenin's famous April Theses read by him at two meetings held at the Taurida Palace on April 4 (17), 1917 (at a meeting of Bolsheviks and at a joint meeting of Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates to the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). The article was reprinted in the Bolshevik newspapers *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Moscow), *Proletary* (Kharkov), *Krasnoyarsky Rabochy* (Krasnoyarsk), *Vperyod* (Ufa), *Bakinsky Rabochy* (Baku), *Kavkazsky Rabochy* (Tiflis) and others. p. 19

[2] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party formed in Russia at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 through the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles (the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, and others). The views of the S.R.s were an eclectic medley of Narodism and revisionism; they tried, as Lenin put it, to "patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The First World War found most of the S.R.s taking a social-chauvinist stand.

After the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, the S.R.s, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and landowners, and the leaders of the party (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) were members of that government. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of the landed estates and in effect stood for private property in land; the S.R. ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized landed estates. On the eve of the October armed uprising this party openly sided with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in defence of the capitalist system and found itself isolated from the mass of the revolutionary people.

At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the party founded a separate Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In an endeavour to maintain their influence among the peasant masses, the Left S.R.s formally recognised the Soviet Government and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but very soon turned against the Soviet power.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the S.R.s engaged in counter-revolutionary subversive activities, zealously supported the interventionists and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state and Communist Party. After the Civil War they continued their anti-Soviet activities within the country and as whiteguard émigrés abroad.

Popular Socialists—members of the petty-bourgeois Labour Popular Socialist Party, which separated from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1906. The P.S.s stood for a bloc with the Cadets. Lenin called them "Social-Cadets", "petty-bourgeois opportunists", and "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks" who vacillated between the Cadets and the S.R.s, and he emphasised that this party "differs very little from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both the republicanism and the demand for all the land" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 228). The party's leaders were A. V. Peshekhonov, N. F. Annensky, V. A. Myakotin, and others. During the First World War the P.S.s took a social-chauvinist stand. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 the Popular Socialist Party merged with the Trudoviks and actively supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, in which it was represented. After the October Socialist Revolution the P.S.s participated in plots and armed acts against the Soviet government. The party went out of existence during the period of foreign military intervention and civil war.

The *Organising Committee* (O.C.) was set up in 1912 at the August conference of the liquidators. During the First World War the O.C. justified the war on the part of tsarism and advocated the ideas of nationalism and chauvinism. The O.C. published the journal *Nashe Zarya*, and when this was closed down, *Nashe Dyelo*, then *Dyelo*, and the newspapers *Rabocheye Utro*, then *Utro*. The O.C. functioned up to the time of the election of the Central Committee of the Menshevik party in August 1917. p. 22

[3] *Yedinstvo* (Unity)—a daily published in Petrograd from March to November 1917, and then under another name from December 1917 to January 1918. Edited by G. V. Plekhanov. United the extreme Right of the Menshevik defencists and gave unqualified support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. Carried on a fierce struggle against the Bolshevik Party. p. 24

[4] *Russkaya Volya* (Russian Freedom)—a bourgeois daily founded and run by the big banks. Carried on a riot-provoking campaign against the Bolsheviks. Lenin called it one of the most disreputable bourgeois newspapers. Appeared in Petrograd from December 1916 to October 1917. p. 25

[5] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 21-22, 516-30, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 42, 463-64. p. 26

[6] On August 4, 1914, the Social-Democrats in the Reichstag voted together with the bourgeois M.P.s in favour of a 5,000 million war loan for the Kaiser government, thereby approving the imperialist policy of Wilhelm II. As it afterwards emerged, the Left Social-Democrats, during the discussion of this question by the Social-Democratic group previous to the Reichstag session, were against granting the government war loans, but they bowed to the decision of the opportunist majority and voted in favour. p. 26

[7] This article is a report to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet made by Lenin the day after his arrival in Petrograd on April 4 (17), 1917, on behalf of the emigrants who returned from Switzerland together with him. p. 27

[8] The *Bund* (General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) was organised in 1897 at the inaugural congress of the Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilna. It was an association mainly of semi-proletarian elements from among the Jewish artisans of Russia's western regions.

During the First World War (1914-18) the Bundists took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917 the Bund supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. During the foreign military intervention and civil war its leaders joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time a change was taking place among the rank-and-file membership in favour of collaboration with the Soviet power. In March 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and some of its members were admitted to membership of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) by the usual rules of procedure. p. 27

[9] *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word)—a Menshevik-Trotskyist daily published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916. p. 27

[10] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily, central organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. Closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. Reappeared under other names until August 1918. p. 29

[11] Lenin refers to the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet "To the Peoples of the World", adopted at its meeting on March 14 (27), 1917, and published the next day in the central newspapers. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders were obliged to issue this appeal under pressure from the revolutionary masses, who demanded an end to the war.

The appeal called upon the working people of the belligerent countries to come out in favour of peace. It did not, however, expose the predatory nature of the war, did not propose any practical steps in the fight for peace, and in effect, justified the continuation of the imperialist war by the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 29

[12] *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—a daily newspaper of the reactionary nobility and bureaucracy, published in St. Petersburg from 1868. In 1905 it became an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called it a model of the venal press. After the February revolution *Novoye Vremya* fully supported the counter-revolutionary policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and conducted a vicious hounding campaign against the Bolsheviks. The paper was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 30

[13] *Izvestia* (News) *of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*—a daily, began to appear on February 28 (March 13), 1917. After the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets at which the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was elected, the newspaper became the organ of the C.E.C., and from August 1 (14), 1917 (beginning with No. 132) it appeared under the name of *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Throughout this time the newspaper was controlled by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and waged a fierce struggle against the Bolshevik Party. Beginning with October 27 (November 9), 1917, after the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, *Izvestia* became the official organ of the Soviet government. With the transfer to Moscow of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, the newspaper was published in Moscow. p. 30

[14] *Pravda* (Truth)—a legal Bolshevik daily, published in St. Petersburg. Founded in April 1912 on the initiative of the St. Petersburg workers.

Pravda was a mass working-class newspaper published with money collected by the workers themselves. A wide circle of worker correspondents and worker writers formed round the paper. In a single year it published over 11,000 items from worker correspondents. *Pravda* had an average daily circulation of 40,000 rising in some months to as high a figure as 60,000.

Lenin directed the newspaper while living abroad. He wrote for it almost every day, gave instructions and advice to its editors, and gathered around the paper the Party's best literary forces.

Pravda was subjected to constant police persecutions. During its first year of publication it was confiscated forty-one times, its editors were prosecuted thirty-six times and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment totalling 47½ months. During two years and three months *Pravda* was closed down by the tsarist government eight times, but reappeared under other names (*Rabochaya Pravda*, *Severnaya Pravda*, *Pravda Truda*, *Za Pravdu*, *Proletarskaya Pravda*, *Put Pravdy*, *Rabochy*, *Trudovaya Pravda*). The paper was closed down on July 8 (21), 1914, on the eve of the First World War, and did not resume publication until after the February revolution. Beginning with March 5 (18), 1917 it came out as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. On April 5 (18), on his

return from abroad, Lenin joined the Editorial Board of *Pravda* and became its Editor-in-Chief. On July 5(18), 1917 the newspaper offices were wrecked by the officer cadets and Cossacks. Between July and October 1917 *Pravda* was persecuted by the Provisional Government and repeatedly changed its name, coming out as *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy*, *Rabochy Put*. Beginning with October 27 (November 9) the paper came out under its old name of *Pravda*. p. 30

[15] The *All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* convened by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was held in Petrograd between March 29 and April 3 (April 11 and 16), 1917.

The Conference was attended by representatives of the Petrograd and local Soviets, as well as of front and rear army units. The Conference discussed the questions of the war, the attitude towards the Provisional Government, the Constituent Assembly, the agrarian, food and other questions.

The Conference, at which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had a controlling influence, took a stand of "revolutionary defencism" and adopted a resolution calling for support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 34

[16] *Kurland*—the old name of a Baltic region west and south-west of the Gulf of Riga. p. 35

[17] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Worker's Newspaper)—the central organ of the Mensheviks, published as a daily in Petrograd from March to November 1917. p. 36

[18] Lenin's pamphlet *Letters on Tactics. First Letter* was issued in Petrograd in 1917 by the Bolshevik publishing house Priboi in three editions. The April Theses were given as a supplement to all three editions. p. 42

[19] See Engels's letter to F. A. Sorge dated November 29, 1886 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 469-73). p. 43

[20] Lenin here quotes the words of Mephistopheles from Goethe's tragedy *Faust*. Erster Teil, Studierzimmer. p. 45

[21] The expression "*His Majesty's Opposition*" belongs to P. N. Milyukov, the leader of the Cadet Party. In a speech made at a luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of London on June 19 (July 2), 1909, Milyukov said: "So long as there is a legislative chamber in Russia which controls the budget, the Russian Opposition will remain the Opposition of His Majesty, not to His Majesty" (*Rech* No. 167, June 21 [July 4], 1909). p. 48

[22] "*No Tsar, but a workers' government*"—an anti-Bolshevik slogan put forward in 1905 by Parvus and Trotsky. This slogan of a

revolution without the peasantry, which became one of the basic postulates of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, was sharply criticised by Lenin. p. 48

[23] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 516-30, 473-74. p. 49

[24] Lenin refers to Plekhanov's pamphlet *Anarchism and Socialism*, first published in German in 1894. p. 50

[25] Lenin here refers to the volume of his writings published in St. Petersburg at the end of 1907: Vl. Ilyin *Twelve Years. A Collection of Articles. Volume I. Two Trends in Russian Marxism and Russian Social-Democracy.* p. 52

[26] *Cadets*—(abbreviated) members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in October 1905, its membership was made up of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders of the landowning class and bourgeois intellectuals. Among the leading personalities of the party were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. Eventually, the Cadets became a party of the imperialist bourgeoisie. During the First World War they fully supported the tsarist government's aggressive foreign policy. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried their hardest to save the monarchy. They used their key positions in the bourgeois Provisional Government to pursue a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people, but favouring the U.S., British and French imperialists. After the victory of the October Revolution the Cadets came out as implacable enemies of the Soviet power. They took part in all the counter-revolutionary armed actions and campaigns of the interventionists. Living abroad as émigrés after the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards, the Cadets did not cease their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activities. p. 57

[27] *Trudoviks* (the Trudovik group)—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Russian Duma consisting of peasants and intellectuals of a Narodnik trend. The Trudovik group was formed in April 1906 by peasant deputies to the First Duma. In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the revolutionary Social-Democrats. During the First World War most of the Trudoviks took a social-chauvinist stand.

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 the Trudoviks, representing the interests of the kulaks, actively supported the Provisional Government. The Trudovik Zarudny, who became Minister of Justice after the July events, persecuted the Bolshevik Party. The Trudoviks were enemies of the October Revolution and sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 58

[28] A quotation from Krylov's fable "The Cat and the Cook". p. 64

[29] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 42. p. 68

[30] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 522-23. p. 69

[31] The term *Narodniks* is here used to denote the three petty-bourgeois parties of the Narodnik trend, namely, the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Popular Socialists. p. 72

[32] *Manilovism*—from the name Manilov, a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, represented as a type of easy-going sentimental landowner, whose name has become a synonym for an idle weak-willed dreamer and gas-bag. p. 75

[33] Lenin refers to the *Fabian Society*, an English reformist organisation, founded in 1884, so called after the Roman General Quintus Fabius Maximus (III century B.C.) surnamed Cunctator (Procrastinator) for his mark-time tactics and evasion of decisive battles in the war with Hannibal. The membership of the Fabian Society consisted chiefly of bourgeois intellectuals—scholars, writers and politicians (the Webbs, Ramsay MacDonald, Bernard Shaw and others). They denied the need for the proletariat's class struggle and a socialist revolution, and maintained that the transition from capitalism to socialism could be brought about by means of minor and gradual reforms. Lenin described Fabianism as "an *extremely opportunist* trend—(see present edition, Vol. 13, p. 358). In 1900 the Fabian Society joined the Labour Party. Fabian socialism is one of the sources of Labour Party ideology.

During the First World War (1914-18) the Fabians took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 76

[34] *Workers' or labour group*—Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Social-Democratic Labour Group)—an organisation of the German Centrists formed in March 1916 by breakaway members of the official Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag. Eventually, in 1917, it formed the core of the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, which sought to justify the overt social-chauvinists and stood for preserving unity with them. p. 77

[35] *Minoritaires* or *Longuetists*—the minority of the French Socialist Party formed in 1915. The minoritaires were followers of the social-reformist Longuet; they held Centrist views and pursued a conciliatory policy towards the social-chauvinists. During the First World War they took a social-pacifist stand. After the victory of the October Revolution in Russia they declared themselves adherents of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but in reality they were against it. They continued the policy of co-operation with the social-chauvinists and supported the annexationist Treaty

of Versailles. Finding themselves in a minority at the congress of the French Socialist Party held in Tours in December 1920, where the Left wing won ascendancy, the Longuetists together with the open reformists split away from the party and joined the Two-and-a-Half International, and after its break-down returned to the Second International. p. 77

[36] The *Independent Labour Party*—a reformist organisation founded by the leaders of the "new trade unions" in 1893 during the active strike movement and the mounting drive for independence of the British working class from the bourgeois parties. The membership of the I.L.P. consisted of the "new trade unionists" and members of some of the old trade unions, as well as intellectuals and petty bourgeois holding Fabian views. The leaders of the Party were James Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald. From the day it was founded the I.L.P. took a bourgeois-reformist stand, devoting its chief attention to parliamentary forms of struggle and parliamentary deals with the Liberal Party. In the words of Lenin, the Independent Labour Party was "actually an opportunist party that has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie" (see V. I. Lenin, *On Britain*, Moscow, p. 401)

On the outbreak of the imperialist world war the I.L.P. issued a manifesto against the war, but shortly afterwards adopted a social-chauvinist stand. p. 77

[37] The *British Socialist Party* was founded in 1911 in Manchester, as a result of the amalgamation of the Social-Democratic Party with other socialist groups. The B.S.P. carried on propaganda in the spirit of Marxist ideas, it was "not opportunist and was really independent of the Liberals" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 273). Owing to its small membership and poor contact with the masses, however, it was somewhat sectarian in character. During the First World War a sharp struggle developed in the party between the internationalist trend (William Gallacher, Albert Inkpin, John MacLean, Theodore Rothstein and others) and the social-chauvinist trend headed by Hyndman. There were inconsistent elements within the internationalist trend who took a Centrist stand on a number of issues. In February 1916 a group of the party's active members founded the newspaper *The Call*, which played an important part in uniting the internationalists. The annual conference of the B.S.P. held at Salford in April 1916 condemned the social-chauvinist stand taken by Hyndman and his adherents, and they left the Party.

The British Socialist Party hailed the October Revolution, and its members played a great part in the British working people's movement in defence of Soviet Russia against foreign intervention.

In 1919 the majority of the Party organisations (98 against 4) declared in favour of joining the Communist International. The B.S.P., together with the Communist Unity Group, played a leading role in the formation of the Communist Party of Great

Britain. At the First (Unity) Congress held in 1920 the overwhelming majority of the B.S.P. locals joined the Communist Party. p. 77

[38] The *Zimmerwald Left group* was founded on Lenin's initiative at the International Socialist Conference held in Zimmerwald in September 1915. It consisted of delegates from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Left Social-Democrats of Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Germany, the Polish Social-Democratic opposition and the Social-Democrats of the Latvian area. The Zimmerwald Left group, headed by Lenin, waged a struggle against the Centrist majority of the Conference and moved resolutions condemning the imperialist war, exposing the betrayal by the social-chauvinists, and urging the necessity of active struggle against the war. These draft resolutions were rejected by the Centrist majority. The Zimmerwald Left succeeded, however, in getting a number of important points from its own draft resolution included in the manifesto adopted by the Conference. Regarding this manifesto as a first step in the fight against the war, the Zimmerwald Left voted for it, and in a special statement pointed out the inadequacy and inconsistency of the manifesto and their reasons for voting for it. They declared that while remaining within the Zimmerwald organisation they would disseminate their views and work independently on an international scale. The group elected an executive body—a Bureau, consisting of Lenin, Zinoviev and Radek. The Zimmerwald Left published a journal *Vorbote* (Herald) in German, which carried a number of articles by Lenin.

The Bolsheviks, the only group to take a consistent internationalist stand, were the guiding force in the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin opposed Radek's opportunist waverings and criticised the mistakes of other Leftists. The Zimmerwald Left soon became the rallying point for internationalist elements of world Social-Democracy. At the Second International Socialist Conference in April 1916 in Kienthal, Switzerland, the Zimmerwald Left had 12 out of the 43 delegates to the Conference, and on a number of issues obtained nearly half of the total votes. The Social-Democrats of various countries who belonged to the Zimmerwald Left group carried on active revolutionary work and played an important role in the establishment of Communist parties in their countries.

On the Zimmerwald Left see Lenin's articles: "The First Step", "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 383-93). p. 77

[39] The *Internationale* group, later called the Spartacus League, was formed by the German Left Social-Democrats Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin and others at the beginning of the First World War. The group played an important part in the history of the German labour movement. At the national conference of Left Social-Democrats held in

January 1916 the group adopted the thesis concerning the tasks of international Social-Democracy drafted and proposed by Rosa Luxemburg. The *Internationale* group carried on revolutionary propaganda among the masses against the imperialist war, exposing the aggressive policy of German imperialism and the treachery of the leaders of Social-Democracy. The group was not free, however, from serious errors on the most important questions of theory and policies: it rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist interpretation (that is, including the right of secession and the formation of a separate state), denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the epoch of imperialism, and underestimated the role of the revolutionary party, so on. Lenin criticised the errors of the German Lefts in his articles: "The Junius Pamphlet", "The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" and others (see present edition, Vols. 22 and 23). In 1917 the *Internationale* group became affiliated to the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany preserving its organisational independence. After the November revolution in Germany in 1918 it broke with the "Independents", and in December of the same year founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 78

[40] The *Socialist Labour Party of America* was founded in 1876 at the unity congress held in Philadelphia as a result of the amalgamation of the American sections of the First International and other socialist organisations. A leading part at the congress was played by F. A. Sorge, an associate of Marx and Engels. The overwhelming majority of the party were immigrants who had poor contacts with the American working class. During the early years the party was controlled by the Lassalleans who made mistakes of a sectarian and dogmatic nature. Some of the party's leaders considered parliamentary activity to be the chief task of the party and underestimated the importance of leadership of the economic struggle of the masses; others slid down to trade-unionism and anarchism. The ideological and tactical waverings of the leaders weakened the party and led to a number of groups dropping away from it. Marx and Engels sharply criticised the sectarianism of the American socialists.

In the nineties the leadership of the party was assumed by the Left wing, headed by D. De Leon, but this group, too, committed errors of an anarcho-syndicalist nature. The S.L.P. withdrew from the struggle for satisfaction of partial demands of the working class, withdrew from work in the reformist trade unions and gradually lost its already weakened contacts with the mass labour movement. During the First World War (1914-18) the S.L.P. leaned towards internationalism. Under the impact of the October Revolution in Russia the more revolutionary section of the S.L.P. took an active part in organising the Communist Party of America. Today the S.L.P. is a small organisation having no influence on the labour movement in the U.S.A. p. 79

[41] The *Socialist Party of America* was formed in July 1901 at the congress in Indianapolis as a result of the amalgamation of groups that had split away from the Socialist Labour Party and the Social-Democratic Party of the U.S.A., one of whose organisers was Eugene Debs, a popular leader of the American labour movement; he was one of the founders of the new party. The party had a mixed social composition, being made up of American workers immigrant workers, as well as small farmers and petty bourgeois. The Centrist and Right opportunist leadership of the party (Victor L. Berger, Morris Hillquit and others) denied the need for a dictatorship of the proletariat, rejecting revolutionary methods of struggle, and reduced the activities of the party mainly to participation in election campaigns. During the First World War three trends appeared in the S.P.—the social-chauvinists, who supported the government's imperialist policy, the Centrists, who paid only lip-service to the cause of anti-imperialism, and the revolutionary minority, who took an internationalist stand and were actively anti-war.

The Left wing of the Socialist Party headed by Charles Ruthenberg, William Foster, William Haywood and others, and backed by the proletarian membership, waged a struggle against the party's opportunist leadership and for independent political action by the proletariat, for the creation of industrial trade unions based on the principles of the class struggle. In 1919 a split occurred in the Socialist Party. The breakaway Left wing took the lead in forming the Communist Party of America, of which it was the core.

At the present time the Socialist Party is a small sectarian organisation. p. 79

[42] *Tribunists*—members of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, whose mouthpiece was the newspaper *De Tribune*. The leaders of the Tribunists were David Wijnkoop, Herman Gorter, Anton Pannekoek, and Henriette Roland-Holst. The Tribunists were not a consistently revolutionary party, but they represented the Left wing of the Dutch labour movement, and during the First World War (1914-18) they adopted, in the main, an internationalist stand.

In 1918 the Tribunists formed the Communist Party of Holland.

De Tribune—a newspaper founded in 1907 by the Left wing of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Holland. In 1909, after the expulsion of the Leftists, who formed the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, the paper became the official organ of this party; in 1918 it became the organ of the Dutch Communist Party, and appeared under this name until 1940. p. 79

[43] *Party of the Young*, or *the Left*—the name given by Lenin to the Left wing of the Swedish Social-Democrats. During the First World War (1914-18) they took an internationalist stand and aligned themselves with the Zimmerwald Left. In May 1917 they

formed the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden. At the party's congress in 1919 a resolution was adopted in favour of joining the Communist International. The revolutionary wing of the party formed the Communist Party of Sweden in 1921. p. 79

[44] *Tesnyaki*—the revolutionary Social-Democratic Labour Party of Bulgaria, founded in 1903 after the split in the Social-Democratic Party. The founder and leader of the Party was D. Blagoev; subsequent leaders, Blagoev's disciples, were G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov and others. In 1914-18 the Tesnyaki came out against the imperialist war. In 1919 they joined the Communist International and formed the Communist Party of Bulgaria, later reorganised into the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists). p. 79

[45] *Avanti!*—a daily, central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in December 1896 in Rome. During the First World War (1914-18) the paper took an inconsistent internationalist stand without breaking with the reformists. In 1926 it was closed down by Mussolini's fascist government, but continued to appear irregularly outside the country. In 1943 it resumed publication in Italy. At present *Avanti!* is the central organ of the Italian Socialist Party. p. 79

[46] *Regional Executive and Chief Executive*—executive bodies of the Social-Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. p. 79

[47] *Volksstimme*—organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Chemnitz from January 1891 to February 1933.

Die Glocke—a fortnightly journal published in Munich and subsequently in Berlin between 1915-25 by the social-chauvinist Parvus (A. L. Gelfand), member of the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 81

[48] This refers to the appeal "To the Peoples Suffering Ruination and Death" adopted at the Second International Conference of the "Zimmerwaldists" held on April 24-30, 1916 in Kienthal (Switzerland). p. 81

[49] *Die Jugendinternationale* (Youth International)—organ of the International Union of Socialist Youth Organisations associated with the Zimmerwald Left. Published in Zurich from September 1915 to May 1918. p. 82

[50] On April 7(20), 1917, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, by a majority of 21 votes against 14, adopted a resolution in favour of supporting the so-called "Liberty Loan" issued by the Provisional Government to finance the continuing imperialist war. The Bolshevik members of the Executive Committee opposed this loan, declaring that support of it was "the worst form of 'civil truce'" and moved a resolution containing a detailed statement of their position. Several members of the E.C. not belonging to the Bolshevik group voted with the Bolsheviks. The

question was put before the plenary meeting of the Soviet after a preliminary discussion in the groups. p. 84

[51] See Engels, Preface to *Internationales aus dem Volkstaat* (*1871-1875*). p. 84

[52] This expression from Heine was quoted by Marx and Engels in their *German Ideology*. p. 86

[53] *Soldatskaya Pravda* (Soldiers' Truth)—a Bolshevik daily, began to appear on April 15 (28), 1917 as the organ of the Military Organisation of the Petrograd Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.), from May 19 (June 1), 1917 it became the organ of the Military Organisation of the Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.); during the July events of 1917 the paper was closed down by the Provisional Government; from July to October 1917 it came out under the names of *Rabochy i Soldat* (Worker and Soldier) and *Soldat* (Soldier). After the October Revolution publication was resumed under the old name and continued up to March 1918. p. 89

[54] The coalition Provisional Government was formed as a result of the crisis caused by the Note which Milyukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had sent to the Allied governments on April 18 (May 1), 1917, confirming the Provisional Government's readiness to honour all the treaties which the tsarist government had concluded with the imperialist powers—Britain and France. Owing to the spontaneous demonstrations of protest, which reached a head on April 20 and 21 (May 3 and 4) in a powerful movement of the workers and soldiers, the Provisional Government, to create the appearance of a change in policy, accepted the resignation of Foreign Minister Milyukov, and War Minister Guchkov, and made a proposal to the Petrograd Soviet to form a coalition government.

Despite its decision of March 1 (14) forbidding members of the Soviet to join the Provisional Government, the Executive Committee, at a special meeting held on the night of May 1 (14), accepted the proposal of the Provisional Government. At the preliminary meetings of the party groups the Bolsheviks were the only group to come out against it. The decision to have representatives of the Soviet join the government was carried by 44 votes to 19 with two abstentions. A commission authorised to negotiate the terms for forming a coalition government was elected, consisting of Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Dan, Bogdanov (Mensheviks), Stankevich, Bramson (Trudoviks), Gots, Chernov (S.R.s), Kamenev (Bolshevik), Yurenev (member of the Inter-District group), and Sukhanov (independent Social-Democrat). On the evening of May 2 (15) an emergency meeting of the Petrograd Soviet was called at which the action of the Executive Committee was approved by a majority vote. After the negotiations an agreement was reached on May 5 (18) for the distribution of posts in the new government as a result of which 6 socialist ministers were to join the cabinet, namely: Kerensky—War and Naval Minister, Skobelev—Labour

Minister, Chernov—Minister of Agriculture, Peshekhonov—Minister of Food Supply, Tsereteli—Minister of Post and Telegraph, and Pereverzev—Minister of Justice. On the evening of May 5(18) the Petrograd Soviet, after hearing Skobelev's report on the results of the negotiations with the Provisional Government, decided to have its representatives join the government on condition that they were answerable and accountable to the Soviet, and expressed full confidence in the new government.

Lenin wrote afterwards that by joining the bourgeois government, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks "saved it from collapse and allowed themselves to be made its servants and defenders" (see present edition, Vol. 25, p. 241). p. 90

[55] Lenin is referring to the order by War Minister Kerensky published on May 11 (24), 1917, containing a "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier", in which there was a point allowing a superior officer to use military force in cases of insubordination in the field. This point was aimed against soldiers and officers who refused to go into the attack. Simultaneously with the promulgation of this order Kerensky started to disband regiments and prosecute officers and soldiers guilty of "inciting to insubordination". p. 91

[56] This pamphlet was planned originally as a leaflet, owing to the fact that the Cadets, S.R.s and Mensheviks were making wide use of leaflets in their propaganda and pasted them up all over the town. Lenin believed that a Bolshevik leaflet explaining what every party was and what it stood for should be pasted alongside the anti-Bolshevik proclamations. The article was too long to be issued as a leaflet; it was published in the Helsingfors Bolshevik newspaper *Volna*, and then issued in pamphlet form by the Zhizn i Znaniye publishers in fifty thousand copies. The proprietors of the printing-press, who sympathised with the Cadets, held up publication, but with the help of the workers' committee the pamphlet was issued on July 4 (17). Owing to the July events, however, it was hidden away in the publishers' warehouse. A few days later it began to circulate in the working-class quarters. The first edition sold out quickly and, according to the testimony of V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, a reprint was put out.

The pamphlet came out with the following introductory text: "Explanation to the draft platform outlined by *N. Lenin* for discussion at meetings of the Bolsheviks. The printing of the draft itself has been held up owing to lack of printing facilities in Petrograd."

The pamphlet was published in English in the journal *The Class Struggle* (New York, November-December 1917, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 49-59) as well as in *The New York Evening Post*, January 15, 1918.

A second edition of it was published in Moscow in 1918 with a foreword by Lenin. p. 93

[57] The *Contact Commission* was set up by the Menshevik-S.R.-controlled Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on March 8 (21), 1917 to maintain contact with the Provisional Government, to "influence" it and exercise "control" over its activities. Actually, the Contact Commission helped the Provisional Government to carry out its bourgeois policy, and tried to keep the working-class mass from taking part in the active revolutionary struggle to bring about the transfer of all power to the Soviets. The members of the Contact Commission were Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Fillipovsky and Skobelev (later joined by Chernov and Tsereteli). The Commission existed up to May 1917, when the Mensheviks and S.R.s joined the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 98

[58] See p. 134 of this volume. p. 103

[59] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs organised by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, assaulted progressive intellectuals, and organised pogroms against the Jews. p. 106

[60] *Military conference in Minsk*—the meeting of army and workers' deputies of the Western front held in Minsk from April 7 to 16 (20-29), 1917. It was attended by nearly 1,200 delegates.

In keeping with their endeavours to win over to their side the mass of soldiers, the Bolsheviks took part in the work of this conference. Members of the Menshevik and S.R. parties and their sympathisers were in the majority at the conference, and this fact predetermined the nature of its decisions. On the most important questions on the agenda (the questions of war and the attitude towards the Provisional Government) the conference adopted the conciliatory resolutions of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets held in Petrograd at the end of March and beginning of April 1917. In other words, it took the stand of "revolutionary defencism" and came out in favour of support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 114

[61] The reference is to Lenin's report at the joint meeting of Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates to the All-Russia Conference of Soviets on April 4 (17), 1917 (see pp. 21-26, 42-43 of this volume). p. 118

[62] *Dyelo Naroda* (People's Cause)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Centrist group of the S.R. Party, published in Petrograd from March 1917 to July 1918 (after the October Revolution it was repeatedly closed down and came out under new names). In June 1917 it became the organ of the Central Committee of the S.R. Party. The paper took a defencist and conciliatory stand and supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. Publication was resumed in October 1918 in Samara, which was captured by the whiteguard Czechs and S.R. rebels (4 issues were put out), and in March 1919 in Moscow (10 issues were put out), after which the paper was closed down for counter-revolutionary activities. p. 120

[63] The appeal "*Against the Riot-Mongers*", which is a redraft of the appeal "To the Soldiers and Sailors" (see pp. 124-26 of this volume), was adopted by the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) on April 14 (27), 1917 during the discussion, out of order, of Point 6 of the agenda, namely, "The Hounding Campaign Against *Pravda*". p. 127

[64] *Dyen* (Day)—a bourgeois liberal daily, published in St. Petersburg from 1912. Among its contributors were Menshevik liquidators, who took over complete control of the paper after February 1917. Closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 134

[65] *Malenkaya Gazeta* (Small Newspaper)—a gutter-press organ of a Black-Hundred tendency, published in Petrograd from September 1914 to July 1917 by A. Suvorin, Junior. From May 1917, playing up to public feeling in favour of socialism, the paper carried the subheading "The paper of the non-party socialists". After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 it was rabidly anti-Bolshevik, and conducted a vicious smear campaign against Lenin. p. 135

[66] The *Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* (*Bolsheviks*) attended by 57 delegates had the following agenda: the present situation; the attitude towards the Provisional Government; the attitude towards the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the question of its reorganisation; the organizational structure of the Party; the attitude towards the Social-Democrats of other trends the municipal elections; the hounding of *Pravda*. The report on the current situation was made by Lenin.

The Conference approved Lenin's April Theses and based its proceedings upon them. p. 139

[67] *Sotsial-Demokrat*—an illegal newspaper, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., published from February 1908 to January 1917. Altogether 58 issues appeared. The first issue was put out in Russia, but further publication was arranged abroad, first in Paris, then in Geneva. By a decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Editorial Board was made up of representatives of the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and the Polish Social-Democrats. Virtually, the paper was run by Lenin.

Over eighty articles and paragraphs by Lenin were published in the paper. Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line on the Editorial Board. Some of its members (Kamenev and Zinoviev) adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and opposed Lenin's line. The Menshevik members of the Editorial Board—Martov and Dan—obstructed the work of the editorial staff while at the same time openly defending liquidationism in their factional newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social-Democrat). Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan resigning from the Editorial

Board in June 1911. From December 1911 *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin.

At the beginning of the First World War (1914-18), after a year's interval, Lenin succeeded in restarting the newspaper. Issue No. 33 containing the manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. drafted by Lenin came out on November 1 (new style), 1914. Lenin's articles published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* during the war played an important part in helping to apply the strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Party on the questions of war, peace and revolution, in exposing the overt and covert social-chauvinists, and uniting the internationalist forces in the world labour movement. p. 142

[68] An advance announcement of the publication of the weekly journal *Internatsional* was published in *Rabochaya Gazeta* on April 16 (29), 1917. The first issue appeared on April 18 (31), and on April 22 (May 5) Lenin, apparently, had not yet seen it. The title page bore a notice to the effect that pending the arrival of L. Martov the journal was edited by Y. Larin. The list of contributors included L. Martov, Y. Larin, P. B. Axelrod and G. O. Binshtok. In the first issue the editors proclaimed the conciliatory slogan of bringing pressure to bear on the Provisional Government to meet the demands of the proletariat in domestic and foreign policies. The third issue of the journal (for June 1917) was its last. In August 1917 some of the journal's contributors headed by Y. Larin broke with the Mensheviks and joined the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. p. 156

[69] *Conference of Peasants' Deputies* is the name Lenin gives to the Conference of representatives of peasant organisations and of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies held in Petrograd on April 13-17 (26-30), 1917 on the initiative of the Moscow Co-operative Congress. The Conference was attended by delegates from 27 gubernias, from the army and from the Central and Petrograd Regional committees of the Peasant Union. The Conference was dominated by the Popular Socialists, Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and was devoted to the business of preparing for an All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies. It declared in favour of setting up a united peasants' organisation, and elected a Bureau for convening the First Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies which appealed to the peasants and soldiers to conduct elections to the congress on a democratic basis. p. 167

[70] Meaning the All-Russia Congress of Co-operative Associations held in Moscow on March 25-28 (April 7-10), 1917. The Congress attended by nearly 800 delegates discussed the questions of organising an All-Russia Co-operative Union, preparing for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, participation of the co-operative organisations in the business of food supply, and other questions. Controlling influence at the Congress was wielded by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Congress

declared in favour of support to the Provisional Government and the continuation of the imperialist war but demanded the transfer of all the land to the working people, the democratisation of the system of government and self-government.

The Congress's attitude to the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. as the best form of peasants' mass organisation—an attitude which drew Lenin's attention—was expressed in the resolution on the report concerning "Participation of the Co-operatives in the Country's Regeneration". p. 167

[71] *Finansovaya Gazeta* (Financial Newspaper)—a daily evening paper of politico-financial, economic, industrial and stock-exchange news. Published in Petrograd from 1915 to 1917. p. 176

[72] *Octobrists*—members of the Octobrist Party (or Union of October Seventeenth) formed in Russia after the promulgation of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party, representing and defending the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the landowners who were running their economy on capitalist lines. Its leaders were A. I. Guchkov, the well-known Moscow landlord and industrialist, and M. V. Rodzyanko, a big landowner. The Octobrists fully supported the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. During the First World War they joined the opposition "progressive bloc" that demanded the setting up of a responsible cabinet, meaning a government enjoying the confidence of bourgeois and landowner circles. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution the Octobrists became the ruling party, and actively combated the mounting socialist. revolution. The party's leader, Guchkov, was War Minister in the first Provisional Government. After the October Revolution the Octobrists fought against the Soviet government. p. 177

[73] The reference is to Saltykov-Shchedrin's comments on France contained in his sketches *Abroad*. p. 179

[74] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 520-21. p. 180

[75] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 46-47. p. 194

[76] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—a daily newspaper of a Menshevik trend, organ of a group of Social-Democrats known as Internationalists, whose members were Menshevik adherents of Martov and non-aligned intellectuals of a semi-Menshevik trend. The *Novaya Zhizn* group constantly vacillated between the conciliators and the Bolsheviks

The paper was published in Petrograd from April 1917. After the October Revolution it took a hostile stand towards the Soviet government and was closed down in July 1918. p. 196

[77] *Gapon, G. A.* (1870-1906)—a Russian priest, leader of the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of the City of St. Petersburg. On January 9, 1905, Gapon organised, with provocative aims, a peaceful procession of workers to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. The procession ended with the unarmed workers being shot down. After this Gapon emigrated abroad, where he joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, then returned to Russia illegally, and resumed contact with the secret political police. Was killed by the S.R.s. p. 197

[78] *Gazeta-Kopeika* (Kopek Newspaper)—a bourgeois daily of the gutter-press type, published in St. Petersburg from 1908. Was closed down in 1918. p. 209

[79] Lenin is referring to the adventurist tactics of a small group of members of the Petrograd Party Committee (Bagdatyev and others), who, during the April demonstration in 1917, put forward the slogan of immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government despite the policy of peaceful development of the revolution which the Party pursued at that period. This group's behaviour was censured by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks). p. 211

[80] *Birzheviye Vedomosti* (Stock-Exchange Recorder)—a bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from 1880. Its abbreviated name Birzhevka' became a generic term for the unscrupulous and venal bourgeois press. At the end of October 1917 the paper was closed down by order of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. p. 218

[81] This interview was published in the "Correspondence" column of the Finnish Social-Democratic newspaper *Työmies* (Worker) No. 122, for May 8, 1917, under the heading "Interview with Russian Revolutionaries", to which the correspondent supplied the following introduction:

"I found Comrade Lenin, of whom so much has been spoken lately in Russia, in the editorial office of *Pravda*. Pressed for time, Lenin agreed to speak only briefly. Nevertheless, he answered my questions with the following statement."

Työmies was published in Helsingfors from March 1895 to 1918. p. 222

[82] The Conference was attended by 133 delegates with a vote and 18 delegates with a consultative voice, representing 80,000 members of the Party. It was the first legal conference of the Bolshevik Party to be held in Russia, and was equal, in point of significance, to a party congress.

The Conference discussed the following questions: (1) The current situation (the war and the Provisional Government, etc.). (2) The peace conference. (3) The attitude to the Soviets. (4) Revision of the Party programme. (5) The situation in the International and the tasks of the Party. (6) Unity of the Social-Democratic

internationalist organisations. (7) The agrarian question. (8) The national question. (9) The Constituent Assembly. (10) The organisational question. (11) Reports from the regions. (12) Election of the Central Committee. Lenin made reports and spoke on all the main questions on the agenda. All his speeches were based on the April Theses. Lenin was opposed at the Conference by Kamenev and Rykov. They declared, with the Mensheviks, that Russia was not yet ripe for a socialist revolution. Lenin exposed the capitulatory, anti-Party position of Kamenev and Rykov, who denied the possibility of socialism being victorious in Russia. Lenin also scathingly criticise Pyatakov, who opposed the Party's policy on the national question and who, already during the war, had adopted together with Bukharin a national-chauvinist stand. Pyatakov and Bukharin were opposed to the right of nations to self-determination if that right included secession. This point of view meant, in effect, refusal on the part of the proletariat to utilise the revolution's reserve forces as represented by the various nationalities, and doomed the revolution to defeat. Lenin strongly condemned Zinoviev's speech in favour of the Bolsheviks co-operating with the Zimmerwaldists and against the organisation of a new, Communist, International.

The April Conference unanimously adopted Lenin's draft resolutions on the war, on the attitude towards the Provisional Government, on the current situation, on the revision of the Party programme, on the agrarian question, on the Soviets, on the national question and others. The Conference elected a Central Committee headed by Lenin. The decisions of the Conference showed the working class and all the working people that struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution was the only way to get rid of exploitation, to lead the country out of the war and save it from ruin and the threat of enslavement by the foreign imperialists. The Conference equipped the Party with a plan of action for developing the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. p. 225

[83] See Marx's letter to Kugelmann dated April 17, 1871. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 464. p. 239

[84] *Erfurt Programme*—the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party adopted at the Congress in Erfurt in October 1891. The Erfurt Programme was a step forward in comparison with the Gotha Programme (1875); it was based on the Marxist doctrine of the inevitable doom of the capitalist mode of production and its replacement by the socialist mode; it stressed the need for the working class to carry on a political struggle, pointed out the party's leading role in that struggle, and so on. The Erfurt Programme, however, contained serious concessions to opportunism. A comprehensive criticism of the Erfurt Programme was given by Engels in his "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891". This was, in effect, a criticism of the opportunism of the whole Second International for whose parties the Erfurt

Programme served as a model. The leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party, however, concealed Engels's criticism from the general membership, and his most important comments were disregarded when the final text of the programme was drawn up. Lenin (and Plekhanov, too, before his defection to Menshevism) considered the chief defect of the Erfurt Programme, its cowardly concession to opportunism, to be the fact that it passes over in silence the dictatorship of the proletariat. p. 240

[85] See Engels, "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891", *Neue Zeit*, Jg. 20, I. Bd., Stuttgart, 1902, S. 7-8. p. 240

[86] The question of calling an international conference of socialists of the belligerent and neutral countries was repeatedly discussed in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet in April 1917, the Executive Committee offering to take upon itself the initiative in convening such a conference. During the latter half of April the Danish Social-Democrat Borgbjerg, who was associated with the German social-chauvinists, arrived in Petrograd, and, on behalf of the joint committee of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish labour parties (the social-patriot majorities of these parties), invited the socialist parties of Russia to attend a conference on the question of concluding peace, due to be held in Stockholm in May 1917.

On April 23 (May 6) Borgbjerg made a report to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet in which he frankly declared that the German Government would "agree" to the peace terms which the German Social-Democrats would propose at the conference. On April 25 (May 8) the Executive Committee heard the declarations of the Party groups on this question. The Bolsheviks announced the "Resolution on Borgbjerg's Proposal" adopted that day by the April Conference. They were supported by the representatives of the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats. Lenin considered participation in this conference a complete betrayal of internationalism. The April Conference was emphatically opposed to participation, and denounced Borgbjerg as an agent of German imperialism. The Trudoviks, Bundists and Mensheviks were in favour of attending the conference. A Menshevik resolution was adopted in which the Executive Committee announced that it took upon itself the initiative in calling the conference and was setting up a special committee for that purpose. The plenary meeting of the Soviet endorsed this decision.

The majority of the British, French and Belgian socialists refused to take part in the conference, since the British and French governments were out for complete victory over Germany. The Centrists agreed to attend: they were the Longuet group in France, and the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany headed by Kautsky, Haase and Ledebour.

The Spartacus group affiliated to the Independents refused to attend the conference with the social-imperialists. A declaration to this effect in his own name and on behalf of Karl Liebknecht

and Rosa Luxemburg, who were in prison, was made by Franz Mehring. The Stockholm conference did not take place, since some of the delegates did not receive passports from their governments, and others refused to sit with the representatives of the enemy countries. p. 247

[87] The drafting of the new Party programme was completed after the October Revolution. The programme was adopted at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in March 1919. p. 277

[88] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 51. p. 277

[89] "*Bill of the 104*"—"A Draft of Fundamental Principles" for a Land Law introduced in the First Duma over the signatures of 104 peasant deputies on May 23 (June 5), 1906. The Bill called for the formation of a national land fund consisting of state, crown and monastery lands, as well as privately-owned lands that exceeded the established labour norm, and demanded that the right to use the land be granted only to those who worked it. Compensation was provided for alienated privately-owned lands. The agrarian reform was to be implemented by the local peasant committees elected by general vote. p. 283

[90] The reference is to the *Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*, written towards the end of 1907. The book was printed in St. Petersburg in 1908 but the police seized it while still at the printers and destroyed it. Only one copy was saved. The book was first published in 1917. p. 283

[91] This refers to Stolypin's agrarian reform aimed at creating a bulwark for the tsarist regime in the countryside in the person of the rich farmers. The tsarist government issued a decree on November 9 (22), 1906 regulating the peasants' withdrawal from the village communes and the establishment of their proprietary rights on the allotment lands. Under this law (named after P. A. Stolypin, the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers) the peasant was free to withdraw from the village commune, take possession of his allotment on a proprietorship basis, or sell it. The village commune was obliged to give the peasant who withdrew from the commune an allotment of land in one place (an *otrub*, homestead). The Stolypin reform speeded up the development of capitalism in the countryside and the process of differentiation among the peasantry, and sharpened the class struggle in the village.

The Stolypin reform is described and evaluated in a number of works by Lenin, notably in *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*. (See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431.) p. 284

[92] See Engels, "Flüchtlings-Literatur. 1. Eine polnische Proklamation". *Der Volksstaat*, Nr. 69, 17. VI. 1874. p. 301

[93] This refers to participation in the proposed third conference of the internationalist socialists due to be held in Stockholm on May 18, 1917. It was held in August 1917. By decision of the April Conference, the Bolsheviks attended it. Lenin disagreed with this decision and voted against the resolution on the situation in the International and the tasks of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Lenin considered attendance of the Bolsheviks at this conference possible only for purposes of information. He wrote about this in his pamphlet *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution* (see p. 82 of this volume). In the postscript to the pamphlet, written in May 1917, Lenin calls this decision of the conference a mistake (see pp. 89-90 of this volume). p. 304

[94] See Engels, "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891", *Neue Zeit*, Jg. 20, I. Bd., Stuttgart, 1902, S. 12. p. 323

[95] The centrist *Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany* was formed in April 1917 at the inaugural congress in Gotha amid an atmosphere of revolutionary enthusiasm stimulated by the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. The opportunist leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party was losing the confidence of the rank and file, and the party was faced with the threat of the Left elements breaking away from it. To prevent a split and the formation of a revolutionary party of the working class the Centrist leaders made an attempt to form a so-called "independent" party by means of which they could maintain their influence upon the masses. Behind a screen of Centrist phraseology the "Independents" preached unity with the social-chauvinists and sank to renunciation of the class struggle. The bulk of the party was made up of the Kautskian organisation Arbeitsgemeinschaft—the "Labour Group" in the Reichstag.

For a time the Spartacus group was associated with the party of "Independents" as an affiliated group, which preserved its organisational and political independence, and continued its illegal work and struggle to free the Social-Democratic workers from the influence of the Centrist leaders. In 1918 the Spartacus League left the Independent Social-Democratic Party and formed the core of the newly founded Communist Party of Germany.

At its congress in Halle in October 1920 a split occurred in the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. In December 1920 many of the "Independents" joined the Communist Party of Germany. The Rights formed a separate party and adopted the old name of Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. This party existed up to 1922. p. 325

[96] *Petrogradskaya Storona*—a district in Petrograd where the Central and City committees of the Bolshevik Party, the Military Organisation under the Central Committee of the Party, the Soldiers' Club, and other organisations of the workers and Soldiers were situated. They were housed in the former mansion of Kshesinskaya. p. 327

[97] "*Reassuring missive*"—the Provisional Government's statement published in the central newspapers on April 22 (May 5), 1917 "elucidating" Foreign Minister Milyukov's Note of April 18 (May 1), 1917. By this "elucidation" the Provisional Government tried to cover up the imperialist character of the Note, which had announced the intention of continuing the war "to decisive victory", and to pacify the angry masses. p. 332

[98] The *Radical and Radical-Socialist Party of France*—a bourgeois party organised as such in 1901, had been in existence since the eighties of the nineteenth century. Before the First World War (1914-18) it largely represented the interests of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. In the period between the first and second world wars the big bourgeoisie gained more influence in the party, whose leaders frequently headed the French Government. p. 350

[99] With the exception of the *Rech* editorial, this article was written on the basis of speeches made at a private meeting of the Fourth Duma members in Petrograd, reported in the bourgeois newspapers for May 5 (18), 1917.

After the February revolution the Provisional Government did not, in spite of the public demand, officially dissolve the Fourth Duma the members of which (from the violent monarchists to the Cadets) regularly gathered at private meetings held at the residence of M. V. Rodzyanko, the Chairman of the Duma, to discuss and adopt resolutions on important issues of foreign and domestic policy. These meetings were widely reported in the bourgeois press. Lenin called these meetings of the Fourth Duma deputies "the headquarters of counter-revolution".

The particular meeting referred to in this article was held on May 4 (17), 1917, and was attended by representatives of all the Duma parties except the Social-Democrats. Speeches were made by the Octobrist and Cadet leaders A. I. Guchkov, V. A. Maklakov, P. N. Milyukov, N. V. Savich, V. V. Shulgin and others, the gist of which was summed up in two demands: first, that the Russian army resume offensive operations at the front, and second, that "order" be restored in the army and in the country at large, meaning that a stop be put to the revolution. The aim of the meeting was to bring pressure to bear on the new, coalition, government.

In June-July the counter-revolutionary activities of the Fourth Duma deputies increased still further. On June 2 (15) Rodzyanko addressed a letter to the deputies of the Fourth Duma calling upon them not to leave Petrograd, since "current political events required that the members of the Duma should be ready on the spot".

On the demand of the Bolsheviks, who were supported by the working masses, the Fourth Duma was officially dissolved by the Provisional Government on October 6 (19), 1917. p. 362

[100] *Vecherneye Vremya* (Evening Times)—a Black-Hundred daily of the gutter-press type founded by the reactionary publisher A. S.

Suvorin. Appeared from November 1911 to November 1917 in St. Petersburg. In 1917 it was the mouthpiece of the counter-revolutionary officers. p. 367

[101] The representatives of the "socialist" parties who joined the coalition Provisional Government formed on May 5 (18), 1917 were Tsereteli and Skobelev (Mensheviks), Kerensky and Chernov (Socialist-Revolutionaries), Pereverzev (closely connected with the S.R.s) and Peshekhonov (Popular Socialist Party). p. 384

[102] The "*Inter-District*" *Organisation of United Social-Democrats* was formed in St. Petersburg in November 1913 with the declared object of working for the unity of the R.S.D.L.P. Under cover of unity slogans and in an attempt to unite the Bolshevik and Menshevik organisations in St. Petersburg, its members set up a factional organisation of their own consisting of some of the former Bolsheviks who had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the opportunists, and Trotskyist Mensheviks.

During the First World War the members of the Inter-District Organisation occupied a Centrist position. They considered the war to be an imperialist war and were against social-chauvinism, but at the same time would not agree to a complete break with the Mensheviks.

In 1917 the I.D.O., among whose members were Volodarsky, Joffe, Lunacharsky, Manuilsky, Trotsky, Uritsky and Yurenev, declared its agreement with the line of the Bolshevik Party. Therefore, at the elections to the Petrograd district councils in May-June 1917 the Bolsheviks formed a bloc with the I.D. Organisation. At the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) the I.D. Organisation (membership about 4,000), which had broken with the Menshevik defencists, was admitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party. As events showed, some of the I.D.O. members—Lunacharsky, Manuilsky, Volodarsky, Uritsky and others—broke with their Centrist past, but Trotsky and a small group of his close associates only temporarily suspended their fight against Bolshevism, and "joined the Party so as, once inside, to fight Leninism and foist their opportunist, anti-socialist policy upon it" (*History of the C.P.S.U.*, Moscow, 1960, p. 240). The I.D.O. published a journal of its own, *Vperyod*. One number was put out illegally in 1915, and publication was resumed in 1917, when it came out legally from June to August as the organ of the St. Petersburg Inter-District Committee of the United Social-Democrats (Internationalists). Eight issues were put out. After the Sixth Congress of the Party the editorial board was changed, and No. 9 of the journal appeared as the organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Publication was discontinued in September 1917 by decision of the Central Committee. p. 390

[103] "*Socialist*" *ministerialism* (*Millerandism*)—opportunist tactics of socialists' participation in bourgeois reactionary governments The term arose in connection with the French socialist Millerand joining the bourgeois government of Waldeck-Rousseau in 1899.

Millerandism was discussed at the Paris Congress of the Second International in 1900. The Congress adopted a conciliatory resolution proposed by Kautsky, condemning the participation of socialists in bourgeois governments but admitting it in certain "exceptional" cases. The French and other socialists made this an excuse for joining the governments of the imperialist bourgeoisie during the First World War. Lenin described ministerialism as revisionism and renegadism, and pointed out that in joining the bourgeois governments the social-reformists were bound to act as figure-heads; as a screen for the capitalists, an instrument in the hands of these governments for deceiving the masses.

p. 390

[104] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal monthly of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from January 1910 to September 1914. The Editor-in-Chief was A. N. Potresov, and among its contributors were F. I. Dan and S. O. Tsederbaum. The liquidators' centre formed around this journal. At the beginning of the First World War *Nasha Zarya* took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 393

[105] The *Chkheidze group*—the Menshevik group in the Fourth Duma, led by N. S. Chkheidze. During the First World War the Menshevik Duma group occupied a Centrist position, but actually gave full support to the policy of the Russian social-chauvinists. Lenin criticised Chkheidze's opportunist line in his articles: "Have the Organising Committee and the Chkheidze Group a Policy of Their Own?" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 127-37) and "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role" (see Vol. 23, pp. 171-74) and other articles. p. 393

[106] The *Declaration* referred to was issued on May 6 (19), 1917 by the first coalition Provisional Government. Paragraph 3 of this document read: "The Provisional Government will redouble its determined efforts to combat economic disorganisation by developing planned state and public control of production, transport, commerce and distribution of products, and where necessary will resort also to the organisation of production." p. 396

[107] See Clausewitz, *On War*, Vol. 1. p. 399

[108] *L'Humanité*—a daily founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War (1914-18) it was controlled by the extreme Right wing of the party and took a social-chauvinist stand.

In 1918, Marcel Cachin, a prominent leader of the French and international labour movement, became political director and head of the newspaper. In 1918-20 the paper came out against the imperialist policy of the French Government, which had sent its armed forces against the Soviet Republic. In December 1920, after the split in the French Socialist Party and the formation of

the Communist Party of France, the newspaper became the latter's central organ. p. 403

[109] *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom)—a daily published by the Regional Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Petrograd from March 21 (April 3) to October 13 (26), 1917. p. 407

[110] *Lyakhov, V. P.* (1869-1919)—a colonel of the tsarist army who made a name for himself as a result of the suppression of the national-revolutionary movement in the Caucasus and Persia. p. 412

[111] The *Congress of delegates from the front*, held in Petrograd on May 12-17 (25-30), discussed, among others, the following questions: the war, fraternisation by the soldiers at the front, deserters, and prisoners of war. The Congress declared in favour of organising a Front Section under the Petrograd Soviet pending the formation of an All-Russia Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Congress, whose proceedings were influenced by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, came out against fraternisation and for continuing the war. p. 422

[112] This refers to statements made by a delegation of Donets workers to the Economic Department of the Petrograd Soviet. This delegation was sent to Petrograd by the April-May conference (1917) of workers of the coal and iron and steel industries in the south of Russia to ask the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Labour to intercede in obtaining a rise for the lower-paid brackets from the association of Donets capitalists.

The delegation submitted statements describing the intolerable conditions of the workers and giving numerous instances of sabotage on the part of the owners and managers of the collieries and metallurgical works, who were out to crush the revolutionary-minded workers and starve them into submission. p. 427

[113] *Priboi* (Tide)—a Bolshevik legal publishing house, founded in St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1913; existed up to the summer of 1914, and resumed its activities in 1917.

Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment)—a Bolshevik legal theoretical monthly, published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914, with a circulation of up to five thousand copies.

The journal was founded on Lenin's initiative to replace the Moscow-published *Mysl*, a Bolshevik journal which was closed down by the tsarist government. Lenin directed *Prosveshcheniye* from Paris and subsequently from Cracow and Poronin. He edited articles and regularly corresponded with the Editorial Board.

The journal exposed the opportunists—the liquidators, otzovists, and Trotskyists, as well as the bourgeois nationalists. It highlighted the struggle of the working class under conditions of a new revolutionary upsurge, propagandised Bolshevik slogans in the Fourth Duma election campaign, and came out against revisionism and Centrism in the parties of the Second International.

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The journal played an important role in the Marxist internationalist education of the advanced workers in Russia.

On the eve of the First World War *Prosveshcheniye* was closed down by the tsarist government. It resumed publication in the autumn of 1917, but only one issue (a double one) appeared.

Lenin's reference to the journal's second name—*Kommunist*—implies an intention of resuming publication of the journal under the old name or that of *Kommunist*. p. 432

[114] *Muzhik Vredny*—part of the pseudonym of the poet Y. A. Pridvorov—Demyan Bedny, Muzhik Vredny. p. 436

[115] *Izvestia of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies*—a daily newspaper, official organ of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, published in Petrograd from May 9 (22) to December 1917. The paper was a mouthpiece of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It took up a hostile attitude towards the October Revolution, and was closed down on account of its counter-revolutionary tendencies. p. 449

[116] Lenin refers to his article "A Question of Principle" (see pp. 536-38 of this volume), in which he quotes from Engels's book "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (See *Neue Zeit*, Jg. 20, I. Bd., Stuttgart, S. 12). p. 462

[117] The *First All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies* was held in Petrograd on May 4-28 (May 17-June 10), 1917. It was attended by 1,115 delegates from the provinces and army units. The Bolsheviks took an active part in the Congress proceedings, during which they exposed the imperialist policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the conciliatory policy of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Congress was dominated by the S.R.s, and this determined the nature of its decisions. The Congress approved the policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and participation of "socialists" in that government. It went on record in favour of continuing the war "to the victorious end" and of launching an offensive at the front. The Congress declared against the immediate transfer of the landed estates to the peasants and postponed the land question pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. p. 481

[118] The *Chief Land Committee* was set up by the Provisional Government in April 1917 under pressure of the growing peasant movement which demanded a solution of the land question. The overwhelming majority of the Committee's members were Cadets and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Committee was to supervise the collection and working up of material for an agrarian reform, for which purpose local land committees were formed.

The formation of the Chief and local land committees was a political manoeuvre on the part of the Provisional Government designed to drag out the settlement of the land question as long as

possible, and to wean the peasant masses away from revolutionary forms of struggle by means of reforms from above that would preserve landed proprietorship intact. This was a method of struggle against the mounting peasant movement.

After the October Revolution the Chief Land Committee opposed the enforcement of Lenin's Decree on Land and was dissolved by a decision of the Council of People's Commissars in December 1917. p. 486

[119] The peasants in Russia, as a class of feudal society, were divided into three major categories: (1) privately-owned (landowners') peasants, (2) state peasants, and (3) crown-land peasants (belonging to the tsar's family). Each of these categories, in turn, was split up into grades and special groups, which differed from one another in origin, forms of holdings and tenure, legal and agrarian status, etc. The Peasant Reform of 1861, carried out from above by the tsarist government in the interests of the feudalist landowners, kept this diversity of grades intact right up to the October Revolution of 1917. p. 499

[120] *Vedomosti Obshchestvennovo Gradonachalstva* (City Administration Recorder)—a daily newspaper, official publication of the Petrograd City Administration, appeared from March 8 (21), 1917 as a continuation of *Vedomosti Sanktpeterburgskoi Gorodskoi Politsii* (St. Petersburg Police Gazette), which was founded in 1839 and repeatedly changed its name. From June 22 (July 5), 1917 the paper assumed the name of *Vestnik Gorodskovo Samoupravleniya* (City Self-Government Herald). It fully supported the policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government. Was closed down after the October Revolution. p. 506

[121] The *Yedinstvo* group—a small Social-Democratic group which, in 1917-18, united the extreme Right Menshevik defencists, former liquidators and others. It was organised in March 1917, and in addition to Petrograd, it had branch organisations in Moscow, Baku and several other cities. The group was headed by Plekhanov and the former liquidators Buryanov and Jordansky. The *Yedinstvo* group denied the possibility of a victorious socialist revolution in Russia and gave unqualified support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. It stood for the war being carried on to "complete victory" and joined the bourgeois and Black-Hundred press in hounding the Bolsheviks. At the Petrograd district council elections the group put forward independent lists, sometimes forming a bloc with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and others, and took part in all patriotic manifestations; it greeted the June offensive; after the July events it campaigned for a "strong government", i.e., a military dictatorship. It published the newspaper *Yedinstvo* (Unity). p. 509

[122] The *All-Russia Conference of Menshevik and Affiliated Organisations* was held in Petrograd on May 7-12 (20-25), 1917, and was

attended by 88 voting delegates and 35 delegates with a consultative voice representing a membership of 44,830. The agenda, among others, included the following items: the attitude to and participation in the Provisional Government, the attitude towards the war, the revival of the International, and the land question. The Conference took a counter-revolutionary, anti-socialist stand on all questions on the agenda. It approved of socialists joining the coalition government, and urged full support for it; it condemned fraternisation among the soldiers at the front, urged the need for strengthening the army's fighting capacity, shared the view of the bourgeois parties that the land reform could not be carried through until after the Constituent Assembly had met and called for "a vigorous struggle against anarchic seizures of land and all other lawless methods of solving the problem". The Conference approved the decision of the Petrograd Soviet to convene an international socialist conference, and instructed the Organising Committee to take an active part in the Third Zimmerwald Conference. p. 510

[123] This refers to the decisions of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) held in Petrograd on April 24-29 (May 7-12), 1917. p. 513

[124] The reference is to two decrees of the Provisional Government published May 24 and 27 (June 6 and 9), 1917. The first stated that "the Provisional Government considers the situation in Kronstadt to be threatening and absolutely intolerable". The second made it known "to all the citizens of Kronstadt that the orders of the Provisional Government are to be obeyed without question".

The sailors, soldiers and workers of the military workshops in Kronstadt—a fortress protecting Petrograd from the sea and the chief rear base of the Baltic fleet—played a very important part in preparing the victory of the October armed uprising in Petrograd. The Kronstadt Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies followed the lead of the Bolsheviks from the very first day of its existence. This was due to the revolutionary traditions of Kronstadt (the mutinies of 1905 and 1906, the uprising on the battle-ship *Gangut* in 1915) and to the existence of a strong Bolshevik organisation there which carried on revolutionary work all through the war.

Owing to the conflict between the Kronstadt Soviet and the Commissar of the Provisional Government, Pepelyaev, a resolution moved by the non-party section of the Soviet and supported by the Bolsheviks was passed on May 17 (30), 1917 abolishing the office of Government Commissar and vesting all power in the Kronstadt Soviet. This resolution stated that the sole authority in the town of Kronstadt was the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which, on affairs of state concern, entered into direct contact with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The bourgeois, S.R. and Menshevik press raised a hue and cry against the men of Kronstadt and the Bolsheviks, declaring that Russia was on the verge of collapse and anarchy, that Kronstadt was seceding, and so on.

A delegation from the Petrograd Soviet (Chkheidze, Gotz and others) followed by one from the Provisional Government (Ministers Skobelev and Tsereteli) went out to settle the Kronstadt incident. The latter succeeded in getting a decision passed through the Kronstadt Soviet arranging a compromise settlement, under which the Commissar was to be elected by the Soviet and endorsed by the Provisional Government. In addition, a general political resolution was adopted in which the Kronstadt Soviet declared that it recognised the authority of the Provisional Government, but that this "recognition does not, of course, exclude criticism and the desire that revolutionary democracy should create a new organisation of central authority by vesting all power in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies". The resolution also expressed the hope that the Bolsheviks would succeed in achieving this by means of ideological influence. It ended with a strong protest against attempts to ascribe to the Kronstadt Bolsheviks "the intention of separating Kronstadt from the rest of Russia".

Lenin considered the revolutionary action in Kronstadt to have been premature. The negotiations by the Bolshevik group of the Kronstadt Soviet to settle the conflict and the further work of the Kronstadt Party organisation were directed by Lenin. p. 533

[125] This is a quotation from Engels's "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (See *Neue Zeit*, Jg. 20, I. Bd., Stuttgart, S. 12). p. 538

[126] *Russkaya Gazeta* (Russian Gazette) was published in St. Petersburg in 1904-06. p. 544

[127] This refers to the replies of the French and British governments to the declaration of the Provisional Government of March 27 (April 9), 1917, published in the newspapers on May 28 (June 10). The French Note (like the British) welcomed the intention of the Provisional Government to secure the independence of Poland, and mentioned France's desire to fight in order to "liberate" Alsace-Lorraine and obtain indemnities from Germany. The British Note tried to justify Britain's participation in the war. Both Notes expressed the hope of Russia's continued co-operation in fighting to win the war. p. 546

[128] See A. I. Herzen's article "Plach" (Weeping) published in the journal *Kolokol* (The Bell) in March 1863. p. 568

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*April-June 1917*)

April 3 (16) Lenin returns to Russia from Switzerland. At Byelo-Ostrov railway station he is met by a delegation of Petrograd workers. Lenin makes a brief speech of greeting.

Late in the evening Lenin arrives in Petrograd. He is given a grand welcome at the Finlandsky Railway Station by the Petrograd workers, soldiers and sailors. On the square facing the station Lenin makes a speech from an armoured car in which he greets the Russian revolutionary proletariat and the army and calls upon them to fight for the socialist revolution.

April 3 (16) (night) Lenin attends a celebration meeting in his honour organised by the Party workers of Petrograd at the Kshesinskaya mansion. He makes a speech concerning the new tasks of the Bolshevik Party.

April 4 (17) Lenin addresses a meeting of Bolshevik delegates to the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, at which he announces and explains his theses concerning the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat (the April Theses).

Lenin makes a second report and reads his Theses at a joint meeting of the Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates to the Conference of Soviets.

April 5 (18) *Pravda* No. 24 publishes Lenin's report to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet under the title of "How We Arrived".

April 6 (19) *Pravda* No. 25 publishes a notice to the effect that Lenin, member of the Editorial Board of the Party's Central Organ, returned from abroad and joined the Editorial Board of *Pravda*.

Lenin's article "Two Worlds" published in *Pravda* No. 25.

April 7 (20) Lenin's article "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" containing the famous April Theses published in *Pravda* No. 26.

April 8 (21)	Lenin's article "Blancism" published in *Pravda* No. 27.
April 9 (22)	Lenin's article "The Dual Power" published in *Pravda* No. 28.
April, between 8 and 13 (21 and 26)	Lenin writes the pamphlet *Letters on Tactics*, which came off the press at the end of April 1917.
April 10 (23)	Lenin finishes writing his pamphlet *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution. Draft Platform for the Proletarian Party*. The pamphlet was published in September 1917. Lenin speaks on the current situation at a meeting of the Izmailovsky Regiment.
Beginning of April	Lenin writes the pamphlet *Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat* published in June 1917.
April 12 (25)	Lenin's article "A Shameless Lie of the Capitalists" published in *Pravda* No. 30.
April 13 (26)	Lenin's articles "The War and the Provisional Government" and "In the Footsteps of *Russkaya Volya*" published in *Pravda* No. 31.
April 14 (27)	Lenin's articles "A Partnership of Lies", "Banks and Ministers" and "An Important Exposure" published in *Pravda* No. 32.
April, between 11 and 12 (24 and 27)	Lenin writes his appeal "To the Soldiers and Sailors" in connection with the smear campaign started in the bourgeois press concerning the passage through Germany of the returning Russian political emigrants.
April 15 (28)	*Pravda* No. 33 publishes Lenin's articles "Citizens! See What Methods the Capitalists of All Countries Are Using!", "A 'Voluntary Agreement' Between Landowners and the Peasants" and "An Honest Voice in a Chorus of Slanderers". Lenin's article "The Soldiers and the Land" published in *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 1. Lenin addresses a meeting of soldiers of an armoured unit in the Mikhailovsky Manege, at which he exposes the imperialist policy of the Provisional Government which was continuing the aggressive war of conquest.

April 14-22 (April 27-May 5)	The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) is held. Lenin takes a leading part in the work of the Conference, of which he is elected honorary chairman.
April 14 (27)	At the Conference's first meeting Lenin makes a report and winds up the debates on the current situation and on the attitude towards the Provisional Government.
	Lenin writes the appeal "Against the Riot-Mongers. To the Workers, Soldiers, and the Whole Population of Petrograd" which is adopted by the Conference and published in *Pravda* No. 33 for April 15 over the signatures of the Central and Petrograd Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks).
April 15 (28)	At the second meeting of the Conference Lenin takes the floor twice in support of the draft resolution concerning the attitude towards the Provisional Government. His resolution is adopted by the Conference.
April 22 (May 5)	At the fourth meeting of the Conference Lenin takes part in the debate on the question of the municipal elections. His resolution is adopted by the Conference.
Not later than April 22 (May 5)	Lenin writes the draft resolution for the Petrograd City Conference on the attitude towards the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Menshevik Social-Democrats, the "non-factional" Social-Democrats and other kindred political trends. The resolution is adopted at the Conference's fourth meeting.
April 22 (May 5)	Lenin's draft resolution on the war is accepted at the Conference's fourth meeting as a basis for submission to the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks).
April 16 (29)	Lenin's articles "Congress of Peasants' Deputies" and "On the Return of the Emigrants" published in *Pravda* No. 34.
April 17 (30)	Lenin makes a speech on the current situation at a meeting of the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet.

April 18 (*May 1*)

Lenin's article "Our Views. *A Reply to the Resolution of the Executive Commission of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies*" published in *Pravda* No. 35,

Lenin speaks at a mass demonstration on Marsovo Polye on the significance of May Day and the tasks of the Russian revolution.

Lenin addresses a May Day meeting of the workers of the Okhta Works.

April 20 (*May 3*)

Lenin's articles "How They Tied Themselves to the Capitalists", "A Proletarian Militia" and "Bankruptcy?" published in *Pravda* No. 36.

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) adopts Lenin's resolution concerning the crisis caused by the Provisional Government's Note of April 18 (May 1), 1917, and his "Appeal to the Soldiers of All the Belligerent Countries" published in *Pravda* No. 37, for May 4 (April 21).

April 21 (*May 4*)

Pravda No. 37 publishes Lenin's articles: "The Provisional Government's Note", "A Basic Question. *A Line of Argument Used by Socialists Who Have Gone Over to the Bourgeoisie*", "Icons Versus Cannons, Phrases Versus Capital", "The Logic of Citizen V. Chernov" and "Mr. Plekhanov's Futile Attempts to Extricate Himself".

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) endorses Lenin's resolution concerning the tasks of the Party in connection with the crisis in the Provisional Government. The resolution is published in *Pravda* No. 38, for May 5 (April 22).

April 22 (*May 5*)

Pravda No. 38 publishes Lenin's articles: "Honest Defencism Reveals Itself", "Mad Capitalists or Weak-Minded Social-Democrats?" and "The Advice or Order of Shingaryov, and the Advice of a Local Soviet".

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) endorses Lenin's resolution concerning the results of the April crisis. The resolution is published in *Pravda* No. 39, for May 6 (April 23).

April 23 (*May 6*)

Pravda No. 39 publishes Lenin's articles: "Lessons of the Crisis", "How a Simple Question Can Be Confused" and "'Disgrace' as the Capitalists and the Proletarians Understand It".

Lenin interviewed by E. Torniainen, editor of *Työmies* (Worker), a Finnish Social-Democratic newspaper.

Lenin attends a preliminary meeting of delegates to the All-Russia Party Conference, at which he delivers a speech on the current situation.

April 25 (May 8) — Lenin's article "Foolish Gloating" published in *Pravda* No. 40.

April 24-29 (May 7-12) — The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) is held. Lenin takes a leading part in the proceedings; he is elected to the presiding committee.

April 24 (May 7) — Lenin opens the Conference with a brief speech.

At the first session of the Conference Lenin makes a report on the current situation and presents draft resolutions on the attitude towards the Provisional Government and on the war.

At the evening session Lenin makes a speech winding up the debate on the question of the current situation.

Lenin is elected to the Resolution Editing Committee.

April 25 (May 8) — At the third session of the Conference Lenin delivers a speech on the proposed international socialist conference, and introduces a draft resolution which is endorsed by the Conference.

At the fourth session Lenin takes the floor twice in the debate on the question of the attitude towards the Soviets.

April 25-26 (May 8-9) — Lenin writes "Draft Theses to the Resolution on the Soviets".

April 26 and 27 (May 9 and 10) — Lenin takes part in the work of the Resolution Editing Committee.

April 27 (May 10) — Lenin takes part in the work of the committees; submits proposed changes to the theoretical and political sections of the Party's programme at the Programme Revision Committee.

At the Conference's sixth session Lenin, on behalf of the Resolution Committee, makes a speech in support of the resolution on the war. His resolution is adopted by the Conference.

April 28 (*May 11*)	At the seventh session Lenin delivers two reports: on the question of revision of the Party programme and on the agrarian question; he introduces the resolutions on these questions drafted by him and endorsed by the respective committees, which the Conference adopts.
April 29 (*May 12*)	At the eighth session the Conference adopts two resolutions of Lenin's on the unity of the internationalists against the petty-bourgeois defencist bloc, and on the Soviets. At the ninth session Lenin is elected to the Party's Central Committee. Lenin makes a speech on the national question; his resolution is adopted by the Conference. Lenin makes a speech opposing the resolution on the situation within the International proposed by Zinoviev. Lenin makes a speech in support of the resolution on the current situation. His resolution is adopted by the Conference. Lenin makes a closing speech.
April 28 (*May 11*)	Lenin's articles "The Significance of Fraternisation" and "What the Counter-Revolutionary Steps of the Provisional Government Lead To" published in *Pravda* No. 43.
April 29 (*May 12*)	Lenin's articles "Social-Chauvinists and Internationalists", "I. G. Tsereteli and the Class Struggle" and "Anxiety" published in *Pravda* No. 44.
May 2 (*15*)	Lenin's articles "The 'Crisis of Power'" and "Finland and Russia" published in *Pravda* No. 46.
May 3 (*16*)	Lenin's articles "Defence of Imperialism Cloaked with Specious Phrases" and "An Unfortunate Document" published in *Pravda* No. 47. Resolutions of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) with an introduction by Lenin are published as a supplement to *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 13.
May 4 (*17*)	Lenin's article "Frightening the People with Bourgeois Terrors" published in *Pravda* No. 48.
Not earlier than May 4 (*17*)	Lenin writes his theses concerning the Provisional Government's declaration on foreign and domestic policies.

May 5 (18)	Lenin's articles "On the Eve" and "They Have Forgotten the Main Thing. *The Municipal Platform of the Proletarian Party*" published in *Pravda* No. 49.
Before May 7 (20)	Lenin writes the mandate to the deputies of the Soviet elected at factories and regiments.
May 6 (19)	*Pravda* No. 50 publishes Lenin's articles: "Class Collaboration with Capital, or Class Struggle Against Capital?", "A Strong Revolutionary Government", "Titbits for the 'Newborn' Government" and "Already the 'New' Government Is Lagging Behind Even the Peasant Mass, Leave Alone the Revolutionary Workers".
May 7 (20)	Lenin's article "Stealing a March on the Workers" published in *Pravda* No. 51. Lenin writes "An Open Letter to the Delegates to the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies", which is published in *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 19, for May 24 (11), 1917.
May 8 (21)	Lenin makes a report on the results of the April Conference at a meeting of Petrograd members of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).
May 9 (22)	Lenin's article "The 'Virtual Armistice'" published in *Pravda* No. 52.
May 10 (23)	*Pravda* No. 53 publishes Lenin's articles: "Secrets of Foreign Policy", "One of the Secret Treaties", "Ministerial Tone" and "In Search of a Napoleon". Lenin addresses a conference of the Inter-District Organisation on the conditions of unity between the Social-Democratic groups and currents standing for internationalism and the Bolshevik Party.
May 11 (24)	Lenin's article "Nothing Has Changed" published in *Pravda* No. 54.
May 12 (25)	Lenin's articles "A Regrettable Deviation from the Principles of Democracy" and "On the Question of Convening an International, So-called Socialist Conference Jointly with the Social-Chauvinists" published in *Pravda* No. 55. Lenin makes a speech on the current situation at a meeting of Putilov workers.

Lenin makes a speech on the current situation at a meeting of workers of the Admiralty Shipyards, the Franco-Russian and other works.

May 13 (26) Lenin's articles "The Proletarian Party at the District Council Elections" and "Statements About the War Made by Our Party Before the Revolution" published by *Pravda* No. 56.

May 14 (27) Lenin's article "Impending Debacle" published in *Pravda* No. 57

Lenin reads a lecture on the subject "War and Revolution".

May 16 (29) Lenin's article "Despicable Methods" published in *Pravda* No. 58.

May 16 and 17 (29 and 30) Lenin's article "Inevitable Catastrophe and Extravagant Promises" published in *Pravda* Nos. 58 and 59.

May 17 (30) Lenin makes a speech on the current situation at a meeting of workers of the Pipe Works and other factories.

May 18 (31) *Pravda* No. 60 publishes Lenin's articles: "The Question of Uniting the Internationalists", "Muddleheadedness. *More on the Subject of Annexations*", "Combating Economic Chaos by a Spate of Commissions" and "One More Departure from Democratic Principles".

May 19 (June 1) *Pravda* No. 61 publishes Lenin's articles: "How the Capitalists Are Trying to Scare the People", "One More Crime of the Capitalists" and "Still More Lies".

Before May 20 (June 2) Lenin prepares his pamphlet *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme* for the press. The pamphlet is published in the first half of June 1917.

May 20 (June 2) Lenin writes the preface to the pamphlet *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*.

Pravda No. 62 publishes Lenin's articles: "Has Dual Power Disappeared?" and "On the 'Unauthorised Seizure' of Land. *Flimsy Arguments of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.*"

May 21 (*June 5*)	Lenin makes a report on the current situation and the tasks of the proletariat at a meeting of workers of the Skorokhod and other factories in Moskovskaya Zastava District of Petrograd.
May 22 (*June 4*)	Lenin addresses the First All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies on the agrarian question; on behalf of the Bolshevik delegates he submits a draft resolution on the subject.
May 24 (*June 6*)	Lenin's article "Parties in the Petrograd District Council Elections" published in *Pravda* No. 64.
Before May 25 (*June 7*)	Lenin drafts the resolution on measures to cope with economic disorganisation for presentation to the First Petrograd Conference of Shop Committees. The resolution is published in the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 64, for May 25 (June 7), over the signature of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.
May 25 (*June 7*)	Lenin's article "A Deal with the Capitalists or Overthrow of the Capitalists? *How to End the War*" published in *Pravda* No. 65.
May 27 (*June 9*)	*Pravda* No. 67 publishes Lenin's articles: "The Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest Link", "The Capitalists Must Be Exposed", "Reports on the Economic Debacle", and "'Sleight of Hand' and Unprincipled Politicians".
May 28 (*June 10*)	*Pravda* No. 68 publishes Lenin's articles: "The Dark Forces Are for the Cadets, the Mensheviks and Narodniks Are in One Government with the Cadets", "The Shameful Menshevik-Narodnik Bloc with *Yedinstvo*", "Counter-Revolution Takes the Offensive. '*Jacobins Without the People*'", "A Question of Principle. '*Forgotten Words*' *of Democracy*" and "For Lack of a Clean Principled Weapon They Snatch at a Dirty One". Lenin writes the afterword to his pamphlet *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution.*
May 30 (*June 12*)	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and submits draft resolutions on the question of a separate organ of the press for the Petrograd Committee.
May 31 (*June 13*)	Lenin's articles "The Harm of Phrase-mongering" and "Capitalist Mockery of the People" published in *Pravda* No. 69.

Lenin writes his "Letter to the District Committee of the Petrograd Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) in connection with the decision of the Petrograd Committee to publish a press organ of its own.

Lenin addresses the First Petrograd Conference of Shop Committees on workers' control over industry. Lenin's resolution on measures to cope with economic disorganisation is adopted by the Conference.

Lenin makes a speech on the current situation at a meeting of the Bolshevik delegates to the First All-Russia Congress of the Soviets.

June 1 (*14*) Lenin's articles: "Infamy Justified", "The Petty-Bourgeois Stand on the Question of Economic Disorganisation" and "A Mote in the Eye" are published in *Pravda* No. 70.

June 2 (*15*) Lenin's article "It Is Undemocratic, Citizen Kerensky!" published in *Pravda* No. 71.

Before June (*4*) Lenin draws up the plan of a speech to be delivered at the First All-Russia Congress of the Soviets.

June 3 (*16*) Lenin's articles "Bolshevism and 'Demoralisation' of the Army" and "The Laugh Is on You!" published in *Pravda* No. 72.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 25 contains works Lenin wrote between June and September 1917, during preparations for the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The volume opens with Lenin's speeches at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In these speeches and in his articles "Confused and Frightened", "A Contradictory Stand", "The Eighteenth of June", "The Revolution, the Offensive, and Our Party", "To What State Have the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks Brought the Revolution?", and "A Class Shift", Lenin exposes the counter-revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government and the conciliatory tactics of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. He expounds the Bolshevik programme of the struggle to resolve the fundamental issues of the revolution, and explains that only Soviet power can lift the country out of war and ruin, win peace and give land to the peasants.

In a number of articles—"The Political Situation", "On Slogans", "Constitutional Illusions" and "Lessons of the Revolution"—Lenin outlines new tactics for the Bolshevik Party in view of the drastic change which occurred in the political situation in the country following the events of July 3-5.

In his work *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*, Lenin sets forth the economic policy of the Bolshevik Party and draws the conclusion that the proletarian revolu-

tian is the only means of saving the country from the approaching disaster.

This volume includes the well-known *The State and Revolution*, in which Lenin develops the Marxist theory of the state and defends it from distortion and vulgarisation by the opportunists.

Also included are seven articles absent from earlier editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*. In his articles "An Alliance to Stop the Revolution", "The Foreign Policy of the Russian Revolution" and "Ruling and Responsible Parties", Lenin explains that the Provisional Government is an alliance of the capitalists on the one hand and the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries on the other to stop the revolution. He blames the ruling conciliatory parties for the counter-revolutionary home and foreign policy and for the disaster threatening the country. In the article "How Rodzyanko Is Trying to Justify Himself", Lenin shows up the former Chairman of the Fourth Duma, Rodzyanko, as a man who protected the agent provocateur Malinovsky. The articles "A New Dreyfus Case?" and "Our Thanks to Prince G. Y. Lvov" expose the provocative methods used by the Kerensky Government against the Bolsheviks. In his article "All Power to the Soviets!" Lenin justifies the Bolshevik Party's slogan of the transfer of all state power to the Soviets.

All works in this volume dating from the period after the events of July 1917 were written by Lenin when he was in hiding from persecution by the Provisional Government.

FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES[1]

JUNE 3-24 (JUNE 6-JULY 7), 1917

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1

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT JUNE 4 (17)

Comrades, in the brief time at my disposal, I can dwell—and I think this best—only on the main questions of principle raised by the Executive Committee rapporteur and by subsequent speakers.

The first and fundamental issue before us was: *what is this assembly* we are attending, what are these Soviets now gathered at the All-Russia Congress, and what is this revolutionary democracy that people here speak so much about to conceal their utter misunderstanding and complete repudiation of it? To talk about revolutionary democracy at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and obscure this institution's character, its class composition and its role in the revolution—not to say a word about this and yet lay claim to the title of democrats really is peculiar. They map out a programme to us for a bourgeois parliamentary republic, the sort of programme that has existed all over Western Europe; they map out a programme to us for reforms which are now recognised by all bourgeois governments, including our own, and yet they talk to us about revolutionary democracy. Whom are they talking to? To the Soviets. But I ask you, is there a country in Europe, a bourgeois, democratic, republican country, where anything like these Soviets exists? You have to admit there isn't. Nowhere is there, nor can there be, a similar institution because you must have one or the other: *either* a bourgeois government with "plans" for reforms like those just mapped out to us and proposed dozens of times in every country but remaining on paper, *or* the institution to which they are now referring, the new type of "government" created by the revolution, examples of which

can be found only at a time of greatest revolutionary upsurge, as in France, 1792 and 1871, or in Russia, 1905. The Soviets are an institution which does not exist in any ordinary bourgeois-parliamentary state and cannot exist side by side with a bourgeois government. They are the new, more democratic type of state which we in our Party resolutions call a peasant-proletarian democratic republic, with power belonging solely to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. People are wrong in thinking that this is a theoretical issue. They are wrong in pretending that it can be evaded and in protesting that at present certain institutions exist side by side with the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Yes, they do exist side by side. But this is what breeds countless misunderstandings, conflicts and friction. And this is why the original upswing, the original advance, of the Russian revolution is giving way to stagnation and to those steps backwards which we can now see in our coalition government,[2] in its entire home and foreign policy, in connection with preparations for an imperialist offensive.

One or the other: either the usual bourgeois government, in which case the peasants', workers', soldiers' and other Soviets are useless and will either be broken up by the generals, the counter-revolutionary generals, who keep a hold on the armed forces and pay no heed to Minister Kerensky's fancy speeches, or they will die an inglorious death. They have no other choice. They can neither retreat nor stand still. They can exist only by advancing. This is a type of state not invented by the Russians but advanced by the revolution because the revolution can win in no other way. Within the All-Russia Congress, friction and the struggle of parties for power are inevitable. But this will be the elimination of possible mistakes and illusions through the political experience of the masses themselves (*commotion*), and not through the reports of Ministers who refer to what they said yesterday, what they will write tomorrow and what they will promise the day after tomorrow. This, comrades, is ridiculous from the point of view of the institution created by the Russian revolution and now faced with the question: to be or not to be? The Soviets cannot continue to exist as they do now. Grown people, workers and peasants, are made to meet, adopt resolutions and listen to reports that cannot

be subjected to any documentary verification! This kind of institution is a transition to a republic which will establish a stable power without a police and a standing army, not in words alone but in action, a power which cannot yet exist in Western Europe and without which the Russian revolution cannot win in the sense of victory over the landowners and over imperialism.

Without this power there can be no question of our gaining such a victory by ourselves. And the deeper we go into the programme recommended to us here, and into the facts with which we are confronted, the more glaringly the fundamental contradiction stands out. We are told by the rapporteur and by other speakers that the first Provisional Government[3] was a bad one! But when the Bolsheviks, those wretched Bolsheviks, said, "No support for and no confidence in this government", how often we were accused of "anarchism"! Now everybody says that the previous government was a bad one. But how does the coalition government with its near-socialist Ministers differ from the previous one? Haven't we had enough talk about programmes and drafts? Haven't we had enough of them? Isn't it time to get down to business? A month has passed since May 6 when the coalition government was formed. Look at the facts, look at the ruin prevailing in Russia and other countries involved in the imperialist war. What is the reason for the ruin? The predatory nature of the capitalists. There's your real anarchy. And this is admitted in statements published, not in our newspaper, not in any Bolshevik newspaper—Heaven forbid!—but in the ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta*,[4] which has reported that industrial coal prices were *raised* by the "revolutionary" government!! The coalition government hasn't changed a thing in this respect. We are asked whether socialism can be introduced in Russia, and whether, generally speaking, radical changes can be made at once. That is all empty talk comrades. The doctrine of Marx and Engels, as they always explained, says: "Our doctrine is not a dogma, but a guide to action."[5] Nowhere in the world is there pure capitalism developing into pure socialism, nor can there be in war-time. But there is something in between, something new and unprecedented, because hundreds of millions of people who have been involved in the criminal war among the capitalists

are losing their lives. It is not a question of promising reforms—that is mere talk. It is a question of taking the step we now need.

If you want to talk of "*revolutionary*" democracy, then you must distinguish this concept from *reformist* democracy under a capitalist Ministry, because it is high time to stop talking about "revolutionary democracy", handing out mutual congratulations on "revolutionary democracy", and get on with a *class* definition, as we have been taught by Marxism, and by scientific socialism generally. It is being proposed that we should pass to reformist democracy under a capitalist Ministry. That may be all well and good from the standpoint of the usual West-European models. A number of countries, however, are today on the brink of destruction, and we can clearly see the practical measures said to be too complicated to carry out easily, and in need of special elaboration, according to the previous speaker, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. He said there was no political party in Russia expressing its readiness to assume full power. I reply: "Yes, there is. No party can refuse this, and our Party certainly doesn't. It is ready to take over full power at any moment." (*Applause and laughter.*) You can laugh as much as you please, but if the Minister confronts us with this question side by side with a party of the Right, he will receive a suitable reply. No party can refuse this. And at a time when liberty still prevails, when threats of arrest and exile to Siberia—threats from the counter-revolutionaries with whom our near-socialist Ministers are sharing government—are still no more than threats, every party says: give us your confidence and we shall give you our programme.

This programme was given by our conference on April 29.[6] Unfortunately, it is being ignored and not taken as a guide. It seems to need a popular exposition. I shall try to give the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs a popular exposition of our resolution and our programme. With regard to the economic crisis, our programme is immediately—it need not be put off—to demand the publication of all the fabulous profits—running as high as 500 and 800 per cent—which the capitalists are making on war supplies, and not as capitalists in the open market under "pure" capitalism. This is where workers' control really is necessary and possible. This is a

measure which, if you call yourselves "revolutionary" democrats, you should carry out in the name of the Congress, a measure which can be carried out overnight. It is not socialism. It is opening the people's eyes to the real anarchy and the real playing with imperialism, the playing with the property of the people, with the hundreds of thousands of lives that tomorrow will be lost because we continue to throttle Greece. Make the profits of the capitalists public, arrest fifty or a hundred of the biggest millionaires. Just keep them in custody for a few weeks, if only in the same privileged conditions in which Nicholas Romanov is being held, for the simple purpose of making them reveal the hidden springs, the fraudulent practices, the filth and greed which even under the new government are costing our country thousands and millions every day. That is the chief cause of anarchy and ruin. That is why we say that everything remains as of old, that the coalition government hasn't changed a thing and has only added a heap of declarations, of pompous statements. However sincere people may be, however sincerely they may wish the working people well, things have not changed—*the same class* remains in power. The policy they are pursuing is not a democratic policy.

You talk to us about "democratisation of the central and local power". Don't you know that these words are a novelty only in Russia, and that elsewhere dozens of near-socialist Ministers have given their countries similar promises? What are they worth when we are faced by the real, concrete fact that while the population elects the authorities locally, the elementary principles of democracy are violated by the centre claiming the right to appoint or confirm the local authorities? The capitalists continue to plunder the people's property. The imperialist war continues. And yet we are promised reforms, reforms and more reforms, which cannot be accomplished at all under these circumstances, because the war crushes and determines everything. Why do you disagree with those who say the war is *not* being waged over capitalist profits? What is the criterion? It is, first of all, which class is in power, which class continues to be the master, which class continues to make hundreds of thousands of millions from banking and financial operations. It is the same capitalist class and the war therefore continues to be

imperialist. Neither the first Provisional Government nor the government with the near-socialist Ministers has changed anything. The secret treaties remain secret. Russia is fighting for the Straits, fighting to continue Lyakhov's policy in Persia,[7] and so on.

I know you don't want this, that most of you don't want it, and that the Ministers don't want it, because no one can want it, for it means the slaughter of hundreds of millions of people. But take the offensive which the Milyukovs and Maklakovs are now talking about so much. They know full well what that means. They know it is linked with the question of power, with the question of revolution. We are told we must distinguish between political and strategic issues. It is ridiculous to raise this question at all. The Cadets[8] perfectly understand that the point at issue is a political one.

It is slander to say the revolutionary struggle for peace that has begun from below might lead to a separate peace treaty. The first step we should take if we had power would be to arrest the biggest capitalists and cut all the threads of their intrigues. Without this, all talk about peace without annexations and indemnities is utterly meaningless. Our second step would be to declare to all people over the head of their governments that we regard all capitalists as robbers—Tereshchenko, who is not a bit better than Milyukov, just a little less stupid, the French capitalists, the British capitalists, and all the rest.

Your own *Izvestia*[9] has got into a muddle and proposes to keep the status quo instead of peace without annexations and indemnities. Our idea of peace "without annexations" is different. Even the Peasant Congress[10] comes nearer the truth when it speaks of a "federal" republic, thereby expressing the idea that the Russian republic does not want to oppress any nation, either in the new or in the old way, and does not want to force any nation, either Finland or the Ukraine, with both of whom the War Minister is trying so hard to find fault and with whom impermissible and intolerable conflicts are being created. We want a single and undivided republic of Russia with a firm government. But a firm government can be secured only by the voluntary agreement of all people concerned. "Revolutionary democracy" are big

words, but they are being applied to a government that by its petty fault-finding is complicating the problem of the Ukraine and Finland, which do not even want to secede. They only say, "Don't postpone the application of the elementary principles of democracy until the Constituent Assembly!"

A peace treaty without annexations and indemnities cannot be concluded until you have renounced your own annexations. It is ridiculous, a comedy, every worker in Europe is laughing at us, saying: You talk very eloquently and call on the people to overthrow the bankers, but you send your own bankers into the Ministry. Arrest them, expose their tricks, get to know the hidden springs! But that you don't do although you have powerful organisations which cannot be resisted. You have gone through 1905 and 1917. You know that revolution is not made to order, that revolutions in other countries were made by the hard and bloody method of insurrection, and in Russia there is no group, no class, that would resist the power of the Soviets. In Russia, this revolution can, by way of exception, be a peaceful one. Were this revolution to propose peace to all peoples today or tomorrow, by breaking with all the capitalist classes, both France and Germany, their people, that is, would accept very soon, because these countries are perishing, because Germany's position is hopeless, because she cannot save herself, and because France—(*Chairman*: "Your time is up.")

I shall finish in half a minute. (*Commotion*; *requests from the audience that the speaker continue*; *protests and applause*.)

(*Chairman*: "I inform the Congress that the Steering Committee proposes the speaker's time be extended. Any objections? The majority are in favour of an extension.")

I stopped at the point that if the revolutionary democrats in Russia were democrats in fact and not merely in words, they would further the revolution and not compromise with the capitalists, not talk about peace without annexations and indemnities but abolish annexations by Russia, and declare in so many words that they consider all annexations criminal and predatory. It would then be possible to avert the imperialist offensive which is threatening death to thousands and millions of people over the partitioning of Persia and the Balkans. The way to peace would then be open, not an easy

way—we do not say it is easy—and one which does not preclude a truly revolutionary war.

We do not put this question as Bazarov does in today's *Novaya Zhizn*.[11] All we say is that Russia has been placed in such a position that at the end of the imperialist war her tasks are easier than might have been expected. And her geographical position is such that any power would have a hard job on its hands if it risked using capital and its predatory interests and risked rising against the Russian working class and the semi-proletariat associated with it, i.e., the poor peasants. Germany is on the brink of defeat, and since the war was joined by the United States, which wants to swallow up Mexico and which tomorrow will probably start fighting Japan, Germany's position has become hopeless, and she will be destroyed. France, who suffers more than the others because of her geographical position and whose state of exhaustion is reaching the limit—this country, while not starving as much as Germany, has lost infinitely more people than Germany. Now if the first step were to restrict the profits of the Russian capitalists and deprive them of all possibility of raking in hundreds of millions in profits, if you were to propose to *all* nations a peace treaty directed against the capitalists of *all* countries and openly declare that you will not enter into any negotiations or relations with the German capitalists and with those who abet them directly or indirectly or are involved with them, and that you refuse to speak with the French and British capitalists, then you would be acting to condemn them in the eyes of the workers. You would not regard it as a victory that a passport has been issued to MacDonald,[12] a man who has never waged a revolutionary struggle against capital and who is being allowed to come because he has never expressed the ideas, principles, practice or experience of the revolutionary struggle against the British capitalists, a struggle for which our Comrade MacLean and hundreds of other British socialists are in prison, and for which our Comrade Liebknecht is confined to a convict prison because he said, "German soldiers, fire on your Kaiser!"

Wouldn't it be more proper to consign the imperialist capitalists to that penal servitude which most of the Provisional Government members in an expressly reconstituted

Third Duma—I don't know, incidentally, whether it is the Third or the Fourth Duma—are daily preparing for us and promising us and about which the Ministry of Justice is already drafting new Bills? MacLean and Liebknecht—those are the names of socialists who are putting the idea of a revolutionary struggle against imperialism into practice. That is what we must say to all governments if we want to fight for peace. We must condemn them before their people. You will then put all the imperialist governments in a difficult position. But now you have complicated your own position by addressing your Peace Manifesto of March 14[13] to the people and saying, "Overthrow your tsars, your kings and your bankers!" while we who possess an organisation unprecedentedly rich in number, experience and material strength, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, join a bloc with our bankers, institute a coalition, near-socialist government, and draft the kind of reforms that have been drafted in Europe for decades. People there in Europe laugh at this kind of peace struggle. There they will understand it only when the Soviets take power and act in a revolutionary way.

Only one country in the world can at the moment take steps to stop the imperialist war on a class scale, in the face of the capitalists and without a bloody revolution. Only one country can do it, and that country is Russia. And she will remain the only one as long as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies exists. The Soviet cannot exist long side by side with the ordinary type of Provisional Government, and will remain what it is only until the offensive is taken. The offensive will be a turning-point in the whole policy of the Russian revolution, that is, it will be a transition from waiting, from paving the way for peace by means of a revolutionary uprising from below, to the resumption of the war. The path that opened up was transition from fraternisation on one front to fraternisation on every front, from spontaneous fraternisation, such as the exchange of a crust of bread with a hungry German worker for a penknife—which is punishable by penal servitude—to conscious fraternisation.

When we take power into our own hands, we shall curb the capitalists, and then the war will *not be the kind* of war that is being waged now, because the nature of a war is

determined by what class wages it, not by what is written on paper. You can write on paper anything you like. But as long as the capitalist class has a majority in the government the war will remain an imperialist war no matter what you write, no matter how eloquent you are, no matter how many near-socialist Ministers you have. Everyone knows that, and everyone can see it. And the cases of Albania, Greece and Persia[14] have shown this so clearly and graphically that I am surprised everyone is attacking our written declaration about the offensive,[15] and no one says a word about specific cases! It is easy to promise Bills, but specific measures are being postponed time and again. It is easy to write a declaration about peace without annexations, but the Albanian, Greek and Persian events took place *after* the coalition Ministry was formed. After all, it was *Dyelo Naroda*,[16] not an organ of our Party, but a government organ, a ministerial organ, which said that it is Russian democracy that is being subjected to this humiliation, and that Greece is being strangled. And this very same Milyukov, whom you imagine to be heaven knows who, although he is just an ordinary member of his party—Tereshchenko in no way differs from him—wrote that the pressure exerted on Greece came from Allied diplomats. The war remains an imperialist war, and however much you may desire peace, however sincere your sympathy for the working people and your desire for peace—I am fully convinced that by and large it must be sincere—you are powerless, because the war can only be ended by taking the revolution further. When the revolution began in Russia, a revolutionary struggle for peace from below also began. If you were to take power into your hands, if power were to pass to the revolutionary organisations to be used for combating the Russian capitalists, then the working people of some countries would believe you and you could propose peace. Then our peace would be ensured at least from two sides, by the two nations who are being bled white and whose cause is hopeless—Germany and France. And if circumstances then obliged us to wage a revolutionary war—no one knows, and we do not rule out the possibility—we should say: "We are not pacifists, we do not renounce war when the revolutionary class is in power and has actually deprived the capitalists of the opportunity to influence things

in any way, to exacerbate the economic dislocation which enables them to make hundreds of millions." The revolutionary government would explain to absolutely every nation that every nation must be free, and that just as the German nation must not fight to retain Alsace and Lorraine, so the French nation must not fight for its colonies. For, while France is fighting for her colonies, Russia has Khiva and Bokhara, which are also something like colonies. Then the division of colonies will begin. And how are they to be divided? On what basis? According to strength. But strength has changed. The capitalists are in a situation where their only way out is war. When you take over revolutionary power, you will have a revolutionary way of securing peace, namely, by addressing a revolutionary appeal to all nations and explaining your tactics by your own example. Then the way to peace secured by revolutionary means will be open to you, and you will most probably be able to avert the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Then you may be certain that the German and French people will declare in your favour. As for the British, American and Japanese capitalists, even if they wanted a war against the revolutionary working class—whose strength will grow tenfold once the capitalists have been curbed and put down and control has passed into the hands of the working class—even if the American, British and Japanese capitalists wanted a war, the chances would be a hundred to one against them being able to wage it. For peace to be ensured, you will only have to declare that you are not pacifists, that you will defend your republic, your workers', proletarian democracy, against the German, French and other capitalists.

That is why we attached such fundamental importance to our declaration about the offensive. The time has come for a radical turn in the whole history of the Russian revolution. When the Russian revolution began it was assisted by the imperialist bourgeoisie of Britain who imagined Russia to be something like China or India. Yet, side by side with a government in which the landowners and capitalists now have a majority, the Soviets arose, a representative institution unparalleled and unprecedented anywhere in the world in strength, an institution which you are killing by taking part in a coalition Ministry of the bourgeoisie. In reality,

the Russian revolution has made the revolutionary struggle from below against the capitalist governments welcome everywhere, in all countries, with three times as much sympathy as before. The question is one of advance or retreat. No one can stand still during a revolution. That is why the offensive is a turn in the Russian revolution, in the political and economic rather than the strategic sense. An offensive now means the continuation of the imperialist slaughter and the death of more hundreds of thousands, of millions of people—objectively, irrespective of the will or awareness of this or that Minister, with the aim of strangling Persia and other weak nations. Power transferred to the revolutionary proletariat, supported by the poor peasants, means a transition to revolutionary struggle for peace in the surest and most painless forms ever known to mankind, a transition to a state of affairs under which the power and victory of the revolutionary workers will be ensured in Russia and throughout the world. (*Applause from part of the audience.*)

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2

SPEECH ON THE WAR
JUNE 9 (22)

Comrades, allow me, by way of an introduction to an analysis of the war issue, to remind you of two passages in the Manifesto to all countries published by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 14. "The time has come," said the Manifesto, "to begin a resolute struggle against the predatory designs of the governments of all countries. The time has come for the people to take the decision on war and peace into their own hands." Another passage in the Manifesto, addressed to the workers of the Austro-German coalition, reads: "Refuse to serve as tools of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers." These are the two passages that have been repeated in different wordings in dozens, hundreds and, I should even imagine, thousands of resolutions by Russia's workers and peasants.

I am sure these two passages show best of all the contradictory and hopelessly complicated position in which the revolutionary workers and peasants find themselves owing to the present policy of the Mensheviks and Narodniks.[17] On the one hand, they support the war. On the other, they belong to classes which have no interest in the predatory designs of the government of any country, and they cannot help saying so. This psychology and ideology, much as it may be vague, is unusually deep-rooted in every worker and peasant. It is realisation that the war is being waged because of the predatory designs of the governments of all countries. But, together with this, it is very vaguely understood, or even not understood at all, that a government, whatever its form, expresses the interests of definite classes and that,

therefore, to contrast the government to the people, as the first passage I quoted does, is an awful theoretical muddle, utter political helplessness, and means condemning yourself and the whole of your policy to the shakiest and most unstable position and trend. By exactly the same token, the closing words in the second passage I have quoted—that excellent call, "Refuse to serve as tools of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers"—are splendid. Only including your own, because if you Russian workers and peasants turn to the workers and peasants of Austria and Germany, whose governments and ruling classes are waging the same kind of predatory war of plunder as the Russian capitalists and bankers, and as those of Britain and France—if you say: "Refuse to serve as tools in the hands of your bankers" but admit your own bankers into the Ministry and give them a seat next to socialist Ministers, you are reducing all your appeals to nothing, and in fact you are refuting your whole policy. Your excellent aspirations or wishes might just as well not exist, for you are helping Russia to wage the very same imperialist war, the very same predatory war. You are coming into conflict with the masses you represent, because these masses will never adopt the capitalist point of view, openly expressed by Milyukov, Maklakov and others, who say: "No idea could be more criminal than that the war is being waged in the interests of capital."

I wonder whether that idea is criminal. I have no doubt that from the point of view of those who half-exist today and will perhaps no longer exist tomorrow, the idea actually is criminal. But it is the only correct idea. It alone expresses our conception of this war. It alone expresses the interests of the oppressed classes as a struggle against their oppressors. And when we say the war is capitalist and predatory, we must have no illusions—there is not the slightest hint that the crimes of individuals, of individual kings, could have provoked this kind of war.

Imperialism is a definite stage in the development of world capital. Capitalism, which has been developing for decades, created a situation in which a small group of immensely rich countries—there are no more than four: Britain, France, Germany and the U.S.A.—amassed wealth amounting to hundreds of thousands of millions, and

concentrated vast power in the hands of the big banks and big capitalists—there are only a couple or half a dozen of them at most in each of these countries—immense power encompassing the whole world, and literally divided the whole globe territorially by setting up colonies. These powers had colonies in every country of the world. They redivided the globe among themselves economically as well, because concessions, and the threads of finance capital, penetrated into every single part of the globe. This is the basis for annexations. Annexations are not a figment of the imagination. They did not arrive because people who loved liberty unexpectedly became reactionaries. Annexations are nothing but a political expression and political form of the domination of giant banks that has arisen inevitably from capitalism, through no one's fault, because shares are the basis of banks and because the accumulation of shares is the basis of imperialism. And the big banks, which dominate the whole world through hundreds and thousands of millions in capital and link entire industries with capitalist and monopoly alliances—that is where we have imperialism, which has split the whole world into three groups of immensely rich plunderers.

One group—the first, which is closer to us in Europe—is headed by Britain, and the other two, by Germany and the U.S.A. The other accomplices are compelled to help while capitalist relations persist. Therefore, if you have a clear idea of the essence of the matter, which every oppressed person realises instinctively and which every Russian worker and the vast majority of peasants realise instinctively—if you have a clear idea of it, you will see how laughable is the idea of fighting the war with words, manifestoes, leaflets and socialist congresses. It is laughable because the banks are still omnipotent no matter how many declarations you issue, no matter how many political revolutions you carry out—you have overthrown Nicholas Romanov in Russia and have to some extent made her a republic; Russia has taken a gigantic stride forward, and may be said to have overtaken, almost overnight, France, which in different conditions required a hundred years to do as much and yet remained a capitalist country. And the capitalists are still there. They have lost some ground. They did so in 1905 as well, but did that under-

mine their strength? While this may be new to Russians, in Europe every revolution showed that with every upswing of the revolutionary movement the workers achieved something more than they had before, but capitalist power remained. The struggle against the imperialist war is impossible unless it is a struggle waged by the revolutionary classes against the ruling classes on a world scale. It is not a question of landowners in general. There *are* landowners in Russia and they play a greater role in Russia than in any other country but they are not the class which brought imperialism into being. It is a question of the capitalist class led by the biggest finance magnates and banks, and there will be no way out of this war until this class, which dominates the oppressed workers allied with the poor peasants, the semi-proletarians, as our programme calls them, until this class is overthrown. The illusion that you can unite the working people of the world by leaflets and appeals to other nations can only come from the narrow Russian outlook, ignorant of how the press in Western Europe, where the workers and peasants are used to political revolutions and have seen dozens of them, laughs at such phrases and appeals. They don't know that the mass of workers has actually risen in Russia, where most of the workers are absolutely sincere in their faith and condemn the predatory designs of the capitalists of every country and want to see the people freed from the bankers. But they, the Europeans, cannot understand why you, who have an organisation which no one else on earth has, the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, which are armed—why you make Ministers of your socialists. After all, you are handing power to the bankers. People abroad accuse you not only of naïveté—this is not the worst—Europeans can no longer understand naïveté in politics, they cannot understand that there are tens of millions of people in Russia who are stirring to life for the first time, and that people in Russia know nothing of the link between the classes and the government, of the link between the government and war. War is a continuation of bourgeois politics, nothing else. The ruling class shapes the country's policy in war-time as well. War is politics from beginning to end. It is pursuit of the same old aims by these classes using a different method. That is why, when you write in your workers' and peasants' appeals

"overthrow your bankers", every politically-conscious worker in a European country either laughs at you or cries bitterly over you, saying to himself: "What can we do since people there have overthrown a half-savage idiot and monster of a monarch, the kind we did away with a long time ago—this is the only crime we have committed—and now, with their 'near-socialist' Ministers, they back the Russian bankers?!"

The bankers remain in power. They pursue a foreign policy through an imperialist war, fully supporting the treaties concluded by Nicholas II in Russia. This is particularly evident in our country. All the principles of Russia's imperialist foreign policy were predetermined not by the present-day capitalists, but by the previous government and Nicholas Romanov whom we have overthrown. He concluded those treaties, they remain secret, and the capitalists cannot publish them because they are capitalists. But no worker or peasant can see his way clear of this tangle because he tells himself: "Since we call for the overthrow of the capitalists in other countries, we must first of all get rid of our own bankers, otherwise nobody will believe in us and nobody will take us seriously. People will say we are naïve Russian savages who put on paper words that are excellent in themselves but lack political substance, or, worse still, they will think us hypocrites. You would see these things in the foreign press if that press, every shade of it, passed freely into Russia across the frontier instead of being stopped by the British and French authorities at Torneå. You would see from a mere selection of quotations from foreign newspapers the glaring contradiction in which you find yourselves. You would see how incredibly ridiculous and erroneous is this idea of fighting the war with socialist-conferences, with agreements with the socialists at congresses. Had imperialism been the fault or crime of individuals, socialism could remain socialism. Imperialism is the final stage of capitalism's development, a stage at which it has gone as far as to divide the whole world, and two gigantic groups are locked in a life-and-death struggle. You must serve one group or the other, or overthrow both groups. There is no other way. When you reject a separate peace treaty, saying you don't want to serve the German imperialists, you are perfectly right, and that is why we, too, are against a separate peace treaty. Yet in effect, and in

spite of yourselves, you continue to serve the Anglo-French imperialists, who have predatory designs of the kind that the Russian capitalists have translated into treaties with the aid of Nicholas Romanov. We do not know the texts of those treaties, but anyone who has followed political writing and has glanced through at least one book on economics or diplomacy must be familiar with the content of the treaties. Moreover, as far as I can remember, Milyukov wrote in his books about those treaties and promises that they would plunder Galicia, the Straits and Armenia, retain what they had annexed earlier and get plenty of other territories. Everyone knows that, but still the treaties are kept secret, and we are told that if we annul them it will mean breaking with our Allies.

With regard to a separate peace treaty, I have already said there can be no separate peace treaty for us, and our Party resolution leaves not the slightest room for doubt that we reject it as we reject all agreement with the capitalists. To us, a separate peace treaty means coming to terms with the German plunderers, because they are plundering in the same way as the others. Coming to terms with Russian capital within the Russian Provisional Government is the same kind of separate peace treaty. The tsarist treaties remain, and they, too, help to plunder and strangle other peoples. When it is said, "Peace without annexations and indemnities", as every worker and every peasant in Russia should say because life teaches him so, because he has no interest in bank profits and because he wants to live, I reply: Your leaders in the present Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies from the Narodnik and Menshevik parties have become tangled up in that slogan. They have said in their *Izvestia* that it means retaining the status quo, that is, the pre-war state of affairs, going back to what existed before the war. Isn't that capitalist peace? And what capitalist peace, too! Since you are putting forward that slogan, you must remember that the course of events may bring your parties to power. That is possible during a revolution, and you will have to do what you say. But if you propose peace without annexations now, the Germans will accept and the British will not, because the British capitalists have not lost an inch of territory but have grabbed plenty in every part of the

world. The Germans grabbed a lot too, but they also lost a lot, and not only lost a lot but found themselves up against the U.S.A., a most formidable enemy. If you who propose peace without annexations mean retaining the status quo, you are drifting into a situation in which your proposal will produce a separate peace treaty with the capitalists, because, if you propose that, the German capitalists, being faced by the U.S.A. and Italy with whom they signed treaties in the past, will say: "We shall accept that peace treaty without annexations. It will not be a defeat for us, it will be victory over the U.S.A. and Italy." Objectively, you are drifting into the same kind of separate peace treaty with the capitalists which you accuse us of, because fundamentally you are not breaking—in your policy, in reality, in your practical moves—with those bankers expressing imperialist domination all over the world whom you and your "socialist" Ministers support in the Provisional Government.

You are thereby creating a contradictory and precarious situation for yourselves in which the masses misunderstand you. The masses, who have no interest in annexations, say: "We refuse to fight for any capitalist's sake." When we are told that this sort of policy can be ended by means of congresses and agreements among the socialists of the world, we reply: "It probably could, if only imperialism were the handiwork of individual criminals; but imperialism is an outgrowth of world capitalism with which the working-class movement is connected."

Imperialism's victory is the beginning of an inevitable, unavoidable split of the socialists of all countries into two camps. Anyone who keeps on talking about the socialists as an integral body, as something that can be integral, is deceiving himself and others. The entire course of the war, the two and a half years of it, has been leading to this split—ever since the Basle Manifesto,[18] signed unanimously, which said that imperialist capitalism was at the root of this war. The Basle Manifesto does not say a word about "defence of the fatherland". No other manifesto could have been written before the war, just as today no socialist would propose writing a manifesto about "defence of the fatherland" in the war between Japan and the U.S.A., in which it is not a matter of risking his own skin, his own capitalists and his

own Ministers. Draft a resolution for international congresses! You know that war between Japan and the U.S.A. is a foregone conclusion. This war has been brewing for decades. It is no accident. Tactics do not depend on who fires the first shot. That is ridiculous. You know very well that Japanese and U.S. capitalism are equally predatory. There will be talk about "defence of the fatherland" on both sides. It will be a crime or an indication of terrible weakness due to the "defence" of the interests of our capitalist enemies. That is why we say that socialism has been split irrevocably. The socialists have completely departed from socialism—or rather, those who have deserted to their government, their bankers and their capitalists, no matter what they may say against them and however much they may condemn them. Condemnation is beside the point. Sometimes, however, condemnation of the Germans' backing for their capitalists covers up defence of the same "sin" by the Russians! If you accuse the German social-chauvinists, i.e., people who are socialists in words—many of them may well be socialists at heart—but chauvinists in fact, people who actually defend the dirty, selfish and predatory German capitalists rather than the German people, then don't defend the British, French and Russian capitalists. The German social-chauvinists are no worse than those in our Ministry who continue the policy of secret treaties, of plunder, and cover this up with pious wishes in which there is much that is kind, and which I admit are absolutely sincere from the point of view of the masses, but in which I do not and cannot see a single word of political truth. It is merely your wish, while the war remains as imperialist and is being waged for the same secret treaties as ever! You are calling on other peoples to overthrow the bankers, yet you are backing your own! When you spoke of peace, you did not say what peace. No one answered us when we pointed out the glaring contradiction in a peace treaty on the basis of the status quo. In your resolution, speaking of peace without annexations, you cannot say that it will not mean retaining the status quo. You cannot say that it will mean retaining the status quo, that is, restoration of the pre-war state of affairs. What will it be, then? Taking the German colonies away from Britain? Try that through peaceful agreements! Everyone will laugh

at you. Try to take away from Japan, without a revolution, Kiaochow or the Pacific islands she has grabbed!

You have got yourselves mixed up in hopeless contradictions. When we say "without annexations", we mean that this slogan is only a subordinate part of the struggle against world imperialism. We say we want to liberate all peoples and begin with our own. You talk of war against annexations and of peace without annexations, but in Russia you continue the policy of annexations. That's simply ridiculous. You and your government, your new Ministers, actually continue the policy of annexations in regard to Finland and the Ukraine. You find fault with the Ukrainian congress and, through your Ministers, prohibit its sittings.[19] Isn't that annexation? It amounts to a mockery of the rights of a nationality which was tormented by the tsars because its children wanted to speak their mother tongue. That means being afraid of separate republics. From the point of view of the workers and peasants, there is nothing terrible about that. Let Russia be a union of free republics. The workers and peasants will not fight to prevent that. Let every nation be free, and first of all let all the nationalities with which you are making the revolution in Russia be free. By not taking that step, you are condemning yourselves to being "revolutionary democrats" in words while your entire policy is in fact counter-revolutionary.

Your foreign policy is anti-democratic and counter-revolutionary. A revolutionary policy may mean you have to wage a revolutionary war. But that is not inevitable. This point has been dealt with at length by the main speaker, and lately by the newspapers as well. I should very much like to dwell on this point.

What is the practical way out of this war as we see it? We say: the way out of this war lies only through revolution. Support the revolution of the classes oppressed by the capitalists, overthrow the capitalist class in your country and thereby set an example to other countries. That alone is socialism. That alone means fighting the war. Everything else is empty promises, phrase-mongering or pious wishes. Socialism has been split all over the world. You continue to confuse things by associating with socialists who back their governments. You forget that in Britain and Germany, the

true socialists, who express the socialism of the masses, are isolated and have been thrown into gaol. Yet they alone express the interests of the proletarian movement. But what if in Russia the oppressed class found itself in power? When asked how we shall break out of the war by ourselves, we answer: you cannot break out of it by yourself. All our Party resolutions and all speakers at our public meetings call it absurd to say you can break out of this war by yourself. This war involves hundreds of millions of people and hundreds of thousands of millions in capital. The only way out is the transfer of power to the revolutionary class which must really break imperialism, its financial, banking and annexationist threads. Until this happens nothing will have been done. The revolution was limited to your getting, in place of tsarism and imperialism, a near-republic which is imperialist through and through and which cannot treat Finland and the Ukraine democratically, i.e., without being afraid of division, even through revolutionary worker and peasant representatives.

It is untrue to say that we are seeking a separate peace treaty. We say: No separate peace treaty with any capitalists, least of all with the Russian capitalists. But the Provisional Government has a separate peace treaty with the Russian capitalists. Down with that separate peace treaty! (*Applause*.) We recognise no separate peace treaty with the German capitalists and we shall not enter into any negotiations. Nor must there be a separate peace treaty with the British and French imperialists. We are told that to break with them would mean coming to terms with the German imperialists. That is not true. We must break with them immediately because it is an alliance for plunder. It is said that the treaties cannot be published because that would mean showing up the whole of our government and the whole of our policy in the eyes of every worker and peasant. If we were to publish these treaties and plainly tell the Russian workers and peasants at meetings, especially in every remote hamlet: "What you are now fighting for is the Straits, and because they want to keep Armenia," they would all say: "We want no such war." (*The Chairman*: "Your time is up." *Voices*: "Let him speak.") I ask for ten minutes more. (*Voices*: "Let him speak.")

I say that this contrast—"either with the British or with the German imperialists"—is wrong. It implies that if we make peace with the German imperialists we must fight the British, and vice versa. This contrasting suits those who are not breaking with their capitalists and bankers, and who accept any alliance with them. But it doesn't suit us. We speak of our defending the alliance with the oppressed class, with the oppressed people. Remain loyal to this alliance, and then you will be revolutionary democrats. It's no easy task. This task will not let you forget that under certain circumstances we shall be unable to do without a revolutionary war. No revolutionary class can rule out revolutionary war, or it will doom itself to ridiculous pacifism. We are not Tolstoyans. If the revolutionary class takes power, if its state keeps no annexed territories, and if no power is left to the banks and big capital, which is not easy to do in Russia, then that class will be waging a revolutionary war in reality and not merely in words. You cannot rule out this kind of war. That would mean succumbing to the Tolstoyan philosophy and to philistinism, forgetting the whole of Marxist science and the experience of all European revolutions.

You cannot pull Russia alone out of the war. But she is winning more and more great allies who do not believe you now because your attitude is contradictory or naïve, and because you advise other peoples to "end annexations" while introducing them in your own country. You tell other peoples to overthrow the bankers. Yet you do not overthrow your own. Try another policy. Publish the treaties and show them up in front of every worker and peasant and at public meetings Say: No peace with the German capitalists, and a complete break with the Anglo-French capitalists. Let the British get out of Turkey and stop fighting for Baghdad. Let them get out of India and Egypt. We refuse to fight for the retention of booty that has been seized, just as we shall not put an ounce of energy into helping the German plunderers to keep their booty. If you *do* that—so far you have only talked about it, and in politics words are not credited, which is just as well—if you do that, and talk about it, then the allies you now have will show what they can do. Think of the mood of every oppressed worker and peasant. They sympathise with you and regret that you are so weak you leave the bank

ers alone even though you have arms. It is the oppressed workers of the world that are your allies. It will be just what the revolution of 1905 showed in practice. It was tremendously weak at first. But what is its international effect? How did that policy, and the history of 1905, shape the foreign policy of the Russian revolution? Today you are conducting the Russian revolution's whole foreign policy with the capitalists. Yet 1905 showed what the Russian revolution's foreign policy should be like. It is an indisputable fact that October 17, 1905,[20] was followed by mass unrest and barricade-building in the streets of Vienna and Prague. After 1905 came 1908 in Turkey, 1909 in Persia and 1910 in China.[21] If, instead of compromising with the capitalists, you call on the truly revolutionary democrats, the working class, the oppressed, you will have as allies the oppressed classes instead of the oppressors, and the nationalities which are now being rent to pieces instead of the nationalities in which the oppressing classes now temporarily predominate.

We have been reminded of the German front where the only change we proposed is the unrestricted dissemination of our appeals written in Russian on one side of the sheet and German on the reverse. In them we say: The capitalists of both countries are robbers. To get them out of the way would be merely a step towards peace. But there are other fronts. I don't know how strong our army is on the Turkish front. Let us assume it is roughly three million strong. It would be better if that army, which is now kept in Armenia and is carrying out annexations that you tolerate while preaching peace without annexations to other peoples, although you have strength and authority—if that army adopted this programme, and if it made Armenia an independent Armenian republic and gave her the money which the financiers of Britain and France take from us.

It is said that we cannot do without the financial support of Britain and France. But this support "supports" us like the rope supporting a hanged man. Let the Russian revolutionary class say: down with that support, I refuse to recognise debts contracted with the French and British capitalists, and I call for a general revolt against the capitalists. No peace treaty with the German capitalists and no alliance with the British and French! If this policy were actually pursued,

our army fighting the Turks could be released and sent to other fronts, because all Asian peoples would see that the Russian people do not merely proclaim peace without annexations on the basis of self-determination but that the Russian worker and peasant are in fact placing themselves at the head of all oppressed nationalities, and that with them, the struggle against imperialism is not a pious wish nor a high-flown ministerial phrase but a matter of vital concern to the revolution.

As we stand now, a revolutionary war may threaten us, but this war is not bound to take place, since the British imperialists will hardly be able to wage war against us if you act as a practical example to the peoples surrounding Russia. Prove that you are liberating the Armenian republic and reaching agreement with the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in every country, that you are for a free republic, and then the Russian revolution's foreign policy will become really revolutionary and really democratic. At present it is that only in words. In reality it is counter-revolutionary, because you are bound hand and foot by the Anglo-French imperialists and refuse to say so openly, you are afraid to admit it. Instead of issuing that appeal "to overthrow foreign bankers", you would have done better to tell the Russian people, the workers and peasants, in so many words: "We are too weak, we cannot throw off the tyranny of the Anglo-French imperialists, we are their slaves and are therefore fighting." It would have been a bitter truth that would have been of revolutionary significance. It would actually have brought this predatory war closer to its end. That means a thousand times more than an agreement with the French and British social-chauvinists, than the convening of congresses which they would agree to attend, than the continuation of this policy by which you are actually afraid to break with the imperialists of one country while remaining the allies of another. You can draw on the support of the oppressed classes of Europe, of the oppressed people of the weaker countries which Russia strangled under the tsars and which she is still strangling now, as she is strangling Armenia. With their support, you can bring freedom by helping their workers' and peasants' committees. You would put yourselves at the head of all the oppressed classes, all op-

pressed peoples, in the war against the German and British imperialists, who cannot join forces against you because they are locked in a life-and-death struggle against each other, and because they are in a hopeless position, in which the Russian revolution's foreign policy, a sincere and real alliance with the oppressed classes, the oppressed peoples, can be successful—it has 99 chances in 100 of being successful!

Recently we read in our Moscow Party newspaper a letter from a peasant commenting on our programme. I should like to bring my speech to a close with a brief quotation from that letter, showing what a peasant makes of our programme. The letter was printed in No. 59 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*,[22] our Moscow Party newspaper, and was reprinted in *Pravda* No. 68.[23]

"We must," says the letter, "press the bourgeoisie harder to make them burst at the seams. Then the war will be over. But things will turn out badly if we don't press the bourgeoisie hard enough." (*Applause.*)

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ECONOMIC DISLOCATION AND THE PROLETARIAT'S STRUGGLE AGAINST IT

We are publishing in this issue the resolution on economic measures for combating dislocation, passed by the Conference of Factory Committees.[24]

The main idea of the resolution is to indicate the conditions for *actual* control over the capitalists and production in contrast to the empty *phrases* about control used by the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois officials. The bourgeoisie are lying when they allege that the systematic measures taken by the state to ensure threefold or even tenfold profits for the capitalists are "control". The petty bourgeoisie, partly out of naïveté, partly out of economic interest, trust the capitalists and the capitalist state, and content themselves with the most meaningless bureaucratic projects for control. The resolution passed by the workers lays special emphasis on the *all-important* thing, that is, on what is to be done 1) to prevent the actual "preservation" of capitalist profits; 2) to tear off the veil of commercial secrecy; 3) to give the workers a majority in the control agencies; 4) to ensure that the organisation (of control and direction), being "nation-wide" organisation, is directed by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies *and not by the capitalists*.

Without this, all talk of control and regulation is either sheer bunkum or outright deception of the people.

Now it is against this truth, as plain as can be to every politically-conscious and thinking worker, that the leaders of our petty bourgeoisie, the Narodniks and Mensheviks (*Izvestia*, *Rabochaya Gazeta*), are up in arms. Unfortunately, those who write for *Novaya Zhizn*, and who have repeatedly wavered between us and them, have this time sunk to the same level.

Comrades Avilov and Bazarov try to cover up their descent into the swamp of petty-bourgeois credulity, compromise, and bureaucratic project-making by Marxist-sounding arguments.

Let us look into these arguments.

We *Pravda* people are said to be deviating from Marxism to syndicalism just because we defend the resolution of the Organising Bureau (approved by the Conference). Shame on you, Comrades Avilov and Bazarov! Such carelessness (or such trickery) is fit only for *Rech*[25] and *Yedinstvo*[26]! We suggest nothing like the ridiculous transfer of the railways to the railwaymen, or the tanneries to the tanners. What we do suggest is *workers' control*, which should develop into complete regulation of production and distribution by the workers, into "nation-wide organisation" of the exchange of grain for manufactured goods, etc. (with "extensive use of urban and rural co-operatives"). What we suggest is "the transfer of *all* state power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies".

Only people who had not read the resolution right through, or who cannot read at all, could, with clear conscience, find any syndicalism in it.

And only pedants, who understand Marxism as Struve and all liberal bureaucrats "understood" it, can assert that "skipping state capitalism is utopian" and that "in our country, too, the very type of regulation should retain its state-capitalist character".

Take the sugar syndicate or the state railways in Russia or the oil barons, etc. What is that but state capitalism? How can you "skip" *what already exists*?

The point is that people who have turned Marxism into a kind of stiffly bourgeois doctrine *evade* the specific issues posed by reality, which in Russia has in practice produced a combination of the syndicates in industry and the small-peasant farms in the countryside. They evade these specific issues by advancing pseudo-intellectual, and in fact utterly meaningless, arguments about a "permanent revolution", about "introducing" socialism, and other nonsense.

Let us get down to business! Let us have fewer excuses and keep closer to practical matters! Are the profits made from war supplies, profits amounting to 500 per cent or more,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to be left intact! Yes or no? Is commercial secrecy to be left intact? Yes or no? Are the workers to be enabled to exercise control? Yes or no?

Comrades Avilov and Bazarov give no answer to these practical questions. By using "Struvean"[27] arguments sounding "near-Marxist", they unwittingly stoop to the level of accomplices of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie want nothing better than to answer the people's queries about the scandalous profits of the war supplies deliverers, and about economic dislocation, with "learned" arguments about the "utopian" character of socialism.

These arguments are ridiculously stupid, for what makes socialism objectively impossible is the *small-scale* economy which we by no means presume to expropriate, or even to regulate or control.

What we are trying to make something real instead of a *bluff* is the "state regulation" of which the Mensheviks, the Narodniks and all bureaucrats (who have carried Comrades Avilov and Bazarov with them) talk in order to dismiss the matter, making projects to *safeguard* capitalist profits and orating to preserve commercial secrecy. This is the point, worthy near-Marxists, and not the "introduction" of socialism!

Not regulation of and control over the workers by the capitalist class, but *vice versa*. This is the point. Not confidence in the "state", fit for a Louis Blanc, but demand for a state led by the proletarians and semi-proletarians—that is how we must *combat economic dislocation*. Any other solution is sheer bunkum and deception.

Pravda No. 73,
June 17 (4), 1917

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THE THOUSAND AND FIRST LIE OF THE CAPITALISTS

In today's leader, *Rech* writes:

"If Germany had her own Lenin acting with the kind foreign collaboration of the Robert Grimms and the Rakovskys, one could only suppose that the International did not wish to prevent the great Russian revolution from consolidating its position, and, more important still, from growing in depth. But so far the Germans have politely replied that they do not need a republic and are satisfied with their Wilhelm. *Vorwärts*,[28] for example, is even more amiable in arguing that the Russian democrats ought not to tolerate secret treaties. And the socialist organ modestly fails to mention the German democrats."

It is a lie to say that "the Robert Grimms and the Rakovskys" have "collaborated" with the Bolsheviks (with whom they have *never* agreed) in any way.

To confuse the "German" *Plekhanovs* (it is *they* and only they who are writing for *Vorwärts*) with the German *revolutionary internationalists*, who (like Karl Liebknecht) are thrown into German prisons by the *hundred*, is the thousand and first, and the most infamous and brazen, lie of *Rech* and the capitalists generally.

There are *two* Internationals: 1) the International of the *Plekhanovs*, i.e., of those who have betrayed socialism, i.e., of people who have deserted to *their* governments: Plekhanov, Guesde, Scheidemann, Sembat, Thomas, Henderson, Vandervelde, Bissolati and Co.; and 2) the International of the *revolutionary internationalists* who even in war-time fight everywhere in a revolutionary mood against *their* governments, against *their* bourgeoisie.

"The great Russian revolution" can *become* "great", can "consolidate its position" and "grow in depth" only if it stops supporting the imperialist "coalition" government, the imperialist war which that government is waging, and the capitalist class as a whole.

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THE DIEHARDS OF JUNE 3[29] FAVOUR AN IMMEDIATE OFFENSIVE

The gentlemen of June 3, who after 1905 helped Nicholas Romanov drench our country in blood, strangle the revolutionaries and re-establish the unlimited power of the landowners and capitalists, are holding their meetings simultaneously with the Congress of Soviets.[30]

While Tsereteli, who found himself in bourgeois captivity, tried by a thousand tricks to hush up the vital importance and urgency of the political question of an immediate offensive, the diehards of June 3, companions-in-arms of Nicholas the Bloody and Stolypin the Hangman, landowners and capitalists, did not hesitate to put the question straightforwardly and openly. Here is the latest and most essential resolution on the offensive which they adopted *unanimously*:

> "The Duma (??) considers that only an immediate offensive and close co-operation with the Allies will guarantee a speedy termination of the war and consolidation of the liberties won by the people".

That is clear enough.

These people are real politicians, men of action, faithful servants of *their* class, of the landowners and capitalists.

And how do Tsereteli, Chernov and the rest serve *their* class? They offer pious wishes in words and support the capitalists in actions.

Tsereteli asserted that the question of an *immediate* offensive could not even be raised, for were he, Minister Tsereteli, to know anything about an "immediate" offensive, he, a Minister, would say nothing about it to anyone. In saying

that, Tsereteli had no inkling (poor innocent man) that he was *refuted* by the diehards of June 3, refuted by *actions*, for they did not hesitate to speak, even in a resolution, and in *everyone's hearing*, about an offensive—not an offensive in general, but an *immediate* offensive. And they were right, for this is a political issue, an issue bearing on the destiny of our revolution as a whole.

There is no middle course. You must either be for or against an "immediate offensive". You cannot abstain from expressing an opinion. In this situation, to evade the issue by referring or alluding to military secrecy would be positively unworthy of a responsible politician.

To favour an immediate offensive means being in favour of continuing the imperialist war, slaughtering Russian workers and peasants in order to strangle Persia, Greece, Galicia, the Balkan peoples, etc., reviving and strengthening the counter-revolution, completely nullifying all the phrases about "peace without annexations", and waging war *for* annexations.

To be against an immediate offensive means being in favour of all power passing to the Soviets, of arousing the revolutionary initiative of the oppressed classes, of an *immediate* offer by the oppressed classes of *all* countries of "peace without annexations", peace based on the precise condition of overthrowing the tyranny of capital and liberating *all* colonies, *all* the oppressed nationalities, or nationalities not enjoying full rights, bar none.

The former way is, together with the capitalists, in the interests of the capitalists and for attaining the aims of the capitalists. It is the way of confidence in the capitalists, who for more than two years have been promising everything under the sun and many things besides, provided the war is "carried on to victory".

The latter way is one of breaking with the capitalists, of distrusting them, of curbing their vile self-interest, of putting an end to their business of making hundreds of millions in profits from contracts. It is the way of confidence in the oppressed classes, primarily in the workers of *all* countries, the way of confidence in a world *workers' revolution against capital*, the way of supporting it in full measure.

You must choose the one or the other. Tsereteli, Chernov and the rest prefer a middle course. But there is no middle course. If they vacillate or try to get away with mere talk, they, Tsereteli, Chernov and the rest, will completely make themselves tools in the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

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AN ALLIANCE TO STOP THE REVOLUTION

That the new coalition government is precisely this sort of alliance between the capitalists and the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders is far from obvious to all. Perhaps it is not obvious even to the Ministers belonging to these parties. Yet it is a fact.

This fact became all the more evident on Sunday, June 4, when the morning papers carried reports on speeches made by Milyukov and Maklakov at the meeting of the counter-revolutionaries of the Third Duma (called the "State Duma", by tradition of Nicholas Romanov and Stolypin the Hangman), and when, in the evening, Tsereteli and other Ministers made speeches in defence of the government and of the policy of an offensive at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies.

Milyukov and Maklakov, like all capitalist and counter-revolutionary leaders of any merit, are men of action who appreciate full well the meaning of the class struggle when it concerns *their* class. That is why they put the question of an offensive with such perfect clarity, without wasting a single minute on utterly meaningless talk about the offensive from the strategic point of view—the kind of talk with which Tsereteli deceived himself and others.

The Cadets certainly know their business. They know that the question of an offensive is now *posed by reality* as a political and not a strategic question, as the question of *a radical turn in the Russian revolution as a whole*. It is from the political point of view that the Cadets raised it in the "State Duma", just as the Bolsheviks, and internationalists generally, raised it on Saturday evening in their written

statement to the Steering Committee of the Congress of Soviets.

"Russia's fate is in her own hands," announced Maklakov, the well-known accomplice of Stolypin the Hangman, "and it will be decided very soon [hear, hear!]. If we do succeed in launching an offensive and waging the war, not only by means of resolutions, not only by speeches at public meetings and by banners borne through the city, but by waging the war as intently as we have been waging it so far [listen to this—it is a capitalist leader speaking these historic words: "as *we* have been waging it so far"!], then it will not be long before Russia recovers completely."

These are remarkable words which should be learned by heart and thought about time and again. They are remarkable because they tell the *class truth*. This was repeated, in a slightly different way, by Milyukov, who reproached the Petrograd Soviet: "Why is it that its [the Soviet's] statement says nothing about an offensive?", and stressed that the Italian imperialists had put "a modest [Mr. Milyukov's irony!] question: 'Are you going to take the offensive or not?' Moreover, no specific answer was given [by the Petrograd Soviet] to this question of theirs, either". Maklakov voiced his "profound respect" for Kerensky, and Milyukov explained:

"I have a very uneasy feeling that what our War Minister ["our is right, meaning one who is in the hands of the capitalists!] has organised may again be disorganised from here and that we shall miss the last opportunity we still have [mark the "still"] of answering our Allies, who are asking whether we are going to attack or not, in a manner satisfactory both to ourselves and to them."

"Both to ourselves and to them", meaning both to the Russian and to the Anglo-French and other imperialists! An offensive can "still" "satisfy" them, i.e., help them finish off Persia, Albania, Greece and Mesopotamia, and ensure that they retain all the booty snatched from the Germans and take away the booty seized by the German plunderers. This is the point. This is the class truth concerning the offensive's political significance. It is to satisfy the appetites of the imperialists of Russia, Britain, etc., protract the imperialist, predatory war, and take the road *not* of peace without annexations (this road is possible only if the revolution continues), *but of war for annexations*.

That is the meaning of an offensive from the standpoint of foreign policy. Maklakov defined its meaning, in the

historic phrase quoted above, from the standpoint of *home* policy. What Maklakov means by "Russia's complete recovery" is the complete victory of the counter-revolution. Those who have not forgotten Maklakov's excellent speeches about the period of 1905 and 1907-13 see almost his every speech reaffirm this appraisal.

To wage the war "*as we have been waging it so far*"—"we" being the capitalists with the tsar at the head!—to wage this imperialist war means enabling Russia to "recover", i.e., ensuring the victory of the capitalists and the landowners.

This is the class truth.

An offensive, whatever its outcome may be from the military point of view, means politically strengthening imperialist morale, imperialist sentiments, and infatuation with imperialism. It means strengthening the old, unchanged army officers ("waging the war *as we have been waging it so far*"), and strengthening *the main position of the counter-revolution*.

Quite independently of whether they wish it or not, and whether they are aware of it or not, Tsereteli and Kerensky, Skobelev and Chernov, as leaders of the Narodnik and Menshevik parties, not as individuals, have given their support to the counter-revolution, gone over, *at this decisive moment*, to its side, and taken a stand inside the alliance for stopping the revolution and continuing the war "*as we have been waging it so far*".

There must be no illusions on this score.

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GRATITUDE

We are very grateful to the chauvinist newspaper, *Volya Naroda*,[31] for publishing (in its issue of June 4) our documents relating to our passage through Germany. It is evident from these documents that *even at that time* we found Grimm's behaviour "ambiguous" and declined his services.

That is a fact, and facts cannot be talked away.

Our answer to the vague insinuations of *Volya Naroda* is: don't be cowards, gentlemen, accuse us *openly* of such-and-such a crime or misdemeanour! Have a go! Is it really hard to understand that it is *dishonest* to make vague insinuations because of a fear to come out with an accusation over one's signature?

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IS THERE A WAY TO A JUST PEACE?

Is there a way to peace without an exchange of annexations, without the division of spoils among the capitalist robbers?

There is: through a workers' revolution against the capitalists of the world.

Russia today is nearer to the beginning of such a revolution than any other country.

Only in Russia can power pass to existing institutions, to the Soviets, immediately, peacefully, without an uprising, for the capitalists can not resist the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

With such a transfer of power it would be possible to curb the capitalists, now making thousands of millions in profits from contracts, to expose all their tricks, arrest the millionaire embezzlers of public property, break their unlimited power.

Only after the transfer of power to the oppressed classes could Russia approach the oppressed classes of other countries, not with empty words, not with mere appeals, but calling their attention to her example, and immediately and explicitly *proposing* clear-cut terms for *universal peace*.

"Comrade workers and toilers of the world," she would say in the proposal for an immediate peace. "Enough of the bloodshed. Peace is possible. A just peace means peace without annexations, without seizures. Let the German capitalist robbers and their crowned robber Wilhelm know that we shall not come to terms with them, that we regard as robbery on their part not only what they have grabbed since the war, but also Alsace and Lorraine, and the Danish and Polish areas of Prussia.

"We also consider that Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, and other non-Great-Russian lands were seized by the Russian tsars and capitalists.

"We consider that *all* colonies, Ireland, and so on, were seized by the British, French and other capitalists.

"We Russian workers and peasants shall *not* hold *any* of the non-Great-Russian lands or colonies (such as Turkestan, Mongolia, or Persia) by force. Down with war *for the division of colonies*, for the division of annexed (seized) lands, for the division of capitalist spoils!"

The example of the Russian workers will be followed inevitably, perhaps not tomorrow (revolutions are not made to order), but inevitably all the same by the workers and all the working people of *at least two great countries*, Germany and France.

For *both are perishing*, the first of hunger, the second of depopulation. Both will conclude peace on our terms, which are just, *in defiance of their capitalist governments*.

The road to peace lies before us.

Should the capitalists of England, Japan and America try to resist *this* peace, the oppressed classes of Russia and other countries will not shrink from a revolutionary war *against the capitalists*. In *this* war they will defeat the capitalists of *the whole world*, not just those of the three countries lying far from Russia and taken up with their own rivalries.

The road to a just peace lies before us. Let us not be afraid to *take* it.

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THE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE

Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* (which even the Socialist-Revolutionary *Dyelo Naroda* justly calls a newspaper at one with the liberal bourgeoisie) has recently recalled the law of the French Republic of 1793 relating to enemies of the people.

A very timely recollection.

The Jacobins of 1793 belonged to the most revolutionary class of the eighteenth century, the town and country poor. It was against this class, which had in fact (and not just in words) done away with its monarch, its landowners and its moderate bourgeoisie by the most revolutionary measures, including the guillotine—against this truly revolutionary class of the eighteenth century—that the monarchs of Europe combined to wage war.

The Jacobins proclaimed enemies of the people those "promoting the schemes of the allied tyrants directed against the Republic".

The Jacobins' example is instructive. It has not become obsolete to this day, except that it must be applied to the revolutionary class of the twentieth century, to the workers and semi-proletarians. To this class, the enemies of the people in the twentieth century are not the monarchs, but the landowners and capitalists as a class.

If the "Jacobins" of the twentieth century, the workers and semi-proletarians, assumed power, they would proclaim enemies of the people the capitalists who are making thousands of millions in profits from the imperialist war, *that is*, a war for the division of capitalist spoils and profits.

The "Jacobins" of the twentieth century would not guillotine the capitalists—to follow a good example does not mean

copying it. It would be enough to arrest fifty to a hundred financial magnates and bigwigs, the chief knights of embezzlement and of robbery by the banks. It would be enough to arrest them for a few weeks *to expose their frauds* and show all exploited people "who needs the war". Upon exposing the frauds of the banking barons, we could release them, placing the banks, the capitalist syndicates, and all the contractors "working" for the government under workers' control.

The Jacobins of 1793 have gone down in history for their great example of a truly revolutionary struggle against *the class of the exploiters by the class of the working people and the oppressed* who had taken *all* state power into their own hands.

The miserable *Yedinstvo* (with which the Menshevik defencists were ashamed to form a bloc) wants to borrow Jacobinism in letter and not in spirit, its exterior trappings and not the content of its policy. This amounts in effect to a betrayal of the revolution of the twentieth century, a betrayal disguised by spurious reference to the revolutionaries of the eighteenth century.

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NOTE

On June 6 *Novoye Vremya*[32] said:

"Why is it that in these days of freedom this black hand has reached out from somewhere and is moving the puppets of Russian democracy? Lenin! But his name is legion. At all cross-roads, a Lenin pops up. And it is quite obvious that strength lies not in Lenin himself but in the receptiveness of the soil to the seeds of anarchy and madness."

Anarchy, as we see it, is the making of scandalous profits from war supplies by the capitalists. Madness, as we see it, is the waging of a war for the division of annexed territories, for the division of capitalist profits. And if these views find sympathy "at all cross-roads", it is because they properly express the interests of the proletariat, the interests of all working people and all the exploited.

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"THE GREAT WITHDRAWAL"

"The great withdrawal of the bourgeoisie from the government." This is what the main speaker of the Executive Committee, in a report he submitted last Sunday, called the formation of the coalition government and the entry of former socialists into the Ministry.

Only the first three words in this phrase are correct. "The great withdrawal" does indeed characterise and explain May 6 (the formation of the coalition government). It was on that day that "the great withdrawal" really began, or, to be exact, manifested itself most clearly. Only, it was not a great withdrawal of the bourgeoisie from the government but a great withdrawal of the Menshevik and Narodnik leaders *from* the revolution.

The significance of the Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies now in session lies in the fact that it has made this circumstance clearer than ever.

May 6 was a triumph for the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois government was on the verge of defeat. The masses were definitely and absolutely, sharply and irreconcilably opposed to it. One word from the Narodnik and Menshevik leaders of the Soviet would have sufficed to induce the government to relinquish its power unquestioningly. Lvov had to admit that openly at the sitting in the Mariinsky Palace.

The bourgeoisie resorted to a skilful manoeuvre which was new to the Russian petty bourgeoisie and to Russia's masses in general, which intoxicated the intellectual Menshevik and Narodnik leaders, and which took proper account of their Louis Blanc nature. The reader may recall that Louis Blanc was a renowned petty-bourgeois socialist who entered

the French Government in 1848 and became as sadly famed in 1871. Louis Blanc imagined himself to be *the leader* of the "labour democrats" or "socialist democrats" (the term "democracy" was used in the France of 1848 as frequently .as in *Socialist-Revolutionary*[33] and Menshevik writing in 1917), but in reality he was the *tail-end* of the bourgeoisie, a plaything in their hands.

During the almost seventy years that have elapsed since then, that manoeuvre, which is a novelty in Russia, has been made many times by the bourgeoisie in the West. The purpose of this manoeuvre is to make the "socialist democratic" leaders who "withdraw" from socialism and from the revolution harmless *appendages* of a bourgeois government, to shield this government from the people by means of near-socialist Ministers, to cover up the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie by a glittering, spectacular facade of "socialist" ministerialism.

This method has been developed to a veritable art in France. It has also been tested on many occasions in Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, and many of the Latin countries. It is this manoeuvre that was made in Russia on May 6, 1917.

"Our" near-socialist Ministers found themselves in a situation in which the bourgeoisie began to use *them* as their cat's paw, to do *through them* what the bourgeoisie could never have done without them.

Through Guchkov it would have been impossible to lure the people into continuing the *imperialist*, predatory war, a war *for* redivision of the colonies and annexed territories in general. Through Kerensky (and Tsereteli, who was busier defending Tereshchenko than defending the post and telegraph workers), the bourgeoisie were able, as correctly admitted by Milyukov and Maklakov, to begin "organising" the continuation of this kind of war.

Through Shingaryov it would have been impossible to ensure the preservation of the landed estates system at least until; the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (if an offensive were to take place, it would "enable Russia to recover completely", said Maklakov. That means that the Constituent Assembly itself would be "healthier"). Through Chernov, this can be brought about. The peasants have been told, although they have not been very glad to hear it, that

to rent land from the landowners by agreement with each individual owner is "order", while to abolish the landed estates at one stroke and rent *from the people*, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, land formerly owned by the landowners is "anarchy". This counter-revolutionary idea of the land owners could only be put into effect through Chernov.

Through Konovalov it would have been impossible to ensure the safeguarding (*and the increase*—see what the ministerial newspaper, *Rabochaya Gazeta*, writes about the coal industrialists) of the scandalous profits from war contracts. Through Skobelev, or with his participation, this safeguarding can be ensured by allegedly preserving the old order, by near-"Marxist" rejection of the possibility of "introducing" socialism.

Because socialism cannot be introduced the scandalously high profits made by the capitalists not from their purely capitalist business *but from supplies to the armed forces, to the state*—these profits can be both concealed from the people and retained!—this is the wonderful Struvean argument which has brought together Tereshchenko and Lvov, on the one hand, and the "Marxist" Skobelev, on the other.

Popular meetings and the Soviets cannot be influenced through Lvov, Milyukov, Tereshchenko, Shingaryov and the rest. But they can be influenced through Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. in the same old bourgeois direction. And one can pursue *the same old* bourgeois-imperialist policy by means of particularly, impressive, particularly "nice"-sounding phrases, to the point of denying the people the elementary democratic right to *elect* local authorities and prevent both their appointment and confirmation from above.

By denying this right, Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. have unwittingly turned from ex-socialists into ex-democrats.

A "great withdrawal", all right!

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THE USE OF STICKING TO THE POINT IN POLEMICS

Dear comrades writing for *Novaya Zhizn*, you resent our criticism, which you call angry. We shall try to be mild and kind.

To begin with, we wish to take up the two questions you raised.

Can one seriously speak of control over production, to say nothing of regulating it, without ending the "inviolability of commercial secrecy"?

We have maintained that *Novaya Zhizn* has not answered this "practical" question. *Novaya Zhizn* objects, saying that we can "find" the answer "even" in *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

We cannot find it, dear comrades! Nor can you ever find it. Look more carefully and you will see you cannot find it.

You will pardon us for saying so, but *Novaya Zhizn* has sinned because, while holding forth about "control", it has not raised the practical question of the inviolability of commercial secrecy in a practical way.

Second question: can one confuse the immediate introduction of socialism (which *Novaya Zhizn* has been arguing against and which we have never suggested) with the immediate assumption of actual control over the banks and trusts? When, in answer to that, we pointed out that we did not propose to expropriate, regulate, or exercise control over small-scale economy, *Novaya Zhizn* commented that we had made a "valuable confession", a "legitimate" one, but had done it "overhastily".

Have a heart, dear comrades, how can you call it "overhasty" when it is just a brief paraphrase of the long and

detailed resolution passed by our conference? Or didn't you care enough to read that resolution?

In polemics, one should stick to the point. It is harmful in this kind of polemics to try to quibble the issue away.

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AN EPIDEMIC OF CREDULITY

"Comrades, the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken."

We gather this pleasant news from a speech by Minister Peshekhonov. It is staggering news! "The resistance of the capitalists has been broken."

And such ministerial speeches are heard and applauded! What is this but an epidemic of credulity?

On the one hand, they use "the dictatorship of the proletariat" more than anything else to scare themselves and other people. On the other hand, what is the difference between the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and breaking the resistance of the capitalists? None whatsoever. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a scientific term indicating the class which plays the leading role in it and the special form of state power called dictatorship, i.e., power based not on law or elections, but directly on the armed force of a particular section of the population.

What is the purpose and significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat? To break the resistance of the capitalists! And if "the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken" in Russia, it is as much as saying "the dictatorship of the proletariat has apparently been realised" here.

The "only" trouble is that this is no more than a ministerial phrase. Something like Skobelev's brave exclamation: "I shall take 100 per cent profit!"[34] It is one of the gems of the "revolutionary-democratic" eloquence that is now overwhelming Russia, intoxicating the petty bourgeoisie, befogging and corrupting the people, and spreading by the handful the germs of an epidemic of credulity.

A scene in a certain French comedy—the French seem to excel at the game of socialist ministries—has a gramophone record that repeats, before audiences of voters in every part of France, a speech full of promises by a "socialist" Minister. We think Citizen Peshekhonov should pass on his historic phrase, "Comrades, the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken", to a record company. It would be very convenient and useful (for the capitalists) to spread this phrase throughout the world, in every language. Here we have, it would say, the splendid achievements of the Russian experiment in having a bourgeois and socialist coalition Ministry.

Still, it would be a good idea if Minister Peshekhonov, whom both the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (who in 1906 dissociated themselves from him in their press, regarding him as a petty bourgeois who had moved too far to the right) call a socialist *now that he has entered the Ministry together with Tsereteli and Chernov*, answered the following simple and modest question:

Isn't it too much for us to try to break the resistance of the capitalists? Shouldn't we rather try to expose before the labour unions and all the major parties the fantastic profits made by the capitalists? Shouldn't we try to abolish commercial secrecy?

Isn't it too much for us to speak of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" ("breaking the resistance of the capitalists")? Shouldn't we rather try to *expose embezzlement and misappropriation*?

If the price of coal supplies has been *raised* by the revolutionary government, as reported by the *ministerial* "*Rabochaya Gazeta*", doesn't it look like plunder of the state? Hadn't we better publish, at least once a week, the "letters of guarantee" of the banks, and other documents relating to war contracts and to the prices paid under those contracts, rather than make speeches about "the resistance of the capitalists having been broken"?

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A BIRD IN THE HAND OR TWO IN THE BUSH

Minister Peshekhonov uttered many beautiful and high-sounding phrases in his speech. He said that "we must divide equitably all we have", that "the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken", and many more phrases of that kind.

But he cited only one exact figure, only one exact fact in his speech, devoting six lines to it out of eight columns. Here it is: nails leave the factory at 20 kopeks a pound, but they reach the consumer at 2 rubles a pound.

Isn't it possible, since "the resistance of the capitalists has been broken", to pass a law on publishing (1) all letters of guarantee concerning prices of supplies under the war contracts; (2) all prices of supplies to the state in general; (3) the cost price of products delivered to the state; (4) isn't it possible to give the workers' organisations an opportunity to verify all these facts?

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INTRODUCTION OF SOCIALISM OR EXPOSURE OF PLUNDER OF THE STATE?

It has been decided and laid down that socialism cannot be introduced in Russia. This was proved, in near-Marxist fashion, by Mr. Milyukov at a meeting of the June 3 diehards, following the ministerial Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta*. And it was subscribed to by the largest party in Russia in general and in the Congress of Soviets in particular, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which, besides being the largest party, is also the party with the greatest ideological (disinterested) fear of seeing the revolution develop towards socialism.

Strictly speaking, a mere glance at the resolution passed by the Bolshevik Conference held from April 24 to 29, 1917, reveals that the Bolsheviks, too, recognise the impossibility of immediately "introducing" socialism in Russia.

What is the argument about, then? Why the fuss?

By the hue and cry against the "introduction" of socialism in Russia, some people are sustaining (many of them unwittingly) the efforts of those who are opposed to the *exposure of plunder of the state*.

Let us not quibble over words, citizens! It is unworthy of "revolutionary democrats" and, indeed, of grown-ups in general. Let's not talk about the "introduction" of socialism, which "everybody" rejects. Let's talk about the exposure of plunder.

When capitalists work for defence, i.e., for the state, it is obviously no longer "pure" capitalism but a special form of national economy. Pure capitalism means commodity production. And commodity production means work for an *unknown* and free market. But the capitalist "working" for defence does not "work" for the market at all—he works on government *orders*, very often with money loaned by the state.

We believe that to conceal the amount of profit made on this peculiar operation and to appropriate the profit in excess of what is necessary to cover the living expenses of a person actually participating in production is *embezzlement*.

If you disagree, then you are clearly out of step with the overwhelming majority of the population. There is no shadow of doubt that by far most of the workers and peasants of Russia agree with us and would say so in plain language were the question put to them without evasions, excuses or diplomatic tricks.

But if you do agree, then let us fight together against excuses and tricks.

To make the greatest possible concessions on a *common* undertaking such as this fight and to show a maximum of tractability, we are proposing the following draft resolution to the Congress of Soviets:

"The first step towards any regulation of, or even simple control over, production and distribution [note that does not belong to the text of the draft: even Minister Peshekhonov promised to strive to ensure "that all we have is divided equitably"], the first step in any serious struggle against economic dislocation and the catastrophe threatening the country, must be a decree abolishing commercial (including banking) secrecy in all transactions arising from supplies to the state or for defence in general. Such a decree should be supplemented immediately by a law treating as criminal offences all direct or indirect attempts to conceal pertinent documents or facts from persons or groups who have mandates from:

"(a) any Soviet of Workers' or Soldiers' or Peasants' Deputies;

"(b) any trade union of industrial workers or office employees, etc.;

"(c) any major political party (the idea of 'major' should be defined specifically, at least on the basis of votes received)."

Everybody agrees that the immediate introduction of socialism in Russia is impossible.

Does everybody agree that the exposure of plunder of the state is an immediate necessity?

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CONFUSED AND FRIGHTENED

The atmosphere in Petrograd is one of fright and confusion reaching truly unparalleled dimensions.

This was illustrated by a small incident prior to the big incident of banning the demonstration fixed by our Party for Saturday.[35]

This small incident was the seizure of Durnovo's country-house. Minister Pereverzev first ordered the house cleared, but then declared at the Congress that he was letting the people use the garden and that the trade unions were not to be evicted from the house! All that was necessary, he said, was to arrest certain anarchists.[36]

If the seizure of Durnovo's country-house was unlawful, then it was *wrong* either to leave the garden for the people's use or to allow the trade unions to remain in the house. If there were lawful grounds for arrest, the arrest had *no* bearing on the house, for it could have occurred *either* in the house *or* outside it. As it happened, the house was not "vacated", nor were any arrests made. The government found itself confused and frightened. Had they not become nervous, there would have been no "incident", for nothing has changed anyway.

The big incident was the demonstration. Our Party's Central Committee, together with a number of other organisations, including the Trade Union Bureau, resolved to call a peaceful demonstration, a march through the streets of the capital. In all constitutional countries, the holding of such a demonstration is an absolutely incontestable civil right. A

peaceful street demonstration calling, incidentally, for an amendment of the Constitution or a change in the government is in no way regarded as unlawful by the legislation of any free country.

People who were confused and frightened, including, in particular, the majority at the Congress of Soviets, made an awful "fuss" over the demonstration. The Congress majority adopted a devastating resolution against the demonstration, full of abuse against our Party, and *prohibited* all demonstrations, including peaceful ones, for three days.

When this formal decision had been adopted, the Central Committee of our Party, as early as 2 a.m. on Saturday, resolved to cancel the demonstration. The cancellation was effected on Saturday morning at an emergency meeting with district representatives.

The question remains: *how* does our second "government", the Congress of Soviets, *explain* its ban? Agreed that every party in a free country has the right to hold demonstrations, and every government can, after proclaiming a state of emergency, prohibit them. But the political question remains: why was the demonstration banned?

Here is the only political motive, clearly stated in the resolution of the Congress of Soviets:

> "We know that concealed counter-revolutionaries want to take advantage of your demonstration [i.e., the one planned by our Party]...."

That is the reason why the peaceful demonstration was banned. The Congress of Soviets "knows" that there are "concealed counter-revolutionaries" and that they wanted to "take advantage" of the action which our Party had planned.

This statement by the Congress of Soviets is highly significant. And we must re-emphasise this *factual* statement, which by virtue of its factualness stands out from the spate of abuse levelled at us. What measures is our second government taking against the "concealed counter-revolutionaries"? What exactly does this government "know"? How exactly did the counter-revolutionaries wart to take advantage of one pretext or another?

The people cannot and will not wait patiently and passively until those concealed counter-revolutionaries act.

If our second government does not want to remain like people who by bans and torrents of abuse try to cover up their confusion and the fact that they have allowed themselves to be frightened by the Right, it will have to *tell* the people a great deal about the "concealed counter-revolutionaries" and *do* a great deal to combat them seriously.

Pravda No. 79,
June 24 (11), 1917

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

INSINUATIONS

Those who rant and rage and fulminate, who gnash their teeth and pour a ceaseless torrent of abusive and riot-raising words upon our Party, do not accuse us of anything directly. They merely "insinuate".

Insinuate what?

There is only one thing they can insinuate: the Bolsheviks wanted to effect a coup d'état, they are Catilines,[37] *and consequently* they are monsters deserving to be torn to pieces.

Our enemies cannot bring themselves to make this foolish statement openly, and so they are compelled to "insinuate" and rage in "rhetorics". For this accusation is exceedingly stupid. A coup d'état through a peaceful demonstration, decided upon on Thursday, planned for Saturday and announced on Saturday morning! Now, gentlemen, whom are you trying to fool with your ridiculous insinuations?

"A demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government," says the resolution of the Congress of Soviets. So the removal of some of the Ministers from the Provisional Government (one of the inscriptions on the planned streamers was to have read: "Down with the bourgeois members of the government!") is a coup d'état, eh?

Why, then, has no one tried, or even threatened, to institute proceedings against those who have repeatedly appeared in the Petrograd streets carrying the banner: "All power to the Soviet"?

Those who rage have been frightened by their own shadow.

A government which knows that it is supported in its

entirety by the will of the majority of the people should not fear demonstrations announced in advance.

It would not ban such demonstrations.

Only those who realise they have no majority to back them, and who lack popular approval, can behave so savagely and make *such insinuations* in malicious articles.

Pravda No. 79,
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"RUMOURS AGITATING THE POPULATION"

The Provisional Government is calling upon the "population" today to stay calm in face of "the rumours that are being spread in the city and are agitating the population".

Doesn't the Provisional Government think that one sentence in the resolution passed by the Congress of Soviets is, and should be, a thousand times more agitating than all "rumours"? That sentence reads:

"We know that concealed counter-revolutionaries want to take advantage of your [Bolshevik] demonstration."

This is "more than rumours". How can they *fail* to agitate the population?

Pravda No. 79,
June 24 (11), 1917

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the *Pravda* text

A RIDDLE

What is the difference between an ordinary bourgeois government and a government which is extraordinary, revolutionary, and which does not regard itself as bourgeois?

Answer:

An ordinary bourgeois government can ban demonstrations only on constitutional grounds and after declaring martial law.

An extraordinary and near-socialist government can ban demonstrations without any grounds and on the strength of "facts" known to it alone.

Pravda No. 79,
June 24 (11), 1917

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the *Pravda* text

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) AND THE BUREAU OF THE BOLSHEVIK GROUP TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS REGARDING THE BAN ON THE DEMONSTRATION[38]

We hold that the unique institution known as the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies is the nearest approach to a popular body expressing the will of the majority of the people, to a revolutionary parliament.

On principle we have been, and are, in favour of all power passing into the hands of such a body, despite the fact that at present it is in the hands of the defencist Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are hostile to the party of the proletariat.

The fact that the position of the Soviets is internally contradictory, shaky and unstable, and powerless in regard to the counter-revolution, is due to their tolerating a nest of counter-revolution—the ten bourgeois Ministers—and to their not breaking with Anglo-French imperialist capital. The shakiness of their position accounts for the nervousness of the present majority of the Soviets and their touchiness towards those who point out this shakiness.

We refuse to co-ordinate our struggle against the counter-revolution with the "struggle" of the defencist and ministerialist parties.

We cannot recognise the decisions of the Soviets as proper decisions taken by a proper government as long as there remain the ten bourgeois, counter-revolutionary Ministers who are part and parcel of the Milyukov spirit and the Milyukov class. But even if the Soviets seized all power (which we want and would always support), and even if they became an omnipotent revolutionary parliament, we would *not* submit to decisions that restrained our freedom of propaganda, for instance, prohibiting leaflets at the front or in the

rear, banning peaceful demonstrations, and so on. In that event we would prefer to become an illegal, officially persecuted party, rather than give up our Marxist, internationalist principles.

We shall act similarly if the Congress of Soviets sees fit to brand us officially before the entire population of Russia as "enemies of the people" or as "enemies of the revolution".

We regard only one of the motives given for banning the demonstration for three days as conditionally valid, namely, that concealed counter-revolutionaries lying in wait wanted to take advantage of the demonstration. If the facts underlying this motive are correct, and if the names of the counter-revolutionaries are known to the entire Soviet (as they are known to us privately from the verbal information given by Lieber and others on the Executive Committee), then these counter-revolutionaries should be immediately proclaimed enemies of the people and arrested, and their followers and helpers tried in court.

As long as the Soviet does not take such measures, even its valid motive is only conditionally valid, or altogether invalid.

Written on June 11 (24), 1917

First published in 1924, in *Byloye* No. 24

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH ON THE CANCELLATION OF THE DEMONSTRATION, DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.), JUNE 11 (24), 1917

The dissatisfaction voiced by most comrades over the cancellation of the demonstration is quite natural, but the Central Committee had no alternative for two reasons: first, we were formally banned from holding the demonstration by the semi-organ of power; secondly, the motive for the ban was stated as follows: "We know that concealed forces of the counter-revolution want to take advantage of your demonstration." In support of this motive, we were given names, such as that of a general, whom they promised to arrest within three days, and others. And they declared that a demonstration of the Black Hundreds[39] had been arranged for June 10 with the intention of breaking into our demonstration and turning it into a skirmish.

Even in ordinary warfare, it sometimes happens that a planned offensive has to be cancelled for strategic reasons. This is all the more likely to occur in class warfare, depending on the vacillation of the middle, petty-bourgeois groups. We must be able to take account of the situation and be bold in adopting decisions.

The cancellation was absolutely necessary, as subsequent developments proved. Today Tsereteli has delivered his historical and hysterical speech.[40] Today the revolution has entered a new phase of its development. They began by banning our peaceful demonstration for three days, and now they want to ban it for the entire duration of the Congress. They

demand that we obey the decision of the Congress under threat of expulsion from the Congress. But we have declared that we prefer arrest rather than renounce freedom of propaganda.

Tsereteli, whose speech showed him up as a blatant counter-revolutionary, declared that the Bolsheviks must not be fought by words and resolutions, but must be deprived of all the technical means they have at their disposal. The result of all bourgeois revolutions is: first arm the proletariat and then disarm it to prevent it from going any further. The fact that a peaceful demonstration had to be banned shows that the situation must be very serious.

Tsereteli, who emerged from the depths of the Provisional Government to attend the Congress, clearly expressed a desire to disarm the workers. He was savagely furious in demanding that the Bolshevik Party be ousted from the ranks of the revolutionary democrats. The workers must clearly realise that there can now be no question of a peaceful demonstration. The situation is far more serious than we thought. We were going to hold a peaceful demonstration in order to exercise maximum pressure on the decisions of the Congress—that is our right—but we are accused of hatching a plot to arrest the government.

Tsereteli says that there are no counter-revolutionaries apart from the Bolsheviks. The meeting that passed judgement on us was organised with particular solemnity. It consisted of the Congress Steering Committee, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in full force and the bureaus of the groups of all the parties attending the Congress. At that meeting they blurted out the whole truth, namely, that they are calling an offensive against us.

The proletariat must reply by showing the maximum calmness, caution, restraint and organisation, and must remember that peaceful processions are a thing of the past.

We must give them no pretext for attack. Let them attack, and the workers will realise that it is an attack on the very existence of the proletariat. But reality is on our side, and it is a moot point whether their attack will succeed—at the front there are the troops, among whom discontent is

very strong, and in the rear there is the high cost of living, economic dislocation and so on.

The Central Committee does not want to force your decision. Your right, the right to protest against the actions of the Central Committee, is a legitimate one, and your decision must be a free one.

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in *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 9

Published according to
the minutes of the meetings
of the Petrograd Committee
of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), 1917

THE TURNING-POINT

At the first stage of its development the Russian revolution transferred power to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and created, alongside of that power, the Soviets of Deputies, with the petty-bourgeois democrats in the majority. The second stage of the revolution (May 6) formally removed from power the cynically frank spokesmen of imperialism, Milyukov and Guchkov, and virtually transformed the majority parties in the Soviets into governing parties. Our Party remained, before and after May 6, a minority opposition. This was inevitable, for we are the party of the socialist proletariat, a party holding an internationalist position. A socialist proletariat whose outlook during an imperialist war is internationalist cannot but be in opposition to any power waging that war, regardless of whether that power is a monarchy or republic, or is held by defencist "socialists". And the party of the socialist proletariat is bound to attract an increasingly large mass of people who are being ruined by the protracted war and are growing distrustful of "socialists" committed to the service of imperialism, in the same way as they previously grew distrustful of imperialists themselves.

The struggle against our Party, therefore, began in the very first days of the revolution. And however infamous and abominable the forms of struggle carried on by the Cadets and the Plekhanov people against the party of the proletariat, the meaning of the struggle is quite clear. It is the same struggle as the imperialists and the Scheidemann people waged against Liebknecht and Adler (both of whom were, in fact, declared "mad" by the Central organ of the German

"socialists", to say nothing of the bourgeois press, which described these comrades simply as "traitors" working for Britain). This is a struggle of the *whole* of bourgeois society, *including the petty-bourgeois democrats*, however r-r-revolutionary they may be, against the socialist, internationalist proletariat.

In Russia, this struggle has reached a stage where the imperialists are trying, through the petty-bourgeois-democratic leaders, the Tseretelis, Chernovs, etc., to destroy the growing power of the workers' party at a single hard and decisive blow. As a pretext for this decisive blow, Minister Tsereteli has struck upon a method repeatedly used by counter-revolutionaries: *the charge of conspiracy*. This charge is a mere pretext. The point is that the petty-bourgeois democrats, who take their cue from the Russian and the Allied imperialists, need to do away with the internationalist socialists once and for all. They think that the moment is ripe for the blow. They are agitated and frightened, and under the whip of their masters they have made up their minds: now or never.

The socialist proletariat and our Party must be as cool and collected as possible, must show the greatest staunchness and vigilance. Let the future Cavaignacs[41] begin first. Our Party conference has already given warning of their arrival. The workers of Petrograd will give them no opportunity to disclaim responsibility. They will bide their time, gathering their forces and preparing for resistance *when* those gentlemen decide to turn from words to action.

Pravda No. 80,
June 26 (13), 1917

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

I am being asked about the reason for my absence at the meeting held on Sunday evening by the Executive Committee, the Steering Committee of the Congress and the bureaus of all groups. The reason is that I upheld the refusal of the Bolsheviks, as a matter of principle, to participate in the meeting, and urged that they present a written statement to the effect that they refuse to participate in any meetings on such questions (the ban on demonstrations).

N. Lenin

Pravda No. 80,
June 26 (13), 1917

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

No idea could be more erroneous or harmful than to separate foreign from home policy. The monstrous falsity of this separation becomes even more monstrous in war-time. Yet the bourgeoisie are doing everything possible and impossible to suggest and promote this idea. Popular ignorance of foreign policy is incomparably greater than of home policy. The "secrecy" of diplomatic relations is sacredly observed in the freest of capitalist countries, in the most democratic republics.

Popular deception has become a real art in foreign "affairs", and our revolution suffers very badly from this deception. The poison of deception is spread far and wide by the millions of copies of bourgeois newspapers.

You must side with one of the two immensely wealthy and immensely powerful groups of imperialist predators—that is how capitalist reality poses the basic issue of present-day foreign policy. That is how this issue is posed by the capitalist class. And that, it goes without saying, is how it is posed by the broad mass of the petty bourgeoisie who have retained their old, capitalist views and prejudices.

Those whose thinking does not go beyond capitalist relations cannot understand why the workers, if they are politically conscious, cannot side with *either* group of imperialist plunderers. Conversely, the worker cannot understand why socialists who remain true to the fraternal alliance of the workers of the world against the capitalists of the world are accused of being inclined towards a separate peace treaty with the Germans, or of virtually serving such a peace treaty. Under no circumstances can these socialists (and hence

the Bolsheviks) agree to a separate peace treaty between the capitalists. The basis for the foreign policy of the politically-conscious proletariat is no separate peace treaty with the German capitalists and no alliance with the Anglo-French capitalists.

By rising up in arms against that programme because they fear a break with "Britain and France", our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are virtually carrying out a capitalist foreign policy programme, while embellishing it with florid and innocent phrases about "revision of treaties", declarations in support of "peace without annexations", etc. All these pious wishes are doomed to remain hollow phrases, for *capitalist* reality puts the issue bluntly: either submit to the imperialists of one of the two groups, or wage a revolutionary struggle against all imperialists.

Have we any allies for this struggle? Yes. The oppressed classes of Europe, primarily the proletariat. The peoples oppressed by imperialism, primarily our neighbours in Asia.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who call themselves "revolutionary democrats", are in fact pursuing a counter-revolutionary and anti-democratic foreign policy. Were they revolutionaries, they would advise the workers and peasants of Russia to march at the head of all peoples oppressed by imperialism and of all the oppressed classes.

"But in that event the capitalists of all other countries would rally against Russia," the frightened philistines object. That is not impossible. No "*revolutionary*" democrat has the right to renounce revolutionary war in advance. But the practical likelihood of such a war is not very great. The British and German imperialists will not be able to "come to terms" against revolutionary Russia.

The Russian revolution, which as early as 1905 led to revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China, would have placed the German and British imperialists in a very difficult position if it had begun to establish a truly revolutionary alliance of the workers and peasants of the colonies and semi-colonies against the despots, against the khans, for expulsion of the Germans from Turkey, the British from Turkey, Persia, India, Egypt, etc.

Social-chauvinists, both French and Russian, like to refer to 1793. By this spectacular reference they try to cover

up their betrayal of the revolution. But people here refuse to think that the *truly* "revolutionary democrats in Russia could and should act *in the spirit* of 1793 towards the oppressed and backward nations.

The foreign policy of the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie is "alliance" with the imperialists, that is, disgraceful dependence on them. The foreign policy of the proletariat is alliance with the revolutionaries of the advanced countries and with all the oppressed nations against all and any imperialists.

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Published according to
the *Pravda* text

A CONTRADICTORY STAND

The Congress resolution in today's papers condemning our Party will no doubt be compared by every class-conscious worker and soldier with our Party's statement addressed to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, a statement made public on the 11th, and printed in today's *Pravda*.[42]

The contradictory nature of the stand taken by the Congress leaders has been revealed by their resolution and particularly by our statement.

"The basis for the success and strength of the Russian revolution is the unity of all revolutionary democrats—the workers, soldiers, and peasants," reads the first and cardinal clause of the Congress resolution. And, of course, this point would undoubtedly be correct if what it meant by "unity" were *unity in the struggle against the counter-revolution*. But what if through their leaders a certain number of the "workers, soldiers and peasants" form a bloc and unite with the counter-revolution? Isn't it clear that *this* section of the "democrats" is *in reality* no longer "revolutionary"?

The Narodniks (Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the Mensheviks will probably be indignant at the mere fact that we think it possible, that we think it conceivable, for any section of the "workers, soldiers and peasants" to "unite" with the counter-revolution.

To those who attempted to obscure our arguments and hush up the issue by indignation, we would reply by simply referring them to the third clause of the same resolution: "*...the resistance* of the counter-revolutionary groups of the *propertied classes is growing*". This is an important statement. It would have bean perfectly correct if it had said: the bourgeoisie, or capitalists, and landowners (instead

of the "propertied classes", which include the well-to-do section of the petty bourgeoisie).

Unquestionably, the resistance of the bourgeoisie is growing.

But then it is the bourgeoisie that control the majority in the Provisional Government with whom the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Menshevik leaders have *united*, not only in general political terms, but also organisationally, in one institution, the Ministry!

This is the pivot of the contradictory stand taken by the leaders of the Congress, this is the fundamental source of the instability of their entire policy. They are allied with the bourgeoisie via the government, where they are controlled by the bourgeois Ministers forming the majority. At the same time, they are *forced* to admit that "the resistance of the counter-revolutionary groups of the propertied classes is growing"!

It is obvious that, under the circumstances, the party of the revolutionary proletariat can accept "unity" with the "revolutionary" democrats (revolutionary in word but not deed) only up to a certain point. We are for unity with them as long as they fight against the counter-revolution. We are *against* unity with them as long as they ally themselves with the counter-revolution.

The "growing resistance" of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is an urgent problem posed by reality. To *evade* this main and fundamental issue through non-committal phrases about "the unity and co-ordinated actions of the revolutionary democrats", thereby glossing over the unity or co-ordination between a section of the revolutionary democrats and the counter-revolution, would be illogical and foolish.

Hence, all the arguments in the Congress resolution condemning our demonstration as "clandestine" and maintaining that mass actions and demonstrations are permissible only with the knowledge or consent of the Soviets, fall to the ground as a matter of principle. These arguments are of no consequence at all. The workers' party will never accept them, as we have already said in our statement to the All-Russia Congress. For every demonstration is *merely* a means of agitation as long as it is peaceful, and you can neither ban agitation nor impose uniformity on it.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

On the formal side, the resolution is even weaker. To ban or decree you must be vested with state power. First achieve that, you gentlemen who now lead the Congress—we are in favour of it, although you are our opponents—and then you will have the right to ban or decree. At the moment you do not wield state power, at the moment you allow yourselves to be swayed by the ten bourgeois Ministers—you are caught in the meshes of your own weakness and indecision.

Phrases like a "clearly expressed will", and so on, will not do. A will, if it is the will of the state, must be expressed in the form of a *law* established by the *state*. Otherwise the word "will" is an empty sound. The moment you thought of *law*, gentlemen, you would have been certain to recall that the Constitution of a free republic *cannot* ban peaceful demonstrations or any mass actions by any party or group.

A contradictory stand has bred very strange revolutionary ideas—ideas as to the struggle against the counter-revolution, ideas about the state (Constitution), and ideas of law in general. With the furious abuse against our Party refuted, nothing is left, nothing whatsoever!

Despite the furious abuse against our proposed demonstration, the demonstration is to be held a week later.

Pravda No. 81,
June 27 (14), 1917

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

THE UKRAINE

The new, coalition Provisional Government's policy failure is becoming more and more obvious. The Universal Act on the organisation of the Ukraine, issued by the Ukrainian Central Rada[43] and adopted on June 11, 1917, by the All-Ukraine Army Congress, plainly exposes that policy and furnishes documentary proof of its failure.

> "Without seceding from Russia, without breaking away from the Russian State," reads the Act, "let the Ukrainian people have the right to shape their own life on their own soil.... All laws by which order is to be established here in the Ukraine shall be passed solely by this Ukrainian Assembly. And laws establishing order throughout the Russian State must be passed by the All-Russia Parliament."

These are perfectly clear words. They state very specifically that the Ukrainian people do not wish to secede from Russia at present. They demand autonomy without denying the need for the supreme authority of the "All-Russia Parliament". No democrat, let alone a socialist, will venture to deny the complete legitimacy of the Ukraine's demands. And no democrat can deny the Ukraine's *right* to freely secede from Russia. Only unqualified recognition of this right makes it possible to advocate a free union of the Ukrainians and the Great Russians, a *voluntary* association of the two peoples in one state. Only unqualified recognition of this right can actually break completely and irrevocably with the accursed tsarist past, when *everything* was done to bring about a *mutual estrangement* of the two peoples so close to each other in language, territory, character and history. Accursed tsarism made the Great Russians executioners of the Ukrainian people, and fomented in them a hatred for

those who even forbade Ukrainian children to speak and study in their native tongue.

Russia's revolutionary democrats, if they want to be truly revolutionary and truly democratic, must break with that past, must regain for themselves, for the workers and peasants of Russia, the brotherly trust of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. This cannot be done without full recognition of the Ukraine's rights, including the *right* to free secession.

We do not favour the existence of small states. We stand for the closest union of the workers of the world against "their own" capitalists and those of all other countries. But for this union to be voluntary, the Russian worker, who does not for a moment trust the Russian or the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in anything, now stands for the right of the Ukrainians to secede, *without imposing* his friendship upon them, but *striving to win* their friendship by treating them as an equal, as an ally and brother in the struggle for socialism.

* * *

Rech, the paper of the embittered bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, who are half demented with rage, savagely attacks the Ukrainians for their "unauthorised" decision. "That act by the Ukrainians," it says, "is a downright crime under the law, and calls for the immediate application of severe legitimate punitive measures." There is nothing to add to this attack by the savage bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. Down with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie! Long live the free union of free peasants and workers of a free Ukraine with the workers and peasants of revolutionary Russia!

Pravda No. 82,
June 28 (15), 1917

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the *Pravda* text

THE CLASS ORIGINS OF PRESENT-DAY AND "FUTURE" CAVAIGNACS

"When a real Cavaignac comes, we shall fight in the same ranks with you," we were told in No. 80 of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, organ of the very same Menshevik party whose member, Minister Tsereteli, in his notorious speech, went to such lengths as to threaten to disarm the Petrograd workers.

The above-quoted statement clearly brings out the fundamental errors of Russia's two ruling parties, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and therefore deserves attention. The ministerial organ's arguments mean that you are looking for Cavaignacs at the wrong time and in the wrong place.

Remember the class role played by Cavaignac. In February 1848 the French monarchy was overthrown. The bourgeois republicans came to power. Like our Cadets, they wanted "order", by which they meant the restoration and strengthening of monarchic instruments for oppressing the masses: the police, the standing army and the privileged bureaucracy. Like our Cadets, they wanted to put an end to the revolution, for they hated the revolutionary workers with their "social" (i.e., socialist) aspirations, at that time very hazy. Like our Cadets, they were implacably hostile to the policy of extending the French Revolution to the rest of Europe, the policy of transforming it into a world proletarian revolution. Like our Cadets, they skilfully used the petty-bourgeois "socialism" of Louis Blanc by making him a Minister and so transforming him from leader of the socialist workers, which he had wanted to be, into an appendage, a hanger-on, of the bourgeoisie.

These were the class interests, the position and policy of the ruling class.

The petty bourgeoisie, vacillating, frightened by the red spectre, and falling for the outcries against the "anarchists", were another basic social force. Dreamily and bombastically "socialist" in their aspirations, and readily calling themselves "socialist democrats" (even this term is now taken up by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks!), the petty bourgeoisie were afraid to entrust themselves to the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat, and did not realise that fear condemned them to entrusting themselves to the bourgeoisie. For there can be *no* "middle" course in a society rent by bitter class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, particularly when this struggle is inevitably aggravated by a revolution. And the whole essence of the class position and aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie is that they want the impossible, that they aspire to the impossible, i.e., to a "middle course".

The third decisive class force was the proletariat, which aspired not to "reconcile itself" with the bourgeoisie, but to defeat them, to fearlessly promote the revolution, doing so, moreover, on an international scale.

That was the objective historical soil which *brought forth* Cavaignac. The vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie "debarred" them from an active role, and the French Cadet, General Cavaignac, taking advantage of the petty bourgeoisie's fear of entrusting themselves to the proletariat, decided to *disarm* the Paris workers and shoot them down *en masse*.

The revolution ended in that historic shooting. The petty bourgeoisie, while numerically superior, had been and remained the politically impotent tail of the bourgeoisie, and three years later France saw the restoration of a particularly vile form of Caesarist monarchy.

Tsereteli's historic speech on June 11, clearly inspired by the Cadet Cavaignacs (perhaps directly inspired by the bourgeois Ministers, or perhaps indirectly prompted by the bourgeois press and bourgeois public opinion—it does not matter which), was remarkable and historic in that Tsereteli *let out*, with inimitable naïveté, the "secret malady" of the entire petty bourgeoisie, both Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik. This "secret malady" consists, first, in a complete inability to pursue an independent policy; secondly, in the fear to entrust themselves to the revolutionary pro-

letariat and wholeheartedly support the independent policy *of the latter*; thirdly, in a drift—inevitably following from this—towards submitting to the Cadets or to the bourgeoisie in general (*i.e.*, *submitting to the Cavaignacs*).

This is the heart of the matter. Tsereteli, Chernov and even Kerensky are not destined as individuals to play the role of Cavaignacs. There will be other people to do that, people who at the right moment will tell the Russian Louis Blancs: "Step aside." But the Tseretelis and Chernovs are leaders pursuing a petty-bourgeois policy that makes the appearance of Cavaignacs possible and necessary.

"When a real Cavaignac comes, we shall be with you"—an excellent promise, a splendid intention! Only, it is a pity that it reveals a misunderstanding of the class struggle, typical of the sentimental or timid petty bourgeoisie. For a Cavaignac is not an accident, his "advent" is not an isolated development. A Cavaignac represents a class (the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie) and carries out the policies of that class. And it is that class and those policies that you Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik gentlemen support *today*. It is to that class and its policies that *you*, who at the moment admittedly command a majority in the country, give *predominance* in the government, i.e., an excellent basis on which to work.

Indeed, the All-Russia Peasant Congress was almost entirely dominated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. At the All-Russia Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc had a vast majority. The same is true of the elections to the Petrograd district councils. The fact is there: the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are the ruling party now. And this ruling party is voluntarily ceding power (the majority in the government) to the *party of the Cavaignacs*!!

Wherever there's a swamp there's sure to be the devil. Once there is a shaky, vacillating petty bourgeoisie dreading the revolution's progress, the Cavaignacs are sure to appear.

In Russia there are many things now that make our revolution different from the French Revolution of 1848: the imperialist war, the proximity of more advanced countries (and not of more backward ones, as was the case of France at the time), an agrarian and a national movement. But all

this may modify only the form in which the Cavaignacs come forward, the moment, the external causes, etc. It cannot change the essence of the matter, for the essence lies in the *class relationships*.

In words, Louis Blanc, too, was as far removed from Cavaignac as heaven is from earth. Louis Blanc, too, made countless promises "to fight in the same ranks" as the revolutionary workers against the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. Nevertheless, no Marxist historian, no socialist, would venture to doubt that it was the weakness, the instability, the credulity of the Louis Blancs with regard to the bourgeoisie that brought forth Cavaignac and assured his success.

The Russian Cavaignacs are inevitable products of the counter-revolutionary character of the Russian bourgeoisie led by the Cadets and of the instability, timidity and vacillation of the petty-bourgeois parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. Whether the Russian Cavaignacs will win or lose the battle depends solely on the staunchness, vigilance, and strength of Russia's revolutionary workers.

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June 29 (16), 1917

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HOW TO FIGHT COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Only a few days ago, Minister Tsereteli declared in his "historic" speech that there was no counter-revolution. Today the ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta* strikes an entirely different note in the article "Dangerous Symptoms".

"*There are clear indications that a counter-revolution is afoot.*"

Thanks for finally admitting the fact at least.

But the ministerial organ goes on to say: "We do not know where it [the counter-revolution] has its headquarters, nor to what extent it is organised."

Is that so? You don't know where the counter-revolution has its headquarters! Permit us to help you out of your ignorance. The counter-revolution which is afoot has its headquarters in the Provisional Government, in the very same coalition Ministry in which you gentlemen have six of your colleagues! The counter-revolution has its headquarters within the walls of the conference hall of the Fourth Duma, where Milyukov, Rodzyanko, Shulgin, Guchkov, A. Shingaryov, Manuilov and Co. rule, for the Cadets in the coalition Ministry are the right hand of Milyukov and Co. The staff of the counter-revolution is recruited from among the reactionary generals. In includes certain retired high-ranking officers.

If you want to do more than merely complain about the counter-revolution, if you want to fight it, you must join us in saying: Down with the ten capitalist Ministers!

Rabochaya Gazeta later points out that the counter-revolution's chief instrument is the press, which is fomenting anti-semitism, inciting the masses against the Jews. That is correct. But what is the conclusion? You are a ministerial

party, gentlemen, aren't you? What have you done to curb the infamous counter-revolutionary press? Do you think you can, while calling yourselves "revolutionary democrats", refuse to take revolutionary measures against the unbridled, blatantly counter-revolutionary press? And then, why don't you start a government organ that would publish advertisements and deprive the infamous counter-revolutionary press of its chief source of income and hence of its main chance to deceive the people? What evidence is there, indeed, that thousands upon thousands of people must now be kept away from productive labour in order to publish *Novoye Vremya*, *Malenkaya Gazeta*,[44] *Russkaya Volya*[45] and other reptiles?

What have you done to fight the counter-revolutionary press which is doing all it can to bait our Party? Nothing! You yourselves have supplied material for that baiting. You have been busy fighting the danger on the Left.

You are reaping what you have sown, gentlemen.

So it was, so it will be—as long as you continue to vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat.

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June 30 (17), 1917

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THE UKRAINE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE RULING PARTIES OF RUSSIA

The ruling parties of Russia, i.e., the Cadets, who have a majority in the government and the omnipotence of *capital* in the economy, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who now have an obvious majority in the country (but who are powerless in the government and in the country's capitalist economy), have *all* suffered an obvious defeat over the Ukrainian issue, and what is more, a nation-wide defeat over an issue of vast importance.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks put up with the fact that the Provisional Government of the Cadets, i.e., of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, had *not* done its elementary democratic duty, had *not* declared itself *in favour* of the Ukraine's autonomy and of her right to freely secede. According to Minister Chernov's report in today's *Dyelo Naroda*, the Ukrainians demanded far less than that. They only wanted the Provisional Government "to declare by a special act that it is *not opposed* to the Ukrainian people's right to autonomy". This is a most modest and legitimate demand. The other two demands are just as modest: (1) The Ukraine should through her own people elect one representative to the central Russian Government. The modesty of this demand can be seen from the fact that in 1897 the Great Russians in Russia were estimated at 43 per cent, and the Ukrainians at 17 per cent of the population. In other words, the Ukrainians could have insisted on having not one but six Ministers out of the sixteen!! (2) In the Ukraine

there should be "one representative of the central Russian Government elected by the local population". What could be more legitimate than this? By what right does a democrat make free to depart from the principle, proved in theory and confirmed by the experience of democratic revolutions, that "no officials for the local population should be appointed from above"??

The Provisional Government's rejection of these very modest and legitimate demands was an instance of utter shamelessness, of savage impertinence, on the part of the counter-revolutionaries, and a true manifestation of the policy of Derzhimorda[46]. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks made a mockery of their own party programmes by tolerating that in the government, and are now defending it in their papers!! To what a disgraceful level the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have fallen! How pitiful the subterfuges of their organs, *Dyelo Naroda* and *Rabochaya Gazeta*, are today!

Chaos, confusion, "Leninism over the national question" anarchy—these are a wild landowner's outcries[47] that the two newspapers are hurling at the Ukrainians.

Let us ignore their outcries. What is the substance of their argument?

Their only argument is that until a Constituent Assembly is convened it will be impossible to settle in a "regular" manner the issue of the Ukraine's boundaries, her freedom, her right to collect taxes, and so on and so forth. They insist on a "guarantee of regularity"—this expression used in *Rabochaya Gazeta*'s editorial gives the *whole gist* of their argument.

But that is an obvious lie, gentlemen, it is a manifestly shameless thing on the part of the counter-revolutionaries. For to advance such an argument means actually helping real traitors to the revolution!!

"Guarantees of regularity" ... stop and think for a second. *Nowhere* in Russia, *neither in the central government* nor in any local department (except in a very small institution, the Petrograd district councils), is there any guarantee of regularity. In fact, there is admittedly *no* regularity. There is admittedly no "regularity" in the existence of the Duma or of the Council of State.[48]

There is admittedly no "regularity" in the composition of the Provisional Government, for its composition is a mockery of the will and intelligence of the majority of Russia's workers, soldiers and peasants. There is admittedly no "regularity" in the composition of the Soviets (of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies), for these institutions have not yet worked out any guarantees of really complete and strictly democratic elections. Still, this does not prevent *either our Party* or the mass of the workers and peasants from regarding the Soviets as the *best* exponent of the will of the majority of the population so far. Nowhere in Russia are there, *can there be*, *or have there ever been at a revolutionary time like the present* any "guarantees of regularity". Everyone realises that, no one asks anything different, everyone is aware that it is inevitable.

It is *only* for the Ukraine that "we" demand "guarantees of regularity"!

You are paralysed with fear, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik gentlemen, having yielded to the counter-revolutionary howls of the Great-Russian landowners and capitalists led by Rodzyanko, Milyukov, Lvov, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov, Shingaryov and Co. You are already the perfect picture of people overawed by the rising Cavaignacs (*and those "lying low"*).

There is absolutely nothing terrible, not the shadow of anarchy or chaos, either in the resolutions or in the demands of the Ukrainians. Accede to their most legitimate and most modest demands and authority will be just as effective in the Ukraine as it is everywhere in Russia, where the Soviets (which have *no* "guarantees of regularity"!!) are the *sole* authority. You and all the peoples of Russia will be given a "guarantee of regularity" by the future Diets, by the future Constituent Assembly, not only in regard to the Ukrainian issue, but in regard to *all* issues. For at this moment there is admittedly no "regularity" in Russia *about any issue*. Accede to the Ukrainians—common sense demands it. For, unless you do, things will be worse. Force will not check the Ukrainians. It will only embitter them. Accede to the Ukrainians, and you will open the way to mutual confidence and brotherly union between the two nations on the basis of equality!

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who constitute ruling parties, have been defeated over the Ukrainian issue by yielding to the counter-revolutionary Cadet Cavaignacs.

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PROSECUTE RODZYANKO AND JUNKOVSKY FOR CONCEALING AN AGENT PROVOCATEUR!

The findings of the committee of inquiry into the case of the agent provocateur Malinovsky indicate that the following fact has been established:

Both Junkovsky and *Rodzyanko knew*, not later than May 7, 1914, that Malinovsky was an agent provocateur.[49]

Neither of the two leaders *warned* the political parties in the Duma, primarily the Bolsheviks, of the agent provocateur operating in their midst!!

Isn't that a crime?

How can Junkovsky and *Rodzyanko* be tolerated after that among honest citizens?

Let all political parties think it over, and let them voice their opinion!

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STRANGE MISQUOTATIONS

The newspapers *Dyen*[50] and *Novaya Zhizn*, which yesterday published a more detailed report of the findings of the committee of inquiry,[51] have quoted a passage from my testimony that is missing in *Birzhevka*,[52] which in certain respects has published an even more complete report of the findings.

Both of the first-mentioned papers printed a quotation from my testimony that begins with the words: "I do not believe there are any agents provocateurs involved here." There are no dots before the quotation, and the perfectly absurd inference is that now "I do not believe".

Only an extremely strange misquotation by both papers could result in such nonsense. What I did testify was this: "I personally have often *had to* (before Malinovsky was found to be an agent provocateur) reason as follows: after the Azef[53] case nothing can surprise me. But I do not believe there are any agents provocateurs involved here, not only because I see neither proof nor evidence, but also because" (and so on, as quoted by *Dyen*: had Malinovsky been an agent provocateur, the secret police would not have gained as much as they had expected, for we have been doing everything through two legal posts, etc.).

And so, my testimony concerned the past. *Dyen* and *Novaya Zhizn** have by a strange misquotation attributed to me an absurdity implying that I spoke of the present.

The result is the direct opposite of what I actually said.

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June 30 (17), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

* Both newspapers contain another misprint: "The Bolsheviks will not organise an armed rising." The word not should be taken out.

RULING AND RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

The formation of a united or federal Central Committee by the Congress of Soviets and the Executive Committee of the Peasant Congress is due to take place in the next few days. This question is up for discussion and will be settled in a matter of days. The petty squabble between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks over the forms in which the Central Committee should be constituted deserves no attention whatsoever, for this fight between two parties, both of which advocate defencism (i.e., support for the predatory war) and ministerialism, i.e., support for the government of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, is much too petty.

The formation of a Central Committee is of vast importance as the ultimate feature showing the distinction between the latest political situation and previous ones. Typical of the new political situation is the final establishment that most people today follow the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, which, as we know, form a bloc.

The All-Russia Peasant Congress and the All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, now in session, have finally established, after the elections to the Petrograd district councils, that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc is *the ruling party in Russia.*

That bloc admittedly has a majority now among the people. There can be no doubt that it will also have a majority in the united or federal Central Committee of Soviets (or the Council of Soviets—no decision seems to have been taken on the name so far) now being formed.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks are ruling and responsible parties.

This is the fundamental fact about the new political situation. Prior to the elections in Petrograd, and prior to

the Peasant Congress and the Congress of Soviets, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were in a position to take refuge, at least with a hint of plausibility, in the argument that the will of the majority was unknown, that the Cadets were probably likewise close to the majority, and so on and so forth. But these subterfuges cannot be used any longer. The fog which some people artificially worked up has dispersed.

You have a majority, gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, you are the ruling parties, or rather the ruling bloc. *You are responsible.*

In propaganda and agitation in general, and in the Constituent Assembly election campaign in particular, our chief task now is to explain to the mass of the workers and peasants, as carefully, efficiently and clearly as possible, that it is the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, the ruling parties, that are responsible for our country's policy today. The situation was different before, because they had not yet revealed their majority as parties, and readily posed as an "opposition" to the ruling Cadets. But now it is beyond doubt that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks command a majority.

They are responsible for the entire policy of the country.

They are now responsible for the results of the six weeks' rule of the "coalition Ministry".

They are responsible for the fact that most of the cabinet Ministers represent the party of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Everyone knows, sees and feels that these Ministers could not have kept their posts for a single day *without the consent* of the Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Peasant Congress.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks are responsible for the fundamental policy contradictions that are making themselves felt more and more sharply and painfully, and are imposing themselves on the people more and more obviously.

In words, they "condemn" the predatory war, and "demand" peace without annexations. In reality they continue the predatory war in alliance with notorious predators, the imperialists of Britain, France, etc. In reality they are preparing for an offensive at the instance of these allies, in

keeping with the secret predatory treaties which Nicholas II concluded with a view to enriching the Russian landowners and capitalists.

In reality their policy is one of annexation, i.e., the forcible incorporation of nations (Albania, Greece) in one country or one group of imperialists, a policy of annexation also *inside* "revolutionary" Russia (which is, however, following a counter-revolutionary course), and treating Finland and the Ukraine as if they were annexed nations and not really free, really equal nations having an indisputable right both to autonomy and to secession.

In words, "the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken", as Peshekhonov, a Minister of the bloc, boasted. In reality, even the resolution of the Congress of Soviets had to admit that "the resistance of the propertied classes [i.e., the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, who have 10 capitalist Ministers out of the 16 and are virtually all-powerful in the country's economy] is mounting".

In words, they promise to establish control and regulation and to take away 100 per cent of the profits (Minister Skobelev). In reality, nothing of the sort has happened in six weeks! Positively not a single effective and important step has been taken against the capitalists who resort to lock-outs, against the profiteering marauders, the knights who capitalise on war contracts, or the big bankers!!

Don't let us go on listing these crying contradictions. We have indicated enough.

Economic dislocation is getting worse. A crisis is imminent. Disaster is drawing irresistibly near. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries reason with the capitalists, threatening to take away 100 per cent. They boast that the capitalists' resistance is broken, they draft resolutions and make plans, make plans and draft resolutions.

Disaster is on the way. The *entire* responsibility for it will fall on the ruling Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc.

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ANOTHER COMMISSION

Economic disintegration has begun. The bourgeoisie are attacking all along the line. Decisive measures must be taken.

What does the Provisional Government intend to do?

To save Russia, to combat economic disintegration, to normalise the economy, it has a project for a new organisation, a detailed plan for combating economic ruin.

The business of "organising the national economy and labour" is to be the concern of an *Economic Council*.

At last they are taking measures, passing from words to deeds. Excellent, they are long overdue!

But what is the composition of this *Economic Council*?

Who is going to fight economic ruin? Who is going to carry on the struggle against the criminal policy of the capitalists, the employers, the factory owners?

It turns out that the overwhelming majority of the Council will be capitalists. Isn't that a mockery?!

Here is the composition of that worthy body:

Bourgeois Ministers	6
Capitalist representatives (Bank Council, the Stock Exchange, agriculture, etc.)	9
Total	15
From the workers (Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies)	3
From the trade unions	3
From the peasant deputies	3
Total	9

The Council membership includes the Ministers of War and of Labour, and three members of the co-operatives.

It is clearly the capitalists who will take decisions.

Another body is to be set up that at best will benefit no one.

Further, there are to be, as usual, countless commissions, sub-commissions, committees, etc.

That is how they intend to combat economic disintegration.

A shark has been thrown into the water.

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THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE

In one way or another, June 18 will go down as a turning-point in the history of the Russian revolution.

The mutual position of the classes, their correlation in the struggle against each other, their strength, particularly in comparison with the strength of the parties, were all revealed so distinctly, so strikingly, so impressively by last Sunday's demonstration that, whatever the course and pace of further development, the gain in political awareness and clarity has been tremendous.

The demonstration in a few hours scattered to the winds, like a handful of dust, the empty talk about Bolshevik conspirators and showed with the utmost clarity that the vanguard of the working people of Russia, the industrial proletariat of the capital, and the overwhelming majority of the troops support slogans that our Party has always advocated.

The measured step of the battalions of workers and soldiers. Nearly half a million demonstrators. A concerted onslaught. Unity around the slogans, among which overwhelmingly predominated: "All power to the Soviets", "Down with the ten capitalist Ministers", "Neither a separate peace treaty with the Germans nor secret treaties with the Anglo-French capitalists", etc. No one who saw the demonstration has any doubt left about the victory of these slogans among the organised vanguard of Russia's workers and soldiers.

The demonstration of June 18 was a demonstration of the strength and policy of the revolutionary proletariat, which is showing the direction for the revolution and indicating the way out of the impasse. This is the tremendous historical significance of last Sunday's demonstration,

and its essential difference from the demonstrations during the funeral of the victims of the revolution and on May Day. Then it was a universal *tribute* to the revolution's first victory and to its heroes. The people looked back over the first stage of the road to freedom, which they had passed very rapidly and very successfully. May Day was a *holiday* of hopes and aspirations linked with the history of the world labour movement and with its ideal of peace and socialism.

Neither of the two demonstrations was intended to point the *direction* for the revolution's further development, nor could it do so. Neither demonstration put before the people, or raised in the name of the people, specific, definite and urgent questions as to how and in what direction the revolution should proceed.

In this sense, June 18 was the first political demonstration of *action*, an explanation of how the various classes act, how they want to and will act, in order to further the revolution—an explanation not given in a book or newspaper, but on the streets, not through leaders, but through the people.

The bourgeoisie kept out of the way. They refused to participate in that peaceful demonstration of a clear majority of the people, in which there was freedom of party slogans, and the chief aim of which was to protest against counter-revolution. That is natural. The bourgeoisie are the counter-revolution. They hide from the people. They organise real counter-revolutionary conspiracies against the people. The parties now ruling Russia, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, clearly showed themselves on that historic day, June 18, as waverers. Their slogans spoke of wavering, and it was obvious to all that the supporters of their slogans were in a minority. By their slogans and wavering *they* advised the people to remain where they were, to leave everything unchanged for the time being. And the people felt, and they themselves felt, that that was impossible.

Enough of wavering, said the vanguard of the proletariat, the vanguard of Russia's workers and soldiers. Enough of wavering. The policy of trust in the capitalists, in *their* government, in *their vain* attempts at reform, in *their war*, in *their policy* of an offensive, is a hopeless policy. Its collapse is imminent. Its collapse is inevitable. And that col-

lapse will also be the collapse of the ruling parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. Economic disruption is coming nearer. There is *no* escaping it except by the revolutionary measures of the revolutionary class which has taken power.

Let the people break with the policy of trust in the capitalists. Let them put their trust in the revolutionary class—the proletariat. The source of power lies in it and only in it. It alone is the pledge that the interests of the *majority* will be served, the interests of the working and exploited people, who, though held down by war and capital, are capable of defeating war and capital!

A crisis of unprecedented scale has descended upon Russia and the whole of humanity. The only way out is to put trust in the most organised and advanced contingent of the working and exploited people, and support its policy.

We do not know whether the people will grasp this lesson soon or how they will put it into effect. But we do know for certain that apart from this lesson there is no way out of the impasse, that possible waverings or brutalities on the part of the counter-revolutionaries will lead nowhere.

There is no way out unless the masses put complete confidence in their leader, the proletariat.

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THE REVOLUTION, THE OFFENSIVE, AND OUR PARTY

"The Russian revolution has reached a turning-point," said Tsereteli informing the Congress of Soviets that the offensive[54] had begun. Yes, the whole course of the world war as well as the Russian revolution has reached a turning-point. After three months of vacillation the Russian Government has actually come to the decision demanded by the "Allied" governments.

The offensive has been declared in the name of peace. And it is also "in the name of peace" that the imperialists of the world send their troops into battle. Every time there is an offensive the generals in every belligerent country try to raise their troops' morale by holding out the real hope of that particular offensive leading to early peace.

The Russian "socialist" Ministers have garnished this common imperialist method with very high-sounding phrases in which words about socialism, democracy, and revolution sound like rattles in the hands of a clever juggler. But no high-sounding phrases can conceal the fact that the revolutionary armies of Russia have been sent into battle in the name of the imperialist designs of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and America. No arguments from Chernov, once a Zimmerwaldist[55] and now Lloyd George's partner, can conceal the fact that while the Russian Army and the Russian proletariat do not really pursue any annexationist aims, this does not in the least change the imperialist, predatory nature of the struggle between the two world trusts.

Until the secret treaties binding Russia to the imperialists of other countries are revised, and as long as Ribot, Lloyd George and Sonnino, Russia's allies, continue to talk about the annexationist aims of their foreign policy, the offensive of the Russian troops will continue to serve the imperialists.

Tsereteli and Chernov object, however, that they have repeatedly declared their renunciation of all annexations. So much the worse, we reply. That means your actions do not accord with your words, for your actions serve both Russian and foreign imperialism. And when you begin to co-operate actively with the imperialist "Allies" you render splendid service to the Russian counter-revolution. The joy of all the Black Hundreds and all counter-revolutionaries over the decisive turn in your policy is the best evidence of that. Yes, the Russian revolution has come to a turning-point. Through its "socialist" Ministers, the Russian Government has done something which the imperialist Ministers, Guchkov and Milyukov, could not do. It has put the Russian Army at the disposal of the general staffs and the diplomats who act in the name and on the basis of unabrogated secret treaties, in the name of designs frankly proclaimed by Ribot and Lloyd George. The government could only fulfil its task, however, because the army trusted and followed it. The army marched to death because it believed it was making sacrifices for freedom, the revolution and early peace.

But the army did so because it is only a part of the people, who at this stage of the revolution are following the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Menshevik parties. This general and basic fact, the trust of the majority in the petty-bourgeois policy of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries which is dependent on the capitalists, determines our Party's stand and conduct.

We shall keep up our efforts to expose government policy, resolutely warning the workers and soldiers, as in the past, against pinning their hopes on unco-ordinated and disorganised actions.

It is a question of a phase in the people's revolution. The Tseretelis and Chernovs, having become dependent on imperialism, are putting into effect a phase of petty-bour-

geois illusions and petty-bourgeois phrases, which serve to disguise the same old cynical imperialism.

This phase must be brought to an end. Let us help to end it as speedily and as painlessly as possible. This will rid the people of the last petty-bourgeois illusions and bring about the transfer of power to the revolutionary class.

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IN WHAT WAY DO YOU SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY AND MENSHEVIK GENTLEMEN DIFFER FROM PLEKHANOV?

Dyelo Naroda repeatedly called *Yedinstvo* social-imperialist. *Rabochaya Gazeta* officially condemned the election bloc with *Yedinstvo* (after elections had taken place to almost all the district councils).

Today, the offensive that has begun is clearing away the fog of empty phrases, showing the people the naked truth. Everyone sees that Plekhanov and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders *are at one* over the serious and important issue of the current offensive.

It means, therefore, that you—*Yedinstvo*, Kerensky and Chernov, Tsereteli and Skobelev—are all "social-imperialists" (to use *Dyelo Naroda*'s expression).

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HOW RODZYANKO IS TRYING TO JUSTIFY HIMSELF

Russkaya Volya No. 143 has published an interview with Rodzyanko, who regards as "unfair" the charge (made by *Pravda* and *Rabochaya Gazeta*) that he sheltered Malinovsky. It appears that *as early as April 22, 1914*, Junkovsky told Rodzyanko that Malinovsky was an agent provocateur but made Rodzyanko give his "word of honour" (!!!) that he would say nothing about it to anyone.

Incredible, but there it is. Rodzyanko pledged his "word of honour" to a member of the secret police and *told the Duma members nothing* about the agent provocateur. And our Party and the whole of society, among whom the agent provocateur Malinovsky was still operating, *continued to labour under a delusion*—because Rodzyanko had given the secret police his "word of honour" that he would *not betray the agent provocateur*.

How can we tolerate that?

How can we fail to consider Rodzyanko a criminal?

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TO WHAT STATE HAVE THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE MENSHEVIKS BROUGHT THE REVOLUTION?

They have brought it to a state of subjection to the imperialists.

The offensive is a renewal of the imperialist war. Nothing essential has changed in the relations between the two gigantic capitalist blocs waging war on one another. Even after the revolution of February 27, Russia remains under the complete sway of the capitalists, who are bound to Anglo-French imperialist capital by alliance and by the old, tsarist, secret treaties. Both the economics and politics of the continuing war are the same as before: the same old imperialist banking capital dominating economic life, the same old secret treaties, and the same old foreign policy of alliances of one group of imperialists against another.

The empty phrases of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are still empty phrases, in practice only serving to adorn the resumption of the imperialist war, which quite naturally meets with enthusiastic howls of approval from all the counter-revolutionaries, the whole bourgeoisie, and Plekhanov, "who tails after the bourgeois press", as the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta* put it, which itself tails after the whole horde of social-chauvinists.

But we must not overlook the distinguishing features of this particular resumption of the imperialist war. The resumption came after three months of hesitation, during which time the mass of workers and peasants thousands of times expressed their condemnation of a war of conquest (while continuing in practice to support the government of the predatory Russian bourgeoisie bent on conquest).

The masses hesitated, as though they were about to carry out *at home* the advice which the March 14 appeal to the peoples of the world gave *other* peoples, namely, "Refuse to serve as tools of conquest and violence in the hands of the *bankers*!" But here at home, in "revolutionary-democratic" Russia, the masses have remained in effect an instrument of conquest and violence in "the hands of the bankers".

A distinguishing feature of this situation is that it was created by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties at a time when the people enjoyed a comparatively large measure of freedom of- organisation. It is these parties that have gained the majority at the moment: the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Peasants' Congress have undoubtedly proved this.

It is these parties that are at present responsible for Russia's policy.

It is these parties that are responsible for the resumption of the imperialist war, for more hundreds of thousands of lives sacrificed virtually with the aim of enabling certain capitalists to "overcome" other capitalists, and for the further aggravation of the economic dislocation inevitably resulting from the offensive.

Here we had, in the purest form, the self-deception of the petty-bourgeois masses and the deception of them by the bourgeoisie with the aid of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. These parties both claim to be "revolutionary democrats". But in fact it was they who placed the people's fate in the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, the Cadets; it was they who deserted the revolution to continue the imperialist war, who deserted democracy to make "concessions" to the Cadets on the issue of power (take, for instance, the "confirmation" from above of the election of authorities by the local population), on the land issue (the Mensheviks' and Socialist-Revolutionaries' renunciation of *their own* programme, namely, to support the revolutionary actions of the peasants, *including confiscation* of the landed estates), and on the national question (defence of the undemocratic attitude of the Cadets towards the Ukraine and Finland).

The petty-bourgeois masses cannot help vacillating between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This has been

the case in all countries, especially between 1789 and 1871. And it is also the case in Russia. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have *induced the masses* to submit to the policy of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

That is the heart of the matter. That is the meaning of the offensive. That is the peculiarity of the situation: it was not violence, but trust in the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that led the people astray.

Will it be for long?

No, not long. The masses will learn from their own experience. The sad experience of the new stage of the war (a stage already begun), of further ruin accentuated by the offensive, will inevitably lead to the *political* downfall of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties

The task of the workers' party is, first of all, to help the masses realise and take proper account of this experience, to prepare properly for this great downfall, which will show the masses their true leader—the organised urban proletariat.

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July 5 (June 22), 1917

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CAN "JACOBINISM" FRIGHTEN THE WORKING CLASS?

The bourgeois and chauvinistic *Dyen*, an organ of "socialist thought" (don't laugh!), returns in issue No. 91 to *Rech*'s really interesting editorial of June 18. *Dyen* has completely failed to understand that editorial, in which a *historian* speaks out alongside an embittered counter-revolutionary bourgeois. *Dyen* reads into the editorial "the Cadets' intention—which has become a firm resolve—to withdraw from the coalition government".

That is nonsense. The Cadets threaten so as to frighten the Tseretelis and Chernovs. That is not serious.

What is serious and interesting is how the *Rech* editorial on June 18 posed the question of power from a historian's standpoint.

> "Whereas," he wrote, "with the previous government composition it was possible, at least to some extent, to direct the course of the Russian revolution, from now on it is apparently destined to develop in accordance with the spontaneous laws of all revolutions.... The inadvisability of the further existence of a government arrangement that has not justified itself is a question already being put not only by the Bolsheviks [note this: *not* only by the Bolsheviks!] ... and not only by the majority in the Soviet.... It is a question which the capitalist Ministers themselves must raise."

The historian is correct in admitting that *not* only the Bolsheviks, but the entire interrelation of classes, the life of society as a whole, has brought to the fore the question of "the inadvisability of the further existence of a government arrangement that has not justified itself". What we actually have is vacillation. The offensive is a possible road to victory for the imperialist bourgeoisie. Is there any other possible road?

The historian in *Rech* answers this question as follows:

"Once they have got 'all power' the Soviets will soon see that they have very little power. And they will have to make up for lack of power by resorting to the historically tested methods of the Young Turks[56] or the Jacobins.... Will they, once the whole issue has again been raised, be willing to stoop to Jacobinism and terrorism, or will they attempt to wash their hands of it? This is the pressing question that will be answered in a few days."

The historian is right. In a few days or not in a few days, that is the question that will soon be answered. *Either* the offensive, a turn to counter-revolution, a success (for how long?) for the cause of the imperialist bourgeoisie, "a washing of hands" by the Chernovs and Tseretelis, *or* "Jacobinism".

Bourgeois historians see Jacobinism as a fall ("to stoop"). Proletarian historians see Jacobinism as one of the highest *peaks* in the emancipation struggle of an oppressed class. The Jacobins gave France the best models of a democratic revolution and of resistance to a coalition of monarchs against a republic. The Jacobins were not destined to win complete victory, chiefly because eighteenth-century France was surrounded on the continent by much too backward countries, and because France herself lacked the material basis for socialism, there being no banks, no capitalist syndicates, no machine industry and no railways.

"Jacobinism" in Europe or on the boundary line between Europe and Asia in the twentieth century would be the rule of the revolutionary class, of the proletariat, which, supported by the peasant poor and taking advantage of the existing material basis for advancing to socialism, could not only provide all the great, ineradicable, unforgettable things provided by the Jacobins in the eighteenth century, but bring about a lasting world-wide victory for the working people.

It is natural for the bourgeoisie to hate Jacobinism. It is natural for the petty bourgeoisie to dread it. The class-conscious workers and working people generally put their trust in the transfer of power to the revolutionary, oppressed class, for *that* is the essence of Jacobinism, the only way out of the present crisis, and the only remedy for economic dislocation and the war.

Pravda No. 90,
July 7 (June 24), 1917

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THE NEED FOR AN AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS' UNION IN RUSSIA

ARTICLE ONE

There is a highly important question which the All-Russia Trade Union Conference now in session in Petrograd[57] should consider. It is the question of founding an all-Russia union of *agricultural labourers*.

All classes in Russia are organising. Only the class which is the most exploited and the poorest of all, the most disunited and downtrodden—the class of Russia's agricultural wage-labourers—seems to have been forgotten. In some non-Russian border regions, such as the Latvian territory, there are organisations of agricultural wage-labourers. The rural proletariat in the vast majority of the Great-Russian and Ukrainian gubernias has no class organisations.

It is the indisputable and paramount duty of the vanguard of Russia's proletariat, the industrial workers' trade unions, to come to the aid of their brothers, the rural workers. The difficulties involved in organising the rural workers are clearly enormous, as is borne out by the experience of other capitalist countries.

This makes it all the more necessary to set about using political liberty in Russia as speedily and vigorously as possible and to immediately found a country-wide union of agricultural labourers. This can and must be done by the trade union conference. It is the more experienced, more developed, more class-conscious representatives of the proletariat gathered at this conference who can and must issue a call to the rural workers, urging the latter to join them in the ranks of the independently organising workers, in the ranks of their trade unions. It is the wage-workers at the

factories who must take the initiative and use the trade union cells, groups and branches scattered all over Russia to awaken the rural worker to independent action and to active participation in the struggle to improve his position and uphold his class interests.

It may seem to many, and perhaps even to most at the moment, that with the peasants organising throughout Russia and calling for the abolition of private ownership of land and for "equalised" land tenure, this is not the right time to set up a rural workers' union.

Quite the contrary. This is precisely the time when it is particularly opportune and urgent. Those who share the proletarian class point of view can have no doubt as to the correctness of the proposition which the Mensheviks approved at the Stockholm Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1906 on the initiative of the Bolsheviks, and which has ever since been part of the R.S.D.L.P. programme. That proposition reads:

> "The Party should in *all* eventualities, and *whatever* the situation with regard to democratic agrarian reforms, consider it as its task to *steadfastly* strive for *independent class* organisation of the *rural proletariat* and explain to it the irreconcilable antithesis between its interests and the interests of the peasant bourgeoisie, to warn it against illusions about the small-holding system, which can never, as long as commodity production exists, do away with the poverty of the masses, and, lastly, to point to the need for a complete socialist revolution as the only means of abolishing all poverty and exploitation."

Every class-conscious worker, every union member, would agree that these propositions are correct. They must be carried out by the trade unions, since it is a question of *independent class organisation of the rural workers.*

We hope that at this revolutionary moment, when the urge to express themselves, to chart their own path, to see that life is not shaped anew without the workers themselves independently deciding labour issues, is making itself felt among the working people in general and the workers in particular—that at this time the trade unions will not confine themselves to narrow craft interests and forget their weaker brethren, the rural workers, but will exert all their energy to help them by founding a union of Russia's rural workers.

In the next article, we shall try to outline some practical steps in this direction.

ARTICLE TWO

In the previous article we dealt with the fundamental significance of a rural workers' union in Russia. Here we shall touch upon certain practical aspects of the question.

A union of Russia's rural workers should group all who are engaged mainly, *or even partly*, as labourers at agricultural undertakings.

Experience will show whether or not it will be necessary to subdivide these unions into those of pure agricultural labourers and those of part-time labourers. At any rate, this is not the main thing. The main thing is that the fundamental class interests of *all* who sell their labour power are identical and that the unity of *all* who gain at least part of their livelihood by hiring themselves out is absolutely necessary.

The wage-workers in the cities, in the factories, are bound by thousands and millions of ties with the wage-workers in the countryside. A call issued by the former to the latter cannot go unheeded. But issuing a call is not the only thing to be done. The urban workers have far more experience, knowledge, means and forces. *Some of their forces* should be directly used to *help* the rural workers *on to their feet*.

All organised workers should give one day's wages to promote and strengthen the unity of town and country wage-workers. Let a certain part of this sum be fully used as a contribution from the urban workers to the class unity of the rural workers. Let this fund be drawn on to cover the expenses of putting out a series of the most popular leaflets, of publishing a rural workers' newspaper—at least a weekly to begin with—and of sending at least a few agitators and organisers to the countryside *to immediately set up* unions of agricultural labourers in the various localities.

Only the experience gained by those unions themselves will help find the right method of furthering this work Each union should first of all try to improve the condition of those who sell their labour power to agricultural undertakings and to secure higher pay, better housing conditions, better food, etc.

A most determined war must be declared on the preconceived notion that the coming abolition of private landownership can "give land" to every farm-hand and day-labourer and undermine the very foundations of wage-labour in agriculture. This is a preconceived notion and, moreover, an extremely harmful one. The abolition of private landownership is a tremendous and unquestionably progressive reform that unquestionably meets the interests of economic development and the interests of the proletariat, a reform which every wage-worker will back to the utmost but which in no way eliminates wage-labour.

You cannot eat land. You cannot farm without livestock, implements, seed, a reserve of produce, or money. To rely on "promises" from anyone—that the wage-workers in the countryside will be "helped" to acquire livestock, implements, etc.—would be the worst kind of error, unpardonable naïveté.

The basic rule, the first commandment, of any trade union movement is not to rely on the "state" but to rely only on the *strength of one's own class*. The state is an organisation of the ruling class.

Don't rely on promises. Rely only on the strength of the unity and political consciousness of your class!

That is why it must be made the immediate task of the rural workers' trade union not only to fight for better conditions for the workers in general, but in particular *to defend their interests as a class* during the coming great land reform.

Many peasants and Socialist-Revolutionaries maintain that "labour power must be put at the disposal of the volost committees". The class of agricultural labourers holds the opposite view—it wants the volost committees to be put at the disposal of labour power! It is clear enough where the master and the labourer stand.

"Land for the whole people." This is correct. *But the people are divided into classes*. Every worker knows, sees, feels, experiences this truth which the bourgeoisie deliberately obscure and the *petty bourgeoisie always forget*.

When alone, a poor man is helpless. No "state" will help the rural wage-worker, the farm-hand, the day-labourer, the poor peasant, the semi-proletarian, *if he does not help*

himself. The first step in this direction is independent class organisation of the rural proletariat.

We hope the all-Russia trade union conference will tackle this task with the greatest energy, will issue a call to all Russia and hold out a helping hand, the mighty hand of the organised vanguard of the proletariat, to the rural workers.

Pravda Nos. 90 and 91,
July 7 (June 24) and July 8
(June 25), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
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A DISORDERLY REVOLUTION

"The Bolsheviks are to blame for everything"—this is agreed on both by the Cadets, who are leading the counter-revolution, and by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who call themselves "revolutionary democrats", probably because of their pretty little bloc's daily departures from the principles of democracy and revolution.

"The Bolsheviks are to blame for everything"—for the growing economic dislocation, against which no measures are being taken, for the poor state of food supplies, and for the "failure" of the Provisional Government over the Ukraine and Finland. You might well imagine that an evil Bolshevik had wormed his way into the midst of the modest, moderate, prudent Finns and "misled" the whole people!

The universal howl of anger and fury against the Bolsheviks, the dirty slander campaign carried on by the dirty Zaslavskys and the anonymous writers of *Rech* and *Rabochaya Gazeta* all indicate a desire, inevitable with representatives of a disorderly revolution, to vent their anger on someone over certain of their policy "failures".

The Cadets are the party of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. This has even been admitted by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik ruling bloc, which declared in a resolution passed by the Congress of Soviets that the resistance of the propertied classes is growing and that it constitutes the backbone of the counter-revolution. Yet this bloc, which *Rech* accuses daily of lack of character, has in turn formed a bloc with the Cadets and, moreover, a most original bloc, confirmed by the composition of the Provisional Government!

Russia is ruled by two blocs: the bloc of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the bloc of this bloc with the Cadets, who constitute a bloc with all the political

parties to the right of them. The inevitable result is a disorderly revolution, for all parts of this ruling "bloc of blocs" are loose.

The Cadets have no faith in their own republicanism, and this applies even more to the Octobrists[58] and the monarchists of other shades who are now hiding behind the Cadets and voting for them. The Cadets have no faith in the "social-bloc people", and they willingly use the Ministers of that bloc as errand boys for all kinds of "pacification" even as they hiss in anger and indignation at the "excessive demands" of the mass of peasants and the section of workers who have now entrusted themselves to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in response to pompous promises ("to satisfy the working people without offending the capitalists") but who are impudent enough to expect and demand the actual fulfilment of these promises!

The social-bloc people have no faith in each other: the Socialist-Revolutionaries have no faith in the Mensheviks, and vice versa. So far neither "spouse" has ventured an explicit and frank public statement, made officially and in a principled manner, as to how, why, for what purpose and to what extent the adherents of a Struvean, emasculated "Marxism" and the advocates of the "right to the land" have united. Unity is bursting at the seams even within each of the two "spouses"; the Socialist-Revolutionary Congress blackballed Kerensky by a vote of 136 to 134, which led to the withdrawal of "Grandmother"[59] herself from the Central Committee and to the Central Committee clarification saying that Kerensky had not been elected only because he was overburdened (unlike Chernov) with ministerial duties. The "Right" Socialist-Revolutionaries of *Volya Naroda* revile their party and its congress, and the Lefts, who have taken refuge in *Zemlya i Volya*,[60] have the audacity to maintain that the masses do not want this war, which they continue to regard as an imperialist war.

The Right wing of the Mensheviks has migrated to *Dyen*; it is headed by Potresov, at whom "love's tender glances" are cast by *Yedinstvo* itself (which only recently, during the Petrograd elections, was in a bloc with the whole Menshevik party). The Left-wing is sympathetic to internationalism and is founding its own paper. A bloc of the banks and the

Potresovs through *Dyen*; a bloc of all the Mensheviks, including Potresov and Martov, through a "united" Menshevik party.

Surely that is loose enough.

"Defencism" is doing a poor job of concealing this disorderly revolution, for even now, even after the resumption of the imperialist war, even amid the ecstatic cries evoked by the offensive, the "offensive" of Potresov's followers against his opponents in one alliance, and of Kerensky's followers against his opponents in the other alliance, has gained in intensity.

The "revolutionary democrats" no longer believe in the revolution. They are afraid of democracy. They fear a break with the Anglo-French capitalists more than anything else and they fear the displeasure of the Russian capitalists. ("Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution"—Minister Chernov "himself" has come to believe in this "truth", so amusingly distorted by Dan, Tsereteli, and Skobelev.) The Cadets hate the revolution and democracy.

Surely that is loose enough.

The universal savage howl of anger and fury against the Bolsheviks is a common complaint by the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks about their own looseness.

They are in the majority. They are in power. They have formed a bloc with one another. And they see that nothing comes of their efforts!! How can they help raging against the Bolsheviks?

The revolution has posed problems of unusual difficulty, of colossal importance, of world-wide scope. It is impossible either to cope with economic dislocation or to break free from the terrible grip of the imperialist war without taking the most drastic revolutionary measures that will be backed by the unbounded heroism of the oppressed and exploited and without them trusting and supporting their organised vanguard, the proletariat.

The masses are still looking for the "easiest" way out—through the bloc of the Cadets with the bloc of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

But there is no way out.

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July 8 (June 25), 1917

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A CLASS SHIFT

Every revolution, if it is a real revolution, amounts to a class shift. Therefore, the best way of enlightening the people, and of fighting those who deceive the people by invoking the revolution, is to analyse the class shift that has taken or is taking place in the present revolution.

From 1904 to 1916, in the last years of tsarism, the relative positions of the classes in Russia became particularly clear. A handful of semi-feudal landowners, headed by Nicholas II, was in power and maintained the closest alliance with the financial magnates who were reaping profits unheard of in Europe and for whose benefit predatory treaties were concluded with foreign countries.

The liberal bourgeoisie, led by the Cadets, were in opposition. They were more afraid of the people than of reaction and were moving closer and closer to power by compromising with the monarchy.

The people, i.e., the workers and peasants, whose leaders had been driven underground, were revolutionary. They constituted the "revolutionary democrats"—proletarian and petty-bourgeois.

The revolution of February 27, 1917, swept away the monarchy and put the liberal bourgeoisie in power, who, operating in direct concord with the Anglo-French imperialists, had wanted a minor court revolution. Under no circumstances were they willing to go beyond a constitutional monarchy with an electoral system conditioned by various qualifications. And when the revolution actually went further, completely abolishing the monarchy and establishing Soviets (of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants'

Deputies), the entire liberal bourgeoisie became counter-revolutionary.

Now, four months after the revolution, the counter-revolutionary character of the Cadets, the main party of the liberal bourgeoisie, is as clear as day. Everyone sees that. And everyone is compelled to admit it. But not nearly everyone is willing to face up to it and think about what it implies.

Russia today is a democratic republic governed by a free agreement between *political parties* which are freely advocating their views among the people. The four months since February 27 have fully consolidated and given final shape to *all* parties of any importance, showed them up during the elections (to the Soviets and to local bodies), and revealed their links with the various classes.

In Russia, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie are in power today, while the petty-bourgeois democrats, namely, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, have become "His Majesty's opposition".[61] The policy of these parties is essentially one of *compromise* with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeois democrats are rising to power by filling local bodies to begin with (just as the liberals did under tsarism—by first winning places in the zemstvos[62]). These petty-bourgeois democrats want *to share power* with the bourgeoisie but not overthrow them, in exactly the same way as the Cadets wanted to share power with the monarchy but not overthrow it. The petty-bourgeois democrats (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks) compromise with the Cadets because of the close class kinship between the petty and the big bourgeoisie, just as the class kinship between the capitalist and the landowner, living in the twentieth century, made them embrace each other at the feet of their "adored" monarch.

It is the *form* of compromise that has changed. Under the monarchy it was crude, and the tsar allowed a Cadet no further than the Duma backyard. In a democratic republic, compromise has become as refined as in Europe, the petty bourgeoisie being permitted, in a harmless minority, to occupy harmless (for capital) posts in the Ministry.

The Cadets have taken the place of the monarchy. The Tseretelis and Chernovs have taken the place of the Cadets.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Proletarian democracy has taken the place of a *truly* revolutionary democracy.

The imperialist war has hastened developments fantastically. Had it not been for this war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks might have sighed for decades for ministerial posts. The same war, however, is hastening further developments. For it *poses* problems in a revolutionary rather than a reformist manner.

The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties could have given Russia many a reform by agreement with the bourgeoisie. But the objective situation in world politics is revolutionary and it *cannot be dealt with* by reforms.

The imperialist war is crushing the peoples and threatens to crush them completely. The petty-bourgeois democrats can perhaps stave off disaster for a while. But it is only the revolutionary proletariat that can prevent a tragic end.

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MIRACLES OF REVOLUTIONARY ENERGY

Our near-socialist Ministers are developing near-incredible energy. Peshekhonov has declared that "the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken" and that everything we have here in Holy Russia will be "equitably" distributed. Skobelev has declared that the capitalists will have to give up 100 per cent of their profits. Tsereteli has declared that the offensive in this imperialist war is the most righteous thing from the point of view of both democracy and socialism.

But Minister Chernov has without a doubt outdone everyone in these manifestations of miraculous energy. At the last meeting of the Provisional Government, Chernov made the Cadet gentlemen hear his report on the general policy of the department entrusted to him, and said he was introducing as many as *ten* Bills!

Surely that was a miracle of revolutionary energy. Less than six weeks have passed since May 6, and yet as many as ten Bills have been *promised* in this short period! And what Bills! The ministerial *Dyelo Naroda* reports that these Bills "in their totality encompass all the principal aspects of the economic activity of the countryside".

"All aspects"—no more no less. What a whopper!

The only suspicious thing is that the ministerial newspaper devotes more than one hundred lines to a description of *some* of those splendid Bills without saying anything definite *about any* of them. "Suspension of certain legislative acts concerning the peasants"—we are not told which. The Bill on the "courts of conciliation" is the most interesting. We are not told who are to be conciliated and how.

"The regulation of rent relations"—we are kept completely in the dark; we are not even told whether it is a question of leasing the landed estates, which are expected to be expropriated without compensation.

"A reform in the sense of greater democratisation of the local land committees." Wouldn't it be better if you authors of sweeping promises immediately listed at least a dozen local land committees, giving, in exact terms, their present, post-revolutionary, yet, according to your own admission, not fully democratic composition?

The point is that the tireless activity of Minister Chernov, as well as of the other Ministers mentioned above, is the best illustration of the difference between a liberal bureaucrat and a revolutionary democrat.

The liberal bureaucrat submits to his "higher-ups", i.e., Lvov, Shingaryov and Co., voluminous reports on hundreds of Bills that are supposed to benefit mankind. All he offers the people is palaver, fine promises, Nozdrev[63] phrases (such as the one about 100 per cent profit or a "socialist" offensive at the front, and so on).

The revolutionary democrat, while submitting a report to his "higher-ups", or even before submitting it, reveals and exposes every evil and every shortcoming before the people to arouse *their* activity.

"Peasants, expose the landowners, expose how much they take from you by way of 'rent', how much they have had adjudged to them in the 'courts of conciliation' or the local land committees, how much cavilling or interference they have been guilty of as regards cultivating all the lands and using the landowners' implements and livestock to meet the needs of the people, particularly the poorest sections! Expose it yourselves, peasants, and I, 'a minister of revolutionary Russia', 'a minister of the revolutionary democrats', shall *help* you to publish all such exposures and to remove all oppression through your pressure from the bottom and mine from the top!!!" Surely, this is how a true "revolutionary democrat" would speak and act.

Nothing of the kind here! Nothing at all! Here is the language used by the ministerial newspaper in regard to Chernov's "report" to Lvov and Co. "While he does not deny that there are a number of agrarian excesses in some

gubernias, V. M. Chernov thinks that, on the whole, rural Russia has proved to be much more balanced than one would have expected....”

Yet not a word was said about the *hold-up* of the only Bill named specifically—the one about “suspending the sale and purchase of land”. For the peasants had long since been promised the immediate suspension of sale and purchase. It was promised as early as May, but on June 25 we read in the papers that Chernov had presented a “report” and that the Provisional Government “has not yet taken a final decision”!!!

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PHRASES AND FACTS

Minister Skobelev has published an appeal to all workers of Russia. In the name of "our" (that is what it says: our) socialist ideal, in the name of the revolution, on behalf of revolutionary democrats, and so on, and so forth, he urges the workers to accept "courts of conciliation" and severely condemns all "unauthorised" actions.

This is how well the near-socialist Minister Skobelev the Menshevik sings his part:

> "You [workers] have every reason to be outraged by the enrichment of the propertied classes that has been taking place during this war, The tsar's government has wasted thousands of millions of the people's money. The revolutionary government must restore this money to the people's treasury."

He sings well, but where will he alight?

Mr. Skobelev's appeal was published on June 28. The coalition Ministry was formed on May 6. But during all this time, in which economic dislocation and an unprecedented catastrophe have been advancing on the country with seven-league strides, the government has not taken a single real step against the capitalists who have made "*thousands of millions*". To "*restore*" these thousands of millions "*to the people's treasury*", a law should have been enacted on *May 7* abolishing all commercial and bank secrecy and establishing immediate control over the capitalist banks and syndicates, for otherwise it is *impossible to find*, let alone "restore", these thousands of millions.

Does the Menshevik Minister Skobelev really imagine that the workers are babes in the wood whom one can feed with promises of the impossible (for it is impossible to

"restore" the "thousands of millions"—may God help us to end plunder of the state and to restore at least one or two hundred millions) without doing the *possible* and the necessary for weeks on end?

As luck would have it, on the very same day the Menshevik Minister Skobelev presented the workers with another basketful of the most florid republican, revolutionary and "socialist" phrases, Comrade Avilov, who wants to "unite" the defencists (i.e., the chauvinists) with the workers, hit on the unusually, extraordinarily fortunate idea of contributing an article to *Novaya Zhizn* in which he *gave facts* without making deductions.

Nothing on earth could be more eloquent than these simple facts.

On May 5, the coalition Ministry was formed. In a solemn declaration it *promised control*, and even "organisation of production".

On May 16, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet adopted "directions" for its Ministers, demanding "the immediate [listen to this!] and most energetic realisation [this is how it reads, believe it or not!] of government regulation of production", and so on, and so forth.

Energetic realisation began.

On May 19, Konovalov resigned, making a very "energetic" statement against "the extreme socialists"! On June 1, the All-Russia conference of representatives of industry and commerce took place. The conference declared emphatically *against* control. The three Deputy Ministers remaining after Konovalov's resignation began to "realise energetically": in the conflict of the Donets mine owners (who are wrecking the industry by a "go-slow strike"), Stepanov, the first Deputy Minister, backed the *employers*. After that the employers rejected all Skobelev's conciliatory proposals.

Palchinsky, the second Deputy Minister, sabotaged the "fuel conference".

Savvin, the third Deputy Minister, instituted "a crude and even silly caricature" of regulation in the form of an "inter-departmental conference".

On June 10, first Deputy Minister Stepanov presented a "report" to the Provisional Government *taking issue* with the Executive Committee's programme.

On June 21, the Congress of Soviets passed another resolution.

The people began to set up supply committees on their own initiative, from below. From above, a chief "Economic Council" was promised. Second Deputy Minister Palchinsky explained: "It is hard to say when it [the Economic Council] will begin to function."

It sounds like mockery, but these are the facts.

The capitalists mock at the workers, at the people, by continuing the policy of secret lock-outs and of concealing their outrageous profits, and send the Skobelevs, Tseretelis and Chernovs to "reassure" the workers with empty phrases.

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HOW THE CAPITALISTS CONCEAL THEIR PROFITS

CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF CONTROL

How much they talk about control! And how *little* it all means. How they dodge the issue by resorting to general phrases, grandiloquent turns of speech, and solemn "projects" doomed for ever to remain projects only.

Now the issue is that unless commercial and bank secrecy is abolished, and unless a law is immediately passed making the books of commercial firms open to the trade unions, all phrases on control and all projects for it will be so much meaningless verbiage.

Here is a small but instructive illustration. A comrade who is a bank employee has sent us the following information showing how profits are concealed in official reports.

On May 7, 1917, *Vestnik Finansov*[64] No. 18 published a report of the Petrograd Loan and Discount Bank. The report gives the bank's net profit as 13,000,000 rubles (the exact figure is 12,960,000; we shall use round numbers in the text and give exact figures in parentheses).

On closer scrutiny, a well-informed person will see at once that that is *not the whole profit at all* and that a considerable part of the profit is cleverly concealed under other items, so that no "tax", "compulsory loan" and, in general, no financial measure will ever bring it out unless commercial and bank secrecy is completely abolished. Indeed, the amount of 5,500,000 rubles is given as reserve capital. Profits are quite often entered for concealment as so-called reserves, or reserve capital. If I am a millionaire who has made a profit of 17,000,000 rubles and wants to reserve 5,000,000, I only have to enter this 5,000,000 as "reserve capital" to do the

trick! In this way I *dodge* all the various laws on "state control", "state taxation of profits" and so on.

Again, the report indicates slightly less than 1,000,000 rubles (825,000) as money made in interest and commissions. "The question is," writes the bank employee, "what are the sums that generally constitute the bank's profit, since the money made in interest is not listed under profits??"

Moreover, the sum of 300,000 rubles, listed as remaining profit made in previous years, *is not included in the total profits*! Together, then, with the foregoing item, we have more than another sweet million in profit hidden away. Similarly, the sum of 224,000 rubles of "unpaid dividends to shareholders" *is missing* in the total profit, although everyone knows that dividends are paid out of net profits.

Furthermore, the report lists the sum of 3,800,000 rubles as "carry-overs". "Whoever has not taken a direct part in the business will find it hard to establish what these carry-overs are," the comrade writes. "One thing is certain: in preparing a report, one can easily conceal a part of the profit by listing it under 'carry-overs' and then transferring it to 'where it belongs'."

To sum up. The profit has been listed as 13,000,000 rubles, but, in point of fact, it must be somewhere between 19 and 24 million, or almost 80 per cent profit on a basic capital of 30 million.

Isn't it obvious that the government's threats to the capitalists, the government's promises to the workers, the government's Bills and laws aimed at taking 90 per cent of the profits of the big capitalists are useless, absolutely useless, as long as there is commercial and bank secrecy?

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CRISIS IS APPROACHING, DISLOCATION IS INCREASING

We are compelled to sound the alarm daily. All kinds of foolish people have accused us of being "too much in a hurry" to transfer all state power to the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. They think it would be more "moderate and proper"[65] to "wait" with dignity for a dignified Constituent Assembly.

Today, even the most foolish of those petty-bourgeois fools can see that reality will not wait and that it is not we but *economic dislocation* that is "*in a hurry*".

Petty-bourgeois cowardice, as typified by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, has resolved: let us for the time being leave all affairs in the hands of the capitalists. Perhaps dislocation will "wait" until the Constituent Assembly meets!

Day by day facts prove that dislocation will probably not wait until the Constituent Assembly meets and that the crash will come earlier.

Take, for example, facts published today. The Economic Department of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies has resolved "to inform the Provisional Government" that "the metal industry of the Moscow area (fifteen gubernias) is in an extremely critical state", that "*the Goujon works management is clearly disorganising production, deliberately trying to bring the works to a standstill*", and that for this reason "state power [left by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the hands of the *party of the Goujons*, the party of the counter-revolutionary capitalists who resort to lock-outs] must take over the management of the works ... and provide operating funds".

Operating funds to the tune of up to five million rubles are required urgently.

The meeting (of the Economic Department and a delegation from the Department of Supplies of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies) "calls the attention of the Provisional Government [poor, innocent, childishly-uninformed Provisional Government! It knew nothing about it! It is blameless! It will learn; the Dans and Cherevanins, the Avksentyevs and Chernovs will exhort and persuade it!] to the fact that the Moscow Factory Meeting and the Provisional Bureau of the Committee of Supplies of the Moscow Region *have already had to intervene in order to prevent* the stoppage of the Kolomna locomotive works, as well as the Sormovo works and the Bryansk works in Bezhetsk. All the same, the Sormovo works is now at a standstill owing to a strike, and the other works may stop at any moment...."

Catastrophe will not wait. It is advancing with terrific speed. Writing about the Donets area, A. Sandomirsky, who no doubt knows the facts very well, says in today's *Novaya Zhizn*:

> "The vicious circle—lack of coal, lack of metal, lack of engines and rolling stock, suspension of production—is growing wider. And while coal is being burned and metal piles up at the works, it cannot be obtained where it is needed."

The government, supported by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, simply *obstructs* the struggle against economic dislocation. Sandomirsky reports it as a fact that Palchinsky, Deputy Minister of Commerce and virtual colleague of the Tseretelis and Chernovs, has responded to the complaint of the manufacturers by prohibiting (!!) "self-appointed" (!!) control commissions from acting on the inquiry instituted by the Donets committee to determine the quantity of metal available.

Just think what a madhouse this is: the country is on the rocks, the people are on the verge of famine and disaster, there is a shortage of coal and iron although they can be mined, the Donets committee is conducting an inquiry *through the Soviets* of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies concerning the quantity of metal, i.e., is looking for iron for the people. On the other hand, a servant of the manufacturers, of the capitalists, Minister Palchinsky, in league with

the Tseretelis and Chernovs, prohibits the inquiry. Meanwhile the crisis is mounting and catastrophe is drawing even nearer.

Where and how does one get the money? It is easy enough to "demand" five million for one factory, but surely one must realise that much more is needed for all the factories.

Isn't it obvious that *no money can be obtained* unless the measure we have been demanding and advocating *since early April* is adopted, unless all the banks are consolidated into one bank and brought under control, and unless commercial secrecy is abolished?

The Goujons and the other capitalists, with the co-operation of the Palchinskys, are "deliberately" (this word was used by the Economic Department) trying to bring production to a standstill. The government is *on their side*. The Tseretelis and Chernovs are mere ornaments or just pawns.

Isn't it high time you gentlemen realised that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks *as parties* will have to answer to the people for the catastrophe?

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JUST HOW IS IT TO BE DONE?

Rabochaya Gazeta is disturbed about the political significance of the offensive. One of its contributors even reproaches another, saying that the latter's evasive phrases ultimately amount to an admission that, objectively, the Russian revolutionary army is now shedding its blood for the annexationist plans of the Allied bourgeoisie rather than for peace without annexations (*Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 93, page 2, column 1).

Now this "objective" significance of the offensive is bound to disturb the workers, some of whom are still following the Mensheviks. And this is also reflected in the columns of *Rabochaya Gazeta*. Not wishing to venture upon an open break with the workers, the paper is trying to somehow link the "offensive" with the revolutionary proletarian peace struggle. Unfortunately for the cunning editors, the only connection that can be established here is a *negative* one.

It would be difficult to imagine more pitiful and confused people than these respectable editors frightened by those very spirits which they, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, have conjured up.

On the one hand, *Rabochaya Gazeta* reports that "the West now sees the significance of the Russian offensive in an entirely false light. The British and French bourgeois newspapers regard it as a renunciation of the Soviet's 'utopian' plans. Chauvinist resolutions are being passed under the pretext of hailing Kerensky and the advancing revolutionary

army. And while the war drums thunder for the Russian offensive, the persecution of those who hold the same views as the Russian democrats and accept the same peace policy is growing".

A very valuable admission! All the more so because it comes from a ministerial newspaper which only yesterday considered our forecasts of these *inevitable* consequences of the offensive to be prompted by Bolshevik malice. It turns out that the question is not of our "malice" at all, but of the fact that the policy adopted by the leaders of the Soviet has its own *logic* and that this logic leads to the strengthening of the *anti-revolutionary* forces in and outside Russia.

It is this unpleasant fact that *Rabochaya Gazeta* would like to gloss over somehow. The method suggested by the editors is very simple: "It is urgently necessary that the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, together with the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, should issue an explicit and categorical statement to the effect that, as far as Russian democrats are concerned, the aims of the war remain the same as before", and so on, and so forth. You see how resolutely the Mensheviks fight against the imperialist war: they are willing to make another urgent and categorical statement. The number of the most "urgent", most "categorical", and most "impassioned" statements that have already been made! How many more times will it be necessary to repeat those categorical statements as speedily as possible to moderate with words, if only a little, the *actions* of a government which the ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta* fully supports!

Really, gentlemen, your most "categorical" words, declarations and notes cannot alleviate the facts which you yourselves report. Those facts can only be countered by *actions* which would *actually* mark a break with the policy of continuing the *imperialist* war. The government of Lvov-Tereshchenko-Shingaryov-Kerensky-Tsereteli cannot do that. All it can do is confirm, by its cowardly and pitiful policy towards Finland and the Ukraine, its complete inability to carry out its most "categorical" statements about "no annexations" and about the "right" to self-determination. Under these circumstances, all those promised declarations will

serve as a means of lulling the people. Lulling the people with high-sounding declarations instead of waging a "proletarian peace struggle"—this is *Rabochaya Gazeta*'s programme, this is its real answer to the growth of the anti-revolutionary forces due to the offensive.

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HOW AND WHY THE PEASANTS WERE DECEIVED

It is known that when peasant deputies from all over Russia arrived in Petrograd for their All-Russia Congress, they were promised—by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and by the government—that the sale and purchase of land would be immediately prohibited.

At first, Minister Pereverzev really wanted to carry out that promise, and sent a telegram to stop all transactions involving the sale or purchase of land. But later some invisible hand intervened, and Minister Pereverzev withdrew his telegram to the notaries public, i.e., again permitted the sale and purchase of land.

The peasants began to worry. If I am not mistaken, they even sent a delegation to the Ministry.

The peasants were reassured. They were soothed as one soothes little children. They were assured that a *law* would be issued immediately prohibiting the sale and purchase of land and that Pereverzev's temporary order had been "suspended" "*only*" because such a law was about to be issued.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries reassured the peasants and fed them with promises. The peasants believed them. The peasants felt reassured. The peasants went home.

Weeks passed.

On June 24—no earlier—news appeared in the papers that Minister Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, had submitted a Bill to the government (no more than a Bill, as yet) to prohibit the sale and purchase of land.

On June 29, the papers published reports about a "private conference" of the Duma, held on June 28. At the conference,

according to *Rech* (a paper of the majority party in the Provisional Government), Mr. Rodzyanko

"in his concluding remarks dwelt on the question of land transactions in connection with the new [oh yes, exceedingly new, new in the extreme!] government measures. He maintained that if land deals were prohibited, land would lose its value [for whom? For the landowners, obviously!! But isn't it from them that the peasants want to take the land?], all security for loans would depreciate, and the landowners [the former landowners, Mr. Rodzyanko!] would be denied all credit. From what funds, asked Rodzyanko, will the landowners pay their debts to the banks? In most cases the debts are already overdue, and this Bill would lead to the immediate and legitimate abolition of all landed property without auctions.

"In view of this, Rodzyanko proposed that the conference should instruct the Provisional Committee to examine the matter in order to *endeavour to prevent the enactment of a law* that would be fatal to the state, not to private ownership of land."

Here, then, is the "invisible hand" made visible! Here is the "cunning mechanism" of the coalition government, with its near-socialist Ministers, given away by this gentleman, this former Chairman of the former Duma, this former landowner, this former confidant of Stolypin the Hangman, this former protector of the agent provocateur Malinovsky—Mr. Rodzyanko!

Let us even assume that now that Mr. Rodzyanko has so clumsily let the cat out of the bag, the law prohibiting the sale and purchase of land will at last be passed. At last!

But that is not the whole point. The point is that this striking example should make clear to all of us, and help the peasants understand, *how and why the peasants were deceived.* For the fact is incontrovertible and indubitable: they have deceived the peasants by *not* fulfilling immediately what they had promised to fulfil immediately at the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

How did they deceive the peasants? By feeding them with promises. That is the "cunning mechanism" of every coalition government on earth, i.e., of every bourgeois Ministry which includes traitors to socialism. In these Ministries, former socialists serve—whether consciously or not makes no difference—as tools with which the capitalists deceive the people.

Why were-the peasants deceived? Because the tools of deceit, the Socialist-Revolutionaries—we shall make the

most favourable assumption about them—*themselves failed to understand* the cunning mechanism of class domination and class policy in the present administration of Russia. The Socialist-Revolutionaries allowed themselves to be led astray by talk. But actually, as the Rodzyanko "incident" shows very well, Russia is being ruled by a bloc between two blocs, by an alliance between two alliances.

One bloc is the bloc of the Cadets and the monarchist landowners, among whom Mr. Rodzyanko ranks first. The existence of this bloc as a political fact was shown to the whole of Russia during the Petrograd elections, when *all* the Black Hundred papers, *all* the papers to the right of the Cadets, supported the Cadets. Thanks to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, this bloc has a *majority* in the government. This bloc delayed the prohibition of transactions involving the sale and purchase of land. It is supporting the landowners and the *capitalists responsible for the lock-outs.*

The second bloc is that of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, which has deceived the people by empty promises. Skobelev and Tsereteli, Peshekhonov and Chernov promised an awful lot. It is easy to make promises. The "socialist" Ministers' method of feeding the people with promises has been tried in *every* advanced country in the world and has everywhere ended in failure. Russia's specific feature is that owing to the revolutionary situation in the country the failure of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties will be worse and will come sooner than usual.

Let every worker and every soldier use this example, which is particularly instructive to the peasants, to fully explain to the peasants *how and why they were deceived*!

The peasants can only achieve their ends in alliance with the workers, not in a bloc (alliance) with the capitalists.

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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

Mr. N. Rostov quotes in the ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta* several excerpts from soldiers' letters which attest to the extreme ignorance of the peasants. The author, according to his own words, has at his disposal a bulky batch of letters sent to the Agitation Department of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies from every part of the country. He says that all the letters clamour for one and the same thing: Papers, send us papers!

The Menshevik writer suddenly exclaims in alarm: "If the revolution does not get through to them [the peasants] as a clear fact of great usefulness, they will rise against the revolution...." The peasants are "as ignorant as ever".

The Menshevik and ministerial official was a bit late in becoming alarmed over his batch of letters. More than seven weeks have passed since May 6, when the Mensheviks began to serve the capitalists, and in all this time bourgeois counter-revolutionary lies and slander against the revolution have been pouring freely into the countryside through the bourgeois papers, which have become dominant, through the direct and indirect servants and supporters of the capitalist government backed by the Mensheviks.

If the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had not been betraying the revolution and supporting the counter-revolutionary Cadets, power would have been in the hands of the Executive Committee since early May. The Executive Committee could immediately have established a state monopoly over private advertising in the press, and could thus have obtained *tens of millions* of newspaper copies for *free* distribution in the countryside. The large printing

presses and stocks of newsprint would have been used by the Executive Committee to enlighten the peasants and not to befog them through a dozen or so bourgeois, counter-revolutionary newspapers which have virtually *seized the key role* in the newspaper business.

The Executive Committee could then have disbanded the Duma, and, having saved the people's money on this—not to speak of many other things—it could have spent that money on sending a thousand agitators, or even thousands of them, to the countryside.

In times of revolution, procrastination is often equivalent to a complete betrayal of the revolution. Responsibility for the delay in the transfer of power to the workers, soldiers and peasants, for the delay in carrying through revolutionary measures to enlighten the ignorant peasants, rests wholly on the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

They have betrayed the revolution on this matter. *They* bear the blame for the fact that the workers and soldiers are forced to limit themselves to primitive means in the fight against the counter-revolutionary bourgeois press and agitation, whereas they could and should have had *nation-wide means* for the purpose.

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WHAT COULD THE CADETS HAVE COUNTED ON WHEN THEY WITHDREW FROM THE CABINET?[66]

The question arises quite naturally. To correctly meet events with definite tactics, we must understand them correctly. How, then, are we to understand the Cadet withdrawal?

Spite? Disagreement in principle over the Ukraine? Of course not. It would be ridiculous to suspect the Cadets of loyalty to principles, or the bourgeoisie of the ability to do something out of spite.

The Cadet withdrawal can only be understood as a calculated move. What are their calculations?

To govern a country which has carried out a major revolution and is still in a state of unrest, and to govern it during a world-wide imperialist war, you need the initiative and scope of a truly revolutionary class—massively courageous, historically great, wholeheartedly enthusiastic. Either you suppress this class by force, as the Cadets have been preaching for some time, since May 6 in fact, or you entrust yourself to its leadership. Either you are in alliance with imperialist capital, then you must take the offensive, you must be an obedient servant of capital, you must sell yourself to it, you must throw overboard the utopian ideas of abolishing landed property without compensation (see *Birzhevka* for Lvov's speeches against Chernov's programme); or you are against imperialist capital, then you must immediately propose precise peace terms to all nations, because they have all been exhausted by the war, you must dare to raise, and be able to raise, the banner of world proletarian revolution against capital, and to do so not in words but in deeds, to further the revolution with the greatest determination in Russia herself.

The Cadets are wily businessmen in trade, in finance, in safeguarding capital, as well as in politics. They have correctly taken into account the fact that the situation is *objectively* a revolutionary one. They agree to reforms and enjoy sharing power with the reformists, the Tseretelis and Chernovs. But reforms will not help. There is *no* way out of the crisis, the war and economic disruption, through reforms.

From their class point of view, from the imperialist exploiters' point of view, the Cadets have calculated correctly. They seem to say: "By withdrawing, we present an ultimatum. We know that at present the Tseretelis and Chernovs do not trust the truly revolutionary class, that at present they do not want to conduct a truly revolutionary policy. Let's frighten them. To be without the Cadets means being without the 'aid' of world-wide Anglo-American capital, means raising the banner of revolution against the latter *as well*. The Tseretelis and Chernovs wouldn't do that, they wouldn't dare! They will give in to us!

"If not, then even if a revolution against capital starts, it will fail and we shall come back."

That is how the Cadets calculate. We repeat: from the point of view of the exploiting class, their calculations are correct.

Were the Tseretelis and Chernovs to take the point of view of the exploited class and not that of the vacillating petty bourgeoisie, they would reply to the Cadets' correct calculations by correct adherence to the revolutionary proletariat's policy.

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ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS!

"Drive nature out of the door and she will rush back through the window." It seems that the ruling Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties have to "learn" this simple truth time and again by their own experience. They undertook to be "revolutionary democrats" and found themselves in the shoes of revolutionary democrats—they are now forced to draw the conclusions which every revolutionary democrat must draw.

Democracy is the rule of the majority. As long as the will of the majority was not clear, as long as it was possible to make it out to be unclear, at least with a grain of plausibility, the people were offered a counter-revolutionary bourgeois government disguised as "democratic". But this delay could not last long. During the several months that have passed since February 27 the will of the majority of the workers and peasants, of the overwhelming majority of the country's population, has become clear in more than a general sense. Their will has found expression in mass organisations—the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

How, then, can anyone oppose the transfer of all power in the state to the Soviets? Such opposition means nothing but renouncing democracy! It means no more no less than imposing on the people a government which *admittedly* can neither come into being nor hold its ground *democratically*, i.e., as a result of truly free, truly popular elections.

It is a fact, strange as it may seem at first sight, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have *forgotten* this perfectly simple, perfectly obvious and palpable truth.

Their position is so false, and they are so badly confused and bewildered, that they are unable to "recover" this truth they have lost. Following the elections in Petrograd and in Moscow, the convocation of the All-Russia Peasant Congress, and the Congress of Soviets, the classes and parties throughout Russia have shown what they stand for so clearly and specifically that people who have not gone mad or deliberately got themselves into a mess simply cannot have any illusions on this score.

To tolerate the Cadet Ministers or the Cadet government or Cadet policies means challenging democrats and democracy. This is the source of the political crises since February 27, and this is also the source of the shakiness and vacillation of our government system. At every turn, daily and even hourly, appeals are being made to the people's revolutionary spirit and to their democracy on behalf of the most authoritative government institutions and congresses. Yet the government's policies in general, and its foreign and economic policies in particular, are all departures from revolutionary principles, and breaches of democracy.

This sort of thing will not do.

It is inevitable that a situation like the present should show elements of instability now for one reason, now for another. And it is not exactly a clever policy to jib. Things are moving by fits and starts towards a point where power will be transferred to the Soviets, which is what our Party called for long ago.

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WHERE IS STATE POWER AND WHERE IS COUNTER-REVOLUTION?

This question is usually answered quite simply: there is no counter-revolution at all or we do not know where it is. But we know full well where power is. It is in the hands of the Provisional Government, which is controlled by the Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.) of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies. This is the usual answer.

Yesterday's political crisis,[67] like most types of crises, which tear down everything conventional and shatter all illusions, left in its wake the ruins of the illusions expressed in the usual answers—cited above—to the basic questions of any revolution.

There is a former member of the Second Duma, Alexinsky, whom the *Socialist-Revolutionaries* and *Mensheviks*, the ruling parties in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, *refused* to admit on to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies *until he rehabilitated himself*, i.e., until he redeemed his honour.[68]

What was the trouble? Why did the Executive Committee publicly and formally deny Alexinsky its confidence, demanding that he redeem his honour, i.e., declaring him dishonest?

It was because Alexinsky had made himself so notorious by libellous statements that he had been branded a slanderer in Paris by journalists of the most diverse parties. Alexinsky did not bother to redeem his honour before the Executive Committee. He preferred to hide himself in Plekhanov's newspaper *Yedinstvo*, appearing first under initials, and then, after he had plucked up courage, under his full name.

On July 4, yesterday afternoon, a few Bolsheviks were warned by friends that Alexinsky had laid before the Petrograd journalists' committee some new malicious libel. Most of those who received the warning ignored it completely, treating Alexinsky and his "work" with disdainful contempt. But one Bolshevik, Jugashvili (Stalin), a member of the Central Executive Committee, who as a Georgian Social-Democrat had known Comrade Chkheidze for a long time, spoke to the latter at a meeting of the C.E.C. about Alexinsky's new infamous slander campaign.

This happened late at night, but Chkheidze declared that the C.E.C. could not be indifferent to the spreading of libel by people who are afraid of open court and an investigation by the C.E.C. In his own name, as Chairman of the C.E.C., and in the name of Tsereteli, a member of the Provisional Government, Chkheidze immediately *telephoned* all newspaper offices, suggesting that they *refrain from publishing Alexinsky's libel*. Chkheidze told Stalin that most papers had expressed readiness to comply with his request, and that only *Yedinstvo* and *Rech* had "kept silent" for a time (we have not seen *Yedinstvo*, but *Rech* has *not* printed the libel). As a result, the libel appeared only on the pages of a petty, yellow, and to most intelligent people completely unknown paper, *Zhivoye Slovo*[69] No. 51 (404), whose editor and publisher signs himself A. M. Umansky.

The slanderers will now answer before the court. In this respect things are quite simple.

The absurdity of the libel is striking: a certain ensign of the Sixteenth Siberian Rifle Regiment by the name of Yermolenko was "dispatched" (?) "on April 25 to us behind the front lines of the Sixth Army to agitate for the speediest conclusion of a separate peace treaty with Germany". Apparently, he is the escaped prisoner of whom the "document" published in *Zhivoye Slovo* says: "This commission was accepted by Yermolenko on the insistence of the comrades"!!

From this alone you can judge how little faith can be put in an individual who is dishonourable enough to accept such a "commission"!... The witness has no sense of honour. This is a fact.

And what was the witness's testimony?

He testified the following: "Officers of the German General Staff, Schiditzki and Lübers, had told him that propaganda of a similar kind was being carried on in Russia by A. Skoropis-Yoltukhovsky, chairman of the Ukrainian section of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,[70] and an agent of the German General Staff, and by Lenin. Lenin was commissioned to do all he could to undermine the confidence of the Russian people in the Provisional Government."

Thus the German officers, in order to induce Yermolenko to commit this dishonourable act, shamelessly lied to him about Lenin who, as everybody knows and as is officially stated by the *entire Bolshevik Party*, has always *rejected* most emphatically, consistently, and unconditionally a separate peace treaty with Germany!! The lie of the German officers is so obvious, crude and preposterous that no literate person would even for a moment take it for anything but a lie. And a politically literate person would be even more certain that to associate Lenin with an individual like Yoltukhovsky (?) and with the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine is particularly preposterous, for both Lenin and all other internationalists have repeatedly *dissociated themselves publicly* from this dubious social-patriotic "Union" during the war!

The crude lie told by Yermolenko, whom the Germans had bribed, or by German officers, would not deserve the slightest attention, were it not that the "document" has added what it calls "fresh information"—it is not known by whom, from whom, how, or when received—according to which "money for propaganda is being received" (by whom? the "document" *is afraid* to say plainly that the accused or suspected is Lenin!! The document says nothing about *who* "is receiving it") "through trusted people": the "Bolsheviks" Fürstenberg (Hanecki) and Kozlovsky. It is alleged that there is information proving the transfer of money through banks, and that "the military censorship has discovered a continuous (!) exchange of telegrams of a political and financial nature between German agents and Bolshevik leaders"!!

Again such a crude lie that it sticks out like a sore thumb. If there were even a word of truth in that, then how could it happen (1) that Hanecki had *quite recently* been allowed freely to enter Russia and permitted to leave her just as

freely? (2) that *neither* Hanecki *nor* Kozlovsky had been arrested *before* the appearance in the press of information concerning their crimes? Is it really possible that the General Staff, had it actually been in possession of even remotely trustworthy information about the sending of money, telegrams, etc., would have permitted the publication of rumours about this through the Alexinskys and the yellow press, without arresting Hanecki and Kozlovsky? Isn't it clear this is nothing but the cheap work of newspaper slanderers of the lowest order?

We may add that Hanecki and Kozlovsky are not Bolsheviks, but members of the Polish Social-Democratic Party; that we have known Hanecki, a member of its Central Committee, since the 1903 London Congress from which the Polish delegates withdrew, and so on. The Bolsheviks *never* received *any money* from either Hanecki or Kozlovsky. All that is a lie, a complete, vulgar lie.

What is its political significance? First, it indicates that the Bolsheviks' political opponents are so low and contemptible that they cannot get along without lies and libel.

Secondly, it provides us with an answer to the title question of this article.

The report about the "documents" was sent to Kerensky as early as *May* 16. Kerensky is a member of the Provisional Government and the Soviet, i.e., of both "powers". May 16 to July 5 is a long time. The power, if it really were a power, could and should *itself* have investigated those "documents", interrogated the witnesses, and arrested the suspects. The power, *both* "powers"—the Provisional Government and the C.E.C.—could and should have done this.

Yet both powers are inactive, while the General Staff is found to have some sort of relations with Alexinsky, who was not admitted to the Soviet's Executive Committee owing to his libellous activities! The General Staff, at the very moment of the Cadets' withdrawal, permits—probably by accident—the handing over of its official documents to Alexinsky for publication!

The power is inactive. Neither Kerensky, nor the Provisional Government, nor the C.E.C. so much as think of arresting Lenin, Hanecki, or Kozlovsky, if they are under suspicion. Last night, July 4, both Chkheidze and Tsereteli

asked the newspapers not to print the obvious libel. But just a little later, late at night, Polovtsev sent military cadets and Cossacks to wreck *Pravda*'s offices, stop the paper's publication, arrest its publishers, seize its ledgers (on the pretext of investigating whether or not suspicious funds were involved). At the same time that yellow, base, filthy little rag, *Zhivoye Slovo*, printed foul libel to arouse passions, revile the Bolsheviks, create an atmosphere of mob violence, and afford a plausible justification for the behaviour of Polovtsev, the military cadets and the Cossacks who had wrecked *Pravda*'s offices.

Whoever does not close his eyes *to the truth* cannot remain deluded. When it is *necessary* to act, *both* powers remain inactive—the C.E.C., because it "trusts" the Cadets and is afraid of irritating them, and the Cadets, who do not act as a power because they prefer to act *behind the scenes*.

Counter-revolution behind the scenes—this is it, as clear as day: the Cadets, certain quarters of the General Staff ("high-ranking officers", as our Party's resolution calls them), and the shady, semi-Black Hundred press. These are *not* inactive, these "work" together hand in glove; this is the soil in which pogroms, attempted pogroms, the shooting of demonstrators, etc., etc., are nurtured.

Whoever does not deliberately shut his eyes to the truth cannot remain deluded any longer.

There is no power, and there will be none until the transfer of power to the Soviets lays the foundation for creating power. Counter-revolution thrives on the absence of authority by uniting the Cadets with certain high-ranking officers and with the Black Hundred press. This is a sad reality, but a reality nevertheless.

Workers and soldiers! You must show firmness, determination and vigilance!

Written on July 5 (18), 1917
Published in *Listok "Pravdy"*, July 19 (6), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text

FOUL SLANDER BY ULTRA-REACTIONARY NEWSPAPERS AND ALEXINSKY

Today's issue of *Zhivoye Slovo*, an obviously Black Hundred type of paper, carries low, foul slander against Lenin.

Pravda cannot appear because its premises were wrecked by military cadets on the night of July 4-5. This accounts for the delay in publishing a detailed refutation of the foul slander.

For the time being we declare that the *Zhivoye Slovo* report is *slander* and that on the night of July 4-5 *Chkheidze rang up all the big papers*, asking them not to publish slanderous, riot-raising articles. The big papers complied with Chkheidze's request, and on July 5 none of them published the *infamous slander*, with the exception of the filthy *Zhivoye Slovo*.

Alexinsky is so well known as a slanderer that he *has not been admitted* to the Executive Committee of the Soviet until he rehabilitates himself, i.e., until he *redeems his honour*.

Citizens! Don't believe those foul slanderers, Alexinsky and *Zhivoye Slovo*.

Zhivoye Slovo's slander is evident at a glance from the following: the paper writes that on *May 16* a letter (No. 3719) accusing Lenin was sent to Kerensky from the General Staff. Obviously, Kerensky would have been duty bound to have Lenin arrested immediately and to order a *government investigation*, had he for a single moment believed those accusations or suspicions to be serious.

Written on July 5 (18), 1917

Published in *Listok "Pravdy"*, July 19 (6), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text

SLANDER AND FACTS

An immense torrent of abuse and slander is being poured on the Bolsheviks for the demonstration of July 3 and 4.

They go so far as to accuse the Bolsheviks of "trying to seize the city", of wanting to "violate" the will of the Soviets, of "encroaching on the authority of the Soviets", and so on, and so forth.

The facts, however, show that the Bolsheviks did *not* seize a single building, a single institution, let alone a section of the city (although they could have), *nor* tried to do so even though the people were armed.

The facts show that the only *political* act of violence *against an institution* occurred on the night of July 4-5, when the military cadets and Cossacks wrecked *Pravda* on Polovtsev's orders, *without the knowledge and against the will of the Soviet*.

This is a fact.

It was a deliberate, malicious use of force against an entire institution, an "encroachment" and "violation" not in words, but in deeds. Had this encroachment been lawful, either the Provisional Government or the Soviet would have sanctioned the measure. *Neither authority*, *however*, *did so*. Those who committed violence against "*Pravda*" *received no support* either in the Soviet or in the Provisional Government.

The Bolsheviks appealed to the soldiers who had started the demonstration to act *peaceably and in an organised way*.

Neither the Provisional Government *nor* the Soviet appealed to the military cadets, the Cossacks or Polovtsev to act peaceably and in an organised, lawful way.

* * *

But, we are told, there was shooting.

Yes, there was. But who did the shooting? Who dares blame it on anyone without an investigation?

Please listen to *a witness from bourgeois quarters*.

This witness is the paper *Birzheviye Vedomosti*, evening edition of July 4—a witness whom nobody in the world could suspect of partiality towards the Bolsheviks! Here is what the witness says:

"At 2 p.m. sharp, when the armed demonstrators were passing the Sadovaya and Nevsky corner and a large number of spectators were watching them quietly, *a deafening shot rang out from the right side of Sadovaya*, after which disorderly firing began."

And so, even the witness from the bourgeois paper is compelled to admit the truth, namely, that the shooting *began from the right side of Sadovaya*!! Surely this is a clear enough indication that the shooting was aimed *at the demonstrators*.

Is it really so difficult to appreciate that if the demonstrators had planned or wished to use force, *they would have sent people against a definite institution*, as Polovtsev sent military cadets and Cossacks against *Pravda*? Since sailors were killed, and since the witness from the bourgeois paper says that the shooting was started "from the right side of Sadovaya" "when the armed demonstrators were passing", isn't this obvious enough proof that it was *the Black Hundreds*, *the opponents* of democracy, the quarters close to the Cadets, that wanted and were bent on violence?

Written on July 5 (18), 1917

Published in *Listok "Pravdy"*, July 19 (6), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text

CLOSE TO THE TRUTH

Speaking at the Central Executive Committee meeting on the evening of July 4, Citizen Chaikovsky came surprisingly close to the truth.

He objected to the Soviet taking power and, among other things, advanced this what we might call "decisive" argument: we must carry on the war but cannot do it without money, and the British and Americans won't give any money if power is in the hands of "socialists"; they will only give money if the Cadets participate in the government.

That is close to the truth.

It is impossible to participate in the imperialist war without "participating" in the capitalist business of subjugating the people with loans from the capitalist gentlemen.

In order to really oppose the imperialist war, we must sever *all* ties that fetter people and bind them to capital. The workers and peasants must fearlessly take over the supervision of the banks and production and the regulation of production.

We, too, think that the British and Americans will give no money unless they have a guarantee from the Cadets. The alternative is: either serve the Cadets, serve capital, pile up imperialist loans (and put up with the fitting title of *imperialist* democrats instead of claiming to be "revolutionary" democrats); or break with the Cadets, break with the capitalists, break with imperialism, and become real revolutionaries on war issues as well.

Chaikovsky came close to the truth.

Written on July 5 (18), 1917
Published in *Listok "Pravdy"*, July 19 (6), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text

A NEW DREYFUS CASE?

Are some of the "leaders" of our General Staff planning to re-enact the Dreyfus case[71]?

This idea is suggested by the outrageously insolent and monstrous slander published in *Zhivoye Slovo* and analysed by us in detail elsewhere.

In the Dreyfus case, the French General Staff made itself sadly and disgracefully famous throughout the world by resorting to wrong, unfair and downright criminal (base) measures to indict Dreyfus.

Our General Staff showed their hand in a "case" against the Bolsheviks, doing it publicly for the first time, I think, through—this is strange and significant and incredible—*Zhivoye Slovo*, a Black Hundred rag, which printed an obvious slander about Lenin being a spy. The report begins as follows:

> "The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command sent the record of interrogation [of Yermolenko] to the War Minister, with his letter No. 3719 of May 16, 1917."

Is it conceivable—if the case is handled properly at all—that records of interrogation belonging to the General Staff should be published in the Black Hundred press *before* investigation is instituted and *before* the suspects are arrested?

The General Staff is in charge of intelligence. This is beyond question. But how can an intelligence service function if a document dispatched on May 16 and received by Kerensky long ago is put in circulation by a Black Hundred rag instead of *Kerensky*?

In what way does this differ, in point of fact, from the methods used in the Dreyfus case?

Listok "Pravdy",
July 19 (6), 1917

Published according to
the text in *Listok "Pravdy"*

APPEAL OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

In pursuance of the decision of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. published yesterday (signed also by the Petrograd Committee), the Executive Commission of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. appeals to workers to resume work tomorrow, i.e., on the morning of July 7.

This decision is supported by a meeting of delegates from the factory staffs of Vyborgskaya Storona.

Executive Commission, Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Written on July 6 (19), 1917

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Published according to the manuscript

DREYFUSIAD

A combination of the old and the new—this has always been the case with methods of exploitation and repression used by tsarism. It has not changed in republican Russia. The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie flavour their political baiting of the Bolsheviks, the party of the international revolutionary proletariat, with the foulest slander and "campaigning" in the press that is quite like the campaign of the French clerical and monarchist papers in the Dreyfus case.

The watchword at that time was that Dreyfus must be indicted for espionage at all costs! Today the watchword is that some Bolshevik or other must be indicted for espionage at all costs! The foulest slander, garbling, crude lies and artful tricks to confuse the reader—all these devices are being used by the yellow press and the bourgeois press generally with great zeal. The net result is a wild, furious uproar in which it is sometimes impossible to make out articulate words, let alone arguments.

Here are some of the methods used in our modern, republican Dreyfusiad. First they trotted out three main "arguments": Yermolenko, Kozlovsky's twenty million, and the implication of Parvus.

Next day *Zhivoye Slovo*, the chief riot-instigating paper, published two "corrections" admitting that the "leader" of the Bolsheviks had not been bribed but was a fanatic and changing the twenty million to twenty thousand. Meanwhile another paper declared Yermolenko's testimony to be of secondary importance.

In *Listok "Pravdy"*[72] of July 6, we showed the complete absurdity of Yermolenko's testimony.* Obviously, it had become inconvenient to refer to it.

In the same issue of *Listok* there is a letter from Kozlovsky denying the slander. Following the denial 20,000,000 is reduced to 20,000—a "round" figure again instead of an exact one.

They implicate Parvus, trying hard to establish some sort of connection between him and the Bolsheviks. In reality it was the Bolsheviks who in the Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat*[73] called Parvus a renegade,** denounced him ruthlessly as a German Plekhanov, and once and for all eliminated all possibility of close relations with social-chauvinists like him. It was the Bolsheviks who at a meeting held in Stockholm jointly with the Swedish Left Socialists[74] categorically refused to admit Parvus in any capacity, even as a guest, let alone speak to him.

Hanecki was engaged in business as an employee of the firm in which Parvus was a partner. Commercial and financial correspondence was censored, of course, and is quite open to examination. An effort is being made to mix these commercial affairs with politics, although no proof whatsoever is being furnished!!

They have gone to the ridiculous extreme of blaming *Pravda* for the fact that its dispatches to the socialist papers of Sweden and all other countries (dispatches which, of course, had to pass the censor and are fully known to him) were reprinted by German papers, often with distortions! As if reprinting, or malicious distortions, can be blamed on the original source!

It is a veritable Dreyfusiad, a campaign of lies and slander stemming from fierce political hatred. How foul the sources must be to substitute slander for the clash of ideas!

Written on July 6-7 (19-20), 1917

First published in *Lenin Miscellany VI*, 1925

Published according to the manuscript

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* See pp. 157-61 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 421-22.—*Ed.*

IN REFUTATION OF SINISTER RUMOURS

Listok "Pravdy" of July 6 carried a detailed refutation of the foul slander spread by the Black Hundred papers* with regard to Lenin and others. A similar refutation, in a briefer form, was published as a separate leaflet on behalf of our Party Central Committee.

In addition, we have only to answer the following question put to us: are the rumours concerning the arrest of Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev and others true? No, these rumours are *untrue*. All the Bolsheviks named here who are baited with particular zeal by the vile and slanderous press are members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Once again we request all fair-minded citizens not to believe these infamous slanders and sinister rumours.

Written on July 7 (20), 1917

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Published according to the manuscript

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* See pp. 157-62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THREE CRISES[75]

The more violent the slander and lies against the Bolsheviks these days, the more calmly must we, while refuting the lies and slander, reflect upon the historical interrelation of events and the political, i.e., *class*, significance of the revolution's present course.

To refute the lies and slander, we only have to refer again to *Listok* "*Pravdy*" of July 6, and to call the reader's attention especially to the article printed below which gives documentary evidence that on July 2 the Bolsheviks campaigned *against* the demonstration (as admitted by the Socialist-Revolutionaries' paper). The article indicates that on July 3 the popular mood exploded into action and the demonstration started against our advice. It shows that on July 4, in a leaflet (reprinted by the Socialist-Revolutionary paper *Dyelo Naroda*), we called for a *peaceful* and *organised* demonstration, that on the night of July 4 we passed a decision to call off the demonstration. Slanderers, continue your slander! You can never refute these facts and their decisive significance in every connection!

Let us turn to the question of the historical interrelation of the events. When, as early as the beginning of April, we opposed support for the Provisional Government, we were attacked by both the S.R.s and the Mensheviks. But what has reality proved?

What have the three political crises proved—April 20 and 21, June 10 and 18, July 3 and 4?

They have proved, in the first place, that the masses are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the bourgeois policy of the Provisional Government's bourgeois majority.

It is rather interesting to note that the ruling Socialist-Revolutionaries' newspaper, *Dyelo Naroda*, despite its marked hostility to the Bolsheviks, is compelled to admit, in its July 6 issue, the deep economic and political causes of the action of July 3 and 4. The stupid, crude, infamous lie that this action was artificially created, that the Bolsheviks campaigned *in favour* of action, will daily be more and more exposed.

The common cause, the common origin, the deep common root of the three above-mentioned political crises is clear, especially if we look at them in their interrelation, as science demands that politics be looked at. It is absurd even to think that three such crises could be produced artificially.

In the second place, it is instructive to grasp what each one of them had in common with the others, and what was its specific features.

What is common to all three is a mass dissatisfaction overflowing all bounds, a mass resentment with the bourgeoisie and *their* government. Whoever forgets, ignores or underestimates *this essence of the matter*, renounces the ABC of socialism concerning the class struggle.

Let those who call themselves socialists, who know something about the character of the class struggle in European revolutions, think about the class struggle in the Russian revolution.

These crises are peculiar in the ways they manifested themselves. The first (April 20-21) was stormy and spontaneous, and completely unorganised. It led to Black Hundreds firing on the demonstrators and to unprecedentedly savage and lying accusations against the Bolsheviks. After the outburst came a political crisis.

In the second case, the demonstration was called by the Bolsheviks, and was cancelled after a stern ultimatum and direct ban by the Congress of Soviets; then, on June 18, came a general demonstration in which the Bolshevik slogans clearly predominated. As the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks themselves admitted on the evening of June 18, a political crisis would certainly have broken out had it not been for the offensive at the front.

The third crisis broke out spontaneously on July 3 despite the Bolsheviks' efforts on July 2 to check it. Reaching its

climax on July 4, it led to a furious outburst of counter-revolution on July 5 and 6. The vacillation of the S.R.s and Mensheviks expressed itself in Spiridonova and a number of other S.R.s declaring for the transfer of power to the Soviets, and in the Menshevik internationalists, previously opposed to it, voicing the same idea.

The last, and perhaps the most instructive, conclusion to be drawn from considering the events in their interconnection is that *all* three crises manifested some form of demonstration that is new in the history of our revolution, a demonstration of a more complicated type in which the movement proceeds in waves, a sudden drop following a rapid rise, revolution and counter-revolution becoming more acute, and the middle elements being eliminated for a more or less extensive period.

In all three crises, the movement took the form of a *demonstration*. An anti-government demonstration—that would be the most exact, formal description of events. But the fact of the matter is that it was not an ordinary demonstration; it was something considerably more than a demonstration, but less than a revolution. It was an outburst of revolution and counter-revolution *together*, a sharp, sometimes almost sudden elimination of the middle elements, while the proletarian and bourgeois elements made a stormy appearance.

In this respect it is extremely typical that, for *each* of these movements, the middle elements blame *both* of the specific class forces—the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie. Look at the S.R.s and Mensheviks. They lean over backwards to frantically shout that, by their extremes, the Bolsheviks are helping the counter-revolution. At the same time, however, they admit again and again that the Cadets (with whom they form a bloc in the government) are counter-revolutionary. "Our urgent task is to draw a line," wrote *Dyelo Naroda* yesterday, "to dig a deep moat between ourselves and all the Right elements, including *Yedinstvo*, which has gone militant" (with which, we may add, the S.R.s formed a bloc during the elections).

Compare that with today's (July 7) issue of *Yedinstvo*, in which Plekhanov's editorial is compelled to state the indisputable fact that the Soviets (i.e., the S.R.s and

Mensheviks) will "think over the matter for a fortnight" and that, if power were to pass to the Soviets, "it would be tantamount to victory for Lenin's supporters". "If the Cadets don't stick to the rule—the worse, the better...," says Plekhanov, "they themselves will have to admit that they have made a big mistake [by withdrawing from the Cabinet], making the work of Lenin's supporters easier."

Isn't that typical? The middle elements blame the Cadets for making the Bolsheviks' work easier, and the Bolsheviks for making the Cadets' work easier! Is it so hard to guess that if we substitute class names for political ones we have before us the dreams of the petty bourgeoisie about the disappearance of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? Isn't the petty bourgeoisie complaining about the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? Is it really so hard to guess that no Bolsheviks in the world could have "created" even a single "popular movement", let alone three movements, if the deepest economic and political causes had not set the proletariat into action? Is it so difficult to guess that no Cadets and monarchists combined could have called forth any movement "from the Right" if it had not been for the equally deep causes that make the bourgeoisie as a class counter-revolutionary?

Both we and the Cadets were blamed for the April 20-21 movement—for intransigence, extremes, and for aggravating the situation. The Bolsheviks were even accused (absurd as it may be) of the firing on Nevsky. When the movement was over, however, those same S.R.s and Mensheviks, in their joint, official organ, *Izvestia*, wrote that the "popular movement" had "swept away the imperialists, Milyukov, etc.", i.e., they *praised* the movement!! Isn't that typical? Doesn't it show very clearly that the petty bourgeoisie do not understand the workings, the meaning, of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie?

The objective situation is this. The vast majority of the country's population is petty-bourgeois by its living conditions and more so by its ideas. But big capital rules the country, primarily through banks and syndicates. There is an urban proletariat in this country, mature enough to go its own way, but not yet able to draw at once the majority of the semi-proletarians to its side. From this fundamental,

class fact follows the inevitability of such crises as the three we are now examining, as well as their forms.

In future the forms of crises may, of course, change, but the substance of the issue will remain the same even if, for instance, the S.R. Constituent Assembly meets in October. The S.R.s have promised the peasants: (1) to abolish private landownership; (2) to transfer the land to the working people; (3) to confiscate the landed estates and transfer them to the peasants without compensation. These great reforms can never be realised without the most decisive revolutionary measures against the bourgeoisie, measures that can *only* be taken when the poor peasants join the proletariat, *only* when the banks and the syndicates are nationalised.

The credulous peasants, believing for a time that these beautiful things can be achieved by compromising with the bourgeoisie, will inevitably be disappointed and ... "dissatisfied" (mildly speaking) with the sharp class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the implementation of the promises of the S.R.s. So it was, and so it will be.

Written on July 7 (20), 1917

Published in the magazine *Rabotnitsa* No. 7, July 19, 1917

Published according to the manuscript

THE QUESTION OF THE BOLSHEVIK LEADERS APPEARING IN COURT[76]

Judging by private conversations, there are two opinions on this question.

Comrades succumbing to the "Soviet atmosphere" often incline towards appearing in court.

Those closer to the workers apparently incline towards not appearing.

In principle, the question chiefly boils down to an estimation of what is usually called constitutional illusions.

Anyone who thinks that a regular government and a regular court exist or can exist in Russia, that a Constituent Assembly is likely to be called, may arrive at a conclusion in favour of appearing.

That idea is completely erroneous, however. It is the latest events, after July 4, that have most vividly shown that a Constituent Assembly is unlikely to be called (without a new revolution), that neither a regular government nor a regular court exists or can exist in Russia (at present).

The court is an organ of power. The liberals sometimes forget this, but it is a sin for a Marxist to do so.

Where, then, is the power? Who constitutes the power?

There is no government. It changes daily. It is inactive.

The power that *is* active is the military dictatorship. Under these conditions, it is ridiculous even to speak of "the courts". It is not a question of "courts", but of *an episode in the civil war*. This is what those in favour of appearing in court unfortunately do not want to understand.

Pereverzev and Alexinsky as initiators of the "case"!! Isn't it ridiculous to speak of courts in such circumstances?

Isn't it naïve to think that, in such conditions, any court can examine, investigate and establish anything??

Power is in the hands of a military dictatorship. Without a new revolution, this power can only become stronger for a certain time, primarily for the duration of the war.

"I've done nothing against the law. The courts are just. They will sort things out. The trial will be public. The people will understand. I shall appear."

This reasoning is childishly naive. *The authorities need* not a trial but a persecution campaign against the internationalists. What Kerensky and Co. need is to put them in gaol and keep them there. So it was (in Britain and France), and so it will be (in Russia).

Let the internationalists work illegally as much as they can, but let them not commit the folly of appearing in court of their own free will!

Written on July 8 (21), 1917

First published in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolyutsia* No. 1 (36), 1925

Published according to the manuscript

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE POLITICAL SITUATION[77]

FOUR THESES

1. The counter-revolution has become organised and consolidated, and has actually taken state power into its hands.

The complete organisation and consolidation of the counter-revolution consists in a combination of its three main forces, a combination excellently conceived and already put into practice: (1.) The Constitutional-Democratic Party, i.e., the real leader of the organised bourgeoisie, has, by withdrawing from the Cabinet, confronted it with an ultimatum, thus clearing the way for the Cabinet's overthrow by the counter-revolution; (2.) The General Staff and the military leaders, with the deliberate or semi-deliberate assistance of Kerensky, whom even the most prominent Socialist-Revolutionaries now call a Cavaignac, have seized actual state power and have proceeded to shoot down revolutionary units at the front, disarm the revolutionary troops and workers in Petrograd and Moscow, suppress unrest in Nizhni-Novgorod, arrest Bolsheviks and ban their papers, not only without trial, but even without a government order. At present, basic state power in Russia is virtually a military dictatorship. This fact is still obscured by a number of institutions that are revolutionary in words but powerless in deeds. Yet it is so obvious and fundamental a fact that, without understanding it, one cannot understand anything about the political situation. (3.) The Black Hundred-monarchist and bourgeois press, which has switched from hounding Bolsheviks to hounding the Soviets, the "incendiary" Chernov, etc., has indicated with the utmost clarity that the true meaning of the policy of military dictatorship, which now reigns supreme and is supported by the Cadets

and monarchists, is preparation for disbanding the Soviets. Many of the leaders of the S.R.s and Mensheviks, i.e., the present majority in the Soviets, have admitted and expressed this during the past few days, but, true to their petty-bourgeois nature, they shrug off this formidable reality with meaningless high-sounding phrases.

2. The leaders of the Soviets and of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, headed by Tsereteli and Chernov, have completely betrayed the cause of the revolution by putting it in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries and by turning themselves, their parties and the Soviets into mere fig-leaves of the counter-revolution.

Proof of this is that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have betrayed the Bolsheviks and have tacitly agreed to close down their papers without daring to tell the people plainly and openly that they are doing so and why. By sanctioning the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary regiments, they have deprived themselves of all real power. They have turned into the most loud-mouthed ranters who help the reaction to "divert" the people's attention until it is finally ready to disband the Soviets. It is impossible to understand anything at all about the present political situation without realising this complete and final bankruptcy of the S.R.s and Mensheviks and the present majority in the Soviets and without realising that their "Directory" and other masquerades are an absolute sham.

3. All hopes for a peaceful development of the Russian revolution have vanished for good. This is the objective situation: either complete victory for the military dictatorship, or victory for the workers' armed uprising; the latter victory is only possible when it coincides with a deep mass upheaval against the government and the bourgeoisie caused by economic disruption and the prolongation of the war.

The slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was a slogan for peaceful development of the revolution which was possible in April, May, June, and up to July 5-9, i.e., up to the time when actual power passed into the hands of the military dictatorship. This slogan is no longer correct, for it does not take into account that power has changed

hands and that the revolution has in fact been completely betrayed by the S.R.s and Mensheviks. Reckless actions, revolts, partial resistance, or hopeless hit-and-run attempts to oppose reaction will not help. What will help is a clear understanding of the situation, endurance and determination of the workers' vanguard, preparation of forces for the armed uprising, for the victory of which conditions at present are extremely difficult, but still possible if the facts and trends mentioned in the thesis coincide. Let us have no constitutional or republican illusions of any kind, no more illusions about a peaceful path, no sporadic actions, no yielding now to provocation from the Black Hundreds and Cossacks. Let us muster our forces, reorganise them, and resolutely prepare for the armed uprising, if the course of the crisis permits it on a really mass, country-wide scale. The transfer of land to the peasants is impossible at present without an armed uprising, since the counter-revolutionaries, having taken power, have completely united with the landowners as a class.

The aim of the insurrection can only be to transfer power to the proletariat, supported by the poor peasants, with a view to putting our Party programme into effect.

4. The party of the working class, without abandoning legal activity but never for a moment overrating it, must *combine* legal with illegal work, as it did in 1912-14.

Don't let a single hour of legal work slip by. But don't cherish any constitutional or "peaceful" illusions. Form illegal organisations or cells everywhere and at once for the publication of leaflets, etc. Reorganise immediately, consistently, resolutely, all along the line.

Act as we did in 1912-14, when we could speak about overthrowing tsarism by a revolution and an armed uprising, without at the same time losing our legal base in the Duma, the insurance societies, the trade unions, etc.

Written on July 10 (23), 1917

Published on August 2 (July 20), 1917, in *Proletarskoye Dyelo* No. 6
Signed: *W*

Published according to the manuscript

LETTER TO THE EDITORS OF *NOVAYA ZHIZN*

Permit us, comrades, to turn to your hospitality on account of the forced suspension of our Party paper. Certain papers have begun a furious baiting campaign against us, accusing us of espionage or of communicating with an enemy government.

The extraordinary thoughtlessness (an inappropriate and much too weak a word) with which this baiting is conducted may be seen from the following plain facts. *Zhivoye Slovo* first published a statement that Lenin was a spy. Then, in a "correction" which is supposed not to change anything, it declared that he was not accused of spying! First the paper came out with Yermolenko's testimony, then it was compelled to admit that it is downright awkward and shameful to see such a person's testimony as evidence.

The name of Parvus is dragged in, without mentioning, however, that no one denounced Parvus as sharply and mercilessly, as far back as 1915, as the Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which we edited and which, in an article entitled "The Uttermost Limit", branded Parvus as "a renegade" "licking Hindenburg's boots",* etc. Every literate person knows, or can easily find out, that all political or other relations between ourselves and Parvus are completely out of the question.

The name of one Sumenson is trotted out, a woman with whom we have never even met, let alone had anything to do. Business enterprises of Hanecki and Kozlovsky are also dragged in, but not a single fact is mentioned as to where, how and when the business was a screen for espionage.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 421-22.—*Ed*.

Not only have we never participated directly or indirectly in business enterprises, but we have never received from any of the above comrades a single kopek either for ourselves personally or for the Party.

They go so far as to blame us for *Pravda* dispatches being reprinted in a distorted fashion by German newspapers, but they "forget" to mention that *Pravda* issues German and French bulletins abroad and that the reprinting of material from these bulletins is entirely free.[78]

And all this is done with the participation and even on the initiative of Alexinsky, who has not been admitted to the Soviet, who, in other words, has been recognised as an obvious slanderer!! Is it really impossible to understand that *such*, methods against us are tantamount to *legal assassination*? The Central Executive Committee's discussion of the conditions on which the Committee's members could be brought to court undoubtedly introduces an element of orderliness.[79] Will the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties want to participate in an attempt at legal assassination? Will they want to take part in an attempt to put us on trial without even indicating whether we are accused of espionage or mutiny, in an attempt to put us on trial without any precise indictment at all? Will they want to take part in an attempt to stage an obviously unfair trial which may handicap their own candidates in the Constituent Assembly elections? Will those parties want to make the eve of the convocation of a Constituent Assembly in Russia the beginning of a Dreyfusiad on Russian soil?

The near future will give an answer to these questions which we deem it the duty of the free press to raise openly.

We are not talking about the bourgeois press. Of course, Milyukov believes in our espionage or in our acceptance of German money about as much as Markov and Zamyslovsky believed that Jews drink children's blood.

But Milyukov and Co. know what they are doing.

N. Lenin

Novaya Zhizn No. 71,
July 11 (24), 1917

Published according to
the text in *Novaya Zhizn*

LETTER
TO THE EDITORS OF *PROLETARSKOYE DYELO*

Comrades,

We have changed our minds about submitting to the Provisional Government's decree ordering our arrests, for the following reasons.

From the letter of Pereverzev, the former Minister of Justice, published on Sunday in *Novoye Vremya*, it became perfectly clear that the "espionage" "case" of Lenin and others was quite deliberately framed by the party of the counter-revolution.

Pereverzev has openly admitted that he took advantage of unconfirmed accusations to work up (his actual expression) the soldiers against our Party. This is admitted by the former Minister of Justice, a man who only yesterday called himself a socialist! Pereverzev is gone, but whether the new Minister of Justice will hesitate to adopt Pereverzev's and Alexinsky's methods, nobody can venture to say.

The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie are trying to create a new Dreyfus case. They believe in our "espionage" as much as the leaders of Russian reaction, who framed the Beilis case,[80] believed that Jews drink children's blood. There are no guarantees of justice in Russia at present.

The Central Executive Committee, which considers itself the plenipotentiary organ of the Russian democrats, appointed a commission to investigate the espionage charges, but under pressure from the counter-revolutionary forces dismissed it. The Central Executive Committee refused to either directly confirm or to revoke the warrant for our arrest. It washed its hands of the case, virtually delivering us to the counter-revolution.

The charges of "conspiracy" and "moral incitement" to revolt preferred against us are of a very definite nature, but no precise indictment of our alleged crime is brought either by the Provisional Government or by the Soviet, both of which know full well that it is sheer nonsense to speak of "conspiracy" in referring to a movement like that of July 3-5. The Menshevik and S.R. leaders are simply trying to appease the counter-revolution that is already bearing down on them too, by delivering a number of our Party members to the counter-revolutionaries in compliance with their demand. At present there can be no legal basis in Russia, not even such constitutional guarantees as exist in the orderly bourgeois countries. To give ourselves up at present to the authorities would mean putting ourselves into the hands of the Milyukovs, Alexinskys, Pereverzevs, of rampant counter-revolutionaries who look upon all the charges against us as a simple civil war episode.

After what happened on July 6-8, not a single Russian revolutionary can harbour constitutional illusions any longer. Revolution and counter-revolution are coming to grips in a decisive fashion. We shall continue to fight on the side of the former.

We shall continue to aid the proletariat's revolutionary struggle as far as we can. The Constituent Assembly alone, if it meets, and if its convocation is not the handiwork of the bourgeoisie, will have full authority to pass judgement upon the Provisional Government's decree ordering our arrest.

N. Lenin

Proletarskoye Dyelo No. 2,
July 28 (15), 1917

Published according to the text
in *Proletarskoye Dyelo*

ON SLOGANS

Too often has it happened that, when history has taken a sharp turn, even progressive parties have for some time been unable to adapt themselves to the new situation and have repeated slogans which had formerly been correct but had now lost all meaning—lost it as "suddenly" as the sharp turn in history was "sudden".

Something of the sort seems likely to recur in connection with the slogan calling for the transfer of all state power to the Soviets. That slogan was correct during a period of our revolution—say, from February 27 to July 4—that has now passed irrevocably. It has patently ceased to be correct now. Unless this is understood, it is impossible to understand anything of the urgent questions of the day. Every particular slogan must be deduced from the totality of specific features of a definite political situation. And the political situation in Russia now, after July 4, differs radically from the situation between February 27 and July 4.

During that period of the revolution now past, the so-called "dual power" existed in the country, which both materially and formally expressed the indefinite and transitional condition of state power. Let us not forget that the issue of power is the fundamental issue of every revolution.

At that time state power was unstable. It was shared, by voluntary agreement, between the Provisional Government and the Soviets. The Soviets were delegations from the mass of free—i.e., not subject to external coercion—and armed workers and soldiers. What *really mattered* was that arms were in the hands of the people and that there was no coercion of the people from without. That is what opened

up and ensured a peaceful path for the progress of the revolution. The slogan "All Power Must Be Transferred to the Soviets" was a slogan for the next step, the immediately feasible step, on that peaceful path of development. It was a slogan for the peaceful development of the revolution, which was possible and, of course, most desirable between February 27 and July 4 but which is now absolutely impossible.

Apparently, not all the supporters of the slogan "All Power Must Be Transferred to the Soviets" have given adequate thought to the fact that it was a slogan for peaceful progress of the revolution—peaceful not only in the sense that nobody, no class, no force of any importance, would then (between February 27 and July 4) have been able to resist and prevent the transfer of power to the Soviets. That is not all. Peaceful development would then have been possible, even in the sense that the struggle of classes and parties *within* the Soviets could have assumed a most peaceful and painless form, provided full state power had passed to the Soviets in good time.

The latter aspect of the matter has similarly not yet received adequate attention. In their class composition, the Soviets were organs of the movement of the workers and peasants, a ready-made form of their dictatorship. Had they possessed full state power, the main shortcoming of the petty-bourgeois groups, their chief sin, that of trusting the capitalists, really would have been overcome, would have been criticised by the experience of their own measures. The change of classes and parties in power could have proceeded peacefully within the Soviets, provided the latter wielded exclusive and undivided power. The contact between all the Soviet parties and the people could have remained stable and unimpaired. One must not forget for a single moment that only such a close contact between the Soviet parties and the people, freely growing in extent and depth, could have helped peacefully to get rid of the illusion of petty-bourgeois compromise with the bourgeoisie. The transfer of power to the Soviets would not, and could not, in itself have changed the correlation of classes; it would in no way have changed the petty-bourgeois nature of the peasants. But it would have taken a big and timely step towards

separating the peasants from the bourgeoisie, towards bringing them closer to, and then uniting them with, the workers.

This is what might have happened had power passed to the Soviets at the proper time. That would have been the easiest and the most advantageous course for the people. This course would have been the least painful, and it was therefore necessary to fight for it most energetically. Now, however, this struggle, the struggle for the timely transfer of power to the Soviets, has ended. A peaceful course of development has become impossible. A non-peaceful and most painful course has begun.

The turning-point of July 4 was precisely a drastic change in the objective situation. The unstable condition of state power has come to an end. At the decisive point, power has passed into the hands of the counter-revolution. The development of the parties on the basis of the collaboration of the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties and the counter-revolutionary Cadets has brought about a situation in which both these petty-bourgeois parties have virtually become participants in and abettors of counter-revolutionary butchery. As the struggle between parties developed, the unreasoning trust which the petty bourgeoisie put in the capitalists led to their deliberate support of the counter-revolutionaries. The development of party relations has completed its cycle. On February 27, all classes found themselves united against the monarchy. After July 4, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, working hand in glove with the monarchists and the Black Hundreds, secured the support of the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, partly by intimidating them, and handed over real state power to the Cavaignacs, the military gang, who are shooting insubordinate soldiers at the front and smashing the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

The slogan calling for the transfer of state power to the Soviets would now sound quixotic or mocking. Objectively it would be deceiving the people; it would be fostering in them the delusion that even *now* it is enough for the Soviets to want to take power, or to pass such a decision, for power to be theirs, that there are still parties in the Soviets which have not been tainted by abetting the butchers, that it is possible to undo what has been done.

It would be a profound error to think that the revolutionary proletariat is capable of "refusing" to support the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks against the counter-revolution by way of "revenge", so to speak, for the support they gave in smashing the Bolsheviks, in shooting down soldiers at the front and in disarming the workers. First, this would be applying philistine conceptions of morality to the proletariat (since, *for the good of the cause*, the proletariat will always support not only the vacillating petty bourgeoisie but even the big bourgeoisie); secondly—and that is the important thing—it would be a philistine attempt to obscure the political substance of the situation by "moralising".

And the political substance is that power can no longer be taken peacefully. It can be obtained only by winning a decisive struggle against those actually in power at the moment, namely, the military gang, the Cavaignacs, who are relying for support on the reactionary troops brought to Petrograd and on the Cadets and monarchists.

The substance of the situation is that these new holders of state power can be defeated-only by the revolutionary masses, who, to be brought into motion, must not only be led by the proletariat, but must also turn their backs on the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, which have betrayed the cause of the revolution.

Those who introduce philistine morals into politics reason as follows: let us assume that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks did commit an "error" in supporting the Cavaignacs, who are disarming the proletariat and the revolutionary regiments; still, they must be given a chance to "rectify" their "error"; the rectification of the "error" "should not be made difficult" for them; the swing of the petty bourgeoisie towards the workers should be facilitated. Such reasoning would be childishly naïve or simply stupid, if not a new deception of the workers. For the swing of the petty-bourgeois masses towards the workers would mean, and could only mean, that these masses had turned their backs upon the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties could now rectify their "error" only by denouncing Tsereteli, Chernov, Dan and Rakitnikov as the butchers' aides. We are wholly

and unconditionally in favour of their "error" being "rectified" in this way....

We said that the fundamental issue of revolution is the issue of power. We must add that it is revolutions that show us at every step how the question of *where* actual power lies is obscured, and reveal the divergence between formal and real power. That is one of the chief characteristics of every revolutionary period. It was not clear in March and April 1917 whether real power was in the hands of the government or the Soviet.

Now, however, it is particularly important for class-conscious workers to soberly face the fundamental issue of revolution, namely, who holds state power at the moment? Consider its material manifestations, do not mistake words for deeds, and you will have no difficulty in finding the answer.

Frederick Engels once wrote the state is primarily contingents of armed men with material adjuncts, such as prisons.[81] Now it is the military cadets and the reactionary Cossacks, who have been specially brought to Petrograd, those who are keeping Kamenev and the others in prison, who closed down *Pravda*, who disarmed the workers and a certain section of the soldiers, who are shooting down an equally certain section of the soldiers, who are shooting down an equally certain section of troops in the army. These butchers are the real power. The Tseretelis and Chernovs are ministers without power, puppet Ministers, leaders of parties that support the butchery. That is a fact. And the fact is no less true because Tsereteli and Chernov themselves probably "do not approve" of the butchery, or because their papers timidly dissociate themselves from it. Such changes of political garb change nothing in substance.

The newspaper of 150,000 Petrograd voters has been closed down. The military cadets on July 6 killed the worker Voinov for carrying *Listok* "*Pravdy*" out of the printers'. Isn't that butchery? Isn't that the handiwork of Cavaignacs? But neither the government nor the Soviets are to "blame" for this, they may tell us.

So much the worse for the government and the Soviets, we reply; for that means that they are mere figureheads, puppets, and that real power is not in their hands.

Primarily, and above all, the people must know the *truth*—they must know who actually wields state power. The people must be told the whole truth, namely, that power is in the hands of a military clique of Cavaignacs (Kerensky, certain generals, officers, etc.), who are supported by the bourgeois class headed by the Cadet Party, and by all the monarchists, acting through the Black Hundred papers, *Novoye Vremya*, *Zhivoye Slovo*, etc., etc.

That power must be overthrown. Unless this is done, all talk of fighting the counter-revolution is so much phrase-mongering, "self-deception and deception of the people".

That power now has the support both of the Tseretelis and Chernovs in the Cabinet and of their parties. We must explain to the people the butcher's role they are playing and the fact that such a "finale" for these parties was inevitable after their "errors" of April 21, May 5, June 9 and July 4 and after their approval of the policy of an offensive, a policy which went nine-tenths of the way to predetermining the victory of the Cavaignacs in July.

All agitational work among the people must be reorganised to ensure that it takes account of the specific experience of the present revolution, and particularly of the July days, i.e., that it clearly points to the real enemy of the people, the military clique, the Cadets and the Black Hundreds, and that it definitely unmasks the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, which played and are playing the part of butcher's aides.

All agitational work among the people must be reorganised so as to make clear that it is absolutely hopeless to expect the peasants to obtain land as long as the power of the military clique has not been overthrown, and as long as the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties have not been exposed and deprived of the people's trust. That would be a very long and arduous process under the "normal" conditions of capitalist development, but both the war and economic disruption will tremendously accelerate it. These are "accelerators" that may make a month or even a week equal to a year.

Two objections may perhaps be advanced against what has been said above: first, that to speak now of a decisive struggle is to encourage sporadic action, which would only benefit

the counter-revolutionaries; second, that their overthrow would still mean transferring power to the Soviets.

In answer to the first objection, we say: the workers of Russia are already class-conscious enough not to yield to provocation at a moment which is obviously unfavourable to them. It is indisputable that for them to take action and offer resistance at the moment would mean aiding the counter-revolutionaries. It is also indisputable that a decisive struggle will be possible only in the event of a new revolutionary upsurge in the very depths of the masses. But it is not enough to speak in general terms of a revolutionary upsurge, of the rising tide of revolution, of aid by the West-European workers, and so forth; we must draw a definite conclusion from our past, from the lessons we have been given. And that will lead us to the slogan of a decisive struggle against the counter-revolutionaries, who have seized power.

The second objection also amounts to a substitution of arguments of too general a character for concrete realities. No one, no force, can overthrow the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries except the revolutionary proletariat. Now, after the experience of July 1917, it is the revolutionary proletariat that must independently take over state power. Without that the victory of the revolution is *impossible*. The only solution is for power to be in the hands of the proletariat, and for the latter to be supported by the poor peasants or semi-proletarians. And we have already indicated the factors that can enormously accelerate this solution.

Soviets may appear in this new revolution, and indeed are bound to, but *not* the present Soviets, not organs collaborating with the bourgeoisie, but organs of revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie. It is true that even then we shall be in favour of building the whole state on the model of the Soviets. It is not a question of Soviets in general, but of combating the *present* counter-revolution and the treachery of the *present* Soviets.

The substitution of the abstract for the concrete is one of the greatest and most dangerous sins in a revolution. The present Soviets have failed, have suffered complete defeat, because they are dominated by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties. At the moment these Soviets are

like sheep brought to the slaughterhouse and bleating pitifully under the knife. The Soviets *at present* are powerless and helpless against the triumphant and triumphing counter-revolution. The slogan calling for the transfer of power to the Soviets might be construed as a "simple" appeal for the transfer of power to the present Soviets, and to say that, to appeal for it, would now mean deceiving the people. Nothing is more dangerous than deceit.

The cycle of development of the class and party struggle in Russia from February 27 to July 4 is complete. A new cycle is beginning, one that involves not the old classes, not the old parties, not the old Soviets, but classes, parties and Soviets rejuvenated in the fire of struggle, tempered, schooled and refashioned by the process of the struggle. We must look forward, not backward. We must operate not with the old, but with the new, post-July, class and party categories. We must, at the beginning of the new cycle, proceed from the triumphant bourgeois counter-revolution, which triumphed because the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks compromised with it, and which can be defeated only by the revolutionary proletariat. Of course, in this new cycle there will be many and various stages, both before the complete victory of the counter-revolution and the complete defeat (without a struggle) of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and before a new upsurge of a new revolution. But it will only be possible to speak of this later, as each of these stages is reached.

Written in mid-July 1917

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Published according to the pamphlet text

OUR THANKS TO PRINCE G. Y. LVOV

In a farewell talk to members of the Committee of Journalists under the Provisional Government, Prince G. Y. Lvov, former head of the Provisional Government, made some valuable admissions for which the workers will certainly be grateful.

"What strengthens my optimism above all else," Lvov said, "are the events of the past few days inside the country. I am convinced that our 'deep breach' in the Lenin front is incomparably more significant for Russia than the German breach in our South-Western Front."

How can the workers not be grateful to the prince for this sober appraisal of the class struggle? They will be more than grateful, they will take a lesson from Lvov.

What an endless flow of fine words and infinite hypocrisy all the bourgeois people and landowners, as well as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks trailing after them, pour out while orating against "civil war"! But look at Prince Lvov's valuable admission and you will see that he very calmly appraises Russia's internal situation from the point of view of civil war. What the paltry truth of the prince's admissions amounts to is that the bourgeoisie, which head the counter-revolution, have made a deep breach in the revolutionary workers' front. Two enemies, two hostile camps, and one has made a breach in the front of the other—this is how Prince Lvov sums up Russia's internal situation. Let us, then, give Prince Lvov our heartfelt thanks for his frankness! After all, he is a thousand times more correct than those sentimental Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik philistines who imagine that the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which inevi-

tably becomes exceedingly aggravated during a revolution, is likely to disappear because of their curses and magic spells!

Two enemies, two hostile camps, and one has made a breach in the front of the other—this is Prince Lvov's correct philosophy of history. He is right in practically discounting the thira camp, the petty bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. This third camp appears to be big, but, in fact, it cannot decide anything independently. That is clear to the sober-minded prince, just as it is clear to every Marxist who understands the economic position of the pe tty bourgeoisie, and as it is clear, lastly, to anyone who thinks about the lessons of the revolution's history, which have always revealed the impotence of the petty-bourgeois parties whenever the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat became acute.

Even in war-time, the internal class struggle is far more important than the struggle against the foreign enemy. What savage abuse the big and petty bourgeoisie have hurled at the Bolsheviks for recognising this truth! What efforts to deny it have been made by the numerous lovers of alluring words about "unity", "revolutionary democracy", and so on, and so forth!

But when a serious and decisive moment came, Prince Lvov at once fully admitted this truth, openly declaring that a "victory" over the class enemy at home was more important than the position in the struggle against the foreign enemy. An incontestable truth. A useful truth. The workers will be very grateful to Prince Lvov for admitting it, for reminding them of it, for spreading it around. And to express their gratitude to the prince, the workers will use their Party to see that the greatest number of working and exploited people understand and assimilate this truth as well as possible. Nothing is more useful to the working class in the struggle for emancipation than this truth.

What is this "breach" in the civil war front which Prince Lvov is so triumphant about? This question must be dealt with very carefully if the workers are to learn well from Lvov.

The "breach in the front" of the internal war on this occasion came, firstly, from the fact that the bourgeoisie had poured oceans of filth and slander on their class enemies, the Bolsheviks, and had shown exceptional tenacity in this really infamous and vile business of slandering their political opponents. It was the "ideological preparation", if we may call it that, for the "breach in the front of the class struggle".

Secondly, the material and really essential "breach" came from the arrest and outlawing of people of hostile political trends, from the murder of some of them in the street without trial (Voinov was murdered on July 6 for carrying publications out of the *Pravda* printers'), from the closing down of their newspapers and the disarming of the workers and revolutionary soldiers.

This is what the "breach in the front of the war against the class enemy" means. Let the workers think this over well so as to be able to apply it to the bourgeoisie when the time is ripe.

The proletariat will never resort to slander. They will close down the bourgeoisie's newspapers after openly declaring by law, by government decree, that the capitalists and their defenders are enemies of the people. The bourgeoisie, in the shape of our enemy, the government, and the petty bourgeoisie, in the shape of the Soviets, are afraid to say a single open and frank word about the ban on *Pravda*, about the reason for closing it down. The proletariat will tell the truth instead of resorting to slander. They will tell the peasants and everyone else the truth about the bourgeois newspapers and why they must be closed down.

Unlike the petty-bourgeois—Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik—windbags, the proletariat will know very well what is actually meant by a "breach in the front" of the class struggle and by making the enemy, the exploiters, harmless. Prince Lvov has helped the workers realise this truth. Thank you, Prince Lvov.

Proletarskoye Dyelo No. 5,
August 1 (July 19), 1917

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CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS[82]

Constitutional illusions are what we call a political error when people believe in the existence of a normal, juridical, orderly and legalised—in short, "constitutional"—system, although it does not really exist. At first glance it may appear that in Russia today, July 1917, when no constitution has yet been drafted, there can be no question of constitutional illusions arising. But it would be very wrong to think so. In reality, the essential characteristic of the present political situation in Russia is that an extremely large number of people entertain constitutional illusions. It is impossible to understand anything about the political situation in Russia today without appreciating this. Positively no step can be taken towards a correct formulation of our tactical tasks in Russia today unless we above all concentrate on systematically and ruthlessly exposing constitutional illusions, revealing all their roots and re-establishing a proper political perspective.

Let us take three ideas which are most typical of the current constitutional illusions, and look into them carefully.

Idea No. 1 is that our country is about to have a Constituent Assembly; therefore, everything going on now is temporary, transitory, inessential and non-decisive, and everything will soon be revised and firmly regulated by the Constituent Assembly. Idea No. 2 is that certain parties, such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries or the Mensheviks, or their alliance, command an obvious and undisputed

majority among the people or in "the most influential" institutions, such as the Soviets; therefore, the will of these parties and institutions, like the will of the majority of the people in general, cannot be ignored, and even less violated, in republican, democratic and revolutionary Russia. Idea No. 3 is that *a certain measure*, such as closing down *Pravda*, was not legalised either by the Provisional Government or by the Soviets; therefore, it was only a passing phase, a chance occurrence, which cannot at all be regarded as something decisive.

Let us look into each of these ideas.

I

The first Provisional Government promised to convene a Constituent Assembly. It considered that its main job was to prepare the country for a Constituent Assembly. The second Provisional Government fixed September 30 for convening a Constituent Assembly. The third Provisional Government, after July 4, solemnly reaffirmed that date.

Nevertheless, the chances are a hundred to one against the Constituent Assembly being convened on that date. And even if it is, the chances are again a hundred to one that it will be as impotent and useless as was the First Duma—until a second revolution triumphs in Russia. To appreciate this, you only have to detach yourself for a moment from the present hubbub of empty phrases, promises and petty doings which fuddles your thinking, and take a look at the main thing, at what determines everything in public life—the class struggle.

It is clear that the bourgeoisie in Russia have become very closely tied up with the landowners. This is shown by the whole press, the elections, the entire policy of the Cadet Party and the parties to the right of it, and by speeches made at "congresses" of "interested" persons. The bourgeoisie understand perfectly what the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and "Left" Menshevik windbags cannot understand, namely, that private landownership in Russia *cannot* be abolished, and this without compensation, except by carrying through a gigantic economic revolution, by bringing the banks under popular control, by national-

ising the syndicates and adopting the most ruthless revolutionary measures against capital. The bourgeoisie understand that perfectly. At the same time, however, they must know, see and feel that the vast majority of peasants in Russia will now be much more to the left than Chernov as well as declaring for confiscation of the landed estates. For the bourgeoisie know better than we do, both as to how many partial concessions were made them by Chernov, say, from May 6 to July 2, over delaying and curtailing the various peasant demands, and as to how much effort it took the *Right* Socialist-Revolutionaries (Chernov, believe it or not, is regarded as a "centre" man by the Socialist-Revolutionaries!) at the Peasant Congress and on the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies to "reassure" the peasants and feed them on promises.

The big bourgeoisie differ from the petty bourgeoisie in that they have learned, from their economic and political experience, the conditions under which "order" (i.e., keeping down the people) can be preserved under capitalism. The bourgeoisie are businessmen, people who make big commercial transactions and are accustomed to getting down even to political matters in a strictly business-like manner. They take the bull by the horns rather than putting their trust in words.

The Constituent Assembly in Russia today will yield a majority to peasants who are more to the left than the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The bourgeoisie know this and therefore are bound to put up a tremendous resistance to an early convocation. *With* a Constituent Assembly convened, it will be impossible, or exceedingly difficult, to carry on the imperialist war in the spirit of the secret treaties concluded by Nicholas II, or to defend the landed estates or the payment of compensation for them. The war will not wait. The class struggle will not wait. This was evident enough even in the brief span from February 28 to April 21.

From the very beginning of the revolution there have been two views on the Constituent Assembly. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, completely swayed by constitutional illusions, viewed the matter with the cred-

ulity of the petty bourgeoisie who will not hear of the class struggle: the Constituent Assembly has been proclaimed, there will be a Constituent Assembly and that's all there is to it! Everything else is of the devil's making. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks said: only the growing strength and authority of the Soviets can guarantee the convocation and success of the Constituent Assembly. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries laid emphasis on the act of law: the proclamation, the promise, the declaration to call a Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks laid emphasis on the class struggle: if the Soviets were to win, the Constituent Assembly would be certain to meet; if not, there would be no such certainty.

That is exactly what happened. The bourgeoisie have all along been waging both in the open and under cover a continuous and relentless struggle against calling a Constituent Assembly. This struggle was prompted by a desire to delay its convocation until after the war. It expressed itself in the fact that several times they postponed the date of convocation. When, after June 18, or more than a month after the formation of the coalition Cabinet, the convocation date was at last set, a Moscow bourgeois paper declared this had been done under the pressure of Bolshevik propaganda. *Pravda* has published an exact quotation from that paper.

After July 4, when the servility and timidity of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had led to the "victory" of the counter-revolution, a brief but highly significant phrase—the "impossibly early" convocation of a Constituent Assembly!!—slipped into *Rech*. And on July 16, an item appeared in *Volya Naroda* and *Russkaya Volya*, saying that the Cadets insisted on postponing the convocation of the Constituent Assembly under the pretext that it was "impossible" to convene it at such "short" notice, and adding that the Menshevik Tsereteli, a lackey of the counter-revolution, had consented to its postponement until November 20!

Undoubtedly, this item slipped in against the will of the bourgeoisie who cannot benefit from such "revelations". But murder will out. The counter-revolutionaries, letting themselves go after July 4, blurted out the truth. The

very first seizure of power by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie after July 4 was immediately followed by a measure (a very serious measure) *against* calling a Constituent Assembly.

That is a fact. And that fact reveals the utter futility of constitutional illusions. Unless a new revolution takes place in Russia, unless the power of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie (primarily the Cadets) is overthrown, and unless the people withdraw their trust from the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, parties compromising with the bourgeoisie, the Constituent Assembly will either never meet, or else will be just a "Frankfurt talking shop",[83] an impotent and worthless assembly of petty bourgeois people frightened to death by the war and the prospect of the bourgeoisie "boycotting the government", and helplessly torn between frantic efforts to rule without the bourgeoisie and the fear of getting along without them.

The Constituent Assembly issue is *subordinate* to that of the course and outcome of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Some time ago, *Rabochaya Gazeta* blurted out the remark that the Constituent Assembly would be a Convention. This is an example of the empty, wretched and contemptible bragging of our Menshevik lackeys of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. If it is not to be a "Frankfurt talking shop" or a First Duma, if it is to be a Convention, it must have the courage, the capacity and the strength to strike merciless blows at the counter-revolutionaries instead of compromising with them. For this purpose power must be in the hands of the most advanced, most determined and most revolutionary class of today. For this purpose that class must be supported by the whole mass of the urban and rural poor (the semi-proletarians). For this purpose the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, i.e., primarily the Cadets and the high-ranking army officers, must be dealt with mercilessly. These are the real, the class, the material conditions necessary for a Convention. You have only to list these conditions in a precise and clear way to understand the stupidity of *Rabochaya Gazeta*'s bragging and the utter foolishness of the constitutional illusions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks regarding a Constituent Assembly in Russia today.

II

When lashing the petty-bourgeois "Social-Democrats" of 1848, Marx was particularly severe in his condemnation of their unrestrained use of empty phrases about "the people" and the majority of the people in general.[84] It is well to recall this in examining the second idea, in analysing constitutional illusions about a "majority".

For the majority in the state to really decide, definite conditions are required, one of which is the firm establishment of a political system, a form of state power, making it possible to decide matters by a majority and guaranteeing the translation of this possibility into reality. That is one thing. Another is that the class composition of this majority and the interrelation of classes inside (and outside) it should *enable* it to draw the chariot of state concertedly and effectively. Every Marxist knows that these two concrete conditions play a decisive part in the question of a popular majority and of the direction of state affairs in line with the will of the majority. And yet the political literature of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and their political conduct even more so, betray a complete lack of understanding of these conditions.

If political power in the state is in the hands of a class whose interests coincide with those of the majority, that state can be governed truly in line with the will of the majority. But if political power is in the hands of a class whose interests diverge from those of the majority, any form of majority rule is bound to become deception or suppression of the majority. Every bourgeois republic provides hundreds and thousands of examples of this kind. In Russia, the bourgeoisie rule both the economic and political life. Their interests, particularly during the imperialist war, violently conflict with the interests of the majority. Hence, from a materialist and Marxist, and not from a formally juridical point of view, we must expose this conflict and combat bourgeois deception of the people.

Our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, on the contrary, have fully demonstrated and proved that their true role is to be an instrument of the bourgeoisie for deceiving the people (the "majority"), to be the vehicle of

that deception and contribute to it. However sincere individual Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks may be, their fundamental political ideas—that it is possible to break free of the imperialist war and gain "peace without annexations and indemnities" without the dictatorship of the proletariat and the triumph of socialism, and that it is possible to secure the transfer of land to the people without compensation and establish "control" over production in the people's interests without the same condition—these fundamental political (and, of course, economic) ideas of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are, in practice, nothing but petty-bourgeois self-deception, or deception of the masses (the "majority") by the bourgeoisie, which is the same thing.

That is our first and main "amendment" to the majority issue as understood by the petty-bourgeois democrats, socialists of the Louis Blanc type, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. What, in fact, is the value of a "majority" when a majority is in itself only a formal thing and when materially, in actual fact, that majority is a majority of the parties through which the bourgeoisie deceive the majority?

And, of course—and this leads us to our second "amendment", to the second of the above-mentioned fundamental conditions—this deception can only be properly understood by ascertaining its class roots and class meaning. This is not self-deception, not (to put it bluntly) a "swindle", but an illusory idea arising out of the economic situation in which a class finds itself. The petty-bourgeois is in such an economic position, the conditions of his life are such that he cannot help deceiving himself, he involuntarily and inevitably gravitates one minute towards the bourgeoisie, the next towards the proletariat. It is *economically impossible* for him to pursue an independent "line".

His past draws him towards the bourgeoisie, his future towards the proletariat. His better judgement gravitates towards the latter, his prejudice[85] (to use a familiar expression of Marx's) towards the former. For the majority of the people to become an actual majority in state administration, the actual servant of the interests of the major-

ity, and the actual protector of its rights, and so on, a certain class condition is required, namely, that the majority of the petty bourgeoisie should join forces with the revolutionary proletariat, at least at the decisive moment and in the decisive place.

Without this, a majority is mere fiction which may prevail for a while, may glitter and shine, make a noise and reap laurels, but is absolutely and inevitably doomed to failure nonetheless. This, incidentally, was where the majority of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks came to grief, as the Russian revolution showed in July 1917.

Further, a revolution differs from a "normal" situation in the state precisely because controversial issues of state life are decided by the direct class and popular struggle to the point of armed struggle. It cannot be otherwise when the masses are free and armed. This fundamental fact implies that in time of revolution it is not enough to ascertain the "will of the majority"—you must *prove to be stronger* at the decisive moment and in the decisive place; you must win. Beginning with the Peasant War in the Middle Ages in Germany, and throughout all the big revolutionary movements and epochs, including 1848, 1871 and 1905, we have seen innumerable examples of the better organised, more politically-conscious and better armed minority forcing its will upon the majority and defeating it.

Frederick Engels particularly stressed the lesson to be drawn from experience, a lesson which to some degree is common to the peasant revolt of the sixteenth century and to the Revolution of 1848 in Germany, namely, disunity of action and lack of centralisation on the part of the oppressed owing to their petty-bourgeois status in life.[86] Examining the matter from this point of view, we come to the same conclusion, namely, that a simple majority of the petty-bourgeois masses does not and cannot decide anything, for the disunited millions of rural petty proprietors can *only* acquire organisation, political consciousness in action and centralisation of action (which is indispensable for victory) when they are led either by the bourgeoisie or by the proletariat.

In the long run we know that the problems of social life are resolved by the class struggle in its bitterest and fierc-

est form—civil war. In this war, as in any other war—a fact also well known and in principle not disputed by anyone—it is economics that decide. It is quite typical and significant that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, while not denying this "in principle" and while realising perfectly the capitalist character of Russia today, dare not face the truth soberly. They are afraid to admit the truth that every capitalist country, including Russia, is basically divided into three main forces: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The first and third are spoken of and recognised by all. Yet the second—which really is the numerical *majority*!— nobody cares to appraise soberly, neither from the economic, political nor military point of view.

Truth does not flatter. That is why the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks shrink from recognising themselves.

III

When I was just beginning this article, the closing down of *Pravda* was merely an "incident", one that had not yet been legalised by the government. But now, after July 16, the government has formally closed *Pravda* down.

If viewed historically and as a whole, throughout the process of its preparation and realisation, this measure casts a remarkably bright light on the "nature of the constitution" in Russia and on the danger of constitutional illusions.

It is known that the Cadet Party, headed by Milyukov and the newspaper *Rech*, has been demanding repressive measures against the Bolsheviks ever since April. This demand for repression, presented in various forms—from "statesman-like" articles in *Rech* to Milyukov's repeated cries "Arrest them" (Lenin and other Bolsheviks)—has been one of the major components, if not the major component, of the Cadet political programme in the revolution.

The Cadet Party had been systematically, relentlessly and continuously demanding repressive measures against the Bolsheviks long before Alexinsky and Co. in June and July invented and fabricated the foully slanderous charge that the Bolsheviks were German spies or were receiving German money, and long before the equally slanderous charge

—running counter to generally known facts and published documents—of "armed uprising" or of "rebellion". Since this demand has now been met, what are we to think of the honesty or intelligence of those who forget, or pretend to forget, the true class and party origin of this demand? How on earth can we help describing as crude falsification or incredible political stupidity the futile efforts of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to make out they believe the "occasion" which presented itself on July 4 for the repressive measures against the Bolsheviks was an "accident" or an "isolated" incident? There must surely be a limit to the distortion of indisputable historical facts!

You have only to compare the movement of April 20-21 with that of July 3-4 to realise immediately that they are alike in character: both contained such objective facts as the spontaneous popular outburst of discontent, impatience and indignation, the provocative shots from the right, the killings on Nevsky, the slanderous outcries from the bourgeoisie, particularly the Cadets, to the effect that "it was the Lenin people who fired the shots on Nevsky", the extreme aggravation and exacerbation of the struggle between the workers and the bourgeoisie, the utter confusion of the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the tremendous range of vacillation in their policy and in their approach to the issue of state power generally. June 9-10 and June 18 give us just the same class picture in a different form.

The course of events is as clear as can be: it shows growing popular discontent, impatience and indignation and an increasing aggravation of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, particularly for influence over the petty-bourgeois masses. Linked with this are two very important historical developments which have made the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks dependent on the counter-revolutionary Cadets. These developments are, first, the formation on May 6 of a coalition Cabinet in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks turned out to be the hangers-on of the bourgeoisie, getting themselves more and more into a tangle by making deals and agreements with the latter, rendering them thousands of "ser-

vices", delaying the most essential revolutionary measures time and again; and secondly, the offensive at the front. The offensive inevitably implied the resumption of the imperialist war, a vast increase in the influence, weight and role of the imperialist bourgeoisie, the most widespread chauvinism among the people, and, last but not least,* the transfer of power—first military power and then state power generally—to the counter-revolutionary high-ranking army officers.

This was the course of historical events which between April 20-21 and July 3-4 deepened and sharpened class antagonisms, and which after July 4 enabled the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie to accomplish what on April 20-21 had stood out very clearly as their programme and tactics, their immediate aim and their "clean" methods, which were to lead to the achievement of that aim.

Nothing could be more pointless historically, more pitiful theoretically or more ridiculous practically than the philistine whining (echoed, incidentally, by L. Martov as well) over July 4, to the effect that the Bolsheviks "contrived" to defeat themselves, that this defeat came from their own "adventurism", and so on, and so forth. All this whining, all these arguments to the effect that we "should not have" participated (in the attempt to lend a "peaceable and organised" character to the perfectly legitimate popular discontent and indignation!!), are either sheer apostasy, if coming from Bolsheviks, or the usual expression of the usual cowed and confused state of the petty bourgeoisie. In actual fact, the movement of July 3-4 grew out of the movement of April 20-21 and after as inevitably as summer follows spring. It was the imperative duty of the proletarian party to remain with the masses and try to lend as peaceable and organised a character as possible to their justified action rather than stand aside and wash its hands like Pontius Pilate, on the pedantic plea that the masses were not organised down to the last man and that their movement sometimes went to excesses—as though there had been no excesses on April 20-21, as though there had ever in history been a serious popular movement free of excesses!

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* These four words are given in English by Lenin.—*Ed.*

The defeat of the Bolsheviks after July 4 followed with historical inevitability from the whole preceding course of events because on April 20-21 the petty-bourgeois masses and their leaders, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were not yet tied by the offensive and had not yet got themselves into a tangle by their deals with the bourgeoisie in the "coalition Cabinet", whereas by July 4 they had become so tied and entangled they could not but stoop to co-operation (in repressive measures, in slander, in butchery) with the counter-revolutionary Cadets. On July 4 the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks slid for good into the cesspool of counter-revolution; they had been stead ly sliding towards it throughout May and June due to their role in the coalition Cabinet and their approval of the policy of offensive.

We may appear to have digressed from our subject, the closing down of *Pravda*, to a historical estimation of the events of July 4. But this only appears so, for the one cannot be understood without the other. We have seen that, if we look into the matter and the interconnection of events, the closing down of *Pravda*, and the arrests and the other forms of persecution of the Bolsheviks are nothing but the realisation of the long-standing programme of the counter-revolutionaries, the Cadets in particular.

It would now be highly instructive to see *who* specifically carried out this programme, and by what means.

Let us have a look at the facts. On July 2-3 the movement was growing; the people were seething with indignation at government inaction, the high cost of living, economic dislocation and the offensive. The Cadets withdrew, playing a give-away game and presenting an ultimatum to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, leaving them, tied to power but lacking power, to pay for the people's defeat and indignation.

On July 2-3 the Bolsheviks were trying to restrain the masses from action. This has been acknowledged *even* by an eyewitness from *Dyelo Naroda*, who reported on what took place in the Grenadier Regiment on July 2. On the evening of July 3, the movement overflowed its banks and the Bolsheviks drew up an appeal stressing that the movement must be "peaceable and organised". On July 4, provocative

shots from the right increased the number of victims of the firing on both sides. It should be pointed out that the Executive Committee's promise to investigate the incidents, to issue bulletins twice a day, etc., etc., has remained an empty promise! The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks did nothing whatsoever, they didn't even publish a complete list of the dead on both sides!!

On the night of July 4 the Bolsheviks drew up an appeal to stop the action and *Pravda* printed it that same night. But that same night, firstly, counter-revolutionary troops began to arrive in Petrograd (apparently upon the summons or with the consent of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, of their Soviets—a "delicate" point regarding which, of course, the strictest silence is maintained even now when every bit of need for secrecy is past!). Secondly, that same night military cadets and suchlike, clearly acting upon instructions from Polovtsev, commanding, and from the General Staff, began raids on the Bolsheviks. On the night of July 4-5, *Pravda*'s office was raided. On July 5 and 6, its printers', "Trud", was wrecked; a worker named Voinov was murdered in broad daylight for carrying *Listok* "*Pravdy*" from the printers'; house searches and arrests were made among the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary regiments were disarmed.

Who started it all? Not the government or the Soviet, but the counter-revolutionary military gang grouped around the General Staff and acting in the name of the "counter-intelligence service", circulating the lies of Pereverzev and Alexinsky in order to stir up the army, and so on.

The government is absent. So are the Soviets; they are trembling for their own fate as they receive message after message that the Cossacks may come and smash them up. The Black Hundred and Cadet press, which led the hounding of the Bolsheviks, is beginning to hound the Soviets.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have bound themselves hand and foot by their entire policy. Being bound, they called (or tolerated the calling of) counter-revolutionary troops to Petrograd. And that bound them even more. They have sunk to the very bottom of the foul counter-revolutionary cesspool. They cravenly dismissed their own commission, appointed to investigate the "case"

of the Bolsheviks. They basely betrayed the Bolsheviks to the counter-revolutionaries. They abjectly participated in the funeral procession of the Cossacks who were killed, and so kissed the hand of the counter-revolutionaries.

They are completely bound. They are at the bottom of the cesspool.

They try this, that and the other; they hand Kerensky the Cabinet, they go to Canossa to the Cadets, they organise a "Zemsky Sobor" or a "coronation" of the counter-revolutionary government in Moscow.[87] Kerensky dismisses Polovtsev.

But nothing comes of all those efforts. They in no way change the *actual state of affairs*. Kerensky dismisses Polovtsev, but at the same time gives shape and legality to Polovtsev's *measures* and to his policy; he closes down *Pravda*, he introduces capital punishment for the soldiers, he bans meetings at the front, he continues to arrest Bolsheviks (even Kollontai!) in accordance with Alexinsky's programme.

The "nature of the constitution" in Russia is coming out with striking clarity: the offensive at the front and the coalition with the Cadets in the rear have cast the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks into the cesspool of counter-revolution. *In reality*, state power is passing into the hands of the counter-revolutionaries, the military gang. Kerensky and the government of Tsereteli and Chernov are *only a screen for it*; they are compelled to legalise its measures, actions and policies *post factum*.

The haggling going on between the Cadets and Kerensky, Tsereteli and Chernov is of secondary importance, if not entirely unimportant. Whether the Cadets win in this haggling, or whether Tsereteli and Chernov hold out "alone", will have no effect on the actual state of affairs. The fundamental, the main and decisive fact is that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have swung over to the counter-revolutionaries (a swing forced by the policy they have been pursuing since May 6).

The cycle of party development is complete. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have slid steadily downwards—from their expression of "confidence" in Kerensky on February 28 to May 6, which bound them to the counter-

revolutionaries, and then to July 5, when they touched rock bottom.

A new period is coming in. The victory of the counter-revolutionaries is making the people disappointed with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties and is paving the way for the masses to adopt a policy of support for the revolutionary proletariat.

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AN ANSWER

I

On July 22 the newspapers printed a report "from the Public Prosecutor of the Petrograd City Court" about the inquiry into the events of July 3-5, and about the prosecution of a group of Bolsheviks, including myself, who are charged with treason and the organisation of an armed uprising.

The government had to publish the report because this dirty business had already created too much of a scandal, having clearly been rigged, as every intelligent person realises, with the aid of the slanderer Alexinsky to meet a long-standing wish and demand of the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party.

But by publishing the report, the government of Tsereteli and Co. will disgrace itself even more, for now the crudeness of the fabrication just hits one in the eye.

I left Petrograd on Thursday, June 29, on account of illness and did not return until Tuesday morning, July 4. But of course I assume full and unqualified responsibility for every single move or measure of our Party Central Committee, as well as of our Party as a whole. I call attention to my absence to account for my ignorance of certain details and for my allusion mainly to documents that have appeared in the press.

Obviously, it is documents of this nature, particularly if published in the anti-Bolshevik press, that the Public Prosecutor should have carefully collected, set in order and examined before anything else. But the "republican" Prosecutor, who is carrying out the policies of the "socia-

list" Minister Tsereteli, failed to perform his principal duty!

Shortly after July 4, the ministerial newspaper *Dyelo Naroda* admitted that it was a fact that on July 2 the Bolsheviks had taken action in the Grenadier Regiment by campaigning *against* a demonstration.

Had the Prosecutor a right to keep quiet about this document? Had he any grounds for discounting the testimony of such a witness?

As it so happens, this testimony establishes the highly important fact that the movement developed spontaneously and that the Bolsheviks tried to put off rather than hasten the demonstration.

Furthermore, the same paper printed a still more important document, namely, the text of an appeal signed by our Party Central Committee and written on the night of July 3-4. The appeal was written and sent to print *after* the movement, despite our efforts to check or rather control it, had "spilled over", after the demonstration had become a fact.

The utter baseness and unscrupulousness of the Tseretelian Prosecutor, and his boundless treachery, show in his *evasion* of the question of exactly when, on what day and hour, whether before the Bolshevik appeal or after it, the demonstration *began*.

As a matter of fact, the appeal stressed the need to give the movement a *peaceable* and *organised* character!

Can you imagine a charge more laughable than that of "organising an armed uprising", made against an organisation which on the night of July 3-4, i.e., the night before the fateful day, issued an appeal for a "peaceful and organised demonstration"? Or take another question: what difference is there between the Prosecutor of Dreyfus or Beilis and the "republican" Prosecutor of the "socialist" Minister Tsereteli, a Prosecutor who keeps completely quiet about the appeal?

Further, the Prosecutor does not say that on the night of July 3-4 our Party Central Committee wrote an appeal to stop the demonstration and printed it in *Pravda*, whose offices were wrecked by counter-revolutionary troops that very night.

Further, the Prosecutor does not say that on July 4 Trotsky and Zinoviev, in *several* speeches delivered before the workers and soldiers marching towards the Taurida Palace, called on them to *disperse* once they had made known their will.

Those speeches were heard by hundreds and thousands of people. Then, let every fair-minded citizen who does not want his country to be disgraced by another rigged "Beilis case" see to it that irrespective of party affiliation, those who heard the speeches make written declarations to the Prosecutor (keeping copies for themselves), stating whether Trotsky's and Zinoviev's speeches contained an appeal to disperse. A decent Prosecutor would himself have made such an appeal to the population. But how on earth can there be decent Prosecutors in the Cabinet of Kerensky, Yefremov, Tsereteli and Co.? And isn't it high time Russian citizens themselves took care to make "Beilis cases" impossible in their country?

By the way, owing to illness, I personally made only one speech on July 4, from the balcony of Kshesinskaya's Palace. The Prosecutor mentions it, and tries to set out what I said, but far from naming any witnesses, he is again reticent about eyewitness reports given in the press. I have by no means been able to secure a complete set of the papers, but still I have seen two testimonies: (1) in the Bolshevik *Proletarskoye Dyelo* (Kronstadt) and (2) in the Menshevik ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta*. Why not verify the contents of my speech by these documents and by a public appeal?

The speech contained the following points: (1) an apology for confining myself to just a few words on account of illness; (2) greetings to the revolutionary people of Kronstadt on behalf of the Petrograd workers; (3) an expression of confidence that our slogan "All Power to the Soviets" must and will win despite all the zigzags of history; (4) an appeal for "firmness, steadfastness and vigilance".

I bring out these particulars in order not to pass by the scant but truly factual evidence which the Prosecutor touched upon—barely touched upon—in such a cursory, indifferent and careless fashion.

However, the important thing is not the particulars, of course, but the overall picture, the overall significance

of July 4. The Prosecutor proved completely incapable of so much as even thinking about this.

On this question, we first of all have the highly valuable testimony given in the press by a rabid anti-Bolshevik, who turns upon us a veritable spate of invective and spiteful phrases. I refer to the ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta* correspondent. He contributed his personal observations shortly after July 4. The facts fully established by him show that his observations and experiences fall into two sharply differentiated parts. He contrasts the second with the first, saying that things had taken a "favourable turn" for him.

The first part of the author's experiences is the attempt he made to defend the ministers amid a raging crowd. He was insulted, pummelled, and eventually detained. He heard extremely violent outcries and slogans, of which he recalls in particular "Death to Kerensky" (because he ordered an offensive, "sent forty thousand men to death", etc.).

The second part of the author's experiences, the one that brought a "favourable" turn for him, as he puts it, began when the raging crowd led him "before the tribunal" at the Kshesinskaya Palace. There he was released at once.

Those are the facts which prompted the author to turn a torrent of abuse upon the Bolsheviks. Abuse coming from a political opponent is natural, particularly if the opponent is a Menshevik who senses that the people, crushed by capital and the imperialist war, are against instead of for him. Yet abuse cannot alter the facts, which even as stated by a most rabid anti-Bolshevik testify that the aroused crowd went as far as to shout "Death to Kerensky", that by and large the Bolshevik organisation gave the movement the slogan "All Power to the Soviets", and that this organisation was the only one that carried any moral weight with the people and urged them to forgo violence.

Those are the facts. Let the willing and unwilling lackeys of the bourgeoisie shout and curse about the facts, accusing the Bolsheviks of "conniving with the mob", etc., etc. We of the party of the revolutionary proletariat reply that our Party has always been and will always be with the oppressed

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

whenever they voice their absolutely justified and legitimate indignation at the high cost of living, at the inaction and treachery of the "socialist" Ministers, at the imperialist war and its prolongation. Our Party did its bounden duty by marching together with the justly indignant people on July 4 and by trying to make their movement, their demonstration, as peaceful and organised as possible. For on July 4 a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets, a peaceful development of the Russian revolution, was *still* possible.

The crass stupidity of the Prosecutor's fairy-tale about the "organisation of an armed uprising" can be seen from the following: no one will deny that the vast majority of the armed soldiers and sailors who crowded the Petrograd streets on July 4 were on our Party's side. Our Party had every opportunity to set about removing and arresting hundreds of high officials, taking over dozens of public and government buildings and institutions, and so on. We did nothing of the kind. Only people so mixed up that they repeat all sorts of tall stories spread by the counter-revolutionary Cadets do not see the laughable absurdity of the assertion that on July 3 or 4 an "armed uprising" was "organised".

The first question the investigation should have put, if it had at all been worthy of that name, was "who started the shooting?" The next question should have been, "How many killed and wounded were there on each side? In what circumstances did each killing and wounding take place?" Had the investigation been anything like a real investigation (and not like a trouble-making article in the papers of the Dans, the Alexinskys, etc.), it would have been the investigators' duty to hold an open, public cross-examination of the witnesses and then immediately publish the record of the interrogation.

That is what courts of inquiry always did in Britain when Britain was a free country. That, or roughly that, is what the Executive Committee of the Soviet felt it had to do at first, when fear of the Cadets had not yet completely numbed its conscience. We know the Executive Committee then promised in the press to issue two bulletins daily on the work of its investigating commission. We also know

the Executive Committee (i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) deceived the people by *not* keeping its promise. But the text of that promise has gone down in history as an admission from our enemies, an admission of what any fair investigator should have done.

It is instructive, at any rate, to note that one of the first *bourgeois*, rabidly anti-Bolshevik papers to carry a report about the shooting on July 4 was the evening *Birzhevka* of the same date. And it is this report that suggests that the shooting was *not* started by the demonstrators, and that the first shots were fired *against* them!! Of course, the "republican" Prosecutor of the "socialist" Cabinet preferred to say nothing about this testimony from *Birzhevka*!! And yet this testimony of the utterly anti-Bolshevik *Birzhevka* fully accords with the general picture of what happened as our Party sees it. Had it been an armed uprising, then, of course, the insurgents would not have fired on the counter-demonstrators but would have surrounded certain barracks and certain buildings; they would have wiped out certain army units, etc. On the other hand, if it was a demonstration against the government, with a counter-demonstration by government defenders, it was perfectly natural that the counter-revolutionaries should be the first to shoot, partly because they were enraged by the enormous number of demonstrators, and partly with provocative intent. And it was just as natural the demonstrators should counter shots with shots.

Lists of the dead, though probably incomplete, were published, nevertheless, in a few papers (I think in *Rech* and *Dyelo Naroda*). The prime and immediate duty of the investigation was to verify, complete, and officially publish these lists. To evade this means *concealing* proof that the counter-revolutionaries started the shooting.

Indeed, even a cursory examination of the published lists shows that the two main and prominent groups, the Cossacks and the sailors, had each about the same number killed. Could this have been so if the ten thousand armed sailors who arrived in Petrograd on July 4 to join the workers and soldiers, particularly the machine-gunners who had many machine-guns, had been intent on an armed uprising?

Obviously, the number of dead among the Cossacks and other opponents of the insurrection would in that case have been ten times greater, for no one will deny that the predominance of the Bolsheviks among the armed people in the Petrograd streets on July 4 was enormous. There is a long list of relevant testimonies in the press from our Party opponents, and any fair investigating body would undoubtedly have collected and published all this evidence.

If the number of dead is approximately the same on both sides, this proves that the shooting was started by the counter-revolutionaries and that the demonstrators merely returned the fire. Otherwise there could not have been an equal number of dead.

Finally, the following piece of press information is exceedingly important: Cossacks are known to have been killed on July 4 during an open skirmish between the demonstrators and counter-demonstrators. Such skirmishes take place even in non-revolutionary times, if the population is at all aroused; for instance, they are not infrequent in the Latin countries, particularly in the South. Bolsheviks are also known to have been killed after July 4, when there was *no* clash between excited demonstrators and counter-demonstrators, and hence when the murder of an unarmed by an armed person was really an act of butchery. Such was the murder of the Bolshevik Voinov in Shpalernaya Street on July 6.

What kind of an investigating commission is it that does not fully collect even the evidence which has appeared in the press concerning the number of dead on both sides, and the time and circumstances of each killing? This is just a mockery of an investigation.

It is clearly futile to expect as much as an attempt at a historical evaluation of July 4 from such an "investigating" commission. Yet this evaluation is indispensable to anyone wanting to maintain an intelligent attitude towards politics.

Whoever attempts a historical estimate of July 3 and 4 cannot shut his eyes to the exact identity of this movement and that of April 20 and 21.

In both cases there was a spontaneous outburst of popular indignation.

In both cases armed people came on to the streets.

In both cases there was a skirmish between the demonstrators and counter-demonstrators, resulting in a certain (approximately equal) number of victims on both sides.

In both cases there was an extremely sharp outburst in the struggle between the revolutionary masses and the counter-revolutionaries, the bourgeoisie, while the neutral, intermediate elements which inclined towards compromise were temporarily inactive.

In both cases the special kind of anti-government demonstration (its special features have been listed above) was due to a deep and protracted crisis of power.

The difference between the two movements is that the latter was much more intense than the former and that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, neutral on April 20 and 21, have since got themselves into a tangle by their dependence on the counter-revolutionary Cadets (through the coalition Cabinet and the policy of taking offensive action), and so, on July 3 and 4, found themselves on the side of the counter-revolution.

The counter-revolutionary Cadet Party brazenly lied even after the events of April 20 and 21, shouting, "The shooting on Nevsky was done by Lenin's men", and, clown-like, they demanded an investigation. The Cadets and their friends then constituted the majority in the government and so the investigation was wholly in their hands. It was begun and abandoned, and nothing was published.

Why? Evidently because the facts in no way confirmed what the Cadets wanted. In other words, the investigation concerning April 20 and 21 was "smothered" because the facts proved that the firing had been started by the counter-revolutionaries, the Cadets and their friends. This is clear.

The same thing apparently happened on July 3 and 4 and that explains the crude and glaring falsification used by the Prosecutor, who affronts all standards of reasonably conscientious investigation to please Tsereteli and Co.

The movement on July 3 and 4 was the last attempt by means of a demonstration to induce the Soviets to take power. That was when the Soviets, i.e., the Socialist-

Revolutionaries and Mensheviks controlling them, virtually handed over power to the counter-revolution by summoning counter-revolutionary troops to Petrograd, disarming and disbanding revolutionary regiments and the workers, approving and tolerating acts of tyranny and violence against the Bolsheviks, the introduction of the death penalty at the front, etc.

Military, and consequently political, power has now virtually passed into the hands of the counter-revolution represented by the Cadets and backed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Now, a peaceful development of the Russian revolution is no longer possible and the historical alternative is either complete victory for the counter-revolution, or a new revolution.

II

The charge of espionage and relations with Germany is purely a Beilis case deserving only a brief comment. On this point, the "investigation" merely repeats the slander of the notorious slanderer Alexinsky, distorting the facts in a particularly crude way.

It is not true that in 1914 Zinoviev and I were arrested in Austria. Only I was arrested.

It is not true that I was arrested as a Russian subject. I was arrested on suspicion of spying, the local gendarme having mistaken the graphs of agrarian statistics in my notebooks for "plans"! Obviously, that Austrian gendarme was quite on a par with Alexinsky and the -group. But it appears that I have been persecuted for internationalism more than anyone else, for I have been persecuted by *both* belligerent coalitions as a spy—by the gendarme in Austria and by the Cadets, Alexinsky and Co. in Russia.

It is not true that Hanecki played a part in my release from the Austrian prison. Victor Adler helped put the Austrian authorities to shame. Poles helped, being ashamed that such an infamous arrest of a Russian revolutionary could take place on Polish soil.

It is an infamous lie that I was in contact with Parvus, that I visited military camps, etc. Nothing of the kind happened, or could have happened. Upon the appearance of the

very first issues of Parvus's journal *The Bell*[88], our newspaper, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, described Parvus as a renegade and a German Plekhanov.* Parvus is as much a social-chauvinist on the side of Germany as Plekhanov is on the side of Russia. Being revolutionary internationalists, we had and could have nothing in common with German, Russian, or Ukrainian (Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine) social-chauvinists.

Steinberg is a member of an exile committee in Stockholm, where I first met him. About April 20 or a little later, Steinberg came to Petrograd, where I remember him soliciting a subsidy for the exile society. The Prosecutor could have verified this quite easily if he had wanted to.

The Prosecutor's argument is that Parvus is connected with Hanecki, and that Hanecki is connected with Lenin! But this is just a big swindle, for everyone knows that Hanecki had financial dealings with Parvus, but none with me.

Hanecki, being a tradesman, worked for Parvus or did business with him. But then a great many Russian exiles associated with the press have worked in establishments and institutions belonging to Parvus.

The Prosecutor's argument is that business correspondence may have served as a screen for relations in the nature of espionage. One wonders how many members of the Cadet, Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties could be indicted for business correspondence according to this wonderful formula!

But since the Prosecutor is in possession of several telegrams from Hanecki to Sumenson (which have already been published) and since the Prosecutor knows in which bank, when, and how much money Sumenson had (for the Prosecutor has published a few figures of this nature), why shouldn't he invite two or three office or business employees to take part in the investigation? It would surely take them no more than a couple of days to make a *complete* extract from all the business and bank records for him.

Hardly anything reveals the true nature of this "Beilis case" as well as the fragmentary figures cited by the Prose-

* See Vol. 21 of present edition, pp. 421-22.—*Ed.*

cutor: within six months Sumenson drew 750,000 rubles, she has 180,000 rubles left on her account!! If you are going to publish figures, why not publish them all? When exactly, from whom exactly did Sumenson receive money "within six months", and to whom did she pay it out? When exactly, and exactly what consignments of goods were received?

What could be easier than to collect these complete data? This could and should have been done in a matter of two or three days! It would have disclosed the whole round of business dealings between Hanecki and Sumenson! It would have left no room for the obscure insinuations the Prosecutor is making!

How low the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have fallen is shown by Alexinsky's foulest and most infamous slander, paraphrased to read like a "state" document by the officials of the Cabinet of Tsereteli and Co.!

III

Of course, it would be extremely naïve to regard the "judicial cases" instituted by the Cabinet of Tsereteli, Kerensky and Co. against the Bolsheviks as actual judicial cases. That would be an absolutely unpardonable constitutional illusion.

Having entered into a coalition with the counter-revolutionary Cadets on May 6 and having adopted the policy of an offensive, i.e., resumption and prolongation of the imperialist war, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks inevitably found themselves under the thumb of the Cadets.

Being captives, they are forced to participate in the filthiest Cadet deals, in the Cadets' lowest and most slanderous intrigues.

The "case" of Chernov is rapidly beginning to enlighten even the backward, that is, to corroborate our view. After Chernov, *Rech* is now denouncing Tsereteli as well, calling him a "hypocrite" and a "Zimmerwaldist".

Now the blind will see and the stones will speak.

The counter-revolutionaries are closing their ranks. The Cadets form their basis. The General Staff, the military leaders and Kerensky are in their hands and the Black Hun-

dred press is at their service. These are the allies of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

Foul slander against political opponents will help the workers to realise all the sooner where the counter-revolution is, and to *sweep it away* in the name of freedom, peace, bread for the hungry and land for the peasants.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the manuscript

THE BEGINNING OF BONAPARTISM

Now that the Cabinet of Kerensky, Nekrasov, Avksentyev and Co.[89] has been formed, the gravest and most disastrous error Marxists could make would be to mistake words for deeds, deceptive appearances for reality or generally for something serious.

Let's leave this pastime to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who have already gone as far as to play the part of clowns around the Bonapartist Kerensky. Indeed, it certainly is buffoonery on the part of the Chernovs, Avksentyevs and Tseretelis to start striking postures and uttering fancy words at a time when Kerensky, clearly at the Cadets' bidding, forms something of a secret Directory composed of himself, Nekrasov, Tereshchenko and Savinkov, keeps quiet about both the Constituent Assembly and the declaration of July 8,[90] proclaims the sacred union of classes in his address to the people, concludes an agreement on terms unknown to anyone with Kornilov, who has presented a most brazen ultimatum, and continues the policy of scandalously outrageous arrests.

At a time like this, it certainly is buffoonery on the part of Chernov to challenge Milyukov to appear before a court of arbitration, of Avksentyev to shout about the futility of a narrow class point of view, or of Tsereteli and Dan to push through the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets the emptiest resolutions stuffed with utterly meaningless phrases, resolutions that call to mind the Cadet First Duma during its worst period of impotence in the face of tsarism.

Just as the Cadets in 1906 prostituted the first assembly of popular representatives in Russia by reducing it to a miserable talking shop in face of the growing tsarist counter-

revolution, so the S.R.s and Mensheviks in 1917 have prostituted the Soviets by reducing them to a miserable talking-shop in face of the growing Bonapartist counter-revolution.

Kerensky's Cabinet is undoubtedly a cabinet taking the first steps towards Bonapartism.

We see the chief historical symptom of Bonapartism: the manoeuvring of state power, which leans on the military clique (on the worst elements of the army) for support, between two hostile classes and forces which more or less balance each other out.

The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has reached the limit and on April 20 and 21, as well as on July 3-5, the country was within a hair's breadth of civil war. This socio-economic condition certainly forms the classical basis for Bonapartism. And then, this condition is combined with others that are quite akin to it; the bourgeoisie are ranting and raving against the Soviets, but are as *yet* powerless to disperse them, while the Soviets, prostituted by Tsereteli, Chernov and Co., are *now* powerless to put up serious resistance to the bourgeoisie.

The landowners and peasants, too, live as on the eve of civil war: the peasants demand land and freedom, they can be kept in check, if at all, only by a Bonapartist government capable of making the most unscrupulous promises to all classes without keeping any of them.

Add to this the situation created by a foolhardy offensive and military reverses, in which fancy phrases about saving the country are particularly fashionable (concealing the desire to save the imperialist programme of the bourgeoisie), and you have a perfect picture of the socio-political setting for Bonapartism.

Don't let us be deluded by phrases. Don't let us be misled by the idea that all we have is the first steps of Bonapartism. It is the first steps we must be able to discern unless we want to find ourselves in the ridiculous predicament of the stupid philistine who laments the second step although he himself helped to take the first.

It would now be nothing short of stupid philistinism to entertain constitutional illusions, such as, for instance, that the present Cabinet is probably more Left than all the preceding ones (see *Izvestia*), that well-meaning criticism

by the Soviets could rectify the errors of the government, that the arbitrary arrests and suppression of newspapers were isolated incidents which, it is to be hoped, will never recur, or that Zarudny is an honest man and that in republican and democratic Russia a fair trial is possible and everyone should appear at it, and so on, and so forth.

The stupidity of these constitutional philistine illusions is too obvious to require special refutation.

The struggle against the bourgeois counter-revolution demands soberness and the ability to see and speak of things as they are.

Bonapartism in Russia is no accident but a natural product of the evolution of the class struggle in a petty-bourgeois country with a considerably developed capitalism and a revolutionary proletariat. Historical stages like April 20 and 21, May 6, June 9 and 10, June 18 and 19, and July 3-5 are landmarks which show clearly how preparations for Bonapartism proceeded. It would be a very big mistake to think that a democratic situation rules out Bonapartism. On the contrary, it is exactly in a situation like this (the history of France has confirmed it twice) that Bonapartism emerges, given a certain relationship between classes and their struggle.

However, to recognise the inevitability of Bonapartism does not at all mean forgetting the inevitability of its downfall.

If we *only* said the counter-revolution had temporarily gained the upper hand here in Russia we should be dodging the issue.

If we analysed the origin of Bonapartism and, fearlessly facing the truth, told the working class and the whole people that the beginning of Bonapartism is a fact, we should thereby start a real and stubborn struggle to overthrow Bonapartism, a struggle waged on a large political scale and based on far-reaching class interests.

The Russian Bonapartism of 1917 differs from the beginnings of French Bonapartism in 1799 and 1849 in several respects, such as the fact that not a single important task of the revolution has been accomplished here. The struggle to settle the agrarian and the national questions is only just gathering momentum.

Kerensky and the counter-revolutionary Cadets who use him as a pawn can neither convoke the Constituent Assembly on the appointed date, nor postpone it, without in both cases promoting the revolution. And the catastrophe engendered by the prolongation of the imperialist war keeps on approaching with even greater force and speed than ever.

The advance contingents of the Russian proletariat succeeded in emerging from our June and July days without losing too much blood. The proletarian party has every opportunity to choose the tactics and form, or forms, of organisation that will in any circumstances prevent unexpected (seemingly unexpected) Bonapartist persecutions from cutting short its existence and its regular messages to the people.

Let the Party loudly and clearly tell the people the whole truth that Bonapartism is beginning; that the "new" government of Kerensky, Avksentyev and Co. is merely a screen for the counter-revolutionary Cadets and the military clique which is in power at present; that the people can get no peace, the peasants no land, the workers no eight-hour day, and the hungry no bread unless the counter-revolution is completely stamped out. Let the Party say so, and every step in the march of events will bear it out.

With remarkable speed Russia has gone through a whole epoch in which the majority of the people put their faith in the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties. And now the majority of the working people are beginning to pay heavily for their credulity.

All indications are that the march of events is continuing at a very fast pace and that the country is approaching the next epoch, when the majority of the working people will have to entrust their fate to the revolutionary proletariat. The revolutionary proletariat will take power and begin a socialist revolution; despite all the difficulties and possible zigzags of development, it will draw the workers of all the advanced countries into the revolution, and will defeat both war and capitalism.

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LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION

The article was written
at the end of July, the *Afterword*
on September 6 (19), 1917

The article was published on
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Lessons of the Revolution,
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Every revolution means a sharp turn in the lives of a vast number of people. Unless the time is ripe for such a turn, no real revolution can take place. And just as any turn in the life of an individual teaches him a great deal and brings rich experience and great emotional stress, so a revolution teaches an entire people very rich and valuable lessons in a short space of time.

During a revolution, millions and tens of millions of people learn in a week more than they do in a year of ordinary, somnolent life. For at the time of a sharp turn in the life of an entire people it becomes particularly clear what aims the various classes of the people are pursuing, what strength they possess, and what methods they use.

Every class-conscious worker, soldier and peasant should ponder thoroughly over the lessons of the Russian revolution, especially now, at the end of July, when it is clear that the first phase of our revolution has failed.

I

Let us see, in fact, what the workers and peasants were striving for when they made the revolution. What did they expect of the revolution? As we know, they expected liberty, peace, bread and land.

But what do we see now?

Instead of liberty, the old tyranny is coming back. The death penalty is being introduced for the soldiers at the front.[91] Peasants are prosecuted for the unauthorised seizure of landed estates. Printing presses of workers' newspapers are wrecked. Workers' newspapers are closed down without trial. Bolsheviks are arrested, often without any charge or upon blatantly trumped-up charges.

It may be argued that the persecution of Bolsheviks does not constitute a violation of freedom, for only certain individuals are being prosecuted and on certain charges. Such an argument, however, would be a deliberate and obvious lie; for how can anyone wreck printing presses and close down newspapers for the crimes of individuals, even if these charges were proved and established by a court of law? It would be a different thing if the government had legally declared the whole party of the Bolsheviks, their very trend and views, to be criminal. But everybody knows that the government of free Russia could not, and did not, do anything of the kind.

What chiefly exposes the libellous character of the charges against the Bolsheviks is that the newspapers of the landowners and capitalists furiously abused the Bolsheviks for their struggle against the war and against the landowners and capitalists, and openly demanded the arrest and prosecution of the Bolsheviks even when not a single charge against a single Bolshevik had been trumped up.

The people want peace. Yet the revolutionary government of free Russia has resumed the war of conquest on the basis of those very same secret treaties which ex-Tsar Nicholas II concluded with the British and French capitalists so that the Russian capitalists might plunder other nations. Those secret treaties remain unpublished. The government of free Russia resorted to subterfuges, and to this day has not proposed a just peace to all nations.

There is no bread. Famine is again drawing near. Everybody sees that the capitalists and the rich are unscrupulously cheating the treasury on war deliveries (the war is now costing the nation fifty million rubles daily), that they are raking in fabulous profits through high prices, while nothing whatsoever has been done to establish effective control by the workers over the production and distribution of goods. The capitalists are becoming more brazen every day; they are throwing workers out into the street, and this at a time when the people are suffering from shortages.

A vast majority of the peasants, at congress after congress, have loudly and clearly declared that landed proprietorship is an injustice and robbery. Meanwhile, a govern-

ment which calls itself revolutionary and democratic has been leading peasants by the nose for months and deceiving them by promises and delays. For months the capitalists did not allow Minister Chernov to issue a law prohibiting the purchase and sale of land. And when this law was finally passed, the capitalists started a foul slander campaign against Chernov, which they are still continuing. The government has become so brazen in its defence of the landowners that it is beginning to bring peasants to trial for "unauthorised" seizures of land.

They are leading the peasants by the nose, telling them to wait for the Constituent Assembly. The convocation of the Assembly, however, is being steadily postponed by the capitalists. Now that owing to Bolshevik pressure it has been set for September 30, the capitalists are openly clamouring about this being "impossibly" short notice, and are demanding the Constituent Assembly's postponement. The most influential members of the capitalist and landowner party, the "Cadet", or "people's freedom", Party, such as Panina, are openly urging that the convocation of the Constituent Assembly be delayed until after the war.

As to land, wait until the Constituent Assembly. As to the Constituent Assembly, wait until the end of the war. As to the end of the war, wait until complete victory. That is what it comes to. The capitalists and landowners, having a majority in the government, are plainly mocking at the peasants.

II

But how could this happen in a free country, after the overthrow of the tsarist regime?

In a non-free country, the people are ruled by a tsar and a handful of landowners, capitalists and bureaucrats who are not elected by anybody.

In a free country, the people are ruled only by those who have been elected for that purpose by the people themselves. At the elections the people divide themselves into parties, and as a rule each class of the population forms its own party; for instance, the landowners, the capitalists, the peasants and the workers all form separate parties. In free countries, therefore, the people are ruled through an

open struggle between parties and by free agreement between these parties.

For about four months after the overthrow of the tsarist regime on February 27, 1917, Russia was ruled as a free country, i.e., through an open struggle between freely formed parties and by free agreement between them. To understand the development of the Russian revolution, therefore, it is above all necessary to study the chief parties, the class interests they defended, and the relations among them all.

III

After the overthrow of the tsarist regime state power passed into the hands of the first Provisional Government, consisting of representatives of the bourgeoisie, i.e., the capitalists, who were joined by the landowners. The "Cadet" Party, the chief capitalist party, held pride of place as the ruling and government party of the bourgeoisie.

It was no accident this party secured power, although it was not the capitalists, of course, but the workers and peasants, the soldiers and sailors, who fought the tsarist troops and shed their blood for liberty. Power was secured by the capitalist party because the capitalist class possessed the power of wealth, organisation and knowledge. Since 1905, and particularly during the war, the class of the capitalists, and the landowners associated with them, have made in Russia the greatest progress in organising.

The Cadet Party has always been monarchist, both in 1905 and from 1905 to 1917. After the people's victory over tsarist tyranny it proclaimed itself a republican party. The experience of history shows that whenever the people triumphed over a monarchy, capitalist parties were willing to become republican as long as they could uphold the privileges of the capitalists and their unlimited power over the people.

The Cadet Party pays lip-service to "people's freedom". But actually it stands for the capitalists, and it was immediately backed by all the landowners, monarchists and Black Hundreds. The press and the elections are proof of this. After the revolution, all the bourgeois papers and the whole Black Hundred press began to sing in unison with the

Cadets. Not daring to come out openly, all the monarchist parties supported the Cadet Party at the elections, as, for example, in Petrograd.

Having obtained state power, the Cadets made every effort to continue the predatory war of conquest begun by Tsar Nicholas II, who had concluded secret predatory treaties with the British and French capitalists. Under these treaties, the Russian capitalists were promised, in the event of victory, the seizure of Constantinople, Galicia, Armenia, etc. As to the people, the government of the Cadets put them off with empty subterfuges and promises, deferring the decision of all matters of vital and essential importance to the workers and peasants until the Constituent Assembly met, without appointing the date of its convocation.

Making use of liberty, the people began to organise independently. The chief organisation of the workers and peasants, who form the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia, was the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. These Soviets already began to be formed during the February Revolution, and within a few weeks all class-conscious and advanced workers and peasants were united in Soviets in most of the larger cities of Russia and in many rural districts.

The Soviets were elected in an absolutely free way. They were genuine organisations of the people, of the workers and peasants. They were genuine organisations of the vast majority of the people. The workers and peasants in soldiers' uniforms were armed.

It goes without saying that the Soviets could and should have taken over state power in full. Pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly there should have been no other power in the state but the Soviets. Only then would our revolution have become a truly popular and truly democratic revolution. Only then could the working people, who are really striving for peace, and who really have no interest in a war of conquest, have begun firmly and resolutely to carry out a policy which would have ended the war of conquest and led to peace. Only then could the workers and peasants have curbed the capitalists, who are making fabulous profits "from the war" and who have reduced the

country to a state of ruin and starvation. But in the Soviets only a minority of the deputies were on the side of the revolutionary workers' party, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats, who demanded that all state power should be transferred to the Soviets. The majority of the deputies to the Soviets were on the side of the parties of the Menshevik Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were opposed to the transfer of power to the Soviets. Instead of removing the bourgeois government and replacing it by a government of the Soviets, these parties insisted on supporting the bourgeois government, compromising with it and forming a coalition government with it. This policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie pursued by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the people, is the main content of the entire course of development of the revolution during the five months since it began.

IV

Let us first see how this compromising of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks with the bourgeoisie proceeded, and then let us try to explain why the majority of the people trusted them.

V

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have compromised with the capitalists in one way or another at every stage of the Russian revolution.

At the very close of February 1917, as soon as the people had triumphed and the tsarist regime had been overthrown, the capitalist Provisional Government admitted Kerensky as a "socialist". As a matter of fact, Kerensky has never been a socialist; he was only a Trudovik,[92] and he enlisted himself with the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" only in March 1917, when it was already safe and quite profitable to do so. Through Kerensky, as Deputy Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, the capitalist Provisional Government immediately set about gaining control of and taming the Soviet. The Soviet, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks who predominated in it, allowed itself to be

tamed, agreeing immediately after the formation of the capitalist Provisional Government to "support it"—"to the extent" that it carried out its promises.

The Soviet regarded itself as a body verifying and exercising control over the activities of the Provisional Government. The leaders of the Soviet established what was known as a Contact Commission to keep in touch with the government.[93] Within that Contact Commission, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders of the Soviet held continuous negotiations with the capitalist government, holding, properly speaking, the status of Ministers without portfolio or unofficial Ministers.

This state of affairs lasted throughout March and almost the whole of April. Seeking to gain time, the capitalists resorted to delays and subterfuges. Not a single step of any importance to further the revolution was taken by the capitalist government during this period. It did absolutely nothing even to further its direct and immediate task, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; it did not submit the question to the localities or even set up a central commission to handle the preparations. The government was concerned with only one thing, namely, surreptitiously renewing the predatory international treaties concluded by the tsar with the capitalists of Britain and France, thwarting the revolution as cautiously and quietly as possible, and promising everything without fulfilling any of its promises. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the Contact Commission acted like simpletons who were fed on fancy phrases, promises, and more promises. Like the crow in the fable, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks succumbed to flattery and listened with pleasure to the assurances of the capitalists that they valued the Soviets highly and did not take a single step without them.

But time passed and the capitalist government did absolutely nothing for the revolution. On the contrary, during this period it managed, to the detriment of the revolution, to renew the secret predatory treaties, or, rather, to reaffirm them and "vitalise" them by supplementary and no less secret negotiations with Anglo-French imperialist diplomats. During this period it managed, to the detriment of the revolution, to lay the foundations of a counter-revolutionary

organisation of (or at least of a rapprochement among) the generals and officers in the army in the field. To the detriment of the revolution it managed to start the organisation of industrialists, of factory-owners, who, under the onslaught of the workers, were compelled to make concession after concession, but who at the same time began to sabotage (damage) production and prepare to bring it to a standstill when the opportunity came.

However, the organisation of the advanced workers and peasants in the Soviets made steady progress. The foremost representatives of the oppressed classes felt that, in spite of the agreement between the government and the Petrograd Soviet, in spite of Kerensky's pompous talk, in spite of the "Contact Commission", the government remained an enemy of the people, an enemy of the revolution. The people felt that unless the resistance of the capitalists was broken, the cause of peace, liberty and the revolution, would inevitably be lost. The impatience and bitterness of the people kept on growing.

VI

It burst out on April 20-21. The movement flared up spontaneously; nobody had cleared the ground for it. The movement was so markedly directed against the government that one regiment even appeared fully armed at the Mariinsky Palace to arrest the ministers. It became perfectly obvious to everybody that the government could not retain power. The Soviets could (and should) have taken over power without meeting the least resistance from any quarter. Instead, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks supported the collapsing capitalist government, entangled themselves even further in compromises with it and took steps that were even more fatal to the revolution, that tended to lead to its doom.

Revolution enlightens all classes with a rapidity and thoroughness unknown in normal, peaceful times. The capitalists, better organised and more experienced than anybody else in matters of class struggle and politics, learnt their lesson quicker than the others. Realising that the government's position was hopeless, they resorted to a method which for many decades, ever since 1848, has been practised

by the capitalists of other countries in order to fool, divide and weaken the workers. This method is known as a "coalition" government, i.e., a joint cabinet formed of members of the bourgeoisie and turncoats from socialism.

In countries where freedom and democracy have long existed side by side with a revolutionary labour movement, in Britain and France, the capitalists have repeatedly and very successfully resorted to this method. When the "socialist" leaders entered a bourgeois cabinet, they invariably proved to be figureheads, puppets, screens for the capitalists, instruments for deceiving the workers. The "democratic and republican" capitalists of Russia resorted to this very method. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks let themselves be fooled at once, and the "coalition" cabinet, joined by Chernov, Tsereteli and Co., became a fact on May 6.

The simpletons of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties were jubilant and fatuously bathed in the rays of the ministerial glory of their leaders. The capitalists gleefully rubbed their hands at having found helpers against the people in the persons of the "leaders of the Soviets" and at having secured their promise to support "offensive operations at the front", i.e., a resumption of the imperialist predatory war, which had come to a standstill for a while. The capitalists were well aware of the puffed-up impotence of these leaders, they knew that the promises of the bourgeoisie—regarding control over production, and even the organisation of production, regarding a peace policy, and so forth—would never be fulfilled.

And so it turned out. The second phase in the development of the revolution, May 6 to June 9, or June 18, fully corroborated the expectations of the capitalists as to the ease with which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks could be fooled.

While Peshekhonov and Skobelev were deceiving themselves and the people with florid speeches to the effect that one hundred per cent of the profits of the capitalists would be taken away from them, that their "resistance was broken", and so forth, the capitalists continued to consolidate their position. Nothing, absolutely nothing, was undertaken during this period to curb the capitalists. The ministerial turncoats from socialism proved to be mere talking machines

for distracting the attention of the oppressed classes, while the entire apparatus of state administration actually remained in the hands of the bureaucracy (the officialdom) and the bourgeoisie. The notorious Palchinsky, Deputy Minister for Industry, was a typical representative of that apparatus, blocking every measure against the capitalists. While the ministers prated everything remained as of old.

The bourgeoisie used Minister Tsereteli in particular to fight the revolution. He was sent to "pacify" Kronstadt when the local revolutionaries had the audacity to remove an appointed commissar.[94] The bourgeoisie launched in their newspapers an incredibly vociferous, violent and vicious campaign of lies, slander and vituperation against Kronstadt, accusing it of the desire "to secede from Russia", and repeating this and similar absurdities in a thousand ways to intimidate the petty bourgeoisie and the philistines. A most typically stupid and frightened philistine, Tsereteli, was the most "conscientious" of all in swallowing the bait of bourgeois slander; he was the most zealous of all in "smashing up and subduing" Kronstadt, without realising that he was playing the role of a lackey of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. He turned out to be the instrument of the "compromise" arrived at with revolutionary Kronstadt, whereby the commissar for Kronstadt was not simply appointed by the government, but was elected locally and was *confirmed* by the government. It was on such miserable compromises that the ministers who had deserted socialism for the bourgeoisie wasted their time.

Wherever a bourgeois minister could not appear in defence of the government, before the revolutionary workers or in the Soviets, Skobelev, Tsereteli, Chernov or some other "socialist" Minister appeared (or, to be precise, was sent by the bourgeoisie) and faithfully performed their assignment; he would do his level best to defend the Cabinet, whitewash the capitalists and fool the people by making promise after promise and by advising people to wait, wait and wait.

Minister Chernov particularly was engaged in bargaining with his bourgeois colleagues; down to July, to the new "crisis of power" which began after the movement of July 3-4, to the resignation of the Cadets from the Cabinet, Minister Chernov was continuously engaged in the useful and inte-

resting work, so beneficial to the people, of "persuading" his bourgeois colleagues, exhorting them to agree at least to prohibition of the purchase and sale of land. This prohibition had been most solemnly promised to the peasants at the All-Russia Congress of Peasant Deputies in Petrograd. But the promise remained only a promise. Chernov proved unable to fulfil it either in May or in June, until the revolutionary tide, the spontaneous outbreak of July 3-4, which coincided with the resignation of the Cadets from the Cabinet, made it possible to enact this measure. Even then, however, it proved to be an isolated measure, incapable of promoting to any palpable extent the struggle of the peasants against the landowners for land.

Meanwhile, at the front, the counter-revolutionary, imperialist task of resuming the imperialist, predatory war, a task which Guchkov, so hated by the people, had been unable to accomplish, was being accomplished successfully and brilliantly by the "revolutionary democrat" Kerensky, that new-baked member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. He revelled in his own eloquence, incense was burned to him by the imperialists, who were using him as a pawn, he was flattered and worshipped—all because he served the capitalists faithfully, trying to talk the "revolutionary troops" into agreeing to resume the war being waged in pursuance of the treaties concluded by Tsar Nicholas II with the capitalists of Britain and France, a war waged so that Russian capitalists might secure Constantinople and Lvov, Erzurum and Trebizond.

So passed the second phase of the Russian revolution—May 6 to June 9. Shielded and defended by the "socialist" Ministers, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie grew in strength, consolidated their position and prepared an offensive both against the external enemy and against the internal enemy, i.e., the revolutionary workers.

VII

On June 9, the revolutionary workers' party, the Bolsheviks, was preparing for a demonstration in Petrograd to give organised expression to the irresistibly growing popular discontent and indignation. The Socialist-Revolutionary and

Menshevik leaders, entangled in compromises with the bourgeoisie and bound by the imperialist policy of an offensive, were horrified, feeling that they were losing their influence among the masses. A general howl went up against the demonstration, and the counter-revolutionary Cadets joined in this howl, this time together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Under their direction, and as a result of their policy of compromise with the capitalists, the swing of the petty-bourgeois masses to an alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie became quite definite and strikingly obvious. This is the historical significance and class meaning of the crisis of June 9.

The Bolsheviks called off the demonstration, having no wish to lead the workers at that moment into a losing fight against the united Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The latter, however, so as to retain at least a vestige of the people's confidence, were compelled to call a general demonstration for June 18. The bourgeoisie were beside themselves with rage, rightly discerning in this a swing of the petty-bourgeois democrats towards the proletariat, and they decided to paralyse the action of the democrats by an offensive at the front.

In fact, June 18 was marked by an impressive victory for the slogans of the revolutionary proletariat, the slogans of Bolshevism, among the people of Petrograd. And on June 19 the bourgeoisie and the Bonapartist* Kerensky solemnly announced that the offensive at the front had begun on June 18.

The offensive meant in effect the resumption of the predatory war in the interests of the capitalists and against the will of the vast majority of the working people. That is why the offensive was inevitably accompanied, on the one hand, by a gigantic growth of chauvinism and the transfer of military power (and consequently of state power) to the military gang of Bonapartists, and, on the other, by the use

* Bonapartism (from Bonaparte, the name of the two French emperors) is a name applied to a government which endeavours to appear non-partisan by taking advantage of a highly acute struggle between the parties of the capitalists and the workers. Actually serving the capitalists, such a government dupes the workers most of all by promises and petty concessions.

of violence against the masses, the persecution of the internationalists, the abolition of freedom of agitation, and the arrest and shooting of those who were against the war.

Whereas May 6 bound the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to the triumphal chariot of the bourgeoisie with a rope, June 19 shackled them, as servants of the capitalists, with a chain.

VIII

Owing to the resumption of the predatory war, the bitterness of the people naturally grew even more rapidly and intensely. July 3-4 witnessed an outburst of their anger which the Bolsheviks attempted to restrain and which, of course, they had to endeavour to make as organised as possible.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, being slaves of the bourgeoisie, shackled by their master, agreed to everything: dispatching reactionary troops to Petrograd, bringing back the death penalty, disarming the workers and revolutionary troops, arresting and hounding, and closing down newspapers without trial. The power which the bourgeoisie in the government were unable to take entirely, and which the Soviets did not want to take, fell into the hands of the military clique, the Bonapartists, who, of course, were wholly backed by the Cadets and the Black Hundreds, by the landowners and capitalists.

Down the ladder, step by step. Having once set foot on the ladder of compromise with the bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks slid irresistibly downwards, to rock bottom. On February 28, in the Petrograd Soviet, they promised conditional support to the bourgeois government. On May 6 they saved it from collapse and allowed themselves to be made its servants and defenders by agreeing to an offensive. On June 9 they united with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in a campaign of furious rage, lies and slander against the revolutionary proletariat. On June 19 they approved the resumption of the predatory war. On July 3 they consented to the summoning of reactionary troops, which was the beginning of their complete surrender of power to the Bonapartists. Down the ladder, step by step.

This shameful finale of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties was not fortuitous but a consequence of the economic status of the small owners, the petty bourgeoisie, as has been repeatedly borne out by experience in Europe.

IX

Everybody, of course, has seen the small owner bend every effort and strain every nerve to "get on in the world", to become a real master, to rise to the position of a "strong" employer, to the position of a bourgeois. As long as capitalism rules the roost, there is no alternative for the small owner other than becoming a capitalist (and that is possible at best in the case of one small owner out of a hundred), or becoming a ruined man, a semi-proletarian, and ultimately a proletarian. The same is true in politics: the petty-bourgeois democrats, especially their leaders, tend to trail after the bourgeoisie. The leaders of the petty-bourgeois democrats console their people with promises and assurances about the possibility of reaching agreement with the big capitalists; at best, and for a very brief period, they obtain certain minor concessions from the capitalists for a small upper section of the working people; but on every decisive issue, on every important matter, the petty-bourgeois democrats have always tailed after the bourgeoisie as a feeble appendage to them, as an obedient tool in the hands of the financial magnates. The experience of Britain and France has proved this over and over again.

The experience of the Russian revolution from February to July 1917, when events developed with unusual rapidity, particularly under the influence of the imperialist war and the deep-going crisis brought about by it, has most strikingly and palpably confirmed the old Marxist truth that the position of the petty bourgeoisie is unstable.

The lesson of the Russian revolution is that there can be no escape for the working people from the iron grip of war, famine, and enslavement by the landowners and capitalists unless they completely break with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties and clearly understand the latter's treacherous role, unless they renounce all compromises with the bourgeoisie and resolutely side with the revolutionary

workers. Only the revolutionary workers, if supported by the peasant poor, are capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists and leading the people in gaining land without compensation, complete liberty, victory over famine and the war, and a just and lasting peace.

AFTERWORD

This article was written at the end of July, as is apparent from the text.

The history of the revolution during August has fully corroborated what is said in this article. Then, at the end of August, the Kornilov revolt[95] caused a new turn in the revolution by clearly demonstrating to the whole people that the Cadets, in alliance with the counter-revolutionary generals, were striving to disband the Soviets and restore the monarchy. The near future will show how strong this new turn of the revolution is, and whether it will succeed in putting an end to the fatal policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie.

N. Lenin

September 6, 1917

KAMENEV'S SPEECH IN THE C.E.C. ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE[96]

The speech made by Comrade Kamenev on August 6 in the Central Executive Committee on the Stockholm Conference cannot but meet with reproof from all Bolsheviks who are faithful to their Party and principles.

In the very first sentence of his speech, Comrade Kamenev made a formal statement which gave his whole speech a monstrous ring. He made the reservation that he was speaking on his own behalf, and that "our group has not discussed this issue".

First of all, since when, in an organised party, do individual members speak about important issues "on their own behalf"? Since the group had not discussed the issue, Comrade Kamenev had no right to speak. This is the first conclusion to be drawn from his words.

Secondly, what right had Comrade Kamenev to ignore the decision of the Party Central Committee against participating in the Stockholm Conference? As long as this decision has not been rescinded by a congress or by a new decision of the Central Committee, it remains law for the Party. Had it been rescinded, Comrade Kamenev could not have kept quiet, could not have spoken in the present perfect: "We Bolsheviks have so far adopted a negative attitude to the Stockholm Conference."

Again the conclusion is that Kamenev had no right to speak and, moreover, directly violated a Party decision, directly spoke against the Party, and thwarted its will by not saying a word about the Central Committee decision, which is binding on him. Yet the decision was published in *Pravda*, even with the additional remark that the Party

representative would withdraw from the Zimmerwald Conference should it favour participation in the Stockholm Conference.*

Kamenev gave an incorrect account of the reasons for the "former" negative attitude of the Bolsheviks towards participation in the Stockholm Conference. He did not say that social-imperialists were going to attend the conference and that it would be a disgrace for a revolutionary Social-Democrat to have any truck with them.

Sad to admit, Starostin, who has often been very much in the wrong in the past, put the revolutionary Social-Democratic point of view a thousand times better, more correctly and more fittingly than Kamenev. To confer with social-imperialists, ministers, butcher's aides in Russia would be shameful treachery. There could then be no talk of internationalism.

Kamenev's arguments, which actually favour a "change" in our view on the Stockholm Conference, are ludicrously feeble.

"It became clear to us," Kamenev said, "that from that [??] moment the Stockholm Conference ceased [??] to be a blind instrument of the imperialist countries."

That is not true. There is not a single fact to support it, and Kamenev could advance no serious argument in its favour. If the Anglo-French social-imperialists refuse to attend, while the German do attend, can that be regarded as a change in principle?? Is it a change at all from an internationalist point of view? Can Kamenev really have "forgotten" the decision of our Party conference (April 29) on the perfectly analogous case of the Danish social-imperialist?

According to newspaper reports, Kamenev further said, "The broad revolutionary banner under which the forces of the world proletariat are mustering is beginning to wave over Stockholm."

This is a meaningless declamation in the spirit of Chernov and Tsereteli. It is a blatant untruth. In actual fact, it is not the revolutionary banner that is beginning to wave over Stockholm, but the banner of deals, agreements, amnesty for the social-imperialists, and negotiations among bankers for dividing up annexed territory.

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* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 388.—*Ed.*

We cannot tolerate a situation where the party of the internationalists, which is responsible to the whole world for revolutionary internationalism, compromises itself by winking at the dirty tricks of the Russian and German social-imperialists, of the ministers of the bourgeois imperialist government of the Chernovs, Skobelevs and Co.

We have decided to build a Third International, and we must do so in face of all difficulties. Not a single step backward to deals with the social-imperialists and deserters from socialism!

Proletary No. 3
August 29 (16), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Proletary*

RUMOURS OF A CONSPIRACY

The item published under the above title in *Novaya Zhizn* No. 103 on August 17 deserves very serious attention. We must dwell on it (again and again), even though what it makes out to be something serious is not serious at all.

It says roughly that on August 14 the rumour was put about in Moscow that some Cossack units were moving towards Moscow from the front and that, moreover, "certain military groups enjoying the sympathy of certain circles in Moscow" were organising "decisive counter-revolutionary actions". It also alleges that the military authorities had notified the Moscow Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, and "with the participation of Central Executive Committee members" (i.e., Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries) had taken steps to inform the soldiers of the need to guard the city, etc. "Moscow Bolsheviks," the item says in conclusion, "were likewise invited to participate in these preparations since they are influential among many army units and were given access to these for the occasion."

This last sentence is deliberately vague and ambiguous, for if the Bolsheviks are influential among many army units (which is indisputable and generally recognised), then who and how *could* give them "access" to those units? This is obviously absurd. If, however, the Bolsheviks were really "given access" "for the occasion" (By whom? Evidently by the Mensheviks and S.R.s!) to *any* army units, that means there was a certain *bloc*, alliance or agreement between the Bolsheviks and the defencists on "defence against the counter-revolution".

It is this circumstance that makes an unserious item serious, and requires a very careful approach to what is reported on the part of all class-conscious workers.

The rumour put about by the defencists, i.e., by the Mensheviks and S.R.s, is clearly absurd, and the foul and infamous political calculations which have prompted it are quite evident. It is the Provisional Government which is really counter-revolutionary and which the defencists allegedly want to defend. Cossack troops *were* recalled from the front to the capitals, specifically to Petrograd on July 3, by none other than the Provisional Government and the "socialist" Ministers, as was formally confirmed by the Cossack General Kaledin at the Moscow counter-revolutionary imperialist meeting. This is a fact.

This particular fact, which exposes the Mensheviks and S.R.s, and proves their betrayal of the revolution, *their alliance* with the counter-revolutionaries, *their alliance* with the Kaledins—this fact the Mensheviks and S.R.s would like to cover up, to hush up, to make people forget, through "rumours" alleging that the Cossacks are marching on Moscow against the will of Kerensky, Tsereteli, Skobelev and Avksentyev, that the Mensheviks and the S.R.s are "defending the revolution", and so on. The political scheme of the Menshevik and defencist traitors is as clear as can be: they want to fool the workers, to make themselves out to be revolutionaries, to learn something about the Bolsheviks (so as to pass it on to the counter-intelligence service, of course), to patch up their reputation! A scheme as vile as it is crude! At small expense, having made up a stupid little "rumour", they hope to gain "access" to the Bolshevik army units and, in general, to strengthen confidence in the Provisional Government by assuring naïve people that it is this government the Cossacks want to overthrow, that it is *not* in collusion with the Cossacks and is "defending the revolution", and so on, and so forth.

The little scheme is obvious. The rumour, of course, is absurd and clearly fabricated. But confidence in the Provisional Government they hope to get in cold cash, and, further, they hope to draw the Bolsheviks into a "bloc" with them!

First page of the manuscript “Rumours of a Conspiracy”, August 1917

Reduced

First page of the manuscript "Rumours of a Conspiracy", August 1917

Reduced

It is hard to believe that there can be such fools and scoundrels among the Bolsheviks willing to enter into a bloc with the defencists at present. It is hard to believe, first, because there is an explicit resolution of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.[97] which says (see *Proletary*[98] No. 4) that "the Mensheviks have deserted for good to the camp of the proletariat's enemies". You do not conclude agreements or make blocs with people who have deserted for good to the enemy camp. "The prime task of revolutionary Social-Democrats", the resolution goes on to say, "is to isolate them [the Menshevik defencists] completely from all the more or less revolutionary elements of the working class." It is obviously against this isolation that the Mensheviks and S.R.s are fighting by spreading absurd rumours. And it is obvious that in Moscow as in Petrograd, the workers are turning away more and more from the Mensheviks and S.R.s, realising more and more clearly the treacherous, counter-revolutionary nature of their policies. And so, to "remedy the situation", the defencists are compelled to resort to every trick in the book.

The Congress resolution being what it is, any Bolshevik who came to terms with the defencists for the purpose of "giving access", or indirectly expressing confidence in the Provisional Government (which is allegedly being defended against the Cossacks), would, of course, be immediately and deservedly expelled from the Party.

There are, however, other reasons why it is hard to believe there can be Bolsheviks, in Moscow or elsewhere, capable of forming a bloc with the defencists, of forming anything like common, even temporary, bodies, of making any kind of deal, etc., with them. Let us imagine a situation most favourable to such rather unlikely Bolsheviks; let us assume that in their naïveté they actually believed in the rumours they hear from the Mensheviks and S.R.s; let us even assume that, to inspire them with confidence, they were given certain, likewise invented, "facts". It is obvious that even in these circumstances, not a single honest Bolshevik who has not completely lost his head would agree to any bloc with the defencists, would make any deals on "giving access", etc. Even in these circumstances, a Bolshevik would say: "Our workers and soldiers will fight the counter-revolutionary

troops if they start an offensive now against the Provisional Government; they will do so *not* to defend this government, which called Kaledin and Co. on July 3, but to independently defend the revolution as they pursue their own aim, the aim of securing victory for the workers, for the poor, for the cause of peace, and not for the imperialists, for Kerensky, Avksentyev, Tsereteli, Skobelev and Co." Even in the exceedingly unlikely situation we have assumed, a Bolshevik would tell the Mensheviks: "We shall fight, of course, but we refuse to enter into any political alliance whatever with you, refuse to express the least confidence in you. We shall fight in the very same way as the Social-Democrats fought tsarism in February 1917, together with the Cadets, without entering into any alliance with the Cadets or trusting them for one second. The slightest confidence in the Mensheviks would be as much of a betrayal of the revolution now as confidence in the Cadets would have been between 1905 and 1917."

A Bolshevik would tell the workers and soldiers: "Let us fight, but not one iota of trust in the Mensheviks if you don't want to rob yourselves of the fruits of victory."

It is all too advantageous for the Mensheviks to put about false rumours and allegations to the effect that the government they support is saving the revolution, while in reality it has *already formed a bloc* with the Kaledins, is *already* counter-revolutionary, has *already* taken a great many steps, and is daily taking further steps, to meet the terms of this bloc with the Kaledins.

To believe these rumours, to support them directly or indirectly, would mean, on the part of the Bolsheviks, betraying the cause of the revolution. The chief guarantee of its success today is for the people to clearly realise the treachery of the Mensheviks and S.R.s and completely break with them, and for every revolutionary worker to boycott them as completely as they boycotted the Cadets after the experience of 1905.

(I request that several copies be made of this article, so that it may be sent to several Party papers and magazines simultaneously for publication, and at the same time be

put before the Central Committee on my behalf with the following postscript:

I request that this article be considered as my report to the Central Committee, with the added proposal that the Central Committee order an official investigation, with Moscow comrades who are not members of the C.C. participating, to establish whether the Bolsheviks had any common institutions with the defencists on this basis, whether there were any blocs or agreements, what they consisted in, etc. The facts and particulars must be investigated officially, and all details ascertained. If the existence of a bloc is confirmed, members of the Central Committee or the Moscow Committee must be relieved of their duties and the question of their formal removal must be submitted, even before the next Congress meets, to the next plenary meeting of the Central Committee. For *now*, after the Moscow meeting, after the strike, after July 3-5, it is Moscow that is acquiring, or may acquire, the significance of a *centre*. It may well be that a movement similar to that of July 3-5 will develop in this vast proletarian centre, which is larger than Petrograd. At that time the task in Petrograd was to give the movement a peaceful and organised character. That *was* a correct slogan. The task facing us in Moscow *now* is entirely different; the former slogan would be absolutely incorrect. Our task now would be to *take power* and to proclaim ourselves the government in the name of peace, land for the peasants, and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time by agreement with the peasants in the various localities, etc. It is quite possible that such a movement will break out in Moscow due to unemployment, famine, a railway strike, economic dislocation, and so on. It is highly important to have people "at the helm" in Moscow who will not swerve to the right, who will not form blocs with the Mensheviks, and who in the event of a movement will understand the *new* tasks, the *new* slogan of seizing power, the *new* ways and means of winning it. This is why an "investigation" of the bloc case and censure of the Bolsheviks in the bloc, if any, and their removal are necessary not only for discipline, not only for remedying the blunder already made, but for the vital interests of the *future* movement. The Moscow strike on August 12 proved that the *active*

workers support the Bolsheviks, even though the Duma elections yielded a majority to the S.R.s. This is very similar to the situation in Petrograd before July 3-5, 1917. But there is a vast difference between the situation then and now, for at that time Petrograd could not even have taken power physically, and had it done so, it could not have retained power politically, for Tsereteli and Co. had not yet sunk as low as to support butchery. This is why *at that time*, on July 3-5, 1917, in Petrograd, the slogan of taking power would have been *incorrect*. At that time, even the Bolsheviks were not, and could not have been, consciously determined to treat Tsereteli and Co. as counter-revolutionaries. At that time, neither the soldiers nor the workers could have had the experience brought by the month of July.

The situation now is entirely different. Should a spontaneous movement break out in Moscow today, the slogan should be precisely to seize power. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that the movement in Moscow be led by people fit for the task, who have *fully* grasped and considered this slogan. This is why we must insist again and again on an investigation and the removal of the guilty.)

Written on August 18-19
(August 31-September 1), 1917

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THEY DO NOT SEE THE WOOD FOR THE TREES

Speaking at the session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets on August 4, L. Martov said (we quote from the *Novaya Zhizn* report) that "Tsereteli's criticism is too mild", that "the government does not repel counter-revolutionary attempts by army officers", and that "it is not our aim to overthrow the present government or undermine confidence in it...." "The actual balance of forces," Martov continued, "does not at present warrant the demand for power to be transferred to the Soviets. This could come only in the course of a civil war, which at the moment is impermissible." "It is not our intention to overthrow the government," Martov concluded, "but we must call its attention to the fact that there are other forces in the country besides the Cadets and army officers. They are the revolutionary democratic forces, and on them the Provisional Government must rely for support."

These are remarkable arguments from Martov, and they deserve very careful examination. They are remarkable in that they bring out very clearly the most widespread, the most harmful and most dangerous political errors of the petty-bourgeois masses and their most typical prejudices. Of all spokesmen for these masses, Martov, a publicist, is certainly one of the most "Left-wing", most revolutionary, most politically conscious and most skilful. It is therefore more useful to analyse his arguments than those of a Chernov flaunting an array of empty words or of a stupid Tsereteli and their like. In analysing Martov's arguments, we shall analyse what is at present most reasonable in the ideas of the petty bourgeoisie.

First of all, Martov's vacillation over the transfer of power to the Soviets is quite typical. Prior to July 4 Martov was *against* this slogan. After July 4, he was *for* it. Early in August, he was once more against it, and note his monstrous-

ly illogical and amusing, from a Marxist point of view, argumentation. He is against it because, he says, "the actual balance of forces does not at present warrant the demand for power to be transferred to the Soviets. This could come only in the course of a civil war, which at the moment is impermissible".

What a muddle. It implies, first, that before July 4 the transfer of power was possible *without* civil war (true enough!), but it was just then that Martov was against the transfer. It implies, secondly, that after July 4, when Martov was for the transfer of power to the Soviets, it was possible without civil war—an obvious, glaring distortion of the facts, for it was on the night of July 4-5 that the Bonapartists, supported by the Cadets and attended on by lackeys like Chernov and Tsereteli, brought the counter-revolutionary troops to Petrograd. To take power peacefully under these circumstances would have been absolutely impossible.

Thirdly and lastly, Martov implies that a Marxist or even just a revolutionary democrat had the right to reject a slogan correctly expressing the interests of the people and those of the revolution on the grounds that the slogan could be realised "only in the course of a civil war". But this is an obvious absurdity, an obvious renunciation of the whole class struggle, the whole revolution. For everyone knows that the history of all revolutions the world over reveals an inevitable rather than an accidental transformation of the class struggle into civil war. Everyone knows that it was after July 4 that we in Russia saw the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie starting civil war, the disarming of regiments, executions at the front, and assassination of Bolsheviks. Civil war is "impermissible" for revolutionary democrats, if you please, just when the course of events has inexorably brought about a situation in which the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie have started civil war.

Martov has entangled himself in the most unbelievable, amusing, and helpless fashion.

In disentangling the confusion created by him, we must say:

It was before July 4 that to transfer full power to the then existing Soviets was the only correct slogan. At that time, it could have been done peacefully, without civil war, because there had been no systematic acts of violence against

the masses, against the people, such as began after July 4. At that time, the transfer of power guaranteed the peaceful progress of the whole revolution and, in particular, made it possible to peacefully eliminate the struggle between classes and parties *within* the Soviets.

After July 4, the transfer of power to the Soviets became impossible without civil war, since, on July 4 and 5, power had passed to a military Bonapartist clique backed by the Cadets and the Black Hundreds. Hence, all Marxists, all those on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, all honest revolutionary democrats, *must* now explain to the workers and peasants the radical change in the situation which necessitates a new path for the transfer of power to the proletarians and semi-proletarians.

Martov has advanced no arguments in defence of his "idea" that civil war is impermissible "at the moment", in defence of his statement that it is not his intention "to overthrow the present government". Because his opinion is unsubstantiated, and particularly because he voiced it at a meeting of defencists, it inevitably smacks of the defencist argument that civil war is impermissible while the enemy threatens from without.

We wonder whether Martov could have brought himself to advance such an argument openly. Among the mass of the petty bourgeoisie, this argument is very popular. And, of course, it is one of the most common place. The bourgeoisie were unafraid of revolution and civil war at times when the enemy threatened from without—either in September 1870 in France or in February 1917 in Russia. The bourgeoisie were unafraid of seizing power at the price of civil war at times when the enemy threatened from without. The revolutionary proletariat will reckon just as little with this "argument" from liars and lackeys of the bourgeoisie.

* * *

One of the most glaring theoretical mistakes which Martov makes and which is also very typical of the whole range of political ideas of the petty bourgeoisie, is to confound tsarist counter-revolution, and monarchist counter-revolution in general, with bourgeois counter-revolution. It is due to the

particular narrow-mindedness, or particular stupidity, of the petty-bourgeois democrat who cannot break free from economic, political and ideological dependence on the bourgeoisie, who cedes them priority, sees them as an "ideal", and believes their cries about the danger of "counter-revolution from the right".

Martov expressed this range of ideas, or rather this petty-bourgeois stupidity, by saying in his speech: "To counterbalance the pressure exerted upon it [the government] from the right, we must create a counter-pressure."

Here is a sample of the philistine credulity and disregard of the class struggle. It implies that the government is something above classes and above parties, the only trouble being that it is under too strong pressure from the right, so that there is need of stronger pressure from the left. What wisdom worthy of Louis Blanc, Chernov, Tsereteli, and all that despicable crew! How infinitely useful this philistine wisdom is for the Bonapartists! How they long to make "the foolish yokels" believe that the present government is fighting both the Right and the Left, the extremes only, as it builds up true statehood and exercises true democracy! Yet, in practice, it is this Bonapartist government that constitutes a government of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie (and necessary for the perpetuation of their domination) to deceive the people by making believe that they represent "the revolution in general, while counter-revolution threatens from the right, from the tsar." It is only through the infinite stupidity of the Dans and Tseretelis, through the infinite conceit of the Chernovs and Avksentyevs, that this idea, nurtured by the conditions of life of the petty bourgeoisie, still survives among "revolutionary democrats" in general.

Anyone who has learned anything from history or from Marxism will have to admit that a political analysis must focus on the *class* issue: what class represents the revolution and what class the counter-revolution?

French history shows us that the Bonapartist counter-revolution developed at the end of the eighteenth century (and then, for a second time, from 1848 to 1852) on the basis of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and in turn paved

the way for the restoration of a legitimate monarchy. Bonapartism is a form of government which grows out of the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie, in the conditions of democratic changes and a democratic revolution.

You have to purposely shut your eyes not to see how, before your very eyes, Bonapartism is growing in Russia under very similar conditions. The tsarist counter-revolution is at present negligible; it has no political importance and plays no political role. The bogey of a tsarist counter-revolution is being purposely played up and made a fuss over by charlatans to frighten fools, to treat philistines to a political sensation, to distract the people's attention from the real and serious counter-revolution. You just cannot help laughing at the arguments of a Zarudny, who endeavours to assess the counter-revolutionary role of a little backyard union called "Holy Russia" but who does "not see" the counter-revolutionary role of the union of the entire bourgeoisie of Russia called the Cadet Party.

The Cadet Party is the major political force of the bourgeois counter-revolution in Russia. This force has splendidly rallied around it all Black Hundred elements, both at the elections and (more important still) in the apparatus of military and civil administration and in the press campaign of lies, slander and baiting directed primarily at the Bolsheviks, i.e., the party of the revolutionary proletariat, and then against the Soviets.

Gradually but relentlessly, the present government is pursuing the very policy which the Cadet Party has been systematically advocating and preparing for ever since March 1917. It has resumed and is prolonging the imperialist war; it has stopped chattering about peace; it first gave ministers the right to close down newspapers, then to disperse conferences, then to arrest and exile people; it has restored capital punishment and executions at the front; it is disarming the workers and the revolutionary regiments; it has flooded the capital with counter-revolutionary troops; it has begun to arrest and persecute the peasants for unauthorised "seizures"; it is shutting down factories and organising lock-outs. This is a far from complete list of measures which present an excellent picture of the bourgeois counter-revolution of Bonapartism.

And what about the postponed convocation of the Constituent Assembly and the crowning of a Bonapartist policy with a Zemsky Sobor in Moscow—a step leading to the postponement of the Constituent Assembly until after the war? Isn't this a gem of Bonapartist politics? Yet Martov does not see where the general headquarters of the bourgeois counter-revolution is. Really some do not see the wood for the trees.

* * *

What really dirty lackey's role the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, i.e., the S.R.s and Mensheviks who dominate it, played in the matter of postponing the Constituent Assembly! The Cadets set the tone by launching the idea of postponement, starting a press campaign and using the *Cossack congress* as a pretext to demand postponement. (A Cossack congress! How could the Liebers, Avksentyevs, Chernovs and Tseretelis help behaving like lackeys!) The Mensheviks and S.R.s hopped along after the Cadets, they crawled at their master's call like dogs threatened with their master's whip.

Instead of giving the people a plain statement of the facts showing how brazenly, how shamelessly the Cadets had been delaying and blocking the convocation of the Constituent Assembly since March, and instead of exposing the false evasions and the assertion that it was impossible to convoke the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time, the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee promptly brushed aside all "doubts" expressed even by Dan (even by Dan!) and sent Bramson and Bronzov, two lackeys of that bureau of lackeys, to the Provisional Government with a report "on the need to postpone elections to the Constituent Assembly until October 28-29". A splendid prelude to the coronation of the Bonapartists by a Zemsky Sobor in Moscow. Whoever has not stooped to complete infamy must rally to the party of the revolutionary proletariat. Without the victory of the revolutionary proletariat there *can be no* peace for the people, land for the peasants nor bread for the workers and all working people.

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Signed: *N. Karpov*

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POLITICAL BLACKMAIL

Blackmail is the extortion of money under threat of exposing certain facts or invented "stories" which may be disagreeable to the person concerned, or under threat of causing him some other unpleasantness.

Political blackmail is the threat of exposing, or the actual exposure, of true, but more often invented, "stories" with the aim of causing an opponent political damage, of slandering him, of depriving him of the possibility of engaging in political activity, or of making it difficult for him.

Our republican and—please excuse the term—even democratic bourgeois and petty-bourgeois people proved themselves to be heroes of political blackmail by starting a "campaign" of defamation, lies and slander against the parties and political leaders that do not suit them. Tsarism persecuted crudely, savagely, brutally. The republican bourgeoisie persecute in a *dirty* way, striving to besmirch the reputation of the hated proletarian revolutionary and internationalist by slander, lies, insinuations, defamation, rumours, etc., etc.

The Bolsheviks in particular have had the honour of experiencing these methods of persecution used by the republican imperialists. In general, the Bolshevik might apply to himself the well-known words of the poet:

He hears the voice of approbation
Not in the dulcet sounds of praise,
But in the savage cries of indignation![99]

Savage cries of indignation at the Bolsheviks rang out from all bourgeois and nearly all petty-bourgeois papers almost *immediately* after the beginning of the Russian revolution. And the Bolshevik, the internationalist, the sup-

porter of the proletarian revolution, may justly hear the voice of approbation in these savage cries of indignation, for the fierce hatred of the bourgeoisie is often the best proof of faithful and honest service to the cause of the proletariat by the slandered, baited and persecuted.

The blackmailing nature of the slanderous methods of the bourgeoisie may be illustrated best of all by an example which does not concern our Party, namely, the "affair" of the Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov. Some members of the Cadet Party, notorious slanderers headed by Milyukov and Hessen, trying to intimidate or expel Chernov, started a campaign, baiting him for his allegedly "defeatist" articles abroad, and for his association with persons supposed to have received money from German imperialist agents. The campaign gathered strength. It was taken up by all bourgeois papers.

Afterwards the Cadets and S.R.s "came to terms" on a certain composition of the Cabinet. And lo and behold! The Chernov "affair" is dropped! It was dropped in a few days, without trial or examination, without publishing documents, without questioning witnesses, without presenting the decision of experts. When the Cadets were dissatisfied with Chernov, they began a slanderous "affair". When the Cadets had come to terms politically with Chernov, at least for a while, the "affair" was dropped.

This is a graphic example of political blackmail. Baiting in the newspapers, slander, and insinuations serve as a weapon of political struggle and political revenge in the hands of the bourgeoisie and such scoundrels as the Milyukovs, Hessens, Zaslavskys, Dans, etc. Once the political aim is attained, the "case" against X or Y is dropped, showing the dirty character, base dishonesty, and blackmailing nature of those who started it.

For it is obvious that one who does *not* practise blackmail would not discontinue his revelations—if he were prompted by honest motives—no matter what political changes took place; he would in any circumstances bring his revelations to a conclusion, to a court sentence, to a point where the public was fully informed, where *all* documents were collected and published, or he would openly and explicitly admit that he had made a mistake or had misinterpreted the facts.

The case of Chernov, who is not a Bolshevik, clearly demonstrates the true nature of the blackmailing crusade against the Bolsheviks by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois papers. When the political aim of those knights and hangers-on of capital seemed to them to have been reached, when the Bolsheviks had been arrested and their newspapers closed down, the blackmailers *fell silent*! Having at their disposal every means of revealing the truth—the press, money, aid from the foreign bourgeoisie, the co-operation of "public opinion" of the whole bourgeoisie of Russia, and the friendly support of the state power of one of the largest countries of the world—having all this at their disposal, the heroes of the anti-Bolshevik crusade, the Milyukovs and Hessens, the Zaslavskys and Dans, *fell silent*!

It is becoming clear to every fair-minded person, as it at once became clear to class-conscious workers, whose entire life prepares them for a quick understanding of the methods of the bourgeoisie, that the Milyukovs and Hessens, the Zaslavskys and Dans, etc., etc., are *political blackmailers*. We must make it perfectly clear, must explain it to the masses, write about it in the papers every day, collect documents about it for a pamphlet, boycott the blackmailers, and so on, and so forth. These are the methods of struggle worthy of the proletariat in combating slander and blackmail!

One of the latest to suffer from blackmail was our comrade, Kamenev. He has "withdrawn from public activity" until his case is examined. We think that a mistake. It is exactly what the blackmailers wanted. They do not want to examine his case. Kamenev should merely have countered the scoundrels with the trust of *his own* party, and let the dogs of *Rech*, *Birzhevka*, *Dyen*, *Rabochaya Gazeta* and other filthy rags bark.

If our Party were to consent to the suspension of public activities by its leaders because they had been slandered by the bourgeoisie, the Party would suffer terribly; it would cause harm to the proletariat and make its enemies happy. For the bourgeoisie have many papers they have even more blackmailing, venal pens (like those of Zaslavsky and Co.), and it would be only too easy for them to "suspend" our Party workers! The bourgeoisie are not interested in examining the case, in getting to the root of the matter.

That won't do, comrades! We must not give in to the clamour of the bourgeois press! We must not please those blackmailing scoundrels, the Milyukovs, Hessens and Zaslavskys. We must rely on the proletarians' verdict, the verdict of the class-conscious workers in our Party, which numbers 240,000 internationalists. We mustn't forget that internationalists are persecuted throughout the world by the bourgeoisie allied with the defencists, through lies, slander and blackmail.

We must stand firm in branding the blackmailers. We must firmly submit our slightest doubts for the class-conscious workers, for our Party, to judge. We trust our Party. We see in it the intelligence, honour and conscience of our times. We see the only guarantee of success for the emancipation movement of the working class in a world alliance of revolutionary internationalists.

No yielding to the "public opinion" of those who sit in one Cabinet with the Cadets, who shake the hands of the Milyukovs, Dans and Zaslavskys!

Down with the political blackmailers! Scorn and boycott them! Always expose their infamous names to the workers! We must unswervingly follow our own path, keep our Party in working order, and even protect its leaders from wasting their time on mud-slingers and their filthy slander.

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PAPER RESOLUTIONS

Mr. Tsereteli is one of the most garrulous of the "socialist" Ministers and petty-bourgeois leaders. You have to force yourself to read his countless speeches right through. These absolutely meaningless, absolutely non-committal, absolutely insignificant, truly "ministerial" speeches are so empty and banal. What makes these eloquent "utterances" (whose very emptiness was bound to make Tsereteli a favourite of the bourgeoisie) so intolerable is the infinite self-conceit of the speaker. It is sometimes hard to decide whether those sleek, smooth and honeyed phrases conceal unusual stupidity or cynical political trickery.

The more meaningless Tsereteli's speeches, the more emphatically we must stress the perfectly incredible and extraordinary thing that happened to him at the plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet on August 18. It is incredible but a fact that Tsereteli accidentally uttered a couple of simple, clear, sensible and true sentences. He uttered two sentences which correctly express a profound and serious political truth, a truth of no fleeting importance, but one that sums up the whole present-day political situation, its essential, radical features and its fundamental characteristics.

According to the account published in *Rech*, Tsereteli (the reader, of course, will remember that Tsereteli was up in arms against the resolution demanding the abolition of the death penalty) said:

> "None of your resolutions will help. What we need is real action and not paper resolutions...."

There is no denying it. Sensible speeches are pleasant to hear.

Of course, this truth hits first and hardest of all at Tsereteli himself. For it was he, one of the most prominent leaders of the Soviet, who helped prostitute this institution, reduce its role to that of a wretched liberal assembly, which is bequeathing an archive of exemplarily impotent and pious wishes to the world. Tsereteli—who got the Soviet, emasculated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, to pass hundreds of "paper resolutions"—least of all had the right, when it came to adopting a resolution which struck a painful blow at himself, to cry out against "paper resolutions". He has put himself in the particularly ridiculous position of a parliamentarian who has worked on more "parliamentary" resolutions than anyone else, has extolled their worth to the skies more than anyone else, and has fussed over them more than anyone else, yet, when a resolution is passed *against him*, cries "sour grapes!" at the top of his voice, saying that the resolution, after all, is only a paper one.

Nevertheless, the truth is the truth, even if uttered by a false man in a false tone.

The resolution is a paper one not for the reason given by ex-Minister Tsereteli, who holds that defence of the revolution (don't laugh!) requires the death penalty. The resolution is a paper one because it repeats the stereotyped formula which has been learnt by heart and meaninglessly reiterated ever since March 1917—"The Soviet demands of the Provisional Government." They are accustomed to "demand", and they go on doing so by force of habit, not seeing that the situation has changed, that power has left them, and that a "demand" not backed by power is ridiculous.

Moreover, this stereotyped "demand" fosters among the people the illusion that the situation has not changed, that the Soviet is a power, that by announcing its "demand" the Soviet has done its business and can sleep the sleep of one who has done his duty as a "revolutionary (if you please) democrat".

A reader may ask: "Do you mean to say that the Bolsheviks, who advocate political clearheadedness and taking account of the forces, and who are opposed to phrasemongering, should not have voted for the resolution?"

No. They should have voted for it, if only because one clause of the resolution (the third) contains the excellent

and true idea (the fundamental, main and decisive idea) that the death penalty is a weapon against the *masses* (the situation would be different if it were a weapon against the landowners and capitalists). They should have voted for the resolution, even though the philistine Socialist-Revolutionaries fouled Martov's text and instead of the reference to "imperialist aims which are alien to the interests of the people" inserted an absolutely false phrase intended to deceive the people and whitewash a predatory war, namely, "defence of the country and the revolution".

They should have voted for the resolution, at the same time recording their disagreement with certain passages and declaring: "Workers, don't think the Soviet is now in a position to demand anything of the Provisional Government. Don't have any illusions. Understand that the Soviet is *already* unable to demand, and that the *present* government is under the complete sway of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Think seriously about this bitter truth." Nobody could have prevented the Soviet members from voting *in favour* after they had made such reservations in one form or another.

Then the resolution would have ceased to be a "paper" one.

And then we could have got round the treacherous question of Tsereteli who asked the Soviet members whether they wanted to "overthrow" the Provisional Government—in quite the same way, in exactly the same way, as Katkov asked the liberals under Alexander III whether they wanted to "overthrow" the autocracy. We would have answered the ex-Minister: "Dear citizen, you have just passed a criminal law against those who 'attempt', or who only intend, to 'overthrow' the government (which was formed by agreement between the landowners and capitalists, on the one hand, and the petty-bourgeois traitors to democracy, on the other). We are well aware that all the bourgeoisie would have praised you even more heartily had you 'brought' several Bolsheviks under that pleasant (for you) law. But don't be surprised if we don't go out of our way to help you and pretexts to apply that 'pleasant' law."

* * *

The whole political system of Russia was reflected in the incident of August 18 like the sun in a pool of water: the Bonapartist government, the death penalty, the criminal law, the coating of these "pleasant" (for the provocateurs) pills by just the kind of phrases that Louis Napoleon used to give out about equality, fraternity, liberty, the honour and prestige of the country, the traditions of the Great Revolution, the suppression of anarchy.

Petty-bourgeois ministers and ex-ministers, cloyingly sweet-tongued, protesting that they have souls, that they are damning their souls by introducing the death penalty and applying it to the people, and that they weep when they do so—an improved edition of the "schoolmaster" of the sixties who followed Pirogov's advice and thrashed not simply, not in the ordinary old way, but while shedding tears of commiseration over the good citizen's son who was undergoing a "legitimate" and "just" caning.

Peasants, deceived by their petty-bourgeois leaders, continuing to believe that the marriage of the bloc of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks with the bourgeoisie can bring about the abolition of private ownership of land without compensation.

Workers—but we shall say nothing about what the workers think until the "humane" Tsereteli abolishes the new criminal law.

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THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

Many people are taking an interest again in the Stockholm Conference. The question of its significance has been discussed at length in the newspapers. It is inseparable from an appraisal of the very principles of the whole of present-day socialism, particularly concerning the attitude to the imperialist war. This is why the Stockholm Conference should be dealt with in some detail.

From the outset the revolutionary Social-Democrats, i.e., the Bolsheviks, were against participating in the conference, as a matter of principle. Everyone knows that on the attitude to the war socialists in all countries, belligerent and neutral alike, are split into two large, main divisions. Some took the side of their governments, of their bourgeoisie. These we call social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in words and chauvinists in action. A chauvinist is one who conceals defence of the predatory interests of "his own" ruling classes with the concept "defence of the fatherland". In the present war, the bourgeoisie of both belligerent coalitions are pursuing predatory aims: the German bourgeoisie are fighting to plunder Belgium, Serbia, etc., the British and French bourgeoisie are fighting to plunder the German colonies, etc., and the Russian bourgeoisie are fighting to plunder Austria (Lvov) and Turkey (Armenia, Constantinople).

Hence, those socialists who have come down on the side of their bourgeoisie in the war have ceased to be socialists, have betrayed the working class and have, in effect, deserted to the camp of the bourgeoisie. They have become class enemies of the proletariat. The history of European and American socialism, particularly during the time of the Second international, i.e., from 1889 to 1914, shows us that

this desertion of certain socialists, particularly most leaders and members of parliament, to the bourgeoisie is no accident. In all countries, the opportunist wing of socialism provided the main recruits for social-chauvinism. Regarded scientifically, which means not singling out individuals but taking the whole international trend in its process of development, the sum total of its social ties, social-chauvinism is opportunism carried to its logical conclusion.

Everywhere the workers are showing, in a more or less clear and sharp form, that they realise the social-chauvinists are betraying socialism, that they hate and despise the more prominent social-chauvinists such as Plekhanov in Russia, Scheidemann in Germany, Guesde, Renaudel and Co. in France, Hyndman and others in Britain, etc., etc.

A revolutionary internationalist trend has arisen in all countries during the war, despite the gagging and ruthless persecution by the bourgeoisie. This trend has remained loyal to socialism. It has not yielded to chauvinism, has not allowed chauvinism to be covered up by lying phrases about defence of the fatherland. It has exposed the utterly fraudulent nature of these phrases and the absolutely criminal nature of the war, which the bourgeoisie of both coalitions pursue for purposes of plunder. This trend includes, for example, MacLean in Britain, who has been sentenced to eighteen months' hard labour for opposing the predatory British bourgeoisie, and Karl Liebknecht in Germany, who has been sentenced to penal servitude by the German imperialist robbers for the "crime" of calling for a revolution in Germany and exposing the predatory character of the war waged by Germany. The Bolsheviks in Russia also belong to this trend and are persecuted by the agents of Russian republican-democratic imperialism for a "crime" similar to the one for which MacLean and Karl Liebknecht are being persecuted.

This is the only trend loyal to socialism. It is the only trend that has not failed the solemn declaration of convictions, the solemn pledge made in November 1912 in the Basle Manifesto which was unanimously signed by the socialists of the world, of every country without exception. The Manifesto speaks not of war in general—there are wars and wars—but of the war which everyone in 1912 clearly saw was being prepared, and which broke out in 1914, the war between

Germany and Britain and their allies for world domination. With this war in the offing, the Basle Manifesto does not say a word about the duty or right of socialists to "defend their fatherland" (i.e., to justify their participation in the war). What it does say, very explicitly, is that this war must lead to the "proletarian revolution". The betrayal of socialism by the social-chauvinists of all countries is perfectly evident from the cowardly manner in which all of them now avoid, like thieves avoiding the scene of their crime, the passage in the Basle Manifesto which speaks of the connection between this particular war and the proletarian revolution.

The impassable gulf that separates the socialists, who remained loyal to the Basle Manifesto and "responded" to the war by advocating and preparing for the proletarian revolution, from the social-chauvinists, who responded to the war by supporting "their" national bourgeoisie, is obvious. It is also obvious how helpless, naive and hypocritical are the attempts to "reconcile" or "unite" the two trends.

It is this kind of attempt that is evident in all its wretchedness on the part of the third trend in world socialism, the so-called "Centre" or "Kautskian" trend (named after the most prominent "Centrist", Karl Kautsky). Throughout the three years of the war this trend has shown its complete lack of principle and its helplessness in all countries. In Germany, for example, events compelled the Kautskyites to break away from the German Plekhanovs and form a separate, so-called Independent Social-Democratic Party.[100] All the same, this party is afraid of drawing the necessary conclusions, it preaches "unity" with the social-chauvinists on an international scale, continues to deceive the mass of workers with the hope of restoring this unity in Germany, and hinders the only correct proletarian tactics of revolutionary struggle against "one's own" government, a struggle to be waged in war-time as well, a struggle which may and must vary in form but which cannot be put off.

This is the state of affairs in international socialism. Without making a clear appraisal of this situation, without having a principled opinion about all the trends in international socialism, it is impossible so much as to approach practical questions like that of the Stockholm Conference. Yet the Bolshevik Party was the *only* party that gave a

principled appraisal of *all* trends in international socialism in the detailed resolution which it adopted at its conference held between April 24 and 29, 1917, and which was endorsed by our Sixth Party Congress in August. To ignore this principled appraisal and discuss Stockholm without reference to it means taking an entirely unprincipled stand.

As an example of the lack of principle prevailing among the petty-bourgeois democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, we may quote an article from *Novaya Zhizn* of August 10. The article is worthy of attention because it brings together, in a newspaper belonging to the extreme Left wing of the petty-bourgeois democrats, the most widespread errors, prejudices and lack of principle over Stockholm.

> "One is free," we read in the leader of *Novaya Zhizn*, "to take a dim view of the Stockholm Conference, for one reason or another. One is free, as a matter of principle, to condemn attempts to bring about agreement among the 'defencist majorities'. But why deny what is strikingly obvious? After all, following the well-known decision of the British workers, which sparked off a political crisis in the country and caused the first deep crack in British 'national unity', the conference acquired a new significance."

This argument is a perfect example of lack of principle. Indeed, how is it possible to draw the conclusion, from the indisputable fact that owing to the Stockholm Conference a deep crack has occurred in British "national unity", that it is our duty to patch up this crack rather than widen it? The fundamental alternative is to break with the defencists (social-chauvinists) or to agree with them. There can be no other choice. The Stockholm Conference was just one of numerous attempts to reach agreement. It failed. Its failure was due to the unwillingness of the Anglo-French imperialists to hold peace negotiations *now*, while the German imperialists are willing. The British workers have become more aware of being deceived by the British imperialist bourgeoisie.

Then what use should be made of this? We revolutionary internationalists say that it should be used for widening the breach between the workers and their social-chauvinists, for making this breach complete, for removing every hindrance to the development of the revolutionary struggle of the masses against their governments, against their bourgeoisie. Acting

in this way, we, and we alone, can widen the crack and force a complete break.

What is actually achieved by those going to Stockholm, or rather, by those preaching to the people that it is necessary to go there, now that reality has "squashed" the idea? All they manage is to patch up the crack, for the Stockholm Conference is admittedly being convened and supported by people who are supporting *their own* governments, by the ministerialist Chernovs and Tseretelis, the Staunings, Brantings and Troelstras, not to speak of the Scheidemanns.

This is what is "strikingly obvious", this is what the opportunists of *Novaya Zhizn* forget, or gloss over, when they argue absolutely without any regard for principles, without a general appreciation of social-chauvinism as a trend. The Stockholm Conference is a colloquy of ministers of imperialist governments. *Novaya Zhizn* cannot evade this fact however hard it tries. To call upon the workers to go to Stockholm, to tell them to wait for Stockholm, to call upon them to place any hopes whatever in Stockholm means saying to them: "You can, you must, expect good to come from an agreement between the petty-bourgeois parties and imperialist government ministers, those who support imperialist governments."

It is this unprincipled and most harmful propaganda that *Novaya Zhizn* is unwittingly carrying on.

Owing to the conflict between the Anglo-French social-chauvinists and their governments, the paper forgets that the Chernovs, Skobelevs, Tseretelis, Avksentyevs, Brantings, Staunings and Scheidemanns are also social-chauvinists supporting their governments. Isn't this lack of principle?

Instead of saying to the workers: see, the Anglo-French imperialists have not even allowed their social-chauvinists to go and talk with the German social-chauvinists; that shows that Britain and France are *also* waging a predatory war and that there is no salvation except through a complete rupture with *all* the governments, with *all* the social-chauvinists, *Novaya Zhizn* consoles the workers with illusions.

"In Stockholm," it writes, "they are going to reach an agreement on peace and to jointly draw up a general plan of *struggle*: refusal to vote credits, renunciation of 'national unity', recall of ministers from the governments, etc."

The only thing which is supposed to make this thoroughly fraudulent sentence sound convincing is that the word "struggle" is printed in bold type. A wonderful device, I must say!

After three years of war, efforts are still being made to feed the workers with the emptiest promises: "In Stockholm they are going" to renounce national unity.

Who plans that? The Scheidemanns, Chernovs, Skobelevs, Avksentyevs, Tseretelis, Staunings and Brantings, i.e., the very people (and parties) who for several years and for several months have been pursuing a national unity policy. No matter how sincere *Novaya Zhizn*'s faith in such a miracle may be, no matter how conscientiously it may hold the conviction that it is possible, we must say, nevertheless, that it is spreading the greatest piece of deception among the workers.

Novaya Zhizn is deceiving the workers by inspiring them with confidence in the social-chauvinists. It implies that, although so far the social-chauvinists have been Cabinet members and have pursued a national unity policy, they will soon reach agreement among themselves in Stockholm, they will come to an understanding and cease to act in that way. They will begin to fight for peace, they will refuse to vote credits, etc., etc.

All that is nothing but deception, the greatest deception. It is reactionary talk designed to console and reassure the workers, to inspire them with confidence in the social-chauvinists. But the socialists who "fight for peace"—not in words, not to deceive themselves or the workers—started their fight long ago, without waiting for any international conferences. They started their fight by renouncing national unity, precisely in the way it was done by MacLean in Britain, Karl Liebknecht in Germany and the Bolsheviks in Russia.

"We quite understand the legitimate and healthy scepticism of the Bolsheviks towards the Renaudels and Scheidemanns," writes *Novaya Zhizn*, "but the publicists of *Rabochy i Soldat*, like doctrinaires, just cannot see the wood for the trees; they do not take into account the changes in the mood of the masses on which Renaudel and Scheidemann have relied."

It is not a matter of scepticism, gentlemen; it is in your midst that intellectual scepticism, which conceals and ex-

presses lack of principle, is the dominant mood. We are not sceptical of the Renaudels and the Scheidemanns, we are their enemies. There is a world of difference between these two things. We have broken with them, and we call upon the masses to break with them. It is we, and we alone, who "take into account" the change in the mood of the masses, as well as something besides, something far more important and more profound than moods and changes in moods, namely, the fundamental interests of the masses, the fact that these interests cannot be reconciled with the social-chauvinist policy represented by the Renaudels and Scheidemanns. In Stockholm, the *Novaya Zhizn* people and the ministers of the Russian imperialist government will meet none other than the Scheidemanns and Renaudels (for there is no real difference between Stauning and Troelstra, let alone between Avksentyev and Skobelev, on the one hand, and Renaudel, on the other). But we turn our backs on the Stockholm comedy played between the social-chauvinists, among the social-chauvinists, in order to open the eyes of the *masses*, so as to express their interests, call them to revolution, and use their change of mood not to pander to a given mood in an unprincipled manner, but to wage a struggle on principle for a complete rupture with social-chauvinism.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"The Bolsheviks," writes *Novaya Zhizn*, "like to taunt the internationalists going to Stockholm with having compromised with the Scheidemanns and Hendersons, 'without noticing' that their attitude to the conference puts them in the same category as the Plekhanovs, Guesdes and Hyndmans—for profoundly different reasons, of course."

It is not true to say that our attitude to the conference puts us in the same category as the Plekhanovs! That is obviously absurd. Our position coincides with that of the Plekhanovs in refusing to go to a milk-and-water conference with a group of social-chauvinists. But both in principle and in practice, our *attitude* towards the conference differs from that of the Plekhanovs. Meanwhile, you who call yourselves internationalists are really going to the conference together with the Scheidemanns, Staunings and Brantings; you are really compromising with them. Isn't that a fact? You describe as "the great cause of uniting the international proletariat" what is the petty, miserable business—largely an

intrigue which is dependent upon the imperialists of one of the coalitions—*of uniting the social-chauvinists*. That is a fact.

You would-be internationalists cannot urge the masses to take part in the Stockholm Conference (it is very probable that things will go no further than urging, for the conference will not take place; but the ideological significance of the urging remains); you cannot urge the masses to participate in the Stockholm Conference without uttering a pile of lies, without sowing illusions, without whitewashing the social-chauvinists, without rousing hopes among the masses that the Staunings and Brantings, the Skobelevs and Avksentyevs are capable of renouncing "national unity" in earnest.

Meanwhile, in our propaganda against Stockholm, we Bolsheviks tell the masses the whole truth. We continue to expose the social-chauvinists and the policy of compromise with them, and lead the masses towards a complete rupture with them. Since matters have reached a point where the German imperialists consider the situation appropriate for participation in the Stockholm Conference and are sending their Scheidemann agents to it, while the British imperialists consider the situation inappropriate and do not even want to talk about peace, we expose the British imperialists and take advantage of the conflict between them and the British workers to promote the latter's class-consciousness, to carry on vigorous propaganda for internationalism, and explain the need for a complete rupture with social-chauvinism.

The would-be internationalists of *Novaya Zhizn* are behaving like intellectual impressionists, i.e., like people who spinelessly yield to the moods of the moment and forget the fundamental principles of internationalism. The *Novaya Zhizn* people reason as follows: since British imperialism is *opposed* to the Stockholm Conference, we must be *for* it; it shows that the conference has acquired a significance it has not had so far.

To reason like that actually means abandoning principles, for German imperialism is at present *in favour* of the Stockholm Conference because of its own selfish and predatory imperialist interests. What is the value of the "internationalism" of "internationalists" who are afraid of openly admitting this indisputable and obvious fact, who have to hide from it? What guarantee have you, gentlemen, that by

taking part in the Stockholm Conference together with the Scheidemanns, Staunings and Co. you will not virtually become a plaything, a tool in the hands of the secret diplomats of German imperialism? You cannot have any such guarantee. There is none. Even if it does take place, which is very improbable, the Stockholm Conference will be an attempt by the German imperialists to explore the possibilities of such and such an exchange of annexations. That will be the true, the actual significance of the eloquent speeches of the Scheidemanns, Skobelevs and Co. And if the conference does not take place, your preaching to the masses, rousing false hopes in them in regard to the social-chauvinists, hopes for their speedy, possible and probable "reformation", will acquire real significance.

In either case, you may wish to be internationalists but you will actually turn out to be accomplices of the social-chauvinists, now of one coalition, now of both coalitions.

We, however, take into account all the ups and downs and all the particulars of politics and remain consistent internationalists advocating the fraternal alliance of the workers, rupture with the social-chauvinists and work for the proletarian revolution.

Rabochy No. 2
September 8 (August 26), 1917
Signed: *N. K-ov*

Published according to
the *Rabochy* text

FROM A PUBLICIST'S DIARY

PEASANTS AND WORKERS

Izvestia of the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies[101] No. 88, of August 19, carries an exceedingly interesting article which should be regarded as basic material for every Party propaganda and agitation worker who has anything to do with the peasants and for every class-conscious worker who is going to the countryside or comes in contact with peasants.

The article is entitled "Model Mandate Compiled on the Basis of 242 Mandates Submitted by Local Deputies to the First All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies Held in Petrograd, 1917".

The best thing would be for the Congress of Peasants' Deputies to publish as much detailed information as possible about all those mandates (if it is absolutely impossible to print them all in full, which, of course, would be preferable). It is particularly necessary, for instance, to have a full list of the gubernias, uyezds and volosts, showing how many mandates have been received from each locality, when they were compiled or delivered, and to analyse at least the basic demands, so that we can tell whether the various points differ according to areas, whether such questions as abolition of private property rights to all *peasant* lands, periodic redistribution of land, prohibition of wage-labour, confiscation of the landowners' implements and livestock, etc., etc., are put differently in, say, areas with homestead and communal land ownership, areas with Russian and non-Russian populations, central and outlying areas, areas that never had serfdom, and so on. No thorough-going study of the extraordinarily valuable material contained in the peasant mandates is possible without such details. And we Marxists

must exert every effort to make a thorough-going study of the facts underlying our policy.

In the absence of better material, and as long as it has not been proved factually incorrect in one respect or another, the *summary of the mandates* (as we shall call the "Model Mandate") remains the only material of its kind which, we repeat, is an absolute must for every Party member.

The first part of the summary is devoted to general political principles, to demands of political democracy; the second, to the land question. (It is to be hoped that the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies or some other body will summarise the peasants' mandates and resolutions concerning the war.) Without going into detail in the first part, we shall note only two points from it, § 6, demanding the election of all office-holders, and § 11, calling for the abolition of the standing army once the war is over. These points bring the peasants' political programme *closest of all* to the Bolshevik Party programme. Basing ourselves on these points, we must stress and prove through all our propaganda and agitation that the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders are traitors not only to socialism, but also to democracy. In Kronstadt, for instance, contrary to the will of the population and to democratic principles, and to please the capitalists, they upheld the office of a commissar subject to *approval* by the government, that is, an office not purely elective. In the Petrograd district councils and in other local self-government bodies, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders, contrary to democratic principles, are fighting the Bolshevik demand for the immediate institution of a workers' militia, to be succeeded by a popular militia.

According to the summary, the peasant land demands are primarily abolition of private ownership of all types of land, including the peasants' lands, without compensation; transfer of lands on which high-standard scientific farming is practised to the state or the communes; confiscation of all livestock and implements on the confiscated lands (peasants with little land are excluded) and their transfer to the state or the communes; a ban on wage-labour; equalised distribution of land among the working people, with periodical redistributions, and so on. In the transition period, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the

peasants demand the *immediate* enactment of laws prohibiting the purchase and sale of land, abolition of laws concerning separation from the commune, farmsteads, etc., laws protecting forests, fisheries, etc., abolishing long-term and revising short-term leases, and so on.

You do not have to give these demands a lot of thought to see that it is absolutely impossible to realise them *in alliance* with the capitalists, without breaking completely with them, without waging the most determined and ruthless struggle against the capitalist class, without overthrowing its rule.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries are deceiving themselves and the peasants precisely by assuming and spreading the idea that these reforms, or *similar* reforms, are possible without overthrowing capitalist rule, without all state power being transferred to the proletariat, without the peasant poor supporting the most resolute, revolutionary measures of a proletarian state power against the capitalists. The significance of the appearance of a Left wing among the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" is that it proves there is a growing awareness of this deception within their party.

Indeed, confiscation of all private land means the confiscation of hundreds of millions in capital belonging to the banks to which the greater part of this land is mortgaged. How can any measure like this be taken without the revolutionary class overcoming the capitalists' resistance by revolutionary methods? Moreover, it is here a question of the most highly centralised capital of all, bank capital, which is connected through billions of threads with all the nerve centres of the capitalist economy of a huge country and which can be defeated only by the no less centralised might of the urban proletariat.

Further, take the transfer of highly efficient farms to the state. Obviously, the "state" capable of taking them over and running them really and truly in the interests of the working people, and not in the interests of the officials and the capitalists themselves, must be a proletarian revolutionary state.

The confiscation of stud farms, etc., and then of all livestock and implements, is something more than striking one staggering blow after another at private ownership of

the means of production. It means taking steps towards socialism, for the transfer of *livestock and implements* "to the exclusive use of the state or a commune" implies large-scale, socialist agriculture or at least socialist control over integrated small farms, socialist regulation of their economy.

And what about a "ban" on wage-labour? This is a meaningless phrase, helpless, unwittingly naïve wishful thinking on the part of downtrodden petty proprietors, who do not see that capitalist industry as a whole would come to a standstill if there were no reserve army of wage-labour in the countryside, that it is impossible to "ban" wage-labour in the villages while permitting it in the towns, and lastly, that to "ban" wage-labour means nothing but a step towards socialism.

Here we come to the fundamental question of the workers' attitude to the peasants.

A mass Social-Democratic workers' movement has existed in Russia for more than twenty years (if we begin with the great strikes of 1896). Throughout this long span of time, through two great revolutions, through the entire political history of Russia, runs the issue of whether the working class is to lead the peasants forward, to socialism, or whether the liberal bourgeoisie are to drag them back, to conciliation with capitalism.

The opportunist wing of the Social-Democrats has always reasoned by the worldly-wise formula: *since* the Socialist-Revolutionaries are petty bourgeois, "we" reject their philistine utopian views on socialism *in the name* of bourgeois rejection of socialism. Struvism neatly replaces Marxism, and Menshevism slithers down to the role of a Cadet flunkey seeking to "reconcile" the peasants to bourgeois rule. The latest and most striking evidence of that role is that Tsereteli and Skobelev, hand in hand with Chernov and Avksentyev, were busy signing the Cadets' reactionary landowner decrees in the name of "revolutionary democrats".

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, who have never renounced criticism of the petty-bourgeois illusions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and *never entered into any bloc* with them except *against* the Cadets, work unremittingly *to wrest* the peasants away from Cadet influence, and in opposition to the philistine's utopian view of socialism,

put forward the revolutionary proletarian road to socialism instead of liberal conciliation with capitalism.

Now that the war has speeded up developments fantastically, aggravated the crisis of capitalism to the utmost, and confronted the peoples with making an immediate choice between destruction and immediate determined strides towards socialism, the full depth of the gulf between semi-liberal Menshevism and revolutionary proletarian Bolshevism is clearly revealed over the practical issue of what action the tens of millions of peasants should take.

Accept the rule of capital *because* "we" are not yet ripe for socialism, the Mensheviks tell the peasants, substituting, incidentally, the abstract question of "socialism" in general for the concrete question of whether it is possible to heal the wounds inflicted by the war without decisive strides towards socialism.

Accept capitalism *because* the Socialist-Revolutionaries are petty-bourgeois utopians, the Mensheviks tell the peasants and rally together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries to support the Cadet government.

And the Socialist-Revolutionaries, beating their breast, assure the peasants that they are against any peace with the capitalists, that they have never regarded the Russian revolution as a bourgeois revolution—and *therefore* enter into a bloc with the *opportunist* social-Democrats and rally to support a bourgeois government. The Socialist-Revolutionaries sign all peasant programmes, however revolutionary, except that they do so not to carry them out, but to pigeon-hole them and deceive the peasants with the most non-committal promises, while actually pursuing for months a policy of compromise with the Cadet in the coalition government.

This crying, practical, direct, palpable betrayal of the peasants' interests by the Socialist-Revolutionaries radically alters the situation. We must take this change into account. It is not enough to conduct agitation against the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the old way, the way we did between 1902 and 1903, and 1905 and 1907. It is not enough to expose theoretically the petty-bourgeois illusions of "socialisation of land", "equalised land tenure", "a ban on wage-labour", etc.

That was on the eve of the bourgeois revolution, or before the bourgeois revolution's completion, and the task was primarily to carry it through to overthrow the monarchy.

Now the monarchy has been overthrown. The bourgeois revolution has been completed in so far as Russia has become a democratic republic with a government of Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. And the war in the past three years has pushed us a good thirty years ahead. It has forced on Europe universal labour service and the compulsory syndication of undertakings, caused hunger and unprecedented ravages in the leading countries, and imposed steps towards socialism.

The fundamental premise of our class policy at that time was that only the workers and peasants can overthrow the monarchy. And this premise was correct. February and March 1917 reaffirmed this.

The premise of our class policy today is that only the proletariat, leading the poorest peasants (the-semi-proletarians, as our programme puts it), can end the war with a democratic peace, heal the war wounds, and initiate steps towards socialism which have become absolutely necessary and *urgent*.

It follows that the emphasis in our propaganda and agitation against the Socialist-Revolutionaries must be shifted to the fact that they have betrayed the peasants. They represent a minority of well-to-do farmers rather than the mass of the peasant poor. They are leading the peasants to an alliance with the capitalists, i.e., to subordination to them, rather than to an alliance with the workers. They have bartered the interests of the working and exploited people for ministerial posts and a bloc with the Mensheviks and Cadets.

History, accelerated by the war, has forged so far ahead that the old formulas have acquired a new meaning. "A ban on wage-labour" was formerly *only* an empty phrase bandied about by the petty-bourgeois intellectual. In the light of today, it means something different: the millions of peasant poor say in their 242 mandates that they want hired labour abolished but do not know how to do it. We know how. We know that this can be done only in alliance with the workers, under their leadership, against the capitalists, not through a compromise with them.

These are the changes that the basic line of our propaganda and agitation against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the basic line we pursue in addressing the peasants, must now undergo.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party has betrayed you, comrade peasants. It has betrayed the hovels and deserted to the palaces, if not the royal palaces, then those where the Cadets, those bitter enemies of the revolution, and particularly the peasant revolution, sit in the same government as the Chernovs, Peshekhonovs, and Avksentyevs.

Only the revolutionary proletariat, only the vanguard that unites it, the Bolshevik Party, can *actually* carry out the programme of the peasant poor which is put forward in the 242 mandates. For the revolutionary proletariat is *really* advancing to the abolition of wage-labour along the only correct path, through the overthrow of capital and not by prohibiting the hiring of labourers, not through a "ban" on wage-labour. The revolutionary proletariat is really advancing to confiscation of land, implements, and agricultural technical establishments, to what the peasants want and what the Socialist-Revolutionaries *cannot* give them.

This is how the basic line pursued by the worker in addressing the peasant must now change. We workers can and will give you what the peasant poor want and are searching for without always knowing where and how to find it. We workers are upholding our own interests and at the same time the interests of the vast majority of the peasants *against the capitalists*, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries, allying themselves with the capitalists, are betraying these interests.

* * *

Let us recall what Engels said on the peasant question shortly before his death. He stressed that socialists have no intention whatever of expropriating the small peasants, and that the advantages of mechanised socialist agriculture[102] will be made clear to them only *by force of example*.

The war has now confronted Russia in practice with a problem of exactly this order. There is a shortage of implements. They must be confiscated, and the highly efficient farms must not be "divided up".

The peasants have begun to realise this. Need has compelled them to do so. The war has compelled them, for there are no implements to be had anywhere. What there is must be thriftily husbanded. And large-scale farming means saving labour through the use of implements as well as many other things.

The peasants want to keep their small farms, to set equal standards for all, and to make readjustments on an equalitarian basis from time to time. Fine. No sensible socialist will differ with the peasant poor over this. If the land is confiscated, that *means* the domination of the banks has been undermined, if the implements are confiscated, that *means* the domination of capital has been undermined—and in that case, *provided the proletariat rules centrally*, provided political power is taken over by the proletariat, the rest will come *by itself*, as a result of "force of example", prompted by experience.

The crux of the matter lies in political power passing into the hands of the proletariat. When this has taken place, everything that is essential, basic, fundamental in the programme set out in the 242 mandates *will become feasible*. Life will show what modifications it will undergo as it is carried out. This is an issue of secondary importance. We are not doctrinaires. Our theory is a guide to action, not a dogma.

We do not claim that Marx knew or Marxists know the road to socialism down to the last detail. It would be nonsense to claim anything of the kind. What we know is the direction of this road, and the class forces that follow it; the specific, practical details will come to light only through the *experience of the millions* when they take things into their own hands.

Trust the workers, comrade peasants, and break with the capitalists! Only in close alliance with the workers can you begin to carry out the programme set out in the 242 mandates. Allied with the capitalists and led by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, you will never live to see *a single* determined, radical step in the spirit of this programme.

But when in alliance with the urban workers, waging a ruthless struggle against capital, you *begin* to realise the programme of the 242 mandates, the whole world will come

to our and your assistance, and then the success of that programme—not as it stands now, but in its essence—will be assured. When that happens, the domination of capital and wage slavery will come to an end. That will be the beginning of the reign of socialism, the reign of peace, the reign of the working people.

Rabochy No. 6
September 11 (August 29), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Rabochy* text

SLANDERERS

The August 20 issue of *Rech*, and *Russkaya Volya*, a newspaper founded with notoriously questionable money and recommending "socialist-minded" voters to vote for *Yedinstvo* and for the Popular Socialists, have again published slanderous statements against me.

The information comes, according to both papers, from the "War Ministry", and "*Rech*" *even asserts* that it is backed by "documentary evidence and numerous testimonies by individuals" .

The law on libel in the press has virtually been suspended in Russia. Slanderers, especially those contributing to the bourgeois papers, have been granted complete freedom. They can come out in the papers anonymously, lie and slander as much as they please, and hide behind allegedly official reports not signed by any official—they can get away with anything! Those infamous slanderers, headed by Mr. Milyukov and his like, enjoy the privilege of immunity.

The slanderers assert that I had certain relations with the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine. Milyukov's newspaper writes: "The German Government instructed Lenin to advocate peace." "In Berlin," it says, "there were two socialist meetings in which Lenin and Yoltukhovsky took part." *Russkaya Volya* adds to the latter phrase: "Lenin stopped a Yoltukhovsky's."

Since Mr. Milyukov and other scoundrels like him—knights of the foul slander—are allowed to slander with impunity, all I can do is repeat that it is slander and again confront the knights of blackmail, who refer to witnesses, with a reference to a witness known to the masses.

I have known Basok, one of those active in the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, since 1906, when he was a Menshevik and attended the Stockholm Congress together with me. In the autumn of 1914, or early 1915, when I was living in Berne, I received a visit at my home from the well-known Caucasian Menshevik Tria, who had come from Constantinople. He told me about Basok's activity in the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, and of the connection between that Union and the German government. He handed me a letter from Basok, who expressed sympathy with me and said he hoped our views would become closer. I was so angry that I wrote an answer to Basok there and then, in the presence of Tria, and gave the letter to Tria asking him to pass it on since he was about to make another trip to Constantinople.

In my letter to Basok, I declared that since he was entering into relations with one of the imperialists, our ways parted for good and we had nothing in common.

That is all the "relations" I have ever had with the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.

Rabochy No. 8
September 12 (August 30), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Rabochy* text

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

It is possible that these lines will come too late, for events are developing with a rapidity that sometimes makes one's head spin. I am writing this on Wednesday, August 30, and the recipients will read it no earlier than Friday, September 2. Still, on chance, I consider it my duty to write the following.

The Kornilov revolt is a most unexpected (unexpected at such a moment and in such a form) and downright unbelievably sharp turn in events.

Like every sharp turn, it calls for a revision and change of tactics. And as with every revision, we must be extra-cautious not to become unprincipled.

It is my conviction that those who become unprincipled are people who (like Volodarsky) slide into defencism or (like other Bolsheviks) into a *bloc* with the S.R.s, into *supporting* the Provisional Government. Their attitude is absolutely wrong and unprincipled. We shall become defencists *only after* the transfer of power to the proletariat, *after* a peace offer, *after* the secret treaties and ties with the banks have been broken—*only afterwards*. Neither the capture of Riga *nor the capture of Petrograd* will make us defencists. (I should very much like Volodarsky to read this.) Until then we stand for a proletarian revolution, we are against the war, and we are *no* defencists.

Even now we must not support Kerensky's government. This is unprincipled. We may be asked: aren't we going to fight against Kornilov? Of course we must! But this is not the same thing; there is a dividing line here, which is being stepped over by some Bolsheviks who fall into

compromise and allow themselves to be *carried away* by the course of events.

We shall fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, *just as* Kerensky's *troops do*, but we do not support Kerensky. *On the contrary*, we expose his weakness. There is the difference. It is rather a subtle difference, but it is highly essential and must not be forgotten.

What, then, constitutes our change of tactics after the Kornilov revolt?

We are changing the *form* of our struggle against Kerensky. Without in the least relaxing our hostility towards him, without taking back a single word said against him, without renouncing the task of overthrowing him, we say that we must *take into account* the present situation. We shall not overthrow Kerensky right now. We shall approach the task of fighting against him *in a different way*, namely, we shall point out to the people (who are fighting against Kornilov) Kerensky's *weakness* and *vacillation*. That has been done in the past *as well*. Now, however, it has become the *all-important* thing and this constitutes the change.

The change, further, is that the *all-important* thing now has become the intensification of our campaign for some kind of "partial demands" to be presented to Kerensky: arrest Milyukov, arm the Petrograd workers, summon the Kronstadt, Vyborg and Helsingfors troops to Petrograd, dissolve the Duma, arrest Rodzyanko, legalise the transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, introduce workers' control over grain and factories, etc., etc. We must present these demands not only to Kerensky, and *not so much* to Kerensky, as to the workers, soldiers and peasants who have been *carried away* by the course of the struggle against Kornilov. We must keep up their *enthusiasm*, encourage them to deal with the generals and officers who have declared for Kornilov, urge *them* to demand the immediate transfer of land to the peasants, suggest to *them* that it is necessary to arrest Rodzyanko and Milyukov, dissolve the Duma, close down *Rech* and other bourgeois papers, and institute investigations against them. The "Left" S.R.s must be especially urged on in this direction.

It would be wrong to think that we have moved farther away from the task of the proletariat winning power. No.



First page of the letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.
August 30 (September 12), 1917

Reduced

First page of the letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. August 30 (September 12), 1917

Reduced

We have come very close to it, *not directly*, but from the side. *At the moment* we must campaign not so much directly against Kerensky, as *indirectly* against him, namely, by demanding a more and more active, truly revolutionary war against Kornilov. The development of this war alone can lead *us* to power, but we must *speak* of this as little as possible in our propaganda (remembering very well that even tomorrow events may put power into our hands, and then we shall not relinquish it). It seems to me that this should be passed on in a letter (not in the papers) to the propagandists, to groups of agitators and propagandists, and to Party members in general. We must relentlessly fight against phrases about the defence of the country, about a united front of revolutionary democrats, about supporting the Provisional Government, etc., etc., since they are just empty *phrases*. We must say: now is the time for *action*; you S.R. and Menshevik gentlemen have long since worn those phrases threadbare. Now is the time for *action*; the war against Kornilov must be conducted in a revolutionary way, by drawing the masses in, by arousing them, by inflaming them (Kerensky is *afraid* of the masses, *afraid* of the people). In the war against the Germans, *action* is required right now; *immediate and unconditional peace must be offered* on *precise* terms. If this is done, either a speedy peace *can* be attained or the war can be turned into a revolutionary war; if not, all the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries remain lackeys of imperialism.

P.S. Having read six issues of *Rabochy*,[103] *after* this was written, I must say that our views fully coincide. I heartily welcome the splendid editorials, press review and articles by V. M—n and Vol—y. As to Volodarsky's speech, I have read his letter to the editors, which likewise "eliminates" my reproaches. Once more, best wishes and greetings!

Lenin

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FROM A PUBLICIST'S DIARY

1. THE ROOT OF THE EVIL

Everyone will probably agree that the writer N. Sukhanov of *Novaya Zhizn* is one of the best rather than worst representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy. He sincerely leans towards internationalism, which he has proved in the hardest times, at the height of tsarist reaction and chauvinism. He has knowledge and a desire to work out serious problems independently, which he has proved by his long evolution from Socialist-Revolutionism towards revolutionary Marxism.

It is all the more characteristic that even such people are apt, when dealing with the fundamental issues of the revolution in its crucial periods, to treat their readers to arguments as thoughtless as the following:

> "No matter how many revolutionary gains we have lost in the past few weeks, one, and perhaps the most important of all, is still there: the government and its policies can only be maintained by the grace of the Soviet majority. The revolutionary democrats have of their own accord given up all the influence they commanded; the democratic organs can still regain it very easily and, given proper understanding of the requirements of the moment, can without difficulty direct the Policies of the Provisional Government into the proper channel" (*Novaya Zhizn* No. 106, August 20).

These words contain the most thoughtless, the most monstrous untruth concerning the most important issue of the revolution, an untruth, moreover, which has most often been put about, in vastly differing countries, among the petty-bourgeois democrats and has ruined the greatest number of revolutions.

When you think over the sum total of petty-bourgeois illusions contained in the argument quoted above, you cannot help thinking that it is no accident the *Novaya Zhizn* people sit at the "unity" congress[104] together with Minis-

ters, with socialists eligible for the cabinet, with the Tseretelis and Skobelevs, with cabinet members who are comrades of Kerensky, Kornilov and Co. No accident at all. They actually have a common ideological foundation, namely, unreasoning philistine gullibility, uncritically borrowed from the petty-bourgeois environment, in good intentions. For this gullibility pervades all of Sukhanov's argument, as well as all the activities of those defencist Mensheviks who act in good faith. This petty-bourgeois gullibility is the root of the evil in our revolution.

Sukhanov would probably hasten to subscribe to what Marxism demands of all serious policy, namely, that it be based on and grounded in *facts* capable of exact and objective verification. Let us try to approach the assertion which Sukhanov makes in the passage above from the point of view of this demand.

What are the facts underlying this assertion? How could Sukhanov prove that the government "can only be maintained by the grace" of the Soviets, that they could "very easily" "regain their influence", or that they could "without difficulty" change the policies of the Provisional Government?

Sukhanov could have referred, first, to his general impression, to the "obvious" strength of the Soviets, to the fact that Kerensky came to the Soviet, to the amiable words of this or that minister, etc. This would certainly have been very poor proof—rather an admission of the complete lack of proof and objective facts.

Sukhanov could have referred, secondly, to the objective fact that by far most of the resolutions passed by workers, soldiers and peasants declare emphatically for the Soviets and in favour of supporting them. These resolutions, he might have said, demonstrate the will of the majority of the people.

This kind of reasoning is as common among philistines as the first kind. But it is absolutely untenable.

In all revolutions, the will of the majority of the workers and peasants, i.e., undoubtedly, the will of the majority of the population, has been for democracy. Nevertheless, the great majority of revolutions have ended with the defeat of democracy.

In view of the experience of the majority of revolutions, particularly that of 1848 (which resembles our present revolution most), Marx mercilessly ridiculed the petty-bourgeois democrats who wished to win through resolutions and references to the will of the majority of the people.

Our own experience proves this even better. In the spring of 1906 most of the resolutions passed by workers and peasants were undoubtedly in favour of the First Duma. The majority of the people undoubtedly stood for it. Nevertheless, the tsar succeeded in dissolving it because the upswing of the revolutionary classes (workers' strikes and peasant unrest in the spring of 1906) proved too weak for a new revolution.

Think over the experience of the present revolution. Both from March to April and from July to August 1917, most resolutions were for the Soviets, the majority of the people were for the Soviets. Yet everyone sees, knows and feels that from March to April the revolution was moving forward, whereas from July to August it was moving backwards. Consequently, reference to the majority of the people decides nothing as far as the specific issues of a revolution are concerned.

This reference, made by way of proof, is in itself a specimen of petty-bourgeois illusion. It shows unwillingness to admit that in a revolution the enemy classes must be *defeated*, the state power that defends them must be *overthrown* and that the "will of the majority of the people" is insufficient to bring this about. What is needed is the *strength* of the revolutionary classes that will and can fight, a strength which at the decisive moment and place will *crush* the enemy's strength.

How often has it happened during revolutions that the small but well-organised, armed and centralised power of the ruling classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, has crushed piecemeal the power of the "majority of the people", who were poorly organised, poorly armed and lacked unity.

To make "general" references to the "will of the people" instead of considering specific issues of the class struggle at a time when it has been particularly sharpened by the revolution is worthy only of the most stupid petty bourgeois.

Thirdly, in the comment quoted above, Sukhanov advances another "argument" that is likewise fairly common among

philistines. He says "the revolutionary democrats have of their own accord given up all the influence they commanded". From this he infers that what was given up "of their own accord" can be taken back easily.

An utterly worthless argument. First of all, the return of what was voluntarily ceded presupposes the "voluntary consent" of the beneficiary of the concession. It follows that this voluntary consent is there. Who has received the "*concession*"? Who has profited from the "influence" given up by the "revolutionary democrats"?

It is quite typical that this question, fundamental to all but a headless politician, is completely ignored by Sukhanov. For the crux of the matter is precisely in whose hands is, *in practice*, that which the "revolutionary [pardon the expression] democrats" have "given up of their own accord".

Sukhanov ignores the crux of the matter, as do all Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, all petty-bourgeois democrats in general.

Moreover, it may be that in a child's "give-and-take" game it is easy to take something back: if Katya freely lets Masha have her ball, it may be "very easy" to take it back. But there are not many, apart from Russian intellectuals, who would venture to extend such conceptions to politics, to the class struggle.

In politics, ceding "influence" of one's own free will proves such impotence on the part of the one who does the ceding, such flabbiness, such lack of character, such meekness, that, generally speaking, the only thing one can infer is that whoever gives up his influence of his own accord "deserves" to be deprived of his right to exist as well as his influence. In other words, the fact of voluntarily giving up one's influence "proves" in itself only this, that the beneficiary of the voluntarily ceded influence will inevitably deprive the one who has ceded it even of his rights.

If the "revolutionary democrats" have voluntarily ceded their influence, they are therefore not revolutionary but vile, philistine, cowardly democrats still bound by servility, democrats whom (after such a surrender) their enemies can either disperse or simply reduce to naught, allowing them to die as much "of their own accord" as they ceded their influence .

To regard the actions of political parties as *whims* means renouncing all *study* of politics. There must be an *explanation* for an action like the "giving up of their influence of their own accord" by two huge parties which, according to all available information and reports and to objective election figures, sway the majority of the people. It cannot be accidental. It must be due to a definite economic position of some large class of the people. It must be linked up with the history of the development of those parties.

Sukhanov's argument is highly typical of thousands upon thousands of similar philistine arguments because it is in effect based on the conception of good will ("their own accord") and ignores the *history* of the parties under consideration. Sukhanov has simply left their history out of his examination, forgetting that voluntary surrender of influence began, strictly speaking, on February 28, when the Soviet expressed confidence in Kerensky and approved the "agreement" with the Provisional Government. And May 6 was a surrender of influence on a truly gigantic scale. Taken as a whole, it is all as clear as can be: the S.R. and Menshevik parties placed themselves on an inclined plane from the very first, and rolled down faster and faster. After July 3-5, they reached rock bottom.

Isn't it perfectly thoughtless to say now that the surrender was voluntary, that it is "very easy" to make great political parties face about, that they can "without difficulty" be induced to take the opposite direction to the one they have been following for years (and for months during the revolution), and that it is "very easy" to scramble out of the pit and climb up the inclined plane to the top?

Fourthly and lastly, Sukhanov could in defence of his opinion have referred to the fact that the workers and soldiers, who express confidence in the Soviet, are armed and therefore could "very easily" regain their influence. But it is on this, perhaps the most important, point that the philistine comment of the writer of *Novaya Zhizn* is particularly lame.

To be as specific as possible, let us compare April 20-21 with July 3-5.

On April 20 popular indignation against the government burst out. An armed regiment came on to the streets of Petrograd intending to arrest the government. There was

no arrest. The government, however, saw clearly that it had nobody to rely on. No troops were *for it. Such* a government was indeed "very easy" to overthrow, and the government confronted the Soviet with an ultimatum: either you back me, or I go.

On July 4, a similar outburst of popular indignation, an outburst which all parties tried to restrain but which broke out in spite of *all* the restraining. As before, there was an armed anti-government demonstration. But the enormous difference was that the S.R. and Menshevik leaders, who had isolated themselves from the people and were confused, agreed with the bourgeoisie *as early as July 3* to call *Kaledin*'s troops to Petrograd. There is the crux of the matter!

With a soldier's frankness, Kaledin said so at the Moscow meeting: "After all, it was you socialist Ministers who called us to your aid on July 31" Nobody dared refute Kaledin at the Moscow meeting because he spoke the truth. Kaledin mocked the Mensheviks and S.R.s, who were compelled to keep silent. The Cossack general spat in their faces, but they merely wiped it off and said: "Divine dew!"

The bourgeois papers reported Kaledin's words but the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta* and the S.R. "*Dyelo Naroda*" *concealed* that political statement from their readers, the most important statement made at the Moscow meeting.

What happened was that for the first time the government resorted expressly to Kaledin's troops, while the determined, truly revolutionary troops and the workers were disarmed. This is the fundamental fact which Sukhanov has "very easily" evaded and forgotten. It remains a fact nevertheless. It is a decisive fact as far as the present period of the revolution, the *first* revolution, is concerned.

Power in a decisive place at the front, and then in the army, has passed into the hands of the *Kaledins*. This is a fact. The most active of the troops hostile to them have been disarmed. The fact that the Kaledins do not use their power immediately to establish their complete dictatorship does not at all disprove that they hold power. Wasn't the tsar in power after December 1905? And didn't circumstances compel him to use it so prudently that he had two Dumas convened before he took *all power*, i.e., before he made a coup d'état[105]?

Power should be judged by actions instead of words. The actions of the government since July 5 have shown that power is in the hands of the Kaledins, who are making slow but *steady* headway, daily securing "concessions", large and small. Today it is the impunity with which military cadets raid the *Pravda* offices and kill its staff members, and make arbitrary arrests; then comes a law closing down newspapers, and laws banning meetings and conferences, throwing citizens out of the country without trial, imposing prison sentences for insulting "the ambassadors of friendly countries", meting out penal servitude for assailing the government, introducing capital punishment at the front, and so on, *and so forth.*

The Kaledins are no fools. Why should they go right through, forcing their way and risking defeat, when they receive the things they need bit by bit, *every day*? Meanwhile, the foolish Skobelevs and Tseretelis, Chernovs and Avksentyevs, Dans and Liebers shout "Triumph for democracy! Victory!" at every step of the Kaledins forward, seeing as "victory" the fact that the Kaledins, Kornilovs and Kerenskys do not swallow them at once!!

The root of the evil is that their very economic position makes the petty-bourgeois masses amazingly credulous and ignorant, and that they are still half asleep and mumble drowsily, "It is 'very easy' to take back what we have given up of our own free will!" Try and get the Kaledins and Kornilovs to give back anything of their own free will!

The root of the evil is that "democratic" journalism maintains this drowsy, philistine, stupid, slavish illusion, instead of fighting it.

If we look at things the way a political historian in general and a Marxist in particular should, i.e., if we consider them as a whole, it is perfectly clear that a decisive turn at present, far from being "easy", is, on the contrary, absolutely impossible *without a new revolution.*

I do not at all touch here on the question of whether this revolution is desirable. I do not at all examine the question of whether it can take place peacefully and legally (generally speaking, there have been examples of peaceful and legal revolutions in history). I merely state that it is historically impossible to bring about a decisive turn without

a new revolution. For power is *already* in other hands. It is no longer held by the "revolutionary democrats". It has *already* been seized and consolidated. The conduct of the S.R. and Menshevik parties is no accident; it is a product of the economic status of the petty bourgeoisie, and the result of a long series of political events—from February 28 to May 6, from May 6 to June 9, from June 9 to June 18 and 19 (the offensive), etc. There is a need for changes in the situation of power, in its composition, in the conditions of activity of the major parties, in the "aspirations" of the class which sustains them. These changes are historically unthinkable *without a new revolution*.

Instead of explaining to the people all the main historical conditions of the new revolution, its economic and political prerequisites, its political aims, the interrelation of classes that corresponds to it, etc., Sukhanov and a host of petty-bourgeois democrats *are lulling* the people *to sleep* by trifling away their time, by asserting self-complacently that "we shall regain everything without difficulty", "very easily", that our "most important" revolutionary gain "is still there", and similar thoughtless, ignorant, downright criminal nonsense.

There are signs of a radical social change. They clearly indicate the direction of the work to be done. The influence of the S.R.s and Mensheviks is plainly dwindling among the proletariat, while the influence of the Bolsheviks is plainly growing. Incidentally, even the elections of August 20, compared with the June elections to the district councils[106] of Petrograd, showed an *increase* in favour of the Bolsheviks, and this despite the bringing of "Kaledin's troops to Petrograd"!

Among the petty-bourgeois democrats, who cannot help wavering between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the turn is objectively evident from the strengthening, consolidation and development of revolutionary internationalist trends: Martov and others among the Mensheviks, Spiridonova, Kamkov and others among the S.R.s. Needless to say, the approaching famine, economic dislocation and military reverses may very greatly hasten this turn towards the transfer of power to the proletariat supported by the peasant poor.

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2. CORVÉE AND SOCIALISM

The bitterest enemies of socialism sometimes do it a service by the excessive zeal of their "exposures". They bear down on the very things that deserve sympathy and emulation. They open the people's eyes to the infamy of the bourgeoisie by the very nature of their attacks.

That is what happened to one of the most infamous bourgeois newspapers, *Russkaya Volya*, which on August 20 published a report from Yekaterinburg entitled "Corvée". Here is what it had to say:

> "The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has introduced in our city a service in kind by horse-owners, who must take it in turns to put their horses at the disposal of the Soviet for the daily business trips of its members.
>
> "A special schedule has been drawn up and every 'citizen with a horse' is punctually notified in writing when and where, and at what precise hour, he must arrive for duty with his horse.
>
> "To make things clearer, the 'order' adds: 'In the event of non-compliance with this demand, the Soviet will hire cabmen at your expense to the amount of 25 rubles'."

The defender of the capitalists is indignant, of course. The capitalists watch with perfect equanimity how the vast majority of the people suffer want all their lives—not only those doing "corvée", but also those doing back-breaking work in a factory, mine, or some other job, often starving because they have no work at all. And the capitalists look on with equanimity.

But now that the workers and soldiers have introduced just one little public duty for the capitalists, the exploiters are howling, "Corvée!"

Ask any worker or peasant whether it would be bad if the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were the only power in the state and introduced everywhere some public duty for the rich, such as a compulsory duty with horses, motor vehicles or bicycles, compulsory daily clerical work to keep a record of products or of the needy, and so on, and so forth.

Any worker, any peasant, except perhaps the kulaks, will say it would be a good thing.

And this is true. It is not socialism as yet—only one of the first steps towards socialism, but it is just what the poor

need urgently and immediately. Without such measures, the people cannot be saved from famine and ruin.

Why, then, does the Yekaterinburg Soviet remain a rare exception? Why have similar measures not been taken all over Russia long ago? Why are they not being developed into a whole system of measures of precisely this kind?

Why, after the introduction of a public duty for the rich to lend their horses, is a similar public duty for the rich not introduced to present full accounts of their financial operations, especially by the terms of government contracts, under a similar control of the Soviets, with "punctual notification in writing" as to when and where the accounts should be presented, when and where taxes should be paid, and to what amount?

Because by far most of the Soviets are controlled by S.R. ("Socialist-Revolutionary") and Menshevik leaders who have in fact deserted to the bourgeoisie, have entered the bourgeois cabinet and pledged themselves to support it, betraying not only socialism but democracy as well. Those leaders are making agreements with the bourgeoisie, who, far from allowing the imposition of a public duty on the rich—as in Petrograd, for example—have for months been holding up much more moderate reforms.

Those leaders deceive themselves and the people by saying that "Russia is not yet ripe for the introduction of socialism".

Why must we treat such assertions as deception?

Because, through such assertions, the situation is misrepresented to make believe that it is a question of unprecedentedly complicated and difficult changes, such as are bound to break up the normal way of life of millions of people. The situation is misrepresented to make believe that some want to "introduce" socialism in Russia by decree, without considering the existing technical level, the great number of small undertakings, or the habits and wishes of the majority of the population.

That is a lie from beginning to end. Nobody has ever proposed anything of the kind. No party or individual has had any intention of "introducing socialism" by decree. It is, and has been, a question solely of measures which, like the public duty imposed on the rich in Yekaterinburg, have

the full approval of the mass of the poor, i.e., the majority of the population, measures which are perfectly ripe, technically and culturally, will bring immediate relief to the poor and make it possible to ease the hardships of the war and distribute them more evenly.

Almost six months of revolution have passed, but the S.R. and Menshevik leaders still obstruct all these measures, betraying the interests of the people in favour of compromise with the bourgeoisie.

Until the workers and peasants realise that those leaders are traitors who must be driven out, must be removed from their posts, they will inevitably remain under the thumb of the bourgeoisie.

Rabochy No. 10
September 14 (1), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Rabochy* text

CONCERNING THE PARTY PROGRAMME

Comrade Bukharin's report in *Spartak*[107] about the "narrow" congress that is to be called to adopt a programme shows how pressing this matter is.

It really is an urgent matter.

Our Party is ahead of the other internationalist parties; this is a fact now.

And it is in duty bound to take the initiative, to come forward with a programme *answering* questions about imperialism.

It will be a scandal and a shame if we do not do this.

I propose that the Central Committee resolve that:

"*Every* Party organisation immediately appoint one or several committees to draft the programme; they, along with all theoreticians or writers, etc., *should* give *precedence* to this matter, and present either drafts of their own, or changes and amendments to other drafts, not later than within *three to seven* days."

This is perfectly feasible, given perseverance.

It will take a couple of weeks to collect and print the drafts or circulate them to the main organisations in typewritten form.

Then we must *immediately* announce the calling of a *narrow* congress (one delegate to 4,000 or 5,000 members) *in a month from now*—for the purpose of adopting the programme.

Our Party must come forward with a programme—*that* is the only way we can *promote* the cause of the Third International in deeds instead of words.

Everything else is empty phrases, empty promises, and postponement to the Greek calends. Once we take the initiative, we shall speed up work on all sides, and only then shall we prepare the programme of the Third International.

Written not later than
September 3 (16), 1917

First published in
Lenin Miscellany VII, 1928

Published according to
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ON ZIMMERWALD[108]

It is now quite clear that we made a mistake by not withdrawing from it.

Everybody is being bamboozled by hopes from Stockholm. Meanwhile the Stockholm Conference is being "postponed" from month to month.

And Zimmerwald is "*waiting*" for Stockholm! The Kautsky men plus the Italians, i.e., the Zimmerwald majority, are "waiting" for Stockholm.

And we are joining in this comedy, bearing *responsibility* for it before the workers.

It is a disgrace.

We must withdraw from Zimmerwald *immediately*.

By staying there for information only, we lose nothing, but we are not going to be held *responsible* for the comedy of "waiting" for Stockholm.

In leaving rotten Zimmerwald we must decide immediately, at the plenary meeting on September 3, 1917, *to call a conference of the Left-wingers*, and entrust this to the Stockholm representatives.

What has happened is that, after we made a blunder by staying in Zimmerwald, our Party, the world's only internationalist party with seventeen newspapers, etc., is *playing at compromise* with the German and Italian Martovs and Tseretelis, just as Martov is compromising with Tsereteli, just as Tsereteli is compromising with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and as the Socialist-Revolutionaries are compromising with the bourgeoisie.

And this is called "standing for" the Third International!!!

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VIOLATIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN MASS ORGANISATIONS

We must pass a resolution branding as a *fraud** worthy of Nicholas II such practices as those of the Soviet of *Soldiers'* Deputies (the soldiers have one representative to every 500 people, while the workers have 1:1,000)[109] or the Trade Union Bureau (1 representative to a members in the small unions and 1 to **a-b** members in the large ones).

What sort of *democrats* are we if we tacitly put up with this *fraud*?

What is wrong with Nicholas II, for that matter, who also "allowed" *unequal* representation from the peasants and from the landowners??

By tolerating such things, we are prostituting democracy.

We must pass a resolution demanding *equal* suffrage (both in the Soviets and at trade union congresses), branding the *slightest* departure from equality as a *fraud*—using exactly this word—as *a Nicholas II method*. This resolution of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee must be written in a language everybody can understand and spread in leaflet form among the mass of the workers.

We cannot tolerate a *fraud* of democracy if we call ourselves "democrats". We are not democrats but unprincipled people if we tolerate this!!

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* "One representative, everywhere, to an *equal* number of electors" is the ABC of democracy. Anything else is a *fraud*.

ON COMPROMISES

The term compromise in politics implies the surrender of certain demands, the renunciation of part of one's demands, by agreement with another party.

The usual idea the man in the street has about the Bolsheviks, an idea encouraged by a press which slanders them, is that the Bolsheviks will never agree to a compromise with anybody.

The idea is flattering to us as the party of the revolutionary proletariat, for it proves that even our enemies are compelled to admit our loyalty to the fundamental principles of socialism and revolution. Nevertheless, we must say that this idea is wrong. Engels was right when, in his criticism of the Manifesto of the Blanquist Communists[110] (1873), he ridiculed their declaration: "No compromises!"[111] This, he said, was an empty phrase, for compromises are often unavoidably forced upon a fighting party by circumstances, and it is absurd to refuse once and for all to accept "payments on account".[112] The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to declare that it is impossible to renounce all compromises, but to be able, *through all compromises*, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of paving the way for revolution and educating the mass of the people for victory in the revolution.

To agree, for instance, to participate in the Third and Fourth Dumas was a compromise, a temporary renunciation of revolutionary demands. But this was a compromise absolutely forced upon us, for the balance of forces made it impossible for us for the time being to conduct a mass revolutionary struggle, and in order to prepare this struggle over a long period we *had* to be able to work even from *inside* such a "pigsty". History has proved that this approach

to the question by the Bolsheviks as a party was perfectly correct.

Now the question is not of a forced, but of a voluntary compromise.

Our Party, like any other political party, is striving after political domination *for itself*. Our aim is the dictatorship of the revolutionary proletariat. Six months of revolution have proved very clearly, forcefully and convincingly that this demand is correct and inevitable in the interests of *this particular* revolution, for otherwise the people will never obtain a democratic peace, land for the peasants, or complete freedom (a fully democratic republic). This has been shown and proved by the course of events during the six months of our revolution, by the struggle of the classes and parties and by the development of the crises of April 20-21, June 9-10 and 18-19, July 3-5 and August 27-31.

The Russian revolution is experiencing so abrupt and original a turn that we, as a party, may offer a voluntary compromise—true, not to our direct and main class enemy, the bourgeoisie, but to our nearest adversaries, the "ruling" petty-bourgeois-democratic parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

We may offer a compromise to these parties only by way of exception, and only by virtue of the particular situation, which will obviously last only a very short time. And I think we should do so.

The compromise on our part is our return to the pre-July demand of all power to the Soviets and a government of S.R.s and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.

Now, and only now, perhaps *during only a few days* or a week or two, such a government could be set up and consolidated in a perfectly peaceful way. In all probability it could secure the peaceful *advance* of the whole Russian revolution, and provide exceptionally good chances for great strides in the world movement towards peace and the victory of socialism.

In my opinion, the Bolsheviks, who are partisans of world revolution and revolutionary methods, may and should consent to this compromise only for the sake of the revolution's peaceful development—an opportunity that is *ex-*

tremely rare in history and *extremely* valuable, an opportunity that only occurs once in a while.

The compromise would amount to the following: the Bolsheviks, without making any claim to participate in the government (which is impossible for the internationalists unless a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants has been realised), would refrain from demanding the immediate transfer of power to the proletariat and the poor peasants and from employing revolutionary methods of fighting for this demand. A condition that is self-evident and not new to the S.R.s and Mensheviks would be complete freedom of propaganda and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly without further delays or even at an earlier date.

The Mensheviks and S.R.s, being the government bloc, would then agree (assuming that the compromise had been reached) to form a government wholly and exclusively responsible to the Soviets, the latter taking over all power locally as well. This would constitute the "new" condition. I think the Bolsheviks would advance no other conditions, trusting that the revolution would proceed peacefully and party strife in the Soviets would be *peacefully overcome* thanks to really complete freedom of propaganda and to the immediate establishment of a new democracy in the composition of the Soviets (new elections) and in their functioning.

Perhaps this is *already* impossible? Perhaps. But if there is even one chance in a hundred, the attempt at realising this opportunity is still worth while.

What would both "contracting" parties gain by this "compromise", i.e., the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and the S.R. and Menshevik bloc, on the other? If *neither* side gains anything, then the compromise must be recognised as impossible, and nothing more is to be said. No matter how difficult this compromise may be at present (after July and August, two months equivalent to two decades in "peaceful", somnolent times), I think it stands a small chance of being realised. This chance has been created by the decision of the S.R.s and Mensheviks not to participate in a government together with the Cadets.

The Bolsheviks would gain the opportunity of quite freely advocating their views and of trying to win influence

in the Soviets under a really complete democracy. In words, "everybody" now concedes the Bolsheviks this freedom. In reality, this freedom is *impossible* under a bourgeois government or a government in which the bourgeoisie participate, or under any government, in fact, other than the Soviets. Under a Soviet government, such freedom would be *possible* (we do not say it would be a certainty, but still it would be possible). For the sake of such a possibility at such a difficult time, it would be worth compromising with the present majority in the Soviets. *We* have nothing to fear from real democracy, for reality is on our side, and even the course of development of trends within the S.R. and Menshevik parties, which are hostile to us, proves us right.

The Mensheviks and S.R.s would gain in that they would at once obtain every opportunity to carry out *their* bloc's programme with the support of the obviously overwhelming majority of the people and in that they would secure for themselves the "peaceful" use of their majority in the Soviets.

Of course, there would probably be two voices heard from this bloc, which is heterogeneous both because it is a bloc and because petty-bourgeois democracy is *always* less homogeneous than the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

One voice would say: we cannot follow the same road as the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary proletariat. It will demand too much anyway and will entice the peasant poor by demagogy. It will demand peace and a break with the Allies. That is impossible. We are better off and safer with the bourgeoisie; after all, we have not parted ways with them but only had a temporary *quarrel*, and only over the Kornilov incident. We have quarrelled, but we shall make it up. Moreover, the Bolsheviks are not "ceding" us anything, for their attempts at insurrection are as doomed to defeat as was the Commune of 1871.

The other voice would say: the allusion to the Commune is very superficial and even foolish. For, in the first place, the Bolsheviks have learnt something since 1871; they would not fail to seize the banks, and would not refuse to advance on Versailles. Under such conditions even the Commune might have been victorious. Furthermore, the Commune could not immediately offer the people what the

Bolsheviks will be able to offer if they come to power, namely, land to the peasants, an immediate offer of peace, real control over production, an honest peace with the Ukrainians, Finns, etc. The Bolsheviks, to put it bluntly, hold ten times more "trumps" than the Commune did. In the second place, the Commune, after all, means a strenuous civil war, a set-back to peaceful cultural development for a long time to come, an opportunity for all sorts of Mac-Mahons and Kornilovs to operate and plot with greater ease—and such operations are a menace to our whole bourgeois society. Is it wise to risk a Commune?

Now a Commune is inevitable in Russia if we do not take power into our own hands, if things remain in as grave a state as they were between May 6 and August 31. Every revolutionary worker and soldier will inevitably think about the Commune and believe in it; he will inevitably attempt to bring it about, for he will argue: "The people are perishing; war, famine and ruin are spreading. Only the Commune can save us. So let us all perish, let us die, but let us set up the Commune." Such thoughts are inevitable with the workers, and it will not be as easy to crush the Commune now as it was in 1871. The Russian Commune will have allies throughout the world, allies a hundred times stronger than those the Commune had in 1871.... Is it wise for us to risk a Commune? I cannot agree, either, that the Bolsheviks virtually cede us nothing by their compromise. For, in all civilised countries, civilised ministers value highly every agreement with the proletariat in war-time, however small. They value it very, very highly. And these are men of action, real ministers. The Bolsheviks are rapidly becoming stronger, in spite of repression, and the weakness of their press.... Is it wise for us to risk a Commune?

We have a safe majority; the peasant poor will not wake up for some time to come; we are safe for our lifetime. I do not believe that in a peasant country the majority will follow the extremists. And against an obvious majority, no insurrection is possible in a really democratic republic. This is what the second voice would say.

There may also be a third voice coming from among the supporters of Martov or Spiridonova, which would say:

I am indignant, "comrades", that both of you, speaking about the Commune and its likelihood, unhesitatingly side with its opponents. In one form or another, both of you side with those who suppressed the Commune. I will not undertake to campaign for the Commune and I cannot promise beforehand to fight in its ranks as every Bolshevik will do, but I must say that *if* the Commune does start *in spite of* my efforts, I shall rather help its defenders than its opponents.

The medley of voices in the "bloc" is great and inevitable, for a host of shades is represented among the petty-bourgeois democrats—from the complete bourgeois, perfectly eligible for a post in the government, down to the semi-pauper who is not yet capable of taking up the proletarian position. Nobody knows what will be the result of this medley of voices at any given moment.

* * *

The above lines were written on Friday, September 1, but due to unforeseen circumstances (under Kerensky, as history will tell, not all Bolsheviks were free to choose their domicile) they did not reach the editorial office that day. After reading Saturday's and today's (Sunday's) papers, I say to myself: perhaps it is already too late to offer a compromise. Perhaps the few days in which a peaceful development was *still* possible have passed *too*. Yes, to all appearances, they have already passed.[113] In one way or another, Kerensky will abandon both the S.R. Party and the S.R.s themselves, and will consolidate his position with the aid of the bourgeoisie *without* the S.R.s, and thanks to their inaction.... Yes, to all appearances, the days when by chance the path of peaceful development became possible have *already* passed. All that remains is to send these notes to the editor with the request to have them entitled: "Belated Thoughts". Perhaps even belated thoughts are sometimes not without interest.

Written on September 1-3 (14-16), 1917

Published in *Rabochy Put* No. 3, September 19 (6), 1917

Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the newspaper text

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION[114]

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., on the basis of the resolution on the political situation adopted by the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), and applying that resolution to the present situation, at its plenary meeting states:

1. In the two months from July 3 to September 3, due to the unparalleled speed of the revolution, the course of the class struggle and the development of political events have carried the whole country as far forward as it would have been impossible for the country to advance over many years in peace-time, without revolution and war.

2. It becomes more and more apparent that the events of July 3-5 were the turning-point of the whole revolution. Without a correct estimate of these events, it is impossible to correctly estimate either the proletariat's tasks, or the speed of development of revolutionary events, which is beyond our control.

3. The slander against the Bolsheviks, which the bourgeoisie spread with tremendous zeal and which they put about very widely among the people with the aid of the millions invested in capitalist papers and publishing houses, is being exposed more and more rapidly and widely. First it was the workers in the capital and in the large cities, and then the peasants, who realised more and more that the slander against the Bolsheviks is one of the main weapons used by the landowners and capitalists in the struggle against the defenders of the interests of the workers and poor peasants, i.e., against the Bolsheviks.

4. An outright attempt was made to camouflage the Kornilov revolt, i.e., a revolt of generals and officers behind whom stand the landowners and the capitalists headed by the Cadet Party (the "people's freedom" party), by bringing up again the old slander against the Bolsheviks. It was this that helped finally to open the eyes of the broadest sections of the people to the true meaning of the bourgeois slander against the Bolshevik workers' party, the party of the true defenders of the poor.

5. Had our Party refused to support the July 3-4 mass movement, which burst out spontaneously despite our attempts to prevent it, we should have actually and completely betrayed the proletariat, since the people were moved to action by their well-founded and just anger at the protraction of the imperialist war, which is a predatory war conducted in the interests of the capitalists, and at the inaction of the government and the Soviets in regard to the bourgeoisie, who are intensifying and aggravating economic disruption and famine.

6. In spite of all the efforts of the bourgeoisie and the government, in spite of the arrest of hundreds of Bolsheviks, the seizure of their papers and documents, the search of their editorial offices, etc.—in spite of all this nobody has succeeded, and nobody will ever succeed, in proving the slander that our Party's aim in the July 3-4 movement was anything other than a "peaceful and organised" demonstration with the slogan of transfer of all state power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

7. It would have been wrong if the Bolsheviks had aimed to seize power on July 3-4, since neither the majority of the people nor even the majority of the workers at that time had yet actually experienced the counter-revolutionary policies of generals in the army, of the landowners in the countryside, and of the capitalists in the town. These policies were only revealed to the masses after July 5, and stemmed from a compromise between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie, on the other. None of our Party organisations, either central or local, advocated, either in writing or by word of mouth, the slogan of seizing power on July 3-4; none of them even discussed this question.

8. The real mistake of our Party on July 3-4, as events now reveal, was merely that the Party considered the general situation in the country *less* revolutionary than it proved to be, that the Party *still* considered a peaceful development of political changes possible through an alteration in the Soviets' policies, whereas in reality the Mensheviks and S.R.s had become so much entangled and bound by compromising with the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie had become so counter-revolutionary, that peaceful development was no longer possible. This erroneous view, however, which was sustained only by the hope that events would not develop too fast, our Party could not have got over other than by participating in the popular movement of July 3-4 with the slogan "All power to the Soviets" and with the aim of making the movement peaceful and organised.

9. The historic significance of the Kornilov revolt is that with extraordinary force, it opened the people's eyes to a fact which the S.R.s and Mensheviks had concealed and still are concealing under conciliatory phrases. The fact is that the landowners and the bourgeoisie, headed by the Cadet Party, and the generals and officers who are on their side, have organised themselves; they are ready to commit, or are committing, the most outrageous crimes, such as surrendering Riga (followed by Petrograd) to the Germans, laying the war front open, putting the Bolshevik regiments under fire, starting a mutiny, leading troops against the capital with the "Savage Division"[115] at their head, etc. The purpose of all this is to seize power completely and put it in the hands of the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the power of the landowners in the countryside, and to drench the country in the blood of workers and peasants.

The Kornilov revolt has proved for Russia what has been proved throughout history for all countries, namely, that the bourgeoisie will betray their country and commit any crime to retain both their power over the people and their profits.

10. The workers and peasants of Russia have no other alternative than the most determined struggle against, and victory over, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, over the Cadet Party and the generals and officers sympathising with it. Only the urban working class can lead the people, i.e., all working people, into such a struggle and to such a

victory, provided all state power passes into its hands and provided it is supported by the peasant poor.

11. Events in the Russian revolution, particularly since May 6, and even more so since July 3, have been developing with such incredible, storm- or hurricane-like velocity, that it can by no means be the task of the Party to speed them up. All efforts, in fact, must be directed towards keeping up with events and doing on time our work of explaining to the workers, and to the working people in general, as much as we can, the changes in the situation and in the course of the class struggle. This is still the main task of our Party; we must explain to the people that the situation is extremely critical, that every action may end in an explosion, and that therefore a premature uprising may cause the greatest harm. At the same time, the critical situation is inevitably leading the working class—perhaps with catastrophic speed—to a situation in which, due to a change in events beyond its control, it will find itself compelled to wage a determined battle with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and to gain power.

12. The Kornilov revolt fully revealed that the entire army *hates the General Staff*. This had to be admitted even by those Mensheviks and S.R.s who through months of effort had proved their hatred for the Bolsheviks and their defence of the policy of agreement between the workers and peasants, on the one hand, and the landowners and the bourgeoisie, on the other. The hatred of the army for the General Staff will not die down but will become stronger now that Kerensky's government has confined itself to substituting Alexeyev for Kornilov, leaving Klembovsky and other Kornilov generals, and has done absolutely nothing substantial to democratise the armed forces and remove the counter-revolutionary commanders. Soviets, which tolerate and support this weak, wavering, unprincipled policy of Kerensky and missed another opportunity to take all power peacefully when the Kornilov revolt was being liquidated, become guilty not only of conciliation but even of criminal conciliation.

The army, which hates the General Staff and does not want to fight a war it now knows to be a war of conquest, is inevitably doomed to new catastrophes.

PROMIAN IOMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

13. Only the working class, when it has gained power, will be able to pursue a peace policy, not merely in words, like the Mensheviks and S.R.s, who in practice support the bourgeoisie and their secret treaties, but in deeds. Specifically, the working class will immediately offer *all* peoples open, precise, clear and *just* peace terms. This will be done irrespective of the military situation, even if Kornilov's generals follow up the surrender of Riga by that of Petrograd. The working class can do this in the name of the entire people, since the overwhelming majority of Russia's workers and peasants oppose the present war of annexation and support a peace on just terms, without annexations and indemnities.

The S.R.s and Mensheviks are deceiving themselves and the people when they spend months talking about this peace. The working class, on gaining power, will offer this peace to all without losing a single day.

The capitalists of all countries have so much difficulty in stemming the workers' revolution against war—a revolution which is growing everywhere—that if the Russian revolution were to pass from impotent and pitiful yearning for peace to a forthright peace offer coupled with the publication and annulment of secret treaties, etc., there are ninety-nine chances in a hundred that peace would quickly follow, that the capitalists would be unable to stand in the way of peace.

If, however, the highly improbable were to happen and the capitalists were to reject the peace terms of the Russian workers' government, against the will of their peoples, a revolution in Europe would come a hundred times nearer, and our workers' and peasants' army would elect for itself not hated but respected commanders and military leaders. The army would see the justice of the war once peace had been offered, the secret treaties torn up, the alliance with the landowners and the bourgeoisie severed, and all land given to the peasants. Only then would the war become a just war for Russia, only this war would the workers and peasants fight of their own free will, without being bludgeoned into fighting; and this war would bring even nearer the inevitable workers' revolution in the advanced countries.

14. Only the working class, when it has gained power, will be able to guarantee the immediate transfer of all landed estates to the peasants without compensation. This must not be put off. The Constituent Assembly will legalise the transfer, but it is not the peasants' fault that the Constituent Assembly is being delayed. The peasants daily become more convinced that it is impossible to get the land by agreement with the landowners and the capitalists. The land can only be obtained through a very close, brotherly alliance of the poor peasants and the workers.

Chernov's resignation from the government after he had for months tried to uphold the interests of the peasants through concessions, big and small, to the Cadet landowners, and after all these attempts had failed, revealed with particular clarity the hopelessness of the policy of conciliation. The peasants see, know and feel that since July 5 the landowners have become arrogant in the villages and that it is necessary to curb them and render them harmless.

15. Only the working class, when it has gained power, will be able to put an end to economic disruption and the impending famine. Since May 6 the government has kept on promising control, but it has done and could do nothing because the capitalists and landowners obstructed all work. Unemployment is growing, famine is approaching, currency is losing value. Peshekhonov's resignation after the fixed prices have doubled will aggravate the crisis, and it again shows the utter feebleness and impotence of the government. Only workers' control over production and distribution can save the situation. Only a workers' government will curb the capitalists, will bring heroic support from all working people for the efforts of *state power*, and will establish order and a fair exchange of grain for manufactured goods.

16. The confidence of the peasant poor in the urban working class, temporarily undermined by the slander of the bourgeoisie and by hopes put in the policy of conciliation, has been returning, particularly after the arrests in the countryside and the various kinds of persecution of working people after July 5 and then the Kornilov revolt opened the people's eyes. One of the signs that the people are losing faith in conciliation with the capitalists is that among the S.R.s. and Mensheviks, the two main parties responsible for

introducing this policy of conciliation and bringing it to a culmination, there have been growing, especially since July 5, a discontent within these parties and a struggle against conciliation. This opposition at the last Socialist-Revolutionary "Council" and at the Menshevik congress involved about two-fifths (40 per cent) of the members.

17. The whole course of events, all economic and political conditions, everything that is happening in the armed forces, are increasingly paving the way for the successful winning of power by the working class, which will bring peace, bread and freedom and will hasten the victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

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

First page of the manuscript
The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It,
September 10-14 (23-27), 1917
Reduced

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FAMINE IS APPROACHING

Unavoidable catastrophe is threatening Russia. The railways are incredibly disorganised and the disorganisation is progressing. The railways will come to a standstill. The delivery of raw materials and coal to the factories will cease. The delivery of grain will cease. The capitalists are deliberately and unremittingly sabotaging (damaging, stopping, disrupting, hampering) production, hoping that an unparalleled catastrophe will mean the collapse of the republic and democracy, and of the Soviets and proletarian and peasant associations generally, thus facilitating the return to a monarchy and the restoration of the unlimited power of the bourgeoisie and the landowners.

The danger of a great catastrophe and of famine is imminent. All the newspapers have written about this time and again. A tremendous number of resolutions have been adopted by the parties and by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies—resolutions which admit that a catastrophe is unavoidable, that it is very close, that extreme measures are necessary to combat it, that "heroic efforts" by the people are necessary to avert ruin, and so on.

Everybody says this. Everybody admits it. Everybody has decided it is so.

Yet nothing is being done.

Six months of revolution have elapsed. The catastrophe is even closer. Unemployment has assumed a mass scale. To think that there is a shortage of goods in the country, the country is perishing from a shortage of food and labour, although there is a sufficient quantity of grain and raw materials, and yet in such a country, at so critical a moment, there is mass unnemployment! What better evidence is

needed to show that after six months of revolution (which some call a great revolution, but which so far it would perhaps be fairer to call a rotten revolution), in a democratic republic, with an abundance of unions, organs and institutions which proudly call themselves "revolutionary-democratic", absolutely *nothing* of any importance has actually been done to avert catastrophe, to avert famine? We are nearing ruin with increasing speed. The war will not wait and is causing increasing dislocation in every sphere of national life.

Yet the slightest attention and thought will suffice to satisfy anyone that the ways of combating catastrophe and famine are available, that the measures required to combat them are quite clear, simple, perfectly feasible, and fully within reach of the people's forces, and that these measures are *not* being adopted *only* because, *exclusively* because, their realisation would affect the fabulous profits of a handful of landowners and capitalists.

And, indeed, it is safe to say that every single speech, every single article in a newspaper of any trend, every single resolution passed by any meeting or institution quite clearly and explicitly recognises the chief and principal measure of combating, of averting, catastrophe and famine. This measure is control, supervision, accounting, regulation by the state, introduction of a proper distribution of labour-power in the production and distribution of goods, husbanding of the people's forces, the elimination of all wasteful effort, economy of effort. Control, supervision and accounting are the prime requisites for combating catastrophe and famine. This is indisputable and universally recognised. And it is just what *is not being done* from fear of encroaching on the supremacy of the landowners and capitalists, on their immense, fantastic and scandalous profits, profits derived from high prices and war contracts (and, directly or indirectly, nearly everybody is now "working" for the war), profits about which everybody knows and which everybody sees, and over which everybody is sighing and groaning.

And absolutely nothing is being done to introduce such control, accounting and supervision by the state as would be in the least effective.

COMPLETE GOVERNMENT INACTIVITY

There is a universal, systematic and persistent sabotage of every kind of control, supervision and accounting and of all state attempts to institute them. And one must be incredibly naïve not to understand, one must be an utter hypocrite to pretend not to understand, where this sabotage comes from and by what means it is being carried on. For this sabotage by the bankers and capitalists, their *frustration* of every kind of control, supervision and accounting, is being adapted to the state forms of a democratic republic, to the existence of "revolutionary-democratic" institutions. The capitalist gentlemen have learnt very well a fact which all supporters of scientific socialism profess to recognise but which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to forget as soon as their friends had secured cushy jobs as ministers, deputy ministers, etc. That fact is that the economic substance of capitalist exploitation is in no wise affected by the substitution of republican-democratic forms of government for monarchist forms, and that, consequently, the reverse is also true—only the *form* of the struggle for the inviolability and sanctity of capitalist profits need be changed in order to uphold them under a democratic republic as effectively as under an absolute monarchy.

The present, modern republican-democratic sabotage of every kind of control, accounting and supervision consists in the capitalists "eagerly" accepting in words the "principle" of control and the necessity for control (as, of course, do all Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), insisting only that this control be introduced "gradually", methodically and in a "state-regulated" way. In practice, however, these specious catchwords serve to conceal the *frustration* of control, its nullification, its reduction to a fiction, the mere playing at control, the delay of all business-like and practically effective measures, the creation of extraordinarily complicated, cumbersome and bureaucratically lifeless institutions of control which are hopelessly dependent on the capitalists, and which do absolutely nothing and cannot do anything.

So as not to trot out bald statements, let us cite witnesses from among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolu-

tionaries, i.e., the very people who had the majority in the Soviets during the first six months of revolution, who took part in the "coalition government" and who are therefore politically responsible to the Russian workers and peasants for winking at the capitalists and allowing them to frustrate all control.

Izvestia TsIK (i.e., the newspaper of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies), the official organ of the highest of the so-called "fully authorised" (no joke!) bodies of "revolutionary" democracy, in issue No. 164, of September 7, 1917, printed a *resolution* by a special control organisation created and run by these very Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. This special institution is the Economic Department of the Central Executive Committee. Its resolution officially records as a fact "*the complete inactivity of the central bodies set up under the government for the regulation of economic life*".

Now, how could one imagine any more eloquent testimony to the collapse of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary policy than this statement signed by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves?

The need for the regulation of economic life was already recognised under tsarism, and certain institutions were set up for the purpose. But under tsarism economic chaos steadily grew and reached monstrous proportions. It was at once recognised that it was the task of the republican, revolutionary government to adopt effective and resolute measures to put an end to the economic chaos. When the "coalition" government was formed with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries participating, it promised and undertook, in its most solemn public declaration of May 6, to introduce state control and regulation. The Tseretelis and Chernovs, like all the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, vowed and swore that not only were they responsible for the government, but that the "authorised bodies of revolutionary democracy" under their control actually kept an eye on the work of the government and verified its activities.

Four months have passed since May 6, four long months, in which Russia has sacrificed the lives of hundreds of

thousands of soldiers for the sake of the absurd imperialist "offensive", in which chaos and disaster have been advancing in seven-league strides, in which the summer season afforded an exceptional opportunity to do a great deal in the matter of water transport, agriculture, prospecting for minerals, and so on and so forth—and after four months the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have been obliged officially to admit the "complete inactivity" of the control institutions set up under the government!!

And these Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, with the serious mien of statesmen, now prate (I am writing this on the very eve of the Democratic Conference of September 12[116]) that matters can be furthered by replacing the coalition with the Cadets by a coalition with commercial and industrial Kit Kityches,[117] the Ryabushinskys, Bublikovs, Tereshchenkos and Co.

How, one may ask, are we to explain this astonishing blindness of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries? Are we to regard them as political babes in the wood who in their extreme foolishness and naïveté do not realise what they are doing and err in good faith? Or does the abundance of posts they occupy as ministers, deputy ministers, governors-general, commissars and the like have the property of engendering a special kind of "political" blindness?

CONTROL MEASURES ARE KNOWN TO ALL AND EASY TO TAKE

One may ask: aren't methods and measures of control extremely complex, difficult, untried and even unknown? Isn't the delay due to the fact that although the statesmen of the Cadet Party, the merchant and industrial class, and the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties have for six months been toiling in the sweat of their brow, investigating, studying and discovering measures and methods of control, still the problem is incredibly difficult and has not yet been solved?

Unfortunately, this is how they are trying to present matters to hoodwink the ignorant, illiterate and downtrodden muzhiks and the Simple Simons who believe everything and never look into things. In reality, however, even tsarism,

even the "old regime", when it set up the War Industries Committees[118] *knew* the principal measure, the chief method and way to introduce control, namely, by uniting the population according to profession, purpose of work, branch of labour, etc. But tsarism *feared* the union of the population and therefore did its best to restrict and artificially hinder this generally known, very easy and quite practical method and way of control.

All the belligerent countries, suffering as they are from the extreme burdens and hardships of the war, suffering—in one degree or another—from economic chaos and famine, have long ago outlined, determined, applied and tested a *whole series* of control measures, which consist almost invariably in uniting the population and in setting up or encouraging unions of various kinds, in which state representatives participate, which are under the supervision of the state, etc. All these measures of control are known to all, much has been said and written about them, and the laws passed by the advanced belligerent powers relating to control have been translated into Russian or expounded in detail in the Russian press.

If our state really *wanted* to exercise control in a business-like and earnest fashion, if its institutions had not condemned themselves to "complete inactivity" by their servility to the capitalists, all the state would have to do would be to draw freely on the rich store of control measures which are already known and have been used in the past. The only obstacle to this—an obstacle concealed from the eyes of the people by the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—was, and still is, that control would bring to light the fabulous profits of the capitalists and would cut the ground from under these profits.

To explain this most important question more clearly (a question which is essentially equivalent to that of the programme of *any* truly revolutionary government that would wish to save Russia from war and famine), let us enumerate these principal measures of control and examine each of them.

We shall see that all a government would have had to do, if its name of revolutionary-democratic government were not merely a joke, would have been to decree, in the

very first week of its existence, the adoption of the principal measures of control, to provide for strict and severe punishment to be meted out to capitalists who fraudulently evaded control, and to call upon the population itself to exercise supervision over the capitalists and see to it that they scrupulously observed the regulations on control—and control would have been introduced in Russia long ago. These principal measures are:

(1) Amalgamation of all banks into a single bank, and state control over its operations, or nationalisation of the banks.

(2) Nationalisation of the syndicates, i.e., the largest, monopolistic capitalist associations (sugar, oil, coal, iron and steel, and other syndicates).

(3) Abolition of commercial secrecy.

(4) Compulsory syndication (i.e., compulsory amalgamation into associations) of industrialists, merchants and employers generally.

(5) Compulsory organisation of the population into consumers' societies, or encouragement of such organisation, and the exercise of control over it.

Let us see what the significance of each of these measures would be if carried out in a revolutionary-democratic way.

NATIONALISATION OF THE BANKS

The banks, as we know, are centres of modern economic life, the principal nerve centres of the whole capitalist economic system. To talk about "regulating economic life" and yet evade the question of the nationalisation of the banks means either betraying the most profound ignorance or deceiving the "common people" by florid words and grandiloquent promises with the deliberate intention of not fulfilling these promises.

It is absurd to control and regulate deliveries of grain, or the production and distribution of goods generally, without controlling and regulating bank operations. It is like trying to snatch at odd kopeks and closing one's eyes to millions of rubles. Banks nowadays are so closely and intimately bound up with trade (in grain and everything else) and with industry that without "laying hands" on the

banks nothing of any value, nothing "revolutionary-democratic", can be accomplished.

But perhaps for the state to "lay hands" on the banks is a very difficult and complicated operation? They usually try to scare philistines with this very idea—that is, the capitalists and their defenders try it, because it is to their advantage to do so.

In reality, however, nationalisation of the banks, which would not deprive any "owner" of a single kopek, presents absolutely no technical or cultural difficulties, and is being delayed *exclusively* because of the vile greed of an insignificant handful of rich people. If nationalisation of the banks is so often confused with the confiscation of private property, it is the bourgeois press, which has an interest in deceiving the public, that is to blame for this widespread confusion.

The ownership of the capital wielded by and concentrated in the banks is certified by printed and written certificates called shares, bonds, bills, receipts, etc. Not a single one of these certificates would be invalidated or altered if the banks were nationalised, i.e., if all the banks were amalgamated into a single state bank. Whoever owned fifteen rubles on a savings account would continue to be the owner of fifteen rubles after the nationalisation of the banks; and whoever had fifteen million rubles would continue after the nationalisation of the banks to have fifteen million rubles in the form of shares, bonds, bills, commercial certificates and so on.

What, then, is the significance of nationalisation of the banks?

It is that no effective control of any kind over the individual banks and their operations is possible (even if commercial secrecy, etc., were abolished) because it is impossible to keep track of the extremely complex, involved and wily tricks that are used in drawing up balance sheets, founding fictitious enterprises and subsidiaries, enlisting the services of figureheads, and so on, and so forth. Only the amalgamation of all banks into one, which in itself would imply no change whatever in respect of ownership, and which, we repeat, would not deprive any owner of a single kopek, would make it *possible* to exercise real con-

trol—provided, of course, all the other measures indicated above were carried out. Only by nationalising the banks can the state *put itself in a position* to know where and how, whence and when, millions and billions of rubles flow. And only control over the banks, over the centre, over the pivot and chief mechanism of capitalist circulation, would make it possible to organise real and not fictitious control over all economic life, over the production and distribution of staple goods, and organise that "regulation of economic life" which otherwise is inevitably doomed to remain a ministerial phrase designed to fool the common people. Only control over banking operations, provided they were concentrated in a single state bank, would make it possible, if certain other easily-practicable measures were adopted, to organise the effective collection of income tax in such a way as to prevent the concealment of property and incomes; for at present the income tax is very largely a fiction.

Nationalisation of the banks has only to be decreed and it would be carried out by the directors and employees themselves. No special machinery, no special preparatory steps on the part of the state would be required, for this is a measure that can be effected by a single decree, "at a single stroke". It was made economically feasible by capitalism itself once it had developed to the stage of bills, shares, bonds and so on. *All* that is required is to *unify accountancy*. And if the revolutionary-democratic government were to decide that immediately, by telegraph, meetings of managers and employees should be called in every city, and conferences in every region and in the country as a whole, for the immediate amalgamation of all banks into a single state bank, this reform would be carried out in a few weeks. Of course, it would be the managers and the higher bank officials who would offer resistance, who would try to deceive the state, delay matters, and so on, for these gentlemen would lose their highly remunerative posts and the opportunity of performing highly profitable fraudulent operations. *That is the heart of the matter*. But there is not the slightest technical difficulty in the way of the amalgamation of the banks; and if the state power were revolutionary not only in word (i.e., if it did not fear to do away with inertia and routine), if it were

democratic not only in word (i.e., if it acted in the interests of the majority of the people and not of a handful of rich men), it would be enough to decree confiscation of property and imprisonment as the penalty for managers, board members and big shareholders for the slightest delay or for attempting to conceal documents and accounts. It would be enough, for example, to organise the poorer employees *separately* and to reward them for detecting fraud and delay on the part of the rich for nationalisation of the banks to be effected as smoothly and rapidly as can be.

The advantages accruing to the whole people from nationalisation of the banks—*not* to the workers especially (for the workers have little to do with banks) but to the mass of peasants and small industrialists—would be enormous. The saving in labour would be gigantic, and, assuming that the state would retain the former number of bank employees, nationalisation would be a highly important step towards making the use of the banks universal, towards increasing the number of their branches, putting their operations within easier reach, etc., etc. The availability of credit on easy terms for the *small* owners, for the peasants, would increase immensely. As to the state, it would for the first time be in a position first to *review* all the chief monetary operations, which would be unconcealed, then to *control* them, then to *regulate* economic life, and finally to *obtain* millions and billions for major state transactions, without paying the capitalist gentlemen sky-high "commissions" for their "services". That is the reason—and the only reason—why all the capitalists, all the bourgeois professors, all the bourgeoisie, and all the Plekhanovs, Potresovs and Co., who serve them, are prepared to fight tooth and nail against nationalisation of the banks and invent thousands of excuses to prevent the adoption of this very easy and very pressing measure, although *even* from the standpoint of the "defence" of the country, i.e., from the military standpoint, this measure would provide a gigantic advantage and would tremendously enhance the "military might" of the country.

The following objection might be raised: why do such advanced states as Germany and the U.S.A. "regulate

economic life" so magnificently without even thinking of nationalising the banks?

Because, we reply, *both* these states are not merely capitalist, but also imperialist states, although one of them is a monarchy and the other a republic. As such, they carry out the reforms they need by reactionary-bureaucratic methods, whereas we are speaking here of revolutionary-democratic methods.

This "little difference" is of major importance. In most cases it is "not the custom" to think of it. The term "revolutionary democracy" has become with us (especially among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) almost a conventional phrase, like the expression "thank God", which is also used by people who are not so ignorant as to believe in God; or like the expression "honourable citizen", which is sometimes used even in addressing staff members of *Dyen* or *Yedinstvo*, although nearly everybody guesses that these newspapers have been founded and are maintained by the capitalists in the interests of the capitalists, and that there is therefore very little "honourable" about the pseudo-socialists contributing to these newspapers.

If we do not employ the phrase "revolutionary democracy" as a stereotyped ceremonial phrase, as a conventional epithet, but *reflect* on its meaning, we find that to be a democrat means reckoning in reality with the interests of the majority of the people and not the minority, and that to be a revolutionary means destroying everything harmful and obsolete in the most resolute and ruthless manner.

Neither in America nor in Germany, as far as we know, is any claim laid by either the government or the ruling classes to the name "revolutionary democrats", to which our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks lay claim (and which they prostitute).

In Germany there are only *four* very large private banks of national importance. In America there are only *two*. It is easier, more convenient, more profitable for the financial magnates of those banks to unite privately, surreptitiously, in a reactionary and not a revolutionary way, in a bureaucratic and not a democratic way, bribing government officials (this is the general rule both in America *and*

in Germany), and preserving the private character of the banks in order to preserve secrecy of operations, to milk the state of millions upon millions in "super-profits", and to make financial frauds possible.

Both America and Germany "regulate economic life" in such a way as to create conditions of *war-time penal servitude* for the workers (and partly for the peasants) and a *paradise* for the bankers and capitalists. Their regulation consists in "squeezing" the workers to the point of starvation, while the capitalists are guaranteed (surreptitiously, in a reactionary-bureaucratic fashion) profits *higher* than before the war.

Such a course is quite possible in republican-imperialist Russia too. Indeed, it is the course being followed not only by the Milyukovs and Shingaryovs, but also by Kerensky in partnership with Tereshchenko, Nekrasov, Bernatsky, Prokopovich and Co., who *also uphold*, in a reactionary-bureaucratic manner, the "inviolability" of the banks and their sacred right to fabulous profits. So let us better tell the *truth*, namely, that in republican Russia they want to regulate economic life in a reactionary-bureaucratic manner, but "often" find it difficult to do so owing to the existence of the "Soviets", which Kornilov No. 1 did not manage to disband, but which Kornilov No. 2 will try to disband.

That would be the truth. And this simple if bitter truth is more useful for the enlightenment of the people than the honeyed lies about "our", "great", "revolutionary" democracy.

* * *

Nationalisation of the banks would greatly facilitate the simultaneous nationalisation of the insurance business, i.e., the amalgamation of all the insurance companies into one, the centralisation of their operations, and state control over them. Here, too, congresses of insurance company employees could carry out this amalgamation immediately and without any great effort, provided a revolutionary-democratic government decreed this and ordered directors and big shareholders to effect the amalgamation without the slightest delay and held every one of them strictly accountable for it. The capitalists have invested hundreds

of millions of rubles in the insurance business; the work is all done by the employees. The amalgamation of this business would lead to lower insurance premiums, would provide a host of facilities and conveniences for the insured and would make it possible to increase their number without increasing expenditure of effort and funds. Absolutely nothing but the inertia, routine and self-interest of a handful of holders of remunerative jobs are delaying this reform, which, among other things, would enhance the country's defence potential by economising national labour and creating a number of highly important opportunities to "regulate economic life" not in word, but in deed.

NATIONALISATION OF THE SYNDICATES

Capitalism differs from the old, pre-capitalistic systems of economy in having created the closest interconnection and interdependence of the various branches of the economy. Were this not so, incidentally, no steps towards socialism would be technically feasible. Modern capitalism, under which the banks dominate production, has carried this interdependence of the various branches of the economy to the utmost. The banks and the more important branches of industry and commerce have become inseparably merged. This means, on the one hand, that it is impossible to nationalise the banks alone, without proceeding to create a state monopoly of commercial and industrial syndicates (sugar, coal, iron, oil, etc.), and without nationalising them. It means, on the other hand, that if carried out in earnest, the regulation of economic activity would demand the simultaneous nationalisation of the banks and the syndicates.

Let us take the sugar syndicate as an example. It came into being under tsarism, and at that time developed into a huge capitalist combine of splendidly equipped refineries. And, of course, this combine, thoroughly imbued with the most reactionary and bureaucratic spirit, secured scandalously high profits for the capitalists and reduced its employees to the status of humiliated and downtrodden slaves lacking any rights. Even at that time the state controlled and regulated production—in the interests of the rich, the magnates.

All that remains to be done here is to transform reactionary-bureaucratic regulation into revolutionary-democratic regulation by simple decrees providing for the summoning of a congress of employees, engineers, directors and shareholders, for the introduction of uniform accountancy, for control by the workers' unions, etc. This is an exceedingly simple thing, yet it has not been done! Under what is a democratic republic, the regulation of the sugar industry *actually* remains reactionary-bureaucratic; everything remains as of old—the dissipation of national labour, routine and stagnation, and the enrichment of the Bobrinskys and Tereshchenkos. Democrats and not bureaucrats, the workers and other employees and not the "sugar barons", should be called upon to exercise independent initiative—and this could and should be done in a few days, at a single stroke, if only the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks did not befog the minds of the people by plans for "association" with these very sugar barons, for the very association with the wealthy from which the "complete inaction" of the government in the matter of regulating economic life follows with absolute inevitability, and of which it is a consequence.*

Take the oil business. It was to a vast extent "socialised" by the earlier development of capitalism. Just a couple of oil barons wield millions and hundreds of millions of rubles, clipping coupons and raking in fabulous profits from a "business" which is *already* actually, technically and socially organised on a national scale and is *already* being conducted by hundreds and thousands of employees, engineers, etc. Nationalisation of the oil industry could be effected *at once* by, and is imperative for, a revolutionary-democratic state, especially when the latter suffers from an acute crisis and when it is essential to economies national labour and to increase the output of fuel at all costs. It is clear that here bureaucratic control can achieve nothing, can change nothing, for the "oil barons" can cope with the

* These lines had been written when I learnt from the newspapers that the Kerensky government is introducing a sugar monopoly, and, of course, is introducing it in a reactionary-bureaucratic way, without congresses of workers and other employees, without publicity, and without curbing the capitalists!

Tereshchenkos, the Kerenskys, the Avksentyevs and the Skobelevs as easily as they coped with the tsar's ministers—by means of delays, excuses and promises, and by bribing the bourgeois press directly or indirectly (this is called "public opinion", and the Kerenskys and Avksentyevs "reckon" with it), by bribing officials (left by the Kerenskys and Avksentyevs in their old jobs in the old state machinery which remains intact).

If anything real is to be done bureaucracy must be abandoned for democracy, and in a truly revolutionary way, i.e., war must be declared on the oil barons and shareholders, the confiscation of their property and punishment by imprisonment must be decreed for delaying nationalisation of the oil business, for concealing incomes or accounts, for sabotaging production, and for failing to take steps to increase production. The initiative of the workers and other employees must be drawn on; *they* must be immediately summoned to conferences and congresses; a certain proportion of the profits must be assigned to *them*, provided they institute overall control and increase production. Had these revolutionary-democratic steps been taken at once, immediately, in April 1917, Russia, which is one of the richest countries in the world in deposits of liquid fuel, could, using water transport, have done a very great deal during this summer to supply the people with the necessary quantities of fuel.

Neither the bourgeois nor the coalition Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik-Cadet government has done anything at all. Both have confined themselves to a bureaucratic playing at reforms. They have not dared to take a single revolutionary-democratic step. Everything has remained as it was under the tsars—the oil barons, the stagnation, the hatred of the workers and other employees for their exploiters, the resulting chaos, and the dissipation of national labour—only the *letterheads* on the incoming and outgoing papers in the "republican" offices have been changed!

Take the coal industry. It is technically and culturally no less "ripe" for nationalisation, and is being no less shamelessly managed by the robbers of the people, the coal barons, and there are a number of most striking *facts* of direct sabotage, direct *damage* to and stoppage of production

by the industrialists. Even the ministerial *Rabochaya Gazeta* of the Mensheviks has admitted these facts. And what do we find? Absolutely nothing has been done, except to call the old, reactionary-bureaucratic meetings "on a half-and-half basis"—an equal number of workers and bandits from the coal syndicate! Not a single revolutionary-democratic step has been taken, not a shadow of an attempt has been made to establish the only control which is real—control from *below*, through the employees' union, through the workers, and by using terror against the coal industrialists who are ruining the country and bringing production to a standstill! How can this be done when we are "all" in favour of the "coalition"—if not with the Cadets, then with commercial and industrial circles. And coalition means leaving power in the hands of the capitalists, letting them go unpunished, allowing them to hamper affairs, to blame everything on the workers, to intensify the chaos and *thus* pave the way for a new Kornilov revolt!

ABOLITION OF COMMERCIAL SECRECY

Unless commercial secrecy is abolished, either control over production and distribution will remain an empty promise, only needed by the Cadets to fool the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to fool the working classes, or control can be exercised only by reactionary-bureaucratic methods and means. Although this is obvious to every unprejudiced person, and although *Pravda* persistently demanded the abolition of commercial secrecy* (and was suppressed largely for this reason by the Kerensky government which is subservient to capital), neither our republican government nor the "authorised bodies of revolutionary democracy" have even thought of this *first step* to real control.

This is the very key to all control. Here we have the most sensitive spot of capital, which is robbing the people and sabotaging production. And this is exactly why the

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* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 521-22, and this volume, pp. 140-41.—*Ed.*

Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are afraid to do anything about it.

The usual argument of the capitalists, one reiterated by the petty bourgeoisie without reflection, is that in a capitalist economy the abolition of commercial secrecy is in general absolutely impossible, for private ownership of the means of production, and the dependence of the individual undertakings on the market render essential the "sanctity" of commercial books and commercial operations, including, of course, banking operations.

Those who in one form or another repeat this or similar arguments allow themselves to be deceived and themselves deceive the people by shutting their eyes to two fundamental, highly important and generally known facts of modern economic activity. The first fact is the existence of large-scale capitalism, i.e., the peculiar features of the economic system of banks, syndicates, large factories, etc. The second fact is the war.

It is modern large-scale capitalism, which is everywhere becoming monopoly capitalism, that deprives commercial secrecy of every shadow of reasonableness, turns it into hypocrisy and into an instrument exclusively for concealing financial swindles and the fantastically high profits of big capital. Large-scale capitalist economy, by its very technical nature, is socialised economy, that is, it both operates for millions of people and, directly or indirectly, unites by its operations hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of families. It is not like the economy of the small handicraftsman or the middle peasant who keep no commercial books at all and who would therefore not be affected by the abolition of commercial secrecy!

As it is, the operations conducted in large-scale business are known to hundreds or more persons. Here the law protecting commercial secrecy does not serve the interests of production or exchange, but those of speculation and profit-seeking in their crudest form, and of direct fraud, which, as we know, in the case of joint-stock companies is particularly widespread and very skilfully concealed by reports and balance-sheets, so compiled as to deceive the public.

While commercial secrecy is unavoidable in small commodity production, i.e., among the small peasants and

handicraftsmen, where production itself is not socialised but scattered and disunited, in large-scale capitalist production, the protection of commercial secrecy means protection of the privileges and profits of literally a handful of people *against* the interest of the whole people. This has already been recognised by the law, inasmuch as provision is made for the publication of the accounts of joint-stock companies. But *this* control, which has already been introduced in all advanced countries, as well as in Russia, is a reactionary-bureaucratic control which does not open the eyes of the *people* and which *does not allow the whole truth* about the operations of joint-stock companies to become known.

To act in a revolutionary-democratic way, it would be necessary to immediately pass another law abolishing commercial secrecy, compelling the big undertakings and the wealthy to render the fullest possible accounts, and investing every group of citizens of substantial democratic numerical strength (1,000 or 10,000 voters, let us say) with the right to examine *all* the records of any large undertaking. Such a measure could be fully and easily effected by a simple decree. It *alone* would allow full scope for *popular* initiative in control, through the office employees' unions, the workers' unions and all the political parties, and it alone would make control effective and democratic.

Add to this the war. The vast majority of commercial and industrial establishments are now working not for the "free market", but *for the government*, for the war. This is why I have already stated in *Pravda* that people who counter us with the argument that socialism cannot be introduced are liars, and barefaced liars at that, because it is not a question of introducing socialism now, directly. overnight, but of *exposing plunder of the state*.*

Capitalist "war" economy (i.e., economy directly or indirectly connected with war contracts) is systematic and legalised *plunder*, and the Cadet gentry, who, together with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, are opposing the abolition of commercial secrecy, are nothing but *aiders and abettors of plunder*.

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* See pp. 68-69 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The war is now costing Russia fifty million rubles *a day*. These fifty million go mostly to army contractors. Of these fifty, at least five million *daily*, and probably ten million or more, constitute the "honest income" of the capitalists, and of the officials who are in one way or another in collusion with them. The very large firms and banks which lend money for war contracts transactions thereby make fantastic profits, and do so by plundering the state, for no other epithet can be applied to this defrauding and plundering of the people "on the occasion of" the hardships of war, "on the occasion of" the deaths of hundreds of thousands and millions of people.

"Everybody" knows about these scandalous profits made on war contracts, about the "letters of guarantee" which are concealed by the banks, about who benefits by the rising cost of living. They are smiled on in "society". Quite a number of precise references are made to them *even* in the bourgeois press, which as a general rule keeps silent about "unpleasant" facts and avoids "ticklish" questions. Everybody knows about them, yet everybody keeps silent, everybody tolerates them, everybody puts up with the government, which prates eloquently about "control" and "regulation"!!

The revolutionary democrats, were they real revolutionaries and democrats, would immediately pass a law abolishing commercial secrecy, compelling contractors and merchants to render accounts public, forbidding them to abandon their field of activity without the permission of the authorities, imposing the penalty of confiscation of property and shooting* for concealment and for deceiving the people, organising verification and control *from below*, democratically, by the people themselves, by unions of workers and other employees, consumers, etc.

Our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks fully deserve to be called scared democrats, for on this question

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* I have already had occasion to point out in the Bolshevik press that it is right to argue against the death penalty only when it is applied by the exploiters against the *mass* of the working people with the purpose of maintaining exploitation. (See pp. 265-68 of this volume.—*Ed.*) It is hardly likely that any revolutionary government whatever could do without applying the death penalty to the *exploiters* (i.e., the landowners and capitalists).

they repeat what is said by all the scared philistines, namely, that the capitalists will "run away" if "too severe" measures are adopted, that "we" shall be unable to get along without the capitalists, that the British and French millionaires, who are, of course, "supporting" us, will most likely be "offended" in their turn, and so on. It might be thought that the Bolsheviks were proposing something unknown to history, something that has never been tried before, something "utopian", while, as a matter of fact, even 125 years ago, in France, people who were real "revolutionary democrats", who were really convinced of the just and defensive character of the war they were waging, who really had popular support and were sincerely convinced of this, were able to establish *revolutionary* control over the rich and to achieve results which earned the admiration of the world. And in the century and a quarter that have since elapsed, the development of capitalism, which resulted in the creation of banks, syndicates, railways and so forth, has greatly facilitated and simplified the adoption of measures of really democratic control by the workers and peasants over the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists.

In point of fact, the whole question of control boils down to who controls whom, i.e., which class is in control and which is being controlled. In our country, in republican Russia, with the help of the "authorised bodies" of supposedly revolutionary democracy, it is the landowners and capitalists who are still recognised to be, and still are, the controllers. The inevitable result is the capitalist robbery that arouses universal indignation among the people, and the economic chaos that is being artificially kept up by the capitalists. We must resolutely and irrevocably, not fearing to break with the old, not fearing boldly to build the new, pass to control *over* the landowners and capitalists by the workers and peasants. And this is what our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks fear worse than the plague.

COMPULSORY ASSOCIATION

Compulsory syndication, i.e., compulsory association, of the industrialists, for example, is already being practised in Germany. Nor is there anything new in it. Here, too.

through the fault of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, we see the utter stagnation of republican Russia, whom these none-too-respectable parties "entertain" by dancing a quadrille with the Cadets, or with the Bublikovs, or with Tereshchenko and Kerensky.

Compulsory syndication is, on the one hand, a means whereby the state, as it were, expedites capitalist development, which everywhere leads to the organisation of the class struggle and to a growth in the number, variety and importance of unions. On the other hand, compulsory "unionisation" is an indispensable precondition for any kind of effective control and for all economy of national labour.

The German law, for instance, binds the leather manufacturers of a given locality or of the whole country to form an association, on the board of which there is a representative of the state for the purpose of control. A law of this kind does not directly, i.e., in itself, affect property relations in any way; it does not deprive any owner of a single kopek and does not predetermine whether the control is to be exercised in a reactionary-bureaucratic or a revolutionary-democratic form, direction or spirit.

Such laws can and should be passed in our country immediately, without wasting a single week of precious time; is should be left to *social conditions themselves* to determine the more specific forms of enforcing the law, the speed with which it is to be enforced, the methods of supervision over its enforcement, etc. In this case, the state requires no special machinery, no special investigation, nor preliminary enquiries for the passing of such a law. All that is required is the determination to break with certain private interests of the capitalists, who are "not accustomed" to such interference and have no desire to forfeit the super-profits which are ensured by the old methods of management and the absence of control.

No machinery and no "statistics" (which Chernov wanted to substitute for the revolutionary initiative of the peasants) are required to *pass* such a law, inasmuch as its implementation must be made the duty of the manufacturers or industrialists themselves, of the *available* public forces, under the control of the available public (i.e., non-govern-

ment, non-bureaucratic) forces too, which, however, must consist by all means of the so-called "lower estates", i.e., of the oppressed and exploited classes, which in history have always proved to be immensely *superior* to the exploiters in their capacity for heroism, self-sacrifice and comradely discipline.

Let us assume that we have a really revolutionary-democratic government and that it decides that the manufacturers and industrialists in every branch of production who employ, let us say, not less than two workers shall immediately amalgamate into uyezd and gubernia associations. Responsibility for the strict observance of the law is laid in the first place on the manufacturers, directors, board members, and big shareholders (for they are the real leaders of modern industry, its real masters). They shall be regarded as deserters from military service, and punished as such, if they do not work for the immediate implementation of the law, and shall bear mutual responsibility, one answering for all, and all for one, with the whole of their property. Responsibility shall next be laid on all office employees, who shall also form *one* union, and on all workers and their trade union. The purpose of "unionisation" is to institute the fullest, strictest and most detailed accountancy, but chiefly to *combine operations* in the purchase of raw materials, the sale of products, and the *economy* of national funds and forces. When the separate establishments are amalgamated into a single syndicate, this economy can attain tremendous proportions, as economic science teaches us and as is shown by the example of all syndicates, cartels and trusts. And it must be repeated that this unionisation will not in itself alter property relations one iota and will not deprive any owner of a single kopek. This circumstance must be strongly stressed, for the bourgeois press constantly "frightens" small and medium proprietors by asserting that socialists in general, and the Bolsheviks in particular, want to "expropriate" them—a deliberately false assertion, as socialists do not intend to, cannot and will not expropriate the small peasant *even if there is a fully socialist* revolution. All the time we are speaking *only* of the immediate and urgent measures, which have already been introduced in Western Europe and which a democracy

that is at all consistent ought to introduce immediately in our country to combat the impending and inevitable catastrophe.

Serious difficulties, both technical and cultural, would be encountered in amalgamating the small and very small proprietors into associations, owing to the extremely small proportions and technical primitiveness of their enterprises and the illiteracy or lack of education of the owners.. But precisely such enterprises could be exempted from the law (as was pointed out above in our hypothetical example). Their non-amalgamation, let alone their belated amalgamation, could create no serious obstacle, for the part played by the huge number of small enterprises in the sum total of production and their importance to the economy as a whole are *negligible*, and, moreover, they are often in one way or another dependent on the big enterprises.

Only the big enterprises are of decisive importance; and here the technical and cultural means and forces for "unionisation" *do exist*; what is lacking is the firm, determined initiative of a *revolutionary* government which should be ruthlessly severe towards the exploiters to set these forces and means in motion.

The poorer a country is in technically trained forces, and in intellectual forces generally, the more *urgent* it is to decree compulsory association as early and as resolutely as possible and to begin with the bigger and biggest enterprises when putting the decree into effect, for it is association that will *economise* intellectual forces and make it possible to use them *to the full* and to distribute them more correctly. If, after 1905, even the Russian peasants in their out-of-the-way districts, under the tsarist government, in face of the thousands of obstacles raised by that government, were able to make a tremendous forward stride in the creation of all kinds of associations, it is clear that the amalgamation of large- and medium-scale industry and trade could be effected in several months, if not earlier, provided compulsion to this end were exercised by a really revolutionary-democratic government relying on the support, participation, interest and advantage of the "lower ranks", the democracy, the workers and other employees, and calling upon *them* to exercise control.

REGULATION OF CONSUMPTION

The war has compelled all the belligerent and many of the neutral countries to resort to the regulation of consumption. Bread cards have been issued and have become customary, and this has led to the appearance of other ration cards. Russia is no exception and has also introduced bread cards.

Using this as an example, we can draw, perhaps, the most striking comparison of all between reactionary-bureaucratic methods of combating a catastrophe, which are confined to minimum reforms, and revolutionary-democratic methods, which, to justify their name, must directly aim at a violent rupture with the old, obsolete system and at the achievement of the speediest possible progress.

The bread card—this typical example of how consumption is regulated in modern capitalist countries—aims at, and achieves (at best), one thing only, namely, distributing available supplies of grain to give everybody his share. A maximum limit to consumption is established, not for all foodstuffs by far, but only for principal foodstuffs, those of "popular" consumption. And that is all. There is no intention of doing anything else. Available supplies of grain are calculated in a bureaucratic way, then divided on a per capita basis, a ration is fixed and introduced, and there the matter ends. Luxury articles are not affected, for they are "anyway" scarce and "anyway" so dear as to be beyond the reach of the "people". And so, in *all* the belligerent countries without exception, *even* in Germany, which evidently, without fear of contradiction, may be said to be a model of the most careful, pedantic and strict regulation of consumption—*even* in Germany we find that the rich constantly *get around* all "rationing". This, too, "everybody" knows and "everybody" talks about with a smile; and in the German socialist papers, and sometimes even in the bourgeois papers, despite the fierce military stringency of the German censorship, we constantly find items and reports about the "menus" of the rich, saying how the wealthy can obtain white bread in any quantity at a certain health resort (visited, on the plea of illness, by everybody who has plenty of money), and how the wealthy substitute choice

and rare articles of luxury for articles of popular consumption.

A reactionary capitalist state which *fears* to undermine the pillars of capitalism, of wage slavery, of the economic supremacy of the rich, which *fears* to encourage the initiative of the workers and the working people generally, which *fears* to provoke them to a more exacting attitude—*such* a state will be quite content with bread cards. Such a state does not for a moment, in any measure it adopts, lose sight of the *reactionary* aim of strengthening capitalism, preventing its being undermined, and confining the "regulation of economic life" in general, and the regulation of consumption in particular, to such measures as are absolutely essential to feed the people, *and makes no attempt* whatsoever at real regulation of consumption by exercising *control over the rich* and laying the *greater part* of the burden in war-time on those who are better off, who are privileged, well fed and overfed in peace-time.

The reactionary-bureaucratic solution to the problem with which the war has confronted the peoples confines itself to bread cards, to the equal distribution of "popular" foodstuffs, of those absolutely essential to feed the people, without retreating one little bit from bureaucratic and reactionary ideas, that is, from the aim of *not* encouraging the initiative of the poor, the proletariat, the mass of the people ("demos"), of *not* allowing *them* to exercise control over the rich, and of leaving *as many* loopholes *as possible* for the rich to compensate themselves with articles of luxury. And a great number of loopholes are left in *all* countries, we repeat, even in Germany—not to speak of Russia; the "common people" starve while the rich visit health resorts, supplement the meagre official ration by all sorts of "extras" obtained on the side, and do *not* allow *themselves* to be controlled.

In Russia, which has only just made a revolution against the tsarist regime in the name of liberty and equality, in Russia, which, as far as its actual political institutions are concerned, has at once become a democratic republic, what particularly strikes the people, what particularly arouses popular discontent, irritation, anger and indignation is that *everybody* sees the easy way in which the wealthy get

around the bread cards. They do it very easily indeed. "From under the counter", and for a very high price, especially if one has "*pull*" (which only the rich have), one can obtain anything, and in large quantities, too. It is the people who are starving. The regulation of consumption is confined within the narrowest bureaucratic-reactionary limits. The government has not the slightest intention of putting regulation on a really revolutionary-democratic footing, is not in the least concerned about doing so.

"Everybody" is suffering from the queues but—but the rich send their servants to stand in the queues, and even engage special servants for the purpose! And that is "democracy"!

At a time when the country is suffering untold calamities, a revolutionary-democratic policy would not confine itself to bread cards to combat the impending catastrophe but would add, firstly, the compulsory organisation of the whole population in consumers' societies, for otherwise control over consumption cannot be fully exercised; secondly, labour service for the rich, making them perform without pay secretarial and similar duties for these consumers' societies; thirdly, the equal distribution among the population of absolutely all consumer goods, so as really to distribute the burdens of the war equitably; fourthly, the organisation of control in such a way as to have the poorer classes of the population exercise control over the consumption of the rich.

The establishment of real democracy in this sphere and the display of a real revolutionary spirit in the organisation of control by the most needy classes of the people would be a very great stimulus to the employment of all available intellectual forces and to the development of the truly revolutionary energies of the entire people. Yet now the ministers of republican and revolutionary-democratic Russia, exactly like their colleagues in all other imperialist countries, make pompous speeches about "working in common for the good of the people" and about "exerting every effort", but the people see, feel and sense the hypocrisy of this talk.

The result is that no progress is being made, chaos is spreading irresistibly, and a catastrophe is approaching, for our government cannot introduce war-time penal servi-

tude for the workers in the Kornilov, Hindenburg, general imperialist way—the traditions, memories, vestiges, habits and institutions of the *revolution* are still too much alive among the people; our government does not want to take any really serious steps in a revolutionary-democratic direction, for it is thoroughly infected and thoroughly enmeshed by its dependence on the bourgeoisie, its "coalition" with the bourgeoisie, and its fear to encroach on their real privileges.

GOVERNMENT DISRUPTION OF THE WORK OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

We have examined various ways and means of combating catastrophe and famine. We have seen everywhere that the contradictions between the democrats, on the one hand, and the government and the bloc of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks which is supporting it, on the other, are irreconcilable. To prove that these contradictions exist in reality, and not merely in our exposition, and that their irreconcilability is *actually* borne out by conflicts affecting the people as a whole, we have only to recall two very typical "results" and lessons of the six months' history of our revolution.

The history of the "reign" of Palchinsky is one lesson. The history of the "reign" and fall of Peshekhonov is the other.

The measures to combat catastrophe and hunger described above boil down to the all-round encouragement (even to the extent of compulsion) of "unionisation" of the population, and primarily the democrats, i.e., the majority of the population, or, above all, the oppressed classes, the workers and peasants, especially the poor peasants. And this is the path which the population itself spontaneously began to adopt in order to cope with the unparalleled difficulties, burdens and hardships of the war.

Tsarism did everything to hamper the free and independent "unionisation" of the population. But after the fall of the tsarist monarchy, democratic organisations began to spring up and grow rapidly all over Russia. The struggle against the catastrophe began to be waged by spontaneously

arising democratic organisations—by all sorts of committees of supply, food committees, fuel councils, and so on and so forth.

And the most remarkable thing in the whole six months' history of our revolution, as far as the question we are examining is concerned, is that a *government* which calls itself republican and revolutionary, and which is *supported* by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the name of the "authorised bodies of revolutionary democracy", *fought* the democratic organisations and *defeated them*!!

By this fight, Palchinsky earned extremely wide and very sad notoriety all over Russia. He acted behind the government's back, without coming out publicly (just as the Cadets generally preferred to act, willingly pushing forward Tsereteli "for the people", while they themselves arranged all the important business on the quiet). Palchinsky hampered and thwarted every serious measure taken by the spontaneously created democratic organisations, for no serious measure could be taken without "injuring" the excessive profits and wilfulness of the Kit Kityches. And Palchinsky was in fact a loyal defender and servant of the Kit Kityches. Palchinsky went so far—and this fact was reported in the newspapers—as simply to *annul* the orders, of the spontaneously created democratic organisations!

The whole history of Palchinsky's "reign"—and he "reigned" for many months, and just when Tsereteli, Skobelev and Chernov were "ministers"—was a monstrous scandal from beginning to end; the will of the people and the decisions of the democrats were frustrated to *please* the capitalists and meet their filthy greed. Of course, only a negligible part of Palchinsky's "feats" could find its way into the press, and a full investigation of the manner in which he *hindered* the struggle against famine can be made only by a truly democratic government of the proletariat when it gains power and submits all the actions of Palchinsky and his like, without concealing anything, *to the judgement* of the people.

It will perhaps be argued that Palchinsky was an exception, and that after all he was removed. But the fact is that Palchinsky was not the exception but the *rule*, that the situation has in no way improved with his removal, that

his place has been taken by the same kind of Palchinskys with different names, and that all the "*influence*" of the capitalists, and the entire policy of *frustrating the struggle against hunger to please the capitalists*, has remained intact. For Kerensky and Co. are only a screen for defence of the interests of the capitalists.

The most striking proof of this is the resignation of Peshekhonov, the Food Minister. As we know, Peshekhonov is a very, very moderate Narodnik. But in the organisation of food supply he wanted to work honestly, in contact with and supported by the democratic organisations. The *experience* of Peshekhonov's work and his *resignation* are all the more interesting because this extremely moderate Narodnik, this member of the Popular Socialist Party, who was ready to accept any compromise with the bourgeoisie, was nevertheless compelled to resign! For the Kerensky government, to please the capitalists, landowners and kulaks, had *raised* the fixed prices of grain!

This is how M. Smith describes this "step" and its significance in the newspaper *Svobodnaya Zhizn*[119] No. 1, of September 2:

> "Several days before the government decided to raise the fixed prices, the following scene was enacted in the national Food Committee: Rolovich, a Right-winger, a stubborn defender of the interests of private trade and a ruthless opponent of the grain monopoly and state interference in economic affairs, publicly announced with a smug smile that he understood the fixed grain prices would shortly be raised.
>
> "The representative of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies replied by declaring that he knew nothing of the kind, that as long as the revolution in Russia lasted such an act could not take place, and that at any rate the government could not take such a step without first consulting the authorised democratic bodies—the Economic Council and the national Food Committee. This statement was supported by the representative of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies.
>
> "But, alas, reality introduced a very harsh amendment to this counter-version! It was the representative of the wealthy elements and not the representatives of the democrats who turned out to be right. He proved to be excellently informed of the preparations for an attack on democratic rights, although the democratic representatives indignantly denied the very possibility of such an attack."

And so, both the representative of the workers and the representative of the peasants explicitly state their opinion in the name of the vast majority of the people, yet the

Kerensky government acts contrary to that opinion, in the interests of the capitalists!

Rolovich, a representative of the capitalists, turned out to be excellently informed behind the backs of the democrats—just as we have always observed, and now observe, that the bourgeois newspapers, *Rech* and *Birzhevka*, are best informed of the doings in the Kerensky government.

What does this possession of excellent information show? Obviously, that the capitalists have their "channels" and *virtually* hold power in their own hands. Kerensky is a figurehead which they use as and when they find necessary. The interests of tens of millions of workers and peasants turn out to have been sacrificed to the profits of a handful of the rich.

And how do our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks react to this outrage to the people? Did they address an appeal to the workers and peasants, saying that after this, prison was the only place for Kerensky and his colleagues?

God forbid! The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, through their Economic Department, confined themselves to adopting the impressive resolution to which we have already referred! In this resolution they declare that the raising of grain prices by the Kerensky government is "a *ruinous* measure which deals a *severe blow* both at the food supply and at the whole economic life of the country", and that these ruinous measures have been taken in direct "*violation*" of the law!!

Such are the results of the policy of compromise, of flirting with Kerensky and desiring to "spare" him!

The government violates the law by adopting, in the interests, of the rich, the landowners and capitalists, a measure which *ruins* the whole business of control, food supply and the stabilisation of the extremely shaky finances, yet the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks continue to talk about an understanding with commercial and industrial circles, continue to attend conferences with Tereshchenko and to spare Kerensky, and confine themselves to a paper resolution of protest, which the government very calmly pigeonholes!!

This reveals with great clarity the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have betrayed the people and the revolution, and that the Bolsheviks are becoming the real leaders of the masses, *even* of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik masses.

For only the winning of power by the proletariat, headed by the Bolshevik Party, can put an end to the outrageous actions of Kerensky and Co. and *restore* the work of democratic food distribution, supply and other organisations, which Kerensky and his government are *frustrating*.

The Bolsheviks are acting—and this can be very clearly seen from the above example—as the representatives of the interests of the *whole* people, which are to ensure food distribution and supply and meet the most urgent needs of the workers *and peasants*, despite the vacillating, irresolute and truly treacherous policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, a policy which has brought the country to an act as shameful as this raising of grain prices!

FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND MEASURES TO COMBAT IT

There is another side to the problem of raising the fixed grain prices. This raising of prices involves a new chaotic increase in the issuing of paper money, a further increase in the cost of living, increased financial disorganisation and the approach of financial collapse. Everybody admits that the issuing of paper money constitutes the worst form of compulsory loan, that it most of all affects the conditions of the workers, of the poorest section of the population, and that it is the chief evil engendered by financial disorder.

And it is to this measure that the Kerensky government, supported by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, is resorting!

There is no way of effectively combating financial disorganisation and inevitable financial collapse except that of revolutionary rupture with the interests of capital and that of the organisation of really democratic control, i.e., control from "below", control by the workers and the poor peasants *over* the capitalists, a way to which we referred throughout the earlier part of this exposition.

Large issues of paper money encourage profiteering, enable the capitalists to make millions of rubles, and place tremendous difficulties in the way of a very necessary expansion of production, for the already high cost of materials, machinery, etc., is rising further by leaps and bounds. What can be done about it when the wealth acquired by the rich through profiteering is being concealed?

An income tax with progressive and very high rates for larger and very large incomes might be introduced. Our government has introduced one, following the example of other imperialist governments. But it is largely a fiction, a dead letter, for, firstly, the value of money is falling faster and faster, and, secondly, the more incomes are derived from profiteering and the more securely commercial secrecy is maintained, the greater their concealment.

Real and not nominal control is required to make the tax real and not fictitious. But control over the capitalists is impossible if it remains bureaucratic, for the bureaucracy is itself bound to and interwoven with the bourgeoisie by thousands of threads. That is why in the West-European imperialist states, monarchies and republics alike, financial order is obtained solely by the introduction of "labour service", which creates *war-time penal servitude* or *war-time slavery* for the workers.

Reactionary-bureaucratic control is the only method known to imperialist states—not excluding the democratic republics of France and America—of foisting the burdens of the war on to the proletariat and the working people.

The basic contradiction in the policy of our government is that, in order not to quarrel with the bourgeoisie, not to destroy the "coalition" with them, the government has to introduce reactionary-bureaucratic control, which it calls "revolutionary-democratic" control, deceiving the people at every step and irritating and angering the masses who have just overthrown tsarism.

Yet only revolutionary-democratic measures, only the organisation of the oppressed classes, the workers and peasants, the masses, into unions would make it possible to establish a most effective control *over the rich* and wage a most successful fight against the concealment of incomes.

An attempt is being made to encourage the use of cheques

as a means of avoiding excessive issue of paper money. This measure is of no significance as far as the poor are concerned, for anyway they live from hand to mouth, complete their "economic cycle" in one week and return to the capitalists the few meagre coppers they manage to earn. The use of cheques might have great significance as far as the rich are concerned. It would enable the state, especially in conjunction with such measures as nationalisation of the banks and abolition of commercial secrecy, *really to control* the incomes of the capitalists, really to impose taxation on them, and really to "democratise" (and at the same time bring order into) the financial system.

But this is hampered by the fear of infringing the privileges of the bourgeoisie and destroying the "coalition" with them. For unless truly revolutionary measures are adopted and compulsion is very seriously resorted to, the capitalists will not submit to any control, will not make known their budgets, and will not surrender their stocks of paper money for the democratic state to "keep account" of.

The workers and peasants, organised in unions, by nationalising the banks, making the use of cheques legally compulsory for all rich persons, abolishing commercial secrecy, imposing confiscation of property as a penalty for concealment of incomes, etc., might with extreme ease make control both effective and universal—control, that is, over the rich, and such control as would *secure the return* of paper money *from those* who have it, *from those* who conceal it, *to the treasury*, which issues it.

This requires a revolutionary dictatorship of the democracy, headed by the revolutionary proletariat; that is, it requires that the democracy should become revolutionary *in fact*. That is the crux of the matter. But that is just what is not wanted by our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are deceiving the people by displaying the *flag* of "revolutionary democracy" while they are in fact supporting the reactionary-bureaucratic policy of the bourgeoisie, who, as always, are guided by the rule: "*Après nous le déluge*"—after us the deluge!

We usually do not even notice how thoroughly we are permeated by anti-democratic habits and prejudices regarding the "sanctity" of bourgeois property. When an

engineer or banker publishes the income and expenditure of a worker, information about his wages and the productivity of his labour, this is regarded as absolutely legitimate and fair. Nobody thinks of seeing it as an intrusion into the "private life" of the worker, as "spying or informing" on the part of the engineer. Bourgeois society regards the labour and earnings of a wage-worker as *its* open book, any bourgeois being entitled to peer into it at any moment, and at any moment to expose the "luxurious living" of the worker, his supposed "laziness", etc.

Well, and what about reverse control? What if the unions of employees, clerks and *domestic servants* were invited by a *democratic* state to verify the income and expenditure of capitalists, to publish information on the subject and to assist the government in combating concealment of incomes?

What a furious howl against "spying" and "informing" would be raised by the bourgeoisie! When "masters" control servants, or when capitalists control workers, this is considered to be in the nature of things; the private life of the working and exploited people is *not* considered inviolable. The bourgeoisie are entitled to call to account any "wage slave" and at any time to make public his income and expenditure. But if the oppressed attempt to control the oppressor, to show up *his* income and expenditure, to expose *his* luxurious living even in war-time, when his luxurious living is directly responsible for armies at the front starving and perishing—oh, no, the bourgeoisie will not tolerate "spying" and "informing"!

It all boils down to the same thing: the rule of the bourgeoisie *is irreconcilable* with truly-revolutionary true democracy. We cannot be revolutionary democrats in the twentieth century and in a capitalist country *if we fear* to advance towards socialism.

CAN WE GO FORWARD IF WE FEAR TO ADVANCE TOWARDS SOCIALISM?

What has been said so far may easily arouse the following objection on the part of a reader who has been brought up on the current opportunist ideas of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Most measures described here,

he may say, are *already* in effect socialist and not democratic measures!

This current objection, one that is usually raised (in one form or another) in the bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press, is a reactionary defence of backward capitalism, a defence decked out in a Struvean garb. It seems to say that we are not ripe for socialism, that it is too early to "introduce" socialism, that our revolution is a bourgeois revolution and therefore we must be the menials of the bourgeoisie (although the great bourgeois revolutionaries in France 125 years ago made their revolution a great revolution by exercising *terror* against all oppressors, landowners and capitalists alike!).

The pseudo-Marxist lackeys of the bourgeoisie, who have been joined by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and who argue in this way, do not understand (as an examination of the theoretical basis of their opinion shows) what imperialism is, what capitalist monopoly is, what the state is, and what revolutionary democracy is. For anyone who understands this is bound to admit that there can be no advance except towards socialism.

Everybody talks about imperialism. But imperialism is merely monopoly capitalism.

That capitalism in Russia has also become monopoly capitalism is sufficiently attested by the examples of the Produgol, the Prodamet, the Sugar Syndicate, etc. This Sugar Syndicate is an object-lesson in the way monopoly capitalism develops into state-monopoly capitalism.

And what is the state? It is an organisation of the ruling class—in Germany, for instance, of the Junkers and capitalists. And therefore what the German Plekhanovs (Scheidemann, Lensch, and others) call "war-time socialism" is in fact war-time state-monopoly capitalism, or, to put it more simply and clearly, war-time penal servitude for the workers and war-time protection for capitalist profits.

Now try to *substitute* for the Junker-capitalist state, for the landowner-capitalist state, a *revolutionary-democratic* state, i.e., a state which in a revolutionary way abolishes *all* privileges and does not fear to introduce the fullest democracy in a revolutionary way. You will find that, given a really revolutionary-democratic state, state-

monopoly capitalism inevitably and unavoidably implies a step, and more than one step, towards socialism!

For if a huge capitalist undertaking becomes a monopoly, it means that it serves the whole nation. If it has become a state monopoly, it means that the state (i.e., the armed organisation of the population, the workers and peasants above all, provided there is *revolutionary* democracy) directs the whole undertaking. In whose interest?

Either in the interest of the landowners and capitalists, in which case we have not a revolutionary-democratic, but a reactionary-bureaucratic state, an imperialist republic.

Or in the interest of revolutionary democracy—and then *it is a step towards socialism.*

For socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly. Or, in other words, socialism is merely state-capitalist monopoly *which is made to serve the interests of the whole people* and has to that extent ceased to be capitalist monopoly.

There is no middle course here. The objective process of development is such that it is *impossible* to advance from *monopolies* (and the war has magnified their number, role and importance tenfold) without advancing towards socialism.

Either we have to be revolutionary democrats in fact, in which case we must not fear to take steps towards socialism. Or we fear to take steps towards socialism, condemn them in the Plekhanov, Dan or Chernov way, by arguing that our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, that socialism cannot be "introduced", etc., in which case we inevitably sink to the level of Kerensky, Milyukov and Kornilov, i.e., we in a *reactionary-bureaucratic* way suppress the "revolutionary-democratic" aspirations of the workers and peasants.

There is no middle course.

And therein lies the fundamental contradiction of our revolution.

It is impossible to stand still in history in general, and in war-time in particular. We must either advance or retreat. It is *impossible* in twentieth-century Russia, which has won a republic and democracy in a revolutionary way, to go forward without *advancing* towards socialism, without taking *steps* towards it (steps conditioned and determined

by the level of technology and culture: large-scale machine production cannot be "introduced" in peasant agriculture nor abolished in the sugar industry).

But to fear to advance *means* retreating—which the Kerenskys, to the delight of the Milyukovs and Plekhanovs, and with the foolish assistance of the Tseretelis and Chernovs, are actually doing.

The dialectics of history is such that the war, by extraordinarily expediting the transformation of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism, has *thereby* extraordinarily advanced mankind towards socialism.

Imperialist war is the eve of socialist revolution. And this not only because the horrors of the war give rise to proletarian revolt—no revolt can bring about socialism unless the economic conditions for socialism are ripe—but because state-monopoly capitalism is a complete *material* preparation for socialism, the *threshold* of socialism, a rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism *there are no intermediate rungs*.

* * *

Our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks approach the question of socialism in a doctrinaire way, from the standpoint of a doctrine learnt by heart but poorly understood. They picture socialism as some remote, unknown and dim future.

But socialism is now gazing at us from all the windows of modern capitalism; socialism is outlined directly, *practically*, by every important measure that constitutes a forward step on the basis of this modern capitalism.

What is universal labour conscription?

It is a step forward on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism, a step towards the regulation of economic life as a whole, in accordance with a certain general plan, a step towards the economy of national labour and towards the prevention of its senseless wastage by capitalism.

In Germany it is the Junkers (landowners) and capitalists who are introducing universal labour conscription, and therefore it inevitably becomes war-time penal servitude for the workers.

But take the same institution and think over its significance in a revolutionary-democratic state. Universal labour conscription, introduced, regulated and directed by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, will *still not* be socialism, but it will *no longer* be capitalism. It will be a tremendous *step towards* socialism, a step from which, if complete democracy is preserved, there can no longer be any retreat back to capitalism, without unparalleled violence being committed against the masses.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ECONOMIC CHAOS—AND THE WAR

A consideration of the measures to avert the impending catastrophe brings us to another supremely important question, namely, the connection between home and foreign policy, or, in other words, the relation between a war of conquest, an imperialist war, and a revolutionary, proletarian war, between a criminal predatory war and a just democratic war.

All the measures to avert catastrophe we have described would, as we have already stated, greatly enhance the defence potential, or, in other words, the military might of the country. That, on the one hand. On the other hand, these measures cannot be put into effect without turning the war of conquest into a just war, turning the war waged by the capitalists in the interests of the capitalists into a war waged by the proletariat in the interests of all the working and exploited people.

And, indeed, nationalisation of the banks and syndicates, taken in conjunction with the abolition of commercial secrecy and the establishment of workers' control over the capitalists, would not only imply a tremendous saving of national labour, the possibility of economising forces and means, but would also imply an improvement in the conditions of the working *masses*, of the majority of the population. As everybody knows, economic organisation is of decisive importance in modern warfare. Russia has enough grain, coal, oil and iron; in this respect, we are in a better position than any of the belligerent European countries. And given a struggle against economic chaos

by the measures indicated above, enlisting popular initiative in this struggle, improving the people's conditions, and nationalising the banks and syndicates, Russia could use her revolution and her democracy to raise the whole country to an incomparably higher level of economic organisation.

If instead of the "coalition" with the bourgeoisie, which is hampering every measure of control and sabotaging production, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had in April effected the transfer of power to the Soviets and had directed their efforts not to playing at "ministerial leapfrog", not to bureaucratically occupying, side by side with the Cadets, ministerial, deputy-ministerial and similar posts, but to guiding the workers and peasants in *their* control *over* the capitalists, in their *war against* the capitalists, Russia would now be a country completely transformed economically, with the land in the hands of the peasants, and with the banks nationalised, i.e., would *to that extent* (and these are extremely important economic bases of modern life) be *superior* to all other capitalist countries.

The defence potential, the military might, of a country whose banks have been nationalised is *superior* to that of a country whose banks remain in private hands. The military might of a peasant country whose land is in the hands of peasant committees is *superior* to that of a country whose land is in the hands of landowners.

Reference is constantly being made to the heroic patriotism and the miracles of military valour performed by the French in 1792-93. But the material, historical economic conditions which alone made such miracles possible are forgotten. The suppression of obsolete feudalism in a really revolutionary way, and the introduction throughout the country of a superior mode of production and free peasant land tenure, effected, moreover, with truly revolutionary-democratic speed, determination, energy and devotion—such were the material, economic conditions which with "miraculous" speed saved France by *regenerating* and *renovating* her economic foundation.

The example of France shows one thing, and one thing only, namely, that to render Russia capable of self-defence, to obtain in Russia, too, "miracles" of mass heroism,

FROM MARX TO MAO
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all that is obsolete must be swept away with "Jacobin" ruthlessness and Russia renovated and regenerated *economically*. And in the twentieth century this cannot be done merely by sweeping tsarism away (France did not confine herself to this 125 years ago). It cannot be done even by the mere revolutionary abolition of the landed estates (we have not even done that, for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have betrayed the peasants), by the mere transfer of the land to the peasants. For we are living in the twentieth century, and mastery over the land *without mastery over the banks* cannot regenerate and renovate the life of the people.

The material, industrial renovation of France at the end of the eighteenth century was associated with a political and spiritual renovation, with the dictatorship of revolutionary democrats and the revolutionary proletariat (from which the democrats had not dissociated themselves and with which they were still almost fused), and with a ruthless war declared on everything reactionary. The whole people, and especially the masses, i.e., the *oppressed* classes, were swept up by boundless revolutionary enthusiasm; *everybody* considered the war a just war of defence, as it *actually was*. Revolutionary France was defending herself against reactionary monarchist Europe. It was not in 1792-93, but many years later, *after* the victory of reaction within the country, that the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of Napoleon turned France's wars from defensive wars into wars of conquest.

And what about Russia? We continue to wage an imperialist war in the interests of the capitalists, in alliance with the imperialists and in accordance with the secret treaties the *tsar* concluded with the capitalists of Britain and other countries, promising the Russian capitalists in these treaties the spoliation of foreign lands, of Constantinople, Lvov, Armenia, etc.

The war will remain an unjust, reactionary and predatory war on Russia's part as long as she does not propose a just peace and does not break with imperialism. The social character of the war, its true meaning, is not determined by the position of the enemy troops (as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks think, stooping to the vul-

garity of an ignorant yokel). What determines this character is the *policy* of which the war is a continuation ("war is the continuation of politics"), the *class* that is waging the war, and the aims for which it is waging this war.

You cannot lead the people into a predatory war in accordance with secret treaties and expect them to be enthusiastic. The foremost class in revolutionary Russia, the proletariat, is becoming increasingly aware of the criminal character of the war, and not only have the bourgeoisie been unable to shatter this popular conviction, but, on the contrary, awareness of the criminal character of the war is growing. The proletariat *of both metropolitan cities* of Russia has definitely become internationalist!

How, then, can you expect mass enthusiasm for the war!

One is inseparable from the other—home policy is inseparable from foreign policy. The country cannot be made capable of self-defence without the supreme heroism of the people in boldly and resolutely carrying out great economic transformations. And it is impossible to arouse popular heroism without breaking with imperialism, without proposing a democratic peace to all nations, and without thus turning the war from a criminal war of conquest and plunder into a just, revolutionary war of defence.

Only a thorough and consistent break with the capitalists in both home and foreign policy can save our revolution and our country, which is gripped in the iron vice of imperialism.

THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT

To be really revolutionary, the democrats of Russia today must march in very close alliance with the proletariat, supporting it in its struggle as the only thoroughly revolutionary class.

Such is the conclusion prompted by an analysis of the means of combating an impending catastrophe of unparalleled dimensions.

The war has created such an immense crisis, has so strained the material and moral forces of the people, has dealt such blows at the entire modern social organisation that humanity must now choose between perishing or entrusting

its fate to the most revolutionary class for the swiftest and most radical transition to a superior mode of production.

Owing to a number of historical causes—the greater backwardness of Russia, the unusual hardships brought upon her by the war, the utter rottenness of tsarism and the extreme tenacity of the traditions of 1905—the revolution broke out in Russia earlier than in other countries. The revolution has resulted in Russia catching up with the advanced countries in a few months, as far as her *political* system is concerned.

But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*.

That is possible, for we have before us the experience of a large number of advanced countries, the fruits of their technology and culture. We are receiving moral support from the war protest that is growing in Europe, from the atmosphere of the mounting world-wide workers' revolution. We are being inspired and encouraged by a revolutionary-democratic freedom which is extremely rare in time of imperialist war.

Perish or forge full steam ahead. That is the alternative put by history.

And the attitude of the proletariat to the peasants in such a situation confirms the old Bolshevik concept, correspondingly modifying it, that the peasants must be wrested from the influence of the bourgeoisie. That is the sole guarantee of salvation for the revolution.

And the peasants are the most numerous section of the entire petty-bourgeois mass.

Our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have assumed the reactionary function of keeping the peasants under the influence of the bourgeoisie and leading them to a coalition with the bourgeoisie, and not with the proletariat.

The masses are learning rapidly from the experience of the revolution. And the reactionary policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks is meeting with failure: they have been beaten in the Soviets of both Petrograd and Moscow.[120] A "Left" opposition is growing in both petty-

bourgeois-democratic parties. On September 10, 1917, a city conference of the Socialist-Revolutionaries held in Petrograd gave a two-thirds majority to the *Left* Socialist-Revolutionaries, who incline towards an alliance with the proletariat and reject an alliance (coalition) with the bourgeoisie.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks repeat a favourite bourgeois comparison—bourgeoisie and democracy. But, in essence, such a comparison is as meaningless as comparing pounds with yards.

There is such a thing as a democratic bourgeoisie, and there is such a thing as bourgeois democracy; one would have to be completely ignorant of both history and political economy to deny this.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks needed a false comparison to *conceal* the indisputable fact that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat stand the *petty bourgeoisie*. By virtue of their economic class status, the latter inevitably vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are trying to draw the petty bourgeoisie into an alliance with the bourgeoisie. That is the whole meaning of their "coalition", of the coalition cabinet, and of the whole policy of Kerensky, a typical semi-Cadet. In the six months of the revolution this policy has suffered a complete fiasco.

The Cadets are full of malicious glee. The revolution, they say, has suffered a fiasco; the revolution has been *unable* to cope either with the war or with economic dislocation.

That is not true. It is the *Cadets*, and the *Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks* who have suffered a fiasco, for this alliance has ruled Russia for six months, only to increase economic dislocation and confuse and aggravate the military situation.

The more complete the fiasco of the *alliance* of the bourgeoisie and the *Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks*, the sooner the people will *learn their lesson* and the more easily they will find the *correct* way out, namely, the alliance of the peasant poor, i.e., the majority of the peasants, and the proletariat.

September 10-14, 1917

ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION

The key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power. Which class holds power decides everything. When *Dyelo Naroda*, the paper of the chief governing party in Russia, recently complained (No. 147) that, owing to the controversies over power, both the question of the Constituent Assembly and that of bread are being forgotten, the Socialist-Revolutionaries should have been answered, "Blame yourselves. For it is the wavering and indecision of *your* party that are mostly to blame for 'ministerial leapfrog', the interminable postponements of the Constituent Assembly, and the undermining by the capitalists of the planned and agreed measures of a grain monopoly and of providing the country with bread."

The question of power cannot be evaded or brushed aside, because it is the key question determining *everything* in a revolution's development, and in its foreign and domestic policies. It is an undisputed fact that our revolution has "wasted" six months in wavering over the system of power; it is a fact resulting from the wavering policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In the long run, these parties' wavering policy was determined by the class position of the petty bourgeoisie, by their economic instability in the struggle between capital and labour.

The whole issue at present is whether the petty-bourgeois democrats have learned anything during these great, exceptionally eventful six months. If not, then the revolution is lost, and only a victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If they have learned something, the establishment of a stable, unwavering power must be begun immediately.

Only if power is based, obviously and unconditionally, *on a majority* of the population can it be stable during a popular revolution, i.e., a revolution which rouses the people, the majority of the workers and peasants, to action. Up to now state power in Russia has *virtually* remained in the hands of the *bourgeoisie*, who are compelled to make only particular concessions (only to begin withdrawing them the following day), to hand out promises (only to fail to carry them out), to search for all sorts of excuses to cover their domination (only to fool the people by a show of "honest coalition"), etc., etc. In words it claims to be a popular, democratic, revolutionary government, but in deeds it is an anti-popular, undemocratic, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois government. This is the contradiction which has existed so far and which has been a source of the complete instability and inconsistency of power, of that "ministerial leapfrog" in which the S.R.s and Mensheviks have been engaged with such unfortunate (for the people) enthusiasm.

In early June 1917 I told the All-Russia Congress of Soviets* that either the Soviets would be dispersed and die an inglorious death, or all power must be transferred to them. The events of July and August very convincingly bore out these words. No matter what lies the lackeys of the bourgeoisie—Potresov, Plekhanov and others, who designate as "broadening the base" of power its virtual transfer to a tiny minority of the people, to the bourgeoisie, the exploiters—may resort to, only the power of the Soviets can be stable, obviously based on a majority of the people.

Only Soviet power could be stable and not be overthrown even in the stormiest moments of the stormiest revolution. Only this power could assure a continuous and broad development of the revolution, a peaceful struggle of parties within the Soviets. Until this power is created, there will inevitably be indecision, instability, vacillation, endless "crises of power", a constant farce of ministerial leapfrog, outbreaks on the Right and on the Left.

The slogan, "Power to the Soviets", however, is very often, if not in most cases, taken quite incorrectly to mean

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* See pp. 17-19 of this volume.—*Ed.*

a "Cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority". We would like to go into more detail on this very false notion.

A "Cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority" means a change of individual ministers, with the entire old government apparatus left intact—a thoroughly bureaucratic and thoroughly undemocratic apparatus incapable of carrying-out serious reforms, such as are contained even in the S.R. and Menshevik programmes.

"Power to the Soviets" means radically reshaping the entire old state apparatus, that bureaucratic apparatus which hampers everything democratic. It means removing this apparatus and substituting for it a new, popular one, i.e., a truly democratic apparatus of Soviets, i.e., the organised and armed majority of the people—the workers, soldiers and peasants. It means allowing the majority of the people initiative and independence not only in the election of deputies, but also in state administration, in effecting reforms and various other changes.

To make this difference clearer and more comprehensible, it is worth recalling a valuable admission made some time ago by the paper of the governing party of the S.R.s, *Dyelo Naroda*. It wrote that *even* in those ministries which were in the hands of socialist Ministers (this was written during the notorious coalition with the Cadets, when some Mensheviks and S.R.s were ministers), the entire administrative apparatus had remained unchanged, and hampered work.

This is quite understandable. The entire history of the bourgeois-parliamentary, and also, to a considerable extent, of the bourgeois-constitutional, countries shows that a change of ministers means very little, for the real work of administration is in the hands of an enormous army of officials. This army, however, is undemocratic through and through, it is connected by thousands and millions of threads with the landowners and the bourgeoisie and is completely dependent on them. This army is surrounded by an atmosphere of bourgeois relations, and breathes nothing but this atmosphere. It is set in its ways, petrified, stagnant, and is powerless to break free of this atmosphere. It can only think, feel, or act in the old way. This army is bound by servility to rank, by certain privileges of "Civil"

Service; the upper ranks of this army are, through the medium of shares and banks, entirely enslaved by finance capital, being to a certain extent its agent and a vehicle of its interests and influence.

It is the greatest delusion, the greatest self-deception, and a deception of the people, to attempt, by means of this state apparatus, to carry out such reforms as the abolition of landed estates without compensation, or the grain monopoly, etc. This apparatus *can* serve a republican bourgeoisie, creating a republic in the shape of a "monarchy without a monarch", like the French Third Republic, but it is absolutely incapable of carrying out reforms which would even seriously curtail or limit the rights of capital, the rights of "sacred private property", much less abolish those rights. That is why it always happens, under all sorts of "coalition" Cabinets that include "socialists", that these socialists, even when individuals among them are perfectly honest, in reality turn out to be either a useless ornament of or a screen for the bourgeois government, a sort of lightning conductor to divert the people's indignation from the government, a tool for the government to deceive the people. This was the case with Louis Blanc in 1848, and dozens of times in Britain and France, when socialists participated in Cabinets. This is also the case with the Chernovs and Tseretelis in 1917. So it has been and so it will be as long as the bourgeois system exists and as long as the old bourgeois, bureaucratic state apparatus remains intact.

The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies are particularly valuable because they represent a new *type* of state apparatus, which is immeasurably higher, incomparably more democratic. The S.R.s and Mensheviks have done everything, the possible and the impossible, to turn the Soviets (particularly the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russia Soviet, i.e., the Central Executive Committee) into useless talking shops which, under the guise of "control", merely adopted useless resolutions and suggestions which the government shelved with the most polite and kindly smile. The "fresh breeze" of the Kornilov affair, however, which promised a real storm, was enough for all that was musty in the Soviet to blow away for a while, and for the initiative of the revolutionary people to begin

expressing itself as something majestic, powerful and invincible.

Let all sceptics learn from this example from history. Let those who say: "We have no apparatus to replace the old one, which inevitably gravitates towards the defence of the bourgeoisie," be ashamed of themselves. For this apparatus *exists*. It is the Soviets. Don't be afraid of the people's initiative and independence. Put your faith in their revolutionary organisations, and you will see *in all* realms of state affairs the same strength, majesty and invincibility of the workers and peasants as were displayed in their unity and their fury against Kornilov.

Lack of faith in the people, fear of their initiative and independence, trepidation before their revolutionary energy instead of all-round and unqualified support for it—this is where the S.R. and Menshevik leaders have sinned most of all. This is where we find one of the deepest roots of their indecision, their vacillation, their infinite and infinitely fruitless attempts to pour new wine into the old bottles of the old, bureaucratic state apparatus.

Take the history of the democratisation of the army in the 1917 Russian revolution, the history of the Chernov Ministry, of Palchinsky's "reign", and of Peshekhonov's resignation—you will find what we have said above strikingly borne out at every step. Because there was no full confidence in the elected soldiers' organisations and no absolute observance of the principle of soldiers electing their commanding officers, the Kornilovs, Kaledins and counter-revolutionary officers came to be at the head of the army. This is a fact. Without deliberately closing one's eyes, one cannot fail to see that *after* the Kornilov affair Kerensky's government is *leaving everything as before*, that *in fact it is bringing back the Kornilov affair*. The appointment of Alexeyev, the "peace" with the Klembovskys, Gagarins, Bagrations and other Kornilov men, and leniency in the treatment of Kornilov and Kaledin all very clearly prove that Kerensky is in fact bringing back the Kornilov affair.

There is no middle course. This has been shown by experience. Either all power goes to the Soviets and the army is made fully democratic, or another Kornilov affair occurs.

And what about the history of the Chernov Ministry? Didn't it prove that every more or less serious step towards actually satisfying the peasants' needs, every step showing confidence in the peasants and in their mass organisations and actions, evoked very great enthusiasm among them? Chernov, however, had to spend almost four months "haggling" with the Cadets and bureaucrats, who by endless delays and intrigues finally forced him to resign without having accomplished anything. For and during these four months the landowners and capitalists "won the game"—they saved the landed estates, delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and even started a number of repressions against the land committees.

There is no middle course. This has been shown by experience. Either all power goes to the Soviets both centrally and locally, and all land is given to the peasants *immediately*, pending the Constituent Assembly's decision, or the landowners and capitalists obstruct every step, restore the landowners' power, drive the peasants into a rage and carry things to an exceedingly violent peasant revolt.

The same thing happened when the capitalists (with the aid of Palchinsky) crushed every more or less serious attempt to supervise production, when the merchants thwarted the grain monopoly and broke up the regulated democratic distribution of grain and other foodstuffs just *begun* by Peshekhonov.

What is now necessary in Russia is not to invent "new reforms", not to make "plans" for "comprehensive" changes. Nothing of the kind. This is how the situation is depicted—deliberately depicted in a false light—by the capitalists, the Potresovs, the Plekhanovs, who shout against "introducing socialism" and against the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The situation in Russia in fact is such that the unprecedented burdens and hardships of the war, the unparalleled and very real danger of economic dislocation and famine have of themselves suggested the way out, have of themselves not only pointed out, but advanced reforms and other changes as absolutely necessary. These changes must be the grain monopoly, control over production and distribution, restriction of the issue of paper money, a fair exchange of grain for manufactured goods, etc.

Everyone recognises measures of this kind and in this direction as inevitable, and in many places they have already been launched from the most diverse sides. *They have already been launched*, but they have been and are being obstructed everywhere by the resistance of the landowners and the capitalists, which is being put up through the Kerensky government (an utterly bourgeois and Bonapartist government *in reality*), through the old bureaucratic state apparatus, and through the direct and indirect pressure of Russian and "Allied" finance capital.

Not so long ago I. Prilezhayev, lamenting the resignation of Peshekhonov and the collapse of the fixed prices and the grain monopoly, wrote in *Dyelo Naroda* (No. 147):

> "Courage and resolve are what our governments of all compositions have lacked.... The revolutionary democrats must not wait; they must themselves show initiative, and intervene in the economic chaos in a planned way.... If anywhere, it is here that a firm course and a determined government are necessary."

That goes without saying. Words of gold. The only trouble is that the author forgot that the question of the firm course to take, of courage and resolve, is not a personal matter, but a question of which *class* is capable of manifesting courage and resolve. The only class capable of this is the proletariat. A courageous and resolute government steering a firm course is nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants. I. Prilezhayev unwittingly longs for *this dictatorship*.

What would such a dictatorship mean in practice? It would mean nothing but the fact that the resistance of the Kornilov men would be broken and the democratisation of the army restored and completed. Two days after its creation ninety-nine per cent of the army would be enthusiastic supporters of this dictatorship. This dictatorship would give land to the peasants and full power to the local peasant committees. How can anyone in his right senses doubt that the peasants would support this dictatorship? What Peshekhonov only *promised* ("the resistance of the capitalists has been broken" was what Peshekhonov actually said in his famous speech before the Congress of Soviets), this dictatorship would put into effect, would translate into reality. At the same time the democratic organisations of

food supply, control, etc., that have already begun to form would in no way be eliminated. They would, on the contrary, be supported and developed, and all obstacles in the way of their work would be removed.

Only the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants is capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists, of displaying truly supreme courage and determination in the exercise of power, and of securing the enthusiastic, selfless and truly heroic support of the masses both in the army and among the peasants.

Power to the Soviets—this is the only way to make further progress gradual, peaceful and smooth, keeping perfect pace with the political awareness and resolve of the majority of the people and with their own experience. Power to the Soviets means the complete transfer of the country's administration and economic control into the hands of the workers and peasants, to whom *nobody* would dare offer resistance and who, through practice, through their own experience, *would soon learn* how to distribute the land, products and grain properly.

Rabochy Put No. 10,
September 27 (14), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

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HOW TO GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

In early April, setting out the Bolsheviks' attitude to the question of whether the Constituent Assembly should be convened, I wrote:

"Yes, and as soon as possible. But there is only one way to assure its convocation and success, and that is by increasing the number and strength of the Soviets and organising and *arming* the working-class masses. This is the only guarantee" (*Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, Cheap Library of Zhizn i Znaniye, Book III, pp. 9 and 29).*

Five months have passed since then and these words have been proved correct by several delays in and postponements of the convocation through the fault of the Cadets. And they have been well borne out by the Kornilov affair.

Now, in connection with the calling of the Democratic Conference on September 12, I should like to dwell on another aspect of the matter.

Both the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Dyelo Naroda* have deplored the fact that very little is being done for campaigning among the peasants to enlighten this real mass of the Russian people, their real majority. Everyone realises and admits that the success of the Constituent Assembly depends on the enlightenment of the peasants, but ridiculously little is being done about it. The peasants are being deceived, fooled and intimidated by the utterly deceitful

* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 99.—*Ed.*

and counter-revolutionary bourgeois and "yellow" press, in comparison with which the press of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (not to speak of the Bolsheviks) is very, very weak.

Why is that so?

Because the ruling S.R. and Menshevik parties are weak, hesitant and inactive, because, disagreeing that all power should be taken over by the Soviets, they leave the peasants in ignorance and solitude, a prey to the capitalists, to *their* press and *their* propaganda.

While boastfully calling our revolution great and shouting to the right and left high-sounding, bombastic phrases about "revolutionary democracy", the Mensheviks and S.R.s *in effect* leave Russia in the conditions of a most ordinary, most petty-bourgeois revolution which, having overthrown the tsar, leaves everything else unchanged and does nothing, absolutely nothing, effective to enlighten the peasants politically and to end the peasants' ignorance, that *last* (and strongest) *bulwark*, the bulwark of the exploiters and oppressors of the people.

This is the time to recall that. It is now, with the Democratic Conference before us, two months ahead of the "appointed" convocation of the Constituent Assembly (to be further postponed), that we must show how easily matters could be put right, how much could be done for the political education of the peasants, if only—if only our "revolutionary democrats" in inverted commas were really revolutionary, i.e., capable of acting in a revolutionary way, and really democratic, i.e., reckoning with the will and interests of the majority of the people, and not of the capitalist minority, which continues to hold power (the Kerensky government) and with which, either directly or indirectly, in a new or old form, the S.R.s and Mensheviks are still eager to compromise.

The capitalists (followed, either from stupidity or from inertia, by many S.R.s and Mensheviks) call "freedom of the press" a situation in which censorship has been abolished and all parties freely publish all kinds of papers.

In reality it is not freedom of the press, but freedom for the rich, for the bourgeoisie, to deceive the oppressed and exploited mass of the people.

Indeed, take, say, the Petrograd and Moscow newspapers. You will see at once that it is the bourgeois papers—*Rech*, *Birzhevka*, *Novoye Vremya*, *Russkoye Slovo*[121], and so on, and so forth (for there are a great many papers of this sort)—that have by far the largest circulation. What makes for this prevalence? Not at all the will of the majority, for the elections have shown that in both capitals the majority (a gigantic majority, too) favours the democrats, i.e., the S.R.s, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. These three parties command from three-quarters to four-fifths of the votes, while the circulation of the newspapers they publish is certainly less than a quarter, or even less than one-fifth, that of the whole bourgeois press (which, as we know and see now, supported the Kornilov affair directly and indirectly).

Why is that so?

Everyone knows very well why. Because the publication of a newspaper is a big and profitable capitalist undertaking in which the rich invest millions upon millions of rubles. "Freedom of the press" in bourgeois society means freedom for the *rich* systematically, unremittingly, daily, in millions of copies, to deceive, corrupt and fool the exploited and oppressed mass of the people, the poor.

This is the simple, generally known, obvious truth which everyone sees and realises but which "almost everyone" "bashfully" passes over in silence, timidly evades.

The question is whether and how this crying evil can be fought.

First of all, there is a very simple, good and lawful means which I pointed out in *Pravda* long ago, which it is particularly opportune to recall now, before September 12, and which workers should always bear in mind, for they will hardly be able to do without it when they have won political power.*

That means is a state monopoly on private press advertising.

Look at *Russkoye Slovo*, *Novoye Vremya*, *Birzhevka*, *Rech*, etc.—you will see a multitude of private advertisements, which yield a tremendous income, in fact the prin-

* See pp. 97-98 of this volume.—*Ed.*

cipal income, to their capitalist publishers. This is how bourgeois papers hold sway, how they get rich, and *how they deal in poison for the people* all over the world.

In Europe there are newspapers which have a circulation as large as one-third the number of inhabitants of the town (for instance, 12,000 copies in a town with a population of 40,000) and are delivered *free to every home*, and yet yield their owners a sizable income. These papers live by advertisements paid by private people, while the free delivery of the paper to every home ensures the best circulation of the advertisements.

Then why cannot democrats who call themselves revolutionary carry out a measure like declaring private press advertising a state monopoly, or banning advertisements anywhere *outside* the newspapers published by the Soviets in the provincial towns and cities and by the *central Soviet* in Petrograd for the whole of Russia? Why must "revolutionary" democrats tolerate such a thing as the enrichment, through private advertising, of rich men, Kornilov backers, and spreaders of lies and slander against the Soviets?

Such a measure would be absolutely just. It would greatly benefit both those who published private advertisements and the whole people, particularly the most oppressed and ignorant class, the peasants, who would be able to have *Soviet* papers, with supplements for the peasants, at a very low price or even free of charge.

Why not do that? Only because private property and hereditary rights (to profits from advertising) are sacred to the capitalist gentlemen. But how can anyone calling himself a revolutionary democrat in the twentieth century, in the second Russian revolution, recognise such rights as "sacred"?!

Some may say it would mean infringing freedom of the press.

That is not true. It would mean extending and restoring freedom of the press, for freedom of the press means that all opinions of *all* citizens may be freely published.

What do we have now? Now, the rich *alone* have this monopoly, and also the big parties. Yet if large *Soviet* newspapers were to be published, with all advertisements,

it would be perfectly feasible to guarantee the expression of their opinion to a much greater number of citizens—say, to every group having collected a certain number of signatures. Freedom of the press would *in practice* become much more democratic, would become incomparably more complete as a result.

But some may ask: where would we get printing presses and newsprint?

There we have it!!! The issue is not "freedom of the press" but the exploiters' sacrosanct ownership of the printing presses and stocks of newsprint they have seized!

Just why should we workers and peasants recognise that sacred right? How is that "right" to publish false information better than the "right" to own serfs?

Why is it that in war-time all sorts of requisitioning—of houses, flats, vehicles, horses, grain and metals—are allowed and practised everywhere, while the requisitioning of printing presses and newsprint is impermissible?

The workers and peasants may in fact be deceived for a while if such measures are made out to be unjust or hard to realise, but the truth will win through in the end.

State power in the shape of the Soviets takes *all* the printing presses and *all* the newsprint and distributes them *equitably*: the state should come first—in the interests of the majority of the people, the majority of the poor, particularly the majority of the peasants, who for centuries have been tormented, crushed and stultified by the landowners and capitalists.

The big parties should come second—say, those that have polled one or two hundred thousand votes in both capitals.

The smaller parties should come third, and then any group of citizens which has a certain number of members or has collected a certain number of signatures.

This is the distribution of newsprint and printing presses that would be just and, with the Soviets in power, could be effected easily enough.

Then, two months before the Constituent Assembly, we could really help the peasants by ensuring the delivery to *every* village of half a dozen pamphlets (or newspaper issues, or special supplements) in *millions* of copies from *every* big party.

That would truly be a "*revolutionary-democratic*" preparation for the elections to the Constituent Assembly; it would be aid to the countryside on the part of the advanced workers and soldiers. It would be state aid to the people's enlightenment, and not to their stultification and deception; it would be real freedom of the press *for all*, and not for the rich. It would be a break with that accursed, slavish past which compels us to suffer the usurpation by the rich of the great cause of informing and teaching the peasants.

Rabochy Put No. 11,
September 28 (15), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text in *Rabochy Put*

THE STATE AND REVOLUTION

THE MARXIST THEORY OF THE STATE AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE REVOLUTION[122]

Written in August-September 1917

Published as a pamphlet in 1918
by *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers

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

First page of the manuscript **The State and Revolution**
August-September 1917

Reduced

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Reduced

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The question of the state is now acquiring particular importance both in theory and in practical politics. The imperialist war has immensely accelerated and intensified the process of transformation of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. The monstrous oppression of the working people by the state, which is merging more and more with the all-powerful capitalist associations, is becoming increasingly monstrous. The advanced countries—we mean their hinterland—are becoming military convict prisons for the workers.

The unprecedented horrors and miseries of the protracted was are making the people's position unbearable and increasing their anger. The world proletarian revolution is clearly maturing. The question of its relation to the state is acquiring practical importance.

The elements of opportunism that accumulated over the decades of comparatively peaceful development have given rise to the trend of social-chauvinism which dominates the official socialist parties throughout the world. This trend—socialism in words and chauvinism in deeds (Plekhanov, Potresov, Breshkovskaya, Rubanovich, and, in a slightly veiled form, Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. in Russia; Scheidemann, Legien, David and others in Germany; Renaudel, Guesde and Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Hyndman and the Fabians[123] in England, etc., etc.)—is conspicuous for the base, servile adaptation of the "leaders of socialism" to the interests not only of "their" national

bourgeoisie, but of "their" state, for the majority of the so-called Great Powers have long been exploiting and enslaving a whole number of small and weak nations. And the imperialist war is a war for the division and redivision of this kind of booty. The struggle to free the working people from the influence of the bourgeoisie in general, and of the imperialist bourgeoisie in particular, is impossible without a struggle against opportunist prejudices concerning the "state".

First of all we examine the theory of Marx and Engels of the state, and dwell in particular detail on those aspects of this theory which are ignored or have been distorted by the opportunists. Then we deal specially with the one who is chiefly responsible for these distortions, Karl Kautsky, the best-known leader of the Second International (1889-1914), which has met with such miserable bankruptcy in the present war. Lastly, we sum up the main results of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and particularly of 1917. Apparently, the latter is now (early August 1917) completing the first stage of its development; but this revolution as a whole can only be understood as a link in a chain of socialist proletarian revolutions being caused by the imperialist war. The question of the relation of the socialist proletarian revolution to the state, therefore, is acquiring not only practical political importance, but also the significance of a most urgent problem of the day, the problem of explaining to the masses what they will have to do before long to free themselves from capitalist tyranny.

The Author

August 1917

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The present, second edition is published virtually unaltered, except that section 3 had been added to Chapter II.

The Author

Moscow
December 17, 1918

CHAPTER I
CLASS SOCIETY AND THE STATE

1. THE STATE—A PRODUCT OF THE IRRECONCILABILITY OF CLASS ANTAGONISMS

What is now happening to Marx's theory has, in the course of history, happened repeatedly to the theories of revolutionary thinkers and leaders of oppressed classes fighting for emancipation. During the lifetime of great revolutionaries, the oppressing classes constantly hounded them, received their theories with the most savage malice, the most furious hatred and the most unscrupulous campaigns of lies and slander. After their death, attempts are made to convert them into harmless icons, to canonise them, so to say, and to hallow their *names* to a certain extent for the "consolation" of the oppressed classes and with the object of duping the latter, while at the same time robbing the revolutionary theory of its *substance*, blunting its revolutionary edge and vulgarising it. Today, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists within the labour movement concur in this doctoring of Marxism. They omit, obscure, or distort the revolutionary side of this theory, its revolutionary soul. They push to the foreground and extol what is or seems acceptable to the bourgeoisie. All the social-chauvinists are now "Marxists" (don't laugh!). And more and more frequently German bourgeois scholars, only yesterday specialists in the annihilation of Marxism, are speaking of the "national-German" Marx, who, they claim, educated the labour unions which are so splendidly organised for the purpose of waging a predatory war!

In these circumstances, in view of the unprecedentedly wide-spread distortion of Marxism, our prime task is to *re-establish* what Marx really taught on the subject of the state. This will necessitate a number of long quotations from the works of Marx and Engels themselves. Of course, long quotations will render the text cumbersome and not help at all to make it popular reading, but we cannot possibly dispense with them. All, or at any rate all they most essential passages in the works of Marx and Engels on the subject of the state must by all means be quoted as fully as possible so that the reader may form an independent opinion of the totality of the views of the founders of scientific socialism, and of the evolution of those views, and so that their distortion by the "Kautskyism" now prevailing may be documentarily proved and clearly demonstrated.

Let us being with the most popular of Engels's works, *The Origin of the Family*, *Private Property*, *and the State*, the sixth edition of which was published in Stuttgart as far back as 1894. We have to translate the quotations from the German originals, as the Russian translations, while very numerous, are for the most part either incomplete or very unsatisfactory.

Summing up his historical analysis, Engels says:

> "The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it 'the reality of the ethical idea', 'the image and reality of reason', as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state." (Pp. 177-78, sixth German edition.)[124]

This expresses with perfect clarity the basic idea of Marxism with regard to the historical role and the meaning of the state. The state is a product and a manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonism objectively *cannot* be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

It is on this most important and fundamental point that the distortion of Marxism, proceeding along two main lines, begins.

On the one hand, the bourgeois, and particularly the petty-bourgeois, ideologists, compelled under the weigh of indisputable historical facts to admit that the state only exists where there are class antagonisms and a class struggle, "correct" Marx in such a way as to make it appear that the gate is an organ for the *reconciliation* of classes. According to Marx, the state could neither have arisen nor maintained itself had it been possible to reconcile classes. From what the petty-bourgeois and philistine professors and publicists say, with quite frequent and benevolent references to Marx, it appears that the state does reconcile classes. According to Marx, the state is an organ of class *rule*, an organ for the *oppression* of one class by another; it is the creation of "order", which legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes. In the opinion of the petty-bourgeois politicians, however, order means the reconciliation of classes, and not the oppression of one class by another; to alleviate the conflict means reconciling classes and not depriving the oppressed classes of definite means and methods of struggle to overthrow the oppressors.

For instance, when, in the revolution of 1917, the question of the significance and role of the state arose in all its magnitude as a practical question demanding immediate action, and, moreover, action on a mass scale, all the Social-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks descended at once to the petty-bourgeois theory that the "state" "reconciles" classes. Innumerable resolutions and articles by politicians of both these parties are thoroughly saturated with this petty-bourgeois and philistine "reconciliation" theory.

That the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which *cannot* be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it) is something the petty-bourgeois democrats will never be able to understand. Their attitude to the state is one of the most striking manifestations of the fact that our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are not socialists at all (a point that we Bolsheviks have always maintained), but petty-bourgeois democrats using near-socialist phraseology.

On the other hand, the "Kautskyite" distortion of Marxism is far more subtle. "Theoretically", it is not denied that the state is an organ of class rule, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. But what is overlooked or glossed over is this: if the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a power standing *above* society and "*alienating* itself *more and more* from it", it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction* of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this "alienation". As we shall see later, Marx very explicitly drew this theoretically self-evident conclusion on the strength of a concrete historical analysis of the tasks of the revolution. And—as we shall show in detail further on—it is this conclusion which Kautsky has "forgotten" and distorted.

2. SPECIAL BODIES OF ARMED MEN, PRISONS, ETC.

Engels continues:

> "As distinct from the old gentile [tribal or clan] order,[125] the state, first, divides its subjects *according to territory*...."
>
> This division seems "natural" to us, but it costs a prolonged struggle against the old organisation according to generations or tribes.
>
> "The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a public power which no longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as an armed force. This special, *public power* is necessary because a self-acting armed organisation of the population has become impossible since the split into classes.... This

> public power exists in every state; it consists not merely of armed men but also of material adjuncts, prisons, and institutions of coercion of all kinds, of which gentile [clan] society knew nothing...."

Engels elucidates the concept of the "power" which is called the state, a power which arose from society but places itself above it and alienates itself more and more from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men having prisons, etc., at their command.

We are justified in speaking of special bodies of armed men, because the public power which is an attribute of every state "does not directly coincide" with the armed population, with its "self-acting armed organisation".

Like all great revolutionary thinkers, Engels tries to draw the attention of the class-conscious workers to what prevailing philistinism regards as least worthy of attention, as the most habitual thing, hallowed by prejudices that are not only deep-rooted but, one might say, petrified. A standing army and police are the chief instruments of state power. But how can it be otherwise?

From the viewpoint of the vast majority of Europeans of the end of the nineteenth century, whom Engels was addressing, and who had not gone through or closely observed a single great revolution, it could not have been otherwise. They could not understand at all what a "self-acting armed organisation of the population" was. When asked why it became necessary to have special bodies of armed men placed above society and alienating themselves from it (police and a standing army), the West-European and Russian philistines are inclined to utter a few phrases borrowed from Spencer of Mikhailovsky, to refer to the growing complexity of social life, the differentiation of functions, and so on.

Such a reference seems "scientific", and effectively lulls the ordinary person to sleep by obscuring the important and basic fact, namely, the split of society into irreconcilably antagonistic classes.

Were it not for this split, the "self-acting armed organisation of the population" would differ from the primitive

organisation of a stick-wielding herd of monkeys, or of primitive men, or of men united in clans, by its complexity, its high technical level, and so on. But such an organisation would still be possible.

It is impossible because civilised society is split into antagonistic, and, moreover, irreconcilably antagonistic classes, whose "self-acting" arming would lead to an armed struggle between them. A state arises, a special power is created, special bodies of armed men, and every revolution, by destroying the state apparatus, shows us the naked class struggle, clearly shows us how the ruling class strives to restore the special bodies of armed men which serve *it*, and how the oppressed class strives to create a new organisation of this kind, capable of serving the exploited instead of the exploiters.

In the above argument, Engels raises theoretically the very same question which every great revolution raises before us in practice, palpably and, what is more, on a scale of mass action, namely, the question of the relationship between "special" bodies of armed men and the "self-acting armed organisation of the population". We shall see how this question is specifically illustrated by the experience of the European and Russian revolutions.

But to return to Engels's exposition.

He points out that sometimes—in certain parts of North America, for example—this public power is weak (he has in mind a rare exception in capitalist society, and those parts of North America in its pre-imperialist days where the free colonists predominated), but that, generally speaking, it grows stronger:

> "It [the public power] grows stronger, however, in proportion as class antagonisms within the state become more acute, and as adjacent states become larger and more populous. We have only to look at our present-day Europe, where class struggle and rivalry in conquest have tuned up the public power to such a pitch that it threatens to swallow the whole of society and even the state."

This was written not later than the early nineties of the last century, Engels's last preface being dated June 16,

1891. The turn towards imperialism—meaning the complete domination of the trusts, the omnipotence of the big banks, a grand-scale colonial policy, and so forth—was only just beginning in France, and was even weaker in North America and in Germany. Since then "rivalry in conquest" has taken a gigantic stride, all the more because by the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century the world had been completely divided up among these "rivals in conquest", i.e., among the predatory Great Powers. Since then, military and naval armaments have grown fantastically and the predatory war of 1914-17 for the domination of the world by Britain or Germany, for the division of the spoils, has brought the "swallowing" of all the forces of society by the rapacious state power close to complete catastrophe.

Engels could, as early as 1891, point to "rivalry in conquest" as one of the most important distinguishing features of the foreign policy of the Great Powers, while the social-chauvinist scoundrels have ever since 1914, when this rivalry, many time intensified, gave rise to an imperialist war, been covering up the defence of the predatory interests of "their own" bourgeoisie with phrases about "defence of the fatherland", "defence of the republic and the revolution", etc.!

3. THE STATE—AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE OPPRESSED CLASS

The maintenance of the special public power standing above society requires taxes and state loans.

> "Having pubic power and the right to levy taxes," Engels writes, "the officials now stand, as organs of society, *above* society. The free, voluntary respect that was accorded to the organs of the gentile [clan] constitution does not satisfy them, even if they could gain it...." Special laws are enacted proclaiming the sanctity and immunity of the officials. "The shabbiest police servant" has more "authority" than the representative of the clan, but even the head of the military power of a civilised state may well envy the elder of a clan the "unrestrained respect" of society.

The question of the privileged position of the officials as organs of state power is raised here. The main point indicated is: what is it that places them *above* society? We shall see how this theoretical question was answered in practice by the Paris Commune in 1871 and how it was obscured from a reactionary standpoint by Kautsky in 1912.

> "Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class...." The ancient and feudal states were organs for the exploitation of the slaves and serfs; likewise, "the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage-labour by capital. By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power as ostensible mediator acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both...." Such were the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Bonapartism of the First and Second Empires in France, and the Bismarck regime in Germany.

Such, we may add, is the Kerensky government in republican Russia since it began to persecute the revolutionary proletariat, at a moment when, owing to the leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats, the Soviets have *already* become impotent, while the bourgeoisie are not *yet* strong enough simply to disperse them.

> In a democratic republic, Engels continues, "wealth exercises its power indirectly, but all the more surely", first, by means of the "direct corruption of officials" (America); secondly, by means of an "alliance of the government and the Stock Exchange" (France and America).

At present, imperialism and the domination of the banks have "developed" into an exceptional art both these

methods of upholding and giving effect to the omnipotence of wealth in democratic republics of all descriptions. Since, for instance, in the very first months of the Russian democratic republic, one might say during the honeymoon of the "socialist" S.R.s and Mensheviks joined in wedlock to the bourgeoisie, in the coalition government. Mr. Palchinsky obstructed every measure intended for curbing the capitalists and their marauding practices, their plundering of the state by means of war contracts; and since later on Mr. Palchinsky, upon resigning from the Cabinet (and being, of course, replaced by another quite similar Palchinsky), was "rewarded" by the capitalists with a lucrative job with a salary of 120,000 rubles per annum—what would you call that? Direct or indirect bribery? An alliance of the government and the syndicates, or "merely" friendly relations? What role do the Chernovs, Tseretelis, Avksentyevs and Skobelevs play? Are they the "direct" or only the indirect allies of the millionaire treasury-looters?

Another reason why the omnipotence of "wealth" is more *certain* in a democratic republic is that it does not depend on individual defects in the political machinery or on the faulty political shell of capitalism. A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and, therefore, once capital has gained possession of this very best shell (through the Palchinskys, Chernovs, Tseretelis and Co.), it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that *no* change of persons, institutions or parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic can shake it.

We must also note that Engels is most explicit in calling universal suffrage as well an instrument of bourgeois rule. Universal suffrage, he says, obviously taking account of the long experience of German Social-Democracy, is

> "the gauge of the maturity of the working class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state."

The petty-bourgeois democrats, such as our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and also their twin brothers, all the social-chauvinists and opportunists of Western Europe, expect just this "more" from universal suffrage. They themselves share, and instil into the minds of the

people, the false notion that universal suffrage "in the *present-day* state" is really capable of revealing the will of the majority of the working people and of securing its realisation.

Here, we can only indicate this false notion, only point out that Engels's perfectly clear, precise and concrete statement is distorted at every step in the propaganda and agitation of the "official" (i.e., opportunist) socialist parties. A detailed exposure of the utter falsity of this notion which Engels brushes aside here is given in our further account of the views of Marx and Engels on the "*present-day*" state.

Engels gives a general summary of his views in the most popular of his works in the following words:

> "The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no idea of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the split of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this split. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them the state will inevitably fall. Society, which will reorganise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers, will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into a museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe."

We do not often come across this passage in the propaganda and agitation literature of the present-day Social-Democrats. Even when we do come across it, it is mostly quoted in the same manner as one bows before an icon, i.e., it is done to show official respect for Engels, and no attempt is made to gauge the breadth and depth of the revolution that this relegating of "the whole machinery of state to a museum of antiquities" implies. In most cases we do not even find an understanding of what Engels calls the state machine.

4. THE "WITHERING AWAY" OF THE STATE, AND VIOLENT REVOLUTION

Engels's words regarding the "withering away" of the state are so widely known, they are often quoted, and so clearly reveal the essence of the customary adaptation of Marxism to opportunism that we must deal with them in detail. We shall quote the whole argument from which they are taken.

> "*The proletariat seizes state power and turns the means of production into state property to begin with*. But thereby it abolishes itself as the proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, and abolishes also the state as state. Society thus far, operating amid class antagonisms, needed the state, that is, an organisation of the particular exploiting class, for the maintenance of its external conditions of production, and, therefore, especially, for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited class in the conditions of oppression determined by the given mode of production (slavery, serfdom or bondage, wage-labour). The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its concentration in a visible corporation. But it was this only insofar as it was the state of that class which itself represented, for its own time, society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our own time, of the bourgeoisie. When at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of society, it renders itself unnecessary. As soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection, as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon the present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from this struggle, are removed, nothing more remains to be held in subjection—nothing necessitating a special coercive force, a state. The first act by which the state really comes forward as the representative of the whole of society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is also its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations

> becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies down of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not 'abolished'. *It withers away*. This gives the measure of the value of the phrase 'a free people's state', both as to its justifiable use for a long time from an agitational point of view, and as to its ultimate scientific insufficiency; and also of the so-called anarchists' demand that the state be abolished overnight." (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* [*Anti-Dühring*], pp. 301-03, third German edition.)[126]

It is safe to say that of this argument of Engels's, which is so remarkably rich in ideas, only one point has become an integral part of socialist thought among modern socialist parties, namely, that according to Marx that state "withers away"—as distinct from the anarchist doctrine of the "abolition" of the state. To prune Marxism to such an extent means reducing it to opportunism, for this "interpretation" only leaves a vague notion of a slow, even, gradual change, of absence of leaps and storms, of absence of revolution. The current, widespread, popular, if one may say so, conception of the "withering away" of the state undoubtedly means obscuring, if not repudiating, revolution.

Such an "interpretation", however, is the crudest distortion of Marxism, advantageous only to the bourgeoisie. In point of theory, it is based on disregard for the most important circumstances and considerations indicated in, say, Engels's "summary" argument we have just quoted in full.

In the first place, at the very outset of his argument, Engels says that, in seizing state power, the proletariat thereby "abolishes the state as state". It is not done to ponder over the meaning of this. Generally, it is either ignored altogether, or is considered to be something in the nature of "Hegelian weakness" on Engels's part. As a matter of fact, however, these words briefly express the experience of one of the greatest proletarian revolutions, the Paris Commune of 1871, of which we shall speak in greater detail in its proper place. As a matter of fact, En-

gels speaks here of the proletariat revolution "abolishing" the *bourgeois* state, while the words about the state withering away refer to the remnants of the *proletarian* state *after* the socialist revolution. According to Engels, the bourgeois state does not "wither away", but is "*abolished*" by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after this revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state.

Secondly, the state is a "special coercive force". Engels gives this splendid and extremely profound definition here with the utmost lucidity. And from it follows that the "special coercive force" for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, of millions of working people by handfuls of the rich, must be replaced by a "special coercive force" for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat). This is precisely what is meant by "abolition of the state as state". This is precisely the "act" of taking possession of the means of production in the name of society. And it is self-evident that *such* a replacement of one (bourgeois) "special force" by another (proletarian) "special force" cannot possibly take place in the form of "withering away".

Thirdly, in speaking of the state "withering away", and the even more graphic and colorful "dying down of itself", Engels refers quite clearly and definitely to the period *after* "the state has taken possession of the means of production in the name of the whole of society", that is, *after* the socialist revolution. We all know that the political form of the "state" at that time is the most complete democracy. But it never enters the head of any of the opportunists, who shamelessly distort Marxism, that Engels is consequently speaking here of *democracy* "dying down of itself", or "withering away". This seems very strange at first sight. But it is "incomprehensible" only to those who have not thought about democracy *also* being a state and, consequently, also disappearing when the state disappears. Revolution alone can "abolish" the bourgeois state. The state in general, i.e., the most complete democracy, can only "wither away".

Fourthly, after formulating his famous proposition that "the state withers away", Engels at once explains specifically that this proposition is directed against both the opportu-

nists and the anarchists. In doing this, Engels puts in the forefront that conclusion, drawn from the proposition that "the state withers away", which is directed against the opportunists.

One can wager that out of every 10,000 persons who have read or heard about the "withering away" of the state, 9,990 are completely unaware, or do not remember, that Engels directed his conclusions from that proposition not against anarchists *alone*. And of the remaining ten, probably nine do not know the meaning of a "free people's state" or why an attack on this slogan means an attack on opportunists. This is how history is written! This is how a great revolutionary teaching is imperceptibly falsified and adapted to prevailing philistinism. The conclusion directed against the anarchists has been repeated thousands of times; it has been vulgarised, and rammed into people's heads in the shallowest form, and has acquired the strength of a prejudice, whereas the conclusion directed against the opportunists has been obscured and "forgotten"!

The "free people's state" was a programme demand and a catchword current among the German Social-Democrats in the seventies. This catchword is devoid of all political content except that it describes the concept of democracy in a pompous philistine fashion. Insofar as it hinted in a legally permissible manner at a democratic republic, Engels was prepared to "justify" its use "for a time" from an agitational point of view. But it was an opportunist catchword, for it amounted to something more than prettifying bourgeois democracy, and was also failure to understand the socialist criticism of the state in general. We are in favour of a democratic republic as the best form of state for the proletariat under capitalism. But we have no right to forget that wage slavery is the lot of the people even in the most democratic bourgeois republic. Furthermore, every state is a "special force" for the suppression of the oppressed class. Consequently, *every* state is *not* "free and *not* a "people's state". Marx and Engels explained this repeatedly to their party comrades in the seventies.

Fifthly, the same work of Engels's, whose arguments about the withering away of the state everyone remembers, also contains an argument of the significance of violent revolu-

tion. Engels's historical analysis of its role becomes a veritable panegyric on violent revolution. This, "no one remembers". It is not done in modern socialist parties to talk or even think about the significance of this idea, and it plays no part whatever in their daily propaganda and agitation among the people. And yet it is inseparably bound up with the "withering away" of the state into one harmonious whole.

Here is Engels's argument:

> "...That force, however, plays yet another role [other than that of a diabolical power] in history, a revolutionary role; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one, that it is the instrument with which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilised political forms—of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of an economy based on exploitation—unfortunately, because all use of force demoralises, he says, the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has been given by every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision—which may, after all, be forced on the people—would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has penetrated the nation's mentality following the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War.[127] And this person's mode of thought—dull, insipid, and impotent—presumes to impose itself on the most revolutionary party that history has ever known!" (P. 193, third German edition, Part II, end of Chap. IV)

How can this panegyric on violent revolution, which Engels insistently brought to the attention of the German Social-Democrats between 1878 and 1894, i.e., right up to the time of his death, be combined with the theory of the "withering away" of the state to form a single theory?

Usually the two are combined by means of eclecticism, by an unprincipled or sophistic selection made arbitrarily (or to please the powers that be) of first one, then another

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argument, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, if not more, it is the idea of the "withering away" that is placed in the forefront. Dialectics are replaced by eclecticism—this is the most usual, the most wide-spread practice to be met with in present-day official Social-Democratic literature in relation to Marxism. This sort of substitution is, of course, nothing new; it was observed even in the history of classical Greek philosophy. In falsifying Marxism in opportunist fashion, the substitution of eclecticism for dialectics is the easiest way of deceiving the people. It gives an illusory satisfaction; it seems to take into account all sides of the process, all trends of development, all the conflicting influences, and so forth, whereas in reality it provides no integral and revolutionary conception of the process of social development at all.

We have already said above, and shall show more fully later, that the theory of Marx and Engels of the inevitability of a violent revolution refers to the bourgeois state. The latter *cannot* be superseded by the proletarian state (the dictatorship of the proletariat) through the process of 'withering away", but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution. The panegyric Engels sang in its honour, and which fully corresponds to Marx's repeated statements (see the concluding passages of *The Poverty of Philosophy*[128] and the *Communist Manifesto*[129], with their proud and open proclamation of the inevitability of a violent revolution; see what Marx wrote nearly thirty years later, in criticising the Gotha Programme of 1875, when he mercilessly castigated the opportunist character of that programme[130])—this panegyric is by no means a mere "impulse", a mere declamation or a polemical sally. The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with *this* and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of the *entire* theory of Marx and Engels. The betrayal of their theory by the now prevailing social-chauvinist and Kautskyite trends expresses itself strikingly in both these trends ignoring *such* propaganda and agitation.

The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of the state in general, is impossible except through the process of "withering away".

A detailed and concrete elaboration of these views was given by Marx and Engels when they studied each particular revolutionary situation, when they analysed the lessons of the experience of each particular revolution. We shall now pass to this, undoubtedly the most important, part of their theory.

CHAPTER II
THE STATE AND REVOLUTION. THE EXPERIENCE OF 1848-51

1. THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION

The first works of mature Marxism—*The Poverty of Philosophy* and the *Communist Manifesto*—appeared just on the eve of the revolution of 1848. For this reason, in addition to presenting the general principles of Marxism, they reflect to a certain degree the concrete revolutionary situation of the time. It will, therefore, be more expedient, perhaps, to examine what the authors of these works said about the state immediately before they drew conclusions from the experience of the years 1848-51.

In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx wrote:

> "The working class, in the course of development, will substitute for the old bourgeois society an association which will preclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power groups, since the political power is precisely the official expression of class antagonism in bourgeois society." (P. 182, German edition, 1885.)[131]

It is instructive to compare this general exposition of the idea of the state disappearing after the abolition of classes with the exposition contained in the *Communist Manifesto*, written by Marx and Engels a few months later—in November 1847, to be exact:

> "...In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolu-

> tion, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat....
>
> "...We have seen above that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class to win the battle of democracy.
>
> "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible." (Pp. 31 and 37, seventh German edition, 1906.)[132]

Here we have a formulation of one of the most remarkable and most important ideas of Marxism on the subject of the state, namely, the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (as Marx and Engels began to call it after the Paris Commune); and, also, a highly interesting definition of the state, which is also one of the "forgotten words" of Marxism: "*the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class*".

This definition of the state has never been explained in the prevailing propaganda and agitation literature of the official Social-Democratic parties. More than that, it has been deliberately ignored, for it is absolutely irreconcilable with reformism, and is a slap in the face for the common opportunist prejudices and philistine illusions about the "peaceful development of democracy".

The proletariat needs the state—this is repeated by all the opportunists, social-chauvinists and Kautskyites, who assure us that this is what Marx taught. But they "*forget*" to add that, in the first place, according to Marx, the proletariat needs only a state which is withering away, i.e., a state so constituted that it begins to wither away immediately, and cannot but wither away. And, secondly, the working people need a "state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class".

The state is a special organisation of force: it is an organisation of violence for the suppression of some class. What class must the proletariat suppress? Naturally, only the

exploiting class, i.e., the bourgeoisie. The working people need the state only to suppress the resistance of the exploiters, and only the proletariat can direct this suppression, can carry it out. For the proletariat is the only class that is consistently revolutionary, the only class that can unite all the working and exploited people in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, in completely removing it.

The exploiting classes need political rule to maintain exploitation, i.e., in the selfish interests of an insignificant minority against the vast majority of all people. The exploited classes need political rule in order to completely abolish all exploitation, i.e., in the interests of the vast majority of the people, and against the insignificant minority consisting of the modern slave-owners—the landowners and capitalists.

The petty-bourgeois democrats, those sham socialists who replaced the class struggle by dreams of class harmony, even pictured the socialist transformation in a dreamy fashion—not as the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting class, but as the peaceful submission of the minority to the majority which has become aware of its aims. This petty-bourgeois utopia, which is inseparable from the idea of the state being above classes, led in practice to the betrayal of the interests of the working classes, as was shown, for example, by the history of the French revolutions of 1848 and 1871, and by the experience of "socialist" participation in bourgeois Cabinets in Britain, France, Italy and other countries at the turn of the century.

All his life Marx fought against this petty-bourgeois socialism, now revived in Russia by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties. He developed his theory of the class struggle consistently, down to the theory of political power, of the state.

The overthrow of bourgeois rule can be accomplished only by the proletariat, the particular class whose economic conditions of existence prepare it for this task and provide it with the possibility and the power to perform it. While the bourgeoisie break up and disintegrate the peasantry and all the petty-bourgeois groups, they weld together, unite and organise the proletariat. Only the proletariat—by virtue of the economic role it plays in large-scale produc-

tion—is capable of being the leader of *all* the working and exploited people, whom the bourgeoisie exploit, oppress and crush, often not less but more than they do the proletarians, but who are incapable of waging an *independent* struggle for their emancipation.

The theory of class struggle, applied by Marx to the question of the state and the socialist revolution, leads as a matter of course to the recognition of the *political rule* of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, i.e., of undivided power directly backed by the armed force of the people. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming the *ruling class*, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organising *all* the working and exploited people for the new economic system.

The proletariat needs state power, a centralised organisation of force, an organisation of violence, both to crush the resistance of the exploiters and to *lead* the enormous mass of the population—the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and semi-proletarians—in the work of organising a socialist economy.

By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and *leading the whole people* to socialism, of directing and organising the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organising their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie. By contrast, the opportunism now prevailing trains the members of the workers' party to be the representatives of the better-paid workers, who lose touch with the masses, "get along" fairly well under capitalism, and sell their birthright for a mess of pottage, i.e., renounce their role as revolutionary leaders of the people against the bourgeoisie.

Marx's theory of "the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class", is inseparably bound up with the whole of his doctrine of the revolutionary role of the proletariat in history. The culmination of this rule is the proletarian dictatorship, the political rule of the proletariat.

But since the proletariat needs the state as a *special* form of organisation of violence *against* the bourgeoisie, the fol-

lowing conclusion suggests itself: is it conceivable that such an organisation can be created without first abolishing, destroying the state machine created by the bourgeoisie for *themselves*? The *Communist Manifesto* leads straight to this conclusion, and it is of this conclusion that Marx speaks when summing up the experience of the revolution of 1848-51.

2. THE REVOLUTION SUMMED UP

Marx sums up his conclusions from the revolution of 1848-51, on the subject of the state we are concerned with, in the following argument contained in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*:

> "But the revolution is thoroughgoing. It is still journeying through purgatory. It does its work methodically. By December 2, 1851 [the day of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état], it had completed one half of its preparatory work. It is now completing the other half. First it perfected the parliamentary power, in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it has attained this, it is perfecting the *executive power*, reducing it to its purest expression, isolating it, setting it up against itself as the sole object, *in order to concentrate all its forces of destruction against it* [italics ours]. And when it has done this second half of its preliminary work, Europe will leap from its seat and exultantly exclaim: well grubbed, old mole!
>
> "This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organisation, with its vast and ingenious state machinery, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes the body of French society and chokes all its pores, sprang up in the days of the absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system, which it helped to hasten." The first French Revolution developed centralisation, "but at the same time" it increased "the extent, the attributes and the number of agents of governmental power. Napoleon completed this state machinery". The legitimate monarchy and the

July monarchy "added nothing but a greater division of labour".

"...Finally, in its struggle against the revolution, the parliamentary republic found itself compelled to strengthen, along with repressive measures, the resources and centralisation of governmental power. *All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it* [italics ours]. The parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor." (*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, pp. 98-99, fourth edition, Hamburg, 1907.)[133]

In this remarkable argument, Marxism takes a tremendous step forward compared with the *Communist Manifesto*. In the latter, the question of the state is still treated in an extremely abstract manner, in the most general terms and expressions. In the above-quoted passage, the question is treated in a concrete manner, and the conclusion is extremely precise, definite, practical and palpable: all previous revolutions perfected the state machine, whereas it must be broken, smashed.

This conclusion is the chief and fundamental point in the Marxist theory of the state. And it is precisely this fundamental point which has been completely *ignored* by the dominant official Social-Democratic parties and, indeed, *distorted* (as we shall see later) by the foremost theoretician of the Second International, Karl Kautsky.

The *Communist Manifesto* gives a general summary of history, which compels us to regard the state as the organ of class rule and leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the proletariat cannot overthrow the bourgeoisie without first winning political power, without attaining political supremacy, without transforming the state into the "proletariat organised as the ruling class"; and that this proletarian state will begin to wither away immediately after its victory because the state is unnecessary and cannot exist in a society in which there are no class antagonisms. The question as to how, from the point of view of historical development, the replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is to take place is not raised here.

This is the question Marx raises and answers in 1852. True to his philosophy of dialectical materialism, Marx takes as his basis the historical experience of the great years of revolution, 1848 to 1851. Here, as everywhere else, his theory is a *summing up of experience*, illuminated by a profound philosophical conception of the world and a rich knowledge of history.

The problem of the state is put specifically: How did the bourgeois state, the state machine necessary for the rule of the bourgeoisie, come into being historically? What changes did it undergo, what evolution did it perform in the course of bourgeois revolutions and in the face of the independent actions of the oppressed classes? What are the tasks of the proletariat in relation to this state machine?

The centralised state power that is peculiar to bourgeois society came into being in the period of the fall of absolutism. Two institutions most characteristic of this state machine are the bureaucracy and the standing army. In their works, Marx and Engels repeatedly show that the bourgeoisie are connected with these institutions by thousands of threads. Every worker's experience illustrates this connection in an extremely graphic and impressive manner. From its own bitter experience, the working class learns to recognise this connection. That is why it so easily grasps and so firmly learns the doctrine which shows the inevitability of this connection, a doctrine which the petty-bourgeois democrats either ignorantly and flippantly deny, or still more flippantly admit "in general", while forgetting to draw appropriate practical conclusions.

The bureaucracy and the standing army are a "parasite" on the body of bourgeois society—a parasite created by the internal antagonisms which rend that society, but a parasite which "chokes" all its vital pores. The Kautskyite opportunism now prevailing in official Social-Democracy considers the view that the state is a *parasitic organism* to be the peculiar and exclusive attribute of anarchism. It goes without saying that this distortion of Marxism is of vast advantage to those philistines who have reduced socialism to the unheard-of disgrace of justifying and prettifying the imperialist war by applying to it the concept of

"defence of the fatherland"; but it is unquestionably a distortion, nevertheless.

The development, perfection, and strengthening of the bureaucratic and military apparatus proceeded during all the numerous bourgeois revolutions which Europe has witnessed since the fall of feudalism. In particular, it is the petty bourgeois who are attracted to the side of the big bourgeoisie and are largely subordinated to them through this apparatus, which provides the upper sections of the peasants, small artisans, tradesmen, and the like with comparatively comfortable, quiet, and respectable jobs raising the holders *above* the people. Consider what happened in Russia during the six months following February 27, 1917. The official posts which formerly were given by preference to the Black Hundreds have now become the spoils of the Cadets, Mensheviks, and Social-Revolutionaries. Nobody has really thought of introducing any serious reforms. Every effort has been made to put them off "until the Constituent Assembly meets", and to steadily put off its convocation until after the war! But there has been no delay, no waiting for the Constituent Assembly, in the matter of dividing the spoils of getting the lucrative jobs of ministers, deputy ministers, governors-general, etc., etc.! The game of combinations that has been played in forming the government has been, in essence, only an expression of this division and redivision of the "spoils", which has been going on above and below, throughout the country, in every department of central and local government. The six months between February 27 and August 27, 1917, can be summed up, objectively summed up beyond all dispute, as follows: reforms shelved, distribution of official jobs accomplished and "mistakes" in the distribution corrected by a few redistributions.

But the more the bureaucratic apparatus is "redistributed" among the various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties (among the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the case of Russia), the more keenly aware the oppressed classes, and the proletariat at their head, become of their irreconcilable hostility to the *whole* of bourgeois society. Hence the need for all bourgeois parties, even for the most democratic and "revolutionary-democratic"

among them, to intensify repressive measures against the revolutionary proletariat, to strengthen the apparatus of coercion, i.e., the state machine. This course of events compels the revolution "*to concentrate all its forces of destruction*" against the state power, and to set itself the aim, not of improving the state machine, but of *smashing and destroying* it.

It was not logical reasoning, but actual developments, the actual experience of 1848-51, that led to the matter being presented in this way. The extent to which Marx held strictly to the solid ground of historical experience can be seen from the fact that, in 1852, he did not yet specifically raise the question of *what* was to take the place of the state machine to be destroyed. Experience had not yet provided material for dealing with this question, which history placed on the agenda later on, in 1871. In 1852, all that could be established with the accuracy of scientific observation was that the proletarian revolution *had approached* the task of "concentrating all its forces of destruction" against the state power, of "smashing" the state machine.

Here the question may arise: is it correct to generalise the experience, observations and conclusions of Marx, to apply them to a field that is wider than the history of France during the three years 1848-51? Before proceeding to deal with this question, let us recall a remark made by Engels and then examine the facts. In his introduction to the third edition of *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, Engels wrote:

> "France is the country where, more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were each time fought out to a finish, and where, consequently, the changing political forms within which they move and in which their results are summarised have been stamped in the sharpest outlines. The centre of feudalism in the Middle Ages, the model country, since the Renaissance, of a unified monarchy based on social estates, France demolished feudalism in the Great Revolution and established the rule of the bourgeoisie in a classical purity unequalled by any other European land. And the struggle of the upward-striving prole-

> tariat against the ruling bourgeoisie appeared here in an acute form unknown elsewhere." (P. 4, 1907 edition).

The last remark is out of date inasmuch as since 1871 there has been a lull in the revolutionary struggle of the French proletariat, although, long as this lull may be, it does not at all preclude the possibility that in the coming proletarian revolution France may show herself to be the classic country of the class struggle to a finish.

Let us, however, cast a general glance over the history of the advanced countries at the turn of the century. We shall see that the same process went on more slowly, in more varied forms, in a much wider field: on the one hand, the development of "parliamentary power" both in the republican countries (France, America, Switzerland), and in the monarchies (Britain, Germany to a certain extent, Italy, the Scandinavia countries, etc.); on the other hand, a struggle for power among the various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties which distributed and redistributed the "spoils" of office, with the foundations of bourgeois society unchanged; and, lastly, the perfection and consolidation of the "executive power", of its bureaucratic and military apparatus.

There is not the slightest doubt that these features are common to the whole of the modern evolution of all capitalist states in general. In the last three years 1848-51 France displayed, in a swift, sharp, concentrated form, the very same processes of development which are peculiar to the whole capitalist world.

Imperialism—the era of bank capital, the era of gigantic capitalist monopolies, of the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism—has clearly shown an extraordinary strengthening of the "state machine" and an unprecedented growth in its bureaucratic and military apparatus in connection with the intensification of repressive measures against the proletariat both in the monarchical and in the freest, republican countries.

World history is now undoubtedly leading, on an incomparably larger scale than in 1852, to the "concentration of all the forces" of the proletarian revolution on the "destruction" of the state machine.

What the proletariat will put in its place is suggested by the highly instructive material furnished by the Paris Commune.

3. THE PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION BY MARX IN 1852*

In 1907, Mehring, in the magazine *Neue Zeit*[134] (Vol. XXV, 2, p. 164), published extracts from Marx's letter to Weydemeyer dated March 5, 1852. This letter, among other things, contains the following remarkable observation:

> "And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists, the economic anatomy of classes. What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up with the *particular*, *historical phases in the development of production* (historische Entwicklungsphasen der Produktion), (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a *classless society*."[135]

In these words, Marx succeeded in expressing with striking clarity, first, the chief and radical difference between his theory and that of the foremost and most profound thinkers of the bourgeoisie; and, secondly, the essence of his theory of the state.

It is often said and written that the main point in Marx's theory is the class struggle. But this is wrong. And this wrong notion very often results in an opportunist distortion of Marxism and its falsification in a spirit acceptable to the bourgeoisie. For the theory of the class struggle was created not by Marx, *but* by the bourgeoisie *before* Marx, and, generally speaking, it is *acceptable* to the bourgeoisie. Those who recognize *only* the class struggle are not yet Marxists;

* Added in the second edition.

they may be found to be still within the bounds of bourgeois thinking and bourgeois politics. To confine Marxism to the theory of the class struggle means curtailing Marxism, distorting it, reducing it to something acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Only he is a Marxist who *extends* the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. That is what constitutes the most profound distinction between the Marxist and the ordinary petty (as well as big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on which the *real* understanding and recognition of Marxism should be tested. And it is not surprising that when the history of Europe brought the working class face to face with this question as a *practical* issue, not only all the opportunists and reformists, but all the Kautskyites (people who vacillate between reformism and Marxism) proved to be miserable philistines and petty-bourgeois democrats *repudiating* the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, published in August 1918, i.e., long after the first edition of the present book, is a perfect example of petty-bourgeois distortion of Marxism and base renunciation of it *in deeds*, while hypocritically recognising it *in words* (see my pamphlet, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Petrograd and Moscow, 1918).

Opportunism today, as represented by its principal spokesman, the ex-Marxist Karl Kautsky, fits in completely with Marx's characterisation of the *bourgeois* position quoted above, for this opportunism limits recognition of the class struggle to the sphere of bourgeois relations. (Within this sphere, within its framework, not a single educated liberal will refuse to recognise the class struggle "in principle"!) Opportunism *does not extend* recognition of the class struggle to the cardinal point, to the period of *transition* from capitalism to communism, of the *overthrow* and the complete *abolition* of the bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably is a period of an unprecedentedly violent class struggle in unprecedentedly acute forms, and, consequently, during this period the state must inevitably be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (against the bourgeoisie).

Further. The essence of Marx's theory of the state has been mastered only by those who realise that the dictatorship of a *single* class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire *historical period* which separates capitalism from "classless society", from communism. Bourgeois states are most varied in form, but their essence is the same: all these states, whatever their form, in the final analysis are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to communism is certainly bound to yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*.

CHAPTER III

THE STATE AND REVOLUTION. EXPERIENCE OF THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871 MARX'S ANALYSIS

1. WHAT MADE THE COMMUNARDS' ATTEMPT HEROIC?

It is well known that in the autumn of 1870, a few months before the Commune, Marx warned the Paris workers that any attempt to overthrow the government would be the folly of despair. But when, in March 1871, a decisive battle was *forced* upon the workers and they accepted it, when the uprising had become a fact, Marx greeted the proletarian revolution with the greatest enthusiasm, in spite of unfavorable auguries. Marx did not persist in the pedantic attitude of condemning an "untimely" movement as did the ill-famed Russian renegade from Marxism, Plekhanov, who in November 1905 wrote encouragingly about the workers' and peasants' struggle, but after December 1905 cried, liberal fashion: "They should not have taken up arms."

Marx, however, was not only enthusiastic about the heroism of the Communards, who, as he expressed it, "stormed heaven". Although the mass revolutionary movement did not achieve its aim, he regarded it as a historic experience of enormous importance, as a certain advance of the world

proletarian revolution, as a practical step that was more important than hundreds of programmes and arguments. Marx endeavored to analyse this experiment, to draw tactical lessons from it and re-examine his theory in the light of it.

The only "correction" Marx thought it necessary to make to the *Communist Manifesto* he made on the basis of the revolutionary experience of the Paris Communards.

The last preface to the new German edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, signed by both its authors, is dated June 24, 1872. In this preface the authors, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, say that the programme of the *Communist Manifesto* "has in some details become out-of-date", and the go on to say:

> "*...One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes'....*"[136]

The authors took the words that are in single quotation marks in this passage from Marx's book, *The Civil War in France*.

Thus, Marx and Engels regarded one principal and fundamental lesson of the Paris Commune as being of such enormous importance that they introduced it as an important correction into the *Communist Manifesto*.

Most characteristically, it is this important correction that has been distorted by the opportunists, and its meaning probably is not known to nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine-hundredths, of the readers of the *Communist Manifesto*. We shall deal with this distortion more fully farther on, in a chapter devoted specially to distortions. Here it will be sufficient to note that the current, vulgar "interpretation" of Marx's famous statement just quoted is that Marx here allegedly emphasises the idea of slow development in contradistinction to the seizure of power, and so on.

As a matter of fact, *the exact opposite is the case*. Marx's idea is that the working class must *break up*, *smash* the "ready-made state machinery", and not confine itself merely to laying hold of it.

On April 12, 1871, i.e., just at the time of the Commune, Marx wrote to Kugelmann:

> "If you look up the last chapter of my *Eighteenth Brumaire*, you will find that I declare that the next attempt of the French Revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to *smash* it [Marx's italics—the original is *zerbrechen*], and this is the precondition for every real people's revolution on the Continent. And this is what our heroic Party comrades in Paris are attempting." (*Neue Zeit*, Vol. XX, 1, 1901-02, p. 709.)[137] (The letters of Marx to Kugelmann have appeared in Russian in no less than two editions, one of which I edited and supplied with a preface.)*

The words, "to smash the bureaucratic-military machine", briefly express the principal lesson of Marxism regarding the tasks of the proletariat during a revolution in relation to the state. And this is the lesson that has been not only completely ignored, but positively distorted by the prevailing, Kautskyite, "interpretation" of Marxism!

As for Marx's reference to *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, we have quoted the relevant passage in full above.

It is interesting to note, in particular, two points in the above-quoted argument of Marx. First, he restricts his conclusion to the Continent. This was understandable in 1871, when Britain was still the model of a purely capitalist country, but without a militarist clique and, to a considerable degree, without a bureaucracy. Marx therefore excluded Britain, where a revolution, even a people's revolution, then seemed possible, and indeed was possible, *without* the precondition of destroying "ready-made state machinery".

Today, in 1917, at the time of the first great imperialist war, this restriction made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives—in the whole world—of Anglo-Saxon "liberty", in the sense that they had no militarist cliques and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which

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* See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 104-12.—*Ed.*

subordinate everything to themselves, and suppress everything. Today, in Britain and America, too, "the precondition for every real people's revolution" is the *smashing*, the *destruction* of the "ready-made state machinery" (made and brought up to the "European", general imperialist, perfection in those countries in the years 1914-17).

Secondly, particular attention should be paid to Marx's extremely profound remark that the destruction of the bureaucratic-military state machine is "the precondition for every real *people's* revolution". This idea of a "people's" revolution seems strange coming from Marx, so that the Russian Plekhanovites and Mensheviks, those followers of Struve who wish to be regarded as Marxists, might possibly declare such an expression to be a "slip of the pen" on Marx's part. They have reduced Marxism to such a state of wretchedly liberal distortion that nothing exists for them beyond the antithesis between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution, and even this antithesis they interpret in an utterly lifeless way.

If we take the revolutions of the 20 twentieth century as examples we shall, of course, have to admit that the Portuguese and the Turkish revolutions are both bourgeois revolutions. Neither of them, however, is a "people's" revolution, since in neither does the mass of the people, their vast majority, come out actively, independently, with their own economic and political demands to any noticeable degree. By contrast, although the Russian bourgeois revolution of 1905-07 displayed no such "brilliant" successes as at time fell to the Portuguese and Turkish revolutions, it was undoubtedly a "real people's" revolution, since the mass of the people, their majority, the very lowest social groups, crushed by oppression and exploitation, rose independently and stamped on the entire course of the revolution the imprint of *their* own demands, *their* attempt to build in their own way a new society in place of the old society that was being destroyed.

In Europe, in 1871, the proletariat did not constitute the majority of the people in any country on the Continent. A "people's" revolution, one actually sweeping the majority into its stream, could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasants. These two classes

then constituted the "people". These two classes are united by the fact that the "bureaucratic-military state machine" oppresses, crushes, exploits them. To *smash* this machine, *to break it up*, is truly in the interest of the "people", of their majority, of the workers and most of the peasants, is "the precondition" for a free alliance of the poor peasant and the proletarians, whereas without such an alliance democracy is unstable and socialist transformation is impossible.

As is well known, the Paris Commune was actually working its way toward such an alliance, although it did not reach its goal owing to a number of circumstances, internal and external.

Consequently, in speaking of a "real people's revolution", Marx, without in the least discounting the special features of the petty bourgeois (he spoke a great deal about them and often), took strict account of the actual balance of class forces in most of the continental countries of Europe in 1871. On the other hand, he stated that the "smashing" of the state machine was required by the interests of both the workers and the peasants, that it united them, that it placed before them the common task of removing the "parasite" and of replacing by something new.

By what exactly?

2. WHAT IS TO REPLACE THE SMASHED STATE MACHINE?

In 1847, in the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx's answer to this question was as yet a purely abstract one; to be exact, it was an answer that indicated he tasks, but not the ways of accomplishing them. The answer given in the *Communist Manifesto* was that this machine was to be replaced by "the proletariat organised as the ruling class", by the "winning of the battle of democracy".

Marx did not indulge in utopias; he expected the *experience* of the mass movement to provide the reply to the question as to the specific forms this organisation of the proletariat as the ruling class would assume and as to the exact manner in which this organisation would be combined with the most complete, most consistent "winning of the battle of democracy".

Marx subjected the experience of the Commune, meagre as it was, to the most careful analysis in *The Civil War in France*. Let us quote the most important passages of this work.

> Originating from the Middle Ages, there developed in the 19th century "the centralised state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature". With the development of class antagonisms between capital and labour, "state power assumed more and more the character of a public force organised for the suppression of the working class, of a machine of class rule. After every revolution, which marks an advance in the class struggle, the purely coercive character of the state power stands out in bolder and bolder relief". After the revolution of 1848-49, state power became "the national war instruments of capital against labour". The Second Empire consolidated this.
>
> "The direct antithesis to the empire was the Commune." It was the "specific form" of "a republic that was not only to remove the monarchical form of class rule, but class rule itself...."

What was this "specific" form of the proletarian, socialist republic? What was the state it began to create?

> "...The first decree of the Commune ... was the suppression of the standing army, and its replacement by the armed people...."

This demand now figures in the programme of every party calling itself socialist. The real worth of their programme, however, is best shown by the behavior of our Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviks, who, right after the revolution of February 27, refused to carry out this demand!

> "The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at any time. The

> majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working class.... The police, which until then had been the instrument of the Government, was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible, and at all times revocable, agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at *workmen's wages*. The privileges and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of state disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves.... Having once got rid of the standing army and the police, the instruments of physical force of the old government, the Commune proceeded at once to break the instrument of spiritual suppression, the power of the priests.... The judicial functionaries lost that sham independence ... they were thenceforward to be elective, responsible, and revocable...."[138]

The Commune, therefore, appears to have replaced the smashed state machine "only" by fuller democracy: abolition of the standing army; all officials to be elected and subject to recall. But as a matter of fact this "only" signifies a gigantic replacement of certain institutions by other institutions of a fundamentally different type. This is exactly a case of "quantity being transformed into quality": democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as is at all conceivable, is transformed from bourgeois into proletarian democracy; from the state (= a special force for the suppression of a particular class) into something which is no longer the state proper.

It is still necessary to suppress the bourgeoisie and crush their resistance. This was particularly necessary for the Commune; and one of the reasons for its defeat was that it did not do this with sufficient determination. The organ of suppression, however, is here the majority of the population, and not a minority, as was always the case under slavery, serfdom, and wage slavery. And since the majority of people *itself* suppresses its oppressors, a 'special force" for suppression *is no longer necessary*! In this sense, the state *begins to wither away*. Instead of the special institutions of a

privileged minority (privileged officialdom, the chiefs of the standing army), the majority itself can directly fulfil all these functions, and the more the functions of state power are performed by the people as a whole, the less need there is for the existence of this power.

In this connection, the following measures of the Commune, emphasised by Marx, are particularly noteworthy: the abolition of all representation allowances, and of all monetary privileges to officials, the reduction of the remuneration of *all* servants of the state to the level of "*workmen's wages*". This shows more clearly than anything else the *turn* from bourgeois to proletarian democracy, from the democracy of the oppressors to that of the oppressed classes, from the state as a "*special force*" for the suppression of a particular class to the suppression of the oppressors by the *general force* of the majority of the people—the workers and the peasants. And it is on this particularly striking point, perhaps the most important as far as the problem of the state is concerned, that the ideas of Marx have been most completely ignored! In popular commentaries, the number of which is legion, this is not mentioned. The thing done is to keep silent about it as if it were a piece of old-fashioned "naïveté", just as Christians, after their religion had been given the status of state religion, "forgot" the "naïveté" of primitive Christianity with its democratic revolutionary spirit.

The reduction of the remuneration of high state officials seem "simply" a demand of naive, primitive democracy. One of the "founders" of modern opportunism, the ex-Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein, has more than once repeated the vulgar bourgeois jeers at "primitive" democracy. Like all opportunists, and like the present Kautskyites, he did not understand at all that, first of all, the transition from capitalism to socialism is *impossible* without a certain "reversion" to "primitive" democracy (for how else can the majority, and then the whole population without exception, proceed to discharge state functions?); and that, secondly, "primitive democracy" based on capitalism and capitalist culture is not the same as primitive democracy in prehistoric or pre-capitalist times. Capitalist culture has *created* large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service,

telephones, etc., and *on this basis* the great majority of the functions of the old "state power" have become so simplified and can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of registration, filing, and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate person, can quite easily be performed for ordinary "workmen's wages", and that these functions can (and must) be stripped of every shadow of privilege, of every semblance of "official grandeur".

All officials, without exception, elected and subject to recall *at any time*, their salaries reduced to the level of ordinary "workmen's wages"—these simple and "self-evident" democratic measures, while completely uniting the interests of the workers and the majority of the peasants, at the same time serve as a bridge leading from capitalism to socialism. These measures concern the reorganisation of the state, the purely political reorganisation of society; but, of course, they acquire their full meaning and significance only in connection with the "expropriation of the expropriators" either bring accomplished or in preparation, i.e., with the transformation of capitalist private ownership of the means of production into social ownership.

> "The Commune," Marx wrote, "made the catchword of all bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality, by abolishing the two greatest sources of expenditure—the army and the officialdom."

From the peasants, as from other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, only an insignificant few "rise to the top", "get on in the world" in the bourgeois sense, i.e., become either well-to-do, bourgeois, or officials in secure and privileged positions. In every capitalist country where there are peasants (as there are in most capitalist countries), the vast majority of them are oppressed by the government and long for its overthrow, long for "cheap" government. This can be achieved *only* by the proletariat; and by achieving it, the proletariat at the same time takes a step towards the socialist reorganisation of the state.

3. ABOLITION OF PARLIAMENTARISM

> "The Commune," Marx wrote, "was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time....
>
> "Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to represent and repress [ver- and zertreten] the people in parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people constituted in communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workers, foremen and accountants for his business."

Owing to the prevalence of social-chauvinism and opportunism, this remarkable criticism of parliamentarism, made in 1871, also belongs now to the "forgotten words" of Marxism. The professional Cabinet Ministers and parliamentarians, the traitors to the proletariat and the "practical" socialists of our day, have left all criticism of parliamentarism to the anarchists, and, on this wonderfully reasonable ground, they denounce *all* criticism of parliamentarism as "anarchism"!! It is not surprising that the proletariat of the "advanced" parliamentary countries, disgusted with such "socialists" as the Scheidemanns, Davids, Legiens, Sembats, Renaudels, Hendersons, Vanderveldes, Staunings, Brantings, Bissolatis, and Co., has been with increasing frequency giving its sympathies to anarcho-syndicalism, in spite of the fact that the latter is merely the twin brother of opportunism.

For Marx, however, revolutionary dialectics was never the empty fashionable phrase, the toy rattle, which Plekhanov, Kautsky and others have made of it. Marx knew how to break with anarchism ruthlessly for its inability to make use even of the "pigsty" of bourgeois parliamentarism, especially when the situation was obviously not revolutionary; but at the same time he knew how to subject parliamentarism to genuinely revolutionary proletarian criticism.

To decide once every few years which members of the ruling class is to repress and crush the people through parliament—this is the real essence of bourgeois parliamen-

tarism, not only in parliamentary-constitutional monarchies, but also in the most democratic republics.

But if we deal with the question of the state, and if we consider parliamentarism as one of the institutions of the state, from the point of view of the tasks of the proletariat in *this* field, what is the way out of parliamentarism? How can it be dispensed with?

Once again, we must say: the lessons of Marx, based on the study of the Commune, have been so completely forgotten that the present-day "Social-Democrat" (i.e., present-day traitor to socialism) really cannot understand any criticism of parliamentarism other than anarchist or reactionary criticism.

The way out of parliamentarism is not, of course, the abolition of representative institutions and the elective principle, but the conversion of the representative institutions from talking shops into "working" bodies. "The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time."

"A working, not a parliamentary body"—this is a blow straight from the shoulder at the present-day parliamentarians and parliamentary "lap-dogs" of Social-Democracy! Take any parliamentary country, from America to Switzerland, from France to Britain, Norway and so forth—in these countries the real business of "state" is performed behind the scenes and is carried on by the departments, chancelleries, and General Staffs. Parliament is given up to talk for the special purpose of fooling the "common people". This is so true that even in the Russian republic, a bourgeois-democratic republic, all these sins of parliamentarism came out at once, even before it managed to set up a real parliament. The heroes of rotten philistinism, such as the Skobelevs and Tseretelis, the Chernovs and Avksentyevs, have even succeeded in polluting the Soviets after the fashion of the most disgusting bourgeois parliamentarism, in converting them into mere talking shops. In the Soviets, the "socialist" Ministers are fooling the credulous rustics with phrase-mongering and resolutions. In the government itself a sort of permanent shuffle is going on in order that, on the one hand, as many Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as possible may in turn get near the "pie", the

lucrative and honourable posts, and that, on the other hand, the "attention" of the people may be "engaged". Meanwhile the chancelleries and army staffs "do" the business of "state".

Dyelo Naroda, the organ of the ruling Socialist-Revolutionary Party, recently admitted in a leading article—with the matchless frankness of people of "good society", in which "all" are engaged in political prostitution—that even in the ministries headed by the "socialists" (save the mark!), the whole bureaucratic apparatus is in fact unchanged, is working in the old way and quite "freely" sabotaging revolutionary measures! Even without this admission, does not the actual history of the participation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the government prove this? It is noteworthy, however, that in the ministerial company of the Cadets, the Chernovs, Rusanovs, Zenzinovs and other editors of *Dyelo Naroda* have so completely lost all sense of shame as to brazenly assert, as if it were a mere bagetelle, that in "their" ministries everything is unchanged!! Revolutionary-democratic phrases to gull the rural Simple Simons, and bureaucracy and red tape to "gladden the hearts" of the capitalists—that is the *essence* of the "honest" coalition.

The Commune substitutes for the venal and rotten parliamentarism of bourgeois society institutions in which freedom of opinion and discussion does not degenerate into deception, for the parliamentarians themselves have to work, have to execute their own laws, have themselves to test the results achieved in reality, and to account directly to their constituents. Representative institutions remain, but there is *no* parliamentarism here as a special system, as the division of labour between the legislative and the executive, as a privileged position for the deputies. We cannot imagine democracy, even proletarian democracy, without representative institutions, but we can and *must* imagine democracy without parliamentarism, if criticism of bourgeois society is not mere words for us, if the desire to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie is our earnest and sincere desire, and not a mere "election" cry for catching workers' votes, as it is with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and also the Scheidemanns and Legiens, the Semblats and Vanderveldes.

It is extremely instructive to note that, in speaking of the function of *those* officials who are necessary for the Commune and for proletarian democracy, Marx compares them to the workers of "every other employer", that is, of the ordinary capitalist enterprise, with its "workers, foremen, and accountants".

There is no trace of utopianism in Marx, in the sense that he made up or invented a "new" society. No, he studied the *birth* of the new society *out of* the old, and the forms of transition from the latter to the former, as a natural-historical process. He examined the actual experience of a mass proletarian movement and tried to draw practical lessons from it. He "Learned" from the Commune, just as all the great revolutionary thinkers learned unhesitatingly from the experience of great movements of the oppressed classes, and never addressed them with pedantic "homilies" (such as Plekhanov's: "They should not have taken up arms" or Tsereteli's: "A class must limit itself").

Abolishing the bureaucracy at once, everywhere and completely, is out of the question. It is a utopia. But to *smash* the old bureaucratic machine at once and to begin immediately to construct a new one that will make possible the gradual abolition of all bureaucracy—this is *not* a utopia, it is the experience of the Commune, the direct and immediate task of the revolutionary proletariat.

Capitalism simplifies the functions of "state" administration; it makes it possible to cast "bossing" aside and to confine the whole matter to the organisation of the proletarians (as the ruling class), which will hire "workers, foremen and accountants" in the name of the whole of society.

We are not utopians, we do not "dream" of dispensing *at once* with all administration, with all subordination. These anarchist dreams, based upon incomprehension of the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship, are totally alien to Marxism, and, as a matter of fact, serve only to postpone the socialist revolution until people are different. No, we want the socialist revolution with people as they are now, with people who cannot dispense with subordination, control, and "foremen and accountants".

The subordination, however, must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and working people, i.e., to

the proletariat. A beginning can and must be made at once, overnight, to replace the specific "bossing" of state officials by the simple functions of "foremen and accountants", functions which are already fully within the ability of the average town dweller and can well be performed for "workmen's wages".

We, the workers, shall organise large-scale production on the basis of what capitalism has already created, relying on our own experience as workers, establishing strict, iron discipline backed up by the state power of the armed workers. We shall reduce the role of state officials to that of simply carrying out our instructions as responsible, revocable, modestly paid "foremen and accountants" (of course, with the aid of technicians of all sorts, types and degrees). This is *our* proletarian task, this is what we can and must *start* with in accomplishing the proletarian revolution. Such a beginning, on the basis of large-scale production, will of itself lead to the gradual "withering away" of all bureaucracy, to the gradual creation of an order—an order without inverted commas, an order bearing no similarity to wage slavery—an order under which the functions of control and accounting, becoming more and more simple, will be performed by each in turn, will then become a habit and will finally die out as the *special* functions of a special section of the population.

A witty German Social-Democrat of the seventies of the last century called the *postal service* an example of the socialist economic system. This is very true. At the present the postal service is a business organised on the lines of a state-*capitalist* monopoly. Imperialism is gradually transforming all trusts into organisations of a similar type, in which, standing over the "common" people, who are overworked and starved, one has the same bourgeois bureaucracy. But the mechanism of social management is here already to hand. Once we have overthrown the capitalists, crushed the resistance of these exploiters with the iron hand of the armed workers, and smashed the bureaucratic machinery of the modern state, we shall have a splendidly-equipped mechanism, freed from the "parasite", a mechanism which can very well be set going by the united workers themselves, who will hire technicians, foremen and accountants, and pay them

all, as indeed *all* "state" officials in general, workmen's wages. Here is a concrete, practical task which can immediately be fulfilled in relation to all trusts, a task whose fulfilment will rid the working people of exploitation, a task which takes account of what the Commune had already begun to practice (particularly in building up the state).

To organise the *whole* economy on the lines of the postal service so that the technicians, foremen and accountants, as well as *all* officials, shall receive salaries no higher than "a workman's wage", all under the control and leadership of the armed proletariat—that is our immediate aim. This is the state and this is the economic foundation we need. This is what will bring about the abolition of parliamentarism and the preservation of representative institutions. This is what will rid the labouring classes of the bourgeoisie's prostitution of these institutions.

4. ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL UNITY

> "In a brief sketch of national organisation which the Commune had no time to develop, it states explicitly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest village...." The communes were to elect the "National Delegation" in Paris.
>
> "...The few but important functions which would still remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as had been deliberately mis-stated, but were to be transferred to communal, i.e., strictly responsible, officials.
>
> "...National unity was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, organised by the communal constitution; it was to become a reality by the destruction of state power which posed as the embodiment of that unity yet wanted to be independent of, and superior to, the nation, on whose body it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority claiming the right to stand above society, and restored to the responsible servants of society."

The extent to which the opportunists of present-day Social-Democracy have failed—perhaps it would be more true to say, have refused—to understand these observations of Marx is best shown by that book of Herostratean fame of the renegade Bernstein, *The Premises of Socialism and the Tasks of the Social-Democrats*. It is in connection with the above passage from Marx that Bernstein wrote that "as far as its political content is concerned", this programme "displays, in all its essential features, the greatest similarity to the federalism of Proudhon.... In spite of all the other points of difference between Marx and the 'petty-bourgeois' Proudhon [Bernstein places the word "petty-bourgeois" in inverted commas, to make it sound ironical] on these points, their lines of reasoning run as close as could be." Of course, Bernstein continues, the importance of the municipalities is growing, but "it seems doubtful to me whether the first job of democracy would be such a dissolution [Auflösung] of the modern states and such a complete transformation [Umwandlung] of their organisation as is visualised by Marx and Proudhon (the formation of a National Assembly from delegates of the provincial of district assemblies, which, in their turn, would consist of delegates from the communes), so that consequently the previous mode of national representation would disappear." (Bernstein, *Premises*, German edition, 1899, pp. 134 and 136.)

To confuse Marx's view on the "destruction of state power, a parasitic excrescence", with Proudhon's federalism is positively monstrous! But it is no accident, for it never occurs to the opportunist that Marx does not speak here at all about federalism as opposed to centralism, but about smashing the old, bourgeois state machine which exists in all bourgeois countries.

The only thing that does occur to the opportunist is what he sees around him, in an environment of petty-bourgeois philistinism and "reformists" stagnation, namely, only "municipalities"! The opportunist has even grown out of the habit of thinking about proletarian revolution.

It is ridiculous. But the remarkable thing is that nobody argued with Bernstein on this point. Bernstein has been refuted by many, especially by Plekhanov in Russian literature and by Kautsky in European literature, but neith-

er of them has said *anything* about *this* distortion of Marx by Bernstein.

The opportunist has so much forgotten how to think in a revolutionary way and to dwell on revolution that he attributes "federalism" to Marx, whom he confuses with the founder of anarchism, Proudhon. As for Kautsky and Plekhanov, who claim to be orthodox Marxists and defenders of the theory of revolutionary Marxism, they are silent on this point! Here is one of the roots of the extreme vulgarisation of the views on the difference between Marxism and anarchism, which is characteristic of both the Kautskyites and the opportunists, and which we shall discuss again later.

There is not a trace of federalism in Marx's above-quoted observation on the experience of the Commune. Marx agreed with Proudhon on the very point that the opportunist Bernstein did not see. Marx disagreed with Proudhon on the very point on which Bernstein found a similarity between them.

Marx agreed with Proudhon in that they both stood for the "smashing" of the modern state machine. Neither the opportunists nor the Kautskyites wish to see the similarity of views on this point between Marxism and anarchism (both Proudhon and Bakunin) because this is where they have departed from Marxism.

Marx disagreed both with Proudhon and Bakunin precisely on the question of federalism (not to mention the dictatorship of the proletariat). Federalism as a principle follows logically from the petty-bourgeois views of anarchism. Marx was a centralist. There is no departure whatever from centralism in his observations just quoted. Only those who are imbued with the philistine "superstitious belief" in the state can mistake the destruction of the bourgeois state machine for the destruction of centralism!

Now if the proletariat and the poor peasants take state power into their own hands, organise themselves quite freely in communes, and *unite* the action of all the communes in striking at capital, in crushing the resistance of the capitalists, and in transferring the privately-owned railways, factories, land and so on to the *entire* nation, to the whole of society, won't that be centralism? Won't that be the most

consistent democratic centralism and, moreover, proletarian centralism?

Bernstein simply cannot conceive of the possibility of voluntary centralism, of the voluntary fusion amalgamation of the proletarian communes, for the sole purpose of destroying bourgeois rule and the bourgeois state machine. Like all philistines, Bernstein pictures centralism as something which can be imposed and maintained solely from above, and solely by the bureaucracy and military clique.

As though foreseeing that his views might be distorted, Marx expressly emphasised that the charge that the Commune had wanted to destroy national unity, to abolish the central authority, was a deliberate fraud. Marx purposely used the words: "National unity was ... to be organised", so as to oppose conscious, democratic, proletarian centralism to bourgeois, military, bureaucratic centralism.

But there are none so deaf as those who will not hear. And the very thing the opportunists of present-day Social-Democracy do not want to hear about it the destruction of state power, the amputation of the parasitic excrescence.

5. ABOLITION OF THE PARASITE STATE

We have already quoted Marx's words on the subject, and we must now supplement them.

> "It is generally the fate of new historical creations," he wrote, "to be mistaken for the counterpart of older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness. Thus, this new Commune, which breaks [*bricht*, smashes] the modern state power, has been regarded as a revival of the medieval communes ... as a federation of small states (as Montesquieu and the Girondins[139] visualised it) ... as an exaggerated form of the old struggle against over-centralisation....
>
> "...The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by that parasitic excrescence, the 'state', feeding upon and hampering the free movement of society. By this one act it would have initiated the regeneration of France....

> "...The Communal Constitution would have brought the rural producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and there secured to them, in the town working men, the natural trustees of their interests. The very existence of the Commune involved, as a matter of course, local self-government, but no longer as a counterpoise to state power, now become superfluous."

"Breaking state power", which as a "parasitic excrescence"; its "amputation", its "smashing"; "state power, now become superfluous"—these are the expressions Marx used in regard to the state when appraising and analysing the experience of the Commune.

All this was written a little less than half a century ago; and now one has to engage in excavations, as it were, in order to bring undistorted Marxism to the knowledge of the mass of the people. The conclusions drawn from the observation of the last great revolution which Marx lived through were forgotten just when the time for the next great proletarian revolution has arrived.

> "...The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which expressed themselves in it show that it was a thoroughly flexible political form, while all previous forms of government had been essentially repressive. Its true secret was this: it was essentially *a working-class government*, the result of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which the economic emancipation of labour could be accomplished....
>
> "Except on this last condition, the Communal Constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion...."

The utopians busied themselves with "discovering" political forms under which the socialist transformation of society was to take place. The anarchists dismissed the question of political forms altogether. The opportunists of present-day Social-Democracy accepted the bourgeois

political forms of the parliamentary democratic state as the limit which should not be overstepped; they battered their foreheads praying before this "model", and denounced as anarchism every desire to *break* these forms.

Marx deduced from the whole history of socialism and the political struggle that the state was bound to disappear, and that the transitional form of its disappearance (the transition from state to non-state) would be the "proletariat organised as the ruling class". Marx, however, did not set out to *discover* the political *forms* of this future stage. He limited himself to carefully observing French history, to analysing it, and to drawing the conclusion to which the year 1851 had led, namely, that matters were moving towards *destruction* of the bourgeois state machine.

And when the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat burst forth, Marx, in spite of its failure, in spite of its short life and patent weakness, began to study the forms it had *discovered*.

The Commune is the form "at last discovered" by the proletarian revolution, under which the economic emancipation of labour can take place.

The Commune is the first attempt by a proletarian revolution to *smash* the bourgeois state machine; and it is the political form "at last discovered", by which the smashed state machine can and must be *replaced*.

We shall see further on that the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, in different circumstances and under different conditions, continue the work of the Commune and confirm Marx's brilliant historical analysis.

CHAPTER IV

CONTINUATION. SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS BY ENGELS

Marx gave the fundamentals concerning the significance of the experience of the Commune. Engels returned to the same subject time and again, and explained Marx's analysis and conclusions, sometimes elucidating *other* aspects of the question with such power and vividness that it is necessary to deal with his explanations specially.

1. THE HOUSING QUESTION

In his work, *The Housing Question* (1872), Engels already took into account the experience of the Commune, and dealt several times with the tasks of the revolution in relation to the state. It is interesting to note that the treatment of this specific subject clearly revealed, on the one hand, points of similarity between the proletarian state and the present state—points that warrant speaking of the state in both cases—and, on the other hand, points of difference between them, or the transition to the destruction of the state.

> "How is the housing question to be settled then? In present-day society, it is settled just as any other social question: by the gradual economic levelling of demand and supply, a settlement which reproduces the question itself again and again and therefore is no settlement. How a social revolution would settle this question not only depends on the circumstances in each particular case, but is also connected with much more far-reaching questions, one of the most fundamental of which is the abolition of the antithesis between town and country. As it is not our task to create utopian systems for the organisation of the future society, it would be more than idle to go into the question here. But one thing is certain: there is already a sufficient quantity of houses in the big cities to remedy immediately all real 'housing *shortage*', provided they are used judiciously. This can naturally only occur through the expropriation of the present owners and by quartering in their houses homeless workers or workers overcrowded in their present homes. As soon as the proletariat has won political power, such a measure prompted by concern for the common good will be just as easy to carry out as are other expropriations and billetings by the present-day state." (German edition, 1887, p. 22.)[140]

The change in the form of state power is not examined here, but only the content of its activity. Expropriations and billetings take place by order even of the present state. From the formal point of view, the proletarian state will

also "order" the occupation of dwellings and expropriation of houses. But it is clear that the old executive apparatus, the bureaucracy, which is connected with the bourgeoisie, would simply be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletarian state.

> "...It must be pointed out that the 'actual seizure' of all the instruments of labour, the taking possession of industry as a whole by the working people, is the exact opposite of the Proudhonist 'redemption'. In the latter case the individual worker becomes the owner of the dwelling, the peasant farm, the instruments of labour; in the former case, the 'working people' remain the collective owners of the houses, factories and instruments of labour, and will hardly permit their use, at least during a transitional period, by individuals or associations without compensation for the cost. In the same way, the abolition of property in land is not the abolition of ground rent but its transfer, if in a modified form, to society. The actual seizure of all the instruments of labour by the working people, therefore, does not at all preclude the retention of rent relations." (P. 68.)

We shall examine the question touched upon in this passage, namely, the economic basis for the withering away of the state, in the next chapter. Engels expresses himself most cautiously, saying that the proletarian state would "hardly" permit the use of houses without payment, "at least during a transitional period". The letting of houses owed by the whole people to individual families presupposes the collection of rent, a certain amount of control, and the employment of some standard in allotting the housing. All this calls for a certain form of state, but it does not at all call for a special military bureaucratic apparatus, with officials occupying especially privileged positions. The transition to a situation in which it will be possible to supply dwellings rent-free depends on the complete "withering away" of the state.

Speaking of the Blanquists' adoption of the fundamental position of Marxism after the Commune and under the

influence of its experience, Engels, in passing, formulates this position as follows:

> "...Necessity of political action by the proletariat and of its dictatorship as the transition to the abolition of classes and, with them, of the state...." (P. 55.)

Addicts of hair-splitting criticism, or bourgeois "exterminators of Marxism", will perhaps see a contradiction between this *recognition* of the "abolition of the state" and repudiation of this formula as an anarchist one in the above passage from *Anti-Dühring*. It would not be surprising if the opportunists classed Engels, too, as an "anarchist", for it is becoming increasingly common with the social-chauvinists to accuse the internationalists of anarchism.

Marxism has always taught that with the abolition of classes the state will also be abolished. The well-known passage on the "withering away of the state in *Anti-Dühring* accuses the anarchists not simply of favouring the abolition of the state, but of preaching that the state can be abolished "overnight".

As the now prevailing "Social-Democratic" doctrine completely distorts the relation of Marxism to anarchism on the question of the abolition of the state, it will be particularly useful to recall a certain controversy in which Marx and Engels came out against the anarchists.

2. CONTROVERSY WITH THE ANARCHISTS

This controversy took place in 1873. Marx and Engels contributed articles against the Proudhonists, "autonomists" or "anti-authoritarians", to an Italian socialist annual, and it was not until 1913 that these articles appeared in German in *Neue Zeit*.[141]

> "If the political struggle of the working class assumes revolutionary form," wrote Marx, ridiculing the anarchists for their repudiation of politics, "and if the workers set up their revolutionary dictatorship in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, they commit the terrible crime of violating principles, for in order to satisfy their wretched, vulgar everyday needs and to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, they give the

> state a revolutionary and transient form, instead of laying down their arms and abolishing the state." (*Neue Zeit*, Vol. XXXII, 1, 1913-14, p. 40.)

It was solely against this kind of "abolition" of the state that Marx fought in refuting the anarchists! He did not at all oppose the view that the state would disappear when classes disappeared, or that it would be abolished when classes were abolished. What he did oppose was the proposition that the workers should renounce the use of arms, organised violence, *that is*, *the state*, which is to serve to "crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie".

To prevent the true meaning of his struggle against anarchism from being distorted, Marx expressly emphasised the "revolutionary and *transient* form" of the state which the proletariat needs. The proletariat needs the state only temporarily. We do not after all differ with the anarchists on the question of the abolition of the state as the *aim*. We maintain that, to achieve this aim, we must temporarily make use of the instruments, resources, and methods of state power *against* the exploiters, just as the temporary dictatorship of the oppressed class is necessary for the abolition of classes. Marx chooses the sharpest and clearest way of stating his case against the anarchists: After overthrowing the yoke of the capitalists, should the workers "lay down their arms", or use them against the capitalists in order to crush their resistance? But what is the systematic use of arms by one class against another if not a "transient form" of state?

Let every Social-Democrat ask himself: Is *that* how he has been posing the question of the state in controversy with the anarchists? Is *that* how it has been posed by the vast majority of the official socialist parties of the Second International?

Engels expounds the same ideas in much greater detail and still more popularly. First of all he ridicules the muddled ideas of the Proudhonists, who call themselves "anti-authoritarians", i.e., repudiated all authority, all subordination, all power. Take a factory, a railway, a ship on the high seas, said Engels: is it not clear that not one of these complex technical establishments, based on the use of machinery and the systematic co-operation of many people,

could function without a certain amount of subordination and, consequently, without a certain amount of authority or power?

> "...When I counter the most rabid anti-authoritarians with these arguments, they only answer they can give me is the following: Oh, that's true, except that here it is not a question of authority with which we vest our delegates, *but of a commission*! These people imagine they can change a thing by changing its name...."

Having thus shown that authority and autonomy are relative terms, that the sphere of their application varies with the various phases of social development, that it is absurd to take them as absolutes, and adding that the sphere of application of machinery and large-scale production is steadily expanding, Engels passes from the general discussion of authority to the question of the state.

> "Had the autonomists," he wrote, "contented themselves with saying that the social organisation of the future would allow authority only within the bounds which the conditions of production make inevitable, one could have come to terms with them. But they are blind to all facts that make authority necessary and they passionately fight the word.
>
> "Why do the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out against political authority, the state? All socialists are agreed that the state, and with it political authority, will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their political character and become mere administrative functions of watching over social interests. But the anti-authoritarians demand that the political state be abolished at one stroke, even before the social relations that gave both to it have been destroyed. They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be the abolition of authority.
>
> "Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is an act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles,

> bayonets and cannon, all of which are highly authoritarian means. And the victorious party must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted more than a day if it had not used the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie? Cannot we, on the contrary, blame it for having made too little use of that authority? Therefore, one of two things: either that anti-authoritarians don't know what they are talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion. Or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the cause of the proletariat. In either case they serve only reaction." (P. 39.)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This argument touches upon questions which should be examined in connection with the relationship between politics and economics during the withering away of the state (the next chapter is devoted to this). These questions are: the transformation of public functions from political into simple functions of administration, and the "political state". This last term, one particularly liable to misunderstanding, indicates the process of the withering away of the state: at a certain stage of this process, the state which is withering away may be called a non-political state.

Against, the most remarkable thing in this argument of Engels's is the way he states his case against the anarchists. Social-Democrats, claiming to be disciples of Engels, have argued on this subject against the anarchists millions of times since 1873, but they have *not* argued as Marxists could and should. The anarchist idea of abolition of the state is muddled and *non-revolutionary*—that is how Engels put it. It is precisely the revolution in its rise and development, with its specific tasks in relation to violence, authority, power, the state, that the anarchists refuse to see.

The usual criticism of anarchism by present-day Social-Democrats has boiled down to the purest philistine banality: "We recognise the state, whereas the anarchists do not!" Naturally, such banality cannot but repel workers who are at all capable of thinking and revolutionary-minded. What Engels says is different. He stresses that all socialists recognise that the state will disappear as a result of the socialist

revolution. He then deals specifically with the question of the revolution—the very question which, as a rule, the Social-Democrats evade out of opportunism, leaving it, so to speak, exclusively for the anarchists "to work out". And when dealing with this question, Engels takes the bull by the horns; he asks: should not the Commune have made *more* use of the *revolutionary* power of the *state*, that is, of the proletariat armed and organised as the ruling class?

Prevailing official Social-Democracy usually dismissed the question of the concrete tasks of the proletariat in the revolution either with a philistine sneer, or, at best, with the sophistic evasion: "The future will show". And the anarchists were justified in saying about such Social-Democrats that they were failing in their task of giving the workers a revolutionary education. Engels draws upon the experience of the last proletarian revolution precisely for the purpose of making a most concrete study of what should be done by the proletariat, and in what manner, in relation to both the banks and the state.

3. LETTER TO BEBEL

One of the most, if not *the* most, remarkable observation on the state in the works of Marx and Engels is contained in the following passage in Engels's letter to Bebel dated March 18-28, 1875. This letter, we may observe in parenthesis, was, as far as we know, first published by Bebel in the second volume of his memoirs (*Aus meinem Leben*), which appeared in 1911, i.e., thirty-six years after the letter had been written and sent.

Engels wrote to Bebel criticising the same draft of the Gotha Programme which Marx criticised in his famous letter to Bracke. Referring specially to the question of the state, Engels said:

> "The free people's state has been transferred into the free state. Taken in its grammatical sense, a free state is one where the state is free in relation to its citizens, hence a state with a despotic government. The whole talk about the state should be dropped, especially since the Commune, which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. The 'people's state' has been thrown

> in our faces by the anarchists to the point of disgust, although already Marx's book against Proudhon and later the *Communist Manifesto* say plainly that with the introduction of the socialist order of society the state dissolves of itself [sich auflöst] and disappears. As the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a 'free people's state'; so long as the proletariat still *needs* the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist. We would therefore propose replacing the *state* everywhere by *Gemeinwesen*, a good old German word which can very well take the place of the French word *commune*." (Pp. 321-22 of the German original.)[142]

It should be borne in mind that this letter refers to the party programme which Marx criticised in a letter dated only a few weeks later than the above (Marx's letter is dated May 5, 1875), and that at the time Engels was living with Marx in London. Consequently, when he says "we" in the last sentence, Engels undoubtedly, in his own as well as in Marx's name, suggests to the leader of the German workers' party that the word "state" *be struck out of the programme* and replaced by the word "*community*".

What a howl about "anarchism" would be raised by the leading lights of present-day "Marxism", which has been falsified for the convenience of the opportunists, if such an amendment of the programme were suggested to them!

Let them howl. This will earn them the praises of the bourgeoisie.

And we shall go on with our work. In revising the programme of our Party, we must by all means take the advice of Engels and Marx into consideration in order to come nearer the truth, to restore Marxism by ridding it of distortions, to guide the struggle of the working class for its emancipation more correctly. Certainly no one opposed to the advice of Engels and Marx will be found among the Bolsheviks. The only difficulty that may perhaps arise will be in regard to

the term. In German there are two words meaning "community", of which Engels used the one which does *not* denote a single community, but their totality, a system of communities. In Russian there is no such word, and we may have to choose the French word "commune", although this also has its drawbacks.

"The Commune was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word"—this is the most theoretically important statement Engels makes. After what has been said above, this statement is perfectly clear. The Commune *was ceasing* to be a state since it had to suppress, not the majority of the population, but a minority (the exploiters). It had smashed the bourgeois state machine. In place of a *special* coercive force the population itself came on the scene. All this was a departure from the state in the proper sense of the word. And had the Commune become firmly established, all traces of the state in it would have "withered away" of themselves; it would not have had to "abolish" the institutions of the state—they would have ceased to function as they ceased to have anything to do.

"The 'people's state' has been thrown in our faces by the anarchists". In saying this, Engels above all has in mind Bakunin and his attacks on the German Social-Democrats. Engels admits that these attacks were justified *insofar* as the "people's state" was as much an absurdity and as much a departure from socialism as the "free people's state". Engels tried to put the struggle of the German Social-Democrats against the anarchists on the right lines, to make this struggle correct in principle, to ride it of opportunist prejudices concerning the "state". Unfortunately, Engels's letter was pigeon-holed for thirty-six years. We shall see farther on that, even after this letter was published, Kautsky persisted in virtually the same mistakes against which Engels had warned.

Bebel replied to Engels in a letter dated September 21, 1875, in which he wrote, among other things, that he "fully agreed" with Engels's opinion of the draft programme, and that he had reproached Liebknecht with readiness to make concessions (p. 334 of the German edition of Bebel's memoirs, Vol. II). But if we take Bebel's pamphlet, *Our Aims*, we find there views on the state that are absolutely wrong.

"The state must ... be transformed from one based on *class rule* into a *people's state*." (*Unsere Ziele*, German edition, 1886, p. 14.)

This was printed in the *ninth* (ninth!) edition of Bebel's pamphlet! It is not surprising that opportunist views on the state, so persistently repeated, were absorbed by the German Social-Democrats, especially as Engels's revolutionary interpretations had been safely pigeon-holed, and all the conditions of life were such as to "wean" them from revolution for a long time.

4. CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT OF THE ERFURT PROGRAMME

In analysing Marxist teachings on the state, the criticism of the draft of the Erfurt Programme,[143] sent by Engels to Kautsky on June 29, 1891, and published only ten years later in *Neue Zeit*, cannot be ignored; for it is with the *opportunist* views of the Social-Democrats on questions of *state* organisation that this criticism is mainly concerned.

We shall note in passing that Engels also makes an exceedingly valuable observation on economic questions, which shows how attentively and thoughtfully he watched the various changes occurring in modern capitalism, and how for this reason he was able to foresee to a certain extent the tasks of our present, the imperialist, epoch. Here is that observation: referring to the word "planlessness" (Planlosigkeit), used in the draft programme, as characteristic of capitalism, Engels wrote:

> "When we pass from joint-stock companies to trusts which assume control over, and monopolise, whole industries, it is not only private production that ceases, but also planlessness." (*Neue Zeit*, Vol. XX, 1, 1901-02, p. 8.)

Here was have what is most essential in the theoretical appraisal of the latest phase of capitalism, i.e., imperialism, namely, that capitalism becomes monopoly *capitalism*. The latter must be emphasised because the erroneous bourgeois reformist assertion that monopoly capitalism or state-monopoly capitalism is *no longer* capitalism, but can now

be called "state socialism" and so on, is very common. The trusts, of course, never provided, do not now provide, and cannot provide complete planning. But however much they do plan, however much the capitalist magnates calculate in advance the volume of production on a national and even on an international scale, and however much they systematically regulate it, we still remain under *capitalism*—at its new stage, it is true, but still capitalism, without a doubt. The "proximity" of *such* capitalism to socialism should serve genuine representatives of the proletariat as an argument proving the proximity, facility, feasibility, and urgency of the socialist revolution, and not at all as an argument for tolerating the repudiation of such a revolution and the efforts to make capitalism look more attractive, something which all reformists are trying to do.

But to return to the question of the state. In his letter Engels makes three particularly valuable suggestions: first, in regard to the republic; second, in regard to the connection between the national question and state organisation; and, third, in regard to local self-government.

In regard to the republic, Engels made this the focal point of this criticism of the draft of the Erfurt Programme. And when we recall the importance which the Erfurt Programme acquired for all the Social- Democrats of the world, and that it became the model for the whole Second International, we may say without exaggeration that Engels thereby criticises the opportunism of the whole Second International.

> "The political demands of the draft," Engels wrote, "have one great fault. *It lacks* [Engels's italics] precisely what should have been said."

And, later on, he makes it clear that the German Constitution is, strictly speaking, a copy of the extremely reactionary Constitution of 1850, that the Reichstag is only, as Wilhelm Liebknecht put it, "the fig leaf of absolutism" and that to wish "to transform all the instruments of labour into common property" on the basis of a constitution which legalises the existence of petty states and the federation of petty German states is an "obvious absurdity".

> "To touch on that is dangerous, however," Engels added, knowing only too well that it was impossible legally to include in the programme the demand for a republic in Germany. But he refused to merely accept this obvious consideration which satisfied "everybody". He continued: "Nevertheless, somehow or other, the thing has to be attacked. How necessary this is is shown precisely at the present time by opportunism, which is gaining ground [einreissende] in a large section of the Social-Democrat press. Fearing a renewal of the Anti-Socialist Law,[144] or recalling all manner of overhasty pronouncements made during the reign of that law, they now want the Party to find the present legal order in Germany adequate for putting through all Party demands by peaceful means...."

Engels particularly stressed the fundamental fact that the German Social-Democrats were prompted by fear of a renewal of the Anti- Socialist Law, and explicitly described it as opportunism; he declared that precisely because there was no republic and no freedom in Germany, the dreams of a "peaceful" path were perfectly absurd. Engels was careful not to tie his hands. He admitted that in republican or very free countries "one can conceive" (only "conceive"!) of a peaceful development towards socialism, but in Germany, he repeated,

> "...in Germany, where the government is almost omnipotent and the Reichstag and all other representative bodies have no real power, to advocate such a thing in Germany, where, moreover, there is no need to do so, means removing the fig leaf from absolutism and becoming oneself a screen for its nakedness."

The great majority of the official leaders of the German Social- Democratic Party, which pigeon-holed this advice, have really proved to be a screen for absolutism.

> "...In the long run such a policy can only lead one's own party astray. They push general, abstract political questions into the foreground, thereby concealing the immediate concrete questions, which at the moment of the first great events, the first political crisis, automat-

> ically pose themselves. What can result from this except that at the decisive moment the party suddenly proves helpless and that uncertainty and discord on the most decisive issues reign in it because these issues have never been discussed?...
>
> "This forgetting of the great, the principal considerations for the momentary interests of the day, this struggling and striving for the success of the moment regardless of later consequences, this sacrifice of the future of the movement for its present may be 'honestly' meant, but it is and remains opportunism, and 'honest' opportunism is perhaps the most dangerous of all....
>
> "If one thing is certain it is that our party and the working class can only come to power in the form of the democratic republic. This is even the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the Great French Revolution has already shown...."

Engels realised here in a particularly striking form the fundamental idea which runs through all of Marx's works, namely, that the democratic republic is the nearest approach to the dictatorship of the proletariat. For such a republic, without in the least abolishing the rule of capital, and, therefore, the oppression of the masses and the class struggle, inevitably leads to such an extension, development, unfolding, and intensification of this struggle that, as soon as it becomes possible to meet the fundamental interests of the oppressed masses, this possibility is realised inevitably and solely through the dictatorship of the proletariat, through the leadership of those masses by the proletariat. These, too, are "forgotten words" of Marxism for the whole of the Second International, and the fact that they have been forgotten was demonstrated with particular vividness by the history of the Menshevik Party during the first six months of the Russian revolution of 1917.

On the subject of a federal republic, in connection with the national composition of the population, Engels wrote:

> "What should take the place of the present-day Germany [with its reactionary monarchical Constitution and its equally reactionary division into petty states, a division which perpetuates all the specific features of

> "Prussianism" instead of dissolving them in Germany as a whole]? In my view, the proletariat can only use the form of the one and indivisible republic. In the gigantic territory of the United States, a federal republic is still, on the whole, a necessity, although in the Eastern states it is already becoming a hindrance. It would be a step forward in Britain where the two islands are peopled by four nations and in spite of a single Parliament three different systems of legislation already exist side by side. In little Switzerland, it has long been a hindrance, tolerable only because Switzerland is content to be a purely passive member of the European state system. For Germany, federalisation on the Swiss model would be an enormous step backward. Two points distinguish a union state from a completely unified state: first, that each member state, each canton, has its own civil and criminal legislative and judicial system, and, second, that alongside a popular chamber there is also a federal chamber in which each canton, whether large or small, votes as such." In Germany, the union state is the transition to the completely unified state, and the "revolution from above" of 1866 and 1870 must not be reversed but supplemented by a "movement from below".

Far from being indifferent to the forms of state, Engels, on the contrary, tried to analyse the transitional forms with the utmost thoroughness in order to establish, in accordance with the concrete historical peculiarities of each particular case, *from what and to what* the given transitional form is passing.

Approaching the matter from the standpoint of the proletariat and the proletarian revolution, Engels, like Marx, upheld democratic centralism, the republic—one and indivisible. He regarded the federal republic either as an exception and a hindrance to development, or as a transition from a monarchy to a centralised republic, as a "step forward" under certain special conditions. And among these special conditions, he puts the national question to the fore.

Although mercilessly criticising the reactionary nature of small states, and the screening of this by the national question in certain concrete cases, Engels, like Marx, never

betrayed the slightest desire to brush aside the national question—a desire of which the Dutch and Polish Marxists, who proceed from their perfectly justified opposition to the narrow philistine nationalism of "their" little states, are often guilty.

Even in regard to Britain, where geographical conditions, a common language and the history of many centuries would seem to have "put an end" to the national question in the various small divisions of the country—even in regard to that country, Engels reckoned with the plain fact that the national question was not yet a thing of the past, and recognised in consequence that the establishment of a federal republic would be a "step forward". Of course, there is not the slightest hint here of Engels abandoning the criticism of the shortcomings of a federal republic or renouncing the most determined advocacy of, and struggle for, a unified and centralised democratic republic.

But Engels did not at all men democratic centralism in the bureaucratic sense in which the term is used by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists, the anarchists among the latter. His idea of centralism did not in the least preclude such broad local self-government as would combine the voluntary defence of the unity of the state by the "communes" and districts, and the complete elimination of all bureaucratic practices and all "ordering" from above. Carrying forward the programme views of Marxism on the state, Engels wrote:

> "So, then, a unified republic—but not in the sense of the present French Republic, which is nothing but the Empire established in 1798 without the Emperor. From 1792 to 1798 each French department, each commune [Gemeinde], enjoyed complete self-government on the American model, and this is what we too must have. How self-government is to be organised and how we can manage, without a bureaucracy has been shown to us by America and the first French Republic, and is being shown even today by Australia, Canada and the other English colonies. And a provincial [regional] and communal self-government of this type is far freer than, for instance, Swiss federalism, under which, it is

> true, the canton is very independent in relation to the Bund [i.e., the federated state as a whole], but is also independent in relation to the district [Bezirk] and the commune. The cantonal governments appoint the district governors [Bezirksstatthalter] and prefects—which is unknown in English-speaking countries and which we want to abolish here as resolutely in the future as the Prussian Landräte and Regierungsräte" (commissioners, district police chiefs, governors, and in general all officials appointed from above). Accordingly, Engels proposes the following words for the self-government clause in the programme: "Complete self-government for the provinces [gubernias or regions], districts and communes through officials elected by universal suffrage. The abolition of all local and provincial authorities appointed by the state."

I have already had occasion to point out—in *Pravda* (No. 68, May 28, 1917),* which was suppressed by the government of Kerensky and other "socialist" Ministers—how on this point (of course, not on this point alone by any means) our pseudo-socialist representatives of pseudo-revolutionary pseudo-democracy have made glaring departures *from democracy*. Naturally, people who have bound themselves by a "coalition" to the imperialist bourgeoisie have remained deaf to this criticism.

It is extremely important to note that Engels, armed with facts, disproved by a most precise example the prejudice which is very widespread, particularly among petty-bourgeois democrats, that a federal republic necessarily means a greater amount of freedom than a centralised republic. This is wrong. It is disproved by the facts cited by Engels regarding the centralised French Republic of 1792-98 and the federal Swiss Republic. The really democratic centralised republic gave *more* freedom that the federal republic. In other words, the *greatest* amount of local, regional, and other freedom known in history was accorded by a *centralised* and not a federal republic.

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* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 536-38.—*Ed.*

Insufficient attention has been and is being paid in our Party propaganda and agitation to this fact, as, indeed, to the whole question of the federal and the centralised republic and local self-government.

5. THE 1891 PREFACE TO MARX'S *THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE*

In his preface to the third edition of *The Civil War in France* (this preface is dated March 18, 1891, and was originally published in *Neue Zeit*), Engels, in addition to some interesting incidental remarks on questions concerning the attitude towards the state, gave a remarkably vivid summary of the lessons of the Commune.[145] This summary, made more profound by the entire experience of the twenty years that separated the author from the Commune, and directed expressly against the "superstitious belief in the state" so widespread in Germany, may justly be called the *last word* of Marxism on the question under consideration.

> In France, Engels observed, the workers emerged with arms from every revolution: "therefore the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for the bourgeois, who were at the helm of the state. Hence, after every revolution won by the workers, a new struggle, ending with the defeat of the workers."

This summary of the experience of bourgeois revolutions is as concise as it is expressive. The essence of the matter—among other things, on the question of the state (*has the oppressed class arms*?)—is here remarkably well-grasped. It is precisely this essence that is most often evaded both by professors influenced by bourgeois ideology, and by petty-bourgeois democrats. In the Russian revolution of 1917, the honour (Cavaignac honour) of blabbing this secret of bourgeois revolutions fell to the Menshevik, would-be Marxist, Tsereteli. In his "historic" speech of June 11, Tsereteli blurted out that the bourgeoisie were determined to disarm the Petrograd workers—presenting, of course, this decision as his own, and as a necessity for the "state" in general!

Tsereteli's historical speech of June 11 will, of course, serve every historian of the revolution of 1917 as a graphic illustration of how the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc, led by Mr. Tsereteli, deserted to the bourgeoisie *against* the revolutionary proletariat.

Another incidental remark of Engels's, also connected with the question of the state, deals with religion. It is well known that the German Social-Democrats, as they degenerated and became increasingly opportunist, slipped more and more frequently into the philistine misinterpretation of the celebrated formula: "Religion is to be declared a private matter." That is, the formula was twisted to mean that religion was a private matter *even for the party* of the revolutionary proletariat!! It was against this complete betrayal of the revolutionary programme of the proletariat that Engels vigorously protested. In 1891 he saw only the *very feeble* beginnings of opportunism in his party, and, therefore, he expressed himself with extreme caution:

> "As almost only workers, or recognised representatives of the workers, sat in the Commune, its decisions bore a decidedly proletarian character. Either they decreed reforms which the republican bourgeoisie had failed to pass solely out of cowardice, but which provided a necessary basis for the free activity of the working class—such as the realisation of the principle that *in relation to the state* religion is a purely private matter—or the Commune promulgated decrees which were in the direct interest of the working class and in part cut deeply into the old order of society."

Engels deliberately emphasised the words "in relation to the state" as a straight thrust at German opportunism, which had declared religion to be a private matter *in relation to the party*, thus degrading the party of the revolutionary proletariat to the level of the most vulgar "free- thinking" philistinism, which is prepared to allow a non-denominational status, but which renounces the *party* struggle against the opium of religion which stupefies the people.

The future historian of the German Social-Democrats, in tracing the roots of their shameful bankruptcy in 1914, will find a fair amount of interesting material on this question,

beginning with the evasive declarations in the articles of the party's ideological leader, Kautsky, which throw the door wide open to opportunism, and ending with the attitude of the party towards the "Los-von-Kirche-Bewegung"[146] (the "Leave-the-Church" movement) in 1913.

But let us see how, twenty years after the Commune, Engels summed up its lessons for the fighting proletariat.

Here are the lessons to which Engels attached prime importance:

> "...It was precisely the oppressing power of the former centralised government, army, political parties, bureaucracy, which Napoleon had created in 1798 and which every new government had since then taken over as a welcome instrument and used against its opponents—it was this power which was to fall everywhere, just as it had fallen in Paris.
>
> "From the very outset the Commune had to recognise that the working class, once in power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just-gained supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old machinery of oppression previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any time...."

Engels emphasised once again that not only under a monarchy, but *also in a democratic republic* the state remains a state, i.e., it retains its fundamental distinguishing feature of transforming the officials, the 'servants of society", its organs, into the *masters* of society.

> "Against this transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society—an inevitable transformation in all previous states—the Commune used two infallible means. In the first place, it filled all posts—administrative, judicial, and educational—by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to recall at any time by the electors. And, in the second place, it paid all officials, high or low, only the wages received

> by other workers. The highest salary paid by the Commune to anyone was 6,000 francs.* In this way a dependable barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies, which were added besides...."

Engels here approached the interesting boundary line at which consistent democracy, on the one hand, is *transformed* into socialism and, on the other, *demands* socialism. For, in order to abolish the state, it is necessary to convert the functions of the civil service into the simple operations of control and accounting that are within the scope and ability of the vast majority of the population, and, subsequently, of every single individual. And if careerism is to be abolished completely, it must be made *impossible* for "honourable" though profitless posts in the Civil Service to be used as a springboard to highly lucrative posts in banks or joint-stock companies, as *constantly* happens in all the freest capitalist countries.

Engels, however, did not make the mistake some Marxists make in dealing, for example, with the question of the right of nations to self- determination, when they argue that is impossible under capitalism and will be superfluous under socialism. This seemingly clever but actually incorrect statement might be made in regard to *any* democratic institution, including moderate salaries for officials, because fully consistent democracy is impossible under capitalism, and under socialism all democracy *will wither away*.

This is a sophism like the old joke about a man becoming bald by losing one more hair.

To develop democracy *to the utmost*, to find the *forms* for this development, to test them *by practice*, and so forth—all this is one of the component tasks of the struggle for the social revolution. Taken separately, no kind of democracy will bring socialism. But in actual life democracy will never be "taken separately"; it will be "taken together" with other

* Nominally about 2,400 rubles or, according to the present rate of exchange, about 6,000 rubles. The action of those Bolsheviks who propose that a salary of 9,000 rubles be paid to members of municipal councils, for instance, instead of a maximum salary of 6,000 rubles—quite an adequate sum—*throughout the state*, is inexcusable.

things, it will exert its influence on economic life as well, will stimulate *its* transformation; and in its turn it will be influenced by economic development, and so on. This is the dialectics of living history.

Engels continued:

> "...This shattering [Sprengung] of the former state power and its replacement by a new and truly democratic one is described in detail in the third section of *The Civil War*. But it was necessary to touch briefly here once more on some of its features, because in Germany particularly the superstitious belief in the state has passed from philosophy into the general consciousness of the bourgeoisie and even of many workers. According to the philosophical conception, the state is the 'realisation of the idea', or the Kingdom of God on earth, translated into philosophical terms, the sphere in which eternal truth and justice are, or should be, realised. And from this follows a superstitious reverence for the state and everything connected with it, which takes root the more readily since people are accustomed from childhood to imagine that the affairs and interests common to the whole of society could not be looked after other than as they have been looked after in the past, that is, through the state and its lucratively positioned officials. And people think they have taken quite an extraordinary bold step forward when they have rid themselves of belief in hereditary monarchy and swear by the democratic republic. In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy. And at best it is an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious proletariat will have to lop off as speedily as possible, just as the Commune had to, until a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to discard the entire lumber of the state."

Engels warned the Germans not to forget the principles of socialism with regard to the state in general in connec-

tion with the substitution of a republic for the monarchy. His warnings now read like a veritable lesson to the Tseretelis and Chernovs, who in their "coalition" practice have revealed a superstitious belief in, and a superstitious reverence for, the state!

Two more remarks. 1. Engels's statement that in a democratic republic, "no less" than in a monarchy, the state remains a "machine for the oppression of one class by another" by no means signifies that the *form* of oppression makes no difference to the proletariat, as some anarchists "teach". A wider, freer and more open *form* of the class struggle and of class oppression vastly assists the proletariat in its struggle for the abolition of classes in general.

2. Why will only a new generation be able to discard the entire lumber of the state? This question is bound up with that of overcoming democracy, with which we shall deal now.

6. ENGELS ON THE OVERCOMING OF DEMOCRACY

Engels came to express his views on this subject when establishing that the term "Social-Democrat" was *scientifically* wrong.

In a preface to an edition of his articles of the seventies on various subjects, mostly on "international" questions (*Internationales aus dem Volkstaat**), dated January 3, 1894, i.e., written a year and a half before his death, Engels wrote that in all his articles he used the word "Communist", and *not* "Social-Democrat", because at that time the Proudhonists in France and the Lassalleans[147] in Germany called themselves Social-Democrats.

> "...For Marx and myself," continued Engels, "it was therefore absolutely impossible to use such a loose term to characterise our special point of view. Today things are different, and the word ["Social-Democrat"] may perhaps pass muster [mag passieren], inexact [*unpassend*, unsuitable] though it still is for a party whose economic programme is not merely socialist in general, but downright communist, and whose ultimate political aim is to overcome the whole state and, consequent-

* *On International Topics from "The People's State".—Ed.*

> ly, democracy as well. The names of *real* [Engels's italics] political parties, however, are never wholly appropriate; the party develops while the name stays."[148]

The dialectician Engels remained true to dialectics to the end of his days. Marx and I, he said, had a splendid, scientifically exact name for the party, but there was no real party, i.e., no mass proletarian party. Now (at the end of the nineteenth century) there was a real party, but its name was scientifically wrong. Never mind, it would "pass muster", so long as the party *developed*, so long as the scientific in accuracy of the name was not hidden from it and did not hinder its development on the right direction!

Perhaps some wit would console us Bolsheviks in the manner of Engels: we have a real party, it is developing splendidly; even such a meaningless and ugly term as "Bolshevik" will "pass muster", although it expresses nothing whatever but the purely accidental fact that at the Brussels-London Congress of 1903 we were in the majority.* Perhaps now that the persecution of our Party by republicans and "revolutionary" petty-bourgeois democrats in July and August has earned the name "Bolshevik" such universal respect, now that, in addition, this persecution marks the tremendous historical progress our Party has made in its *real* development—perhaps now even I might hesitate to insist on the suggestion I made in April to change the name of our Party. Perhaps I would propose a "compromise" to my comrades, namely, to call ourselves the Communist Party, but to retain the word "Bolshevik" in brackets.

But the question of the name of the Party is incomparably less important than the question of the attitude of the revolutionary proletariat to the state.

In the usual argument about the state, the mistake is constantly made against which Engels warned and which we have in passing indicated above, namely, it is constantly forgotten that the abolition of the state means also the abolition of democracy: that the withering away of the state means the withering away of democracy.

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* "Majority" in Russian is *bolshinstvo*; hence the name *Bolshevik*.—*Tr.*

At first sight this assertion seems exceedingly strange and incomprehensible; indeed, someone may even suspect us of expecting the advent of a system of society in which the principle of subordination of the minority to the majority will not be observed—for democracy means the recognition of this very principle.

No, democracy is *not* identical with the subordination of the minority to the majority. Democracy is a *state* which recognises the subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e., an organisation for the systematic use of *force* by one class against another, by one section of the population against another.

We set ourselves the ultimate aim of abolishing the state, i.e., all organised and systematic violence, all use of violence against people in general. We do not expect the advent of a system of society in which the principle of subordination of the minority to the majority will not be observed. In striving for socialism, however, we are convinced that it will develop into communism and, therefore, that the need for violence against people in general, for the *subordination* of one man to another, and of one section of the population to another, will vanish altogether since people will *become accustomed* to observing the elementary conditions of social life *without violence* and *without subordination*.

In order to emphasise this element of habit, Engels speaks of a new *generation*, "reared in new, free social conditions", which will "be able to discard the entire lumber of the state"—of any state, including the democratic-republican state.

In order to explain this, it is necessary to analyse the economic basis of the withering away of the state.

CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE STATE

Marx explains this question most thoroughly in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (letter to Bracke, May 5, 1875, which was not published until 1891 when it was printed in *Neue Zeit*, Vol. IX, 1, and which has appeared in Rus-

sian in a special edition). The polemical part of this remarkable work, which contains a criticism of Lassalleanism, has, so to speak, overshadowed its positive part, namely, the analysis of the connection between the development of communism and the withering away of the state.

1. PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION BY MARX

From a superficial comparison of Marx's letter to Bracke of May 5, 1875, with Engels's letter to Bebel of March 28, 1875, which we examined above, it might appear that Marx was much more of a "champion of the state" than Engels, and that the difference of opinion between the two writers on the question of the state was very considerable.

Engels suggested to Bebel that all chatter about the state be dropped altogether, that the word "state" be eliminated from the programme altogether and the word "community" substituted for it. Engels even declared that the Commune was long a state in the proper sense of the word. Yet Marx even spoke of the "future state in communist society", i.e., he would seem to recognise the need for the state even under communism.

But such a view would be fundamentally wrong. A closer examination shows that Marx's and Engels's views on the state and its withering away were completely identical, and that Marx's expression quoted above refers to the state in the process of *withering away*.

Clearly, there can be no question of specifying the moment of the *future* "withering away", the more so since it will obviously be a lengthy process. The apparent difference between Marx and Engels is due to the fact that they dealt with different subject and pursued different aims. Engels set out to show Bebel graphically, sharply, and in broad outline the utter absurdity of the current prejudices concerning the state (shared to no small degree by Lassalle). Marx only touched upon *this* question in passing, being interested in another subject, namely, the *development* of communist society.

The whole theory of Marx is the application of the theory of development—in its most consistent, complete, consid-

ered and pithy form—to modern capitalism. Naturally, Marx was faced with the problem of applying this theory both to the *forthcoming* collapse of capitalism and to the *future* development of *future* communism.

On the basis of what *facts*, then, can the question of the future development of future communism be dealt with?

On the basis of the fact that it *has its origin* in capitalism, that it develops historically from capitalism, that it is the result of the action of a social force to which capitalism *gave birth*. There is no trace of an attempt on Marx's part to make up a utopia, to indulge in idle guess-work about what cannot be known. Marx treated the question of communism in the same way as a naturalist would treat the question of the development of, say, a new biological variety, once he knew that it had originated in such and such a way and was changing in such and such a definite direction.

To begin with, Marx brushed aside the confusion the Gotha Programme brought into the question of the relationship between state and society. He wrote:

> "'Present-day society' is capitalist society, which exists in all civilised countries, being more or less free from medieval admixture, more or less modified by the particular historical development of each country, more or less developed. On the other hand, the 'present-day state' changes with a country's frontier. It is different in the Prusso-German Empire from what it is in Switzerland, and different in England from what it is in the United States. '*The* present-day state' is, therefore, a fiction.
>
> "Nevertheless, the different states of the different civilised countries, in spite of their motley diversity of form, all have this in common, that they are based on modern bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalistically developed. The have, therefore, also certain essential characteristics in common. In this sense it is possible to speak of the 'present-day state', in contrast with the future, in which its present root, bourgeois society, will have died off.
>
> "The question then arise: what transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In other words,

> what social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to present state functions? This question can only be answered scientifically, and one does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousand-fold combination of the word people with the word state."[149]

After thus ridiculing all talk about a "people's state", Marx formulated the question and gave warning, as it were, that those seeking a scientific answer to it should use only firmly-established scientific data.

The first fact that has been established most accurately by the whole theory of development, by science as a whole—a fact tat was ignored by the utopians, and is ignored by the present-day opportunists, who are afraid of the socialist revolution—is that, historically, there must undoubtedly be a special stage, or a special phase, of *transition* from capitalism to communism.

2. THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM

Marx continued:

> "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*."

Marx bases this conclusion on an analysis of the role played by the proletariat in modern capitalist society, on the data concerning the development of this society, and on the irreconcilability of the antagonistic interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Previously the question was put as follows: to achieve its emancipation, the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeoisie, win political power and establish its revolutionary dictatorship.

Now the question is put somewhat differently: the transition from capitalist society—which is developing towards communism—to communist society is impossible without a "political transition period", and the state in this period

can only be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

What, then, is the relation of this dictatorship to democracy?

We have seen that the *Communist Manifesto* simply places side by side the two concepts: "to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class" and "to win the battle of democracy". On the basis of all that has been said above, it is possible to determine more precisely how democracy changes in the transition from capitalism to communism.

In capitalist society, providing it develops under the most favourable conditions, we have a more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy is always hemmed in by the narrow limits set by capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in effect, a democracy for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich. Freedom in capitalist society always remains about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners. Owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, the modern wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty that "they cannot be bothered with democracy", "cannot be bothered with politics"; in the ordinary, peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life.

The correctness of this statement is perhaps mot clearly confirmed by Germany, because constitutional legality steadily endured there for a remarkably long time—nearly half a century (1871-1914)—and during this period the Social-Democrats were able to achieve far more than in other countries in the way of "utilising legality", and organised a larger proportion of the workers into a political party than anywhere else in the world.

What is this largest proportion of politically conscious and active wage slaves that has so far been recorded in capitalist society? One million members of the Social-Democratic Party—out of fifteen million wage-workers! Three million organised in trade unions—out of fifteen million!

Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich—that is the democracy of capitalist society. If we look more closely into the machinery of capitalist democracy,

we see everywhere, in the "petty"—supposedly petty—details of the suffrage (residential qualifications, exclusion of women, etc.), in the technique of the representative institutions, in the actual obstacles to the right of assembly (public buildings are not for "paupers"!), in the purely capitalist organisation of the daily press, etc., etc.,—we see restriction after restriction upon democracy. These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor seem slight, especially in the eyes of one who has never known want himself and has never been inclose contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life (and nine out of 10 ten, if not 99 ninety-nine out of 100 a hundred, bourgeois publicists and politicians come under this category); but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics, from active participation in democracy.

Marx grasped this *essence* of capitalist democracy splendidly when, in analysing the experience of the Commune, he said that the oppressed are allowed once every few years to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class shall represent and repress them in parliament!

But from this capitalist democracy—that is inevitably narrow and stealthily pushes aside the poor, and is therefore hypocritical and false through and through—forward development does not proceed simply, directly and smoothly, towards "greater and greater democracy", as the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois opportunists would have us believe. No, forward development, i.e., development towards communism, proceeds through the dictatorship of the proletariat, and cannot do otherwise, for the *resistance* of the capitalist exploiters cannot be *broken* by anyone else or in any other way.

And the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organisation of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors, cannot result merely in an expansion of democracy. *Simultaneously* with an immense expansion of democracy, which *for the first time* becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the money-bags, the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must suppress them in order to free humanity from wage slavery,

their resistance must be crushed by force; it is clear that there is no freedom and no democracy where there is suppression and where there is violence.

Engels expressed this splendidly in his letter to Bebel when he said, as the reader will remember, that "the proletariat needs the state, not in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist".

Democracy for the vast majority of the people, and suppression by force, i.e., exclusion from democracy, of the exploiters and oppressors of the people—this is the change democracy undergoes during the *transition* from capitalism to communism.

Only in communist society, when the resistance of the capitalists has been completely crushed, when the capitalists have disappeared, when there are no classes (i.e., when there is no distinction between the members of society as regards their relation to the social means of production), *only* then "the state ... ceases to exist", and "*it becomes possible to speak of freedom*". Only then will a truly complete democracy become possible and be realised, a democracy without any exceptions whatever. And only then will democracy begin to *wither away*, owing to the simple fact that, freed from capitalist slavery, from the untold horrors, savagery, absurdities, and infamies of capitalist exploitation, people will gradually *become accustomed* to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all copybook maxims. They will become accustomed to observing them without force, without coercion, without subordination, *without the special apparatus* for coercion called the state.

The expression "the state *withers away*" is very well-chosen, for it indicates both the gradual and the spontaneous nature of the process. Only habit can, and undoubtedly will, have such an effect; for we see around us on millions of occasions how readily people become accustomed to observing the necessary rules of social intercourse when there is no exploitation, when there is nothing that arouses indignation, evokes protest and revolt, and creates the need for *suppression*.

And so in capitalist society we have a democracy that is curtailed, wretched, false, a democracy only for the rich, for the minority. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to communism, will for the first time create democracy for the people, for the majority, along with the necessary suppression of the exploiters, of the minority. communism alone is capable of providing really complete democracy, and the more complete it is, the sooner it will become unnecessary and wither away of its own accord.

In other words, under capitalism we have the state in the proper sense of the word, that is, a special machine for the suppression of one class by another, and, what is more, of the majority by the minority. Naturally, to be successful, such an undertaking as the systematic suppression of the exploited majority by the exploiting minority calls for the utmost ferocity and savagery in the matter of suppressing, it calls for seas of blood, through which mankind is actually wading its way in slavery, serfdom and wage labour.

Furthermore, during the *transition* from capitalism to communism suppression is *still* necessary, but it is now the suppression of the exploiting minority by the exploited majority. A special apparatus, a special machine for suppression, the "state", is *still* necessary, but this is now a transitional state. It is no longer a state in the proper sense of the word; for the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of the wage slaves of *yesterday* is comparatively so easy, simple and natural a task that it will entail far less bloodshed than the suppression of the risings of slaves, serfs or wage-labourers, and it will cost mankind far less. And it is compatible with the extension of democracy to such an overwhelming majority of the population that the need for a *special machine* of suppression will begin to disappear. Naturally, the exploiters are unable to suppress the people without a highly complex machine for performing this task, but *the people* can suppress the exploiters even with a very simple "machine", almost without a "machine", without a special apparatus, by the simple *organisation of the armed people* (such as the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, we would remark, running ahead).

Lastly, only communism makes the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is *nobody* to be suppressed—"nobody" in the sense of a *class*, of a systematic struggle against a definite section of the population. We are not utopians, and do not in the least deny the possibility and inevitability of excesses on the part of *individual persons*, or the need to stop *such* excesses. In the first place, however, no special machine, no special apparatus of suppression, is needed for this: this will be done by the armed people themselves, as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, interferes to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted. And, secondly, we know that the fundamental social cause of excesses, which consist in the violation of the rules of social intercourse, is the exploitation of the people, their want and their poverty. With the removal of this chief cause, excesses will inevitably begin to "*wither away*". We do not know how quickly and in what succession, but we do know they will wither away. With their withering away the state will also *wither away*.

Without building utopias, Marx defined more fully what can be defined *now* regarding this future, namely, the differences between the lower and higher phases (levels, stages) of communist society.

3. THE FIRST DRAFT PHASE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY

In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx goes into detail to disprove Lassalle's idea that under socialism the worker will receive the "undiminished" or "full product of his labour". Marx shows that from the whole of the social labour of society there must be deducted a reserve fund, a fund for the expansion of production, a fund for the replacement of the "wear and tear" of machinery, and so on. Then, from the means of consumption must be deducted a fund for administrative expenses, for schools, hospitals, old people's homes, and so on.

Instead of Lassalle's hazy, obscure, general phrase ("the full product of his labour to the worker"), Marx makes a sober estimate of exactly how socialist society will have to manage its affairs. Marx proceeds to make a *concrete* anal-

ysis of the conditions of life of a society in which there will be no capitalism, and says:

> "What we have to deal with here [in analysing the programme of the workers' party] is a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it comes."

It is this communist society, which has just emerged into the light of day out of the womb of capitalism and which is in every respect stamped with the birthmarks of the old society, that Marx terms the "first", or lower, phase of communist society.

The means of production are no longer the private property of individuals. The means of production belong to the whole of society. Every member of society, performing a certain part of the socially-necessary work, receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done a certain amount of work. And with this certificate he receives from the public store of consumer goods a corresponding quantity of products. After a deduction is made of the amount of labour which goes to the public fund, every worker, therefore, receives from society as much as he has given to it.

"Equality" apparently reigns supreme.

But when Lassalle, having in view such a social order (usually called socialism, but termed by Marx the first phase of communism), says that this is "equitable distribution", that this is "the equal right of all to an equal product of labour", Lassalle is mistaken and Marx exposes the mistake.

"Hence, the equal right," says Marx, in this case *still* certainly conforms to "bourgeois law", which, like all law, *implies inequality*. All law is an application of an *equal* measure to *different* people who in fact are not alike, are not equal to one another. That is why the "equal right" is a violation of equality and an injustice. In fact, everyone, having performed as much social labour as another, receives an equal share of the social product (after the above-mentioned deductions).

But people are not alike: one is strong, another is weak; one is married, another is not; one has more children, another has less, and so on. And the conclusion Marx draws is:

"...With an equal performance of labour, and hence an equal share in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, the right instead of being equal would have to be unequal."

The first phase of communism, therefore, cannot yet provide justice and equality; differences, and unjust differences, in wealth will still persist, but the *exploitation* of man by man will have become impossible because it will be impossible to seize the *means of production*—the factories, machines, land, etc.—and make them private property. In smashing Lassalle's petty-bourgeois, vague phrases about "equality" and "justice" *in general*, Marx shows the *course of development* of communist society, which is *compelled* to abolish at first *only* the "injustice" of the means of production seized by individuals, and which is *unable* at once to eliminate the other injustice, which consists in the distribution of consumer goods "according to the amount of labour performed" (and not according to needs).

The vulgar economists, including the bourgeois professors and "our" Tugan, constantly reproach the socialists with forgetting the inequality of people and with "dreaming" of eliminating this inequality. Such a reproach, as we see, only proves the extreme ignorance of the bourgeois ideologists.

Marx not only most scrupulously takes account of the inevitable inequality of men, but he also takes into account the fact that the mere conversion of the means of production into the common property of the whole society (commonly called "socialism") *does not remove* the defects of distribution and the inequality of "bourgeois laws" which *continues to prevail* so long as products are divided "according to the amount of labour performed". Continuing, Marx says:

> "But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged, after prolonged birth pangs, from capitalist society.

> Law can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby."

And so, in the first phase of communist society (usually called socialism) "bourgeois law" is *not* abolished in its entirety, but only in part, only in proportion to the economic revolution so far attained, i.e., only in respect of the means of production. "Bourgeois law" recognises them as the private property of individuals. Socialism converts them into *common* property. *To that extent*—and to that extent alone—"bourgeois law" disappears.

However, it persists as far as its other part is concerned; it persists in the capacity of regulator (determining factor) in the distribution of products and the allotment of labour among the members of society. The socialist principle, "He who does not work shall not eat", is *already* realised; the other socialist principle, "An equal amount of products for an equal amount of labour", is also *already* realised. But this is not yet communism, and it does not yet abolish "bourgeois law", which gives unequal individuals, in return for unequal (really unequal) amounts of labour, equal amounts of products.

This is a "defect", says Marx, but it is unavoidable in the first phase of communism; for if we are not to indulge in utopianism, we must not think that having overthrown capitalism people will at once learn to work for society *without any rules of law*. Besides, the abolition of capitalism *does not immediately create* the economic prerequisites for *such* a change.

Now, there are no other rules than those of "bourgeois law". To this extent, therefore, there still remains the need for a state, which, while safeguarding the common ownership of the means of production, would safeguard equality in labour and in the distribution of products.

The state withers away insofar as there are no longer any capitalists, any classes, and, consequently, no *class* can be *suppressed*.

But the state has not yet completely withered away, since thee still remains the safeguarding of "bourgeois law", which sanctifies actual inequality. For the state to wither away completely, complete communism is necessary.

4. THE HIGHER PHASE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY

Marx continues:

> "In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and with it also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished, after labour has become not only a livelihood but life's prime want, after the productive forces have increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be left behind in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"

Only now can we fully appreciate the correctness of Engels's remarks mercilessly ridiculing the absurdity of combining the words "freedom" and "state". So long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be no state.

The economic basis for the complete withering away of the state is such a high state of development of communism at which the antithesis between mental and physical labour disappears, at which there consequently disappears one of the principal sources of modern *social* inequality—a source, moreover, which cannot on any account be removed immediately by the mere conversion of the means of production into public property, by the mere exploitation of the capitalists.

This expropriation will make it *possible* for the productive forces to develop to a tremendous extent. And when we see how incredibly capitalism is already *retarding* this development, when we see how much progress could be achieved on the basis of the level of technique already attained, we are entitled to say with the fullest confidence that the expropriation of the capitalists will inevitably result in an enormous development of the productive forces of human society. But how rapidly this development will proceed, how soon it will reach the point of breaking away from the division of labour, of doing away with the antithesis between mental and phys-

ical labour, of transforming labour into "life's prime want"—we do not and *cannot* know.

That is why we are entitled to speak only of the inevitable withering away of the state, emphasising the protracted nature of this process and its dependence upon the rapidity of development of the *higher phase* of communism, and leaving the question of the time required for, or the concrete forms of, the withering away quite open, because there is *no* material for answering these questions.

The state will be able to wither away completely when society adopts the rule: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs", i.e., when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social intercourse and when their labour has become so productive that they will voluntarily work *according to their ability*. "The narrow horizon of bourgeois law", which compels one to calculate with the heartlessness of a Shylock whether one has not worked half an hour more than somebody else, whether one is not getting less pay than somebody else—this narrow horizon will then be left behind. There will then be no need for society, in distributing the products, to regulate the quantity to be received by each; each will take freely "according to his needs".

From the bourgeois point of view, it is easy to declare that such a social order is "sheer utopia" and to sneer at the socialists for promising everyone the right to receive from society, without any control over the labour of the individual citizen, any quantity of truffles, cars, pianos, etc. Even to this day, most bourgeois "savants" confine themselves to sneering in this way, thereby betraying both their ignorance and their selfish defence of capitalism.

Ignorance—for it has never entered the head of any socialist to "promise" that the higher phase of the development of communism will arrive; as for the greatest socialists' *forecast* that it will arrive, it presupposes not the present productivity of labour and *not the present* ordinary run of people, who, like the seminary students in Pomyalovsky's stories,[150] are capable of damaging the stocks of public wealth "just for fun", and of demanding the impossible.

Until the "higher" phase of communism arrives, the socialists demand the *strictest* control by society *and by the state*

over the measure of labour and the measure of consumption; but this control must *start* with the expropriation of the capitalists, with the establishment of workers' control over the capitalists, and must be exercised not by a state of bureaucrats, but by a state of *armed workers*.

The selfish defence of capitalism by the bourgeois ideologists (and their hangers-on, like the Tseretelis, Chernovs, and Co.) consists in that they *substitute* arguing and talk about the distant future for the vital and burning question of *present-day* politics, namely, the expropriation of the capitalists, the conversion of *all* citizens into workers and other employees of *one* huge "syndicate"—the whole state—and the complete subordination of the entire work of this syndicate to a genuinely democratic state, *the state of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*.

In fact, when a learned professor, followed by the philistine, followed in turn by the Tseretelis and Chernovs, talks of wild utopias, of the demagogic promises of the Bolsheviks, of the impossibility of "introducing" socialism, it is the higher stage, or phase, of communism he has in mind, which no one has ever promised or even thought to "introduce", because, generally speaking, it cannot be "introduced".

And this brings us to the question of the scientific distinction between socialism and communism which Engels touched on in his above-quoted argument about the incorrectness of the name "Social-Democrat". Politically, the distinction between the first, or lower, and the higher phase of communism will in time, probably, be tremendous. But it would be ridiculous to recognise this distinction now, under capitalism, and only individual anarchists, perhaps, could invest it with primary importance (if there still are people among the anarchists who have learned nothing from the "Plekhanov" conversion of the Kropotkins, of Grave, Cornelissen, and other "stars" of anarchism into social-chauvinists or "anarcho-trenchists", as Ghe, one of the few anarchists who have still preserved a sense of humor and a conscience, has put it).

But the scientific distinction between socialism and communism is clear. What is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the "first", or lower, phase of communist society.

Insofar as the means of production becomes *common* property, the word "communism" is also applicable here, providing we do not forget that this is *not* complete communism. The great significance of Marx's explanations is that here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the theory of development, and regards communism as something which develops *out of* capitalism. Instead of scholastically invented, "concocted" definitions and fruitless disputes over words (What is socialism? What is communism?), Marx gives an analysis of what might be called the stages of the economic maturity of communism.

In its first phase, or first stage, communism *cannot* as yet be fully mature economically and entirely free from traditions or vestiges of capitalism. Hence the interesting phenomenon that communism in its first phase retains "the narrow horizon of *bourgeois* law". Of course, bourgeois law in regard to the distribution of *consumer* goods inevitably presupposes the existence of the *bourgeois state*, for law is nothing without an apparatus capable of *enforcing* the observance of the rules of law.

It follows that under communism there remains for a time not only bourgeois law, but even the bourgeois state, without the bourgeoisie!

This may sound like a paradox or simply a dialectical conundrum of which Marxism is often accused by people who have not taken the slightest trouble to study its extraordinarily profound content.

But in fact, remnants of the old, surviving in the new, confront us in life at every step, both in nature and in society. And Marx did not arbitrarily insert a scrap of "bourgeois" law into communism, but indicated what is economically and politically inevitable in a society emerging *out of the womb* of capitalism.

Democracy is of enormous importance to the working class in its struggle against the capitalists for its emancipation. But democracy is by no means a boundary not to be overstepped; it is only one of the stages on the road from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to communism.

Democracy means equality. The great significance of the proletariat's struggle for equality and of equality as a slogan

will be clear if we correctly interpret it as meaning the abolition of *classes*. But democracy means only *formal* equality. And as soon as equality is achieved for all members of society *in relation* to ownership of the means of production, that is, equality of labour and wages, humanity will inevitably be confronted with the question of advancing father, from formal equality to actual equality, i.e., to the operation of the rule "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". By what stages, by means of what practical measures humanity will proceed to this supreme aim we do not and cannot know. But it is important to realise how infinitely mendacious is the ordinary bourgeois conception of socialism as something lifeless, rigid, fixed once and for all, whereas in reality *only* socialism will be the beginning of a rapid, genuine, truly mass forward movement, embracing first the *majority* and then the whole of the population, in all spheres of public and private life.

Democracy is a form of the state, one of its varieties. Consequently, like every state, it represents, on the one hand, the organised, systematic use of force against persons; but, on the other hand, it signifies the formal recognition of equality of citizens, the equal right of all to determine the structure of, and to administer, the state. This, in turn, results in the fact that, at a certain stage in the development of democracy, it first welds together the class that wages a revolutionary struggle against capitalism—the proletariat, and enables it to crush, smash to atoms, wipe off the face of the earth the bourgeois, even the republican-bourgeois, state machine, the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy and to substitute for them a *more* democratic state machine, but a state machine nevertheless, in the shape of armed workers who proceed to form a militia involving the entire population.

Here "quantity turns into quality": *such* a degree of democracy implies overstepping the boundaries of bourgeois society and beginning its socialist reorganisation. If really *all* take part in the administration of the state, capitalism cannot retain its hold. The development of capitalism, in turn, creates the *preconditions* that *enable* really "all" to take part in the administration of the state. Some of these preconditions are: universal literacy, which has already been achieved in

a number of the most advanced capitalist countries, then the "training and disciplining" of millions of workers by the huge, complex, socialised apparatus of the postal service, railways, big factories, large-scale commerce, banking, etc., etc.

Given these *economic* preconditions, it is quite possible, after the overthrow of the capitalists and the bureaucrats, to proceed immediately, overnight, to replace them in the *control* over production and distribution, in the work of *keeping account* of labour and products, by the armed workers, by the whole of the armed population. (The question of control and accounting should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists, and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists and will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers.)

Accounting and control—that is *mainly* what is needed for the "smooth working", for the proper functioning, of the *first phase* of communist society. *All* citizens are transformed into hired employees of the state, which consists of the armed workers. *All* citizens becomes employees and workers of a *single* country-wide state "syndicate". All that is required is that they should work equally, do their proper share of work, and get equal pay. The accounting and control necessary for this have been *simplified* by capitalism to the utmost and reduced to the extraordinarily simple operations—which any literate person can perform—of supervising and recording, knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic, and issuing appropriate receipts.*

When the *majority* of the people begin independently and everywhere to keep such accounts and exercise such control over the capitalists (now converted into employees) and over the intellectual gentry who preserve their capitalist habits, this control will really become universal, general,

* When the more important functions of the state are reduced to such accounting and control by the workers themselves, it will cease to be a "political state" and "public functions will lose their political character and become mere administrative functions" (cf. above, Chapter IV, 2, Engels's controversy with the anarchists).

and popular; and there will be no getting away from it, there will be "nowhere to go".

The whole of society will have become a single office and a single factory, with equality of labour and pay.

But this "factory" discipline, which the proletariat, after defeating the capitalists, after overthrowing the exploiters, will extend to the whole of society, is by no means our ideal, or our ultimate goal. It is only a necessary *step* for thoroughly cleansing society of all the infamies and abominations of capitalist exploitation, *and for further* progress.

From the moment all members of society, or at least the vast majority, have learned to administer the state *themselves*, have taken this work into their own hands, have organised control over the insignificant capitalist minority, over the gentry who wish to preserve their capitalist habits and over the workers who have been thoroughly corrupted by capitalism—from this moment the need for government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it becomes unnecessary. The more democratic the "state" which consists of the armed workers, and which is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word", the more rapidly *every form* of state begins to wither away.

For when *all* have learned to administer and actually do independently administer social production, independently keep accounts and exercise control over the parasites, the sons of the wealthy, the swindlers and other "guardians of capitalist traditions", the escape from this popular accounting and control will inevitably become so incredibly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are practical men and not sentimental intellectuals, and they scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that the *necessity* of observing the simple, fundamental rules of the community will very soon become a *habit*.

Then the door will be thrown wide open for the transition from the first phase of communist society to its higher phase, and with it to the complete withering away of the state.

CHAPTER VI

THE VULGARISATION OF MARXISM BY THE OPPORTUNISTS

The question of the relation of the state to the social revolution, and of the social revolution to the state, like the question of revolution generally, was given very little attention by the leading theoreticians and publicists of the Second International (1889-1914). But the most characteristic thing about the process of the gradual growth of opportunism that led to the collapse of the Second International in 1914 is the fact that even when these people were squarely faced with this question they *tried to evade* it or ignored it.

In general, it may be said that *evasiveness* over the question of the relation of the proletarian revolution to the state—an evasiveness which benefited and fostered opportunism—resulted in the *distortion* of Marxism and in its complete vulgarisation.

To characterise this lamentable process, if only briefly, we shall take the most prominent theoreticians of Marxism: Plekhanov and Kautsky.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

1. PLEKHANOV'S CONTROVERSY WITH THE ANARCHISTS

Plekhanov wrote a special pamphlet on the relation of anarchism to socialism, entitled *Anarchism and Socialism*, which was published in German in 1894.

In treating this subject, Plekhanov contrived completely to evade the most urgent, burning, and most politically essential issue in the struggle against anarchism, namely, the relation of the revolution to the state, and the question of the state in general! His pamphlet falls into two distinct parts: one of them is historical and literary, and contains valuable material on the history of the ideas of Stirner, Proudhon, and others; the other is philistine, and contains a clumsy dissertation on the theme that an anarchist cannot be distinguished from a bandit.

It is a most amusing combination of subjects and most characteristic of Plekhanov's whole activity on the eve of the

revolution and during the revolutionary period in Russia. In fact, in the years 1905 to 1917, Plekhanov revealed himself as a semi-doctrinaire and semi-philistine who, in politics, trailed in the wake of the bourgeoisie.

We have now seen how, in their controversy with the anarchists, Marx and Engels with the utmost thoroughness explained their views on the relation of revolution to the state. In 1891, in his foreword to Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Engels wrote that "we"—that is, Engels and Marx—"were at that time, hardly two years after the Hague Congress of the [First] International,[151] engaged in the most violent struggle against Bakunin and his anarchists."

The anarchists had tried to claim the Paris Commune as their "own", so to say, as a collaboration of their doctrine; and they completely misunderstood its lessons and Marx's analysis of these lessons. Anarchism has given nothing even approximating true answers to the concrete political questions: Must the old state machine be *smashed*? And *what* should be put in its place?

But to speak of "anarchism and socialism" while completely evading the question of the state, and *disregarding* the whole development of Marxism before and after the Commune, meant inevitably slipping into opportunism. For what opportunism needs most of all is that the two questions just mentioned should *not* be raised at all. That *in itself* is a victory for opportunism.

2. KAUTSKY'S CONTROVERSY WITH THE OPPORTUNISTS

Undoubtedly, an immeasurably larger number of Kautsky's works have been translated into Russian than into any other language. It is not without reason that some German Social-Democrats say in jest that Kautsky is read more in Russia than in Germany (let us say, in parenthesis, that this jest has a far deeper historical meaning than those who first made it suspect. The Russian workers, by making in 1905 an unusually great and unprecedented demand for the best works of the best Social-Democratic literature in the world, and by receiving translations and editions of these works in

quantities unheard of in other countries, rapidly transplanted, so to speak, the enormous experience of a neighbouring, more advanced country to the young soil of our proletarian movement).

Besides his popularisation of Marxism, Kautsky is particularly known in our country for his controversy with the opportunists, with Bernstein at their head. One fact, however, is almost unknown, one which cannot be ignored if we set out to investigate how Kautsky drifted into the morass of unbelievably disgraceful confusion and defence of social-chauvinism during the supreme crisis of 1914-15. This fact is as follows: shortly before he came out against the most prominent representatives of opportunism in France (Millerand and Jaurès) and in Germany (Bernstein), Kautsky betrayed very considerable vacillation. The Marxist *Zarya*,[152] which was published in Stuttgart in 1901-02, and advocated revolutionary proletarian views, was forced to *enter into controversy* with Kautsky and describe as "elastic" the half-hearted, evasive resolution, conciliatory towards the opportunists, that he proposed at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1900.[153] Kautsky's letters published in Germany reveal no less hesitancy on his part before he took the field against Bernstein.

Of immeasurably greater significance, however, is the fact that, in his very controversy with the opportunists, in his formulation of the question and his manner of treating it, we can new see, as we study the *history* of Kautsky's latest betrayal of Marxism, his systematic deviation towards opportunism precisely on the question of the state.

Let us take Kautsky's first important work against opportunism, *Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme*. Kautsky refutes Bernstein in detail, but here is a characteristic thing:

Bernstein, in his *Premises of Socialism*, of Herostratean fame, accuses Marxism of "*Blanquism*" (an accusation since repeated thousands of times by the opportunists and liberal bourgeoisie in Russia against the revolutionary Marxists, the Bolsheviks). In this connection Bernstein dwells particularly on Marx's *The Civil War in France*, and tries, quite unsuccessfully, as we have seen, to identify Marx's views on the lessons of the Commune with those of Proudhon.

Bernstein pays particular attention to the conclusion which Marx emphasised in his 1872 preface to the *Communist Manifesto*, namely, that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes".

This statement "pleased" Bernstein so much that he used it no less than three times in his book, interpreting it in the most distorted, opportunist way.

As we have seen, Marx meant that the working-class must *smash*, *break*, *shatter* (*Sprengung*, explosion—the expression used by Engels) the whole state machine. But according to Bernstein it would appear as though Marx in these words warned the working class *against* excessive revolutionary zeal when seizing power.

A cruder and more hideous distortion of Marx's idea cannot be imagined.

How, then, did Kautsky proceed in his most detailed refutation of Bernsteinism?

He refrained from analysing the utter distortion of Marxism by opportunism on this point. He cited the above-quoted passage from Engels's preface to Marx's *Civil War* and said that according to Marx the working class cannot *simply* take over the *ready-made* state machinery, but that, generally speaking, it *can* take it over—and that was all. Kautsky did not say a word about the fact that Bernstein attributed to Marx the *very opposite* of Marx's real idea, that since 1852 Marx had formulated the task of the proletarian revolution as being to "smash" the state machine.

The result was that the most essential distinction between Marxism and opportunism on the subject of the tasks of the proletarian revolution was slurred over by Kautsky!

"We can quite safely leave the solution of the problems of the proletarian dictatorship of the future," said Kautsky, writing "*against*" Bernstein. (P. 172, German edition.)

This is not a polemic *against* Bernstein, but, in essence, a *concession* to him, a surrender to opportunism; for at present the opportunists ask nothing better than to "quite safely leave to the future" all fundamental questions of the tasks of the proletarian revolution.

From 1852 to 1891, or for forty years, Marx and Engels taught the proletariat that it must smash the state machine. Yet, in 1899, Kautsky, confronted with the complete betrayal of Marxism by the opportunists on this point, fraudulently *substituted* for the question whether it is necessary to smash this machine the question for the concrete forms in which it is to be smashed, and then sough refuge behind the "indisputable" (and barren) philistine truth that concrete forms cannot be known in advance!!

A gulf separates Marx and Kautsky over their attitude towards the proletarian party's task of training the working class for revolution.

Let us take the next, more mature, work by Kautsky, which was also largely devoted to a refutation of opportunist errors. It is his pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*. In this pamphlet, the author chose as his special theme the question of "the proletarian revolution" and "the proletarian regime". He gave much that was exceedingly valuable, but he *avoided* the question of the state. Throughout the pamphlet the author speaks of the winning of state power—and no more; that is, he has chosen a formula which makes a concession to the opportunists, inasmuch as it *admits* the possibility of seizing power *without* destroying the state machine. The very thing which Marx in 1872 declared to be "obsolete" in the programme of the *Communist Manifesto*, *is revived* by Kautsky in 1902.

A special section in the pamphlet is devoted to the "forms and weapons of the social revolution". Here Kautsky speaks of the mass political strike, of civil war, and of the "instruments of the might of the modern large state, its bureaucracy and the army"; but he does not say a word about what the Commune has already taught the workers. Evidently, it was not without reason that Engels issued a warning, particularly to the German socialists, against "superstitious reverence" for the state.

Kautsky treats the matter as follows: the victorious proletariat "will carry out the democratic programme", and he goes on to formulate its clauses. But he does not say a word about the new material provided in 1871 on the subject of the replacement of bourgeois democracy by proletarian democracy. Kautsky disposes of the question by using such "impressive-sounding" banalities as:

"Still, it goes without saying that we shall not achieve supremacy under the present conditions. Revolution itself presupposes long and deep-going struggles, which, in themselves, will change our present political and social structure."

Undoubtedly, this "goes without saying", just as the fact that horses eat oats of the Volga flows into the Caspian. Only it is a pity that an empty and bombastic phrase about "deep-going" struggles is used to *avoid* a question of vital importance to the revolutionary proletariat, namely, *what* makes *its* revolution "deep-going" in relation to the state, to democracy, as distinct from previous, non-proletarian revolutions.

By avoiding this question, Kautsky *in practice* makes a concession to opportunism on this most essential point, although *in words* he declares stern war against it and stresses the importance of the "idea of revolution" (how much is this "idea" worth when one is afraid to teach the workers the concrete lessons of revolution?), or says, "revolutionary idealism before everything else", or announces that the English workers are now "hardly more than petty bourgeois".

"The most varied form of enterprises—bureaucratic [??], trade unionist, co-operative, private ... can exist side by side in socialist society," Kautsky writes. "...There are, for example, enterprises which cannot do without a bureaucratic [??] organisation, such as the railways. Here the democratic organisation may take the following shape: the workers elect delegates who form a sort of parliament, which establishes the working regulations and supervises the management of the bureaucratic apparatus. The management of other enterprises may be transferred to the trade unions, and still others may become co-operative enterprises."

This argument is erroneous; it is a step backward compared with the explanations Marx and Engels gave in the seventies, using the lessons of the Commune as an example.

As far as the supposedly necessary "bureaucratic" organisation is concerned, there is no difference whatever between a railway and any other enterprise in large-scale machine industry, any factory, large shop, or large-scale capitalist agricultural enterprise. The technique of all these enterprises makes absolutely imperative the strictest discipline, the utmost precision on the part of everyone in carrying out his allotted task, for otherwise the whole enterprise may

come to a stop, or machinery or the finished product may be damaged. In all these enterprises the workers will, of course, "elect delegates who will form *a sort of parliament*".

The whole point, however, is that this "sort of parliament" will *not* be a parliament in the sense of a bourgeois parliamentary institution. The whole point is that this "sort of parliament" will *not* merely "establish the working regulations and supervise the management of the bureaucratic apparatus", as Kautsky, whose thinking does not go beyond the bounds of bourgeois parliamentarism, imagines. In socialist society, the "sort of parliament" consisting of workers' deputies will, of course, "establish the working regulations and supervise the management" of the "apparatus", *but* this apparatus will *not* be "bureaucratic". The workers, after winning political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, shatter it to its very foundations, and raze it to the ground; they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same workers and other employees, *against* whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only election, but also recall at any time; (2) pay not to exceed that of a workman; (3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by *all*, so that *all* may become "bureaucrats" for a time and that, therefore, *nobody* may be able to become a "bureaucrat".

Kautsky has not reflected at all on Marx's words: "The Commune was a working, not parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time."

Kautsky has not understood at all the difference between bourgeois parliamentarism, which combines democracy (*not for the people*) with bureaucracy (*against the people*), and proletarian democracy, which will take immediate steps to cut bureaucracy down to the roots, and which will be able to carry these measures through to the end, to the complete abolition of bureaucracy, to the introduction of complete democracy for the people.

Kautsky here displays the same old "superstitious reverence" for the state, and "superstitious belief" in bureaucracy.

Let us now pass to the last and best of Kautsky's works against the opportunists, his pamphlet *The Road to Power*

(which, I believe, has not been published in Russian, for it appeared in 1909, when reaction was at its height in our country). This pamphlet is a big step forward, since it does not deal with the revolutionary programme in general, as the pamphlet of 1899 against Bernstein, or with the tasks of the social revolution irrespective of the time of its occurrence, as the 1902 pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*; it deals with the concrete conditions which compels us to recognise that the "era of revolutions" is *setting in*.

The author explicitly points to the aggravation of class antagonisms in general and to imperialism, which plays a particularly important part in this respect. After the "revolutionary period of 1789-1871" in Western Europe, he says, a similar period began in the East in 1905. A world war is approaching with menacing rapidity. "It [the proletariat] can no longer talk of premature revolution." "We have entered a revolutionary period." The "revolutionary era is beginning".

These statements are perfectly clear. This pamphlet of Kautsky's should serve as a measure of comparison of what the German Social-Democrats *promised to be* before the imperialist war and the depth of degradation to which they, including Kautsky himself, sank when the war broke out. "The present situation," Kautsky wrote in the pamphlet under survey, "is fraught with the danger that we [i.e., the German Social-Democrats] may easily appear to be more 'moderate' than we really are." It turned out that in reality the German Social-Democratic Party was much more moderate and opportunist than it appeared to be!

It is all the more characteristic, therefore, that although Kautsky so explicitly declared that the era of revolution had already begun, in the pamphlet which he himself said was devoted to an analysis of the "*political* revolution", he again completely avoided the question of the state.

These evasions of the question, these omissions and equivocations, inevitably added up to that complete swing-over to opportunism with which we shall now have to deal.

Kautsky, the German Social-Democrats' spokesman, seems to have declared: I abide by revolutionary views (1899),

I recognise, above all, the inevitability of the social revolution of the proletariat (1902), I recognise the advent of a new era of revolutions (1909). Still, I am going back on what Marx said as early as 1852, since the question of the tasks of the proletarian revolution in relation to the state is being raised (1912).

It was in this point-blank form that the question was put in Kautsky's controversy with Pannekoek.

3. KAUTSKY'S CONTROVERSY WITH PANNEKOEK

In opposing Kautsky, Pannekoek came out as one of the representatives of the "Left radical" trend which included Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek, and others. Advocating revolutionary tactics, they were united in the conviction that Kautsky was going over to the "Centre", which wavered in an unprincipled manner between Marxism and opportunism. This view was proved perfectly correct by the war, when this "Centrist" (wrongly called Marxist) trend, or Kautskyism, revealed itself in all its repulsive wretchedness.

In an article touching on the question of the state, entitled "Mass Action and Revolution" (*Neue Zeit*, 1912, Vol. XXX, 2), Pannekoek described Kautsky's attitude as one of "passive radicalism", as "a theory of inactive expectancy". "Kautsky refuses to see the process of revolution," wrote Pannekoek (p. 616). In presenting the matter in this way, Pannekoek approached the subject which interests us, namely, the tasks of the proletarian revolution in relation to the state.

> "The struggle of the proletariat," he wrote, "is not merely a struggle against the bourgeoisie *for* state power, but a struggle *against* state power.... The content of this [the proletarian] revolution is the destruction and dissolution [Auflösung] of the instruments of power of the state with the aid of the instruments of power of the proletariat. (P. 544.) "The struggle will cease only when, as the result of it, the state organisation is completely destroyed. The organisation of the majority will then have demonstrated its superiority by destroying the organisation of the ruling minority." (P. 548.)

The formulation in which Pannekoek presented his ideas suffers from serious defects. But its meaning is clear nonetheless, and it is interesting to note *how* Kautsky combated it.

"Up to now," he wrote, "the antithesis between the Social-Democrats and the anarchists has been that the former wished to win the state power while the latter wished to destroy it. Pannekoek wants to do both." (P. 724.)

Although Pannekoek's exposition lacks precision and concreteness—not to speak of other shortcomings of his article which have no bearing on the present subject—Kautsky seized precisely on the point of *principle* raised by Pannekoek; and *on this fundamental* point of *principle* Kautsky completely abandoned the Marxist position and went over wholly to opportunism. His definition of the distinction between the Social-Democrats and the anarchists is absolutely wrong; he completely vulgarises and distorts Marxism.

The distinction between Marxists and the anarchists is this: (1) The former, while aiming at the complete abolition of the state, recognise that this aim can only be achieved after classes have been abolished by the socialist revolution, as the result of the establishment of socialism, which leads to the withering away of the state. The latter want to abolish he state completely overnight, not understanding the conditions under which the state can be abolished. (2) The former recognise that after the proletariat has won political power it must completely destroy the old state machine and replace it by a new one consisting of an organisation of the armed workers, after the type of the Commune. The latter, while insisting on the destruction of the state machine, have a very vague idea of *what* the proletariat will put in its place and *how* it will use its revolutionary power. The anarchists even deny that the revolutionary proletariat should use the state power, they reject its revolutionary dictatorship. (3) The former demand that the proletariat be trained for revolution by utilising the present state. The anarchists reject this.

In this controversy, it is not Kautsky but Pannekoek who represents Marxism, for it was Marx who taught that the proletariat cannot simply win state power in the sense that the old state apparatus passes into new hands, but must smash this apparatus, must break it and replace it by a new one.

Kautsky abandons Marxism for the opportunist camp, for this destruction of the state machine, which is utterly unac-

ceptable to the opportunists, completely disappears from his argument, and he leaves a loophole for them in that "conquest" may be interpreted as the simple acquisition of a majority.

To cover up his distortion of Marxism, Kautsky behaves like a doctrinaire: he puts forward a "quotation" from Marx himself. In 1850, Marx wrote that a "resolute centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority" was necessary, and Kautsky triumphantly asks: does Pannekoek want to destroy "Centralism"?

This is simply a trick, like Bernstein's identification of the views of Marxism and Proudhonism on the subject of federalism as against centralism.

Kautsky's "quotation" is neither here nor there. Centralism is possible with both the old and the new state machine. If the workers voluntarily unite their armed forces, this will be centralism, but it will be based on the "complete destruction" of the centralised state apparatus—the standing army, the police, and the bureaucracy. Kautsky acts like an outright swindler by evading the perfectly well-known arguments of Marx and Engels on the Commune and plucking out a quotation which has nothing to do with the point at issue.

"Perhaps he [Pannekoek]," Kautsky continues, "wants to abolish the state functions of the officials? But we cannot do without officials even in the party and the trade unions, let alone in the state administration. And our programme does not demand the abolition of state officials, but that they be elected by the people.... We are discussing here not the form the administrative apparatus of the 'future state' will assume, but whether our political struggle abolishes [literally *dissolves*—auflöst] the state power *before we have captured it*. [Kautsky's italics] Which ministry with its officials could be abolished?" Then follows an enumeration of the ministries of education, justice, finance and war. "No, not one of the present ministries will be removed by our political struggle against the government.... I repeat, in order to prevent misunderstanding: we are not discussing here the form the 'future state' will be given by the victorious Social-Democrats, but how the present state is changed by our opposition." (P. 725.)

This is an obvious trick. Pannekoek raised the question of *revolution*. Both the title of his article and the passages quoted above clearly indicate this. By skipping to the question of "opposition", Kautsky substitutes the opportunist

for the revolutionary point of view. What he says means: at present we are an opposition; what we shall be *after* we have captured power, that we shall see. *Revolution has vanished!* And that is exactly what the opportunists wanted.

The point at issue is neither opposition nor political struggle in general, but *revolution*. Revolution consists in the proletariat *destroying* the "administrative apparatus" and the *whole* state machine, replacing it by a new one, made up of the armed workers. Kautsky displays a "superstitious reverence" for "ministries"; but why can they not be replaced, say, by committees of specialists working under sovereign, all-powerful Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?

The point is not at all whether the "ministries" will remain, or whether "committees of specialists" or some other bodies will be set up; that is quite immaterial. The point is whether the old state machine (bound by thousands of threads to the bourgeoisie and permeated through and through with routine and inertia) shall remain, or be *destroyed* and replaced by a *new* one. Revolution consists not in the new class commanding, governing with the aid of the *old* state machine, but in this class *smashing* this machine and commanding, governing with the aid of a *new* machine. Kautsky slurs over this *basic* idea of Marxism, or he does not understand it at all.

His question about officials clearly shows that he does not understand the lessons of the Commune or the teachings of Marx. "We cannot do without officials even in the party and the trade unions...."

We cannot do without officials *under capitalism*, under *the rule of the bourgeoisie*. The proletariat is oppressed, the working people are enslaved by capitalism. Under capitalism, democracy is restricted, cramped, curtailed, mutilated by all the conditions of wage slavery, and the poverty and misery of the people. This and this alone is the reason why the functionaries of our political organisations and trade unions are corrupted—or rather tend to be corrupted—by the conditions of capitalism and betray a tendency to become bureaucrats, i.e., privileged persons divorced from the people and standing *above* the people.

That is the *essence* of bureaucracy; and until the capitalists have been expropriated and the bourgeoisie overthrown, *even* proletarian functionaries will inevitably be "bureaucratised" to a certain extent.

According to Kautsky, since elected functionaries will remain under socialism, so will officials, so will the bureaucracy! This is exactly where he is wrong. Marx, referring to the example of the Commune, showed that under socialism functionaries will cease to be "bureaucrats", to be "officials", they will cease to be so *in proportion as*—in addition to the principle of election of officials—the principle of recall at any time is *also* introduced, as salaries are reduced to the level of the wages of the average workman, *and* as parliamentary institutions are replaced by "working bodies, executive and legislative at the same time".

As a matter of fact, the whole of Kautsky's argument against Pannekoek, and particularly the former's wonderful point that we cannot do without officials even in our party and trade union organisations, is merely a repetition of Bernstein's old "arguments" against Marxism in general. In his renegade book, *The Premises of Socialism*, Bernstein combats the ideas of "primitive" democracy, combats what he calls "doctrinaire democracy": binding mandates, unpaid officials, impotent central representative bodies, etc. to prove that this "primitive" democracy is unsound, Bernstein refers to the experience of the British trade unions, as interpreted by the Webbs.[154] Seventy years of development "in absolute freedom", he says (p. 137, German edition), convinced the trade unions that primitive democracy was useless, and they replaced it by ordinary democracy, i.e., parliamentarism combined with bureaucracy.

In reality, the trade unions did not develop "in absolute freedom" *but in absolute capitalist slavery*, under which, it goes without saying, a number of concessions to the prevailing evil, violence, falsehood, exclusion of the poor from the affairs of "higher" administration, "cannot be done without". Under socialism much of "primitive" democracy will inevitably be revived, since, for the first time in the history of civilised society the *mass* of population will rise to taking an *independent* part, not only in voting and elections, *but*

also in the everyday administration of the state. Under socialism *all* will govern in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing.

Marx's critico-analytical genius saw in the practical measures of the Commune the *turning-point* which the opportunists fear and do not want to recognise because of their cowardice, because they do not want to break irrevocably with the bourgeoisie, and which the anarchists do not want to see, either because they are in a hurry or because they do not understand at all the conditions of great social changes. "We must not even think of destroying the old state machine; how can we do without ministries and officials>" argues the opportunist, who is completely saturated with philistinism and who, at bottom, not only does not believe in revolution, in the creative power of revolution, but lives in mortal dread of it (like our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries).

"We must think *only* of destroying the old state machine; it is no use probing into the *concrete* lessons of earlier proletarian revolutions and analyzing *what* to put in the place of what has been destroyed, and *how*," argues the anarchist (the best of the anarchist, of course, and not those who, following the Kropotkins and Co., trail behind the bourgeoisie). Consequently, the tactics of the anarchist become the tactics of *despair* instead of a ruthlessly bold revolutionary effort to solve concrete problems while taking into account the practical conditions of the mass movement.

Marx teaches us to avoid both errors; he teaches us to act with supreme boldness in destroying the entire old state machine, and at the same time he teaches us to put the question concretely: the Commune was able in the space of a few weeks to *start* building a *new*, proletarian state machine by introducing such-and-such measures to provide wider democracy and to uproot bureaucracy. Let us learn revolutionary boldness from the Communards; let us see in their practical measures the *outline* of really urgent and immediately possible measures, and then, *following this road*, we shall achieve the complete destruction of bureaucracy.

The possibility of this destruction is guaranteed by the fact that socialism will shorten the working day, will raise

the *people* to a new life, will create such conditions for the *majority* of the population as will enable *everybody*, without exception, to perform "state functions", and this will lead to the *complete withering away* of every form of state in general.

"Its object [the object of the mass strike]," Kautsky continues, "cannot be to *destroy* the state power; its only object can be to make the government compliant on some specific question, or to replace a government hostile to the proletariat by one willing to meet it half-way [entgegenkommende].... But never, under no circumstances can it [that is, the proletarian victory over a hostile government] lead to the *destruction* of the state power; it can lead only to a certain *shifting* [Verschiebung] of the balance of forces *within the state power*.... The aim of our political struggle remains, as in the past, the conquest of state power by winning a majority in parliament and by raising parliament to the ranks of master of the government." (Pp. 726, 727, 732.)

This is nothing but the purest and most vulgar opportunism: repudiating revolution in deeds, while accepting it in words. Kautsky's thoughts go no further than a "government ... willing to meet the proletariat half-way"—a step backward to philistinism compared with 1847, when the *Communist Manifesto* proclaimed "the organisation of the proletariat as the ruling class".

Kautsky will have to achieve his beloved "unity" with the Scheidemanns, Plekhanovs and Vanderveldes, all of whom agree to fight for a government "willing to meet the proletariat half-way."

We, however, shall break with these traitors to socialism, and we shall fight for the complete destruction of the old state machine, in order that the armed proletariat itself *may become the government*. These are two vastly different things.

Kautsky will have to enjoy the pleasant company of the Legiens and Davids, Plekhanovs, Potresovs, Tseretelis and Chernovs, who are quite willing to work for the "shifting of the balance of forces within the state power", for "winning a majority in parliament", and "raising parliament to the ranks of master of the government". A most worthy object, which is wholly acceptable to the opportunists and which keeps everything within the bounds of the bourgeois parliamentary republic.

We, however, shall break with the opportunists; and the entire class-conscious proletariat will be with us in the fight—not to "shift the balance of forces", but to *overthrow the bourgeoisie*, *to destroy* bourgeois parliamentarism, for a democratic republic after the type of the Commune, or a republic of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

To the right of Kautsky in international socialism there are trends such as *Socialist Monthly*[155] in Germany (Legien, David, Kolb, and many others, including the Scandinavian Stauning and Branting), Jaurès's followers and Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Turati, Treves, and other Right-wingers of the Italian Party; the Fabians and "Independents" (the Independent labour Party, which, in fact, has always been dependent on the Liberals) in Britain; and the like. All these gentry, who play a tremendous, very often a predominant role in the parliamentary work and the press of their parties, repudiate outright the dictatorship of the proletariat and pursue a policy of undisguised opportunism. In the eyes of these gentry, the "dictatorship" of the proletariat "contradicts" democracy!! There is really no essential distinction between them and the petty-bourgeois democrats.

Taking this circumstance into consideration, we are justified in drawing the conclusion that the Second International, that is, the overwhelming majority of its official representatives, has completely sunk into opportunism. The experience of the Commune has been not only ignored but distorted. Far from inculcating in the workers' minds the idea that the time is nearing when they must act to smash the old state machine, replace it by a new one, and in this way make their political rule the foundation for the socialist reorganisation of society, they have actually preached to the masses the very opposite and have depicted the "conquest of power" in a way that has left thousands of loopholes for opportunism.

The distortion and hushing up of the question of the relation of the proletarian revolution to the state could not

but play an immense role at a time when states, which possess a military apparatus expanded as a consequence of imperialist rivalry, have become military monsters which are exterminating millions of people in order to settle the issue as to whether Britain or Germany—this or that finance capital—is to rule the world.*

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* The MS. continues as follows:

Chapter VII

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1905 AND 1917

The subject indicated in the title of this chapter is so vast that volumes could and should be written about it. In the present pamphlet we shall have to confine ourselves, naturally, to the most important lessons provided by experience, those touching directly upon the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution in relation to state power. (Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*)

POSTSCRIPT TO THE FIRST EDITION

This pamphlet was written in August and September 1917. I had already drawn up the plan for the next, the seventh chapter, "The Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917". Apart from the title, however, I had no time to write a single line of the chapter; I was "interrupted" by a political crisis—the eve of the October revolution of 1917. Such an "interruption" can only be welcomed; but the writing of the second part of this pamphlet ("The Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917") will probably have to be put off for a long time. It is more pleasant and useful to go through the "experience of revolution" than to write about it.

The Author

Petrograd
November 30, 1917

NOTES

[1] *The First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* sat in Petrograd from June 3 to 24 (June 16 to July 7), 1917. It was attended by more than a thousand delegates. The Bolsheviks, then a minority in the Soviets, were represented by 105 delegates. The majority was made up of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Among the items on the Congress agenda were: the attitude to the Provisional Government, the war, and preparations for the Constituent Assembly. Lenin spoke on the attitude to the Provisional Government and on the war. The Bolsheviks tabled their own motions on all the major issues. They exposed the imperialist character of the war, stressed the disastrous consequences that compromise with the bourgeoisie was bound to have, and insisted that all power be transferred to the Soviets. The Congress resolutions declared in favour of the Provisional Government and its preparations for an offensive at the front, and took a stand against the transfer of power to the Soviets. p. 15

[2] *The first coalition government* was formed on May 5 (18), 1917, and its composition announced in the press the following day. Along with representatives of the bourgeoisie, it included the Socialist-Revolutionaries Kerensky and Chernov, Pereverzev, who was close to the S.R.s, the Mensheviks Skobelev and Tsereteli; and the Popular Socialist Peshekhonov. p. 18

[3] *The Provisional Government* was formed on March 2 (15), 1917, by agreement between the Duma's Provisional Committee and the S.R. and Menshevik leaders of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It was composed of Prince G. Y. Lvov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior), P. N. Milyukov, the Cadet leader (Minister for Foreign Affairs), A. I. Guchkov, the Octobrist leader (War, and ad interim Naval, Minister), and other members of the big bourgeoisie and landed proprietors, as well as the Trudovik A. F. Kerensky (Minister of Justice). p. 19

[4] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette)—a daily newspaper published by the Mensheviks in Petrograd from March 7 (20) to November 30

(December 13), 1917. On August 30 (September 12) it became a mouthpiece of the Menshevik Central Committee. It supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and fought against the Bolshevik Party and its leader, Lenin. Its reaction to the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule was hostile. p. 19

[5] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 395. p. 19

[6] Lenin is referring to the resolutions of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), held in Petrograd from April 24 to 29 (May 7-12), 1917 (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the C.C.*, 7th ed., Part I, 1954, pp. 332-53 [in Russian]). p. 20

[7] *Lyakhov*—a colonel of the tsarist army, led the Russian troops which put down the bourgeois revolution of 1908 in Persia. By "Lyakhov's policy" Lenin means the suppression of the revolutionary and national liberation movements by the tsarist government. p. 22

[8] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. The party, founded in October 1905, grouped members of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo officials from among the landowners, and bourgeois intellectuals. Among its leaders were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. Subsequently the Cadets became a party of the imperialist bourgeoisie. During the First World War they fully supported the tsarist government's aggressive foreign policy. During the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, they did their best to rescue the monarchy. Following the victory of the October Socialist Revolution they took an uncompromising stand against the Soviet state and shared in all the armed counter-revolutionary actions and campaigns of the interventionists. After the foreign invaders and the whiteguards had been defeated, the Cadets fled from the country and continued their anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary activity as émigrés. p. 22

[9] *Izvestia Petrogradskogo Soveta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (Bulletin of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies)—a daily newspaper founded on February 28 (March 13), 1917.

After the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets had formed the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, *Izvestia* became the organ of the C.E.C., and from August 1 (14) on, that is, beginning with its issue No. 132, appeared under the title of *Izvestia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i Petrogradskogo Soveta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (Bulletin of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). On September 29 (October 12), its issue No. 184 appeared under the new title *Izvestia Tsentralnogo*

Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta Sovetov Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov (Bulletin of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). Throughout that period the paper was controlled by the Mensheviks and S.R.s, and waged a bitter struggle against the Bolshevik Party.

After the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets the *Izvestia* editorial board was changed and the paper became the official organ of Soviet power. It published the first important documents of the Soviet Government, and articles and speeches by Lenin. In March 1918 its publication was transferred to Moscow. In December 1922, with the formation of the U.S.S.R., *Izvestia* became the organ of the C.E.C. U.S.S.R. and the All-Russia C.E.C.

The paper was reorganised by decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. dated January 24, 1938, and ever since January 26, 1938, has been published under the title of *Izvestia Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya* (Bulletin of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies). p. 22

[10] *The First All-Russia Congress of Peasant Deputies* was held in Petrograd from May 4 to 28 (May 17 to June 10), 1917. It was attended by 1,115 delegates from the gubernias and army units. The Bolsheviks, who took an active part in its deliberations, exposed the imperialist policies of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the Menshevik and S.R. policy of compromise. Lenin spoke on the agrarian question. He insisted on immediate confiscation of the landed estates, to be transferred to peasant committees, and on nationalisation of all the lands in Russia. S.R. domination at the Congress left its imprint on the resolutions adopted. The Congress approved the Provisional Government's policy and the entry of "socialists" into the government. It declared for war "to a victorious conclusion" and for an offensive at the front, then in preparation. It pronounced itself against the immediate transfer of the landed estates to the peasants, and put off decision on the land question pending convocation of the Constituent Assembly. p. 22

[11] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—a daily newspaper of a Menshevik trend published by a group of Social-Democrats who called themselves internationalists". The group comprised the Mensheviks who supported Martov, and certain intellectuals with semi-Menshevik leanings. It vacillated continuously between the conciliators and the Bolsheviks.

Novaya Zhizn appeared in Petrograd from April 1917. After the October Revolution it adopted a hostile attitude to the Soviet state. It was closed down in July 1918. p. 24

[12] Lenin has in mind the British Government issuing a passport to Ramsay MacDonald, the British Independent Labour Party leader, who was invited to Russia by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The trip was frustrated by the British Seamen's Union, which refused to man the ship in which MacDonald was to sail to Russia. p. 24

[13] *The Manifesto of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* "*To the Peoples of the World*" was adopted by the Soviet on March 14 (27), 1917, and was published in the capital the next day. The S.R. and Menshevik leaders were compelled to vote for it under pressure from the revolutionary people, who insisted on ending the war.

The Manifesto called on the working people of the belligerent countries to take action in favour of peace. However, it did not expose the predatory nature of the war, nor did it propose any practical measures for peace. It virtually justified the continuation of the imperialist war by the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 25

[14] In June 1917 Italy overran Albania and proclaimed her independence under Italy's virtual protectorate.

In Greece, a coup d'état was carried out under the pressure of Britain and France. By launching an economic blockade that caused a terrible famine, and by occupying a number of Greek provinces, the Allies forced King Constantine to abdicate, and put Venizelos, their adherent, in power. Greece was dragged into the war on the side of the Entente, contrary to the will of the vast majority of her people.

During the First World War Persia (Iran) was occupied by British and Russian troops. By early 1917 Persia, having lost all independence, was occupied by the Russians in the north and the British in the south.

Provisional Government diplomats backed all these acts of imperialist tyranny. p. 26

[15] Reference is to the declaration which the bureau of the Bolshevik group and the bureau of the united internationalist Social-Democrats made at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets. They demanded that the Congress first of all discuss the offensive at the front for which the Provisional Government was preparing. The declaration pointed out that the offensive was being imposed by the magnates of the imperialist Allies and that the Russian counter-revolutionaries expected thereby to concentrate power in the hands of the military-diplomatic and capitalist groups, and to deliver a blow to the revolutionary fight for peace and to the positions gained by the Russian democrats. The declaration warned the working class, the armed forces and the peasants of the danger threatening the country, and called on the Congress to immediately repel the counter-revolutionaries' onslaught.

The Congress rejected the proposal made by the bureau of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) group. p. 26

[16] *Dyelo Naroda* (People's Cause)—an S.R. daily published in Petrograd between March 1917 and June 1918. It changed its title several times. It adopted a defencist and conciliatory stand and supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. Its publication was resumed in Samara in October 1918 (three issues were brought out) and in

Moscow in March 1919 (ten issues). The paper was closed down the same year for its counter-revolutionary trend. p. 26

[17] Lenin described as *Narodniks* three petty-bourgeois parties of a Narodnik type: the Trudoviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Popular Socialists. p. 29

[18] *Basle Manifesto of 1912*—a manifesto on the war, adopted by the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress which sat in Basle on November 24 and 25, 1912. It warned the nations against the imminent threat of a world imperialist war, revealed the aggressive aims of the war and called on the workers of the world to fight for peace and "to pit against the might of capitalist imperialism the international solidarity of the working class". The Manifesto included a clause, formulated by Lenin, from a resolution of the Stuttgart Congress (1907), to the effect that in the event of an imperialist war the socialists should take advantage of the economic and political crisis that would result from the war to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule and fight for socialist revolution. p. 35

[19] Allusion is to the prohibition of the All-Ukraine Army Congress by Kerensky, the Provisional Government's War Minister. Despite the ban, the Congress sat from June 5-12 (18-25), 1917, in Kiev. It was attended by some 2,000 delegates. It passed the "Universal Act" on the autonomy of the Ukraine, published by the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The counter-revolutionary policies of the Provisional Government and the Menshevik and S.R. parties towards the Ukraine were denounced by Lenin in the articles "The Ukraine" and "The Ukraine and the Defeat of the Ruling Parties of Russia" (see pp. 91-92 and 99-102 of this volume). p. 37

[20] Reference is to the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, promising "civil liberties" and a "legislative" Duma. The Manifesto was a concession wrested from the tsarist regime by the revolution. The autocracy wanted to gain time, split the revolutionary forces, foil the All-Russia Strike and crush the revolution. The Bolsheviks exposed this political manoeuvre. On October 18 (31), 1905, the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. issued the appeal "To the Russian People" revealing the spurious character of the tsar's Manifesto and calling on the working people to continue their revolutionary struggle. p. 40

[21] The Russian revolution of 1905-07 gave rise to revolutionary movements among the peoples of the East. In 1908 a bourgeois revolution broke out in Turkey. In 1906 there was a bourgeois revolution in Persia, resulting in the overthrow of the shah in 1909. The year 1910 saw the rise of a revolutionary movement in China against the feudal lords and foreign imperialists. The movement led to a revolution, and to the establishment of a bourgeois republic in December 1911. p. 40

[22] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (The Social-Democrat)—a daily newspaper of the Moscow Regional Bureau, the Moscow Committee, and subsequently the Moscow District Committee of the Bolshevik Party. It was published from March 1917 to March 1918, and was merged with *Pravda* when the Party's Central Committee had moved to Moscow. p. 42

[23] *Pravda* (The Truth)—a Bolshevik daily newspaper published legally. Its first issue appeared in St. Petersburg on April 22 (May 5), 1912.

Lenin, who guided *Pravda* ideologically, contributed to the paper almost daily. He gave recommendations to its editors with a view to making it a militant revolutionary paper.

A substantial part of the Party's organising work was done through *Pravda*. Conferences with representatives of local Party cells were held in its offices, which also received information on Party work in factories and passed on directives of the Party's Central and Petrograd Committees.

Pravda was doggedly persecuted by the police and was closed down on July 8 (21), 1914.

It did not resume publication until after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917. From March 5 (18), 1917, onwards it was brought out as a paper of the Central and Petrograd Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.

Upon his arrival in Petrograd Lenin joined the editorial board, and *Pravda* launched a campaign for his plan to bring about the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

From July to October 1917 the paper, being persecuted by the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government, had to change its title more than once. It appeared as *Listok* "*Pravdy*", *Proletary*, *Rabochy* and *Rabochy Put*. Since the victory of the October Socialist Revolution it has been published—beginning with October 27 (November 9), 1917—under its original title, *Pravda*.

Pravda holds a prominent place in the history of the Bolshevik press. The generation of advanced workers it educated played an outstanding part in the October Revolution and in socialist construction. *Pravda* was the first mass paper of the working class to be published legally. It marked a new stage in the development of the press of Russia's working class and the world proletariat.

The day when the first issue of *Pravda* appeared has been celebrated as the workers' Press Day ever since 1914. p. 42

[24] The *factory committees*, which came into being in March 1917, immediately after the victory of the February Revolution, were class organisations of the workers. The factory elders' councils and other elected bodies formed from provisional strike committees in the periods of revolutionary upsurge are considered the forerunners of the factory committees.

The factory committees became very active as soon as they were set up. They formulated the workers' economic demands and

presented them to the factory owners, introduced an eight-hour day by their own decision, exercised control over the employment and discharge of labour power, formed workers' militia units, combated sabotage on the part of the employers, secured raw materials and fuel for the factories concerned to prevent stoppages, and so on. They took an active part in the October Revolution. In 1918 they were merged with the trade unions and became primary units of the latter.

The First Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees was held from May 30 to June 3 (June 12-16), 1917. The 568 delegates attending it represented the factory committees, trade union bureaus, and other workers' organisations of Petrograd and vicinity. The conference discussed the state of industry and the problem of controlling and regulating production in Petrograd, the tasks of the factory committees, their role in the trade union movement, etc.

The Conference became a scene of bitter struggle between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over the role and tasks of the factory committees and over workers' control. The Mensheviks tried to nullify the political and economic role of the factory committees and to substitute state control involving bourgeois parties for workers' control. The conference carried the Bolshevik motion.

The conference was very important in that it enabled the factory committees to exchange experience and join forces in the campaign for workers' control. To this end it elected a standing Central Council of Factory Committees of 25.

Lenin took part in the conference. He drafted the "Resolution on Measures to Cope with Economic Dislocation", which was carried by a vast majority, and analysed the conference resolutions in his articles "The Petty-Bourgeois Stand on Economic Dislocation" and "Economic Dislocation and the Proletariat's Struggle Against It", criticising the Menshevik stand at the conference and upholding the Bolsheviks' tactics on workers' control over production. p. 43

[25] *Rech* (Speech)—Central Organ of the Cadet Party published daily in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet. On October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued publication under different titles till August 1918. p. 44

[26] *Yedinstvo* (Unity)—mouthpiece of the Right wing of the defencist Mensheviks headed by G. V. Plekhanov; it was published in Petrograd. Four issues appeared in May and June 1914. From March to November 1917 the paper was published daily. In December 1917 and January 1918 it appeared under the title *Nashe Yedinstvo* (Our Unity). Supporting the Provisional Government and advocating coalition with the bourgeoisie and firm power, *Yedinstvo* waged a fierce struggle against the Bolsheviks, very often resorting to the gutter press methods. Its reaction to the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule was hostile. p. 44

[27] *Struvism*—a liberal-bourgeois distortion of Marxism, so named after P. B. Struve, the chief exponent of "legal Marxism" in Russia. p. 45

[28] *Vorwärts* (Forward)—Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party published daily in Berlin from 1891 to 1933.

Engels used the columns of *Vorwärts* to fight against all manifestations of opportunism. In the second half of the nineties, after Engels's death, the paper found itself in the hands of the party's Right wing, and continuously published opportunist articles. It carried biased reports on the struggle against opportunism and revisionism in the R.S.D.L.P. It backed the Economists and then, after the split in the Party, the Mensheviks. In the years of reaction it published slanderous articles by Trotsky, while denying Lenin and other Bolsheviks the opportunity to refute the slander and present an objective picture of the situation in the Party.

During the First World War *Vorwärts* took a social-chauvinist stand. After the October Socialist Revolution it conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. p. 46

[29] In Russian political writing, the term *diehards* was applied to the extreme Right wing of the reactionary landowners. p. 48

[30] The term "*gentlemen of June 3*" applies to the bourgeois and landowner parties (Right-wing, Octobrist and Cadet) which won a vast superiority in the Third and Fourth Dumas under the counter-revolutionary electoral law passed by the tsarist government on June 3 (16), 1907. The law curtailed the already limited suffrage of the workers and peasants.

The June 3 parties periodically held so-called private meetings of Deputies to the Fourth Duma. One of these meetings took place on June 3 (16), 1917, that is, the day the All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was convened. This was not mere coincidence, for the counter-revolutionary parties of the Russian bourgeoisie and landowners were trying to exert political pressure on the petty-bourgeois conciliators, the Mensheviks and S.R.s, who commanded a majority at the Congress.

Among the items, the meeting discussed foreign policy matters. It was addressed by V. A. Maklakov, P. N. Milyukov, V. V. Shulgin and other Octobrist and Cadet leaders. They insisted on the vigorous fulfilment of commitments in respect of the Allies and on putting an end to the revolution. The resolution adopted by the meeting said as much. p. 48

[31] *Volya Naroda* (People's Will)—a daily newspaper published by the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Petrograd in 1917. It was closed down in November 1917. Afterwards it reappeared under other titles, and was suppressed altogether in February 1918. p. 54

[32] *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917. It was owned by different publish-

ers, and repeatedly changed its political trend. In 1905 it became a Black Hundred paper. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 it adopted a counter-revolutionary platform and carried on a fierce anti-Bolshevik campaign. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. Lenin described *Novoye Vremya* as a typically venal organ. p. 59

[33] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party founded in Russia in late 1901 and early 1902 as a result of the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles. Their views were an eclectic hodgepodge of Narodnik and revisionist ideas. During the First World War most of the S.R.s advocated social-chauvinist views.

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 the S.R.s and Mensheviks were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary, bourgeois-landowner Provisional Government, and S.R. leaders (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) were members of the cabinet. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of the landed estates, and advocated their preservation. The S.R. members of the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against peasants who had seized landed estates.

At the end of November 1917 the Left S.R.s formed an independent party. To retain their influence on the peasants, they nominally recognised Soviet power and reached agreement with the Bolsheviks. But shortly afterwards they began to fight against Soviet rule.

During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War the S.R.s engaged in counter-revolutionary subversion, actively supported the invaders and whiteguards, took part in counter-revolutionary conspiracies, and organised acts of terrorism against Soviet statesmen and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War they continued their hostile activity inside the country and abroad, where they joined the White émigrés. p. 61

[34] Reference is to the speech which the Menshevik Skobelev, Labour Minister of the Provisional Government, made at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on May 13 (26), 1917, saying that taxation of the propertied classes should be increased "to 100 per cent of their profits". p. 65

[35] Lenin is referring to the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets banning the demonstration fixed by the Bolshevik Central Committee for June 10 (23), 1917.

Early in June tension in Petrograd grew. The prolongation of the war by the Provisional Government, preparations for an offensive at the front, and food shortages, all caused resentment and indignation among the workers and soldiers. The government's order to troops to take over the Durnovo country-house and evict the workers' organisations of the Vyborgskaya Storona district from it gave rise to a strike. On June 7 (20) four factories went on

strike, and next day, twenty-eight. The masses were eager to hold a street demonstration.

To ward off provocation and unnecessary loss of life, a joint meeting of the Central and Petrograd Committees, the Military Organisation, and district delegates from the workers and delegates from troop units, held on June 8 (21), carried Lenin's motion to hold a peaceful organised demonstration. The action was set for June 10 (23).

The Bolshevik Central Committee's decision to hold a demonstration brought a ready response from the masses and alarmed the government, as well as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who resolved to foil the demonstration. On the evening of June 9 (22) the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, led by them, passed a resolution banning all street demonstrations for three days.

On a motion by Lenin, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, not wishing to go against the Congress decision, resolved on the night of June 9-10 to call off the demonstration. Members of the Central and Petrograd Committees and other prominent members of the Party were sent to factories and barracks to dissuade the workers and soldiers from demonstrating. As a result of their explanatory work, the workers and soldiers agreed that it would be-unwise to hold a demonstration just then. This indicated the Party's growing influence, its ability to keep in touch with the people, and the flexibility of the Bolshevik leadership. Two days later the S.R. and Menshevik leadership of the Congress of Soviets decided to hold a demonstration on June 18 (July 1)—the day when the Russian troops were to take the offensive—as proof of the people's "confidence" in the Provisional Government.

Under Lenin's personal leadership, the Central and Petrograd Committees did a great deal to ensure that the demonstration reflected the true sentiment of the people and win that important peaceful battle against the Mensheviks and S.R.s for influence among the people. Lenin took part in preparations for the demonstration by formulating watchwords, checking the preparation of streamers and banners, giving directions to correspondents, writing telegrams to be sent to local Bolshevik organisations, taking steps to guarantee that there would be an adequate number of Bolshevik speakers, putting his own name on the list of speakers, and attending the Marsovo Polye meeting.

On June 18 (July 1) the demonstration brought some 500,000 Petrograd workers and soldiers out into the streets. By far most of the demonstrators carried Bolshevik revolutionary slogans. Only small groups carried the conciliating parties' slogans expressing confidence in the Provisional Government. The demonstration revealed the heightened revolutionary spirit of the people and the vastly increased influence and prestige of the Bolshevik Party. It also revealed the complete failure of the petty-bourgeois conciliating parties backing the Provisional Government. Lenin dealt with the June demonstration in "The Eighteenth of June", "Three Crises" (see pp. 110-12 and 171-75 of this volume) and other articles. p. 70

[36] After the victory of the February revolution the workers' organisations of the Vyborgskaya Storona district (the bakers' union, the district branch of the people's militia, etc.), joined by the anarchists, took over the vacant country-house of tsarist ex-Minister Durnovo and the adjoining garden (20 dessiatines in area), which the workers of the district subsequently used as recreation grounds.

On June 7 (20) the Provisional Government, backed by the S.R. and Menshevik majority on the Petrograd Soviet and then by the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, ordered the country-house to be vacated. The order brought protests from the Petrograd workers, particularly those of Vyborgskaya Storona. Several factories struck. The government yielded but on the night of June 18-19 (July 1-2) it sent a contingent of Cossacks and soldiers which took the country-house by assault, killing two anarchists and arresting 59 people. As the overwhelming majority of the arrested had nothing to do with the anarchists, they had to be released shortly after. The raid deeply angered the workers.

For several weeks the bourgeois press was busy playing up the "horrors" which it alleged to have taken place at the country-house, and used this particular incident to the hilt to campaign against the revolutionary-minded masses and the Bolsheviks. p. 70

[37] *Catiline* (*Lucius Sergius Catilina*)—Roman politician and soldier. In 63 B.C. he engineered a conspiracy to effect a coup d'état, abolish the republic and establish a military dictatorship. p. 73

[38] The basic provisions of the draft were incorporated in the declaration of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and the Bureau of the Bolshevik group at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets concerning the Congress ban on the peaceful demonstration fixed by the Bolshevik Party for June 10 (23). p. 77

[39] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist bands formed by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and carried out anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 79

[40] Reference is to the speech made by the Menshevik Tsereteli, member of the Provisional Government, on June 11 (24), 1917, at the joint meeting of the Steering Committee of the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Executive Committee of the Congress of Peasants' Deputies, and the bureaus of all Congress parties. The meeting was arranged by the S.R. and Menshevik leaders to strike a blow at the Bolshevik Party, taking advantage of the majority they commanded. In his speech, which he held in a hysterical key, Tsereteli said the demonstration which the Bolsheviks had scheduled for June 10 (23) was "a Bolshevik conspiracy to overthrow the government and seize power". The speech was slanderous and counter-revolutionary throughout. The Bolsheviks left the meeting in protest against the slanders spread by

Tsereteli and other S.R. and Menshevik leaders. Lenin, who had been against the meeting from the outset, did not attend. p. 79

[41] *Cavaignac, Louis Eugène*—French general who after the February revolution of 1848 became War Minister of the Provisional Government. In June 1848 he led the suppression of the Paris workers' uprising. p. 83

[42] Reference is to the statement which the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and the Bureau of the Bolshevik group at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets made regarding the ban on the peaceful demonstration appointed by the Bolshevik Party for June 10 (23), 1917. The statement exposed the provocative conduct of the Menshevik and S.R. leaders of the Congress of Soviets, who banned the demonstration, and the counter-revolutionary policies of the Provisional Government. It warned that the revolution was in danger, and called on the working class to be staunch and vigilant.

The statement was read at the joint meeting of the Congress Steering Committee, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the Executive Committee of the Congress of Peasants' Deputies, and the bureaus of all Congress parties on June 11 (24). The Bolsheviks had wanted the statement to be read at the Congress sitting on June 12 (25), but the chairman of the meeting denied the Bolsheviks the floor. The statement was therefore handed to the Congress Steering Committee. The same sitting passed a resolution condemning the Bolshevik Party despite the fact that the Bolsheviks had called off the demonstration. p. 88

[43] *The Ukrainian Central Rada* (Council) was a counter-revolutionary bourgeois nationalist organisation founded in April 1917 at the All-Ukraine National Congress in Kiev by a bloc of Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties and groups. M. S. Grushevsky, an ideologue of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, was its chairman and V. K. Vinnichenko its vice-chairman. Among its members were Petlyura, Yefremov, Antonovich and other nationalists. Socially, the Rada relied for support on the urban and rural bourgeoisie, the kulaks, and the petty-bourgeois nationalist intellectuals. It tried to consolidate the power of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landowners and to establish a Ukrainian bourgeois state, taking advantage of the national liberation movement in the Ukraine. Under the guise of fighting for national independence, it strove to win the support of the Ukrainian people, divert them from the all-Russia revolutionary movement, bring them under the sway of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, and prevent the victory of the socialist revolution in the Ukraine. The Rada supported the Provisional Government despite differences over the issue of granting autonomy to the Ukraine.

Following the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Rada declared itself the supreme organ of the "Ukrainian People's Republic" and campaigned openly against Soviet rule.

It was one of the principal centres of the counter-revolutionaries of the whole of Russia. p. 91

[44] *Malenkaya Gazeta* (The Little Newspaper)—a yellow reactionary newspaper published in Petrograd from September 1914 to July 1917 by A. A. Suvorin, Jr. From May 1917 on, it appeared under the subtitle of "An Extra-Party Socialist Newspaper", speculating on the people's sympathy for socialism. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 it opposed the Bolshevik Party and conducted a vicious slander campaign against Lenin. p. 98

[45] *Russkaya Volya* (Russia's Will)—a bourgeois daily newspaper founded by A. D. Protopopov, the tsarist Minister of the Interior, and financed by the big banks. It was published in Petrograd from December 1916. After the February revolution it carried on a smear campaign against the Bolsheviks. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee on October 25 (November 7), 1917. p. 98

[46] *Derzhimorda*—a policeman in Gogol's *Inspector-General*, a boorish, insolent oppressor, a petty tyrant. p. 100

[47] *Wild Landowner*—a character in M. Saltykov-Shchedrin's fairy-tale of the same name. p. 100

[48] *The Council of State*—one of the supreme organs of state power in tsarist Russia; was established in 1810, according to M. M. Speransky's plan, as a legislative-advisory body whose members were appointed and confirmed by the tsar. A reactionary institution, it voted down even moderate Bills approved by the Duma. p. 100

[49] Junkovsky, tsarist Deputy Minister of the Interior, was informed in 1914 that Malinovsky, Deputy to the Fourth Duma, was an agent provocateur. He conveyed the information to Rodzyanko, Chairman of the Fourth Duma, who pledged his "honour" that he would not divulge the secret. The two decided to remove Malinovsky from the Duma, doing it, however, in such a way as "not to expose either the Duma or the Ministers to scandal". Malinovsky resigned as Deputy and left Russia with the aid of the police. He was exposed in 1917, on the strength of evidence derived from the Police Department archives. In 1918 he was tried by decision of the Soviet Government and was shot under the sentence of the Revolutionary Tribunal. p. 103

[50] *Dyen* (The Day)—a liberal bourgeois daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1912. Among its contributors were Menshevik liquidators, who took it over completely after the February revolution. *Dyen* was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 104

[51] On June 16 (29), 1917, *Dyen*, *Novaya Zhizn* and *Birzheviye Vedomosti* published the findings of the extraordinary committee of inquiry appointed by the Provisional Government to investigate the crimes of the tsarist regime. The committee published evidence against the agent provocateur Malinovsky. p. 104

[52] *Birzhevka*, short for *Birzheviye Vedomosti* (Stock-Exchange Recorder)—a bourgeois newspaper founded in 1880. It was published in St. Petersburg, first three and then four times a week, and in the end daily. From 1902 onwards it was brought out twice a day. Time-serving, venality and lack of principle made its title a byword. After the February revolution the paper conducted riot-raising propaganda against the Bolshevik Party and Lenin. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet at the end of October 1917. p. 104

[53] Reference is to the treachery of Azef, member of the S.R. Party's Central Committee, who for a number of years was a secret police agent. In 1908 he was exposed, and fled from the country. p. 104

[54] This refers to the offensive launched by the Provisional Government in June 1917, at the instance of the Russian and Anglo-French imperialists. Kerensky, the War Minister, ordered the offensive on June 16 (29). On June 18 (July 1) the Russian troops took the offensive on the South-Western Front. The operation was successful at first and the Russians made headway, taking several thousand prisoners. Later on fatigue, the troops' incomprehension of the purpose of the offensive, and inadequate technical preparation resulted in the German troops effecting a break-through and forcing the Russian troops into a disorderly retreat. The Russian Army sustained a crushing defeat, losing about 60,000 men and officers in ten days.

The miscarriage of the offensive defeated the entire policy of the Provisional Government and the S.R. and Menshevik defencist bloc backing it. The defeat at the front made for an increase in Bolshevik influence on the workers and soldiers, who satisfied themselves more and more that the Bolsheviks were right. The news of the enormous casualties which the offensive had involved angered the working people and hastened a new political crisis in the country. p. 113

[55] The *Zimmerwaldists* were members of the group formed at the first conference of internationalists held in Zimmerwald from September 5 to 8, 1915.

During the conference a struggle developed between the revolutionary internationalists led by Lenin and the Kautskyite majority. Lenin formed of the Left internationalists the Zimmerwald Left group in which the Bolshevik Party was the only one to take a correct and consistently internationalist stand against the war.

The conference adopted a manifesto describing the world war as an imperialist war. It condemned the conduct of those "socialists"

who voted for war credits and were members of bourgeois cabinets. It called on the workers of Europe to begin fighting against the war, for peace without annexations and indemnities. The conference also passed a resolution expressing sympathy with the war victims, and elected the International Socialist Committee. p. 113

[56] *Young Turks*—European name of the members of Unity and Progress, a Turkish bourgeois and landowner nationalist party founded in Istanbul in 1889. They strove to restrict the sultan's absolute power, transform the feudal empire into a bourgeois constitutional monarchy and thereby enhance the role of the Turkish bourgeoisie in the country's economic and political life. In July 1908 they took power as a result of a revolution accomplished by the top section of the bourgeoisie, with support from the armed forces. The government they formed preserved the monarchy and pursued a reactionary policy. After Turkey had been defeated in the First World War (autumn 1918) the Young Turk Party dissolved itself. p. 122

[57] *The All-Russia Trade Union Conference* was held in Petrograd between June 21 and 28 (July 4-11), 1917. It was attended by 211 delegates, 73 of them being Bolsheviks, and the rest Mensheviks, S.R.s, Bundists and non-party people. Among the items on the agenda were the trade union movement and development and the economic struggle. The Bolsheviks moved resolutions or amendments on all the major issues. The conference carried by a slight majority of 10 or 12 the motions tabled by the defencist Mensheviks. It elected a provisional Central Council of Trade Unions. p. 123

[58] *The Octobrists* were members of the Octobrist Party (or Union of October 17), founded in Russia upon the publication of the tsar's manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905. The Party was counter-revolutionary and defended the interests of the big bourgeoisie and of the landed proprietors farming on capitalist lines. It was led by A. I. Guchkov, a noted industrialist and house-owner in Moscow, and M. V. Rodzyanko, a big landowner. The Octobrists fully supported the tsarist government's home and foreign policies.

During the First World War the Octobrists, who saw that the tsarist regime was unable to win the war, formed the "progressive bloc", an opposition group which demanded that a responsible Ministry be set up, that is, a government enjoying the confidence of the bourgeoisie and landed proprietors.

After the February revolution the Octobrists became a ruling party and fought against the approaching socialist revolution. Guchkov was War Minister in the first Provisional Government. After the October Revolution the Octobrists fought against Soviet rule. p. 129

[59] Reference is to the Third Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, held in Moscow between late May and early June 1917. The Congress revealed sharp differences between the party's Right

and Left wings over certain issues, including that of the attitude to the war, the Left S.R.s opposing the Provisional Government's policy of prolonging the war. The Central Committee was elected on June 2 (15). In publishing the results of the vote it was stated that many delegates had voted against electing A. F. Kerensky to the Central Committee because he was overburdened with work in the War and Naval ministries, that is, for practical and not political reasons.

When Y. Breshko-Breshkovskaya ("Grandmother of the Russian Revolution"), one of the founders and veteran members of the S.R. Party, heard that Kerensky had not been elected, she construed that as an intrigue and resigned from the S.R. Party's Central Committee in protest, making a relevant statement for the press. p. 129

[60] *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom)—a Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper published in Moscow from March 1917 to May 1918. p. 129

[61] The expression "*His Majesty's Opposition*" was used by P. N. Milyukov, the Cadet leader. Speaking at a luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of London on June 19 (July 2), 1909, Milyukov said: "So long as Russia has a legislative chamber controlling the budget, the Russian opposition will remain an opposition of, and not to, His Majesty." p. 132

[62] *Zemstvos*—rural self-government bodies set up in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility, and their jurisdiction was limited to purely local economic and welfare matters—hospital and road building, statistics, insurance etc. They functioned under the control of the governors of the gubernias and the Minister of the Interior, who could block any decisions the government found undesirable. p. 132

[63] *Nozdrev*—a blustering liar in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 135

[64] *Vestnik Finansov, Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* (Finance, Industry and Trade Messenger)—a weekly journal published by the Ministry of Finance in St. Petersburg from November 1883 to 1917. It published government decisions, economic articles, and surveys. p. 140

[65] "Moderate and proper"—the philistine virtues of Molchalin, a character in Griboyedov's *Wit Works Woe*. p. 142

[66] On July 2 (15), hearing of the miscarriage of the June offensive, the Cadet Ministers Shingaryov, Manuilov and Shakhovskoi resigned from the coalition Provisional Government on the pretext that they disagreed with the government's stand on the Ukrainian question. In a declaration to the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Provisional Government had promised to appoint by mutual agreement a General Secretariat to administer the Ukraine, while

the Cadets insisted that the Ukrainian question be settled solely by the Constituent Assembly.

The true reason for the Cadets' resignation was their desire to provoke a government crisis with an eye to bringing pressure to bear on the "socialist" Ministers and securing their consent to a Cadet counter-revolutionary programme: the disarming of the Red Guards, withdrawal of the revolutionary troops from Petrograd, and prohibition of the Bolshevik Party. p. 153

[67] Lenin is referring to the massive demonstrations that took place in Petrograd on July 3 and 4 (16 and 17), 1917. The soldiers, sailors and workers took to the streets, being angered by the Provisional Government sending troops into an offensive that ended in defeat, as might have been expected. The movement began on July 3 (16) in the Vyborg district with the action of the First Machine-Gun Regiment. It threatened to develop into an insurrection against the Provisional Government.

Just then the Bolshevik Party was against all armed action, for it considered that there was no revolutionary crisis in the country as yet. The Central Committee meeting held at 4 p.m., on July 3 (16), resolved to refrain from action. A similar resolution was adopted by the Bolsheviks' Second Petrograd City Conference, which took place at the same time. Conference delegates went to the city's factories and districts to restrain the masses from action. But action had already begun and there was no stopping it.

In view of the mood of the masses, the Central Committee meeting in a joint session with the Petrograd Committee and the Military Organisation, resolved late on the evening of July 3 (16) to join in the demonstration in order to lend it a peaceful and organised character. Lenin was not in Petrograd at the time—being ill as a result of sustained overwork, he had gone to the country for a few day's rest. Getting word of the events, he returned to Petrograd on the morning of July 4 (17) and assumed political leadership. During the day of July 4 (17) he addressed the Kronstadt sailors from the balcony of Kshesinskaya's Palace (see this volume, p. 213). His speech played an important part; it called on the sailors to exercise restraint and be staunch and vigilant.

Over 500,000 people took part in the July 4 (17) demonstration. They carried Bolshevik slogans—"All Power to the Soviets!", etc. They insisted that the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets take power into its hands. But the S.R. and Menshevik leaders refused to take power.

With the knowledge and consent of the Menshevik and S.R. Central Executive Committee, the Provisional Government sent military cadets and Cossacks against the peaceful demonstration. The troops opened fire. In addition to them the Provisional Government called in counter-revolutionary units from the front line to smash the demonstration.

A meeting of the Central and Petrograd Committees held on the night of July 4-5 under Lenin's leadership resolved to discontinue the demonstration in an organised fashion. It was a judicious

measure by the Party, which knew how to retreat in time and stave off the defeat of the main revolutionary forces. The Mensheviks and S.R.s virtually took part in and abetted the counter-revolutionary butchery. They joined the bourgeoisie in bearing down on the Bolshevik Party. *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda* and other Bolshevik papers were closed down by the Provisional Government, and the printing plant of *Trud*, acquired with money collected by the workers, was wrecked. The workers were disarmed, and arrests, house searches and riots took place. The revolutionary-minded units in the Petrograd garrison were sent off to the front line.

After the July events power in the country was fully taken over by the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. The Soviets became a mere appendage to it. Dual power was at an end. So was the peaceful period of the revolution. The Bolsheviks were faced with the task of preparing for an armed uprising to overthrow the Provisional Government. p. 157

[68] Lenin is referring to the following fact: Upon his return from abroad in April 1917 G. A. Alexinsky, a slanderer and plotter, began to contribute to the bourgeois *Russkaya Volya* (all socialist newspapers having refused to have anything to do with him) and proffered his services to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Executive Committee adopted the following decision: "In view of the facts regarding G. A. Alexinsky's activity that have become known, the Executive Committee does not see its way to admitting him into its institutions. Should he wish to rehabilitate himself, the Executive Committee will not be disagreeable to taking part in an investigation." p. 157

[69] *Zhivoye Slovo* (The Living Word)—a yellow daily newspaper with Black Hundred leanings published in Petrograd from 1916. In 1917 it campaigned rabidly against the Bolsheviks. The October Revolution put an end to its publication. p. 158

[70] *The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine* was founded by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in 1914, shortly after the beginning of the First World War. Expecting tsarist Russia to lose the war, the Union sought the Ukraine's secession from Russia and the establishment of a bourgeois and landowner Ukrainian monarchy under German protectorate. p. 159

[71] *Dreyfus case*—the trial of the Jew Dreyfus, a French General Staff officer, whom the reactionary monarchists among the French military, bent on provocation, falsely charged in 1894 with espionage and high treason. The French reactionaries took advantage of the framed-up indictment of Dreyfus, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, to foment anti-Semitism and attack the republican regime and democratic liberties. When, in 1898, the socialists and progressive spokesmen of bourgeois democracy, including Emile

Zola, Jean Jaurès and Anatole France, started a campaign for a re-examination of the Dreyfus case, the latter assumed a markedly political character. The country split into two camps over it, with the republicans and democrats on one side and the bloc of monarchists, clericals, anti-Semites and nationalists on the other. In 1899, under pressure from public opinion, Dreyfus was pardoned and released. In 1906, he was acquitted by the Court of Cassation and was reinstated in the Army. p. 166

[72] See Note 23. p. 169

[73] *Sotsial-Demokrat*—illegal Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. published from February 1908 to January 1917. Beginning with issue No. 2, it was brought out abroad, the issues 2 to 32 (February 1909 to December 1913) being published in Paris and 33 to 58 (November 1914 to January 1917) in Geneva. Altogether 58 issues appeared, five of them with supplements. From December 1911 the paper was edited by Lenin, who contributed over eighty articles and other items.

During the First World War *Sotsial-Demokrat* played a prominent role in the struggle against international opportunism, nationalism and chauvinism, in the propaganda of Bolshevik watchwords, and in the matter of arousing the working class and working people generally to fight against the imperialist war and its inspirers. It published Lenin's article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", which for the first time formulated the conclusion of the possibility of socialism triumphing first in one country. The dissemination of the paper in Russia and the reprinting of its more important items by local Bolshevik papers contributed to the political enlightenment and internationalist education of Russia's proletariat and to the training of the working people for the coming revolution.

Sotsial-Demokrat did much to unify the internationalist elements of the world Social-Democratic movement. It made its way into many countries in the face of war-time obstacles.

Lenin, who had a high opinion of *Sotsial-Demokrat*'s role during the First World War, wrote afterwards that "no class-conscious worker who wishes to *understand* the development of the ideas of the international socialist revolution and of its first victory on October 25, 1917, can manage without" studying articles published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (see present edition, Vol. 27, p. 221). p. 169

[74] *The Swedish Left Socialists* (or the Party of the Young) constituted the Left trend among the Swedish Social-Democrats. During the First World War they adhered to an internationalist position and formed part of the Zimmerwald Left. In May 1917 they founded the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden. The congress which this party held in 1919 resolved to join the Communist International. In 1921 the party's revolutionary wing became the Communist Party of Sweden. p. 169

[75] The offices of *Pravda* having been wrecked on July 5 (18), 1917, by the Provisional Government, the article "Three Crises" appeared in *Rabotnitsa* No. 7 on July 19 (August 1). The editors of the journal wanted that particular issue to be circulated as widely as possible and therefore published on the cover an appeal to all workers, trade unions, factory committees, and R.S.D.L.P.(B.) cells and district organisations earnestly asking them to take energetic steps for the widest possible dissemination of the issue.

Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker)—a legal periodical published by the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on Lenin's initiative in St. Petersburg, with money collected by women workers. It appeared from February 23 (March 8) to June 1914. Seven issues were brought out, of which the police confiscated three. Among the members of its editorial board were I. F. Armand, A. I. Yelizarova, N. K. Krupskaya, P. F. Kudelli, L. R. Menzhinskaya, Y. F. Rozmirovich, K. N. Samoilova and L. N. Stal.

The periodical resumed publication on May 10 (23), 1917, and continued till January 1918.

Rabotnitsa played an important part in the political education of women workers during the Bolshevik Party's preparations for the socialist revolution in Russia. p. 171

[76] Reference is to the summons for Lenin to appear before the court of the bourgeois Provisional Government to answer the slanderous charge of espionage in favour of Germany.

The Bolsheviks, who were fighting to transform the imperialist war into a civil war and advocating the tsarist government's defeat in the war, were first charged with high treason in favour of Germany by the tsar's secret police in the early days of the war.

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, when the Party set course for a socialist revolution in Russia, the bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press carried slanderous reports in view of the passage through Germany of a Bolshevik group led by Lenin. The Seventh (April) Conference exposed that lie in its resolution "On the War". p. 176

[77] The article "*The Political Situation*" was first published in the Kronstadt Bolshevik paper *Proletarskoye Dyelo* No. 6 on August 2 (July 20), 1917, under the heading "Political Mood".

To safeguard the newspaper against suppression by the Provisional Government, the editors substituted "a resolute fight" for "an armed uprising". In this volume, the article appears according to the manuscript. p. 178

[78] *Byulleten "Pravdy"* (The "Pravda" Bulletin) was published in German in Stockholm from June to November 1917 under the title of *Russische Korrespondenz "Prawda"*. Its publisher was a C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) group abroad, and it carried articles on major issues of the Russian revolution, documents, reviews, and news items on the life of the Party and the country. There was also a French edition. p. 182

[79] After the reactionary *Zhivoye Slovo* had published the infamous calumny against Lenin, the Menshevik and S.R. Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on July 5 (18), 1917, appointed a commission of inquiry at the instance of the Bolshevik group to investigate the slanderous charges against Lenin and other Bolsheviks. But as soon as the Provisional Government had decided to refer the case "of the organised armed action in the city of Petrograd on July 3-5, 1917, against state power" to the Petrograd Court, the C.E.C. commission of inquiry resigned and on July 9 (22) published in *Izvestia* the statement that it was "discontinuing its activity and putting the evidence collected by it at the disposal of a government committee". At a joint meeting held by the C.E.C. of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies on July 13 (26), the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries put through a resolution stating that they considered Lenin's refusal to appear in court absolutely impermissible. The resolution said that all persons against whom charges had been proferred by the judicial authorities were removed from work in the Soviets. p. 182

[80] *Beilis case*—the trial of the Jew Beilis, staged for provocative purposes by the tsar's government in 1913 in Kiev. Beilis was falsely accused of the ritual murder of Yushchinsky, a Christian boy (the murder was actually committed by the Black Hundreds). The government's aim was to stir up anti-Semitism and take advantage of anti-Jewish pogroms to divert the people's attention from the revolutionary movement growing throughout the country. The trial aroused public indignation. In a number of towns, workers held protest demonstrations. Beilis was acquitted. p. 183

[81] See Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 327). p. 189

[82] The article "*Constitutional Illusions*" was first published in *Rabochy i Soldat* in 1917 and then appeared in pamphlet form under the title of "The Current Situation". To prevent the suppression of the newspaper and ensure the secrecy of the Bolshevik Party's preparations for an armed uprising, the editors substituted "including its drastic forms" for "including armed struggle". p. 196

[83] Lenin is referring to the Frankfurt Parliament, a national assembly convened in Germany in May 1848, after the March revolution. The majority in it was held by the liberal bourgeoisie, which engaged in fruitless talk on a draft constitution, while leaving power in the king's hands. p. 200

[84] Reference is to Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 394-487). p. 201

[85] See Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 480). p. 202

[86] See Frederick Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*, Moscow, 1965. p. 203

[87] Reference is to the State Conference planned by the Provisional Government. It was called in Moscow on August 12 (25), 1917. Most of the delegates were landowners, members of the bourgeoisie, generals, officers and Cossack leaders. The Soviet delegation was composed of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The conference was expected to rally the counter-revolutionary forces of the bourgeoisie and landowners to defeat the revolution. Kornilov, Alexeyev, Kaledin and others put forward a programme for crushing the revolution. Kerensky threatened in his speech to put down the revolutionary movement and prevent seizures of the landed estates by the peasants. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party called on the working class to join in a protest action against the conference. On the opening day of the conference the Bolsheviks organised a one-day general strike in Moscow involving over 400,000 people. Protest meetings and strikes took place in several other cities. p. 209

[88] *The Bell* (*Die Glocke*) a periodical published in Munich and then in Berlin from 1915 to 1925 by the social-chauvinist Parvus (Helfand), member of the German Social-Democratic Party and an agent of German imperialism. p. 220

[89] Lenin means the coalition Provisional Government formed on July 24 (August 6), 1917. It included A. F. Kerensky, Premier and War and Naval Minister (S.R.), N. V. Nekrasov, Deputy Premier and Minister of Finance (Cadet), and N. D. Avksentyev, Minister of the Interior (S.R.). The cabinet was composed of Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Popular Socialists, and non-party people who were close to the Cadets. In this composition, it found itself in Cadet hands. At a joint meeting of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Congress of Peasants' Deputies, held on July 25 (August 7), the Mensheviks and S.R.s adopted a resolution urging the most active support for the new coalition government. p. 223

[90] That is, the declaration issued by the Provisional Government on July 8 (21), 1917. It contained a number of demagogic promises which the Provisional Government hoped would reassure the people after the July events. The government promised to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly on the appointed date, September 17 (30), guarantee the early introduction of local—urban and Zemstvo (rural)—self-government, abolish the social estates, take steps to remedy economic dislocation, and draft legislation on an eight-

hour day, labour safety and social insurance, as well as a land reform, to be considered by the Constituent Assembly. Not one of these promises was kept. p. 223

[91] On July 12 (25) the Provisional Government introduced capital punishment at the front. The divisional "military revolutionary tribunals" that were set up passed sentences which became effective immediately and were executed without delay. p. 229

[92] *The Trudoviks* (Trudovik group) were a Duma group of petty-bourgeois democrats--peasants and intellectuals with Narodnik leanings. The group was formed by the peasant Deputies to the First Duma in April 1906. In the Duma it wavered between the Cadets and the revolutionary Social-Democrats. During the First World War most of the Trudoviks adhered to a social-chauvinist position.

After the February revolution the Trudoviks, expressing the interests of the kulaks, actively supported the Provisional Government. Their reaction to the October Revolution was hostile and they took part in the counter-revolutionary activities of the bourgeoisie. p. 234

[93] *The Contact Commission* was formed by decision of the compromising Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on March 8 (21) to "influence" and "exercise control over" the activity of the Provisional Government. Its members were M. I. Skobelev, Y. M. Steklov, N. N. Sukhanov, V. N. Filippovsky and N. S. Chkheidze (subsequently V. M. Chernov and I. G. Tsereteli were included). The Commission helped the Provisional Government take advantage of the prestige of the Petrograd Soviet to disguise its counter-revolutionary policies. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries hoped with its aid to keep the people from revolutionary action aimed at effecting the transfer of power to the Soviets. The Commission was abolished in the middle of April 1917, its functions being handed over to the Executive Committee's Bureau. p. 235

[94] On May 17 (30), 1917, in view of a conflict between the Kronstadt Soviet and Pepelayev, the Provisional Government Commissar, the non-affiliated section of the Soviet passed a resolution abolishing the office of government commissar and investing the Kronstadt Soviet with full powers. The resolution, supported by the Bolsheviks, said that the only authority in Kronstadt was the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which should enter into direct contact with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on all matters affecting the state.

The bourgeois, S.R. and Menshevik press launched a slander campaign against the people of Kronstadt and the Bolsheviks, alleging that Russia had begun to disintegrate, that a state of anarchy was in, that Kronstadt had seceded, and so on.

First the Petrograd Soviet and then the Provisional Government sent delegations (Chkheidze, Gotz and others in the former

case and the Ministers Skobelev and Tsereteli in the latter) to deal with the Kronstadt incident. In the Kronstadt Soviet the two Ministers succeeded in putting through a compromise decision stipulating that the commissar be elected by the Soviet and his election confirmed by the Provisional Government. A political resolution was also passed, saying that the Kronstadt Soviet recognised the authority of the Provisional Government but adding that this "recognition certainly does not rule out criticism and the desire that the revolutionary democrats should form a new central authority and transfer all power to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies". The resolution expressed the hope that the Bolsheviks would achieve this by exerting ideological influence. It ended with an emphatic protest against attempts to attribute to the Kronstadt Bolsheviks "the intention of severing Kronstadt from the rest of Russia". p. 238

95 *The Kornilov revolt* against the revolution was organised by the bourgeoisie and landowners in August 1917. It was led by the tsarist general Kornilov, then Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The conspirators aimed at capturing Petrograd, smashing the Bolshevik Party, disbanding the Soviets, establishing a military dictatorship, and paving the way for the restoration of the monarchy. A. F. Kerensky, head of the Provisional Government, joined in the conspiracy. However, when the revolt began, he dissociated himself from Kornilov, fearing that he might be swept away with Kornilov, and declared Kornilov to be a rebel against the Provisional Government.

The revolt began on August 25 (September 7). Kornilov marched the Third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd. In Petrograd itself, the counter-revolutionary organisations of Kornilov's backers were getting ready for action.

The Bolshevik Party led the people against Kornilov as it continued, in accordance with Lenin's recommendation, to expose the Provisional Government and its S.R. and Menshevik hangers-on. In response to the call of the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee, the workers of Petrograd and the revolutionary soldiers and sailors rose to fight the rebels. The Petrograd workers promptly formed Red Guard units. Revolutionary committees were set up in several localities. The advance of the Kornilov troops was checked and Bolshevik propaganda began to demoralise them.

The Kornilov revolt was put down by the workers and peasants under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Under pressure from the people, the Provisional Government had to order the arrest and trial of Kornilov and his accomplices. p. 243

96 The question of convening an international socialist conference in Stockholm arose in April 1917. Borgbjerg, a Danish social-chauvinist, arrived in Petrograd and, on behalf of the joint committee of the workers' parties of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, invited the socialist parties of Russia to attend the "Stockholm socialist peace conference". The matter was discussed at a meeting of the Pe-

trograd Soviet. The Mensheviks and S.R.s accepted the invitation and decided to take the initiative in calling the conference. On a motion by Lenin, the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the Bolshevik Party declared itself emphatically against participation in the Stockholm conference, a social-chauvinist affair. It exposed the imperialist nature of the conference and branded Borgbjerg as an agent of the German imperialists.

On August 6 (19), 1917, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee discussing preparations for the Stockholm conference, Kamenev insisted on participation in the conference. He said the Bolshevik resolution on the matter should be revised. The Bolshevik group of the C.E.C. dissociated itself from his statement

Simultaneously with the letter "Kamenev's Speech in the C.E.C. on the Stockholm Conference", which he sent to *Proletary* for publication, Lenin on August 17 (30) wrote another letter, addressed to the Bureau of the Central Committee Abroad. With reference to Kamenev's statement, Lenin wrote: "I consider Kamenev's statement ... the height of stupidity, if not of baseness, and have already written about this to the Central Committee and for the press" (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 320). On August 16 (29), the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee, upon discussing the issue of the Stockholm conference, reaffirmed the decision not to attend.

The conference never met. p. 244

[97] Lenin is referring to the resolution "Unification of the Party", passed by the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). (See *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the C.C.*, Part I, 1954, p. 388 [in Russian].)

The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) sat in Petrograd from July 26 to August 3 (August 8-16), 1917, in semi-legal conditions. It was attended by 157 delegates voting and 110 delegates with voice but no vote, from 240,000 Party members. Lenin guided the congress from underground. He kept in touch with Petrograd through Bolsheviks assigned by the Central Committee who visited him at Razliv. Lenin's theses "The Political Situation", the article "On Slogans" and other items formed the basis for congress resolutions. While at Razliv, Lenin took part in drafting the most important resolutions of the congress. The congress unanimously elected Lenin its honorary chairman.

The items on the congress agenda were: (1) Report by the Organising Bureau; (2) Report by the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.); (3) Reports from Local Organisations; (4) The Current Situation: (a) The War and the International Situation; (b) The Political and Economic Situation; (5) Revision of the Programme; (6) The Organisational Question; (7) Elections to the Constituent Assembly; (8) The International; (9) Unification of the Party; (10) The Trade Union Movement; (11) Elections; (12) Miscellaneous.

The congress also discussed the question whether Lenin should appear in court.

The congress heard the political report of the Central Committee and the report on the political situation, both of which were presented by Stalin on behalf of the Central Committee. The resolution on the political situation was based on Lenin's guiding recommendations. It appraised the political situation in the country following the July events, and set out the Party's political line at the new stage of the revolution. The congress declared that the peaceful development of the revolution was over and that power in the country had virtually passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. In keeping with Lenin's recommendations, it temporarily withdrew the slogan "All Power to the Soviets", because just then the Soviets, led by the Mensheviks and S.R.s, were an appendage to the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. This withdrawal did not imply renunciation of the Soviets as the political form of proletarian dictatorship. The congress advanced the slogan of fighting for the complete abolition of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and for the proletariat winning power in alliance with the peasant poor, through an armed uprising.

The congress rejected the anti-Lenin proposals put forward by Preobrazhensky, who contended that the socialist revolution could not win in Russia and that Russia could not take the socialist road unless a proletarian revolution was accomplished in the West. The congress also rebuffed Bukharin, who opposed the Party's course for the socialist revolution, saying that the peasants formed a bloc with the bourgeoisie and would refuse to follow the working class.

The congress decisions laid special emphasis on Lenin's thesis of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasant poor as the paramount condition for the victory of the socialist revolution. "It is only the revolutionary proletariat," said the resolution "The Political Situation", "that can accomplish this task—a task set by the new upswing—provided it is supported by the peasant poor" (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions*, etc., Part I, 1954, p. 376 [in Russian]).

The question whether Lenin should appear in court was one of the first items discussed by the congress. Stalin, who touched on it in replying to the debate on the Central Committee's political activity, declared in favour of Lenin appearing in court, on the understanding that Lenin's personal safety would be guaranteed and the trial conducted on democratic lines. He moved a resolution to that effect. "It is not clear at the moment," he said, "who is in power. There is no guarantee that if they [Lenin and Zinoviev.—*Ed.*] are arrested they will not be subjected to brute force. Things will be different if the trial is held on democratic lines and it is guaranteed that they will not be torn to pieces. When we asked the Central Executive Committee about this, they replied: 'We don't know what may happen.' So long as the situation is not clear and a covert struggle is going on between the nominal and the real authority, there is no point in the comrades appearing before the authorities. If, however, power is wielded by an authority which can safeguard our comrades against violence and is fair-dealing

at least to some extent ... they shall appear." (*Minutes of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), August 1917*, 1958, pp. 27 and 28 [in Russian].) This approach was prompted by an incorrect estimation of the political power in the country at the time, and by the idea that a bourgeois court could be "fair".

The question whether Lenin should appear in court was dealt with in a report by G. K. Orjonikidze. He stressed that Lenin must under no circumstances be delivered into the hands of the investigators. F. E. Dzerzhinsky, N. A. Skrypnik and others spoke against Lenin appearing in court. We must say clearly and explicitly, said Dzerzhinsky, that those comrades who advised Lenin not to allow himself to be arrested did well. We must make clear to all comrades that we don't trust the Provisional Government and the bourgeoisie and will not deliver Lenin until justice triumphs, that is, until that disgraceful trial is called off.

V. Volodarsky, I. Bezrabotny (D. Z. Manuilsky) and M. Lashevich spoke in favour of Lenin appearing in court (provided his safety was guaranteed, the trial was public and representatives of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets attended it), and moved a resolution in that sense.

As a result of the debate, the Sixth Party Congress unanimously passed a resolution against Lenin appearing in court, expressed its "emphatic protest against the outrageous persecution of revolutionary proletarian leaders by the public prosecutor, spies and police", and sent Lenin a message of greeting.

Y. M. Sverdlov reported on the Central Committee's organising activity. He pointed out that in the three months that had passed since the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference the Party membership had trebled, increasing from 80,000 to 240,000, and the number of Party organisations had grown from 78 to 162. The congress heard nineteen reports from local organisations. The speakers stressed the vast amount of work being carried on by local organisations and the steadily growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the working people.

The congress discussed and approved the Party's economic platform, which envisaged nationalisation and centralisation of the banks, nationalisation of large-scale industry, confiscation of the landed estates and nationalisation of all the lands in the country, establishment of workers' control over production and distribution, organisation of proper exchange between town and country, and other revolutionary measures.

The congress adopted the new Party Rules. The first clause of the Rules, dealing with membership, was supplemented with the stipulation that Party members should submit to all Party decisions. The new provision was introduced that persons seeking admission should present recommendations from two Party members and that their admission should be subject to approval by the general meeting of the organisation concerned. The Rules stressed that "all Party organisations should be based on the principles of democratic centralism. Party congresses were to be con-

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vened once a year and plenary meetings of the Central Committee, not less than once in two months.

The congress reaffirmed the decision of the Seventh Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on the need to revise the Party Programme in the sense indicated by the conference. It found it necessary to call a congress before long for the express purpose of adopting a new Programme, and instructed the Central Committee and all Party organisations to begin discussing a revision of the Party Programme, preparatory to the congress.

The congress resolution "Youth Leagues" said it was a pressing task to contribute to the formation of socialist class organisations of young workers, and obliged Party organisations to devote the greatest attention to this task. In discussing the item "The Trade Union Movement", the congress criticised the theory of trade union neutrality and pointed out that the trade unions had a vital interest in carrying the revolution through to a victorious end and that they could accomplish the tasks facing Russia's working class provided they remained militant class organisations recognising the political leadership of the Bolshevik Party.

The congress made all its decisions subordinate to the chief objective, which was to train the working class and the peasant poor for an armed uprising to bring about the victory of the socialist revolution. In a manifesto addressed to all working people, all workers, soldiers and peasants of Russia, it called on them to gather strength and prepare, under the banners of the Bolshevik Party, for the decisive battle with the bourgeoisie.

Among those the congress elected to the Central Committee were V. I. Lenin, Y. A. Berzin, A. S. Bubnov, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. M. Kollontai, V. P. Milyutin, M. K. Muranov, V. P. Nogin, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), S. G. Shahumyan, J. V. Stalin, Y. M. Sverdlov and M. S. Uritsky. p. 251

[98] *Proletary* (The Proletarian)—Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party, was published daily from August 13 (26) to August 24 (September 6), 1917, instead of *Pravda*, closed down by the Provisional Government. Altogether ten issues were brought out. p. 251

[99] The lines are from Nekrasov's poem "Blessed Is the Unmalicious Poet". p. 261

[100] *The Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany* was a Centrist party founded in April 1917 by the congress in Gotha, in an atmosphere of revolutionary upswing, which was greatly stimulated by the February revolution in Russia. The opportunist leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party was losing ground among the rank and file and the party was threatened with a break-away of Left-wing elements. To avert a split and the formation of a revolutionary party of the working class, the Centrist leaders set up the so-called Independent Party which they hoped, would help them retain their influence. The Independents disguised themselves with Centrist talk in advocating unity with the social-chauvinists, and

tended to renounce the class struggle. The Labour Community, a Kautskyite organisation active in the Reichstag, formed the bulk of the Independent Party.

In October 1920 a split occurred in the Independent Social-Democratic Party at the Halle Congress. In December 1920 a sizable number of Independents joined the Communist Party of Germany. The Right-wing elements founded a separate party and took the party's former name, Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. This party existed till 1922. p. 271

[101] *Izvestia of the All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies* (Izvestia Vserossiiskogo Soveta Krestyanskikh Deputatov)—the official daily newspaper of that Soviet published in Petrograd from May 9 (22) to December 1917. It expressed the views of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Its attitude to the October Revolution was hostile. It was closed down for its counter-revolutionary propaganda. p. 278

[102] Lenin is referring to Frederick Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 469-72). p. 284

[103] *Rabochy* (The Worker)—Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party published daily from August 25 (September 7) to September 2 (15), 1917, instead of *Pravda*, closed down by the Provisional Government. Twelve issues were published in all (including extras). p. 293

[104] The Mensheviks' *unity congress* in Petrograd from August 19-26 (September 1-8), 1917. Its aim was to unite the isolated Menshevik groups in a single party. The congress was attended by defencists (those supporting Plekhanov and Potresov), internationalists (Martov's followers) and representatives of *Novaya Zhizn*, which had taken an active part in convening the congress. The congress passed a resolution in favour of continuing the war "to a victorious conclusion". Another resolution approved of the fact that socialists were members of the Provisional Government, and expressed confidence in the government. The Central Committee elected at the congress included P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov, I. G. Tsereteli and N. S. Chkheidze. While the congress was in session, however, the delegates turned out to differ strongly among themselves, with the result that the attempt to unify the Mensheviks virtually failed. p. 294

[105] Reference is to the June 3 coup d'état, which ushered in the period of the Stolypin reaction.

On June 3 (16), 1907, the tsar issued a manifesto dissolving the Second Duma and revising the Duma election law. The new law greatly increased the Duma representation of the landowners and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and drastically reduced the already small proportion of peasants' and workers' deputies. It was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17,

1905, and the Fundamental Law of 1906, both of which made legislation subject to approval by the Duma. The Third Duma, elected under the new law, convened on November 1 (14), 1907. It was made up mostly of Black Hundreds and Octobrists. p. 299

[106] In the elections to the district councils in Petrograd, held late in May and early in June 1917, the Bolsheviks polled 20 per cent of the votes. The elections to the Petrograd City Council on August 20 (September 2) brought the Bolsheviks 33 per cent of the votes. p. 301

[107] *Spartak* (Spartacus) theoretical journal of the Moscow Regional Bureau, Moscow Committee and (beginning with issue No. 2) Moscow District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), published in Moscow from May 20 (June 2) to October 29 (November 11), 1917. p. 305

[108] The document "*On Zimmerwald*" was written by Lenin in connection with the plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee, fixed for September 3 (16).

Lenin considered that membership in the Zimmerwald association, most of whose members adhered to a Centrist position, hampered and delayed the founding of a third, Communist International. p. 307

[109] In view of the elections to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the workers' section of the Soviet on August 23 (September 5), 1917, raised the question of revising the system of election to the Soviet under which workers elected one delegate from 1,000 persons while soldiers elected one delegate from each unit. As a result, the soldiers had a considerably greater number of deputies to the Soviet than the workers. The workers' section adopted a resolution saying that the system of election to the Soviet should be revised and organised on the principle of proportional representation, that is, one delegate from every thousand voters. The soldiers' section, however, which met on August 25 (September 7), voted down the proposal. The S.R.s succeeded in putting through their own resolution, which left the electoral system intact. p. 308

[110] *Blanquists*—supporters of a trend in the French socialist movement, headed by Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881), the French revolutionary and utopian communist. The Blanquists expected that "mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy of a small minority of intellectuals" (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 392). Substituting the actions of a small group of conspirators for those of a revolutionary party, they ignored the actual situation necessary for a victorious insurrection, and spurned contact with the masses. p. 309

[111] See Frederick Engels, *Flüchtlingsliteratur. II. Programm der blanquistischen Kommuneflüchtlinge*, Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, Berlin, 1962, S. 528-35. p. 309

[112] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 470. p. 309

[113] After the suppression of the Kornilov revolt the question of forming a new provisional cabinet came up for discussion. The new cabinet was expected to include Cadets in addition to Mensheviks and S.R.s. The Mensheviks and S.R.s, fearing that they might completely forfeit popular confidence, announced their refusal to join a cabinet which included Cadets. On September 1 (14), 1917, the Provisional Government decided to form a Directory of five: A. F. Kerensky, A. I. Verkhovsky, D. N. Verderevsky, A. M. Nikitin and M. I. Tereshchenko. Officially no Cadets were included in this cabinet, but its formation was a result of a behind-the-scenes compromise with them. At a joint plenary session of the C.E.C. of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Congress of Peasants' Deputies on September 2 (15), the Mensheviks and S.R.s passed a resolution in support of the new cabinet. This meant that although they had declared they would have nothing to do with the Cadets, the Mensheviks and S.R.s again helped the landowners and capitalists to retain power. p. 314

[114] The "*Draft Resolution on the Present Political Situation*" was written by Lenin for the plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee set for September 3 (16). What took place on that date was not a plenum but a regular meeting of the C.C., which did not discuss the political situation. In the available records of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) for 1917 there is no indication of the draft having been discussed by the Central Committee. p. 315

[115] *Savage Division*—nickname of a division recruited during the First World War from volunteers among the mountain tribes of the North Caucasus. General Kornilov used it as a striking force of the troops he led against revolutionary Petrograd. p. 317

[116] *The All-Russia Democratic Conference* was held in Petrograd between September 14 and 22 (September 27-October 5), 1917. It was called by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to stem the rising tide of the revolution. The delegates represented petty-bourgeois parties, the compromising Soviets, the trade unions, Zemstvos, commercial and industrial circles, and troop units. The Bolsheviks attended with the aim of exposing the designs of the Mensheviks and S.R.s. The conference elected a pre-parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic) through which the Mensheviks and S.R.s hoped to check the revolution and divert the country on to the track of a bourgeois parliamentary system.

On Lenin's proposal, the Central Committee of the Party decided that the Bolsheviks should withdraw from the pre-parliament. Only the capitulators Kamenev, Rykov and Ryazanov, who were against the Party's course for the socialist revolution, insisted on participation in the pre-parliament. The Bolsheviks exposed the treacherous activity of the pre-parliament as they trained the people for an armed uprising. p. 331

[117] *Kit Kitych* (literally, Whale Whaleson)—nickname of Tit Titych, a rich merchant in Alexander Ostrovsky's comedy *Shouldering Another's Troubles*. Lenin applies the nickname to capitalist tycoons. p. 331

[118] *The War Industries Committees*, which came into being in May 1915, were formed by Russia's big imperialist bourgeoisie to help the tsarist regime with the war. The chairman of the Central War Industries Committee was the Octobrist leader A. I. Guchkov, a big capitalist. Among its members were the manufacturer A. I. Konovalov and the banker and sugar manufacturer M. I. Tereshchenko. In an effort to bring the workers under its sway and inspire them with defencist sentiments, the bourgeoisie decided to form "workers' groups" under the committees and thereby to show that "class peace' had been established between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of Russia. The Bolsheviks declared a boycott of the committees, and maintained it with support from the majority of the workers.

As a result of the Bolsheviks' explanatory work, elections to the "workers' groups" took place only in 70 out of the 239 regional and local War Industries Committees, workers' representatives being elected to only 36 Committees. p. 332

[119] *Svobodnaya Zhizn* (Free Life)—a newspaper with a Menshevik trend published in Petrograd from September 2-8 (15-21), 1917, instead of the suspended *Novaya Zhizn*. p. 355

[120] On August 31 (September 13), 1917, the Petrograd Soviet for the first time passed, by a majority of 279 to 115, with 50 abstentions, a motion tabled by the Bolshevik group, emphatically rejecting the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie. The resolution called for the transfer of all power to the Soviets and outlined a programme for revolutionary changes in the country. A few days later the Bolshevik Party won yet another major victory. On September 5 (18) the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies carried a similar Bolshevik motion by a majority of 355 votes. p. 368

[121] *Russkoye Slovo* (The Russian Word)—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from 1895 (the first, trial, issue appeared in 1894) by I. D. Sytin. Nominally non-partisan, it upheld the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie from a moderately liberal point of view.

In 1917 it fully supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and campaigned against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party.

The paper was closed down in November 1917 for carrying slanderous anti-Soviet reports. From January 1918 on, it was published for a period under the titles of *Novoye Slovo* and *Nashe Slovo*. It was suppressed altogether in July 1918. p. 380

[122] Lenin wrote *The State and Revolution* while underground, in August and September 1917. He first spoke of the necessity for a theoretical treatment of the question of the state in the second half of 1916. At that time he wrote the item "The Youth International" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 163-66) criticising Bukharin's un-Marxist position on the state and promising a more detailed article on the Marxists' attitude to the state. On February 17 (New Style), 1917, Lenin wrote to A. M. Kollontai that he had almost finished preparing material on the Marxists' attitude to the state. The material was written in a small hand in a blue-covered copybook entitled "Marxism on the State". It contained quotations from Marx and Engels and passages from books by Kautsky, Pannekoek and Bernstein, with critical comments, conclusions and generalisations by Lenin.

According to Lenin's plan, *The State and Revolution* was to consist of seven chapters. However, the seventh and last chapter, "The experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917", was never written and there is only a detailed plan for it (see *Lenin Miscellany XXI*, 1933, pp. 25-26 [in Russian]). Lenin wrote to the publisher that should he be "too slow in completing this, the seventh, chapter, or should it turn out to be too bulky, the first six chapters should be published separately, as Book One".

The author's pen-name, F. F. Ivanovsky, appeared on the first page of the manuscript. Lenin proposed to use it because the Provisional Government would otherwise confiscate the book. The work was not published until 1918, so that the pen-name did not have to be used. A second edition, with a new section, "The Presentation of the Question by Marx in 1852", added by the author to Chapter II, appeared in 1919. p. 385

[123] *Fabians*—members of the Fabian Society, a British reformist organisation founded in 1884. It grouped mostly bourgeois intellectuals—scholars, writers, politicians—including Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Ramsay MacDonald and Bernard Shaw. The Fabians denied the necessity for the proletarian class struggle and for the socialist revolution. They contended that the transition from capitalism to socialism could only be effected through minor social reforms, that is, gradual changes. Lenin described Fabian ideas as "*an extremely opportunist* trend" (see present edition, Vol. 13, p. 358).

In 1900 the Fabian Society became part of the British Labour Party. "Fabian socialism" is a source of the Labour Party's ideology.

During the First World War the Fabians took a social-chauvinist stand. For Lenin's characterisation of Fabian principles, see Lenin's article "British Pacifism and the British Dislike of Theory" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 260-65). p. 387

[124] See Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 326-27).

Further below, on pp. 393-95, 395-99 of the volume, Lenin is quoting from the same work by Engels (op. cit., pp. 327-30). p. 391

[125] *Gentile, or tribal, organisation of society*—the primitive communal system, or the first socio-economic formation in history. The tribal commune was a community of blood relatives linked by economic and social ties. The tribal system went through the matriarchal and the patriarchal periods. The patriarchate culminated in primitive society becoming a class society and in the rise of the state. Relations of production under the primitive communal system were based on social ownership of the means of production and equalitarian distribution of all products. This corresponded in the main to the low level of the productive forces and to their character at the time.

For the primitive communal system, see Karl Marx, *Conspectus of Lewis Morgan's "Ancient Society"*, and Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 204-334). p. 393

[126] See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 332-33.

Further down, on p. 404 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from the same work by Engels (op. cit., p. 220). p. 401

[127] *Thirty Years' War* (*1618-48*), the first European war, resulted from an aggravation of the antagonisms between various alignments of European states, and took the form of a struggle between Protestants and Catholics. It began with a revolt in Bohemia against the tyranny of the Hapsburg monarchy and the onslaught of Catholic reaction. The states which then entered the war formed two camps. The Pope, the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs and the Catholic princes of Germany, who rallied to the Catholic Church, opposed the Protestant countries—Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, and a number of German states that had accepted the Reformation. The Protestant countries were backed by the French kings, enemies of the Hapsburgs. Germany became the chief battlefield and object of military plunder and predatory claims. The war ended in 1648 with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, which completed the political dismemberment of Germany. p. 404

[128] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 151-52. p. 405

[129] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 137. p. 405

[130] *Gotha Programme*—the programme adopted by the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany in 1875, at the Gotha Congress, which united two German socialist parties, namely, the Eisenachers—led by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht and influenced by Marx and Engels—and the Lassalleans. The programme betrayed eclecticism and was opportunist, because the Eisenachers had made concessions to the Lassalleans on major issues and accepted Lassallean formulations. Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, and Engels in his letter to Bebel of March 18-28, 1875, devastated the Gotha Programme, which they regarded as a serious step backwards compared with the Eisenach programme of 1869. p. 405

[131] See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1973, p. 151. p. 406

[132] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 118-19 and 126. p. 407

[133] See Karl Marx. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 477).

Further below, on pp. 414-15 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from Engels's preface to the third edition of the work (op. cit., p. 396). p. 411

[134] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. It was edited by Karl Kautsky till October 1917 and by Heinrich Cunow in the subsequent period. It published some of Marx's and Engels's writings for the first time. Engels offered advice to its editors and often criticised them for departures from Marxism.

In the second half of the nineties, upon Engels's death, the journal began systematically to publish revisionist articles, including a serial by Bernstein entitled "Problems of Socialism", which initiated a revisionist campaign against Marxism. During the First World War the journal adhered to a Centrist position, and virtually backed the social-chauvinists. p. 416

[135] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 69. p. 416

[136] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 99. p. 419

[137] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 262-63. p. 420

[138] See Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, pp. 217-21).
Further below, on pp. 426, 427, 432-436 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from the same work by Marx (op. cit., pp. 222, 220-23). p. 424

[139] *The Girondists*—a political grouping during the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth century, expressed the interests of the moderate bourgeoisie. They wavered between revolution and counter-revolution, and made deals with the monarchy. p. 435

[140] See Frederick Engels, *The Housing Question* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, pp. 317-18).
Further below, on pp. 439-40 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from the same work by Engels (op. sit., pp. 370, 355). p. 438

[141] Lenin is referring to the articles "L'indifferenza in materia politica" by Karl Marx and "Dell' Autorita" by Frederick Engels (*Almanacco Republicano per l'anno 1874*).
Further below, on pp. 440-41, 442, 442-43 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from the same articles. p. 440

[142] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 293-94. p. 445

[143] *Erfurt Programme*—the programme adopted by the German Social-Democratic Party at its Erfurt Congress in October 1891. A step forward compared with the Gotha Programme (1875), it was base on Marx's doctrine of the inevitable downfall of the capitalist mode of production and its replacement by the socialist mode. It stressed the necessity for the working class to wage a political struggle, pointed out the party's role as the leader of that struggle, and so on. But it also made serious concessions to opportunism. Engels criticised the original draft of the programme in detail in his work *A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891*. It was virtually a critique of the opportunism of the Second International as a whole. But the German Social-Democratic leaders concealed Engels's critique from the rank and file, and disregarded his highly important comments in drawing up the final text of the programme. Lenin considered the fact that the Erfurt Programme said nothing about the dictatorship of the proletariat to be its chief defect and a cowardly concession to opportunism. p. 447

[144] *The Anti-Socialist Law* (Exceptional Law Against the Socialists) was enacted in Germany by the Bismarck government in 1878 to combat the working-class and socialist movement. Under this law, all Social-Democratic Party organisations, all mass organisations of the workers, and the working-class press were banned, socialist

literature was confiscated and the Social-Democrats were persecuted, to the point of banishment. These repressive measures did not, however, break the Social-Democratic Party, which readjusted itself to illegal conditions. *Der Sozial-Demokrat*, the party's Central Organ, was published abroad and party congresses were held at regular intervals (1880, 1883 and 1887). In Germany herself, the Social-Democratic organisations and groups were coming back to life underground, an illegal Central Committee leading their activities. Besides, the Party widely used legal opportunities to establish closer links with the working people, and its influence was growing steadily. At the Reichstag elections in 1890, it polled three times as many votes as in 1878. Marx and Engels did much to help the Social-Democrats. In 1890 popular pressure and the growing working-class movement led to the annulment of the Anti-Socialist Law. p. 449

[145] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2 Moscow, 1973, pp. 178-89.

Further below, on pp. 454, 455, 456-58 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from the same work (op. cit., pp. 179-80, 184, 187-89). p. 454

[146] The *Los-von-Kirche-Bewegung* (the "Leave-the-Church" movement), or *Kirchenaustrittsbewegung* (Movement to Secede from the Church) assumed a vast scale in Germany before the First World War. In January 1914 Neue Zeit began, with the revisionist Paul Göhre's article "Kirchenaustrittsbewegung und Sozialdemokratie" ("The Movement to Secede from the Church and Social-Democracy") to discuss the attitude of the German Social-Democratic Party to the movement. During that discussion prominent German Social-Democratic leaders failed to rebuff Göhre, who affirmed that the party should remain neutral towards the Movement to Secede from the Church and forbid its members to engage in propaganda against religion and the Church on behalf of the party.

Lenin took notice of the discussion while working on material for *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 39, p. 591). p. 456

[147] *Lassalleans*—supporters of the German petty-bourgeois socialist Ferdinand Lassalle, members of the General Association of German Workers founded at the Congress of Workers' Organisations, held in Leipzig in 1863, to counterbalance the bourgeois progressists who were trying to gain influence over the working class. The first President of the Association was Lassalle, who formulated its programme and the fundamentals of its tactics. The Association's political programme was declared to be the struggle for universal suffrage, and its economic programme, the struggle for workers' production associations, to be subsidised by the state. In their practical activities, Lassalle and his followers adapted themselves to the hegemony of Prussia and supported the Great Power policy of Bismarck. "Objectively," wrote Engels to Marx on January 27,

1865, "this was a base action and a betrayal of the whole working-class movement to the Prussians." Marx and Engels frequently and sharply criticised the theory, tactics, and organisational principles of the Lassalleans as an opportunist trend in the German working-class movement. p. 459

[148] See Frederick Engels, "Vorwort zur Broschüre *Internationales aus dem 'Volksstaat' (1871-1875)*", Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 22, Berlin, 1963, S. 417-18. p. 460

[149] See Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 26).

Further below, on pp. 464, 470, 471-73 of this volume, Lenin is quoting from the same work by Marx (op. cit., pp. 26, 17, 19). p. 464

[150] Reference is to the pupils of a seminary who won notoriety by their extreme ignorance and barbarous customs. They were portrayed by N. G. Pomyalovsky, a Russian author. p. 474

[151] *The Hague Congress of the First International* sat from September 2-7, 1872. It was attended by 65 delegates, among whom were Marx and Engels. The powers of the General Council and the political activity of the proletariat were among the items on the agenda. The Congress deliberations were marked throughout by a sharp struggle against the Bakuninists. The Congress passed a resolution extending the General Council's powers. Its resolution "On the Political Activity of the Proletariat" stated that the proletariat should organise a political party of its own to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and that the winning of political power was becoming its great task. The Congress expelled Bakunin and Guillaume from the International as disorganisers and founders of a new, anti-proletarian party. p. 481

[152] *Zarya* (Dawn)—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the editors of *Iskra*. Four issues appeared in three instalments. p. 482

[153] Reference is to the *Fifth World Congress of the Second International*, which met in Paris from September 23 to 27, 1900. On the fundamental issue, "The Winning of Political Power, and Alliances with Bourgeois Parties", whose discussion was prompted by A. Millerand becoming a member of the Waldeck-Rousseau counter-revolutionary government, the Congress carried a motion tabled by Kautsky. The resolution said that "the entry of a single Socialist into a bourgeois Ministry cannot be considered as the normal beginning for winning political power: it can never be anything but a temporary and exceptional makeshift in an emergency situation". Afterwards opportunists frequently referred to this point to justify their collaboration with the bourgeoisie.

Zarya published (No. 1, April 1901) an article by Plekhanov entitled "A Few Words About the Latest World Socialist Congress in Paris. An Open Letter to the Comrades Who Have Empowered Me", which sharply criticised Kautsky's resolution. p. 482

[154] This refers to Sydney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*. p. 492

[155] *Socialist Monthly* (Sozialistische Monatshefte)—the principal journal of the opportunists among the German Social-Democrats, a periodical of international opportunism. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During the world imperialist war of 1914-18 it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 495

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates

June-September 1917

June 3-24 (*June 16-July 7*)	Lenin attends the First All-Russia congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
June 4 (*17*)	Lenin speaks at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on the attitude to the Provisional Government.
	Lenin's articles "Economic Dislocation and the Proletariat's Struggle Against It" and "The Thousand and First Lie of the Capitalists" are published in *Pravda* No. 73.
June 6 (*19*)	Lenin's articles "The Diehards of June 3 Favour an Immediate Offensive", "An Alliance to Stop the Revolution" and "Gratitude" appear in *Pravda* No. 74.
	Lenin attends an enlarged meeting of the Party's Central Committee and moves a resolution for a peaceful workers' and soldiers' demonstration.
June 7 (*20*)	Lenin's articles "Is There a Way to a Just Peace?", "The Enemies of the People" and "Note" appear in *Pravda* No. 75.
June 8 (*21*)	Lenin's articles "'The Great Withdrawal'", "The Use of Sticking to the Point in Polemics", "An Epidemic of Credulity" and "A Bird in the Hand or Two in the Bush" are published in *Pravda* No. 76.

June 9 (*22*)	Lenin's article "Introduction of Socialism or Exposure of Plunder of the State?" is published in *Pravda* No. 77.
	Lenin speaks on the war at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
Night of June 9-10 (*22-23*)	Lenin attends a meeting of the Bolshevik group at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets and then a meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.). On a motion tabled by Lenin, the Central Committee resolves to call off the demonstration fixed for June 10 (23).
	Late at night Lenin prepares material for *Pravda* and C.C. directives in view of the Central Committee's decision to call off the demonstration.
June 11 (*24*)	Lenin's articles "Confused and Frightened", "Insinuations", "'Rumours Agitating the Population'" and "A Riddle" are published in *Pravda* No. 79.
	Lenin writes "Draft Statement by the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and the Bureau of the Bolshevik Group to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets Regarding the Ban on the Demonstration".
	At a meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), Lenin speaks about the calling off of the demonstration.
June 13 (*26*)	Lenin's article "The Turning-Point" and "Letter to the Editor" appear in *Pravda* No. 80.
June 14 (*27*)	Lenin's articles "The Foreign Policy of the Russian Revolution" and "A Contradictory Stand" appear in *Pravda* No. 81.
June 15 (*28*)	Lenin's article "The Ukraine" is published in *Pravda* No. 82.
June 16 (*29*)	Lenin's article "The Class Origins of Present-Day and 'Future' Cavaignacs" is published in *Pravda* No. 83.
June 16-23 (*June 29--July 6*)	Lenin takes a leading part in the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Military Organisations on the War and Home Fronts. He is elected to the steering committee.

June 17 (30)	Lenin writes a letter to the Stockholm Bureau of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Abroad.
	Lenin's articles "How to Fight Counter-Revolution", "The Ukraine and the Defeat of the Ruling Parties of Russia", "Prosecute Rodzyanko and Junkovsky for Concealing an Agent Provocateur!" and "Strange Misquotations" are published in *Pravda* No. 84.
June 18 (July 1)	Lenin holds a private meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) to discuss the results of the June 18 (July 1) demonstration.
	Lenin's articles "Ruling and Responsible Parties" and "Another Commission" appear in *Pravda* No. 85.
June 20 (July 3)	Lenin's article "The Eighteenth of June" appears in *Pravda* No. 86.
	Lenin reports on the current situation to the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Organisations on the War and Home Fronts.
	The First All-Russia Congress of Soviets elects Lenin to the Central Executive Committee.
Between June 20 and 23 (July 3 and 6)	Lenin speaks on the agrarian question at the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Military Organisations on the War and Home Fronts.
June 21 (July 4)	Lenin's articles "The Revolution, the Offensive, and Our Party", "In What Way Do You Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Gentlemen Differ From Plekhanov?" and "How Rodzyanko Is Trying to Justify Himself" are published in *Pravda* No. 87.
June 22 (July 5)	Lenin's article "To What State Have the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks Brought the Revolution?" is published in *Pravda* No. 88.
June 24 (July 7)	Lenin's articles "Can 'Jacobinism' Frighten the Working Class?" and "The Need for an Agricultural Labourers' Union in Russia" (Article One) are published in *Pravda* No. 90.
June 25 (July 8)	Lenin's articles "The Need for an Agricultural Labourers' Union in Russia" (Article Two) and "A Disorderly Revolution" are published in *Pravda* No. 91.

June 27 (July 10)	Lenin's articles "A Class Shift" and "Miracles of Revolutionary Energy" are published in *Pravda* No. 92.
June 29 (July 12)	Lenin's articles "Phrases and Facts" and "How the Capitalists Conceal Their Profits. Concerning the Issue of Control" are published in *Pravda* No. 94.
June 29-July (July 12-17)	Lenin, who is ill, spends a few days in the village of Neivola, near Mustamäki Station, Finland.
June 30 (July 13)	Lenin's articles "Crisis Is Approaching, Dislocation Is Increasing" and "Just How Is It to Be Done?" are published in *Pravda* No. 95.
July 1 (14)	Lenin's articles "How and Why the Peasants Were Deceived" and "Who Is Responsible?" are published in *Pravda* No. 96.
July 3 (16)	Lenin writes the article "What Could the Cadets Have Counted on When They Withdrew From the Cabinet?"
Not later than July (17)	Lenin writes the article "All Power to the Soviets!" It was published in *Pravda* No. 99 (July 18 [5]).
July 4 (17)	Lenin addresses demonstrators from the balcony of the Kshesinskaya Palace.
Night of July 4-5 (17-18)	Lenin attends a meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.), which adopts an appeal for the discontinuance of the July demonstration.
July 5 (18)	Lenin moves to a secret address.
	Lenin writes the articles "Where Is State Power and Where Is Counter-Revolution?", "Foul Slander by Ultra-Reactionary Newspapers and Alexinsky", "Slander and Facts", "Close to the Truth" and "A New Dreyfus Case?" The articles were published in *Listok "Pravdy"* on July 19 (6).
July 6 (19)	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) to discuss the July events.
	Lenin attends a meeting of the Executive Commission of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in the lodge of the Renault (now the Krasny Oktyabr) Works.

	Lenin writes "Appeal of the Executive Commission of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)".
July 6-7 (19-20)	Lenin writes the article "Dreyfusiad".
July 7 (20)	The Provisional Government orders Lenin's arrest.
	Lenin hides in the home of S. Y. Alliluyev, a worker.
	Lenin writes the articles "In Refutation of Sinister Rumours" and "Three Crises".
	Lenin writes a letter to the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies protesting against the search carried out at his home.
July 8 (21)	Lenin writes the article "The Question of the Bolshevik Leaders Appearing in Court".
Night of July 9-10 (22-23)	Lenin leaves the home of S. Y. Alliluyev, a worker, in Petrograd, where he hid from July 7 (20) and illegally moves to the house of N. A. Yemelyanov, a worker, near Razliv Station.
July 10 (23)-August 8 (21)	Lenin hides in the left of Yemelyanov's barn, near Razliv Station, but soon moves to a hut beyond Lake Razliv and lives there disguised as a mower. He keeps contacts with Petrograd through the Party comrades assigned for the purpose by the Central Committee, writes articles and speeches for the Bolshevik newspapers, and works on his book *The State and Revolution*.
July 10 (23)	Lenin writes the article "The Political Situation". The article was published in *Proletarskoye Dyelo* No. 6 (August 2 [July 20]).
July 11 (24)	Lenin's letter to the editors of *Novaya Zhizn* is published in No. 71 of that newspaper.
July 15 (28)	Lenin's article "What Could the Cadets Have Counted on When They Withdrew From the Cabinet?" and "Letter to the Editors of *Proletarskoye Dyelo*" are published in *Proletarskoye Dyelo* No. 2.
Mid-July	Lenin writes the article "On Slogans". The article was published in pamphlet form in 1917 by the Kronstadt Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).

July 19 (*August 1*)	Lenin's article "Our Thanks to Prince G. Y. Lvov" is published in *Proletarskoye Dyelo* No. 5.
	Lenin's article "Three Crises" is published in *Rabotnitsa* No. 7.
July 26 (*August 8*)	Lenin writes the article "Constitutional Illusions".
July 26 and 27 (*August 8 and 9*)	Lenin's article "An Answer" is published in *Rabochy i Soldat* Nos. 3 and 4.
July 26-August 3 (*August 8-16*)	Lenin, who is underground, guides the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), which had elected him honorary chairman and sends him a message of greeting.
July 29 (*August 11*)	The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) elects Lenin to the Central Committee.
	Lenin's article "The Beginning of Bonapartism" is published in *Rabochy i Soldat* No. 6.
Late July	Lenin writes the article "Lessons of the Revolution". It is published in *Rabochy* Nos. 8 and 9 (September 12 and 13 [August 30 and 31]).
August 3 (*16*)	The Sixth Party Congress nominates Lenin for election to the Constituent Assembly.
August 4 and 5 (*17 and 18*)	Lenin's article "Constitutional Illusions" is published in *Rabochy i Soldat* Nos. 11 and 12.
Night of August 8-9 (*21-22*)	Lenin moves from Razliv to Udelnaya Station and from there, disguised as a fireman, illegally crosses the frontier into Finland on a locomotive.
August 10 (*23*)-*September 17* (*30*)	Lenin hides in the Finnish village of Jalkala, near Terijoki Station, then in Lahti, 130 km from Helsingfors, and lastly in Helsingfors.
August 16 (*29*)	Lenin's letter "Kamenev's Speech in the C.E.C. on the Stockholm Conference" is published in *Proletary* No. 3.
August 17-25 (*August 30-September 7*)	Lenin writes a letter to the C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Bureau Abroad.

August 18-19 (August 31-September 1)	Lenin writes the article "Rumours of a Conspiracy".
August 19 (September 1)	Lenin's article "They Do Not See the Wood for the Trees" is published in *Proletary* No. 6.
August 24 (September 6)	Lenin's article "Political Blackmail" is published in *Proletary* No. 10.
August 26 (September 8)	Lenin's articles "Paper Resolutions" and "The Stockholm Conference" are published in *Rabochy* No. 2.
August 29 (September 11)	Lenin's article "From a Publicist's Diary. Peasants and Workers" is published in *Rabochy* No. 6.
August 30 (September 12)	Lenin's article "Slanderers" is published in *Rabochy* No. 8.
	Lenin writes the letter "To the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.".
August-September	Lenin writes *The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution.*
September 4 (14)	Lenin's article "From a Publicist's Diary" is published in *Rabochy* No. 10.
First half of September	Lenin writes the letters "Concerning the Party Programme", "On Zimmerwald" and "Violations of Democracy in Mass Organisations".
September 1-3 (14-16)	Lenin writes the article "On Compromises". The article is published in *Rabochy Put* No. 3 (September 19 [6]).
Not later than September 3 (16)	Lenin writes the "Draft Resolution on the Present Political Situation".
September 6 (19)	The C.C. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) nominates Lenin for election as a delegate to the Democratic Conference.
September 10-14 (23-27)	Lenin writes the pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It.*

September 11 (*24*)	The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elects Lenin a delegate to the Democratic Conference.
September 1 (*27*)	Lenin's article "One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution" is published in *Rabochy Put* No. 10.
September 15 (*28*)	Lenin's article "How to Guarantee the Success of the Constituent Assembly. On Freedom of the Press" is published in *Rabochy Put* No. 11.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 25

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

26

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION
OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE SECOND CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 26 contains the works V. I. Lenin wrote between September 1917 and February 1918. A large part of them deals with the Bolshevik Party's preparation of the armed uprising in October 1917. They include "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", "Marxism and Insurrection", "The Crisis Has Matured", "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?", "Advice of an Onlooker", directives to the Central Committee and the Petrograd and Moscow Party Committees, which Lenin wrote while in hiding. In them he elaborates on Marx's ideas of insurrection as an art and sets out a concrete plan for the uprising.

A considerable part of the volume consists of reports and speeches at congresses of Soviets, meetings of Party and local government workers, appeals and messages to the people, which show Lenin as the leader of the Party and the working masses, the organiser and head of the Soviet state in its first months.

The volume also contains the drafts of the first decrees and the decrees issued by the Soviet Government which were written by Lenin and signed by him in his capacity of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, namely, the Decree on Peace, the Decree on Land, the Draft Regulations on Workers' Control, the Draft Decree on the Right of Recall, the Draft Decree on the Nationalisation of the Banks and on Measures Necessary for Its Implementation, Draft Decree on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, etc.

Lenin's struggle against the provocative and treacherous policy of the Trotskyites and "Left-wing Communists" over

the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is reflected in his "Outline Programme for Peace Negotiations", "On the History of the Question of the Unfortunate Peace", and speeches at meetings of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in January and February 1918, and other documents.

Several of the works deal with the convocation and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. They are Theses on the Constituent Assembly, Declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) Group at the Constituent Assembly Meeting, January 5 (18), 1918, "People from Another World", etc.

The volume also includes "Fear of the Collapse of the Old and the Fight for the New", "How to Organise Competition?", "Draft Decree on Consumers' Communes", which give an analysis of various aspects of socialist construction and substantiate the need for a full-scale socialist competition campaign. These works lay accent on the strictest accounting and control in the economy, as the main task.

Fourteen items in this volume are included in the *Collected Works* for the first time. They are: "Draft Resolution on Freedom of the Press", "Statement to the Bolshevik Group at the Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies", "The Tasks of the Public Library in Petrograd", "Outline Programme for Peace Negotiations", "On the Opening of the Constituent Assembly", "Draft Resolution on the Provisional Bureau of the Bolshevik Group in the Constituent Assembly", "Direct-Line Conversation with L. D. Trotsky, Chairman of the Soviet Peace Delegation at Brest-Litovsk", "Instructions to the Red Guard H. Q.", "Draft Decree on the Nationalisation of Merchant Marine and Inland Water Transport", "Wireless Message Addressed to All. Special to the Peace Delegation in Brest-Litovsk", "Wireless Message Addressed to All", "Trotsky. Russian Peace Delegation. Brest-Litovsk", "Direct-Line Conversation with the Moscow Soviet". All these were written after the October Revolution and are a reflection of the Bolshevik Party's efforts to consolidate Soviet power and secure a just and democratic peace.

THE BOLSHEVIKS MUST ASSUME POWER[1]

A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE PETROGRAD AND MOSCOW COMMITTEES OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

The Bolsheviks, having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, can and *must* take state power into their own hands.

They can because the active majority of revolutionary elements in the two chief cities is large enough to carry the people with it, to overcome the opponent's resistance, to smash him, and to gain and retain power. For the Bolsheviks, by immediately proposing a democratic peace, by immediately giving the land to the peasants and by re-establishing the democratic institutions and liberties which have been mangled and shattered by Kerensky, will form a government which *nobody* will be able to overthrow.

The majority of the people are *on our side*. This was proved by the long and painful course of events from May 6 to August 31 and to September 12.[2] The majority gained in the Soviets of the metropolitan cities *resulted* from the people coming over *to our side*. The wavering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries[3] and Mensheviks and the increase in the number of internationalists within their ranks prove the same thing.

The Democratic Conference[4] represents *not* a majority of the revolutionary people, but *only the compromising upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie*. We must not be deceived by the election figures; elections prove nothing. Compare the elections to the city councils of Petrograd and Moscow with the elections to the Soviets. Compare the elections in Moscow with the Moscow strike of August 12. Those are objective facts regarding that majority of revolutionary elements that are leading the people.

The Democratic Conference is deceiving the peasants; it is giving them neither peace nor land.

A Bolshevik government *alone* will satisfy the demands of the peasants.

* * *

Why must the Bolsheviks assume power *at this very moment*?

Because the impending surrender of Petrograd will make our chances a hundred times less favourable.

And it is *not in our power* to prevent the surrender of Petrograd while the army is headed by Kerensky and Co.

Nor can we "wait" for the Constituent Assembly, for by surrendering Petrograd Kerensky and Co. *can* always frustrate its convocation. Our Party alone, on taking power, can secure the Constituent Assembly's convocation; it will then accuse the other parties of procrastination and will be able to substantiate its accusations.[5]

A separate peace between the British and German imperialists must and can be prevented, but only by quick action.

The people are tired of the waverings of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. It is only our victory in the metropolitan cities that will carry the peasants with us.

* * *

We are concerned now not with the "day", or "moment" of insurrection in the narrow sense of the word. That will be only decided by the common voice of those who are in contact with the workers and soldiers, with the masses.

The point is that now, at the Democratic Conference, our Party has virtually its own congress, and this congress (whether it wishes to or not) must decide the fate of the revolution.

The point is to make the task clear to the Party. The present task must be an armed uprising in Petrograd and Moscow (with its region), the seizing of power and the overthrow of the government . We must consider how to agitate for this without expressly saying as much in the press.

We must remember and weigh Marx's words about insurrection, "*Insurrection is an art*",[6] etc.

* * *

It would be naïve to wait for a "formal" majority for the Bolsheviks. No revolution ever waits for *that*. Kerensky and Co. are not waiting either, and are preparing to surrender Petrograd. It is the wretched waverings of the Democratic Conference that are bound to exhaust the patience of the workers of Petrograd and Moscow! History will not forgive us if we do not assume power now.

There is no apparatus? There is an apparatus—the Soviets and the democratic organisations. The international situation *right* now, on *the eve* of the conclusion of a separate peace between the British and the Germans, is *in our favour*. To propose peace to the nations right now means *to win*.

By taking power both in Moscow and in Petrograd *at once* (it doesn't matter which comes first, Moscow may possibly begin), we shall win *absolutely and unquestionably*.

N. Lenin

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MARXISM AND INSURRECTION

A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

One of the most vicious and probably most widespread distortions of Marxism resorted to by the dominant "socialist" parties is the opportunist lie that preparation for insurrection, and generally the treatment of insurrection as an art, is "Blanquism".[7]

Bernstein, the leader of opportunism, has already earned himself unfortunate fame by accusing Marxism of Blanquism, and when our present-day opportunists cry Blanquism they do not improve on or "enrich" the meagre "ideas" of Bernstein one little bit.

Marxists are accused of Blanquism for treating insurrection as an art! Can there be a more flagrant perversion of the truth, when not a single Marxist will deny that it was Marx who expressed himself on this score in the most definite, precise and categorical manner, referring to insurrection specifically as an *art*, saying that it must be treated as an art, that you must *win* the first success and then proceed from success to success, never ceasing the *offensive* against the enemy, taking advantage of his confusion, etc., etc.?

To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced class. That is the first point. Insurrection must rely upon a *revolutionary upsurge of the people*. That is the second point. Insurrection must rely upon that *turning-point* in the history of the growing revolution when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its height, and when the *vacillations* in the ranks of the enemy and *in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution*

are strongest. That is the third point. And these three conditions for raising the question of insurrection distinguish *Marxism from Blanquism*.

Once these conditions exist, however, to refuse to treat insurrection as an *art* is a betrayal of Marxism and a betrayal of the revolution.

To show that it is precisely the present moment that the Party *must* recognise as the one in which the entire course of events has objectively placed *insurrection* on the order of the day and that insurrection must be treated as an art, it will perhaps be best to use the method of comparison, and to draw a parallel between July 3-4[8] and the September days.

On July 3-4 it could have been argued, without violating the truth, that the correct thing to do was to take power, for our enemies would in any case have accused us of insurrection and ruthlessly treated us as rebels. However, to have decided on this account in favour of taking power at that time would have been wrong, because the objective conditions for the victory of the insurrection did not exist.

(1) We still lacked the support of the class which is the vanguard of the revolution.

We still did not have a majority among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and Moscow. Now we have a majority in both Soviets. It was created *solely* by the history of July and August, by the experience of the "ruthless treatment" meted out to the Bolsheviks, and by the experience of the Kornilov revolt.[9]

(2) There was no country-wide revolutionary upsurge at that time. There is now, after the Kornilov revolt; the situation in the provinces and assumption of power by the Soviets in many localities prove this.

(3) At that time there was no *vacillation* on any serious political scale among our enemies and among the irresolute petty bourgeoisie. Now the vacillation is enormous. Our main enemy, Allied and world imperialism (for world imperialism is headed by the "Allies"), *has begun to waver* between a war to a victorious finish and a separate peace directed against Russia. Our petty-bourgeois democrats, having clearly lost their majority among the people, have begun to vacillate enormously, and have rejected a bloc, i.e., a coalition, with the Cadets.[10]

(4) Therefore, an insurrection on July 3-4 would have been a mistake; we could not have retained power either physically or politically. We could not have retained it physically even though Petrograd was at times in our hands, because at that time our workers and soldiers would not have *fought and died* for Petrograd. There was not at the time that "savageness", or fierce hatred *both of* the Kerenskys *and of* the Tseretelis and Chernovs. Our people had still not been tempered by the experience of the persecution of the Bolsheviks in which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks participated.

We could not have retained power politically on July 3-4 because, *before the Kornilov revolt*, the army and the provinces could and would have marched against Petrograd.

Now the picture is entirely different.

We have the following of the majority of a *class*, the vanguard of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, which is capable of carrying the masses with it.

We have the following of the *majority* of the people, because Chernov's resignation, while by no means the only symptom, is the most striking and obvious symptom that the peasants *will not receive land* from the Socialist-Revolutionaries' bloc (or from the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves). And that is the chief reason for the popular character of the revolution.

We are in the advantageous position of a party that knows for certain which way to go at a lime when *imperialism as a whole* and the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary bloc as a whole are vacillating in an incredible fashion.

Our victory is assured, for the people are close to desperation, and we are showing the entire people a sure way out; we demonstrated to the entire people during the "Kornilov days" the value of our leadership, and then *proposed* to the politicians of the bloc a compromise, *which they rejected*, although there is no let-up in their vacillations.

It would be a great mistake to think that our offer of a compromise had not *yet* been rejected, and that the Democratic Conference may *still* accept it. The compromise was proposed *by a party to parties*; it could not have been proposed in any other way. It was rejected by *parties*. The Democratic Conference is a *conference*, and nothing more.

One thing must not be forgotten, namely, that the *majority* of the revolutionary people, the poor, embittered peasants, are not represented in it. It is a conference of *a minority of the people*—this obvious truth must not be forgotten. It would be a big mistake, sheer parliamentary cretinism on our part, if we were to regard the Democratic Conference as a parliament; for even *if it were* to proclaim itself a permanent and sovereign parliament of the revolution, it would nevertheless *decide nothing*. The power of decision lies *outside it* in the working-class quarters of Petrograd and Moscow.

All the objective conditions exist for a successful insurrection. We have the exceptional advantage of a situation in which *only* our victory in the insurrection can put an end to that most painful thing on earth, vacillation, which has worn the people out; in which *only* our victory in the insurrection will give the peasants land immediately; a situation in which only *our* victory in the insurrection can *foil* the game of a separate peace directed against the revolution—foil it by publicly proposing a fuller, juster and earlier peace, a peace that will *benefit* the revolution.

Finally, our Party alone *can*, by a victorious insurrection, save Petrograd; for if our proposal for peace is rejected, if we do not secure even an armistice, then *we* shall become "defencists", we shall place ourselves *at the head of the war parties*, we shall be the *war party par excellence*, and we shall conduct the war in a truly revolutionary manner. We shall take away all the bread and boots from the capitalists. We shall leave them only crusts and dress them in bast shoes. We shall send all the bread and footwear to the front.

And then we shall save Petrograd.

The resources, both material and spiritual, for a truly revolutionary war in Russia are still immense; the chances are a hundred to one that the Germans will grant us at least an armistice. And to secure an armistice now would in itself mean to win the *whole world*.

* * *

Having recognised the absolute necessity for an insurrection of the workers of Petrograd and Moscow in order to save the revolution and to save Russia from a "separate"

partition by the imperialists of both groups, we must first adapt our political tactics at the Conference to the conditions of the growing insurrection; secondly, we must show that it is not only in words that we accept Marx's idea that insurrection must be treated as an art.

At the Conference we must immediately cement the Bolshevik group, without striving after numbers, and without fearing to leave the waverers in the waverers' camp. They are more useful to the cause of the revolution *there* than in the camp of the resolute and devoted fighters.

We must draw up a brief declaration from the Bolsheviks, emphasising in no uncertain manner the irrelevance of long speeches and of "speeches" in general, the necessity for immediate action to save the revolution, the absolute necessity for a complete break with the bourgeoisie, for the removal of the present government, in its entirety, for a complete rupture with the Anglo-French imperialists, who are preparing a "separate" partition of Russia, and for the immediate transfer of all power to *revolutionary democrats, headed by the revolutionary proletariat.*

Our declaration must give the briefest and most trenchant formulation of *this* conclusion in connection with the programme proposals of peace for the peoples, land for the peasants, confiscation of scandalous profits, and a check on the scandalous sabotage of production by the capitalists.

The briefer and more trenchant the declaration, the better. Only two other highly important points must be clearly indicated in it, namely, that the people are worn out by the vacillations, that they are fed up with the irresolution of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks; and that we are definitely breaking with these *parties* because they have betrayed the revolution.

And another thing. By immediately proposing a peace without annexations, by immediately breaking with the Allied imperialists and with all imperialists, either we shall at once obtain an armistice, or the entire revolutionary proletariat will rally to the defence of the country, and a really just, really revolutionary war will then be waged by revolutionary democrats under the leadership of the proletariat.

Having read this declaration, and having appealed for *decisions* and not talk, for *action* and not resolution-writing, we must *dispatch* our entire group to the *factories and the barracks*. Their place is there, the pulse of life is there, there is the source of salvation for our revolution, and there is the motive force of the Democratic Conference.

There, in ardent and impassioned speeches, we must explain our programme and put the alternative: either the Conference adopts it *in its entirety*, or else insurrection. There is no middle course. Delay is impossible. The revolution is dying.

By putting the question in this way, by concentrating our entire group in the factories and barracks, *we shall be able to determine the right moment to start the insurrection.*

In order to treat insurrection in a Marxist way, i.e., as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single moment, organise a *headquarters* of the insurgent detachments, distribute our forces, move the reliable regiments to the most important points, surround the Alexandrinsky Theatre, occupy the Peter and Paul Fortress,[11] arrest the General Staff and the government, and move against the officer cadets and the Savage Division[12] those detachments which would rather die than allow the enemy to approach the strategic points of the city. We must mobilise the armed workers and call them to fight the last desperate fight, occupy the telegraph and the telephone exchange at once, move *our* insurrection headquarters to the central telephone exchange and connect it by telephone with all the factories, all the regiments, all the points of armed fighting, etc.

Of course, this is all by way of example, only to *illustrate* the fact that at the present moment it is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to remain loyal to the revolution *unless insurrection is treated as an art.*

N. Lenin

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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND CIVIL WAR

THEY ARE TRYING TO FRIGHTEN US WITH CIVIL WAR

The bourgeoisie, frightened by the refusal of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to join a bloc with the Cadets, and by the probability of the democrats being quite capable of forming a government without them and governing Russia against them, are doing their best to intimidate the democrats.

Scare them as much as you can! This is the slogan of the whole bourgeois press. Scare them with all your might! Lie, slander, but frighten them!

Birzhevka[13] does its scaring by fabricating news about Bolshevik activities. Others by spreading rumours about Alexeyev's resignation, and about the imminent German offensive against Petrograd, as if the facts do not prove that it is the Kornilov generals (to whom Alexeyev undoubtedly belongs) who are capable of opening the front to the Germans in Galicia and near Riga and near Petrograd, and that it is the Kornilov generals who are arousing the greatest hatred in the army against the General Staff.

To make this method of intimidating the democrats more "solid" and convincing, they refer to the danger of "civil war". Of all the methods of intimidation, that of scaring with civil war is perhaps the most widespread. Here is the way the Rostov-on-the-Don Committee of the people's freedom party formulated this widespread idea, heartily welcomed in philistine circles, in its resolution of September 1 (*Rech*[14] No. 210):

"The Committee is convinced that civil war may sweep away all the gains of the revolution and drown in rivers of blood our young, still unstable freedom, and is of the opinion that it is necessary to

make an energetic protest against developing the revolution as proposed by the unrealisable socialist utopias if we are to save the gains of the revolution."

Here, the fundamental idea which is to be met with innumerable times in *Rech* editorials, in the articles of Plekhanov and Potresov, in the editorials of Menshevik papers, etc., etc., is expressed in the clearest, most precise, well considered and substantial form. It will therefore be useful to take up this idea in greater detail.

Let us try to make a more concrete analysis of the civil war question, on the basis of the half year's experience of our revolution, among other things.

This experience, similarly to the experience of all European revolutions, from the end of the eighteenth century on, shows that civil war is the sharpest form of the class struggle, it is that point in the class struggle when clashes and battles, economic and political, repeating themselves, growing, broadening, becoming acute, turn into an armed struggle of one class against another. More often than not—one may say almost always—in all more or less free and advanced countries the civil war is between those classes whose antagonistic position towards each other is created and deepened by the entire economic development of capitalism, by the entire history of modern society the world over—civil war is between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

During the past half year of our revolution, we have experienced very strong spontaneous outbursts (April 20-21,[15] July 3-4) in which the proletariat came very close to starting a civil war. On the other hand, the Kornilov revolt was a military conspiracy supported by the landowners and capitalists led by the Cadet Party, a conspiracy by which the bourgeoisie has actually begun a civil war.

Such are the facts. Such is the history of our own revolution. More than anything we must learn from this history, we must give a great deal of thought to the course it has taken and to its class significance.

Let us try to compare the germs of the proletarian civil war and the bourgeois civil war in Russia from the standpoint of (1) the spontaneous nature of the movement; (2) its aims; (3) the political consciousness of the masses participat-

ing in it; (4) the forces in the movement; (5) its tenacity. We think that if all the parties which are now "unnecessarily throwing about" the words "civil war" were to approach the question in this way, and make a real attempt to study the germs of the civil war, the class consciousness of the entire Russian revolution would gain a very great deal.

Let us begin with the spontaneous nature of the movement. For the July 3-4 movement we have the testimony of such witnesses as the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta*[16] and the Socialist-Revolutionary *Dyelo Naroda*[17] which have recognised the spontaneous origin of the movement. This testimony I quoted in an article published in *Proletarskoye Dyelo*,[18] and issued as a separate leaflet entitled *An Answer*.* For obvious reasons, however, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are defending themselves and the part they played in persecuting the Bolsheviks, officially continue to deny the spontaneous nature of the outburst of July 3-4.

Let us put the controversial matter aside for the present. Let us take what is undisputed. No one denies the spontaneous nature of the April 20-21 movement. The Bolshevik Party joined this spontaneous movement under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets"; independently of the Bolsheviks it was joined by the late Linde, who led 30,000 armed soldiers into the street ready to arrest the government. (The action of these troops, let us say in parenthesis, has not been investigated and studied. If it is examined closely, and April 20 is given its place in the historic sequence of events, i.e., if it is seen as a link in the chain which extends from February 28 to August 29, it becomes clear that the fault and the error of the Bolsheviks was the *insufficient* revolutionism of their tactics, and by no means the excessive revolutionism the philistines, accuse us of.)

The spontaneous nature of the movement leading to the proletariat beginning civil war is thus beyond doubt. On the other hand, there is not even a trace of anything resembling spontaneity in the Kornilov revolt; it was merely a conspiracy of generals who hoped by fraud and by the force of military command to carry part of the army with them.

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* See present edition, Vol. 25.—*Ed.*

It is beyond all doubt that the spontaneity of the movement is proof that it is deeply rooted in the masses, that its roots are firm and that it is inevitable. The proletarian revolution is firmly rooted, the bourgeois counter-revolution is without roots—this is what the facts prove if examined from the point of view of the spontaneous nature of the movement.

Let us now look at the aims of the movement. The movement of April 20-21 came very close to adopting the Bolshevik slogans, whereas that of July 3-4 was directly connected with them, was under their influence and guidance. The Bolshevik Party spoke quite openly, definitely, clearly, precisely, for all to hear, in its papers and in verbal propaganda of the chief *aims* of the proletarian civil war—the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, peace and an immediate offer of peace, confiscation of the landed estates.

We all know the aims of the Kornilov revolt, and no one among the democrats disputes that those aims were a dictatorship of the landowners and the bourgeoisie, dispersal of the Soviets, and preparations for the restoration of the monarchy. The Cadet Party, this main Kornilovite party (by the way, it ought to be called from now on the Kornilov party), possesses a larger press and greater forces for propaganda than the Bolsheviks, but it has never dared and still does not dare to tell the people openly either about the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or about the dispersal of the Soviets, or about the Kornilovite aims in general!

As far-as the aims of the movement are concerned, the facts tell us that the proletarian civil war can come out with an open exposition of its final aims before the people and win the sympathies of the working people, whereas the bourgeois civil war can attempt to lead part of the masses only by concealing its aims; this is the tremendous difference in them as far as the class-consciousness of the masses is concerned.

The only objective data on this question seem to be those on party affiliation and elections. There do not appear to be any other facts which allow a clear judgement of the class-consciousness of the masses. It is clear that the pro-

letarian-revolutionary movement is represented by the Bolshevik Party, and the bourgeois counter-revolutionary movement by the Cadet Party, and this can hardly be disputed after six months' experience of the revolution. Three comparisons of a factual nature can be made that concern the question under consideration. A comparison of the May elections to the local councils in Petrograd with the August elections to the city council shows a decrease in Cadet votes and a tremendous increase in Bolshevik votes. The Cadet press admits that, as a rule, Bolshevism is strong wherever masses of workers or soldiers are concentrated.

In the absence of any statistics concerning the fluctuation of the party membership, attendance at meetings, etc., the conscious support of the party by the *masses* may be judged only from published data concerning cash collections for the party. These data show a tremendous mass-scale heroism on the part of worker Bolsheviks in collecting money for *Pravda*,[19] for the papers that have been suppressed, etc. The reports of such collections have always been published. Among the Cadets we see nothing of the kind; their party work is obviously being "nourished" by contributions from the rich. There is no trace of active aid on the part of the masses.

Lastly, a comparison of the movements of April 20-21 and July 3-4 on the one hand, and the Kornilov revolt on the other, shows that the Bolsheviks indicated point-blank to the masses who their enemy in the civil war is, namely, the bourgeoisie, the landowners and capitalists. The Kornilov revolt has already demonstrated that the troops who followed Kornilov did so because they had been *completely deceived*, a fact made obvious the moment the Savage Division and Kornilov's contingents came up against the Petrograd masses.

Furthermore, what data indicate the *strength* of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the civil war? The Bolsheviks are strong only in the numbers and class-consciousness of the proletarians, in the sympathy with the Bolshevik slogans displayed by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik "rank and file" (i.e., workers and poor peasants). It is a fact that these slogans actually won over the *majority*

of the active revolutionary masses in Petrograd on April 20-21, June 18,[20] and July 3-4.

A comparison of the data on the "parliamentary" elections and the data on the above-named mass movements fully corroborates, in respect of Russia, an observation often made in the West, namely, that the revolutionary proletariat is incomparably *stronger* in the *extra-parliamentary* than in the parliamentary struggle, as far as influencing the *masses* and drawing them into the struggle is concerned. This is a very important observation in respect of civil war.

It is quite clear why in all the circumstances and the entire situation of parliamentary struggle and elections the strength of the oppressed classes is less than the strength they can actually develop in civil war.

The strength of the Cadets and the Kornilov revolt is the strength of *wealth*. The press and a long series of political actions show that Anglo-French capital and imperialism are *in favour* of the Cadets and the Kornilov movement. It is common knowledge that the entire Right wing of the Moscow Conference[21] of August 12 gave frantic support to Kornilov and Kaledin. It is common knowledge that the French and British bourgeois press "aided" Kornilov. There are indications of his having been aided by the *banks*.

All the power of wealth stood behind Kornilov—and what a miserable and rapid failure! There are only two social forces among Kornilov's supporters apart from the wealthy—the Savage Division and the Cossacks. In the case of the former it is *only* the power of ignorance and deception, and this power is the more formidable the longer the press remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie. After a victory in the civil war, the proletariat would undermine *this* source of "power" once and for all.

As to the Cossacks, they are a section of the population consisting of rich, small or medium landed proprietors (the average holding is about 50 dessiatines) in one of those outlying regions of Russia that have retained many medieval traits in their way of life, their economy, and their customs. We can regard this as the socio-economic basis for a Russian Vendée.[22] But what have the *facts* of the Kornilov-Kaledin movement proved? Not even Kaledin, the "beloved leader"

supported by the Guchkovs, Milyukovs, Ryabushinskys and Co., has *succeeded* in creating a mass movement!! Kaledin marched towards civil war much more "directly", much more forthrightly than did the Bolsheviks. Kaledin went specifically "to rouse the Don", and still he has not aroused a mass movement in his "home" region, in a Cossack region far removed from Russian democracy in general. On the part of the proletariat, on the contrary, we observe spontaneous outbursts of the movement in the very centre of the influence and power of anti-Bolshevik, all-Russia democracy.

Objective data on the attitude of various strata and economic groups of the Cossacks towards democracy and towards the Kornilov revolt are lacking. There are only indications to the effect that the majority of the poor and middle Cossacks are rather inclined towards democracy and that only the officers and the top layer of the well-to-do Cossacks are entirely in favour of Kornilov.

However that may be, the extreme weakness of a mass Cossack movement in favour of a bourgeois counter-revolution has been historically proved since the experience of August 26-31.

There remains the last question, that of the *tenacity* of the movement. As far as the Bolshevik, proletarian revolutionary movement is concerned, we have proof that the struggle against Bolshevism has been conducted during the six months' existence of a republic in Russia both ideologically, with a *gigantic* preponderance of press organs and propaganda forces on the side of the opponents of Bolshevism (even if we risk classing the campaign of slander as "ideological" struggle), and *by means of repressions*, which include hundreds of people arrested, our main printing-plant demolished, and the chief newspaper and a number of other papers suppressed. The result can be seen in the facts—a tremendous growth of support for the Bolsheviks in the August Petrograd elections, and in both the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, a strengthening of the internationalist and Left trends that are drawing close to Bolshevism. This means that the tenacity of the proletarian revolutionary movement in republican Russia is very great. The facts tell us that the combined efforts

of the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks *have not succeeded* in weakening that movement in the least. On the contrary, it was the alliance of the Kornilovites with "democracy" that *strengthened* Bolshevism. The only possible means of struggle against the proletarian revolutionary trend are ideological influence *and* repressions.

Data on the tenacity of the Cadet-Kornilov movement are still lacking. The Cadets have suffered no persecution at all. Even Guchkov has been set free and Maklakov and Milyukov were not even arrested. *Rech* has not been suppressed. The Cadets are being spared. The Kornilovite Cadets are being *courted* by Kerensky's government. Suppose we put it this way: assuming that the Anglo-French and the Russian Ryabushinskys will give millions and millions more to the Cadets, to *Yedinstvo*,[23] *Dyen*,[24] etc., for the new election campaign in Petrograd, is it probable that the number of their votes will now increase, after the Kornilov revolt? Judging by meetings, etc., the answer to this question can hardly be anything but negative.

* * *

Summing up the results of the analysis in which we compared the data furnished by the history of the Russian revolution, we arrive at the conclusion that the beginning of the proletariat's civil war has revealed the strength, the class-consciousness, deep-rootedness, growth, and tenacity of the movement. The beginning of the bourgeoisie's civil war has revealed no strength, no class-consciousness among the masses, no depth whatsoever, no chance of victory.

The alliance of the Cadets with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks, i.e., against the revolutionary proletariat, has been tried in practice for a number of months, and this alliance of the temporarily disguised Kornilovites with the "democrats" has actually strengthened and not weakened the Bolsheviks, and led to the collapse of the "alliance", and to the strengthening of the Left opposition among the Mensheviks.

An alliance of the Bolsheviks with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks against the Cadets, against

the bourgeoisie, *has not yet been tried*; or, to be more precise, such an alliance *has been tried on one front only*, for *five days* only, from August 26 to August 31, the period of the Kornilov revolt, and this alliance at that time scored a victory over the counter-revolution with an ease never yet achieved in any revolution; it was such a crushing suppression of the bourgeois, landowners', capitalist, Allied-imperialist and Cadet counter-revolution, that the civil war *from that side* ceased to exist, was a mere nothing from the very outset, collapsed before any "battle" had taken place.

In the face of this historic fact the entire bourgeois press and all its chorus (the Plekhanovs, Potresovs, Breshko-Breshkovskayas, etc.) are shouting with all their might that an alliance of the Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries "threatens" the horrors of civil war!

This would be funny, if it were not so sad. It is sad indeed that such an open, self-evident, glaring absurdity, such a flouting of the facts of the whole history of our revolution, can still find listeners.... This only proves that the selfish bourgeois lie is still widespread (and this cannot be avoided as long as the press is monopolised by the bourgeoisie), a lie that shouts down and drowns the most undoubted, palpably obvious lessons of the revolution.

If there is an absolutely undisputed lesson of the revolution, one fully proved by facts, it is that only an alliance of the Bolsheviks with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, only an immediate transfer of all power to the Soviets would make civil war in Russia impossible, for a civil war begun by the bourgeoisie against such an alliance, against the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, is inconceivable; such a "war" would not last even until the first battle; the bourgeoisie, *for the second time* since the Kornilov revolt, would not be able to move even the Savage Division, or the former number of Cossack units against the Soviet Government!

The peaceful development of any revolution is, generally speaking, extremely rare and difficult, because revolution is the maximum exacerbation of the sharpest class contradictions; but in a peasant country, at a time when

a union of the proletariat with the peasantry *can* give *peace* to people worn out by a most unjust and criminal war, when that union can give the peasantry *all the land*, in that country, at that exceptional moment in history, a peaceful development of the revolution is *possible* and *probable* if all power is transferred to the Soviets. The struggle of parties for power within the Soviets may proceed peacefully, if the Soviets are made fully democratic, and "petty thefts" and violations of democratic principles, such as giving the soldiers one representative to every five hundred, while the workers have one representative to every thousand voters, are eliminated. In a democratic republic such petty thefts will have to disappear.

When confronted with Soviets that have given all the land to the peasants without compensation and offer a just peace to all the peoples—when confronted with such Soviets the alliance of the British, French and Russian bourgeoisie, the Kornilovs, Buchanans,[25] Ryabushinskys, Milyukovs, Plekhanovs, and Potresovs is quite impotent and is not to be feared.

The bourgeoisie's resistance to the transfer of the land to the peasants without compensation, to similar reforms in other realms of life, to a just peace and a break with imperialism, is, of course, inevitable. But for such resistance to reach the stage of civil war, *masses* of some kind are necessary, masses capable of *fighting* and vanquishing the Soviets. The bourgeoisie does *not* have these masses, and has nowhere to get them. The sooner and the more resolutely the Soviets take all power, the sooner both Savage Divisions and Cossacks will split into an insignificant minority of politically-conscious Kornilov supporters and a huge majority of those in favour of a democratic and *socialist* (for it is with socialism that we shall then be dealing) alliance of workers and peasants.

When power passes to the Soviets, the resistance of the bourgeoisie will result in *scores and hundreds* of workers and peasants "keeping track of", supervising, controlling, and registering *every single* capitalist, for the interests of the workers and peasants will demand struggle against the capitalists' deception of the people. The forms and methods of this accountancy and control have been devel-

oped and simplified by capitalism itself, by such capitalist creations as banks, big factories, trusts, railways, the post office, consumers' societies, and trade unions. If the Soviets punish those capitalists who evade the most detailed accounting or who deceive the people, punish them by confiscating all their property and arresting them for a short time, that will be sufficient to break all the resistance of the bourgeoisie by bloodless means. For it is through the banks, once they are nationalised, through the unions of employees, through the post office, the consumers' societies, and the trade unions, that control and the accounting will become universal, all-powerful, and irresistible.

And Russia's Soviets, the alliance of her workers and poor peasants, are not alone in the *steps* they take *towards* socialism. If we were alone, we should not be able to accomplish this task peacefully, for it is essentially an international task. But we have enormous reserves, the armies of the most advanced workers in other countries, where Russia's break with imperialism and the imperialist war will inevitably accelerate the workers' socialist revolution that is maturing.

* * *

Some speak about "rivers of blood" in a civil war. This is mentioned in the resolution of the Kornilovite Cadets quoted above. This phrase is repeated in a thousand ways by all the bourgeois and opportunists. Since the Kornilov revolt all the class-conscious workers laugh, will continue to laugh and cannot help laughing at it.

However, the question of "rivers of blood" in the present time of war can and must be studied by an approximate computation of forces, consequences, and results; it must be taken seriously and not as an empty stock phrase, not as simply the hypocrisy of the Cadets, who have done *everything* in their power *to enable* Kornilov to drown Russia in "rivers of blood", and to restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the power of the landowners, and the monarchy.

"Rivers of blood," they say. Let us analyse *this* aspect of the question as well.

Let us assume that the vacillations of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries continue; that these parties

do *not* hand over power to the Soviets; that they do *not* overthrow Kerensky; that they restore the old rotten compromise with the bourgeoisie in a somewhat different form (say, "non-partisan" *Kornilovites* instead of Cadets); that they do not replace the apparatus of state power by the Soviet apparatus, do not offer peace, do not break with imperialism, and do not confiscate the landed estates. Let us assume that this is the outcome of the present wavering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, of this present "September 12".

The experience of our own revolution tells us most clearly that the consequence of this would be a still further weakening of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, their further separation from the masses, an incredible growth of indignation and bitterness among the masses, a tremendous growth of sympathy with the revolutionary proletariat, with the Bolsheviks.

Under such conditions, the proletariat of the capital will be still closer to a Commune, to a workers' uprising, to the conquest of power, to a civil war in its highest and most decisive form, than it is at present; after the experience of April 20-21 and July 3-4 such a result must be recognised as historically inevitable.

"Rivers of blood," shout the Cadets. But such rivers of blood would give victory to the proletariat and the poor peasantry, and it is a hundred to one that this victory would bring *peace* in place of the imperialist war, i.e., that it would save the lives of *hundreds of thousands* of men who are now shedding their blood for the sake of a division of spoils and seizures (annexations) by the capitalists. If April 20-21 had ended by the transfer of all power to the Soviets, and the Bolsheviks in alliance with the poor peasantry had won in the Soviets, it would have saved the lives of the *half million* Russian soldiers, who certainly perished in the battles of June 18, even if it had cost "rivers of blood".

This is how every class-conscious Russian worker and soldier figures, this is how he must figure, if he weighs and analyses the question of civil war now being raised everywhere; and, of course, such a worker or soldier, who has experienced many things and given thought to them,

will not be frightened by the cries of "rivers of blood" raised by individuals, parties and groups willing to sacrifice *more millions* of Russian soldiers for the sake of Constantinople, Lvov, Warsaw, and "victory over Germany".

No "rivers of blood" in an internal civil war can even approximately equal those *seas* of blood which the Russian imperialists have shed since June 19 (in spite of the very great chances they had of avoiding this by handing over power to the Soviets).

All you Milyukovs, Potresovs and Plekhanovs be careful about your arguments *against* "rivers of blood" in civil war while this present war continues, for the soldiers have seen *seas* of blood and know what they mean.

The international situation of the Russian revolution now, in 1917, the fourth year of a terrifically burdensome and criminal war, that has worn out the peoples, is such that an offer of a just peace on the part of a Russian proletariat victorious in the civil war would have a hundred to one chance of achieving an armistice and peace *without the shedding of further seas of blood*.

For a combination of warring Anglo-French and German imperialism *against* the proletarian socialist Russian Republic is *impossible* in practice, while a combination of British, Japanese and American imperialism against us is extremely difficult to realise and is not at all dangerous to us, if only because of Russia's geographical position. On the other hand, the existence of revolutionary and socialist proletarian masses in *all* the European states is a fact; the maturing and the inevitability of the world-wide socialist revolution is beyond doubt, and such a revolution can be seriously aided only by the progress of the Russian revolution and not by delegations and not by playing at Stockholm conferences with the foreign Plekhanovs or Tseretelis.

The bourgeoisie wails about the inevitable defeat of a Commune in Russia, i.e., defeat of the proletariat if it were to conquer power.

These are false, selfish class wailings.

If the proletariat gains power it will have *every* chance of retaining it and of leading Russia until there is a victorious revolution in the West.

In the first place, we have learned much since the Commune, and we would not repeat its fatal errors, we would not leave the banks in the hands of the bourgeoisie, we would not confine ourselves to defence against the Versaillais (or the Kornilovites) but would take the offensive against them and crush them.

Secondly, the victorious proletariat would give Russia peace, and no power on earth would be able to overthrow a government of *peace*, a government of an honest, sincere, just peace, after all the horrors of more than three years' butchery of the peoples.

Thirdly, the victorious proletariat would give the peasantry the land immediately and without compensation. And a tremendous majority of the peasantry—worn out and embittered by the "playing around with the landowners" practised by our government, particularly the coalition government, particularly the Kerensky government—would support the victorious proletariat absolutely, unreservedly, with every means in its power.

You Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are all talking about the "heroic efforts" of the people. Only recently I came across this phrase for the nth time in the leading article of your *Izvestia*[26] of the Central Executive Committee. With you it is a *mere* phrase. But the workers and peasants read it and *think* about it, and such deliberation—reinforced by the experience of the Kornilov revolt, by the "experience" of Peshekhonov's ministry, by the "experience" of Chernov's ministry, *and so forth*—every such deliberation inevitably leads to the conclusion that this "heroic effort" is nothing but confidence of the poor peasantry in the city workers as their most faithful allies and leaders. The heroic effort is nothing but the victory of the Russian proletariat over the bourgeoisie in civil war, for such a victory alone will save the country from painful vacillations, it alone will show the way out, it alone will give land and peace.

If an alliance between the city workers and the poor peasantry can be effected through an immediate transfer of power to the Soviets, so much the better. The Bolsheviks will do *everything* to secure this *peaceful* development of the revolution. Without this, even the Constituent Assem-

bly, by itself, will not save the situation, for even there the Socialist-Revolutionaries may continue their "playing" at agreements with the Cadets, with Breshko-Breshkovskaya and Kerensky (in what way are they better than Cadets?), and so on, and so forth.

If even the experience of the Kornilov revolt has taught the "democrats" nothing, and they continue the destructive policy of vacillation and compromise, we say that nothing is more ruinous to the proletarian revolution than these vacillations. That being the case, do not frighten us, gentlemen, with civil war. Civil war is inevitable, if you do not wish to break with Kornilovism and the "coalition" right now, once and for all. This war will bring victory over the exploiters, it will give the land to the peasants, it will give peace to the peoples, it will open the right road to the victorious revolution of the world socialist proletariat.

Rabochy Put No. 12,
September 29 (16), 1917
Signed: N. Lenin

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to the newspaper text

HEROES OF FRAUD AND THE MISTAKES OF THE BOLSHEVIKS[27]

The so-called Democratic Conference is over. Thank God, one more farce is behind us and still we are advancing, provided fate has no more than a certain number of farces in store for our revolution.

In order correctly to judge the political results of the Conference, we must attempt to ascertain its precise class significance as indicated by objective facts.

Further break-up of the government parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks; their obvious loss of the majority among the revolutionary democrats; one more step towards linking up Mr. Kerensky and Messrs. Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. and exposing the Bonapartism they share—such is the class significance of the Conference.

In the Soviets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have lost their majority. They therefore have had to resort to a fraud—they have violated their pledge to call a new congress of the Soviets in three months. They have evaded reporting back to those who elected the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; and they have rigged the "Democratic" Conference. The Bolsheviks spoke of this fraud prior to the Conference, and the results fully confirmed their correctness. The Lieberdans[28] and the Tseretelis, Chernovs and Co. saw that their majority in the Soviets was dwindling, therefore they resorted to a fraud.

Arguments like that which says that co-operatives and also "properly" elected city and Zemstvo representatives "are already of great significance among the democratic organisations", are so flimsy that it is nothing but crass

hypocrisy to advance them seriously. First of all, the Central Executive Committee was elected by the Soviets, and its refusal to deliver a report and relinquish office to *the Soviets*, is a Bonapartist fraud. Secondly, the Soviets represent revolutionary democracy insofar as they are joined by those who wish to fight in a revolutionary way. Their doors are not closed to members of the co-operatives and city dwellers. Those same Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks ran the Soviets.

Those who remained *only* in the co-operatives, who confined themselves *only* to municipal (city and Zemstvo) work, voluntarily separated themselves from the ranks of revolutionary democracy, thereby attaching themselves to a democracy that was either reactionary or neutral. Everybody knows that co-operative and municipal work is done *not only* by revolutionaries, but *also* by reactionaries; everybody knows that people are elected to co-operatives and municipalities primarily for work that is *not* of general political scope and importance.

The aim of the Lieberdans, Tsereteli, Chernov and Co. when they rigged the Conference was to bring up reserves secretly from among the adherents of *Yedinstvo* and "non-partisan" reactionaries. That was the fraud they perpetrated. That was their Bonapartism, which allies them with the Bonapartist Kerensky. They robbed democracy while hypocritically keeping up democratic appearances—this is the essence of the matter.

Nicholas II stole, figuratively, large sums from democracy. He convened representative institutions but gave the landowners a hundredfold greater representation than the peasants. The Lieberdans, Tseretelis, and Chernovs steal petty sums from democracy; they convoke a Democratic Conference where *both* workers and peasants point with full justice to the curtailment of their representation, to *lack* of proportionality, to *discrimination* in favour of members of the co-operatives and municipal councils closest to the bourgeoisie (and reactionary democracy).

The Lieberdans, Tseretelis and Chernovs have parted ways with the masses of poor workers and peasants. They saved themselves by the fraud that keeps their Kerensky going.

The demarcation of classes is progressing. A protest is growing in the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, a direct split is maturing because the "leaders" have betrayed the interests of the majority of the population. The leaders are relying on the support of a *minority*, in defiance of the principles of democracy. Fraud is *inevitable* as far as they are concerned.

Kerensky is revealing himself more and more as a Bonapartist. He was considered a Socialist-Revolutionary. Now we know that he is not merely a "March" Socialist-Revolutionary who ran over to them from the Trudoviks "for advertising purposes". He is an adherent of Breshko-Breshkovskaya, the Socialist-Revolutionary Mrs. Plekhanov, or Mrs. Potresov in their *Dyen*. The so-called Right wing of the so-called socialist parties, the Plekhanovs, Breshkovskayas, Potresovs, is where Kerensky *belongs*; this wing, however, does not differ substantially from the Cadets *in anything*.

The Cadets have good reason to praise Kerensky. He pursues *their* policies and confers with them and with Rodzyanko *behind the back of the people*; he has been exposed by Chernov and others as conniving with Savinkov, a friend of Kornilov's. Kerensky is a *Kornilovite*; by sheer *accident* he has had a quarrel with Kornilov himself, but he remains in the most intimate alliance with other Kornilovites. This is a *fact*, proved by the revelations about Savinkov, by *Dyelo Naroda* and by the continuation of the political game, Kerensky's "ministerial leapfrog" with the Kornilovites disguised under the name of the "commercial and industrial class".

Secret pacts with the Kornilov gang, secret hobnobbing (through Tereshchenko and Co.) with the imperialist "Allies"; secret obstruction and sabotage of the Constituent Assembly; secret deception of the peasants by way of service to Rodzyanko, i.e., the landowners (by doubling the price of bread)—this is what Kerensky is *really* doing. This is his *class* policy. This is his Bonapartism.

To conceal this from the Conference, the Lieberdans, Tseretelis and Chernovs had to resort to a fraud.

The Bolshevik participation in this hideous fraud, in this farce, had the same justification as their participa-

tion in the Third Duma[29]; even in a "pigsty" we must uphold our line, even from a "pigsty" we must send out material exposing the enemy for the instruction of the people.

The difference, however, is this, that the Third Duma was convened when the revolution was obviously ebbing, while at present there is an obvious upsurge of a *new revolution*; of the scope and the pace of this upsurge, however, we unfortunately know very little.

* * *

The most characteristic episode of the Conference was, in my opinion, Zarudny's speech. He tells us that as soon as Kerensky "as much as hinted" at reorganising the government, all the ministers began to hand in their resignations. "The following day," continues the naïve, childishly naïve (a good thing if he is *only* naïve), Zarudny, "the following day, notwithstanding our resignation, we were called, we were consulted, and finally we were prevailed upon to stay."

"General laughter in the hall," remarks at this point the official *Izvestia*.

Gay folk, those participants in the Bonapartist deception of the people by the republicans. We are all revolutionary democrats—no joking!

"From the very beginning," says Zarudny, "we heard two things; we were to strive to make the army capable of fighting, and to hasten peace on a democratic basis. Well, as far as peace is concerned, I do not know whether, during the six weeks I have been a member of the Provisional Government, the Provisional Government has done anything about it. I did not notice it. (*Applause and a voice from the audience*: "It did nothing", *Izvestia* remarks.) When I, as a member of the Provisional Government, inquired about it, I received no reply...."

Thus speaks Zarudny, according to the report of the official *Izvestia*. And the Conference listen in silence, tolerate such things, do not stop the orator, do not interrupt the session, do not jump to their feet and chase out Kerensky and the government! How could they? These "revolutionary democrats" are for Kerensky to a man!

Very well, gentlemen, but then, wherein does the term

"revolutionary democrat" differ from the terms "lackey" and "scoundrel"?

It is natural that these lackeys are capable of roaring with laughter when "their" Minister, noted for his rare naïveté or rare stupidity, tells them how Kerensky keeps removing and replacing ministers (in order to come to terms with the Kornilov gang behind the hack of the people and "in full privacy"). It is not surprising that the lackeys keep silent when "their" Minister, who seems to have taken general phrases about peace seriously without seeing their hypocrisy, admits that he did not even receive a reply to his question about real steps towards peace. Such is the fate of lackeys, to allow themselves to be fooled by the government. But what has this to do with revolution, what has it to do with democracy?

Would it be surprising if revolutionary soldiers and workers were to get the idea that it would be good if the ceiling of the Alexandrinsky Theatre were to fall and crush all that gang of pitiful scoundrels who can sit there in silence when it is being demonstrated to them that Kerensky and Co. are fooling them with their talk about peace, who can roar with laughter when they are told as clearly as can be by their own ministers that ministerial leapfrog is a farce (concealing Kerensky's dealings with the Kornilovites). God save us from our friends, we can cope with our enemies ourselves! God save us from these claimants to revolutionary democratic leadership, we can cope with the Kerenskys, Cadets and Kornilovites ourselves!

FROM MARX TO MAO
NON-FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* * *

And now I come to the errors of the Bolsheviks. To have confined themselves to ironic applause and exclamations at such a moment was an error.

The people are weary of vacillations and delays. Dissatisfaction is obviously growing. A new revolution is approaching. The reactionary democrats, the Lieberdans, Tseretelis and others, wish only to *distract* the attention of the people with their farce of a "conference", *keep them busy* with it, *cut* the Bolsheviks *off* from the masses, and *provide* the Bolshevik delegates with the unworthy occupation of

sitting and listening to the Zarudnys! And the Zarudnys are not the least sincere of them!

The Bolsheviks should have walked out of the meeting in protest and not allowed themselves to be caught by the conference trap set to divert the people's attention from serious questions. The Bolsheviks should have left two or three of their 136 delegates for "liaison work", that is, to report by telephone the moment the idiotic babbling came to an end and the voting began. They *should not have allowed themselves to be kept busy* with obvious nonsense for the obvious purpose of deceiving the people with the obvious aim of *extinguishing* the growing revolution by wasting time on trivial matters.

Ninety-nine per cent of the Bolshevik delegation ought to have gone to the factories and barracks; that was the proper place for delegates who had come from all ends of Russia and who, after Zarudny's speech, could see the full depth of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik rottenness. There, closer to the masses, at hundreds and thousands of meetings and talks, they ought to have discussed the lessons of this farcical conference whose obvious purpose was only to give a respite to the Kornilovite Kerensky and make it easier for him to try new variations of the "ministerial leapfrog" game.

The Bolsheviks, it turned out, had a wrong attitude to parliamentarism in moments of revolutionary (and not constitutional) crises, an incorrect attitude to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

How it happened can be understood—history made a very sharp turn at the time of the Kornilov revolt. The Party failed to keep pace with the incredibly fast tempo of history at this turning-point. The Party allowed itself to be diverted, for the time being, into the trap of a despicable talking-shop.

They should have left one hundredth of their forces for that talking-shop and devoted ninety-nine hundredths to the *masses*.

If the turn taken by history called for a compromise with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks (personally I believe it did) the Bolsheviks should have proposed it clearly, openly and speedily, so that they could *immediate-*

ly turn to account the possible and probable refusal of the Bonapartist Kerensky's friends to agree to a compromise with them.

The refusal was already indicated by articles in *Dyelo Naroda* and *Rabochaya Gazeta on the eve* of the Conference. The masses should have been told as officially, openly and clearly as possible, they should have been told without the *loss of a minute*, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had rejected our offer of a compromise—Down with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks! The Conference could have afforded "to laugh" at the naïveté of Zarudny to the accompaniment of *this* slogan in the factories and barracks!

The atmosphere of a certain enthusiasm for the Conference and the situation surrounding it seems to have been built up from various sides. Comrade Zinoviev made a mistake in writing about the Commune so ambiguously (ambiguously, to say the least) that it appeared that the Commune, although victorious in Petrograd, might be defeated *as in France in 1871*. This is absolutely untrue. If the Commune were victorious in Petrograd *it would be victorious* throughout Russia. It was a mistake on his part to write that the Bolsheviks did right in proposing a proportional composition for the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet. The revolutionary proletariat would never do anything worth while *in the Soviet* as long as the Tseretelis were allowed proportional participation; to let them in meant *depriving ourselves* of the opportunity to work, it meant *the ruin* of Soviet work. Comrade Kamenev was wrong in delivering the first speech at the Conference in a purely "constitutional" spirit when he raised the foolish question of confidence or non-confidence in the government. If, at such a meeting, it was *not possible* to tell *the truth* about the Kornilovite Kerensky that had *already* been told both in *Rabochy Put*[30] and the Moscow *Sotsial-Demokrat*,[31] why not refer to those papers and *make it well known to the masses* that the Conference did not want to listen to the truth about the Kornilovite Kerensky?

It was a mistake on the part of the Petrograd workers' delegations to send speakers to *such* a conference after

Zarudny had spoken and the situation had been made clear. Why cast pearls before Kerensky's friends? Why divert the attention of proletarian forces to a farcical conference? Why did those delegations not go quite peacefully and legally to the barracks and the more backward factories? That would have been a million times more useful, essential, serious and to the point than the journey to the Alexandrinsky Theatre and chats with co-operators who sympathise with *Yedinstvo* and Kerensky.

Ten soldiers or ten workers from a backward factory who have become politically enlightened *are worth a thousand times more* than a *hundred* delegates hand-picked from various delegations by the Lieberdans. Parliamentarism should be used, especially in revolutionary times, not to waste valuable time over representatives of what is rotten, but *to use the example of what is rotten to teach the masses*.

Why should those same proletarian delegations not "use" the Conference to publish, say, two posters explaining that the Conference is a farce and *to display* them in barracks and factories? One of the posters could depict Zarudny in a fool's cap, dancing on the stage and singing the song "Kerensky *sacked* us, Kerensky *took* us *back*". Around him stand Tsereteli, Chernov, Skobelev and a co-operator arm-in-arm with Lieber and Dan, all rolling with laughter. Caption—*They are Happy*.

Poster number two. Zarudny again in front of the same audience saying "I asked about peace for six weeks. *I got no answer*". The audience is silent, their faces express "statesmanlike importance". Tsereteli looks particularly important as he writes in his notebook "What a fool that Zarudny is! The imbecile should be carting dung instead of being a minister. He is an advocate of the coalition and undermines it worse than a hundred Bolsheviks! He was a minister but he never learned to speak like one, he should have said, 'I continuously followed the campaign for peace for six weeks and I am fully convinced of its final success precisely under the coalition government in accordance with the great idea of Stockholm, etc., etc.' Then even *Russkaya Volya*[32] would have praised Zarudny as the knight of the Russian revolution."

Caption: "Revolutionary-democratic" conference of male prostitutes.

Written *before* the end of the Conference; change the first phrase to something like "In all essentials the so-called Democratic...."

Written not later than September 22 (October 5), 1917

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Signed: N. Lenin

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FROM A PUBLICIST'S DIARY

THE MISTAKES OF OUR PARTY

Friday, September 22, 1917.

The more one reflects on the meaning of the so-called Democratic Conference, and the more attentively one observes from outside—and it is said that the bystander sees most—the more firmly convinced one becomes that our Party committed a mistake by participating in it. We should have boycotted it. One may ask if there is any use in analysing such a question since the past cannot be remedied. Such an objection to criticising the tactics of yesterday, however, would be clearly unfounded. We have always condemned, and as Marxists we must condemn, the tactics of those who live "from hand to mouth". Momentary success is not enough for us. In general, plans calculated for a minute or a day are not enough for us. We must constantly test ourselves by a *study* of the chain of political events in their entirety, in their causal connection, in their results. By analysing the errors of yesterday, we learn to avoid errors today and tomorrow.

A new revolution is obviously maturing in the country, a revolution of *other* classes (other than those that carried out the revolution against tsarism). At that time it was a revolution of the proletariat, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie in alliance with Anglo-French finance capital against tsarism.

The revolution now maturing is one of the proletariat and the majority of the peasants, more specifically, of the poor peasants, against the bourgeoisie, against its ally,

Anglo-French finance capital and against its government apparatus headed by the Bonapartist Kerensky.

At the moment we shall not dwell on the facts testifying to the rise of a new revolution, since, judging by the articles in *Rabochy Put*, our Central Organ, the Party has already made clear its views on this point. The new revolutionary upsurge seems to be a phenomenon commonly recognised by the Party. Data on this process of maturing, of course, still have to be summarised, but they must form the subject of other articles.

At the present moment it is more important to call the closest attention to the class differences between the old revolution and the new, to weigh up the political situation and our tasks from the point of view of this basic fact, class relations. At the time of the first revolution the vanguard was formed by the workers and soldiers, i.e., by the proletariat and the advanced sections of the peasantry.

This vanguard *carried along* not only many of the worst vacillating elements of the petty bourgeoisie (remember the indecision of the Mensheviks and Trudoviks on the question of a republic), but also the monarchist party of the Cadets, the liberal bourgeoisie, thereby making it a republican party. Why was such a change possible?

Because economic domination is everything to the bourgeoisie, and the form of political domination is of very little importance; the bourgeoisie can rule just as well under a republic, its domination is even more certain under a republic, in the sense that under a republican political order, no changes in the composition of the government or in the composition and the grouping of the ruling parties affect the bourgeoisie.

Of course, the bourgeoisie stood for and will stand for a monarchy, because the cruder armed protection of capital by monarchist institutions is more obvious and "closer" to all the capitalists and landowners. However, under a strong pressure "from below", the bourgeoisie has always and everywhere "reconciled" itself to a republic, as long as it could maintain its economic domination.

The relation of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, i.e., the *majority* of the people, in respect of the bourgeoisie and Allied (and world) imperialism is such that it

is impossible for them to "*carry*" the bourgeoisie *with them*. Moreover, the upper strata of the *petty* bourgeoisie and the more well-to-do strata of the *democratic* petty bourgeoisie are patently against a new revolution. This fact is so obvious that there is no need to dwell on it here. The Lieberdans, Tseretelis and Chernovs illustrate this most clearly.

The class relations have changed. This is the crux of the matter.

Different classes now stand "on the one and the other side of the barricade".

That is the main thing.

That, and that *alone*, is the *scientific* reason for speaking of a *new* revolution which—arguing purely theoretically, taking the question in the abstract—could be accomplished legally if, for instance, the Constituent Assembly, convoked by the bourgeoisie, produced a majority opposed to the bourgeoisie, if the majority belonged to the parties of the workers and poor peasants.

The objective relations of the classes, their role (economic and political) outside and inside representative institutions of the given type; the rise or decline of the revolution; the relation of extra-parliamentary to parliamentary means of struggle—these are the chief, the basic objective facts which must be considered if the tactics of boycott or participation are to be deduced in a Marxist way and not arbitrarily, according to our "sympathies".

The experience of our revolution clearly demonstrates how to approach the boycott question in a Marxist way.

Why did the boycott of the Bulygin Duma[33] prove correct tactics?

Because it was in accordance with the objective alignment of social forces in their development. It provided the maturing revolution with a slogan for the overthrow of an old order which, to distract the people from the revolution, was convoking a clumsily fabricated compromise institution (the Bulygin Duma) which did not show promise of any earnest "anchoring" in parliamentarism. The extra-parliamentary means of struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry were stronger. These are the elements that went

into shaping the correct tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma, tactics which took account of the objective situation.

Why did the tactics of boycotting the Third Duma prove incorrect?

Because they were based only on the "catchiness" of the boycott slogan and on the revulsion felt towards the brutal reaction of the June Third "pigsty".[34] The objective situation, however, was such that on the one hand the revolution was in a state of collapse and declining fast. For the upsurge of the revolution a parliamentary base (even inside a "pigsty") was of tremendous political importance, since extra-parliamentary means of propaganda, agitation and organisation were almost nonexistent or extremely weak. On the other hand, the most openly reactionary nature of the Third Duma did not prevent it from being an organ reflecting real class relations, namely, the Stolypin[35] combination of the monarchy and the bourgeoisie. This new relation of classes was something the country had to get rid of.

These very elements shaped the tactics of participation in the Third Duma that took proper account of the objective situation.

It is sufficient to give thought to these lessons gained from experience and the conditions required by a Marxist approach to the question of boycott or participation, to realise that participation in the Democratic Conference, the Democratic Council or the Pre-parliament would be wrong tactics.

On the one hand, a new revolution is maturing. The war is on the upgrade. The extra-parliamentary means of propaganda, agitation and organisation are tremendous. The "parliamentary" tribune in the given Pre-parliament is insignificant. On the other hand, this Pre-parliament neither reflects nor serves a new relation of classes; for instance, the peasantry is here *more poorly* represented than in the already existing organs (Soviets of Peasants' Deputies). The Pre-parliament is in substance a Bonapartist *fraud*, not only because the filthy gang of the Lieberdans, Tseretelis and Chernovs, together with Kerensky and Co. *have given* this Tsereteli-Bulygin Duma a *fake*, hand-picked

composition, but also more profoundly because the only aim of the Pre-parliament is to trick the masses, to deceive the workers and peasants, to distract them from the new upsurge of the revolution, to dazzle the eyes of the oppressed classes by a new dress for the *old*, long tried-out, bedraggled, threadbare "coalition" with the bourgeoisie (i.e., the bourgeoisie's transformation of Tsereteli and Co. into jesters helping to subordinate the people to imperialism and the imperialist war).

"We are weak now," said the tsar in August 1905 to his feudal landowners. "Our power is wavering. The tide of the workers' and peasants' revolution is rising. We must trick the 'plain man', we must dangle something before his eyes...."

"We are weak now," says the present "tsar", the Bonapartist Kerensky, to the Cadets, the non-party Tit Tityches,[36] Plekhanovs, Breshkovskayas and Co. "Our power is tottering. A wave of workers' and peasants' revolution against the bourgeoisie is rising. We must hoodwink the democrats by dying in new colours that jester's costume which the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik 'leaders of revolutionary democracy', our dear friends the Tseretelis and Chernovs, have been wearing to fool the people since May 6, 1917.[37] We can easily dangle a 'Pre-parliament' before their eyes."

"We are strong now," said the tsar to his feudal landowners in June 1907. "The wave of workers' and peasants' revolution is receding, but we cannot maintain ourselves as of old; deception alone will not suffice. We must have a new policy in the village, we must have a new economic and political bloc with the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, with the bourgeoisie."

It is in this way that the three situations, August 1905, September 1917, and June 1907, may be presented to illustrate most vividly the objective basis for the boycott tactics and its connection with class relations. The oppressed classes are always being deceived by the oppressors, but the meaning of this deception differs at different moments in history. Tactics cannot be based on the bare fact that the oppressors deceive the people; tactics must be shaped after analysing class relations *in their entirety* and the

development of both extra-parliamentary and parliamentary struggle.

Participation in the Pre-parliament is *incorrect* tactics that does not correspond to the objective relations of classes, to the objective conditions of the moment.

We should have boycotted the Democratic Conference; we all erred by not doing so, but mistakes are no crime. We shall correct the mistake only if we have a sincere desire to support the revolutionary struggle of the masses, only if we give earnest thought to the objective foundations of our tactics.

We must boycott the Pre-parliament. We must leave it and go to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, to the trade unions, to the masses in general. We must call on *them* to struggle. We must give *them* a correct and clear slogan: disperse the Bonapartist gang of Kerensky and *his* fake Pre-parliament, with this Tsereteli-Bulygin Duma. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, even after the Kornilov revolt, refused to accept our compromise of peacefully transferring the power to the Soviets (in which we *then* had *no* majority); they have again sunk into the morass of filthy and mean bargaining with the Cadets. Down with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries! Struggle against them ruthlessly. Expel them ruthlessly from all revolutionary organisations. No negotiations, no communication with those *friends of the Kishkins*, the friends of the Kornilovite landowners and capitalists.

Saturday, September 23.

Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky!

Boycottism was defeated in the Bolshevik group at the Democratic Conference.

Long live the boycott!

We cannot and must not under any circumstances reconcile ourselves to participation. A group at one of the conferences is not the highest organ of the party and even the decisions of the highest organs are subject to revision on the basis of experience.

We must at all costs strive to have the boycott question

solved both at a plenary meeting of the Executive Committee and at an extraordinary Party congress. The boycott question must now be made the platform for elections to the Congress and for *all* elections inside the Party. We must draw the *masses* into the discussion of this question. Class-conscious workers must take the matter into their own hands, organise the discussion, and exert pressure on "those at the *top*".

There is not the slightest doubt that at the "top" of our Party there are noticeable vacillations that may become *ruinous*, because the struggle is developing; under certain conditions, at a certain moment, vacillations may *ruin* the cause. We must put all our forces into the struggle, we must uphold the correct line of the party of the revolutionary proletariat before it is too late.

Not all is well with the "parliamentary" leaders of our Party; greater attention must be paid to them, there must be greater workers' supervision over them; the competency of parliamentary groups must be more clearly defined.

Our Party's mistake is obvious. The fighting party of the advanced class need not fear mistakes. What it should fear is persistence in a mistake, refusal to admit and correct a mistake out of a false sense of shame.

Sunday, September 24.

The Congress of Soviets has been postponed till October 20. The tempo of Russian life is such that this almost means postponing it to the Greek Calends. The farce staged by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks after April 20-21 is being repeated for the second time.

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THE TASKS OF THE REVOLUTION

Russia is a country of the petty bourgeoisie, by far the greater part of the population belonging to this class. Its vacillations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are inevitable, and only when it joins the proletariat is the victory of the revolution, of the cause of peace, freedom, and land for the working people assured easily, peacefully, quickly, and smoothly.

The course of our revolution shows us these vacillations in practice. Let us then not harbour any illusions about the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties; let us stick firmly to the path of our proletarian class. The poverty of the poor peasants, the horrors of the war, the horrors of hunger—all these are showing the masses more and more clearly the correctness of the proletarian path, the need to support the proletarian revolution.

The "peaceful" hopes of the petty bourgeoisie that there might be a "coalition" with the bourgeoisie and agreements with them, that it will be possible to wait "calmly" for the "speedy" convocation of the Constituent Assembly, etc., have been mercilessly, cruelly, implacably destroyed by the course of the revolution. The Kornilov revolt was the last cruel lesson, a lesson on a grand scale, supplementing thousands upon thousands of small lessons in which workers and peasants were deceived by local capitalists and landowners, in which soldiers were deceived by the officers, etc., etc.

Discontent, indignation and wrath are growing in the army, among the peasantry and among the workers. The "coalition" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks

with the bourgeoisie, promising everything and fulfilling nothing, is irritating the masses, is opening their eyes, is pushing them towards insurrection.

There is a growing Left opposition among the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Spiridonova and others) and among the Mensheviks (Martov and others), and has already reached forty per cent of the Council and Congress of those parties. And down *below*, among the proletariat and the peasantry, particularly the poorest sections, the *majority* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks belong to the *Lefts*.

The Kornilov revolt is instructive and has proved a good lesson.

It is impossible to know whether the Soviets will be able to go farther than the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and thus ensure a peaceful development of the revolution, or whether they will continue to mark time, thus making a proletarian uprising inevitable.

We cannot know this.

Our business is to help get everything possible done to make sure the "last" chance for a peaceful development of the revolution, to help by the presentation of our programme, by making clear its national character, its absolute accord with the interests and demands of a vast majority of the population.

The following lines are an essay in the presentation of such a programme.

Let us take it more to those down below, to the masses, to the office employees, to the workers, to the peasants, not only to our supporters, but particularly to those who follow the Socialist-Revolutionaries, to the non-party elements, to the ignorant. Let us lift them up so that they can pass an independent judgement, make their own decisions, send *their own* delegations to the Conference, to the Soviets, to the government and our work will not have been in vain, *no matter what* the outcome of the Conference. This will then prove useful for the Conference, for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, and for all other political activity in general.

Experience teaches us that the Bolshevik programme and tactics are correct. So little time passed, so much happened from April 20 to the Kornilov revolt.

The experience of the *masses*, the experience of *oppressed* classes taught them very, very much in that time; the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have completely cut adrift from the masses. This will most certainly be revealed in the discussion of our concrete programme insofar as we are able to bring it to the notice of the masses.

AGREEMENTS WITH THE CAPITALISTS ARE DISASTROUS

1. To leave in power the representatives of the bourgeoisie, even a small number of them, to leave in power such notorious Kornilovites as Generals Alexeyev, Klembovsky, Bagration, Gagarin, and others, or such as have proved their complete powerlessness in face of the bourgeoisie, and their ability of acting Bonaparte-fashion like Kerensky, is, on the one hand, merely opening the door wide to famine and the inevitable economic catastrophe which the capitalists are purposely accelerating and intensifying; on the other hand, it will lead to a military catastrophe, since the army hates the General Staff and cannot enthusiastically participate in the imperialist war. Besides, there is no doubt that Kornilovite generals and officers remaining in power will *deliberately open the front to the Germans*, as they have done in Galicia and Riga. This can be prevented only by the formation of a new government on a new basis, as expounded below. To continue any kind of agreements with the bourgeoisie after all that we have gone through since April 20 would be, on the part of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, not only an error but a direct betrayal of the people and of the revolution.

POWER TO THE SOVIETS

2. All power in the country must pass exclusively to the representatives of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies on the basis of a definite programme and under the condition of the government being fully responsible to the Soviets. New elections to the Soviets must be held immediately, both to record the experience of the people during the recent weeks of the revolution, which have

been particularly eventful, and to eliminate crying injustices (lack of proportional representation, unequal elections, etc.) which in some cases still remain.

All power locally, wherever there are not yet any democratically elected institutions, and also in the army, must be taken over exclusively by the local Soviets and by commissars and other institutions elected by them, but only those that have been properly elected.

Workers and revolutionary troops, i.e., those who have in practice shown their ability to suppress the Kornilovites, must everywhere be armed, and this must be done with the full support of the state.

PEACE TO THE PEOPLES

3. The Soviet Government must *straight away* offer to all the belligerent peoples (i.e., simultaneously both to their governments and to the worker and peasant masses) to conclude an immediate general peace on democratic terms, and also to conclude an immediate armistice (even if only for three months).

The main condition for a democratic peace is the renunciation of annexations (seizures)—not in the incorrect sense that all powers get back what they have lost, but in the only correct sense that *every* nationality without any exception, both in Europe and in the colonies, shall obtain its freedom and the possibility to decide for itself whether it is to form a *separate* state or whether it is to enter into the composition of some other state.

In offering the peace terms, the Soviet Government must itself immediately take steps towards their fulfilment, i.e., it must publish and repudiate the secret treaties by which we have been bound up to the present time, those which were concluded by the tsar and which give Russian capitalists the promise of the pillaging of Turkey, Austria, etc. Then we must immediately satisfy the demands of the Ukrainians and the Finns, ensure them, as well as all other non-Russian nationalities in Russia, full freedom, including freedom of secession, applying the same *to all* Armenia, undertaking to evacuate that country as well as the Turkish lands occupied by us, etc.

Such peace terms will not meet with the approval of the capitalists, but they will meet with such tremendous sympathy on the part of all the peoples and will cause such a great world-wide outburst of enthusiasm and of general indignation against the continuation of the predatory war that it is extremely probable that we shall at once obtain a truce and a consent to open peace negotiations. For the workers' revolution against the war is irresistibly growing everywhere, and it can be spurred on, not by phrases about peace (with which the workers and peasants have been deceived by *all* the imperialist governments including our own Kerensky government), but by a break with the capitalists and by the offer of peace.

If the least probable thing happens, i.e., if not a single belligerent state accepts even a truce, then as far as we are concerned the war becomes truly forced upon us, it becomes a truly just war of defence. If this is understood by the proletariat and the poor peasantry Russia will become many times stronger even in the military sense, especially after a complete break with the capitalists who are robbing the people; furthermore, under such conditions it would, as far as we are concerned, be a war in league with the oppressed classes of all countries, a war in league with the oppressed peoples of the whole world, not in word, but in deed.

The people must be particularly cautioned against the capitalists' assertion which sometimes influences the petty bourgeoisie and others who are frightened, namely, that the British and other capitalists are capable of doing serious damage to the Russian revolution if we break the present predatory alliance with them. Such an assertion is false through and through, for "Allied financial aid" enriches the bankers and "supports" the Russian workers and peasants in exactly the same way as a rope supports a man who has been hanged. There is plenty of bread, coal, oil and iron in Russia; for these products to be properly distributed it is only necessary for us to rid ourselves of the landowners and capitalists who are robbing the people. As to the possibility of the Russian people being threatened with war by their present Allies, it is obviously absurd to assume that the French and Italians could unite their

armies with those of the Germans and move them against Russia who offers a just peace. As to Britain, America, and Japan, even if they were to declare war against Russia (which for them is extremely difficult, both because of the extreme unpopularity of such a war among the masses and because of the divergence of material interests of the capitalists of those countries over the partitioning of Asia, especially over the plunder of China), they could not cause Russia one-hundredth part of the damage and misery which the war with Germany, Austria, and Turkey is causing her.

LAND TO THOSE WHO TILL IT

4. The Soviet Government must immediately declare the abolition of private landed estates without compensation and place all these estates under the management of the peasant committees pending the solution of the problem by the Constituent Assembly. These peasant committees are also to take over all the landowners' stock and implements, with the proviso that they be placed primarily at the disposal of the poor peasants for their use free of charge.

Such measures, which have long been demanded by an immense majority of the peasantry, both in the resolutions of congresses and in hundreds of mandates from local peasants (as may be seen, for instance, from a summary of 242 mandates published by *Izvestia Soveta Krestyanskikh Deputatov*[38]), are absolutely and urgently necessary. There must be no further procrastination like that from which the peasantry suffered so much at the time of the "coalition" government.

Any government that hesitates to introduce these measures should be regarded as a government *hostile to the people* that should be overthrown and crushed by an uprising of the workers and peasants. On the other hand, only a govern ent that realises these measures will be a government of all the people.

STRUGGLE AGAINST FAMINE AND ECONOMIC RUIN

5. The Soviet Government must immediately introduce workers' control of production and distribution on a nation-wide scale. Experience since May 6 has shown that

in the absence of such control all the promises of reforms and attempts to introduce them are powerless, and famine, accompanied by unprecedented catastrophe is becoming a greater menace to the whole country week by week.

It is necessary to nationalise the banks and the insurance business immediately, and also the most important branches of industry (oil, coal, metallurgy, sugar, etc.), and at the same time, to abolish commercial secrets and to establish unrelaxing supervision by the workers and peasants over the negligible minority of capitalists who wax rich on government contracts and evade accounting and just taxation of their profits and property.

Such measures, which do not deprive either the middle peasants, the Cossacks or the small handicraftsmen of a single kopek, are urgently needed for the struggle against famine and are absolutely just because they distribute the burdens of the war equitably. Only after capitalist plunder has been curbed and the deliberate sabotage of production has been stopped will it be possible to work for an improvement in labour productivity, introduce universal labour conscription and the proper exchange of grain for manufactured goods, and return to the Treasury thousands of millions in paper money now being hoarded by the rich.

Without such measures, the abolition of the landed estates without compensation is also impossible, for the major part of the estates is mortgaged to the banks, so that the interests of the landowners and capitalists are inseparably linked up.

The latest resolution of the Economic Department of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (*Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 152) recognises not only the "*harm*" caused by the government's measures (like the raising of grain prices for the enrichment of the landowners and kulaks), not only "the fact of the *complete inactivity* on the part of the central organs set up by the government for the regulation of economic life", but even the "*contravention of the laws*" by this government. This admission on the part of the ruling parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, proves once more the criminal nature of the policy of conciliation with the bourgeoisie.

STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF THE LANDOWNERS AND CAPITALISTS

6. The Kornilov and Kaledin revolt was supported by the entire class of the landowners and capitalists, with the party of the Cadets ("people's freedom" party) at their head. This has already been fully proved by the facts published in *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee.

However, nothing has been done either to suppress this counter-revolution completely or even to investigate it, and nothing serious can be done without the transfer of power to the Soviets. No commission can conduct a full investigation, or arrest the guilty, etc., unless it holds state power. Only a Soviet government can do this, and must do it. Only a Soviet government can make Russia secure against the otherwise inevitable repetition of "Kornilov" attempts by arresting the Kornilovite generals and the ringleaders of the bourgeois counter-revolution (Guchkov, Milyukov, Ryabushinsky, Maklakov and Co.), by disbanding the counter-revolutionary associations (the State Duma, the officers' unions, etc.), by placing their members under the surveillance of the local Soviets and by disbanding counter-revolutionary armed units.

This government alone can set up a commission to make a full and public investigation of the Kornilov case and all the other cases, even those started by the bourgeoisie; and the party of the Bolsheviks, in its turn, would appeal to the workers to give full co-operation and to submit only to such a commission.

Only a Soviet government could successfully combat such a flagrant injustice as the capitalists' seizure of the largest printing presses and most of the papers with the aid of millions squeezed out of the people. It is necessary to suppress the bourgeois counter-revolutionary papers (*Rech*, *Russkoye Slovo*,[39] etc.), to confiscate their printing presses, to declare private advertisements in the papers a state monopoly, to transfer them to the paper published by the Soviets, the paper that tells the peasants the truth. Only in this way can and must the bourgeoisie be deprived of its powerful weapon of lying and slandering, deceiving the people with impunity, misleading the peasantry, and preparing a counter-revolution.

PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION

7. A possibility very seldom to be met with in the history of revolutions now faces the democracy of Russia, the Soviets and the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties—the possibility of convening the Constituent Assembly at the appointed date without further delays, of making the country secure against a military and economic catastrophe, and of ensuring the peaceful development of the revolution.

If the Soviets now take full state power exclusively into their own hands for the purpose of carrying out the programme set forth above, they will not only obtain the support of nine-tenths of the population of Russia, the working class and an overwhelming majority of the peasantry; they will also be assured of the greatest revolutionary enthusiasm on the part of the army and the majority of the people, an enthusiasm without which victory over famine and war is impossible.

There could be no question of any resistance to the Soviets if the Soviets themselves did not waver. No class will dare start an uprising against the Soviets, and the landowners and capitalists, taught a lesson by the experience of the Kornilov revolt, will give up their power peacefully and yield to the ultimatum of the Soviets. To overcome the capitalists' resistance to the programme of the Soviets, supervision over the exploiters by workers and peasants and such measures of punishing the recalcitrants as confiscation of their entire property coupled with a short term of arrest will be sufficient.

By seizing full power, the Soviets could still today—and this is probably their last chance—ensure the peaceful development of the revolution, peaceful elections of deputies by the people, and a peaceful struggle of parties inside the Soviets; they could test the programmes of the various parties in practice and power could pass peacefully from one party to another.

The entire course of development of the revolution, from the movement of April 20 to the Kornilov revolt, shows that there is bound to be the bitterest civil war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat if this opportunity is

missed. Inevitable catastrophe will bring this war nearer. It must end, as all data and considerations accessible to human reason go to prove, in the full victory of the working class, in that class, supported by the poor peasantry, carrying out the above programme; it may, however, prove very difficult and bloody, and may cost the lives of tens of thousands of landowners, capitalists, and officers who sympathise with them. The proletariat will not hesitate to make every sacrifice to save the revolution, which is possible only by implementing the programme set forth above. On the other hand, the proletariat would support the Soviets in every way if they were to make use of their last chance to secure a peaceful development of the revolution.

Rabochy Put Nos. 20-21,
October 9 and 10
(September 26 and 27), 1917
Signed: N. K.

Published according
to the newspaper text

LETTER TO I. T. SMILGA, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND WORKERS OF FINLAND

Comrade Smilga,

I am taking advantage of a favourable opportunity to talk with you in greater detail.

1

The general political situation causes me great anxiety. The Petrograd Soviet and the Bolsheviks have declared war on the government. But the government has an army, and is preparing *systematically*. (Kerensky at General Headquarters is obviously entering into an understanding—a *business-like* understanding with the Kornilovites to use troops to put down the Bolsheviks.)

And what are we doing? We are only passing resolutions. We are losing time. We set "dates" (October 20, the Congress of Soviets—is it not ridiculous to put it off so long? Is it not ridiculous to rely on that?). The Bolsheviks are *not* conducting regular work to prepare their *own* military forces for the overthrow of Kerensky.

Events have fully proved the correctness of the proposal I made at the time of the Democratic Conference, namely, that the Party *must* put the armed uprising on the order of the day.* Events *compel* us to do this. History has made the *military* question now the fundamental *political* question. I am afraid that the Bolsheviks forget this, being busy

* See pp. 19-21 of this volume.—*Ed.*

with "day-to-day events", petty current questions, and "*hoping*" that "the wave will sweep Kerensky away". Such hope is naïve; it is the same as relying on chance, and may prove criminal on the part of the party of the revolutionary proletariat.

It is my opinion that inside the Party we must agitate for an earnest attitude towards the armed uprising, for which reason this letter should be typed and delivered to the Petrograd and Moscow comrades.

2

Now about your role. It seems to me we can have *completely* at our disposal only the troops in Finland and the Baltic fleet and only they can play a *serious* military role. I think you must make most of your high position, shift all the petty routine work to assistants and secretaries and not waste time on "resolutions"; give *all your attention* to the *military* preparation of the troops in Finland plus the fleet for the impending overthrow of Kerensky. Create a *secret* committee of absolutely *trustworthy* military men, discuss matters *thoroughly* with them, collect (and *personally* verify) the most precise data on the composition and the location of troops near and in Petrograd, the transfer of the troops from Finland to Petrograd, the movement of the fleet, etc.

If we fail to do this, we may turn out to be consummate idiots, the owners of beautiful resolutions and of Soviets, but *no power*! I think it is possible for you to select really reliable and competent military men, to make a trip to Ino[40] and other most important points, to weigh and study the matter *earnestly*, not relying on the boastful general phrases *all too common* with us.

It is obvious that we can *under no circumstances* allow the troops to be moved from Finland. Better *do anything*, better decide on an uprising, on the seizure of power, later to be transferred to the Congress of Soviets. I read in the papers today that in two weeks the danger of a landing will be nil. Obviously, you have very little time left for preparation.

3

To continue. We must utilise our "power" in Finland to conduct systematic propaganda among the Cossacks now stationed in Finland. From Vyborg, for instance, Kerensky and Co. purposely removed some of them, fearing Bolshevisation", and stationed them in Uusikirkko and Perkjärvi, between Vyborg and Terijoki, in Bolshevik-proof isolation. We must study all the information about the location of the Cossacks, and must organise the dispatch of *propaganda groups* to them from among the best forces of the sailors and soldiers in Finland. This is imperative. Do the same thing about literature.

4

To continue. Of course, both sailors and soldiers go home on furloughs. Out of these men we must form groups of propagandists to travel over the provinces systematically and to carry on both general propaganda and propaganda in favour of the Constituent Assembly in the villages. Your situation is exceptionally good because you are in a position to *begin* immediately to form that bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries which alone can give us stable power in Russia and a majority in the Constituent Assembly. While things are being settled, organise such a *bloc* immediately in your place, organise the publication of leaflets (find out what you can do about them technically as well as in the matter of transporting them into Russia). Then each propaganda group for work in the rural areas should consist of not less than *two* persons—one from the Bolsheviks and one from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Socialist-Revolutionary "trade mark" is still popular among village folk and you must make the most of your good fortune (you have some Left Socialist-Revolutionaries) to effect a bloc of the Bolsheviks and *Left* Socialist-Revolutionaries under this "trade mark" in the countryside, a bloc of peasants and workers and not of peasants and capitalists.

5

It seems to me that in order to prepare people's minds properly we must immediately circulate the following slogan: transfer power now to the Petrograd Soviet *which will transfer it* to the Congress of Soviets. Why should we tolerate three more weeks of war and Kerensky's "Kornilovite preparations"?

Propaganda in favour of this slogan by the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Finland can do nothing but good.

6

Since you are vested with "power" in Finland, you have to do one more very important, though in itself modest job—organise the illegal transport of literature *from* Sweden. Without this all talk of an "International" is an empty *phrase*. This can be done, first, by creating our own organisation *of soldiers* at the frontier; secondly, if this is impossible, by organising *regular trips* of at least *one* reliable man to a certain place where I began to organise the transport with the aid of *the person in whose house I lived for one day* before moving to Helsingfors (Rovio knows him).[41] Perhaps we must help with some money. Get this done by all means!

7

I think we should meet to talk all these things over. You could come here; it would take you less than a day; if you come *only* to see me, have Rovio phone Huttunen and ask him whether Rovio's "sister-in-law" (meaning you) may see Huttunen's "sister" (meaning myself). I may have to leave suddenly.

Do not fail to acknowledge the receipt of this letter (*burn it*) through the comrade who will bring it to Rovio and *who will soon go back*.

In case I stay here longer, we must organise postal connections. *You could help* by sending envelopes through railway workers to the Vyborg *Soviet* (inside envelope: "for Huttunen").

8

Send me by the same comrade identification papers (as formal as possible, either typewritten, or *in very clear handwriting* on the stationery of the Regional Committee, stamped and with the signature of the chairman), in the name of Konstantin Petrovich Ivanov, to the effect that the chairman of the Regional Committee vouches for comrade so-and-so, and requests *all Soviets*, the **Vyborg** Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies as well as others, to give him *full* confidence, aid and support.

I need it in *case* of some emergency, since a "conflict" and a "meeting" are equally possible.

9

Have you a copy of the Moscow collection of articles *On the Revision of the Programme*?[42] Try to find one among the comrades in Helsingfors and send it to me by the same comrade.

10

Bear in mind that Rovio is a fine fellow, but *lazy*. He must be looked after and *reminded* of things twice a day. Otherwise he won't do them.

Greetings. *K. Ivanov*

Written on September 27
(October 10), 1917

First published in *Pravda*
No. 255, November 7, 1925

Published according
to the manuscript

THE CRISIS HAS MATURED[43]

I

The end of September undoubtedly marked a great turning-point in the history of the Russian revolution and, to all appearances, of the world revolution as well.

The world working-class revolution began with the action of individuals, whose boundless courage represented everything honest that remained of that decayed official "socialism" which is in reality social-chauvinism. Liebknecht in Germany, Adler in Austria, MacLean in Britain—these are the best-known names of the isolated heroes who have taken upon themselves the arduous role of forerunners of the world revolution.

The second stage in the historical preparation for this revolution was a widespread mass discontent, expressing itself in the split of the official parties, in illegal publications and in street demonstrations. The protest against the war became stronger, and the number of victims of government persecution increased. The prisons of countries famed for their observance of law and even for their freedom—Germany, France, Italy and Britain—became filled with tens and hundreds of internationalists, opponents of the war and advocates of a working-class revolution.

The third stage has now begun. This stage may be called the eve of revolution. Mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy, and particularly the beginning of *mutinies* in the German army,[44] are indisputable symptoms that a great turning-point is at hand, that we are *on the eve of a world-wide revolution*.

Российская Соціалъ-Демократическая Рабочая Партія.

Цѣна 20 коп. на мѣс. дор. 25 коп.

Пролетаріи всѣхъ странъ, соединяйтесь!

Центральный органъ Р. С.-Д. Р. П.

РАБОЧІЙ ПУТЬ.

№ 30. Суббота | ЕЖЕДНЕВНАЯ ГАЗЕТА. | 20-го Октября (7-го октября ст. ст.) 1917 г.

Товарищи рабочіе, солдаты и крестьяне! Готовьтесь къ Всероссійскому Съѣзду Совѣтовъ на 20-ое октября! Немедленно созывайте Областные Съѣзды Совѣтовъ!

Сегодня въ номерѣ.

РОСПУСКЪ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ.
2-е СЪѢЗД Ъ БАЛТІЙСКАГО ФЛОТА КЪ УГНЕТЕННЫМЪ ВОЪЪ СТРАНЪ.
ВЫМЕНЕЖЕ ЗАКРЫТА БОЛЬШЕВИСТСКАЯ ГАЗЕТА „ВОЛЯ".
КАВКАЗСКІЙ СЪѢЗДЪ БОЛЬШЕВИКОВЪ.
ЗАБАСТОВКА ВЪ АПТЕКАХЪ.
СЪѢЗДЪ ОБОРОНЦЕВЪ ВЪ ГЕРМАНІИ.

СТАТЬИ: СОВѢТЧИКИ НЕРЕНСКАГО — ПОРАЖЕНІЕ ИЛИ ПОБѢДА. — ПРОТИВЪ ЗАГОВОРЪ ПРОТИВЪ РЕВОЛЮЦІИ. — ОТКИНЕЛ. РАБГУЛКА ПЕТРОГРАДА И ПАЛЬЧИНСКІЙ. — ОТКИНЕЛ. ВЪ ГОРОДѢ.

Совѣтчики Керенскаго.

Кризисъ назрѣлъ.

Отклики.

First page of the newspaper Rabochy Put No. 30, October 20 (7), 1917, in which Lenin's article "The Crisis Has Matured" was published

Reduced

First page of the newspaper Rabochy Put No. 30, October 20 (7), 1917, in which Lenin's article "The Crisis Has Matured" was published

Reduced

Even before this there were, no doubt, individual cases of mutiny among the troops in Germany, but they were so small, so weak and isolated that it was possible to hush them up—and that was the chief way of checking the *mass contagion* of seditious action. Finally, there developed such a movement in the navy that it was *impossible* to hush it up, despite all the severity of the German regime of military servitude, severity elaborated with amazing minuteness of detail and observed with incredible pedantry.

Doubt is out of the question. We are on the threshold of a world proletarian revolution. And since of all the proletarian internationalists in all countries only we Russian Bolsheviks enjoy a measure of freedom—we have a legal party and a score or so of papers, we have the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals on our side, and we have the support of a *majority* of the people in a time of revolution—to us the saying, "To whom much has been given, of him much shall be required" in all justice can and must be applied.

II

The crucial point of the revolution in Russia has undoubtedly arrived.

In a peasant country, and under a revolutionary, republican government which enjoys the support of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties that only yesterday dominated petty-bourgeois democracy, a *peasant revolt* is developing.

Incredible as this is, it is a fact.

We Bolsheviks are not surprised by this fact. We have always said that the government of the notorious "coalition" with the bourgeoisie is a government that *betrays* democracy and the revolution, that it is a government of *imperialist* slaughter, a government that *protects* the capitalists and landowners *from* the people.

Owing to the deception practised by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, there still exists in Russia, under a republic and in a time of revolution, a government of capitalists and landowners side by side with the Soviets. This is the bitter and sinister reality. Is it then surprising,

in view of the incredible hardship inflicted on the people by prolonging the imperialist war and by its consequences, that a peasant revolt has begun and is spreading in Russia?

Is it then surprising that the enemies of the Bolsheviks, the leaders of the *official* Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the very party that supported the "coalition" all along, the party that until the last few days or weeks had the majority of the people on its side, the party that continues to harry and abuse the "new" Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have realised that the policy of coalition is a betrayal of the interests of the peasants—is it surprising that these leaders of the official Socialist-Revolutionary Party wrote the following in an editorial in their official organ, *Dyelo Naroda* of September 29:

> "So far practically nothing has been done to put an end to the relations of bondage that still prevail in the villages of central Russia.... The bill for the regulation of land relations in the countryside, which was introduced in the Provisional Government long ago, and which has even passed through such a purgatory as the Judicial Conference, has got hopelessly stuck in some office.... Are we not right in asserting that our republican government is still a long way from having rid itself of the old habits of the tsarist administration, and that the dead hand of Stolypin is still making itself strongly felt in the methods of the revolutionary ministers?"

This is written by the official Socialist-Revolutionaries! Just think: the supporters of the coalition are *forced* to admit that in a peasant country, after seven months of revolution, "practically nothing has been done to put an end to the bondage" of the peasants, to their enslavement by the landowners! These Socialist-Revolutionaries are *forced* to give the name of *Stolypins* to their colleague, Kerensky, and his gang of ministers.

Could we get more eloquent testimony than this from the camp of our opponents, not only to the effect that the coalition has collapsed and that the official Socialist-Revolutionaries who tolerate Kerensky have become an *anti-popular*, *anti-peasant and counter-revolutionary party*, but also that the whole Russian revolution has reached a turning-point?

A peasant revolt in a peasant country against the govern-

ment of the Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, the Mensheviks Nikitin and Gvozdyov, and other ministers who represent capital and the interests of the landowners! The crushing of this revolt by *military measures* by a republican government!

In the face of such facts, can one remain a conscientious champion of the proletariat and yet deny that a crisis has matured, that the revolution is passing through an extremely critical moment, that the government's victory over the peasant revolt would now sound the death knell of the revolution, would be the final triumph of the Kornilov revolt?

III

It is obvious that if in a peasant country, after seven months of a democratic republic, matters could come to a peasant revolt, it irrefutably proves that the revolution is suffering nation-wide collapse, that it is experiencing a crisis of unprecedented severity, and that the forces of counter-revolution have gone the *limit*.

That is obvious. In the face of such a fact as a peasant revolt all other political symptoms, even were they to contradict the fact that a nation-wide crisis is maturing, would have no significance whatsoever.

But on the contrary, all the symptoms do indicate that a nation-wide crisis has matured.

Next to the agrarian question, the most important question in Russia's state affairs is the national question, particularly for the petty-bourgeois masses of the population. And at the "Democratic" Conference, which was fixed by Mr. Tsereteli and Co., we find that the "national" curia takes second place for radicalism, yielding only to the trade unions, and *exceeding* the curia of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the percentage of votes cast *against* the coalition (40 out of 55). The Kerensky government—a government suppressing the peasant revolt—is withdrawing the revolutionary troops from Finland in order to strengthen the reactionary Finnish bourgeoisie. In the Ukraine, the conflicts of the Ukrainians in general, and of the Ukrainian troops in particular, with the government are becoming more and more frequent.

Furthermore, let us take the army, which in war-time plays an exceptionally big role in all state affairs. We find that the army in Finland and the fleet in the Baltic have completely *parted ways* with the government. We have the testimony of the officer Dubasov, a non-Bolshevik, who speaks in the name of the whole front and declares in a manner more revolutionary than that of any Bolsheviks that the soldiers will not fight any longer.[45] We have governmental reports stating that the soldiers are in a state of "agitation" and that it is impossible to guarantee the maintenance of "order" (i.e., participation of these troops in the suppression of the peasant revolt). We have, finally, the voting in Moscow, where fourteen thousand out of seventeen thousand soldiers voted for the Bolsheviks.

This vote in the elections to the district councils in Moscow is in general one of the most striking symptoms of the profound change which has taken place in the mood of the whole nation. It is generally known that Moscow is more petty-bourgeois than Petrograd. It is a fact frequently corroborated and indisputable that the Moscow proletariat has an incomparably greater number of connections with the countryside, that it has greater sympathy for the peasant and is closer to the sentiments of the peasant.

In Moscow the vote cast for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks nevertheless dropped from 70 per cent in June to 18 per cent. There can be no doubt that the petty bourgeoisie and the people have turned away from the coalition. The Cadets have increased their strength from 17 to 30 per cent, but they remain a minority, a hopeless minority, despite the fact that they have obviously been joined by the "Right" Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the "Right" Mensheviks. *Russkiye Vedomosti*[46] states that the *absolute* number of votes cast for the Cadets fell from *67,000* to *62,000*. Only the votes cast for the Bolsheviks increased—from 34,000 to 82,000. They received 47 per cent of the total vote. There can be no shadow of doubt that we, together with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, now have a majority in the Soviets, in the army, and *in the country*.

Among the symptoms that have not only a symptomatic, but also a very real significance is the fact that the armies

of railway and postal employees, who are of immense importance from the general economic, political and military point of view, continue to be in sharp conflict with the government,[47] even the Menshevik defencists are dissatisfied with "their" Minister, Nikitin, and the official Socialist-Revolutionaries call Kerensky and Co. "Stolypins". Is it not clear that if such "support" of the government by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries has any value at all it can be only a negative value?

IV

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V

Yes, the leaders of the Central Executive Committee are pursuing the correct tactics of defending the bourgeoisie and the landowners. And there is not the slightest doubt that if the Bolsheviks allowed themselves to be caught in the trap of constitutional illusions, "faith" in the Congress of Soviets and in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, "waiting" for the Congress of Soviets, and so forth—these Bolsheviks would most certainly be *miserable traitors* to the proletarian cause.

They would be traitors to the cause, for by their conduct they would be betraying the German revolutionary workers who have started a revolt in the navy. To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets and so forth under such circumstances would be a *betrayal of internationalism*, a betrayal of the cause of the world socialist revolution.

For internationalism consists of *deeds* and not phrases, not expressions of solidarity, not resolutions.

The Bolsheviks would be traitors to the *peasants*, for to tolerate the suppression of the peasant revolt by a government which *even Dyelo Naroda* compares with the Stolypin government would be *to ruin* the whole revolution, to ruin it for good. An outcry is raised about anarchy and about the increasing indifference of the people, but what else can the people be but indifferent to the elections, when the peasants have been *driven to revolt* while the so-called

"revolutionary democrats" are patiently tolerating its suppression by military force!

The Bolsheviks would be traitors to democracy and to freedom, for to tolerate the suppression of the peasant revolt at such a moment would *mean* allowing the elections to the Constituent Assembly to be fixed *in exactly the same way* as the Democratic Conference and the "Pre-parliament" were fixed, only even worse and more crudely.

The crisis has matured. The whole future of the Russian revolution is at stake. The honour of the Bolshevik Party is in question. The whole future of the international workers' revolution for socialism is at stake.

The crisis has matured....

September 29, 1917.

Everything to this point may be published, but what follows is *to be distributed* among the members of the *Central Committee*, *the Petrograd Committee*, *the Moscow Committee*, *and the Soviets*.

VI

What, then, is to be done? We must *aussprechen was ist*, "state the facts", admit the truth that there is a tendency, or an opinion, in our Central Committee and among the leaders of our Party which favours *waiting* for the Congress of Soviets, and is *opposed* to taking power immediately, is *opposed* to an immediate insurrection. That tendency, or opinion, must be *overcome*.[48]

Otherwise, the Bolsheviks will cover themselves with eternal *shame* and *destroy themselves* as a party.

For to miss such a moment and to "wait" for the Congress of Soviets would be *utter idiocy*, or *sheer treachery*.

It would be sheer treachery to the German workers. Surely we should not wait until their revolution *begins*. In that case even the Lieberdans would be in favour of "supporting" it. But it *cannot* begin as long as Kerensky, Kishkin and Co. are in power.

It would be sheer treachery to the peasants. To allow the peasant revolt to be suppressed when we control the Soviets

of both *capitals* would be to *lose*, and *justly lose*, every ounce of the peasants' confidence. In the eyes of the peasants we would be putting ourselves on a level with the Lieberdans and other scoundrels.

To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets would be utter idiocy, for it would mean losing *weeks* at a time when weeks and even days decide *everything*. It would mean faint-heartedly *renouncing* power, for on November 1-2 it will have become impossible to take power (both politically and technically, since the Cossacks would be mobilised for the day of the insurrection so foolishly "appointed"*).

To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets is idiocy, for the Congress will *give nothing*, *and can give nothing*!

"Moral" importance? Strange indeed, to talk of the "importance" of resolutions and conversations with the Lieberdans when we know that the Soviets *support* the peasants and that the peasant revolt is *being suppressed*! We would be reducing the *Soviets* to the status of wretched debating parlours. First defeat Kerensky, then call the Congress.

The Bolsheviks are now *guaranteed* the success of the insurrection: (1) we can** (if we do not "wait" for the Soviet Congress) launch a *surprise* attack from three points—from Petrograd, from Moscow and from the Baltic fleet; (2) we have slogans that guarantee us support—down with the government that is suppressing the revolt of the peasants against the landowners! (3) we have a majority *in the country*; (4) the disorganisation among the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries is complete; (5) we are technically in a position to take power in Moscow (where the start might even be made, so as to catch the enemy unawares); (6) we have *thousands* of armed workers and soldiers in Petrograd who could *at once* seize the Winter Palace, the General Staff building, the telephone exchange

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* To "convene" the Congress of Soviets for October 20 in order to decide upon "taking power"—how does that differ from foolishly "appointing" an insurrection? It is possible to take power now, whereas on October 20-29 you will not be given a chance to.

** What has the Party done to *study* the disposition of the troops, etc? What has it done to conduct the insurrection as an art? Mere talk in the Central Executive Committee, and so on!

and the large printing presses. Nothing will be able to drive us out, while agitational work in the *army* will be such as to make it *impossible* to combat this government of peace, of land for the peasants, and so forth.

If we were to attack at once, suddenly, from three points, Petrograd, Moscow and the Baltic fleet, the chances are a hundred to one that we would succeed with smaller sacrifices than on July 3-5, because *the troops will not advance* against a government of peace. Even though Kerensky *already* has "loyal" cavalry, etc., in Petrograd, if we were to attack from two sides, he would be compelled to *surrender* since *we* enjoy the sympathy of the army. If with such chances as we have at present we do not take power, then all talk of transferring the power to the Soviets becomes *a lie*.

To refrain from taking power now, to "wait", to indulge in talk in the Central Executive Committee, to confine ourselves to "fighting for the organ" (of the Soviet), "fighting for the Congress", is *to doom the revolution to failure*.

In view of the fact that the Central Committee has *even left unanswered* the persistent demands I have been making for such a policy ever since the beginning of the Democratic Conference, in view of the fact that the Central Organ is *deleting* from my articles all references to such glaring errors on the part of the Bolsheviks as the shameful decision to participate in the Pre-parliament, the admission of Mensheviks to the Presidium of the Soviet, etc., etc.—I am compelled to regard this as a "subtle" hint at the unwillingness of the Central Committee even to consider this question, a subtle hint that I should keep my mouth shut, and as a proposal for me to retire.

I am compelled to *tender my resignation from the Central Committee*, which I hereby do, reserving for myself freedom to campaign among the *rank and file* of the Party and at the Party Congress.

For it is my profound conviction that if we "wait" for the Congress of Soviets and let the present moment pass, we shall *ruin* the revolution.

September 29. *N. Lenin*

P.S. There are a number of facts which serve to prove that *even* the Cossack troops will not go against a government of peace! And how many are there? Where are they? And will not the entire army dispatch units *for our support*?

Sections I-III and V published on October 20 (7), 1917 in the newspaper *Rabochy Put* No. 30; section VI first published in 1924

Sections I-III published according to the newspaper text, sections V and VI according to the manuscript

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CAN THE BOLSHEVIKS RETAIN STATE POWER?[49]

Written at the end of September-October 1 (14), 1917

Published in October 1917 in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1-2

Published according to the magazine text

CAN THE BOLSHEVIKS RETAIN STATE POWER?[49]

Written at the end of September-October 1 (14), 1917

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Published according to the magazine text

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

The present pamphlet, as is evident from the text, was written at the end of September and was finished on October 1, 1917.

The October 25 Revolution has transferred the question raised in this pamphlet from the sphere of theory to the sphere of practice.

This question must now be answered by deeds, not words. The theoretical arguments advanced against the Bolsheviks taking power were feeble in the extreme. These arguments have been shot to pieces.

The task now is for the advanced class—the proletariat—to prove *in practice* the viability of the workers' and peasants' government. All class-conscious workers, all the active and honest peasants, all working and exploited people, will do everything they can to solve the immense historic question in practice.

To work, everybody to work, the cause of the world socialist revolution must and will triumph.

St. Petersburg, November 9, 1917.

N. Lenin

First published in 1918
in the pamphlet by N. Lenin,
Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?,
"Soldiers' and Peasants' Library"
Series, St. Petersburg

Published according
to the pamphlet

On what are all trends agreed, from *Rech* to *Novaya Zhizn*[50] inclusively, from the Kornilovite Cadets to the semi-Bolsheviks, *all*, except the Bolsheviks?

They all agree that the Bolsheviks will either never dare take over full state power alone, or, if they do dare, and do take power, they will not be able to retain it even for the shortest while.

If anybody asserts that the question of the Bolsheviks alone taking over full state power is a totally unfeasible political question, that only a swelled-headed "fanatic" of the worst kind can regard it as feasible, we refute this assertion by quoting the exact statements of the most responsible and most influential political parties and trends of various "hues".

But let me begin with a word or two about the first of the questions mentioned—will the Bolsheviks dare take over full state power alone? I have already had occasion, at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, to answer this question in the affirmative in no uncertain manner by a remark that I shouted from my seat during one of Tsereteli's[51] ministerial speeches. And I have not met in the press, or heard, any statements by Bolsheviks to the effect that we ought not to take power alone. I still maintain that a political party—and the party of the advanced class in particular—would have no right to exist, would be unworthy of the name of party, would be a nonentity in any sense, if it refused to take power when opportunity offers.

We shall now quote statements by the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and semi-Bolsheviks (I would prefer

to say quarter-Bolsheviks) on the question that interests us.

The leading article in *Rech* of September 16:

"Discord and confusion reigned in the Alexandrinsky Theatre, and the socialist press reflects the same picture. Only the views of the Bolsheviks are definite and straightforward At the Conference, they are the views of the minority. In the Soviets, they represent a constantly growing trend. But In spite of all their verbal pugnacity, their boastful phrases and display of self-confidence, the Bolsheviks, except for a few fanatics, are brave only in words. They would not attempt to take 'full power' on their own accord. Disorganisers and disrupters *par excellence*, they are really cowards who in their heart of hearts are fully aware of both their own intrinsic ignorance and the ephemeral nature of their present successes. They know as well as we all do that the first day of their ultimate triumph would also be the first day of their precipitous fall. Irresponsible by their very nature, anarchists in method and practice, they should be regarded only as a trend of political thought, or rather, as one of its aberrations. The best way to get rid of Bolshevism for many a year, to banish it, would be to place the country's fate in the hands of its leaders. And if it were not for the awareness that experiments of this kind are impermissible and fatal, one might in desperation decide on even this heroic measure. Happily, we repeat, these dismal heroes of the day are not by any means actually out to seize full power. Not under any circumstances are they capable of constructive work. Thus, all their definite and straight-forward views are confined to the political rostrum, to soapbox oratory. For practical purposes their position cannot be taken into consideration from any point of view. In one respect, however, it has some practical consequence: it unites all other shades of 'socialist thought' opposed to it...."

This is the way the Cadets reason. Here, however, is the view of the biggest, "ruling and governing", party in Russia, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, also expressed in an unsigned, i.e., editorial, leading article in their official organ *Dyelo Naroda* of September 21:

..."If the bourgeoisie refuse, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to work with the democracy on the basis of the platform that was endorsed by the Conference, then the *coalition must arise from within the Conference itself*. This would be a serious sacrifice on the part of the supporters of the coalition, *but even those campaigning for the idea of a 'pure line' of power will have to agree to it*. We are afraid, however, that agreement may not be reached here. In that case a third and final combination remains, namely: the government *must* be organised by that half of the Conference which on *principle* advocated the idea of a homogeneous government.

"Let us put it definitely: *the Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a Cabinet*. With the greatest energy, they imbued the revolutionary demo-

crats with hatred of the coalition, promising them all sorts of benefits as soon as 'compromise' was abandoned, and attributing to the latter all the country's misfortunes.

"If they were aware of what they were doing by their *agitation*, if they were *not deceiving the people*, *it is their duty* to redeem the promissory notes they have been handing out right and left.

"The question is clear.

"Let them not make futile attempts to hide behind hastily concocted theory that it is impossible for them to take power.

"The democracy will not accept these theories.

"At the same time, the advocates of coalition must guarantee them full support. These are the three combinations, the three ways, open to us—there are no others!" (The italics are those of *Dyelo Naroda*.)

This is the way the Socialist-Revolutionaries reason. And here, finally, is the "position" (if attempts to sit between two stools can be called a position) of the *Novaya Zhizn* "quarter-Bolsheviks", taken from the editorial in *Novaya Zhizn* of September 23.

"If a coalition with Konovalov and Kishkin is formed again, it will mean nothing but a new capitulation by the democracy and the abrogation of the Conference resolution on the formation of a responsible government on the platform of August 14....

"A homogeneous ministry of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries will be able to feel its responsibility as little as the responsible socialist ministers felt it in the coalition cabinet.... This government would not only be incapable of rallying the 'live forces' of the revolution around itself, but would not even be able to count on any active support from its vanguard—the proletariat.

"But the formation of another type of homogeneous cabinet, a government of the 'proletariat and poor peasants', would be, not a better, but an even worse way out of the situation, in fact it would not be a way out at all, but sheer bankruptcy. True, nobody is advancing such a slogan except in casual, timid and later systematically 'explained away' comments in *Rabochy Put*."

(This glaring untruth is "boldly" written by responsible journalists who have forgotten even the *Dyelo Naroda* editorial of September 21.)

"Formally, the Bolsheviks have now revived the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets'. It was withdrawn after the July days, when the Soviets, represented by the Central Executive Committee, definitely adopted an active anti-Bolshevik policy. Now, however, not only can the 'Soviet line' be regarded as straightened out, but there is every ground to assume that at the proposed Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks will have a majority. Under such circumstances the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets', resurrected by the Bolsheviks, is a 'tactical line' for achieving precisely the dictatorship of the prole-

tariat and the 'poor peasants' True, the Soviets also imply the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies; the Bolshevik slogan therefore implies a power resting on the overwhelmingly greater part of the entire democracy of Russia. In that case, however, the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' loses all independent significance, for it makes the Soviets almost identical in composition to the Pre-parliament set up by the Conference...."

(*Novaya Zhizn*'s assertion is a brazen lie, equivalent to declaring that spurious and fraudulent democracy is "almost identical" to democracy: the Pre-parliament is a *sham* which passes off the will of the minority of the people, particularly of Kuskova, Berkenheim, Chaikovsky and Co., as the will of the majority. This is the first point. The second point is that at the Conference even the Peasants' Soviets that had been packed by the Avksentyevs and Chaikovskys gave such a high percentage opposed to the coalition that taken together with the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, they would have brought about the *absolute collapse of the coalition*. And the third point is that "Power to the Soviets" means that the power of the Peasants' Soviets would embrace mainly the rural districts, and in the rural districts the predominance of the *poor* peasants is assured.)

"If it is one and the same thing, then the Bolshevik slogan should be immediately withdrawn. If, however, 'Power to the Soviets' is only a disguise for the dictatorship of the proletariat, then such a power would mean precisely the failure and collapse of the revolution.

"Does it need proof that the proletariat, isolated not only from the other classes in the country, but also from the real live forces of the democracy, will not be able either technically to lay hold of the state apparatus and set it in motion in an exceptionally complicated situation, or politically to resist all the pressure by hostile forces that will sweep away not only the proletarian dictatorship, but the entire revolution into the bargain?

"The only power that will answer the requirements of the present situation is a really honest coalition within the democracy."

* * *

We apologise to the reader for quoting these lengthy extracts, but they are absolutely necessary. It is necessary to present a precise picture of the positions taken by the different parties hostile to the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to prove in a definite manner the extremely important

fact that *all* these parties have admitted that the question of the Bolsheviks taking full state power alone is not only feasible, but also urgent.

Let us now proceed to examine the arguments which convince "everybody", from the Cadets to the *Novaya Zhizn* people, that the Bolsheviks will not be able to retain power.

The respectable *Rech* advances no arguments whatsoever. It merely pours out upon the Bolsheviks a flood of the choicest and most irate abuse. The extract we quoted shows, among other things, how utterly wrong it would be to say, "Watch out, comrades, for what the enemy advises must certainly be bad", thinking that *Rech* is "provoking" the Bolsheviks to take power. If, instead of weighing up the general and concrete considerations in a practical way, we allow ourselves to be "persuaded" by the plea that the bourgeoisie are "provoking" us to take power, we shall be fooled by the bourgeoisie, for the latter will of course always maliciously prophesy millions of disasters that will result from the Bolsheviks taking power and will always maliciously shout, "It would be better to get rid of the Bolsheviks at one blow and 'for many a year' by allowing them to take power and then crushing them." These cries are also "provocation", if you will, but from a different angle. The Cadets and the bourgeoisie do not by any means "advise", and have never "advised", us to take power; they are only trying to *frighten* us with the allegedly insoluble problems of government.

No. We must not allow ourselves to be frightened by the screams of the frightened bourgeoisie. We must bear firmly in mind that we have never set ourselves "insoluble" social problems, and as for the *perfectly* soluble problem of taking immediate steps towards socialism, which is the only way out of the exceedingly difficult situation, that will be *solved only* by the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasants. Victory, and lasting victory, is now more than ever, more than anywhere else, assured for the proletariat in Russia if it takes power.

We shall in a purely practical manner discuss the *concrete* circumstances that make a certain moment unfavourable; but we shall not for a moment allow ourselves to be scared by the savage howls of the bourgeoisie; and we shall

not forget that the question of the Bolsheviks taking full power is becoming really *urgent*. Our Party will now be threatened with an immeasurably greater danger if we forget this than if we were to admit that taking power is "premature". In this respect, there can be *nothing* "premature" now: there is every chance in a million, except one or two perhaps, in favour of this.

Concerning the irate abuse poured out by *Rech*, we can, and must, say:

In savage cries of irritation
We hear the voice of approbation,
Not in dulcet sounds of praise.[52]

That the bourgeoisie hate us so passionately is one of the most striking proofs that we are showing the people the *right* ways and means of overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie.

* * *

This time, by way of rare exception, *Dyelo Naroda* did not deign to honour us with its abuse nor did it advance a ghost of an argument. It merely tried, by indirect hints, to *frighten* us with the prospect that "the Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a cabinet". I can quite believe that while trying to frighten us, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are themselves sincerely seared to death by the phantom of the frightened liberal. I can equally believe that the Socialist-Revolutionaries do succeed in certain exceptionally high and exceptionally rotten institutions, such as the Central Executive Committee and similar "contact" (i.e., contact with the Cadets, in plain language, hobnobbing with the Cadets) commissions, in scaring some Bolsheviks because, first, the atmosphere in all those Central Executives, pre-parliaments, etc., is abominable, putrid to the point of nausea, and harmful for *any* man to breathe for any length of time; and secondly, sincerity is contagious, and a sincerely frightened philistine is capable of converting even an individual revolutionary into a philistine for a time.

But however much we may, "humanly" speaking, understand the sincere fright of a Socialist-Revolutionary who has had the misfortune to be a minister in the company of

the Cadets, or who is eligible as a minister in the eyes of the Cadets, we would be committing a political error that might only too easily border on treachery to the proletariat if we allowed ourselves to be scared. Let us have your practical arguments, gentlemen! Cherish no hope that we shall allow ourselves to be scared by your fright!

* * *

This time we find practical arguments only in *Novaya Zhizn*. On this occasion the paper comes out in the role of counsel for the bourgeoisie, a role that suits it far better than that of counsel for the defence of the Bolsheviks, which so obviously "shocks" this lady with many good points.[53]

The counsel has advanced *six* pleas:

(1) the proletariat is "isolated from the other classes in the country";

(2) it is "isolated from the real live forces of the democracy";

(3) it "will not be able technically to lay hold of the state apparatus";

(4) it "will not be able to set this apparatus in motion";

(5) "the situation is exceptionally complicated";

(6) it "will be incapable of resisting all the pressure by hostile forces that will sweep away not only the proletarian dictatorship, but the entire revolution into the bargain".

Novaya Zhizn formulates the first plea in a ridiculously clumsy fashion, for in capitalist and semi-capitalist society we know of only three classes: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (which consists mainly of the peasantry), and the proletariat. What sense is there in talking about the proletariat being isolated from the other classes when the point at issue is the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie, revolution against the bourgeoisie?

Evidently, *Novaya Zhizn* wanted to say that the proletariat is isolated from the peasants, for it could not possibly have meant the landowners. It could not, however, say clearly and definitely that the proletariat is now isolated from the peasants, for the utter incorrectness of this assertion would be too obvious.

It is difficult to imagine that in a capitalist country the proletariat should be so little isolated from the petty bourgeoisie—and, mark you, in a revolution *against the bourgeoisie*—as the proletariat now is in Russia. The latest returns of the voting by "curias" *for* and *against* coalition with the bourgeoisie in Tsereteli's "Bulygin Duma", i.e., in the notorious "Democratic" Conference, constitute one of the objective and incontrovertible proofs of this. If we take the Soviets' curias we get:

	For coalition	Against
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.	83	192
Soviets of Peasants' Deputies . .	102	70
All Soviets	185	262

So, the majority as a whole is on the side of the proletarian slogan: *against* coalition with the bourgeoisie. We have seen above that even the Cadets are obliged to admit the growth of Bolshevik influence in the Soviets. And here we have the Conference convened by *yesterday*'s leaders in the Soviets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who have an assured majority in the central institutions! Obviously, the *actual* degree to which the Bolsheviks predominate in the Soviets is here *understated*.

Both on the question of coalition with the bourgeoisie and on the question of immediately transferring the landed estates to peasant committees, the Bolsheviks already have a *majority* in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, a *majority of the people*, a majority of the petty bourgeoisie. *Rabochy Put* No. 19, of September 24 quotes from No. 25 of the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries *Znamya Truda*[54] a report on a conference of local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies held in Petrograd on September 18. At this conference the Executive Committees of four Peasants' Soviets (Kostroma, Moscow, Samara and Taurida gubernias) voted for an unrestricted coalition. The Executive Committees of *three* gubernias and *two* armies (Vladimir, Ryazan and the Black Sea gubernias) voted in favour of a coalition without the Cadets. The Executive Committees

of *twenty-three* gubernias and *four* armies voted against a coalition.

So, the majority of the peasants are against a coalition!

So much for the "isolation of the proletariat".

We should note, by the way, that the supporters of a coalition were three outlying gubernias, Samara, Taurida and the Black Sea, where there is a relatively very large number of rich peasants and big landowners who employ hired labour, and also four industrial gubernias (Vladimir, Ryazan, Kostroma and Moscow) in which the peasant bourgeoisie are also stronger than in the majority of the gubernias in Russia. It would be interesting to collect more detailed figures on this question and to ascertain whether information is available concerning the *poor* peasants in the gubernias where there are larger numbers of "*rich*" peasants. It is interesting, moreover, that the "non-Russian groups" revealed a considerable predominance of opponents of a coalition, namely, 40 votes against 15. The policy of annexation and open violence pursued by the Bonapartist Kerensky and Co. towards the non-sovereign nations of Russia has borne fruit. Wide sections of the people of the oppressed nations (i.e., including the mass of the petty bourgeoisie) trust the proletariat of Russia more than they do the bourgeoisie, for here history has brought to the fore the struggle for liberation of the oppressed nations against the oppressing nations. The bourgeoisie has despicably betrayed the cause of freedom of the oppressed nations; the proletariat is faithful to the cause of freedom.

At the present time the national and agrarian questions are fundamental questions for the petty-bourgeois sections of the population of Russia. This is indisputable. And on both these questions the proletariat is "*not* isolated"—farther from it than ever. It has the majority of the people behind it. It *alone* is capable of pursuing such a determined, genuinely "revolutionary-democratic" policy on both questions which would immediately ensure the proletarian state power not only the support of the majority of the population, but also a real outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm among the people. This is because, for the first time, the people would not see the ruthless oppression of peasants by landowners and of Ukrainians by Great Russians on the part of the

government, as was the case under tsarism, nor the effort to continue the same policy camouflaged in pompous phrases under the republic, nor nagging, insult, chicanery, procrastination, underhand dealing and evasions (all that with which Kerensky rewards the peasants and the oppressed nations), but would receive warm sympathy proved by deeds, immediate and revolutionary measures against the landowners, immediate restitution of *full* freedom for Finland, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, for the Moslems, and so on.

The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik gentlemen know this perfectly well, and are therefore dragging in the semi-Cadet bosses of the co-operative societies to help them pursue their *reactionary*-democratic policy *against* the people. That is why they will never dare canvass popular opinion, take a popular referendum, or at least a vote of all the local Soviets, of all the local organisations, concerning definite points of practical policy, for example, whether all the landed estates should at once be handed over to peasant committees, whether certain demands of the Finns or the Ukrainians should be conceded, etc.

Take the question of peace, the crucial issue of today. The proletariat "is isolated from the other classes".... On this issue the proletariat truly represents the *whole* nation, all live and honest people *in all* classes, the vast majority of the petty bourgeoisie; because only the proletariat, on achieving power, will *immediately* offer a just peace to all the belligerent nations, because only the proletariat will dare take genuinely *revolutionary* measures (publication of the secret treaties, and so forth) to achieve the speediest and most just peace possible.

The proletariat is not isolated. The gentlemen of *Novaya Zhizn* who are shouting about the proletariat being isolated are only betraying their subjective fear of the bourgeoisie. The objective state of affairs in Russia is undoubtedly such that the proletariat, *precisely at the present time*, is not "isolated" from the majority of the petty bourgeoisie. Precisely now, after the sad experience with the "coalition", the proletariat enjoys the sympathy of the *majority* of the people. *This* condition for the retention of power by the Bolsheviks *does exist*.

* * *

The second plea is that the proletariat "is isolated from the real live forces of the democracy". What this means is incomprehensible. It is probably "Greek", as the French say in such cases.

The writers of *Novaya Zhizn* would make good ministers. They would be quite suitable as ministers in a Cadet cabinet because all these ministers need is the ability to spout plausible, polished, but utterly meaningless phrases with which to cover up the dirtiest work and which are therefore sure of winning the applause of the imperialists and social-imperialists. The *Novaya Zhizn* writers are sure to earn the applause of the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov and Co. for asserting that the proletariat is isolated from the real live forces of the democracy, because *indirectly* they imply—or will be understood to imply—that the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov, Kerensky and Co. are the "live forces of democracy".

This is not true. They are dead forces. The history of the coalition has proved this.

Overawed by the bourgeoisie and by their bourgeois-intellectual environment, the *Novaya Zhizn* people regard as "live" the *Right* wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks like *Volya Naroda*[55], *Yedinstvo*, and others who in essentials do not differ from the Cadets. We, however, regard as live only those who are connected with the people and not with the kulaks, only those whom the lessons of the coalition have repelled. The "active live forces" of the petty-bourgeois democracy are represented by the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. That this wing has gained strength, particularly since the July counter-revolution, is one of the surest objective signs that the proletariat is *not* isolated.

This has been made even more strikingly evident by the very recent swing to the left of the Socialist-Revolutionary Centrists, as is proved by Chernov's statement on September 24 that his group cannot support the new coalition with Kishkin and Co. This swing to the left of the Socialist-Revolutionary Centre, which up to now had constituted the overwhelming majority of the members of the Socialist-

Revolutionary Party, the leading and dominant party from the point of view of the number of votes it obtained in the urban and particularly in the rural districts, proves that the statements we quoted from *Dyelo Naroda* that the democracy must, under certain circumstances, "guarantee full support" for a purely Bolshevik government are at any rate not mere empty phrases.

Facts like the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionary Centre to support the new coalition with Kishkin, or the predominance of the *opponents* of the coalition among the *Menshevik-defencists* in the provinces (Jordania in the Caucasus, etc.), are objective proof that a certain section of the *people* which has up to now followed the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries *will support* a purely Bolshevik government.

It is precisely from the *live* forces of the democracy that the proletariat of Russia is now not isolated.

* * *

The third plea, that the proletariat "will not be able technically to lay hold of the state apparatus" is, perhaps, the most common and most frequent. It deserves most attention for this reason, and also because it indicates one of the most *serious* and *difficult* tasks that will confront the victorious proletariat. There is no doubt that these tasks will be very difficult, but if we, who call ourselves socialists, indicate this difficulty only to *shirk* these tasks, in practice the distinction between us and the lackeys of the bourgeoisie will be reduced to nought. The difficulty of the tasks of the proletarian revolution should prompt the proletariat's supporters to make a closer and more definite study of the means of carrying out these tasks.

The state apparatus is primarily the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy. By saying that the proletariat will not he able technically to lay hold of this apparatus, the writers of *Novaya Zhizn* reveal their utter ignorance and their reluctance to take into account either facts or the arguments long ago cited in Bolshevik literature.

All the *Novaya Zhizn* writers regard themselves, if not as Marxists, then at least as being familiar with Marxism,

as educated socialists. But Marx, basing himself on the experience of the Paris Commune, taught that the proletariat cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machine and use it for its own purposes, that the proletariat must smash this machine and substitute a new one for it (I deal with this in greater detail in a pamphlet, the first part of which is now finished and will soon appear under the title *The State and Revolution. A Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution**). This new type of state machinery was created by the Paris Commune, and the Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies are a "state apparatus" of the *same type*. I have indicated this many times since April 4, 1917; it is dealt with in the resolutions of Bolshevik conferences and also in Bolshevik literature. *Novaya Zhizn* could, of course, have expressed its utter disagreement with Marx and with the Bolsheviks, but for a paper that has so often, and so haughtily, scolded the Bolsheviks for their allegedly frivolous attitude to difficult problems to evade this question completely is tantamount to issuing itself a certificate of mental poverty.

The proletariat *cannot* "lay hold of" the "state apparatus" and "set it in motion". But it can *smash* everything that is oppressive, routine, incorrigibly bourgeois in the old state apparatus and substitute its *own*, new apparatus. The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies are exactly this apparatus.

That *Novaya Zhizn* has completely forgotten about this "state apparatus" can be called nothing but monstrous. Behaving in this way in their theoretical reasoning, the *Novaya Zhizn* people are, in essence, doing in the sphere of political theory what the Cadets are doing in political practice. Because, if the proletariat and the revolutionary democrats *do not* in fact *need* a new state apparatus, then the Soviets lose their *raison d'être*, lose their right to existence, and the Kornilovite Cadets are *right* in trying to reduce the Soviets to nought!

This monstrous theoretical blunder and political blindness on the part of *Novaya Zhizn* is all the more monstrous

* See present edition, Vol. 25.—*Ed.*

because even the internationalist Mensheviks (with whom *Novaya Zhizn* formed a bloc during the last City Council elections in Petrograd) have on this question shown some proximity to the Bolsheviks. So, in the declaration of the Soviet majority made by Comrade Martov at the Democratic Conference, we read:

> "The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, set up in the first days of the revolution by a mighty burst of creative enthusiasm that stems from the people themselves, constitute the new fabric of the revolutionary state that has replaced the outworn state fabric of the old regime...."

This is a little too flowery; that is to say, rhetoric here covers up lack of clear political thinking. The Soviets have *not yet* replaced the old "fabric", and this old "fabric" is *not* the state fabric of the old regime, but the state fabric of *both* tsarism *and* of the bourgeois republic. But at any rate, Martov here stands head and shoulders above *Novaya Zhizn*.

The Soviets are a new state apparatus which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is very closely bound up with the people. From the military point of view this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary point of view, it cannot be replaced by anything else. Secondly, this apparatus provides a bond with the people, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so easily verifiable and renewable, that nothing even remotely like it existed in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the people's will without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it provides a close contact with the most varied professions, thereby facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most radical reforms without red tape. Fifthly, it provides an organisational form for the vanguard, i.e., for the most class-conscious, most energetic and most progressive section of the *oppressed* classes, the workers and peasants, and so constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of

the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead *the entire vast mass* of these classes, which has up to now stood completely outside of political life and history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of the parliamentary system with those of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to vest in the people's elected representatives both legislative *and executive* functions. Compared with the bourgeois parliamentary system, this is an advance in democracy's development which is of world-wide, historic significance.

In 1905, our Soviets existed only in embryo, so to speak, as they lived altogether only a few weeks. Clearly, under the conditions of that time, their comprehensive development was out of the question. It is still out of the question in the 1917 Revolution, for a few months is an extremely short period and—this is most important—the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders have *prostituted* the Soviets, have reduced their role to that of a talking shop, of an accomplice in the compromising policy of the leaders. The Soviets have been rotting and decaying alive under the leadership of the Liebers, Dans, Tseretelis and Chernovs. The Soviets will be able to develop properly, to display their potentialities and capabilities to the full only by taking over *full* state power; for otherwise they have *nothing to do*, otherwise they are either simply embryos (and to remain an embryo too long is fatal), or playthings. "Dual power" means paralysis for the Soviets.

If the creative enthusiasm of the revolutionary classes had not given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would have been a hopeless cause, for the proletariat could certainly not retain power with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus immediately. The sad history of the prostitution of the Soviets by the Tseretelis and Chernovs, the history of the "coalition", is also the history of the liberation of the Soviets from petty-bourgeois illusions, of their passage through the "purgatory" of the practical experience of the utter abomination and filth of *all* and *sundry* bourgeois coalitions. Let us hope that this "purgatory" has steeled rather than weakened the Soviets.

* * *

The chief difficulty facing the proletarian revolution is the establishment on a country-wide scale of the most precise and most conscientious accounting and control, of *workers' control* of the production and distribution of goods.

When the writers of *Novaya Zhizn* argued that in advancing the slogan "workers' control" we were slipping into syndicalism, this argument was an example of the stupid schoolboy method of applying "Marxism" without studying it, just *learning it by rote* in the Struve manner. Syndicalism either repudiates the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, or else relegates it, as it does political power in general, to a back seat. We, however, put it in the forefront. If we simply say in unison with the *Novaya Zhizn* writers: *not* workers' control *but* state control, it is simply a bourgeois-reformist phrase, it is, in essence, a purely Cadet formula, because the Cadets have no objection to the workers *participating* in "state" control. The Kornilovite Cadets know perfectly well that such participation offers the bourgeoisie the best way of fooling the workers, the most subtle way of politically *bribing* all the Gvozdyovs, Nikitins, Prokopoviches, Tseretelis and the rest of that gang.

When we say: "workers' control", always *juxtaposing* this slogan to dictatorship of the proletariat, always putting it *immediately after* the latter, we thereby explain what kind of state we mean. The state is the organ of *class* domination. Of which class? If of the bourgeoisie, then it is the Cadet-Kornilov-"Kerensky" state which has been "Kornilovising" and "Kerenskyising" the working people of Russia for more than six months. If it is of the proletariat, if we are speaking of a proletarian state, *that is*, of the proletarian dictatorship, then workers' control *can* become the country-wide, all-embracing, omnipresent, most precise and most conscientious *accounting* of the production and distribution of goods.

This is the chief difficulty, the chief task that faces the proletarian, i.e., socialist, revolution. Without the Soviets, this task would be impracticable, at least in Russia. The Soviets *indicate* to the proletariat the organisational work which *can* solve this historically important problem.

This brings us to another aspect of the question of the state apparatus. In addition to the chiefly "oppressive" apparatus—the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy—the modern state possesses an apparatus which has extremely close connections with the banks and syndicates, an apparatus which performs an enormous amount of accounting and registration work, if it may be expressed this way. This apparatus must not, and should not, be smashed. It must be wrested from the control of the capitalists; the capitalists and the wires they pull must be *cut off*, *lopped off*, *chopped away from* this apparatus; it must be *subordinated* to the proletarian Soviets; it must be expanded, made more comprehensive, and nation-wide. And this *can* be done by utilising the achievements already made by large-scale capitalism (in the same way as the proletarian revolution can, in general, reach its goal only by utilising these achievements).

Capitalism has created an accounting *apparatus* in the shape of the banks, syndicates, postal service, consumers' societies, and office employees' unions. *Without big banks socialism would be impossible.*

The big banks *are* the "state apparatus" which we *need* to bring about socialism, and which we *take ready-made* from capitalism; our task here is merely to *lop off* what *capitalistically mutilates* this excellent apparatus, to make it *even bigger*, even more democratic, even more comprehensive. Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single State Bank, the biggest of the big, with branches in every rural district, in every factory, will constitute as much as nine-tenths of the *socialist* apparatus. This will be country-wide *book-keeping*, country-wide *accounting* of the production and distribution of goods, this will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the *skeleton* of socialist society.

We can "lay hold of" and "set in motion" this "state apparatus" (which is not fully a state apparatus under capitalism, but which will be so with us, under socialism) at one stroke, by a single decree, because the actual work of book-keeping, control, registering, accounting and counting is performed by *employees*, the majority of whom themselves lead a proletarian or semi-proletarian existence.

By a single decree of the proletarian government these employees can and must be transferred to the status of state

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employees, in the same way as the watchdogs of capitalism like Briand and other bourgeois ministers, by a single decree, transfer railwaymen on strike to the status of state employees. We shall need many more state employees of this kind, and more *can* be obtained, because capitalism has simplified the work of accounting and control, has reduced it to a comparatively simple system of *book-keeping*, which any literate person can do.

The conversion of the bank, syndicate, commercial, etc., etc., rank-and-file employees into state employees is quite feasible both technically (thanks to the preliminary work performed for us by capitalism, including finance capitalism) and politically, provided the *Soviets* exercise control and supervision.

As for the higher officials, of whom there are very few, but who gravitate towards the capitalists, they will have to be dealt with in the same way as the capitalists, i.e., "severely". Like the capitalists, they will offer *resistance*. This resistance will have to be *broken*, and if the immortally-naïve Peshekhonov, as early as June 1917, lisped like the infant that he was in state affairs, that "the resistance of the capitalists has been broken", this childish phrase, this childish boast, this childish swagger, *will be converted by the proletariat into reality*.

We can do this, for it is merely a question of breaking the resistance of an insignificant minority of the population, literally a handful of people, over each of whom the employees' unions, the trade unions, the consumers' societies and the Soviets will institute such *supervision* that every Tit Titych will be *surrounded* as the French were at Sedan.[56] We know these Tit Tityches by name: we only have to consult the lists of directors, board members, large shareholders, etc. There are several hundred, at most several thousand of them in the *whole* of Russia, and the proletarian state, with the apparatus of the Soviets, of the employees' unions, etc., will be able to appoint ten or even a hundred supervisers to each of them, so that instead of "breaking resistance" it may even be possible, by means of *workers' control* (over the capitalists), to make all resistance *impossible*.

The important thing will not be even the confiscation of the capitalists' property, but country-wide, all-embrac-

ing workers' control over the capitalists and their possible supporters. Confiscation alone leads nowhere, as it does not contain the element of organisation, of accounting for proper distribution. Instead of confiscation, we could easily impose a *fair* tax (even on the Shingaryov[57] scale, for instance), taking care, of course, to preclude the possibility of anyone evading assessment, concealing the truth, evading the law. And this possibility can be *eliminated only* by the workers' control of the *workers' state*.

Compulsory syndication, i.e., compulsory amalgamation in associations under state control—this is what capitalism has prepared the way for, this is what has been carried out in Germany by the Junkers' state, this is what can be easily carried out in Russia by the Soviets, by the proletarian dictatorship, and this is what will *provide us with a state apparatus* that will be universal, up-to-date, and non-bureaucratic.*

* * *

The fourth plea of the counsels for the bourgeoisie is that the proletariat will not be able "to set the state apparatus in motion". There is nothing new in this plea compared with the preceding one. We could not, of course, either lay hold of or set in motion the old apparatus. The new apparatus, the Soviets, *has already* been set in motion by "a mighty burst of creative enthusiasm that stems from the people themselves". We only have to free it from the *shackles* put on it by the domination of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders. This apparatus *is already* in motion; we only have to free it from the monstrous, petty-bourgeois impediments preventing it from going full speed ahead.

Two circumstances must be considered here to supplement what has already been said. In the first place, the new means of control have been created *not* by us, but by capitalism in its military-imperialist stage; and in the second place, it is important to introduce more democracy into the *administration* of a proletarian state.

* For further details of the meaning of compulsory syndication see my pamphlet: *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*. (See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 346-49.—*Ed.*)

The grain monopoly and bread rationing were introduced not by us, but by the capitalist state in war-time. It had already introduced universal labour conscription within the framework of capitalism, which is war-time penal servitude for the workers. But here too, as in all its history-making activities, the proletariat takes its weapons from capitalism and does not "invent" or "create them out of nothing".

The grain monopoly, bread rationing and labour conscription in the hands of the proletarian state, in the hands of sovereign Soviets, will be the most powerful means of accounting and control, means which, applied to the capitalists, and to *the rich in general*, applied to them by the workers, will provide a force unprecedented in history for "setting the state apparatus in motion", for overcoming the resistance of the capitalists, for subordinating them to the proletarian state. These means of control and of *compelling people to work* will be more potent than the laws of the Convention and its guillotine. The guillotine *only* terrorised, only broke *active* resistance. *For us*, *this is not enough*.

For us, this is not enough. We must not only "terrorise" the capitalists, i.e., make them feel the omnipotence of the proletarian state and give up all idea of actively resisting it. We must also break *passive* resistance, which is undoubtedly more dangerous and harmful. We must not only break resistance of every kind. We must also *compel the capitalists to work* within the framework of the new state organisation. It is not enough to "remove" the capitalists; we must (after removing the undesirable and incorrigible "resisters") employ them *in the service of the new state*. This applies both to the capitalists and to the upper section of the bourgeois intellectuals, office employees, etc.

And we have the means to do this. The means and instruments for this have been placed in our hands by the capitalist state in the war. These means are the grain monopoly, bread rationing and labour conscription. "He who does not work, neither shall he eat"—this is the fundamental, the first and most important rule the Soviets of Workers' Deputies can and will introduce when they become the ruling power.

Every worker has a work-book. This book does not degrade him, although *at present* it is undoubtedly a docu-

ment of capitalist wage-slavery, certifying that the workman belongs to some parasite.

The Soviets will introduce work-books *for the rich* and *then* gradually for the whole population (in a peasant country work-books will probably not be needed for a long time for the overwhelming majority of the peasants). The work-book will cease to be the badge of the "common herd", a document of the "lower" orders, a certificate of wage-slavery. It will become a document certifying that in the new society there are no longer any "workmen", nor, on the other hand, are there any longer men *who do not work*.

The rich will be obliged to get a work-book from the workers' or office employees' union with which their occupation is most closely connected, and every week, or other definite fixed period, they will have to get from that union a certificate to the effect that they are performing their work conscientiously; without this they will not be able to receive bread ration cards or provisions in general. The proletarian state will say: we need good organisers of banking and the amalgamation of enterprises (in this matter the capitalists have more experience, and it is easier to work with experienced people), and we need far, far more engineers, agronomists, technicians and scientifically trained specialists of every kind than were needed before. We shall give all these specialists work to which they are accustomed and which they can cope with; in all probability we shall introduce complete wage equality only gradually and shall pay these specialists higher salaries during the transition period. We shall place them, however, under comprehensive workers' control and we shall achieve the complete and absolute operation of the rule "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." We shall not invent the organisational form of the work, but take it ready-made from capitalism—we shall take over the banks, syndicates, the best factories, experimental stations, academies, and so forth; all that we shall have to do is to borrow the best models furnished by the advanced countries.

Of course, we shall not in the least descend to a utopia, we are not deserting the soil of most sober, practical reason when we say that the entire capitalist class will offer the most stubborn resistance, but this resistance will be broken

by the organisation of the entire population in Soviets. Those capitalists who are exceptionally stubborn and recalcitrant will, of course, have to be punished by the confiscation of their whole property and by imprisonment. On the other hand, however, the victory of the proletariat will bring about *an increase* in the number of cases of the kind that I read about in today's *Izvestia* for example:

"On September 26, two engineers came to the Central Council of Factory Committees to report that a group of engineers had decided to form a union of socialist engineers. The Union believes that the present time is actually the beginning of the social revolution and places itself at the disposal of the working people, desiring, in defence of the workers' interests, to work in complete unity with the workers' organisations. The representatives of the Central Council of Factory Committees answered that the Council will gladly set up in its organisation an Engineers' Section which will embody in its programme the main theses of the First Conference of Factory Committees on workers' control over production. A joint meeting of delegates of the Central Council of Factory Committees and of the initiative group of socialist engineers will be held within the next few days." (*Izvestia*, September 27, 1917.)

* * *

The proletariat, we are told, will not be able to set the state apparatus in motion.

Since the 1905 revolution, Russia has been governed by 130,000 landowners, who have perpetrated endless violence against 150,000,000 people, heaped unconstrained abuse upon them, and condemned the vast majority to inhuman toil and semi-starvation.

Yet we are told that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party will not be able to govern Russia, govern her in the interests of the poor and against the rich. These 240,000 are already backed by no less than a million votes of the adult population, for this is precisely the proportion between the number of Party members and the number of votes cast for the Party that has been established by the experience of Europe and the experience of Russia as shown, for example, by the elections to the Petrograd City Council last August. We therefore already have a "state apparatus" of *one million* people devoted to the socialist state for the sake of high ideals and not for the sake of a fat sum received on the 20th of every month.

In addition to that we have a "magic way" to enlarge our state apparatus *tenfold* at once, at one stroke, a way which no capitalist state ever possessed or could possess. This magic way is to draw the working people, to draw the poor, into the daily work of state administration.

To explain how easy it will be to employ this magic way and how faultlessly it will operate, let us take the simplest and most striking example possible.

The state is to forcibly evict a certain family from a flat and move another in. This often happens in the capitalist state, and it will also happen in our proletarian or socialist state.

The capitalist state evicts a working-class family which has lost its breadwinner and cannot pay the rent. The bailiff appears with police, or militia, a whole squad of them. To effect an eviction in a working-class district a whole detachment of Cossacks is required. Why? Because the bailiff and the militiaman refuse to go without a very strong military guard. They know that the scene of an eviction arouses such fury among the neighbours, among thousands and thousands of people who have been driven to the verge of desperation, arouses such hatred towards the capitalists and the capitalist state, that the bailiff and the squad of militiamen run the risk of being torn to pieces at any minute. Large military forces are required, several regiments must be brought into a big city, and the troops must come from some distant, outlying region so that the soldiers will not be familiar with the life of the urban poor, so that the soldiers will not be "infected" with socialism.

The proletarian state has to forcibly move a very poor family into a rich man's flat. Let us suppose that our squad of workers' militia is fifteen strong; two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of whom, let us suppose, only one is a member of our Party, or a sympathiser), one intellectual, and eight from the poor working people, of whom at least five must be women, domestic servants, unskilled labourers, and so forth. The squad arrives at the rich man's flat, inspects it and finds that it consists of five rooms occupied by two men and two women—"You must squeeze up a bit into two rooms this winter, citizens, and prepare two rooms for two families now living in cellars. Until the

time, with the aid of engineers (you are an engineer, aren't you?), we have built good dwellings for everybody, you will have to squeeze up a little. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save a hundred hours of work wasted on shopping, and so forth. Now in your family there are two unemployed persons who can perform light work: a citizeness fifty-five years of age and a citizen fourteen years of age. They will be on duty for three hours a day supervising the proper distribution of provisions for ten families and keeping the necessary account of this. The student citizen in our squad will now write out this state order in two copies and you will be kind enough to give us a signed declaration that you will faithfully carry it out."

This, in my opinion, can illustrate how the distinction between the old bourgeois and the new socialist state apparatus and state administration could be illustrated.

We are not utopians. We know that an unskilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job of state administration. In this we agree with the Cadets, with Breshkovskaya, and with Tsereteli. We differ, however, from these citizens in that we demand an immediate break with the prejudiced view that only the rich, or officials chosen from rich families, are capable of *administering* the state, of performing the ordinary, everyday work of administration. We demand that *training* in the work of state administration be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers and that this training be begun at once, i.e., that a *beginning* be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor, for this work.

We know that the Cadets are also willing to teach the people democracy. Cadet ladies are willing to deliver lectures to domestic servants on equal rights for women in accordance with the best English and French sources. And also, at the very next concert-meeting, before an audience of thousands, an exchange of kisses will be arranged on the platform: the Cadet lady lecturer will kiss Breshkovskaya, Breshkovskaya will kiss ex-Minister Tsereteli, and the grateful people will therefore receive an object-lesson in republican equality, liberty and fraternity....

Yes, we agree that the Cadets, Breshkovskaya and Tsereteli are in their own way devoted to democracy and are

propagating it among the people. But what is to be done if our conception of democracy is somewhat different from theirs?

In our opinion, to ease the incredible burdens and miseries of the war and also to heal the terrible wounds the war has inflicted on the people, *revolutionary* democracy is needed, *revolutionary* measures of the kind described in the example of the distribution of housing accommodation in the interests of the poor. *Exactly the same* procedure must be adopted in both town and country for the distribution of provisions, clothing, footwear, etc., in respect of the land in the rural districts, and so forth. For the administration of the state in *this* spirit we can *at once set in motion a state* apparatus consisting of ten if not twenty million people, an apparatus such as no capitalist state has ever known. We alone can create such an apparatus, for we are sure of the fullest and devoted sympathy of the vast majority of the population. We alone can create such an apparatus, because we have class-conscious workers disciplined by long capitalist "schooling" (it was not for nothing that we went to learn in the school of capitalism), workers who are *capable* of forming a workers' militia and of *gradually* expanding it (beginning to expand it at once) into a militia *embracing the whole people*. The class-conscious workers must lead, but for the work of administration they can enlist the vast mass of the working and oppressed people.

It goes without saying that this new apparatus is bound to make mistakes in taking its first steps. But did not the peasants make mistakes when they emerged from serfdom and began to manage their own affairs? Is there any way other than practice by which the people can learn to govern themselves and to avoid mistakes? Is there any way other than by proceeding immediately to genuine self-government by the people? The chief thing now is to abandon the prejudiced bourgeois-intellectualist view that only special officials, who by their very social position are entirely dependent upon capital, can administer the state. The chief thing is to put an end to the state of affairs in which bourgeois officials and "socialist" ministers are trying to govern in the old way, but are incapable of doing so and, after seven months, are faced with a peasant revolt in a peasant country! The chief thing is to imbue the oppressed and the working

people with confidence in their own strength, to prove to them in practice that they can and must themselves ensure the *proper*, most strictly regulated and organised distribution of bread, all kinds of food, milk, clothing, housing, etc., *in the interests of the poor*. Unless this is done, Russia *cannot* be saved from collapse and ruin. The conscientious, bold, universal move to hand over administrative work to proletarians and semi-proletarians, will, however, rouse such unprecedented revolutionary enthusiasm among the people, will so multiply the people's forces in combating distress, that much that seemed impossible to our narrow, old, bureaucratic forces will become possible for the millions, who will *begin to work for themselves* and not for the capitalists, the gentry, the bureaucrats, and not out of fear of punishment.

* * *

Pertinent to the question of the state apparatus is also the question of centralism raised with unusual vehemence and ineptitude by Comrade Bazarov in *Novaya Zhizn* No. 138, of September 27, in an article entitled: "The Bolsheviks and the Problem of Power".

Comrade Bazarov reasons as follows: "The Soviets are not an apparatus suitable for all spheres of state life", for, he says, seven months' experience has shown, and "scores and hundreds of documents in the possession of the Economic Department of the St. Petersburg Executive Committee" have confirmed, that the Soviets, although actually enjoying "full power" in many places, "have not been able to achieve anything like satisfactory results in combating economic ruin". What is needed is an apparatus "divided up according to branches of production, with strict centralisation within each branch, and subordinated to one, country-wide centre". "It is a matter", if you please, "not of replacing the old apparatus, but merely of reforming it ... no matter how much the Bolsheviks may jeer at people with a plan...."

All these arguments of Comrade Bazarov's are positively amazing for their helplessness, they echo the arguments of the bourgeoisie and reflect their class point of view.

In fact, to say that the Soviets have anywhere in Russia

ever enjoyed "full power" is simply ridiculous (if it is not a repetition of the selfish class lie of the capitalists). Full power means power over all the land, over all the banks, over all the factories; a man who is at all familiar with the facts of history and science on the connection between politics and economics could not have "forgotten" this "trifling" circumstance.

The bourgeoisie's device is to *withhold* power from the Soviets, *sabotage* every important step they take, while at the same time retaining government in their own hands, retaining power over the land, the banks, etc., and then throwing the blame for the ruin upon the Soviets! This is exactly what the whole sad experience of the coalition amounts to.

The Soviets have never had full power, and the measures they have taken could not result in anything but palliatives that added to the confusion.

The effort to prove the necessity for centralism to the Bolsheviks who are centralists by conviction, by their programme and by the entire tactics of their Party, is really like forcing an open door. The writers of *Novaya Zhizn* are wasting their time only because they have totally failed to understand the meaning and significance of our jeers at their "country-wide" point of view. And the *Novaya Zhizn* people have failed to understand this because they merely pay *lip-service* to the doctrine of the class struggle, but do not accept it seriously. Repeating the words about the class struggle they have learned by rote, they are constantly slipping into the "above-class point of view", amusing in theory and reactionary in practice, and are calling this fawning upon the bourgeoisie a "country-wide" plan.

The state, dear people, is a class concept. The state is an organ or instrument of violence exercised by one class against another. So long as it is an instrument of violence exercised by the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, the proletariat can have only one slogan: *destruction* of this state. But when the state will be a proletarian state, when it will be an instrument of violence exercised by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, we shall be fully and unreservedly in favour of a strong state power and of centralism.

To put it in more popular language, we do not jeer at "plans", but at Bazarov and Co.'s failure to understand

that by repudiating "workers' control", by repudiating the "dictatorship of the proletariat" they *are for* the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. There is no middle course; a middle course is the futile dream of the petty-bourgeois democrat.

Not a single central body, not a single Bolshevik has ever argued against *centralisation* of the Soviets, against their amalgamation. None of us objects to having factory committees in each branch of production, or to their centralisation. Bazarov is *wide of the mark*.

We laugh, have laughed, and will laugh not at "centralism", and not at "plans", but at *reformism*, because, after the experience of the coalition, your reformism is utterly ridiculous. And to say "not replace the apparatus but reform it" means to be a reformist, means to become not a revolutionary but a reformist democrat. Reformism means nothing more than concessions on the part of the ruling class, but *not* its overthrow; it makes concessions, but power remains in *its hands*.

This is precisely what has been tried during six months of the coalition.

This is what we laugh at. Having failed to obtain a thorough grasp of the doctrine of the class struggle, Bazarov allows himself to be caught by the bourgeoisie who sing in chorus "Just so, just so, we are by no means opposed to reform, we are in favour of the workers participating in country-wide control, we fully agree with that", and good Bazarov *objectively* sings the descant for the capitalists.

This has always been and always will be the case with people who in the thick of intense class struggle want to take up a "middle" position. And it is because-the writers of *Novaya Zhizn* are incapable of understanding the class struggle that their policy is such a ridiculous and eternal oscillation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Get busy on "plans", dear citizens, that is not politics, that is not the class struggle; here you may be of use to the people. You have many economists on your paper. Unite with those engineers and others who are willing to work on problems of regulating production and distribution; devote the centre page of your big "apparatus" (your paper) to a practical study of precise facts on the production and distribution of goods in Russia, on banks, syndicates, etc.,

etc.—that is how you will be of use to the people; that is how your sitting between two stools will not be particularly harmful; such work on "plans" will earn not the ridicule, but the gratitude of the workers.

When the proletariat is victorious it will do the following, it will set economists, engineers, agronomists, and so forth, to work *under the control* of the workers' organisations on drawing up a "plan", on verifying it, on devising labour-saving methods of centralisation, on devising the simplest, cheapest, most convenient and universal measures and methods of control. For this we shall pay the economists, statisticians and technicians good money ... but we shall not give them anything to eat if they do not perform this work conscientiously and entirely *in the interests of the working people.*

We are in favour of centralism and of a "plan", but of the centralism and plan of the *proletarian* state, of proletarian regulation of production and distribution in the interests of the poor, the working people, the exploited, *against* the exploiters. We can agree to only one meaning of the term "country-wide", namely, that which breaks the resistance of the capitalists, which gives all power to the majority of the people, i.e., the proletarians and semi-proletarians, the workers and the poor peasants.

* * *

The fifth plea is that the Bolsheviks will not be able to retain power because "the situation is exceptionally complicated"....

O wise men! They, perhaps, would be willing to reconcile themselves to revolution if only the "situation" were not "exceptionally complicated".

Such revolutions never occur, and sighs for such a revolution amount to nothing more than the reactionary wails of a bourgeois intellectual. Even if a revolution has started in a situation that seemed to be not very complicated, the development of the revolution itself *always* creates an *exceptionally* complicated situation. A revolution, a real, profound, a "people's" revolution, to use Marx's expression,[58] is the incredibly complicated and painful process

of the death of the old and birth of the new social order, of the mode of life of tens of millions of people. Revolution is a most intense, furious, desperate class struggle and civil war. Not a single great revolution in history has taken place without civil war. And only a "man in a muffler"[59] can think that civil war is conceivable without an "exceptionally complicated situation".

If the situation were not exceptionally complicated there would be no revolution. If you are afraid of wolves don't go into the forest.

There is nothing to discuss in the fifth plea, because there is no economic, political, or any other meaning whatever in it. It contains only the yearning of people who are distressed and frightened by the revolution. To characterise this yearning I shall take the liberty of mentioning two little things from my personal experience.

I had a conversation with a wealthy engineer shortly before the July days. This engineer had once been a revolutionary, had been in the Social-Democratic movement and even a member of the Bolshevik Party. Now he was full of fear and rage at the turbulent and indomitable workers. "If they were at least like the German workers," he said (he is an educated man and has been abroad), "of course, I understand that the social revolution is, in general, inevitable, but here, when the workers' level has been so reduced by the war ... it is not a revolution, it is an abyss."

He was willing to accept the social revolution if history were to lead to it in the peaceful, calm, smooth and precise manner of a German express train pulling into a station. A sedate conductor would open the carriage door and announce: "Social Revolution Station! *Alle aussteigen!* (All change!)" In that case he would have no objection to changing his position of engineer under the Tit Tityches to that of engineer under the workers' organisations.

That man has seen strikes. He knows what a storm of passion the most ordinary strike arouses even in the most peaceful times. He, of course, understands how many million times more furious this storm must be when the class struggle has aroused *all* the working people of a vast country, when war and exploitation have driven almost to desperation millions of people who for centuries have been torment-

ed by the landowners, for decades have been robbed and downtrodden by the capitalists and the tsar's officials. He understands all this "theoretically", he only pays *lip-service* to this, he is simply terrified by the "exceptionally complicated situation".

After the July days, thanks to the extremely solicitous attention with which the Kerensky government honoured me, I was obliged to go underground. Of course, it was the workers who sheltered people like us. In a small working-class house in a remote working-class suburb of Petrograd, dinner is being served. The hostess puts bread on the table. The host says: "Look what fine bread. 'They' dare not give us bad bread now. And we had almost given up even thinking that we'd ever get good bread in Petrograd again."

I was amazed at this class appraisal of the July days. My thoughts had been revolving around the political significance of those events, weighing the role they played in the general course of events, analysing the situation that caused this zigzag in history and the situation it would create, and how we ought to change our slogans and alter our Party apparatus to adapt it to the changed situation. As for bread, I, who had not known want, did not give it a thought. I took bread for granted, as a by-product of the writer's work, as it were. The mind approaches the foundation of everything, the class struggle for bread, through political analysis that follows an extremely complicated and devious path.

This member of the oppressed class, however, even though one of the well-paid and quite intelligent workers, takes the bull by the horns with that astonishing simplicity and straightforwardness, with that firm determination and amazing clarity of outlook from which we intellectuals are as remote as the stars in the sky. The whole world is divided into two camps: "us", the working people, and "them", the exploiters. Not a shadow of embarrassment over what had taken place; it was just one of the battles in the long struggle between labour and capital. When you fell trees, chips fly.

"What a painful thing is this 'exceptionally complicated situation' created by the revolution," that's how the bourgeois intellectual thinks and feels.

"We squeezed 'them' a bit; 'they' won't dare to lord it over us as they did before. We'll squeeze again—and chuck them out altogether," that's how the worker thinks and feels.

* * *

The sixth and last plea: the proletariat "will be incapable of resisting all the pressure by hostile forces that will sweep away not only the proletarian dictatorship, but the entire revolution into the bargain".

Don't try to scare us, gentlemen, you won't succeed. We saw these hostile forces and their pressure in Kornilovism (from which the Kerensky regime in no way differs). Everybody saw, and the people remember, how the proletariat and the poor peasants swept away the Kornilov gang, and how pitiful and helpless proved to be the position of the supporters of the bourgeoisie and of the few exceptionally well-to-do local small landowners who were exceptionally "hostile" to the revolution. *Dyelo Naroda* of September 30 urges the workers to "be patient and put up with" Kerensky (i.e., Kornilov) and the fake Tsereteli Bulygin Duma until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (convened under the protection of "military measures" against insurgent peasants!) and, with great gusto, it repeats precisely *Novaya Zhizn*'s sixth plea and shouts until it is hoarse: "The Kerensky government will under no circumstances submit" (to the rule of the Soviets, the rule of the workers and peasants, which *Dyelo Naroda*, not wishing to lag behind the pogrom-mongers and anti-Semites, monarchists and Cadets, calls the rule of "Trotsky and Lenin": these are the lengths to which the Socialist-Revolutionaries go!).

But neither *Novaya Zhizn* nor *Dyelo Naroda* can scare the class-conscious workers. "The Kerensky government," you say, "will under no circumstances submit", i.e., it will repeat the Kornilov revolt, to put it more simply, bluntly and clearly. And the gentlemen of *Dyelo Naroda* dare to say that this will be "civil war", that this is a "horrible prospect"!

No, gentlemen, you will not fool the workers. It will not be civil war but a hopeless revolt of a handful of Kornilovites. If they want to "refuse to submit" to the people and at all costs provoke a repetition on a wide scale of what

happened to the Kornilov men in Vyborg—*if* that is what the Socialist-Revolutionaries *want*, if that is what the member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Kerensky wants, he may drive the people to desperation. But you will not scare the workers and soldiers with this, gentlemen.

What boundless insolence. They faked up a new Bulygin Duma; by means of fraud they recruited a crowd of reactionary co-operators and village kulaks to help them, added to these the capitalists and landowners (the so-called property-owning classes) and with the aid of this gang of Kornilovites they want *to thwart the will of the people*, the will of the workers and peasants.

They have brought affairs in a peasant country to such a pass that peasant revolt is spreading everywhere like a river in flood! Think of it! In a democratic republic in which 80 per cent of the population are peasants, the peasants have been driven to revolt.... This same *Dyelo Naroda*, Chernov's newspaper, the organ of the "Socialist-Revolutionary" Party, which on September 30 has the effrontery to advise the workers and peasants to "be patient", was obliged to admit in a leading article on September 29:

> "*So far practically nothing* has been done to put an end to those relations of *bondage* that still *prevail* in the villages of central Russia."

This same *Dyelo Naroda*, in the same leading article of September 29, says that "the dead hand of Stolypin is still making itself strongly felt" in the methods employed by the "revolutionary ministers"; in other words, putting it more clearly and simply, it brands Kerensky, Nikitin, Kishkin and Co. as *Stolypins*.

The "Stolypins" Kerensky and Co. have driven the peasants to revolt, are now taking "military measures" against the peasants, are trying to soothe the people with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (although Kerensky and Tsereteli have already *deceived* the people once by solemnly proclaiming on July 8 that the Constituent Assembly would be convened on the appointed date, September 17; they then *broke their promise* and postponed the Constituent Assembly even against the advice of the *Menshevik Dan*, postponed the Constituent Assembly not to the end of October as the Menshevik Central Executive Committee of

that time wished, but to the end of November). The "Stolypins" Kerensky and Co. are trying to soothe the people with the imminent convocation of the Constituent Assembly, as if the people can believe those who have already lied in this matter, as if the people can believe that the Constituent Assembly will be *properly* convened by a government which has taken *military measures* in remote villages, that is to say, is openly *conniving* at the arbitrary arrest of class-conscious peasants and the *rigging* of the elections.

The government has driven the peasants to revolt and now has the effrontery to say to them: "You must 'be patient', you must wait, trust the government which is pacifying insurgent peasants by 'military measures'!"

To bring matters to such a pitch that hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers perish in the offensive after June 19, the war is being protracted, German sailors have mutinied and are throwing their officers overboard, to bring matters to such a pitch, all the time uttering phrases about peace but *not offering* a just peace to *all* the belligerents, and yet to have the effrontery to tell the workers and peasants, to tell the dying soldiers, "you must be patient", trust the government of the "Stolypin man" Kerensky, trust the Kornilov generals for another month, perhaps in that month they will send several tens of thousands more soldiers to the slaughter.... "You must be patient"....

Isn't that shameless?

But you won't fool the soldiers, gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky's fellow party members.

The workers and soldiers will not endure the Kerensky government for a single day, for an *extra* hour, for they know that the *Soviet* Government will *immediately* offer all the belligerents a just peace and therefore will *in all probability* achieve an immediate armistice and a speedy peace.

Not for a single day, not for an *extra* hour will the soldiers of our peasant army allow the Kerensky government—the government which is employing *military measures* to suppress the peasant revolt—to remain in power against the will of the Soviets.

No, gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky's fellow party members, you won't fool the workers and peasants any more.

* * *

On the question of the pressure by hostile forces which the mortally frightened *Novaya Zhizn* assures us will sweep away the proletarian dictatorship, still another monstrous logical and political mistake is made, which only people who have allowed themselves to be frightened out of their wits can fail to see.

"Pressure by hostile forces will sweep away the proletarian dictatorship," you say. Very well. But you are all economists and educated people, dear fellow-citizens. You all know that to contrast democracy to the bourgeoisie is senseless and a sign of ignorance; it is the same as contrasting pounds to yards, for there is a democratic bourgeoisie and undemocratic groups of the petty bourgeoisie (capable of raising a Vendée).

"Hostile forces" is merely an empty phrase. The class term is *bourgeoisie* (backed by the landowners).

The bourgeoisie and the landowners, the proletariat, and the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, primarily the peasants—these are the three main "forces" into which Russia, like *every* capitalist country, is divided. These are the three main "forces" that have long been revealed in every capitalist country (including Russia) not only by scientific economic analysis, but also by the *political experience* of the modern history of *all* countries, by the experience of *all* European revolutions since the eighteenth century, by the experience of the *two* Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

So, you threaten the proletariat with the prospect that its rule will be swept away by the pressure of the bourgeoisie? That, and that alone, is what your threat amounts to, it has no other meaning.

Very well. If, for example, the bourgeoisie can sweep away the rule of the workers and poor peasants, then the only alternative is a "coalition", i.e., an alliance, or agreement, between the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Nothing else can be contemplated!

But coalition has been tried for about six months and it has led to bankruptcy, and you yourselves, my dear but dense citizens of *Novaya Zhizn*, have *renounced* coalition.

So what do we get?

You have become so muddled, citizens of *Novaya Zhizn*, you have allowed yourselves to be so scared, that you cannot think straight in the extremely simple matter of *counting even up to three, let alone up to five.*

Either all power to the bourgeoisie—the slogan you have long ceased to advocate, and which the bourgeoisie themselves dare not even hint at, for they know that the people overthrew this power with one hitch of the shoulder at the time of the April 20-21 events, and would overthrow it now with thrice that determination and ruthlessness; or power to the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., a coalition (alliance, agreement) between them and the bourgeoisie, for the petty bourgeoisie do not wish to and *cannot* take power alone and independently, as has been proved by the experience of all revolutions, and as is proved by economics, which explains that in a capitalist country it is possible to stand for capital and it is possible to stand for labour, but it is impossible to stand for long in between. In Russia this coalition has for six months tried scores of ways and failed.

Or, finally, all power to the proletarians and the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie in order to break their resistance. This has not yet been tried, and you, gentlemen of *Novaya Zhizn*, are *dissuading* the people from this, you are trying to frighten them with your own fear of the bourgeoisie.

No fourth way can be invented.

If *Novaya Zhizn*, therefore, is afraid of the proletarian dictatorship and rejects it because, as it claims, the proletarian power may be defeated by the bourgeoisie, it is tantamount to its *surreptitiously reverting* to the position of *compromise* with the capitalists! It is as clear as daylight, that whoever is afraid of resistance, whoever does not believe that it is possible to break this resistance, whoever warns the people: "beware of the resistance of the capitalists, you will not be able to cope with it", is *thereby* again calling for compromise with the capitalists.

Novaya Zhizn is hopelessly and pitifully muddled, as are all the petty-bourgeois democrats who now realise that the coalition is bankrupt, dare not defend it openly and, at the same time, protected by the bourgeoisie, fear the transfer of all power to the proletarians and poor peasants.

* * *

To fear the resistance of the capitalists and yet to call oneself a revolutionary, to wish to be regarded as a socialist—isn't that disgraceful? How low must international socialism, corrupted by opportunism, have fallen ideologically if such voices *could* be raised?

We have already seen the strength of the capitalists' resistance; the entire people have seen it, for the capitalists are more class-conscious than the other classes and at once realised the significance of the Soviets, at once exerted *all their efforts* to the utmost, resorted to everything, went to all lengths, resorted to the most incredible lies and slander, to military plots *in order to frustrate the Soviets*, to reduce them to nought, to prostitute them (with the aid of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), to transform them into talking-shops, to wear down the peasants and workers by months and months of empty talk and playing at revolution.

We have not yet seen, however, the strength of resistance of the proletarians and poor peasants, for this strength will become fully apparent only when power is in the hands of the proletariat, when tens of millions of people who have been crushed by want and capitalist slavery see from experience and *feel* that state power has passed into the hands of the oppressed classes, that the state is helping the poor to fight the landowners and capitalists, is *breaking* their resistance. *Only* then shall we see what untapped forces of resistance to the capitalists are latent among the people; only then will what Engels called "latent socialism"[60] manifest itself. Only then, for every *ten thousand* overt and concealed enemies of working-class rule, manifesting themselves actively or by passive resistance, there will arise *a million* new fighters who had been politically dormant, writhing in the torments of poverty and despair, having ceased to believe that they were human, that they had the right to live, that they too could be served by the entire might of the modern centralised state, that contingents of the proletarian militia could, with the fullest confidence, also call upon *them* to take a direct, immediate, daily part in state administration.

The capitalists and landowners, with the kind help of Plekhanov, Breshkovskaya, Tsereteli, Chernov and Co., have done *everything* in their power to *defile* the democratic republic, to defile it by servility to wealth to such a degree that the people are being overcome by apathy, indifference; *it is all the same to them*, because the hungry man cannot see the difference between the republic and the monarchy; the freezing, barefooted, worn-out soldier sacrificing his life for alien interests is not inclined to love the republic.

But when every labourer, every unemployed worker, every cook, every ruined peasant sees, not from the newspapers, but with his own eyes, that the proletarian state is not cringing to wealth but is helping the poor, that this state does not hesitate to adopt revolutionary measures, that it confiscates surplus stocks of provisions from the parasites-and distributes them to the hungry, that it forcibly installs the homeless in the houses of the rich, that it compels the rich to pay for milk but does not give them a drop until the children of *all* poor families are sufficiently supplied, that the land is being transferred to the working people and the factories and banks are being placed under the control of the workers, and that immediate and severe punishment is meted out to the millionaires who conceal their wealth—when the poor see and feel this, no capitalist or kulak forces, no forces of world finance capital which manipulates thousands of millions, will vanquish the people's revolution; on the contrary, *the socialist revolution* will triumph all over the world for it is maturing in all countries.

Our revolution will be invincible if it is not afraid of itself, if it transfers all power to the proletariat, for behind us stand the immeasurably larger, more developed, more organised world forces of the proletariat which are temporarily held down by the war but not destroyed; on the contrary, the war has multiplied them.

* * *

How can one be afraid that the Bolshevik government, that is to say, the proletarian government, which is assured of the devoted support of the poor peasants, will be "swept away" by the capitalist gentlemen! What shortsightedness!

What disgraceful fear of the people! What hypocrisy! Those who show this fear belong to that "high" (by capitalist standards, but actually *rotten*) "society" which utters the word "justice" without believing in it, from habit, as a trite phrase, attaching no meaning to it.

Here is an example.

Mr. Peshekhonov is a well-known semi-Cadet. A more moderate Trudovik, one of the same mind as the Breshkovskayas and Plekhanovs, will not be found. There has never been a minister more servile to the bourgeoisie. The world had never seen a more ardent advocate of "coalition", of compromise with the capitalists.

Here are the admissions this gentleman-was *forced* to make in his speech at the "Democratic" (read: Bulygin) Conference as reported by the defencist *Izvestia*:

> "There are two programmes. One is the programme of group claims, class and national claims. This programme is most frankly advocated by the Bolsheviks. It is not easy, however, for the other sections of the democracy to reject this programme. They are the claims of the working people, the claims of the cheated and oppressed nationalities. It is not so easy, therefore, for the democracy to break with the Bolsheviks, to reject these class demands, primarily because in essence these demands are just. But this programme, for which we fought before the revolution, for the sake of which we made the revolution, and which we would all unanimously support under other circumstances, constitutes a very grave danger under present conditions. The danger is all the greater now because these demands have to be presented at a time when it is impossible for the state to comply with them. We must first defend the whole—the state, to save it from doom, and there is only one way to do that, not the satisfaction of demands, however just and cogent they may be, but, on the contrary, restriction and sacrifice, which must be contributed from all quarters. (*Izvestia*, September 17.)

Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that as long as the capitalists are in power he is defending *not* the whole, but the selfish interests of Russian and "Allied" imperialist capital. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that the war would cease to be an imperialist, predatory war of annexation only after a rupture with the capitalists, with *their* secret treaties, with *their* annexations (seizure of alien territory), with *their* banking and financial swindles. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that only *after* this would the war become—if the enemy rejected the formal offer of

a just peace—a defensive war, a just war. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand that the defence potential of a country that has thrown off the yoke of capital, that has given the peasants land and has placed the banks and factories under workers' control, would be many times greater than the defence potential of a capitalist country.

The main thing that. Mr. Peshekhonov fails to understand is that he surrenders his entire position, the entire position of the entire petty-bourgeois democracy when he is forced to admit the justice of Bolshevism, to admit that its demands are the demands of the "working people", i.e., of the majority of the people.

This is where our strength lies. This is why our government will be invincible; because even our opponents are forced to admit that the Bolshevik programme is that of the "working people" and the "oppressed nationalities".

After all, Mr. Peshekhonov is the political friend of the Cadets, of the Yedinstvo and Dyelo Naroda people, of the Breshkovskayas and Plekhanovs, he is the representative of the kulaks and of the gentlemen whose wives and sisters would come tomorrow to gouge out with their umbrellas the eyes of wounded Bolsheviks if they were to be defeated by Kornilov's or (which is the same thing) Kerensky's troops.

A gentleman like that is forced to admit the "justice" of the Bolshevik demands.

For him "justice" is merely an empty phrase. For the mass of semi-proletarians, however, and for the majority of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie who have been ruined, tortured and worn out by the war, it is not an empty phrase, but a most acute, most burning and immense question of death from starvation, of a crust of bread. That is why no policy can be based on a "coalition", on a "compromise" between the interests of the starving and ruined and the interests of the exploiters. That is why the Bolshevik government is assured of the support of the overwhelming majority of these people.

Justice is an empty word, say the intellectuals and those rascals who are inclined to proclaim themselves Marxists on the lofty grounds that they have "contemplated the hind parts" of economic materialism.

Ideas become a power when they grip the people. And precisely at the present time the Bolsheviks, i.e., the representatives of revolutionary proletarian internationalism, have embodied in their policy the idea that is motivating countless working people all over the world.

Justice alone, the mere anger of the people against exploitation, would never have brought them on to the true path of socialism. But now that, thanks to capitalism, the material apparatus of the big banks, syndicates, railways, and so forth, has grown, now that the immense experience of the advanced countries has accumulated a stock of engineering marvels, the employment of which is being *hindered* by capitalism, now that the class-conscious workers have built up a party of a quarter of a million members to systematically lay hold of this apparatus and set it in motion with the support of all the working and exploited people—now that these conditions exist, no power on earth can prevent the Bolsheviks, *if they do not allow themselves to be scared* and if they succeed in taking power, from retaining it until the triumph of the world socialist revolution.

AFTERWORD

The foregoing lines were already written when the leading article in *Novaya Zhizn* of October 1 produced another gem of stupidity which is all the more dangerous because it professes sympathy with the Bolsheviks and offers most sagacious philistine admonitions "not to allow yourselves to be provoked" (not to allow ourselves to be caught in the trap of screams about provocation, the object of which is to frighten the Bolsheviks and cause them to *refrain* from taking power).

Here is this gem:

> "The lessons of movements, like that of July 3-5, on the one hand, and of the Kornilov days, on the other, have shown quite clearly that the democracy, having at its command organs that exercise immense influence among the population, is invincible when it takes a defensive position in civil war, and that it suffers defeat, loses all the middle vacillating groups when it takes the initiative and launches an offensive."

If the Bolsheviks were to yield in any form and in the slightest degree to the philistine stupidity of this argument they would ruin their Party and the revolution.

For the author of this argument, taking it upon himself to talk about civil war (just the subject for a lady with many good points), has distorted *the lessons of history* on this question in an incredibly comical manner.

This is how *these* lessons, the lessons of history on *this* question, were treated by the representative and founder of proletarian revolutionary tactics, Karl Marx:

"Now, insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other art, and is subject to certain procedural rules which,

when neglected, will bring about the downfall of the party neglecting them. These rules, logical deductions from the nature of the parties and the circumstances you have to deal with in such a case, are so plain and simple that the brief experience of 1848 made the Germans fairly well acquainted with them. Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to go the whole way [literally: face the consequences of your game].* "Insurrection is an equation with very indefinite magnitudes, the value of which may change every day; the forces opposed to you have all the advantage of organisation, discipline and habitual authority [Marx has in mind the most "difficult" case of insurrection: against the "firmly established" old authority, against the army not yet disintegrated by the influence of the revolution and the vacillation of the government]; unless you bring strong odds against them you are defeated and ruined. Secondly, once you have entered upon the insurrectionary career, act with the greatest determination, and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising; it is lost before it measures itself with its enemies. Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattered, prepare the way for new successes, however small, but prepare daily; keep up the moral superiority which the first successful rising has given to you; rally in this way those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary tactics yet known: *de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace!*" (*Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, German edition, 1907, p. 118).

We have changed all that, the "would-be Marxists" of *Novaya Zhizn* may say about themselves; instead of triple audacity they have two virtues: "We have two, sir: moderation and accuracy."[61] For "us", the experience of world history, the experience of the Great French Revolution, is nothing. The important thing for "us" is the experience of the two movements in 1917, distorted by Molchalin spectacles.

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Let us examine this experience without these charming spectacles.

You compare July 3-5 with "civil war", because you believed Alexinsky, Pereverzev and Co. It is typical of the gentlemen of *Novaya Zhizn* that they believe *such* people (and do absolutely nothing themselves to *collect information* about July 3-5, although they have the huge apparatus of a big daily newspaper at their disposal).

Let us assume for a moment, however, that July 3-5 was not the rudiment of civil war that was kept within the rudimentary stage by the Bolsheviks, but actual civil war. Let us assume this.

In that case, then, what does this lesson prove?

First, the Bolsheviks did *not* take the offensive, for it is indisputable that on the night of July 3-4, and even on July 4, they would have gained a great deal if they had taken the offensive. Their defensive position was their weakness, if we are to speak of civil war (as *Novaya Zhizn* does, and not of converting a spontaneous outburst into a demonstration of the type of April 20-21, as the *facts* show).

The "lesson" therefore proves that the wise men of *Novaya Zhizn* are *wrong*.

Secondly, if the Bolsheviks did not even set out to start an insurrection on July 3 or 4, if *not a single* Bolshevik *body* even raised such a question, the reason for it lies *beyond* the scope of our controversy with *Novaya Zhizn*. For we are arguing about the *lessons* of "civil war", i.e., of insurrection, and not about the point that obvious lack of a majority to support it restrains the revolutionary party from thinking of insurrection.

Since everybody knows that the Bolsheviks received a majority in the metropolitan Soviets and in the country (over 49 per cent of the Moscow votes) *much later* than July 1917, it again follows that the "lessons" are far, far from what *Novaya Zhizn*, that lady with many good points, would like them to be.

No, no, you had better not meddle with politics, citizens of *Novaya Zhizn*!

If the revolutionary party has no majority in the advanced contingents of the revolutionary classes and in the country, insurrection is out of the question. Moreover, insurrection

requires: (1) growth of the revolution on a country-wide scale; (2) the complete moral and political bankruptcy of the old government, for example, the "coalition" government; (3) extreme vacillation in the camp of all middle groups, i.e., those who do *not* fully support the government, although they did fully support it yesterday.

Why did *Novaya Zhizn*, when speaking of the "lessons" of July 3-5, fail even to note this very important lesson? Because a political question was not dealt with by politicians but by a circle of intellectuals who had been terrified by the bourgeoisie.

To proceed. Thirdly, the facts show that it was *after* July 3-4 that the *rot* set in among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, precisely because the Tseretelis had *exposed* themselves by their *July* policy, precisely because the mass of the *people* realised that the Bolsheviks were *their own* front-rank fighters and that the "social-bloc" advocates were traitors. *Even before* the Kornilov revolt this rot was fully revealed by the Petrograd elections on August 20, which resulted in a victory for the Bolsheviks and the rout of the "social-bloc" advocates (*Dyelo Naroda* recently tried to refute this *by concealing* the returns for *all* parties, but this was both self-deception and deception of its readers; according to the figures published in *Dyen* of August 24, covering only the city, the Cadets' share of the total vote increased from 22 to 23 per cent, but the absolute number of votes cast for the Cadets dropped 40 per cent; the Bolsheviks' share of the total vote increased from 20 to 33 per cent, while the absolute number of votes cast for the Bolsheviks dropped only 10 per cent; the share of all "middle groups" dropped from 58 to 44 per cent, but the absolute number of votes cast for them dropped 60 per cent!).

That a rot had set in among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks after the July days and before the Kornilov days is also proved by the growth of the Left wings in both parties, reaching almost 40 per cent: this is "retribution" for the persecution of the Bolsheviks by the Kerenskys.

In spite of the "loss" of a few hundred members, the proletarian party *gained* enormously from July 3-4, for it was precisely during those stern days that the *people* real-

ised and saw its devotion and the *treachery* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. So, the "lesson" is far, very far from being of the *Novaya Zhizn* sort, it is one entirely different, namely: don't desert the seething masses for the "Molchalins of democracy"; and if you launch an insurrection, go over to the offensive while the enemy forces are scattered, catch the enemy unawares.

Is that not so, gentlemen "would-be Marxists" of *Novaya Zhizn*?

Or does "Marxism" mean *not* basing tactics on an exact appraisal of the *objective* situation but senselessly and uncritically lumping together "civil war" and "a Congress of Soviets and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly"?

But this is simply ridiculous, gentlemen, this is a sheer mockery of Marxism and of logic in general!

If there is *nothing* in the *objective* situation that warrants the intensification of the class struggle to the point of "civil war", why did you speak of "civil war" *in connection* with "a Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly"? (For this is the title of the leading article in *Novaya Zhizn* here under discussion.) In that case you should clearly have told the reader and proved to him that there is *no* ground in the objective situation for civil war and that, therefore, peaceful, constitutionally-legal, juridically and parliamentarily "simple" things like a Congress of Soviets and a Constituent Assembly can and should be the cornerstone of tactics. In that case it is *possible* to hold the opinion that such a congress and such an assembly are really capable *of making decisions*.

If, however, the present objective conditions harbour the inevitability or even only the probability of civil war, if you did not "idly" speak about it, but did so clearly seeing, feeling, sensing the existence of a situation of civil war, how could you make a Congress of Soviets or a Constituent Assembly the cornerstone? This is a sheer mockery of the starving and tormented people! Do you think the starving will consent to "wait" two months? Or that the ruin, about the increase of which you yourselves write every day, will consent to "wait" for the Congress of Soviets or for the Constituent Assembly? Or that the German offensive, in the absence of serious steps on our part towards peace (i.e., in

the absence of a formal offer of a just peace to all belligerents), will consent to "wait" for the Congress of Soviets or for the Constituent Assembly? Or are you in possession of facts which permit you to conclude that the history of the Russian revolution, which from February 28 to September 30 had proceeded with extraordinary turbulence and unprecedented rapidity, will, from October 1 to November 29,[62] proceed at a super-tranquil, peaceful, legally balanced pace that will preclude upheavals, spurts, military defeats and economic crises? Or will the army at the front, concerning which the *non*-Bolshevik officer Dubasov said officially, in the name of the front, "it will not fight", quietly starve and freeze until the "appointed" date? Or will the peasant revolt cease to be a factor of civil war because you call it "anarchy" and "pogrom", or because Kerensky will send "military" forces *against the peasants*? Or is it possible, *conceivable*, that the government can work calmly, honestly, and *without* deception to convene the Constituent Assembly in a *peasant* country when that same government is *suppressing* the peasant revolt?

Don't laugh at the "confusion in the Smolny Institute",[63] gentlemen! There is no less confusion in your own ranks. You answer the formidable questions of civil war with confused phrases and pitiful constitutional illusions. That is why I say that if the Bolsheviks were to give in to these moods they would ruin both their Party and their revolution.

October 1, 1917. *N. Lenin*

TO WORKERS, PEASANTS, AND SOLDIERS!

Comrades! The Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, to which Kerensky belongs, appeals to you in its paper *Dyelo Naroda* (of September 30) "*to be patient*".

The paper asks us "to be patient" and urges that power be left in the hands of Kerensky's government, that power should not pass to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Let Kerensky rely on the landowners, capitalists and kulaks, let the Soviets that have carried through the revolution and vanquished the Kornilovite generals "be patient", we are told. Let them have patience until the Constituent Assembly, which will soon be convened.

Comrades! Look around you, see what is happening in the countryside, see what is happening in the army, and you will realise that the peasants and the soldiers cannot tolerate it any longer. *An uprising of the peasants* from whom the land has hitherto been withheld by fraud is sweeping like a broad river over the whole of Russia. The peasants cannot tolerate it any longer. Kerensky sends *troops* to suppress the peasants and to defend the landowners. Kerensky has again come to an agreement with the Kornilovite generals and officers who stand for the landowners.

Neither the workers in the cities nor the soldiers at the front can tolerate this military suppression of the just struggle of the peasants for the land.

As to what is going on in the army at the front, Dubasov, a non-Party officer, has declared before all of Russia: "The soldiers will not fight any longer." The soldiers are tired out, the soldiers are barefooted, the soldiers are starving, the soldiers do not want to fight for the interests of the capital-

ists, they do not want to "*be patient*" when they are treated only to beautiful words about peace, while for months there has been a delay (as Kerensky is delaying it) in the *peace proposal*, the proposal for a just peace without annexations, to be offered to *all* the belligerent peoples.

Comrades! Know that Kerensky is again negotiating with the Kornilovite generals and officers to *lead troops against the Soviets* of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, to *prevent* the Soviets *from obtaining power*! Kerensky "*will under no circumstances submit*" to the Soviets, *Dyelo Naroda* openly admits.

Go, then, to the barracks, go to the Cossack units, go to the working people and explain the *truth* to them.

If power is in the hands of the Soviets, then not later than October 25 (if the Congress of Soviets opens on October 20) *a just peace will be offered* to all the belligerent peoples. There will be *a workers' and peasants' government* in Russia; it will *immediately*, without losing a single day, *offer a just peace to all the belligerent peoples*. Then the people will learn who wants the unjust war. Then in the Constituent Assembly the people will decide.

If power is in the hands of the Soviets, the *landowners'* estates will *immediately* be declared the *inalienable property of the whole people*.

This is what Kerensky and his government fight against, relying on the village exploiters, capitalists and landowners!

This is for whom and for whose interests you are asked to "be patient".

Are you willing to "be patient" in order that Kerensky may use armed force to suppress the peasants who have risen for land?

Are you willing to "be patient" in order that *the war may be dragged out longer, in order that the offer* of peace and the annulling of the former tsar's secret treaties with the Russian and Anglo-French capitalists may be postponed?

Comrades, remember that Kerensky deceived the people once when he promised to convene the Constituent Assembly! On July 8 he solemnly promised to convene it not later than September 17, and he has *deceived the people*. Comrades! Whoever believes in the Kerensky government is a traitor to his brothers, the peasants and soldiers!

No, *not for one more day* are the people willing to suffer postponement . *Not for a single day longer* can we suffer the peasants to be suppressed by armed force, thousands upon thousands to perish in the war, when *a just peace* can and must be *offered* at once.

Down with the government of Kerensky, who is conniving with the Kornilovite landowning generals to suppress the peasants, to fire on the peasants, to drag out the war!

All power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!

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LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW AND PETROGRAD COMMITTEES AND THE BOLSHEVIK MEMBERS OF THE PETROGRAD AND MOSCOW SOVIETS[64]

Dear Comrades,

Events are prescribing our task so clearly for us that procrastination is becoming positively *criminal*.

The peasant movement is developing. The government is intensifying its severe repressive measures. Sympathy for us is growing in the army (99 per cent of the soldiers' votes were cast for us in Moscow, the army in Finland and the fleet are against the government, and there is Dubasov's evidence about the front in general).

In Germany the beginning of a revolution is obvious, especially since the sailors were shot. The elections in Moscow—47 per cent Bolsheviks—are a tremendous victory. Together with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries we have an *obvious* majority *in the country*.

The railway and postal employees are in conflict with the government. Instead of calling the Congress for October 20, the Lieberdans are already talking of calling it at the end of October, etc., etc.

Under such circumstances to "wait" would be a crime.

The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets, they must *take power at once*. By so doing they will save the world revolution (for otherwise there is danger of a deal between the imperialists of all countries, who, after the shootings in Germany, will be more accommodating to each other and *will unite against us*), the Russian revolution (otherwise a wave of real anarchy may become stronger *than we are*) and the lives of hundreds of thousands of people at the front.

Delay is criminal. To wait for the Congress of Soviets would be a childish game of formalities, a disgraceful game of formalities, and a betrayal of the revolution.

If power cannot be achieved without insurrection, we must *resort to insurrection at once.* It may very well be that right now power can be achieved without insurrection, for example, if the Moscow Soviet were to take power at once, immediately, and proclaim itself (together with the Petrograd Soviet) the government. Victory in Moscow is guaranteed, and there is no need to fight. Petrograd can wait. The government cannot do anything to save itself; it will surrender.

For, by seizing power and taking over the banks, the factories and *Russkoye Slovo*, the Moscow Soviet would secure a tremendous basis and tremendous strength, it would be able to campaign throughout Russia and raise the issue thus: we shall propose *peace tomorrow* if the Bonapartist Kerensky surrenders (and if he does not, we shall overthrow him). We shall hand over the *land* to the peasants *at once*, we shall make concessions to the railway and postal employees *at once*, and so on.

It is not necessary to "begin" with Petrograd. If Moscow "begins" without any blood being shed, it will certainly be supported by (1) the army at the front by its sympathy, (2) the peasants everywhere and (3) the fleet and the troops in Finland, which will *proceed to Petrograd.*

Even if Kerensky has a corps or two of mounted troops near Petrograd, he will be obliged to surrender. The Petrograd Soviet can wait and campaign for the Moscow Soviet Government. The slogan is: Power to the Soviets, Land to the Peasants, Peace to the Nations, Bread to the Starving!

Victory is certain, and the chances are ten to one that it will be a bloodless victory.

To wait would be a crime to the revolution.

Greetings, *N. Lenin*

Written October 1 (14), 1917

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THESES FOR A REPORT AT THE OCTOBER 8 CONFERENCE OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANISATION, ALSO FOR A RESOLUTION AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THOSE ELECTED TO THE PARTY CONGRESS[65]

ON THE QUESTION OF THE PARTY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PRE-PARLIAMENT

1. The participation of our Party in the Pre-parliament, in the Democratic Council, or in the Council of the Republic is an obvious error and a deviation from the proletarian revolutionary path.

2. The objective situation is such that a revolution against Kerensky's Bonapartist government is undoubtedly fomenting in the country (peasant uprising, increasing dissatisfaction and conflicts with the government in the army and among non-Russian groups, conflict with railway and postal employees, the resounding defeat of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary conciliators at the elections, etc.).

At a time when there is such an upsurge of the revolution, to go to a sham parliament decked out to deceive the people is to facilitate this deception, make the preparation for the revolution *more difficult*, and distract the attention of the people and the forces of the Party from the urgent task of the struggle for power and for the overthrow of the government.

3. The Party congress, therefore, must recall Party members from the Pre-parliament, declare a boycott of it, appeal to the people to prepare forces for dispersing this "Bulygin Duma" of Tsereteli's.

ON THE SLOGAN "ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS"

1. All the six months' work of the Bolsheviks in the revolution, all the criticism levelled by them against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries for their "conciliationism" and for their having turned the Soviets into talking-shops, demand on the part of the Bolsheviks a loyal adherence to this slogan in a straightforward Marxist way. Unfortunately, vacillations are to be noted at the top levels of our Party, a "fear", as it were, of the struggle for power, a tendency to substitute resolutions, protests, and congresses for this struggle.

2. All the experience of both revolutions, that of 1905 and that of 1917, and all the decisions of the Bolshevik Party, all its political declarations for many years, may be reduced to the concept that the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is a reality only as an organ of insurrection, as an organ of revolutionary power. Apart from this, the Soviets are a meaningless plaything that can only produce apathy, indifference and disillusion among the masses, who are legitimately disgusted at the endless repetition of resolutions and protests.

3. Particularly today, when a peasant uprising is sweeping the country and is being suppressed by Kerensky with the aid of picked troops, when even the military measures in the rural areas constitute an obvious threat that the elections to the Constituent Assembly will be rigged, when even in Germany there has been a mutiny in the fleet, a refusal on the part of the Bolsheviks to transform the Soviets into organs of insurrection would be a betrayal both of the peasants and of the cause of the world socialist revolution.

4. The problem of the seizure of power by the Soviets is that of a successful uprising. That is why all the best forces of the Party must be sent to the factories and barracks to explain to the masses their task and, taking their mood correctly in account, choose the proper moment for overthrowing the Kerensky government.

To insist on connecting this task with the Congress of Soviets, to subordinate it to this Congress, means *to be merely playing at insurrection* by setting a definite date beforehand, by making it easier for the government to

prepare troops, by confusing the masses with the illusion that a "resolution" of the Congress of Soviets can solve a task which only the insurrectionary proletariat is capable of solving by force.

5. It is necessary to fight against constitutional illusions and hopes placed in the Congress of Soviets, to discard the preconceived idea that we absolutely must "wait" for it, to concentrate all efforts on explaining to the masses the inevitability of an uprising, and on preparing it. With the Soviets of both capital cities in their hands the Bolsheviks would be reducing all their propaganda for the Power-to-the-Soviets slogan to empty phrases and, politically, would be covering themselves with shame as a party of the revolutionary proletariat if they refused to carry out this task, and if they became reconciled to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (which means a faked Constituent Assembly) by the Kerensky government.

6. This is particularly true now, when the Moscow elections have given the Bolsheviks 49.5 per cent of the votes and when the Bolsheviks, with the support of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, which has long existed in reality, have an undoubted majority in the country.

NOTE TO THE RESOLUTION ON POWER TO THE SOVIETS

Not everything in the Theses on Power to the Soviets should be published, but it is tantamount to the Party's losing its connections with the vanguard of the proletariat, if we refuse to discuss within the Party and to make clear to the masses those most urgent and important problems that cannot be discussed in the open due to the absence of full freedom of the press, or that cannot be brought out openly before the enemy.

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LETTER TO THE PETROGRAD CITY CONFERENCE

TO BE READ IN CLOSED SESSION

Comrades,

Permit me to call the attention of the Conference to the extreme seriousness of the political situation. I base my opinion on the news in the Saturday morning papers alone. That news, however, compels me to raise the question in this way.

The absolute inaction of the British fleet in general, and also of British submarines during the occupation of Esel by the Germans, coupled with the government's plan to move from Petrograd to Moscow—does not all this prove that the Russian and British imperialists, Kerensky and the Anglo-French capitalists, *have conspired* to surrender Petrograd to the Germans and *thus* stifle the Russian revolution?

I think it does.

Perhaps there was no direct conspiracy, but an agreement reached through some Kornilovites (Maklakov or other Cadets, "non-party" Russian millionaires, etc.), but this does not in any way change the nature of it.

The conclusion is clear.

We must admit that unless the Kerensky government is overthrown by the proletariat and the soldiers in the near future the revolution is ruined. The question of an uprising is on the order of the day.

We must mobilise all forces to convince the workers and soldiers that it is absolutely imperative to wage a last, desperate and decisive fight for the overthrow of the Kerensky government.

We must appeal to the Moscow comrades, persuade them to seize power in Moscow, declare the Kerensky government deposed, and declare the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Moscow the provisional government of Russia in order to offer immediate peace and save Russia from the conspiracy. Let the Moscow comrades raise the question of the uprising in Moscow immediately.

We must use the opportunity offered by the Congress of the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Region,[66] called for October 8 in Helsingfors, and mobilise all our forces to win the delegates over for the uprising (as they go back through Petrograd).

We must put the request and proposal to the Central Committee of our Party that it hasten the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-parliament and devote all efforts to exposing to the masses Kerensky's conspiracy with the imperialists of other countries and to preparing the uprising so that the right *moment* for it is chosen.

P.S. The resolution of the *soldiers*' section of the Petrograd Soviet against moving the government from Petrograd[67] shows that the soldiers are also becoming *more* convinced of Kerensky's conspiracy. We must gather all forces to support this *correct* conviction and to carry on propaganda among the soldiers.

* * *

I move that the following resolution be adopted:

"The Conference, having discussed the present situation, which is generally admitted to be highly critical, establishes the following facts:

"1. The aggressive operations of the German fleet, accompanied by the very strange inactivity of the British fleet and coupled with the Provisional Government's plan to move from Petrograd to Moscow, arouse a very strong suspicion that the government of Kerensky (or, what is the same thing, the Russian imperialists behind him) have entered into a conspiracy with the Anglo-French imperialists to surrender Petrograd to the Germans and *in this way* to suppress the revolution.

"2. These suspicions are greatly strengthened, and are being confirmed, as far as is possible in such cases, by the following:

"First, the conviction has long been growing and strengthening in the army that it was betrayed by the tsarist generals and is also being betrayed by the generals of Kornilov and Kerensky (particularly in the surrender of Riga);

"Second, the Anglo-French bourgeois press does not conceal its fierce, even frenzied hatred for the Soviets and its readiness to drown them in any quantity of blood;

"Third, Kerensky, the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov and similar politicians are conscious or unconscious tools in the hands of Anglo-French imperialism, as six months' history of the Russian revolution has proved in full;

"Fourth, the vague but persistent rumours of a separate peace between Britain and Germany 'at the expense of Russia' could not have arisen without cause;

"Fifth, all the circumstances of the Kornilov conspiracy, as admitted even by *Dyelo Naroda* and *Izvestia*, papers that on the whole sympathise with Kerensky, have proved that Kerensky was to a very large extent mixed up in the Kornilov affair, that Kerensky was and is the most dangerous Kornilovite; Kerensky, in fact, has shielded such leaders of the Kornilov revolt as Rodzyanko, Klembovsky, Maklakov, and others.

"The Conference, therefore, recognises that all the shouting by Kerensky and the bourgeois papers that support him about the defence of Petrograd is sheer deception and hypocrisy, and the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet was perfectly right when it sharply condemned the plan to move from Petrograd; furthermore, that Petrograd cannot be defended and the revolution saved unless the tired army is absolutely and urgently convinced of the sincerity of the government and is given bread, clothing and footwear at the cost of revolutionary measures against the capitalists, who hitherto have sabotaged the struggle against economic ruin (as admitted even by the Economic Department of the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee).

"The Conference therefore declares that only the overthrow of the Kerensky government with its packed Council of the Republic, and the substitution for it of a workers' and peasants revolutionary government, can ensure:

"(a) the transfer of the land to the peasants instead of suppressing the peasant uprising;

"(b) the offer of an immediate and just peace so that our entire army will believe that truth exists;

"(c) adoption of the most decisive revolutionary measures against the capitalists in order to provide the army with bread, clothing and footwear and in order to fight against economic ruin.

"The Conference urgently requests the Central Committee to take all measures to lead the inevitable uprising of the workers, soldiers and peasants for the overthrow of the anti-popular, feudal Kerensky government.

"The Conference decides on the immediate dispatch of delegations to Helsingfors, Vyborg, Kronstadt and Revel, to the military units south of Petrograd, and also to Moscow, to carry on propaganda in favour of adopting this resolution and in favour of a swift, general uprising and the overthrow of Kerensky as the steps necessary to open the road to peace, to save Petrograd and the revolution, and to give the land to the peasants and power to the Soviets."

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REVISION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME

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Signed: N. Lenin

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The extraordinary congress of the Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), called by the Central Committee for October 17, has on the agenda the revision of the Party programme. The Conference of April 24-29[68] passed a resolution on the necessity for such a revision and indicated in eight points the direction which this revision should follow.* Then, later, pamphlets were published in Petrograd** and Moscow,*** which took up the question of revision, and on August 10 the Moscow journal *Spartak*[69] No. 4 published an article by Comrade N. I. Bukharin devoted to the same subject.

Let us examine the points raised by the Moscow comrades.

I

For the Bolsheviks, who all agree on the need to "evaluate imperialism and the epoch of imperialist wars in connection with the approaching socialist revolution" (Clause 1 of the resolution adopted by the Conference of April 24-29), the main question in the revision of the Party programme is that of formulating a new programme. Should we round out the old programme by adding a characterisation of imperi-

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* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 280-81.—*Ed.*

** *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*, edited and with a preface by N. Lenin, *Priboi* Publishers, 1917.

*** *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*. Collection of articles by V. Milyutin V. Sokolnikov, A. Lomov, V. Smirnov. Published by the Regional Bureau of the Moscow Industrial District of the R.S.D.L.P., 1917.

alism (I advocated this opinion in the Petrograd pamphlet), or should we change the whole text of the old programme? (This opinion was expressed by the group which was formed at the April Conference, and is now being advocated by the Moscow comrades.) This is primarily the question confronting our Party.

We have two drafts. The one I proposed complements the old programme by adding a characterisation of imperialism*; the second, proposed by Comrade V. Sokolnikov, and based on the remarks of a committee of three (this committee was elected by the group formed at the April Conference), changes the entire general part of the programme.

I also had occasion to express my opinion (in the abovementioned pamphlet, p. 11**) concerning the theoretical incorrectness of the plan of revision indicated by the group. Let us see now how this plan is carried out in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft.

Comrade Sokolnikov has divided the general part of our programme into ten sections, giving each a number (see pp. 11-18 of the Moscow pamphlet). We will adhere to his numerical scheme so as to enable the reader to find the relevant passages.

The first section of the present programme consists of two clauses. The first declares that the labour movement has become international because of the development of exchange; the second, that the Russian Social-Democratic Party considers itself one of the contingents of the army of the world proletariat. (Further on in the second section the common ultimate aim of all Social-Democrats is mentioned.)

Comrade Sokolnikov leaves the second clause intact, while he replaces the first by a new one, adding to the point about the development of exchange an allusion to the "export of capital" and the growth of the struggle of the proletariat into "a world-wide socialist revolution".

The immediate result is inconsistency, a mixture of subjects, a confusion of two *types* of programme structure. One of the two: *either* we must begin with the characterisation of imperialism *as a whole*—and in that case we must

* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 459-60 and 469.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 464-65.—*Ed.*

not single out only the "export of capital", or leave in, as Comrade Sokolnikov does, the analysis of "the process of development" of bourgeois society in the *second* section; *or* we must leave the type of programme structure unchanged, i.e., first explain why our movement has become international, what its common ultimate goal is, how the "process of development" of bourgeois society is leading to this goal.

To make the inconsistency and lack of logic in Comrade Sokolnikov's formulation of the programme more evident, we will quote in full the opening sentences of the old programme:

"The development of exchange has established such close ties between all the nations of the civilised world that the great movement of the proletariat towards emancipation was bound to become—and has long since become—international."

Here Comrade Sokolnikov is dissatisfied with two points—(1) speaking of the development of exchange, the programme describes an antiquated "period of development"; (2) after the word "civilised" he puts an exclamation mark and says that "the close ties between metropolis and colony" are "not taken cognisance of" in our programme.

"Can protectionism, tariff wars, imperialist wars sever the ties of the proletarian movement?" queries Comrade Sokolnikov? and he himself answers: "If we are to believe the text of our programme, they can, for they sever the ties established by exchange."

Rather strange criticism. Neither protectionism, nor tariff wars "sever" exchange; they only change it temporarily or interrupt it at one point, permitting its continuation at another. Exchange has not been eliminated by the present war, it has only been made difficult in some places and has shifted to other places, but it still *remains* an international tie. The most obvious proof is the course of exchange. This is the first point. And secondly, we read in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft: "The development of productive forces, which, on the basis of the exchange of goods and the export of capital, draws all peoples into one world economy", etc. Imperialist war (in one place, for a time) also interrupts the export of capital, as well as exchange; therefore, Comrade Sokolnikov's "criticism" may be turned against *him*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Thirdly, the old programme showed why the labour movement "*has long since become*" international. It had unquestionably become international before the export of capital, which is the highest stage of capitalism.

To sum up: Comrade Sokolnikov inserted a *bit* of the definition of imperialism (the export of capital) in a place where it is obviously *incongruous*.

Moreover, the words "the civilised world" do not appeal to Comrade Sokolnikov, for, in his opinion, they refer to something peaceful and harmonious, and leave the colonies out.

Quite the contrary. Speaking of the "civilised world", the programme points out the *dis*harmony, the existence of uncivilised countries (this is a *fact*), while in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft things appear *much more harmonious*, for it speaks simply of "drawing all peoples into one world economy"! As if all peoples were *equally* drawn into this one world economy! As if there existed no relationship of *bondage* between the uncivilised and the "civilised" peoples precisely *on the basis* of "all peoples" being drawn "into one world economy".

Comrade Sokolnikov has really *weakened* the old programme on the two points he mentions. He has put *less* emphasis on internationalism. It is very important for us to point out that it emerged *long ago*, long before the era of finance capital. His wording gives the impression of a *greater* "harmony" in respect of the colonies. It is nevertheless unfortunately true that so far the labour movement has affected *only* the civilised countries, and to ignore this fact is not proper.

I would be ready to agree with Comrade Sokolnikov had he demanded a *clearer* exposition of the exploitation of the colonies. That is a really *important* component of the concept "imperialism". But in the first section of Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, there is no mention of it. He *scatters* the various component parts of the concept "imperialism" over several places to the detriment of consistency and clarity.

We shall soon see how Comrade Sokolnikov's *entire* draft suffers from this looseness and inconsistency.

II

Let the reader observe the general arrangement and the sequence of *topics* in the various sections of the old programme (we follow Comrade Sokolnikov's numerical scheme):

1. The labour movement has long since become international. We are one of its contingents.
2. The final goal of the movement is determined by the course of development of bourgeois society. The point of departure is that the means of production are privately owned and the proletariat is propertyless.
3. The growth of capitalism. The crowding out of the small producers.
4. The growth of exploitation (female labour, the reserve labour army, etc.).
5. Crises.
6. The progress of technology; the growth of inequality.
7. Growing struggle on the part of the proletariat. Material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by socialism.
8. The proletarian social revolution.
9. Its premise—the dictatorship of the proletariat.
10. The task of the Party—to lead the struggle of the proletariat for the social revolution.

I add another point:

11. Capitalism has developed to its highest stage (imperialism), and the era of the proletarian revolution has now set in.

Compare this with the arrangement of the *subject matter*—not the individual corrections to the text, but the subject matter itself—in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, and also the *points he adds on imperialism.*

1. The labour movement is international. We are one of its contingents. (Inserted—the export of capital, world economy, the growth of the struggle into the world revolution; i.e., a bit of the definition of imperialism is inserted.)
2. The final goal of the movement is determined by the course of development of bourgeois society. The point of departure is that the means of production are privately owned and the proletariat is propertyless. (In the middle is inserted: omnipotent banks and syndicates, monopoly

combines on a world scale; i.e., another bit of the definition of imperialism is inserted.)

3. The growth of capitalism. The crowding out of the small producers.

4. The growth of exploitation (female labour, the reserve labour army, foreign workers, etc.).

5. Crises and wars. Still another bit of the definition of imperialism is inserted: "attempts to partition the globe"; monopoly associations and the export of capital are repeated once more; the term "finance capital" is explained parenthetically as meaning "the product of a merger of industrial and banking capital".

6. The progress of technology; the growth of inequality. Yet another bit of the definition of imperialism is put in: high cost of living, militarism. Monopoly associations are mentioned again.

7. Growing struggle on the part of the proletariat. Material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by socialism. In the middle there is an interpolation, again reiterating: "monopoly capitalism", and pointing out how the banks and the syndicates have prepared the apparatus for social regulation, etc.

8. The proletarian social revolution. (A note that it will put an end to the rule of finance capital.)

9. Its premise—the dictatorship of the proletariat.

10. The task of the Party—to lead the struggle of the proletariat for the social revolution. (In the middle there is an interpolation that the latter is now on the order of the day.)

I believe that this comparative study clearly shows that Comrade Sokolnikov's draft suffers from the "mechanical" additions some comrades were so afraid of. Without any logical sequence, various bits of the definition of imperialism have been scattered throughout the draft in the form of a mosaic. There is no general and integral characterisation of imperialism. There are too many repetitions. The old canvas is preserved. Preserved also is the general plan of the old programme which points out that the "ultimate goal" of the movement is "determined" by the nature of contemporary bourgeois society and *the course of its development*. But it is just this "course of development" which is not brought out;

and the effect is that odds and ends of the definition of imperialism have been inserted, mostly *inappropriately*.

Let us take the second section. Here Comrade Sokolnikov left unchanged the beginning and the end; the beginning states that the means of production are in the hands of a minority; the end, that the majority of the population are proletarians or semi-proletarians. *Right in the middle*, Comrade Sokolnikov inserts a special phrase to the effect that "during the last quarter of a century the direct or indirect control of production organised on capitalist lines has passed into the hands of all-powerful" banks, trusts, etc.

This is mentioned *earlier* than the *crowding out of the small by the big producers*! The latter fact is first mentioned in the *third* section. But are not trusts the highest and latest manifestation of the very process of the crowding out of small-scale by large-scale production? Is it appropriate to speak first of trusts, and then of the ousting of the small producer? Is it not a violation of logical sequence? Where, then, did the trusts come from? Is this not an error in theory? How and why has control "passed" into their hands? All this cannot be understood before the process of the ousting of the small producer is made clear.

Let us take the third section that deals with the crowding out of small by large enterprises. Here too Comrade Sokolnikov retains the beginning (the increasing importance of big enterprises) and the end (small producers are being crowded out). In the middle, however, he adds that big enterprises "have merged into gigantic organisms which combine a series of consecutive steps of production and exchange". But this insertion deals with an entirely different matter, namely, the concentration of the means of production and the socialisation of labour by capitalism, the creation of the material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by socialism. In the old programme this point is not dealt with until the seventh section.

Comrade Sokolnikov adheres to the general plan of the old programme. He, too, speaks of the material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by socialism *only in the seventh section*. He also retains in the seventh section a mention of the concentration of means of production and the socialisation of labour!

And so the concentration of capital is indicated in part a few paragraphs *before* an entire general, summarising section specially devoted to the subject. This is devoid of all logic and is likely to render the programme less intelligible to the masses.

III

Comrade Sokolnikov "subjects to a general revision" the fifth section of the programme, the one dealing with crises. He finds that the old programme "sins in theory to win popularity" and "deviates from Marx's theory of crises".

Comrade Sokolnikov suggests that the word "overproduction" is made "the basis of the explanation" of crises in the old programme and that "such a view is more in keeping with the theory of Rodbertus[70] who explains crises as being due to under-consumption by the working class".

A comparison of the old text with the new one proposed by Comrade Sokolnikov will show how unsuccessful his hunt for theoretical heresy has been, and how Rodbertus has been dragged in *by the hair*.

The old text contains the following, *after* mention (in the fourth section) of "technical progress", intensified exploitation of labour, and relatively lower consumption by the workers: "*This* state of affairs in the bourgeois countries, etc., makes it more and more difficult for them to market commodities produced in ever-increasing quantities. *Overproduction*, manifesting itself in ... crises ... and periods of stagnation ... is an inevitable consequence...."

It is clear that here overproduction is by no means used as the "basis of the explanation" of crises, but that this is only a *description* of the origin of crises and periods of stagnation. In Comrade Sokolnikov's draft we read the following:

> "The development of the productive forces assuming these contradictory forms, in which the conditions of production come into conflict with the conditions of consumption and the conditions for the realisation of capital with those for its accumulation—this development, whose sole motive force is the pursuit of profit, has as its inevitable consequence acute industrial crises and depressions which signify the cessation of the sale of commodities, anarchically produced in ever-increasing quantities."

Comrade Sokolnikov said exactly the same thing, because "the cessation of the sale of commodities" produced in "ever-increasing quantities", is exactly what we call *overproduction*. There is no need for him to fear this word, there is nothing inaccurate in it. It is useless for Comrade Sokolnikov to write that instead of "overproduction", "underproduction might be used, with much the same or even more reason" (page 15 of the Moscow pamphlet).

Well, just try calling the "cessation of the sale of commodities", "produced in ever-increasing quantities", "underproduction"! It cannot be done.

Rodbertus's theory is not merely a matter of using the word "overproduction" (which alone *exactly describes* one of the profoundest *contradictions* of capitalism), but of explaining crises *merely* as the result of insufficient consumption by the working class. The old programme does *not* deduce crises from insufficient consumption. It bases its explanation on "*this* state of affairs in the bourgeois countries", as has been described in the preceding section of the programme and which consists in "technical progress" and "the relatively lower demand for human labour-power". Alongside of this the old programme speaks of "the ever-growing competition on the world market".

Here something *basic* is said about the conflict between the conditions for accumulation and the conditions for realisation, and is said much *more clearly*. The theory has not been "changed" here at all, "to win popularity", as Comrade Sokolnikov erroneously thinks, but is presented clearly and popularly, which is a good point.

Of crises, to be sure, one could write volumes, one might give a more concrete analysis of the conditions of accumulation, mention the role of the *means of production*, of the exchange of surplus value and variable capital expressed in the means of production for constant capital expressed in articles of consumption, of the depreciation of constant capital due to new inventions, and so on, and so forth. But Comrade Sokolnikov makes no attempt to do this! His supposed correction of the programme consists only in the following:

1. Having preserved the plan of transition from the fourth to the fifth section, from the reference to technical progress,

etc., to crises, he *weakened the connection* between the two sections by leaving out the words, "*this* state of affairs".

2. He added theoretical-sounding phrases about the conflict between the conditions of production and the conditions of consumption, and between the conditions for realisation and the conditions for accumulation—phrases which are quite correct but which do not express any new idea, for the preceding section gives the substance of all this more clearly.

3. He adds "the pursuit of profit"—an expression hardly suited to the programme, and which is used here, we suspect, precisely "*to win* popularity", for *the same idea* is expressed several times in the phrases about "conditions for realisation", commodity production, etc.

4. He substitutes "depression" for "stagnation"; an unfortunate change.

5. He adds the word "anarchically" to the old text ("commodities, anarchically produced in ever-increasing quantities"). This addition is theoretically wrong, for "anarchy" or "absence of planning" using an expression from the Erfurt Programme and contested by Engels, does *not* exactly characterise trusts.*

Here is how Comrade Sokolnikov puts it:

> "Commodities are anarchically produced in ever-increasing quantities. Efforts of capitalist associations (trusts and the like) to prevent crises by limiting production end in failure," etc.

But it is by trusts that commodities are *not* produced anarchically, but according to a plan. Trusts *do not merely* "limit" production. They do not make any *efforts* to prevent crises, nor can they make any such "efforts". Comrade Sokolnikov is guilty of a number of inaccuracies. What he should have said was: although trusts produce commodities not anarchically but according to a plan, crises nevertheless cannot be averted because of the above-mentioned characteristics of capitalism which are also inherent in the trusts. And if trusts, in periods of the greatest prosperity and speculation, limit production in the sense of being careful "not to

* Engels criticised the expressions "private production" and "absence of planning" in the draft of the Erfurt Programme. He wrote: "If we go over from stock companies to trusts, which dominate and monopolise whole branches of industry, not only private production, but also the absence of planning comes to an end."[71]

go too far", then at best they only succeed in saving the largest enterprises; but crises come just the same.

Summarising all that has been said on the question of crises, we come to the conclusion that Comrade Sokolnikov has *not* improved upon the old programme. On the contrary, the new draft contains inaccuracies. The need to correct the old programme has not been proved.

IV

In his draft Comrade Sokolnikov makes two theoretical errors on the question of wars of an imperialist nature.

First, he does not give an appreciation of the present war. He says that the imperialist epoch generates imperialist wars. This is correct and should, of course, be stated in the programme. But this is not enough. Besides this it is necessary to say that the present war of 1914-17 is imperialist. The German Spartacus group in their "theses" published in German in 1915 advanced the proposition that in an era of imperialism national wars *are impossible*.[72] This is obviously a wrong assertion, for imperialism makes the oppression of nations more acute and, as a result, national revolts and national wars (attempts to draw a line of demarcation between revolts and wars are doomed to failure) are not only possible and probable but absolutely inevitable.

Marxism demands a very precise assessment of each separate war on the basis of concrete data. To evade the question of the present war by resorting to general discussions is wrong in theory and inadmissible in practice. This method is used as a screen by the opportunists, they use it for evasion. They say that imperialism is, in general, an epoch of imperialist wars, but *this particular* war is *not wholly* imperialist (thus argued, for instance, Kautsky).

Secondly, Comrade Sokolnikov *links* "crises and wars", as if they were a two-in-one companion of capitalism in general, and of modern capitalism in particular. On pages 20 and 21 of the Moscow pamphlet, he repeats the "crises and wars" combination in his draft *three times*. Here it is not only a question of the undesirability of repetitions in the programme. It is also a question of incorrectness in principle.

Crises in the shape of overproduction, or "cessation of the sale of commodities", if Comrade Sokolnikov insists on banishing the word overproduction, are phenomena *exclusive* to capitalism. But wars are also characteristic of the slave-owning and serf systems of economy. Imperialist wars also occurred in the period of slavery (the war between Rome and Carthage was on both sides an imperialist war), as well as in the Middle Ages and in the epoch of mercantile capitalism. A war is certainly imperialist if *both* warring sides oppress foreign countries or nationalities, and are fighting for their share of the loot and for the right to "oppress and rob" more than the others.

If we were to say that only modern capitalism, only imperialism, has brought imperialist wars in its wake, it would be correct, for the *preceding* stage of capitalism, the stage of free competition, or the stage of pre-monopoly capitalism, was characterised in Western Europe mainly by *national* wars. But if we were to say that in the preceding stage there were no imperialist wars at all, it would be incorrect. It would mean that we had forgotten the "colonial" wars, which are *also* imperialist. This is the first point.

And secondly, the *linking up* of "crises and wars" is particularly incorrect, for these are quite different phenomena of different historical origin and different class significance. For instance, it would be wrong to say, as Comrade Sokolnikov says in his draft, that "both crises and wars, in turn, mean still greater ruin for the small producers and increase the dependence of hired labour on capital. . .". For there could *possibly* be wars fought for the emancipation of hired labour from capital. In the course of the struggle of wage-workers against the capitalist class, wars of a revolutionary and not only of a reactionary-imperialist nature are possible. War is the continuation of the politics of this *or* that class; and in every class society, slave-owning, feudal, or capitalist, there have been wars which continued the politics of the oppressor classes and also wars which continued the politics of the oppressed classes. This is exactly why it would be wrong to say, as Comrade Sokolnikov does, that "crises and wars show that the capitalist system is changing from a form of the development of productive forces into a hindrance to it".

It is true that the present imperialist war, by its reactionary character and the hardships it entails, revolutionises the masses and accelerates the revolution, and this must be stated. It is also true that imperialist wars in general are *typical* of an imperialist epoch, and this may be mentioned. But it would be wrong to say this about all "wars" in general, and, moreover, under no circumstances should crises and wars be tied up together.

V

We must draw our conclusions on the chief question which should, according to the unanimous decision of all Bolsheviks, be primarily dealt with and assessed in the new programme—the question of *imperialism*. Comrade Sokolnikov maintains that such treatment and assessment could be more expediently given piecemeal, so to speak, dividing up the various characteristics of imperialism among various sections of the programme. I think it would be more to the purpose to present it in a special section or a special part of the programme, by gathering together everything that there is to say about imperialism. The members of the Party now have both drafts before them, and the congress will decide. We are in full accord with Comrade Sokolnikov in that imperialism must be dealt with. What we must find out is whether there are differences of opinion as to *how* imperialism should be treated and assessed.

From this point of view let us examine the two drafts of the new programme. In my draft five basic distinguishing features of imperialism are presented: (1) capitalist monopoly associations; (2) the fusion of banking and industrial capital; (3) the export of capital to foreign countries; (4) the territorial partition of the globe, already completed; (5) the partition of the globe among international economic trusts. (In my pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which came out after the *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*, these five distinguishing features of imperialism are cited on p. 85.*) In Comrade Sokolnikov's draft we actually find the same five basic features, so that on the question of imperialism there is appar-

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 266.—*Ed.*

ently complete agreement in principle within our Party—as was to be expected, for the practical propaganda of our Party on this question, both oral and printed, has long since, from the very beginning of the revolution, shown the complete unanimity of all the Bolsheviks on this fundamental question.

What remains to be examined is the differences in the way the definition and characterisation of imperialism are *formulated*. Both drafts point specifically to the time when capitalism may be properly regarded as having become transformed into imperialism. The necessity for such a statement in the interests of precision and correct historical evaluation of economic development would hardly be denied. Comrade Sokolnikov says: "during the last quarter of a century"; I say: "about the beginning of the twentieth century". In the above-mentioned pamphlet on imperialism (on pp: 10 and 11, for instance*) I cited the testimony of an economist who has made a special study of cartels and syndicates. According to him, the turn towards the *complete* victory of the cartels in Europe came with the crisis of 1900-03. That is why, it seems, it would be more accurate to say: "about the beginning of the twentieth century" than "during the last quarter of a century". It would be more correct for still another reason. The above-mentioned specialist and all other European economists, generally work with data supplied by Germany, and Germany is *far ahead* of other countries in the formation of cartels.

Furthermore, speaking of monopolies my draft says: "Monopolist associations of capitalists have assumed decisive importance." Comrade Sokolnikov calls attention to monopoly associations *several times*. Only once is he fairly definite:

> "During the last quarter of a century the direct or indirect control of production organised on capitalist lines has passed into the hands of all-powerful, interlocking banks, trusts and syndicates which have formed world-wide monopoly associations under the direction of a handful of magnates of finance capital."

Here, it appears, there is too much "propaganda". "To win popularity" something that has no place there is injected

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 200-02.—*Ed.*

into the programme. In newspaper articles, in speeches, in popular pamphlets, "propaganda" is indispensable; the programme of a party, however, must be distinguished by the precision of its economics; it must contain nothing superfluous. The statement that "capitalist monopoly associations have acquired decisive importance" seems to me more exact; it says all that is necessary. Besides much superfluous matter, the above-quoted excerpt from Comrade Sokolnikov's draft contains an expression questionable from the theoretical point of view—"control of production organised on capitalist lines". Is it only organised on capitalist lines? No. This is too weak. Even production *not* so organised—petty craftsmen, peasants, small cotton-growers in the colonies, etc., etc.—has become dependent on banks and finance capital in general. When we speak of "world capitalism" in general (and this is the only capitalism we can discuss here if we are not to make mistakes), our statement that monopolist associations acquire "a decisive importance" *does not* mean that any other producers are excluded from subordination to this rule. To limit the influence of monopolist associations to "production organised on capitalist lines" is incorrect.

To proceed. In his draft, Comrade Sokolnikov twice repeats the same thing about the role played by banks: once in the above-quoted passage and a second time in the section dealing with crises and wars, where he defines finance capital as "the product of a merger of banking and industrial capital". My draft says that "enormously concentrated banking capital has fused with industrial capital". To say it once in the programme is sufficient.

The third feature "the export of capital to foreign countries has assumed vast dimensions" (so in my draft). In Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, we find a mere reference to the "export of capital" in one place, while in another, and in an entirely different connection, we read of "new countries which are fields for the utilisation of capital exported in search of superprofits". It is difficult to accept as correct the statement on superprofits and new countries since capital has also been exported from Germany to Italy, from France to Switzerland, etc. Under imperialism, capital has begun to be exported to the old countries as well, and not for

*super*profits alone. What is true with regard to the new countries is not true with regard to the export of capital in general.

The fourth feature is what Hilferding has called "the struggle for economic territory". This term is *not* exact, for it does not indicate what mostly distinguishes modern imperialism from the *older* forms of struggle for economic territory. Ancient Rome fought for such territories; the European kingdoms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries fought for such territories and acquired colonies; so did old Russia by her conquest of Siberia, etc. The distinguishing feature of modern imperialism is (as pointed out in my draft) that "the whole world has been divided up territorially among the richer countries", i.e., the partition of the earth among various states has been completed. This circumstance makes the conflicts for a *re-partitioning* of the globe all the sharper, and is the cause of the particularly sharp collisions which lead to war.

All this is expressed in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft with great verbosity and is hardly accurate theoretically. But before I quote his statement of the case which also includes the economic partitioning of the globe, I will first touch upon that fifth and last feature of imperialism. Here is how this is expressed in my draft:

"The economic partitioning of the world among international trusts has begun." The data of political economy and statistics do not warrant any more elaborate statement. *This* partitioning of the world is a very important process, but it has just begun. *This* partitioning, or rather *re-partitioning* of the world, is bound to cause imperialist wars since the territorial partition is complete, i.e., there are *no* more "free" lands that can be grabbed without war against a rival nation.

Let us see now how Comrade Sokolnikov formulates this part of the programme:

"But the realm of capitalist relations becomes ever wider; they are carried across frontiers, into new lands. These lands serve the capitalists as markets for commodities, as sources of raw materials, as fields for the utilisation of capital exported in search of superprofits. The vast accumulation of surplus value at the disposal of finance capital (a product of a merger of banking and industrial capital) is dumped on to the world market. The rivalry of powerful nationally

and at times internationally organised associations of capitalists for command of the market, for the possession or control of territories of weaker countries, i.e., for the exclusive right to oppress them mercilessly, inevitably leads to attempts at partitioning the whole world among the richest capitalist countries, to imperialist wars, which engender universal suffering, ruin, and degeneration."

Here we have too many words, covering up a series of theoretical errors. One cannot speak of "attempts" at dividing up the world, because the world has *already* been divided up. The war of 1914-17 is not "an attempt at partitioning" the world, but a struggle for the *re-partitioning* of a world already divided. The war became inevitable for capitalism, because a few years before it imperialism *divided up* the world according to yardsticks of strength now out of date, and which are being "corrected" by the war.

The struggle for colonies (for "new lands"), and the struggle for "the possession of territories of weaker countries", all existed *before* imperialism. Modern imperialism is characterised by *something else*, namely, by the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century the whole earth was divided up and occupied by various countries. That is why, under capitalism, the re-partitioning of "world domination" could only take place at the price of a world war. "Internationally organised associations of capitalists" existed *before* imperialism. Every joint-stock company with a membership of capitalists from various countries is an "internationally organised association of capitalists".

The distinguishing feature of imperialism is *something quite different*, something which *did not exist* before the twentieth century—the economic partitioning of the world among international trusts, the partitioning of countries, *by agreement*, into market areas. This particular point has not been expressed in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, the power of imperialism is, therefore, represented as much *weaker* than it really is.

Finally, it is theoretically incorrect to speak of dumping a vast accumulation of *surplus value* on to the world market. This reminds one of Proudhon's theory of realisation, according to which capitalists may easily realise both fixed and variable capital, but find it difficult to realise surplus value. As a matter of fact capitalists cannot realise without

difficulties and crises either surplus value or variable and fixed capital. Commodities dumped on to the market are not only accumulated value, but also value reproducing variable capital and fixed capital. For instance, stocks of rails or iron are thrown into the world market, and should be exchanged for articles consumed by the workers, or for other means of production (wood, oil, etc.).

VI

Having thus concluded our analysis of Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, we must note one very valuable addition which he proposes and which in my opinion should be adopted and even developed. To the paragraph which deals with technical progress and the greater employment of female and child labour, he proposes to add the phrase "as well as the labour of unskilled foreign workers imported from backward countries". This addition is valuable and necessary. The exploitation of *worse paid* labour from backward countries is particularly characteristic of imperialism. On this exploitation rests, to a certain degree, the *parasitism* of rich imperialist countries which bribe a part of their workers with higher wages while shamelessly and unrestrainedly exploiting the labour of "cheap" foreign workers. The words "worse paid" should be added and also the words "and frequently deprived of rights"; for the exploiters in "civilised" countries always take advantage of the fact that the imported foreign workers have no rights. This is often to be seen in Germany in respect of workers imported from Russia; in Switzerland of Italians; in France, of Spaniards and Italians, etc.

It would be expedient, perhaps, to emphasise more strongly and to express more vividly in our programme the prominence of the handful of the richest imperialist countries which prosper parasitically by robbing colonies and weaker nations. This is an extremely important feature of imperialism. To a certain extent it facilitates the rise of powerful revolutionary movements in countries that are subjected to imperialist plunder, and are in danger of being crushed and partitioned by the giant imperialists (such as Russia), and on the other hand, tends to a certain extent to prevent the rise of profound revolutionary movements in

the countries that plunder, by imperialist methods, many colonies and foreign lands, and thus make a very large (comparatively) portion of their population *participants* in the division of the imperialist loot.

I would therefore suggest that the point on this exploitation of a number of weak countries by the richest should be inserted in that section of my draft where social-chauvinism is described (page 22 of the pamphlet*). The relevant passage in the draft would then assume the following form (the additions are in italics):

"Such a perversion is, on the one hand, the social-chauvinist trend, socialism in word and chauvinism in deed, the use of the 'defence of the fatherland' slogan to hide the predatory interests 'their own' national bourgeoisie *pursues in an imperialist war and to maintain the privileged position of citizens of rich nations which make enormous profits by pillaging colonies and weak nations*. Another such perversion, on the other hand, is the equally wide and international movement of the 'Centre', etc."

It is necessary to add the words "in an imperialist war" for greater accuracy. "Defence of the fatherland" is nothing but a slogan to justify the war, the recognition of it as legitimate and just. There are different kinds of wars. There may also be revolutionary wars. We must therefore say precisely what we mean: imperialist war. This is of course implied, but to avoid misinterpretation, it must not be implied, but stated directly and clearly.

VII

From the general or theoretical part of the programme we shall now turn to the minimum programme. Here we at once encounter the ostensibly "very radical" but really very groundless proposal of Comrades N. Bukharin and V. Smirnov *to discard* the minimum programme *in toto*. The division into maximum and minimum programmes is out of date, they claim. Since we speak of a transition to socialism there is no need for it. No minimum programmes;

* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 470.—*Ed.*

our programme must indicate measures for the transition to socialism.

Such is the proposal of these two comrades. For some reason, they have not ventured to offer their own draft (although, since the revision of the Party programme was on the agenda of the next congress of the Party, they were really under an obligation to work out a draft). It is possible that the authors of the ostensibly "radical" proposal have themselves halted in indecision.... Be that as it may, their opinion should be examined.

War and economic ruin have forced all countries to advance from monopoly capitalism to state monopoly capitalism. This is the objective state of affairs. In a revolutionary situation, during a revolution, however, state monopoly capitalism is *directly* transformed into socialism. During a revolution it is impossible to move forward without moving towards socialism—this is the objective state of affairs created by war and revolution. It was taken cognisance of by our April Conference, which put forward the slogans, "a Soviet Republic" (the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat), and the nationalisation of banks and syndicates (a basic measure in the transition towards socialism). Up to this point all the Bolsheviks unanimously agree. But Comrades Smirnov and Bukharin want to go farther, they want to discard the minimum programme *in toto*. This is contrary to the wise counsel of the wise proverb, "*Do not boast when riding to battle*; *boast when you return from it*".

We are riding to battle, that is, we are fighting for the conquest of political power by our Party. This power would be the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants. In taking power, we are not at all afraid of stepping beyond the bounds of the bourgeois system; on the contrary, we declare clearly, directly, definitely, and openly that we shall step beyond those bounds, that we shall fearlessly march towards socialism, that our road shall be through a Soviet Republic, through nationalisation of banks and syndicates, through workers' control, through universal labour conscription, through nationalisation of the land, confiscation of the landowners' livestock and implements, etc. In this sense we drafted our programme of measures for transition to socialism.

But we must not boast when riding to battle, we must not discard the minimum programme, for this would be an empty boast: we do not wish to "demand anything from the bourgeoisie", we wish to realise everything ourselves, we do not wish to work on petty details within the framework of bourgeois society.

This would be an empty boast, because first of all we must win power, which has not yet been done. We must first carry out the measures of transition to socialism, we must continue our revolution until the world socialist revolution is victorious, and only then, "*returning from battle*", may we discard the minimum programme as of *no further use.*

Is it possible to guarantee now that the minimum programme will not be needed any more? Of course not, for the simple reason that we have not yet won power, that socialism has not yet been realised, and that we have not achieved even the beginning of the world socialist revolution.

We must firmly, courageously, and without hesitation *advance* towards our goal, but it is ludicrous to declare that we have reached it when we definitely have not. Discarding the minimum programme would be equivalent to declaring, to announcing (to bragging, in simple language) that we have already won.

No, dear comrades, we have not yet won.

We do not know whether our victory will come tomorrow or a little later. (I personally am inclined to think that it will be tomorrow—I am writing this on October 6, 1917—and that there may be a delay in our seizure of power; still, tomorrow is tomorrow and not today.) We do not know how soon after our victory revolution will sweep the West. We do not know whether or not our victory will be followed by temporary periods of reaction and the victory of the counter-revolution—there is nothing impossible in that—and therefore, after our victory, we shall build a "triple line of trenches" against such a contingency.

We do not know and *cannot know* anything of this. *No one* is in a position to know. It is therefore ridiculous to discard the minimum programme, which is *indispensable* while we still live within the framework of bourgeois society, while we have not yet destroyed that framework, not yet realised the basic prerequisites for a transition to socialism, not yet

smashed the enemy (the bourgeoisie), and even if we have smashed them we have not yet annihilated them. All this will come, and perhaps much sooner than many people think (I personally think that it *will begin* tomorrow), *but it has not yet come.*

Take the minimum programme in the political sphere. This programme is limited to the bourgeois republic. We add that we do not confine ourselves to its limits, we start immediately upon a struggle for a higher type of republic, a *Soviet Republic*. This we must do. With unshakable courage and determination we must advance towards the new republic *and in this way we shall reach our goal*, *of that I am sure*. But the minimum programme should under no circumstances be discarded, for, first of all, there is *as yet* no Soviet Republic; secondly, "attempts at restoration" are not out of the question, and they will first have to be experienced and vanquished; thirdly, during the transition from the old to the new there may be temporary "combined types" (as *Rabochy Put* correctly pointed out a day or two ago)—for instance, a Soviet Republic together with a Constituent Assembly. Let us first *get over* all that—then it will be time to discard the minimum programme.

The same in the economic sphere. We all agree that the *fear* of marching towards socialism is the most contemptible *treason* to the cause of the proletariat. We all agree that the most important of the first steps to be taken must be such measures as the nationalisation of banks and syndicates. Let us first realise this and other similar measures, and *then we shall see*. Then we shall be able to see *better*, for practical experience, which is worth a million times more than the best of programmes, will considerably widen our horizon. It is possible, and even probable, nay, indubitable, that without transitional "combined types" the change will not take place. We shall not, for instance, be able to nationalise petty enterprises with one or two hired labourers at short notice or subject them to real workers' control. Their role may be insignificant, they may be bound hand and foot by the nationalisation of banks and trusts, but so long as there are even odds and ends of bourgeois relations, why abandon the minimum programme? As Marxists, advancing boldly to the world's greatest revolution, but at the same

time taking a sober view of the facts, we have no right to abandon the minimum programme.

By abandoning it we should prove that we have lost our heads before we have won. And we must not lose our heads either before our victory, at the time of victory, or after it; for if we lose our heads, we lose everything.

Comrade Bukharin actually proposed nothing concrete; he only repeated what had been said long before concerning the nationalisation of banks and syndicates. Comrade Smirnov in his article offered a very interesting and instructive series of tentative reforms that may be reduced to the regulation of production and consumption of commodities. In a general way all this is *contained* in my draft, followed by an "*etc.*". To go further, to venture into a discussion of separate and concrete measures, seems to me inexpedient. Many things will become clearer *after* the basic measures of the new type have been carried out, *after* the nationalisation of banks, *after* the introduction of workers' control; experience will tell us *a lot more*, for it will be the experience of millions, the experience in building a new system of economy with the conscious participation of millions. It stands to reason that to *indicate* the new, develop plans, evaluate them, analyse the local and partial experiences of various Soviets or supply committees, etc., is all very useful work to be done in articles, pamphlets and speeches. But to inject into the programme an overdose of detail is premature and may become even harmful by tying our hands with petty matters. Our hands must be free so that we may build the new with greater vigour, once we have fully entered upon the new path.

VIII

Comrade Bukharin's article touches upon another question worthy of consideration.

> "The question of the revision of our Party programme should be bound up with the question of working out a single programme for the international party of the proletariat."

This is not very clearly expressed. If we take it to mean that the author advises us not to accept a new programme until a single international programme, a programme of the Third International, has been drawn up, then we have to

object to this opinion most decisively. To postpone it on this account (I presume that there are no other reasons for delay; no one, for instance, demanded a postponement on account of inadequate preparation of our Party material for the revision) would be equivalent to *our* delaying the foundation of the Third International. The foundation of the Third International ought not of course to be understood formally. Not until the proletarian revolution has triumphed in at least one country, or until the war has come to an end, may we hope for a speedy and successful advance in convening a *great* conference of internationalist revolutionary parties of various countries; or for their consent to a formal adoption of a new programme. In the meantime we must advance our cause on the initiative of those parties which are now in a more favourable position than the others and can take the first step—not viewing it, of course, as the last step, not necessarily opposing their programme to other "Left" (i.e., internationalist revolutionary) programmes, but *working* directly *towards* the formulation of a general programme. Outside of Russia there is at present no other country in the world where there is comparative freedom for internationalists to meet, and where there are as many comrades well informed on subjects concerning international movements and programmes as there are in our Party. This is why we must take the initiative upon ourselves. This is our immediate duty as internationalists.

Apparently Comrade Bukharin views this matter in exactly the same way. At the beginning of the article he says that "the Party Congress which has just been concluded [it was written in August] recognised the necessity of revising the programme" and that "a special congress will be called for this purpose". We conclude from this that Comrade Bukharin has no objections to the adoption of a new programme at that congress.

If so, then we have perfect unanimity on this question. Hardly anyone would be against the proposition that our congress, upon adopting a new programme, express a desire to draw up a single general programme for the Third International, and take certain steps in that direction—hasten the conference of the Lefts, publish a collection of articles in several languages, set up a committee for the purpose

of collecting material on what has been done in other countries in order to "feel the way" (according to Comrade Bukharin's correct expression) for a new programme (the "Tribunists"[73] in Holland, the Lefts in Germany. The Socialist Propaganda League in America[74] has already been mentioned by Comrade Bukharin; we may also mention the American Socialist *Labour* Party[75] and its demand that "the political state give way to industrial democracy").

Comrade Bukharin has pointed out a flaw in my draft which I must acknowledge to be absolutely correct. He cites a passage in the draft (page 23 of the pamphlet*) where I discuss the present situation in Russia, the capitalist Provisional Government, etc. Comrade Bukharin is right in criticising this passage and saying that it should be transferred to the resolution on tactics or to the platform. I therefore propose either to leave out the last paragraph on page 23 altogether, or to put it as follows:

"Striving for a political system which would best ensure economic progress and the rights of the people in general, and, in particular, make the transition to socialism as painless as possible, the party of the proletariat cannot rest content", etc.

Finally, I must answer one question raised by a few comrades, but as far as I know, not yet discussed in the press. This is the question of Clause 9 of our political programme on the right of nations to self-determination. This clause consists of two parts: the first part is a new statement on the right to self-determination; the second contains not a demand but a declaration. I am asked whether a declaration is in place here. Generally speaking, there is no place for declarations in a programme, but I think an exception to the rule is necessary here. Instead of the word self-determination, which has given rise to numerous misinterpretations, I propose the perfectly precise concept: "the right to free secession". After six months' experience of the 1917 Revolution, it is hardly possible to dispute that the party of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, the party which uses the Great-Russian language, is obliged to recognise the right to secede. When we win power, we shall immediately and uncondition-

* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 471.—*Ed.*

ally recognise this right for Finland, the Ukraine, Armenia, and any other nationality oppressed by tsarism (and the Great-Russian bourgeoisie). On the other hand, we do not at all favour secession. We want as vast a state, as close an alliance of the greatest possible number of nations who are neighbours of the Great Russians; we desire this in the interests of democracy and socialism, to attract into the struggle of the proletariat the greatest possible number of the working people of different nations. We desire *proletarian revolutionary* unity, *unification*, and not secession. We desire *revolutionary* unification; that is why our slogan does not call for unification of all states in general, for the social revolution demands the unification *only* of those states which have gone over or are going over to socialism, colonies which are gaining their freedom, etc. We want *free* unification; that is why we must recognise the right to secede (without freedom to secede, unification cannot be called free). The more so must we recognise the right of secession, because tsarism and the Great-Russian bourgeoisie have by their oppression left great bitterness and distrust of the Great Russians generally in the hearts of the neighbouring nations, and these must be eradicated *by deeds* and not by words.

But we want unification, and this must be stated; it is so important to state it in the programme of a party of a heterogeneous state that it is necessary to abandon custom and to incorporate a declaration. We want the republic of the Russian (I am even inclined to say Great-Russian, for this is more correct) people to *attract* other nations to it. But how? Not by violence, but solely by voluntary agreement. Otherwise the unity and the brotherly ties of the *workers* of all countries are broken. Unlike the bourgeois democrats, we call for the brotherhood of *workers* of all nationalities, and not the brotherhood of nations, for we do not trust the bourgeoisie of any country, we regard them as our enemies.

This is why we should here allow an exception to the rule by inserting in Clause 9 a *declaration of principles*.

IX

The foregoing pages were written before No. 31 of *Rabochy Put* appeared with Comrade Y. Larin's article "The Labour Demands of Our Programme". We welcome this article as the

beginning of the discussion of the various draft programmes by our Central Organ. Comrade Larin dwells especially on that section of the programme which I had no occasion to work upon, and the draft for which is in the possession of the editors of the "Subsection on Labour Protection", the subsection was formed at the Conference of April 24-29, 1917. Comrade Larin proposes a number of *additions* which seem to me quite acceptable but which, I am sorry to say, are not always quite accurately expressed.

One point seems to me to have been ineptly formulated by Comrade Larin: "The correct [?] distribution of the labour force on the basis [?] of democratic [?] self-government by the workers in deciding how to employ [?] their persons [?]". In my opinion this is worse than the formulation of the subsection: "The labour exchanges must be proletarian class organisations", etc. (see *Materials*, p. 15). Comrade Larin, moreover, should have gone into the problem of a minimum wage much more thoroughly. He should have formulated his proposition with greater exactness, and should have *related it to the history* of the views of Marx and Marxism on this subject.

Furthermore, Comrade Larin thinks that the political and agrarian parts of the programme should have been "more carefully edited". We do hope that our Party press forthwith begins to discuss the question of *editing* this or that demand, without waiting for the congress, since, firstly, we shall not have a well prepared congress, and secondly, everyone who has had occasion to work on programmes and resolutions knows how often a careful *editing* of a certain point *discloses* and *eliminates* vagueness and disagreements of principle.

Finally, concerning the financial and economic part of the programme, Comrade Larin writes that "it is almost a blank, no mention is made, even of the annulment of war loans and the state debts contracted by tsarism [only tsarism?] or of the struggle against the fiscal utilisation of state monopolies, etc.". It is extremely desirable for Comrade Larin not to postpone his practical proposals in anticipation of the congress. He should bring them up immediately, or we shall not be well prepared for the congress. On the question of the annulment of state debts (and of course, not of

tsarism alone, but also of the bourgeoisie) we must give considerable thought to the question of small bondholders. As to the question about "the struggle against the fiscal utilisation of state monopolies", we must see how things stand with the monopoly production of articles of luxury, and what connection the proposed point has with programme demands for the abolition of all indirect taxes.

I repeat: in order to prepare our programme seriously, to ensure the actual co-operation of the entire Party, all those interested must *immediately* get busy and *publish* their suggestions as well as *precise drafts* of points already edited and which contain additions and amendments.

ADVICE OF AN ONLOOKER

I am writing these lines on October 8 and have little hope that they will reach Petrograd comrades by the 9th. It is possible that they will arrive too late, since the Congress of the Northern Soviets has been fixed for October 10. Nevertheless, I shall try to give my "Advice of an Onlooker" in the event that the probable action of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and of the whole "region" will take place soon but has not yet taken place.

It is clear that all power must pass to the Soviets. It should be equally indisputable for every Bolshevik that proletarian revolutionary power (or Bolshevik power—which is now one and the same thing) is assured of the utmost sympathy and unreserved support of all the working and exploited people all over the world in general, in the belligerent countries in particular, and among the Russian peasants especially. There is no need to dwell on these all too well known and long established truths.

What must be dealt with is something that is probably not quite clear to all comrades, namely, that in practice the transfer of power to the Soviets now means armed uprising. This would seem obvious, but not everyone has or is giving thought to the point. To repudiate armed uprising now would mean to repudiate the key slogan of Bolshevism (All Power to the Soviets) and proletarian revolutionary internationalism in general.

But armed uprising is a *special* form of political struggle, one subject to special laws to which attentive thought must be given. Karl Marx expressed this truth with remark-

able clarity when he wrote that "*insurrection is an art quite as much as war*".

Of the principal rules of this art, Marx noted the following:

(1) *Never play* with insurrection, but when beginning it realise firmly that you must *go all the way*.

(2) Concentrate a *great superiority of forces* at the decisive point and at the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organisation, will destroy the insurgents.

(3) Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest *determination*, and by all means, without fail, take the of *offensive*. "The defensive is the death of every armed rising."

(4) You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.

(5) You must strive for *daily* successes, however small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), and at all costs retain "*moral superiority*".

Marx summed up the lessons of all revolutions in respect to armed uprising in the words of "Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known: *de l'audace*, *de l'audace*, *encore de l'audace*".[76]

Applied to Russia and to October 1917, this means: a simultaneous offensive on Petrograd, as sudden and as rapid as possible, which must without fail be carried out from within and from without, from the working-class quarters and from Finland, from Revel and from Kronstadt, an offensive of the *entire* navy, the concentration of a *gigantic superiority* of forces over the 15,000 or 20,000 (perhaps more) of our "bourgeois guard" (the officers' schools), our "Vendée troops" (part of the Cossacks), etc.

Our *three* main forces—the fleet, the workers, and the army units—must be so combined as to occupy without fail and to hold *at any cost*: (a) the telephone exchange; (b) the telegraph office; (c) the railway stations; (d) and above all, the bridges.

The *most determined* elements (our "shock forces" and *young workers*, as well as the best of the sailors) must be formed into small detachments to occupy all the more important points and to *take part* everywhere in all important operations, for example:

to encircle and cut off Petrograd; to seize it by a combined attack of the sailors, the workers, and the troops—a task which requires *art and triple audacity*;

to form detachments from the best workers, armed with rifles and bombs, for the purpose of attacking and surrounding the enemy's "centres" (the officers' schools, the telegraph office, the telephone exchange, etc.). Their watchword must be: "*Better die to a man than let the enemy pass*!"

Let us hope that if action is decided on, the leaders will successfully apply the great precepts of Danton and Marx.

The success of both the Russian and the world revolution depends on two or three days' fighting.

Written on October 8 (21), 1917

First published in November 7, 1920 in the newspaper *Pravda* No. 250
Signed: *An Onlooker*

Published according to the newspaper text

LETTER TO THE BOLSHEVIK COMRADES ATTENDING THE CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE NORTHERN REGION

Comrades,

Our revolution is passing through a highly critical period. This crisis coincides with the great crisis—the growth of the world socialist revolution and the struggle waged against it by world imperialism. A gigantic task is being presented to the responsible leaders of our Party, and failure to perform it will involve the danger of a complete collapse of the internationalist proletarian movement. The situation is such that, in truth, delay would be fatal.

Take a glance at the international situation. The growth of a world revolution is beyond dispute. The outburst of indignation on the part of the Czech workers has been suppressed with incredible ferocity, testifying to the government's extreme fright. Italy too has witnessed a mass outbreak in Turin.[77] Most important, however, is the revolt in the German navy. One can imagine the enormous difficulties of a revolution in a country like Germany, especially under present conditions. It cannot be doubted that the revolt in the German navy is indicative of the great crisis—the growth of the world revolution. While our chauvinists, who are advocating Germany's defeat, demand a revolt of the German workers immediately, we Russian revolutionary internationalists know from the experience of 1905-17 that a more impressive sign of the growth of revolution than a revolt among the troops cannot be imagined.

Just think what our position is now in the eyes of the German revolutionaries. They can say to us: We have only Liebknecht who openly called for a revolution. His voice has been stifled in a convict prison. We have not a single newspaper which openly explains the necessity for a revolu-

tion; we have not got freedom of assembly. We have not a single Soviet of Workers' or Soldiers' Deputies. Our voice barely reaches the real, broad mass of people. Yet we made an attempt at revolt, although our chance was only one in a hundred. But you Russian revolutionary internationalists have behind you a half-year of free agitation, you have a score of newspapers, you have a number of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, you have gained the upper hand in the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow, you have on your side the entire Baltic fleet and all the Russian troops in Finland. And still you do not respond to our call for an uprising, you do not overthrow your imperialist, Kerensky, although the chances are a hundred to one that your uprising will be successful.

Yes, we shall be real traitors to the International if, at such a moment and under such favourable conditions, we respond to this call from the German revolutionaries with ... *mere* resolutions.

Add to this, as we all perfectly well know, that the plotting and conspiracy of the international imperialists against the Russian revolution are rapidly growing. International imperialism is coming closer to the idea of stifling the revolution at all costs, stifling it both by military measures and by a peace made at the expense of Russia. It is this that is making the crisis in the world socialist revolution so acute, and is rendering our delay of the uprising particularly dangerous—I would almost say criminal.

Take, further, Russia's internal situation. The petty-bourgeois compromising parties which expressed the naïve confidence of the masses in Kerensky and in the imperialists in general, are absolutely bankrupt. Their collapse is complete. The vote cast against coalition by the Soviet curia at the Democratic Conference, the vote cast against coalition by a *majority* of the local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies (in spite of their central Soviet, where Avksentyev and other friends of Kerensky's are installed), the elections in Moscow, where the working-class population has the closest ties with the peasants, and where *over 49 per cent* voted for the Bolsheviks (and among the soldiers fourteen thousand out of seventeen thousand)—does this not signify that the confidence of the people in Kerensky and in those

who are compromising with Kerensky and Co. has completely collapsed? Can one imagine any way in which the people could say more clearly to the Bolsheviks than they did by this vote, "Lead us, we shall follow you"?

And we, who have thus won the majority of the people over to our side, and who have gained the Soviets in both the capital cities—are we to wait? What for? For Kerensky and his Kornilovite generals to surrender Petrograd to the Germans, and thus enter directly or indirectly, openly or secretly, into a conspiracy with *both* Buchanan *and* Wilhelm for the purpose of completely stifling the Russian revolution.

By the Moscow vote and by the re-elections to the Soviets, the people have expressed their confidence in us, but that is not all. There are signs of growing apathy and indifference. That is understandable. It implies not the ebb of the revolution, as the Cadets and their henchmen vociferate, but the ebb of confidence in resolutions and elections. In a revolution, the masses demand action, not words from the leading parties, they demand victories in the struggle, not talk. The moment is approaching when the people may conceive the idea that the Bolsheviks are no better than the others, since they were unable *to act* when the people placed confidence in them....

The peasant revolt is spreading over the whole country. It is perfectly clear that the Cadets and their hangers-on are minimising it in every way and are claiming it to be nothing but "riots" and "anarchy". That lie is being refuted because in the revolt centres the land is beginning to be handed over to the peasants. "Riots" and "anarchy" have never led to such splendid political results! The tremendous strength of the peasant revolt is shown by the fact that the compromisers and the Socialist-Revolutionaries of *Dyelo Naroda*, and *even* Breshko-Breshkovskaya, have begun to talk of transferring the land to the peasants in order to check the movement before it has finally engulfed them.

Are we to wait until the Cossack units of the Kornilovite Kerensky (who was recently exposed as a Kornilovite by the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves) succeed in suppressing this peasant revolt *piecemeal*?

Apparently, many leaders of our Party have failed to note the *specific* meaning of the slogan which we all adopted and

which we have repeated endlessly. The slogan is "All Power to the Soviets". There were periods, there were moments during the six months of the revolution, when this slogan did *not* mean insurrection. Perhaps those periods and those moments blinded some of our comrades and led them to forget that now, at least since the middle of September, this slogan for us too has become *equivalent to a call for insurrection*.

There can be no shadow of doubt on this score. *Dyelo Naroda* recently explained this "in a popular way", when it said "Kerensky will under no circumstances submit!" As if he could!

The slogan "All Power to the Soviets" is nothing but a call for insurrection. And the blame will be wholly and undoubtedly ours, if we, who for months have been calling upon the people to revolt and repudiate compromise, fail to lead them to revolt on the eve of the revolution's collapse, after the people have expressed their confidence in us.

The Cadets and compromisers are trying to scare us by citing the example of July 3-5, by pointing to the intensified agitation of the Black Hundreds,[78] and so forth. But if any mistake was made on July 3-5, it was that we did not take power. I do not think we made a mistake then, for at that time we were not *yet* in a majority. But now it would be a fatal mistake, worse than a mistake. The spread of Black-Hundred agitation is understandable. It is an aggravation of extremes in an atmosphere of a developing proletarian and peasant revolution. But to use this as an argument against an uprising is ridiculous, for the impotence of the Black Hundreds, hirelings of the capitalists, *the impotence of the Black Hundreds in the struggle*, does not even require proof. In the struggle they are not worth considering. In the struggle Kornilov and Kerensky can only rely on the Savage Division and the Cossacks. And now demoralisation has set in even among the Cossacks; furthermore, the peasants are threatening them with civil war within their Cossack regions.

I am writing these lines on Sunday, October 8. You will read them not earlier than October 10. I have heard from a comrade who passed through here that people travelling on the Warsaw railway say, "Kerensky is bringing Cossacks to Petrograd!" This is quite probable, and it will be entirely

our fault if we do not verify it *most carefully* and do not *make a study* of the strength and distribution of *the Kornilovite troops of the second draft.*

Kerensky has again brought Kornilovite troops into the vicinity of Petrograd in order to prevent state power from passing into the hands of the Soviets, in order to prevent this power from proposing an immediate peace, in order to prevent all the land from being immediately handed over to the peasants, in order to surrender Petrograd to the Germans, and himself escape to Moscow! That is the slogan of the insurrection which we must circulate as widely as possible and which will have a tremendous success.

We must not wait for the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which the Central Executive Committee may delay even until November. We must not delay and permit Kerensky to bring up more Kornilovite troops. Finland, the fleet and Revel are represented at the Congress of Soviets. These can together start an immediate movement on Petrograd against the Kornilovite regiments, a movement of the fleet, artillery, machine-guns and two or three army corps, such as have shown, for instance in Vyborg, the intensity of their hatred for the Kornilovite generals, with whom Kerensky is again in collusion.

It would be a great mistake to refuse to seize the opportunity of immediately smashing the Kornilovite regiments of the second draft on the ground that the Baltic fleet, by moving into Petrograd, would allegedly expose the front to the Germans. The Kornilovite slanderers will say this, as they will tell any lie, but it is unworthy of revolutionaries to allow themselves to be intimidated by lies and slanders. Kerensky will surrender Petrograd to the Germans, that is now as clear as daylight. No assertions to the contrary can destroy our full conviction that this is so, for it follows from the entire course of events and Kerensky's entire policy.

Kerensky and the Kornilovites will surrender Petrograd to the Germans. And it is in order to save Petrograd that Kerensky must be overthrown and power taken by the *Soviets of both capital cities*. These Soviets will immediately propose a peace to all the nations and will thereby fulfil their duty to the German revolutionaries. They will thereby also be taking a decisive step towards frustrating the criminal

conspiracies against the Russian revolution, the conspiracies of international imperialism.

Only the immediate movement of troops from Finland, and of the Baltic fleet, Revel and Kronstadt against the Kornilovite forces quartered near Petrograd can save the Russian and the world revolution. Such a movement has a hundred to one chance of leading *within a few days* to the surrender of a part of the Cossack troops, to the utter defeat of the other part, and to the overthrow of Kerensky, for the workers and the soldiers of both capital cities will support such a movement.

In truth, delay would be fatal.

The slogan "All Power to the Soviets" is a slogan of insurrection. Whoever uses this slogan without having grasped this and given thought to it will have only himself to blame. And insurrection must be treated as an *art*. I insisted on this during the Democratic Conference and I insist on it now, because *that* is what Marxism teaches us, and it is what is being taught us by the present situation in Russia and in the world generally.

It is not a question of voting, of attracting the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, of additional provincial Soviets, or of a congress of these Soviets. It is a question of insurrection, which *can* and must be decided by Petrograd, Moscow, Helsingfors, Kronstadt, Vyborg and Revel. It is *in the vicinity of Petrograd* and in Petrograd itself that the insurrection can, and must be decided on and effected, as earnestly as possible, with as much preparation as possible, as quickly as possible and as energetically as possible.

The fleet, Kronstadt, Vyborg, and Revel can and must advance on Petrograd; they can and must smash the Kornilovite regiments, rouse both the capital cities, start a mass agitation for a government which will immediately give land to the peasants and immediately make proposals for peace, overthrow Kerensky's government and establish such a government.

Delay would be fatal.

October 8, 1917. *N. Lenin*

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Published according to a type written copy

MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) OCTOBER 10 (23), 1917[79]

1
REPORT

MINUTES

Comrade Lenin maintains that a sort of indifference to the question of insurrection has been noticeable since the beginning of September. But this is impermissible if we are issuing the slogan of the seizure of power by the Soviets in all seriousness. It is therefore high time to pay attention to the technical aspect of the question. Apparently a lot of time has already been lost.

Nevertheless the question is an urgent one, and the decisive moment is near.

The international situation is such that we must take the initiative.

What is being done to surrender territory as far as Narva, and to surrender Petrograd makes it still more imperative for us to take decisive action.

The political situation is also working impressively in this direction. Decisive action on our part on July 3, 4 and 5 would have failed because we did not have the majority behind us. Since then we have made tremendous progress.

Absenteeism and indifference on the part of the masses is due to their being tired of words and resolutions.

We now have the majority behind us. Politically, the situation is fully ripe for taking power.

The agrarian movement is also developing in that direction, for it is obvious that extreme effort would be needed to stem that movement. The slogan of the transfer of all

land has become the general slogan of the peasants. The political situation, therefore, is mature. We must speak of the technical aspect. That is the crux of the matter. Nevertheless we, like the defencists, are inclined to regard the systematic preparation of an uprising as something in the nature of a political sin.

It is senseless to wait for the Constituent Assembly that will obviously not be on our side, for this will only make our task more involved.

The regional congress and the proposal from Minsk[80] must be used for the beginning of decisive action.

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Published according to the handwritten copy of the Minutes

2
RESOLUTION

The Central Committee recognises that the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German navy which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the threat of peace by the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets—all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov revolt (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the encircling of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)—all this places the armed uprising on the order of the day.

Considering therefore that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organisations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the action of our people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view.

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No. 10, 1922

Published according
to the manuscript

MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) OCTOBER 10 (23), 1917[81]

1
REPORT

MINUTES

Comrade Lenin read the resolution adopted by the Central Committee at the previous meeting. He stated that the resolution had been adopted with two dissenting votes. If the dissident comrades wished to make a statement, a discussion could be held; meanwhile he continued with the motives of the resolution.

If the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties were to break with their policy of conciliation, a compromise with them could be proposed. The proposal bad been made, but those parties had obviously rejected the compromise.* On the other hand, by that time it had become definitely clear that the masses were following the Bolsheviks. That had been before the Kornilov revolt. Lenin cited election returns from Petrograd and Moscow as evidence. The Kornilov revolt had pushed the masses still more decisively to the side of the Bolsheviks. The alignment of forces at the Democratic Conference. The position was clear—either Kornilov's dictatorship or the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorer strata of the peasantry. The Party could not be guided by the temper of the masses because it was changeable and incalculable; the Party must be guided by an objective analysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses had put their trust in the Bolsheviks and

* See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 305-10.—*Ed.*

demanded deeds from them and not words, a decisive policy both in the struggle against the war and in the struggle against economic ruin. If the political analysis of the revolution were taken as the basis, it would be perfectly clear that even anarchic outbursts confirmed that.

Lenin went onto analyse the situation in Europe and showed that revolution would be even more difficult in Europe than in Russia; if matters had gone as far as a revolt in the navy in such a country as Germany, there too they must already have gone very far. Certain objective data on the international situation showed that by acting at that moment the Bolsheviks would have all proletarian Europe on their side; he showed that the bourgeoisie wanted to surrender Petrograd. That could only be prevented by the Bolsheviks taking over Petrograd. The obvious conclusion from all this was—the armed uprising was on the order of the day as was stated in the resolution of the Central Committee.

It would be better to draw practical conclusions from the resolution after hearing the reports of representatives from the centres.

From a political analysis of the class struggle in Russia and in Europe there emerged the necessity to pursue the most determined and most active policy, which could be only the armed uprising.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

2

SPEECHES IN DISCUSSION

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin argued against Milyutin and Schotmann and showed that it was not a matter of armed forces, that it was not a question of fighting against the troops but of one part of the army fighting against another. He could see no pessimism in what had been said there. He demonstrated that the forces on the side of the bourgeoisie were small. The facts showed that ours were superior to the enemy. Why could the Central Committee not begin? There was no reason that derived from the facts. To reject the resolution of the

Central Committee it would have to be proved that there was no economic ruin and that the international situation would not lead to complications. If trade union leaders were in favour of full power they knew very well what they wanted. Objective conditions showed that the peasantry must be led; they would follow the proletariat.

Some were afraid that Bolsheviks would not be able to maintain power, but at that moment there was a better chance than ever that they would be able to.

Lenin expressed the wish that the debate be confined to the substance of the resolution.

2

If all resolutions were defeated in that manner nothing better could be wished for. Zinoviev was saying: do away with the "Power to the Soviets" slogan and bring pressure to bear on the government. When it was said that the time was ripe for insurrection there could be no question of conspiracy. Since an insurrection was inevitable politically, it must be regarded as an art. Politically, an insurrection was due.

Because there was only enough bread for a day the Party could not wait for the Constituent Assembly. Comrade Lenin proposed that the resolution be approved, that energetic preparations be begun and that it be left to the Central Committee and the Soviet to decide when.

3

Comrade Lenin opposed Zinoviev, saying that the revolution could not be contrasted to the February revolution. He proposed a resolution straight to the point.

3

RESOLUTION

The meeting fully welcomes and fully supports the resolution of the Central Committee and calls upon all organisations and on workers and soldiers to make all-round, energetic preparations for an armed uprising and to support

the centre set up for that purpose by the Central Committee; the meeting expresses its complete confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviet will indicate in good time the favourable moment and the most appropriate methods of attack.

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No. 10, 1927

Speeches published
according to a typewritten
copy of the Minutes;
resolution according
to the manuscript

LETTER TO COMRADES

Comrades,

We are living in a time that is so critical, events are moving at such incredible speed that a publicist, placed by the will of fate somewhat aside from the mainstream of history, constantly runs the risk either of being late or proving uninformed, especially if some time elapses before his writings appear in print. Although I fully realise this, I must nevertheless address this letter to the Bolsheviks, even at the risk of its not being published at all, for the vacillations against which I deem it my duty to warn in the most decisive manner are of an unprecedented nature and may have a disastrous effect on the Party, the movement of the international proletariat, and the revolution. As for the danger of being too late, I will prevent it by indicating the nature and date of the information I possess.

It was not until Monday morning, October 16, that I saw a comrade who had on the previous day participated in a very important Bolshevik gathering in Petrograd, and who informed me in detail of the discussion.[82] The subject of discussion was that same question of the uprising discussed by the Sunday papers of all political trends. The gathering represented all that is most influential in all branches of Bolshevik work in the capital. Only a most insignificant minority of the gathering, namely, all in all two comrades, took a negative stand. The arguments which those comrades advanced are so weak, they are a manifestation of such an astounding confusion, timidity, and collapse of all the fundamental ideas of Bolshevism and proletarian

revolutionary internationalism that it is not easy to discover an explanation for such shameful vacillations. The fact, however, remains, and since the revolutionary party has no right to tolerate vacillations on such a serious question, and since this pair of comrades, who have scattered their principles to the winds, might cause some confusion, it is necessary to analyse their arguments, to expose their vacillations, and to show how shameful they are. The following lines are an attempt to do this.

"We have no majority among the people, and without this condition the uprising is hopeless...."

People who can say this are either distorters of the truth or pedants who want an advance guarantee that throughout the whole country the Bolshevik Party has received exactly one-half of the votes plus one, this they want at all events, without taking the least account of the real circumstances of the revolution. History has never given such a guarantee, and is quite unable to give it in any revolution. To make such a demand is jeering at the audience, and is nothing but a cover to hide one's own *flight* from reality.

For reality shows us clearly that it was after the July days that the majority of the people began quickly to go over to the side of the Bolsheviks. This was demonstrated first by the August 20 elections in Petrograd, even before the Kornilov revolt, when the Bolshevik vote rose from 20 to 33 per cent in the city not including the suburbs, and then by the district council elections in Moscow in September, when the Bolshevik vote rose from 11 to 49.3 per cent (one Moscow comrade, whom I saw recently, told me that the correct figure is 51 per cent). This was proved by the new elections to the Soviets. It was proved by the fact that a majority of the peasant Soviets, their "Avksentyev" central Soviet notwithstanding, has expressed itself *against* the coalition . To be against the coalition means in *practice* to follow the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, reports from the front prove more frequently and more definitely that the soldiers are passing *en masse* over to the side or the Bolsheviks with ever greater determination, in spite of the malicious slan-

ders and attacks by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders, officers, deputies, etc., etc.

Last, but not least, the most outstanding fact of present-day Russian life is *the revolt of the peasantry*. This shows objectively, not by words but by deeds, that the people are going over to the side of the Bolsheviks. But the fact remains, notwithstanding the lies of the bourgeois press and its miserable yes-men of the "vacillating" *Novaya Zhizn* crowd, who shout about riots and anarchy. The peasant movement in Tambov Gubernia[83] was an uprising both in the physical and political sense, an uprising that has yielded such splendid political results as, in the first place, agreement to transfer the land to the peasants. It is not for nothing that the Socialist-Revolutionary rabble, including *Dyelo Naroda*, who are frightened by the uprising, now scream about the need to transfer the land to the peasants. Here is a *practical* demonstration of the correctness of Bolshevism and of its success. It proved to be impossible to "teach" the Bonapartists and their lackeys in the Pre-parliament otherwise than by an uprising.

This is a fact and facts are stubborn things. And such a factual "argument" *in favour* of an uprising is stronger than thousands of "pessimistic" evasions on the part of confused and frightened politicians.

If the peasant uprising were not an event of nation-wide political import, the Socialist-Revolutionary lackeys from the Pre-parliament would not be shouting about the need to hand over the land to the peasants.

Another splendid political and revolutionary consequence of the peasant uprising, as already noted in *Rabochy Put*, is the delivery of grain to the railway stations in Tambov Gubernia. Here is another "argument" for you, confused gentlemen, an argument in favour of the uprising as the only means to save the country from the famine that is knocking at our door and from a crisis of unheard-of dimensions. While the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik betrayers of the people are grumbling, threatening, writing resolutions, promising to feed the hungry by convening the Constituent Assembly, the people are beginning to solve the bread problem *Bolshevik-fashion*, *by rebelling* against the landowners, capitalists, and speculators.

Even the *bourgeois* press, even *Russkaya Volya*, was compelled to admit the wonderful results of *such* a solution (the only real solution) of the bread problem, by publishing information to the effect that the railway stations in Tambov Gubernia were swamped with grain.... *And this after the peasants had revolted!*

To doubt now that the majority of the people are following and will follow the Bolsheviks is shameful vacillation and in practice is the abandoning of *all* the principles of proletarian revolutionism, the complete renunciation of Bolshevism.

"We are not strong enough to seize power, and the bourgeoisie is not strong enough to hinder the convening of the Constituent Assembly."

The first part of this argument is a simple paraphrase of the preceding one. It does not gain in strength or power of conviction, when the confusion of its authors and their fear of the bourgeoisie are expressed in terms of pessimism in respect of the workers and optimism in respect of the bourgeoisie. If the officer cadets and the Cossacks say that they will fight against the Bolsheviks to the last drop of blood, this deserves full credence; if, however, the workers and soldiers at hundreds of meetings express full confidence in the Bolsheviks and affirm their readiness to defend the transfer of power to the Soviets, then it is "timely" to recall that voting is one thing and fighting another!

If you argue like that, of course, you "refute" the possibility of an uprising. But, we may ask, in what way does this peculiarly orientated "pessimism" with its peculiar urge differ from a political shift to the side of the bourgeoisie?

Look at the facts. Remember the Bolshevik declarations, repeated thousands of times and now "forgotten" by our pessimists. We have said thousands of times that the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are a force, that they are the vanguard of the revolution, that they *can* take power. Thousands of times have we upbraided the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries for phrase-mongering about the "plenipotentiary organs of democracy" accompanied by *fear* to transfer power to the Soviets.

And what has the Kornilov revolt proved? It has proved that the Soviets are a real force.

And, now, after this has been proved by experience, by facts, we are expected to repudiate Bolshevism, deny ourselves, and say that we are not strong enough (although the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow and a majority of the provincial Soviets are on the side of the Bolsheviks)! Are these not shameful vacillations? As a matter of fact, our "pessimists" are abandoning the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets", though they *are afraid* to admit it.

How can it be proved that the bourgeoisie are not strong enough to hinder the calling of the Constituent Assembly?

If the Soviets *have not the strength* to overthrow the bourgeoisie, this *means* the latter are strong enough to prevent the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, for there is nobody else to stop them. To trust the promises of Kerensky and Co., to trust the resolutions of the servile Pre-parliament—is this worthy of a member of a proletarian party and a revolutionary?

Not only has the bourgeoisie *strength enough* to hinder the convocation of the Constituent Assembly if the present government is not overthrown, but it can also achieve this result *indirectly* by surrendering Petrograd to the Germans, laying open the front, increasing lockouts, and sabotaging deliveries of foodstuffs. It has been proved by *facts* that the bourgeoisie have already been partly doing this, which means that they are capable of doing it *to the full extent*, if the workers and soldiers do not overthrow them.

"The Soviets must be a revolver pointed at the head of the government with the demand to convene the Constituent Assembly and stop all Kornilovite plots."

This is how far one of the two sad pessimists has gone.

He had to go that far, for to reject the uprising is *the same as* rejecting the slogan "All Power to the Soviets".

Of course, a slogan is "not sacred"; we all agree to that. But then why has *no one* raised the question of changing this slogan (in the same way as I raised the question after the July days*)? Why be *afraid* to say it openly, when the

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* See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 185-92.—*Ed.*

Party, since September, has been discussing the question of the uprising, which is now *the only way* to realise the slogan "All Power to the Soviets".

There is no way for our sad pessimists to turn. A renunciation of the uprising is a renunciation of the transfer of power to the Soviets and implies a "transfer" of all hopes and expectations to the kind bourgeoisie, which has "promised" to convoke the Constituent Assembly.

Is it so difficult to understand that once *power* is in the hands of the Soviets, the Constituent Assembly and its success are *guaranteed*? The Bolsheviks have said so thousands of times and *no one* has ever attempted to refute it. Everybody has recognised this "combined type", but to smuggle in a *renunciation* of the transfer of power to the Soviets under cover of the words "combined type", to smuggle it in *secretly* while *fearing* to renounce our slogan openly is a matter for wonder. Is there any parliamentary term to describe it?

Someone has very pointedly retorted to our pessimist: "Is it a revolver with no cartridges?" If so, it means going over directly to the Lieberdans, who have declared the Soviets a "revolver" thousands of times and have deceived the people thousands of times. For *while they were in control* the Soviets proved to be worthless.

If, however, it is to be a revolver "with cartridges", this cannot mean anything but *technical* preparation for an uprising; the cartridges have to be procured, the revolver has to be loaded—and cartridges alone will not be enough.

Either go over to the side of the Lieberdans and *openly* renounce the slogan "All Power to the Soviets", or start the uprising.

There is no middle course.

"The bourgeoisie cannot surrender Petrograd to the Germans, although Rodzyanko wants to, for the fighting is done not by the bourgeoisie, but by our heroic sailors."

This argument again reduces itself to the same "optimism" *in respect of the bourgeoisie* which is fatally manifested at every step by those who are pessimistic about the revolutionary forces and capabilities of the proletariat.

The fighting is done by the heroic sailors, *but* this did not

prevent *two* admirals from *disappearing* before the capture of Esel!

That is a fact and facts are stubborn things. The facts prove that admirals *are capable* of treachery no less than Kornilov. It is an undisputed fact that Field Headquarters has not been reformed, and that the commanding staff is Kornilovite in composition.

If the Kornilovites (with Kerensky at their head, for he is also a Kornilovite) *want* to surrender Petrograd, they can do it in two or even in three ways.

First, they can, through an act of treachery on the part of the Kornilovite officers, open the northern land front.

Second, they can "agree" on freedom of action for the entire German navy, which is *stronger* than we are; they can agree both with the German and the British imperialists. Moreover, the admirals who have disappeared may have delivered the *plans* to the Germans *as well.*

Third, they can, by means of lockouts, and by sabotaging the delivery of food, bring our troops to *complete* desperation and impotence.

Not a single one of these three ways can be denied. The facts have proved that the bourgeois-Cossack party of Russia has already knocked at all three doors and has tried to force open each of them.

What follows? It follows that we have no right to *wait* until the bourgeoisie strangle the revolution.

Experience has proved that Rodzyanko's wishes are no trifle. Rodzyanko is a man of affairs. Rodzyanko is backed by *capital*. This is beyond dispute. Capital is tremendous strength as long as the proletariat do not have power. *For decades*, Rodzyanko has faithfully and truly carried out the policies of capital.

What follows? It follows that to vacillate on the question of an uprising as the only means to save the revolution means to sink into that cowardly credulity in the bourgeoisie which is half-Lieberdan, Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik and half "peasant-like" unquestioning credulity, against which the Bolsheviks have been battling most of all.

Either fold your idle arms on your empty chest, wait and swear "faith" in the Constituent Assembly until Rodzyanko and Co. have surrendered Petrograd and strangled the

revolution or start an uprising. There is no middle course.

Even the convocation of the Constituent Assembly does not, in itself, change anything, for no "constituting", no voting by any arch-sovereign assembly will have any effect on the famine, or on Wilhelm. Both the convocation and the *success* of the Constituent Assembly depend upon the transfer of power to the Soviets. This old Bolshevik truth is being proved by reality ever more strikingly and ever more *cruelly*.

"We are becoming stronger every day. We can enter the Constituent Assembly as a strong opposition; why should we stake everything?..."

This is the argument of a philistine who has "read" that the Constituent Assembly is being called, and who trustingly acquiesces in the most legal, most loyal, most constitutional course.

It is a pity, however, that *waiting* for the Constituent Assembly does not solve either the question of famine or the question of surrendering Petrograd . This "trifle" is forgotten by the naïve or the confused or those who have allowed themselves to be frightened.

The famine will not wait. The peasant uprising did not wait. The war will not wait. The admirals who have disappeared did not wait.

Will the famine agree to wait, because we Bolsheviks *proclaim* faith in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly? Will the admirals who have disappeared agree to wait? Will the Maklakovs and Rodzyankos agree to stop the lockouts and the sabotaging of grain deliveries, or to denounce the secret treaties with the British and the German imperialists?

This is what the arguments of the heroes of "constitutional illusions" and parliamentary cretinism amount to. The living reality disappears, and what remains is only a *paper* dealing with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; there is nothing left but to hold elections.

And blind people are still wondering why hungry people and soldiers betrayed by generals and admirals are indifferent to the elections! Oh, wiseacres!

"Were the Kornilovites to start again, we would show them! But why should we take risks and start?"

This is extraordinarily convincing and revolutionary. History does not repeat itself, but if we turn our *backs* on it, contemplate the first Kornilov revolt and repeat: "If only the Kornilovites would start"—if we do that, what excellent revolutionary strategy it would be. How much like a waiting game it is! Maybe the Kornilovites will start again at an inopportune time. Isn't this a "weighty" argument? What kind of an earnest foundation for a proletarian policy is this?

And what if the Kornilovites of the second draft will have learned a thing or two? What if they *wait* for the hunger riots to begin, for the front to be broken through, for Petrograd to be surrendered, *before they begin*? What then?

It is proposed that we build the tactics of the proletarian party on the possibility of the Kornilovites' repeating one of their old errors!

Let us forget all that was being and *has been demonstrated* by the Bolsheviks a hundred times, all that the six months' history of our revolution has proved, namely, that there is no way out, that there is no objective way out and can be none *except* a dictatorship of the Kornilovites or a dictatorship of the proletariat. Let us forget this, let us renounce all this and wait! Wait for what? Wait for a miracle, for the tempestuous and catastrophic course of events from April 20 to August 29 to be succeeded (due to the prolongation of the war and the spread of famine) by a peaceful, quiet, smooth, legal convocation of the Constituent Assembly and by a fulfilment of its most lawful decisions. Here you have the "Marxist" tactics! Wait, ye hungry! Kerensky has promised to convene the Constituent Assembly.

"There is really nothing in the international situation that makes it obligatory for us to act immediately, we would be more likely to damage the cause of a socialist revolution in the West, if we were to allow ourselves to be shot...."

This argument is truly magnificent: Scheidemann "himself", Renaudel[84] "himself" would not be able to "manipu-

late" more cleverly the workers' sympathies for the international socialist revolution!

Just think of it: under devilishly difficult conditions, having but *one* Liebknecht (and he in prison) with no newspapers, with no freedom of assembly, with no Soviets, with *all* classes of the population, including every well-to-do peasant, incredibly hostile to the idea of internationalism, with the imperialist big, middle, and petty bourgeoisie splendidly organised—the Germans, i.e., the German revolutionary internationalists, the German workers dressed in sailors' jackets, started a mutiny in the navy with one chance in a hundred of winning.

But we, with dozens of papers at our disposal, freedom of assembly, a *majority* in the Soviets, we, the best situated proletarian internationalists in the world, should refuse to support the German revolutionaries by our uprising. We ought to reason like the Scheidemanns and Renaudels, that it is most prudent not to revolt, for if we are shot, then the world will lose such excellent, reasonable, ideal internationalists!

Let us prove how reasonable we are. Let us pass a resolution of sympathy with the *German insurrectionists*, and let us renounce the *insurrection* in Russia. This would be genuine, reasonable internationalism. Imagine how fast world internationalism would blossom forth, if the same wise policy were to triumph *everywhere*!

The war has fatigued and tormented the workers of all countries to the utmost. Outbursts are becoming frequent in Italy, Germany and Austria. We *alone* have Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Let us then *keep on waiting*. Let us betray the German internationalists as we are betraying the Russian peasants, who, not by words but by deeds, by their uprising against the landowners, appeal to us to rise against Kerensky's government....

Let the clouds of the imperialist conspiracy of the capitalists of all countries who are ready to strangle the Russian revolution gather—we shall wait patiently until we are strangled *by the ruble*! Instead of attacking the conspirators and breaking their ranks by a victory of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, let us wait for the Constituent Assembly, where all international plots will be

vanquished by *voting*, provided Kerensky and Rodzyanko conscientiously convene the Constituent Assembly. Have we any right to doubt the honesty of Kerensky and Rodzyanko?

"But 'everyone' is against us! We are isolated; the Central Executive Committee, the Menshevik internationalists, the *Novaya Zhizn* people, and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries have been issuing and will continue to issue appeals against us!"

A crushing argument. Up to now we have been mercilessly scourging the vacillators for their vacillations. *By so doing*, we have won the sympathies of the people. *By so doing*, we have won over the Soviets, without which the uprising could not be safe, quick, and sure. Now let us use the Soviets which we have won over in order *to move into the camp of the vacillators*. What a splendid career for Bolshevism!

The whole essence of the policy of the Lieberdans and Chernovs, and also of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, consists in *vacillations*. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshevik internationalists have *tremendous* political importance as an *indication* of the fact that the *masses are moving to the left*. Two such facts as the passing of some 40 per cent of both Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into the camp of the Left, on the one hand, and the peasant uprising, on the other, are clearly and obviously interconnected.

But it is the very character of this connection that reveals the abysmal spinelessness of those who have now undertaken to whimper over the fact that the Central Executive Committee, which has rotted away, or the vacillating Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Co., have come out against us. For *these* vacillations of the petty-bourgeois leaders—the Martovs, Kamkovs, Sukhanovs and Co.—have to be compared to the *uprising* of the peasants. Here is a *realistic* political comparison. With whom shall we go? Should it be with the vacillating handfuls of Petrograd leaders, who have expressed *indirectly* the *leftward swing* of the masses, but who, at *every* political turn, have shamefully whimpered, vacillated, run to ask forgiveness of the

Lieberdans, Avksentyevs and Co., *or with those masses that have moved to the left*?

Thus, and only thus, can the question be presented.

Because the peasant uprising has been betrayed by the Martovs, Kamkovs, and Sukhanovs, we, the workers' party of revolutionary internationalists, are asked to betray it, too. This is what the policy of blaming the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshevik internationalists reduces itself to.

But we have said that to help the vacillating, we must stop vacillating ourselves. Have those "nice" Left petty-bourgeois democrats not "vacillated" in favour of the coalition? In the long run we succeeded in making them follow us because we ourselves did not vacillate. Events have shown we are right.

These gentlemen by their vacillations have always held back the revolution; We alone have saved it. Shall we now give up, when the famine is knocking at the gates of Petrograd and Rodzyanko and Co. are preparing to surrender the city?!

"But we have not even firm connections with the railwaymen and the postal employees. Their official representatives are the Plansons.[85] And can we win without the post office and without railways?"

Yes, yes, the Plansons here, the Lieberdans there. What confidence have the *masses* shown them? Have we not always shown that those leaders betrayed the *masses*? Did the masses not turn away from those leaders *towards us*, both at the elections in Moscow and at the elections to the Soviets? Or perhaps the mass of railway and postal employees are not starving! Or do not strike against Kerensky and Co.?

"Did we have connections with these unions before February 28?" one comrade asked a pessimist. The latter replied by pointing out that the two revolutions could not be compared. But this reply only *strengthens* the position of the one who asked the question. For it is the Bolsheviks who have spoken thousands of times about prolonged preparation for the *proletarian* revolution *against the bourgeoisie* (and they have not spoken about it in order to forget their words when the decisive moment is at hand). The political and

economic life of the unions of postal and telegraph employees and railwaymen is characterised by the very *separation* of the proletarian elements of the masses from the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois upper layer. It is not absolutely necessary to secure "connections" with one or the other union beforehand; what matters is that only a victory of a proletarian and peasant uprising *can* satisfy the *masses* both of the army of railwaymen and of postal and telegraph employees.

"There is only enough broad in Petrograd for two or three days. Can we give bread to the insurrectionists?"

This is one of a thousand sceptical remarks (the sceptics can *always* "doubt" and cannot be refuted by anything but experience), one of those remarks that put the blame on the wrong shoulders.

It is Rodzyanko and Co., it is the bourgeoisie that are preparing the famine and speculating on strangling the revolution by famine. There is no escaping the famine and *there can be none* except by an uprising of the peasants against the landowners in the countryside and by a victory of the workers over the capitalists in the cities and Petrograd and Moscow. There is *no other way* to get grain from the rich, or to transport it despite their sabotage, or to break the resistance of the corrupt employees and the capitalist profiteers, or to establish strict accounting. The history of the supply organisations and of the food difficulties of the "democracy" with its millions of *complaints* against the sabotage of the capitalists, with its *whimpering* and *supplication* is proof of this.

There is no power on earth apart from the power of a victorious proletarian revolution that would advance from complaints and begging and tears to *revolutionary action*. And the longer the proletarian revolution is delayed, the longer it is put off by events or by the vacillations of the wavering and confused, the more victims it will claim and the more difficult it will be to *organise* the transportation and distribution of food.

"In insurrection delay is fatal" this is our answer to those having the sad "courage" to look at the growing economic ruin, at the approaching famine, and still *dissuade* the

workers from the uprising (*that is*, *persuade them to wait and place confidence in the bourgeoisie for some further time*).

"There is not yet any danger at the front either. Even if the soldiers conclude an armistice themselves, it is still not a calamity."

But the soldiers will not conclude an armistice. For this state power is necessary and that cannot be obtained without an uprising. The soldiers will simply *desert*. Reports from the front tell that. We must not wait because of the risk of aiding collusion between Rodzyanko and Wilhelm and the risk of *complete* economic ruin, with the soldiers deserting in masses, once they (*being already close to desperation*) sink into absolute despair and leave everything to the mercy of fate.

"But if we take power, and obtain neither an armistice nor a democratic peace, the soldiers may not be willing to fight a revolutionary war. What then?"

An argument which brings to mind the saying: one fool can ask ten times more questions than ten wise men can answer.

We have never denied the difficulties of *those in power* during an imperialist war. Nevertheless, we have always *preached* the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry. Shall we renounce this, when the moment to act has arrived?

We have always said that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country creates gigantic changes in the international situation, in the economic life of the country, in the condition of the army and in its mood—shall we now "forget" all this, and allow ourselves to be frightened by the "difficulties" of the revolution?

"As everybody reports, the masses are not in a mood that would drive them into the streets. Among the signs justifying pessimism may be mentioned the greatly increasing circulation of the pogromist and Black-Hundred press."

When people allow themselves to be frightened by the bourgeoisie, all objects and phenomena naturally appear

yellow to them. First, they substitute an impressionist, intellectualist criterion for the Marxist criterion of the movement; they *substitute* subjective impressions of moods *for* a political analysis of the development of the class struggle and of the course of events in the entire country against the entire international background. They "conveniently" forget, of course, that a firm party line, its unyielding resolve, is *also* a mood-creating *factor*, particularly at the sharpest revolutionary moments. It is sometimes very "convenient" for people to forget that the responsible leaders, by their vacillations and by their readiness to burn their yesterday's idols, cause the most unbecoming vacillations in the mood of certain strata of the masses.

Secondly—and this is at present the main thing—in speaking about the mood of the masses, the spineless people forget to add:

that "everybody" reports it as a tense and expectant mood;

that "everybody" agrees that, called upon by the Soviets for the defence of the Soviets, the workers will rise to a man;

that "everybody" agrees that the workers are greatly dissatisfied with the indecision of the centres concerning the "last decisive struggle", the inevitability of which they clearly recognise;

that "everybody" unanimously characterises the mood of the broadest masses as close to desperation and points to the anarchy developing therefrom;

that "everybody" also recognises that there is among the class-conscious workers a definite unwillingness to go out into the streets *only* for demonstrations, *only* for partial struggles, since a general and not a partial struggle is in the air, while the hopelessness of individual strikes, demonstrations and acts to influence the authorities has been seen and is fully realised.

And so forth.

If we approach this characterisation of the mass mood from the point of view of the entire development of the class and political struggle and of the entire course of events during the six months of our revolution, it will become clear to us how people frightened by the bourgeoisie are distorting the question. Things are not as they were before

April 20-21, June 9, July 3, for then it was a matter of *spontaneous excitement* which we, as a party, either failed to comprehend (April 20) or held back and shaped into a peaceful demonstration (June 9 and July 3), for we knew very well at that time that the Soviets were *not yet* ours, that the peasants *still* trusted the Lieberdan-Chernov and not the Bolshevik course (uprising), that consequently we could not have the majority of the people behind us, and that consequently the uprising would be premature.

At that time the majority of the class-conscious workers did *not* raise the question of the last decisive struggle at all; not one of all our Party units would have raised it at that time. As for the unenlightened and very broad masses, there was neither a concerted effort nor the resolve born out of despair; there was only a spontaneous *excitement* with the naïve hope of "influencing" Kerensky and the bourgeoisie by "action", by a demonstration pure and simple.

What is needed for an uprising is not this, but, on the one hand, a conscious, firm and unswerving resolve on the part of the class-conscious elements to fight to the end; and on the other, a mood of despair among the broad masses who *feel* that nothing can now be saved by half-measures; that you cannot "influence" anybody; that the hungry will "smash everything, destroy everything, even anarchically", *if* the Bolsheviks are not able to lead them in a decisive battle.

The development of the revolution has in practice brought *both* the workers *and* the peasantry to precisely this combination of a tense mood resulting from experience among the class-conscious and a mood of hatred towards those using the lockout weapon and the capitalists that is close to despair among the broadest masses.

We can also understand the "success" on this very soil of the scoundrels of the reactionary press who imitate Bolshevism. The malicious glee of the reactionaries at the approach of a decisive battle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has been observed in all revolutions without exception; it has always been so, and it is absolutely unavoidable. And if you allow yourselves to be frightened by *this* circumstance, then you have to renounce not only the uprising but the proletarian revolution in general. For in a cap-

italist society this revolution *cannot* mature *without* being accompanied by malicious glee on the part of the reactionaries and by hopes that they would be able to feather their nest in this way.

The class-conscious workers know perfectly well that the Black Hundreds work hand in hand with the bourgeoisie, and that a decisive victory of the workers (in which the petty bourgeoisie do not believe, which the capitalists are afraid of, which the Black Hundreds sometimes wish for out of sheer malice, convinced as they are that the Bolsheviks cannot retain power)—that this victory will completely *crush* the Black Hundreds, that the Bolsheviks *will be able* to retain power firmly and to the greatest advantage of all humanity tortured and tormented by the war.

Indeed, is there anybody in his senses who can doubt that the *Rodzyankos* and Suvorins are acting in concert, that the roles have been distributed among them?

Has it not been proved by facts that Kerensky acts on Rodzyanko's orders, while the State Printing Press of the Russian Republic (don't laugh!) prints the Black-Hundred speeches of reactionaries in the "Duma" at the expense of the state. Has not this fact been exposed *even* by the lackeys from *Dyelo Naroda*, who serve "their own mannikin"? Has not the experience of *all* elections proved that the Cadet lists were fully supported by *Novoye Vremya*, which is a venal paper controlled by the "interests" of the tsarist landowners?[86]

Did we not read yesterday that commercial and industrial capitalists (non-partisan capitalists, of course; oh, non-partisan capitalists, to be sure, for the Vikhlayevs and Rakitnikovs, the Gvozdyovs and Nikitins are not in coalition with the Cadets—God forbid—but with *non-partisan* commercial and industrial circles!) have donated the goodly sum of 300,000 rubles to the Cadets?

The whole Black-Hundred press, if we look at things from a class and not a sentimental point of view, is a *branch* of the firm "Ryabushinsky, Milyukov, and Co.". Capitalists buy, on the one hand, the Milyukovs, Zaslavskys, Potresovs, and so on; on the other, the Black Hundreds.

The *victory of the proletariat* is the only means of putting an end to this most hideous poisoning of the people by the cheap Black-Hundred venom.

Is it any wonder that the crowd, tired out and made wretched by hunger and the prolongation of the war, clutches at the Black-Hundred poison? Can one imagine a capitalist society on the eve of collapse in which the oppressed masses are *not* desperate? Is there any doubt that the desperation of the masses, a large part of whom are still ignorant, *will* express itself in the increased consumption of all sorts of poison?

Those who, in arguing about the mood of the masses, blame the masses for their own personal spinelessness, are in a hopeless position. The masses are divided into those who are consciously biding their time and those who unconsciously are ready to sink into despair; but the masses of the oppressed and the hungry are *not* spineless.

"On the other hand, the Marxist party cannot reduce the question of an uprising to that of a military conspiracy...."

Marxism is an extremely profound and many-sided doctrine. It is, therefore, no wonder that *scraps* of quotations from Marx—especially when the quotations are made *inappropriately*—can always be found among the "arguments" of those who break with Marxism. Military conspiracy is Blanquism, *if* it is organised not by a party of a definite class, *if* its organisers have not analysed the political moment in general and the international situation in particular, *if* the party has not on its side the sympathy of the majority of the people, as proved by objective facts, *if* the development of revolutionary events has not brought about a practical refutation of the conciliatory illusions of the petty bourgeoisie, *if* the majority of the Soviet-type organs of revolutionary struggle that have been recognised as authoritative or have shown themselves to be such in practice have not been won over, *if* there has not matured a sentiment in the army (if in war-time) against the government that protracts the unjust war against the will of the whole people, *if* the slogans of the uprising (like "All power to the Soviets", "Land to the peasants", or "Immediate offer of a democratic peace to all the belligerent nations, with an immediate abrogation of all secret treaties and secret diplomacy", etc.) have not become widely known and popular, *if* the advanced

workers are not sure of the desperate situation of the masses and of the support of the countryside, a support proved by a serious peasant movement or by an uprising against the landowners and the government that defends the landowners, *if* the country's economic situation inspires earnest hopes for a favourable solution of the crisis by peaceable and parliamentary means.

This is probably enough.

In my pamphlet entitled: *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* (I hope it will appear in a day or two), there is a quotation from Marx which really bears upon the question of insurrection and which enumerates the features of insurrection as an "art".*

I am ready to wager that if we were to propose to all those chatterers in Russia who are now shouting against a military conspiracy, to open their mouths and explain the difference between the "art" of an insurrection and a military conspiracy that deserves condemnation, they would either repeat what was quoted above or would cover themselves with shame and would call forth the general ridicule of the workers. Why not try, my dear would-be Marxists! Sing us a song *against* "military conspiracy"!

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* See pp. 131-32 of this volume.—*Ed.*

POSTSCRIPT

The above lines had been written when I received, at eight o'clock Tuesday evening, the morning Petrograd papers; there was an article by Mr. V. Bazarov in *Novaya Zhizn*. Mr. V. Bazarov asserts that "a handwritten manifesto was distributed in the city, in which arguments were presented in the name of two eminent Bolsheviks, against immediate action".

If this is true, I beg the comrades, whom this letter cannot reach earlier than Wednesday noon, to *publish it* as quickly as possible.

I did not write it for the press; I wanted to talk to the members of our Party by letter. But we cannot remain silent when the heroes of *Novaya Zhizn*, who do not belong to the Party and who have been ridiculed by it a thousand times for their contemptible spinelessness (they voted for the Bolsheviks the day before yesterday, for the Mensheviks yesterday, and who *almost* united them at the world-famous unity congress) —when such individuals receive a *manifesto* from members of our Party in which they carry on propaganda against an uprising. We must agitate also *in favour of* an uprising. Let the anonymous individuals come right out into the light of day, and let them bear the punishment they deserve for their shameful vacillations, even if it be only the ridicule of all class-conscious workers. I have at my disposal only one hour before I send the present letter to Petrograd, and I therefore can say only a word or two about one of the "methods" of the sad heroes of the brainless *Novaya Zhizn* trend. Mr. V. Bazarov attempts to polemise against Comrade Ryazanov, who has said, and who is a thousand times correct

in saying, that "all those who create in the masses a mood of despair and indifference are preparing an uprising".

The sad hero of a sad cause "rejoins" as follows:

"Have despair and indifference ever conquered?"

O contemptible fools from *Novaya Zhizn*! Do they know such examples of uprising in history, in which the masses of the oppressed classes were victorious in a desperate battle without having been reduced to despair by long sufferings and by an extreme sharpening of all sorts of crises, in which those masses had not been seized by indifference towards various lackey-like pre-parliaments, towards idle playing at revolution, towards the Lieberdans' reduction of the Soviets from organs of power and uprising to empty talking-shops?

Or have the contemptible little fools from *Novaya Zhizn* perhaps discovered among the masses an *indifference*—to the question of bread, to the prolongation of the war, to and for the peasants?

Written on October 17 (30), 1917

Published in *Rabochy Put* Nos. 40, 41 and 42, November 1, 2 and 3 (October 19, 20 and 21), 1917
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the newspaper text

LETTER TO BOLSHEVIK PARTY MEMBERS[87]

Comrades,

I have not yet been able to obtain the Petrograd papers for Wednesday, October 18. When the full text of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's statement in the non-Party paper *Novaya Zhizn* was transmitted to me by telephone, I refused to believe it. But, as it has turned out, there can be no doubt about it and I have to avail myself of this opportunity to get a letter to Party members by Thursday evening or Friday morning; for to remain silent in the face of such unheard-of *strike-breaking* would be a crime.

The more serious the practical problem, and the more responsible and "prominent" the persons guilty of strike-breaking, the more dangerous it is, the more resolutely must the strike-breakers be kicked out, and the more unpardonable would it be to stop even to consider the past "services" of the strike-breakers.

Just think of it! It has been known in Party circles that the Party has been discussing the question of an insurrection since September. Nobody has ever heard of a single letter or manifesto by either of the persons named! Now, on the eve, one might say, of the Congress of Soviets, two prominent Bolsheviks come out *against* the majority, and, obviously, *against the Central Committee*. It is not said plainly, but the harm done to the cause is all the greater, for to speak in hints is even more dangerous.

It is perfectly clear from the text of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's statement that they have gone against the Central

Committee, for otherwise their statement would be meaningless. But they do not say *what* specific decision of the Central Committee they are disputing.

Why?

The reason is obvious: because it has not been published by the Central Committee.

What does this boil down to?

On a burning question of supreme importance, on the eve of the critical day of October 20, two "prominent Bolsheviks" attack an *un*published decision of the Party centre and attack it in the *non*-Party press and, furthermore; in a paper which on this very question is *hand in glove with the bourgeoisie against the workers' party*!

This is a thousand times more despicable and a *million times more harmful* than all the statements Plekhanov, for example, made in the non-Party press in 1906-07, and which the Party so sharply condemned! At that time it was only a question of elections, whereas now it is a question of an insurrection for the conquest of power!

On such a question, *after* a decision has been taken by the centre, to dispute this *unpublished* decision in front of the Rodzyankos and Kerenskys in a non-Party paper—can you imagine an act more treacherous or blacklegging any worse?

I should consider it disgraceful on my part if I were to hesitate to condemn these former comrades because of my earlier close relations with them. I declare outright that I no longer consider either of them comrades and that I will fight with all my might, both in the Central Committee and at the Congress, to secure the expulsion of both of them from the Party.

A workers' party, which the course of events is confronting more and more frequently with the need for an insurrection, is unable to accomplish that difficult task if, after their adoption, unpublished decisions of the centre are disputed in the non-Party press, and vacillation and confusion are brought into the ranks of the fighters.

Let Mr. Zinoviev and Mr. Kamenev found their own party with the dozens of perplexed people or with candidates for election to the Constituent Assembly. The workers will not join such a party, for its first slogan will be:

> "Members of the Central Committee who are defeated at a meeting of the Central Committee on the question of a decisive fight are permitted to resort to the non-Party press for the purpose of attacking the unpublished decisions of the Party."

Let them build themselves *such* a party; our workers' Bolshevik Party will only gain from it.

When all the documents are published, the strike-breaking act of Zinoviev and Kamenev will stand out even more glaringly. Meanwhile, let the workers consider the following question:

> 'Let us assume that the Executive Committee of an all-Russia trade union had decided, after a month of deliberation and by a majority of over 80 per cent, that preparations must be made for a strike, but that for the time being neither the date nor any other details should be divulged. Let us assume that, *after* the decision had been taken, two members, under the false pretext of a "dissenting opinion", not only began to write to local groups urging a reconsideration of the decision, but also permitted their letters to be communicated to *non*-Party newspapers. Let us assume, finally, that they themselves attacked the decision in non-Party papers, although it had not yet been published, and began to vilify the strike in front of the capitalists.
>
> 'We ask, would the workers hesitate to expel such blacklegs from their midst?'

* * *

As to the situation with regard to an insurrection now, when October 20 is so close at hand, I cannot judge from afar to what exact extent the cause has been damaged by the strike-breaking statement in the non-Party press. There is no doubt that very great *practical* damage has been done. In order to remedy the situation, it is necessary first of all to restore unity in the Bolshevik front by expelling the blacklegs.

The weakness of the ideological arguments against an insurrection will become clearer, the more we drag them into the light of day. I recently sent an article on this subject to *Rabochy Put*, and if the editors do not find it possible to print it, Party members will probably acquaint themselves with it in the manuscript.*

There are basically two so-called "ideological" arguments. First, that it is necessary to "wait" for the Constituent Assembly. Let us wait, perhaps we can hold on until then—hat is the whole argument. Perhaps, despite famine, despite economic chaos, despite the fact that the patience of the soldiers is exhausted, despite Rodzyanko's steps to surrender Petrograd to the Germans, despite the lockouts, perhaps we can hold on.

Perhaps and maybe—that is the whole point of the argument.

The second is noisy pessimism. Everything is fine with the bourgeoisie and Kerensky; everything is wrong with us. The capitalists have prepared everything wonderfully; everything is wrong with the workers. The "pessimists" are shouting at the top of their voices about the military side of the matter, but the "optimists" are silent, for to disclose certain things to Rodzyanko and Kerensky is hardly pleasant to anybody but blacklegs.

Difficult times. A hard task. A grave betrayal.

Nevertheless, the task will be accomplished; the workers will consolidate their ranks, the peasant revolt and the extreme impatience of the soldiers at the front will do their work! Let us close our ranks—the proletariat must win!

N. Lenin

Written on October 18 (31), 1917

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Published according to the manuscript

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* See pp. 195-215 of this volume.—*Ed.*

THE TASKS OF OUR PARTY IN THE INTERNATIONAL

APROPOS OF THE THIRD ZIMMERWALD CONFERENCE[88]

Rabochy Put No. 22 of September 28 published the manifesto of the Third Zimmerwald Conference. If we are not mistaken, the only other newspaper that published this manifesto was the Menshevik, internationalist *Iskra*[89] No. 1 of September 26, which added a very brief note referring to the composition of the Third Zimmerwald Conference and the date on which it was held (August 20 to 27, N. S.). No other newspaper published either the manifesto or any detailed information about the Conference.

We are now in possession of certain materials on this Conference consisting of an article published in *Politiken*, the organ of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats (a translation of which appeared in *Työmies*, the organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland)[90] and two written communications, one from a Polish and one from a Russian comrade who took part in the Conference. On the basis of this information we will first of all say something about the Conference in general and then make our appraisal of it and of the tasks of our Party.

I

The representatives of the following parties and groups were present at the Conference: (1) the German "Independent" Social-Democratic Party (the Kautskyites); (2) the Swiss party; (3) the Swedish *Left* party (which, you will remember, has broken off all connection with the opportunist Branting party); (4) the Norwegians and (5) the Danes (there is nothing in our material to indicate whether this refers to the official,

opportunist, Danish party headed by the Minister Stauning); (6) the Social-Democratic Party of Finland; (7) the Rumanians; (8) the R.S.D.L.P. Bolsheviks; (9) the R.S.D.L.P. Mensheviks (Panin sent a written statement to the effect that he would not take part in this Conference on the grounds that it was not a representative conference; Axelrod, however, attended some of the meetings, *but did not sign the manifesto*); (10) the Menshevik internationalists; (11) the American group of Christian Socialist Internationalists (?), (12) the American Social-Democratic Propaganda Group (evidently this is the group I mentioned in my pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution. Draft Platform for the Proletarian Party*, page 24,* for this group began to publish the newspaper, *The Internationalist*[91] in January 1917); (13) the Polish Social-Democrats united under the National Executive; (14) the Austrian Opposition (the Karl Marx Club, which was closed down by the Austrian Government after the execution of Stürgkh by Friedrich Adler[92]; this Club is also referred to in the above-mentioned pamphlet, page 25**); (15) the Bulgarian Independent Trade Unions (which, as the writer of the letter I have in my possession adds, belong not to the Tesnyaki, i.e., not to the Left, internationalist Bulgarian party, but to the Shiroki group, i.e., to the opportunist Bulgarian party); this delegate arrived after the Conference had closed, as also did the delegates of (16) the Serbian party.

Of these sixteen parties and groups, Nos. 3, 8, 12, 13, and 14 belong to the "third" trend referred to in the resolution of our Conference of April 24-29, 1917 (and in my pamphlet, page 23,*** in which this trend is called "true internationalist"); closer to this Left trend, or between it and the Kautskian Centre, stand groups 4 and 16, although it is difficult to define their position precisely—perhaps they also belong to the Centre. Then, group 1, and probably 2, 6 and 7, group 10 and probably 15, belong to the Kautskian Centre. Groups 5 (if this is Stauning's party) and 9 are ministerialists, defencists and social-chauvinists. Finally, group 11 obviously got to the Conference by accident.

* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 79.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid., pp. 77-80.—*Ed.*

From this it is soon that the composition of the Conference was very mixed—even absurd, for the people who got together were *not* in agreement on the *main* thing, and therefore were *incapable* of really unanimous action, of really acting together; they were people who were bound to disagree on the *fundamental* trend of their policy. Naturally, the fruit of the "collaboration" of such people is either wrangling or gossip, or elastic, compromise resolutions written for the purpose of concealing the truth. Examples and proof of this we shall see in a moment...*

Written in October 1917
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in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Published according
to the manuscript

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

Dear Comrades,

No self-respecting party can tolerate strike-breaking and blacklegs in its midst. That is obvious. The more we reflect upon Zinoviev's and Kamenev's statement in the non-Party press, the more self-evident it becomes that their action is strike-breaking in the full sense of the term. Kamenev's evasion at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet is something really despicable. He is, don't you see, in full agreement with Trotsky. But is it so difficult to understand that in the face of the enemy, Trotsky *could not* have said, he had no right to say, and should not have said more than he did? Is it so difficult to understand that it is a *duty* to the Party which has concealed *its* decision from the enemy (on the necessity for an armed uprising, on the fact that the time for it is fully ripe, on the thorough preparations to be made for it, etc.), and it is this decision that makes it *obligatory* in public statements to fasten not only the "blame", but also the initiative upon the adversary? Only a child could fail to understand that. Kamenev's evasion is a sheer fraud. The same must be said of Zinoviev's evasion, at least of his letter of "justification" (written, I think, to the Central Organ), which is the only document I have seen (for, as to a dissenting opinion, "an alleged dissenting opinion", which has been trumpeted in the *bourgeois* press, I, a member of the Central Committee, have *to this very day* seen nothing of it). Among Zinoviev's "arguments" there is this: Lenin, he says, sent out his letters "*before* any decisions were adopted", and you did not protest. That is literally what Zinoviev

wrote, himself underlining the word *before* four times. Is it really so difficult to understand that *before* a decision has been taken on a strike by the centre, it is permissible to agitate for and against it; but that *after* a decision in favour of a strike (with the additional decision to conceal this from the enemy), to carry on agitation against the strike is strike-breaking? Any worker will understand that. The question of insurrection has been discussed in the centre since September. That is when Zinoviev and Kamenev could and *should* have come out in writing, so that *everybody*, upon seeing their arguments, would have realised that they had completely lost their heads. To conceal one's views from the Party for a whole month *before* a decision is taken, and to send out a dissenting opinion *after* a decision is taken—that is strike-breaking.

Zinoviev pretends not to understand this difference, he pretends not to understand that after a decision to strike has been taken by the centre, only blacklegs can carry on agitation among the lower bodies against that decision. Any worker will understand that.

And Zinoviev did agitate and attempted to defeat the centre's decision, both at Sunday's meeting,[93] where he and Kamenev secured not a single vote, and in his present letter. For Zinoviev has the effrontery to assert that "the opinion of the Party has not been canvassed" and that such questions "cannot be decided by ten men". Just think! Every member of the Central Committee knows that more than ten C.C. members were present at the decisive meeting, that a *majority of the plenary meeting* were present, that Kamenev himself declared at the meeting that "this meeting is decisive", that it was known with absolute certainty that the *majority* of the absent members of the Central Committee *were not in agreement* with Zinoviev and Kamenev. And now, *after* the Central Committee has adopted a decision at a meeting which Kamenev himself admitted to be *decisive*, a member of the Central Committee has the audacity to write that "the opinion of the Party has not been canvassed", and that such questions "cannot be decided by ten men". That is strike-breaking in the full sense of the term. Between Party congresses, the Central Committee decides. The Central Committee has decided. Kamenev and Zinoviev, who did not come out in

writing *before* the decision was taken, began to *dispute* the Central Committee's decision *after* it had been taken.

That is strike-breaking in the full sense of the term. After a decision has been taken, any dispute is *impermissible* when it concerns immediate and *secret* preparations for a strike. Now Zinoviev has the insolence to blame *us* for "warning the enemy". Is there any limit to his brazenness? Who is it that has damaged the cause, frustrated the strike by "warning the enemy", if not those who came out in the *non-Party* press?

How can one come out *against* a "decisive" resolution of the Party in a paper which on *this* question is band in glove with the entire bourgeoisie?

If that is tolerated, the Party will become impossible, the Party will be destroyed.

It is ridiculing the Party to give the name of "dissenting opinion" to that which Bazarov learns about and publishes in a non-Party paper.

Kamenev's and Zinoviev's statement in the non-Party press was especially despicable for the additional reason that the Party is not in a position to refute their *slanderous lie* openly. I know of no decisions regarding the date, Kamenev writes and publishes his writings in his own name and in the name of Zinoviev. (After such a statement, Zinoviev bears full responsibility for Kamenev's conduct and statements.)

How can the Central Committee refute this?

We cannot tell the capitalists the truth, namely, that we have *decided* on a strike and have decided to *conceal the moment chosen* for it.

We cannot refute the slanderous lie of Zinoviev and Kamenev *without doing even greater damage to the cause*. And the utter baseness, the real treachery of these two individuals is precisely in their having revealed the strikers' plan to the capitalists, for, since we remain silent in the press, everybody will guess *how* things stand.

Kamenev and Zinoviev have *betrayed* to Rodzyanko and Kerensky the decision of the Central Committee of their Party on insurrection and the decision to conceal from the enemy preparations for insurrection and the date appointed for it. That is a fact and no evasions can refute it. Two mem-

bers of the Central Committee have by a slanderous lie *betrayed* the decision of the workers to the capitalists. There can and must be only one answer to that: an immediate decision of the Central Committee:

"The Central Committee, regarding Zinoviev's and Kamenev's statement in the non-Party press as strike-breaking in the full sense of the term, expels both of them from the Party."

It is not easy for me to write in this way about former close comrades. But I should regard any hesitation in this respect as a crime, for otherwise a party of revolutionaries which does not punish prominent blacklegs would *perish*.

The question of insurrection, even if the blacklegs have now delayed it for a long time by betraying it to Rodzyanko and Kerensky, has not been *removed from the agenda*, it has not been removed by the Party. But how can we prepare ourselves for insurrection and lay plans for it, if we *tolerate* "prominent" strike-breakers in our midst? The more prominent, the *more dangerous* they are, and the less deserving of "forgiveness". *On n'est trahi que par les siens*, the French say. Only your *own people* can betray you.

The more "*prominent*" the strike-breakers are, the more imperative it is to punish them by immediate expulsion.

That is the only way for the workers' party to recuperate, rid itself of a dozen or so spineless intellectuals, rally the ranks of the revolutionaries, and advance to meet great and momentous difficulties hand in hand *with the revolutionary workers*.

We cannot publish the truth, namely, that *after* the decisive meeting of the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev at Sunday's meeting had the audacity to demand a *revision*, that Kamenev had the effrontery to shout: "The Central Committee has collapsed, for it has done nothing for a whole week" (I could *not* refute that because to say *what really had been done* was impossible), while Zinoviev with an air of innocence proposed this resolution, which was rejected by the meeting: "No action shall be taken before consulting with the Bolsheviks who are to arrive on October 20 for the Congress of Soviets."

Just imagine! After the *centre* has taken a decision to call a strike, it is proposed at a meeting of the rank and file

that it be postponed (until October 20, when the Congress was to convene. The Congress was subsequently postponed—the Zinovievs trust the Lieberdans) and be referred to a body *such* as the Party Rules do not provide for, that has *no* authority over the Central Committee, and that does *not* know Petrograd.

And *after this* Zinoviev still has the insolence to write: "This is hardly the way to strengthen the unity of the Party."

What else can you call it but a threat to effect a split?

My answer to this threat is that I shall go the limit, I shall win freedom of speech for myself before the workers, and I shall, *at whatever cost*, brand the blackleg Zinoviev as a blackleg. My answer to the threat of a split is to declare war to a finish, war for the expulsion of both blacklegs from the Party.

The Executive Committee of a trade union, after a *month* of deliberation, decides that a strike is inevitable, that the time is ripe, but that the date is to be concealed from the employers. After that, two members of the Executive Committee appeal *to the rank and file*, disputing the decision, and are defeated. Thereupon these two come out in the press and with a slanderous lie betray the decision of the Executive Committee to the capitalists, thus more than half wrecking the strike, or delaying it to a less favourable time by warning the enemy.

Here we have strike-breaking in the full sense of the term. And that is why I demand the expulsion of both the blacklegs, reserving for myself the right (in view of their threat of a split) to publish *everything* when publication becomes possible.

Written on October 19 (November 1), 1917

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SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CHEATS THE PEASANTS ONCE AGAIN

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party has made a solemn and public announcement, in its chief newspaper, *Dyelo Naroda*, of October 18 and 19, that the Minister of Agriculture's new land bill is a "major step towards the implementation of the Party's agrarian programme", and that the "Party's Central Committee insistently urges all Party organisations to launch a vigorous campaign in favour of the bill and popularise it among the masses".

Actually, however, this bill, produced by the Minister, S. L. Maslov, who is a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and summarised in *Dyelo Naroda*, is a *fraud on the peasants*. The S.R. Party has deceived the peasants: it has crawled away from its own land bill and has adopted the plan of the landowners and Cadets for a "fair assessment" and preservation of landed proprietorship. At its congresses during the first Russian revolution (1905) and the second Russian revolution (1917), the S.R. Party solemnly and publicly committed itself to the peasant demand for *confiscation* of the landed estates, that is, for their transfer to the peasants *without compensation*. Under Mr. Maslov's present project, however, not only are the landed estates left intact but the *landlords are also* to get the "fairly" assessed rent paid by the peasants for the "leased" lands.

This bill of Mr. Maslov's is downright betrayal of the peasants by the S.R. Party, and signifies its complete subservience to the landed proprietors. The utmost must be done, every effort must be made to drive this fact home to the widest possible sections of peasants.

On October 18, *Dyelo Naroda* carried Clauses 25-40 of Maslov's bill. Here are its main points:

(1) *Not all* landed estates are to go into the proposed "provisional lease pool".

(2) Landed estates are pooled by *land committees* set up under the law of April 21, 1917, which was issued by Prince Lvov's government of *landed proprietors*.

(3) The rent paid by the peasants for these tracts is to be fixed by the land committees "in accordance with the net income" and after deduction of various payments goes to the "rightful owner", *that is*, *the landed proprietor*.

This is a triple fraud worked on the peasants by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and each of these three points must be dealt with in greater detail.

Izvestia Vserossiiskogo Soveta Krestyanskikh Deputatov No. 88, dated August 19, carries a "model mandate drawn up on the basis of 242 mandates submitted by deputies from various localities to the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies held in Petrograd in 1917".

This summary of 242 mandates, made by representatives of peasants in the localities, gives the *best* idea of *what the peasants want*. This summarised mandate shows very well that the project of Maslov and the S.R. Party is a swindle.

The peasants are demanding the abolition of the right to private ownership of land; the conversion of *all* private land holdings, etc., into the property of the whole people, without compensation; the conversion of land tracts farmed on a highly efficient level (orchards, plantations, etc.) into "model farms", their transfer to "the exclusive use of the state and the communes"; the confiscation of "*all* livestock and farm implements", etc.

Such is the clear-cut statement of the peasant demands based on 242 local mandates submitted by the peasants themselves.

But the S.R. Party, having entered "a coalition" (that is, an alliance or agreement) with the bourgeoisie (the capitalists) and the landowners, and taking part in the government of capitalists and landowners, has now produced a bill which *does not abolish landed property* but transfers *only a part* of the landed estates into a *provisional lease pool*.

Under the bill, *no* orchards, plantations, beet fields, etc., can go into the lease pool! *Nor* can the pool include lands required "to satisfy the needs of the owner, his family, employees and workers, or to ensure the maintenance of available livestock"!

This means that the great landowner who has a sugar refinery, a potato processing plant, oil or other mill, orchards and plantations, hundreds of head of cattle and dozens of employees and workers, is to retain *a great estate farmed on capitalist lines*. The S.R. Party has indeed cheated the peasants with exceptional brazenness.

Landed estates, or "privately held land", as the bill puts it, are to be transferred to the lease pool by *land committees* set up under the law of April 21, 1917, by the government of *landed proprietors* headed by *Prince Lvov* and Co., the selfsame government of Milyukov and Guchkov, the imperialists and plunderers of the masses, who were routed by the workers' and soldiers' movement in Petrograd on April 20 and 21, i.e., a full six months ago.

The land committee law issued by this government of landed proprietors is, of course, far from being a democratic (popular) law. On the contrary, it contains a whole series of outrageous departures from democracy. Take its Clause 11, which gives the "gubernia* land committees the right to suspend decisions of the volost and uyezd committees, pending a final ruling by the central land committee". Under this swindling landowners' law, the committees are so constituted that the uyezd committee is less democratic than the volost committee, the gubernia committee is less democratic than the uyezd committee, and the central committee is less democratic than the gubernia committee.

The volost land committee is entirely elected by the population of the volost. Under the law, for instance, the uyezd committee must include the local magistrate and five members of "provisional executive committees" (pending the

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* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, divided into uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system continued under Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative territorial divisions in 1929-30.—*Ed*.

establishment of a new local government body). The gubernia committee includes a member of the circuit court and a magistrate, and also a representative of the ministry who is *appointed* by the minister, etc. The central land committee consists of 27 members "invited to sit on it by the Provisional Government"! This includes one each from the 11 political parties, with the majority (6 out of 11) going to *the Cadets and those to the right of them*. Isn't this an obvious swindle on the part of Lvov, Shingaryov (who signed the bill) and their friends? Isn't this simply flouting democracy to please the landed proprietors?

Does this not bear out the repeated Bolshevik statement that the will of the peasantry can be correctly expressed and implemented only by the *Soviets of Peasants' Deputies*, elected *by the mass of working people* and subject to recall at any time?

The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were returned in a majority to the All-Russia Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies by the unsuspecting peasants, have now *betrayed* them; they have *sold out* the peasant Soviets, *gone over to the landowners*, and accepted the land committee law of Prince Lvov, the landed proprietor. Therein lies the second big fraud which the Socialist-Revolutionaries have worked on the peasants.

This makes it all the more imperative for us, the workers' party, to reiterate the Bolshevik demand: all power in the countryside to the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and Agricultural Labourers' Deputies!

The peasant mandates demand the confiscation, that is, the alienation of landed estates *without compensation*, and the confiscation of stud farms, private pedigree stock-breeding and poultry farms, the transfer to state use of all highly efficient farms, and the confiscation of all livestock and implements on the landed estates.

Instead, the S.R. ministerial bill treats the peasants to *a preservation of rent*, which is still to go into landlords' coffers.

"Rent," says Clause 33 of the S.R. bill, "shall be paid to the committees, which shall hand over the remainder [after various payments to the Treasury, etc.] to the rightful owner."

That is how the "Socialist-Revolutionaries", having cheated the peasants with fine promises, now present them with a *landowner-Cadet* land bill!

This is a swindle, pure and simple.

Nothing at all remains of the peasant demand for confiscation. This is not confiscation of landed estates, but *consolidation* of landed property by a "republican" government which *assures* the landowners *retention* of both implements and land for the maintenance of their "employees and workers", the retention of land "designated by the landowner [it's as easy as that!] for the planting of sugar-beet and other industrial crops", *and of payment* for the rest of the land which goes into the lease pool. The land committees are turned into *rent collectors* for the landed gentry!

The Socialist-Revolutionaries do not abolish but consolidate landed property. It is now abundantly clear that they have betrayed the peasants and have defected to the landowners.

The sly Cadets, these loyal friends of the capitalists and landowners, must not be allowed to bring off their fraud. The Cadets make believe that the S.R. bill is terribly "revolutionary", and there is a great outcry in all the bourgeois papers *against* it; they all report "*opposition*" on the part of the bourgeois ministers (and, of course, of their avowed hangers-on like Kerensky) to this "terrible" bill. The whole thing is a farce, a game; it is the bartering of a trader who expects to drive a harder bargain with the spineless Socialist-Revolutionaries. Actually, Maslov's is a *landowners*' bill drawn up *for the express purpose* of securing an agreement with them and saving them.

It is pure humbug for *Dyelo Naroda* to declare, as it does in these issues, that it is "an outstanding land bill inaugurating [!] a great [!!] reform in socialising [!!!] land". There is no trace of "socialisation" in the bill (save perhaps for the "social" help given the landlord in assuring him of his rent); there is not the least trace of anything "revolutionary or democratic"; there is in fact nothing at all in it with the exception of the Irish-type "reforms"[94] which are a common feature of European *bourgeois reformism*.

Let me say this again: it is a bill *to save* the landowners, and *to* "*pacify*" the incipient peasant uprising by making

concessions on trifles and allowing the landowners to keep what is important.

The fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have submitted such a mean bill to the government really shows the' incredible hypocrisy of those who accuse the Bolsheviks of 'frustrating" the Constituent Assembly with their plans for transferring power to the Soviets. "Only 40 days till the Constituent Assembly"—Cadets, capitalists, landowners, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, all have joined in this hypocritical cry. Meanwhile, they slip the government a sweeping land bill, *swindling* the peasants, *saddling* them with landlords, *consolidating* landed property.

When it comes to supporting the landowners against the mounting peasant uprising, a sweeping bill *can* be rushed through 40 and even 30 days before the Constituent Assembly is due to meet.

When it comes to transferring all power to the Soviets *in order* to hand over *all* the land to the peasants, *at once* abolish landed property and *at once* offer a just peace, then Cadets, capitalists, landowners, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries all join in the howl against the Bolsheviks.

The peasants must know how they have been cheated and betrayed to the landowners by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

The peasants must know that it is only the *workers*' party, the *Bolsheviks*, who are prepared to stand to the last for the interests of the *poor* peasants and *all* working people *against* the capitalists and the landowners.

October 20, 1917.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according
to the newspaper text

LETTER TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS[95]

Comrades,

I am writing these lines on the evening of the 24th. The situation is critical in the extreme. In fact it is now absolutely clear that to delay the uprising would be fatal.

With all my might I urge comrades to realise that everything now hangs by a thread; that we are confronted by problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed people.

The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovites and the removal of Verkhovsky[96] show that we must not wait. We must at all costs, this very evening, this very night, arrest the government, having first disarmed the officer cadets (defeating them, if they resist), and so on.

We must not wait! We may lose everything!

The value of the immediate seizure of power will be the defence of the *people* (not of the congress, but of the people, the army and the peasants in the first place) from the Kornilovite government, which has driven out Verkhovsky and has hatched a second Kornilov plot.

Who must take power?

That is not important at present. Let the Revolutionary Military Committee[97] do it, or "some other institution" which will declare that it will relinquish power only to the true representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army (the immediate proposal of peace), the interests of the peasants (the land to be taken imme-

diately and private property abolished), the interests of the starving.

All districts, all regiments, all forces must be mobilised at once and must immediately send their delegations to the Revolutionary Military Committee and to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks with the insistent demand that under no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co. until the 25th—not under any circumstances; the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night.

History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, in fact, they risk losing everything.

If we seize power today, we seize it not in opposition to the Soviets but on their behalf.

The seizure of power is the business of the uprising; its political purpose will become clear after the seizure.

It would be a disaster, or a sheer formality, to await the wavering vote of October 25. The people have the right and are in duty bound to decide such questions not by a vote, but by force; in critical moments of revolution, the people have the right and are in duty bound to give directions to their representatives, even their best representatives, and not to wait for them.

This is proved by the history of all revolutions; and it would be an infinite crime on the part of the revolutionaries were they to let the chance slip, knowing that the *salvation of the revolution*, the offer of peace, the salvation of Petrograd, salvation from famine, the transfer of the land to the peasants depend upon them.

The government is tottering. It must be *given the deathblow* at all costs.

To delay action is fatal.

Written on October 24 (November 6), 1917

First published in 1924

Published according to a typewritten copy

TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA![98]

The Provisional Government has been deposed. State power has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—the Revolutionary Military Committee, which heads the Petrograd proletariat and the garrison.

The cause for which the people have fought, namely, the immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed proprietorship, workers' control over production, and the establishment of Soviet power—this cause has been secured.

Long live the revolution of workers, soldiers and peasants!

Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

10 a.m., October 25, 1917.

Rabochy i Soldat No. 8, October 25 (November 7), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text verified with the manuscript



Facsimile of the manuscript of “To the Citizens of Russia!”, written by Lenin on October 25 (November 1), 1917

Reduced

Facsimile of the manuscript of "To the Citizens of Russia!", written by Lenin on October 25 (November 1), 1917

Reduced

MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES OCTOBER 25 (NOVEMBER 7), 1917[99]

1
REPORT ON THE TASKS OF THE SOVIET POWER

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, the workers' and peasants' revolution, about the necessity of which the Bolsheviks have always spoken, has been accomplished.

What is the significance of this workers' and peasants' revolution? Its significance is, first of all, that we shall have a Soviet government, our own organ of power, in which the bourgeoisie will have no share whatsoever. The oppressed masses will themselves create a power. The old state apparatus will be shattered to its foundations and a new administrative apparatus set up in the form of the Soviet organisations.

From now on, a new phase in the history of Russia begins, and this, the third Russian revolution, should in the end lead to the victory of socialism.

One of our urgent tasks is to put an immediate end to the war. It is clear to everybody that in order to end this war, which is closely bound up with the present capitalist system, capital itself must be fought.

We shall be helped in this by the world working-class movement, which is already beginning to develop in Italy, Britain and Germany.

The proposal we make to international democracy for a just and immediate peace will everywhere awaken an ardent response among the international proletarian masses. All the secret treaties[100] must be immediately published in order to strengthen the confidence of the proletariat.

Within Russia a huge section of the peasantry have said that they have played long enough with the capitalists, and will now march with the workers. A single decree putting an end to landed proprietorship will win us the confidence of the peasants. The peasants will understand that the salvation of the peasantry lies only in an alliance with the workers. We shall institute genuine workers' control over production.

We have now learned to make a concerted effort. The revolution that has just been accomplished is evidence of this. We possess the strength of mass organisation, which will overcome everything and lead the proletariat to the world revolution.

We must now set about building a proletarian socialist state in Russia.

Long live the world socialist revolution! (*Stormy applause.*)

2
RESOLUTION

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies hails the victorious revolution of the proletariat and the garrison of Petrograd. The Soviet particularly emphasises the solidarity, organisation, discipline and complete unanimity displayed by the masses in this unusually bloodless and unusually successful uprising.

It is the unshakable conviction of the Soviet that the workers' and peasants' government which will be created by the revolution, as a Soviet government, and which will ensure the urban proletariat the support of the whole mass of the poor peasantry, will firmly advance towards socialism, the only means of saving the country from the untold miseries and horrors of war.

The new workers' and peasants' government will immediately propose a just and democratic peace to all belligerent nations.

It will immediately abolish landed proprietorship and hand over the land to the peasants. It will institute workers' control over the production and distribution of goods and establish national control over the banks, at the same time transforming them into a single state enterprise.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies calls on all workers and all peasants to support the workers' and peasants' revolution devotedly and with all their energy. The Soviet expresses the conviction that the urban workers, in alliance with the poor peasants, will display strict,

comradely discipline and establish the strictest revolutionary order, which is essential for the victory of socialism.

The Soviet is convinced that the proletariat of the West-European countries will help us to achieve a complete and lasting victory for the cause of socialism.

Izvestia No. 207,
October 26, 1917

Published according
to the *Izvestia* text

SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES[101]

OCTOBER 25-26 (NOVEMBER 7-8), 1917

SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES[101]

OCTOBER 25-26 (NOVEMBER 7-8), 1917

ЕЖЕДНЕВНАЯ ВЕЧЕРНЯЯ ГАЗЕТА

РАБОЧІЙ и СОЛДАТЪ

Органъ Петроградскаго Совѣта Рабочихъ и Солдатскихъ Депутатовъ.

Цѣна в Петроградѣ 15 к. В п. кн. дня 20 к.

№ 9. Четвергъ, 26 Октября (8 ноября нов. ст.) 1917 года. № 9.

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РАБОЧИМЪ, СОЛДАТАМЪ и КРЕСТЬЯНАМЪ!

Второй Всероссійскій Съѣздъ Совѣтовъ Рабочихъ и Солдатскихъ Депутатовъ открылся. На немъ представлено громадное большинство Совѣтовъ. На съѣздѣ присутствуетъ и рядъ делегатовъ отъ крестьянскихъ Совѣтовъ. Полномочія соглашательскаго Ц. И. К. окончились. Опираясь на волю громаднаго большинства рабочихъ, солдатъ и крестьянъ, опираясь на совершившееся въ Петроградѣ побѣдоносное возстаніе рабочихъ и гарнизона, Съѣздъ беретъ власть въ свои руки.

Временное Правительство низложено. Большинство членовъ Временного Правительства уже арестовано.

Совѣтская власть предложитъ немедленный демократическій миръ всѣмъ народамъ и немедленное перемиріе на всѣхъ фронтахъ. Она обезпечиваетъ безвозмездную передачу помѣщичьихъ, удѣльныхъ и монастырскихъ земель въ распоряженіе крестьянскихъ комитетовъ, отстоитъ права солдата, проведя полную демократизацію арміи, установитъ рабочій контроль надъ производствомъ, обезпечитъ своевременный созывъ Учредительнаго Собранія, озаботится доставкой хлѣба въ города и предметовъ первой необходимости въ деревню, обезпечитъ всѣмъ націямъ, населяющимъ Россію, подлинное право на самоопредѣленіе.

Съѣздъ постановляетъ: вся власть на мѣстахъ переходитъ къ Совѣтамъ Рабочихъ, Солдатскихъ и Крестьянскихъ депутатовъ, которые и должны обезпечить подлинный революціонный порядокъ.

Съѣздъ призываетъ солдатъ въ окопахъ къ бдительности и стойкости. Съѣздъ Совѣтовъ увѣренъ, что революціонная армія сумѣетъ защитить революцію отъ всякихъ посягательствъ имперіализма, пока новое правительство не добьется заключенія демократическаго мира, который оно непосредственно предложитъ всѣмъ народамъ. Новое Правительство приметъ всѣ мѣры къ тому, чтобы обезпечить революціонную армію всѣмъ необходимымъ, путемъ рѣшительной политики реквизицій и обложенія имущихъ классовъ, а также улучшитъ положеніе солдатскихъ семей.

Корниловцы — Керенскій, Калединъ и др. дѣлаютъ попытки вести войска на Петроградъ. Нѣсколько отрядовъ, обманнымъ путемъ двинутыхъ Керенскимъ, перешли на сторону возставшаго народа.

Солдаты, окажите активное противодѣйствіе корниловцу Керенскому! Будьте на сторожѣ!

Желѣзнодорожники, останавливайте всѣ эшелоны, посылаемые Керенскимъ на Петроградъ!

Солдаты, рабочіе, служащіе,—въ вашихъ рукахъ судьба революціи и судьба демократическаго мира!

ДА ЗДРАВСТВУЕТЪ РЕВОЛЮЦІЯ!

Всероссійскій Съѣздъ Совѣтовъ Рабочихъ и Солдатскихъ Депутатовъ.
Делегаты отъ Крестьянскихъ Совѣтовъ.

First page of the newspaper Rabochy i Soldat No. 9, October 26 (November 8), 1917

Reduced

First page of the newspaper Rabochy i Soldat No. 9, October 26 (November 8), 1917

Reduced

1
TO WORKERS, SOLDIERS AND PEASANTS!

The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has opened. The vast majority of the Soviets are represented at the Congress. A number of delegates from the Peasants' Soviets are also present. The mandate of the compromising Central Executive Committee has terminated.[102] Backed by the will of the vast majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants, backed by the victorious uprising of the workers and the garrison which has taken place in Petrograd, the Congress takes power into its own hands.

The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The majority of the members of the Provisional Government have already been arrested.

The Soviet government will propose an immediate democratic peace to all the nations and an immediate armistice on all fronts. It will secure the transfer of the land of the landed proprietors, the crown and the monasteries to the peasant committees without compensation; it will protect the rights of the soldiers by introducing complete democracy in the army; it will establish workers' control over production; it will ensure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the time appointed; it will see to it that bread is supplied to the cities and prime necessities to the villages; it will guarantee all the nations inhabiting Russia the genuine right to self-determination.

The Congress decrees: all power in the localities shall pass to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which must guarantee genuine revolutionary order.

The Congress calls upon the soldiers in the trenches to be vigilant and firm. The Congress of Soviets is convinced that the revolutionary army will be able to defend the revolution against all attacks of imperialism until such time as the new government succeeds in concluding a democratic peace, which it will propose directly to all peoples. The new government will do everything to fully supply the revolutionary army by means of a determined policy of requisitions and taxation of the propertied classes, and also will improve the condition of soldiers' families.

The Kornilov men—Kerensky, Kaledin and others—are attempting to bring troops against Petrograd. Several detachments, whom Kerensky had moved by deceiving them, have come over to the side of the insurgent people.

Soldiers, actively resist Kerensky the Kornilovite! Be on your guard!

Railwaymen, hold up all troop trains dispatched by Kerensky against Petrograd!

Soldiers, workers in factory and office, the fate of the revolution and the fate of the democratic peace is in your hands!

Long live the revolution!

The All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

The Delegates from the Peasants' Soviets

Written on October 25 (November 7), 1917

Published in the newspaper *Rabochy i Soldat* No. 9, October 26 (November 8), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text

2
REPORT ON PEACE, OCTOBER 26 (NOVEMBER 8)

The question of peace is a burning question, the painful question of the day. Much has been said and written on the subject, and all of you, no doubt, have discussed it quite a lot. Permit me, therefore, to proceed to read a declaration which the government you elect should publish.

DECREE ON PEACE

The workers' and peasants' government, created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, calls upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace.

By a just or democratic peace, for which the overwhelming majority of the working class and other working people of all the belligerent countries,[103] exhausted, tormented and racked by the war, are craving—a peace that has been most definitely and insistently demanded by the Russian workers and peasants ever since the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy—by such a peace the government means an immediate peace without annexations (i.e., without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and without indemnities.

The Government of Russia proposes that this kind of peace be immediately concluded by all the belligerent nations, and expresses its readiness to take all the resolute measures now, without the least delay, pending the final ratification of all the terms of such a peace by authoritative assemblies of the people's representatives of all countries and all nations,

In accordance with the sense of justice of democrats in general, and of the working classes in particular, the government conceives the annexation or seizure of foreign lands to mean every incorporation of a small or weak nation into a large or powerful state without the precisely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent and wish of that nation, irrespective of the time when such forcible incorporation took place, irrespective also of the degree of development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed to the given state, or forcibly retained within its borders, and irrespective, finally, of whether this nation is in Europe or in distant, overseas countries.

If any nation whatsoever is forcibly retained within the borders of a given state, if, in spite of its expressed desire—no matter whether expressed in the press, at public meetings, in the decisions of parties, or in protests and uprisings against national oppression—it is not accorded the right to decide the forms of its state existence by a free vote, taken after the complete evacuation of the troops of the incorporating or, generally, of the stronger nation and without the least pressure being brought to bear, such incorporation is annexation, i.e., seizure and violence.

The government considers it the greatest of crimes against humanity to continue this war over the issue of how to divide among the strong and rich nations the weak nationalities they have conquered, and solemnly announces its determination immediately to sign terms of peace to stop this war on the terms indicated, which are equally just for all nationalities without exception.

At the same time the government declares that it does not regard the above-mentioned peace terms as an ultimatum; in other words, it is prepared to consider any other peace terms, and insists only that they be advanced by any of the belligerent countries as speedily as possible, and that in the peace proposals there should be absolute clarity and the complete absence of all ambiguity and secrecy.

The government abolishes secret diplomacy, and, for its part, announces its firm intention to conduct all negotiations quite openly in full view of the whole people. It will proceed immediately with the full publication of the secret treaties endorsed or concluded by the government of land-

owners and capitalists from February to October 25, 1917. The government proclaims the unconditional and immediate annulment of everything contained in these secret treaties insofar as it is aimed, as is mostly the case, at securing advantages and privileges for the Russian landowners and capi alists and at the retention, or extension, of the annexations made by the Great Russians.

Proposing to the governments and peoples of all countries immediately to begin open negotiations for peace, the government, for its part, expresses its readiness to conduct these negotiations in writing, by telegraph, and by negotiations between representatives of the various countries, or at a conference of such representatives. In order to facilitate such negotiations, the government is appointing its plenipotentiary representative to neutral countries.

The government proposes an immediate armistice to the governments and peoples of all the belligerent countries, and, for its part, considers it desirable that this armistice should be concluded for a period of not less than three months, i.e., a period long enough to permit the completion of negotiations for peace with the participation of the representatives of all peoples or nations, without exception, involved in or compelled to take part in the war, and the summoning of authoritative assemblies of the representatives of the peoples of all countries for the final ratification of the peace terms.

While addressing this proposal for peace to the governments and peoples of all the belligerent countries, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia appeals in particular also to the class-conscious workers of the three most advanced nations of mankind and the largest states participating in the present war, namely, Great Britain, France and Germany. The workers of these countries have made the greatest contributions to the cause of progress and socialism; they have furnished the great examples of the Chartist movement in England, a number of revolutions of historic importance effected by the French proletariat, and, finally, the heroic struggle against the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany[104] and the prolonged, persistent and disciplined work of creating mass proletarian organisations in Germany, a work which serves as a model to the workers of the whole world. All these examples of proletar-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ian heroism and historical creative work are a pledge that the workers of the countries mentioned will understand the duty that now faces them of saving mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences, that these workers, by comprehensive, determined, and supremely vigorous action, will help us to conclude peace successfully, and at the same time emancipate the labouring and exploited masses of our population from all forms of slavery and all forms of exploitation.

The workers' and peasants' government, created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on the support of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, must start immediate negotiations for peace. Our appeal must be addressed both to the governments and to the peoples. We cannot ignore the governments, for that would delay the possibility of concluding peace, and the people's government dare not do that, but we have no right not to appeal to the peoples at the same time. Everywhere there are differences between the governments and the peoples, and we must therefore help the peoples to intervene in questions of war and peace. We will, of course, insist upon the whole of our programme for a peace without annexations and indemnities. We shall not retreat from it; but we must not give our enemies an opportunity to say that their conditions are different from ours and that therefore it is useless to start negotiations with us. No, we must deprive them of that advantageous position and not present our terms in the form of an ultimatum. Therefore the point is included that we are willing to consider any peace terms and all proposals. We shall consider them, but that does not necessarily mean that we shall accept them. We shall submit them for consideration to the Constituent Assembly which will have the power to decide what concessions can and what cannot be made. We are combating the deception practised by governments which pay lip-service to peace and justice, but in fact wage annexationist and predatory wars. No government will say all it thinks. We, however, are opposed to secret diplomacy and will act openly in full view of the whole people. We do not close our eyes to difficulties and never have done. War cannot be ended by refusal, it cannot be

ended by one side. We are proposing an armistice for three months, but shall not reject a shorter period, so that the exhausted army may breathe freely, even if only for a little while; moreover, in all the civilised countries national assemblies must be summoned for the discussion of the terms.

In proposing an immediate armistice, we appeal to the class-conscious workers of the countries that have done so much for the development of the proletarian movement. We appeal to the workers of Britain, where there was the Chartist movement, to the workers of France, who have in repeated uprisings displayed the strength of their class consciousness, and to the workers of Germany, who waged the fight against the Anti-Socialist Law and have created powerful organisations.

In the Manifesto of March 14,[105] we called for the overthrow of the bankers, but, far from overthrowing our own bankers, we entered into an alliance with them. Now we have overthrown the government of the bankers.

The governments and the bourgeoisie will make every effort to unite their forces and drown the workers' and peasants' revolution in blood. But the three years of war have been a good lesson to the masses—the Soviet movement in other countries and the mutiny in the German navy, which was crushed by the officer cadets of Wilhelm the hangman.[106] Finally, we must remember that we are not living in the depths of Africa, but in Europe, where news can spread quickly.

The workers' movement will triumph and will pave the way to peace and socialism. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Izvestia No. 208, October 27, 1917, and *Pravda* No. 171, November 10 (October 28), 1917

Report published according to the *Pravda* text, decree according to the *Izvestia* text

3
CONCLUDING SPEECH FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT ON PEACE OCTOBER 26 (NOVEMBER 8)

I shall not touch on the general character of the declaration. The government which your Congress sets up may amend unessential points.

I shall vigorously oppose lending our demand for peace the form of an ultimatum. An ultimatum may prove fatal to our whole cause. We cannot demand that, since some insignificant departure from our demands on the part of the imperialist governments would give them the opportunity of saying that it was impossible to enter into negotiations for peace because of our irreconcilability.

We shall send out our appeal everywhere, it will be made known to everybody. It will be impossible to conceal the terms proposed by our workers' and peasants' government.

It will be impossible to hush up our workers' and peasants' revolution, which has overthrown the government of bankers and landowners.

The governments may not reply to an ultimatum; they will have to reply to the text as we formulate it. Let everyone know what their governments have in mind. We do not want any secrets. We want a government to be always under the supervision of the public opinion of its country.

What will the peasant of some remote province say if, owing to our insistence on ultimatums, he will not know what another government wants? He will say: Comrades, why did you rule out the possibility of any peace terms being proposed? I would have discussed them, I would have examined them, and would then have instructed my representatives in the Constituent Assembly how to act. I am prepared to fight by revolutionary methods for just terms if the governments do not agree, but there might be such terms for some

countries that I would be prepared to recommend their governments to go on fighting by themselves. The full realisation of our ideas depends solely on the overthrow of the entire capitalist system. This is what the peasant might say to us, and he would accuse us of being excessively uncompromising over trifles, when for us the main thing is to expose all the vileness, all the baseness of the bourgeoisie and of its crowned and uncrowned hangmen at the head of the government.

We should not and must not give the governments an opportunity of taking refuge behind our uncompromising attitude and of concealing from the peoples the reason why they are being sent to the shambles. This is a tiny drop, but we should not and must not reject this drop, which will wear away the stone of bourgeois conquest. An ultimatum would make the position of our opponents easier. But we shall make all the terms known to the people. We shall confront all the governments with our terms, and let them give an answer to their people. We shall submit all peace proposals to the Constituent Assembly for decision.

There is still another point, comrades, to which you must pay the most careful attention. The secret treaties must be published. The clauses dealing with annexations and indemnities must be annulled. There are various clauses, comrades—the predatory governments, you know, not only made agreements between themselves on plunder, but among them they also included economic agreements and various other clauses on good-neighbourly relations.

We shall not bind ourselves by treaties. We shall not allow ourselves to be entangled by treaties. We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these. We propose an armistice for three months; we choose a lengthy period because the peoples are exhausted, the peoples long for a respite from this bloody shambles that has lasted over three years. We must realise that the peoples should be given an opportunity to discuss the peace terms and to express their will with parliament participating, and this takes time. We demand a lengthy armistice, so that the soldiers in the trenches may enjoy a respite from this night-

mare of constant slaughter; but we shall not reject proposals for a shorter armistice; we shall examine them, and it is incumbent upon us to accept them, even if we are offered an armistice of a month or a month and a half. Nor must our proposal for an armistice have the form of an ultimatum, for we shall not give our enemies an opportunity of concealing the whole truth from the peoples, using our irreconcilability as a pretext. It must not be in the form of an ultimatum, for a government is criminal that does not desire an armistice. If we do not put our proposal for an armistice in the form of an ultimatum, we shall thereby show the peoples that the governments are criminal, and the peoples will not stand on ceremony with such criminals. The objection is raised that by not resorting to an ultimatum we are displaying weakness, but it is time to cast aside all bourgeois cant when speaking of the strength of the people. According to the bourgeois conception, there is strength when the people go blindly to the slaughter in obedience to the imperialist governments. The bourgeoisie admit a state to be strong only when it can, by the power of the government apparatus, hurl the people wherever the bourgeois rulers want them hurled. Our idea of strength is different. Our idea is that a state is strong when the people are politically conscious. It is strong when the people know everything, can form an opinion of everything and do everything consciously. We need not fear to tell the truth about fatigue, for what state today is not tired, what nation does not talk about it openly? Take Italy, where, owing to this tiredness, there was a prolonged revolutionary movement demanding the termination of the slaughter. Are there not mass demonstrations of workers in Germany that put forward a demand for the termination of the war? Was it not fatigue that provoked the mutiny in the German navy that was so ruthlessly suppressed by that hangman, Wilhelm, and his hirelings? If such things are possible in so disciplined a country as Germany, where they are beginning to talk about fatigue and about putting an end to the war, we need not fear to say the same openly, because it is the truth, equally true both of our country and of all the belligerent and even non-belligerent countries.

Pravda No. 171,
November 10 (October 28), 1917

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

4
REPORT ON LAND
OCTOBER 26 (NOVEMBER 8)

We maintain that the revolution has proved and demonstrated how important it is that the land question should be put clearly. The outbreak of the armed uprising, the second, October, Revolution, clearly proves that the land must be turned over to the peasants. The government that has been overthrown and the compromising parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries committed a crime when they kept postponing the settlement of the land question on various pretexts and thereby brought the country to economic chaos and a peasant revolt. Their talk about riots and anarchy in the countryside sounds false, cowardly, and deceitful. Where and when have riots and anarchy been provoked by wise measures? If the government had acted wisely, and if their measures had met the needs of the poor peasants, would there have been unrest among the peasant masses? But all the measures of the government, approved by the Avksentyev and Dan Soviets, went counter to the interests of the peasants and compelled them to revolt.

Having provoked the revolt, the government raised a hue and cry about riots and anarchy, for which they themselves were responsible. They were going to crush it by blood and iron, but were themselves swept away by the armed uprising of the revolutionary soldiers, sailors and workers. The first duty of the government of the workers' and peasants' revolution must be to settle the land question, which can pacify and satisfy the vast masses of poor peasants. I shall read to you the clauses of a decree your Soviet Government

must issue. In one of the clauses of this decree is embodied the Mandate to the Land Committees, compiled on the basis of 242 mandates from local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

DECREE ON LAND

(1) Landed proprietorship is abolished forthwith without any compensation.

(2) The landed estates, as also all crown, monastery, and church lands, with all their livestock, implements, buildings and everything pertaining thereto, shall be placed at the disposal of the volost land committees and the uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

(3) All damage to confiscated property, which henceforth belongs to the whole people, is proclaimed a grave crime to be punished by the revolutionary courts. The uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies shall take all necessary measures to assure the observance of the strictest order during the confiscation of the landed estates, to determine the size of estates, and the particular estates subject to confiscation, to draw up exact inventories of all property confiscated and to protect in the strictest revolutionary way all agricultural enterprises transferred to the people, with all buildings, implements, livestock, stocks of produce, etc.

(4) The following peasant Mandate, compiled by the newspaper *Izvestia Vserossiiskogo Soveta Krestyanskikh Deputatov*[107] from 242 local peasant mandates and published in No. 88 of that paper (Petrograd, No. 88, August 19, 1917), shall serve everywhere to guide the implementation of the great land reforms until a final decision on the latter is taken by the Constituent Assembly.

Peasant Mandate on the Land

"The land question in its full scope can be settled only by the popular Constituent Assembly.

"The most equitable settlement of the land question is to be as follows:

"(1) *Private ownership of land shall be abolished for ever*; land shall not be sold purchased, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise alienated.

"All land, whether *state*, *crown*, *monastery*, *church*, *factory*, *entailed*, *private*, *public*, *peasant*, *etc.*, *shall be confiscated without compen-*

sation and become the property of the whole people, and pass into the use of all those who cultivate it.

"Persons who suffer by this property revolution shall be deemed to be entitled to public support only for the period necessary for adaptation to the new conditions of life.

"(2) All mineral wealth—ore, oil, coal, salt, etc., and also all forests and waters of state importance, shall pass into the exclusive use of the state. All the small streams, lakes, woods, etc., shall pass into the use of the communes, to be administered by the local self-government bodies.

"(3) Lands on which *high-level scientific* farming is practised—orchards, plantations, seed plots, nurseries, hothouses, etc.—*shall not be divided up*, *but shall be converted into model farms*, to be turned over for exclusive use *to the state or to the communes*, depending on he size and importance of such lands.

"Household land in towns and villages, with orchards and vegetable gardens, shall be reserved for the use of their present owners, the size of the holdings, and the size of tax levied for the use thereof, to be determined by law.

"(4) Stud farms, government and private pedigree stock and poultry farms, etc., shall be confiscated and become the property of the whole people, and pass into the exclusive use of the state or a commune depending on the size and importance of such farms.

"The question of compensation shall be examined by the Constituent Assembly.

"(5) All livestock and farm implements of the confiscated estates shall pass into the exclusive use of the state or a commune, depending on their size and importance, and no compensation shall be paid for this.

"The farm implements of peasants with little land shall not be subject to confiscation.

"(6) The right to use the land shall be accorded to all citizens of the Russian state (without distinction of sex) desiring to cultivate it by their own labour, with the help of their families, or in partnership, but only as long as they are able to cultivate it. The employment of hired labour is not permitted.

"In the event of the temporary physical disability of any member of a village commune for a period of up to two years, the village commune shall be obliged to assist him for this period by collectively cultivating his land until he is again able to work.

"Peasants who, owing to old age or ill-health, are permanently disabled and unable to cultivate the land personally, shall lose their right to the use of it but, in return, shall receive a pension from the state.

"(7) Land tenure shall be on an equality basis, i.e. the land shall be distributed among the working people in conformity with a labour standard or a subsistence standard,[108] depending on local conditions.

"There shall be absolutely no restriction on the forms of land tenure—household, farm, communal, or co-operative, as shall be decided in each individual village and settlement.

"(8) All land, when alienated, shall become part of the national land fund. Its distribution among the peasants shall be in charge of the local and central self-government bodies, from democratically organised village and city communes, in which there are no distinctions of social rank, to central regional government bodies.

"The land fund shall be subject to periodical redistribution depending on the growth of population and the increase in the productivity and the scientific level of farming.

"When the boundaries of allotments are altered, the original nucleus of the allotment shall be left intact.

"The land of the members who leave the commune shall revert to the land fund, preferential right to such land shall be given to the near relatives of the members who have left, or to persons designated by the latter.

"The cost of fertilisers and improvements put into the land, to the extent that they have not been fully used up at the time the allotment is returned to the land fund shall be compensated.

"Should the available land fund in a particular district prove inadequate for the needs of the local population, the surplus population shall he settled elsewhere.

"The state shall take upon itself the organisation of resettlement and shall bear the cost thereof, as well as the cost of supplying implements, etc.

"Resettlement shall be effected in the following order: landless peasants desiring to resettle, then members of the commune who are of vicious habits, deserters, and so on, and, finally, by lot or by agreement."

The entire contents of this Mandate, as expressing the absolute will of the vast majority of the class-conscious peasants of all Russia, is proclaimed a provisional law, which, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, shall be carried into effect as far as possible immediately, and as to certain of its provisions with due gradualness, as shall be determined by the uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

(5) The land of ordinary peasants and ordinary Cossacks shall not be confiscated.

Voices are being raised here that the decree itself and the Mandate were drawn up by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. What of it? Does it matter who drew them up? As a democratic government, we cannot ignore the decision of the masses of the people, even though we may disagree with it. In the fire of experience, applying the decree in practice, and

carrying it out locally, the peasants will themselves realise where the truth lies. And even if the peasants continue to follow the Socialist-Revolutionaries, even if they give this party a majority in the Constituent Assembly, we shall still say—what of it? Experience is the best teacher and it will show who is right. Let the peasants solve this problem from one end and we shall solve it from the other. Experience will oblige us to draw together in the general stream of revolutionary creative work, in the elaboration of new state forms. We must be guided by experience; we must allow complete freedom to the creative faculties of the masses. The old government, which was overthrown by armed uprising, wanted to settle the land problem with the help of the old, unchanged tsarist bureaucracy. But instead of solving the problem, the bureaucracy only fought the peasants. The peasants have learned something during the eight months of our revolution; they want to settle all land problems themselves. We are therefore opposed to all amendments to this draft law. We want no details in it, for we are writing a decree, not a programme of action. Russia is vast, and local conditions vary. We trust that the peasants themselves will be able to solve the problem correctly, properly, better than we could do it. Whether they do it in our spirit or in the spirit of the Socialist-Revolutionary programme is not the point. The point is that the peasants should be firmly assured that there are no more landowners in the countryside, that they themselves must decide all questions, and that they themselves must arrange their own lives. (*Loud applause.*)

Izvestia No. 209, October 28, 1917 and *Pravda* No. 171, November 10 (October 28), 1917

Report published according to the *Pravda* text, decree according to the *Izvestia* text

5
DECISION TO FORM THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

The All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies resolves:

To establish a provisional workers' and peasants' government, to be known as the Council of People's Commissars, to govern the country until the Constituent Assembly is convened. The management of individual branches of state activity is entrusted to commissions whose members shall ensure the fulfilment of the programme announced by the Congress, and shall work in close contact with mass organisations of men and women workers, sailors, soldiers, peasants and office employees. Governmental authority is vested in a collegium of the chairmen of those commissions, i.e., the Council of People's Commissars.

Control over the activities of the People's Commissars with the right to replace them is vested in the All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies and its Central Executive Committee.

At the present time the Council of People's Commissars is constituted as follows:

Chairman of the Council—*Vladimir Ulyanov* (*Lenin*);
People's Commissar of the Interior—*A. I. Rykov*;
Agriculture—*V. P. Milyutin*;
Labour—*A. G. Shlyapnikov*;
Army and Navy Affairs—a committee consisting of: *V. A. Ovseyenko* (*Antonov*), *N. V. Krylenko and P. Y. Dybenko*;
Commerce and Industry—*V. P. Nogin*;
Education—*A. V. Lunacharsky*;

Finance—*I. I. Skvortsov* (*Stepanov*);
Foreign Affairs—*L. D. Bronstein* (*Trotsky*);
Justice—*G. I. Oppokov* (*Lomov*);
Food—*I. A. Teodorovich*;
Posts and Telegraph—*N. P. Avilov* (*Glebov*);
Chairman for Nationalities Affairs—*J. V. Jugashvili* (*Stalin*).

The office of People's Commissar of Railways is temporarily vacant.

Written on October 26
(November 8), 1917

Published in the newspaper
Rabochy i Soldat No. 10,
October 27 (November 9), 1917

Published according
to the newspaper text

DRAFT REGULATIONS ON WORKERS' CONTROL[109]

1. *Workers' control* over the production, storage, purchase and sale of all products and raw materials shall be introduced in all industrial, commercial, banking, agricultural and other enterprises employing not less than five workers and office employees (together), or with an annual turnover of not less than 10,000 rubles.

2. Workers' control shall be exercised by all the workers and office employees of an enterprise, either directly, if the enterprise is small enough to permit it, or through their elected representatives, who shall be elected *immediately* at general meetings, at which minutes of the elections shall be taken and the names of those elected communicated to the government and to the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

3. Unless permission is given by the elected representatives of the workers and office employees, the suspension of work of an enterprise or an industrial establishment of state importance (see Clause 7), or any change in its operation is strictly prohibited.

4. The elected representatives shall be given access to *all* books and documents and to *all* warehouses and stocks of materials, instruments and products, without exception.

5. The decisions of the elected representatives of the workers and office employees are binding upon the owners of enterprises and may be annulled only by trade unions and their congresses.

6. In all enterprises of state importance *all* owners and *all* representatives of the workers and office employees elected for the purpose of exercising workers' control

shall be answerable to the state for the maintenance of the strictest order and discipline and for the protection of property. Persons guilty of dereliction of duty, concealment of stocks, accounts, etc., shall be punished by the confiscation of the whole of their property and by imprisonment for a term of up to five years.

7. By enterprises of state importance are meant all enterprises working for defence, or in any way connected with the manufacture of articles necessary for the existence of the masses of the population.

8. More detailed rules on workers' control shall be drawn up by the local Soviets of Workers' Deputies and by conferences of factory committees, and also by committees of office employees at general meetings of their representatives.

Written on October 26 or 27 (November 8 or 9), 1917

First published in 1929 in the second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII

Published according to the manuscript

DIRECT-LINE CONVERSATION WITH HELSINGFORS OCTOBER 27 (NOVEMBER 9), 1917

1

CONVERSATION WITH A. L. SHEINMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HELSINGFORS SOVIET OF DEPUTIES OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND WORKERS OF FINLAND

Are you authorised to speak on behalf of the Regional Army and Navy Committee?

Of course, I am.

Can you move the greatest possible number of destroyers and other warships to Petrograd at once?

Let me call the Tsentrobalt* Chairman, because this is a purely naval matter. What's new in Petrograd?

There is a report that Kerensky's troops have moved up and have taken Gatchina, and since a part of the Petrograd troops are tired, it is imperative that we have the strongest reinforcements as soon as possible.

Anything else?

Instead of the "anything else" I expected you to say you were ready to set out and fight.

That goes without saying: we have announced our decision and will, consequently, act up to it.

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* The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet.—*Ed.*

Have you any stocks of rifles and machine-guns, and in what quantities?

Here is Mikhailov, Chairman of the Regional Committee's Military Department. He will tell you about the army in Finland.

2

CONVERSATION WITH MIKHAILOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND WORKERS OF FINLAND

How many men do you need?

As many as possible, but only loyal men who are ready to fight. How many such men have you?

All of 5,000. Those who will fight can be sent urgently.

If sent with all possible dispatch, how many hours will it take them to reach Petrograd for sure?

Twenty-four hours, from now, at the outside.

By the overland route?

By rail.

Can you supply them with rations?

Yes. There are plenty of rations. There are also about 35 machine-guns; we could also send a few field guns with their detachments without worsening the situation here.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic I insistently request you to start such dispatch at once, and also to tell me whether you are aware of the formation of the new government, and how the news has been met by your Soviets?

We heard about the government only from the papers. People over here are enthusiastic about power passing into the hands of the Soviets.

So, you say, the troops will set out at once, and will be supplied with rations?

That's right. We'll set about their dispatch right away and will supply them with rations. Here's the Tsentrobalt Deputy Chairman because Dybenko himself went to Petrograd at 10.00 p.m. today.

3

CONVERSATION WITH N. F. IZMAILOV, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF TSENTROBALT

How many destroyers and other warships can you send?

We can send the battleship *Republic* and two destroyers.

Will they also be supplied with rations from your end?

Our fleet has enough rations, and they will be supplied. I want to say I am sure the *Republic* and all the destroyers we send will do their duty in defending the revolution. Have no doubt about the dispatch of the armed forces. This will be fulfilled without fail.

In how many hours?

Eighteen, at the most. Is there any need to send them out now?

Yes. The government is absolutely convinced that there is need for their immediate dispatch so that the battleship could enter the Ship Canal as close to the shore as possible.

The battleship is a large vessel with 12-inch guns, and cannot anchor offshore: if it did it could be easily boarded and captured. This can be done by the destroyers, with their small-calibre guns and machine-guns- as for the battleship, it should be in the roads or close by, or near the cruiser *Aurora*, because its guns have a range of 25 versts*; in short let the sailors and their command handle this.

The destroyers must enter the Neva near the Rybatskoye village, in order to protect the Nikolayevskaya railway line and all the approaches to it.

Right, all this will be done. What else is there?

Is there a wireless telegraph on the *Republic* and can it communicate with Petrograd while on its way?

Not only on the *Republic*, but also on the destroyers, they can all communicate with the Eiffel Tower. Let me assure you that everything will be done well.

May we expect that the ships will set out immediately?

Yes, that is so. We shall issue urgent orders right away so that these ships will get to Petrograd in time.

Have you stocks of rifles and ammunition? Let's have everything you can spare.

---

* 25 versts = 16.5 miles.—*Tr.*

There are some on the ships, but we shall let you have everything there is.

Good-bye. Good luck.

Good-bye. Was that you speaking? Will you tell me your name?

Lenin.

Good-bye. We're setting everything in motion.

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in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 10

Published according
to the telegraph tape

CONFERENCE OF REGIMENTAL DELEGATES OF THE PETROGRAD GARRISON OCTOBER 29 (NOVEMBER 11), 1917[110]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

1
REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

The political situation does not warrant long speeches. The political question is now merging with the military question. It is all too clear that Kerensky has recruited the Kornilovites, and they are his only support. In Moscow they have seized the Kremlin, but they have no control over the suburbs, where the workers and the poor in general live. There is no one to back Kerensky at the front. Even those who are of two minds, like the members of the Railwaymen's Union, are speaking in favour of the Decrees on Peace and on Land.

The vast majority of workers, soldiers and peasants want a policy of peace.

This is not a Bolshevik policy. In no sense is it a "party" policy. It is the policy of the workers, soldiers and peasants, that is, the majority of the people. Nor are we implementing a Bolshevik programme on the land question, because there, too, our programme has been taken bodily from peasant mandates.

It is not our fault that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks have gone. They were invited to share political power, but they want to sit on the fence until the fight against Kerensky is over.

We asked everyone to take part in the government. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries[111] said they wanted to support the Soviet Government's policy. They did not even dare voice disagreement with the new government's programme.

People in the provinces give credence to papers like *Dyelo Naroda*. Here everyone knows that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks went because they were

left in a minority. The men of the Petrograd garrison are aware of this. They know that we wanted a coalition Soviet government. We did not exclude anyone from the Soviet. If they do not want to work with us, so much the worse for them. The mass of soldiers and peasants will not follow the Mensheviks or the Socialist-Revolutionaries. I am sure that nine-tenths of any workers' or soldiers' meeting will be on our side.

Kerensky's bid is just as pathetic a gamble as Kornilov's. But the situation is a difficult one. Vigorous efforts must be made to get some order into the food situation, and put an end to the misery at the fronts. We cannot wait, nor can we tolerate Kerensky's mutiny a single day. If the Kornilovites launch another offensive, they will get what the mutinous officer cadets got today. The cadets have only themselves to blame. We took power almost without bloodshed. If there were any losses they were on our side. The entire people wanted the policy the new government is conducting. It did not borrow this policy from the Bolsheviks, but from the soldiers at the front, the peasants in the villages, and the workers in the towns.

The Decree on Workers' Control is to be issued presently. Let me say this again: the political situation is now reduced to a military one. We cannot allow Kerensky to win: if he did there would be no peace, no land, and no freedom. I am sure that the soldiers and workers of Petrograd, who have just brought off a victorious revolution, will be able to crush the Kornilovites. We have had our defects. There is no use denying it. We have had to pay for them. But they can be eliminated. Without losing a single hour, a single minute, we must get organised, and set up a headquarters, and we must do it today. Once organised, we are sure to win out within a few days, and possibly even earlier.

The government set up by the will of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies will not tolerate any nonsense from the Kornilovites.

The political and the military task is to set up a headquarters, to concentrate the material forces, and to provide the soldiers with all they need. If we are to go on from strength to strength, this must be done without wasting a single hour, nay, minute.

2
SPEECH ON ARMING THE TROOPS

The period of great chaos is at an end. A chief of staff has been appointed and this will be announced. The period of vacillation is over. We felt keenly the lack of military order and communications. It has now been established that there is a great deal of enthusiasm and unity among the troops. It is now up to you to take things in hand, personally verify every act, the execution of your orders and assignments, see whether the workers' organisations have been contacted, etc. The workers will help you in this matter. Let me give you some advice: you must check every report through the control commission or through the regimental delegates, without relying on others to see that orders are carried out, or to check reports on stocks. The best guarantee of success is to do all this yourself, to check everything, take account of all stocks and verify every step personally.

3
SPEECH ON RESTORING LAW AND ORDER IN THE CITY

I fully agree with what has been said: the workers must take a hand in guarding the city. As they do this together, the soldiers will teach the workers how to handle arms. The wholesale arming of the people and the abolition of the regular army is a task which we must not lose sight of for a single minute. If we recruit the working population the task will be much easier. The comrades' proposal that we meet every day is a practical one. It is true that the Russian revolution produces a great deal of what is novel, that has not occurred in any other revolution. For one thing, there have never been such organs as the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. You must merge with the workers, they will give you everything the bourgeoisie has failed to give you. Every unit, together with the workers' organisation, must see to it that there is a stock of everything necessary for this war of yours, without waiting for pointers from above. We must tackle this task on our own tonight. The units must not wait for instructions from headquarters, they must make their own proposals. You have something the bourgeoisie have never bad: their only way is to buy; you can contact the workers who produce everything.

Pravda No. 174, November 13 (October 31), 1917

Published according to the *Pravda* text

WIRELESS MESSAGE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OCTOBER 30 (NOVEMBER 12), 1917

Calling Everyone

The All-Russia Congress of Soviets has set up a new Soviet Government. Kerensky's government has been overthrown and arrested. Kerensky has fled. All institutions are in the hands of the Soviet Government. A revolt of officer cadets who had been released on parole on October 25 broke out on October 29. The revolt was suppressed that same day. Kerensky and Savinkov, together with the officer cadets and a part of the Cossacks, have made their way by deceit to Tsarskoye Syelo. The Soviet Government has mustered forces for the suppression of the new Kornilov advance on Petrograd. The fleet, headed by the armoured battleship *Republic*, has been summoned to the capital. Kerensky's officer cadets and Cossacks are wavering. Prisoners arriving from Kerensky's camp assure us that the Cossacks have been deceived and that if they come to realise the true state of affairs they will refuse to shoot. The Soviet Government is making every effort to avert bloodshed. If bloodshed cannot be avoided and if Kerensky's units do begin to shoot, the Soviet Government will not hesitate to suppress the new Kerensky-Kornilov campaign ruthlessly.

We announce for your information that the Congress of Soviets which has already dispersed, adopted two important decrees: (1) on the immediate transfer of all the landed estates to the peasant committees, and (2) on the proposal of a democratic peace.

Vladimir Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Soviet Government

Izvestia No. 212,
October 31, 1917

Published according
to the newspaper text

DRAFT RULES FOR OFFICE EMPLOYEES

1. All employees of state, public and large private industrial enterprises (employing at least five wage-workers) undertake to perform the business assigned to them, and not to leave their posts without special permission from the government, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, or trade unions.

2. Violation of the rule set forth in § 1, or negligence in the dispatch of business or presenting accounts to the government and organs of power, or in discharge of services for the public and the economy shall be punishable with confiscation of all the property of the offender and imprisonment for a term of up to five years.

Written at the end of October 1917

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Published according
to the manuscript

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) NOVEMBER 1 (14), 1917

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin considers that Kamenev's policy must be checked at once. There is now no point in negotiating with the Vikzhel.[112] Troops must be dispatched to Moscow. He proposes a resolution on the Vikzhel. The Vikzhel is not represented on the Soviet, and must not be admitted to it; the Soviets are voluntary organisations, and the Vikzhel has no support among the people.

2

Comrade Lenin considers that the negotiations were to serve as diplomatic cover for military operations. The only correct solution would be to put an end to the wavering of the waverers and to become firm ourselves. Assistance must be given to the Muscovites, and our victory will be assured.

3

Comrade Lenin considers the question a fundamental one, and thinks it is time to put an end to wavering. It is obvious that the Vikzhel sides with the Kaledins and Kornilovs. There must be no vacillation. We are backed by the majority of the workers and peasants and of the army. Nobody here has proved that the rank and file are against us. Either with the agents of Kaledin, or with the rank and file. We must rely on the people, we must send propagandists into the countryside. The Vikzhel was called upon to transport troops to Moscow; it refused, we must appeal to the people, and they will overthrow it.

First published in 1922
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 10

Published according to
a handwritten copy
of the Minutes

RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) ON THE OPPOSITION WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 2 (15), 1917

The Central Committee considers that the present meeting is of historic importance and that it is therefore necessary to record the two positions which have been revealed here.

1. The Central Committee considers that the opposition formed within the Central Committee has departed completely from all the fundamental positions of Bolshevism and of the proletarian class struggle in general by reiterating the utterly un-Marxist talk of the impossibility of a socialist revolution in Russia and of the necessity of yielding to the ultimatums and threats of resignation on the part of the obvious minority in the Soviet organisation, thus thwarting the will and the decision of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets and sabotaging the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry which has been inaugurated.

2. The Central Committee lays the whole responsibility for hindering revolutionary work and for the vacillations, so criminal at the present moment, on this opposition, and invites them to transfer their discussion and their scepticism to the press and to withdraw from the practical work they do not believe in. For this opposition reflects nothing but intimidation by the bourgeoisie and the sentiments of the exhausted (not the revolutionary) section of the population.

3. The Central Committee affirms that the purely Bolshevik government cannot be renounced without betraying the slogan of Soviet power, since the majority at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, without excluding anybody from the Congress, entrusted power, to this government.

4. The Central Committee affirms that, without betraying the slogan of the power of the Soviets of Workers',

Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, there can be no entering into petty bargaining over the affiliation to the Soviets of organisations of a non-Soviet type, i.e., organisations which are not voluntary associations of the revolutionary vanguard of the people who are fighting for the overthrow of the landowners and capitalists.

5. The Central Committee affirms that to yield to the ultimatums and threats of the minority of the Soviets would be tantamount to complete renunciation not only of Soviet power but of democracy, for such yielding would be tantamount to the majority's fear to make use of its majority, it would be tantamount to submitting to anarchy and inviting the repetition of ultimatums on the part of any minority.

6. The Central Committee affirms that, not having excluded anybody from the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, it is even now fully prepared to permit the return of those who walked out and to agree to a coalition within the Soviets with those who walked out, and that, consequently, all talk about the Bolsheviks refusing to share power with anybody is absolutely false.

7. The Central Committee affirms that on the day the present government was formed, a few hours before its formation, the Central Committee invited three representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to attend its meeting and formally proposed that they should join the government. The refusal of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, although it was provisional and conditional, places on these Left Socialist-Revolutionaries the entire responsibility for the fact that an agreement with them was not reached.

8. The Central Committee recalls that a resolution, proposed by the Bolshevik group, was adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets expressing readiness to reinforce the Soviet both by soldiers from the trenches and by peasants from the localities, from the villages, and that therefore the assertion that the Bolshevik government is opposed to a coalition with the peasants is absolutely false. On the contrary, the Central Committee declares that the land law of our government, which was wholly copied from the Socialist-Revolutionary Mandate, is practical proof of the complete and most sincere readiness of the Bolsheviks

to effect a coalition with the vast majority of Russia's population.

9. The Central Committee affirms, finally, that despite all difficulties, the victory of socialism both in Russia and in Europe can only be ensured by the unswerving continuation of the present government's policy. The Central Committee expresses its firm belief in the victory of this socialist revolution and calls upon all sceptics and waverers to abandon their waverings and whole-heartedly and with supreme energy support the actions of this government.

Lenin

Published, without the first three points, on November 17 (4), 1917 in Pravda No. 180

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Published according to the manuscript

ULTIMATUM FROM THE MAJORITY ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) TO THE MINORITY

The majority on the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), fully approving the policy so far pursued by the Council of People's Commissars, considers it necessary to address the following categorical statement to the minority on the Central Committee.

Our Party's policy at the present moment is defined in the resolution submitted by Comrade Lenin and adopted yesterday, November 2, by the Central Committee.* This resolution declares that every attempt to induce our Party to decline power is treason to the proletariat's cause, since the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, in the name of the millions of workers, soldiers and peasants, has entrusted this power to the representatives of our Party on the basis of our programme. This fundamental line of our tactics, which follows logically from our whole struggle against the conciliators and which guided us in the uprising against Kerensky's government, at present constitutes the revolutionary essence of Bolshevism and is once again endorsed by the Central Committee. This line is absolutely binding on all members of the Party, and first and foremost, on the Central Committee minority.

Yet members of the minority, both before and after yesterday's meeting of the Central Committee, have been pursuing a policy which obviously runs counter to our Party's fundamental line and which is demoralising our own ranks by causing hesitation at a moment when the greatest firmness and steadfastness are essential.

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* See pp. 277-79 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Thus, at yesterday's meeting of the Central Executive Committee, the Bolshevik group, with the direct participation of the Central Committee's minority members, openly voted against a decision of the Central Committee (on the number and persons of the representatives of our Party in the government). This unparalleled violation of discipline, committed by Central Committee member's behind the back of the Central Committee after many hours' discussions on the Central Committee, discussions provoked by these same members of the opposition, makes it obvious to us that the opposition intend to force the hand of Party institutions by sabotaging the Party's work at a moment when the fate of the Party, the fate of the revolution, depends upon the immediate result of this work.

We cannot and do not wish to bear responsibility for such a state of affairs.

Addressing the present statement to the minority of the Central Committee, we categorically demand a written reply to the question: Does the minority undertake to submit to Party discipline and to carry out the policy formulated in Comrade Lenin's resolution which was adopted by the Central Committee?

In the event of a negative or indefinite reply to this question we shall immediately place before the Petrograd Committee, the Moscow Committee, the Bolshevik group on the Central Executive Committee, the Petrograd City Conference and the Extraordinary Party Congress, the following alternative proposal:

Either the Party must entrust the present opposition with the task of forming a new government in conjunction with those of its allies on whose behalf the opposition is at present sabotaging our work—in which case we shall consider ourselves absolutely free in relation to this new government, which can contribute nothing but wavering, impotence and chaos.

Or—which we do not doubt—the Party will endorse the only possible revolutionary line, as expressed in yesterday's decision of the Central Committee—in which case the Party must categorically demand that the members of the opposition conduct their disorganising work outside our Party organisation. There is not and cannot be any other solution.

It stands to reason, a split would be highly deplorable. But an honest and open split would now be incomparably better than internal sabotage, the thwarting of our own decisions, disorganisation and prostration. At any rate, we do not doubt for a moment that the submission of our differences (which are in the main a replica of our differences with the *Novaya Zhizn* and Martov groups) to the people's judgement will ensure our policy the unreserved and devoted support of the revolutionary workers, soldiers and peasants, and will very soon condemn the wavering opposition to impotent isolation.

Written on November 3 (16), 1917

First published in 1922 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 7

Published according to a typewritten copy

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS[113]

For the bourgeoisie, freedom of the press meant freedom for the rich to publish and for the capitalists to control the newspapers, a practice which in all countries, including even the freest, produced a corrupt press.

For the workers' and peasants' government, freedom of the press means liberation of the press from capitalist oppression, and public ownership of paper mills and printing presses; equal right for public groups of a certain size (say, numbering 10,000) to a fair share of newsprint stocks and a corresponding quantity of printers' labour.

As a first step towards this goal, which is bound up with the working people's liberation from capitalist oppression, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government has appointed a Commission of Inquiry to look into the ties between capital and periodicals, the sources of their funds and revenues, the list of their donors, covers for their deficits, and every other aspect of the newspaper business in general. Concealment of books, accounts or any other documents from the Commission of Inquiry, or the giving of any evidence known to be false shall be punishable by a revolutionary court.

All newspaper owners, shareholders, and all members of their staffs shall be under the obligation to immediately submit written reports and information on the said questions to the *Commission of Inquiry*, probing the ties between capital and the press, and its dependence on capital, at Smolny Institute, Petrograd.

The following are appointed to serve on the Commission of Inquiry:*

The Commission shall have the power to co-opt members, call experts, subpoena witnesses, order the presentation of all accounts, etc.

Written on November 4 (17), 1917

First published on November 7, 1932 in *Pravda* No. 303

Published according to the manuscript

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* Follows space for list of names.—*Ed.*

MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 4 (17), 1917

1
SPEECH ON THE PRESS

Comrade Karelin assured us that the way he was taking led to socialism, but I am afraid this would be marching to socialism backwards. Trotsky was right: the officer cadets staged their uprising, and war was declared in Petrograd and Moscow for freedom of the press. This time the Socialist-Revolutionaries did not act at all like socialists or revolutionaries. This week all the telegraph offices were in Kerensky's hands. The Vikzhel was on their side. But they had no troops. It turned out that the army was on our side. The civil war was started by a handful of men. It is not over. Kaledin's troops are approaching Moscow, and the shock troops are approaching Petrograd. We do not want a civil war. Our troops have shown great restraint. They held their fire, and it all began when three of our men were killed. Krasnov was given soft treatment. He was only placed under house arrest. We are against civil war. But if it nevertheless goes on what are we to do? Trotsky was right in asking in whose behalf you spoke? We asked Krasnov whether he could sign on behalf of Kaledin that the latter would not continue the war. He naturally replied that he could not. How can we stop retaliative measures against an enemy who has not stopped his hostile operations?

We shall negotiate when peace terms are offered to us. But so far peace is being offered to us by those on whom it does not depend. These are only fine words. After all, *Rech* is an organ of the Kaledinites. We can well allow that

the Socialist-Revolutionaries are sincere, but it is, after all, a fact that Kaledin and Milyukov are behind them.

The firmer your stand, soldiers and workers, the more we shall gain. Otherwise they will say to us: "If they've let out Milyukov, they can't be strong." Earlier on we said that if we took power, we intended to close down the bourgeois newspapers. To tolerate the existence of these papers is to cease being a socialist. Those who say: "Open the bourgeois newspapers", fail to understand that we are moving at full speed to socialism. After all, tsarist newspapers were closed down after the overthrow of tsarism. Now we have thrown off the bourgeois yoke. We did not invent the social revolution: it was proclaimed by the Congress of the Soviets—no one protested, all adopted the decree proclaiming it. The bourgeoisie proclaimed liberty, equality and fraternity. The workers say: "We want something else." We are told that we are retreating. No, comrades, it is the Socialist-Revolutionaries who are returning to Kerensky. We are told that there are new elements in our resolution. Of course there are, because we are advancing to socialism. When the Socialist-Revolutionaries made speeches in the First and the Second Duma, they were also ridiculed for saying something new.

There should be a monopoly of private advertisements. The members of the printers' union look at them from the point of view of income. They will get it, but in another form. We cannot provide the bourgeoisie with an opportunity for slandering us. We must appoint a commission right away to probe the ties between the banks and the bourgeois newspapers. What kind of freedom do these newspapers want? Isn't it freedom to buy rolls of newsprint and hire crowds of penpushers? We must escape from the freedom of a press dependent on capital. This is a matter of principle. If we are to advance to socialism we cannot allow Kaledin's bombs to be reinforced by the bombs of falsehood.

Of course, our draft law is not perfect. But it will be applied everywhere by the Soviets in accordance with their local conditions. We are not bureaucrats and do not want to insist on the letter of the law everywhere, as was the practice in the old government offices. I recall the Socialist-Revolutionaries saying that people in the countryside knew

so very little. They were getting their information from *Russkoye Slovo*. We should blame ourselves for leaving the newspapers in the hands of the bourgeoisie. We must go forward, to a new society, and take the same attitude to the bourgeois newspapers as we did to the ultra-reactionary papers in February and March.

2
REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM THE LEFT SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' question was answered by Lenin.[114] He recalled that in the first days of the revolution the Bolsheviks invited the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to join the new government, but the group of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who refused to share responsibility in those difficult, critical days with their neighbours on the Left, declined to collaborate with the Bolsheviks.

In its activity the new regime could not afford to reckon with all the obstacles which could arise in its way if it scrupulously observed all formalities. The situation was much too grave and allowed of no procrastination. There was no time to waste on smoothing off rough corners that merely changed outward appearances without altering the essence of the new measures. After all, the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets itself, brushing aside all difficulties of a formal nature, adopted two laws of world importance at one long sitting. These laws may have formal defects from the standpoint of bourgeois society, but power is, after all, in the hands of the Soviets, which can always make the necessary amendments. The Kerensky government's criminal failure to act brought the country and the revolution to the brink of disaster: delay may indeed prove to be fatal, and the new regime is setting up milestones in the development of new forms of life by issuing laws to meet the aspirations and hopes of the broad masses. The local Soviets, depending on time and place, can amend, enlarge and add to the basic provisions worked out by the government. Creative activity at the grass roots is the basic factor

of the new public life. Let the workers set up workers' control at their factories. Let them supply the villages with manufactures in exchange for grain. Account must be taken of every single article, every pound of grain, because what socialism implies above all is keeping account of everything. Socialism cannot be decreed from above. Its spirit rejects the mechanical bureaucratic approach; living, creative socialism is the product of the masses themselves.

3
SPEECHES CONCERNING THE LEFT SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES' QUESTION

I

Lenin examines the concrete charges made against the Council of People's Commissars. It first learned of Muravyov's order[115] from the press, because the Commander-in-Chief had the power to issue emergency orders on his own authority. In view of the fact that the order did not contain anything clashing with the spirit of the new power, but was so worded that it could lead to undesirable misunderstandings, the Central Executive Committee has rescinded it. Furthermore, you criticise the Decree on Land. But it meets the demands of the people. You accuse us of schematising, but where are your own drafts, amendments and resolutions? Where are the fruits of your legislative activity? You were free to produce them. But we see nothing of them. You say we are extremists, but who are you? You are apologists for the sort of parliamentary obstruction that used to be known as scandal-mongering. If you are dissatisfied, why don't you call another congress and act, but don't talk about the collapse of power. Power is in the hands of our Party, which enjoys the confidence of the broad masses. Some of our comrades may have adopted a platform which has nothing in common with Bolshevism. But the mass of Moscow workers will not follow Rykov and Nogin. Comrade Proshyan said that in Finland, where the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were in touch with the mass, they believed there was need for the closest collaboration within the entire Left wing of revolutionary socialism. The fact that

the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries are not with us here merely shows that they have gone the way of their predecessors, the defencists. They have lost the common touch.

II

Lenin and Trotsky, referring to the example of the Party congresses and the need for them to submit to Party discipline, announce that they will take part in the voting.

4
SPEECH AND RESOLUTION ON THE RESIGNATION OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS FROM THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

Comrade Lenin replies to the preceding speakers. He says no internationalist can use the expression: "The West is disgracefully silent."[116] Only the blind fail to see the ferment among the working masses in Germany and the West. The top sections of the German proletariat and the socialist intelligentsia there, as everywhere else, are mostly defencists. But the lower strata of the proletariat are prepared to respond to our call in defiance of the will of their leaders. The fierce discipline of the German army and navy failed to prevent action by the opposition elements. The revolutionary sailors of the German navy, fully aware that their attempt was doomed, boldly went to their death in order to waken the spirit of revolt still dormant among the people. The Spartacus group[117] is intensifying its revolutionary propaganda. The name of Liebknecht, a tireless fighter for proletarian ideals, is daily gaining in popularity in Germany.

We believe in the revolution in the West. We know that it is inevitable, but it cannot, of course, be made to order. Did we know last December what exactly would happen in the coming February? Did we, in September, know with any certitude at all that within a month the revolutionary democrats of Russia would carry out the world's greatest revolution? We were aware that the old power was on top of a volcano. Many signs told us of the great work going on deep down in people's minds. We felt that the air was charged with electricity. We were sure that it would inevitably explode in a purifying thunderstorm. But we

could not predict the day and hour. We now see the same picture in Germany. There, too, there is a swelling undercurrent of dissatisfaction which will inevitably take the forms of a popular movement. We cannot decree a revolution, but we can help it along. We shall conduct organised fraternisation in the trenches and help the peoples of the West to start an invincible socialist revolution. Comrade Zaks further spoke about decreeing socialism. But doesn't the present government urge the masses to create better forms of life themselves? You have the beginnings of socialism in the exchange of manufactured goods for grain, and the strict control and accounting of production. We are sure we are going to have a republic of labour. He who will not work, will have to go without food.

But to continue: what is the sign of our Party's isolation? It is the breakaway of a few intellectuals. But we daily find more and more support among the peasants. Victory will belong only to those who have faith in the people, those who are immersed in the life-giving spring of popular creativity.

Comrade Lenin then proposes to the Central Executive Committee the following resolution:

The Central Executive Committee authorises the Council of People's Commissars to nominate, by the next sitting, candidates for the People's Commissars of the Interior, and Trade and Industry, and invites Comrade Kolegayev to fill the post of People's Commissar of Agriculture.

Izvestia No. 218,
November 7, 1917

Published according to the *Izvestia* text; Resolution on the resignation, according to the text of *Minutes of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies, Second Convocation*, Moscow, 1918

SPEECH AT A JOINT MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES AND DELEGATES FROM THE FRONTS NOVEMBER 4 (17), 1917

NEWSPAPER REPORT

I am unable to make a long speech; I can merely outline the new government's position, programme and tasks.

You are aware that there was a unanimous demand for a policy of peace, for an immediate offer of peace. There is not a single bourgeois minister in the whole of Europe, including this country, who has not promised peace; the soldiers of Russia have found these speeches to be false; they were promised a policy of peace, but no peace was offered and instead they were driven into an offensive. We believed it to be our government's first duty to offer an immediate peace, and this has been done.

Comrade Lenin sets forth the terms on which the new government has proposed peace, and adds: If the powers keep their colonies, there will never be an end to this war. What is the way out? There is only one: it is for the workers' and peasants' revolution to defeat capital. We never promised that the war could be ended at one stroke, by driving bayonets into ground. War springs from the clash of fortunes running to thousands of millions, which have divided up the world, and if the war is to be brought to an end, the power of capital must be destroyed.

Comrade Lenin speaks on the transfer of power to the Soviets, and declares that we have witnessed a new phenomenon: the peasants refuse to believe that all power belongs to the Soviets, they are still expecting something else from the government and forget that the Soviet is not a private but a state institution. We declare that we want a new state, that the Soviet must replace the old officialdom, and that all the people must learn to govern. You should stand

up to your full stature and straighten your backs, and then you need have no fear of threats. The officer cadets tried to engineer an uprising but we were able to deal with them; they organised a bloodbath in Moscow and shot soldiers on the Kremlin wall. But when the people won out, they let the enemy keep not only their military honour but also their arms.

The Vikzhel has threatened a strike, but we shall turn to the masses and ask them whether they want to go on strike and starve the soldiers at the front and the people in the rear, and I am sure that the railway proletariat won't have it. We are accused of making arrests. Indeed, we have made arrests; today we arrested the director of the State Bank. We are accused of resorting to terrorism, but we have not resorted, and I hope will not resort, to the terrorism of the French revolutionaries who guillotined unarmed men. I hope we shall not resort to it, because we have strength on our side. When we arrested anyone we told him we would let him go if he gave us a written promise not to engage in sabotage. Such written promises have been given. Our fault is that the Soviet organisation has not yet learned to govern, and that there are far too many meetings. Let the Soviets form teams and get down to the business of government. Our task is to advance to socialism. A few days ago the workers received the law on the control of production[118] which makes the factory committee a state institution. The workers must implement this law immediately. They will supply the peasants with cloth and iron, and the peasants will give them grain. I just saw a comrade from Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and he told me this was the main thing. Socialism means keeping account of everything. You will have socialism if you take stock of every piece of iron and cloth. We need engineers for production, and we value their labour highly. We shall be glad to pay them. We do not intend, at the moment, to deprive them of their privileged position. We value everyone who is willing to work but he must not behave as a boss but as an equal, under workers' control. We have no feeling of animosity for individuals, and we shall try to help them fit into the new pattern.

As for the peasants we say: help the working peasant, spare the middle peasant, compel the rich peasant to pay. After the October 25 Revolution we were threatened with

destruction. Some were scared and wanted to escape power, but we were not destroyed. This was because our enemies could find support only from the officer cadets, whereas we had the people on our side. But for the massive drive by the soldiers and workers, power would never have dropped from the hands that held it. Power passed to the Soviets, which are organisations giving the people full freedom. We, the Soviet Government, have received our powers from the Congress of Soviets and, confident of your support, we shall continue to act as we have acted. We have not excluded anyone. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries have gone, but that is a crime on their part. We invited the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to take part in the government, but they refused. We do not want any bargaining over power, we don't want any bids or counterbids. We shall keep the City Council away from power because it is a Kornilovite centre. Some say we are isolated. The bourgeoisie has surrounded us with an atmosphere of lies and slander, but I have yet to see the soldier who is not enthusiastic over the Soviets having taken power. I have yet to see the peasant who opposes the Soviets. There must be an alliance of the poor peasants and the workers, and socialism will triumph the world over. (*Members of the Soviet rise, and give Lenin a stormy ovation as he leaves.*)

Pravda No. 181,
November 18 (5), 1917

Published according
to the *Pravda* text

TO THE POPULATION

Comrades—workers, soldiers, peasants and all working people!

The workers' and peasants' revolution has definitely triumphed in Petrograd, having dispersed or arrested the last remnants of the small number of Cossacks deceived by Kerensky. The revolution has triumphed in Moscow too. Even before the arrival of a number of troop trains dispatched from Petrograd, the officer cadets and other Kornilovites in Moscow signed peace terms—the disarming of the cadets and the dissolution of the Committee of Salvation.[119]

Daily and hourly reports are coming in from the front and from the villages announcing the support of the overwhelming majority of the soldiers in the trenches and the peasants in the uyezds for the new government and its decrees on peace and the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants. The victory of the workers' and peasants' revolution is assured because the majority of the people have already sided with it.

It is perfectly understandable that the landowners and capitalists, and the *top groups* of office employees and civil servants closely linked with the bourgeoisie, in a word, all the wealthy and those supporting them, react to the new revolution with hostility, resist its victory, threaten to close the banks, disrupt or bring to a standstill the work of the different establishments, and hamper the revolution in every way, openly or covertly. Every politically-conscious worker was well aware that we would inevitably encounter resistance of this kind. The entire Party press of

the Bolsheviks has written about this on numerous occasions. Not for a single minute will the working classes be intimidated by this resistance; they will not falter in any way before the threats and strikes of the supporters of the bourgeoisie.

The majority of the people are with us. The majority of the working and oppressed people all over the world are with us. Ours is the cause of justice. Our victory is assured.

The resistance of the capitalists and the high-ranking employees will be smashed. Not a single person will be deprived of his property except under the special state law proclaiming nationalisation of the banks and syndicates. This law is being drafted. Not one of the working people will suffer the loss of a kopek; on the contrary, he will be helped. Apart from the strictest accounting and control, apart from levying the set taxes in full the government has no intention of introducing any other measure.

In support of these just demands the vast majority of the people have rallied round the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government.

Comrades, working people! Remember that now *you yourselves* are at the helm of state. No one will help you if you yourselves do not unite and take into *your* hands *all affairs* of the state. *Your* Soviets are from now on the organs of state authority, legislative bodies with full powers.

Rally around your Soviets. Strengthen them. Get on with the job yourselves; begin right at the bottom, do not wait for anyone. Establish the strictest revolutionary law and order, mercilessly suppress any attempts to create anarchy by drunkards, hooligans, counter-revolutionary officer cadets, Kornilovites and their like.

Ensure the strictest control over production and accounting of products. Arrest and hand over to the revolutionary courts all who dare to injure the people's cause, irrespective of whether the injury is manifested in sabotaging production (damage, delay and subversion), or in hoarding grain and products or holding up shipments of grain, disorganising the railways and the postal, telegraph and telephone services, or any resistance whatever to the great cause of peace, the cause of transferring the land to the peasants, of ensuring workers' control over the production and distribution of products.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Comrades, workers, soldiers, peasants and all working people! Take *all* power into the hands of *your* Soviets. Be watchful and guard like the apple of your eye your land, grain, factories, equipment, products, transport—all that from now onwards will be *entirely* your property, public property. Gradually, with the consent and approval of the majority of the peasants, in keeping with their *practical* experience and that of the workers, we shall go forward firmly and unswervingly to the victory of socialism—a victory that will be sealed by the advanced workers of the most civilised countries, bring the peoples lasting peace and liberate them from all oppression and exploitation.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

November 5, 1917,
Petrograd.

Pravda No. 4,
(evening edition)
November 19 (6), 1917

Published according
to the manuscript

REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM PEASANTS[120]

In reply to numerous questions from peasants, be it known that all power in the country henceforth belongs wholly to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The workers' revolution has won in Petrograd and Moscow and is winning everywhere else in Russia. The Workers' and Peasants' Government ensures the alliance of the mass of the peasants, the poor peasants, the majority of the peasants, with the workers against the landowners, against the capitalists.

Hence the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, primarily the uyezd and then the gubernia Soviets, are from now on, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, vested with full governmental authority in their localities. Landed proprietorship has been *abolished* by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. A decree on land has already been issued by the present Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government. In conformity with this decree all landed estates pass over wholly to the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

The volost land committees must at once take over the administration of all landed estates, instituting the strictest accounting, maintaining- perfect order and safeguarding with utmost strictness the former property of the landowners, which henceforth is the property of the whole people and which the people themselves must therefore protect.

All rulings of the volost land committees issued with the approval of the uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies have the force of *law* and must be carried out unconditionally and without delay.

The Workers' and Peasants' Government appointed by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets has been named the Council of People's Commissars.

The Council of People's Commissars calls upon the peasants to take all power into their own hands in their respective localities. The workers give their full, undivided, all-round support to the peasants, are getting the production of machines and implements started, and ask the peasants to help by delivering grain.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

November 5, 1917,
Petrograd.

Izvestia No. 219,
November 8, 1917

Published according
to the manuscript

FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)

To Comrades Kamenev, Zinoviev, Ryazanov and Larin

Once before, the Central Committee delivered an ultimatum to the leading exponents of your policy (Kamenev and Zinoviev), demanding complete subordination to the Central Committee's line and decisions, and renunciation of efforts to sabotage its work and of all subversive activity.*

By leaving the Central Committee, but remaining in the Party, the exponents of your policy undertook to abide by Central Committee decisions. Actually, however, you have not confined yourselves to criticism within the Party, but have brought confusion into the ranks of the fighters in an uprising which is still going on, and continue, in violation of Party discipline, to frustrate Central Committee decisions and hamper its work outside the Party, in the Soviets, the municipal bodies, the trade unions, etc.

In view of this, the Central Committee is forced to restate its ultimatum and to request that you immediately pledge yourselves in writing either to abide by Central Committee decisions and to conduct its policy in all your statements, or to withdraw from all Party activity in public and resign from all responsible posts in the working-class movement until the next Party congress.

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* See pp. 280-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Refusal to pledge yourselves to either course will make it imperative for the Central Committee to consider the question of your immediate expulsion from the Party.

Written on November 5 or 6 (18 or 19), 1917

First published in 1927, in the pamphlet *The Party's Fight Against Zinoviev's and Kamenev's Strike-breaking Tactics in October 1917*

Published according to the manuscript

FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)

TO ALL PARTY MEMBERS AND TO ALL THE WORKING CLASSES OF RUSSIA

Comrades,

It is a matter of common knowledge that the majority at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were delegates belonging to the Bolshevik Party.

This fact is fundamental for a proper understanding of the victorious revolution that has just taken place in Petrograd, Moscow and the whole of Russia. Yet that fact is constantly forgotten and ignored by all the supporters of the capitalists and their unwitting aides, who are undermining the fundamental principle of the new revolution, namely, *all power to the Soviets*. There must be no government in Russia other than the *Soviet Government*. Soviet power has been won in Russia, and the transfer of government from one Soviet party to another is guaranteed without any revolution, simply by a decision of the Soviets; simply by new elections of deputies to the Soviets. The majority at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets belonged to the Bolshevik Party. Therefore the only Soviet Government is the one formed by that Party. And everybody knows that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, several hours prior to the formation of the new government, and to the presentation of the list of its members to the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, summoned to its session three of the most prominent members of the group of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Comrades Kamkov, Spiro and Karelin, and *invited them* to join the new government. We very much regret that the Left Socialist-Revolutionary

comrades refused; we regard their refusal as impermissible on the part of revolutionaries and champions of the working people. We are ready at any moment to include Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the government, but we declare that, as the majority party at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, we are entitled to form the government, *and it is our duty* to the people to do so.

Everybody knows that the Central Committee of our Party submitted a purely Bolshevik list of People's Commissars to the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and that *the Congress approved this list of a purely Bolshevik government.*

The statements to the effect that the Bolshevik government is *not* a Soviet Government are therefore pure lies, and come, and can come, only from the enemies of the people, from the enemies of Soviet power. On the contrary, now, after the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and until the Third Congress meets, or until new elections to the Soviets are held, or until a new government is formed by the Central Executive Committee, *only* a Bolshevik government can be regarded as the *Soviet* Government.

* * *

Comrades, yesterday, November 4, several members of the Central Committee of our Party and of the Council of People's Commissars—Kamenev, Zinoviev, Nogin, Rykov, Milyutin and a few others—resigned from the Central Committee of our Party, and the three last named from the Council of People's Commissars. In a large party like ours, notwithstanding the proletarian and revolutionary line of our policy, it was inevitable that individual comrades should have proved to be insufficiently staunch and firm in the struggle against the enemies of the people. The tasks that now face our Party are really immense, the difficulties are enormous, and several members of our Party who formerly held posts of responsibility have flinched in face of the onslaught of the bourgeoisie and fled from our ranks. The bourgeoisie and all its helpers are jubilant over this fact and are maliciously rejoicing, clamouring about disintegration and predicting the fall of the Bolshevik government.

Comrades, do not believe these lies. The comrades who have resigned have acted as deserters, since they not only quitted the posts entrusted to them, but violated the direct decision of the Central Committee of our Party binding them to delay their resignation at least until a decision was taken by the Petrograd and Moscow Party organisations. We strongly condemn this desertion. We are profoundly convinced that all class-conscious workers, soldiers and peasants who belong to or sympathise with our Party will condemn the actions of the deserters with equal severity.

But we declare that the desertion of a few individuals belonging to the leading group of our Party cannot for a moment or in the slightest way shake the unity of the masses who follow our Party and that it therefore will not shake our Party.

You must recall, comrades, that two of the deserters, Kamenev and Zinoviev, acted as deserters and blacklegs even before the Petrograd uprising; for they not only voted against the uprising at the decisive meeting of the Central Committee on October 10, 1917, but, even *after* the decision had been taken by the Central Committee, agitated among the Party workers against the uprising. It is common knowledge that newspapers which fear to take the side of the workers and are more inclined to side with the bourgeoisie (e.g., *Novaya Zhizn*), raised at that time, in common with the whole bourgeois press, a hue and cry about the "disintegration" of our Party, about "the collapse of the uprising" and so on. Events, however, swiftly refuted the lies and slanders of some and the doubts, waverings and cowardice of others: The "storm" they tried to raise over the efforts of Kamenev and Zinoviev to thwart the Petrograd uprising proved to be *a storm in a teacup*, while the great enthusiasm of the people, the great heroism of millions of workers, soldiers, and peasants in Petrograd, in Moscow, at the front, in the trenches and in the villages, pushed the deserters out of the way as easily as a railway train pushes aside splinters of wood.

Shame on all the faint-hearted, all the waverers and doubters, on all those who allowed themselves to be intimidated by the bourgeoisie or who have succumbed to the outcries of their direct and indirect supporters! *There*

is not the slightest hesitation among the *mass* of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd, Moscow and other places. Our Party stands solidly and firmly, as one man, in defence of Soviet power, in defence of the interests of all the working people, and first and foremost of the workers and poor peasants.

Bourgeois hacks and those who allowed themselves to be intimidated by the bourgeoisie accuse us in chorus of being uncompromising, of being irreconcilable, of refusing to share power with another party. That is not true, comrades. *We have invited* and continue to invite the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to share power with us. It is not our fault that *they have refused*. We began the negotiations, and, after the delegates of the Second Congress of Soviets had dispersed, we made all kinds of concessions in the course of these negotiations, even to the point of provisionally agreeing to admit representatives of a section of the Petrograd City Council, that nest of Kornilov men, which will be the first to be swept away by the people should the Kornilovite scoundrels, should the darling sons of the capitalists and landowners, the officer cadets, attempt once more to resist the will of the people as they did last Sunday in Petrograd and as they would like to do again (as is proved by the exposure of the conspiracy of Purishkevich and the documents seized on him yesterday, November 3). But the gentlemen who stand behind the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and act through them in the interests of the bourgeoisie interpreted our readiness to make concessions as weakness, and took advantage of this readiness to present us with new ultimatums. At the conference on November 3, Mr. Abramovich and Mr. Martov appeared and presented an ultimatum: no negotiations until our government puts a stop to the arrests and to the suppression of bourgeois newspapers.

Both our Party and the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets *refused* to accept this ultimatum, which obviously emanated from the supporters of Kaledin, the bourgeoisie, Kerensky and Kornilov. The conspiracy of Purishkevich and the appearance in Petrograd on November 5 of a delegation from a unit of the 17th Army Corps threatening us with a march on Petrograd (a ridiculous threat, for the advanced detachments of these Kornilovites have

already been beaten and have fled at Gatchina, while most of them have refused to fight against the Soviets)—all these events have proved who were the *real* authors of the ultimatum of Mr. Abramovich and Mr. Martov and whom these people *really* served.

Let the working people, therefore, remain calm and firm! Our Party will never yield to the ultimatums of the minority in the Soviets, the minority who have allowed themselves to be intimidated by the bourgeoisie and, despite their "good intentions" virtually act as puppets in the hands of the Kornilov gang.

We stand firmly by the principle of Soviet power, i.e., the power of the *majority* obtained at the last Congress of Soviets. We agreed, and *still agree*, to share power with the minority in the Soviets, provided that minority loyally and honestly undertake to submit to the majority and carry out the programme, *approved by the whole* Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, for gradual, but firm and undeviating steps towards socialism. But we shall not submit to any ultimatums of groups of intellectuals who are not backed by the people, and who *in actual fact* are backed only by the Kornilovites, the Savinkov men, the officer cadets, etc.

Let the working people, therefore, remain calm and firm! Our Party, the party of the Soviet majority, stands solid and united in defence of their interests and, as before, behind our Party stand the millions of the workers in the cities, the soldiers in the trenches and the peasants in the villages, prepared at all costs to achieve the victory of peace and the victory of socialism!

Written on November 5-6 (18-19), 1917

Published in *Pravda* No. 182, November 20 (7), 1917

Published according to the newspaper text

DIRECT-LINE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND FIELD H.Q. NOVEMBER 9 (22), 1917[121]

Is that the Commander-in-Chief?

Dieterichs here.

We should like to speak to the Acting Commander-in-Chief. If General Dukhonin is no longer charged with these duties, please let us have the person now acting in his stead. As far as we are aware, General Dukhonin has not yet resigned.

Field H. Q. replying: Acting C.-in-C. General Dukhonin waited for your call until 1 a.m. and is now asleep. The telegraph was out of order, and later was used by Field H. Q. to communicate with G.H.Q.

Could you tell us whether you have received a wireless message from the Council of People's Commissars sent at 4.00 o'clock, and what has been done to carry out the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars?

Field H. Q. replying: An undated and unnumbered message of state importance was received, and that is why General Dukhonin requested General Manikovsky for the necessary guarantees confirming its authenticity.

What was Manikovsky's reply, at what time was the query sent, and was it radioed, telephoned or telegraphed?

Field H. Q. replying: No answer has been received yet, and a request was sent an hour ago to speed up the reply.

Please specify the time and means used in sending the first query. Will you hurry up, please?

Field H. Q. replying: The message was telegraphed and radioed to General Manikovsky—the time, just a minute....
The message was sent at 19.50.

Why wasn't a copy of the query sent to me, the People's Commissar for War[122]? From a personal conversation with me the C.-in-C. was aware that General Manikovsky's sole responsibility is continuity of technical operations in logistics and food supplies, and that I have been entrusted with the political direction of and responsibility for the War Ministry's activity.

Field H. Q. replying: I can say nothing at all about this.

We declare most emphatically that we place all the responsibility for the delay in this crucial state matter upon General Dukhonin and unconditionally demand: first, the immediate dispatch of truce envoys, and second, General Dukhonin's personal presence on the line at 11 a.m. sharp tomorrow. Should the delay result in famine, disorganisation or defeat, or anarchic revolts, the full blame will fall upon you, and the soldiers will be duly informed of it.

Field H. Q. replying: I shall inform General Dukhonin of this.

When? Right away? We are waiting for Dukhonin.

Field H. Q. replying: I shall wake him up at once.
This is Acting C.-in-C. General Dukhonin.

The People's Commissars here; what's your answer?

I see from the tape I just got of your conversation with G.H.Q. that your message to me was sent before any decision was taken on the substance of the message signed by the People's Commissars Ulyanov-Lenin, Trotsky and Krylenko; in view of this I must have the following factual information: (1) Has the Council of People's Commissars received any reply to its message to the belligerent powers containing the Decree on Peace; (2) What was to be done with the Rumanian Army, which is a part of our front; (3) Was there any intention of engaging in talks about a separate armistice and with whom only with the Germans or with the Turks, or are we to negotiate a general armistice?

The text of the message sent to you is absolutely clear and to the point; it speaks of an immediate opening of armistice talks with all the belligerents, and we resolutely deny the right to delay this matter of state importance by any preliminary queries whatsoever; we insist that truce envoys

should be dispatched immediately and that we receive progress reports every hour.

Field H. Q. replying: My questions are of a purely technical character and unless they are answered it will be impossible to negotiate.

You must be aware that many technical, rather detailed questions will arise during the talks, and we shall answer them as they arise or are raised by the enemy; that is why we demand once again, in the form of an ultimatum, that formal armistice negotiations be started unconditionally and without delay with all the belligerent countries, both Allied and those hostile to us. Please state your reply in precise terms.

I can understand only one thing, and it is that you cannot negotiate directly with the powers. It is even less possible for me to do so on your behalf. Only a central government supported by the army and the nation can have enough prestige and importance for the enemy to lend these negotiations the authority necessary to achieve results. I also believe that an early conclusion of a general peace is in Russia's interests.

Do you flatly refuse to give us a precise reply and carry out our orders?

I have given you a precise reply as to the reasons why I find it impossible to put your message into effect, and I repeat that the peace Russia needs can be obtained only by a central government. Dukhonin.

In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, we dismiss you from your post for refusing to obey government orders and for conduct that entails untold hardships for the working people of all countries and especially the armies. We order you, on pain of responsibility under war-time laws, to continue your duties pending the arrival at Field Headquarters of a new Commander-in-Chief or a person empowered by him to take over from you. Ensign Krylenko is appointed Commander-in-Chief.

Lenin, *Stalin*, *Krylenko*

Rabochy i Soldat No. 20,
November 9 (22), 1917

Published according
to the newspaper text

WIRELESS MESSAGE

TO ALL REGIMENTAL, DIVISIONAL, CORPS, ARMY AND OTHER COMMITTEES, TO ALL SOLDIERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND SAILORS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY NAVY[123]

On the night of November 7 the Council of People's Commissars sent a wireless message to Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin ordering him immediately and formally to propose an armistice to all the belligerent countries, both Allied and those hostile to us.

This message was received at Field Headquarters on November 8 at 5.05 a.m. Dukhonin was ordered to keep the Council of People's Commissars constantly informed of the progress of the negotiations and to sign the armistice agreement only after it had been approved by the Council of People's Commissars. Simultaneously, a similar proposal to conclude an armistice was formally submitted to all the plenipotentiary representatives of the Allied countries in Petrograd.

Not having received a reply from Dukhonin by the evening of November 8, the Council of People's Commissars empowered Lenin, Stalin and Krylenko to ascertain the causes of the delay from Dukhonin over the direct line.

The conversation lasted from 2 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. on November 9. Dukhonin made numerous attempts to evade giving an explanation of his conduct and a precise reply to the orders of the government, but when Dukhonin was given a categorical order to enter immediately into formal negotiations for an armistice, he refused to obey. Thereupon, in the name of the Government of the Russian Republic, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, Dukhonin was informed that he was dismissed from his post for refusing to obey government orders and for conduct that entailed untold hardships for the working people of all countries and

especially for the armies. At the same time, Dukhonin was ordered to continue his duties pending the arrival of a new Commander-in-Chief or a person empowered by the latter to take over from Dukhonin. Ensign Krylenko has been appointed the new Commander-in-Chief.

Soldiers, the cause of peace is in your hands! Do not allow the counter-revolutionary generals to frustrate the great cause of peace, place them under guard in order to avert acts of summary justice unworthy of a revolutionary army and to prevent these generals from escaping the trial that awaits them. Maintain the strictest revolutionary and military order.

Let the regiments at the front immediately elect representatives to start formal negotiations for an armistice with the enemy.

The Council of People's Commissars authorises you to do this.

Do everything possible to keep us informed of every step in the negotiations. The Council of People's Commissars is alone authorised to sign the final armistice agreement.

Soldiers, the cause of peace is in your hands! Maintain vigilance, restraint and energy, and the cause of peace will triumph!

In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

N. Krylenko,
People's Commissar for War and
Commander-in-Chief

Written on November 9 (22), 1917

Published in the newspaper
Rabochy i Soldat No. 20,
November 9 (22), 1917

Published according
to the newspaper text

FOREWORD TO THE PAMPHLET, *HOW THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES CHEATED THE PEOPLE, AND WHAT THE NEW BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN THE PEOPLE*

The peasants of Russia are now faced with the prospect of taking their country's destiny into their own hands.

The victory of the workers' revolution in the two leading cities and in most of the rest of Russia has given the peasants the *possibility* of taking the land arrangements into *their own* hands. Not all peasants have as yet realised that *their* Soviets of Peasants' Deputies are the true, authentic, supreme *state* power, but they soon will.

When they do realise it, their alliance with the workers, the alliance of the bulk of the peasants—the poor, working peasants—will be consolidated. *This* alliance, both in the Soviets and the Constituent Assembly, and not the alliance of the peasants and the capitalists, is the only one really capable of ensuring the working people's interests.

It will surely very soon be brought home to the peasants that if they are to be rid of the horrors of war and the oppression of the landowners and capitalists, they must ally themselves with the working people of the towns, above all the factory workers, and *not* with the rich.

If the peasants are to see this soon, they must, among other things, make a closer and more amply documented comparison of the promises and draft laws of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Decree on Land issued by the new, workers' and peasants' government.

Such a comparison is made in this pamphlet. It gives the *documents*, which is the first thing anyone needs if he is going to use his head. The main document relating to the Socialist-Revolutionaries is their Minister Maslov's draft land law. I take it in full from *Dyelo Naroda* (Cher-

nov's newspaper). I am also republishing in full my own article on the subject from *Rabochy Put*.*

The Decree on Land issued by the workers' and peasants' government is also given in full.**

Peasant comrades, seek the truth about the various parties, and you shall find it! Collect and compare the draft land laws proposed by the various parties.

You must read carefully the draft land law put forward by the Socialist-Revolutionary minister, and the Decree on Land issued by the present Bolshevik government, which received its powers from the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. We have no doubt at all as to what the peasants' final conclusion will be.

N. Lenin

November 9, 1917,
Petrograd.

Published in 1917
in a pamphlet issued
by *Selsky Vestnik*
(Rural Herald) in Petrograd

Published according
to the pamphlet text

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* See pp. 228-33 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 258-60 of this volume.—*Ed.*

MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, NOVEMBER 10 (23), 1917

1
REPORT ON TALKS WITH DUKHONIN

The full text of our talks with Dukhonin has been printed, so I can confine myself to a few remarks. It was clear to us that we were dealing with an opponent of the people's will and an enemy of the revolution. Dukhonin resorted to all manner of shifts and dodges to delay matters. Doubt was expressed as to the authenticity of our message, and the query was not addressed to Krylenko but to General Manikovsky. Thus, the generals have stolen at least one full day in this important and vital matter of peace. General Dukhonin came to the apparatus only when we said we would refer the matter to the soldiers. We told Dukhonin of our demand that he should start armistice negotiations immediately, and nothing more. Dukhonin was not empowered to conclude an armistice. Not only was the conclusion of an armistice outside Dukhonin's competence, but his every step in the matter of the armistice negotiations was to have been under the control of the People's Commissars. The bourgeois press has accused us of offering a separate armistice and of ignoring the interests of the Rumanian Army. That is a lie. We propose that the peace talks should be started immediately, and an armistice concluded with all countries, without exception. We have information that our wireless messages have been reaching Europe. Thus, our message about the victory over Kerensky* was monitored and

* See p. 274 of this volume.—*Ed.*

relayed by the Austrian wireless telegraph. The Germans, on their part, tried to jam it. We can contact Paris by wireless, and when the peace treaty is drawn up, we shall be able to inform the French people that it can be signed, and that it is up to them to have the armistice concluded within two hours. Let's see what Clemenceau will have to say then. Our Party has never said that it could produce a peace all at once. It said that it would make an immediate offer of peace and would publish the secret treaties. That has been done—the fight for peace is on. It will be an uphill fight. International imperialism is mobilising all its forces against us, but despite its great strength our chances are quite good in the revolutionary struggle for peace, in which we shall combine revolutionary fraternisation with the struggle for peace. The bourgeoisie would very much like the imperialist governments to combine against us.

2
CONCLUDING SPEECH

Comrade Chudnovsky said here that he had "taken the liberty" of making some sharp criticisms of the Commissars' actions. There can be no question at all as to whether or not sharp criticism is to be allowed, for it is a revolutionary's duty to engage in such criticism, and the People's Commissars do not claim to be infallible.

Comrade Chudnovsky said we could not accept an indecent peace, but he failed to cite a single word or fact to show that this peace was unacceptable. We said: peace can be concluded only by the Council of People's Commissars. When we began our talks with Dukhonin we were aware that we were about to negotiate with an enemy, and we cannot procrastinate when dealing with an enemy. We could not foretell the outcome of the talks. But we were fully determined. We had to take a decision on the spot, without leaving the line. We had to act against an insubordinate general there and then. We could not get the Central Executive Committee together on the line; that was in no sense a violation of the Central Executive Committee's prerogatives. You don't wait for the outcome in a war, and it was a war we were fighting against the counter-revolutionary generals, so we turned to the soldiers. We removed Dukhonin but we are not formalists or bureaucrats, and we are well aware that it was not enough to remove him. He opposed us and we appealed over his head to the army masses. We authorised them to enter into armistice negotiations. But we did not conclude an armistice. The soldiers were warned to keep an eye on the counter-revolutionary generals.* I think any

* See pp. 312-13 of this volume.—*Ed.*

regiment is disciplined enough to maintain the necessary revolutionary order. In the event of betrayal during the soldiers' armistice negotiations or an attack during fraternisation, it is the soldiers' duty to shoot the traitors on the spot, without more ado.

It is monstrous to allege that we have now weakened our front in the event of the Germans starting an offensive. Until Dukhonin's exposure and removal, the army was never sure that it was conducting an international policy of peace. It now has this assurance: the only way to fight Dukhonin is to appeal to the sense of discipline and initiative of the masses of soldiers. Peace cannot be concluded only from above. Peace must be won from below. We put no trust in the German generals, but we have faith in the German people. A peace concluded by the commanders-in-chief, without the active participation of the soldiers, would be precarious. I do not object to Kamenev's proposal as a matter of principle but because it is inadequate and too weak. I have no objections to a commission but I suggest that we keep an open mind on its functions; I dislike half-measures and propose that we should be given a free hand in this respect.

Pravda No. 188,
November 26 (13), 1917

Published according to the text of *Minutes of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies, Second Convocation*, Moscow, 1918

FROM THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMITTEE

The disruption of the food supply caused by war and mismanagement is being aggravated to the extreme by profiteers, marauders and their accomplices on the railways, on steamship lines, in transport offices, etc.

At a time of great national hardship, criminal plunderers are jeopardising the health and lives of millions of soldiers and workers for their own gain.

Such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated for a single day longer.

The Council of People's Commissars orders the Revolutionary Military Committee to adopt the most vigorous measures to eradicate profiteering and sabotage, concealment of supplies, the malicious delay of freight, etc.

All persons guilty of such actions are liable, by special decision of the Revolutionary Military Committee, *to immediate arrest and custody in the prisons of Kronstadt*, pending their trial by revolutionary court martial.

All public organisations must be drawn into the fight against the food plunderers.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Written not later than November 10 (23), 1917

Published on November 12 (25), 1917 in *Izvestia* No. 223

Published according to the newspaper text

THE EXTRAORDINARY ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[124]

NOVEMBER 10-25 (NOVEMBER 23-DECEMBER 8), 1917

THE EXTRAORDINARY ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[124]

NOVEMBER 10-26 (NOVEMBER 23-DECEMBER 8), 1917

1

STATEMENT TO THE BOLSHEVIK GROUP AT THE EXTRAORDINARY ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[125]

We demand most emphatically that the Bolsheviks insist, in the form of an ultimatum, on an open *vote* on the question of issuing an *immediate* invitation to *several* representatives of the Government.

If the *reading* of this proposal and voting on it at the plenary session are refused, the whole Bolshevik group should *walk out* by way of protest.

Lenin

Written on November 12 (25), 1917

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Published according to the manuscript

2
SPEECH ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
NOVEMBER 14 (27)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

On the instructions of the Bolshevik group, Comrade Lenin delivered a speech setting forth the views of the Bolshevik Party on the agrarian question.

He said that the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries had suffered defeat over the agrarian question, since it had advocated the confiscation of the landed estates, but refused to carry it into effect.

Landed proprietorship forms the basis of feudal oppression, and the confiscation of the landed estates is the first step of the revolution in Russia. But the land question cannot be settled independently of the other problems of the revolution. A correct view of these problems can be derived from an analysis of the stages through which the revolution has passed. The first stage was the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of the power of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. The interests of the landowners were closely interwoven with those of the bourgeoisie and the banks. The second stage was the consolidation of the Soviets and a policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie. The mistake of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was that at that time they failed to oppose the policy of compromise on the plea that the masses were not sufficiently enlightened. A party is the vanguard of a class, and its duty is to lead the masses and not merely to reflect the average political level of the masses. But in order to lead those who vacillate the Left Socialist-Revolutionary comrades must themselves stop vacillating.

Comrades Left Socialist-Revolutionaries! In July there began a period in which the masses of the people started

breaking away from the policy of compromise, but to this very day the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries are stretching out a hand to the Avksentyevs, while offering the workers only their little finger. If compromise continues, the revolution is doomed. Only if the peasantry supports the workers can the problems of the revolution be solved. Compromise is an attempt on the part of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers to get their needs satisfied by means of reforms, by concessions on the part of capital, without a socialist revolution. But it is impossible to give the people peace and land without overthrowing the bourgeoisie, without socialism. It is the duty of the revolution to put an end to compromise, and to put an end to compromise means taking the path of socialist revolution.

Comrade Lenin went on to defend the instructions to the volost committees[126] and spoke of the necessity of breaking with the leading organs, such as the army committees, the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Deputies, etc. We adopted our law on the volost committees, he said, from the peasants. The peasants want land and the prohibition of hired labour; they want implements for the cultivation of the soil. And this cannot be obtained without defeating capital. You want land, we said to them, but the land is mortgaged and belongs to Russian and world capital. You are throwing down a challenge to capital, you are following a different path from ours; but we are at one with you in that we are marching, and must march, towards the social revolution. As for the Constituent Assembly, the speaker said that its work will depend on the mood in the country, but he added, trust in the mood, but don't forget your rifles.

Comrade Lenin went on to deal with the question of the war. When he referred to the removal of Dukhonin and the appointment of Krylenko as Commander-in-Chief, there was laughter among the audience. It may be funny to you, he retorted, but the soldiers will condemn you for this laughter. If there are people here who think it funny that we removed a counter-revolutionary general and appointed Krylenko, who is against the general and has gone to conduct negotiations,[127] we have nothing to say to them. We have nothing in common with those who do not recognise

the need to fight the counter-revolutionary generals. Rather than have anything to do with such people we prefer to retire from power, go underground if necessary.

Pravda No. 190,
November 28 (15), 1917

Published according
to the *Pravda* text

3
DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Peasants' Congress fully and in every way supports the law (decree) on land of October 26, 1917, approved by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and published by the Council of People's Commissars as the provisional workers' and peasants' government of the Russian Republic. The Peasants' Congress declares its firm and unshakable resolve to ensure the implementation of this law, calls upon all peasants to support it unanimously and to carry it out themselves in the localities without delay, and also to elect to all and every responsible post and office only people who have proved not in word but in deed their complete devotion to the interests of the working and exploited peasants, their readiness and ability to uphold these interests against any resistance the landowners, capitalists, and their supporters or accomplices may offer.

The Peasants' Congress also expresses its conviction that the full implementation of all the measures constituting the law on land is possible only if the workers' socialist revolution which began on October 25 is successful, for only the socialist revolution can ensure the transfer of the land to the working peasantry without compensation, the confiscation of the landowners' implements, full protection of the interests of agricultural wage-workers and the immediate commencement of the unconditional abolition of the entire system of capitalist wage-slavery, the proper and planned distribution of the products of both agriculture and industry among the various regions and the population of the country, control over the banks (without such con-

trol the people will not be masters of the land even though private property in land is abolished), all-round state assistance specifically to the working and exploited people, etc.

Therefore the Peasants' Congress, fully supporting the Revolution of October 25, and supporting it precisely as a socialist revolution, declares its unswerving resolve to carry out, with due gradualness but without the slightest vacillation, measures aimed at the socialist transformation of the Russian Republic.

A necessary condition for the victory of the socialist revolution, which alone can secure the lasting triumph and full implementation of the law on land, is the close alliance of the working and exploited peasantry with the working class—the proletariat—in all the advanced countries. In the Russian Republic the entire organisation and administration of the state from top to bottom must henceforth be based on such an alliance. Rejecting all and every attempt, direct and indirect, overt and covert, to return to a course that experience has rejected, to the course of conciliation with the bourgeoisie and the champions of bourgeois policy, this alliance alone can ensure the victory of socialism the world over.

Written on November 14 (27), 1917

Published in *Izvestia* No. 226, November 15 (28), 1917

Published according to the *Izvestia* text

4
SPEECH IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT OF A VIKZHEL SPOKESMAN
NOVEMBER 18 (DECEMBER 1)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, the Vikzhel statement is undoubtedly nothing but a misunderstanding. Can you imagine, for one moment, that troops, fully aware of their revolutionary duty and fighting for the people's interests, would approach Field Headquarters and begin smashing up everything and everyone, without making known their demands, without so much as explaining to the soldiers around H.Q. why they had come. You must realise, comrades, that that is impossible. A revolutionary army, conscious of what it is about, must make its demands known to those to whom it applies. When the demands were being made, much more was done, care was taken to make it quite clear that resistance meant resisting the people's will, that this was not a common but a moral crime against the people's freedom, interests and highest aspirations. A revolutionary army never fires the first shot, and acts in anger only against invaders and tyrants. Had it been otherwise, the word revolution would have lost its meaning. I feel I must draw your attention to the fact that while making its unverified charges, Vikzhel announces its "neutrality". That is something Vikzhel has no right to do. At a time of revolutionary struggle, when every minute counts, when dissent and neutrality allow the enemy to put in his word, when he will certainly be heard, and when no haste is made to help the people in their struggle for their sacred rights, I cannot call such a stand neutrality; it is not neutrality; a revolutionary would call it incitement. (*Applause.*) By taking such a stand you incite the generals to action; when you fail to support us, you oppose the people.

To postpone the armistice is just what General Dukhonin wants. By assisting him you are sabotaging the armistice. Think of the grave responsibility that falls upon you, and consider what the people will say.

Comrade Lenin went on to say that the telegraph services were being sabotaged in some areas. The government was left without information, while its opponents circulated absurd rumours. Take the allegation that the Polish battalions were opposing the government, although the Poles had repeatedly declared that they had not interfered and did not intend to interfere in Russian affairs; they have also informed us that they want an armistice.

Izvestia No. 230,
November 19, 1917

Published according
to the *Izvestia* text

5
CONCLUDING SPEECH ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
NOVEMBER 18 (DECEMBER 1)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin first showed that the accusation of anarchism made against the Bolsheviks by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had not been proved.

In what way did socialists differ from anarchists? The anarchists did not recognise state power whereas the socialists, the Bolsheviks among them, did recognise it in the period of transition between the state of affairs then obtaining and the socialism towards which they were progressing.

The Bolsheviks favoured a strong authority, but it must be a workers' and peasants' authority.

All state power is compulsion, but until then it had always been the power of the minority, the power of the landowner and capitalist employed against the worker and peasant.

He said that the Bolsheviks stood for the state power that would be a firm authority of the majority of the workers and peasants employed against the capitalists and landowners.

Comrade Lenin then went on to show that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' resolution on the land had called the new government a people's socialist government, and dwelt on the points that could closely unite the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The alliance of the peasants and-workers was a basis for an agreement between the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks.

It was an honest coalition, an honest alliance, but it would be an honest coalition at the summit too, between the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, if the

Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were more definite in stating their conviction that the revolution was a socialist revolution. It was a socialist revolution. The abolition of private property in land, the introduction of workers' control, the nationalisation of the banks—all these were measures that would lead to socialism. They were not socialism, but they were measures that would lead to socialism by gigantic strides. The Bolsheviks did not promise the workers and peasants milk and honey immediately, but they did say that a close alliance between the workers and the exploited peasantry, a firm, unwavering struggle for the power of the Soviets would lead to socialism, and any party that really wanted to be a people's party would have to state clearly and decisively that the revolution was a socialist revolution.

And only in the event of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries stating that clearly and unambiguously would the Bolsheviks' alliance with them grow and become stronger.

It had been said that the Bolsheviks were against the socialisation of the land and could not, therefore, come to an agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Bolsheviks answered that they were indeed against the Socialist-Revolutionaries' socialisation of the land but that did not prevent an honest alliance with them.

Today or tomorrow the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries would nominate their Minister of Agriculture, and the Bolsheviks would not vote against a law on the socialisation of the land if he proposed it; they would abstain from voting.

In conclusion Comrade Lenin stressed that only an alliance of workers and peasants could acquire land and make peace.

Among other things Comrade Lenin was asked what the Bolsheviks would do in the Constituent Assembly if the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were there in a minority and proposed a bill on the socialisation of the land—would the Bolsheviks abstain from voting? Of course not. The Bolsheviks would vote for the bill but would make the proviso that they were voting for it in order to support the peasants against their enemies.

Pravda No. 195,
December 4 (November 21), 1917

Published according
to the *Pravda* text

ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND THE WORKING AND EXPLOITED PEASANTS

A LETTER TO *PRAVDA*

Today, Saturday, November 18, in the course of a speech I made at the Peasants' Congress, I was publicly asked a question to which I forthwith replied. It is essential that this question and my reply should immediately be made known to all the reading public, for while formally speaking only in my own name, I was actually speaking in the name of the whole Bolshevik Party.

The matter was the following.

Touching on the question of an alliance between the Bolshevik workers and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, whom many peasants at present trust, I argued in my speech that this alliance *can* be an "honest coalition", an honest alliance, for there is *no* radical divergence of interests between the wage-workers and the working and exploited peasants. Socialism is *fully* able to meet the interests of both. *Only* socialism can meet their interests. Hence the possibility and necessity for an "honest coalition" between the proletarians and the working and exploited peasantry. On the contrary, a "coalition" (alliance) between the working and exploited classes, on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie, on the other, *cannot* be an "honest coalition" because of the radical divergence of interests between these classes.

Imagine, I said, that there is a majority of Bolsheviks and a minority of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the government, or even, let us assume, only one Left Socialist-Revolutionary—the Commissar of Agriculture. Could the Bolsheviks practise an honest coalition under such circumstances?

They could; for, while they are irreconcilable in their fight against the counter-revolutionary elements (including the Right Socialist-Revolutionary and the defencist elements), the Bolsheviks would be obliged to *abstain* from voting on questions which concern purely Socialist-Revolutionary points in the land programme approved by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Such, for instance, would be the point on equal land tenure and the redistribution of land among the small holders.

By abstaining from voting on such a point the Bolsheviks would not be changing their programme in the slightest. For, given the victory of socialism (workers' control over the factories, to be followed by their expropriation, the nationalisation of the banks, and the creation of a Supreme Economic Council for the regulation of the entire economic life of the country)—given that the workers *would be obliged to agree* to the transitional measures proposed by the small working and exploited peasants, provided such measures were *not detrimental* to the cause of socialism. Even Kautsky, when he was still a Marxist (1899-1909), frequently admitted—I said—that the measures of transition to socialism cannot be identical in countries with large-scale and those with small-scale farming.

We Bolsheviks would be obliged to abstain from voting when such a point was being decided in the Council of People's Commissars or in the Central Executive Committee, for if the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (as well as the peasants who support them) agreed to workers' control, to the nationalisation of the banks, etc., equal land tenure would be only one of the measures of *transition* to full socialism. For the proletariat to *impose* such transitional measures would be absurd; it is obliged, in the interests of the victory of socialism, to *yield* to the small working and exploited peasants in the choice of these transitional measures, for they could do *no harm* to the cause of socialism.

Thereupon, a Left Socialist-Revolutionary (it was Comrade Feofilaktov, if I am not mistaken) asked me the following question:

"How would the Bolsheviks act if in the Constituent Assembly the peasants wanted to pass a law on equal land

tenure, while the bourgeoisie were opposed to the peasants and the decision depended on the Bolsheviks?"

I replied: under such circumstances, when the cause of socialism would be ensured by the introduction of workers' control, the nationalisation of the banks, etc., the alliance between the workers and the working and exploited peasants would make it obligatory for the party of the proletariat to vote for the peasants and against the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks, in my opinion, would be entitled when the vote was being taken to make a declaration of dissent, to place on record their non-agreement, etc., but to abstain from voting under such circumstances would be to betray their allies *in the fight for socialism* because of a difference with them on a partial issue. The Bolsheviks would never betray the peasants in such a situation. Equal land tenure and like measures *cannot* prejudice socialism if the power is in the hands of a workers' and peasants' government, if workers' control has been introduced, the banks nationalised, a workers' and peasants' supreme economic body set up to direct (regulate) the *entire* economic life of the country, and so forth.

Such was my reply.

N. Lenin

Written on November 18 (December 1), 1917

Published in *Pravda* No. 194, December 2 (November 19), 1917

Published according to the *Pravda* text

DRAFT DECREE ON THE RIGHT OF RECALL[128]

No elective institution or representative assembly can be regarded as being truly democratic and really representative of the people's will unless the electors' right to recall those elected is accepted and exercised. This fundamental principle of true democracy applies to all representative assemblies without exception, including the Constituent Assembly.

Because the system of proportional representation is more democratic than the majority system, it demands more complex measures for the exercise of the right of recall, that is, the actual subordination of the elected to the people. But it would be betraying democracy and abdicating the basic principles and tasks of the socialist revolution, which has begun in Russia, to refuse, on that ground, to practise the right of recall, or to hamper or restrict its exercise in any way. What proportional representation demands is not a curtailment of the right of recall but a mere change of form.

Since the system of proportional representation is based on acceptance of the party system and the conduct of elections by organised parties, any major change in the balance of class forces and the relation of classes to parties, especially in the event of splits within major parties, necessarily produces the need for a re-election in any electoral district where there is a clear and obvious discrepancy between the will of the various classes and their strength, on the one hand, and the party composition of those elected, on the other. True democracy makes it imperative that the appointment of re-elections should not depend only on the institution to be re-elected, that is, that the desire on the part

of those elected to retain their seats should not work against the exercise of the people's will to recall its representatives.

In view of this, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, resolves:

The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies of each electoral district shall have the right to appoint re-elections to all city, Zemstvo and all other representative institutions in general, not excluding the Constituent Assembly. The Soviets shall also have the right to set the date for the re-elections, which shall be held in the usual manner, in strict conformity with the principles of the system of proportional representation.

Written on November 19
(December 2), 1917

Published in *Minutes of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies, Second Convocation*, Moscow, 1918

Published according to the manuscript

REPORT ON THE RIGHT OF RECALL AT A MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 21 (DECEMBER 4), 1917

The question of re-election is one of actually implementing the democratic principle. It is the accepted practice in all leading countries that only the elected are entitled to speak in the language of state legislation. But having allowed the right of summons for the conduct of affairs of state, the bourgeoisie intentionally withheld the right of recall—the right of actual control.

In all revolutionary periods in history, a prominent feature in the struggle for constitutional changes has been the fight for the right of recall.

Democratic representation exists and is accepted under all parliamentary systems, but this right of representation is curtailed by the fact that the people have the right to cast their votes once in every two years, and while it often turns out that their votes have installed those who help to oppress them, they are deprived of the democratic right to put a stop to that by removing these men.

But this democratic right of recall has survived in countries with old democratic traditions, for instance, in some cantons of Switzerland and some states of America.

Any great revolution clearly confronts the people not only with the use of existing statutes but also with the framing of appropriate new statutes. It is necessary, therefore, in view of the impending convocation of the Constituent Assembly, to review the new electoral statutes.

The Soviets have been created by the working people themselves, by their revolutionary energy and initiative, and that is the only guarantee of their working entirely to promote the interests of the masses. The truly popular

nature of the Soviets is evident in the fact that every peasant sends his representatives to the Soviet and is also entitled to recall them.

Various parties in this country have been in power. The last time power passed from one party to another there was a revolution, a rather stormy revolution, but if we had had the right of recall, a simple vote would have sufficed.

There is this word freedom. In the old days it meant freedom for the bourgeoisie to manipulate its millions for swindling, freedom to use its forces through such swindling. We have done with the bourgeoisie and that kind of freedom. The state is an institution for coercion. In the old days, it was the coercion of the whole people by a handful of money-bags. We want to turn the state into an institution enforcing the will of the people. We want to institute coercion in the working people's interests.

Failure to grant the right of recall from the Constituent Assembly is failure to elicit the revolutionary will of the people, it is usurpation of the people's rights. We do have proportional representation, which is indeed the most democratic. Under this system it may be somewhat difficult to introduce the right of recall but the difficulties entailed are purely technical and are fairly easy to overcome. In any case there is no contradiction between proportional representation and the right of recall.

The people do not cast their votes for individuals but for parties. The party spirit is rather strong in Russia, and as far as the people are concerned each party has a definite political character. That is why any party split must bring confusion unless the right of recall is provided for. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party enjoyed great influence. But a split occurred after the election lists had been put out. The lists cannot be altered, nor can the convocation of the Constituent Assembly be postponed. As a result, the people actually voted for a party which had ceased to exist. This was proved by the Left-wing Second Peasant Congress.[129] It turned out that the peasants were not misled by individuals but by the party split. This state of things needs to be set right. The direct, consistent and immediate democratic principle, namely, the right of recall, must be introduced.

One thing we should be wary of is being faced with an unrepresentative election. Given a high level of mass consciousness—compare the revolutions of 1905 and 1917—there is nothing to fear from introducing the right of re-election.

The people were told that the Soviet is a plenipotentiary organ: they believed it and acted upon that belief. The process of democratisation must be carried forward and the right of recall introduced.

The right of recall should be given to the Soviets, as the best embodiment of the idea of state power, of coercion. The transfer of power from one party to another may then take place peacefully, by mere re-election.

Pravda No. 196, December 5 (November 22), 1917 and *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 87, November 24, 1917

Published according to the *Soldatskaya Pravda* text

SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF THE NAVY[130] NOVEMBER 22 (DECEMBER 5), 1917

MINUTES

On behalf of the Council of People's Commissars Comrade Lenin greeted the army of sailors, assembled in congress, who have proved themselves to be dedicated fighters for the liberation of the working classes.

Lenin went on to analyse the current situation. He said the Kerensky government's collapse had been inevitable in view of its policy of conciliation, which was not aimed at satisfying the needs of the broad masses, and was based on the principle of safeguarding all the interests of the bourgeoisie, the oppressor class. He continued:

"But alongside the Provisional Government were the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which were produced by the revolutionary initiative of the insurgent people, and which, as time goes on, are rallying ever wider sections of the working masses. In Russia the people have produced and given support to a truly popular government, something no other European revolution has achieved, and the credit for this accrues to the Soviets alone. The oppressed masses were confronted with a highly difficult task, that of building a new state on their own. You can see how much effort the bourgeoisie has thrown into its resistance to us, how attempts are being made to sabotage our activity, and what a flood of lies and slander is being poured on us in and out of season.

"Accusations of terrorism and violence are being heaped on us, but we take these in our stride. We say we are not anarchists, and are committed to establishing a state. However, the capitalist state has to be smashed and the power of the capitalists destroyed. It is our task to build a new

socialist state. We shall be working tirelessly towards that goal, and we shall be neither intimidated nor deterred by any obstacles. Evidence of this is to be seen in the new Government's first steps. But the transition to a new system is an extremely involved process and requires a firm government to make it easier. Until recently, power has been in the hands of monarchs and the henchmen of the bourgeoisie. All their efforts and policies have served the purpose of coercing the masses. By contrast we say: there must be firm power, coercion is necessary, but we shall direct it against the handful of capitalists, the bourgeois class. We shall always retaliate with coercion against any attempts—hopeless and mad attempts they must be—to resist Soviet power. In every case, responsibility for this will fall upon those who resist."

Comrade Lenin then discussed the establishment of a state machine which, in the interests of the people, should be free from red tape and should leave a lot of room for the operation of the nation's creative forces. He went on:

"The bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectual sections of the population are subverting the people's power in every possible way. The working masses have no one to look to but themselves. There is no doubt that the great tasks facing the people are tremendously difficult. But there is need for self-assurance, there is need for all the elements awakened among the people and capable of action to join existing organisations and those that will be set up by the working masses. Divided the masses are helpless; united they are strong. They have gained self-assurance and, refusing to be put out by the bourgeoisie's badgering, they have set about running the state on their own. Difficulties may crop up at the start, due to inadequate training. But the art of practical government, which has been monopolised by the bourgeoisie, must be mastered. In this respect the Navy has shown itself to be well to the fore, offering a brilliant example of the creative capacity latent in the working masses."

Comrade Lenin then went on to discuss in detail the major questions of the current situation: land, workers' policy, the nationalities problem, and peace.

The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopted the Decree on Land, in

which the Bolsheviks reproduced the principles stated in the peasant mandates in their entirety. This was a departure from the Social-Democratic programme, for the mandates were drawn up in the spirit of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' programme, but this was proof that the people's power had no intention of imposing its will on the people but tried to meet them half-way.

Whatever the solution of the land problem, whatever the programme serving as a basis for the transfer of the land to the peasants, it would in no way hamper the strong alliance of the workers and peasants. The important thing was that if the peasants had pressed for the abolition of landownership for ages, it had to be abolished.

The speaker emphasised the tremendous importance of having a strong alliance of workers and peasants, for the question of land was closely bound up with that of industry, and the agrarian revolution had to go hand in hand with a ploughing up of capitalist relations.

The onward march of the Russian revolution had shown that the slavish policy of conciliating the landowners and capitalists had been a soap bubble. The will of the majority would be uppermost; it would be carried- out by a working people's alliance, an honest alliance of workers and peasants on the basis of their common interests. Parties came and went, but the working people remained, and the speaker urged dedication to the strengthening of this alliance.

Let the Navy, he said, dedicate itself to keeping this alliance as the foundation of state affairs; if it remained sound, nothing could frustrate the cause of transition to socialism.

Turning to the nationalities question, Lenin said, we should take note of Russia's highly patchy national composition, with the Russians making up only about 40 per cent, and the majority consisting of other nationalities. National oppression under the tsars, unmatched in savagery and absurdity, turned the rightless nationalities into great reservoirs of fierce hatred for the monarchs. It was not surprising that all Russians had been included in their hatred for those who went to the extent of prohibiting the use of the mother tongue, and doomed masses of people to illiteracy. It was assumed that the privileged Russians would try to retain

the advantages which had been so assiduously preserved for them by Nicholas II and Kerensky.

"We are told that Russia will disintegrate and split up into separate republics but we have no reason to fear this. We have nothing to fear, whatever the number of independent republics. The important thing for us is not where the state border runs, but whether or not the working people of all nations remain allied in their struggle against the bourgeoisie, irrespective of nationality. (*Stormy applause.*)

"If the Finnish bourgeoisie are buying arms from the Germans in order to use them against their workers, we offer the latter an alliance with the Russian working people. Let the bourgeoisie start their filthy petty squabbles and their trading over frontiers, the workers of all countries and nationalities will not fall out over that sort of thing. (*Stormy applause.*)

"We are now 'conquering' Finland—this is using a nasty word—but not the way the robber barons of international capitalism conquered it. We are winning Finland over by giving her complete freedom to live in alliance with us or with others, guaranteeing full support for the working people of all nationalities against the bourgeoisie of all countries. It is not an alliance based on treaties, but on the solidarity of the exploited against the exploiters.

"We now see a national movement in the Ukraine and we say that we stand unconditionally for the Ukrainian people's complete and unlimited freedom. We have to wipe out that old bloodstained and dirty past when the Russia of the capitalist oppressors acted as the executioner of other peoples. We are determined to wipe out that past, and leave no trace of it. (*Stormy applause.*)

"We are going to tell the Ukrainians that as Ukrainians they can go ahead and arrange their life as they see fit. But we are going to stretch out a fraternal hand to the Ukrainian workers and tell them that together with them we are going to fight against their bourgeoisie and ours. Only a socialist alliance of the working people of all countries can remove all ground for national persecution and strife. (*Stormy applause.*)

"I shall now touch on the question of war. We have started a resolute struggle against the war brought on by the clash

of robbers over their spoils. Until now all parties have spoken of this struggle but have not gone beyond words and hypocrisy. Now the struggle for peace is on. It is a difficult struggle. It is highly naïve to think that peace can be easily attained, and that the bourgeoisie will hand it to us on Q platter as soon as we mention it. Those who ascribed this view to the Bolsheviks were cheating. The capitalists are embroiled in a life and death struggle over the share-out of the booty. One thing is clear: to kill war is to defeat capital, and Soviet power has started the struggle to that end. We have published and will continue to publish secret treaties. We are not going to be deterred in this by anyone's anger or slander. The bourgeois gentlemen are beside themselves because the people see why they have been driven to the slaughter. They threaten Russia with the prospect of another war, in which she will find herself isolated. But we are not going to be deterred by the bourgeoisie's fierce hatred for us and for our peace movement. It will be quite futile for them to try to incite the peoples against each other in this fourth year of the war. They are sure to fail. It is not only in this country, but in all the belligerent countries that the struggle against the imperialist government at home is welling up. There has been an open mutiny in the navy even in Germany, which the imperialists tried for decades to turn into an armed camp with the entire government machine geared to stamping out the slightest sign of popular discontent. To understand the significance of this mutiny, one has to be aware that police reprisals in Germany are unparalleled. But revolution is not made to order; it results from an outburst of mass indignation. Whereas it was quite easy to drive out a band of nitwits, like Romanov and Rasputin,[131] it is immensely more difficult to fight against the organised and strong clique of German imperialists, both crowned and uncrowned. But we can and have to work hand in hand with the revolutionary class of working people in all countries. That is the path the Soviet Government has taken by making public the secret treaties and showing that the rulers of all countries are brigands. That is not propaganda by word but by deed." (*Stormy applause.*)

In conclusion the speaker dealt with the question of the peace talks and said:

"When the Germans gave an evasive reply to our demand not to transfer any troops to the Western and Italian fronts, we broke off the talks and shall resume them in a little while. And when we do tell this to the world, no German worker will remain ignorant of the fact that the peace talks had been broken off through no fault of ours. In the hypothetical case of the German working class siding with their government of imperialist plunderers and confronting us with the need to continue the war, the Russian people—who have always shed blood without a murmur, and have done the will of an oppressive government when quite ignorant of its aims and purposes—will undoubtedly throw their weight into the struggle with so much more courage and vigour when it came to fighting for socialism and freedom threatened with the bayonets of the world bourgeoisie. But we put our trust in the international solidarity of the working masses, who will surmount every obstacle and barrier in the struggle for socialism." (*Stormy applause.*)

Izvestia No. 235,
November 25, 1917

Published according to a typewritten text of the Minutes verified with the text of the newspaper *Izvestia*

FOREWORD TO THE PAMPHLET, *MATERIAL ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION*

The present pamphlet is a collection (made on the initiative of one of the Bolsheviks and not the author's) of my most important articles and speeches on the land question which are suitable for popular reading. They date from the end of April to the end of October 1917, and are supplemented by the Resolution of the April Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(Bolsheviks),* and the Decree on Land, adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on October 26, 1917.** I wrote the original texts (that is, the *drafts*) of both these documents.

Taken together, these documents and articles give an accurate picture of how Bolshevik views developed over the six months of the revolution and how these views were applied in practice.

I also refer the reader to my article, "From a Publicist's Diary. Peasants and Workers", in the newspaper *Rabochy* (Petersburg, September 11 (August 29), 1917, No. 6).*** It gives a detailed analysis of the summarised peasants' Mandate which appeared in *Izvestia Vserossiiskogo Soveta Krestyanskikh Deputatov* No. 88, of August 19, and which was incorporated in the Decree on Land of October 26, 1917.

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* See present edition, Vol. 24.—*Ed.*

** See pp. 258-60 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 25.—*Ed.*

Two months before the October 25 revolution, this article explained that it was necessary for the workers "to change the basic line pursued by the worker in addressing the peasant".

N. Lenin

Petersburg.
November 27, 1917.

Published in December 1917 in the pamphlet, N. Lenin, *Material on the Agrarian Question*, Priboi Publishers, Petersburg

Published according to the pamphlet text

OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS[132]

(1) The talks shall be political and economic.

(2) The main theme of the political talks and the basic principle shall be: "*No annexations or indemnities*".

(3) Concept of annexation:

(a) *non*-acceptability of the definition of annexation as lands integrated after the proclamation of the present war.*

(b) any territory shall be deemed to be annexed whose population, over the last few decades (since the second half of the 19th century), has expressed dissatisfaction with the integration of their territory into another state, or its status in the state, regardless of whether such dissatisfaction has been expressed in writings, decisions of meetings, assemblies, municipal councils and similar institutions, in state and diplomatic acts, arising from the national movement in these territories, in national friction, clashes, disturbances, etc.[133]

(1) Official recognition for each (non-sovereign) nation, which is part of a given belligerent country, of the right to free self-determination, including secession and formation of an independent state; (2) the right to self-determination shall be realised through a referendum of the whole population of the territory seeking self-determination; (3) the geographical boundaries of the territory seeking self-determination shall be established by democratically elected representatives of the territory and contiguous territories; (4) preliminary conditions guaranteeing the exercise of the right of nations to free self-determination:

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* The definition of annexation under which only lands integrated after the proclamation of the war are regarded as annexed is rejected.

(a) withdrawal of troops from the territory seeking self-determination;

(b) return to the territory of refugees and inhabitants expelled by the authorities since the outbreak of war;

(c) establishment in the given territory of a caretaker administration consisting of democratically elected representatives of the nation seeking self-determination, with the right (among others) of implementing Clause (b);

(d) establishment under the caretaker administration of commissions of the contracting parties with the right of reciprocal control;

(e) the expenditure on implementing Clauses (b) and (c) shall be covered from a special fund set up by the occupying party.

Written on November 27 (December 10), 1917

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

DECREE ON THE ARREST OF THE LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR AGAINST THE REVOLUTION[134]

Members of leading bodies of the Cadet Party, as a party of enemies of the people, are liable to arrest and trial by revolutionary tribunal.

Local Soviets are ordered to exercise special surveillance over the Cadet Party in view of its connection with the Kornilov-Kaledin civil war against the revolution.

This decree enters into effect from the time of signing.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Petrograd, November 28, 1917,
10.30 p.m.

Pravda No. 23 (evening edition), December 12 (November 29), 1917 and *Izvestia* No. 239, November 29, 1917

Published according to the manuscript

THE TASKS OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY IN PETROGRAD

It takes knowledge to participate in the revolution with intelligence, purpose and success.

Because tsarism had played havoc with public education over a period of many years, the library service in Petrograd is in a very bad state.

The following changes, based on principles long practised in the free countries of the West, especially Switzerland and the United States, must be made immediately and unconditionally:

(1) The public library (the former Imperial Library) must immediately start an *exchange* of books with *all* public and state libraries in Petrograd and the provinces and with *foreign* libraries (in Finland, Sweden, *etc.*).

(2) The forwarding of books *from one library to another* must be made *post-free* by law.

(3) The library's reading-room must be open, as is the practice with *private* libraries and reading-rooms for the *rich* in civilised countries,

from 8.00 a.m. to 11.00 p.m. daily, *not* excluding Sundays and holidays.

(4) The required personnel must be immediately transferred to the Public Library from the various offices of the Ministry of Education (with more women, in view of the military demand for men), where nine-tenths of the staff are engaged not merely in useless, but in downright harmful work.

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Published according
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MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DECEMBER 1 (14), 1917

1
SPEECH ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[135]

Considered apart from the circumstances of the class war, which has developed into civil war, we so far do not know of a more perfect institution for determining the will of the people than the Constituent Assembly. But we must not indulge in fancies. The Constituent Assembly will have to function under civil war conditions; the Kaledinite bourgeois elements have started a civil war.

After attempting to drag out the insurrection in Moscow, after the unsuccessful attempt on the part of Kerensky to bring troops against Petrograd, after the fruitless attempt to organise the counter-revolutionary high-ranking officers of the army, these elements are now endeavouring to organise an uprising on the Don. The attempt is hopeless, since the working Cossacks are opposed to the Kaledinites.

Replying to the charge of persecuting the Cadet Party, Comrade Lenin said: "The class struggle must not be regarded separately from one's political opponents. When it is said that the Cadet Party is not a strong group, it is not true. The Cadet Central Committee is the political general staff of the bourgeois class. The Cadets have absorbed all propertied classes; they have been joined by elements that stood to the right of the Cadets. They all support the Cadet Party.

"We are being called upon to convene the Constituent Assembly in the form in which it was first planned. Under no circumstances. It was planned against the interests of the people. We made the revolution so as to have guarantees that the Constituent Assembly would not be used against the people, and in order that the guarantees would be in the

hands of the government. Our decree states clearly and unambiguously when the Constituent Assembly will be convened.[136] It contains an exact answer to that question. Do not try any thought-reading—we are concealing nothing. We said that we shall convene the Constituent Assembly as soon as four hundred deputies have arrived. We are not to blame that the elections took place later than appointed. In certain localities the Soviets themselves appointed later election dates. Since the elections were held on various dates, it was necessary to determine how many deputies are required in order to open the Constituent Assembly. An attempt to convene it irrespective of the number of deputies present has been made, taking advantage of the fact that the number is not indicated in the law. What would be the position of a government that permitted such a thing? The Soviet government did the right thing in decreeing the number of deputies necessary for the Constituent Assembly to be deemed properly constituted. That is what the Soviet government did. Those who are not in agreement should criticise the decree. But if we hear insinuations and guesses instead of criticism, we brush them aside.

"When a revolutionary class is fighting the propertied classes that offer resistance, the resistance must be crushed. And we shall crush the resistance of the propertied classes, using the same means as they used to crush the proletariat—no other means have been invented.

"You said the bourgeoisie must be isolated. But the Cadets are actually starting civil war under cover of a formally democratic demand, the demand for a Constituent Assembly. They say they want to sit in the Constituent Assembly and organise civil war at the same time. And you reply to that by talk about isolation.

"We are not merely persecuting non-observers of formalities, we are levelling direct political accusations against a political party. The French revolutionaries acted in this way. This is our reply to those peasants who elected without realising whom they were electing. Let the people know that the Constituent Assembly is being summoned in a way somewhat different from what Kerensky intended. We have introduced the right of recall, and the Constituent Assembly will not be quite the thing the bourgeoisie planned. Although

only a few days remain before the Constituent Assembly is summoned, the bourgeoisie are organising civil war, intensifying sabotage and undermining the armistice. We shall not let ourselves be deceived by formal slogans. The bourgeoisie would like to sit in the Constituent Assembly and at the same time organise civil war. Let them examine the substance of our accusation against the Cadet Party; let them prove that the Cadet Party is not the general staff of the civil war, an obviously hopeless war that is drenching the country in blood. Comrade Steinberg has not attempted to prove that. He has forgotten all that has been revealed about the contacts between the Cadets and Kornilov; it was not we, but Chernov, our political opponent, who revealed those contacts. It is proposed that we catch the little men, but we shall not hunt for particular individuals in order to hide our political accusation against the general staff of a whole class."

Comrade Lenin then dealt with the remark that the Bolsheviks had also been proclaimed enemies of the people.

"They threatened to proclaim us enemies of the people," he said, "but they did not do so. They did not dare. We said to them at that time, 'Well, try it, if you can; try to tell the people that the Bolshevik Party, as a party, as a trend, is the enemy of the people'. They did not dare; they hunted down individuals, they resorted to slander. We said, 'You cannot proclaim us enemies of the people; you have not a single objection in principle to bring against the Bolsheviks; all you can do is to spread calumnies.' Our accusation against the Cadet Party puts an end to petty manoeuvres in the political struggle. We shall tell the people the truth. We shall tell the people that their interests are superior to the interests of a democratic institution. We must not return to the old prejudices, which subordinate the interests of the people to formal democracy. The Cadets cry, All Power to the Constituent Assembly. But what they mean in fact is, All Power to Kaledin. The people must be told that, and the people will approve our action."

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Published according to the *Pravda* text

2
RESOLUTION ON THE DECREE CONCERNING THE CADET PARTY

Having heard the explanations by spokesmen of the Council of People's Commissars concerning the Decree declaring the Cadets a party of enemies of the people and ordering the arrest of the members of that Party's governing bodies, and surveillance by the Soviets over the party as a whole, the Central Executive Committee reaffirms the need to press forward the most vigorous struggle against bourgeois counter-revolution, which is led by the Cadet Party, and which has started a fierce civil war against the very foundations of the workers' and peasants' revolution.

The Central Executive Committee assures the Council of People's Commissars of its continued support in this matter and rejects the protests of political groups whose vacillation has been undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants.

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December 3, 1917

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES DECEMBER 2 (15), 1917[137]

Comrades, at the last Extraordinary Congress of Peasants' Deputies I spoke as a member of the Bolshevik group and not as a member of the Council of People's Commissars, I am speaking in the same capacity today, for I consider it important that the opinion of the Party of the Bolsheviks should be known to this Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

When I arrived here I heard part of the speech of the last speaker, who, turning to me, told you that I wanted to disperse you at the point of the bayonet. Comrades, Russia has grown too mature to suffer anyone to rule her. You know that from the moment the army turned their weapons to win freedom, from the moment it became possible for the peasant in uniform to meet and arrange matters with the peasant not in uniform, from that moment there has been no force that can break the will of the people, the will of the peasants and workers.

Comrades, I want to tell you how we understand the Revolution of October 25. Comrades, it has been said here that a new wave of revolution may sweep the Soviets away. I say "No". I am firmly convinced that the Soviets will never perish; the Revolution of October 25 proved that. The Soviets will never perish, for they were formed as far back as the first revolution of 1905; they were formed after the February revolution, and they were not formed on the initiative of any individual, but from below, by the will of

the masses. There can be no restrictions and no red tape, for they have been formed by the will of the people, and the people are free to recall their representatives at any moment. The Soviets are superior to any parliament, they are superior to any constituent assembly. (*Commotion and cries*: That's a lie!) The Party of the Bolsheviks has always declared that the supreme body is the Soviets. That cannot be called a lie, because the revolutions in Europe that overthrew monarchies formed bourgeois republics with the help of constituent assemblies. There has never before been a revolution such as ours anywhere in the world. It is said that the Revolution of October 25 created only "a Bolshevik government". I might say that there are not only Bolsheviks in the Council of People's Commissars. Those of you who remember the First Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will know that the Bolsheviks were then in the minority; but, having learned the meaning of the policy of compromise from experience, the Second Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which represented the people, gave a majority to the Bolshevik Party. When they tell me that bayonets may be directed against the Soviets and shout it from the columns of the hostile press, I simply laugh. The bayonets are in the hands of the workers, the soldiers and the peasants, and as long as they are they will never be directed against the Soviets. Let the counter-revolution turn its bayonets on the Soviets, it will not scare them.

Passing to the question of the Constituent Assembly, I must say that the Constituent Assembly can help only if the people themselves are free to develop and build up a new life. And I ask you: Is that the case?

I am telling you what you all know: "The sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath". Comrades, you know how the Constituent Assembly was elected. It was elected by one of the most progressive election methods, for it is not individuals who were elected, but representatives of parties. This is a step forward, for revolutions are made by parties and not by individuals. When the elections to the Constituent Assembly took place there was only one party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party which has the majority in the Constituent Assembly. But that is not the case now.

You will perhaps say that the Bolsheviks also brought that about. No, comrades, that is a universal law. Always and everywhere, the people are slowly and painfully dividing into two camps—that of the dispossessed and downtrodden, of those who are fighting for a brighter future for all working people, and that of those who in one way or another support the landowners and capitalists. When the elections took place the people did not elect those who expressed their will and their desires. You say that we have declared the whole Cadet Party enemies of the people. Yes, we have. And thereby we expressed the will of the Second Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. And now that we are on the threshold of peace and the cessation of the terrible slaughter that has lasted three years, we are convinced that this is the demand of all the working people in all countries. The overthrow of imperialism in Europe is proceeding slowly and painfully, and imperialists in all countries will now see that the people are strong, and in their strength will overthrow all who stand in their way. We shall not be deterred when people who are organising revolt against the workers and peasants, against the Soviets, with the other hand show us their credentials to the Constituent Assembly. In July we were told that we should be proclaimed enemies of the people. And we answered, "Try it". If the bourgeois gentlemen and their followers had only tried to say that to the people openly! But they did not; they resorted to insinuation, slander and mud-slinging. When the bourgeoisie began the civil war (we witnessed it), they incited the officer cadets to revolt. And we, the victors, were merciful to them, the vanquished. More than that, we even spared their military honour. And now, when the Constituent Assembly is being convened, we say: We shall open the Constituent Assembly as soon as four hundred of its members arrive. We see that the conspiracy of the Cadets is continuing, we see that they are organising a revolt against the Soviets in the interests of the money-bags, of greed and riches, and we publicly proclaim them enemies of the people. At a time when the terms of peace will shortly be known, when we are about to have an armistice, when the members of the land committees will be immune from arrest, when the landed estates are being confiscated, and when

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

control will be established over the factories—at such a time they are conspiring against us, against the Soviets. We therefore declare that the party of the Cadets is a party of the bourgeoisie, that they are enemies of the people, and that we shall fight them.

Izvestia No. 244,
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MANIFESTO TO THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE WITH AN ULTIMATUM TO THE UKRAINIAN RADA[138]

Proceeding from the interests of the unity and fraternal alliance of factory workers and the working and exploited masses in the struggle for socialism, and also from the recognition of these principles by numerous decisions of the organs of revolutionary democracy, the Soviets, and especially the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars—the Socialist government of Russia—reaffirms that the right to self-determination belongs to all nations oppressed by tsarism and the Great Russian bourgeoisie, up to and including the right of these nations to secede from Russia.

Accordingly we, the Council of People's Commissars, recognise the People's Ukrainian Republic, and its right to secede from Russia or enter into a treaty with the Russian Republic on federal or similar relations between them.

We, the Council of People's Commissars, recognise at once, unconditionally and without reservations everything that pertains to the Ukrainian people's national rights and national independence.

We have not taken a single step, in the sense of restricting the Finnish people's national rights or national independence, against the bourgeois Finnish Republic, which still remains bourgeois, nor shall we take any steps restricting the national independence of any nation which had been—or desires to be—a part of the Russian Republic.

We accuse the Rada of conducting, behind a screen of national phrases, a double-dealing bourgeois policy, which has long been expressed in the Rada's non-recognition of

the Soviets and of Soviet power in the Ukraine (incidentally, the Rada has refused to convoke a territorial congress of the Ukrainian Soviets immediately, as the Soviets of the Ukraine had demanded). This ambiguous policy, which has made it impossible for us to recognise the Rada as a plenipotentiary representative of the working and exploited masses of the Ukrainian Republic, has lately led the Rada to steps which preclude all possibility of agreement.

These, firstly, were steps to disorganise the front.

The Rada has issued *unilateral* orders moving Ukrainian units and withdrawing them from the front, thereby breaking up the common united front *before* any demarcation, which can be carried out only through a formal agreement between the governments of the two republics.

Secondly, the Rada has started to disarm the Soviet troops stationed in the Ukraine.

Thirdly, the Rada has been extending support to the Cadet-Kaledin plot and revolt against Soviet power. On the patently false plea of "the Don and the Kuban" having autonomous rights, a plea that serves to cover up Kaledin's counter-revolutionary moves, which clash with the interests and demands of the vast majority of the working Cossacks, the Rada has allowed its territory to be crossed by troops on their way to Kaledin, but *has refused transit to any anti-Kaledin troops.*

Even if the Rada had received full formal recognition as the uncontested organ of supreme state power of an independent bourgeois Ukrainian republic, we would have been forced to declare war on it without any hesitation, because of its attitude of unexampled betrayal of the revolution and support of the Cadets and the Kaledinites—the bitterest enemies of the national independence of the peoples of Russia, the enemies of Soviet power and of the working and exploited masses.

At the present time, in view of the circumstances set forth above, the Council of People's Commissars, with the full cognisance of the peoples of the Ukrainian and Russian Republics, asks the Rada[139] to answer the following questions:

1. Will the Rada undertake to give up its attempts to disorganise the common front?

2. Will the Rada undertake to refuse transit to any army units on their way to the Don, the Urals or elsewhere, unless it has the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief?

3. Will the Rada undertake to assist the revolutionary troops in their struggle against the counter-revolutionary Cadet-Kaledin revolt?

4. Will the Rada undertake to stop attempts to disarm the Soviet regiments and the workers' Red Guard in the Ukraine and immediately return arms to those who had been deprived of them?

In the event no satisfactory answer is received to these questions within 48 hours, the Council of People's Commissars will deem the Rada to be in a state of open war with Soviet power in Russia and the Ukraine.

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Published according to the manuscript

REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF PETROGRAD WORKERS AND THE TASKS OF THE WORKING CLASS, DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE WORKERS' SECTION OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES DECEMBER 4 (17), 1917

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The Revolution of October 25 had shown the exceptional political maturity of the proletariat and its ability to stand firm in opposition to the bourgeoisie, said the speaker. The complete victory of socialism, however, would require a tremendous organisational effort filled with the knowledge that the proletariat must become the ruling class.

The proletariat was faced with the tasks of transforming the state system on socialist lines, for no matter how easy it would be to cite arguments in favour of a middle course such a course would be insignificant, the country's economic situation having reached a state that would rule out any middle course. There was no place left for half-measures in the gigantic struggle against imperialism and capitalism.

The point at issue was—win or lose.

The workers should and did understand this; this was obvious because they had rejected half-way, compromise decisions. The more profound the revolution, the greater the number of active workers required to accomplish the replacement of capitalism by a socialist machinery. Even if there were no sabotage, the forces of the petty bourgeoisie would be inadequate. The task was one that could be accomplished only by drawing on the masses, only by the independent activity of the masses. The proletariat, therefore, should not think of improving its position at the moment, but should think of becoming the ruling class. It could not be expected that the rural proletariat would be clearly and firmly conscious of its own interests. Only the working class could be, and every proletarian, conscious of the great pros-

pects, should feel himself to be a leader and carry the masses with him.

The proletariat should become the ruling class in the sense of being the leader of all who work; it should be the ruling class politically.

The illusion that only the bourgeoisie could run the state must be fought against. The proletariat must take the rule of the state upon itself.

The capitalists were doing everything they could to complicate the tasks of the working class. And all working-class organisations—trade unions, factory committees and others—would have to conduct a determined struggle in the economic sphere. The bourgeoisie was spoiling everything, sabotaging everything, in order to wreck the working-class revolution. And the tasks of organising production devolved entirely on the working class. They should do away, once and for all, with the illusion that state affairs or the management of banks and factories were beyond the power of the workers. All this could be solved only by tremendous day-to-day organisational work.

It was essential to organise the exchange of products and introduce regular accounting and control—these were tasks for the working class, and the knowledge necessary for their accomplishment had been provided by factory life.

Every factory committee should concern itself not only with the affairs of its own factory, but should also be an organisation nucleus helping arrange the life of the state as a whole.

It was easy to issue a decree on the abolition of private property, but it must and could be implemented only by the workers themselves. Let there be mistakes—they would be the mistakes of a new class creating a new way of life.

There was not and could not be a definite plan for the organisation of economic life.

Nobody could provide one. But it could be done from below, by the masses, through their experience. Instructions would, of course, be given and ways would be indicated, but it was necessary to begin simultaneously from above and from below.

The Soviets would have to become bodies regulating all production in Russia, but in order that they should not

become staff headquarters without troops, work in the lower echelons was needed....*

The working-class masses must set about the organisation of control and production on a country-wide scale. Not the organisation of individuals, but the organisation of all the working people, would be a guarantee of success; if they achieved that, if they organised economic life, everything opposing them would disappear of its own accord.

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December 20 (7), 1917
and *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 104,
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Pravda text

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* Several illegible words were omitted.—*Ed.*

ON THE OPENING OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

In view of the delay in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, mainly due to the fault of the former All-Russia Electoral Commission, and in view of the formation by counter-revolutionary groups of a special Constituent Assembly Commission in opposition to the Commissariat set up by Soviet power, rumours have been circulated that the Constituent Assembly, as at present constituted, would not be convened at all. The Council of People's Commissars deems it necessary to declare that these are absolutely false rumours, deliberately and maliciously spread by the enemies of the Soviets of Peasants', Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. According to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars, which has been approved by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Constituent Assembly is to meet as soon as one-half of its members, namely 400 deputies, are duly registered at the Taurida Palace chancellory.

Vl. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

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DRAFT OF A MANIFESTO TO THE PEASANTRY FROM THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[140]

The Second All-Russia Peasants' Congress ardently appeals to the peasantry of all the nationalities and peoples of Russia to devote mind and will, and the power of their numbers and their energy to arousing the slumberers and encouraging the irresolute, and from every corner of the country, from every village and every quarter of the large cities, to utter aloud so that all may hear, their weighty and decisive word at this, perhaps the most serious and most responsible, moment of the great Russian revolution.

Peasant comrades, we constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of our country, the vast mass of the working and exploited people. We are the vast mass that champions the lawful and just demands of the working people—first and foremost the demand for land—we fight all forms of oppression and exploitation by the landowners and capitalists.

Peasant comrades, we are the main body of our army, those who have suffered most the inhuman torments of more than three years of the war instigated by kings and capitalists; it has also fallen to our lot to undertake the difficult but thankful and honourable role of vanguard fighters—together with the workers—for freedom, land and peace, and for the complete emancipation of the working people from all oppression and exploitation.

Peasant comrades, consider our appeal, this manifesto issued by peasant deputies to the peasants of all nationalities in Russia. Make known our appeal in every village and in every cottage; discuss it at every meeting and village

assembly and in every peasant body without exception, and make your own firm and unshakable decisions in the localities. For it is chiefly on your decisions, on the decisions of the majority of the people, the decisions of the peasants themselves, that the fate of our native land depends.

The fateful hour is approaching. The last fight is at hand. The whole country and all the nations of our republic are divided into two great camps.

One is the camp of the landowners and capitalists, the rich and their servitors, the state dignitaries and their friends, the bosses of the nation and the champions of the war.

The other is the camp of the factory workers and the working and exploited peasants, the poor people and their friends, the rank-and-file soldiers and the champions of peace, the advocates of a heroic, decisive and bold revolutionary struggle for peace, a struggle in which no mercy will be shown to the oppressors of the people.

The struggle between these two camps has in some parts of the country already assumed the acute form of open and direct civil war, a war of the Soviet armies against a small handful of those who are relying on the power of wealth and who desire to overthrow Soviet power, the power and government of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Peasant comrades, on your weighty, firm and unshakable word much now depends; on it depends the cessation of this civil war; on it depends the possibility in Russia of peacefully transferring all the land to the working people without compensation; on it depends the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. Peasant comrades, rise to a man; give voice to your demands; draw up *your mandates* in every village. You can make yourselves heard; you can make everyone listen to you!

Peasant comrades, you must in the first place roundly condemn those deputies to the Second All-Russia Peasants' Congress who *split away* from the Congress. Condemn the splitters. Condemn those who are smashing the unity of the peasants, the unity of the working people, the unity of the peasants and workers. These splitters, these breakers of peasant unity, these deserters to the camp of the rich,

to the camp of the landowners and capitalists have committed an outrageous crime. These people call themselves Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Right wing and the Centre, followers of Avksentyev and Chernov. They have betrayed the whole doctrine and programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries; they have deserted to the enemies of socialism, to the suppressors of the revolution. They have broken with the faithful custodians of the doctrine, programme and demands of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party of the internationalist Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have remained loyal to the interests of the working peasantry. These followers of Avksentyev and Chernov have quit the Second All-Russia Peasants' Congress and refused to submit to the decision of the majority of the peasants in order to carry out the will of the wealthy and the capitalists against the peasants, in order to hinder the cause of peace, in order to prevent the immediate transfer of all the land, without compensation, to the working people, and in order to protect the policy of Avksentyev, Chernov, Maslov and their like, a policy fatal to the peasants.

Condemn these traitors to the peasant cause. By condemning them, you will save many of the weak and wavering, and you will save Russia from insane attempts at civil war—insane, because, apart from shedding rivers of blood in vain, they will change nothing; nothing in the world can shatter the unanimous decision of the workers, soldiers and peasants, the decision of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

Condemn these traitors to the peasant cause. Let every village express its confidence in the decisions of the two congresses, the Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets and the Congress of Peasants' Soviets. Let every village *recall* from the Constituent Assembly those deputies from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, or from the Peasants' Soviets and institutions, who have not loudly proclaimed, and proved in practice, their wholehearted acceptance of these decisions.

Peasant comrades, you all know that opponents of the decisions of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the Second All-

Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies could be elected and did get elected to the Constituent Assembly as peasant representatives, only *by fraud*. These people, who often call themselves Socialist-Revolutionaries, actually duped the peasants, who did not yet know the truth about the policy of Avksentyev, Chernov and Maslov, a policy of making concessions to the landowners, compromising with the capitalists, and arresting members of the local peasants' land committees. These Avksentyevs, Maslovs and Chernovs deceived the peasants, since the general lists of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party were compiled before October 17, whereas the truth was revealed to the whole of Russia only *after* October 17.

The truth was revealed to the whole of Russia by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, held on October 25 and 26, 1917. The truth was further revealed by Soviet power, the Soviet Government, which was the first to publish the shameful secret treaties, the first to start a really revolutionary struggle for peace, the first to show *in practice* what that struggle should be; and it has already achieved its first success: an armistice on one of the fronts.

The truth was revealed by the Soviet Government when it passed the Decree on Land, thereby unconditionally siding with the peasants and eliminating all possibility of outside interference in the full power of the peasants in the localities.

The truth was revealed by the Second All-Russia Peasants' Congress, which was the first to expose to the peasants, in a special and detailed resolution, the shameful role played by the Avksentyev-Chernov Executive Committee. The congress will close on December 8, having begun (?)[141] on November 30, 1917.

You thus see, peasant comrades, that when the lists were drawn up on October 17, and during the elections to the Constituent Assembly on November 12, the peasants *still could not* have known the truth about land and peace, and *still could not* distinguish their friends from their enemies, from the wolves in sheep's clothing. You see that those Socialist-Revolutionaries who oppose the decisions of the Second All-Russia Congress of Workers' and Soldiers'

Deputies and of the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies can speak in the name of the peasants *only by fraud.*

Peasant comrades, do not allow blood to be shed *because of this fraud*! Raise your voices in determined protest against those who quitted the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies. Draw up your *mandates* in every gubernia, in every uyezd, in every volost and in every village; protest against those who withdrew from the congress; *publish the names* of the peasant deputies to the Constituent Assembly from your localities who have *not* accepted the decisions of these congresses, and *demand the resignation* of these deputies from the Constituent Assembly; for it is only by deceiving the people that they can pretend to have been elected by them.

Peasant comrades, the Constituent Assembly must express the will of the people. Those who quitted the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies, who thwarted its will, who caused a split among the peasants and who deserted the peasants for the rich, are not the representatives of the people. They are traitors, and there is no place for them in the Constituent Assembly. They do not bring peace or land to the working people, they bring the people the senseless and criminal rebellion of the rich against Soviet power. The people will not tolerate fraud. The people will not allow their will to be thwarted. The people will not hand Soviet power over to the rich. The people will not allow the rich to ruin the cause of *peace* they uphold, or disrupt the transfer of the *land* to the working people, immediately, without exception and without compensation.

The country is faced with only this alternative:

Either a civil war of the Kaledinites, the Cadets, the Kornilovites (and their concealed allies, the followers of Avksentyev, Chernov and Maslov) against Soviet power, a bloody war, a hopeless war for its initiators, a war that will not deprive the Soviets of power but will only result in greater bitterness, greater sacrifice, greater bloodshed, greater delay in carrying through the great socialist reforms, and greater famine in the gubernias where there is no grain, or—

the honest recognition of the obvious truth that the opponents of the decisions of the Second All-Russia Congress of

Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies could have got the peasants to elect them to the Constituent Assembly only by fraud, and that there must be *new elections* for such deputies.

There is no third path. Either the bloody extermination to the rich, the followers of Avksentyev, Chernov and Maslov, or their consent to new elections of peasants' deputies of the Constituent Assembly as soon as the opponents of the decisions of the two Soviet congresses, the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, come out in the name of the peasants in the Constituent Assembly.

It is for you to say, peasant comrades!

It is for you to decide!

The resolute word of *all* peasants, *the peasant mandates from all the localities*, can bring peace to the whole country, to all the nationalities of Russia, can stop the civil war, can guarantee a true and genuine and not a sham Constituent Assembly, can expedite and facilitate the termination of the war by a just peace and accelerate the transfer of the land to the working people, can strengthen the alliance between the peasants and the workers and hasten the triumph of socialism.

It is for you to decide, peasant comrades! Long live the transfer of the land to the working people! Long live peace! Long live socialism!

The Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies

Written December 6-7 (19-20), 1917

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Published according to the manuscript

NOTE TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY WITH A DRAFT OF A DECREE ON FIGHTING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND SABOTEURS[142]

To Comrade Dzerzhinsky,

Further to your report today on measures for fighting saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries,

would it not be possible to submit a decree *like the following*?

On Fighting Counter-Revolutionaries and Saboteurs

The bourgeoisie, the landowners and all the rich classes are making desperate efforts to undermine the revolution, the aim of which is to safeguard the interests of the workers, the working and exploited masses.

The bourgeoisie are prepared to commit the most heinous crimes; they are bribing the outcast and degraded elements of society and plying them with drink to use them in riots. The supporters of the bourgeoisie, particularly among the higher clerical staff, bank officials, and so on, are sabotaging their work, and are organising strikes to thwart the government's measures for the realisation of socialist reforms. They have even gone so far as to sabotage food distribution, thereby menacing millions of people with famine.

Urgent measures are necessary to fight the counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs. In virtue of this, the Council of People's Commissars decrees:

(1) Persons belonging to the wealthy classes (i.e., with incomes of 500 rubles or more per month, and owners of urban real estate, stocks and shares, or money amounting

to over 1,000 rubles), and also all employees of banks, joint-stock companies, state and public institutions, shall within three days* present to their house committees written statements in three copies over their own signatures, and indicating their address, income, place of employment and their occupation.

(2) The house committees shall countersign these statements, retain one copy and send one copy to the municipality and another to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (address:....**).

(3) Persons guilty of contravening the present law (failing to submit statements, giving false information, etc.) and members of house committees infringing the regulations governing the collection, filing and presentation of these statements to the institutions mentioned above shall be liable to a fine of up to 5,000 rubles for each infringement, or to imprisonment up to one year, or shall be sent to the front, depending on the nature of the offence.

(4) Persons sabotaging the work of, or declining to work in, banks, state and public institutions, joint-stock companies, railways, etc., shall be liable to similar punishment.

(5) As a first step towards universal labour conscription, it is decreed that the persons referred to in § 1 shall be obliged, first, constantly to carry with them a copy of the above-mentioned statement certified by the house committees and by their chiefs or elected officials (factory committees, food committees, railway committees, employees' trade unions, etc.); the certificates must indicate what public service or work is being performed by the individual in question, or whether he is living with his family as a disabled member thereof, etc.

(6) Secondly, such persons shall be obliged to acquire, within one week from the promulgation of the present law, worker-consumer books (specimen attached), in which their weekly income and expenditures shall be entered, together with the public duties performed by the individual in

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* In the manuscript Lenin wrote "within 24 hours" above the words "within three days".—*Ed.*

** In the manuscript Lenin left a space for the address.—*Ed.*

question, certified by the proper committees or institutions.

(7) Persons who do not come under §1 shall present to their house committees a statement in one copy of their income and place of employment and shall carry another copy of this statement certified by the house committee.

Written on December 7 (20), 1917

First published in 1924 in the journal *Krasny Arkhiv*, No. 5

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) DECEMBER 11 (24), 1917[143]

MINUTES

Comrade Lenin proposes (1) to dismiss the bureau of the Constituent Assembly group; (2) to explain our attitude towards the Constituent Assembly to the group in the form of theses; (3) to draw up an address to the group in which it should be mentioned that the Party Rules prescribe the subordination of all representative institutions to the Central Committee; (4) to appoint a member of the Central Committee to lead the group; (5) to draw up rules for the group.

First published in 1929 in *Minutes of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P., August 1917-February 1918*

Published according to a handwritten copy of the minutes

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PROVISIONAL BUREAU OF THE BOLSHEVIK GROUP IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

In view of the fact that the Provisional Bureau of the Social-Democratic group of Bolsheviks in the Constituent Assembly has taken no action in respect of its chief task, that of working out a principled resolution on our Party's attitude to the Constituent Assembly; and

that the numerous individual statements, proposals and votes have shown that the majority of (or all?) the members of the Provisional Bureau hold views that are absolutely un-Social-Democratic and reveal a bourgeois-democratic attitude to the Constituent Assembly ignoring the real conditions of the class struggle and civil war,

the group resolves that the Provisional Bureau shall be dissolved and a new one elected.

Written on December 11 or 12 (24 or 25), 1917
Published for the first time

Published according to the manuscript

THESES ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

1. The demand for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly was a perfectly legitimate part of the programme of revolutionary Social-Democracy, because in a bourgeois republic the Constituent Assembly represents the highest form of democracy and because, in setting up a Pre-parliament, the imperialist republic headed by Kerensky was preparing to rig the elections and violate democracy in a number of ways.

2. While demanding the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, revolutionary Social-Democracy has ever since the beginning of the Revolution of 1917 repeatedly emphasised that a republic of Soviets is a higher form of democracy than the usual bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly.

3. For the transition from the bourgeois to the socialist system, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Republic of Soviets (of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies) is not only a higher type of democratic institution (as compared with the usual bourgeois republic crowned by a Constituent Assembly), but is the only form capable of securing the most painless transition to socialism.

4. The convocation of the Constituent Assembly in our revolution on the basis of lists submitted in the middle of October 1917 is taking place under conditions which preclude the possibility of the elections to this Constituent Assembly faithfully expressing the will of the people in general and of the working people in particular.

5. Firstly, proportional representation results in a faithful expression of the will of the people only when the party

lists correspond to the real division of the people according to the party groupings reflected in those lists. In our case, however, as is well known, the party which from May to October had the largest number of followers among the people, and especially among the peasants—the Socialist-Revolutionary Party—came out with united election lists for the Constituent Assembly in the middle of October 1917, but split in November 1917, after the elections and before the Assembly met.

For this reason, there is not, nor can there be, even a formal correspondence between the will of the mass of the electors and the composition of the elected Constituent Assembly.

6. Secondly, a still more important, not a formal nor legal, but a socio-economic, class source of the discrepancy between the will of the people, and especially the will of the working classes, on the one hand, and the composition of the Constituent Assembly, on the other, is due to the elections to the Constituent Assembly having taken place at a time when the overwhelming majority of the people could not yet know the full scope and significance of the October, Soviet, proletarian-peasant revolution, which began on October 25, 1917, i.e., after the lists of candidates for the Constituent Assembly had been submitted.

7. The October Revolution is passing through successive stages of development before our very eyes, winning power for the Soviets and wresting political rule from the bourgeoisie and transferring it to the proletariat and poor peasantry.

8. It began with the victory of October 24-25 in the capital, when the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the vanguard of the proletarians and of the most politically active section of the peasants, gave a majority to the Bolshevik Party and put it in power.

9. Then, in the course of November and December, the revolution spread to the entire army and peasants, this being expressed first of all in the deposition of the old leading bodies (army committees, gubernia peasant committees, the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, etc.)—which expressed the superseded, compromising phase of the revolution, its

bourgeois, and not proletarian, phase, and which were therefore inevitably bound to disappear under the pressure of the deeper and broader masses of the people—and in the election of new leading bodies in their place.

10. This mighty movement of the exploited people for the reconstruction of the leading bodies of their organisations has not ended even now, in the middle of December 1917, and the Railwaymen's Congress, which is still in session, represents one of its stages.

11. Consequently, the grouping of the class forces in Russia in the course of their class struggle is in fact assuming, in November and December 1917, a form differing in principle from the one that the party lists of candidates for the Constituent Assembly compiled in the middle of October 1917 could have reflected.

12. Recent events in the Ukraine (partly also in Finland and Byelorussia, as well as in the Caucasus) point similarly to a regrouping of class forces which is taking place in the process of the struggle between the bourgeois nationalism of the Ukrainian Rada, the Finnish Diet, etc., on the one hand, and Soviet power, the proletarian-peasant revolution in each of these national republics, on the other.

13. Lastly, the civil war which was started by the Cadet-Kaledin counter-revolutionary revolt against the Soviet authorities, against the workers' and peasants' government, has finally brought the class struggle to a head and has destroyed every chance of setting in a formally democratic way the very acute problems with which history has confronted the peoples of Russia, and in the first place her working class and peasants.

14. Only the complete victory of the workers and peasants over the bourgeois and landowner revolt (as expressed in the Cadet-Kaledin movement), only the ruthless military suppression of this revolt of the slave-owners can really safeguard the proletarian-peasant revolution. The course of events and the development of the class struggle in the revolution have resulted in the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly!"—which disregards the gains of the workers' and peasants' revolution, which disregards Soviet power, which disregards the decisions of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Depu-

ties, of the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies, etc.—*becoming in fact* the slogan of the Cadets and the Kaledinites and of their helpers. The entire people are now fully aware that the Constituent Assembly, if it parted ways with Soviet power, would inevitably be doomed to political extinction.

15. One of the particularly acute problems of national life is the problem of peace. A really revolutionary struggle for peace began in Russia only after the victory of the October 25 Revolution, and the first fruits of this victory were the publication of the secret treaties, the conclusion of an armistice, and the beginning of open negotiations for a general peace without annexations and indemnities.

Only now are the broad sections of the people actually receiving a chance fully and openly to observe the policy of revolutionary struggle for peace and to study its results.

At the time of the elections to the Constituent Assembly the mass of the people had no such chance.

It is clear that the discrepancy between the composition of the elected Constituent Assembly and the actual will of the people on the question of terminating the war is inevitable from this point of view too.

16. The result of all the above-mentioned circumstances taken together is that the Constituent Assembly, summoned on the basis of the election lists of the parties existing prior to the proletarian-peasant revolution under the rule of the bourgeoisie, must inevitably clash with the will and interests of the working and exploited classes which on October 25 began the socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie. Naturally, the interests of this revolution stand higher than the formal rights of the Constituent Assembly, even if those formal rights were not undermined by the absence in the law on the Constituent Assembly of a provision recognising the right of the people to recall their deputies and hold new elections at any moment.

17. Every direct or indirect attempt to consider the question of the Constituent Assembly from a formal, legal point of view, within the framework of ordinary bourgeois democracy and disregarding the class struggle and civil war, would be a betrayal of the proletariat's cause, and the adoption of the bourgeois standpoint. The revolutionary

Social-Democrats are duty bound to warn all and sundry against this error, into which a few Bolshevik leaders, who have been unable to appreciate the significance of the October uprising and the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, have strayed.

18. The only chance of securing a painless solution to the crisis which has arisen owing to the divergence between the elections to the Constituent Assembly, on the one hand, and the will of the people and the interests of the working and exploited classes, on the other, is for the people to exercise as broadly and as rapidly as possible the right to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly anew, and for the Constituent Assembly to accept the law of the Central Executive Committee on these new elections, to proclaim that it unreservedly recognises Soviet power, the Soviet revolution, and its policy on the questions of peace, the land and workers' control, and to resolutely join the camp of the enemies of the Cadet-Kaledin counter-revolution.

19. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the crisis in connection with the Constituent Assembly can be settled only in a revolutionary way, by Soviet power adopting the most energetic, speedy, firm and determined revolutionary measures against the Cadet-Kaledin counter-revolution, no matter behind what slogans and institutions (even participation in the Constituent Assembly) this counter-revolution may hide. Any attempt to tie the hands of Soviet power in this struggle would be tantamount to aiding counter-revolution.

Written on December 11 or 12 (24 or 25), 1917

Published in *Pravda* No. 213, December 26 (13), 1917

Published according to the manuscript verified with a typewritten copy bearing Lenin's corrections

SPEECH AT THE EXTRAORDINARY ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF RAILWAYMEN DECEMBER 13 (26), 1917[144]

Allow me to greet the Congress on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and to express the hope that the organisation of the railwaymen will be conducted on the same lines as the vast majority of workers and peasants in Russia. There is no doubt at all that the October Revolution, carried out by the workers, peasants and soldiers, is a socialist one. It is opposed by all the forces of the bourgeoisie and the top salaried sections, who have grown accustomed to the old order and cannot understand that the revolution is going to remake the old system from top to bottom. Listen to their loud cries that Soviet power is repudiated by the majority in Russia. You know the worth of all this clamour. There is a flood of telegrams saying that troops are moving on Petrograd, against the gains of the October Revolution. We throw them into the waste-paper basket, being fully aware that we shall not have to wait long for a refutation. The top-drawer organisations of the First Peasant Congress, as represented by the Avksentyevs, said on behalf of the peasant mass that they were opposed to the rule of tyrants and usurpers. What we said was: "Let them curse, we shall see what the peasants have to say when we start confiscating the landed estates and giving them to the peasants." As you see, the Second Peasant Congress has brought victory to Soviet power. We have established close contacts with the Second Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. It is with them that we have organised the Soviet power of workers, soldiers and peasants. We shall surely find the same attitude among the mass of railwaymen. You are aware that disruption of railway communications—aggravated by sabotage on the part

of senior officials—is telling on the country. You are aware that a breakdown of railway communications makes impossible any balanced exchange between town and country, which is so vital to normal food supplies. Comrades, we need your help to get the railways going. Only by joining efforts with you can we overcome the disorder and strengthen the power of the workers, soldiers and peasants. Soviet power has no other support than that of the broad working masses. We are sure that the present Railwaymen's Congress will consolidate the power of the People's Commissars by setting up an organisation that will help us in the struggle for land and peace. In conclusion, comrades, I extend to you once again our greetings and best wishes of fruitful work. (*As Comrade Lenin leaves the hall, almost the entire audience joins in a burst of applause. To general applause, the Congress elects him honorary chairman.*)

Pravda No. 214,
December 27 (14), 1917
and *Izvestia* No. 251,
December 14, 1917

Published according
to the *Izvestia* text

FOR BREAD AND PEACE[145]

Two questions now take precedence over all other political questions—the question of bread and the question of peace. The imperialist war, the war between the biggest and richest banking firms, Britain and Germany, that is being waged for world domination, the division of the spoils, for the plunder of small and weak nations; this horrible, criminal war has ruined all countries, exhausted all peoples, and confronted mankind with the alternative—either sacrifice all civilisation and perish or throw off the capitalist yoke in the revolutionary way, do away with the rule of the bourgeoisie and win socialism and durable peace.

If socialism is not victorious, peace between the capitalist states will be only a truce, an interlude, a time of preparation for a fresh slaughter of the peoples. Peace and bread are the basic demands of the workers and the exploited. The war has made these demands extremely urgent. The war has brought hunger to the most civilised countries, to those most culturally developed. On the other hand, the war, as a tremendous historical process, has accelerated social development to an unheard-of degree. Capitalism had developed into imperialism, i.e., into monopoly capitalism, and under the influence of the war it has become state monopoly capitalism. We have now reached the stage of world economy that is the immediate stepping stone to socialism.

The socialist revolution that has begun in Russia is, therefore, only the beginning of the world socialist revolution. Peace and bread, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, revo-

lutionary means for the healing of war wounds, the complete victory of socialism—such are the aims of the struggle.

Petrograd, December 14, 1917.

Written in Russian
on December 14 (27), 1917
Signed: *Lenin*

First published in German
in May 1918 in the newspaper
Jugend-Internationale No. 11
Signed: *W. Lenin*

First published in Russian
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Facsimile of the first paragraph
of the MS published in 1919
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Published, first
paragraph according
to the facsimile;
remainder translated
from
Jugend-Internationale

SPEECH ON THE NATIONALISATION OF THE BANKS DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DECEMBER 14 (27), 1917[146]

MINUTES

The last speaker tried to intimidate us by asserting that we are heading towards an abyss, towards certain destruction. There is, however, nothing new for us in this intimidation. *Novaya Zhizn*, the newspaper that expresses the views of the group to which the speaker belongs, said before the October days that our revolution would bring nothing but disorders and anarchic riots. Talk about our travelling the wrong road is, therefore, a reflection of bourgeois psychology that even disinterested people cannot get rid of. (*Voice from among the internationalists*: "Demagogy!") No, that is not demagogy, it is your constant talk of the axe that is real demagogy.

The measures proposed in the decree are only an effective way of ensuring control.

You speak of the intricacy of the machinery, of its fragility and of the involved nature of the problem—these are elementary truths that everybody is aware of. But if these truths are merely used to put a brake on all socialist undertakings, we say that anyone who takes that line is a demagogue, and a dangerous demagogue at that.

We want to begin an inventory of the vaults, but the learned specialists tell us there is nothing in them but documents and securities. Then what is there bad about representatives of the people checking them?

If what they say is true, why do those same learned specialists who criticise us not come out with it openly? Whenever

the Council makes decisions they declare that they agree with us, but only in principle. This is the way of the bourgeois intelligentsia, of all conciliators, who ruin everything with their constant agreement in principle and disagreement in practice.

If you know so much about all these things and have the experience, why don't you help us, why do we meet with nothing but sabotage from you in our difficult task?

You proceed from a correct scientific theory, but for us theory forms the basis of actions to be undertaken, it gives us confidence in those actions and does not scare the life out of us. Of course it is difficult to make a beginning and we often come up against fragile things; nevertheless we have coped with them, are coping with them and shall continue to cope with them.

If book-learning were to serve no other purpose than that of hampering every new step and instilling eternal fear of the new, it would be useless.

Nobody, with the exception of the utopian socialists, has ever asserted that victory is possible without resistance, without the dictatorship of the proletariat and without seizing the old world in an iron grip.

You accepted this dictatorship in principle, but when that word is translated into Russian, called an "iron grip" and applied in practice, you warn us of the fragility and involved nature of the matter.

You stubbornly refuse to see that the iron hand that destroys also creates. It is an undoubted advantage to us to go over from principles to deeds.

To effect control we have called upon the bankers and together with them have elaborated measures that they agreed to, so that loans could be obtained under full control and properly accounted for. But there are people among the bank employees who have the interests of the people at heart and who have told us: "They are deceiving you, make haste and check their criminal activity that is directly harmful to you." And we did make haste.

We realise that this is an involved measure. None of us, even those who are trained economists, will undertake to carry it out. We shall invite the specialists who are engaged in that work, but only when we have the keys in our own

hands. Then we shall even be able to draw advisers from the former millionaires. We invite anybody who wants to work as long as he does not try to reduce every revolutionary enterprise to mere words; that is something we shall not stand for. We use the words "dictatorship of the proletariat" in all seriousness and we shall effect that dictatorship.

We wanted to take the line of agreement with the banks, we gave them loans to finance factories, but they carried out sabotage on an unprecedented scale, and practical experience has forced us to adopt other measures of control.

A comrade from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries has said that in principle they would vote for the immediate nationalisation of the banks and afterwards work out practical measures in the shortest possible time. But he was wrong in that, because our draft does not contain anything but principles. The Supreme Economic Council is waiting to discuss them, but if the decree is not approved the banks will immediately do everything to further disrupt the economy.

The adoption of the decree is urgent, otherwise opposition and sabotage will ruin us. (*Stormy applause.*)

Pravda No. 216,
December 29 (16), 1917
and *Izvestia* No. 253,
December 16, 1917

Published according to *Minutes of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies, Second Convocation*, Moscow, 1918

DRAFT DECREE ON THE NATIONALISATION OF THE BANKS AND ON MEASURES NECESSARY FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION[147]

The critical food situation and the threat of famine caused by the profiteering and sabotage of the capitalists and officials, as well as by the general economic ruin, make it imperative to adopt extraordinary revolutionary measures to combat this evil.

To enable all citizens of the state, and in the first place all the working classes to undertake this struggle under the leadership of their Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, and normalise the country's economic life immediately and comprehensively, stopping at nothing and acting in the most revolutionary manner, the following regulations are decreed:

DRAFT DECREE ON THE NATIONALISATION OF THE BANKS AND ON MEASURES NECESSARY FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION

1. All joint-stock companies are proclaimed the property of the state.

2. Members of boards and directors of joint-stock companies, as well as all shareholders belonging to the wealthy classes (i.e., possessing property to the value of over 5,000 rubles or an income exceeding 500 rubles per month), shall be obliged to continue to conduct the affairs of these enterprises in good order, observing the law on workers' control,

presenting all shares to the State Bank and submitting to the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies weekly reports on their activities.

3. State loans, foreign and domestic, are annulled (abrogated) .

4. The interests of small holders of bonds and all kinds of shares, i.e., holders belonging to the working classes of the population, shall be fully guaranteed.

5. Universal labour conscription is introduced. All citizens of both sexes between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five shall be obliged to perform work assigned to them by the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, or by other bodies of Soviet power.

6. As a first step towards the introduction of universal labour conscription, it is decreed that members of the wealthy classes (see § 2) shall be obliged to keep, and have entries properly made in, consumer-worker books, or worker budget books, which must be presented to the appropriate workers' organisations or to the local Soviets and their bodies for weekly recording of the performance of work undertaken by each.

7. For the purpose of proper accounting and distribution of food and other necessities, every citizen of the state shall be obliged to join a consumers' society. The food boards, committees of supplies and other similar organisations, as well as the railway and transport unions, shall, under the direction of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, establish supervision to ensure the observance of the present law. Members of the wealthy classes, in particular, shall be obliged to perform the work to be assigned to them by the Soviets in the sphere of organising and conducting the affairs of the consumers' societies.

8. The railway workers' and employees' unions shall be obliged urgently to draw up and immediately begin to carry into effect emergency measures for the better organisation of transport, particularly as regards the' delivery of food, fuel and other prime necessities, and shall be guided in the first place by the instructions and orders of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and then of the bodies authorised by the latter, and of the Supreme Economic Council.

Similarly, the railway unions, working in conjunction with the local Soviets, shall be responsible for most vigorously combating speculation in food and mercilessly suppressing all profiteering, not hesitating to adopt revolutionary measures.

9. Workers' organisations, unions of office employees and local Soviets shall be obliged immediately to set about switching enterprises which are closing down or are to be demobilised, and also unemployed workers to useful work and the production of necessities, and to search for orders, raw materials and fuel. While under no circumstances postponing either this work or the beginning of the exchange of farm produce for industrial goods pending receipt of special instructions from higher bodies, the local unions and Soviets shall be strictly guided by the orders and instructions of the Supreme Economic Council.

10. Members of the wealthy classes shall be obliged to keep all their monetary possessions in the State Bank and its branches, or in the savings-banks, and shall be entitled to withdraw not more than 100-125 rubles a week (as shall be established by the local Soviets) for living expenses; withdrawals for the needs of production and trade shall be made only on presentation of written certificates of the organs of workers' control.

To supervise the due observance of the present law, regulations will be introduced providing for the exchange of existing currency notes for new currency notes. All the property of persons guilty of deceiving the state and the people shall be confiscated.

11. All offenders against the present law, saboteurs and government officials who go on strike, as well as profiteers, shall be liable to a similar penalty, and also to imprisonment, dispatch to the front, or hard labour. The local Soviets and bodies under their jurisdiction shall urgently decide upon the most revolutionary measures to combat these real enemies of the people.

12. The trade unions and other organisations of the working people, in conjunction with the local Soviets, and with the collaboration of the most reliable persons recommended by Party and other organisations, shall form mobile groups of inspectors to supervise the implementation of the

present law, to verify the quantity and quality of work performed and to bring to trial before the revolutionary courts persons guilty of violating or evading the law.

The workers and office employees of the nationalised enterprises must exert every effort and adopt extraordinary measures to improve the organisation of the work, strengthen discipline and raise the productivity of labour. The organs of workers' control are to present to the Supreme Economic Council weekly reports on the results achieved in this respect. Those found guilty of shortcomings and neglect are to be brought before revolutionary courts.

Written not earlier than
December 14 (27), 1917

First published in part
in November 1918 in the
magazine *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo* No. 11

Published according
to the manuscript

QUESTIONS TO DELEGATES TO THE ARMY CONGRESS ON THE DEMOBILISATION OF THE ARMY[148]

(1) Is the likelihood of the Germans starting an offensive in the near future great or small—

(a) from the viewpoint of the physical and technical possibility of a winter offensive;

(b) from the viewpoint of the mood of the mass of the German soldiers; is that mood capable of preventing an offensive, or at least of retarding it?

(2) Can it be assumed that the Germans, if we immediately break off peace negotiations, and if their troops immediately take the offensive, are capable of inflicting a decisive defeat upon us? Will they be able to take Petrograd?

(3) Is it to be feared that the news of the peace negotiations having been broken off will result in widespread anarchist sentiments in the army and in desertions from the front, or may we be confident that the army will staunchly hold the front even after the receipt of such news?

(4) Would our army be capable, from the military viewpoint, of resisting a German offensive, if it began on January 1? If not, when would our army be in a position to resist a German offensive?

(5) In the event of a swift German advance, could our army retire in good order and preserve its artillery, and if 50. could the Germans' advance into the heart of Russia be held up for long?

(6) General conclusion: from the point of view of the state of the army, should we strive to drag out the peace negotiations? or would it be preferable to break them off immediately in revolutionary fashion, because of the Germans'

annexationist policy and as a decisive and firm step which would prepare the ground for a possible revolutionary war?

(7) Should we at once undertake intensive agitation against the Germans' annexationist policy and for a revolutionary war?

(8) Would it be possible at very short notice (5-10 days, say) to arrange a canvass of fairly wide sections of the army at the front with a view to obtaining fuller replies to the above questions in more suitable form?

(9) Is it to be hoped that the dissensions with the Ukrainians will weaken, or even yield place to a firm consolidation of forces when they hear of the Germans' annexationist demands, or it may be expected that the Ukrainians will take advantage of the Great Russians' greater difficulties to step up the struggle against them?

(10) If the army could vote would it be in favour of immediate peace on annexationist (loss of the occupied regions) and economically very harsh terms for Russia, or would it favour the maximum effort for a revolutionary war, i.e., resistance to the Germans?

Written on December 17 (30), 1917

First published in 1927 in *Transactions of the Lenin Institute*, Vol. II

Published according to the *Transactions*

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[149]

1. Intensified agitation against the annexationist policy of the Germans.
2. Allocation of additional funds for this agitation.
3. Transfer of peace negotiations to Stockholm.
4. Continuation of peace negotiations and resistance to their speed-up by the Germans.
5. Greater efforts to reorganise the army, reducing its strength and enhancing its defence potential.
6. Urgent measures for defence in the event of a breakthrough to Petrograd.
7. Propaganda and agitation on the necessity for a revolutionary war.

Written on December 18 (31), 1917

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RADA

Having heard the report of Comrade Proshyan, who, as a delegate to the Peasants Congress, had a talk with Vinnichenko, Grushevsky, Porsh and others, in their capacity of official representatives of the Rada;

and considering that these official representatives of the Rada have expressed their readiness in principle to negotiate an agreement with the Council of People's Commissars on the basis of recognition by the Council of People's Commissars of the independence of the people's Ukrainian republic, and the Rada's recognition of the counter-revolutionary nature of Kaledin and his accomplices;

considering further that the Council of People's Commissars has always unconditionally recognised the right of every nation, including the Ukrainian, to exist as an independent state;

that any attempt to avoid war with the Rada, provided the Rada recognised Kaledin's counter-revolutionary nature and did not hamper the war against him, was undoubtedly desirable;

expressing its conviction that only the Soviets of the Ukrainian poor peasants, workers and soldiers could set up a power in the Ukraine under which clashes between fraternal peoples would be impossible,

the Council of People's Commissars, deeming it appropriate at the same time to open effective negotiations with the Rada with the aim of stopping the clashes caused by the Rada's policy in respect of the common front and Kaledin's counter-revolutionary revolt, resolves:

to invite the Rada to negotiate an agreement on the above-mentioned principles and to designate the town of Smolensk or Vitebsk as being probably the most convenient place for the negotiation.

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FEAR OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD AND THE FIGHT FOR THE NEW

The capitalists and their supporters, witting and unwitting, are thinking, saying and writing: "The Bolsheviks have now been in power for two months, but instead of a socialist paradise we find the hell of chaos, civil war and even greater dislocation."

We reply: the Bolsheviks have been in power for only two months, but a tremendous step towards socialism has already been made. This is not evident only to those who do not wish to see or are unable to analyse the chain of historical events. They refuse to see that in a matter of weeks the undemocratic institutions in the army, the countryside and industry have been almost completely destroyed. There is no other way—there can be no other way—to socialism save through such destruction. They refuse to see that in a few weeks, the lying imperialist foreign policy, which dragged out the war and covered up plunder and seizure through secret treaties, has been replaced by a truly revolutionary-democratic policy working for a really democratic peace, a policy which has already produced such a great practical success as the armistice and has increased the propaganda power of our revolution a hundredfold. They refuse to see that workers' control and the nationalisation of the banks are being put into practice, and these are the first steps towards socialism.

Those tyrannised by capitalist routine, shocked by the thundering crash of the old world, and the blast, rumble, and "chaos" (apparent chaos) as the age-old structures of tsarism and the bourgeoisie break up and cave in cannot see the historical prospects; nor can those who are scared by the

class struggle at its highest pitch when it turns into civil war, the only war that is legitimate, just and sacred—not in the clerical but in the human sense—the sacred war of the oppressed to overthrow the oppressors and liberate the working people from all oppression. Actually all these tyrannised, shocked and scared bourgeois, petty bourgeois and "those in the service of the bourgeoisie" are frequently guided, without realising it, by that old, absurd, sentimental and vulgar intellectualist idea of "introducing socialism", which they have acquired from hearsay and scraps of socialist theory, repeating the distortions of this theory produced by ignoramuses and half-scholars, and attributing to us Marxists the idea, and even the plan, to "introduce" socialism.

To us Marxists these notions, to say nothing of the plans, are alien. We have always known, said and emphasised that socialism cannot be "introduced", that it takes shape in the course of the most intense, the most acute class struggle—which reaches heights of frenzy and desperation and civil war; we have always said that a long period of "birth-pangs" lies between capitalism and socialism; that violence is always the midwife of the old society; that a special state (that is, a special system of organised coercion of a definite class) corresponds to the transitional period between the bourgeois and the socialist society, namely, the dictatorship of the proletariat. What dictatorship implies and means is a state of simmering war, a state of military measures of struggle against the enemies of the proletarian power. The Commune was a dictatorship of the proletariat, and Marx and Engels reproached it for what they considered to be one of the causes of its downfall, namely, that the Commune had not used its armed force with *sufficient* vigour to suppress the resistance of the exploiters.[150]

These intellectualist howls about the suppression of capitalist resistance are actually nothing but an echo of the old "conciliation", to put it in a "genteel" manner. Putting it with proletarian bluntness, this means: continued kowtowing to the money-bags is what lies behind the howls against the present working-class coercion now being applied (unfortunately, with insufficient pressure or vigour) against the bourgeoisie, the saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries. The kind Peshekhonov, one of the conciliating ministers,

proclaimed in June 1917: "The resistance of the capitalists has been broken." This kind soul had no inkling of the fact that their resistance must really be *broken*, and it *will* be broken, and that the scientific name for this breaking-up operation is dictatorship of the proletariat; that an entire historical period is marked by the suppression of capitalist resistance, and, consequently, by systematic application of *coercion* to an entire class (the bourgeoisie) and its accomplices.

The grasping, malicious, frenzied filthy avidity of the money-bags, the cowed servility of their hangers-on is the true social source of the present wail raised by the spineless intellectuals—from those of *Rech* to those of *Novaya Zhizn*—against violence on the part of the proletariat and the revolutionary peasants. Such is the objective meaning of their howls, their pathetic speeches, their clownish cries of "freedom" (freedom for the capitalists to oppress the people), etc. They would be "prepared" to recognise socialism, if mankind could jump straight into it in one spectacular leap, without any of the friction, the struggles, the exploiters' gnashing of teeth, or their diverse attempts to preserve the old order, or smuggle it back through the window, without the revolutionary proletariat responding to each attempt in a violent manner. These spineless hangers-on of the bourgeoisie with intellectualist pretensions are quite "prepared" to wade into the water provided they do not get their feet wet.

The drooping intellectuals are terrified when the bourgeoisie and the civil servants, employees, doctors, engineers, etc., who have grown accustomed to serving the bourgeoisie, go to extremes in their resistance. They tremble and utter even shriller cries about the need for a return to "conciliation". Like all true friends of the oppressed class, we can only derive satisfaction from the exploiters' extreme measures of resistance, because we do not expect the proletariat to mature for power in an atmosphere of cajoling and persuasion, in a school of mealy sermons or didactic declamations, but in the school of life and struggle. To become the ruling class and defeat the bourgeoisie for good the proletariat must be *schooled*, because the skill this implies does not come ready-made. The proletariat must do its learning in the struggle, and stubborn, desperate struggle in

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

earnest is the only real teacher. The greater the extremes of the exploiters' resistance, the more vigorously, firmly, ruthlessly and successfully will they be suppressed by the exploited. The more varied the exploiters' attempts to uphold the old, the sooner will the proletariat learn to ferret out its enemies from their last nook and corner, to pull up the roots of their domination, and cut the very ground which could (and had to) breed wage-slavery, mass poverty and the profiteering and effrontery of the money-bags.

The strength of the proletariat and the peasantry allied to it grows with the resistance of the bourgeoisie and its retainers. As their enemies, the exploiters, step up their resistance, the exploited mature and gain in strength; they grow and learn and they cast out the "old Adam" of wage-slavery. Victory will be on the side of the exploited, for on their side is life, numerical strength, the strength of the mass, the strength of the inexhaustible sources of all that is selfless, dedicated and honest, all that is surging forward and awakening to the building of the new, all the vast reserves of energy and talent latent in the so-called "common people", the workers and peasants. Victory will be theirs.

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HOW TO ORGANISE COMPETITION?

Bourgeois authors have been using up reams of paper praising competition, private enterprise, and all the other magnificent virtues and blessings of the capitalists and the capitalist system. Socialists have been accused of refusing to understand the importance of these virtues, and of ignoring "human nature". As a matter of fact, however, capitalism long ago replaced small, independent commodity production, under which competition could develop enterprise, energy and bold initiative to any *considerable* extent, by large- and very large-scale factory production, joint-stock companies, syndicates and other monopolies. Under such capitalism, competition means the incredibly brutal suppression of the enterprise, energy and bold initiative of the *mass* of the population, of its overwhelming majority, of ninety-nine out of every hundred toilers; it also means that competition is replaced by financial fraud, nepotism, servility on the upper rungs of the social ladder.

Far from extinguishing competition, socialism, on the contrary, for the first time creates the opportunity for employing it on a really *wide* and on a really *mass* scale, for actually drawing the majority of working people into a field of labour in which they can display their abilities, develop the capacities, and reveal those talents, so abundant among the people whom capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled in thousands and millions.

Now that a socialist government is in power our task is to organise competition.

The hangers-on and spongers on the bourgeoisie described socialism as a uniform, routine, monotonous and drab barrack system. The lackeys of the money-bags, the lickspittles



First page of the manuscript of Lenin's
"How to Organize Competition?". December 1917

Reduced

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "How to Organize Competition?". December 1917

Reduced

of the exploiters, the bourgeois intellectual gentlemen used socialism as a bogey to "frighten" the people, who, under capitalism, were doomed to the penal servitude and the barrack-like discipline of arduous, monotonous toil, to a life of dire poverty and semi-starvation. The first step towards the emancipation of the people from this penal servitude is the confiscation of the landed estates, the introduction of workers' control and the nationalisation of the banks. The next steps will be the nationalisation of the factories, the compulsory organisation of the whole population in consumers' societies, which are at the same time societies for the sale of products, and the state monopoly of the trade in grain and other necessities.

Only now is the opportunity created for the truly mass display of enterprise, competition and bold initiative. Every factory from which the capitalist has been ejected, or in which he has at least been curbed by genuine workers' control, every village from which the landowning exploiter has been smoked out and his land confiscated has only now become a field in which the working man can reveal his talents, unbend his back a little, rise to his full height, and feel that he is a human being. For the first time after centuries of working for others, of forced labour for the exploiter, it has become possible to *work for oneself* and moreover to employ all the achievements of modern technology and culture in one's work.

Of course, this greatest change in human history from working under compulsion to working for oneself cannot take place without friction, difficulties, conflicts and violence against the inveterate parasites and their hangers-on. No worker has any illusions on that score. The workers and poor peasants, hardened by dire want and by many long years of slave labour for the exploiters, by their countless insults and acts of violence, realise that it will take time to *break* the resistance of those exploiters. The workers and peasants are not in the least infected with the sentimental illusions of the intellectual gentlemen, of the *Novaya Zhizn* crowd and other slush, who "shouted" themselves hoarse "denouncing" the capitalists and "gesticulated" against them, only to burst into tears and to behave like whipped puppies when it came to *deeds*, to putting threats into action,

to carrying out in practice the work of *removing* the capitalists.

The great change from working under compulsion to working for oneself, to labour planned and organised on a gigantic, national (and to a certain extent international, world) scale, also requires—in addition to "*military*" measures for the suppression of the exploiters' resistance—tremendous *organisational*, organising effort on the part of the proletariat and the poor peasants. The organisational task is interwoven to form a single whole with the task of ruthlessly suppressing by military methods yesterday's slave-owners (capitalists) and their packs of lackeys—the bourgeois intellectual gentlemen. Yesterday's slave-owners and their "intellectual" stooges say and think, "We have always been organisers and chiefs. We have commanded, and we want to continue doing so. We shall refuse to obey the 'common people', the workers and peasants. We shall not submit to them. We shall convert knowledge into a weapon for the defence of the privileges of the money-bags and of the rule of capital over the people."

That is what the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals say, think, and do. From the point of view of *self-interest* their behaviour is comprehensible. The hangers-on and spongers on the feudal landowners, the priests, the scribes, the bureaucrats as Gogol depicted them, and the "intellectuals" who hated Belinsky,[151] also found it "hard" to part with serfdom. But the cause of the exploiters and of their "intellectual" menials is hopeless. The workers and peasants are beginning to break down their resistance—unfortunately, not yet firmly, resolutely and ruthlessly enough—*and break down they will.*

"They" think that the "common people", the "common" workers and poor peasants, will be unable to cope with the great, truly heroic, in the world-historic sense of the word, organisational tasks which the socialist revolution has imposed upon the working people. The intellectuals who are accustomed to serving the capitalists and the capitalist state say in order to console themselves: "You cannot do without us." But their insolent assumption has no truth in it; educated men are already making their appearance on the side of the people, on the side of the working people,

and are helping to break the resistance of the servants of capital. There are a great many talented organisers among the peasants and the working class, and they are only just beginning to become aware of themselves, to awaken, to stretch out towards great, vital, creative work, to tackle with their own forces the task of building socialist society.

One of the most important tasks today, if not the most important, is to develop this independent initiative of the workers, and of all the working and exploited people generally, develop it as widely as possible in creative *organisational* work. At all costs we must break the old, *absurd*, savage, despicable and disgusting prejudice that only the so-called "upper classes", only the rich, and those who have gone through the school of the rich, are capable of administering the state and directing the organisational development of socialist society.

This is a prejudice fostered by rotten routine, by petrified views, slavish habits, and still more by the sordid selfishness of the capitalists, in whose interest it is to administer while plundering and to plunder while administering. The workers will not forget for a moment that they need the power of knowledge. The extraordinary striving after knowledge which the workers reveal, particularly now, shows that mistaken ideas about this do not and cannot exist among the proletariat. But every *rank-and-file* worker and peasant who can read and write, who can judge people and has practical experience, is capable of *organisational* work. Among the "common people", of whom the bourgeois intellectuals speak with such haughtiness and contempt, there are *many* such men and women. This sort of talent among the working class and the peasants is a rich and still untapped source.

The workers and peasants are still "timid", they have not yet become accustomed to the idea that *they* are now the *ruling class*; they are not yet resolute enough. The revolution could not *at one stroke* instil these qualities into millions and millions of people who all their lives had been compelled by want and hunger to work under the threat of the stick. But the Revolution of October 1917 is strong, viable and invincible because it *awakens* these qualities, breaks down the old impediments, removes the worn-out shackles, and

leads the working people on to the road of the *independent* creation of a new life.

Accounting and control—this is the *main* economic task of every Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, of every consumers' society, of every union or committee of supplies, of every factory committee or organ of workers' control in general.

We must fight against the old habit of regarding the measure of labour and the means of production, from the point of view of the slave whose sole aim is to lighten the burden of labour or to obtain at least some little bit *from the bourgeoisie*. The advanced, class-conscious workers have already started this fight, and they are offering determined resistance to the newcomers who flocked to the factory world in particularly large numbers during the war and who now would like to treat the *people's* factory, the factory that has come into the possession of the people, in the old way, with the sole aim of "snatching the biggest possible piece of the pie and clearing out". All the class-conscious, honest and thinking peasants and working people will take their place in this fight by the side of the advanced workers.

Accounting and control, *if* carried on by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies as the supreme state power, or on the instructions, on the authority, of *this* power—widespread, general, universal accounting and control, the accounting and control of the amount of labour performed and of the distribution of products—is the *essence* of socialist transformation, once the political rule of the proletariat has been established and secured.

The accounting and control essential for the transition to socialism can be exercised only by the people. Only the voluntary and conscientious co-operation of the *mass* of the workers and peasants in accounting and controlling *the rich*, *the rogues*, *the idlers and the rowdies*, a co-operation marked by revolutionary enthusiasm, can conquer these survivals of accursed capitalist society, these dregs of humanity, these hopelessly decayed and atrophied limbs, this contagion, this plague, this ulcer that socialism has inherited from capitalism.

Workers and peasants, working and exploited people! The land, the banks and the factories have now become the

property of the entire people! You *yourselves* must set to work to take account of and control the production and distribution of products—this, and this *alone* is the road to the victory of socialism, the only guarantee of its victory, the guarantee of victory over all exploitation, over all poverty and want! For there is enough bread, iron, timber, wool, cotton and flax in Russia to satisfy the needs of everyone, if only labour and its products are properly distributed, if only a *business-like*, *practical* control over this distribution by the entire people is established, provided only we can defeat the enemies of the people: the rich and their hangers-on, and the rogues, the idlers and the rowdies, *not only* in politics, but also in *everyday economic* life.

No mercy for these enemies of the people, the enemies of socialism, the enemies of the working people! War to the death against the rich and their hangers-on, the bourgeois intellectuals; war on the rogues, the idlers and the rowdies! All of them are of the same brood—the spawn of capitalism, the offspring of aristocratic and bourgeois society; the society in which a handful of men robbed and insulted the people; the society in which poverty and want forced thousands and thousands on to the path of rowdyism, corruption and roguery, and caused them to lose all human semblance; the society which inevitably cultivated in the working man the desire to escape exploitation even by means of deception, to wriggle out of it, to escape, if only for a moment, from loathsome labour, to procure at least a crust of bread by any possible means, at any cost, so as not to starve, so as to subdue the pangs of hunger suffered by himself and by his near ones.

The rich and the rogues are two sides of the same coin, they are the two principal categories of *parasites* which capitalism fostered; they are the principal enemies of socialism. These enemies must be placed under the special surveillance of the entire people; they must be ruthlessly punished for the slightest violation of the laws and regulations of socialist society. Any display of weakness, hesitation or sentimentality in this respect would be an immense crime against socialism.

In order to render these parasites harmless to socialist society we must organise the accounting and control of the

amount of work done and of production and distribution by the entire people, by millions and millions of workers and peasants, participating voluntarily, energetically and with revolutionary enthusiasm. And in order to organise this accounting and control, which is *fully within the ability* of every honest, intelligent and efficient worker and peasant, we must rouse their organising talent, the talent that is to be found in their midst; we must rouse among them—and organise on a national scale—*competition* in the sphere of organisational achievement; the workers and peasants must be brought to see clearly the difference between the necessary advice of an educated man and the necessary control by the "common" worker and peasant of the *slovenliness* that is so usual among the "educated".

This slovenliness, this carelessness, untidiness, unpunctuality, nervous haste, the inclination to substitute discussion for action, talk for work, the inclination to undertake everything under the sun without finishing anything, are characteristics of the "educated"; and this is not due to the fact that they are bad by nature, still less is it due to their evil will; it is due to all their habits of life, the conditions of their work, to fatigue, to the abnormal separation of mental from manual labour, and so on, and so forth.

Among the mistakes, shortcomings and defects of our revolution a by no means unimportant place is occupied by the mistakes, etc., which are due to these deplorable—but at present inevitable—characteristics of the intellectuals in our midst, and to the *lack* of sufficient supervision by the *workers* over the *organisational* work of the intellectuals.

The workers and peasants are still "timid"; they must get rid of this timidity, and they *certainly* will get rid of it. We cannot dispense with the advice, the instruction of educated people, of intellectuals and specialists. Every sensible worker and peasant understands this perfectly well, and the intellectuals in our midst cannot complain of a lack of attention and comradely respect on the part of the workers and peasants. Advice and instruction, however, is one thing, and the organisation of *practical* accounting and control is another. Very often the intellectuals give excellent advice and instruction, but they prove to be ridiculously, *absurdly*, shamefully "unhandy" and incapable of *carrying out* this

advice and instruction, of exercising *practical control* over the translation of words into deeds.

In this very respect it is utterly impossible to dispense with the help and the *leading role* of the practical organisers from among the "people", from among the factory workers and working peasants. "It is not the gods who make pots"—this is the truth that the workers and peasants should get well drilled into their minds. They must understand that the whole thing now is *practical work*; that the historical moment has arrived when theory is being transformed into practice, vitalised by practice, corrected by practice, tested by practice; when the words of Marx, "Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes",[152] become particularly true—every step in really curbing in practice, restricting, fully registering the rich and the rogues and keeping them under control is worth more than a dozen excellent arguments about socialism. For, "theory, my friend, is grey, but green is the eternal tree of life".[153]

Competition must be arranged between practical organisers from among the workers and peasants. Every attempt to establish stereotyped forms and to impose uniformity from above, as intellectuals are so inclined to do, must be combated. Stereotyped forms and uniformity imposed from above have nothing in common with democratic and socialist centralism. The unity of essentials, of fundamentals, of the substance, is not disturbed but ensured by *variety* in details, in specific local features, in methods of *approach*, in *methods* of exercising control, in *ways* of exterminating and rendering harmless the parasites (the rich and the rogues, slovenly and hysterical intellectuals, etc., etc.).

The Paris Commune gave a great example of how to combine initiative, independence, freedom of action and vigour from below with voluntary centralism free from stereotyped forms. Our Soviets are following the same road. But they are still "timid"; they have not yet got into their stride, have not yet "bitten into" their new, great, creative task of building the socialist system. The Soviets must set to work more boldly and display greater initiative. All "communes"—factories, villages, consumers' societies, and committees of supplies—must *compete* with each other as practical organisers of accounting and control of labour and

distribution of products. The programme of this accounting and control is simple, clear and intelligible to all—everyone to have bread; everyone to have sound footwear and good clothing; everyone to have warm dwellings; everyone to work conscientiously; not a single rogue (including those who shirk their work) to be allowed to be at liberty, but kept in prison, or serve his sentence of compulsory labour of the hardest kind; not a single rich man who violates the laws and regulations of socialism to be allowed to escape the fate of the rogue, which should, in justice, be the fate of the rich man. "He who does not work, neither shall he eat"—this is the *practical* commandment of socialism. This is how things should be organised *practically*. These are the *practical* successes our "communes" and our worker and peasant organisers should be proud of. And this applies particularly to the organisers among the intellectuals (*particularly*, because they are *too much*, *far too* much in the habit of being proud of their general instructions and resolutions).

Thousands of practical forms and methods of accounting and controlling the rich, the rogues and the idlers must be devised and put to a practical test by the communes themselves, by small units in town and country. Variety is a guarantee of effectiveness here, a pledge of success in achieving the single common aim—to *clean* the land of Russia of all vermin, of fleas—the rogues, of bugs—the rich, and so on and so forth. In one place half a score of rich, a dozen rogues, half a dozen workers who shirk their work (in the manner of rowdies, the manner in which many compositors in Petrograd, particularly in the Party printing-shops, shirk their work) will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines. In a third place they will be provided with "yellow tickets" after they have served their time, so that everyone shall keep an eye on them, as *harmful* persons, until they reform. In a fourth place, one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot. In a fifth place mixed methods may be adopted, and by probational release, for example, the rich, the bourgeois intellectuals, the rogues and rowdies who are corrigible will be given an opportunity to reform quickly. The more variety there will be, the better and richer will be our general experience, the more certain and rapid will be the success of socialism, and the easier will it be for

practice to devise—for only practice can devise—the best methods and means of struggle.

In what commune, in what district of a large town, in what factory and in what village are there *no* starving people, *no* unemployed, *no* idle rich, *no* despicable lackeys of the bourgeoisie, saboteurs who call themselves intellectuals? Where has most been done to raise the productivity of labour, to build good new houses for the poor, to put the poor in the houses of the rich, to regularly provide a bottle of milk for every child of every poor family? It is on these points that *competition* should develop between the communes, communities, producer-consumers' societies and associations, and Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. This is the work in which *talented organisers* should come to the fore *in practice* and be promoted to work in state administration. There is a great deal of talent among the people. It is merely suppressed. It must be given an opportunity to display itself. It *and it alone*, with the support of the people, can save Russia and save the cause of socialism.

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DRAFT DECREE ON CONSUMERS' COMMUNES[154]

The war, brought about by the conflict between capitalists for the division of the spoils of depredation, has resulted in untold ruin. This is intensified by criminal speculation and profiteering, particularly among the wealthy classes, which have brought the tortures of hunger and unemployment to hundreds of thousands and even millions of people. The need to adopt extraordinary measures to aid the starving and to wage merciless war on speculators has induced the workers' and peasants' government to enact the following regulations as a law of the Russian Republic:

Every citizen of the state shall belong to a local (village, volost, hamlet, section of a town, section of a street, etc.) consumers' society.

The grouping of families in the consumers' societies shall be voluntary, except for the proviso that not less than two-thirds of the number of families in each society must belong to the non-affluent classes (i.e., workers, peasants not employing hired labour, and so on).

Apart from the purchase and distribution of products, every consumers' society shall engage in the sale of local products. The boards of the consumers' societies shall set up *committees of supplies*, and no transport of products shall be permitted without the written sanction of the appropriate committee of supplies.

Existing consumers' societies are hereby nationalised and shall be obliged to admit to membership the whole population of the localities in which they are situated, without exception.

If they so desire private individuals may purchase products in the central stores and not in their local shops, but

only on condition that the relevant entry is made in the book of the local consumers' society.

The transport, purchase and sale of products without a permit from the committees of supplies shall be punishable by the confiscation of the whole of the property of the offender, by imprisonment for a period of not less than six months and by sentence to compulsory labour.

Permits for the transport or the purchase and sale of products shall be drawn up in duplicate and signed by not less than three members of the board of the committee of supplies concerned, one copy being filed by the board.

Each permit must state from which and to which consumers' society the products are being consigned.

Telegraph offices shall give priority to the telegrams of the committees of supplies.

All committees of supplies shall act under the control and in accordance with the instructions of the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Every individual shall be entitled to acquire at his consumers' society any product, without any restrictions whatsoever, except for such regulations as may be established to limit the import of products from abroad.

Products produced for sale must be delivered to the local committee of supplies at uncontrolled prices, except in cases when fixed prices are established by law. Money received for products sold shall be entered to the account of the owners in the local (village, volost, city, factory or other) branch of the People's Bank.

Every Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies must appoint a group of inspectors, auditors and instructors to assist the population to establish consumers' societies (committees of supplies) and check their accounts and all their business.

Instructions on keeping the accounts and on the correspondence of the committees of supplies will be issued separately.

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RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE RADA'S REPLY TO THE C.P.C.

The Council of People's Commissars regards the Rada's reply as so indefinite and evasive as to verge on mockery. The main source of difference with the Rada was the fact clearly indicated by the Council of People's Commissars in its first message to the Rada containing the proposal for peace talks.* The message said that we regarded the Rada's direct or indirect support of the Kaledinites as unconditional ground for military operations against the Rada. Counter-revolutionary elements of landowners and the bourgeoisie from every part of Russia have rallied round Kaledin. He has against him a clear majority of the peasants and working Cossacks even in the Don area. It is obvious to everyone that Soviet power has been accepted by the majority of the population of Russia, above all by the working masses of all nations. The revolutionary movement of the Ukrainian working classes for the transfer of all power to the Soviets is assuming ever greater proportions in the Ukraine itself and holds out the prospect of an early victory over the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.

The Rada's evasion of the question of whether it is prepared to stop giving direct and indirect support to the Kaledinites has wrecked the peace talks we had started and makes the Rada fully responsible for the continued civil war which the bourgeois classes of the various nations have launched and which is absolutely hopeless, because the overwhelming majority of the workers, peasants and soldiers

* See pp. 361-63 of this volume.—*Ed.*

have come down solidly on the side of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

As for the national demands of the Ukrainians, the independence of their people's republic, and its right to federate, these are all recognised by the Council of People's Commissars and are not in dispute at all.

Written on December 30, 1917
(January 12, 1918)

Published on December 31, 1917
(January 13, 1918), in *Pravda*
No. 227 and *Izvestia* No. 264

Published according
to the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE SEND-OFF OF THE SOCIALIST ARMY'S FIRST TROOP TRAINS JANUARY 1 (14), 1918[155]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, I greet you as the living embodiment of the Russian proletariat's determination to fight for the triumph of the Russian revolution, for the triumph of its great slogans not only in this country, but also among the peoples of the whole world. I greet you as the first heroic volunteers of the socialist army, who are to build up a mighty revolutionary army. This army is called upon to safeguard the gains of the revolution and our people's power, the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the whole of this new and truly democratic system, against the attacks of all the enemies of the people, who are bending all efforts to destroy the revolution. These enemies are the world capitalists who are now organising a crusade against the Russian revolution, which holds out the prospect of liberation to all working people. We must show that we are a force capable of overcoming every obstacle on the way to world revolution. Let the example of the comrades going into the trenches buoy up the weak, steady the hesitant and rouse the weary. The peoples hear our revolution's clarion call and are awakening; our army's ranks will soon be swelled by the proletarian forces of other countries and we shall no longer be alone. (*Comrade Lenin's words were drowned in shouts of greetings and prolonged applause. The volunteers of the socialist army accompanied Comrade Lenin to his car to the strains of the Internationale.*)

Pravda No. 3 (evening edition), January 17 (4), 1918

Published according to the *Pravda* text



Декларація прав трудящагося и эксплуатируемаго народа.

Учред. Собраніе постановляет:

I 1. Россія провозглашается республикой Советов Рабочих, Солдатских и Крестьянских Депутатов. Все власть в центре и на местах принадлежит этим Советам.

2. Советская российская республика учреждается на началах федерации этих республик.

Стоя на своей основной задачей уничтожить всякую эксплуатацию человека человеком, полностью отменить деление общества на классы, беспощадно подавить сопротивление эксплуататоров, установить социалистическую диктатуру пролетариата и бедных крестьян и создать мощную социалистическую Советскую Республику на всех языках, Учред. Собраніе постановляет далее:

1. Частная собственность на землю отменяется. Все земли, со всеми постройками, инвентарем и прочими принадлежностями с.-х. производства, объявляется достоянием всего трудящегося народа

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People." Early January 1918

Reduced

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People." Early January 1918

Reduced

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE WORKING AND EXPLOITED PEOPLE[156]

The Constituent Assembly resolves:

I. 1. Russia is hereby proclaimed a Republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All power, centrally and locally, is vested in these Soviets.

2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the principle of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics.

II. Its fundamental aim being to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to completely eliminate the division of society into classes, to mercilessly crush the resistance of the exploiters, to establish a socialist organisation of society and to achieve the victory of socialism in all countries, the Constituent Assembly further resolves:

1. Private ownership of land is hereby abolished. All land together with all buildings, farm implements and other appurtenances of agricultural production, is proclaimed the property of the entire working people.

2. The Soviet laws on workers' control and on the Supreme Economic Council are hereby confirmed for the purpose of guaranteeing the power of the working people over the exploiters and as a first step towards the complete conversion of the factories, mines, railways, and other means of production and transport into the property of the workers' and peasants' state.

3. The conversion of all banks into the property of the workers' and peasants' state is hereby confirmed as one of the conditions for the emancipation of the working people from the yoke of capital.

4. For the purpose of abolishing the parasitic sections of society, universal labour conscription is hereby instituted.

5. To ensure the sovereign power of the working people, and to eliminate all possibility of the restoration of the power of the exploiters, the arming of the working people, the creation of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants and the complete disarming of the propertied classes are hereby decreed.

III. 1. Expressing its firm determination to wrest mankind from the clutches of finance capital and imperialism, which have in this most criminal of wars drenched the world in blood, the Constituent Assembly whole-heartedly endorses the policy pursued by Soviet power of denouncing the secret treaties, organising most extensive fraternisation with the workers and peasants of the armies in the war, and achieving at all costs, by revolutionary means, a democratic peace between the nations, without annexations and indemnities and on the basis of the free self-determination of nations.

2. With the same end in view, the Constituent Assembly insists on a complete break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilisation, which has built the prosperity of the exploiters belonging to a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries.

The Constituent Assembly welcomes the policy of the Council of People's Commissars in proclaiming the complete independence of Finland, commencing the evacuation of troops from Persia, and proclaiming freedom of self-determination for Armenia.[157]

3. The Constituent Assembly regards the Soviet law on the cancellation of the loans contracted by the governments of the tsar, the landowners and the bourgeoisie as a first blow struck at international banking, finance capital, and expresses the conviction that Soviet power will firmly pursue this path until the international workers' uprising against the yoke of capital has completely triumphed.

IV. Having been elected on the basis of party lists drawn up prior to the October Revolution, when the people were not yet in a position to rise *en masse* against the exploiters, had not yet experienced the full strength of resistance of the latter in defence of their class privileges, and had not yet

applied themselves in practice to the task of building socialist society, the Constituent Assembly considers that it would be fundamentally wrong, even formally, to put itself in opposition to Soviet power.

In essence the Constituent Assembly considers that now, when the people are waging the last fight against their exploiters, there can be no place for exploiters in any government body. Power must be vested wholly and entirely in the working people and their authorised representatives—the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Supporting Soviet power and the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars, the Constituent Assembly considers that its own task is confined to establishing the fundamental principles of the socialist reconstruction of society.

At the same time, endeavouring to create a really free and voluntary, and therefore all the more firm and stable, union of the working classes of all the nations of Russia, the Constituent Assembly confines its own task to setting up the fundamental principles of a federation of Soviet Republics of Russia, while leaving it to the workers and peasants of each nation to decide independently at their own authoritative Congress of Soviets whether they wish to participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions, and on what terms.

Written not later than
January 3 (16), 1918

Published in *Pravda* No. 2 and *Izvestia* No. 2, January 4 (17), 1918

Published according to the manuscript

LETTER TO THE ARMY CONGRESS ON THE DEMOBILISATION OF THE ARMY

Dear comrades,

Comrade Podvoisky has told me of your proposal and I ask you not to take amiss the fact that I am forced to confine myself to writing a letter to you. I whole-heartedly welcome your confidence that *you will succeed in the great task of building a socialist army*—in view of all the present difficulties and in spite of them. We may be in one of the critical periods of the revolution, when Soviet power is threatened both by an external foe—the German and other imperialists—and an internal one—the counter-revolutionaries hiding behind the slogan of "All Power to the Constituent Assembly".

We shall overcome this crisis as well. There is not the least doubt about it. The Soviets will retain the power they have won. The socialist revolution has begun. It will go on to victory in Russia and the whole world.

With best wishes of success and courage in your work.

Yours,
Lenin

(*The reading of the letter was met with loud, prolonged applause.*)

Written on January 3 (16), 1918

Published on January 6 (19), 1918 in the newspaper *Armia i Flot Rabochei i Krestyanskoi Rossii* No. 4

Published according to the newspaper text

DIRECT-LINE CONVERSATION WITH L. D. TROTSKY, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET PEACE DELEGATION AT BREST-LITOVSK JANUARY 3 (16), 1918

1

Lenin here. I have just received your special letter. Stalin is away and I have not yet been able to show it to him. I think your plan is worth discussing. Can its final implementation be somewhat deferred, and the final decision taken after a special Central Executive Committee meeting over here? I shall show the letter to Stalin as soon as he returns.

Lenin.

2

I should like to consult Stalin before replying to your question. A delegation of the Kharkov Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, which has assured me that the Kiev Rada is on its last legs, is leaving today to join you.

Lenin.

3

Stalin has just arrived, I shall discuss it with him, and will shortly let you know our joint reply.

Lenin.

4

Please inform Trotsky. Request arrange adjournment and return to Petrograd.

Lenin. Stalin.

First published in 1929
in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Published according
to the telegraph tape

RESOLUTION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE JANUARY 3 (16), 1918

On the basis of all the achievements of the October Revolution, and in accordance with the Declaration of the Working and Exploited People adopted at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of January 3, 1918, all power in the Russian Republic belongs to the Soviets and the Soviet institutions. Accordingly, any attempt by any person or institution whatsoever to usurp any of the functions of state power will be regarded as a counter-revolutionary act. All such attempts will be suppressed by every means at the disposal of the Soviet power, including the use of armed force.

Pravda No. 2 and *Izvestia* No. 2, January 4 (17), 1918

Published according to the manuscript

DECLARATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS) GROUP AT THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY MEETING JANUARY 5 (18), 1918[158]

The vast majority of working Russia—workers, peasants and soldiers—have demanded that the Constituent Assembly should recognise the gains of the Great October Revolution, the Soviet decrees on land, peace and workers' control, and above all the power of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee, fulfilling the will of the vast majority of the working classes of Russia, has proposed that the Constituent Assembly should declare itself bound by this will. However, the majority of the Constituent Assembly—in line with the pretensions of the bourgeoisie, has rejected this proposal, thereby challenging the whole of working Russia.

The majority in the Constituent Assembly went to the Party of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party of Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov. This party, which calls itself socialist and revolutionary, is leading the fight of the bourgeois elements against the workers' and peasants' revolution and is in fact a bourgeois and counter-revolutionary party.

The Constituent Assembly, as at present constituted, is the result of the balance of forces obtaining before the Great October Revolution. The present counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly elected on outdated party lists, is a reflection of an earlier period of the revolution and is trying to throw up a roadblock in the way of the workers' and peasants' movement.

The day-long debate has shown that the Party of Right Socialist-Revolutionaries continues, as it did under Kerensky, to lavish the people with promises of all manner of

things; actually it has decided to fight against the power of the workers', peasants' and soldiers' Soviets, against the socialist measures, the transfer of land and all implements to the peasants without compensation, the nationalisation of banks, and the repudiation of the state debt.

Refusing for a single moment to cover up the crimes of the enemies of the people, we make this announcement of our withdrawal from the Constituent Assembly, leaving it to Soviet power to take the final decision on the attitude to the counter-revolutionary section of the Constituent Assembly.

Pravda No. 5 (evening edition), January 19 (6), 1918

Published according to the *Pravda* text

PEOPLE FROM ANOTHER WORLD

"Friends, I have lost a day," says an old Latin tag. One cannot help but recall it when one remembers how the fifth of January was lost.

After real, lively, Soviet work among workers and peasants engaged on *real tasks*, clearing the forest and uprooting the stumps of landowner and capitalist exploitation, we were suddenly transported to "another world", to arrivals from another world, from the camp of the bourgeoisie with its willing or unwilling, conscious or unconscious champions, with its hangers-on, servants and advocates. Out of the world in which the working people and their Soviet organisation were conducting the struggle against the exploiters we were transported to the world of saccharine phrases, of slick, empty declamations, of promises and more promises based, as before, on conciliation with the capitalists.

It is as though history had accidentally, or by mistake, turned its clock back, and January 1918 for a single day became May or June 1917!

It was terrible! To be transported from the world of living people into the company of corpses, to breathe the odour of the dead, to hear those mummies with their empty "social" Louis Blanc[159] phrases, to hear Chernov and Tsereteli, was simply intolerable.

Comrade Skvortsov was right when he rapped out to the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries these two or three brief phrases, simple, calm and at the same time ruthlessly cutting: "Between us everything is over. We are carrying the October Revolution against the bourgeoisie to its culmination. We and you are on different sides of the barricades."

In reply to that came a torrent of over-smooth, empty phrases from Chernov and Tsereteli that carefully avoided only (only!) one question—that of Soviet power, of the October Revolution. "Let there be no civil war, let there be no sabotage," said Chernov, invoking the revolution in the name of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. And the latter who for six months, from June 1917 to January 1918, had been sleeping like corpses in their coffins, stood up and clapped furiously and persistently. It is really so easy and so pleasant to settle the problems of the revolution by an incantation. "Let there be no civil war, let there be no sabotage, let everybody recognise the Constituent Assembly." In what way does that differ, in essence, from the invocation: "Let the workers and capitalists make peace"? Not in any way. The Kaledins and Ryabushinskys together with their imperialist friends in all countries will not disappear or change their policy because of the invocations of the mealy-mouthed Chernov or because of Tsereteli's boring precepts that seem to have been taken from a misunderstood, poorly read and misinterpreted book.

Either conquer the Kaledins and Ryabushinskys or give up the revolution. Either victory over the exploiters in the civil war, or the collapse of the revolution. Such has been the issue in *all* revolutions, in the English revolution in the seventeenth century, in the French in the eighteenth century and in the German in the nineteenth century. How could it be thought that the Russian revolution in the twentieth century would *not* face that issue? How can wolves become lambs?

Tsereteli and Chernov do not show a grain of an idea, not the slightest desire to accept the fact of the class struggle that has become civil war, not by chance, not suddenly, not because of somebody's caprice or ill will, but inevitably, in the long process of revolutionary development.

It was a hard, boring and irksome day in the elegant rooms of the Taurida Palace, whose very aspect differs from that of Smolny approximately in the same way as elegant, but moribund bourgeois parliamentarism differs from the plain, proletarian Soviet apparatus that is in many ways still disorderly and imperfect but is living and vital. There, in that old world of bourgeois parliamentarism, the leaders

of hostile classes and hostile groups of the bourgeoisie did their *fencing*. Here, in the new world of the proletarian and peasant, socialist state, the oppressed classes are making clumsy, inefficient....*

Written on January 6 (19), 1918
First published on January 21, 1926 in *Pravda* No. 17

Published according to the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed*.

DRAFT DECREE ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[160]

At its very inception, the Russian revolution produced the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies as the only mass organisation of all the working and exploited classes capable of leading the struggle of these classes for their complete political and economic emancipation.

During the whole of the initial period of the Russian revolution the Soviets multiplied in number, grew and gained strength and were taught by their own experience to discard the illusions of compromise with the bourgeoisie and to realise the deceptive nature of the forms of the bourgeois-democratic parliamentary system; they arrived by practical experience at the conclusion that the emancipation of the oppressed classes was impossible unless they broke with these forms and with every kind of compromise. The break came with the October Revolution, which transferred the entire power to the Soviets.

The Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of electoral lists drawn up prior to the October Revolution, was an expression of the old relation of political forces which existed when power was held by the compromisers and the Cadets. When the people at that time voted for the candidates of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, they were not in a position to choose between the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the supporters of the bourgeoisie, and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the supporters of socialism. The Constituent Assembly, therefore, which was to have crowned the bourgeois parliamentary republic, was bound to become an obstacle in the path of the October Revolution and Soviet power.

The October Revolution, by giving power to the Soviets, and through the Soviets to the working and exploited classes, aroused the desperate resistance of the exploiters, and in the crushing of this resistance it fully revealed itself at the beginning of the socialist revolution. The working classes learned by experience that the old bourgeois parliamentary system had outlived its purpose and was absolutely incompatible with the aim of achieving socialism, and that not national institutions, but only class institutions (such as the Soviets) were capable of overcoming the resistance of the propertied classes and of laying the foundations of socialist society. To relinquish the sovereign power of the Soviets, to relinquish the Soviet Republic won by the people, for the sake of the bourgeois parliamentary system and the Constituent Assembly, would now be a step backwards and would cause the collapse of the October workers' and peasants' revolution.

Owing to the above-mentioned circumstances, the Party of Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party of Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov, obtained the majority in the Constituent Assembly which met on January 5. Naturally, this party refused to discuss the absolutely clear, precise and unambiguous proposal of the supreme organ of Soviet power, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, to recognise the programme of Soviet power, to recognise the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, to recognise the October Revolution and Soviet power. By this action the Constituent Assembly severed all ties with the Soviet Republic of Russia. It was inevitable that the Bolshevik group and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary group, who now patently constitute the overwhelming majority in the Soviets and enjoy the confidence of the workers and the majority of the peasants, should withdraw from such a Constituent Assembly.

The Right Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties are in fact carrying on outside the Constituent Assembly a most desperate struggle against Soviet power, calling openly in their press for its overthrow and describing as arbitrary and unlawful the crushing of the resistance of the exploiters by the forces of the working classes, which is essential in the interests of emancipation from exploita-

tion. They are defending the saboteurs, the servants of capital, and are going as far as undisguised calls to terrorism, which certain "unidentified groups" have already begun. It is obvious that under such circumstances the remaining part of the Constituent Assembly could only serve as a screen for the struggle of the counter-revolutionaries to overthrow Soviet power.

Accordingly, the Central Executive Committee resolves that the Constituent Assembly is hereby dissolved.

Written on January 6 (19), 1918

Published in *Izvestia* No. 5, January 7, 1918

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DELIVERED TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE JANUARY 6 (19), 1918

Comrades, the clash between Soviet power and the Constituent Assembly results from the entire course of the Russian revolution, which was confronted by the unprecedented task of reconstructing society on socialist lines. After the events of 1905 there could be no doubt that tsarism's day was over and that it had scrambled out of the pit only because of the backwardness and ignorance of the rural population. The Revolution of 1917 was marked on the one hand by the transformation of the bourgeois imperialist party into a republican party under the pressure of events, and on the other hand, by the emergence of democratic organisations, the Soviets, that had been formed in 1905; even then the socialists had realised that the organisation of these Soviets was creating something great, something new and unprecedented in the history of world revolution. The Soviets, created solely by the initiative of the people, are a form of democracy without parallel in any other country of the world.

The revolution produced two forces—the union of the masses for the purpose of overthrowing tsarism, and the organisations of the working people. When I hear the enemies of the October Revolution exclaim that the ideas of socialism are unfeasible and utopian, I usually put to them a plain and simple question. What in their opinion, I ask, are the Soviets? What gave rise to these organisations of the people, which have no precedent in the history of the development of world revolution? Not one of them has been able to give a precise answer to this question. Defending the

bourgeois system by inertia, they oppose these powerful organisations, the formation of which has never before been witnessed in any revolution in the world. All who are fighting the landowners are joining forces with the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. The Soviets embrace all who do not wish to stand idle and are devoting themselves to creative work. They have spread their network over the whole country, and the denser this network of Soviets of the people, the less will it be possible to exploit the working people. For the existence of the Soviets is incompatible with a prosperous bourgeois system. That is the source of all the contradictions among the bourgeoisie, who are fighting our Soviets solely in their own interests.

The transition from capitalism to a socialist system entails a long and bitter struggle. Having overthrown tsarism, the Russian revolution was bound to go farther; it could not stop at the victory of the bourgeois revolution; for the war, and the untold sufferings it caused the exhausted peoples, created a soil favourable for the outbreak of the social revolution. Nothing, therefore, is more ludicrous than the assertion that the subsequent development of the revolution, and the revolt of the masses that followed, were caused by a party, by an individual, or, as they vociferate, by the will of a "dictator". The fire of revolution broke out solely because of the incredible sufferings of Russia, and because of the conditions created by the war, which sternly and inexorably faced the working people with the alternative of taking a bold, desperate and fearless step, or of perishing, of dying from starvation.

And revolutionary fire was manifest in the creation of the Soviets—the mainstay of the workers' revolution. The Russian people have made a gigantic advance, a leap from tsarism to the Soviets. That is a fact, irrefutable and unpa^ ralleled. While the bourgeois parliaments of all countries and states, confined within the bounds of capitalism and private property, have never anywhere supported a revolutionary movement, the Soviets, having lit the fire of revolution, imperatively command the people to fight, take everything into their own hands, and organise themselves. In the course of a revolution called forth by the strength of the Soviets there are certain to be all kinds of errors and blunders.

But everybody knows that revolutionary movements are always and inevitably accompanied by temporary chaos, destruction and disorder. Bourgeois society is the same war, the same shambles; and it was this circumstance that gave rise to and accentuated the conflict between the Constituent Assembly and the Soviets. Those who point out that we are now "dissolving" the Constituent Assembly although at one time we defended it are not displaying a grain of sense, but are merely uttering pompous and meaningless phrases. At one time, we considered the Constituent Assembly to be better than tsarism and the republic of Kerensky with their famous organs of power; but as the Soviets emerged, they, being revolutionary organisations of the whole people, naturally became incomparably superior to any parliament in the world, a fact that I emphasised as far back as last April. By completely smashing bourgeois and landed property and by facilitating the final upheaval which is sweeping away all traces of the bourgeois system, the Soviets impelled us on to the path that has led the people to organise their own lives. We have taken up this great work of organisation, and it is well that we have done so. Of course, the socialist revolution cannot be immediately presented to the people in a clean, neat and impeccable form; it will inevitably be accompanied by civil war, sabotage and resistance. Those who assert the contrary are either liars or cowards. (*Stormy applause.*) The events of April 20, when the people, without any directions from "dictators" or parties, came out independently and solidly against the government of compromisers, showed even then that the bourgeoisie were weak and had no solid support. The masses sensed their power, and to placate them the famous game of ministerial leapfrog began, the object of which was to fool the people. But the people very soon saw through the game, particularly after Kerensky, both his pockets stuffed with predatory secret treaties with the imperialists, began to move the armies for an offensive. Gradually the activities of the compromisers became obvious to the deceived people, whose patience began to be exhausted. The result was the October Revolution. The people learned by experience, having suffered torture, executions and wholesale shootings and it is nonsense for the butchers to assert that the Bolsheviks, or cer-

tain "dictators", are responsible for the revolt of the working people. They are given the lie by the split that is occurring among the people themselves at congresses, meetings, conferences, and so forth. The people have not yet fully understand the October Revolution. This revolution has shown in practice how the people must take into their own hands, the hands of the workers' and peasants' state, the land, the natural resources, and the means of transport and production. Our cry was, All power to the Soviets; it is for this we are fighting. The people wanted the Constituent Assembly summoned, and we summoned it. But they sensed immediately what this famous Constituent Assembly really was. And now we have carried out the will of the people, which is—All power to the Soviets. As for the saboteurs, we shall crush them. When I came from Smolny, that fount of life and vigour, to the Taurida Palace, I felt as though I were in the company of corpses and lifeless mummies. They drew on all their available resources in order to fight socialism, they resorted to violence and sabotage, they even turned knowledge—the great pride of humanity—into a means of exploiting the working people. But although they managed to hinder somewhat the advance towards the socialist revolution, they could not stop it and will never be able to. Indeed the Soviets that have begun to smash the old, outworn foundations of the bourgeois system, not in gentlemanly, but in a blunt proletarian and peasant fashion, are much too strong.

To hand over power to the Constituent Assembly would again be compromising with the malignant bourgeoisie. The Russian Soviets place the interests of the working people far above the interests of a treacherous policy of compromise disguised in a new garb. The speeches of those outdated politicians, Chernov and Tsereteli, who continue whining tediously for the cessation of civil war, give off the stale and musty odour of antiquity. But as long as Kaledin exists, and as long as the slogan "All power to the Constituent Assembly" conceals the slogan "Down with Soviet power", civil war is inevitable. For nothing in the world will make us give up Soviet power! (*Stormy applause.*) And when the Constituent Assembly again revealed its readiness to postpone all the painfully urgent problems and tasks that were

placed before it by the Soviets, we told the Constituent Assembly that they must not be postponed for one single moment. And by the will of Soviet power the Constituent Assembly, which has refused to recognise the power of the people, is being dissolved. The Ryabushinskys have lost their stakes; their attempts at resistance will only accentuate and provoke a new outbreak of civil war.

The Constituent Assembly is dissolved. The Soviet revolutionary republic will triumph, no matter what the cost. (*Stormy applause. Ovation.*)

Pravda No. 6,
January 22 (9), 1918

Published according
to the *Pravda* text

ON THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION OF THE UNFORTUNATE PEACE

It might be argued that this is no time to deal with history. Certainly, this kind of assertion would be permissible if a particular question from the past were not inseparably and directly connected in practice with the present. The question of the unfortunate peace, the exceptionally harsh peace is, however, such a burning question that it calls for elucidation. I am therefore publishing my theses on this subject that were read at a meeting of about sixty of the leading Petrograd Party functionaries on January 8, 1918.

Here are these theses:

January 7, 1918.

THESES ON THE QUESTION OF THE IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AND ANNEXATIONIST PEACE[161]

1. The position of the Russian revolution at the present moment is such that nearly all the workers and the vast majority of the peasants undoubtedly side with Soviet power and the socialist revolution which it has started. To that extent the socialist revolution in Russia is assured.

2. At the same time, the civil war, provoked by the frantic resistance of the wealthy classes, who realise full well that they are faced with the last and decisive fight for the preservation of private ownership of the land and means of production, has not yet reached its climax. The victory of Soviet power in this war is assured, but some time must inevitably elapse, no little exertion of effort will inevitably

be required, a certain period of acute economic dislocation and chaos, which accompany all wars, and civil war in particular, is inevitable, before the resistance of the bourgeoisie is crushed.

3. Furthermore, this resistance, in its less active and non-military forms—sabotage, the hire of declassed elements and agents of the bourgeoisie, who worm their way into the ranks of the socialists in order to ruin their cause, and so on and so forth—has proved so stubborn and capable of assuming such diversified forms, that the fight against it will inevitably require some more time, and, in its main forms, is hardly likely to end until several months have passed. And unless this passive and covert resistance of the bourgeoisie and its supporters is definitely crushed the socialist revolution cannot succeed.

4. Lastly, the organisational problems of the socialist transformation of Russia are so immense and difficult that their solution—in view of the numerous petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the socialist proletariat, and of the latter's low cultural level—will also require a fairly long time.

5. All these circumstances taken together are such as to make it perfectly clear that for the success of socialism in Russia a certain amount of time, several months at least, will be necessary, during which the hands of the socialist government must be absolutely free to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie first in our own country and to launch far-reaching mass organisational work on a wide scale.

6. The position of the socialist revolution in Russia must form the basis of any definition of the international tasks of our Soviet power, for the international situation in the fourth year of the war is such that it is quite impossible to predict the probable moment of outbreak of revolution and overthrow of any of the European imperialist governments (including the German). That the socialist revolution in Europe must come, and will come, is beyond doubt. All our hopes for the *final* victory of socialism are founded on this certainty and on this scientific prognosis. Our propaganda activities in general, and the organisation of fraternisation in particular, must be intensified and extended. It would be a mistake, however, to base the tactics of the Russian socialist government on attempts to determine

whether or not the European, and especially the German, socialist revolution will take place in the next six months (or some such brief period). Inasmuch as it is quite impossible to determine this, all such attempts, objectively speaking, would be nothing but a blind gamble.

7. The peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk have by now—January 7, 1918—made it perfectly clear that the war party has undoubtedly gained the upper hand in the German Government (which has the other governments of the Quadruple Alliance at its beck and call) and has virtually already presented Russia with an ultimatum (and it is to be expected, most certainly to be expected, that any day now it will be presented formally). The ultimatum is as follows: either the continuation of the war, or a peace with annexations, i.e., peace on condition that we surrender all the territory we have occupied, while the Germans retain all the territory they have occupied and impose upon us an indemnity (outwardly disguised as payment for the maintenance of prisoners)—an indemnity of about three thousand million rubles, payable over a number of years.

8. The socialist government of Russia is faced with the question—a question whose solution brooks no delay—of whether to accept this peace with annexations now, or to immediately wage a revolutionary war. In fact, no middle course is possible. No further postponement can now be achieved, for we have *already* done everything possible and impossible to deliberately protract the negotiations.

9. On examining the arguments in favour of an immediate revolutionary war, the first argument we encounter is that a separate peace at this juncture would, objectively speaking, be an agreement with the German imperialists, an "imperialistic deal", and so forth, and that, consequently, such a peace would mean a complete break with the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism.

This argument, however, is obviously incorrect. Workers who lose a strike and sign terms for the resumption of work which are unfavourable to them and favourable to the capitalists, do not betray socialism. The only people who betray socialism are those who secure advantages for a section of the workers in exchange for profit to the capitalists; only such agreements are impermissible in principle.

He betrays socialism who calls the war with German imperialism a defensive and just war, but actually receives support from the Anglo-French imperialists, and conceals secret treaties concluded with them from the people. He does not in the least betray socialism who, without concealing anything from the people, and without concluding any secret treaties with the imperialists, agrees to sign terms of peace which are unfavourable to the weak nation and favourable to the imperialists of one group, if at that moment there is no strength to continue the war.

10. Another argument in favour of immediate war is that, by concluding peace, we objectively become agents of German imperialism, for we afford it the opportunity to release troops from our front, we surrender to it millions of prisoners of war, and so on. But this argument too is manifestly incorrect, for a revolutionary war at the present juncture would, objectively speaking, make us agents of Anglo-French imperialism, by providing it with forces which would promote its aims. The British bluntly offered our Commander-in-Chief, Krylenko, one hundred rubles per month for every one of our soldiers provided we continued the war. Even if we did not take a single kopek from the Anglo-French, we nevertheless would be helping them, objectively speaking, by diverting part of the German army.

From that point of view, in neither case would we be entirely escaping some sort of imperialist bond, and it is obvious that it is impossible to escape it completely without overthrowing world imperialism. The correct conclusion from this is that the moment a socialist government triumphed in any one country, questions must be decided, not from the point of view of whether this or that imperialism is preferable, but exclusively from the point of view of the conditions which best make for the development and consolidation of the socialist revolution which has already begun.

In other words, the underlying principle of our tactics must not be, which of the two imperialisms it is more profitable to aid at this juncture, but rather, how the socialist revolution can be most firmly and reliably ensured the possibility of consolidating itself, or, at least, of maintaining itself in one country until it is joined by other countries.

11. It is said that the German Social-Democratic opponents of the war have now become "defeatists" and are requesting us not to yield to German imperialism. But we recognised defeatism only in respect of *one's own* imperialist bourgeoisie, and we always discountenanced victory over an alien imperialism, victory attained in formal or actual alliance with a "friendly" imperialism, as a method impermissible in principle and generally wrong.

This argument is therefore only a modification of the previous one. If the German Left Social-Democrats were proposing that we delay concluding a separate peace for a *definite* period, and guaranteed revolutionary action in Germany within this period, the question *might* assume a different aspect for us. Far from saying this, however, the German Lefts formally declare: "Hold out as long as you can, but decide the question from the point of view of the state of affairs in the *Russian* socialist revolution, for we cannot promise you anything positive regarding the German revolution."

12. It is said that in a number of Party statements we actually "promised" a revolutionary war, and that by concluding a separate peace we would be going back on our word.

That is not true. We said that in the era of imperialism a socialist government *had to* "*prepare for and wage*" a revolutionary war*; we said this in order to combat abstract pacifism and the theory that "defence of the fatherland" must be completely rejected in the era of imperialism, and, lastly to combat the purely selfish instincts of a part of the soldiers, but we never gave any pledge to start a revolutionary war without considering whether it is possible to wage it at a given moment.

Unquestionably, even at this juncture we must *prepare for* a revolutionary war. We are carrying out this promise, as we have, in general, carried out all our promises that could be carried out at once: we annulled the secret treaties, offered all peoples a fair peace, and several times did our best to drag out peace negotiations so as to give other peoples a chance to join us.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 404.—Ed.

But the question whether it is possible to carry on a revolutionary war *now*, *immediately*, must be decided exclusively from the point of view of whether material conditions permit it, and of the interests of the socialist revolution which has already begun.

13. Summing up the arguments in favour of an immediate revolutionary war, we have to conclude that such a policy might perhaps answer the human yearning for the beautiful, dramatic and striking, but that it would totally disregard the objective balance of class forces and material factors at the present stage of the socialist revolution now under way.

14. There can be no doubt that our army is absolutely in no condition at the present moment, and will not be for the next few weeks (and probably for the next few months), to beat back a German offensive successfully; firstly, owing to the extreme fatigue and exhaustion of the majority of the soldiers, coupled with the incredible chaos in the matter of food supply, replacement of the overfatigued, etc.; secondly, owing to the utter unfitness of the horses and the consequent inevitable ruin of our artillery; and, thirdly, owing to the absolute impossibility of defending the coastline from Riga to Revel, which affords the enemy a very certain chance of seizing the rest of Lifland, and then Estland, and of outflanking a large part of our forces, and finally, of capturing Petrograd.

15. Further, there is not the slightest doubt that the peasant majority of our army would at the present juncture unreservedly declare in favour of a peace with annexations and not in favour of an immediate revolutionary war; the socialist reorganisation of the army, the merging of the Red Guard detachments with it, and so on, have only just begun.

With the army completely democratised, to carry on war in defiance of the wishes of the majority of the soldiers would be a reckless gamble, while to create a really staunch and ideologically stable socialist workers' and peasants' army will, at the very least, require months and months.

16. The poor peasants in Russia are capable of supporting the socialist revolution led by the working class, but they are not capable of agreeing to fight a serious revolutionary war immediately, at the present juncture. To ignore the

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objective balance of class forces on this issue would be a fatal error.

17. Consequently, the situation at present with regard to a revolutionary war is as follows:

If the German revolution were to break out and triumph in the coming three or four months, the tactics of an immediate revolutionary war might perhaps not ruin our socialist revolution.

If, however, the German revolution does not occur in the next few months, the course of events, if the war is continued, will inevitably be such that grave defeats will compel Russia to conclude an even more disadvantageous separate peace, a peace, moreover, which would be concluded, not by a socialist government, but by some other (for example, a bloc of the bourgeois Rada and Chernov's followers, or something similar). For the peasant army, which is exhausted to the limit by the war, will after the very first defeats—and very likely within a matter of weeks, and not of months—overthrow the socialist workers' government.

18. This being the state of affairs, it would be absolutely impermissible tactics to stake the fate of the socialist revolution, which has already begun in Russia, merely on the chance that the German revolution may begin in the immediate future, within a matter of weeks. Such tactics would be a reckless gamble. We have no right to take such risks.

19. The German revolution will by no means be made more difficult of accomplishment as far as its objective premises are concerned, if we conclude a separate peace. Probably chauvinist intoxication will weaken it for a time, but Germany's position will remain extremely grave, the war with Britain and America will be a protracted one, and aggressive imperialism will be fully and completely exposed on both sides. A socialist Soviet Republic in Russia will stand as a living example to the peoples of all countries, and the propaganda and revolutionising effect of this example will be immense. There—the bourgeois system and a fully exposed predatory war between two groups of marauders. Here—peace and a socialist Soviet Republic.

20. In concluding a separate peace we free ourselves *as much as is possible at the present moment* from both hostile

imperialist groups, we take advantage of their mutual enmity and warfare which hamper concerted action on their part against us, and for a certain period have our hands free to advance and to consolidate the socialist revolution. The reorganisation of Russia on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the nationalisation of the banks and large-scale industry, coupled with *exchange of products* in kind between the towns and the small-peasant consumers' societies, is quite feasible economically, provided we are assured a few months in which to work in peace. And such a reorganisation will render socialism invincible both in Russia and all over the world, and at the same time will create a solid economic basis for a mighty workers' and peasants' Red Army.

21. A really revolutionary war at this juncture would be a war waged by a socialist republic against the bourgeois countries, with the aim—an aim clearly defined and fully approved by the socialist army—of overthrowing the bourgeoisie in other countries. However, we *obviously* cannot set ourselves this aim at the *present* moment. Objectively, we would be fighting now for the liberation of Poland, Lifland and Courland. But no Marxist, without renouncing the principles of Marxism and of socialism generally, can deny that the interests of socialism are higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-determination. Our socialist republic has done all it could, and continues to do all it can to give effect to the right to self-determination of Finland, the Ukraine, etc. But if the concrete situation is such that the existence of the socialist republic is being imperilled at the present moment on account of the violation of the right to self-determination of several nations (Poland, Lifland, Courland, etc.), naturally the preservation of the socialist republic has the higher claim.

Consequently, whoever says, "We cannot sign a humiliating, atrocious, etc., peace, betray Poland, and so forth", does not realise that by concluding peace on the condition that Poland is liberated, he would only be strengthening German imperialism against Britain, Belgium, Serbia and other countries *still further*. Peace on the condition of the liberation of Poland, Lifland and Courland would be a "patriotic" peace *from the point of view of Russia*, but would by

no means cease to be a peace *with the annexationists*, with the German imperialists.

January 21, 1918. The following should be added to the above theses:

22. The mass strikes in Austria and Germany, and, subsequently, the formation of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in Berlin and Vienna, and, lastly, beginning from January 18-20, armed clashes and street fighting in Berlin—all this should be regarded as evidence of the fact that the revolution in Germany has begun.

This fact offers us the opportunity, for the time being, of further delaying and dragging out the peace negotiations.

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Thesis 22 on January 21 (February 3);
Introduction prior to February 11 (24),
1918

Published without Thesis 22
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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Introduction published
according to the *Pravda* text,
Theses according to the manuscript

AFTERWORD TO THE THESES ON THE QUESTION OF THE IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AND ANNEXATIONIST PEACE

I read the above Theses to a small private meeting of Party functionaries on January 8, 1918. The discussion on them showed three opinions in the Party on this question—about a half those present spoke in favour of revolutionary war (this was sometimes called the "Moscow" point of view because the Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party adopted it earlier than other organisations); then about a quarter were for Comrade Trotsky who proposed to "declare the cessation of hostilities, demobilise the army, send the soldiers home but refrain from signing a treaty", and, lastly, about a quarter supported me.

The state of affairs now obtaining in the Party reminds me very strongly of the situation in the summer of 1907 when the overwhelming majority of the Bolsheviks favoured the boycott of the Third Duma and I stood side by side with Dan in favour of participation and was subjected to furious attacks for my opportunism. Objectively, the present issue is a complete analogy; as then, the majority of the Party functionaries, proceeding from the very best revolutionary motives and the best Party traditions, allow themselves to be carried away by a "flash" slogan and *do not grasp the new* socio-economic and political situation, do not take into consideration *the change in the conditions* that demands a speedy and abrupt change in tactics. The essence of my argument, today as then, is to make clear that Marxism demands the consideration of objective conditions and their changes, that the question must be presented concretely as

applicable to those conditions, that the most significant change that has occurred is the foundation of the Russian Soviet Republic, and the preservation of the republic that has already begun the socialist revolution is most important to us and to the *international socialist movement*; that at the moment the slogan of revolutionary war proclaimed by Russia would either be an empty phrase and an unsupported demonstration, or would be tantamount, objectively, to falling into the trap set for us by the imperialists, who wish to *inveigle* us into continuing the *imperialist war* while we are still a weak unit, so that the young Soviet Republic might be *crushed* as cheaply as possible.

"I stand by Lenin's old position," exclaimed one young Muscovite (youth is one of the greatest virtues distinguishing that group of speakers) . And that same speaker reproached me for repeating the old arguments of the defencists about the improbability of a revolution in Germany.

The whole trouble is that the Muscovites want to stick to the old *tactical* position, and stubbornly refuse to see the *change* that has taken place, the *new objective* situation that has arisen.

The Muscovites, in their zealous repetition of old slogans, have not even taken into consideration the fact that we Bolsheviks have now all become defencists. Having overthrown the bourgeoisie, having denounced and exposed the secret treaties, having proposed peace to all peoples, actually...*

Written between January 8 and 11 (21 and 24), 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

THIRD ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', SOLDIERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES[162]

JANUARY 10-18 (23-31), 1918

Published in *Izvestia* Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 15, January 12, 13, 14 and 20, 1918, and *Pravda* Nos. 9, 10 and 15, January 26-27 (13-14) and February 2 (January 20), 1918

Draft Decree on expunging references to the Constituent Assembly from Soviet legislation first published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Published according to the *Izvestia* text, the draft decree according to the manuscript

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REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
JANUARY 11 (24)

Comrades, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars I must submit to you a report of its activities for the two months and fifteen days that have elapsed since the establishment of Soviet power and the Soviet Government in Russia.

Two months and fifteen days—that is only five days more than the preceding workers' power lasted and ruled over a whole country, or over the exploiters and the capitalists, the power of the Paris workers at the time of the Paris Commune of 1871.

We must first of all remember this workers' power, we must cast our minds back and compare it with the Soviet power that was formed on October 25. And if we compare the preceding dictatorship of the proletariat with the present one we shall see at once what a gigantic stride the international working-class movement has made, and in what an immeasurably more favourable position Soviet power in Russia finds itself, notwithstanding the incredibly complicated conditions of war and economic ruin.

After retaining power for two months and ten days, the workers of Paris, who for the first time in history established the Commune, the embryo of Soviet power, perished at the hands of the French Cadets, Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries of a Kaledin type. The French workers had to pay an unprecedentedly heavy price for the first experience of workers' government, the meaning and purpose of which the overwhelming majority of the peasants in France did not know.

We find ourselves in immeasurably more favourable circumstances because the Russian soldiers, workers and peasants were able to create the Soviet Government, an apparatus which informed the whole world of their methods of struggle. It is this that puts the Russian workers and peasants in a position that differs from the power of the Paris proletariat. They had no apparatus, the country did not understand them; we were immediately able to rely on Soviet power, and that is why we never doubted that Soviet power enjoys the sympathy and the warmest and most devoted support of the overwhelming majority of the people, and that therefore Soviet power is invincible.

Those who were sceptical of Soviet power and frequently, either consciously or unconsciously, sold and betrayed it for compromise with the capitalists and the imperialists, raised a deafening clamour about the power of the proletariat alone not being able to be maintained in Russia. As if any Bolsheviks or their supporters forgot even for a moment that in Russia only that power could last for any length of time that would be able to unite the working class and the majority of the peasants, all the working and exploited classes, in a single, inseparably interconnected force fighting against the landowners and the bourgeoisie.

We never doubted that only the alliance of the workers and the poor peasants, the semi-proletarians, mentioned in our Party Programme, can, in Russia, embrace the majority of the population and ensure firm support for the government. And after October 25 we were immediately able, in the course of several weeks, to overcome all difficulties and establish a government on the basis of this firm alliance.

Yes, comrades! When the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, in its old form—when the peasants did not yet understand who in this party were real advocates of socialism—put forward the slogan of equalitarian land tenure, without caring who was to put it through, whether it was to be effected in alliance with the bourgeoisie or not, we branded that as a fraud. And this section, which has, now realised that the people are not with it and that it is a bubbler claimed that it could carry out equalitarian land tenure in alliance with the bourgeoisie. In this lay the basic fraud. And when the Russian revolution presented an example of collabora-

tion between the working people and the bourgeoisie, in the greatest moment in the life of the people; when the war had been ruining the people and dooming millions to death from starvation and its consequences showed what compromise meant in practice; when the Soviets themselves experienced it and felt it after having passed through the school of compromise, it became obvious that there was a sound, virile and great socialist core in the teachings of those who wanted to unite the working section of the peasants with the great socialist movement of the workers of the whole world.

And as soon as this became a clear and distinct practical question to the peasants, something happened of which no one had any doubt, as has now been proved by the Peasants' Soviets and Congresses: when the time came to implement socialism, the peasants were able to see clearly these two main political lines—alliance with the bourgeoisie, or alliance with the working people. They then realised that the party which expressed the real aims and interests of the peasants was the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. And when we concluded our government alliance with this party, we, from the very outset, arranged it so that the alliance rested on the clearest and most obvious principles. If the peasants of Russia want to socialise the land in alliance with the workers who will nationalise the banks and establish workers' control, then they are our loyal colleagues, our most loyal and valuable allies. Comrades, no socialist would refuse to admit the obvious truth that between socialism and capitalism there lies a long, more or less difficult transitional period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the forms this period will take will be determined to a large extent by whether small or big ownership, small- or large-scale farming, predominates. It goes without saying that the transition to socialism in Estland, that small country in which the whole population is literate, and which consists of large-scale farms, cannot be the same as the transition to socialism in Russia, which is mainly a petty-bourgeois country. This must be taken into account.

Every politically-conscious socialist says that socialism cannot be imposed upon the peasants by force and that we must count only on the power of example and on the mass of

the peasants assimilating day-to-day experience. How would the peasants prefer to pass to socialism? This is the problem which now confronts the Russian peasants in practice. How can they support the socialist proletariat and begin the transition to socialism? The peasants have already tackled this transition, and we have complete confidence in them.

The alliance we concluded with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries is built on a firm basis and is growing stronger and stronger by the hour. At first we on the Council of People's Commissars feared that factional struggle would hinder the work, but now, after the experience of two months' work together, I must say definitely that on the majority of questions we arrive at unanimous decisions.

We know that only when experience has shown the peasants, for example, the kind of exchange there must be between town and country they will themselves, from below, on the basis of their own experience, establish their own connections. On the other hand, the experience of the Civil War has demonstrated to the peasants that there is no other road to socialism except the dictatorship of the proletariat and the ruthless suppression of the rule of the exploiters. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, every time we touch upon this theme, at the present meeting, or in the Central Executive Committee, I, from time to time, hear from the Right side of the meeting the exclamation "Dictator!" Yes, "when we were socialists" everyone recognised the dictatorship of the proletariat; they even wrote about it in their programmes, they were indignant at the widespread false idea that it was possible to persuade and prove to the population that the working people ought not to be exploited, that this was sinful and disgraceful, and that once people were persuaded of this there would be paradise on earth. No, this utopian notion was smashed in theory long ago, and now our task is to smash it in practice.

We must not depict socialism as if socialists will bring it to us on a plate all nicely dressed. That will never happen. Not a single problem of the class struggle has ever been solved in history except by violence. When violence is exercised by the working people, by the mass of exploited against the exploiters—then we are for it! (*Stormy applause.*) And we

are not in the least disturbed by the howls of those people who consciously or unconsciously side with the bourgeoisie, or who are so frightened by them, so oppressed by their rule, that they have been flung into consternation at the sight of this unprecedentedly acute class struggle, have burst into tears, forgotten all their premises and demand that we perform the impossible, that we socialists achieve complete victory without fighting against the exploiters and without suppressing their resistance.

As far back as the summer of 1917 the exploiters understood that it is a matter of "the last and decisive battles", and that if the Soviets came to power the last bulwark of the bourgeoisie, their principal source for suppressing the working people, would be torn out of their hands.

That is why the October Revolution began this systematic and unswerving struggle to compel the exploiters to cease their resistance and to become reconciled to the idea, no matter how difficult that may be for even the best of them, that the rule of the exploiting classes has gone never to return, that from now on the ordinary peasant will give the orders and that they must obey, however unpleasant that may be.

This will entail many difficulties, sacrifices and mistakes; it is something new, unprecedented in history and cannot be studied from books. It goes without saying that this is the greatest and most difficult transition that has ever occurred in history; but there is no other way to make this great transition and the fact that Soviet power has been established in Russia has shown that it is the revolutionary people who are richest of all in revolutionary experience—when millions come to the assistance of a few score of Party people—the people who actually take their exploiters by the throat.

That is why civil war has acquired predominance in Russia at the present time. Against us is advanced the slogan: "Down with civil war!" I happened to hear this shouted from the Right benches of the so-called Constituent Assembly. Down with civil war.... What does that mean? Civil war against whom? Against Kornilov, Kerensky and Ryabushinsky who are spending millions to bribe vagabonds and officials? Against the saboteurs who, consciously or unconsciously, are accepting these bribes? Undoubtedly, among the latter

there are ignorant people who accept these bribes unconsciously, because they cannot even imagine that the old bourgeois system can and must be destroyed to the very foundation and that an entirely new, socialist society can and must be built up on its ruins. Undoubtedly there are people like that, but does that alter the situation?

That is why the representatives of the propertied classes are staking their all, that is why these are the last and decisive battles for them, and they would stop at no crime in their efforts to smash Soviet power. Does not the whole history of socialism, particularly of French socialism, which is so rich in revolutionary striving, show us that when the working people themselves take power in their hands the ruling classes resort to unheard-of crimes and shootings if it is a matter of protecting their money-bags. When these people talk to us about civil war we answer them with ridicule; but when they spread their slogans among the students we say—you are deceiving them!

The class struggle did not accidentally assume its latest form, the form in which the exploited class takes all the means of power in its own hands in order to completely destroy its class enemy, the bourgeoisie, in order to sweep from the land of Russia not only the bureaucrats, but also the landowners, as the Russian peasants in several gubernias have done.

We are told that the sabotage with which the bureaucrats and the landowners met the Council of People's Commissars is an indication of their unwillingness to assist socialism, as if it were not clear that the whole of this gang of capitalists and swindlers, vagabonds and saboteurs, represent a single gang bribed by the bourgeoisie and resisting the power of the working people. Of course, those who thought that it was possible to leap straight from capitalism to socialism, or those who imagined that it was possible to convince the majority of the population that this could be achieved through the medium of the Constituent Assembly—those who believed in this bourgeois democratic fable, can go on blithely believing it, but let them not complain if life destroys this fable.

Those who have come to understand what the class struggle means, what the sabotage organised by the bureau-

crats means, know that we cannot leap straight into socialism. There remained the bourgeoisie, capitalists, who hope to restore their rule and who defend their money-bags. There remained vagabonds, a section of corrupt people who are absolutely downtrodden by capitalism and who are unable to grasp the idea of the proletarian struggle. There remained office employees, bureaucrats who believe that it is in the interests of society to protect the old system. How can anyone imagine that the victory of socialism can come about except by the complete collapse of these sections, except by the complete destruction of the Russian and European bourgeoisie? Do you think the Ryabushinskys do not understand their class interests? It is they who are paying the saboteurs not to work. Or do they operate disunited? Are they not operating in conjunction with the French, British and American capitalists by buying up securities? It remains to be seen whether they will get much out of these transactions. Will not the heaps of securities they are now buying up turn out to be merely useless heaps of scrap-paper?

That is why, comrades, our reply to all the reproaches and accusations hurled against us of employing terror, dictatorship, civil war, although we are far from having resorted to real terror, because we are stronger than they—we have the Soviets, it will be sufficient if we nationalise the banks and confiscate their property in order to compel them to submit—our reply to all these charges of instigating civil war is: yes, we have openly proclaimed what no other government has been able to proclaim. The first government in the world that can speak openly of civil war is the government of the workers, peasants and soldiers. Yes, we have started and we are waging civil war against the exploiters. The more straightforwardly we say this, the more quickly will this war come to an end, the more quickly will all the working and exploited people understand us, will understand that Soviet power is fighting for the real, vital cause of all the working people.

Comrades, I do not think we shall achieve victory in this struggle quickly, but we are very rich in experience: we have managed to achieve a great deal in the course of two months. We have experienced Kerensky's attempt to launch an attack against Soviet power and the complete

failure of this attempt. We have experienced the organisation of power of the Ukrainian Kerenskys—the struggle has not yet ended there, but to anyone who has watched it, who has heard at least a few truthful reports from representatives of Soviet power, it is obvious that the bourgeois elements of the Ukrainian Rada are living their last days. (*Applause.*) There cannot be the slightest doubt about the victory of Soviet power, of the Ukrainian People's Republic, over the Ukrainian bourgeois Rada.

As for the struggle against Kaledin—here, indeed, everything rests on the basis of the exploitation of the working people, on the basis of the bourgeois dictatorship—if there is any social basis at all against Soviet power. The Peasants' Congress has clearly demonstrated that Kaledin's cause is hopeless; the working people are against him. The experience of Soviet power, propaganda by deeds, by the example of the Soviet organisations, is having its effect, and Kaledin's stronghold in the Don Region is now collapsing—not so much externally as internally.

That is why, looking at the civil war front in Russia, we can say with complete conviction: here the victory of Soviet power is complete and absolutely assured. And, comrades, the victory of Soviet power is being achieved because right from the outset it began to realise the age-old aspirations of socialism, while consistently and determinedly relying on the people and considering it to be its duty to awaken the most oppressed and downtrodden sections of society to active life, to raise them to socialist creative work. That is why the old army with its barrack-square drilling and torture of soldiers has retreated into the past. It has been thrown on the scrap-heap, nothing remains of it. (*Applause.*) The complete democratisation of the army has been carried out.

Permit me to relate an incident that occurred when I was in the carriage of a Finnish train and I overheard a conversation between several Finns and an old woman. I could not take part in the conversation because I cannot speak Finnish. But one of the Finns turned to me and said: "Do you know the curious thing this old woman said? She said, 'Now there is no need to fear the man with the gun. I was in the woods one day and I met a man with a gun, and

instead of taking the firewood I had collected from me, he added some more.'"

When I heard that, I said to myself: let the hundreds of newspapers, no matter what they call themselves—socialist, near-socialist, etc.—let hundreds of extremely loud voices shout at us, "dictators", "violators", and similar words. We know that another voice is now rising from among the people; they say to themselves: now we need not be afraid of the man with the gun because he protects the working people and will be ruthless in suppressing the rule of the exploiters. (*Applause.*) This is what the people have felt, and that is why the propaganda that simple and uneducated people are carrying on when they relate how the Red Guards are turning their might against the exploiters—that propaganda is invincible. It will spread among millions and tens of millions, and will firmly create what the French Commune of the nineteenth century began to create, but was able to continue for only a very short time because it was wrecked by the bourgeoisie—it will create a socialist Red Army, something all socialists have always aimed at, i.e., the general arming of the people. It will create new Red Guard cadres that will enable us to train the working people for the armed struggle.

It used to be said about Russia that she would be unable to fight because she would have no officers. But we must not forget what these very bourgeois officers said as they observed the workers fighting against Kerensky and Kaledin. They said: "The Red Guards' technical level is very low, but if these people had a little training they would have an invincible army." This is because, for the first time in the history of the world struggle, elements have entered the army which are not the vehicles of bureaucratic knowledge, but are guided by the idea of the struggle to emancipate the exploited. And when the work we have commenced is completed, the Russian Soviet Republic will be invincible. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, the road which Soviet power has traversed insofar as concerns the socialist army has also been traversed insofar as concerns another instrument of the ruling classes, an even more subtle, an even more complicated instrument—the bourgeois court, which claimed to maintain

order, but which, as a matter of fact, was a blind, subtle instrument for the ruthless suppression of the exploited, and an instrument for protecting the interests of the moneybags. Soviet power acted in the way all the proletarian revolutions had shown that it must act; it immediately threw the old court on to the scrap-heap. Let them shout that we, without reforming the old court, immediately threw it on to the scrap-heap. By that we paved the way for a real people's court, and not so much by the force of repressive measures as by massive example, the authority of the working people, without formalities; we transformed the court from an instrument of exploitation into an instrument of education on the firm foundations of socialist society. There is no doubt whatever that we cannot attain such a society at once.

These, then, are the main steps Soviet power has taken along the road indicated by the experience of the great popular revolutions throughout the world. There has not been a single revolution in which the working people did not begin to take some steps along this road in order to set up a new state power. Unfortunately, they only began to do this, but were unable to finish, they were unable to create the new type of state power. We have created it—we have already established a socialist Republic of Soviets.

I have no illusions about our having only just entered the period of *transition* to socialism, about not yet having reached socialism. But if you say that our state is a socialist Republic of Soviets, you will be right. You will be as right as those who call many Western bourgeois republics democratic republics although everybody knows that not one of even the most democratic of these republics is completely democratic. They grant scraps of democracy, they cut off tiny bits of the rights of the exploiters, but the working people are as much oppressed there as they are everywhere else. Nevertheless, we say that the bourgeois system is represented by both old monarchies and by constitutional republics.

And so in our case now. We are far from having completed even the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. We have never cherished the hope that we could finish it without the aid of the international proletariat.

We never had any illusions on that score, and we know how difficult is the road that leads from capitalism to socialism. But it is our duty to say that our Soviet Republic is a socialist republic because we have taken this road, and our words will not be empty words.

We have initiated many measures undermining the capitalists' rule. We know that our power had to unite the activities of all our institutions by a single principle, and this principle we express in the words: "Russia is declared to be a Socialist Republic of Soviets." (*Applause.*) This will be that truth which rests on what we must do and have already begun to do, this will be the best unification of all our activities, the proclamation of our programme, a call to the working people and the exploited of all countries who either do not know at all what socialism is, or, what is worse, believe that socialism is the Chernov-Tsereteli mess of bourgeois reforms which we have tasted and tried during the ten months of the revolution and which we have become convinced is a falsification and not socialism.

And that is why "free" Britain and France did all they could during the ten months of our revolution to prevent a single copy of Bolshevik and Left Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers from entering their countries. They had to act in this way because they saw that the workers and peasants in all countries instinctively grasped what the Russian workers were doing. There was not a single meeting where news about the Russian revolution and the slogan of Soviet power was not hailed with stormy applause. The working people and the exploited everywhere have already come into conflict with their party top leadership. The old socialism of these leaders is not yet buried like that of Chkheidze and Tsereteli in Russia, but it is already done for in all countries of the world, it is already dead.

A new state—the Republic of Soviets, the republic of the working people, of the exploited classes that are breaking down the old bourgeois barriers, now stands against the old bourgeois system. New state forms have been created, which make it possible to suppress the exploiters, to overcome the resistance of this insignificant handful who are still strong because of yesterday's money-bags and yesterday's store of knowledge. They—the professors,

teachers and engineers—transform their knowledge into an instrument for the exploitation of the working people, saying they want their knowledge to serve the bourgeoisie, otherwise they refuse to work. But their power has been broken by the workers' and peasants' revolution, and a state is rising against them in which the people themselves freely elect their own representatives.

It is precisely at the present time that we can say that we really have an organisation of power which clearly indicates the transition to the complete abolition of any power, of any state. This will be possible when every trace of exploitation has been abolished, that is, in socialist society.

Now I shall deal briefly with the measures which the socialist Soviet Government of Russia has begun to realise. The nationalisation of the banks was one of the first measures adopted for the purpose, net only of wiping the landowners from the face of Russian earth, but also of eradicating the rule of the bourgeoisie and the possibility of capital oppressing millions and tens of millions of the working people. The banks are important centres of modern capitalist economy. They collect fantastic wealth and distribute it over this vast country; they are the nerve centres of capitalist life. They are subtle and intricate organisations, which grew up in the course of centuries; and against them were hurled the first blows of Soviet power which at first encountered desperate resistance in the State Bank. But this resistance did not deter Soviet power. We succeeded in the main thing in organising the State Bank; this main thing is in the hands of the workers and peasants. After these basic measures, which still require a lot of working out in detail, we proceeded to lay our hands on the private banks.

We did not act in the way the compromisers would probably have recommended us to do, i.e., first wait until the Constituent Assembly is convened, then perhaps draft a bill and introduce it in the Constituent Assembly and by that inform the bourgeoisie of our intentions and enable them to find a loophole through which to extricate themselves from this unpleasant thing; perhaps draw them into our company, and then make state laws—that would be a "state act".

That would be the rejection of socialism. We acted quite simply; not fearing to call forth the reproaches of the "educated" people, or rather of the uneducated supporters of the bourgeoisie who were trading in the remnants of their knowledge, we said we had at our disposal armed workers and peasants. This morning they must occupy all the private banks. (*Applause.*) After they have done that, after power is in our hands, only after this, we shall discuss what measures to adopt. In the morning the banks were occupied and in the evening the Central Executive Committee issued a decree: "The banks are declared national property"—state control, the socialisation of banking, its transfer to Soviet power, took place.

There was not a man among us who could imagine that an intricate and subtle apparatus like banking, which grew out of the capitalist system of economy in the course of centuries, could be broken or transformed in a few days. We never said that. And when scientists, or pseudo-scientists, shook their heads and prophesied, we said: you can prophesy what you like. We know only one way for the proletarian revolution, namely, to occupy the enemy's positions—to learn to rule by experience, from our mistakes. We do not in the least belittle the difficulties in our path, but we have done the main thing. The source of capitalist wealth has been undermined in the place of its distribution. After all this, the repudiation of the state loans, the overthrow of the financial yoke, was a very easy step. The transition to confiscation of the factories, after workers' control had been introduced, was also very easy. When we were accused of breaking up production into separate departments by introducing workers' control, we brushed aside this nonsense. In introducing workers' control, we knew that it would take much time before it spread to the whole of Russia, but we wanted to show that we recognise only one road—changes from below; we wanted the workers themselves, from below, to draw up the new, basic economic principles. Much time will be required for this.

From workers' control we passed on to the creation of a Supreme Economic Council. Only this measure, together with the nationalisation of the banks and railways which will be carried out within the next few days, will make it

possible for us to begin work to build up a new socialist economy. We know perfectly well the difficulties that confront us in this work; but we assert that only those who set to work to carry out this task relying on the experience and the instinct of the working people are socialists in deed. The people will commit many mistakes, but the main thing has been done. They know that when they appeal to Soviet power they will get whole-hearted support against the exploiters. There is not a single measure intended to ease their work that was not entirely supported by Soviet power. Soviet power does not know everything and cannot handle everything in time, and very often it is confronted with difficult tasks. Very often delegations of workers and peasants come to the government and ask, for example, what to do with such-and-such a piece of land. And frequently I myself have felt embarrassed when I saw that they had no very definite views. And I said to them: you are the power, do all you want to do, take all you want, we shall support you, but take care of production, see that production is useful. Take up useful work, you will make mistakes, but you will learn. And the workers have already begun to learn; they have already begun to fight against the saboteurs. Education has been turned into a fence which hinders the advance of the working classes; it will be pulled down.

Undoubtedly, the war is corrupting people both in the rear and at the front; people who are working on war supplies are paid far above the rates, and this attracts all those who hid themselves to keep out of the war, the vagabond and semi-vagabond elements who are imbued with one desire, to "grab" something and clear out. But these elements are the worst that has remained of the old capitalist system and are the vehicles of all the old evils; these we must kick out, remove, and we must put in the factories all the best proletarian elements and form them into nuclei of future socialist Russia. This is not an easy task, it will give rise to many conflicts, to much friction and many clashes. We, the Council of People's Commissars, and I personally, have heard complaints and threats from them, but we have remained calm, knowing that now we have a judge to whom we can appeal. That judge is the Soviets of Workers' and

Soldiers' Deputies. (*Applause.*) The word of this judge is indisputable, and we shall always rely upon it.

Capitalism deliberately differentiates the workers in order to rally an insignificant handful of the upper section of the working class around the bourgeoisie. Conflicts with this section are inevitable. We shall not achieve socialism without a struggle. But we are ready to fight, we have started it and we shall finish it with the aid of the apparatus called the Soviets. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will easily solve any problem we bring before it. For however strong the group of privileged workers may be, when they are brought before the representative body of all the workers, then this court, I repeat, will be indisputable for them. This sort of adjustment is only just beginning. The workers and peasants have not yet sufficient confidence in their own strength; age-old tradition has made them far too used to waiting for orders from above. They have not yet fully appreciated the fact that the proletariat is the ruling class; there are still elements among them who are frightened and downtrodden and who imagine that they must pass through the despicable school of the bourgeoisie. This most despicable of bourgeois notions has remained alive longer than all the rest, but it is dying and will die out completely. And we are convinced that with every step Soviet power takes the number of people will constantly grow who have completely thrown off the old bourgeois notion that a simple worker and peasant cannot administer the state. Well, if he sets to doing it, he can and will learn! (*Applause.*)

And it will be our organisational task to select leaders and organisers from among the people. This enormous, gigantic work is now on the agenda There could even be no thought of carrying it out if it were not for Soviet power, a filtering apparatus which can promote people.

Not only have we a state law on control, we have something even far more valuable—attempts on the part of the proletariat to enter into agreements with the manufacturers' associations in order to guarantee the workers' management over whole branches of industry. Such an agreement has begun to be drawn up, and is almost completed, between the leather workers and the all-Russia leather manufactur-

ers' society. I attach very special importance to these agreements,[163] they show that the workers are becoming aware of their strength.

Comrades, in my report I have not dealt with the particularly painful and difficult questions of peace and the food supply, because they are special items on the agenda and will be discussed separately.

My purpose in making this brief report was to show, as it appears to me and to the whole of the Council of People's Commissars, the entire history of what we have experienced during the past two and a half months, how the relation of class forces took shape in this new period of the Russian revolution, how a new state power was formed and what social tasks confront it.

Russia has started to achieve socialism in the right way—by the nationalisation of the banks and the transfer of all the land entirely to the working people. We are well aware of the difficulties that lie ahead, but we are convinced, by comparing our revolution with previous revolutions, that we shall achieve enormous successes and that we are on the road that guarantees complete victory.

And with us will go the masses of the more advanced countries, countries which have been divided by a predatory war, whose workers have passed through a longer period of training in democracy. When people depict the difficulties of our task, when we are told that the victory of socialism is possible only on a world scale, we regard this merely as an attempt, a particularly hopeless attempt, on the part of the bourgeoisie and of its voluntary and involuntary supporters to distort the irrefutable truth. The final victory of socialism in a single country is of course impossible. Our contingent of workers and peasants which is upholding Soviet power is one of the contingents of the great world army, which at present has been split by the world war, but which is striving for unity, and every piece of information, every fragment of a report about our revolution, every name, the proletariat greets with loud and sympathetic cheers, because it knows that in Russia the common cause is being pursued, the cause of the proletariat's uprising, the international socialist revolution. A living example, tackling the job somewhere in one country is more effective than any procla-

mations and conferences; this is what inspires the working people in all countries.

The October strike in 1905—the first steps of the victorious revolution—immediately spread to Western Europe and then, in 1905, called forth the movement of the Austrian workers; already at that time we had a practical illustration of the value of the example of revolution, of the action by the workers in one country, and today we see that the socialist revolution is maturing by the hour in all countries of the world.

If we make mistakes and blunders and meet with obstacles on our way, that is not what is important to them; what is important to them is our example, that is what unites them. They say: we shall go together and conquer, come what may. (*Applause.*)

The great founders of socialism, Marx and Engels, having watched the development of the labour movement and the growth of the world socialist revolution for a number of decades saw clearly that the transition from capitalism to socialism would require prolonged birth-pangs, a long period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the break-up of all that belonged to the past, the ruthless destruction of all forms of capitalism, the co-operation of the workers of all countries, who would have to combine their efforts to ensure complete victory. And they said that at the end of the nineteenth century "the Frenchman will begin it, and the German will finish it"[164]—the Frenchman would begin it because in the course of decades of revolution he had acquired that intrepid initiative in revolutionary action that made him the vanguard of the socialist revolution.

Today we see a different combination of international socialist forces. We say that it is easier for the movement to start in the countries that are not among those exploiting countries which have opportunities for easy plunder and are able to bribe the upper section of their workers. The pseudo-socialist, nearly all ministerial, Chernov-Tsereteli parties of Western Europe do not accomplish anything, and they lack firm foundations. We have seen the example of Italy; during the past few days we witnessed the heroic struggle of the Austrian workers against the predatory imperialists.[165] Though the pirates may succeed in holding up

the movement for a time, they cannot stop it altogether, it is invincible.

The example of the Soviet Republic will stand before them for a long time to come. Our socialist Republic of Soviets will stand secure, as a torch of international socialism and as an example to all the working people. Over there—conflict, war, bloodshed, the sacrifice of millions of people, capitalist exploitation; here—a genuine policy of peace and a socialist Republic of Soviets.

Things have turned out differently from what Marx and Engels expected and we, the Russian working and exploited classes, have the honour of being the vanguard of the international socialist revolution; we can now see clearly how far the development of the revolution will go. The Russian began it—the German, the Frenchman and the Englishman will finish it, and socialism will be victorious. (*Applause.*)

2
CONCLUDING SPEECH
ON THE REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
JANUARY 12 (25)

Having listened today to the speakers on the Right, who voiced objections to my report, I am surprised that they have not yet learned anything and have forgotten all that they in vain call "Marxism". One of the objectors declared that we had favoured the dictatorship of democracy, that we had recognised the rule of democracy. That declaration was so absurd, so utterly meaningless, that it is merely a collection of words. It was just like saying "iron snow", or something similar. (*Laughter.*) Democracy is a form of bourgeois state championed by all traitors to genuine socialism, who now find themselves at the head of official socialism and who assert that democracy is contrary to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Until the revolution transcended the limits of the bourgeois system, we were for democracy; but as soon as we saw the first signs of socialism in the progress of the revolution, we took a firm and resolute stand for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is strange that people who cannot or refuse to understand this plain truth, this definition of the meaning of the terms "democracy" and "dictatorship of the proletariat", should make bold to bring before so numerous an assembly old, utterly worthless rubbish, such as that in which all the objecting gentlemen's speeches abound. Democracy is formal parliamentarism, but in reality it is a continuous, cruel mockery, heartless, unbearable oppression of the working people by the bourgeoisie. And this can only be denied by those who are not true spokesmen for the working class but wretched men in mufflers who have kept away from life all

the time, who have been sleeping with an old, shabby little book carefully stowed away under the pillow, the unwanted book that serves them as a guide and manual in implanting official socialism. But the minds of tens of millions of those who are doing things create something infinitely loftier than the greatest genius can foresee. Genuine, revolutionary socialism did not break away today but at the beginning of the war. This significant break, this rift in socialist theory, has come about in every country and every state. And it is splendid that socialism has split!

We can counter the accusation that we are fighting against "socialists" by saying merely that in the epoch of parliamentarism these supporters of the latter no longer have anything in common with socialism but have become decayed, obsolete and backward, and have ended by deserting to the bourgeoisie. "Socialists" who shouted about "defending the country" during a war resulting from the imperialist urge of international robbers are not socialists but hangers-on of the bourgeoisie, their dish-lickers.

Those who talk so much about the dictatorship of democracy merely utter meaningless, absurd phrases which indicate neither economic knowledge nor political understanding.

One of the objectors said here that the Paris Commune can be proud of the fact that during the Paris workers' uprising there was no violence or arbitrary action on their part; but it is beyond doubt that the Commune fell only because it did not make proper use of armed force at the right moment, although it won undying fame in history, for it was the first to put the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat into practice.

Commenting briefly on the struggle against the bourgeoisie, landowners and capitalists, the speaker declared firmly and resolutely, amidst a burst of applause: "Say what you may, the bourgeoisie will in the end be forced by the will of the revolutionary people either to capitulate, or to perish."

Drawing a parallel between anarchism and Bolshevik views, Comrade Lenin said that at that time, in the period of a radical break-up of the bourgeois system, the concept of anarchism was finally assuming concrete features. But

if the oppression of the bourgeois system was to be abolished, there would have to be firm revolutionary power of the working classes, the power of a revolutionary state. This was the essence of communism. When the masses were themselves taking up arms to start an unrelenting struggle against the exploiters, when a new people's power was being applied that had nothing in common with parliamentary power, it was no longer the old state, outdated in its traditions and forms, that they had before them, but something new, something based on the creative power of the people. And while some anarchists spoke of the Soviets with fear because they were still influenced by obsolete views, the new, fresh trend in anarchism was definitely on the side of the Soviets, because it saw their vitality and their ability to win the sympathy of the working masses and arouse their creative energy.

"Your sin and blindness," said the speaker, turning to the "objectors", "are due to your failure to learn anything from the revolution. As early as April 4, I affirmed, speaking in this hall, that the Soviets are the highest form of democracy.* Either the Soviets will perish and then the revolution will be irrevocably lost, or the Soviets will live and then it will be ridiculous to talk of a bourgeois-democratic revolution at a time when the socialist system is on the way to its full development and capitalism is collapsing. The Bolsheviks spoke of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1905, but today, when the Soviets are in power, when the workers, soldiers and peasants have said—in a war situation unprecedented for hardships and horrors, in an atmosphere of ruin, and in the face of death by starvation—that they will assume full power and will themselves set about building a new life, there can be no question of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. And the Bolsheviks said as much at their congresses and meetings and conferences, and in their resolutions and decisions, as early as last April.

"To those who say that we have done nothing, that we have been inactive all the time, that Soviet rule has borne no fruits, we can say this: Look wherever there are working people, look among the masses, and you will see organisa-

* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 21-26.—*Ed.*

tional, creative work in full swing, you will see the stir of a life that is being renewed and hallowed by the revolution. The peasants are taking over the land in the countryside, the workers are seizing the factories, and all kinds of organisations are springing up everywhere.

"Soviet power is striving to bring the war to an end, and we are confident that it will achieve this goal earlier than Kerensky government spokesmen have promised. For the revolution has become a factor in the matter of ending the war, a factor which has denounced treaties and repudiated loans. The war will come to an end due to the international revolutionary movement."

In conclusion, the speaker commented in a few words on counter-revolutionary saboteurs, saying that they were groups bribed by the bourgeoisie, which showered its gifts on the sabotaging officials who declared war on the Soviet state, for the triumph of reaction. To them it was doomsday, the irrevocable end of everything when they saw the people striking vigorously at the bourgeoisie with a peasants' and workers' axe. "Our only fault, if any, is that we were much too humane, much too kind-hearted, towards the monstrously treacherous representatives of the bourgeois-imperialist system.

"A few days ago some *Novaya Zhizn* writers visited me, saying they had come on behalf of bank employees who wanted to take up service and submit fully to Soviet power, stopping the policy of sabotage. High time, I answered.* But, speaking confidentially, if they imagine that having begun those talks, we shall cede our revolutionary positions one iota, they are sorely mistaken.

"The world has never seen anything like that which is now taking place here in Russia, in this vast country broken up into a number of separate states and containing an enormous number of heterogeneous nationalities and peoples. I refer to the immense organisational work in every uyezd and region, the organisation of the lower strata, the work of the masses themselves, the creative, constructive activity, which encounters obstacles raised by various bourgeois representatives of imperialism. They, the workers and

* See p. 501 of this volume.—*Ed.*

peasants, are engaged in an effort unprecedented in its titanic aims; together with the Soviets, they will smash capitalist exploitation, and bourgeois oppression will in the end be abolished once and for all."

3
DRAFT DECREE ON EXPUNGING REFERENCES TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY FROM SOVIET LEGISLATION

DECREE

A number of laws, decrees and decisions taken by the Soviet Government contain references to the Constituent Assembly and its legislative character.

All these references naturally become irrelevant and lapse with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Central Executive Committee and the approval of this step by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

Accordingly, the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets resolves: any references to the forthcoming Constituent Assembly shall be expunged from all new editions of decrees and laws of the Soviet Government.

Written on January 18 (31), 1918

4
SUMMING-UP SPEECH AT THE CONGRESS
JANUARY 18 (31)

Comrades, before the Third Congress of Soviets closes we must establish with complete impartiality the momentous part it has had to play in the history of the international revolution and of mankind. There are incontestable grounds for saying that the Third Congress of Soviets has opened a new epoch in world history and there is growing awareness of its significance in these times of world revolution. It has consolidated the organisation of the new state power which was created by the October Revolution and has projected the lines of future socialist construction for the whole world, for the working people of all countries.

The new system of the socialist Soviet Republic, as a federation of free republics of the different nations inhabiting Russia, has been finally accepted in this country in the sphere of domestic politics. It is now clear to all, and even to our enemies, I daresay, that the new system, the Soviet power, is not an invention or a party trick, but is the result of the development of life itself, the outcome of the world revolution as it spontaneously takes shape. You will recall that all great revolutions invariably strove to raze the old capitalist system to the ground; they strove not only to win political rights but also to wrest the very reins of government from the hands of the ruling classes, and all the exploiters and oppressors of the working people, so as to put an end to all exploitation and all oppression for good. Great revolutions strove to demolish this old exploiting state machine but had not managed to bring it off until now. And now Russia, in virtue of the peculiarities of her economic and political position, has first achieved this transfer of

government powers into the hands of the working people. We shall now proceed to build, on the space cleared of historical rubbish, the airy towering edifice of the socialist society. A new type of state power is being created for the first time in history, a power that the will of the revolution has called upon to wipe out all exploitation, oppression and slavery the world over.

Let us take a look at what the new socialist principle of government has yielded in the sphere of our domestic policy. Comrades, you will recall that just recently the bourgeois press was vociferously accusing us of destroying the Russian state and saying that we were incapable of running the country, and so all the nationalities—Finland, the Ukraine, etc.—were leaving us. The bourgeois press, transported with malicious joy, carried almost daily reports of such "secessions". We. comrades, had a better understanding than they of the main causes of this phenomenon which were rooted in the working people's mistrust of the conciliatory imperialist government of Kerensky and Co. We kept silent, being quite sure that our just principles and our government would demonstrate our true purposes and aspirations to all the working people better than words.

We proved to be right. We see now that our ideas have won out in Finland and the Ukraine and are winning out on the Don, that they are awakening the working people's class-consciousness and are organising them into a solid alliance. We acted without any diplomatists or the use of the old imperialist methods, but can point to the greatest result: the revolution has won, and those who have won are allied with us in a mighty revolutionary federation. We do not rule by dividing, as ancient Rome's harsh maxim required, but by uniting all the working people with the unbreakable bonds of living interests and a sense of class. This our union, our new state is sounder than power based on violence which keeps artificial state entities hammered together with lies and bayonets in the way the imperialists want them. Thus, no sooner had the Finnish workers and peasants taken power than they sent us their expressions of loyalty to the world proletarian revolution and greetings which reveal unflinching determination to march with us along the path of the International.[166] There is the basis of our federa-

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

tion and I am profoundly convinced that more and more diverse federations of free nations will group themselves around revolutionary Russia. This federation is invincible and will grow quite freely, without the help of lies or bayonets. The laws and the state system which we are creating over here are the best earnest of its invincibility. You have just heard a reading of the law on the socialisation of land.[167] Isn't it a pledge of the unbreakable unity of the workers and peasants, isn't it a guarantee that in this unity we shall be able to overcome all obstacles on the way to socialism?

I must tell you that these obstacles are tremendous. You can depend on the bourgeoisie to resort to every trick, to stake their all on crushing our unity. They can be expected to make use of liars, provocateurs, traitors, possibly, dupes, but henceforth we have nothing to fear, because we have established our own new state power and because we hold the reins of government. We shall throw the full weight of our power against any counter-revolutionary attempt. But the chief pillar of the new system is the organisational measures we shall be implementing for the sake of socialism. In this respect we are faced with a vast amount of work. You must bear in mind, comrades, that the imperialists, the world's brigands, who had embroiled the nations in war, have disrupted the economic life of the world to its very roots. They have left us an onerous legacy, the work to restore what they had destroyed.

Of course, the working people had no experience in government but that does not scare us. The victorious proletariat looks out on a land that has now become a public good, and it will be quite able to organise the new production and consumption on socialist lines. In the old days, human genius, the brain of man, created only to give some the benefits of technology and culture, and to deprive others of the bare necessities, education and development. From now on all the marvels of science and the gains of culture belong to the nation as a whole, and never again will man's brain and human genius be used for oppression and exploitation. Of this we are sure, so shall we not dedicate ourselves and work with abandon to fulfil this greatest of all historical tasks? The working people will perform this titanic historical

feat, for in them lie dormant the great forces of revolution, renascence and renovation.

We are no longer alone. In the last few days, momentous events have taken place not only in the Ukraine and the Don area, not only in the realm of our Kaledins and Kerenskys, but in Western Europe as well. You have already heard of the telegrams on the state of the revolution in Germany. The flames of a revolutionary wildfire are leaping higher and higher over the whole of this rotten old world system. It was no pie-in-the-sky theory, no armchair pipe dream that once we had established Soviet power we would induce others to make similar attempts in other countries. For I must repeat that the working people had no other way out of the slaughter. These attempts are now being consolidated as gains of the international revolution. We close this historic Congress of Soviets under the sign of the mounting world revolution, and the time is not far off when the working people of all countries will unite into a single world-wide state and join in a common effort to build a new socialist edifice. The way to this construction runs through the Soviets, as a form of the incipient world revolution. (*Stormy applause.*)

In greeting you I urge you to build this new edifice. You will return to your various places and will bend every effort to organise and consolidate our great victory. (*The delegates rise and greet Comrade Lenin with stormy applause.*)

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE RED GUARD H.Q.

January 12, 1918

In view of the looming danger of famine in Petrograd, and in accordance with the Council of People's Commissars decision on the inspection of railways in Petrograd and its vicinity to discover any possible carloads of grain in the yards, the Red Guard H.Q. is hereby ordered to help carry out such inspection and apprehend profiteers and saboteurs.

With this aim in view, the required number of detachments must be immediately formed and dispatched tomorrow morning, January 13, to Comrade Nevsky or his Deputy at the Commissariat for Railway Affairs, to conduct the following joint operations with him:

(1) make a round of the stations and get their chiefs and other administrative personnel to sign written statements that there is not a single carload of grain or food stuffs (at the station or on the railway tracks);

(2) to verify that there are actually no carloads of grain, etc.; the check-up to be conducted jointly with railwaymen;

(3) in the event of false evidence or misleading reports, administrative personnel (by agreement with railway men's committees) should be arrested and handed over to revolutionary tribunals.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

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EXTRAORDINARY ALL-RUSSIA RAILWAYMEN'S CONGRESS JANUARY 5-30 (JANUARY 18-FEBRUARY 12), 1918[168]

1
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS JANUARY 13 (26)

Comrades, I am unfortunately unable to report on all points and hope that those of you who take a closer interest in the state of affairs have got a full and accurate picture of the present p(,sition of Soviet power, its attitude to other institutions and the tasks now facing it, partly from newspaper reports and partly from personal impressions at the Congress of Soviets. Allow me, therefore, to confine myself to a few brief additional remarks. In order to characterise the tasks and position of Soviet power, I must tell you of its attitude to the organisation of the railway proletariat, the railway workers.

Comrades, you are aware that Soviet power clashed with the Constituent Assembly and that all the propertied classes —the landowners, the bourgeoisie, the Kaledinites and their supporters—are now berating us for having dissolved it. But the louder these complaints in the few bourgeois papers, the louder is the voice of the workers, the soldiers, the working and exploited people. The peasants say that they have never doubted that Soviet power was head and shoulders above any other power, and that the workers, soldiers and peasants would never let any institution take over from their own Soviets, which they had elected, and set up and which they control and verify. You are well aware that Soviet power clashed with the Constituent Assembly mainly because it had been elected on lists drawn up before

the October Revolution. The Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of proportional representation through universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. That is the most perfect electoral system but it can be a correct expression of the people's will only on one condition, namely, that the parties which under that system alone have the right and possibility of drawing up electoral lists are truly representative of the mood, the wishes, the interests and the will of the groups of population electing them, because under another electoral system, when individual candidates or deputies are each elected by a separate district, the people, depending on their mood or any political changes, can very easily correct their mistakes. Under the system of proportional representation, the lists had to be drawn up by each party as a whole long before the elections actually took place; this explains how it came about that the parties had to draw up their lists back in September and early October for a Constituent Assembly that was to have met on November 12. You all remember that there was a statutory period within which all the parties had to submit their lists, and that no changes were allowed after that. That is how it came about that Russia's biggest party—the one that was undoubtedly the biggest that summer and autumn, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party—had to present its lists by the beginning of October 1917 on behalf of the whole Socialist-Revolutionary Party. That is what actually took place. The lists of candidates were presented in early October, including that of the Socialigt-Revolutionary Party, as if such a party continued to exist as an entity. It turned out that the conciliation with Kerensky came to an end after the list had been drawn up, after the Russian workers and peasants had travelled a long, hard and strenuous way in setting up their Soviets. After all, Kerensky was also regarded as a Socialist-Revolutionary—he was believed to be both a socialist and a revolutionary—although in actual fact he was an imperialist who hid in his pocket secret treaties with the French and British imperialists, the very same treaties that had been concluded by the tsar, who was deposed in February, the very game treatieg which doomed the Russian people to participation in the bloodbath over whether or not the Russian capitalists would seize Constantinople, the Darda-

nelles and Armenia or a piece of Galicia; some who really let themselves go, like the famous Milyukov, made maps, well in advance, showing the strip of Eastern Prussia which was to be the Russian people's own reward for the blood shed by millions of its workers and soldiers. There you have a true picture of the dominant Russian bourgeois-imperialist republic of Kerensky, who continued to be regarded as, and in fact was, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies met in late October, by which time the people were fed up with placating the imperialists, and the June offensive had cost us hundreds of thousands of lives, and had clearly shown why the war was dragging on, how these secret treaties doomed the soldiers to the slaughter, and why talk of peace remained nothing but talk. That was why the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets overthrew the rule of the bourgeois-imperialist government and established Soviet power. The elections to the Constituent Assembly fell on November 12 and confronted the workers, soldiers and especially the peasants with a situation in which they had to vote on the old lists, because there were no others, and none could be drawn up. So when we are now told, "You have dissolved the Constituent Assembly which represents the majority of the people", when this is chorused by bourgeois penpushers and newspapers of the Kerensky-socialist stamp, we respond: "Why is it that you cannot make a single straightforward statement to the people about the argument which I have just set forth and which was contained in the decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly?" We cannot consider the Constituent Assembly to be expressive of the people's will because it was elected on old lists. The workers and especially the peasants voted for the Socialist-Revolutionaries as a whole party, but it split after the elections, and appeared before the people as two parties: the Right-wingers, who sided with the bourgeoisie, and the party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who sided with the working class and the working people, and came down on the side of socialism. Did the people have any chance to choose between the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries under the Constituent As-

sembly? No, they did not, and so we say that, even from this formal standpoint of the lists and the election, no one can refute our assertion that the Constituent Assembly was unable to give a correct expression to the people's will. The revolution is not to blame for having come after the lists had been drawn up and before the elections to the Constituent Assembly had been held; the revolution is not to blame that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had kept the people, especially the peasants, in the dark and misled them with talk for so long; that only after October 25, when the Second Peasants' Congress was convened, we saw that there could be no reconciliation between the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and it was then that there came a series of congresses, starting with the soldiers' and peasants' and ending with the railwaymen's congress.

Everywhere we found the same picture: everywhere there was, on the one hand, the vast majority of those who truly belonged to the working and exploited people, and came down fully, unconditionally and irrevocably on the side of Soviet power, and on the other, the top layers of the bourgeoisie, the civil servants, the executives, the rich peasants, all of whom sided with the propertied classes and the bourgeoisie, and put out the slogan: "All power to the Constituent Assembly", the assembly that was elected before the revolution, when the people had no way of distinguishing between Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. No, indeed, the revolution of the working classes comes first and not the old lists; the interests of the working and exploited people who were oppressed before the revolution are paramount. If the Constituent Assembly goes against the will of Soviet power, the will of a clear majority of the working people, we say: Down with the Constituent Assembly, and long live Soviet power. (*Applause.*) Comrades, it is our daily experience that Soviet power is meeting with ever greater support from the poor, the working and exploited people in every branch of the economy and in every part of the country, and no matter how we may be slandered by bourgeois and by "socialist" newspapers, like those of Kerensky's party, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, no matter how they may lie that our power is against the people and does not have their support, they will still be

patently lying. We got some very strong confirmation of this just today. It was a report from the Don area (a night telegram) about a congress held by a section of the Cossacks in Voronezh, and a congress of 20 Cossack regiments and 5 batteries in Kamenskaya village. The Cossacks at the front convened their own congress because they saw that Kaledin was rallying officers, cadets and landowners' sons who do not want the Soviets to take power in Russia and want the Don to have self-determination. A party is being formed there around Kaledin, who styles himself the great chieftain. And so the congress of the front-line Cossacks had to be dispersed.[169] The Cossacks countered by, firstly, uniting with the Voronezh Congress, and secondly, by declaring war on Kaledin, thirdly, arresting the Cossack atamans, and fourthly, occupying all the main stations.

Let the Ryabushinskys, who sent millions abroad and donated millions over here to pay the saboteurs for obstructing Soviet power, let the Ryabushinskys, and the capitalists of France and Britain, together with the king of Rumania, let them all bewail their fate; their last stake has been lost even in the Don area, where there were the greatest number of rich peasants who lived on hired labour, who exploited the labour of others, and carried on a constant struggle against the migrant labourers driven to those parts from afar by privation; even there, where exploiter-peasants were most numerous, the people resent this organisation of cadets, officers and property-owners who have decided to oppose Soviet power. Even there we find the same division which everyone ignores and for which the blame is being put on us. "The Bolsheviks have declared civil war." Is it possible that we have invented Kaledin; is it possible that the Bolsheviks have invented Ryabushinsky? We all know that they were the mainstay of the tsarist regime, and are now merely lying in wait, biding their time to turn the Russian Republic into the kind of bourgeois republic that you have in most countries where, with all the liberty and representation, the working people are oppressed just as much as, if not more than, in any monarchy. When we hear it said that the Bolsheviks are kindling a fratricidal war, a civil war, when curses are heaped on the Bolsheviks for having brought about the criminal fratricidal civil war, we reply:

"What kind of fratricidal war is this? Are the Ryabushinskys and Kaledins the working people's brothers? It is strange that the sailors, the soldiers, the workers and the peasants had no inkling of this; it is strange that they had never noticed this before; and it is strange that they firmly demand that the Ryabushinskys and Kaledins submit to Soviet power."

The absurd, madcap attempt on the part of the cadets and officers to stage an uprising in Petrograd and Moscow fizzled out because the vast majority of the workers and soldiers are clearly on the side of Soviet power. They were aware that if they started a war, the soldiers would be armed and would not give up their arms to anyone. The people rallied to take their destiny into their own hands, and that was why they started the revolution. They were very well aware that over here, in Petrograd, the people were solidly behind Soviet power, and so when they were routed both in Petrograd and Moscow they rushed to the Don area to engineer a counter-revolutionary plot against the working people over there, hoping to get support from the bourgeois Rada in Kiev, which is on its last legs because it no longer commands confidence. Having declared civil war on the working people everywhere, they accused us of starting it. They said: You are fostering civil war, down with civil war. We replied: Down with the Ryabushinskys and Kaledins and all their accomplices. (*Applause.*)

That is why, comrades, we say it is not true that we are destroying democracy as the bourgeoisie's grave charge and assertion runs; nor is it true that we have destroyed faith in the forms of democracy, in the cherished democratic institutions which have for so long supported and fed the revolutionary movement in Russia; it is not true that we have destroyed the highest form of democracy, the Constituent Assembly. Under the republic of the socialist Kerensky—a republic of the imperialist chieftains, the chieftains of the bourgeoisie with secret treaties in thier pockets, driving the soldiers to war (and calling it a just war)—the Constituent Assembly was naturally preferable to the Pre-parliament, in which Kerensky, by agreement with Chernov and Tsereteli, conducted the same policy. We have been openly and straightforwardly gaying from the very start of

the revolution—April 1917—that the Soviets were a much higher, a very much more perfect and purposeful form of democracy—a working people's democracy—than the Constituent Assembly.* The Constituent Assembly unites all classes, which means also the exploiter classes, the propertied classes, hence, the bourgeoisie and those who received their education at the expense of the people, at the expense of the exploited, and abandoned the people to join the capitalists, turning their knowledge, the greatest achievements of knowledge, into a tool for oppressing the people, and fighting the working classes. For our part we declare that when a revolution of the working and exploited classes breaks out, all power in the state goes to their organisation. This form of democracy is incomparably higher than the old one. No party invented the Soviets. You know very well that no party could have invented them. They were brought to life by the 1905 revolution. And although at that time the Soviets were short-lived, it was clear that they were the people's only reliable bulwark in the struggle against the autocracy. Whenever the Soviets declined and gave way to some national representative institutions—as all these Dumas, congresses and assemblies have shown—the Constitutional-Democrats, the capitalists and exploiters came to the fore, deals were made with the tsar, the organs of the people's movement declined and the revolution collapsed. That is why when the 1917 Revolution did not merely revive the Soviets but extended a network of them across the country, they taught the workers, soldiers and peasants that they could and should take all state power into their own hands, not as in bourgeois parliaments, where every citizen has the same rights as the next man. Life will not be sweeter for the poor if the worker proclaims that he is the equal of Ryabushinsky, and the peasant the equal of a man who owns 12,000 dessiatines of land. That is why the best form of democracy, the best democratic republic is power without the landowners and the rich.

The Russian people gained a great deal of experience much faster and came to a decision in a matter of months because of the war. the unprecedented dislocation, the fam-

* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 21-26.—*Ed.*

ine, the danger of extinction, the physical destruction of millions of people. From April 20 on, when the wounded Linde marched his soldiers out into a street in Petrograd to overthrow the government of Milyukov and Guch1sov, through the long period of ministerial leapfrogging, when all the parties kowtowed the Constitutional-Democrats and vied with each other in displaying loud and alluring programmes, the people saw for themselves that it was no use at all: they had been promised peace, but were in fact driven into an offensive. In June 1917, tens of thousands of soldiers died because of this secret treaty between the tsar and the European imperialists, which Kerensky honoured. It was not propaganda but this first-hand experience that helped the people to make a comparison between the socialist power of the Soviets and the bourgeois republic. They carried away the conviction that there was nothing in the old reforms and the old institutions of bourgeois imperialism for the working and exploited people, and that only the power of the Soviets was good enough for them. The people—and this includes workers, soldiers, peasants and railwaymen, in fact, all working people—are free to elect their own deputies to the Soviets and are free to recall them when they do not satisfy the people's demands and wishes. You don't sit in a Soviet to interpret laws or make brilliant parliamentary speeches but to implement the freedoms and throw off the yoke of exploitation. The workers, on their own, will build their state on new lines; they will build a new life in the new Russia without any room for exploiters. That is what produced the Soviets, and that is why we say that the experience of the Russian revolution showed the people and went to confirm something we had said long ago, namely, that Soviet power is a much higher form of democracy than any bourgeois republic that has taken shape in Western Europe; in a real democracy, the working classes can and must control the non-working elements, the exploiting section of society; workers, soldiers, peasants and railwaymen can be their own masters; they can arrange an exchange of goods between towns and villages, and set a fair wage, without the capitalists and landowners.

That is why the Soviet Republic in Russia has now taken the shape of a fully socialist republic which has taken

away the land from the landowners, established workers' control in industry, and put the banks in the hands of socialist workers' organisations, giving the people access to the immense wealth accumulated and stockpiled by the capitalists to manage and use for the greater welfare and cultural growth of all the working people and not for their oppression. That is the task facing the Soviet Republic. And this is why we have so much sympathy among the people, the working classes abroad, in spite of the military censorship of the tsars, and the harassment of socialist newspapers by the Kerenskys abroad. The bourgeois newspapers over there tell lies about this country in a most shameful fashion; our newspapers are suppressed: not a single issue of *Pravda* has been allowed to go through. A few days ago a friend of mine returned from Switzerland, from that part of the country where I recently spent so many miserable days, and he said that people in free Switzerland were not aware of the fact that the free republics of free Europe were not letting through any issues of our paper, that they read only the wholesale lies circulated by the bourgeois newspapers, which do nothing but rail at the Bolsheviks. Yet the workers in all countries have understood that Soviet power in Russia is truly a working people's government. You will not find a single worker in Europe today—either in Britain, France, Germany or any other country—who does not applaud news of the Russian revolution, because they all regard it with hope and see it as a torch that will light the flame all over Europe.

The Russian revolution was such a simple affair only because Russia had been under the most savage oppression of tsarism and because no other country had been torn and tortured by the war as she had been.

The Russian people were the first to raise the torch of the socialist revolution, but they are aware that they are not alone in their struggle and that they will accomplish their task with the help of the most loyal comrades and friends. We don't know how long it will take for the socialist revolution to break out in the other countries—it may take a long time. You know how revolutions generally take place in other countries. Everyone here has been through 1917, and you all know that three months before the revolution

started, no one knew that it was coming. We know that workers' strikes have already spread to Austria. When the European parties headed by their local Chernovs and Tseretelis began to lose control of events and felt they had lost all touch, there was talk of martial law there, and o£ military dictatorship, in Germany; the strikes in Vienna have now been stopped and the papers are out again. I have received a telegram from our Stockholm representative, Vorovsky, and he says that the movement has undoubtedly halted but that it is impossible to crush it altogether, and that it would go on. There you have one of the results of the fact that the peace negotiations have opened at Brest and that we have kept our promise. The secret treaties have been abrogated, published and exposed to public shame. We have shown that we regard these commitments of the old capitalists—whether they are known as secret treaties or loans—as mere scraps of paper to be swept aside because they hamper us, the working masses, in our construction of socialist society. The working masses are beginning to realise the impudence of the German demands at Brest, which revealed the same plunderous and predacious urge behind a screen of promises to accept a just peace. The delay is artificial, and the masses are clear on this: they say that the war can be stopped, because the Russian workers and peasants have stopped it, and that an offensive can be started against the governments. On October 17, 1905, the first great nationwide strike was suppressed by the autocracy, but it sparked off a chain of events and workers' demonstrations in Austria, in Vienna and Prague, and that was when the Austrians won their universal suffrage. Although the Russian revolution of 1905 was crushed by tsarism, it gave hope to the West-European workers of great reforms in the future, that is, the very events now taking place.

When the Third Congress of Soviets opened, you all saw a number of delegates from foreign parties who said in one voice that from their observation of the working-class movement in Britain, Switzerland and America they drew the conclusion that the socialist revolution in Europe was becoming a task of the day. The bourgeoisie over there is stronger and cleverer than our Kerenskys; it has managed to get organised to make the uprising of the masses more difficult.

Over there the workers have a measure of prosperity, which is why it is more difficult to shake up the old socialist parties which had been there for decades, had come to power, and had acquired authority in the eyes of the people. But that kind of authority is already running out, the masses are surging, and there is no doubt at all that in the near—or possibly more remote—future, the socialist revolution will be on the order of the day in all countries, because the oppression of capital is at an end.

When we are told that the Bolsheviks have invented this utopian idea of introducing socialism in Russia, which is an impossible thing, we reply: How did it happen that utopians and dreamers enjoy the sympathy of the majority of the workers, peasants and soldiers? Did not the majority of the workers, peasants and soldiers side with us because they had acquired a first-hand knowledge of the war and its effects? They realised that there was no way out of the old society, that the capitalists with all their marvels of technology and culture were engaged in a destructive war, and that men had degenerated to a state of frenzy, savagery and starvation. That is what the capitalists have done, and that is why we are faced with the alternative of perishing or demolishing the old bourgeois society. That explains why our revolution has depth. That is why we find that in tiny neighbouring Estland, where the people are literate, there was recently a congress of farm-hands who elected agents to take control of all the efficient farms. This is a world-shaking development: farms are controlled by farm-hands who had always been at the very bottom of the social scale in the capitalist economy. Then take Finland, where the Diet spoke on behalf of the nation, and the bourgeoisie demanded that we should recognise her independence. We were not going to use force to keep under Russia's control or in one Russian state any of the nations tsarism had kept in by oppression. We had not planned to attract other nations—the Ukraine or Finland—by force or imposition but by allowing them to set up their own socialist system, their own Soviet republics. We now find that a working-class revolution is expected to break out in Finland almost any day. This is the same Finland that had enjoyed complete internal freedom for 12 years—since 1905—and had the right to elect democratic

institutions. Between 1905 and 1917, the sparks of the fire which the Bolsheviks are alleged to have fanned artificially, also penetrated into that country which is distinguished for its high culture, its efficient economy and its history, and we find the socialist revolution beginning there as.well. This proves that we are not blinded by party struggles, that we had not acted according to plan, and that it was nothing but mankind's hopeless state since the war began that brought on the revolution, and made the socialist revoiution invincible.

Comrades, let me point out in conclusion that the same thing has happened at this railwaymen's congress. We saw your hard fight against your top-drawer railway organisations. You railwaymen have seen for yourselves that the mass of working railway proletarians bore the brunt of the effort to get the railways running. Things did not come to such a pass by pure chance: either they had been deliberately hampered by the bourgeoisie, bribed by the millionaires who threw in hundreds of thousands of rubles and were prepared to go to any length to destroy Soviet power, or had been caused by the bourgeoisie's refusal to change the system, because it held that that was how God had ordained all things—there have always been masters and servants, and the rich have always abused the poor who worked for them. In effect the railway officials thought that such a state of affairs had been ordained by God, which meant there could be no other system, and that chaos would result from any attempt to change it. But that did not happen. The unity of the working masses is paramount; they will establish their own discipline of equals and, using the technical and cultural achievements, make the railways run like clockwork, and carry on the exchange of goods between town and country to help the workers and peasants organise the economy on a Russia-wide scale and enable the working masses to make use of the products of their labour without the capitalists and landowners. When this is done scientific and technical knowledge will no longer help a handful of men to get rich and stuff their money-bags, but will help to improve the operation of the railway system as a whole. This is of especial importance to us. You know how much corruption, swindling and speculation there is at each junction; you

also know that the exploiters are spending millions to disrupt transportation and get cars into places where they cannot be found. All this is being done to aggravate the famine and incite the people against Soviet power. But you all know that if the majority of railway organisations unite and set themselves the task of supporting Soviet power, all the swindlers, saboteurs, capitalists and exploiters—all these remnants of bourgeois society will be ruthlessly swept away. Only then will it be possible to organise the railways in a proper manner and achieve the complete liberation of the workers, soldiers and peasants from the power of the oppressors. Only then we shall have socialism. (*The entire audience joins in stormy applause.*)

2
REPLIES TO NOTES

Comrades, the notes lying before me fall into two groups: one raises the question of the Constituent Assembly, the other, of the famine and the economic chaos. I shall reply on these two points, putting those notes together that more or less refer to the same topic. About the Constituent Assembly we are being asked: Was it fair to dissolve it, and shouldn't another one be convened? Or wouldn't it have been more correct to refer the question to a popular referendum before dissolving the Constituent Assembly? No, comrades, neither a referendum nor a new constituent assembly can help matters. That is how the parties in Russia have taken shape. We have seen where the sympathies of the capitalists, and where those of the workers and peasants lie. Soviet power was not established by decree or party resolution, because it is above parties, and is the outcome of revolutionary experience, the experience of millions of men: it was no accident at all that the Soviets first emerged in 1905, and in 1917 grew to full stature and established a new republic, the likes of which do not exist in any European country, and will not exist in any of them so long as they are ruled by capital. But the Soviet Republic will triumph everywhere, and that is when the decisive blow will be dealt at capital. I must point out that the Constituent Assembly and the referendum are based on the old bourgeois parliamentary pattern and because capital holds sway, any popular poll has to reckon and bargain with it. Soviet power does not produce men who fence in parliament and exchange brilliant speeches, the while consolidating the rule of capital and the bureaucracy. Soviet power springs from the working

masses themselves; it does not produce a parliament, but an assembly of working people's representatives who enact laws which are implemented immediately, are translated into life and are aimed at fighting the exploiters. The old-type constituent assembly and referendum were designed to unite the will of the whole nation and create the possibility of the sheep living side by side with the wolves, the exploited with the exploiters. That is something we don't want. It is something we have tried out and gone through. We've had enough. And we are sure that the majority of the workers, peasants and soldiers feel that way too. At a time when the war has forced us to make a series of heroic efforts to escape the grip of capital or perish in the attempt, we are invited to put on an experiment which had already been tried out in some European countries, and which would give us the old bourgeois capitalism and national representation, instead of the representation of the working masses. We do not want bourgeois representation but the representation of the exploited and the oppressed that would wage a ruthless fight against the exploiters. That is the intention of Sovie~ power, which does not include either parliament or referendum. It is superior to both, because if the working people are dissatisfied with their party they can elect other delegates, hand power to another party and change the government without any revolution at all, for their experience of Kerensky-Kaledin and the bourgeois Rada has shown that it is impossible to fight against Soviet power. There might be a handful of men in Russia today fighting against Soviet power, but such eccentrics are few, and they will disappear in a matter of weeks, while Soviet power will triumph as an organisation of the oppressed class for the ovarthrow of the oppressors and removal of the exploiters.

I now come to the famine, this horrible curse of our time which threatens us. What is the main cause of the chaos? The main cause of the chaos which threatens the towns and industrial areas with famine is the sway of saboteurs, and the economic chaos these saboteurs keep stirring up, while blaming it on us. We are very well aware that there is enough grain in Russia and that it is stored in Kaledin's realm, in far-away Siberia and in the grain producing gubernias. I must say that the exploited classes will never

succeed in liberating themselves unless they set up a firm, ruthless and revolutionary government. About the saboteurs, let me say, comrades, that we know the addresses at which sabotaging civil servants called to collect and sign for a three-month advance on their salaries, to which Ryabushinsky had contributed 5 million, the Anglo-French imperialists so much, and the Rumanian, so much. Here is what sabotage means: it means people, senior officials, who are bribed and whose only purpose is to overthrow Soviet power, although many of them are not aware of this. Sabotage is the effort to restore the old paradise for the exploiters and the old hell for the working people. But if we are to frustrate them in this purpose, we must break down their resistance.

Railwaymen's pay is another point that has been brought to our notice. This is nothing but a misunderstanding. It may have been that one commissar took this view of the affair and issued a decree but amended it[170] as soon as he received instructions from the Council of People's Commissars, so that anyone who says that that had been the Soviet Government's intention doesn't know what he is talking about.

What are we to do to eliminate the famine and the chaos? Firstly, the capitalists' resistance must be broken, and the saboteurs driven to the wall. When the supporters of *Novaya Zhizn* and other ostensibly socialist periodicals say that sabotage has not been stopped in these ten weeks, I say: why don't you help us stop it? The banks have now passed under the authority of the Soviets. Here is what happened yesterday: a certain specialist writer by the name of Finn-Yenotayevsky came to see me on behalf of 50,000 persons and declared that the banks were prepared to operate entirely under the authority of Soviet power. (*Loud applause.*) "High time, too," I said to this spokesman of the bank officials. We will not refuse to negotiate with any organisation, be it an organisation of bank officials or any other, provided such recognition of Soviet power is actually accepted by the majority of the working people. That is what we were told by the bank officials who are in the habit of putting through unheard-of speculative deals to turn an honest penny, all of which keeps their pockets bulging with profits running into millions of rubles.

Now they want to negotiate with us, but these negotiations will differ from those of Kerensky. We shall not discuss any reform of banking. After occupying the banks with armed force, we enter into negotiations and issue orders and instructions. It is important for us to break down the resistance of the saboteurs before opening negotiations. That is the way to fight the famine and the chaos, and this alone can help us to overcome the horrors of capitalism and anarchy. You know of the terrible chaos that has spread everywhere in the world, especially in Russia, where tsarism has left a legacy of graft, violence, hatred and humiliation of the working people. This is followed by complaints about chaos; I put it to you: can the war-weary men who have stood in the trenches for three years fight to increase the profits of the Russian capitalists and capture Constantinople for them? On every hand they see that millions are being spent to overthrow Soviet power and get the country under control.

Comrades, such changes cannot be expected to take place overnight. The socialist revolution is on, and everything now depends on the establishment of a discipline of equals, the discipline of the working masses themselves, which must take the place of capitalist barrack-room discipline. When the railway workers take power into their own hands, they will wipe out sabotage and speculation through their armed organisation, and set themselves the task of prosecuting those who engage in graft and disrupt railway traffic. Such people should be prosecuted as arch-criminals, fighting against the people's power. It is on such a well-knit, vigorous organisation—a Soviet organisation—that the fight against the capitalists, the saboteurs, the swindlers and the Ryabushinskys depends. That is the way to defeat the famine, because Russia has everything she needs: iron, oil and grain, in short, everything it takes to have a decent life. If we defeat the exploiters, we shall establish Soviet power and economic control in Russia, and that is the way it is going to be. (*Stormy applause.*)

First published in 1918
in the book *Transactions of the All-Russia Extraordinary Congress of Railwaymen, Petrograd, January 5-30, 1918*

Published according
to the text of the book

MEETING OF PRESIDIUM OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET WITH DELEGATES FROM FOOD SUPPLY ORGANISATIONS JANUARY 14 (27), 1918[171]

1
ON COMBATING THE FAMINE

I

Vladimirov's data indicate that the old ration should not be changed. Measures must be taken to find what there is available in Petrograd.

II

All these data show that the workers of Petrograd are monstrously inactive. The Petrograd workers and soldiers must understand that they have no one to look to but themselves. The facts of abuse are glaring, the speculation, monstrous; but what have the mass of soldiers and workers done about it? You cannot do anything without rousing the masses to action. A plenary meeting of the Soviet must be called to decide on mass searches in Petrograd and the goods stations. To carry out these searches, each factory and company must form contingents, not on a voluntary basis: it must be the duty of everyone to take part in these searches under the threat of being deprived of his bread card. We can't expect to get anywhere unless we resort to terrorism: speculators must be shot on the spot. Moreover, bandits must be dealt with just as resolutely: they must be shot on the spot.

The rich section of the population must be left without bread for three days because they have stocks of other foodstuffs and can afford to pay the speculators the higher price.

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in the magazine *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 1

Published according
to a handwritten copy
of the Minutes

2
DRAFT RESOLUTION

A plenary meeting of the Petrograd Soviet shall be called to take revolutionary measures to fight speculators and overcome the famine:

(1) All soldiers and workers must be recruited to form several thousand groups (consisting of 10-15 men, and possibly more) who shall be bound to devote a certain number of hours (say, 3-4) daily to the food supply service.

(2) Regiments and factories failing to provide the number of groups required shall be deprived of bread cards, subjected to revolutionary coercive and penal measures.

(3) The groups shall immediately conduct searches, firstly, of railway stations, inspecting and counting cars loaded with grain; secondly, of railway tracks and junctions near Petrograd; thirdly, of all warehouses and private living quarters.

The instructions covering search, counting and requisition shall be worked out by the presidium of the Petrograd Soviet with participation of delegates from the district Soviets or by a special commission.

(4) Speculators who are caught and fully exposed as such shall be shot by the groups on the spot. The same penalty shall be meted out to members of the groups who are exposed as dishonest.

(5) The most reliable and best armed groups of the mass of revolutionary contingents organised to take extreme measures to overcome the famine shall be detailed for dispatch to all stations and all uyezds of the principal grain supplying gubernias. These groups, with the participation of railwaymen delegated by local railway committees, shall be autho-

rised, firstly, to control the movement of grain freights; secondly, take charge of the collection and storage of grain; thirdly, adopt the most extreme revolutionary measures to fight speculators and to requisition grain stocks.

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(6) When making any record of requisition, arrest or execution, the revolutionary contingents shall summon at least six witnesses to be selected from the poorest section of the population closest at hand.

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in the magazine
Krasnaya Letopis No. 1

Published according
to the manuscript

DRAFT DECREE ON THE NATIONALISATION OF THE MERCHANT MARINE AND INLAND WATER TRANSPORT[172]

1
DRAFT DECREE

1. The Council of People's Commissars states that the Central Committee[173] and Tsentrovolga* are entirely in agreement concerning the need to nationalise, immediately and without compensation, all sea-going and river vessels used for commercial purposes.

2. The C.P.C. accordingly resolves that such nationalisation shall be carried out immediately, and authorises a special commission consisting of representatives of the Navy Commissariat, two from the C.C., two from Tsentrovolga, and a chairman appointed by the Supreme Economic Council to work out the following main points of a nationalisation decree and to submit it to the Council of People's Commissars within two days.

3. The nationalisation of the entire fleet is decreed.

4. It is incumbent on the crews and subsequently on the unions of ship workers of each basin and sea to maintain order on board their vessels, safeguard them, etc.

5. The C.C. and Tsentrovolga shall be regarded as caretaker central boards of the nationalised ileet, pending a congress and their merger.

If the merger is not achieved on a voluntary basis, it shall be carried out forcibly by the Soviet Government.

6. The central boards shall operate in full subordination to the local and central organs of Soviet power.

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* The Central Committee of the Volga Fleet.—*Tr.*

2
ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT

This should be added to the *immediate* decree on nationalisation:

(a) arrest of all boards of management (house arrest),
(b) strict liability for damage to vessels, etc.

Written on January 18 (31), 1918

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Published according
to the manuscript

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) JANUARY 19 (FEBRUARY 1), 1918

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin asks what kind of conference should be called.[174] He believes we should have it out with the advocates of a revolutionary war, because their remark seems to hint at the charge that one group within the Party suspects the other of being diplomatic on the question of peace. Actually, there is no diplomacy involved at all, because the armistice decision said quite openly that any side wishing to terminate it must announce its intention to do so seven days before the start of hostilities. On that ground we have been marking time with the peace. How was the decision adopted at the Third Congress of Soviets? It was adopted as proposed by the Central Executive Committee, which adopted its decision on the strength of the Party group decision, and the latter adopted it in line with a C.C. resolution. Lenin believes that the best way to dissuade the comrades favouring a revolutionary war would be for them to go to the front and see for themselves that it is quite impossible to conduct the war. Nor does he see any sense in having a conference, because its decisions could not be binding on the Central Committee; in view of this it might be necessary for us to call a Party congress[175] to get precise instructions from the Party. By dragging out the peace talks we are creating an opportunity to continue fraternisation, and by concluding a peace we could at once have an exchange of prisoners of war, thereby sending to Germany a great mass of people who had seen our revolution in action and had been schooled by it. It would be easier for them to work on

the awakening of a revolution in Germany. He believes, in addition, that in order to ascertain exactly what is going on in Germany we should send aviators to Berlin, which, they say, is quite possible.

2

Comrade Lenin, speaking on a point of order, suggests that Bukharin should give the facts on the state of affairs within the Petrograd Committee.

3

Comrade Lenin makes a concrete proposal. He points out to those who want a conference that it would not heal the rift. A Party congress is a necessity, whereas a conference merely elicits opinion in the Party which should be put on record. With that end in view he proposes the convocation of a meeting representing all shades of opinion and standpoints, each by at least three persons. Such a meeting should work out an agreement.

4

Comrade Lenin suggests the meeting should be held within two or three days, without publishing the theses, which should not be made known to Germany. The question of the conference should not be solved before the meeting, but it would be absurd to defer the question of peace until a congress without publishing the theses.

5

Comrade Lenin proposes a meeting of delegates leaving after the Third Congress of Soviets, without, however, anything being handed out in writing.

6

Comrade Lenin says that the Party programme will not be ready by February 15, and proposes that:

the meeting should be held on January 2D, and should be made up as follows: (1) Central Committee; (2) representatives of clearly expressed opinions, namely, Lenin, Sokolnikov, Bukharin, Obolensky, Stukov. If Smirnov, Obolensky, Stukov and Pyatakov differ, they will send two representatives, and otherwise, one; (3) the Petrograd Committee to be represented by Fenigstein; (4) a Latvian.

Bukharin and Lomov should be authorised to talk it over with the Muscovites and with Pyatakov. Each group to present its own theses.[176]

First published: 1 and 6 in 1922 in N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov), *Works*, Vol. XV; 2 and 5 in 1929, in the book, *Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., August 1917-February 1918*

Published according to a handwritten copy of the Minutes

WIRELESS MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO ALL. SPECIAL TO THE PEACE DELEGATION IN BREST-LITOVSK

We are also extremely alarmed that the line[177] is out of order for which, we think, the Germans are to blame. The Kiev Rada has fallen. All power in the Ukraine is in the hands of the Soviet. The Kharkov Central Executive Committee holds undivided sway over the Ukraine; Bolshevik Kotsubinsky has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Ukrainian Republic. In Finland, the affairs of the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries are hopeless, and workers' resentment is running extremely high. At a congress in the village of Kamenskaya, the Don area, 46 Cossack regiments proclaimed themselves the government, and are fighting against Kaledin. There is great enthusiasm among Petrograd workers over the formation of a Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Berlin. There are rumours that Karl Liebknecht has been released and will soon head the German Government. Tomorrow's sitting of the Petrograd Soviet will discuss a message to the Berlin and Vienna Soviets of Workers.

Written on January 21 (February 3), 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

WIRELESS MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO ALL.

Calling Everybody

A number of newspapers abroad have published false reports of horrors and chaos in Petrograd, etc.

All these reports are absolutely untrue. There is complete calm in Petrograd and Moscow. No socialists have been arrested. Kiev is in the hands of the Ukrainian Soviet authorities. The Kiev bourgeois Rada has fallen and dispersed. The authority of the llkrainian Soviet~ Kharkov has been fully recognised. On the Don, 46 Cossack regiments have revolted against Kaledin. Orenburg has been taken by the Soviet authorities and the Cossack ataman, Dutov, has been routed and is in flight. In Finland, the victory of the Finnish workers' government is being rapidly consolidated, the counter-revolutionary whiteguard troops have been pushed back to the North, and the workers' victory over them is certain.

There has been an improvement in the food situation in Petrograd. Today, January 22, 1918, old style, Petrograd workers are sending 10 carloads of food to aid the Finns.

Information about Germany is very scarce. The Germans are clearly concealing the truth about the revolutionary movement in Germany. Trotsky has telegraphed to Petrograd from Brest-Litovsk that the Germans are dragging out the talks. The German bourgeois press, obviously given its cue, is spreading false reports about Russia to intimidate the public.

A decree on the complete separation of church and state and the confiscation of all church property was published yesterday, January 21, 1918.

Written on January 22
(February 4), 1918

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according
to the manuscript

SPEECH TO PROPAGANDISTS ON THEIR WAY TO THE PROVINCES JANUARY 23 (FEBRUARY 5), 1918

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, you all know that Soviet power has been recognised by the majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants of the Russian nation and of other nations which in the old days were part of Russia by compulsion and are now parts of the free Russian Republic. We now have before us a short struggle against the pathetic remnants of Kaledin's counter-revolutionary troops, who, it seems, has to save himself from the revolutionary Cossacks in his home Don area.

Now that the last bastion of the counter-revolution is about to collapse it is safe to say that Soviet power is growing stronger and it will be consolidated. Everyone can understand this, for there is compelling proof that only this power—the workers, soldiers and peasants in their Soviets—can lead Russia to a free working people's community.

We are confronted with two powerful enemies, the first of which is international capital. There it stands raging at the consolidation of Soviet power it hates. There is no doubt that these multi-millionaires must wage war over an extra piece of the pie grabbed from someone else. There is no doubt either that they are as yet stronger than the Soviet Republic.

But it turns out that although the capitalists are stronger than we are, they have already been sending their men to our Commissars, and might even recognise Soviet power and, what is more, our repudiation of the loans, which for these tightwads would really be a most painful and terrible blow. The fact that the agents of the international financial oligarchy have broached the subject shows that the capi-

talists of the world have reached an impasse. They would love to extricate themselves from the war and throw their full force against the hated Soviet Republic, which has started a conflagration all over Europe and America, but they cannot.

Our revolution sprang from the war: but for the war; we would find the capitalists of the world banded and ranged against us. Their only worry is to prevent the sparks of our fire from falling on their roofs. But you can't throw up a Chinese Wall around Russia. We have yet to hear of a workers' organisation anywhere in the world that is not elated at our decrees on land, nationalisation of the banks, etc.

We may be faced with a stiff fight in the future, but you should never forget, comrades, that in most countries the workers, oppressed by their capitalists, are already awakening, and the Kaledinites of all countries, no matter how they rave, will never be able to consolidate their positions, even if they manage to get in a blow at Russia. Upon the other hand, our position is sound because we have the workers of all countries behind us. (*Applause.*)

Chaos is our other enemy. It has to be fought with greater vigour now that the position of the Soviets has become stronger. That struggle, comrades, is one you must promote. Great importance now attaches to your trip, the trip of propagandists from both government parties now at the head of Soviet power. I believe that in the backwoods you will derive a great deal of satisfaction from persistent efforts to build up Soviet power and spread revolutionary ideas in the villages, eliminate the chaos and liberate the toiling peasants from the village kulaks.

We are faced with some very hard work in healing the wounds of war. The bourgeoisie of other European countries had made better preparations than ours did. Over there they had a correct distribution of foodstuffs, which is why they now have it easier; they also had a system of rotating the soldiers at the front. Nothing of the sort had been done by the tsarist regime or by the Kerensky government, which was a vacillating, conciliating bourgeois regime.

That is why Russia now finds herself in such dire straits. To lay the foundation of socialist society on the ruins

she must solve the tasks of organisation and struggle against those who are war-weary and against the criminal elements who play up the chaos for their own benefit.

Comrades, you have before you some very difficult but, as I have said, satisfying work which boils down to getting the rural economy running and building up Soviet power. But you have assistants, for we know that every worker and peasant earning his own livelihood feels, deep down in his heart, that there is no salvation from famine and ruin but in Soviet power. We can save Russia. There is every indication that Russia has the grain, and it would have been available if we had taken stock of it in good time and distributed it fairly. Cast your mind's eye over the boundless expanses of Russia and her disrupted railways and you will realise that we need to tighten up the control and distribution of grain, if this famine is not to be the end of us all. This can be done only on one condition, which is that each worker, each peasant and each citizen must understand that he has no one to look to but himself. Comrades, no one is going to help you. All the bourgeoisie, the civil servants, the saboteurs are against you, for they know that if the people manage to share out among themselves this national wealth which had been in the hands of the capitalists and kulaks, they will rid Russia of the chaff and the drones. That is why they have mustered against the working people all their forces, ranging from Kaledin and Dutov to the saboteurs, the bribed vagrants and those who are simply weary and are habitually unable to put up any resistance because they are mesmerised by the exploiting bourgeoisie. One day they bribe ignorant soldiers to raid wine and spirit warehouses; the next day they get railway officials to hold up freights or shipowners to hold up grain barges, etc., on their way to the capital. But when the people come to realise that organisation alone will bring cohesion and the conscious discipline of equals, they need have no fear of any tricks on the part of the bourgeoisie.

That is the job you have, that is where you must work to unite, organise and establish Soviet power. Out there in the countryside, you will come across "bourgeois" peasants, the kulaks, who will try to upset Soviet power. It will be easy to fight them because the mass will be on your side.

They will see that it is not punitive expeditions but propagandists that are sent from the centre to bring light to the countryside, to unite those in every village who earn their own livelihood and have never lived at the expense of others.

Take the question of land: it has been declared public propert-y and all types of private property are being abolished. This marks a great step towards the elimination of exploitation.

There will be a struggle between the rich and the working peasants, and it is not bookish help that the poor need but experience and actual participation in the struggle. We did not take away the land from the landowners to let the rich peasants and the kulaks get it. It is for the poor. This will win you the sympathies of the poor peasants.

You must see to it that farm implements and machines do not remain in the hands of the kulaks and rich peasants. They must belong to Soviet power and be temporarily allotted to the working peasants for their use, through the volost committees. They themselves must see to it that these machines are not used to enrich the kulaks but to cultivate their own land.

Every peasant will help you in this difficult task. You must explain to the people in the villages that the kulaks and sharks must be pulled up short. There is need for an even distribution of products so that the working people can enjoy the fruits of the people's labour. Ten working people must stand up against every rich man who stretches out his avaricious paw towards public property.

The Soviets have a revenue of 8,000 million and an expenditure of 28,0~0 million. With such a state of affairs we are naturally going to fail, unless we manage to pull the state chariot out of the bog into which the tsarist regime drove it.

The external war is over or nearly so. There is no doubt on that score. It is an internal war that is now before us. The bourgeoisie, its plundered goods hidden in its chests, is not worried and thinks: "We shall sit this out." The people must ferret out the sharks and make them disgorge. This is your task in the localities. If we are not to collapse, we must get at them in their hideouts. It is not the police who must make them disgorge—the police are dead and buried—the

people themselves must do this, and there is no other way of fighting them.

One old Bolshevik gave a correct explanation of Bolshevism to a Cossack.

The Cossack asked him: "Is it true that you Bolsheviks plunder?" "Yes, indeed," said the old man,"we plunder the plunder."[178]

We shall sink in this sea unless we manage to extract from those coffers all that is stored in them, all that has been amassed through plunder over the years of ruthless criminal exploitation.

We in the Central Executive Committee will soon adopt a law on a new tax on the property holders, but it is up to you to put this through in the localities and get the working people to lay their hands on all the hundred ruble notes tucked away since the war. But this should not be done by force of arms: the shooting war is over but this one is ahead of us.

Our revolution will not be overthrown by the force of the exploiters, if we go about this business efficiently, because the world proletariat is on our side.

Pravda No. 18, February 6 (January 24), 1918

Published according to the *Pravda* text

TROTSKY. RUSSIAN PEACE DELEGATION. BREST-LITOVSK

REPLY[179]

January 28, 6.30 p.m.

You know our standpoint; it has lately been confirmed, especially after Ioffe's letter. We repeat: nothing remains of the Kiev Rada, and the Germans will have to recognise this fact, if they have not done so already.

Keep us informed.

Lenin

Written on January 28 (February 10), 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE LAND COMMITTEE CONGRESS AND THE PEASANT SECTION OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF SOVIETS JANUARY 28 (FEBRUARY 10), 1918[180]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

We are now engaged in the great task of consolidating the gains of the working masses, the great task of uniting the workers, soldiers and peasants. At the Peasant Congress where the Rights had a majority I said that if the peasants recognised all our demands we in turn would support all the peasant demands, the chief of which is socialisation of land.* We have now done this. We have passed the world's first law abolishing all private ownership of land. We now have power, the power of the Soviets. This power, brought to the fore by the people themselves, lays a sound foundation for the great cause of world peace. The war has been stopped, and demobilisation has been ordered on every front. There is still the war against the bourgeoisie which is mobilising all its forces to fight Soviet power. We have almost put an end to the Russian counter-revolution. We are gaining the upper hand in almost every battle fought on all the fronts. There is still another enemy; it is international capital; the fight against this enemy will be a long one and we shall win by getting organised and obtaining support for our revolution from the international proletariat. We are still faced with a big fight, the class struggle at home. This is an economic struggle against the bourgeoisie, who, directly or indirectly, support our enemies and who will try to establish economic domination over the working masses.

One thing that we suffer from, that makes our country weak, is the lack of money. The big kulaks in town and country still have lots of money, which is evidence of their

* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 486-505.—*Ed.*

exploitation of the people's labour, and which must belong to the people. We are sure that the working peasants will declare a ruthless war against the kulaks, their oppressors, and will help us in our struggle for the people's better future and for socialism.

Published on February 15 (2), 1918
in the newspaper *Izvestia Sovetov Rabochikh, Soldatskikh i Krestyanskikh Deputatov Goroda Moskvy i Moskovskoi Oblasti* No. 25

Published according to the newspaper text

STATEMENTS MADE AT THE MORNING SITTING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) FEBRUARY 18, 1918[181]

MINUTES

1

Item under discussion: German offensive. A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov) moves a proposal to adjourn the debate.

Comrade Lenin objects, but proposes that a five-minute limit should be set for speakers expressing group opinions.

2

Following a decision to continue the debate, N. I. Bukharin moves that more speakers should be given the floor.

Comrade Lenin objects to this and proposes that the matter should be reduced to the dispatch or non-dispatch of a telegram with an offer of peace, and the pros and cons heard.

Lenin's proposal is adopted.

3

L. D. Trotsky opposes the dispatch of a telegram with an offer of peace.

Comrade Lenin (speaking in favour of a peace offer). Yesterday's vote was especially characteristic, with everyone recognising the need for peace in the event of an offensive but no movement in Germany.[182] There is good cause to believe that the Germans want an offensive in order to overthrow the Soviet Government. We face a situation which calls for action. If an imperialist offensive clearly gets under way, we shall then all be in favour of defence?

and this can be explained to the people. If an offensive gets under way now, and we explain this to the masses later, we shall create more confusion than if we now continue negotiations for an extension of the armistice; there is no time to lose in this because the masses will never understand such an approach. Either we wage a revolutionary war for the socialisation of land, something the masses can understand, or we continue the peace negotiations.

First published:
1 and 2 in 1928, in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 2;
3 in 1922, in N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov), *Works*, Vol. XV

Published according to a handwritten copy of the Minutes

SPEECHES AT THE EVENING SITTING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) FEBRUARY 18, 1918[183]

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin. This is a basic question. Uritsky's proposal is amazing. The Central Committee voted against a revolutionary war, but we have neither war nor peace, and are being drawn into a revolutionary war. War is no joke. We are losing railway cars, and our transport is breaking down. We cannot wait any longer because the situation has fully crystallised. The people will not understand this: since there is a war on, there should have been no demobilisation; the Germans will now take everything. This thing has gone so far that continued sitting on the fence will inevitably ruin the revolution. Ioffe wrote from Brest that there was no sign of a revolution in Germany; if that is so the Germans will find their advance very rewarding. We cannot afford to wait, which would mean consigning the Russian revolution to the scrap-heap. If the Germans said that they wanted to overthrow Bolshevik power, we would naturally have to fight; no more procrastination is permissible. It is now no longer a matter of the past but of the present. If we apply to the Germans, all we have is a piece of paper. You can't call that a policy. The only thing we can do is offer the Germans a resumption of the talks. There is no half-way house in this. If it is to be revolutionary war it must be declared, and the demobilisation stopped, but we can't go on in this manner. While we engage in paperwork, they take warehouses and railway cars, leaving us to perish.

The issue now is that while playing with war we have been surrendering the revolution to the Germans.

History will say that you have surrendered the revolution. We could have concluded a peace which held no threat to the revolution. We have nothing, we have not even get the time to blow up anything as we retreat. We have done our best to help the revolution in Finland, but now we can do no more. This is not the time for an exchange of notes, and this temporising must stop. It is too late to put out feelers, because it is quite clear now that the Germans can launch an offensive. We cannot argue against the advocates of a revolutionary war, but we can and must argue against the temporisers. An offer of peace must be made to the Germans.

FROM MARX TO MAO

2

Comrade Lenin. Bukharin failed to notice how he went over to the position of a revolutionary war. The peasants do not want war and will not fight. Can we now tell the peasants to fight a revolutionary war? But if that is what we want we should not have demobilised the army. It is a utopia to want a permanent peasant war. A revolutionary war must not be a mere phrase. If we are not ready, we must conclude peace. Since we have demobilised the army it is ridiculous to talk of a permanent war. There is no comparison at all with a civil war. The muzhik will not have a revolutionary war, and will overthrow anyone who openly calls for one. The revolution in Germany has not yet started, and we know that over here, too, our revolution did not win out all at once. It has been said here that they would take Lifland and Estland; but we can give them up for the sake of the revolution. If they should want us to withdraw our troops from Finland, well and good—let them take revolutionary Finland. The revolution will not be lost if we give up Finland, Lifland and Estland. The prospects with which Comrade Ioffe tried to scare us yesterday do not at all spell ruin to the revolution.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

I propose a declaration that we are willing to conclude the peace the Germans offered us yesterday; should they add to this non-interference in the affairs of the Ukraine, Finland, Lifland and Estland, we should unquestionably

accept all that as well. Our soldiers are in a poor state; the Germans want grain, they will take it and go back, making it impossible for Soviet power to continue in existence. To say that the demobilisation has been stopped is to be overthrown.

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in N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov),
Works, Vol. XV

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to a handwritten copy
of the Minutes

DRAFT WIRELESS MESSAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH[184]

The Council of People's Commissars lodges a protest over the German Government's movement of troops against the Russian Soviet Republic, which had declared the state of war ended and had started to demobilise its army on all fronts. The Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia could not have expected such a step, especially since neither of the parties to the armistice had, directly or indirectly, made any announcement either on February 10, or at any other time, that the armistice was at an end, as both parties to the treaty of December 2 (15), 1917 had undertaken to do.

The Council of People's Commissars finds itself forced, in the situation that has arisen, to declare its readiness formally to conclude peace on the terms the German Government demanded at Brest-Litovsk.

At the same time, the Council of People's Commissars expresses its readiness, if the German Government should formulate its precise peace terms, to reply within 12 hours whether or not these terms are acceptable.

Written on the night of February 18, 1918

Message published on February 19 (6), 1918 in *Pravda* No. 30 (evening edition)

Published according to the manuscript

DIRECT-LINE CONVERSATION WITH THE MOSCOW SOVIET FEBRUARY 20, 1918

At 2.15 p.m. the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Lenin, was called up by Comrade Feldman, member of the Executive Committee, who, on behalf of the Bolshevik group, asked Comrade Lenin the following:

(1) What happened after the receipt of the telegram from Berlin;

(2) What measures have been taken by the Council of People's Commissars at present;

(3) Whether or not there was any other reply from Berlin apart from Hoffmann's telegram.

To the first question Comrade Lenin replied:

There is no army; the Germans are attacking from Riga along the entire front. They have taken Dvinsk and Rezhitsa and are on their way to Lutsk and Minsk. Those who want to do something—and stop talking—must conclude peace and continue the task of consolidating and extending the revolution at home.

To the second question:

Until the offensives are stopped, an order has been issued to put up resistance wherever possible, and destroy everything, down to the last hunk of bread, all along the way.

To the third question:

No, there was none.

Published on February 21 (8), 1918 in the newspaper *Izvestia Sovetov Rabochikh, Soldatskikh i Krestyanskikh Deputatov Goroda Moskvy i Moskovskoi Oblasti* No. 29

Published according to the newspaper text

NOTES

[1] The letters on pp. 19-21 and 22-27 were discussed by the Central Committee on September 15 (28), 1917, which decided to call a meeting shortly to discuss tactics. The following question was put to the vote: preservation of only one copy of Lenin's letters. The vote was 6 in favour, four against and six abstentions. Kamenev, an opponent of the Party's course towards a socialist revolution, motioned a resolution aimed against Lenin's proposals to organise an armed uprising. Kamenev's motion was defeated. p. 19

[2] *May 6*: announcement of the first coalition Provisional Government; *August 31*: the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies passed a Bolshevik resolution calling for the establishment of a Soviet Government; *September 12*: the date set by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, both dominated by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, for the convocation of a Democratic Conference. The Democratic Conference took place in Petrograd, September 14-22 (September 27-October 5), 1917. For details see pp. 43-51 and 52-58 of this volume. p. 19

[3] *Socialist-Revolutionaries*—a petty-bourgeois party founded in late 1901 and early 1902 through the merger of various Narodnik groups and circles (League of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Socialist-Revolutionary Party, etc.) which professed a hotch-potch of Narodnik and revisionist ideas. During the First World War, most of its members held social-chauvinist views.

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks, were the mainstay of the bourgeois-landowner Provisional Government, and the Party's leaders (Avksentyev, Kerensky and Chernov) were in the Cabinet. The Party refused to support the peasant demand for the abolition of landed estates and favoured the preservation of large holdings; its ministers in the Provisional Government sent

punitive expeditions against peasants who seized tracts of large estates.

At the end of November 1917, the Left wing formed a separate party, which, in an effort to retain its influence among the peasants, went through the motions of recognising Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. Very soon, however, they began to fight against Soviet power.

During the foreign armed intervention and Civil War the Socialist-Revolutionaries engaged in subversion and gave active support to the interventionists and whiteguards; they took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and staged terroristic acts against Soviet Government and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War, they continued to engage in their hostile activity at home and among the whiteguard émigrés abroad. p. 19

[4] *The All-Russia Democratic Conference* was called by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which was dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, to decide on the question of state power, but its actual purpose was to switch the attention of the masses away from the mounting revolutionary movement. It was first set for September 12 (25), and later postponed to September 14-22 (September 27-October 5), 1917, when it was held in Petrograd and attended by more than 1,500 delegates. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders did their utmost to reduce the number of workers' and peasants' delegates and increase those of various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois groups, thereby securing a majority.

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) met on September 3 (16) and decided to take part. It circulated a letter among local Party organisations instructing them to "do their utmost to build up the largest possible well-knit group of delegates from among our Party members". The Bolsheviks decided to attend in order to expose the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The tactics of the Bolsheviks in respect of the Democratic Conference were outlined by Lenin in two of his letters (see pp. 19-21 and 22-27.

The Democratic Conference adopted a resolution on the establishment of a Pre-parliament (Caretaker Council of the Republic), which was an attempt to create the impression that Russia now had a parliamentary system. Actually, according to the Provisional Government's ordinance, the Pre-parliament was to be a consultative body under the Government.

A meeting of the Bolshevik delegates to the Democratic Conference called by the Central Committee decided, by a vote of 77 to 50, to take part in the Pre-parliament.

In the articles on pp. 43-51, 52-58 and 74-85, Lenin had some criticism to make of the Bolshevik tactics in respect of the Democratic Conference; he flatly demanded that the Bolsheviks should withdraw from the Pre-parliament and concentrate on preparing for the insurrection. The Central Committee debated Lenin's proposal

and adopted a resolution on the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-parliament despite resistance on the part of Kamenev, Rykov and other capitulants. On October 7 (20), the opening day of the Pre-parliament, the Bolsheviks read out a declaration and walked out. p. 19

[5] The Provisional Government announced the convocation of the Constituent Assembly in its declaration of March 2 (15), 1917. On June 14 (27) it adopted a decision setting the election for September 17 (30), but in August postponed the date to November 12 (25).

The election was actually held after the October Socialist Revolution at the appointed time and on party lists drawn up before the revolution, in accordance with a Provisional Government ordinance. At the time of the election the bulk of the people had not yet realised the full implications of the socialist revolution, a fact which the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries used to win a majority in the areas remote from the capital and the industrial centres. The Constituent Assembly was called by the Soviet Government and opened in Petrograd on January 5 (18), 1918. Its counter-revolutionary majority rejected the *Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People*, which was placed before it by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, and refused to recognise Soviet power. It was dissolved by a decree of the Central Executive Committee on January 6 (19). For details see pp. 379-83, 434-36, 437-41 of this volume. p. 20

[6] See Engels's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany* which was published in instalments in the *New York Daily Tribune* in 1851 and 1852. It bore Marx's signature, who had intended to write the work but was too busy with his economic studies and asked Engels to do it. Engels consulted Marx on various points and submitted the articles for his perusal before dispatching them to the paper. The fact that the work was written by Engels came out later with the publication of their correspondence. p. 21

[7] *Blanquism*—a trend within the French socialist movement led by Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881), an outstanding utopian communist. "Blanquism expects that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals" (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 392). The trend failed to reckon with the concrete situation, which must be taken into account if an insurrection is to succeed, and neglected to establish ties with the masses. p. 22

[8] What Lenin has in mind are the mass demonstrations which took place in Petrograd on July 3-4 (16-17), 1917. It was a movement of soldiers, sailors and workers, who were incensed at the Provisional Government for sending troops into a patently hopeless

offensive which proved a fiasco. It started on July 3 (16) with a demonstration by the First Machine-Gun Regiment in the Vyborg District, and threatened to develop into an armed revolt against the Provisional Government.

The Bolshevik Party was opposed to insurrection at that time because it believed that the revolutionary crisis had not yet come to a head. The Central Committee, meeting at 4.00 p.m. on July 3 (16), decided to refrain from taking action, and a similar decision was adopted by the Second Petrograd City Conference of Bolsheviks which was just then in session. Its delegates went to the factories and the districts to stop the masses from going into action, but the movement had already got underway and nothing could be done to stop it.

Late that night, the Central Committee, together with the Petrograd Committee and the Military Organisation, took account of the mood of the masses and decided to take part in the demonstration to lend it a peaceful and organised character. Lenin was away on a short holiday after an exhausting stretch of work. Being informed of the events, he returned to Petrograd on the morning of July 4 (17) and assumed leadership.

More than 500,000 persons took part in the demonstration on July 4 (17). The demonstrators carried Bolshevik slogans, such as "All Power to the Soviets", and demanded that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviet should take power. But the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders refused to do so. The Provisional Government, with the knowledge and consent of the Central Executive Committee, which was dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, sent detachments of officer cadets and Cossacks to attack and shoot down the peaceful demonstrators. Counter-revolutionary troops were brought in from the front to disperse the demonstrations.

That night, Lenin presided at a meeting of members of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee, which adopted a decision to stop the demonstrations in an organised manner. This was a wise step, for it helped to save the main revolutionary force from defeat. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries acted in a manner which helped the counter-revolutionaries: they joined the bourgeoisie in attacking the Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik newspapers, *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda* (Soldiers' Truth) and others were closed down by the Provisional Government, while the *Trud* Printing House, operated on funds donated by the workers, was destroyed. The workers were disarmed and arrested, and searches and persecution were started. The revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison were withdrawn from the capital and sent to the front.

After the July events, power in the country passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government, with the Soviet an impotent appendage. The period of dual power was at an end, and so was the revolution's peaceful stage. The Bolsheviks were faced with the task of preparing an armed insurrection to overthrow the Provisional Government. p. 23

[9] The counter-revolutionary revolt of the bourgeoisie and the landowners in August 1917, which was headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the tsarist General Kornilov. The plotters planned to take Petrograd, destroy the Bolshevik Party, disperse the Soviets and set up a military dictatorship with a view to restoring the monarchy. Kerensky, the head of the Provisional Government, took part in the plot, but when the revolt got under way he realised that he would be swept away with Kornilov and washed his hands of the whole business: be declared the revolt was aimed against the Provisional Government.

It broke out on August 25 (September 7), with Kornilov sending the Third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd, where counter-revolutionary organisations were itching to go into action.

The mass struggle against Kornilov was led by the Bolshevik Party, which continued, as Lenin demanded, to expose the Provisional Government and its Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik accomplices. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party rallied the workers of Petrograd, and the revolutionary soldiers and sailors to struggle against the mutineers. Petrograd workers swiftly organised Red Guard units and revolutionary committees were set up in several places. The advance of the Kornilov troops was stopped and their morale undermined by Bolshevik agitators.

The Kornilov revolt was crushed by the workers and peasants led by the Bolshevik Party. Under the pressure of the masses, the Provisional Government was forced to order the arrest and prosecution of Kornilov and his accomplices on charges of organising the revolt. p. 23

[10] *Cadets* (Constitutional-Democratic Party)—the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia, set up in October 1905. Its membership was made up of capitalists, landowners serving on local councils and bourgeois intellectuals. Among its more prominent members were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, and P. B. Struve. The Cadets eventually developed into a party of the imperialist bourgeoisie. During the First World War they actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of aggrandisement. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, they tried to save the monarchy; playing a keg part in the bourgeois Provisional Government, they conducted a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the people's interests.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution they became rabid enemies of Soviet power and took part in all the counter-revolutionary military operations and the campaigns of the interventionists. After the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards, the Cadets fled abroad to continue their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity. p. 23

[11] *The Alexandrinsky Theatre* in Petrograd was the place where the Democratic Conference was convened.

The Peter and Paul Fortress on the Neva opposite the Winter Palace, served as a state prison for the tsar's political opponents. Now a museum, it had a large arsenal and was strategically situated. p. 27

[12] *The Savage Division*—formed during the First World War from volunteer mountaineers of the North Caucasus. General Kornilov tried to use it as a battering ram in his assault on revolutionary Petrograd. p. 27

[13] *Birzhevka* (*Birzheviye Vedomosti*—Stock Exchange Recorder)—a bourgeois newspaper founded in 1880. Published in Petrograd three, then four times a week, then as a daily, and finally, in 1902 as a daily with two editions. It won notoriety for corruption and lack of principle. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February its editors launched a campaign of incitement against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet in late October 1917. p. 28

[14] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily, the central organ of the Cadet Party, published in Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906. After the February revolution, it gave active support to the Provisional Government's home and foreign policy, and carried on a vicious campaign against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued to be published until August 1918 under the names of *Nasha Rech*, *Svobodnaya Rech*, *Vek*, *Novaya Rech*, and *Nash Vek*. p. 28

[15] The reference is to the following facts. On April 20 (May 3), the newspapers carried a note from Foreign Minister Milyukov to the Allied Governments in which the Provisional Government reaffirmed its intention to honour all the treaties of the tsarist government and to carry on the war to a victorious end. There was massive indignation over this imperialist policy, and on April 21 (May 4), the workers of Petrograd responded to a call issued by the Bolshevik Party and downed tools. They staged a demonstration which demanded peace and was attended by more than 100,000 workers and soldiers. Protest demonstrations were also staged in Moscow, the Urals, the Ukraine, Kronstadt and other towns and districts. Resolutions protesting against Milyukov's note were received by the Petrograd Soviet from many urban Soviets.

The April demonstration led to a government crisis. Mass pressure forced Milyukov and Guchkov to resign from the Cabinet. The first coalition government was formed on May 5 (18), and consisted of 10 capitalist ministers and leaders of the parties collaborating with them, namely, Kerensky and Chernov from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; Tsereteli and Skobelev from the Mensheviks, etc. The bourgeois government was saved by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks who openly sided with the bourgeoisie. p. 29

[16] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Newspaper) published daily by the Mensheviks in Petrograd from March 7 (20) to November 30 (December 13), 1917; from August 30 (September 12) it was the organ of the Menshevik Central Committee. It supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, fought against the Bolshevik Party and its leader, Lenin, and bristled with hostility at the October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power.

p. 30

[17] *Dyelo Naroda* (People's Cause)—a daily, the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries; published in Petrograd from March 1917 to July 1918, under various names. It took a defencist attitude, collaborated with the capitalists and supported the Provisional Government. It resumed publication in Samara in October 1918 (four issues) and in Moscow in March 1919 (10 issues), and was closed down for counter-revolutionary activity. p. 30

[18] *Proletarskoye Dyelo* (Proletarian Cause)—a daily, the organ of the Bolshevik group of the Kronstadt Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Published in 1917 instead of the *Golos Pravdy* (Voice of Truth), which had been closed down by the Provisional Government in July. p. 30

[19] *Pravda* (Truth)—a legal Bolshevik daily; first issue out in Petersburg on April 22 (May 5), 1912.

Lenin provided *Pravda* with ideological direction, wrote for it almost daily, and issued instructions to its editors to make it a militant revolutionary newspaper.

A considerable part of the Party's organisational effort was carried out in its editorial offices, where members of local Party cells held meetings, information was collected on Party activities at the factories, and Party directives of the Central and Petersburg Committees were issued.

Pravda was constantly harassed by the police and was closed down on July 8 (21), 1914.

It resumed publication after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. On March 5 (18), 1917, it became the organ of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

When Lenin returned to Petrograd he became a member of its editorial board and the newspaper launched a campaign for his plan of turning the bourgeois-democratic revolution in a socialist revolution.

Owing to the Provisional Government's persecution, the paper appeared under various names, such as *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy* and *Rabochy Put* between July and October 1917. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, on October 29 (November 9), 1917, the paper continued publication under its original name. p. 32

[20] On June 9 (22), 1917, the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets prohibited the demonstration set by the Bolshevik Central Com-

mittee for June 10 (23). The decision to stage the demonstration was adopted at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) together with delegates from the districts, army units, trade unions and factory committees. The demonstration was to have shown the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets that the Petrograd workers and soldiers wanted the Soviets to take all state power. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to prevent the demonstration from taking place and pushed a resolution through the congress to that effect.

The Bolshevik Central Committee did not wish to oppose the Congress decision and at Lenin's suggestion withdrew its decision on the night of June 9 (22). Members of the Central Committee, Petrograd Committee, and Party activists went to the factories and barracks to convince the workers and soldiers to stay in. Their efforts were successful and the workers and soldiers agreed that a demonstration would be badly timed.

The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leadership of the Congress of Soviets decided to stage a demonstration on June 18 (July 30) as an expression of confidence in the Provisional Government.

Lenin led the Central and Petrograd Committees in a great effort to prepare a demonstration showing the true feelings of the masses. On the eve of the demonstration, June 17 (30), *Pravda* carried an appeal from the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee, the Central Committee's Military Organisation, and the Central Council of Factory Committees calling on the people to demonstrate the strength of the revolution.

Some 500,000 workers and soldiers took part in the demonstration on June 18 (July 1), with the overwhelming majority carrying the revolutionary slogans of the Bolshevik Party. Only a small group carried the slogans of the collaborating parties, which urged support for the Provisional Government. The demonstration showed the mounting revolutionary activity of the masses and the Bolshevik Party's growing influence, it was a great victory for the Bolshevik Party. It showed that the masses put no trust in the Provisional Government, and the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary policy of collaborating with the bourgeoisie. p. 33

[21] Called by the Provisional Government on August 12 (25), 1917, to rally the forces of the bourgeoisie and landowners. It was a counter-revolutionary affair attended mostly by big businessmen and industrialists, bankers, landowners, and members of the tsarist Duma. The delegates of the Soviets came from the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. Generals Kornilov, Alekseyev, Kaledin and others put forward a plan to crush the revolution. Kerensky threatened to stamp out the revolutionary movement and use force against peasants who seized tracts of landed estates. The Bolshevik Central Committee called on the proletariat to protest against the Moscow Conference. In Moscow, the Bolsheviks staged a one-day general strike to mark its opening. More than

400,000 workers responded. Protest meetings and strikes were also staged in other cities. p. 33

[22] *Vendée*—a province in France, which was a hotbed of counter-revolution during the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the 18th century. The backward peasants of the Vendée, who were strongly influenced by the Catholic clergy, were a tool in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries in their fight against revolutionary France. p. 33

[23] *Yedinstvo* (Unity)—a daily published in Petrograd from March to November-1917, and also in December 1917 and January 1918 under other names; edited by Plekhanov. It united the extreme Right-wing group of the Menshevik defencists and gave unconditional support for the bourgeois Provisional Government. It waged a vicious fight against the Bolshevik Party. p. 35

[24] *Dyen* (Day)—a bourgeois-liberal daily published in Petersburg from 1912. It had active Menshevik contributors and finally fell into their hands after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 35

[25] *Buchanan, George William* (1855-1924)—British diplomat and ambassador to Russia (1910-1918). He helped the reactionaries in their anti-revolutionary fight and in August 1917 gave support to Kornilov's counter-revolutionary revolt. p. 37

[26] *Izvestia*—a daily newspaper published from February 28 (March 13), 1917. It was first issued by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Following the formation at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the paper became the organ of the Executive, and from August 1 (14) (No. 132) was called the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet, and from September 29 (October 12) (No. 184), the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. All this time the paper was under the control of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and waged a fierce fight against the Bolshevik Party.

After the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the paper came under a new editorial board and became the official organ of the Soviet power. It carried the first major documents adopted by the Soviet Government, and Lenin's articles and speeches. When the U.S.S.R. came into being in December 1922, the paper became the organ of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and the All-Russia Executive Committee. It was reorganised under a decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of January 24, 1938, and since January 26, 1938, has

been known as the organ of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies. p. 41

[27] An abridged version of the article was first published in No. 19 of *Rabochy Put* of October 7 (September 24),1917, under the title "Heroes of Fraud". It did not contain the part of Lenin's article which criticised the mistakes of the Bolsheviks in respect of the Democratic Conference, and also those of Zinoviev and Kamenev. It may have been this Lenin had in mind when in Chapter VI of the article "The Crisis Has Matured", which was circulated among members of the Central Committee, the Petrograd and Moscow Committees and the Soviets, he wrote with indignation that the Central Organ was deleting his statements about "the glaring errors on the part of the Bolsheviks..." (see p. 84 of this volume).

The first, second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works* contained the text of the article as it had appeared in *Rabochy Put*, but in the fourth edition it was published in full, according to the manuscript; this translation follows the manuscript. p. 43

[28] *Lieberdans*—an ironical nickname which stuck to the Mensheviks Lieber and Dan and their followers, after Demyan Bedny's feuilleton in *Sotsial-Demokrat* [No. 141 of August 25 (September 7), 1917], under that title. p. 43

[29] On June 3 (16), 1907, the tsar issued a manifesto dissolving the Second State Duma and amending the electoral law. The landowners, industrialists and merchants were given many more seats in the Duma, and the workers and peasants very many less. This was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, and the Fundamental Law of 1906, which made all Government decrees subject to Duma approval. The Third Duma, which was elected under the new law and met on November 1 (14), 1907, was out-and-out reactionary. p. 46

[30] *Rabochy Put* (The Workers' Path)—the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party, a daily published from September 3 (16) to October 26 (November 8), 1917 in place of the newspaper *Pravda*, which was closed down by the Provisional Government. On October 27 (November 9), *Pravda* resumed publication under its original name. p. 49

[31] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Social-Democrat)—a daily, the organ of the Moscow Regional Bureau, and the Moscow Committee, and later, also of the Moscow District Committee of the Bolshevik Party; published from March 1917 to March 1918. When the Soviet Government and the Party's Central Committee moved to Moscow the paper was merged with *Pravda*. p. 49

[32] *Russkaya Volya* (Russia's Freedom)—a bourgeois daily founded by the tsarist Minister of the Interior Protopopov, and subsidised

by the major banks. Published in Petrograd from December 1916. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, it conducted a slanderous campaign against the Bolsheviks. Lenin said it was "one of the rottenest bourgeois newspapers". Closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee on October 25 (November 7), 1917. p. 50

[33] *Bulygin Duma*—a consultative "representative institution", which the tsarist government promised to convene in 1905. The draft law on the institution of a consultative Duma and the election law were worked out by a commission chaired by the Minister of the Interior Bulygin, and published on August 6 (19), 1905. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Duma which the Government failed to convoke: it was swept away by the general political strike in October. p. 54

[34] See Note 29. p. 55

[35] *Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadyevich* (1862-1911)—tsarist statesman and big landowner. From 1906 to 1911, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior. His name applies to a period of fierce political reaction in which he tried to shore up the autocratic regime by putting through some reforms from above in the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. p. 55

[36] *Tit Titych*—a merchant from Ostrovsky's comedy *Shouldering Another's Troubles*, personifying the petty tyranny of the rich. p. 56

[37] See Note 2. p. 56

[38] *Izvestia Vserossiiskogo Soveta Krestyanskikh Deputatov* (News of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies)—a daily, the official organ of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, published in Petrograd from May 9 (22) to December 1917. It expressed the views of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It met the October Socialist Revolution with hostility and was closed down for counter-revolutionary propaganda. p. 64

[39] *Russkoye Slovo* (Russian Word)—a daily published in Moscow from 1895 (a pilot issue was published in 1894). Ostensibly independent, it took a moderately liberal attitude in the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie. In 1917, the paper sided with the bourgeois Provisional Government and bitterly attacked Lenin and the Bolshevik Party.

In November 1917, it was closed down for carrying slanderous anti-Soviet reports. From January 1918, it appeared for a time under the name of *Novoye Slovo* (New Word) and *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word). It was finally closed down in July 1918. p. 66

[40] A fortified area on the Finnish border which with Kronstadt protected the approaches to Petrograd. p. 70

[41] The reference is to Deputy of the Finnish Diet K. Vijk, in whose country-house at Mälm station Lenin stayed for a day when on his way to Helsingfors. p. 72

[42] A collection published in 1917 by the Regional Bureau of the Moscow Industrial District of the R.S.D.L.P., consisting of articles by V. Milyutin, V. Sokolnikov, A. Lomov, and V. Smirnov. The foreword said the collection was being published in connection with the forthcoming Party Congress which was to review the programme. In his article "Revision of the Party Programme" (see pp. 149-78) Lenin gave a detailed analysis and criticism of the articles of Sokolnikov and Smirnov. p. 73

[43] Written in Vyborg. It consisted of six chapters, the last not being intended for publication but for circulation among members of the Central Committee, the Petrograd and Moscow Committees and the Soviets. Only the manuscript of the last two chapters has come down to us. The article was first published in four chapters in *Rabochy Put* No. 30 of October 20 (7), 1917; a comparison of the newspaper text and the manuscript shows that one of the chapters was omitted and Chapter V was headed as Chapter IV.

The article was widely carried by Bolshevik periodicals. p. 74

[44] The reference is to the revolutionary action by German sailors in August 1917, who were led by a revolutionary sailors' organisation numbering 4,000 members (late July 1917). It was led by seamen Max Reichpietsch and Albin Köbis of the *Friedrich der Grosse*. The organisation decided to fight for a democratic peace and prepare for an uprising. Manifestations broke out in the navy in early August. Sailors of the warship *Prinzeregent Luitpold*, which was at Wilhelmshaven, took absence without leave to fight for the release of their comrades who had earlier been arrested for staging a strike; on August 16, the firemen of the *Westphalia* refused to work; at the same time the crew of the cruiser *Nürnberg*, which was out at sea, staged an uprising. The sailors' movement spread to the ships of several squadrons at Wilhelmshaven . These manifestations were put down with great savagery. Reichpietsch and Köbis were shot and other active participants were sentenced to long terms of hard labour. p. 74

[45] The reference is to what an officer, Dubasov, said at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on September 21 (October 4), 1917. He had just returned from the front and declared: "Whatever you may say over here, the soldiers will not fight". p. 80

[46] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Recorder)—a daily published in Moscow from 1863, expressing the views of moderate liberal intellectuals. From 1905 the paper was an organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. In 1918, it was closed down at the same time as other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 80

[47] The reference is to the nation-wide strike of railwaymen for higher wages. It started on the night of September 23 (October 6), 1917, and threw the Provisional Government into a panic. The bourgeois press attacked the striking railwaymen.

The strike was discussed by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on September 24 (October 7), 1917. In an appeal, "Let's Help the Railwaymen", which was published in *Rabochy Put* (The Workers' Path), the Central Committee exposed the counter-revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government and called on the proletariat to express full sympathy for the railwaymen, protect them from the provocative attacks of the counter-revolutionaries and do everything to prevent their strike from being isolated and defeated. The strike ended on the night of September 26 (October 9), 1917, when the Provisional Government satisfied some of the railwaymen's demands. p. 81

[48] The reference is to the attitude of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky and their followers. Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed Lenin's plan for an armed uprising, declaring that the working class of Russia was incapable of carrying out a socialist revolution. They slid down to the Menshevik position of demanding a bourgeois republic. Trotsky insisted on a postponement of the uprising until the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which meant frustrating the insurrection because this gave the Provisional Government a chance to concentrate its forces on the opening day of the Congress and crush the uprising. p. 82

[49] Written at Vyborg in late September-October 1 (14), 1917. First published in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* (Education) No. 1-2 for October 1917.

Prosveshcheniye, a monthly Bolshevik theoretical journal legally published in Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. It had a peak circulation of 5,000.

It was put out on Lenin's suggestion, and contained contributions from Vorovsky, Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Krupskaya, Olminsky and others. Gorky edited the belles-lettres section. Lenin directed its policy from Paris and then from Cracow and Poronin; he edited some of the articles and kept up a regular correspondence with members of the editorial board.

The magazine exposed opportunists—liquidators, otzovists and Trotskyites—and also bourgeois nationalists, and reported on the working-class struggle at the time of the new revolutionary upsurge; it popularised Bolshevik slogans in the electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma and opposed revisionism and centrism in the parties of the Second International. It had a great part to play in educating forward-looking workers in Russia in the Marxist international spirit.

On the eve of the First World War, in June 1914 it was closed down by the tsarist government, and resumed publication in the autumn of 1917, but only one double issue was put out. p. 87

[50] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—a Menshevik daily, the organ of a group of Social-Democrats known as the internationalists, among whom were Mensheviks, the followers of Martov and Menshevik minded intellectuals. Published in Petrograd from April 1917 to July 1918. p. 90

[51] This happened on June 4 (17), 1917, during a speech of the Menshevik Tsereteli, a Minister of the Provisional Government, who had said that there was no political party in Russia which was prepared to take full power in the country. On behalf of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin interrupted Tsereteli with the remark: "There is!" In his speech from the rostrum later, Lenin declared that the Bolshevik Party "is ready to take over full power at any moment" (see present edition Vol. 25, p. 20). p. 90

[52] From Nekrasov's poem, *Blessed Is the Gentle Poet.* p. 95

[53] Reference to a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 96

[54] *Znamya Truda* (The Banner of Labour)—a daily, the organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; published from August 23 (September 5), 1917. From November 1 (14), 1917 (No. 59), the organ of the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the group of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Central Executive Committee of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. From December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918) (No. 105), the paper became the Central Organ of the Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Closed down in July 1918 during the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' revolt. p. 97

[55] *Volya Naroda* (People's Will)—a daily, the organ of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Published in Petrograd from April 29, 1917; closed down in November 1917. Later published under other names. Closed down for good in February 1918. p. 100

[56] *Sedan*—scene of the rout of the French Army by the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870, when more than 100,000 French soldiers, together with their Emperor Napoleon III, were taken prisoner. p. 107

[57] *Shingaryov, A. I.* (1869-1918)—Cadet from 1907, member of the Cadet Central Committee. Deputy to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 was Minister of Agriculture in the First and Minister of Finance in the Second Provisional Government. p. 108

[58] See Marx's letter to L. Kugelmann of April 12, 1871. (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 318.) p. 118

[59] Reference to Chekhov's The Man in a Muffler, portraying a timid soul who is afraid of every little innovation. p. 119

[60] See Engels's letter to F. A. Sorge of February 22, 1888. p. 126

[61] Reference to the words of Molchalin, a character from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe* who became a symbol of sycophancy and toadyism. p. 132

[62] Reference to the following: February 28 (March 13)—date of the February revolution, September 30 (October 13)—first tentative date set by the Provisional Government for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; November 28 (December 11), 1917—date of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. p. 136

[63] A quotation from N. Sukhanov's article "Another Thunderbolt" carried by the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life).

From August 1917, the Smolny Institute was the headquarters of the Bolshevik groups of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Revolutionary Military Committee also had its premises there from October. p. 136

[64] This letter was discussed by the Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), under the chairmanship of M. I. Kalinin, on October 5 (18), 1917. Volodarsky and Lashevich had opposed Lenin's proposal for an armed uprising. Lashevich said that the pace of developments should not be forced, and that it was best to wait for the Congress of Soviets. They were rebuffed by Kalinin, Rahja, Lacis, and others. The majority came out in favour of the armed insurrection proposed in Lenin's letter.

It was also discussed by a meeting of leading Party functionaries in the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). On October 7 (20), the Moscow Committee adopted a resolution setting the task of launching an immediate campaign for power. On October 10 (23), a city conference of Moscow Bolsheviks adopted a resolution declaring that only the overthrow of the Kerensky government and the installation of a workers' and peasants' government could allow the implementation of the following revolutionary measures: transfer of the land to the peasants; an offer of a just peace to the nations; and a resolute struggle against the dislocation. The Conference authorised the Moscow Committee to take steps to bring the revolutionary forces into a state of combat readiness. p. 140

[65] Written, when Lenin was in hiding, for the Extraordinary Party Congress set for October 17 (30), 1917, and the Third Petrograd City Conference of Bolsheviks. The Congress was postponed by a decision of the Central Committee on October 5 (18), and the theses were discussed at the City Conference.

Third Petrograd City Conference of Bolsheviks was held from October 7 to 11 (20-24), 1917, and was attended by 92 delegates with vote and 40 with voice but no vote. Lenin was elected honorary chairman and the conference decisions were based on his theses. In a resolution on the current political situation the Conference declared the need for replacing the Kerensky government with a revolutionary workers' and peasants' government which alone would hand the land to the peasants and take the country out of the war and the chaos. Conference decisions stressed that the country was on the eve of a mass proletarian uprising and expressed confidence that it would win out. It also discussed the question of elections to the Constituent Assembly, Lenin being among the Petrograd candidates. On October 11 (24), the Conference also heard Lenin's letter to the Petrograd City Conference (see pp. 145-48). The Conference had a very important part to play in the preparations for the Great October Socialist Revolution. p. 142

66 *The Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region* was initially to have taken place at Helsingfors on October 8 (21), 1917. On October 5 (18), the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) decided it was to be held in Petrograd on October 10 (23). It opened on October 11 (24) and closed on October 13 (26). It was attended by 94 delegates, including 51 Bolsheviks, from Petrograd, Moscow, Novgorod, Staraya Russa, Borovichy, Revel, Yuriev, Archangel, Kronstadt, Gatchina, Tsarskoye Syelo, Sestroretsk, Vyborg, Helsingfors, etc. The Menshevik group walked out when the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, declared that the Congress was not a plenipotentiary regional congress but a private conference of individual Soviets. The items on its agenda were: (1) reports from the localities; (2) current political situation; (3) land question; (4) the country's military and political position; (5) All-Russia Congress of Soviets; (6) Constituent Assembly; (7) organisational question.

Lenin attached great importance to the Congress. On October 8 (21) he wrote his "Letter to the Bolshevik Comrades Attending the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region" (see pp. 182-87), which was discussed by the Bolshevik group of the Congress on the morning of October 11 (24). In its resolution on the current political situation, the Congress stressed that only an immediate transfer of power to the Soviets in the centre and in the provinces could save the country and the revolution. The Congress adopted an appeal to the peasants, calling on them to support the proletariat in its struggle for power. It elected a 17-man Northern Regional Committee including 11 Bolsheviks and 6 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Congress decisions had a great impact on the preparation, organisation and rallying of all forces for the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution. p. 146

67 A resolution of the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet dated September 6 (19), 1917, voiced a vigorous protest against the

planned removal of the Provisional Government from Petrograd to Moscow. It said that if the "Provisional Government was unable to protect Petrograd its duty was either to conclude peace or make way to another government". p. 146

[68] The reference is to the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), held in Petrograd on April 24-29 (May 7-12), 1917. p. 151

[69] *Spartak* (Spartacus)—a theoretical journal of the Moscow Regional Bureau, of the Moscow Committee and (from No. 2) of the Moscow District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.); published in Moscow from May 20 (June 2) to October 29 (November 11), 1917. p. 151

[70] *Rodbertus-Jagetzow, Johann Karl* (1805-1875)—a German vulgar economist, politician and champion of Prussian Junker development along bourgeois lines.

He believed that the contradictions between labour and capital could be resolved through reforms carried out by the Prussian Junker state. He did not understand the origin of surplus value and the essence of the basic contradictions of capitalism and maintained economic crises all came from low national consumption. He said the fact that agriculture did without expenditure on raw materials gave rise to ground rent. p. 158

[71] See Frederick Engels, *Contribution to the Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme*, 1891. p. 160

[72] *Spartacus Group* (*Internationale*)—a revolutionary organisation of German Left-wing Social-Democrats formed at the beginning of the First World War by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Leo Jogiches (Tyszka) and Wilhelm Pieck.

The Theses on the Tasks of International Social-Democracy were written by Rosa Luxemburg, with the participation of Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin, and were adopted by the all-Germany Conference of Left-wing Social-Democrats in January 1916, where the group set up a formal organisation and adopted the name of *Internationale*.

From 1916, the *International* group, apart from political leaflets published in 1915, began the illegal publication and circulation of *Political Letters*, which were signed "Spartacus" (they were issued regularly until October 1918). In view of this the *Internationale* group, too, assumed the name of Spartacus. They carried on revolutionary propaganda in the masses, organised massive anti-war manifestations, directed strikes, and exposed the imperialist character of the world war and the treachery of the opportunist leaders of Social-Democracy. But the Spartacus group made some grave errors on important questions of theory and policy: they denied the possibility of national-liberation wars

in the epoch of imperialism, they were inconsistent on the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war; they underrated the role of the proletarian party as the vanguard of the working class, and were afraid of breaking with the opportunists. Lenin repeatedly criticised their mistakes and helped them to take a correct attitude (see *The Junius Pamphlet*, *The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution*, etc., in Vols. 22 and 23 of the present edition).

In April 1917, the Spartacus group were affiliated to the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, but remained organisationally independent. During the November 1918 revolution in Germany they broke with the Independents and formed the Spartacusbund, issuing their own programme on December 14, 1918. At their Constituent Congress, December 30, 1918-January 1, 1919, they set up the Communist Party of Germany.

p. 161

[73] *Tribunists*—members of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, whose organ was the newspaper Tribune. They were led by Wijnkoop, Gorter, Pannekoek and Roland-Holst. They were not a consistently revolutionary party but were on the Left wing of the working-class movement in Holland, and on the whole took an internationalist attitude during the First World War.

In 1918, they formed the Communist Party of Holland.

p. 175

[74] *The Socialist Propaganda League* was formed in Boston, U.S.A., in 1915, as an independent group within the Socialist Party. It adopted the platform of the Zimmerwald Left, and rallied the revolutionary elements of the Socialist Party. After the October Revolution the League set up a Committee for Bolshevik Information, which exposed the lies and slander of bourgeois and reformist periodicals about the Soviet Republic. During the Allied armed intervention against Russia the League campaigned under the slogan of "Hands Off Soviet Russia!". p. 175

[75] *Socialist Labour Party of America*—set up in Philadelphia in 1876 at the unifying congress of the American sections of the First International and other Socialist organisations. The overwhelming majority of the party consisted of foreign-born Americans who had few ties with native workers. In its first few years, it was led by the Lassalleans, who made sectarian and dogmatic errors. Some of the party's leaders believed it should concentrate on parliamentary activity and underestimated the importance of leading the massive economic struggle; others slid down to trade-unionism and anarchism. These ideological and tactical mistakes on the part of the leadership weakened the party and led to splits. Marx and Engels sharply criticised the sectarian tactics of the U.S. Socialists.

By the nineties, the Left wing led by Daniel de Leon, assumed leadership of the party. But they, too, made mistakes of an anarch-

ist and syndicalist nature. They refused to fight for the partial demands of the working class, and shied away from activity in reformist trade unions, and this lost them what ties they had with the mass labour movement. During the First World War, the Socialist Labour Party inclined to internationalism. Under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution, its more revolutionary members took part in setting up the Communist Party of the United States. At present, the Socialist Labour Party is a small group without any influence on the U.S. labour movement. p. 175

[76] See Note 6. p. 180

[77] The reference is to the large anti-war manifestations in Turin, Italy, in August 1917. A demonstration against the food shortage broke out on August 21. The workers struck the following day, and a general strike followed. Barricades were thrown up. The movement assumed a political, anti-war character. On August 23, Turin's suburbs were in the hands of the insurgents. The Government threw the army against them and imposed martial law. The general strike was called off on August 27. p. 182

[78] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs organised by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They killed revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and provoked anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 185

[79] *The Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on October 10 (23), 1917*, was the first one Lenin attended after his return to Petrograd from Vyborg. Sverdlov was in the chair. Lenin gave a report on the current situation. The Central Committee adopted the resolution motioned by Lenin who proposed immediate preparations for an armed uprising. Only Zinoviev and Kamenev voted against the proposal. Trotsky abstained, but he held that it had to be postponed until the Second Congress of Soviets, which in practice meant bungling the insurrection and allowing the Provisional Government to pull up its forces to crush the uprising on the day the Congress opened. The Central Committee rebuffed the capitulants. The October 10 meeting of the Central Committee is of tremendous historical importance. The resolution on the uprising adopted by 10 to 2 became the Bolshevik Party's directive in starting immediate preparations for an insurrection. To direct the insurrection, the Central Committee set up a Political Bureau headed by Lenin. p. 188

[80] The reference is to Sverdlov's report to the Central Committee on October 10 (23), 1917, on the third item of the agenda: "Minsk and the Northern Front". He said that there was a technical possibility of staging an armed uprising in Minsk, and that Minsk had offered to send a revolutionary corps to help Petrograd. p. 189

[81] The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) held an enlarged meeting at the Lesnovskaya District Council in Petrograd with Kalinin in the chair) on October 16 (29), 1917. It heard Lenin's report on the C.C. October 10 (23) resolution calling for an armed uprising. Kamenev and Zinoviev once again opposed the idea of an insurrection on the plea that the Bolsheviks were not strong enough and should await the Constituent Assembly. The resolution was resolutely supported by Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin Rahja, Sverdlov, Skrypnik and others who sharply criticised Kamenev's and Zinoviev's back-tracking. Lenin's resolution was adopted by 19 votes to 2, with four abstentions. A closed meeting of the Central Committee set up a Revolutionary Military Centre to direct the insurrection. It was to be a part of the Soviet Revolutionary Military Committee. p. 191

[82] A reference to the enlarged Central Committee meeting on October 16 (29), 1917. Lenin remained in hiding in Petrograd and changed the date of the meeting to October 15 (28) in order to conceal his presence at the meeting; for reasons of secrecy he referred to a comrade who had allegedly informed him of the meeting. p. 195

[83] The peasant movement in Tambov Gubernia in September 1917 assumed great proportions: the peasants seized tracts of landed estates, destroyed and burned landowners' mansions and confiscated grain stocks. In September, 82 landowners' estates were destroyed in 68 gubernias and regions, including 32 in Tambov Gubernia. Altogether there is a record of 166 peasant manifestations in the gubernia, especially in Kozlov Uyezd. The frightened landowners took their grain to the railway stations in an effort to sell it, so that the railway junctures were literally swamped with grain. The commanding officer of the Moscow Military District sent military units to Tambov Gubernia to crush the peasant uprising, and imposed martial law, but the peasants' revolutionary struggle for land continued to grow in scope. p. 197

[84] *Scheidemann*, *Philip* (1865-1939)—a leader of the extreme Right-wing opportunist section of German Social-Democracy, and an organiser of the bloody suppression of the German working-class movement in 1918-21.

Renaudel, *Pierre* (1871-1935)—a reformist leader of the French Socialist Party. p. 203

[85] *Planson*, *A. A.*—a Popular Socialist, and member of the Central Executive Committee (First Convocation). A leader of Vikzhel—the All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Trade Union, an organisation run by the compromisers. p. 206

[86] *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—a daily published in Petersburg from 1868 to 1917, by various publishers. It changed political

colours a number of times, and from 1905 became the organ of the Black Hundreds. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, it took a counter-revolutionary attitude and conducted a rabid campaign against the Bolsheviks. Closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. Lenin said it was an example of the corrupt press. p. 211

[87] This and the letter on pp. 223-27 are a reflection of Lenin's struggle against Kamenev and Zinoviev, who tried to frustrate the C.C. decision on an armed uprising. They were defeated at the Central Committee meeting on October 10 (23), 1917, which discussed the question of an uprising, and on the next day sent the C.C. a statement of their views and a letter opposing the C.C. decision entitled "On the Current Situation" to the Petersburg, Moscow, Moscow Regional, and Finnish Regional Committees of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and the Bolshevik groups of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region. Having failed to rally support at an enlarged meeting of the Petersburg Committee on October 15 (28), which heard their letter and the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee on October 16 (29), where they again spoke against any armed uprising Kamenev and Zinoviev stooped to downright treason. On October 18 (31), the semi-Menshevik newspaper, *Novaya Zhizn*, carried an item entitled: "Kamenev about the 'Uprising'", in which the author, on behalf of Zinoviev and himself argued against the armed uprising and incidentally gave away a most important secret Party decision to the enemy. That same day, Lenin wrote his first letter (p. 216) and the next day the second (p. 223), branding the move as betrayal of the revolution. He called the two men strike-breakers and demanded their expulsion from the Party.

Lenin's letter was discussed by the Central Committee on October 20 (November 2), when Dzerzhinsky, who spoke first, motioned that "Kamenev should withdraw from political activity entirely". As for Zinoviev, he said, he was in hiding from the authorities and was not participating in any Party activity anyway. Sverdlov said Kamenev's act could have no justification whatever, but the Central Committee was not authorised to expel members from the Party. He suggested that Kamenev should resign from the Central Committee. Stalin spoke twice. He first proposed that the discussion should be transferred to a C.C. plenary meeting, and when the proposal was voted down, he declared that "expulsion from the Party was no remedy". He proposed that Zinoviev and Kamenev should be left in the C.C. and should be bound to abide by C.C. decisions.

Kamenev was removed from the C.C., and both were forbidden to make any statement against decisions of the C.C. and its policies. It was also decided that members of the C.C. should be prohibited from making public statements against decisions passed by the C.C.

Lenin did not agree with the decision and said it was a compromise. p. 216

88 *The Third Zimmerwald Conference* took place at Stockholm from September 5 to 12, 1917. The composition of the Conference was very mixed, as Lenin said in the present article. He wrote: "They were people who were bound to disagree on the *fundamental* trend of their policy". The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was represented by V. V. Vorovsky and N. A. Semashko.

The Conference examined the Grimm Affair. Grimm had been exposed in Russia as an emissary of the Swiss Minister Hoffmann, who was putting out feelers for a separate peace treaty in the interests of German imperialism. By that time Grimm had been relieved of his post of Chairman of the International Socialist Committee; the Conference approved his expulsion from the I.S.C., declaring that his behaviour had been inadmissible, a measure Lenin considered inadequate.

During the discussion of the attitude the Socialists of the Second International took to the Stockholm Peace Conference, some delegates came out in favour of participation, while the Russian Mensheviks were given an imperative mandate to remain at the Zimmerwald Conference only on condition that it would participate in the Stockholm Conference *in toto*.

On behalf of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Central Committee and its Bureau Abroad and Polish Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks and their followers were sharply criticised by Vorovsky who demanded a resolution on the state of affairs in Russia. However, the Centrist majority of the Conference refused to adopt such a resolution on the plea that they were not sufficiently well informed about Russian affairs.

The conference manifesto called on workers of all countries to stage a general strike against war, but it did not reflect any of the revolutionary Social-Democratic slogans on turning the imperialist war into a civil war and fighting for a defeat of the home government in each belligerent country. The Third Zimmerwald Conference bore out Lenin's conclusion that the Zimmerwald Association had gone bankrupt and that there was need to break with it immediately and set up a Third, Communist, International. The Third Zimmerwald Conference was the last one held by the Association.

Lenin cites the date of the Conference as erroneously given by the Menshevik newspaper *Iskra*. p. 220

89 *Iskra* (The Spark)—the newspaper of the Menshevik internationalists; published in Petrograd from September 26 (October 9) to December 4 (17), 1917.

Menshevik internationalists—a small group within the Menshevik Party which took an inconsistently internationalist attitude during the First World War. Prominent among them were L. Martov, Y. Larin and A. Martynov. From April to June 1917 they published the monthly, *International*.

They took a Centrist attitude and criticised the social chauvinists but were afraid to break with them and opposed the basic principles of Lenin's tactics adopted by the Bolshevik Party on war, peace and revolution.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, some of them sided with avowed enemies of Soviet power and left the country. Others accepted Soviet power and worked in Soviet institutions. Some of them joined the Bolshevik Party. p. 220

[90] *Politiken* (Politics)—a newspaper of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats, who formed the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden in 1917; it was published in Stockholm from April 27, 1916. From November 1917 it came out under the name of *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* (People's Political Daily). Among its contributors were Zimmerwald Left Socialists from Germany, Russia, France and other countries. Then the Left Social-Democratic Party joined the Communist International in 1921, it became the Communist Party, and the newspaper became its organ. When the party split in October 1929, the paper passed into the hands of the Right wing. It suspended publication in May 1945.

Työmies (The Worker)—a newspaper of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, published in Helsingfors from March 1895 to 1918. p. 220

[91] *The Internationalist*—a weekly, the organ of the Left-wing Socialists, published in Boston, U.S.A., from early 1917 by the Socialist Propaganda League. On its editorial board were U.S. and other internationalists, among them Williams, Gibbs, Zartarian, Rosin, Rutgers, and Edwards. p. 221

[92] *Stürgkh*, *Karl* (1859-1916)—reactionary Austrian statesman; from 1911 to 1916, head of the Austro-Hungarian Government which took active part in preparing and starting the First World War. It dissolved the Austrian and later the Hungarian Parliament and set up a military-absolutist dictatorship which crushed the mounting anti-war and revolutionary movement. In October 1916, Stürgkh was killed by the Austrian Social-Democrat Friedrich Adler. p. 221

[93] A reference (as on p. 224) to the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), on October 16 (29), 1917, at which Zinoviev and Kamenev opposed the decision to launch an armed uprising taken on October 10 (23). p. 224

[94] Lenin refers to the reforms launched by the British bourgeoisie in Ireland at the turn of the twentieth century under pressure from the Irish land movement. See also Lenin's article "The British Liberals and Ireland" (in Volume 20 of the present edition). p. 232

[95] Written on the night of October 24 (November 6). That same day Lenin secretly arrived at Smolny and took over the leadership of the uprising. p. 234

[96] *Verkhovsky*, *A. I.* (1886-1941)—Minister of War in the last bourgeois Provisional Government. On October 19, (November 1), 1917, he resigned over the Pre-parliament's rejection of his proposal for demobilising a considerable part of the army and other measures. p. 234

[97] *The Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet* was set up on October 12 (25), 1917, on instructions from the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Its members were drawn from the Central Committee, the Petersburg Committee the Petrograd Soviet, factory committees, trade unions and military organisations. It operated under the leadership of the Central Committee and was closely bound up with the Bolshevik Military Organisation in forming Red Guard detachments and arming the workers. Its main task was to prepare the armed uprising in accordance with the Central Committee directives. It carried on diverse activity in organising the combat forces for victory in the October Revolution. Its leading core, the Revolutionary Military Centre, was formed by the Central Committee on October 16 (29), 1917, and received daily directions from Lenin. After the victory of the October Revolution and the election of the Soviet Government at the Second Congress of Soviets, the main task of the Revolutionary Military Committee was to fight the counter-revolution and safeguard the revolutionary order. It handed over its functions to various People's Commissariats as they arose. It was dissolved on December 5 (18), 1917. p. 234

[98] Written by Lenin on behalf of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It was carried by the newspaper *Rabochy i Soldat* on October 25 (November 7), 1917, and reprinted by the *Derevenskaya Bednota, Izvestia* and other newspapers.

Rabochy i Soldat (Worker and Soldier)—an evening paper, the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; published from October 17 (30), 1917 to February 1918. p. 236

[99] The meeting opened at 2.35 p.m. on October 25 (November 7), and heard a report of the Revolutionary Military Committee on the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the triumph of the revolution. Lenin gave a report on the tasks facing Soviet power. The resolution motioned by Lenin (see p. 241) was adopted by an overwhelming majority. p. 239

[100] The reference is to secret diplomatic documents, such as the secret treaties concluded by the tsarist and later by the bourgeois Provisional Government of Russia with the governments of Britain,

France, Germany, Japan and other imperialist powers. From November 10 (23), 1917, these documents were published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, and in December were put out in a series entitled *Collection of Secret Documents from the Archives of the Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Seven volumes were published from December 1917 to February 1918. By publishing the secret treaties, the Soviet Government's revolutionary propaganda struck a great blow for a general democratic peace, without annexations and indemnities, and exposed the imperialist nature of the First World War. p. 239

[101] Held in Petrograd on October 25 and 26 (November 7 and 8), 1917. It was also attended by delegates from a number of uyezd and gubernia Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. When the Congress opened, 649 delegates were in attendance, among them 390 Bolsheviks, 160 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 72 Mensheviks, and 14 Menshevik internationalists. More delegates arrived later.

It opened at Smolny Institute at 10.40 p.m. on October 25, while the Red Guard detachments, sailors and revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison were still storming the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government had taken refuge under the protection of its shock troops and officer cadets. Lenin was directing the uprising and did not attend the first sitting. Fourteen Bolsheviks were elected to the Presidium, among them Lenin, Antonov-Ovseyenko, Krylenko and Lunacharsky; seven Socialist-Revolutionaries including Kamkov, Karelin and Spiridonova, and one member of the Ukrainian Socialist Party. The Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries declined to sit on the Presidium. The leaders of the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary Right wing motioned that negotiations should be started with the Provisional Government to set up a coalition government, because, they said, the socialist revolution then under way was nothing but a plot. When they saw that the majority supported the Bolsheviks, they walked out (they were joined by Bund delegates). Shortly after 3.00 a.m., October 26 (November 8), the Congress heard a report on the capture of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the Provisional Government and adopted its appeal "To Workers, Soldiers and Peasants!" It was written by Lenin, and proclaimed the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The sitting closed after 5.00 a.m.

The second sitting opened at 9.00 p.m. the same day, heard Lenin's reports and adopted his historic decrees on peace and on land; it formed the workers' and peasants' government known as the Council of People's Commissars, headed by Lenin. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries refused to enter the Soviet Government, which consisted of Bolsheviks only. A 101-man All-Russia Central Executive Committee elected by the Congress included 62 Bolsheviks and 29 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Congress also decided that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee could be enlarged by delegates from Peasants' Soviets

and army units, and groups which had walked out. The Congress closed after 5.00 a.m. p. 243

[102] The reference is to the Central Executive Committee elected by the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets which was held in Petrograd from June 3 to 24 (June 16 to July 7), 1917. The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who favoured support of the bourgeois Provisional Government, had a majority in the First Executive Committee. p. 247

[103] The reference is to the belligerents in the First World War: the Entente (France, Britain, Russia, Italy and the U.S.A., which joined them) and also Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Japan and China; and the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria). p. 249

[104] *The Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878 by the Bismarck Government to fight the working-class and socialist movement. It outlawed all Social-Democratic organisations, working-class associations, the working-class press, and provided for the confiscation of socialist literature. Social-Democrats were harassed and deported. However these reprisals failed to break down the Social-Democratic Party, which adapted itself to underground activity: its central organ, *Sozial-Demokrat* was published abroad, and it held regular party congresses (1880, 1883 and 1887). Underground Social-Democratic organisations and groups were rapidly revived at home and operated under a Central Committee in hiding. At the same time, the Party used various legal means of strengthening its ties with the masses and its influence grew steadily: from 1878 to 1890, the number of votes it polled in the Reichstag elections more than tripled. Marx and Engels gave the German Social-Democrats a great deal of help. In 1890, the Anti-Socialist Law was lifted as a result of mass pressure and the mounting working-class movement. p. 251

[105] The reference is to a manifesto issued by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the peoples of the world, which was carried by the newspaper *Izvestia* No. 15, of March 15, 1917. p. 253

[106] See Note 44. p. 253

[107] See Note 38. p. 258

[108] *A labour standard* is the amount of land that could be tilled by its owner without outside help.

A subsistence standard is the minimum amount of land necessary to feed a family. p. 259

[109] *The Law on Workers' Control* was drafted right after the revolution. Lenin's Draft Regulations on Workers' Control, which he wrote

on October 26 or 27 (November 8 or 9), 1917, was discussed and in the main adopted by a meeting at the Petrograd Central Council of Factory Committee, at which Lenin was present. On October 27, the draft was placed before the Council of People's Commissars, which authorised Milyutin and Larin to draw up detailed Draft Regulations on Workers' Control within two days. But their draft clashed with the tasks of revolutionary workers' control formulated by Lenin; for instance, it did not contain the most important clause making decisions of workers' control bodies binding on factory owners. Lenin's draft was then taken as a basis for the law on workers' control. It was amended and published in *Gazeta Vremennogo Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* (Gazette of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government) No. 3, of November 1 (14), under the title: "Draft Law on Workers Control (Submitted to the Labour Commission)". In the subsequent discussion, it was proposed that workers' control bodies setup in the localities should be replaced by government bodies, and that workers' control should be introduced only at the major factories, railways, etc. Lenin won his point that workers' control should be introduced everywhere to stimulate the workers' initiative. The final drafting of the decree was assigned to a commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee appointed on November 8 (21). On November 14 (27) the All-Russia Central Executive Committee examined the commission's draft and issued the decree which is known as "Regulations on Workers' Control", and contains the basic provisions of Lenin's draft. The decree was published in *Izvestia* No. 227, on November 16 (29).

p. 264

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

110 The Conference was called by the Revolutionary Military Committee to decide on the defence of Petrograd against the counter-revolutionary forces. It was attended by 40 army delegates. The following items were on its agenda: (1) information; (2) formation of a H.Q.; (3) arming of detachments; (4) law and order. After a special report from the front, the meeting heard a report on the current situation by Lenin, in his capacity of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin also spoke on other points. Several delegates reported on the state of affairs in their areas. The Conference adopted a unanimous appeal to the soldiers of Petrograd urging them to fight for the gains of the revolution.

p. 270

111 *Left Socialist-Revolutionaries*—the party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (internationalists); formed at its First All-Russia Congress held from November 19 to 28 (December 2 to 11), 1917. Until then they had existed as a Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which took shape during the First World War. They were headed by Spiridonova, Kamkov and Natanson (Bobrov). The Left wing grew rapidly after the July 1917 events (see Note 8) and this was a reflection of the shift to the Left among the peasants. In August, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries secured

control of the newspaper *Znamya Truda* (see Note 54), which subsequently became the Central Organ of their Party.

At the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviet, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries constituted a majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary group, which split up on the question of participation in the Congress; the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, acting on directives of their Party's Central Committee, left the Congress, while the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries remained and voted with the Bolsheviks on the major items of the agenda. The Bolsheviks believed that a bloc should be formed with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who at that time had a considerable following among the peasants. Accordingly, they invited them to enter the Soviet Government, but they refused and insisted on the demand to set up a so-called "uniform socialist government" with the participation of the Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and other parties and groups. After considerable hesitation, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, intent on retaining their influence among the peasants, agreed to collaborate with the Bolsheviks. As a result of the talks held in late November and early December 1917, an agreement was reached on their participation in the Government. They committed themselves to follow the common policy of the Council of People's Commissars, and were made members of several collegiums of People's Commissariats.

While collaborating with the Bolsheviks, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries took wrong attitudes on vital aspects of socialist construction and opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat. In January and February 1918, their Central Committee launched a campaign against the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and when it was signed and ratified by the Fourth Congress of Soviets in March, they withdrew from the Government, but continued to take part in the collegiums and local organs of power. In July, their Central Committee organised the assassination of the German Ambassador Mirbach in Moscow and an armed revolt against Soviet power in the hope of sabotaging the peace treaty and provoking war between Soviet Russia and Germany. The Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, held after the suppression of the July revolt, decided to expel Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who shared the views of their leadership from the Soviets. Having lost all support among the masses, the party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries launched an armed fight against Soviet power. Some of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who wanted to collaborate with the Bolsheviks formed a party of Narodnik Communists and Revolutionary Communists, and a considerable number of them later joined the Communist Party. p. 270

[112] The reference is to the Bolsheviks' participation in a conference called by the Vikzhel for talks on the composition of the government.

The Vikzhel, the All-Russia Central Committee of the Railwaymen's Trade Union which was dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, was one of the bulwarks of the

counter-revolution after the victory of the October insurrection in Petrograd. On October 29 (November 11), 1917 it adopted a resolution calling for a so-called "uniform socialist government", consisting of representatives of all parties, from the Bolsheviks to the Popular Socialists. The Conference on the composition of the government opened on the same day and was attended by Menshevik defencists, Menshevik internationalists, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and members of the Postal Union, the Petrograd Duma, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, etc. The Bolshevik Central Committee decided to attend stating that any talks on the enlargement of the government and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee could take place only on the basis of the programme for Soviet power adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets. Kamenev and Sokolnikov were authorised by the Central Committee to attend. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee also sent its representatives to the Conference, among whom was Ryazanov.

The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries expected to play the leading part in any coalition government and to use it to fight the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the Co-ordinating Committee set up by the Conference, they demanded that resistance to Kerensky's troops be stopped and insisted that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee should be replaced by a People's Council which would have a majority of members representing the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies City councils and other organisations which they had under control. They proposed the establishment of a new government headed by Chernov or Avksentyev. The Bolshevik delegates who attended took a conciliatory attitude and did not object to discussing the proposals tabled by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Bolshevik Central Committee discussed the question of negotiations with the Vikzhel and the behaviour of the Bolshevik delegates on November 1 (14). The majority censured the policy of conciliation and proposed that the talks should either be broken off or formulated as an ultimatum. Kamenev, Milyutin, Rykov and Ryazanov insisted on a continuation of the talks. A C.C. resolution said the parties of conciliation were negotiating to subvert Soviet power, and the C.C. therefore authorised Bolshevik representatives to attend the talks with the sole aim of exposing the futile attempts to set up a coalition government, and terminating the talks. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee discussed the progress of the talks on the night of November 1 (14) and adopted a Bolshevik resolution drawn up in the spirit of the C.C. decision of November 1 (14). However, the opposition group of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Milyutin, Larin, Ryazanov and others, who took a Right-wing opportunist stand, opposed their line to that of the Central Committee and fought against the C.C. decision. On November 2 (15), the C.C. adopted a resolution on the opposition within the C.C. (see pp. 277-79). At the All-

Russia Central Executive Committee meeting on the night of November 2 (15), following the speeches of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who demanded a review of the Committee's decision on the terms of an agreement, Kamenev and Zinoviev pushed through a resolution which clashed with that of the Central Committee adopted earlier. Their resolution provided for a change in the composition of the government and gave the Bolsheviks only half the government posts. The opposition voted for this resolution. Following the ultimatum which the majority of the Central Committee presented to the opposition minority (see pp. 280-82) on November 3 (16), Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Milyutin and Nogin withdrew from the Central Committee, while the last three and Teodorovich resigned from their posts of People's Commissars. They were joined by Ryazanov, Larin and several others. On November 5 or 6 (18 or 19), the Central Committee once again demanded in the form of an ultimatum that Kamenev, Zinoviev, Ryazanov and Larin should stop their disrupting tactics (they had come out against the C.C. decisions in non-Party organisations) (see p. 302). On November 7 (20), the Central Committee published in *Pravda* an appeal to all members of the Party and all working classes of Russia, branding the opposition as deserters of the revolution who had abandoned the principles of Bolshevism (see pp. 304-08). p. 276

[113] Written by Lenin in connection with a discussion of the matter by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 4 (17), 1917.

On October 26 (November 8), 1917, the Revolutionary Military Committee took a decision to close down a number of bourgeois newspapers—*Rech*, *Dyen* and others—for their counter-revolutionary propaganda. The Decree on the Press was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars the next day. On November 4 (17) the All-Russia Central Executive Committee discussed the question of the press, with Larin and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries—Kolegayev, Karelin, Proshyan and others—opposing the decree.

Lenin spoke in favour of the measures taken by the Revolutionary Military Committee and the Government (see pp. 285-87). By a majority of 34 to 24, with 1 abstention, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a Bolshevik resolution voicing unconditional support for the Government's policy on the press. The resolution drafted by Lenin was not tabled at the meeting. p. 283

[114] The question was addressed to Lenin, as the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, at a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 4 (17), 1917, in connection with the issue of several decrees by the Council of People's Commissars without the sanction of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Having heard Lenin's explanations, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary group declared them to be unsatisfactory. Uritsky tabled a resolution on behalf of the Bolshevik group

expressing full confidence in the Government. Before the vote on the resolution, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries declared that the People's Commissars, being parties in interest, should not take part in the voting. A majority of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee passed a resolution approving the Government's activity. p. 288

[115] A reference to order No. 1 of November 1 (14), 1917, issued by the officer in command of the troops defending Petrograd, Muravyov, calling on the soldiers, sailors and Red Guardsmen to deal ruthlessly with any criminal elements. Because his wording could lead to undesirable consequences the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 2 (15) asked the People's Commissariat of the Interior to rescind it. p. 290

[116] Lenin is referring to a speech by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary G. D. Zaks in defence of the Right-wing opportunist attitude of Nogin, Rykov, Milyutin and others on the issue of setting up a "uniform socialist government". He said he feared the socialist revolution in Russia would be left in isolation because Western Europe was disgracefully silent. p. 292

[117] See Note 71. p. 292

[118] See Note 109. p. 295

[119] *Committee of Salvation* (*Committee of Public Safety*) was set up on October 25 (November 7), 1917, by the Moscow City Council to fight the Soviets in Moscow, and led the counter-revolutionary revolt of officer cadets which broke out on October 28 (November 10). The revolt was crushed on November 2 (15), and the Committee capitulated to the Moscow Revolutionary Military Committee. p. 297

[120] Written in connection with numerous questions submitted by peasant messengers to the Council of People's Commissars. Each messenger got a typewritten answer bearing Lenin's personal signature. It was published in the newspapers *Derevenskaya Bednota*, *Izvestia* and others, and was issued as a leaflet under the title, "Instruction to Peasants". The answer was an important document regulating the revolutionary abolition of landed estates. p. 300

[121] The circumstances which led to the conversation between members of the Soviet Government and Field H.Q. in Mogilev are set forth on pp. 312-13 and 316-17.

Field H.Q., which in that period was a centre where plans were being hatched for the overthrow of Soviet power, was occupied by revolutionary troops on November 20 (December 3). p. 309

[122] The conversation was conducted by the People's Commissar for War N. V. Krylenko. p. 310

[123] The Soviet Government's call on the soldiers to take the initiative in the armistice negotiations met with broad response in the army. On various sectors divisions, corps and armies, and even entire fronts (e.g., the Western Front) sent envoys across the line and concluded ceasefire agreements, which provided for a stop to military operations, reinforcements, construction of military installations, etc. These so-called "soldiers' peace treaties" remained in force until the conclusion of a general armistice.

p. 312

[124] The Congress was called by a decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and met in Petrograd from November 10 to 25 (November 23 to December 8), 1917. Attempts were made by the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies (elected by the First All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies in May 1917) to prevent the Congress from meeting and the peasant delegates from coming into contact with the Bolsheviks. These attempts were foiled by the vigorous efforts of the Bolsheviks, who were supported by grass roots delegates and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary minority of the peasant Executive.

About 260 delegates attended the first sitting, on November 18 (December 1) there were 330 delegates with vote, including 195 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 37 Bolsheviks, 65 Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Right and Centre, and more were arriving.

The Congress was the scene of a sharp struggle between the Right and Left wing, with the Right-wingers eventually walking out. The Bolsheviks' fight against the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries was hampered by the vacillation of the Left-wingers. The resolution "On Power" tabled by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries contained the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik demand for a government of all socialist parties, from Popular Socialists to the Bolsheviks, inclusive. But in that same resolution the Congress stated that the government was being set up to implement the programme of the Second Congress of Soviets. It also provided for a merger of the Executive of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies with the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

The Right-wingers failed in their efforts to split the Congress. On November 15 (28) it discussed and approved the Presidium's report on the terms for the merger worked out jointly with the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, on whose behalf Sverdlov delivered a speech of greetings. The Congress then moved as a body to Smolny, where at 6.00 p.m. a ceremonial joint sitting was held by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and the Petrograd Soviet. It heard a report on the merger of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Executive Committee elected by the Congress, and adopted a resolution confirming the decrees of the Second Congress of Soviets on peace and on land, and the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on workers' control.

The Congress adopted a resolution on the agrarian question which was tabled by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and was based on the principle of equalitarian land tenure.

The Congress authorised the Presidium to open the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies on November 26 (December 9). The delegates to the Extraordinary Congress were incorporated in the Second Congress.

Lenin spoke three times in explanation of the Bolshevik attitude to the agrarian question and the terms of agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. His speeches were of tremendous importance in guiding the Congress and rallying its Left wing. p. 321

[125] Written in connection with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' objections to the Bolshevik demand that Lenin should be invited to speak at the Congress in his capacity of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. They thought this would be prejudicial to the issue of power. On their motion, the Congress rejected the Bolshevik proposal, and Lenin addressed it as a member of the Bolshevik group. p. 323

[126] The reference is to the instruction to the volost land committees approved by the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on June 23 (July 6), 1917, and published as a law "On the Volost Committees" on November 3 (16), 1917. p. 325

[127] The reference is to the start of the peace talks with Germany.

Following the publication of the Decree on Peace, adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the Soviet Government took practical steps to conclude a general democratic peace among the belligerents. On November 7 (20), 1917, it issued special directions to General Dukhonin, the Commander-in-Chief, ordering him to make an offer to the enemy command to stop military operations and open peace talks. The directions said the government deemed it necessary to make a formal proposal for an armistice between the belligerents without delay (*Izvestia* No. 221, November 10, 1917). But the counter-revolutionary top brass, who had contacts with the military missions of the Entente, blocked the armistice in every possible way. On November 8 (21), the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Allied ambassadors proposing an immediate ceasefire on all fronts and negotiations on peace. The Entente ambassadors met at the U.S. Embassy in Petrograd on November 9 (22) and decided to ignore the Soviet Government's note.

The refusal of the Entente imperialists to support the Soviet Government's peace initiative and their active resistance to the conclusion of a peace, forced the Council of People's Commissars to start separate peace talks with Germany. On November 14 (27), word was received that the German High Command was prepared to start armistice talks. On the Soviet Government's proposal the

talks were postponed for five days to give the Allied Governments another chance to make known their attitude on the peace proposal. On November 15 (28), the Soviet Government issued its appeal to the governments and peoples of all the belligerent countries urging them to join in the peace negotiations. There was no reply from the Allied powers.

On November 19 (December 2), a Soviet peace delegation led by A. A. Ioffe arrived in the neutral zone and proceeded to Brest-Litovsk, where it met a delegation of the Austro-Hungarian bloc which included representatives of Bulgaria and Turkey. A 10-day ceasefire was arranged as a result of the talks of November 20-22 (December 3-5). The Soviet Government took the opportunity to try to turn the separate talks with Germany into negotiations for a general democratic peace. On November 24 (December 7) it sent another note to the Entente ambassadors inviting them to join in the talks. This note was also ignored. On December 2 (15), the talks were resumed and that same day a 28-day ceasefire was agreed upon. It provided for a peace conference, which opened at Brest-Litovsk on December 9 (22). p. 325

[128] Placed before the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 21 (December 4), 1917, by the Bolshevik group. The need for such a decree was substantiated by Lenin (see pp. 338-40). The right of recall was in principle upheld by a majority of the Committee; two members voted against, and one abstained. The draft was referred to a Co-ordinating Committee with the participation of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. It introduced amendments to Lenin's draft, in which the right to appoint elections was vested in congresses of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies (instead of the Soviets themselves), while the Soviets were empowered to appoint elections upon the demand of more than half the electorate in a given electoral district. The draft worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee was unanimously adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and published in *Izvestia* No. 233 on November 23 (December 6).

Under it several peasants' and army congresses passed decisions recalling deputies from the Constituent Assembly. They were Cadets, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. including Avksentyev, Gots, Milyukov, and others. p. 336

[129] The reference is to the *Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies* held from November 10 to 25 (November 23 to December 8), 1917. See Note 124. p. 339

[130] *The First All-Russia Congress of the Navy* was held at Petrograd from November 18 to 25 (December 1 to 8), 1917. On its agenda were the following items: the current situation and the question of power; the activity of the Central Committee of the Navy; reforms in the Navy Department, etc. It was addressed by Lenin, who spoke on the current situation. It discussed the activity of Tsentroflot which had betrayed its electors, and endorsed the

activity of the Revolutionary Naval Committee which had dissolved Tsentroflot. It approved the organisational scheme for the administration of the Navy Department, and elected 20 men to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The Congress sent a message of greetings to the Council of People's Commissars and an appeal to the whole of Russia. p. 341

[131] *Romanov*—Nicholas 11 (1868-1918), the last Russian Emperor, who reigned from 1894 to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. He was shot in Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) on July 17, 1918, by order of the Urals Regional Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Rasputin, G. Y. (1872-1916)—an adventurer who enjoyed great influence at the Court of Tsar Nicholas II. He was of peasant stock and came from Tobolsk Gubernia. The Rasputin period is the epitome of the obscurantism, fanaticism and moral degradation of Russia's ruling circles. Rasputin was killed in Petrograd by a group of monarchists who tried to save the dynasty and stifle the growing revolution. p. 345

[132] Written, it would appear, in connection with the discussion by the Soviet Government on November 27 (December 10), 1917, of instructions to the Soviet delegation empowered to negotiate a peace with Germany at the peace conference at Brest-Litovsk. The government decision on this question said: "Instruction on the Talks, on the Basis of the Decree on Peace."

The peace conference opened on December 9 (22), 1917, and was attended by the Soviet delegation and those of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey). At the first sitting the Soviet delegation read out a declaration on the peace terms. The other side appeared to agree to conduct the talks on these terms, but in fact this preliminary period already revealed Germany's annexationist intentions. On January 5 (18), the delegates of the Quadruple Alliance made known their governments' territorial claims to the Soviet delegation. This included a part of Russia which was to be ceded to Germany and Austria-Hungary (a territory of more than 150,000 square kilometres): Poland, Lithuania, a part of Estonia and Latvia, and also sizable areas inhabited by Ukrainians and Byelorussians.

Despite the clearly predatory nature of the terms put forward by the German imperialists, Lenin insisted on the conclusion of peace because he believed a breathing space was necessary to build up Soviet power in view of the general war-weariness and dislocation and the army's low morale, any continuation of the war would be fatal to Soviet power. This attitude was opposed by Trotsky and a group of Left Communists, including Bukharin, Lomov (Oppokov), Ioffe, Pyatakov and Osinsky (Obolensky), who insisted on breaking off the talks. They put forward the reckless slogan of a "revolutionary war" and bitterly attacked Lenin and his supporters. Their views gained some ground among Party

organisations in Moscow, Petrograd, the Urals, etc. The Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), where the Left Communists temporarily had a majority, adopted a resolution on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), demanding that the talks with Germany should be broken off. Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation at the second stage of the peace talks, adopted the provocative attitude which was summed up in his statement: "No peace, no war, army demobilised." Trotsky and the Left Communists were imposing a policy on the Party which led to the destruction of the Soviet state.

On January 8 (21), 1918, Lenin gave an elaborate substantiation of the need for a peace in his "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace" (see pp. 442-50 and Note 161). But the Central Committee was not unanimous on the question of peace. Lenin only succeeded in obtaining a decision to prolong the talks. When the Soviet delegation was leaving for Brest-Litovsk, Lenin instructed Trotsky to drag out the talks to the utmost, but to sign a peace treaty in the event of a German ultimatum.

The talks were resumed on January 17 (30). On January 27 (February 9), the delegation of the Austro-German bloc concluded a secret treaty with the representatives of the bourgeois-nationalist Central Ukrainian Rada, which actually gave Germany leave to plunder the Ukraine. Having thus reinforced its position, the German delegation, at the sittings on January 27 and 28 (February 9 and 10), demanded that the talks be speeded up. On January 28 (February 10), the Soviet delegation asked for instructions and Lenin reaffirmed his earlier instructions (see p. 517). However, Trotsky treacherously disobeyed these instructions and issued a statement at Brest-Litovsk to the effect that Soviet Russia would not sign a peace treaty would discontinue the war, and would demobilise the army. This led to a break-down of the talks. On February 18, the Germans started an offensive along the whole front .

At the morning sittings of the Central Committee on February 17 and 18, Lenin's proposal that talks should be started with Germany right away received a minority of votes. Lenin first secured a majority in favour of signing a peace treaty at the evening sitting of the Central Committee urgently called on February 18, following a sharp and protracted struggle against Trotsky and the Left Communists, when the German offensive had become a fact.

On the morning of February 19 a wireless message was sent to the German Government stating the Soviet Government's readiness to sign a peace on the German terms set forth at Brest-Litovsk (see p. 525). The German Command took its time, while its troops continued to advance along the whole front, and within a week occupied a number of cities and came within striking distance of Petrograd.

The German Command's reply, received on February 23, contained even more onerous terms. The intense struggle continued

in the Central Committee when the matter of the new German ultimatum was discussed on February 23. It finally gave Lenin a majority for an immediate peace treaty on Germany's terms. That night, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars decided to accept the German peace terms, and this was communicated to the German Government.

The Left Communists continued their fight against the peace treaty, but the position of Lenin and his supporters was gaining ground among the Party masses. Most of the local government organisations polled by the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee also favoured signing the peace treaty. It was signed on March 3. The Seventh Party Congress, which was urgently called, gave a majority for the Leninist policy on peace. The Extraordinary Fourth Congress of Soviets, held from March 14 to March 16, ratified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The November revolution in Germany (1918) overthrew Kaiser Wilhelm II, and this allowed the Soviet Government to abrogate the Treaty. p. 349

[133] The text which follows was written by J. V. Stalin. p. 349

[134] The decree was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on November 28 (December 11), 1917, following a counter-revolutionary demonstration staged that day by the Cadets in Petrograd. They had intended to mount a counter-revolutionary revolt by opening the Constituent Assembly despite the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 26 (December 9), 1917, stating that it would be opened by a person specially authorised to do so by the government and in the presence of at least half its members. p. 351

[135] Delivered in the discussion of the question on the arrest of the Cadets who were members of the All-Russia Commission for Elections to the Constituent Assembly presented on behalf of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary group at a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 25 (December 8) They demanded an explanation of the grounds on which the personal immunity of members of the Constituent Assembly, an organ of supreme power, had been violated Following Lenin's speech and a discussion a majority of 150 to 98, with 3 abstentions, adopted Lenin's resolution approving the government decree ordering the arrest of the leaders of the civil war against the revolution (see p. 351) p. 353

[136] The reference is to the decree "On the Opening of the Constituent Assembly", adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on November 26 (December 9) 1917, and published in *Izvestia* No. 237 on November 27. The decree was issued in view of the fact that several Right-wing newspapers had carried the decision

of a group of former ministers who continued to style themselves as members of the Provisional Government, on the opening of the Constituent Assembly at the Taurida Palace at 2.00 p.m. on November 28 (December 11). p. 354

137 The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies was held in Petrograd from November 26 to December 10 (December 9 to 23), 1917. Apart from delegates from various localities invited by the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Peasant Executive Committee, it was attended by all the delegates of the Extraordinary Peasant Congress, a total of 790 with vote, including 305 Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Centre and Right, 350 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 91 Bolsheviks. The atmosphere at the Congress was extremely tense. The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to push the Congress their way, and to drive a wedge between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were sitting on the fence. There was an especially stiff fight over the attitude to the Constituent Assembly and the government's decree declaring the Cadets enemies of the people.

Lenin spoke on these issues on December 2 (15). At first a considerable majority supported the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, whose resolution demanded the transfer of power to the Constituent Assembly and censure of the government's acts in ordering the arrest of several Cadets. The Bolshevik group insisted on a revote, and the Congress passed the resolution of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Contradictions on the issue split the Congress and the Right-wingers walked out. The Left-wing majority remained and continued their work. They confirmed the decisions of the Extraordinary All-Russia Peasants' Congress and adhered to the decisions of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The Congress elected a new Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, which it authorised to join the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in implementing the basic demands of the peasants for land and peace. p. 357

138 *Ukrainian Central Rada*—a counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist organisation set up at the All-Ukraine National Congress in Kiev in April 1917 by a bloc of Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties and groups. The ideologist of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, M. S. Grushevksy, was its chairman, and V. K. Vinnichenko, his deputy. The Rada had a social base of urban and rural bourgeoisie, and petty-bourgeois nationalist-minded intellectuals. It tried to build up the power of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and landowners and set up a Ukrainian bourgeois state with the aid of the national liberation movement in the Ukraine. It waved the banner of national independence in an effort to lead the Ukrainian masses away from the all-Russia revolutionary movement, subordinate them to the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and prevent the socialist revolution from winning out in the Ukraine. It supported the Provisional Government in spite of contradictions over the issue of Ukrainian autonomy.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Rada proclaimed itself the supreme organ of the Ukrainian People's Republic and launched an open struggle against Soviet power. It was one of the centres of the counter-revolution.

The First All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets, held in Kharkov in December 1917, proclaimed the Ukraine a Soviet republic. The Congress declared the Central Rada overthrown. The Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. recognised the Ukrainian Soviet Government as the sole legitimate government of the Ukraine and decided to give it immediate help in fighting the counter-revolutionary Rada. Armed uprisings against the Central Rada for the re-establishment of Soviet power took place all over the country in December 1917 and January 1918. In January 1918, Soviet troops in the Ukraine launched an offensive and on January 26 (February 8) occupied Kiev. The bourgeois Rada was overthrown.

Defeated and ousted from the territory of the Soviet Ukraine, deprived of any support among the working people, the Central Rada joined the German imperialists in an alliance to overthrow Soviet power and restore the rule of the bourgeoisie in the Ukraine. It sent a delegation to Brest-Litovsk and secretly concluded a separate peace giving Germany the Ukraine's corn, coal, raw materials in return for military aid in the fight against Soviet power. In March 1918, the Rada returned to Kiev as the puppet of the Austro-German invaders who dispersed it in late April when they realised that it was absolutely incapable of suppressing the revolutionary movement in the Ukraine and delivering the goods. p. 361

[139] The rest of the text was written by L. D. Trotsky and edited by Lenin and Stalin. p. 362

[140] Written on December 6-7 (19-20), 1917. After the members of the presidium of the Congress had seen the Manifesto it was read out on their behalf at the evening sitting of December 8 (21). At the insistence of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries the wording was toned down and in that form adopted by the Congress. On behalf of the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies the Manifesto was published in the newspaper *Golos Trudovogo Krestyanstva* (Voice of the Labouring Peasantry) No. 22 of December 15 (28) under the title, "To the Labouring Peasants". p. 368

[141] See Note 137. p. 371

[142] Lenin raised the question of fighting the internal counter-revolution and sabotage before the Council of People's Commissars on December 6 (19), 1917, in view of the fierce resistance to the measures of the Soviet Government and a possible strike by senior civil servants. Dzerzhinsky was asked to form a commission to inquire into ways of fighting the sabotage. On December 7 (20),

the government heard his report, in connection with which Lenin appears to have written his draft decree. At the same sitting the government formed the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage. Dzerzhinsky was appointed its chairman. p. 374

[143] On December 11 (24), 1917, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) discussed one question—the stand taken by the Bolshevik group in the Constituent Assembly. It was raised in view of the fact that "Right-wing sentiments have prevailed in the group, whose views differ from those of the Central Committee" (*Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), August, 1917 to February 1918*, (in Russian, Moscow, 1958, p. 160).

The provisional bureau of the group opposed the C.C. line on the Constituent Assembly. It took a bourgeois-democratic approach to the Assembly and held that its convocation was the final stage of the revolution. It proposed that control over its convocation should be abandoned. The Central Committee resolved to work out theses on the Constituent Assembly and set a meeting of members of the group in Smolny at 4.00 p.m. on December 12 (25) to discuss a C.C. report and theses and to re-elect the bureau of the group. Lenin read out his "Theses on the Constituent Assembly" (see pp. 379-83), which he had written at the Central Committee's request. After a prolonged debate, they were unanimously adopted by the group. On December 13 (26) they were published in *Pravda*. p. 377

[144] *The Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Railwaymen* was held in Petrograd from December 12 (25) to December 30, 1917 (January 12, 1918). It was called on the initiative of the railwaymen's trade unions of the Moscow and Petrograd junctures, and was attended by nearly 300 delegates, of whom more than half were Bolsheviks. On the second day of the Congress Lenin delivered a speech of greetings and was elected honorary chairman. The Congress heard reports on the current situation, a speech by a representative of the Vikzhel, and reports on the food situation, trade-union organisation and the establishment of a network of local Soviets of Railwaymen's Deputies. The overwhelming majority of the Congress supported the views of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The Congress adopted a resolution stating that the Vikzhel's policy was playing into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and passed a vote of no confidence in it. The Congress elected 78 delegates for the Railwaymen's Congress set by the Vikzhel for December 19, 1917 (January 1, 1918). p. 384

[145] Written on December 14 (27), 1917, at the request of the Swedish Left-wing Social-Democrat Höglund, who had arrived in Petrograd on an assignment from the Left-wing Social-Democratic Party of Sweden. The article was first published in German in May 1918 in the newspaper *Jugend-Internationale*, the organ of

the International Alliance of Socialist Youth Organisations, which was affiliated with the Zimmerwald Left (published in Zurich from September 1915 to May 1918).

In November 1919, a facsimile of the opening paragraph was used as an illustration to a special edition of *Det röda Ryssland. 1917 11/7 1919*, issued by the Left-wing Socialist publishers *Fram* (Forward) in Stockholm to mark the second anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia. p. 386

[146] Delivered to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 14 (27), 1917, in connection with a discussion of the decree nationalising the banks.

Work on practical measures for the nationalisation of the banks was started as soon as the socialist revolution won out. The State Bank was seized on October 25 (November 7), 1917. Having overcome the sabotage of the bourgeois officials, Soviet power soon established practical control of the State Bank and set up control over private banks as a transitional measure to their nationalisation. However, because of sabotage by the bankers, the Soviet Government speeded up the nationalisation of private banks. On the morning of December 14 (27), the Government ordered workers' detachments and Red Guard units to seize all banks and credit institutions in Petrograd. That same day, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted decrees "On the Nationalisation of the Banks" and "On the Inspection of Steel Safes in Banks".

Both decrees were published in *Izvestia* No. 252 on December 15 (28). p. 388

[147] The draft decree was tabled by Lenin for the approval of the Supreme Economic Council in mid-December 1917, and was first published in the magazine *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo* (The National Economy) No. 11 for November 1918. The last paragraph comes from the manuscript and is published here for the first time.

Narodnoye Khozyaistvo—the organ of the Supreme Economic Council; published from March 1918 to December 1922.

p. 391

[148] The questions were raised by Lenin on December 17 (30), 1917- at a conference of delegates to the Army Congress on the Demobilisation of the Army whom the Congress had elected to participate in a Commission for the Demobilisation of the Army under the People's Commissariat for the Army. No answers or summaries of answers have been discovered in the archives. It would appear that the answers helped Lenin to arrive at the firm conviction that it would be impossible to continue the war with the Germans, and were taken into account in working out the Party's tactics at the peace talks with Germany. The results of the questionnaire were discussed by the government on December 18 (31) after a report given by N. V. Krylenko on the situation at the front and the morale of the army. The government resolved to

recognise the results of the questionnaire as being exhaustive and adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin (see p. 397).

The manuscript of Lenin's questionnaire has not come down to us; the text published here was given in a letter from a man who was present at the conference, D. S. Vitebsky, to the Lenin Institute in 1924.

The Army Congress on the Demobilisation of the Army was held in Petrograd from December 15 (28), 1917, to January 3 (16), 1918. It was attended by delegates from the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, front-line and corps committees, engineers, artillery units and brigades, staffs, etc. When the Congress opened there were 234 delegates, 119 of them Bolsheviks and 45 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries appeared to have formed the so-called "extra-factional group". The number of delegates subsequently increased to 272. The task of the Congress was to control the spontaneous demobilisation of the army and to discuss the creation of a new army of the socialist state. The Congress was for all purposes a caretaker organ to guide the army demobilisation and did a great deal of work to that effect.

On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Congress discussed the organisation of a socialist army, and the Bolshevik group motioned a project for the formation of a workers' and peasants' army. It was opposed by the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. After some hesitation the Left-wingers supported the Bolsheviks. The project was adopted by 153 to 40 with 13 abstentions.

Lenin was expected to speak at the Congress but was unable to do so because of pressure of work. On January 3 (16), the closing day, he sent a message of greetings to the delegates (see p. 426).

p. 395

[149] Adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on December 18 (31), 1917. p. 397

[150] See Marx's letters to Liebknecht of April 8, 1871 and to Kugelmann of April 12, 1871 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 317-18). p. 401

[151] *Belinsky*, *Vissarion Grigoryevich* (1811-1848)—outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, critic, publicist and materialist philosopher. His activity had a great impact on the progress of social thinking and the liberation movement in Russia. p. 408

[152] Marx, Letter to Wilhelm Bracke of May 5, 1875 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 360). p. 413

[153] A quotation from Goethe's *Faust*, Part One, Scene 4—Faust's Study. p. 413

[154] Written December 25-28, 1917 (January 7-10, 1918). Lenin said in his Preliminary Theses that in writing the draft he had made

use of the following documents: directive of the People's Commissariat for Food to the local Soviets of December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), on organising the food supply machinery; the Commissariat's project for a Commissariat for Supply, and also the Supreme Economic Council's project for district economic councils. p. 416

[155] The send-off took place in Mikhailovsky Manège on January 1 (14), 1918. As Lenin was returning to the Smolny an attempt was made on his life: a bullet went through the windscreen and passed over his head. The Swiss Communist, Fritz Platten, who was with Lenin, was wounded. p. 420

[156] The draft of the declaration was placed before the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on January 3 (16), 1918, and adopted as a basis by a majority with two against and one abstention. It was referred to a Co-ordinating Commission for final drafting. The declaration was adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and published in *Izvestia* on January 4 (17). On behalf of the Committee it was read out by Sverdlov at the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly on January 5 (18) and motioned for approval. The counter-revolutionary majority of the Assembly rejected the motion to discuss it. On January 12 (25), it was approved by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets and subsequently formed the basis of the Soviet Constitution.

Paragraph 2 of Lenin's manuscript was altered by Stalin. The paragraph beginning with the words "In essence the Constituent Assembly considers..." was written by Bukharin and edited by Lenin. p. 423

[157] On December 6 (19), 1917, the Finnish Diet adopted a declaration of Finland's independence. In accordance with the nationalities policy of the Soviet state, the Council of People's Commissars, on December 18 (31), 1917, issued a decree on Finland's independence. At the meeting of the Government, Lenin personally handed the text of the decree to Prime Minister Svinhufvud, who led a Finnish Government delegation. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the decree on Finland's independence was approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

On December 19, 1917 (January 1, 1918), in conformity with a treaty concluded between Russia and Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at Brest-Litovsk on December 2 (15), the Soviet Government proposed to the Persian Government to elaborate a common plan for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia.

On December 29, 1917 (January 11, 1918), the Government issued the Decree on Turkish Armenia, which was published in *Pravda* No. 227 on December 31, 1917 (January 13, 1918). p. 424

[158] When the counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly refused to discuss the "Declaration of Rights of the

Working and Exploited People", the Bolshevik and Left Socialist-Revolutionary groups demanded an adjournment to allow the groups to confer. Lenin made a short speech at the meeting of the Bolshevik group (no record of it remains). He proposed that his declaration of the Bolshevik group should be read out in the Assembly, after which the Bolsheviks would walk out. His proposal was adopted by the group.

When the Bolsheviks left, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, whose attitude to the Constituent Assembly was uncertain, motioned an immediate vote on the attitude to the policy of peace conducted by Soviet power. When this proposal was rejected by the Right wing, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries walked out as well.

Shortly after, P. E. Dybenko, People's Commissar for the Navy; who was in charge of security in the Taurida Palace, ordered the guard to close the sitting of the Constituent Assembly. When Lenin heard of this, he issued the following instructions: "The comrades soldiers and sailors on guard duty in the Taurida Palace must refrain from any acts of violence in respect of the counter-revolutionary section of the Constituent Assembly, freely allowing everyone to leave the Taurida Palace, but allowing no one in without a special pass. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V. Ulyanov (Lenin)." (*Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, p. 46. Published in Russian.)

The Constituent Assembly adjourned at 4.40 a.m. on January 6 (19), 1918. p. 429

[159] *Louis Blanc* (1811-1882)—French petty-bourgeois socialist and historian, who denied that class contradictions under capitalism were antagonistic, opposed the proletarian revolution, and wanted a compromise with the bourgeoisie. Lenin uses the epithet to denote the opportunist and conciliatory tactics of the Mensheviks and other traitors to the cause of the revolution and the interests of the working class. p. 431

[160] The question of dissolving the Constituent Assembly was discussed by the Soviet Government on January 6 (19), 1918. The main content of the decree dissolving it was set out by Lenin in the form of theses.

The All-Russia Central Executive Committee met on the night of January 6 (19) and by a majority against two, with five abstentions, adopted the decree. Lenin spoke on the dissolution of the Assembly (see pp. 437-41). The decree was based on Lenin's draft and was published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on January 7 (20), 1918. p. 434

[161] A discussion of the question of war and peace was held by the Central Committee on January 11 (24), 1918, following a speech by Lenin, who was opposed by the Left Communists and Trotsky. Some of them—Bukharin, Uritsky, Lomov (Oppokov)—supported Trotsky's proposal for a "neither war nor peace" attitude. Stalin,

Sergeyev (Artyom) and Sokolnikov favoured peace. The Left Communists did not expect the "revolutionary war now" slogan to go through (only two voted for it), and so voted for Trotsky's proposal, which received 9 votes to 7 against. In the hope of overcoming the resistance to the conclusion of peace within the Central Committee and winning over the section of the masses which followed the advocates of a revolutionary war, Lenin motioned the proposal that the talks should be delayed in every possible way, and this was passed by 12 votes to one. p. 442

[162] The Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies was held in Petrograd from January 10 to 18 (23 to 31), 1918. It was attended by delegates from 317 Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and 110 army, corps and divisional committees. At the opening were 707 delegates, 441 of them Bolsheviks. On January 13 (26), it was joined by the delegates to the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. Together with late arrivals there was a total of 1,587 delegates at the final sitting.

The Presidium of the Congress consisted of 10 Bolsheviks, 3 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and 1 delegate from each other group (Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc.).

Greetings were conveyed by delegates from the Swiss, Rumanian, Swedish and Norwegian Social-Democratic parties, the British Socialist Party and the labour socialists of America.

The Congress discussed Sverdlov's report on the activity of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Lenin reported to the Congress on the activity of the Council of People's Commissars. In the debates, the Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Menshevik internationalists opposed the domestic and foreign policy of Soviet power. Their attitudes were criticised by Lenin in a summing-up speech. The Congress approved Lenin's "Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People", which later became the basis of the Soviet Constitution. A Congress resolution gave full approval to the policy of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars and gave them a vote of confidence.

The Congress also approved the Government's policy on peace and conferred on it the broadest powers in this matter.

The Congress heard a report by Stalin, People's Commissar for Nationalities', on the principles of federation and the policy of Soviet power on the question of nationalities and adopted a resolution constituting the Russian Socialist Republic as a federation of Soviet Republics, on the basis of a free union of the peoples of Russia. The Congress approved the Government's policy on the question of nationalities.

The arrival of the delegates to the Third All-Russia Peasants' Congress was a notable event: the Congress continued its deliberations as a joint Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

The Congress approved the basic provisions of the law on the socialisation of land worked out on the basis of the Decree on Land.

It elected an All-Russia Central Executive Committee consisting of 160 Bolsheviks, 125 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2 Social-Democrat internationalists, 3 anarchist Communists, 7 Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists, 7 Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and 2 Mensheviks.

In a summing-up speech, Lenin said that the Congress "has opened a new epoch in world history" and by establishing the organisation of a new state power created by the October Revolution "has projected the lines of future socialist construction for the whole world, for the working people of all countries" (p. 479).

p. 453

[163] The reference is to the talks between the All-Russia Leather Workers Union with their employers for wider workers' representation in the Central Leather Committee and its remoulding on democratic lines. The Central Committee and the district committees were reorganised in early 1918 with the workers getting two-thirds of the votes. On April 6, 1918, a telegram signed by Lenin was sent to all Soviets on the need to democratise the local organs of the leather industry, and fulfil precisely the instructions issued by the Central and district committees for the leather industry. p. 470

[164] Marx's letter to Engels of February 12, 1870. p. 471

[165] The reference is to the anti-war general strike by Italian workers in Turin in August 1917, and the strikes staged by Austrian workers in January 1918 in connection with the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. The strikes in Austria were held under slogans demanding a general peace and improvement of food supplies for the workers.

p. 471

[166] The reference is to the Message of the Revolutionary Finnish Government to the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Republic, published in *Pravda* (evening edition) No. 13, on January 17 (30), 1918.

The revolution in Finland broke out in mid-January 1918 in the southern industrial areas. On January 15 (28), the Finnish Red Guard occupied Helsingfors, the capital, and overthrew the reactionary bourgeois government of Svinhufvud. A revolutionary government of Finland, the Council of People's Representatives was set up on January 16 (29). Power in the towns and villages in the south of Finland passed into the hands of the workers. The Svinhufvud government was entrenched in the north and appealed to the German Government for help. Following the intervention of the German armed forces and a bitter civil war, the revolution in Finland was crushed in May 1918. p. 480

[167] The reference is to the Basic Law on the Socialisation of Land tabled for approval at the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The draft was edited by a commission of the Congress in which Lenin took part. On January 18 (31), 1918, the law (Section One—General Provisions) was approved by the Congress. It was further elaborated at joint sittings of the Congress of Land Committees and the peasant section of the Third Congress of Soviets. The final text of the law was approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on January 27 (February 9). p. 481

[168] *Extraordinary All-Russia Railwaymen's Congress* was held in Petrograd from January 5 to 30 (January 18 to February 12), 1918. The Left wing of the Second Extraordinary Railwaymen's Congress called by the Vikzhel on December 19, 1917 (January 1, 1918), walked out and held a separate congress when the Right wing (Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc.) adopted a resolution by a majority of 12 to the effect that all power in the country must belong to the Constituent Assembly.

The resolution adopted by the Extraordinary All-Russia Railwaymen's Congress said that it was solidly behind Soviet power. It worked out new wage rates for railway workers and officials adopted railway regulations and rules for the people's railway militia, heard a report on the nationalisation of private railways, etc. It elected a new All-Russia Railwaymen's Executive Committee (Vikzhedor). p. 484

[169] Kaledin's order for the arrest of the Congress of Front-line Cossacks in Kamenskaya Village came too late, for the Revolutionary Military Committee set up at the Congress had taken power in Kamenskaya. This was reported to the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets by a delegate who had taken part in the events in Kamenskaya. p. 488

[170] The reference is to the decree issued by the People's Commissar for Communications M. T. Yelizarov on January 2 (15), 1918, on wage rates for railwaymen, which set an almost similar rate for the labour of skilled workers, engineers and unskilled workers. The Council of People's Commissars rescinded his decree on January 7 (20), and, pending the Extraordinary All-Russia Railwaymen's Congress, ordered payments to be made at rates established by a decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 2 (15), 1917, which were based on grades and zones. p. 499

[171] The meeting of the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet with delegates from food supply organisations discussed the grave food situation of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd who received only a quarter of a pound of bread a day. It heard a report by a representative of the food board on the prospects of better food supplies for Petrograd and a report of the unloading commission. A decision of the Council of People's Commissars on January 19

(February 1) increased the food ration to one-half pound for the whole population of Petrograd. p. 501

[172] The question of the nationalisation of the merchant marine and inland water transport was discussed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on January 18 (31), 1918. It heard three reports: one from Tsentrovolga, another from the Central Committee of the All-Russia Seamen's and River Transport Workers' Union, and a third from the Supreme Economic Council. Lenin's draft was approved as a decision of the Council of People's Commissars "On Seamen and River Transport Workers". p. 505

[173] The reference is to the Central Committee of the All-Russia Seamen's and River Transport Workers' Union. p. 505

[174] The reference is to a demand made by a group of Left Communists—Bukharin, Lomov (Oppokov), Osinsky (Obolensky) and others—on January 15 (28), 1918, to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) for a Party conference to discuss and decide on the question of peace. p. 507

[175] Lenin's proposal for a congress was adopted. It was first set by the C.C. meeting of January 19 (February 1), 1918, for February 20, but was later postponed until March 6, 1918. p. 507

[176] Lenin's proposal for a conference of various groups on peace was adopted. It was held on January 21 (February 3), 1918, but no minutes are available. There is only a record of the vote on 10 questions connected with the conclusion of peace (see *Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), August 1917-February 1918*, in Russian, 1958, pp. 190-91). On the main question—Is it permissible to sign a German annexationist peace now?—five participants said yes. They were Lenin, Stalin, Muranov, Artyom (Sergeyev) and Sokolnikov; 9 voted against. They were Lomov (Oppokov), Krestinsky, Bubnov, Kosior, Osinsky (Obolensky), Stukov, Preobrazhensky, Spunde and Fenigstein. Zinoviev, Bukharin and Uritsky left the conference before the vote. p. 509

[177] The reference is to a break in telegraph communications between Moscow and Brest-Litovsk due to German tampering. p. 510

[178] The reference is to the fact cited in a report to the Third Congress of Soviets on January 16 (29), 1918, by a participant in the Cossack Congress in Kamenskaya. p. 516

[179] The telegram is in reply to Trotsky's query on the German ultimatum at Brest-Litovsk on January 15 (28), 1918.

Apart from Lenin's signature there is also that of Stalin. The words "Reply, January 28, 6.30 p.m. ... Keep us informed" were written by Stalin. p. 517

[180] Lenin delivered his speech at the closing sitting of the Land: Committee Congress and the peasant section of the Third Congress of Soviets.

The Land Committee Congress opened in Petrograd on January 17 (30), 1918. Its first sitting was attended by 472 delegates from 43 gubernias and 243 uyezds. The Congress subsequently worked together with the peasant section of the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets which ended on January 18 (31). It was then attended by more than 1,000 delegates. The various sections of the Congress worked out the details of the Basic Law on the Socialisation of Land (see Note 167). p. 518

[181] The morning sitting of the Central Committee on February 18, 1918, discussed the German offensive and the dispatch of a telegram to the German Government announcing readiness to conclude a peace.

The pretext for the German offensive was Trotsky's refusal to sign a peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk. At 7.30 p.m. on February 16, 1918, the German Command officially informed the Soviet representatives at Brest-Litovsk that the ceasefire between Russia and Germany would be terminated at noon on February 18 and a state of war resumed. Under the Brest-Litovsk armistice agreement, concluded on December 2 (15), 1917, the parties were bound to give a seven-day notice of their intention to abrogate the agreement. The German Command violated this commitment. The Soviet Government sent a protest to the German Government over the breach of the armistice agreement, but received no reply. On the morning of February 18 reports were received that German troops had gone into action.

At the Central Committee meeting, Lenin's proposal that a telegram should be sent to the German Government immediately was opposed by Trotsky and Bukharin; Zinoviev favoured its dispatch. When put to the vote Lenin's proposal got 6 votes with 7 against. It was decided to call the next meeting at 2.00 p.m. the next day, but in view of the unfurling German offensive it was called on the night of February 18. p. 520

[182] The reference is to the Central Committee meeting on the evening of February 17 which discussed the question of a possible German offensive. Five members of the Central Committee (Lenin, Stalin Sverdlov, Sokolnikov and Smilga) voted for Lenin's proposal that the talks with Germany should be renewed immediately; 6 voted against (Trotsky, Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky, Ioffe and Krestinsky). However, when the question was formulated as follows: "If the German offensive becomes a fact, without there being any revolutionary upsurge in Germany and Austria, do we conclude a peace?" Trotsky voted in the affirmative. Bukharin,

Lomov, Uritsky and Krestinsky abstained, and only Ioffe voted against. Thus the proposal was adopted by a majority. p. 520

[183] The evening sitting of the Central Committee on February 18, 1918, was held in a highly tense atmosphere. It was called in view of the fact that the Germans had launched an offensive that day and had taken Dvinsk in their headlong advance. The Left Communists once again opposed Lenin's proposals, but Trotsky proposed that inquiries should be sent to Berlin and Vienna about the German Government's demands, without informing it of the consent to conclude a peace. Sverdlov, Stalin and Zinoviev favoured the dispatch of a telegram to the German Government informing it of readiness to resume the talks. It was at this sitting that Lenin first succeeded, after a bitter struggle, to secure a majority in favour of concluding a peace: his proposal for an immediate message to the German Government offering to conclude peace was adopted by 7 votes to 6. p. 522

[184] The wireless message to the Government of the German Reich was sent to Berlin on the morning of February 19 on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. But the German Government's reply, containing even harsher peace terms, was handed to the Soviet courier only on February 22 and was received in Petrograd on the morning of February 23; it demanded that the new peace terms should be studied within 48 hours. The Germans, while delaying their own reply, continued their offensive, and in those few days covered a great deal of territory; they occupied a number of towns and came within striking distance of Petrograd. p. 525

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*September 1917-February 1918*)

1917

Prior to September 17 (30)	Lenin lives in Helsingfors (Finland). Following the July events he goes underground to escape the Provisional Government's agents and directs the Party through his followers and associates in Petrograd.
September 15 (28)	The Central Committee discusses Lenin's letters "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power" and "Marxism and Insurrection", which it circulated among the major Bolshevik organisations.
September 17 (30)	Lenin moves from Helsingfors to Vyborg to establish closer ties with the Party's Central Committee.
Not later than September 22 (October 5)	Lenin writes the article "Heroes of Fraud and the Mistakes of the Bolsheviks". Under the title "Heroes of Fraud" an abridged version of the article appeared in *Rabochy Put* No. 19 on September 24 (October 7).
September 22-2 (October 5-7)	Lenin writes the article "From a Publicist's Diary. The Mistakes of Our Party".
September 27 (October 10)	Lenin writes a letter to the Chairman of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland, I. T. Smilga.
September 29 (October 12)	Lenin writes the article "The Crisis Has Matured".
End of September-October 1 (14)	Lenin writes the article "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"

Between September 29 and October 4 (October 12 and 17)	Lenin writes his "Theses for a Report at the October 8 Conference of the Petrograd Organisation, also for a Resolution and Instructions to Those Elected to the Party Congress".
Between September 30 and October 12 (October 13 and 25)	Lenin signs two applications stating his consent to stand for the Constituent Assembly as a nominee of the Northern Front of the army in the field and the Baltic Fleet.
October 1 (14)	Lenin writes the "Letter to the Central Committee, the Moscow and Petrograd Committees and the Bolshevik Members of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets", proposing that power should be taken without delay.
October 1-2 (14-15)	Lenin writes his message "To Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers!", calling on them to overthrow the Kerensky government and hand power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.
October 3 (16)	The Central Committee adopts a decision to invite Lenin to Petrograd.
October 5 (18)	The Central Committee elects a commission headed by Lenin to draft the Party's programme.
October 6-8 (19-21)	Lenin writes the article "Revision of the Party Programme".
October 7 (20)	Lenin returns from Vyborg to Petrograd illegally and settles in M. V. Fofanova's flat in Vyborg District. That same day he writes his "Letter to the Petrograd City Conference. To be Read in Closed Session".
October 8 (21)	Lenin writes the article "Advice of an Onlooker" and "Letter to the Bolshevik Comrades Attending the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, saying that the Bolsheviks should take power and giving a concrete plan for the uprising.
October 10 (23)	Lenin reports to the Central Committee on the current situation; he tables a resolution calling for an armed uprising, which is adopted.
	The Central Committee also sets up a Political

	Bureau headed by Lenin to provide political guidance during the insurrection.
Between October 10 and 16 (23 and 29)	In M. I. Kalinin's flat, Lenin meets members of the Central Committee and discusses preparations for the armed uprising.
Between October 12 and 15 (25 and 28)	Lenin has several secret meetings with O. A. Pyatnitsky, a representative of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), and discusses with him preparations in Moscow for the armed uprising-signs statement agreeing to stand in the election to the Constituent Assembly as the candidate for Moscow.
October 14 (27)	At the flat of G. E. Jalava, an engine driver of the Finland Railway, Lenin meets leading Bolsheviks to discuss preparations for the armed uprising.
October 16 (29)	Lenin reports to an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee on the C.C. meeting of October 10 (23) and reads out its resolution on the armed uprising.
October 17 (30)	Lenin writes his "Letter to Comrades" exposing Kamenev and Zinoviev's treacherous behaviour in opposing the armed uprising.
October 18 (31)	Lenin writes his "Letter to Bolshevik Party Members" demanding the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party as "strike-breakers" who had divulged the secret Central Committee decision on the armed uprising.
October 19 (November 1)	Lenin writes his "Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)" demanding the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party as "strike-breakers" who had divulged the secret Central Committee decision on the armed uprising.
October 20 (November 2)	Lenin writes the article "Socialist-Revolutionary Party Cheats the Peasants Once Again".
	The Central Committee discusses Lenin's "Letter to Bolshevik Party Members" and the "Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)".
October 24 (November 6)	Lenin writes the "Letter to Central Committee Members" demanding an immediate armed uprising.

Night of October 24 (November 6)	Lenin secretly arrives in the Smolny and takes over the general practical direction of the armed uprising of the Petrograd workers, soldiers and sailors.
	Lenin takes part in the Central Committee meeting which discusses the formation of the Soviet Government.
October 25 (November 7)	At 10 a.m., Lenin, on behalf of the Revolutionary Military Committee, writes the appeal "To the Citizens of Russia!", announcing the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the transfer of power into the hands of the Revolutionary Military Committee.
	Lenin attends the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, drafts its resolution and reports on the tasks of Soviet power.
	Lenin writes the appeal of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to Workers, Soldiers and Peasants.
	Lenin writes the draft decrees on peace, on land, and the formation of the Soviet Government.
October 26 (November 8)	Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and gives reports on peace and on land. The Congress adopts Lenin's Decree on Peace, Decree on Land, and the resolution forming the Workers' and Peasants' Government; it approves the composition of the Council of People's Commissars headed by Lenin. Lenin is elected member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (Second Convocation).
October 26 or 27 (November 8 or 9)	Lenin writes the "Draft Regulations on Workers' Control".
	Lenin attends the meeting of the Central Council of the Petrograd Factory Committees to discuss the introduction of workers' control of production and the establishment of a governing economic organ.
October 27 (November 9)	Lenin attends the first sitting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (Second Convocation).

Night of October 27 November 9)

The Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars set up a commission headed by Lenin to organise and direct the fight against the Kerensky-Krasnov counter-revolutionary revolt.

Lenin arrives at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District, and hears the reports of N. I. Podvoisky, V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko and K. A. Mekhanoshin on the situation obtaining after the seizure of Gatchina by General Krasnov's Cossack units, and the plans for fighting them. On Lenin's proposal, a decision is taken to use the ships of the Baltic Fleet in the operations against Krasnov's troops.

Lenin telegraphs an order to Helsingfors on the immediate dispatch to Petrograd of detachments of sailors and warships of the Baltic Fleet and army units to fight the Krasnov-Kerensky troops.

Lenin informs the members of the Executive Commission of the Petersburg Party Committee of the Krasnov offensive against Petrograd and proposes that the digging of trenches and throwing up of barbed-wire entanglements should be started right away at the approaches to the city.

October 28 (*November 10*)

Lenin directs the operations to defeat the Krasnov-Kerensky counter-revolutionary revolt, and takes part in working out plans for operations against them.

Lenin holds a conference of delegates from Party organisations, factory committees, trade unions, district Soviets, and units of the Petrograd garrison on the defence of Petrograd.

Lenin asks the Putilov workers to supply the front with several batteries and an armoured train.

Night of October 28 (*November 10*)

Lenin arrives at the Putilov Works, talks with workers and asks them to speed up the construction of the armoured train and assembly of guns.

October 29 (*November 11*)

In connection with the counter-revolutionary putsch launched by officer cadets in Petrograd on the night of October 29, Lenin confers with members of the Revolutionary Military Committee.

Lenin talks with member of the Moscow Revolu-

tionary Military Committee, M. P. Tomsky, on the course of the putsch in Moscow.

Lenin explains to agitators, who met at his request that there is need to call on the regiments of the Petrograd garrison to fight against the Krasnov-Kerensky counter-revolutionary troops.

Lenin reports to a conference of regimental delegates of the Petrograd garrison on the current situation and speaks on the arming of units and law and order in the city.

October 29 (November 12) — Lenin attends a meeting of the Bolshevik group of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to discuss the proposal of the All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Trade Union (Vikzhel) on the formation of a "uniform socialist government" with the participation of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and exposes Kamenev and other capitulants who supported the proposal.

October 30 (November 12) — Lenin writes and broadcasts the government's announcement that power has passed to the Soviets, and that the Soviet Government is taking measures to suppress counter-revolutionary risings.

End of October — Lenin writes the "Draft Rules for Office Employees".

November 1 (13) — Lenin addresses an enlarged meeting of the Party's Central Committee on the treasonable behaviour of Kamenev and Ryazanov at the Vikzhel conferences.

November 2 (15) — Lenin signs the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, proclaiming complete equality for the country's nationalities.

Lenin attends a sitting of the Party's Central Committee to discuss the defeatist behaviour of Kamenev, Zinoviev and others. The Central Committee adopts Lenin's resolution on the opposition within the Central Committee.

November 3 (16) — Lenin writes the "Ultimatum from the Majority on the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) to the Minority".

Lenin presides at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars to discuss Nogin's report on the situation in Moscow and objects to any agreement with the Vikzhel.

November 4 (17) Lenin attends a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, speaks on the question of the press and on the resignation of Nogin, Rykov, Milyutin and Teodorovich and replies to the questions of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet and front-line delegates on the programme and tasks of the Soviet Government.

November 5 (18) Lenin writes a message "To the Population" and "Reply to Questions from Peasants"; instructs the government's secretary to hand typewritten copies of his "Reply" bearing his signature to peasant messengers arriving at the Smolny.

November 5-6 (18-19) Lenin writes an appeal "From the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks). To All Party Members and to All the Working Classes of Russia", branding Kamenev, Zinoviev, Nogin, Rykov and Milyutin as deserters and traitors for having left the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

November 7 (20) On behalf of the government Lenin orders the Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin, to make an offer of an immediate ceasefire to all the belligerent countries.

Night of November 8 (21) Lenin has a direct-line conversation with General Dukhonin from the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District.

Lenin arrives at the "Novaya Gollandia" radio station and writes his "Wireless Message. To All Regimental, Divisional, Corps, Army and Other Committees, to All Soldiers of the Revolutionary Army and Sailors of the Revolutionary Navy".

November 9 (22) Lenin speaks at an enlarged meeting of the Petrograd Trade Union Council on the nature of the October Revolution and the tasks of Soviet power.

November 10 (*23*)

Lenin reports to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the talks with Dukhonin.

Lenin approves and signs the decree abolishing social estates and civil ranks.

November 12 (*25*)

The government instruction to the Revolutionary Military Committee on strict measures to eradicate speculation and sabotage, written by Lenin, appears in *Izvestia* No. 223.

November 1 (*27*)

Lenin speaks before the Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies on the agrarian question and reads out his draft resolution on the attitude of the Congress to the Decree on Land.

November 15 (*28*)

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the establishment of an Economic Council.

November 16 (*29*)

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss a draft decree on revolutionary courts and the abolition of all the old judicial institutions; transfer of Ukrainian national relics to the Ukrainian people, talks with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries on their participation in the government, etc.

November 18 (*December 1*)

Lenin delivers a summing-up speech on the agrarian question at the Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the questions of a Supreme Economic Conference; nationalisation of factories in the Donets area; and salaries for People's Commissars. Lenin's draft resolution is adopted.

November 19 (*December 2*)

Lenin writes the draft decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the right of electors to recall deputies, and the right of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants Deputies to appoint re-elections to all representative institutions, including the Constituent Assembly.

Lenin presides at a meeting of the government, writes a draft resolution on a report on a war ministry. Other items discussed at the meeting include the situation in the Ukraine and the question of the Central Rada; the query of the Moscow Soviet about the right of Soviets to se-

quester factories and plants; questions of trade and financial relations with Finland, a purge of the ministries, etc.

November 21 (*December 4*) Lenin reports to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the right of recalling deputies to the Constituent Assembly, and tables a draft decree which is adopted.

November 22 (*December 5*) Lenin speaks on the current situation at the First All-Russia Congress of the Navy.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the question of revolutionary courts.

November 25 (*December 8*) Lenin sends a letter to the Factory Committee of the Tula Arms Factory requesting rifles, pistols and other arms for the Red Guard of the Bokovsky Mountain District, Don Region.

Lenin reports to the government on his talk with a delegation of the Union of Cossack Troops.

November 26 (*December 9*) Lenin writes a letter to the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District urging the extension of urgent military aid to Orenburg against the whiteguard Cossack Chief, Dutov.

November 27 (*December 10*) Lenin writes the foreword to *Material on the Agrarian Question*.

Lenin presides at a government meeting; motions a proposal to set up a special commission to implement a socialist policy in financial and economic affairs. The meeting also discusses the composition of a peace delegation for talks with Germany, instructions to the delegation, etc.

Lenin writes the general political part of the "Outline Programme for Peace Negotiations".

November 28 (*December 11*) Lenin writes to the All-Russia Commission for elections to the Constituent Assembly requesting it to consider him elected to the Assembly from the Baltic Fleet.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the Cadet Party's counter-revolutionary plot; he tables his draft decree on the arrest of the leaders of the civil war against the revolution.

November 29 (*December 12*) Lenin speaks at a Central Committee meeting on the composition of Pravda's editorial board-is elected to the Central Committee Bureau set up to handle urgent matters.

Lenin writes and tables for the government's approval a decision transferring all war plants to productive economic operation.

December 1 (*14*) Lenin speaks at the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the establishment of a Supreme Economic Council and on the Constituent Assembly.

Lenin reports to the Bolshevik group of the Constituent Assembly on the Party's tactics in respect of the Assembly.

December 2 (*15*) Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss instructions to the Commander-in-Chief Krylenko on the Ukrainian question, on the Byelorussian Rada and financial support for the Byelorussian Regional Committee, etc.

On behalf of the Bolshevik group, Lenin addresses the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies.

December 3 (*16*) Lenin writes the "Main Points of a Manifesto to the Ukrainian People" and the "Manifesto to the Ukrainian People with an Ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada". The Manifesto is unanimously adopted by the Council of People's Commissars.

December 4 (*17*) Lenin reports to a meeting of the workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on the economic condition of the Petrograd workers and the tasks facing the working class.

December 5 (*18*) Lenin presides at a government meeting, takes part in a commission to organise military operations against the Central Rada and addresses an appeal, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, to the Ukrainian people and soldiers Lenin is also elected to a commission to examine draft regulations and instructions for volost committees.

December 6 (*19*) Lenin issues instructions to railway commissars to give the green light to the troops train of the

First Caucasian Regiment of the Fifth Caucasian Cossack Division on its way to fight the whiteguard General Kaledin.

December 7 (20) Lenin writes a note to Felix Dzerzhinsky on the fight against saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss Dzerzhinsky's report on the establishment and composition of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka).

December 11 (24) Lenin takes part in the proceedings of the plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee.

December 11 or 12 (24 or 25) Lenin writes the "Draft Resolution on the Provisional Bureau of the Bolshevik Group in the Constituent Assembly", and draws up his "Theses on the Constituent Assembly".

December 12 (25) Lenin's "Theses on the Constituent Assembly" are unanimously adopted by the Bolshevik group of the Constituent Assembly.

December 13 (26) Lenin delivers a speech of greetings on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars at the Extraordinary Congress of Railwaymen.

December 14 (27) Lenin hears reports from the chiefs of operations to seize private banks.

Lenin writes the article "For Bread and Peace".

Lenin attends a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and speaks in the debate on the report on the nationalisation of the banks.

Not earlier than December 14 (27) Lenin writes his notes on the Soviet Government's economic policy.

Lenin works out the "Draft Decree on the Nationalisation of the Banks and on Measures Necessary for Its Implementation".

Lenin attends a meeting of the Bureau of the Supreme Economic Council; tables his "Draft Decree on the Nationalisation of the Banks and

on Measures Necessary for Its Implementation", delivers a report to substantiate his project and answers questions.

December 15 (28) — Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the establishment of a commission of practical workers under the Supreme Economic Council-the government adopts Lenin's draft decision on the question.

December 16 (29) — Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss transitional forms for the army in the period of demobilisation, and the formation of non-Russian units in the army, etc.

December 17 (30) — Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss a report of the Soviet peace delegation to Brest-Litovsk, etc.

Lenin attends a conference of delegates to the Army Congress on the Demobilisation of the Army called on his proposal, writes "Questions to Delegates to the Army Congress on the Demobilisation of the Army", reads them out, and asks the conference and Congress delegates to answer the questions in writing.

December 18 (31) — Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the situation at the front and the morale of the army; Lenin's resolution is adopted.

Lenin sees a Finnish Government delegation and hands it the government's decree recognising Finland as an independent state.

December 19 (January 1) — Lenin presides at a government meeting; tables his draft decisions on starting talks with the Central Rada and on the action of I. Z. Steinberg, People's Commissar for Justice, in releasing without sanction members of the Alliance in Defence of the Constituent Assembly arrested by the Cheka.

Night of December 20 (January 2, 1918) — Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss preparations for the Constituent Assembly, etc.

December 23 (January 5, 1918) — Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the draft decree on Turkish Armenia, etc.

	The government decides to send Lenin on a short holiday.
December 2 (January 6, 1918)	Lenin takes a holiday in Finland.
December 24-27 (January 6-9, 1918)	While on holiday, Lenin writes the articles "From a Publicist's Diary (Topics for Elaboration)" "Fear of the Collapse of the Old and the Fight for the New"; "How to Organise Competition?"; "Draft Decree on Consumers' Communes".

1918

January 1 (14)	Lenin speaks at the Mikhailovsky Manège at the send-off of the first troop trains of the socialist army. Lenin is unhurt when his car is shot at by counter-revolutionary terrorists as he is leaving.
	Lenin reports to the government on the events of the day.
Not later than January 3 (16)	Lenin writes the "Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People".
January 3 (16)	Lenin writes a letter to the Army Congress on the Demobilisation of the Army.
	Lenin telegraphs instructions to the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk to arrange an adjournment of the peace conference and to return to Petrograd.
January 5 (18)	Lenin attends a sitting of the Constituent Assembly; during a recess he attends a meeting of the Central Committee to discuss tactics in respect of the Constituent Assembly; writes a draft declaration by the Bolsheviks on their withdrawal from the Assembly; talks with Bolshevik deputies; and speaks at a meeting of the Bolshevik group to substantiate the Central Committee's proposal for a Bolshevik walk-out from the Assembly and their subsequent attitude.
January 6 (19)	Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss

his theses on the Constituent Assembly, all of which are adopted.

Lenin writes the "Draft Decree on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly".

Lenin speaks before the Committee on the dissolution of the Assembly and tables his draft decree which the Committee approves.

January 7 (20) Lenin writes the "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace".

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss a report on the course of the peace talks at Brest-Litovsk, etc.

January 8 (21) Lenin reads his "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace" at a meeting of Petrograd's leading Party workers.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss food policy and an All-Russia Food Council under the Supreme Economic Council.

January 9 (22) Lenin takes part in the proceedings of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee.

January 10 (23) Lenin attends the opening of the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and is elected its honorary chairman.

January 11 (24) Lenin speaks twice on the question of peace at a meeting of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee.

Lenin reports to the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets on the activity of the Council of People's Commissars.

January 12 (25) Lenin's "Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People" is adopted by the Third Congress of Soviets.

Lenin delivers the summing-up speech at the Third Congress of Soviets on the report of the Council of People's Commissars.

January 13 (26) Lenin reports to the Extraordinary All-Russia

Railwaymen's Congress on the activity of the Council of People's Commissars, and replies to written questions.

January 14 (27) Lenin speaks at a conference of the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet and delegates of food organisations on measures to combat the famine, and tables his draft resolution.

January 15 (28) Lenin writes a letter to G. K. Orjonikidze, Commissar Extraordinary for the Ukraine, and Commander-in-Chief Antonov-Ovseyenko in Kharkov, demanding that they should take "the most vigorous and revolutionary measures" to dispatch grain to Petrograd.

Lenin orders the Revolutionary Naval Committee to send 2,000 sailors for military operations against the Central Rada.

Lenin signs a government decree on the organisation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

January 16 (29) Lenin works out a draft government message to the All-Russia Food Congress proposing that experienced workers should be appointed to the top food supply bodies to take resolute steps to overcome the famine.

Lenin signs a government decree appropriating 20 million rubles to organise the Red Army.

January 18 (31) Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the nationalisation of the merchant marine and inland water transport; a resolution drafted by Lenin is adopted.

Lenin writes the "Draft Decree On Expunging References to the Constituent Assembly from Soviet Legislation".

Lenin delivers the summing-up speech at the closing of the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

January 19 (February 1) Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Central Committee on the conclusion of peace with Germany and the convocation of a Party Congress.

January 21 (February 3) Lenin speaks at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee and Party workers on the conclusion of peace with Germany.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Lenin broadcasts a message to the peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk on the ground gained by Soviet power in the Ukraine, Finland and on the Don.

January 22 (*February 4*) — Lenin broadcasts on the situation at home.

Lenin sends a telegram to Orjonikidze in Kharkov conveying his thanks for the vigorous measures taken to supply food and gives his instructions on further efforts to procure and deliver grain to the centre.

January 23 (*February 5*) — Lenin signs Broadcast No. 4 on the liquidation of the counter-revolutionary Rada, the proclamation of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine and its People's Secretariat as the supreme power in the Ukraine; establishment of federal relations between Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine; the defeat of the Dutov revolt in the Urals and the triumph of Soviet power in the Crimea.

January 24 (*February 6*) — Lenin speaks at a Central Committee meeting on the agenda of the Seventh Party Congress; he proposes the following items: review of the Party programme, the question of peace, and tactical questions. Lenin is elected to a commission to draft the Party programme.

Lenin's speech to propagandists on their way to the provinces is carried by *Pravda* No. 18.

January 28 (*February 10*) — Lenin delivers a speech at the closing sitting of the Land Committee Congress and t e peasant section of the Third Congress of Soviets.

In reply to a question from the chairman of the Russian delegation to the Brest-Litovsk peace conference, Trotsky, as to the attitude to be taken to the German delegation's ultimatum, Lenin sends a telegram reaffirming his view that a peace treaty should be signed with Germany.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss a revolutionary press tribunal, etc.

February 18 — Lenin speaks at the morning and evening sittings of the Central Committee on the resumption of peace talks with Germany.

February 18 Lenin sends a government telegram to the German Government protesting against the German offensive and announcing readiness to conclude a peace.

February 19 Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss foreign policy and organise national defence in the face of the German offensive.

February 20 Lenin cables his replies to the Moscow Soviet on the government's measures in connection with the German offensive.

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the nationalisation of oilfields and the situation at the front.

Lenin is elected to the Provisional Executive Committee set up to handle current business in between government meetings.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 26

На английскот языке



LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

27

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
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V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume Twenty-seven contains the works of Lenin written between February 21 and July 27, 1918.

It includes reports, speeches and articles reflecting Lenin's work as leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the period of the struggle for peace, for Soviet Russia's revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist war, for consolidation of Soviet power and for the development of socialist construction during the respite that followed the conclusion of the Brest peace.

An important place in the volume is occupied by documents aimed against the provocatory policy of Trotsky and the "Left Communists", a policy of involving the young Soviet Republic, which as yet had no army, in war. Included among these documents are the articles: "The Revolutionary Phrase", "Peace or War?", "A Painful but Necessary Lesson", "Strange and Monstrous", "On a Businesslike Basis", "A Serious Lesson and a Serious Responsibility", and also the reports and replies to debates on the question of peace at the Seventh Party Congress and the Extraordinary Fourth Congress of Soviets.

Lenin's pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality* sums up the results of the struggle with the "Left Communists" over the Brest peace and domestic policy, and shows that the "Left Communists" expressed the interests of the "frenzied petty bourgeois" and were "instruments of imperialist provocation".

A large part of the volume is taken up by works devoted to socialist construction, the organisation of nation-wide accounting and control, raising the productivity of labour, the development of socialist competition, and the inculcation of new, proletarian discipline. These works include

Lenin's famous *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*, in which he outlined the programme of socialist construction and ways of creating new; socialist production relations.

Other documents, "On the Famine. *A Letter to the Workers of Petrograd*", the "Report on Combating the Famine" delivered at the Joint Meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies and the Trade Unions on June 4, form part of a group that shows the spread of the socialist revolution in the rural areas, the struggle against the kulaks, the organisation of aid for the rural poor, and the establishment of the food dictatorship.

A number of Lenin's speeches and articles deal with the struggle against internal and external counter-revolution and the defence of the Soviet Republic. These documents include: "Speech Delivered at a Public Meeting in the Sokolniki Club", June 21, "Speech at a Public Meeting in the Simonovsky Sub-District", June 28, "Interview Granted to an Izvestia Correspondent" concerning the Left S.R. insurrection, and the "Report Delivered at a Moscow Gubernia Conference of Factory Committees", July 23.

The present volume contains seventeen new documents published for the first time in the *Collected Works*. Most of these characterise Lenin's work in organising the defence of the Republic at the time of the offensive of the German imperialists and when foreign military intervention and civil war were just beginning. These include: "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!", "Draft of an Order to All Soviets", drawing attention to the need for defence in view of the possibility of the Germans' breaking off peace negotiations, and "Directives to the Vladivostok Soviet" concerning the Japanese landing in Vladivostok.

In the letter to Zinoviev, Lashevich and Stasova, and also in the note "By Direct Line. To Zinoviev, the Smoly, Petrograd", published in the *Collected Works* for the first time, Lenin exposes the disorganising and anti-state conduct of Zinoviev, who held up dispatch of Petrograd workers to the front to the detriment of the country's defence.

Other works published in the *Collected Works* for the first time include: two documents concerning the foundation of

a socialist academy; two documents on revolutionary tribunals, "To Members of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Justice" and "Draft Decision of the Council of People's Commissars"; the letter "To the C.C., R.C.P." protesting against a mild sentence passed for bribery; "Basic Propositions on Economic and Especially on Banking Policy"; and "Food Detachments", a speech delivered at workers' meetings in Moscow on June 20.

The "Protest to the German Government Against the Occupation of the Crimea", written on May 11, 1918, had not previously been published and appears for the first time in the *Collected Works*.

V. I. LENIN
1918

THE REVOLUTIONARY PHRASE[1]

When I said at a Party meeting that the revolutionary phrase about a revolutionary war might ruin our revolution, I was reproached for the sharpness of my polemics. There are, however, moments, when a question must be raised sharply and things given their proper names, the danger being that otherwise irreparable harm may be done to the Party and the revolution.

Revolutionary phrase-making, more often than not, is a disease from which revolutionary parties suffer at times when they constitute, directly or indirectly, a combination, alliance or intermingling of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, and when the course of revolutionary events is marked by big, rapid zigzags. By revolutionary phrase-making we mean the repetition of revolutionary slogans irrespective of objective circumstances at a given turn in events, in the given state of affairs obtaining at the time. The slogans are superb; alluring, intoxicating, but there are no grounds for them; such is the nature of the revolutionary phrase.

Let us examine the groups of arguments, the most important of them at least, in favour of a revolutionary war in Russia today, in January and February 1918, and the comparison of this slogan with objective reality will tell us whether the definition I give is correct.

1

Our press has always spoken of the need to prepare for a revolutionary war in the event of the victory of socialism in one country with capitalism still in existence in the neighbouring countries. That is indisputable.

The question is—how have those preparations *actually* been made since our October Revolution?

We have prepared in this way: we had to demobilise the army, we were compelled to, compelled by circumstances so obvious, so weighty and so insurmountable that, far from a "trend" or mood having arisen in the Party against demobilisation, there was not a single voice raised against it. Anyone who wants to *give some thought* to the class causes of such an unusual phenomenon as the demobilisation of the army by the Soviet Socialist Republic before the war with a neighbouring imperialist state is finished will without great difficulty discover these causes in the social composition of a backward country with a small-peasant economy, reduced to extreme economic ruin after three years of war. An army of many millions was demobilised and the creation of a Red Army on *volunteer* lines was begun—such are the facts.

Compare these facts with the talk of a revolutionary war in January and February 1918, and the nature of the revolutionary phrase will be clear to you.

If this "championing" of a revolutionary war by, say, the Petrograd and Moscow organisations had not been an empty phrase we should have had other *facts* between October and January; we should have seen a determined struggle on their part against demobilisation. But there has been nothing of the sort.

We should have seen the Petrograders and Muscovites sending *tens of thousands* of agitators and soldiers to the front and should have received daily reports from there about their struggle against demobilisation, about the successes of their struggle, about the halting of demobilisation.

There has been nothing of the sort.

We should have had hundreds of reports of regiments forming into a Red Army, using terrorism to halt demobilisation, renewing defences and fortifications against a possible offensive by German imperialism.

There has been nothing of the sort. Demobilisation is in full swing. The old army does not exist. The new army is only just being born.

Anyone who does not want to comfort himself with mere words, bombastic declarations and exclamations must see

that the "slogan" of revolutionary war in February 1918 is the emptiest of phrases, that it has nothing real, nothing objective behind it. This slogan today *contains* nothing but sentiment, wishes, indignation and resentment. And a slogan with such a content is called a revolutionary phrase.

Matters as they stand with our own Party and Soviet power as a whole, matters as they stand with the Bolsheviks of Petrograd and Moscow show that *so far* we have not succeeded in getting beyond the first steps in forming a volunteer Red Army. To hide from this unpleasant fact—and fact it is—behind a screen of words and at the same time not only do nothing to halt demobilisation but even *raise no objection* to it, is to be intoxicated with the sound of words.

A typical substantiation of what has been said is, for instance, the fact that in the Central Committee of our Party *the majority* of the most prominent opponents of a separate peace voted *against* a revolutionary war, voted against it both in January and in February.[2] What does that mean? It means that everybody who is not afraid to look truth in the face recognises the impossibility of a revolutionary war.

In such cases the truth is evaded by putting forward, or attempting to put forward, arguments. Let us examine them.

2

Argument No. 1. In 1792 France suffered economic ruin to no less an extent, but a revolutionary war cured everything, was an inspiration to everyone, gave rise to enthusiasm and carried everything before it. Only those who do not believe in the revolution, only opportunists could oppose a revolutionary war in our, more profound revolution.

Let us compare this reason, or this argument, with the facts. It is a fact that in France at the end of the eighteenth century the *economic* basis of the new, higher mode of production was *first created*, and then, as a result, as a superstructure, the powerful revolutionary army appeared. France abandoned feudalism before other countries, swept it away *in the course of a few years* of victorious revolution, and led

a people who were not fatigued from any war, who had won land and freedom, who had been made stronger by the elimination of feudalism, led them to war against a number of economically and politically backward peoples.

Compare this to contemporary Russia. Incredible fatigue from war. A new economic system, superior to the organised state capitalism of technically well-equipped Germany, *does not yet exist*. It is only being founded. Our peasants have only a law on the socialisation of the land, but not one single year of free (from the landowner and from the torment of war) work. Our workers have begun to throw the capitalists overboard but have not yet managed to organise production, arrange for the exchange of products, arrange the grain supply and *increase* productivity of labour.

This is what we advanced towards, this is the road we took, but it is obvious that the new and higher economic system *does not yet exist.*

Conquered feudalism, consolidated bourgeois freedom, and a well-fed peasant opposed to feudal countries—such was the economic basis of the "miracles" in the sphere of war in 1792 and 1793.

A country of small peasants, hungry and tormented by war, only just beginning to heal its wounds, opposed to technically and organisationally higher productivity of labour—such is the objective situation at the beginning of 1918.

That is why any reminiscing over 1792, etc., is nothing but a revolutionary phrase. People repeat slogans, words, war cries, but are afraid to analyse objective reality.

3

Argument No. 2. Germany "cannot attack", *her* growing revolution will not allow it.

The Germans "cannot attack" was an argument repeated millions of times in January and at the beginning of February 1918 by opponents of a separate peace. The more cautious of them said that there was a 25 to 33 per cent probability (approximately, of course) of the Germans being unable to attack.

The facts refuted these calculations. The opponents of a separate peace here, too, frequently brush aside facts, fearing their iron logic.

What was the source of this mistake, which real revolutionaries (and not revolutionaries of sentiment) should be able to recognise and analyse?

Was it because we, in general, manoeuvred and agitated *in connection with* the peace negotiations? It was not. We had to manoeuvre and agitate. But we also had to choose "our own time" for manoeuvres and agitation—while it was still possible to manoeuvre and agitate—and also for calling a halt to all manoeuvres when the issue became acute.

The source of the mistake was that our relations of revolutionary co-operation with the German revolutionary workers were turned into an empty phrase. We helped and are helping the German revolutionary workers in every way we can—fraternisation, agitation, the publication of secret treaties, etc. That was help in deeds, real help.

But the declaration of some of our comrades—"the Germans cannot attack"—was an empty phrase. We have only just been through a revolution in our own country. We all know very well why it was easier for a revolution to *start* in Russia than in Europe. We saw that we could not check the offensive of Russian imperialism in June 1917, although our revolution had not only begun, had not only overthrown the monarchy, but had set up Soviets everywhere. We saw, we knew, we explained to the workers—wars are conducted by governments. To stop a bourgeois war it is necessary to overthrow the bourgeois government.

The declaration "the Germans cannot attack" was, therefore, tantamount to declaring "we know that the German Government will be overthrown *within the next few weeks*". Actually we did not, and could not, know this, and for this reason the declaration was an empty phrase.

It is one thing to be certain that the German revolution is maturing and to do your part towards helping it mature, to serve it as far as possible by *work*, agitation and fraternisation, anything you like, but help the maturing of the revolution by *work*. That is what revolutionary proletarian internationalism means.

It is another thing to declare, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, that the German revolution is *already mature* (although it obviously is not) and to base your tactics on it. There is not a grain of revolutionism in that, there is nothing in it but phrase-making.

Such is the source of the error contained in the "proud", "striking", "spectacular", "resounding" declaration "the Germans cannot attack".

4

The assertion that "we are helping the German revolution by resisting German imperialism, and are thus bringing nearer Liebknecht's victory over "Wilhelm" is nothing but a variation of the same high-sounding nonsense.

It stands to reason that victory by Liebknecht—which will be possible and inevitable when the German revolution reaches maturity—would deliver us from all international difficulties, including revolutionary war. Liebknecht's victory would deliver us from the consequences of any foolish act of ours. But surely that does not justify foolish acts?

Does any sort of "resistance" to German imperialism help the German revolution? Anyone who cares to think a little, or even to recall the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, will quite easily realise that resistance to reaction helps the revolution only when it is *expedient*. During a half century of the revolutionary movement in Russia we have experienced many cases of resistance to reaction that were not expedient. We Marxists have always been proud that we determined the expediency of any form of struggle by a precise calculation of the mass forces and class relationships. We have said that an insurrection is not always expedient; unless the prerequisites exist among the masses it is a gamble; we have often condemned the most heroic forms of resistance by individuals as inexpedient and harmful from the point of view of the revolution. In 1907, on the basis of bitter experience we rejected resistance to participation in the Third Duma as inexpedient, etc., etc.

To help the German revolution we must either limit ourselves to propaganda, agitation and fraternisation as long as the forces are not strong enough for a firm, serious, decisive blow in an open military or insurrectionary clash,

or we must accept that clash, *if we are sure* it will not help the enemy.

It is clear to everyone (except those intoxicated with empty phrases) that to undertake a serious insurrectionary or military clash *knowing* that we have no forces, *knowing* that we have no army, is a gamble that will not help the German workers but will make their struggle more difficult and make matters easier for their enemy and for our enemy.

5

There is yet another argument that is so childishly ridiculous that I should never have believed it possible if I had not heard it with my own ears.

"Back in October, didn't the opportunists say that we had no forces, no troops, no machine-guns and no equipment, but these things all appeared during the struggle, when the struggle of class against class began. They will also make their appearance in the struggle of the proletariat of Russia against the capitalists of Germany, the German proletariat will come to our help."

As matters stood in October, we had made a precise calculation of the *mass* forces. We not only thought, we *knew* with certainty, from the experience of the *mass* elections to the Soviets, that the overwhelming majority of the workers and soldiers had *already* come over to our side in September and in early October. We knew, even if only from the voting at the Democratic Conference[3] that the coalition had also lost the support of the peasantry—and that meant that our cause had *already* won.

The following were the *objective* conditions for the October insurrectionary struggle:

(1) there was no longer any bludgeon over the heads of the soldiers—it was abolished in February 1917 (Germany has not yet reached "her" February);

(2) the soldiers, like the workers, had already had enough of the coalition and had finished their conscious, planned, heartfelt *withdrawal* from it.

This, and this alone, determined the *correctness of the slogan* "for an insurrection" *in October* (the slogan would have been incorrect in July, when we did *not* advance it).

The mistake of the opportunists of October[4] was not their "concern" for objective conditions (only children could think it was) but their *incorrect appraisal of facts*—they got hold of trivialities and did not see the *main thing*, that the Soviets had come over from conciliation to us.

To compare an armed clash with Germany (that has not yet experienced "her" February or her "July", to say nothing of October), with a Germany that has a *monarchist*, bourgeois-imperialist government—to compare that with the October insurrectionary struggle against the enemies of the Soviets, the Soviets that had been maturing since February 1917 and had reached maturity in September and October, is such childishness that it is only a subject for ridicule. Such is the absurdity to which people are led by empty phrases!

6

Here is another sort of argument. "But Germany will strangle us economically with a separate peace treaty, she will take away coal and grain and will enslave us."

A very wise argument—we must accept an armed clash, *without an army*, even though that clash is certain to result not only in our enslavement, but also in our strangulation, the seizure of grain without any compensation, putting us in the position of Serbia or Belgium; we have to accept that, because *otherwise* we shall get an unfavourable treaty, Germany will take from us 6,000 or 12,000 million in tribute by instalments, will take grain for machines, etc.

O heroes of the revolutionary phrase! In renouncing the "enslavement" to the imperialists they *modestly* pass over in silence the fact that it is necessary to *defeat* imperialism to be completely delivered from enslavement.

We are accepting an unfavourable treaty and a separate peace knowing that *today* we are not yet ready for a revolutionary war, that we have to bide our time (as we did when we tolerated Kerensky's bondage, tolerated the bondage of our own bourgeoisie from July to October), we must wait until we are stronger. Therefore, *if there is a chance* of obtaining the most unfavourable separate peace, we *absolutely must accept* it in the interests of the socialist revolution,

which is *still* weak (since the maturing revolution in Germany has not *yet* come to our help, to the help of the Russians). Only if a separate peace is *absolutely* impossible shall we have to fight immediately—*not because it will be correct tactics, but because we shall have no choice.* If it proves impossible there will be no occasion for a dispute over tactics. There will be nothing but the inevitability of the most furious resistance. But as long as we have a choice we must choose a separate peace and an extremely unfavourable treaty, because that will still be a hundred times better than the position of Belgium.[5]

Month by month we are growing stronger, although we are today still weak. Month by month the international socialist revolution is maturing in Europe, although it is not yet fully mature. Therefore ... therefore, "revolutionaries" (God save us from them) argue that we must accept battle when German imperialism is *obviously* stronger than we are but is *weakening* month by month (because of the slow but certain maturing of the revolution in Germany).

The "revolutionaries" of sentiment argue magnificently, they argue superbly!

7

The last argument, the most specious and most widespread, is that "this obscene peace is a disgrace, it is betrayal of Latvia, Poland, Courland and Lithuania".

Is it any wonder that the Russian *bourgeoisie* (and their hangers-on, the *Novy Luch*,[6] *Dyelo Naroda*[7] and *Novaya Zhizn*[8] gang) are the most zealous in elaborating this allegedly internationalist argument?

No, it is no wonder, for this argument is a trap into which the bourgeoisie are deliberately dragging the Russian Bolsheviks, and into which some of them are falling unwittingly, because of their love of phrases.

Let us examine the argument from the standpoint of theory; which should be put first, the right of nations to self-determination, or socialism?

Socialism should.

Is it permissible, because of a contravention of the right of nations to self-determination, to allow the Soviet Social-

ist Republic to be devoured, to expose it to the blows of imperialism at a time when imperialism is obviously stronger and the Soviet Republic obviously weaker?

No, it is not permissible—that is *bourgeois* and not socialist politics.

Further, would peace on the condition that Poland, Lithuania and Courland are returned "to us" be *less* disgraceful, be any less an annexationist peace?

From the point of view of the Russian bourgeois, *it would.*

From the point of view of the socialist-internationalist, *it would not.*

Because if German imperialism set Poland free (which at one time some *bourgeois* in Germany desired), it would squeeze Serbia, Belgium, etc., *all the more.*

When the Russian bourgeoisie wail against the "obscene" peace, they are correctly expressing their class interests.

But when some Bolsheviks (suffering from the phrase disease) repeat that argument, it is simply very sad.

Examine the *facts* relating to the behaviour of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie. They are doing everything they can to drag us into the war against Germany now, they are offering us millions of blessings, boots, potatoes, shells, locomotives (on credit ... that is not "enslavement", don't fear that! It is "only" credit!). They want us to fight against Germany now.

It is obvious why they should want this; they want it because, in the first place, we should engage part of the German forces. And secondly, because Soviet power might collapse most easily from an untimely armed clash with German imperialism.

The Anglo-French bourgeoisie are setting a trap for us: please be kind enough to go and fight *now*, our gain will be magnificent. The Germans will plunder you, will "do well" in the East, will agree to cheaper terms in the West, and furthermore, Soviet power will be swept away.... Please do fight, Bolshevik "allies", we shall help you!

And the "Left" (God save us from them) Bolsheviks[9] are walking into the trap by reciting the most revolutionary phrases....

Oh yes, one of the manifestations of the traces of the petty-bourgeois spirit is surrender to revolutionary phrases. This is an old story that is perennially new....

8

In the summer of 1907 our Party also experienced an attack of the revolutionary phrase that was, in some respect, analogous.

St. Petersburg and Moscow, nearly all the Bolsheviks were in favour of boycotting the Third Duma; they were guided by "sentiment" instead of an objective analysis and walked into a trap.

The disease has recurred.

The times are more difficult. The issue is a million times more important. To fall ill at such a time is to risk ruining the revolution.

We must fight against the revolutionary phrase, we have to fight it, we absolutely must fight it, so that at some future time people will not say of us the bitter truth that "a revolutionary phrase about revolutionary war ruined the revolution".

Pravda No. 31, February 21, 1918
Signed: *Karpov*

Izvestia VTsIK No. 43,
March 8, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text, collated
with the *Izvestia* text

THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND IS IN DANGER![10]

In order to save this exhausted and ravaged country from new ordeals of war we decided to make a very great sacrifice and informed the Germans of our readiness to sign their terms of peace. Our truce envoys left Rezhitsa for Dvinsk in the evening on February 20 (7), *and still there is no reply*. The German Government is evidently in no hurry to reply. It obviously does not want peace. Fulfilling the task with which it has been charged by the capitalists of all countries, German militarism *wants to strangle the Russian and Ukrainian workers and peasants*, *to return the land to the landowners*, *the mills and factories to the bankers*, *and power to the monarchy*. The German generals want to establish their "order" in Petrograd and Kiev. *The Socialist Republic of Soviets is in gravest danger*. Until the proletariat of Germany rises and triumphs, it is the sacred duty of the workers and peasants of Russia devotedly to defend the Republic of Soviets against the hordes of bourgeois-imperialist Germany. The Council of People's Commissars resolves: (1) *The country's entire manpower and resources are placed entirely at the service of revolutionary defence*. (2) *All Soviets and revolutionary organisations are ordered to defend every position to the last drop of blood*. (3) Railway organisations and the Soviets associated with them must do their utmost to prevent the enemy from availing himself of the transport system; in the event of a retreat, they are to destroy the tracks and blow up or burn down the railway buildings; all rolling stock —carriages and locomotives—must be immediately dispatched eastward, into the interior of the country. (4) All grain and food stocks generally, as well as all valuable property in danger of falling into the enemy's hands, must be uncon-

СОЦІАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЕ ОТЕЧЕСТВО ВЪ ОПАСНОСТИ!

Чтобъ спасти изнуренную, истерзанную страну отъ новыхъ военныхъ испытаній, мы пошли на величайшую жертву и объявили нѣмцамъ о нашемъ согласіи подписать ихъ условія мира.

Наши парламентеры 20 (7) февраля, вечеромъ, выѣхали изъ Рѣжицы въ Двинскъ и до сихъ поръ нѣтъ отвѣта.

Нѣмецкое правительство, очевидно, медлитъ отвѣтомъ. Оно явно и не хочетъ мира. Выполняя порученіе капиталистовъ всѣхъ странъ германскій милитаризмъ хочетъ задушить русскихъ и украинскихъ рабочихъ и крестьянъ, вернуть земли помѣщикамъ, фабрики и заводы — банкирамъ, власть монархіи.

Германскіе генералы хотятъ установить свой „порядокъ" въ Петроградѣ и въ Кіевѣ.

Соціалистическая Республика Совѣтовъ находится въ величайшей опасности.

До того момента, какъ поднимется и побѣдитъ пролетаріатъ Германіи, священнымъ долгомъ рабочихъ и крестьянъ Россіи является беззавѣтная защита Республики Совѣтовъ противъ полчищъ буржуазно-имперіалистской Германіи.

Совѣтъ Народныхъ Комиссаровъ постановляетъ:

1) Всѣ силы и средства страны цѣликомъ предоставляются на дѣло революціонной обороны.

2) Всѣмъ Совѣтамъ и Революціоннымъ организаціямъ вмѣняется въ обязанность защищать каждую позицію до послѣдней капли крови.

3) Желѣзнодорожные организаціи и связанные съ ними Совѣты обязаны всѣми силами воспрепятствовать врагу воспользоваться аппаратомъ путей сообщенія; при отступленіи уничтожать пути, взрывать и сжигать желѣзнодорожныя зданія; весь подвижной составъ — вагоны и паровозы, немедленно направлять на востокъ въ глубь страны.

4) Всѣ хлѣбные, и вообще продовольственные запасы, а равно всякое цѣнное имущество, которымъ грозитъ опасность попасть въ руки врага, должны подвергаться безусловному уничтоженію; наблюденіе за этимъ возлагается на мѣстные Совѣты подъ личной отвѣтственностью ихъ предсѣдателей.

5) Рабочіе и крестьяне Петрограда, Кіева, всѣхъ городовъ, мѣстечекъ, селъ и деревень по линіи новаго фронта должны мобилизовать батальоны для рытья окоповъ подъ руководствомъ военныхъ спеціалистовъ.

6) Въ эти батальоны должны быть включены всѣ работоспособные члены буржуазнаго класса, мужчины и женщины подъ надзоромъ красногвардейцевъ; сопротивляющіяся разстрѣливать.

7) Всѣ изданія, противодѣйствующія дѣлу революціонной обороны и становящіяся на сторону нѣмецкой буржуазіи, а также стремящіяся использовать нашествіе имперіалистическихъ полчищъ въ цѣляхъ свержения Совѣтской власти, закрываются; работоспособные редакторы и сотрудники этихъ изданій мобилизуются для рытья окоповъ и другихъ оборонительныхъ работъ.

8) Непріятельскіе агенты, спекулянты, громилы, хулиганы, контръ-революціонные агитаторы, германскіе шпіоны разстрѣливаются на мѣстѣ преступленія.

Соціалистическое отечество въ опасности. Да здравствуетъ соціалистическое отечество!

Да здравствуетъ Международная Соціалистическая революція!

Совѣтъ Народныхъ Комиссаровъ.

21-го февраля. Петроградъ.

The Decree "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!" written by Lenin on February 21, 1918

Reduced

Reduced

written by Lenin on February 21, 1918

the Decree the Socialist Katherinad is in danger!

ditionally destroyed; the duty of seeing that this is done is laid upon the local Soviets and their chairmen are made personally responsible. (5) The workers and peasants of Petrograd, Kiev, and of all towns, townships, villages and hamlets along the line of the new front are to mobilise battalions to dig trenches, under the direction of military experts. (6) *These battalions are to include all able-bodied members of the bourgeois class, men and women, under the supervision of Red Guards; those who resist are to be shot.* (7) All publications which oppose the cause of revolutionary defence and side with the German bourgeoisie, or which endeavour to take advantage of the invasion of the imperialist hordes in order to overthrow Soviet rule, are to be suppressed; able-bodied editors and members of the staffs of such publications are to be mobilised for the digging of trenches or for other defence work. (8) *Enemy agents, profiteers, marauders, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators and German spies are to be shot on the spot.*

The socialist fatherland is in danger! Long live the socialist fatherland! Long live the international socialist revolution!

Council of People's Commissars

February 21, 1918
Petrograd

Pravda No. 32,
February 22, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SUPPLEMENT TO THE DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS: "THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND IS IN DANGER!"

For correct and strict implementation of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of February 21 it is decided:

(1) Every worker, after an 8-hour working day, is obliged to work three hours daily (or 4½ hours daily with every third day off) on war or administrative work.

(2) Everyone belonging to the rich class or well-off groups (income not less than 500 rubles per month, or owning not less than 1,500 rubles in cash) is obliged to provide himself immediately with a *work book*, in which will be entered weekly whether he has performed his due share of war or administrative work. The entries will be made by the trade union, Soviet of Workers' Deputies or local Red Guard detachment, whichever he belongs to.

Work books for well-off persons will cost 50 rubles each.

(3) Non-workers who do not belong to the well-off classes are also obliged to have a work book, for which they will pay five rubles (or one ruble, at cost price).

The work books of the well-off will have columns for weekly entry of income and expenditure.

Failure to possess a work book or the making of incorrect (and, still more, false) entries in it will be punished according to wartime laws.

All those who possess arms must obtain fresh permission to do so (a) from the local house committee, (b) from the bodies mentioned in item 2. Without these two permissions

possession of arms is forbidden; the penalty for violating this regulation is death by shooting.

The same penalty is incurred by concealing food.

For correct organisation of food supplies all citizens are obliged to join in *consumers' co-operative societies*, house....*

Written February 21 or 22, 1918

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Published according to the manuscript

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed*.

THE ITCH[11]

The itch is a painful disease. Ana when people are seized by the itch of revolutionary phrase-making the mere sight of this disease causes intolerable suffering.

Truths that are simple, clear, comprehensible, obvious and apparently indisputable to all who belong to the working people are distorted by those suffering from the above-mentioned kind of itch. Often this distortion arises from the best, the noblest and loftiest impulses, "merely" owing to a failure to digest well-known theoretical truths or a childishly crude, schoolboyishly slavish repetition of them irrelevantly (people don't know "what's what"). But the itch does not cease to be harmful on that account.

What, for example, could be more conclusive and clear than the following truth: a government that gave Soviet power, land, workers' control and *peace* to a people tortured by three years of predatory war would be invincible? Peace is the chief thing. If, after *conscientious* efforts to obtain a general and just peace, it turned out in actual fact that it was impossible to obtain this *at the present time*, every peasant would understand that one would have to adopt not a general peace, but a separate and unjust peace. Every peasant, even the most ignorant and illiterate, would understand this and *appreciate* a government that gave him even such a peace.

Bolsheviks must have been stricken by the vile itch of phrase-making to forget this and evoke the peasants' most legitimate dissatisfaction with them when this itch has led to a new war being launched by predatory Germany against overtired Russia! The ludicrous and pitiful "theoretical" trivialities and sophistries under which this itch is dis-

guised I have pointed out in an article entitled "The Revolutionary Phrase" (*Pravda*, February 21 [8]).* I would not be recalling this if the same itch had not cropped up today (what a catching disease!) in a new place.

To explain how this has happened, I shall cite first of all a little example, quite simply and clearly, without any "theory"—if the itch claims to be "theory" it is intolerable—and without erudite words or anything that the masses cannot understand.

Let us suppose Kalyayev,[12] in order to kill a tyrant and monster, acquires a revolver from an absolute villain, a scoundrel and robber, by promising him bread, money and vodka for the service rendered.

Can one condemn Kalyayev for his "deal with a robber" for the sake of obtaining a deadly weapon? Every sensible person will answer "no". If there is nowhere else for Kalyayev to get a revolver, and if his intention is really an honourable one (the killing of a tyrant, not killing for plunder), then he should not be reproached but commended for acquiring a revolver in this way.

But if a robber, in order to commit murder for the sake of plunder, acquires a revolver from another robber in return for money, vodka or bread, can one compare (not to speak of identifying) *such* a "deal with a robber" with the deal made by Kalyayev?

No, everyone who is not out of his mind or infected by the itch will agree that one cannot. Any peasant who saw an "intellectual" disavowing such an obvious truth by means of phrase-making would say: you, sir, ought not to be managing the state but should join the company of wordy buffoons or should simply put yourself in a steam bath and get rid of the itch.

If Kerensky, a representative of the ruling class of the bourgeoisie, i.e., the exploiters, makes a deal with the Anglo-French exploiters to get arms and potatoes from them and at the same time conceals from the people the treaties which promise (if successful) to give one robber Armenia, Galicia and Constantinople, and another robber Baghdad, Syria and so forth, is it difficult to understand that this deal is a

* See this volume, pp. 19-29.—*Ed*

predatory, swindling, vile deal on the part of Kerensky and his friends?

No, this is not difficult to understand. Any peasant, even the most ignorant and illiterate, will understand it.

But if a representative of the exploited, oppressed class, after this class has overthrown the exploiters, and published and annulled all the secret and annexationist treaties, is subjected to a bandit attack by the imperialists of Germany, can he be condemned for making a "deal" with the Anglo-French robbers, for obtaining arms and potatoes from them in return for money or timber, etc.? Can one find such a deal dishonourable, disgraceful, dirty?

No, one cannot. Every sensible man will understand this and will ridicule as silly fools those who with a "lordly" and learned mien undertake to prove that "the masses will not understand" the difference between the robber war of the imperialist Kerensky (and his dishonourable .deals with robbers for a division of jointly stolen spoils) and the *Kalyayev* deal of the Bolshevik Government with the Anglo-French robbers in order to get arms and potatoes to repel the German robber.

Every sensible man will say: to obtain weapons by purchase from a robber for the purpose of robbery is disgusting and villainous, but to buy weapons from the same robber for the purpose of a just war against an aggressor is something quite legitimate. Only mincing young ladies and affected youths who have "read books" and derived nothing but affectation from them can see something "dirty" in it. Apart from people of that category only those who have contracted the itch can fall into such an "error".

But will the German worker understand the difference between Kerensky's purchase of weapons from the Anglo-French robbers for the purpose of annexing Constantinople from the Turks, Galicia from the Austrians and Eastern Prussia from the Germans—and the Bolsheviks' purchase of weapons from the same robbers for the purpose of repelling Wilhelm when he has moved troops against socialist Russia which proposed an honourable and just peace to all, against Russia which has declared an end to the war?

It must be supposed that the German worker will "understand" this, firstly because he is intelligent and educated,

and secondly because he is used to a neat and cultured life, and suffers neither from the Russian itch in general, nor from the itch of revolutionary phrase-making in particular.

Is there a difference between killing for the purpose of robbery and the killing of an aggressor?

Is there a difference between a war of two groups of plunderers for a division of spoils and a just war for liberation from the attack of a plunderer against a people that has overthrown the plunderers?

Does not the appraisal whether I act well or badly in acquiring weapons from a robber depend on the end and object of these weapons? On their use for a war that is base and dishonourable or for one that is just and honourable?

Ugh! The itch is a nasty disease. And hard is the occupation of a man who has to give a steam bath to those infected with it....

P.S. The North Americans in their war of liberation against England at the end of the eighteenth century got help from Spain and France, who were her competitors and just as much colonial robbers as England. It is said that there were "Left Bolsheviks" to be found who contemplated writing a "learned work" on the "dirty deal" of these Americans....

Written on February 22, 1918

Published on February 22, 1918 in the evening edition of *Pravda* No. 33 Signed: *Karpov*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

PEACE OR WAR?

The Germans' reply, as the reader sees, sets us peace terms still more onerous than those of Brest-Litovsk. Nevertheless, I am absolutely convinced that only complete intoxication by revolutionary phrase-making can impel some people to refuse to sign these terms. It was precisely on that account that, by articles in *Pravda* (signed Karpov) on "The Revolutionary Phrase" and on "The Itch",* I began a relentless struggle against revolutionary phrase-making, which I saw and see now as the greatest menace to our Party (and, consequently, to the revolution as well). On many occasions in history revolutionary parties which wore strictly carrying out revolutionary slogans became infected with revolutionary phrase-making and perished as a result.

Hitherto I have been trying to persuade the Party to fight against revolutionary phrase-making. Now I must do this publicly. For—alas!—my very worst suppositions have proved justified.

On January 8, 1918, at a meeting of about 60 of the chief Party workers of Petrograd I read out my "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace" (17 theses, which will be published tomorrow). In these theses (paragraph 13) I declared war against revolutionary phrase-making, doing so in the mildest and most comradely fashion (I now profoundly condemn this mildness of mine). I said that the policy of refusing the proposed peace "would, perhaps, answer the needs of someone who is striving for an eloquent, spectacular and brilliant effect, but would completely fail to reckon with the objective

* See this volume, pp. 19-29, 36-39.—*Ed.*

relationship of class forces and material factors at the present period of the socialist revolution that has begun".

In the 17th thesis I wrote that if we refuse to sign the proposed peace, "very heavy defeats will compel Russia to conclude a still more unfavourable separate peace".

Things have turned out still worse, for our army, which is retreating and demobilising, is refusing to fight at all.

Under such conditions, only unrestrained phrase-making is capable of pushing Russia into war at the present time and I personally, of course, would not remain for a second either in the government or in the Central Committee of our Party if the policy of phrase-making were to gain the upper hand.

The bitter truth has now revealed itself with such terrible clarity that it is impossible not to see it. The entire bourgeoisie in Russia is rejoicing and gloating over the arrival of the Germans. Only those who are blind or intoxicated by phrases can close their eyes to the fact that the policy of a revolutionary war (*without an army*...) brings grist to the mill of our bourgeoisie. In Dvinsk, Russian officers are already going about wearing their shoulder-straps.

In Rezhitsa, the bourgeoisie exultantly welcomed the Germans. In Petrograd, on Nevsky Prospekt, and in bourgeois newspapers (*Rech*, *Dyelo Naroda*, *Novy Luch*, etc.), they are licking their lips with delight at the impending overthrow of Soviet power by the Germans.

Let everyone know: he who is against an immediate, even though extremely onerous peace, is endangering Soviet power.

We are compelled to endure an onerous peace. It will not halt the revolution in Germany and in Europe. We shall set about preparing a revolutionary army, not by phrases and exclamations (after the manner of those who since January 7 have done nothing even to halt our fleeing troops), *but by organisational work*, by deeds, by the creation of a proper, powerful army of the whole people.

Written in the morning
of February 23, 1918

Published on February 23, 1918
in the evening edition
of *Pravda* No. 34
Signed: *Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE BOLSHEVIK AND "LEFT" SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C. FEBRUARY 23, 1918[13]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin spoke in defence of signing the German proposals. He began by saying that Soviet power must face up to the truth, that it must acknowledge the total impossibility of resistance to the Germans. He referred to the previous speakers who rejected signature to the treaty, but the view that we could organise an army in the near future was wholly without grounds; the army did not want to fight and no one could compel it to do so; if, however, we were to start organising an army, if we were to collect a small handful of valiant fighters whom we would throw into the jaws of imperialism, we would thereby lose energetic and ideologically equipped fighters who had won us victory.

Further, Lenin said that our Russian proletariat was not at all to blame if the German revolution was delayed. It would come but it was not there yet, and for us the best way out was to gain time; if we were to sign a peace treaty at the present moment, we could subsequently, by energetic, organised work, by railway construction and by putting food matters in order, create a strong and stable army for the defence of our revolution, and before that time the socialist revolution in Germany would certainly arrive.

Published on February 24, 1918 in *Izvestia of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of the City of Moscow and Moscow Region* No. 32

Published according to the newspaper text

REPORT AT THE MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C. FEBRUARY 24, 1918[14]

Comrades, the terms put to us by the representatives of German imperialism are unprecedentedly severe, immeasurably oppressive, predatory terms. The German imperialists, taking advantage of the weakness of Russia, have their knee on our chest. Not to conceal from you the bitter truth of which I am deeply convinced, the situation being what it is, I must tell you that we have no other way out than to subscribe to these terms. And that any other proposal means to incur, either voluntarily or involuntarily, still worse evils and further (if one can speak here of degrees) complete subjection of the Soviet Republic, its enslavement to German imperialism, or it is a pitiful attempt at using words to evade a terrible, immeasurably cruel, but undeniable reality. Comrades, you all know very well, and many of you know it from personal experience, that the burden Russia had to bear in the imperialist war was for indisputable reasons that everyone can understand more terrible and severe than that endured by other countries. You know, therefore, that our army was martyrised and tortured by the war as was no other, that all the slanders cast at us by the bourgeois press and the parties which supported it, or which were hostile to the Soviet government, alleging that the Bolsheviks were demoralising the troops, are nonsense. I shall remind you once again of the proclamation which Krylenko, while still an ensign under Kerensky, distributed to the troops when he left for Petrograd, and which was reprinted in Pravda, and in which he said: we do not urge upon you any kind of mutiny, we urge upon you organised

political actions; strive to be as organised as possible.[15] Such was the propaganda of one of the most ardent representatives of the Bolsheviks, one who was most closely connected with the army. Everything that could be done to hold together this unprecedentedly, immeasurably fatigued army, and to make it stronger, was done. And if we see now, though I have entirely refrained, during the last month, for example, from setting out my view, which could seem pessimistic, if we have seen that, as regards the army during the past month, we have said all that could be said, and done all that could be done, to ease the situation, reality has shown us that after three years of war our army is altogether unable and unwilling to fight, That is the basic cause, simple, obvious, and in the highest degree bitter and painful, but absolutely clear, why, living side by side with an imperialist plunderer, we are compelled to sign peace terms when he puts his knee on our chest. That is why I say, fully conscious of the responsibility I bear, and repeat that no single member of the Soviet government has the right to evade this responsibility. Of course, it is pleasant and easy to tell the workers, peasants and soldiers, as it has been pleasant and easy to observe, how the revolution has gone forward after the October uprising, but when we have to acknowledge the bitter, painful, undeniable truth—the impossibility of a revolutionary war—it is impermissible now to evade this responsibility and we must shoulder it frankly. I consider myself obliged, I consider it essential to fulfil my duty and state plainly how things are, and therefore I am convinced that the class of toilers of Russia, who know what war is, what it has cost the working people and the degree of exhaustion to which it has led them, that—I do not doubt it for a moment—they along with us recognise the unprecedented severity, grossness and vileness of these peace terms and nevertheless approve our conduct. They will say: you undertook to propose the terms of an immediate and just peace, you should have utilised every possibility of delaying peace in order to see whether other countries would join in, whether the European proletariat, without whose help we cannot achieve a lasting socialist victory, would come to our aid. We did everything possible to protract the negotiations, we did even more than was possible; what we did was that after

the Brest negotiations we declared the state of war at an end, confident as many of us were that the situation in Germany would not allow her to make a brutal and savage attack on Russia.

This time we have had to endure a heavy defeat, and we have to be able to look the defeat straight in the face. Yes, hitherto the revolution has proceeded along an ascending line from victory to victory; now it has suffered a heavy defeat. The German working-class movement, which began so rapidly, has been interrupted for a time. We know that its main causes have not been abolished, and that they will grow and will inevitably extend because the excruciating war is being drawn out, because the bestiality of imperialism is being exposed ever more fully and obviously, and is opening the eyes of masses of people who might seem to be most remote from politics or incapable of understanding socialist policy. That is why this desperate, tragic situation has arisen, which compels us to accept peace now and will compel the masses of the working people to say: yes, they acted correctly, they did all they could to propose a just peace, they had to submit to a most oppressive and unfortunate peace because the country had no other way out. Their situation is such that they are forced to wage a life-and-death struggle against the Soviet Republic; if they are unable now to continue their intention of advancing against Petrograd and Moscow it is only because they are tied up in a bloody and predatory war with Britain, and because there is an internal crisis as well. When it is pointed out to me that the German imperialists may present us with still worse conditions tomorrow or the day after, I say that we must be prepared for that; naturally, living side by side with bestial plunderers, the Soviet Republic must expect to be attacked. If at present we cannot reply by war it is because the forces are lacking, because war can be waged only together with the people. If the successes of the revolution cause many comrades to say the opposite, that is not a mass phenomenon, it does not express the will and opinion of the real masses. If you go to the class of real toilers, to the workers and peasants, you will hear only one answer, that we are quite unable to wage war, we lack the physical strength, we are choked in blood, as one of the sol-

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

diers put it. These masses will understand us and approve of our concluding this forced and unprecedentedly onerous peace. It may be that the respite needed for an upswing of the masses will take no little time, but those who had to live through the long years of revolutionary battles in the period of the upswing of the revolution and the period when the revolution fell into decline, when revolutionary calls to the masses obtained no response from them, know that all the same the revolution always arose afresh. Therefore we say: yes, at present the masses are not in a state to wage war, at present every representative of the Soviet government is obliged to tell the people to its face the whole bitter truth. The time of unheard-of hardship and of three years of war and of the desperate disruption left by tsarism will pass away, and the people will recover its strength and find itself capable of resistance. At present the oppressor confronts us; it is best, of course, to answer oppression by a revolutionary war, by an uprising, but, unfortunately, history has shown that it is not always possible to answer oppression by an uprising. But to refrain from an uprising does not mean refraining from the revolution. Do not succumb to the provocation coming from the bourgeois newspapers, the enemies of Soviet power. Indeed, they have nothing except talk about "an obscene peace" and cries of "shame!" about this peace, but in fact this bourgeoisie greets the German conquerors with delight. They say: "Now, at last, the Germans will come and restore order", that is what they want and so they bait us with cries of "an obscene peace, a shameful peace". They want the Soviet government to give battle, an unheard-of battle, knowing that we lack strength, and they are dragging us into complete enslavement to the German imperialists in order to do a deal with the German gendarmes, but they express only their own class interests, because they know that the Soviet government is growing stronger. These voices, these cries against peace, are in my view the best proof of the fact that those who reject this peace have not only been consoling themselves with unjustified illusions but have succumbed to provocation. No, we must look the disastrous truth squarely in the face: before us is the oppressor with his knee on our chest, and we shall fight with all the means of revolutionary struggle. At present, however,

we are in a desperately difficult situation, our ally cannot hasten to our aid, the international proletariat cannot come just now, but it will come. This revolutionary movement, which at present has no possibility of offering armed resistance to the enemy, is rising and it will offer resistance later, but offer it it will. (*Applause*.)

A brief report of this speech was published on February 26, 1918 in *Pravda* No. 35

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Published according to the verbatim report

WHERE IS THE MISTAKE?[16]

The outstanding and most responsible opponents of the conclusion of a separate peace on the Brest terms have set out the essence of their arguments in the following form:



Here are advanced the most concentrated, the most important arguments, set out almost in the form of a resolution. For convenience in analysing the arguments, we have numbered each proposition separately.

When one examines these arguments, the authors' main error immediately strikes the eye. They do not say a word about the concrete conditions of a revolutionary war at the present moment. The chief and fundamental consideration for the supporters of peace, namely, that it is impossible for us to fight *at the present time*, is altogether evaded. In reply—in reply, say, to my theses,* well-known to the authors since January 8—they put forward exclusively *general* considerations, abstractions, which inevitably turn into empty phrases. For every general historical statement applied to a particular case without a special analysis of the conditions of that particular case becomes an empty phrase.

* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 442-50.—*Ed.*

Take the first proposition. Its whole "point" is a reproach, an exclamation, a declamation, an effort to "shame" the opponent, an appeal to sentiment. See what bad people you are, they say: the imperialists are attacking you, "proclaiming" as their aim the suppression of the proletarian revolution, and you reply by agreeing to conclude peace! But our argument, as the authors are aware, is that by rejecting an onerous peace we *actually make it easier* for the enemy to suppress the proletarian revolution. And this conclusion of ours is reinforced (for example, in my theses) by a number of very concrete indications about the state of the army, its class composition, etc. The authors have avoided everything concrete and the result they arrive at is an empty phrase. For if the enemy are "proclaiming" that their aim is to suppress the revolution, then he is a bad revolutionary who by choosing an admittedly impossible form of resistance helps to achieve a transition from the "proclamation" to the *realisation* of the enemy's aims.

Second argument: "reproaches" are being intensified. You, they say, agree to peace at the first onslaught of the enemy.... Do the authors seriously suppose that this can be convincing for those who ever since January, long before the "onslaught", analysed the relationship of forces and the concrete conditions of the war at that time? Is it not phrase-making if "reproach" is regarded as argument against analysis??

Agreeing to peace under the present conditions, we are told, "is a surrender of the foremost contingent of the international proletariat to the international bourgeoisie".

Again an empty phrase. General truths are inflated in such a way that they become untrue and are turned into declamation. The German bourgeoisie is not "international", for the Anglo-French capitalists *welcome* our refusal to conclude peace. "Surrender", generally speaking, is a bad thing, but this praiseworthy truth does not decide every individual proposition, for refusal to fight under obviously unfavourable conditions can also be called surrender, but *such* surrender is obligatory for a serious revolutionary. Agreeing to enter the Third Duma, the concluding of peace with Stolypin, as the "Left" declamationists called it at that time, wag also, generally speaking, a surrender.

We are the foremost contingent in the sense of the revolutionary beginning, that is indisputable, but in order to be the foremost contingent in the sense of a military clash with the forces of foremost imperialism, that....*

Written February 23 or 24, 1918

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Published according to the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

AN UNFORTUNATE PEACE

Trotsky was right when he said: the peace may be a triply unfortunate peace, but the peace ending this hundredfold obscene war cannot be an obscene, disgraceful, dirty peace.

It is incredibly, unprecedentedly hard to sign an unfortunate, immeasurably severe, infinitely humiliating peace when the strong has the weak by the throat. But it is impermissible to give way to despair, impermissible to forget that history has examples of still greater humiliations, still more unfortunate, onerous peace terms. Yet even so, the peoples crushed by bestially cruel conquerors were able to recover and rise again.

Napoleon I crushed and humiliated Prussia immeasurably more heavily than Wilhelm is now crushing and humiliating Russia.[17] For a number of years Napoleon I was completely victorious on the continent; his victory over Prussia was much more decisive than Wilhelm's victory over Russia. Yet after a few years Prussia recovered and in a war of liberation, not without the aid of robber states that waged against Napoleon by no means a war of liberation but an imperialist war, threw off the Napoleonic yoke.

Napoleon's imperialist wars continued for many years, took up a whole epoch and exhibited an extremely complex network of imperialist* relationships interwoven with national liberation movements. And as a result, through all this epoch, unusually rich in wars and tragedies (tragedies of whole peoples), history went forward from feudalism to "free" capitalism.

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* I call here imperialism the plunder of foreign countries in general and an imperialist war the war of plunderers for the division of such booty.

History is now advancing still more swiftly, the tragedies of whole nations that are being crushed or have been crushed by imperialist war are immeasurably more terrible. The interweaving of imperialist and national liberation trends, movements and aspirations is also in evidence, with the immense difference that the national liberation movements are immeasurably weaker and the imperialist ones immeasurably stronger. But history goes steadily forward, and in the depths of all the advanced countries there is maturing—despite everything—the socialist revolution, a revolution infinitely deeper, closer to the people and more powerful than the previous bourgeois revolution.

Hence, again and yet again: of all things the most impermissible is despair. The peace terms are intolerably severe. Nevertheless history will come into its own; to our aid will come—even if not so quickly as we should like—the steadily maturing socialist revolution in other countries.

The plunderer has besieged us, oppressed and humiliated us—we are capable of enduring all these burdens. We are not alone in the world. We have friends, supporters, very loyal helpers. They are late—owing to a number of conditions independent of their will—but they will come.

Let us work to organise, organise and yet again organise! The future, in spite of all trials, is ours.

Pravda No. 34,
February 24, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECHES AT THE MEETING OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) FEBRUARY 24, 1918

MINUTES

1

The question of sending a delegation to Brest to sign the peace treaty was discussed.

Lenin considered that it was necessary to preserve continuity with the preceding delegation and since it would not be enough for Comrade Karakhan to go alone, it was very desirable that Comrades Joffe and Zinoviev should go.

2

A. A. Joffe categorically refused to go, declaring that "concluding peace is the death of the whole Brest policy.

Lenin said that he did not insist on Joffe going as a plenipotentiary for signing the treaty, but he considered Comrade Joffe should go as a consultant. Undoubtedly, the Germans had sent their answer in the form of an ultimatum, fearing opposition on our part, but if they saw our willingness to sign the peace treaty they might agree also to negotiations. In view of this a consultant who knew the whole matter was essential. If it turned out that it was only necessary to sign, then, of course, there would be nothing to talk about, and the consultant would not even appear at the meeting.

3

Lenin said that Radek, though opposed to concluding peace, had nevertheless agreed to go, but the Poles had forbidden him to do so.

4

In further discussion L. D. Trotsky declared that in Brest it would only be necessary to sign the peace treaty and A. A. Joffe would not be necessary there, since in the Germans' reply there was already a formulation on the chief questions.

Lenin considered that he was wrong, since experts were undoubtedly required at the signing of the treaty and we had none, even for a trade treaty. Krasin could have gone, but he had gone to Stockholm for a time. We were going to sign the treaty with clenched teeth, about which the delegation had made its declaration, but we did not know the situation, we did not know what might happen by the time the delegation arrived in Brest, and therefore Joffe as a consultant was essential. In general it must be borne in mind that we empowered the delegation to enter into negotiations if there was any possibility of doing so.

5

In further discussion the candidatures of G. Y. Zinoviev and G. Y. Sokolnikov were put forward.

Lenin considered that both should be sent, and that if it was only a question of signing the peace treaty, they could both leave at once, having reached agreement with Chicherin about further developments.

6

G. Y, Sokolnikov declared that he would not go to Brest and if the Central Committee insisted he would resign from the Central Committee.

Lenin asked the comrades not to get excited and pointed out that Comrade Petrovsky could go in the delegation as People's Commissar.

7

L. D. Trotsky's statement about his resigning the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was discussed.

Lenin pointed out that this was unacceptable, that a change of policy was a crisis. That a questionnaire on policy had been distributed in the provinces,[18] and that to polemise a little was not at all harmful.

He made a practical proposal: the Central Committee would ask Comrade Trotsky to postpone his statement until the next meeting of the C.C., until Tuesday. (Amendment—until the return of the delegation from Brest.)

8

Lenin proposed that the following declaration should be put to the vote: the C.C., considering it impossible to accept the resignation of Comrade Trotsky at the present time, requests him to postpone his decision until the return of the delegation from Brest or until a change in the actual state of affairs.

Adopted with three abstaining.

9

L. D. Trotsky declared that since his statement had not been accepted he would be compelled to give up appearing in official institutions.

Lenin moved that it should be voted: the Central Committee, having heard Comrade Trotsky's statement, while fully agreeing to Comrade Trotsky's absence during decisions on foreign affairs in the Council of People's Commissars, requests Comrade Trotsky not to keep aloof from other decisions.

Adopted.

10

The C.C. discussed the statement of A. Lomov, M. S. Uritsky, V. M. Smirnov, G. L. Pyatakov, D. P. Bogolepov and A. P. Spunde about their resignation from posts in the Council of People's Commissars. M. S. Uritsky expressed the hope that their statement concerning their resignation from responsible Party and Soviet posts would be published.

Lenin moved that it be adopted: the C.C. requests the comrades who submitted the statement to postpone their

decision until the return of the delegation from Brest and to discuss this decision of the C.C. in the group.

11

Lenin moved two proposals:

1) While recognising the legitimate demand of the four, the C.C. requests them to discuss the proposal of the C.C. and to postpone their statement both in view of the nearness of the Congress and in view of the complexity of the political situation.

2) While guaranteeing the comrades the publication of their statement in *Pravda*, the C.C. requests them to revise their decision and to discuss whether they do not find it possible to remain both in responsible posts and in the C.C.[19]

Lenin's proposals were accepted.

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August 1917-February 1918*, 1929

NOTE ON THE NECESSITY OF SIGNING THE PEACE TREATY

Not to conclude peace at the present moment means declaring an armed uprising or a revolutionary war against German imperialism. This is either phrase-making or a provocation by the Russian bourgeoisie, which is thirsting for the arrival of the Germans. In reality we cannot fight at the present time, for the army is against the war and is unable to fight. The week of war against the Germans, in face of whom our troops simply ran away, from February 18 to 24, 1918, has fully proved this. We are prisoners of German imperialism. Not empty phrases about an immediate armed uprising against the Germans, but the systematic, serious, steady work of preparing a revolutionary war, the creation of discipline and an army, the putting into order of the railways and food affairs. That is the point of view of the majority of the C.E.C., including Lenin (and the majority of the C.C., Bolsheviks), and of Spiridonova and Malkin (the minority of the C.C., Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).

Written February 24, 1918

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to
the manuscript

POSITION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS) ON THE QUESTION OF THE SEPARATE AND ANNEXATIONIST PEACE[20]

Dear Comrades,

The Organising Bureau of the Central Committee considers it essential to submit to you an explanation of the motives that led the Central Committee to agree to the peace terms proposed by the German Government. The Organising Bureau is addressing this explanation to you, comrades, in order that all Party members should be thoroughly informed of the point of view of the Central Committee which, in the period between Congresses, represents the entire Party. The Organising Bureau considers it essential to state that the Central Committee was not unanimous on the question of signing the peace terms. Since the decision has been made, however, it must be supported by the whole Party. A Party Congress is due in a few days, and only then will it be possible to decide the question of the extent to which the Central Committee rightly expressed the actual position of the whole Party. Until the Congress, all Party members, in pursuance of their duty to the Party and for the sake of the maintenance of unity in our Party ranks, will carry out the decisions of their central leading body, the Central Committee of the Party.

The absolute necessity of signing, at the given moment (February 24, 1918), an annexationist and unbelievably harsh peace treaty with Germany is due primarily to the fact that we have no army and cannot defend ourselves.

Everybody knows why since October 20, 1917, since the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, we have all become defencists, we are all for the defence of the fatherland.

From the point of view of defending the fatherland, it is impermissible for us to allow ourselves to be drawn into an armed conflict when we have no army and the enemy is armed to the teeth and excellently prepared.

The Soviet Socialist Republic cannot wage a war when the obviously overwhelming majority of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers who elect deputies to the Soviets are against the war. It would be a rash gamble. It will be a different thing if an end is put to this war, excessively harsh though the terms of peace may be, and German imperialism again decides to start an aggressive war against Russia. Then the majority of the Soviets will most certainly be in favour of war.

To wage war today would amount objectively to falling for the provocation of the Russian bourgeoisie. They know full well that at the moment Russia is defenceless and would be crushed by even insignificant German forces, which would have only to cut the main railway lines to starve Petrograd and Moscow into surrendering. The bourgeoisie want war, because they want the overthrow of Soviet power and an agreement with the German bourgeoisie. The jubilation of the bourgeoisie when the German troops arrived in Dvinsk and Rezhitsa, Venden and Gapsal, Minsk and Drissa confirms this as clearly as can be.

Defence of revolutionary war at the present moment is nothing but an empty revolutionary phrase. It is impossible for a ruined peasant country to wage a modern war against advanced imperialism without an army and without the most serious economic preparation. It is beyond all doubt that German imperialism must be resisted, for it will crush us and hold us prisoner. It would, however, be empty talk to demand resistance specifically by means of armed uprising, especially now, when *such* resistance is obviously hopeless for us, and obviously to the advantage of the German and Russian bourgeoisie.

It is equally empty talk to argue in favour of revolutionary war at this moment on the grounds of support for the

international socialist movement. If we make it easier for German imperialism to crush the Soviet Republic by our untimely acceptance of battle, we shall harm and not help the German and international working-class movement and the cause of socialism. We must help only the revolutionary internationalists in all countries by all-round, persistent and systematic work; but to undertake the gamble of launching an armed uprising, when it would obviously be a gamble, is unworthy of a Marxist.

If Liebknecht is victorious in two or three weeks (which is possible) he will, of course, get us out of all difficulties. It would, however, be simply foolish and would be turning the great slogan of the solidarity of the working people of all countries into sheer mockery if we were to assure the people that Liebknecht will certainly and unavoidably score victory within the next few weeks. Indeed, by arguing in this way we should be turning the great slogan "We bank on the world revolution" into an empty phrase.

Objectively the situation is similar to that of the summer of 1907. Then, it was the Russian monarchist Stolypin who crushed us and held us prisoner; today it is the German imperialist. Then, the slogan of an immediate insurrection, which, unfortunately, was supported by the entire Socialist-Revolutionary Party, proved to be an empty phrase. Today, at this very moment, the slogan of revolutionary war is obviously an empty phrase that attracts the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who repeat the arguments of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. We are the prisoners of German imperialism and we have ahead of us a long and difficult struggle to overthrow that ringleader of world imperialism; this struggle is undoubtedly the last decisive struggle for socialism, but to begin that struggle at the present moment with an armed uprising against the leader of imperialism would be a gamble that no Marxist would ever undertake.

The systematic, unrelenting, all-round building up of the country's defence potential, self-discipline everywhere, the use of grievous defeat to improve discipline in all spheres of life for the purpose of the country's economic progress and the consolidation of Soviet power—that is the task of the day, that is the way to prepare a revolutionary war in deed and not merely in word.

In conclusion, the Organising Bureau considers it essential to state that, since the offensive of German imperialism has not yet been halted, all members of the Party must organise a concerted opposition to it. If it is impossible to sign a peace treaty, even the harshest, and gain time to prepare for new battles, our Party must emphasise the need to exert every effort for all-out resistance.

If we can gain time, gain even a brief respite for organisational work, we must do our best to get it. If we are granted no deferment our Party must call on the masses to fight, to engage in the most energetic self-defence. We are confident that all Party members will do their duty by the Party, by the working class of their country, by the people and the proletariat. By preserving Soviet power we are rendering the best, the most powerful support to the proletariat of all countries in their incredibly hard struggle against their own bourgeoisie. Today the cause of socialism could suffer no heavier blow than the collapse of Soviet power in Russia.

With comradely greetings,

Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)

Written February 24, 1918
Published on February 26, 1918 in *Pravda* No. 35

Published according to the *Pravda* text

A PAINFUL BUT NECESSARY LESSON

The week from February 18 to 24, 1918, has been one that will be remembered as a great turning-point in the history of the Russian—and the international—revolution.

On February 27, 1917, the Russian proletariat, jointly with part of the peasantry who had been aroused by the course the war was taking, and also with the bourgeoisie, overthrew the monarchy. On April 21, 1917, the proletariat overthrew the absolute rule of the imperialist bourgeoisie and shifted power into the hands of the petty-bourgeois advocates of compromise with the bourgeoisie. On July 3, the urban proletariat gave the compromisers' government a severe shock by its spontaneous demonstration. On October 25, it overthrew that government and established the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

This victory had to be defended in civil war. It took about three months, beginning with the victory over Kerensky near Gatchina, continued in the victories over the bourgeoisie, the officer cadets and part of the counter-revolutionary Cossacks in Moscow, Irkutsk, Orenburg and Kiev, and ending with the victory over Kaledin, Kornilov and Alexeyev at Rostov-on-Don.

The fire of proletarian insurrection flared up in Finland, and the conflagration spread to Rumania.

Victories on the home front were achieved with relative ease since the enemy did not possess any material or organisational advantage, and, furthermore, did not have any sound economic basis or any support among the masses. The ease with which these victories were gained was bound to turn the heads of many leaders! Their attitude has been; "We'll have a walk-over."

They have disregarded the widespread disintegration of the army, which is rapidly demobilising itself and abandoning the front. They have become intoxicated with revolutionary phrases. They have applied them to the struggle against world imperialism. They have mistaken Russia's temporary "freedom" from imperialist pressure for something normal, although actually that "freedom" was due only to an interruption in the war between the German and Anglo-French plunderers. They have mistaken the mass strikes that are beginning in Austria and Germany for a revolution that is supposed to have delivered us from any serious danger from German imperialism. Instead of serious, effective, sustained work to aid the German revolution, which is coming to birth in a particularly difficult and painful manner, we have had people waving their arms—"what can those German imperialists do—with Liebknecht on our side we'll kick them out in no time!"

The week from February 18 to February 24, 1918, from the capture of Dvinsk to the capture of Pskov (later recaptured), the week of imperialist Germany's military offensive against the Soviet Socialist Republic, has been a bitter, distressing, and painful lesson, but it has been a necessary, useful and beneficial one. How highly instructive it has been to compare the two groups of telegraphic and telephonic communications that have reached the central government in the past week! On the one hand there has been the unrestrained flood of "resolution-type" revolutionary phrases—one might call them Steinberg phrases, if one recalls a chef-d'oeuvre in that style, the speech of the "Left" (hm ... hm) Socialist-Revolutionary Steinberg at the Saturday meeting of the Central Executive Committee.[21] On the other hand there have been the painful and humiliating reports of regiments refusing to retain their positions, of refusal to defend even the Narva Line, and of disobedience to the order to destroy everything in the event of a retreat, not to mention the running away, the chaos, ineptitude, helplessness and slovenliness.

A bitter, distressing, painful but necessary, useful and beneficial lesson!

The thoughtful, class-conscious worker will draw three conclusions from this historic lesson—on our attitude to the

defence of the fatherland, its defence potential and to socialist revolutionary war; on the conditions under which we may come into collision with world imperialism; on the correct presentation of the question of our attitude to the world socialist movement.

We are and have been defencists since October 25, 1917, we champion the defence of the fatherland ever since that day. That is because we have shown *by deeds* that we have broken away from imperialism. We have denounced and published the filthy, bloodstained treaties of the imperialist plotters. We have overthrown *our own* bourgeoisie. We have given freedom to the peoples *we* formerly oppressed. We have given land to the people and introduced workers' control. We are in favour of defending the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic.

And because we are in favour of defending the fatherland we demand a *serious* attitude towards the country's defence potential and preparedness for war. We declare a ruthless war against revolutionary phrases about revolutionary war. There must be a lengthy, serious preparation for it, beginning with economic progress, the restoration of the railways (for without them modern warfare is an empty phrase) and with the establishment of the strictest revolutionary discipline and self-discipline everywhere.

From the point of view of the defence of the fatherland it would be a crime to enter into an armed conflict with an infinitely superior and well-prepared enemy when we obviously have no army. From the point of view of the defence of the fatherland we have to conclude the most harsh, oppressive, brutal, disgraceful peace—not in order to "capitulate" to imperialism but in order to learn and prepare to fight against imperialism in a serious and effective manner.

The past week has raised the Russian revolution to an immeasurably higher level of historical development. In the course of it history has progressed, has ascended several steps at once.

Until now we have been faced with miserable, despicable (from the standpoint of world imperialism) enemies, an idiot called Romanov, Kerensky the boaster, gangs of officer cadets and bourgeois. Now there has arisen against us the giant of world imperialism, a splendidly organised and technically well-equipped, civilised giant. That giant *must* be

fought. And one must *know how* to fight him. A peasant country that has been subjected to unparalleled devastation by three years of war and that has begun the socialist revolution, must avoid armed conflicts—must avoid them while it is still possible, even at the cost of huge sacrifices—in order to be able to do something worthwhile before the "last, decisive battle" begins.

That battle will begin only when the socialist revolution breaks out in the leading imperialist countries. That revolution is undoubtedly maturing and growing stronger month by month, week by week. That growing strength *must* be helped. And we have to *know how* to help it. It would harm and not help that growing strength if we were to give up the neighbouring Soviet Socialist Republic to destruction at a moment when it obviously has no army.

We must not turn into an empty phrase the great slogan "We bank on the victory of socialism in Europe". It is a true slogan if we have in mind the long and difficult path to the full victory of socialism. It is an indisputable philosophic-historical truth in respect of the entire "era of the socialist revolution". But any abstract truth becomes an empty phrase if it is applied to *any* concrete situation. It is indisputable that "every strike conceals the hydra of the social revolution". But it is nonsense to think that we can stride directly from a strike to the revolution. If we "bank on the victory of socialism in Europe" in the sense that we guarantee to the people that the European revolution will break out and is certain to be victorious within the next few weeks, certainly before the Germans have time to reach Petrograd, Moscow or Kiev, before they have time to "finish off" our railway transport, we shall be acting not as serious internationalist revolutionaries, but as adventurers.

If Liebknecht is victorious over the bourgeoisie in two or three weeks (it is not impossible), he will get us out of all difficulties. That is beyond doubt. If, however, we determine our tactics for today in the struggle against the imperialism of today in the hope that Liebknecht will probably be victorious within the next few weeks, we shall deserve nothing but ridicule. We shall be turning the greatest revolutionary slogans of the present day into an empty revolutionary phrase.

Worker comrades, learn from the painful but useful lessons of the revolution! Prepare seriously, vigorously and unwaveringly to defend the fatherland, to defend the Soviet Socialist Republic!

Pravda (evening edition) No. 35
February 25, 1918
Signed: *Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

DRAFT DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE EVACUATION OF THE GOVERNMENT[22]

1. Choose Moscow as the seat of government.
2. From each department evacuate the minimum number of leaders of the central administrative body, not more than two or three dozen people (plus families).
3. Whatever happens, immediately remove the State Bank, the gold and the Stationery Office.
4. Begin evacuating Moscow valuables.

Written February 26, 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

STRANGE AND MONSTROUS

The Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party, in a resolution adopted on February 24, 1918, has expressed lack of confidence in the Central Committee, refused to obey those of its decisions "that will be connected with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria and Germany", and, in an "explanatory note" to the resolution, declared that it "considers a split in the Party in the very near future hardly avoidable".*

There is nothing monstrous, nor even strange in all this. It is quite natural that comrades who sharply disagree with the Central Committee over the question of a separate peace should sharply condemn the Central Committee and express their conviction that a split is inevitable. All that is the most legitimate right of Party members, which is quite understandable.

But here is what is strange and monstrous. An "explanatory note" is appended to the resolution. Here it is in full:

"The Moscow Regional Bureau considers a split in the Party in the very near future hardly avoidable, and it sets itself the aim of helping to unite all consistent revolutionary communists who equally oppose both the advocates of

* Here is the full text of the resolution: "Having discussed the activities of the Central Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. expresses lack of confidence in the Central Committee in view of its political line and composition, and will at the first opportunity insist that a new Central Committee be elected. Furthermore, the Moscow Regional Bureau does not consider itself bound to obey unreservedly those decisions of the Central Committee that will be connected with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria and Germany." The resolution was adopted unanimously.

the conclusion of a separate peace and all moderate opportunists in the Party. *In the interests of the world revolution, we consider it expedient to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power, which is now becoming purely formal.* We maintain as before that our primary task is to spread the ideas of the socialist revolution to all other countries and resolutely to promote the workers' dictatorship, ruthlessly to suppress bourgeois counter-revolution in Russia."

It is the words we have stressed in this passage which are—strange and monstrous.

It is in these words that the crux of the matter lies.

These words reduce to an absurdity the whole line put forward by the authors of the resolution. These words expose the root of their error with exceptional clarity.

"In the interests of the world revolution it is expedient to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power...." That is strange, for there is not even any connection between the premises and the conclusion. "In the interests of the world revolution it is expedient to accept the *military defeat* of Soviet power"—such a proposition might be right or wrong, but it could not be called strange. That is the first thing.

Second thing: Soviet power "is now becoming purely formal". Now this is not only strange but downright monstrous. Obviously, the authors have got themselves thoroughly entangled. We shall have to disentangle them.

As regards the first question, the authors' idea evidently is that it would be expedient in the interests of the world revolution to accept the possibility of defeat in war, which would lead to the loss of Soviet power, in other words, to the triumph of the bourgeoisie in Russia. By voicing this idea the authors indirectly admit the truth of what I said in the theses (on January 8, 1918, published in *Pravda* on February 24, 1918),* namely, that refusal to accept the peace terms presented by Germany would lead to Russia's defeat and the overthrow of Soviet power.

And so, *la raison finit toujours par avoir raison*—the truth always triumphs! My "extremist" opponents, the Muscovites who threaten a split, have been obliged—just because they have got to the point of talking openly of a split—to

* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 442-50.—*Ed.*

be equally explicit about their *real* reasons, the reasons which people who confine themselves to general phrase-making about revolutionary war prefer to pass over in silence. The very essence of my theses and arguments (as anyone who cares to read attentively my theses of January 7, 1918, may see) is that we must accept this extremely harsh peace *now*, at once, while at the same time seriously *preparing* for a revolutionary war (and accept it, moreover, precisely *in the interest* of such serious preparations). Those who confined themselves to general phrase-making about a revolutionary war ignored or failed to notice, or did not want to notice, the very essence of my arguments. And now it is my "extremist" opponents, the Muscovites, whom I have to thank from the bottom of my heart for having broken the "conspiracy of silence" over the *essence* of my arguments. The Muscovites have been the *first* to reply to them.

And what is their reply?

Their reply is an *admission of the correctness* of my *concrete* argument. Yes, the Muscovites have admitted, we shall certainly be defeated if we fight the Germans now.* Yes, this defeat would certainly lead to the fall of Soviet power.

Again and again I thank my "extremist" opponents, the Muscovites, from the bottom of my heart for having broken the "conspiracy of silence" against the essence of my arguments, i.e., against my *concrete* statement as to what the conditions of war would be, if we were to accept it at once, and for having fearlessly admitted the correctness of my concrete statement.

Further, on what grounds are my arguments, the substantial correctness of which the Muscovites have been compelled to admit, rejected?

On the grounds that in the interests of the world revolution *we must* accept the loss of Soviet power.

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* As to the counter-argument, that to avoid fighting was anyway impossible, the reply has been given by the facts: On January 8 my theses were read; by January 15 we *might* have had peace. A respite would have been certainly assured (and for us even the briefest respite would have been of gigantic significance, both materially and morally, for the *Germans* would have had to declare a *new* war), if ... if it had not been for revolutionary phrase-making.

Why should the interests of the world revolution demand it? This is the crux of the matter; this is the very essence of the reasoning of those who would like to defeat my arguments. And it is on this, the most important, fundamental and vital point, that not a word is said, either in the resolution or in the explanatory note. The authors of the resolution found time and space to speak of what is universally known and indisputable—of "ruthlessly suppressing bourgeois counter-revolution in Russia" (using the methods and means of a policy which would lead to the loss of Soviet power?), and of opposing all moderate opportunists in the Party—but of that which is really disputable and which concerns the very essence of the position of the opponents of peace—not a word!

Strange. Extremely strange. Did the authors of the resolution keep silent about this because they felt that on this point they were particularly weak? To have plainly stated *why* (this is demanded by the interests of the world revolution) would most likely have meant exposing themselves....

However that may be, we have to *seek out* the arguments which *may* have guided the authors of the resolution.

Perhaps the authors believe that the interests of the world revolution forbid making any peace at all with imperialists? This opinion was expressed by some of the opponents of peace at one of the Petrograd meetings, but only an insignificant minority of those who objected to a separate peace supported it.[23] It is clear that this opinion would lead to a denial of the expediency of the Brest negotiations and to a rejection of peace, "even" if accompanied by the return of Poland, Latvia and Courland. The incorrectness of this view (which was rejected, for example, by a majority of the Petrograd opponents of peace) is as clear as day. A socialist republic surrounded by imperialist powers could not, from this point of view, conclude any economic treaties, and could not exist at all, without flying to the moon.

Perhaps the authors believe that the interests of the world revolution require that it should be *given a push*, and that such a push can be given only by war, never by peace, which might give the people the impression that imperialism was being "legitimised"? Such a "theory" would be completely at variance with Marxism, for Marxism has always been

opposed to "pushing" revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions. Such a theory would be tantamount to the view that armed uprising is a form of struggle which is obligatory always and under all conditions. Actually, however, the interests of the world revolution demand that Soviet power, having overthrown the bourgeoisie in our country, should *help* that revolution, but that it should choose a *form* of help which is commensurate with its own strength. To help the socialist revolution on an international scale by accepting the possibility of defeat of that revolution in *one's own* country is a view that does not follow even from the "pushing" theory.

Perhaps the authors of the resolution believe that revolution has already begun in Germany and has already reached the stage of an open, nation-wide civil war, that we must therefore devote our strength to helping the German workers, and must perish ourselves ("losing Soviet power") to *save* a German revolution which has already started its decisive fight and is being hard pressed? According to this theory, we, while perishing ourselves, would be diverting part of the forces of German counter-revolution, thereby saving the German revolution.

It is quite conceivable that, given these premises, it would not only be "expedient" (as the authors of the resolution put it) but a downright *duty* to accept the possibility of defeat and the possibility of the loss of Soviet power. But obviously these premises do not exist. The German revolution is ripening, but it has obviously not reached the stage of an explosion in Germany, of civil war in Germany. By "accepting the possibility of losing Soviet power", we certainly would not be helping the German revolution to reach maturity, but *would be hindering* it. We would be helping German reaction, playing into its hands, hampering the socialist movement in Germany and frightening away from socialism large masses of German proletarians and semi-proletarians who have not yet come over to socialism and would be scared by the defeat of Soviet Russia, just as the British workers were scared by the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871.

Twist and turn them how you will, but you can find no logic in the authors' contentions. There are no

sensible arguments to support the view that "in the interests of the world revolution it is expedient to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power".

"Soviet power is now becoming purely formal"—this, as we see, is the monstrous view the authors of the Moscow resolution have come to proclaim.

Since the German imperialists are going to make us pay indemnities and forbid us to carry on propaganda and agitation against Germany, Soviet power loses all significance and "becomes purely formal"—this is probably the line of "reasoning" of the authors of the resolution. We say "probably", for the authors offer nothing clear and specific in support of their thesis.

Profound and hopeless pessimism and complete despair—such is the sum and substance of the "theory" that the significance of Soviet power is purely formal, and that tactics which will risk the possible loss of Soviet power are permissible. Since there is no salvation anyway, then let even Soviet power perish—such is the sentiment that dictated this monstrous resolution. The allegedly "economic" arguments in which such ideas are sometimes clothed reveal the same hopeless pessimism: what sort of Soviet republic is it—the implication is—when not just tribute, but tribute on such a scale can be exacted from it?

Nothing but despair: we shall perish anyhow!

It is a quite understandable mood in the extremely desperate situation in which Russia finds herself. But it is not "understandable" among conscious revolutionaries. The typical thing about it is that here we have the views of the Muscovites reduced to absurdity. The Frenchmen of 1793 would never have said that their gains—the republic and democracy—were becoming purely formal and that they would have to accept the possibility of losing the republic. They were not filled with despair, but with faith in victory. To call for a revolutionary war, and at the same time to talk in an official resolution of "accepting the possibility of losing Soviet power", is to expose oneself completely.

Early in the nineteenth century, at the time of the Napoleonic wars, Prussia and a number of other countries suffered incomparably and immeasurably greater hardships and burdens of defeat, conquest, humiliation and oppression on

the part of the conqueror than Russia is suffering in 1918. Yet the best men of Prussia, when Napoleon's military jack-boots trampled upon them a hundred times more heavily than we can be trampled upon now, did not despair, and did not say that their national political institutions were "purely formal". They did not give up, did not succumb to the feeling: "We shall perish anyhow." They signed peace treaties infinitely more drastic, brutal, humiliating and oppressive than the Brest Treaty, and then knew how to bide their time; they staunchly bore the conqueror's yoke, fought again, fell under the conqueror's yoke again, again signed the vilest of vile peace treaties, and again rose, and *in the end liberated themselves* (not without exploiting the dissensions among the stronger competing conquerors).

Why shouldn't this be repeated in our history?

Why should we give way to despair and write resolutions—which, by heavens, are more disgraceful than the most disgraceful peace—saying that "Soviet power is becoming purely formal"?

Why shouldn't the most crushing military defeats in the struggle against the giants of modern imperialism steel the national character in Russia, too, strengthen self-discipline, put an end to the bragging and phrase-making, teach fortitude and bring the people round to the correct tactics of the Prussians when they were crushed by Napoleon—the tactics of signing the most humiliating of peace treaties when you haven't an army, then mustering your forces and rising again and again?

Why should we give way to despair at the first peace treaty, incredibly harsh though it be, when other nations were able staunchly to bear even bitterer misfortunes?

Is it the staunchness of the proletarian who knows that one must submit when strength is lacking, and is then nevertheless is able to rise again and again at any price and to build up strength under *all* circumstances, that corresponds to these tactics of despair, or, rather, the spinelessness of the petty bourgeois, who in our country, in the shape of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, has beaten the record for phrase-making about a revolutionary war?

No, dear Moscow "extremist" comrades, every day of trial will drive away from you those very workers who are

the most class-conscious and the staunchest. Soviet power, they will say, is not *becoming*, and will not *become*, purely formal; and not only now, when the conqueror is in Pskov and is making us pay a ten-thousand-million-ruble tribute in grain, ore and money, but even if he gets as far as Nizhni-Novgorod and Rostov-on-Don and makes us pay a tribute of twenty thousand million rubles.

Never will any foreign conquest render a popular political institution "purely formal" (and Soviet power is *not* only a political institution far and away superior to anything known to history). On the contrary, alien conquest will only strengthen popular sympathy for Soviet power, provided—provided it does not indulge in reckless follies.

And to refuse to conclude even the vilest peace when you have no army would be a reckless gamble, for which the people would be justified in condemning the government that refused to do so.

Immensely more harsh and humiliating peace treaties than the Brest Treaty have been signed before in history (we gave some instances above) without discrediting the regime or turning it into a formality; they ruined neither the regime nor the people, but rather steeled the people, *taught* them the stern and difficult science of building up an effective army even in the most desperate conditions and under the heel of the conqueror.

Russia is making for a new and genuine patriotic war, a war for the preservation and consolidation of Soviet power. It is possible that another epoch will—like the epoch of the Napoleonic wars—be an epoch of liberation *wars* (not one war, but wars) imposed by aggressors upon Soviet Russia. That is possible.

And, therefore, more humiliating than any harsh or even extremely harsh peace, rendered imperative owing to the lack of an army—more humiliating than any humiliating peace is humiliating despair. We shall not perish even from a dozen obnoxious peace treaties if we take revolt and war *seriously*. No conquerors can destroy us if we do not destroy ourselves by despair and phrase-making.

Pravda Nos. 37 and 38,
February 28 and March 1, 1918
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

ON A BUSINESSLIKE BASIS

We are witnessing an upsurge of revolutionary enthusiasm called forth by the treacherous assault of the German white-guards on the Russian revolution. Telegrams are pouring in from everywhere expressing readiness to rise in defence of Soviet power and to fight to the last man. No other attitude on the part of the workers and peasants towards their own workers' and peasants' power could have been expected.

But enthusiasm alone is not enough for the conduct of war against such an adversary as German imperialism. A frivolous attitude towards this real, stubborn and bloody war would be the sheerest simple-mindedness, even a crime.

War must be waged in earnest, or not waged at all. There can be no middle course. Since the German imperialists are forcing war upon us, it is our sacred duty soberly to weigh our situation, calculate our forces and check up the economic machinery. All this must be done at wartime speed, for any procrastination in our present situation would be truly "similar to death". Hannibal is at the gates—that we must not forget for a single minute.

To wage the war *in earnest* we need a strong and organised rear. Even the best of armies, even people most sincerely devoted to the revolutionary cause will be immediately exterminated by the enemy, if they are not adequately armed, supplied with food and trained. That is so obvious as to need no explanation.

What is the state of the rear of our revolutionary army? Most deplorable, to say the least. The preceding war has utterly disorganised our transport services; exchange between town and countryside has been disrupted, and the direct and immediate result of this is famine in the large cities.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Our army is radically reshaping itself under the blows of the enemy. The old army, which was familiar with conditions of modern warfare, no longer exists. Utterly worn out by the preceding war, and tired to death by three and a half years in the trenches, it is a nonentity as far as its fighting capacity is concerned. The Red Army is undoubtedly splendid fighting material, but raw and unfinished material. In order that it may not become cannon fodder for the German guns, it must be trained and disciplined.

We are facing colossal difficulties. All local Soviets must immediately, following upon their telegrams announcing readiness to fight the external enemy, report how many truckloads of grain they have dispatched to Petrograd, what number of troops they are in a position to send to the front immediately, and how many Red Army men are undergoing training. Stock must be taken of all arms and shells, and the production of new arms and shells must be resumed immediately. The railways must be cleared of bag-traders and hooligans. The strictest revolutionary discipline must be restored everywhere. Only if *all* these conditions are observed can we talk of war *seriously*. Otherwise, all the talk about the "most revolutionary of wars" will be *phrase-making*. And phrase-mongering, which is always harmful, may at this critical juncture play a fatal role.

I am profoundly convinced that our revolution will cope with the colossal difficulties of the moment. It has already performed an immense work, but if our cause is to be successfully accomplished we must multiply our efforts a hundredfold.

Only then shall we win.

Pravda No. 38,
March 1, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

DRAFT OF AN ORDER TO ALL SOVIETS

We assume that the peace treaty will be signed tomorrow, March 3, but the reports of our agents, taken in connection with all the circumstances, lead us to expect that among the Germans the party of war against Russia will gain the upper hand in the very near future. Hence the categorical order: delay the demobilisation of Red Army men; intensify preparations for blowing up railways, bridges and roads; mobilise and arm detachments; continue accelerated evacuation; withdraw armaments into the interior of the country.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Written on March 2, 1918
First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to
the manuscript

A SERIOUS LESSON AND A SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY

Our pseudo-Lefts, who yesterday brought out their own paper, the *Kommunist*[24] (Communist of the pre-Marxian era, one should add), are trying to dodge the lesson and lessons of history, are trying to dodge responsibility.

But they are dodging in vain. They will not succeed in dodging it.

The dodgers are trying their hardest, are filling countless newspaper columns, are sweating and straining, are not sparing "even", as they put it, printer's ink to represent the "breathing-space" "theory" as an unfounded and unsound "theory".

Alas, their efforts are powerless to refute the facts. Facts are stubborn things, as the English proverb rightly says. It is a fact that from March 3, when at 1 p.m. the Germans ceased hostilities, to March 5, at 7 p.m., when I am writing these lines, we have had a breathing-space, and we have *already* made use of these two days for the *businesslike* (as expressed in deeds, not phrase-making) defence of the socialist fatherland. This is a fact which will become more evident to the masses every day. It is a fact that at a moment when the army at the front, being in no condition to fight, is fleeing in panic, abandoning its guns and not even stopping to blow up bridges, the defence of the fatherland and the *raising* of its defensive capacity lie not in babbling about a revolutionary war (to babble in the face of this panic-stricken flight of the army—*not one* detachment of which was *stopped* by the advocates of revolutionary war—is downright shameful), but in retreating in good order, so as to save the remnants of the army, taking advantage of every day's respite for this purpose.

Facts are stubborn things.

Our pseudo-Lefts, in their efforts to dodge the facts, the lessons to be derived from them and the question of responsibility, are endeavouring to *conceal* from their readers the recent, quite fresh and historically important past, and to *gloss it over* by references to the distant and unimportant past. For example, K. Radek; in his article recalls that he wrote about the necessity of helping the army to hold out in December (December, mind you!), in a "memorandum to the Council of People's Commissars". I have not had the opportunity to read this memorandum and I ask myself: why does not Karl Radek print it *in full*? Why does he not explain clearly and frankly what exactly he meant then by a "compromise peace"? Why does he not recall the more recent past, when he wrote in *Pravda* about his illusion (the worst of all illusions) that peace could be concluded with the German imperialists on condition of the restoration of Poland?

Why?

Because the pseudo-Lefts are compelled to gloss over facts which reveal *their*, the "Lefts"', responsibility for sowing illusions which actually *helped* the German imperialists and *hindered* the growth and development of the revolution in Germany.

N. Bukharin is now even attempting to deny the fact that he and his friends asserted that it was impossible for the Germans to attack. But very, very many people know that it is a fact, that Bukharin and his friends did assert this, and that by sowing such an illusion they *helped* German imperialism and *hindered* the growth of the German revolution, which has now been weakened by the fact that the Great-Russian Soviet Republic, during the panic-stricken flight of the peasant army, has been deprived of thousands upon thousands of guns and of wealth to the value of hundreds upon hundreds of millions. I had predicted this definitely and clearly in my theses of January 7.* If N. Bukharin is now compelled to eat his words, so much the worse for him. All who remember that Bukharin and his friends said that it was impossible for the Germans to attack will only shrug

* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 442-50.—*Ed.*

their shoulders now that N. Bukharin is compelled to eat his own words.

And for the benefit of those who do not remember them, of those who did not hear them, let us refer to a document which is a little more valuable, interesting and instructive *now* than what K. Radek wrote in December. This document, which unfortunately is being concealed by the "Lefts" from their readers, is the record (1) of the vote on January 21, 1918, at the meeting of the Central Committee of our Party with the present "Left" opposition, and (2) of the vote in the Central Committee on February 17, 1918.

On January 21, 1918, on the question of whether to break off negotiations with the Germans immediately, Stukov alone (of the contributors to the pseudo-Left *Kommunist*) voted *in favour*. All the rest voted against.

On the question of whether it was *permissible* to sign an annexationist treaty if the Germans should break off negotiations or present an ultimatum, only Obolensky (When will "his" theses be published? Why is the *Kommunist* silent about them?) and Stukov voted *against*. All the rest voted *in favour*.

On the question of whether in this event the proposed peace *should* be concluded, only Obolensky and Stukov voted *against*. The rest of the "Lefts" *abstained*!! That is a fact.

On February 17, 1918, when the question was put: who is in favour of a revolutionary war?—Bukharin and Lomov "refused to vote on the question as put". None voted *in favour*. That is a fact!

On the question of whether to "refrain from resuming peace negotiations until the German attack becomes sufficiently (*sic*!) evident and its influence upon the German working-class movement becomes clear", Bukharin, Lomov and Uritsky, of the present contributors to the "Left" paper, voted *in favour*.

On the question, "Should we conclude peace if a German offensive becomes a fact and a revolutionary upsurge fails to eventuate in Germany and Austria?"—Lomov, Bukharin and Uritsky *abstained*.

Facts are stubborn things. And the facts show that Bukharin denied the possibility of a German offensive and sowed illusions by which he *actually*, against his own wishes, *helped*

the German imperialists and *hindered* the growth of the German revolution. That indeed is the essence of revolutionary phrase-making. You strive for one thing and achieve the opposite.

N. Bukharin rebukes me for not giving a concrete analysis of the terms of the present peace. But it should not be difficult to understand that from the point of view of my argument and of the essence of the matter there was not, nor is there now, any necessity for that. It was enough to show that we are facing only one real—not imagined—dilemma: either to accept *such* terms as would afford us a breathing space for a few days at least, or the position of Belgium and Serbia. And this Bukharin did not refute, even in the eyes of Petrograd. That his colleague, M. N. Pokrovsky, admitted.

And if the new terms are worse, more onerous and humiliating than the bad, onerous and humiliating Brest terms, it is *our pseudo-Lefts*, Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co., who *are to blame for this* happening to the Great-Russian Soviet Republic. This is a historical fact, as is proved by the voting referred to above. It is a fact you cannot escape, wriggle as you will. You were *offered* the Brest terms, and you replied by blustering and swaggering, which *led* to worse terms. That is a fact. And you cannot absolve yourselves of the responsibility for it.

In my theses of January 7, 1918, it was predicted with the utmost clarity that in view of the state of our army (which could not be changed by phrase-making "*against*" the tired peasant masses), Russia *would have* to conclude a *worse* separate peace if she did not accept the Brest peace.

The "Lefts" fell into a trap set by the Russian bourgeoisie, who *had* to embroil us in the *worst* kind of war we could possibly become embroiled in.

That these Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, in declaring for war *now*, have obviously parted company with the peasantry, is a fact. And this fact attests to the *frivolity* of the policy of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, just as the seemingly "revolutionary" policy of all the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the summer of 1907 was frivolous.

That the more class-conscious and advanced workers are quickly shaking off the fumes of revolutionary phrase-making

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is shown by the example of Petrograd and Moscow. In Petrograd the best of the workers' districts—Vyborg and Vasilyevsky Island—have already sobered up. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies is not in favour of war *now*; they have realised that it is necessary to *prepare* for it, and are preparing for it.[25] In Moscow, at the Bolshevik city conference on March 3 and 4, 1918, the opponents of revolutionary phrase-making won the day.[26]

To what monstrous lengths of self-deception our "Lefts" have gone is evident from one sentence in Pokrovsky's article, which says: "If we are to fight, we must fight *now*" (Pokrovsky's italics), "while" (listen to this!) "the Russian army, including the newly-formed units, has still not been demobilised."

But everybody who does not shut his eyes to the facts knows that the greatest *hindrance* to resisting the Germans in February 1918, whether in Great Russia, the Ukraine, or Finland, was *our undemobilised army*. That is a fact. For it could not help fleeing in panic, carrying the Red Army detachments along with it.

Anyone who wants to benefit by the lessons of history, and not to hide from the responsibility they impose, or shut his eyes to them, let him recall at least the wars of Napoleon I against Germany.

Many a time did Prussia and Germany conclude with the conqueror peace treaties *ten times* more onerous and humiliating (than ours), even to the extent of accepting a foreign police, even to the extent of undertaking to furnish troops to help Napoleon I in his campaigns of conquest. Napoleon I in his treaties with Prussia harassed and dismembered Germany ten times worse than Hindenburg and Wilhelm have pinned us down now. Yet there were people in Prussia who did not bluster, but signed ultra-"disgraceful" peace treaties, signed them because they had no army, signed terms ten times more oppressive and humiliating, and then *in spite of everything* rose up in revolt and to wage war. That happened not once, but many times. History knows of several such peace treaties and wars. Of several cases of respite. Of several new declarations of war by the conqueror. Of several cases of an alliance between an *oppressed* nation and an oppressing nation, which was a rival of the conqueror and

no less a conqueror itself (be it noted by the advocates of a "revolutionary war" *without* accepting aid from imperialists!).

Such was the course of history.

So it was. So it will be. We have entered an epoch of a *succession* of wars. We are moving towards a new, *patriotic* war. We will arrive at that war in the midst of a ripening socialist revolution. And while on that difficult road the Russian proletariat and the Russian revolution will be able to cure themselves of blustering and revolutionary phrase-making, will know how to accept even the most onerous peace treaties, and then rise again.

We have signed a *Tilsit Peace*. We shall attain our victory and our liberation, just as the Germans after the Peace of Tilsit of 1807 attained their liberation from Napoleon in 1813 and 1814. The interval between our Tilsit Peace and our liberation will probably be shorter, for history is moving faster.

Down with blustering! On with the improvement of discipline and organisation in all earnest!

Written on March 5, 1918

Published on March 6, 1918
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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the manuscript

EXTRAORDINARY SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[27]

MARCH 6-8, 1918

First published in full in 1923
in the book *Seventh Congress
of the Russian Communist Party.
Verbatim Report. March 6-8, 1918*

Published in 1928 according to the book:
*Minutes of the Congresses
and Conferences
of the All-Union Communist
Party (Bolsheviks).—Seventh Congress.
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1

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MARCH 7

A political report might consist of an enumeration of measures taken by the Central Committee; but the essential thing at the present moment is not a report of this kind, but a review of our revolution as a whole; that is the only thing that can provide a truly Marxist substantiation of all our decisions. We must examine the whole preceding course of development of the revolution and ascertain why the course of its further development has changed. There have been turning-points in our revolution that will have enormous significance for the world revolution. One such turning-point was the October Revolution.

The first successes of the February Revolution were due to the fact that the proletariat was followed, not only by the masses of the rural population, but also by the bourgeoisie. Hence, the easy victory over tsarism, something we had failed to achieve in 1905. The spontaneous formation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the February Revolution was a repetition of the experience of 1905—we had to proclaim the principle of Soviet power. The masses learned the tasks of the revolution from their own experience of the struggle. The events of April 20-21[28] were a peculiar combination of demonstrations and of something in the nature of armed uprising. This was enough to cause the fall of the bourgeois government. Then began the long period of the collaboration policy, which stemmed from the very nature of the petty-bourgeois government that had come to power. The July events[29] could not then establish the dictatorship of the proletariat—the masses were still not prepared for

it. That was why not one of the responsible organisations called upon them to establish it. But as a reconnoitring operation in the enemy's camp, the July events were of enormous significance. The Kornilov revolt[30] and the subsequent events served as practical lessons and made possible the October victory. The mistake committed by those who even in October wished to divide power[31] was their failure to connect the October victory with the July days, with the offensive, with the Kornilov revolt, etc., etc., events which caused the millions of the common people to realise that Soviet power had become inevitable. Then followed our triumphal march throughout Russia, accompanied by a universal desire for peace. We know that we cannot achieve peace by a unilateral withdrawal from the war. We pointed to this as far back as the April Conference.[32] In the period from April to October, the soldiers clearly realised that the policy of collaboration was prolonging the war and was leading to the savage, senseless attempts of the imperialists to start an offensive and to get still more entangled in a war that would last for years. That was the reason why it was necessary at all costs to adopt an active policy of peace as quickly as possible, why it was necessary for the Soviets to take power into their own hands, and abolish landed proprietorship. You know that the latter was upheld not only by Kerensky but also by Avksentyev, who even went so far as to order the arrest of the members of the Land Committees. The policy we adopted, the slogan of "Power to the Soviets", which we instilled into the minds of the majority of the people, enabled us, in October, to achieve victory very easily in St. Petersburg, and transformed the last months of the Russian revolution into one continuous triumphal march.

Civil war became a fact. The transformation of the imperialist war into civil war, which we had predicted at the beginning of the revolution, and even at the beginning of the war, and which considerable sections of socialist circles treated skeptically and even with ridicule, actually took place on October 25, 1917, in one of the largest and most backward of the belligerent countries. In this civil war the overwhelming majority of the population proved to be on our side, and that is why victory was achieved with such extraordinary ease.

The troops who abandoned the front carried with them wherever they went the maximum of revolutionary determination to put an end to collaboration; and the collaborationist elements, the whiteguards and the landowners' sons found themselves without support among the population. The war against them gradually turned into a victorious triumphal march of the revolution as the masses of the people and the military units that were sent against us came over to the side of the Bolsheviks. We saw this in Petrograd, on the Gatchina front, where the Cossacks, whom Kerensky and Krasnov tried to lead against the Red capital, wavered; we saw this later in Moscow, in Orenburg and in the Ukraine. A wave of civil war swept over the whole of Russia, and everywhere we achieved victory with extraordinary ease precisely because the fruit had ripened, because the masses had already gone through the experience of collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Our slogan "All Power to the Soviets", which the masses had tested in practice by long historical experience, had become part of their flesh and blood.

That is why the Russian revolution was a continuous triumphal march in the first months after October 25, 1917. As a result of this the difficulties which the socialist revolution immediately encountered, and could not but encounter, were forgotten, were pushed into the background. One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution is that for the bourgeois revolution, which arises out of feudalism, the new economic organisations are gradually created in the womb of the old order, gradually changing all the aspects of feudal society. The bourgeois revolution faced only one task—to sweep away, to cast aside, to destroy all the fetters of the preceding social order. By fulfilling this task every bourgeois revolution fulfils all that is required of it; it accelerates the growth of capitalism.

The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, has proved to be the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult is it for that country to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. New incredibly difficult tasks, organisational tasks, are added to the tasks of destruction. Had not the popular

creative spirit of the Russian revolution, which had gone through the great experience of the year 1905, given rise to the Soviets as early as February 1917, they could not under any circumstances have assumed power in October, because success depended entirely upon the existence of available organisational forms of a movement embracing millions. The Soviets were the available form, and that is why in the political sphere the future held out to us those brilliant successes, the continuous triumphal march, that we had; for the new form of political power was already available, and all we had to do was to pass a few decrees, and transform the power of the Soviets from the embryonic state in which it existed in the first months of the revolution into the legally recognised form which had become established in the Russian state—i.e., into the Russian Soviet Republic. The Republic was born at one stroke; it was born so easily because in February 1917 the masses had created the Soviets even before any party had managed to proclaim this slogan. It was the great creative spirit of the people, which had passed through the bitter experience of 1905 and had been made wise by it, that gave rise to this form of proletarian power. The task of achieving victory over the internal enemy was an extremely easy one. The task of creating the political power was an extremely easy one because the masses had created the skeleton, the basis of this power. The Republic of Soviets was born at one stroke. But two exceedingly difficult problems still remained, the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphal march we experienced in the first months of our revolution—we did not doubt, we could not doubt, that the socialist revolution would be later confronted with enormously difficult tasks.

First, there was the problem of internal organisation, which confronts every socialist revolution. The difference between a socialist revolution and a bourgeois revolution is that in the latter case there are ready-made forms of capitalist relationships; Soviet power—the proletarian power—does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture. The organisation of accounting, the control of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole

of the state economic mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that will work in such a way as to enable hundreds of millions of people to be guided by a single plan—such was the enormous organisational problem that rested on our shoulders. Under the present conditions of labour this problem could not possibly be solved by the "hurrah" methods by which we were able to solve the problems of the Civil War. The very nature of the task prevented a solution by these methods. We achieved easy victories over the Kaledin[33] revolt and created the Soviet Republic in face of a resistance that was not even worth serious consideration; the course of events was predetermined by the whole of the preceding objective development, so that all we had to do was say the last word and change the signboard, i.e., take down the sign "The Soviet exists as a trade union organisation", and put up instead the sign "The Soviet is the sole form of state power"; the situation, however, was altogether different in regard to organisational problems. In this field we encountered enormous difficulties. It immediately became clear to everyone who cared to ponder over the tasks of our revolution that only by the hard and long path of self-discipline would it be possible to overcome the disintegration that the war had caused in capitalist society, that only by extraordinarily hard, long and persistent effort could we cope with this disintegration and defeat those elements aggravating it, elements which regarded the revolution as a means of discarding old fetters and getting as much out of it for themselves as they possibly could. The emergence of a large number of such elements was inevitable in a small-peasant country at a time of incredible economic chaos, and the fight against these elements that is ahead of us, that we have only just started, will be a hundred times more difficult, it will be a fight which promises no spectacular opportunities. We are only in the first stage of this fight. Severe trials await us. The objective situation precludes any idea of limiting ourselves to a triumphal march with flying banners such as we had in fighting against Kaledin. Anyone who attempted to apply these methods of struggle to the organisational tasks that confront the revolution would only prove his bankruptcy as a politician, as a socialist, as an active worker in the socialist revolution.

The same thing awaited some of our young comrades who were carried away by the initial triumphal march of the revolution, when it came up against the second enormous difficulty—the international question. The reason we achieved such an easy victory over Kerensky's gangs, the reason we so easily set up our government and without the slightest difficulty passed decrees on the socialisation of the land and on workers' control, the reason we achieved all this so easily was a fortunate combination of circumstances that protected us for a short time from international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organised war machine, which is a real force, a real stronghold of international capital, could not, under any circumstances, under any conditions, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class embodied in it, because of commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. This is the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem—the need to solve international problems, the need to evoke a world revolution, to effect the transition from our strictly national revolution to the world revolution. This problem confronts us in all its incredible difficulty. I repeat, very many of our young friends who regard themselves as Lefts have begun to forget the most important thing: why in the course of the weeks and months of the enormous triumph after October we were able so easily to pass from victory to victory. And yet this was due only to a special combination of international circumstances that temporarily shielded us from imperialism. Imperialism had other things to bother about besides us. And it seemed to us that we, too, had other things to bother about besides imperialism. Individual imperialists had no time to bother with us, solely because the whole of the great social, political and military might of modern world imperialism was split by internecine war into two groups. The imperialist plunderers involved in this struggle had gone to such incredible lengths, were locked in mortal combat to such a degree, that neither of the groups was able to concentrate any effective forces against the Russian revolution. These were the circumstances in which we found ourselves

in October. It is paradoxical but true that our revolution broke out at so fortunate a moment, when unprecedented disasters involving the destruction of millions of human beings had overtaken most of the imperialist countries, when the unprecedented calamities attending the war had exhausted the nations, when in the fourth year of the war the belligerent countries had reached an impasse, a parting of the ways, when the question arose objectively—could nations reduced to such a state continue fighting? It was only because our revolution broke out at so fortunate a moment as this, when neither of the two gigantic groups of plunderers was in a position immediately either to hurl itself at the other, or to unite with the other against us; our revolution could (and did) take advantage only of a situation such as this in international political and economic relations to accomplish its brilliant triumphal march in European Russia, spread to Finland and begin to win the Caucasus and Rumania. This alone explains the appearance of Party functionaries, intellectual supermen, in the leading circles of our Party who allowed themselves to be carried away by this triumphal march and who said we could cope with international imperialism; over there, there will also be a triumphal march, over there, there will be no real difficulties. This was at variance with the objective position of the Russian revolution which had merely taken advantage of the setback of international imperialism; the engine that was supposed to bear down on us with the force of a railway train bearing down on a wheelbarrow and smashing it to splinters, was temporarily stalled—and the engine was stalled because the two groups of predators had clashed. Here and there the revolutionary movement was growing, but in all the imperialist countries without exception it was still mainly in the initial stage. Its rate of development was entirely different from ours. Anyone who has given careful thought to the economic prerequisites of the socialist revolution in Europe must be clear on the point that in Europe it will be immeasurably more difficult to start, whereas it was immeasurably more easy for us to start; but it will be more difficult for us to continue the revolution than it will be over there. This objective situation caused us to experience an extraordinarily sharp and difficult turn in history.

From the continuous triumphal march on our internal front, against our counter-revolution, against the enemies of Soviet power in October, November and December, we had to pass to a collision with real international imperialism, in its real hostility towards us. From the period of the triumphal march we had to pass to a period in which we were in an extraordinarily difficult and painful situation, one which certainly could not be brushed aside with words, with brilliant slogans—however pleasant that would have been—because in our disorganised country we had to deal with incredibly weary masses, who had reached a state in which they could not possibly go on fighting, who were so shattered by three years of agonising war that they were absolutely useless from the military point of view. Even before the October Revolution we saw representatives of the masses of the soldiers, not members of the Bolshevik Party, who did not hesitate to tell the bourgeoisie the truth that the Russian army would not fight. This state of the army has brought about a gigantic crisis. A small-peasant country, disorganised by war, reduced to an incredible state, has been placed in an extremely difficult position. We have no army, but we have to go on living side by side with a predator who is armed to the teeth, a predator who still remains and will continue to remain a plunderer and is not, of course, affected by agitation in favour of peace without annexations and indemnities. A tame, domestic animal has been lying side by side with a tiger and trying to persuade the latter to conclude a peace without annexations and indemnities, although the only way such a peace could be attained was by attacking the tiger. The top layer of our Party—intellectuals and some of the workers' organisations—has been trying in the main to brush this prospect aside with phrases and such excuses as "that is not the way it should be". This peace was too incredible a prospect for them to believe that we, who up to now had marched in open battle with colours flying and had stormed the enemy's positions with "hurrahs", could yield and accept these humiliating terms. Never! We are exceedingly proud revolutionaries, we declare above all: "The Germans cannot attack."[34]

This was the first argument with which these people consoled themselves. History has now placed us in an extraor-

dinarily difficult position; in the midst of organisational work of unparalleled difficulty we shall have to experience a number of painful defeats. Regarded from the world-historical point of view, there would doubtlessly be no hope of the ultimate victory of our revolution if it were to remain alone, if there were no revolutionary movements in other countries. When the Bolshevik Party tackled the job alone, it did so in the firm conviction that the revolution was maturing in all countries and that in the end—but not at the very beginning—no matter what difficulties we experienced, no matter what defeats were in store for us, the world socialist revolution would come—because it is coming; would mature—because it is maturing and will reach full maturity. I repeat, our salvation from all these difficulties is an all-Europe revolution. Taking this truth, this absolutely abstract truth, as our starting-point, and being guided by it, we must see to it that it does not in time become a mere phrase, because every abstract truth, if it is accepted without analysis, becomes a mere phrase. If you say that every strike conceals the hydra of revolution, and he who fails to understand this is no socialist, you are right. Yes, the socialist revolution looms behind every strike. But if you say that every single strike is an immediate step towards the socialist revolution, you will be uttering perfectly empty phrases. We have heard these phrases "every blessed time in the same place" and have got so sick and tired of them that the workers have rejected these anarchist phrases, because undoubtedly, clear as it is that behind every strike there looms the hydra of socialist revolution, it is equally clear that the assertion that every strike can develop into revolution is utter nonsense. Just as it is indisputable that all the difficulties in our revolution will be overcome only when the world socialist revolution matures—and it is maturing now everywhere—it is absolutely absurd to declare that we must conceal every real difficulty of our revolution today and say: "I bank on the international socialist movement—I can commit any piece of folly I please." "Liebknecht will help us out, because he is going to win, anyhow." He will create such an excellent organisation, he will plan everything beforehand so well that we shall be able to take ready-made forms in the same way as we took the ready-made Marxist doctrine from

Western Europe—and maybe that is why it triumphed in our country in a few months, whereas it has been taking decades to triumph in Western Europe. Thus it would have been reckless gambling to apply the old method of solving the problem of the struggle by a triumphal march to the new historical period which has set in, and which has confronted us, not with feeble Kerensky and Kornilov, but with an international predator—the imperialism of Germany, where the revolution has been maturing but has obviously not yet reached maturity. The assertion that the enemy would not dare attack the revolution was such a gamble. The situation at the time of the Brest negotiations[35] was not yet such as to compel us to accept any peace terms. The objective alignment of forces was such that a respite would not have been enough. It took the Brest negotiations to show that the Germans would attack, that German society was not so pregnant with revolution that it could give birth to it at once; and we cannot blame the German imperialists for not having prepared that outbreak by their conduct, or, as our young friends who regard themselves as Lefts say, for not having created a situation in which the Germans could not attack. When we tell them that we have no army, that we were compelled to demobilise—we were compelled to do so, although we never forgot that a tiger was lying beside our tame, domestic animal—they refuse to understand. Although we were compelled to demobilise we did not for a moment forget that it was impossible to end the war unilaterally by issuing an order to stick the bayonets in the ground.

Generally speaking, how is it that not a single trend, not a single tendency, not a single organisation in our Party opposed this demobilisation? Had we gone mad? Not in the least. Officers, not Bolsheviks, had stated even before October that the army could not fight, that it could not be kept at the front even for a few weeks longer. After October this became obvious to everybody who was willing to recognise the facts, willing to see the unpleasant, bitter reality and not hide, or pull his cap over his eyes, and make shift with proud phrases. We have no army, we cannot hold it. The best thing we can do is to demobilise it as quickly as possible. This is the sick part of the organism, which has suffered incredible torture, has been ravaged by the priva-

tions of a war into which it entered technically unprepared, and from which it has emerged in such a state that it succumbs to panic at every attack. We cannot blame these people who have experienced incredible suffering. In hundreds of resolutions, even in the first period of the Russian revolution, the soldiers have said quite frankly: "We are drowning in blood, we cannot go on fighting." One could have delayed the end of the war artificially, one could have committed the frauds Kerensky committed, one could have postponed the end for a few weeks, but objective reality broke its own road. This is the sick part of the Russian state organism which can no longer bear the burden of the war. The quicker we demobilise the army, the sooner it will become absorbed by those parts that are not so sick and the sooner will the country be prepared for new severe trials. That is what we felt when we unanimously, without the slightest protest, adopted the decision—which was absurd from the point of view of foreign events—to demobilise the army. It was the proper step to take. We said that it was a frivolous illusion to believe that we could hold the army. The sooner we demobilised the army, the sooner would the social organism as a whole recover. That is why the revolutionary phrase, "The Germans cannot attack", from which the other phrase ("We can declare the state of war terminated. Neither war nor the signing of peace.") derived, was such a profound mistake, such a bitter over-estimation of events. But suppose the Germans do attack? "No, they cannot attack." But have you the right to risk the world revolution? What about the concrete question of whether you may not prove to be accomplices of German imperialism when that moment comes? But we, who since October 1917 have all become defencists, who have recognised the principle of defence of the fatherland, we all know that we have broken with imperialism, not merely in word but in deed; we have destroyed the secret treaties,"[36] vanquished the bourgeoisie in our own country and proposed an open and honest peace so that all the nations may see what our intentions really are. How could people who seriously uphold the position of defending the Soviet Republic agree to this gamble, which has already produced results? And this is a fact, because the severe crisis which our Party is now experiencing, owing to the formation

of a "Left" opposition within it, is one of the gravest crises the Russian revolution has experienced.

This crisis will be overcome. Under no circumstances will it break the neck of our Party, or of our revolution, although at the present moment it has come very near to doing so, there was a possibility of it. The guarantee that we shall not break our neck on this question is this: instead of applying the old method of settling factional differences, the old method of issuing an enormous quantity of literature, of having many discussions and plenty of splits, instead of this old method, events have provided our people with a new method of learning things. This method is to put everything to the test of facts, events, the lessons of world history. You said that the Germans could not attack. The logic of your tactics was that we could declare the state of war to be terminated. History has taught you a lesson, it has shattered this illusion. Yes, the German revolution is growing, but not in the way we should like it, not as fast as Russian intellectuals would have it, not at the rate our history developed in October—when we entered any town we liked, proclaimed Soviet power, and within a few days nine-tenths of the workers came over to our side. The German revolution has the misfortune of not moving so fast. What do you think? Must we reckon with the revolution, or must the revolution reckon with us? You wanted the revolution to reckon with you. But history has taught you a lesson. It is a lesson, because it is the absolute truth that without a German revolution we are doomed—perhaps not in Petrograd, not in Moscow, but in Vladivostok, in more remote places to which perhaps we shall have to retreat, and the distance to which is perhaps greater than the distance from Petrograd to Moscow. At all events, under all conceivable circumstances, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed. Nevertheless, this does not in the least shake our conviction that we must be able to bear the most difficult position without blustering.

The revolution will not come as quickly as we expected. History has proved this, and we must be able to take this as a fact, to reckon with the fact that the world socialist revolution cannot begin so easily in the advanced countries as the revolution began in Russia—in the land of Nicholas

and Rasputin, the land in which an enormous part of the population was absolutely indifferent as to what peoples were living in the outlying regions, or what was happening there. In such a country it was quite easy to start a revolution, as easy as lifting a feather.

But to start without preparation a revolution in a country in which capitalism is developed and has given democratic culture and organisation to everybody, down to the last man—to do so would be wrong, absurd. There we are only just approaching the painful period of the beginning of socialist revolutions. This is a fact. We do not know, no one knows, perhaps—it is quite possible—it will triumph within a few weeks, even within a few days, but we cannot stake everything on that. We must be prepared for extraordinary difficulties, for extraordinarily severe defeats, which are inevitable because the revolution in Europe has not yet begun, although it may begin tomorrow; and when it does begin, then, of course, we shall not be tortured by doubts, there will be no question about a revolutionary war, but just one continuous triumphal march. That is to come, it will inevitably be so, but it is not so yet. This is the simple fact that history has taught us, with which it has hit us very painfully—and it is said a man who has been thrashed is worth two who haven't. That is why I think that now history has given us a very painful thrashing, because of our hope that the Germans could not attack and that we could get everything by shouting "hurrah!", this lesson, with the help of our Soviet organisations, will be very quickly brought home to the masses all over Soviet Russia. They are all up and doing, gathering, preparing for the Congress, passing resolutions, thinking over what has happened. What is taking place at the present time does not resemble the old pre-revolutionary controversies, which remained within narrow Party circles; now all decisions are submitted for discussion to the masses, who demand that they be tested by experience, by deeds, who never allow themselves to be carried away by frivolous speeches, and never allow themselves to be diverted from the path prescribed by the objective progress of events. Of course, an intellectual, or a Left Bolshevik, can try to talk his way out of difficulties. He can try to talk his way out of such

facts as the absence of an army and the failure of the revolution to begin in Germany. The millions-strong masses—and politics begin where millions of men and women are; where there are not thousands, but millions, that is where serious politics begin—the masses know what the army is like, they have seen soldiers returning from the front. They know—that is, if you take, not individual persons, but real masses—that we cannot fight, that every man at the front has endured everything imaginable. The masses have realised the truth that if we have no army, and a predator is lying beside us, we shall have to sign a most harsh, humiliating peace treaty. That is inevitable until the birth of the revolution, until you cure your army, until you allow the men to return home. Until then the patient will not recover. And we shall not be able to cope with the German predator by shouting "hurrah!"; we shall not be able to throw him off as easily as we threw off Kerensky and Kornilov. This is the lesson the masses have learned without the excuses that certain of those who desire to evade bitter reality have tried to present them with.

At first a continuous triumphal march in October and November—then, suddenly, in the space of a few weeks, the Russian revolution is defeated by the German predator; the Russian revolution is prepared to accept the terms of a predatory treaty. Yes, the turns taken by history are very painful. All such turns affect us painfully. When, in 1907, we signed the incredibly shameful internal treaty with Stolypin, when we were compelled to pass through the pigsty of the Stolypin Duma and assumed obligations by signing scraps of monarchist paper,[37] we experienced what we are experiencing now but on a smaller scale. At that time, people who were among the finest in the vanguard of the revolution said (and they too had not the slightest doubt that they were right), "We are proud revolutionaries, we believe in the Russian revolution, we will never enter legal Stolypin institutions." Yes, you will, we said. The life of the masses, history, are stronger than your protestations. If you won't go, we said, history will compel you to. These were very Left people and after the first turn in history nothing remained of them as a group but smoke. Just as we proved able to remain revolutionaries, proved able to work under

terrible conditions and emerge from them, so shall we emerge now because it is not our whim, it is objective inevitability that has arisen in an utterly ruined country, because in spite of our desires the European revolution dared to be late, and in spite of our desires German imperialism dared to attack.

Here one must know how to retreat. We cannot hide the incredibly bitter, deplorable reality from ourselves with empty phrases; we must say: God grant that we retreat in what is half-way good order. We cannot retreat in good order, but God grant that our retreat is half-way good order, that we gain a little time in which the sick part of our organism can be absorbed at least to some extent. On the whole the organism is sound, it will overcome its sickness; But you cannot expect it to overcome it all at once, instantaneously; you cannot stop an army in flight. When I said to one of our young friends, a would-be Left, "Comrade, go to the front, see what is going on in the army", he took offence at this proposal. He said, "They want to banish us so as to prevent our agitating here for the great principles of a revolutionary war." In making this proposal I really had no intention whatever of banishing factional enemies; I merely suggested that they go and see for themselves that the army had begun to run away in an unprecedented manner. We knew that even before this, even before this we could not close our eyes to the fact that the disintegration of the army had gone on to such an unheard-of extent that our guns were being sold to the Germans for a song. We knew this, just as we know that the army cannot be held back, and the argument that the Germans would not attack was a great gamble. If the European revolution is late in coming, gravest defeats await us because we have no army, because we lack organisation, because, at the moment, these are two problems we cannot solve. If you are unable to adapt yourself, if you are not inclined to crawl on your belly in the mud, you are not a revolutionary but a chatterbox; and I propose this, not because I like it, but because we have no other road, because history has not been kind enough to bring the revolution to maturity everywhere simultaneously.

The way things are turning out is that the civil war has begun as an attempt at a clash with imperialism, and this

has shown that imperialism is rotten to the core, and that proletarian elements are rising in every army. Yes, we shall see the world revolution, but for the time being it is a very good fairy-tale, a very beautiful fairy-tale—I quite understand children liking beautiful fairy-tales. But I ask, is it proper for a serious revolutionary to believe in fairy-tales? There is an element of reality in every fairy-tale. If you told children fairy-tales in which the cock and the cat did not converse in human language they would not be interested. In the same way, if you tell the people that civil war will break out in Germany and also guarantee that instead of a clash with imperialism we shall have a field revolution on a world-wide scale,[38] the people will say you are deceiving them. In doing this you will be overcoming the difficulties with which history has confronted us only in your own minds, by your own wishes. It will be a good thing if the German proletariat is able to take action. But have you measured it, have you discovered an instrument that will show that the German revolution will break out on such-and-such a day? No, you do not know that, and neither do we. You are staking everything on this card. If the revolution breaks out, everything is saved. Of course! But if it does not turn out as we desire, if it does not achieve victory tomorrow—what then? Then the masses will say to you, you acted like gamblers—you staked everything on a fortunate turn of events that did not take place, you proved unfitted for the situation that actually arose instead of the world revolution, which will inevitably come, but which has not yet reached maturity.

A period has set in of severe defeats, inflicted by imperialism, which is armed to the teeth, upon a country which has demobilised its army, which had to demobilise. What I predicted has come to pass; instead of the Brest peace we have a much more humiliating peace, and the blame for this rests upon those who refused to accept the former peace. We knew that through the fault of the army we were concluding peace with imperialism. We sat at the table beside Hoffmann and not Liebknecht[39]—and in doing so we assisted the German revolution. But now you are assisting German imperialism, because you have surrendered wealth valued at millions in guns and shells; and anybody who had

seen the state—the incredible state—of the army could have predicted this. Everyone of integrity who came from the front said that had the Germans made the slightest attack we should have perished inevitably and absolutely. We should have fallen prey to the enemy within a few days.

Having been taught this lesson, we shall overcome our split, our crisis, however severe the disease may be, because an immeasurably more reliable ally will come to our assistance—the world revolution. When the ratification of this Peace of Tilsit, this unbelievable peace, more humiliating and predatory than the Brest peace, is spoken of, I say: certainly, yes. We must do this because we look at things from the point of view of the masses. Any attempt to apply the tactics applied internally in one country between October and November—the triumphant period of the revolution—to apply them with the aid of our imagination to the progress of events in the world revolution, is doomed to failure. When it is said that the respite is a fantasy, when a newspaper called *Kommunist*—from the word "Commune", I suppose—when this paper fills column after column with attempts to refute the respite theory, I say that I have lived through quite a lot of factional conflicts and splits and so I have a great deal of experience; and I must say that it is clear to me that this disease will not be cured by the old method of factional Party splits because events will cure it more quickly. Life is marching forward very quickly. In this respect it is magnificent. History is driving its locomotive so fast that before the editors of *Kommunist* bring out their next issue the majority of the workers in Petrograd will have begun to be disappointed in its ideas, because events are proving that the respite is a fact. We are now signing a peace treaty, we have a respite, we are taking advantage of it the better to defend our fatherland—because had we been at war we should have had an army fleeing in panic which would have had to be stopped, and which our comrades cannot and could not stop, because war is more powerful than sermons, more powerful than ten thousand arguments. Since they did not understand the objective situation they could not hold back the army, and cannot do so. This sick army infected the whole organism, and another unparalleled defeat was inflicted upon us. German imperialism struck

another blow at the revolution, a severe blow, because we allowed ourselves to face the blows of imperialism without machine-guns. Meanwhile, we shall take advantage of this breathing-space to persuade the people to unite and fight, to say to the Russian workers and peasants: "Organise self-discipline, strict discipline, otherwise you will have to remain lying under the German jackboot as you are lying now, as you will inevitably have to lie until the people learn to fight and to create an army capable, not of running away, but of bearing untold suffering." It is inevitable, because the German revolution has not yet begun, and we cannot guarantee that it will come tomorrow.

That is why the respite theory, which is totally rejected in the flood of articles in *Kommunist*, is advanced by reality. Everyone can see that the respite is a fact, that everyone is taking advantage of it. We believed that we would lose Petrograd in a few days when the advancing German troops were only a few days' march away, and when our best sailors and the Putilov workers,[40] notwithstanding all their great enthusiasm, remained alone, when incredible chaos and panic broke out, which compelled our troops to flee all the way to Gatchina, and when we had cases of positions being recaptured that had never been lost—by a telegraph operator, arriving at the station, taking his place at the key and wiring, "No Germans in sight. We have occupied the station." A few hours later I received a telephone communication from the Commissariat of Railways informing me, "We have occupied the next station. We are approaching Yamburg. No Germans in sight. Telegraph operator at his post." That is the kind of thing we had. This is the real history of the eleven days' war.[41] It was described to us by sailors and Putilov workers, who ought to be brought to the Congress of Soviets. Let them tell the truth. It is a frightfully bitter, disappointing, painful and humiliating truth, but it is a hundred times more useful, it can be understood by the Russian people.

One may dream about the field revolution on a world-wide scale, for it will come. Everything will come in due time; but for the time being, set to work to establish self-discipline, subordination before all else, so that we can have exemplary order, so that the workers for at least one

hour in twenty-four may train to fight. This is a little more difficult than relating beautiful fairy-tales. This is what we can do today; in this way you will help the German revolution, the world revolution. We do not know how many days the respite will last, but we have got it. We must demobilise the army as quickly as possible, because it is a sick organ; meanwhile, we will assist the Finnish revolution.[42]

Yes, of course, we are violating the treaty; we have violated it thirty or forty times. Only children can fail to understand that in an epoch like the present, when a long painful period of emancipation is setting in, which has only just created and raised the Soviet power three stages in its development—only children can fail to understand that in this case there must be a long, circumspect struggle. The shameful peace treaty is rousing protest, but when comrades from *Kommunist* talk about war they appeal to sentiment and forget that the people are clenching their fists with rage, are "seeing red". What do they say? "A class-conscious revolutionary will never live through this, will never submit to such a disgrace." Their newspaper bears the title *Kommunist*, but it should bear the title *Szlachcic** because it looks at things from the point of view of the *szlachcic* who, dying in a beautiful pose, sword in hand, said: "Peace is disgraceful, war is honourable." They argue from the point of view of the *szlachcic*; I argue from the point of view of the peasant.

If I accept peace when the army is in flight, and must be in flight if it is not to lose thousands of men, I accept it in order to prevent things from getting worse. Is the treaty really shameful? Why, every sober-minded peasant and worker will say I am right, because they understand that peace is a means of gathering forces. History knows—I have referred to it more than once—the case of the liberation of the Germans from Napoleon after the Peace of Tilsit. I deliberately called the peace a Peace of Tilsit although we did not undertake to do what had been stipulated in that treaty, we did not undertake to provide troops to assist the victor to conquer other nations—things like that have happened in history, and will happen to us if we continue

* *Szlachcic*—a Polish nobleman—*Ed.*

to place our hopes in the field revolution on a world-wide scale. Take care that history does not impose upon you this form of military slavery as well. And before the socialist revolution is victorious in all countries the Soviet Republic may be reduced to slavery. At Tilsit, Napoleon compelled the Germans to accept incredibly disgraceful peace terms. That peace had to be signed several times. The Hoffmann of those days—Napoleon—time and again caught the Germans violating the peace treaty, and the present Hoffmann will catch us at it. Only we shall take care that he does not catch us soon.

The last war has been a bitter, painful, but serious lesson for the Russian people. It has taught them to organise, to become disciplined, to obey, to establish a discipline that will be exemplary. Learn discipline from the Germans; for, if we do not, we, as a people, are doomed, we shall live in eternal slavery.

This way, and no other, has been the way of history. History tells us that peace is a respite for war, war is a means of obtaining a somewhat better or somewhat worse peace. At Brest the relation of forces corresponded to a peace imposed upon the one who has been defeated, but it was not a humiliating peace. The relation of forces at Pskov corresponded to a disgraceful, more humiliating peace; and in Petrograd and Moscow, at the next stage, a peace four times more humiliating will be dictated to us. We do not say that the Soviet power is only a form, as our young Moscow friends[43] have said, we do not say that the content can be sacrificed for this or that revolutionary principle. We do say, let the Russian people understand that they must become disciplined and organised, and then they will be able to withstand all the Tilsit peace treaties. The whole history of wars of liberation shows that when these wars involved large masses liberation came quickly. We say, since history marches forward in this way, we shall have to abandon peace for war, and this may happen within the next few days. Everyone must be prepared. I have not the slightest shadow of doubt that the Germans are preparing near Narva, if it is true that it has not been taken, as all the newspapers say; if not in Narva, then near Narva, if not in Pskov, then near Pskov, the Germany are grouping their regular army, making ready

their railways, to capture Petrograd at the next jump. And this beast can jump very well. He has proved that. He will jump again. There is not a shadow of doubt about that. That is why we must be prepared, we must not brag, but must be able to take advantage of even a single day of respite, because we can take advantage of even one day's respite to evacuate Petrograd, the capture of which will cause unprecedented suffering to hundreds of thousands of our proletarians. I say again that I am ready to sign, and that I consider it my duty to sign, a treaty twenty times, a hundred times more humiliating, in order to gain at least a few days in which to evacuate Petrograd, because by that I will alleviate the sufferings of the workers, who otherwise may fall under the yoke of the Germans; by that I facilitate the removal from Petrograd of all the materials, gunpowder, etc., which we need; because I am a defencist, because I stand for the preparation of an army, even in the most remote rear, where our present, demobilised, sick army is being healed.

We do not know how long the respite will last—we will try to take advantage of the situation. Perhaps the respite will last longer, perhaps it will last only a few days. Anything may happen, no one knows, or can know, because all the major powers are bound, restricted, compelled to fight on several fronts. Hoffmann's behaviour is determined first by the need to smash the Soviet Republic; secondly, by the fact that he has to wage war on a number of fronts, and thirdly, by the fact that the revolution in Germany is maturing, is growing, and Hoffmann knows this. He cannot, as some assert, take Petrograd and Moscow this very minute. But he may do so tomorrow, that is quite possible. I repeat that at a moment when the army is obviously sick, when we are taking advantage of every opportunity, come what may, to get at least one day's respite, we say that every serious revolutionary who is linked with the masses and who knows what war is, what the masses are, must discipline the masses, must heal them, must try to arouse them for a new war—every such revolutionary will admit that we are right, will admit that any disgraceful peace is proper, because it is in the interests of the proletarian revolution and the regeneration of Russia, because it will help to get rid of the sick organ. As every sensible man understands, by signing this peace treaty

we do not put a stop to our workers' revolution; everyone understands that by concluding peace with the Germans we do not stop rendering military aid; we are sending arms to the Finns, but not military units, which turn out to be unfit.

Perhaps we will accept war; perhaps tomorrow we will surrender even Moscow and then go over to the offensive; we will move our army against the enemy's army if the necessary turn in the mood of the people takes place. This turn is developing and perhaps much time is required, but it will come, when the great mass of the people will not say what they are saying now. I am compelled to accept the harshest peace terms because I cannot say to myself that this time has arrived. When the time of regeneration arrives everyone will realise it, will see that the Russian is no fool; he sees, he will understand that for the time being we must refrain, that this slogan must be carried through—and this is the main task of our Party Congress and of the Congress of Soviets.

We must learn to work in a new way. That is immensely more difficult, but it is by no means hopeless. It will not break Soviet power if we do not break it ourselves by utterly senseless adventurism. The time will come when the people will say, we will not permit ourselves to be tortured any longer. But this will take place only if we do not agree to this adventure but prove able to work under harsh conditions and under the unprecedentedly humiliating treaty we signed the other day, because a war, or a peace treaty, cannot solve such a historical crisis. Because of their monarchic organisation the German people were fettered in 1807, when after several humiliating peace treaties, which were transformed into respites to be followed by new humiliations and new infringements, they signed the Peace of Tilsit. The Soviet organisation of the people makes our task easier.

We should have but one slogan—to learn the art of war properly and put the railways in order. To wage a socialist revolutionary war without railways would be rank treachery. We must produce order and we must produce all the energy and all the strength that will produce the best that is in the revolution.

Grasp even an hour's respite if it is given you, in order to maintain contact with the remote rear and there create new

armies. Abandon illusions for which real events have punished you and will punish you more severely in the future. An epoch of most grievous defeats is ahead of us, it is with us now, we must be able to reckon with it, we must be prepared for persistent work in conditions of illegality, in conditions of downright slavery to the Germans; it is no use painting it in bright colours, it is a real Peace of Tilsit. If we are able to act in this way, then, in spite of defeats, we shall be able to say with absolute certainty—victory will be ours. (*Applause.*)

2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MARCH 8

Comrades, let me begin with some relatively minor remarks, let me begin from the end. At the end of his speech Comrade Bukharin went so far as to compare us to Petlyura. If he thinks that is so, how can he remain with us in the same party? Isn't it just empty talk? If things were really as he said, we should not, of course, be members of the same party. The fact that we are together shows that we are ninety per cent in agreement with Bukharin. It is true he added a few revolutionary phrases about our wanting to betray the Ukraine. I am sure it is not worth while talking about such obvious nonsense. I shall return to Comrade Ryazanov, and here I want to say that in the same way as an exception that occurs once in ten years proves the rule, so has Comrade Ryazanov chanced to say a serious word. (*Applause.*) He said that Lenin was surrendering space to gain time. That is almost philosophical reasoning. This time it happened that we heard from Comrade Ryazanov a serious phrase—true it is only a phrase—which fully expresses the case; to gain time I want to surrender space to the actual victor. That and that alone is the whole point at issue. All else is mere talk—the need for a revolutionary war, rousing the peasantry, etc. When Comrade Bukharin pictures things as though there could not be two opinions as to whether war is possible and says—"ask any soldier" (I wrote down his actual words)—since he puts the question this way and wants to ask any soldier, I'll answer him. "Any soldier" turned out to be a French officer that I had a talk with. That French

officer looked at me, with anger in his eyes, of course—had I not sold Russia to the Germans?—and said: "I am a royalist, I am also a champion of the monarchy in France, a champion of the defeat of Germany, so don't think I support Soviet power—who would, if he was a royalist?—but I favour your signing the Brest Treaty because it's necessary."[44] That's "asking any soldier" for you. Any soldier would say what I have said—we had to sign the Brest Treaty. If it now emerges from Bukharin's speech that our differences have greatly diminished, it is only because his supporters have concealed the chief point on which we differ.

Now that Bukharin is thundering against us for having demoralised the masses, he is perfectly correct, except that it is himself and not us that he is attacking. Who caused this mess in the Central Committee?—You, Comrade Bukharin. (*Laughter*.) No matter how much you shout "No", the truth will out; we are here in our own comradely family, we are at our own Congress, we have nothing to hide, the truth must be told. And the truth is that there were three trends in the Central Committee. On February 17 Lomov and Bukharin did not vote. I have asked for the record of the voting to be reproduced and copies made so that every Party member who wishes to do so can go into the secretariat and see how people voted—the historic voting of January 21, which shows that they wavered and we did not, not in the least; we said, "Let us accept the Brest peace—you'll get nothing better—so as to prepare for a revolutionary war". Now we have gained five days in which to evacuate Petrograd. Now the manifesto signed by Krylenko and Podvoisky[45] has been published, they were not among the Lefts, and Bukharin insulted them by saying that Krylenko had been "dragged in", as though we had invented what Krylenko reported. We agree in full with what they said; that is how matters stand, for it was these army men who gave proof of what I had said; and you dismiss the matter by saying the Germans won't attack. How can this situation be compared with October, when the question of equipment did not arise? If you want to take facts into consideration, then consider this one—that the disagreement arose over the statement that we cannot start a war that is obviously to our disadvantage. When Comrade Bukharin began his concluding speech with the thunderous

question "Is war possible in the near future?" he greatly surprised me. I answer without hesitation—yes, it is possible, but today we must accept peace. There is no contradiction in this.

After these brief remarks I shall give detailed answers to previous speakers. As far as Radek is concerned I must make an exception. But there was another speech, that of Comrade Uritsky. What was there in that speech apart from Canossa,[46] "treachery", "retreated", "adapted"? What is all this about? Haven't you borrowed your criticism from a Left Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper? Comrade Bubnov read us a statement submitted to the Central Committee by those of its members who consider themselves very Left-wing and who gave us a striking example of a demonstration before the eyes of the whole world—"the behaviour of the Central Committee strikes a blow at the international proletariat". Is that anything but an empty phrase? "Demonstrate weakness before the eyes of the whole world!" How are we demonstrating? By proposing peace? Because our army has run away? Have we not proved that to begin war with Germany at this moment, and not to accept the Brest peace, would mean showing the world that our army is sick and does not want to give battle? Bubnov's statement was quite empty when he asserted that the wavering was entirely of our making—it was due to our army's being sick. Sooner or later, there had to be a respite. If we had had the correct strategy we should have had a month's breathing-space, but since your strategy was incorrect we have only five days—even that is good. The history of war shows that even days are sometimes enough to halt a panic-stricken army. Anyone who does not accept, does not conclude this devilish peace now, is a man of empty phrases and not a strategist. That is the pity of it. When Central Committee members write to me about "demonstrations of weakness", "treachery", they are writing the most damaging, empty, childish phrases. We demonstrated our weakness by attempting to fight at a time when the demonstration should not have been made, when an offensive against us was inevitable. As for the peasants of Pskov, we shall bring them to the Congress of Soviets to relate how the Germans treat people, so that they can change the mood of the soldier in panic-

stricken night and he will begin to recover from his panic and say, "This is certainly not the war the Bolsheviks promised to put an end to, this is a new war the Germans are waging against Soviet power." Then recovery will come. But you raise a question that cannot be answered. Nobody knows how long the respite will last.

Now I must say something about Comrade Trotsky's position. There are two aspects to his activities; when he began the negotiations at Brest and made splendid use of them for agitation, we all agreed with Comrade Trotsky. He has quoted part of a conversation with me, but I must add that it was agreed between us that we would hold out until the Germans presented an ultimatum, and then we would give way. The Germans deceived us—they stole five days out of seven from us.[47] Trotsky's tactics were correct as long as they were aimed at delaying matters; they became incorrect when it was announced that the state of war had been terminated but peace had not been concluded. I proposed quite definitely that peace be concluded. We could not have got anything better than the Brest peace. It is now clear to everybody that we would have had a month's respite and that we would not have lost anything. Since history has swept that away it is not worth recalling, but it is funny to hear Bukharin say, "Events will show that we were right." I was right because I wrote about it back in 1915—"We must prepare to wage war, it is inevitable, it is coming, it will come."* But we had to accept peace and not try vain blustering. And because war is coming, it was all the more necessary to accept peace, and now we are at least making easier the evacuation of Petrograd—we have made it, easier. That is a fact. And when Comrade Trotsky makes fresh demands; "Promise not to conclude peace with Vinnichenko", I say that under no circumstances will I take that obligation upon myself.[48] If the Congress accepts this obligation, neither I, nor those who agree with me, will accept responsibility for it. It would mean tying our hands again with a formal decision instead of following a clear line of manoeuvre—retreat when possible, and at times attack. In war you must never

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 404.—*Ed.*

tie yourself down with formal decisions. It is ridiculous not to know the history of war, not to know that a treaty is a means of gathering strength—I have already mentioned Prussian history. There are some people who are just like children, they think that if we have signed a treaty we have sold ourselves to Satan and have gone to hell. That is simply ridiculous when it is quite obvious from the history of war that the conclusion of a treaty after defeat is a means of gathering strength. There have been cases in history of one war following immediately after another, we have all forgotten that, we see that the old war is turning into....* If you like, you can bind yourselves for ever with formal decisions and then hand over all the responsible posts to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.[49] We shall not accept responsibility for it. There is not the least desire for a split here. I am sure that events will teach you—March 12 is not far away, and you will obtain plenty of material.[50]

Comrade Trotsky says that it will be treachery in the full sense of the word. I maintain that that is an absolutely wrong point of view. To demonstrate this concretely, I will give you an example: two men are walking together and are attacked by ten men, one fights and the other runs away—that is treachery; but suppose we have two armies of a hundred thousand each and there are five armies against them; one army is surrounded by two hundred thousand, and the other must go to its aid; knowing that the other three hundred thousand of the enemy are ambushed to trap it, should the second army go to the aid of the first? It should not. That is not treachery, that is not cowardice; a simple increase in numbers has changed all concepts, any soldier knows this; it is no longer a personal concept. By acting in this way I preserve my army; let the other army be captured, I shall be able to renew mine, I have allies, I shall wait till the allies arrive. That is the only way to argue; when military arguments are mixed up with others, you get nothing but empty phrases. That is not the way to conduct politics.

We have done everything that could be done. By signing the treaty we have saved Petrograd, even if only for a few

* Several words are missing in the verbatim report.—*Ed.*

days. (The secretaries and stenographers should not think of putting that on record.) The treaty requires us to withdraw our troops from Finland, troops that are clearly no good, but we are not forbidden to take arms into Finland. If Petrograd had fallen a few days ago, the city would have been in a panic and we should not have been able to take anything away; but in those five days we have helped our Finnish comrades—how much I shall not say, they know it themselves.

The statement that we have betrayed Finland is just a childish phrase. We helped the Finns precisely by retreating before the Germans in good time. Russia will never perish just because Petrograd falls. Comrade Bukharin is a thousand times right in that, but if we manoeuvre in Bukharin's way we may ruin a good revolution. (*Laughter.*)

We have not betrayed either Finland or the Ukraine. No class-conscious worker would accuse us of this. We are helping as best we can. We have not taken one good man away from our army and shall not do so. You say that Hoffmann will catch us—of course he may, I do not doubt it, but how many days it will take him, he does not know and nobody knows. Furthermore, your arguments about his catching us are arguments about the political alignment of forces, of which I shall speak later.

Now that I have explained why I am absolutely unable to accept Trotsky's proposal—you cannot conduct politics in that way—I must say that Radek has given us an example of how far the comrades at our Congress have departed from empty phrases such as Uritsky still sticks to. I certainly cannot accuse him of empty phrases in that speech. He said, "There is not a shadow of treachery, not a shadow of disgrace, because it is clear that you retreated in the face of overpowering military force." That is an appraisal that destroys Trotsky's position. When Radek said, "We must grit our teeth and prepare our forces," he was right—I agree with that in full—don't bluster, grit your teeth and make preparations.

Grit your teeth, don't bluster and muster your forces. The revolutionary war will come, there is no disagreement on this; the difference of opinion is on the Peace of Tilsit—should we conclude it or not? The worst of it is that we have a

sick army, and the Central Committee, therefore, must have a firm line and not differences of opinion or the middle line that Comrade Bukharin also supported. I am not painting the respite in bright colours; nobody knows how long it will last and I don't know. The efforts that are being made to force me to say how long it will last are ridiculous. As long as we hold the main lines we are helping the Ukraine and Finland. We are taking advantage of the respite, manoeuvring and retreating.

The German worker cannot now be told that the Russians are being awkward, for it is now clear that German and Japanese imperialism is attacking—it will be clear to everybody; apart from a desire to strangle the Bolsheviks, the Germans also want to do some strangling in the West, everything is all mixed up, and in this war we shall have to and must be able to manoeuvre.

With regard to Comrade Bukharin's speech, I must say that when he runs short of arguments he puts forward something in the Uritsky manner and says, "The treaty disgraces us." Here no arguments are needed; if we have been disgraced we should collect our papers and run, but, although we have been "disgraced", I do not think our position has been shaken. Comrade Bukharin attempted to analyse the class basis of our position, but instead of doing so told us an anecdote about a deceased Moscow economist. When you discovered some connection between our tactics and food speculation—this was really ridiculous—you forgot that the attitude of the class as a whole, the class, and not the food speculators, shows that the Russian bourgeoisie and their hangers-on—the *Dyelo Naroda* and *Novaya Zhizn* writers—are bending all their efforts to goad us on to war. You do not stress that class fact. To declare war on Germany at the moment would be to fall for the provocation of the Russian bourgeoisie. That is not new because it is the surest—I do not say absolutely certain, because nothing is absolutely certain—the surest way of getting rid of us today. When Comrade Bukharin said that events were on their side, that in the long run we would recognise revolutionary war, he was celebrating an easy victory since we prophesied the inevitability of a revolutionary war in 1915. Our differences were on the following—would the Germans attack or not;

that we should have declared the state of war terminated; that in the interests of revolutionary war we should have to retreat, surrendering territory to gain time. Strategy and politics prescribe the most disgusting peace treaty imaginable. Our differences will all disappear once we recognise these tactics.

3

RESOLUTION ON WAR AND PEACE[51]

The Congress recognises the necessity to confirm the extremely harsh, humiliating peace treaty with Germany that has been concluded by Soviet power in view of our lack of an army, in view of the most unhealthy state of the demoralised army at the front, in view of the need to take advantage of any, even the slightest, possibility of obtaining a respite before imperialism launches its offensive against the Soviet Socialist Republic.

In the present period of the era that has begun, the era of the socialist revolution, numerous military attacks on Soviet Russia by the imperialist powers (both from the West and from the East) are historically inevitable. The historical inevitability of such attacks at a time when both internal, class relations and international relations are extremely tense, can at any moment, even immediately, within the next few days, lead to fresh imperialist aggressive wars against the socialist movement in general and against the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic in particular.

The Congress therefore declares that it recognises the primary and fundamental task of our Party, of the entire vanguard of the class-conscious proletariat and of Soviet power, to be the adoption of the most energetic, ruthlessly determined and Draconian measures to improve the self-discipline and discipline of the workers and peasants of Russia, to explain the inevitability of Russia's historic advance towards a socialist, patriotic war of liberation, to create everywhere soundly co-ordinated mass organisations held together by a single iron will, organisations that are capable of concerted, valorous action in their day-to-day efforts and especially

at critical moments in the life of the people, and, lastly, to train systematically and comprehensively in military matters and military operations the entire adult population of both sexes.

The Congress considers the only reliable guarantee of consolidation of the socialist revolution that has been victorious in Russia to be its conversion into a world working-class revolution.

The Congress is confident that the step taken by Soviet power in view of the present alignment of forces in the world arena was, from the standpoint of the interests of the world revolution, inevitable and necessary.

Confident that the working-class revolution is maturing persistently in all belligerent countries and is preparing the full and inevitable defeat of imperialism, the Congress declares that the socialist proletariat of Russia will support the fraternal revolutionary movement of the proletariat of all countries with all its strength and with every means at its disposal.

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4

SPEECHES AGAINST TROTSKY'S AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION ON WAR AND PEACE[52] MARCH 8 (MORNING)

I

Comrades, in my speech I have already said that neither I nor those who support me consider it possible to accept this amendment. We must in no way bind our hands in any strategic manoeuvre. Everything depends on the relationship of forces and the time of the attack against us by these or those imperialist countries, the time when the rehabilitation of our army, which is undoubtedly beginning reaches the point when we shall be in a position and obliged not merely to refrain from concluding peace but to declare war. Instead of the amendments which Comrade Trotsky proposes, I am ready to accept the following:

First, to say—and this I shall certainly uphold—that the present resolution is not to be published in the press but that a communication should be made only about the ratification of the treaty.

Secondly, in the forms of publication and content the Central Committee shall have the right to introduce changes in connection with a possible offensive by the Japanese.

Thirdly, to say that the Congress will empower the C.C. of the Party both to break all the peace treaties and to declare war on any imperialist power or the whole world when the C.C. of the Party considers that the appropriate moment for this has come.

We must give the C.C. full power to break the treaties at any moment but this does not in any way imply that we shall break them just now, in the situation that exists today.

At the present time we must not bind our hands in any way. The words that Comrade Trotsky proposes to introduce will gain the votes of those who are against ratification in general, votes for a middle course which will create afresh a situation in which not a single worker, not a single soldier, will understand anything in our resolution.

At the present time we shall endorse the necessity of ratifying the treaty and we shall empower the Central Committee to declare war at any moment, because an attack against us is being prepared, perhaps from three sides; Britain or France wants to take Archangel from us—it is quite possible they will, but in any case we ought not to hamper our central institution in any way, whether in regard to breaking the peace treaty or in regard to declaring war. We are giving financial aid to the Ukrainians, we are helping them in so far as we can. In any case we must not bind ourselves to not signing any peace treaty. In an epoch of growing wars, coming one after the other, new combinations grow up. The peace treaty is entirely a matter of vital manoeuvring—either we stand by this condition of manoeuvring or we formally bind our hands in advance in such a way that it will be impossible to move; neither making peace nor waging war will be possible.

II

It seems to me that I have said: no, I cannot accept this. This amendment makes a hint, it expresses what Comrade Trotsky wants to say. There should be no hints in the resolution.

The first point says that we accept ratification of the treaty, considering it essential to utilise every, even the smallest, possibility of a breathing-space before imperialism attacks the Soviet Socialist Republic. In speaking of a breathing-space, we do not forget that an attack on our Republic is still going on. There you have my opinion, which I stressed in my reply to the debate.

5

SPEECH AGAINST THE STATEMENT OF THE "LEFT COMMUNIST" GROUP IN SUPPORT OF TROTSKY'S AMENDMENT

MARCH 8

I am unable to give an immediate answer to Comrade Radek's polemic[53]—since I am not voting, I cannot give grounds for my vote. According to the usual procedure, I cannot reply; I do not want to hold up the Congress by requesting to be given the floor in order to reply to this polemic. I merely remind you, therefore, of what was said in my reply to the debate and, secondly, register my protest against a speech on grounds for voting being turned into a polemic to which I am not in a position to reply.

6

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION ON WAR AND PEACE MARCH 8

The Congress deems it essential not to publish the resolution that has been adopted and requires of all Party members that they keep this resolution secret. The only communication to be made to the press—and that not today but on the instructions of the Central Committee—will be that the Congress is in favour of ratification.

Furthermore, the Congress lays special stress on the authority granted to the Central Committee to denounce at any moment all peace treaties concluded with imperialist and bourgeois states, and also to declare war on them.

Published according to the manuscript

7

SPEECH AGAINST ZINOVIEV'S AMENDMENT TO THE ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION ON WAR AND PEACE MARCH 8

I think, comrades, that there is no need for this amendment which Comrade Zinoviev has moved.[54] I hope that only members of the Party are in the hall; in view of the state importance of the question, I think that we can adopt a decision to take the personal signature of everyone present in this hall.

This is by no means a superfluous measure; we are in conditions in which military secrets become very important questions, the most essential questions, for the Russian Republic. If we say in the press that the Congress has decided on ratification there cannot be any misunderstanding. I only propose that this should not be voted on just now because there may be changes: further information should reach us today. We have taken special measures to obtain information from the North-East and the South—this news may cause some change. Since the Congress agrees that we must manoeuvre in the interests of a revolutionary war—will even empower the Central Committee to declare war—it is obvious that we have the agreement of both sections of the Party on this; the dispute was only over whether or not to continue the war without any respite. I consider that in moving this amendment I am saying something indisputable for the majority and for the opposition; I think that there cannot be any other interpretations. I consider it more practical merely to confirm that it must be kept secret. And in addition, to adopt supplementary measures and on this account to take the personal signature of each person present in the hall.

8

PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE RESOLUTION ON WAR AND PEACE MARCH 8

I

In view of the fact that the resolution has been distributed, can we not at once adopt a decision that everyone who has received a copy should bring it to this table immediately? That is one means of preserving a military secret.

II

I ask for the vote to be taken. Our Party centres consist of adult people who will understand that communications containing a military secret are made orally. Therefore I absolutely insist that all texts of the resolution in anyone's possession shall immediately be put on the table here.

9

REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE PROGRAMME AND ON CHANGING THE NAME OF THE PARTY[55]
MARCH 8

Comrades, as you know, a fairly comprehensive Party discussion on changing the name of the Party has developed since April 1917 and the Central Committee has therefore been able to arrive at an immediate decision that will probably not give rise to considerable dispute—there may even be practically none at all; the Central Committee proposes to you that the name of our Party be changed to the Russian Communist Party, with the word "Bolsheviks" added to it in brackets. We all recognise the necessity for this addition because the word "Bolshevik" has not only acquired rights of citizenship in the political life of Russia but also throughout the entire foreign press, which in a general way keeps track of events in Russia. It has already been explained in our press that the name "Social-Democratic Party" is scientifically incorrect. When the workers set up their own state they realised that the old concept of democracy—bourgeois democracy—had been surpassed in the process of the development of our revolution. We have arrived at a type of democracy that has never existed anywhere in Western Europe. It has its prototype only in the Paris Commune, and Engels said with regard to the Paris Commune that it was not a state in the proper sense of the word.[56] In short, since the working people themselves are undertaking to administer the state and establish armed forces that support the given state system, the special government apparatus is disappearing, the special apparatus for a certain state coercion is disappearing, and we cannot therefore uphold democracy in its old form.

On the other hand, as we begin socialist reforms we must have a clear conception of the goal towards which these reforms are in the final analysis directed, that is, the creation of a communist society that does not limit itself to the expropriation of factories, the land and the means of production, does not confine itself to strict accounting for, and control of, production and distribution of products, but goes farther towards implementing the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". That is why the name of Communist Party is the only one that is scientifically correct. The objection that it may cause us to be confused with the anarchists was immediately rejected by the Central Committee on the grounds that the anarchists never call themselves simply Communists but always add something to that name. In this respect we may mention the many varieties of socialism, but they do not cause the confusion of the Social-Democrats with social-reformers, or national socialists, or any similar parties.

On the other hand, the most important argument in favour of changing the name of the Party is that up to now the old official socialist parties in all the leading European countries have still not got rid of their intoxication with social-chauvinism and social-patriotism that led to the complete collapse of European official socialism during the present war, so that up to now almost all official socialist parties have been a real hindrance to the working-class revolutionary socialist movement, a real encumbrance to it. And our Party, which at the present time undoubtedly enjoys the greatest sympathy of the masses of the working people of all countries—our Party must make the most decisive, sharp, clear and unambiguous statement that is possible to the effect that it has broken off connections with that old official socialism, for which purpose a change in the name of the Party will be the most effective means.

Further, comrades, the much more difficult question was that of the theoretical part of the Programme and of its practical and political part. As far as the theoretical part of the Programme is concerned, we have some material—the Moscow and Petrograd symposia on the review of the Programme, which have been published[57]; the two main theoretical organs of our Party, *Prosveshcheniye*[58] published

TO MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

in Petrograd, and *Spartak*[59] published in Moscow, have carried articles substantiating certain trends in changing the theoretical part of the Programme of our Party. In this sphere we have a certain amount of material. Two main points of view are to be seen which, in my opinion, do not diverge, at any rate radically, on matters of principle; one point of view, the one I defended, is that we have no reason to reject the old theoretical part of our Programme, and that it would be actually incorrect to do so. We have only to add to it an analysis of imperialism as the highest stage of the development of capitalism and also an analysis of the era of the socialist revolution, proceeding from the fact that the era of the socialist revolution has begun. Whatever may be the fate of our revolution, of our contingent of the international proletarian army, whatever may be the future complications of the revolution, the objective situation of the imperialist countries embroiled in a war that has reduced the most advanced countries to starvation, ruin and barbarity, that situation, in any case, is hopeless. And here I must repeat what Frederick Engels said thirty years ago, in 1887, when appraising the probable prospects of a European war. He said that crowns would lie around in Europe by the dozen and nobody would want to pick them up; he said that incredible ruin would fall to the lot of the European countries, and that there could be only one outcome to the horrors of a European war—he put it this way—"either the victory of the working class or the creation of conditions that would make that victory possible and necessary".[60] Engels expressed himself on this score with exceptional precision and caution. Unlike those people who distort Marxism and offer their belated pseudo-philosophising about socialism being impossible in conditions of ruin, Engels realised full well that every war, even in an advanced society, would create not only devastation, barbarity, torment, calamities for the masses, who would drown in blood, and that there could be no guarantee that it would lead to the victory of socialism; he said it would be "either the victory of the working class or the creation of conditions that would make that victory possible and necessary", i.e., that there was, consequently, the possibility of a number of difficult stages of transition in view of the tremendous

destruction of culture and the means of production, but that the result could be only the rise of the working class, the vanguard of all working people, and the beginning of its taking over power into its own hands for the creation of a socialist society. For no matter to what extent culture has been destroyed, it cannot be removed from history; it will be difficult to restore but no destruction will ever mean the complete disappearance of that culture. Some part of it, some material remains of that culture will be indestructible, the difficulties will be only in restoring it. There you have one point of view—that we must retain the old Programme and add to it an analysis of imperialism and of the beginning of the social revolution.

I expressed that point of view in the draft Programme that I have published.* Another draft was published by Comrade Sokolnikov in the Moscow symposium. The second point of view has been expressed in our private conversations, in particular by Comrade Bukharin, and by Comrade V. Smirnov in the press, in the Moscow symposium. This point of view is that the old theoretical part of our Programme should be completely or almost completely eliminated and replaced by a new part that does not analyse the development of commodity production and capitalism, as the present Programme does, but analyses the contemporary, highest stage of capitalist development—imperialism—and the immediate transition to the epoch of the social revolution. I do not think that these two points of view diverge radically and in principle, but I shall defend my point of view. It seems to me that it would be theoretically incorrect to eliminate the old programme that analyses the development from commodity production to capitalism. There is nothing incorrect in it. That is how things were and how they are, for commodity production begot capitalism and capitalism led to imperialism. Such is the general historical perspective, and the fundamentals of socialism should not be forgotten. No matter what the further complications of the struggle may be, no matter what occasional zigzags we may have to contend with (there will be very many of them—we have seen from experience what gigantic turns the history

* See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 459-63.—*Ed.*

of the revolution has made, and so far it is only in our own country; matters will be much more complicated and proceed much more rapidly, the rate of development will be more furious and the turns will be more intricate when the revolution becomes a European revolution)—in order not to lose our way in these zigzags, these sharp turns in history, in order to retain the general perspective, to be able to see the scarlet thread that joins up the entire development of capitalism and the entire road to socialism, the road we naturally imagine as straight, and which we must imagine as straight in order to see the beginning, the continuation and the end—in real life it will never be straight, it will be incredibly involved —in order not to lose our way in these twists and turns, in order not to get lost at times when we are taking steps backward, times of retreat and temporary defeat or when history or the enemy throws us back—in order not to get lost, it is, in my opinion, important not to discard our old, basic Programme; the only theoretically correct line is to retain it. Today we have reached only the first stage of transition from capitalism to socialism here in Russia. History has not provided us with that peaceful situation that was theoretically assumed for a certain time, and which is desirable for us, and which would enable us to pass through these stages of transition speedily. We see immediately that the civil war has made many things difficult in Russia, and that the civil war is interwoven with a whole series of wars. Marxists have never forgotten that violence must inevitably accompany the collapse of capitalism in its entirety and the birth of socialist society. That violence will constitute a period of world history, a whole era of various kinds of wars, imperialist wars, civil wars inside countries the intermingling of the two, national wars liberating the nationalities oppressed by the imperialists and by various combinations of imperialist powers that will inevitably enter into various alliances in the epoch of tremendous state-capitalist and military trusts and syndicates. This epoch, an epoch of gigantic cataclysms, of mass decisions forcibly imposed by war, of crises, has begun—that we can see clearly—and it is only the beginning. We therefore have no reason to discard everything bearing on the definition of commodity production in general, of capitalism in gen-

eral. We have only just taken the first steps towards shaking off capitalism altogether and beginning the transition to socialism. We do not know and we cannot know how many stages of transition to socialism there will be. That depends on when the full-scale European socialist revolution begins and on whether it will deal with its enemies and enter upon the smooth path of socialist development easily and rapidly or whether it will do so slowly. We do not know this, and the programme of a Marxist party must be based on facts that have been established with absolute certainty. The power of our Programme—the programme that has found its confirmation in all the complications of the revolution—is in that alone. Marxists must build up their programme on this basis alone. We must proceed from facts that have been established with absolute certainty, facts that show how the development of exchange and commodity production became a dominant historical phenomenon throughout the world, how it led to capitalism and capitalism developed into imperialism; that is an absolutely definite fact that must first and foremost be recorded in our Programme. That imperialism begins the era of the social revolution is also a fact, one that is obvious to us, and about which we must speak clearly. By stating this fact in our Programme we are holding high the torch of the social revolution before the whole world, not as an agitational speech, but as a new Programme that says to the peoples of Western Europe, "Here is what you and we have gathered from the experience of capitalist development. This is what capitalism was, this is how it developed into imperialism, and here is the epoch of the social revolution that is beginning, and in which it is our lot to play, chronologically, the first role." We shall proclaim this manifesto before all civilised countries; it will not only be a fervent appeal but will be substantiated with absolute accuracy and will derive from facts recognised by all socialist parties. It will make all the clearer the contradiction between the tactics of those parties that have now betrayed socialism and the theoretical premises which we all share, and which have entered the flesh and blood of every class-conscious worker—the rise of capitalism and its development into imperialism. On the eve of imperialist wars the congresses at Chemnitz and Basle

passed resolutions defining imperialism, and there is a flagrant contradiction between that definition and the present tactics of the social-traitors.[61] We must, therefore, repeat that which is basic in order to show the working people of Western Europe all the more clearly what we accuse their leaders of.

Such is the basis which I consider to be the only theoretically correct one on which to build a programme. The abandoning of the analysis of commodity production and capitalism as though it were old rubbish is not dictated by the historical nature of what is now happening, since we have not gone farther than the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism, and our transition is made more intricate by features that are specific to Russia and do not exist in most civilised countries. And so it is not only possible but inevitable that the stages of transition will be different in Europe; it would be theoretically incorrect to turn all attention to specific national stages of transition that are essential to us but may not be essential in Europe. We must begin with the general basis of the development of commodity production, the transition to capitalism and the growth of capitalism into imperialism. In this way we shall occupy and strengthen a theoretical position from which nobody without betraying socialism can shift us. From this we draw the equally inevitable conclusion—the era of the social revolution is beginning.

We draw this conclusion without departing from our basis of definitely proved facts.

Following this, our task is to define the Soviet type of state. I have tried to outline theoretical views on this question in my book *The State and Revolution*.* It seems to me that the Marxist view on the state has been distorted in the highest degree by the official socialism that is dominant in Western Europe, and that this has been splendidly confirmed by the experience of the Soviet revolution and the establishment of the Soviets in Russia. There is much that is crude and unfinished in our Soviets, there is no doubt about that, it is obvious to everyone who examines their work; but what is impor-

* See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 385-497.—*Ed.*

tant, has historical value and is a step forward in the world development of socialism, is that they are a new type of state. The Paris Commune was a matter of a few weeks, in one city, without the people being conscious of what they were doing. The Commune was not understood by those who created it; they established the Commune by following the unfailing instinct of the awakened people, and neither of the groups of French socialists was conscious of what it was doing. Because we are standing on the shoulders of the Paris Commune and the many years of development of German Social-Democracy, we have conditions that enable us to see clearly what we are doing in creating Soviet power. Despite all the crudity and lack of discipline that exist in the Soviets—this is a survival of the petty-bourgeois nature of our country—despite all that the new type of state has been created by the masses of the people. It has been functioning for months and not weeks, and not in one city, but throughout a tremendous country, populated by several nations. This type of Soviet power has shown its value since it has spread to Finland, a country that is different in every respect, where there are no Soviets but where there is, at any rate, a new type of power, proletarian power.[62] This is, therefore, proof of what is theoretically regarded as indisputable—that Soviet power is a new type of state without a bureaucracy, without police, without a regular army, a state in which bourgeois democracy has been replaced by a new democracy, a democracy that brings to the fore the vanguard of the working people, gives them legislative and executive authority, makes them responsible for military defence and creates state machinery that can re-educate the masses.

In Russia this has scarcely begun and has begun badly. If we are conscious of what is bad in what we have begun we shall overcome it, provided history gives anything like a decent time to work on that Soviet power. I am therefore of the opinion that a definition of the new type of state should occupy an outstanding place in our Programme. Unfortunately we had to work on our Programme in the midst of governmental work and under conditions of such great haste that we were not even able to convene our commission, to elaborate an official draft programme. What has been

distributed among the delegates is only a rough sketch,* and this will be obvious to everyone. A fairly large amount of space has been allotted in it to the question of Soviet power, and I think that it is here that the international significance of our Programme will make itself felt. I think it would be very wrong of us to confine the international significance of our revolution to slogans, appeals, demonstrations, manifestos, etc. That is not enough. We must show the European workers exactly what we have set about, how we have set about it, how it is to be understood; that will bring them face to face with the question of how socialism is to be achieved. They must see for themselves—the Russians have started on something worth doing; if they are setting about it badly we must do it better. For that purpose we must provide as much concrete material as possible and say what we have tried to create that is new. We have a new type of state in Soviet power; we shall try to outline its purpose and structure, we shall try to explain why this new type of democracy in which there is so much that is chaotic and irrational, to explain what makes up its living spirit—the transfer of power to the working people, the elimination of exploitation and the machinery of suppression. The state is the machinery of suppression. The exploiters must be suppressed, but they cannot be suppressed by police, they must be suppressed by the masses themselves, the machinery must be linked with the masses, must represent them as the Soviets do. They are much closer to the masses, they provide an opportunity to keep closer to the masses, they provide greater opportunities for the education of those masses. We know very well that the Russian peasant is anxious to learn; and we want him to learn, not from books, but from his own experience. Soviet power is machinery, machinery that will enable the masses to begin right away learning to govern the state and organise production on a nation-wide scale. It is a task of tremendous difficulty. It is, however, historically important that we are setting about its fulfilment, and not only from the point of view of our one country; we are calling upon European workers to help. We must give a concrete explanation of our Programme from precisely that common point

* See this volume, pp. 152-58.—*Ed.*

of view. That is why we consider it a continuation of the road taken by the Paris Commune. That is why we are confident that the European workers will be able to help once they have entered on that path. They will do what we are doing, but do it better, and the centre of gravity will shift from the formal point of view to the concrete conditions. In the old days the demand for freedom of assembly was a particularly important one, whereas our point of view on freedom of assembly is that nobody can now prevent meetings, and Soviet power has only to provide premises for meetings. General proclamations of broad principles are important to the bourgeoisie: "All citizens have freedom to assemble, but they must assemble in the open, we shall not give them premises." But we say: "Fewer empty phrases, and more substance." The palaces must be expropriated—not only the Taurida Palace, but many others as well—and we say nothing about freedom of assembly. That must be extended to all other points in the democratic programme. We must be our own judges. All citizens must take part in the work of the courts and in the government of the country. It is important for us to draw literally all working people into the government of the state. It is a task of tremendous difficulty. But socialism cannot be implemented by a minority, by the Party. It can be implemented only by tens of millions when they have learned to do it themselves. We regard it as a point in our favour that we are trying to help the masses themselves set about it immediately, and not to learn to do it from books and lectures. If we state these tasks of ours clearly and definitely we shall thereby give an impetus to the discussion of the question and its practical presentation by the European masses. We are perhaps making a bad job of what has to be done, but we are urging the masses to do what they have to. If what our revolution is doing is not accidental (and we are firmly convinced that it is not), if it is not the product of a Party decision but the inevitable product of any revolution that Marx called "popular", i.e., a revolution that the masses themselves create by their slogans, their efforts and not by a repetition of the programme of the old bourgeois republic—if we present matters in this way, we shall have achieved the most important thing. And here we come to the question of whether

we should abolish the difference between the maximum and minimum programmes. Yes and no. I do not fear this abolition, because the viewpoint we held in summer should no longer exist. I said then, when we still had not taken power, that it was "too soon", but now that we have taken power and tested it, it is not too soon.* In place of the old Programme we must now write a new Programme of Soviet power and not in any way reject the use of bourgeois parliamentarism. It is a utopia to think that we shall not be thrown back.

It cannot be denied historically that Russia has created a Soviet Republic. We say that if ever we are thrown back, while not rejecting the use of bourgeois parliamentarism—if hostile class forces drive us to that old position—we shall aim at what has been gained by experience, at Soviet power, at the Soviet type of state, at the Paris Commune type of state. That must be expressed in the Programme. In place of the minimum programme, we shall introduce the Programme of Soviet power. A definition of the new type of state must occupy an important place in our Programme.

It is obvious that we cannot elaborate a programme at the moment. We must work out its basic premises and hand them over to a commission or to the Central Committee for the elaboration of the main theses. Or still more simply—the elaboration is possible on the basis of the resolution on the Brest-Litovsk Conference, which has already provided theses.** Such a definition of Soviet power should be given on the basis of the experience of the Russian revolution, and followed by a proposal for practical reforms. I think it is here, in the historical part, that mention should be made that the expropriation of the land and of industrial enterprises has begun.[63] Here we shall present the concrete task of organising distribution, unifying the banks into one universal type and converting them into a network of state institutions covering the whole country and providing us with public book-keeping, accounting and control carried out by the population itself and forming the foundation for further socialist steps. I think that this part, being the most

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* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 169-73.—*Ed.*

** See this volume, pp. 118-19.—*Ed.*

difficult, should be formulated as the concrete demands of our Soviet power—what we want to do at the moment, what reforms we intend to carry out in the sphere of banking policy, the organisation of production, the organisation of exchange, accountancy and control, the introduction of labour conscription, etc. When we are able to, we shall add what great or small measures or half-measures we have taken in that direction. Here we must state with absolute precision and clarity what has been begun and what has not been completed. We know full well that a large part of what has been begun has not been completed. Without any exaggeration, with full objectivity, without departing from the facts, we must state in our Programme what we have done and what we want to do. We shall show the European proletariat this truth and say, this must be done, so that they will say, such-and-such things the Russians are doing badly but we shall do them better. When this urge reaches the masses the socialist revolution will be invincible. The imperialist war is proceeding before the eyes of all people, a war that is nothing but a war of plunder. When the imperialist war exposes itself in the eyes of the world and becomes a war waged by all the imperialists against Soviet power, against socialism, it will give the proletariat of the West yet another push forward. That must be revealed, the war must be described as an alliance of the imperialists against the socialist movement . These are the general considerations that I think should be shared with you, and on the basis of which I now make the practical proposal to exchange basic views on that question and then, perhaps, elaborate a few fundamental theses here on the spot, and, if that should be found difficult, give up the idea and hand the question of the Programme over to the Central Committee or to a special commission that will be instructed, on the basis of the material available and of the shorthand or secretaries' detailed reports of the Congress, to draw up a Programme for the Party, which must immediately change its name. I am of the opinion that we can do this at the present time, and I think everybody will agree that with our Programme in the editorially unprepared state in which events found it, there is nothing else we can do. I am sure we can do this in a few weeks. We have a sufficient number of theoreticians in all

the trends of our Party to obtain a programme in a few weeks. There may be much that is erroneous in it, of course, to say nothing of editorial and stylistic inaccuracies, because we have not got months in which to settle down to it with the composure that is necessary for editorial work.

We shall correct all these errors in the course of our work in the full confidence that we are giving Soviet power an opportunity to implement the programme. If we at least state precisely, without departing from reality, that Soviet power is a new type of state, a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that we present democracy with different tasks, that we have translated the tasks of socialism from a general abstract formula—"the expropriation of the expropriators"—into such concrete formulas as the nationalisation of the banks[64] and the land, that will be an important part of the Programme.

The land question must be reshaped so that we can see in it the first steps of the small peasantry wanting to take the side of the proletariat and help the socialist revolution, see how the peasants, for all their prejudices and all their old convictions, have set themselves the practical task of the transition to socialism. This is a fact, although we shall not impose it on other countries. The peasantry have shown, not in words but by their deeds, that they wish to help and are helping the proletariat that has taken power to put socialism into effect. It is wrong to accuse us of wanting to introduce socialism by force. We shall divide up the land justly, mainly from the point of view of the small farm. In doing this we give preference to communes and big labour co-operatives.[65] We support the monopolising of the grain trade. We support, the peasantry have said, the confiscation of banks and factories. We are prepared to help the workers in implementing socialism. I think a fundamental law on the socialisation of the land should be published in all languages. This will be done, if it has not been done already.[66] That is an idea we shall state concretely in the Programme—it must be expressed theoretically without departing one single step from concretely established facts. It will be done differently in the West. Perhaps we are making mistakes, but we hope that the proletariat of the West

will correct them. And we appeal to the European proletariat to help us in our work.

In this way we can work out our Programme in a few weeks, and the mistakes we make will be corrected as time goes on—we shall correct them ourselves. Those mistakes will be as light as feathers compared with the positive results that will be achieved.

10

RESOLUTION ON CHANGING THE NAME OF THE PARTY AND THE PARTY PROGRAMME

The Congress resolves that our Party (the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party of Bolsheviks) be named henceforth the *Russian Communist Party*, with the word "Bolsheviks" added in brackets.

The Congress resolves to change the Programme of our Party, re-editing the theoretical part or adding to it a definition of imperialism and the era of the international socialist revolution that has begun.

Following this, the change in the political part of our Programme must consist in the most accurate and comprehensive definition possible of the new type of state, the Soviet Republic, as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and as a continuation of those achievements of the world working-class revolution which the Paris Commune began. The Programme must show that our Party does not reject the use even of bourgeois parliamentarism, should the course of the struggle push us back, for a time, to this historical stage which our revolution has now passed. But in any case and under all circumstances the Party will strive for a Soviet Republic as the highest, from the standpoint of democracy, type of state, as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of abolition of the exploiters' yoke and of suppression of their resistance.

The economic, including agrarian, and educational and other parts of our Programme must be recast in the same spirit and direction. The centre of gravity must be a precise definition of the economic and other reforms begun by our Soviet power, with a definite statement of the immediate

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Съѣздъ постановляетъ именовать впредь нашу партію (Рос. Соц. Рабочую Партію большевиковъ) Россійской Коммунистической Партіей с добавленіем в скобках „большевиков".

Съѣздъ постановляетъ пересмотрѣть программу нашей партіи, переработав теоретическую часть и дополнив ее характеристикой империализма и начавшейся эры (международной) соціалистической революціи. Затѣмъ изложеніе политической части нашей программы

First page of the manuscript
of Lenin's "Resolution on
Changing the Name of the Party
and the Party Programme".
March 1918

definite tasks which Soviet power has set itself, and which proceed from the practical steps we have already taken towards expropriating the expropriators.

The Congress instructs the special commission to compile, with the utmost urgency, a programme for our Party based on the points laid down and to have it approved as the Programme of our Party.

Pravda No. 45,
March 9, 1918

Published according to
the manuscript

11

PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE REVISION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME MARCH 8 (EVENING)

Comrades, allow me to read the draft of a resolution which formulates a somewhat different proposal, but which in substance is somewhat similar to what the last speaker has said.[67] I request the Congress's attention to the following resolution. (*He reads it.*)*

Comrades, the distinguishing feature of this proposal is that I want first of all to defend my idea of accelerating the publication of the Programme and directly instruct the Central Committee to publish it or set up a special commission.

The tempo of development is so furious that we ought not to delay. In view of the difficulties of the present time, we shall have a programme in which there will be many mistakes, but that does not matter—the next Congress will correct it, even if it is a too rapid correction of the Programme; but events move so swiftly that if it is necessary to make a series of alterations to the Programme, we shall make them. Our Programme now will be constructed not so much according to the books as from practice, from the experience of Soviet power. Accordingly, I believe that it is in our interests to approach the international proletariat not with ardent appeals, not with exhortatory speeches at meetings, not with shouts, but with the precise, concrete Programme of our Party. Let the Programme be less satisfactory than one which would result from being worked

* See this volume, pp. 140-41.—*Ed.*

on in a number of commissions and endorsed by the Congress.

I venture to hope that we shall pass this resolution unanimously because I have avoided the disagreement to which Comrade Bukharin has referred; I have formulated it in such a way as to leave the question open. We can hope that if too great changes do not occur we shall be in a position to have a new programme which will be a precise document for the All-Russia Party, and shall not be in the nasty position in which I found myself when at the last Congress one of the Left Swedes asked me: "But what is the programme of your Party—is it the same as that of the Mensheviks?"[68] You ought to have seen the expression of surprise on the face of this Swede, who fully understood how immensely far we had gone away from the Mensheviks. We cannot allow such a monstrous contradiction to remain. I think that this will be of practical benefit to the international working-class movement, and that what we shall gain will undoubtedly outweigh the fact that the programme will have mistakes. That is why I propose that this be accelerated, without being in the least afraid of the Congress having to correct it.

12

SPEECH ON MGELADZE'S PROPOSAL FOR DRAWING THE CHIEF PARTY ORGANISATIONS INTO THE WORK OF DRAFTING THE PARTY PROGRAMME MARCH 8 (EVENING)

Under the conditions in which Russia is at present—in a state of civil war, of being cut up into parts—this is impermissible. It goes without saying that if it is at all possible the commission which will make corrections will print them immediately, and on each occasion the local organisations will be able to express their opinion and must do so, but formally to bind ourselves to do something that cannot be carried out in the near future will entail still greater delay than a congress.

13

SPEECH AGAINST LARIN'S AMENDMENT TO THE NAME OF THE PARTY[69] MARCH 8 (EVENING)

Comrades, I agree with Comrade Larin that the change of title and the dropping of the term Labour Party, will certainly be made use of, but that should not worry us. If we were to reckon with every drawback, we should be immersed in trifles. What we are doing is to return to a good old model that is known throughout the world. We all know the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*,[70] the whole world knows it; the purpose of the correction is not to state that the proletariat is the only class which is revolutionary to the end, and that all other classes, including the working peasantry, can be revolutionary only in so far as they come over to the point of view of the proletariat. That is so fundamental, such a world-renowned thesis of the *Communist Manifesto*, that there cannot be any honest misunderstandings here, and as for dishonest ones, there is no keeping up with false interpretations in any case. That is why we must return now to the old, good, undoubtedly correct model which has played its part in history, spreading to all countries, to the whole world; I think that there are no grounds for departing from this best of all models.

14

SPEECH AGAINST PELSHE'S AMENDMENT TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE PARTY PROGRAMME MARCH 8 (EVENING)

I think that the last speaker is wrong.[71] The masses are not children and they understand that the struggle is extremely serious. They saw how we were thrown back previously, for example in July. It is impossible to delete these words. We ought not in any way to give the impression that we attach absolutely no value to bourgeois parliamentary institutions. They are a huge advance on what preceded them. By rejecting these words we create an impression of something that does not yet exist—of the absolute stability of the stage achieved. We know that this is not so yet. It will be so when the international movement gives its support. I am ready to delete the words "under no circumstances"; it is possible to leave the words "the Party will not reject the use", but we cannot leave the way open for a purely anarchist denial of bourgeois parliamentarism. These are stages directly linked one with another, and any repulse can throw us back to that stage. I do not consider that this would cause the masses to be despondent. If by the masses we mean people who are politically quite uneducated—they will not understand, but the Party members and sympathisers will understand, they will realise that we do not regard the positions won as definitely consolidated. If by a gigantic effort of will we arouse the energy of all classes, and consolidate this position, then we shall cease to recall the past. But that requires the support of Europe. But to say now that we may work under worse circumstances will not result in any despondency among the masses.

15

SPEECH AGAINST BUKHARIN'S AMENDMENT TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE PARTY PROGRAMME[72] MARCH 8 (EVENING)

I

I cannot agree at all to Comrade Bukharin's amendment. The Programme characterises imperialism and the era of social revolution that has begun. The era of social revolution has begun—this has been established with absolute accuracy. What, however, does Comrade Bukharin want?—That we should give a description of socialist society in its developed form, i.e., communism. Here he is inaccurate. At present we certainly uphold the state and to say we should give a description of socialism in its developed form where the state will cease to exist—you couldn't do anything about that except say that then the principle would be realised: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. But this is still a long way off, and to say that means not saying anything except that we have no firm ground to go on. We shall arrive there in the long run if we reach socialism. It is enough for us to set to work on what we have said. If we were to do this it would be a tremendous historic achievement. We cannot give a description of socialism; what socialism will be like when its completed forms are arrived at—this we do not know, we cannot tell. To say that the era of social revolution has begun, that we have done this or that, and that we want to do this or that—this we do know and will say, and it will show the European workers that we do not in any way exaggerate, so to speak, our strength; this is what we have begun to do and what we intend to do. But as to knowing at the present time what social-

ism will look like when completed—this we do not know. Theoretically, in theoretical works, in articles, speeches and lectures, we shall expound the view that the struggle against the anarchists is being waged by Kautsky incorrectly, but we cannot put this in the Programme because we do not yet have the data for a description of socialism. The bricks of which socialism will be composed have not yet been made. We cannot say anything further, and we should be as cautious and accurate as possible. In that and only in that will lie our Programme's power of attraction. But if we advance the slightest claim to something that we cannot give, the power of our Programme will be weakened. It will be suspected that our Programme is only a fantasy. The Programme describes what we have begun to do and the succeeding steps that we wish to take. We are not in a position to give a description of socialism and it was incorrect that this task was formulated.

II

Since the formulation was not in writing, misunderstanding, of course, is possible. But Comrade Bukharin did not convince me. The name of our Party indicates sufficiently clearly that we are advancing towards complete communism, thus we are putting forward such abstract propositions as that each of us will work according to his ability and will receive according to his needs, without any military control and compulsion. It is premature to speak about this now. Just when will the state wither away? We shall have managed to convene more than two congresses before the time comes to say: see how our state is withering away. It is too early for that. To proclaim the withering away of the state prematurely would distort the historical perspective .

16

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE[73] MARCH 8 (EVENING)

Lomov very cleverly referred to my speech in which I demanded that the Central Committee should be capable of pursuing a uniform line. This does not mean that all those in the Central Committee should be of one and the same opinion. To hold that view would be to go towards a split; therefore I proposed that the Congress should not accept this declaration, in order to enable the comrades, after consulting their local organisations, to think over their decision. I, too, was in the Central Committee in such a position at the time when a proposal not to sign the peace treaty was adopted, and I kept silent, without in any way closing my eyes to the fact that I was not accepting responsibility for it. Every member of the Central Committee is able to disclaim responsibility without ceasing to be a member and without raising an uproar. Of course, comrades, in certain circumstances it is permissible, sometimes it is inevitable, but that this should be necessary now with the present organisation of Soviet power, which enables us to check how far we are keeping contact with the masses—this I doubt. I think that if the question of Vinnichenko arises, the comrades can defend their point of view without resigning from the Central Committee. If we are going to uphold the standpoint of preparing for a revolutionary war and of manoeuvring, it is necessary to enter the Central Committee; one can state that disagreements have arisen from below, we have an absolute right to make a statement about that. There is not the slightest danger that history

will impose responsibility on Uritsky and Lomov for not rejecting the title of members of the Central Committee. We must try to find some kind of restraint that will do away with the fashion for resigning from the Central Committee. It should be stated that the Congress expresses the hope that comrades will formulate their disagreement through their protests but not by resigning from the Central Committee, and that the Congress, taking its statement into account, will vote against removal of the candidatures of the group of comrades and will hold the elections, calling on them to take back their declarations.

17

RESOLUTION ON THE REFUSAL OF THE "LEFT COMMUNISTS" TO BE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Congress is of the opinion that a refusal to enter the Central Committee in the situation at present obtaining in the Party is particularly undesirable, since such a refusal is in general impermissible in principle to those who desire the unity of the Party, and would today be a double threat to unity.

The Congress declares that everyone can and should deny his responsibility for any step taken by the Central Committee, if he does not agree with it, by means of a declaration to that effect but not by leaving the Central Committee.

The Congress is firm in the hope that the comrades will, after a consultation with the mass organisations, withdraw their resignation; the Congress will, therefore, carry through elections without taking the statement of resignation into consideration.

Published according to the manuscript

18

ROUGH OUTLINE OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

My draft to be taken as the basis* (pamphlet, p. 19 *et seq.*).

The theoretical part to remain, after discarding the last paragraph of the first part (p. 22 of the pamphlet, from the words "The urgent task of the day" to the words "the substance of the socialist revolution",** i.e., 5 lines).

In the next paragraph (p. 22), beginning with the words "The fulfilment of this task", insert the alteration indicated in the article "Concerning a Revision of the Party Programme" in *Prosveshcheniye* (No. 1-2, September-October 1917), p. 93.***

In the same paragraph in two places insert instead of "social-chauvinism":

(1) "*opportunism* and social-chauvinism";

(2) "between *opportunism* and social-chauvinism, on the one hand, and the revolutionary internationalist struggle of the proletariat for the realisation of the socialist system, on the other."

Further on, everything has to be re-written, approximately as follows:

* The name of the Party simply: "Communist Party" (without addition of "Russian"), but in brackets: (Party of Bolsheviks).

** See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 469.—*Ed.*

*** *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 470, and Vol. 26, p. 169.—*Ed.*

The Revolution of October 25 (November 7), 1917 in Russia brought about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has been supported by the poor peasants or semi-proletarians.

This dictatorship confronts the Communist Party in Russia with the task of carrying through to the end, of completing, the expropriation of the landowners and bourgeoisie that has already begun, and the transfer of all factories, railways, banks, the fleet and other means of production and exchange to ownership by the Soviet Republic;

utilisation of the alliance of urban workers and poor peasants, which has already abolished private ownership of land, and utilisation of the law on the transitional form between small-peasant farming and socialism, which modern ideologists of the peasantry that has put itself on the side of the proletarians have called socialisation of the land, for a gradual but steady transition to joint tillage and large-scale socialist agriculture;

consolidation and further development of the Federative Republic of Soviets as an immeasurably higher and more progressive form of democracy than bourgeois parliamentarism, and as the sole type of state corresponding, on the basis of the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871 and equally of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917-18, to the transitional period between capitalism and socialism, i.e., to the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat;

thorough utilisation in every way of the torch of world socialist revolution lit in Russia in order, by paralysing the attempts of the imperialist bourgeois states to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia or to unite for direct struggle and war against the socialist Soviet Republic, to carry the revolution into the most advanced countries and in general into all countries.

TEN THESES ON SOVIET POWER

Consolidation and Development of Soviet Power

The consolidation and development of Soviet power as the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry (semi-proletarians), a form already tested by

experience and brought to the fore by the mass movement and the revolutionary struggle.

The consolidation and development must consist in the accomplishment (a broader, more general and planned accomplishment) of those tasks which historically devolve on this form of state power, on this new type of state, namely:

(1) union and organisation of the working and exploited masses oppressed by capitalism, and only them, i.e., only the workers and poor peasantry, semi-proletarians, with automatic exclusion of the exploiting classes and rich representatives of the petty bourgeoisie;

(2) union of the most vigorous, active, class-conscious part of the oppressed classes, their vanguard, which must educate every member of the working population for independent participation in the management of the state, not theoretically but practically;

(4) (3) abolition of parliamentarism (as the separation of legislative from executive activity); union of legislative and executive state activity. Fusion of administration with legislation;

(3) (4) closer connection of the whole apparatus of state power and state administration with the masses than under previous forms of democracy;

(5) creation of an armed force of workers and peasants, one least divorced from the people (Soviets = armed workers and peasants). Organised character of nation-wide arming of the people, as one of the first steps towards arming the whole people;

(6) more complete democracy, through less formality and making election and recall easier;

(7) close (and direct) connection with occupations and with productive-economic units (elections based on factories, and on local peasant and handicraft areas). This close connection makes it possible to carry out profound socialist changes;

(8) (partly, if not wholly, covered by the preceding)—the possibility of getting rid of bureaucracy, of doing without it, the beginning of the realisation of this possibility;

(9) transfer of the focus of attention in questions of democracy from formal recognition of a formal equality of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, of poor and rich, to the prac-

tical feasibility of the enjoyment of freedom (democracy) by the working and exploited mass of the population;

(10) the further development of the Soviet organisation of the state must consist in every member of a Soviet being obliged to carry out constant work in administering the state, alongside participation in meetings of the Soviet;—and furthermore in each and every member of the population being drawn gradually both into taking part in Soviet organisation (on the condition of subordination to organisations of the working people) and into serving in state administration.

The Fulfilment of These Tasks Requires:

a) in the political sphere: development of the Soviet Republic.

Advantages of Soviets (*Prosveshcheniye*, pp. 13-14)*; (six items);

extension of the Soviet Constitution *in so far as* the resistance of the exploiters ceases to the *whole* population;

federation of nations, as a transition to a *conscious* and closer unity of the working people, when they have learnt *voluntarily* to rise above national dissension;

necessarily ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters; standards of "general" (*i.e.*, bourgeois) democracy are subordinate to this aim, give way to it:

"Liberties" and democracy *not* for all, but *for* the working and exploited masses, to emancipate them from exploitation; ruthless suppression of exploiters;

NB: chief stress is shifted *from* formal *recognition* of liberties (such as existed under bourgeois parliamentarism) *to* actually ensuring the *enjoyment* of liberties by the working people who are overthrowing the exploiters, e.g., from *recognition* of freedom of assembly to the *handing over* of all the best halls and premises to the workers, from recognition of freedom of speech to the handing over of all the best printing presses to the workers, and so forth.

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* See present edition, Vol. 26, p. 103.—*Ed.*

A brief enumeration of these "liberties" from the old minimum programme.

[Arming the workers and disarming the bourgeoisie.]

Transition *through* the Soviet state to the gradual abolition of the state by systematically drawing an ever greater number of citizens, and subsequently *each and every* citizen, into direct and *daily* performance of their share of the burdens of administering the state.

b) In the economic sphere:

Socialist organisation of production on the scale of the whole state: management by *workers' organisations* (trade unions, factory committees, etc.) under the general leadership of Soviet power, which alone is *sovereign*.

The same for transport and distribution (at first state monopoly of "trade", subsequently replacement, complete and final, of "trade" by planned, organised *distribution* through associations of trading and industrial office workers, under the leadership of Soviet power).

—Compulsory organisation of the *whole* population in consumer and producer communes.

While not (for the time being) abolishing money and not prohibiting individual purchase and sale transactions by individual families, we must, in the first place, make it obligatory by law to carry out all such transactions through the consumer and producer communes.

—An immediate start to be made on full realisation of universal compulsory labour service, with the most cautious and gradual extension of it to the small peasants who live by their own farming without wage labour;

the first measure, the first step towards universal compulsory labour service must be the introduction of consumers' work (budget) books (compulsory introduction) for all well-to-do (=persons with an income over 500 rubles per month, and then for owners of enterprises with wage-workers, for families with servants, etc.).

Buying and selling is also permissible not through one's commune (during journeys, at markets, etc.), but with compulsory entry of the transaction (if above a definite sum) in the consumers' work book.

—Complete concentration of banking in the hands of the state and of all financial operations of trade in the banks.

Standardisation of banking current accounts; gradual transition to the compulsory keeping of current accounts in the bank, at first by the largest, and later by *all* the country's enterprises. Compulsory deposit of money in the banks and transfer of money *only* through the banks.

—Standardisation of accounting and control over all production and distribution of output; this accounting and control must be carried out at first by workers' organisations and subsequently by *each and every* member of the population.

—Organisation of competition between the various (all) consumer and producer communes of the country for steady improvement of organisation, discipline and labour productivity, for transition to superior techniques, for economising labour and materials, for gradually reducing the working day to six hours, and for gradually equalising *all* wages and salaries in *all* occupations and categories.

—Steady, systematic measures for (transition to *Massenspeisung**) replacement of the individual domestic economy of separate families by joint catering for large groups of families.

In the educational sphere

the old items, plus.

In the financial sphere

replacement of indirect taxes by a progressive income and property tax, and equally by deduction of a (definite) revenue from state monopolies. In this connection, remittance in kind of bread and other products to workers employed by the state in various forms of socially necessary labour.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY

Support of the revolutionary movement of the socialist proletariat in the advanced countries in the first instance.

Propaganda. Agitation. Fraternisation.

Ruthless struggle against opportunism and social-chauvinism.

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* public catering.—*Ed.*

Support of the democratic and revolutionary movement in all countries in general, and especially in the colonies and dependent countries.

Liberation of the colonies. Federation as a transition to voluntary fusion.

Kommunist No. 5,
March 9, 1918

Published according to
the manuscript

THE CHIEF TASK OF OUR DAY[74]

Thou art wretched, thou art abundant,
Thou art mighty , thou art impotent
—Mother Russia![75]

Human history these days is making a momentous and most difficult turn, a turn, one might say without the least exaggeration, of immense significance for the emancipation of the world. A turn from war to peace; a turn from a war between plunderers who are sending to the shambles millions of the working and exploited people for the sake of establishing a new system of dividing the spoils looted by the strongest of them, to a war of the oppressed against the oppressors for liberation from the yoke of capital; a turn from an abyss of suffering, anguish, starvation and degradation to the bright future of communist society, universal prosperity and enduring peace. No wonder that at the sharpest points of this sharp turn, when all around the old order is breaking down and collapsing with a terrible grinding crash, and the new order is being born amid indescribable suffering, there are some whose heads grow dizzy, some who are seized by despair, some who seek salvation from the at times too bitter reality in fine-sounding and alluring phrases.

It has been Russia's lot to see most clearly, and experience most keenly and painfully the sharpest of sharp turning-points in history as it swings round from imperialism towards the communist revolution. In the space of a few days we destroyed one of the oldest, most powerful, barbarous and brutal of monarchies. In the space of a few months we passed through a number of stages of collaboration with the bourgeoisie and of shaking off petty-bourgeois illusions, for which other countries have required decades. In the course

of a few weeks, having overthrown the bourgeoisie, we crushed its open resistance in civil war. We passed in a victorious triumphal march of Bolshevism from one end of a vast country to the other. We raised the lowest strata of the working people oppressed by tsarism and the bourgeoisie to liberty and independent life. We established and consolidated a Soviet Republic, a new type of state, which is infinitely superior to, and more democratic than, the best of the bourgeois-parliamentary republics. We established the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poor peasantry, and began a broadly conceived system of socialist reforms. We awakened the faith of the millions upon millions of workers of all countries in their own strength and kindled the fires of enthusiasm in them. Everywhere we issued the call for a world workers' revolution. We flung a challenge to the imperialist plunderers of all countries.

Then in a few days we were thrown to the ground by an imperialist plunderer, who fell upon the unarmed. He compelled us to sign an incredibly burdensome and humiliating peace—as tribute for having dared to tear ourselves, even for the shortest space of time, from the iron clutches of an imperialist war. The more ominously the shadow of a workers' revolution in his own country rises before the plunderer, the greater his ferocity in crushing and stifling Russia and tearing her to pieces.

We were compelled to sign a "Tilsit" peace. We need no self-deception. We must courageously look the bitter, unadorned truth straight in the face. We must measure fully, to the very bottom, that abyss of defeat, dismemberment, enslavement, and humiliation into which we have now been pushed. The more clearly we understand this, the firmer, the more steeled and tempered will be our will to liberation, our aspiration to rise again from enslavement to independence, and our unbending determination to ensure that at any price Russia ceases to be wretched and impotent and becomes mighty and abundant in the full meaning of these words.

And mighty and abundant she can become, for, after all, we still have sufficient territory and natural wealth left to us to supply each and all, if not with abundant, at least

with adequate means, of life. Our natural wealth, our manpower and the splendid impetus which the great revolution has given to the creative powers of the people are ample material to build a truly mighty and abundant Russia.

Russia will become mighty and abundant if she abandons all dejection and all phrase-making, if, with clenched teeth, she musters all her forces and strains every nerve and muscle, if she realises that salvation lies *only* along that road of world socialist revolution upon which we have set out. March forward along that road, undismayed by defeats, lay the firm foundation of socialist society stone by stone, work with might and main to establish discipline and self-discipline, consolidate everywhere organisation, order, efficiency, and the harmonious co-operation of all the forces of the people, introduce comprehensive accounting of and control over production and distribution—such is the way to build up military might and socialist might.

It would be unworthy of a genuine socialist who has suffered grave defeat either to bluster or to give way to despair. It is not true that our position is hopeless and that all that remains for us is to choose between an "inglorious" death (inglorious from the point of view of the *szlachcic*), such as this harsh peace represents, and a "gallant" death in a hopeless fight. It is not true that by signing a "Tilsit" peace we have betrayed our ideals or our friends. We have betrayed nothing and nobody, we have not sanctified or covered up any lie, we have not refused to help a single friend or comrade in misfortune in every way we could and with everything at our disposal. A general who withdraws the remnants of his army into the heart of the country when it has been beaten or is in panic-stricken flight, or who, in extremity, shields this retreat by a harsh and humiliating peace, is not guilty of treachery towards that part of his army which he is powerless to help and which has been cut off by the enemy. Such a general performs his duty by choosing the only way of saving what can still be saved, by refusing to gamble recklessly, by not embellishing the bitter truth for the people, by "surrendering space in order to gain time", by taking advantage of any *and every respite*, even the briefest, in which to muster his forces and to allow his army to rest or recover, if it is affected by disintegration and demoralisation.

We have signed a "Tilsit" peace. When Napoleon I, in 1807, compelled Prussia to sign the Peace of Tilsit, the conqueror smashed the Germans' entire army, occupied their capital and all their big cities, brought in his own police, compelled the vanquished to supply him, the conqueror, with auxiliary corps for fresh predatory wars, and partitioned Germany, concluding alliances with some German states against others. Nevertheless, the German people survived even *such* a peace, proved able to muster their forces, to rise and to win the right to liberty and independence.

To all those who are able and willing to think, the example of the Peace of Tilsit (which was only one of many harsh and humiliating treaties forced upon the Germans at that period) clearly shows how childishly naïve is the idea that under all conditions a harsh peace means the bottomless pit of ruin, while war is the path of valour and salvation. Periods of war teach us that peace has not infrequently in history served as a respite and a means of mustering forces for new battles. The Peace of Tilsit was a supreme humiliation for Germany, but at the same time it marked a turn towards a supreme national resurgence. At that time historical conditions were such that this resurgence could be channelled only in the direction of a *bourgeois* state. At that time, more than a hundred years ago, history was made by handfuls of nobles and a sprinkling of bourgeois intellectuals, while the worker and peasant masses were somnolent and dormant. As a result history at that time could only crawl along at a terribly slow pace.

But now capitalism has raised culture in general, and the culture of the masses in particular, to a much higher level. War has shaken up the masses, its untold horrors and suffering have awakened them. War has given history momentum and it is now flying with locomotive speed. History is now being independently made by millions and tens of millions of people. Capitalism has now matured for socialism.

Consequently, if Russia is now passing—as she undeniably is—from a "Tilsit" peace to a national resurgence, to a great patriotic war, the outlet for it is not in the direction of a bourgeois state, but in the direction of a world socialist revolution. Since October 25, 1917, we have been defencists.

We are for "defence of the fatherland"; but that patriotic war towards which we are moving is a war for a socialist fatherland, for socialism as a fatherland, for the Soviet Republic as a contingent of the world army of socialism.

"Hate the Germans, kill the Germans"—such was, and is, the slogan of common, i.e., bourgeois, patriotism. But we will say "Hate the imperialist plunderers, hate capitalism, death to capitalism" and at the same time "Learn from the Germans! Remain true to the brotherly alliance with the German workers. They are late in coming to our aid. We shall gain time, we shall live to see them coming, and they will come, to our aid."

Yes, learn from the Germans! History is moving in zigzags and by roundabout ways. It so happens that it is the Germans who now personify, besides a brutal imperialism, the principle of discipline, organisation, harmonious co-operation on the basis of modern machine industry, and strict accounting and control.

And that is just what we are lacking. That is just what we must learn. That is just what our great revolution needs in order to pass from a triumphant beginning, through a succession of severe trials, to its triumphant goal. That is just what the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic requires in order to cease being wretched and impotent and become mighty and abundant for all time.

March 11, 1918

Izvestia VTsIK No. 46,
March 12, 1918
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text of the pamphlet:
N. Lenin, *The Chief Task of Our Day*, Moscow, 1918

SPEECH IN THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS', PEASANTS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES MARCH 12, 1918

VERBATIM REPORT

Comrades, we are celebrating the anniversary of the Russian revolution at a time when the revolution is passing through difficult days, when many are ready to give way to despondency and disillusionment. But if we look around us, if we recall what the revolution has achieved during this past year and how the international situation is shaping, then not one of us, I am sure, will find room for despair or despondency. There should be no room for doubt that the world socialist revolution, begun in October, will triumph over all difficulties and obstacles, over all the efforts of its enemies.

Comrades, remember how the Russian revolution developed.... Remember how, in a few days in February, thanks to the joint action of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, who saw that under tsarism even a bourgeois society could not exist, thanks to the co-operation between the workers and the more enlightened section of the peasants, namely, the soldiers, who had lived through all the horrors of war—remember how in a few days they succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy, which in 1905, 1906 and 1907 had resisted incomparably heavier blows and drowned revolutionary Russia in blood. And when, after the February victory, the bourgeoisie found themselves in power, the revolution went forward with incredible speed.

The Russian revolution produced results which sharply distinguish it from the revolutions in Western Europe. It produced revolutionary people prepared by the events of

1905 to take independent action; it produced the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, bodies incomparably more democratic than all those preceding them, able to educate, elevate and lead the oppressed mass of workers, soldiers and peasants. Thanks to these circumstances the Russian revolution within a few months passed through that period of compromise with the bourgeoisie which in Western Europe took entire decades. The bourgeoisie now say that the working class and its representatives, the Bolsheviks, are to blame for the fact that the army was unequal to the situation. But we can now see that if at that time—in March and April—power had not been in the hands of the conciliators, of the bourgeoisie who secured cushy jobs for themselves and placed the capitalists in power, while at the same time leaving the army ragged and starving, if power had not been in the hands of such gentlemen as Kerensky, who called themselves socialists, but who actually carried in their pockets secret treaties binding the Russian people to fight until 1918, then perhaps the Russian army and revolution might have been spared those incredibly severe trials and humiliations through which we have had to pass. If at that time power had passed to the Soviets, if the conciliators, instead of helping Kerensky to drive the army into battle, had come forward with a proposal for a democratic peace, then our army would not have been so badly shattered. They should have said to it: stand by. In one hand let it hold the torn-up secret treaty with the imperialists and the proposal to all nations for a democratic peace; in the other let it hold rifle and gun, and let the front remain absolutely intact. If that had been done, the army and the revolution could have been saved. Such a gesture, even before an enemy like German imperialism, even if it were aided by the whole bourgeoisie, by the entire capitalist world, by all the representatives of the bourgeois parties, such a gesture could, nevertheless, have been of help then. This gesture could have put the enemy in a situation where it would have seen, on the one hand, the proposed democratic peace and the unmasked treaties and, on the other hand, the guns. Today we have not such a strong front. We cannot reinforce it without artillery. The restoration of the front is too difficult, it is proceeding too slowly because we

have never come into contact with such an enemy. It was one thing to struggle with that idiot Romanov or that boaster Kerensky, but here we have an enemy which has organised all its forces and the economic life of its country for defence against the revolution. We knew that in June 1917, instead of tearing up the imperialist treaties, Kerensky's government hurled the soldiers into an offensive, which sapped their strength completely. And now, when the bourgeoisie scream about unparalleled disorganisation and national disgrace, do they imagine that a revolution, born of war, born of unprecedented destruction, can develop calmly, smoothly, peacefully, without suffering, without torment, without horror? Anyone who imagines the revolution beginning in this way is either nothing but a phrase-monger, or one of those flabby intellectuals incapable of understanding the significance of this war and of the revolution. Yes, that is how they reason. But to us it is clear that throughout this whole process a great national resurgence is taking place, which those who scream about national disgrace do not see.

However that may be, we have extricated ourselves from the war. We are not saying that we extricated ourselves without giving anything in return, without paying a price. But we managed to get out of the war. We gave the people a breathing-space. We do not know how long this breathing-space will last. Possibly it will be exceedingly brief because the imperialist robbers are bearing down on us from the West and the East, and a new war will inevitably begin. We do not close our eyes to the fact that the country lies in ruins. But the people have been able to rid themselves of the tsarist government, of the bourgeois government, and to create Soviet organisations which only now, when the soldiers have returned from the front, have reached the remotest villages. The necessity for them and their significance have been understood by the lowest strata of the people, by the most oppressed and downtrodden of the people, who were wronged and humiliated by tsars, landowners and capitalists, and who were seldom able to put heart and soul into anything or display their creative ability. They not only established Soviet power in the large towns and factory areas, but also in the most remote corners of the country. Every peasant who up to now has known only

oppression and robbery at the hands of the authorities, now sees the government of the poor in power, the government which he himself elects, which has liberated him from oppression, and which, despite all the unparalleled obstacles and difficulties, will be able to lead him still farther.

Comrades, although we now have to live through days of heavy defeat and oppression, when the head of the Russian revolution is under the boot of the Prussian landowners and imperialists, I am sure, no matter how great may be the anger and indignation in some circles, that deep among the people a constructive process is taking place, an accumulation of energy and discipline, which will give us the strength to survive all blows, and which proves that we have not betrayed, and will not betray, the revolution. If we have been compelled to undergo these trials and defeats, it is because the course of history does not run smoothly and pleasantly, permitting the working people of all countries to rise simultaneously with us. We must not forget the sort of enemy we are dealing with. The enemies with whom we have had to deal before, Romanov, Kerensky and the Russian bourgeoisie—the stupid, unorganised, uncultured bourgeoisie that only yesterday licked the boots of Romanov and then ran about with secret treaties in their pockets—do these enemies amount to anything compared with the international bourgeoisie, who have turned all the achievements of the human mind into a weapon to suppress the will of the working people and have adapted the whole of their organisation to exterminating people?

This is the enemy that has hurled itself at us just at the moment when we have completely disarmed, when we have to state quite openly: we have no army, we are a country which has lost its army and is forced to accept a very humiliating peace.

We are not deceiving anybody, we are not betraying anyone, we are not refusing to aid our brothers. But we shall have to accept a very onerous peace, we shall have to accept terrible conditions. We shall have to retreat in order to gain time while this is still possible, so that our allies can come to our aid. And we have got allies. No matter how great our hatred of imperialism, no matter how strong the feeling,

a justified feeling, of anger and indignation against it, we must recognise that we are now defencists. It is not secret treaties that we are defending, we are defending socialism, we are defending our socialist fatherland. In order to be able to defend it, however, we have had to accept the most bitter humiliation. We know that there are periods in every nation's history when it is obliged to retreat before the pressure of an enemy with stronger nerves. We have gained a breathing-space, and we must make use of it so that the army may have some sort of respite, so that as a mass (not those tens of thousands in the large cities who attend meetings, but the millions and tens of millions who have dispersed to the villages) it should understand that the old war is over, and a new war is beginning, a war to which we have replied with a peace offer, a war in which we have retreated in order to overcome our lack of discipline, our inertia, our flabbiness—despite which we were able to defeat tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie, but not the European international bourgeoisie. If we overcome them we shall be the victors, because we have allies, and we are convinced of this.

However viciously the international imperialists now behave on seeing our defeat, their enemies, who are our allies, are maturing within their own countries. We know and have always known for certain that among the German working class this process is taking place, perhaps more slowly than we expected, than we would have liked, but there is no doubt that indignation against the imperialists is growing, that the number of allies in our work is increasing and that they will come to our aid.

You must give all your strength, provide the right watchword and enforce discipline. This is our duty to the socialist revolution. Then we shall be able to hold out until the allied proletariat comes to our aid and, together, we shall defeat all the imperialists and capitalists.

Izvestia VTsIK No. 47,
March 14, 1918

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report

EXTRAORDINARY FOURTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[76]

MARCH 14-16, 1918

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MARCH 14-16, 1918

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WILSON'S MESSAGE[77]

The Congress expresses its gratitude to the American people, and primarily to the working and exploited classes of the United States of America, in connection with President Wilson's expression of his sympathy for the Russian people through the Congress of Soviets at a time when the Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia is passing through severe trials.

The Russian Soviet Republic, having become a neutral country, takes advantage of the message received from President Wilson to express to all peoples that are perishing and suffering from the horrors of the imperialist war its profound sympathy and firm conviction that the happy time is not far away when the working people of all bourgeois countries will throw off the yoke of capital and establish the socialist system of society, the only system able to ensure a durable and just peace and also culture and well-being for all working people.

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2

REPORT ON RATIFICATION OF THE PEACE TREATY MARCH 14

Comrades, today we have to settle a question that marks a turning-point in the development of the Russian revolution, and not only of the Russian but also of the international revolution, and in order to decide correctly on this very harsh peace which representatives of Soviet power have concluded at Brest-Litovsk, and which Soviet power asks you to approve, or ratify—in order to settle this question correctly it is more than ever necessary for us to get an understanding of the historical meaning of the turning-point we are at, an understanding of the main feature of the development of the revolution up to now and the main reason for the severe defeat and the period of stern trials we have passed through.

It seems to me that the chief source of disagreement among the Soviet parties[78] on this question is that some people too easily give way to a feeling of just and legitimate indignation over the defeat of the Soviet Republic by imperialism, too easily give way at times to despair instead of considering the historical conditions of the revolution as they developed up to the time of the present peace, and as they appear to us since the peace; instead of doing that they try to answer questions of the tactics of the revolution on the basis of their immediate feelings. The entire history of revolutions, however, teaches us that when we have to do with a mass movement or with the class struggle, especially one like that at present developing not only throughout a single country, albeit a tremendous country, but also involving all international relations—in such a case we must base our

tactics first and foremost on an appraisal of the objective situation, we must examine analytically the course of the revolution up to this moment and the reason it has taken a turn so menacing and so sharp, and so much to our disadvantage.

If we examine the development of our revolution from that point of view we see clearly that it has so far passed through a period of relative and largely imaginary self-dependence, and of being temporarily independent of international relations. The path travelled by our revolution from the end of February 1917 to February 11 of this year,[79] when the German offensive began, was, by and large, a path of easy and rapid successes. If we study the development of that revolution on an international scale, from the standpoint of the Russian revolution alone, we shall see that we have passed through three periods in the past year. The first period is that in which the working class of Russia, together with all advanced, class-conscious and active peasants, supported not only by the petty bourgeoisie but also by the big bourgeoisie, swept away the monarchy in a few days. This astounding success is to be explained by the fact that on the one hand, the Russian people had acquired a big reserve of revolutionary fighting potential from the experience of 1905, while on the other hand, Russia, an extremely backward country, had suffered more than any other from the war and had, at an especially early date, reached a stage when it was absolutely impossible to continue the war under the old regime.

This short tempestuous success when a new organisation was created—the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies—was followed by the long months of the period of transition of our revolution, the period in which the government of the bourgeoisie, immediately undermined by the Soviets, was kept going and strengthened by the petty-bourgeois compromising parties, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who supported it. It was a government that supported the imperialist war and the imperialist secret treaties, fed the working class on promises, did literally nothing, and preserved the state of economic ruin. The Soviets mustered their forces in this period, a period that for us, for the Russian revolution, was a long one;

it was a long period for the Russian revolution but it was a short one from the international point of view, because in most of the leading countries the period of overcoming petty-bourgeois illusions, of compromise by various parties, groups and trends had been taking not months but long decades. The span of time, from April 20 to the moment Kerensky renewed the imperialist war in June (he had the secret imperialist treaty in his pocket), was decisive. This second period included our July defeat and the Kornilov revolt, and only through the experience of the mass struggle, only when the working-class and peasant masses had realised from their own experience and not from sermons that petty-bourgeois compromise was all in vain—only then, after long political development, after long preparations and changes in the moods and views of party groups, was the ground made ready for the October Revolution; only then did the Russian revolution enter the third period of its initial stage, a stage of isolation, or temporary separation, from the world revolution.

This third, or October, period, the period of organisation, was the most difficult; at the same time it was a period of the biggest and most rapid triumphs. After October, our revolution—the revolution that placed power in the hands of the revolutionary proletariat, established its dictatorship and obtained for it the support of the vast majority of the proletariat and the poor peasantry—after October our revolution made a victorious, triumphal advance. Throughout Russia civil war began in the form of resistance by the exploiters, the landowners and bourgeoisie, supported by part of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Civil war broke out, and in that war the forces of the enemies of Soviet power, the forces of the enemies of the working and exploited masses, proved to be insignificant; the civil war was one continuous triumph for Soviet power because its opponents, the exploiters, the landowners and bourgeoisie, had neither political nor economic support, and their attacks collapsed. The struggle against them was not so much a military operation as agitation; section after section, mass after mass, down to the working Cossacks, abandoned the exploiters who were trying to lead them away from Soviet power.

This period of the victorious, triumphal advance of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power, when great masses of the working and exploited people of Russia were drawn to the side of Soviet power definitely and irrevocably—this period constituted the final and highest point of development of the Russian revolution, which had been progressing all this time, apparently, independently of world imperialism. That was the reason why a country which was extremely backward and was the most prepared for the revolution by the experience of 1905 was able to promote one class after another to power rapidly, easily and systematically, getting rid of various political alignments until at last that political structure was reached which was the last word, not only in the Russian revolution, but also in the West-European workers' revolutions, for Soviet power has been consolidated in Russia and has won the absolute sympathy of the working and exploited people because it has destroyed the old state apparatus that was an instrument of oppression and has laid the foundation of a state of a new and higher form of which the Paris Commune was the prototype. The Commune destroyed the old state machine and replaced it by the armed force of the masses themselves, replaced bourgeois parliamentary democracy by the democracy of the working people, which excluded the exploiters and systematically suppressed their resistance.

That is what the Russian revolution did in this period and that is why a small vanguard of the Russian revolution is under the impression that this rapid triumphal advance can be expected to continue in further victory. That is precisely their mistake because the period when the Russian revolution was developing, passing state power in Russia from one class to another and getting rid of class compromise within the bounds of Russia alone—this period-was able to exist historically only because the predatory giants of world imperialism were temporarily halted in their advance against Soviet power. A revolution that overthrew the monarchy in a few days, exhausted all possibilities of compromise with the bourgeoisie in a few months and overcame all the resistance by the bourgeoisie in a civil war of a few weeks, this revolution, the revolution of a socialist republic, could live side by side with the imperialist powers, among the

international plunderers, the wild beasts of international imperialism, only so long as the bourgeoisie, locked in mortal struggle with each other, were paralysed in their offensive against Russia.

And then began the period that we feel so keenly and see before our eyes, the period of disastrous defeats and severe trials for the Russian revolution, the period in which the swift, direct and open offensive against the enemies of the revolution is over while in its place we are experiencing disastrous defeats and have to retreat before forces that are immeasurably greater than ours, before the forces of international imperialism and finance capital, before the military might that the entire bourgeoisie with its modern weapons and its organisation has mustered against us in the interests of plunder, oppression and the strangling of small nations; we had to think of bringing our forces up to their level; we had to face a task of tremendous difficulty, that of direct combat with enemies that differed from Romanov and Kerensky who could not be taken seriously; we had to meet the forces of the international imperialist bourgeoisie, all its military might, we had to stand face to face with the world plunderers. In view of the delay in getting help from the international socialist proletariat we naturally had to take upon ourselves a conflict with these forces and we suffered a disastrous defeat.

And this epoch is one of disastrous defeats, an epoch of retreat, an epoch in which we must save at least a small part of our position by retreating before imperialism, by awaiting the time when there will be changes in the world situation in general, when the forces of the European proletariat arrive, the forces that exist and are maturing but which have not been able to deal with their enemy as easily as we did with ours; it would be a very great illusion, a very great mistake, to forget that it was easy for the Russian revolution to begin but difficult for it to take further steps .This was inevitable because we had to begin with the most backward and most rotten political system. The European revolution will have to begin against the bourgeoisie, against a much more serious enemy and under immeasurably more difficult conditions. It will be much more difficult for the European revolution to begin. We see that it is immeasurably more dif-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ficult to make the first breach in the system that is holding back the revolution. It will be much easier for the European revolution to advance to the second and third stages. Things cannot be different with the alignment of forces of the revolutionary and reactionary classes that at present obtains in the world. This is the main turn in events that is always overlooked by people who view the present situation, the extremely serious position of the revolution, from the standpoint of their own feelings and their indignation, and not from the historical standpoint. Historical experience teaches us that always, in all revolutions, at a time when a revolution takes an abrupt turn from swift victory to severe defeats, there comes a period of pseudo-revolutionary phrase-making that invariably causes the greatest damage to the development of the revolution. And so, comrades, we shall be able to appraise our tactics correctly only when we set out to consider the turn in events that has hurled us back from swift, easy and complete victories to grave defeats. This is an extremely difficult and extremely serious question arising out of the present turning-point in the development of the revolution, the turn from easy victories within the country to exceptionally heavy defeats without; it is also a turning-point in the entire world revolution, a turn from the period of propaganda and agitation on the part of the Russian revolution, with imperialism biding its time, to the offensive of imperialism against Soviet power, and this turn puts a particularly difficult and acute question before the international movement in Western Europe. If we are not to ignore this historical aspect of the situation we must try to understand how Russia's basic interests in the question of the present harsh, or obscene, as it is called, peace took shape.

When arguing against those who refused to see the need to accept that peace, I have often come up against the statement that the idea of concluding the peace expresses only the interests of the exhausted peasant masses, the declassed soldiers, and so on and so forth. Whenever I hear such statements, whenever I hear such things referred to, I am always amazed that the class aspect of national development is forgotten by comrades—people who limit themselves exclusively to seeking explanations. As though the Party

of the proletariat on taking power had not counted on the alliance of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat, i.e., the-poor peasantry (i.e., the majority of the peasantry of Russia), had not known that only such an alliance would be able to hand the government of Russia over to the revolutionary power of the Soviets, the power of the majority, the real majority of the people, and that without this alliance it would be senseless to make any attempt to establish power, especially at difficult turning-points in history! As though we could now abandon this verity that was accepted by all of us and confine ourselves to a contemptuous reference to the exhausted state of the peasantry and the declassed soldiers! With regard to the exhausted state of the peasantry and the declassed soldiers we must say that the country will offer resistance, and that the poor peasants will be able to offer resistance only in so far as those poor peasants are capable of directing their forces to the struggle.

When we were about to take power in October it was obvious that events were inevitably leading up to it, that the turn towards Bolshevism in the Soviets indicated a turn throughout the country, and that the Bolsheviks must inevitably take power. When we, realising this, took power in October, we said to ourselves and to all the people, very clearly and unequivocally, that it was a transfer of power to the proletariat and the poor peasantry, that the proletariat knew the peasantry would support it—you know yourselves in what—in its active struggle for peace and its readiness to continue the fight against big finance capital. In this we are making no mistake, and nobody who sticks to the concept of class forces and class alignments can get away from the indisputable truth that we cannot ask a country of small peasants, a country that has given much for the European and world revolution, to carry on the struggle in a difficult situation, a most difficult situation, when help from the West-European proletariat has undoubtedly been delayed, although there is no doubt that it is coming to us, as the facts, the strikes, etc., show. That is why I say that such references to the exhaustion of the peasant masses, etc., are made by people who simply have no arguments, who are absolutely helpless when they seek such arguments, and who are quite unable to grasp class relations as a whole, in their

entirety, the relations of the revolution of the proletariat and of the peasant masses; it is only when, at every sharp turn in history, we appraise the class relations as a whole, the relations of all classes, and do not select individual examples and individual cases, that we feel ourselves firmly supported by an analysis of probable facts. I realise full well that the Russian bourgeoisie are today urging us on towards a revolutionary war when it is absolutely impossible for us to have such a war. This is essential to the class interests of the bourgeoisie.

When they shout about an obscene peace and do not say a word about who brought the army to its present state, I realise quite well that it is the bourgeoisie together with the *Dyelo Naroda* people, the Tsereteli and Chernov Mensheviks and their yes-men (*applause*)—I know quite well that it is the bourgeoisie who are bawling for a revolutionary war. Their class interests demand it, their anxiety to see Soviet power make a false move demands it. It is not surprising that this comes from people who, on the one hand, fill the pages of their newspapers with counter-revolutionary scribbling.... (*Voices*: "They've all been suppressed!") Unfortunately, not yet all of them, but we will close them all down. (*Applause*.) I should like to see the proletariat that would allow the counter-revolutionaries, those who support the bourgeoisie and collaborate with them, to continue using the monopoly of wealth to drug the people with their bourgeois opium. There is no such proletariat. (*Applause*.)

I realise, of course, that nothing but shouts, howls and screams about an obscene peace comes from those publications, I realise full well that the people who favour this revolutionary war—from the Constitutional-Democrats to the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries—are those who meet the Germans as they advance and say triumphantly, here come the Germans, and then allow their officers, again wearing their badges of rank, to strut about in the places that have been occupied by the German imperialist invaders. Oh no, I am not a bit surprised at these bourgeois, these collaborators, preaching a revolutionary war. They want Soviet power to be caught in a trap. They have shown their hand, these bourgeois and collaborators. We have seen them and can still see live specimens, we know that in the Ukraine

there are Ukrainian Kerenskys, Ukrainian Chernovs and Ukrainian Tseretelis—there they are, the Vinnichenkos. Those gentlemen, the Ukrainian Kerenskys, Chernovs and Tseretelis, concealed from the people the peace they concluded with the German imperialists, and today they are trying to overthrow Soviet power in the Ukraine with the help of German bayonets. That is what those bourgeois and those collaborators and their accomplices have done. That is what they have done, those Ukrainian bourgeois and collaborators, whose example you have before your very eyes; they concealed and are still concealing their secret treaties from the people, they are attacking Soviet power with the aid of German bayonets. That is what the Russian bourgeoisie want, that is where the bourgeois yes-men are trying to push Soviet power, wittingly or unwittingly; they know that under no circumstances can Soviet power undertake an imperialist war against the might of imperialism at the present moment. That is why it is only in this international situation, in this general class situation, that we can understand the full depth of the mistake of those who, like the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, have allowed themselves to be carried away by a theory that is common to the history of all revolutions at moments of difficulty, a theory that is half desperation and half empty phrases; according to this theory, instead of taking a sober view of reality and appraising the tasks of the revolution in respect of the internal and external enemy from the standpoint of class forces, you are asked to settle a serious and very grave problem only under the impact of your feelings, merely from standpoint of feelings. The peace is incredibly harsh and shameful. In my statements and speeches I have had occasion to liken it to the Peace of Tilsit that the conqueror Napoleon forced on the Prussian and German peoples after a series of heavy defeats. Yes, the peace is a grave defeat and is humiliating to Soviet power, but if you, proceeding from this, and limiting yourselves to it, appeal to feelings and arouse discontent in an attempt to settle a gigantic historical problem, you will get into that ridiculous and pitiful situation into which the Socialist-Revolutionary Party once got itself, when in 1907, in a situation that was somewhat similar in certain respects, that party also appealed to the feelings

of revolutionaries, when, after our revolution had suffered heavy defeats in 1906 and 1907, Stolypin presented us with the laws on the Third Duma—shameful and extremely difficult conditions of work in one of the rottenest of representative institutions—when our Party, after brief internal wavering (the wavering on the question was greater than it is today), decided the question in this way: we have no right to give way to feelings; no matter how great our indignation and dissatisfaction with the shameful Third Duma, we have to recognise that it was not chance but the historical necessity of a developing class struggle which lacked the strength to continue but which could muster that strength even in the shameful conditions that have been imposed. We proved to be right. Those who tried to attract people by revolutionary phrases, by appeals to justice (since they were expressing feelings that were trebly legitimate)—those people were given a lesson that will not be forgotten by any revolutionary capable of thought and possessing ideas.

Revolutions do not go smoothly enough to ensure rapid and easy progress. There has never been any great revolution, even on a national scale, that did not experience a hard period of defeat, and the attitude of a revolutionary towards the serious question of mass movements, of developing revolutions, must not be one of declaring the peace obscene and humiliating and then saying he cannot reconcile himself to it; it is not sufficient to quote agitational phrases, to shower reproaches on us because of the peace—that is the known ABC of the revolution, the experience of all revolutions. Our experience since 1905—and if we are rich in anything, if there is any reason why the Russian working class and poor peasantry have taken upon themselves the most difficult and honourable task of beginning the world socialist revolution, it is because the Russian people have been able, owing to specific historical conditions, to make two great revolutions at the beginning of the twentieth century—we have to learn from the experience of those revolutions, we have to learn to understand that only by studying the changes in the class connections between one country and another is it possible to prove definitely that we are in no condition to accept battle at the moment; we have to take this into consideration and say to ourselves,

whatever respite we may obtain, no matter how unstable, no matter how brief, harsh and humiliating the peace may be, it is better than war, because it gives the masses a breathing-space, because it provides us with an opportunity to correct what the bourgeoisie have done, the bourgeoisie that are shouting wherever they have an opportunity to shout, especially under the protection of the Germans in the occupied regions.

The bourgeoisie are shouting that the Bolsheviks are responsible for the disintegration of the army, that there is no army and the Bolsheviks are to blame for it; but let us look at the past, comrades, let us look, firstly, at the development of our revolution. Do you not know that desertion and the disintegration of our army began long before the revolution, in 1916, and that everybody who has seen the army will have to admit that? And what did our bourgeoisie do to prevent it? Is it not clear that the only chance for salvation from the imperialists at that time was in their hands, that a chance presented itself in March and April, when Soviet organisations could have taken power by a simple motion of the hand against the bourgeoisie. And if the Soviets had then taken power, if the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, instead of helping Kerensky deceive the people, conceal the secret treaties and lead the army to an offensive—if they had then come to the aid of the army, had supplied it with munitions and rations and had compelled the bourgeoisie to help the fatherland—not the fatherland of the hucksters, not the fatherland of treaties that help to slaughter the people (*applause*)—and had themselves participated; if the Soviets had forced the bourgeoisie to help the fatherland of the workers and all working people, and had helped the ragged, barefoot and hungry army, then, perhaps, we should have had a period of ten months, long enough to rest the army and gain unanimous support for it, so that without the army having moved one step from the front a general, democratic peace could have been proposed, the secret treaties could have been torn up and the line held without retreating a single step. There would then have been a chance of peace, which the workers and peasants would have willingly supported and approved. That would

have been the tactics of the defence of the fatherland, not the fatherland of the Romanovs, Kerenskys, or Chernovs, a fatherland with secret treaties, a fatherland of the treacherous bourgeoisie—not that fatherland but the fatherland of the working people. That is who is responsible for having made the transition from war to revolution and from the Russian revolution to world socialism a period of severe trials. That is why such proposals as a revolutionary war sound like empty phrases, when we know that we have no army, when we know that it would have been impossible to hold the army, and people with a knowledge of the situation could not help seeing that our decree on demobilisation was not an invention but the result of obvious necessity, because it would have been impossible to hold the army. The army could not have been held. That officer, not a Bolshevik, was right who, before the October Revolution, said that the army could not and would not fight.[80] This is what has come of months of bargaining with the bourgeoisie and of all the speeches about the need to continue the war; no matter what noble sentiments on the part of many revolutionaries, or of few revolutionaries, may have dictated them, they proved to be empty revolutionary phrases that played into the hands of international imperialism so that it could plunder as much again and more, just as it has been doing since our tactical or diplomatic error, since the time we did not sign the Brest Treaty. When we told those who opposed concluding peace that if we had a respite of any length they would realise that the recuperation of the army and the interests of the working people were more important than anything else, and that peace should have been concluded for this reason—they maintained that there could be no respite.

But our revolution differs from all previous revolutions in having aroused among the masses a desire to build and create, and the working people in the most out-of-the-way villages, people humiliated, downtrodden and oppressed by tsars, landowners, and bourgeoisie, have been aroused; this is a period of the revolution that is only now being accomplished, now that the rural revolution is under way, the revolution that is building a new way of life. And for the sake of this respite, no matter how brief and how small

it may be, it was our duty to sign the treaty, since we place the interests of the working people above the interests of the bourgeois warriors who rattle their sabres and call on us to fight. That is what the revolution teaches. The revolution teaches that when we make diplomatic mistakes, when we assume that the German workers will come to our aid tomorrow, when we hope that Liebknecht will be victorious immediately (and we know that one way or another Liebknecht will win, that is inevitable in the development of the working-class movement [*applause*]), it means that, when used unthinkingly, the revolutionary slogans of the difficult socialist movement turn into empty phrases. There is not a single representative of the working people, there is not a single honest worker who would refuse to make the greatest sacrifice to help the socialist movement of Germany, because during all this time at the front he has learned to distinguish between the German imperialists and the soldiers tormented by German discipline, most of whom are in sympathy with us. That is why I say that the Russian revolution has corrected our mistake in practice, has corrected it by giving us the respite. It is very probable that it will be an extremely brief one, but we have the chance of at least a brief respite in which the army, worn out and hungry as it is, will become conscious of the fact that it has been given an opportunity to recuperate. It is clear to us that the period of the old imperialist wars is over and we are threatened with the further horrors of an outbreak of fresh wars, but there have been such periods of war in many historical epochs, and they have always become most fierce towards the end. This must be understood, not only at meetings in Petrograd and Moscow; it must be understood by the many tens of millions in the countryside; and the more enlightened part of the rural population, those returning from the front, those who have experienced the horrors of war, must help them understand it; the huge masses of peasants and workers must become convinced of the necessity for a revolutionary front—they will then say we have acted correctly.

They tell us we have betrayed the Ukraine and Finland—what disgrace! But the situation that has arisen is such that we are cut off from Finland, with whom we concluded an unwritten treaty before the revolution and have now con-

cluded a formal treaty.[81] They say we are surrendering the Ukraine, which Chernov, Kerensky and Tsereteli are going to ruin; they say we are traitors, we have betrayed the Ukraine! I say: Comrades, I've seen enough of the history of revolution not to be embarrassed by the hostile glances and shouts of people who give way to their feelings and are incapable of clear judgement. I will give you a simple example. Suppose that two friends are out walking at night and they are attacked by ten men. If the scoundrels isolate one of them, what is the other to do? He cannot render assistance, and if he runs away is he a traitor? And suppose that it is not a matter of individuals or of spheres in which questions of direct feelings are being settled, but of five armies, each a hundred-thousand strong, that surround an army of two hundred thousand, and that there is another army that should come to the embattled army's assistance. But if that second army knows that it is certain to fall into a trap, it should withdraw; it must withdraw, even if the retreat has to be covered by the conclusion of an obscene, foul peace —curse as much as you like, but it is necessary to conclude the peace. There is no reason for considering the feelings of a duelist who draws his sword and says that he must die because he is being compelled to conclude a humiliating peace. But we all know that, however we may decide, we have no army, and no gestures will save us from the necessity of withdrawing to gain time and enable our army to recuperate; everybody who looks reality in the face and does not deceive himself with revolutionary phrase-making will agree with this. Anyone who faces the facts without blinding himself with phrase-making and arrogance must know this.

If we know this, it is our revolutionary duty to conclude even this harsh, super-harsh and rapacious treaty, for by so doing we shall reach a better position for ourselves and for our allies. Did we actually lose anything by concluding the peace treaty of March 3? Anyone who wants to look at things from the point of view of mass relations, and not from that of the aristocratic duelist, will realise that without an army, or having only the sick remnant of an army, it would be self-deception, it would he the greatest deception of the people, to accept battle and call it a revolutionary

war. It is our duty to tell the people the truth; yes, the peace is a harsh one. The Ukraine and Finland are perishing but we must accept this peace and all class-conscious working people in Russia will accept it because they know the unvarnished truth, they know the meaning of war, they know that to stake everything on one card on the assumption that the German revolution will begin immediately is self-deception. By concluding peace we have obtained what we gave our Finnish friends—a respite, help and not destruction.

I know of examples from history of much more rapacious peace treaties having been concluded, treaties that surrendered viable nations to the mercy of the conqueror. Let us compare our peace to the Peace of Tilsit; the Peace of Tilsit was enforced on Prussia and Germany by a conqueror. That peace was so harsh that not only were all the capital cities of all the German states seized, not only were the Prussians thrown back to Tilsit, which would be the same as throwing us back to Omsk or Tomsk; not only that—the worst of all was that Napoleon compelled the conquered peoples to supply him with auxiliary troops for his wars; but nevertheless, when the situation became such that the German peoples had to withstand the attacks of the conqueror, when the epoch of revolutionary wars in France gave place to the epoch of imperialist wars of conquest, then came the revelation which those people who wax enthusiastic over empty phrases do not want to understand, those people, that is, who picture the conclusion of peace as a downfall. This psychology is understandable in an aristocratic duelist but not in a worker or peasant. The latter has been through the hard school of war and has learned to calculate. There have been even greater trials, and nations even more backward have come through them. Harsher peace treaties have been concluded, the Germans concluded one in an epoch when they had no army, or when their army was sick like ours. They concluded a very harsh peace with Napoleon. But that peace was not the downfall of Germany—on the contrary, it was the turning-point, national defence, renewal. We are on the eve of just such a turning-point and are experiencing analogous conditions. We must look truth in the face and banish all empty phrases and declarations. We

must say, peace, if it is necessary, must be concluded. The war of liberation, the class war, the war of the people will take the place of the Napoleonic wars. The system of the Napoleonic wars will change, war will give place to peace and peace to war, and from every harsh peace there has always emerged a more extensive preparation for war. The harshest of peace treaties—the Peace of Tilsit—has gone down in history as a turning-point towards the time when the German people began to swing round; when they retreated to Tilsit, to Russia, they were actually gaining time, waiting for the international situation that had, at one time, favoured Napoleon—he was another plunderer like Hohenzollern or Hindenburg—waiting until the situation changed, until the mentality of the German people, tormented by decades of Napoleonic wars and defeats, had recuperated and the German people were resuscitated. That is what history teaches us, that is why all despair and empty phrases are criminal, that is why everyone will say yes, the old imperialist wars are ending—an historical turning-point has come.

Our revolution has been one long triumph since October, and now the lengthy times of hardship have come, we do not know for how long, but we do know that it will be a long and difficult period of defeats and retreats, because the alignment of forces is what it is, because by retreating we shall give the people a chance to recuperate. We shall make it possible for every worker and peasant to realise the truth that will enable him to understand that new wars waged by the imperialist plunderers against the oppressed peoples are beginning, and every worker and peasant will realise that we must rise in defence of the fatherland, because we have been defencists since October. Since October 25 we have said openly that we stand for the defence of the fatherland, because we have a fatherland, the one from which we have driven the Kerenskys and Chernovs, because we have torn up the secret treaties, because we have crushed the bourgeoisie—badly so far, but we shall learn to do it better.

Comrades, there is another important difference between the condition of the German people and of the Russian people who have suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the

German invaders—there is a tremendous difference that must be mentioned, although I have already touched upon it briefly in the preceding part of my speech. Comrades, when the German people, over a hundred years ago, entered a period of the most cruel wars of conquest, a period when they had to retreat and conclude one shameful treaty after another before they were awakened—at that time the German people were weak and backward, just that and nothing more. They had against them not only the military forces and the might of the conqueror Napoleon, they had against them a country that was far above Germany in the revolutionary and political sense and in every other respect, a country that had risen far above all others, a country that had reached the top. That country was far above the people who were languishing in subjection to the imperialists and landowners. A people that, I repeat, had been nothing but a weak and backward people, managed to learn from its bitter lessons and to raise itself up. We are in a better position; we are not merely a weak and backward people, we are the people who have been able—not because of any special services or of historical predestination, but because of a definite conjunction of historical circumstances—who have been able to accept the honour of raising the banner of the international socialist revolution. (*Applause.*)

I am well aware, comrades, that the banner is in weak hands, I have said that outright several times already, and the workers of the most backward country will not be able to hold that banner unless the workers of all advanced countries come to their aid. The socialist reforms that we have accomplished are far from perfect, they are weak and insufficient; they will serve as a guide to the advanced West-European workers who will say to themselves, "The Russians haven't made a very good beginning on the job that has to be done"; the important thing is that our people are not merely a weak and backward people as compared with the Germans, they are the people who have raised the banner of revolution. Although the bourgeoisie of any country you like are filling the columns of their press with slander of the Bolsheviks, although the voice of the imperialist press in France, Britain, Germany, etc., curses the Bolsheviks in unison, you will not find a meeting of workers in any country at

which the names and slogans of our socialist government give rise to bursts of indignation. (*Voice*: "That's a lie!") No, it is not, it is the truth, and anyone who has been in Germany, Austria, Switzerland or America during the past few months will tell you it is the truth and not a lie, that the names and slogans of representatives of Soviet power in Russia are greeted with the greatest enthusiasm by the workers and that, despite all the lies of the bourgeoisie of Germany, France, etc., the working-class masses have realised that no matter how weak we may be, their cause is being served here in Russia. Yes, our people have a very heavy burden to bear, the burden they have themselves taken up; but a people that has been able to establish Soviet power cannot perish. Again I repeat—there is not a single politically conscious socialist, not a single worker among those who think over the history of the revolution, who can dispute the fact that Soviet power—despite all the defects that I know only too well and fully appreciate—is the highest type of state, the direct successor to the Paris Commune. It has ascended a step higher than the other European revolutions so that we are not experiencing the difficult conditions that the German people experienced a hundred years ago; the change in the balance of forces among the plunderers, taking advantage of the conflict and satisfying the demands of plunderer Napoleon, plunderer Alexander I and the plundering British monarchy—that was the only thing left, the one chance, for the German people, oppressed by feudalism; and yet the German people did not perish from the Peace of Tilsit. But we, I say again, have better conditions, we have a powerful ally in all West-European countries, the international socialist proletariat, the proletariat that is on our side no matter what our enemies may say. (*Applause*.) True, it is not easy for that ally to raise his voice, any more than it was easy for us until the end of February 1917. That ally is living in the underground, under conditions of the military prison into which all imperialist countries have been turned, but he knows us and understands our cause; it is difficult for him to come to our aid, and Soviet troops, therefore, will need much time and patience and will have to go through many trials before the time comes when he will aid us—we shall use even the slightest chance of procrastination, for

time is working on our side. Our cause is gaining strength, the forces of the imperialists are weakening, and no matter what trials and defeats may emerge from the "Tilsit" peace, we are beginning the tactics of withdrawal and, once more I say it, there is no doubt the politically-conscious proletariat and, likewise, the politically-conscious peasants are on our side, and we shall be able not only to make heroic attacks, but also to make a heroic retreat and we shall wait until the international socialist proletariat comes to our aid and shall then begin a second socialist revolution that will be world-wide in its scope. (*Applause.*)

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3

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON RATIFICATION OF THE PEACE TREATY
MARCH 15

Comrades, had I desired to find a confirmation of what was said in my first speech about the nature of the revolutionary war that was proposed to us, the best and clearest confirmation would have been given me by the report of the representative of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.[82] I think it will be most expedient if I quote his speech from the verbatim report and we shall see what arguments they adduce in confirmation of their propositions.

Here is a specimen of the arguments on which they rely. There has been talk here of the volost gathering.[83] Those who consider this meeting a volost gathering can resort to such arguments, but it is clear that these people are repeating our words but are incapable of thinking them out. People repeat what the Bolsheviks taught the Left S.R.s when the latter were still among the Rights, and when they speak it is evident that they have learnt by rote what we said, but they have not understood on what it was based, and now they repeat it. Tsereteli and Chernov were defencists, and now we are defencists, we are "traitors", we are "betrayers". The accomplices of the bourgeoisie speak here about a volost gathering—they make eyes when they say this—but every worker understands very well the aims of the defencism by which Tsereteli and Chernov were guided and the grounds which cause us to be defencists.

If we were to support the Russian capitalists who wanted to be given the Dardanelles, Armenia and Galicia, as it was written in the secret treaty, that would be defencism

in the spirit of Chernov and Tsereteli, and that defencism was disgraceful then, but now our defencism is honourable. (*Applause.*)

And when, alongside such arguments, in the verbatim report of Kamkov's speech I find twice repeated the statement that the Bolsheviks are agents of German imperialism (*applause from the Right*), a harsh term—I am very glad that all those who pursued Kerensky's policy emphasise it by their applause. (*Applause.*) And indeed, of course, it is not for me to object to harsh words. I shall never raise any objection to that. Only, in order to be harsh one must have the right to be so, and the right to be harsh is given by one's words not differing from one's deeds. That is the little condition which many intellectuals do not appreciate, but which the workers and peasants have grasped even at volost gatherings—it is such a meagre thing, the volost gathering—they have grasped it both at volost gatherings and in Soviet organisations, and their word does not differ from their deed. But we are very well aware that they, the Left S.R.s, remained in the party of the Right S.R.s until October, during the time when the latter were sharing the rewards of office, when they acted as agents because they had been promised ministerial posts in return for keeping silent about the secret treaties. (*Applause.*) But it is quite impossible to call agents of imperialism people who actually proclaimed war against it, tore up the treaties and undertook the risk that this involved, undertook to drag out the negotiations in Brest, knowing that this would ruin the country, endured the military attack and a series of unprecedented defeats, and did not conceal the slightest thing from the people.

Martov has assured us here that he has not read the treaty. Let those who like to, believe him. We know that these people are accustomed to read a lot of newspapers, but they have not read the treaty. (*Applause.*) Let those who wish, believe it. But I tell you that, while the party of the S.R.s knows very well that we are giving way in the face of violence, which has been fully exposed by us, that we are doing so deliberately, frankly saying that we are unable to fight just now but are giving way—history knows of a number of most shameful treaties and a number of wars—when people in reply to this produce the word "agents", this harshness

exposes them, and when they assure us that they disclaim responsibility for what they are doing—is it not hypocrisy, when people disclaim responsibility but continue to be in the government? I maintain that when they say that they disclaim responsibility—they do not divest themselves of it, and they are quite wrong in thinking this is a volost gathering. No, this is everything that is honest and best among the working masses. (*Applause.*) This is no bourgeois parliament to which people are elected once or twice a year to take their seats and receive a salary. These are people sent from the provinces and tomorrow they will be in the provinces and will relate that if the party of Left S.R.s is losing votes, it deserves to, because the party which acts in this way is the same soap bubble among the peasantry as it proved to be among the working class. (*Applause*, *voices*: "Quite right.")

Further, I will quote you one more passage from Kamkov's speech to show how every representative of the working and exploited people reacts to it. "When yesterday Comrade Lenin asserted here that Comrades Tsereteli and Chernov and others had demoralised the army, can we really not find the courage to say that Lenin and I also demoralised the army?" He is a long way wide of the mark. (*Applause.*) He has heard that we were defeatists, and he has recalled this when we have ceased to be defeatists. He has recalled it at the wrong time. They have learnt the word by heart, they have a revolutionary-sounding toy rattle to play with, but they are incapable of giving some thought to the actual state of affairs. (*Applause.*) I assert that out of a thousand volost gatherings where Soviet power has been consolidated, in more than nine hundred there are people who will tell the Party of Left S.R.s that they do not deserve any confidence. They will say—all right; we demoralised the army and we must recall that now. But how did we demoralise the army? We were defeatists at the time of the tsar, but at the time of Tsereteli and Chernov we were not defeatists. We published in Pravda a proclamation which Krylenko, who was then still being persecuted, addressed to the army: "Why I am going to Petrograd." He said: "We are not calling on you for mutinies." That was not demoralisation of the army. Those who declared this war to be a great war were the ones who demoralised the army.

It was Tsereteli and Chernov who demoralised the army because they spoke grand words to the people, words which many Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were accustomed to throw out at random. It is easy to play with words, but the Russian people at volost gatherings are accustomed to think over them and take them seriously. If, however, the people were told that we were striving for peace and discussing the conditions of the imperialist war, then I ask: and what about the secret treaties and the June offensive? That is how they demoralised the army. If they spoke to the people about the struggle against the imperialists, about defence of the homeland, the people asked themselves: do they seize the capitalists by the scruff of the neck somewhere?—that is how they demoralised the army, and that is why I said, and no one has refuted it, it would have been the salvation of the army if we had taken power in March or April, and if instead of the furious hatred of the exploiters because we suppressed them—they quite justifiably hate us—if instead of this they had put the interests of the homeland of the working and exploited people higher than the interests of the homeland of Kerensky and Ryabushinsky's secret treaties, and of designs on Armenia, Galicia and the Dardanelles, that would have spelt salvation. And in this connection—beginning with the great Russian Revolution, and especially from March, when a half-hearted appeal to the peoples of all countries[84] was issued—the government, which issued the appeal that called for the overthrow of the bankers of all countries, was itself sharing profits and favours with the bankers—that is what demoralised the army and why the army could not keep going. (*Applause.*)

And I assert that we—beginning from this appeal of Krylenko's, which was not the first,[85] and which I am recalling because it stuck in my mind—we did not demoralise the army but said: hold the front—the sooner you take power the easier will it be to retain it, and to say now: we are against civil war and for an uprising—how unworthy this is and how despicable this chatter of some people. When this reaches the countryside and when the soldiers there, who have seen war not as the intellectuals have, and who know that it is easy to wave only a cardboard sword, when they say that at the critical moment they, unshod, badly clothed and

suffering, were helped by being driven into an offensive—they are now being told that it doesn't matter that there will be no army, there will be an uprising instead. To drive the people against a regular army with superior technical equipment—that is criminal, and we, as socialists, taught that it is so. Indeed, the war taught a great deal, not only that people suffered, but also that those who have the greatest technical equipment, organisation and discipline, and the best machines, will gain the upper hand; the war taught this, and it is excellent that it did so. It has to be learnt that it is impossible to live in modern society without machines, without discipline—one has either to master modern techniques or be crushed. Years of most painful suffering have taught the peasants what war is. And when anyone goes speech-making at the volost gatherings, when the party of Left S.R.s goes there, they will receive well-merited punishment. (*Applause.*)

One more example, another quotation from Kamkov's speech. (*He reads it.*)

It is sometimes surprisingly easy to raise questions; only there is a saying—an impolite, rude one—which refers to such questions—I'm afraid I can't change the proverb—I will remind you of it: one fool can ask more questions than ten wise men can answer.

Comrades, in the quotation I have just read out I am invited to answer the question: will the respite last one week, two weeks, or will it last more? I assert that at any volost gathering or at any factory a person who in the name of a serious party comes out with such a question will be laughed at by the people and chased away, because at any volost gathering they will understand that there is no point in raising questions about something that cannot be known. That will be understood by any worker and peasant. (*Applause.*) If you absolutely insist on an answer, I will tell you that of course any Left S.R. who writes in the newspapers or speaks at meetings will say what this duration depends on: it depends on when Japan attacks, with what forces, and what resistance it encounters; on the extent to which the Germans get into difficulties in Finland, in the Ukraine; on when the offensive on all fronts begins; on how it develops; on the further course of the internal conflict

in Austria and Germany, and on many other things as well. (*Applause.*)

Therefore, when at a serious meeting people with an air of triumph raise the question: answer me, what kind of a respite will it be?—I say that such people will be chased out of workers' and peasants' meetings by those who understand that after three years of war torment, every week of respite is a very great boon. (*Applause.*) And I assert that whatever the abuse now heaped on us here, if tomorrow all the abusive terms addressed to us from the Rights, almost-Rights, near-Rights, Left S.R.s, Cadets, and Mensheviks were collected together and published, even if some hundreds of poods were the result, as far as I am concerned all this would weigh as light as a feather compared with the fact that among us in the Bolshevik group nine-tenths of its representatives have said: we know war and we see that now, when we have secured this short respite, it is an advantage for the recovery of our sick army. And at every peasant meeting nine-tenths of the peasants will say what everyone who concerns himself with the matter knows, and when able to help in any way we have not rejected and do not reject any practical proposal.

We have gained the possibility of a respite, even if only for twelve days, thanks to the policy which has countered revolutionary phrase-making and "public" opinion. When Kamkov and the Left S.R.s play a game with you and make eyes at you, then, on the one hand, they are making eyes at you and, on the other, they are saying to the Constitutional-Democrats: put that down in our favour, indeed, we are heart and soul with you. (*Voice from the hall*: "It's a lie.") And when one of the representatives of the S.R.s, apparently not even of the Lefts, but of the super-Lefts, a Maximalist, spoke about phrase-making, he said that phrase-making was everything that concerned honour. (*A voice*: "Quite right.") Well, of course, in the Right-wing camp they call out "quite right"; this exclamation is pleasanter to me than the exclamation "it's a lie", although that does not impress me in the slightest either. But if I were to accuse them of phrase-making without giving any clear and precise confirmation of it, but the fact is I quoted two examples and I took them not from my imagination but from actual occurrence.

Remember, were not the representatives of the S.R.s

in the same situation when in 1907 they gave their signatures to Stolypin that they would faithfully and truly serve the Emperor Nicholas II? I hope that I have learnt something from the long years of the revolution, and when I am defamed by accusations of treachery, I say: one must first of all be able to find one's way in history. If we wanted to alter the course of history and it turns out that it was we who altered course and not history—then execute us. History is not to be convinced by speeches, and history will show that we were right, that we brought the workers' organisations into the Great October Revolution of 1917, but only thanks to the fact that we rose above phrase-making and knew how to look at the facts, to learn from them. And when now, on March 14-15, it has become clear that if we had fought we should have helped imperialism, we should have finally wrecked the transport system and lost Petrograd—we see that to play with words and wave a cardboard sword is useless. But when Kamkov comes to me and asks "will this respite be for long?", it is impossible to give an answer because internationally there has not been an objective revolutionary situation. There cannot be a long respite for reaction now, because the objective situation is everywhere revolutionary, because everywhere the working-class masses are indignant, are at the limit of their patience, at the limit of exhaustion from the war; that is a fact. It is impossible to escape from this fact, and therefore I have been proving to you that there was a period when the revolution went ahead and we went in front and the Left S.R.s stepped out perkily behind us. (Applause.) But now a period has begun when we have to retreat in the face of overwhelming force. That is an absolutely concrete description. No one will rebut me on this. Historical analysis is bound to confirm it. Here you have our Marxist, almost Marxist, Martov, speaking ill of the volost gathering; he speaks ill of the closing down of newspapers; he boasts that the oppressed and offended newspapers were closed down because they were helping to overthrow Soviet power, he speaks ill of.... About this he does not keep silent. Such things he sets before you, but an attempt to answer the historical question put point-blank by me, whether it is the truth or not that since October we have made a triumphant advance.... (*Voices from the Right*: "No.") You say "no",

but all these say "yes". I ask: can we now make a victorious advance in an offensive against world imperialism. We cannot, and everyone knows it. When this, a frank simple statement, is made forthrightly in order to teach people revolution—revolution is a profound, difficult and complex science—in order to teach both the workers and the peasants, the people who are making the revolution, how to do so, our enemies cry out: cowards, traitors, the flag has been abandoned; they fall back on words, they wave their arms. No. The whole history of revolutions has shown many such revolutionary phrase-mongers and nothing is left of them but stench and smoke. (*Applause.*)

Another example I cited, comrades, was that of Germany, of Germany which was crushed by Napoleon, of Germany which witnessed shameful peace alternating with wars. I am asked: are we going to observe the treaties for a long time? If it were a three-year-old child who asked me: are you going to observe the treaty or not?—it would be both pleasant and naïve. But when grown-up Kamkov of the party of Left S.R.s asks it, I know a few adult workers and peasants will believe in the naïveté, but the majority of them will say: "Stop being hypocritical." For the historical example I cited shows as clearly as can be that emancipatory wars of peoples that have lost an army—and that has happened more than once—of peoples crushed to the extent of complete loss of all their territory, crushed to such an extent that they have surrendered auxiliary corps to the conqueror for new annexationist campaigns—cannot be struck out of history, and can in no way be erased. If, however, the Left S.R. Kamkov, in rebutting me, said, as I saw in the verbatim report: "In Spain, however, there were revolutionary wars," he thereby confirmed what I am saying, indeed he hit out at himself. Spain and Germany precisely confirm my example that to decide the question of the historical period of annexationist wars on the basis of "are you going to observe the treaty and, when you violate it, when will they catch you...?" is indeed worthy of children. History tells us that every treaty results from a cessation of struggle and a change in the relationship of forces, that there have been peace treaties which were shattered in a few days, that there have been peace treaties which were shattered after a month, that there were

periods of many years when Germany and Spain concluded peace and violated it after a few months, violated it several times, and in a series of wars the peoples learnt what waging war means. When Napoleon led German armies in order to strangle other peoples he taught them revolutionary war. Such was the course of history.

That is why I tell you, comrades, that I am deeply convinced that the decision adopted by nine-tenths of our Bolshevik group[86] will be approved by nine-tenths of all the politically-conscious working people of Russia—workers and peasants. (*Applause.*)

We have a means of checking whether I spoke the truth or whether I am mistaken, for you will go into the provinces and each one of you will report to the local Soviets, and everywhere there will be local decisions. I will say in conclusion: do not succumb to provocation. The bourgeoisie knows what it is doing, the bourgeoisie knows why it rejoiced in Pskov, rejoiced recently in Odessa, the bourgeoisie of the Vinnichenkos, of the Ukrainian Kerenskys, of Tsereteli and Chernov. It rejoiced because it understood perfectly what a tremendous mistake in diplomacy, in taking account of the situation, Soviet power had committed by trying to wage war with a fleeing, sick army. The bourgeoisie is trying to draw you into the pitfall of war. One has not only to attack but also to retreat. Every soldier knows that. Realise that the bourgeoisie is trying to draw both you and us into a trap. Realise that the whole bourgeoisie and all its voluntary and involuntary accomplices are setting this trap. You will be able to endure the most severe defeats and to maintain the most difficult positions, and by retreating to gain time. Time is on our side. The imperialists, having glutted themselves, will burst, and in their womb a new giant is developing; it is growing more slowly than we should like, but it is growing, it will come to our aid, and when we see that it is beginning to strike its first blow, we shall say: the time for retreat has come to an end, the era of the world offensive and the era of the victory of the world socialist revolution is beginning. (*Stormy applause, continuing for a long time.*)

Pravda No. 49
March 19, 1918

Published according to
the verbatim report,
collated with the *Pravda* text

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RESOLUTION ON RATIFICATION OF THE BREST TREATY

The Congress confirms (ratifies) the peace treaty signed by our representatives at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

The Congress recognises as correct the actions of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars in deciding to conclude the present incredibly harsh, rapacious and humiliating peace in view of our having no army and of the extreme war weariness of the people, who in their distress have received no support from the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia, but have seen that distress made use of for selfish class purposes.

The Congress also recognises the undoubted correctness of the actions of the peace delegation that refused to enter into a detailed discussion on the German peace terms, because those terms were imposed on us in the form of an obvious ultimatum and by undisguised force.

The Congress most insistently urges upon all workers, soldiers and peasants, all the working and oppressed masses, the main, immediate and most urgent task of the moment—the improvement of the discipline and self-discipline of the working people; the creation throughout the country of strong, well-founded organisations that cover, as far as possible, all production and distribution; a ruthless struggle against the chaos, disorganisation and economic ruin which are historically inevitable as the legacy of a most agonising war, but which are, at the same time, the main obstacle to the complete victory of socialism and the strengthening of the foundations of socialist society.

Today, after the October Revolution, after the overthrow of the political power of the bourgeoisie in Russia, after

our denunciation and publication of all secret imperialist treaties, after the cancellation of the foreign loans, after the workers' and peasants' government has proposed a just peace to all peoples without exception, Russia, having escaped from the clutches of the imperialist war, has the right to announce that she is not a participant in the plunder and suppression of other countries.

The Russian Soviet Federative Republic, having unanimously condemned predatory wars, from now on deems it its right and its duty to defend the socialist fatherland against all possible attacks by any of the imperialist powers.

The Congress therefore deems it the unconditional duty of all working people to muster all forces to re-establish and improve the defence potential of our country, to re-establish its military strength on the basis of a socialist militia and the universal military training of all adolescents and adults of both sexes.

The Congress expresses its absolute confidence that Soviet power, which has valiantly fulfilled all the obligations of the international solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggle for socialism against the yoke of capital, will in future do everything possible to promote the international socialist movement, to secure and shorten the road leading mankind to deliverance from the yoke of capital and from wage slavery, to the creation of a socialist society and to an enduring, just peace between the peoples.

The Congress is firmly convinced that the international workers' revolution is not far away, that the full victory of the socialist proletariat is assured despite the fact that the imperialists of all countries do not hesitate to use the most brutal means for the suppression of the socialist movement.

Pravda (*Sotsial-Demokrat*)
No. 47, March 16, 1918

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collated with the manuscript

COMMENT ON THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE "LEFT COMMUNISTS"

Since the conclusion of the Brest peace, some comrades who call themselves "Left Communists" have formed an "Opposition" in the Party, and in consequence of this their activity is slipping further and further towards a completely disloyal and impermissible violation of Party discipline.

Comrade Bukharin has refused to accept the post of member of the C.C. to which he was appointed by the Party Congress.

Comrades Smirnov, Obolensky and Yakovleva have resigned from their posts as People's Commissars and as business manager of the Supreme Economic Council.

These are absolutely disloyal, uncomradely actions that violate Party discipline, and such behaviour was and remains a *step towards a split* on the part of the above-mentioned comrades....*

Written in the second half of March 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Published according to the manuscript

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE ARTICLE "THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT"[87]

VERBATIM REPORT

CHAPTER X

...* The Soviet press has devoted excessive space and attention to the petty political issues, the personal questions of political leadership by which the capitalists of all countries have striven to divert the attention of the masses from the really important, profound and fundamental questions of our life. In this connection we are faced with the need to solve almost anew a problem for the solution of which all the material requisites are available, only awareness of the urgency of this problem and readiness to solve it being absent. This problem is how to convert the press from an organ mainly devoted to communicating the political news of the day into a serious organ for educating the mass of the population in economics. We shall have to ensure, and we shall ensure, that the press serving the Soviet masses will devote less space to questions of the personal composition of the political leadership, or to questions of the tenth-rate political measures that comprise the commonplace activity and routine work of all political institutions. Instead the press will have to give priority to labour questions in their immediately practical setting. The press must become the organ of the labour commune in the sense of giving publicity to just what the leaders of capitalist enterprises used to try to conceal from the masses. For the capitalist the internal organisation of his enterprise was something veiled by trade

* The beginning of the verbatim report has been lost.—*Ed.*

secrets from the eyes of the outside world, something over which, it seems, he wanted to be omnipotent and in sole command, hidden not only from criticism, not only from outside interference, but also from outside eyes. For the Soviet government, on the contrary, it is the organisation of labour in any particular large enterprises, in any particular village communes that is the chief, fundamental and urgent question of all social life. Our first and main means for increasing the self-discipline of the working people and for passing from the old, good-for-nothing methods of work, or methods of shirking work, in capitalist society, must be the press, revealing shortcomings in the economic life of each labour commune, ruthlessly branding these shortcomings, frankly laying bare all the ulcers of our economic life, and thus appealing to the public opinion of the working people for curing these ulcers. Let there be ten times less newspaper material (perhaps it would be good if there were 100 times less) devoted to so-called current news, but let us have, distributed in hundreds of thousands and millions of copies, a press that acquaints the whole population with the exemplary arrangement of affairs in a few state labour communes which surpass the others. Each factory, each artel and agricultural enterprise, each village that goes over to the new agriculture by applying the law on socialisation of the land, is now, as one of the democratic bases of Soviet power, an independent commune with its own internal organisation of labour. In each of these communes, an increase in the self-discipline of the working people, their ability to work together with managing experts, even from the bourgeois intelligentsia, their achievement of practical results in the sense of raising labour productivity, economising human labour and safeguarding output from the unprecedented thieving from which we are suffering immeasurably at the present time—that is what should form the main content of our Soviet press. That is the way in which we can and must bring it about that the force of example becomes first of all a morally essential, and later a compulsorily introduced, pattern for organising labour in the new Soviet Russia.

In capitalist society there have been repeated examples of the organisation of labour communes by people who hoped

peacefully and painlessly to convince mankind of the advantages of socialism and to ensure its adoption. Such a standpoint and such methods of activity evoke wholly legitimate ridicule from revolutionary Marxists because, under the conditions of capitalist slavery, to achieve any radical changes by means of isolated examples would in fact be a completely vain dream, which in practice has led either to moribund enterprises or to the conversion of these enterprises into associations of petty capitalists.

This habitual attitude of ridicule and scorn towards the importance of example in the national economy is sometimes evident even now among people who have not thoroughly considered the radical changes that began from the time of the conquest of political power by the proletariat. Now, when the land has ceased to be private property, when the factories have almost ceased to be private property and will undoubtedly cease to be such in the very near future (it will be no trouble at all for the Soviet government in its present situation to introduce the appropriate decrees), the example of the labour commune, which solves organisational problems better than any other means, has acquired tremendous significance. It is just now that we must see to it that the mass of unusually valuable material available in the form of the experience of the new organisation of production in individual towns, in individual enterprises, in individual village communes, becomes the possession of the masses.

We are still under considerable pressure from the old public opinion imposed by the bourgeoisie. If we look at our newspapers, it is easy to see what a disproportionately large place we still devote to questions raised by the bourgeoisie, questions with which it seeks to divert the attention of the working people from the concrete practical tasks of socialist reconstruction. We must convert—and we shall convert—the press from an organ for purveying sensations, from a mere apparatus for communicating political news, from an organ of struggle against bourgeois lying—into an instrument for the economic re-education of the masses, into an instrument for telling the masses how to organise work in a new way. Enterprises or village communes which do not respond to any appeals and demands for restoring

self-discipline and raising labour productivity will be entered on a "black list" by the socialist parties and will either be put in the category of sick enterprises in regard to which measures have to be taken for their rehabilitation by means of special arrangements—special steps and statutes—or they will be put in the category of punished enterprises which are liable to closure and whose participants must be handed over to a people's court. Introducing publicity in this sphere will by itself be a vast reform and will serve to draw the broad mass of the people into independent participation in deciding these questions, which most closely concern the masses. The reason why so little has been done in this respect up to now is that what was kept hidden from public knowledge in individual enterprises and communes has remained a secret as of old, which was understandable under capitalism but which is absolutely absurd and senseless in a society that wants to achieve socialism. The force of example, which could not be displayed in capitalist society, will be of enormous importance in a society that has abolished private ownership of land and factories, not only because, perhaps, good examples will be followed here, but also because a better example of the organisation of production will be accompanied inevitably by a lightening of labour and an increase in the amount of consumption for those who have carried out this better organisation. And here, in connection with the importance of the press as an organ for the economic reorganisation and re-education of the masses, we must also touch on the importance of the press in organising competition.

The organisation of competition must take a prominent place among the tasks of the Soviet government in the economic sphere. In their criticism of socialism, bourgeois economists have often declared that socialists deny the importance of competition or give it no place in their system or, as the economists express it, in their plan of social organisation. There is no need to say how stupid is this accusation, which has often been refuted in the socialist press. The bourgeois economists, as always, have confused the question of the specific features of capitalist society with the question of a different form of organisation of competition. The socialists' attacks have never been directed against

competition as such, but only against market competition. Market competition, however, is a special form of competition characteristic of capitalist society and consisting in a struggle of individual producers for a livelihood and for influence, for a place in the market. The abolition of competition as a struggle of producers that is connected only with the market does not at all mean the abolition of competition—on the contrary, the abolition of commodity production and capitalism makes it possible to organise competition in its human instead of its bestial forms. It is just at the present time in Russia, in view of the foundations of political power that have been created by the Soviet Republic, and of the economic characteristics of Russia with her vast expanses and tremendous diversity of conditions—it is just now that organisation of competition on a socialist basis in our country should be one of the most important and rewarding tasks in the reorganisation of society.

We are for democratic centralism. And it must be clearly understood how vastly different democratic centralism is from bureaucratic centralism on the one hand, and from anarchism on the other. The opponents of centralism continually put forward autonomy and federation as a means of struggle against the uncertainties of centralism. As a matter of fact, democratic centralism in no way excludes autonomy, on the contrary, it presupposes the necessity of it. As a matter of fact, even federation, if carried out within limits that are rational from an economic point of view, if it is based on important national distinctions that give rise to a real need for a certain degree of state separateness—even federation is in no way in contradiction to democratic centralism. Under a really democratic system, and the more so with the Soviet organisation of the state, federation is very often merely a transitional step towards really democratic centralism. The example of the Russian Soviet Republic shows us particularly clearly that federation, which we are introducing and will introduce, is now the surest step towards the most lasting union of the various nationalities of Russia into a single democratic centralised Soviet state.

And just as democratic centralism in no way excludes autonomy and federation, so, too, it in no way excludes, but on the contrary presupposes, the fullest freedom of various

localities and even of various communes of the state in developing multifarious forms of state, social and economic life. There is nothing more mistaken than confusing democratic centralism with bureaucracy and routinism. Our task now is to carry out democratic centralism in the economic sphere, to ensure absolute harmony and unity in the functioning of such economic undertakings as the railways, the postal and telegraph services, other means of transport, and so forth. At the same time, centralism, understood in a truly democratic sense, presupposes the possibility, created for the first time in history, of a full and unhampered development not only of specific local features, but also of local inventiveness, local initiative, of diverse ways, methods and means of progress to the common goal. The task of organising competition, therefore, has two aspects: on the one hand, it requires the carrying out of democratic centralism as described above, on the other hand, it makes it possible to find the most correct and most economical way of reorganising the economic structure of Russia. In general terms, this way is known. It consists in the transition to large-scale economy based on machine industry, in the transition to socialism. But the concrete conditions and forms of this transition are and must be diverse, depending on the conditions under which the advance aiming at the creation of socialism begins. Local distinctions, specific eco omic formations, forms of everyday life, the degree of preparedness of the population, attempts to carry out a particular plan—all these are bound to be reflected in the specific features of the path to socialism of a particular labour commune of the state. The greater such diversity—provided, of course, that it does not turn into eccentricity—the more surely and rapidly shall we ensure the achievement of both democratic centralism and a socialist economy. It only remains for us now to organise competition, i.e., to ensure publicity which would enable all communes in the state to learn how economic development has proceeded in various localities; to ensure, secondly, that the results of the advance towards socialism in one commune of the state are comparable with those in another; to ensure, thirdly, that the experience acquired in one commune can be repeated in practice by other communes; to ensure the possibility of

an exchange of those material—and human—forces which have done well in any particular sphere of the national economy or of the state administration. Crushed by the capitalist system, we cannot at present even imagine at all accurately what rich forces lie hidden in the mass of the working people, in the diversity of labour communes of a large state, in the forces of the intelligentsia, who have hitherto worked as lifeless, dumb executors of the capitalists' pre-determined plans, what forces are lying hidden and can reveal themselves given a socialist structure of society. What we have to do is only to clear the way for these forces. If we devote ourselves to the organisation of competition as a matter of state importance, then—provided that Soviet principles of the state system are implemented, provided that private ownership of land, factories, etc., is abolished—the results are inevitably bound to show themselves and will dictate our further forms of construction.

CHAPTER XI

The resolution of the Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, which I referred to at the beginning, mentions, among other things, the need to create a harmonious and strong organisation.* At the present time the degree of organisation, both of Soviet institutions and of economic units operating within the bounds of Russia, is extremely low. It could be said that immense disorganisation prevails.

But it would be incorrect to regard this as a state of ruin, collapse and decline. If the bourgeois press makes such an appraisal, it is clear that the interests of the capitalist class compel people to look at things in this way, or rather compel them to appear to look at them thus. In fact, however, anyone who is capable of looking at things at all historically will not doubt for a moment that the present state of disorganisation is a state of transition—of transition from the old to the new—a state of growth of what is new. The transition from the old to the new, if it proceeds as sharply as it has in Russia since February 1917, presupposes of course a gigantic destruction of what has become obsolete and moribund in social life. And it is clear that the search for the new

* See this volume, p. 200.—*Ed.*

cannot at once provide those definite, established, almost fixed and final forms which previously took shape in the course of centuries and lasted for centuries. The present Soviet institutions and the economic organisations which are characterised by the concept of workers' control in industry—those organisations are still in a period of ferment and instability. In these organisations, naturally, the aspect characterised by discussion and the airing of questions at meetings prevails over the business aspect. It could not be otherwise, for without drawing new sections of the people into socialist construction, without awakening to activity the broad masses hitherto asleep, there could be no question of any revolutionary change. The endless discussions and endless holding of meetings—about which the bourgeois press talks so much and so acrimoniously—is a necessary transition of the masses still completely unprepared for social construction, a transition from historical somnolence to new historical creativeness. There is absolutely nothing terrible in the fact that this transition is protracted in some places, or in the fact that the training of the masses in new work does not go forward with the rapidity which could be dreamt of by a man who is accustomed to work in isolation and does not understand what is involved in rousing hundreds, thousands and millions to independent political life. But in realising this we must also realise the turn that is now beginning in this respect. While Soviet institutions had not spread throughout Russia, while socialisation of the land and nationalisation of factories remained an exception to the general rule, it was natural that social management of the national economy (considered on a nationwide scale) could not emerge from the stage of preliminary discussional preparation either, from the stage of discussion and interpretation. Just now a fundamental change is taking place, Soviet institutions have spread all over Russia.- From Great Russia they have spread to the vast majority of the other nationalities of Russia. Socialisation of the land in the countryside and workers' control in the towns have ceased to be exceptions; instead, they have become the rule.

On the other hand, the extremely critical and even desperate situation the country is in as regards ensuring at least the mere possibility of existence for the majority

of the population, as regards safeguarding it from famine—these economic conditions urgently demand the achievement of definite practical results. The countryside could subsist on its own grain—there is no doubt of that—but it will be able to do so only if in actual fact an absolutely strict account is taken of all existing grain, and if it can be distributed among the whole population with the greatest economy and carefulness. Correct distribution requires correct organisation of transport. But it is transport that has suffered the worst destruction by war. And what is most of all necessary for the revival of transport in a country marked by such huge distances as Russia is harmonious; strong organisation and, perhaps, really millions of people working with the precision of clockwork. Now has come the turning-point when—without in any way ceasing to prepare the masses for participation in state and economic administration of all the affairs of society, and without in any way hindering their most detailed discussion of the new tasks (on the contrary, helping them in every way to carry out this discussion so that they independently think out and arrive at correct decisions)—we must at the very same time begin strictly to separate two categories of democratic functions: on the one hand, discussions and the airing of questions at public meetings, and, on the other hand, the establishment of strictest responsibility for executive functions and absolutely businesslike, disciplined, voluntary fulfilment of the assignments and decrees necessary for the economic mechanism to function really like clockwork. It was impossible to pass to this at once; some months ago it would have been pedantry or even malicious provocation to demand it. Generally speaking, this change cannot be brought about by any decree, by any prescription. But the time has come when the achievement of precisely this change is the pivot of all our revolutionary reforms. Now it has been prepared for, now the conditions for it have matured, now it is impossible to postpone it or wait for it any longer. Not long ago, in discussing the question of the reorganisation and correct planning of railway transport, the question arose of how far one-man managerial authority (which could be called dictatorial) is compatible with democratic organisations in general, with the collective principle in manage-

ment especially, and with the Soviet socialist principle of organisation in particular. Undoubtedly, the opinion is very widely held that there can be no question of such compatibility, that one-man dictatorial authority is incompatible with democracy, the Soviet type of state and collective management. Nothing could be more mistaken than this opinion.

The democratic principle of organisation—in its highest form, in which the Soviets put into effect proposals and demands for the active participation of the masses not only in discussing general rules, decisions and laws, and in controlling their fulfilment, but also directly in their implementation—implies that every representative of the masses, every citizen, must be put in such conditions that he can participate in the discussion of state laws, in the choice of his representatives and in the implementation of state laws. But it does not at all follow from this that we shall permit the slightest chaos or disorder as regards who is responsible in each individual case for definite executive functions, for carrying out definite orders, for controlling a definite joint labour process during a certain period of time. The masses must have the right to choose responsible leaders for themselves. They must have the right to replace them, the right to know and check each smallest step of their activity. They must have the right to put forward any worker without exception for administrative functions. But this does not at all mean that the process of collective labour can remain without definite leadership, without precisely establishing the responsibility of the person in charge, without the strictest order created by the single will of that person. Neither railways nor transport, nor large-scale machinery and enterprises in general can function correctly without a single will linking the entire working personnel into an economic organ operating with the precision of clockwork. Socialism owes its origin to large-scale machine industry. If the masses of the working people in introducing socialism prove incapable of adapting their institutions in the way that large-scale machine industry should work, then there can be no question of introducing socialism. That is why in the period we are now passing through, when the Soviet government and the dictatorship of the proletariat have grown sufficiently

strong, when the main lines of the enemy opposing us, i.e., of the exploiters opposing us, have been sufficiently destroyed or rendered harmless, when the functioning of Soviet institutions has adequately prepared the mass of the population for independent participation in all spheres of social life—at the present moment we are immediately confronted by the tasks of strictly separating discussion and airing questions at meetings from unfailing execution of all instructions of the person in charge. This means separating the necessary, useful preparation of the masses for executing a certain measure and checking up on its execution, which is fully recognised by every Soviet, from the actual execution itself. The masses can now—this is guaranteed them by the Soviets—take all power into their hands and consolidate this power. But to prevent this resulting in the overlapping of authority and irresponsibility from which we are suffering incredibly at the present time, it is necessary that for each executive function we should know precisely what persons, having been chosen to act as responsible leaders, bear responsibility for the functioning of the economic organism as a whole. This requires that as often as possible, when there is the slightest opportunity for it, responsible persons should be elected for one-man management in all sections of the economic organism as a whole. There must be voluntary fulfilment of the instructions of this individual leader, there must be a transition from the mixed form of discussions, public meetings, fulfilment—and at the same time criticism, checking and correction—to the strict regularity of a machine enterprise. The great majority of the labour communes of Russia, the mass of the workers and peasants, are already approaching this task or have already arrived at it. The Soviet government's task is to undertake the role of interpreting the fundamental change that is now beginning and of giving this necessity legal form.

CHAPTER XII

The slogan of practical ability and businesslike methods has enjoyed little popularity among revolutionaries. One can even say that no slogan has been less popular among them. It is quite understandable that as long as the revolutionaries' task consisted in destroying the old capitalist

order they were bound to reject and ridicule such a slogan. For at that time this slogan in practice concealed the endeavour in one form or another to come to terms with capitalism, or to weaken the proletariat's attack on the foundations of capitalism, to weaken the revolutionary struggle against capitalism. Quite clearly, things were bound to undergo a radical change after the proletariat had conquered and consolidated its power and work had begun on a wide scale for laying the foundations of a new, i.e., socialist, society. Now, too, as was pointed out above, we have no right to weaken in the slightest degree either our work of convincing the mass of the population of the correctness of our ideas, or our work of destroying the resistance of the exploiters. But the main thing in the fulfilment of these two functions has already been achieved by us. The chief and urgent requirement now is precisely the slogan of practical ability and businesslike methods. It follows that it is now an immediate, ripe and essential task to draw the bourgeois intelligentsia into our work. It would be ludicrously stupid to regard this drawing in of the intelligentsia as some kind of weakening of the Soviet system, some kind of departure from the principles of socialism or some kind of inadmissible compromise with the bourgeoisie. To express such an opinion would be a meaningless repetition of words that refer to a quite different period of activity of the revolutionary proletarian parties. On the contrary, precisely for fulfilling our revolutionary tasks, precisely in order that these tasks should not remain a utopia or a naïve aspiration but actually become a reality—and be achieved immediately—precisely for the sake of this aim we must now put practical ability and businesslike methods in organisational work as our primary, immediate and chief task. What has to be done just now is to tackle from every aspect the practical erection of the edifice, the plan of which we outlined long ago, the foundations for which we have fought for vigorously enough and firmly enough won, the materials for which we have adequately collected and which now—having provided it with scaffolding and put on working clothes, which we are not afraid of dirtying with any auxiliary materials, and strictly fulfilling the instructions of those in charge of the practical work—we must build and build and build.

The extent to which the changes in the formulation of our tasks are sometimes still not understood is evident. incidentally from the recent discussion on the role of the trade unions.[88] The view was expressed (supported by the Mensheviks, of course, with obviously provocatory aims, that is to say, with the aim of provoking us to take steps advantageous only to the bourgeoisie) that in the interests of preserving and strengthening the class independence of the proletariat the trade unions should not become state organisations. This view was camouflaged by specious and quite customary phrases learnt by heart about the struggle of labour against capital and the necessity for the class independence of the proletariat. In actual fact, however, this view was and is either a bourgeois provocation of the crudest kind or an extreme misunderstanding, a slavish repetition of the slogans of yesterday, as is shown by an analysis of the altered conditions of the present period of history. Yesterday the chief task of the trade unions was the struggle against capital and defence of the class independence of the proletariat. Yesterday the slogan of the day was distrust of the state, for it was the bourgeois state. Today the state is becoming and has become proletarian. The working class is becoming and has become the ruling class in the state. The trade unions are becoming and must become state organisations which have prime responsibility for the reorganisation of all economic life on a socialist basis. Hence to apply the slogans of the old trade unionism to the present epoch would mean renouncing the socialist tasks of the working class.

The same thing has to be said of the co-operatives. A co-operative is a little shop, and no changes, improvements or reforms alter the fact that it is a shop. The capitalist era taught socialists this view. And there is no doubt that these views correctly expressed the essence of the co-operatives as long as they remained a small appendage to the mechanism of the bourgeois system. But the point is that the position of the co-operatives undergoes a fundamental change from the time of the conquest of state power by the proletariat, from the moment that the proletarian state sets about systematic creation of the socialist order. Here quantity passes into quality. The co-operative, as a small island in capitalist society is a little shop. The co-operative, if it

embraces the whole of society, in which the land is socialised and the factories nationalised, is socialism. The task of the Soviet government after the bourgeoisie has been expropriated politically and economically consists obviously (mainly) in spreading co-operative organisations throughout society so as to make every citizen a member of a single nation-wide, or rather state-wide, co-operative. If we brush this task aside by referring to the class character of the workers' co-operatives, we shall prove to be reactionaries, harking back from the era that began with the conquest of political power by the proletariat to the era that existed prior to that conquest. While capitalism existed the political and economic activity of the working class was marked by two tendencies. On the one hand, there was the tendency to settle down fairly comfortably under capitalism, which was feasible only for a small upper stratum of the proletariat. On the other hand, there was the tendency to lead the whole mass of working and exploited people towards the revolutionary overthrow of capital in general. It is clear that when this, second tendency has gained the upper hand, when capital has been overthrown, and it is necessary to begin organising a nation-wide socialist co-operative, our view of the tasks and conditions of the co-operative movement undergoes a fundamental change. We must enter into an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives as well as with the proletarian co-operatives. We must not be afraid. It would be ridiculous if we were to fear an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives, for we are the ruling power. We need an agreement enabling us to find practically feasible, convenient and suitable forms of transition from fragmentary, scattered co-operatives to a single, national co-operative. As the state power, we must not be afraid of an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives, for such an agreement will inevitably mean their subordination to us. At the same time, we have to realise that we represent the new proletarian state power, that the working class has become the ruling class in the state. Hence the workers' co-operative must be at the head of the movement for converting the individual co-operatives into a single, national co-operative. The working class must not isolate itself from the rest of the population; on the contrary, it must lead all sections of the population without

exception in the matter of uniting them one and all in a single, national co-operative. What practical, immediately feasible, transitional measures are required for this is another question. But we must clearly realise and unequivocally decide that the whole point now is precisely this practical transition, that the proletarian state power must undertake it, test all reforms by experience and achieve the transition at all costs.

CHAPTER XIII

In discussing the question of restoring the discipline and self-discipline of the working people, special mention should be made of the important role now devolving on the courts of law. In capitalist society, the court was mainly an instrument of oppression, an instrument of bourgeois exploitation. Hence the bounden duty of the proletarian revolution lay not in reforming the judicial institutions (the task to which the Cadets and their henchmen, the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s, confined themselves), but in completely destroying and razing to its foundations the whole of the old judicial apparatus. The October Revolution fulfilled, and successfully fulfilled, this necessary task. In place of the old court, it began to establish a new, people's court or, rather, Soviet court, based on the principle of the participation of the working and exploited classes—and only of these classes—in administering the state. The new court has been needed first and foremost for the struggle against the exploiters who are trying to restore their domination, or to defend their privileges, or secretly to smuggle through and secure by deception some particle of these privileges. But, in addition, the courts—if they are really organised on the principle of Soviet institutions—have another, still more important task. This task is to ensure the strictest discipline and self-discipline of the working people. We would be ridiculous utopians if we were to imagine that such a task could be carried out on the morrow of the fall of bourgeois rule, i.e., in the first stage of the transition from capitalism to socialism, or—without coercion. It is quite impossible to fulfil this task without coercion. We need the state, we need coercion. The Soviet courts must be the organ of the proletarian state carrying out such coercion. They have

the immense task of educating the population in labour discipline. As yet, exceedingly little, or rather almost nothing, has been done by us in this respect. We must, however, achieve the organisation of such courts on the widest scale, with their activity extending to the entire working life of the country. Only such courts, provided the broad mass of the working and exploited population take part in them, will be able to ensure, through democratic forms conforming to the principles of the Soviet system, that aspirations for discipline and self-discipline do not remain vain aspirations. Only such courts will be able to ensure that we have a revolutionary authority, which we all recognise in words when speaking of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but instead of which we often see around us something as amorphous as jelly. Incidentally, it would be more correct to compare the state of society in which we live now not with a jelly, but with metal that is being melted to prepare a more stable alloy.

Dictated March 28, 1918

First published on April 14, 1929 in *Pravda* No. 86

Published according to the verbatim report

CONCERNING THE DECREE ON REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNALS[89]

A

TO MEMBERS OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE COMMISSARIAT FOR JUSTICE, AND A COPY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE C.E.C.

March 30, 1918

The decree on Soviet tribunals is in my opinion quite wrong and requires radical revision.

It is incorrect to annul the decree on press tribunals without a preliminary summary (and discussion) of the results of their work.

It is incorrect to establish the post of a one-man "tribune" outside the Collegium of the Commissariat for Justice. The result is something like the worst precedents of a "Prosecutor-General".

Instead of devoting attention to reforms of institutions, to petty or almost verbal reforms ("tribune"), attention should be directed to the practical results of the work of the Collegium for Justice in setting up a really revolutionary court that is rapid and mercilessly severe in dealing with counter-revolutionaries, hooligans, idlers and disorganisers.

Lenin

B

DRAFT DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

The Council of People's Commissars instructs the Commissariat for Justice to revise the draft decree on tribunals in the direction of abolishing the one-man power of the

"tribune" and laying chief stress not on petty alterations of the institutions set up since October 1917, but on the practical results to be achieved by setting up courts that will act really swiftly and with revolutionary ruthlessness against counter-revolutionaries, bribe-takers, disorganisers and violators of discipline.

The final draft is to be published and submitted to the C.E.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Published according to
the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE COLLECTED ARTICLES *AGAINST THE STREAM*

The majority of the articles in this publication appeared abroad in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party-Bolsheviks), which was issued from the end of 1914 to the beginning of 1917 in Switzerland. Only one large magazine article is taken from the periodical Kommunist[90] (only one issue of which appeared in 1915 in Switzerland).

To understand correctly the connection between the individual articles, one must bear in mind the chronological sequence of their publication in the newspaper.

The articles are divided into two main categories. One part is devoted to an appraisal of the war and the political tasks arising from this appraisal. The other part examines internal Party relations, the struggle of groups, which for a long time seemed to short-sighted people to be "chaos" or a "personal conflict", and which in fact has now led, as everyone can see, to a demarcation of the real socialists from the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, the Lieberdans,[91] Martovs and Co.

Obviously, the first part or first category of articles is incomparably more important. No class-conscious worker who wishes to *understand* the development of the ideas of the international socialist revolution and its first victory on October 25, 1917, can manage without an acquaintance with these articles.

N. Lenin

Written in March 1918

Published in 1918 in the collected articles *Against the Stream*, Publishing House of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies

Published according to the text of the collected articles

THESES ON BANKING POLICY[92]

1. A report to be compiled of what has been received in private banks, including in the report the liquidation of all affairs of each private bank. (Unanimous.)

On the question of how to draw up the report, the following opinions expressed:

(a) The former staff (the Commissariat for the State Bank having the right to remove some employees) of each private bank will be given an ultimatum requiring them to put in order in a very brief period of time all the affairs of the bank and to draw up a balance sheet in final form, firstly for December 14, 1917,[93] and, secondly, for the last day of operations.

(b) Private banks, in fulfilling this function of compiling reports and liquidating all affairs of the bank, act exclusively as branches of the united People's Bank of the Russian Republic and only for the purpose of liquidation, without carrying out any new operations. (Hanecki and Gukovsky and Lenin.)

Special opinion of Spunde:

The balance sheet for 14:XII:1917 should be drawn up by a special commission appointed by us.

No need to draw up another balance sheet.

Further operations, as from 14:XII:1917, to be carried out in the name of the People's Bank.

All private banks, and also the State Bank, to be declared the united People's Bank of the Russian Republic.

2. All the work of compiling reports to be under the supervision of the Commissariat for the State Bank:

The largest possible number of experienced collaborators to be invited, including former employees of the State Bank and private banks.

(Unanimous.)

3. Banking policy, without being confined to nationalisation of the banks, must gradually but steadily be directed towards converting the banks into a single apparatus for accounting and regulation of the socialistically organised economic life of the country as a whole.

Spunde and Lenin in favour.

Gukovsky against.

Hanecki abstains, considers this impossible to carry out.

4. Extraordinary measures for opening the largest possible number of branches of the People's Bank throughout the country.

These branches to be located in towns and villages so as to provide greatest convenience for the public.

Existing branches of former private banks to be used as branches of the People's Bank.

5. Declaration of inviolability of deposits (which, of course, does not diminish the right of the state to levy taxes).

6. Free circulation of cheques.

7. Full preservation of workers' control with regard to withdrawal of money from the banks.

8. Limitation of withdrawals of money for consumer purposes to be retained.

A series of improved facilities for the public to be introduced for the purpose of accelerating deposits of money in the banks and withdrawal of money from the banks, as well as simplification of formalities.

9. Adoption of measures so that the population should keep in the banks all money not absolutely necessary for consumer purposes. Preparation of a law and practical steps for compulsory implementation of this principle.

(Not to be published.)

10. In their activity, all branches of the People's Bank within the bounds of the Federative Russian Soviet Republic are to be guided strictly by the instructions and directives of the central board of management, without having the right to establish any local rules and restrictions. Exceptions are permitted only with the consent of the central board of management.

Written in March or April 1918

First published in 1926 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 6 (53)

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN THE ALEXEYEVSKY RIDING SCHOOL APRIL 7, 1918[94]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Lenin's appearance on the platform was greeted with a storm of applause.*) We are now passing through the hardest months of the revolution, said Lenin. There is famine, which we must exert all our strength to combat, while the Right S.R.s and Mensheviks look on with malicious joy. Their tactics are the tactics of Dutov and Kornilov, the tactics of the officer cadets who organised an uprising in Moscow against the Soviet government. In this respect the Mensheviks, who are striving to overthrow the Soviet government, are on their side, are on the side of the bourgeoisie, and are thereby betraying us. When we apply the death penalty by shooting, they turn into Tolstoyans and shed crocodile tears, shouting about our cruelty. They have forgotten how, along with Kerensky, they drove the workers into the slaughter, while the secret treaties were hidden in their pockets. They have forgotten this and have turned into meek Christians, fretting about mercy.

We cannot overcome our enemies without arms; they are very well aware of that but all the same they try to discredit us.

We have to put the national economy in order, and this gigantic task is the more difficult because our revolution is the first to have gone so far along the path of social transformation. To lighten this difficult task, we have to learn, but to learn not from books, but from action, from experience. Only Soviet power is any good for building the

national economy, and therefore I am proposing that you should bring thousands of our comrades into the Soviets throughout the country. Besides that, we have to develop comradely discipline. The workers and peasants must realise that the land and factories belong to them and they must be as careful of them as of their own property.

Only now, on looking back and seeing the utter helplessness of the bourgeoisie and the worthlessness of the sabotaging intelligentsia, am I certain of the tremendous progress we have made. In order to continue advancing successfully we must get rid of ignorance and negligence, but it is much more difficult to do that than to overthrow the idiot Romanov or the fool Kerensky.

Germany is strangling us, Japan is attacking us.[95] And it is in this difficult period that the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s, those tender lambs, are shouting about our cruelty, forgetting the gallows that they erected for Comrade Shahumyan.[96] In reply to them, I can say: No, we do not reject the use of force by us against the exploiters.

These tears of the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s evoked by our cruelty are their last attempt at taking part in the political life of the country and at the same time a sign of their weakness. We shall fight them mercilessly. We have to pay now for all the legacy of tsarism, for Nicholas's and Kerensky's rule. When, however, we have conquered disorganisation and apathy, then by our unceasing work we shall achieve the great victory of socialism. (*Loud applause.*)

Izvestia Saratovskovo Soveta
No. 71,
April 13, 1918

Published according to the newspaper text

DIRECTIVES TO THE VLADIVOSTOK SOVIET[97]

The following telegram must be sent by the direct line to Irkutsk (for Vladivostok):

We consider the situation very serious and issue the most categorical warning to the comrades. Do not harbour any illusions: the Japanese will certainly attack. That is inevitable. Probably all the Allies without exception will help them. Hence it is necessary to begin preparations without the least delay and to prepare seriously, exerting every effort. Above all, attention must be devoted to correct withdrawal, retreat, and removal of stores and railway materials. Do not set yourselves unrealisable aims. Prepare to sap and blow up railway lines, and to remove rolling stock and locomotives; prepare minefields around Irkutsk or in the Transbaikal area. Twice every week inform us exactly how many locomotives and how much rolling stock have been removed, and how much remains. Otherwise we do not and shall not believe anything. We have no currency notes now, but we shall have plenty as from the second half of April, but our help is conditional on your practical success in removing rolling stock and locomotives from Vladivostok, in preparing to blow up bridges and so forth.

Lenin

April 7

Published in 1934 in the collection:
V. I. Lenin, *From the Epoch of the Civil War*

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH ON THE FINANCIAL QUESTION AT THE SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C. APRIL 18, 1918

One thing is clear at the present time: we shall not solve the financial problem in the immediate future, and shall not restore the financial machinery to its usual channels. That is clear to all. It must be said, however, that so far unfortunately none of us are doing anything in this department to find even the landmarks by which it will be possible to bring the financial apparatus on to the proper course. Comrade Gukovsky has proposed a plan to us. I shall not dwell upon whether this plan is good or bad. One thing only is clear to me: at the present time it is impossible to fulfil even the best plan in the financial sphere because as a matter of fact the machinery has not been organised for fulfilling it. If we were to try to carry out any kind of taxation, we would immediately come up against the fact that at present individual regions impose taxation according as someone takes it into his head to do so, as he has occasion to do so, and as local conditions allow him. In this respect the Soviets, which have power locally are not connected with one another at the present time. On the one hand, they are therefore divorced from the central authority and, on the other hand, they are insufficiently organised to be able actually to carry out what we draw up here. Let us take an example. I have personally had occasion to see Soviets which not only could not put into effect this financial plan that we are outlining, but which even in their own localities very often do not possess the power that they should have. Very often, owing to the policy which we see in operation just now, these Soviets do not make use of

their power, are unable to use it, because power is actually in the hands of certain groups which are often hostile to the Soviets, do not obey the Soviets and which, unfortunately, have a definite armed force at their disposal. In order not to speak abstractly, I shall cite an example. Not far from Moscow, in Ryazan Gubernia, I observed the following. There is a Soviet. Alongside it there is a Revolutionary Military Committee. The latter regards itself as autonomous in relation to the Soviet and itself imposes taxes, without even rendering any account to the Soviet. The Soviet itself also imposes taxes. As you see, if under such circumstances we try to carry out a plan from here, of course, it will not work and, of course, nothing will come of it, because even there, locally the Revolutionary Military Committee does not obey the Soviet and consequently, too, the Soviet cannot do anything for the central government. Hence something has to he done. It is necessary to set up a different organisation so that all the decrees published do not remain merely decrees, and so that they can be put into effect and not left hanging in the air.

Brief newspaper report
published on April 19, 1918
in *Izvestia VTsIK*, No. 77

First published in full
in 1920 in the book *Minutes of the Sessions of the All-Russia C.E.C., 4th Convocation. Verbatim Report*, Moscow

Published according to the text of the book

SPEECH IN THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS', PEASANTS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES APRIL 23, 1918

VERBATIM REPORT

Comrades, allow me first of all to greet the newly elected Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies.

You have had to elect a new membership at an extremely grave time, at a tragic moment when the development of our revolution is entering its most dangerous and difficult phase. Elements hostile to the revolution, all those who support the enemies of the people, all those who follow in the wake of the bourgeoisie, had put great hopes in the elections to our Soviet, for at the present time we are passing through an extremely difficult period, when the victorious advance of the revolution has ended and it has entered a phase of painful experiences and even defeats. And at this moment the proletariat has again shown us the great strength of its class-consciousness. The workers, appreciating the full difficulty of the period we are passing through, clearly understand that the removal of the great afflictions which have now fallen to the lot of the working people depends not on us, but on the whole course of historical events. With heroic determination the workers will shoulder the burden of new deprivations, if they can defend thereby the gains of the October Revolution.

There is no doubt that, along with severe trials, the revolution has nevertheless entered a phase of new, inconspicuous victories, which do not catch the eye but are not less important than the brilliant victories of the epoch of the October barricades. We are confronted in all their

magnitude by our two mortal enemies; facing us in full armour are the external and the internal enemies, ready to tear the revolution to pieces and awaiting a suitable moment to deliver a knock-out blow. The external enemy is international imperialism. Armed to the teeth and possessing a wealth of technical equipment, it is awaiting the moment for a new predatory attack on Soviet Russia. Bearing this in mind, we must with merciless clear-sightedness look the ominous truth squarely in the face.

At the present time, as a result of the most reactionary war which our tormented country has had to endure, we do not have sufficient forces for an active, armed struggle against world reaction; we do not have an army, we do not have the forces with which to oppose the excellently organised contingents of international counter-revolution, which have the strength that comes with up-to-date equipment and ideal discipline. For the time being we are alone and surrounded by deadly enemies.

At the time of the October uprising of the working people, when we unfurled the Red banner of the socialist revolution before the workers, we went through a period of easy, dazzling success. The workers of other countries, who heard the far-off roar of the Russian revolution, understood what was taking place in Russia and realised that the Russian proletariat's action furthered their own vital cause. At that time, we easily coped with the reactionary gangs, we easily suppressed the remnants of the Menshevik gangs who were in revolt against the people and who opposed us not by open struggle arms in hand but by the dirty weapon of lies, slander and unprecedented treachery. As a result of our struggle against the counter-revolution we achieved a big victory, as seen from the fact that the counter-revolutionary Kornilov, foremost in audacity, was killed by his own soldiers, who had revolted against him.[98]

Waging an extensive struggle against the domestic counter-revolution on all fronts, we took advantage of the hitch suffered by the international bourgeoisie and delivered a well-timed, powerful body-blow at the now shattered counter-revolution. We can say with confidence that in the main the civil war is at an end. There will be some skirmishes, of course, and in some towns street fighting will

flare up here or there, due to isolated attempts by the reactionaries to overthrow the strength of the revolution—the Soviet system—but there is no doubt that on the internal front reaction has been irretrievably smashed by the efforts of the insurgent people. Thus we have survived the first period of development of the revolution—the beginning of which dates from the October days—a period of intoxicating success, which did, in fact, go to the heads of some people.

I repeat again that the most difficult, the gravest phase in the life of our revolution has now begun. The task before us is the inflexible exertion of all our strength and its application to new creative work, for only iron endurance and labour discipline will enable the revolutionary Russian proletariat, as yet so solitary in its gigantic revolutionary work, to hold out till the time of deliverance when the international proletariat will come to our aid.

We are a revolutionary working-class contingent that has advanced to the forefront, not because we are better than other workers, not because the Russian proletariat is superior to the working class of other countries, but solely because we were one of the most backward countries in the world. We shall achieve final victory only when we succeed at last in conclusively smashing international imperialism, which relies on the tremendous strength of its equipment and discipline. But we shall achieve victory only together with all the workers of other countries, of the whole world.

By force of circumstances, we have had to make an onerous peace in Brest, and we do not hide the fact that at any moment this peace may be treacherously violated by the numerous enemies of the revolution who are advancing upon us from all sides, and against whom we are powerless to begin an active struggle at the present moment. Bear in mind that anyone who would call you just now to this active, armed, open struggle against international predatory imperialism would commit an act of treachery to the people, would be a voluntary or involuntary agent provocateur and servitor of one or other clique of the imperialists. And anyone who acts in opposition to the tactics to which we have adhered in the recent period—even if he calls himself the most "Left", even super-Left, Communist—is a bad

revolutionary, I will say more, is not a revolutionary at all. (*Applause.*)

Our backwardness has put us in the forefront, and we shall perish unless we are capable of holding out until we receive powerful support from workers who have risen in revolt in other countries. Our task consists in steadily continuing our tactics of proletarian struggle.

We have one extremely dangerous secret enemy, more dangerous than many open counter-revolutionaries; this enemy is the deadly enemy of the socialist revolution and Soviet power, which is a people's parliament of a new type for the poor, one that has hitherto not existed anywhere—this enemy is the anarchy of the petty proprietor. There is no doubt that we have come near to surmounting the most difficult obstacles in the way of the development of the socialist revolution. The first and foremost task confronting us is the full realisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in all spheres: in the organisation of labour discipline, in production, and in the distribution of products. The enemy of whom I have spoken is the anarchy of the petty proprietors, whose life is guided by one thought: "I grab all I can—the rest can go hang." This enemy is more powerful than all the Kornilovs, Dutovs and Kaledins put together.

These petty kulaks, petty employers and proprietors say: "All the time we have been oppressed, all the time we have been crushed—well, how can we fail to take advantage of such a favourable opportunity." This phenomenon is a serious obstacle and unless we overcome it victory is inconceivable, for a new Kornilov will grow from each petty proprietor, from each greedy grabber.

Alongside this danger, the terrible spectre of approaching famine and mass unemployment confronts us, but we see that all class-conscious workers, whose numbers increase not daily but hourly, take into consideration and understand that at the present time the sole means of struggle against these grave dangers is the unrelaxing exertion of all our strength and powerful endurance. And let it be remembered by those who give way to despair, and who lose heart and vigour at difficult moments in our revolution, that we have always said that we cannot pass from capital-

ism to the full victory of socialism by the bloodless and easy path of persuasion and conciliation, and that we can only reach our goal as the result of a furious struggle.

The dictatorship of the proletariat stands for the use of force against the exploiters. Our road is through endurance, proletarian solidarity, and the iron dictatorship of the working people. There is no doubt that in many cases the Soviet government has not displayed sufficient determination in the struggle against counter-revolution, and in this respect it has had the appearance not of iron, but of jelly, from which socialism cannot be built. We have not conquered petty-bourgeois anarchy. This country, which the course of history has advanced to the foremost position in the arena of the world revolution, a country devastated and bled white, is in an extremely grave situation and we shall be crushed if we do not counter ruin, disorganisation and despair with the iron dictatorship of the class-conscious workers. We shall be merciless both to our enemies and to all waverers and harmful elements in our midst who dare to bring disorganisation into our difficult creative work of building a new life for the working people.

We have begun to solve a problem the mastery of which will bring the full guarantee and consolidation of socialism. To overcome all difficulties, to struggle successfully against famine and unemployment, we shall perform an imperceptible, modest but difficult task of state importance, and anyone who opposes us will be a bitter enemy of the world proletariat.

The elections to the Moscow Soviet have shown how great is the workers' insight into current events. They have realised that Soviet power is not a showy ornament but something of their own flesh and blood. This last act, that of the elections to our Soviet, has spelt defeat for all those who pinned their hopes on these elections, for all the wavering elements, and this gives me hope and confidence that we are on the right road, which will lead us to the full victory of socialism. (*Ovation.*)

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the *Pravda* text,
collated with the verbatim report
and the *Izvestia* text

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT[99]

Written in March-April 1918
Published on April 28, 1918
in *Pravda* No. 83
and *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 85
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text of the pamphlet:
N. Lenin, *The Immediate*
Tasks of the Soviet Government
2nd ed., Moscow, 1918,
collated with the manuscript

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THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC AND THE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Thanks to the peace which has been achieved—despite its extremely onerous character and extreme instability—he Russian Soviet Republic has gained an opportunity to concentrate its efforts for a while on the most important and most difficult aspect of the socialist revolution, namely, the task of organisation.

This task was clearly and definitely set before all the working and oppressed people in the fourth paragraph (Part 4) of the resolution adopted at the Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in Moscow on March 15, 1918, in that paragraph (or part) which speaks of the self-discipline of the working people and of the ruthless struggle against chaos and disorganisation.*

Of course, the peace achieved by the Russian Soviet Republic is unstable not because she is now thinking of resuming military operations; apart from bourgeois counter-revolutionaries and their henchmen (the Mensheviks and others), no sane politician thinks of doing that. The instability of the peace is due to the fact that in the imperialist states bordering on Russia to the West and the East, which command enormous military forces, the military party, tempted by Russia's momentary weakness and egged on by capitalists, who hate socialism and are eager for plunder, may gain the upper hand at any moment.

Under these circumstances the only real, not paper, guarantee of peace we have is the antagonism among the imperialist powers, which has reached extreme limits, and

* See this volume, p. 200.—*Ed.*

which is apparent on the one hand in the resumption of the imperialist butchery of the peoples in the West, and on the other hand in the extreme intensification of imperialist rivalry between Japan and America for supremacy in the Pacific and on the Pacific coast.

It goes without saying that with such an unreliable guard for protection, our Soviet Socialist Republic is in an extremely unstable and certainly critical international position. All our efforts must be exerted to the very utmost to make use of the respite given us by the combination of circumstances so that we can heal the very severe wounds inflicted by the war upon the entire social organism of Russia and bring about an economic revival, without which a real increase in our country's defence potential is inconceivable.

It also goes without saying that we shall be able to render effective assistance to the socialist revolution in the West which has been delayed for a number of reasons, only to the extent that we are able to fulfil the task of organisation confronting us.

A fundamental condition for the successful accomplishment of the primary task of organisation confronting us is that the people's political leaders, i.e., the members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and following them all the class-conscious representatives of the mass of the working people, shall fully appreciate the radical distinction in this respect between previous bourgeois revolutions and the present socialist revolution.

In bourgeois revolutions, the principal task of the mass of working people was to fulfil the negative or destructive work of abolishing feudalism, monarchy and medievalism. The positive or constructive work of organising the new society was carried out by the property-owning bourgeois minority of the population. And the latter carried out this task with relative ease, despite the resistance of the workers and the poor peasants, not only because the resistance of the people exploited by capital was then extremely weak, since they were scattered and uneducated, but also because the chief organising force of anarchically built capitalist society is the spontaneously growing and expanding national and international market.



Тезисы о задачах Советской власти в настоящий момент.

Председатель Совета Народных Комиссаров Ленин

1. Главная добродетель люд, — центры на всю его грандиозность и всю его непреложность, — российская советская республика получает возможность на нынешнее время сосредоточить свои силы на важнейшей 3-й и труднейшей социалистической революции, именно: на задачах организационной.

Эта задача ясна и точно государственно определена трудящимися и угнетенными массами в 4-м съезде (4-й созыв) резолюции, принятой 11.V. 1918 г. на московском чрезвычайном съезде Советов, — в этом съезде (или 4-й созыв) резолюция, где говорится о самодеятельности трудящихся и о беспощадной борьбе с хаосом и дезорганизацией.

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Theses on the Tasks of the Soviet Government in the Present Situation", March-April 1918

Reduced

First page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Theses on the Tasks of the Soviet Government in the Present Situation", March-April 1918

Reduced

In every socialist revolution, however—and consequently in the socialist revolution in Russia which we began on October 25, 1917—the principal task of the proletariat, and of the poor peasants which it leads, is the positive or constructive work of setting up an extremely intricate and delicate system of new organisational relationships extending to the planned production and distribution of the goods required for the existence of tens of millions of people. Such a revolution can be successfully carried out only if the majority of the population, and primarily the majority of the working people, engage in independent creative work as makers of history. Only if the proletariat and the poor peasants display sufficient class-consciousness, devotion to principle, self-sacrifice and perseverance, will the victory of the socialist revolution be assured. By creating a new, Soviet type of state, which gives the working and oppressed people the chance to take an active part in the independent building up of a new society, we solved only a small part of this difficult problem . The principal difficulty lies in the economic sphere, namely, the introduction of the strictest and universal accounting and control of the production and distribution of goods, raising the productivity of labour and *socialising* production *in practice.*

The development of the Bolshevik Party, which today is the governing party in Russia, very strikingly indicates the nature of the turning-point in history we have now reached, which is the peculiar feature of the present political situation, and which calls for a new orientation of Soviet power, i.e., for a new presentation of new tasks.

The first task of every party of the future is to convince, the majority of the people that its programme and tactics are correct. This task stood in the forefront both in tsarist times and in the period of the Chernovs' and Tseretelis' policy of compromise with the Kerenskys and Kishkins. This task has now been fulfilled in the main, for, as the recent Congress of Soviets in Moscow incontrovertibly proved, the majority of the workers and peasants of Russia are obviously on the side of the Bolsheviks; but of course,

it is far from being completely fulfilled (and it can never be completely fulfilled).

The second task that confronted our Party was to capture political power and to suppress the resistance of the exploiters. This task has not been completely fulfilled either, and it cannot be ignored because the monarchists and Constitutional-Democrats on the one hand, and their henchmen and hangers-on, the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the other, are continuing their efforts to unite for the purpose of overthrowing Soviet power. In the main, however, the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters was fulfilled in the period from October 25, 1917, to (approximately) February 1918, or to the surrender of Bogayevsky.[100]

A third task is now coming to the fore as the immediate task and one which constitutes the peculiar feature of the present situation, namely, the task of organising *administration* of Russia. Of course, we advanced and tackled this task on the very day following October 25, 1917. Up to now, however, since the resistance of the exploiters still took the form of open civil war, up to now the task of administration *could not* become the *main*, the *central* task.

Now it has become the main and central task. We, the Bolshevik Party, have *convinced* Russia. We have *won* Russia from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the working people. Now we must *administer* Russia. And the whole peculiarity of the present situation, the whole difficulty, lies in understanding *the specific features of the transition* from the principal task of convincing the people and of suppressing the exploiters by armed force to the principal task of *administration*.

For the first time in human history a socialist party has managed to complete in the main the conquest of power and the suppression of the exploiters, and has managed to *approach directly* the task of *administration*. We must prove worthy executors of this most difficult (and most gratifying) task of the socialist revolution. We must *fully realise* that in order to administer successfully, *besides* being able to convince people, besides being able to win a civil war, we must be able to do *practical organisational work*. This is the most difficult task, because it is a matter

of organising in a new way the most deep-rooted, the economic, foundations of life of scores of millions of people. And it is the most gratifying task, because only *after* it has been fulfilled (in the principal and main outlines) will it be possible to say that Russia *has become* not only a Soviet, but also a socialist, republic.

THE GENERAL SLOGAN OF THE MOMENT

The objective situation reviewed above, which has been created by the extremely onerous and unstable peace, the terrible state of ruin, the unemployment and famine we inherited from the war and the rule of the bourgeoisie (represented by Kerensky and the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries who supported him), all this has inevitably caused extreme weariness and even exhaustion of wide sections of the working people. These people insistently demand—and cannot but demand—a respite. The task of the day is to restore the productive forces destroyed by the war and by bourgeois rule; to heal the wounds inflicted by the war, by the defeat in the war, by profiteering and the attempts of the bourgeoisie to restore the overthrown rule of the exploiters; to achieve economic revival; to provide reliable protection of elementary order. It may sound paradoxical, but in fact, considering the objective conditions indicated above, it is absolutely certain that at the present moment the Soviet system can secure Russia's transition to socialism only if these very elementary, extremely elementary problems of maintaining public life are practically solved in spite of the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. In view of the specific features of the present situation, and in view of the existence of Soviet power with its land socialisation law, workers' control law, etc., the practical solution of these extremely elementary problems and the overcoming of the organisational difficulties of the first stages of progress toward socialism are now two aspects of the same picture.

Keep regular and honest accounts of money, manage economically, do not be lazy, do not steal, observe the strictest labour discipline—it is these slogans, justly scorned

by the revolutionary proletariat when the bourgeoisie used them to conceal its rule as an exploiting class, that are now, since the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, becoming the immediate and the principal slogans of the moment. On the one hand, the practical application of these slogans by *the mass* of working people is the *sole* condition for the salvation of a country which has been tortured almost to death by the imperialist war and by the imperialist robbers (headed by Kerensky); on the other hand, the practical application of these slogans by the *Soviet* State, by *its* methods, on the basis of *its* laws, is a necessary and *sufficient* condition for the final victory of socialism. This is precisely what those who contemptuously brush aside the idea of putting such "hackneyed" and "trivial" slogans in the forefront fail to understand. In a small-peasant country, which overthrew tsarism only a year ago, and which liberated itself from the Kerenskys less than six months ago, there has naturally remained not a little of spontaneous anarchy, intensified by the brutality and savagery that accompany every protracted and reactionary war, and there has arisen a good deal of despair and aimless bitterness. And if we add to this the provocative policy of the lackeys of the bourgeoisie (the Mensheviks, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.) it will become perfectly clear what prolonged and persistent efforts must be exerted by the best and the most class-conscious workers and peasants in order to bring about a complete change in the mood of the people and to bring them on to the proper path of steady and disciplined labour. Only such a transition brought about by the mass of the poor (the proletarians and semi-proletarians) can consummate the victory over the bourgeoisie and particularly over the peasant bourgeoisie, more stubborn and numerous.

THE NEW PHASE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BOURGEOISIE

The bourgeoisie in our country has been conquered, but it has not yet been uprooted, not yet destroyed, and not even utterly broken. That is why we are faced with a new and higher form of struggle against the bourgeoisie, the transition from the very simple task of further expropriating the

capitalists to the much more complicated and difficult task of creating conditions in which it will be impossible for the bourgeoisie to exist, or for a new bourgeoisie to arise. Clearly, this task is immeasurably more significant than the previous one; and until it is fulfilled there will be no socialism.

If we measure our revolution by the scale of West-European revolutions we shall find that at the present moment we are approximately at the level reached in 1793 and 1871. We can be legitimately proud of having risen to this level, and of having certainly, in one respect, advanced somewhat further, namely: we have decreed and introduced throughout Russia the highest *type* of state—Soviet power. Under no circumstances, however, can we rest content with what we have achieved, because we have only just started the transition to socialism, we have *not yet* done the decisive thing in *this* respect.

The decisive thing is the organisation of the strictest and country-wide accounting and control of production and distribution of goods. And yet, we have *not yet* introduced accounting and control in those enterprises and in those branches and fields of economy which we have taken away from the bourgeoisie; and without this there can be no thought of achieving the second and equally essential material condition for introducing socialism, namely, raising the productivity of labour on a national scale.

That is why the present task could not be defined by the simple formula: continue the offensive against capital. Although we have certainly not finished off capital and although it is certainly necessary to continue the offensive against this enemy of the working people, such a formula would be inexact, would not be concrete, would not take into account the *peculiarity* of the present situation in which, in order to go on advancing successfully *in the future*, we must "suspend" our offensive *now*.

This can be explained by comparing our position in the war against capital with the position of a victorious army that has captured, say, a half or two-thirds of the enemy's territory and is compelled to halt in order to muster its forces, to replenish its supplies of munitions, repair and reinforce the lines of communication, build new storehouses,

bring up new reserves, etc. To suspend the offensive of a victorious army under such conditions is necessary precisely in order to gain the rest of the enemy's territory, i.e., in order to achieve complete victory. Those who have failed to understand that the objective state of affairs at the present moment dictates to us precisely such a "suspension" of the offensive against capital have failed to understand anything at all about the present political situation.

It goes without saying that we can speak about the "suspension" of the offensive against capital only in quotation marks, i.e., only metaphorically. In ordinary war, a general order can be issued to stop the offensive, the advance can actually be stopped. In the war against capital, however, the advance cannot be stopped, and there can be no thought of our abandoning the further expropriation of capital. What we are discussing is the shifting of the *centre of gravity* of our economic and political work. Up to now measures for the direct expropriation of the expropriators were *in the forefront*. Now the organisation of accounting and control in those enterprises in which the capitalists have already been expropriated, and in all other enterprises, advances *to the forefront*.

If we decided to continue to expropriate capital at the same rate at which we have been doing it up to now, we should certainly suffer defeat, because our work of organising proletarian accounting and control has obviously—obviously to every thinking person—*fallen behind* the work of *directly* "expropriating the expropriators". If we now concentrate all our efforts on the organisation of accounting and control, we shall be able to solve this problem, we shall be able to make up for lost time, we shall *completely* win our "campaign" against capital.

But is not the admission that we must make up for lost time tantamount to admission of some kind of an error? Not in the least. Take another military example. If it is possible to defeat and push back the enemy merely with detachments of light cavalry, it should be done. But if this can be done successfully only up to a certain point, then it is quite conceivable that when this point has been reached, it will be necessary to bring up heavy artillery. By admitting that it is now necessary to make up for lost time in

bringing up heavy artillery, we do not admit that the successful cavalry attack was a mistake.

Frequently, the lackeys of the bourgeoisie reproached us for having launched a "Red Guard" attack on capital. The reproach is absurd and is worthy only of the lackeys of the money-bags, because *at one time* the "Red Guard" attack on capital was absolutely dictated by circumstances. Firstly, *at that time* capital put up military resistance through the medium of Kerensky and Krasnov, Savinkov and Gotz (Gegechkori is putting up such resistance even now), Dutov and Bogayevsky. Military resistance cannot be broken except by military means, and the Red Guards fought in the noble and supreme historical cause of liberating the working and exploited people from the yoke of the exploiters.

Secondly, we could not at that time put methods of administration in the forefront in place of methods of suppression, because the art of administration is not innate, but is acquired by experience. At that time we lacked this experience; now we have it. Thirdly, at that time we could not have specialists in the various fields of knowledge and technology at our disposal because those specialists were either fighting in the ranks of the Bogayevskys, or were still able to put up systematic and stubborn passive resistance by way of *sabotage*. Now we have broken the sabotage. The "Red Guard" attack on capital was successful, was victorious, because we broke capital's military resistance and its resistance by sabotage.

Does that mean that a "Red Guard" attack on capital is *always* appropriate, under *all* circumstances, that we have no other means of fighting capital? It would be childish to think so. We achieved victory with the aid of light cavalry, but we also have heavy artillery. We achieved victory by methods of suppression; we shall be able to achieve victory also by methods of administration. We must know how to change our methods of fighting the enemy to suit changes in the situation. We shall not for a moment renounce "Red Guard" suppression of the Savinkovs and Gegechkoris and all other landowner and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. We shall not be so foolish, however, as to put "Red Guard" methods in the forefront at a time

when the period in which Red Guard attacks were necessary has, in the main, drawn to a close (and to a victorious close), and when the period of utilising bourgeois specialists by the proletarian state power for the purpose of reploughing the soil in order to prevent the growth of any bourgeoisie whatever is knocking at the door.

This is a peculiar epoch, or rather stage of development, and in order to defeat capital completely, we must be able to adapt the forms of our struggle to the peculiar conditions of this stage.

Without the guidance of experts in the various fields of knowledge, technology and experience, the transition to socialism will be impossible, because socialism calls for a conscious mass advance to greater productivity of labour compared with capitalism, and on the basis achieved by capitalism. Socialism must achieve this advance *in its own way*, by its own methods—or, to put it more concretely, by *Soviet* methods. And the specialists, because of the whole social environment which made them specialists, are, in the main, inevitably bourgeois. Had our proletariat, after capturing power, quickly solved the problem of accounting, control and organisation on a national scale (which was impossible owing to the war and Russia's backwardness), then we, after breaking the sabotage, would also have completely subordinated these bourgeois experts to ourselves by means of universal accounting and control. Owing to the considerable "delay" in introducing accounting and control generally, we, although we have managed to conquer sabotage, have *not yet* created the conditions which would place the bourgeois specialists at our disposal. The mass of saboteurs are "going to work", but the best organisers and the top experts can be utilised by the state either in the old way, in the bourgeois way (i.e., for high salaries), or in the new way, in the proletarian way (i.e., creating the conditions of national accounting and control from below, which would inevitably and of itself subordinate the experts and enlist them for our work).

Now we have to resort to the old bourgeois method and to agree to pay a very high price for the "services" of the top bourgeois experts. All those who are familiar with the subject appreciate this, but not all ponder over the sig-

nificance of this measure being adopted by the proletarian state. Clearly, this measure is a compromise, a departure from the principles of the Paris Commune and of every proletarian power, which call for the reduction of all salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker, which urge that careerism be fought not merely in words, but in deeds.

Moreover, it is clear that this measure not only implies the cessation—in a certain field and to a certain degree—of the offensive against capital (for capital is not a sum of money, but a definite social relation); it is also *a step backward* on the part of our socialist Soviet state power, which from the very outset proclaimed and pursued the policy of reducing high salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker.[101]

Of course, the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, particularly the small fry, such as the Mensheviks, the *Novaya Zhizn* people and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, will giggle over our confession that we are taking a step backward. But we need not mind their giggling. We must study the specific features of the extremely difficult and new path to socialism without concealing our mistakes and weaknesses, and try to be prompt in doing what has been left undone. To conceal from the people the fact that the enlistment of bourgeois experts by means of extremely high salaries is a retreat from the principles of the Paris Commune would be sinking to the level of bourgeois politicians and deceiving the people. Frankly explaining how and why we took this step backward, and then publicly discussing what means are available for making up for lost time, means educating the people and learning from experience, learning together with the people how to build socialism. There is hardly a single victorious military campaign in history in which the victor did not commit certain mistakes, suffer partial reverses, temporarily yield something and in some places retreat. The "campaign" which we have undertaken against capitalism is a million times more difficult than the most difficult military campaign, and it would be silly and disgraceful to give way to despondency because of a particular and partial retreat.

We shall now discuss the question from the practical point of view. Let us assume that the Russian Soviet

Republic requires one thousand first-class scientists and experts in various fields of knowledge, technology and practical experience to direct the labour of the people towards securing the speediest possible economic revival. Let us assume also that we shall have to pay these "stars of the first magnitude"—of course the majority of those who shout loudest about the corruption of the workers are themselves utterly corrupted by bourgeois morals—25,000 rubles per annum each. Let us assume that this sum (25,000,000 rubles) will have to be doubled (assuming that we have to pay bonuses for particularly successful and rapid fulfilment of the most important organisational and technical tasks), or even quadrupled (assuming that we have to enlist several hundred foreign specialists, who are more demanding). The question is, would the annual expenditure of fifty or a hundred million rubles by the Soviet Republic for the purpose of reorganising the labour of the people on modern scientific and technological lines be excessive or too heavy? Of course not. The overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers and peasants will approve of this expenditure because they know from practical experience that our backwardness causes us to lose thousands of millions, and that we have *not yet* reached that degree of organisation, accounting and control which would induce all the "stars" of the bourgeois intelligentsia to participate voluntarily in *our* work.

It goes without saying that this question has another side to it. The corrupting influence of high salaries—both upon the Soviet authorities (especially since the revolution occurred so rapidly that it was impossible to prevent a certain number of adventurers and rogues from getting into positions of authority, and they, together with a number of inept or dishonest commissars, would not be averse to becoming "star" embezzlers of state funds) and upon the mass of the workers—is indisputable. Every thinking and honest worker and poor peasant, however, will agree with us, will admit, that we cannot immediately rid ourselves of the evil legacy of capitalism, and that we can liberate the Soviet Republic from the duty of paying an annual "tribute" of fifty million or one hundred million rubles (a tribute for our own-backwardness in organising *country-wide*

accounting and control *from below*) only by organising ourselves, by tightening up discipline in our own ranks, by purging our ranks of all those who are "preserving the legacy of capitalism", who "follow the traditions of capitalism", i.e., of idlers, parasites and embezzlers of state funds (now all the land, all the factories and all the railways are the "state funds" of the Soviet Republic). If the class-conscious advanced workers and poor peasants manage with the aid of the Soviet institutions to organise, become disciplined, pull themselves together, create powerful labour discipline in the course of one year, then in a year's time we shall throw off this "tribute", which can be reduced even before that ... in exact proportion to the successes we achieve in our workers' and peasants' labour discipline and organisation. The sooner we ourselves, workers and peasants, learn the best labour discipline and the most modern technique of labour, using the bourgeois experts to teach us, the sooner we shall liberate ourselves from any "tribute" to these specialists.

Our work of organising country-wide accounting and control of production and distribution under the supervision of the proletariat has lagged very much behind our work of directly expropriating the expropriators. This proposition is of fundamental importance for understanding the specific features of the present situation and the tasks of the Soviet government that follow from it. The centre of gravity of our struggle against the bourgeoisie is shifting to the organisation of such accounting and control. Only with this as our starting-point will it be possible to determine correctly the immediate tasks of economic and financial policy in the sphere of nationalisation of the banks, monopolisation of foreign trade, the state control of money circulation, the introduction of a property and income tax satisfactory from the proletarian point of view, and the introduction of compulsory labour service.

We have been lagging very far behind in introducing socialist reforms in these spheres (very, very important spheres), and this is because accounting and control are insufficiently organised in general. It goes without saying that this is one of the most difficult tasks, and in view of the ruin caused by the war, it can be fulfilled only over a

long period of time; but we must not forget that it is precisely here that the bourgeoisie—and particularly the numerous petty and peasant bourgeoisie—are putting up the most serious fight, disrupting the control that is already being organised, disrupting the grain monopoly, for example, and gaining positions for profiteering and speculative trade. We have far from adequately carried out the things we have decreed, and the principal task of the moment is to concentrate all efforts on the businesslike, practical *realisation* of the principles of the reforms which have already become law (but not yet reality).

In order to proceed with the nationalisation of the banks and to go on steadfastly towards transforming the banks into nodal points of public accounting under socialism, we must first of all, and above all, achieve real success in increasing the number of branches of the People's Bank, in attracting deposits, in simplifying the paying in and withdrawal of deposits by the public, in abolishing queues, in catching and *shooting* bribe-takers and rogues, etc. At first we must really carry out the simplest things, properly organise what is available, and then prepare for the more intricate things.

Consolidate and improve the state monopolies (in grain, leather, etc.) which have already been introduced, and by doing so prepare for the state monopoly of foreign trade. Without this monopoly we shall not be able to "free ourselves" from foreign capital by paying "tribute".[102] And the possibility of building up socialism depends entirely upon whether we shall be able, by paying a certain tribute to foreign capital during a certain transitional period, to safeguard our internal economic independence.

We are also lagging very far behind in regard to the collection of taxes generally, and of the property and income tax in particular. The imposing of indemnities upon the bourgeoisie—a measure which in principle is absolutely permissible and deserves proletarian approval—shows that in this respect we are still nearer to the methods of warfare (to win Russia from the rich for the poor) than to the methods of administration. In order to become stronger, however, and in order to be able to stand firmer on our feet, we must adopt the latter methods, we must substitute for the

indemnities imposed upon the bourgeoisie the constant and regular collection of a property and income tax, which will bring a *greater* return to the proletarian state, and which calls for better organisation on our part and better accounting and control.[103]

The fact that we are late in introducing compulsory labour service also shows that the work that is coming to the fore at the present time is precisely the preparatory organisational work that, on the one hand, will finally consolidate our gains and that, on the other, is necessary in order to prepare for the operation of "surrounding" capital and compelling it to "surrender". We ought to begin introducing compulsory labour service immediately, but we must do so very gradually and circumspectly, testing every step by practical experience, and, of course, taking the first step by introducing compulsory labour service *for the rich*. The introduction of work and consumers' budget books for every bourgeois, including every rural bourgeois, would be an important step towards completely "surrounding" the enemy and towards the creation of a truly popular accounting and control of the production and distribution of goods.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STRUGGLE FOR COUNTRY-WIDE ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL

The state, which for centuries has been an organ for oppression and robbery of the people, has left us a legacy of the people's supreme hatred and suspicion of everything that is connected with the state. It is very difficult to overcome this, and only a Soviet government can do it. Even a Soviet government, however, will require plenty of time and enormous perseverance to accomplish it. This "legacy" is especially apparent in the problem of accounting and control—the fundamental problem facing the socialist revolution on the morrow of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. A certain amount of time will inevitably pass before the people, who feel free for the first time now that the landowners and the bourgeoisie have been overthrown, will understand—not from books, but from their own, *Soviet* experience—will understand and feel that without comprehensive state accounting and control of the production and

distribution of goods, the power of the working people, the freedom of the working people, *cannot* be maintained, and that a return to the yoke of capitalism is *inevitable*.

All the habits and traditions of the bourgeoisie, and of the petty bourgeoisie in particular, also oppose *state* control, and uphold the inviolability of "sacred private property", of "sacred" private enterprise. It is now particularly clear to us how correct is the Marxist thesis that anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism are *bourgeois* trends, how irreconcilably opposed they are to socialism, proletarian dictatorship and communism. The fight to instill into the people's minds the idea of *Soviet* state control and accounting, and to carry out this idea in practice; the fight to break with the rotten past, which taught the people to regard the procurement of bread and clothes as a "private" affair, and buying and selling as a transaction "which concerns only myself"—is a great fight of world-historic significance, a fight between socialist consciousness and bourgeois-anarchist spontaneity.

We have introduced workers' control as a law, but this law is only just beginning to operate and is only just beginning to penetrate the minds of broad sections of the proletariat. In our agitation we do not sufficiently explain that lack of accounting and control in the production and distribution of goods means the death of the rudiments of socialism, means the embezzlement of state funds (for all property belongs to the state and the state is the Soviet state in which power belongs to the majority of the working people). We do not sufficiently explain that carelessness in accounting and control is downright aiding and abetting the German and the Russian Kornilovs, who can overthrow the power of the working people *only* if we fail to cope with the task of accounting and control, and who, with the aid of the whole of the rural bourgeoisie, with the aid of the Constitutional-Democrats, the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, are "watching" us and waiting for an opportune moment to attack us. And the advanced workers and peasants do not think and speak about this sufficiently. Until workers' control has become a fact, until the advanced workers have organised and carried out a victorious and ruthless crusade against the violators of

this control, or against those who are careless in matters of control, it will be impossible to pass from the first step (from workers' control) to the second step towards socialism, i.e., to pass on to workers' regulation of production.

The socialist state can arise only as a network of producers' and consumers' communes, which conscientiously keep account of their production and consumption, economise on labour, and steadily raise the productivity of labour, thus making it possible to reduce the working day to seven, six and even fewer hours. Nothing will be achieved unless the strictest, country-wide, comprehensive accounting and control of *grain* and the *production of grain* (and later of all other essential goods) are set going. Capitalism left us a legacy of mass organisations which can facilitate our transition to the mass accounting and control of the distribution of goods, namely, the consumers' co-operative societies. In Russia these societies are not so well developed as in the advanced countries, nevertheless, they have over ten million members. The Decree on Consumers' Co-operative Societies,[104] issued the other day, is an extremely significant phenomenon, which strikingly illustrates the peculiar position and the specific tasks of the Soviet Socialist Republic at the present moment.

The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois co-operative societies and the workers' co-operative societies which still adhere to the bourgeois point of view. It is an agreement, or compromise, firstly because the representatives of the above-mentioned institutions not only took part in discussing the decree, but actually had a decisive say in the matter, for the parts of the decree which were strongly opposed by these institutions were dropped. Secondly, the essence of the compromise is that the Soviet government has abandoned the principle of admission of new members to co-operative societies without entrance fees (which is the only consistently proletarian principle); it has also abandoned the idea of uniting the whole population of a given locality in a *single* co-operative society. Contrary to this principle, which is the only socialist principle and which corresponds to the task of abolishing classes, the "working-class co-operative societies" (which in this case call themselves "class" societies only because they subordinate

themselves to the class interests of the bourgeoisie) were given the right to continue to exist. Finally, the Soviet government's proposal to expel the bourgeoisie entirely from the boards of the co-operative societies was also considerably modified, and only owners of private capitalist trading and industrial enterprises were forbidden to serve on the boards.

Had the proletariat, acting through the Soviet government, managed to organise accounting and control on a national scale, or at least laid the foundation for such control, it would not have been necessary to make such compromises. Through the food departments of the Soviets, through the supply organisations under the Soviets we should have organised the population into a single co-operative society under proletarian management. We should have done this without the assistance of the bourgeois co-operative societies, without making any concession to the purely bourgeois principle which prompts the workers' co-operative societies to remain workers' societies *side by side* with bourgeois societies, *instead of* subordinating these bourgeois co-operative societies entirely to themselves, merging the two together and taking the *entire* management of the society and the supervision of the consumption of the rich *in their own* hands.

In concluding such an agreement with the bourgeois co-operative societies, the Soviet government concretely defined its tactical aims and its peculiar methods of action in the present stage of development as follows: by directing the bourgeois elements, utilising them, making certain partial concessions to them, we create the conditions for further progress that will be slower than we at first anticipated, but surer, with the base and lines of communication better secured and with the positions which have been won better consolidated. The Soviets can (*and should*) now gauge their successes in the field of socialist construction, among other things, by extremely clear, simple and practical standards, namely, in how many communities (communes or villages, or blocks of houses, etc.) co-operative societies have been organised, and to what extent their development has reached the point of embracing the whole population .

RAISING THE PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR

In every socialist revolution, after the proletariat has solved the problem of capturing power, and to the extent that the task of expropriating the expropriators and suppressing their resistance has been carried out in the main, there necessarily comes to the forefront the fundamental task of creating a social system superior to capitalism, namely, raising the productivity of labour, and in this connection (and for this purpose) securing better organisation of labour. Our Soviet state is precisely in the position where, thanks to the victories over the exploiters—from Kerensky to Kornilov—it is able to approach this task directly, to tackle it in earnest. And here it becomes immediately clear that while it is possible to take over the central government in a few days, while it is possible to suppress the military resistance (and sabotage) of the exploiters even in different parts of a great country in a few weeks, the capital solution of the problem of raising the productivity of labour requires, at all events (particularly after a most terrible and devastating war), several years. The protracted nature of the work is certainly dictated by objective circumstances.

The raising of the productivity of labour first of all requires that the material basis of large-scale industry shall be assured, namely, the development of the production of fuel, iron, the engineering and chemical industries. The Russian Soviet Republic enjoys the favourable position of having at its command, even after the Brest peace, enormous reserves of ore (in the Urals), fuel in Western Siberia (coal), in the Caucasus and the South-East (oil), in Central Russia (peat), enormous timber reserves, water power, raw materials for the chemical industry (Karabugaz), etc. The development of these natural resources by methods of modern technology will provide the basis for the unprecedented progress of the productive forces.

Another condition for raising the productivity of labour is, firstly, the raising of the educational and cultural level of the mass of the population. This is now taking place extremely rapidly, a fact which those who are blinded by bourgeois routine are unable to see; they are unable to

understand what an urge towards enlightenment and initiative is now developing among the "lower ranks" of the people thanks to the Soviet form of organisation. Secondly, a condition for economic revival is the raising of the working people's discipline, their skill, the effectiveness, the intensity of labour and its better organisation.

In this respect the situation is particularly bad and even hopeless if we are to believe those who have allowed themselves to be intimidated by the bourgeoisie or by those who are serving the bourgeoisie for their own ends. These people do not understand that there has not been, nor could there be, a revolution in which the supporters of the old system did not raise a howl about chaos, anarchy, etc. naturally, among the people who have only just thrown off an unprecedentedly savage yoke there is deep and widespread seething and ferment; the working out of new principles of labour discipline by the people is a very protracted process, and this process could not even start until complete victory had been achieved over the landowners and the bourgeoisie.

We, however, without in the least yielding to the despair (it is often false despair) which is spread by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals (who have despaired of retaining their old privileges), must under no circumstances conceal an obvious evil. On the contrary, we shall expose it and intensify the Soviet methods of combating it, because the victory of socialism is inconceivable without the victory of proletarian conscious discipline over spontaneous petty-bourgeois anarchy, this real guarantee of a possible restoration of Kerenskyism and Kornilovism.

The more class-conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already set itself the task of raising labour discipline. For example, both the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union and the Central Council of Trade Unions have begun to draft the necessary measures and decrees.[105] This work must be supported and pushed ahead with all speed. We must raise the question of piece-work[106] and apply and test it in practice; we must raise the question of applying much of what is scientific and progressive in the Taylor system; we must make wages correspond to the total amount of goods turned out, or to the amount of work done by the railways, the water transport system, etc., etc.

The Russian is a bad worker compared with people in advanced countries. It could not be otherwise under the tsarist regime and in view of the persistence of the hangover from serfdom. The task that the Soviet government must set the people in all its scope is—learn to work. The Taylor system, the last word of capitalism in this respect, like all capitalist progress, is a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievements in the field of analysing mechanical motions during work, the elimination of superfluous and awkward motions, the elaboration of correct methods of work, the introduction of the best system of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must at all costs adopt all that is valuable in the achievements of science and technology in this field. The possibility of building socialism depends exactly upon our success in combining the Soviet power and the Soviet organisation of administration with the up-to-date achievements of capitalism. We must organise in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and systematically try it out and adapt it to our own ends. At the same time, in working to raise the productivity of labour, we must take into account the specific features of the transition period from capitalism to socialism, which, on the one hand, require that the foundations be laid of the socialist organisation of competition, and, on the other hand, require the use of compulsion, so that the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat shall not be desecrated by the practice of a lily-livered proletarian government.

THE ORGANISATION OF COMPETITION

Among the absurdities which the bourgeoisie are fond of spreading about socialism is the allegation that socialists deny the importance of competition. In fact, it is only socialism which, by abolishing classes, and, consequently, by abolishing the enslavement of the people, for the first time opens the way for competition on a really mass scale. And it is precisely the Soviet form of organisation, by ensuring transition from the formal democracy of the bourgeois republic to real participation of the mass of working people in *administration*, that for the first time puts

competition on a broad basis. It is much easier to organise this in the political field than in the economic field; but for the success of socialism, it is the economic field that matters.

Take, for example, a means of organising competition such as publicity. The bourgeois republic ensures publicity only formally; in practice, it subordinates the press to capital, entertains the "mob" with sensationalist political trash and conceals what takes place in the workshops, in commercial transactions, contracts, etc., behind a veil of "trade secrets", which protect "the sacred right of property". The Soviet government has abolished trade secrets[107]; it has taken a new path; but we have done hardly anything to utilise publicity for the purpose of encouraging economic competition. While ruthlessly suppressing the thoroughly mendacious and insolently slanderous bourgeois press, we must set to work systematically to create a press that will not entertain and fool the people with political sensation and trivialities, but which will submit the questions of everyday economic life to the people's judgement and assist in the serious study of these questions. Every factory, every village is a producers' and consumers' commune, whose right and duty it is to apply the general Soviet laws in their own way ("in their own way", not in the sense of violating them, but in the sense that they can apply them in various forms) and in their own way to solve the problem of accounting in the production and distribution of goods. Under capitalism, this was the "private affair" of the individual capitalist, landowner or kulak. Under the Soviet system, it is not a private affair, but a most important affair of state.

We have scarcely yet started on the enormous, difficult but rewarding task of organising competition between communes, of introducing accounting and publicity in the process of the production of grain, clothes and other things, of transforming dry, dead, bureaucratic accounts into living examples, some repulsive, others attractive. Under the capitalist mode of production, the significance of individual example, say the example of a co-operative workshop, was inevitably very much restricted, and only those imbued with petty-bourgeois illusions could dream of

"correcting" capitalism through the example of virtuous institutions. After political power has passed to the proletariat, after the expropriators have been expropriated, the situation radically changes and—as prominent socialists have repeatedly pointed out—force of example for the first time is able to influence the people. Model communes must and will serve as educators, teachers, helping to raise the backward communes. The press must serve as an instrument of socialist construction, give publicity to the successes achieved by the model communes in all their details, must study the causes of these successes, the methods of management these communes employ, and, on the other hand, must put on the "black list" those communes which persist in the "traditions of capitalism", i.e., anarchy, laziness, disorder and profiteering. In capitalist society, statistics were entirely a matter for "government servants", or for narrow specialists; we must carry statistics to the people and make them popular so that the working people themselves may gradually learn to understand and see how long and in what way it is necessary to work, how much time and in what way one may rest, so that *the comparison of the business results* of the various communes may become a matter of general interest and study, and that the most outstanding communes may be rewarded immediately (by reducing the working day, raising remuneration, placing a larger amount of cultural or aesthetic facilities or values at their disposal, etc.).

When a new class comes on to the historical scene as the leader and guide of society, a period of violent "rocking", shocks, struggle and storm, on the one hand, and a period of uncertain steps, experiments, wavering, hesitation in regard to the selection of new methods corresponding to new objective circumstances, On the other, are inevitable. The moribund feudal nobility avenged themselves on the bourgeoisie which vanquished them and took their place, not only by conspiracies and attempts at rebellion and restoration, but also by pouring ridicule over the lack of skill, the clumsiness and the mistakes of the "upstarts" and the "insolent" who dared to take over the "sacred helm" of state without the centuries of training which the princes, barons, nobles and dignitaries had had; in exactly the same

way the Kornilovs and Kerenskys, the Gotzes and Martovs, the whole of that fraternity of heroes of bourgeois swindling or bourgeois scepticism, avenge themselves on the working class of Russia for having had the "audacity" to take power.

Of course, not weeks, but long months and years are required for a new social class, especially a class which up to now has been oppressed and crushed by poverty and ignorance, to get used to its new position, look around, organise its work and promote its *own* organisers. It is understandable that the Party which leads the revolutionary proletariat has not been able to acquire the experience and habits of large organisational undertakings embracing millions and tens of millions of citizens; the remoulding of the old, almost exclusively agitators' habits is a very lengthy process. But there is nothing impossible in this, and as soon as the necessity for a change is clearly appreciated, as soon as there is firm determination to effect the change and perseverance in pursuing a great and difficult aim, we shall achieve it. There is an enormous amount of organising talent among the "people", i.e., among the workers and the peasants who do not exploit the labour of others. Capital crushed these talented people in thousands; it killed their talent and threw them on to the scrap-heap. We are not yet able to find them, encourage them, put them on their feet, promote them. But we shall learn to do so if we set about it with all-out revolutionary enthusiasm, without which there can be no victorious revolutions.

No profound and mighty popular movement has ever occurred in history without dirty scum rising to the top, without adventurers and rogues, boasters and ranters attaching themselves to the inexperienced innovators, without absurd muddle and fuss, without individual "leaders" trying to deal with twenty matters at once and not finishing any of them. Let the lap-dogs of bourgeois society, from Belorussov to Martov, squeal and yelp about every extra chip that is sent flying in cutting down the big, old wood. What else are lap-dogs for if not to yelp at the proletarian elephant? Let them yelp. We shall go our way and try as carefully and as patiently as possible to test and discover real organisers, people with sober and practical minds, people who combine loyally to socialism with ability without

fuss (and in spite of muddle and fuss) to get a large number of people working together steadily and concertedly within the framework of Soviet organisation. *Only* such people, after they have been tested a dozen times, by being transferred from the simplest to the more difficult tasks, should be promoted to the responsible posts of leaders of the people's labour, leaders of administration. We have not yet learned to do this, but we shall learn.

"HARMONIOUS ORGANISATION" AND DICTATORSHIP

The resolution adopted by the recent Moscow Congress of Soviets advanced as the primary task of the moment the establishment of a "harmonious organisation", and the tightening of discipline.* Everyone now readily "votes for" and "subscribes to" resolutions of this kind; but usually people do not think over the fact that the application of such resolutions calls for coercion—coercion precisely in the form of dictatorship. And yet it would be extremely stupid and absurdly utopian to assume that the transition from capitalism to socialism is possible without coercion and without dictatorship. Marx's theory very definitely opposed this petty-bourgeois-democratic and anarchist absurdity long ago. And Russia of 1917-18 confirms the correctness of Marx's theory in this respect so strikingly, palpably and imposingly that only those who are hopelessly dull or who have obstinately decided to turn their backs on the truth can be under any misapprehension concerning this. Either the dictatorship of Kornilov (if we take him as the Russian type of bourgeois Cavaignac), or the dictatorship of the proletariat—any other choice is *out of the question* for a country which is developing at an extremely rapid rate with extremely sharp turns and amidst desperate ruin created by one of the most horrible wars in history. Every solution that offers a middle path is either a deception of the people by the bourgeoisie—for the bourgeoisie dare not tell the truth, dare not say that they need Kornilov—or an expression of the dull-wittedness of the petty-bourgeois democrats, of the Chernovs, Tseretelis and Martovs, who

* See this volume, p. 200.—*Ed.*

chatter about the unity of democracy, the dictatorship of democracy, the general democratic front, and similar nonsense. Those whom even the progress of the Russian Revolution of 1917-18 has not taught that a middle course is impossible, must be given up for lost.

On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that during every transition from capitalism to socialism, dictatorship is necessary for two main reasons, or along two main channels. Firstly, capitalism cannot be defeated and eradicated without the ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, who cannot at once be deprived of their wealth, of their advantages of organisation and knowledge, and consequently for a fairly long period will inevitably try to overthrow the hated rule of the poor; secondly, every great revolution, and a socialist revolution in particular, even if there is no external war, is inconceivable without internal war, i.e., civil war, which is even more devastating than external war, and involves thousands and millions of cases of wavering and desertion from one side to another, implies a state of extreme indefiniteness, lack of equilibrium and chaos. And of course, all the elements of disintegration of the old society, which are inevitably very numerous and connected mainly with the petty bourgeoisie (because it is the petty bourgeoisie that every war and every crisis ruins and destroys first), are bound to "reveal themselves" during such a profound revolution. And these elements of disintegration *cannot* "reveal themselves" otherwise than in an increase of crime, hooliganism, corruption, profiteering and outrages of every kind. To put these down requires time and *requires an iron hand.*

There has not been a single great revolution in history in which the people did not instinctively realise this and did not show salutary firmness by shooting thieves on the spot. The misfortune of previous revolutions was that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, which sustained them in their state of tension and gave them the strength to suppress ruthlessly the elements of disintegration, did not last long. The social, i.e., the class, reason for this instability of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people was the weakness of the proletariat, which *alone* is able (if it is sufficiently numerous, class-conscious and disci-

plined) to win over to its side *the majority* of the working and exploited people (the majority of the poor, to speak more simply and popularly) and retain power sufficiently long to suppress completely all the exploiters as well as all the elements of disintegration.

It was this historical experience of all revolutions, it was this world-historic—economic and political—lesson that Marx summed up when he gave his short, sharp, concise and expressive formula: dictatorship of the proletariat. And the fact that the Russian revolution has been correct in its approach to this world-historic task *has been proved* by the victorious progress of the Soviet form of organisation among all the peoples and tongues of Russia. For Soviet power is nothing but an organisational form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the advanced class, which raises to a new democracy and to independent participation in the administration of the state tens upon tens of millions of working and exploited peoples who by their own experience learn to regard the disciplined and class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat as their most reliable leader.

Dictatorship, however, is a big word, and big words should not be thrown about carelessly. Dictatorship is iron rule, government that is revolutionarily bold, swift and ruthless in suppressing both exploiters and hooligans. But our government is excessively mild, very often it resembles jelly more than iron. We must not forget for a moment that the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois element is fighting against the Soviet system in two ways; on the one hand, it is operating from without, by the methods of the Savinkovs, Gotzes, Gegechkoris and Kornilovs, by conspiracies and rebellions, and by their filthy "ideological" reflection, the flood of lies and slander in the Constitutional-Democratic, Right Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press; on the other hand, this element operates from within and takes advantage of every manifestation of disintegration, of every weakness, in order to bribe, to increase indiscipline, laxity and chaos. The nearer we approach the complete military suppression of the bourgeoisie, the more dangerous does the element of petty-bourgeois anarchy become. And the fight against this element cannot be waged

solely with the aid of propaganda and agitation, solely by organising competition and by selecting organisers. The struggle must also be waged by means of coercion.

As the fundamental task of the government becomes, not military suppression, but administration, the typical manifestation of suppression and compulsion will be, not shooting on the spot, but trial by court. In this respect also the revolutionary people after October 25, 1917 took the right path and demonstrated the viability of the revolution by setting up their own workers' and peasants' courts, even before the decrees dissolving the bourgeois bureaucratic judiciary were passed. But our revolutionary and people's courts are extremely, incredibly weak. One feels that we have not yet done away with the people's attitude towards the courts as towards something official and alien, an attitude inherited from the yoke of the landowners and of the bourgeoisie. It is not yet sufficiently realised that the courts are an organ which enlists precisely the poor, every one of them, in the work of state administration (for the work of the courts is one of the functions of state administration), that the courts are an *organ of the power* of the proletariat and of the poor peasants, that the courts are an instrument *for inculcating discipline*. There is not yet sufficient appreciation of the simple and obvious fact that if the principal misfortunes of Russia at the present time are hunger and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be overcome by spurts, but only by comprehensive, all-embracing, country-wide organisation and discipline in order to increase the output of bread for the people and bread for industry (fuel), to transport these in good time to the places where they are required, and to distribute them properly; and it is not fully appreciated that, consequently, it is *those* who violate labour discipline at any factory, in any undertaking, in any matter, who are *responsible* for the sufferings caused by the famine and unemployment, that we must know how to find the guilty ones, to bring them to trial and ruthlessly punish them. Where the petty-bourgeois anarchy against which we must now wage a most persistent struggle makes itself felt is in the failure to appreciate the economic and political connection between famine and unemployment, on the one hand, and general

laxity in matters of organisation and discipline, on the other—in the tenacity of the *small-proprietor* outlook, namely, I'll grab all I can for myself; the rest can go hang.

In the rail transport service, which perhaps most strikingly embodies the economic ties of an organism created by large-scale capitalism, the struggle between the element of petty-bourgeois laxity and proletarian organisation is particularly evident. The "administrative" elements provide a host of saboteurs and bribe-takers; the best part of the proletarian elements fight for discipline; but among both elements there are, of course, many waverers and "weak" characters who are unable to withstand the "temptation" of profiteering, bribery, personal gain obtained by spoiling the whole apparatus, upon the proper working of which the victory over famine and unemployment depends.

The struggle that has been developing around the recent decree on the management of the railways, the decree which grants individual executives dictatorial powers (or "unlimited" powers),[108] is characteristic. The conscious (and to a large extent, probably, unconscious) representatives of petty-bourgeois laxity would like to see in this granting of "unlimited" (i.e., dictatorial) powers to individuals a departure from the collegiate principle, from democracy and from the principles of Soviet government. Here and there, among Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, a positively hooligan agitation, i.e., agitation appealing to the base instincts and to the small proprietor's urge to "grab all he can", has been developed against the dictatorship decree. The question has become one of really enormous significance. Firstly, the question of principle, namely, is the appointment of individuals, dictators with unlimited powers, in general compatible with the fundamental principles of Soviet government? Secondly, what relation has this case—this precedent, if you will—to the special tasks of government in the present concrete situation? We must deal very thoroughly with both these questions.

That in the history of revolutionary movements the dictatorship of individuals was very often the expression, the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes has been shown by the irrefutable experience of history. Undoubtedly, the dictatorship of individuals was

compatible with bourgeois democracy. On this point, however, the bourgeois denigrators of the Soviet system, as well as their petty-bourgeois henchmen, always display sleight of hand: on the one hand, they declare the Soviet system to be something absurd, anarchistic and savage, and carefully pass over in silence all our historical examples and theoretical arguments which prove that the Soviets are a higher form of democracy, and what is more, the beginning of a *socialist* form of democracy; on the other hand, they demand of us a higher democracy than bourgeois democracy and say: personal dictatorship is absolutely incompatible with your, Bolshevik (i.e., not bourgeois, *but socialist*), Soviet democracy.

These are exceedingly poor arguments. If we are not anarchists, we must admit that the state, *that is*, *coercion*, is necessary for the transition from capitalism to socialism. The form of coercion is determined by the degree of development of the given revolutionary class, and also by special circumstances, such as, for example, the legacy of a long and reactionary war and the forms of resistance put up by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. There is, therefore, absolutely *no* contradiction in principle between Soviet (*that is*, socialist) democracy and the exercise of dictatorial powers by individuals. The difference between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois dictatorship is that the former strikes at the exploiting minority in the interests of the exploited majority, and that it is exercised—*also through individuals*—not only by the working and exploited people, but also by organisations which are built in such a way as to rouse these people to history-making activity. (The Soviet organisations are organisations of this kind.)

In regard to the second question, concerning the significance of individual dictatorial powers from the point of view of the specific tasks of the present moment, it must be said that large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict *unity of will*, which directs the joint labours of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it as

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

one of the conditions of socialism. But how can strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to the will of one.

Given ideal class-consciousness and discipline on the part of those participating in the common work, this subordination would be something like the mild leadership of a conductor of an orchestra. It may assume the sharp forms of a dictatorship if ideal discipline and class-consciousness are lacking. But be that as it may, *unquestioning subordination* to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of processes organised on the pattern of large-scale machine industry. On the railways it is twice and three times as necessary. In this transition from one political task to another, which *on the surface* is totally dissimilar to the first, lies the whole originality of the present situation. The revolution has only just smashed the oldest, strongest and heaviest of fetters, to which the people submitted under duress. That was yesterday. Today, however, the same revolution demands—precisely in the interests of its development and consolidation, precisely in the interests of socialism—that the people *unquestioningly obey the single will* of the leaders of labour. Of course, such a transition cannot be made at one step. Clearly, it can be achieved only as a result of tremendous jolts, shocks, reversions to old ways, the enormous exertion of effort on the part of the proletarian vanguard, which is leading the people to the new ways. Those who drop into the philistine hysterics of *Novaya Zhizn* or *Vperyod*,[109] *Dyelo Naroda* or *Nash Vek*[110] do not stop to think about this.

Take the psychology of the average, ordinary representative of the toiling and exploited masses, compare it with the objective, material conditions of his life in society. Before the October Revolution he did *not* see a single instance of the propertied, exploiting classes making any real sacrifice for him, giving up anything for his benefit. He did *not* see them giving him the land and liberty that had been repeatedly promised him, giving him peace, sacrificing "Great Power" interests and the interests of Great Power secret treaties, sacrificing capital and profits. He saw this only *after* October 25, 1917, when he took it himself by force, and had to defend by force what he had taken, against the

Kerenskys, Gotzes, Gegechkoris, Dutovs and Kornilovs. Naturally, for a certain time, all his attention, all his thoughts, all his spiritual strength, were concentrated on taking a breath, on unbending his back, on straightening his shoulders, on taking the blessings of life that were there for the taking, and that had always been denied him by the now overthrown exploiters. Of course, a certain amount of time is required to enable the ordinary working man not only to see for himself, not only to become convinced, but also to feel that he cannot simply "take", snatch, grab things, that this leads to increased disruption, to ruin, to the return of the Kornilovs. The corresponding change in the conditions of life (and consequently in the psychology) of the ordinary working men is only just beginning. And our whole task, the task of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which is the class-conscious spokesman for the strivings of the exploited for emancipation, is to appreciate this change, to understand that it is necessary, to stand at the head of the exhausted people who are wearily seeking a way out and lead them along the true path, along the path of labour discipline, along the path of co-ordinating the task of arguing at mass meetings *about* the conditions of work with the task of unquestioningly obeying the will of the Soviet leader, of the dictator, *during* the work.

The "mania for meetings" is an object of the ridicule, and still more often of the spiteful hissing of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks, the *Novaya Zhizn* people, who see only the chaos, the confusion and the outbursts of small-proprietor egoism. But without the discussions at public meetings the mass of the oppressed could never have changed from the discipline forced upon them by the exploiters to conscious, voluntary discipline. The airing of questions at public meetings is the genuine democracy of the working people, their way of unbending their backs, their awakening to a new life, their first steps along the road which they themselves have cleared of vipers (the exploiters, the imperialists, the landowners and capitalists) and which they want to learn to build themselves, in their own way, for themselves, on the principles of their own *Soviet*, and not alien, not aristocratic, not bourgeois rule. It required precisely the October victory of the working people over the exploiters, it required

a whole historical period in which the working people themselves could first of all discuss the new conditions of life and the new tasks, in order to make possible the durable transition to superior forms of labour discipline, to the conscious appreciation of the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat, to unquestioning obedience to the orders of individual representatives of the Soviet government during the work.

This transition has now begun.

We have successfully fulfilled the first task of the revolution; we have seen how the mass of working people evolved in themselves the fundamental condition for its success: they united their efforts against the exploiters in order to overthrow them. Stages like that of October 1905, February and October 1917 are of world-historic significance.

We have successfully fulfilled the second task of the revolution: to awaken, to raise those very "lower ranks" of society whom the exploiters had pushed down, and who only after October 25, 1917 obtained complete freedom to overthrow the exploiters and to begin to take stock of things and arrange life in their own way. The airing of questions at public meetings by the most oppressed and downtrodden, by the least educated mass of working people, their coming over to the side of the Bolsheviks, their setting up everywhere of their own Soviet organisations—this was the second great stage of the revolution.

The third stage is now beginning. We must consolidate what we ourselves have won, what we ourselves have decreed, made law, discussed, planned—consolidate all this in stable forms of *everyday labour discipline*. This is the most difficult, but the most gratifying task, because only its fulfilment will give us a socialist system. We must learn to combine the "public meeting" democracy of the working people—turbulent, surging, overflowing its banks like a spring flood—with *iron* discipline while at work, with *unquestioning obedience* to the will of a single person, the Soviet leader, while at work.

We have not yet learned to do this.

We shall learn it.

Yesterday we were menaced by the restoration of bourgeois exploitation, personified by the Kornilovs, Gotzes,

Dutovs, Gegechkoris and Bogayevskys. We conquered them. This restoration, this very same restoration menaces us today in another form, in the form of the element of petty-bourgeois laxity and anarchism, or small-proprietor "it's not my business" psychology, in the form of the daily, petty, but numerous sorties and attacks of this element against proletarian discipline. We must, and we shall, vanquish this element of petty-bourgeois anarchy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ORGANISATION

The socialist character of Soviet, i.e., *proletarian*, democracy, as concretely applied today, lies first in the fact that the electors are the working and exploited people; the bourgeoisie is excluded. Secondly, it lies in the fact that all bureaucratic formalities and restrictions of elections are abolished; the people themselves determine the order and time of elections, and are completely free to recall any elected person. Thirdly, it lies in the creation of the best mass organisation of the vanguard of the working people, i.e., the proletariat engaged in large-scale industry, which enables it to lead the vast mass of the exploited, to draw them into independent political life, to educate them politically by their own experience; therefore for the first time a start is made by the *entire* population in learning the art of administration, and in beginning to administer.

These are the principal distinguishing features of the democracy now applied in Russia, which is a higher *type* of democracy, a break with the bourgeois distortion of democracy, transition to socialist democracy and to the conditions in which the state can begin to wither away.

It goes without saying that the element of petty-bourgeois disorganisation (which must *inevitably* be apparent to some extent in *every* proletarian revolution, and which is especially apparent in our revolution, owing to the petty-bourgeois character of our country, its backwardness and the consequences of a reactionary war) cannot but leave its impress upon the Soviets as well.

We must work unremittingly to develop the organisation of the Soviets and of the Soviet government. There is a petty-bourgeois tendency to transform the members of the

Soviets into "parliamentarians", or else into bureaucrats. We must combat this by drawing *all* the members of the Soviets into the practical work of administration. In many places the departments of the Soviets are gradually merging with the Commissariats. Our aim is to draw *the whole of the poor* into the practical work of administration, and all steps that are taken in this direction—the more varied they are, the better—should be carefully recorded, studied, systematised, tested by wider experience and embodied in law. Our aim is to ensure that *every* toiler, having finished his eight hours' "task" in productive labour, shall perform state duties *without pay*; the transition to this is particularly difficult, but this transition alone can guarantee the final consolidation of socialism. Naturally, the novelty and difficulty of the change lead to an abundance of steps being taken, as it were, gropingly, to an abundance of mistakes, vacillation—without this, any marked progress is impossible. The reason why the present position seems peculiar to many of those who would like to be regarded as socialists is that they have been accustomed to contrasting capitalism with socialism abstractly, and that they profoundly put between the two the word "leap" (some of them; recalling fragments of what they have read of Engels's writings, still more profoundly add the phrase "leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom"[111]). The majority of these so-called socialists, who have "read in books" about socialism but who have never seriously thought over the matter, are unable to consider that by "leap" the teachers of socialism meant turning-points on a world-historical scale, and that leaps of this kind extend over decades and even longer periods. Naturally, in such times, the notorious "intelligentsia" provides an infinite number of mourners of the dead. Some mourn over the Constituent Assembly, others mourn over bourgeois discipline, others again mourn over the capitalist system, still others mourn over the cultured landowner, and still others again mourn over imperialist Great Power policy, etc., etc.

The real interest of the epoch of great leaps lies in the fact that the abundance of fragments of the old, which sometimes accumulate more rapidly than the rudiments (not always immediately discernible) of the new, calls for

the ability to discern what is most important in the line or chain of development. History knows moments when the most important thing for the success of the revolution is to heap up as large a quantity of the fragments as possible, i.e., to blow up as many of the old institutions as possible; moments arise when enough has been blown up and the next task is to perform the "prosaic" (for the petty-bourgeois revolutionary, the "boring") task of clearing away the fragments; and moments arise when the careful nursing of the rudiments of the new system, which are growing amidst the wreckage on a soil which as yet has been badly cleared of rubble, is the most important thing.

It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a Communist in general. You must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which you must grasp with all your might in order to hold the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the next link; the order of the links, their form, the manner in which they are linked together, the way they differ from each other in the historical chain of events, are not as simple and not as meaningless as those in an ordinary chain made by a smith.

The fight against the bureaucratic distortion of the Soviet form of organisation is assured by the firmness of the connection between the Soviets and the "people", meaning by that the working and exploited people, and by the flexibility and elasticity of this connection. Even in the most democratic capitalist republics in the world, the poor never regard the bourgeois parliament as "their" institution. But the Soviets are "theirs" and not alien institutions to the mass of workers and peasants. The modern "Social-Democrats" of the Scheidemann or, what is almost the same thing, of the Martov type are repelled by the Soviets, and they are drawn towards the respectable bourgeois parliament, or to the Constituent Assembly, in the same way as Turgenev, sixty years ago, was drawn towards a moderate monarchist and noblemen's Constitution and was repelled by the peasant democracy of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky.[112]

It is the closeness of the Soviets to the "people", to the working people, that creates the special forms of recall

and other means of control from below which must be most zealously developed now. For example, the Councils of Public Education, as periodical conferences of Soviet electors and their delegates called to discuss and control the activities of the Soviet authorities in this field, deserve full sympathy and support. Nothing could be sillier than to transform the Soviets into something congealed and self-contained. The more resolutely we now have to stand for a ruthlessly firm government, for the dictatorship of individuals *in definite processes of work*, in definite aspects of *purely executive* functions, the more varied must be the forms and methods of control from below in order to counteract every shadow of a possibility of distorting the principles of Soviet government, in order repeatedly and tirelessly to weed out bureaucracy.

CONCLUSION

An extraordinarily difficult, complex and dangerous situation in international affairs; the necessity of manoeuvring and retreating; a period of waiting for new outbreaks of the revolution which is maturing in the West at a painfully slow pace; within the country a period of slow construction and ruthless "tightening up", of prolonged and persistent struggle waged by stern, proletarian discipline against the menacing element of petty-bourgeois laxity and anarchy—these in brief are the distinguishing features of the special stage of the socialist revolution in which we are now living. This is the link in the historical chain of events which we must at present grasp with all our might in order to prove equal to the tasks that confront us before passing to the next link to which we are drawn by a special brightness, the brightness of the victories of the international proletarian revolution.

Try to compare with the ordinary everyday concept "revolutionary" the slogans that follow from the specific conditions of the present stage, namely, manoeuvre, retreat, wait, build slowly, ruthlessly tighten up, rigorously discipline, smash laxity.... Is it surprising that when certain "revolutionaries" hear this they are seized with noble indignation and begin to "thunder" abuse at us for forgetting

the traditions of the October Revolution, for compromising with the bourgeois experts, for compromising with the bourgeoisie, for being petty bourgeois, reformists, and so on and so forth?

The misfortune of these sorry "revolutionaries" is that even those of them who are prompted by the best motives in the world and are absolutely loyal to the cause of socialism fail to understand the particular, and particularly "unpleasant", condition that a backward country, which has been lacerated by a reactionary and disastrous war and which began the socialist revolution long before the more advanced countries, inevitably has to pass through; they lack stamina in the difficult moments of a difficult transition. Naturally, it is the "Left Socialist-Revolutionaries" who are acting as an "official" opposition of *this* kind against our Party. Of course, there are and always will be individual exceptions from group and class types. But social types remain. In the land in which the small-proprietor population greatly predominates over the purely proletarian population, the difference between the proletarian revolutionary and petty-bourgeois revolutionary will inevitably make itself felt, and from time to time will make itself felt very sharply. The petty-bourgeois revolutionary wavers and vacillates at every turn of events; he is an ardent revolutionary in March 1917 and praises "coalition" in May, hates the Bolsheviks (or laments over their "adventurism") in July and apprehensively turns away from them at the end of October, supports them in December, and, finally, in March and April 1918 such types, more often than not, turn up their noses contemptuously and say: "I am not one of those who sing hymns to 'organic' work, to practicalness and gradualism."

The social origin of such types is the small proprietor, who has been driven to frenzy by the horrors of war, by sudden ruin, by unprecedented torments of famine and devastation, who hysterically rushes about seeking a way out, seeking salvation, places his confidence in the proletariat and supports it one moment and the next gives way to fits of despair. We must clearly understand and firmly remember the fact that socialism cannot be built on such a social basis. The only class that can lead the working and

exploited people is the class that unswervingly follows its path without losing courage and without giving way to despair even at the most difficult, arduous and dangerous stages. Hysterical impulses are of no use to us. What we need is the steady advance of the iron battalions of the proletariat.

SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C.[113]

APRIL 29, 1918

First published in 1920
in the book: *Minutes
of the Sessions
of the All-Russia C.E.C.,
4th Convocation.
Verbatim Report*, Moscow

Published according to
the text of the book,
collated with the verbatim report
and with the text of the pamphlet:
N. Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov),
*Old Articles on Almost New
Subjects*, Moscow, 1922

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1

REPORT
ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Comrades, as regards my report, I shall have to present the question today in a somewhat unusual fashion. The point is that the real report is my article on the immediate tasks of the Soviet government,* which was published on Sunday in two newspapers, and with which I presume the majority of those present are acquainted.

Hence I consider that there is no need for me now to repeat here what was said in the report and I can confine myself merely to additions to and explanations of the report. I think that the most suitable form for such explanations now will be that of a polemic, because the question I have touched on in these theses on immediate tasks is nothing but a development of the resolution already adopted by the All-Russia Extraordinary Congress in Moscow on March 15,** a resolution which was not confined to the question of peace then under discussion, but pointed out also the chief task of the present time, the organisational task, the task of self-discipline, the task of combating disorganisation.

It is this that has been the basis, it seems to me, of our political trends, or the chief lines of our political trends, which have become fairly definitely marked in the recent period. I think, therefore, that a polemical form can most clearly confirm what I tried to sketch in a positive form in my article on immediate tasks.

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* See this volume, pp. 235-77.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, pp. 200-01.—*Ed.*

Comrades, if you look at the political trends of contemporary Russia you are above all confronted with the task—here too, as always, so as not to make any mistake in your appraisal—of trying to look at all the trends taken together, for only in this way, only on this condition, can we safeguard ourselves from the errors involved in selecting particular examples. It is clearly possible to find any number of examples to confirm some particular proposition. But that is not the essence of the matter. We can try to get near to elucidating the connection between what is happening to the political trends in the country, taking these trends as a whole, and what is happening to the class interests, which are always manifested in big, serious and powerful political trends, only if we examine these trends as a whole, in their totality.

And so, if we take a look at the big political trends in Russia, it cannot be disputed, I think, that they are clearly and unquestionably divisible into three big groups. In the first group we have the entire bourgeoisie, united wholly and strongly, as one man, in the most determined, one might say reckless, "opposition" to the Soviet government. It is, of course, an opposition in quotation marks, because in fact we have here a furious struggle, which at this moment has drawn to the side of the bourgeoisie all those petty-bourgeois parties which agreed with Kerensky during the revolution. These are the Mensheviks, the *Novaya Zhizn* adherents and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, who outdid even the bourgeoisie in the fury of their attacks on us, for it is well known that very often the fury of attacks and the loudness of yelping are inversely proportional to the strength of the political elements from which the furious attacks proceed. (*Applause.*)

The entire bourgeoisie and all its yes-men and servitors, of the Chernov and Tsereteli type, joined in furious attacks against the Soviet system. With an eye to the pleasant prospect which has been realised by their friends, their political fellow-thinkers in the Ukraine, they are all longing to conclude a peace which would allow them, with the help of German bayonets and the bourgeoisie at home, to suppress the influence of the Bolsheviks. This is only too well known. We see a beautiful example of such friends in

the shape of Chkhenkeli in the Caucasus. Everyone will remember this from the newspapers.

It is obvious that the proletariat, having taken power and launched the dictatorship of the working people, the dictatorship of the very poor over the exploiters, could not, of course, meet with anything else.

On the one hand, we have one flank, one front, completely united. If we are sometimes proffered dreams of a united democratic front, I at least, in the rare moments when I have occasion to pick up bourgeois newspapers, in the rare event of having the pleasure of reading such newspapers as *Nash Vek*, *Dyelo Naroda*, etc., even if only glancing at all these newspapers, I always think: what more do you need for unity of the democratic front?

All this unity of the democratic front they have to the full, and we can only rejoice at this unity, for—in so far as fragments of this bourgeois journalism come the way of the masses—it is not unity of a democratic front but unity of attacks on the Bolsheviks. And this unity of the front, from Milyukov to Martov, has deserved that we should put it on a roll of honour on May Day for excellent propaganda in favour of the Bolsheviks.

Comrades, if you take the other, opposite camp, you will see there now only our Party, the Party of Communist Bolsheviks. Events have developed in such a way that our allies during a great part of the post-October period—the Left S.R.s—have at present resigned from formal participation in the government. Their last Congress marked especially vividly the extreme vacillation in this party,[114] and this has now been shown more clearly than ever, since even in the press this party also gives expression to its complete confusion and complete vacillation.

If you decided to draw a graph showing how this party from February 1917—of course, prior to the split of the S.R.s into a Left and a Right wing—if you decided to draw a graph showing month by month on which side this party stood, on the side of the proletariat or on the side of the bourgeoisie, and if you were to continue drawing it for a year, the result would be a graph looking like a medical chart, at the sight of which everyone would say: here is a remarkable case of fever, a remarkably persistent fever!

In point of fact, hardly any other party has undergone such permanent and continual vacillations in the history of the revolution.

And so, if we take all these three main trends and look at them, it will become clear to us that such an alignment is not accidental, that it fully confirms what we Bolsheviks had occasion to point out in 1915, while still abroad, when the first news began to arrive that the revolution in Russia was growing, that it was inevitable—and when we had to answer questions about what the situation of the party would be if events put it in power while the war was still going on. At that time we had to say: it is possible that the revolution will win a decisive victory, this is possible from the class standpoint if at the decisive moments and decisive points the leading elements of the petty bourgeoisie waver to the side of the proletariat*; and that is literally what happened, that is the course the history of the Russian revolution took and is taking at the present moment. Of course, in these vacillations of the petty-bourgeois elements we cannot find the slightest grounds for pessimism, not to speak of despair. It is clear that revolution in a country which has turned against the imperialist war earlier than other countries, revolution in a backward country which, to a considerable extent owing to this backwardness, events have put—of course, for a short time and, of course, in particular questions—in front of other, more advanced countries, this revolution, of course, is inevitably doomed to experience moments of the greatest difficulty and gravity, and most disheartening as well in the near future. For it to hold its front and its allies, for it to manage without waverers at such moments, would be absolutely unnatural; it would mean completely leaving out of account the class character of the revolution, and the nature of the parties and political groupings.

And so, if we look at the sum total of the political trends in Russia from the standpoint of the immediate tasks, from the standpoint of how the real, immediate and prime tasks confront us, the tasks of organisation and discipline, the tasks of accounting and control, we see that there is

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 403.—*Ed.*

not the slightest attempt to make a real assessment of this task in the camp which is united in a single democratic front from Milyukov to Martov. There is not and cannot be such an assessment because there is only a single malevolent desire there—and the more vicious it is, the more it does honour to us—to find some possibility, or hint, or dream, of the overthrow of the Soviet regime, and nothing else. Unfortunately, representatives of the party of Left S.R.s have actually expressed most of all—in spite of the very great devotion to the revolution displayed by a large number of members of this party who have always shown much initiative and energy—they have displayed vacillation precisely over the immediate tasks of the present moment in regard to proletarian discipline, accounting, organisation and control, tasks which became natural for socialists when power had been won and the military attacks ranging from the Kerenskys and Krasnovs to the Kornilovs, Gegechkoris and Alexeyevs had been repulsed.

Now, when for the first time we have come to the vital core of the development of the revolution, the question is whether proletarian discipline and organisation will prevail, or whether victory will go to the petty-bourgeois element, which is especially strong in Russia.

For our opponents from the petty-bourgeois camp, the chief arena of struggle against us is the sphere of home policy and economic construction; their weapon is the undermining of everything that the proletariat decrees and endeavours to bring about in the matter of building an organised, socialist economy. Here the petty-bourgeois element—the element of petty proprietors and unbridled selfishness—acts as the determined enemy of the proletariat.

And in the graph shown by the petty bourgeoisie throughout the events of the revolution we see their most marked withdrawal from us. Naturally we find here in this camp the chief opposition to the immediate and current tasks of the moment, opposition in the more exact sense of the word; here we have the opposition of people who do not reject agreement with us in principle, who support us on more essential questions than those on which they criticise, an opposition that is combined with support.

We shall not be surprised if in the pages of the Left S.R. press we come across such statements as those I found in *Znamya Truda*[115] of April 25. It writes: "The Right-wing Bolsheviks are ratifiers" (a horribly contemptuous nickname). What would happen if the opposite nickname was given to the warriors? Would it produce a less horrible impression? Well, if one encounters such trends in Bolshevism, it is an indication of something. It was on April 25 that I happened to look at the theses in a newspaper that gave a political characterisation of us. When I read this thesis I thought this must be someone from *Kommunist*, the newspaper of the "Left Communists" or from their magazine—there is so much that is similar here; but I was destined to disillusionment, because it turned out to be a thesis of Isuv's, published in the newspaper *Vperyod*.[116] (*Laughter, applause.*)

And so, comrades, when we observe such political phenomena as the solidarity of *Znamya Truda* with a particular trend of Bolshevism or with some sort of formulation of Menshevik theses of the very party that pursued the policy of an alliance with Kerensky, of the very party in which Tsereteli concluded an agreement with the bourgeoisie, when we meet with attacks exactly coinciding with those emanating from the group of Left Communists and the new magazine—there is something amiss here. There is something here which sheds light on the real significance of these attacks, and it is worth while paying attention to these attacks if only because we have here an opportunity of assessing the chief tasks of the Soviet government in disputes with people with whom it is worth while disputing, because here we have Marxist theory, and we can take into consideration the significance of the events of the revolution and the undoubted desire to seek out the truth. Here the main basis for a real debate is provided by devotion to socialism and the obvious resolve to be on the side of the proletariat, against the bourgeoisie, whatever errors—in the opinion of particular persons, groups or trends—may have been committed in this respect by the proletariat in fighting against the bourgeoisie.

When I say that it is worth while disputing with them, I mean by a worth-while dispute, of course, not a polemic,

but the fact that the question concerns a dispute over the most essential, fundamental problem of the present time. It is no accident that it is along this line that disputes are taking place. Objectively, it is along this line that the cardinal task lies at the present time—the task of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, which is dictated by the existing conditions in Russia and which has to be carried out in every way in the presence of an abundance of the most diverse petty-bourgeois trends, and when there is every need for the proletariat to say to itself that on this point it cannot make any concessions, because the socialist revolution, begun by wresting power from the bourgeoisie and continued by smashing all resistance of the bourgeoisie, places firmly in the forefront the problems of proletarian discipline and organisation of the working people and ability to tackle the work with strictly businesslike methods and knowledge of the interests of large-scale industry. These problems the proletariat must solve in practice, for otherwise it will suffer defeat.—Here is the chief, real difficulty of the socialist revolution.—This is the reason why it is so worth while, so important, in the historical and political sense of the word, to argue with the representatives of the group of Left Communists, in spite of the fact that, taking their position and theory and examining it, we see there, I repeat—and I shall prove it in a moment—absolutely nothing but the same petty-bourgeois waverings. The comrades of the group of Left Communists, whatever they call themselves, strike a blow primarily at their own theses. I assume that their views are known to the great majority of those at this meeting, because we have discussed the essence of them in Bolshevik circles, starting from the beginning of March, while those who have not taken an interest in the major political literature must have got to know and must have discussed these views in connection with the disputes that arose at the last All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

And so, we see in their theses primarily the same thing that we see now in the whole S.R. party, the same thing that we see now both in the Right-wing camp and in the camp of the bourgeoisie from Milyukov to Martov, for whom these present difficulties of the situation for Russia are especially

painful from the point of view of the loss of her position as a Great Power, from the point of view of her conversion from the old nation, an oppressing state, into an oppressed country, from the standpoint of deciding not on paper but in practice whether the hardships of the road to socialism are worth while, whether the hardships of the newly-begun socialist revolution are worth while, whether it is worth while that the country should undergo the most difficult situations as regards its statehood, as regards its national independence.

Here the deepest division of all is between those for whom that state independence is, as it is for all the bourgeoisie, an ideal and a boundary, their holy of holies—a boundary which must not be crossed and an encroachment on which is a denial of socialism—and those who say that in the age of frenzied imperialist slaughter for redivision of the world the socialist revolution cannot proceed without very heavy defeats for many nations which were formerly considered oppressors. And so, however painful it is for mankind, socialists, class-conscious socialists are ready to undergo all such trials.

The Left S.R.s have wavered most of all on this basis, which is most of all unacceptable to them, and it is just on this basis that we see the greatest waverings among the Left Communists.

In their theses, which, as we know, they discussed with us on April 4,[117] and which they published on April 20, they keep returning to the question of peace.

They devote the greatest attention to appraising the question of peace and thereby try to prove that peace is a manifestation of the psychology of the exhausted and declassed masses.

How very comic their arguments are, when they quote their figures: that 12 were against and 28 were for the conclusion of peace.[118] But if one is to collect statistics, and if the vote of a month and a half ago is to be recalled, should one not take more recent figures. If political significance is to be attached to that vote, should one not call to mind the vote of the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets[119] before saying that the healthy South was against peace, while the exhausted, declassed, industrially weakened North

was allegedly for peace. Should one not call to mind the vote of the majority of the group at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, in which not even one-tenth were against peace. If figures are to be recalled and political significance attached to them, the political voting needs to be taken as a whole, and then you will see at once that the parties which learnt certain slogans by heart, which made a fetish of these slogans, proved to be on the side of the petty bourgeoisie, while the mass of the working and exploited people, the mass of workers, soldiers and peasants, did not reject peace.

And now, when alongside the criticism of this stand for peace the allegation is made that it was insisted upon by the exhausted, declassed masses, while we see clearly that it was the declassed intelligentsia that was against peace, when we are given the appraisal of events that I read in the newspapers—this fact shows us that on the question of the conclusion of peace the majority of our Party was absolutely right, that when we were told that the game was not worth the candle, that all the imperialists had already combined against us and would in any case strangle us, bring us into disgrace, etc.—we nevertheless concluded peace. It not only seemed to them disgraceful, it seems to them of no avail. They told us that we would not gain a respite. And when we replied: it is impossible to know how international relations will develop, but we do know that the imperialist enemies are fighting one another, events confirmed this, and it was acknowledged by the group of Left Communists, our opponents in ideology and principle, who by and large adopt the standpoint of communism.

This phrase alone is a complete recognition of the correctness of our tactics and the fullest condemnation of those waverings on the question of peace which most of all drove away from us a certain wing of our supporters, both the entire wing grouped in the party of Left S.R.s, and the wing which has existed and still exists in our Party, and which one can confidently say will remain there, and which in its vacillations especially clearly reveals the source of these vacillations. Yes, the peace which we have arrived at is in the highest degree unstable; the respite which we have gained may be cut short any day both from the West and from the East—of this there is no doubt. Our interna-

tional situation is so critical that we must exert all our strength to hold out as long as possible, until the Western revolution matures, the Western revolution which is maturing much more slowly than we expected and desired, but is undoubtedly maturing; it is undoubtedly absorbing and accumulating more and more inflammable material.

If we, as a separate contingent of the world proletariat, have been the first to go forward, it is not because this contingent has been more strongly organised than others. No, it is worse, more weakly and less organised than others, but it would be the height of stupidity and pedantry to argue, as many do: well, if things had been begun by the most organised contingent, and if it had been followed by one less well organised, and after that by one with a third-rate organisation, then we should willingly have been supporters of the socialist revolution. But since things did not go according to the book, since it turned out that the leading contingent was not supported by other contingents, our revolution is doomed to perish. We, on the other hand, say: no, our task is to transform the organisation in general; our task, since we are alone, is to maintain the revolution, to preserve for it at least a certain bastion of socialism, however weak and moderately sized, until the revolution matures in other countries, until other contingents come up to us. But to expect history to set the socialist contingents of the various countries in motion in strict sequence and according to a plan, means to have no notion of revolution or, out of stupidity, to renounce support of the socialist revolution.

At a time when we have found out for ourselves and proved that we have a firm position in Russia but do not have forces to oppose international imperialism, we have only one task, our tactics become those of manoeuvring, waiting and retreat. I am very well aware that these words cannot claim to be popular and that if they are given an appropriate turn and put in association with the word "coalition", then the way is wide open here for piquant comparisons and for all kinds of reproaches and scoffing. But however much our adversaries—the bourgeoisie—on the Right and Our friends of yesterday on the Left, the Left S.R.s, and our friends—friends, I am sure, of yesterday, today and

tomorrow—the Left Communists, however much they aim the shafts of their wit at this, and whatever proofs they give of their petty-bourgeois vacillations, they cannot refute these facts. Events have confirmed us, we have gained a respite solely because the imperialist slaughter in the West continues, and in the Far East imperialist rivalry flares up ever more extensively—only this explains the existence of the Soviet Republic, for the time being hanging by the weakest of threads, to which we are holding tight in this political situation. Of course, no piece of paper, no peace treaty, will protect us, nor the circumstance that we do not want to fight against Japan; it is true that she is plundering us, without being deterred by any treaties or formalities. We shall be protected, of course, not by a paper treaty or "state of peace", but by the continuing struggle between the two "giants" of imperialism in the West, and by our endurance. We have not forgotten the basic Marxist lesson which has been so clearly confirmed by the Russian revolution: that it is necessary to reckon forces in tens of millions; anything less is not taken into account in politics; politics discard anything less as a magnitude of no importance. If we look at the international revolution from this aspect, the matter is as clear as it could possibly be: a backward country can easily begin because its adversary has become rotten, because its bourgeoisie is not organised, but for it to continue demands of that country a hundred thousand times more circumspection, caution and endurance. It will be different in Western Europe; there it will be immeasurably more difficult to begin but immeasurably easier to go on. It could not be otherwise, because the degree of organisation and solidarity of the proletariat there is incomparably greater. So long as we are alone, we must say to ourselves, taking all the forces into account: we have just one chance until the outbreak of the European revolution, which will solve all our difficulties—the continuation of the struggle of the international imperialist giants; we have estimated this chance correctly, we have held on to it for several weeks, but it may be shattered tomorrow. Hence the conclusion is: to continue in our foreign policy what we began in March, which can be formulated in the words: to manoeuvre, to retreat, to wait. When

the words "an active foreign policy" turn up in this Left-wing *Kommunist*, when the expression defence of the socialist fatherland is put in quotation marks, which are bound to be ironical, then I say to myself: these people have understood absolutely nothing of the position of the Western proletariat. While they call themselves Left Communists, they are going over to the standpoint of the wavering petty bourgeoisie, which regards the revolution as a means for ensuring its own specific system. International relations indicate as plainly as could be: any Russian who contemplated the task of overthrowing international imperialism on the basis of Russian forces would be a lunatic. While over there in the West the revolution is maturing, although it is now maturing more rapidly than yesterday, our task is only this: we, being the contingent that has come to the forefront despite our weakness, must do everything, take advantage of every chance, so as to hold out in the positions we have won. All other considerations must be subordinated to this, to taking full advantage of our chance, so that we can put off for a few weeks the moment when international imperialism will unite against us. If we act in that way we shall advance along a road that will be approved by every class-conscious worker in the European countries, for he knows what we have learnt since 1905, whereas France and Britain have been learning it for centuries—he knows how slowly revolution grows in the free society of the united bourgeoisie, he knows that against such forces it will be necessary to set in operation an agitational bureau which will conduct propaganda in the true sense of the word when we stand side by side with the German, French and British proletariat which have risen in revolt. Until then, however distressing it may be, however repugnant to revolutionary traditions, the only tactics are: to wait, manoeuvre and retreat.

When people say that we have no foreign, international policy, I say: every other policy consciously or unconsciously slips into playing a provocatory role and makes Russia a tool of alliance with imperialists of the type of Chkhenkeli or Semyonov.

And we say: it is better to endure and be patient, to suffer infinitely greater national and state humiliations

and hardships, but to remain at our post as a socialist contingent that has been cut off by the force of events from the ranks of the socialist army and compelled to wait until the socialist revolution in other countries comes to its aid. And it is coming to our aid. It comes slowly but it is coming. The war that is now going on in the West is revolutionising the masses more than before and is bringing near the hour of an uprising.

The propaganda conducted up to now has said that the imperialist war is a most criminal and most reactionary war for the sake of annexations. But it is now being confirmed that on the Western front, where there are hundreds of thousands and millions of French and German soldiers engaged in slaughter, the revolution cannot fail to mature more rapidly than hitherto, although this revolution is coming more slowly than we expected.

I have dwelt on the question of foreign policy more than I intended, but it seems to me that we see here very clearly that in this question we are, strictly speaking, faced with two main lines—the proletarian line, which says that the socialist revolution is what is dearest and highest for us, and that we must take account of whether it will soon break out in the West, and the other line—the bourgeois line—which says that for it the character of the state as a Great Power and national independence are dearer and higher than anything else.

In regard to domestic issues, we see the same thing on the part of the group of Left Communists, who repeat the main arguments levelled against us from the bourgeois camp. For example, the main argument of the group of Left Communists against us is that there can be observed a Right-Bolshevik deviation, which threatens the revolution by directing it along the path of state capitalism.

Evolution in the direction of state capitalism, there you have the evil, the enemy, which we are invited to combat.

When I read these references to such enemies in the newspaper of the Left Communists, I ask: what has happened to these people that fragments of book-learning can make them forget reality? Reality tells us that state capitalism would be a step forward. If in a small space of time we could achieve state capitalism in Russia, that would be a victory.

How is it that they cannot see that it is the petty proprietor, small capital, that is our enemy? How can they regard state capitalism as the chief enemy? They ought not to forget that in the transition from capitalism to socialism our chief enemy is the petty bourgeoisie, its habits and customs, its economic position. The petty proprietor fears state capitalism above all, because he has only one desire—to grab, to get as much as possible for himself, to ruin and smash the big landowners, the big exploiters. In this the petty proprietor eagerly supports us.

Here he is more revolutionary than the workers, because he is more embittered and more indignant, and therefore he readily marches forward to smash the bourgeoisie—but not as a socialist does in order, after breaking the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to begin building a socialist economy based on the principles of firm labour discipline, within the framework of a strict organisation, and observing correct methods of control and accounting—but in order, by grabbing as much as possible for himself, to exploit the fruits of victory for himself and for his own ends, without the least concern for general state interests and the interests of the class of working people as a whole.

What is state capitalism under Soviet power? To achieve state capitalism at the present time means putting into effect the accounting and control that the capitalist classes carried out. We see a sample of state capitalism in Germany. We know that Germany has proved superior to us. But if you reflect even slightly on what it would mean if the foundations of such state capitalism were established in Russia, Soviet Russia, everyone who is not out of his senses and has not stuffed his head with fragments of book-learning, would have to say that state capitalism would be our salvation.

I said that state capitalism would be our salvation; if we had it in Russia, the transition to full socialism would he easy, would be within our grasp, because state capitalism is something centralised, calculated, controlled and socialised, and that is exactly what we lack: we are threatened by the element of petty-bourgeois slovenliness, which more than anything else has been developed by the whole history of Russia and her economy, and which prevents us

from taking the very step on which the success of socialism depends. Allow me to remind you that I had occasion to write my statement about state capitalism some time before the revolution and it is a howling absurdity to try to frighten us with state capitalism. I remind you that in my pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe** I then wrote.... (*He reads the passage.*)

I wrote this about the revolutionary-democratic state, the state of Kerensky, Chernov, Tsereteli, Kishkin and their confreres, about a state which had a bourgeois basis and which did not and could not depart from it. I wrote at that time that state capitalism is a step towards socialism; I wrote that in September 1917, and now, in April 1918, after the proletariat's taking power in October, when it has proved its capacity: many factories have been confiscated, enterprises and banks nationalised, the armed resistance of the bourgeoisie and saboteurs smashed—now, when they try to frighten us with capitalism, it is so ludicrous, such a sheer absurdity and fabrication, that it becomes surprising and one asks oneself: how could people have this idea? They have forgotten the mere trifle that in Russia we have a petty-bourgeois mass which sympathises with the abolition of the big bourgeoisie in all countries, but does not sympathise with accounting, socialisation and control—herein lies the danger for the revolution, here you have the unity of social forces which ruined the great French revolution and could not fail to do so, and which, if the Russian proletariat proves weak, can alone ruin the Russian revolution. The petty bourgeoisie, as we see, steeps the whole social atmosphere with petty-proprietor tendencies, with aspirations which are bluntly expressed in the statement: I took from the rich, what others do is not my affair.

Here is our main danger. If the petty bourgeois were subordinated to other class elements, subordinated to state capitalism, the class-conscious worker would be bound to greet that with open arms, for state capitalism under Kerensky's democracy would have been a step towards socialism, and under the Soviet government it would be three-quarters

* See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 323-69.—*Ed.*

of socialism, because anyone who is the organiser of state-capitalist enterprises can be made one's helper. The Left Communists, however, adopt a different attitude, one of disdain, and when we had our first meeting with the Left Communists on April 4, which incidentally proved that this question from remote history, which had been long discussed, was already a thing of the past, I said that it was necessary, if we properly understood our tasks, to learn socialism from the organisers of the trusts.

These words made the Left Communists horribly indignant, and one of them—Comrade Osinsky—devoted his whole article to inveighing against them. That is substantially what his arguments amounted to.—The fact is, we do not want to teach them, but to learn from them.—We, "Right-wing" Bolsheviks, we want to learn from the organisers of the trusts, but these "Left Communists" want to teach them. But what do you want to teach them? Socialism, perhaps? Teach socialism to merchants, to businessmen? (*Applause.*) No, take on the job yourselves, if you like. We are not going to help you, it is labour in vain. It is no use our teaching these engineers, businessmen and merchants. It is no use teaching them socialism. If we had a bourgeois revolution, then there would be nothing to learn from them—except perhaps that you should grab what you can and have done with it, there is nothing more to learn. But that is not a socialist revolution—that is something that happened in France in 1793, that occurs where there is no socialism but only an approach to socialism.

The landowners have to be overthrown, the bourgeoisie has to be overthrown, and all the actions of the Bolsheviks, all their struggle, their violence against the landowners and capitalists, expropriation and forcible suppression of the resistance of the landowners and capitalists, will be justified and proved a million times correct by history. Taken as a whole, this was a very great historical task, but it was only the first step. What matters now is the purpose for which we crushed them. Was it in order to say that now, having finally crushed them, we shall bow down before their capitalism? No, we shall now learn from them because we lack knowledge, because we do not have this knowledge. We know about socialism, but knowledge of organisation on a

scale of millions, knowledge of the organisation and distribution of goods, etc.—this we do not have. The old Bolshevik leaders did not teach us this. The Bolshevik Party cannot boast of this in its history. We have not done a course on this yet. And we say, let him be a thorough-paced rascal even, but if he has organised a trust, if he is a merchant who has dealt with the organisation of production and distribution for millions and tens of millions, if he has acquired experience—we must learn from him. If we do not learn this from them, we shall not get socialism, the revolution will remain at the stage it has now reached. Only the development of state capitalism, only the painstaking establishment of accounting and control, only the strictest organisation and labour discipline, will lead us to socialism. Without this there is no socialism. (*Applause.*)

It is no use our undertaking the ridiculous task of teaching the organisers of trusts—there is nothing to teach them. We have to expropriate them. That is not where the hitch lies. There is no difficulty whatsoever in that. (*Applause.*) That we have sufficiently demonstrated and proved.

I told every workers' delegation with which I had to deal when they came to me and complained that their factory was at a standstill: you would like your factory to be confiscated. Very well, we have blank forms for a decree ready, they can be signed in a minute. (*Applause.*) But tell us: have you learnt how to take over production and have you calculated what you will produce? Do you know the connection between what you are producing and the Russian and international market? Whereupon it turns out that they have not learnt this yet; there has not been anything about it yet in Bolshevik pamphlets, and nothing is said about it in Menshevik pamphlets either.

The situation is best among those workers who are carrying out this state capitalism: among the tanners and in the textile and sugar industries, because they have a sober, proletarian knowledge of their industry and they want to preserve it and make it more powerful—because in that lies the greatest socialism.[120] They say: I can't cope with this task just yet; I shall put in capitalists, giving them one-third of the posts, and I shall learn from them. And

when I read the ironical statement of the Left Communists: it is yet to be seen who is taking advantage of whom, I find their short-sightedness strange. Of course, if, after taking power in October and after a victorious campaign against the whole bourgeoisie from October to April, we could still be doubtful as to who is taking advantage of whom—whether the workers of the trust organisers, or the businessmen and rascals of the workers—if that were the case, we should have to pack up our belongings and go home, leaving the field to the Milyukovs and Martovs. But that is not the case. The class-conscious worker will not believe it, and the fright of the petty bourgeoisie is laughable; they know that socialism begins where larger-scale industry begins, that the merchants and businessmen have learnt this by their own experience.

We have said: only these material conditions, the material conditions of large-scale machine industry serving tens of millions of people, only these are the basis of socialism, and to learn to deal with this in a petty-bourgeois, peasant country is difficult, but possible. Revolution comes at the price of civil war, but that is something that is the more serious the more the country is civilised and developed. In Germany, state capitalism prevails, and therefore the revolution in Germany will be a hundred times more devastating and ruinous than in a petty-bourgeois country—there, too, there will be gigantic difficulties and tremendous chaos and imbalance. Therefore I do not see the slightest shadow of a reason for despair or despondency in the fact that the Russian revolution accomplished the easier task to start with—that of overthrowing the landowners and bourgeoisie—and is faced now by the more difficult socialist task of organising nation-wide accounting and control.-

It is facing the task with which real socialism begins, a task which has the backing of the majority of the workers and class-conscious working people. Yes, the majority of the workers, who are better organised and have gone through the school of the trade unions, are wholeheartedly with us.

This majority raised the questions of piece-work and Taylorism—questions which the gentlemen from *Vperyod* are scoffingly trying to reject—in the trade union councils

before we did, even before the coming of Soviet power with its Soviets; they got busy and set about working out standards of labour discipline. These people showed that for all their proletarian modesty they were well acquainted with the conditions of factory labour, they grasped the essence of socialism better than those who spouted revolutionary phrases but in reality consciously or unconsciously descended to the level of the petty bourgeoisie, whose standpoint was: throw out the rich but it's not worth while putting oneself under the accounting and control of an organisation; that's not needed for small proprietors, they don't want that—but in that alone lies the guarantee of the stability and triumph of our revolution.

Comrades, I shall not touch on further details and quotations from the newspaper *Levi Kommunist*,[121] but I shall say briefly: it is time to cry out when people have gone so far as to say that the introduction of labour discipline will be a step back. And I must say that I regard this as such an unheard-of reactionary thing, such a threat to the revolution, that if I did not know that it was said by a group without any influence, and that it would be refuted at any class-conscious meeting of workers, I would say: the Russian revolution is lost.

The Left Communists write: "The introduction of labour discipline, coupled with restoring the leadership of capitalists in industry, cannot substantially raise labour productivity but it will lower the class initiative, activity and organised character of the proletariat. It threatens serfdom for the working class...." This is untrue; if it were the case, our Russian revolution as regards its socialist tasks and its socialist essence would be on the point of collapse. But this is not true. The declassed petty-bourgeois intelligentsia does not understand that the chief difficulty for socialism lies in ensuring labour discipline. Socialists wrote about this long ago, they thought most of all about this in the distant past, they devoted the greatest concern to it and its analysis, they understood that the real difficulties for the socialist revolution begin here. More than once up to now there have been revolutions which ruthlessly overthrew the bourgeoisie, no less vigorously than we did, but when we went so far as to establish Soviet power

we thereby showed that we were making the practical transition from the abolition of economic serfdom to the self-discipline of labour, that our rule is one which must really be the rule of labour. When people say to us that the dictatorship of the proletariat is recognised in words but that in reality it is mere phrases that are written, this actually shows that they have no notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for it by no means merely consists in overthrowing the bourgeoisie or the landowners—that happened in all revolutions—our dictatorship of the proletariat is the establishment of order, discipline, labour productivity, accounting and control by the proletarian Soviet power, which is more stable and firmly based than the previous one. That is what you won't solve, that is what we have not yet taught, that is what is needed by the workers, that is why it is good to show them a mirror in which all these shortcomings are plainly visible. I consider that this is a useful task for it will cause all thinking, class-conscious workers and peasants to devote their main efforts to it. Yes, by overthrowing the landowners and bourgeoisie we cleared the way but we did not build the edifice of socialism. On the ground cleared of one bourgeois generation, new generations continually appear in history, as long as the ground gives rise to them, and it does give rise to any number of bourgeois. As for those who look at the victory over the capitalists in the way that the petty proprietors look at it—"they grabbed, let me have a go too"—indeed, everyone of them is the source of a new generation of bourgeois. When they tell us that the introduction of labour discipline coupled with restoring capitalists as leaders is a threat to the revolution, I say: it is just the socialist character of our revolution that these people have failed to understand, they repeat the very thing that easily unites them with the petty bourgeois, who fear discipline, organisation, accounting and control as the devil fears holy water.

They may say: you are actually proposing here to give us capitalists as leaders among the working-class leaders. Yes, they are being brought in because in the matter of practical organisation they have knowledge that we do not possess. The class-conscious worker will never be afraid of such a leader, because he knows that Soviet power is his

power, that it will stand firm in his defence, because he knows that he wants to learn the practice of organisation.

We organised thousands under the tsar and hundreds of thousands under Kerensky. That is nothing, it does not count in politics. It was preparatory work, it was a preparatory course. Until the leading workers have learnt to organise tens of millions, they will not be socialists or creators of a socialist society, they will not acquire the necessary knowledge of organisation. The road of organisation is a long road and the tasks of socialist construction demand stubborn, long-continued work and appropriate knowledge, of which we do not have enough. Even the more developed generation of the immediate future will hardly achieve the complete transition to socialism.

Recall what former socialists wrote about the future socialist revolution; it is doubtful whether it would be possible to pass to socialism without learning from the organisers of trusts, for they have been concerned with this type of production on a large scale. We do not need to teach them socialism, we need to expropriate them and to break their sabotage. These two tasks we have carried out. We have to make them submit to workers' control. And if our critics among the Left Communists have levelled against us the reproach that we are not leading to communism by our tactics but are going back, their reproaches are ridiculous: they forget that we have lagged behind with accounting and control because it has been very difficult to smash this resistance and bring the bourgeoisie and its technicians and bourgeois specialists into our service. But we need their knowledge, their experience and labour, without which it is impossible, in fact, to gain possession of the culture that was created by the old social relations and has remained as the material basis of socialism. If the Left Communists have not noticed this, it is because they do not see life as it really is but concoct their slogans by counterposing state capitalism to ideal socialism. We, however, must tell the workers: yes, it is a step back, but we have to help ourselves to find a remedy. There is only one remedy: organise to the last man, organise accounting over production, organise accounting and control over consumption and act so that we do not have to turn out hundreds of mil-

lions in currency from the printing press,[122] and so that not a single hundred-ruble note is lost to the state treasury by falling into the wrong hands. This cannot be done by any outburst of revolutionary fervour, by any knock-out blow to the bourgeoisie. It can be done only by self-discipline, only by organising the labour of the workers and peasants, only by accounting and control. This we do not have yet and for it we have paid tribute by paying the capitalist organisers a higher remuneration than they paid you. This we have not learnt, but must learn, it is the road to socialism, the sole road—that of teaching the workers the practical business of managing gigantic enterprises, of organising big industry and large-scale distribution.

Comrades, I am very well aware how easy it is to talk of accounting, control, discipline and self-discipline when the speaker is someone occupying a definite social position. What a lot of material for witticisms this provides, and for saying: when your Party was not in power it promised the workers rivers flowing with milk and honey, mountains of sugar candy, but when these people are in power there is the usual transformation, they begin to talk of accounting, discipline, self-discipline, control, etc. I am very well aware what promising material this is for publicists of the type of Milyukov and Martov.

I am very well aware what rich material this is for persons whose concern is hack writing or showmanship, and who are inclined to use the flimsiest arguments, which receive scant sympathy from class-conscious workers.

In the newspaper *Levi Kommunist* I came across a review of my book[123] by such an eminent publicist as Bukharin; it was moreover a sympathetic review, but anything of value in it lost all its value for me when I had read through this review to the end. I perceived that Bukharin had not seen what should have been seen, and this happened because he wrote his review in April but quoted what had already become out of date for April, what belonged to a previous day, viz., that it was necessary to smash the old state. This we have already done, it is a task which belongs to a previous day, and we have to go forward and look not at the past but at the future and create a state based on the commune; he wrote about what is already embodied in Soviet

organisations, but said nothing about accounting, control and discipline. What a frame of mind these people have, and how their psychology coincides with the sentiments of the petty bourgeoisie: let us overthrow the rich, but there is no need for control. That is how they look at it; it holds them captive and it divides the class-conscious proletarian from the petty bourgeoisie and even from the extreme revolutionaries. This is when the proletarian says: let us organise and brace up, or some petty kulak, and there are millions of them, will overthrow us.

Here is the division between the class-conscious proletarian and the petty bourgeois; here the revolution takes leave of the petty bourgeoisie. And how blind are those people who do not say anything about this.

I shall venture to remind you of some more of my quotations; I said that people will be able to do without coercion when they are accustomed to act without it; such a custom of course, may be the result of long training.

When the Left Communists hear this, they clutch their heads and say: how is it that we didn't notice this? Bukharin, why didn't you criticise it? We showed our strength in suppressing the landowners and the bourgeoisie, and now we have to show our strength as regards self-discipline and organisation, because this is known from thousands of years of past experience and the people must be told that only in this lies the strength of our Soviet power, of the workers' dictatorship, of our proletarian authority. The petty bourgeois, however, hide from this truth behind the shield of revolutionary phraseology.

We have to show our strength. Yes, the small employers, petty proprietors, are ready to help us proletarians to overthrow the landowners and capitalists. But after this our paths diverge. They have no love for organisation, discipline, they are hostile to it. And here we have to wage the most determined, ruthless struggle against these proprietors and small employers. Because it is here, in the sphere of organisation, that socialist construction begins for us. And when I express my dissent to those people who claim to be socialists and who promise the workers they shall enjoy as much as they like and whatever they like, I say that communism presupposes a productivity of labour that

we do not have at present. Our productivity is too low, that is a fact. Capitalism leaves us as a heritage, especially in a backward country, a host of customs through which all state property, all public property, is regarded as something that may be maliciously spoilt. This psychology of the petty-bourgeois mass is felt at every step, and the struggle in this sphere is a very difficult one. Only the organised proletariat can endure everything. I wrote: "Until the higher phase of communism arrives, the socialists demand the strictest control by society and by the state."*

I wrote this before the October Revolution and I stand by it now.

Now, having suppressed the bourgeoisie and broken their sabotage, the time has come when we have an opportunity of dealing with this matter. While this was not the case, the heroes of the day and the heroes of the revolution were the Red Guards who performed their great historic deeds. They took up arms without the consent of the propertied classes. They performed this great historic work. They took up arms in order to overthrow the exploiters and make their arms an instrument for defence of the workers, and in order to look after the standards of production and labour and the standard of consumption.

We have not produced this, but it contains the kernel and the basis of socialism. If there are any to whom such work seems boring and uninteresting, they are representatives of petty-bourgeois laziness.

If our revolution halted here, it would go down in history no less than the revolution of 1793. But people will say: that was in the eighteenth century. For the eighteenth century that sufficed, but for the twentieth it is not enough. Accounting and control—that is mainly what is needed for the proper functioning of communist society. So I wrote before the October Revolution.** I repeat, it was impossible to tackle this matter until the Alexeyevs, Kornilovs and Kerenskys were crushed. Now the armed resistance of the bourgeoisie has been crushed. Our task is to put all the sabo-

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* See present edition, Vol. 25, p. 474.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 478.—*Ed.*

teurs to work under our control, under the control of the Soviet power, to set up managerial bodies so that accounting and control will be strictly carried out. The country is being ruined because after the war it has been through it lacks the elementary conditions for normal existence. Our enemies who are attacking us seem terrible only because we have not instituted accounting and control. When I hear hundreds of thousands of complaints about famine, when you see and know that these complaints are justified, that we have grain and cannot transport it, when we encounter the scoffing of the Left Communists and their objections to such measures as our railway decree—they have mentioned it twice—these are trifles.

At the meeting with the Left Communists on April 4, I said: give us your draft of the decree; after all, you are citizens of the Soviet Republic, members of Soviet institutions, you are not critics standing apart from us, outside the gate, like the bourgeois traders and saboteurs who criticise in order to vent their spleen. You, I repeat, are leaders of Soviet organisations; try to give us your draft decree. They cannot give it and will never be able to, because our railway decree is correct, because by introducing dictatorship our decree has the sympathy of the masses and class-conscious working people of the railways, but is opposed by those managers who plunder and accept bribes; because a vacillating attitude to it is shown by all those who waver between the Soviet government and its enemies—whereas the proletariat, which learnt discipline from large-scale production, knows that there cannot be socialism until production is organised on a large scale and until there is even stricter discipline.

This proletariat supports us in the railway movement; it will combat the anarchy of the petty proprietors and will show that the Russian revolution, which is capable of winning brilliant victories, is capable also of overcoming its own lack of organisation. And among the May Day slogans, from the standpoint of immediate tasks, it will appreciate the slogan of the Central Committee which reads: "We conquered capital, we shall conquer also our own lack of organisation". Only then shall we reach the full victory of socialism! (*Loud applause.*)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS

First of all I must reply to Comrade Bukharin's speech. In my first speech I remarked that we were nine-tenths in agreement with him, and so I think it is a pity that we should disagree as regards the other tenth. He is one-tenth in the position of having to spend half his speech disassociating and exorcising himself from absolutely everyone who spoke in support of him. And no matter how excellent his intentions and those of his group, the falsity of their position is proved by the fact that he always has to spend time making excuses and disassociating himself on the issue of state capitalism.

Comrade Bukharin is completely wrong; and I shall make this known in the press because this question is extremely important. I have a couple of words to say about the Left Communists' reproaching us on the grounds that a deviation in the direction of state capitalism is to be observed in our policy; now Comrade Bukharin wrongly states that under Soviet power state capitalism is impossible. So he is contradicting himself when he says that there can be no state capitalism under Soviet power—that is an obvious absurdity. The large number of enterprises and factories under the control of the Soviet government and owned by the state, this alone shows the transition from capitalism to socialism, but Comrade Bukharin ignores this. Instead, he recalls that we were against him in the Left Zimmerwald,[124] but that was ages ago and to recall that now, after Soviet power has been in existence for six months, after we have performed all the experiments we

could when we had expropriated, confiscated and nationalised—after all that to recall what we wrote in 1915 is absurd.... Now we cannot help bringing up the problem of state capitalism and socialism, of how to act in the transitional period, in which you have bits of capitalism and socialism existing side by side under Soviet power. Comrade Bukharin refuses to understand this problem; but I think we cannot throw it out all at once, and Comrade Bukharin does not propose throwing it out and does not deny that this state capitalism is something higher than what is left of the small proprietor's mentality, economic conditions and way of life, which are still extremely prevalent. Comrade Bukharin has not refuted that fact, for it cannot be refuted without forgetting the word Marxist.

Ghe's position that the proletariat in Europe is unclean, that in Germany the proletariat is corrupted,[125] is so crudely nationalistic, so obtuse that I don't know what he will say next. The proletariat in Europe is not one bit more unclean than in Russia, but to start a revolution there is more difficult because the people in power are not idiots like Romanov or boasters like Kerensky but serious leaders of capitalism, which was not the case in Russia.

Finally I come to the chief objections that have been showered upon my article and my speech from all sides. Particularly heavy fire was directed at the slogan: "steal back the stolen", a slogan in which, no matter how I look at it, I can find nothing wrong, when history comes on the scene. If we use the words "expropriate the expropriators", why can't we do without Latin words? (*Applause.*)

I think history will fully justify us, and the masses of the working people are coming over to our side even before history; but if the slogan "steal back the stolen" has shown itself unrestrainedly in the activity of the Soviets, and if it turns out that in a practical and fundamental matter like famine and unemployment we are confronted by enormous difficulties, it is appropriate to say that after the words "steal back what was stolen" the proletarian revolution makes a distinction, which runs: "Count up what was stolen and don't let it be filched piecemeal, and if people start filching for themselves directly or indirectly, these infringers of discipline must be shot...."

And when they start yelling and shouting that this is dictatorship, when they start yelling about Napoleon III and Julius Caesar, when they say this is the working class's inability to act seriously, when they accuse Trotsky, it means there is the same muddle-headedness, the same political mood induced by petty-bourgeois anarchy, which has been protesting not against the "steal back the stolen" slogan, but against the slogan of strict accounting and correct distribution. There will be no famine in Russia if we calculate how much grain there is, check up on all stocks, and if any breaking of the regulations is followed by the most severe punishment. That is where the difference lies. And it arises from the situation that obtains when the socialist revolution is seriously supported only by the proletariat while the petty bourgeoisie approaches it with hesitation, a fact we have always been aware of and always taken into account; and in this wavering they are against us. This will not make us hesitate and we shall continue to follow our path in the certainty that half the proletariat will follow us because it knows perfectly well how the factory owners robbed and stole merely so that the poor should have nothing.

It is just a lot of verbal trickery, all this talk about a dictatorship, Napoleon III, Julius Caesar and so forth. People can be fooled with that kind of talk here, but in the provinces, at every factory, in every village they know perfectly well that we are lagging behind in this respect; no one will question this slogan, everyone knows what it means. And there can be no doubt either that we shall direct all our efforts towards organising accounting, control and correct distribution.

Bukharin told us: "I disassociate myself from those who embrace me." But there are so many of them that Bukharin cannot extricate himself. They don't tell us what their proposals are because they have nothing to propose. Do you know what to propose? I have reproached you in the press and in my speeches. Over the matter of the railway decree we had the pleasure of recalling April 4. There is a reference to this in your magazine, and I have said that if you are not quite satisfied with the decree, give us a new decree. But there has not been a word about this in the

first issue, nor in the second issue, the proofs of which have kindly been given to me to look at; and there was not a word about it in Comrade Bukharin's speech either—a complete coincidence. Both Comrade Bukharin and Comrade Martov have got on their hobby horse—the railway decree—and are riding it to death. They talk about the dictatorship of Napoleon III, Julius Caesar and so on, providing material for a hundred issues that no one will read. But this is a little nearer the point. This is about the workers and the railways. Without railways not only will there be no socialism but everyone will starve to death like dogs while there is grain to be had close by. Everyone knows this perfectly well. Why don't you answer? You are closing your eyes. You are throwing dust in the eyes of the workers—the adherents of *Novaya Zhizn* and the Mensheviks deliberately, Comrade Bukharin by mistake. You are concealing the main issue from the workers when you talk of construction. What can be constructed without railways? And when I see some merchant or other, who tells me during a meeting of some kind, or when I am receiving a delegation, that there has been some improvement on such and such a railway, that praise is worth a million times more to me than 20 resolutions by Communists or anyone else, or any speeches.

When the practical people—engineers, merchants and so on—say that if this government copes at least to some extent with the railways, they will admit that it is a government, their opinion matters more than anything else. Because the railways are the key, they are one of the most striking manifestations of the connection between town and country, between industry and agriculture, on which socialism is entirely based. To make this connection good for the sake of planned activity in the interests of the whole population, we need railways.

All these phrases about dictatorship and so on, over which the Martovs and Karelins have found common ground and which have been masticated twice over by the Constitutional-Democratic press—they amount to nothing.

I have given you the example of the workers' organisations that are doing it, and the state capitalism of other enterprises, other branches of industry; the tobacco workers and tanners have more state capitalism than others, and

their affairs are in better order, and their road to socialism is more certain. There is no concealing this fact, and another thing you can't do is to come out with absurd phrases as Ghe does, when he says that with a rifle he can force anyone. That is a complete absurdity and a complete failure to understand what a rifle is for. After that one might think that a rifle is a bad thing, unless it is anarchist Ghe's head that is the bad thing. (*Applause.*) A rifle was a very good thing when the capitalist who was waging war against us had to be shot, when thieves had to be caught at their thievery and shot. But when Comrade Bukharin said there were people who were receiving salaries of 4,000 and they ought to be put up against a wall and shot, he was wrong. We have got to *find* such people. We have not very many posts where people get 4,000. We pick them up here and there. The whole point is that we have no experts, that is why we have got to enlist 1,000 people, first-class experts in their fields, who value their work, who like large-scale industry because they know that it means improvements in technology. When people here say that socialism can be won without learning from the bourgeoisie, I know this is the psychology of an inhabitant of Central Africa. The only socialism we can imagine is one based on all the lessons learned through large-scale capitalist culture. Socialism without postal and telegraph services, without machines is the emptiest of phrases. But it is impossible to sweep aside the bourgeois atmosphere and bourgeois habits all at once; it needs the kind of organisation on which all modern science and technology are based. To say a rifle will do the job is the greatest stupidity. Everything depends on nation-wide organisation—the whole population's paying income tax, the introduction of labour service, everyone's being registered; while a person is not registered, we have to pay him. When Bukharin said he could not see the principle, he was missing the point. Marx envisaged buying up the bourgeoisie as a class. He was writing about Britain, before Britain had imperialism, when a peaceful transition to socialism was possible—it certainly is not a reference to the earlier type of socialism.[126] We are talking not about the bourgeoisie but about recruiting experts. I have given one example. One could cite thousands. It is simply a question of

attracting people who can be attracted either by buying them with high salaries or by ideological organisation, because you can't deny the fact that it is they who are receiving all the high wages. We know from the example I gave—up to now you have been criticising only tacitly, yet the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries know perfectly well that the salaries paid are high. And the Left Communists and *Novaya Zhizn* adherents know it too.

And they don't criticise this. That's their sincere criticism of the Soviet government! When they saw that their engineers were getting 1,500, they kept quiet. Far better to pay these engineers. And no mention of Julius Caesar or dictatorship. This is political education of the masses. But if I say we are going to pay from 1,500 to 2,000 a month, that's a step back. Then out come Julius Caesar and Napoleon III and the Brest-Litovsk peace and everything; but not a word about your experts, about your engineers. And when they say, when Bukharin says, this is no violation of principle, I say that here we have a violation of the principle of the Paris Commune. State capitalism is not money but social relations. If we pay 2,000 in accordance with the railway decree, that is state capitalism. Comrade Bukharin referred to the Zimmerwald resolution of 1915 and he can't free himself of that ill-digested theory. Free yourself, Comrade Bukharin. Now Comrade Bukharin has said that I am attacking the petty-bourgeois element.

I was not attacking the working peasants when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let us leave the working peasants alone—that's not what I am talking about. But among the peasantry there are working peasants and petty-bourgeois peasants, who live like petty proprietors at the expense of others; the working peasants are exploited by others, but they want to live at their own expense. So Comrade Karelin in thinking that the working peasants are being attacked is wrong. The poor peasants who have nothing to gain from stealing what is stolen are on our side. They will accept our slogans. We know very well and have seen how people in the villages understand the slogan "steal back the stolen". If people go there agitating about dictatorship and spouting phrases about the Brest peace and so forth, these people who are arguing against us will find themselves

isolated and will receive no support. The proletariat, the mass of the peasants, who are ruined and have no hopes as regards individual farming, will be on our side because they know perfectly well that Russia cannot be kept going simply by stealing. We all know that quite well and everyone can see and feel it in his own, everyday affairs.

In this we are keeping up with economic demands and the mood of the masses of the working people. So when the declassed intellectuals among the Left Communists hurl their thunderbolts at us, we must remain confident that no matter how much they curse us, this slogan of the socialist revolution is the only correct slogan, which the masses of the working people must understand and use if we are to consolidate and complete the socialist revolution. You won't wriggle out of that problem at any workers' meeting; you will be pursued with this decree, this problem. We do not claim to be infallible; many of our decrees are bad. Put them right; you have various magazines and groups of writers. Tell us what is wrong with the railway decree. We suggested you should do so at the meeting of April 4, and today it is April 29th. Twenty-five days have passed and a whole group of splendid writers is silent because they have nothing to say.

You know that our railway decree, in spite of all its mistakes, which we are quite ready to correct, got down to the core of what is needed. It pivots on that mass of workers who respond to the strictest discipline, who need to be organised by a single authority which the Soviets can appoint and which the Soviets can replace and from whom they demand unfailing execution of assignments so that large-scale industry will operate like a machine and thousands of people will be directed by a single will, obey the orders of a single Soviet manager. (*Applause.*) And to bring up Napoleon and Julius Caesar on these grounds is either to go mad or to become completely lost in the literature of the privileged classes whose sole purpose in life is to curse the Bolsheviks. The railway decree, comrades, is a step that shows we are on the right road. In my speech I informed you why we had taken that road; in the Council of People's Commissars we did not spend our time discussing Napoleon

the Great and Julius Caesar but we did go over the question a hundred times of how to get the railways in order, and we know the response from the provinces, and we know from any number of talks with the railway organisations that the proletarians are for us, that they seek discipline and expect order. They see that people in Central Russia are starving while there is grain, but that owing to the transport muddle it is hard to deliver it.

But if there are people who are wavering, lost, in a petty-bourgeois mood, who have been frightened by one-man management, who go into hysterics and refuse to support us, why is this? Is it because there is a Right wing, or because people have got hysterics, particularly the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries? In their case the confusion is complete, no one could sort it out. So to avoid a lot of useless argument we say: get down to the main issue and deal with it in specific terms.

When people here talk of conciliation with the bourgeoisie, as Karelin and Martov have done, that is nonsense. I will remind you from Kautsky's authoritative pamphlet how he conceived life the day after the social revolution. I will tell you approximately what he wrote; the trust organisers will not be left without work to do. That was written by a man who realised that to organise tens of millions of people for the production and distribution of goods is some job! We have not learned this and there is nowhere to learn it, but the trust organisers know that without this there will be no socialism. And we need to know it too. So all these phrases about conciliation and agreement with the bourgeoisie are empty chatter. You cannot refute Kautsky's premise that large-scale industry must be learned through experience.

SIX THESES ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT[127]

1. The international position of the Soviet Republic is extremely difficult and critical, because the deepest and fundamental interests of international capital and imperialism induce it to strive not only for a military onslaught on Russia, but also for an agreement on the partition of Russia and the strangulation of the Soviet power. Only the intensification of the imperialist slaughter of the peoples in Western Europe and the imperialist rivalry between Japan and America in the Far East paralyse, or restrain, these aspirations, and then only partially, and only for a certain, probably short, time.

Therefore, the tactics of the Soviet Republic must be, on the one hand, to exert every effort to ensure the country's speediest economic recovery, to increase its defence capacity, to build up a powerful socialist army; on the other hand, in international policy, the tactics must be those of manoeuvring, retreat, waiting for the moment when the international proletarian revolution—which is now maturing more quickly than before in a number of advanced countries—fully matures.

2. In the sphere of domestic policy, the task that comes to the forefront at the present time in conformity with the resolution adopted by the All-Russia Congress of Soviets on March 15, 1918, is the task of organisation. It is this task, in connection with the new and higher organisation of production and distribution on the basis of socialised large-scale machine (labour) production, that constitutes the chief content—and chief condition of complete victory

—of the socialist revolution that was begun in Russia on October 25, 1917.

3. From the purely political point of view, the essence of the present situation is that the task of convincing the working people of Russia that the programme of the socialist revolution is correct and the task of winning Russia from the exploiters for the working people have, in main and fundamental outline, been carried out, and the chief problem that comes to the forefront now is—how to administer Russia. The organisation of proper administration, the undeviating fulfilment of the decisions of the Soviet government—this is the urgent task of the Soviets, this is the condition for the complete victory of the Soviet type of state, which it is not enough to proclaim in formal decrees, which it is not enough to establish and introduce in all parts of the country, but which must also be practically organised and tested in the course of the regular, everyday work of administration.

4. In the sphere of the economic building of socialism, the essence of the present situation is that our work of organising the country-wide and all-embracing accounting and control of production and distribution, and of introducing proletarian control of production, lags far behind the direct expropriation of the expropriators—the landowners and capitalists. This is the fundamental fact determining our tasks.

From this it follows, on the one hand, that the struggle against the bourgeoisie is entering a new phase, namely: the centre of gravity is shifting to the organisation of accounting and control. Only in this way is it possible to consolidate all the economic achievements directed against capital, all the measures in nationalising individual branches of the national economy that we have carried out since October; and only in this way is it possible to prepare for the successful consummation of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, i.e., the complete consolidation of socialism.

From this basic fact follows, on the other hand, the explanation as to why the Soviet government was obliged in certain cases to take a step backward, or to agree to compromise with bourgeois tendencies. Such a step backward and departure from the principles of the Paris Commune was,

for example, the introduction of high salaries for a number of bourgeois experts. Such a compromise was the agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives concerning steps and measures for gradually bringing the entire population into the co-operatives. Compromises of this kind will be necessary until the proletarian government has put country-wide control and accounting firmly on its feet; and our task is, while not in the least concealing their unfavourable features from the people, to exert efforts to improve accounting and control as the only means and method of completely eliminating all compromises of this kind. Compromises of this kind are needed at the present time as the sole (because we are late with accounting and control) guarantee of slower, but surer progress. When the accounting and control of production and distribution is fully introduced the need for such compromises will disappear.

5. Particular significance now attaches to measures for raising labour discipline and the productivity of labour. Every effort must be exerted for the steps already undertaken in this direction, especially by the trade unions, to be sustained, consolidated and increased. This includes, for example, the introduction of piece-work, the adoption of much that is scientific and progressive in the Taylor system, the payment of wages commensurate with the general results of the work of a factory, the exploitation of rail and water transport, etc. This also includes the organisation of competition between individual producers' and consumers' communes, selection of organisers, etc.

6. The proletarian dictatorship is absolutely indispensable during the transition from capitalism to socialism, and in our revolution this truth has been fully confirmed in practice. Dictatorship, however, presupposes a revolutionary government that is really firm and ruthless in crushing both exploiters and hooligans, and our government is too mild. Obedience, and unquestioning obedience at that, during work to the one-man decisions of Soviet directors, of the dictators elected or appointed by Soviet institutions, vested with dictatorial powers (as is demanded, for example, by the railway decree), is far, very far from being guaranteed as yet. This is the effect of the influence

of petty-bourgeois anarchy, the anarchy of small-proprietor habits, aspirations and sentiments, which fundamentally contradict proletarian discipline and socialism. The proletariat must concentrate all its class-consciousness on the task of combating this petty-bourgeois anarchy, which is not only directly apparent (in the support given by the bourgeoisie and their hangers-on, the Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., to every kind of resistance to the proletarian government), but also indirectly apparent (in the historical vacillation displayed on the major questions of policy by both the petty-bourgeois Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the trend in our Party called "Left Communist", which descends to the methods of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness and copies the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).

Iron discipline and the thorough exercise of proletarian dictatorship against petty-bourgeois vacillation—this is the general and summarising slogan of the moment.

Written between April 30 and May 3, 1918

Published in 1918 in the pamphlet: N. Lenin *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*, All-Russia C.E.C. Publishers

Published according to the text of the second edition of the pamphlet, 1918, collated with the manuscript

BASIC PROPOSITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND ESPECIALLY ON BANKING POLICY

I. Completion of nationalisation of industry and exchange.
II. Nationalisation of banks and gradual transition to socialism.
III. Compulsory organisation of the population in consumer co-operative societies.
{+Commodity exchange}
IV. Accounting and control of production and distribution of goods.
V. Labour discipline.
{+Tax policy}

Centralisation

Measures for transition to compulsory current accounts or to compulsory keeping of money in the banks.

Compulsory organisation of the population in consumer co-operative, societies and measures for transition to this.

Conditions of an agreement with co-operators on gradual transition of their apparatus towards organisation of the whole population in consumer co-operative societies

Compulsory labour service, begun from the top.

The most ruthless measures to combat chaos, disorder and idleness, and the most vigorous and severe measures for raising the discipline and self-discipline of the workers and peasants, are to be regarded as absolutely essential and urgent.

Conversion of state control into a real control for setting up mobile groups of controllers in all spheres of economic life.

Practical conditions concerning the employment of bourgeois intellectuals and saboteurs who express the desire to work with the Soviet government.

Industrial courts for taking account of production, stocks of goods and labour productivity.

(Immediate and categorical.)

1. Completion of nationalisation of industry.
2. Gradual transition to organisation of one and all in consumer co-operatives and commodity exchange.
3. Banking policy.
4. Labour discipline and so forth.
5. Tax policy (finance).

1. Completion of the nationalisation of all factories, railways, means of production and exchange. Categorical and ruthless struggle against the syndicalist and chaotic attitude to nationalised enterprises.[128] Persistent carrying out of centralisation of economic life on a nationwide scale. Unremitting demand for preliminary plans and estimates, weekly reports and actual increase of labour productivity, Establishment and practical trial of the apparatus for managing the nationalised industries.

Written in April 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT PLAN OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL WORK[129]

The Supreme Economic Council should immediately give its instructions to the Academy of Sciences, which has launched a systematic study and investigation of the natural productive forces* of Russia, to set up a number of expert commissions for the speediest possible compilation of a plan for the reorganisation of industry and the economic progress of Russia.

The plan should include:

the rational *distribution* of industry in Russia from the standpoint of proximity to raw materials and the lowest consumption of labour-power in the transition from the processing of the raw materials to all subsequent stages in the processing of semi-manufactured goods, up to and including the output of the finished product;

the rational merging and concentration of industry in a few big enterprises from the standpoint of the most up-to-date large-scale industry, especially trusts;

enabling the present Russian Soviet Republic (excluding the Ukraine and the regions occupied by the Germans) as far as possible to provide itself *independently* with *all* the chief items of raw materials and organise main branches of industry;

special attention to the electrification of industry and transport and the application of electricity to farming, and the use of lower grades of fuel (peat, low-grade coal)

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* *Publication* of this material must be accelerated to the utmost; a note about this must be sent to the Commissariat for Education, the Printing Workers' Trade Union and the Commissariat for Labour.[130]

for the production of electricity, with the lowest possible expenditure on extraction and transport;

water power and wind motors in general and in their application to farming.

Written in April 1918

First published on March 4, 1924 in *Pravda* No. 52

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE C.C., R.C.P.[131]

I request you to put on the agenda the question of expelling from the Party those members who, being judges in the case (May 2, 1918) against bribe-takers, where bribery was proved and admitted by the defendants, confined themselves to a sentence of six months' imprisonment.

To award bribe-takers such derisively weak and mild sentences, instead of shooting, is *disgraceful* behaviour for a Communist and revolutionary. Such comrades must be *pilloried* by the court of public opinion and *expelled from the Party*, for their place is at the side of Kerensky and Martov and not at the side of revolutionary Communists.

Lenin

May 4, 1918

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Published according to
the manuscript

"LEFT-WING" CHILDISHNESS AND THE PETTY-BOURGEOIS MENTALITY

Published May 9, 10, and 11, 1918
in *Pravda* Nos. 88, 89, and 90
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text of the pamphlet: N. Lenin, *The Chief Task of Our Day*, Pribol Publishers, Moscow, 1918, collated with the *Pravda* text and the text of the pamphlet: N. Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov), *Old Articles on Almost New Subjects*, Moscow, 1922

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The publication by a small group of "Left Communists" of their journal, *Kommunist* (No. 1, April 20, 1918), and of their "theses", strikingly confirms my views expressed in the pamphlet *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government.** There could not be better confirmation, in political literature, of the utter naïveté of the defence of petty-bourgeois sloppiness that is sometimes concealed by "Left" slogans. It is useful and necessary to deal with the arguments of "Left Communists" because they are characteristic of the period we are passing through. They show up with exceptional clarity the negative side of the "core" of this period. They are instructive, because the people we are dealing with are the best of those who have failed to understand the present period, people who by their knowledge and loyalty stand far, far above the *ordinary* representatives of the same mistaken views, namely, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

I

As a political magnitude, or as a group claiming to play a political role, the "Left Communist" group has presented its "Theses on the Present Situation". It is a good Marxist custom to give a coherent and complete exposition of the principles underlying one's views and tactics. And this good Marxist custom has helped to reveal the mistake committed by our "Lefts", because the mere attempt to argue and not to declaim exposes the unsoundness of their argument.

The first thing that strikes one is the abundance of allusions, hints and evasions with regard to the old question

* See this volume, pp. 235-77.—*Ed.*

of whether it was right to conclude the Brest Treaty. The "Lefts" dare not put the question in a straightforward manner. They flounder about in a comical fashion, pile argument on argument, fish for reasons, plead that "on the one hand" it may be so, but "on the other hand" it may not, their thoughts wander over all and sundry subjects, they try all the time not to see that they are defeating themselves. The "Lefts" are very careful to quote the figures: twelve votes at the Party Congress against peace, twenty-eight votes in favour, but they discreetly refrain from mentioning that of the hundreds of votes cast at the meeting of the Bolshevik group of the Congress of Soviets they obtained less than one-tenth. They have invented a "theory" that the peace was carried by "the exhausted and declassed elements", while it was opposed by "the workers and peasants of the southern regions, where there was greater vitality in economic life and the supply of bread was more assured".... Can one do anything but laugh at this? There is not a word about the voting at the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets in favour of peace, nor about the social and class character of the typically petty-bourgeois and declassed political conglomeration in Russia who were opposed to peace (the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party). In an utterly childish manner, by means of amusing "scientific" explanations, they try to conceal their own bankruptcy, to conceal the facts, the mere review of which would show that it was precisely the declassed, intellectual "cream" of the party, the élite, who opposed the peace with slogans couched in revolutionary petty-bourgeois phrases, that it was precisely the *mass* of workers and exploited peasants who carried the peace.

Nevertheless, in spite of all the above-mentioned declarations and evasions of the "Lefts" on the question of war and peace, the plain and obvious truth manages to come to light. The authors of the theses are compelled to admit that "the conclusion of peace has for the time being weakened the imperialists' attempts to make a deal on a world scale" (this is inaccurately formulated by the "Lefts", but this is not the place to deal with inaccuracies). "The conclusion of peace has already caused the conflict between the imperialist powers to become more acute."

Now this is a fact. Here is something that has *decisive* significance. That is why those who opposed the conclusion of peace were unwittingly playthings in the hands of the imperialists and fell into the trap laid for them by the imperialists. For, until the world socialist revolution breaks out, until it embraces several countries and is strong enough to overcome *international imperialism*, it is the direct duty of the socialists who have conquered in one country (especially a backward one) *not* to accept battle against the giants of imperialism. Their duty is to try to avoid battle, to wait until the conflicts between the imperialists weaken them *even more*, and bring the revolution in other countries even nearer. Our "Lefts" did not understand this simple truth in January, February and March. Even now they are afraid of admitting it openly. But it comes to light through all their confused reasoning like "on the one hand it must be confessed, on the other hand one must admit".

"During the coming spring and summer," the "Lefts" write in their theses, "the collapse of the imperialist system must begin. In the event of a victory for German imperialism in the present phase of the war this collapse can only be postponed, but it will then express itself in even more acute forms."

This formulation is even more childishly inaccurate despite its playing at science. It is natural for children to "understand" science to mean something that can determine in what year, spring, summer, autumn or winter the "collapse must begin".

These are ridiculous, vain attempts to ascertain what cannot be ascertained. No serious politician will ever say when this or that collapse of a "system" "must begin" (the more so that the collapse of the *system* has already begun, and it is now a question of the moment when the outbreak of revolution in *particular* countries will begin). But an indisputable truth forces its way through this childishly helpless formulation, namely, the outbreaks of revolution in other, more advanced, countries are *nearer* now, a month since the beginning of the "respite" which followed the conclusion of peace, than they were a month or six weeks ago.

What follows?

It follows that the peace supporters were absolutely right, and their stand has been justified by the course of events. They were right in having drummed into the minds of the lovers of ostentation that one must be able to calculate the balance of forces and *not help* the imperialists by making the battle against socialism easier for them, when socialism is still weak, and when the chances of the battle are manifestly *against* socialism.

Our "Left" Communists, however, who are also fond of calling themselves "proletarian" Communists, because there is very little that is proletarian about them and very much that is petty-bourgeois, are incapable of giving thought to the balance of forces, to calculating it. This is the core of Marxism and Marxist tactics, but they disdainfully brush aside the "core" with "proud" phrases such as:

"...That the masses have become firmly imbued with an inactive 'peace mentality' is an objective fact of the political situation...."

What a gem! After three years of the most agonising and reactionary war, the people, thanks to Soviet power and its correct tactics, which never lapsed into mere phrase-making, have obtained a very, very brief, insecure and far from sufficient respite. The "Left" intellectual stripling, however, with the magnificence of a self-infatuated Narcissus, profoundly declare "that the masses [???] have become firmly imbued [!!!] with an inactive [!!!???] peace mentality". Was I not right when I said at the Party Congress that the paper or journal of the "Lefts" ought to have been called not *Kommunist* but *Szlachcic*?*

Can a Communist with the slightest understanding of the mentality and the conditions of life of the toiling and exploited people descend to the point of view of the typical declassed petty-bourgeois intellectual with the mental outlook of a noble or *szlachcic*, which declares that a "peace mentality" is "inactive" and believes that the brandishing of a cardboard sword is "activity"? For our "Lefts" merely brandish a cardboard sword when they ignore the universally known fact, of which the war in the Ukraine has served as an additional proof, that peoples utterly exhausted by

* See this volume, p. 105.—*Ed.*

three years of butchery cannot go on fighting without a respite; and that war, if it cannot be organised on a national scale, very often creates a mentality of disintegration peculiar to petty proprietors, instead of the iron discipline of the proletariat. Every page of *Kommunist* shows that our "Lefts" have no idea of iron proletarian discipline and how it is achieved, that they are thoroughly imbued with the mentality of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectual.

II

Perhaps all these phrases of the "Lefts" about war can be put down to mere childish exuberance, which, moreover, concerns the past, and therefore has not a shadow of political significance? This is the argument some people put up in defence of our "Lefts". But this is wrong. Anyone aspiring to political leadership must be able to *think out* political problems, and lack of this ability converts the "Lefts" into spineless preachers of a policy of vacillation, which objectively can have only one result, namely, by their vacillation the "Lefts" *are helping* the imperialists to provoke the Russian Soviet Republic into a battle that will obviously be to its disadvantage, they *are helping* the imperialists to draw us into a snare. Listen to this:

"...The Russian workers' revolution cannot 'save itself' by abandoning the path of world revolution, by continually avoiding battle and yielding to the pressure of international capital, by making concessions to 'home capital'.

"From this point of view it is necessary to adopt a determined class international policy which will unite international revolutionary propaganda by word and deed, and to strengthen the organic connection with international socialism (and not with the international bourgeoisie)...."

I shall deal separately with the thrusts at home policy contained in this passage. But examine this riot of phrase-making—and timidity in deeds—in the sphere of foreign policy. What tactics *are binding* at the *present* time on all who do not wish to be tools of imperialist provocation, and who do not wish to walk into the snare? Every politician must give a clear, straightforward reply to this

question. Our Party's reply is well known. At the *present* moment we must retreat and avoid battle. Our "Lefts" dare not contradict this and shoot into the air: "A determined class international policy"!!

This is deceiving the people. If you want to fight now, say so openly. If you don't wish to *retreat* now, say so openly. Otherwise, in your objective role, you are a tool of imperialist provocation. And your subjective "mentality" is that of a frenzied petty bourgeois who swaggers and blusters but senses perfectly well that the proletarian is *right* in retreating and in trying to retreat in an organised way. He senses that the proletarian is right in arguing that because we lack strength we must retreat (before Western and Eastern imperialism) even as far as the Urals, for in this lies the *only* chance of playing for time while the revolution in the West matures, the revolution which is not "bound" (despite the twaddle of the "Lefts") to begin in "spring or summer", but which is coming nearer and becoming more probable *every month*.

The "Lefts" have no policy of their "own". They dare *not* declare that retreat at the *present moment* is unnecessary. They twist and turn, play with words, substitute the question of "continuously" avoiding battle for the question of avoiding battle at the *present moment*. They blow soap bubbles such as "international revolutionary propaganda by deed"!! What does this mean?

It can only mean one of two things: either it is mere Nozdryovism,[132] or it means an offensive war to overthrow international imperialism. Such nonsense cannot be uttered openly, and that is why the "Left" Communists are obliged to take refuge from the derision of every politically conscious proletarian behind high-sounding and empty phrases. They hope the inattentive reader will not notice the real meaning of the phrase "international revolutionary propaganda by deed".

The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals. The organised proletarian Communists will certainly punish this "habit" with nothing less than derision and expulsion from all responsible posts. The people must be told the bitter truth simply, clearly and in a straightforward manner:

it is possible, and even probable, that the war party will again get the upper hand in Germany (that is, an offensive against us will commence at once), and that Germany together with Japan, by official agreement or by tacit understanding, will partition and strangle us. Our tactics, if we do not want to listen to the ranters, must be to wait, procrastinate, avoid battle and retreat. If we shake off the ranters and "brace ourselves" by creating genuinely iron, genuinely proletarian, genuinely communist discipline, we shall have a good chance of gaining many months. And then by retreating even, if the worst comes to the worst, to the Urals, we shall *make it easier* for our ally (the international proletariat) to come to our aid, to "catch up" (to use the language of sport) the distance between the beginning of revolutionary outbreaks and revolution.

These, and these alone, are the tactics which can in fact strengthen the connection between one temporarily isolated section of international socialism and the other sections. But to tell the truth, all that your arguments lead to, dear "Left Communists", is the "strengthening of the organic connection" between one high-sounding phrase and another. A bad sort of "organic connection", this!

I shall enlighten you, my amiable friends, as to why such disaster overtook you. It is because you devote more effort to learning by heart and committing to memory revolutionary slogans than to thinking them out. This leads you to write "the defence of the socialist fatherland" in quotation marks, which are probably meant to signify your attempts at being ironical, but which really prove that you are muddleheads. You are accustomed to regard "defencism" as something base and despicable; you have learned this and committed it to memory. You have learned this by heart so thoroughly that some of you have begun talking nonsense to the effect that defence of the fatherland in an imperialist *epoch* is impermissible (as a matter of fact, it is impermissible only in an imperialist, reactionary war, waged by the bourgeoisie). But you have not thought out why and when "defencism" is abominable.

To recognise defence of the fatherland means recognising the legitimacy and justice of war. Legitimacy and justice from what point of view? Only from the point of view

of the socialist, proletariat and its struggle for its emancipation. We do not recognise any other point of view. If war is waged by the exploiting class with the object of strengthening its rule as a class, such a war is a criminal war, and "defencism" in *such* a war is a base betrayal of socialism. If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the bourgeoisie in its own country, and is waged with the object of strengthening and developing socialism, such a war is legitimate and "holy".

We have been "defencists" since October 25, 1917. I have said this more than once very definitely, and you dare not deny this. It is precisely in the interests of "strengthening the connection" with international socialism that we *are in duty bound* to defend our *socialist* fatherland. Those who treat frivolously the defence of the country in which the proletariat has already achieved victory are the ones who destroy the connection with international socialism. When we were the representatives of an oppressed class we did not adopt a frivolous attitude towards defence of the fatherland in an imperialist war. We opposed such defence on principle. Now that we have become representatives of the ruling class, which has begun to organise socialism, we demand that everybody adopt a *serious* attitude towards defence of the country. And adopting a serious attitude towards defence of the country means thoroughly preparing for it, and strictly calculating the balance of forces. If our forces are obviously small, the best means of defense is *retreat into the interior of the country* (anyone who regards this as an artificial formula, made up to suit the needs of the moment, should read old Clausewitz, one of the greatest authorities on military matters, concerning the lessons of history to be learned in this connection). The "Left Communists", however, do not give the slightest indication that they understand the significance of the question of the balance of forces.

When we were opposed to defencism on principle we were justified in holding up to ridicule those who wanted to "save" their fatherland, ostensibly in the interests of socialism. When we gained the right to be proletarian defencists the whole question was radically altered. It has become our duty to calculate with the utmost accuracy the different forces involved, to weigh with the utmost care the

chances of our ally (the international proletariat) being able to come to our aid in time. It is in the interest of capital to destroy its enemy (the revolutionary proletariat) bit by bit, before the workers in all countries have united (actually united, i.e., by beginning the revolution). It is in our interest to do all that is possible, to take advantage of the slightest opportunity to postpone the decisive battle until the moment (or *until after* the moment) the revolutionary workers' contingents have united in a single great international army.

III

We shall pass on to the misfortunes of our "Left" Communists in the sphere of home policy. It is difficult to read the following phrases in the theses on the *present* situation without smiling.

"...The systematic use of the remaining means of production is conceivable only if a most determined policy of socialisation is pursued" ... "not to capitulate to the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois intellectualist servitors, but to rout the bourgeoisie and to put down sabotage completely...."

Dear "Left Communists", how determined they are, but how little thinking they display. What do they mean by pursuing "a most determined policy of socialisation"?

One may or may not be determined on the question of nationalisation or confiscation, but the whole point is that even the greatest possible "determination" in the world is not enough to pass *from* nationalisation and confiscation *to* socialisation. The misfortune of our "Lefts" is that by their naïve, childish combination of the words "most determined policy of socialisation" they reveal their utter failure to understand the crux of the question, the crux of the "present" situation. The misfortune of our "Lefts" is that they have missed the very essence of the "present situation", the transition from confiscation (the carrying out of which requires above all determination in a politician) to socialisation (the carrying out of which requires a *different* quality in the revolutionary).

Yesterday, the main task of the moment was, as determinedly as possible, to nationalise, confiscate, beat down

and crush the bourgeoisie, and put down sabotage. Today, only a blind man could fail to see that we have nationalised, confiscated, beaten down and put down more *than we have had time to count*. The difference between socialisation and simple confiscation is that confiscation can be carried out by "determination" alone, without the ability to calculate and distribute properly, whereas *socialisation cannot be brought about without this ability*.

The historical service we have rendered is that yesterday we were determined (and we shall be tomorrow) in confiscating, in beating down the bourgeoisie, in putting down sabotage. To write about this today in "theses on the present situation" is to fix one's eyes on the past and to fail to understand the transition to the future.

"...To put down sabotage completely...." What a task they have found! Our saboteurs are quite sufficiently "put down". What we lack is something quite different. We lack the proper *calculation* of which saboteurs to set to work and where to place them. We lack the organisation of our own forces that is needed for, say, one Bolshevik leader or controller to be able to supervise a hundred saboteurs who are now coming into our service. When that is how matters stand, to flaunt such phrases as "a most determined policy of socialisation", "routing", and "completely putting down" is just missing the mark. It is typical of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary not to notice that routing, putting down, etc., is not enough for socialism. It is sufficient for a small proprietor enraged against a big proprietor. But no proletarian revolutionary would ever fall into such error.

If the words we have quoted provoke a smile, the following discovery made by the "Left Communists" will provoke nothing short of Homeric laughter. According to them, under the "Bolshevik deviation to the right" the Soviet Republic is threatened with "evolution towards state capitalism". They have really frightened us this time! And with what gusto these "Left Communists" repeat this threatening revelation in their theses and articles....

It has not occurred to them that state capitalism would be a *step forward* as compared with the present state of affairs in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months' time state capitalism became established in our

Republic, this would be a great success and a sure guarantee that within a year socialism will have gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible in our country.

I can imagine with what noble indignation a "Left Communist" will recoil from these words, and what "devastating criticism" he will make to the workers against the "Bolshevik deviation to the right". What! Transition to state *capitalism* in the Soviet *Socialist* Republic would be a step forward?... Isn't this the betrayal of socialism?

Here we come to the root of the *economic* mistake of the "Left Communists". And that is why we must deal with this point in greater detail.

Firstly, the "Left Communists" do not understand what kind of *transition* it is from capitalism to socialism that gives us the right and the grounds to call our country the Socialist Republic of Soviets.

Secondly, they reveal their petty-bourgeois mentality precisely by *not recognising* the petty-bourgeois element as the *principal* enemy of socialism in our country.

Thirdly, in making a bugbear of "state capitalism", they betray their failure to understand that the Soviet state differs from the bourgeois state economically.

Let us examine these three points.

No one, I think, in studying the question of the economic system of Russia, has denied its transitional character. Nor, I think, has any Communist denied that the term Socialist Soviet Republic implies the determination of Soviet power to achieve the transition to socialism, and not that the new economic system is recognised as a socialist order.

But what does the word "transition" mean? Does it not mean, as applied to an economy, that the present system contains elements, particles, fragments of *both* capitalism and socialism? Everyone will admit that it does. But not all who admit this take the trouble to consider what elements actually constitute the various socio-economic structures that exist in Russia at the present time. And this is the crux of the question.

Let us enumerate these elements:

1) patriarchal, i.e., to a considerable extent natural, peasant farming;

2) small commodity production (this Includes the majority of those peasants who sell their grain);
3) private capitalism;
4) state capitalism;
5) socialism.

Russia is so vast and so varied that all these different types of socio-economic structures are intermingled. This is what constitutes the specific features of the situation.

The question arises: what elements predominate? Clearly in a small-peasant country, the petty-bourgeois element predominates and it must predominate, for the great majority of those working the land are small commodity producers. The shell of our state capitalism (grain monopoly, state-controlled entrepreneurs and traders, bourgeois co-operators) is pierced now in one place, now in another by *profiteers*, the chief object of profiteering being *grain*.

It is in this field that the main struggle is being waged. Between what elements is this struggle being waged if we are to speak in terms of economic categories such as "state capitalism"? Between the fourth and the fifth in the order in which I have just enumerated them. Of course not. It is not state capitalism that is at war with socialism, but the petty bourgeoisie plus private capitalism fighting together against both state capitalism and socialism. The petty bourgeoisie oppose *every* kind of state interference, accounting and control, whether it be state capitalist or state socialist. This is an absolutely unquestionable fact of reality, and the root of the economic mistake of the "Left Communists" is that they have failed to understand it. The profiteer, the commercial racketeer, the disrupter of monopoly—these are our principal "internal" enemies, the enemies of the economic measures of Soviet power. A hundred and twenty-five years ago it might have been excusable for the French petty bourgeoisie, the most ardent and sincere revolutionaries, to try to crush the profiteer by executing a few of the "chosen" and by making thunderous declamations. Today, however, the purely rhetorical attitude to this question assumed by some Left Socialist-Revolutionaries can rouse nothing but disgust and revulsion in every politically conscious revolutionary. We know perfectly well that the economic basis of profiteering is both the small

proprietors, who are exceptionally widespread in Russia, and private capitalism, of which *every* petty bourgeois is an agent. We know that the million tentacles of this petty-bourgeois hydra now and again encircle various sections of the workers, that, *instead of state monopoly*, profiteering forces its way into every pore of our social and economic organism.

Those who fail to see this show by their blindness that they are slaves of petty-bourgeois prejudices. This is precisely the case with our "Left Communists", who in words (and of course in their deepest convictions) are merciless enemies of the petty bourgeoisie, while in deeds they help only the petty bourgeoisie, serve only this section of the population and express only its point of view by fighting—*in April 1918!!*—against ... "state capitalism". They are wide of the mark!

The petty bourgeoisie have money put away, the few thousand that they made during the war by "honest" and especially by dishonest means. They are the characteristic economic type that serves as the basis of profiteering and private capitalism. Money is a certificate entitling the possessor to receive social wealth; and a vast section of small proprietors, numbering millions, cling to this certificate and conceal it from the "state". They do not believe in socialism or communism, and "mark time" until the proletarian storm blows over. Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to *our* control and accounting (we can do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-proletarians, around the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will overthrow our workers' power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the Napoleons and Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of petty proprietorship. This is how the question stands. Only the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries fail to see this plain and evident truth through their mist of empty phrases about the "toiling" peasants. But who takes these phrase-mongering Left Socialist-Revolutionaries seriously?

The petty bourgeois who hoards his thousands is an enemy of state capitalism. He wants to employ his thousands just for himself, against the poor, in opposition to any

kind of state control. And the sum total of these thousands, amounting to many thousands of millions, forms the base for profiteering, which undermines our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then assume that 200 of this total vanishes owing to petty profiteering, various kinds of embezzlement and the "evasion" by the small proprietors of Soviet decrees and regulations. Every politically conscious worker will say that if better order and organisation could be obtained at the price of 300 out of the 1,000 he would willingly give 300 instead of 200, for it will be quite easy under Soviet power to reduce this "tribute" later on to, say, 100 or 50, once order and organisation are established and once the petty-bourgeois disruption of state monopoly is completely overcome.

This simple illustration in figures, which I have deliberately simplified to the utmost in order to make it absolutely clear, explains the present *correlation* of state capitalism and socialism. The workers hold state power and have every legal opportunity of "taking" the whole thousand, without giving up a single kopek, except for socialist purposes. This legal opportunity, which rests upon the actual transition of power to the workers, is an element of socialism.

But in many ways, the small proprietary and private capitalist element undermines this legal position, drags in profiteering, hinders the execution of Soviet decrees. State capitalism would be a gigantic step forward *even if* we paid *more* than we are paying at present (I took a numerical example deliberately to bring this out more sharply), because it is worth while paying for "tuition", because it is useful for the workers, because victory over disorder, economic ruin and laxity is the most important thing; because the continuation of the anarchy of small ownership is the greatest, the most serious danger, and it will *certainly* be our ruin (unless we overcome it), whereas not only will the payment of a heavier tribute to state capitalism not ruin us, it will lead us to socialism by the surest road. When the working class has learned how to defend the state system against the anarchy of small ownership, when it has learned to organise large-scale production on a national scale, along state capitalist lines, it will hold, if I may use the

expression, all the trump cards, and the consolidation of socialism will be assured.

In the first place, *economically*, state capitalism is immeasurably superior to our present economic system.

In the second place, there is nothing terrible in it for Soviet power, for the Soviet state is a state in which the power of the workers and the poor is assured. The "Left Communists" failed to understand these unquestionable truths, which, of course, a "Left Socialist-Revolutionary", who cannot connect any ideas on political economy in his head in general, will never understand, but which every Marxist *must* admit. It is not even worth while arguing with a Left Socialist-Revolutionary. It is enough to point to him as a "repulsive example" of a windbag. But the "Left Communists" *must* be argued with because it is Marxists who are making a mistake, and an analysis of their mistake will help the *working class* to find the true road.

IV

To make things even clearer, let us first of all take the most concrete example of state capitalism. Everybody knows what this example is. It is Germany. Here we have "the last word" in modern large-scale capitalist engineering and planned organisation, *subordinated to Junker-bourgeois imperialism*. Cross out the words in italics, and in place of the militarist, Junker, bourgeois, imperialist *state* put *also a state*, but of a different social type, of a different class content—a *Soviet* state, that is, a proletarian state, and you will have the *sum total* of the conditions necessary for socialism.

Socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering based on the latest discoveries of modern science. It is inconceivable without planned state organisation, which keeps tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard in production and distribution. We Marxists have always spoken of this, and it is not worth while wasting two seconds talking to people who do not understand *even* this (anarchists and a good half of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).

At the same time socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state. This also is ABC. And history (which nobody, except Menshevik blockheads of the first order, ever expected to bring about "complete" socialism smoothly, gently, easily and simply) has taken such a peculiar course that it *has given birth* in 1918 to two unconnected halves of socialism existing side by side like two future chickens in the single shell of international imperialism. In 1918 Germany and Russia have become the most striking embodiment of the material realisation of the economic, the productive and the socio-economic conditions for socialism, on the one hand, and the political conditions, on the other.

A successful proletarian revolution in Germany would immediately and very easily smash any shell of imperialism (which unfortunately is made of the best steel, and hence cannot be broken by the efforts of *any* ... chicken) and would bring about the victory of world socialism for certain, without any difficulty, or with slight difficulty—if, of course, by "difficulty" we mean difficult on a world-historical scale, and not in the parochial philistine sense.

While the revolution in Germany is still slow in "coming forth", our task is to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare *no effort* in copying it and not shrink from adopting *dictatorial* methods to hasten the copying of it. Our task is to hasten this copying even more than Peter hastened the copying of Western culture by barbarian Russia, and we must not hesitate to use barbarous methods in fighting barbarism. If there are anarchists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (I recall off-hand the speeches of Karelin and Ghe at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee) who indulge in Narcissus-like reflections and say that it is unbecoming for us revolutionaries to "take lessons" from German imperialism, there is only one thing we can say in reply: the revolution that took these people seriously would perish irrevocably (and deservedly).

At present, petty-bourgeois capitalism prevails in Russia, and it is *one and the same road* that leads from it to *both* large-scale state capitalism and to socialism, *through one and the same* intermediary station called "national accounting and control of production and distribution". Those

who fail to understand this are committing an unpardonable mistake in economics. Either they do not know the facts of life, do not see what actually exists and are unable to look the truth in the face, or they confine themselves to abstractly comparing "capitalism" with "socialism" and fail to study the concrete forms and stages of the transition that is taking place in our country. Let it be said in parenthesis that this is the very theoretical mistake which misled the best people in the *Novaya Zhizn* and *Vperyod* camp. The worst and the mediocre of these, owing to their stupidity and spinelessness, tag along behind the bourgeoisie, of whom they stand in awe. The best of them have failed to understand that it was not without reason that the teachers of socialism spoke of a whole period of transition from capitalism to socialism and emphasised the "prolonged birth-pangs" of the new society. And this new society is again an abstraction which can come into being only by passing through a series of varied, imperfect concrete attempts to create this or that socialist state.

It is because Russia cannot advance from the economic situation now existing here without traversing the ground which *is common* to state capitalism and to socialism (national accounting and control) that the attempt to frighten others as well as themselves with "evolution *towards* state capitalism" (*Kommunist* No. 1, p. 8, col. 1) is utter theoretical nonsense. This is letting one's thoughts wander away from the true road of "evolution", and failing to understand what this road is. In practice, it is equivalent to pulling us back to small proprietary capitalism.

In order to convince the reader that this is not the first time I have given this "high" appreciation of state capitalism and that I gave it *before* the Bolsheviks seized power I take the liberty of quoting the following passage from my pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*, written in September 1917.

"...Try to substitute *for* the Junker-capitalist state, for the landowner-capitalist state, a *revolutionary-democratic* state, i.e., a state which in a revolutionary way abolishes *all* privileges and does not fear to introduce the fullest democracy in a revolutionary way. You will find that, given a really revolutionary-democratic state, state-monop-

oly capitalism inevitably and unavoidably implies a step, and more than one step, towards socialism!

"...For socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly.

"...State-monopoly capitalism is a complete *material* preparation for socialism, the *threshold* of socialism, a rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism *there are no intermediate rungs*" (pp. 27 and 28).*

Please note that this was written when Kerensky was in power, that we are discussing *not* the dictatorship of the proletariat, *not* the socialist state, but the "revolutionary-democratic" state. Is it not clear that the *higher* we stand on this political ladder, *the more completely* we incorporate the socialist state and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviets, *the less* ought we to fear "state capitalism"? Is it not clear that from the *material*, economic and productive point of view, we are not yet on "the threshold" of socialism? Is it not clear that we cannot pass through the door of socialism without crossing "the threshold" we have not yet reached?

From whatever side we approach the question, only one conclusion can be drawn: the argument of the "Left Communists" about the "state capitalism" which is alleged to be threatening us is an utter mistake in economics and is evident proof that they are complete slaves of petty-bourgeois ideology.

V

The following is also extremely instructive.

When we argued with Comrade Bukharin in the Central Executive Committee,** he declared, among other things, that on the question of high salaries for specialists "we" (evidently meaning the "Left Communists") were "more to the right than Lenin", for in this case "we" saw no deviation from principle, bearing in mind Marx's words that under certain conditions it is more expedient for the working class to "buy out the whole lot of them"[133] (namely, the

* See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 361, 362, 363.—*Ed.*
** See this volume, p. 310.—*Ed.*

whole lot of capitalists, i.e., *to buy f*rom the bourgeoisie the land, factories, works and other means of production).

This extremely interesting statement shows, in the first place, that Bukharin is head and shoulders above the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists, that he is by no means hopelessly stuck in the mud of phrase-making, but on the contrary is making efforts to think out the *concrete* difficulties of the transition—the painful and difficult transition—from capitalism to socialism.

In the second place, this statement makes Bukharin's mistake still more glaring.

Let us consider Marx's idea carefully.

Marx was talking about the Britain of the seventies of the last century, about the culminating point in the development of pre-monopoly capitalism. At that time Britain was a country in which militarism and bureaucracy were less pronounced than in any other, a country in which there was the greatest possibility of a "peaceful" victory for socialism in the sense of the workers "buying out" the bourgeoisie. And Marx said that under certain conditions the workers would certainly not refuse to buy out the bourgeoisie. Marx did not commit himself, or the future leaders of the socialist revolution, to matters of form, to ways and means of bringing about the revolution. He understood perfectly well that a vast number of new problems would arise, that the whole situation would change in the course of the revolution, and that the situation would change *radically* and *often* in the course of revolution.

Well, and what about Soviet Russia? Is it not clear that *after* the seizure of power by the proletariat and *after* the crushing of the exploiters' armed resistance and sabotage, *certain* conditions prevail which correspond to those which might have existed in Britain half a century ago had a peaceful transition to socialism begun there? The subordination of the capitalists to the workers in Britain would have been assured at that time owing to the following circumstances: (1) the absolute preponderance of workers, of proletarians, in the population owing to the absence of a peasantry (in Britain in the seventies there was hope of an extremely rapid spread of socialism among agricultural labourers); (2) the excellent organisation of the proletariat

in trade unions (Britain was at that time the leading country in the world in this respect); (3) the comparatively high level of culture of the proletariat, which had been trained by centuries of development of political liberty; (4) the old habit of the well-organised British capitalists of settling political and economic questions by compromise—at that time the British capitalists were better organised than the capitalists of any country in the world (this superiority has now passed to Germany). These were the circumstances which at that time gave rise to the idea that the *peaceful* subjugation of the British capitalists by the workers was possible.

In our country, at the present time, this subjugation is assured by certain premises of fundamental significance (the victory in October and the suppression, from October to February, of the capitalists' armed resistance and sabotage). But *instead of* the absolute preponderance of workers, of proletarians, in the population, and *instead of* a high degree of organisation among them, the important factor of victory in Russia was the support the proletarians received from the poor peasants and those who had experienced sudden ruin. Finally, we have neither a high degree of culture nor the habit of compromise. If these concrete conditions are carefully considered, it will become clear that we can and ought to employ two methods *simultaneously*. On the one hand we must ruthlessly suppress* the uncultured capitalists who refuse to have anything to do with "state capitalism" or to consider any form of compromise, and who continue by means of profiteering, by bribing the poor peasants, etc., to hinder the realisation of the measures

* In this case also we must look truth in the face. We stlll have too little of that ruthlessness which is indispensable for the success of socialism, and we have too little not because we lack determination. We have sufficient determination. What we do lack is the ability to *catch* quickly enough a sufficient number of profiteers, racketeers and capitalists—the people who infringe the measures passed by the Soviets. The "ability" to do this can only be acquired by establishing accounting and control! Another thing is that the courts are not sufficiently firm. Instead of sentencing people who take bribes to be shot, they sentence them to six months' imprisonment. These two defects have the same social root: the influence of the petty-bourgeois element, its flabbiness.

taken by the Soviets. On the other hand, we must use the *method of compromise*, or of buying off the cultured capitalists who agree to "state capitalism", who are capable of putting it into practice and who are useful to the proletariat as intelligent and experienced organisers of the *largest* types of enterprises, which actually supply products to tens of millions of people.

Bukharin is an extremely well-read Marxist economist. He therefore remembered that Marx was profoundly right when he taught the workers the importance of preserving the organisation of large-scale production, precisely for the purpose of facilitating the transition to socialism. Marx taught that (as an exception, and Britain was then an exception) the idea was conceivable of *paying the capitalists well*, of buying them off, *if* the circumstances were such as to compel the capitalists to submit peacefully and to come over to socialism in a cultured and organised fashion, provided they were paid.

But Bukharin went astray because he did not go deep enough into the specific features of the situation in Russia at the present time—an exceptional situation when we, the Russian proletariat, are in *advance* of any Britain or any Germany as regards our political order, as regards the strength of the workers' political power, but are *behind* the most backward West-European country as regards organising a good state capitalism, as regards our level of culture and the degree of material and productive preparedness for the "introduction" of socialism. Is it not clear that the specific nature of the present situation creates the need for a specific type of "buying out" which the workers must offer to the most cultured, the most skilled, the most capable organisers among the capitalists who are ready to enter the service of Soviet power and to help honestly in organising "state" production on the largest possible scale? Is it not clear that in this specific situation we must make, every effort to avoid two mistakes, both of which are of a petty-bourgeois nature? On the one hand, it would be a fatal mistake to declare that since there is a discrepancy between our economic "forces" and our political strength, it "follows" that we should not have seized power.[134] Such an argument can be advanced only by a 'man in a muffler",[135]

who forgets that there will always be such a "discrepancy", that it always exists in the development of nature as well as in the development of society, that only by a series of attempts—each of which, taken by itself, will be one-sided and will suffer from certain inconsistencies—will complete socialism be created by the revolutionary co-operation of the proletarians of *all* countries.

On the other hand, it would be an obvious mistake to give free rein to ranters and phrase-mongers who allow themselves to be carried away by the "dazzling" revolutionary spirit, but who are incapable of sustained, thoughtful and deliberate revolutionary work which takes into account the most difficult stages of transition.

Fortunately, the history of the development of the revolutionary parties and of the struggle that Bolshevism waged against them has left us a heritage of sharply defined types, of which the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists are striking examples of bad revolutionaries. They are now shouting hysterically, choking and shouting themselves hoarse, against the "compromise" of the "Right Bolsheviks". But they are incapable of thinking *what* is bad in "compromise", and *why* "compromise" has been justly condemned by history and the course of the revolution.

Compromise in Kerensky's time meant the surrender of power to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and the question of power is the fundamental question of every revolution. Compromise by a section of the Bolsheviks in October-November 1917 either meant that they feared the proletariat seizing power or wished to *share* power equally, not only with "unreliable fellow-travellers" like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but also with the enemies, with the Chernovists and the Mensheviks. The latter would inevitably have hindered us in fundamental matters, such as the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the ruthless suppression of the Bogayevskys, the universal setting up of the Soviet institutions, and in every act of confiscation.

Now power has been seized, retained and consolidated in the hands of a single party, the party of the proletariat, even without the "unreliable fellow-travellers". To speak of compromise at the present time when there is no question, and can be none, of sharing *power*, of renouncing the

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dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, is merely to repeat, parrot-fashion, words which have been learned by heart but not understood. To describe as "compromise" the fact that, having arrived at a situation when we can and must rule the country, we try to win over to our side, not grudging the cost, the most skilled people capitalism has trained and to take them into our service against small proprietary disintegration, reveals a total incapacity to think out the economic tasks of socialist construction.

Therefore, while it is to Comrade Bukharin's credit that on the Central Executive Committee he "felt ashamed" of the "service" he had been rendered by Karelin and Ghe, nevertheless, as far as the "Left Communist" *trend* is concerned, the reference to their political comrades-in-arms still remains a serious warning.

Take, for example, *Znamya Truda*, the organ of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, of April 25, 1918, which proudly declares, "The present position of our party coincides with that of another trend in Bolshevism (Bukharin, Pokrovsky and others)". Or take the Menshevik *Vperyod* of the same date, which contains among other articles the following "thesis" by the notorious Menshevik Isuv:

"The policy of Soviet power, from the very outset devoid of a genuinely proletarian character, has lately pursued more and more openly a course of compromise with the bourgeoisie and has assumed an obviously anti-working-class character. On the pretext of nationalising industry, they are pursuing a policy of establishing industrial trusts, and on the pretext of restoring the productive forces of the country, they are attempting to abolish the eight-hour day, to introduce piece-work and the Taylor system, black lists and victimisation. This policy threatens to deprive the proletariat of its most important economic gains and to make it a victim of unrestricted exploitation by the bourgeoisie."

Isn't it marvellous?

Kerensky's friends, who, together with him, conducted an imperialist war for the sake of the secret treaties, which promised annexations to the Russian capitalists, the colleagues of Tsereteli, who, on June 11, threatened to disarm the workers,[136] the Lieberdans, who screened the rule of

the bourgeoisie with high-sounding phrases—these are the very people who accuse Soviet power of "compromising with the bourgeoisie", of "establishing trusts" (that is, of establishing "state capitalism"!), of introducing the Taylor system.

Indeed, the Bolsheviks ought to present Isuv with a medal, and his thesis ought to be exhibited in every workers' club and union as an example of the *provocative speeches of the bourgeoisie*. The workers know these Lieberdans, Tseretelis and Isuvs very well now. They know them from experience, and it would be extremely useful indeed for the workers to think over the reason why *such lackeys of the bourgeoisie* should incite the workers to resist the Taylor system and the "establishment of trusts".

Class-conscious workers will carefully compare the "thesis" of Isuv, a friend of the Lieberdans and the Tseretelis, with the following thesis of the "Left Communists".

"The introduction of labour discipline in connection with the restoration of capitalist management of industry cannot considerably increase the productivity of labour, but it will diminish the class initiative, activity and organisation of the proletariat. It threatens to enslave the working class; it will rouse discontent among the backward elements as well as among the vanguard of the proletariat. In order to implement this system in the face of the hatred prevailing among the proletariat against the 'capitalist saboteurs', the Communist Party would have to rely on the petty bourgeoisie, as against the workers, and in this way would ruin itself as the party of the proletariat" (*Kommunist* No. 1, p. 8, col. 2).

This is most striking proof that the "Lefts" have fallen into the trap, have allowed themselves to be provoked by the Isuvs and the other Judases of capitalism. It serves as a good lesson for the workers, who know that it is precisely the vanguard of the proletariat which stands for the introduction of labour discipline, and that it is precisely the petty bourgeoisie which is doing its utmost to disrupt this discipline. Speeches such as the thesis of the "Lefts" quoted above are a terrible disgrace and imply the complete renunciation of communism in practice and complete desertion to the camp of the petty bourgeoisie.

"In connection with the restoration of capitalist management"—these are the words with which the "Left Communists" hope to "defend themselves". A perfectly useless defence, because, in the first place, when putting "management" in the hands of capitalists Soviet power appoints workers' Commissars or workers' committees who watch the manager's every step, who learn from his management experience and who not only have the right to appeal against his orders, but can secure his removal through the organs of Soviet power. In the second place, "management" is entrusted to capitalists only for executive functions while at work, the conditions of which are determined by the Soviet power, by which they may be abolished or revised. In the third place, "management" is entrusted by the Soviet power to capitalists not as capitalists, but as technicians or organisers for higher salaries. And the workers know very well that ninety-nine per cent of the organisers and first-class technicians of really large-scale and giant enterprises, trusts or other establishments belong to the capitalist class. But it is precisely these people whom we, the proletarian party, must appoint to "manage" the labour process and the organisation of production, for there are no other people who have practical experience in this matter. The workers, having grown out of the infancy when they could have been misled by "Left" phrases or petty-bourgeois loose thinking, are advancing towards socialism precisely through the capitalist management of trusts, through gigantic machine industry, through enterprises which have a turnover of several millions per year—only through such a system of production and such enterprises. The workers are not petty bourgeois. They are not afraid of large-scale "state capitalism", they prize it as their *proletarian* weapon which *their Soviet* power will use against small proprietary disintegration and disorganisation.

This is incomprehensible only to the declassed and consequently thoroughly petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, typified among the "Left Communists" by Osinsky, when he writes in their journal:

"...The whole initiative in the organisation and management of any enterprise will belong to the 'organisers of the trusts'. We are not going to *teach* them, or make

rank-and-file workers out of them, we are going to *learn* from them" (*Kommunist* No. 1, p. 14, col. 2).

The attempted irony in this passage is aimed at my words "learn socialism from the organisers of the trusts".

Osinsky thinks this is funny. He wants to make "rank-and-file workers" out of the organisers of the trusts. If this had been written by a man of the age of which the poet wrote "But fifteen years, not more?..."[137] there would have been nothing surprising about it. But it is somewhat strange to hear such things from a Marxist who has learned that socialism is impossible unless it makes use of the achievements of the engineering and culture created by large-scale capitalism. There is no trace of Marxism in this.

No. Only those are worthy of the name of Communists who understand that it is *impossible* to create or introduce socialism *without learning* from the organisers of the trusts. For socialism is not a figment of the imagination, but the assimilation and application by the proletarian vanguard, which has seized power, of what has been created by the trusts. We, the party of the proletariat, have *no other way* of acquiring the ability to organise large-scale production on trust lines, as trusts are organised, except by acquiring it from first-class capitalist experts.

We have nothing to teach them, unless we undertake the childish task of "teaching" the bourgeois intelligentsia socialism. We must not teach them, but expropriate them (as is being done in Russia "determinedly" enough), *put a stop* to their sabotage, *subordinate* them as a section or group to Soviet power. We, on the other hand, if we are not Communists of infantile age and infantile understanding, must learn from them, and there is something to learn, for the party of the proletariat and its vanguard have *no experience* of independent work in organising giant enterprises which serve the needs of scores of millions of people.

The best workers in Russia have realised this. They have begun to learn from the capitalist organisers, the managing engineers and the technicians. They have begun to learn steadily and cautiously with easy things, gradually passing on to the more difficult things. If things are going more slowly in the iron and steel and engineering industries, it is

because they present greater difficulties. But the textile and tobacco workers and tanners are not afraid of "state capitalism" or of "learning from the organisers of the trusts", as the declassed petty-bourgeois intelligentsia are. These workers in the central leading institutions like Chief Leather Committee and Central Textile Committee take their place by the side of the capitalists, *learn from them*, establish trusts, establish "state capitalism", which under Soviet power represents the threshold of socialism, the condition of its firm victory.

This work of the advanced workers of Russia, together with their work of introducing labour discipline, has begun and is proceeding quietly, unobtrusively, without the noise and fuss so necessary to some "Lefts". It is proceeding very cautiously and gradually, taking into account the lessons of practical experience. This hard work, the work of *learning* practically how to build up large-scale production, is the guarantee that we are on the right road, the guarantee that the class-conscious workers in Russia are carrying on the struggle against small proprietary disintegration and disorganisation, against petty-bourgeois indiscipline*—the guarantee of the victory of communism.

VI

Two remarks in conclusion.

In arguing with the "Left Communists" on April 4, 1918 (see *Kommunist* No. 1, p. 4, footnote), I put it to them bluntly: "Explain what you are dissatisfied with in the railway decree; submit *your* amendments to it. It is your duty as Soviet leaders of the proletariat to do so, otherwise what you say is nothing but empty phrases."

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* It is extremely characteristic that the authors of the theses do not say a single word about the significance of the *dictatorship* of the proletariat in the *economic* sphere. They talk only of the "organisation" and so on. But that is accepted also by the petty bourgeoisie, who shun *dictatorship* by the workers in economic relations. A proletarian revolutionary could never at such a moment "forget" this core of the proletarian revolution, which is directed against the economic foundations of capitalism.

The first issue of *Kommunist* appeared on April 20, 1918, but did not contain a *single word* about how, according to the "Left Communists", the railway decree should be altered or amended.

The "Left Communists" stand condemned by their own silence. They did nothing but *attack* the railway decree with all sorts of insinuations (pp. 8 and 16 of No. 1), they *gave no* articulate answer to the question, "How should the decree be amended if it is wrong?"

No comment is needed. The class-conscious workers will call *such* "criticism" of the railway decree (which is a typical example of our line of action, the line of firmness, the line of dictatorship, the line of proletarian discipline) either "Isuvian" criticism or empty phrase-making.

Second remark. The first issue of *Kommunist* contained a very flattering review by Comrade Bukharin of my pamphlet *The State and Revolution*. But however much I value the opinion of people like Bukharin, my conscience compels me to say that the *character* of the review reveals a sad and significant fact. Bukharin regards the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship from the point of view of the *past* and not of the future. Bukharin noted and emphasised what the proletarian revolutionary and the petty-bourgeois revolutionary may have in common on the question of the state. But Bukharin "overlooked" the very thing that distinguishes the one from the other.

Bukharin noted and emphasised that the old state machinery must be "smashed" and "blown up", that the bourgeoisie must be "finally and completely strangled" and so on. The frenzied petty bourgeoisie may also want this. And this, in the main, is what our revolution has *already* done between October 1917 and February 1918.

In my pamphlet I also mention what even the most revolutionary petty bourgeois cannot want, what the class-conscious proletarian does want, what our revolution has *not yet* accomplished. On this task, the task of tomorrow, Bukharin said nothing.

And I have all the more reason not to be silent on this point, because, in the first place, a Communist is expected to devote greater attention to the tasks of tomorrow, and not of yesterday, and, in the second place, my pamphlet

was written *before* the Bolsheviks seized power, when it was impossible to treat the Bolsheviks to vulgar petty-bourgeois arguments such as: "Yes, *of course*, *after* seizing power, you begin to talk about discipline."

"...Socialism will develop into communism ... since people will become accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social life without violence and without subordination." (*The State and Revolution*, pp. 77-78*; thus, "elementary conditions" were discussed before the seizure of power.)

"...Only then will democracy begin to wither away ..." when "people gradually become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all copy-book maxims; they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without coercion, without the special apparatus for coercion called the state" (*ibid.*, p. 84**; thus mention was made of "copy-book maxims" *before* the seizure of power).

"...The higher phase of the development of communism" (from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs) "...presupposes not the present productivity of labour and not the present ordinary run of people, who, like the seminary students in Pomyalovsky's stories, are capable of damaging the stocks of public wealth just for fun, and of demanding the impossible" (*ibid.*, p. 91).***

"Until the higher phase of communism arrives, the socialists demand the strictest control by society and by the state over the measure of labour and the measure of consumption ..." (*ibid.*).

"Accounting and control—that is mainly what is needed for the smooth working, for the proper functioning of the first phase of communist society" (*ibid.*, p. 95).**** And this control must be established not only over "the insignificant capitalist minority, over the gentry who wish to preserve their capitalist habits", but also over the

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* See present edition, Vol. 25, p. 461.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 467.—*Ed.*

*** *Ibid.*, p. 474.—*Ed.*

**** *Ibid.*, p. 478.—*Ed.*

workers who "have been thoroughly corrupted by capitalism" (*ibid.*, p. 96)* and over the "parasites, the sons of the wealthy, the swindlers and other guardians of capitalist traditions" (*ibid.*).

It is significant that Bukharin did *not* emphasise *this*.

May 5, 1918

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* *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 479.—*Ed.*

DECISION OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION[138]

To yield to the German ultimatum. The British ultimatum to be rejected. (For war against Germany threatens greater losses and calamities than against Japan.)

In view of the obvious political alliance between the Ukrainian and Russian counter-revolution, martial law to be instituted against the bourgeoisie.

Every effort to be exerted for defence of the Urals-Kuznetsk area and territory from both Japan and Germany.*

Negotiations to be conducted with Mirbach to ascertain whether Finland and the Ukraine are being obliged to conclude peace with Russia, and to hasten this peace in every way, while recognising that it will bring about new annexations.

Adopted in the C.C.
on Monday, May 6,
1918, *at night*

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the manuscript

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* Immediate evacuation to the Urals of everything in general and of the Stationery Office in particular.

MAIN PROPOSITIONS OF THE DECREE ON FOOD DICTATORSHIP[139]

The draft decision to be revised in the following way:

1) delete the references to the international situation;

2) insert that after peace with the Ukraine we shall be left with *only just enough* grain to save us from famine;

3) insert that decisions of the dictator will be checked by his collegium, which has the right, without holding up implementation, to appeal to the Council of People's Commissars;

4) insert that decisions which by their nature are connected with the Commissariat for Ways of Communication or the Supreme Economic Council are to be adopted by consultation with the appropriate departments;

5) give a more precise legal formulation of the rights of the Commissar for Food;

6) emphasise more strongly the basic idea of the necessity, for salvation from famine, of conducting and carrying through a ruthless and terrorist struggle and war against peasant or other bourgeois elements who retain surplus grain for themselves;

7) lay down precisely that owners of grain who possess surplus grain and do not *send it to* the depots and places of grain collection will be declared *enemies of the people* and will be subject to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, confiscation of all their property and expulsion for ever from the community;

8) insert an addition on the duty of working peasants who are propertyless and do not possess surpluses to join forces for ruthless struggle against the kulaks;

9) define precisely the relation of the delegate committees to the gubernia food committees and the rights and duties of the former in carrying out food work.

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PROTEST TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE OCCUPATION OF THE CRIMEA[140]

May 11, 1918

In connection with the wireless message from the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in the East.

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to express its emphatic protest to the German Government:

1) On no occasion nor in any document has the German Government made any statement to us alleging that our fleet has taken part in fighting against German troops in the Ukraine.

2) Consequently the statement to this effect in the wireless message of May 11, 1918, is clearly untrue and is not confirmed in the acts of the German Government.

3) If part of the fleet considered itself attached to the Ukrainian fleet, it remained in Sevastopol.

3 bis) If our fleet left Sevastopol this happened only after the Germans' offensive and the attack on Sevastopol; consequently, in this case clearly the Brest Treaty was violated by the Germans and not by us.

4) The facts prove, therefore, that we firmly stand by the Brest Treaty, but that the Germans have violated it by occupying the entire Crimea.

5) They have occupied it solely with German troops, removing therefrom all Ukrainians.

6) They have occupied the Crimea after the German Government in its wireless message of the month of ..., 1918,[141] had quite precisely stated that it considered the Crimea not to be part of the territory of the Ukraine.

7) The German Ambassador Mirbach has stated to our Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Germany is not claiming new territorial acquisitions.

8) If at the present time the German Government has adopted a different position and is presenting demands for the Crimea or part of the Crimea or other territorial acquisitions, we consider that complete clarity in this matter is absolutely necessary, and we state again officially that for our part we insist on the conclusion of a precisely formulated peace with Finland, the Ukraine and Turkey, which is waging war in defiance of the Brest Peace Treaty.

9) We once again insistently request the German Government to inform us whether it holds the view that peace with the Ukraine, Finland and Turkey is desirable, and what steps it has undertaken or will undertake with this aim.

10) On the question of the Black Sea fleet we agree to give any new guarantees of its non-intervention in the war or of its disarmament (concerning which Ambassador Mirbach made an official statement to us yesterday, May 10, 1918), provided the German Government informs us of the exact terms of a complete peace, i.e., peace with Finland and the Ukraine and Turkey, and provided this peace is concluded, on which we insist.

11) Nor do we in any way refuse to return the fleet to Sevastopol if this port—in accordance with Mirbach's statement of May 10, 1918, in a conversation with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs—is not annexed in one form or another and is not occupied by Germany, and a clearly defined peace with the Germans, constituting part of the Finnish, Ukrainian and Turkish armies, is concluded.

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according to the manuscript

THESES ON THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION[142]

I

The extreme instability of the international situation of the Soviet Republic, surrounded as it is by imperialist powers, has been frequently pointed out in the Bolshevik press and has been admitted in the resolutions of the higher organs of Soviet power.

During the past few days, i.e., the first ten days of May 1918, the political situation has become extremely critical owing to both external and internal causes:

First, the direct offensive of the counter-revolutionary forces (Semyonov and others) with the aid of the Japanese in the Far East has been stepped up, and in connection with it there are a number of signs indicating the possibility of the entire anti-German imperialist coalition coming to an agreement on the presentation of an ultimatum to Russia—either fight against Germany, or there will be a Japanese invasion aided by us.

Secondly, since Brest the war party has gained the upper hand in German politics in general, and this party could now, at any moment, gain the upper hand on the question of an immediate general offensive against Russia, i.e., it could completely overcome the other policy of German bourgeois-imperialist circles that strive for fresh annexations in Russia but for the time being want peace with her and not a general offensive against her.

Thirdly, the restoration of bourgeois-landowner monarchism in the Ukraine with the support of the Constitutional-Democratic and Octobrist elements of the bourgeoisie of all Russia and with the aid of the German troops was bound

to make the struggle against the counter-revolution in Russia more intense, was bound to encourage the plans and raise the spirit of our counter-revolutionaries.

Fourthly, the disorganised food situation has become extremely acute and in many places has led to real hunger both because we were cut off from Rostov-on-Don and because of the efforts of the petty bourgeoisie and the capitalists in general to sabotage the grain monopoly, accompanied by insufficiently firm, disciplined and ruthless opposition on the part of the ruling class, i.e., the proletariat, to those strivings, efforts and attempts.

II

The foreign policy of Soviet power must not be changed in any way. Our military preparations are not yet complete, and our general slogan, therefore, will remain as before—manoeuvre, withdraw, bide our time, and continue our preparations with all our might.

Although we do not in general reject military agreements with one of the imperialist coalitions against the other in those cases in which such an agreement could, without undermining the basis of Soviet power, strengthen its position and paralyse the attacks of any imperialist power, we cannot at the present moment enter into a military agreement with the Anglo-French coalition. For them, the importance of such an agreement would be the diversion of German troops from the West, i.e., by means of the advance of many Japanese army corps into the interior of European Russia, which is an unacceptable condition since it would mean the complete collapse of Soviet power. If the Anglo-French coalition were to present us with an ultimatum of this kind we should reject it, because the danger of the Japanese advance can more easily be paralysed (or can be delayed for a longer time) than the threat of the Germans occupying Petrograd, Moscow and a large part of European Russia.

III

In considering the tasks of the foreign policy of Soviet power at the present moment, the greatest caution, discretion and restraint must be observed in order not to help

the extreme elements in the war parties of Japan and Germany by any ill-considered or hasty step.

The fact of the matter is that the extreme elements in the war parties of both these countries favour an immediate general offensive against Russia for the purpose of occupying all her territory and overthrowing Soviet power. At any moment these extreme elements may gain the upper hand.

On the other hand, however, it is an undoubted fact that the majority of the imperialist bourgeoisie in Germany are against such a policy and at the present moment prefer the annexationist peace with Russia to a continuation of the war for the simple reason that war would divert forces from the West and increase the instability of the internal situation in Germany that is already making itself felt; it would also make it difficult to obtain raw materials from places involved in insurrection or that are suffering from damage to railways, from failure to plant sufficient crops, etc., etc.

The Japanese urge to attack Russia is being held back, first, by the danger of the movement and of revolts in China, and secondly, there is a certain antagonism on the part of America, the latter fearing the strengthening of Japan and hoping to obtain raw materials from Russia more easily under peaceful conditions.

It goes without saying that it is quite possible for the extreme elements of the war parties in both Germany and Japan to gain the upper hand at any moment. There can be no guarantee against this until the revolution breaks out in Germany. The American bourgeoisie may plot together with the Japanese bourgeoisie, or the Japanese with the German. It is, therefore, our imperative duty to make the most energetic preparations for war.

As long as there remains even a slight chance of preserving peace or of concluding peace with Finland, the Ukraine and Turkey, at the cost of certain new annexations or losses, we must not take a single step that might aid the extreme elements in the war parties of the imperialist powers.

IV

The primary task in undertaking more energetic military training, as in the question of combating famine, is that of organisation.

There cannot be any really serious preparation for war unless the food difficulties are overcome, unless the population is properly supplied with bread, unless the strictest order is introduced on the railways, unless truly iron discipline is established among the masses of the working people (and not only at the top). It is in this field that we are most backward.

Guiltiest of all of a complete lack of understanding of this truth are the Left Socialist-Revolutionary and anarchist elements with their screaming about "insurrectionary committees" and their howls of "to arms", etc. Such screams and howls are the quintessence of stupidity and are nothing but pitiful, despicable and disgusting phrase-making; it is ridiculous to talk about "insurrection" and "insurrectionary committees" when Soviet central power is doing its utmost to persuade the people to start military training and arm themselves, when we have more weapons than we can count and distribute, when it is precisely the economic ruin and the lack of discipline that prevent us from using the weapons available and compel us to lose valuable time that could be used for training.

Intensified military training for a serious war cannot be done by means of a sudden impulse, a battle-cry, a militant slogan; it requires lengthy, intense, persistent and disciplined work on a mass scale. We must deal ruthlessly with the Left Socialist-Revolutionary and anarchist elements that do not wish to understand this, and must not give them an opportunity to infect certain elements of our proletarian Communist Party with their hysteria.

V

It is essential to wage a ruthless struggle against the bourgeoisie, which on account of the above circumstances has raised its head during the past few days, and to declare a state of emergency, close newspapers, arrest the leaders and

so on. These measures are as necessary as the military campaign against the rural bourgeoisie, who are holding back grain surpluses and infringing the grain monopoly. There will be no salvation either from the counter-revolution or from famine without iron discipline on the part of the proletariat.

In particular it must be borne in mind that during the past few days the bourgeoisie have been making extremely skilful and cunning use of panic-spreading as a weapon against proletarian power. Some of our comrades, especially those who are less resolute in their attitude to the Left Socialist-Revolutionary and anarchist revolutionary phrases, have allowed themselves to be diverted, have got into a panic or have failed to observe the line that divides legitimate and necessary warning of the coming danger from the spreading of panic.

The basic specific features of the entire present economic and political situation in Russia must be kept firmly in mind; because of these features our cause cannot be helped by outbursts. We must become firmly convinced ourselves and try to convince all workers of the truth that only restraint and patient creative work to establish iron proletarian discipline, including ruthless measures against hooligans, kulaks and disorganising elements, can protect Soviet power at this moment, one of the most difficult and dangerous periods of transition, unavoidable owing to the delay of the revolution in the West.

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REPORT ON FOREIGN POLICY DELIVERED AT A JOINT MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE MOSCOW SOVIET[143] MAY 14, 1918

Comrades, permit me to acquaint you with the present foreign policy situation. In the past few days our international position has in many respects become more complicated owing to the aggravation of the general situation. Because of this aggravation, the provocation, the deliberate panic-spreading by the bourgeois press and its echo, the socialist press, is again doing its dark and filthy work of repeating the Kornilov affair.

First, I shall draw your attention to the factors determining, in the main, the international position of the Soviet Republic in order to proceed to the outward legal forms determining this position, and, on the basis of this, describe again the difficulties which have arisen or, to be more precise, define the turning-point at which we have arrived and which forms the basis of the worsened political situation.

Comrades, you know, and your knowledge has been particularly reinforced by the experience of the two Russian revolutions, that economic interests and the economic position of the classes which rule our state lie at the root of both our home and foreign policy. These propositions which constitute the basis of the Marxist world outlook and have been confirmed for us Russian revolutionaries by the great experience of both Russian revolutions, must not be forgotten even for a moment if we are to avoid losing ourselves

in the thickets, the labyrinth of diplomatic tricks, a labyrinth which at times is artificially created and made more intricate by people, classes, parties and groups who like to fish in muddy waters, or who are compelled to do so.

We recently experienced, and to a certain extent are experiencing now, a situation in which our counter-revolutionaries—the Constitutional-Democrats and their foremost yes-men, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—have been attempting to take advantage of the increased complexity of the international situation.

Basically, the position is that the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, due to economic and political causes which we have described in the press on more than one occasion, and of which you are aware, due to a different rate of development, a basis of development different from that of the West, still remains a lone island in the stormy sea of imperialist robbery. The main economic factor in the West is that this imperialist war which has tortured and exhausted mankind has given rise to such complicated, such acute, such involved conflicts that again and again, at every step, the question of war and peace, the solution of the question to the advantage of one or other grouping, hangs by a thread. We have lived through precisely such a situation in the past few days. The contradictions that have arisen out of the frenzied struggle between the imperialist powers drawn into a war which is the result of the economic conditions of the development of capitalism over a number of decades, have made it impossible for the imperialists themselves to stop this war.

Owing to these contradictions, it has come about that the general alliance of the imperialists of all countries, forming the basis of the economic alliance of capitalism, an alliance whose natural and inevitable aim is to defend capital, which recognises no fatherland, and which has proved in the course of many major and important episodes in world history that capital places the safeguarding of the alliance of the capitalists of all countries against the working people above the interests of the fatherland, of the people or of what you will—that this alliance is not the moving force of politics.

Of course, as before, this alliance remains the main economic trend of the capitalist system, a trend which must ultimately make itself felt with inevitable force. That the imperialist war has divided into hostile groups, into hostile coalitions the imperialist powers which at the present moment, one may say, have divided up the whole world among themselves, is an exception to this main tendency of capitalism. This enmity, this struggle, this death grapple, proves that in certain circumstances the alliance of world imperialism is impossible. We are witnessing a situation in which the stormy waves of imperialist reaction, of the imperialist slaughter of nations, are hurling themselves at the small island of the socialist Soviet Republic, and seem about to sink it any minute, while actually these waves are only breaking against each other.

The basic contradictions between the imperialist powers have led to such a merciless struggle that, while recognising its hopelessness, neither the one, nor the other group is in a position to extricate itself at will from the iron grip of this war. The war has brought out two main contradictions, which in their turn have determined the socialist Soviet Republic's present international position. The first is the battle being waged on the Western front between Germany and Britain, which has reached an extreme degree of ferocity. We have heard on more than one occasion representatives of the two belligerent groups promise and assure their own people and other peoples that all that is required is one more last effort for the enemy to be subdued, the fatherland defended and the interests of civilisation and of the war of liberation saved for all time. The longer this terrible struggle drags on and the deeper the belligerent countries become involved, the further off is the way out of this interminable war. And it is the violence of this conflict that makes extremely difficult, well-nigh impossible, an alliance of the great imperialist powers against the Soviet Republic, which in the bare half-year of Its existence has won the warm regard and the most whole-hearted sympathy of the class-conscious workers of the world.

The second contradiction determining Russia's international position is the rivalry between Japan and America. Over several decades the economic development of these

countries has produced a vast amount of inflammable material which makes inevitable a desperate clash between them for domination of the Pacific Ocean and the surrounding territories. The entire diplomatic and economic history of the Far East leaves no room for doubt that under capitalist conditions it is impossible to avert the imminent conflict between Japan and America. This contradiction, temporarily concealed by the alliance of Japan and America against Germany, delays Japanese imperialism's attack on Russia, which was prepared for over a long period, which was a long time feeling its way, and which to a certain degree was started and is being supported by counter-revolutionary forces. The campaign which has been launched against the Soviet Republic (the landing at Vladivostok and the support of the Semyonov bands) is being held up because it threatens to turn the hidden conflict between Japan and America into open war. It is quite likely, of course, and we must not forget that no matter how solid the imperialist groupings may appear to be, they can be broken up in a few days if the interests of sacred private property, the sacred rights of concessions, etc., demand it. It may well be that the tiniest spark will suffice to blow up the existing alignment of powers, and then the afore-mentioned contradictions will no longer protect us.

At the moment, however, the situation we have described explains why it is possible to preserve our socialist island in the middle of stormy seas and also why its position is so unstable, and, at times, to the great joy of the bourgeoisie and the panic of the petty bourgeoisie, it seems that it may be engulfed by the waves at any minute.

The outer aspect, the external expression of this situation is the Brest Treaty on the one hand, and the customs and laws with regard to neutral countries on the other.

You know that treaties and laws are worth nothing but a scrap of paper in the face of international conflicts.

These words are usually recalled and quoted as an example of the cynicism of imperialist foreign policy; the cynicism, however, lies not in these words, but in the ruthless, the cruelly and agonisingly ruthless, imperialist

war, in which all peace treaties and all laws of neutrality have been flouted, are flouted, and will be flouted, as long as capitalism exists.

That is why, when we come to the most important question for us, the Brest peace and the likelihood of its violation with all the possible consequences for us—if we want to stand firmly on our socialist feet and do not want to be overthrown by the plots and provocations of the counter-revolutionaries, no matter under what socialist labels they disguise themselves, we must not forget for a single moment the economic principles underlying all peace treaties, including that of Brest-Litovsk, the economic principles underlying all neutrality, including our own. We must not forget, on the one hand, the state of affairs internationally, the state of affairs of international imperialism in relation to the class which is growing, and which sooner or later, perhaps even later than we desire or expect, will nevertheless become capitalism's heir and will defeat world capitalism. And on the other hand, we must not forget the relations between the imperialist countries, the relations between the imperialist economic groups.

Having clarified this situation, I think, comrades, we shall not find it difficult to understand the significance of those diplomatic particulars and details, at times even trifles, which have mainly occupied our attention during the past few days, which have been on our minds during the past few days. Clearly, the instability of the international situation gives rise to panic. This panic emanates from the Constitutional-Democrats, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who aid and abet the interests of those who want and who strive to sow panic. In no way closing our eyes to the full danger and tragedy of the situation, and analysing the economic relations on an international scale, we must say: yes, the question of war and peace hangs by a thread both in the West and in the Far East because two trends exist; one, which makes an alliance of all the imperialists inevitable; the other, which places the imperialists in opposition to each other—two trends, neither of which has any firm foundation. No, Japan cannot now decide to launch a full-scale attack, although with her million-strong army she could quite easily overrun

obviously weak Russia. I do not know, nor can anyone know, when this is likely to take place.

The form of the ultimatum threatens war against the allies and a treaty with Germany, but this position can change in a few days. There is always the possibility of it changing, because the American bourgeoisie, now at loggerheads with Japan, can tomorrow come to terms with her, because the Japanese bourgeoisie are just as likely tomorrow to come to terms with the German bourgeoisie. Their basic interests are the same: the division of the world between themselves, the interests of the landowners, of capital, the safeguarding (as they say) of their national self-respect and their national interests. This language is sufficiently familiar to those who have either the misfortune or the habit—I don't know which—of reading newspapers like those of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. And when national self-respect begins to be mentioned frequently we all know, we know very well from the experience of 1914, what facts of imperialist robbery this is prompted by. In view of this relationship it is clear why the situation in the Far East is unstable. One thing must be said: we must have a clear understanding of these contradictions of capitalist interests, we must appreciate that the stability of the Soviet Republic is growing with every week, every month that passes, and that sympathy towards it among the working and exploited people of the world is growing at the same time.

And, at the same time, any day, any moment we must be prepared for and expect changes in international politics in favour of the policies of the extremist war parties.

The position of the German coalition is clear to us. At the present moment the majority of the German bourgeois parties stand for observing the Brest peace, but, of course, are very glad to "improve" on it and to receive a few more annexations at Russia's expense. What makes them take this stand? The political and military considerations of German national interests—as they express it—of imperialist interests, make them prefer peace in the East, so that their hands may be free in the West, where German imperialism has promised an immediate victory on many occasions, and where every week or every month proves that this victory, the more the partial successes gained, recedes still further

into the distance. On the other hand, there is a war party which, during discussions on the Brest Treaty, showed its hand on a number of occasions, a party which naturally exists in all imperialist countries, a war party which says to itself: force must be used immediately, irrespective of possible consequences. These are the voices of the extremist war party. It has been known in German history since the time when overwhelming military victories became a feature history. It has been known since 1866, for instance, when the extremist war party of Germany achieved victory over Austria and turned this victory into a complete rout. All these clashes, all these conflicts are inevitable and lead to a situation where matters now hang by a thread, where, on the one hand, the bourgeois imperialist majority of the German parliament, the German propertied classes, the German capitalists prefer to stand by the Brest Treaty, while having, I repeat, no hesitation about improving on it. And on the other hand, any day, any moment we must be prepared for and expect changes in politics in the interests of the extremist war party.

This explains the instability of the international situation; this explains how easy it is in the circumstances to put the Party in one situation or another; this shows what prudence, caution, self-control and presence of mind is demanded of the Soviet government if it is to define its task clearly. Let the Russian bourgeoisie rush from a French to a German orientation. They like doing this. They have in several areas seen that German support is an excellent guarantee against the peasants who are taking the land, and against the workers who are building the foundations of socialism. In the quite recent past, and over a long period, over a number of years they branded as traitors those who condemned the imperialist war and opened people's eyes to its real nature, but now they are all prepared in a few weeks to change their political beliefs and to go over from an alliance with the British robbers to an alliance with the German robbers against Soviet power. Let the bourgeoisie of all shades, from the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, rush this way and that. It suits their nature. Let them spread panic, for they are themselves in a panic. Let them rush to

and fro, unable to do otherwise, vacillating between the different orientations and between the absurd phrases that fail to take into consideration the fact that to deepen the effect of the revolution, when it has attained great proportions, one has to experience the most diverse groupings and transitions from one stage to another. We Russian revolutionaries have had the good fortune in the twentieth century to pass through two revolutions, each of which gave us a lot of experience, which has also stamped its impression on the lives of the people, of how a deep-going and effective revolutionary movement is prepared; how the different classes in this movement behave; by what difficult and exhausting path, sometimes by a long evolution, the maturity of new classes comes about.

Remember how hard it was for the Soviets, created by the spontaneous outburst in 1905, how hard it was for them in 1917 to take up the fight again, and how hard later, when they had to go through all the suffering of compromise with the bourgeoisie and with the hidden, most rabid enemies of the working class, who talked of the defence of the revolution, of the Red Flag, and committed the greatest of crimes in June 1917—now, when the majority of the working class supports us, remember what it cost after the great 1905 Revolution to emerge with Soviets of the working and peasant classes. Remember all this, and think of the mass scale on which the struggle against international imperialism is developing, think how difficult the transition to this situation is, and what the Russian Republic had to undergo when it found itself ahead of all the other contingents of the socialist army.

I know that there are, of course, wiseacres with a high opinion of themselves and even calling themselves socialists, who assert that power should not have been taken until the revolution broke out in all countries. They do not realise that in saying this they are deserting the revolution and going over to the side of the bourgeoisie. To wait until the working classes carry out a revolution on an international scale means that everyone will remain suspended in mid-air. This is senseless. Everyone knows the difficulties of a revolution. It may begin with brilliant success in one country and then go through agonising periods, since

final victory is only possible on a world scale, and only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries. Our task consists in being restrained and prudent, we must manoeuvre and retreat until we receive reinforcements. A change-over to these tactics is inevitable, no matter how much they are mocked by so-called revolutionaries with no idea of what revolution means.

Having dealt with the general questions I now want to examine the causes of the recent alarm and panic which have again enabled the counter-revolutionaries to start activities intended to undermine Soviet power.

I have already mentioned that the outward legal form and outer aspect of all international relations of the Soviet Socialist Republic are, on the one hand, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and, on the other, the general law and custom defining the status of a neutral country among other, belligerent countries; this status accounts for the recent difficulties. The conclusion of peace with Finland, the Ukraine and Turkey should have been the natural consequence of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, yet we are still at war with these countries, and this is not due to our internal development, but to the influence of the ruling classes of these countries. In these conditions the only temporary way out lay in the temporary breathing-space provided by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the breathing-space which provoked so many futile and unnecessary words about its being impossible but which nevertheless turned out to be possible and in two months brought results, made itself felt on the majority of Russian soldiers, enabled them to return home and see how things were going, to take advantage of the revolution's gains, to work the land, to look around and draw new strength for the fresh sacrifices ahead.

Naturally, this temporary breathing-space appeared to be coming to an end when the situation worsened in Finland, the Ukraine and Turkey, when, instead of peace, we merely obtained a postponement of that selfsame acute economic problem: war or peace? And now are we to go to war once again, despite all the peaceful intentions of Soviet power and its absolute determination to sacrifice so-called Great Power status, i.e., the right to conclude secret treaties, to conceal them from the people with the assistance

of the Chernovs, Tseretelis and Kerenskys, to sign secret predatory treaties and conduct an imperialist, predatory war? Indeed, instead of peace, all that we have obtained is a brief postponement of that selfsame pressing question of war or peace.

Here is the result of this situation, and you again clearly see where its final outcome lies—namely, in the question of what the results will be of the wavering among the two hostile groups of imperialist countries—the American conflict in the Far East, and the German-British conflict in Western Europe. It is clear how these contradictions have intensified over the conquest of the Ukraine, over the situation which the German imperialists, particularly their main war party, frequently viewed so optimistically, looked upon as so easy, and which caused precisely this extremist German war party such fantastic difficulties. It was this situation which temporarily raised the hopes of the Russian Constitutional-Democrats, Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have fallen in love with what Skoropadsky is bringing the Ukraine, and who now hope that this will also be easily achieved in Russia. These gentlemen will be mistaken; their hopes will turn to dust because ... (*stormy applause*), because, I say, that same main war party in Germany, which is too accustomed to rely on the power of the sword, even this party in these particular circumstances has not been supported by the majority of the imperialists, those bourgeois imperialist circles who have seen unprecedented difficulties in the conquest of the Ukraine, in the struggle to subjugate a whole people, in the forced necessity of resorting to a terrible coup d'état.

This main war party created unprecedented difficulties in Germany when, having promised its people and the workers supreme victories on the Western Front, this extremist war party was forced to recognise that it was faced with new, unbelievable economic and political difficulties, with having to divert military forces to tasks which also at first seemed easy, and also with having to conclude a treaty with the Ukrainian Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were the signatories to the peace treaty.

The extremist war party in Germany reasoned: we shall send many troops and obtain grain, but then it became neces-

sary to engineer a coup d'état. That turned out to be easy, because the Ukrainian Mensheviks readily supported this move. But it then turned out that this coup d'état created fresh and gigantic difficulties, because the grain and raw materials, without which Germany cannot exist, had to be fought for at every step, and their appropriation by military force in an occupied country involved too great an effort and too many sacrifices.

Such is the situation that has arisen in the Ukraine and that should have lent wings to the hopes of the Russian counter-revolution. It is clear that in this struggle, Russia, which has been unable to rebuild her army, has suffered and is suffering further losses. The peace talks have led to new, onerous conditions, to new open and concealed indemnities. Under what decree the Ukraine's frontiers are to be determined is not clear. The Rada,[144] which signed the decree, has been removed. A landowner-hetman has been put in its place. Because of this uncertainty a whole number of problems have emerged which prove that the questions of war and peace remain as before. The partial armistice existing between the Russian and German troops in no way predetermines the general situation. The question hangs in the air. The same is true of Georgia, where we have a protracted counter-revolutionary struggle by the government of the Caucasian Mensheviks, a protracted struggle by counter-revolutionaries who call themselves Social-Democrats. And when the victory of Soviet power and the working people, having embraced the whole of Russia, has begun to draw in the non-Russian outlying areas, when it has become quite obvious and beyond all doubt that the victory of Soviet power, as has been admitted by the counter-revolutionary representatives of the Don Cossacks, cannot be delayed, when the Menshevik government in the Caucasus has begun to waver the government of Gegechkori and Jordania, who realised this too late and started to talk about finding a common language with the Bolsheviks when Tsereteli, aided by the Turkish troops, has shown his hand by advancing against the Bolsheviks—they will reap the same harvest as the Rada. (*Applause.*)

Remember, however, that if these bargainers of the Caucasian Rada receive the support of the German troops,

as did the Ukrainian Rada, then there will no doubt be fresh difficulties for the Russian Soviet Republic, a new inevitability of war, new dangers and now uncertainties. There are people who refer to this uncertainty, to the strain of an uncertain situation (in fact such an uncertain situation is sometimes worse than any clearly defined one), and say that the uncertainty can be easily removed—you only have to demand openly that the Germans observe the Brest Treaty.

I have heard such naïve people, who consider themselves to be on the left, but who in fact only reflect the narrow-mindedness of our petty bourgeoisie....*

They forget that you have first to be victorious before you can make demands. If you are not victorious the enemy can delay his reply or even make no reply at all to your demands. That is the law of imperialist war.

You don't like it. Then be able to defend your homeland. The worker has every right to defend his homeland for the sake of socialism, for the sake of the working class.

I shall only add that this uncertain situation on the Caucasian border was a result of the quite unpardonable vacillation of the Gegechkori government which at first announced that it did not recognise the Brest peace, and then declared its independence without informing us of what territory this independence covered. We have sent innumerable radio-telegrams saying to them, please inform us of the territory you lay claim to. You have the right to claim independence, but since you speak of independence, you are bound to say what territory you are representing. That was a week ago. Countless radio-telegrams have been dispatched, but not a single reply has been received. German imperialism is taking advantage of this. This has made it possible for Germany, and Turkey, as a satellite state, to push farther and farther forward, making no replies, ignoring everything, stating: we shall take whatever we can, we are not infringing the Brest peace, because the Transcaucasian army does not recognise it, because the Caucasus is independent.

Of whom is the Gegechkori government independent? It is independent of the Soviet Republic, but it is dependent,

* A phrase that is not clearly written in the verbatim report has been omitted.—*Ed.*

just a little, on German imperialism, and quite naturally so. (*Applause.*)

That is the situation which has developed, comrades—an acute aggravation of relations in the last few days—it is a situation which has once again, and fairly obviously, confirmed the correctness of the tactics which the vast majority of our Party, the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, has employed and firmly insisted on during recent months.

We possess great revolutionary experience, which has taught us that it is essential to employ the tactics of merciless attack when objective conditions permit, when the experience of compromising has shown that the people's indignation has been aroused, and that attack will express this change. But we have to resort to temporising tactics, to a slow gathering of forces when objective circumstances do not favour a call for a general merciless repulse.

Any person who does not shut his eyes to the facts, who is not blind, knows that we are merely repeating what we have said earlier, and what we have always said: that we do not forget the weakness of the Russian working class compared to other contingents of the international proletariat. It was not our own will, but historical circumstances, the legacy of the tsarist regime, the flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, that caused this contingent to march ahead of the other contingents of the international proletariat; it was not because we desired it, but because circumstances demanded it. We must remain at our post until the arrival of our ally, the international proletariat, which will arrive and will inevitably arrive, but which is approaching at an immeasurably slower pace than we expect or wish. If we see that as a result of objective conditions the international proletariat moves too slowly, we must nevertheless stick to our tactics of temporising and utilising the conflicts and contradictions between the imperialists, of slowly accumulating strength; the tactics of preserving this island of Soviet power in the stormy imperialist sea, maintaining this island which now already attracts the gaze of the working people of all countries. That is why we tell ourselves that, if the extremist war party can at any moment defeat any imperialist coalition and build

a new unexpected imperialist coalition against us, we at any rate will not make it any easier for them. And if they come against us—yes, we are now defencists—we shall do everything in our power, everything within the power of diplomatic tactics, we shall do everything to delay that moment, everything to make the brief and unstable respite, given us in March, last longer, for we are firmly convinced that behind us are tens of millions of workers and peasants who know that with every week and, even more so, with every month of this respite they gain new strength, they are consolidating Soviet power, making it firm and stable. They know that they are introducing a new spirit, and that after the attrition and weariness of this exhausting reactionary war, they will create firmness and readiness for the last and decisive battle should external forces attack the Socialist Soviet Republic.

We have been defencists since October 25, 1917; we have won the right to defend our native land. It is not secret treaties that we are defending, we have annulled and exposed them to the whole world. We are defending our country against the imperialists. We are defending and we shall win. It is not the Great Power status of Russia that we are defending—of that nothing is left but Russia proper—nor is it national interests, for we assert that the interests of socialism, of world socialism are higher than national interests, higher than the interests of the state. We are defenders of the socialist fatherland.

This is not achieved by issuing declarations, but only by overthrowing the bourgeoisie in one's own country, by a ruthless war to the death begun in one's own country; and we know that we shall win this war. Ours is a small island in the war that engulfs the imperialist world, but on this small island we have shown and proved to all what the working class can do. Everyone knows this and has acknowledged it. We have proved that we possess the right to defend our homeland. We are defencists and look upon our task with all the seriousness taught us by the four years of war, with all the seriousness and caution understood by every worker and peasant who has met a soldier and has learned what that soldier has lived through in these four years of war—the caution which may not be understood, which may

be sneered at and regarded frivolously only by people who are revolutionaries in word but not in deed. It is just because we do support the defence of the fatherland that we tell ourselves: a firm and strong army and a strong rear are needed for the defence, and in order to have a firm and strong army we must in the first place ensure that the food supplies are on a sound basis. For this the dictatorship of the proletariat must be expressed not only centrally—that is the first step and only the first step—but there must be dictatorship throughout the whole of Russia—that is the second step and only the second step, which we have not yet carried out sufficiently. Proletarian discipline is essential and necessary for us; real proletarian dictatorship, when the firm and iron rule of class-conscious workers is felt in every remote corner of our country, when not a single kulak, not a single rich man, not a single opponent of the grain monopoly remains unpunished, but is found and punished by the iron hand of the disciplined dictators of the working class, the proletarian dictators. (*Applause.*)

We say to ourselves: our attitude to defence of the fatherland is a cautious one; it is our duty to do everything that our diplomacy can do to delay the moment of war, to extend the respite period; we promise the workers and peasants to do all we can for peace. This we shall do. And bourgeois gentlemen and their hirelings, who think that just as in the Ukraine, where a coup was brought about so easily, so in Russia it may be possible to give birth to new Skoropadskys, should not forget that the war party in Germany found it very difficult to effect a coup in the Ukraine, and will meet with plenty of opposition in Soviet Russia. Everything goes to prove this; Soviet power has pursued this line and has made every sacrifice to consolidate the position of the working people.

The situation with regard to peace with Finland may be summed up in the words: Fort Ino and Murmansk. Fort Ino, which defends Petrograd, lies geographically within the Finnish state. In concluding peace with the workers' government of Finland we, the representatives of socialist Russia, recognised Finland's absolute right to the whole territory, but it was mutually agreed by both governments that Fort Ino should remain in Russia's hands "for the

defence of the joint interests of the Socialist Republics", as stated in the treaty that was concluded.[145] It is natural that our troops should conclude this peace in Finland, should sign these terms. It is natural that bourgeois and counter-revolutionary Finland was bound to raise a hue and cry against this. It is natural that the reactionary and counter-revolutionary Finnish bourgeoisie should lay claim to this stronghold. It is natural that, because of this, the issue should become acute on a number of occasions and should still remain acute. Matters hang by a thread. It is natural that the question of Murmansk, to which the Anglo-French have laid claim, should give rise to even greater aggravation, because they have spent tens of millions on the port's construction in order to safeguard their military rear in their imperialist war against Germany. Their respect for neutrality is so wonderful that they make use of everything that is left unguarded. Furthermore, sufficient excuse for their grabbing is their possession of a battleship, while we have nothing with which to chase it away. It is natural that all this should have aggravated the situation. There is an outer aspect, a legal expression resulting from the international position of the Soviet Republic, which presumes that it is impossible for armed forces of any belligerent state to set foot on neutral territory without being disarmed. The British landed their military forces at Murmansk, and we were unable to prevent this by armed force. Consequently, we are presented with demands almost in the nature of an ultimatum: if you cannot protect your neutrality, we shall wage war on your territory.

A worker-peasant army, however, has now been formed, it has rallied in the uyezds and gubernias the peasants who have returned to their land, land wrested from the landowners; they now have something to defend. An army has been formed which has started to build Soviet power, and which will become the vanguard if an invasion against Russia breaks out; we shall rise as one man to meet the enemy.

My time is up, and I want to conclude by reading a telegram received by radio from Comrade Joffe, Soviet Ambassador in Berlin. This telegram will show you that, on the one hand, you have confirmation from our Ambassador

of whether my analysis of the international situation is correct and, on the other hand, that the foreign policy of our Soviet Republic is a responsible one—it is a policy of preparation for defence of our country, a steadfast policy, not allowing a single step to be taken that would aid the extremist parties of the imperialist powers in the East and West. This is a responsible policy with no illusions. There always remains the possibility that any day military forces may be thrown against us and we, the workers and peasants, assure ourselves and the whole world, and shall be able to prove, that we shall rise to a man to defend the Soviet Republic. I hope, therefore, that the reading of this telegram will serve as an appropriate conclusion to my speech and will show us the spirit in which the representatives of the Soviet Republic work abroad in the interests of the Soviets, of all Soviet institutions and the Soviet Republic.

"The latest radio-telegrams received today report that the German War Prisoners' Commission is leaving on Friday, May 10. We have already received a Note from the German Government proposing the setting up of a special commission to consider all legal questions in regard to our possessions in the Ukraine and in Finland. I have agreed to such a commission and have asked you to send the appropriate military and legal representatives. Today I had a talk about further advances, demands for clearing Fort Ino, and the attitude of the Russians to Germany. Here is the reply: The German High Command states that there will be no further advances; Germany's role in the Ukraine and Finland has ended. Germany is willing to assist our peace talks with Kiev and Helsingfors and is entering into negotiations with the governments concerned. As regards Fort Ino, in connection with the Finnish Peace talks: according to the treaty, the forts should be destroyed. Germany considers that when defining the frontiers the agreement with the Reds can be accepted; the Whites have not yet replied. The German Government declares officially: Germany abides firmly by the Brest Treaty, she wants peaceful relations with us, she has no aggressive plans and has no intention of attacking us in any way. It is promised that, in accordance with my request, Russian citizens in Germany will be treated on a par with other neutrals."

Newspaper report published in *Pravda* Nos. 93 and 94, May 15 and 16, 1918; in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 95 May 15, 1918

Published according to the text of the book: *Minutes of the Sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, 4th Convocation. Verbatim Report*, Moscow, 1920, collated with the text of the newspaper *Petrogradskaya Pravda* No. 101 May 19, 1918

REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE MOSCOW REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[146] MAY 15, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin dealt first with the views of the "Lefts" on foreign policy and pointed out the tremendous propaganda value of the Brest negotiations, for the Western proletariat had been able to learn a lot, and to understand who the Bolsheviks were, and what the situation here was after the revolution, etc. Salvation now lay not in an open rupture of the Brest Treaty but in the ability to manoeuvre in the complex international situations that arose from the conflicting interests of the various imperialist countries. One had to take into account the relations between Japan and America, Germany and Britain, the dissension in the German capitalist and war parties, and so on. The need in internal politics was for proletarian discipline, a struggle against the kulaks in the villages, the campaign for grain, a complete food dictatorship and dictatorship of the working class. Replying to the "Lefts" on the question of state capitalism, Lenin explained that this held no terrors for us because in the agonising period of transition from capitalism to socialism that we had been going through the main thing was to save industry, and production could be got going and an exact account kept of production and consumption only by means of the large-scale organisation that was possible at present only under state capitalism. An essential condition for this was workers' control. As an example Lenin mentioned the tanners, their sound organisation, and the workers' control in private enterprises.

Pravda No. 95, May 17, 1918

Published according to the *Pravda* text

REPORT TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FINANCIAL DEPARTMENTS OF SOVIETS[147] MAY 18, 1918

The country's financial situation is critical. The problem of transforming the country on socialist lines offers many difficulties that at times appear insurmountable, but no matter how arduous the work that at every step meets with the resistance of the petty-bourgeoisie, the profiteers and propertied classes, I think we shall have to carry it out.

You experienced, practical people know better than anybody what difficulties have to be overcome in advancing from general assumptions and decrees to daily practice. We have tremendous work ahead of us, because the propertied classes will put up a desperate resistance, but the more difficult the task, the greater the benefits when we have conquered the bourgeoisie and subordinated them to the control of the Soviet authorities. Our tasks are such that it is worth while working and fighting the last decisive battle against the bourgeoisie, for the success of the socialist reform of the country depends on the fulfilment of those tasks.

The basic tasks presented by the Soviet government in the field of finance must be immediately put into effect, and this meeting we are holding with you will help towards ensuring that our planned reforms do not remain mere declarations.

We must effect sound financial reforms at all costs, and we must remember that any radical reforms will be doomed to failure unless our financial policy is successful.

In the name of the Council of People's Commissars I draw your attention to the tasks that have come to the fore

at a large number of meetings and ask you to work out the details of their practical application. The tasks are the following.

CENTRALISATION OF FINANCES

The centralisation of finances and the concentration of our forces are essential; unless these principles are applied in practice we shall be unable to carry out the economic reforms that will provide every citizen with enough to eat and the possibility of satisfying his cultural needs.

The need for centralisation is now reaching the consciousness of the masses; this change is taking place slowly and for this reason it will be more extensive and more profound; an urge towards decentralisation is to be observed, but it is a disease of the transitional period, a disease due to growth, and is quite natural because the centralism of the tsar and the bourgeoisie engendered hatred of and disgust at all centralised authority among the masses.

I regard centralism as the means of providing a subsistence minimum for the working people. I am in favour of the broadest autonomy for local Soviet organisations but at the same time I believe that if our work of consciously transforming the country is to be fruitful, there must be a single, strictly defined financial policy, and that instructions must be carried out from top to bottom.

From you we expect a decree on the centralisation of the country's finances.

INCOME AND PROPERTY TAXATION

The second task confronting us is the correct organisation of a progressive income and property tax. You know that all socialists are against indirect taxation because the only correct tax from the socialist point of view is the progressive income and property tax. I will not conceal the fact that we shall meet with tremendous difficulty in introducing this tax—the propertied classes will put up a desperate resistance.

The bourgeoisie are today evading taxation by bribery and through their connections; we must close all loopholes. We have many plans in this sphere and have cleared the

ground on which to build the foundation, but the actual foundation of that building has not yet been built. The time for this has now come.

Decrees alone will be insufficient to put the income tax into effect; practical methods and experience will be needed.

We assume that we shall have to go over to the monthly collection of the income tax. The section of the population receiving its income from the state-treasury is increasing, and measures must be taken to collect the income tax from these people by stopping it out of their wages.

All income and earnings, without exception, must be subject to income tax; the work of the printing press that has so far been practised may be justified as a temporary measure, but it must give place to a progressive income and property tax that is collected at very frequent intervals.

I should like to ask you to work out this measure in detail and draw up practical and precise plans that can be incorporated in decrees and instructions in the shortest time.

On the question of indemnities, Lenin said:

I am not against indemnities in general; the proletariat could not destroy the bourgeoisie without resorting to indemnities; it was a correct measure in the period of transition, but now that period is past and the taxation of the propertied classes must be replaced by a single, centralised state tax.

There is no doubt that the bourgeoisie will try with every means in their power to evade our laws and indulge in petty frauds. We shall struggle against that and in the end we shall defeat what is left of the bourgeoisie.

LABOUR CONSCRIPTION

The third aim of our financial policy is the introduction of labour conscription and the registration of the propertied classes.

The old capitalism, based on free competition, has been completely killed by the war—it has given way to state, monopolised capitalism. Because of the war, the advanced countries of Western Europe, Britain and Germany, have introduced strict accounting for, and control of, all

production; they have introduced labour conscription for the propertyless classes but have left many loopholes open for the bourgeoisie. We must apply the experience of these countries, but must introduce labour conscription primarily for the propertied classes who have grown rich on the war, and not for the poor people who have already made more than enough sacrifices on the altar of war.

The time has come to introduce labour taxation—budget books primarily for the bourgeoisie so that it will be possible to see what amount of work each of them devotes to the country. Control must be maintained by the local Soviets. This measure is at present quite superfluous as far as the poor are concerned since they already have to work enough; furthermore, the trade unions will adopt all the necessary measures to increase labour productivity and introduce labour discipline.

The registration of all propertied people and a law compelling rich people to have work, taxation and budget books—this is something we have to settle immediately. It must be worked out practically and concretely and is a measure that will enable us to place the burden of taxation on the rich, which is only just.

NEW CURRENCY

The fourth task of the moment is the substitution of new currency for the old. Money, banknotes—everything that is called money today—these titles to social well-being, have a disruptive effect and are dangerous in so far as the bourgeoisie, by hoarding these banknotes, retain economic power.

To reduce this effect we must undertake the strict registration of all banknotes in circulation in order to change all old currency for new. It is beyond all doubt that in putting this measure into effect we shall come up against terrific economic and political difficulties; the preparatory work must be thorough—several thousand millions in the new money must be ready; in every volost, in every block of every large town, we must have savings banks, but these difficulties will not make us hesitate. We shall announce a very short period in which everyone must declare the amount

of money he possesses and obtain new currency for it; if the sum is a small one he will get ruble for ruble; if it is above the established limit he will get only part of it. This is a measure that will undoubtedly meet with counteraction, not only on the part of the bourgeoisie, but also on the part of the kulaks in the countryside who have been growing rich on the war and burying thousands of banknotes in bottles. We shall come face to face with the class enemy. It will be an arduous but rewarding struggle. Among us there is no doubt as to whether we have to take upon ourselves the full burden of this struggle, since it is necessary and inevitable. Tremendous preparatory work will be necessary to effect this measure; we must draw up a type of declaratory leaflet, we must develop propaganda in the localities, fix a time for the exchange of old money for new, etc. We shall, however, do it. It will be the last decisive battle with the bourgeoisie and will enable us to pay temporary tribute to foreign capital—until the hour of the social revolution strikes in the West—and carry out the necessary reforms in the country.

In conclusion Lenin, speaking in the name of the Council of People's Commissars, wished the Congress success in its work. (*Lenin's speech was interrupted more than once by enthusiastic applause.*)

Newspaper report published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 99, May 19, 1918

Published according to the text of the book: *Report on the Work of the First All-Russia Congress of Representatives of the Financial Departments of Regional, Gubernia, and Uyezd Soviets*, Moscow, 1918

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ENTERPRISES TO BE NATIONALISED[148] MAY 18, 1918

Having heard the statement made by the comrades elected as the workers' delegation at the conference of representatives of large metalworks, and bearing in mind the resolution adopted by the conference, I am able to say that in my opinion the Council of People's Commissars will certainly be unanimously *in favour* of immediate nationalisation if the conference exerts every effort to secure planned and systematic organisation of work and increased productivity.

Hence, it is desirable that the conference: 1) Should immediately elect a Provisional Council to prepare for the amalgamation of the works; 2) Should authorise the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union, in agreement with the Supreme Economic Council, to change the form of and to add members to this Provisional Council for the purpose of transforming it into a *Management Board* of a single union (or amalgamation) of all the nationalised works; 3) Should approve, or by means of a resolution legalise, the factory regulations on the model of the Bryansk regulations,[149] for the purpose of creating strict labour discipline; 4) Should nominate candidates from among specialists, engineers and organisers of large-scale production, for the purpose of participating in the management, or authorise the Supreme Economic Council to seek for and appoint such; 5) It is desirable that workers from the best organised works, or those having most experience in managing large-scale production, shall be sent by the

Provisional Council or by the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union) to assist in organising affairs properly at the less successful works; 6) By keeping the strictest account and control of all materials with reference to the productivity of labour, we must achieve, and we can achieve, enormous economies in raw materials and labour.

I think that if the conference and the bodies it sets up work energetically, it will be possible for the Council of People's Commissars to pass the nationalisation decree *within the next few days.*

Izvestia VTsIK No. 99,
May 19, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

DRAFT OF A TELEGRAM TO THE PETROGRAD WORKERS[150] MAY 21, 1918

The Soviet system can be upheld, the victory of the toilers and exploited *over* the landowners and capitalists can be upheld and consolidated only by the stern, iron rule of the class-conscious workers. Only such a system can attract and rally around it all the toiling people, all the poor.

Comrades, workers, remember that the revolution is in a critical situation! Remember that *you alone* can save the revolution, nobody else can.

What we need is tens of thousands of picked, politically advanced workers, loyal to the cause of socialism, incapable of succumbing to bribery and the temptations of pilfering, and capable of creating an iron force against the kulaks, profiteers, racketeers, bribe-takers and disorganisers.

That is what we urgently and insistently need.

Failing that, famine, unemployment and the destruction of the revolution are inevitable.

The strength of the workers and their salvation lie in organisation. Everybody knows that. Today what we need is a special kind of organisation of the workers, the organisation of the iron rule of the workers in order to vanquish the bourgeoisie. Comrades, workers, the cause of the revolution, the salvation of the revolution, is in your hands!

Time is short: an intolerably difficult May will be followed by an even more difficult June and July, and perhaps even part of August.

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 103
May 22, 1918

Published according to the manuscript

ON THE FAMINE

A LETTER TO THE WORKERS OF PETROGRAD[151]

Comrades, the other day your delegate, a Party comrade, a worker in the Putilov Works, called on me. This comrade drew a detailed and extremely harrowing picture of the famine in Petrograd. We all know that the food situation is just as acute in many of the industrial gubernias, that famine is knocking just as cruelly at the door of the workers and the poor generally.

And side by side with this we observe an orgy of profiteering in grain and other food products. The famine is not due to the fact that there is no grain in Russia, but to the fact that the bourgeoisie and the rich generally are putting up a last decisive fight against the rule of the toilers, against the state of the workers, against Soviet power, on this most important and acute of issues, the issue of bread. The bourgeoisie and the rich generally, including the rural rich, the kulaks, are thwarting the grain monopoly; they are disrupting the distribution of grain undertaken by the state for the purpose and in the interests of supplying bread to the whole of the population, and in the first place to the workers, the toilers, the needy. The bourgeoisie are disrupting the fixed prices, they are profiteering in grain, they are making a hundred, two hundred and more rubles' profit on every pood of grain; they are disrupting the grain monopoly and the proper distribution of grain by resorting to bribery and corruption and by deliberately supporting everything tending to destroy the power of the workers, which is endeavouring to put into effect the prime, basic and root principle of socialism: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

"He who does not work, neither shall he eat"—every toiler understands that. Every worker, every poor and even middle peasant, everybody who has suffered need in his lifetime, everybody who has ever lived by his own labour, is in agreement with this. Nine-tenths of the population of Russia are in agreement with this truth. In this simple, elementary and perfectly obvious truth lies the basis of socialism, the indefeasible source of it's strength, the indestructible pledge of its final victory.

But the whole point is that it is one thing to subscribe to this truth, to swear one's allegiance to it, to give it verbal recognition, but it is quite different to be able to put it into effect. When hundreds of thousands and millions of people are suffering the pangs of hunger (in Petrograd, in the non-agricultural gubernias, and in Moscow) in a country where millions upon millions of poods of grain are being concealed by the rich, the kulaks, and the profiteers—in a country which calls itself a socialist Soviet Republic—there is something to which every conscious worker and peasant must give serious and profound thought.

"He who does not work, neither shall he eat"—how is this to be put into effect? It is as clear as daylight that in order to put it into effect we require, first, a state grain monopoly, i.e., the absolute prohibition of all private trade in grain, the compulsory delivery of all surplus grain to the state at a fixed price, the absolute prohibition of all hoarding and concealment of surplus grain, no matter by whom. Secondly, we require the strictest registration of all grain surpluses, faultless organisation of the transportation of grain from places of abundance to places of shortage, and the building up of reserves for consumption, for processing, and for seed. Thirdly, we require a just and proper distribution of bread, controlled by the workers' state, the proletarian state, among all the citizens of the state, a distribution which will permit of no privileges and advantages for the rich.

One has only to reflect ever so slightly on these conditions for coping with the famine to see the abysmal stupidity of the contemptible anarchist windbags, who deny the necessity of a state power (and, what is more, a power ruthless in its severity towards the bourgeoisie and ruthlessly firm

towards disorganisers of government) for the transition from capitalism to communism and for the ridding of the working people of all forms of oppression and exploitation. It is at this moment, when our revolution has directly, concretely, and practically approached the tasks involved in the realisation of socialism—and therein lies its inestimable merit—it is at this moment, and exactly in connection with this most important of issues, the issue of bread, that the need becomes absolutely clear for an iron revolutionary rule, for a dictatorship of the proletariat, for the organisation of the collection of food products, their transportation, and distribution on a mass, national scale, taking into account the requirements of tens and hundreds of millions of people, calculating the conditions and the results of production for a year and many years ahead (for there are sometimes years of crop failure, sometimes land improvements essential for increasing grain crops require years of work, and so forth).

Romanov and Kerensky left to the working class a country utterly impoverished by their predatory, criminal, and most terrible war, a country picked clean by Russian and foreign imperialists. Bread will suffice for all only if we keep the strictest account of every pood, only if every pound is distributed absolutely evenly. There is also an acute shortage of bread for machines, i.e., fuel; the railways and factories will come to a standstill, unemployment and famine will bring ruin on the whole nation, if we do not bend every effort to establish a strict and ruthless economy of consumption and proper distribution. We are faced by disaster, it is very near. An intolerably difficult May will be followed by a still more difficult June, July and August.

Our state grain monopoly exists in law, but in practice it is being thwarted at every step by the bourgeoisie: The rural rich, the kulak, the parasite who has been robbing the whole neighbourhood for decades, prefers to enrich himself by profiteering and illicit distilling: it is so good for his pocket, and he can throw the blame for the famine on Soviet power. That, too, is the line of the political defenders of the kulak—the Constitutional-Democrats, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Mensheviks—who are overtly and covertly "working" against the grain monopoly

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and against Soviet power. The party of the spineless, i.e., the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, are displaying their spinelessness here too: they are yielding to the covetous howls and outcries of the bourgeoisie, they are crying out against the grain monopoly, they are "protesting" against the food dictatorship, they are allowing themselves to be intimidated by the bourgeoisie, they are afraid to fight the kulak, and are flapping about hysterically, recommending that the fixed prices be raised, that private trading be permitted, and so forth.

This party of the spineless reflects in politics something akin to what takes place in ordinary life when the kulak incites the poor peasants against the Soviets, bribes them by, say, letting some poor peasant have a pood of grain not for six, but for three rubles, so that the poor peasant, thus corrupted, may himself "make a bit" by profiteering, may "turn a penny" by selling that pood of grain at a profiteering price of one hundred and fifty rubles, and himself become a decrier of the Soviets, which have prohibited private trading in grain.

Anyone who is capable of reflecting, anyone who is willing to reflect ever so little, will see clearly what line this fight has taken.

Either the advanced and class-conscious workers triumph and unite the poor peasant masses around themselves, establish rigorous order, a mercilessly severe rule, a genuine dictatorship of the proletariat—either they compel the kulak to submit, and institute a proper distribution of food and fuel on a national scale;

—or the bourgeoisie, with the help of the kulaks, and with the indirect support of the spineless and muddle-headed (the anarchists and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries), will overthrow Soviet power and set up a Russo-German or a Russo-Japanese Kornilov, who will present the people with a sixteen-hour working day, an ounce of bread per weak, mass shooting of workers and torture in dungeons, as has been the case in Finland and the Ukraine.

Either—or.

There is no middle course.

The situation of the country is desperate in the extreme.

Anyone who reflects upon political life cannot fail to see that the Constitutional-Democrats, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Mensheviks are coming to an understanding about who would be "pleasanter", a Russo-German or a Russo-Japanese Kornilov, about who would crush the revolution more effectively and reliably, a crowned or a republican Kornilov.

It is time all class-conscious and advanced workers came to an understanding. It is time they bestirred themselves and realised that every minute's delay may spell ruin to the country and ruin to the revolution.

Half-measures will be of no avail. Complaining will lead us nowhere. Attempts to secure bread or fuel "in retail fashion", "each man for himself", i.e., for "our" factory, "our" workshop, are only increasing the disorganisation and facilitating for the profiteers their selfish, filthy, and blackguardly work.

That is why, comrades, workers of Petrograd, I have taken the liberty of addressing this letter to you. Petrograd is not Russia. The Petrograd workers are only a small part of the workers of Russia. But they are one of the best, the advanced, most class-conscious, most revolutionary, most steadfast detachments of the working class and of all the working people of Russia, and one of the least liable to succumb to empty phrases, to spineless despair and to the intimidation of the bourgeoisie. And it has frequently happened at critical moments in the life of nations that even small advanced detachments of advanced classes have carried the rest with them, have fired the masses with revolutionary enthusiasm, and have accomplished tremendous historical feats.

"There were forty thousand of us at the Putilov Works," the delegate from the Petrograd workers said to me. "But the majority of them were 'temporary' workers, not proletarians, an unreliable, flabby lot. Now there are fifteen thousand left, but these are proletarians, tried and steeled in the fight."

That is the sort of vanguard of the revolution—in Petrograd and throughout the country—that must sound the call, must *rise together*, must understand that the salvation of the country is in their hands, that from them is demanded

a heroism no less than that which they displayed in January and October 1905 and in February and October 1917, that a great "*crusade*" must be organised against the grain profiteers, the kulaks, the parasites, the disorganisers and bribe-takers, a great "*crusade*" against the violators of strictest state order in the collection, transportation, and distribution of bread for the people and bread for the machines.

The country and the revolution can be saved only by the mass effort of the advanced workers. We need tens of thousands of advanced and steeled proletarians, class-conscious enough to explain matters to the millions of poor peasants all over the country and to assume the leadership of these millions, resolute enough to ruthlessly cast out of their midst and shoot all who allow themselves to be "tempted"—as indeed happens—by the temptations of profiteering and turn from fighters for the cause of the people into robbers; we need proletarians steadfast enough and devoted enough to the revolution to bear in an organised way all the hardships of the crusade and take it to every corner of the country for the establishment of order, for the consolidation of the local organs of Soviet power, and for the exercise of control in the localities over every pood of grain and every pood of fuel.

It is rather more difficult to do this than to display heroism for a few days without leaving one's accustomed place, without joining in a *crusade*, confining oneself to an impulsive uprising against the idiot monster Romanov or the fool and braggart Kerensky. Heroism displayed in prolonged and persevering organisational work on a national scale is immensely more difficult than, but at the same time immensely superior to, heroism displayed in an uprising. But the strength of working-class parties, the strength of the working class has always been that it looks danger boldly, squarely and openly in the face, that it does not fear to admit danger and soberly weighs the forces in "our" camp and in "the other" camp, the camp of the exploiters. The revolution is progressing, developing, and growing. The tasks we face are also growing. The struggle is broadening and deepening. Proper distribution of bread and fuel, their procurement in greater quantities and the very strict account and control of them by *the workers* on a national scale—that is the real and chief prelude to socialism. That is no longer a "general

revolutionary" task but a *communist* task, a task which requires that the working people and the poor engage capitalism in a decisive battle.

And this battle is worth giving all one's strength to it; the difficulties are great, but so is the cause of the abolition of oppression and exploitation for which we are fighting.

When the people are starving, when unemployment is becoming ever more terrible, anyone who conceals an extra pood of grain, anyone who deprives the state of a pood of fuel is an out-and-out criminal.

At such a time—and for a genuinely communist society, it is always true—every pood of grain and fuel is veritably sacred, much more so than the sacred things which priests use to confuse the minds of fools, promising them the kingdom of heaven as a reward for slavery on earth. And in order to rid this genuinely sacred thing of every remnant of the "sacredness" of the priests, we must *take possession of it practically*, we must achieve its proper distribution *in practice*, we must collect the whole of it without exception; every particle of surplus grain must be brought into the state stores, *the whole country must be swept clean* of concealed or ungarnered grain surpluses; we need the firm hand of the worker to harness every effort to increase the output of fuel and to secure the greatest economy of fuel, the greatest efficiency in its transportation and consumption.

We need a mass "crusade" of the advanced workers to every centre of production of grain and fuel, to every important centre of supply and distribution—a mass "crusade" to increase the intensity of work tenfold, to assist the local organs of Soviet power in the matter of accounting and control, and to eradicate profiteering, graft, and slovenliness by armed force. This is not a new task. History, properly speaking, is not advancing new tasks—all it is doing is to increase the size and scope of old tasks as the scope of the revolution, its difficulties, and the greatness of its world-historic aim increase.

One of the greatest and indefeasible accomplishments of the October Revolution—the Soviet revolution—is that the advanced worker, *as the leader* of the poor, *as the leader* of the toiling masses of the countryside, *as the builder of the state of the toilers*, has "gone among the people".

Petrograd and other proletarian centres have given thousands upon thousands of their best workers to the countryside. The detachments of fighters against the Kaledins and Dutovs, and the food detachments, are nothing new. Only the proximity of disaster, the acuteness of the situation compel us to do *ten times more* than before.

When the worker became the vanguard leader of the poor he did not thereby become a saint. He led the people forward, but he also became infected with the diseases of petty-bourgeois disintegration. The fewer the detachments of best organised, of most class-conscious, and most disciplined and steadfast workers were, the more frequently did these detachments degenerate, the more frequently did the small-proprietor instincts of the past triumph over the proletarian-communist consciousness of the future.

Having begun the communist revolution, the working class cannot instantly discard the weaknesses and vices inherited from the society of landowners and capitalists, the society of exploiters and parasites, the society based on the filthy selfishness and personal gain of a few and the poverty of the many. But the working class can vanquish the old world—*and in the end will certainly and inevitably vanquish it*—with its vices and weaknesses, if against the enemy are brought ever greater detachments of workers, ever more enlightened by experience and tempered by the hardships of the struggle.

Such and only such is the state of affairs in Russia today. Single-handed and disunited, we shall not be able to cope with famine and unemployment. We need a mass "crusade" of advanced workers to every corner of this vast country. We need ten times more *iron detachments* of the proletariat, class-conscious and boundlessly devoted to communism. Then we shall triumph over famine and unemployment. Then we shall make the revolution the real prelude to socialism, and then, too, we shall be in a position to conduct a victorious war of defence against the imperialist vultures.

May 22, 1918 *N. Lenin*

Pravda No. 101,
May 24, 1918

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the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF COMMISSARS FOR LABOUR[152] MAY 22, 1918

Comrades, permit me first of all to greet the Congress of Commissars for Labour in the name of the Council of People's Commissars. (*Enthusiastic applause.*)

At yesterday's session of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Shlyapnikov reported that your Congress had subscribed to the resolution of the trade unions on labour discipline and production rates. Comrades, I believe you have taken an important step in passing this resolution, which not only deals with the productivity of labour and production conditions, but is also a very important step in principle from the standpoint of the present situation in general. Your contact with the broad masses of the workers is constant and a matter of business and not merely a casual contact, and you know that our revolution is experiencing one of the most important and critical moments of its development.

You are fully aware that our enemies, the Western imperialists, are lying in wait for us, and that there may perhaps come a time when they will turn their hordes loose on us. That external enemy is now being joined by another dangerous enemy—the internal enemy—the disruption, chaos and disorganisation that are being intensified by the bourgeoisie in general and by the petty bourgeoisie in particular, and by various yes-men and hangers-on of the bourgeoisie. You know, comrades, that after the most brutal war, in which we were involved by the tsarist regime And by the collaborators headed by Kerensky, we were left with a heritage of disruption and extreme economic ruin. We now have to face the most critical moment, when hunger and unemployment are knocking at the door of an

increasing number of workers, when hundreds and, thousands of people are suffering the pangs of hunger, when the situation is being aggravated by there being no bread when there could be bread, when we know that the proper distribution of bread depends on proper transport of grain. The shortage of fuel since we have been cut off from the rich fuel regions, the catastrophic condition of the railways that may possibly be threatened with a stoppage of traffic—such are the conditions that breed difficulties for the revolution and fill with joy the hearts of the Kornilovites of all kinds and colours. They are now daily, hourly, perhaps, discussing how to take advantage of the difficulties of the Soviet Republic and proletarian power, how to again place a Kornilov on the throne. They are now arguing about what nationality the new Kornilov is to be—it must be someone who suits the bourgeoisie, whether he wears a crown or is a republican Kornilov. The workers now know what the matter is, and after what the Russian revolution has experienced since Kerensky, they are not a bit surprised. But the strength of the working-class organisation, of the working-class revolution, lies in our not closing our eyes to the truth, in our realising the exact state of affairs.

We have said that the war, such is its scale and incredible brutality, threatens the complete destruction of European civilisation. The only possible salvation is for the workers to take over power and establish strict law and order. Since 1905 the proletariat of Russia has for a certain time moved far ahead of the other international armies of the proletariat because of the course taken by the Russian revolution and a special historical situation. We have now reached the stage when the revolution is maturing in all West-European countries, when it is becoming clear that the situation of the armies of German workers is hopeless. We know that over there in the West, the working people are not confronted with the rotten regime of Romanov and empty boasters but by a bourgeoisie that is fully organised and can rely on all the achievements of modern civilisation and engineering. That is why it was so easy for us to start the revolution and more difficult to continue it, and why over there in the West it will be more difficult to start and easier to continue. Our difficulty is that every-

thing has to be done by the efforts of the proletariat of Russia alone, and that we have to maintain our position until our ally, the international proletariat of all countries, grows strong enough. Every day impresses it on us that there is no other way out. Our position is made more difficult because, without reinforcements, we are faced with disorganisation on the railways, with transport and food disruptions. There the question must be presented in a way that is clear to everyone.

I hope that the Congress of Commissars for Labour, which is in more immediate contact with the workers than anybody else—that this Congress will not only mark a stage in the direct improvement of those labour arrangements which we must make the basis of socialism, but that it will also serve to clear the minds of the workers in respect of the situation we are at present experiencing. The working class is confronted with a difficult but honourable task on which the fate of socialism in Russia depends, and probably in other countries, too. That is why a resolution on labour discipline is so important.

Now that power is firmly in the hands of the workers, everything depends on proletarian discipline and proletarian organisation. It is a question of discipline and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a question of iron rule. The type of government that meets with the warmest sympathy and very determined support of the poor must be as strong as iron, because incredible calamities are advancing upon us. A large section of the workers are living under the impression of the old and hope that we shall somehow manage to get out of the present situation.

Every day, however, these illusions are being shattered, and it is becoming more and more obvious that the world war threatens whole countries with famine and decay if the working class does not overcome the economic ruin by means of its organisational ability. Side by side with the politically conscious section of the working class whose entire activity is devoted to making the new discipline of comradeship the basis of everything, we see the many millions of petty property-owners, the petty-bourgeois element, who look at everything from the standpoint of their own narrow interests. We cannot fight against the famine and

disaster that are approaching, other than by establishing the iron discipline of the politically conscious workers—without it we can do nothing. Because of the huge extent of Russia we are living under conditions in which there is a lot of bread at one end of the country and none at the other. It is no use consoling ourselves with the thought that the war of defence that may be forced on us will not take place. It must not be thought that the towns and the huge industrial centres can be fed if food is not delivered regularly. Every pood of grain must be recorded so that not a single pood is wasted. We know, however, that no such record is really made, except on paper. In real life the petty profiteers are only corrupting the village poor by impressing on them that private trading can make up for their shortages. We cannot get out of the crisis under those conditions. In Russia there can be enough bread for the people and enough bread, i.e., fuel, for industry, only if everything we have is strictly divided among all citizens so that nobody can take an extra pound of bread and not a single pound of fuel can remain unused. That is the only way to save the country from famine. That is a lesson in communist distribution—everything accounted for, so that there is enough bread for the people and enough fuel for industry—and it is not a lesson taken from a book, it is one we have arrived at through bitter experience.

The broad masses of the workers may not immediately realise that we are face to face with disaster. What is needed is a workers' crusade against disorganisation and against the concealment of grain. And a crusade is needed to establish throughout the country the labour discipline you have passed a resolution on and have been talking about within the limits of the factories; the masses must be made to understand that there is no other way out. In the history of our revolution, the strength of the politically conscious workers has always been their ability to look the most bitter and dangerous reality straight in the face, to harbour no-illusions but calculate their forces exactly. We can count on the politically conscious workers alone; the remaining mass, the bourgeoisie and the petty proprietors, are against us; they do not believe in the new order and take advantage of every opportunity to worsen the plight of the people. What

we see in the Ukraine and in Finland may serve as an example: the incredible atrocities and the seas of blood in which the bourgeoisie and its supporters, from the Constitutional-Democrats to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are drowning the towns they conquer with the aid of their allies. All this goes to show what awaits the proletariat in the future if it does not fulfil its historic task. We know how small is the section of advanced and politically conscious workers in Russia. We also know the plight of the people and know that the broad masses are certain to realise that we cannot get out of the situation by half-measures, that there will have to be a proletarian revolution. We live at a time when countries are being ruined and millions of people are doomed to perish or subjected to military slavery. Hence, the revolution that history has forced on us, not by the evil will of individuals, but because the entire capitalist system is breaking up, because its foundations are cracking.

Comrades, Commissars for Labour, make use of every meeting you hold at any factory, of your talks with delegations of workers, make use of every opportunity to explain the situation, so that the workers know that we are faced with either destruction or self-discipline, organisation and the possibility to defend ourselves. Let them know that we are faced with a return of the Kornilovs—Russian, German or Japanese Kornilovs—who will bring a ration of an ounce of bread a week if the politically conscious workers, at the head of all the poor, do not organise a crusade against the chaos and disorganisation which the petty bourgeoisie are everywhere intensifying, and which we must put down. It is a question of every politically conscious worker feeling that he is not only the master in his own factory but that he is also a representative of the country, of his feeling his responsibility. The politically conscious worker must know that he is a representative of his class. He must win if he takes the lead in the movement against the bourgeoisie and the profiteers. The politically conscious worker will understand what the main task of the socialist is, and then we shall win. Then we shall find the forces and shall be able to fight. (*Loud, prolonged applause.*)

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and *Pravda* No. 101, May 24, 1918

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the *Pravda* text,
collated with the *Izvestia* text

THE SOCIALIST ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

I

DRAFT DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[153]

The Council of People's Commissars, fully approving and welcoming the idea underlying the draft for the foundation of the Socialist Academy, instructs the Commissariat for Education to remake this draft on the following bases:

1)—a publishing society of a Marxist trend to be made the cornerstone;
2)—Marxist forces abroad to be enlisted in especially large numbers;
3)—a series of social investigations to be made one of the primary tasks;
4)—immediate measures to be taken to ascertain, assemble and utilise Russian personnel available for lecturing.

Written on May 25, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Published according to the manuscript

II

DIRECTIVES FOR THE COMMISSION

The Commission is to be instructed:

1) to make a detailed examination of the Rules of the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences for submission to the Council of People's Commissars and then to the C.E.C.;
2) to begin immediately an exchange of opinions on this question, and also on the question of membership, with non-Russian and foreign Marxists,
3) to compile and discuss a list of suitable and willing candidates as foundation members, and as teachers, for submission of this list to the Council of People's Commissars and the C.E.C.[154]

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THESES ON THE CURRENT SITUATION[155]

1) The Commissariat for War to be converted into a Commissariat for War and Food—i.e., 9/10 of the work of the Commissariat for War to be concentrated on reorganising the army for the war for grain and on waging this war—for three months: June-August.

2) Martial law to be declared throughout the country during this period.

3) The army to be mobilised, selecting its sound elements, and 19-year-olds to be called up, at any rate in certain regions, for systematic military operations to fight for, win, collect and transport grain and fuel.

4) Shooting for indiscipline to be introduced.

5) The success of detachments to be measured by success in obtaining grain and by practical results in collecting grain surpluses.

6) The tasks of the military campaign should be formulated as follows:

a) the collection of stocks of grain for feeding the population;

b) ditto—for three months' food reserve for war;

c) safeguarding stocks of coal, collecting them and increasing output.

7) The detachments of the active army (active against kulaks, etc.) to consist of from one-third to one-half (in each detachment) of workers and poor peasants of the famine-stricken gubernias.

8) Each detachment to be issued two kinds of instruction:

a) ideological-political, on the importance of victory over famine and the kulaks, on the dictatorship of the proletariat as the working people's power;

b) military-organisational, on the internal organisation of the detachments, on discipline, on control and written documents of control for each operation, etc.

9) A collective liability of the whole detachment to be introduced, for example the threat of shooting every tenth man—for each case of plunder.

10) All means of transport belonging to rich persons in the towns to be mobilised for work in transporting grain; well-to-do classes to be mobilised to act as clerks and stewards.

11) If signs of demoralisation of the detachments become threateningly frequent, the "sick" detachments to be sent back after a month, i.e., exchanged, to the place from which they came, for report and "treatment".

12) The following to be adopted both in the Council of People's Commissars and in the Central Executive Committee:

(a) declaration that the country is in a state of grave *danger* as regards food;

(b) martial law;

(c) mobilisation of the army, together with its reorganisation as mentioned above, for the *campaign for grain*;

(d) in each uyezd and volost with grain surpluses, immediate compilation of a *list* of rich owners of land (kulaks), grain traders, etc., making them personally responsible for the collection of all grain surpluses;

(e) the appointment to each military detachment—at the rate of at least one out of approximately ten men—of persons with a party recommendation of the R.C.P., the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries or the trade unions.

13) In implementing the grain monopoly the most vigorous measures for assistance to the rural poor to be made obligatory without shrinking from any financial sacrifices, and measures for free distribution among them of part of the grain surpluses collected from the kulaks, side by side with ruthless suppression of kulaks who withhold grain surpluses.

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SPEECH, AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF ECONOMIC COUNCILS[156] MAY 26, 1918

Comrades, permit me first of all to greet the Congress of Economic Councils in the name of the Council of People's Commissars. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, the Supreme Economic Council now has a difficult, but a most rewarding task. There is not the slightest doubt that the further the gains of the October Revolution go, the more profound the upheaval it started becomes, the more firmly the socialist revolution's gains become established and the socialist system becomes consolidated, the greater and higher will become the role of the Economic Councils, which alone of all the state institutions are to endure. And their position will become all the more durable the closer we approach the establishment of the socialist system and the less need there will be for a purely administrative apparatus, for an apparatus which is solely engaged in administration. After the resistance of the exploiters has been finally broken, after the working people have learned to organise socialist production, this apparatus of administration in the proper, strict, narrow sense of the word, this apparatus of the old state, is doomed to die; while the apparatus of the type of the Supreme Economic Council is destined to grow, to develop and become strong, performing all the main activities of organised society.

That is why, comrades, when I look at the experience of our Supreme Economic Council and of the local councils, with the activities of which it is closely and inseparably connected, I think that, in spite of much that is unfinished, incomplete and unorganised, we have not even the slightest grounds for pessimistic conclusions. For the task which the Supreme Economic Council sets itself, and the task which all the regional and local

councils set themselves, is so enormous, so all-embracing, that there is absolutely nothing that gives rise to alarm in what we all observe. Very often—of course, from our point of view, perhaps too often—the proverb "measure thrice and cut once" has not been applied. Unfortunately, things are not so simple in regard to the organisation of the economy on socialist lines as they are expressed in that proverb.

With the transition of all power—this time not only political and not even mainly political, but economic power, that is, power that affects the deepest foundations of everyday human existence—to a new class, and, moreover, to a class which for the first time in the history of humanity is the leader of the overwhelming majority of the population, of the whole mass of the working and exploited people—our tasks become more complicated.

It goes without saying that in view of the supreme importance and the supreme difficulty of the organisational tasks that confront us, when we must organise the deepest foundations of the existence of hundreds of millions of people on entirely new lines, it is impossible to arrange matters as simply as in the proverb "measure thrice and cut once". We, indeed, are not in a position to measure a thing innumerable times and then cut out and fix what has been finally measured and fitted. We must build our economic edifice as we go along, trying out various institutions, watching their work, testing them by the collective common experience of the working people, and, above all, by the results of their work. We must do this as we go along, and, moreover, in a situation of desperate struggle and frenzied resistance by the exploiters, whose frenzy grows the nearer we come to the time when we can pull out the last bad teeth of capitalist exploitation. It is understandable that if even within a brief period we have to alter the types, the regulations and the bodies of administration in various branches of the national economy several times, there are not the slightest grounds for pessimism in these conditions, although, of course, this gives considerable grounds for malicious outbursts on the part of the bourgeoisie and the exploiters, whose best feelings are hurt. Of course, those who take too close and too direct a part in this work, say, the Chief Water Board, do not always find it pleasant to alter the regulations, the norms and the laws of

administration three times; the pleasure obtained from work of this kind cannot be great. But if we abstract ourselves somewhat from the direct unpleasantness of extremely frequent alteration of decrees, and if we look a little deeper and further into the enormous world-historic task that the Russian proletariat has to carry out with the aid of its own still inadequate forces, it will become immediately understandable that even far more numerous alterations and testing in practice of various systems of administration and various forms of discipline are inevitable; that in such a gigantic task, we could never claim, and no sensible socialist who has ever written on the prospects of the future ever even thought, that we could immediately establish and compose the forms of organisation of the new society according to some predetermined instruction and at one stroke.

All that we knew, all that the best experts on capitalist society, the greatest minds who foresaw its development, exactly indicated to us was that transformation was historically inevitable and must proceed along a certain main line, that private ownership of the means of production was doomed by history, that it would burst, that the exploiters would inevitably be expropriated. This was established with scientific precision, and we knew this when we grasped the banner of socialism, when we declared ourselves socialists, when we founded socialist parties, when we transformed society. We knew this when we took power for the purpose of proceeding with socialist reorganisation; but we could not know the forms of transformation, or the rate of development of the concrete reorganisation. Collective experience, the experience of millions can alone give us decisive guidance in this respect, precisely because, for our task, for the task of building socialism, the experience of the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of those upper sections which have made history up to now in feudal society and in capitalist society is insufficient. We cannot proceed in this way precisely because we rely on joint experience, on the experience of millions of working people.

We know, therefore, that organisation, which is the main and fundamental task of the Soviets, will inevitably entail a vast number of experiments, a vast number of steps, a vast number of alterations, a vast number of difficulties,

particularly in regard to the question of how to fit every person into his proper place, because we have no experience of this; here we have to devise every step ourselves, and the more serious the mistakes we make on this path, the more the certainty will grow that with every increase in the membership of the trade unions, with every additional thousand, with every additional hundred thousand that come over from the camp of working people, of exploited, who have hitherto lived according to tradition and habit, into the camp of the builders of Soviet organisations, the number of people who should prove suitable and organise the work on proper lines is increasing.

Take one of the secondary tasks that the Economic Council—the Supreme Economic Council—comes up against with particular frequency, the task of utilising bourgeois experts. We all know, at least those who take their stand on the basis of science and socialism, that this task can be fulfilled only when—that this task can be fulfilled only to the extent that international capitalism has developed the material and technical prerequisites of labour, organised on an enormous scale and based on science, and hence on the training of an enormous number of scientifically educated specialists. We know that without this socialism is impossible. If we reread the works of those socialists who have observed the development of capitalism during the last half-century, and who have again and again come to the conclusion that socialism is inevitable, we shall find that all of them without exception have pointed out that socialism alone will liberate science from its bourgeois fetters, from its enslavement to capital, from its slavery to the interests of dirty capitalist greed. Socialism alone will make possible the wide expansion of social production and distribution on scientific lines and their actual subordination to the aim of easing the lives of the working people and of improving their welfare as much as possible. Socialism alone can achieve this. And we know that it must achieve this, and in the understanding of this truth lies the whole complexity and the whole strength of Marxism.

We must achieve this while relying on elements which are opposed to it, because the bigger capital becomes the more the bourgeoisie suppresses the workers. Now that power

is in the hands of the proletariat and the poor peasants and the government is setting itself tasks with the support of the people, we have to achieve these socialist changes with the help of bourgeois experts who have been trained in bourgeois society, who know no other conditions, who cannot conceive of any other social system. Hence, even in cases when these experts are absolutely sincere and loyal to their work they are filled with thousands of bourgeois prejudices, they are connected by thousands of ties, imperceptible to themselves, with bourgeois society, which is dying and decaying and is therefore putting up furious resistance.

We cannot conceal these difficulties of endeavour and achievement from ourselves. Of all the socialists who have written about this, I cannot recall the work of a single socialist or the opinion of a single prominent socialist on future socialist society, which pointed to this concrete, practical difficulty that would confront the working class when it took power, when it set itself the task of turning the sum total of the very rich, historically inevitable and necessary for us store of culture and knowledge and technique accumulated by capitalism from an instrument of capitalism into an instrument of socialism. It is easy to do this in a general formula, in abstract reasoning, but in the struggle against capitalism, which does not die at once but puts up increasingly furious resistance the closer death approaches, this task is one that calls for tremendous effort. If experiments take place in this field, if we make repeated corrections of partial mistakes, this is inevitable because we cannot, in this or that sphere of the national economy, immediately turn specialists from servants of capitalism into servants of the working people, into their advisers. If we cannot do this at once it should not give rise to the slightest pessimism, because the task which we set ourselves is a task of world-historic difficulty and significance. We do not shut our eyes to the fact that in a single country, even if it were a much less backward country than Russia, even if we were living in better conditions than those prevailing after four years of unprecedented, painful, severe and ruinous war, we could not carry out the socialist revolution completely, solely by our own efforts. He who turns away from the socialist revolution now taking place

in Russia and points to the obvious disproportion of forces is like the conservative "man in a muffler" who cannot see further than his nose, who forgets that not a single historical change of any importance takes place without there being several instances of a disproportion of forces. Forces grow in the process of the struggle, as the revolution grows. When a country has taken the path of profound change, it is to the credit of that country and the party of the working class which achieved victory in that country, that they should take up in a practical manner the tasks that were formerly raised abstractly, theoretically. This experience will never be forgotten. The experience which the workers now united in trade unions and local organisations are acquiring in the practical work of organising the whole of production on a national scale cannot be taken away, no matter how difficult the vicissitudes the Russian revolution and the international socialist revolution may pass through. It has gone down in history as socialism's gain, and on it the future world revolution will erect its socialist edifice.

Permit me to mention another problem, perhaps the most difficult problem, for which the Supreme Economic Council has to find a practical solution. This is the problem of labour discipline. Strictly speaking, in mentioning this problem, we ought to admit and emphasise with satisfaction that it was precisely the trade unions, their largest organisations, namely, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union and the All-Russia Trade Union Council, the supreme trade union organisations uniting millions of working people, that were the first to set to work independently to solve this problem and this problem is of world-historic importance. In order to understand it we must abstract ourselves from those partial, minor failures, from the incredible difficulties which, if taken separately, seem to be insurmountable. We must rise to a higher level and survey the historical change of systems of social economy. Only from this angle will it be possible to appreciate the immensity of the task which we have undertaken. Only then will it be possible to appreciate the enormous significance of the fact that on this occasion, the most advanced representatives of society, the working and exploited people are, on their own initiative, taking on them-

selves the task which hitherto, in feudal Russia, up to 1861, was solved by a handful of landed proprietors, who regarded it as their own affair. At that time it was their affair to bring about state integration and discipline.

We know how the feudal landowners created this discipline. It was oppression, humiliation and the incredible torments of penal servitude for the majority of the people. Recall the whole of this transition from serfdom to the bourgeois economy. From all that you have witnessed—although the majority of you could not have witnessed it—and from all that you have learned from the older generations, you know how easy, historically, seemed the transition to the new bourgeois economy after 1861, the transition from the old feudal discipline of the stick, from the discipline of the most senseless, arrogant and brutal humiliation and personal violence, to bourgeois discipline, to the discipline of starvation, to so-called free hire, which in fact was the discipline of capitalist slavery. This was because mankind passed from one exploiter to another; because one minority of plunderers and exploiters of the people's labour gave way to another minority, who were also plunderers and exploiters of the people's labour; because the feudal landowners gave way to the capitalists, one minority gave way to another minority, while the toiling and exploited classes remained oppressed. And even this change from one exploiter's discipline to another exploiter's discipline took years, if not decades, of effort; it extended over a transition period of years, if not decades. During this period the old feudal landowners quite sincerely believed that everything was going to rack and ruin, that it was impossible to manage the country without serfdom; while the new, capitalist boss encountered practical difficulties at every step and gave up his enterprise as a bad job. The material evidence, one of the substantial proofs of the difficulty of this transition was that Russia at that time imported machinery from abroad, in order to have the best machinery to use, and it turned out that no one was available to handle this machinery, and there were no managers. And all over Russia one could see excellent machinery lying around unused, so difficult was the transition from the old feudal discipline to the new, bourgeois, capitalist discipline.

And so, comrades, if you look at the matter from this angle, you will not allow yourselves to be misled by those people, by those classes, by those bourgeoisie and their hangers-on whose sole task is to sow panic, to sow despondency, to cause complete despondency concerning the whole of our work, to make it appear to be hopeless, who point to every single case of indiscipline and corruption, and for that reason give up the revolution as a bad job, as if there has ever been in the world, in history, a single really great revolution in which there was no corruption, no loss of discipline, no painful experimental steps, when the people were creating a new discipline. We must not forget that this is the first time that this preliminary stage in history has been reached, when a new discipline, labour discipline, the discipline of comradely contact, Soviet discipline, is being created in fact by millions of working and exploited people. We do not claim, nor do we expect, quick successes in this field. We know that this task will take an entire historical epoch. We have begun this historical epoch, an epoch in which we are breaking up the discipline of capitalist society in a country which is still bourgeois, and we are proud that all politically conscious workers, absolutely all the toiling peasants are everywhere helping this destruction; an epoch in which the people voluntarily, on their own initiative, are becoming aware that they must—not on instructions from above, but on the instructions of their own living experience—change, this discipline based on the exploitation and slavery of the working people into the new discipline of united labour, the discipline of the united, organised workers and working peasants of the whole of Russia, of a country with a population of tens and hundreds of millions. This is a task of enormous difficulty, but it is also a thankful one, because only when we solve it in practice shall we have driven the last nail into the coffin of capitalist society which we are burying. (*Applause.*)

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APPEAL TO RAILWAY, WATER TRANSPORT AND METAL WORKERS[157]

Having heard the representatives of the railway and water transport organisations, and the representatives of workers of metallurgical factories and the trade union of railway workers,

and having heard the proposal of these comrades to permit their organisations, the Central Food Bureau of the Commissariat for Ways of Communication, the Food Commission of the Chief Water Board of the Commissariat for Ways of Communication, etc., to carry out independent procurements,

the Council of People's Commissars insistently calls the attention of all organised, class-conscious and thinking workers and working peasants to the obvious unreasonableness of such proposals. It is clear to everyone that permitting the Central Food Bureau of the Commissariat for Ways of Communication, and food commissions of the Chief Water Board, of the Chief Metal Board and of the Chief Rubber Board, etc., to carry out separate independent procurements would completely ruin the whole food undertaking, would destroy every and any state organisation of workers and poor peasants and clear the way for the victory of the kulaks and Skoropadskys.

All workers and starving peasants must understand that only by joint efforts, by organising hundreds and thousands of the best workers in common food detachments, only by throwing the united, combined, common, mass forces of the workers into the struggle for order, for bread, is it possible to overcome famine and disorder, and defeat the profiteers and kulaks.

It is foolish to believe those who request independent procurements for the Central Food Bureau of the Commissa-

riat for Ways of Communication, for the Food Commission of the Chief Water Board, heedless of the fact that in *each uyezd* of the non-agricultural gubernias there are *tens* and hundreds of *thousands* of starving peasants who for months have received no grain at all.

Does it not spell ruin if the peasants in each uyezd are allowed separate procurements? Is it really fair to give the Central Food Bureau of the Commissariat for Ways of Communication, as it wants, 60 millions for independent procurements, without giving each famine-stricken uyezd ten millions, without giving it independent procurements?

Each railway workshop, every thousand office workers or water transport workers or factory workers should put forward a detachment of the best and most reliable persons in order by their joint, combined efforts to promote the general workers' and peasants' cause, that of salvation from famine, of victory over famine.

Separate, independent procurements spell the ruin of the whole food undertaking, the ruin of the revolution, collapse and disintegration.

Enlisting the best and most devoted workers from each thousand workers and office employees into detachments to form a general working-class fighting force for inculcating order, for aid in supervising, for collecting all grain surpluses, for complete victory over profiteers—in that alone is, salvation.

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JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS', PEASANTS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES AND THE TRADE UNIONS[158]

JUNE 4, 1918

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REPORT ON COMBATING THE FAMINE
JUNE 4, 1918

Comrades, the subject I am about to speak of today is the great crisis which has overtaken all modern countries and which perhaps weighs most heavily on Russia, or, at any rate, is being felt by her far more severely than by other countries. I must speak of this crisis, the famine which has afflicted us, in conjunction with the problems that confront us as a result of the general situation. And when we speak of the general situation, we cannot of course confine ourselves to Russia, particularly as all countries of modern capitalist civilisation are now bound together more painfully and more distressingly than ever before.

Everywhere, both in the belligerent countries and in the neutral countries, the war, the imperialist war between two groups of gigantic plunderers, has resulted in an utter exhaustion of productive forces. Ruin and impoverishment have reached such a pitch that the most advanced, civilised and cultured countries, which for decades, nay for centuries, had not known what famine means, have been brought by the war to the point of famine in the genuine and literal sense of the term. It is true that in the advanced countries, especially in those in which large-scale capitalism has long since trained the population to the maximum level of economic organisation possible under that system, they have succeeded in properly distributing the famine, in keeping it longer at bay and in rendering it less acute. But Germany and Austria, for example, not to speak of the countries that have been defeated and enslaved, have for a long time been suffering from real starvation. We can now open

hardly a single issue of a newspaper without coming across numerous reports from a number of the advanced and cultured countries—not only belligerent, but also neutral countries, such as Switzerland and certain of the Scandinavian countries—regarding the famine and the terrible hardships that have overtaken humanity as a result of the war.

Comrades, for those who have been following the development of European society it has for long been indisputable that capitalism cannot end peacefully, and that it must lead either to a direct revolt of the broad masses against the yoke of capital or to the same result by the more painful and bloody way of war.

For many years prior to the war the socialists of all countries pointed out, and solemnly declared at their congresses, that not only would a war between advanced countries be an enormous crime, that not only would such a war, a war for the partition of the colonies and the division of the spoils of the capitalists, involve a complete rupture with the latest achievements of civilisation and culture, but that it might, that, in fact, it inevitably would, undermine the very foundations of human society. Because it is the first time in history that the most powerful achievements of technology have been applied on such a scale, so destructively and with such energy, for the annihilation of millions of human lives. When all means of production are being thus devoted to the service of war, we see that the most gloomy prophecies are being fulfilled, and that more and more countries are falling a prey to retrogression, starvation and a complete decline of all the productive forces.

I am therefore led to recall how justified Engels, one of the great founders of scientific socialism, was, when in 1887, thirty years before the Russian revolution, he wrote that a European war would not only result, as he expressed it, in crowns falling from crowned heads by the dozen without anybody to pick them up, but that this war would also lead to the brutalisation, degradation and retrogression of the whole of Europe; and that, on the other hand, war would result either in the domination of the working class or in the creation of the conditions which would render its domination indispensable.[159] On this occasion the co-founder of Marxism expressed himself with extreme caution,

for he clearly saw that if history took this course, the result would be the collapse of capitalism and the extension of socialism, and that a more painful and severe transition period, greater want and a severer crisis, disruptive of all productive forces, could not be imagined.

And we now clearly see the significance of the results of the imperialist slaughter of the peoples which has been dragging on for more than three years, when even the most advanced countries feel that the war has reached an impasse, that there is no escape from war under capitalism, and that it will lead to agonising ruin. And if we, comrades, if the Russian revolution—which is not due to any particular merit of the Russian proletariat but to the general course of historical events, which by the will of history has temporarily placed that proletariat in a foremost position and made it for the time being the vanguard of the world revolution—if it has befallen us to suffer particularly severe and acute agony from the famine, which is afflicting us more and more heavily, we must clearly realise that these misfortunes are primarily and chiefly a result of the accursed imperialist war. This war has brought incredible misfortunes on all countries, but these misfortunes are being concealed, with only temporary success, from the masses and from the knowledge of the vast majority of the peoples.

As long as military oppression continues, as long as the war goes on, as long as, on the one hand, it is accompanied by hopes of victory and a belief that this crisis may be resolved by the victory of one of the imperialist groups, and, on the other hand, an unbridled military censorship prevails and the people are intoxicated by the spirit of militarism, as long as this continues the mass of the population of the majority of the countries, will be kept in ignorance of the abyss into which they are about to fall and into which half of them have already fallen. And we are feeling this with particular intensity now, because nowhere but in Russia is there such a glaring contrast to the vastness of the tasks the insurgent proletariat has set itself, realising that it is impossible to end the war, the world war between the world's most powerful imperialist giants, that this war cannot be ended without a mighty proletarian revolution, also embracing the whole world.

And since the march of events has placed us in one of the most prominent positions in this revolution and forced us to remain for a long time, at least since October 1917, an isolated contingent, prevented by events from coming quickly enough to the aid of other contingents of international socialism, the position we find ourselves in is now ten times more severe. Having done all that can be done by the directly insurgent proletariat, and the poor peasantry supporting it, to overthrow our chief enemy and to protect the socialist revolution, we find nevertheless that at every step oppression by the imperialist predatory powers surrounding Russia and the legacy of the war are weighing on us more and more heavily. These consequences of the war have not yet made themselves fully felt. We are now, in the summer of 1918, facing what is perhaps one of the most difficult, one of the most severe and critical transitional stages of our revolution. And the difficulty is not confined to the international arena, where our policy is inevitably bound to be one of retreat as long as our true and only ally, the international proletariat, is only preparing, is only maturing, for revolt, but is not yet in a position to act openly and concertedly, although the whole course of events in Western Europe, the furious savagery of the recent battles on the Western front, the crisis which is growing increasingly acute in the belligerent countries, all go to show that the revolt of the European workers is not far off, and that although it may be delayed it will inevitably come.

It is in a situation like this that we have to experience enormous internal difficulties, owing to which considerable vacillations have been caused mainly by the acute food shortage, by the agonising famine which has overtaken us and which compels us to face a task demanding the maximum exertion of effort and the greatest organisation, and which at the same time cannot be tackled by the old methods. We shall undertake the solution of this problem together with the class that was with us in opposing the imperialist war, the class together with which we overthrew the imperialist monarchy and the imperialist republican bourgeoisie of Russia, the class that must forge its weapons, develop its forces and create its organisation in the midst

of increasing difficulties, increasing tasks and the increasing scope of the revolution.

We are now facing the most elementary task of human society—to vanquish famine, or at least to mitigate at once the direct famine, the agonising famine which has afflicted both our two principal cities and numerous districts of agricultural Russia. And we have to solve this problem in the midst of a civil war and the furious and desperate resistance of the exploiters of all ranks and colours and of all orientations. Naturally, in such a situation those elements in the political parties which cannot break with the old and cannot believe in the new find themselves in a state of war, which is being exploited for only one aim—to restore the exploiters.

The news we are receiving from every corner of Russia demands that we shall face this question, the connection between the famine and the fight against the exploiters, against the counter-revolution which is raising its head. The task confronting us is to vanquish the famine, or at least to mitigate its severities until the new harvest, to defend the grain monopoly and the rights of the Soviet state, the rights of the proletarian state. All grain surpluses must be collected; we must see to it that all stocks are brought to the places where they are needed and that they are properly distributed. This fundamental task means the preservation of human society; at the same time it involves incredible effort, it is a task which can be performed in only one way—by general and increased intensification of labour.

In the countries where this problem is being solved by means of war, it is being solved by military servitude, by instituting military servitude for the workers and peasants; it is being solved by granting new and greater advantages to the exploiters. In Germany, for instance, where public opinion is stifled, where every attempt to protest against the war is suppressed, but where a sense of reality, of socialist hostility to the war nevertheless persists, you will find no more common method of saving the situation than the rapid increase in the number of millionaires who have grown rich on the war. These new millionaires have been enriching themselves fantastically.

In all the imperialist countries the starvation of the masses offers a field for the most furious profiteering; incredible fortunes are being amassed on poverty and starvation.

This is encouraged by the imperialist countries, e.g., Germany, where starvation is organised best of all. And not without reason is it said that Germany is a centre of organised starvation, where rations and crusts of bread are distributed among the population better than anywhere else. We see there that new millionaires are a common feature of the imperialist state; indeed, they know no other way of combating starvation. They permit twofold, threefold and fourfold profits to be made by those who possess plenty of grain and who know how to profiteer and to turn organisation, rationing, regulation and distribution into profiteering. We do not wish to follow that course, no matter who urges us to do so, whether wittingly or unwittingly. We say that we have stood and shall continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with the class together with which we opposed the war, together with which we overthrew the bourgeoisie and together with which we are suffering the hardships of the present crisis. We must insist on the grain monopoly being observed, not so as to legitimise capitalist profiteering, large or small, but so as to combat deliberate racketeering.

And here we see greater difficulties and greater dangers than those that faced us when we were confronted by tsarism armed to the teeth against the people; or when we were confronted by the Russian bourgeoisie, which was also armed to the teeth, and which in the offensive of last June did not consider it a crime to shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of Russian workers and peasants while it kept in its pocket the secret treaties providing it with a share in the spoils, but which does consider it a crime for the toilers to wage war against the oppressors, the only just and sacred war, the war of which we spoke at the very outset of the imperialist slaughter and which events at every step are now inevitably associating with the famine.

We know that the tsarist autocracy from the very beginning instituted fixed prices for grain and raised those prices. Why not? It remained faithful to its allies, the

grain merchants, the profiteers and the banking magnates who made millions out of it.

We know how the compromisers of the Constitutional-Democratic Party—together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks—and Kerensky introduced a grain monopoly, because all Europe was saying that without a monopoly they could not hold out any longer. And we know how this same Kerensky in August 1917 evaded the democratic law of the time. That is what democratic laws and artfully interpreted regimes are for—to be evaded. We know that in August Kerensky doubled those prices and that at that time socialists of every shade and colour protested against and resented this measure. There was not a single newspaper at the time that was not outraged by Kerensky's conduct and that did not expose the fact that behind the republican Ministers, behind the Cabinet of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, were the manipulations of the profiteers, that the doubling of grain prices was a concession to the profiteers, that the whole business was nothing but a concession to the profiteers. We know that story.

We can now compare the course of the grain monopoly and of the fight against the famine in European capitalist countries with the course taken in our country. We see what use the counter-revolutionaries are making of these events. They are a lesson from which we must draw definite and rigorous conclusions. The crisis, having reached the pitch of a severe famine, has rendered the civil war still more acute. It has led to the exposure of parties like the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who differ from that avowed capitalist party, the Constitutional-Democrats, only in that the Constitutional-Democratic Party is an open party of the Black Hundreds. The Constitutional-Democrats have nothing to say and are not obliged to address themselves to the people, they are not obliged to conceal their aims, whereas these parties, who compromised with Kerensky and shared power and the secret treaties with him, are obliged to address themselves to the people. (*Applause.*) And so they are from time to time forced to expose themselves, despite their wishes and their plans.

When, as a result of the famine, we see on the one hand an outbreak of uprisings and revolts of starving people and

on the other a series of counter-revolutionary rebellions spreading like fire from one end of Russia to the other, obviously fed with funds from the Anglo-French imperialists, and aided by the efforts of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, we say to ourselves the picture is clear and we leave it to whoever so desires to dream of united fronts.

And we now see very clearly that after the Russian bourgeoisie was defeated in open military conflict, all the open collisions between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in the period from October 1917 to February and March 1918 proved to the counter-revolutionaries, even to the leaders of the Don Cossacks, in whom the greatest hopes had been placed, that their cause was lost, lost because everywhere the majority of the people were opposed to them. And every new attempt, even in the most patriarchal districts, where the agriculturists are most wealthy and most socially isolated, from the outside world, as, for instance, the Cossacks—every new attempt without exception has resulted in new sections of the oppressed toilers actually rising against them.

The experience of the civil war in the period from October to March has shown that the masses of the working people, the Russian working class and the peasants who live by their own labour and not by exploiting others, are all over Russia, the vast majority of them, in favour of Soviet power. But those who thought that we were already on the path of greater organic development have been obliged to admit that they were mistaken.

The bourgeoisie saw that it was defeated.... Then there came a split among the Russian petty bourgeoisie. Some of them are drawn towards the Germans, others towards the Anglo-French orientation, while both have this in common, that they are united by the famine orientation.

In order that it may be clear to you, comrades, that it is not our Party but its enemies and the enemies of Soviet power who are reconciling the German orientation and the Anglo-French orientation and uniting them on a common programme, viz., to overthrow the Soviet power as the result of famine—in order to make it clear how this is taking

place, I will take the liberty of briefly quoting from the report of the recent conference of the Mensheviks.[160] This report appeared in the newspaper *Zhizn*.[161] (*Commotion and applause.*)

From this report, printed in No. 26 of *Zhizn*, we learn that Cherevanin, who made a report on economic policy, criticised the policy of the Soviet government and proposed a compromise solution of the problem—to enlist the services of representatives of merchant capital, as practical businessmen, to act as commission agents on terms which would be very favourable for them. We learn from this report that the chairman of the Northern Food Board, Groman, who was present at the conference, announced the following conclusions, which he had arrived at, so that report states, on the basis of a vast store of personal and of all sorts of other observations—observations, I would add, made entirely in bourgeois circles. "Two methods," he said, "must be adopted: the first is that present prices must be raised; the second, that a special reward must be offered for prompt deliveries of grain," etc. (*Voice*: "What is wrong with that?") Yes, you will hear what is wrong with that, although the speaker, who has not been given the floor, but has taken it from that corner over there (*applause*), thinks he can convince you that there is nothing wrong with it. But he has presumably forgotten the course the Menshevik conference took. This same paper, *Zhizn*, states that Groman was followed by the delegate Kolokolnikov, who said the following: "We are being invited to participate in the Bolshevik food organisations." Very wrong, is it not? That is what we have to say, recalling the interjection of the previous speaker. And if this speaker, who refuses to calm down and is taking the floor although he has not been granted it, cries out that it is a lie and that Kolokolnikov did not say that, I take note of the statement and request you to repeat that denial coherently and so that all may hear you. I take the liberty of recalling the resolution proposed at the conference by Martov, who is not unknown to you, and which on the question of the Soviet government literally says the same thing, although in different terms and phrases. (*Commotion, shouting.*) Yes, you may laugh, but the fact remains that in connection with a

report on the food situation Menshevik representatives say that the Soviet government is not a proletarian organisation, that it is a useless organisation.

And at such a time, when counter-revolutionary uprisings are breaking out owing to the famine, and taking advantage of the famine, no denials and no tricks will avail, for the fact is obvious. We see the policy on this question effectively developed by Cherevanin, Groman and Kolokolnikov. The Civil War is reviving, counter-revolution is raising its head, and I am convinced that ninety-nine per cent of the Russian workers and peasants have drawn—although not everybody yet knows this—are drawing and will draw their conclusion from these events, and that this conclusion will be that only by smashing counter-revolution, only by continuing a socialist policy over the famine, to combat the famine, shall we succeed in vanquishing both the famine and the counter-revolutionaries who are taking advantage of the famine.

Comrades, we are in fact approaching a time when Soviet power, after a long and severe struggle against numerous and formidable counter-revolutionary enemies, has defeated them in open conflict, and, having overcome the military resistance of the exploiters and their sabotage, has come to grips with the task of organisation. This difficult struggle with famine, this tremendous problem is actually explained by the fact that we have now come directly face to face with a task of organisation.

Success in an uprising is infinitely more easy. It is a million times easier to defeat the resistance of counter-revolution than to succeed in the sphere of organisation. This particularly applies to the cases when we dealt with a task in which the insurgent proletarian and the small property-owner, i.e., the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, among whom there were many general-democratic and general-labour elements, could to a considerable extent act together. We have now passed from this task to another. Serious famine has driven us to a purely communist task. We are being confronted by a revolutionary socialist task. Incredible difficulties face us here.

We do not fear these difficulties. We were aware of them. We never said that the transition from capitalism to social-

ism would be easy. It will involve a whole period of violent civil war, it will involve taking painful measures, when the contingent of the insurgent proletariat in one country is joined by the proletariat of another country in order to correct their mistakes by joint efforts. The tasks that face us here are organisational tasks, concerned with articles of general consumption, concerned with the deepest roots of profiteering, which are connected with the upper strata of the bourgeois world and of capitalist exploitation, and which cannot be so easily removed by mere mass pressure. We have to deal here with the roots and runners of bourgeois exploitation, the shallow ones and those that have taken a deep or shallow hold in all countries in the form of the small property-owners, their whole system of life, and in the habits and sentiments of the small property-owner and the small master; we have to deal here with the small profiteer, with his unfamiliarity with the new system of life, his lack of faith in it and his despair.

For it is a fact that when they sensed the tremendous difficulties that confront us in the revolution, many members of the working masses gave way to despair. We do not fear that. There never has been a revolution anywhere in which certain sections of the population were not overcome by despair.

When the masses put up a certain disciplined vanguard, and that vanguard knows that this dictatorship, this firm government, will help to win over all the poor peasants—this is a long process, involving a stern struggle—it is the beginning of the socialist revolution in the true sense of the term. But when we see that the united workers and the mass of poor peasants, who were about to organise against the rich and the profiteers, against the people to whom intellectuals like Groman and Cherevanin are wittingly or unwittingly preaching profiteers' slogans, when these workers, led astray, advocate the free sale of grain and the importing of freight transport, we say that this means helping the kulaks out of a hole! That path we shall never take. We declare that we shall rely on the working elements, with the help of whom we achieved the October victory, and that only together with our own class, and only by establishing proletarian discipline among all sections of the work-

ing population, shall we be able to solve the historic tasks now confronting us.

We have vast difficulties to overcome. We shall have to gather up all surpluses and stocks, properly distribute them and properly organise transportation for tens of millions of people. We shall have to see that the work proceeds with the regularity of clockwork. We shall have to overcome the disruption which is being fostered by the profiteers and by the doubters, who are spreading panic. This task of organisation can be accomplished only by the class-conscious workers, meeting the practical difficulties face to face. It is worth devoting all one's energies to this task; it is worth engaging in this last, decisive fight. And in this fight we shall win. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, the recent decrees on the measures taken by the Soviet government[162] show us that the path of the proletarian dictatorship, as every socialist who is a real socialist can see, will obviously and undoubtedly involve severe trials.

The recent decrees deal with the fundamental problem of life—bread. They are all inspired by three guiding ideas. First, the idea of centralisation: the uniting of everybody for the performance of the common task under leadership from the centre. We must prove that we are serious and not give way to despondency, we must reject the services of the bag-traders and merge all the forces of the proletariat; for in the struggle against the famine we rely on the oppressed classes and we see the solution only in their energetic resistance to all exploiters, in uniting all their activities.

Yes, we are told that the grain monopoly is being undermined by bag-trading and profiteering on every hand. We frequently hear the intellectuals say that the bag-traders are helping us, are feeding us. Yes, but the bag-traders are feeding us on kulak lines: they are doing just what is needed to establish, strengthen and perpetuate the power of the kulaks, to enable those who have power to extend that power over those around them with the help of their profits and through various individuals. And we assert that if the forces of those whose chief sin at the present moment is their lack of belief were to be united, the fight would he considerably easier. If there ever existed a revolutionary who hoped that we could pass to the socialist system with

out difficulties, such a revolutionary, such a socialist, would not be worth a brass farthing.

We know that the transition from capitalism to socialism is a struggle of an extremely difficult kind. But we are prepared to overcome a thousand difficulties, we are prepared to make a thousand attempts; and having made a thousand attempts we shall go on to the next attempt. We are now enlisting all the Soviet organisations in this new creative life, we are getting them to display new energies. We count on overcoming the new difficulties with the help of new strata, by organising the poor peasants and now I shall pass to the second main task.

I have said that the first idea that runs through all these decrees is that of centralisation. Only by collecting all the grain in common bag shall we be able to overcome the famine. And even then grain will barely suffice. Nothing is left of Russia's former abundance, and all minds must be deeply imbued with communism, so that everybody regards surplus grain as the property of the people and is alive to the interests of the working people. And this can be achieved only by the method proposed by the Soviet government.

When they tell us of other methods, we reply as we did at the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.* When they talked of other methods, we said: Go to Skoropadsky, to the bourgeoisie. Teach them your methods, such as raising grain prices or forming a bloc with the kulaks. There you will find willing ears. But the Soviet government says only one thing, that the difficulties are immense and you must respond to every difficulty by new efforts of organisation and discipline. Such difficulties cannot be overcome in a single month. There have been cases in the history of nations when decades were devoted to overcoming smaller difficulties, and these decades have gone down in history as great and fruitful decades. You will never cause us to despond by referring to the failures of the first half-year or the first year of a great revolution. We shall continue to utter our old slogan of centralisation, unity and proletarian discipline on an all-Russia scale.

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* See this volume, pp. 365-81.—*Ed.*

When they say to us, as Groman says in his report, that "the detachments you have sent to collect grain are taking to drink and are themselves becoming moonshiners and robbers", we reply that we are fully aware how frequently this is the case. We do not conceal such facts, we do not whitewash them, we do not try to avoid them with pseudo-Left phrases and intentions. No, the working class is not separated by a Chinese wall from the old bourgeois society. And when a revolution takes place, it does not happen as in the case of the death of an individual, when the deceased is simply removed. When the old society perishes, its corpse cannot be nailed up in a coffin and lowered into the grave. It disintegrates in our midst; the corpse rots and infects us.

No great revolution has ever proceeded otherwise; no great revolution can proceed otherwise. The very things we have to combat in order to preserve and develop the sprouts of the new order in an atmosphere infested with the miasmas of a decaying corpse, the literary and political atmosphere, the play of political parties, which from the Constitutional-Democrats to the Mensheviks are infested with these miasmas of a decaying corpse, are all going to be used against us to put a spoke in our wheel. A socialist revolution can never be engendered in any other way; and not a single country can pass from capitalism to socialism except in an atmosphere of disintegrating capitalism and of painful struggle against it. And so we say that our first slogan is centralisation and our second slogan is the unity of the workers. Workers, unite and unite again! That is not new, it may not sound sensational or novel. It does not promise the specious successes with which you are being tempted by people like Kerensky, who in August 1917 doubled prices, just as the German bourgeois has raised them to twice and even ten times their level. These people promise you direct and immediate successes, as long as you offer new inducements to the kulaks. Of course that is not the road we shall follow. We say that our second method may be an old method, but it is a permanent method: Unite! (*Applause.*)

We are in a difficult situation. The Soviet Republic is perhaps passing through one of its most arduous periods. New strata of workers will come to our aid. We have no

police, we shall not have a special military caste, we have no other apparatus than the conscious unity of the workers. They will save Russia from her desperate and tremendously difficult situation. (*Applause.*) The workers must unite, workers' detachments must be organised, the hungry people from the non-agricultural districts must be organised—it is to them we turn for help, it is to them our Commissariat for Food appeals, it is they we call upon to join the crusade for bread, the crusade against the profiteers and the kulaks and for the restoration of order.

A crusade used to be a campaign in which physical force was supplemented by faith in something which centuries ago people were compelled by torture to regard as sacred. But we desire, we think, we are convinced, we know that the October Revolution has led the advanced workers and the advanced representatives of the poor peasants to regard the preservation of their power over the landowners and capitalists as sacred. (*Applause.*) They know that physical force is not enough to influence the masses of the population. We need physical force because we are building a dictatorship, we are applying force to the exploiters, and we shall cast aside with contempt all who fail to understand this, so as not to waste words in talking about the form of socialism. (*Applause.*)

We say that a new historical task is confronting us. We must get the new historical class to understand that we need detachments of agitators from among the workers. We need workers from the various uyezds of the non-producing gubernias. We need them to go thence as conscious advocates of Soviet power; they must sanctify and legitimise our food war, our war against the kulaks, our war against disorders; they must make possible the carrying on of socialist propaganda; they must establish in the countryside the distinction between the poor and the rich, which every peasant can understand and which is a profound source of our strength. It is a source which it is difficult to get to flow at full pressure, because the exploiters are numerous. And these exploiters resort to the most varied methods in order to subjugate the masses, such as bribing the poor peasants by permitting the latter to make money out of illicit distilling or to make a profit of several rubles on every ruble by selling at profiteering prices. Such are the methods to which

the kulaks and the rural bourgeoisie resort in order to establish their hold over the masses.

We cannot blame the poor peasants for this, for we know that they have been enslaved for hundreds, thousands of years, that they have suffered from serfdom and from the system which was left by serfdom in Russia. Our approach to the poor peasants must consist not only in the guns directed against the kulaks, but also in the propaganda of enlightened workers who bring the strength of their organisation into the countryside. Representatives of the poor, unite!—that is our third slogan. This is not making advances to the kulaks, and it is not the senseless method of raising prices. If we were to double prices, they would say: "They are raising prices. They are hungry. Wait a bit, they will raise prices still higher."

It is a well-trodden path, this path of playing up to the kulaks and profiteers. It is easy to take this path and to hold out tempting prospects. Intellectuals, who call themselves socialists, are quite prepared to paint such prospects for us; and the number of such intellectuals is legion. But we say to you: "You who wish to follow the Soviet government, you who value it and regard it as a government of the working people, as a government of the exploited class, on you we call to follow another path". This new historical task is a difficult thing. If we accomplish it, we shall raise a new stratum, give a new form of organisation to those sections of the working and exploited people, who are mostly downtrodden and ignorant, who are least united and have still to be united.

All over the world the foremost contingents of the workers of the cities, the industrial workers, have united, and united unanimously. But hardly anywhere in the world have systematic, supreme and self-sacrificing attempts been made to unite those who are engaged in small-scale agricultural production and, because they live in remote out-of-the-way places and in ignorance, have been stunted by their conditions of life. The task that faces us here unites for a single purpose both the fight against the food shortage and the fight for the profound and important system of socialism. The fight for socialism which faces us now is one to which it is worth devoting all our energies, for which it is worth

staking everything, because it is a fight for socialism (*applause*), because it is a fight for the state power of the working and exploited people.

In following this path we shall regard the working peasants as our allies. Solid achievements await us along this path, not only solid, but inalienable. That is our third significant slogan!

Such are the three fundamental slogans: centralisation of food work, unity of the proletariat and organisation of the poor peasants. And our appeal, the appeal of our Commissariat for Food, to every trade union, to every factory committee, says: Life is hard for you, comrades; then help us, join your efforts to ours, punish every breach of the regulations, every evasion of the grain monopoly. It is a difficult task; but fight bag-trading, profiteering and the kulaks, again and again, a hundred times, a thousand times, and we shall win. For this is the path on to which the majority of the workers are being led by the whole course of their lives and by the severity of our failures and trials in the matter of food supply. They know that, whereas when there was still no absolute shortage of grain in Russia the shortcomings of the food supply organisations were corrected by individual and isolated actions, this can no longer be the case now. Only the joint effort and the unity of those who are suffering most in the hungry cities and gubernias can help us. That is the path the Soviet government is calling on you to follow—unity of the workers, of their vanguard, for the purpose of carrying on agitation in the villages and of waging a war for grain against the kulaks.

According to the calculations of the most cautious experts, not far from Moscow, in gubernias quite close by—Kursk, Orel and Tambov—there is still a surplus of up to ten million poods of grain. We are very far from being able to collect this surplus for the common state fund.

Let us set about this task energetically. Let an enlightened worker go to every factory where despair is temporarily in the ascendant, and where, driven by hunger, people are prepared to accept the specious slogans of those who are reverting to the methods of Kerensky, to an increase of the fixed prices, and let him say: "We see people who are despairing of the Soviet government. Join our detachments of

militant agitators. Do not be dismayed by the many cases in which these detachments have disintegrated and turned to drink. We shall use every such example to show not that the working class is not fit, but that the working class has still not rid itself of the shortcomings of the old predatory society and cannot rid itself of them at once. Let us unite our efforts, let us form dozens of detachments, let us combine their activities, and in this way we shall get rid of our shortcomings."

Comrades, allow me in conclusion to draw your attention to some of the telegrams which are being received by the Council of People's Commissars and particularly by our Commissariat for Food.

Comrades, in this matter of the food crisis, of the torments of hunger that are afflicting all our cities, we observe that, as the proverb says, ill news hath wings. I should like to read you certain documents which were received by Soviet government bodies and institutions after the issue of the decree of May 13 on the food dictatorship, in which it is stated that we continue to rely only on the proletariat. The telegrams indicate that in the provinces they have already started to organise the crusade against the kulaks and to organise the rural poor, as we proposed. The telegrams we have received are proof of this.

Let the Cherevanins and the Gromans blow their trumpets, let their raucous voices sow panic and demand the destruction and abolition of the Soviet government! Those who are hard at work will be least disturbed by this; they will see the facts, they will see that the work is progressing and that new ranks are forming and uniting.

A new form of struggle against the kulaks is emerging, namely, an alliance of the poor peasants, who need assistance and who need to be united. It is proposed that awards be given for deliveries of grain, and we must help. We are willing to make such awards to the poor peasants, and we have already begun to do so. But against the kulaks, the criminals who are subjecting the population to the torments of hunger, and on account of whom millions of people are suffering, against them we shall use force. We shall give every possible inducement to the rural poor, for they are entitled to it. The poor peasant has for the first time

obtained access to the good things of life, and we see that he is living more meagerly than the worker. We shall encourage and give every possible inducement to the poor peasants and shall help them if they help us to organise the collection of grain, to secure grain from the kulaks. We must spare no resources to make that a reality in Russia.

We have already adopted this course, and it will be still further developed by the experience of every enlightened worker and by the new detachments.

Comrades, the work has been started and is progressing. We do not expect dazzling success, but success there certainly will be. We know that we are now entering a period of new destruction, one of the most severe and difficult periods of the revolution. We are not in the least surprised that counter-revolution is raising its head, that the number of waverers and despairers in our ranks is growing. We say: stop your wavering; abandon your despair, of which the bourgeoisie will take advantage, because it is in its interests to sow panic; get to work; with our food decrees and our plan based on the support of the poor peasants we are on the only right road. In the face of the new historical tasks we call upon you to make a new exertion of effort. This task is an infinitely difficult one, but, I repeat, it is an extremely rewarding one. We are here fighting for the basis of communist distribution and for the actual creation of the foundations of a communist society. Let us all set to work. We shall vanquish the famine and achieve socialism. (*Applause.*)

2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON COMBATING THE FAMINE JUNE 4, 1918

Comrades, the speeches of the representatives of the various groups have, in my opinion, shown what might have been expected.

Notwithstanding the differences that exist between the Bolsheviks and certain other parties and groups, we have convinced ourselves that the tremendous enthusiasm of the masses is uniting them in the struggle against the famine, and not only the Bolshevik organisations. And we have no doubt that the further the struggle against the famine proceeds and the more the counter-revolutionaries hiding behind the Czechoslovak and other bands show their faces, the more actively will the supporters of the Bolsheviks—the workers and the working peasant masses—dissociate themselves from those enemies, whatever they may call themselves, whose arguments we are disputing. These enemies go on using the old, hackneyed arguments about the Brest peace and the civil war, as though during the three months that have elapsed since the Brest peace was concluded events had not convincingly borne out the views of those who said that only the tactics of the Communists could bring the people peace and leave them free for the work of organising and uniting their forces in preparation for the new and great wars which are now about to take place, this time under different conditions. The events fully show that the European proletariat, which at that time was not yet in a position to come to our aid, is now with every month—that can be said today without exaggeration—approaching

the point when the necessity for revolt will be fully realised and revolt become inevitable. Events have fully shown that we had only one choice, namely, to accept a forced and predatory peace.

Every thinking person felt that the resolution moved by the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries at the Fourth Congress of Soviets was counter-revolutionary[163]; and every thinking person must feel the same about the resolution of the Mensheviks, who to this day keep crying, "Down with the Brest peace!" and who pretend they do not know that in doing so they actually want to embroil us in a war with the German bourgeoisie through the Czechoslovak mutineers[164] and agents hired for the purpose.

It is not worth while dwelling on the accusations that the Communists are responsible for the famine. We had the same thing during the October Revolution. No socialist or anarchist, call him what you will, who has not taken leave of his senses will venture to get up at any meeting and assert that socialism can be reached without civil war.

You may examine all the publications of all the more or less responsible socialist parties, factions and groups, and you will not find a single responsible and serious socialist saying anything so absurd as that socialism can ever come except through civil war, or that the landowners and capitalists will voluntarily surrender their privileges. That would be naïve to the point of stupidity. And now, after the bourgeoisie and its supporters have suffered a number of defeats, we hear admissions like that of Bogayevsky, for example, who on the Don had the best soil in Russia for counter-revolution, but who has also admitted that the majority of the people are against them—and therefore no subversive activities of the bourgeoisie will be of any avail without the aid of foreign bayonets. Yet the Bolsheviks are being attacked here for the civil war. That is tantamount to going over to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, no matter what slogans are used to mask the fact.

As before the revolution, so now, we say that when international capital throws war on to the scales of history, when hundreds of thousands of people are perishing, and when war is remoulding people's habits and accustoming them to

settle issues by armed force, to think that we can emerge from the war in any other way than by converting it into a civil war is more than strange. And what is brewing in Austria, in Italy, in Germany shows that civil war in those countries will assume even keener forms, will be even more acute. There is no other way for socialism; and whoever wages war on socialism, betrays socialism completely.

As to food measures, it has been said that I have not dwelt on them in detail. But that was not part of my task. The report on the food question has been made by my colleagues,[165] who have been specially working on that problem, and doing so not for months but for years, studying it not only in the offices of Petrograd and Moscow, but in the provinces, and making a practical study of how to store grain, how to fit up the granaries, and so on. These reports were made to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and to the Moscow Soviet, and there you will find the material on the subject. As to specific criticism and practical recommendations, that was not part of my task. My task was to outline the principles of the problem that faces us, and I have not heard here any criticism worthy of any attention or any sensible objection worthy of examination from the standpoint of principle. And let me say in conclusion, comrades, that I am convinced, in fact I am sure, that this will be the conviction of the vast majority, for the purpose of our meeting is not to adopt a definite resolution—although, of course, that, too, is important, because it will show that the proletariat is capable of uniting its forces; but this is not enough, it is very, very far from enough—what we have to do now is to tackle practical problems.

We know, and our worker comrades know it especially, that at every step in practical life, in every factory, at every meeting, at every chance gathering in the streets, this same question of the famine is brought up, and in ever more acute forms. And therefore our chief task should be to make this meeting, too, where we have assembled with representatives from the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and the trade unions, the starting-point for a radical change in all our practical work. Everything else must be entirely subordinated to the success of our propaganda, agitation and organisational work

in combating famine, that must be put before everything else and completely merged with the proletarian and ruthlessly firm war on the kulaks and profiteers.

Our Commissariat for Food has already appealed to the factory committees, the trade unions and the big proletarian centres, where we are operating directly, to those close and numerous links which unite the Moscow workers with hundreds of thousands of organised factory workers in all the big industrial districts.

All the more must we make use of them.

The situation is critical. Famine is not only threatening, it is already upon us. Every worker, every Party functionary must at once make it his practical job to change the fundamental trend of his activities.

Out into the factories, among the masses, all of you! Tackle the practical job at once! It will give us a host of practical hints as to far more fertile methods, and at the same time will help to discover and promote new forces. With the aid of these new forces we shall launch the work on a broad scale, and we are firmly convinced that the three months, which will be far more difficult than the preceding ones, will serve to steel our forces and will lead us to complete victory over famine and help to realise all the plans of the Soviet government. (*Applause.*)

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT ON COMBATING THE FAMINE JUNE 4, 1918[166]

This joint meeting draws the attention of all workers and working peasants to the fact that the famine which has overtaken many parts of the country demands of us the most vigorous and determined measures to combat this calamity.

The enemies of Soviet power, the landowners, capitalists and kulaks and their numerous hangers-on, want to take advantage of the calamity to engineer revolts, aggravate the chaos and disorder, overthrow the Soviet government, resurrect the old system of servitude and slavery for the working people, and restore the power of the landowners and capitalists, as has been done in the Ukraine.

Only the utmost exertion of all the efforts of the working class and the working peasantry can save the country from famine and safeguard the gains of the revolution from the attacks of the exploiting classes.

This joint meeting considers that the firm policy pursued by the Soviet government in combating the famine is an absolutely correct policy and the only correct one.

Only the strictest revolutionary order in every sphere of activity, and especially on the railways and in the water transport system, only the strictest discipline among the workers, and their self-sacrificing aid in the form of detachments of agitators and fighters against the bourgeoisie and the kulaks, and only the independent organisation of the rural poor can save the country and the revolution.

This joint meeting urgently appeals to all workers and peasants to set about this work, and by concerted and united effort to vanquish chaos, disorder and unco-ordinated effort.

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF INTERNATIONALIST TEACHERS[167] JUNE 5, 1918

BRIEF REPORT

(*The Congress gave Lenin a rousing welcome.*) Lenin greeted the Congress on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and said that the teachers, who had at first been rather slow in making up their minds to work with the Soviet government, were now growing more and more convinced that such collaboration was essential. Such cases of conversion from opposition to support of the Soviet government were very numerous among other sections of society too.

The army of teachers must set themselves tremendous tasks in the educational sphere, and above all must form the main army of socialist education. Life and knowledge must be liberated from the sway of capital, from the yoke of the bourgeoisie. The teachers must not confine themselves to narrow pedagogical duties. They must join forces with the entire body of the embattled working people. The task of the new pedagogics was to link up teaching activities with the socialist organisation of society.

It had to be admitted that the majority of the intellectuals of the old Russia were downright opponents of the Soviet regime, and there was no doubt that it would be not at all easy to overcome the difficulties this involved. The process of fermentation among the broad mass of the teachers had only just begun, and no schoolteacher who had the welfare of the people sincerely at heart could confine himself to the All-Russia Teachers' Union, but must confidently carry his

propaganda among the masses. This road would lead to a joint struggle of the proletariat and the teachers for the victory of socialism. (*Lenin left the hall amidst general applause.*)

Newspaper report published on June 6, 1918 in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 114,

Published according to the text of the *Transactions* of the *All-Russia Union of Internationalist Teachers* No. 1, 1918

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN AND A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

TSARITSYN
TO PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS STALIN AND SHLYAPNIKOV

I have received Stalin's third telegram and note. We are taking all measures. Tsyurupa says money will be sent tomorrow without fail, and orders have been given for the goods to be loaded today. Send through trains with a triple guard. Arrest saboteurs and hooligans and send them here.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Lenin

Written not later than June 11, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Published according to the manuscript

FOOD DETACHMENTS[168]

SPEECH AT WORKERS' MEETINGS IN MOSCOW JUNE 20, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

From my visits to working-class areas in Moscow I have gained the firm conviction that the idea of the need to form food detachments has spread through the entire mass of the workers. A "distrustful" attitude is shown only by the print workers, who usually live better than the other workers, paid for by the bourgeoisie which is poisoning the minds of the poor with its newspaper slanders. The class-conscious attitude of the broad mass of the workers to such a basic issue of the Russian revolution as the struggle against famine gives me grounds for believing that socialist Russia will successfully survive all temporary failures and the devastation of the old regime. Even if we do not succeed in speedily dealing with the Czechoslovaks (which is most improbable), the large stocks of grain hidden by the kulaks in Voronezh, Orel and Tambov gubernias will enable us to get through the last two difficult months before the new harvest. The food problem is the most urgent problem of our revolution. All workers without exception must understand that the struggle for grain is their own vital concern.

The task undertaken by the food detachments is only that of helping to collect grain surpluses from the kulaks, and not (as our enemies are trying in advance to frighten the countryside into believing) to plunder all and sundry in the countryside.... Manufactured goods, thread and household and agricultural articles will definitely be provided in return for grain.

Steps will be taken to make it impossible for the detachments sent to the countryside to be joined by hooligans and swindlers, who always endeavour to fish in muddy waters. It is better to send fewer people, but ones who are suitable for the job.

It is true there have been cases of detachments being infiltrated by unstable, weak-willed workers, whom the kulaks have bribed with home-distilled vodka. But attention has been paid to this.... It is necessary to have accurate information of the past history of every worker going with a detachment. Inquiries must be made in the factory committee, the trade union and also in Party cells, as to the personal character of everyone whom the working class entrusts with such an important task.

Party comrades in many factories are unwilling to accept "non-Party" people in the detachment. This is quite wrong. A person who is "non-Party", but completely honest and with no stain on his reputation, can be a very valuable comrade in the starving people's campaign for grain.

To class-conscious detachments of this kind the Council of People's Commissars will give the broadest assistance by providing money and manufactured goods, and also arms.

What matters is that the workers should actively and with the utmost speed take up their own vital cause—the struggle against famine!...

Bednota No. 69,
June 21, 1918

Published according to
the *Bednota* text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN THE SOKOLNIKI CLUB JUNE 21, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Our Party has decided to hold as many public meetings today in Moscow as possible with the object of drawing the attention of the working class to the situation in which the Soviet government is placed and to the efforts it will have to make in order to cope successfully with the present situation.

You know that in these past few months, and even weeks, counter-revolution has raised its head. The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks are accusing the Soviet government of betraying Russia to the German imperialists.

However, we are perfectly aware of what has been taking place in the Caucasus, where the Caucasian Mensheviks have concluded an alliance with the Turkish imperialists, and in the Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Right Socialist-Revolutionaries have concluded an alliance with the German imperialists. And what is more, comrades, not only have they reduced all the achievements of Soviet power to naught in these regions, not only are they arresting and shooting workers, not only have they deprived them of all their gains, but they have even set a Skoropadsky in the saddle. These measures, of course, will not win them the sympathy of the working class. That is why the counter-revolutionaries are now trying to make the most out of the fatigue of the Russian people, out of the famine. They are making a last attempt to overthrow the Soviet government.

Now they are clutching at the Czechoslovaks, who, it should be said, are by no means hostile to the Soviet

government. It is not the Czechoslovaks, but their counter-revolutionary officers who are hostile to the Soviet government. With the help of these officers, the imperialists are trying to drag Russia into the world slaughter which is still going on.

And it is a characteristic thing that wherever the power passes into the hands of the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, we at once find that they want to bestow upon us some Skoropadsky or other. And as soon as the masses realise where the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries have led them, the latter are left without the support of the masses.

They are left without support. Then, as a last hope, they begin to speculate on famine, and when that too fails, they do not shrink even from treacherous assassination.

You all know that Comrade Volodarsky, an old Party worker, who paid for his convictions by suffering and hardships, has been assassinated. It is quite possible of course that they may succeed in assassinating a few more active members of the Soviet government, but that will only serve to anchor it in the affections of the masses and rouse us to hold on even more firmly to our gains.

Today there are two factors which render the position of the Soviet Republic particularly grave: famine and the international situation.

The international situation is grave because the German, French and British imperialists are only waiting for an opportune moment to fling themselves once more on the Soviet Republic. The task of our Party is to throw off the yoke of capitalism; this can only be done by an international revolution. But, comrades, you must realise that revolutions are not made to order. We realise that the position of the Russian Republic is that the Russian working class has been the first to succeed in throwing off the yoke of capital and the bourgeoisie, and we realise that it has succeeded in this, not because it is more advanced and perfect than others, but because our country is a most backward one.

Capitalism will be finally overthrown when at least a few other countries join in this assault. And we know that in all countries, in spite of a most rigorous censorship, we have succeeded in this much, that at all meetings the mere

mention of the Communist Party and of the Russian Republic evokes an outburst of enthusiasm. (*Loud applause.*)

And we say that as long as the world carnage continues over there in the West, we are secure. Whatever the consequences of the war may be, it is bound to call forth revolution, which will be, and is, our ally.

After describing the grave position of Soviet Russia, surrounded as it is by enemies without and attacked by counter-revolution at home, Lenin passed to the subject of the famine.

Our revolution strikes terror into the imperialist classes, for they are clearly aware that their existence depends on whether capitalism manages to hold on or not, and we must therefore stand fast and march shoulder to shoulder with the class with which we won the October Revolution.

It is with this same class that we are marching in the fight against the famine.

From now on, for one, one and a half or two months—the most difficult of all—we must exert all of our strength and energies.

There have been moments in the life of nations before now when state power passed into the hands of the working class; but it was never able to retain it. We, however, can retain it, for we have our Soviet government, which unites a working class that has taken its cause into its own hands.

However grave our position may be, whatever plots the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Czechoslovaks may hatch, we know that there is grain available even in the provinces surrounding the capital. And we must secure this grain by preserving and strengthening the alliance between the working class and the poor peasants.

Detachments of Red Army men leave the capital with the best intentions in the world, but, on arriving at their destination, they sometimes succumb to the temptations of looting and drunkenness. For this we have to blame the four years of carnage, which kept men in the trenches for so long and compelled them to slaughter each other like wild beasts. This bestiality is to be observed in all countries. Years will pass before men cease to act like beasts and resume human shape.

We appeal to the workers to let us have men.

PROPERTY OF MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

When I read a report to the effect that in Usman Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, a food detachment turned over to the poor peasants 3,000 of the 6,000 poods of grain it had requisitioned, I declare that even if you were to prove to me that to this day there has been only one such detachment in Russia, I should still say that the Soviet government is doing its job.[169] For in no other country in the world will you find such a detachment! (*Loud applause.*)

The bourgeoisie is fully conscious of its interests and is doing its utmost to safeguard them. It knows that if this autumn, for the first time in many centuries, the peasants reap the fruits of their own labour in the shape of the crop, and keep the working class of the town supplied, all its hopes of restoration will collapse and the Soviet government will be strengthened. That is why the bourgeoisie is now displaying such feverish activity.

We must bend all our efforts to combat the rich peasants, the profiteers and the urban bourgeoisie.

One of the greatest drawbacks of our revolution is the timidity of our workers, who are still convinced that the only people capable of governing the state are their "betters"—their betters in the art of robbery.

But there are fine workers in every mill and factory. No matter if they do not belong to the Party—you must weld them together and unite them, and the state will do everything in its power to help them in their difficult work, (*Loud applause.*)

Izvestia VTsIK No. 127 and 128, June 22 and 23, 1918; *Pravda* No. 126, June 23, 1918

Published according to the *Izvestia* text, collated with the *Pravda* text

ORGANISATION OF FOOD DETACHMENTS[170]

In view of the fact that it is too late to send a delegate from the Commissariat for Food to the Congress, I request you to bring the following to the attention of the Congress. Delegates to the Congress who support the Soviet government should remember, firstly, that the grain monopoly is being enforced simultaneously with a monopoly on textiles and on other staple articles of general consumption, and, secondly, that the demand for the abolition of the grain monopoly is a political move on the part of counter-revolutionary strata, who are endeavouring to wrench from the hands of the revolutionary proletariat the system of monopoly regulation of prices, one of the most important implements for the gradual transition from capitalist exchange of commodities to socialist exchange of products. Explain to the Congress that as a method of combating the food shortage the abolition of the monopoly would be not only useless but harmful, as is shown by the Ukraine, where Skoropadsky has abolished the grain monopoly and as a result profiteering in grain has within a few days achieved such proportions that the Ukrainian proletariat is now suffering from famine far more acutely than under the monopoly.

Point out that the only effective method of increasing bread rations is contained in the decision of the Council of People's Commissars to requisition grain forcibly from the kulaks and to distribute it among the poor of the cities -and the countryside. This requires that the poor shall much more rapidly and resolutely enlist in the food army which is being created by the People's Commissariat for Food.

Propose that the Congress immediately start agitating among the workers to enlist ill the food army formed by the

Penza Soviet of Deputies and to abide by the following rules:

1) Every factory shall provide one person for every twenty-five of its workers.

2) Registration of those desiring to enlist in the food army shall be conducted by the factory committee, which shall draw up a list of the names of those mobilised, in two copies, one of which it shall deliver to the People's Commissariat for Food while retaining the other.

3) To the list must be attached a guarantee given by the factory committee, or by the trade union organisation, or by a Soviet body, or by responsible representatives of Soviet organisations, testifying to the personal honesty and revolutionary discipline of every candidate. Members of the food army must be selected so that there will not in future be a single stain on the names of those who are setting out for the villages to combat the handful of predatory kulaks and save millions of toilers from starvation.

Comrades, workers, only if this condition is observed will it be obvious to all that the requisition of grain from the kulaks is not robbery but the fulfilment of a revolutionary duty to the worker and peasant masses who are fighting for socialism!

4) In every factory those mobilised shall elect a representative from their midst to perform all the organisational measures necessary for the actual enrolment of the candidates of the factory as members of the food army by the People's Commissariat.

5) Those enrolled in the army shall receive their former pay as well as food and equipment from the date of actual enlistment.

6) Those enrolled in the army shall give a pledge that they will unreservedly carry out any instructions that may be given by the People's Commissariat for Food when the detachments leave for their place of operation, and that they will obey the commissars of the detachments.

I am certain that if convinced socialists loyal to the October Revolution are placed at the head of the food requisition detachments, they will be able to organise Poor Peasants' Committees[171] and by their concerted action

succeed in taking grain from the kulaks even without resort to armed force.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

June 27, 1918 *Lenin*

Published on July 1918
in the magazine *Bulletin of the People's Commissariat for Food* No. 10-11

Published according to the magazine text

FOURTH CONFERENCE OF TRADE UNIONS AND FACTORY COMMITTEES OF MOSCOW[172]

JUNE 27-JULY 2, 1918

Brief reports published on
June 28, 1918 in *Pravda* No. 130
and *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 132

Full report published in 1918
in the book: *Minutes
of the Fourth Conference
of Factory Committees
and Trade Unions of Moscow*,
A.C.C.T.U. Publishers

Published according to
the text of the book,
collated with the verbatim report

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1

REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION
JUNE 27, 1918

Comrades, you all know, of course, of the great disaster that has befallen our country, namely, famine. Before discussing the measures to be adopted to combat this disaster, which has now become more acute than ever, we must first of all discuss its main causes. In discussing this question we must say to ourselves, and remember, that this disaster has befallen not only Russia, but all, even the most cultured, advanced and civilised countries.

In Russia, where the overwhelming majority of the peasantry were ruined and oppressed by the yoke of the tsars, the landowners and capitalists, famine more than once in the past few decades affected whole regions of our agrarian country. And it has affected us particularly now, during the revolution. But this disaster reigns also in the West-European countries. Many of these countries had not known what famine was for decades and even centuries, so highly was agriculture developed there, and to such an extent were those European countries which could not produce a sufficient supply of grain of their own assured of an enormous quantity of imported grain. But now, in the twentieth century, side by side with still greater progress in technology, side by side with wonderful inventions, side by side with the wide application of machinery and electricity, of modern internal combustion engines in agriculture, side by side with all this we now see this same disaster of famine advancing upon the people in all European countries without exception. It would seem that despite civilisation, despite culture, the countries are once again returning

to primitive savagery are again experiencing a situation when morals deteriorate and people become brutalised in the struggle for a crust of bread. What has caused this return to savagery in a number of European countries, in the majority of them? We all know that it has been caused by the imperialist war, by the war which has been torturing humanity for four years, a war which has already cost the peoples more, far more than ten million young lives, a war which was called forth by the avarice of the capitalists, a war which is being waged to decide which of the great robbers—the British or the German—shall rule the world, acquire colonies and strangle the small nations.

This war, which has affected almost the whole of the globe, which has destroyed not less than ten million lives, not counting the millions of maimed, crippled and sick, this war which, in addition, has torn millions of the healthiest and best forces from productive labour—this war has reduced humanity to a state of absolute savagery. What numerous socialist writers foresaw as the worst, most painful and most unbearable end of capitalism has come to pass. They said: capitalist society, based on the private ownership of the land, the factories and tools by a handful of capitalists, of monopolists, will be transformed into socialist society, which alone is capable of putting an end to war, because the "civilised", "cultured" capitalist world is heading for unprecedented bankruptcy, which is capable of undermining and will inevitably undermine all the foundations of cultured life. I repeat, we see famine not only in Russia, but in the most cultured, advanced countries, like Germany, where the productivity of labour is incomparably greater, which can supply the world with more than a sufficiency of technical appliances, and which, still maintaining free intercourse with remote countries, can supply her population with food. The famine there is incomparably better "organised", it is spread over a longer period than in Russia, but it is famine nevertheless, still more severe and more painful than here. Capitalism has led to such a severe and painful disaster that it is now perfectly clear to all that the present war cannot end without a number of most severe and bloody revolutions, of which the Russian revolution was only the first, only the beginning.

You have now received news to the effect that in Vienna for example, an *Arbeiterrat* has been established for the second time, and for the second time the working population have come out on an almost general mass strike.[173] We hear that in cities like Berlin, which up to now have been models of capitalist order, culture and civilisation, it is becoming dangerous to go out into the street after dark, because, in spite of the very severe measures and the very strict guard that is kept, the war and famine have reduced people to such a state of absolute savagery, have led to such anarchy, have roused such indignation, that not merely the sale, but downright looting, an actual war for a crust of bread, is becoming the order of the day in all cultured, civilised countries.

Hence, comrades, since a painful and difficult situation has been created in our country as a consequence of the famine, we must explain to the few absolutely blind and ignorant people (though few, they do still exist) the main and principal causes of the famine. We can still meet people in our country who argue in this way: but under the tsar we had bread; the revolution has come and there is no bread. Naturally, it is quite possible that for some old village women the development of history during the past ten years is summed up entirely by the fact that formerly there was bread and now there is none. This is comprehensible, because famine is a disaster which sweeps away all other questions, which takes its place as the cornerstone, and overrules everything else. But it goes without saying that our task, the task of the class-conscious workers, is to explain to the broad masses, to explain to all the representatives of the working masses in town and country the principal cause of the famine; for unless we explain this we shall not be able to create a proper attitude either among ourselves or among the representatives of the working masses, we shall not be able to create a proper understanding of its harmfulness and we shall not be able to create that firm determination and temper that is required to combat this disaster. If we remember that this disaster was caused by the imperialist war, that today even the richest countries are experiencing unprecedented food shortages and that the overwhelming majority of the working masses are suffering incredible torture; if

we remember that for four years already this imperialist war has been compelling the workers of the various countries to shed their blood for the benefit of the greedy capitalists, and if we remember that the longer the war lasts, the fewer become the ways out of it, we will understand what gigantic, immense forces will have to be set moving.

The war has lasted nearly four years. Russia has come out of the war, and owing to the fact that she has come out of the war alone she has found herself between two gangs of imperialist plunderers, each of which is clutching at her, strangling her and taking advantage of her temporary defencelessness and lack of arms. The war has already lasted four years. The German imperialist plunderers have achieved a number of victories and continue to deceive their workers, a section of whom, bribed by the bourgeoisie, have deserted to the side of the German imperialists and continue to repeat the despicable lie about the defence of the fatherland when as a matter of fact the German soldiers are defending the selfish predatory interests of the German capitalists who have promised them that Germany will bring peace and prosperity. Actually we see that the more extensive Germany's victories become the more the hopelessness of her position is revealed.

When the forced, exploiters' peace of Brest, a peace based upon violence and the oppression of peoples, was concluded, Germany, the German capitalists boasted that they would give the workers bread and peace. But now they are reducing the bread ration in Germany. It is universally admitted that the food campaign in the rich Ukraine has been a failure. In Austria the situation has again reached the stage of hunger riots, of nation-wide outbursts of indignation, because the more Germany is victorious the clearer it becomes to all, even to many representatives of the big bourgeoisie in Germany, that the war is hopeless. They are beginning to realise that even if the Germans are able to maintain their resistance on the Western front it will not bring the end of the war any nearer but will create another enslaved country which will have to be occupied by German troops and make it necessary to continue the war; and this will lead to the disintegration of the German army, which is being transformed from an army into a gang of plunderers

violating foreign peoples, unarmed peoples, and extracting from their countries the last remnants of food supplies and raw materials in the face of tremendous resistance from the population. The closer Germany approaches the outer frontiers of Europe the clearer it becomes that she is confronted by Britain and America, which are far more developed than she is, which have greater productive forces, which have had time to dispatch tens of thousands of the best new forces to Europe, and to transform all their machines and factories into instruments of destruction. The war is receiving fresh fuel, and that means that every year, nay every month, sees the further extension of this war. There is no other way out of this war except revolution, except civil war, except the transformation of the war between capitalists for profits, for the sharing of the loot, for the strangulation of small countries, into a war of the oppressed against the oppressors, a war which always accompanies not only great revolutions but every serious revolution in history, a war which is the only war that is legitimate and just, a holy war from the point of view of the interests of the working people, of the oppressed and of the exploited masses. (*Applause.*) Without such a war there can be no liberation from imperialist slavery. We must be perfectly clear in our minds about the new disasters that civil war brings for every country. The more cultured a country is the more serious will be these disasters. Let us picture to ourselves a country possessing machinery and railways in which civil war is raging, and this civil war cuts off communication between the various parts of the country. Picture to yourselves the condition of regions which for decades have been accustomed to living by the interchange of manufactured goods and you will understand that every civil war brings fresh disasters, which the great socialists foresaw. The imperialists doom the working class to disaster, suffering and extinction. Intolerable and painful as all this may be for the whole of mankind, it is becoming clearer and clearer every day to the new socialist society that the imperialists will not be able to put an end to the war which they started; other classes will end it—the working class, which in all countries is becoming more and more active every day, more and more angry and indignant, and which, irres-

pective of sentiments and moods, the force of circumstances is compelling to overthrow the rule of the capitalists. We, in Russia, are particularly affected by the disaster of famine and are passing through a period more difficult than had ever been experienced by any revolution, and we cannot count on immediate aid from our West-European comrades. The whole difficulty of the Russian revolution is that it was much easier for the Russian revolutionary working class to start than it is for the West-European classes, but it is much more difficult for us to continue. It is more difficult to start a revolution in West-European countries because there the revolutionary proletariat is opposed by the higher thinking that comes with culture, and the working class is in a state of cultural slavery.

Meanwhile, because of our international position, we must pass through an incredibly difficult time, and we representatives of the working masses. We workers, class-conscious workers, in all our agitation and propaganda, in every speech we deliver, in every appeal we issue, in our talks in the factories and at every meeting with peasants, must explain that the disaster that has befallen us is an international disaster and that there is no other way out of it except world revolution. Since we must pass through such a painful period in which we temporarily stand alone, we must exert all our efforts to bear the difficulties of this period staunchly, knowing that in the last analysis we are not alone, that the disaster which we are experiencing is creeping upon every European country, and that not one of these countries will be able to extricate itself except by a series of revolutions.

Russia has been afflicted by famine, which has been made more acute by the fact that the imposed peace has deprived her of the most fertile grain-bearing gubernias, and it has also been made more acute by the fact that the old food campaign is drawing to a close. We still have several weeks to go before the next harvest, which will undoubtedly be a rich one; and these few weeks will be a very difficult period of transition which, being a difficult one generally, is rendered still more critical by the fact that in Russia the deposed exploiting classes of landowners and capitalists are doing all they can, are exerting every effort to restore their power.

This is one of the main reasons why the grain-bearing gubernias of Siberia are cut off from us as a result of the Czechoslovak mutiny. But we know very well what forces are behind this revolt, we know very well that the Czechoslovak soldiers are declaring to the representatives of our troops, of our workers and of our peasants, that they do not want to fight against Russia and against the Russian Soviet government, that they only want to make their way by force of arms to the frontier. But at their head stand yesterday's generals, landowners and capitalists, who are financed by the British and the French and enjoy the support of Russian traitors to socialism who have deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie. (*Applause.*)

The whole gang of them is taking advantage of the famine to make another attempt to restore the landowners and the capitalists to power. Comrades, the experience of our revolution confirms the correctness of the words which always distinguish the representatives of scientific socialism, Marx and his followers, from the utopian socialists, from the petty-bourgeois socialists, from the socialist intellectuals and from the socialist dreamers. The intellectual dreamers, the petty-bourgeois socialists, thought, and perhaps still think, or dreamt that it is possible to introduce socialism by persuasion. They think that the majority of the people will be convinced, and when they become convinced the minority will obey; that the majority will vote and socialism will be introduced. (*Applause.*) No, the world is not built so happily; the exploiters, the brutal landowners, the capitalist class are not amenable to persuasion. The socialist revolution confirms what everybody has seen—the furious resistance of the exploiters. The stronger the pressure of the oppressed class becomes, the nearer they come to overthrowing all oppression, all exploitation, the more resolutely the oppressed peasantry and the oppressed workers display their own initiative, the more furious does the resistance of the exploiters become.

We are passing through a very severe and very painful period of transition from capitalism to socialism, a period which will inevitably be a very long one in all countries because, I repeat, the oppressors retaliate to every success achieved by the oppressed class by fresh attempts at resist-

ance, by attempts to overthrow the power of the oppressed class. The Czechoslovak mutiny, which is obviously being supported by Anglo-French imperialism in the pursuit of its policy of overthrowing the Soviet government, illustrates what this resistance can be. We see that this mutiny is, of course, spreading because of the famine. It is understandable that among the broad masses of the toilers there are many (you know this particularly well; every one of you sees this in the factories) who are not enlightened socialists and cannot be such because they have to slave in the factories and they have neither the time nor the opportunity to become socialists. It is understandable that these people should be in sympathy when they see the workers coming to the fore in the factory, when they see that these workers obtain the opportunity to learn the art of managing factories—a difficult and exacting task in which mistakes are inevitable, but the only task in which the workers can at last realise their constant striving to make the machines, the factories, the works, the best of modern techniques, the best achievements of humanity serve not purposes of exploitation, but the purpose of improving and easing the lives of the overwhelming majority. But when they see the imperialist plunderers in the West, in the North and in the East taking advantage of Russia's defencelessness to tear her heart out, and since they do not yet know what the situation in the labour movement will be in other countries, of course they are guided by despair. Nor can it be otherwise. It would be ridiculous to expect and foolish to think that capitalist society based on exploitation, could at one stroke create a complete appreciation of the need for socialism and an understanding of it. This cannot be. This appreciation comes only at the end of the struggle which has to be waged in this painful period, in which one revolution has broken out before the rest and gets no assistance from the others, and when famine approaches. Naturally, certain strata of the toilers are inevitably overcome by despair and indignation and turn away in disgust from everything. Naturally, the counter-revolutionaries, the landowners and capitalists, and their protectors and henchmen, take advantage of this situation for the purpose of launching attack after attack upon the socialist government.

We see what this has led to in all the towns where no assistance was given by foreign bayonets. We know that it was possible to defeat the Soviet government only when those people who had shouted so much about defending the fatherland and about their patriotism revealed their capitalist nature and concluded agreements, one day with the German bayonets in order jointly with them to massacre the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, the next day with the Turkish bayonets in order to march against the Bolsheviks, the day after that with the Czechoslovak bayonets in order to overthrow the Soviet government and massacre the Bolsheviks' in Samara. Foreign aid alone, the aid of foreign bayonets alone, the selling out of Russia to Japanese, German and Turkish bayonets alone, have up to now given some show of success to the landowners and to those who have compromised with the capitalists. But we know that when, owing to the famine and the despair of the masses, rebellions of this sort broke out in districts where the aid of foreign bayonets could not be obtained, as was the case in Saratov, Kozlov and Tambov, the rule of the landowners, the capitalists and their friends who camouflaged themselves with the beautiful slogans of the Constituent Assembly lasted not more than days, if not hours. The further the units of the Soviet army were from the centre temporarily occupied by the counter-revolution, the more determined was the movement among the urban workers, the more initiative these workers and peasants displayed in marching to the aid of Saratov, Penza and Kozlov and in immediately overthrowing the rule of the counter-revolution which had been established.

Comrades, if you examine these events from the point of view of all that is taking place in world history, if you bear in mind that your task, our common task, is to explain to ourselves and to explain to the masses that these great disasters have not befallen us accidentally, but first as a result of the imperialist war, and secondly as a result of the furious resistance of the landowners, the capitalists and the exploiters, if we are clear about this we can be certain that, however difficult it may be, the full appreciation of this will spread wider and wider among the masses and we shall succeed in creating discipline, in overcoming the indiscipline in our factories, and in helping the people to

live through this painful and particularly difficult period, which perhaps will last the month or two, the few weeks that still remain until the new harvest.

You know that, as a consequence of the Czechoslovak counter-revolutionary mutiny, which has cut us off from Siberia, as a consequence of the continuous unrest in the South, and as a consequence of the war, the position in Russia today is particularly difficult; but it goes without saying that the more difficult the position of our country in which famine is approaching becomes, the more determined and firm must be the measures that we adopt to combat that famine. One of the principal measures to combat the famine is the establishment of the grain monopoly. In this connection you will know perfectly well from your own experience that the kulaks, the rich, are raising an outcry against the grain monopoly at every step. This can be understood, because in those places where the grain monopoly was temporarily abolished, as Skoropadsky abolished it in Kiev, profiteering reached unprecedented dimensions; there the price of a pood of grain rose to two hundred rubles. Naturally, when there is a shortage of foods without which it is impossible to live, the owners of such goods can become rich, prices rise to unprecedented heights. Naturally, the horror, the panic created by the fear of death from starvation forced prices up to unprecedented heights, and in Kiev they had to think of restoring the monopoly. Here in Russia, long ago, when before the Bolsheviks came to power, notwithstanding the wealth of grain that Russia possessed, the government realised the necessity of introducing the grain monopoly. Only those who are absolutely ignorant, or who have deliberately sold themselves to the interests of the money-bags, can be opposed to it. (*Applause.*)

But, comrades, when we speak of the grain monopoly we must think of the enormous difficulties of realisation that are contained in this phrase. It is quite easy to say "grain monopoly", but we must ponder over what this phrase means. It means that all surplus grain belongs to the state; it means that every single pood of grain over and above that required by the peasant for his farm, to maintain his family and cattle and for sowing, that every extra pood of grain must be taken by the state. How is this to be done? The

state must fix prices; every surplus pood of grain must be found and brought in. How can the peasant, whose mind has been stultified for hundreds of years, who has been robbed and beaten to stupefaction by the landowners and capitalists, who never allowed him to eat his fill, how can this peasant learn to appreciate in a few weeks or a few months what the grain monopoly means? How can millions of people who up to now have known the state only by its oppression, its violence, by the tyranny and robbery of the government officials, how can these peasants, living in remote villages and doomed to ruin, be made to understand that the rule of the workers and peasants means, be made to understand that power is in the hands of the poor, that to hoard grain, possess surplus grain and not hand it over to the state is a crime, and that those who hoard surplus grain are robbers, exploiters, and guilty of causing terrible starvation among the workers of Petrograd, Moscow, etc.? How can the peasant understand these things, considering that up to now he has been kept in ignorance and that the only thing he has been concerned with in the village is to sell his grain? How can he understand these things? It is not surprising that when we examine this question more closely, from the point of view of practical life, we realise what an enormously difficult task it is to introduce a grain monopoly in a country in which tsarism and the landowners held the majority of the peasants in ignorance, in a country in which the peasantry have sown grain on their own land for the first time In many centuries. (*Applause.*)

But the more difficult this task is, the greater it appears to be upon close and careful study, the more clearly must we say to ourselves what we have always said, namely, that the emancipation of the workers must be performed by the workers themselves. We have always said: the emancipation of the working people from oppression cannot be brought from outside; the working people themselves, by their struggle, by their movement, by their agitation, must learn to solve a new historical problem; and the more difficult, the greater, the more responsible the new historical problem is, the larger must be the number of those enlisted for the purpose of taking an independent part in solving it. No class consciousness, no organisation is required to sell grain to

a merchant, to a trader. To do that one must live as the bourgeoisie has ordered. One must merely be an obedient slave and imagine and admit that the world as built by the bourgeoisie is magnificent. But in order to overcome this capitalist chaos, in order to introduce the grain monopoly, in order to ensure that every surplus pood of grain is transferred to the state, there must be prolonged, difficult and strenuous organisational work, not by organisers, not by agitators, but by the masses themselves.

There are such people in the Russian countryside. The majority of the peasants belong to the category of the very poor and poor peasants who are not in a position to trade in grain surpluses and become robbers hoarding perhaps hundreds of poods of grain while others are starving. But today, the situation is that a peasant will perhaps call himself a working peasant (some people like this term very much); but if such a peasant has by his own labour, even without the aid of hired labour, harvested hundreds of poods of grain and calculates that if he keeps this grain he will be able to get more than six rubles, from a profiteer, or from a starving urban worker who has come with his starving family and may offer two hundred rubles a pood—such a peasant, who hoards hundreds of poods of grain in order to raise the price and get even a hundred rubles a pood, cannot be called a working peasant, he becomes transformed into an exploiter, into someone worse than a robber. What must we do under these circumstances? Whom can we rely upon in our struggle? We know that the Soviet revolution and the Soviet government differ from other revolutions and other governments not only because they have overthrown the power of the landowners and the capitalists, not only because they have destroyed the feudal state, the autocracy, but also because the masses have rebelled against all the bureaucrats and created a new state in which power must belong to the workers and peasants—not only must, but already does belong to them. In this state there are no police, no bureaucrats and no standing army kept in barracks for many years, isolated from the people and trained to shoot the people.

We place arms in the hands of the workers and peasants, who must learn the art of war. There are units who give way

to temptation, vice and crime because they are not separated by a Chinese Wall from the world of oppression, from the world of starvation, in which those who have want to enrich themselves out of what they have. That is why very often we see detachments of class-conscious workers leaving Petrograd and Moscow and, on reaching the district to which they have been sent, going astray and becoming criminals. We see the bourgeoisie clapping their hands in delight and filling the columns of their corrupt press with all sorts of bogies to frighten the people. "See what your detachments are like," they say, "what disorder they are creating, how much better our detachments of private capitalists behaved!"

No, thank you, bourgeois gentlemen! You will not frighten us. You know very well that recovery from the misfortunes and ulcers of the capitalist world will not come all at once. And we know that recovery will come only through struggle; we will expose every incident of this kind, not to provide material for the counter-revolutionary Mensheviks and Constitutional-Democrats to smile and gloat over, but in order to teach wider masses of the people. Since our detachments do not fulfil their duties properly, give us more loyal and class-conscious detachments far exceeding the number of those who gave way to temptation. These must be organised and educated; exploited and starving workers who are not class-conscious must be rallied around every class-conscious worker. The rural poor must be roused, educated and shown that the Soviet government will do all it possibly can to help them, so as to carry out the grain monopoly.

And so, when we approached this task, when the Soviet government stated these questions clearly, it said: comrades, workers, organise, rally the food detachments, combat every case in which these detachments show that they are not equal to their duties, organise more strongly and rectify your mistakes, rally the village poor around you. The kulaks know that their last hour has struck, that their enemy is advancing not merely with sermons, words and phrases, but by organising the village poor; and if we succeed in organising the village poor we shall vanquish the kulaks. The kulaks know that the hour of the last, most determined, most desperate battle for socialism is approaching.

This struggle seems to be only a struggle for bread, but as a matter of fact it is a struggle for socialism. If the workers learn to solve these problems independently—no one will come to their aid—if they learn to rally the village poor around them, they will achieve victory, they will have broad and the proper distribution of bread, they will even have the proper distribution of labour, because by distributing labour properly we shall be supreme in all spheres of labour, in all spheres of industry.

Foreseeing all this, the kulaks have made repeated attempts to bribe the poor. They know that grain must be sold to the state at fix rubles per pood, but they sell grain to a poor peasant neighbour at three rubles per pood and say to him: "You can go to a profiteer and sell at forty rubles per pood. We have common interests; we must unite against the state, which is robbing us. It wants to give us six rubles per pood here, take three poods, you can make sixty rubles. You needn't worry about how much I make, that is my business."

I know that on these grounds armed conflicts with the peasants repeatedly occur, while the enemies of the Soviet government gloat over it and snigger, and exert every effort to overthrow the Soviet government. But we say: "That is because the food detachments that were sent were not sufficiently class-conscious; but the larger the detachments were the more frequently we had cases—and this happened repeatedly—when the peasants gave their grain without a single case of violence, because class-conscious workers show that their main strength lies, not in violence, but in the fact that they are the representatives of the organised and enlightened poor, whereas in the rural districts there is a mass of ignorance, the poor are not enlightened. If the latter are approached in an intelligent manner, if they are told in plain language, without bookish words, in a plain human way, that in Petrograd and Moscow and in scores of uyezds people are starving and typhus is spreading as a result of famine, that tens of thousands of Russian peasants and workers are dying of starvation, that it is the rich who have been unjustly hoarding grain and making profit out of the starvation of the people, it will be possible to organise the poor and get the surplus grain collected not

by violence but by the organisation of the village poor. I frequently receive complaints about the kulaks from comrades who have gone to the villages with food detachments and who have fought against the counter-revolution. I will quote an example of which I have a particularly lively recollection because I heard it yesterday, of something that occurred in Yelets Uyezd,[174] In that uyezd a Soviet of Workers' Deputies has been set up, and there are a large number of class-conscious workers and poor peasants there. Thanks to this, it has been possible to consolidate the power of the poor. The first time the representatives of Yelets Uyezd came to report to me I would not believe them, I thought they were boasting. But what they said was confirmed by comrades who had been sent especially from Moscow to other gubernias. They said that the manner in which work had been organised in Yelets was only to be welcomed, and confirmed the fact that in Russia there were uyezds where the Soviets were equal to their tasks and had succeeded in completely removing the kulaks and exploiters from the Soviets, in organising the toilers, in organising the poor, Let those who use their wealth for profit clear out of the Soviet state organisations! (*Applause.*)

After they had expelled the kulaks they went to the town of Yelets, a trading town. They did not wait for a decree to introduce the grain monopoly but remembered that the Soviets represent a government that is close to the people and that every person, if he is a revolutionary, if he is a socialist and is really on the side of the toilers, must act quickly and decisively. They organised all the workers and poor peasants and formed so many detachments that searches were made all over Yelets. They allowed only the trusted and responsible leaders of the detachments to enter the houses. Not a single person of whom they were not certain was allowed to enter the houses, for they knew how often vacillation occurs and that nothing disgraces the Soviet government so much as these cases of robbery committed by unworthy representatives and servants of the Soviet government. They succeeded in collecting a huge quantity of surplus grain and there was not a single house in commercial Yelets in which the bourgeoisie could make any profit by profiteering.

Of course, I know that it is much easier to do this in a small town than in a city like Moscow, but it must not be forgotten that not a single uyezd town possesses the proletarian forces that Moscow has.

In Tambov, recently, the counter-revolution was victorious for several hours. It even published one issue of a Menshevik and Right Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper which called for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, for the overthrow of the Soviet government and declared that the victory of the new government was permanent. But Red Army men and peasants arrived from the surrounding country and in one day overthrew this new "permanent" government, which claimed to be supported by the Constituent Assembly. (*Applause.*)

,The same thing occurred in other uyezds in Tambov Gubernia—a gubernia of enormous size. Its northern uyezds are in the non-agricultural zone, but its southern uyezds are extraordinarily fertile, there they gather very big harvests. Many of the peasants there have surplus grain, and there one must act energetically and have a particularly firm and clear understanding of the situation to be able to gain the support of the poor peasants and overcome the kulaks. There the kulaks are hostile to every sort of workers' and peasants' government and our people have to wait for the assistance of the Petrograd and Moscow workers who, on every occasion, armed with the weapon of organisation, expel the kulaks from the Soviets, organise the poor and jointly with the local peasants acquire experience in fighting for the state monopoly of grain, experience in organising the rural poor and urban toilers in such a way as will guarantee us final and complete victory. I have quoted these examples to illustrate the food situation, comrades, because it seems to me that from the point of view of the working people, for us, for the workers, for the politically conscious proletariat, it is not the statistical estimate of the amount of grain, of how many million poods we can obtain, that matters when one is describing the fight against the kulaks for bread. I leave it to the food supply experts to draw up these statistics. I must say that if we succeed in securing the surplus grain from the gubernias adjacent to the Moscow non-agricultural zone and from fertile Siberia,

even there we could secure enough grain to save the non-agricultural gubernias from starvation during the few critical weeks that remain until the harvest. In order to do that we must organise a still larger number of class-conscious, advanced workers. This was the main lesson to be learned from all preceding revolutions, and it is the main lesson to be learned from our revolution. The better we are organised, the more widely organisation manifests itself, the more the workers in the factories realise that their strength lies entirely in their organisation and that of the village poor, the more will our victory in the struggle against famine and in the struggle for socialism be assured. For, I repeat, our task is not to invent a new form of government but to rouse, to educate and to organise every representative of the village poor, even in the remotest villages, to independent activity. It will not be difficult for a few class-conscious urban workers, Petrograd and Moscow workers, to explain, even in remote villages, that it is wrong to hoard grain, to profiteer in grain, to use it for making vodka, when hundreds of thousands are dying in Moscow. In order to do that, the workers of Petrograd and Moscow, and particularly you, comrades, the representatives of the most varied trades, factories and works, must thoroughly understand that no one will come to your assistance, that from other classes you can expect not assistants but enemies, that the Soviet government has no loyal intelligentsia at its service. The intelligentsia are using their experience and knowledge—the highest human achievement—in the service of the exploiters, and are doing all they can to prevent our gaining victory over the exploiters; their efforts will cause the death of hundreds of thousands from starvation, but that will not break the resistance of the toilers. We have no one to depend upon but the class with which we achieved the revolution and with which we shall overcome the greatest difficulties, cross the very difficult zone that lies ahead of us—and that is the factory workers, the urban and rural proletariat, who speak to each other in a language they all understand, who in town and country will vanquish all our enemies—the kulaks and the rich.

But in order to achieve this we must remember the fundamental postulate of the socialist revolution which the

workers so often forget, and that is, that in order to make a socialist revolution, in order to bring it about, in order to liberate the people from oppression, it is not necessary immediately to abolish classes; the most class-conscious and organised workers must take power in their hands. The workers must become the ruling class in the state. That is the truth which the majority of you have read in *The Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, which was written more than seventy years ago, and which has been translated into all languages and circulated in all countries. Everywhere the truth has been revealed that in order to vanquish the capitalists it is necessary during the struggle against exploitation, while ignorance is rife, while people do not yet believe in the new system, that the organised urban factory workers become the ruling class. When you gather together in your factory committees to settle your affairs, remember that the revolution will not be able to retain a single one of its gains if you, in your factory committees, merely concern yourselves with workers' technical or purely financial interests. The workers and the oppressed classes have managed to seize power more than once, but never have they been able to retain it. To do this the workers must be able not only to rise in heroic struggle and overthrow exploitation; they must also be able to organise, to maintain discipline, to be staunch, to discuss affairs calmly when everything is tottering, when you are being attacked, when innumerable stupid rumours are being spread—it is at such a time that the factory committees, which in all things are closely connected with the vast masses, are faced with the great political task of becoming primarily an organ of administration of political life. The fundamental political problem that faces the Soviet government is that of securing the proper distribution of grain. Although Yelets succeeded in bridling the local bourgeoisie, it is much more difficult to do this in Moscow; but here we have incomparably better organisation, and here you can easily find tens of thousands of honest people whom your parties and your trade unions will supply and answer for, who will be able to lead the detachments and guarantee that they will remain ideologically loyal in spite of all difficulties, in spite of all temptations and in spite of the torments of hunger. No other class could

undertake this task at the present time, no other class would be able to lead the people who often fall into despair; there is no other class but the urban factory proletariat that can do this. Your factory committees must cease to be merely factory committees, they must become the fundamental state nuclei of the ruling class. (*Applause.*) Your organisation, your solidarity, your energy will determine whether we shall hold out in this severe transitional period as staunchly as a Soviet government should hold out. Take up this work yourselves, take it up from every side, expose abuses every day. Rectify every mistake that is committed with your own experience—many mistakes are committed today because the working class is still inexperienced, but the important thing is that it should itself take up this work and rectify its own mistakes. If we act in this way, if every committee understands that it is one of the leaders of the greatest revolution in the world—then we shall achieve socialism for the whole world! (*Applause culminating in an ovation.*)

2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE CURRENT SITUATION JUNE 28, 1918

Comrades, permit me first of all to deal with a few of the propositions advanced in opposition to me by Paderin, who delivered the second report. From the shorthand report I note that he said: "We must do everything possible to enable primarily the British and German proletariat to rise against their oppressors. What must be done to bring this about? Is it our business to help these oppressors? By rousing enmity among ourselves, by destroying and weakening the country, we infinitely strengthen the position of the imperialists, British, French and German, who in the end will unite in order to strangle the working class of Russia." This argument shows how irresolute the Mensheviks have always been in their struggle against and in their opposition to imperialist war, because the argument I have just quoted can only be understood as coming from the lips of a man who calls himself a defencist, who takes up a completely imperialist position (*applause*), of a man who justifies imperialist war and who repeats the bourgeois lie that in such a war the workers defend their fatherland. If, indeed, one adopts the point of view that the workers must not destroy and weaken the country during such a war, it is tantamount to calling upon the workers to defend the fatherland in an imperialist war. And you know what the Bolshevik Government, which considered it its first duty to publish, to expose and to pillory the secret treaties, has done. You know that the Allies waged war for the sake of the secret treaties, and that the Kerensky government, which existed with the aid

and support of the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, not only did not annul the secret treaties, but did not even publish them; you know that the Russian people waged war for the sake of these secret treaties, which promised the Russian landowners and capitalists, in the event of victory, Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Lvov, Galicia and Armenia. If we adopt the point of view of the working class, if we are opposed to the war, how could we tolerate these secret treaties? As long as we tolerated the secret treaties, as long as we tolerated the rule of the bourgeoisie in Russia, we fostered the chauvinistic conviction in the minds of the German workers that there were no class-conscious workers in Russia, that everyone in Russia supported imperialism, and that Russia was pursuing a war for the purpose of plundering Austria and Turkey. But the very opposite is the case. The workers' and peasants' government has done more than any other government in the world to weaken the German imperialists, to tear the German workers away from them, because when the secret treaties were published and exposed to the world, even the German chauvinists, even the German defencists, even those workers who supported their government, had to admit in their newspaper *Vorwarts*,[175] their central organ, that "this is an act of a socialist government, a genuinely revolutionary act". They had to admit this because not a single imperialist government involved in the war did this; ours was the only government that denounced the secret treaties.

Of course at the back of every German worker's mind, no matter how cowed, downtrodden or bribed by the imperialists he may be, there is the thought: "Has not our government secret treaties?" (*A voice*: "Tell us about the Black Sea fleet.") All right, I will tell you about it, although it has nothing to do with the subject. At the back of every German worker's mind there is the thought: "If the Russian workers have gone to the length of denouncing the secret treaties, has not the German Government secret treaties?" When the Brest negotiations began, Comrade Trotsky's exposures reached the whole world. Did not this policy rouse in an enemy country engaged in a terrible imperialist war with other governments, not anger but the sympathy of the masses of the people? The only government to do that was our

government. Our revolution succeeded in rousing a great revolutionary movement during wartime in an enemy country merely by the fact that we denounced the secret treaties by the fact that we said; "We will not be deterred by any danger." If we know, if we say, and not merely say, but mean it, that international revolution is the only salvation from world war, from the imperialist massacre of the people, then we in our revolution must pursue that aim, notwithstanding all difficulties and all dangers. And when we took this path, for the first time in history, in Germany, in the most imperialistic and most disciplined country, in the midst of war, a mass strike broke out and flared up in January. Of course there are people who believe that revolution can break out in a foreign country to order, by agreement. These people are either mad or they are provocateurs. We have experienced two revolutions during the past twelve years. We know that revolutions cannot be made to order, or by agreement; they break out when tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live in the old way any longer. We know what difficulties accompanied the birth of the revolution in 1905 and in 1917, and we never expected revolution to break out in other countries at one stroke, as a result of a single appeal. The revolution now beginning to grow in Germany and in Austria in a tribute to the great service rendered by the Russian October Revolution. (*Applause.*) We read in the newspapers today that in Vienna, where the bread ration is smaller than ours, where the plunder of the Ukraine can bring no relief, where the population says that it has never before experienced such horrors of starvation, an *Arbeiterrat* has sprung up. In Vienna general strikes are breaking out again.

And we say to ourselves: This is the second step, this is the second proof that when the Russian workers denounced the imperialist secret treaties, when they expelled their bourgeoisie, they acted as consistent class-conscious worker internationalists, they facilitated the growth of the revolution in Germany and in Austria in a way that no other revolution in the world has ever done in a hostile country which was in a state of war, and in which bitter feeling ran high.

To forecast when a revolution will mature, to promise that it will come tomorrow, would be deceiving you. You

remember, particularly those of you who experienced both Russian revolutions, that no one in November 1904 could guarantee that within two months a hundred thousand St. Petersburg workers would march to the Winter Palace and start a great revolution.

Recall December 1916. How could we guarantee that two months later the tsarist monarchy would be overthrown in the course of a few days? We in this country, which has experienced two revolutions, know and realise that the progress of the revolution cannot be foretold, and that revolution cannot be called forth. We can only work for the revolution. If you work consistently, if you work devotedly, if this work is linked up with the interests of the oppressed masses, who make up the majority, revolution will come; but where, how, at what moment, from what immediate cause, cannot be foretold. That is why we shall never take the liberty of deceiving the masses by saying: "The German workers will help us tomorrow, they will blow up their Kaiser the day after tomorrow." We have no right to say such things.

Our position is made more difficult by the fact that the Russian revolution proved to be ahead of other revolutions; but the fact that we are not alone is proved by the news that reaches us nearly every day that the best German Social-Democrats are expressing themselves in favour of the Bolsheviks, that the Bolsheviks are being supported in the open German press by Clara Zetkin and also by Franz Mehring, who in a series of articles has been showing the German workers that the Bolsheviks alone have properly understood what socialism is. Recently a Social-Democrat named Hoschka definitely stated in the Württemberg Landtag that he regarded the Bolsheviks alone as models of consistency in the pursuit of a correct revolutionary policy. Do you think that such statements do not find an echo among scores, hundreds and thousands of German workers who associate themselves with these statements almost before they are uttered? When affairs in Germany and Austria have reached the stage of the formation of *Arbeiterräte* and of a second mass strike, we can say without the least exaggeration, without the least self-deception, that this marks the beginning of a revolution. We say very

definitely: Our policy and our path have been a correct policy and a correct path; we have helped the Austrian and the German workers to regard themselves, not as enemies strangling the Russian workers in the interests of the Kaiser, in the interests of the German capitalists, but as brothers of the Russian workers, who are performing the same revolutionary work as they are. (*Applause.*)

I would also like to mention a passage in Paderin's speech which, in my opinion, deserves attention, the more so that it partly coincides with the idea expressed by the preceding speaker.[176] This is the passage: "We now see that civil war is being waged within the working class. Can we permit this to go on?" You see that civil war is described as war within the working class or as war against the peasants, as the preceding speaker described it. We know perfectly well that both descriptions are wrong. The civil war in Russia is a war waged by the workers and the poor peasants against the landowners and the capitalists. This war is being prolonged and protracted because the Russian landowners and capitalists were vanquished in October and November with relatively small losses, were vanquished by the enthusiasm of the masses of the people under conditions in which it became immediately clear to them that the people would not support them. Things reached the stage that even in the Don region, where there is the largest number of rich Cossacks who live by exploiting wage labour, where the hopes of the counter-revolution were brightest, even there, Bogayevsky, the leader of the counter-revolutionary rebellion, had to admit and publicly admitted: "Ours is a lost cause because even in our region the majority of the population are on the side of the Bolsheviks." (*Applause.*)

That was the position, that was how the landowners and capitalists lost their counter-revolutionary game in October and November.

That was the result of their reckless attempt to organise the officer cadets, the officers, the sons of landowners and capitalists, into a White Guard to fight the workers' and peasants' revolution. And now—if you don't know this read today's newspapers—the Czechoslovak adventurers are operating with the financial assistance of the Anglo-French capitalists,[177] who are bribing troops to drag us into the

war again. Haven't you read that the Czechoslovaks said in Samara? They said: "We shall join Dutov and Semyonov and compel the workers of Russia and the Russian people, once again to fight against Germany side by side with Britain and France. We shall restore those secret treaties and fling you once again, for another four years perhaps, into this imperialist war in alliance with the bourgeoisie." But instead of that we are now waging war against our bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of other countries, and it is solely due to the fact that we are waging this war that we have won the sympathy and support of the workers of other countries. If the workers of one belligerent country see that in the other belligerent country close connections are being established between the workers and the bourgeoisie it splits the workers up according to nation and unites them with their respective bourgeoisie. This is a great evil, it means the collapse of the socialist revolution, it means the collapse and doom of the whole International. (*Applause.*)

In 1914 the International was wrecked because the workers of all countries united with the bourgeoisie in their respective countries and split their own ranks. Now, this split is being healed. Perhaps you have read that in Britain recently the Scottish schoolteacher and trade unionist MacLean was sentenced for a second time, to five years' imprisonment—the first time he was sentenced to eighteen months—for exposing the real objects of the war and speaking about the criminal nature of British imperialism.. When he was released there was already a representative of the Soviet Government in Britain, Litvinov, who immediately appointed MacLean Consul, a representative of the Soviet Russian Federative Republic in Britain, and the Scottish workers greeted this appointment with enthusiasm. The British Government has again started persecuting MacLean and this time not only as a Scottish schoolteacher, but also as Consul of the Federative Soviet Republic. MacLean is in prison because he acted openly as the representative of our government; we have never seen this man, he is the beloved leader of the Scottish workers, he has never belonged to our Party, but we joined with him; the Russian and Scottish workers united against the British Government in spite of the fact that the latter buys Czechoslovaks and

is manoeuvring frantically to drag the Russian Republic into the war. This is proof that in all countries, irrespective of their position in the war—in Germany which is fighting against us, in Britain which is trying to grab Baghdad and strangle Turkey—the workers are uniting with the Russian Bolsheviks, with the Russian Bolshevik revolution. The speaker whose words I have quoted said that workers and peasants are waging a civil war against workers and peasants; we know perfectly well that this is not true. The working class is one thing; groups, small strata of the working class are another thing. From 1871 to 1914, for almost half a century, the German working class was a model of socialist organisation for the whole world. We know that it had a party with a membership of a million, that it created trade unions with a membership of two, three and four millions; nevertheless, in the course of this half-century hundreds of thousands of German workers remained united in Christian trade unions, which stood staunchly for the priests, for the church and for the Kaiser. Who were the real representatives of the working class? Was it the huge German Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions, or the hundreds of thousands of church-going workers? The working class, which comprises the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious, advanced, thinking workers, is one thing, while a single factory, a single district, a few groups of workers who still remain on the side of the bourgeoisie are another thing.

The overwhelming majority of the working class of Russia—this is shown by all the elections to the Soviets, the factory committees and conferences—ninety-nine per cent of them are on the side of the Soviet government (*applause*), knowing that this government is waging war against the bourgeoisie, against the kulaks, and not against the peasants and workers. It is quite a different matter that there is an insignificant group of workers still in slavish dependence upon the bourgeoisie. We are not waging war against them but against the bourgeoisie. If those insignificant groups which are still in alliance with the bourgeoisie get hurt in the process they have only themselves to blame. (*Applause.*)

A question has been sent to me in writing; it reads as follows: "Why are counter-revolutionary newspapers still

published?" One of the reasons is that there are elements among the printers who are bribed by the bourgeoisie.[178] (Commotion, shouts: "It's not true.") You can shout as much as you like, but you will not prevent me from telling the truth, which all the workers know and which I have just begun to explain. When a worker attaches great importance to the wages he gets for working for the bourgeois press, when he says: "I want to keep my high wages by helping the bourgeoisie to sell poison, to poison the minds of the people," then I say it is as if these workers were bribed by the bourgeoisie (applause), not in the sense that any individual person was hired, but in the sense in which all Marxists have spoken about the British workers who ally themselves with their capitalists. All of you who have read trade union literature know that there are not only trade unions in Britain, but also alliances between the workers and capitalists in a particular industry for the purpose of raising prices and of robbing everybody else. All Marxists, all socialists of all countries point the finger of scorn at these cases and, beginning with Marx and Engels, say that there are workers who, owing to their ignorance and pursuit of their craft interests, allow themselves to be bribed by the bourgeoisie. They have sold their birthright, their right to the socialist revolution, by entering into an alliance with their capitalists against the overwhelming majority of the workers and the oppressed toilers in their own country, against their own class. The same thing is happening here. When certain groups of workers say, the fact that the stuff we print is opium, poison, spreads lies and provocation, has nothing to do with us, we get high wages and we don't care a hang for anybody else —we will denounce such workers. In our literature we have always said openly: "Such workers are abandoning the working class and deserting to the side of the bourgeoisie." (*Applause.*)

Comrades, I will in a moment deal with the questions that have been put to me; but first of all, so as not to forget, I will reply to the question about the Black Sea fleet,[179] which seems to have been put for the purpose of exposing us. Let me tell you that the man who was operating there was Comrade Raskolnikov, whom the Moscow and Petrograd workers know very well because of the agitation and Party

work he has carried on. Comrade Raskolnikov himself will be here and he will tell you how he agitated in favour of destroying the fleet rather than allow the German troops to use it for the purpose of attacking Novorossiisk. That was the situation in regard to the Black Sea fleet; and the People's Commissars Stalin, Shlyapnikov and Raskolnikov will arrive in Moscow soon and tell us all about it. You will see then that ours was the only possible policy; like the Brest peace policy, it caused us many misfortunes but it enabled the Soviet government and the workers' socialist revolution to hold their banner aloft before the workers of all countries. If the number of workers in Germany who are abandoning the old prejudices about the Bolsheviks, and who understand that our policy is correct, is growing day by day it is due to the tactics we have been pursuing since the Brest Treaty.

Of the questions that have been sent up to me I will deal with the two concerning the transportation of grain. Certain workers ask: "Why do you prohibit individual workers from bringing grain into the town when it is for the use of their own families?" The reply is a simple one. Just think what would happen if the thousands of poods that are necessary for a given locality, for a given factory, for a given district, or for a given street were carried by thousands of people. If we allowed this, the food supply organisations would begin to break down entirely. We do not blame the man who, tormented by hunger, travels into the country to get grain and procures it in whatever way he can, but we say: "We do not exist as a workers' and peasants' government for the purpose of legalising and encouraging disintegration and ruin." A government is not required for this purpose. It is required for the purpose of uniting and organising the class-conscious in order to combat lack of class consciousness. We cannot blame those who owing to their lack of class consciousness throw up everything, close their eyes to everything, and try to save themselves by procuring grain in whatever way they can, but we can blame Party people who, while advocating the grain monopoly, do not sufficiently foster class consciousness and solidarity in action. Yes, the struggle against the bag-trader, against the private transportation of grain is a very difficult one be-

cause it is a struggle against ignorance, against lack of class consciousness, against the lack of organisation of the broad masses; but we shall never abandon this struggle. Every time people try to collect grain on their own, we shall call for proletarian socialist methods of combating famine: having united together, let us replace the sick food detachments by new forces, by fresher, stronger, more honest, more class-conscious and tried men, and we shall collect the same amount of grain, the same thousands of poods that are collected individually by two hundred persons, each carrying fifteen poods, each raising prices and increasing profiteering. We shall unite these two hundred persons, we shall create a strong, compact workers' army. If we do not succeed in doing this at the first attempt we shall repeat our efforts; we shall try to induce the class-conscious workers in every factory to delegate larger numbers of more reliable people for the purpose of combating profiteering, and we are sure that the class consciousness, discipline and organisation of the workers will in the last resort withstand all severe trials. When people are convinced by their own experience that individual bag-traders cannot help to save hundreds of thousands from starvation we shall see the victory of the cause of organisation and class consciousness, and by united action we shall organise the fight against famine and secure the proper distribution of grain.

I am asked: "Why is not a monopoly introduced on manufactured goods, which are as necessary as grain?" My reply is: "The Soviet government is adopting all measures to this end." You know that there is a tendency to organise, to amalgamate the textile factories, the textile industry. You know that the majority of the people in the leading bodies of this organisation are workers, you know that the Soviet government is preparing to nationalise all branches of industry; you know that the difficulties that confront us in this matter are enormous, and that much effort will be required to do all this in an organised manner. We are not setting to work on this task in the way governments which rely on bureaucrats do. It is quite easy to manage affairs in that way: let one man receive 400 rubles per month; let another get more, a thousand rubles per month—our busi-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ness is to give orders and the others must obey. That is how all bourgeois countries are administered; they hire officials at high salaries, they hire the sons of the bourgeoisie and entrust the administration to them. The Soviet Republic cannot be administered in this way. We have no officials to manage and guide the work of amalgamating all the textile factories, of registering all their property and stocks, of introducing a monopoly of all articles of primary necessity, and of properly distributing them. We call upon the workers to do this work; we call upon the representatives of the Textile Workers' Union and say to them: "You must form the majority on the collegium of the Central Textile Board, and you are the majority on it, in the same way as you are the majority on the collegiums of the Supreme Economic Council. Comrades, workers, take up this very important State task yourselves. We know that it is much more difficult than appointing efficient officials, but we know also that there is no other way of doing it." Power must be placed in the hands of the working class, and the advanced workers must, in spite of all difficulties, learn by their own bitter experience, by their own efforts, by the work of their own hands, how all articles, all textile goods, should be distributed in the interests of the toilers. (*Applause.*)

Hence, the Soviet government is doing all it possibly can in the present circumstances to introduce a state monopoly and to fix prices. It is doing it through the medium of the workers, in conjunction with the workers; it gives them the majority on the management boards, and in every leading centre, as, for example, the Supreme Economic Council or the amalgamated metalworks, or the amalgamated sugar refineries, which were nationalised in a few weeks. This is a difficult road, but, I repeat, we cannot avoid difficulties in the task of getting the workers to adopt a new position, workers who have been accustomed and have been trained by the bourgeoisie for hundreds of years merely to carry out its orders slavishly, to work like convicts, of making them feel that they are the government. We are the owners of industry, we are the owners of the grain, we are the owners of all the wealth of the country. Only when this has deeply penetrated the minds of the working class, when, by their own experience, by their own

efforts, they increase their forces tenfold, will all the difficulties of the socialist revolution be overcome.

I conclude by once again appealing to this factory committee conference. In the city of Moscow the difficulties are particularly great because it is an enormous centre of trade and speculation in which, for many years, tens of thousands of people have obtained their livelihood by trade and speculation. Here the difficulties are particularly great, but here there are forces that no small town in the country possesses. Let the workers' organisations, let the factory committees remember and take firm note of what present events and the famine that has descended upon the toilers of Russia teach. New organisations, broader organisations of class-conscious and advanced workers alone can save the revolution and prevent the restoration of the rule of the landowners and capitalists. Such workers are now in the majority, but it is not enough; they must take a greater part in general state work. In Moscow we have hosts of cases of profiteers gambling on the famine, making profit out of the famine, breaking the state grain monopoly, of the rich having everything they desire. In Moscow there are 8,000 members of the Communist Party. In Moscow the trade unions can delegate 20,000 to 30,000 men and women whom they can vouch for, who will be reliable and staunch exponents of proletarian policy. Unite them, create hundreds of thousands of detachments, tackle the food problem, search the whole of the rich population, and you will secure what you need. (*Applause.*)

In my report I told you what successes were achieved in this sphere in the town of Yelets; but it is more difficult to achieve this in Moscow. I said that Yelets was a well-organised town. There are many towns that are much less organised because this is a very difficult matter, because it is not a matter of a shortage of arms—we have any amount of them—the difficulty lies in appointing hundreds and thousands of completely reliable workers to responsible administration posts, workers who understand that they are not working in their local cause but in the cause of the whole of Russia, who are capable of sticking at their posts as representatives of the whole class, of organising the work according to a definite and systematic plan, of carrying out orders, of carrying out the decisions of the Moscow Soviet, of the Moscow organisa-

tions representing the whole of proletarian Moscow. The whole difficulty lies in organising the proletariat, in training it to become more class-conscious than it has been up to now. Look at the Petrograd elections.[180] You will see that although famine is raging there even worse than in Moscow and still greater misfortunes have befallen it, the loyalty to the workers' revolution is growing, organisation and solidarity are increasing, and you will say to yourselves: the disasters that have befallen us are multiplying but the determination of the working class to overcome all these difficulties is multiplying also. Take this path, increase your efforts, put thousands of new detachments on this path to help to solve the food problem, and together with you, relying on your support, we will overcome the famine and secure proper distribution. (*Applause*.)

3

RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

The Fourth Moscow Conference of Factory Committees wholeheartedly supports the Soviet government's food policy and particularly approves (and insists that it should be supported by all workers) the policy of uniting the rural poor.

The liberation of the workers can be achieved only by the workers' own efforts, and only the closest alliance between the urban workers and the rural poor can overcome the resistance of the bourgeoisie and the kulaks, bring all surpluses of grain into their hands and achieve proper distribution among those in need both in town and country.

The Conference calls on all factory committees to exert every effort to organise broader sections of the workers in food detachments and to send them under the leadership of the most reliable comrades to give all-round support to the food policy of the workers' and peasants' government.

SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN SIMONOVSKY SUB-DISTRICT JUNE 28, 1918[181]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(T*he workers gave Lenin a rousing welcome.*) Lenin spoke of the necessity of civil war and called upon the Moscow proletariat to organise solidly in the struggle both against the forces of counter-revolution and against famine and disruption.

He touched in passing on the Saratov and Tambov events, and pointed out that wherever revolts inspired by the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries broke out, the working class rapidly became disillusioned with the views of these parties and no less rapidly overthrew the usurpers of the power of the workers and peasants.

We would receive telegrams, he said, appealing for aid, but before our troops could get half-way, the workers who had sent the appeal would inform us that the need for immediate assistance had passed as the usurpers had been defeated by local forces. Such was the case in Saratov, Tambov and other cities.

Lenin stated that, in general, war ran counter to the aims of the Communist Party. But the war that was being preached today was a sacred war; it was a civil war, a war of the working class against its exploiters.

Without effort, without tremendous expenditure of energy, he said, we should never set foot on the road to socialism. A successful fight for the ideals of the working class entailed organisation. Organisation was also needed to consolidate the gains we had won at the cost of such severe sacrifice and effort.

It was harder to retain power than to seize it, and we knew of many cases in history when the working class had taken power into its hands but had been unable to retain it merely because it did not possess strong enough organisations.

The people were worn out, Lenin continued, and they might, of course, be driven to any folly, even to the acceptance of a Skoropadsky; for, in their mass, the people were ignorant.

Famine was imminent, but we knew that there was grain enough even without Siberia, the Caucasus and the Ukraine. There was enough grain in the provinces surrounding Moscow and Petrograd to last us until the new harvest, but it was all hidden away by the kulaks. We must organise the poor peasants, so as to get this grain with their help. A ruthless struggle with words, as well as action, must be waged on profiteering and profiteers.

Only the working class, knit together by organisation, could explain to the common people the need for war on the kulaks. The Russian people must know that the poor peasantry had a powerful ally in the shape of the organised urban proletariat.

The working class and the peasantry must not place too much hope in the intelligentsia, as many of the intellectuals beginning to side with us were expecting our downfall any moment.

Lenin concluded with an appeal to organise for the struggle of the workers and peasants against the kulaks, the landowners and the bourgeoisie. (*Lenin's speech ended amid a general ovation.*)

Izvestia VTsIK No. 133,
June 29, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

PROPHETIC WORDS

Nobody, thank God, believes in miracles nowadays. Miraculous prophecy is a fairy-tale. But scientific prophecy is a fact. And in these days, when we so very often encounter shameful despondency and even despair around us, it is useful to recall one scientific prophecy which has come true.

Frederick Engels had occasion in 1887 to write of the coming world war in a preface to a pamphlet by Sigismund Borkheim, *In Memory of the German Arch-Patriots of 1806-1807* (*Zur Erinnerung für die deutschen Mordspatrioten 1806-1807*). (This pamphlet is No. XXIV of the Social-Democratic Library published in Göttingen-Zürich in 1888.)

This is how Frederick Engels spoke over thirty years ago of the future world war:

"...No war is any longer possible for Prussia-Germany except a world war and a world war indeed of an extent and violence hitherto undreamt of. Eight to ten millions of soldiers will massacre one another and in doing so devour the whole of Europe until they have stripped it barer than any swarm of locusts has ever done. The devastations of the Thirty Years' War compressed into three or four years, and spread over the whole Continent; famine, pestilence, general demoralisation both of the armies and of the mass of the people produced by acute distress; hopeless confusion of our artificial machinery in trade, industry and credit, ending in general bankruptcy; collapse of the old states and their traditional state wisdom to such an extent that crowns will roll by dozens on the pavement and there will be nobody to pick them up; absolute impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end and who will come out of the struggle as victor; only one result is absolutely certain: general exhaustion

and the establishment of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class.

"This is the prospect when the system of mutual outbidding in armaments, taken to the final extreme, at last bears its inevitable fruits. This, my lords, princes and statesmen, is where in your wisdom you have brought old Europe. And when nothing more remains to you but to open the last great war dance—that will suit us all right (*uns kann es recht sein*). The war may perhaps push us temporarily into the background, may wrench from us many a position already conquered. But when you have unfettered forces which you will then no longer be able again to control, things may go as they will: at the end of the tragedy you will be ruined and the victory of the proletariat will either be already achieved or at any rate (*doch*) inevitable.

"London, December 15, 1887 *Frederick Engels*"[182]

What genius is displayed in this prophecy! And how infinitely rich in ideas is every sentence of this exact, clear, brief and scientific class analysis! How much could be learnt from it by those who are now shamefully succumbing to lack of faith, despondency and despair, if ... if people who are accustomed to kowtow to the bourgeoisie, or who allow themselves to be frightened by it, could but think, were but capable of thinking!

Some of Engels's predictions have turned out differently; and one could not expect the world and capitalism to have remained unchanged during thirty years of frenzied imperialist development. But what is most astonishing is that so many of Engels's predictions are turning out "to the letter". For Engels gave a perfectly exact class analysis, and classes and the relations between them have remained unchanged.

"...The war may perhaps push us temporarily into the background...." Developments have proceeded exactly along these lines, but have gone even further and even worse: some of the social-chauvinists who have been "pushed back", and their spineless "semi-opponents", the Kautskyites, have begun to extol their backward movement and have become direct traitors to and betrayers of socialism.

"...The war may perhaps wrench from us many a position already conquered...." A number of "legal" positions have

been wrenched from the working class. But on the other hand it has been steeled by trials and is receiving severe but salutary lessons in illegal organisation, in illegal struggle and in preparing its forces for a revolutionary attack.

"...Crowns will roll by dozens...." Several crowns have already fallen. And one of them is worth dozens of others—the crown of the autocrat of all the Russias, Nicholas Romanov.

"...Absolute impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end...." After four years of war this absolute impossibility has, if one may say so, become even more absolute.

"...Hopeless confusion of our artificial machinery in trade, industry and credit...." At the end of the fourth year of war this has been fully borne out in the case of one of the biggest and most backward of the states drawn into the war by the capitalists—Russia. But do not the growing starvation in Germany and Austria, the shortage of clothing and raw material and the wearing out of the means of production show that a similar state of affairs is very rapidly overtaking other countries as well?

Engels depicts the consequences brought about only by "foreign" war; he does not deal with internal, i.e., civil war, without which not one of the great revolutions of history has taken place, and without which not a single serious Marxist has conceived the transition from capitalism to socialism. And while a foreign war may drag on for a certain time without causing "hopeless confusion" in the "artificial machinery" of capitalism, it is obvious that a civil war without such a consequence is quite inconceivable.

What stupidity, what spinelessness—not to say mercenary service to the bourgeoisie—is displayed by those who, like our *Novaya Zhizn* group, Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., while continuing to call themselves "socialists", maliciously point to the manifestation of this "hopeless confusion" and lay the blame for everything on the revolutionary proletariat, the Soviet power, the "utopia" of the transition to socialism. The "confusion", or *razrukha*,* to use the excellent Russian word, has been brought about by the war'. There can be no severe war without dis-

* Dislocation, disruption.—*Ed.*

ruption. There can be no civil war—the inevitable condition and concomitant of socialist revolution—without disruption. To renounce revolution and socialism "in view of" the disruption, only means to display one's lack of principle and in practice to desert to the bourgeoisie.

"...Famine, pestilence, general demoralisation both of the armies and of the mass of the people produced by acute distress...."

How simply and clearly Engels draws this indisputable conclusion, which must be obvious to everyone who is at all capable of reflecting on the objective consequences of many years of severe and agonising war. And how astonishingly stupid are these numerous "Social-Democrats" and pseudo-Socialists who will not or cannot realise this most simple idea.

Is it conceivable that a war can last many years without both the armies and the mass of the people becoming *demoralised*? Of course not. Such a consequence of a long war is absolutely inevitable over a period of several years, if not a whole generation. And our "men in mufflers", the bourgeois intellectual snivelers who call themselves "Social-Democrats" and "Socialists", second the bourgeoisie in blaming the revolution for the manifestations of demoralisation or for the inevitable severity of the measures taken to combat particularly acute cases of demoralisation—although it is as clear as noonday that this demoralisation has been produced by the imperialist war, and that no revolution can rid itself of *such* consequences of war without a long struggle and without a number of stern measures of repression.

Our sugary writers in *Novaya Zhizn*, *Vperyod* or *Dyelo Naroda* are prepared to grant a revolution of the proletariat and other oppressed classes "theoretically", provided only that the revolution drops from heaven and is not born and bred on earth soaked in the blood of four years of imperialist butchery of the peoples, with millions upon millions of people exhausted, tormented and demoralised by this butchery.

They had heard and admitted "in theory" that a revolution should be compared to an act of childbirth; but when it came to the point, they disgracefully took fright and

their fainthearted whimperings echoed the malicious outbursts of the bourgeoisie against the insurrection of the proletariat. Consider the descriptions of childbirth given in literature, when the authors aim at presenting a truthful picture of the severity, pain and horror of the act of travail, as in Emile Zola's *La joie de vivre* (The Joy of Life), for instance, or in Veresayev's *Notes of a Doctor*. Human childbirth is an act which transforms the woman into an almost lifeless, bloodstained heap of flesh, tortured, tormented and driven frantic by pain. But can the "individual" that sees *only* this in love and its sequel, in the transformation of the woman into a mother, be regarded as a human being? Who would renounce love and procreation for *this* reason?

Travail may be light or severe. Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific socialism, always said that the transition from capitalism to socialism would be inevitably accompanied *by prolonged birth pangs*. And analysing the consequences of a world war, Engels outlines simply and clearly the indisputable and obvious fact that a revolution that follows and is connected with a war (and still more—let us add for our part—a revolution which breaks out during a war, and which is obliged to grow and maintain itself in the midst of a world war) is a *particularly severe* case of childbirth.

Clearly realising this, Engels speaks with great caution of socialism being brought to birth by a capitalist society which is perishing in a world war. "Only one result [of a world war]," he says, "is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the *establishment* of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class."

This thought is expressed even more clearly at the end of the preface we are examining.

"...At the end of the tragedy you (the capitalists and landowners, the kings and statesmen of the bourgeoisie) will be ruined and the victory of the proletariat will either be already achieved or at any rate inevitable."

Severe travail greatly increases the danger of grave illness or of a fatal issue. But while individuals may die in the act of childbirth, the new society to which the old system gives birth cannot die; all that may happen is that the

birth may be more painful, more prolonged, and growth and development slower.

The war has not yet ended. General exhaustion has already set in. As regards the two *direct* results of war predicted by Engels conditionally (either the victory of the working class already achieved, or the establishment of conditions which will make this inevitable, *despite all difficulties*), as regards these two conditions, now, in the middle of 1918, we find *both* in evidence.

In one, the least developed, of the capitalist countries, the victory of the working class *is already achieved*. In the others, with unparalleled pain and effort, the conditions are being established which will make this victory "at any rate inevitable".

Let the "socialist" snivelers croak, let the bourgeoisie rage and fume, but only people who shut their eyes so as not to see, and stuff their ears so as not to hear, can fail to notice that all over the world the birth pangs of the old, capitalist society, which is pregnant with socialism, have begun. Our country, which has temporarily been advanced by the march of events to the van of the socialist revolution, is undergoing the particularly severe pains of the first period of travail. We have every reason to face the future with complete assurance and absolute confidence, for it is preparing for us new allies and new victories of the socialist revolution in a number of the more advanced countries. We are entitled to be proud and to consider ourselves fortunate that it has come to our lot to be the first to fell in one part of the globe that wild beast, capitalism, which has drenched the earth in blood, which has reduced humanity to starvation and demoralisation, and which will assuredly perish soon, no matter how monstrous and savage its frenzy in the face of death.

June 29, 1918

Pravda No. 133,
July 2, 1918
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING IN THE ALEXEYEVSKY RIDING SCHOOL[183] JULY 2, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin pointed out that the army, like the means of production, had formerly been an instrument of oppression in the hands of the exploiting class. Today in Russia both were becoming weapons in the struggle for the interests of the working people.

This radical change was no easy thing to accomplish, as the soldiers of the old tsarist army knew from the discipline that held that army in a vice. Lenin then cited a recent experience of his. When he was in Finland, he had heard an old Finnish peasant woman say that whereas in the old days the man with the gun was there to prevent her gathering faggots in the forest, today he was no longer dangerous; on the contrary, he even protected her. In spite of all the. mud slung at us by the bourgeois and their followers, Lenin said, in spite of all the plotting of the whiteguards, once it had been brought home even to such unenlightened masses, the exploited, that the present army was their protector, the Soviet government stood firmly planted.

Lenin then went on to say that, as in the past, famine was strengthening the hand of the profiteers and capitalists. The same thing was occurring today, so that the new army might in the civil war have to deal with these people who were making money out of the famine. Let the old world—the representatives of an outworn society—go on trying to help the starving in the old way; the new world would, despite them, do it in a new way. We would win, Lenin said,

if the vanguard of the working people, the Red Army, remembered that it was there to represent and defend the interests of international socialism. Lenin further said that we were not alone, as had been shown by the events in Austria, as well as by like-minded people in all the countries of Europe, who, although held in subjection at present, were doing their work.

Pravda No. 135,
July 4, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP AT THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS JULY 3, 1918[184]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Dealing with Russia's international position, Lenin said that it continued to be dangerous. The external enemy was not only threatening to attack Russia but was already tearing pieces from her.

This unstable and precarious situation would probably continue until capital was overthrown by the efforts of the working class of the whole world. The present stage must be taken advantage of as a breathing-space in which to consolidate the Soviet regime.

Speaking of the world war, Lenin stated that the victory of German arms was making peace between the imperialist countries impossible. The British and French capitalists could not reconcile themselves to Germany retaining the huge booty she had seized. Moreover, after a series of offensives in France, where Germany had lost hundreds of thousands of men, a certain balance of forces had ensued, and German bayonets no longer constituted a direct threat. Besides, the Entente[185] imperialists were fully alive to the disruption and catastrophic state of affairs that had come about in Austria-Hungary.

There was one conclusion to be drawn from the general state of affairs, and that was that the war was becoming hopeless. This hopelessness was an earnest that our socialist revolution had a very good chance of holding on until the world revolution broke out; and the guarantee of this was

the war, which only the working masses could end. Our task was to maintain the Soviet regime intact; and that was what we were doing by retreating and manoeuvring. To join open battle at this juncture would damage the position of the world revolution.

Describing the economic state of the country as we had inherited it from the various Right parties formerly in power, Lenin spoke of the great difficulties that would attend the work of economic development organised on new lines, on new principles.

In the struggle against famine, he said, we had two enemies: the rich and the economic disruption. In this struggle it was essential that the poor peasant should believe in a fraternal alliance with the worker. He would believe only deeds, not words. Our only hope here lay in an alliance of the class-conscious urban workers with the poor peasants. The aim of this struggle—the right of all to bread and the right to fair distribution—was a great aim. The ability to distribute equally was the foundation of socialism, which we were building. For this we were answerable not only to our brothers, but to the workers of the whole world.

They must be shown that socialism was not something impossible, but a firm workers' system, and one for which the proletariat of the whole world must strive.

Pravda No. 135,
July 4, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

FIFTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', PEASANTS', SOLDIERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES[186]

JULY 4-10, 1918

Newspaper report published
July 6, 1918
in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 139

Published according to the text of the book: *Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets*, *Verbatim Report*, All-Russia C.E.C. Publishers, 1918; first five paragraphs of the reply to the debate published according to the text of the magazine *Bulletin of Ways of Communication* No. 7-8, 1918

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1

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
JULY 5, 1918

Comrades, permit me, even though the previous speaker was at times extremely excited,[187] to submit my report on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars in the usual way, that is, to deal with the main questions of principle in order of merit, and not enter into the argument which the previous speaker would so much like to have, and which, of course, I have no intention of declining altogether. You know that since the last Congress, the chief factor which has determined our position, changed our policy and shaped our tactics and attitude towards certain other parties in Russia has been the Brest Treaty. You will recall how many reproaches were hurled at us at the last Congress, how many accusations were levelled at us, and how many voices were raised declaring that this famous respite would not help Russia, that in any case an international imperialist alliance had been concluded, and that in practice the retreat we were advocating would lead nowhere. This basic factor determined the whole position of the capitalist states, too, and we must naturally dwell on it. I think that the past three and a half months have made it absolutely indisputable that despite all reproaches and accusations we ware right. We may say that the proletariat and the peasantry, who do not exploit others, do not make profits out of the people's hunger, are entirely and unreservedly on our side, and at any rate are against those unwise people who would embroil them in war, who are against the Brest Treaty. (*Commotion.*)

Nine-tenths of the people are on our side, and the clearer the situation becomes, the more certain it is that now, when the West-European imperialist parties, the two chief imperialist groups, are locked in a life-and-death struggle, when with every month, every week, every day they are pushing each other nearer and nearer to the abyss whose outlines we can clearly perceive, at such a time it is clearer than ever to us that our tactics were right. That is best felt and realised by those who have been through the war, who have seen what war means and do not talk about it in airy terms. To us it is perfectly clear that as long as each of these groups is stronger than we are, and as long as that radical change which will permit the workers, and the working people of Russia in general, to enjoy the fruits of the revolution, to recover from the blow that has been dealt them and to rise to their full stature, so as to create a new, organised and disciplined army on new lines, in order that we may, not merely in words, but in deeds ... (*loud applause on the Left. Voice from the Right*: "Kerensky!"), as long as that radical change has not come, we have to wait. Therefore, the deeper we go down among the masses of the people, and the nearer we get to the workers of the mills and factories and to the working peasants, who do not exploit hired labour, do not defend the profiteering interests of the kulak, who conceals his grain and fears the food dictatorship, the more surely may we say that there too we shall meet and are meeting—in fact we may say with absolute conviction that we have already met—with full sympathy and unanimous accord. Yes, it is a fact that at present the people do not want to fight, cannot fight, and will not fight these enemies—the imperialists—however much some may try, in their ignorance or infatuation with phrases, to drive them into this war, and no matter what catchwords they may use as a camouflage. No, comrades, anyone who now calls for war directly or indirectly, in open or veiled form, anyone who howls about the Brest Peace Treaty being a noose, fails to see that it is Kerensky and the landowners, capitalists and kulaks who are putting a noose around the necks of the workers and peasants of Russia ... (*Voice*: "Mirbach!" *Commotion.*) Let them scream, as they do at every meeting; among the people their cause is hopeless! (*Applause and commotion.*)

I am not a bit surprised that, in view of the predicament these people are in, the only way they can answer is by shouts, hysterical outcries, abuse and wild behaviour (*applause*), when they have no other arguments.... (*Voice*: "We have arguments!" *Commotion.*)

Ninety-nine out of every hundred Russian soldiers know what incredible suffering it cost to get the mastery of this war. They know that in order to put war on a new socialist and economic basis (*cries of* "Mirbach won't let you!"), tremendous effort will be required, and first of all we had to put an end to the war of plunder. Knowing that the frenzied forces of imperialism are continuing to fight, and that in the three months which have elapsed since the last Congress they have moved several steps nearer to the abyss, they will not join in this war. After we had performed our duty to all the nations, realising the value of a declaration of peace and bringing its value home to the workers of all countries through our Brest delegation, headed by Comrade Trotsky, when we openly proposed an honest democratic peace, this proposal was frustrated by the frenzied bourgeoisie of all countries. Our position cannot be any other but to wait, and the people will yet see these frenzied imperialist cliques, strong though they still are today, tumble into the abyss which they are now approaching, as everybody can see.... (*Applause.*) Everybody can see that who does not deliberately close his eyes. In these three and a half months, during which the frenzied imperialist party has been doing its best to drag out the war, this abyss has undoubtedly drawn nearer. We know, feel and realise that we are not yet ready for war; that is what the soldiers, the men under arms, who know what war means in practice, are saying. And as for the cries that we should throw off the Brest noose at once, they come from the Mensheviks, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the followers of Kerensky, the Constitutional-Democrats. You know where the followers of the landowners and the capitalists, where the hangers-on of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Constitutional-Democrats still stand. In that camp, the speeches of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who also incline towards war, will be greeted with loud applause. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, as the previous speakers have said, find

themselves in an awkward predicament: they have landed in the wrong box. (*Applause.*)

We know that great revolutions arise from the very depths of the people, that this takes months and years, and we are not surprised that in the course of the revolution the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party has shown such incredible vacillations. Trotsky has told us about these vacillations here, and it only remains for me to add that on October 26, when we invited the Left Socialist-Revolutionary comrades to join the government, they refused, and when Krasnov was at the gates of Petrograd, they were not with us, with the consequent result that they helped not us, but Krasnov. We are not surprised at these vacillations. Yes, this party has been through a great deal. But, comrades, there is a limit to everything.

We know that revolution is a thing that is learned by experience and practice, that a revolution becomes a real revolution only when tens of millions of people rise up with one accord, as one man. (*Lenin's words are drowned by applause. Cries of* "Long live the Soviets!") This struggle, which is raising us to a new life, has been begun by one hundred and fifteen million people: this great struggle must be examined with the utmost attention. (*Loud applause.*) In October, when the Soviet regime was founded, on October 26, 1917, when ... (*commotion, shouts and applause*) our party and its representatives on the Central Executive Committee invited the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party to join the government, it refused. When the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries refused to join our government they were not with us, but against us. (*Commotion on the Left Socialist-Revolutionary benches.*) I am very sorry to have to say things you do not like. (*The commotion on the Right becomes louder.*) But what's to be done? If Krasnov, the Cossack general.... (*The commotion and outcries prevent Lenin from continuing.*) When, on October 26, you vacillated, not knowing yourselves what you wanted, and refused to join us.... (*Commotion lasting several minutes.*) The truth is hard to swallow! Let me remind you that those who vacillated, who do not know themselves what they want and refuse to join us, willingly listen to the fables of others. I have told you that the soldier who has been in the war.... (*Commotion and*

applause.) When the previous speaker had the floor the vast majority of the delegates did not interrupt her. Well, it is only to be expected. If these people prefer to withdraw from the Congress, well, then, good riddance! (*Commotion and excitement on the Right benches.*)

And so, comrades, the whole course of events has shown that we were right in concluding the Brest peace. And those who tried at the last Congress of Soviets to crack feeble jokes about the respite have seen and learnt that we have secured a breathing-space; true, it cost us incredible effort, but during this breathing-space our workers and peasants have taken a tremendous step forward to socialist construction, while the Western powers, on the contrary, have taken a tremendous step towards that abyss for which imperialism is heading faster and faster with every week of this war.

And so the only way I can explain the conduct of those who denounce our tactics because of the difficulty of our situation is that they are completely bewildered. I repeat that one only has to recall the past three and a half months. I would remind those who were at the last Congress of some of the things that were said there, and would recommend those who were not to read the minutes or the newspaper reports of that Congress, which will convince them that events have fully corroborated our tactics. There can be no boundary line between the victories of the October Revolution and the victories of the international socialist revolution; outbursts are bound to begin in other countries. And in order to hasten them we did all we could in the Brest period. Those who have been through the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, those who have pondered over them and examined them thoughtfully and seriously, will know that these revolutions in our country were engendered with incredible difficulty.

Two months before January 1905 or February 1917 no revolutionary, whatever his experience and knowledge, however familiar he was with the life of the people, could have foreseen that Russia would be shaken by such explosions. To fasten on individual cries and launch appeals to the masses which are tantamount to terminating the peace and plunging us into war is the policy of people who are

utterly bewildered and have lost their heads completely. And to prove that this is so, I will cite the words of a person whose sincerity neither I nor anybody else will question—the words of Comrade Spiridonova, from the speech which was published in *Golos Trudovovo Krestyanstva*,[188] and which has not been repudiated. In this speech of June 30, Comrade Spiridonova inserted three totally irrelevant lines to the effect that the Germans had presented us with an ultimatum to deliver to them 2,000 million rubles' worth of textiles.

A party which drives its most sincere representatives into such an awful quagmire of lies and deceit, such a party is absolutely doomed. The workers and peasants cannot help knowing what tremendous effort and anguish it cost us to sign the Brest Treaty. Surely, it is not necessary to exaggerate the hardships of that peace by the kind of fables and fabrications to which even the sincerest members of that party resort. But we know that truth is with the people, and we are guided by it, while this party writhes in hysterics. From that standpoint, conduct inspired by such utter bewilderment is worse than any provocation. Especially if we compare all the parties of Russia as a whole, as a scientific attitude towards the revolution requires. One must never neglect to examine the relations of all the parties as a whole. Individual persons or groups may be mistaken, may be baffled, may not be able to explain their own conduct; but if we take all the parties of Russia as a whole and examine their mutual relations, there can be no mistake. Just see what the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky, Savinkov and the rest, are saying now, when they hear the appeals of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.... Why, they applaud like mad. They would be glad to embroil Russia in a war just now, when it would suit Milyukov's purpose. And to talk like that, to talk now about the Brest peace being a noose, is to cast the landowner's noose around the neck of the Russian peasant. When they talk here about fighting the Bolsheviks, like the previous speaker, who spoke about a quarrel with the Bolsheviks, my reply is: no, comrades, this is no quarrel, but a genuine and irrevocable rupture, a rupture between those who are bearing the whole onus of the situation by telling the people the truth, and not allow-

ing themselves to be intoxicated by outcries, and those who are intoxicating themselves with such outcries and involuntarily doing the work of the enemy, the work of provocateurs. (*Applause.*)

I will now conclude the first part of my report. During these three and a half months of frantic imperialist war, the imperialist states have drawn nearer to the abyss into which they are driving the people. This wounded beast has torn many a lump of flesh from our living organism. Our enemies are nearing this abyss so fast that even if they had more than three and a half months at their disposal, and even if the imperialist carnage were again to inflict just as heavy losses on us, it is they who would perish, not we; for the rapidity with which their power of resistance is diminishing is drawing them rapidly nearer to the abyss. We, on the other hand, in spite of the tremendous difficulties, which we do not conceal from the people, after these three and a half months have many a healthy shoot of a healthy organism to show; both in industry and everywhere else, small-scale constructive work is going on, unpretentious and unsensational though it may be. It has already yielded very fruitful results, and, given another three months, six months, a whole winter season of such work, we shall march forward, while the West-European imperialist beast, worn out by the struggle, will be unable to stand such a contest, because within it forces are maturing which, although they have no faith in themselves as yet, will lead imperialism to its doom. And what has already been begun there, and begun radically and fundamentally, is not likely to be changed in three and a half months. Far too little is being said about this constructive, small-scale, creative work, and it seems to me that we should talk about it more. I, for my part, cannot pass over this fact in silence, if only because the attacks of the previous speaker must be taken into account. I would mention the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of April 29, 1918.* At the time I made a speech in which I spoke of the immediate tasks of the Soviet government,** and I pointed out that notwithstanding the incredible

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* See this volume, pp. 314-17.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, pp. 279-313.—*Ed.*

difficulties of our position prime attention at home must be given to constructive work.

And here we must cherish no illusions, and must say that to this work, difficult though it may be, we must devote all our efforts. Our experience, which I can tell you about, shows that in this respect we have undoubtedly made big strides. To be sure, if one looks only for outward results, as the bourgeoisie do, seizing on our individual mistakes, one can scarcely speak of success; but we look at it from a totally different angle. The bourgeoisie picks on the administration of the river fleet, for example, and points out how often we have set about reconstructing it and proclaims with malicious glee that the Soviet government cannot cope with the job. To which I reply that it is true that we have time and again reconstructed the administration of our river fleet, as we have the administration of the railways, and now are about to undertake an even bigger reorganisation of the Economic Council. That is the whole meaning of the revolution, namely, that socialism has passed from the sphere of a dogma, which can be discussed only by people who understand nothing at all, from the sphere of book knowledge, of a programme, to the sphere of practical work. And today the workers and peasants are making socialism with their own hands.

The times have passed, and in Russia, I am sure, have passed beyond recall, when we used to argue about the socialist programme on the basis of book knowledge. Today socialism can be discussed only on the basis of experience. The whole meaning of the revolution lies in the fact that it has for the first time in history discarded the old apparatus of bourgeois officialdom, the bourgeois system of administration, and has created conditions which enable the workers and peasants themselves to set about this job, a job of incredible difficulty, whose difficulties it would be absurd to conceal from ourselves; for the capitalists and landowners have for centuries been hounding and persecuting tens of millions of people even for harbouring the thought of administering the land. Now, in the space of a few weeks, a few months, in the midst of desperate and frightful disruption, when the whole body of Russia has been bruised and battered by the war, so that the people are like a man who has been thrashed

within an inch of his life—at such a time, when the tsars, the landowners and the capitalists have left us with a country in a state of utter disruption, the new job, the new work of building must be shouldered by the new classes, by the workers and those peasants who do not exploit hired workers and do not profiteer in grain. Yes, this is an extremely difficult task, but an extremely rewarding one. Every month of such work and such experience is worth ten, if not twenty, years of our history. Yes, we are not afraid to confess what an acquaintance with our decrees will show, namely, that we have constantly to alter them; we have not yet produced anything finished and complete, we do not yet know a socialism that can be embodied in clauses and paragraphs. If we are now able to submit a Soviet Constitution[189] to this Congress, it is only because Soviets have been set up and tested in all parts of the country, because you yourselves have created that Constitution and tested it in all parts of the country; only six months after the October Revolution, and nearly a year after the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, are we able to write down what already exists in practice.

In the economic sphere, where we are only just beginning to build socialism, and where a new discipline must be built up, we have no such experience—we are acquiring it by dint of alteration and reconstruction. That is our prime task. We say that every new social order demands new relations between man and man, a new discipline. There was a time when economic life was impossible without feudal discipline, when there was only one kind of discipline—the discipline of the lash; and there was a time of the rule of the capitalists, when the disciplinary force was starvation. But now, with the Soviet revolution, with the beginning of the socialist revolution, discipline must be built on entirely new principles; it must be a discipline of faith in the organising power of the workers and poor peasants, a discipline of comradeship, a discipline of the utmost mutual respect, a discipline of independence and initiative in the struggle. Anyone who resorts to the old capitalist methods, anyone who at a time of famine and want argues in the old, capitalist way—if I sell grain on my own, I shall make a bigger profit; if I set out on my own to get grain, I shall

get it easier—anyone who argues in that way may be choosing the easier road, but he will never arrive at socialism.

It is simple and easy to keep within the old realm of customary capitalist relations; but we want to take a new road. It is one which demands of us and of all the people a high level of political consciousness and organisation; it demands more time and involves graver mistakes. But we say that only those who attempt nothing practical make no mistakes.

If, in the opinion of the meeting, the period under review includes experiments in which one frequently meets with changes, amendments, reversions to the old, that is not the chief thing, the chief meaning and value of this period. The old government apparatus of bureaucrats, for whom it was enough to order an increase of salary, is a thing of the past. We have now to deal with workers' organisations which are taking economic administration into their own hands. We have to deal with the railway workers, who used to be worse off than others, and who have a legitimate right to demand an improvement of conditions. Tomorrow the river transport workers will submit their demands, and the day after, the middle peasants—I shall speak of them at greater length—who often feel they are worse off than the worker, whom we treat with the utmost attention, and to whose interest all our decrees are devoted—a thing the previous speaker has absolutely failed to grasp. All this creates enormous difficulties, but they are difficulties which are due to the fact that the workers and poor peasants for the first time in centuries are themselves, with their own hands, organising the whole economic life of Russia. And so, we have to find means of satisfying just demands; we have to alter decrees and reconstruct the system of administration. Side by side with cases of mistakes and failures—cases which the bourgeois press seizes upon and which, of course, are numerous—we achieve successes, we learn by these partial mistakes and failures, we learn by experience how to build the edifice of socialism. And when we are showered with new demands from all sides, we say: that is as it should be, that is just what socialism means, when each wants to improve his condition and all want to enjoy the benefits of life. But the country is poor, the country is poverty-stricken, and it is

impossible just now to satisfy all demands; that is why it is so difficult to build the new edifice in the midst of disruption. But those who believe that socialism can be built at a time of peace and tranquillity are profoundly mistaken: it will everywhere be built at a time of disruption, at a time of famine. That is how it must be. And when we see before us people with real ideas, we say: all the thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of workers and working peasants have set about building the new, socialist edifice with their own hands. A profound revolution is now beginning in the countryside, where the kulaks are agitating and trying to interfere with the working peasants who do not exploit the labour of others or profiteer in grain, and there the task is different. In the towns the thing is to organise the factories, the metal industry; and what with the havoc of the war, to distribute production, to distribute raw materials and other materials is a very difficult task.

There the workers are learning to do this and are forming central organs of administration; there we are having to reconstruct the Supreme Economic Council; for the old laws, passed at the beginning of the year, are already out of date, the workers' movement is marching ahead, the old workers' control is already antiquated, and the trade unions are becoming the embryos of administrative bodies for all industry. (*Applause.*) In this sphere quite a lot has already been done, but still we cannot boast of any brilliant successes. We know that in this sphere the bourgeois elements, the capitalists, landowners and kulaks will for a long time yet have the opportunity to carry on their propaganda and say that, as usual, a decree has been passed but is not being enforced, another has only just been passed, yet after three months it is already being altered, while profiteering is going on just the same as under capitalism. Yes, it is true that we do not know of any universal quack panacea for putting an end to profiteering at one stroke. The habits of the capitalist system are too strong; to re-educate the people who have been brought up to these habits for centuries is no easy matter and will take a long time. But we say that our fighting weapon is organisation. We must organise everything, take everything into our own hands, keep a check on the kulaks and profiteers at every step,

declare implacable war on them and never allow them to breathe freely, controlling their every move.

We know from experience that alterations of decrees are unavoidable, for new difficulties are encountered which are a source of fresh changes. And if in the matter of food supply we have now arrived at the point of organising the poor peasants, and if our former comrades, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, say in all sincerity—which cannot be doubted—that our ways have parted, our firm reply to them is: all the worse for you, for that means that you have turned your back on socialism. (*Applause.*)

Comrades! The food question is the main question, it is the one to which we are devoting most attention in our policy-making. A host of small measures which are imperceptible to the outsider, but which the Council of People's Commissars has adopted—such as the steps to improve the water and rail transport systems, the clearing up of the war commissariat stores, the fight against profiteering—were all directed towards putting food supply on a proper footing. Not only our country, but even the most civilised countries, which never knew what famine meant before the war, are now all in a state of utmost distress, created by the imperialists in their struggle for the supremacy of one group or another. In the West, tens of millions of people are suffering the torments of starvation. It is this that makes social revolution inevitable, for social revolution stems not from programmes but from the fact that tens of millions of people say: "Rather than live and starve, we prefer to die for the revolution." (*Applause.*)

A terrible disaster—famine—has befallen us, and the more difficult our situation, the more acute the food crisis, the more the capitalists intensify their struggle against Soviet power. You know that the Czechoslovak mutiny is a mutiny of men who have been bought by the British and French imperialists. We are constantly hearing of revolts against the Soviets in one place or another. The kulak risings are spreading from region to region. In the Don region, there is Krasnov, whom the Russian workers magnanimously allowed to go free in Petrograd when he came and surrendered his sword, for the prejudices of the intellectual are still strong and the intellectuals protested against capital punish-

ment—Krasnov was allowed to go free because of the intellectual's prejudice against capital punishment. But I would like to see the people's court today, the workers' or peasants' court, which would not sentence Krasnov, who is shooting workers and peasants, to be shot. We are told that when people are sentenced to be shot by Dzerzhinsky's commission[190] it is all right, but if a court were to declare publicly and openly that a man was a counter-revolutionary and deserved to be shot, that would be wrong. People who have sunk to such depths of hypocrisy are political corpses. (Applause.) No, a revolutionary who does not want to be a hypocrite cannot renounce capital punishment. There has never been a revolution or a period of civil war without shootings.

Our food supply has been reduced to an almost catastrophic state. We have reached the direst period in our revolution. We are facing the most distressful period of all—there never has been a more difficult period in workers' and peasants' Russia—the period that remains until the harvest. I have seen plenty of party differences and revolutionary disputes in my day, and I am not surprised to find that in such a time of stress an increasing number of people are giving way to hysterics and crying: "I will resign from the Soviets," and talking of the decrees abolishing capital punishment. But he is a poor revolutionary who at a time of acute struggle is halted by the immutability of a law. In a period of transition laws have only a temporary validity; and when a law hinders the development of the revolution, it must be abolished or amended. Comrades, the worse the famine becomes, the clearer it becomes that this desperate calamity must be combated by equally desperate measures. Socialism, I repeat, has ceased to be a dogma, just as it has perhaps ceased to be a programme. Our Party has not yet drawn up a new programme, but the old one is already worthless. The proper and equitable distribution of bread—that is what constitutes the basis of socialism today. (*Applause.*) The war has bequeathed to us a legacy of economic disruption; the efforts of Kerensky and the landowners and kulaks saying, "After us the deluge", have reduced the country to such a state that they say, "The worse it gets, the better." The war has bequeathed us such

hardships that in this matter of the food supply we have the very essence of the whole socialist system, and we must take this matter into our hands and find a practical solution for it. And we ask ourselves what is to be done about bread: are we to continue along the old, capitalist lines, with peasants taking advantage of the situation and making thousands of rubles profit out of grain, at the same time calling themselves working peasants, and sometimes even Left Socialist-Revolutionaries? (*Applause and commotion.*) They argue like this: if people are starving, grain prices will rise; if the towns are starving, I will stuff my pockets; and if the starvation becomes worse, I will make thousands more. But I know very well that the blame for this kind of argument does not lie with individuals. The whole abominable heritage of landowner and capitalist society has taught people to argue, to think and to live like this; and to reform the life of tens of millions of people is terribly difficult; it will require long and persistent work, and this work we have only just begun. We would never think of blaming people who, tormented by hunger and seeing no benefit in the organisation of a socialist system of bread distribution, scurry to look after themselves and let everything else go hang. These people cannot be blamed. But we do say that when it is a case of representatives of parties, when it is a case of people belonging to a definite party, when it is a case of large bodies of people, we expect them to look at the matter, not from the standpoint of the suffering, tormented, hungry individual, against whom nobody would think of raising his hand, but from the standpoint of the building of a new society.

I repeat, it will never be possible to build socialism at a time when everything is running smoothly and tranquilly; it will never be possible to realise socialism without the landowners and capitalists putting up a furious resistance. The worse our situation is, the more gleefully they rub their hands and the more they resort to revolt; the worse our situation is and the more saboteurs there are in our midst, the more eagerly they embark on all kinds of Czechoslovak and Krasnov affairs. And we say that the old way is not the way to cope with this, hard though it may be to drag the cart forward, uphill, instead of allowing it to slip back

downhill. We know very well that not a week or even a day passed without the Council of People's Commissars considering the food problem, without our issuing thousands of recommendations, orders and decrees, and discussing how to combat famine. Some say there is no need for special prices, for fixed prices, for a grain monopoly: give people a free hand to trade. The rich will get richer still, and if the poor die of starvation, well, they always have. But a socialist cannot argue like that; at this moment, when the hill is steeper than ever and the cart has to be dragged up the steepest inclines, socialism has ceased to be a matter of party differences and has become a practical issue; it is a question of whether we can hold out against the kulaks, by allying ourselves with the peasants who do not profiteer in grain; it is a question of whether we can hold out now, when we have to fight, and work of the heaviest kind lies ahead of us. They talk about the Poor Peasants' Committees. Those who have seen the torments of hunger for themselves will clearly realise that in order to break and ruthlessly crush the kulaks, the most drastic and ruthless meansures are required. When we proceeded to organise unions of poor peasants, we fully realised what a severe and drastic measure this was; but only an alliance of the towns with the rural poor and with those who have stocks but do not profiteer, with those who want to cope vigorously with the difficulties and ensure that the grain surpluses go to the state and are distributed among the working people—such an alliance is the sole method of waging this struggle. And the way to wage this struggle is not by means of programmes and speeches; this struggle with famine will show who is going the direct route to socialism, despite all trials and hardships, and who is succumbing to the trickery and deceit of the kulaks.

If there are people in the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party who, like the previous speaker—one of the sincerest, and therefore one who is most liable to be carried away, most subject to changes of opinion—say that they cannot work with the Bolsheviks and are quitting, we shall not regret it for a minute. Socialists who quit at a moment like this, when hundreds and thousands of people are dying of hunger while others have such large surpluses of grain

that they had not sold them before last August, when the fixed prices for grain were doubled—against which all democrats protested—those who know that the people are suffering untold torments of hunger yet do not want to sell their grain at the price at which the middle peasants are selling it, are enemies of the people, they are out to ruin the revolution and are lending their support to oppression—they are friends of the capitalists! War on such people, relentless war on them! (*General applause, in which a large number of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries take part.*) A thousand times wrong, a thousand times mistaken is he who allows himself even for a moment to be carried away by enemy talk and to say that this is a fight against the peasantry—as incautious or thoughtless Left Socialist-Revolutionaries sometimes do. No, this is a fight against that insignificant minority, the village kulaks, this is a fight to save socialism and to distribute bread in Russia properly (*Voices*: "What about goods?") We shall fight in alliance with the overwhelming majority of the peasants; we shall win this fight, and then every European worker will see in practice what socialism means.

We shall get help in this struggle from anyone who has been toiling all his life and who may not know scientifically what socialism means, but who knows that he earned his bread at a hard price. He will understand us. That man will be on our side. As for the kulaks who possess surpluses of grain and are capable of concealing that grain at a moment of extreme national calamity, at a moment when all the gains of the revolution are at stake, when the Skoropadskys of every hue and in every part of the country, occupied or not, are craning their necks and only waiting for the moment to overthrow the power of the workers and peasants by famine and reinstate the landowners—at such a moment it is our cardinal socialist duty to proclaim ruthless war on the kulaks. He is a poor socialist who at this moment of grave difficulty and severe trial for the starving people and for the socialist revolution washes his hands and repeats the lying tales of the bourgeoisie.

It is false, a thousand times false, to say this is a fight against the peasantry! I have seen this said hundreds of times in the columns of the Constitutional-Democratic news-

papers, and I am not surprised to hear them crying that the workers have split with the peasantry. When they hysterically cry: "Peasants, open your eyes, come to your senses and have done with the Bolsheviks!"—when I hear and read things like this, I am not at all surprised. There it is quite in place. These people are serving the master it is their function to serve. But I would not like to be in the skin of a socialist who sinks to talk like this! (*Loud applause.*) Comrades, we fully realise what incredible difficulties the solution of the food problem entails. Here the prejudices are most profound; here the interests are most deep-rooted—kulak interests; here division, stagnation, the scattered character of village life, ignorance—all, in many cases, are united against us. But we say that in spite of these difficulties, we cannot withdraw; famine is not a thing to be trifled with; and if the masses of the people do not receive assistance in this famine, hunger is capable of driving them even into the arms of Skoropadsky. It is false to say that this is a fight against the peasantry! Anyone who says that is an out-and-out criminal; those who have allowed themselves to be driven by hysteria to such talk are victims of a terrible misfortune. No, we are not even fighting the middle peasant, let alone the poor peasant. All over Russia, the middle peasants have only the smallest surpluses of grain. The middle peasants for decades before the revolution lived worse than the workers. Before the revolution their life was one of unrelieved want and oppression. Our policy towards these middle peasants is one of agreement. The socialist revolution means equality for all the working people; it would be unfair for the urban worker to receive more than the middle peasant, who does not exploit the labour of others by hiring labour or profiteering; the peasants suffer from greater want and oppression than the workers, and fare even worse than the workers. They have no organisations or trade unions to work for the improvement of their conditions. Even with the workers' unions we find it necessary to hold dozens of meetings to try and level out wages among the various trades, and all the same cannot get them levelled. Every sensible worker knows that this will require a long time. See how many complaints are received by the Commissariat for

Labour! You will find that every trade is raising its head; they don't want to live in the old way; they don't want to live like slaves, they say. In this poverty-stricken, destitute country we want to heal the wounds it has suffered. We must somehow or other save economic life, which has almost completely broken down. This can only be done by organisation. In order to organise the peasantry, we issued the decree about the Poor Peasants' Committees. Only the enemies of socialism can be opposed to this decree. We said that we considered it fair to lower the price of textiles We are registering and nationalising positively everything. (*Applause.*) And that will permit us to regulate the distribution of the products of industry.

We said: cut the prices of textiles for the poor peasants by half, and for the middle peasants by 25 per cent. Perhaps these scales are wrong. We do not claim that our solution of the problem is right. We do not say that. To solve the problem rightly, go and do it together. (*Applause.*) Sitting in your armchairs in the chief administrations, fighting profiteering and trying to catch swindlers who are doing their dirty work in secret, is not going to solve the problem.

Only when the Commissariat for Food, in conjunction with the Commissariat for Agriculture, nationalises all goods and fixes prices—do we really come close up to socialism. It is only the working people of the towns and the rural poor, all those who labour, do not rob others, do not exploit the labour of others either by hiring or by profiteering, only they come close to socialism—for the man who demands a hundred rubles or more for grain is no less a profiteer than the man who employs hired labour; perhaps he is even a worse, a more arrant profiteer. After a desperately difficult half-year of Soviet rule, we have now arrived at the organisation of the poor peasants. It is a pity we did not arrive at it after half a week—that is where we are to blame! If we had been reproached with having brought in the decree on the organisation of the poor peasants and the food dictatorship six months too late, we should have welcomed the reproof. We say that only now that we have taken this path has socialism ceased to be a mere phrase and is becoming a practical thing. It is possible that the decree is unhappily conceived, that the scales are wrong. How were we to

determine them? Only by your experience. How many times have we altered the railwaymen's scales, even though they have their trade unions, whereas the poor peasants have none! Let us co-operate in checking whether the scales laid down in the decree on the poor peasants are right, whether it is right to lower prices for the poor peasants by half and for the middle peasants by a quarter, and to take everything away from the rich peasants—whether these scales are right or not.

If there is to be a fight, we shall wage that fight by bold decrees without hesitating for a moment. It will be a real fight for socialism—not for a dogma, not for a programme, for a party, for a faction, but for living socialism, for the distribution of bread among hundreds of thousands and millions of starving people in the foremost districts of Russia, for taking grain wherever it is to be found and distributing it properly. I repeat, we do not doubt for a moment that ninety-nine peasants out of every hundred, when they learn the truth, when they receive the decree, test it, try it in practice and tell us how to correct it—and we will correct it, we will alter the scales—when they tackle this job and get an idea of its practical difficulty, these peasants will be on our side and will say, we are displaying the healthy instinct of the working man, and that this, and only this, will decide the real issue, the fundamental and vital issue—socialism. We shall establish proper prices for goods, we shall establish a monopoly on grain, on textiles and on all products; and then the people will say: "Yes, the distribution of labour, the distribution of bread and other products inaugurated by socialism is better than it was before." And that is what the people are beginning to say. In spite of a host of mistakes, in spite of incidents which we make no attempt to conceal, but rather drag into the light and hold up to shame—cases when our detachments themselves succumb to profiteering, sink down into that slippery gulf into which all the capitalist habits and customs tend to drag people—yes, there are such cases everywhere, we know that people cannot be remoulded all at once, that you cannot inspire tens of millions of people with faith in socialism all at once (where are they to get this faith from? Not out of their own heads, surely? No, from their exerience)—

but in spite of all this, people are beginning to say that bread can be secured without profiteering, and that the only salvation from famine lies in an alliance of the urban, factory, industrial workers with the poor peasants, for only the poor peasant does not profiteer in grain. Yes, as soon as the middle peasant sees our decrees, reads them for himself, compares them with the talk and slanders of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the champions of the kulak, he will say that in establishing one scale for the poor peasants and another for the middle peasants, and in taking grain from the kulaks without compensation, we are acting rightly. He may not say that we are acting like socialists—he may not know that word—but he is our sure ally, for he does not profiteer in grain, and he will realise and agree that to profiteer in grain at a moment of direst danger to the socialist revolution is a heinous crime against the people.

Bread cannot be distributed by decree. But when, after long and persistent effort in establishing and improving the alliance of the factory, urban workers with the rural poor, with the working peasants who do not hire any labourers and do not engage in profiteering, we get this thing properly going, no hysterical outcries against our Party will succeed in rupturing that alliance. (*Applause.*)

When we promised the peasants socialisation of the land, we made a concession; for we understood that nationalisation could not be introduced at one stroke. We know that we may have made a mistake in embodying your socialisation of the land in our law of October 26.* It was a concession to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who refused to be in the government and said they would only remain if this law were passed. Spiridonova is a thousand times wrong in bringing forward unconnected facts and saying that she came to see me, humbled herself and implored. Comrades, many of you have been to see me and know that that cannot have been the case, that no comrade could have been treated like that. It must be a bad party indeed whose best spokesmen stoop to spreading fairy-tales. (*Commotion.*) I have a letter from Comrade Spiridonova—she has often written

* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 257-61.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to me. I shall find that letter tomorrow and make it known. She writes: "Why do you refuse to grant two million for agricultural communes?" And this on the very day when Sereda, the People's Commissar for Agriculture, whose work she does not understand, submitted a proposal to assign ten million for agricultural communes.[191] (*Prolonged applause*). You heard Comrade Spiridonova say the same thing in her speech; but it must be a bad party indeed whose sincerest people stoop to spreading fairy-tales for propaganda purposes. I repeat, it must be a bad party indeed whose best and sincerest spokesmen go to the length of spreading such fairy-tales about the Soviet government! All the worse for them! Every peasant who comes to the Commissariat for Agriculture and reads that ten million have been assigned for agricultural communes will see and believe his own yes and ears more than somebody else's speeches, and will understand that these people have sunk so low as to spread fairy-tales, and he will turn his back on this party. (*Applause.*). I want to say only one thing in concluding my speech. Until the new harvest, until that harvest is brought to the starving localities of Petrograd and Moscow, a hard period of the Russian revolution lies before us. A really close alliance between the urban workers and the rural poor, the rural working masses who do not profiteer in grain, is the only thing that can save the revolution.

Our Congress shows that in spite of everything the alliance of all the working people is growing, spreading and gaining strength not only in Russia, but all over the world. Absurdly little, terribly little is known abroad about our revolution. The military censorship there lets nothing through. The comrades who returned from abroad have told us that; yet, in spite of everything, guided by sheer instinct, the European workers sympathise with the Bolshevik Government. And ever more numerous are voices showing that sympathy for the socialist revolution is growing in Europe in the countries where the imperialist war is still in progress. The Bolshevik Government is receiving expressions of gratitude, sympathy and support from German socialists and other men and women whose names are known to every enlightened worker and peasant, people like Clara Zetkin and Franz Mehring. In Italy, Lazzari, the old

secretary of the party, who at Zimmerwald regarded the Bolsheviks with mistrust, is now in prison for having expressed his sympathy with us.

Understanding of the revolution is growing. In France, comrades and workers, who at the Zimmerwald Conference treated the Bolsheviks with profound mistrust, the other day issued a manifesto in the name of the Committee of International Relations[192] earnestly appealing for support of the Bolshevik Government and opposing adventures by any party.

And so, comrades, however difficult and arduous the period that lies ahead of us may be, it is our duty to tell the truth and to open people's eyes to this, for only the people, by their initiative and organisation, by advancing demand after demand and defending the socialist republic, can help us. And we say, comrades, that there is not a shadow of doubt that if we follow the path which we have chosen and which events have confirmed, if we follow this path firmly and unswervingly, if we do not allow ourselves to be diverted from the right path by any phrase-making, illusions, deceit or hysterics, we have every chance in the world of maintaining our position and of resolutely furthering the victory of socialism in Russia, and thus furthering the victory of the world socialist revolution! (*Loud and prolonged applause and cheers.*)

2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE
JULY 5, 1918

All the objections of the opposition concerning my report begin with the question of the Brest Treaty. But such a formulation of the question could be called practical only if it led to practical results. None of their speeches about this have produced results, nor can they produce any. (*Applause.*)

If the party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries happened to have a majority, they would not be making so much fuss about this matter as they are making now. What should be discussed are the real achievements of the Soviet Republic on the road to socialism. We can assert—and not one speaker has denied this—that in this respect great success has been achieved since the last Congress. Nor have the representatives of the opposition refuted the fact that all who are in favour of tearing up the Brest peace are acting in the interests of restoring the power of the landowners and capitalists and rely for their strength on the support of Anglo-French imperialism. When I said that the Czechoslovaks in return for ten or fifteen million are also out to bring about this break, no one denied it. Can anyone deny that the Czechoslovaks, hiding behind the slogan of the Constituent Assembly, are aiming at dragging us into war?

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries said it was impossible to create an army in a short time, but everything depends on how soon we put the fuel situation right, how the peasants get on, and what happens to the harvest.

Your appeals for the creation of guerilla detachments to fight a regular imperialist army are recognised as absurd by any soldier.

When people force us to go back to the question of the Brest peace, we say: "That peace will be violated if you overthrow Soviet power, and that will not happen!" (*Applause.*) Only then, on the basis of tearing up the Brest peace, will you be able to drag the masses of the working people into a war to the delight of the landowners, capitalists and whiteguards, who have been bribed with the millions of the Anglo-French imperialists. Sabotage of the Brest peace will in practice stem from forces hostile to the masses of the working people. None of the objections concerning the Brest peace can be considered practical. They are merely the hysterics of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

When it was said here that the Bolsheviks were yielding, and that their reports contained nothing of practical value, I recalled the words uttered here by one Socialist-Revolutionary, a Maximalist I think he was, to the effect that the Supreme Economic Council is passing from the control of production to its administration.[193] Isn't that statement of practical value? What, then, are those workers doing, who by their own efforts, through their trade unions, have begun to learn from the bosses the business of administering enterprises? You say that it is an easy thing to learn to administer, but every day we in the Supreme Economic Council have to settle thousands of conflicts and incidents which show that the worker has learnt a lot, and we must conclude that the workers are beginning to learn—slowly, to be sure, and with mistakes; but it is one thing to utter fine phrases, and another to see how with every passing month the worker is beginning to find his feet, how he is beginning to lose his timidity and to feel that he is the ruler. Rightly or wrongly, he is acting as the peasant does in an agricultural commune. Time has shown that the worker had to learn to administer industry, and all the rest is just empty talk and not worth a brass farthing. If, after six months of Soviet rule, we are now beginning to find that control is out of date, that is a big step forward.

The cry has been raised here that we are marking time, or even retreating. Nothing of the kind. You may persuade the kulak of that, but not the ordinary worker; he knows what we mean when we say, let us have better people than the ones you sent, make them learn better than you are learning.

And so, when the cry is raised here about concessions, let us ask any worker or peasant what he prefers: to pay in concessions the debt the Germans imposed upon us, or to fight? When we signed the Peace Treaty of Brest, we said of the imperialists that until they were vanquished by an international socialist revolution, we should not be able to defend ourselves in any other way than by retreating. That is unpleasant, but it will remain a fact—and it is better to tell the people so until we have built up an army, for which we shall need only a few years, not decades, provided we introduce a proper system of bread distribution, so that there will be stocks of grain for the army, gathered and stored. In what uyezd or gubernia have the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries done that? They have done nothing of the kind! And until it is done, we declare that all your cries are just empty talk; whereas when we take a step towards administration by the workers, we take a step forward. My words have been misquoted here. What I said was that it must be a bad party whose sincere members are obliged to stoop to such talk.

We have assigned a thousand million to our Commissariat for Food—isn't that a step forward? Much still remains to be arranged, and you can do it if you only have the desire. But through whom, I do not know. Not through the old officials, surely? Our workers and peasants on the Soviets are learning to do it (*applause*), and so the purchases of textiles and the appropriations are having their effect. Hundreds of times the Council of People's Commissars has discussed through whom to purchase textiles, how to exercise control, and how to get them distributed as quickly as possible. And we know that as the weeks go by measures have been devised for combating profiteering and catching profiteers, and that with every month the workers are getting a firmer mastery of this job—and this success of ours nobody can deny. We are advancing, not marking time. On June 28, we carried out nationalisation[194] to the extent perhaps of several hundred millions, yet you keep on objecting and repeating the talk of the bourgeois intellectuals. Socialism is not a job that can be done in a few months. We are not marking time, but are continuing to move towards socialism, and since the Brest peace we have come closer to it.

The workers have derived experience from a number of mistakes, they realise the gravity and difficulty of the struggle, while the peasants have experience in the socialisation of the land, and there can be no doubt that the more experienced and intelligent peasants are saying: "In the first spring we took land for ourselves; in the autumn we'll take over the whole job, the whole business of distributing the land." Do not forget that we are selling the peasants textiles at a 50 per cent rebate, that is, at half-price. Who else would have given the poor peasants textiles at such a price? We shall proceed towards socialism by way of grain, textiles and implements, which will not fall into the hands of the profiteers, but will go first and foremost to the poor peasants. That is socialism. (*Applause.*) After six months of socialist revolution, the people who get all their ideas from books understand nothing. We have arrived at a stage where we are taking the concrete step of distributing bread and exchanging textiles for bread in such a way that it is the poor that benefit, and not the rich profiteers. We are not a bourgeois republic; if we were we should not need Soviets. It is the poor that must benefit from the distribution of grain and textiles—that is something no republic in the world has attempted, but we are attempting it now. (*Applause.*) We are doing a noble work; we have the experience; and we are doing everything in our power to get the poor to organise. Cases of extortion and hooliganism are practically disappearing; for every such case there are a dozen others when the poor peasants and the middle peasants say: we must get rid of the kulak and the landowner! Since the Brest peace we have made tremendous strides in the education of the peasants, and they are now no longer novices in the struggle for socialism.

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

July 7, 1 a.m.

TSARITSYN
TO PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR STALIN

Today at about three p.m. a Left Socialist-Revolutionary killed Mirbach with a bomb. This murder is obviously in the interests of the monarchists or Anglo-French capitalists. The Left S.R.s, not wanting to surrender the assassin, arrested Dzerzhinsky and Latsis and began an uprising against us. We are liquidating it mercilessly this very night and we shall tell the people the whole truth: we are a hair's breadth from war. We have hundreds of Left S.R.s as hostages. Everywhere it is essential to crush mercilessly these pitiful and hysterical adventurers who have become tools in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. All who are against war will be for us.

As regards Baku, the most important thing is that you should be continuously in contact with Shahumyan, and that Shahumyan should know of the Germans' proposal, made to Ambassador Joffe in Berlin, to the effect that the Germans would agree to halt the Turks' offensive against Baku if we guaranteed the Germans part of the oil: Of course, we shall agree. And so, be merciless against the Left S.R.s and report more frequently.

Lenin

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the manuscript

INTERVIEW GRANTED TO AN *IZVESTIA* CORRESPONDENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LEFT SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY REVOLT[195]

BRIEF REPORT

Revolution with remarkable consistency drives every proposition to its logical conclusion and ruthlessly exposes the utter futility and criminality of all wrong tactics.

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, carried away by high-sounding phrases, have for several months now been screaming: "Down with the Brest peace! To arms against the Germans!"

We replied that under present conditions, in the present period of history, the Russian people cannot fight and do not want to fight.

Closing their eyes to the facts, they continued with insane obstinacy to persist in their own line, not sensing that they were drawing further and further away from the masses of the people, and determined at all costs, even by brute force, to impose their will on these masses, the will of their Central Committee, which included criminal adventurers, hysterical intellectuals, and so on.

And the further they drew away from the people, the more they earned the sympathies of the bourgeoisie, which was hoping to accomplish its designs by their hand.

Their criminal terrorist act and revolt have fully and completely opened the eyes of the broad masses to the abyss into which the criminal tactics of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary adventurers are dragging Soviet Russia, the Russia of the people.

On the day of the revolt, I myself and many other comrades had occasion to hear even the most backward sections of the people expressing their profound disgust of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries .

One simple old woman said indignantly on hearing of the assassination of Mirbach:

"The devils, so they've driven us into war after all!"

It at once became perfectly clear and obvious to everybody that the Socialist-Revolutionaries' terroristic act had brought Russia to the brink of war. That, in fact, was what the masses thought of the action of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

They are trying by underhand methods to embroil us in war with the Germans at a time when we cannot fight and do not want to fight. The masses will never forgive the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries for trampling so brutally on the will of the people and trying to force them into war.

And if anybody was well pleased with the action of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and rubbed his hands with glee, it was only the whiteguards and the servitors of the imperialist bourgeoisie whereas the worker and peasant masses have been rallying ever closer and more solidly around the Communist-Bolshevik Party, the authentic spokesman of the will of the masses.

Izvestia VTsIK No. 141,
July 8, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

TO THE WORKERS OF PETROGRAD

Dear Comrades,

I am taking advantage of the fact that Comrade Kayurov, an old acquaintance of mine and well known to the Petrograd workers, is leaving for Petrograd, to send you a few words.

Comrade Kayurov has been in Simbirsk Gubernia and has himself observed the attitude of the kulaks to the poor peasants and to our government. He has perfectly realised what no Marxist and no class-conscious worker can doubt, namely, that the kulaks hate the Soviet government, the government of the workers, and *will inevitably overthrow it* if the workers do not *immediately* make every effort to forestall the attack of the kulaks on the Soviets and to smash the kulaks before they can manage to unite.

The class-conscious workers can do this at the present moment; they can rally the poor peasants around themselves, defeat the kulaks and smash them, *provided the vanguard* of the workers realise their duty, make every effort and organise *a mass campaign into the rural districts.*

Nobody but the workers of Petrograd can do this, for there are no other workers in Russia as class-conscious as the Petrograd workers. It is *foolish and criminal* to stay in Petrograd, starve, hang around idle factories and cherish the absurd dream of restoring Petrograd industry or defending Petrograd. That will mean the ruin of our revolution. The Petrograd workers must abandon such nonsense, send packing the fools who advocate it, and set out in *tens of thousands* for the Urals, the Volga and the South, where there

is an abundance of grain, where they can feed themselves and their families, where they *must* help the poor peasants to organise, and where the Petrograd worker is *indispensable* as an organiser, guide and leader.

Kayurov will recount his personal observations, and, I am certain, will convince all waverers. The revolution is in danger. Only a *mass* campaign of the Petrograd workers can save it. Arms and money we shall not stint.

With Communist greetings,
Lenin

July 12, 1918

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the manuscript

SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT STATEMENT AT THE SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C. JULY 15, 1918[196]

Comrades, our Soviet Republic cannot complain of any shortage of political crises and sudden political changes. No matter how simple, how elementary all the imperialist forces may be (and they cannot, of course, feel at ease side by side with the Socialist Soviet Republic), yet in a situation like the one we are passing through at present, with war still continuing on its former scale, the obviously dominant forces, the combination of the two imperialist groups continues to cause political crisis and the like. Concerning one such event, which either resembles or is a real political crisis, I have a communication to make to you.

Yesterday, July 14, at 11 p.m., the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was visited by the German Chargé d'Affaires Doctor Ritzler, who informed him of the contents of a telegram he had just received from Berlin in which the German Government instructs him to request the Russian Government to allow a battalion of German soldiers in uniform to enter Moscow for the purpose of guarding the German Embassy and to allow these soldiers to be dispatched to Moscow at once.

It was further stated in the message that the German Government was far from aiming at any sort of occupation.

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in agreement with the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, replied that the common people of Russia desire peace, that the Russian Government is prepared to give the German Embassy, Consulate and Commissions an entirely adequate

and reliable guard consisting of its own troops, but that it cannot under any circumstances allow a foreign military unit to enter Moscow; it firmly hopes that the German Government, inspired by the same desire for peace, will not insist on its request.

In fact, the request to the Russian Government is in complete contradiction to the statement made by the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag that the unfortunate murder of Count Mirbach would not lead to a worsening of relations between the two countries. It also contradicts the wish that we know has been expressed by leading commercial and industrial circles to set up and develop close economic relations to the benefit of both countries; it contradicts the negotiations that have been proceeding successfully. Numerous statements made to our representative in Berlin concerning the political situation and the attitude to Russia also bear witness to this fact.

We still have every reason to hope that a favourable solution to this unexpected incident will be found, but whenever tension arises in our international relations we consider it necessary to make known the facts openly and make the issues clear.

I therefore consider it my duty to make the following Government statement:

"The Government of the Soviet Republic was well aware when it concluded the Brest peace what an onerous task the workers and peasants of Russia had been obliged to undertake owing to the international situation that had developed. The will of the overwhelming majority at the Fourth Congress of Soviets was perfectly clear; the working classes demanded peace because they needed a rest to be able to work, to organise the socialist economy, to recover and build up their strength, which had been undermined by an agonising war.

"In obedience to the will of the Congress the government has carried out the harsh terms of the Brest Treaty to the letter, and of late our negotiations with the German Government concerning the exact amount of the payments to be made by us, and the forms of payment, which we have decided to discharge as soon as possible, have made considerable progress.

"But while most scrupulously fulfilling the terms of Brest and upholding the will of the workers and peasants to have peace, the Soviet Government has never lost sight of the fact that there are limits beyond which even the most peace-loving masses of the working people will be compelled to rise, and will rise, as one man to defend their country with arms in hand.

"The senseless and criminal folly of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries has brought us to the brink of war. Our relations with the German Government were bound, despite our will, to become strained. We acknowledge the legitimacy of the German Government's desire to strengthen the guard over its Embassy and we have gone very far in order to satisfy this desire.

"But when we were informed of the German Government's desire, which is not yet formulated as a categorical demand, that we should allow a battalion of armed German soldiers in uniform access to Moscow, we replied—and we now repeat that reply before the highest body of the Soviet government of workers and peasants, before the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—that we could on no account and under no circumstances satisfy such a request, because this would be objectively the beginning of the occupation of Russia by foreign troops.

"To this action we would have been obliged to respond as we have responded to the Czechoslovak mutiny and to the military operations of the British in the North, namely—by expanded mobilisation, by the calling up of all adult workers and peasants for armed resistance, and for the destruction, in the event of a temporarily necessitated withdrawal, of absolutely every road and railway without exception, and also of stores, particularly food stores, so that they do not fall into the hands of the enemy. War would then be for us a fateful but absolute and unconditional necessity, and this would be a revolutionary war waged by the workers and peasants of Russia shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet government till the last breath.

"Like its foreign policy, the home policy of the Soviet government, in strict adherence to the decisions of the Fifth Congress of Soviets, remains unchanged. The criminal folly of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have turned out

to be henchmen of the whiteguards, the landowners and the capitalists, will now that the clouds are gathering and the danger of war is increasing be even more criminal in the eyes of the people, and we shall fully and wholeheartedly support and carry out the ruthless punishment of the traitors who have been irrevocably condemned by the will of the Fifth Congress of Soviets. If war, in spite of all our efforts, becomes a fact, we shall be unable to maintain a shadow of trust in the gang of Left Socialist-Revolutionary traitors, who are capable of thwarting the will of the Soviets, resorting to military betrayal and the like. We shall draw fresh strength for war from the merciless suppression both of the madly reckless (Left Socialist-Revolutionary) and the class-conscious (landowner, capitalist and kulak) exponents of counter-revolution .

"To the workers and peasants of all Russia this is our appeal: 'Triple vigilance, caution and endurance, comrades! Everyone must be at his post! Everyone must give his life if necessary to defend Soviet power, to defend the interests of the working people, the exploited, the poor, to defend socialism!'"

Newspaper reports published on July 16, 1918 in *Pravda* No. 146 and in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 148

Published according to the text of the book: *Fifth Convocation of the All-Russia C.E.C. of the Soviets, Verbatim Report.* All-Russia C.E.C. Publishers, 1919; the Government Statement published according to the manu-

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN LEFORTOVO DISTRICT[197] JULY 19, 1918

The critical position of the Soviet Republic has two causes, home and foreign. We have never attempted to conceal from the workers and peasants how great was the burden of the shameful peace. Burdensome though it was, the Fourth Congress of Soviets deemed it essential to make this peace in order to afford the Russian workers and peasants a breathing-space and an opportunity to consolidate their position. The responsibility for the assassination of Mirbach lies at the door of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party, which has brought Russia within an ace of doom.

There are signs that the German Government is prepared to come to terms and may renounce the dispatch of a battalion of German soldiers to Moscow. The Soviet Government has categorically rejected this request of the German Government, even if it leads to war.

The folly of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries has severely affected the position of Soviet power, but, on the other hand, one result has been that the best of them, the working people, are repudiating the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party.

The aggravation of relations with Germany has been accompanied by an aggravation of relations with the other coalition. The Czechoslovak revolt is its work. This is borne out in the case of the officers, who are being supported by French money and are assisting the Czechoslovaks.

Lenin went on to speak of the war, which is engendering revolution, and the longer it lasts, the more hopeless it makes the position of the belligerent countries and the

nearer it brings them to revolution. Germany and Austria have again been swept by a strike wave. All the imperialist sharks are hurling themselves on Russia and are bent on tearing her to pieces, for they know that every month of socialist Russia's existence brings them nearer to their own doom. To us has fallen the supreme honour and supreme difficulty of being the first socialist detachment in the fight against world imperialism. Our task is to hold on.

Lenin then went on to speak of the famine, which the whiteguards are banking on in order to overthrow the Soviet government. The monarchists, the kulaks, the moneybags are playing up the famine for all they are worth. They are not confining themselves to propaganda, but are corrupting the poor peasants, egging them on to profiteer and to fight the workers. Two classes are in conflict: the proletariat and the kulaks, the capitalists. One of these classes must win, and the other will be smashed. Our socialist revolution calls for an alliance of the class-conscious workers with the majority of the peasantry, the poor and middle peasants, to combat the kulaks and to establish the strictest order in the interests of the workers. We have one means of salvation from famine at our disposal, and that is a fighting alliance between the workers and the poor peasants to take away the grain from the kulaks and profiteers. Look the danger in the face! The enemy is everywhere, but we have new allies too—the proletariat of the countries where war is still being waged. We also have allies at home—the vast mass of the poor peasants, who will march shoulder to shoulder with the urban proletariat.

Pravda No. 151,
July 21, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TO ZINOVIEV, LASHEVICH AND STASOVA

It is essential to move the *maximum* number of workers from Petrograd:

(1) some dozens of "leaders" (à la Kayurov)

(2) thousands of "rank and file".

Otherwise *we shall fall*, for the situation with the Czechoslovaks is *as bad as could be.*

In such a situation it is silly to "sit tight" on the "well-being" of Petrograd and to "grudge" giving from there: let the Bolshevik majority in the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies even fall from 98 per cent (have you 98 per cent?) to 51 per cent! What does it matter!

We shall not perish *even* (even!) if in Petrograd the number of those not ours in the Soviet of Deputies goes up to 49 per cent (if ever this does happen). But we shall certainly *perish* owing to the Czechoslovaks unless we make *desperate* efforts to add hundreds and thousands of *leading* workers in order to convert the jelly into something solid. This is not an exaggeration but an accurate appraisal. *You* will be responsible for our perishing if you are miserly and keep back "for Petrograd".

Greetings! Yours, *Lenin*

P.S. Reply!

July 20, 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Published according to the manuscript

REPORT DELIVERED AT A MOSCOW GUBERNIA CONFERENCE OF FACTORY COMMITTEES[198] JULY 23, 1918

NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Lenin's appearance in the conference hall was greeted with loud applause, which continued for several minutes.*) These past few days have been marked by an extreme aggravation of the affairs of the Soviet Republic, caused both by the country's position internationally and by the counter-revolutionary plots and the food crisis which is closely connected with them.

Allow me to dwell on the international situation. The Russian revolution is only one of the contingents of the international socialist army, on the action of which the success and triumph of our revolution depends. This is a fact which none of us lose sight of. We likewise bear in mind that the vanguard role of the Russian proletariat in the world working-class movement is not due to the economic development of the country. On the contrary, it is the backwardness of Russia, the inability of what is called our native bourgeoisie to cope with the enormous problems connected with the war and its cessation that have led the proletariat to seize political power and establish its own class dictatorship.

Aware of the isolation of its revolution, the Russian proletariat clearly realises that an essential condition and prime requisite for its victory is the united action of the workers of the whole world, or of several capitalistically advanced countries. But the Russian proletariat knows perfectly well that it has both avowed and unavowed friends in every country. For example, there is no country where the prisons are not crammed with internationalists who

sympathise with Soviet Russia; there is no country where revolutionary socialist thought has not found expression in either the open or underground press. And therefore, knowing our true friends, we refuse to come to any understanding with the Mensheviks, who supported Kerensky and his offensive. Very significant in this latter connection is a letter (small in size but distinctly internationalist in substance) from the internationalist Rosa Luxemburg, which appeared in the British paper the *Workers' Dreadnought*[199] on the subject of the June offensive. Rosa Luxemburg holds that the internationalism of the Great Russian Revolution was undermined by Kerensky's offensive and by the sanction and approval given to it by the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets. This offensive of revolutionary Russia retarded the development of the revolution in the West, and it was only the dictatorship of the proletariat, its assumption of the entire power, that led to the frustration of the secret treaties and the exposure of their predatory, imperialist character, and, hence, to the acceleration of revolutionary developments in Europe. An equally powerful influence in awakening and developing proletarian energies in the West was exercised by our appeal to all the nations for the conclusion of a democratic peace without annexations or indemnities.* All these revolutionary acts opened the eyes of the workers of the whole world, and no efforts on the part of the bourgeois and renegade socialist groups will succeed in obscuring their awakened class consciousness. The reception given to Kerensky by the British workers shows this quite clearly. The attraction exercised by the Russian revolution found expression in the first action of the German workers on a grand scale since the outbreak of the war, when they reacted to the Brest negotiations by a gigantic strike in Berlin and other industrial centres. This action of the proletariat in a country doped by the fumes of nationalism and intoxicated with the poison of chauvinism is a fact of cardinal importance and marks a turn of sentiment among the German proletariat.

We cannot say what course the revolutionary movement in Germany will take. One thing is certain, and that is the

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* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 249-53.—*Ed.*

existence of a tremendous revolutionary force there that must by iron necessity make its presence felt. There is no reason to blame the German workers for not making a revolution. One might with equal justice have blamed the Russian workers for not manufacturing a revolution during the ten years 1907-1917. But that, we know, would be wrong. Revolutions are not made to order, they cannot be timed for any particular moment; they mature in a process of historical development and break out at a moment determined by a whole complex of internal and external causes. That moment is close at hand and is bound to come, inevitably and unavoidably. It was easier for us to start the revolution, but it is extremely difficult to continue it and consummate it. It is terribly difficult to make a revolution in such a highly developed country as Germany, with its splendidly organised bourgeoisie, but all the easier will it be to triumphantly consummate the socialist revolution once it flares up and spreads in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe.

There is no reason to blame us for concluding the Brest Treaty—humiliating, distressful and brutal though it is—or to regard it as a complete renunciation of our ideals and an act of allegiance to German imperialism. It is characteristic that these accusations come from the bourgeois circles and compromiser-socialists, who in the Ukraine, Finland and the Caucasus (the Mensheviks) are today greeting the German Junkers with open arms. Similar accusations are showered upon our heads by the empty-headed Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. We are perfectly aware of the distressful nature of the Brest Treaty. We are also aware that under this brutal treaty we shall have to pay Germany about 6,000,000,000 rubles, according to the calculations of our economic delegation now in Berlin. The situation is undoubtedly a hard one, but a way out can and must be found by the joint efforts of the proletariat and the poor peasants. And the mad attempt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to embroil us in war by assassinating Mirbach is not the way to escape from the Brest Treaty. On the contrary, this act of folly played into the hands of the German war parties, whose position, naturally, is bound to be weakened by the growth of defeatism not only among the German

workers, but also among the bourgeoisie. For now, after the Brest peace, it is clear and obvious to everybody that Germany is waging a predatory war for definitely imperialist aims.

The food situation in Soviet Russia, surrounded as she is on all sides by imperialist plunderers and with ever alert counter-revolutionaries within the country supporting them, is very grave.

The attention of the working class must be directed to combating famine, the bourgeoisie's most effective means of fighting the proletarian dictatorship. But one thing we must take as our fundamental precept: in combating famine, we will categorically renounce the bourgeois methods of struggle, the method of starving the masses in the interests of the money-bags and parasites, and will resort to purely socialist methods. And these consist in introducing a grain monopoly and establishing fixed prices in the interests of the workers.

The bourgeoisie and its followers, the compromiser-socialists, are advocating freedom of trade and the abolition of the fixed prices. But freedom of trade has already displayed its fruits in a number of cities. No sooner were the bourgeoisie in power than the price of grain increased several times over, and as a result that commodity disappeared from the market; it was hidden away by the kulaks in the hope of a further rise of prices.

The most desperate enemy of the proletariat and Soviet Russia is famine. But in its efforts to vanquish it, the proletariat comes into collision with the rural bourgeoisie, which, far from having any interest in putting an end to the famine, derives advantage from it for its own group and class. The proletariat must bear this in mind and, in alliance with the starving peasant poor, must start a desperate and uncompromising struggle against the rural kulaks. With the same purpose in view, the organisation of food detachments already begun should be continued, and at the head of them should be placed honest Communists who enjoy the confidence of the Party and trade union organisations. Only then will the food problem be solved and the cause of the revolution saved.

Published in *Pravda* No. 153
and in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 155,
July 24, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text, collated
with the *Izvestia* text

CONVERSATION WITH J. V. STALIN BY DIRECT LINE JULY 24, 1918

TSARITSYN, TO STALIN

Lenin speaking.

Can you transmit to Baku a wireless telegram just received from Tashkent:

. . . . . .

Next about food, I must tell you that today none at all is being issued; neither in Petrograd nor in Moscow. The situation is very bad. Inform us whether you can take extraordinary measures, for there is nowhere we can get anything except from you. In Yaroslavl the rising of the Whites has been put down. Simbirsk has been captured by the Whites or Czechs. I await your reply.

STALIN'S REPLY

Two nights ago we sent to Turkestan all that could be sent.

The wireless message has been transmitted to Baku. There are large stocks of grain in the North Caucasus, but the railway line being cut prevents sending them to the North.

Until the line is restored delivery of grain is out of the question. An expedition has been sent to Samara and Saratov gubernias, but it will not be possible to help you with grain within the next few days. We hope to restore the line in about ten days. Hold out somehow, distribute meat and fish, which we can send you in plenty. In a week's time things will be better.

Stalin

TSARITSYN, TO STALIN

Send fish, meat, vegetables, any kind of produce, whatever you can and as much as you can.

Lenin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Published according to
the manuscript; J. V. Stalin's
reply according to the text
of the telegram

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING IN KHAMOVNIKI DISTRICT[200] JULY 26, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Lenin was welcomed with cheers and loud applause.*) Speaking on the subject, "What the Soviet Constitution Will Mean to the Working People", Lenin noted that the Soviet Constitution, which, like the Soviets, had been created in a period of revolutionary struggle, was the first to proclaim the government power of the working people and to disfranchise the exploiters—the enemies of the building of a new life. This was the chief thing that distinguished it from the constitutions of other countries, and it was a pledge of ultimate victory over capital.

Referring to some of the chief principles of the Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, Lenin said that the working people of all countries would see that the Soviet Constitution—the fundamental law of the Russian Socialist Federative Republic—reflected the ideals of the proletariat of the whole world. "The hour of reckoning with the bourgeoisie of all countries is approaching! Indignation is growing in Western Europe! The task before us is to overcome all obstacles in our path, however difficult they may be, and to maintain the power of the Soviets until the working class of all countries revolts and raises aloft the great banner of a world socialist republic!" (*Loud applause.*)

Pravda No. 157,
July 28, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

BY DIRECT LINE
TO ZINOVIEV, THE SMOLNY, PETROGRAD

News has just been received that Alexeyev in the Kuban area, with about sixty thousand men, is advancing against us, carrying out the plan for a combined attack by the Czechoslovaks, the British and the Alexeyev Cossacks. In view of this, and in view of the statement of the Petrograd workers, Kayurov, Chugurin and others, who have arrived here, that Petrograd could provide ten times as many if it were not for the opposition of the Petrograd section of the C.C.—in view of this I categorically and imperatively insist on the cessation of all opposition and on the dispatch from Petrograd of ten times as many workers. That is the demand of the C.C. of the Party.

I categorically warn you that the Republic is in a dangerous situation and that the Petrograders, by holding up dispatch of workers from Petrograd to the Czech front, will make themselves responsible for the possible downfall of our whole cause.

Lenin

N.B. Return me this paper with a note *of the time* it was transmitted to the Smolny in Petrograd.

Lenin

Written July 27, 1918

First published in 1948
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Published according to
the manuscript

NOTES

[1] With this article, published in *Pravda* on February 21, 1918, Lenin launched a public campaign in the press for the conclusion of peace. p. 19

[2] The reference is to the voting on the question of peace at the meetings of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on January 11 (24)* and on February 17, 1918. At the first meeting two members of the Central Committee voted in favour of a revolutionary war; at the second meeting no votes were cast in favour of this proposal. Those in favour of continuing the war abstained from voting. p. 21

[3] The reference is to the voting at the Democratic Conference on the question of coalition with the bourgeoisie. Lenin analyses the results of the voting in his work *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* "The latest returns of the voting by 'curias' *for* and *against* coalition with the bourgeoisie in Tsereteli's 'Bulygin Duma', i.e., in the notorious 'Democratic' Conference, constitute one of the objective and incontrovertible proofs of this. If we take the Soviets' curias we get:

	For coalition	Against
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies	83	192
Soviets of Peasants' Deputies	102	70
All Soviets	185	262

So, the majority as a whole is on the side of the proletarian slogan: against coalition with the bourgeoisie." (See present edition, Vol. 26, p. 97.)

The *All-Russia Democratic Conference* was held by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee of the Soviets ostensibly to decide who should rule the country. The organisers' real aim, however, was to distract the attention of the masses of the people from the mounting revo-

* The new calendar was introduced on February 21, 1918. Dates up to the reform are indicated in both Old and New Styles, the New Style date appearing in brackets.

lution. The conference took place from September 14 to 22 (September 27 to October 5), 1917 in Petrograd. It was attended by more than 1,500 people. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders did all they could to weaken worker and peasant representation and to increase the number of delegates from the various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois organisations, thus ensuring themselves a majority at the conference. The Bolsheviks took part in the conference in order to use it as a platform for exposing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 25

[4] This is a reference to the defeatism of Zinoviev and Kamenev, who opposed armed uprising in October 1917. p. 26

[5] The reference is to the occupation of Belgium by German troops for nearly four years during the world war of 1914-18. p. 27

[6] *Novy Luch* (New Ray)—organ of the Mensheviks' combined Central Committee. The newspaper began publication in Petrograd on December 1 (14), 1917 under the editorship of Dan, Martov, Martynov and others. It was closed down in June 1918 for counter-revolutionary agitation. The reference here is to the Mensheviks associated with the paper. p. 27

[7] *Dyelo Naroda* (People's Cause)—organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, first published in Petrograd, then in Samara and Moscow. It appeared irregularly and under various titles from March 1917 to March 1919. The reference here is to the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries associated with the paper. p. 27

[8] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life) began publication in April 1917 in Petrograd. The group connected with the paper referred to here consisted of Menshevik supporters of Martov, who called themselves internationalists, and of lone intellectuals of a semi-Menshevik orientation. In October 1917 this group threw in its lot with the rest of the Mensheviks in opposing the armed uprising; after the October Revolution, with the exception of a few individuals who joined the Bolsheviks, it took up a hostile attitude to Soviet power. In July 1918 *Novaya Zhizn* was closed down along with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 27

[9] "Left Bolsheviks", or "Left Communists"—an anti-Party group formed at the beginning of 1918 during the controversy over concluding peace with Germany. The "Left Communists", like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, opposed peace negotiations and upheld the adventuristic policy of involving the young Soviet Republic, which as yet had no army, in "revolutionary war" against imperialist Germany. The group was led by Bukharin, Radek and Pyatakov. The "Left Communists" and Trotsky, who pursued the line of continuing the war in a more oblique and disguised form under the slogan of "not waging war but not concluding peace either", attempted to impose on the Party a policy that would

have led to the destruction of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin called the "Left Communists" an "instrument of imperialist provocation". With Trotsky's support the "Left Communists" launched an open campaign against the Party line and caused disorganisation by resigning from their posts in the Party and the Soviets, and so on. Lenin and his associates had a hard struggle in the Central Committee against Trotsky and the "Left Communists" to achieve a decision in favour of concluding peace with Germany and thus save the young Soviet Republic from destruction. Under Lenin's leadership the Party came out firmly against the provocatory policy of Trotsky and the "Left Communists"; the "Left Communists" were isolated and routed. p. 28

[10] This decree was passed by the Council of People's Commissars on February 21, 1918 and published on February 22 in *Pravda* and *Izvestia TsIK*. It was also issued as a separate pamphlet. p. 30

[11] This article was written by Lenin in connection with the opposition, expressed by the "Left Communists" at a meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on February 22, 1918, to acquiring arms and food supplies from Britain and France for purposes of defence against the German imperialists. When the Council of People's Commissars discussed the question on February 21, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries opposed the use of aid from the Allies and the following resolution was passed: "In view of the disagreement concerning the negotiations with the Allied Powers for supplying the country with food and military equipment the meeting shall be adjourned for the groups to consult among themselves."

Lenin was not present at the discussion of this question in the Central Committee on February 22, but he sent the following statement: "To the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Please include my vote in favour of accepting potatoes and arms from the bandits of Anglo-French imperialism." By 6 votes to 5 the Central Committee passed a resolution in which it acknowledged that it was permissible for the purpose of arming and providing the revolutionary army with the necessary supplies to acquire such supplies from the governments of capitalist countries, while maintaining complete independence in foreign policy.

After the vote Bukharin tendered his resignation from the Central Committee and the editorship of *Pravda*. In addition, eleven "Left Communists"—Lomov (Oppokov), Uritsky, Bukharin, Bubnov, Pyatakov and others—submitted a statement to the Central Committee charging the Central Committee with capitulating to the international bourgeoisie, and stating that they would conduct extensive agitation against the policy of the Central Committee.

The same day the question of obtaining arms and food supplies from the Allied Powers was again discussed, this time by the Council of People's Commissars, which decided in favour of obtaining them. p. 36

[12] *Kalyayev, I. P.* (1871-1905)—a member of the combat group of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, took part in a number of terroristic acts. On February 4 (17), 1905 he assassinated the Governor General of Moscow, the Grand Duke S. A. Romanov, uncle of Nicholas II. He was executed at Schlüsselburg on May 10 (23). p. 37

[13] A joint meeting of the Bolshevik and Left Socialist-Revolutionary groups in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee was held in the evening of February 23, 1918 to discuss the question of accepting the new German peace terms. The atmosphere at the meeting was extremely tense. After a report on the situation at the front by the Supreme Commander N. V. Krylenko, who announced that the army was demobilising spontaneously, K. B. Radek, D. B. Ryazanov and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary I. Z. Steinberg spoke against concluding peace. Lenin spoke in favour of concluding peace.

No decisions were taken at the meeting.

The joint meeting of the two groups was followed by a meeting of the Bolshevik group of the All-Russia C.E.C. The "Left Communists" demanded freedom to vote as they pleased at the forthcoming meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., but this demand was rejected by the group and a majority decision was taken to vote at the All-Russia C.E.C. meeting in favour of concluding peace. p. 42

[14] The meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. to discuss the question of making peace with Germany opened on February 24, 1918 at 3 a.m. under the chairmanship of Y. M. Sverdlov. During the debate on Lenin's report the conclusion of peace was opposed by representatives of the Mensheviks, the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the anarchists. By 116 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions, the meeting passed the Bolshevik resolution on accepting the German peace terms. The majority of the "Left Communists" did not participate in the voting and left the hall while it was being taken. p. 43

[15] The reference is to N. V. Krylenko's appeal to the troops quoted in Lenin's article "Bolshevism and 'Demoralisation' of the Army". Lenin's article was published in *Pravda* No. 72, June 3 (16), 1917. p. 44

[16] This article examines the statement submitted to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on February 22 by the "Left Communists" and signed by a group of members of the Central Committee and People's Commissars—A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov), M. S. Uritsky, N. I. Bukharin, A. S. Bubnov, V M. Smirnov, I. N. Stukov, M. G. Bronsky, V N. Yakovleva, A. P. Spunde, M. N. Pokrovsky and G. L. Pyatakov.

The copy of the statement on which Lenin made notes in preparation for quoting it in his article has not survived. p. 48

[17] The reference is to the Peace of Tilsit signed in July 1807 between France and Prussia, which imposed onerous and humiliating obligations on Prussia. Prussia lost a large part of her territory and was compelled to pay an indemnity of 100 million francs; she also undertook to reduce her army to 40,000 men, to provide auxiliaries for Napoleon on demand, and to cease trading with England. p. 51

[18] Lenin refers to the inquiry telegraphed by the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia C.E.C. to all gubernia and uyezd Soviets and to all gubernia, uyezd and volost land committees, requesting them to communicate as quickly as possible their attitude to the signing of the peace terms offered by the German Government. The inquiry was sent out on the basis of a decision passed by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on Lenin's proposal of February 23, 1918. The inquiry described the German peace terms and stated that the All-Russia C.E.C. had accepted them; the results of the voting in the All-Russia C.E.C. were quoted and the two points of view on the question of making peace were set forth.

Lenin made a close study of the answers received. In an article for *Komsomolskaya Pravda* No. 56, March 6, 1928 entitled "Vladimir Ilyich and the Treaty of Brest", B. Malkin wrote: "I remember how on the next day (after the inquiry had been sent out—*Ed.*) I brought Vladimir Ilyich some replies we had received by direct line. He quickly sorted them out between industrial and peasant centres and declared immediately: 'It is perfectly clear that the villages don't want to fight. A special inquiry must be made of all the volosts, then the picture will be perfectly clear.' On behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia C.E.C., express telegrams of inquiry were sent out even to the volosts, In the following fortnight replies began to come in from all over Russia."

These replies were published in *Izvestia VTsIK* between February 28 and March 8. Lenin kept a record of the replies, grouping them under the headings, "For Peace" and "For War' (see *Lenin Miscellany XI*, pp. 59-60 and *XXXVI*, p. 30).

In the final table, which Lenin evidently compiled on the eve of the Seventh Party Congress, the following data are cited:

	For peace	For war		For peace		For war		
26.II	60	61	replies					
27.II	54	24	received					
28.II	26	23	by					
1.III	9	7	C.P.C.	155	+	119	=	274
2.III	6	4	and	95	+	105	=	200
Total:	155	119	C.E.C.	Σ = 250	+	224	=	474
3.III				167	+	128	=	295
4.III and 5.III	12	9		95	+	105	=	200
	167	128		262	+	233	=	495

p. 55

[19] On February 25 the "Left Communists" announced that "for as long as the C.C. and the C.P.C. are compelled to take a defensive line, we shall refrain from putting our decision into practice". When the peace was signed, however, they reaffirmed their withdrawal from the Central Committee and "responsible posts". p. 56

[20] In the document "Position of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) on the Question of the Separate and Annexationist Peace" the first and the two concluding paragraphs were written by Y. M. Sverdlov. p. 58

[21] Lenin has in mind the joint meeting of the Bolshevik and Left Socialist-Revolutionary groups of the All-Russia C.E.C. on February 23, 1918. p. 63

[22] The question of the evacuation of the Government and government institutions from Petrograd to Moscow in view of the German offensive on Pskov was discussed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on February 26, 1918. With minor amendments Lenin's draft decision was accepted by the Council of People's Commissars. The final decision on making Moscow the capital of the Soviet Republic was taken by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in March 1918. p. 67

[23] This refers to the voting on the question of peace with Germany at a meeting of the Party Central Committee representing various trends in the Party on January 21 (February 3), 1918. Two "Left Communists", Osinsky (Obolensky) and Stukov, voted against any possibility of peace between socialist and imperialist countries. The majority of the "Left Communists", however, took an ambivalent stand. While admitting the possibility of peace being concluded between socialist and imperialist states, they voted against the immediate conclusion of peace with Germany (see *Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)*, August 1917 to February 1918, 1958, pp. 190-91). p. 71

[24] *Kommunist*—a daily newspaper issued by the "Left Communists" in Petrograd from March 5 to March 19, 1918 as the "organ of the St. Petersburg Committee and the St. Petersburg Area Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." Only eleven issues appeared. Publication was ceased by decision of the Petrograd City Party Conference of March 20, 1918. The conference stated that the policy of the Petrograd Committee, as expressed in the newspaper *Kommunist*, was deeply erroneous, and that it completely failed to reflect the attitude of the Petrograd organisation of the Communist Party. The conference declared *Petrogradskaya Pravda* to be the organ of the Petrograd Party organisation in place of *Kommunist*. p. 79

[25] On February 24, 1918 the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies passed a resolution approving the decision of the All-Russia C.E.C., which stated that the conclusion of peace was

essential as "the only way out of the present grave situation". At the same time the Petrograd Soviet decided "to take all necessary measures to organise troop trains to be sent to the front". p. 83

[26] At a meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Moscow on March 3, 1918, in which factory committees, trade unions, district Soviets, responsible officials and others took part, the majority of those present spoke in favour of peace. On March 4 the question of peace was discussed at a meeting of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.); by 10 votes to 7 a resolution in favour of making peace was passed. On the night of March 4, a Moscow city conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was held at which a large number of workers were also present, besides the delegates. The majority at the conference voted for a resolution approving the position of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on the question of peace. p. 83

[27] The Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), the Communist Party's first Congress after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, was held March 6-8, 1918 in the Taurida Palace in Petrograd to decide the question of concluding peace with Germany, over which a fierce internal controversy had sprung up within the Party.

Lenin and the members of the Central Committee who supported him were striving to bring Soviet Russia out of the imperialist war. The principles on which Lenin's position was based were most fully expressed in his *Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace* (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 442-50). The conclusion of the Brest peace was opposed by a group of "Left Communists" led by N. I. Bukharin. L. D. Trotsky took up a position close to that of the "Left Communists". The "Left Communists", who held leading posts in the Moscow, Petrograd, Urals and some other Party organisations, launched a violent campaign against Lenin's policy. The Moscow Regional Bureau passed a resolution expressing distrust of the Party Central Committee and made what Lenin described as the "strange and monstrous" statement (see this volume, pp. 68-75) that it would be expedient in the interests of international revolution to "accept the possibility of losing Soviet power". The adventuristic slogans of the "Left Communists" were rejected by the majority of lower Party organisations. By the time the Congress took place Lenin's policy of concluding peace enjoyed the support of the majority of Party organisations.

Such were the conditions in which the Congress assembled. Of the delegates attending the Congress 47 had a vote and 59 had a voice but no vote; they represented over 170,000 Party members, including members of the big Party organisations—Moscow, Petrograd, Urals and Volga Region. By the time the Congress opened the Party numbered nearly 300,000 members (50 per cent more than at the time of the Sixth Congress). But a considerable number of

organisations were unable to send delegates because of the haste with which the Congress was assembled, or were unable to do so because of the temporary occupation of various parts of the country by the Germans.

The agenda and procedure were considered on March 5 at a preliminary meeting of delegates. At this first meeting the Congress approved the following agenda: report of the Central Committee; the question of war and peace; revision of the Programme and changing the name of the Party; organisational matters; election of the Central Committee.

Lenin directed all the work of the Congress. He delivered the Central Committee's political report and the report on revision of the Programme and changing the name of the Party, and took part in discussing all questions on the agenda. Altogether he spoke 18 times.

After the Central Committee's political report the leader of the "Left Communists" Bukharin delivered the second report, in which he upheld the adventuristic demand for war with Germany.

Eighteen delegates took part in the hard-hitting debate on the two reports. Lenin was supported by Y. M. Sverdlov, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), I. T. Smilga, the delegate from Yaroslavl Rozanova, and others. Some of the "Left Communists" were moved by the force of Lenin's arguments to revise their position.

Having unanimously approved the Central Committee's report, the Congress went on to discuss the resolution on war and peace. The Congress rejected the "Theses on the Present Situation", which had been submitted as a resolution by the "Left Communists". A signed vote was taken and by 30 votes to 12 with 4 abstentions Lenin's resolution on the Brest peace was passed (see this volume, pp. 118-19).

The Congress discussed the question of revising the Programme and changing the name of the Party. Lenin delivered a report on these subjects. The basis of his report was his "Rough Outline of the Draft Programme" (see this volume, pp. 152-58), which had been handed round to the delegates at the beginning of the Congress. Lenin pointed out that the name of the Party should reflect its aims, and proposed renaming the Party the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and altering its Programme. The Congress voted unanimously in favour of Lenin's resolution and approved his proposal for the name of the Party. The Congress elected a seven-man commission headed by Lenin to draw up the final version of the new Programme.

By a secret vote the Congress elected a Central Committee consisting of 15 members and 8 candidates. The "Left Communists" N. I. Bukharin, A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov) and M. S. Uritsky, who were elected to the Central Committee, stated at the Congress that they would not work in the Central Committee, and did not begin work there for several months in spite of the insistent demands of the Central Committee.

The Seventh Party Congress was of immense historical importance. It affirmed the correctness of the Leninist principles of the

foreign policy to be pursued by the Soviet State, the policy of gaining a peaceful respite; it routed the disorganisers of the Party, the "Left Communists" and the Trotskyites, and set the Communist Party and the working class to solve the basic tasks of socialist construction. The decisions of the Congress were widely discussed in the local Party organisations and were generally approved in spite of the continued disrupting activities of the "Left Communists".

The Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which was held soon afterwards (March 14-16), ratified the Peace Treaty of Brest. p. 85

[28] On April 18,1917, Milyukov, the Foreign Minister of the bourgeois Provisional Government, circulated a Note to the Allied Powers stating that the Provisional Government would observe all the tsarist treaties and undertook to continue the imperialist war. On April 20 the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, on learning about Milyukov's Note, demonstrated in the streets with the slogans "All power to the Soviets" and "Down with war". On April 21 the Petrograd workers in response to a call made by the Bolshevik Party stopped work and held a demonstration. The chief demand of the 100,000 demonstrators was for peace. By confronting the broad masses with the question of "who to support?" and showing that only the working class by taking power could put an end to the war, the April demonstration hastened the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie replied to it with the new manoeuvre of forming a coalition government in which Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries participated. p. 87

[29] Lenin refers to the demonstration in Petrograd of July 3-4 (16-17), 1917. Spontaneous demonstrations against the Provisional Government began in Vyborg District on July 3 (16). The 1st Machine-Gun Regiment was the first to demonstrate. It was joined by other army units and factory workers. The demonstration threatened to develop into an armed attack on the Provisional Government.

At this time the Bolshevik Party was against an armed uprising because it considered that the revolutionary crisis had not yet matured, that the army and the provinces were not ready to support an uprising in the capital. At a joint meeting of the Central Committee with the Petrograd Committee and the Military Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) at 4 p.m. on July 3 (16), it was decided to refrain from armed action. The Second Petrograd City Conference of Bolsheviks, which was being held simultaneously, took an analogous decision. The conference delegates went out to the factories and various districts of the city to restrain the masses from taking armed action. But the uprising had already begun and it could not be stopped.

Taking into account the mood of the masses, the Central Committee in consultation with the Petrograd Committee and the Military Organisation decided late in the evening on July 3 (16) to

participate in the demonstration in order to give it an organised and peaceful character. Lenin, who was not in Petrograd at the time, came straight to the capital when he heard what was happening. He arrived in the morning on July 4 (17). More than 500,000 people took part in the demonstration of July 4 (17), which was conducted under the main slogan of the Bolsheviks, "All power to the Soviets".

With the knowledge and consent of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee, detachments of officers and officer cadets were sent against the peacefully demonstrating workers and soldiers, and opened fire on the demonstrators. Counter-revolutionary military units were recalled from the front to smash the revolutionary movement.

On the night of July 4 (17) the Bolshevik Central Committee decided to halt the demonstration. Late at night Lenin visited the *Pravda* editorial office to look at the current issue; half an hour after he left, the office was wrecked by a detachment of officer cadets and Cossacks.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in effect, aided and abetted the counter-revolution. Having helped to smash the demonstration, they associated themselves with the bourgeoisie in attacking the Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik newspapers *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda* and others were banned by the Provisional Government. Mass arrests, searches and pogroms began. The revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison were withdrawn from the capital and sent to the front.

After the July Days the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government took over complete control of the country and the Soviets were reduced to the role of a helpless appendage. The period of dual power was over, the peaceful state of the revolution was also over. The Bolsheviks were now faced with the task of preparing an armed uprising for the overthrow of the Provisional Government. p. 87

[30] *Kornilov revolt*—a counter-revolutionary conspiracy organised in August 1917 by the Russian bourgeoisie and landowners and led by the tsarist general Kornilov. On August 25 Kornilov began withdrawing troops from the front to march against Petrograd. In response to a Bolshevik appeal the common people rose against Kornilov. The workers of Petrograd took up arms and began to form detachments of Red Guards. The attempt at counter-revolution was quickly crushed and Kornilov himself arrested. p. 88

[31] The reference is to the defeatist position taken up by L. B. Kamenev, G. Y. Zinoviev, A. I. Rykov and certain other members of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government, who after the October Socialist Revolution supported the Socialist-Revolutionary demand for the setting up of a "homogeneous socialist government" (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 275-82, 301-07). p. 88

[32] The April (Seventh) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was held in Petrograd April 24-29 (May 7-12), 1917. The conference was attended by 133 delegates with a vote and 18 delegates with a voice but no vote, representing 80,000 Party members. This was the first legal Bolshevik conference with the importance of a Party Congress.

The April Conference took Lenin's April Theses as the basis for its work, defined the Party line on all basic questions of the revolution and set the Party the aim of fighting for the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. p. 88

[33] Kaledin, A. M. (1861-1918) was a tsarist general. At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 he became one of the leaders of the monarchist counter-revolution and organiser of the Civil War against Soviet power on the River Don. When defeated in January 1918, he shot himself. p. 91

[34] This argument against the signing of the peace terms dictated by Germany was put forward by the "Left Communists" at a meeting of members of the Central Committee with Party workers on January 8 (21), 1918. V. V. Obolensky (N. Osinsky) asserted that "the German soldier will not agree to take part in an offensive", and Y. A. Preobrazhensky tried to prove that the German army was "technically incapable of advancing: winter, no roads...". The wrongness and harmfulness of such arguments was exposed by Lenin in his article "The Revolutionary Phrase" (see this volume, pp. 19-29). p. 94

[35] Soon after the publication of Lenin's Decree on Peace, which was passed by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the Soviet Government sent a Note to the Entente powers proposing the immediate conclusion of an armistice on all fronts and the starting of peace negotiations. The refusal of the imperialists of the Entente to support the initiative of the Soviet Government and their active opposition to the conclusion of peace compelled the Council of People's Commissars to begin separate peace negotiations with Germany. After preliminary negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice, the peace conference opened at Brest-Litovsk on December 9 (22), 1917. It was attended by a delegation from Soviet Russia and a delegation from the powers of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey). At the conference the Soviet delegation made a declaration, based on the propositions of the Decree on Peace, setting forth proposals for the conclusion of a just and democratic peace without annexations and indemnities. After going through a series of manoeuvres, the delegation from the German bloc stated that the Soviet proposals were inacceptable and on January 5 (18), 1918 offered Soviet Russia onerous and predatory peace terms stipulating that Poland, Lithuania and parts of Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia should be placed under German control.

On January 8 (21), 1918 at a meeting between members of the Central Committee and Party workers Lenin gave detailed arguments proving the need to conclude peace even on these onerous terms. These arguments were expounded in his "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace" (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 442-44). Questions of war and peace were discussed at meetings of the Central Committee on January 11 (24), January 19 (February 1), January 21 (February 3), and on February 18, 22, 23 and 24, 1918. To prevent the collapse of the peace negotiations and to stop the adventuristic policy of the "Left Communists" and Trotsky being put into effect, Lenin got the Central Committee of the Party to pass a decision on the need for sustaining the peace negotiations for as long as possible and signing the peace terms only if the Germans should present an ultimatum. On January 27 (February 9), however, when the Germans demanded in the form of an ultimatum that the Soviet delegation should sign the peace terms they had proposed on January 5 (18), Trotsky, who was leading the Soviet delegation at this stage, ignored the Central Committee's decision and in spite of Lenin's demand refused to sign the peace treaty while stating simultaneously that Russia would cease waging war and would demobilise her army.

The German imperialists took advantage of this. On February 18, German troops broke the armistice agreement and launched an offensive all along the Russo-German front. The same day, on Lenin's insistence the Party Central Committee passed a decision to sign the peace treaty with Germany. But on February 22, imperialist Germany presented a fresh ultimatum stipulating even more onerous and humiliating peace terms: in addition to the territory they had occupied the Germans demanded that Soviet Russia should cede provinces of Latvia and Estonia that were not in German hands, and that she should conclude peace with the Ukrainian Central Rada, withdraw Soviet troops from the Ukraine and Finland, pay Germany a huge indemnity and demobilise her army. On February 23 the Central Committee came out in favour of Lenin's proposal to conclude peace immediately on the terms proposed by Germany. On the morning of February 24, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and then the Council of People's Commissars decided to accept the new peace terms, and this was immediately made known to the German Government. On March 1, 1918 the peace negotiations were reopened and the Peace Treaty was signed on March 3.

The revolution in Germany of November 1918 deposed Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Soviet Government was able to annul the Treaty of Brest. p. 96

[36] The Soviet Government published the secret diplomatic papers and the secret treaties between the tsarist government (and subsequently the bourgeois Provisional Government) of Russia and the governments of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Austria-Hungary and other imperialist powers, On November 10 (23), 1917

the newspapers began publishing these secret diplomatic papers and treaties, which afterwards appeared in the *Collections of Secret Documents from the Archives of the Former Ministry for Foreign Affairs*. Seven of these collections came out between December 1917 and February 1918. p. 97

[37] The reference is to the signed oath of loyalty to the tsar that was obligatory for deputies of the Third State Duma. Since refusal to take this oath meant losing the platform in the Duma that was needed to mobilise the proletariat for revolutionary struggle, the Social-Democrat deputies signed the oath along with the rest of the members of the Duma. p. 100

[38] The term "field revolution on a world-wide scale" was used by V. V. Obolensky (N. Osinsky) in the "Theses on the Question of War and Peace", which he wrote for the meeting of the Party Central Committee on January 21 (February 3), 1918 and published on March 14 in the "Left Communist" newspaper *Kommunist* No. 8. Explaining what he meant by this term, Obolensky wrote: "Revolutionary war, as a field civil war, cannot resemble in character the regular military actions of national armies when they are carrying out strategic operations.... Military action assumes the character of guerrilla warfare (analogous to barricade fighting) and is mixed with class agitation." p. 102

[39] *Hoffmann*, *Max* (1869-1927)—German general and prominent figure in German reactionary militarist circles. In September 1916 he became Chief of Staff and, in effect, was in command of the German forces on the Eastern front. He played a prominent part in the Brest negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Austro-German coalition.

Liebknecht, *Karl* (1871-1919)—an outstanding figure in the German working-class movement, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany and a leader of the uprising of the Berlin workers in January 1919. After the suppression of the uprising he was brutally murdered by counter-revolutionaries. p. 102

[40] *Putilov workers*—those employed at the Putilov Works in Petrograd. p. 104

[41] Lenin appears to be referring to the period between the launching of the German offensive, on February 18, and the arrival of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk on February 28, 1918. The German offensive continued until March 3, the day the peace treaty was signed. p. 104

[42] The revolution in Finland which began on January 27, 1918 in response to a call from the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, deposed Svinhufvud's bourgeois government and placed power in the hands of the workers. On January 29 a revolutionary government of Finland was set up in the shape of the

Council of People's Representatives, which included E. Gylling, O. W. Kuusinen, Y. Sirola, A. Taimi and others. This government's most important acts were the passing of a law making landless peasants sole owners of the land they tilled, the freeing of the poorest sections of the population of all taxes the expropriation of enterprises belonging to owners who had fled the country, and the setting up of state control over private banks.

The proletarian revolution was victorious, however, only in the south of Finland. The Svinhufvud government made good its losses in the north of the country, where a build-up of counter-revolutionary forces took place, and appealed to the government of Kaiser Germany for aid. On May 2, 1918 German armed forces intervened and the workers' revolution was crushed after a bitter civil was lasting three months. During the White Terror that ensued thousands of revolutionary workers and peasants were executed or tortured to death in prison. p. 105

[43] This refers to the resolution passed by the Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. on February 24, 1918. For a criticism of this anti-Party document see Lenin's article "Strange and Monstrous" (see this volume, pp. 68-75). p. 106

[44] Lenin is referring to his conversation with the French officer, the Comte de Lubersac, which took place on February 27, 1918. p. 111

[45] The reference is to the appeal of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, which called upon all workers and peasants to take up voluntary military training. Military training had to be made voluntary because the Russian Army under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was to be completely demobilised. The appeal was published on March 5, 1918 in the newspaper *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 40. p. 111

[46] *Canossa*—castle in Northern Italy. In 1077, the Roman Emperor Henry IV, who had been defeated by Pope Gregory VII, stood for three days in the robes of repentance before the gates of this castle in order to save himself from excommunication and regain his power as emperor. Hence the phrase "to go to Canossa", i.e., to humiliate oneself before a person whom one has previously resisted. p. 112

[47] According to the terms of the armistice concluded on December 2 (15), 1917 at Brest-Litovsk between the Soviet Government and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey), either side could renew hostilities at seven days' notice. The German military command broke this condition by launching an offensive along the whole front on February 18, two days after denouncing the armistice. p. 113

[48] According to Clause VI of the Treaty of Brest, signed on March 3, 1918 Russia undertook to conclude peace with the counter-revo-

lutionary Ukrainian Central Rada. The peace negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Rada did not take place, however. On April 29, 1918 the German occupation forces in collusion with the Constitutional-Democrat and Octobrist bourgeoisie engineered a coup in the Ukraine. The Rada was overthrown and replaced by the dictatorial regime of Hetman Skoropadsky. Negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Skoropadsky government began on May 23 and an armistice was signed on June 14, 1918. p. 114

[49] *Left Socialist-Revolutionaries* (Internationalists) officially became a party at their First All-Russia Congress, held November 19-28 (December 2-11), 1917. They had previously existed as the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which took shape during the First World War and was led by M. A. Spiridonova, B. D. Kamkov and M. A. Natanson (Bobrov). At the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had a majority in the Socialist-Revolutionary group, which was split over the question of participation in the Congress. The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, obedient to the instructions of the Socialist-Revolutionary Central Committee, walked out of the Congress, but the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries stayed on and voted with the Bolsheviks on the main points on the agenda; they rejected, however, the Bolsheviks' offer of posts in the Soviet Government.

After considerable wavering the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, anxious to maintain their influence with the peasants, decided to co-operate with the Bolsheviks and were given posts on the boards of various People's Commissariats. One of the leaders of the party, A. L. Kolegayev, was appointed People's Commissar for Agriculture. Though they co-operated with the Bolsheviks, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries dissented on the basic issues of the construction of socialism and opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat. In January and February 1918 the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party launched a campaign against the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty. When the treaty was signed and ratified by the Fourth Congress of Soviets in March 1918, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars but remained on the boards of the People's Commissariats and in local government bodies. As the socialist revolution progressed in the countryside, anti-Soviet feelings emerged among the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. In July 1918 the Left S.R. Central Committee organised the assassination of the German Ambassador in Moscow in the hope of provoking war between Soviet Russia and Germany, and launched an armed revolt against Soviet power. After the suppression of the revolt the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets passed a decision expelling from the Soviets all Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who shared the views of their leadership. p. 114

[50] March 12 was the provisional date for the assembly of the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets to decide the ques-

tion of ratifying the peace treaty. The Congress was held March 14-16, 1918. p. 114

[51] The resolution on war and peace was passed on March 8 at the morning session of the Party Congress. On Lenin's proposal, which was affirmed by the Congress, the resolution was not made public. It was first published on January 1, 1919 in the workers' daily *Kommunar*, which was issued by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in Moscow from October 9, 1918 to June 1, 1919.

The last three paragraphs of the resolution were written by G. Y. Sokolnikov and G. Y. Zinoviev. p. 118

[52] During the discussion of Lenin's resolution on war and peace L. D. Trotsky, supported by the "Left Communists", proposed amendments forbidding the Soviet Government from concluding peace with the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Finnish bourgeois government. After Lenin's speech against the attempts by Trotsky and the "Left Communists" to restrict the Central Committee's freedom of manoeuvre, the Congress voted down the amendments. p. 120

[53] K. Radek made a statement on behalf of the group of "Left Communists", in which he tried to continue the polemic over the question of war and peace. p. 122

[54] G. Y. Zinoviev proposed instructing the new Central Committee to find a form for the publication of the resolution on war and peace. Zinoviev's amendment was not accepted; by a majority vote the Congress affirmed Lenin's proposed addition to the resolution. p. 124

[55] The question of revising the Party Programme was put forward by Lenin after the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917. In his "Rough Draft for the Fifth *Letter from Afar*" he defined the basic directions in which the Programme should be changed, and added that "this work must be started at once". Lenin developed the propositions contained in this draft in his April Theses, in his report on the question of revising the Party Programme at the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and in other documents (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 277-79). For the April Conference Lenin wrote the "Proposed Amendments to the Doctrinal, Political and Other Sections of the Programme", which contained a number of amendments to the R.S.D.L.P. Programme of 1903 (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 459-63). The proofs of this draft were handed out to delegates to the April Conference, which gave the Central Committee two months to draw up a draft Party Programme for the Sixth Party Congress.

The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), which sat from July 26 to August 3 (August 8-16), 1917, endorsed the decision of the April Conference on the need to revise the Programme and instruct-

ed the Central Committee to organise a broad discussion on the problems involved (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Part 1, Russ. ed., 1954, pp. 387-88). Before the Congress opened, in June 1917 a pamphlet prepared by Lenin on the Central Committee's instructions and called *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme*, was published; it contained all the Programme materials in the possession of the Central Committee. Almost simultaneously the Regional Bureau of the Moscow Industrial Area of the R.S.D.L.P. published "Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme. Collected Articles by V. Milyutin, G. Sokolnikov, A. Lomov and V. Smirnov". A theoretical discussion developed within the Party in the summer and autumn of 1917. A critical analysis of the articles that had appeared in the periodical press and the Moscow collection was given by Lenin in his article "Revision of the Party Programme", published in October 1917, in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1-2 (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 149-78).

After several discussions on the question of the Party Programme, the Central Committee at a meeting on October 5 (18), 1917 set up under Lenin's chairmanship a commission to revise the Party Programme for the next Party Congress which was due to be held in the autumn of 1917. Eventually, by a decision of the Central Committee of January 24 (February 6), 1918 the drafting of the new Programme was entrusted to a new commission also headed by Lenin. Lenin wrote the "Rough Outline of the Draft Programme", which was handed out to the delegates to the Seventh Congress as material for discussion. The Congress did not, however, discuss the Programme in detail; the drafting of the final version was entrusted to a seven-man commission elected by the Congress. The commission was headed by Lenin. The Congress charged the commission to be guided in its revision of the Programme by the instructions laid down in Lenin's resolution, which had been unanimously adopted by the Congress (see this volume, pp. 140-41). The new, second Party Programme was passed only by the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in March 1919.

The question of changing the name of the Party had been raised by Lenin as early as 1914, at the beginning of the First World War (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 93). Lenin showed why this was necessary in his April Theses and in the pamphlet *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution* (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 24 and 84-88) and in a number of other works and speeches in 1917. In the April Theses Lenin wrote: "Instead of 'Social-Democracy', whose official leaders *throughout* the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the *Communist Party*."

This question was not considered at the April Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) of 1917 or at the Sixth Party Congress. The decision to change the name of the Party was taken only at the Seventh Party Congress, at which Lenin made a report on the subject. p. 126

[56] Lenin is referring to a proposition put forward by Engels in a letter to August Bebel of March 18-28, 1875 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1953, p. 357). p. 126

[57] The reference is to the symposia *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme.* Edited and with an Introduction by N. Lenin, Petrograd, Priboi Publishers, 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 455-79) and *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme.* Collected Articles by V. Milyutin, G. Sokolnikov, A. Lomov and V. Smirnov. Published by the Regional Bureau of the Moscow Industrial Area of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), 1917. p. 127

[58] *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—a Bolshevik theoretical monthly magazine, set up on Lenin's initiative, started coming out legally in St. Petersburg in December 1911. Its circulation was sometimes as many as 5,000 copies. While in exile abroad, Lenin directed the work of the magazine, edited articles and kept up a regular correspondence with members of the editorial board. The magazine published a number of his works, including *The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism*, *Critical Remarks on the National Question*, and *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*. On the eve of the First World War, in June 1914, the magazine was banned by the tsarist government. In the autumn of 1917 publication was resumed, but only one, double issue, No. 1-2 (September-October), appeared. It contained Lenin's article "Revision of the Party Programme". p. 127

[59] *Spartak* (Spartacus)—the theoretical magazine of the Moscow Regional Bureau of the Moscow Committee and (as from the second issue) of the Moscow Area Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. It was published in Moscow from May 20 (June 2) to October 29 (November 11), 1917. p. 128

[60] Lenin is giving an account of *Introduction to Borkheim's Pamphlet "In Memory of the German Arch-Patriots of 1806-1807"*, written by Engels on December 15, 1887 (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 21, S. 351, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962). Lenin refers more fully to Engels's propositions in the article "Prophetic Words" (see this volume, pp. 494-99). p. 128

[61] *Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democrats*, of September 15-21, 1912, passed a resolution "On Imperialism", in which it described the policy of the imperialist states as a "barefaced policy of robbery and aggression" and called on the working class "to fight with redoubled energy against imperialism until it is overthrown".

Basle Extraordinary International Socialist Congress (November 24-25, 1912) unanimously adopted a manifesto calling on the workers of all countries to wage a resolute fight for peace and to "pit against the might of capitalist imperialism the internation-

al solidarity of the working class". The manifesto recommended that if imperialist war broke out, socialists should use the economic and political crisis it would cause in the struggle for a socialist revolution.

During the world imperialist war of 1914-18 the leaders of the Social-Democratic parties in the countries of Western Europe broke the decisions of the international socialist congresses, descended to positions of social-chauvinism and sided with their imperialist governments. Lenin exposed this betrayal by the leaders of the Second International in his works *The Collapse of the Second International*, and *Socialism and War* (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 205-65, 295-338) and elsewhere. p. 132

[62] Lenin has in mind the revolutionary government of Finland—the Council of People's Representatives—set up on January 29, 1918 after the overthrow of Svinhufvud's bourgeois government. In addition to the Council of People's Representatives there was also the Main Council of Workers' Organisations, which was the supreme organ of government. State power was based on the "seims of workers' organisations", which were elected by the organised workers.

Lenin's conclusion that the Soviets were not the only form of the dictatorship of the proletariat was subsequently fully confirmed. After the Second World War a new form of dictatorship of the proletariat arose in a number of countries of Europe and Asia. This was people's democracy, which reflected "the distinctive development of socialist revolution at a time when imperialism had been weakened and the balance of forces had tilted in favour of socialism" (Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1961, p. 20). p. 133

[63] Nationalisation of the land in Soviet Russia was brought about by the Decree on Land of October 26 (November 8), 1917, which announced the expropriation of the landed estates and abolished private ownership of land. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Soviet Government gradually nationalised industry and the basic means of production. By the spring of 1918 the largest metallurgical and machine-building works of Petrograd, Moscow and other districts, and the mining industry of the Urals and the Donets Basin had become public property. In May 1918, such important branches of industry as oil and sugar began to be nationalised. At the same time the Soviet Government was preparing to nationalise all large-scale industry, and a decree to this effect was issued on June 28, 1918. p. 136

[64] The decree on the nationalisation of the banks, which was based on Lenin's draft, was endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 14 (27), 1917 and published on December 15 (28) in *Izvestia TsIK* No. 252 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 1, 1957, pp. 225-30). p. 138

[65] The Decree on Land of October 26 (November 8). 1917 and the Fundamental Law on the Socialisation of the Land of January 18 (31), 1918 envisaged equalitarian distribution of the land ("according to a labour or subsistence standard"), a demand which had been put forward by the peasantry. This was a concession on the part of the Soviet Government to the middle peasant and it was aimed at consolidating the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. At the same time the law on the socialisation of the land proposed "the development of collective farming as the most profitable with regard to economising labour and produce, at the expense of individual farms and with the aim of going over to a socialist economy". p. 138

[66] At the beginning of 1918 the Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs started publishing the Decree on Land in foreign languages. In February 1918 the decree was published in Petrograd in English in the book *Decrees Issued by the Revolutionary People's Government*, Vol. 1, Petrograd, February 1918. p. 138

[67] The "last speaker" was the delegate to the Congress for the Petrograd Party organisation Y. G. Fenigstein (Doletsky). On the grounds that the draft programme had not been discussed in the Party organisations, he proposed setting up at the Congress a commission to consider Lenin's draft and to work out a programme for the next Congress. p. 142

[68] This appears to be a reference to a conversation with the leader of the Swedish Left Social-Democratic Party Höglund, who visited Soviet Russia in February 1918. p. 143

[69] In a speech at the Congress Y. Larin proposed including in the name of the Party the word "workers'". His amendment was rejected by the Congress. p. 145

[70] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1958, pp. 43-44. p. 145

[71] The "last speaker" was R. A. Pelshe, who proposed removing from the Party Programme the proposition on using the parliamentary struggle. His amendment was rejected by the Congress. p. 146

[72] Bukharin's proposal, which the Congress rejected, was that the theoretical part of the Programme should include an extensive description of socialism and communism and an indication that the state would wither away in the very near future. His proposition on the withering away of the state was connected with his theoretically incorrect and semi-anarchistic attitude concerning the problem of the state which Lenin had pointed out as early as 1916. Criticising Bukharin's mistaken thesis that the Social-Demo-

crats should stress their fundamental hostility to the state in general, Lenin wrote that Bukharin had "absolutely wrongly" defined the difference between Marxists and anarchists over the question of the state (see present edition, Vol. 35, "To N. Bukharin"). Lenin also criticised Bukharin's theory of the state in his notes on Bukharin's articles on the state and on Bukharin's book *The Economics of the Transitional Period* (see V. I. Lenin, "Notes on the Articles by N. I. Bukharin on the State", Russ. ed., Moscow, 1933, and *Lenin Miscellany XI*, pp. 345-403). Posing the question of the withering away of the state as a short-term aim, soon after the victory of the October Revolution, meant, in effect, weakening the new state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. p. 147

[73] When the new Central Committee was elected the "Left Communists" refused to serve on it. On behalf of a group of "Left Communists" M. S. Uritsky stated at the Congress that they would not serve on the Central Committee because they did not wish to take responsibility for the policy it was conducting. The "Left Communists" even refused to vote during the election of the Central Committee. The Congress voted its condemnation of this disruptive step and passed a decision that the Party organisations that had delegated the "Left Communists" were to be informed of their conduct. When it met this resistance from the Congress, the group took part in the voting and the Congress rescinded its decision.

The Congress voted in favour of Lenin's resolution condemning the "Left Communists'" refusal to serve on the Central Committee (see this volume, p. 151). In the belief that they would submit to Party discipline, the Congress elected their representatives (N. I. Bukharin, A. Lomov and M. S. Uritsky) to the Central Committee. All three, however, demonstratively stated before the Congress that they refused to serve on the Central Committee. The refusal was not accepted and the Congress decided without a debate to postpone the question of providing deputies in place of the elected "Left Communists" until the Central Committee met.

After the Party Congress and the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which ratified the peace treaty with Germany, the "Left Communists", in spite of the Central Committee's insistent demands, refused to begin work for several months. For Lenin's appraisal of the disruptive activities of the "Left Communists" after the Seventh Party Congress see "Comment on the Behaviour of the 'Left Communists'" (this volume, p. 202). p. 149

[74] The article "The Chief Task of Our Day" together with Lenin's work "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see this volume, pp. 323-54) were published in May 1918 as a separate pamphlet under the title *The Chief Task of Our Day*, to which Lenin wrote a short introduction. p. 159

[75] The epigraph is taken from Nikolai Nekrasov's poem "Who Lives Well in Russia". p. 159

[76] *Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets*, which was held to decide the question of the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, was held in Moscow from March 14 to 16, 1918. On March 13 this question was discussed by the Communist group of the Congress; Lenin spoke at the meeting (for the secretarial record of this speech see *Lenin Miscellany XI*, pp. 68-70). By 453 votes to 36 the group approved the signing of the treaty. Not all the delegates had arrived at the time and the group was not present in full strength.

According to the minutes, the Congress was attended by 1,232 delegates with a vote; they included 795 Bolsheviks, 283 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 25 Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Centre, 21 Mensheviks, and 11 Menshevik-Internationalists. The questions on the agenda were: ratification of the peace treaty; transfer of the capital; election of the All-Russia C.E.C. After a statement on the peace treaty by G. V. Chicherin, People's Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lenin gave the report on the main question on the agenda on behalf of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; the second report on behalf of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries against ratification of the treaty was given by B. D. Kamkov.

The Mensheviks, Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Maximalists, anarchists and others put up a solid front against ratification of the treaty. After a keen debate a signed vote was taken and the Congress adopted Lenin's resolution in favour of ratification by an overwhelming majority. There were 784 votes in favour, 261 against and 115 delegates abstained. In connection with the ratification of the Brest Treaty the Left S.R.s withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars. The "Left Communists" refused to take part in the voting and stated in a special declaration that the conclusion of peace would undermine the country's defence and the gains of the revolution. By refusing to vote, the "Left Communists" violated the decisions of the Seventh Party Congress and the Communist group of the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the decision taken by the Central Committee, which met while the Congress was on, that there should be no action against the decisions of the Party.

The Congress passed a resolution on the transfer of the capital of the Soviet state to Moscow and elected a Central Executive Committee consisting of 200 members.

The decision of the Congress on ratification of the peace treaty was approved by the local Soviets, the Party organisations and the working people at numerous meetings and conferences held at the time. p. 169

[77] The draft resolution was written by Lenin in reply to a message from Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, in which he tried, by expressing sympathy he probably did not feel for the Russian people over the German occupation of the Baltic States, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, to influence the decision of the Con-

gress and prevent Soviet Russia from ratifying the peace treaty with Germany.

The draft resolution was read out by Y. M. Sverdlov and approved by the Congress. p. 171

[78] The reference is to the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, which were represented in the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, however, soon took the path of direct counter-revolution and on June 14, 1918 the All-Russia C.E.C. passed a decision expelling the counter-revolutionary Socialist-Revolutionaries (the Rights and the Centre) and the Mensheviks from the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the local Soviets. The decision was published on June 18 in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 123. p. 172

[79] Lenin appears to connect the new turn in the development of the revolution with February 10, when Germany broke off peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. The German action was facilitated by L. D. Trotsky's refusal to conclude peace on the terms proposed by the German imperialists. Lenin also mentions this date in the plan he made for his report to the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on ratification of the Brest Treaty. In another document, the plan for his speech at a meeting of the Communist group of the Congress of Soviets, Lenin defines the turning point in the development of the revolution as February 17. The German offensive along the whole front began on February 18, 1918. p. 173

[80] Lenin has in mind the speech at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on September 21 (October 4), 1917 by Dubasov, an army officer who had returned from the front. Describing the mood of the soldiers, Dubasov stated that they wanted only one thing, an end to the war, and that they would not go on fighting. p. 183

[81] The reference is to the Treaty between the Russian and Finnish Socialist Republics, the first treaty in history between socialist countries. In the middle of February 1918, the revolutionary government of the Finnish republic proposed a treaty of friendship to the Soviet Government. The Russia-Finland Co-ordinative Commission was formed to draw up the treaty and its draft was discussed at several meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, Lenin making several amendments to it. The treaty was signed on March 1 by a special commission headed by Lenin. It was endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and published on March 10, 1918 in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 45 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 1, 1957, pp. 503-10). Based on recognition of the state sovereignty of Finland, the treaty provided evidence of the Soviet Government's consistent adherence to the principle of the right of nations to self-determination. p. 185

[82] Lenin is referring to the second report, by B. D. Kamkov, on the question of ratification of the peace treaty. p. 191

[83] In his speech at the Congress the Menshevik L. Martov claimed that the contents of the treaty were not known to the Congress delegates and compared them to peasants at a volost gathering, forced by the local authorities to sign papers without knowing what was in them. p. 191

[84] Lenin is referring to the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies "To the Peoples of the Whole World", which was published in the leading newspapers on March 15 (28), 1917. For an appraisal of this half-hearted Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary appeal see Lenin's speech on war, delivered June 9 (22), 1917 at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets (present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 29-42). p. 194

[85] The Appeal to the Soldiers of All the Belligerent Countries was the first appeal written by Lenin on behalf of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the St. Petersburg Committee and the editorial board of *Pravda* (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 186-88). p. 194

[86] When the resolution on ratification of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was put to the vote at the Communist group of the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on March 13, 1918, 453 votes were cast in favour of ratification and 36 against. p. 199

[87] *Original Version of the Article* "*The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*" was dictated by Lenin to a shorthand typist on March 23-28, 1918. p. 203

[88] This refers to the discussion on the role of the trade unions at the First All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions held in Petrograd, January 7-14 (20-27), 1918. p. 215

[89] The first draft of the Decree on Revolutionary Tribunals was submitted by the People's Commissariat for Justice on March 30, 1918 for approval by the Council of People's Commissars. When it was discussed by the Council a decision (document "B") proposed by Lenin, stating that it should be radically revised, was accepted. The draft was revised on the basis of Lenin's instructions, approved at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on May 4, 1918 and published on May 17, 1918. p. 219

[90] *Kommunist*—a magazine organised by Lenin. It was published in Geneva by the editors of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* in 1915. Only one issue (a double issue) appeared. It contained three articles by Lenin: "The Collapse of the Second International", "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist", and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 205-59, 349-56, 357-66).

Lenin had planned to make *Kommunist* an international organ of the Left Social-Democrats. But the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*

soon became involved in serious disagreements with Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosch, which grew worse after the magazine appeared. In view of this group's anti-Party conduct the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, on Lenin's suggestion, announced that they considered it impossible to continue publishing the magazine. p. 221

[91] *Lieberdans*—ironic nickname for the Menshevik leaders, Lieber and Dan, and their supporters. It caught on after a satirical article by Demyan Bedny called "The Lieberdan" had appeared in the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 141, August 25 (September 7), 1917. p. 221

[92] *Theses on Banking Policy* were approved at one of the meetings between Lenin and bank employees that took place in March and April 1918. The theses were drawn up by Lenin in the form of minutes, with notes on the results of the voting on the various points and any special opinions expressed by those taking part. p. 222

[93] The Decree on the nationalisation of the banks was passed on December 14 (27), 1917 by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. p. 222

[94] The meeting in the Alexeyevsky Riding School in Moscow, attended by 8,000 people, was in protest against the shooting down by the Menshevik government of Georgia of a workers' meeting held in Tiflis on February 23, 1918, the day of the convocation of the Transcaucasian Seim. After speeches by V. I. Lenin, N. V. Krylenko, N. I. Podvoisky and others, a resolution was passed unanimously stating: "We, workers, ... brand with scorn the criminal and treacherous tactics of the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, who deal brutally with the Caucasian workers and peasants and associate themselves with the bourgeoisie in welcoming the invasion of foreign plunderers. We declare that the working class has nothing in common with these traitors and will reply to any attempt at seizing the power of the workers and peasants by *ruthless* suppression of the capitalist counter-revolutionaries and their agents." (*Pravda* No. 67, April 9, 1918.)

Lenin's speech did not appear in the leading newspapers. In *Pravda* No. 67, April 9, 1918 a short notice appeared stating: "Comrade Lenin made a long and vivid speech. He was greeted with loud applause." p. 224

[95] Imperialist Japan had just begun its occupation of the Far East, On December 30, 1917 (January 12, 1918) a Japanese warship and merchant ship entered the Port of Vladivostok without informing the local Soviet authorities. The same day the Japanese Consul General in Vladivostok sent the city authorities a Note stating on behalf of the Japanese Government that Japanese warships had been dispatched to the port "for the purpose of protecting our nationals".

On March 29, 1918 the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary municipal council fell in with the wishes of the Japanese military by declaring itself unable to maintain order in Vladivostok. On April 4, two Japanese were murdered in a planned and organised act of provocation. With this as a pretext, Japanese troops assisted by Russian whiteguards made their first landing and occupied Vladivostok on April 5. The occupation of the city marked the beginning of the open intervention of the countries of the Entente in the Far East.

When news of the Japanese intervention was received, Lenin sent the Vladivostok Soviet specific instructions on how to fight the occupying forces (see this volume, p. 226). p. 225

[96] *Shahumyan, S. G.* (1878-1918)—Temporary Commissar Extraordinary for Caucasian Affairs and Chairman of the Baku Soviet—was constantly persecuted by the Transcaucasian counter-revolutionary Menshevik government. In February 1918 it became known that the Mensheviks intended to murder him. This is what Lenin is referring to when he speaks of a gallows being erected for Comrade Shahumyan. The plot was not carried out at the time simply because Shahumyan successfully evaded capture by the Transcaucasian Menshevik government.

In August 1918 Shahumyan and other leading Party workers in Baku were arrested by the British intervention forces with the assistance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. He was one of the 26 Baku commissars who were shot. p. 225

[97] Immediately after the Japanese landing in Vladivostok a plenary meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Siberia (Tsentrosibir) passed a resolution protesting against the illegal action taken by the Japanese Government; military law was declared throughout Siberia and all local Soviets undertook to redouble their efforts to organise a Red Army. On April 5 Lenin sent a telegram to Tsentrosibir approving this decision and particularly stressed that "no assurances can now be believed and the only serious guarantee is substantial military preparation on our part" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 22). In some localities, however, hopes were entertained of settling the conflict with the aid of commissions from the Entente countries. Lenin sent the telegram published here to discourage these illusions. p. 226

[98] In April 1918 it was reported in the press that General Kornilov had been killed by his own soldiers. Later it was established that Kornilov had been killed by an artillery shell on April 13, 1918 during an action against units of the Red Army near Ekaterinodar (now Krasnodar). p. 230

[99] In the manuscript, Lenin's work *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* was headed "Theses on the Tasks of the Soviet Government in the Present Situation". Lenin's theses were discussed at a meeting of the Party Central Committee on April 26, 1918.

The Central Committee unanimously approved them and passed a decision to have them published as an article in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, and also as a separate pamphlet. In 1918 the pamphlet went through more than ten editions, in Moscow, Petrograd, Saratov, Kazan, Tambov and other cities of Russia. It was published in the same year in English in New York, and in French in Geneva; an abridged version in German, edited by F. Platten, appeared in Zurich under the title *Am Tage nach der Revolution*.

The Central Committee instructed Lenin to give a report on the immediate tasks of the Soviet government at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. and to formulate the Theses briefly as a resolution (see this volume, pp. 314-17). p. 235

[100] *Bogayevsky*, *M. P.* (1881-1918)—counter-revolutionary leader and organiser of the civil war against Soviet power on the Don. He was defeated and surrendered in the spring of 1918. p. 242

[101] On November 18 (December 1), 1917 the Council of People's Commissars, acting on a proposal made by Lenin, passed a decision "On the Remuneration of People's Commissars and Senior Government Employees and Officials" (published on November 23 [December 6], 1917 in No. 16 of the *Newspaper of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government*). Drafted by Lenin it fixed the maximum monthly salary of a People's Commissar at 500 rubles with an additional 100 rubles for every member of his family unable to work. This corresponded roughly to the worker's average monthly wage. On January 2 (15), 1918, in answer to an inquiry from the People's Commissar for Labour A. G. Shlyapnikov, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decision written by Lenin explaining that the Decree of November 18 (December 1), 1917 fixed no limit for the payment of experts, and thus sanctioned higher remuneration for scientific and technical experts. p. 249

[102] Control over foreign trade was initiated in the early days of Soviet power. At first this was handled by the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee, which considered applications for the import and export of goods and supervised the work of the customs. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of December 29, 1917 (January 11, 1918) foreign trade was placed under the control of the People's Commissariat for Trade and Industry. This kind of control and customs inspection, however, was not enough to protect the Soviet economy from foreign capital. Lenin emphasised later that the working class of Soviet Russia "would be totally unable to build up its own industry and make Russia an industrial country without the protection, not of tariffs, but of the monopoly of foreign trade" (see V. I. Lenin, *On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State*, Moscow, p. 424). In December 1917 Lenin proposed introducing a state monopoly on foreign trade, a decree on which was passed by the Council of People's Commissars on April 22, 1918 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 158-60). p. 252

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[103] In the first months of Soviet power indemnities and special taxes were one of the principal sources of revenue, particularly in the provinces. When Soviet power became more firmly established, the question arose of how to devise a regular system of taxation based primarily on a progressive income tax and a property tax, which would make it possible to place the main burden of taxation on the well-to-do sections of the population. At the First All-Russia Congress of Representatives of the Financial Departments of the Soviets, Lenin pointed out: "We have many plans in this sphere and have cleared the ground on which to build the foundation, but the actual foundation of that building has not yet been built. The time for this has now come" (see this volume, pp. 384-85). The Congress accepted Lenin's proposal on the need to introduce an income tax and property tax and elected a special commission to draw up the requisite Statute on the basis of Lenin's theses.

On June 17,1918 the Council of People's Commissars approved the Decree on the Amendment of the Decree of November 24, 1917 on the Levying of Direct Taxes, which laid down a strict system of income and property taxation (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 441-43). p. 253

[104] *Decree on Consumers' Co-operative Societies* was passed by the Council of People's Commissars on April 10, 1918, approved at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. on April 11, and published over Lenin's signature in *Pravda* No. 71 of April 13 and *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 75 of April 16.

The first draft of the decree, written by Lenin, was worked out in detail by the People's Commissariat for Food and published on January 19 (February 1) in *Izvestia TsIK* No. 14. The draft decree was bitterly opposed by bourgeois co-operators, who insisted that co-operative societies should be independent of the organs of Soviet power. In order to use the existing co-operative apparatus for accounting and control of the distribution of foodstuffs the Council of People's Commissars made several concessions during its negotiations with bourgeois co-operators (March to the beginning of April 1918). On April 9 and 10 the C.P.C. discussed the draft decree proposed by the co-operators. Lenin revised the draft considerably (he rewrote points 11, 12 and 13), and the decree with his amendments was passed by the Council of People's Commissars, and then by the All-Russia C.E.C. p. 255

[105] The organisation of social production on socialist principles made it necessary to draw up new internal regulations for the nationalised enterprises, and new regulations on labour discipline and on enrolling all able-bodied persons for socially useful work. These questions acquired special importance in the period of the peaceful breathing-space in the spring of 1918.

The first regulations concerning labour discipline were worked out by the Soviet trade unions in conjunction with managerial

bodies. They were discussed at a number of meetings of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council with representatives of the central organs of the trade unions taking part. On March 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council after a debate in which Lenin participated passed a decision charging the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions with the task of drawing up a general statute on labour discipline. On April 1, with Lenin taking part, the Presidium examined the draft resolution on labour discipline drawn up by the A.C.C.T.U. and proposed that it should be re-worded as a decree, taking into account Lenin's remarks and suggestions. The re-worded Statute on Labour Discipline passed by the A.C.C.T.U. on April 3 was published in the magazine *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo* No. 2, for April 1918. In this statute the A.C.C.T.U. stated that strict regulations regarding internal management should be introduced at all state-owned enterprises, that output quotas and account of labour productivity should be established, that piece-work and a system of bonuses for exceeding output quotas should be introduced, and that stern action should be taken against those who violated labour discipline. On the basis of the Statute specific internal regulations were drawn up at factories and these played an important part in the organisation of socialist industry.

The Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union was one of the first to carry out Lenin's instructions on raising labour productivity by introducing a system of piece-work and bonuses. When the question of improving labour discipline was discussed by the A.C.C.T.U. representatives of the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union got the thesis on the need for piece rates included in the resolution submitted on April 1 for consideration by the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council. In April, on the basis of the decisions taken by the A.C.C.T.U. the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union instructed all the lower organisations of the union to adopt piece-work and the bonus system in the metal industry. p. 258

[106] After the October Revolution piece-work was almost everywhere superseded by a time system of payment, which had an adverse effect on labour productivity and labour discipline.

The introduction of piece-work, which came closest to the socialist principle of "to each according to his work", began at the first nationalised enterprises. During the period of respite, piece-work was widely adopted in industry. By July 1918, for instance, a quarter of the workers of Petrograd went over to piece-work. The principle of payment according to the piece was finally endorsed by the publication in December 1918 of the Soviet Labour Code. p. 258

[107] This refers to the right protected by bourgeois law to keep secret all production, trade and financial operations and also all the relevant documents at private capitalist enterprises.

In his work *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It* Lenin showed that commercial secrecy in the hands of the bourgeoisie was "an instrument for concealing financial swindles and the fantastically high profits of big capital" (see present edition, Vol. 25, p. 343), and showed why commercial secrecy should be abolished. The resolution of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) "On the Economic Situation" demanded the abolition of commercial secrecy as an essential measure for making workers' control effective (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Part 1, Russ. ed., 1954, p. 378). After the October Revolution commercial secrecy was abolished by the Statute on Workers' Control passed by the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars on November 14 (27), 1917. p. 260

108 The reference is to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On Centralisation of Management, Protection of Roads and the Improvement of Their Carrying Capacity" (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. 2 Russ. ed., 1959, pp. 18-20). Having considered on March 18, 1918 the draft decree proposed by the People's Commissariat for Ways of Communication on non-interference by various institutions in the affairs of the Railway Department, the Council of People's Commissars instructed a special commission to revise the decree on the basis of the following theses put forward by Lenin: (1) Considerable centralisation. (2) Appointment of responsible executives at every local centre as elected by the railway organisations. (3) Unquestioning obedience to their orders. (4) Dictatorial rights to be given to the military detachments for maintaining order. (5) Steps to be taken immediately to take account of rolling stock and its whereabouts. (6) Steps to be taken to set up a technical department. (7) Fuel.

Lenin made several important amendments to the draft, which was submitted by the commission and considered at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on March 21, before being approved by the government. In view of the hostility with which the decree was greeted by the All-Russia Executive Committee of Railwaymen (Vikzhedor), which was strongly influenced by the Mensheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the People's Commissariat for Ways of Communication on March 23 proposed amending the decree at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars. The representatives of Vikzhedor who attended the meeting attacked the decree on the grounds that it meant the "destruction of the role of Vikzhedor and its replacement by the individual authority of a Commissar". Arguing against the opponents of the decree, Lenin explained the need for taking the very firmest measures to eliminate sabotage and inefficiency on the railways and introduced amendments making the decree even more categorical. With these amendments the decree was finally approved by the government on March 23 and published over Lenin's signature on March 26 in No. 57 of *Izvestia VTsIK*. p. 267

[109] *Vperyod* (Forward)—a Menshevik daily newspaper, which began to appear in March 1917 in Moscow as the organ of the Moscow organisation of Mensheviks, and subsequently as the organ of the committees of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks) of the Moscow organisation and the Central Region On April 2, 1918 the newspaper became the organ of the Mensheviks' Central Committee as well, and L. Martov, F. I. Dan and A. S. Martynov joined its editorial board, It was banned for its counter-revolutionary activities in February 1919 by decision of the All-Russia C.E.C. p. 269

[110] *Nash Vek* (Our Age)—one of the names of the newspaper Rech, the central organ of the counter-revolutionary party of the Constitutional-Democrats. After it had been banned by a decision of the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee of October 26 (November 8), 1917, the newspaper continued to appear until August 1918 under various names: *Nasha Rech* (Our Speech), *Svobodnaya Rech* (Free Speech), *Vek* (Age), *Novaya Rech* (New Speech) and *Nash Vek*. p. 269

[111] Lenin is referring to and quoting from *Anti-Dühring* by F. Engels, Section Three. Socialism. Chapter II. Theoretical. p. 273

[112] Chernyshevsky describes Turgenev's attitude to Dobrolyubov and himself in an account of a conversation he had with Turgenev in the early sixties of the last century (see the article "An Expression of Gratitude" in *Complete Collected Works* by N. G. Chernyshevsky, Vol. 10, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1951, pp. 122-23). p. 274

[113] The politically active workers of Moscow and many Party and Soviet workers were invited to a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. on April 29, 1918.

N. K. Krupskaya wrote of Lenin's speech at this meeting, "To enable the workers' active of Moscow to hear Ilyich's report on the immediate tasks of the Soviet government, the meeting was held at the Polytechnical Museum. Ilyich was greeted with a tumultuous ovation and listened to with rapt attention. Obviously, the question was one of keen interest to everybody. Ilyich spoke there with extraordinary fervour" (see N. K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, Moscow, 1959, p. 462). p. 279

[114] The reference is to the Second Congress of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which was held from April 17 to 25, 1918 in Moscow. Two trends emerged during the discussion of the party's tasks in the current situation. One section of the delegates led by B. D. Kamkov defended the activities of the Central Committee directed against the conclusion of the Brest peace and approved the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' refusal to work in the central organs of the Soviet Government because the treaty had been ratified by the Extraordinary Fourth Congress of Soviets. Another section, led by M. A. Spiridonova, criticised the Central Committee, accused it of extreme "Leftism" and insisted that the Left

Socialist-Revolutionaries should participate in the Soviet Government in order to get their agrarian programme adopted. After a heated debate the Congress passed an ambivalent decision. While approving the position of the Central Committee on the question of the Brest peace and the withdrawal of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Council of People's Commissars, it advocated participation in the central and local administrative bodies with the aim of "straightening out the general line of Soviet policy". p. 283

[115] *Znamya Truda* (Banner of Labour)—daily newspaper of the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It first appeared on August 23 (September 5), 1917. After the First All-Russia Congress of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, as from No. 105, which appeared on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the newspaper became the central organ of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It was banned in July 1918 during the Left Socialist-Revolutionary revolt. p. 286

[116] This refers to the third point in the theses passed at the proposal of the Menshevik I. A. Isuv by the plenum of the Moscow Regional Committee of Social-Democrats (Mensheviks), held in April 1918. In his article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" Lenin compared this thesis (a "perfect example of bourgeois provocatory speech-making") with the economic propositions put forward by the "Left Communists", showing that they were the same and that the position the "Left Communists" had taken up meant their complete renunciation of communism in practice and complete desertion to the camp of the petty bourgeoisie" (see this volume, p. 348). p. 286

[117] *Theses on the Present Situation* put forward by the "Left Communists" were discussed at a joint meeting of members of the Party Central Committee and the "Left Communist" group on April 4, 1918. Lenin examined and criticised these theses in detail in his article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see this volume, pp. 323-54). p. 288

[118] The reference is to the voting on the ratification of the peace treaty at the Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B). Distorting the facts, the "Left Communists" quoted the number who voted for the peace treaty according to the results of the preliminary voting on the two resolutions—Lenin's and that of the "Left Communists" (the former, Lenin's resolution, gained 28 votes, the latter only 9, and was immediately turned down). But when speaking of how many votes were cast against conclusion of the peace treaty the "Left Communists" quoted the results of the final voting on Lenin's resolution alone (30 votes in favour, 12 against, and 4 abstentions). p. 288

[119] *The Second All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets* was held in Ekaterinoslav (now Dniepropetrovsk) March 17-19, 1918. The Congress

was attended by 964 delegates: 428 Bolsheviks, 414 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 82 non-Party, and 40 other delegates. The Bolsheviks had to fight not only the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bourgeois nationalists but also the "Left Communists", who tried to use the Congress to promote their adventuristic policy and put forward a disruptive motion of censure against the Soviet Government's conclusion of the Brest Treaty. The Bolshevik group, however led by Y. B. Gamarnik, A. V. Ivanov, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom) and N. A. Skrypnik, staunchly defended Lenin's position over the matter of peace and got the Congress to approve the decision of the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on the ratification of the peace treaty with Germany.

In its Resolution on the Political Situation, which expressed the will of the Ukrainian people, the Congress stated that the mass of the working people of the Ukraine together with the workers and peasants of Russia and the other republics would fight resolutely for Soviet power. In view of the situation that had arisen in connection with the Brest peace, the Congress declared the Ukraine an independent Soviet republic and called on the working people of the Ukraine to wage a ruthless struggle against the Austro-German invaders and the Central Rada. At the same time the Congress stressed that the terms of the peace treaty insisted on by imperialist Germany were unjust, that the Ukraine's federative connection with Russia was only formally broken, and that essentially her relations with the R.S.F.S.R. remained unchanged.

p. 288

[120] Lenin is referring to the state-capitalist combines set up in the leather, textile and sugar industries. At the beginning of 1918 the Tanners' Union came to an agreement with the All-Russia Society of Manufacturers and Factory-owners of the Leather Industry, under which the tanneries were to work on a subsidised basis for the Soviet Government and place all their output at the disposal of the state. The industry was administered by the Central Leather Board (Glavkozha), on which two-thirds of the seats were held by workers and one-third by private manufacturers and bourgeois technical experts. Analogous agreements were concluded in textiles, sugar and some other branches of the light and food industries. The state retained the right to confiscate any enterprises that were part of a state-capitalist combine.

Lenin approved the "proletariat's attempts to make contracts with the manufacturers' associations" under conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and stated that agreements of this kind could ensure the workers' control over whole branches of industry".

p. 297

[121] *Levi Kommunist* (Left Communist) was how Lenin ironically dubbed the magazine *Kommunist*, the mouthpiece of the anti-Party group of "Left Communists".

p. 299

[122] Lenin is referring to the issue of money and banknotes by the Soviet Government to make good its insufficient revenues from the usual sources (industry, transport, regular taxes and so on). Thanks to Party and Government measures to improve the country's financial position, this emission was reduced in the middle of 1918. p. 302

[123] The reference is to Lenin's book *The State and Revolution*, which was reviewed on April 20, 1918 in the "Left Communist" magazine *Kommunist* No. 1. p. 302

[124] *The Left Zimmerwald*—a group of Left Internationalists founded on Lenin's initiative at the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald, September 1915. p. 306

[125] Speaking on Lenin's report at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., the anarchist A. Y. Ghe stated that "hope of assistance from the German proletariat is a utopia". According to Ghe, the German proletariat, like the whole West-European proletariat was "unclean" and "hypnotised by its depraving orthodox Social-Democratic education". p. 307

[126] Karl Marx spoke of the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism under certain specific conditions in a speech at a meeting in Amsterdam on September 8, 1872 (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 18, S. 160, Dietz Verlag, Berlin). Marx regarded purchasing the means of production from the capitalists as one of the specific ways of bringing about such a transition. Engels wrote: "We are certainly not of the opinion that buying up is inadmissible under any circumstances; Marx has stated his opinion to me—and how often!—that the cheapest thing for us would be if we could buy off the whole gang of them" (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 22, S. 504). p. 310

[127] *Six Theses on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* were written by Lenin on instructions of the All-Russia C.E.C. after his report on the immediate tasks of the Soviet government had been discussed at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. on April 29, 1918. Lenin's theses were unanimously approved by the Party Central Committee on May 3, and on May 4 the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. sent them out to the local Soviets with a circular letter stating that Lenin's theses "should form the basis of the work of all Soviets". p. 314

[128] The reason for this demand was that when certain enterprises were nationalised the staffs of these enterprises and certain trade unions had a tendency to regard the enterprise or branch of industry as belonging to the staff of the enterprise or to the trade union. Lenin was very much against such anarcho-syndicalist-tendencies. When the question of water transport on the Volga was being discussed by the Council of People's Commissars on March 4, 1918,

Lenin condemned the proposal to make the nationalised river craft the property of the trade unions of the various shipping lines and stressed that such aspirations had nothing in common with socialism. "The task of socialism," Lenin said, "is to make all the means of production the property of the whole people, and certainly not to have the ships handed over to the ship workers and the banks handed over to the bank workers." p. 319

[129] *The Draft Plan of Scientific and Technical Work* marked an important stage in the process of mobilising Russia's scientific personnel to deal with the, problems of the national economy.

Negotiations with the Academy of Sciences were initiated by Lenin and the Soviet Government in January 1918. Lenin directed the work of the People's Commissariat for Education, which was conducting the negotiations. At the end of March the Academy of Sciences in a declaration to the Soviet Government consented to the government's proposal that the Academy should work, in the field of exploring the country's natural resources. On April 12, at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars with Lenin in the chair a resolution was passed that set the Academy of Sciences "the urgent task of systematically solving the problems of the correct distribution of the country's industry and the most rational utilisation of economic resources". A decision was also taken recognising the need to finance the work of the Academy in this field. With considerable financial backing from the government the Academy's Commission for the Study of Russia's Natural Productive Forces enlarged the scope of its activities.

In the Draft Plan of Scientific and Technical Work Lenin outlined a broad programme for the work of the Academy of Sciences and all the country's scientific and technical personnel, Lenin's pointers were later amplified in a number of documents drawn up by the Supreme Economic Council (SEC). One of these was the model programme of work of the expert commissions of the Academy of Sciences compiled on April 25 by the Supreme Economic Council Department for the Organisation of Production. Guided by Lenin's instructions, the Soviet economic departments in the capital and the provinces, the Academy of Sciences and various research institutes and societies studied the country's natural wealth, power resources and various problems connected with the electrification of the national economy. Committees and bureaus for the electrification of the basic industrial areas were set up in Petrograd and Moscow in the first months of Soviet rule. In the autumn of 1918, the Central Electrotechnical Council was formed on a mandate from Lenin, which set out its main task as "producing the best and most rapid solution of the technical and estimating problems in the field of the new power developments". Electrification on a large scale for those days was launched in 1918. p. 320

[130] Lenin is referring to the materials provided by the Commission for the Study of Russia's Natural Productive Forces, set up by the

Academy of Sciences in 1915. On Lenin's instructions the commission was given much wider scope for publishing its findings. A series of books called "Russia's Riches" and the multi-volume *The Natural Productive Forces of Russia* began to appear. In the first three years of Soviet power (1918-20) the commission published four times as many books as in the three years preceding the revolution. p. 320

[131] On May 2, 1918 the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal passed a light sentence against four judges serving on the Moscow Commission of Investigation who had been charged with blackmail and taking bribes. Lenin first sent his letter on the subject to N. V. Krylenko, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Justice, with a request that the Party Central Committee should be informed of the names of the guilty judges. When he received the reply, which was written on the other side of the letter, Lenin sent it to the Central Committee, drawing their attention to the facts furnished by Krylenko. On Lenin's insistence the All-Russia C.E.C. reconsidered the case and three of the accused had their sentences increased to ten years' imprisonment.

Simultaneously with his letter to the Central Committee Lenin sent the People's Commissar for Justice D. I. Kursky a note demanding that "a law must be introduced *at once*, with demonstrative haste, stating that the punishment for bribery (extortion, subornation, arranging of bribes and *so on*) is to be *not less* than ten years' imprisonment with an additional ten years' compulsory labour" (see present edition, Vol. 35, "Letter to D. I. Kursky"). On Lenin's initiative the Council of People's Commissars passed a decision on May 4, 1918 instructing the People's Commissariat for Justice to draw up a decree that stipulated a heavy minimum sentence for bribery and any connivance in bribery. The Draft Decree on Bribery was submitted by the People's Commissariat for Justice for consideration at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on May 8. Lenin introduced an amendment, after which the decree was passed (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 236-37 and 240-42). p. 322

[132] *Nozdryov*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls* personifying the bullying type of landowner. p. 330

[133] Lenin is quoting statements by Karl Marx set forth by Engels in *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, p. 438). p. 342

[134] Lenin has in mind one of the basic arguments used by the Mensheviks against the October Socialist Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Mensheviks maintained that the seizure of power was "premature", that Russia had not yet achieved a high enough development of the productive forces for socialism to be feasible. After the October Revolution they continued to oppose Soviet power and revolutionary socialist reforms.

These Menshevik views were summed up in a book by N. Sukhanov, *Notes on the Revolution*, which Lenin criticised in his article "Our Revolution (Appropos the Notes of N. Sukhanov)". Refuting the Menshevik idea that the socialist revolution in Russia was "premature" because of economic and cultural backwardness, Lenin wrote that the working class of Russia must begin with the winning of state power by revolutionary means "and *then*, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations" (*Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 822). p. 345

[135] *The Man in a Muffler*—a character from the story of that title by Anton Chekhov. Typifies the narrow-minded Philistine. afraid of all innovation and initiative. p. 345

[136] In June 1917 the Bolshevik Central Committee was planning a peaceful demonstration by the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. At a joint meeting of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and members of the Presidium of the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets held to discuss the matter on June 11 (24), 1917, the Menshevik I. G. Tsereteli made a viciously slanderous statement against the Bolsheviks, accusing them of plotting against the government and aiding the counter-revolution, and threatened to take resolute steps to disarm the workers who supported the Bolsheviks. p. 347

[137] Lenin is quoting V. L. Pushkin's epigram about a mediocre poet who sent his verses to Phoebus, god of the sun and patron of the arts. The epigram ends with the following lines:

And while he read, the yawning Phoebus asked
What age this rhymster had attained,
How long such rumbling odes composed?
"*He is fifteen*," *Erato made reply.*
"*But fifteen years?*" "*No more, my lord.*"
"*Then shall the birch be his reward!*" p. 350

[138] The international situation was discussed by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in connection with the crisis caused by Germany, which was demanding the cession to Finland of Fort Ino (a fortification on the Russian frontier with Finland, which with Kronstadt formed an essential part of the Petrograd defence system), and also in connection with the continued British occupation of Murmansk in spite of the protests of the Soviet Government, and the occupying forces' preparations to penetrate into the hinterland. Lenin examined both these questions in detail at a joint meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Moscow Soviet on May 14, 1918 (see this volume, pp. 379-80). p. 355

[139] Lenin's proposals were endorsed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on May 8, 1918, during the discussion on the report of the People's Commissar for Food A. D. Tsyurupa

and on the decree granting the Commissar emergency powers. The document is an instruction to the commission set up by the Council of People's Commissars to revise the draft decree submitted by the People's Commissariat for Food granting the Commissar emergency powers.

Based on Lenin's propositions, the decree was approved on May 9, 1918 by the Council of People's Commissars, and on May 13, by the All-Russia C.E.C. It was published on May 14 in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 94 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 261-66). p. 356

[140] *Protest to the German Government against the occupation of the Crimea* was written by Lenin in the spring of 1918, when the German imperialist forces occupied the Ukraine and, in violation of the Brest Treaty, marched into the Crimea as far as Sevastopol, where the Black Sea fleet was stationed. On the instructions of the Soviet Government some of the ships were moved on April 29-30 to a new base at Novorossiisk. Only the ships that refused to obey the instruction to move and those that could not be moved for technical reasons remained in Sevastopol. On May 11 the German Command sent an ultimatum demanding the return of the fleet to Sevastopol on the grounds that the withdrawal of the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol was an infringement of the Brest Treaty, and threatening to continue its offensive along the Black Sea coast.

Lenin's protest formed the basis of the Note sent by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs on May 13, 1918. p. 358

[141] This refers to the German Government's radio-telegram of March 30, 1918, which declared that the Ukraine consisted of nine gubernias, including Taurida Gubernia but not the Crimea. The German occupation of the Crimea was therefore in contradiction to the official declaration of the German Government. p. 358

[142] *Theses on the Present Political Situation* were drafted by Lenin on May 10, 1918 and discussed on the same day at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The final, edited version of the theses was approved by the Central Committee on May 13, all members of the Central Committee who attended the meeting voted in favour, except G. Y. Sokolnikov and J. V. Stalin. Later, the majority of members of the Central Committee living in Petrograd gave their support to the theses. The Central Committee entrusted Lenin with the task of making the reports to the Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Joint Meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Moscow Soviet, and of moving these theses as a resolution. The same day Lenin delivered a report based on the theses at the Moscow City Party Conference, which voted its approval. p. 360

[143] Lenin's report evoked bitter attacks from the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who tried to use the critical international and internal situation as a weapon against the Bolshevik

Party and the Soviet government. Because Lenin had to leave the conference on urgent business the reply to the debate, by agreement with Lenin, was given by Y. M. Sverdlov, who made a resolute stand against the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary attacks. The meeting rejected the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary resolutions, demanding the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, denunciation of the Brest Treaty, and conclusion of an alliance with the Allied powers for continuation of the war against Germany. The Bolshevik resolution, written by Sverdlov, approving the policy of the Soviet Government, was carried by a majority.

The plan of Lenin's report on foreign policy at the Joint Meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Moscow Soviet is published in *Lenin Miscellany XI*, p. 92. p. 365

144 *Rada*—the Central Rada, a counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist government set up in April 1917 at the All-Ukraine National Congress in Kiev by a bloc of Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties and groups. The chairman of the Rada was M. S. Grushevsky, ideologist of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, the vice-chairman was V. K. Vinnichenko. Among its members were Petlyura, Yefremov, Antonovich and other nationalists.

After the victory of the October Revolution the Rada declared itself the supreme organ of the "Ukrainian People's Republic", opposed Soviet power and became one of the main centres of counter-revolution.

In December 1917, at the First All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets, which took place in Kharkov, the Ukraine was proclaimed a Soviet republic. The Congress also declared the power of the Central Rada overthrown. The Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. recognised the Ukrainian Soviet Government as the sole legitimate government of the Ukraine and passed a decision that it should be given immediate assistance in its struggle against the counter-revolutionary Rada. In December 1917 and January 1918, armed uprisings against the Central Rada and for the establishment of Soviet power flared up in all parts of the Ukraine. In January 1918, Soviet troops in the Ukraine launched an offensive and on January 26 (February 8) occupied Kiev and deposed the bourgeois Rada.

Driven out of the Soviet Ukraine, the Central Rada allied itself with the German imperialists in order to overthrow Soviet power and restore the bourgeois regime in the Ukraine. During the peace negotiations between the Soviet Republic and Germany the Rada sent its delegation to Brest-Litovsk and behind the back of the Soviet delegation concluded a separate peace with Germany, by which it undertook to supply Germany with Ukrainian grain, coal, and raw materials in return for military assistance against Soviet power. In March 1918 the Rada, now a puppet in the hands of the German and Austrian invaders, returned to Kiev. Realising that the Rada was incapable of crushing the revolutionary

movement in the Ukraine and ensuring the delivery of supplies of food and raw materials, the Germans eventually abolished it. p. 375

[145] The reference is to the Treaty between Russia and Finnish Socialist Republics, which was endorsed in Petrograd on March 1, 1918 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 1, 1957, pp. 505-10. p. 380

[146] *Moscow Regional Conference of the Russian Communist Party* (*Bolsheviks*) was held May 14-17, 1918. The conference heard reports from the provinces (Tver, Vladimir and Yaroslavl gubernias) concerning the state of Party work, the growth of the Red Army and other questions, and discussed the reports of the Moscow Regional Bureau and the Moscow Committee of the Party, and also of the Moscow Area Party organisation. On May 15, the conference discussed the current situation. A report sharply criticising the foreign policy of the Bolshevik Central Committee on behalf of the "Left Communists" was made by A. Lomov (G. I. Oppokov). This report was followed by a report by Lenin. After the debate and replies to the debate by Lenin and Lomov the conference decided by 47 votes to 9 in favour of accepting as the basis for its resolution Lenin's "Theses on the Present Political Situation" (see this volume, pp. 360-64). In reply to this, when a new Regional Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) was elected, the "Left Communists" refused to join it. p. 382

[147] *First All-Russia Congress of Representatives of the Financial Departments of the Regional*, *Gubernia and Uyezd Soviets* was held in Moscow, May 17-21, 1918. It was attended by 230 delegates. The following subjects were on the agenda: reports from the provinces; general financial policy; local finances; banks, treasury and tax inspection; correct use of credits; organisational problems.

Lenin spoke at the evening session on May 18. The propositions in his report on the tasks of Soviet financial policy formed the basis of the resolution moved by the Communist group at the Congress; the resolution was accepted by the majority of delegates. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries moved a resolution of their own but after the debate withdrew it and voted for the communist resolution. The Congress gave a commission of six people the task of drawing up together with the Commissariat for Finances as quickly as possible a number of decisions: on a progressive income tax and a general property tax "on the basis of Comrade Lenin's theses"; on a system of indirect taxes based on state monopolies; on centralisation of taxation and banking; on reform of the currency; on the "uniform centralised organisation of the whole (local and central) apparatus of financial administration". p. 383

[148] *Conference of Representatives of the Metal Works Due for Nationalisation* was held in Moscow, May 12-18, 1918. It was attended

by 6 representatives from each works: 3 workers, 2 engineers and one representative from the managerial side. The conference discussed the problems involved in nationalising large works like those at Bryansk, Kolomna, Sormovo, Byeloretsk, Zlatoust Tver and the Baltic Works in Petrograd.

Before the conference took place, the subject had been discussed by various economic and trade union bodies and by the Council of People's Commissars. During this discussion the proposal (known as the Meshchersky plan) put forward by the capitalists and bourgeois experts to amalgamate the big machine-building works in a capitalist joint-stock company controlled by the state was rejected and it was decided that these enterprises should be nationalised. On May 17, the conference came out in favour of nationalisation. Only the group of bourgeois experts, who had a voice but no vote, defended the Meshchersky plan.

Lenin's letter, which was read out at the morning session on May 18, was greeted with loud applause. As Lenin proposed, the conference elected a temporary committee to organise the amalgamation of the state metal works under the Supreme Economic Council, confirmed the Regulations on the Committee, and also the instructions on the management of nationalised enterprises.

The share companies of the Sormovo and Byeloretsk iron works and the Kolomna machine-building works and others were nationalised on June 18, 1918. They were amalgamated as the Temporary Central Board of the Sormovo-Kolomna Amalgamated National Machine-Building Works. When the Bryansk, Mytishchi, Tver and other machine-building works were added to this organisation, it became known as the State Amalgamation of Machine-Building Works. p. 388

149 *The Bryansk Regulations*—the Provisional Regulations of Internal Management drawn up by the factory trade union committee and the workers' management of the nationalised Bryansk Rail-rolling, Iron-making and Machine Works in Bezhitsa (now the Krasny Profintern Works). On May 9, 1918 they were published as an order signed by the works trade union committee and the director of the works. The Regulations were drawn up on the basis of the Statute on Labour Discipline, which had been passed by the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on April 3, 1918. They instituted a firm system of discipline at the works and helped to strengthen one-man management in industry. p. 388

150 This was written by Lenin at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on May 20, 1918. It formed the basis of the final text of an appeal telegraphed to the Petrograd Party Committee with the following instruction attached: "Publish the following appeal at all mills and factories and take steps for the immediate organisation of enrolment in the food detachments".

On May 22, 1918, this appeal was published over the signature of Lenin and A, D. Tsyurupa in the newspaper *Petrogradskaya Pravda* No. 103, and on May 29 *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 107 and in other newspapers. p. 390

[151] *On the Famine* (*A Letter to the Petrograd Workers*) was written by Lenin after a conversation with A. V. Ivanov, chairman of the Putilov (now Kirov) Works purchasing commission. Lenin paid close attention to what the Putilov workers' representative had to say, then asked him to tell the Petrograd workers that the Government was "taking resolute measures to improve the country's food situation" and handed him a copy of a decree to pass on to the Putilov workers. The decree gave the People's Commissar for Food emergency powers to fight the famine. In a letter to A. D. Tsyurupa, Lenin wrote of his conversation with Ivanov: "I told him my opinion: if the *best* Petrograd workers do not create a *picked*, reliable workers' army" for a campaign against the rural bourgeoisie, "famine and the destruction of the revolution are inevitable" (*Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, p. 163). Lenin told the People's Commissariat for Food to give every assistance to the Petrograd workers' detachments.

At the beginning of June 1918, the Petrograd workers sent off their first food detachment of 400 men. p. 391

[152] *The Second All-Russia Congress of Commissars for Labour* took place in Moscow, May 18-25, 1918. It was attended by representatives of the regional, gubernia, and uyezd commissariats for labour, labour exchanges, hospital and insurance funds and associations, unemployment funds, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and other organisations—about 600 people in all. The agenda included the following items: report of the People's Commissariat for Labour; the situation in industry, labour discipline and the raising of labour productivity; standards of payment and standards of productivity; the economic position of the working class. The Congress worked in five committees (commissars for labour, labour exchanges, protection of labour, insurance, and statistics). The Congress approved the Statute of the A.C.C.T.U. of April 3, 1918, on Labour Discipline and the Statute on Rate-Fixing; on the basis of these statutes, resolutions were passed on labour discipline, wages policy, the economic position of the working class and other matters. The Congress also passed a law on protection of labour and a decision of the setting up in the provinces of bureaus for fixing wages and work quotas. p. 399

[153] The question of founding a Socialist Academy of Social Sciences was discussed by the Council of People's Commissars on May 25, 1918. The draft statute for the Academy submitted by the People's Commissariat for Education did not satisfy Lenin and he drew up the proposals published here; apparently they were written during the meeting. They were subsequently approved by the C.P.C.

On June 7, the Government considered the Statute of the Socialist Academy which had been revised on the basis of Lenin's proposals. The Decree (Statute) of the All-Russia C.E.C. on the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences was published on July 12, 1918, in the newspaper *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 145 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 468-79). The Academy was officially opened on October 1, 1918. p. 404

[154] Lists of Members of the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences and teachers at the Academy, which had been approved by the All-Russia C.E.C., were published on August 9. 1918, in the newspaper *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 169.

On February 5, 1922, Lenin was elected a member of the Socialist Academy. When he was informed of his election by the Presidium of the Academy, Lenin replied with the following note: "I am very grateful. Unfortunately, I am not well enough to be able to perform even the smallest fraction of the duties of a member of the Socialist Academy. I do not want to be a fictitious member. I therefore request you to remove my name from the list of members or not to include it in the list" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 432). p. 405

[155] *Theses on the Current Situation* were written when the country was undergoing a very serious food shortage. The Council of People's Commissars was guided by these theses on May 28, 1918, when it passed a decision on food policy (see *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, p. 95) instructing the People's Commissariat for Food to draw up by the following day an appeal to the workers and peasants on the organisation of armed detachments to be used in the campaign for grain. The appeal, which was drawn up on the basis of Lenin's theses, was approved by the Government on May 29 and published in the newspapers on May 31 on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 406

[156] *The First All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils* was held May 26 to June 4, 1918, in Moscow; it was attended by 252 delegates representing 5 regional, 30 gubernia and a considerable number of uyezd economic councils, and also departments of the Supreme Economic Council, trade union organisations and factory trade union committees.

Lenin took a direct part in preparing the Congress. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, which was held in the Kremlin on May 23, and attended by Lenin, matters connected with the Congress were examined in detail; the agenda was decided upon and the theses of a number of reports were approved with alterations and amendments. During the discussion of the theses of G. D. Veinberg's report on the management of the nationalised enterprises Lenin moved that the system of managing nationalised enterprises should be cut down to include only factory management boards on the spot and a central managing board—the production department of the Supreme Economic Council—all intermediate

boards being eliminated. Other items included in the Congress agenda were: the economic consequences of the Brest Treaty; Russia's general economic position and economic policy; the work of the Supreme Economic Council; Russia's financial position; the state budget; foreign trade; the Committee of State Construction; reports from the provinces. Some of the questions were examined by the committees on the organisation of production, labour, trade and agriculture.

At the opening session of the Congress Lenin made a speech outlining the immediate tasks of economic construction and the organisation of management of the nationalised economy. Lenin's plan for the organisation of socialist production and management on the principle of democratic centralism was opposed at the Congress by the "Left Communists", the anarcho-syndicalists, the Mensheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Statute drawn up under Lenin's direction was passed by the Congress. The Congress also took important decisions on other questions, following the principles set out by Lenin. These were on the need for carrying out further socialist nationalisation, on trade between town and country, and on the reorganisation of the Supreme Economic Council. The Congress worked out measures for improving labour discipline and raising the productivity of labour and declared the production of agricultural machines and implements to be a matter of primary state importance. p. 408

[157] This document was written by Lenin in connection with requests from various organisations to be allowed to procure food independently. On May 29, 1918, the appeal to workers and peasants on the organisation of armed grain detachments, based on Lenin's "Theses on the Current Situation" (see this volume, pp. 406-07), was discussed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars in the presence of representatives of these organisations. During the discussion, Lenin wrote the People's Commissar for Food A. D. Tsyurupa the following note: "Is there going to be a struggle over 'independent procuring'? Perhaps not? Shall we publish the attached in the newspapers, and in whose name?" (*Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, p. 106). To this Tsyurupa replied: "There will be a struggle. The attached should be published in the name of the Council of People's Commissars." "The attached" was the draft appeal published here. It was passed with slight amendments on June 1 as a decision of the Council of People's Commissars and published on June 4 in the newspaper *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 112 under the heading "Decision of the Council of People's Commissars on the Question of Independent Procuring". p. 416

[158] The Joint Session of the All-Russia C.E.C., the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, the A.C.C.T.U. and the trade unions, factory committees and other workers' organisations was held on June 4, 1918 in the Bolshoi Theatre. There was only one question on the agenda—the struggle against

famine in connection with the general situation. Opening the session, Y. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russia C.E.C., said that such a widely representative meeting had been called in view of the extreme urgency of the problem and in order to draw all the workers of Moscow into an energetic campaign against famine. The report at the session was delivered by Lenin. Left and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks made sharp attacks on the Soviet Government and criticised its food policy. The resolution moved by the Bolshevik group, which was based on Lenin's draft, was passed by a majority vote. p. 419

[159] Lenin is expounding an idea expressed by Engels in his *Einleitung zu Sigismund Borkheims Broschüre zur Erinnerune für die deutschen Mordspatrioten. 1806-1807* (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 21, S. 346-51). p. 422

[160] Lenin has in mind the All-Russia Conference of Mensheviks (held in Moscow, May 21-27, 1918), which showed up the counter-revolutionary nature of the Mensheviks' activity. In their speeches N. Cherevanin, V. G. Groman and other Mensheviks tried to exploit the country's food difficulties for anti-Soviet purposes. They described the organisation of food detachments and the "crusade" for grain which Lenin was urging upon the workers as "the last convulsive efforts" of Soviet power to save itself. p. 429

[161] *Zhizn* (Life)—a newspaper published in Moscow from April 23 to July 6, 1918 under the editorship of the anarchistic writers A. Borovoi and Y. Novomirsky. Made use of by various anti-Soviet elements, it was eventually banned along with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 429

[162] Lenin is referring to the All-Russia C.E.C. decrees: On the Emergency Powers of the People's Commissar for Food of May 13 (The Food Dictatorship Decree) and On the Reorganisation of the Commissariat for Food and Local Food Bodies of May 27, 1918 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 261-64 and 307-12) These decrees instituted complete centralisation of food supply, both procuring and distribution; they also envisaged measures for the organisation of a workers' grain campaign and help for the poor in their struggle against the kulaks. p. 432

[163] Lenin has in mind a resolution moved at the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets by the Right and Centre S.R.s, in which they expressed strong opposition to the Peace Treaty of Brest and demanded the immediate abolition of Soviet power and the holding of a Constituent Assembly. p. 441

[164] The reference is to the counter-revolutionary armed revolt of the Czechoslovak Army Corps organised by the imperialists of the Entente with the active connivance of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Czechoslovak corps had been formed in

Russia before the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution out of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. By the summer of 1918 it numbered over 60,000 men (the total number of Czech and Slovak war prisoners in Russia was nearly 200,000). After the setting up of Soviet power the financing of the corps was taken over by the countries of the Entente, which had decided to use it against the Soviet Republic. T. Massarik, leader of the Czech bourgeois nationalists and president of the Czechoslovak National Council, declared the corps to be part of the French army and the representatives of the Entente raised the question of its evacuation to France. The Soviet Government agreed to the evacuation of the Czechoslovaks on condition that the Russian soldiers in France were sent home. By the agreement of March 26, 1918, the corps was granted permission to quit Russia via Vladivostok on condition that they handed in their arms and deposed their counter-revolutionary commanders, who were Russian officers. But the counter-revolutionary commanders of the corps treacherously broke the agreement with the Soviet Government on the surrendering of arms and, on instructions from the imperialists of the Entente instigated an armed revolt at the end of May. The governments of the United States, Britain and France openly and whole-heartedly supported the revolt and French officers took a direct part in it. Operating in close contact with the whiteguards and the kulaks, the corps occupied a large part of the Urals, the Volga area and Siberia, everywhere restoring the rule of the bourgeoisie. With the support of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries whiteguard governments were set up in the occupied areas. A Siberian "government" was set up in Omsk, a Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly in Samara, and so forth.

Soon after the revolt started, on June 11, the Central Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist groups in Russia issued a manifesto to the soldiers of the corps, exposing the counter-revolutionary nature of the revolt and appealing to these Czech and Slovak workers and peasants to put a stop to it and join the Czechoslovak units of the Red Army. The majority of the Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war were sympathetic towards Soviet power and refused to be taken in by the anti-Soviet propaganda of the reactionary clique in command. Realising that they were being tricked, many of the rank and file left the corps and refused to fight against Soviet power. Nearly 12,000 Czechs and Slovaks served in the ranks of the Red Army.

The Volga area was liberated by the Red Army in the autumn of 1918 and the whiteguard Czechoslovaks were finally defeated during the victorious campaign against Kolchak. p. 441

[165] The reference is to the reports delivered at the All-Russia C.E.C. meetings by the People's Commissar for Food A. D. Tsyurupa (May 9, 1918) and A. I. Svidersky (May 27) on reorganisation of the food bodies and the system of food supply. p. 442

[166] This draft resolution formed the basis of the resolution submitted by the Bolshevik group at the meeting of June 4, 1918. It was accepted by a joint meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., the Moscow Soviet and the Trade Unions, which rejected the Left S.R. resolution aimed against organisation of the poor, against fixed prices for grain and other measures initiated by the Soviet Government. p. 444

[167] *Union of Internationalist Teachers* was set up at the beginning of December 1917 in opposition to the counter-revolutionary All-Russia Union of Teachers. The new union was for teachers who bad come over to the side of Soviet power. It set itself the aim of rallying democratic teachers and winning over the waverers. In a manifesto published in *Pravda* on December 6 (19) the union appealed to teachers to join the union and work with the people to "create a new, socialist school". The response was immediate and by the spring of 1918 the Union had 12,000 members. It formed the nucleus of the Union of Educational Workers that was set up in August 1919.

The *First All-Russia Congress of Internationalist Teachers* was held in Moscow June 2-6, 1918; it was attended by 150 delegates with the right to vote. The Congress heard and discussed the following reports: tasks of the Union of Internationalist Teachers; reform of the schools; general plan for the reorganisation of public education; polytechnical education; organisational and propaganda tasks of the new teacher; teachers' living standards; draft rules for the Union of Internationalist Teachers; report by N. K. Krupskaya "The School and the State", and others. The first speaker at the Congress was A. V. Lunacharsky, People's Commissar for Education who outlined the role of the Soviet teacher in the sphere of public education. In its resolutions the Congress called for "energetic support of the power of the workers and peasants in their struggle to consolidate socialism", defined the tasks of the Soviet school as polytechnical and based on initiative and productive labour, approved the rules of the Union, and proposed to the People's Commissariat for Education that a Pedagogical Academy should be founded.

Lenin spoke at the fourth session of the Congress. p. 445

[168] Lenin delivered this speech on the food detachments to workers' meetings in Moscow and it was published in *Bednota* (The Poor), a daily newspaper issued by the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.). The first food detachments were sent out from Petrograd and Moscow to the grain-growing provinces in November 1917. Mass recruiting for the detachments among the advanced workers began in the summer of 1918, when the food crisis was at its height. The food detachments were formed by the Party, Soviet and trade union organisations of Petrograd, Moscow and other industrial centres. There were about 3,000 people in them by June 15, and by the end of August the number had risen to nearly 17,000. In 1918 there were 122 detachments and in 1919, more than 1,000, with an enrolment

of about 30,000 men. These workers' food detachments played a big part in procuring food for the population and the Red Army, in fighting the kulaks and rallying the rural poor. p. 448

[169] Lenin is referring to a food detachment that operated in the village of Kulikovo, Usman Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia. With the help of the poor people of the area the detachment confiscated from the kulaks hidden arms and a large amount of grain—4,073 poods of rye, 1,006 poods of oats, 428 poods of millet and 188 poods of flour (one pood = 36 lbs.). More than half the requisitioned grain was given to the famine-stricken village of Kulikovo. The village Soviet, which had consisted formerly of kulaks, was re-elected with the support of the detachment. p. 453

[170] This telegram was sent to the Second Gubernia Congress of Soviets in Penza in reply to a letter from the Chairman of the Penza Gubernia Soviet A. Y. Minkin. When the Congress opened on June 24, 1918, it elected Lenin its honorary chairman. p. 454

[171] *Poor Peasants' Committees* were instituted by a decree of the All-Russia C.E.C. of June 11, 1918, on the Organisation and Supply of the Rural Poor, which encouraged the practice of setting up such committees on the initiative of the rank and file. By November 1918, 105,000 poor peasants' committees had been formed and were operating in the provinces under the leadership of the Communist Party. The decree charged the committees to keep account of the food supplies in the peasant farms, expose hoarding by kulaks, and help the Soviet food organisations in the work of confiscating their surpluses. They were also to guard and deliver confiscated grain to state storage points; provide food for the poor at the expense of the kulak farms; distribute farm implements and industrial goods; organise sowing and harvesting campaigns; guard sown fields; and combat bag-trading and profiteering on grain. The practical work of the poor peasants' committees, however, embraced all aspects of village life. They were, in fact, strongpoints of proletarian dictatorship in the countryside. Their organisation heralded the further development of the socialist revolution in the villages.

The committees played an outstanding part in suppressing the kulak counter-revolution and in breaking the economic power of the kulaks by partially expropriating them. In a comparatively short time the committees confiscated from the kulaks and distributed among the poor and middle peasants 50 million hectares of land and confiscated from the kulaks a large quantity of farm implements for use by poor peasants and hard-up middle peasants. They also did good work in finally abolishing landed proprietorship and keeping the famine-stricken urban workers and units of the Red Army supplied with food. The committees took an active part in organising collective agricultural enterprises—artels and communes—which along with the state farms were the first

centres of socialist-type economic organisation in the villages; between the time the committees were set up and the end of 1918 the number of collective peasant enterprises increased, according to incomplete data, from 240 to 1,600. Volunteer detachments and regiments for the Red Army were formed from among the rural poor on the initiative of the poor peasants' committees. The committees did a lot towards consolidating the local Soviets and freeing them from kulak influence.

The work of the committees was of immense importance in consolidating the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and in winning the middle peasant over to Soviet power. Lenin stressed that the organisation and activities of the committees should be planned to take in not only the poor peasants but the middle peasants as well. During the discussion of the draft decree on poor peasants' committees he pointed out the need to draw the middle peasant into the work of the committees (see Lenin's amendments to the decree in *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 413-16).

By the autumn of 1918 the poor peasants' committees had fulfilled their historic role in the socialist revolution. In this connection and also in connection with the need for "completing Soviet construction by the creation of a uniform organisation of Soviets throughout the territory of the Soviet Republic", the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which was held in November 1918, proposed the re-election of all volost and village Soviets, to be organised by the poor peasants' committees. According to the election instructions published by the All-Russia C.E.C. on December 4, 1918, the poor peasants' committees were to wind up their activities after the election campaign and hand over all their equipment and records to the new Soviets. p. 455

[172] *Fourth Conference of Trade Unions and Factory Committees of Moscow* was held from June 27 to July 2, 1918 . It was attended by 472 delegates with a vote and 71 with a voice but no vote; 341 of them were Communists, 34 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, 24 Mensheviks, 9 Right S.R.s, and 64 non-party people and representatives of other groups. The Conference considered the food situation; universal military training and mobilisation; labour discipline; work of the labour exchange; rules of the factory committees, etc. Lenin delivered a report on the vital question of food supply. The Conference passed a resolution based on the draft proposed by Lenin. In spite of opposition from the Mensheviks and S.R.s, the Conference approved the resolutions moved by the Communist group on all questions. p. 457

[173] In May-June 1918, Austria-Hungary was swept by a wave of strikes, demonstrations and mass protests by the workers of a political and anti-militarist nature. A big strike was launched in Vienna in the middle of June over the reduction of the bread ration; Soviets of Workers' Deputies (*Arbeiterräte*) came into being and started operating in Vienna, Budapest and other cities.

The Vienna Soviet presented the government with the strikers' demands: conclusion of peace, increase of wages, reduction of working hours and restoration of the former bread ration. The Social-Democratic leaders were unable to prevent the strike but they succeeded in making the Vienna Soviet abandon it.

The first Soviets of Workers' Deputies and Soldiers' Deputies were formed during the strike campaign in Vienna, Budapest and other cities in January 1918. A political strike, which spread to the industrial centres of Austria-Hungary, was declared in Vienna on January 14 in protest against the rapacious demands made on Soviet Russia by the governments of the Austro-German bloc during the peace negotiations. Strike calls went out for immediate conclusion of general peace on the terms proposed by Soviet Russia, abolition of wartime laws and the censorship, an amnesty for political prisoners, fair distribution of food, etc. The movement was crushed and the Soviets broken up with the direct support of the opportunist leaders of the Austrian Social-Democrats. p. 461

[174] Lenin met delegates from the Yelets Soviet of Deputies on May 30, 1918. After they had talked together Lenin handed them a letter to the Editors of *Izvestia VTsIK* in which he wrote: "To be delivered by representatives of the Yelets Soviet of Deputies. Please publish an interview with them in the paper. This is a model uyezd as regards order, accounting and management of *large modern farms*, and as regards the *suppression* of the bourgeoisie" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 45). The day before he spoke at the conference, June 26, Lenin met the Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs I. G. Pravdin, who had returned from an inspection tour of Tula, Yelets and Orel, and talked to him about the situation in these areas (see *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, pp 116 and 179). p. 473

[175] Lenin is referring to the article "The Secret Treaties Exposed", printed on November 28, 1917, in the newspaper *Vorwärts* (Forward) No. 326. It was admitted in this article that "by publishing the secret despatches exchanged between St. Petersburg and Paris the Bolshevik Government of Russia is performing a truly revolutionary act".

Vorwärts was the main daily newspaper of the German Social-Democratic Party and had been coming out in Berlin since 1891. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels the editorship of the paper fell into the hands of the Right wing of the party and began systematically printing articles by opportunists. During the imperialist war of 1914-18 *Vorwärts* took up a position of social-chauvinism; after the Great October Socialist Revolution the paper conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. It continued appearing in Berlin until 1933. p. 479

[176] The reference is to V. A. Tikhomirov, a representative of the Bogorodsk Soviet of Workers' Deputies, who was also at the time chairman of the Bogorodsk co-operatives union. p. 482

[177] Lenin is referring to the article "The French Millions", published June 28, 1918, in *Prukopnik Svobody* (Pioneer of Freedom), the main newspaper of the C.E.C. of the Czechoslovak Communist groups in Soviet Russia. In this article it was stated that the French and British governments had given the Czechoslovak white-guards about 15 million rubles. The article was reprinted on the same day in *Pravda* No. 130 and a summary appeared in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 132. p. 482

[178] Lenin has in mind a group of print workers which had for a long time been under the influence of the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s who ran the yellow Union of Printing Trade Workers. After the October Revolution this union opposed Soviet power and organised strikes in Moscow, Petrograd and other cities. The Bolsheviks and Left Internationalists had their groups in all the large printshops and founded the Red Union of Printers. When this union was organised, the influence of the yellow union began to decline. p. 485

[179] The Black Sea fleet was moved from Sevastopol to Novorossiisk on April 29-30, 1918, on orders from the Soviet Government because the Crimea was being occupied by the German imperialists. Lenin set forth the circumstances concerning the fleet's removal and its possible return to Sevastopol in the "Protest to the German Government against the Occupation of the Crimea". Since there was no possibility of saving the fleet and the Soviet Government did not wish to surrender it to the German imperialists, who had presented an ultimatum demanding the return of the fleet to Sevastopol, Lenin sent the following instruction to the Supreme Military Council: "In view of the hopelessness of the situation, which has been proved by the highest military authorities, the fleet must be destroyed immediately" (see *History of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R.*, Vol. 3, 1957, p, 139). On June 18-19 the government's order was carried out. Most of the ships were scuttled off Novorossiisk. p. 485

[180] The reference is to the elections to the Petrograd Soviet in June 1918. During the elections the Mensheviks and S.R.s conducted a bitter struggle against the Bolsheviks, resorting even to terrorism (on June 20 during the elections V. Volodarsky, an active member of the Communist Party, was assassinated by a Right S.R.). The Communists won the election. The first session of the Soviet on June 27 was attended by 405 Bolsheviks and Bolshevik sympathisers, 75 Left S.R.s, 59 Menshevik defencists and Right S.R.s and 43 non-party people. p. 490

[181] On June 28, 1918, on the instructions of the Moscow Party Committee meetings on the subject of the Civil War were held in all districts of Moscow. These enthusiastic mass meetings showed the working people's growing trust in the Communist Party, their

support for its policy and condemnation of the counter-revolutionary parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were supporting the bourgeoisie whose actions had led to civil war. The meetings were addressed by prominent Party workers and also delegates from the Urals, the Volga country and other areas, who had come to Moscow for the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The delegates described the counter-revolutionary activities of the Mensheviks and S.R.s and the fierce struggle the kulaks were waging against Soviet power.

Lenin spoke at the AMO Works (Simonovsky Sub-District), the former Mikhelson Works (Zamoskvorechye District) and in the Soviet Gardens in Rogozhsky District.

Four thousand workers and other employees at the former Mikhelson Works listened to Lenin's speech with the greatest attention and stated in their resolution that they approved the Moscow Soviet's decision of June 25, 1918 on the expulsion "for ever from the Soviets" of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (Right and Centre), who, as members of the Soviets, had sabotaged their work and tried to overthrow Soviet power with the aid of foreign imperialists. The meeting appealed to all working people to "recall from all Soviets and their institutions the Right S.R.s and Mensheviks, who criminally and shamefully reside in the camp of the dark forces of the counter-revolution in order to betray our workers' cause". p. 492

[182] Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 21, S. 350-51. Diets Verlag. Berlin. p. 495

[183] On July 2, 1918, meetings of men called up for the Red Army were held in Moscow. The public meeting in the former Alexeyevsky Riding School was attended by about 1,500 mobilised men and Red Army volunteers. After Lenin and other speakers had addressed the meeting there was a concert. The atmosphere at the meeting was one of great enthusiasm.

The same day Lenin went to a meeting at the Salamonsky Circus but did not speak because the meeting did not start on time. p. 500

[184] The meetings of the Communist group at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets before the Congress opened were held July 1-3, 1918; they were attended by about 500 Communist delegates who had arrived for the Congress. The first meeting was opened by Y. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russia C.E.C. After speaking briefly of the tasks before the Congress, he informed the delegates about the work that had been done on drawing up a draft Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. Lenin spoke on July 3 on the foreign and domestic affairs of the Republic. After his speech a resolution approving the policy of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars was passed unanimously. The group heard reports from the provinces and discussed and approved the Congress agenda. p. 502

[185] *Entente cordiale*—bloc of imperialist powers (Britain, France and Russia) formed at the beginning of this century in opposition to the imperialists of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). It took its name from the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. During the world imperialist war of 1914-18 the United States, Japan and other countries joined the Entente. After the Great October Socialist Revolution the chief members of the bloc, Britain, France, the U.S.A. and Japan, inspired, organised and participated in the armed intervention against Soviet Russia. p. 502

[186] *Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets* opened on July 4, 1918 in the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. It was attended by 1,164 delegates with the right to vote. These included 773 Bolsheviks, 353 Left S.R.s, 17 Maximalists (a variety of Left S.R.s), 4 anarchists, 4 Menshevik-Internationalists, 3 members of other parties and 10 non-party people. Among the delegates there were representatives of the German-occupied areas of the Ukraine, Latvia, and Transcaucasia, who brought greetings and described the situation in these areas. The Congress was greeted by the representative of the British Socialist Party, Joseph Fineberg, who read out a resolution passed by his party's conference declaring its support for the socialist revolution in Russia. The Congress also received greetings from the working people of Germany and Norway, and from Russian prisoners-of-war interned in various countries.

The Congress approved the agenda proposed by the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C., which included the following items: reports of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars, the food question; organisation of the socialist Red Army; Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic; elections to the All-Russia C.E.C. The Congress rejected the Left S.R. demand that reports from the provinces and a discussion on the Soviet Government's decision to introduce capital punishment for treason should be added to the agenda.

After the agenda had been approved, the Congress discussed a question that was not on the agenda concerning incidents in the area bordering on the Ukraine, where Mensheviks and S.R.s were agitating among the military units in the area with the aim of causing a clash with the Germans and thus sabotaging the peace treaty with Germany and drawing the country into war. In their explanation to the Congress the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries demagogically accused the Communist Party of not wishing to help the working people of the occupied areas, refused to discuss the resolution moved by the Communist group and walked out of the meeting. The Congress unanimously resolved that "decisions on matters of war and peace rest solely with the All-Russia Congress of Soviets" and the central organs of Soviet power—the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars, and advised the Soviet Government to deal firmly with all agents provocateurs.

Y. M. Sverdlov delivered the report on the work of the All-

Russia C.E.C. Lenin reported on the work of the Council of People's Commissars. After stormy debates on the two reports the Congress passed the Communist group's resolution expressing "complete approval of the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Government". The Left S.R. resolution calling for a vote of no confidence in the Soviet Government, denunciation of the Brest Peace Treaty, and a change in the home and foreign policy of Soviet power was rejected.

Defeated at the Congress, the Left S.R.s resorted to use of force, and on July 6 launched an armed counter-revolutionary insurrection in Moscow. The Congress adjourned until July 9. When it met again to discuss the events of July 6-7, the Congress fully approved the government's resolute measures to deal with the criminal venture of the Left S.R.s and stated that the Left S.R.s who shared the views of their ruling clique "can have no place in the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies".

In a resolution on the report by the People's Commissar for Food A. D. Tsyurupa the Congress endorsed the grain monopoly, stressed the need for resolute suppression of kulak resistance and approved the setting up of the poor peasants' committees.

At its final session on July 10, the Congress heard a report on the organisation of the Red Army and unanimously approved the Communist group's resolution outlining essential measures for organising and consolidating the Red Army on the basis of compulsory military service by the working people.

The Congress completed its work with an act of the greatest historical significance. It passed the first Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., thus legislatively consolidating the gains of the working people of Soviet Russia. p. 505

[187] The "previous speaker" was M. A. Spiridonova, one of the Left S.R. leaders. She had delivered a supplementary report to the Congress on the work of the peasant section of the All-Russia C.E.C., which contained a number of counter-revolutionary attacks on the policy of the Soviet Government, and the Communist Party. p. 507

[188] *Golos Trudovovo Krestyanstva* (Voice of the Labouring Peasantry) —daily newspaper that appeared in Petrograd from the end of November 1917 as the organ of the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, Second Convocation (until December 9 [22] it was known as *Izvestia of the All-Russia Peasant Congress*). On January 20 (February 2), 1918, it became the organ of the Peasant Section of the All-Russia C.E.C. Up to July 10, 1918, the paper was controlled by the Left S.R.s. On November 6, 1918, it became the organ of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. It continued to appear until May 31, 1919. p. 512

[189] The reference is to the Draft Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which was submitted for the approval of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

A decision on preparation of a draft constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. had been passed in January 1918 by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets. But the Soviet Government was able to begin work on the draft only after the peaceful breathing-space had been gained. Lenin played a decisive part in drawing up the first Soviet Constitution.

The work of preparing the draft was done by the constitution commission set up by the All-Russia C.E.C. on April 1, 1918, under the chairmanship of Y. M. Sverdlov.

On Sverdlov's suggestion at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. on June 14 the question of the Soviet Constitution was included on the agenda of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The final drafting of the Constitution for submission to the Congress was entrusted to a commission of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) under the chairmanship of Lenin. On July 3 this commission considered two drafts of the Soviet Constitution—one made by the constitution commission of the All-Russia C.E.C. and another submitted by the People's Commissariat for Justice. The commission of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) took as the basis for the constitution the draft submitted by the constitution commission of the All-Russia C.E.C., adding some of the propositions put forward by the People's Commissariat for Justice. On Lenin's suggestion the following amendments were made: a Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People was included as a preamble to the Constitution; an article on national and racial equality in the Soviet Republic, and articles on the political rights of foreigners resident in the R.S.F.S.R. for purposes of work (Lenin's "Rough Draft of Point 20 of the Second Section of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.", which defines their rights) and on the granting of the right of asylum to all foreigners subjected to persecution for their political and religious beliefs (Lenin's amendments, see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Russ. ed., Vol. 2, 1959, pp. 546-49) were added. The commission of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) also introduced a number of other important amendments and corrections. The draft passed by the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) was submitted for approval by the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

On the first day of the Congress Sverdlov proposed setting up a commission to consider the draft Constitution and report on it to the Congress. The commission was formed from among representatives of the various groups; it made a few changes of a stylistic nature, added several articles to the section on budget rights and introduced a new section on the arms and flag of the R.S.F.S.R. At its final session on July 10 the Congress heard the report of the commission on the draft Constitution, after which it unanimously approved the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. and entrusted the final work of editing the text to the new All-Russia C.E.C.

On July 19, 1918, the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was published as the Fundamental Law and came into force as from the date of publication. p. 515

[190] The reference is to the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission of the Council of People's Commissars, whose Chairman was F. E. Dzerzhinsky.

The *All-Russia Extraordinary Commission* (Cheka) was set up on December 7 (20), 1917 by decision of the Council of People's Commissars for the purpose of "ruthlessly combating counter-revolution, sabotage and profiteering". As the strong right arm of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Cheka played an enormous part in checking counter-revolutionary sabotage and in protecting the security of the Soviet Republic. Appraising the work of this commission, Lenin pointed out in his report to the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1921: "...It was our effective weapon against the numerous plots and numerous attacks on Soviet power" (see V. I. Lenin, *Report on Peace*, Moscow, p. 262). In its Resolution on the Cheka the Ninth Congress noted the commission's heroic work in protecting the gains of the October Revolution and, in view of the consolidation of Soviet power, proposed curtailing the commission's sphere of activity. This resolution reflected proposals made by Lenin in a draft decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Cheka, which he wrote on December 1, 1921 (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 369). On February 6, 1922 the All-Russia C.E.C. passed a decree abolishing the Cheka. p. 519

[191] In the very first months of its existence Soviet power gave the collective farming enterprises considerable material and financial assistance. Estimates of the Current Land Policy Department of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture show that in the second half of 1918 fifteen million rubles were assigned to the organisation of agricultural communes and artels in the form of interest-free loans. Additionally the government assigned 10 million rubles for the same purpose in July 1918. A decree passed on November 2, 1918 "for the purpose of improving and developing agriculture and bringing about its speediest reorganisation on socialist principles" set up a fund of one thousand million rubles for financial and technical assistance to the labour associations and communes. The actual amount disbursed to communes and artels on the basis of this decree was considerably more than one thousand million rubles.

The collective farms enjoyed great advantages during the distribution of complex agricultural machinery, livestock and farm implements, and seed. State farms and collective farms were given priority by the state agricultural machine-hire points and repair stations that had been set up. p. 527

[192] *Committee of International Relations* was set up by the French Internationalists in January 1916. This was the first attempt to set up in France a revolutionary-internationalist organisation of socialists to counter the social-chauvinist organisations there. Lenin saw the value of the committee's work in rallying internationalists and on his instructions I. F. Armand took part in the committee's work.

Thanks to the influence of the October Revolution in Russia and the growing-strength of the French working-class movement the committee became a centre for people with revolutionary-internationalist views. In 1920 it merged with the French Communist Party.

The manifesto referred to by Lenin was published on June 29, 1918 in *Pravda* No. 131. p. 528

[193] Lenin is referring to a speech by a representative of the S.R.-Maximalist group Svetlov. p. 530

[194] Lenin has in mind the historic Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the Nationalisation of Large-Scale Industry, passed on June 28, 1918 and published on June 30 in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 134. "According to a plan that had been outlined long before," Lenin wrote of this decree, "after extensive preparatory work a decree, whose appearance was impatiently-awaited by the masses of the people of Russia was finally published on June 28" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 27). The decree made all large industrial enterprises public property. In spite of enormous difficulties the work of nationalisation was carried out in a short period thanks to the organising work of the Communist Party and the energetic participation of the workers. By August 31, 1918 there were over 3,000 nationalised enterprises in the country.

Under the same decree, all private railways and also the public utilities (water supply, gasworks, urban transport, etc.) were made public property and put under the control of the local Soviets. p. 531

[195] *The counter-revolutionary insurrection of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow* (July 6-7, 1918) was organised in accordance with the decision of the C.C. of the Left S.R.s of June 24. It was part of a general attack by the internal counter-revolution and the imperialists of the Entente against Soviet Russia, and the insurrectionists were secretly supported by foreign diplomatic missions.

The insurrection was launched during the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, at which the anti-Soviet speeches of the Left S.R.s received no support from the overwhelming majority of delegates. Defeated at the Congress, the Left S.R.s pursued their aim of sabotaging the Brest Peace Treaty and dragging Soviet Russia into war with Germany by assassinating the German Ambassador in Moscow Count Mirbach on July 6. This was followed up by an insurrection. The main rebel force was a detachment commanded by D. I. Popov, a Left S.R. and member of the Cheka, About 1,800 people took part in the insurrection, bombarding the Kremlin with artillery and seizing the telephone exchange and telegraph office. During the two hours that they remained in control there, they sent out several provocatory manifestos, bulletins and telegrams in the name of the Left S.R. Central Commit-

tee alleging that the Left S.R.s had taken over power and that their action had been welcomed by, the whole population.

The Fifth Congress of Soviets instructed the government to suppress the insurrection at once, and the group of Left S.R.s at the Congress was arrested. Thanks to the energetic measure taken by the Soviet Government and the united action of the Moscow workers and garrison the insurrection was put down within twenty-four hours. By 2 p.m. on July 7 it was all over.

The Left S.R.s also tried to start insurrections in Petrograd, Vologda and other cities. A telegram from the Left S.R. Central Committee stating that the Left S.R.s had seized power in Moscow, was sent to M. A. Muravyov, a Left S.R. and Commander of the Eastern Front. On the pretext of attacking the Germans, he tried to seize Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk) and march his forces on Moscow in support of the insurrectionists. Like the other insurrections, Muravyov's reckless attempt was quickly suppressed.

When the Fifth Congress of Soviets reassembled after the defeat of the insurrection, it passed a decision expelling from the Soviets the Left S.R.s who had supported the adventuristic line of their leadership. Numerous telegrams in which the workers and peasants expressed their approval of the suppression of the revolt and their readiness to take up arms to defend Soviet power reached the Congress from all parts of the country. p. 534

[196] At its first session on July 15, 1918 the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (5th Convocation) heard Lenin's speech and declaration and unanimously passed the following resolution: "The All-Russia Central Executive Committee wholly approves the statement of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and decrees that it shall be brought to the attention of the widest masses of the working people." A government statement under the title "Appeal of Comrade Lenin to the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of the Red Army, Approved at the Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of July 15, 1918" was published on July 17 in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 149.

The document has also been published under the title "Statement at a Meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. of July 15, 1918". p. 538

[197] On July 19, 1918 the meetings arranged every Friday by the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) went off very well in all districts of Moscow. The meeting in Lefortovo District, at which Lenin spoke on the international and internal situation, was attended by about 2,000 people. p. 542

[198] *The Moscow Gubernia Conference of Factory Committees and Trade Unions* was held July 22-23, 1918. It was attended by 500 delegates, the majority of whom were Communists or Communist sympathisers. After Lenin's speech on the current situation the Communists moved a resolution, which had previously been approved, on

Lenin's report to the Fourth Conference of Trade Unions and Factory Committees of Moscow, which was held June 27-July 2, 1918. The resolution with a few minor amendments was passed by a large majority. p. 545

[199] *The Workers' Dreadnought* was published in London from March 1914 to June 1924; up to July 1917 it appeared under the title *Woman's Dreadnought*. From 1918 to 1919 it was the paper of the Workers' Socialist Federation and from 1920 to 1921 of the British Communist Party. p. 546

[200] On July 26, 1918 meetings were held in all districts of Moscow on the subject "What Does the Soviet Constitution Give the Working People". Prominent members of the Communist Party addressed the meetings explaining the importance of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., which had been adopted on July 10, 1918 by the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

Lenin addressed more than a thousand people assembled in the hall of the Higher Women's Courses. p. 551

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*February-July 1918*)

1918

February 21	Lenin's article "The Revolutionary Phrase" published in No. 31 of the newspaper *Pravda*.
	Lenin holds a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars to discuss the question of accepting military-technical assistance from Britain, France and other countries to resist the German offensive.
	Lenin writes the C.P.C. draft decree "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!"
February 22	Lenin writes the article "The Itch", published the same day in *Pravda* No. 33 (evening edition).
	Lenin telephones the Commissar for Post and Telegraph Services in Moscow to inform him of the German offensive.
	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the setting up of an extraordinary commission for evacuating Petrograd, etc.
February 23	Lenin attends a meeting of the Party C.C. and votes for immediate acceptance of the German Government's peace terms and for preparation of revolutionary war.
	Lenin's article "Peace or War?" published in No. 34 of *Pravda* (evening edition).
	At a joint meeting of the Bolshevik and Left Socialist-Revolutionary groups in the All-Russia C.E.C. Lenin urges acceptance of the German peace terms.
	Lenin sends a telegram instructing the Command of the Don Front to recapture Rostov immediately.
Night of February 23	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. on the German peace terms.

February 24	Lenin's "An Unfortunate Peace" and "Theses on the Question of Concluding Immediately a Separate and Annexationist Peace" published in No. 34 of *Pravda*.
	At a meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Lenin moves a proposal on the composition of the peace delegation to be sent to Brest. Proposal accepted.
	Lenin writes a "Note on the Necessity of Signing the Peace Treaty".
	Lenin and Sverdlov draft the message of the Organising Bureau of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) to Party members. The message is published under the heading "Position of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on the Question of the Separate and Annexationist Peace".
Night of February 24	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the Soviet Republic's position in view of the German capture of Pskov.
February 25	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of a treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Finnish Socialist Republic, drafts a decision, and makes amendments to the draft treaty.
	Lenin's article "A Painful but Necessary Lesson" published in *Pravda* No. 35 (evening edition).
February 26	Lenin drafts the C.P.C. decision on the evacuation of the government from Petrograd to Moscow.
February 27	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of a trade treaty between the Russian and Finnish Republics and drafts the decision.
	Lenin writes a C.P.C. instruction for the Russia-Finland Co-ordinative Commission on arranging full political rights for the citizens of both republics, for Finns in the R.S.F.S.R. and for Soviet citizens in Finland.
February 28	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C.
	The beginning of Lenin's article "Strange and Monstrous" published in *Pravda* No. 37.
March 1	Conclusion of Lenin's article "Strange and Monstrous", and another article, "On a Businesslike Basis", published in *Pravda* No. 38.

March 2	Lenin drafts an order to all Soviets instructing them to prepare for defence in case the Germans break off the peace negotiations.
March 4	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: organisation of the management of water transport (decision written by Lenin); state control; evacuation of government offices.
March 5	Lenin writes the article "A Serious Lesson and a Serious Responsibility".
March 6-8	Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Lenin elected to the Congress presidium. He directs the work of the Congress.
March 7	Lenin delivers the Central Committee's political report (the Report on War and Peace) at the second session of the Congress.
March 8	Lenin gives the reply to the debate on the report on war and peace at the fourth session of the Congress. The Congress approves the C.C. report and the resolution on war and peace moved by Lenin.
	At the fifth session of the Congress Lenin delivers a report on revision of the Party Programme and changing the name of the Party. The Congress approves Lenin's resolution on renaming the Party the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); Lenin elected to the commission for revising the Party Programme.
	At the fifth session, Lenin elected a member of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.).
March, not earlier than March 8	From telegrams received by the Council of People's Commissars and the C.E.C. in response to the inquiry sent out to all Soviets of Deputies on February 25, 1918, Lenin compiles a "Table of Answers to the Question: Peace or War".
March 9	"Rough Outline of the Draft Programme", written by Lenin, published in No. 5 of the newspaper *Kommunist*.
	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: evacuation of Petrograd industry; nationalisation of the oil industry.
March 10-11	Lenin and other members of the government move from Petrograd to Moscow.
March 11	Lenin writes the article "The Chief Task of Our Day".

March 12	Lenin speaks on the current situation at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet and at a meeting in the Alexeyevsky Riding School.
March 13	At a meeting of the Bolshevik group at the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets Lenin speaks on the necessity of ratifying the peace treaty with Germany.
March 14	Lenin speaks at a Moscow meeting of Social-Democrat Internationalists of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and other countries.
March 14-16	Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Lenin elected to the presidium and takes a leading part in the work of the Congress.
March 14	The resolution drafted by Lenin concerning President Wilson's message to the Extraordinary Fourth Congress approved by the Congress.
	Lenin delivers the report on ratification of the peace treaty at the Fourth Congress.
March 15	Lenin replies to the debate on ratification of the peace treaty; his resolution on ratification approved by the Congress.
March 18	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss replacement of the Left S.R.s and "Left" Communists who have withdrawn from the government, and banning of the Moscow bourgeois press. He also moves a resolution on centralisation of management of the railways.
March 19	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of organising a Supreme Military Council and other matters.
March 23	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss setting up of state control over all forms of insurance (makes notes for a draft decision); centralisation of management of the railways (defends the decree on this subject). The C.P.C. sets up a commission under Lenin's chairmanship to deal with the problem of building narrow-gauge railways for supplying Moscow with grain.
March 24	Lenin presides at a meeting of the commission set up by the C.P.C. on March 23. Questions discussed include the cotton programme and irrigation works in Turkestan.

March 25	Lenin attends a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, at which the question of co-operative societies is discussed.
March 26	Lenin reports to a meeting of the Bolshevik group in the Moscow Soviet, on organisational tasks in the current situation.
	Lenin directs the work of a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: control of expenditure by all departments of the Supreme Economic Council (drafts the decision); the water transport situation (drafts the decision); commodity exchange with the rural areas.
March 27	Lenin attends a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and speaks in the debate on labour service and labour discipline.
March 28	Lenin dictates to a shorthand typist the original version of the article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government".
March 29	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the drafting of a provisional resolution on direction of the Baltic Fleet, and other matters.
March 30	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of revolutionary tribunals; he amends the draft decree and drafts the C.P.C. resolution.
March	Lenin writes the preface to the collected articles *Against the Stream*.
March-April	Lenin writes the "Theses on Banking Policy".
April 1	Lenin signs the C.P.C. decision on setting up the Supreme Military Council to direct the country's defence and organise the armed forces.
	Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council to consider the question of labour discipline.
April 2	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of opening peace negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada in view of the German attack on Kharkov.
April 3	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the proclamation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; the radiotelegraph; measures to protect the Black Sea fleet in the event of a further advance by the Germans.

April 5 — In view of the Japanese landing in Vladivostok Lenin telegraphs the C.E.C. of the Siberian Soviets to prepare for defence.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the procedure to be adopted by government departments for sending commissars to the provinces, he makes amendments and additions to the draft decision.

April 6 — Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: appointment of a prisoner-of-war commission (drafts the decision); centralisation of the administration of post and telegraph services.

April 7 — Lenin speaks at a meeting in the Alexeyevsky Riding School.

Lenin sends a telegram to the Vladivostok Soviet warning it of the inevitability of an attack by the Japanese imperialists and of the necessity for serious defence preparations.

April 8 — Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: organisation of the army; the state flag of the R.S.F.S.R.

April 9 and 10 — At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin speaks of the question of co-operative societies and amends the draft decree on consumers' co-operative organisations.

April 11 — Lenin takes part in a joint meeting of the Supreme Economic Council and representatives of the Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Council of the Union of Metalworkers, to discuss the question of nationalising the metallurgical industry.

April 12 — Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: assignment of funds to counteract unemployment; state control; the Academy of Sciences offer to make an assessment of Russia's natural wealth.

April 13 — Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of the defence of Murmansk and other matters.

Lenin signs a decree of the C.P.C. On Monuments to the Republic, providing for the removal of monuments erected in honour of the tsars and their servants and the design of monuments "to celebrate the great days of the Russian Socialist Revolution".

April 15 Lenin writes a letter to the People's Commissariat for Justice inviting all members of the board of the Commissariat to discuss with him the publication of a Collection of Enactments and Instructions and the organisation of a court that would be more rapid and ruthless in its treatment of the bourgeoisie and all embezzlers of state funds.

April 16 At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin edits, amends and signs the C.P.C. decree on administration of post and telegraph services in the Soviet Republic.

April 16 or 17 Lenin receives a delegation from the congress of representatives of the sugar industry in Russia and talks to them about getting the sugar refineries going again.

April 17 At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin signs an order to the Soviets of Kursk, Orel and other gubernias on disarming Ukrainian and German troops who cross over on to Soviet territory; he drafts a decision granting subsidies to peasants who sow beet.

April 18 Lenin speaks on the financial situation at a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: registration of shares, bonds and other interest-bearing securities (amends and makes additions to the draft decree); banning of joint-stock companies.

April 19 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: setting up of an All-Russia Evacuation Commission (amends the draft decision); assignment of funds for coal mining, and other matters.

April 20 Lenin telegraphs an inquiry to the Simbirsk Soviet about the election of chairmen of the Chuyash women's and men's teachers' seminaries and asks about I. Y. Yakovlev, an inspector with 50 years' service to the national development of the Chuyash people to his credit.

At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin amends the draft decree on the organisation of the Main Peat Committee. The draft is approved with Lenin's amendments.

April 22 Lenin signs the C.P.C. decree on the nationalisation of foreign trade.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of electrifying the industry of Moscow

and Petrograd by building hydropower stations on the rivers Volkhov and Imatra; makes notes.

Lenin writes and signs a telegram of greetings to the Congress of Soviets of the Turkestan Territory.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the defence of the eastern boundary of Kharkov Gubernia from attacks by the Germans and Haidamaks (Ukrainian nationalists).

April 22 or 23 At the Moscow City Conference of Working Women Lenin speaks on the position of the Soviet Republic.

April 23 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of providing agriculture with implements, machinery and metal. He writes an addendum to the draft decree.

Lenin addresses the Moscow Soviet on the current situation.

April 24 Lenin receives a delegation of workers of the Tsaritsyn Ordnance Factory who want the factory put under state control; during his discussion with the workers he makes notes on the factory's needs.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: prisoners-of-war; abolition of inheritance; amendments to the decree on providing agriculture with the means of production and metal.

April 26 At a Party Central Committee meeting Lenin submits his theses on the immediate tasks of the Soviet government. The Central Committee approves the theses and instructs him to make a report on the subject to the All-Russia C.E.C.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: organisation of assistance for the unemployed; organisation of the Central Board of Archives and Libraries; assistance for disabled soldiers.

April 27 Lenin attends a meeting of a delegation that is to be sent to negotiate a peace treaty with the Ukrai-. nian People's Republic.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: construction of power stations on the rivers Svir and Volkhov; railway construction.

April 28 Lenin's article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" published in *Pravda* No. 83 and *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 85.

April 29 At a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. Lenin delivers the report and the reply to the debate on the current tasks of the Soviet government.

April 30 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the position of government institutions in regions occupied by the Germans; the draft decree on the making of gifts; organisation and refitting of the navy.

April Lenin writes "Basic Propositions on Economic and Especially on Banking Policy", Lenin discusses theses on banking policy at a meeting with leading personnel from the People's Commissariat for Finance and the State Bank.

Lenin writes the "Draft Plan of Scientific and Technical Work".

May 1 Lenin speaks at a May Day demonstration in Red Square and at a meeting of Latvian Infantry and Kremlin personnel; he attends a military parade on the Khodynka Field.

While Lenin is driving through Moscow, workers in a column of demonstrators from Sushchevo-Maryino District stop the car and lift him shoulder high. He makes a short speech on the significance of the international celebration of May Day.

May 2 Lenin holds a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars to discuss nationalisation of the sugar industry (amends the draft decree).

May 3 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: assignment of funds for building works on the River Svir; peat extraction in the Northern District, and other matters.

The draft resolution of the All-Russia C.E.C. written by Lenin—"Six Theses on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government"—is approved by the Party Central Committee.

May 4 Lenin writes a letter to the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) demanding that it should consider the question of expelling from the Party the judges who have passed over-lenient sentences in a case of bribery.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the Revolutionary Tribunal's sentence in the case of bribery; setting up of military districts, and other matters,

May 5 Lenin writes the article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality".

Lenin signs a telegram sent to Voronezh (copies were also sent to Orjonikidze in Rostov, and to Bryansk), on the conclusion of an armistice on the German-Ukrainian front.

May 6 Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Party Central Committee to discuss Soviet Russia's international position and drafts a decision on the international situation.

Lenin drafts a radiogram to the peace delegation in Kursk concerning the coup carried out in the Ukraine by Skoropadsky wlth the help of the German army. The message also refers to the German capture of Rostov-on-Don.

May 8 Lenin signs a telegram to the peace delegation in Kursk instructing it to negotiate a cease-fire with the Skoropadsky government.

Lenin instructs the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin to send truce envoys to Kiev to negotiate an armistice with the Skoropadsky government.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the food situation (writes the main propositions of a decree on the food dictatorship); bribery (amends the draft decree); declaration of a state of emergency in the Kuban area in connection with the advance of the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists.

May, not later than May 8 Lenin directs the People's Commissar for Justice to submit to the C.P.C. a law on penalties for bribery.

May 9 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the food dictatorship; the committee of state constructions (makes amendments to both decrees); mobilisation of the workers to aid the rural poor in the struggle against the kulaks (amends the draft decision).

Lenin signs a circular telegram to all Gubernia Soviets and Gubernia Food Committees on the catastrophic food situation in Petrograd and on the need to send the city immediate assistance.

Lenin takes part in a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., which discusses and approves the decree submitted by the C.P.C. on the food dictatorship.

May 10 In a conversation with a worker of the Putilov Works Lenin gives instructions on the selection of a reli-

able workers' army of 20,000 to deal with the rural bourgeoisie and bribery.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the work of the prisoner-of-war collegium; measures for rehabilitating and developing the economy of Siberia, etc.

Lenin approves and signs the C.P.C. decision on the assignment of a lump sum of 100,000 rubles for purchasing seed and agricultural implements for the poor peasants whose homes have been burnt in the village of Rizovatovo, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia.

May 11 Lenin writes a protest to the German Government against the occupation of the Crimea.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: organisation of the economy of Siberia; registration of professional people in Moscow, etc.

Lenin signs a C.P.C. decision on nationalisation of the Sudzhensk coalfields (Siberia), the Spassk Copper Works, the Biisk Tanneries and other enterprises of the extractive and processing industries.

Pravda No. 90 announces the publication of Lenin's books *The State and Revolution* and *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture.*

May 13 Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Party Central Committee which approves Lenin's "Theses on the Present Political Situation".

At a City Party Conference Lenin delivers a report on the current political situation.

May 14 Lenin writes a preface to his pamphlet *Karl Marx.*

Lenin delivers a report on foreign policy at a joint meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Moscow Soviet.

At a meeting of the Bolshevik group in the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Moscow Soviet, Lenin delivers a report on foreign and domestic policy.

May 15 At a Moscow Regional Party Conference Lenin delivers a report on the current situation.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss nationalisation of Russian banks which have foreign creditors; the possibility of concluding treaties with countries that do not recognise the Soviet government, and other matters.

May 16 Lenin instructs the Supreme Military Council to send truce envoys to the South-Eastern (Don) Front to conclude an armistice and agree on a line of demarcation on this front.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the administration of the oil industry, and other matters.

May 17 Lenin signs a C.P.C. decree on the organisation of irrigation works in Turkestan.

Lenin writes a preface to the pamphlet *The Chief Task of Our Day.*

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: labour inspection; extra funds for the Vyksa Mining Area; the setting up of the Main Oil Committee.

May 18 At a session of the All-Russia Congress of Representatives of the Financial Departments of Soviets Lenin delivers a report on financial policy aims.

Lenin receives representatives of a workers' delegation elected at a conference of the big metallurgical factories, and writes a letter to the conference on preparation for and carrying out of nationalisation and on how to organise affairs at the factories.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss Soviet auditing, distribution of coal, and other matters.

May 20 At a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. Lenin takes part in the debate on Y. M. Sverdlov's report concerning the tasks of the Soviets in the rural areas.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the convention with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey on the conditions of the maintenance and exchange of prisoners-of-war; use of the railways to build up fuel stocks, and other matters.

May 21 Lenin edits and amends the draft Appeal of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars to the Workers of Petrograd on Enrolment in the Food Detachments.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: distribution of coal and coke; organisation of an institute of agricultural science; motor transport.

May 22 Lenin writes a letter to the workers of Petrograd "On the Famine".

At the Second All-Russia Congress of Labour Commissars Lenin speaks of labour discipline and raising the productivity of labour.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the emergency revolutionary tribunal (amends the draft decree); the allotting of 100 million rubles and the dispatch of 10,000 poods of grain to Baku to ensure oil supplies.

May 23 Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council on the question of holding the First All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils and moves a proposal on how to administer the nationalised enterprises.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss complaints of bureaucratic handling of affairs in the offices of the People's Commissariats, and other matters.

May 24 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the fuel problem and drafts a decision on rules for increasing fuel production and economising in its use.

May 25 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss road transport, and the founding of a Socialist Academy of Social Sciences. He drafts decisions on both questions.

May 26 Lenin writes and submits for the Central Committee's approval the "Theses on the Current Situation", which deal with the food situation and the campaign against famine.

Lenin makes a speech of welcome on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars at the First All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils.

May 27 Lenin sends a greetings telegram to the Extraordinary Third Congress of Soviets of the Kuban-Black Sea Republic and the Congress of Front Line Soldiers in Ekaterinodar.

May 28 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss urgent measures for keeping the railwaymen supplied with food (drafts a decree on food policy), and the procedure for granting concessions.

Lenin instructs the Commander of the Black Sea fleet to destroy all naval and merchant ships in the port of Novorossiisk in view of the Germans' obvious intention of seizing them.

May 29	Lenin signs the C.P.C. appeal to the workers and peasants to organise armed detachments to fight the enemies of the people and the rural bourgeoisie.
	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss his draft decision on prohibiting independent procurement of grain. He writes an appeal on the subject to railway and water transport workers and metal workers.
May 30	Lenin signs the C.P.C. appeal to the working Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban.
	Lenin signs the C.P.C. proclamation "Workers and Peasants!" calling for a struggle for grain against the counter-revolutionary rebels and conspirators.
	Lenin signs the All-Russia C.E.C. decree on reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Food and local food organs.
	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the procedure for hearing of appeals against the sentences of the revolutionary tribunals; and assignment of funds for the erection of a monument to Karl Marx.
May 31	Lenin holds a C.P.C. meeting at which he proposes publishing a fresh public proclamation in view of the worsening of the Soviet Republic's international position. The C.P.C. instructs a commission headed by Lenin to draft the proclamation.
End of May	Lenin talks by direct line with V. V. Kuibyshev, Chairman of the Samara Soviet, about Ataman Dutov's offensive against Orenburg.
June 1	Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: ways and means of supplying Siberia with Urals metal and machines; a supplementary decree on the question of independent procurement of food supplies.
Before June 3	In a telephone message to the Petrograd Soviet Lenin demands that the best food workers be sent to Moscow to be enrolled in the food detachments there.
	Lenin takes a leading part in the work of a commission elected by the First Congress of Economic Councils to work out propositions on administration of the nationalised enterprises.
	Lenin and Y. M. Sverdlov send out instructions of the C.P.C. and the All-Russia C.E.C. to the local Soviets on how to act in the event of an enemy attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic.

June 2 Lenin goes to see the play *Stepanchikovo Village* at the Moscow Art Theatre.

June 3 At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin moves draft decisions on financing the construction of agricultural machinery, on independent procurement, and on the adjustment of fixed prices.

June 4 At a joint meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., the Moscow Soviet and the Trade Unions, Lenin delivers the report and replies to the debate on combating the famine, and moves a resolution he has drafted on the subject.

June 5 Lenin makes a speech of welcome on behalf of the C.P.C. at the All-Russia Congress of Internationalist Teachers.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss centralisation of banking; working out of wage rates and means of counteracting undue increases.

June 6 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss allotment of funds to meet the needs of the mining areas and factories of the Urals, and other matters.

June 7 Lenin receives representatives of the Vyshni Volochok Soviet and talks with them about the grave food crisis in their uyezd, the forming of food detachments and the tasks involved in food work. He instructs the People's Commissariat for Food to give them emergency assistance.

At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin writes the directives of a commission set up by the C.P.C. concerning the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences; he also drafts a C.P.C. decision on correct organisation of library work.

In a telegram to the Archangel Soviet Lenin warns of the danger of British military intervention in Murmansk and Archangel.

June 8 At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin moves amendments to and edits the draft decision on organisation of the rural poor and providing them with supplies.

June 10 Lenin makes a report to a meeting of the C.P.C. concerning the publishing of a manifesto on the Czechoslovak mutiny. The meeting also discusses how to draw engineers into economic and administrative work (Lenin drafts a decision on the matter).

Lenin receives a delegation of workers of the

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Maltsev factories (Orel Gubernia) and writes to the People's Commissariat for Food on the grave food shortage at these factories and demands emergency measures to assist the workers.

June 11 Lenin receives representatives of the Bryansk Factory (Orel Gubernia) concerning the food situation at the factory and sends them to the People's Commissariat for Food with a request that they be given emergency assistance.

Lenin instructs the Petrograd Soviet to speed up the dispatch of food detachments to the Urals via Vyatka.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: abolition of the Czechoslovak National Council in view of the armed mutiny of the Czechoslovak regiments against Soviet power; allotment of funds for the development of stock-raising, and other matters.

June 12 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss a decree on vacations, a decree on the salaries of employees and workers in Soviet institutions, and other matters.

June 14 In a letter to the Petrograd Soviet Lenin gives instructions that more detachments and more workers are to be sent to the Urals for propaganda work.

At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin drafts a decree on improving railway transport.

June 15 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the financing of the Central Leather Board (Glavkozha) and the granting of credit to the Central Textiles Board (Tsentrotekstil) for purchasing flax. He drafts decisions on both questions.

June 17 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the raising of Red Army men's pay, the setting up of a body to deal with questions of trade with the Ukraine, and other matters.

June 18 Lenin telegraphs S. G. Shahumyan in Baku insisting that he must do everything to get oil products sent to the Volga.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the question of funds to pay for work on hydraulic extraction of oil; teachers' salaries; and the organisation of public education.

June 19 Lenin makes a speech at a meeting of Party groups of factories in Zamoskvorechye District in Moscow concerning the food crisis.

June 20 Lenin speaks at workers' meetings in Moscow on the food detachments.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the organisation of a supreme transport board (moves amendments to the draft decision); and checking up on the work of the hydrotechnical organisations of the Northern Front; nationalisation of the oil industry.

June 21 Lenin speaks at a meeting in the Sokolniki Club and Presnya District on the campaign against famine and counter-revolution.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: extending the powers of the Commissar Extraordinary for the Murmansk Territory to cover the Belomorsk Territory; allotting funds to the Western Region and establishing it as an economic unit.

June 22 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the Semirechye Railway; rates of pay for teachers; procurement of cloth.

The C.P.C. sets up a commission under Lenin's chairmanship to consider the compilation of a general statement on state income and expenditure.

Pravda No. 125 announces publication of Lenin's books. *The Agrarian Question in Russia towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* and *Karl Marx (A Biography)*.

June 26 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: the Black Sea fleet; unification of financial policy.

June 27 In a telegram to the Second Penza Gubernia Congress of Soviets Lenin gives instructions on the organisation of a food army of workers and the rural poor to fight for the consolidation of the grain monopoly and requisitioning of kulak grain.

Lenin is elected a delegate to the Fifth Congress of Soviets by the Petrograd Soviet.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: library work; the housing situation in Moscow and its environs; organisation of government statistics.

June 27 and 28 At the Fourth Conference of Trade Unions and Factory Committees of Moscow Lenin makes a report and replies to the debate on the current situation.

A resolution drafted by Lenin on support for the Soviet Government's food policy is approved by the conference.

June 28 Lenin speaks on the Civil War at meetings at the AMO Works (Simonovsky Sub-District), at the former Mikhelson Works (Zamoskvorechye District), and in the Soviet Gardens of Rogozhsky District.

Lenin receives the chairman of the Temnikov Soviet, Tambov Gubernia, and discusses the situation in this uyezd.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss measures to expand the work of the Central Textile Board (moves an amendment to the draft decree); the draft Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. nationalisation of the big industrial enterprises.

June 29 Lenin is elected a delegate to the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets by the Regional Congress of the Soviets of Moscow Region.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: allotment of funds for the erection of temporary monuments to participants in the Russian revolution (Lenin's motion), the procurement and distribution of cloth, and other matters.

Lenin sends a letter of greeting to S. G. Shahumyan in Baku.

Lenin writes the article "Prophetic Words".

July 1 Lenin makes corrections to and signs a telegram to the leaders of the requisitioning detachments on all railways concerning the introduction of strict discipline in the detachments.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: evacuation of industrial plant; the rubber industry, and other matters.

July 2 Lenin addresses a meeting of about 1,500 mobilised men in the Alexeyevsky Riding School.

Izvestia VTsIK No. 135 announces the publication of Lenin's books, *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* and *The Fight for Grain*.

At a meeting of the C.P.C. Lenin introduces an emergency motion on assisting the peasants with agricultural machinery; on Lenin's suggestion the C.P.C. sets up a commission to find ways of giving the peasants practical assistance.

July 3 At a meeting of the Communist group at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets Lenin speaks on Soviet Russia's external and domestic position.

July 5 Lenin delivers the C.P.C. report and reply to the debate at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

July 6 Lenin sends a telephone message to all district Party committees, all district Soviets, and all Red Army headquarters concerning the Left S.R.s provocatory assassination of German Ambassador Mirbach and orders mobilisation of all forces to deal with these criminals.

July 8 Lenin edits and signs a telegram to all uyezd Soviets of Moscow Gubernia insisting that measures be taken to clear the districts of bands, of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Izvestia VTsIK No. 141 publishes an interview with Lenin concerning the Left S.R.s uprising.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the Sormovo-Kolomna factories, the Moscow-motor-car workshops and other matters.

July 11 Lenin telegraphs the Commissar of Voronezh to inform him that the Left S.R. revolt has been crushed, and gives him orders and directives concerning military operations on the Czechoslovak and Kuban fronts.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss endorsement of the statement on state income and expenditure for January-June 1918, the setting up of the People's Commissariat for Public Health (signs the decree), and other matters.

July 12 Lenin writes a letter "To the Workers of Petrograd", appealing for a mass campaign in the countryside to organise the poor against the kulaks.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: progress made in investigating the assassination of Mirbach; the organisation of control over water passenger transport, and other matters.

July 13 Lenin writes a note to the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs requesting them to speed up the dispatch of warships to the Caspian Sea.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: unification of all forms of protection for the rail-

ways; the housing situation in Moscow; allotment of funds for the Volkhov power development.

July 15 At a meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C. Lenin makes a statement on behalf of the Soviet Government, categorically rejecting the German Government's proposal to send a battalion of German soldiers to Moscow to guard the German Embassy.

July 16 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: means of nationalising all the textiles in the R.S.F.S.R.; raising of salaries of People's Commissars (both matters raised by Lenin); organisation of an Extraordinary Commission for combating counter-revolution on the Czechoslovak front, and other matters.

July 17 *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 149 publishes a message, written by Lenin and approved by the All-Russia C.E.C., to workers, peasants and Red Army men concerning the Left S.R. insurrection and the need for triple vigilance, caution and endurance.

Lenin telegraphs the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Republic informing him of the measures being taken to aid the republic and of energetic action to crush the Czechoslovak mutiny.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: inclusion of Kazan Gubernia as a part of the Volga Military Area (Lenin's proposal), the erection in Moscow of 50 monuments to great people in the sphere of revolutionary and social work; safeguarding of the libraries and book depositories of the R.S.F.S.R.

July 18 Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C, to discuss: the textiles monopoly (amends the draft decree); allotment of funds for putting the Archangel area and the Arctic flotilla in a state of military preparedness, and other matters.

July 19 Lenin receives a delegation from the Congress of Byelorussian Refugees, who have brought him greetings from the congress and informed him of the condition of the Byelorussian people.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss: centralisation of radio work; manufacture of goods for export; mobilisation on the home front and rules for the registration of non-working elements of society.

Lenin speaks on the international and domestic situation at a meeting in Lefortovo District of Moscow.

July 20 In a note to Zinoviev, Lashovich and Stasova Lenin demands the immediate dispatch of hundreds of thousands of workers to the Czechoslovak front and reminds them of their responsibility and of the consequences that failure to carry out this directive may involve.

July 22 Lenin telegraphs S. G. Shahumyan on behalf of the C.P.C. and the All-Russia C.E.C. instructing the Baku Soviet to take resolute action against the agents of foreign capital.

Lenin holds a meeting of the C.P.C. to discuss the draft decree on combating profiteering, the annulment of the convention on literature between Russia and Germany, and other matters.

July 23 Lenin delivers a report on the current situation to the Moscow Gubernia Conference of Factory Committees.

July 26 Lenin receives leaders of the Central Consumers' Co-operative Society and discusses the state of organisation of the consumers' co-operatives and suggests making maximum use of the co-operative societies in the work of procuring grain.

Lenin makes a speech in Khamovniki District. in Moscow on "What Does the Soviet Constitution Give the Working People".

Lenin writes a letter to Clara Zetkin about the fierce struggle with counter-revolution and expresses his firm confidence in the triumph of the revolution.

July 27 In a note transmitted by direct line to the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet Lenin insists categorically that the "opposition on the part of the Petrograd Section of the Central Committee" must stop and that a larger number of workers be sent to the Czech front.

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 27

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

28

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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PREFACE

Volume 28 contains works written by Lenin between July 29, 1918 and early March 1919, the initial period of the Civil War and foreign intervention.

In his classic *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* Lenin expounds his ideas on the Soviet state, analyses the essence of Soviet democracy as the highest form of democracy in class society, explains how Soviet democracy is diametrically opposed to bourgeois democracy, and exposes opportunism and the servility of Kautsky and other leaders of the Second International to imperialism. More on Soviet and bourgeois democracy may be found in "'Democracy' and Dictatorship", "Letter to American Workers", "Letter to the Workers of Europe and America", "Won and Recorded", and in the theses and speeches on the founding of the Third International.

Many items here are reports and speeches delivered at workers' meetings, congresses of Soviets and trade unions, sittings of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow City Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and elsewhere.

All these speeches and reports centre on organisation of defence, all-out support for the Read Army and the bolstering of the army's rear, thus illustrating Lenin's work at that time as Party and state leader.

Several works deal with promotion of the socialist revolution in the countryside and attitude towards the middle peasants. Among these are: "Letter to Yelets Workers", "Comrade Workers, Forward to the Last, Decisive Fight!", speech on the anniversary of the revolution to the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on November

6, 1918, speeches to delegates from Poor Peasants' Committees of central gubernias on November 8, 1918, and at the First All-Russia Congress of Land Departments, Poor Peasants' Committees and Communes on December 11, 1918.

In his well-known article "The Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin", Lenin advocates the policy of agreement and alliance with the middle peasant; this is later approved by the Eighth Party Congress.

In the anniversary speech on November 6, 1918, in his report at a meeting of Moscow Party workers on November 27, 1918, and elsewhere, Lenin justifies the proletariat's policy towards the petty-bourgeois democrats in connection with their turn to the Soviet side, and points the way to winning over the intellectuals and old specialists to the socialist cause.

In "Letter to American Workers", speech on the international situation delivered to the Sixth Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1918, speech at the Third Congress of Workers' Co-operatives on December 9, speech at a workers' conference in Presnya District on December 14 (published in full for the first time in the fourth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*) and in many other works, Lenin exposes British and American imperialism which would not stop at smothering weak nations and destroying European culture to gain world supremacy.

The volume also contains a number of works published for the first time in the fourth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, most of which are drafts of government decisions and letters and telegrams very relevant to the rest of the volume's contents.

The items "Greetings to the Red Army on the Capture of Kazan", "Letter to Red Army Men Who Took Part in the Capture of Kazan", and telegrams to the Penza Gubernia Executive Committee and the Revolutionary War Council of the First Army and to officer cadets in Petrograd deal with defence matters.

More thoughts on strengthening the peasant-worker alliance are contained in the "Draft of Telegram to All Soviets of Deputies Concerning the Worker-Peasant Alliance" and in a speech delivered to the Moscow Gubernia Congress

of Soviets, Poor Peasants' Committees and District Committees of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 8, 1918.

Lenin's work in promoting culture and economic development is reflected in the documents: "Admission to Higher Educational Institutions of the Russian Federation. Draft Decision of the Council of People's Commissars", "Draft Decision on the Use of State Control", "Speech at the Second Conference of Heads of Adult Education Divisions of Gubernia Education Departments, January 24, 1919" and in a letter "To the People's Commissariat of Education" on the subject of setting up and running libraries.

The items first published in the fourth Russian edition of the *Collected Works* also include "Telegram to All Soviets of Deputies, to Everyone" concerning the beginning of revolution in Germany, the draft of the theses "Tasks of the Trade Unions", the draft resolution of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee "Closure of the Menshevik Newspaper Undermining the Country's Defence" and the "Draft Wireless Message from People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs".



V. I. LENIN
October 1918

SPEECH AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET, FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS OF MOSCOW JULY 29, 1918[1]

(*Applause*, *which grows into ovation*.) Comrades, this is not the first time we have pointed out in the Party press, in Soviet institutions and in our agitation among the people that the period up to the new harvest will be the most difficult, arduous and crucial phase in the socialist revolution that has begun in Russia. Now, I think, we must say that this crucial situation has reached its climax. That is because it has now become perfectly clear once and for all who are the supporters of the imperialist world, of the imperialist countries, and who are the supporters of the Soviet Socialist Republic. It should first be said that from the military standpoint the position of the Soviet Republic has only now become quite clear. Many at first regarded the Czechoslovak revolt[2] as just one of the episodes in the chain of counter-revolutionary revolts. We did not sufficiently appreciate the news in the papers about the participation in this revolt of British and French capital, of the British and French imperialists. We must now recall how events developed in Murmansk, among the Siberian troops and in the Kuban, how the British and French, in alliance with the Czechs, with the closest co-operation of the British bourgeoisie, endeavoured to overthrow the Soviets. All these facts now show that the Czechoslovak

movement was one link in the chain long since forged by the systematic policy of the British and French imperialists to throttle Soviet Russia so as to again drag Russia into the ring of imperialist wars. This crisis must now be resolved by the broad mass of the people of Soviet Russia, for we are today faced not only with a struggle to preserve the Soviet Socialist Republic from the Czech attack, as one particular counter-revolutionary assault, and not even from counter-revolutionary assaults in general, but with a struggle against the onslaught of the whole imperialist world.

I should like first of all to remind you of the fact that the direct participation of the British and French imperialists in the Czechoslovak revolt has long been established; I would remind you of an article printed by *Prukopník Svobody*, the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, on June 28 and reprinted in our press[3]:

"On March 7, the Department of the National Council received the first instalment from the French Consul to the amount of three million rubles.

This money was handed to a certain Mr. Šíp, an official of the Department of the National Council.

On March 9, this same Šíp received another two million and on March 25 another million, and on March 26, Mr. Bohumil-Čermák, Vice-President of the National Council, received one million; on April 3, Mr. Šíp received another million.

In all, from March 7 to April 4, the French Consul paid the Department of the National Council 8 million rubles.

No dates are indicated for the following payments: Mr. Šíp one million, Mr. Bohumil-Čermák one million and Mr. Šíp another million.

In addition, a sum of 188,000 rubles was paid to an unknown person. Total: 3,188,000 rubles. Together with the above-mentioned 8 million we get a total of 11,188,000 rubles paid by the French Government to the Department of the National Council.

From the British Consul the Department received £80,000. Thus, from March 7 to the date of action, the leaders of the Czech National Council received about 15 million rubles from the French and British governments, and for this sum the Czechoslovak army was sold to the French and British imperialists."

The majority of you, of course, read this report in the newspapers at the time it was published. We certainly never doubted that the imperialists and financial magnates of

Britain and France would do their very utmost to overthrow the Soviet government and place every possible obstacle in its way. But at that time the picture was not yet complete to show that what we are faced with here is a systematic, methodical and evidently long-planned counter-revolutionary military and financial campaign against the Soviet Republic, which all the representatives of British and French imperialism had evidently been preparing for months. The general trend of events becomes clear now when we review them as a whole, when we compare the Czechoslovak counter-revolutionary movement with the Murmansk landing—where we know the British have disembarked over ten thousand soldiers, and under the pretext of defending Murmansk have actually begun to advance, have occupied Kem and Soroki, have moved to the east of Soroki, and have begun to shoot our Soviet officials—and when we read in the newspapers that many thousands of railwaymen and other workers of the Far North are fleeing from these saviours and liberators, or, to give them their true name, these new imperialist bandits who are rending Russia from another end. And quite recently we received new confirmation of the character of the Anglo-French offensive against Russia.

For geographical considerations alone it is clear that the form of this imperialist offensive against Russia cannot be the same as it was in the case of Germany. There are no common frontiers with Russia, as in the case of Germany; troop strength is less. In her wars of conquest, Britain has been compelled for many decades, owing to the primarily colonial and naval character of her military might, to employ different methods of attack, to attempt chiefly to cut off her victim's supply sources, and to prefer the method of strangulation, under pretext of aid, to open, direct, blunt and outright military force. From information recently received, it is clear that Alexeyev, who has long been notorious among the Russian soldiers and workers and who recently seized the village of Tikhoretskaya, has undoubtedly been utilising the aid of British and French imperialism. There the revolt was more clear-cut, again apparently because British and French imperialism had a hand in it.

Lastly, we received news yesterday that in Baku the British and French imperialists have succeeded in making a very effective move. They have managed to secure a majority of about thirty votes in the Baku Soviet, over our Party, over the Bolsheviks, and those Left Socialist-Revolutionaries—unfortunately, very few in number—who refused to fall in with the despicable gambles and treachery of the Moscow Left Socialist-Revolutionaries,[4] and who have remained loyal to the Soviet government in the struggle against imperialism and war. Over this nucleus in the Baku Soviet which is loyal to the Soviet government and which up to now constituted the majority, the British and French imperialists have now secured a majority of thirty votes, owing to the fact that the greater part of the Dashnaktsutyun Party,[5] the Armenian quasi-socialists, have sided with them against us. (*Reads telegram.*)

"On July 26, on the orders of People's Commissar Korganov, the Adji-Kabul detachment retired from Adji-Kabul to a position near Alyat. After the withdrawal of the Shemakha detachment from Shemakha and Maraza the enemy began to advance along the River Pirsagat valley; the first skirmish with the enemy's vanguard occurred near the village of Kubala.

Simultaneously from the south, from the direction of the Kura, a large force of cavalry began to advance towards Pirsagat. Under the circumstances, to hold Adji-Kabul we would have had to deploy all our available forces on three sides: to the west of Adji-Kabul, and to the north and south of the Navagi-Pirsagat valley. Such an extension of the front would have left us without reserves and would have made it impossible for us to strike at the enemy as we have no cavalry, and would even have endangered the group at Adji-Kabul if the front had been broken from the north or south. In view of this situation, and in order to conserve the strength of the troops, orders were given to the detachment to retreat from Adji-Kabul to a position near Alyat. The retreat was carried out in good order. Important railway installations and the Adji-Kabul station, as well as the kerosene and oil tanks, have been blown up. In Daghestan, the enemy is on the move as part of the general offensive. On July 24, the enemy advanced in large forces in four directions. After twenty-four hours- fighting we occupied the enemy's trenches; the foe dispersed into the woods and nightfall prevented further pursuit. On July 24, news of successes was received from Shura, where fighting is going on around the town; the enemy is putting up a stubborn and organised resistance, and is commanded by former Daghestan officers. Daghestan peasants are taking an active part in the fighting around Shura.

The Right-wing parties in Baku have raised their heads and are vigorously campaigning to call in the British. This campaign is strongly backed by the army officers and is being conducted among the forces at the front. Anglophile agitation has disorganised the army. The British orientation has recently been making great headway among the worn-out and despairing people.

Under the influence of the unscrupulous and provocative activities of the Right-wing parties, the Caspian flotilla has adopted several contradictory resolutions in regard to the British. Deceived by British hirelings and volunteer agents, until quite recently it blindly believed in the sincerity of British support.

Latest reports say that the British are advancing in Persia and have occupied Resht (Giljan), where for four days they have been engaged against Kuchuk-Khan and the German and Turkish bands, who have joined forces with him, headed by Mussavatists[6] who had fled from Baku. After the Resht battle the British applied to us for assistance, but our representatives in Persia refused. The British got the upper hand in Resht. But they have practically no forces in Persia. We know they have only fifty men in Enzeli. They need petrol, in exchange for which they are offering us cars. Without petrol they are stuck.

On July 25, a second session of the Soviet was held to discuss the political and military situation, and at the insistence of the Right-wing parties the question of the British was raised. Comrade Shahumyan, Commissar Extraordinary for the Caucasus, citing the resolution of the Fifth Congress of Soviets and Stalin's telegram on behalf of the Central Council of People's Commissars, spoke against inviting the British and demanded that this question be struck from the agenda. Comrade Shahumyan's move was defeated by a small majority, whereupon, as representative of the central government, he entered a vigorous protest. The session heard the report of the delegates who had visited the front. By 259 votes of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Right Dashnaks and Mensheviks against 236 votes of the Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Dashnaks, a resolution was adopted to invite the British and form a government comprising members of all parties represented in the Soviet and recognising the power of the Council of People's Commissars. The resolution was sharply condemned by the Left wing. Shahumyan declared that he regarded it as a shameful betrayal and stark ingratitude towards the workers and peasants of Russia and that as the central government's representative, he renounced all responsibility for the decision. A statement was made on behalf of the group of the Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Dashnaks to the effect that they would not join the coalition government and that the Council of People's Commissars would resign. Comrade Shahumyan declared in the name of the three Left groups that a government which had in fact broken with the Russian Soviet government by inviting the British imperialists would receive no support from Soviet Russia. By its treacherous policy of inviting the British, the local Soviet had lost Russia and the parties supporting the soviet government.

The Right-wing parties were thrown into utter confusion at the decision of the Council of People's Commissars to resign. When news of this situation got around there was an abrupt change of sentiment in the districts and at the front. The sailors realised they had been duped by traitors who want to break with Russia and bring down the Soviet government. The people are having second thoughts about the British. Yesterday, an urgent meeting of the Executive Committee was held over the resignation of the Council of People's Commissars. It was decided that all the People's Commissars should remain at their posts and continue their former functions pending decision of the question of power at the Soviet's session on July 31. The Executive Committee has decided to take urgent measures to combat the threatening counter-revolution. The foe is carrying on activities under the wing of the Anglo-French parties.

Press Bureau of the Baku Council of People's Commissars."

Not unlike the groups here who call themselves socialists but have never broken off relations with the bourgeoisie, there, too, these people came out in favour of inviting the British troops to defend Baku.[7] We already know only too well the meaning of such an invitation to imperialist troops to defend the Soviet Republic. We know the meaning of this invitation extended by the bourgeoisie, a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and by the Mensheviks. We know the meaning of this invitation extended by the Menshevik leaders in Tiflis, Georgia.

We may now say that the Bolshevik, the Communist Party is the only party which has never invited imperialists and has never entered into a rapacious alliance with them, but has only retreated before these cutthroats when they pressed too hard. (*Applause.*) We know our Communist comrades in the Caucasus were in a very difficult position because the Mensheviks betrayed them everywhere by entering into direct alliance with the German imperialists, on the pretext, of course, of defending Georgia's Independence.

You are all aware that this independence of Georgia has become a sheer fraud. In actual fact it amounts to the occupation and complete seizure of Georgia by the German imperialists, an alliance of German bayonets with the Menshevik government against the Bolshevik workers and peasants. And, therefore, our Baku comrades were a thousand times right in refusing to close their eyes to the danger of the situation and saying: We would never be

opposed to peace with an imperialist power on the basis of ceding part of our territory, provided this would not harm us, would not bind our troops in an alliance with the bayonets of the aggressors and would not prevent us from carrying on our socialist reconstruction.

But since, as the question now stands, by inviting the British, supposedly for the defence of Baku, they are inviting a power which has now swallowed up the whole of Persia and which has long been moving up its forces for seizing the Southern Caucasus—that is, surrendering themselves to British and French imperialism—we cannot doubt or hesitate for a moment and must say that, however difficult the position of our Baku comrades may be, by refusing to conclude such a peace they have taken the only step worthy of true socialists. This resolute rejection of any agreement whatsoever with the British and French imperialists was the only true course for our Baku comrades to take, for you cannot invite them without converting your independent socialist government, even though on severed territory, into a slave of imperialist war.

We therefore do not entertain the slightest doubt as to the significance of the Baku events in the general scheme of things. Yesterday, news was received that counter-revolutionary revolts have broken out in a number of towns in Central Asia with the obvious complicity of the British entrenched in India, who, having brought Afghanistan completely under their sway, long ago created a base for extending their colonial possessions, strangling nations, and attacking Soviet Russia. And now, when these separate links have become quite clear to us, the present military and general strategic position of our Republic has been fully revealed. Murmansk in the North, the Czechoslovak front in the East, Turkestan, Baku and Astrakhan in the South-East—we see that practically all the links in the chain forged by British and French imperialism have been joined.

We now clearly see that the landowners, the capitalists and the kulaks, all of whom, of course, for perfectly natural reasons have a burning hatred for the Soviet government, are acting here, too, in ways greatly resembling those

of the landowners, capitalists and kulaks in the Ukraine and in other regions severed from Russia. As the lackeys of British and French imperialism, they have done their utmost to undermine the Soviet government at all costs. Realising they could not do it with forces inside Russia alone, they decided to act not by words or appeals in the spirit of the Martov gentry, but by resorting to more effective methods of struggle—military hostilities. That is where our attention should be chiefly directed; that is where we should concentrate all our agitation and propaganda; and we should shift the centre of the whole of our Soviet work accordingly.

The fundamental fact is that it is the imperialist forces of the other coalition that are now at work, not the German, but the Anglo-French, which have seized part of our territory and are using it as a base. Up to now their geographical position has prevented them from attacking Russia by the direct route; now British and French imperialism, which for four years has been drenching the whole world in blood in a bid for world supremacy, has by an indirect route approached within easy reach of Russia, with the object of strangling the Soviet Republic and once more plunging Russia into imperialist war. You are all perfectly aware, comrades, that from the very beginning of the October Revolution our chief aim has been to put a stop to the imperialist war; but we never harboured the illusion that the forces of the proletariat and the revolutionary people of any one country, however heroic and however organised and disciplined they might be, could overthrow international imperialism. That can be done only by the joint efforts of the workers of the world.

What we have done, however, is to sever all connections with the capitalists of the whole world in one country. Our government is not tied by a single thread to any kind of imperialist and never will be, whatever future course our revolution may take. The revolutionary movement against imperialism during the eight months of our rule has made tremendous strides, and in one of the chief centres of imperialism, Germany, matters in January 1918 came to an armed clash and the bloody suppression of that movement. We have done our revolutionary duty as no revolutionary

government in any country has ever done on an international, world-wide scale. But we never deceived ourselves into thinking this could be done by the efforts of one country alone. We knew that our efforts were inevitably leading to a world-wide revolution, and that the war begun by the imperialist governments could not be stopped by the efforts of those governments themselves. It can be stopped only by the efforts of all workers; and when we came to power, our task as the proletarian Communist Party, at a time when capitalist bourgeois rule still remained in the other countries—our immediate task, I repeat, was to retain that power, that torch of socialism, so that it might scatter as many sparks as possible to add to the growing flames of socialist revolution.

This was everywhere an extremely difficult task; and what enabled us to accomplish it was the fact that the proletariat rallied to the defence of the gains of the Socialist Republic. This task has led to a particularly arduous and critical situation, for the socialist revolution, in the direct sense of the term, has not yet begun in any country, although it is more imminent in countries like Italy and Austria. But as it has not yet begun, we are faced with a new success to British and French, and therefore world, imperialism. Whereas from the West, German imperialism continues to stand as a military, annexatory, imperialist force, from the North-East and South of Russia, British and French imperialism has been able to dig itself in and is making it patently obvious to us that this force is prepared once more to plunge Russia into imperialist war, is prepared to crush Russia, the independent socialist state that is continuing its socialist work and propaganda on a scale hitherto unparalleled anywhere in the world. Against this, British and French imperialism has won a big victory, and, surrounding us on all sides, it is doing its utmost to crush Soviet Russia. We are fully aware that British and French imperialism's victory is inseparably connected with the class struggle.

We have always said—and revolutions bear it out—that when the foundations of the exploiters' economic power are at stake, their property, which places the labour of tens of millions of workers and peasants at their disposal and

enables the landowners and capitalists to enrich themselves, when, I repeat, the private property of the capitalists and landowners is at stake, they forget all talk about love for one's country and independence. We know full well that the Cadets, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks have beaten the record in concluding alliances with the imperialist powers, in concluding predatory treaties and betraying the country to Anglo-French imperialism. The Ukraine and Tiflis are good examples. The alliance of the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries with the Czechs is sufficient proof of this. And the action of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, when they tried to embroil the Russian Republic in war in the interests of the Yaroslavl whiteguards,[8] shows quite clearly that when their class profits are at stake, the bourgeoisie will sell their country and strike a bargain with any foreigner against their own people. This truth has time and again been borne out by the history of the Russian revolution, after the history of revolution over a hundred years had shown that that is the law of the class interests, of the class policy of the bourgeoisie, at all times and in all countries. It is therefore by no means surprising that the present aggravation of the Soviet Republic's international position is connected with the aggravation of the class struggle at home.

We have often said that, in this respect, in regard to the aggravation of the food crisis, the period until the new harvest will be the most difficult. Russia is being flayed with the scourge of famine, which has attained unparalleled proportions precisely because it is the plan of the imperialist robbers to cut off her granaries. Their calculations are well founded and are aimed at getting social and class support in the grain-producing outlying regions; they seek areas where the kulaks predominate—the rich peasants, who have battened on the war and who live by the labour of others, the labour of the poor. You know that these people have piled up hundreds of thousands of rubles and that they have huge stocks of grain. You know that it is these people who have battened on national misfortunes and who had greater opportunity to rob and increase their profits the more the population of the capital suffered—it is

these kulaks who have constituted the chief and most formidable buttress of the counter-revolutionary movement in Russia. Here the class struggle has reached its deepest source. There is not a village left where the class struggle is not raging between a miserable handful of kulaks on the one hand and the vast labouring majority—the poor and those middle peasants who have no grain surpluses, who have consumed them long ago, and who did not go in for profiteering—on the other. This class struggle has penetrated every village.

When we were determining our political plans and publishing our decrees—the vast majority of those present here are, of course, familiar with them—when, I repeat, we drafted and passed the decrees on the organisation of the poor peasants,[9] it was clear to us we were coming up against the most decisive and fundamental issue of the whole revolution, the most decisive and fundamental issue, the issue of power—whether power would remain in the hands of the workers; whether they could gain the support of all the poor peasants, with whom they have no differences; whether they would succeed in winning over the peasants with whom they have no disagreement, and unite this whole mass, which is dispersed, disunited and scattered through the villages—in which respect it lags behind the urban workers; whether they could unite them against the other camp, the camp of the landowners, the imperialists and kulaks.

Before our very eyes the poor peasants have begun to rally together very quickly. It is said that revolution teaches. The class struggle does indeed teach in practice that any false note in the position of any party immediately lands that party where it deserves to be. We have clearly seen the policy of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, who, because of their spinelessness and stupidity, started to vacillate at a time when the food problem was at its height, and that party disappeared from the scene as a party and became a pawn in the hands of the Yaroslavl whiteguards. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, the wave of revolts sweeping Russia is easy to understand in the light of this sharpening of the class struggle over the food crisis at the very time when we know

the new harvest is a bumper one but cannot yet be gathered, and when the hunger-tormented people of Petrograd and Moscow are being driven to revolt by the kulaks and the bourgeoisie, who are making the most desperate efforts, crying "Now or never!" There is the revolt in Yaroslavl. And we can see the influence of the British and French; we see the calculations of the counter-revolutionary landowners and bourgeoisie. Wherever the question of grain arose, they obstructed the grain monopoly, without which there can be no socialism. That is just where the bourgeoisie are bound to unite; here the bourgeoisie have a stronger backing than the country yokel. The decisive fight between the forces of socialism and bourgeois society is bound to come in any case, whatever happens, if not today, then tomorrow, on one issue or another. Only pseudo-socialists, like our Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, for example, can waver. When socialists waver over this question, over this fundamental question, it means they are only pseudo-socialists, and are not worth a brass farthing. The effect of the revolution has virtually been to turn such socialists into mere pawns in the hands of the French generals, pawns whose role was demonstrated by the former Central Committee of the former Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Comrades, the result of these combined efforts of the counter-revolutionary Russian bourgeoisie and the British and French imperialists has been that the Civil War in our country is now coming from a quarter which not all of us anticipated and from which not all of us clearly realised it might come, and it has merged with the war from without into one indivisible whole. The kulak revolt, the Czechoslovak mutiny and the Murmansk movement are all part of one and the same war that is bearing down on Russia. We escaped from war in one quarter by incurring tremendous losses and signing an incredibly harsh peace treaty; we knew we were concluding a predatory peace,[10] but we said we would be able to continue our propaganda and our constructive work, and in that way cause the imperialist world's disintegration. We have succeeded in doing so. Germany is now negotiating with us as to how many thousand millions to extort from Russia on the basis of the

Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, but she has recognised all the acts of nationalisation we proclaimed under the decree of June 28.[11] She has not raised the question of private ownership of land in the Republic; this point must be stressed as a counterblast to the fantastic lies spread by Spiridonova and similar leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, lies that have brought grist to the mill of the landowners and are now being repeated by the most ignorant and backward Black-Hundred[12] elements. These lies must be nailed.

The fact of the matter is that, burdensome as the peace treaty may be, we have won freedom to carry on socialist construction at home, and taken steps in this direction which are now becoming known in Western Europe and constitute elements of propaganda that are incomparably more effective than any before.

So, having got out of war in one quarter, with one coalition, we have been at once subjected to an imperialist assault from another quarter. Imperialism is a world-wide phenomenon; it is a struggle for the division of the whole world, of the whole earth, for the domination of one or another group of robbers. Now another group of vultures, the Anglo-French, are hurling themselves at our throats and threatening to drag us into war again. Their war is merging with the Civil War into one continuous whole, and that is the chief source of our difficulties at present, when the question of war, of military hostilities, has again come to the fore as the cardinal and fundamental question of the revolution. There lies the whole difficulty, for the people are tired of war, exhausted by it as never before. The Russian people's state of extreme war fatigue and exhaustion is rather like that of a man who has been thrashed within an inch of his life, and who cannot be expected to show any energy or working capacity. And in the same way this nearly four years' war, overwhelming a country which had been despoiled, tormented, and defiled by tsarism, by the autocracy, the bourgeoisie and Kerensky, has for many reasons naturally aroused a feeling of abhorrence in the Russian people, and is one of the chief sources of the tremendous difficulties we are now experiencing.

Yet such a turn of events definitely made for war. We have again been plunged into war, we are in a state of war; and it is not only civil war, war against the kulaks, the landowners and the capitalists who have united against us—now we are faced with British and French imperialism. The imperialists are still not in a position to throw their armies against Russia—they are prevented by geographical conditions; but they are devoting all they can, all their millions, all their diplomatic connections and forces, to aid our enemies. We are in a state of war, and we can emerge triumphant. But here we come up against a formidable enemy, one of the most difficult to cope with—war-weariness, hatred and abhorrence of war; and this must be overcome, otherwise we shall not be able to tackle this problem—the problem of war—which does not depend on our will. Our country has again been plunged into war, and the outcome of the revolution will now entirely depend on who is the victor. The principal protagonists are the Czechs, but the real directors, the real motive and actuating power are the British and French imperialists. The whole question of the existence of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the whole question of the Russian socialist revolution has been reduced to a question of war. There lie tremendous difficulties, considering the state in which the people have emerged from the imperialist war. Our task is now perfectly clear. Any deceit would be tremendously harmful; we consider it a crime to conceal this bitter truth from the workers and peasants. On the contrary, let the truth be brought home to them all as clearly and graphically as possible.

Yes, there have been cases when our troops displayed criminal weakness, as, for example, during the capture of Simbirsk by the Czechs, when our forces retreated. We know the troops are tired of war and loathe it; but it is also natural and inevitable that until imperialism is defeated internationally, it should attempt to drag Russia into imperialist war, endeavour to make a shambles of her. Whether we like it or not, the question stands as follows: we are in a war, and on the outcome of that war hangs the fate of the revolution. That should be the first and last word in our

propaganda work, in all our political, revolutionary, and construction activities. We have done very much in a short time, but the job is not yet over. All our activities must be entirely and completely geared to this question, on which the fate and outcome of the revolution, the fate of the Russian and world revolution now depends. Of course, world imperialism cannot get out of the present war without a number of revolutions; this war cannot end otherwise than by the ultimate victory of socialism. But our task now is to maintain, protect and uphold this force of socialism, this torch of socialism, this source of socialism which is so actively influencing the whole world. And as matters now stand, this task is a military task.

This is not the first time we have been in such a situation, and many of us have said that however severe the price we had to pay for peace, however grave the sacrifices it demanded of us, however much the enemy was striving to rob us of more and more territory, Russia so far, in the face of great odds, was enjoying peace and in a position to consolidate her socialist gains. We have even gone farther in this direction than many of us expected. For example, our workers' control has advanced a long way from its early forms, and today we are about to witness the conversion of the state administration into a socialist system. We have made great strides in our practical affairs. We now have the workers completely running industry. But circumstances have prevented us from continuing that work in peace; they have once again plunged us into war, and we must strain every nerve and summon everyone to arms. It would be a disgrace for any Communist to be in two minds over this.

Vacillation among the peasants does not surprise us. The peasants have not been through the same school of life as the workers, who have been accustomed for decades to look upon the capitalist as their class enemy, and who have learned to unite their forces to combat him. We know the peasants have not been through such a university. At one time they sided with the workers but today we are witnessing a period of vacillation, when the peasants are splitting up. We know any number of instances of kulaks

selling grain to the peasants below the fixed prices in order to create the impression that they, the kulaks, are defending the peasants' interests. None of this surprises us. But the Communist worker will not waver, the working class will stand firm; and if a kulak spirit prevails among the peasants, it is quite understandable. Where the Czechs rule and the Bolsheviks no longer are, we have the following picture: at first the Czechs are hailed practically as deliverers; but after a few weeks of this bourgeois rule, a tremendous movement against the Czechs and in favour of the Soviet government arises, because the peasants begin to realise that all talk about freedom of trade and a Constituent Assembly means only one thing—the rule of the landowners and capitalists.

Our job is to get the workers to rally and to create an organisation under which within the next few weeks everything will be devoted to solving the war issue. We are now at war with British and French imperialism and with everything bourgeois and capitalist in Russia, with everyone endeavouring to frustrate the socialist revolution and embroil us in war. The situation is one where all the gains of the workers and peasants are at stake. We may be confident that we shall have the broad sympathy and support of the proletariat, and then the danger will be completely averted, and new ranks of the proletariat will come forward to stand up for their class and save the socialist revolution. As matters now stand, the struggle is being fought over two major issues, and all the main party differences have been obliterated in the fires of revolution. The Left Socialist-Revolutionary who keeps insistently reminding us that he is on the left, concealing himself behind a cloud of revolutionary phrases, while actually revolting against the Soviet government, is just the same a hireling of the Yaroslav whiteguards. That is what he is in history and the revolutionary struggle! Today only two classes confront each other in the battle arena: the class struggle is between the. proletariat, which is protecting the interests of the working people, and those protecting the interests of the landowners and capitalists. All talk about a Constituent Assembly, about an independent state and so on, which is being used to dupe the ignorant masses, has been exposed by the exper-

ience of the Czech and Caucasian Menshevik movements. Behind all this talk stand the same forces—the landowners and capitalists; and the Czech mutiny brings in its train the rule of the landowners and capitalists, just as the German occupation does. That is what the war is about!

Comrades, the workers must close their ranks more firmly than ever and set an example of organisation and discipline in this struggle. Russia is still the only country which has severed all ties with the imperialists. True, we are bleeding from grave wounds. We have retreated in the face of the imperialist brute, playing for time, striking a blow at it here and there. But, as the Socialist Soviet Republic, we have remained independent. Performing our socialist work, we opposed the imperialism of the whole world; and this struggle is becoming clearer and clearer to the workers of the world, and their mounting indignation is bringing them nearer and nearer to the future revolution. It is over this that the struggle is being waged, because our Republic is the only country in the world not to march hand in hand with imperialism and not to allow millions of people to be slaughtered to decide whether the French or the Germans will rule the world. Our Republic is the only country to have broken away by force, by revolutionary means, from the world imperialist war, and to have raised the banner of socialist revolution. But it is being dragged back into the imperialist war, and being forced into the trenches. Let the Czechs fight the Germans, let the Russian bourgeoisie make their choice, let Milyukov decide, perhaps even in concurrence with Spiridonova and Kamkov, which imperialists to side With. But we declare we must be prepared to lay down our lives to prevent them deciding this question, for the salvation of the whole socialist revolution is at stake. (*Applause.*) I know there is a change of spirit among the peasants of the Saratov, Samara, and Simbirsk gubernias, where fatigue was most marked and fitness for military action was lowest of all. After experiencing the ravages of the Cossacks and Czechs, and having a real taste of what the Constituent Assembly and the cries "Down with the Brest Peace Treaty!" mean, they have realised that all this only leads to the return of the landowner,

to the capitalist mounting the throne—and they are now becoming the most ardent champions of Soviet power. I have not the slightest doubt that the Petrograd and Moscow workers, who are marching at the head of the revolution, will understand the situation, will understand the gravity of the times and will act with greater determination than ever, and that the proletariat will smash both the Anglo-French and the Czech offensive in the interests of the socialist revolution. (*Applause.*)

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Published according to the text of the book checked with the verbatim report

SPEECH AT A CONGRESS OF CHAIRMEN OF GUBERNIA SOVIETS[13] JULY 30, 1918

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, your job is one of administration, which plays a dominant part in the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars. Quite naturally, many difficulties lie ahead of you. In the majority of gubernia Executive Committees it is evident that the masses are at last beginning to tackle the work of administration themselves. There are certainly bound to be difficulties. One of our greatest shortcomings has been that we still draw too little on the workers for our staffs. But it was never our intention to adapt the old apparatus to the new system of administration, and we do not regret that with the abolition of the old apparatus everything has to be built anew with so much difficulty. The workers and peasants possess greater constructive abilities than might have been expected. It is to the revolution's credit that it swept away the old administrative apparatus. Yet at the same time we must admit that the people's chief shortcoming is their timidity and reluctance to take things into their own hands.

Some of our gubernia Soviets have been inefficient, but now the work is steadily improving. Information has been coming in from many parts of the country stating that the work is progressing without any misunderstandings or conflicts. Although only eight months have elapsed, the Russian revolution has proved that the new class which has taken administration into its own hands is capable of coping with the task. Although it is short-staffed, the administrative apparatus is running more smoothly every day.

Our apparatus is still at a stage where no definite results are visible, a fact which the enemy keeps harping on. Nevertheless, quite a lot has already been done. The transfer of land and industry to the working people, the exchange of goods and the organisation of food supply are being carried into effect in face of fantastic difficulties. The working people must be promoted to independent work in building up and running the socialist state. Only practice will teach them that the old exploiting class is finished and done with.

Our chief and most urgent task is administration, organisation and control. This is a thankless and inconspicuous job; but it is in doing this job that the managerial and administrative talents of the workers and peasants will develop more and more effectively.

Now to the new Constitution.[14] It embodies what experience has already given, and will be corrected and supplemented as it is being put into effect. The main thing about the Constitution is that the Soviet government is completely dissociating itself from the bourgeoisie, preventing them from participating in building up the state.

The workers and peasants, upon whom the government has called to run the country, and who have remained remote from such affairs for so long, were bound to want to build the state by their own experience. The effect of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was that the people in the localities wanted to gain experience in building the state by learning from their own mistakes. Such a transitional period was unavoidable, and it has proved beneficial. In this tendency towards separatism, there was much that was healthy and wholesome in the sense that it displayed a creative spirit. The Soviet Constitution has defined the relations between the volost authority and the uyezd authority, between the uyezd authority and the gubernia authority, and between the latter and the centre.

Only large-scale, planned construction, which aims at evenly utilising economic and business values, deserves to be called socialist. The Soviet government certainly does not intend to belittle the importance of the local authorities or kill their autonomy and initiative. Even the peasants realise through their own experience the need for centralism.

Now that the Constitution has been endorsed and is being put into effect, an easier period in our state affairs is beginning. But, unfortunately, it is hard for us just now to devote ourselves to an economic, business and agricultural policy. We have to divert all our attention to more elementary things—the food question. The condition of the working class in the hungry provinces is really drastic. Until the new harvest is brought in, every effort must be made to overcome somehow the food difficulties and other troubles.

Besides this, there are military tasks. You know that the Czech movement, financed and instigated by the British and French imperialists, has caught Russia in a semicircle. You also know that the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the kulak peasants are joining this movement. We have received news from the localities that Soviet Russia's recent reverses have convinced the workers and the revolutionary peasants by their own experience that control is needed in the military sphere as well as in state development.

I am convinced that things will get better in future. I am convinced that the gubernia Executive Committees will create a strong socialist army by organising control over the commanding staff with the help of the peasants. The lessons of the revolution have at last taught the classes of the workers and exploited peasants the need to take up arms. The peasants and workers, besides having won the land, control, etc., have learnt to understand the need to control the army. By carrying their efforts into the sphere of military affairs, they will make the army of their creation fully worthy of the title of a socialist army, an army which will successfully fight the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the imperialists until the international revolutionary proletariat comes to our aid. (*Comrade Lenin's speech is greeted with stormy applause from all delegates.*)

Izvestia No. 161,
July 31, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE WARSAW REVOLUTIONARY REGIMENT AUGUST 2, 1918[15]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Comrade Lenin's appearance in the hall is greeted with enthusiastic applause and the "Internationale".*) We Polish and Russian revolutionaries are now burning with one desire—to do everything to defend the gains of the first mighty socialist revolution, which will inevitably be followed by a series of revolutions in other countries. Our difficulty is that we had to take action much earlier than the workers of the more cultured, more civilised countries.

The world war was caused by the forces of international capital, of two coalitions of vultures. For four years the world has been drenched in blood in order to settle which of these two rapacious imperialist groups shall rule the globe. We feel and sense that this criminal war cannot end in victory for either of them. It is becoming clearer every day that a victorious workers' revolution, not the imperialists, can end it. And the worse the position of the workers now becomes in all countries, and the more ferociously proletarian free speech is persecuted, the more desperate the bourgeoisie get, for they cannot cope with the growing movement. We have for a time forged ahead of the main body of the socialist army, which is full of hope as it watches us and says to its bourgeoisie: however much you rant and rage, we shall follow the Russian example and do what the Russian Bolsheviks have done.

We wanted peace. It was just because Soviet Russia proposed peace to the whole world that in February German troops attacked us. Now, however, we see with our own eyes

that one imperialism is no better than the other. Both of them have lied, and lie now when they say they are waging a war of liberation. Anglo-French capital is showing itself up just as robber Germany once did with the utterly shameful Brest Peace. The British and French are now making their last bid to draw us into the war. For fifteen million, through generals and other officers, they have now bought new lackeys, the Czechs, so as to involve them in the rash adventure and turn the Czechoslovak revolt into a white-guard-landlord movement. And strange to say, all this is apparently being done to "defend" Russia. The "freedom-loving" and "fair" British oppress all and sundry, seize Murmansk, British cruisers come right up to Archangel and bombard the coastal batteries—all to "defend" Russia. Quite obviously they want to encircle Russia in a ring of imperialist plunderers and crush her for having exposed and torn up their secret treaties.

Our revolution has resulted in the workers of Britain and France indicting their governments. In Britain, where civil peace has prevailed and where the workers' resistance to socialism has been strongest, for they too have had a hand in plundering the colonies, the workers are now veering round and breaking the civil peace with the bourgeoise.

The workers of France are condemning the policy of intervention in Russia's affairs. That is why the capitalists of these countries are staking everything they have.

The fact of Soviet Russia's existence and vitality is driving them mad.

We know the war is coming to an end; we know they cannot finish it; we know we have a reliable ally. We must therefore exert all our energy and make a last effort. Either the rule of the proletariat or the rule of the kulaks, capitalists and the tsar, as was the case in the unsuccessful revolutions in the West. As you go to the front you must remember above all that this war alone, the war of the oppressed and exploited against the violators and plunderers, is legitimate, just and sacred.

An alliance is coming into being between the revolutionaries of different nations—something that the finest people have dreamt of; a real alliance of workers, and not intellectual dreamers.

The guarantee of victory lies in overcoming national hatred and mistrust.

It is your great privilege to uphold sacred ideas arms in hand, and to make international brotherhood of nations a reality by fighting together with your front-line enemies of yesterday—Germans, Austrians and Magyars.

And, comrades, I am confident that if you muster all your military forces and set up a mighty international Red Army, and hurl these iron battalions against the exploiters and oppressors, against the reactionary thugs of the whole world, making your battle cry "Victory or Death!"—no imperialist force will be able to hold us! (*Lenin's concluding words are drowned in prolonged and stormy applause.*)

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August 3, 1918

Published according to the newspaper text

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN BUTYRSKY DISTRICT AUGUST 2, 1918

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, today socialist Russia's destiny is being discussed all over Moscow.[16]

The enemies of Soviet Russia surround us in a tight ring of iron to try to deprive the workers and peasants of everything they gained from the October Revolution. The high-flying banner of the Russian social revolution is a thorn in the side of the imperialist vultures and they have gone to war against us, gone to war against the Soviet government, against the workers' and peasants' government.

You will remember, comrades, that at the beginning of the revolution the French and British never tired of insisting they were the "allies" of free Russia. And here we have these "allies" today in their true colours. By lies and deceit, saying they had no intention of fighting Russia, these people occupied Murmansk, then captured Kem and began to shoot our comrades, members of the Soviets. True enough, they are not fighting the Russian bourgeoisie, they are not fighting the Russian capitalists, they have declared war on the Soviets, they have declared war on the workers and peasants.

The French and Russian bourgeoisie have found ready accomplices in the Czechs. These mercenaries had reason to fight us. We know whose millions induced the Czechs to go to war against the Soviet government. It was Anglo-French gold. But besides the Czechs, there are other people who did not think twice about bringing down the Soviet government. Like the Czechs, our own "saviours of the fatherland", Dutov, Alexeyev and the rest, are lining their pockets

with British and French gold and waiting for a Russian shower of gold. The Soviet government has a lot of enemies. But are we alone, comrades?

You will recall what it was like in January, when the flame of social revolution had just been lit—there had been a mass strike movement in Germany; now, eight months later, we see mass strike movements in various countries: there is a mass strike movement among the Austrian workers, our comrades in Italy are on strike. The end is near for the oppressors of the workers. The imperialists of the world are digging their own graves.

War for mutual plunder does not abate. Two serpents are grappling in the war of plunder: Anglo-French and German imperialism. To please them, for one side's triumph, ten million peasants and workers have already been killed and twenty million maimed, and many millions of people are engaged in manufacturing weapons of death. In every country the strongest and healthiest people are being called up, the flower of humanity is perishing.... And for what? Just for one of these vultures to lord it over the other....

The Soviet government said we do not want to fight the Germans, the British or the French. We do not want to kill workers and peasants like ourselves. They are not our enemies. We have a different enemy—the bourgeoisie, whether it be the German, the French, or the Russian who have now joined up with the British and French.

And, like our revolutionary banner, our slogans are being taken up all over the world. In America, the country that used to be called the land of the free, socialists are filling the gaols to overflowing. In Germany, the words of the German socialist Friedrich Adler are being spread far and wide among the workers and soldiers: "Turn your bayonets on your own bourgeoisie instead of on the Russian workers and peasants." There is no end in sight to the slaughter started by the capitalists. The more Germany wins, the more the savages like her who tag on to the other side. America, too, is now fighting together with the British and French. Only the workers can put an end to the war: world revolution is inevitable. A "defeatist" movement like the one we had has already begun in Germany, mass strikes are taking place in Italy and Austria; and socialists are being arrested whole-

sale in America. Sensing their doom, the capitalists and landowners are making a last effort to crush the revolutionary movement. The Russian capitalists are stretching out a hand to the British and French capitalists and landowners.

Now there are two fronts: the workers and peasants on one side, and the capitalists on the other. The last, decisive battle is near. Now there can be no compromise with the bourgeoisie. Either them or us.

In 1871, the bourgeoisie overthrew the power of the Paris workers. But in those days there were very few class-conscious workers or revolutionary fighters. This time the workers are backed by the poor peasants and this time the bourgeoisie will not triumph as they did in 1871.

The workers are keeping a firm grip on the mills and factories, and the peasants will not surrender the land to the landowners. And in defence of these achievements we also declare war on all marauders and profiteers. Besides machine-guns and cannons, they are threatening us with famine.

As we declare war on the rich, we say: "Peace to the cottages!" We shall take all the stocks from the profiteers and never abandon the labouring poor to the mercy of fate. (*Comrade Lenin's speech is greeted with stormy applause.*)

Brief report published
August 3, 1918
in *Izvestia* No. 164

Published according to the
text in the newspaper
Soldat Revolutsii (Tsaritsyn)
No. 14, August 23, 1918

SPEECH AT A RALLY OF RED ARMY MEN AT KHODYNKA AUGUST 2, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Enthusiastic applause.*) The Russian revolution has charted the road to socialism for the whole world and has shown the bourgeoisie that their triumph is coming to an end. Our revolution is taking place amidst the frightful hardships of world slaughter.

Revolutions are not made to order; but there are sure signs that the whole world is ready for great events.

We are surrounded by enemies who have concluded a holy alliance for the overthrow of the Soviet government, but they will not get power themselves.

The rejoicing of the whiteguard bands is premature—their success will be short-lived; unrest is already spreading among them.

The Red Army reinforced by the revolutionary proletariat will help us raise on high the banner of the world social revolution.

Victory or death!

We shall vanquish the world kulak and uphold the socialist cause!

Izvestia No. 164,
August 3, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

THESES ON THE FOOD QUESTION[17]

FOR THE COMMISSARIATS OF FOOD, AGRICULTURE, THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL, FINANCE, TRADE AND INDUSTRY

I propose that these Commissariats hurry to debate and formulate the following measures no later than today (August 2) so that they can be put through the Council of People's Commissars today or tomorrow.

(Some of these measures should be in decrees, others in unpublished decisions.)

(1) Out of the two schemes—lowering prices on manufactured and other goods or raising the purchasing price of grain—we must certainly choose the latter for, though the two are essentially the same, only the latter can help us in quickly getting more grain from a number of grain-growing provinces like Simbirsk, Saratov, Voronezh, etc., and help us neutralise as many peasants as possible in the Civil War.

(2) I suggest raising the grain prices to 30 rubles a pood, and correspondingly (and even more) to raise prices on manufactured and other goods.

(3) I suggest for discussion: whether to make this a temporary rise (so that we can sum up the practical indications as to the correct principle on which our trade exchange should be organised), say, for a month or month and a half, promising to *lower prices* afterwards (thereby offering bonuses for quick collection).

(4) To enact several very urgent measures for *requisitioning all* the products of urban industry for exchange (and put up their prices after requisitioning to a *greater* extent than the rise in grain prices).

(5) To preface the decree on grain price rise with a popular elucidation of the measure connected with the trade exchange and the establishment of the correct correlation between the prices of grain, manufactured and other goods.

(6) The decree should immediately compel the co-operatives a) to set up a grain-collection point in each village shop; b) to give goods *only* according to the customers' ration books; c) *not* to give a *single* item to peasant farmers except in exchange for grain.

To establish forms and means of control over the implementation of these measures and introduce stern punishment (confiscation of all property) for their violation.

(7) To confirm (or to formulate more precisely) the rules and regulations concerning property confiscation for *not handing over* to the state (*or the co-operatives*) grain surpluses *and all other* food products for registration.

(8) To impose a tax *in kind*, in grain, on the rich peasants. This category should include those whose amount of grain (including the new harvest) is double or more than double their own consumption (taking into account needs for their family, livestock and sowing).

This is to be designated as an *income* and property tax and made progressive.

(9) To establish for *workers* of the hungry regions temporarily, let's say for one month, preferential carriage of 1.5 poods of grain on condition of special certificate and special control.

The certificate must contain the exact address and authority a) from a factory committee; b) from a house committee; c) from a trade union; and control must establish that it is for *personal* consumption, with a very severe penalty to anyone who cannot prove the impossibility of its reselling.

(10) To make it a rule to issue a receipt, two or three copies, for literally *every* requisition (particularly in the countryside and on the railway). To print forms of the receipt. Shooting to be the penalty for not giving a receipt.

(11) To enforce the same penalty for members of all kinds of requisitioning, food and other teams for any blatantly unjust action towards the working people or any infringement of the rules and regulations or actions liable

to rouse the indignation of the population, as well as for failure to keep a record and to hand over a copy to anyone who has already suffered requisitioning or punishment.

(12) To make it a rule that the workers and poor peasants in the hungry regions should have the right to have a goods train delivered to *their* station directly, under certain conditions: a) authorisation of local organisations (Soviet of Deputies plus the trade union without fail and others); b) making up a *responsible* team; c) inclusion in it of teams from other regions; d) participation of an inspector and Commissar from the Food, War, Transport and other Commissariats; e) their control of the train load and the distribution of grain. They must see that a *compulsory* part (a third to a half or more) goes to the Food Commissariat.

(13) As an exception, in view of the acute hunger among some railway *workers* and the particular importance of railways for grain delivery, to establish temporarily that:

requisitioning or anti-profiteering teams, in requisitioning the grain, shall issue receipts to those from whom it has been taken, and put the grain into the goods waggons and dispatch these waggons to the *Central Food Bureau*, while observing the following forms of control: a) sending a telegram to the Food and Transport Commissariats notifying them about each goods waggon; b) summoning officials from both Commissariats to meet the goods waggon and distribute the grain under the Food Commissariat's supervision.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Written August 2, 1918
First published in 1931

Published according to the manuscript

ADMISSION TO HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

DRAFT DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[18]

The Council of People's Commissars instructs the Commissariat of Education at once to prepare several decisions and measures so that in the event of the number of applicants to the higher educational institutions exceeding the usual number of places, extra-special measures be taken to ensure a chance to study for all who so desire, and to ensure there be no actual or legal privileges for the propertied classes. Priority must certainly go to workers and poor peasants, who are to be given grants on an extensive scale.

Written August 2, 1918

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Published according to the manuscript

LETTER TO YELETS WORKERS[19]

I have received a clipping from a Yelets newspaper containing a report of a special meeting of the Yelets branch of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party held on July 27. I see from it that Mochenov reported on the Saratov conference of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, where eight branches approved their Central Committee's tactics which had been defended by Mr. Kolegayev, while thirteen branches demanded the party's reorganisation and a change of tactics.

I note that at the Yelets meeting Comrade Rudakov insisted that "our party [the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries] be reorganised" and its name changed, that it be purged and that under no circumstances should it be allowed to fall apart and disappear. A certain Kryukov then alleged that he had spoken to representatives of the central government in Moscow and that Comrades Avanesov, Sverdlov and Bonch-Bruyevich had declared that the Soviet government favoured the existence of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. He also alleged that in a conversation with him I had said the same thing and had stated that the Communists too had come so far from their former theories, from their books, that they had no programme at all at present, while in their policies a great deal was being indirectly borrowed from Narodnik theory, and so on and so forth.

I consider it my duty to say this is pure fiction and that I have never spoken to this Kryukov. I earnestly request our comrades, the workers and peasants of the Yelets Uyezd, to be extremely wary of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who all too frequently tell lies.

A few words about my view of them. Types like Kolegayev and the others are certainly just pawns in the hands

of the whiteguards, the monarchists and the Savinkovs, who in Yaroslavl showed who was "profiting" by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary revolt. Their stupidity and spinelessness brought Kolegayev and his friends to this degradation, and good riddance! They will go down in history as "Savinkov lackeys". But the facts show that among the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries there are people (and in Saratov they are in the majority) who were ashamed of this stupidity and spinelessness, of this servility to monarchism and the interests of the landowners. We can only welcome it if these people desire to change even their party's name (I have heard they want to call themselves "Village-Commune Communists" or "Narodnik Communists", etc.).

The pure ideological basis of this Narodism, an alliance with which the Bolshevik Communists have never rejected, is, firstly, disagreement with Marxism, and, secondly, complete agreement with the theory of "equal land tenure" (and with the law of equal land tenure).

We favour such an alliance, an agreement with the middle peasants, for we worker Communists have no grounds for quarrelling with the middle peasants and are prepared to make them a number of concessions. We have proved this, and proved it in deed, because we have been carrying out the law on the socialisation of land with absolutely good faith, despite the fact that we do not entirely agree with it.[20] Generally, we have been and are in favour of ruthless war on the kulaks, but we favour an agreement with the middle peasants and union with the poor peasants. An agreement with the middle peasants must not be construed as necessarily implying agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Nothing of the kind.

We passed the socialisation law at a time when we had no agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries; and this law, in fact, is an expression of our agreement with the middle peasants, with the peasant masses, and not with the Left Socialist-Revolutionary petty intellectuals.

Comrade workers and peasants, don't seek an agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, for we have seen and experienced their unreliability. Spread communism among the poor peasants; the majority will be on our side. Try to make concessions to the middle peasants. Treat them

as tactfully and as fairly as possible. We can and should make concessions to them. Be ruthless in your attitude towards the tiny handful of exploiters, including the kulaks and the grain profiteers, who are growing rich on the people's misfortunes and the starvation of the workers—towards the handful of kulaks who are sucking the blood of the working people.

V. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

Moscow, August 6, 1918

Sovetskaya Gazeta (Yelets) No. 73, August 11, 1918

Published according to the newspaper text

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN SOKOLNIKI DISTRICT AUGUST 9, 1918[21]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Prolonged applause.*) The war is already in its fifth year, and by now everyone can see who wanted it. The rich have grown richer, and the poor are literally choking under the yoke of capitalism. This war has cost the poor people many a bloody sacrifice, and all they have received in return is hunger, unemployment and the noose drawn tighter than ever around their necks.

The war was started by the British and German vultures who found themselves too cramped living together, and so each of them decided to drown the other in the blood of the workers of the world. Each of these vultures assures us he is inspired by the people's interests, but in fact he is working in the interests of his own pocket.

Britain is plundering the German colonies she has seized, part of Palestine and Mesopotamia, while Germany, in turn, is plundering Poland, Courland, Lithuania and the Ukraine. The millionaires of these countries have grown ten times richer; but, all the same, they have miscalculated.

Locked in mortal combat, these vultures are on the edge of a precipice. They can no longer stop the war, which is inevitably driving the peoples to revolution.

The Russian revolution has cast sparks into every country of the world, and has pushed the imperialists, who have gone too far, nearer to the edge of the precipice.

Comrades, we are in a very difficult position, but we must overcome every difficulty and hold fast the banner of socialist revolution we have raised aloft.

The workers of the world are looking hopefully towards us. We can hear their cry: "Hold on a little longer! You are surrounded by enemies, but we shall come to your aid, and by our joint effort we shall finally hurl the imperialist vultures over the precipice."

We hear this cry, and we swear we shall hold on, we shall stick to our post fighting with all our strength and not lay down our arms in face of the onslaught of world counter-revolution!

Izvestia No. 171,
August 11, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

COMRADE WORKERS, FORWARD TO THE LAST, DECISIVE FIGHT!

The Soviet Republic is surrounded by enemies. But it will defeat its enemies at home and abroad. A rising spirit which will ensure victory is already perceptible among the working people. We already see how frequent the sparks and explosions of the revolutionary conflagration in Western Europe have become, inspiring us with the assurance that the triumph of the world workers' revolution is not far off.

The external foe of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic at present is British, French, American and Japanese imperialism. This foe is attacking Russia, is plundering our territory, has seized Archangel and (if the French newspapers are to be believed) has advanced from Vladivostok to Nikolsk-Ussuriisky. This foe has bribed the generals and officers of the Czechoslovak Corps. This enemy is attacking peaceful Russia with the ferocity and voracity of the Germans in February, the only difference being that the British and Japanese are out to seize and plunder Russian territory and to overthrow the Soviet government so as to "restore the front", i.e., to draw Russia again into the imperialist (or more simply, the predatory) war between Britain and Germany.

The British and Japanese capitalists want to restore the power of the landowners and capitalists in Russia in order to share with them the booty captured in the war; they want to shackle the Russian workers and peasants to British and French capital, to squeeze out of them interest on the billions advanced in loans, and to extinguish the fire of socialist revolution which has broken out in our country and which is threatening to spread across the world.

Товарищи-рабочие! идем в последний, решительный бой!

Советская республика окружена врагами. Со она повсюду и внешних и внутренних врагов. Уже уже подъем среди рабочей массы, обнаруживающий погоду. Уже уже, как угасшие искры и вулки революционного пожара в западной Европе, дающие нам уверенность в недалекой победе международной рабочей революции.

Главный враг российской советской социалистической республики, это — в данный

First page of the manuscript
"Comrade Workers,
Forward to the Last,
Decisive Fight!"
Early August 1918

Reduced

The British and Japanese imperialist savages are not strong enough to occupy and subjugate Russia. Even neighbouring Germany is not strong enough for that, as was shown by her "experience" in the Ukraine. The British and Japanese counted on taking us unawares. They failed. The Petrograd workers, followed by the Moscow workers, and after Moscow the workers of the entire central industrial region, are rising more unitedly, with growing persistence and courage and in ever larger numbers. That is a sure sign we shall win.

In launching their attack on peaceful Russia the British and Japanese capitalist robbers are also counting on alliance with the internal enemy of the Soviet government. We all know who that internal enemy is. It is the capitalists, the landowners, the kulaks, and their offspring, who hate the government of the workers and working peasants—the peasants who do not suck the blood of their fellow-villagers.

A wave of kulak revolts is sweeping across Russia. The kulak hates the Soviet government like poison and is prepared to strangle and massacre hundreds of thousands of workers. We know very well that if the kulaks were to gain the upper hand they would ruthlessly slaughter hundreds of thousands of workers, in alliance with the landowners and capitalists, restore back-breaking conditions for the workers, abolish the eight-hour day and hand back the mills and factories to the capitalists.

That was the case in all earlier European revolutions when, as a result of the weakness of the workers, the kulaks succeeded in turning back from a republic to a monarchy, from a working people's government to the despotism of the exploiters, the rich and the parasites. This happened before our very eyes in Latvia, Finland, the Ukraine and Georgia. Everywhere the avaricious, bloated and bestial kulaks joined hands with the landowners and capitalists against the workers and against the poor generally. Everywhere the kulaks wreaked their vengeance on the working class with incredible ferocity. Everywhere they joined hands with *the foreign capitalists* against the workers of their own country. That is the way the Cadets, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks have been acting: we have only to remember their exploits in "Czechoslovakia".[22] That is the way the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, in their crass stupidity

and spinelessness, acted too when they revolted in Moscow, thus assisting the whiteguards in Yaroslavl and the Czechs and the Whites in Kazan. No wonder these Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were praised by Kerensky and his friends, the French imperialists.

There is no doubt about it. The kulaks are rabid foes of the Soviet government. Either the kulaks massacre vast numbers of workers, or the workers ruthlessly suppress the revolts of the predatory kulak minority of the people against the working people's government. There can be no middle course. Peace is out of the question: even if they have quarrelled, the kulak can easily come to terms with the landowner, the tsar and the priest, but with the working class *never*.

That is why we call the fight against the kulaks the *last*, decisive fight. That does not mean there may not be many more kulak revolts, or that there may not be many more attacks on the Soviet government by foreign capitalism. The words, the *last* fight, imply that the last and most numerous of the *exploiting* classes has revolted against us in our country.

The kulaks are the most brutal, callous and savage exploiters, who in the history of other countries have time and again restored the power of the landowners, tsars, priests and capitalists. The kulaks are more numerous than the landowners and capitalists. Nevertheless, they are a minority.

Let us take it that there are about fifteen million peasant families in Russia, taking Russia as she was before the robbers deprived her of the Ukraine and other territories. Of these fifteen million, probably ten million are poor peasants who live by selling their labour power, or who are in bondage to the rich, or who lack grain surpluses and have been most impoverished by the burdens of war. About three million must be regarded as middle peasants, while barely two million consist of kulaks, rich peasants, grain profiteers. These bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want suffered by the people in the war; they have raked in thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by pushing up the price of grain and other products. These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the peasants ruined by the war, at the expense of the starving workers. These leeches have sucked the

blood of the working people and grown richer as the workers in the cities and factories starved. These vampires have been gathering the landed estates into their hands; they continue to enslave the poor peasants.

Ruthless war on the kulaks! Death to them! Hatred and contempt for the parties which defend them—the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and today's Left Socialist-Revolutionaries! The workers must crush the revolts of the kulaks with an iron hand, the kulaks who are forming an alliance with the foreign capitalists against the working people of their own country.

The kulaks take advantage of the ignorance, the disunity and isolation of the poor peasants. They incite them against the workers. Sometimes they bribe them while permitting them to "make a bit", a hundred rubles or so, by profiteering in grain (at the same time robbing the poor peasants of many thousands of rubles). The kulaks try to win the support of the middle peasants, and they sometimes succeed.

But there is no reason why the working class should quarrel with the middle peasant. The workers cannot come to terms with the kulak, but they may seek, and are seeking, an *agreement* with the middle peasant. The workers' government, the Bolshevik government, *has proved* that in deed.

We proved it by passing the law on the "socialisation of land" and strictly carrying it into effect. That law contains *numerous* concessions to the interests and views of the middle peasant.

We proved it (the other day) by *trebling* grain prices[23]; for we fully realise that the earnings of the middle peasant are often disproportionate to present-day prices for manufactured goods and *must* be raised.

Every class-conscious worker will explain this to the middle peasant and will patiently, persistently, and repeatedly point out to him that socialism is infinitely more beneficial for him than a government of the tsars, landowners and capitalists.

The workers' government has never wronged and never will wrong the middle peasant. But the government of the tsars, landowners, capitalists and kulaks not only always wronged the middle peasant, but stifled, plundered, and

ruined him outright. And this is true of all countries without exception, Russia included.

The class-conscious worker's programme is the closest alliance and complete unity with the poor peasants; concessions to and agreement with the middle peasants; ruthless suppression of the kulaks, those bloodsuckers, vampires, plunderers of the people and profiteers, who batten on famine. That is the policy of the working class.

Written in the first part of August 1918

First published January 17, 1925 in *Rabochaya Moskva* No. 14

Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT OF TELEGRAM TO ALL SOVIETS OF DEPUTIES CONCERNING THE WORKER-PEASANT ALLIANCE[24]

The Poor Peasants' Committees are necessary to fight the kulaks, the rich, the exploiters, who shackle the working peasants. But between the kulaks, who are a small minority, and the poor or semi-proletarians there is the section of the middle peasants. The Soviet government has never declared or conducted any struggle against them. Any steps or measures to the contrary must be condemned most vigorously and stopped. The socialist government must pursue a policy of agreement with the middle peasants. The Soviet government has time and again shown by its actions that it is firmly resolved to pursue this policy. The most important of such actions are the adoption by a Communist (Bolshevik) majority of the law on the socialisation of land and its strictly faithful enforcement, followed by the trebling of grain prices (decree of August ..., 1918). The purport of the decree on agricultural machinery,[25] etc., is the same. The policy set forth above is strictly binding on everyone.

Written August 16, 1918
First published in 1931

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE MOSCOW PARTY COMMITTEE ON ORGANISING GROUPS OF SYMPATHISERS AUGUST 16, 1918[26]

MINUTES

1

We are experiencing a great shortage of forces, yet forces are to be had among the people, forces that can be utilised. Greater confidence must be shown in the working people and we must learn to draw forces from their midst. This can be done by enlisting sympathisers among the young people and the trade unions into the Party. Never mind if their membership dues are in arrears—there is no danger in that. There is no great danger in assigning six thousand for the front and taking on twelve thousand others in their place. We must utilise our moral influence to enlarge our Party.

All too few new people get up and speak at our meetings, yet we want new people because there would be a live note in their speeches. We should organise this in some way or other. The young people must be taken from among the workers so that there is control by the workers. The exigencies of the situation demand that large numbers of Party members be sent to the front, before the Japanese and the Americans can consolidate their position in Siberia. These old forces must be replaced by new forces, by young people.

2

Party members must carry on energetic agitation among the workers. Comrades who are capable of doing anything at all must not be kept in office jobs.

We must broaden our sphere of influence among the workers. The nuclei are displaying too little initiative; their activities could be very useful in influencing non-Party people on the spot. Attention should be paid to the clubs, Party workers recruited from the masses.

We must not accept people who try to join from careerist motives; people like this should be driven out of the Party.

First published January 22, 1928
in *Pravda* No. 19

Published according to
the handwritten copy of
the minutes

LETTER TO AMERICAN WORKERS[27]

Comrades! A Russian Bolshevik who took part in the 1905 Revolution, and who lived in your country for many years afterwards, has offered to convey my letter to you. I have accepted his proposal all the more gladly because just at the present time the American revolutionary workers have to play an exceptionally important role as uncompromising enemies of American imperialism—the freshest, strongest and latest in joining in the world-wide slaughter of nations for the division of capitalist profits. At this very moment, the American multimillionaires, these modern slaveowners have turned an exceptionally tragic page in the bloody history of bloody imperialism by giving their approval—whether direct or indirect, open or hypocritically concealed, makes no difference—to the armed expedition launched by the brutal Anglo-Japanese imperialists for the purpose of throttling the first socialist republic.

The history of modern, civilised America opened with one of those great, really liberating, really revolutionary wars of which there have been so few compared to the vast number of wars of conquest which, like the present imperialist war, were caused by squabbles among kings, landowners or capitalists over the division of usurped lands or ill-gotten gains. That was the war the American people waged against the British robbers who oppressed America and held her in colonial slavery, in the same way as these "civilised" bloodsuckers are still oppressing and holding in colonial slavery hundreds of millions of people in India, Egypt, and all parts of the world.

About 150 years have passed since then. Bourgeois civilisation has borne all its luxurious fruits. America has taken

first place among the free and educated nations in level of development of the productive forces of collective human endeavour, in the utilisation of machinery and of all the wonders of modern engineering. At the same time, America has become one of the foremost countries in regard to the depth of the abyss which lies between the handful of arrogant multimillionaires who wallow in filth and luxury, and the millions of working people who constantly live on the verge of pauperism. The American people, who set the world an example in waging a revolutionary war against feudal slavery, now find themselves in the latest, capitalist stage of wage-slavery to a handful of multimillionaires, and find themselves playing the role of hired thugs who, for the benefit of wealthy scoundrels, throttled the Philippines in 1898 on the pretext of "liberating" them, and are throttling the Russian Socialist Republic in 1918 on the pretext of "protecting" it from the Germans.

The four years of the imperialist slaughter of nations, however, have not passed in vain. The deception of the people by the scoundrels of both robber groups, the British and the German, has been utterly exposed by indisputable and obvious facts. The results of the four years of war have revealed the general law of capitalism as applied to war between robbers for the division of spoils: the richest and strongest profited and grabbed most, while the weakest were utterly robbed, tormented, crushed and strangled.

The British imperialist robbers were the strongest in number of "colonial slaves". The British capitalists have not lost an inch of "their" territory (i.e., territory they have grabbed over the centuries), but they have grabbed all the German colonies in Africa, they have grabbed Mesopotamia and Palestine, they have throttled Greece, and have begun to plunder Russia.

The German imperialist robbers were the strongest in organisation and discipline of "their" armies, but weaker in regard to colonies. They have lost all their colonies, but plundered half of Europe and throttled the largest number of small countries and weak nations. What a great war of "liberation" on both sides! How well the robbers of both groups, the Anglo-French and the German capitalists, together with their lackeys, the social-chauvinists, i.e., the

socialists who went over to the side of "their own" bourgeoisie, have "defended their country"!

The American multimillionaires were, perhaps, richest of all, and geographically the most secure. They have profited more than all the rest. They have converted all, even the richest, countries into their tributaries. They have grabbed hundreds of billions of dollars. And every dollar is sullied with filth: the filth of the secret treaties between Britain and her "allies", between Germany and her vassals, treaties for the division of the spoils, treaties of mutual "aid" for oppressing the workers and persecuting the internationalist socialists. Every dollar is sullied with the filth of "profitable" war contracts, which in every country made the rich richer and the poor poorer. And every dollar is stained with blood—from that ocean of blood that has been shed by the ten million killed and twenty million maimed in the great, noble, liberating and holy war to decide whether the British or the German robbers are to get most of the spoils, whether the British or the German thugs are to be *foremost* in throttling the weak nations all over the world.

While the German robbers broke all records in war atrocities, the British have broken all records not only in the number of colonies they have grabbed, but also in the subtlety of their disgusting hypocrisy. This very day, the Anglo-French and American bourgeois newspapers are spreading, in millions and millions of copies, lies and slander about Russia, and are hypocritically justifying their predatory expedition against her on the plea that they want to "protect" Russia from the Germans!

It does not require many words to refute this despicable and hideous lie; it is sufficient to point to one well-known fact. In October 1917, after the Russian workers had overthrown their imperialist government, the Soviet government, the government of the revolutionary workers and peasants, openly proposed a just peace, a peace without annexations or indemnities, a peace that fully guaranteed equal rights to all nations—and it proposed such a peace to *all* the belligerent countries.

It was the Anglo-French and the American bourgeoisie who refused to accept our proposal; it was they who even refused to talk to us about a general peace! It was *they* who

betrayed the interests of all nations; it was they who prolonged the imperialist slaughter!

It was they who, banking on the possibility of dragging Russia back into the imperialist war, refused to take part in the peace negotiations and thereby gave a free hand to the no less predatory German capitalists who imposed the annexationist and harsh Brest Peace upon Russia!

It is difficult to imagine anything more disgusting than the hypocrisy with which the Anglo-French and American bourgeoisie are now "blaming" us *for* the Brest Peace Treaty. The very capitalists of those countries which could have turned the Brest negotiations into general negotiations for a general peace are now our "accusers"! The Anglo-French imperialist vultures, who have profited from the plunder of colonies and the slaughter of nations, have prolonged the war for nearly a whole year after Brest, and yet they "accuse" *us*, the Bolsheviks, who proposed a just peace to all countries, they accuse *us*, who tore up, published and exposed to public disgrace the secret, criminal treaties concluded between the ex-tsar and the Anglo-French capitalists.

The workers of the whole world, no matter in what country they live, greet us, sympathise with us, applaud us for breaking the iron ring of imperialist ties, of sordid imperialist treaties, of imperialist chains—for breaking through to freedom, and making the heaviest sacrifices in doing so—for, as a socialist republic, although torn and plundered by the imperialists, keeping *out* of the imperialist war and raising the banner of peace, the banner of socialism for the whole world to see.

Small wonder that the international imperialist gang hates us for this, that it "accuses" us, that all the lackeys of the imperialists, including our Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, also "accuse" us. The hatred these watchdogs of imperialism express for the Bolsheviks, and the sympathy of the class-conscious workers of the world, convince us more than ever of the justice of our cause.

A real socialist would not fail to understand that for the sake of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie, for the sake of power passing to the workers, for the sake of *starting* the world proletarian revolution, we *cannot* and must not hesitate to make the heaviest sacrifices, including the sacrifice

of part of our territory, the sacrifice of heavy defeats at the hands of imperialism. A real socialist would have proved by *deeds* his willingness for "his" country to make the greatest sacrifice to give a real push forward to the cause of the socialist revolution.

For the sake of "their" cause, that is, for the sake of winning world hegemony, the imperialists of Britain and Germany have not hesitated to utterly ruin and throttle a whole number of countries, from Belgium and Serbia to Palestine and Mesopotamia. But must socialists wait with "their" cause, the cause of liberating the working people of the whole world from the yoke of capital, of winning universal and lasting peace, until a path without sacrifice is found? Must they fear to open the battle until an easy victory is "guaranteed"? Must they place the integrity and security of "their" bourgeois-created "fatherland" above the interests of the world socialist revolution? The scoundrels in the international socialist movement who think this way, those lackeys who grovel to bourgeois morality, thrice stand condemned.

The Anglo-French and American imperialist vultures "accuse" us of concluding an "agreement" with German imperialism. What hypocrites, what scoundrels they are to slander the workers' government while trembling because of the sympathy displayed towards us by the workers of "their own" countries! But their hypocrisy will be exposed. They pretend not to see the difference between an agreement entered into by "socialists" with the bourgeoisie (their own or foreign) *against the workers*, against the working people, and an agreement entered into *for the protection* of the workers who have defeated their bourgeoisie, with the bourgeoisie of one national colour *against the bourgeoisie* of another colour in order that the proletariat may take advantage of the antagonisms between the different groups of bourgeoisie.

In actual fact, every European sees this difference very well, and, as I shall show in a moment, the American people have had a particularly striking "illustration" of it in their own history. There are agreements and agreements, there are *fagots et fagots*, as the French say.

When in February 1918 the German imperialist vultures hurled their forces against unarmed, demobilised Russia,

who had relied on the international solidarity of the proletariat before the world revolution had fully matured, I did not hesitate for a moment to enter into an "agreement" with the French monarchists. Captain Sadoul, a French army officer who, in words, sympathised with the Bolsheviks, but was in deeds a loyal and faithful servant of French imperialism, brought the French officer de Lubersac to see me. "I am a monarchist. My only aim is to secure the defeat of Germany," de Lubersac declared to me. "That goes without saying (*cela va sans dire*)," I replied. But this did not in the least prevent me from entering into an "agreement" with de Lubersac concerning certain services that French army officers, experts in explosives, were ready to render us by blowing up railway lines in order to hinder the German invasion. This is an example of an "agreement" of which every class-conscious worker will approve, an agreement in the interests of socialism. The French monarchist and I shook hands, although we knew that each of us would willingly hang his "partner". But for a time our interests coincided. Against the advancing rapacious Germans, *we*, in the interests of the Russian and the world socialist revolution, utilised the equally rapacious counter-interests of *other* imperialists. In this way we served the interests of the working class of Russia and of other countries, we strengthened the proletariat and weakened the bourgeoisie of the whole world, we resorted to the methods, most legitimate and essential in *every* war, of manoeuvre, stratagem, retreat, in anticipation of the moment when the rapidly maturing proletarian revolution in a number of advanced countries *completely matured*.

However much the Anglo-French and American imperialist sharks fume with rage, however much they slander us, no matter how many millions they spend on bribing the Right Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik and other social-patriotic newspapers, *I shall not hesitate one second* to enter into a *similar* "agreement" with the German imperialist vultures if an attack upon Russia by Anglo-French troops calls for it. And I know perfectly well that my tactics will be approved by the class-conscious proletariat of Russia, Germany, France, Britain, America—in short, of the whole civilised world. Such tactics will ease the task of the socialist revolution, will hasten it, will weaken the international bourgeoisie,

will strengthen the position of the working class which is defeating the bourgeoisie.

The American people resorted to these tactics long ago to the advantage of their revolution. When they waged their great war of liberation against the British oppressors, they had also against them the French and the Spanish oppressors who owned a part of what is now the United States of North America. In their arduous war for freedom, the American people also entered into "agreements" with some oppressors against others for the purpose of weakening the oppressors and strengthening those who were fighting in a revolutionary manner against oppression, for the purpose of serving the interests of the oppressed *people*. The American people took advantage of the strife between the French, the Spanish and the British; sometimes they even fought side by side with the forces of the French and Spanish oppressors against the British oppressors; first they defeated the British and then freed themselves (partly by ransom) from the French and the Spanish.

Historical action is not the pavement of Nevsky Prospekt, said the great Russian revolutionary Chernyshevsky.[28] A revolutionary would not "agree" to a proletarian revolution only "on the condition" that it proceeds easily and smoothly, that there is, from the outset, combined action on the part of the proletarians of different countries, that there are guarantees against defeats, that the road of the revolution is broad, free and straight, that it will not be necessary during the march to victory to sustain the heaviest casualties, to "bide one's time in a besieged fortress", or to make one's way along extremely narrow, impassable, winding and dangerous mountain tracks. Such a person is no revolutionary, he has not freed himself from the pedantry of the bourgeois intellectuals; such a person will be found constantly slipping into the camp of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, like our Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and even (although more rarely) Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Echoing the bourgeoisie, these gentlemen like to blame us for the "chaos" of the revolution, for the "destruction" of industry, for the unemployment and the food shortage. How hypocritical these accusations are, coming from those who welcomed and supported the imperialist war, or who

entered into an "agreement" with Kerensky who continued this war! It is this imperialist war that is the cause of all these misfortunes. The revolution engendered by the war cannot avoid the terrible difficulties and suffering bequeathed it by the prolonged, ruinous, reactionary slaughter of the nations. To blame us for the "destruction" of industry, or for the "terror", is either hypocrisy or dull-witted pedantry; it reveals an inability to understand the basic conditions of the fierce class struggle, raised to the highest degree of intensity that is called revolution.

Even when "accusers" of this type do "recognise" the class struggle, they limit themselves to verbal recognition; actually, they constantly slip into the philistine utopia of class "agreement" and "collaboration"; for in revolutionary epochs the class struggle has always, inevitably, and in every country, assumed the form of *civil war*, and civil war is inconceivable without the severest destruction, terror and the restriction of formal democracy in the interests of this war. Only unctuous parsons—whether Christian or "secular" in the persons of parlour, parliamentary socialists—cannot see, understand and feel this necessity. Only a lifeless "man in the muffler"[29] can shun the revolution for this reason instead of plunging into battle with the utmost ardour and determination at a time when history demands that the greatest problems of humanity be solved by struggle and war.

The American people have a revolutionary tradition which has been adopted by the best representatives of the American proletariat, who have repeatedly expressed their complete solidarity with us Bolsheviks. That tradition is the war of liberation against the British in the eighteenth century and the Civil War in the nineteenth century. In some respects, if we only take into consideration the "destruction" of some branches of industry and of the national economy, America in 1870 was *behind* 1860. But what a pedant, what an idiot would anyone be to deny on *these* grounds the immense, world-historic, progressive and revolutionary significance of the American Civil War of 1863-65!

The representatives of the bourgeoisie understand that for the sake of overthrowing Negro slavery, of overthrowing the rule of the slaveowners, it was worth letting the country go through long years of civil war, through the abysmal

ruin, destruction and terror that accompany every war. But now, when we are confronted with the vastly greater task of overthrowing capitalist wage-slavery, of overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie—now, the representatives and defenders of the bourgeoisie, and also the reformist socialists who have been frightened by the bourgeoisie and are shunning the revolution, cannot and do not want to understand that civil war is necessary and legitimate.

The American workers will not follow the bourgeoisie. They will be with us, for civil war against the bourgeoisie. The whole history of the world and of the American labour movement strengthens my conviction that this is so. I also recall the words of one of the most beloved leaders of the American proletariat, Eugene Debs, who wrote in the *Appeal to Reason*,[30] I believe towards the end of 1915, in the article "What Shall I Fight For" (I quoted this article at the beginning of 1916 at a public meeting of workers in Berne, Switzerland)*—that he, Debs, would rather be shot than vote credits for the present criminal and reactionary war; that he, Debs, knows of only one holy and, from the proletarian standpoint, legitimate war, namely: the war against the capitalists, the war to liberate mankind from wage-slavery.

I am not surprised that Wilson, the head of the American multimillionaires and servant of the capitalist sharks, has thrown Debs into prison. Let the bourgeoisie be brutal to the true internationalists, to the true representatives of the revolutionary proletariat! The more fierce and brutal they are, the nearer the day of the victorious proletarian revolution.

We are blamed for the destruction caused by our revolution.... Who are the accusers? The hangers-on of the bourgeoisie, of that very bourgeoisie who, during the four years of the imperialist war, have destroyed almost the whole of European culture and have reduced Europe to barbarism, brutality and starvation. These bourgeoisie now demand we should not make a revolution on these ruins, amidst this wreckage of culture, amidst the wreckage and ruins created by the war, nor with the people who have been brutalised by the war. How humane and righteous the bourgeoisie are!

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 125.—*Ed.*

Their servants accuse us of resorting to terror.... The British bourgeoisie have forgotten their 1649, the French bourgeoisie have forgotten their 1793. Terror was just and legitimate when the bourgeoisie resorted to it for their own benefit against feudalism. Terror became monstrous and criminal when the workers and poor peasants dared to use it against the bourgeoisie! Terror was just and legitimate when used for the purpose of substituting one exploiting minority for another exploiting minority. Terror became monstrous and criminal when it began to be used for the purpose of overthrowing *every* exploiting minority, to be used in the interests of the vast actual majority, in the interests of the proletariat and semi-proletariat, the working class and the poor peasants!

The international imperialist bourgeoisie have slaughtered ten million men and maimed twenty million in "their" war, the war to decide whether the British or the German vultures are to rule the world.

If our war, the war of the oppressed and exploited against the oppressors and the exploiters, results in half a million or a million casualties in all countries, the bourgeoisie will say that the former casualties are justified, while the latter are criminal.

The proletariat will have something entirely different to say.

Now, amidst the horrors of the imperialist war, the proletariat is receiving a most vivid and striking illustration of the great truth taught by all revolutions and bequeathed to the workers by their best teachers, the founders of modern socialism. This truth is that no revolution can be successful unless *the resistance of the exploiters is crushed*. When we, the workers and toiling peasants, captured state power, it became our duty to crush the resistance of the exploiters. We are proud we have been doing this. We regret we are not doing it with sufficient firmness and determination.

We know that fierce resistance to the socialist revolution on the part of the bourgeoisie is inevitable in all countries, and that this resistance will *grow* with the growth of this revolution. The proletariat will crush this resistance; during the struggle against the resisting bourgeoisie it will finally mature for victory and for power.

Let the corrupt bourgeois press shout to the whole world

about every mistake our revolution makes. We are not daunted by our mistakes. People have not become saints because the revolution has begun. The toiling classes who for centuries have been oppressed, downtrodden and forcibly held in the vice of poverty, brutality and ignorance cannot avoid mistakes when making a revolution. And, as I pointed out once before, the corpse of bourgeois society cannot be nailed in a coffin and buried.* The corpse of capitalism is decaying and disintegrating in our midst, polluting the air and poisoning our lives, enmeshing that which is new, fresh, young and virile in thousands of threads and bonds of that which is old, moribund and decaying.

For every hundred mistakes we commit, and which the bourgeoisie and their lackeys (including our own Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries) shout about to the whole world, 10,000 great and heroic deeds are performed, greater and more heroic because they are simple and inconspicuous amidst the everyday life of a factory district or a remote village, performed by people who are not accustomed (and have no opportunity) to shout to the whole world about their successes.

But even if the contrary were true—although I know such an assumption is wrong—even if we committed 10,000 mistake for every 100 correct actions we performed, even in that case our revolution would be great and invincible, and *so it will be in the eyes of world history*, because, *for the first time*, not the minority, not the rich alone, not the educated alone, but the real people, the vast majority of the working people, are *themselves* building a new life, are *by their own experience* solving the most difficult problems of socialist organisation .

Every mistake committed in the course of such work, in the course of this most conscientious and earnest work of tens of millions of simple workers and peasants in reorganising their whole life, every such mistake is worth thousands and millions of "lawless" successes achieved by the exploiting minority—successes in swindling and duping the working people. For only *through* such mistakes will the workers and peasants *learn* to build the new life, learn to do *without*

* See present edition, Vol. 27, p. 434.—*Ed.*

capitalists; only in this way will they hack a path for themselves—through thousands of obstacles—to victorious socialism.

Mistakes are being committed in the course of their revolutionary work by our peasants, who at one stroke, in one night, October 25-26 (old style), 1917, entirely abolished the private ownership of land, and are now, month after month, overcoming tremendous difficulties and correcting their mistakes themselves, solving in a practical way the most difficult tasks of organising new conditions of economic life, of fighting the kulaks, providing land for the *working people* (and not for the rich), and of changing to *communist* large-scale agriculture.

Mistakes are being committed in the course of their revolutionary work by our workers, who have already, after a few months, nationalised almost all the biggest factories and plants, and are learning by hard, everyday work the new task of managing whole branches of industry, are setting the nationalised enterprises going, overcoming the powerful resistance of inertia, petty-bourgeois mentality and selfishness, and, brick by brick, are laying the foundation of *new* social ties, of a *new* labour discipline, of a *new* influence of the workers' trade unions over their members.

Mistakes are committed in the course of their revolutionary work by our Soviets, which were created as far back as 1905 by a mighty upsurge of the people. The Soviets of Workers and Peasants are a new *type* of state, a new and higher *type* of democracy, a form of the proletarian dictatorship, a means of administering the state *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie. For the first time democracy is here serving the people, the working people, and has ceased to be democracy for the rich as it still is in all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic. For the first time, the people are grappling, on a scale involving one hundred million, with the problem of implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat and semi-proletariat—a problem which, if not solved, makes socialism *out of the question*.

Let the pedants, or the people whose minds are incurably stuffed with bourgeois-democratic or parliamentary prejudices, shake their heads in perplexity about our Soviets, about the absence of direct elections, for example. These people

have forgotten nothing and have learned nothing during the period of the great upheavals of 1914-18. The combination of the proletarian dictatorship with the new democracy for the working people—of civil war with the widest participation of the people in politics—such a combination cannot be brought about at one stroke, nor does it fit in with the outworn modes of routine parliamentary democracy. The contours of a new world, the world of socialism, are rising before us in the shape of the Soviet Republic. It is not surprising that this world does not come into being ready-made, does not spring forth like Minerva from the head of Jupiter.

The old bourgeois-democratic constitutions waxed eloquent about formal equality and right of assembly; but our proletarian and peasant Soviet Constitution casts aside the hypocrisy of formal equality. When the bourgeois republicans overturned thrones they did not worry about formal equality between monarchists and republicans. When it is a matter of overthrowing the bourgeoisie, only traitors or idiots can demand formal equality of rights for the bourgeoisie. "Freedom of assembly" for workers and peasants is not worth a farthing when the best buildings belong to the bourgeoisie. Our Soviets have *confiscated* all the good buildings in town and country from the rich and have *transferred all* of them to the workers and peasants for *their* unions and meetings. This is *our* freedom of assembly—for the working people! This is the meaning and content of our Soviet, our socialist Constitution!

That is why we are all so firmly convinced that no matter what misfortunes may still be in store for it, our Republic of Soviets is *invincible*.

It is invincible because every blow struck by frenzied imperialism, every defeat the international bourgeoisie inflict on us, rouses more and more sections of the workers and peasants to the struggle, teaches them at the cost of enormous sacrifice, steels them and engenders new heroism on a mass scale.

We know that help from you will probably not come soon, comrade American workers, for the revolution is developing in different countries in different forms and at different tempos (and it cannot be otherwise). We know that although the European proletarian revolution has been maturing very

rapidly lately, it may, after all, not flare up within the next few weeks. We are banking on the inevitability of the world revolution, but this does not mean that we are such fools as to bank on the revolution inevitably coming on a *definite* and early date. We have seen two great revolutions in our country, 1905 and 1917, and we know revolutions are not made to order, or by agreement. We know that circumstances brought *our* Russian detachment of the socialist proletariat to the fore not because of our merits, but because of the exceptional backwardness of Russia, and that *before* the world revolution breaks out a number of separate revolutions may be defeated.

In spite of this, we are firmly convinced that we are invincible, because the spirit of mankind will not be broken by the imperialist slaughter. Mankind will vanquish it. And the first country to *break* the convict chains of the imperialist war was *our* country. We sustained enormously heavy casualties in the struggle to break these chains, but we *broke* them. We are *free from* imperialist dependence, we have raised the banner of struggle for the complete overthrow of imperialism for the whole world to see.

We are now, as it were, in a besieged fortress, waiting for the other detachments of the world socialist revolution to come to our relief. These detachments *exist*, they are *more numerous* than ours, they are maturing, growing, gaining more strength the longer the brutalities of imperialism continue. The workers are breaking away from their social-traitors—the Gomperses, Hendersons, Renaudels, Scheidemanns and Renners. Slowly but surely the workers are adopting communist, Bolshevik tactics and are marching towards the proletarian revolution, which alone is capable of saving dying culture and dying mankind.

In short, we are invincible, because the world proletarian revolution is invincible.

N. Lenin

August 20, 1918

Pravda No. 178
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SPEECH AT A MEETING IN THE ALEXEYEV PEOPLE'S HOUSE AUGUST 23, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Comrade Lenin's appearance is greeted with stormy, prolonged applause.*) Comrades, today our Party is arranging meetings to explain what we Communists are fighting for.

The most concise answer to this question would be that we are fighting for the termination of the imperialist war and for socialism.

Right at the very outbreak of the war, when reaction and tsarism held sway, we called the war criminal and said that the only way out was to convert it from imperialist into civil war.

In those days many were uncertain about the connection between the imperialist war and socialism; even many socialists thought that this war, like any other, would end by the conclusion of peace.

But four years of war have taught people a lot. It is now becoming clearer and clearer that there is no other way out. The Russian revolution is being followed by the growth of revolution in all the belligerent countries. Why is this so? To answer that question we must explain the attitude of Communists towards war, give our appraisal of it. We regard all wars which are the result of the rapacious ambitions of kings and capitalists as criminal, because they are fatal to the labouring classes and bring rich spoils to the ruling bourgeoisie.

But there are some wars which the working class must regard as the only just wars. These are wars for emancipation from slavery, from capitalist oppression. And such wars are

bound to occur, for we cannot secure our emancipation without struggle.

When the war broke out in 1914 between the Germans on the one hand and the British and French on the other to determine how they were to divide up the earth among themselves, who was to have the right to oppress the whole world, the capitalists of both camps tried to disguise their predatory aims by talking about "national defence"; that is how they tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the people.

Millions of people have been killed and millions crippled in this war. It has become world-wide. And more and more insistenly people are asking what is the purpose of these unnecessary sacrifices.

Britain and Germany are drenched in blood, yet there is no way out of the war; even if some of the imperialist countries were to stop fighting, others would continue.

The capitalists have overreached themselves, they have grabbed more than they can hold. Meanwhile, the armies are becoming demoralised; there are deserters everywhere. The mountains of Italy are swarming with them; in France soldiers are refusing to fight, and even in Germany the old discipline has fallen apart.

French and German soldiers are beginning to realise they must reverse their front and turn their guns against their own governments, as it is impossible to end this bloody war under the capitalist system. Hence the realisation that the workers of the world must take up the struggle against the capitalists of the world.

It is no easy matter to create a socialist system. The Civil War is bound to continue for many a long month, perhaps for many a long year. This should be clear to a Russian, for he knows how difficult it is to overthrow the ruling class and what desperate resistance the Russian landowners and capitalists are putting up.

There is no country in Europe in which the workers are not in sympathy with the Bolsheviks and are not convinced that the time will come when they will overthrow their own government, just as the Russian workers have overthrown theirs.

We Russian Communists so far stand alone, because our detachment has proved to be ahead of all the others. We

have been cut off from our comrades; but we had to act first because our country was the most backward. Our revolution was begun as a general revolution, and we shall tackle our tasks with the help of the workers and peasants of the world.

Our tasks are hard and difficult; many undesirable and pernicious elements are joining our ranks. But the work has begun, and even if we do make mistakes, we should remember that every mistake is an education and a lesson.

Capitalism is an international force, and it can therefore be completely destroyed only through victory in all countries, not in one alone. The war against the Czechs is a war against the capitalists of the whole world.

The workers are rising and joining this struggle; the Petrograd and Moscow workers are joining the army and bringing with them the idea of fighting for the victory of socialism.

The workers will ensure the victory of the Soviet Republic over the Czechs and give it a chance to hold out until the world socialist revolution breaks out. (*Comrade Lenin concludes his speech amidst stormy applause.*)

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SPEECH IN POLYTECHNICAL MUSEUM
AUGUST 23, 1918

(*Stormy applause.*) What is the essence of our programme? Winning socialism. There is no way out of the world war at this moment except by the victory of socialism. But many do not realise this. Most people all over the world now oppose this bloody slaughter, but they cannot see its direct connection with the capitalist system. The horrors of this war are obvious even to the bourgeoisie, but you cannot expect them to associate the end of the war with the end of capitalism.... This, however, is the fundamental idea which has always distinguished the Bolsheviks, and the revolutionary socialists of all other countries, from those who would like to bring peace on earth while leaving the capitalist system intact.

What are wars fought for? We know the majority of wars were fought in the interests of dynasties, and were called dynastic wars. But some wars were fought in the interests of the oppressed. Spartacus set off a war in defence of the enslaved class. Wars of this nature were waged in the period of colonial oppression continuing to this day, in the period of slavery, etc. These wars were just wars and must not be condemned.

But when we talk about the present European war and condemn it, we do so only because it is being waged by the oppressor class.

What is the aim of the present war? If we are to believe the diplomats of all countries, it is being fought by France and Britain to defend the small nations from the barbarians, the German Huns. Germany, for her part, is fighting the Cossack barbarians who are menacing the civilised German people, and is defending the fatherland from the enemy attack.

But we know this war was carefully prepared, it matured and became inevitable. It was just as inevitable as war is between America and Japan. Why?

Because capitalism has concentrated the earth's wealth in the hands of a few states and divided the world up to the last little bit. Any further division, any further enrichment could take place only at the expense of others, as the enrichment of one state at the expense of another. The issue could only be settled by force—and, accordingly, war between the world marauders became inevitable.

This war has up to now been headed by two principal firms—Britain and Germany. Britain was the strongest of the colonialist countries. Although her population is not more than 40,000,000, that of her colonies exceeds 400,000,000. Long ago she took by force the colonies of others; she seized vast territories and exploited them. But economically she fell behind Germany during the last fifty years. German industry overhauled British industry. Germany's large-scale state capitalism combined with the bureaucracy—and Germany beat all records.

The rivalry for supremacy between these two giants could only be settled by force.

There was a time when Britain, by dint of her might, seized territory from Holland, Portugal and other countries. Then Germany appeared on the scene and declared that it was now her turn to enrich herself at the expense of others.

That is the root of the matter—the struggle between the strongest powers for the division of the world. And as both sides possess hundreds of millions of capital, their struggle has become world-wide.

We know how many secret crimes have been committed in connection with this war. The secret treaties we have published show that the lofty reasons given for the war are just a lot of empty talk, and that, just like Russia, all the states were involved in sordid treaties for getting rich at the expense of small and weak nations. The result was that those who were strong grew richer still, while those who were weak were crushed.

Individuals cannot be blamed for starting the war; it would be wrong to blame kings and tsars for having brought

about this holocaust—it was brought about by capital. Capitalism has turned into a blind alley. This blind alley is imperialism, which dictated war among the rivals for world supremacy.

The claim that the war is being waged for the liberation of small nations is a monstrous lie. Both sets of marauders continue to stand glaring bloodthirstily at each other, while about them many a small nation lies crushed.

And we say there is no way out of the imperialist holocaust except by civil war.

When we said this in 1914 we were told it was like a straight line extending into space; but our analysis has been corroborated by the whole subsequent course of events. Today we find chauvinism's generals being left without an army. In France, which suffered most from the war and was most responsive to the call to defend the fatherland—for the enemy stood at the gates of Paris—the defence advocates have recently suffered a fiasco. True enough, it was at the hands of people like Longuet, who do not know whether they are coming or going, but that is not important.

We know that in the early days of the revolution in Russia power fell into the hands of people who spouted all sorts of words but kept the old tsarist treaties in their pockets. And if in Russia parties veered to the left more rapidly, this was due to the accursed regime that existed before the revolution and to our Revolution of 1905.

In Europe, though, where a shrewd and calculating capitalism rules, where it possesses a powerful and well-knit organisation, the fumes of nationalism are wearing off more slowly. Nevertheless, we can unmistakably see that the imperialist war is dying a slow and painful death.

There is quite reliable information to show that the German army is becoming demoralised, and has taken to profiteering. It could hardly be otherwise. The moment the soldier wakes up and begins to understand that he is being maimed and killed solely in the interests of the bourgeoisie, demoralisation is bound to spread among the mass of soldiers.

The French army, which kept its morale longer and more persistently than any of the others, likewise shows that it

is not immune to demoralisation. The Malvy trial has somewhat lifted the curtain over the scene in France, too, and has revealed that thousands of soldiers have refused to go to the front.[31]

All this is but the herald of events similar to those in Russia, except that in the civilised countries the civil war will be far more brutal than in Russia. We can see that in the case of Finland, the most democratic country in Europe, the first country to give women the vote. Yet this country took savage and ruthless reprisals on the Red Army men; and the latter did not surrender easily. This shows what a terrible fate awaits these civilised countries.

You can see for yourselves how absurd it was to accuse the Bolsheviks of demoralising the Russian army.

We represent only one detachment, a detachment which has advanced some way ahead of the other workers' detachments—not because it is any better than the others, but because the stupid policy of our bourgeoisie enabled the working class of Russia to throw off its chains sooner. Today, in fighting for a socialist system in Russia, we are fighting for socialism all over the world. Today, the Bolsheviks are the sole subject of discussion at all workers' meetings and gatherings in all countries. They know us; they know that what we are now doing is furthering the cause of the whole world, that we are working for them.

When we abolish private ownership of land, nationalise the factories and the banks, which are now engaged in organising industry, cries are raised on all sides that we are committing hosts of mistakes. That may be true, but the workers are creating socialism themselves, and no matter what mistakes we make we are learning from experience and paving the way for the art of making revolution without mistakes.

That is why we are the objects of such savage hatred. That is why the French imperialists do not begrudge hundreds of millions to support counter-revolution, since this would bring the repayment to France of the Russian debts, running into billions, which the workers and peasants have annulled.

Today the whole bourgeois press is amusing itself by filling its columns with such lies as that the Council of People's

Commissars has moved to Tula, that it was seen ten days ago in Kronstadt, and so on, that Moscow is about to fall and that the Soviet Government has fled.

The whole bourgeoisie, all the Romanovs, all the capitalists and landowners support the Czechs, whose revolt they associate with the possible fall of the Soviet government. The Allies know this, and they are launching one of their fiercest attacks. What they lacked in Russia was a nucleus, and now they have found it in the Czechs. The Czech revolt therefore must not be treated lightly. This revolt was the signal for a number of counter-revolutionary risings; our revolutionary history has recently been marked by many kulak and whiteguard revolts.

The position of the Soviet government is grave, and we must not close our eyes to the fact. But you have only to look around you to be filled with confidence in our victory.

Germany has suffered a number of defeats, and it is no secret that these defeats are the result of "treason" on the part of German soldiers; French soldiers refused to go to the front at a very critical moment because of the arrest of Comrade Andrieux whom the government was compelled to release to get the troops to move, and so on and so forth.

We have made many sacrifices. The Brest-Litovsk Peace was one painful wound; we expected a revolution in Germany, but the time for it was not yet ripe. It is ripening now; revolution is undoubtedly brewing and is inevitable. But only a fool can ask when revolution will break out in the West. Revolution can never be forecast, it cannot be foretold; it comes of itself. Revolution is brewing and is bound to flare up. Did anybody know a week before the February revolution it was about to break out? When the mad priest led the people to the palace,[32] did anybody think the Revolution of 1905 was about to break out? But revolution is brewing and is bound to come.

And we must keep the Soviet government intact until it begins. Our mistakes must serve as a lesson to the proletariat in the West, to the world socialist movement. The salvation of the world revolution as well as of the Russian revolution lies on the Czech front. And we already have news that

the army which time and again was betrayed by the generals, which is terribly exhausted, that this army, with the coming of our comrades, the Communists, the workers, is beginning to win victories, is beginning to display revolutionary enthusiasm in the struggle against the world bourgeoisie.

We believe that victory will be ours and that by our victory we shall save the cause of socialism. (*Stormy applause.*)

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SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS ON EDUCATION[33] AUGUST 28, 1918

(*All rise as Comrade Lenin appears in the hall. Stormy, prolonged applause.*) Comrades, we are passing through one of the most critical, important and interesting moments of history—a moment when the world socialist revolution is in the making. It is now becoming apparent even to those who stood remote from socialist theories and forecasts that this war will not end as it began, that is, by the conclusion of peace in the usual way between the old imperialist governments. The Russian revolution has shown that the war is inevitably leading to the disintegration of capitalist society in general, that it is being converted into a war of the working people against the exploiters. Therein lies the significance of the Russian revolution.

The workers of the world feel that the cause of the Russian revolution is their own cause no matter how great the obstacles in our way, no matter how many tens of millions in money are lavished in all countries to disseminate lies and slander about the Russian revolution. Parallel with the war between the two groups of imperialists, another war is beginning everywhere, the war which the working class, inspired by the example of the Russian revolution, is declaring against its own bourgeoisie. All the signs go to show that Austria and Italy are on the verge of revolution. The old order in these countries is disintegrating rapidly. In the stronger and more stable countries such as Germany, Britain and France, the same process is going on, although in a somewhat different and

less noticeable form. The collapse of the capitalist system and the capitalist war is inevitable.

The German imperialists have been unable to stifle the socialist revolution. The price Germany had to pay for crushing the revolution in Red Latvia, Finland and the Ukraine was the demoralisation of her army. The defeat of Germany on the Western front is largely due to the fact that her old army no longer exists. What the German diplomats joked about—the "Russification" of the German soldiers—now turns out to be no joke at all, but the bitter truth. The spirit of protest is rising, "treason" is becoming a common thing in the German army.

On the other hand, Britain and France are making a last effort to save their own situation. They are hurling themselves on the Russian Republic and straining capitalism to breaking point. Even the bourgeois papers have to admit that a definite change of spirit has appeared among the working people: in France, the idea of "national defence" is breaking down; in Britain, the working class is denouncing the "civil truce". That means the British and French imperialists have staked their last card—and we can say with the utmost confidence that that card will be trumped. (*Stormy applause.*) No matter how loudly certain groups cry that the Bolsheviks are backed by a minority, they have to admit they cannot find the forces inside Russia to fight the Bolsheviks, and are compelled to resort to foreign intervention. The working class of France and Britain is thus being forced to take part in a blatant war of conquest, whose purpose is to crush the Russian revolution. That means that British and French, and, consequently, world imperialism is at its last gasp. (*Stormy applause.*)

We have surmounted all difficulties, even though it was hard to declare martial law again in a country where the people themselves had suppressed the war and smashed the old army, and even though it was hard to form an army in the midst of acute civil war. The army has been formed, and victory over the Czechs, the whiteguards, the landowners, the capitalists and the kulaks is assured. (*Stormy applause.*) The working people realise they are fighting for their own cause and not in the interests of a handful of capitalists. The Russian workers and peasants have for the first time got a

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

chance to run the factories and dispose of the land themselves, and that experience was bound to have its effect. Our army has been formed from chosen people, from the class-conscious peasants and workers. Each of them goes to the front aware that he is fighting for the destiny of the world revolution as well as the Russian revolution; for we may rest assured that the Russian revolution is only a sample, only the first step in the series of revolutions in which the war is bound to end.

Education is one of the component parts of the struggle we are now waging. We can counter hypocrisy and lies with the complete and honest truth. The war has shown plainly enough what the "will of the majority" means, a phrase used as a cover by the bourgeoisie. It has shown that a handful of plutocrats drag whole nations to the slaughter in their own interests. The belief that bourgeois democracy serves the interests of the majority has now been utterly discredited. Our Constitution, our Soviets, which were something new to Europe, but with which we were already acquainted from the experience of the 1905 Revolution, serve as splendid agitation and propaganda material, completely exposing the lying and hypocritical nature of bourgeois democracy. We have openly proclaimed the rule of the working and exploited people—and there lies the source of our strength and invincibility.

The same is true of education: the more cultured the bourgeois state, the more subtly it lied when declaring that schools could stand above politics and serve society as a whole.

In fact the schools were turned into nothing but an instrument of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. They were thoroughly imbued with the bourgeois caste spirit. Their purpose was to supply the capitalists with obedient lackeys and able workers. The war has shown that the marvels of modern technology are being used as a means of exterminating millions of workers and creating fabulous profits for the capitalists who are making fortunes out of the war. The war has been internally undermined, for we have exposed their lies by countering them with the truth. We say that our work in the sphere of education is part of the struggle for overthrowing the bourgeoisie. We publicly declare that education divorced from life and politics is lies and hypocrisy. What was the meaning of

the sabotage resorted to by the best educated representatives of the old bourgeois culture? This sabotage showed better than any agitator, better than all our speeches, better than thousands of pamphlets that these people regard learning as their monopoly and have turned it into an instrument of their rule over the so-called common people. They used their education to frustrate the work of socialist construction, and came out openly against the working people.

The revolutionary struggle has been the finishing school for the Russian workers and peasants. They have seen that our system alone assures their genuine rule, they have been able to convince themselves that the state is doing everything to assist the workers and the poor peasants in completely crushing the resistance of the kulaks, the landowners and the capitalists.

The working people are thirsting for knowledge because they need it to win. Nine out of ten of the working people have realised that knowledge is a weapon in their struggle for emancipation, that their failures are due to lack of education, and that now it is up to them really to give everyone access to education. Our cause is assured because the people have themselves set about building a new, socialist Russia. They are learning from their own experience, from their failures and mistakes, and they see how indispensable education is for the victorious conclusion of their struggle. In spite of the apparent collapse of many institutions and the jubilation of the intellectuals carrying out sabotage, we find that experience in the struggle has taught the people to take their fate into their own hands. All who really sympathise with the people, all the best teachers will come to our aid, and that is a sure pledge that the socialist cause will triumph. (*Ovation.*)

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SPEECH AT A MEETING IN BASMANNY DISTRICT AUGUST 30, 1918[34]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

The bourgeoisie made themselves masters of revolutionary Russia for a time, ruling from February to October with the support of the social-compromisers.

With the first steps taken by the Milyukov-Guchkov government, the people began to realise where the bourgeoisie were leading them. But the dirty work of the Russian capitalists and landowners, who were in fact continuing the policy of the tsar the people had overthrown, was covered up by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who pretended to be socialists while actually betraying socialism in the interests of the British and French stock exchanges.

Swept aside by the October uprising, and ousted from the revolution, the compromisers set about their customary work in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, in Siberia and on the Volga. They eventually succeeded in getting the local Soviets overthrown and the Bolshevik members turned over to the tender mercies of the Czech hirelings and the Russian whiteguards.

But what do we find in these places rising out of the ruins of the Soviets? The complete triumph of the capitalists and landowners, and groans and curses from the workers and peasants. The land has been returned to the nobility and the mills and factories to their former owners. The eight-hour day has been abolished, the workers' and peasants' organisations suppressed, and the tsarist Zemstvos[35] and the old police regime restored instead.

Let every worker and peasant who is still undecided about his choice of government take a look at the Volga, Siberia, and the Ukraine, and the answer will be clear and unmistakable. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Pravda No. 185
August 31, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT A MEETING AT THE FORMER MICHELSON WORKS AUGUST 31), 1918[36]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Stormy applause passing into ovation.*) We Bolsheviks are constantly being accused of forsaking the slogans of equality and fraternity. Let us now put things straight.

What government replaced the tsar? The Guchkov-Milyukov government, which set about convening a Constituent Assembly in Russia. What was behind these activities supposed to be in favour of the people liberated from their millennial oppression? It was that Guchkov and other champions were backed by a gang of capitalists pursuing their own imperialist ends. And when Kerensky, Chernov and Co. were in the saddle, this government, tottering and without any foundation, was only concerned with the vested interests of their friends, the bourgeoisie. Power in fact passed into the hands of the kulaks, and the working people got nothing. We find the same thing in other countries. Take America, the freest and most civilised country. There you have a democratic republic. But what do we find? The brazen rule of a handful, not even of millionaires, but multimillionaires, while the people are in slavery and servitude. Where is your much-vaunted equality and fraternity if the mills, factories, banks, and all the country's wealth belong to the capitalists, and side by side with the democratic republic you have feudal servitude for millions of workers and unrelieved destitution?

No, wherever "democrats" are in power, you have real, barefaced robbery. We know the true nature of the so-called democracies.

The secret treaties of the French Republic, of Britain and the other democracies have clearly revealed the underlying nature and essence of this whole business. Their aims and interests are as criminal and predatory as Germany's. The war has opened our eyes, and we clearly see the barefaced robber and plunderer in the guise of the defender of the fatherland. This robbers' raid must be countered by revolutionary action, by revolutionary creative effort. True, it is not easy to achieve unity at such a difficult time, especially among the revolutionary peasants; but we believe in the creative power and public-mindedness of the industrial workers, the vanguard of the revolution. The workers are now fully aware that as long as minds are swayed by the fairy-tale of a democratic republic and a Constituent Assembly, fifty million rubles will continue to be spent daily for war purposes that are disastrous to them, and they will never secure their liberation from capitalist oppression. It was because they realised this that the workers created their Soviets.

Similarly, the realities of life have taught the workers to realise that as long as the landowners are snugly installed in their mansions and magic castles, the right of assembly will not exist, and will mean, if anything, the right to assemble only in the world to come. You will agree that to promise the workers freedom while leaving the mansions, the land, the factories and all wealth in the hands of the capitalists and landowners has hardly anything to do with liberty and equality. We have only one maxim, one slogan: All who work have the right to enjoy the benefits of life. Idlers and parasites who suck the blood of the working people must be deprived of these benefits. And we proclaim: Everything for the workers, everything for the working people!

We know how hard all this is to achieve, we know the furious resistance the bourgeoisie are putting up, but we believe in the ultimate victory of the workers, for they are bound to win if they were capable of extricating themselves from the terrible hardships of the imperialist holocaust and of erecting the edifice of socialist revolution on the ruins of the edifice they destroyed.

And, in fact, forces are uniting everywhere. Now that we have abolished private ownership of land, the workers of

town and country are rapidly coming together. And in the West, too, we see the workers' class-consciousness awakening. The British, French, Italian and other workers are making more and more appeals and demands indicating the approaching triumph of the world revolution. And our task today is to carry on our revolutionary work and to scorn the hypocrisy, the insolent outcries and lamentations of the predatory bourgeoisie. We must pit all we have on the Czech front so as to crush this whole gang who put up liberty and equality as a smokescreen to conceal the shooting down of hundreds and thousands of workers and peasants.

We have only one alternative: victory or death!

Izvestia No. 188
September 1, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON THE CAPTURE OF KAZAN

Hearty greetings to the Red Army on its wonderful victory.

May it serve as a pledge that the alliance of workers and revolutionary peasants will finish off the bourgeoisie, break down all and every resistance by the exploiters and ensure the victory of socialism all over the world.

Long live the world workers' revolution!

Lenin

Written September 11, 1918
Published September 12, 1918
in *Pravda* No. 195

Published according to
the manuscript

LETTER TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CONFERENCE OF PROLETARIAN CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL ORGANISATIONS[37]

17.9.18

Dear Comrades,

Many thanks for your good wishes, and the very best of luck in your work.

One of the chief conditions for the socialist revolution's victory is that the working class must realise it has to rule and that its rule should be carried through during the transition period from capitalism to socialism. The rule of the proletariat, the vanguard of all the working and exploited people, is essential in this transition period if classes are to be completely abolished, if the resistance of the exploiters is to be suppressed, and if the entire mass of the working and exploited people—crushed, downtrodden and disunited by capitalism—are to be united around the urban workers and brought in close alliance with them.

All our successes have been due to the workers grasping this and *governing* the state through their Soviets.

But the workers have not yet grasped this *sufficiently* and are often too *timid* in promoting *workers to governing* the state.

Fight for this, comrades! Let the proletarian cultural and educational organisations help in this. That will be a pledge of further success and the final victory of the socialist revolution.

Greetings,
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Pravda No. 201,
September 19, 1918

Published according to
the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO OFFICER CADETS IN PETROGRAD

18.9.18

To the District Commissar, 3 Cadet Line, Vasilyevsky Island, Petrograd

Greetings to the 400 comrade workers who pass out today as Red Army officers and go to join the ranks. The success of the Russian and world socialist revolution depends on the degree of energy the workers display in running the state and commanding the army of working and exploited people fighting to overthrow the rule of capital. I am sure therefore that thousands and thousands of workers will follow the example of the four hundred; with such administrators and commanders the victory of communism is assured.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars

Pravda No. 201,
September 19, 1918

Published according to
the manuscript

THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEWSPAPERS

Far too much space is being allotted to political agitation on outdated themes—to political ballyhoo—and far too little to the building of the new life, to the facts about it.

Why, instead of turning out 200-400 lines, don't we write twenty or even ten lines on such simple, generally known, clear topics with which the people are already fairly well acquainted, like the foul treachery of the Mensheviks—the lackeys of the bourgeoisie—the Anglo-Japanese invasion to restore the sacred rights of capital, the American multi-millionaires baring their fangs against Germany, etc., etc.? We must write about these things and note every new fact in this sphere, but we need not write long articles and repeat old arguments; what is needed is to condemn in just a few lines, "in telegraphic style", the latest manifestation of the old, known and already evaluated politics.

The bourgeois press in the "good old bourgeois times" never mentioned the "holy of holies"—the conditions in privately-owned factories, in the private enterprises. This custom fitted in with the interests of the bourgeoisie. We must radically break with it. We have *not* broken with it. So far our type of newspaper has *not* changed as it should in a society in transition from capitalism to socialism.

Less politics. Politics has been "elucidated" fully and reduced to a struggle between the two camps: the insurrectionary proletariat and the handful of capitalist slaveowners (with the whole gang, right down to the Mensheviks and others). We may, and, I repeat, we must, speak very briefly about these politics.

More economics. But not in the sense of "general" discussions, learned reviews, intellectual plans and similar piffle,

for, I regret to say, they are all too often just piffle and nothing more. By economics we mean the gathering, *careful checking* and study of the facts of the actual organisation of the new life. Have *real* successes been achieved by big factories, agricultural communes, the Poor Peasants' Committees, and local Economic Councils in building up the new economy? What, precisely, are these successes? Have they been verified? Are they not fables, boasting, intellectual promises ("things are moving", "the plan has been drawn up", "we are getting under way", "we now vouch for", "there is undoubted improvement", and other charlatan phrases of which "we" are such masters)? How have the successes been achieved? What must be done to extend them?

Where is the black list with the names of the lagging factories which since nationalisation have remained models of disorder, disintegration, dirt, hooliganism and parasitism? Nowhere to be found. But there *are* such factories. We shall not be able to do our duty unless we wage *war* against these "guardians of capitalist traditions". We shall be jellyfish, not Communists, as long as we tolerate such factories. We have not learned to wage the class struggle in the newspapers as skilfully as the bourgeoisie did. Remember the skill with which it *hounded its* class enemies in the press, ridiculed them, disgraced them, and tried to sweep them away. And we? Doesn't the class struggle in the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism take the form of safeguarding the interests of the working *class* against the few, the groups and sections of workers who stubbornly cling to capitalist traditions and continue to regard the Soviet state in the old way: work as little and as badly as they can and grab as much money as possible from the state. Aren't there many such scoundrels, even among the compositors in Soviet printing works, among the Sormovo and Putilov workers, etc.? How many of them have we found, how many have we exposed and how many have we pilloried?

The press is silent. And if it mentions the subject at all it does so in a stereotyped, official way, not in the manner of a *revolutionary* press, not as an organ of the *dictatorship* of a class demonstrating that the resistance of the capitalists and of the parasites—the custodians of capitalist traditions—will be crushed with an iron hand.

The same with the war. Do we harass cowardly or inefficient officers? Have we denounced the really bad regiments to the whole of Russia? Have we "caught" enough of the bad types who should be removed from the army with the greatest publicity for unsuitability, carelessness, procrastination, etc.? We are not yet waging an effective, ruthless and truly revolutionary *war* against the *specific* wrongdoers. We do very little to *educate the people* by living, concrete examples and models taken from all spheres of life, although that is the chief task of the press during the transition from capitalism to communism. We give little attention to that aspect of *everyday* life inside the factories, in the villages and in the regiments where, more than anywhere else, the new is being built, where attention, publicity, public criticism, condemnation of what is bad and appeals to learn from the good are needed most.

Less political ballyhoo. Fewer highbrow discussions. Closer to life. More attention to the way in which the workers and peasants are *actually* building the *new* in their everyday work, and more *verification* so as to ascertain the extent to which the new is *communistic*.

Pravda No. 202,
September 20, 1918
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TELEGRAM TO THE PENZA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR COUNCIL OF THE FIRST ARMY[38]

Moscow 22.9.18

The capture of Simbirsk, my home town, is a wonderful tonic, the best treatment for my wounds. I feel a new lease of life and energy. Congratulations to the Red Army men on their victory, and, on behalf of all working people, thanks for all their sacrifices.

Published (without address, date and signature) September 25, 1918 in *Petrogradskaya Pravda* No. 209

Published in full January 27, 1935 in *Krasnaya Zvezda* No. 22

Published according to the *Petrogradskaya Pravda* text checked with the *Krasnaya Zvada* text

LETTER TO RED ARMY MEN WHO TOOK PART IN THE CAPTURE OF KAZAN[39]

Comrades,

You already know what tremendous significance Kazan's capture has acquired for the whole Russian revolution. It marked a turning-point in the soldiers' mood, their change-over to firm, resolute and victorious actions. The immense sacrifices you bore in battle are saving the Soviet Republic. The Republic's strength in the fight against the imperialists depends on the army's fortification. So does the victory of socialism in Russia and all over the world. With all my heart I greet the heroic Soviet troops, the army of the vanguard of the exploited fighting for the overthrow of the exploiters. Very best wishes for the future.

Comradely and communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Znamya Revolutsii (Kazan) No. 177, September 29, 1918

Published according to the *Znamya Revolutsii* text

LETTER TO A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET AND REPRESENTATIVES OF FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS OCTOBER 3, 1918[40]

Germany is in the throes of a political crisis. The panicky bewilderment both of the government and of all the exploiting classes in genaral has become abundantly clear to the whole people. The hopelessness of the military situation and the lack of support for the ruling classes among the working people have been exposed at one go. This crisis means either that the revolution has begun or at any rate that the people have clearly realised it is inevitable and imminent.

The government has morally resigned and is in a state of hysterical indecision, wavering between a military dictatorship and a coalition cabinet. But a military dictatorship has, virtually speaking, been under test ever since the outbreak of the war, and now it has ceased to be feasible because the army has become unreliable. And the admission of Scheidemann and Co. to the cabinet would only hasten the revolutionary outburst and make it more widespread, more conscious, more firm and determined after the thorough exposure of the pitiful impotence of these lackeys of the bourgeoisie, of these corrupt individuals, who are just like our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, like the Hendersons and Sidney Webbs in Britain, the Albert Thomas and Renaudels in France, and so on.

The crisis in Germany has only begun. It will inevitably end in the transfer of political power to the German proletar-

iat. The Russian proletariat is following events with the keenest attention and enthusiasm. Now even the blindest workers in the various countries will see that the Bolsheviks were right in basing their whole tactics on the support of the world workers' revolution, and in not fearing to bear all sorts of heavy sacrifices. Today even the most ignorant will see how unspeakably vile the betrayal of socialism by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries was when they formed an alliance with the predatory British and French bourgeoisie, ostensibly to secure the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. And the Soviet government will certainly not help the German imperialists by attempting to violate the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, to tear it up at a moment when the anti-imperialist forces in Germany are beginning to seethe and boil, and when the spokesmen for the German bourgeoisie are beginning to excuse themselves to their people for having concluded such a peace treaty, and to search for a way of "changing" their policy.

But the workers of Russia are not merely following events with attention and enthusiasm. They are demanding that everything be done to *help the German workers*, who have the gravest trials ahead of them, a most difficult transition from slavery to freedom, a most stubborn *struggle against their own and British imperialism*. The defeat of German imperialism will for a while have the effect of increasing the insolence, brutality, reaction, and annexatory attempts of British and French imperialism.

The Bolshevik working class of Russia has always been internationalist in action, unlike those scoundrels, the heroes and leaders of the Second International, who either resorted to outright betrayal by forming an alliance with their bourgeoisie, or tried, by phrase-mongering and excuses (as Kautsky, Otto Bauer and Co. did), to avoid revolution, and opposed all bold and great revolutionary action, all sacrifice of narrow national interests for the sake of furthering the workers' revolution.

The Russian workers will understand that very soon they will have to make the greatest sacrifices in the cause of internationalism. The time is approaching when circumstances may require us to come to the aid of the

German people, who are struggling for their liberation from their own imperialism, against British and French imperialism.

Let us begin to prepare at once. Let us show that the Russian worker is capable of working much harder, of fighting and dying much more self-sacrificingly, when the world workers' revolution is at stake, as well as the Russian revolution.

First of all, let us multiply our efforts in storing up grain stocks. Let us resolve that every large elevator will put aside some grain to help the German workers should they be hard pressed in their struggle for emancipation from the imperialist monsters and brutes. Let every Party organisation, every trade union, every factory and workshop, etc., form special connections with several rural areas of their own selection with the object of strengthening the alliance with the peasants, helping and enlightening them, vanquishing the kulaks, and gathering up all surpluses of grain to the last ounce.

Let us, similarly, multiply our efforts in creating a proletarian Red Army. The turning-point has arrived—we all know it, we all see and feel it. The workers and labouring peasants have had a respite from the horrors of imperialist slaughter, they have realised and learnt from experience that war must be waged against the oppressors in defence of the gains of their revolution, the revolution of the working people, of their government, the Soviet government. An army is being created, a Red Army of workers and poor peasants, who are prepared to make any sacrifice in defending socialism. The army is growing in strength and is being tempered in battle with the Czechs and whiteguards. A firm foundation has been laid, and we must now hurry to erect the edifice itself.

We had decided to have an army of one million men by the spring; now we need an army of three million. We can have it. *And we shall have it.*

In these past few days world history has given tremendous momentum to the world workers' revolution. The most kaleidoscopic changes are possible, there may be attempts to form an alliance between German and Anglo-French imperialism against the Soviet government.

And we too must speed up our preparations. We must multiply our efforts.

Let this be the slogan for the anniversary of the Great October Workers' Revolution!

Let it be a pledge to the coming victories of the world workers' revolution!

N. Lenin

Pravda No. 213,
October 4, 1918

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the *Pravda* text

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RENEGADE KAUTSKY

This is the title of a pamphlet* I have begun to write in criticism of Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, which has just appeared in Vienna. But as this work is taking longer than I had anticipated, I have decided to ask *Pravda* to find space for a short article on the subject.

Over four years of a most exhausting and reactionary war have done their work. One can feel the impending proletarian revolution in Europe—in Austria, Italy, Germany, France and even in Britain (very significant, for example, is the article "Confessions of a Capitalist" in the July number of the arch-opportunist *Socialist Review*,[41] edited by the semi-liberal Ramsay MacDonald).

And at a time like this, Mr. Kautsky, leader of the Second International, comes out with a book on the dictatorship of the proletariat—in other words, on the proletarian revolution—that is a hundred times more disgraceful, outrageous and renegade than Bernstein's notorious *Premises of Socialism*. Nearly twenty years have elapsed since the appearance of that renegade book, and now Kautsky repeats this renegacy in an even grosser form!

Only a very small part of the book deals with the Russian Bolshevik revolution as such. Kautsky repeats every one of the Mensheviks' pearls of wisdom in a way that would make the Russian worker split his sides laughing. Just imagine, for example, what goes by the name of "Marxism": the argument—peppered with quotations from the semi-liberal works by the semi-liberal Maslov—that the rich peasants are

* See present volume, pp. 227-325.—*Ed*.

trying to appropriate the land (novel!), that they find high grain prices profitable, and so on. Then our "Marxist" makes the following contemptuous, and utterly liberal, statement: "The poor peasant is recognised here [that is, by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Republic] to be a permanent and wholesale product of the socialist agrarian reform under the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'." (P. 48 of Kautsky's pamphlet.)

Fine. Here is a socialist, a Marxist, who tries to prove to *us* the *bourgeois* nature of the revolution, and who at the same time scoffs at the organisation of the poor peasants, quite in the spirit of Maslov, Potresov *and the Cadets*.

> "The expropriation of the rich peasants only introduces a new element of unrest and civil war into the production process, which urgently needs peace and security for its recovery." (P. 49.)

Incredible, but there we are. These are the very words, not of Savinkov or Milyukov, but of Kautsky!

Kautsky does not surprise us since we in Russia have seen so many cases of "Marxism" being used as a screen by defenders of the kulaks. For the benefit of the European reader, I should perhaps dwell in greater detail on this despicable kowtowing to the bourgeoisie and the liberal fear of civil war. But for the Russian worker and peasant it is enough to point one's finger at Kautsky's renegacy—and pass on.

* * *

Nearly nine-tenths of Kautsky's book is devoted to a general theoretical question of the utmost importance, the question of the relation between the dictatorship of the proletariat and "democracy". And it is here that Kautsky's complete break with Marxism is particularly evident.

Kautsky assures his reader—in a perfectly serious and extremely "learned" tone—that what Marx meant by "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" was not a "*form of governing*" that precludes democracy, but a *state*, namely, "a state of rule". And the rule of the proletariat, as the majority of the population, is possible with the strictest observance of democracy, and, for instance, the Paris Commune, which was in fact a dictatorship of the proletariat, was elected

by universal suffrage. "The fact that Marx thought that in England and America the transition [to communism] might take place peacefully, i.e., in a democratic way, proves" that when he spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat Marx did not have in mind a "form of governing" (or a form of government, *Regierungsform*) (pp. 20-21).

Incredible, but there we are! That is exactly the way Kautsky argues and he angrily accuses the Bolsheviks of violating "democracy" in their Constitution and throughout their policy; and he takes every opportunity to energetically preach "the democratic instead of the dictatorial method".

This is a complete desertion to the opportunists (those like David, Kolb and other pillars of German social-chauvinism, or the English Fabians[42] and Independents,[43] or the French and Italian reformists), who have declared more frankly and honestly that they do not accept Marx's doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the ground that it runs counter to democracy.

It is a complete reversion to the views of the pre-Marxist German socialists, who used to claim they wanted a "free people's state", to the views of the petty-bourgeois democrats, who did not understand that *every* state is a machine for the suppression of one class by another.

It is a complete renunciation of the proletarian revolution, which is replaced by the liberal theory of "winning a majority" and "utilising democracy"! Kautsky the renegade has completely forgotten, distorted and thrown overboard everything Marx and Engels taught for forty years, from 1852 to 1891, demonstrating the need for the proletariat to "smash" the bourgeois state machine.

To analyse Kautsky's theoretical mistakes in detail would mean repeating what I have said in *The State and Revolution*.* There is no need for that. I shall only say briefly:

Kautsky has renounced Marxism by forgetting that *every* state is a machine for the suppression of one class by another, and that the most *democratic* bourgeois republic is a machine for the oppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletarian state, which is a machine for the suppression *of the bourgeoisie by*

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* See present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 385-497.—*Ed.*

the proletariat, is not a "form of governing", but a *state of a different type*. Suppression is necessary because the bourgeoisie will always furiously resist being expropriated.

(The argument that Marx in the seventies allowed for the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism in England and America[44] is completely fallacious, or, to put it bluntly, dishonest in that it is juggling with quotations and references. Firstly, Marx regarded it as an exception even then. Secondly, in those days monopoly capitalism, i.e., imperialism, did not exist. Thirdly, in England and America there was no militarist clique then—*as there is now*—serving as the chief apparatus of the bourgeois state machine.)

You cannot have liberty, equality and so on where there is suppression. That is why Engels said: "So long as the proletariat still needs the stale, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist."[45]

Bourgeois democracy, which is invaluable in educating the proletariat and training it for the struggle, is always narrow, hypocritical, spurious and false; it always remains democracy for the rich and a swindle for the poor.

Proletarian democracy suppresses the exploiters, the bourgeoisie—and is therefore not hypocritical, *does not promise them* freedom and democracy—and gives the working people *genuine democracy*. Only Soviet Russia has given the proletariat and the whole vast labouring majority of Russia a *freedom and democracy* unprecedented, impossible and inconceivable in any bourgeois democratic republic, by, for example, taking the palaces and mansions away from the bourgeoisie (without which freedom of assembly is sheer hypocrisy), by taking the print-shops and stocks of paper away from the capitalists (without which freedom of the press for the nation's labouring majority is a lie), and by replacing bourgeois parliamentarism by the democratic organisation of the *Soviets*, *which are a thousand times* nearer to the people and more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois parliament. *And so on*.

Kautsky has thrown overboard ... the "class struggle" as applied to democracy! Kautsky has become a downright renegade and a lackey of the bourgeoisie.

* *
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I must mention, in passing, a few gems of his renegacy.

Kautsky has to admit that the Soviet form of organisation is of world-wide, and not only of Russian significance, that it is one of the "most important phenomena of our times", and that it promises to acquire "decisive significance" in the future great "battles between capital and labour". But, imitating the wisdom of the Mensheviks, who have happily sided with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, Kautsky "deduces" that the Soviets are all right as "battle organisations", but not as "state organisations".

Marvellous! Form up in Soviets, you proletarians and poor peasants! But, for God's sake, don't you dare win! Don't even think of winning! The moment you will and vanquish the bourgeoisie, that will be the end of you; for you must not be "state" organisations in a proletarian state. In fact, as soon as you have won you must break up!

What a marvellous Marxist this man Kautsky is! What an inimitable "theoretician" of renegacy!

Gem No. 2. Civil war is the "mortal enemy" of "social revolution", for, as we have already heard, the latter "needs peace [for the rich?] and security" (for the capitalists?).

Workers of Europe, don't think of revolution until you have found a bourgeoisie who *will not hire* Savinkov and Dan, Dutov and Krasnov, Czechs and kulaks to wage civil war on you!

Marx wrote in 1870 that the chief hope lay in the practice in arms that the war had given the French workers.[46] What Kautsky the "Marxist" expects of four years of war is not the use of arms by the workers against the bourgeoisie (Heaven forbid, that wouldn't really be "democratic"!), but ... the conclusion of a nice little peace by the nice little capitalists!

Gem No. 3. Civil war has another unpleasant side to it: whereas "democracy" provides for the "protection of the minority" (as—we might note in parenthesis—those in France who stood up for Dreyfus, and people like Liebknecht, Maclean or Debs in more recent times, have learned so well from their own experience), civil war (mark that!) "threatens the vanquished with complete annihilation".

Well, isn't this man Kautsky a real revolutionary? He is heart and soul for revolution ... provided there is no serious struggle threatening annihilation! He has completely "overcome" the old errors of old Engels, who so enthusiastically lauded the educational value of violent revolutions.[47] Like the "serious" historian he is, he has completely renounced the delusions of those who said that civil war steels the exploited and teaches them to build a new society without exploiters.

Gem No. 4. Viewed historically, was the dictatorship of the workers and petty bourgeoisie in the 1789 Revolution great and beneficial? Certainly not. For along came Napoleon. "The dictatorship of the lower sections of the population paves the way for the dictatorship of the sword" (p. 26). Like all liberals, to whose camp lie has deserted, our "serious" historian is firmly convinced that in countries which have not known the "dictatorship of the lower sections"—Germany, for example—there has never been a dictatorship of the sword. Germany has never been distinguished from France by a grosser and viler dictatorship of the sword—that is all slander thought up by Marx and Engels, who brazenly lied when they said that there have so far been a greater love of freedom and a greater pride of the oppressed among the "people" in France than in England or Germany, and that it was precisely her revolutions that France has to thank for this.

...But enough! One would have to write a whole pamphlet to enumerate all the gems of renegacy of that despicable renegade Kautsky.

* * *

I must say a word or two about Mr. Kautsky's "internationalism". He inadvertently cast light upon it himself by his most sympathetic way of portraying the internationalism of the Mensheviks, who, dear Mr. Kautsky assures us, were also Zimmerwaldists[48] and, if you please, are "brothers" of the Bolsheviks!

Here is his lovely little picture of the "Zimmerwaldism" of the Mensheviks:

"The Mensheviks wanted universal peace. They wanted all those in the war to accept the slogan: no annexations

or indemnities. Until this would have been achieved, the Russian army, in their opinion, should have maintained itself in a stale of fighting readiness But the wretched Bolsheviks "disorganised" the army and concluded the wretched Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.... And Kautsky says as clear as clear can he that the Constituent Assembly should have been preserved, and the Bolsheviks should not have taken power.

So internationalism means *supporting one's "own"* imperialist government, as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries supported Kerensky, it means concealing its secret treaties, hoodwinking the people with fancy phrases, such as that we "demand" the savage beasts be tame, we "demand" the imperialist governments "accept the slogan of no annexations or indemnities".

That, in Kautsky's opinion, is internationalism.

In our opinion it is sheer renegacy.

Internationalism means breaking with *one's own* social-chauvinists (i.e., defence advocates) and with *one's own* imperialist government; it means waging a revolutionary struggle against that government and overthrowing it, and being ready to make the greatest national sacrifices (even down to a Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty), if it should benefit the development of the *world* workers' revolution.

We all know very well that Kautsky and his friends (Ströbel, Bernstein, and the rest) were greatly "put out" by the Brest-Litovsk Peace: they would have liked us to have made a "gesture" ... that would at once have turned over power in Russia to the bourgeoisie! These dim-witted but all too nice and kind German petty bourgeois were not interested in the proletarian Soviet Republic—the first country in the world to overthrow its imperialism by revolutionary means—maintaining itself until the revolution took place in Europe, fanning the flames of the conflagration in other countries (the petty bourgeoisie *dread* a conflagration in Europe, they *dread* civil war, which would disturb "peace and security"). No, what interested them was to maintain in *all* countries the *petty-bourgeois* nationalism which calls itself "internationalism" because of its "moderation and propriety". If only the Russian Republic had remained bourgeois and ... had waited ... then everybody on earth would have

been a good, moderate, non-predatory, petty-bourgeois nationalist—and that, in fact, would have been internationalism!

That is the line of thought of the Kautskyites in Germany, the Longuetists in France, the Independents (I.L.P.) in England, Turati and his "comrades" in renegacy in Italy, and the rest of the crowd.

By now only an utter idiot can fail to see that we were not only right in overthrowing our bourgeoisie (and their lackeys, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), but also in concluding the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty *after* our open appeal for universal peace, backed by the publication and annulment of the secret treaties, had been rejected by the bourgeoisie of the Entente. In the first place, if we had not concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, we would at once have surrendered power to the Russian bourgeoisie and thus have done untold damage to the world socialist revolution. In the second place, at the cost of *national* sacrifices, we preserved such an *international* revolutionary influence that today we have Bulgaria directly imitating us, Austria and Germany in a state of ferment, *both* imperialist systems weakened, while we have grown stronger and *begun* to create a real proletarian army.

From the tactics of Kautsky the renegade it follows that the German workers should now defend their homeland together with the bourgeoisie and dread a German revolution most of all, for the British might impose a new edition of the Brest-Litovsk Peace on it. There's renegacy for you. There's petty-bourgeois nationalism.

We, however, say that while the loss of the Ukraine was a grave national sacrifice, it helped to steel and strengthen the workers and poor peasants of the Ukraine as revolutionary fighters for the world workers' revolution. The Ukraine's suffering was the world revolution's gain, for the German troops were corrupted, German imperialism was weakened, and the German, Ukrainian and Russian revolutionary workers were *drawn closer together*.

It would of course he "nicer" if we could overthrow both Wilhelm and Wilson simply by war. But that is utter nonsense. We cannot overthrow them by a war from without. But we can speed up their *internal* disintegration. We have

achieved that on an *immense* scale by the Soviet, proletarian revolution.

The German workers would do it even more successfully if they began a revolution *disregarding* national sacrifices (that alone is internationalism), if they said (and backed their word by *actions*) that they prize the interests of the world workers' revolution *higher* than the integrity, security and peace of any national state, *and of their own in particular*.

* *
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Europe's greatest misfortune and danger is that it has no revolutionary party. It has parties of traitors like the Scheidemanns, Renaudels, Hendersons, Webbs and Co., and of servile souls like Kautsky. But it has no revolutionary party.

Of course, a mighty, popular revolutionary movement may rectify this deficiency, but it is nevertheless a serious misfortune and a grave danger.

That is why we must do our utmost to expose renegades like Kautsky, thereby supporting the revolutionary groups of genuine internationalist workers, who are to be found in all countries. The proletariat will very soon turn away from the traitors and renegades and follow these groups, drawing and training leaders from their midst. No wonder the bourgeoisie of all countries are howling about "world Bolshevism".

World Bolshevism will conquer the world bourgeoisie.

9.10.18

Pravda No. 219, October 11, 1918
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the manuscript

REPORT AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET, FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS OCTOBER 22, 1918[49]

(*Stormy, prolonged applause and shouts of* "*hurrah*".) Comrades, I think our present situation for all its contradictions, might be expressed by saying, firstly, that never before have we been so near the world workers' revolution, and, secondly, that never have we been in such a perilous position. It is these two propositions, especially the second, that I want to go into today. I think the people at large scarcely realise the full danger bearing down on us, and as we can only act with popular support, the chief task of the representatives of the Soviet government is to bring home to the people the full truth of the present situation, however difficult this may sometimes be. As far as our being near the world socialist revolution is concerned, I shall be brief since it has been spoken about time and again. Indeed, one of the chief reproaches levelled at the Soviet government both by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie who have lost faith in socialism, as well as by many so-called socialists who are used to times of peace and never did believe in socialism, is that we are taking a rash step in carrying through the socialist revolution in Russia, for the revolution in the West is not yet ripe.

Comrades, this is the fifth year of the war and the universal collapse of imperialism is as plain as can be; everyone can now see revolution must come in every country in the war. And we, who were not given more than a few days or weeks

at the beginning, have done more in this year of revolution than any proletarian party in the world has ever done. Our revolution has become a world-wide phenomenon. Even the entire bourgeoisie say that Bolshevism is a world-wide phenomenon. This admission goes to show that our revolution has spread from the East to the West and is falling on more and more receptive soil. You know that revolution has flared up in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian soldiers have begun to form Soviets. And now news has come that Soviets are being set up in Serbia too. Even though the Anglo-French Entente is promising the peoples thousands of blessings if they rebel and break with Germany, even though the capitalists of America, Britain and France, the richest and most powerful in the world, are so lavish with their promises, it is becoming obvious that the bourgeoisie of the various small countries into which Austria is now disintegrating cannot hold out under any circumstances, that their rule and power in these countries will be short-lived and transitory, for the workers' revolution is knocking on the door everywhere.

The bourgeoisie of individual countries know that the only way they can hold on to power in their states is with the help of foreign bayonets. And we see that revolution has begun not only in Austria, but even in Germany, both of whose positions seemed so stable only a little while ago. News has come that the German press is already talking about the Kaiser's abdication and that the press of the Independent Social-Democratic Party[50] has already received permission from the Chancellor to talk about a German republic. That certainly is something. We know demoralisation is increasing among the troops and that there are direct appeals for an army mutiny. We know that revolutionary military committees have been set up in Eastern Germany and that they are issuing revolutionary publications which are stirring up the soldiers. There is therefore every justification to say that revolution is growing in leaps and bounds. And we are not the only ones to say so; it is being said by all Germans in the war party and among the bourgeoisie who feel that the ministers are tottering, that the people do not trust them, and that they and their government will not hold on much longer. That is what everybody who knows anything about the state of affairs is saying, which just goes to show how inevitable a

popular revolution, and perhaps a proletarian revolution, has become in Germany.

We know very well what an immense workers' movement has sprung up in other countries as well. We saw how Gompers went to Italy and, with Entente money and the help of all the Italian bourgeoisie and social-patriots, toured every town in Italy calling upon the Italian workers to carry on the imperialist war. We saw how the Italian socialist papers wrote articles about this in which all that was left was Gompers's name, after the censor had deleted everything else; or articles which jeered: "Gompers is banqueting and tongue-wagging." And the bourgeois papers admitted Gompers was hissed everywhere. The bourgeois papers wrote: "The Italian workers are behaving as if they would allow only Lenin and Trotsky to tour Italy." During the war the Italian Socialist Party[51] has made tremendous strides forward, that is, to the left. We know there have been too many patriots among the workers in France; they were told that Paris and French territory were in grave danger. But there, too, the workers' attitude is changing. There were cries of "Hurrah for the Socialist Republic!" at the last congress,[52] when a letter was read about what the Allies, the British and French imperialists, were doing. And yesterday news was received that a meeting had been held in Paris attended by two thousand metalworkers, which hailed the Soviet Republic in Russia. We see that of the three socialist parties in Great Britain,[53] only one, the Independent Socialist Party, is not openly supporting the Bolsheviks, whereas the British Socialist Party and the Socialist Labour Party of Scotland have definitely proclaimed their support for the Bolsheviks. Bolshevism is also beginning to spread in Britain. And the Spanish parties are hailing the Russian Bolsheviks at their congresses[54] although they had formerly sided with British and French imperialism and had had only one or two men on the outbreak of the war with even a remote conception of what internationalists were. Bolshevism has become the world-wide theory and tactics of the international proletariat! (*Applause.*) It has accomplished a thoroughgoing socialist revolution for all the world to see. To be for or against the Bolsheviks is actually the dividing line among socialists. As a result of what Bolshevism has done, a programme for

the creation of a workers' state is the vital question of the day. Workers who had no idea of what was going on in Russia, because they only read the bourgeois papers which were full of lies and slander, began to realise, on seeing the workers' government winning one victory after another over its counter-revolutionaries, that our tactics and the revolutionary form of action of our workers' government was the only way out of this war. Last Wednesday there was a demonstration in Berlin, and the workers expressed their disgust with the Kaiser by trying to march past his palace; then they proceeded to the Russian Embassy to express their solidarity with the actions of the Russian Government.

That is what Europe has come to in this fifth year of war! That is why we say we have never been so near the world revolution, it has never been so obvious that the Russian workers have established their might. It is clear that millions and scores of millions of workers of the world will follow our example. That is why, I repeat, we have never been so near the world revolution, and never have we been in such a perilous position, because this is the first time Bolshevism has been regarded as a world force. It had seemed to be only a result of the fatigue of the Russian soldiers, an outburst of discontent on the part of the war-weary Russian soldiers; it had seemed that as soon as this discontent had passed and peace had been established, even a peace of the most coercive character, all steps towards building a new state and towards socialist reforms would have been crushed. Everyone had been certain of that, but it turned out that as soon as we emerged from the imperialist war, which ended in very harsh peace terms, to take the first steps in building our state, as soon as we were able to give the peasants a real chance of living without landowners, of establishing relations against the landowners, and of convincing themselves in practice that they were building their own lives on the expropriated land, really for the labouring people and not for the kulaks or the new capitalists; as soon as the workers saw they had a chance to build their lives without capitalists and learn that difficult but great business without which they will never escape from exploitation—it became obvious to all, and was shown in practice, that no force, no counter-revolution could overthrow the Soviet government.

It took months before we in Russia arrived at this conviction. It is said that in the countryside it was only in the summer of 1918, only towards autumn, that the peasants came to realise the meaning and significance of our revolution. In the town this was realised some time ago, but it took many a long month for it to reach every district, every remote rural area and village, for the peasant to see from his own experience, not from books or speeches, that the land has to go to those who till it, and not to the kulak, and that the kulak has to be fought, has to be defeated by organisation, that the revolts which swept over the country this summer were supported by the landowners, kulaks and whiteguards; to learn from his own bitter experience, at his own cost, what the rule of the Constituent Assembly meant. And now, the countryside is emerging steeled and tempered, and the mass of poor peasants, who do not exploit the labour of others, have only now learnt from their own experience, not from books, from which the working people will never derive firm convictions, that Soviet government means the government of the exploited working people, and that now every village can proceed to lay the foundations of a new, socialist Russia.

It took many long months for us to be able to say with conviction, basing ourselves on the reports of people with practical experience, that after 1918 in the rest of Russia, too, in every village, however remote, the people know what Soviet government means and uphold it. For the peasants have seen what a menace the capitalists and landowners are. They have also seen the difficulties of the socialist transformation, yet were not deterred; they said: "We shall put our millions of hands to this work; we have learnt a lot in a year, and we shall learn even more." This is what scores of millions in Russia are now saying with full conviction, on the basis of their own experience.

This is just getting through to the West-European bourgeoisie as well. Up to now they had not taken the Bolsheviks seriously; now they begin to realise that the only stable form of state has been set up here, a state which works hand in hand with the working people and can rouse them to real heroic self-sacrifice. And when this workers' state began to infect Europe, it turned out that this was by no means something peculiar to Russia alone, and that four years of

war had caused demoralisation of the armies all over the world. Before, they used to say that owing to her backwardness and inefficiency, only Russia had reached such a stage when her army had fallen to pieces in the fourth year of war, and that this could never happen in civilised, parliamentary countries.

Now, however, everybody can see that after four years of world war, when millions have been slaughtered and crippled for the profit of the capitalists, and when there are tens of thousands of deserters, this extraordinary thing is happening in Austria as well as Russia, and even in Germany, which boasts of her good order. When that happened, the world bourgeoisie realised they had to contend with a more serious enemy, and they began to rally together; and the nearer we approached the world workers' revolution, the more the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie rallied together.

In some countries people are still ignoring revolution, just as in October the coalition ministers ignored the Bolsheviks and said Russia would never fall under Bolshevik rule. In France, for example, they say the Bolsheviks are a gang of traitors who are selling their people to the Germans. The French bourgeoisie are more to be excused for saying that than the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, for it is only to be expected that the bourgeoisie will spend millions on fabricating lies. But when the French bourgeoisie saw Bolshevism developing in France and even non-revolutionary parties backing the Bolsheviks with revolutionary slogans, they saw they were confronted with a more formidable enemy—the collapse of imperialism and the superiority of the workers in the revolutionary struggle.

Everyone knows that the danger to the workers' revolution is particularly great just now owing to the imperialist war, because the workers' revolution develops unevenly in different countries, since the conditions of political life differ. In one country the proletariat is too weak and in another it is stronger. In one country the top section of workers is weak, and in other countries the bourgeoisie are able to split the ranks of the workers for a time as was the case in Britain and France. That is why the workers' revolution develops unevenly, and that is why the bourgeoisie

recognised that their most powerful enemy is the revolutionary proletariat. They are rallying together to ward off the collapse of world imperialism.

Now our situation has changed and events are moving tremendously fast. At first there were two groups of imperialist marauders who tried to annihilate each other, but now they see—especially by the example of German imperialism, which had only recently considered itself the match of Britain and France—that their chief enemy is the revolutionary proletariat. Now, when Germany is being torn apart by the revolutionary movement at home, the British and French imperialists consider themselves masters of the world. They are convinced their chief enemy is the Bolsheviks and the world revolution. The more the revolution develops, the more the bourgeoisie rally together. That is why some of us, and many especially among the people at large, who are now convinced they can defeat our counter-revolutionaries—the Cossacks, officers and Czechs—and think that settles everything, do not realise this is not enough for us now, that there is a new enemy, a far more formidable one: British and French imperialism. So far this enemy has not had very much success in Russia, as, for example, in the case of the Archangel landing. A French writer who published a newspaper called *La victoire*[55] said that victory over the Germans was not enough for France, that she also needed victory over Bolshevism, and that the campaign against Russia was not an attack on Germany, but a campaign against the Bolshevik revolutionary proletariat and against the contagion that is spreading all over the world.

That is why a new danger has appeared, a danger which has not yet fully developed and is not yet fully apparent, a danger which the British and French imperialists are plotting surreptitiously and which we must clearly realise so as to open the people's eyes to it through their leaders. For although it is true the British and French have not achieved any great success in Siberia or in Archangel—in fact they have suffered a number of setbacks—they are now directing their efforts for an attack on Russia from the South, either through the Dardanelles and the Black Sea, or else overland, through Bulgaria and Rumania. As they keep their moves a military secret, we cannot tell how far advanced

the preparations for this campaign are, and which of the two plans, or perhaps even a third, has been selected; there lies the danger, for we cannot know for certain. But we do know absolutely for certain that these preparations are being made, for the newspapers of these countries are not always very cautious, and now and again some journalist openly announces the chief aims, and discards all the false talk about a league of nations.

Among the German ruling circles, we now clearly perceive two tendencies, two plans of salvation—if salvation is still possible. Some say: Let us play for time and keep going until spring, and perhaps we may yet be able to put up military resistance along the fortified line. Others see their chief hope of salvation in Britain and France; they concentrate on reaching an agreement with Britain and France against the Bolsheviks; their attention is centred on this. And while it is true that Wilson now replies to peace overtures with a blunt and contemptuous refusal, this is scarcely enough to induce the party of the German capitalists who are seeking agreement with Britain to renounce their plans. They know that agreements are sometimes reached tacitly, and that they may be rewarded if they are of service to the British and French capitalists against the Bolsheviks. In capitalist society they do pay for services rendered. They think: "Perhaps if we help the British and French capitalists grab something, they will leave a portion of the spoils for us." One good turn deserves another—such are the ethics of the capitalist world. And I think that in laying claim to a certain share of British and French capital, these people know what they are up to and are counting on billions, no less. Some of these gentlemen are past masters at this sort of calculations.

A tacit bargain has most definitely been struck between the German bourgeoisie and that of the Entente powers. The gist of it is that the British and French say to the Germans: "We shall get to the Ukraine, but don't withdraw your troops until our occupational forces arrive, otherwise the workers will take power and the Soviet government will triumph there too." That is the way they reason, for they realise that the bourgeoisie of all the occupied countries—Finland, the Ukraine, Poland—know they cannot hold out for a single day if the German army of occupation withdraws. And

that is why the bourgeoisie of these countries—which yesterday sold themselves to the Germans, went cap in hand to the German imperialists and concluded an alliance with them against their own workers, just as the Ukrainian Mensheviks did and the Socialist-Revolutionaries did in Tiflis—are now ready to sell their country to anybody. Yesterday they sold it to the Germans, and today they are selling it to the British and French. That is the sort of bargaining going on behind the scenes. Seeing that the British and French bourgeoisie are winning, they are all going over to them and preparing to make a deal with the British and French imperialists against us and at our expense.

When they tell their future Anglo-French multimillionaire master they are siding with him, they say: "Your Excellency will defeat the Bolsheviks, you must help us, because the Germans will not save us." This conspiracy by the bourgeoisie of all countries against the revolutionary workers and the Bolsheviks is increasingly taking shape and becoming openly blatant. And it is our direct duty to indicate this danger to the workers and peasants of all countries in the war.

Take the Ukraine as an example. Imagine her position and what the workers and intelligent Communists must do in the present situation. On the one hand they see the indignation against the German imperialists, against the dreadful plunder of the Ukraine, and on the other they see that some of the German troops, the greater part perhaps, have been withdrawn. They may think of giving vent to their pent-up hatred and resentment by attacking the German imperialists at once, regardless of everything. But others say: "We are internationalists, we must look at things from the point of view both of Russia and of Germany; even from Germany's point of view we know that the government there cannot hold out; we are firmly convinced that if the victory of the workers and peasants in the Ukraine is accompanied by the consolidation and success of the government of Russia, then socialist proletarian Ukraine will not only win but will be invincible!" Such intelligent Ukrainian Communists say: We must be very cautious. Tomorrow we may have to exert every effort and stake everything in the struggle against imperialism and the German troops. That may be so for tomorrow, but not for today; and today we know that the troops of the

German imperialists are being demoralised, we know that beside the Ukrainian troops, the East-Prussian and German troops are publishing revolutionary literature.[56] At the same time, our chief task is to carry on propaganda for a revolt in the Ukraine. That is correct from the standpoint of the world revolution because Germany is the main link in this chain, since the German revolution is already ripe; and the success of the world revolution most of all depends on it.

We shall take care that our interference will not harm their revolution. One must understand the changes and growth of every revolution. The revolution proceeds in its own way in every country—we ought to know after seeing and experiencing it—and these ways are so diverse that it may be delayed for a year or two. World revolution is not so smooth as to proceed in the same way everywhere, in all countries. If it were, we should have been victorious long ago. Every country has to go through definite political stages. Everywhere we find the compromisers making the same efforts, the same attempts "to save the people from the bourgeoisie"—in conjunction with the bourgeoisie. Tsereteli and Chernov did it here, and the Scheidemannites are doing it in Germany; in France they are doing it in their own way. And now that the revolution is making its way into Germany, the country where the workers' movement is strongest, and where it is distinguished for its organisation and endurance, where the workers have been patient longest of all—but perhaps have accumulated more revolutionary hatred and are better able to settle scores with their enemies—interference in these events by people who do not know how fast the revolution is growing may hamper those intelligent Communists who say: "My prime purpose is to make this a deliberate process." Now that the German soldier has seen that he is being driven to the slaughter on the pretext that he is going to defend his country, while in fact going to defend the German imperialists, the time is coming when the revolution will break out in Germany with such force and organisation as to solve a hundred international problems. That is why intelligent Ukrainian Communists say: "We must make every sacrifice for the victory of the world revolution, but we should realise that the future depends on us and we must march in step with the German revolution."

Those are the difficulties I wanted to point out, using the reasoning of the Ukrainian Communists as an example. These difficulties also affect Soviet Russia's position. We can now say that the workers of the world have awoken and are making immense strides; but this makes our position all the more difficult, for our "ally" of yesterday is attacking us as his chief enemy. He is now out to fight international Bolshevism, not hostile armies. Now that Krasnov's troops are mustering on the Southern Front (and we know they have received ammunition from the Germans), now that we have exposed imperialism in the eyes of the world, the people who blamed us for the Brest-Litovsk Peace and sent Krasnov to get ammunition from the Germans with which to bombard the Russian workers and peasants, are currently getting ammunition from the British and French imperialists, auctioning off Russia to the highest millionaire bidder. That is why our general conviction that a change has set in is now not enough. We have our old enemies, and behind them new forces are now rallying to their aid. We know and see all that. Six months ago, in February or March, we had no army. The army could not fight. The army which had been through four years of imperialist war, without knowing what it was fighting for, but vaguely feeling that it was fighting in the interests of others, that army took to its heels, and no force on earth could stop it.

No revolution is worth anything unless it can defend itself; but a revolution does not learn to defend itself at once. The revolution has awakened millions to a new life. In February and March these millions did not know why they were being sent to continue the slaughter to which the tsars and the Kerenskys had driven them, and whose aim was exposed by the Bolshevik Government only in December. All they knew was that it was not their war, and nearly six months were required before a turn in the tide. This turn has now come; it is changing the force of the revolution. In February and March, the people, exhausted and tormented by four years of war, abandoned everything and said there must be peace and the war terminated. They were in no state to ask what the war was about. If these people have now created a new discipline in the Red Army, not the discipline of the rod and of the landowner but the discipline of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies; if they are now

ready to make the greatest sacrifices; if a new unity has sprung up among them, it is because for the first time a new discipline, a socialist discipline, has been born in the minds and experience of tens of millions, a Red Army has been born. It was born only when these tens of millions of people saw from their own experience that they had overthrown the landowners and capitalists, that a new life was being built, that they had begun to build it themselves, and that they would get it built if they were not prevented by foreign invasion.

When the peasants saw who their chief enemy was and began the struggle against the village kulaks, when the workers overthrew the manufacturers and began to organise the factories in accordance with a proletarian principle of national economy, they saw all the difficulty this work of reorganisation entailed, but they proved equal to the task. It took months to get things going. These months have passed, and the turn has come. Gone is the time when we were impotent. We have begun to advance with giant strides. Gone is the time when we had no army and no discipline; a new discipline has been created, and new people are joining the army and laying down their lives by the thousand.

That means that the new discipline, the comradely alliance, has re-educated us in the struggle at the front and in the struggle in the countryside against the kulak. This turning-point has been a difficult one, but now we feel that things are beginning to move, and that we are passing from unorganised, decree-made socialism to true socialism. The chief task facing us is to fight imperialism, and this fight we must win. We make no secret of all the difficulty and danger this fight entails. We know that the tide of feeling has changed in the Red Army; it has begun to win victories, it is promoting from its ranks thousands of officers who have been through training courses in the new proletarian military colleges and thousands of other officers who have been through no other training than the hard training of war. Thus, without the least exaggeration, and fully recognising the danger, we can now say that we have an army; and this army has created discipline and has achieved fighting efficiency. Our Southern Front is not just a front—it is a front against British and French imperialism, against the

most powerful foe in the world. But we are not afraid, for we know the foe will be unable to cope with its own enemy at home.

Three months ago, people used to laugh when we said there might be a revolution in Germany. They said that only half-crazy Bolsheviks could believe in a German revolution. Not only the entire bourgeoisie, but the Mensheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries as well, called the Bolsheviks traitors to patriotism and said that revolution in Germany was impossible. But we knew that our help was needed there, and that to render that help we had to sacrifice everything and consent even to the most onerous terms of peace. That was how these people were talking and trying to prove their point to us only a few months ago, but in these few months Germany, from a mighty empire, has become a rotten hulk. The force which has corroded it is operating in America and England as well; today it is weak, but with every step the British and French try to take in Russia, with every step they try to take to occupy the Ukraine, as the Germans did, this force will loom larger and larger and become even more formidable than the Spanish 'flu.

That, comrades, is why I repeat that the chief task of every class-conscious worker now is to reveal the whole truth, not to conceal anything from the people, who may not fully realise the acuteness of the situation. The workers are mature enough to be told the truth. We have to defeat world imperialism as well as the whiteguards. We have to defeat, and we shall defeat, not only that enemy, but an enemy even more formidable. And for this we need the Red Army more than anything else. Every organisation in Soviet Russia must always give its prime attention to the army. Today, when everything is clear, the war and the strengthening of the army must take first place. We are absolutely confident we shall cope with the counter-revolution. We know we have the forces, but we also know that British and French imperialism is stronger than we are, and we want the working people to realise this quite clearly. We say that the army must be ten times stronger, and more; we must go on strengthening discipline, and every class-conscious, enlightened, organised and genuine leader must show ten times more attention and concern for this. Then this growth of the world revolution will

not be confined to the defeated countries. Revolution is now beginning in the victor countries as well. Our forces must grow daily, and this constant growth is, as it was, our chief and complete guarantee that world socialism will triumph! (*Comrade Lenin's speech is repeatedly interrupted by loud applause and ends in ovation. All rise and greet the leader of the world revolution.*)

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RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET, FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS OCTOBER 22, 1918

The proletarian and peasant revolutionary movement against the imperialist war has recently had tremendous successes in all countries, especially in the Balkans, Austria and Germany. These successes, however, have particularly embittered the international bourgeoisie, now headed by the Anglo-American and French bourgeoisie, and have forced them to make hasty efforts to organise themselves as a counter-revolutionary force for crushing the revolution and, above all, for crushing Soviet power in Russia, which is the chief hotbed of revolution at present.

The German bourgeoisie and the German Government, defeated in the war and threatened by a mighty revolutionary movement from within, are threshing about in their search for salvation. One trend in the ruling circles of Germany still hopes by delays to gain time before the winter and to prepare for the country's military defence on a new line of fortifications. Another trend is feverishly seeking agreement with the Anglo-French bourgeoisie against the revolutionary proletariat and the Bolsheviks. Since this trend is running up against the flat refusal of the victors, the Anglo-French imperialists, to strike a bargain, it is trying to frighten them with the Bolshevik danger and bribe them by offering its services against the Bolsheviks, against the proletarian revolution.

The bourgeoisie of the countries subordinated to Germany or occupied by her are still more eagerly seeking agreement

with the Entente, especially in those cases—as, for example, in Finland, the Ukraine, etc.—where they are aware that it is completely impossible for them to maintain power over the exploited working people without the aid of foreign bayonets.

Owing to these circumstances, Soviet power finds itself in the following peculiar situation: on the one hand, we have never been so close to an international proletarian revolution as we are now; on the other hand, we have never been in such a perilous position as we are now. There are no longer two approximately equal groups of imperialist plunderers, devouring and weakening each other. There remains a single group of victors, the Anglo-French imperialists, which intends to divide the whole world among the capitalists. It intends to overthrow Soviet power in Russia at all costs and replace it by bourgeois power. It is preparing now to attack Russia from the South, through the Dardanelles and the Black Sea, for example, or through Bulgaria and Rumania. Moreover, at least a part of the Anglo-French imperialists evidently hope that the German Government, by a direct or tacit agreement with them, will withdraw its troops from the Ukraine only as the latter becomes occupied by Anglo-French troops, so as not to allow the otherwise inevitable victory of the Ukrainian workers and peasants and their establishment of a Ukrainian workers' and peasants' government.

Behind the back of the Krasnov and whiteguard counter-revolutionaries, preparations are being made for an attack against us by a much more dangerous force, the force of the international counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, with the Anglo-American and French bourgeoisie in first place. This is a fact that is not realised everywhere and the awareness of which has not penetrated deep down among the broad mass of the workers and peasants. We must therefore tirelessly imbue this awareness in the people. The most assiduous attention must be devoted to strengthening the Southern Front and establishing and arming an incomparably mightier Red Army than we have now. Every workers' organisation, every union of poor peasants, every Soviet institution must again and again give priority to the question of strengthening the army, and repeatedly re-examine whether we have done

enough, and what new measures we could and should undertake.

A marked change has taken place in the mood of our workers and peasants. The people have overcome their extreme war-weariness. An army is being created and has been created. A new, communist discipline, a class-conscious discipline of the working people, has developed. And this fact gives us every reason to confidently expect that we can and will defend our socialist homeland and secure the victory of the international proletarian revolution.

Izvestia No. 231
October 23, 1918

Published according to
the manuscript

SPEECH AT A RALLY IN HONOUR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 3, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Storm of applause.*) Events have shown that the people's sufferings have not been in vain.

We are not only fighting Russian capitalism. We are fighting the capitalism of all countries, world capitalism—we are fighting for the freedom of all workers.

Hard as it was for us to cope with famine and our enemies, we now see that we have millions of allies.

They are the workers of Austria, Hungary and Germany. While we are gathered here, Friedrich Adler is very likely on his way to Vienna after his release from prison. The first day of the Austrian workers' revolution is probably being celebrated on the squares of Vienna.

The time is near when the first day of the world revolution will be celebrated everywhere.

Our labour and sufferings have not been in vain! The world revolution will triumph!

Long live the world proletarian revolution! (*Storm of applause.*)

Pravda No. 240
November 5, 1918

Published according to the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT A CEREMONIAL MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL AND MOSCOW TRADE UNION COUNCILS NOVEMBER 6, 1918[57]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Those present rise and greet Comrade Lenin with stormy, prolonged applause.*) People today are gathering at hundreds of meetings to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution. To those who have been in the workers' movement for some time, who were connected with the workers in the old days, and who had close contacts with the factories, it is clear that this past year has been one of genuine proletarian dictatorship. This concept used to be mysterious book Latin, a mouthful of incomprehensible words. Intellectuals sought an explanation of the concept in learned works, which only gave them a hazy notion of what the proletarian dictatorship was all about. The chief thing that stands to our credit during this past year is that we have translated these words from abstruse Latin into plain Russian. During this past year the working class has not been engaged in idle philosophising, but in the practical work of creating and exercising a proletarian dictatorship, despite the excited mental state of the intellectuals.

Capitalism still rules the roost in the West. But now the day of great upheavals is dawning there too. Today the West-European workers, too, are approaching the difficult period of transition from capitalism to socialism. They, like ourselves, will have to smash the entire old apparatus and build a new one.

We have not been able to utilise the whole store of experience, knowledge and technical training the bourgeois intel-

lectuals had. The bourgeoisie sneered at the Bolsheviks and said the Soviet government would scarcely hold out for a fortnight; so they not only shirked co-operation, but wherever they could and with every means in their power put up resistance to the new movement, the new construction which was destroying the old order.

The resistance of the bourgeoisie has by no means ceased. It is growing more vindictive every day; the nearer the end of the old capitalist world approaches, the faster it grows.

Due to Bolshevism's growing strength and the world-wide dimensions it is assuming, the international situation today could well cause an alliance of imperialists of all shades to attack the Soviet Republic; then bourgeois resistance would be international rather than national.

Germany, as you know, has expelled our Ambassador from Berlin on the pretext that our mission in Germany was conducting revolutionary propaganda. As if the German Government did not know before that our Embassy was a carrier of the revolutionary contagion. If Germany said nothing about it before, it was because she was still strong and not afraid of us. But now, after her military collapse, she has begun to dread us. The German generals and capitalists are turning to the Allies and saying: "You may have beaten us, but don't carry your experiments on us too far, for we are both menaced by world Bolshevism; and we might be useful in the fight against it."

It is quite possible that the Allied imperialists may unite with the German imperialists for a joint campaign against Russia, provided, of course, the German imperialists still survive. That is why the danger that has surrounded us all through the past year is now looming larger than ever. But now we are not alone. We now have friends in the people who have already rebelled and those who are about to rebel and who are making it plain enough to their governments that they refuse to go on fighting for rapacious aims. Although a new stretch of very dangerous periods lies ahead, we shall continue our socialist construction. Past experience will help us avoid mistakes and lend us fresh strength in our further work.

The part played by the trade unions in the building of a new apparatus has been tremendous. The working class has

shown that it is capable of organising industry without intellectuals or capitalists. Much has been done, but much still remains to be done. Comrades, carry on boldly along the path you have been following, and get more and more people to join in the work! Give all workers who are connected with the people and sincerely want the new system to take firm root, even though they may be illiterate, inexperienced and untrained—give them all, whether Party members or not, a chance to work and learn in the new proletarian state, to govern and create wealth.

The workers of the world will rise up, overthrow capitalism everywhere and consummate our work, which will lead to the complete victory of socialism! (*Stormy applause.*)

Izvestia No. 244
November 9, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

EXTRAORDINARY SIXTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', PEASANTS', COSSACKS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES[58]

NOVEMBER 6-9, 1918

EXTRAORDINARY SIXTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', PEASANTS', COSSACKS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES

NOVEMBER 6-9, 1918

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SPEECH ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 6

(*Comrade Lenin's appearance in the hall is greeted with prolonged ovation.*) Comrades, we are celebrating the anniversary of our revolution at a time when events of the utmost importance are taking place in the international working-class movement. It has become obvious even to the most sceptical and doubting elements of the working class and working people in general that the world war will end neither by agreements nor by coercion on the part of the old government and the old ruling bourgeois class, that this war is leading the whole world as well as Russia to a world proletarian revolution and to the workers' triumph over capital. Capital drenched the earth in blood, and, after the violence and outrages of German imperialism, Anglo-French imperialism, supported by Austria and Germany, is pursuing the same policy.

Today, when celebrating the anniversary of the revolution, it is fitting that we cast a glance back along the path traversed by the revolution. We began our revolution in unusually difficult conditions, such as no other workers' revolution in the world will ever have to face. It is therefore particularly important that we endeavour to review the path we have covered as a whole, to take stock of our achievements during this period, and see to what extent we have prepared ourselves during the past year for our chief, our real, our decisive and fundamental task. We must be one of the detachments, one of the units of the world proletarian and socialist army. We have always realised that it

was not on account of any merit of the Russian proletariat, or because it was in advance of the others, that we happened to begin the revolution, which grew out of world-wide struggle. On the contrary, it was only because of the peculiar weakness and backwardness of capitalism, and the peculiar pressure of military strategic circumstances, that we happened in the course of events to move ahead of the other detachments, while not waiting until they had caught us up and rebelled. We are now making this review so as to take stock of our preparations for the battles that will face us in the coming revolution.

And so, comrades, when we ask ourselves what big changes we have made over the past year, we call say the following: from workers' control, the working class's first steps, and from disposing of all the country's resources, we are now on the threshold of creating a workers' administration of industry; from the general peasants' struggle for land, the peasants' struggle against the landowners, a struggle that had a national, bourgeois-democratic character, we have now reached a stage where the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements in the countryside have set themselves apart: those who labour and are exploited have set themselves apart from the others and have begun to build a new life; the most oppressed country folk are fighting the bourgeoisie, including their own rural kulak bourgeoisie, to the bitter end.

Furthermore, from the first steps of Soviet organisation we have now reached a stage where, as Comrade Sverdlov justly remarked in opening this Congress, there is no place in Russia, however remote, where Soviet authority has not asserted itself and become an integral part of the Soviet Constitution, which is based on long experience gained in the struggle of the working and oppressed people.

We now have a powerful Red Army instead of being utterly defenceless after the last four years' war, which evoked hatred and aversion among the mass of the exploited and left them terribly weak and exhausted, and which condemned the revolution to a most difficult and drastic period when we were defenceless against the blows of German and Austrian imperialism. Finally, and most important of all, we have come from being isolated internationally, from which

we suffered both in October and at the beginning of the year, to a position where our only, but firm allies, the working and oppressed people of the world, have at last rebelled. We have reached a stage where the leaders of the West-European proletariat, like Liebknecht and Adler, leaders who spent many months in prison for their bold and heroic attempts to gather opposition to the imperialist war, have been set free under the pressure of the rapidly developing workers' revolutions in Vienna and Berlin. Instead of being isolated, we are now in a position where we are marching side by side, shoulder to shoulder with our international allies. Those are the chief achievements of the past year. I want to say a few words about the road we have covered, about this transitional stage.

At first our slogan was workers' control. We said that despite all the promises of the Kerensky government, the capitalists were continuing to sabotage production and increase dislocation. We can now see that this would have ended in complete collapse. So the first fundamental step that every socialist, workers' government has to take is workers' control. We did not decree socialism immediately throughout industry, because socialism can only take shape and be consolidated when the working class has learnt how to run the economy and when the authority of the working people has been firmly established. Socialism is mere wishful thinking without that. That is why we introduced workers' control, appreciating that it was a contradictory and incomplete measure, but an essential one so that the workers themselves might tackle the momentous tasks of building up industry in a vast country without and opposed to exploiters.

Everyone who took a direct, or even indirect, part in this work, everyone who lived through all the oppression and brutality of the old capitalist regime, learned a great deal. We know that little has been accomplished. We know that in this extremely backward and impoverished country where innumerable obstacles and barriers were put in the workers' way, it will take them a long time to learn to run industry. But we consider it most important and valuable that the workers have themselves tackled the job, and that we have passed from workers' control, which in all the main branches

of industry was bound to be chaotic, disorganised, primitive and incomplete, to workers' industrial administration on a national scale.

The trade unions' position has altered. Their main function now is to send their representatives to all management boards and central bodies, to all the new organisations which have taken over a ruined and deliberately sabotaged industry from capitalism. They have coped with industry without the assistance of those intellectuals who from the very outset deliberately used their knowledge and education—the result of mankind's store of knowledge—to frustrate the cause of socialism, rather than assist the people in building up a socially-owned economy without exploiters. These men wanted to use their knowledge to put a spoke in the wheel, to hamper the workers who were least trained for tackling the job of administration.

We can now say that the main hindrance has been removed. It was extremely difficult, but the sabotage of all people gravitating towards the bourgeoisie has been checked. The workers have succeeded in taking this basic step, in laying the foundations of socialism, despite tremendous handicaps. We are not exaggerating and are not afraid to tell the truth. It is true that in terms of our ultimate goal, little has been accomplished. But a great deal, a very great deal, has been done to strengthen the foundations. When speaking of socialism, we cannot say that great sections of workers have laid the foundations in a politically-conscious way in the sense that they have taken to reading books and pamphlets. By political consciousness we mean that they have tackled this formidable task with their own hands and by their own efforts. And they have committed thousands of blunders from each of which they have themselves suffered. But every blunder trained and steeled them in organising industrial administration, which has now been established and put upon a firm foundation. They saw their work through. From now on the work will be different, for now all workers, not just the leaders and advanced workers, but great sections of workers, know that they themselves, with their own hands, are building socialism and have already laid its foundations, and no force in the country can prevent them from seeing the job through.

We may have had great difficulties in industry, where we had to cover a road which to many seemed long, but which was actually short and led from workers' control to workers' administration, yet far greater preparatory work had to be done in the more backward countryside. Anyone who has studied rural life and come into contact with the peasants would say that it was only in the summer and autumn of 1918 that the urban October Revolution became a real rural October Revolution. And the Petrograd workers and the Petrograd garrison soldiers fully realised when they took power that great difficulties would crop up in rural organisational work, and our progress there would have to he more gradual and that it would be the greatest folly to try to introduce socialised farming by decree, for only an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might support us, while the vast majority had no such object in view. We therefore confined ourselves to what was absolutely essential in the interests of promoting the revolution—in no case to endeavour to outrun the people's development, but to wait until a movement forward occurred as a result of their own experience and their own struggle. In October we confined ourselves to sweeping away at one blow the age-old enemy of the peasants, the feudal landowner, the big landed proprietor. This was a struggle in which all the peasants joined. At this stage the peasants were not yet divided into proletarians, semi-proletarians, poor peasants and bourgeoisie. We socialists knew there would be no socialism without such a struggle, but we also realised that knowing it was not enough—it had to be brought home to the millions, and through their own experience, not through propaganda. And for that reason, since the peasants as a whole could only conceive of the revolution on the basis of equal land tenure, we openly declared in our decree of October 26, 1917, that we would take the Peasant Mandate on the Land as our starting-point.*

We said frankly that it did not accord with our views, that it was not communism, but we were not imposing on the peasants something that was merely in accord with our programme and not with their views. We said we were marching alongside them, as with fellow-workers, fully confident

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 258-60.—*Ed.*

that the development of the revolution would lead them to the conclusions we ourselves had drawn. The result of this policy is the peasant movement. The agrarian reform began with the socialisation of the land which we voted for and carried out, though openly declaring that it did not accord with our views. We knew that the idea of equal land tenure had the support of the vast majority, and we had no desire to force anything upon them. We were prepared to wait until the peasants themselves abandoned the idea and advanced further. So we waited and we have been able to prepare our forces.

The law we then passed was based on general democratic principles, on that which unites the rich kulak peasant with the poor peasant—hatred for the landowner. It was based on the general idea of equality which was undoubtedly a revolutionary idea directed against the old monarchist system. From this law we had to pass to differentiation of the peasants. The land socialisation law was universally accepted; it was unanimously adopted both by us and by those who did not subscribe to Bolshevik policy. We gave the agricultural communes the biggest say in deciding who should own the land. We left the road open for agriculture to develop along socialist lines, knowing perfectly well that at that time, October 1917, it was not yet ready for it. Our preparatory work cleared the way for the gigantic and epoch-making step we have now taken, one that has not been taken by any other country, not even by the most democratic republic. That step was taken this summer by all the peasants, even in the most remote villages of Russia. When food difficulties arose and famine threatened, when the heritage of the past and the aftermath of the accursed four years of war made themselves felt, when counter-revolution and the Civil War had deprived us of our richest grain region, when all this reached a climax and the cities were menaced by famine, the only, the most reliable and firm bulwark of our government, the advanced workers of the towns and industrial regions, went en masse to the countryside. It is slander to say the workers went there to provoke an armed conflict between workers and peasants. Events expose that slander. The workers went to put down the rural exploiters, the kulaks, who were making huge fortunes out of grain

profiteering at a time when people were starving. They went to help the poor peasants, that is, the majority of the rural population. The July crisis, when kulak revolts swept the whole of Russia, clearly showed that their mission had not been in vain, that they had extended the hand of alliance, and that their preparatory work had merged with the efforts of the peasants. The working and exploited country people settled the July crisis by rising up everywhere and coming out in alliance with the urban proletariat. Today Comrade Zinoviev told me over the telephone that 18,000 people are attending the regional congress of Poor Peasants' Committees in Petrograd and that there is remarkable enthusiasm and high spirits.[59]

As events unfolding throughout Russia became more evident, the village poor realised from their own experience when they went into action what the struggle against the kulaks meant, and that to keep the cities supplied with food and to re-establish commodity exchange, without which the countryside cannot live, they must part company with the rural bourgeoisie and the kulaks. They have to organise separately. And we have now taken the first and most momentous step of the socialist revolution in the countryside. We could not have taken that step in October. We gauged the moment when we could approach the people. And we have now reached a point where the socialist revolution in the rural areas has begun, where in every village, even the most remote the peasant knows that his rich neighbour, the kulak, if he is engaged in grain profiteering, sees everything in the light of his old, backwoods mentality.

And so the countryside, the rural poor, uniting with their leaders, the city workers, are only now providing us with a firm and stable foundation for real socialist construction. Socialist construction will only now begin in the countryside. Only now are Soviets and farms being formed which are systematically working towards large-scale socialised farming, towards making full use of knowledge, science and technology, realising that even simple, elementary human culture cannot be based on the old, reactionary, ignorant way of life. The work here is even more difficult than in industry, and even more mistakes are being made by our local committees and Soviets. But they learn from

their mistakes. We are not afraid of mistakes when they are made by ordinary people who take a conscientious attitude to socialist construction, because we rely only on the experience and effort of our own people.

And now the tremendous upheaval that in so short a time has led us to socialism in the countryside shows that this fight has been crowned with success. The Red Army is the most striking proof of that. You know the state we were in during the imperialist world war when conditions in Russia made life unbearable for the common people. We know that at that time we were in an utterly helpless state. We frankly told the working people the whole truth. We exposed the secret imperialist treaties, the fruits of a policy which serves as a massive instrument of deception, and which in America today, the most advanced of the bourgeois imperialist democratic republics, is more than ever deceiving the people and leading them by the nose. When the imperialist character of the war became patent to all, the Russian Soviet Republic was the only country that completely shattered the bourgeoisie's secret foreign policy. We exposed the secret treaties and declared, through Comrade Trotsky, to all countries of the world: We appeal to you to put an end to this war in a democratic way, without annexations and indemnities, and frankly and proudly declare the truth, a bitter truth but the truth nevertheless, that only a revolution against the bourgeois governments can put an end to this war. But we stood alone. So we had to pay the price of that terribly excruciating peace which was forced upon us by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and which drove many of our sympathisers to gloom and despair. That was because we were alone. But we did our duty and showed up the aims of the war for everyone to see! The onslaught of German imperialism was able to overwhelm us because it took some time before our workers and peasants could organise properly. We had no army then; all we had was the old, disorganised, imperialist army which had been driven to fight in the war for aims which the soldiers did not support and with which they did not sympathise. So we had to go through a very painful period. It was a time when the people needed a respite from the terrible imperialist war, and had to realise that a new war was beginning. We are entitled to regard the war we shall

wage in defence of our socialist revolution as our war. That is what millions and tens of millions of people had to learn to appreciate from their own experience. It took months. It took a long and hard battle for this realisation to get through. By this summer, however, everyone saw that it had got through at last, and that the breakthrough had come. Everyone realised that to have the army fight for the Soviet Republic, the army that comes from the people, that is sacrificing itself, and that after four years of bloody slaughter is again prepared to go to war, our country had to replace the weariness and despair of the people going to war by a clear realisation that they go to their death for their own cause: for the workers' and peasants' Soviets and the socialist republic. That has been achieved.

The victories we gained over the Czechs in the summer, and the news of big victories now coming in go to show that a turning-point has come, and that the hardest task—organising the people in a politically-conscious, socialist way after four years of terrible war—has been achieved. That political consciousness has penetrated a long way among the people. Tens of millions of people have come to realise they are tackling a difficult job. And that gives us assurance that we shall not despair, even though the forces of world imperialism, stronger than us today, are being mustered against us, even though we are surrounded by the soldiers of the imperialists, who realise that the Soviet government is a danger, and are eager to strangle it, and even though we truthfully say they are stronger than us.

We say we are growing, the Soviet Republic is growing. The cause of the proletarian revolution is growing faster than the imperialist forces are closing in upon us. We are full of hope and assurance that we are fighting in the interests of the world socialist revolution as well as the Russian socialist revolution. Our hopes of victory are growing faster because our workers are becoming more politically-conscious. What was the state of Soviet organisation last October? Only the first steps were being taken. We could not make it perfect or put it on a proper basis. But now we have the Soviet Constitution. The Soviet Constitution, ratified in July, is, as we know, not the invention of a commission, nor the creation of lawyers, nor is it copied from other

constitutions. The world has never known such a constitution as ours. It embodies the workers' experience of struggle and organisation against the exploiters both at home and abroad. We possess a fund of fighting experience. (*Applause.*) And this fund of experience has provided a striking corroboration of the fact that the organised workers created a Soviet government without civil servants, without a standing army and without privileges (privileges in practice for the bourgeoisie), and that they created the foundations of a new system in the factories. We are getting down to work and drawing in new helpers, who are essential if the Soviet Constitution is to be carried into effect. We now have ready new recruits, young peasant, who must be drawn into the work and help us carry the job through.

The last question I want to touch upon is the international situation. We are standing shoulder to shoulder with our international comrades, and we have now seen for ourselves the resoluteness and enthusiasm they put into their conviction that the Russian proletarian revolution will go along with them as the world revolution.

As the revolution's international significance grew, the imperialists of the whole world banded even closer and more furiously together against us. In October 1917 they regarded our Republic as a curiosity not worth serious attention. In February they regarded it as an experiment in socialism not to be taken seriously. But the Republic's army grew and gained in strength until the very difficult task of creating a socialist Red Army had been accomplished. As our cause gained in strength and its successes multiplied, the opposition and the hatred of the imperialists of all countries grew more rabid. Things have reached a state where British and French capitalists, who had proclaimed they were Wilhelm's enemies, are now on the verge of joining forces with this same Wilhelm in an effort to strangle the Socialist Soviet Republic. For they have come to realise that it is no longer a curiosity or an experiment in socialism, but the hotbed, the really genuine hotbed, of the world socialist revolution. Hence, the number of our enemies has increased along with the successes of our revolution. We must realise what is lying in store for us, without in any way concealing the gravity of the situation. We shall go to meet it not alone

but with the workers of Vienna and Berlin, who are moving into the same fight, and who will perhaps bring greater discipline and class-consciousness to our common cause.

To give you an idea of how the clouds are gathering over our Soviet Republic and what dangers are threatening us, I shall read you the full text of a Note sent to us by the German Government through its consulate:

"G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Moscow, November 5, 1918.

On the instructions of the German Imperial Government, the Imperial German Consulate has the honour to notify the Russian Federative Soviet Republic of the following: The German Government has already had occasion to protest twice against the impermissible campaign that is being conducted against German state institutions through declarations made by official Russian authorities in contravention of Article 2 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It can no longer confine itself to protests against this campaign, which is not only a violation of the said stipulations of the Treaty, but a serious departure from normal international practice.

When the Soviet Government established its Diplomatic Legation in Berlin after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Herr Joffe, the appointed Russian representative, received a clear reminder of the need to refrain from any agitation or propaganda in Germany. To this he replied that he was acquainted with Article 2 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and was aware that in his capacity as representative of a foreign Power he must not interfere in Germany's internal affairs. Herr Joffe and the departments in his charge accordingly enjoyed in Berlin the attention and confidence normally accorded to extraterritorial foreign legations. This confidence was, however, betrayed. It has been clear for some time that the Russian Legation has been in close contact with certain people working for the overthrow of the political order in Germany, and, by employing such people in its service, has been interested in a movement aimed at overthrowing the existing system in Germany.

The following incident, which occurred on the 4th instant, revealed that the Russian Legation, by importing leaflets calling for revolution, is even taking an active part in movements aimed at overthrowing the existing order, thereby abusing the privilege of employing diplomatic couriers. Because one of the boxes in the official baggage of the Russian courier who arrived in Berlin yesterday was damaged during transportation, it was ascertained that the boxes contained revolutionary leaflets printed in German and, judging by their contents, designed for dissemination in Germany.

The German Government has further grounds for complaint because of the attitude taken by the Soviet Government towards the expiation to be made for the assassination of Count Mirbach, the Imperial Ambassador. The Russian Government solemnly declared that it would do everything in its power to bring the criminals to court. But the German

Government has not observed any signs of the prosecution and punishment of the criminals having been undertaken, or even of any intention of it being done. The murderers escaped from a house surrounded on all sides by Public Security men of the Russian Government. The instigators of the assassination, who have publicly admitted they were behind the whole affair, to this day go unpunished and, according to information received, have even been pardoned.

The German Government protests against such violations of the Treaty and of public law. It is obliged to demand guarantees from the Russian Government that no further agitation and propaganda running counter to the Peace Treaty will be conducted. It must furthermore insist on the expiation of the assassination of the Ambassador, Count Mirbach, by the punishment of the perpetrators and instigators of the murder. Until such time as these demands are satisfied, the German Government must request the Government of the Soviet Republic to withdraw its diplomatic and other representatives from Germany. The Russian plenipotentiary in Berlin was today informed that a special train for the departure of the diplomatic and consular representatives in Berlin and of other Russian officials in the city will be ready tomorrow evening, and that measures will be taken to secure the unhampered transit of all Russian personnel to the Russian frontier. The Soviet Government is requested to enable the German representatives in Moscow and Petrograd to leave at the same time, with the observance of all the demands of courtesy. Other Russian representatives in Germany, and likewise German officials in other parts of Russia, will be informed they must leave within a week, the former for Russia, the latter for Germany. The German Government concludes in anticipation that all the rules of courtesy will be similarly observed towards the latter German officials in relation to their departure and that other German subjects or persons under German protection will be allowed the opportunity of unhampered departure should they request it."

We all know perfectly well, comrades, that the German Government has been fully aware that German socialists enjoyed the hospitality of the Russian Embassy and that no supporters of German imperialism ever crossed the threshold of the Russian Embassy. Its friends were those socialists who opposed the war and who sympathised with Karl Liebknecht. They have been guests of the Embassy ever since it opened, and we have had dealings with them alone. The German Government was perfectly aware of that. It followed the movements of every representative of our government as zealously as the government of Nicholas II used to follow the movements of our comrades. The German Government is now making this move not because the situation has in any way changed, but because it formerly felt stronger, and was not afraid that one "burning' house on the streets of Berlin

would set all Germany alight. The German Government has lost its head, and now that the whole of Germany is ablaze, it thinks it can put out the fire by turning its police hose on a single house. (*Stormy applause.*)

That is simply ridiculous. If the German Government is going to break off diplomatic relations, all we call say is that we knew it would, and that it is doing all it can to get an alliance with the British and French imperialists. We know Wilson's government has received telegram after telegram requesting that German troops be left in Poland, the Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia. Although they are enemies of German imperialism, the German troops are doing their job: they are putting down the Bolsheviks.* They can clear out when pro-Entente "armies of liberation" appear on the scene to strangle the Bolsheviks.

We are perfectly aware of what is going on and none of it is unexpected. We merely repeat that now that Germany is on fire and Austria is all ablaze, now that they have had to liberate Liebknecht and allow him to visit the Russian Embassy, where a joint meeting of Russian and German socialists with Liebknecht at their head was held, such a step on the part of the German Government shows not so much that they want to fight as that they have completely lost their heads. It shows they are at a loss for a decision because Anglo-American imperialism, the most brutal enemy of all, is advancing upon them, an enemy that has crushed Austria with peace terms a hundred times more onerous than those of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Germany sees that these liberators want to strangle, crush and torture her too. But at the same time the workingman's Germany is rebelling. The German army proved to be useless and unfit for action not because discipline was weak but because the soldiers who refused to fight were transferred from the Eastern front to the German Western front and carried with them what the bourgeoisie call world Bolshevism.

That is why the German army was unfit for action and why this document is the best proof of Germany's utter confusion. We say it will lead to a diplomatic rupture, and perhaps even to war if they can find the strength to lead the white-guard troops. We have therefore sent a telegram to all the

* See pp. 128-30 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Soviets of Deputies,[60] which concludes by warning them to be on their guard, to hold themselves in readiness and muster all their forces, for this is just another sign that the chief aim of international imperialism is the overthrow of Bolshevism. That does not mean defeating Russia alone. It means defeating their own workers in every country. But they will not succeed, no matter what brutalities and outrages may follow this decision. These vultures are preparing to swoop down on Russia from the South, through the Dardanelles, or by way of Bulgaria and Rumania. They are negotiating for the formation of a White Army in Germany to be pitted against Russia. We are fully aware of this danger, and say quite plainly that we have not worked a year for nothing; we have laid the foundations, we are coming up to decisive battles, battles which will indeed be decisive. But we are not alone: the proletariat of Western Europe has gone into action and has not left anything standing in Austria-Hungary. The government of the country is just about as helpless, as wildly confused, has lost its head as completely as Nicholas Romanov's government at the end of February 1917. Our slogan must be: Put every effort into the fight once more, and remember that we are coming up to the last, decisive fight, not for the Russian revolution alone, but for the world socialist revolution.

We know that the imperialist vultures are still stronger than us. They can still inflict wholesale damage, brutalities and atrocities upon our country. But they cannot defeat the world revolution. They are full of savage hatred, so we tell ourselves that come what may, every Russian worker and peasant will do his duty and will face death if the interests of defence of the revolution demand it. No matter what miseries the imperialists may still inflict upon us, it will not save them. Imperialism will perish and the world socialist revolution will triumph in face of all odds! (*Stormy applause passing into prolonged ovation.*)

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2

SPEECH ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION NOVEMBER 8

(*Prolonged applause.*) Comrades, from the very beginning of the October Revolution, foreign policy and international relations have been the main questions facing us. Not merely because from now on all the states in the world are being firmly linked by imperialism into a single system, or rather, into one dirty, bloody mass, but because the complete victory of the socialist revolution in one country alone is inconceivable and demands the most active co-operation of at least several advanced countries, which do not include Russia. Hence one of the main problems of the revolution is now the extent to which we succeed in broadening the revolution in other countries too, and the extent to which we succeed meanwhile in warding off imperialism.

I should like to remind you briefly of the main stages of our international policy over the past year. As I have already had occasion to point out in my speech on the anniversary of the revolution, the main feature characterising our position a year ago was that we were on our own.* No matter how sound our conviction that a revolutionary force was being and had been created throughout Europe and that the war would not end without revolution, there were no signs at the time that a revolution had begun or was beginning. In these circumstances we could do nothing but direct our foreign policy efforts to enlightening the working people of Western Europe. This was not because

* See pp. 138-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

we claimed to be more enlightened than they, but because so long as the bourgeoisie of a country have not been overthrown, military censorship and that fantastically bloodthirsty atmosphere which accompanies every war, particularly a reactionary one, predominate in that country. You well appreciate that in the most democratic, republican countries, war means military censorship and unprecedented methods employed by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois military staffs to deceive the people. We set out to share our achievements in this respect with other nations. We did everything possible for this when we annulled and published the disgraceful secret treaties which the ex-tsar had concluded with the British and French capitalists to the benefit of the Russian capitalists. You know that these were downright predatory treaties. You know that the government of Kerensky and the Mensheviks kept these treaties secret and upheld them. By way of exception, we come across statements in that section of the British and French press which is to any degree honest that, thanks only to the Russian revolution, the French and the British learned much that was material to them as regards their diplomatic history.

We have certainly done very little from the point of view of the social revolution as a whole, but what we have done has been one of the greatest steps in its preparation.

If we now make a general survey of the results gained by the exposure of German imperialism, we shall see that it is now obvious to the working people of all countries that they were made to wage a bloody and predatory war. And at the end of this year of war the behaviour of Britain and America is beginning to be exposed in the same way, since the people are opening their eyes and begin to see through the evil designs. That is all we have done, but we have done our bit. The exposure of these treaties was a blow to imperialism. The terms of the peace treaty which we were compelled to conclude proved to be a powerful weapon of propaganda and agitation; we did more with them than any other government or nation has done. But while it is true that the attempt we made to awaken the people did not produce immediate results, we never even assumed that the

revolution would begin immediately, or that all would be lost. During the past fifteen years we have brought about two revolutions, and we have clearly seen how much time must elapse before they grip the people. Recent events in Austria and Germany confirm this. We said that we had no intention of allying ourselves with robbers and becoming robbers ourselves; no, we expected to arouse the proletariat of the enemy countries. We were jeered at and told we were preparing to arouse the German proletariat which would strangle us while we were preparing to launch a propaganda attack. But facts have shown we were right to assume that the working people in all countries are equally hostile to imperialism. They only need to be given a certain period for preparation; the Russian people, too, despite memories of the 1905 Revolution, took some time before they again came up for revolution.

Before the Brest-Litovsk Peace we did everything in our power to hit at imperialism. If the history of the growth of the proletarian revolution did not completely wipe this out, and if the Brest-Litovsk Peace forced us to retreat before imperialism, this was because we were insufficiently prepared in January 1918. Fate condemned us to isolation, and we went through an agonising period after the Brest-Litovsk Peace.

Comrades, the four years which we spent in world war ended in peace, but on onerous terms. In the final analysis, however, even these onerous peace terms proved that we were right and that our hopes were not built on sand. With every passing month we grew strong while West-European imperialism grew weak. Now, as a result, we see that Germany, who six months ago completely ignored our Embassy and thought there could be no Red institution there, recently, at any rate, has been weakening. The latest telegram informs us of the German imperialists' appeal to the people to keep calm, saying that peace is near at hand. We know what is meant when monarchs appeal for calm and promise to do the impossible in the near future. If Germany gets peace soon, it will be a Brest-Litovsk Peace, which instead of peace will bring the working people more misery than ever.

The results of our international policy shaped in such a way that six months after the Brest-Litovsk Peace we were

a devastated country to the bourgeoisie, but, to the proletariat, we were rapidly developing and now head the proletarian army which has begun to shake Austria and Germany. This success vindicated and fully justified all our sacrifices in any worker's eyes. If we were to be suddenly wiped out, if our activities were to be cut short—this is impossible since miracles do not happen—yet if this were to happen we would be justified in saying, without concealing our mistakes, that we had made full use of the period, offered us by fate, for the world socialist revolution! We have done everything possible for the working people of Russia, and we have done more than anyone else for the world proletarian revolution. (*Applause.*)

In recent months, and in-recent weeks, the international situation has begun to change sharply; now German imperialism is almost completely defeated. All designs on the Ukraine which the German imperialists fostered among their working people proved to be empty promises. It turned out that American imperialism was ready, and a blow was struck at Germany. A totally different situation has arisen. We have been under no illusions. After the October Revolution we were considerably weaker than imperialism and even now we are weaker than international imperialism. We must repeat this now so as not to deceive ourselves: following the October Revolution we were weaker and could not fight. Now we are weaker too and must do everything we can to avoid a clash with imperialism.

That we were able to survive a year after the October Revolution was due to the split of international imperialism into two predatory groups: Anglo-French-American on the one hand, and German on the other, which were locked in mortal combat, and which had no time for us. Neither group could muster large forces against us, which they would have done had they been in a position to do so. They were blinded by the bloodthirsty atmosphere of war. The material sacrifices required to carry on the war demanded the utmost concentration of their efforts. They had no time for us, not because by some miracle we were stronger than the imperialists—no, that would be nonsense—but only because international imperialism had split into two predatory groups which were at each other's throats. Only thanks

to this the Soviet Republic was able to openly declare war on the imperialists of all countries, depriving them of their capital in the shape of foreign loans, slapping them in the face and openly emptying their plunder-laden pockets.

An end has come to the period of declarations which we then made over the correspondence started by the German imperialists, even though world imperialism could not tear into us as it should have done in line with its hostility and thirst for capitalist profits, which had been fantastically expanded by the war. Until the moment of the Anglo-American imperialists' victory over the other group they were fully occupied fighting among themselves, and so had no chance to launch a decisive campaign against the Soviet Republic. There is no longer a second group. Only one group of victors remains. This has completely altered our international position, and we must take this change into account. The facts show how this change bears on the development of the international situation. The workers' revolution is now winning in the defeated countries; everyone can clearly see what tremendous advances it has made. When we took power in October we were nothing more in Europe than a single spark. True, the sparks began to fly, and they flew from us. This is our greatest achievement, but even so, these were isolated sparks. Now most countries within the sphere of German-Austrian imperialism are aflame (Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary). We know that from Bulgaria the revolution has spread to Serbia. We know how these worker-peasant revolutions passed through Austria and reached Germany. Several countries are enveloped in the flames of workers' revolution. In this respect our efforts and sacrifices have been justified. They were not reckless adventures, as our enemies slanderously claimed, but an essential step towards world revolution, which had to be taken by the country that had been placed in the lead, despite its underdevelopment and backwardness.

This is one result, and the most important from the point of view of the final outcome of the imperialist war. The other result is the one to which I referred earlier, that Anglo-American imperialism is now exposing itself in the same way as Austro-German did in its time. We can see that

if, at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Germany had been somewhat level-headed, able to keep herself in check and to refrain from making gambles, she would have been able to maintain her domination and undoubtedly could have secured an advantageous position in the West. She did not do this because when a machine like a war involving millions and tens of millions, a war which inflamed chauvinist passions to the utmost, a war bound up with capitalist interests totalling hundreds of billions of rubles—when such a machine has gathered full speed there are no brakes that can stop it. This machine went farther than the German imperialists themselves desired, and they were crushed by it. They were stuck; they ended up like a man who had gorged himself to death. And now, before our very eyes, British and American imperialism is in this extremely ugly, but, from the viewpoint of the revolutionary proletariat, extremely useful position. You might have thought they would have had much greater political experience than Germany. Here are people used to democratic rule, not to the rule of some Junker or other, people who went through the hardest period of their history hundreds of years ago. You might have thought these people would-have retained their presence of mind. If we were to speak as individuals, from the point of view of democracy in general, as bourgeois philistines, professors, who have understood nothing from the struggle between imperialism and the working class, whether or not they were capable of level-headedness, if we reasoned from the point of view of democracy in general, then we would have to say that Britain and America are countries with a centuries-old tradition of democracy, that the bourgeoisie there would be able to hold their ground. If by some means they were to succeed now in holding on, this would at any rate be for a fairly long period. But it seems that the same thing is happening to them as happened to the militarist-despotic Germany. In this imperialist war there is a tremendous difference between Russia and the republican countries. The imperialist war is so steeped in blood, so predatory and bestial, that it has effaced even these important differences, and in this respect it has brought the freest democracy of America to the level of semi-militarist, despotic Germany.

We see that Britain and America, countries which had greater opportunities than others for remaining democratic republics, have overdone things as savagely and insanely as Germany did in her time, and so they are heading, just as quickly, and perhaps even faster, towards the end so successfully arrived at by German imperialism. It swelled out fantastically over three-quarters of Europe, became distended and then burst, leaving behind it an awful stench. Now British and American imperialism is racing to the same end. You only have to take a cursory glance at the armistice and peace terms which the British and Americans, the "liberators" of the people from German imperialism, are presenting to the defeated nations. Take Bulgaria. You would have thought that a country like Bulgaria could hold no terror for the Anglo-American imperialist colossus. Nevertheless, the revolution in this small, weak, absolutely helpless country caused the Anglo-Americans to lose their heads and present armistice terms that are tantamount to occupation. In this country where a peasants' republic has been proclaimed, in Sofia, an important railway junction, the whole railway is now in the hands of Anglo-American troops. They are forced to fight this little peasants' republic. From the military point of view this is a walkover. People who take the view of the bourgeoisie, of the old ruling class, of old military relations, merely smile contemptuously. What does this pigmy Bulgaria signify in comparison with the Anglo-American forces? Nothing from the military standpoint, but a great deal from the revolutionary standpoint. This is not a colony where they are used to exterminating the defeated people in their millions. The British and Americans consider this is only establishing law and order, bringing civilisation and Christianity to African savages. But this is not Central Africa. Here the soldiers, no matter how strong their army, become demoralised when they come up against a revolution. Germany is proof enough of this. In Germany, at any rate as regards discipline, the soldiers were model army men. Yet when the Germans marched into the Ukraine, factors other than discipline came into play. The starving German soldier marched for bread, and it would have been unrealistic to demand that he should not steal too much bread. Moreover, we know that

in this country he was most of all infected by the spirit of the Russian revolution. The German bourgeoisie were well aware of this and it caused Wilhelm to panic. The Hohenzollerns are mistaken if they imagine that Germany will shed a single drop of blood for them. This is the result of the policy of bellicose German imperialism. The same thing is repeating itself in regard to Britain. The Anglo-American army is already becoming demoralised; this began as soon as it launched the ferocious campaign against Bulgaria. And this is only the beginning. Austria followed Bulgaria. Permit me to read you some of the clauses of the terms dictated by the Anglo-American imperialist victors. These are the people who most of all shouted to the working people that they were conducting a war of liberation, that their chief aim was to crush Prussian militarism which threatened to spread the despotic regime over all countries. They shouted loudest that they were conducting a war of liberation. This was a deception. You know that bourgeois lawyers, these parliamentarians who have spent their whole lives learning the art of deception without blushing, find it easy to deceive each other—but they don't get away with it when they have to deceive the workers in the same way. British and American politicians and parliamentarians are past masters at this art. But they will not get away with deception. The working people, whom they incited in the name of freedom, will come to their senses straight away, and even more so when, on a mass scale, not from proclamations (which help, but do not really move the revolution), but from their own experience, they see they are being deceived, when they become aware of the peace terms with Austria.

These are peace terms now being forced on a comparatively weak, disintegrating state by people who shouted that the Bolsheviks were traitors because they signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. When the Germans wanted to send their soldiers to Moscow, we said we would rather all die in battle than agree to this. (*Applause.*) We told ourselves great sacrifices would have to be made in the occupied areas, but everybody knows how Soviet Russia helped and kept them supplied with necessities. Now the democratic troops of Britain and France will have to serve to "maintain law and order", and this when there are Soviets of Workers' Deputies

in Bulgaria and Serbia, when there are Soviets of Workers' Deputies in Vienna and Budapest. We know what kind of order this means. It means that the Anglo-American troops are to be the throttlers and executioners of the world revolution.

Comrades, when the Russian serf troops were sent to suppress the Hungarian Revolution in 1848,[61] they were able to get away with it because they were serfs; they were able to get away with it in relation to Poland.[62] But people who have known freedom for a century and who were incited to hate German imperialism because it was a beast which had to be destroyed, must understand that Anglo-American imperialism is the same sort of beast whom it would be only right to destroy as well!

And now history, with its usual malicious irony, has arrived at the point where, after the exposure of German imperialism, it is the turn of Anglo-French imperialism to utterly expose itself. We declare to the Russian, German and Austrian working people that these are not the Russian serf troops of 1848! They will not get away with it! They are out to stop people getting from capitalism to freedom and to suppress the revolution. We are absolutely convinced that this bloated monster will fall into the same abyss as did the German imperialist monster.

I now turn to matters which affect us most of all. I shall begin with the peace terms which Germany will have to agree to. The comrades from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs told me that *The Times*, the chief mouthpiece of the fabulously rich British bourgeoisie who actually shape the entire policy, has already published the terms to be imposed on Germany. She is expected to hand over Heligoland and the Wilhelmshaven Canal, Essen, where practically all military equipment is manufactured, disband her merchant fleet, immediately hand over Alsace-Lorraine and pay indemnities totalling 60 thousand-million, a great part of which must be paid in kind because money has depreciated everywhere and British merchants too have begun to calculate in another currency. We can see that the peace terms they are preparing for Germany will be completely devastating, far harsher than the Brest-Litovsk terms. They are strong enough materially and physically to do so if it were not

for the existence of that awful Bolshevism. By imposing these peace terms they are preparing their own doom. For this is happening in civilised countries in the twentieth century, not in Central Africa. The once disciplined German soldier who put down the illiterate Ukrainian people has now buried his discipline. So it is all the more certain that the British and American imperialists will bury themselves when they make the gamble, which will bring about their political downfall, of making their troops throttlers and gendarmes of all Europe. They have been trying to destroy Russia for some time, and have been thinking of attacking her for some time. You only have to recall the Murmansk occupation, the millions they squandered on the Czechs, the treaty they concluded with Japan. And now Britain has a treaty with the Turks which gives her Baku so that she may strangle us by depriving us of raw materials.

British troops are ready to attack Russia from the South, through the Dardanelles or through Bulgaria and Rumania. They are closing in around the Soviet Republic, they are trying to cut off our economic contacts with the whole world. For this reason they compelled Holland to break off diplomatic relations with us.[63] When Germany expelled our Ambassador she acted, if not in direct agreement with Anglo-French policy, then hoping to do them a service so that they should be magnanimous to her. The implication was that we are also fulfilling the duties of executioner against the Bolsheviks, your enemies.

The main point about the international situation is (as I mentioned the other day) that we have never been so near to world proletarian revolution as we are now. We have proved we were not mistaken in banking on world proletarian revolution. Our great national and economic sacrifices were not made in vain. We achieved successes. Yet if we have never previously been so close to world revolution, then it is also true to say that we have never been in such a dangerous situation as we are now. The imperialists were busy among themselves, but now one group has been wiped out by the Anglo-French-American group, which considers its main task to be the extermination of world Bolshevism and the strangulation of its main centre,

the Russian Soviet Republic. To do this, they intend to surround themselves with a Great Wall of China so as to keep out the plague, the plague of Bolshevism. These people are trying to rid themselves of Bolshevism by going into quarantine, but this cannot be done. Even if these Anglo-French imperialist gentlemen, who possess the best techniques in the world, succeed in building this Great Wall around the Republic, the germ of Bolshevism will still penetrate the wall and infect the workers of the world. (*Applause.*)

The West-European press, the press of Anglo-French imperialism, tries its hardest to keep silent about the state of imperialism. No lie or slander is vile enough to use against the Soviet government. It is true to say now that all the Anglo-French and American papers, with financial backing running into billions, are in capitalist hands and that they act in one syndicate to suppress the truth about Soviet Russia, to spread lies and slander about us. Yet despite the fact that for years there has been a military censorship which has prevented a word of truth about the Soviet Republic from appearing in the newspapers of the democratic countries, not a single large workers' meeting held anywhere goes by without the workers siding with the Bolsheviks, because it is impossible to hide the truth. The enemy accuses us of implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat. They are right and we do not hide it. The fact that the Soviet Government is not afraid and openly admits this attracts more millions of workers to its side, because the dictatorship is directed against the exploiters, and the working people see and are convinced that the struggle we are waging against the exploiters is a serious one and will be brought to a serious conclusion. Although the European papers surround us with a conspiracy of silence, they have so far announced that they regard it their duty to attack Russia because Russia surrendered to Germany, because Russia is in fact a German agent, because government leaders in Russia, they claim, are German agents. New forged documents, for which a good price is paid, appear every month proving that Lenin and Trotsky are downright traitors and German agents. Despite all this they cannot hide the truth, and from time to time there are open signs that the imperialist gentlemen feel uneasy. *L'Echo de Paris*[64] admits: "We are going into

Russia to break the power of the Bolsheviks." Their official line is that they are only fighting German domination, not conducting a war with Russia and not interfering in military matters. Our French internationalists who publish the *III-me Internationale*[65] in Moscow cited this quotation, and although we have been cut off from Paris and France by an extremely elaborate Great Wall of China, we tell the French imperialist gentlemen that they cannot defend themselves from their own bourgeoisie. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of French workers know this small quotation, and others too, and see that all the declarations of their rulers, of their bourgeoisie, are nothing but lies. Their own bourgeoisie let the cat out of the bag; they acknowledge that they want to break the power of the Bolsheviks. After four years of bloody war they have to tell their people: go and fight again against Russia to break the power of the Bolsheviks whom we hate because they owe us 17 thousand million and won't pay up,[66] because they are rude to capitalists, landowners and tsars. Civilised nations who come down to admitting such things, patently betray the failure of their policy. No matter how strong they may be militarily we calmly review their strength and say: but you have in your rear an even more terrible enemy—the common people, whom you have deceived up to now; so much so that your tongue has dried up from the lies and slander you have spread about Soviet Russia. Similar information may be gleaned from *The Manchester Guardian*[67] of October 23. This British bourgeois newspaper writes: "If the Allied armies still remain in Russia and still operate in Russia, their purpose can only be to effect a revolution in ... Russia. The Allied governments must, therefore, either ... put an end to their operations in Russia or announce that they are at war with Bolshevism."

I repeat that the significance of this small quotation, which sounds to us like a revolutionary call, like a powerful revolutionary appeal, is that it is written by a bourgeois newspaper, which is itself an enemy of the socialists, but feels that the truth can no longer be hidden. If bourgeois papers write in this vein you can imagine what the British workers must be thinking and saying. You know the sort of language used by the liberals in tsarist times, prior to the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. You know this language

heralded an impending explosion amidst the revolutionary proletariat. From the language of these British bourgeois liberals, therefore, you can draw conclusions about what is going on in the moods, minds and hearts of the British, French and American workers. We must, therefore, face the bitter truth about our international position. The world revolution is not far off, but it cannot develop according to a special time-table. Having survived two revolutions we well appreciate this. We know, however, that although the imperialists cannot contain the world revolution, certain countries are likely to be defeated, and even heavier losses are possible. They know that Russia is in the birth-pangs of a proletarian revolution, but they are mistaken if they think that by crushing one centre of the revolution they will crush the revolution in other countries.

We, for our part, must admit that the situation is more dangerous than ever before, that once again we shall have to summon up every effort. Over the past year we have laid a firm foundation, created a socialist Red Army with a new discipline, and we are absolutely certain that we can and must continue the work we are doing. At all meetings, in every Soviet institution, at trade union meetings and at meetings of Poor Peasants' Committees we must say: Comrades, we have survived a year and have achieved some success, but all this is still insufficient when we consider the powerful enemy bearing down on us. This enemy, Anglo-French imperialism, is world-wide, powerful and has defeated the whole world. We are going to fight it not because we think ourselves economically and technically on a par with the advanced countries of Europe. No, but we do know this enemy is going to topple into the abyss into which Austro-German imperialism once toppled; we know that the enemy, which has now ensnared Turkey, seized Bulgaria and is bent on occupying the whole of Austria-Hungary with the object of establishing a tsarist, gendarme regime, is heading for its doom. We know this as a historical fact, and that is why, while in no way attempting the impossible, we say we can beat off Anglo-French imperialism!

Every step in strengthening our Red Army will be echoed by a dozen steps in the disintegration of and revolutions in this apparently all-powerful enemy. There is therefore

no cause whatsoever for despair or pessimism. We know the danger is great. It may be that fate has even heavier sacrifices in store for us. Even if they can crush one country, they can never crush the world proletarian revolution, they will only add more fuel to the flames that will consume them all. (*Prolonged applause passing into ovation.*)

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SPEECH AT THE UNVEILING OF A MEMORIAL TO MARX AND ENGELS NOVEMBER 7, 1918

We are unveiling a memorial to Marx and Engels, the leaders of the world workers' revolution.

Humanity has for ages suffered and languished under the oppression of a tiny handful of exploiters who maltreated millions of labourers. But whereas the exploiters of an earlier period, the landowners, robbed and maltreated the peasant serfs, who were disunited, scattered and ignorant, the exploiters of the new period, the capitalists, came face to face with the vanguard of the downtrodden people, the urban, factory, industrial workers. They were united by the factory, they were enlightened by urban life, they were steeled by the common strike struggle and by revolutionary action.

It is to the great historic merit of Marx and Engels that they proved by scientific analysis the inevitability of capitalism's collapse and its transition to communism, under which there will be no more exploitation of man by man.

It is to the great historic merit of Marx and Engels that they indicated to the workers of the world their role, their task, their mission, namely, to be the first to rise in the revolutionary struggle against capital and to rally around themselves in this struggle all working and exploited people.

We are living at a wonderful time, when this prophecy of the great socialists is beginning to be realised. We all see the dawn of the world socialist revolution of the proletariat breaking in several countries. The unspeakable horrors of the imperialist butchery of nations are everywhere evoking

a heroic upsurge of the oppressed and multiplying their strength in the struggle for emancipation.

Let this memorial to Marx and Engels again and again remind the millions of workers and peasants that we are not alone in our struggle. Side by side with us the workers of more advanced countries are rising. Hard battles still lie ahead of them and us. In common struggle capitalist oppression will be broken, and socialism finally won!

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SPEECH AT THE UNVEILING OF A MEMORIAL PLAQUE TO THOSE WHO FELL IN THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 7, 1918

Comrades, we are here to unveil a memorial to those who fell in the October Revolution, 1917. The best sons of the working people laid down their lives in starting a revolution to liberate nations from imperialism, to put an end to wars among nations, to overthrow capital and to win socialism.

For several decades now the history of Russia has had a long list of revolutionary martyrs. Thousands upon thousands died fighting tsarism. Their death roused new fighters and drew more and more people into the struggle.

Those comrades who fell last October brought the magnificent happiness of victory. The greatest honour of which the revolutionary leaders of mankind dreamed was won by them: over the bodies of those comrades who gallantly fell in battle passed thousands and millions of new and just as fearless fighters who won victory by their mass heroism.

Today, all over the world, the workers are seething with anger. The workers' socialist revolution is beginning in several countries. The capitalists of the whole world in terror and hatred hurriedly rally together for the revolution's suppression. And the Socialist Soviet Republic of Russia is a particular thorn in their side. The combined imperialists of the world are prepared to attack us, to involve us in more battles, and to impose more sacrifices on us.

Comrades, let us honour the memory of the October fighters by swearing before their memorial that we shall

follow in their footsteps and emulate their courage and heroism. Let their motto be our motto, the motto of the rebelling workers of the world—"Victory or Death!"

And with this motto the fighters for the proletarian world socialist revolution will be invincible.

Brief report published
November 8, 1918 in
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SPEECH AT A RALLY AND CONCERT FOR THE ALL-RUSSIA EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION STAFF NOVEMBER 7, 1918

(*Storm of applause.*) Comrades, in celebrating the anniversary of our revolution, I would like to say a few words about the onerous duties of the Extraordinary Commissions.

It is not at all surprising to hear Cheka's activities frequently attacked by friends as well as enemies. We have taken on a hard job. When we took over the government of the country, we naturally made many mistakes, and it is only natural that the mistakes of the Extraordinary Commissions strike the eye most. The narrow-minded intellectual fastens on these mistakes without trying to get to the root of the matter. What does surprise me in all these outcries about Cheka's mistakes is the manifest inability to put the question on a broad footing. People harp on individual mistakes Cheka makes, and raise a hue and cry about them.

We, however, say that we learn from our mistakes. In this department, as in all others, we say we shall learn by self-criticism. It is not a matter, of course, of Cheka's personnel but the nature of its functions, which demand determined, swift and, above all, faithful action. When I consider its activities and see how they are attacked, I say this is all narrow-minded and futile talk. It reminds me of Kautsky's homily on the dictatorship, which is tantamount to supporting the bourgeoisie. We surely know from experience that the expropriation of the bourgeoisie entails a drastic struggle—a dictatorship.

Marx said that the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat lies between capitalism and communism. The more the proletariat presses the bourgeoisie, the more furiously they will resist. We know what vengeance was wreaked on the workers in France in 1848. And when people charge us with harshness we wonder how they can forget the rudiments of Marxism. We have not forgotten the mutiny of the officer cadets[68] in October, and we must not forget that a number of revolts are now being engineered. We have, on the one hand, to learn to work constructively, and, on the other, to smash the bourgeoisie's resistance. The Finnish whiteguards, for all their much-vaunted democracy, had no scruples about shooting down workers. The realisation of the need for dictatorship has taken deep root in the people's minds, arduous and difficult though it is. That alien elements should try to worm their way into Cheka is quite natural. With the help of self-criticism we shall dig them out. The important thing for us is that Cheka is directly exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that respect its services are invaluable. There is no way of emancipating the people except by forcibly suppressing the exploiters. That is what Cheka is doing, and therein lies its service to the proletariat.

Brief reports published November 9, 1918 in *Izvestia* No. 244

Published according to the typewritten copy of the minutes

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF DELEGATES FROM THE POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES OF CENTRAL GUBERNIAS NOVEMBER 8, 1918[69]

Comrades, the organisation of the poor peasants is the key problem in our internal construction work, and even in our whole revolution.

The aim of the October Revolution was to wrench the factories from the hands of the capitalists so as to make the means of production the property of the whole people, and to reconstruct agriculture on socialist lines by handing over the land to the peasants.

The first part of this aim was much easier to accomplish than the second. In the cities, the revolution was dealing with large-scale industry employing tens and hundreds of thousands of workers. The factories belonged to a small number of capitalists, who gave the workers little trouble. The workers had already gained experience in their long struggle against the capitalists, which had taught them to act concertedly, resolutely, and in an organised way. Moreover, they did not have to split up the factories; the thing that mattered was to make all production serve the interests of the working class and the peasants and see that the products of labour should not fall into capitalist hands.

But agriculture is quite a different proposition. A number of transitional measures are required if socialism is to win here. To transform a vast number of small peasant farms into large farms is something that cannot be done immediately. Agriculture, which has hitherto been conducted on a haphazard basis, cannot immediately or in a short space

of time be socialised and transformed into large-scale state enterprise, whose produce would be equally and justly distributed among all working people under a system of universal and equal labour service.

While the factory workers in the cities have already succeeded in completely overthrowing the capitalists and getting rid of exploitation, in the countryside the real fight against exploitation has only just begun.

After the October Revolution we finished off the landowner and took away his land. That, however, did not end the rural struggle. Gaining the land, like every other workers' gain, can only be secure when it is based on the independent action of the working people themselves, on their own organisation, on their endurance and revolutionary determination.

Did the peasants have this organisation?

Unfortunately not. And that is the trouble, the reason why the struggle is so difficult.

Peasants who do not employ the labour of others, who do not profit at the expense of others, will, of course, always be in favour of the land being divided among all equally, of everybody working, of land tenure not serving as a basis of exploitation; they are against the concentration of land in the hands of a few. But it is different with the kulaks and the parasites who grew rich on the war, who took advantage of the famine to sell grain at fabulous prices, who concealed grain in anticipation of higher prices, and who are now doing all they can to grow rich on the people's misfortunes and on the starvation of the village poor and urban workers.

They, the kulaks and parasites, are no less formidable enemies than the capitalists and landowners. And if the kulaks are not dealt with properly, if we do not cope with the parasites, the return of the tsar and the capitalists is inevitable.

The experience of every revolution that has occurred in Europe offers striking corroboration of the fact that revolution is inevitably doomed if the peasants do not throw off the domination of the kulaks.

Every European revolution ended in failure because the peasants could not cope with their enemies. In the cities the workers overthrew their kings (in England and France they executed their kings several centuries ago; it was

only we who were late with our tsar), yet after a certain interval the old order came back. That was because in those days even in the cities there was no large-scale industry which could unite millions of workers in the factories and weld them into an army powerful enough to withstand the onslaught of the capitalists and the kulaks even without peasant support.

The poor peasants were unorganised, fought the kulaks badly, and as a result the revolution was defeated in the cities as well.

Now the situation is different. During the last two hundred years large-scale production has developed so powerfully and has covered all countries with such a network of huge factories employing thousands and tens of thousands of workers that today everywhere in the cities there are many organised workers, the proletarians, who constitute a force strong enough to achieve final victory over the bourgeoisie, the capitalists.

In former revolutions the poor peasants had nowhere to turn for support in their difficult struggle against the kulaks.

The organised proletariat—which is stronger and more experienced than the peasants (having gained experience in earlier struggles)—now holds power in Russia and possesses all the means of production, the mills, factories, railways, ships, etc.

Now the poor peasants have a reliable and powerful ally in their anti-kulak struggle. They know that the town is behind them, that the proletariat will help them, and is in fact already helping them with every means in its power. That has been shown by recent events.

You all remember, comrades, in what a dangerous situation the revolution was this July. The Czech revolt was spreading, the food shortage in the cities was worsening and the kulaks were becoming more insolent and violent than ever in their attacks on the towns, the Soviet government and the poor peasants.

We appealed to the poor peasants to organise. We proceeded to form Poor Peasants' Committees and organise workers' food detachments. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries started an uprising. They said the Poor Peasants'

Committees consisted of idlers and the workers were robbing the working peasants of grain.

We replied that they were defending the kulaks, who realised that the Soviet government could be fought by starvation as well as arms. They talked about "idlers". And we asked, "But why does an individual become an 'idler', why does he deteriorate, why is he impoverished, and why does he take to drink? Isn't it because of the kulaks?" The kulaks, in unison with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, raised an outcry against "idlers", but they themselves were raking in grain, concealing it and profiteering because they wanted to grow rich on the starvation and suffering of the workers.

The kulaks were squeezing the poor peasants dry. They were profiting from the labour of others, at the same time crying, "Idlers!"

The kulaks waited impatiently for the Czechs. They would most willingly have enthroned a new tsar so as to continue their exploitation with impunity, to continue to dominate the farm labourer and to continue to grow rich.

The only salvation was in the village uniting with the town, the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians (those who do not employ the labour of others) joining the town workers in a campaign against the kulaks and parasites.

To achieve this unity a great deal had to be done about the food situation. The workers in the towns were starving, while the kulak said: "If I hold my grain back a bit longer they may pay more."

The kulaks, of course, are in no hurry; they have plenty of money; they say themselves they have tons of Kerensky notes.[70]

But people who during famine can conceal and hoard grain are vicious criminals. They must be fought as the worst enemies of the people.

And we have begun this fight in the countryside.

The Mensheviks and S.R.s tried to frighten us by saying that in forming the Poor Peasants' Committees we were splitting the peasants. But if we don't split the peasants? The countryside will be left at the kulak's mercy. And that is exactly what we do not want, so we decided to split them. We said: true, we are losing the kulaks—we cannot avoid that misfortune (*laughter*)—but we shall win thousands

and millions of poor peasants who will side with the workers. (*Applause.*)

And that is exactly what is taking place. The split among the peasants only served to bring out more clearly who are the poor peasants, who are the middle peasants not employing the labour of others, and who are the parasites and kulaks.

The workers have been helping the poor peasants in their struggle against the kulaks. In the civil war that has flared up in the countryside the workers are on the side of the poor peasants, as they were when they passed the S.R.-sponsored law on the socialisation of the land.

We Bolsheviks were opposed to this law. Yet we signed it, because we did not want to oppose the will of the majority of peasants. The majority will is binding on us always, and to oppose the majority will is to betray the revolution.

We did not want to impose on the peasants the idea that the equal division of the land was useless, an idea which was alien to them. Far better, we thought, if, by their own experience and suffering, the peasants themselves come to realise that equal division is nonsense. Only then could we ask them how they would escape the ruin and kulak domination that follow from the division of the land.

Division of the land was all very well as a beginning. Its purpose was to show that the land was being taken from the landowners and handed over to the peasants. But that is not enough. The solution lies only in socialised farming.

You did not realise this at the time, but you are coming round to it by force of experience. The way to escape the disadvantages of small-scale farming lies in communes, artels or peasant associations. That is the way to improve agriculture, economise forces and combat the kulaks, parasites and exploiters.

We were well aware that the peasants live rooted to the soil. The peasants fear innovations and tenaciously cling to old habits. We knew the peasants would only believe in the benefits of any particular measure when their own common sense led them to understand and appreciate the benefits. And that is why we helped to divide the land, although we realised this was no solution.

Now the poor peasants themselves are beginning to agree with us. Experience is teaching them that while ten ploughs,

say, are required when the land is divided into one hundred separate holdings, a smaller number suffices under communal farming because the land is not divided up so minutely. A commune permits a whole artel or association to make improvements in agriculture that are beyond the capacity of individual small owners, and so on.

Of course, it will not be possible to change everywhere to socialised farming immediately. The kulaks will put up every resistance—and frequently the peasants themselves stubbornly resist the introduction of communal farming principles. But the more the peasants are convinced by example and by their own experience of the advantages of communes, the greater progress will be.

The Poor Peasants' Committees have an immensely important part to play. They must cover the whole of Russia. For some time their development has been quite rapid. The other day a Congress of Poor Peasants' Committees of the Northern Region was held in Petrograd. Instead of the 7,000 representatives expected, 20,000 actually turned up, and the hall booked for the purpose could not accommodate them all. The fine weather came to the rescue and the meeting was held in the square outside the Winter Palace.

The Congress showed that the rural civil war is being properly understood: the poor peasants are uniting and fighting together against the kulaks, the rich and the parasites.

Our Party Central Committee has drawn up a plan for reforming the Poor Peasants' Committees which will be submitted for the approval of the Sixth Congress of Soviets. We have decided that the Poor Peasants' Committees and the rural Soviets must not exist separately, otherwise there will be squabbling and too much useless talk. We shall merge the Poor Peasants' Committees with the Soviets and turn the Poor Peasants' Committees into Soviets.

We know kulaks sometimes worm their way even into the Poor Peasants' Committees. If this continues the poor peasants will have the same sort of attitude towards the Committees as they had towards the kulak Soviets of Kerensky and Avksentyev. A change of name will fool nobody. It is therefore proposed to hold new elections to the Poor Peasants' Committees. The right to vote will only go to those who do not exploit the labour of others, who do not

PROMETEA TOMAS NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

make the starving people a source of plunder, and who do not profiteer on or conceal grain surpluses. There must be no place for kulaks and parasites in the proletarian Poor Peasants' Committees.

The Soviet government has decided to assign one thousand million rubles to a special fund for improving farming. All existing and newly formed communes will receive monetary and technical assistance.

We shall send trained experts if they are required. Although most of these experts are counter-revolutionary, the Poor Peasants' Committees should be able to harness them and they will work for the people no worse than they used to work for the exploiters. Our specialists are now quite sure they cannot overthrow the workers' government by sabotage or wilful damage to work.

We are not afraid of foreign imperialism either. Germany has already burnt her fingers in the Ukraine. Instead of the sixty million poods of grain which Germany hoped to carry off from the Ukraine, she got only nine million poods, and Russian Bolshevism into the bargain, for which she was not so keen. (*Storm of applause.*) The British should watch out the same thing does not happen to them. We might warn them not to choke themselves! (*Laughter and applause.*)

The danger, however, continues to exist as long as our brothers abroad have not everywhere rebelled. And we must therefore continue to organise and strengthen our Red Army. The poor peasants should be particularly concerned in this matter for they can only carry on farming under the protection of our army.

Comrades, the transition to the new form of agriculture may perhaps proceed slowly, but the beginnings of communal farming must be carried into practice unswervingly.

There must be no let-up in the fight against the kulaks, and no deals must be made with them.

We can work together with the middle peasants, and with them fight the kulaks. We have nothing against the middle peasants. They may not be socialists, and may never become socialists, but experience will teach them the advantages of socialised farming and the majority of them will not resist.

We tell the kulaks: We have nothing against you either, but hand over your surplus grain, don't profiteer and don't exploit the labour of others. Until you do so we shall hit you with everything we've got.

We are taking nothing from the working peasants; but we shall completely expropriate all those who employ hired labour and who grow rich at the expense of others. (*Stormy applause.*)

Byednota No. 185
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TELEGRAM TO ALL SOVIETS OF DEPUTIES, TO EVERYONE

10.11 .18

News came from Germany in the night about the victory of the revolution there. First Kiel radio announced that power was in the hands of a Council of Workers and Sailors. Then Berlin made the following announcement:

"Greetings of peace and freedom to all. Berlin and the surrounding districts are in the hands of a Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Adolf Hoffmann, Deputy to the Seym. Joffe and the Embassy staff are returning at once."

Please take every step to notify German soldiers at all border points. Berlin also reports that German soldiers at the front have arrested the peace delegation from the former German Government and have begun peace negotiations themselves with the French soldiers.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars

Pravda No. 244,
November 12, 1918

Published according to
the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN[71] NOVEMBER 19, 1918

(*Comrade Lenin is greeted by the delegates with stormy applause.*) Comrades, in a certain sense this Congress of the women's section of the workers' army has a special significance, because one of the hardest things in every country has been to stir the women into action. There can be no socialist revolution unless very many working women take a big part in it.

In all civilised countries, even the most advanced, women are actually no more than domestic slaves. Women do not enjoy full equality in any capitalist state, not even in the freest of republics.

One of the primary tasks of the Soviet Republic is to abolish all restrictions on women's rights. The Soviet government has completely abolished divorce proceedings, that source of bourgeois degradation, repression and humiliation.

It will soon be a year now since complete freedom of divorce was legislated. We have passed a decree annulling all distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children and removing political restrictions. Nowhere else in the world have equality and freedom for working women been so fully established.

We know that it is the working-class woman who has to bear the full brunt of antiquated codes.

For the first time in history, our law has removed everything that denied women rights. But the important thing is not the law. In the cities and industrial areas this law on complete freedom of marriage is doing all right, but in

the countryside it all too frequently remains a dead letter. There the religious marriage still predominates. This is due to the influence of the priests, an evil that is harder to combat than the old legislation.

We must be extremely careful in fighting religious prejudices- some people cause a lot of harm in this struggle by offending religious feelings. We must use propaganda and education. By lending too sharp an edge to the struggle we may only arouse popular resentment; such methods of struggle tend to perpetuate the division of the people along religious lines, whereas our strength lies in unity. The deepest source of religious prejudice is poverty and ignorance; and that is the evil we have to combat.

The status of women up to now has been compared to that of a slave; women have been tied to the home, and only socialism can save them from this. They will only be completely emancipated when we change from small-scale individual farming to collective farming and collective working of the land. That is a difficult task. But now that Poor Peasants' Committees are being formed, the time has come when the socialist revolution is being consolidated.

The poorest part of the rural population is only now beginning to organise, and socialism is acquiring a firm foundation in these organisations of poor peasants.

Before, often the town became revolutionary and then the countryside.

But the present revolution relies on the countryside, and therein lie its significance and strength. The experience of all liberation movements has shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the women take part in it. The Soviet government is doing everything in its power to enable women to carry on independent proletarian socialist work.

The Soviet government is in a difficult position because the imperialists of all countries hate Soviet Russia and are preparing to go to war with her for kindling the fire of revolution in a number of countries and for taking determined steps towards socialism.

Now that they are out to destroy revolutionary Russia, the ground is beginning to burn under their own feet. You know how the revolutionary movement is spreading in Ger-

many. In Denmark the workers are fighting their government. In Switzerland and Holland the revolutionary movement is getting stronger. The revolutionary movement in these small countries has no importance in itself, but it is particularly significant because there was no war in these countries and they had the most "constitutional" democratic system. If countries like these are stirring into action, it makes us sure the revolutionary movement is gaining ground all over the world.

No other republic has so far been able to emancipate woman. The Soviet government is helping her. Our cause is invincible because the invincible working class is rising in all countries. This movement signifies the spread of the invincible socialist revolution. (*Prolonged applause. All sing the "Internationale"*.)

Newspaper report published November 20, 1918 in *Izvestia* No. 253

Published according to the typewritten copy of the minutes checked with the newspaper text

SPEECH AT A RALLY IN LENIN'S HONOUR NOVEMBER 20, 1918[72]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Comrade Lenin is greeted with stormy applause passing into ovation.*) Comrades, I should like to say a few words about a letter in today's *Pravda*. The letter is written by Pitirim Sorokin, a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly and Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Sorokin informs his constituents that he is relinquishing his seat in the Constituent Assembly and withdrawing completely from politics. Apart from being an extremely interesting "human document", the letter has a great deal of political significance.

As is fairly well known, Pitirim Sorokin was the main force on the staff of the Right-wing S.R. *Volya Naroda*[73] which connived with the Cadets. To admit this in the press is quite a *volte-face*, a big change, which is taking place among people who had been violently hostile to the Soviet government up till now. In saying that in many cases the policy of certain statesmen is socially harmful, Pitirim Sorokin shows that he is publicly and hohestly admitting at last that the whole policy of the Right-wing S.R.s was socially harmful.

Through recent events, many members of this party are beginning to realise that the time has come when the Bolshevik stand is being proved right and all the blunders and errors of its inveterate enemies are being exposed.

Sorokin's letter goes to show that at the given moment we can count on at least a neutral attitude to the Soviet government from a whole number of groups now antagonistic.

The monstrous Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty turned many away from us, many did not believe in revolution, many piously trusted the pure intentions of the Allies; and now all this has been exposed and everyone can see that the notorious Allies, having dictated even more monstrous peace terms to Germany than those at Brest-Litovsk, are just as rapacious as the German imperialists.

As we all know, the Allies are supporters of the monarchy in Russia: in Archangel, for instance, they are actively backing the monarchists. The British are attacking Russia to take the place of the vanquished German imperialists. All this has opened the eyes of even the most inveterate and uninformed enemies of the revolution.

Many people had been blind supporters of the Constituent Assembly up till now, although we had always said it was just a slogan of the landowners, the monarchists and the entire bourgeoisie with Milyukov at their head, who is selling Russia left, right and centre to the highest bidder.

The "Republic" of America is oppressing the working class. Now everyone knows what a democratic republic actually is. Now it is apparent to everyone that either victorious imperialism or Soviet power can exist—there's no middle way. (*Lenin's speech is repeatedly interrupted by stormy ovations.*)

Pravda No. 253,
November 22, 1918

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

THE VALUABLE ADMISSIONS OF PITIRIM SOROKIN

Pravda today carries a remarkably interesting letter by Pitirim Sorokin, to which the special attention of all Communists should be drawn. In this letter, which was originally published in *Izvestia of the North Dvina Executive Committee*,[74] Pitirim Sorokin announces that he is leaving the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party and relinquishing his seat in the Constituent Assembly. His motives are that he finds it difficult to provide effective political recipes, not only for others, but even for himself, and that therefore he "is withdrawing completely from politics". He writes: "The past year of revolution has taught me one truth: politicians may make mistakes, politics may be socially useful, but may also be socially harmful, whereas scientific and educational work is always useful and is always needed by the people...." The letter is signed: "Pitirim Sorokin, lecturer at St. Petersburg University and the Psycho-Neurological Institute, former member of the Constituent Assembly and former member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party".

This letter is worth mentioning in the first place because it is an extremely interesting "human document". We do not often meet such sincerity and frankness as are displayed by Sorokin in admitting the mistakenness of his politics. In practically the majority of cases politicians who become convinced that the line they have been pursuing is erroneous try to conceal their change of front, to hush it up, to "invent" more or less extraneous motives, and so on. A frank and honest admission of one's political error is in itself an important political act. Pitirim Sorokin is wrong when he says that scientific work "is always useful".

For mistakes are made in this sphere too, and there are examples also in Russian literature of the obstinate advocacy of, for instance, reactionary philosophical views by people who are not conscious reactionaries. On the other hand, a frank declaration by a prominent person—i.e., a person who has occupied a responsible political post known to the people at large—that he is withdrawing from politics *is also politics*. An honest confession of a political error may be of great political benefit to many people if the error was shared by whole parties which at one time enjoyed influence over the people.

The political significance of Pitirim Sorokin's letter is very great precisely at the present moment. It is a "lesson" which we should all seriously think over and learn thoroughly.

It is a truth long known to every Marxist that in every capitalist society the only *decisive* forces are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, while all social elements occupying a position between these classes and coming within the economic category of the petty bourgeoisie *inevitably* vacillate between these decisive forces. But there is an enormous gulf between academic recognition of this truth and the ability to draw the conclusions that follow from it in the complex conditions of practical reality.

Pitirim Sorokin is representative of the Menshevik Socialist-Revolutionary trend, an extremely broad public and political trend. That this is a single trend, that the difference between the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in their attitude towards the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is insignificant, is especially convincingly and strikingly borne out by the events in the Russian revolution since February 1917. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries are varieties of petty-bourgeois democrats—that is the economic essence and fundamental political characteristic of the trend in question. We know from the history of the advanced countries how frequently this trend in its early stages assumes a "socialist" hue.

What was it that several months ago so forcibly repelled those of this trend from the Bolsheviks, from the proletarian revolution, and what is it that is now inducing them to

shift from hostility to neutrality? It is quite obvious that the cause of this shift was, firstly, the collapse of German imperialism in connection with the revolution in Germany and other countries, and the exposure of Anglo-French imperialism, and, secondly, the dispelling of bourgeois-democratic illusions.

Let us deal with the first cause. Patriotism is one of the most deeply ingrained sentiments, inculcated by the existence of separate fatherlands for hundreds and thousands of years. One of the most pronounced, one might say exceptional, difficulties of our proletarian revolution is that it was obliged to pass through a phase of extreme departure from patriotism, the phase of the Brest-Litovsk Peace. The bitterness, resentment, and violent indignation provoked by this peace were easy to understand and it goes without saying that we Marxists could expect only the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to appreciate the truth that we were making and were obliged to make great national sacrifices for the sake of the supreme interests of the world proletarian revolution. There was no source from which ideologists who are not Marxists, and the broad mass of the working people, who do not belong to the proletariat trained in the long school of strikes and revolution, could derive either a firm conviction that the revolution was maturing, or an unreserved devotion to it. At best, our tactics appeared to them a fantastic, fanatical, and adventurist sacrifice of the real and most obvious interests of hundreds of millions for the sake of an abstract, utopian, and dubious hope of something that might occur abroad. And the petty bourgeoisie, owing to their economic position, are more patriotic than the bourgeoisie or the proletariat.

But it turned out as we had said.

German imperialism, which had seemed to be the only enemy, collapsed. The German revolution, which had appeared to be a "dream-farce" (to use Plekhanov's expression), became a fact. Anglo-French imperialism, which the fantasy of the petty-bourgeois democrats had pictured as a friend of democracy and a protector of the oppressed, turned out to be a savage beast which imposed on the German Republic and the people of Austria terms worse than those of Brest, a savage beast which used armies of "free" republicans—French

and American—as gendarmes, butchers and throttlers of the independence and freedom of small and weak nations. Anglo-French imperialism was exposed by world history with ruthless thoroughness and frankness. The facts of world history demonstrated to the Russian patriots, who formerly would hear of nothing that was not to the direct advantage (as formerly understood) of their country, that the transformation of our Russian revolution into a socialist revolution was not a dubious venture but a necessity, for *there was no other* alternative: Anglo-French and American imperialism will *inevitably* destroy the independence and freedom of Russia *if* the world socialist revolution, world Bolshevism, does not triumph.

Facts are stubborn things, as the English say. And during recent months we have witnessed facts that signify a most momentous turning-point in world history. These facts are compelling the petty-bourgeois democrats of Russia, in spite of their hatred of Bolshevism, a hatred inculcated by the history of our inner-Party struggle, to turn from hostility to Bolshevism first to neutrality and then to support of Bolshevism. The objective conditions which repelled these democratic patriots from us most strongly have now vanished. The objective conditions existing in the world now *compel* them to turn to us. Pitirim Sorokin's change of front is by no means fortuitous, but rather the symptom of an inevitable change of front on the part of a *whole class*, of the whole petty-bourgeois democracy. Whoever fails to reckon with this fact and to take advantage of it is a bad socialist, not a Marxist.

Furthermore, faith in "democracy" *in general*, as a universal panacea, and failure to understand that this democracy is *bourgeois* democracy, historically limited in its usefulness and its necessity, have for decades and centuries been particularly characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie of all countries. The big bourgeois is case-hardened; he knows that under capitalism a democratic republic, like every other form of state, is nothing but a machine for the suppression of the proletariat. The big bourgeois *knows* this from his most intimate acquaintance with the real leaders and with the most profound (and therefore frequently the most concealed) springs of *every* bourgeois state machine. The petty

bourgeois, Owning to his economic position and his conditions of life generally, is less able to appreciate this truth, and even cherishes the illusion that a democratic republic implies "pure democracy", "a free people's state", the non-class or supra-class rule of the people, a pure manifestation of the will of the people, and so on and so forth. The tenacity of these prejudices of the petty-bourgeois democrat is inevitably due to the fact that he is farther removed from the acute class struggle, the stock exchange, and "real" politics; and it would be absolutely un-Marxist to expect these prejudices to be eradicated very rapidly by propaganda alone.

World history, however, is moving with such furious rapidity, is smashing everything customary and established with a hammer of such immense weight, by crises of such unparalleled intensity, that the most tenacious prejudices are giving way. The naïve belief in a Constituent Assembly and the naïve habit of contrasting "pure democracy" with "proletarian dictatorship" took shape naturally and inevitably in the mind of the "democrat in general". But the experiences of the Constituent Assembly supporters in Archangel, Samara, Siberia and the South could not but destroy even the most tenacious of prejudices. The idealised democratic republic of Wilson *proved* in practice to be a form of the most rabid imperialism, of the most shameless oppression and suppression of weak and small nations. The average "democrat" in general, the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary, thought: "How can we even dream of some allegedly superior type of state, some Soviet government? God grant us even an ordinary democratic republic!" And, of course, in "ordinary", comparatively peaceful times he could have kept on cherishing this "hope" for many a long decade.

Now, however, the course of world events and the bitter lessons derived from the alliance of all the Russian monarchists with Anglo-French and American imperialism are proving *in practice* that a democratic republic is a bourgeois-democratic republic, which is already out of date from the point of view of the problems which imperialism has placed before history. They show that there is no *other* alternative: *either* Soviet government triumphs in every advanced country

in the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs, the most savage imperialism, which is throttling the small and weak nations and reinstating reaction all over the world—Anglo-American imperialism, which has perfectly mastered the art of using the form of a democratic republic.

One or the other.

There is no middle course. Until quite recently this view was regarded as the blind fanaticism of the Bolsheviks.

But it turned out to be true.

If Pitirim Sorokin has relinquished his seat in the Constituent Assembly, it is not without reason; it is a symptom of a change of front on the part of a whole class, the petty-bourgeois democrats. A split among them is inevitable: one section will come over to our side, another section will remain neutral, while a third will deliberately join forces with the monarchist Constitutional-Democrats, who are selling Russia to Anglo-American capital and seeking to crush the revolution with the aid of foreign bayonets. One of the most urgent tasks of the present day is to take into account and make use of the turn among the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary democrats from hostility to Bolshevism first to neutrality and then to support of Bolshevism.

Every slogan the Party addresses to the people is bound to become petrified, become a dead letter, yet remain valid for many even when the conditions which rendered it necessary have changed. That is an unavoidable evil, and it is impossible to ensure the correctness of Party policy unless we learn to combat and overcome it. The period of our proletarian revolution in which the differences with the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary democrats were particularly acute was a historically necessary period. It was impossible to avoid waging a vigorous struggle against these democrats when they swung to the camp of our enemies and set about restoring a *bourgeois and imperialist* democratic republic. Many of the slogans of this struggle have now become frozen and petrified and *prevent* us from properly assessing and taking effective advantage of the new period, in which a change of front has begun among these democrats, a change in our direction, not a fortuitous change, but one rooted deep in the conditions of the international situation.

It is not enough to encourage this change of front and amicably greet those who are making it. A politician who knows what he is working for must learn to *bring about* this change of front among the various sections and groups of the broad mass of petty-bourgeois democrats if he is convinced that serious and deep-going historical reasons for such a turn exist. A revolutionary proletarian must know whom to suppress and with whom—and when and how—to conclude an agreement. It would be ridiculous and foolish to refrain from employing terror against and suppressing the landowners and capitalists and their henchmen, who are selling Russia to the foreign imperialist "Allies". It would be farcical to attempt to "convince" or generally to "psychologically influence" them. But it would be equally foolish and ridiculous—if not more so—to insist only on tactics of suppression and terror in relation to the petty-bourgeois democrats when the course of events is compelling them to turn in our direction.

The proletariat encounters these democrats everywhere. Our task in the rural districts is to destroy the landowner and smash the resistance of the exploiter and the kulak profiteer. For this purpose we can safely rely *only* on the semi-proletarians, the "poor peasants". But the middle peasant is not our enemy. He wavered, is wavering, and will continue to waver. The task of influencing the waverers *is not identical* with the task of overthrowing the exploiter and defeating the active enemy. The task at the present moment is to come to an agreement with the middle peasant—while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak and at the same time firmly relying solely on the poor peasant—for a turn in our direction on the part of the middle peasants is now inevitable owing to the causes enumerated above.

This applies also to the handicraftsman, the artisan, and the worker whose conditions are most petty-bourgeois or whose views are most petty-bourgeois, and to many office workers and army officers, and, in particular, to the intellectuals generally. It is an unquestionable fact that there often are instances in our Party of inability to make use of this change of front among them and that this inability can and must be overcome.

We already have the firm support of the vast majority of the proletarians organised in the trade unions. We must know how to win over the least proletarian and most petty-bourgeois sections of the *working people* who are turning towards us, to include them in the general organisation and to subject them to general proletarian discipline. The slogan of the moment here is not to fight these sections, but to win them over, to be able to influence them, to convince the waverers, to make use of those who are neutral, and, by mass proletarian influence, to educate those who are lagging behind or who have only very recently begun to free themselves from "Constituent Assembly" or "patriotic-democratic" illusions.

We already have sufficiently firm support among the working people. This was quite strikingly borne out by the Sixth Congress of Soviets. We are not afraid of the bourgeois intellectuals, but we shall not for a moment relax the struggle against the deliberate saboteurs and white-guards among them. But the slogan of the moment is to make use of the change of attitude towards us which is taking place among them. There still remain plenty of the worst bourgeois specialists who have wormed themselves into Soviet positions. To throw them out, to replace them by specialists who yesterday were our convinced enemies and today are only neutral is one of the most important tasks of the present moment, the task of every active Soviet functionary who comes into contact with the "specialists", of every agitator, propagandist, and organiser.

Of course, like every other political action in a complex and rapidly changing situation, agreement with the middle peasant, with the worker who was a Menshevik yesterday and with the office worker or specialist who was a saboteur yesterday, takes skill to achieve. The whole point is not to rest content with the skill we have acquired by previous experience, but *under all circumstances to go on*, *under all circumstances to strive for something bigger*, under all circumstances to proceed from simpler to more difficult tasks. Otherwise, no progress whatever is possible and in particular no progress is possible in socialist construction.

The other day I was visited by representatives from a congress of delegates of credit co-operative societies. They

showed me the congress resolution[75] protesting *against the merger* of the Credit Co-operative Bank with the People's Bank of the Republic. I told them that I stood for agreement with the middle peasants and highly valued even the beginnings of a change in attitude from hostility to neutrality towards the Bolsheviks on the part of the co-operators, but the basis for an agreement could be created only by their consent to the complete merger of their special bank with the single Bank of the Republic. The congress delegates thereupon replaced their resolution by another, which they had the congress adopt, and in which everything hostile to the merger was deleted; *but ... but* what they proposed was a plan for a special "credit union" of co-operators, which in fact differed in no way from a special bank! That was ridiculous. Only a fool, of course, will be deceived by such verbiage. But the "failure" of one such ... "attempt" will not affect our policy in the least; we have pursued and will pursue a policy of agreement with the co-operators, the middle peasants, at the same time suppressing every attempt to change the *policy* of the Soviet government and of Soviet socialist construction.

Vacillation on the part of the petty-bourgeois democrats is inevitable. It was enough for the Czechs to win a few victories for these democrats to fall into a panic, to begin to spread panic, to hasten to the side of the "victors", and be ready to greet them in a servile manner. Of course, it must not be forgotten for a moment that now, too, any partial success of, let us say, the Anglo-American-Krasnov whiteguards would be enough for vacillation to begin in the other direction, increasing panic and multiplying cases of the dissemination of panic, of treachery, and desertion to the imperialists, and so on and so forth.

We are aware of that. We shall not forget it. The purely proletarian basis we have won for the Soviet government, which is supported by the semi-proletarians, will remain firm and enduring. Our ranks will not falter, our army will not waver—that we already know from experience. But when profound world-historic changes bring about an inevitable turn in our direction among the mass of non-Party, Menshevik, and Socialist-Revolutionary democrats, we must learn and shall learn to make use of this change of front, to

encourage it, to induce it among the various groups and sections of the population, to do everything possible to reach agreement with them and thus facilitate the work of socialist construction and ease the burden of grievous economic dislocation, ignorance, and incompetence which are delaying the victory of socialism.

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Published November 21, 1918
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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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the *Pravda* text

SPEECH ON RED OFFICERS' DAY NOVEMBER 24, 1918[76]

(*Thunderous applause*, *singing of the* "*Internationale*".) Greetings on behalf of the People's Commissars. Whenever I think about the tasks of our army and Red officers, I recall something that happened in a train on Finnish Railways not so long ago.

I noticed that the passengers were smiling at something an old Finnish woman was saying, so I asked someone to translate her words. She was comparing the revolutionary soldiers to the old soldiers and saying that the former protected the poor whereas the latter used to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. "Formerly the poor man had to pay heavily for every stick of wood he took without permission," the old woman said. "But when you meet a soldier in the woods nowadays he'll even give you a hand with your bundle of sticks. You don't have to fear the man with the gun any more," she said.

I think it would be hard to imagine any better tribute to the Red Army than that.

Most of the old officers were the spoiled and depraved darling sons of capitalists, who had nothing in common with the private soldier. So in building our new army now, we must draw our officers solely from among the people. Only Red officers will have any respect among the soldiers and be able to strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible.

Izvestia No. 258,
November 26, 1918

Published according to
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SPEECH DELIVERED TO A MEETING OF DELEGATES FROM THE MOSCOW CENTRAL WORKERS' CO-OPERATIVE NOVEMBER 26, 1918[77]

(*Comrade Lenin's appearance is greeted with stormy, prolonged applause.*) Comrades, greetings to you representatives of the workers' co-operative societies that have a tremendous part to play in setting the whole business of supply on the proper lines. In the Council of People's Commissars we have frequently, especially just lately, had to discuss questions that concern co-operative societies and the attitude of the workers' and peasants' government towards them.

In this respect we should remember how important the role of the co-operative movement was under capitalism, when it functioned on the principle of fighting the capitalist class economically.

It is certainly true that in their approach to the practical work of distribution, the co-operatives often turned the interests of the people into the interests of a group of individuals, and were often guided by the urge to share trading profits with the capitalists. With purely commercial interests as their guide, the co-operators often forgot about the socialist system that seemed to them to be too far away, or even unattainable.

The co-operatives were often associations of mainly petty-bourgeois people, middle peasants, whose efforts in the co-operative movement were governed by their own petty-bourgeois interests. Nevertheless these co-operatives undoubtedly helped to encourage popular initiative, thereby

rendering a great service. They really did build big economic organisations based on popular initiative, and in this, we must admit, they played an important role.

In some cases these economic organisations developed into institutions capable of replacing or complementing the capitalist apparatus; this is something we should recognise. But in the meantime the urban workers had been drawn into the organisation of large-scale capitalist industry to such an extent that they had grown strong enough to overthrow the landowning and capitalist class, and to be capable of utilising the entire capitalist apparatus.

The urban workers well appreciated that owing to the disorder caused by the imperialist war the supply system had to be put in order and for that purpose they used, first and foremost, the big economic apparatus of the capitalists.

We must keep that in mind. The co-operative movement is a huge cultural legacy that we must treasure and make use of.

Hence we approached the problem cautiously in the Council of People's Commissars when we had to deal with it, knowing full well how important it was to make full use of that efficient economic apparatus.

Yet we had to bear in mind that the chief co-operative workers were Mensheviks, Right S.R.s and members of other compromise and petty-bourgeois parties. We could not forget that while the political groups between the two warring classes used the co-operatives partially as a screen for counter-revolutionaries, even to support the Czechs out of their funds. We had evidence of this all right. This, however, was certainly not the case everywhere and we frequently invited the co-operatives to work with us, if they wished to.

Soviet Russia's international position has recently become such that many petty-bourgeois groups have come to realise the importance of the workers' and peasants' government.

When Soviet Russia was faced with the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and we were forced to conclude that very harsh peace with the German imperialists, the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s were particularly vociferous in attacking us. When Soviet Russia was forced to conclude that peace,

the Mensheviks and S.R.s raised a hue and cry that the Bolsheviks were ruining Russia.

Some of those people thought the Bolsheviks were utopians, dreamers who believed in the possibility of world revolution. Others thought the Bolsheviks were agents of German imperialism.

Furthermore, many of them in those days assumed that the Bolsheviks had made concessions to German imperialism and gloated over this being an agreement with the ruling German bourgeoisie.

I won't mention other expressions unflattering, to say the least, that these groups then hurled at the Soviet government.

Recent events all over the world, however, have taught the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s a great deal. The Menshevik Central Committee appeal to all working people[78] published recently in our press states that although they have ideological differences with the Communists they consider it necessary to fight world imperialism today headed by the Anglo-American capitalists.

Indeed, events of tremendous importance have occurred. Soviets of Workers' Deputies have been formed in Rumania and Austria-Hungary. In Germany the Soviets have opposed the Constituent Assembly and soon, perhaps in a few weeks, the Haase-Scheidemann government will fall and be replaced by the Liebknecht government. At the same time the British and French capitalists are doing all they can to crush the Russian revolution and thereby halt the world revolution. Everyone now realises that the aspirations of Allied imperialism go even farther than those of German imperialism; the terms imposed on Germany are even worse than those of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, and on top of that they want to crush the revolution and be world gendarmes. The Mensheviks have shown by their resolution that they realise which way the British winds are blowing. We must not now turn them away, on the contrary, we must meet them halfway and give them a chance to work with us.

Last April the Communists showed they were not averse to working with co-operators. It is the job of the Communists, relying on the support of the urban proletariat, to be able to use all those who can be enlisted for the work,

who formerly adopted socialist slogans but did not have the courage to continue fighting for them until they achieved victory or were defeated. Marx said the proletariat must expropriate the capitalists and make use of petty-bourgeois groups. And we said everything must be taken from the capitalists but only pressure must be brought to bear on the kulaks and they must be kept under the control of the grain monopoly. We must come to an agreement with the middle peasants, bring them under our control, while at the same time actually promoting the ideals of socialism.

We must say forthrightly that the workers and poor peasants will do all they can to really promote the ideals of socialism, and if there are people out of step with these ideals, we shall go it alone. We must, however, make use of everyone who can really help us in this most difficult struggle.

When discussing these questions last April the Council of People's Commissars came to an agreement with the co-operators.[79] This was the only meeting that was attended by members of the non-government co-operative movement as well as the Communist People's Commissars.

We came to an agreement with them. This was the only meeting that adopted a decision by a minority, by co-operators, and not by a majority of Communists.

The Council of People's Commissars did this because it thought it necessary to make use of the experience and knowledge of the co-operators and of their apparatus.

You also know that a decree[80] on the organisation of supply was adopted a few days ago and published in Sunday's *Izvestia*, and which allots a considerable role to the co-operatives and the co-operative movement. This is because socialist economic organisation is impossible without a network of co-operative organisations and because there have been a lot of mistakes in this sphere up to now. Some co-operatives have been closed or nationalised even though the Soviets could not cope with distribution and the organisation of Soviet shops.

By the decree everything taken from the co-operatives must be returned to them.

The co-operatives must be denationalised and re-established.

True enough, the decree is cautious towards co-operatives that were closed because counter-revolutionaries had wormed their way into them. We categorically stated that in this respect the work of the co-operatives had to be kept under control, although they must be fully utilised.

All of you well appreciate that one of the proletariat's chief tasks is the immediate and proper organisation of the supply and distribution of food.

Since we do have an apparatus with the necessary experience and which, most important of all, is based on popular initiative, we must set it to fulfilling these tasks. It is particularly important to utilise the initiative of the people who created these organisations. The ordinary people must be drawn into this work, and this is the main task we must set the co-operatives, the workers' co-operatives in particular.

The supply and distribution of food is something everyone understands. Even a man with no book-learning understands. And in Russia most people are still ignorant and illiterate because everything had been done to prevent the working and exploited people from acquiring education.

Yet there are very many live wires among the people who can display tremendous ability, far greater than might be imagined. It is, therefore, the duty of the workers' co-operatives to enlist these people, to nose them out and give them direct work in the supply and distribution of food. Socialist society is one single co-operative.

I do not doubt that popular initiative in the workers' co-operatives will indeed lead to the conversion of the workers' co-operatives into a single Moscow city consumers' commune.

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MOSCOW PARTY WORKERS' MEETING NOVEMBER 27, 1918[81]

1

REPORT ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PROLETARIAT TO PETTY-BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATS

Comrades, I should like to talk about the tasks facing our Party and the Soviet government in connection with the policy of the proletariat towards the petty-bourgeois democrats. Recent events have undoubtedly brought this question to the fore because the vast changes in the international situation—such as the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the revolution in Germany, the collapse of German imperialism and the disintegration of British and American imperialism—were bound to undermine a number of bourgeois-democratic tenets underlying the theory of the petty-bourgeois democrats. Russia's military position and the onslaught of the British, French and American imperialists were bound to bring some of the petty-bourgeois democrats more or less over to our side. What I should like to talk about this evening are the changes we must make in our tactics and the new tasks before us.

Let me begin with certain fundamental theoretical propositions. There can be no doubt that the chief social group which gives the petty-bourgeois democrats an economic basis is, in Russia, the middle peasants. Undoubtedly the socialist revolution and the transition from capitalism to socialism are bound to assume special forms in a country where the peasant population is numerically large. I should therefore like first to remind you of the main tenets of Marxism with regard to the proletariat's attitude to the middle peasants. I shall do so by reading some of Engels's

statements in his article "The Peasant Question in France and Germany". This article, published in pamphlet form, was written in 1894 or 1895, when the agrarian programme of the socialist party, its attitude towards the peasants, became a practical issue in connection with the discussion of the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party at its Breslau Congress.[82] This is what Engels had to say about the attitude of the proletariat:

"What, then, is our attitude towards the small peasantry?

"To begin with, the French programme is absolutely correct in stating: that we foresee the inevitable doom of the small peasant but that it is not our mission to hasten it by any interference on our part.

"Secondly, it is just as evident that when we are in possession of state power we shall not even think of forcibly expropriating the small peasants (regardless of whether with or without compensation), as we shall have to do in the case of the big landowners. Our task relative to the small peasant consists, in the first place, in effecting a transition of his private enterprise and private possession to co-operative ones, not forcibly but by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose."

Engels says further:

"Neither now nor at any time in the future can we promise the small-holding peasants to preserve their individual property and individual enterprise against the overwhelming power of capitalist production. We can only promise them that we shall not interfere in their property relations by force, against their will."[83]

And the last statement I would like to quote is the argument about the rich peasants, the big peasants, the kulaks as we call them in Russia, peasants who employ hired labour. Unless these peasants realise the inevitability of the doom of their present mode of production and draw the necessary conclusions, Marxists cannot do anything for them. Our duty is only to facilitate their transition, too, to the new mode of production.[84]

These are the tenets which I wanted to quote to you and which are no doubt known to every Communist. It follows that when the workers come to power, they cannot have the same task in countries where large-scale capitalism predom-

inates and in countries where backward, small, middle and big peasants predominate. Thus, we were interpreting Marxism quite correctly when we said it was our duty to wage war on the landowners, the exploiters.

For the middle peasant we say: no force under any circumstances. For the big peasant we say: our aim is to bring him under the control of the grain monopoly and fight him when he violates the monopoly and conceals grain. I expounded these principles the other day at a meeting of several hundred delegates from Poor Peasants' Committees who had come to Moscow at the time the Sixth Congress was being held.* In our Party literature, as in our propaganda and agitation, we have always stressed the distinction between our attitude to the big bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. But although we are all in agreement as to theory, not all of us by a long shot have drawn the correct political conclusions, or drawn them rapidly enough. I deliberately began in a roundabout way, so to speak, to show you what economic concepts about class relations must guide us if our policy towards the petty-bourgeois democrats is to be based on a firm foundation.

There can be no doubt that this small-peasant class (by middle peasant we mean one who does not sell his labour power) in Russia, at any rate, constitutes the chief economic class which is the source of the broad diversity of political trends among the petty-bourgeois democrats. Here in Russia these trends are associated mostly with the Menshevik and S.R. parties. The history of socialism in Russia shows a long struggle between the Bolsheviks and these parties, while West-European socialists have always regarded this struggle as one *within* socialism, that is, as a split in the Russian socialist movement. Incidentally, this view is often expressed even by sound Social-Democrats.

Only today I was handed a letter from Friedrich Adler, a man who is well known for his revolutionary activity in Austria. His letter, which was written at the end of October and received today, contains only one request: to release the Mensheviks from prison. He could find nothing more sensible to write about at a moment like this. True,

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* See pp. 171-78 of this volume.—*Ed.*

he makes the reservation that he is not well informed about our movement, and so on. But still this is typical. This silly mistake by West-European socialists comes from them looking backwards instead of forwards, and not realising that neither the Mensheviks nor the S.R.s, who preach socialism, can be classed as socialists. All through the 1917 revolution the Mensheviks and S.R.s did nothing but vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; they could never stick to a correct stand, as though to deliberately illustrate Marx's words that the petty bourgeoisie are incapable of taking an independent stand in decisive battles.

As soon as they began to form the Soviets, the workers instinctively took up a firm class stand by the very act of establishing them. The Mensheviks and S.R.s, on the other hand, vacillated all the time. And when in the spring and summer of 1917 their own friends labelled them semi-Bolsheviks, this was a true description, not merely a witticism. On every single issue they would say "yes" one day and "no" the next, whether it was the question of the Soviets, the revolutionary movement in the countryside, the direct seizure of land, fraternisation at the front, or whether to support imperialism. They would help on the one hand, and hinder on the other, all the time displaying their spinelessness and helplessness. Yet their propaganda among the people for the Soviets, which they always referred to as revolutionary democracy and contrasted with what they called the propertied elements, was only a cunning political device on their part, and the masses whom they addressed were carried away by this propaganda. Thus the Menshevik preaching was partly of service to us too.

This is a very complex question with a wealth of history behind it. I need only dwell on it briefly. This policy of the Mensheviks and S.R.s before our very eyes is conclusive proof of our assertion that it is wrong to regard them as socialists. If they had at any time been socialists, it was only in their phraseology and reminiscences; in fact they are nothing but Russian petty bourgeois.

I began with the attitude Marxists should adopt towards the middle peasant, or, in other words, towards the petty-bourgeois parties. We are now coming to a stage when our

slogans of the previous period of the revolution must be changed to take proper account of the present turn of events. You know that in October and November these people wavered.

The Bolshevik Party stood firm then and rightly so. We said we should have to destroy the enemies of the proletariat, and were facing a battle on the fundamental issues of war or peace, of bourgeois representation, and of Soviet government. In all these questions we only had our own forces to rely on, and we were absolutely right when we refused to compromise with the petty-bourgeois democrats.

The subsequent course of events confronted us with the question of peace and the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. You know that the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty repelled the petty bourgeoisie from us.

The petty-bourgeois democrats sharply recoiled from us as a consequence of these two circumstances: our foreign policy, which led to the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, on the one hand, and our ruthless struggle against democratic illusions on the part of a section of the petty-bourgeois democrats, our ruthless struggle for the Soviet government, on the other. You know that after the Brest-Litovsk Peace, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries began to waver, some taking to open warfare, and others splitting up, and still splitting up to this day. But the fact remains. Of course, we cannot doubt for one minute or one little bit that our policy was absolutely right. To start proving that now would be to reiterate the fundamentals, because the German revolution has proved more than anything else that our views were correct.

What we were reproached for most after the Brest-Litovsk Peace, and what we heard most often from the less enlightened workers, was that our hopes of a German revolution were in vain and were not being fulfilled. The German revolution has refuted all these reproaches and has proved we were right in our view that it had to come and that we had to fight German imperialism by propaganda and by undermining it from within as well as by a national war. Events have justified us so fully that no further proof is needed. The very same applies to the Constituent Assembly; vacillations on this score were inevitable, and events

have proved the correctness of our views so fully that all the revolutions now starting up in the West are taking place under the slogan of Soviet government and are setting up Soviet government. Soviets are the distinguishing feature of the revolution everywhere. They have spread from Austria and Germany to Holland and Switzerland, countries with the oldest democratic culture, which call themselves Western Europe even in relation to Germany. In these countries the demand for Soviet government is being raised. That means that the historical collapse of bourgeois democracy was an absolute historical necessity, not an invention of the Bolsheviks. In Switzerland and Holland, the political struggle took place hundreds of years ago, and it is not for the sake of the Bolsheviks' beautiful eyes that the demand for Soviet government is being raised there now. That means we gauged the situation rightly. Events have borne out the correctness of our tactics so well that it is not worth dwelling on the subject any further. Only we must realise that this is a serious matter, one affecting the most deep-seated prejudices of the petty-bourgeois democrats. Look at the overall history of the bourgeois revolution and parliamentary development in all the West-European countries, and you will find that a similar prejudice prevailed among the old Social-Democrats of the forties in all countries. These views persisted longest of all in France. All this is only natural.

When it comes to parliamentarism, the petty bourgeoisie are the most patriotic, more patriotic than the proletariat or the big bourgeoisie. The latter are more international. The petty bourgeoisie are less mobile, are not connected to the same extent with other nations and are not drawn into the orbit of world trade. It was therefore impossible to expect anything else than that the petty bourgeoisie should be most up in arms over the question of parliamentarism. And this proved to be the case in Russia too. An important factor was that our revolution had to fight against patriotism. At the time of the Brest-Litovsk Peace we had to go against patriotism. We said that if you are a socialist you must sacrifice all your patriotic feelings to the international revolution, which is inevitable, and although it is not here yet you must believe in it if you are an internationalist.

And, naturally, with this sort of talk, we could only hope to win over the advanced workers. It was only natural that the majority of the petty bourgeoisie should not see eye to eye with us. We could scarcely have expected them to. How could the petty bourgeoisie have been expected to accept our point of view? We had to exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat in its harshest form. It took us several months to live through the period of illusions. But if you examine the history of the West-European countries, you will find they did not get over this illusion even in decades. Take the history of Holland, France, Britain, etc. We had to disperse the petty-bourgeois illusion that the people are an integral whole and that the popular will can be expressed other than in class struggle.

We were absolutely right in rejecting all compromise over this. If we had made any concessions to petty-bourgeois illusions, to illusions about the Constituent Assembly, we would have ruined the whole cause of the proletarian revolution in Russia. We would have sacrificed to narrow national interests the interests of the world revolution, which turned out to be proceeding along the Bolshevik course, because it was purely proletarian instead of national. The result of these conditions was that the Menshevik and S.R. petty-bourgeois people recoiled from us. They crossed the barricades and landed in the camp of our enemies. When the Dutov revolt broke out, we saw clearly enough that the political forces that had been fighting us were in the camp of Dutov, Krasnov and Skoropadsky. The proletariat and poor peasants stood on our side.

You know that during the Czech attack, when it was at the height of its success, kulak revolts broke out all over Russia. It was only the close ties formed between the urban workers and the peasants that consolidated our rule. It was only the proletariat, with the help of the poor peasants, that held off all our enemies. The overwhelming majority of both the Mensheviks and the S.R.s sided with the Czechs, the Dutov and Krasnov gangs. This state of affairs forced us to make a ruthless struggle and use terrorist methods of warfare. No matter how much people may have condemned this terrorism from different points of view—and we were condemned by all the vacillating Social-

Democrats—we knew perfectly well it was necessitated by the acute Civil War. It was necessary because all the petty-bourgeois democrats had turned against us. They used all kinds of methods against us—civil war, bribery and sabotage. It was these conditions that necessitated the terror. Therefore we should not repent or renounce it. Only we must clearly appreciate the conditions of our proletarian revolution that gave rise to these acute forms of struggle. These special conditions were that we had to go against patriotism, that we had to replace the Constituent Assembly with the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!"

The change in international politics was inevitably followed by a change in the position of the petty-bourgeois democrats. A change of heart is now occurring in their camp. In the Menshevik appeal we find a call to renounce alliance with the propertied classes, a call to go and fight British and American imperialism addressed by the Mensheviks to their friends, people from among the petty-bourgeois democrats who had concluded an alliance with the Dutov men, the Czechs and the British. It is now clear to everybody that, except for British and American imperialism, there is no force that can put up any sort of stand against the Bolshevik power. Similar vacillations are going on among the S.R.s and the intellectuals, who most of all share the prejudices of the petty-bourgeois democrats and were swayed by patriotic sentiments. The same sort of thing is going on among them too.

Our Party's job now is to be guided by class relations when choosing tactics, and to be perfectly clear whether this is just chance, spinelessness, groundless vacillation, or, on the contrary, a process with deep social roots. The answer is quite obvious if we examine this question as a whole from the standpoint of theoretically established relations between the proletariat and the middle peasants, and from the standpoint of the history of our revolution. This change of front is *not due to chance* or *something personal.* It involves millions and millions of people whose status in Russia is either that of middle peasants or something equivalent. The change of front involves all the petty-bourgeois democrats, who opposed us with a bitterness amount-

ing almost to fury because we had to break down all their patriotic sentiments. But history has veered round to bring patriotism back towards us now. It is evident that the Bolsheviks cannot be overthrown except by foreign bayonets. Up till now the petty bourgeoisie had cherished the illusion that the British, French and Americans stood for real democracy. But now that illusion is being completely dispelled by the peace terms that are being imposed on Austria and Germany. The British are behaving as if they had made a special point of proving the correctness of the Bolshevik views on international imperialism.

Hence voices are being raised in the parties that fought us, as in the Plekhanovite camp, for instance, saying: "We were mistaken, we thought that German imperialism was our chief enemy and that the Western countries—France, Britain and America—would bring us a democratic system." Yet now it appears that the peace terms these Western countries offer are a hundred times more humiliating, rapacious and predatory than our peace terms at Brest-Litovsk. It appears that the British and Americans are acting as the hangmen of Russian freedom, as gendarmes, playing the part of the Russian butcher Nicholas I, and are doing it no less effectively than the kings who played the hangmen in throttling the Hungarian revolution. This part is now being played by Wilson's agents. They are crushing the revolution in Austria, they are playing the gendarme, they are issuing an ultimatum to Switzerland: "You'll get no bread from us if you don't join the fight against the Bolshevik Government." They tell Holland: "Don't you dare allow Soviet ambassadors into your country, or we'll blockade you." Theirs is a simple weapon—the noose of famine. That is what they are using to strangle the peoples.

The history of recent times, of the war and post-war period, has developed with extraordinary speed, and it goes to show that British and French imperialism is just as infamous as German imperialism. Don't forget that even in America, where we have the freest and most democratic of all republics, that does not prevent its imperialists from behaving just as brutally. Internationalists are not only lynched, they are dragged into the street by the mob, stripped naked, tarred and burned.

Events are exposing the imperialists most effectively, and posing the alternative: either a Soviet government, or the complete suppression of the revolution by British and French bayonets. There is no longer any question of an agreement with Kerensky. As you know, they have thrown him away like a squeezed lemon. They joined forces with Dutov and Krasnov. Now the petty bourgeoisie have got over that phase. Patriotism is now pushing them to us—that is how things have turned out, that is how history has compelled them to act. And we must all draw a lesson from this great experience of all world history. The bourgeoisie cannot be defended, the Constituent Assembly cannot be defended, because it in fact played into the hands of the Dutovs and Krasnovs. It seems funny that they should have been for the Constituent Assembly, but that happened because the bourgeoisie were still on top when it was being convened. The Constituent Assembly turned out to be an organ of the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie turned out to be on the side of the imperialists, whose policy was directed against the Bolsheviks. The bourgeoisie were prepared to go to any lengths, to resort to the vilest means to throttle the Soviet government, to sell Russia to anybody, only to destroy the power of the Soviets.

That is the policy that led to civil war and made the petty-bourgeois democrats change round. Of course, there is always bound to be vacillation among them. When the Czechs gained their first victories, the petty-bourgeois intellectuals tried to spread rumours that the Czechs were bound to win. Telegrams from Moscow were issued declaring that the city was surrounded and about to fall. And we know perfectly well that if the British and French gain even the slightest success, the petty-bourgeois intellectuals will be the first to lose their heads, give way to panic and spread all sorts of rumours about enemy gains. But the revolution showed that revolts against imperialism are inevitable. And now our "Allies" have proved to be the chief enemies of Russian freedom and independence.

Russia cannot and will not be independent unless Soviet power is consolidated. That is why this turn about has occurred. So we must now define our tactics. It would be a great mistake to think of mechanically applying slogans

of our revolutionary struggle from the time when there could be no reconciliation between us, when the petty bourgeoisie were against us, and when our firm stand demanded resort to terror. Today, this would not be standing firm but sheer stupidity, a failure to understand Marxist tactics. When we were obliged to sign the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, this step seemed, from the narrow patriotic point of view to be a betrayal of Russia; but from the point of view of world revolution it was a correct strategical step, which was of the greatest help to the world revolution. The world revolution has broken out just now, when Soviet power has become an institution of the whole people.

Although the petty-bourgeois democrats are still wavering, their illusions have been dispelled. And we must of course take this state of affairs into account, as we must all the other conditions. Formerly we looked at things differently, because the petty bourgeois sided with the Czechs, and we had to use force. After all, war is war, and when at war you have to fight. But now that these people are beginning to swing over to us, we must not turn away from them simply because the slogan in our leaflets and newspapers used to be different. When we find them half turning towards us, we must rewrite our leaflets, because the petty-bourgeois democrats' attitude towards us has changed. We must say: "Come along, we are not afraid of you; if you think the only way we know how to act is by force, you are mistaken; we might reach agreement." Everyone steeped in the traditions of bourgeois prejudice, all the co-operators, all sections of working people particularly connected with the bourgeoisie, might come over to us.

Take the intellectuals. They lived a bourgeois life, they were accustomed to certain comforts. When they swung towards the Czechs, our slogan was *ruthless struggle—terror*. Now that there is this change of heart among the petty-bourgeois masses, our slogan must be one of *agreement*, of establishing good-neighbourly relations. When we come across a declaration from a group of petty-bourgeois democrats to the effect that they want to be neutral towards the Soviet government, we must say: neutrality and good-neighbourly relations are old-fashioned rubbish and absolutely useless from the point of view of communism.

They are just old-fashioned rubbish and nothing else, but we must consider this rubbish from the practical standpoint. That has always been our view, and we never had hopes that these petty-bourgeois people would become Communists. But practical propositions must be considered.

We said of the dictatorship of the proletariat that the proletariat must dominate over all other classes. We cannot obliterate the distinctions between classes until complete communism. Classes will remain until we have got rid of the exploiters—the big bourgeoisie and the landowners, whom we are ruthlessly expropriating. But we cannot say the same thing of the middle and small peasants. While relentlessly suppressing the bourgeoisie and the landowners, we must win over the petty-bourgeois democrats. And when they say they want to be neutral and live on good-neighbourly terms with us, we shall reply: "That's just what we want. We never expected you to become Communists."

We continue to stand for the ruthless expropriation of the landowners and capitalists. Here we are ruthless, and we cannot agree to any conciliation or compromise. But we realise that no decrees can convert small-scale into large-scale production, that we must gradually, keeping in step with events, win conviction for the inevitability of socialism. These people will never become socialists by conviction, honest to goodness socialists. They will become socialists when they see there is no other way. Now they can see that Europe has been so thoroughly shattered and imperialism has reached such a state that no bourgeois democracy can save the situation, that only a Soviet system can do so. That is why this neutrality, this good-neighbourly attitude of the petty-bourgeois democrats is to be welcomed rather than feared. That is why, if we look at the matter as the representatives of a class which is exercising dictatorship, we must say that we never counted on anything more from the petty-bourgeois democrats. That is quite sufficient as far as we are concerned. You maintain good-neighbourly relations with us, and we shall keep state power. After your declaration in regard to the "Allies" we are quite willing to legalise you, Menshevik gentlemen. Our Party Central Committee will do that. But we shall not forget there are still "activists" in your party, and for

them our methods of struggle will remain the same; for they are friends of the Czechs and until the Czechs are driven out of Russia, you are our enemies too. We reserve state power for ourselves, *and for ourselves alone*. To those who adopt an attitude of neutrality towards us we shall act as a class which holds political power and keeps the sharp edge of its weapon for the landowners and capitalists, and which says to the petty-bourgeois democrats: if it suits you better to side with the Czechs and Krasnov, well, we have shown you we can fight, and we shall carry on fighting. But if you prefer to learn from the Bolshevik example, we shall come some way to meet you, knowing that without a series of agreements, which we shall try out, examine and compare, the country cannot get to socialism.

This is the path we took from the very beginning, for example, by passing the socialisation of the land law and turning it gradually into the means that enabled us to unite the poor peasants around us and turn them against the kulaks. Only as the proletarian movement succeeds in the countryside shall we systematically pass to collective common ownership of land and to socialised farming. This could only be done with the backing of a purely proletarian movement in the countryside, and in this respect a great deal still remains to be done. There can be no doubt that only practical experience, only realities will show us how to act properly.

To reach agreement with the middle peasants is one thing, with the petty-bourgeois elements another, and with the co-operators yet another. There will be some modification of our task in relation to the associations which have preserved petty-bourgeois traditions and habits. It will be even further modified in relation to the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. They vacillate, but we need them, too, for our socialist revolution. We know socialism can only be built from elements of large-scale capitalist culture, and the intellectuals are one of these elements. We had to be ruthless with them, but it was not communism that compelled us to do so, it was events, which repelled from us all "democrats" and everyone enamoured of bourgeois democracy. Now we have the chance to utilise the intellectuals for socialism, intellectuals who are not socialist, who will

never be communist, but whom objective events and relations are now inducing to adopt a neutral and good-neighbourly attitude towards us. We shall never rely on the intellectuals, we shall only rely on the vanguard of the proletariat that leads all workers and poor peasants. The Communist Party can rely on no other support. It is one thing, however, to rely on the class which embodies the dictatorship, and another to dominate over other classes.

You may remember what Engels said even of the peasants who employ hired labour: Most likely we shall not have to expropriate all of them.[85] We are expropriating as a general rule, and we have no kulaks in the Soviets. We are crushing them. We suppress them physically when they worm their way into the Soviets and from there try to choke the poor peasants. You see how the domination of one class is exercised here. Only the proletariat may dominate. But this is applied in one way to the small peasant, in another to the middle peasant, in another to the landowner, and in yet another to the petty bourgeois. The whole point is for us to understand this change of attitude brought about by international conditions, to understand that it is inevitable that slogans we were accustomed to during the past six months of the revolution's history should be modified as far as the petty-bourgeois democrats are concerned. We must say that we reserve the power for the same class. In relation to the petty-bourgeois democrats our slogan was one of agreement, but we were forced to resort to terror. If you co-operators and intellectuals really agree to live in good-neighbourly relations with us, then work a bit and do the jobs we give you. If you don't, you will be lawbreakers and our enemies, and we shall fight you. But if you maintain good-neighbourly relations and perform these tasks, that will be more than enough for us. Our support is secure. We've always known you were weak and flabby. But we don't deny we need you, for you are the only educated group.

Things would not be so bad if we did not have to build socialism with people inherited from capitalism. But that is the whole trouble with socialist construction—we have to build socialism with people who have been thoroughly spoiled by capitalism. That is the whole trouble with the transition—it is associated with a dictatorship which can

be exercised only by one class—the proletariat. That is why we say the proletariat will set the pace since it has been schooled and moulded into a fighting force capable of smashing the bourgeoisie. Between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat stand innumerable transitional groups, and our policy to them must now be put on the lines which were envisaged by our theory, and which we are now in a position to follow in practice. We shall have to settle a number of problems and make a number of agreements and technical assignments which we, as the ruling proletarian power, must know how to set. We must know how to set the middle peasant one assignment—to assist in commodity exchange and in exposing the kulak—and the co-operators another—they have the apparatus for distributing products on a mass scale, and we must take over that apparatus. And the intellectuals must be set quite a different assignment. They cannot continue their sabotage, and they are now in a very good-neighbourly mood towards *us*. We must make use of these intellectuals, set them definite tasks and keep an eye on them and check their work; we must treat them as Marx said when speaking of office workers under the Paris Commune: "Every other employer knows how to choose assistants and accountants for his business, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. If they prove to be unfit for the job, he replaces them with other, efficient assistants and accountants."[86]

We are building our state out of the elements left over by capitalism. We cannot build it if we do not utilise such a heritage of capitalist culture as the intellectuals. Now we can afford to treat the petty bourgeoisie as good neighbours who are under the strict control of the state. The class-conscious proletariat's job now is to appreciate that its domination does not mean carrying out all the tasks itself. Whoever thinks that has not the slightest inkling of socialist construction and has learnt nothing from a year of revolution and dictatorship. People like that had better go to school and learn something. But whoever has learnt something in this period will say to himself: "These intellectuals are the people I am now going to use in construction. For I have a strong enough support among the peasants." And we must remember that we can only work out the form

of construction that will lead to socialism in that struggle, and in a number of agreements and trial agreements between the proletariat and the petty-bourgeois democrats.

Remember that Engels said we must act by force of example.[87] No form will be final until complete communism has been achieved. We never claimed to know the exact road. But we are inevitably moving towards communism. In times like these every week is worth more than decades of tranquility. The six months that have elapsed since the Brest-Litovsk Peace have shown a swing away from us. The West-European revolution—a revolution which is following our example—should strengthen us. We must take account of the changes taking place, we must take account of every element, and must have no illusions, for we know that the waverers will remain waverers until the world socialist revolution is completely triumphant. That may not be so soon, although the course of the German revolution leads us to hope that it may be sooner than many anticipate. The German revolution is developing in the same way as ours, but at a faster pace. In any case, our job now is to wage a desperate struggle against British and American imperialism. Just because it feels that Bolshevism has become a world force, it is trying to throttle us as fast as possible in the hope of dealing first with the Russian Bolsheviks, and then with its own.

We must make use of the waverers whom the atrocities of imperialism are driving towards us. And we shall do so. You know full well that in time of war no aid, even indirect, can be scorned. In war even the position of the wavering classes is of immense significance. The fiercer the war, the more we need to gain influence over the waverers who are coming over to us. So the tactics we have been pursuing for six months must be modified to suit the new tasks with regard to the various groups of petty-bourgeois democrats.

If I have succeeded in directing the attention of Party workers to this problem and in inducing them to seek a correct solution by systematic experiment, I may consider my task accomplished.

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REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION OF REPORT OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE PROLETARIAT TO PETTY-BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATS

Comrades, I have a few remarks to make in reply to the discussion. First of all, I would like to reply to the question of dogma that was raised. Marx and Engels repeatedly said that our teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action,[88] and I think that is what we should bear in mind most.

The teaching of Marx and Engels is not a dogma to be learnt by heart. It must be taken as a guide to action. We have always stood by that, and I think we have acted consistently, never succumbing to opportunism, modifying our tactics. That is no departure from Marxism, and certainly cannot be called opportunism. I have said before, and I repeat once again, that this teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action.

Now on to Comrade Steklov's remark about whom we are to make an agreement with—the top men or the rank and file? My reply is, of course, with the rank and file, and then with the top men; and when it comes to fighting the top men, all will depend on the particular circumstances. I shall come to that, but just now I see no practical possibility of an agreement with the Menshevik and S.R. parties. It is said that agreement means ceding something. What do we intend to cede and how are we going to depart from basic policy? That would be apostasy, but if it is to apply only to practice, there is nothing new in it. Of course, we shall never renounce our principles. That does not come into the argument now. Fifteen years ago there was a controversy over the basic policy and principles and, unfortunately, I had to carry on this controversy mostly abroad,

not in Russia. But now it is the question of state power that is at issue, and there simply cannot be any question of ceding anything here. No wonder Wilson declared: "Our enemy now is world Bolshevism." That is what the bourgeoisie all over the world are saying. The fact that they are preparing to attack us means they realise that the Bolshevik government is not only a Russian but a world phenomenon. He would be a sorry and miserable Bolshevik who offered any kind of agreement to the bourgeoisie. And, anyway, now that the fires of revolution have spread to so many countries, no capitalist bourgeois government will or can consent to it.

When the recent events developed, the Swiss bourgeoisie said outright: "We are not Russians, we shan't surrender power to you." Captain Sadoul, who has now sided with Bolshevism, writes that he is surprised at the astonishing docility of the Russian bourgeoisie, and declares that that is not the way the French bourgeoisie will act. There the struggle will be far fiercer, and civil war, if it breaks out, will assume the most ruthless forms. No one would deny it.

In practice, the matter has been fully decided by the year of proletarian dictatorship, and no peasant or worker would think of trying to reach agreement with the bourgeoisie. As to agreement being nothing new, I fully agree. I only wanted all of us to confer on these questions.

The circumstances which most repelled the Mensheviks and S.R.s and the lesser intellectuals from us, namely, the relentless struggle over the Brest-Litovsk Peace when German imperialism was on the advance, are now a thing of the past. But we know perfectly well that any success, however transient, the British and French may have, will produce more hesitation among these intellectuals and petty democrats, and they will begin to spread panic and desert to the other side. We are making an agreement with them to achieve definite results and for definite practical work. These tactics should present no cause either for controversy or surprise. Yet many, even such an influential member of the Moscow Soviet as Comrade Maximov, have shown they do not understand these tactics. Comrade Maximov said that we do not have to come to terms with Khinchuk, but only come to a sensible understanding with him. When we issued the first decree on the co-operative societies in the

spring, and they presented us with an ultimatum, we gave in to them. That is what we call agreement—there is no other name for this policy. And I shall be satisfied if every Soviet official makes it a rule and says to himself and all his comrades that we must come to a sensible understanding with the petty-bourgeois democrats.

In our work, especially in our work in the localities, we are still a long way from a sensible understanding. We all too frequently do not discuss matters sensibly. This is thrown in our faces by people who do not appreciate that this is bound to happen in building a new society. There is no genius who could build a new way of life without having learnt how to build. We are no good at coming to sensible terms with practical men when we have to. To run a shop, you must know *how* to run it. We need people who know their business. We Bolsheviks have had very little chance to apply our talents to practical affairs of this kind. We are not often short of propagandists, but our most crying shortage is the lack of efficient leaders and organisers. And that is still so despite the year's experience we have behind us. Come to a sensible understanding with every person who has enough experience in this sphere and who favours neutrality and good-neighbourly relations. If he knows how to run a shop and distribute goods, if he can teach us anything if he is a practical man, he will be a great attribute.

Everybody knows the Bolsheviks have many enemies among their "friends" ever since their triumph. Very often utterly unreliable and dishonest people worm their way into our midst, elements that are politically unstable, who sell us out, deceive us and betray us. We are perfectly aware of it, but it does not alter our purpose. It is historically inevitable. When the Mensheviks reproach us that among Soviet employees there are many hangers-on, people who are dishonest even in the ordinary sense, we say: Where are we to get better people? What can we do to make the best people believe in us at once? No revolution can immediately triumph and convince everyone, can make people believe in it at once. A revolution may begin in one country, and elsewhere people will not believe in it. Our revolution is reckoned an awful nightmare, utter chaos, and in other countries they do not expect anything to come of our

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organised "chaotic" assemblies, which we call Soviets. And that is quite natural. There were many things we had to fight for. So when they say we must come to a sensible understanding with Khinchuk, because he knows how to run shops, I say: Come to terms with others too, and make use of the petty bourgeoisie, they are good at many things.

If we drive this "come to an understanding" slogan into the heads of the people in the localities, if we realise that a new class is awakening to power, that things are being run by people who have never tackled such a complicated job before, and are naturally making mistakes, we shan't be sorry. We know that it is impossible to govern without making mistakes. But, besides making mistakes, people are using the power crudely, as nothing but power, as though to say: "I have the power, I have given my orders, and you must obey." We say, this is not the way to treat quite a number of people—the petty-bourgeois democrats in the trade unions, the peasants and those in the co-operatives—it is becoming unnecessary. It is therefore more sensible to come to an understanding with the petty-bourgeois democrats, especially the intellectuals—that is our task. Of course, we shall come to such an understanding on the basis of our policy, we shall do so as the government.

We ask: Is it true you have abandoned hostility for neutrality and good-neighbourly relations? Is it true you have stopped being hostile? If not, we shall not close our eyes to the fact and we'll tell you straight: If you want war, you'll have it . And we'll act as people do in war. If you really have abandoned your hostility for neutrality, however, if you really do want good-neighbourly relations—I have taken these words from statements by people who do not belong to the communist camp, who only yesterday were much closer to the whiteguards—I say that since there are so many people abandoning their former hostility for neutrality and good-neighbourly relations, we must continue our propaganda.

Comrade Khmelnitsky need have no fear that the Mensheviks are carrying on their own propaganda to run the lives of the workers. We won't mention the Social-Democrats, who have not understood the socialist republic, nor the petty-bourgeois bureaucrats. What we have to do is wage an

ideological struggle, a relentless war, against Menshevism. You cannot make a worse insult to a Menshevik than to call him a petty-bourgeois democrat; and the more calmly you try to prove it to him, the more furious he will get. It is a mistake to think we shall surrender a hundredth or even a thousandth part of the position we have won. We shan't budge an inch.

The examples quoted by Comrade Schmidt show that even the workers who stood closest to the bourgeoisie (like the printers, for example), the petty-bourgeois clerks, the bourgeois bank officials who used to perform the business operations in the commercial and industrial firms, stand to lose a lot from the transition to socialism. We have closed down a great many bourgeois papers, we have nationalised the banks, we have blocked several channels through which bank employees used to make money by dabbling in profiteering. Even in this camp we see them wavering, we find them siding with us. If Khinchuk is valuable because he knows how to run shops, the bank employee is valuable because he knows the ins and outs of the money business, with which many of us may have a theoretical acquaintance, but in which we are very weak practically. We must come to a sensible understanding with a man who knows the ins and outs of this business and who tells us he has abandoned his former hostility for neutrality and good-neighbourliness. I shall be more than satisfied if Comrade Maximov, as a prominent member of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet, pursues in the Soviets the tactics he spoke of in relation to the intellectuals and the vacillating petty bourgeoisie.

Next, the question of the co-operative societies. Comrade Steklov said the co-operatives stink. Comrade Maximov said we should not pass decrees like the last one passed by the Council of People's Commissars. On the practical side opinions differed. It is nothing new to us that we must come to an agreement with the petty bourgeoisie on such a basis if they are not hostile to us. If the old stand is no good, it should be revised when new circumstances demand it. And things have certainly changed all right. The co-operatives are a striking example. The co-operative apparatus is a supply apparatus based on the mass participation of the working people themselves, instead of the private initiative

of capitalists. Kautsky was right when he said, long before he became a renegade, that socialist society is one big co-operative.

If we are out to get control going and organise the economy in a practical way, in the interests of hundreds of thousands of people, we must not forget that when socialists discuss this question they point out that directors of trusts, as experienced practical men, may be useful to them. Today experience shows that petty-bourgeois people have renounced hostility for neutrality. And, moreover, we must realise that they do know how to run shops. We do not deny that Khinchuk as an ideologist is chock-full of bourgeois prejudices. They all reek of them, but at the same time, they have practical knowledge. As far as ideas are concerned, all the guns are on our side, and not a single one on theirs. But when they say they are no longer hostile and intend to be neutral, we must remember that now hundreds and thousands of people less capable than Khinchuk are coming to a sensible understanding. We must know how to come to terms with them. In practical matters they know more than we do and are more proficient, and we must learn from them. Let them learn from us how to influence the international proletariat; but when it comes to running shops we shall learn from them. That is something we do not know. Technicians with special knowledge are needed in every field.

As far as the co-operatives are concerned, I don't understand why you say they stink. When drafting the first decree on the co-operatives we invited for discussion in the Council of People's Commissars people who not only were not Communists, but were actually far closer to the whiteguards. We conferred with them and asked: Can you accept this point? They replied: We can accept this, but not that. Of course, looking at it offhand, superficially, this was compromising with the bourgeoisie. For, after all, these were representatives of bourgeois co-operatives, and it was at their request that several clauses were deleted from the decree. Thus, we deleted a clause providing that there should be no dues or entrance fees in the proletarian co-operatives. To us that seemed quite acceptable, but they rejected our proposal.

We say we must come to terms with people who know how to run shops much better than we do; that's something we are weak at. But we shall not budge an inch from our struggle. When we issued another decree of the same type, Comrade Maximov said such decrees must not be written, because the decree says that the co-operatives that were closed down are to be reopened. This shows that in the Moscow Soviet, as among ourselves, there are certain misapprehensions, and if only for the sake of removing such misapprehensions, conferences and discussions should be arranged like ours here today.

We said that in the interests of our work we intended to utilise not only the trade unions in general, but even the Union of Trade and Industrial Employees, and, you know, the trade and industrial employees have always been a mainstay of the bourgeois system. But since these people have come to us and say they are willing to live on good-neighbourly terms with us, we must welcome them with open arms, and accept the hand they proffer—our own won't drop off. We do not forget that if the British and French imperialists were to strike tomorrow, they would be the first to turn tail and run away. But as long as this party, these bourgeois people do not run away, we repeat that we must have closer relations with them. That is why we adopted the decree published on Sunday, the one that is not to Comrade Maximov's liking—which shows that he clings to the old communist tactics, tactics which are inapplicable to the new conditions. We drew up that decree the other day, and received in reply the resolution of the Central Committee of the Employees,[89] and it would be foolish to say we are issuing decrees at the wrong time, when the change of front has begun and the situation is changing.

The armed capitalists are continuing the war with greater stubbornness than ever, and it is immensely important for our practical construction to take advantage of this change of attitude, even if it is only temporary. All power is in our hands. We need not close down co-operatives, and we can reopen those that have been closed down, for we closed them down when they served the ends of whiteguard propaganda. Every slogan has the faculty of becoming more rigid than is necessary. When the wave of closing down and

persecuting the co-operatives swept over Russia, it was the conditions of the time that made it necessary. But now it is no longer necessary. They are a highly important apparatus connected with the middle peasants; they unite the scattered and disunited sections of the peasants. These Khinchuks are doing a useful job, which was started by bourgeois elements. When these peasants and petty-bourgeois democrats say they are abandoning hostility for neutrality, for good-neighbourly relations, we must say to them: That's just what we want. And now, good neighbours, let us come to a sensible understanding. We shall assist you all we can and help you to exercise your rights, and we shall examine your claims and grant you every privilege, but you must carry out the jobs we assign you. If you don't, remember that the whole Extraordinary Commission apparatus is in our hands. If you are unable to make proper use of your rights and do not carry out our assignments, we have the whole apparatus of State Control in our hands, and we shall regard you as violators of the will of the state. You must account for the last kopek, and any violation will be punished as a violation of the will of the state and its laws.

This entire system of control remains in our hands, but just now the task of winning over these people, if only for a while, although it may not be a gigantic one from the standpoint of world politics, is for us one of urgent necessity. It will strengthen our position in the war. We have no decently organised rear. It will give us a moral victory, for it will show the West-European imperialists that they can expect to meet pretty serious resistance. And that is not to be scoffed at, for inside every country there is a workers' opposition to the attack on Russia. That is why I think, as far as one can judge from Comrade Maximov's statement, that we are groping our way to a definite agreement. Even if differences do crop up, they are not so important, for once we recognise the necessity of coming to a sensible understanding with all the petty-bourgeois democrats, with the intellectuals, the co-operators and the trade unions which still do not recognise us, while at the same time never allowing power to slip from our hands—if we firmly adhere to this policy all winter, we shall gain a great advantage for the whole cause of world revolution.

First published in 1929

Published according to the verbatim report

TELEGRAM TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

In Serpukhov

29/11

As our troops push on west wards and into the Ukraine, provisional regional Soviet governments are being formed to back up the Soviets in the localities. This has the advantage of depriving the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian chauvinists of a chance to regard our troop movements as occupation and of creating a favourable situation for further advance. Otherwise our troops would have been in an impossible situation on unoccupied territory and the local population would not have meet them as liberators. In view of the situation, please issue an order to the commanders of the corresponding units so that they render all possible support to the provisional Soviet governments in Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine and Lithuanian, but, of course, only to the Soviet governments.

Lenin

Written November 29, 1918
First published in 1942

Published according to
the text written by
Stalin with additions by Lenin

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RENEGADE KAUTSKY[90]

Written October-November 1918

Published in pamphlet form in 1918 by Kommunist Publishers, Moscow

Published according to the pamphlet checked with the manuscript

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

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Cover of the pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. 1918

Reduced

PREFACE

Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, recently published in Vienna (Wien, 1918, Ignaz Brand, pp. 63) is a most lucid example of that utter and ignominious bankruptcy of the Second International about which all honest socialists in all countries have been talking for a long time. The proletarian revolution is now becoming a practical issue in a number of countries, and an examination of Kautsky's renegade sophistries and his complete renunciation of Marxism is therefore essential.

First of all, it should be emphasised, however, that the present author has, from the very beginning of the war, repeatedly pointed to Kautsky's rupture with Marxism. A number of articles published between 1914 and 1916 in *Sotsial-Demokrat*[91] and *Kommunist*,[92] issued abroad, dealt with this subject. These articles were afterwards collected and published by the Petrograd Soviet under the title Against the Stream, by G. Zinoviev and N. Lenin (Petrograd, 1918, pp. 550). In a pamphlet published in Geneva in 1915 and translated at the same time into German and French[93] I wrote about "Kautskyism" as follows:

"Kautsky, the leading authority in the Second International, is a most typical and striking example of how a verbal recognition of Marxism has led in practice to its conversion into 'Struvism', or into 'Brentanoism' [i.e., into a bourgeois-liberal theory recognising the non-revolutionary "class" struggle of the proletariat, which was expressed most clearly by Struve, the Russian writer, and Brentano, the German economist]. Another example is Plekhanov. By means of patent sophistry, Marxism is stripped of its revolutionary living spirit; everything is recognised in

Marxism *except* the revolutionary methods of struggle, the propaganda and preparation of those methods, and the education of the masses in this direction. Kautsky reconciles in an unprincipled way the fundamental idea of social-chauvinism, recognition of defence of the fatherland in the present war, with a diplomatic sham concession to the Lefts—his abstention from voting for war credits, his verbal claim to be in the opposition, etc. Kautsky, who in 1909 wrote a book on the approaching epoch of revolutions and on the connection between war and revolution, Kautsky, who in 1912 signed the Basle Manifesto[94] on taking revolutionary advantage of the impending war, is outdoing himself in justifying and embellishing social-chauvinism and, like Plekhanov, joins the bourgeoisie in ridiculing any thought of revolution and all steps towards the immediate revolutionary struggle.

"The working class cannot play its world-revolutionary role unless it wages a ruthless struggle against this backsliding, spinelessness, subservience to opportunism, and unparalleled vulgarisation of the theories of Marxism. Kautskyism is not fortuitous; it is the social product of the contradictions within the Second International, a blend of loyalty to Marxism in word and subordination to opportunism in deed" (G. Zinoviev and N. Lenin, *Socialism and War*, Geneva, 1915, pp. 13-14).

Again, in my book *Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism*,[95] written in 1916 and published in Petrograd in 1917, I examined in detail the theoretical fallacy of all Kautsky's arguments about imperialism. I quoted Kautsky's definition of imperialism: "Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex all large areas of *agrarian* [Kautsky's italics] territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit it." I showed how utterly incorrect this definition was, and how it was "adapted" to the glossing over of the most profound contradictions of imperialism, and then to reconciliation with opportunism. I gave my own definition of imperialism: "Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; at which the export of capital has acquired

pronounced importance; at which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; at which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed." I showed that Kautsky's critique of imperialism is on an even lower plane than the bourgeois, philistine critique.

Finally, in August and September 1917—that is, before the proletarian revolution in Russia (October 25 [November 7], 1917), I wrote a pamphlet (published in Petrograd at the beginning of 1918) entitled *The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*. In Chapter VI of this book, entitled "The Vulgarisation of Marxism by the Opportunists", I devoted special attention to Kautsky, showing that he had completely distorted Marx's ideas, tailoring them to suit opportunism, and that he had "repudiated the revolution in deeds, while accepting it in words."

In substance, the chief theoretical mistake Kautsky makes in his pamphlet on the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in those opportunist distortions of Marx's ideas on the state—the distortions which I exposed in detail in my pamphlet, *The State and Revolution*.

These preliminary remarks were necessary for they show that I openly accused Kautsky of being a renegade *long before* the Bolsheviks assumed state power and were condemned by him on that account.

HOW KAUTSKY TURNED MARX INTO A COMMON LIBERAL

The fundamental question that Kautsky discusses in his pamphlet is that of the very essence of proletarian revolution, namely, the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a question that is of the greatest importance for all countries, especially for the advanced ones, especially for those at war, and especially at the present time. One may say without fear of exaggeration that this is the key problem of the entire proletarian class struggle. It is, therefore, necessary to pay particular attention to it.

Kautsky formulates the question as follows: "The contrast between the two socialist trends" (i.e., the Bolsheviks

and non-Bolsheviks) "is the contrast between two radically different methods: the *dictatorial* and the *democratic*" (p. 3).

Let us point out, in passing, that when calling the non-Bolsheviks in Russia, i.e., the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, socialists, Kautsky was guided by their *name*, that is, by a word, and not by the *actual place* they occupy in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. What a wonderful understanding and application of Marxism! But more of this later.

For the moment we must deal with the main point, namely, with Kautsky's great discovery of the "fundamental contrast" between "democratic and dictatorial methods". That is the crux of the matter; that is the essence of Kautsky's pamphlet. And that is such an awful theoretical muddle, such a complete renunciation of Marxism, that Kautsky, it must be confessed, has far excelled Bernstein.

The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a question of the relation of the proletarian state to the bourgeois state, of proletarian democracy to bourgeois democracy. One would think that this is as plain as a pikestall. But Kautsky, like a schoolmaster who has become as dry as dust from quoting the same old textbooks on history, persistently turns his back on the twentieth century and his face to the eighteenth century, and for the hundredth time, in a number of paragraphs, in an incredibly tedious fashion chews the old cud over the relation of bourgeois democracy to absolutism and medievalism!

It sounds just like he were chewing rags in his sleep!

But this means he utterly fails to understand what is what! One cannot help smiling at Kautsky's effort to make it appear that there are people who preach "contempt for democracy" (p. 11) and so forth. That is the sort of twaddle Kautsky uses to befog and confuse the issue, for he talks like the liberals, speaking of democracy in general, and not of *bourgeois* democracy; he even avoids using this precise, class term, and, instead, tries to speak about "pre-socialist" democracy. This windbag devotes almost one-third of his pamphlet, twenty pages out of sixty-three, to this twaddle, which is so agreeable to the bourgeoisie, for it is tantamount to embellishing bourgeois democracy, and obscures the question of the proletarian revolution.

But, after all, the title of Kautsky's pamphlet is *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. Everybody knows that this is the very *essence* of Marx's doctrine; and after a lot of irrelevant twaddle Kautsky *was obliged* to quote Marx's words on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the *way* in which he the "Marxist" did it was simply farcical! Listen to this:

"This view" (which Kautsky dubs "contempt for democracy") "rests upon a single word of Karl Marx's". This is what Kautsky literally says on page 20. And on page 60 the same thing is repeated even in the form that they (the Bolsheviks) "opportunely recalled the little word" (that is literally what he says—*des Wörtchens*!!) "about the dictatorship of the proletariat which Marx once used in 1875 in a letter".

Here is Marx's "little word":

"Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."[96]

First of all, to call this classical reasoning of Marx's, which sums up the whole of his revolutionary teaching, "a single word" and even "a little word," is an insult to and complete renunciation of Marxism. It must not be forgotten that Kautsky knows Marx almost by heart, and, judging by all he has written, he has in his desk, or in his head, a number of pigeon-holes in which all that was ever written by Marx is most carefully filed so as to be ready at hand for quotation. Kautsky *must know* that both Marx and Engels, in their letters as well as in their published works, *repeatedly* spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat, before and especially after the Paris Commune. Kautsky must know that the formula "dictatorship of the proletariat" is merely a more historically concrete and scientifically exact formulation of the proletariat's task of "smashing" the bourgeois state machine, about which both Marx and Engels, in summing up the experience of the Revolution of 1848, and, still more so, of 1871, spoke *for forty years*, between 1852 and 1891.

How is this monstrous distortion of Marxism by that Marxist pedant Kautsky to be explained? As far as the philo-

sophical roots of this phenomenon are concerned, it amounts to the substitution of eclecticism and sophistry for dialectics. Kautsky is a past master at this sort of substitution. Regarded from the point of view of practical politics, it amounts to subservience to the opportunists, that is, in the last analysis to the bourgeoisie. Since the outbreak of the war, Kautsky has made increasingly rapid progress in this art of being a Marxist in words and a lackey of the bourgeoisie in deeds, until he has become a virtuoso at it.

One feels even more convinced of this when examining the remarkable way in which Kautsky "interprets" Marx's "little word" about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Listen to this:

> "Marx, unfortunately, neglected to show us in greater detail how he conceived this dictatorship...." (This is an utterly mendacious phrase of a renegade, for Marx and Engels gave us, indeed, quite a number of most detailed indications, which Kautsky, the Marxist pedant, has deliberately ignored.) "Literally, the word dictatorship means the abolition of democracy. But, of course, taken literally, this word also means the undivided rule of a single person unrestricted by any laws—an autocracy, which differs from despotism only insofar as it is not meant as a permanent state institution, but as a transient emergency measure.
>
> "The term, dictatorship of the proletariat', hence not the dictatorship of a single individual, but of a class, *ipso facto* precludes the possibility that Marx in this connection had in mind a dictatorship in the literal sense of the term.
>
> "He speaks here not of a *form of government*, but of a *condition*, which must necessarily arise wherever the proletariat has gained political power. That Marx in this case did not have in mind a form of government is proved by the fact that he was of the opinion that in Britain and America the transition might take place peacefully, i.e., in a democratic way" (p. 20).

We have deliberately quoted this argument in full so that the reader may clearly see the methods Kautsky the "theoretician" employs.

Kautsky chose to approach the question in such a way as to begin with a definition of the "*word*" dictatorship.

Very well. Everyone has a sacred right to approach a question in whatever way he pleases. One must only distinguish a serious and honest approach from a dishonest one. Anyone who wants to be serious in approaching the

question in this way ought to give *his own definition* of the "word". Then the question would be put fairly and squarely. But Kautsky does not do that. "Literally," he writes, "the word dictatorship means the abolition of *democracy.*"

In the first place, this is not a definition. If Kautsky wanted to avoid giving a definition of the concept dictatorship, why did he choose this particular approach to the question?

Secondly, it is obviously wrong. It is natural for a liberal to speak of "democracy" in general; but a Marxist will never forget to ask: "for what class?" Everyone knows, for instance (and Kautsky the "historian" knows it too), that rebellions, or even strong ferment, among the slaves in ancient times at once revealed the fact that the ancient state was essentially a *dictatorship of the slaveowners*. Did this dictatorship abolish democracy *among*, and *for*, the slaveowners? Everybody knows that it did not.

Kautsky the "Marxist" made this monstrously absurd and untrue statement because he "*forgot*" the class struggle....

To transform Kautsky's liberal and false assertion into a Marxist and true one, one must say: dictatorship does not necessarily mean the abolition of democracy for the class that exercises the dictatorship over other classes; but it does mean the abolition (or very material restriction, which is also a form of abolition) of democracy for the class over which, or against which, the dictatorship is exercised.

But, however true this assertion may be, it does not give a definition of dictatorship.

Let us examine Kautsky's next sentence:

> "...But, of course, taken literally, this word also means the undivided rule of a single person unrestricted by any laws...."

Like a blind puppy sniffing at random first in one direc - tion and then in another, Kautsky accidentally stumbled upon *one* true idea (namely, that dictatorship is rule unrestricted by any laws), *nevertheless*, he *failed* to give a definition of dictatorship, and, moreover, he made an obvious historical blunder, namely, that dictatorship means the rule of a single person. This is even grammatically incorrect, since dictatorship may also be exercised by a handful of persons, or by an oligarchy, or by a class, etc.

Kautsky then goes on to point out the difference between dictatorship and despotism, but, although what he says is obviously incorrect, we shall not dwell upon it, as it is wholly irrelevant to the question that interests us. Everyone knows Kautsky's inclination to turn from the twentieth century to the eighteenth, and from the eighteenth century to classical antiquity, and we hope that the German proletariat, after it has attained its dictatorship, will bear this inclination of his in mind and appoint him, say, teacher of ancient history at some Gymnasium. To try to evade a definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat by philosophising about despotism is either crass stupidity or very clumsy trickery.

As a result, we find that, having undertaken to discuss the dictatorship, Kautsky rattled off a great deal of manifest lies, but has given no definition! Yet, instead of relying on his mental faculties he could have used his memory to extract from "pigeon-holes" all those instances in which Marx speaks of dictatorship. Had he done so, he would certainly have arrived either at the following definition or at one in substance coinciding with it:

Dictatorship is rule based directly upon force and unrestricted by any laws.

The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, rule that is unrestricted by any laws.

This simple truth, a truth that is as plain as a pikestaff to every class-conscious worker (who represents the people, and not an upper section of petty-bourgeois scoundrels who have been bribed by the capitalists, such as are the social-imperialists of all countries), this truth, which is obvious to every representative of the exploited classes fighting for their emancipation, this truth, which is beyond dispute for every Marxist, has to be "extracted by force" from the most learned Mr. Kautsky! How is it to be explained? Simply by that spirit of servility with which the leaders of the Second International, who have become contemptible sycophants in the service of the bourgeoisie, are imbued.

Kautsky first committed a sleight of hand by proclaiming the obvious nonsense that the word dictatorship, in its

literal sense, means the dictatorship of a single person, and then—on the strength of this sleight of hand—he declared that "hence" Marx's words about the dictatorship of a class were *not* meant in the literal sense (but in one in which dictatorship does not imply revolutionary violence, but the "peaceful" winning of a majority under bourgeois—mark you—"democracy").

One must, if you please, distinguish between a "condition" and a "form of government". A wonderfully profound distinction; it is like drawing a distinction between the "condition" of stupidity of a man who reasons foolishly and the "form" of his stupidity.

Kautsky *finds it necessary* to interpret dictatorship as a "condition of domination" (this is the literal expression he uses on the very next page, p. 21), because then *revolutionary violence*, *and violent revolution*, *disappear*. The "condition of domination" is a condition in which any majority finds itself under ... "democracy"! Thanks to such a fraud, *revolution* happily *disappears*!

The fraud, however, is too crude and will not save Kautsky. One cannot hide the fact that dictatorship presupposes and implies a "condition," one so disagreeable to renegades, of *revolutionary violence* of one class against another. It is patently absurd to draw a distinction between a "condition" and a "form of government". To speak of forms of government in this connection is trebly stupid, for every schoolboy knows that monarchy and republic are two different forms of government. It must be explained to Mr. Kautsky that *both* these forms of government, like all transitional "forms of government" under capitalism, are only variations of the *bourgeois state*, that is, of the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*.

Lastly, to speak of forms of government is not only a stupid, but also a very crude falsification of Marx, who was very clearly speaking here of this or that form or type of *state*, and not of forms of government.

The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a *new one* which, in the words of Engels, is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word".[97]

Because of his renegade position, Kautsky, however, has to befog and belie all this.

Look what wretched subterfuges he uses.

First subterfuge. "That Marx in this case did not have in mind a form of government is proved by the fact that he was of the opinion that in Britain and America the transition might take place peacefully, i.e., in a democratic way."

The *form of government* has absolutely nothing to do with it, for there are monarchies which are not typical of the bourgeois *state*, such, for instance, as have no military clique, and there are republics which are quite typical in this respect, such, for instance, as have a military clique and a bureaucracy. This is a universally known historical and political fact, and Kautsky cannot falsify it.

If Kautsky had wanted to argue in a serious and honest manner he would have asked himself: Are there historical laws relating to revolution which know of no exception? And the reply would have been: No, there are no such laws. Such laws only apply to the typical, to what Marx once termed the "ideal," meaning average, normal, typical capitalism.

Further, was there in the seventies anything which made England and America exceptional *in regard to what we are now discussing*? It will be obvious to anyone at all familiar with the requirements of science in regard to the problems of history that this question must be put. To fail to put it is tantamount to falsifying science, to engaging in sophistry. And, the question having been put, there can be no doubt as to the reply: the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is *violence* against the bourgeoisie; and the necessity of such violence is *particularly* called for, as Marx and Engels have repeatedly explained in detail (especially in *The Civil War in France* and in the preface to it), by the existence of *militarism and a bureaucracy*. But it is precisely these institutions that were *non-existent* in Britain and America in the seventies, when Marx made his observations (they *do* exist in Britain and in America *now*)!

Kautsky has to resort to trickery literally at every step to cover up his apostasy!

And note how he inadvertently betrayed his cloven hoof when he wrote: "peacefully, *i.e.*, *in a democratic way*"!

In defining dictatorship, Kautsky tried his utmost to

conceal from the reader the fundamental feature of this concept, namely, revolutionary *violence*. But now the truth is out: it is a question of the contrast between *peaceful* and *violent revolutions*.

That is the crux of the matter. Kautsky has to resort to all these subterfuges, sophistries and falsifications only to excuse himself from *violent* revolution, and to conceal his renunciation of it, his desertion to the side of the *liberal* labour policy, i.e., to the side of the bourgeoisie. That is the crux of the matter.

Kautsky the "historian" so shamelessly falsifies history that he "forgets" the fundamental fact that pre-monopoly capitalism-which actually reached its zenith in the seventies-was by virtue of its fundamental *economic* traits, which found most typical expression in Britain and in America, distinguished by a, relatively speaking, maximum fondness for peace and freedom. Imperialism, on the other hand, i.e., monopoly capitalism, which finally matured only in the twentieth century, is, by virtue of its fundamental *economic* traits, distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom, and by a maximum and universal development of militarism. To "fail to notice" this in discussing the extent to which a peaceful or violent revolution is typical or probable is to stoop to the level of a most ordinary lackey of the bourgeoisie.

Second subterfuge. The Paris Commune was a dictatorship of the proletariat, but it was elected by *universal* suffrage, i.e., without depriving the bourgeoisie of the franchise, i.e., "*democratically*". And Kautsky says triumphantly: "...The dictatorship of the proletariat was for Marx" (or: according to Marx) "a condition which ;necessarily follows from pure democracy, if the proletariat forms the majority" (*bei überwiegendem Proletariat*, S. 21).

This argument of Kautsky's is so amusing that one truly suffers from a veritable *embarras de richesses* (an embarrassment due to the wealth ... of objections that can be made to it). Firstly, it is well known that the flower, the General Staff, the upper sections of the bourgeoisie, had fled from Paris to Versailles. In Versailles there was the "socialist" Louis Blanc—which, by the way, proves the falsity of Kautsky's assertion that "all trends" of socialism took part

in the Paris Commune. Is it not ridiculous to represent the division of the inhabitants of Paris into two belligerent camps, one of which embraced the entire militant and politically active section of the bourgeoisie, as "pure democracy" with "universal suffrage"?

Secondly, the Paris Commune waged war against Versailles as the workers' government of *France* against the bourgeois government. What have "pure democracy" and "universal suffrage" to do with it, when Paris was deciding the fate of France? When Marx expressed the opinion that the Paris, Commune had committed a mistake in failing to seize the bank, which belonged to the whole of France,[98] did he not proceed from the principles and practice of "pure democracy"?

In actual fact, it is obvious that Kautsky is writing in a country where the police forbid people to laugh "in crowds," otherwise Kautsky would have been killed by ridicule.

Thirdly, I would respectfully remind Mr. Kautsky, who has Marx and Engels off pat, of the following appraisal of the Paris Commune given by Engels from the point of view of ... "pure democracy":

"Have these gentlemen" (the anti-authoritarians) "ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is an act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon—all of which are highly authoritarian means. And the victorious party must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted more than a day if it had not used the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie? Cannot we, on the contrary, blame it for having made too little use of that authority?"[99]

Here is your "pure democracy"! How Engels would have ridiculed the vulgar petty bourgeois, the "Social-Democrat" (in the French sense of the forties and the general European sense of 1915-18), who took it into his head to talk about "pure democracy" in a class-divided society!

But that's enough. It is impossible to enumerate all Kautsky's various absurdities, since every phrase he utters is a bottomless pit of apostasy.

Marx and Engels analysed the Paris Commune in a most detailed manner and showed that its merit lay in its attempt *to smash*, *to break up* the "ready-made state machinery". Marx and Engels considered this conclusion to be so important that this was the *only* amendment they introduced in 1872 into the "obsolete" (in parts) programme of the *Communist Manifesto*.[100] Marx and Engels showed that the Paris Commune had abolished the army and the bureaucracy, had abolished *parliamentarism*, had destroyed "that parasitic excrescence, the state," etc. But the sage Kautsky, donning his nightcap, repeats the fairy-tale about "pure democracy," which has been told a thousand times by liberal professors.

No wonder Rosa Luxemburg declared, on August 4, 1914, that German Social-Democracy was a *stinking corpse*.

Third subterfuge. "When we speak of the dictatorship as a form of government we cannot speak of the dictatorship of a class, since a class, as we have already pointed out, can only rule but not govern...." It is "organisations" or "parties" that govern.

That is a muddle, a disgusting muddle, Mr. "Muddle-headed Counsellor"! Dictatorship is not a "form of government"; that is ridiculous nonsense. And Marx does not speak of the "form of government" but of the form or type of *state*. That is something altogether different, entirely different. It is altogether wrong, too, to say that a *class* cannot govern: such an absurdity could only have been uttered by a "parliamentary cretin," who sees nothing but bourgeois parliaments and notices nothing but "ruling parties". Any European country will provide Kautsky with examples of government by a ruling *class*, for instance, by the landowners in the Middle Ages, in spite of their insufficient organisation.

To sum up: Kautsky has in a most unparalleled manner distorted the concept dictatorship of the proletariat, and has turned Marx into a common liberal; that is, he himself has sunk to the level of a liberal who utters banal phrases about "pure democracy," embellishing and glossing over the class content of *bourgeois* democracy, and shrinking, above all, from the use of *revolutionary violence* by the oppressed class. By so "interpreting" the concept "revolutionary dic-

tatorship of the proletariat" as to expunge the revolutionary violence of the oppressed class against its oppressors, Kautsky has beaten the world record in the liberal distortion of Marx. The renegade Bernstein has proved to be a mere puppy compared with the renegade Kautsky.

BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIAN DEMOCRACY

The question which Kautsky has so shamelessly muddled really stands as follows.

If we are not to mock at common sense and history, it is obvious that we cannot speak of pure democracy" as long as different *classes* exist; we can only speak of *class* democracy. (Let us say in parenthesis that "pure democracy" is not only an *ignorant* phrase, revealing a lack of understanding both of the class struggle and of the nature of the state, but also a thrice-empty phrase, since in communist society democracy will *wither away* in the process of changing and becoming a habit, but will never be "pure" democracy.)

"Pure democracy" is the mendacious phrase of a liberal who wants to fool the workers. History knows of bourgeois democracy which takes the place of feudalism, and of proletarian democracy which takes the place of bourgeois democracy.

When Kautsky devotes dozens of pages to "proving" the truth that bourgeois democracy is progressive compared with medievalism, and that the proletariat must unfailingly utilise it in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, that in fact is just liberal twaddle intended to fool the workers. This is a truism, not only for educated Germany, but also for uneducated Russia. Kautsky is simply throwing "learned" dust in the eyes of the workers when, with a pompous mien, he talks about Weitling and the Jesuits of Paraguay and many other things, *in order to avoid* telling about the *bourgeois* essence of modern, i.e., *capitalist*, democracy.

Kautsky takes from Marxism what is acceptable to the liberals, to the bourgeoisie (the criticism of the Middle Ages, and the progressive historical role of capitalism in general and of capitalist democracy in particular), and discards, passes over in silence, glosses over all that in Marxism which is *unacceptable* to the bourgeoisie (the revo-

lutionary violence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the latter's destruction). That is why Kautsky, by virtue of his objective position and irrespective of what his subjective convictions may be, inevitably proves to be a lackey of the bourgeoisie.

Bourgeois democracy, although a great historical advance in comparison with medievalism, always remains, and under capitalism is bound to remain, restricted, truncated, false and hypocritical, a paradise for the rich and a snare and deception for the exploited, for the poor. It is this truth, which forms a most essential part of Marx's teaching, that Kautsky the "Marxist" has failed to understand. On this—the fundamental issue—Kautsky offers "delights" for the bourgeoisie instead of a scientific criticism of those conditions which make every bourgeois democracy a democracy for the rich.

Let us first remind the most learned Mr. Kautsky of the theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels which that pedant has so disgracefully "forgotten" (to please the bourgeoisie), and then explain the matter as popularly as possible.

Not only the ancient and feudal, but also "the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage-labour by capital" (Engels, in his work on the state).[101] "As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a 'free people's state'; so long as the proletariat still needs the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist" (Engels, in his letter to Bebel, March 28, 1875). "In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy" (Engels, Introduction to *The Civil War in France* by Marx).[102] Universal suffrage is "the gauge of the maturity of the working class. *It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state*". (Engels, in his work on the state.[103] Mr. Kautsky very tediously chews over the cud in the first part of this proposition, which is acceptable to the bour-

geoisie. But the second part, which we have italicised and which is not acceptable to the bourgeoisie, the renegade Kautsky passes over in silence!) "The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time.... Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to represent and suppress (*ver- und zertreten*) the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workers, foremen and accountants for his business" (Marx, in his work on the Paris Commune, *The Civil War in France*).[104]

Every one of these propositions, which are excellently known to the most learned Mr. Kautsky, is a slap in his face and lays bare his apostasy. Nowhere in his pamphlet does Kautsky reveal, the slightest understanding of these truths. His whole pamphlet is a sheer mockery of Marxism!

Take the fundamental laws of modern states, take their administration, take freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, or "equality of all citizens before the law," and you will see at every turn evidence of the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy with which every honest and class-conscious worker is familiar. There is not a single state, however democratic, which has no loopholes or reservations in its constitution guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the possibility of dispatching troops against the workers, of proclaiming martial law, and so forth, in case of a "violation of public order," and actually in case the exploited class "violates" its position of slavery and tries to behave in a non-slavish manner. Kautsky shamelessly embellishes bourgeois democracy and omits to mention, for instance, how the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie in America or Switzerland deal with workers on strike.

The wise and learned Kautsky keeps silent about these things! That learned politician does not realise that to remain silent on this matter is despicable. He prefers to tell the workers nursery tales of the kind that democracy means "protecting the minority". It is incredible, but it is a fact! In the year of our Lord 1918, in the fifth year of the world imperialist slaughter and the strangulation of internationalist minorities (i.e., those who have not despicably

betrayed socialism, like the Renaudels and Longuets, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Hendersons and Webbs et al.) in all "democracies" of the world, the learned Mr. Kautsky sweetly, very sweetly, sings the praises of "protection of the minority". Those who are interested may read this on page 15 of Kautsky's pamphlet. And on page 16 this learned ... individual tells you about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century!

What wonderful erudition! What refined servility to the bourgeoisie! What civilised belly-crawling before the capitalists and boot-licking! If I were Krupp or Scheidemann, or Clemenceau or Renaudel, I would pay Mr. Kautsky millions, reward him with Judas kisses, praise him before the workers and urge "socialist unity" with "honourable" men like him. To write pamphlets against the dictatorship of the proletariat, to talk about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century, to assert that democracy means "protecting the minority," and remain silent about pogroms against internationalists in the "democratic" republic of America—isn't this rendering lackey service to the bourgeoisie?

The learned Mr. Kautsky has "forgotten"—accidentally forgotten, probably—a "trifle," namely, that the ruling party in a bourgeois democracy extends the protection of the minority only to another *bourgeois* party, while the proletariat, on all *serious*, *profound and fundamental* issues, gets martial law or pogroms, instead of the "protection of the minority". *The more highly developed a democracy is*, *the more imminent are pogroms or civil war in connection with any profound political divergence which is dangerous to the bourgeoisie*. The learned Mr. Kautsky could have studied this "law" of bourgeois democracy in connection with the Dreyfus case[105] in republican France, with the lynching of Negroes and internationalists in the democratic republic of America, with the case of Ireland and Ulster in democratic Britain,[106] with the baiting of the Bolsheviks and the staging of pogroms against them in April 1917 in the democratic republic of Russia. I have purposely chosen examples not only from wartime but also from pre-war time, peacetime. But mealy-mouthed Mr. Kautsky prefers to shut his eyes to these facts of the twentieth century, and instead

to tell the workers wonderfully new, remarkably interesting, unusually edifying and incredibly important things about the Whigs and Tories of the eighteenth century!

Take the bourgeois parliament. Can it be that the learned Kautsky has never heard that the *more highly* democracy is developed, the *more* the bourgeois parliaments are subjected by the stock exchange and the bankers? This does not mean that we must not make use of bourgeois parliament (the Bolsheviks made better use of it than probably any other party in the world, for in 1912-15 we won the entire workers' curia in the Fourth Duma). But it does mean that only a liberal can forget the *historical limitations and conventional nature* of the bourgeois parliamentary system as Kautsky does. Even in the most democratic bourgeois state the oppressed people at every step encounter the crying contradiction between the *formal* equality proclaimed by the "democracy" of the capitalists and the thousands of *real* limitations and subterfuges which turn the proletarians into *wage-slaves*. It is precisely this contradiction that is opening the eyes of the people to the rottenness, mendacity and hypocrisy of capitalism. It is this contradiction that the agitators and propagandists of socialism are constantly exposing to the people, *in order to prepare* them for revolution! And now that the era of revolution *has begun*, Kautsky turns his back upon it and begins to extol the charms of *moribund* bourgeois democracy.

Proletarian democracy, of which Soviet government is one of the forms, has brought a development and expansion of democracy unprecedented in the world, for the vast majority of the population, for the exploited and working people. To write a whole pamphlet about democracy, as Kautsky did, in which two pages are devoted to dictatorship and dozens to "pure democracy," and *fail to notice* this fact, means completely distorting the subject in liberal fashion.

Take foreign policy. In no bourgeois state, not even in the most democratic, is it conducted openly. The people are deceived everywhere, and in democratic France, Switzerland, America and Britain this is done on an incomparably wider scale and in an incomparably subtler manner than in other countries. The Soviet government has torn the veil of mystery from foreign policy in a revolutionary

manner. Kautsky has not noticed this, he keeps silent about it, although in the era of predatory wars and secret treaties for the "division of spheres of influence" (i.e., for the partition of the world among the capitalist bandits) this is of *cardinal* importance, for on it depends the question of peace, the life and death of tens of millions of people.

Take the structure of the state. Kautsky picks at all manner of "trifles," down to the argument that under the Soviet Constitution elections are "indirect," but he misses the point. He fails to see the *class* nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of state. Under bourgeois democracy the capitalists, by thousands of tricks—which are the more artful and effective the more "pure" democracy is developed—*drive* the people away from administrative work, from freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, etc. The Soviet government is the *first* in the world (or strictly speaking, the second, because the Paris Commune began to do the same thing) to *enlist* the people, specifically the *exploited* people, in the work of administration. The working people are *barred* from participation in bourgeois parliaments (they *never decide* important questions under bourgeois democracy, which are decided by the stock exchange and the banks) by thousands of obstacles, and the workers know and feel, see and realise perfectly well that the bourgeois parliaments are institutions *alien* to them, *instruments for the oppression* of the workers by the bourgeoisie, institutions of a hostile class, of the exploiting minority.

The Soviets are the direct organisation of the working and exploited people themselves, which *helps* them to organise and administer their own state in every possible way. And in this it is the vanguard of the working and exploited people, the urban proletariat, that enjoys the advantage of being best united by the large enterprises; it is easier for it than for all others to elect and exercise control over those elected. The Soviet form of organisation automatically *helps* to unite all the working and exploited people around their vanguard, the proletariat. The old bourgeois apparatus—the bureaucracy, the privileges of wealth, of bourgeois education, of social connections, etc. (these real privileges are the more varied the more highly bourgeois democracy is developed)—all this disappears under the Soviet

form of organisation. Freedom of the press ceases to be hypocrisy, because the printing-plants and stocks of paper are taken away from the bourgeoisie. The same thing applies to the best buildings, the palaces, the mansions and manor-houses. Soviet power took thousands upon thousands of these best buildings from the exploiters at one stroke, and in this way made the right of assembly—without which democracy is a fraud—*a million times* more democratic for the people. Indirect elections to non-local Soviets make it easier to hold congresses of Soviets, they make the *entire* apparatus less costly, more flexible, more accessible to the workers and peasants at a time when life is seething and it is necessary to be able very quickly to recall one's local deputy or to delegate him to a general congress of Soviets.

Proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy; Soviet power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.

To fail to see this one must either deliberately serve the bourgeoisie, or be politically as dead as a doornail, unable to see real life from behind the dusty pages of bourgeois books, be thoroughly imbued with bourgeois-democratic prejudices, and thereby objectively convert oneself into a lackey of the bourgeoisie.

To fail to see this one must be incapable of *presenting the question* from the point of view of the *oppressed* classes:

Is there a single country in the world, even among the most democratic bourgeois countries, in which the *average rank-and-file* worker, the average rank-and-file *farm labourer*, or village semi-proletarian generally (i.e., the representative of the oppressed, of the overwhelming majority of the population), enjoys anything approaching such *liberty* of holding meetings in the best buildings, such *liberty* of using the largest printing-plants and biggest stocks of paper to express his ideas and to defend his interests, such *liberty* of promoting men and women of his own class to administer and to "knock into shape" the state, as in Soviet Russia?

It is ridiculous to think that Mr. Kautsky could find in any country even one out of a thousand of well-informed workers or farm labourers who would have any doubts as to

the reply. Instinctively, from hearing fragments of admissions of the truth in the bourgeois press, the workers of the whole world sympathise with the Soviet Republic precisely because they regard it as a *proletarian* democracy, *a democracy for the poor*, and not a democracy for the rich that every bourgeois democracy, even the best, actually is.

We are governed (and our state is "knocked into shape") by bourgeois bureaucrats, by bourgeois members of parliament, by bourgeois judges—such is the simple, obvious and indisputable truth which tens and hundreds of millions of people belonging to the oppressed classes in all bourgeois countries, including the most democratic, know from their own experience, feel and realise every day.

In Russia, however, the bureaucratic machine has been completely smashed, razed to the ground; the old judges have all been sent packing, the bourgeois parliament has been dispersed—and *far more accessible* representation has been given to the workers and peasants; *their* Soviets have replaced the bureaucrats, or *their* Soviets have been put in control of the bureaucrats, and *their* Soviets have been authorised to elect the judges. This fact alone is enough for all the oppressed classes to recognise that Soviet power, i.e., the present form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.

Kautsky does not understand this truth, which is so clear and obvious to every worker, because he has "forgotten," "unlearned" to put the question: democracy *for which* class? He argues from the point of view of "pure" (i.e., non-class? or above-class?) democracy. He argues like Shylock: my "pound of flesh" and nothing else. Equality for all citizens—otherwise there is no democracy.

We must ask the learned Kautsky, the "Marxist" and "socialist" Kautsky:

Can there be equality between the exploited and the exploiters?

It is dreadful, it is incredible that such a question should have to be put in discussing a book written by the ideological leader of the Second International. But "having put your hand to the plough, don't look back," and having

undertaken to write about Kautsky, I must explain to the learned man why there can be no equality between the exploiter and the exploited.

CAN THERE BE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE EXPLOITED AND THE EXPLOITER?

Kautsky argues as follows:

(1) "The exploiters have always formed only a small minority of the population" (p. 14 of Kautsky's pamphlet).

This is indisputably true. Taking this as the starting-point, what should be the argument? One may argue in a Marxist, a socialist way. In which case one would proceed from the relation between the exploited and the exploiters. Or one may argue in a liberal, a bourgeois-democratic way. And in that case one would proceed from the relation between the majority and the minority.

If we argue in a Marxist way, we must say: the exploiters inevitably transform the state (and we are speaking of democracy, i.e., one of the forms of the state) into an instrument of the rule of their class, the exploiters, over the exploited. Hence, as long as there are exploiters who rule the majority, the exploited, the democratic state must inevitably be a democracy for the exploiters. A state of the exploited must fundamentally differ from such a state; it must be a democracy for the exploited, 'and a means of *suppressing the exploiters*; and the suppression of a class means inequality for that class, its exclusion from "democracy".

If we argue in a liberal way, we must say: the majority decides, the minority submits. Those who do not submit are punished. That is all. Nothing need be said about the class character of the state in general, or of "pure democracy" in particular, because it is irrelevant; for a majority is a majority and a minority is a minority. A pound of flesh is a pound of flesh, and that is all there is to it.

And this is exactly how Kautsky argues.

(2) "Why should the rule of the proletariat assume, and necessarily assume, a form which is incompatible with democracy?" (P. 21). Then follows a very detailed and a very verbose explanation, backed by a quotation from Marx

and the election figures of the Paris Commune, to the effect that the proletariat is in the majority. The conclusion is: "A regime which is so strongly rooted in the people has not the slightest reason for encroaching upon democracy. It cannot always dispense with violence in cases when violence is employed to suppress democracy. Violence can only be met with violence. But a regime which knows that it has popular backing will employ violence only to *protect* democracy and not to *destroy* it. It would be simply suicidal if it attempted to do away with its most reliable basis—universal suffrage, that deep source of mighty moral authority" (p. 22).

As you see, the relation between the exploited and the exploiters has vanished in Kautsky's argument. All that remains is majority in general, minority in general, democracy in general, the "pure democracy" with which we are already familiar.

And all this, mark you, is said *apropos of the Paris Commune*! To make things clearer I shall quote Marx and Engels to show what they said on the subject of dictatorship *apropos of the Paris Commune*:

Marx: "...When the workers replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by their revolutionary dictatorship ... to break down the resistance of the bourgeoisie ... the workers invest the state with a revolutionary and transitional form....[107]

Engels: "...And the victorious party" (in a revolution) "must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted more than a day if it had not used the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie? Cannot we, on the contrary, blame it for having made too little use of that authority?...[108]

Engels: "As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a 'free people's state'; so long as the proletariat still needs the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist....[109]

Kautsky is as far removed from Marx and Engels as heaven is from earth, as a liberal from a proletarian revolutionary. The pure democracy and simple "democracy" that Kautsky talks about is merely a paraphrase of the "free people's state", i.e., *sheer nonsense*. Kautsky, with the learned air of a most learned armchair fool, or with the innocent air of a ten-year-old schoolgirl, asks: Why do we need a dictatorship when we have a majority? And Marx and Engels explain:

—to break down the resistance of the bourgeoisie;

—to inspire the reactionaries with fear;

—to maintain the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie;

—that the proletariat may forcibly hold down its adversaries.

Kautsky does not understand these explanations. Infatuated with the "purity" of democracy, blind to its bourgeois character, he "consistently" urges that the majority, since it is the majority, need not "break down the resistance" of the minority, nor "forcibly hold it down"—it is sufficient to suppress *cases* of infringement of democracy. Infatuated with the "purity" of democracy, Kautsky *inadvertently* commits the same little error that all bourgeois democrats always commit, namely, he takes formal equality (which is nothing but a fraud and hypocrisy under capitalism) for actual equality! Quite a trifle!

The exploiter and the exploited cannot be equal.

This truth, however unpleasant it may be to Kautsky, nevertheless forms the essence of socialism.

Another truth: there can be no real, actual equality until all possibility of the exploitation of one class by another has been totally destroyed.

The exploiters can be defeated at one stroke in the event of a successful uprising at the centre, or of a revolt in the army. But except in very rare and special cases, the exploiters cannot be destroyed at one stroke. It is impossible to expropriate all the landowners and capitalists of any big country at one stroke. Furthermore, expropriation alone, as a legal or political act, does not settle the matter by a long chalk, because it is necessary to *depose* the landowners and capitalists in actual fact, to *replace* their management

of the factories and estates by a different management, workers' management, in actual fact. There can be no equality between the exploiters—who for many generations have been better off because of their education, conditions of wealthy life, and habits—and the exploited, the majority of whom even in the most advanced and most democratic bourgeois republics are downtrodden, backward, ignorant, intimidated and disunited. For a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably continue to retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (since it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property—often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organisation and management; knowledge of all the "secrets" (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management; superior education; close connections with the higher technical personnel (who live arid think like the bourgeoisie); incomparably greater experience in the art of war (this is very important), and so on and so forth.

If the exploiters are defeated in one country only—and this, of course, is typical, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception—they *still* remain *stronger* than the exploited, for the international connections of the exploiters are enormous. That a section of the exploited from the least advanced middle-peasant, artisan and similar groups of the population may, and indeed does, follow the exploiters has been proved by *all* revolutions, including the Commune (for there were also proletarians among the Versailles troops, which the most learned Kautsky has "forgotten").

In these circumstances, to assume that in a revolution which is at all profound and serious the issue is decided simply by the relation between the majority and the minority is the acme of stupidity, the silliest prejudice of a common liberal, an attempt to *deceive the people* by concealing from them a well-established historical truth. This historical truth is that in every profound revolution, the *prolonged*, *stubborn and desperate* resistance of the exploiters, who for a number of years retain important practical advantages over the exploited, is the *rule*. Never—except in the sentimental fantasies of the sentimental fool Kautsky—will the exploiters submit to the decision of the exploited

majority without trying to make use of their advantages in a last desperate battle, or series of battles.

The transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch is over, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope turns into *attempts* at restoration. After their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters—who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it—throw themselves with energy grown tenfold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold, into the battle for the recovery of the "paradise", of which they were deprived, on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the "common herd" is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to "common" labour...). In the train of the capitalist exploiters follow the wide sections of the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic-stricken at the first defeat or semi-defeat of the workers, grow nervous, run about aimlessly, snivel, and rush from one camp into the other—just like our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In these circumstances, in an epoch of desperately acute war, when history presents the question of whether age-old and thousand-year-old privileges are to be or not to be—at such a time to talk about majority and minority, about pure democracy, about dictatorship being unnecessary and about equality between the exploiter and the exploited! What infinite stupidity and abysmal philistinism are needed for this!

However, during the decades of comparatively "peaceful" capitalism between 1871 and 1914, the Augean stables of philistinism, imbecility, and apostasy accumulated in the socialist parties which were adapting themselves to opportunism....

* * *

The reader will probably have noticed that Kautsky, in the passage from his pamphlet quoted above, speaks of an

attempt to encroach upon universal suffrage (calling it, by the way, a deep source of mighty moral authority, whereas Engels, apropos of the same Paris Commune and the same question of dictatorship, spoke of the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie—a very characteristic difference between the philistine's and the revolutionary's views on "authority"...).

It should be observed that the question of depriving the exploiters of the franchise is a *purely Russian* question, and not a question of the dictatorship of the proletariat in general. Had Kautsky, casting aside hypocrisy, entitled his pamphlet *Against the Bolsheviks*, the title would have corresponded to the contents of the pamphlet, and Kautsky would have been justified in speaking bluntly about the franchise. But Kautsky wanted to come out primarily as a "theoretician". He called his pamphlet *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat—in general*. He speaks about the Soviets and about Russia specifically only in the second part of the pamphlet, beginning with the sixth paragraph. The subject dealt with in the first part (from which I took the quotation) is *democracy* and *dictatorship in general*. In speaking about the franchise, Kautsky *betrayed himself* as an opponent of the Bolsheviks, *who does not care a brass farthing for theory*. For theory, i.e., the reasoning about the general (and not the nationally specific) class foundations of democracy and dictatorship, ought to deal not with a special question, such as the franchise, but with the general question of whether democracy can be *preserved for the rich, for the exploiters* in the historical period of the overthrow of the exploiters and the replacement of their state by the state of the exploited.

That is the way, the only way, a theoretician can present the question.

We know the example of the Paris Commune, we know all that was said by the founders of Marxism in connection with it and in reference to it. On the basis of this material I examined, for instance, the question of democracy and dictatorship in my pamphlet, *The State and Revolution*, written before the October Revolution. *I did not say anything at all* about restricting the franchise. And it must be said now that the question of restricting the franchise is

a nationally specific and not a general question of the dictatorship. One must approach the question of restricting the franchise by studying the *specific conditions* of the Russian revolution and the *specific path* of its development. This will be done later on in this pamphlet. It would be a mistake, however, to guarantee in advance that the impending proletarian revolutions in Europe will all, or the majority of them, be necessarily accompanied by restriction of the franchise for the bourgeoisie. It may be so. After the war and the experience of the Russian revolution it probably will be so; but it is *not absolutely necessary* for the exercise of the dictatorship, it is not an *indispensable* characteristic of the logical concept "dictatorship", it does not enter as an *indispensable* condition in the historical and class concept "dictatorship".

The indispensable characteristic, the necessary condition of dictatorship is the *forcible* suppression of the exploiters as a *class*, and, consequently, the *infringement* of "pure democracy", i.e., of equality and freedom, *in regard to* that *class*.

This is the way, the only way, the question can be put theoretically. And by failing to put the question thus, Kautsky has shown that he opposes the Bolsheviks not as a theoretician, but as a sycophant of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie.

In which countries, and given what national features of capitalism, democracy for the exploiters will be in one or another form restricted (wholly or in part), infringed upon, is a question of the specific national features of this or that capitalism, of this or that revolution. The theoretical question is different: Is the dictatorship of the proletariat possible *without infringing democracy* in relation to the *exploiting* class?

It is precisely this question, the *only* theoretically important and essential one, that Kautsky has evaded. He has quoted all sorts of passages from Marx and Engels, *except those* which bear on this question, and which I quoted above.

Kautsky talks about anything you like, about everything that is acceptable to liberals and bourgeois democrats and does not go beyond their circle of ideas, but he does not talk about the main thing, namely, the fact that the prole-

tariat cannot achieve victory *without breaking the resistance* of the bourgeoisie, *without forcibly suppressing its adversaries*, and that, where there is "forcible suppression", where there is no "freedom", *there is*, *of course*, *no democracy*.

This Kautsky has not understood.

* * *

We shall now examine the experience of the Russian revolution and that divergence between the Soviets of Deputies and the Constituent Assembly which led to the dissolution of the latter and to the withdrawal of the franchise from the bourgeoisie.

THE SOVIETS DARE NOT BECOME STATE ORGANISATIONS

The Soviets are the Russian form of the proletarian dictatorship. If a Marxist theoretician, writing a work on the dictatorship of the proletariat, had really studied the subject (and not merely repeated the petty-bourgeois lamentations against dictatorship, as Kautsky did, singing to Menshevik tunes), he would first have given a general definition of dictatorship, and would then have examined its peculiar, national, form, the Soviets; he would have given his critique of them as one of the forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It goes without saying that nothing serious could be expected from Kautsky after his liberalistic "interpretation" of Marx's teaching on dictatorship; but the manner in which he approached the question of what the Soviets are and the way he dealt with this question is highly characteristic.

The Soviets, he says, recalling their rise in 1905, created "the most all-embracing (*umfassendste*) form of proletarian organisation, for it embraced all the wage-workers" (p. 31). In 1905 they were only local bodies; in 1917 they became a national organisation.

"The Soviet form of organisation," Kautsky continues, "already has a great and glorious history behind it, and it has a still mightier future before it, and not in Russia alone. It appears that everywhere the old methods of the economic and political struggle of the proletariat are inadequate" (*versagen*; this German expression is somewhat stronger

than "inadequate" and somewhat weaker than "impotent") "against the gigantic economic and political forces which finance capital has at its disposal. These old methods cannot he discarded; they are still indispensable for normal times; but from time to time tasks arise which they cannot cope with, tasks that can be accomplished successfully only as a result of a combination of all the political and economic instruments of force of the working class" (p. 32).

Then follows a reasoning on the mass strike and on "trade union bureaucracy"—which is no less necessary than the trade unions—being "useless for the purpose of directing the mighty mass battles that are more and more becoming a sign of the times...."

"Thus," Kautsky concludes, "the Soviet form of organisation is one of the most important phenomena of our time. It promises to acquire decisive importance in the great decisive battles between capital and labour towards which we are marching.

"But are we entitled to demand more of the Soviets? The Bolsheviks, after the November Revolution" (new style, or October, according to our style) "1917, secured in conjunction with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries a majority in the Russian Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and after the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly, they set out to transform the Soviets from a *combat organisation* of one *class*, as they had been up to then, into a *state organisation*. They destroyed the democracy which the Russian people had won in the March" (new style, or February, our style) "Revolution. In line with this, the Bolsheviks have ceased to call themselves Social-*Democrats*. They call themselves *Communists*" (p. 33, Kautsky's italics).

Those who are familiar with Russian Menshevik literature will at once see how slavishly Kautsky copies Martov, Axelrod, Stein and Co. Yes, "slavishly", because Kautsky ridiculously distorts the facts in order to pander to Menshevik prejudices. Kautsky did not take the trouble, for instance, to ask his informants (Stein of Berlin, or Axelrod of Stockholm) *when* the questions of changing the name of the Bolsheviks to Communists and of the significance of the Soviets as state organisations were first raised. Had Kautsky made this simple inquiry he would not have penned these ludicrous lines, for both these questions were raised by the Bolsheviks *in April 1917*, for example, in my "Theses" of April 4, 1917, i.e., *long before* the Revolution of October 1917 (and, of course, long before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918).

But Kautsky's argument which I have just quoted in full represents the *crux* of the whole question of the Soviets.

The crux is: should the Soviets aspire to become state organisations (in April 1917 the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan: "All Power to the Soviets!" and at the Bolshevik Party Conference held in the same month they declared they were not satisfied with a bourgeois parliamentary republic but demanded a workers' and peasants' republic of the Paris Commune or Soviet type); *or* should the Soviets not strive for this, refrain from taking power into their hands, refrain from becoming state organisations and remain the "combat organisations" of one "class" (as Martov expressed it, embellishing by this innocent wish the fact that under Menshevik leadership the Soviets were *an instrument for the subjection of the workers to the bourgeoisie*)?

Kautsky slavishly repeats Martov's words, picks out *fragments* of the theoretical controversy between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and uncritically and senselessly transplants them to the general theoretical and general European field. The result is such a hodge-podge as to provoke Homeric laughter in every class-conscious Russian worker had he read these arguments of Kautsky's.

When we explain what the question at issue is, every worker in Europe (barring a handful of inveterate social-imperialists) will greet Kautsky with similar laughter.

Kautsky has rendered Martov a backhanded service by developing his mistake into a glaring absurdity. Indeed, look what Kautsky's argument amounts to.

The Soviets embrace all wage-workers. The old methods of economic and political struggle of the proletariat are inadequate against finance capital. The Soviets have a great role to play in the future, and not only in Russia. They will play a decisive role in great decisive battles between capital and labour in Europe. That is what Kautsky says.

Excellent. But won't the "decisive battles between capital and labour" decide which of the two classes will assume state power?

Nothing of the kind! Heaven forbid!

The Soviets, which embrace all the wage-workers, must *not become state organisations* in the "decisive" battles!

But what is the state?

The state is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one class by another.

Thus, the oppressed class, the vanguard of all the working and exploited people in modern society, must strive towards the "decisive battles between capital and labour", *but must not touch* the machine by means of which capital suppresses labour!—*It must not break up* that machine!—*It must not make use* of its all-embracing organisation *for suppressing the exploiters*!

Excellent, Mr. Kautsky, magnificent! 'We" recognise the class struggle—in the same way as all liberals recognise it, i.e., without the overthrow of the bourgeoisie....

This is where Kautsky's complete rupture both with Marxism and with socialism becomes obvious. Actually, it is desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie, who are prepared to concede everything except the transformation of the organisations of the class which they oppress into state organisations. Kautsky can no longer save his position of trying to reconcile everything and of getting away from all profound contradictions with mere phrases.

Kautsky either rejects the assumption of state power by the working class altogether, or he concedes that the working class may take over the old, bourgeois state machine. But he will by no means concede that it must break it up, smash it, and replace it by a new, proletarian machine. Whichever way Kautsky's arguments are "interpreted", or "explained", his rupture with Marxism and his desertion to the bourgeoisie are obvious.

Back in the *Communist Manifesto*, describing what sort of state the victorious working class needs, Marx wrote: "the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class."[110] Now we have a man who claims still to be a Marxist coming forward and declaring that the proletariat, fully organised and waging the "decisive battle" against capital, must not transform its class organisation into a state organisation. Here Kautsky has betrayed that "superstitious belief in the state" which in Germany, as Engels wrote in 1891, "has been carried over into the general thinking of the bourgeoisie and even of many workers".[111] Workers, fight!—our philistine "agrees" to this (as every bourgeois "agrees", since the workers are fighting all the same, and the only thing to do is to devise means of blunting the edge of their sword)—fight, but *don't dare win*! Don't

destroy the state machine of the bourgeoisie, don't replace the bourgeois "state organisation" by the proletarian "state organisation"!

Whoever sincerely shared the Marxist view that the state is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one class by another, and who has at all reflected upon this truth, could never have reached the absurd conclusion that the proletarian organisations capable of defeating finance capital must not transform themselves into state organisations. It was this point that betrayed the petty bourgeois who believes that "after all is said and done" the state is something outside classes or above classes. Indeed, why should the proletariat, "*one class*", be permitted to wage unremitting war on *capital*, which rules not only over the proletariat, but over the whole people, over the whole petty bourgeoisie, over all the peasants, yet this proletariat, this "*one class*", is not to be permitted to transform its organisation into a state organisation? Because the petty bourgeois is *afraid* of the class struggle, and does not carry it to its logical conclusion, *to its main object*.

Kautsky has got himself completely mixed up and has given himself away entirely. Mark you, he himself admits that Europe is heading for decisive battles between capital and labour, and that the old methods of economic and political struggle of the proletariat are inadequate. But these old methods were precisely the utilisation of *bourgeois* democracy. It therefore follows...?

But Kautsky is afraid to think of what follows.

...It therefore follows that only a reactionary, an enemy of the working class, a henchman of the bourgeoisie, can now turn his face to the obsolete past, paint the charms of bourgeois democracy and babble about pure democracy. Bourgeois democracy *was* progressive compared with medievalism, and it had to be utilised. But now it is *not sufficient* for the working class. Now we must look forward instead of backward—to replacing the bourgeois democracy by *proletarian* democracy. And while the preparatory work for the proletarian revolution, the formation and training of the proletarian army were possible (and necessary) *within the framework* of the bourgeois-democratic state, now that we have reached the stage of "decisive battles", to confine the

proletariat to this framework means betraying the cause of the proletariat, means being a renegade.

Kautsky has made himself particularly ridiculous by repeating Martov's argument *without noticing* that in Martov's case this argument was based on *another* argument which he, Kautsky, does not use! Martov said (and Kautsky repeats after him) that Russia is not yet ripe for socialism; from which it logically follows that it is too early to transform the Soviets from organs of struggle into state organisations (read: it is timely to transform the Soviets, with the assistance of the Menshevik leaders, into instruments for *subjecting* the workers to the imperialist bourgeoisie). Kautsky, however, *cannot* say outright that Europe is not ripe for socialism. In 1909, when he was not yet a renegade, he wrote that there was then no reason to fear a *premature* revolution, that whoever had renounced revolution for fear of defeat would have been a traitor. Kautsky does not dare renounce this *outright*. And so we get an absurdity, which completely reveals the stupidity and cowardice of the petty bourgeois: on the one hand, Europe is ripe for socialism and is heading towards decisive battles between capital and labour; but, on the other hand, the *combat organisation* (i.e., the organisation which arises, grows and gains strength in combat), the organisation of the proletariat, the vanguard and organiser, the leader of the oppressed, *must not* be transformed into a state organisation!

* * *

From the point of view of practical politics the idea that the Soviets are necessary as combat organisations but must not be transformed into state organisations is infinitely more absurd than from the point of view of theory. Even in peacetime, when there is no revolutionary situation, the mass struggle of the workers against the capitalists—for instance, the mass strike—gives rise to great bitterness on both sides, to fierce passions in the struggle, the bourgeoisie constantly insisting that they remain and mean to remain "masters in their own house", etc. And in time of revolution, when political life reaches boiling point, an organisation like the Soviets, which embraces *all* the workers in *all*

branches of industry, *all* the soldiers, and all the working and poorest sections of the rural population—such an organisation, of its own accord, with the development of the struggle, by the simple "logic" of attack and defence, comes inevitably to pose the question *point-blank*. The attempt to take up a middle position and to "reconcile" the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is sheer stupidity and doomed to miserable failure. That is what happened in Russia to the preachings of Martov and other Mensheviks, and that will inevitably happen in Germany and other countries if the Soviets succeed in developing on any wide scale, manage to unite and strengthen. To say to the Soviets: fight, but don't take all state power into your hands, don't become state organisations—is tantamount to preaching class collaboration and "social peace" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It is ridiculous even to think that such a position in the midst of fierce struggle could lead to anything but ignominious failure. But it is Kautsky's everlasting fate to sit between two stools. He pretends to disagree with the opportunists on everything in theory, but *in practice* he agrees with them on everything essential (i.e., on everything pertaining to revolution)

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

The question of the Constituent Assembly and its dispersal by the Bolsheviks is the crux of Kautsky's entire pamphlet. He constantly reverts to it, and the whole of this literary production of the ideological leader of the Second International is replete with innuendoes to the effect that the Bolsheviks have "destroyed democracy" (see one of the quotations from Kautsky above). The question is really an interesting and important one, because the relation between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy here confronted the revolution in a *practical* form. Let us see how our "Marxist theoretician" has dealt with the question.

He quotes the "Theses on the Constituent Assembly", written by me and published in *Pravda* on December 26, 1917. One would think that no better evidence of Kaut-

sky's serious approach to the subject, quoting as he does the documents, could be desired. But look *how* he quotes. He does not say that there were nineteen of these theses; he does not say that they dealt with the relation between the ordinary bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly and a Soviet republic, as well as with the *history* of the divergence in our revolution between the Constituent Assembly and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky ignores all that, and simply tells the reader that "two of them" (of the theses) "are particularly important": one stating that a split occurred among the Socialist-Revolutionaries after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, but before it was convened (Kautsky does not mention that this was the fifth thesis), and the other, that the republic of Soviets is in general a higher democratic form than the Constituent Assembly (Kautsky does not mention that this was the third thesis).

Only from this third thesis does Kautsky quote a part in full, namely, the following passage:

"The republic of Soviets is not only a higher type of democratic institution (as compared with the *usual* bourgeois republic crowned by a Constituent Assembly), but is the only form capable of securing the most painless* transition to socialism" (Kautsky omits the word "usual" and the introductory words of the thesis: "For the transition from the bourgeois to the socialist system, for the dictatorship of the proletariat").

After quoting these words, Kautsky, with magnificent irony, exclaims:

> "It is a pity that this conclusion was arrived at only after the Bolsheviks found themselves in the minority in the Constituent Assembly. Before that no one had demanded it more vociferously than Lenin."

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* Incidentally, Kautsky, obviously trying to be ironical, repeatedly quotes the expression "most painless" transition; but as the shaft misses its mark, a few pages farther on he commits a slight forgery and falsely quotes it as a "painless" transition! Of course, by such means it is easy to put any absurdity into the mouth of an opponent. The forgery also helps him to evade the substance of the argument, namely, that the most painless transition to socialism is possible only when all the poor are organised to a man (Soviets) and when the core of state power (the proletariat) helps them to organise.

This is literally what Kautsky says on page 31 of his book! It is positively a gem! Only a sycophant of the bourgeoisie could present the question in such a false way as to give the reader the impression that all the Bolsheviks' talk about a higher type of state was an invention which saw light of day *after* they found themselves in the minority in the Constituent Assembly! Such an infamous lie could only have been uttered by a scoundrel who has sold himself to the bourgeoisie, or, what is absolutely the same thing, who has placed his trust in Axelrod and is concealing the source of his information.

For everyone knows that on the very day of my arrival in Russia, on April 4, 1917, I publicly read my theses in which I proclaimed the superiority of the Paris Commune type of state over the bourgeois parliamentary republic. Afterwards I *repeatedly* stated this in print, as, for instance, in a pamphlet on political parties, which was translated into English and was published in January 1918 in the New York *Evening Post*.[112] More than that, the Conference of the Bolshevik Party held at the end of April 1917 adopted a resolution to the effect that a proletarian and peasant republic was superior to a bourgeois parliamentary republic, that our Party would not be satisfied with the latter, and that the Party Programme should be modified accordingly.

In face of these facts, what name can be given to Kautsky's trick of assuring his German readers that I had been vigorously demanding the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and that I began to "belittle" the honour and dignity of the Constituent Assembly only after the Bolsheviks found themselves in the minority in it? How can one excuse such a trick?* By pleading that Kautsky did not know the facts? If that is the case, why did he undertake to write about them? Or why did he not honestly announce that he was writing on the strength of information supplied by the Mensheviks Stein and Axelrod and Co.? By pretending to be objective, Kautsky wants to conceal his role as the servant of the Mensheviks, who are disgruntled because they have been defeated.

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* Incidentally, there are many Menshevik lies of this kind in Kautsky's pamphlet! It is a lampoon written by an embittered Menshevik.

This, however, is a mere trifle compared with what is to come.

Let us assume that Kautsky would not or could not (?) obtain from his informants a translation of the Bolshevik resolutions and declarations on the question of whether the Bolsheviks would be satisfied with a bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic or not. Let us assume this, although it is incredible. But Kautsky *directly mentions* my theses of December 26, 1917, on page 30 of his book.

Does he not know these theses in full, or does he know only what was translated for him by the Stems, the Axelrods and Co.? Kautsky quotes the *third* thesis on the *fundamental* question of whether the Bolsheviks, *before* the elections to the Constituent Assembly, realised that a Soviet republic is superior to a bourgeois republic, and whether they told the *people* that. *But he keeps silent about the second thesis.*

The second thesis reads as follows:

"While demanding the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, revolutionary Social-Democracy has ever since the beginning of the revolution of 1917 *repeatedly emphasised* that *a republic of Soviets is a higher form of democracy than the usual bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly.* (my italics).

In order to represent the Bolsheviks as unprincipled people, as "revolutionary opportunists" (this is a term which Kautsky employs somewhere in his book, I forget in which connection), Mr. Kautsky *has concealed from his German readers* the fact that the theses contain a direct reference to "*repeated*" declarations!

These are the petty, miserable and contemptible methods Mr. Kautsky employs! That is the way he has evaded the *theoretical* question.

Is it true or not that the bourgeois-democratic parliamentary republic is *inferior* to the republic of the Paris Commune or Soviet type? This is the whole point, and Kautsky has evaded it. Kautsky has "forgotten" all that Marx said in his analysis of the Paris Commune. He has also "forgotten" Engels's letter to Bebel of March 28, 1875, in which this same idea of Marx is formulated in a particularly lucid and comprehensible fashion: "The Commune was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word."

Here is the most prominent theoretician of the Second International, in a special pamphlet on *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, specially dealing with Russia, where the question of a form of state that is higher than a democratic bourgeois republic has been raised directly and repeatedly, ignoring this very question. In what way does this differ *in fact* from desertion to the bourgeois camp?

(Let us observe in parenthesis that in this respect, too, Kautsky is merely trailing after the Russian Mensheviks. Among the latter there are any number of people who know "all the quotations" from Marx and Engels. Yet not a single Menshevik, from April to October 1917 and from October 1917 to October 1918, has *ever* made a *single* attempt to examine the question of the Paris Commune type of state. Plekhanov, too, has evaded the question. *Evidently he had to*.)

It goes without saying that to discuss the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly[113] with people who call themselves socialists and Marxists, but who in fact desert to the bourgeoisie on the *main* question, the question of the Paris Commune type of state, would be casting pearls before swine. It will be sufficient to give the complete text of my theses on the Constituent Assembly as an appendix to the present book. The reader will then see that the question was presented on December 26, 1917, in the light of theory, history and practical politics.

If Kautsky has completely renounced Marxism as a theoretician he might at least have examined the question of the struggle of the Soviets with the Constituent Assembly as a historian. We know from many of Kautsky's works that he *knew how* to he a Marxist historian, and that *such* works of his will remain a permanent possession of the proletariat in spite of his subsequent apostasy. But on this question Kausky, even as a historian, *turns his back* on the truth, ignores *well-known* facts and behaves like a sycophant. He *wants* to represent the Bolsheviks as being unprincipled and he tells his readers that they tried to *mitigate* the conflict with the Constituent Assembly before dispersing it. There is absolutely nothing wrong about it, we have nothing to recant; I give the theses in full and there it is said as clear as clear can be: Gentlemen of the vacillating petty bour-

geoisie entrenched in the Constituent Assembly, either reconcile yourselves to the proletarian dictatorship, or else we shall defeat you by "revolutionary means" (theses 18 and 19).

That is how a really revolutionary proletariat has always behaved and always will behave towards the vacillating petty bourgeoisie.

Kautsky adopts a formal standpoint on the question of the Constituent Assembly. My theses say clearly and repeatedly that the interests of the revolution are higher than the formal rights of the Constituent Assembly (see theses 16 and 17). The formal democratic point of view is precisely the point of view of the *bourgeois* democrat who refuses to admit that the interests of the proletariat and of the proletarian class struggle are supreme. As a historian, Kautsky would not have been able to deny that bourgeois parliaments are the organs of this or that class. But now (for the sordid purpose of renouncing revolution) Kautsky finds it necessary to forget his Marxism, and he *refrains from putting the question*: the organ of what *class* was the Constituent Assembly of Russia? Kautsky does not examine the concrete conditions; he does not want to face facts; he does not say a single word to his German readers about the fact that the theses contained not only a theoretical elucidation of the question of the limited character of bourgeois democracy (theses 1-3), not only a description of the concrete conditions which determined the discrepancy between the party lists of candidates in the middle of October 1917 and the real state of affairs in December 1917 (theses 4-6), but also *a history of the class struggle and the Civil War* in October-December 1917 (theses 7-15). From this concrete history we drew the conclusion (thesis 14) that the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly!" had, *in reality*, become the slogan of the Cadets and the Kaledin men and their abettors.

Kautsky the historian fails to see this. Kautsky the historian has never heard that universal suffrage sometimes produces petty-bourgeois, sometimes reactionary and counter-revolutionary parliaments. Kautsky the Marxist historian has never heard that the form of elections, the form of democracy, is one thing, and the class content of the given

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institution is another. This question of the class content of the Constituent Assembly is directly put and answered in my theses. Perhaps my answer is wrong. Nothing would have been more welcome to us than a Marxist criticism of our analysis by an outsider. Instead of writing utterly silly phrases (of which there are plenty in Kautsky's book) about somebody preventing criticism of Bolshevism, he ought to have set out to make such a criticism. But the point is that he offers no criticism. He does not even *raise the question* of a class analysis of the Soviets on the one hand, and of the Constituent Assembly on the other. It is therefore *impossible* to argue, to debate with Kautsky. All we can do is *demonstrate* to the reader why Kautsky cannot be called anything else but a renegade.

The divergence between the Soviets and the Constituent Assembly has its history, which even a historian who does not share the point of view of the class struggle could not have ignored. Kautsky would not *touch* upon this actual history. Kautsky has concealed from his German readers the universally known fact (which only malignant Mensheviks now conceal) that the divergence between the Soviets and the "general state" (that is, bourgeois) institutions existed even under the rule of the Mensheviks, i.e., from the end of February to October 1917. Actually, Kautsky adopts the position of conciliation, compromise and collaboration between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However much Kautsky may repudiate this, it is a fact which is borne out by his whole pamphlet. To say that the Constituent Assembly should not have been dispersed is tantamount to saying that the fight against the bourgeoisie should not have been fought to a finish, that the bourgeoisie should not have been overthrown and that the proletariat should have made peace with them.

Why has Kautsky kept quiet about the fact that the Mensheviks were engaged in this inglorious work between February and October 1917 and did not achieve anything? If it was possible to reconcile the bourgeoisie with the proletariat, why didn't the Mensheviks succeed in doing so? Why did the bourgeoisie stand aloof from the Soviets? Why did the *Mensheviks* call the Soviets "revolutionary democracy", and the bourgeoisie the "propertied elements"?

Kautsky has concealed from his German readers that it was the Mensheviks who, in the "epoch" of their rule (February to October 1917), called the Soviets "revolutionary democracy", *thereby* admitting their superiority over all other institutions. It is only by concealing this fact that Kautsky the historian made it appear that the divergence between the Soviets and the bourgeoisie had no history, that it arose instantaneously, without cause, suddenly, because of the bad behaviour of the Bolsheviks. Yet, in actual fact, it was *the more than six months*' (an enormous period in time of revolution) *experience* of Menshevik compromise, of their attempts to reconcile the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, that convinced the people of the fruitlessness of these attempts and drove the proletariat away from the Mensheviks.

Kautsky admits that the Soviets are an excellent combat organisation of the proletariat, and that they have a great future before them. But, that being the case, Kautsky's position collapses like a house of cards, or like the dreams of a petty bourgeois that the acute struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can be avoided. For revolution is one continuous and moreover desperate struggle, and the proletariat is the vanguard class of *all* the oppressed, the focus and centre of all the aspirations of all the oppressed for their emancipation! Naturally, therefore, the Soviets, as the organ of the struggle of the oppressed people, reflected and expressed the moods and changes of opinions of these people ever so much more quickly, fully, and faithfully than any other institution (that, incidentally, is one of the reasons why Soviet democracy is the highest type of democracy).

In the period between February 28 (old style) and October 25, 1917, the Soviets managed to convene *two* all-Russia congresses of representatives of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia, of all the workers and soldiers, and of 70 or 80 per cent of the peasants, not to mention the vast number of local, uyezd, town, gubernia, and regional congresses. During this period the bourgeoisie did not succeed in convening a single institution representing the majority (except that obvious sham and mockery called the "Democratic Conference",[114] which enraged the

proletariat). The Constituent Assembly reflected *the same* popular mood and *the same* political grouping as the First (June) All-Russia Congress of Soviets. By the time the Constituent Assembly was convened (January 1918), the Second (October 1917) and Third (January 1918) Congresses of Soviets had met, both of which had *demonstrated as clear as clear could be* that the people had swung to the left, had become revolutionised, had turned away from the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and had passed over to the side of the Bolsheviks; *that is*, had turned away from petty-bourgeois leadership, from the illusion that it was possible to reach a compromise with the bourgeoisie, and had joined the proletarian revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

So, even the *external history* of the Soviets shows that the Constituent Assembly was a *reactionary* body and that its dispersal was inevitable. But Kautsky sticks firmly to his "slogan": let "pure democracy" prevail though the revolution perish and the bourgeoisie triumph over the proletariat! *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*!*

Here are the brief figures relating to the all-Russia congresses of Soviets in the course of the history of the Russian re-revolution:

All-Russia Congress of Soviets		Number of Delegates	Number of Bolsheviks	Percentage of Bolsheviks
First	(June 3, 1917)	790	103	13
Second	(October 25, 1917) . .	675	343	51
Third	(January 10, 1918) . .	710	434	61
Fourth	(March 14, 1918) . . .	1,232	795	64
Fifth	(July 4, 1918)	1,164	773	66

One glance at these figures is enough to understand why the defence of the Constituent Assembly and talk (like Kautsky's) about the Bolsheviks not having a majority of the population behind them are just ridiculed in Russia.

THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION

As I have already pointed out, the disfranchisement of the bourgeoisie is not a necessary and indispensable feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And in Russia, the

* Let justice be done, even though the world may perish.—*Ed.*

Bolsheviks, who long before October put forward the slogan of proletarian dictatorship, did not say anything in advance about disfranchising the exploiters. *This* aspect of the dictatorship did not make its appearance "according to the plan" of any particular party; it *emerged* of itself in the course of the struggle. Of course, Kautsky the historian failed to notice this. He failed to understand that even when the Mensheviks (who compromised with the bourgeoisie) still ruled the Soviets, the bourgeoisie cut themselves off from the Soviets of their own accord, boycotted them, put themselves up in opposition to them and intrigued against them. The Soviets arose without any constitution and existed without one for *more than a year* (from the spring of 1917 to the summer of 1918). The fury of the bourgeoisie against this independent and omnipotent (because it was all-embracing) organisation of the oppressed; the fight, the unscrupulous, self-seeking and sordid fight, the bourgeoisie waged against the Soviets; and, lastly, the overt participation of the bourgeoisie (from the Cadets to the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, from Milyukov to Kerensky) in the Kornilov mutiny[115]—all this *paved the way* for the formal exclusion of the bourgeoisie from the Soviets.

Kautsky has heard about the Kornilov mutiny, but he majestically scorns historical facts and the course and forms of the struggle which determine the *forms* of the dictatorship. Indeed, who should care about facts where "pure" democracy is involved? That is why Kautsky's "criticism" of the disfranchisement of the bourgeoisie is distinguished by such ... sweet naïveté, which would be touching in a child but is repulsive in a person who has not yet been officially certified as feeble-minded.

"...If the capitalists found themselves in an insignificant minority under universal suffrage they would more readily become reconciled to their fate" (p. 33).... Charming, isn't it? Clever Kautsky has seen many cases in history, and, generally, knows perfectly well from his own observations of life of landowners and capitalists reckoning with the will of the majority of the oppressed. Clever Kautsky firmly advocates an "opposition", i.e., parliamentary struggle. That is literally what he says: "opposition" (p. 34 and elsewhere).

My dear learned historian and politician! It would not harm you to know that "opposition" is a concept that belongs to the peaceful and only to the parliamentary struggle, i.e., a concept that corresponds to a non-revolutionary situation, a concept that corresponds to an *absence of revolution*. During revolution we have to deal with a ruthless enemy in civil war; and no reactionary jeremiads of a petty bourgeois who fears such a war, as Kautsky does, will alter the fact. To examine the problems of ruthless civil war from the point of view of "opposition" at a time when the bourgeoisie are prepared to commit any crime—the example of the Versailles men and their deals with Bismarck must mean something to every person who does not treat history like Gogol's Petrushka[116]—when the bourgeoisie are summoning foreign states to their aid and intriguing with them against the revolution, is simply comical. The revolutionary proletariat is to put on a nightcap, like "Muddle-headed Counsellor" Kautsky, and regard the bourgeoisie, who are organising Dutov, Krasnov and Czech counter-revolutionary insurrections and are paying millions to saboteurs, as a legal "opposition". Oh, what profundity!

Kautsky is exclusively interested in the formal, legal aspect of the question, and, reading his disquisitions on the Soviet Constitution, one involuntarily recalls Bebel's words: Lawyers are thoroughbred reactionaries. "In reality," Kautsky writes, "the capitalists alone cannot be disfranchised. What is a capitalist in the legal sense of the term? A property-owner? Even in a country which has advanced so far along the path of economic progress as Germany, where the proletariat is so numerous, the establishment of a Soviet republic would disfranchise a large mass of people. In 1907, the number of persons in the German Empire engaged in the three great occupational groups—agriculture, industry and commerce—together with their families amounted roughly to thirty-five million in the wage-earners' and salaried employees' group, and seventeen million in the independent group. Hence, a party might well form a majority among the wage-workers but a minority among the population as a whole" (p. 33).

That is an example of Kautsky's mode of argument. Isn't it the counter-revolutionary whining of a bourgeois?

Why, Mr. Kautsky, have you relegated all the "independents" to the category of the disfranchised, when you know very well that the overwhelming majority of the Russian peasants do not employ hired labour, and do not, therefore, lose their franchise? Isn't this falsification?

Why, learned economist, did you not quote the facts with which you are perfectly familiar and which are to be found in those same German statistical returns for 1907 relating to hired labour in agriculture according to size of farms? Why did you not quote these facts to enable the German workers, the readers of your pamphlet, to see *how many exploiters there are*, and how few they are compared with the total number of "farmers" who figure in German statistics?

You did not because your apostasy has made you a mere sycophant of the bourgeoisie.

The term capitalist, Kautsky argues, is legally a vague concept, and on several pages he thunders against the "arbitrariness" of the Soviet Constitution. This "serious scholar" has no objection to the British bourgeoisie taking several centuries to work out and develop a new (new for the Middle Ages) bourgeois constitution, but, representative of lackey's science that lie is, he will allow no time to us, the workers and peasants of Russia. He expects us to have a constitution all worked out to the very last letter in a few months....

"Arbitrariness!" Just imagine what a depth of vile subservience to the bourgeoisie and most inept pedantry is contained in *such* a reproach. When thoroughly bourgeois and for the most part reactionary lawyers in the capitalist countries have for centuries or decades been drawing up most detailed rules and regulations and writing scores and hundreds of volumes of laws and interpretations of laws to *oppress* the workers, to bind time *poor man* hand and foot and to place thousands of hindrances and obstacles in the way of any of the common labouring people—there the bourgeois liberals and Mr. Kautsky see no "arbitrariness"! That is "law" and "order"! The ways in which the poor are to be "kept down" have all been thought out and written down. There are thousands of bourgeois lawyers arid bureaucrats (about them Kautsky says nothing at all, probably just

because Marx attached enormous significance to smashing the bureaucratic machine...)—lawyers and bureaucrats who know how to interpret the laws in such a way that the worker and the average peasant can never break through the barbed-wire entanglements of these laws. This is not "arbitrariness" on the part of the bourgeoisie, it is not the dictatorship of the sordid and self-seeking exploiters who are sucking the blood of the people. Nothing of the kind! It is "pure democracy", which is becoming purer and purer every day.

But now that the toiling and exploited classes, while cut off by the imperialist war from their brothers across the border, have for the first time in history set up their *own* Soviets, have called to the work of political construction *those people* whom the bourgeoisie used to oppress, grind down and stupefy, and have begun *themselves* to build a *new*, proletarian state, have begun in the heat of furious struggle, in the fire of civil war, to *sketch* the fundamental principles of a state *without exploiters*—all the bourgeois scoundrels, the whole gang of bloodsuckers, with Kautsky echoing them, howl about "arbitrariness"! Indeed, how will these ignorant people, these workers and peasants, this "mob", be able to interpret their laws? How can these common labourers acquire a sense of justice without the counsel of educated lawyers, of bourgeois writers, of the Kautskys and the wise old bureaucrats?

Mr. Kautsky quotes from my speech of April 28, 1918, the words: "The people themselves determine the procedure and the time of elections." And Kautsky, the "pure democrat", infers from this:

> "...Hence, it would mean that every assembly of electors may determine the procedure of elections at their own discretion. Arbitrariness and the opportunity of getting rid of undesirable opposition in the ranks of the proletariat itself would thus be carried to the extreme" (p. 37).

Well, how does this differ from the talk of a hack lured by capitalists, who howls about the people oppressing industrious workers who are "willing to work" during a strike? Why is the *bourgeois* bureaucratic method of determining electoral procedure under "pure" bourgeois democracy *not* arbitrariness? Why should the sense of justice *among the masses who have risen to fight* their age-old exploiters and

who are being educated and steeled in this desperate struggle be less than that of a *handful* of bureaucrats, intellectuals and lawyers brought up in *bourgeois* prejudices?

Kautsky is a true socialist. Don't dare suspect the sincerity of this very respectable father of a family, of this very honest citizen. He is an ardent and convinced supporter of the victory of the workers, of the proletarian revolution. All he wants is that the honey-mouthed, petty-bourgeois intellectuals and philistines in nightcaps should *first—before* the masses begin to move, *before* they start a furious battle with the exploiters, and certainly *without* civil war—draw up a moderate and precise *set of rules for the development of the revolution....*

Burning with profound moral indignation, our most learned Judas Golovlyov[117] tells the German workers that on June 14, 1918, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets resolved to expel the representatives of the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks from the Soviets. "This measure," writes Judas Kautsky, all afire with noble indignation, "is not directed against definite persons guilty of definite punishable offences.... The Constitution of the Soviet Republic does not contain a single word about the immunity of Soviet deputies. It is not definite *persons*, but definite *parties* that are expelled from the Soviets" (p. 37).

Yes, that is really awful, an intolerable departure from pure democracy, according to the rules of which our revolutionary Judas Kautsky will make the revolution. We Russian Bolsheviks should first have guaranteed immunity to the Savinkovs and Co., to the Lieberdans,[118] Potresovs ("activists"[119]) and Co., then drawn up a criminal code proclaiming participation in the Czech counter-revolutionary war, or in the alliance with the German imperialists in the Ukraine or in Georgia *against* the workers of one's own country, to be "punishable offences", and *only then*, on the basis of this criminal code, would we be entitled, in accordance with the principles of "pure democracy", to expel "definite persons" from the Soviets. It goes without saying that the Czechs, who are subsidised by the British and French capitalists through the medium (or thanks to the agitation) of the Savinkovs, Potresovs and Lieberdans, and

the Krasnovs who receive ammunition from the Germans through the medium of the Ukrainian and Tiflis Mensheviks, would have sat quietly waiting until we were ready with our proper criminal code, and, like the purest democrats they are, would have confined themselves to the role of an "opposition"....

No less profound moral indignation is aroused in Kautsky's breast by the fact that the Soviet Constitution disfranchises all those who "employ hired labour with a view to profit". "A home-worker, or a small master employing only one journeyman," Kautsky writes, "may live and feel quite like a proletarian, but he has no vote" (p. 36).

What a departure from "pure democracy"! What an injustice! True, up to now all Marxists have thought—and thousands of facts have proved it—that the small masters were the most unscrupulous and grasping exploiters of hired labour, but our Judas Kautsky takes the small masters not as a *class* (who invented that pernicious theory of the class struggle?) but as single individuals, exploiters who "live and feel quite like proletarians". The famous "thrifty Agnes", who was considered dead and buried long ago, has come to life again under Kautsky's pen. This "thrifty Agnes" was invented and launched into German literature some decades ago by that "pure" democrat, the bourgeois Eugen Richter. He predicted untold calamities that would follow the dictatorship of the proletariat, the confiscation of the capital of the exploiters, and asked with an innocent air: What is a capitalist in the legal sense of the term? He took as an example a poor, thrifty seamstress ("thrifty Agnes"), whom the wicked "proletarian dictators" rob of her last farthing. There was a time when all German Social-Democrats used to poke fun at this "thrifty Agnes" of the pure democrat, Eugen Richter. But that was a long, long time ago, when Bebel, who was quite frank and open about there being many national-liberals[120] in his party, was still alive; that was very long ago, when Kautsky was not yet a renegade.

Now "thrifty Agnes" has come to life again in the person of the "small master who employs only one journeyman and who lives and feels quite like a proletarian". The wicked Bolsheviks are wronging him, depriving him of his vote.

It is true that "every assembly of electors" in the Soviet Republic, as Kautsky tells us, may admit into its midst a poor little master who, for instance, may be connected with this or that factory, if, by way of an exception, he is not an exploiter, and if he *really* "lives and feels quite like a proletarian". But can one rely on the knowledge of life, on the sense of justice if an irregular factory meeting of common workers acting (how awful!) without a written code? Would it not clearly be better to grant the vote to *all* exploiters, to *all* who employ hired labour, rather than risk the possibility of "thrifty Agnes" and the "small master who lives and feels quite like a proletarian" being wronged by the workers?

* * *

Let the contemptible renegade scoundrels, amidst the applause of the bourgeoisie and the social-chauvinists,* abuse our Soviet Constitution for disfranchising the exploiters! That's fine because it will accelerate and widen the split between the revolutionary workers of Europe and the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Renaudels and Longuets, the Hendersons and Ramsay MacDonalds, the old leaders and old betrayers of socialism.

The mass of the oppressed classes, the class-conscious and honest revolutionary proletarian leaders will be *on our side*. It will be enough to acquaint such proletarians and such people with our Soviet Constitution for them to say at once: "These are really *our people*, this is a real workers' party, this is a real workers' government, for it does not deceive the workers by talking about reforms in the way *all the above-mentioned leaders have done*, but is fighting the exploiters in real earnest, making a revolution in real earnest and *actually* fighting for the complete emancipation of the workers."

The *fact* that after a year's "experience" the Soviets

* I have just read a leading article in *Frankfurter Zeitung*[121] (No. 293, October 22, 1918), giving an enthusiastic summary of Kautsky's pamphlet. This organ of the stock exchange is satisfied. And no wonder! And a comrade writes to me from Berlin that *Vorwärts*,[122] the organ of the Scheidemanns, has declared in a special article that it subscribes to almost every line Kautsky has written. Hearty congratulations!

have deprived the exploiters of the franchise *shows* that the Soviets are really organisations of the oppressed and not of social-imperialists and social-pacifists who have sold themselves to the bourgeoisie. The *fact* that the Soviets have disfranchised the exploiters *shows* they are not organs of petty-bourgeois compromise with the capitalists, not organs of parliamentary chatter (on the part of the Kautskys, the Longuets and the MacDonalds), but organs of the genuinely revolutionary proletariat which is waging a life-and-death struggle against the exploiters.

"Kautsky's book is almost unknown here," a well-informed comrade wrote to me from Berlin a few days ago (today is October 30). I would advise our ambassadors in Germany and Switzerland not to stint thousands in buying up this book and *distributing it gratis* among the class-conscious workers so as to trample in the mud this "European"—read: imperialist and reformist—Social-Democracy, which has long been a "stinking corpse".

* * *

At the end of his book, on pages 61 and 63, Mr. Kautsky bitterly laments the fact that the "new theory" (as he calls Bolshevism, fearing to touch Marx's and Engels's analysis of the Paris Commune) "finds supporters even in old democracies like Switzerland, for instance". "It is incomprehensible" to Kautsky "how this theory can be adopted by German Social-Democrats".

No, it is quite comprehensible; for after the serious lessons of the war the revolutionary masses are becoming sick and tired of the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys.

"We" have always been in favour of democracy, Kautsky writes, yet we are supposed suddenly to renounce it!

"We", the opportunists of Social-Democracy, have always been opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Kolb and Co. proclaimed this *long ago*. Kautsky knows this and vainly expects that he will be able to conceal from his readers the obvious fact that he has "returned to the fold" of the Bernsteins and Kolbs.

"We", the revolutionary Marxists, have never made a fetish of "pure" (bourgeois) democracy. As is known, in 1903 Plekhanov was a revolutionary Marxist (later his

unfortunate turn brought him to the position of a Russian Scheidemann). And in that year Plekhanov declared at our Party Congress, which was then adopting its programme, that in the revolution the proletariat would, if necessary, disfranchise the capitalists and *disperse any parliament* that, was found to be counter-revolutionary. That this is the only view that corresponds to Marxism will be clear to anybody even from the statements of Marx and Engels which I have quoted above; it patently follows from all the fundamental principles of Marxism.

"We", the revolutionary Marxists, never made speeches to the people that the Kautskyites of all nations love to make, cringing before the bourgeoisie, adapting themselves to the bourgeois parliamentary system, keeping silent about the *bourgeois* character of modern democracy and demanding only *its* extension, only that *it* be carried to its logical conclusion.

"We" said to the bourgeoisie: You, exploiters and hypocrites, talk about democracy, while at every step you erect thousands of barriers to prevent the *oppressed people* from taking part in politics. We take you at your word and, in the interests of these people, demand the extension of your bourgeois democracy *in order to prepare the people for revolution* for the purpose of overthrowing you, the exploiters. And if you exploiters attempt to offer resistance to our proletarian revolution we shall ruthlessly suppress you; we shall deprive you of all rights; more than that, we shall not give you any bread, for in our proletarian republic the exploiters will have no rights, they will be deprived of fire and water, for we are socialists in real earnest, and not in the Scheidemann or Kautsky fashion.

That is what "we", the revolutionary Marxists, said, and will say—and that is why the oppressed people will support us and be with us, while the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys will be swept into the renegades' cesspool.

WHAT IS INTERNATIONALISM?

Kautsky is absolutely convinced that he is an internationalist and calls himself one. The Scheidemanns he calls "government socialists". In defending the Mensheviks (he

does not openly express his solidarity with them, but he faithfully expresses their views), Kautsky has shown with perfect clarity what kind of "internationalism" he subscribes to. And since Kautsky is not alone, but is spokesman for a trend which inevitably grew up in the atmosphere of the Second International (Longuet in France, Turati in Italy, Nobs and Grimm, Graber and Naine in Switzerland, Ramsay MacDonald in Britain, etc.), it will be instructive to dwell on Kautsky's "internationalism".

After emphasising that the Mensheviks also attended the Zimmerwald Conference (a diploma, certainly, but ... a tainted one), Kautsky sets forth the views of the Mensheviks, with whom he agrees, in the following manner:

"...The Mensheviks wanted a general peace. They wanted all the belligerents to adopt the formula: no annexations and no indemnities. Until this had been achieved, the Russian army, according to this view, was to stand ready for battle. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, demanded an immediate peace at any price; they were prepared, if need be, to make a separate peace; they tried to force it by increasing the state of disorganisation of the army, which was already bad enough" (p. 27). In Kautsky's opinion the Bolsheviks should not have taken power, and should have contented themselves with a Constituent Assembly.

So, the internationalism of Kautsky and the Mensheviks amounts to this: to demand reforms from the imperialist bourgeois government, but to continue to support it, and to continue to support the war that this government is waging until everyone in the war has accepted the formula: no annexations and no indemnities. This view was repeatedly expressed by Turati, and by the Kautsky supporters (Haase and others), and by Longuet and Co., who declared that they stood *for* defence of the fatherland.

Theoretically, this shows a complete inability to dissociate oneself from the social-chauvinists and complete confusion on the question of defence of the fatherland. Politically, it means substituting petty-bourgeois nationalism for internationalism, deserting to the reformists' camp and renouncing revolution.

From the point of view of the proletariat, recognising "defence of the fatherland" means justifying the present

war, admitting that it is legitimate. And since the war remains an imperialist war (both under a monarchy and under a republic), irrespective of the country—mine or some other country—in which the enemy troops are stationed at the given moment, recognising defence of the fatherland means, *in fact*, supporting the imperialist, predatory bourgeoisie, and completely betraying socialism. In Russia, even under Kerensky, under the bourgeois-democratic republic, the war continued to be imperialist war, for it was being waged by the bourgeoisie as a ruling class (and war is a "continuation of politics"); and a particularly striking expression of the imperialist character of the war were the secret treaties for the partitioning of the world and the plunder of other countries which had been concluded by the tsar at the time with the capitalists of Britain and France.

The Mensheviks deceived the people in a most despicable manner by calling this war a defensive or revolutionary war. And by approving the policy of the Mensheviks, Kautsky is approving the popular deception, is approving the part played by the petty bourgeoisie in helping capital to trick the workers and harness them to the chariot of the imperialists. Kautsky is pursuing a characteristically petty-bourgeois, philistine policy by pretending (and trying to make the people believe the absurd idea) that *putting forward a slogan* alters the position. The entire history of bourgeois democracy refutes this illusion; the bourgeois democrats have always advanced all sorts of "slogans" to deceive the people. The point is to *test* their sincerity, to compare their words with their *deeds*, not to be satisfied with idealistic or charlatan *phrases*, but to get down to *class reality*. An imperialist war does not cease to be imperialist when charlatans or phrase-mongers or petty-bourgeois philistines put forward sentimental "slogans", but only when the *class* which is conducting the imperialist war, and is bound to it by millions of economic threads (and even ropes), is really *overthrown* and is replaced at the helm of state by the really revolutionary class, the proletariat. *There is no other way of getting out of an imperialist war, as also out of an imperialist predatory peace.*

By approving the foreign policy of the Mensheviks, and by declaring it to be internationalist and Zimmerwaldist,

Kautsky, first, reveals the utter rottenness of the opportunist Zimmerwald majority (no wonder we, the *Left* Zimmerwaldists,[123] at once dissociated ourselves from such a majority!), and, secondly—and this is the chief thing—passes from the position of the proletariat to the position of the petty bourgeoisie, from the revolutionary to the reformist.

The proletariat fights for the revolutionary overthrow of the imperialist bourgeoisie; the petty bourgeoisie fights for the reformist "improvement" of imperialism, for adaptation to it, while *submitting* to it. When Kautsky was still a Marxist, for example, in 1909, when he wrote his *Road to Power*, it was the idea that war would inevitably lead to *revolution* that he advocated, and he spoke of the approach of an *era of revolutions*. The Basle Manifesto of 1912 plainly and definitely speaks of a *proletarian revolution* in connection with that very imperialist war between the German and the British groups which actually broke out in 1914. But in 1918, when revolutions did begin in connection with the war, Kautsky, instead of explaining that they were inevitable, instead of pondering over and thinking out the *revolutionary* tactics and the ways and means of preparing for revolution, began to describe the reformist tactics of the Mensheviks as internationalism. Isn't this apostasy?

Kautsky praises the Mensheviks for having insisted on maintaining the fighting strength of the army, and he blames the Bolsheviks for having added to "disorganisation of the army", which was already disorganised enough as it was. This means praising reformism and submission to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and blaming and renouncing revolution. For under Kerensky maintaining the fighting strength of the army meant its preservation under *bourgeois* (albeit republican) command. Everybody knows, and the progress of events has strikingly confirmed it, that this republican army preserved the *Kornilov* spirit because its officers were Kornilov men. The bourgeois officers could not help being Kornilov men; they could not help gravitating towards imperialism and towards the forcible suppression of the proletariat. All that the Menshevik tactics amounted to *in practice* was to leave all the foundations of

the imperialist war and all the foundations of the *bourgeois* dictatorship intact, to patch up details and to daub over a few trifles ("reforms").

On the other hand, not a single great revolution has ever taken place, or ever can take place, without the "disorganisation" of the army. For the army is the most ossified instrument for supporting the old regime, the most hardened bulwark of bourgeois discipline, buttressing up the rule of capital, and preserving and fostering among the working people the servile spirit of submission and subjection to capital. Counter-revolution has never tolerated, and never could tolerate, armed workers side by side with the army. In France, Engels wrote, the workers emerged armed from every revolution: "therefore, the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for the bourgeoisie, who were at the helm of the state."[124] The armed workers were the embryo of a *new* army, the organised nucleus of a *new* social order. The first commandment of the bourgeoisie was to crush this nucleus and prevent it from growing. The first commandment of every victorious revolution, as Marx and Engels repeatedly emphasised, was to smash the old army, dissolve it and replace it by a new one.[125] A new social class, when rising to power, never could, and cannot now, attain power and consolidate it except by completely disintegrating the old army ("Disorganisation!" the reactionary or just cowardly philistines howl on this score), except by passing through a most difficult and painful period without any army (the great French Revolution also passed through such a painful period), and by gradually building up, in the midst of hard civil war, a new army, a new discipline, a new military organisation of the new class. Formerly, Kautsky the historian understood this. Now, Kautsky the renegade has forgotten it.

What right has Kautsky to call the Scheidemanns "government socialists" if he *approves* of the tactics of the Mensheviks in the Russian revolution? In supporting Kerensky and joining his Ministry, the Mensheviks were also government socialists. Kautsky could not escape this conclusion if he were to put the question as to which is the *ruling class* that is waging the imperialist war. But Kautsky avoids raising the question about the ruling class, a question that

is imperative for a Marxist, for the mere raising of it would expose the renegade.

The Kautsky supporters in Germany, the Longuet supporters in France, and Turati and Co. in Italy argue in this way: socialism presupposes the equality and freedom of nations, their self-determination, *hence*, when our country is attacked, or when enemy troops invade our territory, it is the right and duty of socialists to defend their country. But theoretically such an argument is either a sheer mockery of socialism or a fraudulent subterfuge, while from the point of view of practical politics it coincides with the argument of the quite ignorant country yokel who has even no conception of the social, class character of the war, and of the tasks of a revolutionary party during a reactionary war.

Socialism is opposed to violence against nations. That is indisputable. But socialism is opposed to violence against men in general. Apart from Christian anarchists and Tolstoyans, however, no one has yet drawn the conclusion from this that socialism is opposed to *revolutionary* violence. So, to talk about "violence" in general, without examining the conditions which distinguish reactionary from revolutionary violence, means being a philistine who renounces revolution, or else it means simply deceiving oneself and others by sophistry.

The same holds true of violence against nations. Every war is violence against nations, but that does not prevent socialists from being *in favour* of a revolutionary war. The class character of war—that is the fundamental question which confronts a socialist (if lie is not a renegade). The imperialist war of 1914-18 is a war between two groups of the imperialist bourgeoisie for the division of the world, for the division of the booty, and for the plunder and strangulation of small and weak nations. This was the appraisal of the impending war given in the Basle Manifesto in 1912, and it has been confirmed by the facts. Whoever departs from this view of war is not a socialist.

If a German under Wilhelm or a Frenchman under Clemenceau says, "It is my right and duty as a socialist to defend my country if it is invaded by an enemy", lie argues not like a socialist, not like an internationalist, not like a revolutionary proletarian, but like a *petty-bourgeois*

nationalist. Because this argument ignores the revolutionary class struggle of the workers against capital, it ignores the appraisal of the war as a *whole* from the point of view of the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat, that is, it ignores internationalism, and all that remains is miserable and narrow-minded nationalism. My country is being wronged, that is all I care about—that is what this argument amounts to, and that is where its petty-bourgeois, nationalist narrow-mindedness lies. It is the same as if in regard to individual violence, violence against an individual, one were to argue that socialism is opposed to violence and therefore I would rather be a traitor than go to prison.

The Frenchman, German or Italian who says: "Socialism is opposed to violence against nations, *therefore* I defend myself when my country is invaded", *betrays* socialism and internationalism, because such a man *sees only* his own "country", he puts "his own" ... *bourgeoisie* above everything else and does not give a thought to the *international connections* which make the war an imperialist war and *his* bourgeoisie a link in the chain of imperialist plunder.

All philistines and all stupid and ignorant yokels argue in the same way as the renegade Kautsky supporters, Longuet supporters, Turati and Co.: "The enemy has invaded my country, I don't care about anything else."*

The socialist, the revolutionary proletarian, the internationalist, argues differently. He says: "The character of the war (whether it is reactionary or revolutionary) does not depend on who the attacker was, or in whose country the 'enemy' is stationed; it depends on *what class* is waging the war, and on what politics this war is a continuation of. If the war is a reactionary, imperialist war, that is, if it

* The social-chauvinists (the Scheidemanns, Renaudels, Hendersons, Gomperses and Co.) absolutely refuse to talk about the "International" during the war. They regard the enemies of "*their*" respective bourgeoisies as "traitors" to ... socialism. They *support* the policy of conquest pursued by *their* respective bourgeoisies. The social-pacifists (i.e., socialists in words and petty-bourgeois pacifists in practice) express all sorts of "internationalist" sentiments, protest against annexations, etc., but *in practice* they continue to *support their* respective imperialist bourgeoisies. The difference between the two types is unimportant; it is like the difference between two capitalists—one with bitter, and the other with sweet, words on his lips.

is being waged by two world groups of the imperialist, rapacious, predatory, reactionary bourgeoisie, then every bourgeoisie (even of the smallest country) becomes a participant in the plunder, and my duty as a representative of the revolutionary proletariat is to prepare for the *world proletarian revolution* as the *only* escape from the horrors of a world slaughter. I must argue, not from the point of view of 'my' country (for that is the argument of a wretched, stupid, petty-bourgeois nationalist who does not realise that he is only a plaything in the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie), but from the point of view of *my share* in the preparation, in the propaganda, and in the acceleration of the world proletarian revolution."

That is what internationalism means, and that is the duty of the internationalist, the revolutionary worker, the genuine socialist. That is the *ABC* that Kautsky the renegade has "forgotten". And his apostasy becomes still more obvious when he passes from approving the tactics of the petty-bourgeois nationalists (the Mensheviks in Russia, the Longuet supporters in France, the Turatis in Italy, and Haase and Co. in Germany) to criticising the Bolshevik tactics. Here is his criticism:

"The Bolshevik revolution was based on the assumption that it would become the starting-point of a general European revolution, that the bold initiative of Russia would prompt the proletarians of all Europe to rise.

"On this assumption it was, of course, immaterial what forms the Russian separate peace would take, what hardships and territorial losses (literally: mutilation or maiming, *Verstümmelungen*) it would cause the Russian people, and what interpretation of the self-determination of nations it would give. At that time it was also immaterial whether Russia was able to defend herself or not. According to this view, the European revolution would be the best protection of the Russian revolution, and would bring complete and genuine self-determination to all peoples inhabiting the former Russian territory.

"A revolution in Europe, which would establish and consolidate socialism there, would also become the means of removing the obstacles that would arise in Russia in the way of the introduction of the socialist system of production owing to the economic backwardness of the country.

"All this was very logical and very sound—only if the main assumption were granted, namely, that the Russian revolution would infallibly let loose a European revolution. But what if that did not happen?

"So far the assumption has not been justified. And the proletarians of Europe are now being accused of having abandoned and betrayed

the Russian revolution. This is an accusation levelled against unknown persons, for who is to be held responsible for the behaviour of the European proletariat?" (P. 28.)

And Kautsky then goes on to explain at great length that Marx, Engels and Bebel were more than once mistaken about the advent of revolution they had anticipated, but that they never based their tactics on the expectation of a revolution "*at a definite date*" (p. 29), whereas, he says, the Bolsheviks "staked everything on one card, on a general European revolution".

We have deliberately quoted this long passage to demonstrate to our readers Kautsky's "skill" in counterfeiting Marxism by palming off his banal and reactionary philistine view in its stead.

First, to ascribe to an opponent an obviously stupid idea and then to refute it is a trick practised by none too clever people. If the Bolsheviks had based their tactics on the expectation of a revolution in other countries *by a definite date* that would have been an undeniable stupidity. But the Bolshevik Party has never been guilty of such stupidity. In my letter to American workers (August 20, 1918), I expressly disown this foolish idea by saying that we count on an American revolution, but not by any definite date. I dwelt at length upon the very same idea more than once in my controversy with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the "Left Communists" (January-March 1918). Kautsky has committed a slight ... just a very slight forgery, on which he in fact based his criticism of Bolshevism. Kautsky has confused tactics based on the expectation of a European revolution in the more or less near future, but not at a definite date, with tactics based on the expectation of a European revolution at a definite date. A slight, just a very slight forgery!

The last-named tactics are foolish. The first-named *are obligatory* for a Marxist, for every revolutionary proletarian and internationalist—*obligatory*, because they alone take into account in a proper Marxist way the objective situation brought about by the war in all European countries, and they alone conform to the international tasks of the proletariat.

By substituting the petty question about an error which

the Bolshevik revolutionaries might have made, but did not, for the important question of the foundations of revolutionary tactics in general, Kautsky adroitly abjures all revolutionary tactics!

A renegade in politics, he is *unable even to present the question* of the objective prerequisites of revolutionary tactics theoretically.

And this brings us to the second point.

Secondly, it is obligatory for a Marxist to count on a European revolution if a *revolutionary situation* exists. It is the *ABC* of Marxism That the tactics of the socialist proletariat cannot be the same both when there is a revolutionary situation and when there is no revolutionary situation.

If Kautsky had put this question, which is obligatory for a Marxist, he would have seen that the answer was absolutely against him. Long before the war, all Marxists, all socialists were agreed that a European war would create a revolutionary situation. Kautsky himself, before he became a renegade, clearly and definitely recognised this—in 1902 (in his *Social Revolution*) and in 1909 (in his *Road to Power*). It was also admitted in the name of the entire Second International in the Basle Manifesto. No wonder the social-chauvinists and Kautsky supporters (the "Centrists", i.e., those who waver between the revolutionaries and the opportunists) of all countries shun like the plague the declarations of the Basle Manifesto on this score!

So, the expectation of a revolutionary situation in Europe was not an infatuation of the Bolsheviks, but the *general opinion* of all Marxists. When Kautsky tries to escape from this indisputable truth using such phrases as the Bolsheviks "always believed in the omnipotence of violence and will", he simply utters a sonorous and empty phrase to *cover up* his evasion, a shameful evasion, to put the question of a revolutionary situation.

To proceed. Has a revolutionary situation actually come or not? Kautsky proved unable to put this question either. The economic facts provide an answer: the famine and ruin created everywhere by the war imply a revolutionary situation. The political facts also provide an answer: ever since 1915 a splitting process has been evident in *all* countries within the old and decayed socialist parties, a process

of *departure of the mass* of the proletariat from the social-chauvinist leaders to the left, to revolutionary ideas and sentiments, to revolutionary leaders.

Only a person who dreads revolution and betrays it could have failed to see these facts on August 5, 1918, when Kautsky was writing his pamphlet. And now, at the end of October 1918, the revolution is growing *in a number* of European countries, and growing under everybody's eyes and very rapidly at that. Kautsky the "revolutionary", who still wants to be regarded as a Marxist, has proved to be a short-sighted philistine, who, like those philistines of 1847 whom Marx ridiculed, failed to see the approaching revolution!

Now to the third point.

Thirdly, what should be the specific features of revolutionary tactics when there is a revolutionary situation in Europe? Having become a renegade, Kautsky feared to put this question, which is obligatory for a Marxist. Kautsky argues like a typical petty bourgeois, a philistine, or like an ignorant peasant: has a "general European revolution" begun or not? If it has, then *he too* is prepared to become a revolutionary! But then, mark you, every scoundrel (like the scoundrels who now sometimes attach themselves to the victorious Bolsheviks) would proclaim himself a revolutionary!

If it has not, then Kautsky will turn his back on revolution! Kautsky does not display a shade of understanding of the truth that a revolutionary Marxist differs from the philistine and petty bourgeois by his ability to *preach* to the uneducated masses that the maturing revolution is necessary, to prove that it is inevitable, to *explain* its benefits to the people, and to *prepare* the proletariat and all the working and exploited people for it.

Kautsky ascribed to the Bolsheviks an absurdity, namely, that they had staked everything on one card, on a European revolution breaking out at a definite date. This absurdity has turned against Kautsky himself, because the logical conclusion of his argument is that the tactics of the Bolsheviks would have been correct if a European revolution had broken out by August 5, 1918! That is the date Kautsky mentions as the time he was writing his pamphlet. And

when, a few weeks after this August 5, it became clear that revolution was coming in a number of European countries, the whole apostasy of Kautsky, his whole falsification of Marxism, and his utter inability to reason or even to present questions in a revolutionary manner, became revealed in all their charm!

When the proletarians of Europe are accused of treachery, Kautsky writes, it is an accusation levelled at unknown persons.

You are mistaken, Mr. Kautsky! Look in the mirror and you will see those "unknown persons" against whom this accusation is levelled. Kautsky assumes an air of naïveté and pretends not to understand *who* levelled the accusation, and its *meaning*. In reality, however, Kautsky knows perfectly well that the accusation has been and is being levelled by the German "Lefts", by the Spartacists,[126] by Liebknecht and his friends. This accusation expresses a *clear appreciation* of the fact that the German proletariat betrayed the Russian (and world) revolution when it strangled Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia. This accusation is levelled primarily and above all, not against the *masses*, who are always downtrodden, but against those *leaders* who, like the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, *failed* in their duty to carry on revolutionary agitation, revolutionary propaganda, revolutionary work among the masses to overcome their inertness, who in fact worked *against* the revolutionary instincts and aspirations which are always aglow deep down among the mass of the oppressed class. The Scheidemanns bluntly, crudely, cynically, and in most cases for selfish motives betrayed the proletariat and deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie. The Kautsky and the Longuet supporters did the same thing, only hesitatingly and haltingly, and casting cowardly side-glances at those who were stronger at the moment. In all his writings during the war Kautsky tried to *extinguish* the revolutionary spirit instead of fostering and fanning it.

The fact that Kautsky does not even understand the enormous *theoretical* importance, and the even greater agitational and propaganda importance, of the "accusation" that the proletarians of Europe have betrayed the Russian revolution will remain a veritable historical monument to

the philistine stupefaction of the "average" leader of German official Social-Democracy! Kautsky does not understand that, owing to the censorship prevailing in the German "Reich", this "accusation" is perhaps the only form in which the German socialists who have not betrayed socialism—Liebknecht and his friends—can express *their appeal to the German workers* to throw off the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, to push aside such "leaders", to free themselves from their stultifying and debasing propaganda, to rise in revolt *in spite of* them, *without* them, and march over their heads *towards revolution*!

Kautsky does not understand this. And how could he understand the tactics of the Bolsheviks? Can a man who renounces revolution in general be expected to weigh and appraise the conditions of the development of revolution in one of the most "difficult" cases?

The Bolsheviks' tactics were correct; they were the *only* internationalist tactics, because they were based, not on the cowardly fear of a world revolution, not on a philistine "lack of faith" in it, not on the narrow nationalist desire to protect one's "own" fatherland (the fatherland of one's own bourgeoisie), while not "giving a damn" about all the rest, but on a correct (and, before the war and before the apostasy of the social-chauvinists and social-pacifists, a universally accepted) *estimation* of the revolutionary situation in Europe. These tactics were the only internationalist tactics, because they did the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*. These tactics have been justified by their enormous success, for Bolshevism (not by any means because of the merits of the Russian Bolsheviks, but because of the most profound sympathy of the *people* everywhere for tactics that are revolutionary in practice) has become *world* Bolshevism, has produced an idea, a theory, a programme and tactics which differ concretely and in practice from those of social-chauvinism and social-pacifism. Bolshevism *has given a coup de grâce* to the old, decayed International of the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, Renaudels and Longuets, Hendersons and MacDonalds, who from now on will be treading on each other's feet, dreaming about "unity" and trying to revive a corpse. Bolshevism *has created* the ideological

and tactical foundations of a Third International, of a really proletarian and Communist International, which will take into consideration both the gains of the tranquil epoch and the experience of the *epoch of revolutions*, *which has begun.*

Bolshevism has popularised throughout the world the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", has translated these words from the Latin, first into Russian, and then into *all* the languages of the world, and has shown by the example of *Soviet government* that the workers and poor peasants, *even* of a backward country, even with the least experience, education and habits of organisation, *have been able* for a whole year, amidst gigantic difficulties and amidst a struggle against the exploiters (who were supported by the bourgeoisie of the *whole* world), to maintain the power of the working people, to create a democracy that is immeasurably higher and broader than all previous democracies in the world, and to *start* the creative work of tens of millions of workers and peasants for the practical construction of socialism.

Bolshevism has actually helped to develop the proletarian revolution in Europe and America more powerfully than any party in any other country has so far succeeded in doing. While the workers of the whole world are realising more and more clearly every day that the tactics of the Scheidemanns and Kautskys have not delivered them from the imperialist war and from wage-slavery to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and that these tactics cannot serve as a model for all countries, the mass of workers in all countries are realising more and more clearly every day that Bolshevism has indicated the right road of escape from the horrors of war and imperialism, that Bolshevism *can serve as a model of tactics for all.*

Not only the general European, but the world proletarian revolution is maturing before the eyes of all, and it has been assisted, accelerated and supported by the victory of the proletariat in Russia. All this is not enough for the complete victory of socialism, you say? Of course it is not enough. One country alone cannot do more. But this one country, thanks to Soviet government, has done so much that even if Soviet government in Russia were to be crushed by world

imperialism tomorrow, as a result, let us say, of an agreement between German and Anglo-French imperialism—even granted that very worst possibility—it would still be found that Bolshevik tactics have brought enormous benefit to socialism and have assisted the growth of the invincible world revolution.

SUBSERVIENCE TO THE BOURGEOISIE IN THE GUISE OF "ECONOMIC ANALYSIS"

As has already been said, if the title of Kautsky's book were properly to reflect its contents, it should have been called, not *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, but *A Rehash of Bourgeois Attacks on the Bolsheviks.*

The old Menshevik "theories" about the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution, i.e., the old distortion of Marxism by the Mensheviks (*rejected* by Kautsky in 1905!), are now once again being rehashed by our theoretician. We must deal with this question, however boring it may be for Russian Marxists.

The Russian revolution is a bourgeois revolution, said all the Marxists of Russia before 1905. The Mensheviks, substituting liberalism for Marxism, drew the following conclusion from this: the proletariat therefore must not go beyond what is acceptable to the bourgeoisie and must pursue a policy of compromise with them. The Bolsheviks said this was a bourgeois-liberal theory. The bourgeoisie were trying to bring about the reform of the state on bourgeois, *reformist*, not revolutionary lines, while preserving the monarchy, the landlord system, etc., as far as possible. The proletariat must carry through the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the end, not allowing itself to be "bound" by the reformism of the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks formulated the alignment of *class* forces in the bourgeois revolution as follows: the proletariat, winning over the peasants, will neutralise the liberal bourgeoisie and utterly destroy the monarchy, medievalism and the landlord system.

It is the alliance between the proletariat and the peasants *in general* that reveals the bourgeois character of the revolution, for the peasants in genera] are small producers who exist on the basis of commodity production. Further, the

Bolsheviks then added, the proletariat will win over *the entire semi-proletariat* (all the working and exploited people), will neutralise the middle peasants and *overthrow* the bourgeoisie; this will be a socialist revolution, as distinct from a bourgeois-democratic revolution. (See my pamphlet *Two Tactics*, published in 1905 and reprinted in *Twelve Years*, St. Petersburg, 1907.)

Kautsky took an indirect part in this controversy in 1905, when, in reply to an inquiry by the then Menshevik Plekhanov, he expressed an opinion that was essentially against Plekhanov, which provoked particular ridicule in the Bolshevik press at the time. But now Kautsky does *not* say *a single word* about the controversies of that time (for fear of being exposed by his own statements!), and thereby makes it utterly impossible for the German reader to understand the essence of the matter. Mr. Kautsky *could not* tell the German workers in 1918 that in 1905 he had been in favour of an alliance of the workers with the peasants and not with the liberal bourgeoisie, and on what conditions he had advocated this alliance, and what programme he had outlined for it.

Backing out from his old position, Kautsky, under the guise of an "economic analysis", and talking proudly about "historical materialism", now advocates the subordination of the workers to the bourgeoisie, and, with the aid of quotations from the Menshevik Maslov, chews over the old liberal views of the Mensheviks. Quotations are used to prove the new idea of the backwardness of Russia. But the deduction drawn from this new idea is the old one, that in a bourgeois revolution one must not go farther than the bourgeoisie! And this in spite of all that Marx and Engels said when comparing the bourgeois revolution of 1789-93 in France with the bourgeois revolution of 1848 in Germany![127]

Before passing to the chief "argument" and the main content of Kautsky's "economic analysis", let us note that Kautsky's very first sentences reveal a curious confusion, or superficiality, of thought.

"Agriculture, and specifically small peasant farming," our "theoretician" announces, "to this day represents the economic foundation of Russia. About four-fifths, perhaps

even five-sixths, of the population live by it" (p. 45). First of all, my dear theoretician, have you considered how many exploiters there may be among this mass of small producers? Certainly not more than one-tenth of the total, and in the towns still less, for there large-scale production is more highly developed. Take even an incredibly high figure; assume that one-fifth of the small producers are exploiters who are deprived of the franchise. Even then you will find that the 66 per cent of the votes held by the Bolsheviks at the Fifth Congress of Soviets represented the *majority of the population*. To this it must be added that there was always a considerable section of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who were in favour of Soviet power—in principle *all* the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were in favour of Soviet power, and when a section of them, in July 1918, started an adventurous revolt, two new parties split away from the old party, namely, the "Narodnik Communists" and the "Revolutionary Communists"[128] (of the prominent Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who had been nominated for important posts in the government by the old party, to the first-mentioned belongs Zax, for instance, and to the second Kolegayev). So, Kautsky has himself—inadvertently—refuted the ridiculous fable that the Bolsheviks only have the backing of a minority of the population.

Secondly, my dear theoretician, have you considered the fact that the small peasant producer *inevitably* vacillates between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? This Marxist truth, which has been confirmed by the whole modern history of Europe, Kautsky very conveniently "forgot", for it simply demolishes the Menshevik "theory" that he keeps repeating! Had Kautsky not "forgotten" this he could not have denied the need for a proletarian dictatorship in a country in which the small peasant producers predominate.

Let us examine the main content of our theoretician's "economic analysis".

That Soviet power is a dictatorship cannot be disputed, says Kautsky. "But is it a dictatorship of *the proletariat*?" P. 34.)

"According to the Soviet Constitution, the peasants form the majority of the population entitled to participate in legislation and administration. What is presented to us as a dictatorship of *the proletariat*

would prove to be—if carried out consistently, and if, generally speaking, a class could directly exercise a dictatorship, which in reality can only be exercised by a party—a dictatorship of *the peasants*" (p. 35).

And, highly elated over so profound and clever an argument, our good Kautsky tries to be witty and says: "It would appear, therefore, that the most painless achievement of socialism is best assured when it is put in the hands of the peasants" (p. 35).

In the greatest detail, and citing a number of extremely learned quotations from the semi-liberal Maslov, our theoretician labours to prove the new idea that the peasants are interested in high grain prices, in low wages for the urban workers, etc., etc. Incidentally, the enunciation of these new ideas is the more tedious the less attention our author pays to the really new features of the post-war period—for example, that the peasants demand for their grain, not money, but goods, and that they have not enough agricultural implements, which cannot be obtained in sufficient quantities for any amount of money. But more of this later.

Thus, Kautsky charges the Bolsheviks, the party of the proletariat, with having surrendered the dictatorship, the work of achieving socialism, to the petty-bourgeois peasants. Excellent, Mr. Kautsky! But what, in your enlightened opinion, should have been the attitude of the proletarian party towards the petty-bourgeois peasants?

Our theoretician preferred to say nothing on this score—evidently bearing in mind the proverb: "Speech is silver, silence is gold." But he gives himself away by the following argument:

"At the beginning of the Soviet Republic, the peasants' Soviets were organisations of the *peasants* in general. Now this Republic proclaims that the Soviets are organisations of the proletarians and the *poor* peasants. The well-to-do peasants are deprived of the suffrage in the elections to the Soviets. The poor peasant is here recognised to be a permanent and mass product of the socialist agrarian reform under the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'" (p. 48).

What deadly irony! It is the kind that may be heard in Russia from any bourgeois: they all jeer and gloat over the fact that the Soviet Republic openly admits the existence of poor peasants. They ridicule socialism. That is their right. But a "socialist" who jeers at the fact that after

four years of a most ruinous war there remain (and will remain for a long time) poor peasants in Russia—such a "socialist" could only have been born at a time of wholesale apostasy.

And further:

"...The Soviet Republic interferes in the relations between the rich and poor peasants, but not by redistributing the land. In order to relieve the bread shortage in the towns, detachments of armed workers are sent into the countryside to take away the rich peasants' surplus stocks of grain. Part of that stock is given to the urban population, the other—to the poorer peasants" (p. 48).

Of course, Kautsky the socialist and Marxist is profoundly indignant at the idea that such a measure should be extended beyond the environs of the large towns (and we have extended it to the whole of the country). With the matchless, incomparable and admirable coolness (or pigheadedness) of a philistine, Kautsky the socialist and Marxist sermonises: ... "It [the expropriation of the well-to-do peasants] introduces a new element of unrest and civil war into the process of production" ... (civil war introduced into the "process of production"—that is something supernatural!)... "which stands in urgent need of peace and security for its recovery" (p. 49).

Oh, yes, of course, Kautsky the Marxist and socialist must sigh and shed tears over the subject of peace and security for the exploiters and grain profiteers who hoard their surplus stocks, sabotage the grain monopoly law, and reduce the urban population to famine. "We are all socialists and Marxists and internationalists," the Kautskys, Heinrich Webers[129] (Vienna), Longuets (Paris), MacDonalds (London), etc., sing in chorus. "We are all in favour of a working-class revolution. Only ... only we would like a revolution that does not infringe upon the peace and security of the grain profiteers! And we camouflage this sordid subservience to the capitalists by a 'Marxist' reference to the 'process of production'...." If this is Marxism, what is servility to the bourgeoisie?

Just see what our theoretician arrives at. He accuses the Bolsheviks of presenting the dictatorship of the peasants as the dictatorship of the proletariat. But at the same time he accuses us of introducing civil war into the rural districts

(which we think is to our *credit*), of dispatching into the countryside armed detachments of workers, who publicly proclaim that they are exercising the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants", assist the latter and confiscate from the profiteers and the rich peasants the surplus stocks of grain which they are hoarding in contravention of the grain monopoly law.

On the one hand, our Marxist theoretician stands for pure democracy, for the subordination of the revolutionary class, the leader of the working and exploited people, to the majority of the population (including, therefore, the exploiters). On the other hand, as an argument *against* us, he explains that the revolution must inevitably bear a bourgeois character —bourgeois, because the life of the peasants as a whole is based on bourgeois social relations—and at the same time he pretends to uphold the proletarian, class, Marxist point of view!

Instead of an "economic analysis" we have a first-class hodge-podge. Instead of Marxism we have fragments of liberal doctrines and the preaching of servility to the bourgeoisie and the kulaks.

The question which Kautsky has so tangled up was fully explained by the Bolsheviks as far back as 1905. Yes, our revolution is a bourgeois revolution *as long* as we march *with* the peasants *as a whole*. This has been as clear as clear can be to us; we have said it hundreds and thousands of times since 1905, and we have never attempted to skip this necessary stage of the historical process or abolish it by decrees. Kautsky's efforts to "expose" us on this point merely expose his own confusion of mind and his fear to recall what he wrote in 1905, when he was not yet a renegade.

Beginning with *April* 1917, however, long before the October Revolution, that is, long before we assumed power, we publicly declared and explained to the people: the revolution cannot now stop at this stage, for the country has marched forward, capitalism has advanced, ruin has reached fantastic dimensions, which (whether one likes it or not) *will demand* steps forward, *to socialism*. For there is *no* other way of advancing, of saving the war-weary country and of *alleviating* the sufferings of the working and exploited people.

Things have turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the "whole" of the peasants against the monarchy, against the landowners, against medievalism (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). *Then*, with the poor peasants, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one. To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and second, to separate them *by anything else* than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means to distort Marxism dreadfully, to vulgarise it, to substitute liberalism in its place. It means smuggling in a reactionary defence of the bourgeoisie against the socialist proletariat by means of quasi-scientific references to the progressive character of the bourgeoisie in comparison with medievalism.

Incidentally, the Soviets represent an immensely higher form and type of democracy just because, by uniting and drawing the *mass of workers and peasants* into political life, they serve as a most sensitive barometer, the one closest to the "people" (in the sense in which Marx, in 1871, spoke of a real people's revolution[130]), of the growth and development of the political, class maturity of the people. The Soviet Constitution was not drawn up according to some "plan"; it was not drawn up in a study, and was not foisted on the working people by bourgeois lawyers. No, this Constitution *grew up* in the course of the development of *the class struggle* in proportion as *class antagonisms* matured. The very facts which Kautsky himself has to admit prove this.

At first, the Soviets embraced the peasants as a whole. It was owing to the immaturity, the backwardness, the ignorance of the poor peasants that the leadership passed into the hands of the kulaks, the rich, the capitalists and the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. That was the period of the domination of the petty bourgeoisie, of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (only fools or renegades like Kautsky can regard either of these as socialists). The petty bourgeoisie inevitably and unavoidably vacillated between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (Kerensky, Kornilov,

Savinkov) and the dictatorship of the proletariat; for owing to the basic features of its economic position, the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of doing anything independently. Kautsky, by the way, completely renounces Marxism by confining himself in his analysis of the Russian revolution to the legal and formal concept of "democracy", which serves the bourgeoisie as a screen to conceal their domination and as a means of deceiving the people, and by *forgetting* that in practice "democracy" sometimes stands for the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*, sometimes for the impotent reformism of the petty bourgeoisie who submit to that dictatorship, and so on. According to Kautsky, in a capitalist country there were bourgeois parties and there was a proletarian party (the Bolsheviks), which led the majority, the mass of the proletariat, but *there were no* petty-bourgeois parties! The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had no *class roots*, no petty-bourgeois roots!

The vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie, of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, helped to enlighten the people and to repel the overwhelming majority of them, all the "lower sections", all the proletarians and semi-proletarians, from such "leaders". The Bolsheviks won predominance in the Soviets (in Petrograd and Moscow by October 1917); the split among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks became more pronounced.

The victorious Bolshevik revolution meant the end of vacillation, meant the complete destruction of the monarchy and of the landlord system (which had *not* been destroyed before the October Revolution). We carried the *bourgeois* revolution *to its conclusion*. The peasants supported us as *a whole*. Their antagonism to the socialist proletariat could not reveal itself all at once. The Soviets united the peasants *in general*. The class divisions among the peasants had not yet matured, had not yet come into the open.

That process took place in the summer and autumn of 1918. The Czech counter-revolutionary mutiny roused the kulaks. A wave of kulak revolts swept over Russia. The poor peasants learned, not from books or newspapers, *but from life itself*, that their interests were irreconcilably antagonistic to those of the kulaks, the rich, the rural bourgeoisie. Like every other petty-bourgeois party, the

"Left Socialist-Revolutionaries" reflected the vacillation of the people, and in the summer of 1918 they split: one section joined forces with the Czechs (the rebellion in Moscow, when Proshyan, having seized the Telegraph Office—for one hour!—announced to Russia that the Bolsheviks had been overthrown; then the treachery of Muravyov,[131] Commander-in-Chief of the army that was fighting the Czechs, etc.), while the other section, that mentioned above, remained with the Bolsheviks.

The growing food shortage in the towns lent increasing urgency to the question of the grain monopoly (this Kautsky the theoretician completely "forgot" in his economic analysis, which is a mere repetition of platitudes gleaned ten years ago from Maslov's writings!).

The old landowner and bourgeois, and even democratic-republican, state had sent to the rural districts armed detachments which were practically at the beck and call of the bourgeoisie. Mr. Kautsky does not know this! He does not regard that as the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie"—Heaven forbid! That is "pure democracy", especially if endorsed by a bourgeois parliament! Nor has Kautsky "heard" that, in the summer and autumn of 1917, Avksentyev and S. Maslov, in company with the Kerenskys, the Tseretelis and other Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, arrested members of the Land Committees; he does not say a word about that!

The whole point is that a bourgeois state which is exercising the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie through a democratic republic cannot confess to the people that it is serving the bourgeoisie; it cannot tell the truth, and has to play the hypocrite.

But the state of the Paris Commune type, the Soviet state, openly and frankly tells the people the *truth* and declares that it is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants; and by this truth it wins over scores and scores of millions of new citizens who are kept down in any democratic republic, but who are drawn by the Soviets into political life, *into democracy*, into the administration of the state. The Soviet Republic sends into the rural districts detachments of armed workers, primarily the more advanced, from the capitals. These workers carry socialism into the

countryside, win over the poor, organise and enlighten them, and help them to *suppress the resistance of the bourgeoisie.*

All who are familiar with the situation and have been in the rural districts declare that it is only now, in the summer and autumn of 1918, that the rural districts *themselves* are passing through the "October" (i.e., proletarian) Revolution. Things are beginning to change. The wave of kulak revolts is giving way to a rise of the poor, to a growth of the "Poor Peasants' Committees". In the army, the number of workers who become commissars, officers and commanders of divisions and armies is increasing. And at the very time that the simple-minded Kautsky, frightened by the July (1918) crisis[132] and the lamentations of the bourgeoisie, was running after the latter like a cockerel, and writing a whole pamphlet breathing the conviction that the Bolsheviks are on the eve of being overthrown by the peasants; at the very time that this simpleton regarded the secession of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries as a "narrowing" (p. 37) of the circle of those who support the Bolsheviks—at that very time the *real* circle of supporters of Bolshevism was *expanding enormously*, because scores and scores of millions of the village poor were freeing themselves from the tutelage and influence of the kulaks and village bourgeoisie and were awakening to *independent* political life.

We have lost hundreds of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, spineless intellectuals and kulaks from among the peasants; but we have gained millions of poor people.*

A year after the proletarian revolution in the capitals, and under its influence and with its assistance, the proletarian revolution began in the remote rural districts, and it has finally consolidated the power of the Soviets and Bolshevism, and has finally proved there is no force in the country that can withstand it.

Having completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution in alliance with the peasants as a whole, the Russian proletariat finally passed on to the socialist revolution when it succeeded in splitting the rural population, in winning over

* At the Sixth Congress of Soviets (November 6-9, 1918), there were 967 voting delegates, 950 of whom were Bolsheviks, and 351 delegates with voice but no vote, of whom 335 were Bolsheviks, i.e., 97 per cent of the total number of delegates were Bolsheviks.

the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, and in uniting them against the kulaks and the bourgeoisie, including the peasant bourgeoisie.

Now, if the Bolshevik proletariat in the capitals and large industrial centres had not been able to rally the village poor around itself against the rich peasants, this would indeed have proved that Russia was "unripe" for socialist revolution. The peasants would then have remained an "integral whole", i.e., they would have remained under the economic, political, and moral leadership of the kulaks, the rich, the bourgeoisie, and the revolution would not have passed beyond the limits of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. (But, let it be said in parenthesis, even if this had been the case, it would not have proved that the proletariat should not have taken power, for it is the proletariat alone that has really carried the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion, it is the proletariat alone that has done something really important to bring nearer the world proletarian revolution, and the proletariat alone that has created the Soviet state, which, after the Paris Commune, is the second step towards the socialist state.)

On the other hand, if the Bolshevik proletariat had tried at once, in October-November 1917, without waiting for the class differentiation in the rural districts, without being able to *prepare* it and bring it about, to "decree" a civil war or the "introduction of socialism" in the rural districts, had tried to do without a temporary bloc with the peasants in general, without making a number of concessions to the middle peasants, etc., that would have been a *Blanquist*[133] distortion of Marxism, an attempt by the *minority* to impose its will upon the majority; it would have been a theoretical absurdity, revealing a failure to understand that a general peasant revolution is *still* a bourgeois revolution, and that *without a series of transitions*, of transitional stages, it cannot be transformed into a socialist revolution in a backward country.

Kautsky has confused *everything* in this very important theoretical and political problem, and has, in practice, proved to be nothing but a servant of the bourgeoisie, howling against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

Kautsky has introduced a similar, if not greater, confusion into another extremely interesting and important question, namely: was the *legislative* activity of the Soviet Republic in the sphere of agrarian reform—that most difficult and yet most important of socialist reforms—based on sound principles and then properly carried out? We should be boundlessly grateful to any West-European Marxist who, after studying at least the most important documents, gave a *criticism* of our policy, because he would thereby help us immensely, and would also help the revolution that is maturing throughout the world. But instead of criticism Kautsky produces an incredible theoretical muddle, which converts Marxism into liberalism and which, in practice, is a series of idle, venomous, vulgar sallies against the Bolsheviks. Let the reader judge for himself:

"Large landed estates could not be preserved. This was a result of the revolution. That was at once clear. The transfer of the large estates to the peasant population became inevitable...." (That is not true, Mr. Kautsky. You substitute what is "clear" to you for the attitude of the different *classes* towards the question. The history of the revolution has shown that the coalition government of the bourgeois and the petty bourgeois, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, pursued a policy of preserving big landownership. This was proved particularly by S. Maslov's bill and by the arrest of the members of the Land Committees.[134] Without the dictatorship of the proletariat, the "peasant population" would not have vanquished the landowners, who had joined forces with the capitalists.)

"...But as to the forms in which it was to take place, there was no unity. Various solutions were conceivable...." (Kautsky is most of all concerned about the "unity" of the "socialists", no matter who called themselves by that name. He forgets that the principal classes in capitalist society are bound to arrive at different solutions.) "...From the socialist point of view, the most rational solution would have been to convert the large estates into state property and to allow the peasants who hitherto had been employed on them as wage-labourers to cultivate them in the form of co-operative societies. But such a solution presupposes the existence of a type of farm labourer that did not exist in

Russia. Another solution would have been to convert the large estates into state property and to divide them up into small plots to be rented out to peasants who owned little land. Had that been done, at least something socialistic would have been achieved...."

As usual Kautsky confines himself to the celebrated: on the one hand it cannot but be admitted, and on the other hand it must be confessed. He places different solutions *side by side* without a thought—the only, realistic and Marxist thought—as to what must be the *transitional* stages from capitalism to communism in such-and-such *specific* conditions. There are farm labourers in Russia, but not many; and Kautsky did not touch on the question—which the Soviet government *did raise*—of the method of transition to a communal and co-operative form of land cultivation. The most curious thing, however, is that Kautsky claims to see "something socialistic" in the renting out of small plots of land. In reality, this is a *petty-bourgeois* slogan, and there is *nothing* "socialistic" in it. If the "state" that rents out the land is *not* a state of the Paris Commune type, but a parliamentary bourgeois republic (and that is exactly Kautsky's constant assumption), the renting of land in small plots is a typical *liberal reform*.

Kautsky says nothing about the Soviet government having abolished *all* private ownership of land. Worse than that: he resorts to an incredible forgery and quotes the decrees of the Soviet government in such a way as to omit the most essential.

After stating that "small production strives for complete private ownership of the means of production", and that the Constituent Assembly would have been the "only authority" capable of preventing the dividing up of the land (an assertion which will evoke laughter in Russia, where everybody knows that the Soviets *alone* are recognised as authoritative by the workers and peasants, while the Constituent Assembly has become the slogan of the Czechs and the landowners), Kautsky continues:

"One of the first decrees of the Soviet Government declared that: (1) Landed proprietorship is abolished forthwith without any compensation. (2) The landed estates, as also all crown, monastery and church lands, with all their livestock, implements, buildings and everything

pertaining thereto, shall be placed at the disposal of the volost Land Committees of the uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies pending the settlement of the land question by the Constituent Assembly."

Having quoted *only these two clauses*, Kautsky concludes:

"The reference to the Constituent Assembly has remained a dead letter. In point of fact, the peasants in the separate volosts could do as they pleased with the land" (p. 47).

Here you have an example of Kautsky's "criticism"! Here you have a "scientific" work which is more like a fraud. The German reader is induced to believe that the Bolsheviks capitulated before the peasants on the question of private ownership of land, that the Bolsheviks permitted the peasants to act locally ("in the separate volosts") in whatever way they pleased!

But in reality, the decree Kautsky quotes—the first to be promulgated, on October 26, 1917 (old style)—consists not of two, but of five clauses, *plus* eight clauses of the Mandate, which, it was expressly stated, "shall serve as a guide".

Clause 3 of the decree states that the estates are transferred "*to the people*", and the "exact inventories of all property confiscated" shall be drawn up and the property "protected in the strictest revolutionary way". And the Mandate declares that "private ownership of land shall be abolished for ever", that "lands on which high-level scientific farming is practised ... *shall not be divided up*", that "all livestock and farm implements of the confiscated estates shall pass into the exclusive use of the state or a commune, depending on size and importance, and no compensation shall be paid for this", and that "all land shall become part of the national land fund".

Further, simultaneously with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (January 5, 1918), the Third Congress of Soviets adopted the *Declaration of Rights* of the Working and Exploited People, which now forms part of the Fundamental Law of the Soviet Republic. Article 2, paragraph 1 of this Declaration states that "private ownership of land is hereby abolished", and that "model estates and agricultural enterprises are proclaimed national property".

So, the reference to the Constituent Assembly did *not* remain a dead letter, because another national representative body, immeasurably more authoritative in the eyes of the

peasants, took upon itself the solution of the agrarian problem.

Again, on February 6 (19), 1918, the land socialisation law was promulgated, which once more confirmed the abolition of all private ownership of land, and placed the land and *all private* stock and implements at the disposal of the Soviet authorities *under the control of the federal Soviet government*. Among the duties connected with the disposal of the land, the law prescribed:

"the development of collective farming as more advantageous from the point of view of economy of labour and produce, at the expense of individual farming, with a view to transition to socialist farming" (Article 11, paragraph *e*).

The same law, in establishing the principle of *equal* land tenure, replied to the fundamental question: "Who has a right to the use of the land?" in the following manner:

(Article 20.) "Plots of land surface within the borders of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic may be used for public and private needs. A. For cultural and educational purposes: (1) by the state as represented by the organs of Soviet power (federal, as well as in regions, gubernias, uyezds, volosts, and villages), and (2) by public bodies (under the control, and with the permission, of the local Soviet authorities); B. For agricultural purposes: (3) by agricultural communes, (4) by agricultural co-operative societies, (5) by village communities, (6) by individual families and persons...."

The reader will see that Kautsky has completely distorted the facts, and has given the German reader an absolutely false view of the agrarian policy and agrarian legislation of the proletarian state in Russia.

Kautsky proved even unable to formulate the theoretically important fundamental questions!

These questions are:

(1) Equal land tenure and

(2) Nationalisation of the land—the relation of these two measures to socialism in general, and to the transition from capitalism to communism in particular.

(3) Farming in common as a transition from small scattered farming to large-scale collective farming; does the manner in which this question is dealt with in Soviet legislation meet the requirements of socialism?

On the first question it is necessary, first of all, to establish the following two fundamental facts: (a) in reviewing the

experience of 1905 (I may refer, for instance, to my work on the agrarian problem in the First Russian Revolution), the Bolsheviks pointed to the democratically progressive, the democratically revolutionary meaning of the slogan "equal land tenure", and in 1917, *before* the October Revolution, they spoke of this quite definitely; (b) when enforcing the land socialisation law—the "spirit" of which is equal land tenure—the Bolsheviks most explicitly and definitely declared: this is not our idea, we do not agree with this slogan, but we think it our duty to enforce it because this is the demand of the overwhelming majority of the peasants. And the idea and demands of the majority of the working people are things that the working people must *discard of their own accord*: such demands cannot be either "abolished" or "skipped over". We Bolsheviks shall *help* the peasants to discard petty-bourgeois slogans, to *pass* from them as quickly and as easily as possible to socialist slogans.

A Marxist theoretician who wanted to help the working-class revolution by his scientific analysis should have answered the following questions: first, is it true that the idea of equal land tenure has a democratically revolutionary meaning of carrying the *bourgeois*-democratic revolution to its conclusion? Secondly, did the Bolsheviks act rightly in helping to pass by their votes (and in most loyally observing) the petty-bourgeois equal land tenure law?

Kautsky failed even to *perceive* what, theoretically, was the crux of the problem!

Kautsky will never be able to refute the view that the idea of equal land tenure has a progressive and revolutionary value in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Such a revolution cannot go beyond this. By reaching its limit, it *all the more clearly*, *rapidly* and *easily* reveals to the people the *inadequacy* of bourgeois-democratic solutions and the necessity of proceeding beyond their limits, of passing on to *socialism*.

The peasants, who have overthrown tsarism and the landowners, dream of equal land tenure, and no power on earth could have stopped the peasants, once they had been freed both from the landowners and from the *bourgeois* parliamentary republican state. The workers say to the peasants:

We shall help you reach "ideal" capitalism, for equal land tenure is the idealisation of capitalism by the small producer. At the same time we shall prove to you its inadequacy and the necessity of passing to farming in common.

It would be interesting to see Kautsky's attempt to disprove that *this kind* of leadership of the peasant struggle by the proletariat was right.

Kautsky, however, preferred to evade the question altogether....

Next, Kautsky deliberately deceived his German readers by withholding from them the fact that in its *land law* the Soviet government gave *direct* preference to communes and co-operative societies.

With all the peasants right through to the end of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; and with the poor, the proletarian and semi-proletarian section of the peasants, forward to the socialist revolution! That has been the policy of the Bolsheviks, and it is the only Marxist policy.

But Kautsky is all muddled and incapable of formulating a single question! On the one hand, he *dare not* say that the workers should have parted company with the peasants over the question of equal land tenure, for he realises that it would have been absurd (and, moreover, in 1905, when he was not yet a renegade, he himself clearly and explicitly advocated an alliance between the workers and peasants as a condition for the victory of the revolution). On the other hand, he sympathetically quotes the liberal platitudes of the Menshevik Maslov, who "proves" that petty-bourgeois equal land tenure is utopian and reactionary *from the point of view of socialism*, but hushes up the progressive and revolutionary character of the petty-bourgeois struggle for equality and equal tenure *from the point of view of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.*

Kautsky is in a hopeless muddle: note that he (in 1918) *insists* on the *bourgeois* character of the Russian revolution. He (in 1918) peremptorily says: Don't go beyond these limits! Yet this very same Kautsky sees "something *socialistic*" (for a *bourgeois* revolution) in the *petty-bourgeois* reform of renting out small plots of land to the *poor* peasants (which is an approximation to equal land tenure)!

Understand this if you can!

In addition to all this, Kautsky displays a philistine inability to take into account the real policy of a definite party. He quotes the empty *phrases* of the Menshevik Maslov and *refuses to see the real* policy the Menshevik Party pursued in 1917, when, in "coalition" with the landowners and Cadets, they advocated what was virtually a *liberal agrarian reform and compromise with the landowners* (proof: the arrest of the members of the Land Committees and S. Maslov's land bill).

Kautsky failed to notice that P. Maslov's phrases about the reactionary and utopian character of petty-bourgeois equality are really a screen to conceal the Menshevik policy of *compromise* between the peasants and the landowners (i.e., of supporting the landowners in duping the peasants), instead of the *revolutionary* overthrow of the landowners by the peasants.

What a "Marxist" Kautsky is!

It was the Bolsheviks who strictly differentiated between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution: by carrying the former through, they opened the door for the transition to the latter. This was the only policy that was revolutionary and Marxist.

It would have been wiser for Kautsky not to repeat the feeble liberal witticism: "Never yet have the small peasants anywhere adopted collective farming under the influence of theoretical convictions" (p. 50).

How very smart!

But never as yet and nowhere have the small peasants of any large country been under the influence of a proletarian state.

Never as yet and nowhere have the small peasants engaged in an open class struggle reaching the extent of a civil war between the poor peasants and the rich peasants, *with* propagandist, political, economic and military support given to the poor by a proletarian state.

Never as yet and nowhere have the profiteers and the rich amassed such wealth out of war, while the mass of peasant have been so utterly ruined.

Kautsky just reiterates the old stuff, he just chews the old cud, afraid even to give thought to the new tasks of the proletarian dictatorship.

But what, dear Kautsky, if the peasants *lack* implements for small-scale farming and the proletarian state *helps* them to obtain machines for collective farming—is that a "theoretical conviction"?

We shall now pass to the question of nationalisation of the land. Our Narodniks, including all the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, deny that the measure we have adopted is nationalisation of the land. They are wrong in theory. Insofar as we remain within the framework of commodity production and capitalism, the abolition of private ownership of land is nationalisation of the land. The term "socialisation" merely expresses a tendency, a desire, the preparation for the transition to socialism.

What should be the attitude of Marxists towards nationalisation of the land?

Here, too, Kautsky fails even to formulate the theoretical question, or, which is still worse, he deliberately evades it, although one knows from Russian literature that Kautsky is aware of the old controversies among the Russian Marxists on the question of nationalisation, municipalisation (i.e., the transfer of the large estates to the local self-government authorities), or division of the land.

Kautsky's assertion that to transfer the large estates to the state and rent them out in small plots to peasants who own little land would be achieving "something socialistic" is a downright mockery of Marxism. We have already shown that there is nothing socialistic about it. But that is not all; it would not even be carrying the *bourgeois-democratic* revolution to its conclusion. Kautsky's great misfortune is that he placed his trust in the Mensheviks. Hence the curious position that while insisting on our revolution having a bourgeois character and reproaching the Bolsheviks for taking it into their heads to proceed to socialism, he *himself* proposes a liberal reform under the guise of socialism, *without carrying this reform* to the point of completely clearing away all the survivals of medievalism in agrarian relations! The arguments of Kautsky, as of his Menshevik advisers, amount to a defence of the liberal bourgeoisie, who fear revolution, instead of defence of consistent bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Indeed, why should only the large estates, and not all the land, be converted into state property? The liberal bourgeoisie thereby achieve the maximum preservation of the old conditions (i.e., the least consistency in revolution) and the maximum facility for a reversion to the old conditions. The radical bourgeoisie, i.e., the bourgeoisie that want to carry the bourgeois revolution to its conclusion, put forward the slogan of *nationalisation of the land*.

Kautsky, who in the dim and distant past, some twenty years ago, wrote an excellent Marxist work on the agrarian question, cannot but know that Marx declared that land nationalisation is in fact a *consistent* slogan of the *bourgeoisie*.[135] Kautsky cannot but be aware of Marx's controversy with Rodbertus, and Marx's remarkable passages in his *Theories of Surplus Value* where the revolutionary significance—in the bourgeois-democratic sense—of land nationalisation is explained with particular clarity.

The Menshevik P. Maslov, whom Kautsky, unfortunately for himself, chose as an adviser, denied that the Russian peasants would agree to the nationalisation of all the land (including the peasants' lands). To a certain extent, this view of Maslov's could be connected with his "original" theory (which merely parrots the bourgeois critics of Marx), namely, his repudiation of absolute rent and his recognition of the "law" (or "fact", as Maslov expressed it) "of diminishing returns".

In point of fact, however, already the 1905 Revolution revealed that the vast majority of the peasants in Russia, members of village communes as well as homestead peasants, were in favour of nationalisation of all the land. The 1917 Revolution confirmed this, and after the assumption of power by the proletariat this was done. The Bolsheviks remained loyal to Marxism and never tried (in spite of Kautsky, who, without a scrap of evidence, accuses us of doing so) to "skip" the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks, first of all, helped the most radical, most revolutionary of the bourgeois-democratic ideologists of the peasants, those who stood closest to the proletariat, namely, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, to carry out what was in effect nationalisation of the land. On October 20, 1917, i.e., on the very first day of the proletarian,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

socialist revolution, private ownership of land was abolished in Russia.

This laid the foundation, the most perfect from the point of view of the development of capitalism (Kautsky cannot deny this without breaking with Marx), and at the same time created an agrarian system which is the *most flexible* from the point of view of the transition to socialism. From the bourgeois-democratic point of view, the revolutionary peasants in Russia *could go no farther*: *there can be nothing* "more ideal" from this point of view, nothing "more radical" (from this same point of view) than nationalisation of the land and equal land tenure. It was the Bolsheviks, and only the Bolsheviks, who, thanks only to the victory of the *proletarian* revolution, helped the peasants to carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution really to its conclusion. And only in this way did they do the utmost to facilitate and accelerate the transition to the socialist revolution.

One can judge from this what an incredible muddle Kautsky offers to his readers when he accuses the Bolsheviks of failing to understand the bourgeois character of the revolution, and yet himself betrays such a departure from Marxism that he *says nothing* about nationalisation of the land and presents the least revolutionary (from the bourgeois point of view) liberal agrarian reform as "something socialistic"!

We have now come to the third question formulated above, namely, to what extent the proletarian dictatorship in Russia has taken into account the necessity of passing to farming in common. Here again, Kautsky commits something very much in the nature of a forgery: he quotes only the "theses" of one Bolshevik which speak of the task of passing to farming in common! After quoting one of these theses, our "theoretician" triumphantly exclaims:

> "Unfortunately, a task is not accomplished by the fact that it is called a task. For the time being, collective farming in Russia is doomed to remain on paper only. Never yet have the small peasants anywhere adopted collective farming under the influence of theoretical convictions" (p. 50).

Never as yet and nowhere has a literary swindle been perpetrated equal to that to which Kautsky has stooped. He quotes "theses", but says nothing about the *law* of the Soviet

government. He talks about "theoretical convictions", but says nothing about the proletarian state power which holds in its hands the factories and goods! All that Kautsky the Marxist wrote in 1899 in his *Agrarian Question* about the means at the disposal of the proletarian state for bringing about the gradual transition of the small peasants to socialism has been forgotten by Kautsky the renegade in 1918.

Of course, a few hundred state-supported agricultural communes and state farms (i.e., large farms cultivated by associations of workers at the expense of the state) are very little, but can Kautsky's ignoring of this fact be called "criticism"?

The nationalisation of the land that has been effected in Russia by the proletarian dictatorship has best ensured the carrying of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion—even in the event of a victory of the counter-revolution causing a reversion from land nationalisation to land division (I made a special examination of this possibility in my pamphlet on the agrarian programme of the Marxists in the 1905 Revolution). In addition, the nationalisation of the land has given the proletarian state the maximum opportunity of passing to socialism in agriculture.

To sum up, Kautsky has presented us, as far as theory is concerned, with an incredible hodge-podge which is a complete renunciation of Marxism, and, as far as practice is concerned, with a policy of servility to the bourgeoisie and their reformism. A fine criticism indeed!

* * *

Kautsky begins his "economic analysis" of industry with the following magnificent argument:

Russia has a large-scale capitalist industry. Cannot a socialist system of production be built up on this foundation? "One might think so if socialism meant that the workers of the separate factories and mines made these their property" (literally appropriated these for themselves) "in order to carry on production separately at each factory" (p. 52). "This very day, August 5, as I am writing these lines," Kautsky adds, "a speech is reported from Moscow delivered by Lenin on August 2, in which he is stated to have declared:

'The workers are holding the factories firmly in their hands, and the peasants will not return the land to the landowners.' Up till now, the slogan: the factories to the workers, and the land to the peasants, has been an anarcho-syndicalist slogan, not a Social-Democratic one" (pp. 52-53).

I have quoted this passage in full so that the Russian workers, who formerly respected Kautsky, and quite rightly, might see for themselves the methods employed by this deserter to the bourgeois camp.

Just think: on August 5, when numerous decrees on the nationalisation of factories in Russia had been issued—and not a single factory had been "appropriated" by the workers, but had all been converted into the property of the Republic—on August 5, Kautsky, on the strength of an obviously crooked interpretation of one sentence in my speech, tries to make the German readers believe that in Russia the factories are being turned over to individual groups of workers! And after that Kautsky, at great length, chews the cud about it being wrong to turn over factories to individual groups of workers!

This is not criticism, it is the trick of a lackey of the bourgeoisie, whom the capitalists have hired to slander the workers' revolution.

The factories must be turned over to the state, or to the municipalities, or the consumers' co-operative societies, says Kautsky over and over again, and finally adds:

"This is what they are now trying to do in Russia...." Now! What does that mean? In August? Why, could not Kautsky have commissioned his friends Stein or Axelrod, or any of the other friends of the Russian bourgeoisie, to translate at least one of the decrees on the factories?

"How far they have gone in this direction, we cannot yet tell. At all events, this aspect of the activity of the Soviet Republic is of the greatest interest to us, but it still remains entirely shrouded in darkness. There is no lack of decrees...." (That is why Kautsky ignores their *content*, or conceals it from his readers!) "But there is no reliable information as to the effect of these decrees. Socialist production is impossible without all-round, detailed, reliable and rapidly informative statistics. The Soviet Republic cannot possibly have created such statistics yet. What we learn about its economic activities is highly contradictory and can in no way be verified. This, too, is a result of the dictatorship and the suppression of democracy. There is no freedom of the press, or of speech" (p. 53).

This is how history is written! From a "free" press of the capitalists and Dutov men Kautsky would have received information about factories being taken over by the workers.... This "serious savant" who stands above classes is magnificent, indeed! About the countless facts which show that the factories are being turned over to the Republic *only*, that they are managed by an organ of Soviet power, the Supreme Economic Council, which is constituted mainly of workers elected by the trade unions, Kautsky refuses to say a single word. With the obstinacy of the "man in the muffler", he stubbornly keeps repeating one thing: give me peaceful democracy, without civil war, without a dictatorship and with good statistics (the Soviet Republic has created a statistical service in which the best statistical experts in Russia are employed, but, of course, ideal statistics cannot be obtained so quickly). In a word, what Kautsky demands is a revolution without revolution, without fierce struggle, without violence. It is equivalent to asking for strikes in which workers and employers do not get excited. Try to find the difference between this kind of "socialist" and common liberal bureaucrat!

So, relying upon such "factual material", i.e., deliberately and contemptuously ignoring the innumerable facts, Kautsky "concludes":

> "It is doubtful whether the Russian proletariat has obtained more in the sense of real practical gains, and not of mere decrees, under the Soviet Republic than it would have obtained from a Constituent Assembly, in which, as in the Soviets, socialists, although of a different hue, predominated" (p. 58).

A gem, is it not? We would advise Kautsky's admirers to circulate this utterance as widely as possible among the Russian workers, for Kautsky could not have provided better material for gauging the depth of his political degradation. Comrade workers, Kerensky, too, was a "socialist", only of a "different hue"! Kautsky the historian is satisfied with the name, the title which the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks "appropriated" to themselves. Kautsky the historian refuses even to listen to the facts which show that under Kerensky the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries supported the imperialist policy and marauding practices of the bourgeoisie: he is

discreetly silent about the fact that the majority in the Constituent Assembly consisted of these very champions of imperialist war and bourgeois dictatorship. And this is called "economic analysis"!

In conclusion let me quote another sample of this "economic analysis":

> "...After nine months' existence, the Soviet Republic, instead of spreading general well-being, felt itself obliged to explain why there is general want" (p. 41).

We are accustomed to hear such arguments from the lips of the Cadets. All the flunkeys of the bourgeoisie in Russia argue in this way: show us, after nine months, your general well-being—and this after four years of devastating war, with foreign capital giving all-round support to the sabotage and rebellions of the bourgeoisie in Russia. *Actually*, there has remained absolutely no difference whatever, not a shadow of difference, between Kautsky and a counter-revolutionary bourgeois. His honeyed talk, cloaked in the guise of "socialism", only repeats what the Kornilov men, the Dutov men and Krasnov men in Russia say bluntly, straightforwardly and without embellishment.

* * *

The above lines were written on November 9, 1918. That same night news was received from Germany announcing the beginning of a victorious revolution, first in Kiel and other northern towns and ports, where power has passed into the hands of Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, then in Berlin, where, too, power has passed into the hands of a Council.

The conclusion which still remained to be written to my pamphlet on Kautsky and on the proletarian revolution is now superfluous.

November 10, 1918

Appendix I

THESES ON THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[136]

Appendix II

VANDERVELDE'S NEW BOOK ON THE STATE

It was only after I had read Kautsky's book that I had the opportunity to acquaint myself with Vandervelde's *Socialism versus the State* (Paris, 1918). A comparison of the two books involuntarily suggests itself. Kautsky is the ideological leader of the Second International (1889-1914), while Vandervelde, in his capacity of Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau,[137] is its official representative. Both represent the complete bankruptcy of the Second International, and both with the dexterity of experienced journalists "skilfully" mask this bankruptcy and their own bankruptcy and desertion to the bourgeoisie with Marxist catchwords. One gives us a striking example of what is typical of German opportunism, ponderous, theorising and grossly falsifying Marxism by trimming it of all that is unacceptable to the bourgeoisie. The other is typical of the Latin—to a certain extent, one may say, of the West-European (that is, west of Germany)—variety of prevailing opportunism, which is more flexible, less ponderous, and which falsifies Marxism by the same fundamental method, but in a more subtle manner.

Both radically distort Marx's teaching on the state as well as his teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat; Vandervelde deals more with the former subject, Kautsky with the latter. Both obscure the very close and inseparable connection that exists between the two subjects. Both are revolutionaries and Marxists in word, but renegades in practice, who strain every effort to *dissociate themselves* from revolution. Neither of them has anything that permeates the works of Marx and Engels, and that actually distinguishes

socialism from a bourgeois caricature of it, namely, the elucidation of the tasks of revolution as *distinct* from the tasks of reform, the elucidation of revolutionary tactics as distinct from reformist tactics, the elucidation of the role of the proletariat in the *abolition* of the system, order or regime of wage-slavery as distinct from the role of the proletariat of the "Great" Powers which shares with the bourgeoisie a particle of the latter's imperialist superprofits and superbooty.

We shall quote a few of Vandervelde's most important arguments in support of this opinion.

Like Kautsky, Vandervelde quotes Marx and Engels with great zeal, and like Kautsky, he quotes from Marx and Engels anything you like *except* what is absolutely unacceptable to the bourgeoisie and what distinguishes a revolutionary from a reformist. He speaks volubly about the conquest of political power by the proletariat, since practice has already confined this within strictly parliamentary limits. But as regards the fact that after the experience of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels found it necessary to supplement the partially obsolete *Communist Manifesto* with an elucidation of the truth that the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, but must *smash* it—*not a single word* has he to say about that! Vandervelde and Kautsky, as if by agreement, pass over in complete silence what is most essential in the *experience* of the proletarian revolution, precisely that which distinguishes proletarian revolution from bourgeois reforms.

Like Kautsky, Vandervelde talks about the dictatorship of the proletariat only to dissociate himself from it. Kautsky did it by gross falsifications. Vandervelde does it in a more subtle way. In the part of his book, Section 4, on the subject of the "conquest of political power by the proletariat", he devotes sub-section *b* to the question of the "collective dictatorship of the proletariat", "quotes" Marx and Engels (I repeat: omitting precisely what pertains to the main point, namely, the *smashing* of the old, bourgeois-democratic state machine), and concludes:

"... In socialist circles, the social revolution is commonly conceived in the following manner: a new Commune, this time victorious, and not in one place but in the main centres of the capitalist world.

"A hypothesis, but a hypothesis which has nothing improbable about it at a time when it is becoming evident that the post-war period will see in many countries unprecedented class antagonisms and social convulsions.

"But if the failure of the Paris Commune, not to speak of the difficulties of the Russian revolution, proves anything at all, it proves that it is impossible to put an end to the capitalist system until the proletariat has sufficiently prepared itself to make proper use of the power the force of circumstances may place into its hands" (p. 73).

And absolutely nothing more on the point at issue!

Here they are, the leaders and representatives of the Second International! In 1912 they signed the Basle Manifesto, which explicitly speaks of the connection between that very war which broke out in 1914 and a proletarian revolution, and actually holds it up as a *threat*. And when the war broke out and a revolutionary situation arose, the Kautskys and Vanderveldes began to dissociate themselves from revolution. A revolution of the Paris Commune type is only a not improbable hypothesis! This is quite analogous to Kautsky's argument about the possible role of the Soviets in Europe.

But that is just the way every educated *liberal* argues; he will, no doubt, agree now that a new Commune is "not improbable", that the Soviets have a great role to play, etc. The proletarian revolutionary differs from the liberal precisely in that he, as a theoretician, analyses the new significance of the Commune and the Soviets *as a state*. Vandervelde, however, *passes over in silence* everything Marx and Engels said at such length on the subject when analysing the experience of the Paris Commune.

As a practical worker, as a politician, a Marxist should have made it clear that only traitors to socialism can now evade the task of elucidating the need for a proletarian revolution (of the Commune type, the Soviet type, or perhaps of some third type), of explaining the necessity of preparing for it, of conducting propaganda for revolution among the people, of refuting the petty-bourgeois prejudices against it, etc.

But neither Kautsky nor Vandervelde does anything of the sort, precisely because they themselves are traitors to socialism, who want to maintain their reputation as socialists and Marxists among the workers.

Take the theoretical formulation of the question.

The state, even in a democratic republic, is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one class by another. Kautsky is familiar with this truth, admits it, agrees with it, but ... he evades the fundamental question as to what particular class the proletariat must suppress when it establishes the proletarian state, for what reasons, and by what means.

Vandervelde is familiar with, admits, agrees with and quotes this fundamental proposition of Marxism (p. 72 of his book), but ... he does not say a single word on the "unpleasant" (for the capitalist gentlemen) subject of the *suppression of the resistance of the exploiters*!

Both Vandervelde and Kautsky have completely evaded this "unpleasant" subject. Therein lies their apostasy.

Like Kautsky, Vandervelde is a past master in the art of substituting eclecticism for dialectics. On the one hand it cannot but be admitted, and on the other hand it must be confessed. On the one hand, the term state may mean "the nation as a whole" (see Littré's dictionary—a learned work, it cannot be denied—and Vandervelde, p. 87); on the other hand, the term state may mean the "government" (ibid.). Vandervelde quotes this learned platitude, with approval, *side by side* with quotations from Marx.

The Marxist meaning of the word "state" differs from the ordinary meaning, writes Vandervelde. Hence, "misunderstandings" may arise. "Marx and Engels regard the state not as the state in the broad sense, not as an organ of guidance, as the representative of the general interests of society (*intérêts généraux de la société*). It is the state as the power, the state as the organ of authority, the state as the instrument of the rule of one class over another" (pp. 75-76 of Vandervelde's book).

Marx and Engels speak about the abolition of the state only in its second meaning.... "Too absolute affirmations run the risk of being inexact. There are many transitional stages between the capitalist state, which is based on the exclusive rule of one class, and the proletarian state, the aim of which is to abolish all classes" (p. 156).

There you have an example of Vandervelde's "manner", which is only slightly different from that of Kautsky's,

and, in essence, identical with it. Dialectics repudiate absolute truths and explain the successive changes of opposites and the significance of crises in history. The eclectic does not want propositions that are "too absolute", because he wants to push forward his philistine desire to substitute "*transitional stages*" for revolution.

The Kautskys and Vanderveldes say nothing about the fact that the transitional stage between the state as an organ of the rule of the capitalist class and the state as an organ of the rule of the proletariat is *revolution*, which means *overthrowing* the bourgeoisie and *breaking up*, smashing, *their* state machine.

The Kautskys and Vanderveldes obscure the fact that the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie must be replaced by the dictatorship of one class, the proletariat, and that the "transitional stages" of the revolution will be followed by the "transitional stages" of the gradual withering away of the proletarian state.

Therein lies their political apostasy.

Therein, theoretically, philosophically, lies their substitution of eclecticism and sophistry for dialectics. Dialectics are concrete and revolutionary and distinguish between the "transition" from the dictatorship of one class to the dictatorship of another and "transition" from the democratic proletarian state to the non-state ("the withering away of the state"). To please the bourgeoisie, the eclecticism and sophistry of the Kautskys and Vanderveldes blur all that is concrete and precise in the class struggle and advance instead the general concept "transition", under which they may hide (as *nine-tenths* of the official *Social-Democrats* of our time *do hide*) their renunciation of revolution!

As an eclectic and sophist, Vandervelde is more skilful and subtle than Kautsky; for the *phrase*, "transition from the state in the narrow sense to the state in the broad sense", can serve as a means of evading all and sundry problems of revolution, all the difference between revolution and reform, and even the difference between the Marxist and the liberal. For what bourgeois with European education would think of denying, "in general", "transitional stages" in this "general" sense?

Vandervelde writes:

"I agree with Guesde that it is impossible to socialise the means of production and exchange without the following two conditions having been fulfilled:

"1. The transformation of the present state as the organ of the rule of one class over another into what Monger calls a people's labour state, by the conquest of political power by the proletariat.

"2. Separation of the state as an organ of authority from the state as an organ of guidance, or, to use Saint-Simon's expression, of the government of men from the administration of things" (p. 89).

Vandervelde puts this in italics, laying special emphasis on the importance of these propositions. But this is a sheer eclectical hodge-podge, a complete rupture with Marxism! The "people's labour state" is just a paraphrase of the old "free people's state", which the German Social-Democrats paraded in the seventies and which Engels branded as an absurdity.[138] The term "people's labour state" is a phrase worthy of petty-bourgeois democrats (like our Left Socialist-Revolutionaries), a phrase which substitutes *non-class* concepts for class concepts. Vandervelde places the conquest of state power by the *proletariat* (by one class) alongside of the "people's" state, and fails to see that the result is a hodge-podge. With Kautsky and his "pure democracy", the result is a similar hodge-podge, and a similar anti-revolutionary, philistine disregard of the tasks of the class revolution, of the class, proletarian, dictatorship, of the *class* (proletarian) state.

Further, the government of men will disappear and give way to the administration of things only when the state *in all forms* withers away. But talking about this relatively distant future, Vandervelde overlays, obscures the task of *tomorrow*, namely, the *overthrow* of the bourgeoisie.

This trick is also equivalent to subserviency to the liberal bourgeoisie. The liberal is willing to talk about what will happen when it is not necessary to govern men. Why not indulge in such innocuous dreams? But about the proletariat having to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance to their expropriation—not a word. The class interests of the bourgeoisie demand it.

Socialism versus the State. This is Vandervelde's bow to the proletariat. It is not difficult to make a bow; every "democratic" politician knows how to make a how to his

electors. And under cover of a "bow", an anti-revolutionary, anti-proletarian meaning is insinuated.

Vandervelde extensively paraphrases Ostrogorsky[139] to show what amount of deceit, violence, corruption, mendacity, hypocrisy and oppression of the poor is hidden beneath the civilised, polished and perfumed exterior of modern bourgeois democracy. But he draws no conclusion from this. He fails to notice that bourgeois democracy suppresses the working and exploited people and that *proletarian democracy* will have to *suppress the bourgeoisie*. Kautsky and Vandervelde are blind to this. The class interests of the bourgeoisie, in whose wake these petty-bourgeois traitors to Marxism are floundering, *demand* that this question be evaded, that it be hushed up, or that the necessity of such suppression be directly denied.

Petty-bourgeois eclecticism versus Marxism, sophistry versus dialectics, philistine reformism versus proletarian revolution-that should have been the title of Vandervelde's book.

DRAFT DECISION ON THE USE OF STATE CONTROL[140]

On the question of using State Control for keeping a check on work and improving defence capacity, the majority on the commission have voted for lightning control, that is, dispatch of groups or commissions with wide powers to check on various institutions.

We must have concrete, factual, numerical data on the forces at our disposal (Party members first, then non-Party, but absolutely honest men) for exercising genuine control. We must know the number of specialists in the various branches; the number of those experienced in administration and management.

Tasks of control are of two kinds:

the very simple task of checking on warehouses, goods, etc.;

the more difficult one of checking on the efficiency of the work; combating sabotage, completely exposing it; checking on the way the work is being organised; ensuring the greatest *efficiency* of work, and so on.

No. 1 task is to improve work in the *Food* and *Communications* Commissariats.

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First published in 1931

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH TO THE MOSCOW GUBERNIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES AND DISTRICT COMMITTEES OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) DECEMBER 8, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Storm of applause.*) Lenin began his speech by saying that events of the past few weeks in Austria and Germany had gone to show that in our estimation of the international situation we had been right to base our policy on a precise, lucid and proper account of all the consequences of the four-year war, which, from being a battle of capitalists for dividing up their spoils, had turned into a battle between them and the workers of the world. The revolution had had a hard time starting in Western Europe, but once it had done so it had been developing more rapidly, surely and orderly than ours.

Speaking of the labour movement in other countries which is coming to our aid Comrade Lenin called for an all-out effort and said that every month of our existence, which we were defending at so high a cost, was bringing us nearer to a lasting victory.

On the current task of re-elections to the volost and village Soviets, Comrade Lenin stressed that all the difficulties of independent organisation of the working people from below would be overcome when everyone realised that the government must rely on the workers and the poor and middle peasants, who are not our enemies, they are just wavering, and with the consolidation of the Soviet government they will side with us.

The cause we have begun, Lenin concluded, will be carried through by the workers of the whole world. (*Prolonged applause.*)

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December 11, 1918

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

SPEECH TO THE THIRD WORKERS' CO-OPERATIVE CONGRESS[141] DECEMBER 9, 1918

(*Stormy ovation.*) Comrades, the workers' co-operatives are today faced with extremely important economic and political tasks. Both the one and the other are now part and parcel of the economic and political struggle. In respect of the immediate tasks I want to underline the meaning of "conciliation with the co-operatives". This conciliation, mentioned so frequently of late in the papers, radically differs from the conciliation with the bourgeoisie, which is nothing short of treachery. This conciliation we are talking about now is conciliation of a very special kind. There is a world of difference between the Soviet Government's conciliation with Germany which produced some results, and the conciliation—which would be harmful and even fatal to the country—of the working class with the bourgeoisie. What that pretext of conciliation amounts to is the complete betrayal both of the class struggle and the fundamentals of socialism. Socialists who are well aware that their chief task is to fight the bourgeoisie and capital appreciate this distinction.

All of us very well realise that there can only be one alternative in our class struggle: recognition either of the rule of capital or of the working class. We know that all the attempts by the petty-bourgeois parties to form and pursue their policy in the country are doomed to failure before they even start. We have clearly seen and experienced several attempts by various petty-bourgeois parties and groups to push through their policy, and we see that all attempts by intermediate forces are bound to end in failure. By virtue of the very

definite conditions there are only two central forces, standing-at opposite ends of the pole, that can have a hold on Russia, can decide her fate one way or the other. I will go even further and say that the whole world is being formed and directed by one or the other of these central forces. As far as Russia is concerned I can say quite definitely that, because of the specific economic conditions, only one of these forces can take control. The rest, the intermediate forces, may be numerous but they can never count for much.

Right now, the Soviet authorities must face the question of conciliation with the co-operatives. In April we departed from our vowed intention and made concessions. Naturally enough, there should be no class co-operatives in a country where all classes are being eliminated, but, I repeat, the conditions of the time demanded a certain delay and we put it off for a few months. Nevertheless, we all realise that the Soviet government will never abandon the position it now occupies. We had to make those concessions since at that time we were alone in the whole world. Our concessions were due to the difficulties we had in our work. Because of the economic tasks which the proletariat had taken on, we had to reconcile ourselves to and preserve certain petty-bourgeois habits. The point here is that in one way or another we must ensure the guidance and coordination of the activity of the whole mass of working and exploited people. We must all the while bear in mind what the proletariat requires of us. A popular government must remember that the various sections of the petty bourgeoisie will more and more come over to the governing working class when they eventually see there is no choice, that all their hopes of a middle way of running the country are finally ruined. All the wonderful slogans about popular will, the Constituent Assembly and the like, which were a screen for all the half-measures, were immediately swept away the moment genuine popular will asserted itself. You can see for yourselves what happened and how all these slogans, the half-measure slogans, were scattered to the winds. At the given moment, we can see this happening throughout the whole world in revolution as well as in Russia.

I want to show you the difference between the conciliation which produced such an appalling disgust throughout

the working class, and the conciliation which we are now calling for, agreement with all the small peasants, all the petty bourgeoisie. At the time of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, when we accepted the harsh terms of the treaty, it was said there was no hope of a world revolution, nor could there be. We were quite alone in the world. We know that at that time many parties were repelled from us because of the treaty and joined the bourgeoisie. At that time we had to endure all sorts of terrible experiences. A few months later we saw there was and could be no choice, no middle way.

When the German revolution came, everyone realised that revolution was sweeping the whole world, that Britain, France and America were also going the same way—along our path! When our petty-bourgeois democrats followed their patrons, they did not realise where they were being led, they did not realise they were being led along the capitalist road. Now we see by the example of the German revolution that these representatives and patrons of democracy, these Wilsons and Co., are imposing worse treaties on a defeated nation than the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which was forced on us. It is quite clear to us that international demagogy is now bankrupt because of the events in the West and the new situation. Now the physiognomy of every nation is as clear as can be. Now, the masks have been torn off and all the illusions have been dispelled by the battering-ram of history.

It is natural that the Soviet government should have to use all its influence and weight with such waverers who are always around during a transition, so as to carry out tasks which we are now setting, tasks which back our policy begun in April. We then had to put off our vowed intentions for a while; then we consciously and openly made several concessions.

Someone asked about exactly where we stand on this road. Now the whole of Europe clearly sees that our revolution is no longer in the experimental stage, the attitude of the civilised nations to us has now changed. They now appreciate that in this respect we are doing something new and tremendous, that we have had so much trouble because for almost all the time we stood utterly alone and completely forsaken by the entire international proletariat. In this respect we have been guilty of many serious mistakes which we

do not in any way hide. We should, of course, have endeavoured to unite the whole population and not to divide them. We may not have done it up to now and we must get down to the job sometime. We have already joined up with many organisations. Now, the workers' co-operatives and Soviet bodies should be merged. Since this April we have been organising on the basis of experience and we have been employing the store of social and political forces that we have at our disposal. We have been organising the supply and distribution of goods among the whole population. We have checked every step we took because this organisation has been particularly difficult to carry out in our economically backward country. Agreements with the co-operatives were first made in April and the decree issued on the complete merger and organisation of supply and distribution pursues the same aim.

The previous speaker mentioned friction in a reference to Petrograd; we know there is friction almost everywhere. We also know that this friction is quite inevitable because the time has come when two utterly different types of apparatus are meeting and merging. We know too, however, that we have to pass through it because it is inevitable. In just the same way you must realise that the long resistance put up by the workers' co-operatives has finally resulted in distrust from the Soviet government, a distrust that is perfectly natural.

You say you want independence. It is quite natural that anyone who puts forward this demand should induce distrust. If you complain of friction and want to avoid it, then you must first give up the idea of independence since anyone who insists on that is an enemy of the Soviet government at a time when we are all striving for a closer union. Once the workers' co-operatives unite in a perfectly clear-cut, honest and open way with the Soviet government, this friction will begin to disappear. I know only too well that when two groups merge the work does not proceed smoothly at first. Nevertheless, with a little time, when the one group earns the trust of the other, all the friction gradually fades away. However, constant inter-departmental friction is likely if the two groups stay apart. I don't understand what independence has got to do with it. After all we all agree

that the whole of society should be one big co-operative as far as supply and distribution are concerned. All of us agree that the co-operatives are a socialist gain. There lies the immense difficulty of socialist gains. There lie the difficulty and aim of victory. Capitalism deliberately splits the population. This split must disappear once and for all, and the whole of society must become a single workers' co-operative. There can and must be no question of any kind of independence for individual groups.

To establish this type of co-operative I was speaking about just now is the condition for the victory of socialism. That is why we say that no matter what difference of opinion we may have over private matters, we shall never come to terms with capitalism or take any step away from the principles of our struggle. The agreement we are now going to make with sections of social classes is an agreement not with the bourgeoisie or capital, but with individual groups of workers and democrats. There is nothing to be afraid of in this agreement because the whole difference between these sections will disappear without a trace in the fire of revolution. Now all we need is a single will to enter with an open heart that single world co-operative. What the Soviet government and the co-operatives have done up to now must be merged. That is the substance of the latest decree passed by the Soviet government. That has been the approach by Soviet representatives in many places in the absence of our decree. The tremendous good accomplished by the co-operatives must be merged with the tremendous good accomplished by the Soviet government. All sections of the population fighting for their freedom must be merged in a single strong organisation. We know we have made a lot of mistakes, especially in the first months after the October Revolution. But from now onwards, after a passage of time, we shall endeavour to attain a complete union and complete agreement among the population. To do so, everything must come under the Soviet government and all illusions about some sort of "independence", whether for individual groups or the workers' co-operatives, must be dispelled as quickly as possible. Hopes for "independence" can only be held out where there can still be hopes for some sort of return to the past.

The Western nations once regarded us and all our revolutionary movement as a curiosity. They used to say: "Let the people have their fling; we shall wait and see how it all works out.... Queer people, those Russians !" Now the "queer Russians" have shown the world what their "fling" means. (*Applause.*)

Now that the German revolution has broken out, a foreign consul said to Zinoviev: "It's hard to say at this point who has made better use of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, you or we."

He said this because everyone was saying it. Everyone saw that this was just the beginning of the great world revolution. And this great revolution was started by the backward and "queer" Russian people.... History certainly has strange ways: that a backward country should have the honour of leading a great world movement, which is seen and understood by the bourgeoisie of the whole world. This conflagration has swept Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Holland.

This movement is spreading from day to day, the revolutionary Soviet Government is daily gaining in strength. That is why the bourgeoisie have now taken an entirely different attitude to matters. Now that the axe is about to fall on world capitalism, there can be no question at all of any independence for individual parties. America provides the most glaring example. America is one of the most democratic countries, it is a great democratic social republic. Where else, if not in that country—which has all the electoral rights and all the rights of a free state—could we expect a correct solution to all legal questions? Yet we know what has happened to a clergyman there, in that democratic republic: he was tarred and whipped until his blood flowed in the dust. This took place in a free country, in a democratic republic. This was allowed to happen by the "humane", "philanthropic" Tiger Wilsons and Co. What are these Wilsons now doing with Germany, a defeated country? The pictures of world relations are displayed before us in full view! We see the substance of what the Wilsons offer their friends from these pictures, which carry such overwhelming conviction. The Wilsons would have instantly proved our point. These gentlemen—the free multimillionaires, the "most humane" people in the world—would have instantly

broken their friends' habit of talking, even of dreaming, of "independence" in any form. They would have squarely put before you the alternative: either you stand for the capitalist system or you stand for the Soviets. They would have said: do this, because we say so, we, your friends, the British, the Americans—the Wilsons, and the French—Clemenceau's friends.

That is why it is quite hopeless to expect any vestige of independence to remain. This cannot be, and it is no use dreaming of it. There can be no middle course once it is a question of protecting property on the one hand, and once the proletariat has found its way on the other. The branches of the tree of life must either be closely intertwined with capital, or even more closely with the Soviet Republic. It is absolutely clear to everyone that socialism has entered the period of its realisation. It is quite clear to everyone that it is absolutely impossible to maintain or retain petty-bourgeois positions through universal suffrage. The Wilsons may nurture such illusions, rather, they do not nurture such illusions but try to embellish their own aims by fostering such illusions, but you won't find many people nowadays who believe these fairy-tales. If such people do exist, they are a historical rarity or a museum piece. (*Applause.*)

The differences you have had from the outset about preserving the "independence" of the co-operative movement are nothing but vain efforts which must peter out without any hope of a positive solution. This struggle is not serious and it clashes with the principles of democracy. Although this is not surprising because the Wilsons are also "democrats". They say that it remains for them to establish one final union because they have so many dollars they can buy up the whole of Russia, and the whole of India, and the whole world. Wilson presides over their company, their pockets are bulging with dollars and that is why they talk about buying up Russia and India and everything else. But they forget that basic international issues are settled in an entirely different manner, that only some people, in a definite environment, may be impressed by their statements. They forget that the resolutions daily adopted by the strongest class in the world—the kind our own Congress is sure to adopt unanimously—greet only the dictatorship of the proletariat

all over the world. By adopting such a resolution our Congress takes the road which does not and cannot lead to the kind of "independence" being discussed here today. You are aware that Karl Liebknecht has shown some opposition not only to the petty-bourgeois peasants, but also to the co-operative movement. You know that just for this Scheidemann and company consider him a dreamer and fanatic, yet you addressed a message of greetings to him, just as you sent greetings to Maclean. By voicing solidarity on these matters with the great world leaders you have burnt your boats. You must keep a firm stand because at the moment you are standing up not only for yourselves, not only for your own rights, but also for the rights of Liebknecht and Maclean. I have often heard the Russian Mensheviks condemn conciliation, and inveigh against those who came to terms with the Kaiser's lackeys. Nor were the Mensheviks alone in erring that way. The whole world pointed at us, hurling this stern charge: "Conciliators." Now that the world revolution has started, and they have to deal with Haase and Kautsky, we have the right to describe our position in the words of the good Russian proverb: "Let's stand back, and see how well we are placed."

We know our shortcomings, and they are easily pointed out. But to the onlooker everything appears to be quite different from what it actually is. At one time, you know, everyone in the other parties condemned our behaviour and our policy, and now whole parties are siding with us, and want to work with us.[142] The wheel of the world revolutionary movement has now turned to such an extent that we need not fear any kind of conciliation whatsoever. And I am sure that our Congress will find the right way out of the situation. There is only one way out: a merger of the co-operative movement with the Soviet government. You know that Britain, France, America and Spain regarded our actions as experiments; they have now changed their tune: they now have to look to their own affairs at home. Of course, physically, materially and financially they are considerably stronger than we are, in spite of their outward polish we know they are rotten inside; they are stronger than we are at present with the strength that was Germany's when the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was concluded. But what do we

see now? Everyone recoiled from us then. Now, every month we spend in strengthening the Soviet Republic we spend in defending not only ourselves, but also the cause started by Liebknecht and Maclean, and we already see that Britain, France, America and Spain have been infected with the same disease and are fired with the same flame as Germany, the flame of the universal and world-wide struggle of the working class against imperialism. (*Prolonged applause.*)

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Published according to the pamphlet checked with the verbatim report

SPEECH TO THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF LAND DEPARTMENTS, POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES AND COMMUNES[143] DECEMBER 11, 1918

(*Loud applause passing into ovation.*) Comrades, the composition of this Congress, in my opinion, is in itself an indication of the profound change that has taken place and the great progress we, the Soviet Republic, have made in building socialism, in particular in agricultural relations, which are of the utmost importance to our country. This Congress consists of representatives of the land departments, the Poor Peasants' Committees and the agricultural communes, a combination which shows that within a short space of time, within a single year, our revolution has made great strides in recasting those relations that are the most difficult to recast and which in all previous revolutions constituted the greatest hindrance to the cause of socialism, but which must be most fully recast to ensure the triumph of socialism.

The first stage in the development of our revolution since October was mainly devoted to defeating the common enemy of all the peasants, the landowners.

Comrades, you are all very well aware that even the February Revolution—the revolution of the bourgeoisie, the revolution of the compromisers—promised the peasants victory over the landowners, and that this promise was not fulfilled. Only the October Revolution, only the victory of the urban working class, only the Soviet government could relieve the whole of Russia, from end to end, of the ulcer of the old feudal heritage, the old feudal exploitation, landed estates and the landowners' oppression of the peasants as a whole, of all peasants without distinction.

This fight against the landowners was one in which all the peasants were bound to participate, and participate they did. The fight united the poor peasants, who do not live by exploiting the labour of others. But it also united the most prosperous and even wealthy peasants, who cannot get along without hired labour.

As long as our revolution was occupied with this task, as long as we had to exert every effort for the independent movement of the peasants, aided by the urban workers' movement, to sweep away and completely destroy the power of the landowners, the revolution remained a general peasant revolution and could therefore not go beyond bourgeois limits.

It had still not touched the more powerful and more modern enemy of all working people—capital. It therefore ran the risk of ending halfway, like the majority of the revolutions in Western Europe, in which a temporary alliance of the urban workers and all the peasants succeeded in sweeping away the monarchy and the survivals of medievalism, in more or less thoroughly sweeping away the landed estates or the power of the landowners, but never succeeded in undermining the actual foundations of the power of capital.

Our revolution began to tackle this much more important and much more difficult task this summer and autumn. The wave of counter-revolutionary uprisings which arose this summer—when the attack of the West-European imperialists and their Czech hirelings on Russia was joined by all the exploiting and oppressing elements in Russian life—injected a new spirit and fresh life in the countryside.

In practice, all these revolts united the European imperialists, their Czech hirelings, and all those in Russia who remained on the side of the landowners and capitalists, united them in a desperate struggle against the Soviet government. These revolts were followed by the revolt of all the village kulaks.

The village was no longer united. The peasants, who had fought as one man against the landowners, now split into two camps—the camp of the more prosperous peasants and the camp of the poor peasants who, side by side with the workers, continued their steadfast advance towards socialism

and changed from fighting the landowners to fighting capital, the power of money, and the use of the great land reform for the benefit of the kulaks. This struggle cut the property-owning and exploiting classes off from the revolution completely; it definitely put our revolution on the socialist road which the urban working class had tried so hard and vigorously to put it on in October, but along which it will not be able to direct the revolution successfully unless it finds firm, deliberate and solid support in the countryside.

There lies the significance of the revolution which took place this summer and autumn even in the most remote villages of Russia, a revolution which was not spectacular, not as striking and obvious as the October Revolution of last year, but whose significance is incomparably deeper and greater.

The formation of the Poor Peasants' Committees in the rural districts was the turning-point; it showed that the urban working class, which in October had united with all the peasants to crush the landowners, the principal enemy of the free, socialist Russia of the working people, had progressed from this to the much more difficult and historically more noble and truly socialist task—that of carrying the enlightening socialist struggle into the rural districts, and reaching the minds of the peasants as well. The great agrarian revolution—proclamation in October of the abolition of private ownership of land, proclamation of the socialisation of the land—would have inevitably remained a paper revolution if the urban workers had not stirred into action the rural proletariat, the poor peasants, the working peasants, who constitute the vast majority. Like the middle peasants, they do not exploit the labour of others and are not interested in exploitation. They are therefore capable of advancing, and have already advanced, beyond the joint struggle against the landowners to the general proletarian struggle against capital, against the rule of the exploiters, who rely on the power of money and property. They have progressed from sweeping Russia clean of landowners to establishing a socialist system.

This, comrades, was an extremely difficult step to take. Those who doubted the socialist character of our revolution

prophesied that this is where we were bound to slip up. Today, however, socialist construction in the countryside depends entirely on this step. The formation of the Poor Peasants' Committees, their wide network throughout Russia, their coming conversion, which in part has already begun, into fully competent rural Soviets that will have to put the fundamental principles of Soviet organisation, the power of the working people, into effect in the rural districts, constitute a real guarantee that we have gone further than the tasks to which ordinary bourgeois-democratic revolutions in West-European countries confined themselves. We have destroyed the monarchy and the medieval power of the landowners, and we are now getting down to the real work of building socialism. This is the most difficult but at the same time the most important and very rewarding work in the countryside. We have got through to the working peasants right in the villages; the wave of capitalist revolts has completely turned them against the capitalist class; the peasants in the Poor Peasants' Committees and in the Soviets which are now undergoing changes are more and more joining forces with the urban workers. In all this we see the sole, yet true and undoubtedly permanent guarantee that socialist development in Russia has now become more stable, and has now acquired a basis among the vast mass of the agricultural population.

There is no doubt that building socialism is a very difficult job in a peasant country like Russia. There is no doubt that it was comparatively easy to sweep away an enemy like tsarism, the power of the landowners, the landed estates. At the centre the job could be done in a few days; throughout the country it could be done in a few weeks. But, by its very nature, the task we are now tackling can be accomplished only by extremely persistent and sustained effort. Here we shall have to fight our way step by step, inch by inch. We shall have to fight for every achievement to win a new, socialist Russia; we shall have to fight for collective farming.

It goes without saying that a revolution of this kind, the transition from small individual peasant farms to collective farming, will take some time and can certainly not be accomplished at one stroke.

We know very well that in countries where small peasant farming prevails the transition to socialism cannot be effected except by a series of gradual, preliminary stages. In the light of this, the first aim set by the October Revolution was merely to overthrow and destroy the landowners' power. The February fundamental law on the socialisation of the land, which, as you know, was passed unanimously both by Communists and the non-Communist partners of the Soviet government, was at the same time an expression of the conscious will of the vast majority of the peasants and proof that the working class, the workers' Communist Party, aware of their task, are persistently and patiently advancing towards the new socialist construction—advancing by a series of gradual measures, by awakening the working peasants, and forging ahead only in step with that awakening, only insofar as the peasants are independently organised.

We fully realise that such tremendous changes in the lives of tens of millions of people as the transition from small individual peasant farming to collective farming, affecting as they do the most deep-going roots of the peasants' way of life and their mores, can only be accomplished by long effort, and only when necessity compels people to reshape their lives.

After the long and desperate world war, we call clearly discern the beginnings of a socialist revolution all over the world. This has become a necessity for even the more backward countries and—irrespective of any theoretical views or socialist doctrines—is emphatically bringing it home to everybody that it is impossible to live in the old way.

The country has suffered tremendous ruin and disruption, and we see this disruption spreading all over the world, we see many centuries of man's cultural, scientific and technological achievements swept away in these four years of criminal, destructive and predatory war, and the whole of Europe, not merely Russia alone, returning to a state of barbarism. Now, all common people, particularly the peasants, who have probably suffered most from the war, are coming to realise clearly enough that tremendous efforts are required, that every ounce of energy must be exerted to

get rid of the legacy of this accursed war which has left us nothing but ruin and want. It is impossible to live in the old way, in the way we lived before the war, and the waste of human toil and effort associated with individual small-scale peasant farming cannot continue. The productivity of labour would be doubled or trebled, there would be a double or triple saving of human labour in agriculture and human activity in general if a transition were made from this scattered small-scale farming to collective farming.

The ruination left by the war simply does not allow us to restore the old small-scale peasant farms. Not only have the mass of the peasants been awakened by the war, not only has the war shown them what technical marvels now exist and how these marvels have been adapted for people's extermination, but it has also given rise to the idea that these technical marvels must be used primarily to reshape agriculture, the most common form of production in the country, in which the greatest number of people are engaged, but which at the same time is the most backward. Not only has this idea been provoked, but the monstrous horrors of modern warfare have made people realise what forces modern technology has created, how these forces are wasted in awful and senseless war, and that it is the forces of technology themselves that are the only means of salvation from such horrors. It is our obligation and duty to use these forces to give new life to the most backward form of production, agriculture, to reshape it, and to transform it from production conducted in the old, unenlightened way, into production based on science and technical achievements. The war has made people realise this much more than any of us can imagine. But besides this the war has also made it impossible to restore production in the old way.

Those who cherish the hope that after this war the pre-war situation can be restored, that the old system and farming methods can be resumed, are mistaken and are coming to realise their mistake more and more every day. The war has resulted in such terrible ruin that some small farms now possess no draught animals or implements. We cannot allow the waste of people's labour to continue. The poor peasants, who have borne the greatest sacrifices for the revolution and suffered most from the war, did not take the land from the

landowners for it to fall into the hands of new kulaks. The latest developments are now confronting these peasants with the question of turning to collective farming as the only means of restoring the agriculture that has been ruined and destroyed by the war. This is the only means of escaping from ignorance and oppression to which capitalism doomed the entire rural population, due to which the capitalists were able for four years to burden mankind with war and from which the working people of all countries are now striving with revolutionary energy and fervour to rid themselves at all costs.

These, comrades, are the conditions that were required on a world scale for this most difficult and at the same time most important socialist reform, this crucial and fundamental socialist measure, to come to the forefront, and it has come to the forefront in Russia. The formation of the Poor Peasants' Committees and this joint Congress of land departments, Poor Peasants' Committees and agricultural communes, taken in conjunction with the struggle which took place in the countryside this summer and autumn, go to show that very many peasants have been awakened, and that the peasants themselves, the majority of the working peasants, are striving toward collective farming. Of course, I repeat, we must tackle this great reform gradually. Here, nothing can be done at one stroke. But I must remind you that the fundamental law on the socialisation of the land, whose adoption was a foregone conclusion on the first day after the Revolution of October 25, at the very first session of the first organ of Soviet power, the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, did more than abolish private ownership of land forever and do away with landed estates. It also stipulated, among other things, that farm property, draught animals and farm implements which passed into the possession of the nation and the working peasants should become public property and cease to be the private property of individual farms. And on the fundamental question of our present aims, of what tasks of land disposal we want carried out, and what we want from the supporters of the Soviet government, the working peasants, in this respect, Article 11 of the law on the socialisation of the land, which was adopted in February 1918, states that the aim is to develop collective

farming, the most advantageous form of farming from the point of view of economy of labour and products. This will be at the expense of individual farming and with the aim of passing over to socialist farming.

Comrades, when we passed this law, complete agreement did not exist between the Communists and the other parties. On the contrary, we passed this law when the Soviet Government united the Communists and the Left S.R. Party members, who did not hold communist views. Nevertheless, we arrived at a unanimous decision, to which we adhere to this day, remembering, I repeat, that the transition from individual farming to collective farming cannot be effected at one stroke, and that the struggle which developed in the towns was resolved more easily. In the towns thousands of workers had one capitalist to deal with, and it did not take much trouble to remove him. The struggle which developed in the rural districts, however, was much more complex. At first there was the general drive of the peasants against the landowners; at first the power of the landowners was utterly destroyed so that it could never be restored again. This was followed by a struggle among the peasants themselves, among whom new capitalists arose in the shape of the kulaks, the exploiters and profiteers who used their surplus grain to enrich themselves at the expense of the starving non-agricultural parts of Russia. Here a new struggle began, and you know that this summer it led to a number of revolts. We do not say of the kulak as we do of the capitalist landowner that he must be deprived of all his property. What we do say is that we must break the kulak's resistance to indispensable measures, such as the grain monopoly, which he is violating to enrich himself by selling his grain surplus at exorbitant prices, while the workers and peasants in the non-agricultural areas are suffering pangs of hunger. Our policy here has been to wage a struggle as merciless as that waged against the landowners and capitalists. But there also remained the question of the attitude of the poor peasants to the middle peasants. Our policy has always been to form an alliance with the middle peasant. He is no enemy of Soviet institutions. He is no enemy of the proletariat or socialism. He will, of course, hesitate and only consent to socialism when he sees by

definite and convincing example that it is necessary. The middle peasant, of course, cannot be convinced by theoretical arguments or by agitation. And we do not count on that. But he can be convinced by the example and the solid front of the poor peasants. He can be convinced by an alliance of the poor peasants with the proletariat. And here we are counting on a prolonged and gradual process of persuasion and on a number of transitional measures which will bring about agreement between the proletarian, socialist section of the population, agreement between the Communists who are conducting a resolute fight against capital in all its forms, and the middle peasants.

Appreciating this state of affairs and that our task in the rural areas is incomparably more difficult, we present the question in the way it was presented in the law on the socialisation of the land. You know that the law proclaimed abolition of private ownership of land and equal land tenure, and you know that the enforcement of this law was begun in that spirit, and that it has been put into effect in the majority of rural areas. The law, moreover, contains, with the unanimous consent both of Communists and of people who at that time did not yet share communist views, the thesis I have just read to you, which declares that our common task and our common aim is the transition to socialist farming, to collective land tenure and collective farming. As we proceed with our construction, both the peasants who have already settled on the land and the prisoners of war who are now returning from captivity in thousands and millions, ragged and exhausted, are coming to realise more and more clearly the vast scope of the work that must be done to restore agriculture and free the peasant for ever from his old, neglected, downtrodden and ignorant state. It is becoming clearer to them that the only sure way of escape, one that will bring the mass of peasants nearer to a civilised life and put them on a par with other citizens, is collective farming, which the Soviet government is now systematically striving to put into effect by gradual measures. It is for this purpose, for collective farming, that the communes and state farms are being formed. The importance of this type of farming is indicated in the law on the socialisation of the land. In the clause stating who is entitled to the use of the

land, you will find that among the persons and institutions so entitled first place is given to the state, second to public organisations, third to agricultural communes, and fourth to agricultural co-operative societies. I again draw your attention to the fact that these fundamental principles of the law on the socialisation of the land were laid down when the Communist Party was carrying out not only its own will, but when it made deliberate concessions to those who in one way or another expressed the ideas and will of the middle peasants. We made such concessions, and are still making them. We concluded and are concluding agreements of this kind because the transition to the collective form of landownership, to collective farming, to state farms, to communes, cannot be effected at one stroke. It requires the determined and persistent action of the Soviet government, which has assigned one thousand million rubles for the improvement of agriculture on condition that collective farming is adopted. This law shows that we want to influence the mass of middle peasants mainly by force of example, by inviting them to improve farming, and that we count only on the gradual effect of such measures to bring about this profound and crucial revolution in agricultural production in Russia.

The alliance of the Poor Peasants' Committees, agricultural communes and land departments at the present Congress shows us, and gives us full assurance, that by this transition to collective farming we have got things going correctly, on a truly socialist scale. This steady and systematic work must ensure an increase in the productivity of labour. For this purpose we must adopt the best farming methods and enlist the farm specialists of Russia so that we may be able to put the best organised farms at our service, which hitherto served as a source of enrichment for individuals, as the source of capitalist revival, as the source of a new bondage and a new enslavement of wage-labourers, but which now, under the socialisation of land law and the complete abolition of private ownership of land, must serve as a source of agricultural knowledge and culture and of higher productivity for the millions of working people. This alliance between the urban workers and the working peasants, the formation of the Poor Peasants' Committees and their merger with the Soviets are a guarantee that

agricultural Russia has taken a path which is being taken by one West-European state after another, later than us, but with greater certainty. It has much harder for them to start the revolution because their enemy is not a rotten autocracy, but a highly cultured and united capitalist class. But, as you know, this revolution has begun. You know that the revolution has not been confined to Russia, and that our chief hope, our chief support, is the proletariat of the more advanced countries of Western Europe, and that this chief support of the world revolution has begun to move. And we are firmly convinced, and the course of the German revolution has shown it in practice, that the transition to socialist farming there, the use of more advanced agricultural techniques and the union of the agricultural population will proceed more rapidly and easily than in our country.

In alliance with the urban workers and the socialist proletariat of the whole world, the working peasants of Russia can now be certain they will overcome all their adversities, beat off all the attacks of the imperialists, and accomplish that without which the emancipation of the working people is impossible—collective farming, the gradual but steady transition from small individual farms to collective farming. (*Loud, prolonged applause.*)

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ROUGH DRAFT OF RULES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOVIET INSTITUTIONS[144]

1

Collective discussion and decision of all questions of administration in Soviet institutions must be accompanied by the precisely defined *responsibility of every person* holding any Soviet post for the *performance of definite*, and clearly and explicitly specified, functions and *practical* jobs.

Henceforth, this rule, without which it will be impossible to select the most suitable people for each office and job or to exercise effective control, must be *unreservedly obeyed*.

Accordingly, every Soviet body and every Soviet institution without exception shall immediately:

First, adopt a decision precisely distributing the work and responsibilities among all their members or officials;

Second, define the exact responsibility of all persons entrusted with the performance of any duties whatever, especially such as concern the speedy and proper collection and distribution of materials and products.

This rule is binding on all Soviet institutions, and in particular on local, uyezd, urban and other Economic Councils and Economic Departments of Executive Commit tees. Such Departments and Economic Councils shall immediately assign responsibility to definite persons for the speedy and proper collection of *each* of the raw materials and products needed by the population.

All leading Soviet bodies—Executive Committees, gubernia and city Soviets, etc.—shall immediately reorganise

their work with a view to giving prime place to effective control for actual fulfilment of the decisions of the central authorities and of local institutions. Other kinds of work are to be turned over, as far as possible, to sub-committees consisting of a small number of members of the given body.

2

With a view to eliminating red tape and to the more effective disclosure of abuses, and also to the exposure and removal of dishonest officials ensconced in Soviet institutions, the following rules are hereby established:

Every Soviet institution shall post notices of its reception days and hours outside as well as inside its premises, for all to see without having to obtain passes. The premises assigned for the reception of the public shall be freely accessible without any passes whatever.

Every Soviet institution shall keep a register for recording in brief the name of every visitor, the nature of his business, and to whom it has been entrusted.

Sundays and holidays shall be reception days.

State Control officials shall have the right to be present at all receptions, and it shall be their duty to attend from time to time during reception hours, to examine the visitors' register, and to draw up a report of their visit and the result of their examination of the register and interrogation of the public.

The Commissariats of Labour, State Control and Justice shall everywhere organise information bureaus, which shall be open to all without passes and free of charge, reception on Sundays being compulsory; the said Commissariats shall widely announce to the public the days and hours the bureaus are open.

It shall be the duty of these information bureaus, not only to give all information requested, orally or in writing, but also to draw up written declarations free of charge for persons who are illiterate or unable to draw up such declarations properly themselves. It shall be obligatory to enlist the services for work on these bureaus of members of all parties

represented on the Soviets, as well as of parties which are not represented in the government, and also members of the non-party trade unions and non-party unions of intellectuals.

3

The task of defending the Soviet Republic imperatively calls for the greatest economy of forces and the most productive utilisation of manpower.

With these ends in view it is ordered—in the first place in regard to all Soviet institutions, later to be extended to every enterprise and body—that:

1. Every more or less independent department of every Soviet institution without exception shall within three days submit to the local Executive Committee (and in Moscow to the People's Commissariat of Justice as well) brief information on the following: (a) name of institution; (b) name of department; (c) nature of its work, in brief; (d) number of sub-departments, sections, or other divisions, with a list of such; (e) number of employees, male and female; (f) volume of work, calculated as far as possible, for example, in number of cases handled, volume of correspondence, or other indices.

Local Executive Committees (in Moscow, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in agreement with the People's Commissariat of Justice and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee) shall immediately: (1) take measures to verify whether the above rule is being promptly and properly observed; (2) draw up within one week after the aforesaid information has been received a plan for coordinating, uniting and *merging* departments which are engaged in similar or kindred affairs.

The commissions which the above-mentioned institutions charge with this task shall include representatives of the Departments for the Interior, Justice, State Control and Labour, as well as of other departments, if need be. The commissions shall submit to the Council of People's Commissars and the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee brief *weekly* reports on what has been done to merge kindred departments and to economise labour.

2. In every town in which there are kindred departments or institutions—central, regional, town, gubernia or uyezd—the highest institution shall immediately set up a commission for the purpose of coordinating and amalgamating all these institutions, with a view to the maximum economy of forces; this commission to be guided by the rules and schedule indicated in Clause 1.

3. These same commissions (clauses 1 and 2) are instructed, and on the same grounds, to take urgent measures to substitute female labour for male labour to the utmost and to draw up a list of males who can be transferred to work in the army or for the army, or to other work of an operative and practical and not of an office nature.

4. These same commissions (clauses 1 and 2) are instructed, in agreement with the local organisations of the Russian Communist Party, to make such alteration in staffs as to leave members of the R.C.P. (of not less than two years' standing) only in leading and responsible posts; all other posts to be filled by non-Party people, or by members of other parties so as to release as large a number of members of the R.C.P. as possible for other work.

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DRAFT DECISION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)

All organisations of the R.C.P. shall within one week of publication of the present decision of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. enter on all membership and registration cards *the date* on which the respective members joined the Bolshevik Party.

In the absence of this information, and if it is impossible to obtain (and to have it verified and signed by not less than three members of the R.C.P. of two years' standing and over), such membership or registration cards shall be marked: "Date of joining the Party unknown."

Every member of the R.C.P. holding any Soviet post must immediately make a brief entry into his membership card stating what parties he belonged to, or was associated with, over the past *five* years, the entry to be certified by the chairman or secretary of his Party organisation.

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SPEECH AT PRESNYA DISTRICT WORKERS' CONFERENCE DECEMBER 14, 1918

Comrades, I am going to examine a couple of questions fixed for discussion today. The first concerns the international situation and the second our attitude to the petty-bourgeois democratic parties.

First a few words about the international situation. As you know, the British, French and American imperialists have declared a grand campaign against the Russian Soviet Republic. These imperialists are carrying on agitation against Russia among their workers, accusing the Bolsheviks of flouting the majority and being propped up by a minority. Since the vast majority of papers in France and Britain belong to the bourgeoisie, these lies against the Soviet Government spread quickly and freely. That is why it is not worth even bothering about such a ridiculous and crude story that the Bolsheviks are backed by the minority of the people in Russia. It is a story that is not even worth refuting because everyone who knows anything about what is going on here realises how ridiculous it is. Yet when you look at the British, French and American papers—and, by the way, we only get the bourgeois papers here—you see the bourgeoisie are still spreading these tales.

The only people who have no voting rights and no right to take part in or influence the country's political life are exploiters, those who exploit the labour of others and do not work themselves. There are only a handful of such people among the population. You can just imagine how many people are exploiting hired labour in the towns. Private ownership of the land is no more. The landowners have been deprived

of their estates and the homesteaders,[145] who were still robbing the peasants under Stolypin, have had their land taken away. The number of those exploiting other people's labour in the countryside is negligible too. But the Soviet government has not told them it will take their vote away. It has said that we recognise anyone's right to participate in administration if he wants to stop exploiting other people's labour. If you want to be a worker, God bless you. If you want to be an exploiter, we shall not only disfranchise you, but we shan't let you feed off someone else's labour.

From these fundamentals of our Constitution it is apparent that the Soviet government relies on those who work and offers them the right to run the country. The government is relying on the vast, overwhelming majority of the people. Every Soviet congress, and there have been six so far, shows us that the workers', peasants' and-Red Army representatives, representatives of the majority of people who live by their own and not someone else's labour, constitute an increasingly solid foundation for the Soviet government. The First Congress of Soviets was held in June 1917, when Russia was a bourgeois republic engaged in an imperialist war. It took place in the June of 1917 when Kerensky was driving the troops on to the offensive and millions were killed in battle. At that Congress the number of Communists or Bolsheviks was only 13 per cent, that is one-seventh. At the Second Congress of Soviets which paved the way for the workers' and peasants' government, the Bolsheviks had jumped to 51 per cent, a half. And at the Fifth Congress this July the Bolsheviks had 66 per cent. It was then that the Left S.R.s, seeing how quickly Bolshevism was growing, tried their rash action and in so doing split apart completely. Three different parties arose from this split, of which the last one, the Narodnik Communists, came over to the Bolsheviks along with a whole number of prominent individuals like Kolegayev.

At the Sixth Congress, the Bolsheviks had 97 per cent, that is, practically all representatives of the workers and peasants of the whole of Russia. This is an indication of the present unity of the vast majority of working people around the Soviet government, and how stupid and ridiculous is the bourgeoisie's fairy-tale about the Bolsheviks

only having minority support. The bourgeoisie lie like they do because of the 17 thousand million debt of the tsarist government to the capitalists, the 17 thousand million debt which we repudiated and refused to pay. We don't intend to pay for the old rulers. We recognise that the debts have been incurred but we say: "Fair enough, you made the debt, you settle up among yourselves." The allies want to get their own back on us for the debt and restore the power of the landowners and the tsar. We know what they did in Archangel, Samara and Siberia. There, even the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s., who were antagonistic after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and thought we were wrong to count on a German revolution, are now convinced of being driven out and of private property and the landowners being restored with the aid of British and Czech troops.

Even though the British and French papers hide the truth, it seems to be making some headway. The workers sense and realise that the revolution in Russia is theirs, a workingman's, socialist revolution. Even in France and Britain the labour movement is now carrying such slogans as "Withdraw the forces from Russia!" and "He who makes war against Russia is a criminal!" A socialist rally was recently held in London's Albert Hall and according to information received, which the British Government tried hard to repress, the rally demanded "Withdraw the forces from Russia!" and all the workers' leaders condemned the government policy as robbery and violence. We also have news that Maclean, who was a Scottish schoolmaster at one time, called the workers out on strike in the principal industrial districts, condemning the war as a war of plunder. He had been in prison earlier. Then he was put in again. But when the revolutionary movement flared up in Europe, Maclean was let out and he put up as parliamentary candidate in Glasgow, one of the biggest cities in the North of England and Scotland. This shows that the British labour movement and its revolutionary demands are having a bigger impact. The British Government was forced to set Maclean free, its rabid enemy, a man who is proud to call himself a British Bolshevik.

In France, where the workers are still affected by chauvinism, and where they still think the war is being waged only for the defence of the country, a revolutionary mood is

growing. Now, when Britain and France have beaten the Germans, they, as you know, have presented them with terms a hundred times harsher than those of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Today, revolution in Europe has become a reality. The Allies, who boasted they were bringing Germany freedom from the Kaiser and militarism, have fallen to the role once played by the Russian troops in Nicholas I's time, when Russia was in the dark, when Nicholas I drove the Russian troops to stifle the Hungarian revolution. That was under serfdom over 60 years ago. Yet today, free Britain and other countries have turned into hangmen and think they are strong enough to stifle the revolution and repress the truth. But this truth will overcome all the obstacles both in France and Britain, and the workers will realise they have been deceived and inveigled into a war for robbing another country, and not for freeing France or Britain. From France we now hear there are people in the Socialist Party, which had previously supported defence of the fatherland, who warmly welcome the Soviet Republic and protest against military intervention in Russia.

On the other hand, the British and French imperialists are menacing Russia and giving support to the Krasnovs and Dutovs, helping to restore the monarchy and thinking they can deceive a free nation. We know that militarily the imperialists are stronger than us. We knew about it and said so ages ago. We appealed to everyone to aid the Red Army so as to bar the way to and repel the robbers and plunderers. When people say: "If British and French imperialism is stronger, what's the sense in fighting?" we reply: "Do you remember the Brest-Litovsk Treaty? Didn't the whole Russian bourgeoisie shout that the Bolsheviks were selling Russia to the Germans? Didn't they shout then that the Bolsheviks were hoping for a miracle in banking on a German revolution?" The German imperialists were then much stronger than us and had every chance of plundering Russia because we had no army. The old army could not and would not fight because people were so exhausted by the war that they just could not summon up the strength to fight. Everyone who knows what happened then realises that we could not defend ourselves and it looked like Russia was going to fall into the hands of the Kaiser's henchmen.

Yet, a few months later, the Germans had got themselves into such a mess in this same Russia and met such resistance, had so much trouble with the agitation among the German soldiers that now, as I was told by Zinoviev, Chairman of the Northern Commune in Petrograd, the German consul said as the German representatives were making off: "Now it's hard to tell who gained more, you or we." He realised that the German soldiers, who had been so much stronger than us, had been infected by the Bolshevik disease. And Germany today is in the grip of a revolution, there is a battle going on for Soviet power. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which had been declared the complete downfall of the Bolsheviks, turned out to be only a stepping stone to our present position. Having fortified ourselves we have now begun to form a Red Army. Yet the German soldiers have been infected by Bolshevism and the apparent victories turned out to be only a step to the complete downfall of German imperialism, an intermediate rung towards extending and developing the world revolution.

We were alone at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. All Europe looked on the Russian revolution as an exceptional affair, they regarded our revolution as an "Asiatic revolution", which began so hastily and toppled the tsar just because Russia was a backward country, and quickly moved on to take away property and to a socialist revolution because of this backwardness. But they forgot the other reason behind the Russian revolution: Russia had no alternative. The war had caused such destruction and starvation everywhere, made the people and soldiers so weary, they realised they had been tricked for so long, and that the only way out for Russia was revolution.

The Germans were told they had to defend themselves against the Russian invasion. And now this lie is being nailed with every passing day. The German capitalists and generals continued to lead their troops against Russia even when the country had become socialist. This made it quite clear to even the dimmest German soldier that he had been tricked for the whole four years and sent to war so that the German capitalists could plunder Russia. The same thing that brought the downfall of German imperialism, and the revolution in Germany, is with every passing day and hour bringing

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the revolution closer in France, Britain and other countries. We were alone. Now we are not. Today, there is a revolution in Berlin, Austria, Hungary; even in Switzerland, Holland and Denmark, free countries that were not touched by the war, the revolutionary movement is growing and the workers are demanding that Soviets be formed. Now it seems there is no alternative. Revolution is maturing all over the world. We were the first and we must defend the revolution until our allies, the workers of all Europe, catch us up. The further their governments get into the mire, the closer these allies will be to us.

When at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Germans thought they were the masters, they were only a step away from their doom. And today, Britain and France, by imposing peace terms on the Germans which are far harsher and more despicable than those Germany foisted on us, are standing on the edge of a precipice. No matter how much they lie, they are now only a few steps away from their doom. They are scared stiff of this doom, their lies are being increasingly exposed as the days go by. We say this: however much these imperialists lie in their newspapers, our cause is sound, much sounder than theirs because it is backed by the class-consciousness of the mass of workers everywhere; this class-consciousness was born of the war, which bled the whole world white for four years. The old governments will not enter God's world from this war. The old governments now say they are against world Bolshevism. The workers know what is going on in Russia: the landowners and capitalists are being hounded out, and are calling hirelings, alien soldiers to the rescue. The situation is now clear to everyone. Workers everywhere realise what is going on. And despite the whole savagery and bitterness of the imperialists, we courageously go into battle with them in the awareness that every step they take inside Russia will be a step towards their doom, and that they will fare no better than the German soldiers who brought Bolshevism back from the Ukraine instead of bread.

Power in Russia is now in the hands of the working people; if they lose it, nobody will ever be able to heal the wounds caused by this bloody, terrible war! To leave power in the hands of the old capitalists would mean that the whole

burden of war would have to be shouldered by the working people, who would have to pay the entire cost.

Britain? America and Japan are now fighting for a share of the spoils. Everything has been divided. Wilson is President of the world's most democratic republic. But what is he saying? People there are shot in the streets by jingoist crowds for one word in favour of peace. A clergyman who had never been a revolutionary was dragged out into the street and severely beaten for preaching peace. Where the wildest terror reigns troops are now being used to crush the revolution, to threaten suppression of the German revolution. The revolution in Germany broke out just recently, only a month ago; the burning issue there is a Constituent Assembly or Soviet government. All the bourgeoisie there are for the Constituent Assembly, and all the socialists—those who served the Kaiser as lackeys, who did not dare start a revolutionary war—they, too, want a Constituent Assembly. Germany is split into two camps. The socialists now favour the Constituent Assembly, while Liebknecht, who spent three years in prison, stands, like Rosa Luxemburg, at the head of *Die Rote Fahne*.[146] An issue of the newspaper was received in Moscow yesterday. It had a very difficult and eventful journey. In it you will find a number of articles—all the authors, who are revolutionary leaders, describe how the bourgeoisie are cheating the people. Freedom in Germany was in the hands of the capitalists. They published only their own newspapers, and now *Die Rote Fahne* says that only the workers have the right to use national wealth. Although the revolution in Germany is only a month old, the country is split into two camps. All the traitor socialists are clamouring for a Constituent Assembly, while the genuine, honest socialists are saying: "We all stand for the power of the workers and the soldiers." They are not saying "and the peasants", because in Germany many peasants also hire labourers, and so they are saying "for the workers and the soldiers". They say instead "for the small peasants". Soviet power there has already become a form of government.

Soviet government is a world-wide government. It is replacing the old bourgeois state. A republic as well as a monarchy is a form of the bourgeoisie's robbery of the people

if the capitalists are left with their property—the factories, banks and print-shops. The Bolsheviks were right when they said the world revolution was growing. It develops differently in different countries. It takes a long time and is not very easy. Any socialist who thinks the capitalists are going to renounce their rights at once is a bad socialist. No, the world has not seen such kindly capitalists yet. Socialism can only develop through struggle with capitalism. There has not yet been any ruling class which has given way without a fight. The capitalists know what Bolshevism is. They used to say: "Russian stupidity and Russian backwardness are making some sort of hocus-pocus there, nothing will come of it. They're chasing ghosts over there in Russia." But today these very same capitalist gentlemen realise this revolution is a world conflagration and only the workers' government can triumph. We are now setting up Poor Peasants' Committees. And in Germany most peasants are either farm labourers or small farmers. The big farmers are in most cases the German brand of landowners.

Yesterday the Swiss Government expelled our representative from the country, and we know the reason why. We know the French and British imperialists are scared because our representative has every day sent us telegrams and accounts of rallies in London at which the British workers have declared: "Down with British forces in Russia!" He sent us news about France too. The imperialists have reportedly presented the Russian representatives with an ultimatum. The Soviet government's representatives have been kicked out of Sweden as well and they must return to Russia. But it is still too early for them to rejoice. It is a barren victory. This step won't get them anywhere. No matter how hard the "Allies" try to hide the truth, deceive their people and get rid of representatives of Soviet Russia, the people will learn the whole truth in the end.

We are calling on you to give everything you have to repulse the "Allies" and support the Red Army. When we did not have the Red Army, what happened was understandable. But now we see that the Red Army is growing strong and winning battles. Our army is up against the British forces. And our army has officers who only yesterday came

up from the working class, who only yesterday had completed their military training. From prisoners, we have a lot of evidence that when they read the Constitution of our Republic in English they say to themselves they have been deceived, that Soviet Russia is not what they thought, that the Soviet government is a workers' government. And we say: "Yes, comrades, we are not only fighting for Soviet Russia, we are fighting for the government of workers and working people generally, the world over." As long as we can contain imperialism, the German revolution will strengthen. Revolution will strengthen elsewhere too. That is why, no matter what names they call it in Europe, this world revolution has stood up to its full stature and world imperialism will go under. Our position may be difficult but we have the assurance that we are not alone in fighting for a just cause, we have allies in the workers of every country.

Comrades, after these remarks on our international position, I want to say a few words about other questions. I want to talk about the petty-bourgeois parties. They considered themselves socialists. But they are not. We know full well that the institutions in capitalist society like banks, savings banks, mutual aid societies are called "mutual help" institutions, but in actual fact they are nothing of the sort, this name is a screen for robbery. These parties, which made out they were for the people, at the time when the Russian working class was fighting off Krasnov (he was arrested by our troops and set free, unfortunately, through the magnanimity of the Petrograders), those Menshevik and Right S.R. gentlemen were siding with the bourgeoisie. These parties of the petty bourgeoisie never know where to go—to the capitalists or to the workers. They are made up of people who live in the hope that one day they will grow rich. They constantly see that around them most small holders live badly—these are all working people. So these petty-bourgeois parties, who are scattered throughout the world, have begun to waver. This isn't new. It has always been the same, and that is how it is with us too. They all forsook us when the Brest-Litovsk Treaty came along, the hardest time of our revolution, when we had no army and we were forced to conclude a peace treaty, saying to ourselves: we shall not drop our socialist work for one minute. It slipped their

mind that Russia was making her supreme sacrifice for the socialist revolution, and they deserted to the Constituent Assembly advocates. These turned up in Samara and Siberia as well. Now they are being driven away from there and shown the only choice is between the landowners' government and the Bolsheviks' government. There is no middle course. Either the government of the oppressed or of the oppressors. All the poor peasants can only follow us. And they will only come when they see we do not stand on ceremony with the old regime and are doing everything for the good of the people. That is the only government of Soviets that could have had the people's support throughout the year despite the terrible conditions and famine. The workers and peasants realise that no matter how badly the war goes, the workers' and peasants' government will do everything it can against the capitalist exploiters, so that the whole burden of the war falls on these gentlemen's shoulders and not on the workers. And there you are, the workers' and peasants' government has had the people's support for more than a year.

Today, with the beginning of the German revolution, the Mensheviks and S.R.s are starting to change round. The best of them strove for socialism. But they thought the Bolsheviks were chasing ghosts, hoping for a miracle. Now they are convinced that whatever the Bolsheviks expected was not daydreams but real life. They see that the world revolution has begun and is growing throughout the world. And the best people among the Mensheviks and S.R.s are beginning to repent for their mistakes and realise that the Soviet government is not only Russian but a world-wide government of workers, and that no Constituent Assembly will help matters.

Britain, France and America know that today, now that the world revolution has flared up, they have no external enemies. The enemy comes from inside every country. A new breakthrough has arrived, when the Mensheviks and Right S.R.s are starting to waver and the best of them follow the Bolsheviks and see that though they swear by the Constituent Assembly they cannot help being on the side of the Whites. All over the world the question now is: either Soviet power or the power of the plunderers who have had ten million

people murdered in the war, twenty million maimed, and are now continuing to plunder other countries.

There you have, comrades, the question which causes the petty-bourgeois democrats to waver. We know these parties always have wavered and always will. Most of the people get their convictions straight from their own experience and have no trust in books and words. We tell the middle peasant he is not our enemy and we have no cause to oppress him. And if a local Soviet somewhere or other hits the middle peasant hard and it hurts, that Soviet must be taken away because it does not know how to act properly. The middle, petty-bourgeois democrats will always waver. And if they swing our way, like a pendulum, we must give them support. We tell them that if they are going to spoil our work, we don't want them. But if they are prepared to help us, we shall accept them. There are different groups among the Mensheviks, there is the group of "activists" which includes all those who have said: "It's about time we stopped criticising only and helped by action." We have said we shall fight the Czechs and whoever helps them will be dealt with ruthlessly. But when there are people who have seen their mistake, we must accept them and treat them with leniency. The person who stands in the middle between the worker and the capitalist will always waver. He thought the Soviet government would not last long. But he thought wrong. European imperialism cannot bring down our government. Revolution is now spreading all over the world. And we invite those who wavered and now see and understand their error, to come over to us. We won't turn them away. We must above all see to it that all these people, no matter what they were before, whether they wavered or not, as long as they are sincere, come over to us. We are now strong enough not to be afraid of anyone. We can stomach them all. But they cannot stomach us. Just remember that these parties are bound to waver. Today the pendulum swings one way, tomorrow the other. We must remain the proletarian party of workers and oppressed. But we are now in charge of the whole of Russia and our only enemy is the person who lives by another's labour. The others are not our enemies. They are only waverers. But waverers are not yet enemies.

Now, one more question. Food. As you all know, the food situation, which had improved somewhat in the autumn, is again on the decline. People are starving once more and things will be worse by the spring. Our rail transport is now very much in a mess. On top of everything, it is overburdened with prisoners of war coming home. Two million men are on their way home from Germany. These two million are utterly worn out. They have starved terribly. They are not people, but shadows, skeletons of people. Our transport suffered more from the fighting at home. There are no steam engines, and no carriages. And the food situation is getting really bad. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Council of People's Commissars said to itself: We now have an army and discipline established by Party cells which exist in each regiment. The majority of officers are now from the workers and not sons of the rich. If these officers now appreciate that the working class must find people to run the country, and Red officers too, then the socialist army will really be socialist with officer personnel renovated by the presence of Red officers. We know the breakthrough has now arrived. We have an army. It has a new discipline. The discipline is maintained by the Party cells, workers and commissars who went to the front in their hundreds of thousands explaining to the workers and peasants what the war was all about. That is why the breakthrough started in our army. That is why it has had such a great effect. The British papers are saying they are now running up against a serious foe in Russia.

We are very well aware of the poor apparatus we have for procuring and distributing food supplies. Certain groups of people have wormed their way in who are swindling and robbing. We know, too, that among the railway workers all those who are shouldering the whole burden of the work are on the side of the Soviet government. But up top they back the old regime, are either causing sabotage or not working with a will. Comrades, you know this war is revolutionary. Every force in the country must be summoned for this war. The whole country must be turned into a revolutionary camp. Everyone must help. By help we do not only mean that everyone should go to the front, but that the class of our state which is leading everyone to freedom, and which is the

Soviet government's support, should run the country because it alone has the right to do so. We appreciate the difficulties resulting from the working class having been kept away both from administration and education for so long. We appreciate the difficulties of the workers in learning everything at once. Nevertheless, in military matters, the most difficult and dangerous of all, it was the working class which effected the breakthrough. The politically-conscious working class must help us to make the same sort of breakthrough with food supplies and the railways. Every railwayman and every food worker should regard himself as a soldier performing his duty. He should remember that he is fighting a war on hunger. He must throw off his former bureaucratic habits. The other day we passed a decree on forming a workers' food inspection. We told ourselves that we need the workers' participation to bring about a breakthrough in the railway apparatus, to make a type of Red Army out of it. Call on your people. Rig up courses, teach them, make them commissars. Only they, if they give us their staff, can turn the army of old civil servants into some sort of Red Socialist Army responsible for provisions, an army led by workers and working not under the lash but of their own free will, just like the Red officers are fighting and dying at the front, in the knowledge that they die for a socialist republic.

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Published according to the verbatim report

TELEGRAM TO THE SAMARA UKRAINIANS

Samara, Gubernia Military Commissar for Samara Ukrainians

Consider it necessary to inform you in reply to telegram sent by Samara Ukrainians that in view of influx of Ukrainian volunteers and abundance of conscripts in Ukraine itself still without arms, Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine considers it unnecessary to call up Ukrainians in Russia and despatch them to Ukraine. In name of Council of People's Commissars propose you stop sending Ukrainian units to Ukraine.

Lenin, *Stalin*

Written December 16 or 17, 1918
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Published according to the telegram

"DEMOCRACY" AND DICTATORSHIP

The few numbers of the Berlin *Red Banner* and the Vienna *Call* (*Weckruf*),[147] organ of the Communist Party of German Austria, that have reached Moscow, show that the traitors to socialism—those who supported the war of the predatory imperialists—the Scheidemanns and Eberts, Austerlitzes and Renners—are getting the rebuff they deserve from the genuine representatives of the revolutionary workers of Germany and Austria. We extend warm greetings to both papers, which epitomise the vitality and growth of the Third International.

Apparently the chief question of the revolution both in Germany and Austria now is: Constituent Assembly or Soviet government? The spokesmen of the bankrupt Second International, all the way from Scheidemann to Kautsky, stand for the first and describe their stand as defense of "democracy" (Kautsky has even gone so far as to call it "pure democracy") as distinct from dictatorship. In the pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, which has just come off the press in Moscow and Petrograd, I examine Kautsky's views in detail. I shall try briefly to give the substance of the point at issue, which has become the question of the day for all the advanced capitalist countries.

The Scheidemanns and Kautskys speak about "pure democracy" and "democracy" in general for the purpose of deceiving the people and concealing from them the *bourgeois* character of *present-day* democracy. Let the bourgeoisie continue to keep the entire apparatus of state power in their hands, let a handful of exploiters continue to use the former, bourgeois, state machine! Elections held in such circumstances are lauded by the bourgeoisie, for very good reasons, as being "free", "equal", "democratic" and "universal".

These words are designed to conceal the truth, to conceal the fact that the means of production and political power remain in the hands of the exploiters, and that therefore real freedom and real equality for the exploited, that is, for the vast majority of the population, are out of the question. It is profitable and indispensable for the bourgeoisie to conceal from the people the *bourgeois* character of modern democracy, to picture it as democracy in general or "pure democracy", and the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, repeating this, *in practice* abandon the standpoint of the proletariat and side with the bourgeoisie.

Marx and Engels in their last joint preface to the *Communist Manifesto* (in 1872) considered it necessary specially to warn the workers that the proletariat cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made (that is, the bourgeois) state machine and wield it for its own purpose, that it must smash it, break it up. The renegade Kautsky, who has written a special pamphlet entitled *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, concealed from the workers this most important Marxist truth, utterly distorted Marxism, and, quite obviously, the praise which Scheidemann and Co. showered on the pamphlet was fully merited as praise by agents of the bourgeoisie for one switching to the side of the bourgeoisie.

It is sheer mockery of the working and exploited people to speak of pure democracy, of democracy in general, of equality, freedom and universal rights when the workers and all working people are ill-fed, ill-clad, ruined and worn out not only as a result of capitalist wage-slavery, but as a consequence of four years of predatory war, while the capitalists and profiteers remain in possession of the "property" usurped by them and the "ready-made" apparatus of state power. This is tantamount to trampling on the basic truths of Marxism which has taught the workers: you must take advantage of bourgeois democracy which, compared with feudalism, represents a great historical advance, but not for one minute must you forget the bourgeois character of this "democracy", its historically conditional and limited character. Never share the "superstitious belief" in the "state" and never forget that the state even in the most democratic republic, and not only in a monarchy, is simply a machine for the suppression of one class by another.

The bourgeoisie are compelled to be hypocritical and to describe as "popular government" or democracy in general, or pure democracy, the (*bourgeois*) democratic republic which is, in practice, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the exploiters over the working people. The Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Austerlitzes and Renners (and now, to our regret, with the help of Friedrich Adler) fall in line with this falsehood and hypocrisy. But Marxists, Communists, expose this hypocrisy, and tell the workers and the working people in general this frank and straightforward truth: the democratic republic, the Constituent Assembly, general elections, etc., are, in practice, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and for the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital there is no other way but to replace this dictatorship with the *dictatorship of the proletariat.*

The dictatorship of the proletariat alone can emancipate humanity from the oppression of capital, from the lies, falsehood and hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy—democracy *for the rich*—and establish democracy *for the poor*, that is, make the blessings of democracy *really* accessible to the workers and poor peasants, whereas now (even in the most democratic—*bourgeois*—republic) the blessings of democracy are, *in fact*, inaccessible to the vast majority of working people.

Take, for example, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press. The Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Austerlitzes and Renners assure the workers that the present elections to the Constituent Assembly in Germany and Austria are "democratic". That is a lie. *In practice* the capitalists, the exploiters, the landowners and the profiteers own 9/10 of the best meeting halls, and 9/10 of the stocks of newsprint, printing-presses, etc. The urban workers and the farm hands and day labourers are, *in practice*, debarred from democracy by the "sacred right of property" (guarded by the Kautskys and Renners, and now, to our regret, by Friedrich Adler as well) and by the bourgeois state apparatus, that is, bourgeois officials, bourgeois judges, and so on. The present "freedom of assembly and the press" in the "democratic" (bourgeois-democratic) German republic is false and hypocritical, because *in fact* it is *freedom for the rich* to buy and

bribe the press, *freedom for the rich* to befuddle the people with the venomous lies of the bourgeois press, *freedom for the rich* to keep as their "property" the landowners' mansions, the best buildings, etc. The dictatorship of the proletariat *will take* from the capitalists and hand over to the working people the landowners' mansions, the best buildings, printing-presses and the stocks of newsprint.

But this means replacing "universal", "pure" democracy by the "dictatorship of one class", scream the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Austerlitzes and Renners (together with their followers in other countries—the Gomperses, Hendersons, Renaudels, Vandervelde and Co.).

Wrong, we reply. This means replacing what in fact is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (a dictatorship hypocritically cloaked in the forms of the democratic bourgeois republic) by the dictatorship of the proletariat. This means replacing democracy for the rich by democracy for the poor. This means replacing freedom of assembly and the press for the minority, for the exploiters, by freedom of assembly and the press for the *majority* of the population, for the working people. This means a gigantic, world-historic *extension* of democracy, its transformation from falsehood into truth, the liberation of humanity from the shackles of capital, which *distorts* and truncates any, even the most "democratic" and republican, *bourgeois* democracy. This means replacing the bourgeois state by the *proletarian* state, a replacement that is the sole way the state can eventually wither away altogether.

But why not reach this goal without the dictatorship of one class? Why not switch directly to "pure" democracy? So ask the hypocritical friends of the bourgeoisie or the naïve petty bourgeois and philistines gulled by them.

And we reply: Because in any capitalist society the decisive say lies with either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, while the small proprietors, inevitably, remain wavering, helpless, stupid dreamers of "pure", i.e., non-class or above-class, democracy. Because from a society in which one class oppresses another there is no way out other than through the dictatorship of the oppressed class. Because the proletariat alone is capable of defeating the bourgeoisie, of overthrowing them, being the sole class which capitalism

has united and "schooled", and which is capable of drawing to its side the wavering mass of the working population with a petty-bourgeois way of life, of drawing them to its side or at least "neutralising" them. Because only mealy-mouthed petty bourgeois and philistines can dream—deceiving thereby both themselves and the workers—of overthrowing capitalist oppression without a long and difficult process of *suppressing the resistance* of the exploiters. In Germany and Austria this resistance is not yet very pronounced because expropriation of the expropriators has not yet begun. But once expropriation begins the resistance will be fierce and desperate. In concealing this from themselves and from the workers the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Austerlitzes and Renners betray the interests of the proletariat, switching at the most decisive moment from the class struggle and overthrow of the yoke of the bourgeoisie to getting the proletariat to come to terms with the bourgeoisie, achieving "social peace" or reconciliation of exploited and exploiters.

Revolutions are the locomotives of history, said Marx.[148] Revolutions teach quickly. The urban workers and farm hands in Germany and Austria will quickly discern the betrayal of the cause of socialism by the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Austerlitzes and Renners. The proletariat will cast aside these "social traitors"—socialists in words and betrayers of socialism in practice—as it did in Russia with the same kind of petty bourgeoisie and philistines—the Mensheviks and "Socialist-Revolutionaries". The more complete the domination of the above-mentioned "leaders", the quicker the proletariat will see that only the replacement of the bourgeois state, be it the most democratic bourgeois republic, by a state of the type of the Paris Commune (about which so much was said by Marx, who has been distorted and betrayed by the Scheidemanns and Kautskys) or by a state of the Soviet type, can open the way to socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat will deliver humanity from capitalist oppression and war.

Moscow, December 23, 1918

Pravda No. 2,
January 3, 1919
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the manuscript

HEROISM OF THE PRESNYA WORKERS

Thirteen years ago the workers of Moscow raised the standard of revolt against tsarism. This was the culminating point in the development of the first workers' revolution against tsarism. The workers were defeated, and Presnya ran with workers' blood.

The unforgettable heroism of the Moscow workers set an example of militancy to the working people throughout Russia. But these people were then too ignorant, too disunited, and failed to back the heroes of Presnya and Moscow as a whole who rose in arms against the tsarist, landlord monarchy.

The defeat of the Moscow workers was followed by the defeat of the first revolution as a whole. For twelve long and painful years the savage landlord reaction tortured all the workers and peasants of all nationalities of Russia.

The heroism of the Presnya workers was not in vain. Their sacrifices bore fruit. The first breach was made in the tsarist monarchy; the breach was slowly but surely widened, weakening the obsolete, medieval regime. The heroism of the Moscow workers started a deep ferment among the urban and rural working people, the effects of which never died down, in spite of all persecution.

Before the armed insurrection of December 1905, the people of Russia were incapable of waging a mass armed struggle against their exploiters. After December they were no longer the same people. They had been reborn. They had received their baptism of fire. They had been steeled in revolt. They trained the fighters who were victorious in 1917 and who now, despite the incredible difficulties, and

overcoming the tormets of hunger and devastation caused by the imperialist war, are fighting for the world victory of socialism.

Long live the workers of Red Presnya, the vanguard of the world workers' revolution!

Byednota No. 222,
December 24, 1918
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Byednota* text

SPEECH TO THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF ECONOMIC COUNCILS[149] DECEMBER 25, 1918

(*Ovation.*) Comrades, first I want to say a few words about the Soviet Republic's international situation. Of course, you all know that the main issue at stake is the victory of the British, French and American imperialists and their attempts to seize complete possession of the whole world, and, particularly, to destroy Soviet Russia.

At the beginning of the October Revolution, as you know, not only the majority of the West-European bourgeoisie, but also a certain section of the Russian bourgeoisie believed that what was going on in our country was a sort of socialist experiment which could have no essential and serious significance from a world point of view. Particularly arrogant and short-sighted bourgeois people frequently maintained that the communist experiments in Russia could serve no other purpose than to give satisfaction to German imperialism. And, unfortunately, there were people who allowed themselves to be blinded by such words and who, incidentally, regarded the fantastically harsh and coercive terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty from this angle. In actual fact, these people were wittingly or unwittingly fostering petty-bourgeois class patriotism and regarding the growing unfavourable situation not from the point of view of its world significance, nor from the development of events on a world scale, but from the point of view that German imperialism is the chief enemy, and that these harsh and immensely extortionate peace terms were a triumph for the German imperialists.

Indeed, if we regard the events of that period from the point of view of the situation in Russia, more ruinous terms can scarcely be imagined. But the folly of the calculations of the German imperialists became apparent within a few months, when the Germans were conquering the Ukraine and bragging to the German bourgeoisie, and even more so to the German proletariat, that the moment had arrived to reap the fruits of imperialist policy, and that in the Ukraine they would get everything Germany needed. That was a very short-sighted and shallow judgement of events.

For it soon became apparent that the only people who were right were those who regarded events from the point of view of their influence on the development of the world revolution. The example of the Ukraine,-which had suffered tremendously, in fact showed that the only correct judgement of events was one based on a study and careful observation of the international proletarian revolution. Imperialism found itself hard pressed by the working people, whose condition had become intolerable. And we can now see that the Ukrainian episode was one of the links in the process of growth of the world revolution.

The German imperialists were able to procure from the Ukraine far less material benefits than they had anticipated. On the other hand, this transformation of the war into a patently predatory one demoralised the entire German army, while contact with Soviet Russia started in this army of German working people the process of disintegration which was to make itself felt a few months later. And now that the British and American imperialists have become even more arrogant, and regard themselves as overlords whom nobody can resist, we have no illusions about the extremely difficult situation in which we find ourselves. The Entente powers have now overstepped the bounds of the possible for bourgeois policy; they have overdone it, just as the German imperialists overdid it in February and March 1918 in concluding the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. The cause that led to the collapse of German imperialism is again clearly perceptible in the case of Anglo-French imperialism. The latter has imposed peace terms on Germany that are far worse, far harsher than those which Germany imposed on us when concluding the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

In doing so, Anglo-French imperialism has overstepped the bounds and this will later prove fatal. Beyond these bounds imperialism forfeits the hope of holding down the working people.

In spite of the hullabaloo raised by the chauvinists around Germany's defeat and destruction, in spite of the fact that the war is not yet officially over, we can already discern signs in France and Britain of an extremely rapid growth of the labour movement and a change of attitude by politicians who were formerly chauvinists but who are now opposing their governments' attempt to meddle in Russian affairs. If we add to this the recent newspaper reports about the beginnings of fraternisation on the part of the British and American soldiers, and if we remember that imperialist armies consist of citizens who are being held in check by deceit and threats, we can see that Soviet Russia is standing on fairly firm ground. With this general picture of world war and revolution before us, we are absolutely calm, and regard the future with complete confidence. And we assert that Anglo-French imperialism has gone so far as to overstep all the bounds of peace practically obtainable by imperialists and to fall in danger of complete collapse.

The tasks that the Entente powers, who are continuing the imperialist war, have set themselves are to stifle revolution and to seize and divide up all countries of the world. But although Britain and America have been more exempt from the horrors of war than Germany, and although their democratically organised bourgeoisie are much more far-sighted than the German, the British and American imperialists have lost their heads and are now compelled by objective conditions to undertake a task that is beyond their power. They are being forced to maintain troops for purposes of pacification and suppression.

Nevertheless, our present situation demands a maximum exertion of effort. And we must still set greater value on a month than we formerly did on a whole decade, because we are now doing a hundred times more. Besides safeguarding the Russian Republic, we are doing a great job for the world proletariat. Intense effort is demanded of us, immense work in compiling a plan of organisation and in defining general relations.

Passing to the question of our immediate tasks, I must say that the main thing has already been accomplished, and that in the interval between the First and Second Congresses of the Economic Councils the principal type of work has been outlined. A general plan of running industry, nationalised undertakings and whole branches of industry has been drawn up and put on a firm basis with the help of the trade unions. Incidentally, we shall continue to combat all syndicalist, separatist, parochial and regional tendencies, which can only harm our cause.

The military situation imposes a special responsibility and grave duties on us. Collegiate management with the participation of the trade unions is essential. Collegiate bodies are necessary, but collegiate management must not be allowed to become a hindrance to practical work. And when I personally now see the way economic tasks are being carried out by our undertakings, what strikes me most is that the executive part of our work, associated as it is with collective discussion, at times impedes the execution. This transition from collective execution to personal responsibility is the urgent problem of the day.

We shall unreservedly demand that all the Economic Councils, Central Boards and Central Administrations see that the collegiate system of management is not reduced to empty discussion, to writing resolutions, to compiling plans and to regional favouritism. That would be intolerable. We shall firmly insist that every member of an Economic Council and every member of a Central Board shall know for which branch of economy, in the narrow sense, he is responsible. When we receive reports that raw material is available, but people do not know how much, cannot work it out, when we hear complaints that warehouses filled with goods are under lock and key while the peasants are demanding, and justly demanding, commodity exchange, and are refusing to surrender grain in exchange for devaluated paper notes, we must know what member of what particular collegiate board is guilty of red tape. We must say that this member is responsible for the red tape and will be made to answer for it from the defence point of view, i.e., he will be liable to immediate arrest and court martial, even if he is a member of the most important union in the most

important Central Board. He must be made to answer for the practical performance of the most simple and elementary things, such as keeping account of goods in the warehouses and putting them to proper use. It is in the performance of such elementary duties that obstructions most frequently arise.

From the historical standpoint, this should not evoke any misgivings, because in breaking new ground a certain amount of time has to be spent in outlining the general plan, which is then developed in the actual process of work. On the contrary, h is astonishing how much has been done in this respect in so short a time. From the military and the socialist standpoint, however, when the proletariat demands all-out efforts from us so that there may by bread and warm coats, so that they are not so short of footwear, foodstuffs, and so on, commodity exchange must be increased to three times and ten times as much as at present. This side of the matter must be made the immediate task of the Economic Councils.

What we require is practical work by people who will be responsible for exchanging grain for goods, for seeing that grain is not lying about, for proper account of the raw materials in every warehouse, as well as for seeing that they do not lie about unutilised, and for real assistance being given in production.

The co-operatives, too, must be approached in a business-like way. When I hear members of the Economic Councils asserting that the co-operative societies are a matter for shopkeepers, that they are full of Mensheviks and white-guards, and that we must therefore keep them at arm's length, I maintain that these people display complete ignorance of the matter. They absolutely fail to understand the tasks of the moment when, instead of referring to the good co-operators-as experts, they refer to them as people who are stretching out a hand to the whiteguards. They should mind their own business: we have the Extraordinary Commissions for ferreting out whiteguards, and that business should be left to them. The co-operatives, after all, are the only apparatus created by capitalist society which we must utilise. And we shall therefore ruthlessly punish by military law any attempt to replace action by arguments

that are the epitome of short-sightedness, gross stupidity and intellectual conceit. (*Stormy applause.*)

When to this day, after the lapse of a year, matters are not organised as they should be, when, confronted by practical problems, we still continue to discuss plans while the country is demanding bread, felt boots and the distribution of raw materials on time, such red tape and meddling in other people's affairs are not to be tolerated.

There are sometimes people in our apparatus who incline towards the whiteguards, but given communist control in all our institutions these people cannot acquire political significance or leading positions. There cannot be the slightest doubt on this score. But we need them as practical workers, and there is no need to fear them. I have no doubt that Communists are splendid people, that there are splendid organisers among them, but it will take years and years to obtain such organisers in large numbers, and we cannot wait.

Now we can obtain these workers from among the bourgeoisie, from among the experts and intellectuals. And we shall ask all comrades working in the Economic Councils: what, sirs, have you done to enlist experienced people in the work? What have you done to secure experts, salesmen, efficient bourgeois co-operators, who must work for you in no worse a manner than they did for the Kolupayevs and Razuvayevs?[150] Time to abandon the old prejudices and enlist all the experts we need in our work. Every collegiate body, every Communist executive must know this. The pledge of success lies in this attitude.

Let's cut out the idle talk and get down to practical work to extricate our country from the ring in which the imperialists have surrounded it. That must be the position of every Soviet and co-operative organisation. We need action and more action! The proletariat will forfeit much if, once in power, it cannot utilise that power, put the problem practically and solve it practically. It is about time you dropped the idea that only Communists, among whom there are unquestionably excellent people, can perform a particular job. It is about time you lost this prejudice; we need many workers who know their job, and we must enlist them all in the work.

Capitalism has left us a valuable legacy in the shape of its biggest experts. And we must be sure to utilise them, and utilise them on a broad and mass scale; we must put every one of them to work. We have no time to spend on training experts from among our Communists, because everything now depends on practical work and practical results.

We must demand that every member of a collegiate body, every member of a responsible institution take charge of a job and be fully responsible for it. It is absolutely essential that everyone who takes charge of a definite branch of work should be responsible for everything, both for production and distribution. I must tell you that our Soviet Republic's situation is such that given proper distribution of bread and other goods we can hold on for a very, very long time. But we must have a proper policy of definitely abandoning all red tape. We must act swiftly and decisively, we must appoint definite people for definite responsible work, every one of them must know his job exactly, must answer for it exactly, answer for it even with his head. That is the policy we are pursuing in the Council of People's Commissars and in the Council of Defence[151]; and to this policy all the activities of the Economic Councils and the co-operatives must be subordinated. That is the path the proletariat's policy must take.

We must see to it that the wheels of commodity exchange revolve properly. That is the whole problem right now. An enormous amount of work has to be done in this sphere, and, in conclusion, my emphatic appeal to all of you is to do your share of this work. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Brief reports published in *Izvestia* No. 284 and *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 42, December 26, 1918

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Published according to the book

TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS

I

The theses by Tomsky, Radus-Zenkovich and Nogin each express the viewpoint of the particular job they represent: trade unions, commissariat and co-operatives with mutual benefit societies.

Each group of theses therefore suffers from a lopsided emphasis of only one side of the picture and an overshadowing and suppression of the fundamental points at issue.

A correct picture of these fundamental issues concerning the trade union movement today and its attitude towards the Soviet government requires above all proper consideration for the specific features of the *present*, *given* situation in the transition from capitalism to socialism.

All three gave insufficient attention or virtually no attention at all to this vital aspect of the matter.

II

The chief feature of the present situation in this respect is as follows.

The Soviet government as the dictatorship of the proletariat is victorious both among the urban proletariat and among the poor peasants but has far from won over by communist propaganda and strong organisation all trades and the whole mass of semi-proletarians.

Hence the special importance, particularly at the moment, of stepping up our propaganda and organisational work so that, on the one hand, we extend our influence over those workers and employees who are the *least Soviet* (that is,

the furthest from fully accepting Soviet policy), and subordinate them to the general proletarian movement. And so that, on the other hand, we shake up and rouse ideologically, and rally organisationally, the most backward sections and individuals among the proletariat and semi-proletariat, such as the unskilled workers, the town servants, rural semi-proletariat, and so on.

Then, the second principal feature of the present situation is that the construction of socialist society is based on a solid foundation, that is, we have not only done more than map it out and set it as our immediate practical goal; we have formed several highly important bodies of this construction (the Economic Councils, for example), had certain experience of their relationship with mass organisations (trade unions, co-operatives), and obtained certain practical results. All the same, however, our construction is not yet finished by any means, we still have very many flaws to iron out, the very essentials are not yet guaranteed (for instance, proper collection and distribution of grain, production and distribution of fuel), and the main body of working people are still not playing a big enough part in the construction.

III

With this in view, the trade unions have the following tasks at present.

There can be no talk of any sort of trade union "neutrality". Any campaign for neutrality is either a hypocritical screen for counter-revolution or a complete lack of class-consciousness.

We are now strong enough in the basic core of the trade union movement to be able to bring under our influence and proletarian discipline both the backward and the passive non-Communists inside the unions, and those workers who are still in some respects petty-bourgeois.

So the chief aim now is, not to break the resistance of a strong enemy, for Soviet Russia no longer has such an enemy among the proletarians and semi-proletarians, but to overcome by stubborn, persistent, more extensive educational and organisational work the prejudices of certain petty-bourgeois sections of the proletariat and semi-proletariat.

The unions must steadily extend the insufficiently wide base of the Soviet government (that is, increase the number of workers and poor peasants directly taking part in state administration), educate the backward working people (by practical experience in management as well as by books, lectures and newspapers), and discover *new organisational forms* both for these new tasks of the trade union movement in general, and for attracting a far more numerous mass of semi-proletarians, like the poor peasants, for example.

Thus, they must attract *all* trade union members into state administration—through the system of commissars, through participation in lightning control groups, and so on and so forth. They must attract the housemaid, first into co-operative work, in supplying the population with provisions, supervising their production, etc., and then into more responsible and less "narrow" work—but of course with the necessary gradualness.

They must get the specialists into state work together with the workers and keep an eye on them.

Transitional forms demand new bounds of organisation. Thus, for instance, the Poor Peasants' Committees are playing a tremendous role. There may be a danger that their merging with the Soviets would somewhere end up by leaving the *mass* of semi-proletarians *outside* of the bounds of permanent organisation. But we cannot forgo the task of organising the poor peasants under the pretext that they are not hired hands. It is possible and even necessary to search, search and search again for new forms, if only, for example, by forming unions of poor peasants (perhaps the very same Poor Peasants' Committees) as unions of *the very poor* (a) uninterested in grain profiteering and high grain prices, (b) interested in improving their lot by common measures for everyone, (c) interested in strengthening socialised farming, (d) interested in a permanent alliance with the urban workers, etc.

Such a poor peasant union could make up a *special section* of the All-Russia Trade Union Council to prevent it overwhelming the completely proletarian elements. The form can be modified and must be sought through applying it to practice, to the new task of embracing the new, transitional social types (the village poor are not the proletariat, and

now not even semi-proletariat, but *those who* stand closest to the semi-proletariat since capitalism is not yet dead, and at the same time *those who* are most sympathetic to the transition to socialism)....*

Written in December 1918
and January 1919

First published in 1933

Published according to
the manuscript

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* Here the manuscript ends.—*Ed.*

A LITTLE PICTURE IN ILLUSTRATION OF BIG PROBLEMS

Comrade Sosnovsky, editor of *Byednota*,[152] has brought me a remarkable book. As many workers and peasants as possible should be made familiar with it. Most valuable lessons, splendidly illustrated by vivid examples, are to be drawn from it on some of the major problems of socialist construction. The book, by Comrade Alexander Todorsky, is called *A Year with Rifle and Plough* and was published in the little town of Vesyegonsk by the local uyezd Executive Committee to mark the anniversary of the October Revolution.

The author describes the year's experience of the men in charge of organising Soviet power in the Vesyegonsk Uyezd—first the Civil War, the revolt of the local kulaks and its suppression, and then "peaceful creative life". The author has succeeded in giving such a simple, and at the same time such a lively, account of the course of the revolution in this rural backwater, that to attempt to retell it could only weaken its effect. This book should be distributed as widely as possible, and it would be very good if many more of those who have been working among the people and with the people, in the very thick of life, sat down to describe their experiences. The publication of several hundred, or even several dozen, such descriptions, the best, most truthfully and plainly told and containing numerous valuable facts, would be infinitely more useful to the cause of socialism than many of the newspaper and magazine articles and books by professional journalists and writers who only too often cannot see real life for the paper they write on.

Let me give a brief example from Comrade Todorsky's narrative. It was suggested that "merchant hands" should not be allowed to go "unemployed", but should be encouraged to "set to work".

"...With this end in view, three young, energetic and very business-like manufacturers, E. Yefremov, A. Loginov and N. Kozlov, were summoned to the Executive Committee and ordered on pain of imprisonment and confiscation of all property to set up a sawmill and tannery. The work was started immediately.

"The Soviet authorities were not mistaken in their choice of men, and the manufacturers, to their credit, were among the first to realise that they were not dealing with 'casual and temporary guests', but with real masters who had taken power firmly into their hands.

"Having quite rightly realised this, they set to work energetically to carry out the orders of the Executive Committee, with the result that Vesyegonsk now has a sawmill going at full swing, covering the needs of the local population and filling orders for a new railway under construction.

"As to the tannery, the premises are now ready, and the engine, drums and other machinery, obtained from Moscow, are being installed, so that in a month and a half, or two at the most, Vesyegonsk will be getting fine leather of its own make.

"The building of two Soviet plants by 'non-Soviet' hands is a good example of how to fight a class which is hostile to us.

"To rap the exploiters over the knuckles, to render them harmless or 'finish them off', is only half the job. The whole job will be done only when we compel them to work, and with the fruits of their labour help to improve the new life and strengthen Soviet power."

These fine and absolutely true words should be carved in stone and prominently displayed in every Economic Council, food organisation, factory, land department and so on. For what has been understood by our comrades in remote Vesyegonsk is all too often stubbornly ignored by Soviet officials in the capitals. It is quite common to meet a Soviet intellectual or worker, a Communist, who turns his nose up at the mere mention of co-operative societies and declares with an air of profound importance—and with equally profound stupidity—that these are not Soviet hands, they are bourgeois people, shopkeepers, Mensheviks, that at such and such a time and place the co-operators used their financial manipulations to conceal aid given to white-guards, and that in our Socialist Republic the supply and distribution apparatus must be built up by clean Soviet hands.

Such arguments are typical insofar as the truth is so mixed with falsehood that we consequently get a most dangerous distortion of the aims of communism that can do incalculable harm to our cause.

The co-operatives certainly are an apparatus of bourgeois society, an apparatus which grew up in an atmosphere of "shopkeeping" and which has trained its leaders in the spirit of bourgeois politics and in a bourgeois outlook, and has therefore been producing a large proportion of whiteguards or their accomplices. That is undeniable. But it is a bad thing when absurd conclusions are drawn from undeniable truths, by their oversimplification and slapdash application. We can only build communism out of the material created by capitalism, out of that refined apparatus which has been moulded under bourgeois conditions and which—as far as concerns the human material in the apparatus—is therefore inevitably imbued with the bourgeois mentality. That is what makes the building of communist society difficult, but it is also a guarantee that it can and will be built. In fact, what distinguishes Marxism from the old, utopian socialism is that the latter wanted to build the new society not from the mass human material produced by bloodstained, sordid, rapacious, shopkeeping capitalism, but from very virtuous men and women reared in special hothouses and cucumber frames. Everyone now sees that this absurd idea really is absurd and everyone has discarded it, but not everyone is willing or able to give thought to the opposite doctrine of Marxism and to think out how communism can (and should) be built from the mass human material which has been corrupted by hundreds and thousands of years of slavery, serfdom, capitalism, by small individual enterprise, and by the war of every man against his neighbour to obtain a place in the market, or a higher price for his product or his labour.

The co-operatives are a bourgeois apparatus. Hence they do not deserve to be trusted *politically*; but this does not mean we may turn our backs on the task of using them for administration and construction. Political distrust means we must not put non-Soviet people in *politically* responsible posts. It means the Cheka must keep a sharp eye on members of classes, sections or groups that have leanings towards the

whiteguards. (Though, incidentally, one need not go to the same absurd lengths as Comrade Latsis, one of our finest, tried and tested Communists, did in his Kazan magazine, *Krasny Terror*. He wanted to say that Red terror meant the forcible suppression of exploiters who attempted to resfore their rule, but instead, he put it this way [on page 2 of the first issue of his magazine]: "Don't search [!!?] the records for evidence of whether his revolt against the Soviet was an armed or only a verbal one.")

Political distrust of the members of a bourgeois apparatus is legitimate and essential. But to refuse to use them in administration and construction would be the height of folly, fraught with untold harm to communism. If anybody tried to recommend a Menshevik as a socialist, or as a political leader, or even as a political adviser, he would be committing a great mistake, for the history of the revolution in Russia has definitely shown that the Mensheviks (and the Socialist-Revolutionaries) are not socialists, but petty-bourgeois democrats who are capable of siding with the *bourgeoisie* every time the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie becomes particularly acute. But petty-bourgeois democracy is not a chance political formation, not an exception, but a *necessary* product of capitalism. And it is not only the old, pre-capitalist, economically reactionary middle peasants who are the "purveyors" of this democracy. So, too, are the co-operative societies with their capitalist training that have sprung from the soil of large-scale capitalism, the intellectuals, etc. After all, even backward Russia produced, side by side with the Kolupayevs and Razuvayevs, capitalists who knew how to make use of the services of educated intellectuals, be they Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary or non-party. Are we to be more stupid than those capitalists and fail to use such "building material" in erecting a communist Russia?

Written at the end of 1918
or beginning of 1919

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November 7, 1926

Published according to
the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO STALIN AND DZERZHINSKY[153]

14.1.19

Glazov, for Stalin and Dzerzhinsky

Received and read first code message. Request both of you personally to see to execution of intended measures on spot, otherwise no guarantee of success.

Lenin

First published in 1934

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET AND ALL-RUSSIA TRADE UNION CONGRESS JANUARY 17, 1919[154]

(*Stormy ovation.*) Comrades, allow me to begin by briefly mentioning the chief facts relating to our food policy. I think these brief remarks will be useful in enabling us to form a correct judgement of the significance of the resolution we are recommending today for adoption by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. They should also enable us to form an opinion of our whole food policy in general, and of the role which now, when a difficult change is coming, falls to the organised proletariat—that vanguard and chief buttress of Soviet Russia and the socialist revolution.

Our food policy has been marked by three major acts, which, taken chronologically, are as follows: first—the decision to form Poor Peasants' Committees, a step which lies at the very basis of our food policy and which, moreover, was a tremendously important turning-point in the whole course of development and structure of our revolution. By taking this step we crossed the boundary dividing the bourgeois from the socialist revolution. By themselves, the victory of the working class in the cities and the transfer of all factories to the proletarian state would not have been enough to create and consolidate the foundation of a socialist system, if we had not also created for ourselves not a general peasant, but a really proletarian buttress in the countryside. In October, we had to confine ourselves to uniting the proletariat and the peasants in general, as a

whole. And thanks to this alliance we were able rapidly to destroy the landlord system and sweep it off the face of the earth. But it was only when we proceeded to organise the poor peasants, the peasant proletariat and semi-proletariat, that a durable alliance could be formed between the mass of the urban proletariat and rural proletariat. Only then could the war against the kulaks and the peasant bourgeoisie be fought in real earnest. This radical step continues to be the keystone of our food policy.

The second step, less important perhaps, was the decree passed with the participation and on the initiative of our representatives, the decree on utilising the co-operative societies. There we resolved that we must make use of the machinery created by the co-operatives and capitalist society in general, and which, for obvious reasons, was weaker in Russia than in Western Europe. In this respect we were guilty of many sins and many omissions in the towns and big proletarian centres, as well as in the countryside. Here we are up against a lack of understanding and ability, prejudices and traditions which tend to repel us from the co-operatives. It is quite natural that there should be many non-proletarians in the upper ranks of the co-operative movement. We must fight these people, who are capable of swinging over to the bourgeoisie, and the counter-revolutionary elements and their scheming. But at the same time we must preserve this machinery, the co-operative machinery—which is likewise a capitalist heritage—this machinery of distribution among millions of people, without which we cannot build socialism with any success. In this respect the Food Commissariat has outlined a correct policy, but we have not yet put it fully into effect. The proposals we are submitting today to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on behalf of the Communist group, which insists that the co-operative machinery be utilised, are one more step in the same direction. We must know how to combat the undesirable top officials in the co-operative machinery—we have forces and authority enough for that, for it would be silly to think they can put up any serious resistance. We must know how to combat them, but we must utilise the co-operative machinery without fail so as not to squander our forces, so that this machine may be united,

and so that the Communists may devote their energies not only to political, but also to organisational work, and make technical use of the machinery which stands ready for this work—the co-operative machinery.

The third step in our food policy is the formation of workers' food organisations. Here, a responsible task confronts you, the food workers. Our path is the right path for us to follow, and we must see to it that it is followed by all the Commissariats. It is a measure of general social and class importance as well as of importance for food supplies. To make the socialist revolution lasting, a new class must run the country. We know that prior to 1861[155] it was the feudal landowners who were the power that governed Russia. We know that since then, generally speaking, the power that governed was the bourgeoisie, those from the wealthy. The permanence of the socialist revolution will depend on the extent we can elevate the new class, the proletariat, to the work of government, have Russia governed by the proletariat. We must make this work of government a step towards the universal training of the working people in the art of governing the state, a training not derived from books or newspapers, speeches or pamphlets, but from practice, enabling everyone to try his hand at this work.

That, comrades, is the chief stage in our food policy, which at the same time is indicative of the very character of its structure. Very responsible duties here confront our food supply comrades. It need scarcely be said that there is no more cruel and dreadful calamity than famine, that the people are naturally driven to impatience, anger and indignation by every flop in this sphere, for it is a calamity that cannot be endured. Nor need it be said that the Food Commissariat's task is a most difficult one. You know, and the comrades from the trade unions know it particularly, how much chaos and disorder there is in running the big factories, in keeping stock of their output. Yet this is a thousand times easier than keeping stock of food which is gathered in by millions of peasants. But we have no alternative. There is a general food shortage in the country. There is not enough to go round.

What do we mean when we say that certain foodstuffs are scarce? It means we could avoid starvation, although living

on reduced rations, if we were now to distribute them among the whole population, if every peasant were to turn over all his produce, if everybody were to cut consumption somewhat below the standard of sufficiency—because there is not enough for a full standard all round—if every peasant were to agree to reduce his consumption somewhat below the standard of sufficiency and turn over all the rest to the state, and if we distributed it all properly. But, if we set ourselves this aim, it is obviously impossible to carry it out by ordinary means amidst the present state of economic disruption and with our nation-wide inefficiency—we are only just getting the knack; we had nowhere to get it from before. If there is a shortage of food, it means ... what does it mean? It means that if you were to sanction free trade when there is a shortage of vitally essential foodstuffs, the result would be frantic profiteering and prices would be inflated to what is called monopoly or famine prices, and only a few top people, with incomes considerably above the average, would be able to satisfy their needs at these fantastic prices, while the vast majority of the people would starve. That is what it means when there is a food shortage in the country, when the country is in a state of famine. Ever since the imperialists began to march on Russia, she has been surrounded. They cannot come out openly with their predatory plans; but that does not mean the end of their intervention, as Comrade Kamenev has rightly remarked. We are a besieged country, a besieged fortress. In this besieged fortress want is inevitable. And therefore the Food Commissariat's job is the most difficult organisational job of all the Commissariats.

Our enemy today, if we take the enemy within, is not so much the capitalist or landowner—this exploiting minority was easy to vanquish, and it has been. It is the profiteer and the bureaucrat. And every peasant is a profiteer by inclination, who has a chance to line his pockets taking advantage of the desperate want and agonising famine in the cities and in some of the villages. And you know very well, especially the comrades from the trade unions, that the urge, the tendency to go in for profiteering occurs in the industrial centres, too, when certain goods are not to be had, or are scarce, and that everybody who

manages to lay his hands on them tries to hoard and make a profit out of them. If we were to allow free trade, prices would at once be inflated to fantastic levels, levels beyond the reach of the vast majority of people.

That, comrades, is the situation, and that is why among the less educated people, exhausted as they are and worn out by starvation and suffering, there is a tendency, or an undefined feeling of resentment and anger against the comrades engaged in food supplies. They are all people who cannot think, cannot see further than the end of their noses, and it seems to them that food could be procured somehow. They have heard that there is food in some place or other, that somebody went there and got some—but they are incapable of calculating on a large scale whether there is enough for ten million people, and how much is required for such a number. It seems to them that someone is holding things up, that our food workers are putting obstacles in their way. They do not understand that the food workers are acting like wise and thrifty managers, saying that if you observe the utmost stringency and the utmost organisation, you shall at best, at the very best, be able to maintain a standard that will keep you from starvation, even if it does fall short of sufficiency. This is the position the country is in for we have been cut off from the chief food-supplying centres—Siberia and the Donets region; we have been cut off from fuel and raw material, food for the population and for industry, without which the country is forced to suffer the most desperate agonies.

The food workers are acting like sensible managers. They say we must stick together, which is the only way we can keep going; we must take systematic action against all attempts by individuals acting for themselves only, willing to pay any price to fill their own belly, and who do not give a hang for anything else. We must not think and act individually, each for himself, for that spells ruin. We must combat such tendencies and habits, which have been fostered in all of us, in the millions of working people, by capitalist private enterprise, by the system of working for the market: "I shall sell and make my bit; the more I make the less I shall starve, and the more others will." That is the accursed legacy of private property, which left

the people to starve even when there was enough food in the country, when a measly minority grew rich both on wealth and on poverty, while the people lived in want and perished in the war. That, comrades, is the position with regard to our food policy. That is the economic law which says that when there is a food shortage, frantic profiteering is engendered by every step towards what is called free trade. That is why all talk about free trade, all attempts to encourage it are utterly pernicious and are a retreat, a step back from that socialist constructive work which the Food Commissariat is doing amidst incredible difficulties in a fight against millions of profiteers, whom we have inherited from capitalism with its old petty-bourgeois, private-property maxim: "Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost." If we cannot root out this evil, we shall never build socialism.

Only unity, only the closest alliance, achieved in everyday life, in everyday work, where it is hardest of all to achieve—in dividing up a crust of bread when bread is short—will allow us really to build socialism. We know that this cannot be accomplished in a single year, that people who have suffered so long from hunger are tremendously impatient and demand that at least from time to time we retreat from this only correct food policy. And we do have to retreat from it now and then; but we shall not desert or depart from our policy as a whole.

That, comrades, was the situation six months ago, when the food crisis reached its climax, when we had no stocks at all, when the Czech victories had robbed us of the greater part of the Volga region. We had to consent to the pood and a half.[156] This measure cost us a big fight, a sharp fight—both sides were in a very bad state. The food workers said: "Yes, things are grim, but we must not make them worse. By giving relief to a few for a week, we will be making things worse for the millions." Others said: "You are demanding ideal organisation from people who are exhausted and starving; you are demanding the impossible; you must allow some relief, even if it spoils the general policy for a while. This measure will bring new courage, and that is the main thing." That was the plight we were in when we proposed the pood and a half idea. We kept to the general,

fundamental, radical line, but when the position became unbearable, we had to retreat from it to afford at least some temporary relief and preserve the people's courage and morale.

The same thing is happening now, when we are on the border line, when six comparatively easy months are behind us and six hard months are about to begin. To make this clear, let me tell you that during the first half of 1918 the Food Commissariat procured 28,000,000 poods, and during the second half 67,000,000 poods, that is, two and a half times as much. So you can clearly see that the first half-year is one of particularly dire and acute want, whereas the second, owing to the harvest, offers an opportunity of improvement. Now, in 1919, the success of our food organisations, thanks chiefly to the Poor Peasants' Committees in the countryside and the workers' food inspectors in the towns is immense and has enabled us to procure two and a half times as much grain. But the success of the first year of our work, when a new edifice had to be built and new methods tested, was not and could not have been enough to ensure us supplies for the whole year, although it afforded us a six-month respite. That respite is coming to an end, and another six months are beginning, the most difficult and hardest of all. We must bring all our resources into play to help the workers, to secure them a short respite, to improve their position in every way we can. And it is only natural that the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet and its Chairman, Kamenev, should have been so insistent that we lay down our policy as clearly as possible and make a clear-cut division between monopoly and non-monopoly foodstuffs, which would enable us to attain certain results, if only for a time, so that the workers in the towns and the non-agricultural areas might get at least some slight relief and gain new courage and energy. These are particularly necessary just now, when we are on the eve of these difficult six months, but when there are signs that the forces in the imperialist camp and their attacks on us are slacking off.

Comrade Kamenev, it is true, has mentioned not only signs but facts to show that, in spite of the severe trials and reverses we suffered at Perm, the Red Army is being built on a firm foundation, that it can and will win. The

coming six months, however, will be very difficult, and from the very outset we must therefore do whatever is necessary and possible to alleviate the situation and lay down a clear-cut food policy. That is our most urgent task. There was a conflict over the pood and a half idea among us, the Communists, and it sometimes assumed acute forms. But it has not weakened us. Rather, it has led us to examine our policy in an even more critical and cautious way. There may be mutual recriminations, but we are arriving at a decision which is being adopted rapidly and unanimously, and which, at this difficult juncture, when we are beginning another and trying six months, demands that we once more clarify for ourselves the reason why a situation has arisen which compels us once more to muster all our strength and strain every nerve.

We have had an exceptionally hard year, and we are now on the verge of an even harder six months. But every six months since the German revolution and since the beginning of ferment in Britain and France brings us nearer to the victory not only of the Russian revolution, but of the world revolution as well. That is the situation as it now stands. We have decided to present a draft of the fundamental principles of food policy, which we shall request the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to affirm, so that it may be immediately embodied by the food workers in appropriate decrees that will enable us, those in the centre, the workers of the towns and the non-agricultural areas, to multiply our efforts once more. For in our efforts alone lies the pledge that we shall win, that, though we make certain temporary concessions, necessitated by fatigue and famine, we shall uphold the fundamental principles of our communist food policy and preserve them intact until the time comes when the victory of communism will be complete and world-wide. I shall now read, clause by clause, the motion which the Communist group on the All-Russia Central Executive Committee submits for its consideration:

This joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the All-Russia Trade Union Congress, the Moscow Soviet, and representatives of factory committees and trade unions of the city of Moscow hereby lays down the following fundamental principles of food policy and instructs the People's Commissariat of Food to draw up forthwith decrees embodying these principles.

1. The Soviet food policy is confirmed as correct and unassailable, this policy consisting in:

(a) registration and state distribution on the class principle;

(b) monopoly of the principal foodstuffs;

(c) transfer of supply from private hands to state hands.

2. Unless the state monopoly of the chief items of food (bread, sugar, tea and salt) already decreed is strictly enforced, and unless mass procurements of other of the more important foodstuffs (meat, sea-fish, hemp, sunflower-seed and linseed oil, animal fats, except butter, and potatoes) are made by the state at fixed prices, it will be impossible to ensure a regular supply of food to the population under present conditions. Furthermore, such mass procurements at fixed prices are only a preliminary measure, in preparation for a state monopoly of these foodstuffs, too, which will be the next task of the Food Commissariat to introduce.

The procurement and transportation of all foodstuffs enumerated in this clause, with the exception of potatoes, are forbidden to all but the state food bodies. The right to mass procurement of potatoes at the established fixed prices shall, in addition to state bodies, be granted also to workers' organisations, trade unions and co-operative societies.

3. As a temporary measure, workers' organisations and co-operative societies shall be granted the right to procure all foodstuffs other than those enumerated in Clause 2.

4. The local food bodies are hereby compelled to assist the food-procuring organisations in the exercise of this right.

From the standpoint of old habits and the old idea of government, the use of the word "compelled" may surprise you. You may perhaps say: "Can things be so bad in the Soviet Republic that people have to be compelled to obey the will of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee?" Yes, we have to compel, and it is better to say so frankly than to hide our heads under our wing and pretend everything is going swimmingly. Just let our comrades, the representatives of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the delegates at the All-Russia Trade Union Congress, give good thought to what they say among themselves. Let them give a thought to whether they are properly carrying out everything decreed long ago concerning the proper registration of foodstuffs and the full delivery to the state of those foodstuffs which cannot be left for commodity exchange purposes. When there is no commodity exchange the peasants say: "No, you'll get nothing from us for your Kerensky money." If you give a thought to what you say in private among yourselves and bear in mind how many of the orders of the central authorities remain unful-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

filled, you must admit it is better to tell the truth and say that our local bodies have to be compelled, firmly and ruthlessly. (*Applause.*) At this meeting, in which the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, as our supreme body, has come together with the All-Russia Trade Union Congress bodies, which have the most numerous representation—and that just now is the main thing—these most influential comrades must firmly say, and make it known in their localities, that the local bodies must get accustomed to the idea that we have to compel them to carry out the policy of the central authorities consistently. That is very difficult, and it is natural that many millions of people, who are accustomed to looking on the central authorities as robbers, landowners, exploiters, can have no trust in the centre. But this distrust must be overcome. Socialism cannot be built if it is not, for that means building a centralised economic system, an economic system directed from the centre, and that can only be done by the proletariat, which has been trained in this spirit by the factory and by its whole mode of life. Only the proletariat can do this. The fight against parochial tendencies, against the habits of the small property-owner, is a difficult one. We know this cannot be done all at once, but we shall never tire of urging the workers to reiterate this truth and put it into practice, for socialism cannot be built otherwise.

Clause 4 explains further:

> The transportation and marketing of these foodstuffs shall be absolutely unrestricted. No pickets, cordons, guards, etc., shall have the right to prevent the unrestricted transportation and sale of the said foodstuffs in bazaars or markets, from carts, etc.

This point is particularly important. Comrade Kamenev has mentioned many things here which, naturally, in the haste of our work, we have not carried out; our Food and other Commissariats have to issue one order on top of another, with the result that our local bodies find it very difficult to get them all straight. We are accused of issuing decrees too hastily; but what are we to do when we have to make haste because of the advance of imperialism, when we are compelled to make haste by the strongest scourge imaginable—the lack of bread and fuel. This being so, we must use every means to explain our tasks, to elucidate particular mistakes, and that is why the clear and precise demarcation

now achieved by this struggle is so important. To achieve this on a far larger scale we must now make sure that the local bodies do not act as if they are a law to themselves, that they do not dare to plead they remembered yesterday's decree but forgot today's. We must make sure they know quite clearly and definitely which foodstuffs are a state monopoly, and which are open to unrestricted transportation and sale—that is everything except what is specifically enumerated in clauses 1 and 2. Let this be made generally known. Let those who are now about to return home convey it to the localities. Let them do what their official position requires of them. Let them take along with them copies of the decrees that will be drawn up on the subject, so that these may be implicitly obeyed and carried out in the localities, so that the orders of the centre may really be carried out, and the former indecision stopped.

Further, the end of Clause 4 reads:

Note. With respect to eggs and butter, this decision shall apply only to districts where mass procurements of eggs and butter are not made by the Food Commissariat.

Comrades, I am now going to read the remaining clauses of the decree in brief. As I am unable to go into detail, and as there is no need to do so since several other comrades, some of them better qualified than myself, will speak after me, I shall only stress what I consider most important. I shall read only the basic principles which we recommend the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to adopt and instruct the Council of People's Commissars and all other authorities of the Soviet Republic to embody in decrees and carry out unreservedly and implicitly. (*Applause.*)

5. With a view to increasing procurements, and to the more efficient performance of individual tasks, the principle of surplus appropriation and procurement shall be extended to non-monopoly foodstuffs, and a bonus system introduced for co-operative and other organisations engaged in procuring both monopoly and non-monopoly produce for the state.

Measures of organisation for introducing fresh forces into the food bodies and for the wider participation of workers:

(a) Workers' food inspectors shall be widely utilised and their functions extended to include control over the way the December 10 decrees are observed by the food bodies, and over the procurement of non-monopoly foodstuffs;

(b) Workers' inspection shall be introduced at the earliest possible date in all food bodies in the localities and extended to the Food Commissariat departments, with the object of vigorously combating bureaucracy and red tape;

(c) Connections with the workers' organisations—trade unions and workers' co-operative societies—shall be strengthened by reinforcing the local bodies with active members of the aforesaid organisations;

(d) A system of workers' trainees shall be introduced in all central and local bodies and institutions in order to train workers as practical specialists in food affairs capable of filling responsible posts.

6. The co-operative apparatus shall be employed to the full in the work of procurement and distribution. Responsible representatives of the state supply bodies shall be appointed to the co-operative societies to control the activities of the co-operative organisations and coordinate them with the government's food policy.

That, incidentally, is one of the ways of fighting the top people in the co-operatives. But it would be a great mistake and positively fatal to scorn the entire co-operative apparatus, to reject it out of hand or in a contemptuous way, saying: "We shall build ourselves a new one; this is no business of ours, this is something for Communists only." We must make use of the machinery ready at hand—we cannot build socialism unless we utilise what capitalism has left us. We must utilise everything in the way of cultural values capitalism created against our interests. Therein lies the difficulty of socialism, that it has to be built of materials made by our adversaries; but therein lies the only possibility for socialism. We all know this theoretically, and now that we have got over this year, we have seen in practice that socialism can only be built from what capitalism has created against our interests, and that we must employ all this to build and consolidate socialism.

Clause 7 reads:

7. Supervision to ensure the proper observance of the regulations governing the transportation of foodstuffs and the strict enforcement of the monopolies shall devolve on the workers, aided by armed detachments formed by the Food Commissariat.

All food pickets other than the teams of the Food Commissariat and the Gubernia Food Committees shall be withdrawn immediately. The teams of the Food Commissariat and the Gubernia Food Committees shall be withdrawn as and when the respective bodies of workers' inspectors are formed in the localities.

My time is up, comrades, and I shall only point out that here, in these last clauses, we find the main principles

underlying our food policy and Soviet policy in general. I have already said that hard times have come, that a more drastic six months has begun, that the respite in food difficulties is over and a most difficult period has commenced. Every time the Soviet government encounters difficulties in the extremely difficult job of building socialism, it knows only one way to overcome them, and that is to turn to the workers, to wider and wider sections of the workers every time. I have already said socialism can be built only when ten and a hundred times more people themselves begin to build the state and the new economic life. Our food workers have, as their reports show, already got to a stage where no less than one-third of the members of the district food committees are workers, chiefly workers from Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk—the flower of our proletarian army. That is good, but it is not enough. What we need is two-thirds, and we must go on working for it. As you know, the advanced sections of the workers have already set about governing the state, building a new life. We know we must reach down deeper and more boldly enlist new sections. They still lack training, they will inevitably make mistakes, but we are not afraid of that. We know that in this way we shall get young trained workers and recompense errors a hundredfold by securing scores of younger and fresher forces. There is no other source we can draw on. We must move ahead all the time, take our young workers from wherever we can and put them in more and more responsible posts.

The present food crisis is due to the fact that a more difficult six months has begun. It is also due to the state of transport. As I have already said, in the second half of 1918 we procured 67,500,000 poods. But we were unable to get out 20,000,000 of this amount. The latest severe crisis in Petrograd is due to the fact that our stocks are held up on the Volga-Bugulma Railway, and we cannot move them out. The railways are in a desperate state. The rolling stock is in a dreadful state, because no country has suffered so badly as Russia owing to her prevailing backwardness, and because the rail workers are not so well organised. I would ask you, on leaving this meeting, to make the people aware of our need for numerous workers for food organisation and

the railways, who would help us with their experience. Give them a job, keep an eye on the novices, and they will do a lot more than the old organisations. Everybody on food and transport work! Let every organisation, no matter which branch it belongs to, review all its forces and ask itself whether it has taken enough men, whether it has done all it should in the way of sending commissars, as we send them for the army. The workers are suffering from lack of food. We must put our best people on the job, appoint them all to responsible military, food or transport posts. Everybody can be of use here, even if he is not an expert. On the railways it is sometimes the aid of a Party comrade that is required, the influence of an ideologically staunch proletarian who has had his schooling and will influence the less proletarian sections of railway employees by control and supervision. Comrades, I once more repeat the slogan: "Everybody on food and transport work!" We must do what we did in the army, where we sent our political commissars and achieved the tasks we set ourselves. I am sure we shall this time, too, in these difficult six months, conquer famine and devastation!

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SPEECH AT THE MOSCOW CITY CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) JANUARY 18, 1919[157]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

As far as I can see from the resolutions, from the two drafts submitted after the discussion on the relations between centre and districts—the first for improving Soviet affairs, and the second for completely reconstructing the Soviet apparatus—the second, contained in the motion of a group of comrades, gives the impression that something is lacking, inasmuch as no definite grounds exist for the change in the Soviet apparatus proposed in this resolution.

Our enemy today is bureaucracy and profiteering. We cannot see the improvements for the devastation. But the devastation can be overcome only by centralisation, by foregoing purely local interests. It looks like it is these interests that have given rise to the opposition to centralism, which, nevertheless, is the only way out of our present predicament. The group of comrades who submitted this resolution are abandoning centralism for the quagmire of localism.

The districts appear to be dissatisfied because certain decisions of the central Soviet authorities are being taken without consulting them. If that is so, the districts have every right to convene conferences to discuss all questions in which they are interested. We are being ground down by red tape, which is very difficult to cope with. It has to be vigorously fought, and more workingmen have to be appointed to government offices. But when the attack on red tape is directed to the wrong quarter, things become very dangerous, as, for example, in relation to

specialists. The reason we are in a bad way is not because we have got a lot of specialists, but because we have not got strict centralisation. There are fields of Soviet work which suffer from a shortage of specialists. We must appoint more workers of average qualifications to the government offices, who would learn their jobs from the specialists and be able to replace them eventually and do the practical work independently. Thus, it is evident that the theses submitted by Comrade Ignatov do not say what these comrades really want. The attack is being levied at the wrong quarter.

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the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF INTERNATIONALIST TEACHERS[158] JANUARY 18, 1919

(*Stormy applause passing into ovation.*) Comrades, greetings to your Congress on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. The teachers are now faced with tasks of the highest importance. I hope that after the year we have just been through, after a year of struggle, after what has taken place in international affairs, the struggle that has been going on among the teachers—between those who took their stand from the very first with the Soviet government to work for the socialist revolution, and those who have so far stood by the old system, by the old prejudices that teaching can continue to be based on the old system—must come to an end, and is in fact coming to an end. There can be no doubt that the vast majority of teachers, who stand close to the working class and the working peasants, are now convinced that the socialist revolution is deeply rooted and is inevitably spreading all over the world. And I think that now the vast majority of teachers will quite sincerely come over to the side of the government of working and exploited people in the struggle for the socialist revolution and against those teachers who still stand by the old bourgeois prejudices, the old system and hypocrisies, and imagine that some part of that system can be salvaged.

One of these bourgeois hypocrisies is the belief that the school can stand aloof from politics. You know very well how false this belief is. The bourgeoisie themselves, who advocated this principle, made their own bourgeois politics the cornerstone of the school system, and tried to reduce

schooling to the training of docile and efficient servants of the bourgeoisie, to reduce even universal education from top to bottom to the training of docile and efficient servants of the bourgeoisie, of slaves and tools of capital. They never gave a thought to making the school a means of developing the human personality. And now it is clear to all that this can be done only by socialist schools, which have inseparable bonds with all the working and exploited people and wholeheartedly support Soviet policy.

Of course, the reconstruction of education is no easy matter. And, naturally, mistakes have been and still are being made, as are attempts to misinterpret the principle of the ties between education and politics and to give it a crude and distorted meaning. Awkward attempts are being made to put politics into the minds of the younger generation when they have not been prepared enough for it. Undoubtedly, we shall always have to combat such crude applications of this basic principle. But today the chief task of those members of the teaching profession who have sided with the International and the Soviet government is to work for the creation of a wider and, as nearly as possible, an all-embracing teachers' union.

There is no place in your union, the union of internationalists, for the old teachers' union, which clung to bourgeois prejudices and revealed a lack of understanding. It has been fighting longest of all to uphold these privileges, longer even than other top unions, which were formed at the very beginning of the 1917 revolution and which we combated in all spheres of life. In my opinion, your internationalist union may very well become a single schoolteachers' trade union, siding, like all the other trade unions—as has been very clearly shown by the Second All-Russia Trade Union Congress—with Soviet government policy. The task facing the teachers is immense. They have to combat the survivals of the slackness and disunity left by the last revolution.

Next, as regards propaganda and agitation. It is only natural that disunity should still prevail in every sphere of propaganda and education when we consider the lack of confidence in the teachers caused by the sabotage and prejudices of the bourgeois section of the teaching body,

who are accustomed to thinking that only the rich are entitled to real education, while the majority of the working people need only be trained to be good servants and good workers, but not real masters of life. This condemns a section of the teachers to a narrow sphere, the sphere of pseudo-education, and has prevented us from properly creating a single apparatus in which all scholastic forces would merge and collaborate with us. We shall only succeed when we discard the old bourgeois prejudices. This is where it is your union's task to draw the broad mass of teachers into your family, to educate the most backward sections of the teaching profession, to bring them under general proletarian policy, and weld them together into one common organisation.

In trade union organisation, the teachers have a big job on their hands with our country in its present predicament, when all the issues of the Civil War are becoming quite clear, and when the petty-bourgeois democratic people are being compelled by the logic of events to come over to the Soviet government. For they have seen for themselves that any other course will, whether they like it or not, drive them towards defending the whiteguards and international imperialism. Now that the whole world is faced with one cardinal task, the issue is: either extreme reaction, military dictatorship and shootings—of which we have had striking illustrations from Berlin—either this vicious reaction from the capitalist brutes who feel they will not go unpunished for these four years of war, and are therefore prepared to go to any lengths, to go on drenching the earth in the blood of the working people, or the complete victory of the working people in a socialist revolution. Today there can be no middle course. Hence, those teachers who sided with the International from the very first, and who now clearly perceive that their opponents among the teachers of the other camp cannot put up any serious resistance, must launch into far wider activities. Your union should now become a broad teachers' trade union embracing vast numbers of teachers, a union which will resolutely stand by Soviet policy and the struggle for socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This is the formula adopted by the Second Trade Union Congress now in session. The Congress demands that every-

one engaged in a given trade, in a given sphere of activity, should join a single union. At the same time it declares that the trade union movement cannot hold aloof from the fundamental tasks of the struggle for the emancipation of labour from capital. And, consequently, only those unions which recognise the revolutionary class struggle for socialism by the dictatorship of the proletariat can be full and equal members of the trade unions. Your union is a union of this kind. If you stand by that position, you will be sure of success in winning over the greater bulk of the teachers and in working to make knowledge and science no longer something for the privileged, no longer a medium for reinforcing the position of the rich and exploiters, but a weapon for the emancipation of the working and exploited people. Allow me to wish you every success in this endeavour.

Short report published in *Izvestia* No. 13, January 19, 1919

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SPEECH AT A PROTEST RALLY FOLLOWING THE MURDER OF KARL LIEBKNECHT AND ROSA LUXEMBURG JANUARY 19, 1919[159]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Today the bourgeoisie and the social-traitors are jubilating in Berlin—they have succeeded in murdering Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Ebert and Scheidemann, who for four years led the workers to the slaughter for the sake of depredation, have now assumed the role of butchers of the proletarian leaders. The example of the German revolution proves that "democracy" is only a camouflage for bourgeois robbery and the most savage violence.

Death to the butchers!

Pravda No. 14,
January 21, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

REPORT AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA TRADE UNION CONGRESS[160] JANUARY 20, 1919

(*Stormy, prolonged applause.*) Comrades, owing to a slight indisposition, I must first ask you to excuse me for having to confine myself today to only a few remarks on the question now put before you—the tasks of the trade unions.

The resolution now before you has been submitted to the Trade Union Congress by the Communist group, which has given it thorough deliberation. As the resolution has already been printed, I presume that all present are acquainted with it, and I shall therefore dwell only on two main points, which in my opinion are the most significant of those dealt with, generally speaking, in this resolution.

I think that the first of these points, a negative one, so to speak, is the statement regarding the slogan of unity or independence of the trade union movement. Clause 3 of the resolution refers to this slogan, saying that in practice it has led the groups behind this slogan to an open struggle against the Soviet government, and that this attempt has placed them outside the bounds of the working class.

This notorious independence slogan deserves attention, I think, from more than the trade union standpoint. In my opinion, only if we realise that the independence slogan is self-deception for some people and plain deception for others, can the struggle over the issue of dictatorship of the proletariat or dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, which is now going on all over the world and which is obviously coming to a head with fantastic speed, be properly understood and properly reckoned with, and enable the working class,

its class-conscious representatives, to take a proper part in this struggle. First of all, I should like to point out, if only briefly, how false this slogan is theoretically, and how open it is to criticism from the theoretical point of view.

What has lately happened in Germany, the brutal and treacherous murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, is not merely the most dramatic and tragic event in the revolution beginning in Germany. It is something more. It sheds an extraordinarily vivid light on the way the problems of the present-day struggle are presented by the various trends of political thought and in the various theoretical systems of today. It was from Germany that we heard most talk, for example, on the celebrated subject of democracy, on the slogan of democracy in general, and on the slogan that the working class must be independent of government. These slogans may at first glance seem to be unconnected, but they are actually very closely connected. They are closely connected because they show how strong petty-bourgeois prejudices are to this day, despite the proletariat's immense experience of the class struggle; how to this day often lip service is paid to the class struggle which is not recognised by the minds or hearts of those who talk about it. Indeed, if we recall even the rudiments of political economy as we learnt it from Marx's *Capital*, that theory of the class struggle by which we all firmly stand, how can there be any talk of democracy in general or independence when the struggle has grown as acute and far-flung as it is today, when it is clear that the socialist revolution is facing the whole world, and when this has been palpably demonstrated in the most democratic countries? Whoever thinks there can shows that, as far as the theory of political economy is concerned, he has not understood a single page of Marx's *Capital*, by which all socialists without exception now swear.

But, as a matter of fact, although they swear by this work, now that they are on the verge of that cardinal struggle to which Marx's *Capital* led, they retreat from this class struggle and imagine there can be an extra-class or above-class democracy. They imagine that in modern society, while the capitalists still retain their property, there can be a democracy other than bourgeois democracy, that is,

other than a bourgeois dictatorship masked by false and hypocritical democratic labels. It was from this very Germany that we recently heard voices saying that over there the dictatorship of the proletariat, possibly, in fact most probably, would not transcend the bounds of democracy, that there democracy would remain. It was there that people who claim to be teachers of Marxism, people who from 1889 to 1914 were the ideologists of the entire Second International, people like Kautsky, unfurled the banner of democracy and failed to understand that as long as property remains in the hands of the capitalists democracy is nothing but a thoroughly hypocritical cover for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. They failed to understand that there cannot be any serious question of the emancipation of labour from capital as long as this hypocritical cover is not torn away. Not as long as we do not put the question as Marx always taught us to put it, and as we have been taught to put it by the proletariat's day-to-day struggle, by every strike and by every acute turn in the trade union struggle—namely, that while property remains in the hands of the capitalists, all democracy will be nothing but a hypocritical cover for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. All talk about universal suffrage, about the popular will and about equality at the polls will be a sheer fraud, for there can be no equality between the exploiter and the exploited, between the owner of capital and property and the modern wage-slave.

Of course, compared with tsarism, absolutism, monarchy and all feudal survivals, bourgeois democracy historically denotes immense progress. Of course, we shall have to utilise it. And until the time comes for the struggle of the working class for full power it is incumbent on us to make use of the forms of bourgeois democracy. But the fact is that we have now arrived at this decisive moment of the struggle internationally. For the issue now is whether the capitalists can maintain their power over the means of production and, above all, their ownership of the implements of production. And this means they are preparing for new wars. The imperialist war has quite clearly demonstrated how capitalist property is connected with that slaughter of the nations, how it led up to it irresistibly and inexorably. But that being so, all talk of democracy

expressing the popular will is obviously sheer deception, nothing but the privilege of the capitalists and the rich to dupe the more backward sections of the working people both through their press, which remains in the hands of the property-owners, and by all other means of political influence.

There is and can be only one alternative: either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, disguised by constituent assemblies, all kinds of voting systems, democracy and similar bourgeois frauds that are used to blind fools, and that only people who have become utter renegades from Marxism and socialism all along the line can make play of today—or the dictatorship of the proletariat for suppressing with an iron hand the bourgeoisie, who are inciting the most backward elements against the finest leaders of the world proletariat. This dictatorship means the victory of the proletariat for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie, who are now putting up a most desperate resistance, which gets all the more furious the more clearly the bourgeoisie perceive that it is the people that have raised this issue. Previously, in the vast majority of cases, they regarded dissatisfaction and indignation among the workers as only a temporary expression of discontent. That, in fact, is the way the matter is quite often regarded to this day by the British capitalists, for example, who are perhaps the most experienced in deceiving the workers politically, and politically the best trained and the best organised. They realise that the war has, of course, led to discontent, and that this discontent inevitably gives rise and will continue to give rise to unrest among the workers. But, they argue, the workers have not yet said who is to head the state, who is to hold state power, and whether the capitalists are to be allowed to retain their property. But events have shown that this is undoubtedly a pressing issue not only in Russia, but in a number of West-European countries as well, and, what is more, not only in countries which took part in the war, but in neutral countries, too, which have suffered relatively little, such as Switzerland and Holland.

The bourgeoisie have above all been brought up, and have trained the people, in the spirit of bourgeois parliamentarism. Yet it has become perfectly clear that a Soviet

movement, a movement for Soviet government, has been ripening among the people. The Soviet movement has ceased to be a Russian form of the power of the proletariat; it has become the policy of the international proletariat in its struggle for power. It has become the second step in the world-wide development of the socialist revolution. The first step was the Paris Commune, which showed that the working class cannot arrive at socialism except by way of dictatorship, by the forcible suppression of the exploiters. That is the first thing the Paris Commune showed, namely, that the working class cannot get to socialism via the old, bourgeois-democratic parliamentary state, but only via a new type of state, which will smash both parliamentarism and the bureaucracy from top to bottom.

The second step from the point of view of the world-wide development of the socialist revolution was the Soviet government. It was at first considered a purely Russian phenomenon—as it might well have been, and was in fact bound to have been when judged only by the facts. But today events have shown that it is also the international form of the struggle of the proletariat. The wars which have reshuffled the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses have furnished them with a new form of organisation which is patently in direct opposition to rapacious imperialism, to the capitalist class and its fabulous profits, profits without precedent before the war. The wars have everywhere created these new mass fighting organisations, organisations of the proletariat for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie.

Not everybody realised that this in fact was what the Soviets signified when they came into being. Not everybody realises it even today. But to us the picture could not be clearer for we saw the germs of these Soviets in 1905 and, after the February Revolution of 1917, we witnessed a long period of hesitation and vacillation between the Soviet organisation of the people and the compromising, treacherous, petty-bourgeois ideology. It lies before us as though in the palm of our hand, and it is with this picture in mind—and knowing the way the struggle of the proletariat against capitalist property for state power has developed and is growing wider and deeper every day—that we approach

the matter. And knowing this, what is the sense of all the references to democracy and all talk about "independence" and suchlike, which are constantly tending towards some classless position? We know that in capitalist society it is the bourgeoisie that rule, that capitalist society in fact arises from the bourgeoisie's political and economic power. Either the power of the proletariat or dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, there is no middle course on issues of any seriousness for any length of time. And anyone who talks about independence, about democracy in general, consciously or unconsciously presupposes something intermediate, something standing between classes or above classes. In every case that is self-deception or deception of others. It serves to conceal the fact that as long as capitalist power remains, as long as the capitalists retain the ownership of the means of production, democracy may be broad or narrow, more or less civilised, and so on and so forth, but it actually remains dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and all the more obviously and palpably does civil war spurt from every big contradiction.

The nearer the French political forms are to democracy, the more easily something like the Dreyfus case causes civil war. The broader democracy is in America, with its proletariat, its internationalists, and even pure pacifists, the more easily cases of lynching and outbreaks of civil war arise. The meaning of this is even clearer now, when the first-week of bourgeois freedom, of democracy, in Germany has led to a most frenzied outbreak of civil war, far more acute and far more desperate than in our country.

And whoever judges these outbreaks from the point of view of whether proceedings were brought by parties, whoever judges them simply from the point of view of the murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, reveals blindness and intellectual cowardice, refusing to understand that these are outbreaks of an irresistible civil war, a war that springs irresistibly from all the contradictions of capitalism. There is not and cannot be any middle course. All talk of independence or democracy in general, no matter what sauce it may be served up with, is a sheer fraud and a downright betrayal of socialism. And if the theoretical propaganda of the Bolsheviks, who are now the virtual founders of the

International, if the theoretical teaching of the Bolsheviks on civil war did not reach very far and was all too often halted by obstacles of censorship and the military barrages of the imperialist states, today it is no longer the teaching, no longer the theory, but the facts of civil war that are becoming all the more violent the older the democracy of the West-European states and the longer it has lasted. These facts will pierce even the hardest and most obtuse skulls. The people who talk about democracy in general, about independence, may now be called fossils.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the difficult conditions of the struggle in which the trade union movement of Russia has so recently arisen and grown up—and it has now almost reached full growth—we must, in passing, glance back and recall recent events. Such recollections and reminders are, I think, all the more necessary since the trade union movement, as such, is having to undergo a particularly abrupt change now that world-wide socialist revolution has begun.

It was in the trade union movement especially that the ideologists of the bourgeoisie tried to fish in troubled waters. They endeavoured to make the economic struggle, which is the basis of the trade union movement, independent of the political struggle. But now, precisely now, especially after the political revolution, which has transferred power to the proletariat, the time has come for the trade unions, as the broadest organisation of the proletariat on a class scale, to play a very great role, to take the centre of the political stage, to become, in a sense, the chief political organ. For all the old concepts and categories of politics have been upset and reversed by the political revolution which has turned power over to the proletariat. The old state, even the best and most democratic bourgeois republics, was never, I repeat, and never could be, anything but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, that is, of those who own the factories, the implements of production, the land, the railways—in a word, all the material means, all the instruments of labour, without the possession of which labour remains in slavery.

That is why, when political power passed into the proletariat's hands the trade unions had increasingly to take on the tasks of builders of working-class politics, the task

of people whose class organisation was to replace the old exploiting class after upsetting all the old traditions and prejudices of the old science which, in the words of one scholar, told the proletariat: "You look after your economic affairs and the party of the bourgeoisie will look after politics." All these ideas have proved to be a direct weapon in the hands of the exploiting class and its thugs for keeping down the proletariat, which is beginning to revolt and struggle everywhere.

And here the trade unions must take up an entirely new question in their state organisation work—the question of "governmentalising" the trade unions, as it is termed in the Communist group's resolution. In this connection the trade unions must give very serious thought to the profound and famous words of the founders of modern communism to the effect that "the broader and deeper the revolution going on in society, the larger should be the number of people who make the revolution, who are its makers in the true sense of the word".[161] Take the old society of the feudal nobility. There revolutions were absurdly easy, as long as it was only a matter of taking power from one handful of nobles or feudal lords and turning it over to another. Take bourgeois society, which boasts of its universal suffrage. In actual fact, as we know, this universal suffrage, this whole machine, becomes a fraud, for even in the most advanced, cultured and democratic countries the overwhelming majority of the working people are downtrodden and crushed—crushed by the hell of capitalism, so that actually they do not and cannot take any part in politics.

Now for the first time in history a revolution has begun which can lead to the complete victory of socialism—provided only that new and large masses of people set about the work of governing independently. The socialist revolution does not imply a change in the form of state, not the replacement of a monarchy by a republic, nor new elections in which people are assumed to be absolutely "equal" but which are actually nothing but an artificial obfuscation, a screen for the fact that some own property and others do not. From the point of view of bourgeois society, once there is "democracy", and once capitalist and proletarian alike take part in the voting, this is the "popular will",

this is "equality" and an expression of the people's will. We know what an abominable fraud this talk is, which only serves as a cover for butchers and murderers like Ebert and Scheidemann. In bourgeois society, the mass of the working people are governed by the bourgeoisie with the help of more or less democratic forms. They are governed by a minority, the property-owners, those who have a share in capitalist property and who have turned education and science, that supreme bulwark and flower of capitalist civilisation, into an instrument of exploitation, into a monopoly, in order to keep the overwhelming majority of the people in slavery. The revolution we have begun and have been making for two years, and which we are firmly determined to carry through to the end (*applause*), is possible and feasible only provided we manage to transfer power to the new class, provided the bourgeoisie, the capitalist slaveowners, the bourgeois intellectuals, the representatives of all the owners and property-holders are replaced by the new class in all spheres of government, in all state affairs, in the entire business of running the new life, from top to bottom. (*Applause.*)

That is the task before us now. The socialist revolution can only be lasting when this new class learns, not from books, not from meetings or lectures, but from the practical work of government. Only when it enlists the vast mass of working people for this work, when it elaborates forms which will enable all working people to adapt themselves easily to the work of governing the state and establishing law and order. Only on this condition is the socialist revolution bound to be lasting. Given this condition, it will constitute a force which will brush away capitalism and all its survivals as easily as straw or dust.

From the class standpoint, generally speaking, that is the task before us as a condition for the victory of the socialist revolution. It is a task closely and directly associated with the tasks of those organisations which even under capitalist society worked for the broadest possible mass struggle to destroy that society. And of the organisations that then existed, the trade unions were the broadest. And now, while formally remaining independent organisations, they can and should, as one of the passages in the resolution

before you states, take an active part in the work of the Soviet government by directly working in all government bodies, by organising mass control over their activities, etc., and by setting up new bodies for the registration, control and regulation of all production and distribution, relying on the organised initiative of the broad mass of the interested working people themselves.

The trade unions have never embraced more than one-fifth of the wage-workers in capitalist society, even under the most favourable circumstances, even in the most advanced countries, after decades and sometimes even centuries of development of bourgeois-democratic civilisation and culture. Only a small upper section were members, and of them only a very few were lured over and bribed by the capitalists to take their place in capitalist society as workers' leaders. The American socialists called these people "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class". In that country of the freest bourgeois culture, in that most democratic of bourgeois republics, they saw most clearly the role played by this tiny upper section of the proletariat who had virtually entered the service of the bourgeoisie as its deputies, who were bribed and bought by it, and who came to form those groups of social-patriots and defence advocates of which Ebert and Scheidemann will always remain the perfect heroes.

In our country things are now different. The trade unions are in a position to start the economic development of the state on new lines, making use of everything created by capitalist culture and capitalist production. They can build socialism on that material basis, on that large-scale industry, whose burden used to weigh on us, which was created against our interests, was made for the endless oppression of the working people, but which united and welded them, and thus created the vanguard of the new society. And since the October Revolution, since the transfer of power to the proletariat, this vanguard has begun to perform its real task—to educate the working and exploited people, to enlist them in the work of governing the state and administering industry without officials, without the bourgeoisie and without capitalists. That is why the resolution we submit to you rejects all bourgeois plans and

all that treacherous talk. That is why it declares the governmentalisation of the trade unions to be unavoidable. It also takes a step forward. We are no longer raising the question of the governmentalisation of the trade unions merely in its theoretical aspect. We have, thank God, passed the stage when such questions were raised purely as subjects for theoretical discussion. We may even forget at times the days when we used to engage in such free discussions on purely theoretical themes. Those times have long since passed, and today we are raising these questions on the basis of a year's experience of the trade unions, which, in their role as organisers of production, have created such organisations as the Supreme Economic Council. In this incredibly difficult business, the trade unions have committed innumerable blunders, and constantly still are committing them, but they are not deterred by the malicious sneers of the bourgeoisie; who say the proletarians decided to do things themselves and are making a mess of it.

The bourgeoisie imagine they made no blunders when they took over from the tsar and the nobles. They imagine the 1861 Reform, which attempted to repair the edifice of serfdom, and left power and abundant sources of revenue in the hands of the serfowners, went off quite smoothly and that it was not followed by chaos in Russia for several decades. There is no country in the world in which the nobility did not scoff at the upstart bourgeoisie and commoners when they set out to govern the state.

It goes without saying that the entire flower, or, rather, sterile blossom, of the bourgeois intellectuals is now also scoffing at every mistake the new government is making, especially since the new class, the alliance of all working people, has had to make its revolution at a furious rate because of the frantic resistance of the exploiters and the campaign of the world alliance of exploiters against Russia—one of the weakest and least prepared of countries. We had to act under conditions in which we had to think not so much of making the course of revolution smooth, as of holding on as best we could until the West-European proletariat came to life. We have accomplished this task. In this respect, we can already say we have done far better than the men who made the French Revolution, which

was defeated by an alliance of monarchical and backward countries. The French Revolution, in the form of the power of the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie of that time, held on for a year only, and did not at once evoke a similar movement in other countries. Nevertheless, it did so much for the bourgeoisie, for the bourgeois democracy, that the entire development of civilised humanity throughout the nineteenth century sprang from the great French Revolution, and was indebted to it for everything.

We have done much better. What was done in a year for the development of the bourgeois democracy at that time, we have done on a far larger scale for the new proletarian regime in about the same time. And we have done it so successfully that already now the movement in Russia, whose beginning was due to a special set of circumstances rather than any merit of ours, to special conditions that put Russia between two imperialist giants of the modern civilised world—that the effect of this movement and the victory of the Soviet system during the past year has been to make the movement international. The Communist International has been founded, the slogans and ideals of the old bourgeois democracy have been shattered, and today there is no intelligent politician anywhere in the world, whatever his party may be, who can fail to see that the world socialist revolution has begun, really is taking place. (*Applause.*)

I have digressed somewhat in speaking about how we have left the theoretical aspect of the question far behind and are now about to tackle its practical solution. We have had a year's experience, and we have already accomplished incomparably more for the victory of the proletariat and its revolution than was accomplished by a year's dictatorship of bourgeois democrats for the victory of bourgeois democracy all over the world at the end of the century before last. But, besides this, we have, during this year, acquired a vast amount of practical experience. This enables us, if not to calculate every one of our steps with absolute precision, at least to indicate the rate of development, its speed, to see its practical difficulties and take the practical steps which will lead from one partial victory in overthrowing the bourgeoisie to another.

Looking back, we can see the mistakes we have to correct. We can clearly see what we have to build and how we have to build in the future. That is why our resolution is not confined to proclaiming the governmentalisation of the trade unions, to proclaiming the dictatorship of the proletariat in principle and the need for us to proceed, as one passage in the resolution states, "inevitably to the fusion of the trade union organisations with state bodies". That we already know from theory, we outlined it before October, and we should have outlined it even sooner. But it is not enough. The whole crux of the question has changed for a party which is now about to tackle the practical job of building socialism, for trade unions which have already set up bodies to run industry on a countrywide, state scale, which have already formed a Supreme Economic Council, and which have at a cost of thousands of mistakes acquired thousands of useful bits of experience in organisation.

Today we can no longer confine ourselves to proclaiming the dictatorship of the proletariat. The trade unions have to be governmentalised; they have to be fused with state bodies. The work of building up large-scale industry has to be entrusted entirely to them. But all that is not enough.

We must also learn from our practical experience to determine the next immediate step. That is the essence of our task just now. And that is what the resolution has in mind when it says that if the trade unions were arbitrarily to attempt to take over government functions now, they would only make a mess of it. We have suffered enough from this sort of thing. We have fought hard enough against the survivals of the accursed bourgeois system, against the anarchistic and selfish tendencies of the small holder, which are so deeply ingrained even among the workers.

The workers were never separated by a Great Wall of China from the old society. And they have preserved a good deal of the traditional mentality of capitalist society. The workers are building a new society without themselves having become new people, or cleansed of the filth of the old world; they are still standing up to their knees in that filth. We can only dream of clearing the filth away. It would be utterly utopian to think this could be done all

at once. It would be so utopian that in practice it would only postpone socialism to kingdom come.

No, that is not the way we intend to build socialism. We are building while still standing on the soil of capitalist society, combating all those weaknesses and shortcomings which also affect the working people and which tend to drag the proletariat down. There are many old separatist habits and customs of the small holder in this struggle, and we still feel the effects of the old maxim: "Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost." There used to be quite enough of that in every trade union, in every factory, which often thought only of itself, and left everything else to the tender care of the Lord and our betters. We have been through all that, and know the cost. It has been the cause of so many mistakes, so many dreadful mistakes, that now, on the strength of that experience, we give our comrades a most emphatic warning against any arbitrary action in this field. Instead of building socialism, it would mean we had all succumbed to the weaknesses of capitalism.

We have now learnt to appreciate the difficulties of the task in front of us. We stand at the very heart of the work of building socialism, and in the interests of this cardinal work we are against all arbitrary actions. The class-conscious workers must be warned against arbitrary actions of this kind. They must be told that we cannot merge the trade unions with the state bodies at once, at one stroke. It would be a mistake. That is not the way to tackle the job.

We know that the proletariat has promoted several thousands, perhaps several tens of thousands of workers to state administration. We know that the new class—the proletariat—now has its representatives in every branch of state administration, in every section of the enterprises already socialised or about to be socialised, and in every branch of the economy. The proletariat knows this. It has set about the job practically. It can now see that we must continue along the same lines, that we shall have to take quite a number of steps more before we are in a position to say that the trade union organisations of the working people have definitely merged with the entire state

apparatus. That will be so when the workers completely take over the organs of suppression of one class over the other. And we are quite certain that will be so.

I now want to focus your attention on the next practical job. We must go on extending the participation of the working people in economic administration and in building a new economy. We shall never bring the work of communist construction to its completion unless we cope with this task; unless we convert the trade unions into organs for training ten times as many people as at present for direct participation in state administration. That we realise quite clearly. It is dealt with in our resolution, and it is a matter I want to direct your attention to particularly.

In this greatest revolution in history, when the proletariat has taken state power into its own hands, all the functions of the trade unions are undergoing a profound change. The trade unions are becoming the chief builders of the new society, for only the millions can build this society. In the era of serfdom these builders numbered hundreds; in the capitalist era the builders of the state numbered thousands and tens of thousands. The socialist revolution can be made only with the active and direct practical participation of tens of millions in state administration. That is our goal but we are not there yet.

The trade unions should know that there is a higher and more important task than those tasks which are partly still in force and partly have already lapsed, and which, at any rate, even if they are still in force, call only be minor ones in our eyes: registration, establishing work standards, amalgamation of organisations. This task is to teach the people the art of administration, not from books, not from lectures or meetings, but from practical experience, so that instead of just the vanguard of the proletariat which has been set to command and organise, more and more fresh blood may enter the departments, and this new section may be reinforced by ten others like it. This may seem an immense and difficult task. But it will not seem so overpowering if we stop to think how rapidly the experience of the revolution has enabled us to cope with the immense tasks that have cropped up since the October Revolution

and how the working people who had had no access to and no use for knowledge are now thirsting for it.

We shall find that we can cope with this task and teach vast numbers of working people how to run the state and industry. We shall discover we can develop practical activity, and shatter that pernicious prejudice which for decades and centuries has been implanted among the working people, namely, that state administration is the preserve of the privileged few, that it is a special art. That is not true. We shall inevitably make mistakes; but now every mistake will serve to teach, not handfuls of students taking some course of theory in state administration, but millions of working people who will personally suffer the consequences of every mistake. They will themselves see that they are faced with the urgent task of registering and distributing products, of increasing labour productivity, and will see from experience that power is in their own hands and that nobody will help them if they do not help themselves. That is the new mentality which is awakening in the working class. That is the new task of tremendous historical importance which faces the proletariat and which must, more than any other, strike root in the minds of trade unionists and the leaders of the trade union movement. They are not only trade unions. Today they are trade unions only to the extent that they are constituted within the only possible framework linked with the old capitalist system, and embrace the largest number of working people. But their task is to advance these millions and tens of millions of working people from simple to higher forms of activity, untiringly drawing new forces from the reserve of working people and advancing them to the most difficult tasks. In this way they will teach more and more people the art of state administration. It is their job to identify themselves with the struggle of the proletariat, which has established the dictatorship and is retaining it in the face of the whole world, every day winning over more industrial workers and socialists everywhere who only yesterday tolerated the orders of the social-traitors and social-defence advocates, but who are today coming more and more to accept the banner of communism and the Communist International.

Hold on to this banner, and at the same time steadily enlarge the ranks of the builders of socialism. Remember that the tasks of the trade unions are to build the new life and train millions and tens of millions, who will learn by experience not to make mistakes and will discard the old prejudices, who will learn by their own experience how to run the state and industry. That is the only sure guarantee that the cause of socialism will completely triumph, precluding any chance of a reversion to the past.

Newspaper reports published January 21, 1919 in *Economicheskaya Zhizn* No. 14 and in *Pravda* Nos. 15, 16, 17 for January 22, 24, 25

Published in 1921 in the book *Second All-Russia Trade Union Congress. Verbatim Report*

Published according to the book checked with the verbatim report and the newspaper texts

LETTER TO THE WORKERS OF EUROPE AND AMERICA[162]

Comrades, at the end of my letter to American workers dated August 20, 1918, I wrote that we are in a besieged fortress so long as the other armies of the world socialist revolution do not come to our aid. I added that the workers are breaking away from their social-traitors, the Gomperses and Renners. The workers are slowly but surely coming round to communist and Bolshevik tactics.

Less than five months have passed since those words were written, and it must be said that during this time, in view of the fact that workers of various countries have turned to communism and Bolshevism, the maturing of the world proletarian revolution has proceeded very rapidly.

Then, on August 20, 1918, only our Party, the Bolshevik Party, had resolutely broken with the old, Second International of 1889-1914 which so shamefully collapsed during the imperialist war of 1914-18. Only our Party had unreservedly taken the new path, from the socialists and social-democracy which had disgraced themselves by alliance with the predatory bourgeoisie, to communism; from petty-bourgeois reformism and opportunism, which had thoroughly permeated, and now permeate, the official Social-Democratic and socialist parties, to genuinely proletarian, revolutionary tactics.

Now, on January 12, 1919, we already see quite a number of communist proletarian parties, not only within the boundaries of the former tsarist empire—in Latvia, Finland and Poland, for example—but also in Western Europe—ustria, Hungary, Holland and, lastly, Germany. The *foundation* of a genuinely proletarian, genuinely interna-

tionalist, genuinely revolutionary Third International, the *Communist International*, became *a fact* when the German Spartacus League, with such world-known and world-famous leaders, with such staunch working-class champions as Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin and Franz Mehring, made a clean break with socialists like Scheidemann and Südekum, social-chauvinists (socialists in words, but chauvinists in deeds) who have earned eternal shame by their alliance with the predatory, imperialist German bourgeoisie and Wilhelm II. It became a fact when the Spartacus League changed its name to the Communist Party of Germany. Though it has not yet been officially inaugurated, the Third International actually exists.

No class-conscious worker, no sincere socialist can now fail to see how dastardly was the betrayal of socialism by those who, like the Mensheviks and "Socialist-Revolutionaries" in Russia, the Scheidemanns and Südekums in Germany, the Renaudels and Vanderveldes in France, the Hendersons and Webbs in Britain, and Gompers and Co. in America, supported "their" bourgeoisie in the 1914-18 war. That war fully exposed itself as an imperialist, reactionary, predatory war both on the part of Germany and on the part of the capitalists of Britain, France, Italy and America. The latter are now beginning to quarrel over the spoils, over the division of Turkey, Russia, the African and Polynesian colonies, the Balkans, and so on. The hypocritical phrases uttered by Wilson and his followers about "democracy" and "union of nations" are exposed with amazing rapidity when we see the capture of the left bank of the Rhine by the French bourgeoisie, the capture of Turkey (Syria, Mesopotamia) and part of Russia (Siberia, Archangel, Baku, Krasnovodsk, Ashkhabad, and so on) by the French, British and American capitalists, and the increasing animosity over the division of the spoils between Italy and France, France and Britain, Britain and America, America and Japan.

Beside the craven, half-hearted "socialists" who are thoroughly imbued with the prejudices of bourgeois democracy, who yesterday defended "their" imperialist governments and today limit themselves to platonic "protests" against military intervention in Russia—beside

these there is a growing number of people in the Allied countries who have taken the communist path, the path of Maclean, Debs, Loriot, Lazzari and Serrati. These are men who have realised that if imperialism is to be crushed and the victory of socialism and lasting peace ensured, the bourgeoisie must be overthrown, bourgeois parliaments abolished, and Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat established.

Then, on August 20, 1918, the proletarian revolution was confined to Russia, and "Soviet government", i.e., the system under which *all* state power is vested in Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, still seemed to be (and actually was) only a Russian institution.

Now, on January 12, 1919, we see a mighty "Soviet" movement not only in parts of the former tsarist empire, for example, in Latvia, Poland and the Ukraine, but also in West-European countries, in neutral countries (Switzerland, Holland and Norway) and in countries which have suffered from the war (Austria and Germany). The revolution in Germany—which is particularly important and characteristic as one of the most advanced capitalist countries—at once assumed "Soviet" forms. The whole course of the German revolution, and particularly the struggle of the Spartacists, i.e., the true and only representatives of the proletariat, against the alliance of those treacherous scoundrels, the Scheidemanns and Südekums, with the bourgeoisie—all this clearly shows how history has *formulated* the question in relation to Germany:

"Soviet power" or the bourgeois parliament, no matter under what signboard (such as "National" or "Constituent" Assembly) it may appear.

That is how *world history* has formulated the question. Now, this can and must be said without any exaggeration.

"Soviet power" is the second historical step, or stage, in the development of the proletarian dictatorship. The first step was the Paris Commune. The brilliant analysis of its nature and significance given by Marx in his *The Civil War in France* showed that the Commune had created a *new type* of state, a *proletarian state*. Every state, including the most democratic republic, is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one class by another. The proletarian

state is a machine for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. Such suppression is necessary because of the furious, desperate resistance put up by the landowners and capitalists, by the entire bourgeoisie and all their hangers-on, by all the exploiters, who stop at nothing when their overthrow, when the expropriation of the expropriators, begins.

The bourgeois parliament, even the most democratic in the most democratic republic, in which the property and rule of the capitalists are preserved, is a machine for the suppression of the working millions by small groups of exploiters. The socialists, the fighters for the emancipation of the working people from exploitation, had to utilise the bourgeois parliaments as a platform, as a base, for propaganda, agitation and organisation *as long as our struggle was confined to the framework of the bourgeois system*. Now that world history has brought up the question of destroying the whole of that system, of overthrowing and suppressing the exploiters, of passing from capitalism to socialism, it would be a shameful betrayal of the proletariat, deserting to its class enemy, the bourgeoisie, and being a traitor and a renegade to confine oneself to bourgeois parliamentarism, to bourgeois democracy, to present it as "democracy" in general, to obscure its *bourgeois* character, to forget that as long as capitalist property exists universal suffrage is an instrument of the bourgeois state.

The three trends in world socialism, about which the Bolshevik press has been speaking incessantly since 1915, stand out with particular distinctness today, against the background of the bloody struggle and civil war in Germany.

Karl Liebknecht is a name known to the workers of all countries. Everywhere, and particularly in the Allied countries, it is the symbol of a leader's devotion to the interests of the proletariat and loyalty to the socialist revolution. It is the symbol of really sincere, really self-sacrificing and ruthless struggle against capitalism. It is the symbol of uncompromising struggle against imperialism not in words, but in deeds, of self-sacrificing struggle precisely in the period when "one's own" country is flushed with imperialist victories. With Liebknecht and the Spartacists are all those German socialists who have remained

honest and really revolutionary, all the best and dedicated men among the proletariat, the exploited masses who are seething with indignation and among whom there is a growing readiness for revolution.

Against Liebknecht are the Scheidemanns, the Südekums and the whole gang of despicable lackeys of the Kaiser and the bourgeoisie. They are just as much traitors to socialism as the Gomperses and Victor Bergers, the Hendersons and Webbs, the Renaudels and Vanderveldes. They represent that top section of workers who have been bribed by the bourgeoisie, those whom we Bolsheviks called (applying the name to the Russian Südekums, the Mensheviks) "agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement", and to whom the best socialists in America gave the magnificently expressive and very fitting title: "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class". They represent *the latest*, "modern", *type* of socialist treachery, for in all the civilised, advanced countries the bourgeoisie rob—either by colonial oppression or by financially extracting "gain" from formally independent weak countries—they rob a population many times larger than that of "their own" country. This is the economic factor that enables the imperialist bourgeoisie to obtain superprofits, part of which is used to bribe the top section of the proletariat and convert it into a reformist, opportunist petty bourgeoisie that fears revolution.

Between the Spartacists and the Scheidemann men are the wavering, spineless "Kautskyites", who in words are "independent", but in deeds are entirely, and all along the line, *dependent* upon the bourgeoisie and the Scheidemann men one day, upon the Spartacists the next, some following the former and some the latter. These are people without ideas, without backbone, without policy, without honour, without conscience, the living embodiment of the bewilderment of philistines who stand for socialist revolution in words, but are actually incapable of understanding it when it has begun and, in renegade fashion, defend "democracy" in general, that is, *actually* defend *bourgeois* democracy.

In every capitalist country, every thinking worker will, in the situation varying with national and historical conditions, perceive these three main trends among the

socialists and among the syndicalists, for the imperialist war and the incipient world proletarian revolution engender identical ideological and political trends all over the world.

* * *

The foregoing lines were written before the brutal and dastardly murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg by the Ebert and Scheidemann government. Those butchers, in their servility to the bourgeoisie, allowed the German whiteguards, the watchdogs of sacred capitalist property, to lynch Rosa Luxemburg, to murder Karl Liebknecht by shooting him in the back on the patently false plea that he "attempted to escape" (Russian tsarism often used that excuse to murder prisoners during its bloody suppression of the 1905 Revolution). At the same time those butchers protected the whiteguards with the authority of the government, which claims to be quite innocent and to stand above classes! No words can describe the foul and abominable character of the butchery perpetrated by alleged socialists. Evidently, history has chosen a path on which the role of "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class" must be played to the "last degree" of brutality, baseness and meanness. Let those simpletons, the Kautskyites, talk in their newspaper *Freiheit*[163] about a "court" of representatives of "all" "socialist" parties (those servile souls insist that the Scheidemann executioners are socialists)! Those heroes of philistine stupidity and petty-bourgeois cowardice even fail to understand that the courts are organs of state power, and that the issue in the struggle and civil war now being waged in Germany is precisely one of who is to hold this power—the bourgeoisie, "served" by the Scheidemanns as executioners and instigators of pogroms, and by the Kautskys as glorifiers of "pure democracy", or the proletariat, which will overthrow the capitalist exploiters and crush their resistance.

The blood of the best representatives of the world proletarian International, of the unforgettable leaders of the world socialist revolution, will steel ever new masses of workers for the life-and-death struggle. And this struggle will lead to victory. We in Russia, in the summer of 1917,

lived through the "July days",[164] when the Russian Scheidemanns, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, also provided "state" protection for the "victory" of the whiteguards over the Bolsheviks, and when Cossacks shot the worker Voinov in the streets of Petrograd for distributing Bolshevik leaflets.[165] We know from experience how quickly such "victories" of the bourgeoisie and their henchmen cure the people of their illusions about bourgeois democracy, "universal suffrage", and so forth.

* * *

The bourgeoisie and the governments of the Allied countries seem to be wavering. One section sees that demoralisation is already setting in among the Allied troops in Russia, who are helping the whiteguards and serving the blackest monarchist and landlord reaction. It realises that continuation of the military intervention and attempts to defeat Russia—which would mean maintaining a million-strong army of occupation for a long time—is the surest and quickest way of carrying the proletarian revolution to the Allied countries. The example of the German occupation forces in the Ukraine is convincing enough of that.

Another section of the Allied bourgeoisie persists in its policy of military intervention, "economic encirclement" (Clemenceau) and strangulation of the Soviet Republic. The entire press in the service of that bourgeoisie, i.e., the majority of the capitalist-bought daily newspapers in Britain and France, predicts the early collapse of the Soviet government, draws lurid pictures of the horrors of the famine in Russia, lies about "disorders" and the "instability" of the Soviet Government. The whiteguard armies of the landowners and capitalists, whom the Allies are helping with officers, ammunition, money and auxiliary detachments, are cutting off the starving central and northern parts of Russia from the most fertile regions, Siberia and the Don.

The distress of the starving workers in Petrograd and Moscow, in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other industrial centres is indeed great. If the workers did not understand that they are defending the cause of socialism in Russia and

throughout the world they would never be able to bear the hardships, the torments of hunger to which they are doomed by the Allied military intervention (often covered up by hypocritical promises not to send their "own" troops, while continuing to send "black" troops, and also ammunition, money and officers).

The "Allied" and whiteguard troops hold Archangel, Perm, Orenburg, Rostov-on-Don, Baku and Ashkhabad, but the "Soviet movement" has won Riga and Kharkov. Latvia and the Ukraine are becoming Soviet republics. The workers see that their great sacrifices are not in vain, that the victory of Soviet power is approaching, spreading, growing and gaining strength the world over. Every month of hard fighting and heavy sacrifice strengthens the cause of Soviet power throughout the world and weakens its enemies, the exploiters.

The exploiters are still strong enough to murder the finest leaders of the world proletarian revolution, to increase the sacrifices and suffering of the workers in occupied or conquered countries and regions. But the exploiters all over the world are not strong enough to prevent the victory of the world proletarian revolution, which will free mankind from the yoke of capital and the eternal menace of new imperialist wars, which are inevitable under capitalism.

N. Lenin

January 21, 1919

Pravda No. 16,
January 24, 1919

Published according to
the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF ADULT EDUCATION DIVISIONS OF GUBERNIA EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS JANUARY 24, 1919

Comrades, you are all here as representatives of local adult education departments of gubernia Soviets. I have not got a lot to say since, unfortunately, I am not very closely acquainted with your work. Greetings to your congress of adult educationalists—you certainly have some important tasks to fulfil!

There are many schoolteachers in our schools trained in the old ways and this makes things difficult to change over from the capitalist to the socialist system. Although it may seem strange, many learned people are putting up stubborn resistance to us. Those who are used to looking on the old apparatus as their own private domain, merely look after themselves and serve the propertied class.

Adult education is better off than children's school education.

We recently discussed the question in the Council of People's Commissars of setting up a commission for amalgamating several scattered educational .organisations. Adult education is important for transforming the whole of our life. New ways have to be sought.

It must be admitted that some new and inexperienced representatives of the Soviet government frequently use the old methods and give the government a bad name.

I think you adult educationalists have a hard job on your hands. In our Party work we have set our own ways of far-reaching influence on the masses, but they must be linked up with educational methods, and particularly with

school and, above all, adult education. This is not always done.

In your adult education work you get assistance from the working people in the sense that they thirst for knowledge and this makes it easier for you to get across to them. This is the last place you can gallop ahead, especially with masses at a very low level of education. You must try to work more closely with Party organisations, as propaganda organs, and get the masses into the adult education campaign. If the popular initiative meets the necessary response from you, you can expect the best results. Allow me to wish you the best of luck.

Adult Education No. 2-3,
February-March 1919

Published according to
the journal *Adult Education*

EVERYBODY ON FOOD AND TRANSPORT WORK!

I have already had occasion at the last session of the Central Executive Committee to point out that the next six months will be particularly difficult for the Soviet Republic. During the first six months of 1918 we procured 28,000,000 poods of grain, and during the second 67,000,000 poods. The first six months of 1919 will be more difficult than the preceding.

The food shortage is growing more and more acute. Typhus is becoming an extremely serious menace. Heroic efforts are required, but what we are doing is far from enough.

Can we save the situation?

Certainly. The capture of Ufa and Orenburg, our victories in the South and the success of the Soviet uprising in the Ukraine[166] open up very favourable prospects.

We are now in a position to procure far more grain than is required for semi-starvation food rations.

Millions of poods of grain have already been delivered in the East. They are being held up by the bad state of the transport system. In the South, the liberation of the entire Voronezh Gubernia and part of the Don region from Krasnov's Cossacks makes it fully possible to procure considerable quantities of grain, over and above our previous calculations. Finally, the grain surplus in the Ukraine is truly enormous, and the Soviet Government of the Ukraine is offering to help us.

Not only can we now obviate famine, but we can even fully satisfy the starving population of non-agricultural Russia.

The whole trouble lies in the bad state of transport and the tremendous shortage of food workers.

Every effort must be made and we must stir the mass of workers into action. We must definitely get out of the habitual, everyday rut of life and work. We must pull ourselves together. We must set about the *revolutionary mobilisation* of people for food and transport work. We must *not confine ourselves* to "current" work, but go beyond its bounds and discover new methods of securing additional forces.

On the most "cautious" and even pessimistic estimate, we now have very weighty grounds for believing that a victory over famine and typhus in these six months (and such a victory is *perfectly* feasible) will lead to a *radical improvement* in the whole economic situation, for the establishment of contact with the Ukraine and Tashkent removes the main and basic causes of the shortage and dearth of raw materials.

Of course, the hungry masses are exhausted, and that exhaustion is at times more than human strength can endure. But there is a way out, and renewed energy is undoubtedly possible, all the more since the growth of the proletarian revolution all over the world is becoming increasingly apparent and promises a radical improvement in our foreign as well as our home affairs.

We must pull ourselves together.

Every Party organisation, every trade union, every group of organised workers, and even workers who are not organised but are anxious to "tackle" the famine—every group of Soviet workers and citizens generally must ask themselves the following questions:

What can we do to extend and intensify the national crusade against the famine?

Can we replace male labour by female labour and thus release more men for the difficult duties of transport and food work?

Can we provide commissars for the engine and carriage repair shops?

Can we provide rank-and-file workers for the food army?

Should we not assign every tenth or fifth man from our midst, from our group, from our factory, etc., to the food

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

army, or for exceptionally difficult and arduous work in the railway shops?

Are not some of us engaged in Soviet or other work which might be relaxed or even suspended altogether without undermining the main foundations of the state? Is it not our duty to mobilise such workers immediately for food and transport work?

Let as many people as possible go into action and deal one more blow to that accursed maxim of the old capitalist society, a maxim which we have inherited from that society and which infects and spoils every one of us in one degree or another, the maxim "every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost". It is this heritage from predatory, sordid and bloody capitalism that is stifling us, crushing us, oppressing, ruining and frustrating us more than anything else. We cannot rid ourselves of this heritage at once. It must be fought incessantly; more than one crusade will have to be declared and conducted against it.

We can save the millions and tens of millions from famine and typhus. Salvation is at hand. The famine and typhus crisis hovering over us can be vanquished, and vanquished completely. It would be absurd, foolish, shameful to give way to despair. To stampede pellmell, every man for himself, and each as he knows best, just to "get of the fix" oneself somehow, to shove back the more feeble and push forward alone, would be to desert, to abandon the sick and exhausted comrades and to make the overall situation even worse.

We have created the firm foundation of a Red Army, which has now *forced its way* through incredible difficulties, through the iron wall of the armies of the landowners and capitalists supported by the fabulously wealthy British and French multimillionaires, forced its way through to the principal sources of raw materials, to grain, cotton and coal. We created that foundation by working in a new way, by political propaganda at the front, by organising the Communists of our army, by the self-sacrificing organisation and struggle of the best of the workers.

We have gained a number of successes both on the external, military front and on the home front, in the fight against the exploiters, against sabotage, and for the dif-

ficult, arduous, thorny but *correct* path of socialist construction. We are on the verge of a complete and decisive victory both at home and on an international scale.

A little more effort, and we shall escape from the tenacious clutches of famine.

What we have done and are doing for the Red Army we must also do, and with redoubled energies, to step up, extend and intensify food and transport work. All our best workers must do *this* work. A place will be found for everybody who is anxious and able to work. Everybody who wishes can help to achieve an organised and mass victory over devastation and famine. Every active force, every talent, every speciality, every trade, every thoughtful individual can and must be found employment in this *peace army* of food and transport workers—a peace army which, to achieve complete victory, must now support the Red Army and consolidate and follow up its victories.

Everybody on food and transport work!

N. Lenin

January 26, 1919

Pravda No. 19,
January 28, 1919

Published according to
the manuscript

MEASURES GOVERNING THE TRANSITION FROM BOURGEOIS-CO-OPERATIVE TO PROLETARIAN-COMMUNIST SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION[167]

The question of the co-operatives and consumers' communes (see *Izvestia*, February 2) recently discussed in the Council of People's Commissars involves the *most vital* problem of the day, measures of *transition from* the bourgeois co-operatives *to* a communist consumers' and producers' union of the whole population.

Let us imagine co-operatives embrace 98 per cent of the population. This happens in the countryside.

Does this make them communes?

No, if the co-operative (1) gives advantages (dividends on shares, etc.) to a group of special shareholders; (2) preserves its own special apparatus which shuts out the population at large, in particular the proletariat and semi-proletariat; (3) does not give preference in produce distribution to the semi-proletariat over the middle peasants, to the middle peasants over the rich; (4) does not confiscate the surplus produce first from the rich, then from the middle peasants, and does not rely on the proletariat and semi-proletariat. And so on and so forth.

The whole difficulty of the task (and the whole *essence* of the present task which confronts us right now) springs from the fact that we have to work out a system of *practical* measures governing the *transition* from the old co-operatives (which are bound to be bourgeois since they have a group of *shareholders* who constitute a *minority* of the population, as well as for other reasons) to a new and

to a real *commune*. These are measures for the transition from bourgeois-co-operative to proletarian-communist supply and distribution.

It is essential

(1) to discuss this question in the press;

(2) to organise the movement of all the central and local government institutions (particularly of the Supreme Economic Council and the other Economic Councils, the Food Commissariat and food departments, the Central Statistical Board and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture) to tackle this task;

(3) to instruct the Co-operative Department of the Supreme Economic Council and the institutions enumerated in par. 2 to work out a *programme* of these measures and a form for collecting information on such measures and facts which enable us to develop these measures;

(4) to award a bonus for the best programme of measures, for the most practicable programme, for the most convenient and effective form and means of collecting information about it.

Written February 2, 1919
First published in 1931

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO UFA GUBERNIA REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE[168]

Ufa, Gubernia Revolutionary Committee Chairman

Propose not to alienate Khalikov and to grant amnesty on condition that a common front with Bashkir regiments is set up against Kolchak. The Soviet government pledges its full guarantee for Bashkir national freedom. But naturally, you must deal severely with counter-revolutionries among Bashkir population and achieve de facto control to ensure proletarian reliability of Bashkir forces.

Lenin, *Stalin*

Written February 5 or 6, 1919
Published February 16, 1919
in *Zhizn Natsionalnostei*
No. 5 (13)

Published according to
the manuscript

DRAFT WIRELESS MESSAGE FROM PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS[169]

In reply to your wireless message I hasten to inform you that although we do not consider the Berne Conference either socialist or in any way representative of the working class, we nevertheless permit the commission appointed by you to come to Russia and guarantee it the opportunity to fully acquaint itself with the situation, just as we permit the entry of any bourgeois commission on a fact-finding mission, directly or indirectly connected with any bourgeois government, even if it is engaged in attacking the Soviet Republic. Permitting the entry of your commission we would like to know whether your democratic government, and the governments of other democratic countries, whose citizens take part in the commission, will permit the entry of our commission from the Soviet Republic.

Written February 19, 1919

Published February 20, 1919 in *Izvestia* No. 39

Published according to the manuscript

CLOSURE OF THE MENSHEVIK NEWSPAPER UNDERMINING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCE

ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DRAFT RESOLUTION[170]

Taking into consideration that

1) the Menshevik newspaper *Vsegda Vperyod* published an article "Stop the Civil War" on 20.2.19, which proved once and for all that it is counter-revolutionary;

2) the slogan "Down with the Civil War", openly advocated in the paper at a time when the landlord and capitalist troops, led by Kolchak, have captured Perm as well as Siberia, is equivalent to support for Kolchak and an obstacle to the workers and peasants of Russia winning the war against Kolchak;

3) the Mensheviks, who in their conference resolution condemned the overwhelming majority of Menshevik party members who have lined up with the propertied classes, i.e., the landowners and capitalists in Siberia, Archangel, on the Volga, in Georgia and the South, are thus now starting to pursue the same policy in fact, while hypocritically denying it in words;

4) those of the Mensheviks who are not hypocritical friends of the landowners and capitalists are now again displaying the spineless vacillation bringing them to serving Kolchak;

5) the Soviet Government, right at the time of the last, decisive and sharpest armed clash with the landlord and capitalist troops, cannot put up with people who are unwilling to endure great sacrifices alongside the workers and peasants fighting for their just cause;

6) such people are again and again leaning towards the Kolchak brand of democracy under which the bourgeoisie and their hangers-on do so well,

the Central Executive Committee decrees that

a) the newspaper *Vsegda Vperyod* shall be closed down until the Mensheviks show by actions their resolve to break once and for all with Kolchak and firmly stand for the defence and support of the Soviet government;

b) all the necessary measures shall be taken to exile Mensheviks hampering the victory of the workers and peasants over Kolchak to a life under the Kolchak brand of democracy.

Written February 22, 1919

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Published according to the manuscript



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“To the People’s Commissariat of Education”. February 1919
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First page of the manuscript
"To the People's Commissariat of Education". February 1919
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TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF EDUCATION[171]

Please pass on to your library departments (both adult education and public library, etc.) my supplementary ideas on the question recently raised in the Council of People's Commissars and let me know your conclusions (and those of the respective departments).

* * *

More than anything else the libraries, including of course reading huts, all kinds of reading rooms, etc., require *competition* between individual provincial libraries, groups, reading rooms, etc.

The proper way to *send in accounts*, which is now demanded by the Council of People's Commissars, should serve *three* aims:

1) authentic and complete *information* to the Soviet government and all citizens about what is going on;

2) enlisting the *public* in library work;

3) encouraging *competition* among library workers.

To these ends lists and forms of accounting should be immediately drawn up that will suit the purposes.

Account lists should, I think, be drawn up at the centre and then reprinted in the gubernias and distributed among all educational departments and *all* libraries, reading rooms, clubs, etc.

These account lists should *enumerate* (printed, say, in heavy type) the *compulsory* questions which library managers, etc., must answer on pain of *prosecution*. Apart from these compulsory questions there should be a *considerable* number of *non-compulsory* questions (in the sense that

failure to answer does not necessarily carry the threat of prosecution).

The compulsory questions should include the library's (or reading room's, etc.) address, name and address of the manager and his board members, quantity of books and newspapers, working hours, etc. (the big libraries will have to give more information).

The non-compulsory questions should include all improvements being applied in Switzerland and America (and elsewhere) so that we can *reward* (by giving bonuses in the form of valuable books, collections, and so on) those who make the most improvements and carry them out best of all.

For example: 1) Can you supply precise information to prove more books have been lent from your library? or 2) how many people visit your reading room? 3) book and newspaper exchange with other libraries and reading rooms? or 4) compilation of a central catalogue? or 5) work on Sundays? or 6) work in the evenings? or 7) encouragement of new readers, women, children, non-Russians, etc.? or 8) satisfaction of readers' references? or 9) simple and practical means of storing books and newspapers? Saving them? Mechanical means of obtaining the book and returning it to its place? or 10) lending a book? or 11) simplification of guarantees in lending a book? or 12) sending it through the post?

And so on, ad infinitum....

Bonuses are to be awarded for the best accounts and forthcoming successes.

The Library Department of the People's Commissariat of Education *must* inform the Council of People's Commissars about the *number* of accounts received monthly and the answers to which questions are given; and the totals.

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FIRST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[172]

MARCH 2-6, 1919

FIRST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[172]

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1

SPEECH AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CONGRESS MARCH 2

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party I declare the First Congress of the Communist International open. First I would ask all present to rise in tribute to the finest representatives of the Third International: Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. (*All rise.*)

Comrades, our gathering has great historic significance. It testifies to the collapse of all the illusions cherished by bourgeois democrats. Not only in Russia, but in the most developed capitalist countries of Europe, Germany for example, civil war is a fact.

The bourgeoisie are terror-stricken at the growing workers' revolutionary movement. This is understandable if we take into account that the development of events since the imperialist war inevitably favours the workers' revolutionary movement, and that the world revolution is beginning and growing in intensity everywhere.

The people are aware of the greatness and significance of the struggle now going on. All that is needed is to find the practical form to enable the proletariat to establish its rule. Such a form is the Soviet system with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship of the proletariat—until now these words were Latin to the masses. Thanks to the spread of the Soviets throughout the world this Latin has been translated into all modern languages; a practical form of dictatorship has been found by the working people. The mass of workers now understand it thanks to Soviet power in Russia, thanks to the Spartacus League in Germany and to similar organisations in other countries,

such as, for example, the Shop Stewards Committees in Britain.[173] All this shows that a revolutionary form of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been found, that the proletariat is now able to exercise its rule.

Comrades, I think that after the events in Russia and the January struggle in Germany, it is especially important to note that in other countries, too, the latest form of the workers' movement is asserting itself and getting the upper hand. Today, for example, I read in an anti-socialist newspaper a report to the effect that the British Government had received a deputation from the Birmingham Workers' Council and had expressed its readiness to recognise the Councils as economic bodies.[174] The Soviet system has triumphed not only in backward Russia, but also in the most developed country of Europe—in Germany, and in Britain, the oldest capitalist country.

Even though the bourgeoisie are still raging, even though they may kill thousands more workers, victory will be ours, the victory of the world-wide communist revolution is assured.

Comrades, I extend hearty greetings to you on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. I move that we elect a presidium. Let us have nominations.

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2

THESES AND REPORT ON BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT MARCH 4

1. Faced with the growth of the revolutionary workers' movement in every country, the bourgeoisie and their agents in the workers' organisations are making desperate attempts to find ideological and political arguments in defence of the rule of the exploiters. Condemnation of dictatorship and defence of democracy are particularly prominent among these arguments. The falsity and hypocrisy of this argument, repeated in a thousand strains by the capitalist press and at the Berne yellow International Conference in February 1919, are obvious to all who refuse to betray the fundamental principles of socialism.

2. Firstly, this argument employs the concepts of "democracy in general" and "dictatorship in general", without posing the question of the class concerned. This non-class or above-class presentation, which supposedly is popular, is an outright travesty of the basic tenet of socialism, namely, its theory of class struggle, which socialists who have sided with the bourgeoisie recognise in words but disregard in practice. For in no civilised capitalist country does "democracy in general" exist; all that exists is bourgeois democracy, and it is not a question of "dictatorship in general", but of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, i.e., the proletariat, over its oppressors and exploiters, i.e., the bourgeoisie, in order to overcome the resistance offered by the exploiters in their fight to maintain their domination.

3. History teaches us that no oppressed class ever did, or could, achieve power without going through a period of dictatorship, i.e., the conquest of political power and forcible suppression of the resistance always offered by the exploiters—a resistance that is most desperate, most furious, and that stops at nothing. The bourgeoisie, whose domination is now defended by the socialists who denounce "dictatorship in general" and extol "democracy in general", won power in the advanced countries through a series of insurrections, civil wars, and the forcible suppression of kings, feudal lords, slaveowners and their attempts at restoration. In books, pamphlets, congress resolutions and propaganda speeches socialists everywhere have thousands and millions of times explained to the people the class nature of these bourgeois revolutions and this bourgeois dictatorship. That is why the present defence of bourgeois democracy under cover of talk about "democracy in general" and the present howls and shouts against proletarian dictatorship under cover of shouts about "dictatorship in general" are an outright betrayal of socialism. They are, in fact, desertion to the bourgeoisie, denial of the proletariat's right to its own, proletarian, revolution, and defence of bourgeois reformism at the very historical juncture when bourgeois reformism throughout the world has collapsed and the war has created a revolutionary situation.

4. In explaining the class nature of bourgeois civilisation, bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois parliamentary system, all socialists have expressed the idea formulated with the greatest scientific precision by Marx and Engels, namely, that the most democratic bourgeois republic is no more than a machine for the suppression of the working class by the bourgeoisie, for the suppression of the working people by a handful of capitalists.[175] There is not a single revolutionary, not a single Marxist among those now shouting against dictatorship and for democracy who has not sworn and vowed to the workers that he accepts this basic truth of socialism. But now, when the revolutionary proletariat is in a fighting mood and taking action to destroy this machine of oppression and to establish proletarian dictatorship, these traitors to socialism claim that

the bourgeoisie have granted the working people "pure democracy", have abandoned resistance and are prepared to yield to the majority of the working people. They assert that in a democratic republic there is not, and never has been, any such thing as a state machine for the oppression of labour by capital.

5. The Paris Commune—to which all who parade as socialists pay lip service, for they know that the workers ardently and sincerely sympathise with the Commune—showed very clearly the historically conventional nature and limited value of the bourgeois parliamentary system and bourgeois democracy—institutions which, though highly progressive compared with medieval times, inevitably require a radical alteration in the era of proletarian revolution. It was Marx who best appraised the historical significance of the Commune. In his analysis, he revealed the exploiting nature of bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois parliamentary system under which the oppressed classes enjoy the right to decide once in several years which representative of the propertied classes shall "represent and suppress" (*ver- und zertreten*) the people in parliament.[176] And it is now, when the Soviet movement is embracing the entire world and continuing the work of the Commune for all to see, that the traitors to socialism are forgetting the concrete experience and concrete lessons of the Paris Commune and repeating the old bourgeois rubbish about "democracy in general". The Commune was not a parliamentary institution.

6. The significance of the Commune, furthermore, lies in the fact that it endeavoured to crush, to smash to its very foundations, the bourgeois state apparatus, the bureaucratic, judicial, military and police machine, and to replace it by a self-governing, mass workers' organisation in which there was no division between legislative and executive power. All contemporary bourgeois-democratic republics, including the German republic, which the traitors to socialism, in mockery of the truth, describe as a proletarian republic, retain this state apparatus. We therefore again get quite clear confirmation of the point that shouting in defence of "democracy in general" is actually defence of the bourgeoisie and their privileges as exploiters.

7. "Freedom of assembly" can be taken as a sample of the requisites of "pure democracy". Every class-conscious worker who has not broken with his class will readily appreciate the absurdity of promising freedom of assembly to the exploiters at a time and in a situation when the exploiters are resisting the overthrow of their rule and are fighting to retain their privileges. Then the bourgeoisie were revolutionary, they did not, either in England in 1649 or in France in 1793, grant "freedom of assembly" to the monarchists and nobles, who summoned foreign troops and "assembled" to organise attempts at restoration. If the present-day bourgeoisie, who have long since become reactionary, demand from the proletariat advance guarantees of "freedom of assembly" for the exploiters, whatever the resistance offered by the capitalists to being expropriated, the workers will only laugh at their hypocrisy.

The workers know perfectly well, too, that even in the most democratic bourgeois republic "freedom of assembly" is a hollow phrase, for the rich have the best public and private buildings at their disposal, and enough leisure to assemble at meetings, which are protected by the bourgeois machine of power. The rural and urban workers and the small peasants—the overwhelming majority of the population—are denied all these things. As long as that state of affairs prevails, "equality", i.e., "pure democracy", is a fraud. The first thing to do to win genuine equality and enable the working people to enjoy democracy in practice is to deprive the exploiters of all the public and sumptuous private buildings, to give the working people leisure and to see to it that their freedom of assembly is protected by armed workers, not by scions of the nobility or capitalist officers in command of downtrodden soldiers.

Only when that change is effected can we speak of freedom of assembly and of equality without mocking at the workers, at working people in general, at the poor. And this change can be effected only by the vanguard of the working people, the proletariat, which overthrows the exploiters, the bourgeoisie.

8. "Freedom of the press" is another of the principal slogans of "pure democracy". And here, too, the workers know—and socialists everywhere have admitted it millions

of times—that this freedom is a deception while the best printing-presses and the biggest stocks of paper are appropriated by the capitalists, and while capitalist rule over the press remains, a rule that is manifested throughout the world all the more strikingly, sharply and cynically the more democracy and the republican system are developed, as in America for example. The first thing to do to win real equality and genuine democracy for the working people, for the workers and peasants, is to deprive capital of the possibility of hiring writers, buying up publishing houses and bribing newspapers. And to do that the capitalists and exploiters have to be overthrown and their resistance suppressed. The capitalists have always used the term "freedom" to mean freedom for the rich to get richer and for the workers to starve to death. In capitalist usage, freedom of the press means freedom of the rich to bribe the press, freedom to use their wealth to shape and fabricate so-called public opinion. In this respect, too, the defenders of "pure democracy" prove to be defenders of an utterly foul and venal system that gives the rich control over the mass media. They prove to be deceivers of the people, who, with the aid of plausible, fine-sounding, but thoroughly false phrases, divert them from the concrete historical task of liberating the press from capitalist enslavement. Genuine freedom and equality will be embodied in the system which the Communists are building, and in which there will be no opportunity for amassing wealth at the expense of others, no objective opportunities for putting the press under the direct or indirect power of money, and no impediments in the way of any workingman (or groups of workingmen, in any numbers) for enjoying and practising equal rights in the use of public printing-presses and public stocks of paper.

9. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrated, even before the war, what this celebrated "pure democracy" really is under capitalism. Marxists have always maintained that the more developed, the "purer" democracy is, the more naked, acute and merciless the class struggle becomes, and the "purer" the capitalist oppression and bourgeois dictatorship. The Dreyfus case in republican France, the massacre of strikers by hired

bands armed by the capitalists in the free and democratic American republic—these and thousands of similar facts illustrate the truth which the bourgeoisie are vainly seeking to conceal, namely, that actually terror and bourgeois dictatorship prevail in the most democratic of republics and are openly displayed every time the exploiters think the power of capital is being shaken.

10. The imperialist war of 1914-18 conclusively revealed even to backward workers the true nature of bourgeois democracy, even in the freest republics, as being a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Tens of millions were killed for the sake of enriching the German or the British group of millionaires and multimillionaires, and bourgeois military dictatorships were established in the freest republics. This military dictatorship continues to exist in the Allied countries even after Germany's defeat. It was mostly the war that opened the eyes of the working people, that stripped bourgeois democracy of its camouflage and showed the people the abyss of speculation and profiteering that existed during and because of the war. It was in the name of "freedom and equality" that the bourgeoisie waged the war, and in the name of "freedom and equality" that the munition manufacturers piled up fabulous fortunes. Nothing that the yellow Berne International does can conceal from the people the now thoroughly exposed exploiting character of bourgeois freedom, bourgeois equality and bourgeois democracy.

11. In Germany, the most developed capitalist country of continental Europe, the very first months of full republican freedom, established as a result of imperialist Germany's defeat, have shown the German workers and the whole world the true class substance of the bourgeois-democratic republic. The murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg is an event of epoch-making significance not only because of the tragic death of these finest people and leaders of the truly proletarian, Communist International, but also because the class nature of an advanced European state—it can be said without exaggeration, of an advanced state on a world-wide scale—has been conclusively exposed. If those arrested, i.e., those placed under state protection, could be assassinated by officers

and capitalists with impunity, and this under a government headed by social-patriots, then the democratic republic where such a thing was possible is a bourgeois dictatorship. Those who voice their indignation at the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg but fail to understand this fact are only demonstrating their stupidity, or hypocrisy. "Freedom" in the German republic, one of the freest and advanced republics of the world, is freedom to murder arrested leaders of the proletariat with impunity. Nor can it be otherwise as long as capitalism remains, for the development of democracy sharpens rather than dampens the class struggle which, by virtue of all the results and influences of the war and of its consequences, has been brought to boiling point.

Throughout the civilised world we see Bolsheviks being exiled, persecuted and thrown into prison. This is the case, for example, in Switzerland, one of the freest bourgeois republics, and in America, where there have been anti-Bolshevik pogroms, etc. From the standpoint of "democracy in general", or "pure democracy", it is really ridiculous that advanced, civilised, and democratic countries, which are armed to the teeth, should fear the presence of a few score men from backward, famine-stricken and ruined Russia, which the bourgeois papers, in tens of millions of copies, describe as savage, criminal, etc. Clearly, the social situation that could produce this crying contradiction is in fact a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

12. In these circumstances, proletarian dictatorship is not only an absolutely legitimate means of overthrowing the exploiters and suppressing their resistance, but also absolutely necessary to the entire mass of working people, being their only defence against the bourgeois dictatorship which led to the war and is preparing new wars.

The main thing that socialists fail to understand and that constitutes their short-sightedness in matters of theory, their subservience to bourgeois prejudices and their political betrayal of the proletariat is that in capitalist society, whenever there is any serious aggravation of the class struggle intrinsic to that society, there can be no alternative but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dreams of some third way

are reactionary, petty-bourgeois lamentations. That is borne out by more than a century of development of bourgeois democracy and the working-class movement in all the advanced countries, and notably by the experience of the past five years. This is also borne out by the whole science of political economy, by the entire content of Marxism, which reveals the economic inevitability, wherever commodity economy prevails, of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie that can only be replaced by the class which the very growth of capitalism develops, multiplies, welds together and strengthens, that is, the proletarian class.

13. Another theoretical and political error of the socialists is their failure to understand that ever since the rudiments of democracy first appeared in antiquity, its forms inevitably changed over the centuries as one ruling class replaced another. Democracy assumed different forms and was applied in different degrees in the ancient republics of Greece, the medieval cities and the advanced capitalist countries. It would be sheer nonsense to think that the most profound revolution in human history, the first case in the world of power being transferred from the exploiting minority to the exploited majority, could take place within the time-worn framework of the old, bourgeois, parliamentary democracy, without drastic changes, without the creation of new forms of democracy, new institutions that embody the new conditions for applying democracy, etc.

14. Proletarian dictatorship is similar to the dictatorship of other classes in that it arises out of the need, as every other dictatorship does, to forcibly suppress the resistance of the class that is losing its political sway. The fundamental distinction between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of other classes—landlord dictatorship in the Middle Ages and bourgeois dictatorship in all the civilised capitalist countries—consists in the fact that the dictatorship of the landowners and bourgeoisie was the forcible suppression of the resistance offered by the vast majority of the population, namely, the working people. In contrast, proletarian dictatorship is the forcible suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, i.e., an insignificant minority of the population, the landowners and capitalists.

It follows that proletarian dictatorship must inevitably entail not only a change in democratic forms and institutions, generally speaking, but precisely such a change as provides an unparalleled extension of the actual enjoyment of democracy by those oppressed by capitalism—the toiling classes.

And indeed, the form of proletarian dictatorship that has already taken shape, i.e., Soviet power in Russia, the Räte-System in Germany, the Shop Stewards Committees in Britain and similar Soviet institutions in other countries, all this implies and presents to the toiling classes, i.e., the vast majority of the population, greater practical opportunities for enjoying democratic rights and liberties than ever existed before, even approximately, in the best and the most democratic bourgeois republics.

The substance of Soviet government is that the permanent and only foundation of state power, the entire machinery of state, is the mass-scale organisation of the classes oppressed by capitalism, i.e., the workers and the semi-proletarians (peasants who do not exploit the labour of others and regularly resort to the sale of at least a part of their own labour-power). It is the people, who even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, while possessing equal rights by law, have in fact been debarred by thousands of devices and subterfuges from participation in political life and enjoyment of democratic rights and liberties, that are now drawn into constant and unfailing, moreover, decisive, participation in the democratic administration of the state.

15. The equality of citizens, irrespective of sex, religion, race, or nationality, which bourgeois democracy everywhere has always promised but never effected, and never could effect because of the domination of capital, is given immediate and full effect by the Soviet system, or dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact is that this can only be done by a government of the workers, who are not interested in the means of production being privately owned and in the fight for their division and redivision.

16. The old, i.e., bourgeois, democracy and the parliamentary system were so organised that it was the mass of working people who were kept farthest away from the

machinery of government. Soviet power, i.e., the dictator hip of the proletariat, on the other hand, is so organised as to bring the working people close to the machinery of government. That, too, is the purpose of combining the legislative and executive authority under the Soviet organisation of the state and of replacing territorial constituencies by production units—the factory.

17. The army was a machine of oppression not only under the monarchy. It remains as such in all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic ones. Only the Soviets, the permanent organisations of government authority of the classes that were oppressed by capitalism, are in a position to destroy the army's subordination to bourgeois commanders and really merge the proletariat with the army; only the Soviets can effectively arm the proletariat and disarm the bourgeoisie. Unless this is done, the victory of socialism is impossible.

18. The Soviet organisation of the state is suited to the leading role of the proletariat as a class most concentrated and enlightened by capitalism. The experience of all revolutions and all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world socialist movement teaches us that only the proletariat is in a position to unite and lead the scattered and backward sections of the working and exploited population.

19. Only the Soviet organisation of the state can really effect the immediate break-up and total destruction of the old, i.e., bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial machinery, which has been, and has inevitably had to be, retained under capitalism even in the most democratic republics, and which is, in actual fact, the greatest obstacle to the practical implementation of democracy for the workers and working people generally. The Paris Commune took the first epoch-making step along this path. The Soviet system has taken the second.

20. Destruction of state power is the aim set by all socialists, including Marx above all. Genuine democracy, i.e., liberty and equality, is unrealisable unless this aim is achieved. But its practical achievement is possible only through Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, for by enlisting the mass organisations of the working people in constant

and unfailing participation in the administration of the state, it immediately begins to prepare the complete withering away of any state.

21. The complete bankruptcy of the socialists who assembled in Berne, their complete failure to understand the new, i.e., proletarian, democracy, is especially apparent from the following. On February 10, 1919, Branting delivered the concluding speech at the international Conference of the yellow International in Berne. In Berlin, on February 11, 1919, *Die Freiheit*, the paper of the International's affiliates, published an appeal from the Party of "Independents" to the proletariat. The appeal acknowledged the bourgeois character of the Scheidemann government, rebuked it for wanting to abolish the Soviets, which it described as *Träger und Schützer der Revolution*—vehicles and guardians of the revolution—and proposed that the Soviets be legalised, invested with government authority and given the right to suspend the operation of National Assembly decisions pending a popular referendum.

That proposal indicates the complete ideological bankruptcy of the theorists who defended democracy and failed to see its bourgeois character. This ludicrous attempt to combine the Soviet system, i.e., proletarian dictatorship, with the National Assembly, i.e., bourgeois dictatorship, utterly exposes the paucity of thought of the yellow socialists and Social-Democrats, their reactionary petty-bourgeois political outlook, and their cowardly concessions to the irresistibly growing strength of the new, proletarian democracy.

22. From the class standpoint, the Berne yellow International majority, which did not dare to adopt a formal resolution out of fear of the mass of workers, was right in condemning Bolshevism. This majority is in full agreement with the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Scheidemanns in Germany. In complaining of persecution by the Bolsheviks, the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries try to conceal the fact that they are persecuted for participating in the Civil War on the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Similarly, the Scheidemanns and their party have already demonstrated in Germany that they, too, are participating in

the civil war on the side of the bourgeoisie against the workers.

It is therefore quite natural that the Berne yellow International majority should be in favour of condemning the Bolsheviks. This was not an expression of the defence of "pure democracy", but of the self-defence of people who know and feel that in the civil war they stand with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.

That is why, from the class point of view, the decision of the yellow International majority must be considered correct. The proletariat must not fear the truth, it must face it squarely and draw all the necessary political conclusions.

Comrades, I would like to add a word or two to the last two points. I think that the comrades who are to report to us on the Berne Conference will deal with it in greater detail.

Not a word was said at the Berne Conference about the significance of Soviet power. We in Russia have been discussing this question for two years now. At our Party Conference in April 1917 we raised the following question, theoretically and politically: "What is Soviet power, what is its substance and what is its historical significance?" We have been discussing it for almost two years. And at our Party Congress we adopted a resolution on it.[177]

On February 11 Berlin *Die Freiheit* published an appeal to the German proletariat signed not only by the leaders of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, but also by all the members of the Independent Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag. In August 1918, Kautsky, one of the leading theorists of these Independents, wrote a pamphlet entitled *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, in which he declared that he was a supporter of democracy *and* of Soviet bodies, but that the Soviets must be bodies merely of an economic character and that they must not by any means he recognised as state organisations. Kautsky says the same thing in *Die Freiheit* of November 11 and January 12. On February 9 an article appeared by Rudolf Hilferding, who is also regarded as one of the leading and authoritative theorists of the Second International, in which he proposed that the Soviet system be united with

the National Assembly juridically, by state legislation. That was on February 9. On February 11 this proposal was adopted by the whole of the Independent Party and published in the form of an appeal.

There is vacillation again, despite the fact that the National Assembly already exists, even after "pure democracy" has been embodied in reality, after the leading theorists of the Independent Social-Democratic Party have declared that the Soviet organisations must not be state organisations! This proves that these gentlemen really understand nothing about the new movement and about its conditions of struggle. But it goes to prove something else, namely, that there must be conditions, causes, for this vacillation! When, after all these events, after nearly two years of victorious revolution in Russia, we are offered resolutions like those adopted at the Berne Conference, which say nothing about the Soviets and their significance, about which not a single delegate uttered a single word, we have a perfect right to say that all these gentlemen are dead to us as socialists and theorists.

However, comrades, from the practical side, from the political point of view, the fact that these Independents, who in theory and on principle have been opposed to these state organisations, suddenly make the stupid proposal to "peacefully" unite the National Assembly with the Soviet system, i.e., to unite the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat, shows that a great change is taking place among the masses. We see that the Independents are all bankrupt in the socialist and theoretical sense and that an enormous change is taking place among the masses. The backward masses among the German workers are coming to us, have come to us! So, the significance of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the best section of the Berne Conference, is nil from the theoretical and socialist standpoint. Still, it has some significance, which is that these waverers serve as an index to us of the mood of the backward sections of the proletariat. This, in my opinion, is the great historical significance of this Conference. We experienced something of the kind in our own revolution. Our Mensheviks traversed almost exactly the same path as that of the theorists of

the Independents in Germany. At first, when they had a majority in the Soviets, they were in favour of the Soviets. All we heard then was: "Long live the Soviets!", "For the Soviets!", "The Soviets are revolutionary democracy!" When, however, we Bolsheviks secured a majority in the Soviets, they changed their tune; they said: the Soviets must not exist side by side with the Constituent Assembly. And various Menshevik theorists made practically the same proposals, like the one to unite the Soviet system with the Constituent Assembly and to incorporate the Soviets in the state structure. Once again it is here revealed that the general course of the proletarian revolution is the same throughout the world. First the spontaneous formation of Soviets, then their spread and development, and then the appearance of the practical problem: Soviets, or National Assembly, or Constituent Assembly, or the bourgeois parliamentary system; utter confusion among the leaders, and finally—the proletarian revolution. But I think we should not present the problem in this way after nearly two years of revolution; we should rather adopt concrete decisions because for us, and particularly for the majority of the West-European countries, spreading of the Soviet system is a most important task.

I would like to quote here just one Menshevik resolution. I asked Comrade Obolensky to translate it into German. He promised to do so but, unfortunately, he is not here. I shall try to render it from memory, as I have not the full text of it with me.

It is very difficult for a foreigner who has not heard anything about Bolshevism to arrive at an independent opinion about our controversial questions. Everything the Bolsheviks assert is challenged by the Mensheviks, and vice versa. Of course, it cannot be otherwise in the middle of a struggle, and that is why it is so important that the last Menshevik Party conference, held in December 1918, adopted the long and detailed resolution published in full in the Menshevik *Gazeta Pechatnikov*.[178] In this resolution the Mensheviks themselves briefly outline the history of the class struggle and of the Civil War. The resolution states that they condemn those groups in their party which are allied with the propertied classes in the

Urals, in the South, in the Crimea and in Georgia—all these regions are enumerated. Those groups of the Menshevik Party which, in alliance with the propertied classes, fought against the Soviets are now condemned in the resolution; but the last point of the resolution also condemns those who joined the Communists. It follows that the Mensheviks were compelled to admit that there was no unity in their party, and that its members were either on the side of the bourgeoisie or on the side of the proletariat. The majority of the Mensheviks went over to the bourgeoisie and fought against us during the Civil War. We, of course, persecute Mensheviks, we even shoot them, when they wage war against us, fight against our Red Army and shoot our Red commanders. We responded to the bourgeois war with the proletarian war—there can be no other way. Therefore, from the political point of view, all this is sheer Menshevik hypocrisy. Historically, it is incomprehensible how people who have not been officially certified as mad could talk at the Berne Conference, on the instructions of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, about the Bolsheviks fighting the latter, yet keep silent about their own struggle, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat.

All of them furiously attack us for persecuting them. This is true. But they do not say a word about the part they themselves have taken in the Civil War! I think that I shall have to provide the full text of the resolution to be recorded in the minutes, and I shall ask the foreign comrades to study it because it is a historical document in which the issue is raised correctly and which provides excellent material for appraising the controversy between the "socialist" trends in Russia. In between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie there is another class of people, who incline first this way and then the other. This has always been the case in all revolutions, and it is absolutely impossible in capitalist society, in which the proletariat and the bourgeoisie form two hostile camps, for intermediary sections not to exist between them. The existence of these waverers is historically inevitable, and, unfortunately, these elements, who do not know themselves on whose side they will fight tomorrow, will exist for quite some time.

I want to make the practical proposal that a resolution be adopted in which three points shall be specifically mentioned.

First: One of the most important tasks confronting the West-European comrades is to explain to the people the meaning, importance and necessity of the Soviet system. There is a sort of misunderstanding on this question. Although Kautsky and Hilferding are bankrupt as theorists, their recent articles in *Die Freiheit* show that they correctly reflect the mood of the backward sections of the German proletariat. The same thing took place in our country: during the first eight months of the Russian revolution the question of the Soviet organisation was very much discussed, and the workers did not understand what the new system was and whether the Soviets could be transformed into a state machine. In our revolution we advanced along the path of practice, and not of theory. For example, formerly we did not raise the question of the Constituent Assembly from the theoretical side, and we did not say we did not recognise the Constituent Assembly. It was only later, when the Soviet organisations had spread throughout the country and had captured political power, that we decided to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. Now we see that in Hungary and Switzerland the question is much more acute. On the one hand, this is very good: it gives us the firm conviction that in the West-European states the revolution is advancing more quickly and will yield great victories. On the other hand, a certain danger is concealed in it, namely, that the struggle will be so precipitous that the minds of the mass of workers will not keep pace with this development. Even now the significance of the Soviet system is not clear to a large mass of the politically educated German workers, because they have been trained in the spirit of the parliamentary system and amid bourgeois prejudices.

Second: About the spread of the Soviet system. When we hear how quickly the idea of Soviets is spreading in Germany, and even in Britain, it is very important evidence that the proletarian revolution will be victorious. Its progress can be only retarded for a short time. It is quite another thing, however, when Comrades Albert and Platten

tell us that in the rural districts in their countries there are hardly any Soviets among the farm labourers and small peasants. In *Die Rote Fahne* I read an article opposing peasant Soviets, but quite properly supporting Soviets of farm labourers and of poor peasants.[179] The bourgeoisie and their lackeys, like Scheidemann and Co., have already issued the slogan of peasant Soviets. All we need, however, is Soviets of farm labourers and poor peasants. Unfortunately, from the reports of Comrades Albert, Platten and others, we see that, with the exception of Hungary, very little is being done to spread the Soviet system in the countryside. In this, perhaps, lies the real and quite serious danger threatening the achievement of certain victory by the German proletariat. Victory can only be considered assured when not only the urban workers, but also the rural proletarians are organised, and organised not as before—in trade unions and co-operative societies—but in Soviets. Our victory was made easier by the fact that in October 1917 we marched with the peasants, with all the peasants. In that sense, our revolution at that time was a bourgeois revolution. The first step taken by our proletarian government was to embody in a law promulgated on October 26 (old style), 1917, on the next day after the revolution, the old demands of all the peasants which peasant Soviets and village assemblies had put forward under Kerensky. That is where our strength lay; that is why we were able to win the overwhelming majority so easily. As far as the countryside was concerned, our revolution continued to be a bourgeois revolution, and only later, after a lapse of six months, were we compelled within the framework of the state organisation to start the class struggle in the countryside, to establish Committees of Poor Peasants, of semi-proletarians, in every village, and to carry on a methodical fight against the rural bourgeoisie. This was inevitable in Russia owing to the backwardness of the country. In Western Europe things will proceed differently, and that is why we must emphasise the absolute necessity of spreading the Soviet system also to the rural population in proper, perhaps new, forms.

Third: We must say that winning a Communist majority in the Soviets is the principal task in all countries in which

Soviet government is not yet victorious. Our Resolutions' Commission discussed this question yesterday. Perhaps other comrades will express their opinion on it; but I would like to propose that these three points be adopted as a special resolution. Of course, we are not in a position to prescribe the path of development. It is quite likely that the revolution will come very soon in many West-European countries, but we, as the organised section of the working class, as a party, strive and must strive to gain a majority in the Soviets. Then our victory will be assured and no power on earth will be able to do anything against the communist revolution. If we do not, victory will not be secured so easily, and it will not be durable. And so, I would like to propose that these three points be adopted as a special resolution.

Theses published March 6, 1919 in *Pravda* No. 51; report first published in 1920 in the German and in 1921 in the Russian editions of the minutes of the First Congress of the Communist International

Theses published according to the *Pravda* text; report according to the Russian edition of the minutes checked with the German edition

3

RESOLUTION TO THE THESES ON BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

On the basis of these theses and the reports made by the delegates from the different countries, the Congress of the Communist International declares that the chief task of the Communist Parties in all countries where Soviet government has not yet been established is as follows:

1) to explain to the broad mass of the workers the historic significance and the political and historical necessity of the new, proletarian, democracy which must replace bourgeois democracy and the parliamentary system;

2) to extend the organisation of Soviets among the workers in all branches of industry, among the soldiers in the Army and sailors in the Navy and also among farm labourers and poor peasants;

3) to build a stable Communist majority inside the Soviets.

Pravda No. 54, March 11, 1919
and the journal *Communist International* No. 1, May 1, 1919

Published according to the journal checked with the *Pravda* text

4
CONCLUDING SPEECH AT THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CONGRESS MARCH 6

That we have been able to gather, despite all the persecution and all the difficulties created by the police, that we have been able without any serious differences and in a brief space of time to reach important decisions on all the vitally urgent questions of the contemporary revolutionary epoch, we owe to the fact that the proletarian masses of the whole world, by their action, have brought up these questions in practice and begun to tackle them.

All we have had to do here has been to record the gains already won by the people in the process of their revolutionary struggle.

Not only in the East-European but also in the West-European countries, not only in the vanquished but also in the victor countries, for example in Britain, the movement in favour of Soviets is spreading farther and farther, and this movement is, most assuredly, a movement pursuing the aim of establishing the new, proletarian democracy. It is the most significant step towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, towards the complete victory of communism.

No matter how the bourgeoisie of the whole world rage, how much they deport or jail or even kill Spartacists and Bolsheviks—all this will no longer help. It will only serve to enlighten the masses, help rid them of the old bourgeois-democratic prejudices and steel them in struggle. The

victory of the proletarian revolution on a world scale is assured. The founding of an international Soviet republic is on the way. (*Stormy applause.*)

First published in 1920 in the German and in 1921 in the Russian editions of the minutes of the First Congress of the Communist International

Published according to the Russian edition of the minutes checked with the German edition

WON AND RECORDED

been won by the mass of the proletariat. The only gain worth recording is that which really has been firmly won.

The founding of the Third, Communist International in Moscow on March 2, 1919, was a record of what has been gained not only by the Russian workers, but also by the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Finnish, Swiss—in a word, by the workers of the world.

Precisely because of this the founding of the Third, Communist International really is firm.

Only four months ago it was impossible to say that Soviet government, the Soviet form of state, was an international achievement. There was something in it, and moreover something essential, which belonged to all capitalist countries as well as to Russia. But, until it had been put to the test, it was still impossible to say what changes, of what depth and importance, the development of the world revolution would bring.

The German revolution has provided this test. An advanced capitalist country, coming after one of the most backward, has demonstrated to the whole world in a matter of a hundred-odd days not only the same principal revolutionary forces and principal direction of the revolution, but also the same principal form of the new, proletarian democracy—the Soviets.

At the same time in Britain, a victor country, the richest in colonies, the longest serving model of "social peace", or so it was reputed, the oldest capitalist country, we can see an extensive, irrepressible, intense and powerful growth of Soviets and of new Soviet forms of mass proletarian struggle—the Shop Stewards Committees.

In America, the strongest and youngest capitalist country, the workers have tremendous sympathy with the Soviets.

The ice has been broken.

The Soviets have triumphed throughout the world.

They have triumphed first and foremost because they have won the workers' sympathy. That is the main thing. No savagery by the imperialist bourgeoisie, no persecution or murder of Bolsheviks can deprive the people of this gain. The more the "democratic" bourgeoisie rage, the firmer the grip these gains will take on the hearts of the workers, on their moods, on their minds, and the more they will inspire their heroic struggle.

The ice has been broken.

That is why the work of the International Conference of Communists in Moscow which founded the Third International has proceeded so easily, so smoothly, with such calm and firm resolution.

We have recorded what has already been won. We have written down what has already taken a firm grip on the people's minds. Everyone knew, and what is more, everyone saw, felt, sensed, each from his own country's experience, that a new proletarian movement was in full swing. Everyone realised that this unprecedentedly strong and deep-going movement cannot be confined to any of the old frameworks, or held in check by the past masters at petty politics, neither by the world-schooled, world-skilled Lloyd Georges and Wilsons of British and American "democratic" capitalism, nor by the Hendersons, Renaudels, Brantings and all the other case-hardened heroes of social-chauvinism.

The new movement is heading towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, making headway despite all the vacillation, despite desperate reverses, despite the unparalleled and incredible "Russian" chaos (if one judges superficially as an onlooker). It is heading for *Soviet government* with the torrential might of millions and tens of millions of workers sweeping everything from their path.

This is what we have recorded. We have embodied in our resolutions, theses, reports and speeches what has already been won.

Marxism, illuminated by the bright light of the new, universally rich experience of the revolutionary workers,

has helped us to understand the inevitability of the present development. It will help the workers of the whole world, who are fighting to overthrow capitalist wage-slavery, more clearly to appreciate the aims of their struggle, to march more firmly along the path already outlined, more confidently and firmly to achieve victory and to consolidate it.

The founding of the Third, Communist International heralds the international republic of Soviets, the international victory of communism.

March 5, 1919

Pravda No. 51, March 6, 1919
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

FOUNDING OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

SPEECH AT A JOINT MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET, THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS), THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS, MOSCOW TRADE UNIONS AND FACTORY COMMITTEES TO MARK THE FOUNDING OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL MARCH 6, 1919

(*Stormy ovation.*) Comrades, at the First Congress of the Communist International we did not succeed in getting representatives from all countries where this organisation has most faithful friends and where there are workers whose sympathies are entirely with us. Allow me, therefore, to begin with a short quotation which will show you that in reality we have more friends than we can see, than we know and than we were able to assemble here, in Moscow, despite all persecution, despite the entire, seemingly omnipotent, union of the bourgeoisie of the whole world. This persecution has gone to such lengths as to attempt to surround us with a sort of Great Wall of China, and to deport Bolsheviks in dozens from the freest republics of the world. They seem to be scared stiff that ten or a dozen Bolsheviks will infect the whole world. But we, of course, know that this fear is ridiculous—because they have already infected the whole world, because the Russian workers' struggle has already convinced working people everywhere that the destiny of the world revolution is being decided here, in Russia.

Comrades, I have here a copy of *L'Humanité*,[180] a French newspaper whose policy corresponds more to that of our Mensheviks or Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. During the war, this paper was utterly ruthless in its attacks on

those who supported our viewpoint. Today it is defending those who during the war went along with their own bourgeoisie. This very newspaper reports in its issue of January 13, 1919, that a mammoth meeting (as the newspaper itself admits) took place in Paris of active party and trade union members of the Seine Federation, i.e., the district nearest to Paris, the centre of the proletarian movement, the centre of all political life in France. The first speaker was Bracke, a socialist who throughout the war took the same line as our Mensheviks and Right-wing defence advocates. He was meek and mild now. Not a word about a single burning issue! He ended by saying that he was against his government's interference in the struggle of the proletariat of other countries. His words were drowned in applause. The next speaker was a supporter of his, a certain Pierre Laval. He spoke of demobilisation, the burning issue in France today—a country which has probably borne greater sacrifices than any other country in this criminal war. And this country now sees that demobilisation is being dragged out, held up, that there is no desire to carry it through, that preparations are being made for a new war that will obviously demand new sacrifices from the French workers for the sake of settling how much more of the spoils the French or British capitalists will get. The newspaper goes on to say that the crowd listened to the speaker, Pierre Laval, but when he started running down Bolshevism, the protests and excitement stopped the meeting. After that, citizen Pierre Renaudel was refused a hearing, and the meeting ended with a brief statement by citizen Péricat. He is one of the few people in the French labour movement who in the main is in agreement with us. And so, the newspaper has to admit that the speaker who began to attack the Bolsheviks was immediately pulled up.

Comrades, we have not been able to get even one delegate here directly from France, and only one Frenchman, Comrade Guilbeaux, arrived here, and he with great difficulty. (*Stormy applause.*) He will speak here today. He spent months in the prisons of that free republic, Switzerland, being accused of having contact with Lenin and preparing a revolution in Switzerland. He was escorted through Germany by gendarmes and officers, for fear, evidently, that

he might drop a match that would set Germany on fire. But Germany is ablaze without this match. In France, too, as we can see, there are sympathisers with the Bolshevik movement. The French people are probably among the most experienced, most politically conscious, most active and responsive. They will not allow a speaker at a public meeting to strike a false note: he is stopped. Considering the French temperament, he was lucky not to have been dragged down from the rostrum! Therefore, when a newspaper hostile to us admits what took place at this big meeting we can safely say the French proletariat is on our side.

I am going to read another short quotation, from an Italian newspaper. The attempts to isolate us from the rest of the world are so great that we very rarely receive socialist newspapers from abroad. It is a rare thing to receive a copy of the Italian newspaper *Avanti!*,[181] the organ of the Italian Socialist Party, a party which participated in Zimmerwald, fought against the war and has now resolved not to attend the yellow congress in Berne, the congress of the old International, which was to be attended by people who had helped their governments to prolong this criminal war. To this day, *Avanti!* is under strict censorship. But in this issue, which arrived here by chance, I read an item on party life in a small locality called Cavriago (probably a remote spot because it cannot be located on the map). It appears that the workers there adopted a resolution supporting their newspaper for its uncompromising stand and declared their approval of the German Spartacists. Then follow the words "*Sovietisti russi*" which, even though they are in Italian, can be understood all over the world. They sent greetings to the Russian "*Sovietisti*" and expressed the wish that the programme of the Russian and German revolutionaries should be adopted throughout the world and serve to carry the fight against the bourgeoisie and military domination to a conclusion. When you read a resolution like that, adopted in some Italian Poshekhonye,[182] you have every right to say to yourself that the Italian people are on our side, the Italian people understand what the Russian "*Sovietisti*" are, what the programme of the Russian "*Sovietisti*" and the German Spartacists is. Yet at that time we had no such programme! We had no common

programme with the German Spartacists, but the Italian workers rejected all they had seen in their bourgeois press, which, bribed as it is by the millionaires and multimillionaires, spreads slander about us in millions of copies. It failed to deceive the Italian workers, who grasped what the Spartacists and the "*Sovietisti*" were and declared that they sympathised with their programme, at a time when this programme did not exist. That is why we found our task so easy at this Congress. All we had to do was to record as a programme what had already been implanted in the minds and hearts of the workers, even those cast away in some remote spot and cut off from us by police and military cordons. That is why we have been able to reach concerted decisions on all the main issues with such ease and complete unanimity. And we are fully convinced that these decisions will meet with a powerful response among workers elsewhere.

The Soviet movement, comrades, is the form which has been won in Russia, which is now spreading throughout the world and the very name of which gives the workers a complete programme. I hope that we, having had the good fortune to develop the Soviet form to victory, will not become swelled-headed about it.

We know very well that the reason we were the first to take part in a Soviet proletarian revolution was not because we were as well or better prepared than other workers, but because we were worse prepared. This is why we were faced with the most savage and decrepit enemy, and it is this that accounted for the outward scale of the revolution. But we also know that the Soviets exist here to this day, that they are grappling with gigantic difficulties which originate from an inadequate cultural level and from the burden that has weighed down on us for more than a year, on us who stand alone at our posts, at a time when we are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and when, as you know perfectly well, harrowing ordeals, the hardships of famine and terrible suffering have befallen us.

Those who directly or indirectly side with the bourgeoisie often try to appeal to the workers and provoke indignation among them by pointing to the severe sufferings of the workers today. And we tell them: yes, these sufferings are

severe and we do not conceal them from you. We tell the workers that, and they know it well from their own experience. You can see we are fighting not only to win socialism for ourselves, not only to ensure that our children shall only recollect capitalists and landowners as prehistoric monsters; we are fighting to ensure that the workers of the whole world triumph together with us.

And this First Congress of the Communist International, which has made the point that throughout the world the Soviets are winning the sympathy of the workers, shows us that the victory of the world communist revolution is assured. (*Applause.*) The bourgeoisie will continue to vent their fury in a number of countries; the bourgeoisie there are just beginning to prepare the destruction of the best people, the best representatives of socialism, as is evident from the brutal murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht by the whiteguards. These sacrifices are inevitable. We seek no agreement with the bourgeoisie, we are marching to the final and decisive battle against them. But we know that after the ordeal, agony and distress of the war, when the people throughout the world are fighting for demobilisation, when they feel they have been betrayed and appreciate how incredibly heavy the burden of taxation is that has been placed upon them by the capitalists who killed tens of millions of people to decide who would receive more of the profits—we know that these brigands' rule is at an end!

Now that the meaning of the word "Soviet" is understood by everybody, the victory of the communist revolution is assured. The comrades present in this hall saw the founding of the first Soviet republic; now they see the founding of the Third, Communist International (*applause*), and they will all see the founding of the World Federative Republic of Soviets. (*Applause.*)

Brief report published in *Pravda* No. 52, March 7, 1919

Published in full in May 1919

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NOTE TO STALIN ON REORGANISATION OF STATE CONTROL[183]

I think the following should be added to the decree on control:

1) formation of central (and local) bodies with workers' participation;

2) introduction by law of the systematic participation of witnesses from among the workers, with compulsory participation of up to two-thirds women;

3) giving immediate priority to the following as our urgent tasks:

(a) lightning inquiries into citizens' complaints

(b) combating red tape

(c) revolutionary measures to combat abuses and red tape

(d) special attention to boosting labour productivity, and

(e) to increasing the quantity of products, etc.

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NOTES

[1] The session was called because of the critical position of the Soviet Republic which was cut off from her main sources of food supply, raw materials and fuel as a result of the foreign armed intervention and whiteguard revolts. A unanimous resolution was passed on Lenin's report, moved by the Communist group. p. 18

[2] Reference is to a counter-revolutionary revolt of the Czechoslovak army corps engineered by the Entente with the active assistance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The corps was formed in Russia from Czech and Slovak prisoners of war before the October Socialist Revolution. In the summer of 1918 the corps numbered more than 60,000 men (the total number of Czechoslovak prisoners of war was 200,000). After the establishment of Soviet power the corps was financed by the Entente. Tomáš Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak National Council and leader of the Czech bourgeois nationalists, proclaimed the corps part of the French army, and Entente representatives raised the question of its evacuation to France. The Soviet Government agreed to the evacuation, provided the Russian troops were allowed to return home from France. The agreement of March 26, 1918, allowed the corps to leave Russia via Vladivostok on the condition that it surrender its arms. But the commanders of the corps did not keep their word and provoked an armed revolt at the end of May on the instigation of the Entente. The governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France openly supported the revolt in every possible way, while French officers took a direct part in it. Acting in close contact with the whiteguards and kulaks, the mutineers occupied a large part of the Urals, the Volga area and Siberia and restored bourgeois rule. In the occupied areas they formed whiteguard governments with Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary participation—the Siberian government in Omsk, the Committee of Constituent Assembly members in Samara, etc.

On June 11, the Central Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist groups in Russia addressed an appeal to the soldiers of the corps exposing the counter-revolutionary nature of the revolt and calling on them to join Czechoslovak units of the Red Army. Most Czech and Slovak prisoners of war were sympathetic to Soviet power and did not fall for the counter-revolutionary propaganda of the corps commanders. Realising they had been deceived, many left the corps, refusing to fight against Soviet power. About 12,000 fought for the Red Army.

The Volga area was liberated in the autumn of 1918. The white-guard Czechs were completely routed along with Kolchak's troops. p. 18

[3] Lenin refers to the article "The French Millions", which appeared in the issue of June 28, 1918, of the Czechoslovak Communist newspaper *Průkopník Svobody* (*The Banner of Freedom*) published in Moscow in 1918-19. On the same day, the article was reprinted in full in *Pravda* and partly in *Izvestia* of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. p. 19

[4] Lenin refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries which took place on July 6-7, 1918, as the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets was meeting in Moscow.

The Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party was formed at its First National Congress held in November 1917. Until then its members had belonged to the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which had emerged during the First World War and was headed by M. A. Spiridonova, B. D. Kamkov and M. A. Natanson (Bobrov). At the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries constituted the majority in the Socialist-Revolutionary group. The group split over the question of Congress attendance The Right Socialist-Revolutionaries left the Congress on the directives of the Central Committee of their party and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries stayed and voted together with the Bolsheviks on the major items of the agenda. But they rejected the Bolsheviks' invitation to join the Soviet Government. After long hesitation and so as to retain influence among the peasants, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries came to an agreement with the Bolsheviks and their representatives took posts in the Council of People's Commissars. They clashed with the Bolsheviks, however, on the fundamental questions of the socialist revolution and opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat. In January and February 1918 the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party campaigned against the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Following its conclusion and ratification by the Fourth Congress of Soviets in March 1918 the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries resigned from the Council of People's Commissars, but retained their posts on the boards of People's Commissariats and in local government bodies. As the socialist revolution developed in the countryside they went into opposition to Soviet power.

On June 24 the party's Central Committee decided on revolt. Defeated at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to torpedo the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and embroil the country in a war with Germany. On July 6 they assassinated the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, in Moscow. They followed this up with armed revolt. Their strike force was a unit under the command of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Popov, a Cheka worker. They bombarded the Kremlin and seized the Telephone Exchange and the Telegraph Office which they held for two hours. They issued several provocative messages, bulletins

and telegrams announcing that power had passed into their hands and that the entire population had greeted them enthusiastically,

The Fifth Congress of Soviets instructed the government to take urgent measures to suppress the revolt. The Left Socialist-Revolutionary group at the Congress was arrested. Twenty-four hours after it had begun, by 2 p.m. July 7, the revolt was put down due to the steps taken by the Soviet Government and the concerted action of the Moscow workers and garrison. The revolt was part of the anti-Soviet campaign of the counter-revolutionaries at home and the imperialists abroad, and was secretly supported by foreign diplomatic missions. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to start revolts also in Petrograd, Vologda and other towns.

Following the suppression of the revolt the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets adopted a decision to remove from the Soviets all Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who supported the reckless policy of their leaders. The Congress received numerous telegrams from workers and peasants all over the country welcoming the suppression of the revolt and expressing their readiness to defend Soviet power by arms. p. 21

[5] *Dashnaktsutyun Party*—Armenian nationalist party which arose in the early nineties of the last century and strove for liberation of the Turkish Armenians from subjugation to the sultan of Turkey. Besides the bourgeoisie it included many national intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie and working people who fell for the nationalist and socialist phrase-mongering. During the Revolution of 1905-07 the party drew close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In 1907 a congress of the party adopted a Narodnik type of "socialist" programme.

After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution the Dashnaks supported the Provisional Government policy and, following the October Revolution, they joined the anti-Soviet bloc of Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mussavatists. Between 1918 and 1920 they headed the counter-revolutionary nationalist government of Armenia. Their policy tended to turn Armenia into a colony of the imperialists and bridgehead for the British and French imperialists and Russian whiteguards in the struggle against the Soviet Republic. In November 1920 the people of Annenia led by the Bolsheviks and Red Army units brought down the Dashnak government. After Soviet power had triumphed in Transcaucasia the Dashnaktsutyun organisations were broken up. p. 21

[6] *Mussavatists*—members of the nationalist Mussavat Party of the Azerbaijanian bourgeoisie and landowners, which was formed in 1912. During the October Revolution and Civil War it was the main counter-revolutionary force in Azerbaijan. After the fall of Soviet government in 1918, the Mussavatists came to power with the help of the Turkish and British interventionists. On April 28, 1920, the working people of Azerbaijan and Red Army units overthrew the Mussavatist government. p. 22

[7] On July 25, 1918, an emergency session of the Baku Soviet discussed the political and military situation in Baku in connection with the Turkish offensive. Under the pretext of defending Baku, the Mensheviks, Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries demanded that British troops be called in "for help". The Bolshevik leaders of the Soviet government in Baku, S. G. Shahumyan, M. A. Azizbekov, P. A. Djaparidze, Y. D. Zevin and others, rejected these treacherous demands. They declared that to "invite" the British interventionists into Baku would be betraying the Soviet Republic and insisted on taking urgent measures to defend Baku with the forces available. The Bolsheviks, however, were narrowly defeated and a resolution was carried to call in the British.

Finding themselves outvoted, the Bolsheviks announced their resignation from the Council of People's Commissars. But they soon realised their mistake and decided to stay on and utilise every opportunity to isolate and defeat the traitors. At its emergency meeting the Executive of the Baku Soviet decided that the People's Commissars should retain their posts until settlement of the question of power. The Baku city Bolshevik conference held on July 27 decided not to relinquish power without a fight, urgently to organise the city's defence under the leadership of the Council of People's Commissars, announce general mobilisation and call on the workers to defend the city and Soviet government. In pursuance of this decision the Baku Council of People's Commissars declared martial law in the city, instructed the Cheka to cut short counter-revolutionary propaganda and called on the workers of Baku to take to arms in defence of the city

However, the efforts of the Communists and many Baku workers were frustrated by the treachery of the Dashnaks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The Dashnak units left the front and the Turkish troops advanced through the exposed section. On July 31 Soviet power in Baku fell to the foreign interventionists and their agents. Among other causes of its fall were the failure of the Party organisations of Azerbaijan and the Baku Council of People's Commissars to secure a firm alliance between the Baku proletariat and the working peasants of Azerbaijan and their mistakes over the national question, which were taken advantage of by the Mussavatists, Dashnaks and other counter-revolutionaries to deceive the people.

Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Dashnaks, the agents of the Entente, formed a counter-revolutionary government—the Dictatorship of the Central Caspian Area. The Soviet leaders in Azerbaijan were arrested. On the night of September 19-20 twenty-six Baku Commissars (S. G. Shahumyan, M. A. Azizbekov, P. A. Djaparidze, I. T. Fioletov, Y. D. Zevin, G. N. Korganov, M. G. Vezirov and others) were shot by the British with the direct connivance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. p. 23

[8] This refers to the whiteguard revolt in Yaroslavl which began on July 6, 1918. It was organised by the counter-revolutionary Union for the Defence of the Country and Freedom which was led by the

Right Socialist-Revolutionary B. V. Savinkov. This revolt, like other counter-revolutionary revolts in Russia at that time, was supported by the Entente imperialists with the active participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Union received large sums of money from them. The revolt was part of the general plan of intervention in Russia and was timed to coincide with the revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow (see Note 4). It was also planned to start simultaneous revolts in Murom, Kostroma, Rybinsk and other towns of the Volga area and central Russia.

On the eve of the revolt Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and whiteguard officers gathered in Yaroslavl in large numbers. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, being most influential, filled a number of responsible posts. On July 6, the mutineers occupied the centre of the town, the arsenal, the Post and Telegraph Office and other buildings. Party and Soviet workers were killed. The mutineers tried to seize the workers' districts but encountered stubborn and organised resistance. Party organisations of the factories rallied the people, and armed workers and Red Army units went into battle. The Soviet Government sent military units and armed workers' detachments from Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kostroma, Vologda and Rybinsk. On July 21, 1918, the revolt was put down. p. 27

[9] Lenin refers to the decree On the Organisation of the Village Poor and Supply to Them of Grain, Prime Necessities and Agricultural Implements which was endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on June 11, 1918. The decree provided for the establishment of the Poor Peasants' Committees on local initiative It charged the Committees with the task of taking stock of the food supplies of the peasant farms, ascertaining the kulaks' food resources and assisting the Soviet supply bodies in requisitioning surpluses as well as protecting and delivering confiscated grain to the state granaries. The Committees were also to supply the poor peasants with food at the expense of the kulak farms, distribute farm implements and manufactured goods, look after sowing and harvesting, protect the crops and combat grain profiteering. By the autumn of 1918 over 80,000 Poor Peasants' Committees were functioning in the localities. They formed the strongholds and organs of the proletarian dictatorship in the countryside. Their establishment marked the extensive development of the socialist revolution in the villages. They played an outstanding part in suppressing the kulak counter-revolution and undermining the economic power of the kulaks through their partial expropriation. In a comparatively short period of time the Committees confiscated and turned over to the poor and middle peasants 50 million hectares of land, and requisitioned the bulk of the kulaks' farm implements for distribution among the poor and economically weak middle peasants. Great credit is due to the Committees for carrying through the abolition of landed proprietorship and supplying foodstuffs to the hungry industrial centres and the Red Army. The Poor Peasants' Committees

were active in establishing collective agricultural enterprises, the artels and communes, which together with the state farms were the first stones laid in the foundation of the socialist countryside. According to incomplete data the number of collective farms increased from 240 at the time the Poor Peasants' Committees were created to 1,600 at the end of 1918. The Committees took the initiative in forming Red Army units by recruiting volunteers from among the poor peasants. They also helped to consolidate local Soviets and purge them of kulak elements.

The Poor Peasants' Committees were vastly important in strengthening the worker-peasant alliance and in winning over the middle peasants to the Soviet side. As Lenin pointed out, in their activities the Poor Peasants' Committees were to rely on the middle as well as the poor peasants. They paved the way for a change-over from the policy of neutralising the middle peasants to a firm alliance with them.

By the autumn of 1918 the Poor Peasants' Committees, which played a historic role in the socialist revolution, had outlived their usefulness. The Soviets were consolidated with the help of the Committees and the extensive network of rural Party cells. In view of this and also of the need to "consummate Soviet construction by establishing a uniform pattern of Soviets on the entire territory of the Soviet Republic" the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets held in November 1918 decided to merge the Poor Peasants' Committees with the volost and village Soviets. p. 28

[10] Lenin refers to the peace treaty concluded between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) on March 3, 1918, in Brest-Litovsk and ratified on March 15 by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The peace terms were very harsh. Germany and Austria-Hungary were to get Poland, nearly the whole of the Baltic region and part of Byelorussia. The Ukraine was to be severed from Russia and become dependent on Germany. Turkey was to get Ardahan, Batumi and Kars. In August 1918 Germany forced Soviet Russia to conclude a supplementary treaty and financial agreement which contained even harsher terms.

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was concluded despite dogged resistance from Trotsky and the anti-Party group of "Left Communists". Credit for its conclusion was due to Lenin's efforts to overcome opposition. The peace was a judicious political compromise. It brought a respite from the war and enabled the Soviet government to demobilise the old demoralised army and create a new Red Army, to launch socialist construction and gather strength for the coming struggle against internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention. The signing of the treaty also promoted the peace struggle, enhanced the revolutionary mood in the armies and among the people of all countries in the war. On November 13, following the revolution in Germany, which led to the downfall of the monarchy, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee repealed the treaty. p. 29

[11] Lenin refers to the historic decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the nationalisation of large-scale industry, approved on June 28, 1918, and published in *Izvestia* No. 134 on June 30. Under the decree all big factories with basic capital of 200,000-1,000,000 rubles and over were nationalised. The decree consummated the socialisation of the major means of production. It was preceded by the nationalisation of banks, big metallurgical plants, sugar refineries, coal and oil industries, water transport, etc. While establishing state ownership of large-scale industry, the Council of People's Commissars left the nationalised enterprises, pending their transfer to Soviet economic bodies, "in the hands of their former owners for free use on lease terms". The owners were held responsible for the maintenance and proper operation of the enterprises. The workers, technical staff and managers were brought into the service of the Soviet Republic. The Supreme Economic Council was obliged to draw up at short notice and circulate to all the nationalised enterprises detailed instructions on how to run them. Despite the enormous difficulties involved, the nationalisation was completed quickly due to the organisational measures of the Communist Party and the enthusiasm of the workers. By August 31 more than 3,000 enterprises had been nationalised.

The decree also announced the nationalisation of all privately-owned railways and communal services (water supply, gasworks, trams, etc.), which came under the control of local Soviets. p. 29

[12] *Black Hundreds*—Monarchist gangs in tsarist Russia formed by the police to fight the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, hounded progressives among the intellectuals and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 29

[13] The Congress was held in Moscow from July 30 to August 1, 1918. There were 122 delegates, of whom 120 were Communists. G. I. Petrovsky, People's Commissar for the Interior of the R.S.F.S.R., delivered a report on the work of the Commissariat of the Interior and its immediate tasks. Other speakers at the Congress dealt with the activity of the local Soviets, the character, tasks and organisational forms of Soviet militia, housing and other subjects. Lenin spoke at the evening session on July 30. The resolutions called for the improvement of the Soviet apparatus and emphasised the need for greater harmony between all its parts, close contact with the centre and complete obedience to the Constitution. The Congress called on the workers and peasants of the Republic to rise in arms in defence of the socialist fatherland. p. 35

[14] Reference is to the *Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic*, unanimously adopted at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918, and published on July 19 as the Fundamental Law which went into force on publication.

It was the first Soviet Constitution. It gave force of law to the great gains of the October Revolution—the new, Soviet state system,

the abolition of private capitalist property and landed proprietorship, equality of all nations inhabiting Russia, etc. It gave force of law to the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of Soviet power, provided for the participation of all working people in state administration and disfranchised the exploiters. Lenin pointed out: "The world has never known such a constitution as ours. It embodies the workers' experience of struggle and organisation against the exploiters both at home and abroad" (see p. 146 of this volume). p. 36

[15] The Warsaw revolutionary regiment was formed from Polish volunteers and numbered 16,000 men. On many occasions it took part in the fight against the whiteguard troops. On August 2, 1918, on the eve of departure for the front, a regimental meeting addressed by Lenin was held at the former Commercial Institute in Moscow (now the Plekhanov Institute of the National Economy). The meeting was organised, among others, by Julian Marchlewski, a prominent figure in the Polish working-class movement. p. 38

[16] Once a week, on Fridays, the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) called big rallies of workers and Red Army men in various districts of Moscow. On Lenin's suggestion, members of the Central Committee and high-ranking officials regularly addressed these rallies. Lenin often spoke at the rallies, sometimes 3-4 times a day, and demanded that no high-ranking official shirk his duty of speaking before workers. He liked to keep his ear to the ground and showed a keen interest in the questions and proposals put to the speakers by the workers.

On August 2, 1918, rallies were held on the subject "The Soviet Republic Is in Danger". p. 41

[17] Lenin wrote the theses at the time when the country was in the grip of a very severe food crisis and was beating off the interventionists and counter-revolutionaries at home.

The theses provided the basis for the six decrees on the food question which were discussed and adopted at the sessions of the Council of People's Commissars on August 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1918: On the Enlistment of the Services of Workers' Organisations in Grain Collection; Decree on Harvesting and Requisitioning Teams; Regulations on (Guard Requisitioning Teams on Railways and Water Routes; Decree on Obligatory Commodity Exchange in the Grain-Growing Areas, On Fixed Prices for the Grain Harvested in 1918, and the appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to all working people entitled "Join the Grain Campaign". The decrees were all published in *Izvestia* on August 6 and 8.

The decree on the tax in kind mentioned in Clause 8 of the theses was drafted later and adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on October 26, 1918. p. 45

[18] The draft decision written by Lenin was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on August 2, 1918, together with the decree

on the regulations governing admission to higher educational establishments of the R.S.F.S.R. The decree opened colleges and universities for all over 16 and abolished school leavers' diplomas or certificates, competitive examinations and tuition fees. The decision and the decree were published in *Izvestia* on August 6. p. 48

[19] Lenin wrote this letter in reply to the report about the meeting of the Yelets branch of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which appeared in the Yelets *Sovetskaya Gazeta* on July 31, 1918. The copy of the newspaper carrying the report was delivered to Lenin by K. Grodner, a representative of the Yelets branch of the R.C.P.(B.), who was sent to Moscow for the purpose of refuting the slander of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Kryukov, with which Lenin deals in his letter. On August 11, *Sovetskaya Gazeta* carried Lenin's letter and Grodner's report, in which the latter said he had ascertained from talks with Y. M. Sverdlov, V. A. Avanesov and V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich that they did not say what Kryukov had charged them with saying

Sovetskaya Gazeta—organ of the Yelets Uyezd Executive Committee, Orel Gubernia. Appeared from May 16, 1918, to March 2, 1919. p. 49

[20] Reference is to the decree on land adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets on October 26 (November 8), 1917. The decree abolished private ownership of land and proclaimed its nationalisation. However, the Peasant Mandate, which formed part of the decree, insisted on the distribution of land among working peasants "in conformity with a labour standard or a subsistence standard quota," putting forward the idea of land socialisation. Lenin's comment on the nationalisation of land and "equal land tenure" is to be found on pp. 306-15 of this volume. p. 50

[21] The rally at which Lenin spoke was held in Sokolniki Krug (now Sokolniki Park) in Moscow. On that day rallies were held on the subject "The Fifth Year of the World Slaughter". p. 52

[22] Lenin refers to the Czech-occupied towns and areas where white-guard governments had been formed. These governments, with Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries participating in them, perpetrated mass atrocities. p. 55

[23] On August 6, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars passed a decision "On Fixed Prices for the Grain Harvested in 1918" providing for a threefold increase in grain procurement prices. Lenin first raised the question of putting up procurement prices for grain in his "Theses on the Food Question" which he wrote on August 2 (see pp. 45-47 of this volume). On August 8 the decision was published in *Izvestia*. p. 57

[24] The draft of the telegram was written by Lenin after reports from the localities had mentioned distortions by Party and government

bodies of the policy towards the Poor Peasants' Committees. In a number of areas the slogan calling for the organisation of the Committees was taken to mean that the poor peasants should be opposed to the rest of the peasants, that is, to the kulaks and the middle peasants. The latter were barred from elections to the Poor Peasants' Committees and there were even cases of the Committees being appointed by volost Soviets instead of being elected. On August 17, the telegram based on this draft and signed by Lenin and Tsurupa, the People's Commissar for Food, was sent to all the gubernia Soviets and food committees. On August 18 it was published in *Izvestia*. p. 59

[25] On August 6, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decision to raise grain procurement prices and a decree On the Supply of Agriculture with Implements and Metal. The draft of the decree submitted to the Council of People's Commissars for approval was supplemented by Lenin and in this final form was endorsed on April 24. Three days later it appeared in *Izvestia*. p. 59

[26] The meeting of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) discussed the question of setting up groups of sympathisers, which had been raised by Lenin. This was dictated by the need to enlist new forces for the Party from among the advanced and politically-conscious working people. Lenin spoke twice during the debate. On Lenin's suggestion it was decided to start creating the groups and to work out rules of organisation.

On August 22, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published the rules approved by the Executive Commission of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). The rules set out the procedure for admittance and the rights and duties of members of the groups. On August 31, the rules were ratified at the Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) which by an overwhelming majority declared itself in favour of setting up the groups. This step strengthened the ties between the Party and the masses and drew broad sections of the working people into political life. Later on, the groups of sympathisers developed into the system of candidature for Party membership. p. 60

[27] The dispatch of the letter to America was organised by the Bolshevik M. M. Borodin, who had recently been there. With the foreign military intervention and the blockade of Soviet Russia this involved considerable difficulties. The letter was delivered to the United States by P. I. Travin (Sletov). Along with the letter he brought the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Government's Note to President Wilson containing the demand to stop the intervention. The well-known American socialist and journalist John Reed secured the publication of all these documents in the American press.

In December 1918 a slightly abridged version of the letter appeared in the New York magazine *The Class Struggle* and the Boston weekly *The Revolutionary Age*, both organs of the Left wing of the American Socialist Party. *The Revolutionary Age* was brought out

by John Reed and Sen Katayama. The letter evoked keen interest among readers and it was published as a reprint from *The Class Struggle* in a large number of copies. Subsequently it was published many times in the bourgeois and socialist press of the U.S.A. and Western Europe, in the French socialist magazine *Demain* No. 28-29, 1918, in No. 138 of *The Call*, organ of the British Socialist Party, the Berlin magazine *Die Aktion* No. 51-52, 1918, and elsewhere. In 1934 the letter was brought out in New York in the form of a pamphlet, which contained the passages omitted in earlier publications.

The letter was widely used by the American Left Socialists and was instrumental in aiding the development of the labour and communist movement in the U.S. and Europe. It helped advanced workers to appreciate the nature of imperialism and the great revolutionary changes effected by the Soviet government. Lenin's letter aroused a mounting protest in the U.S. against the armed intervention. p. 62

[28] Lenin quotes from Chernyshevsky's review of the book by the American economist H. Ch. Carey, *Letters to the President on the Foreign and Domestic Policy of the Union, and its Effects*. Chernyshevsky wrote: "The path of history is not paved like Nevsky Prospekt; it runs across fields, either dusty or muddy, and cuts through swamps or forest thickets. Anyone who fears being covered with dust or muddying his boots, should not engage in social activity." p. 68

[29] *Man in the muffler*—a character from Chekhov's story of the same title, personifying a narrow-minded philistine scared of initiative and new ideas. p. 69

[30] *Appeal to Reason*—American socialist newspaper, founded in Girard, Kansas, in 1895. The newspaper propagated socialist ideas and was immensely popular among the workers. During the First World War it pursued an internationalist policy.

Debs's article appeared in the paper on September 11, 1915. Its title, which Lenin most probably quoted from memory, was "When I Shall Fight". p. 70

[31] In the spring and summer of 1917 there was mounting discontent in the French army against the continuation of the war, inspired by the growth of an anti-war revolutionary movement among the French workers under the impact of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in February 1917. The presence of Russian soldiers in France, who had been sent there in 1916, also added to the ferment in the French armed forces. After the February 1917 revolution the Russian army units stationed in France set up Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies to control the actions of the officers. Most Russian soldiers refused to fight and demanded from the Provisional Government that they be sent home. This had its inevitable effect on the French units. In mid May, after the French offensive had failed and scores of thousands of French soldiers had been killed, a revolutionary movement began in the army and continued to the end of

June. War-weary soldiers did not want to stay in the trenches and organised rallies demanding better conditions and cessation of the imperialist war. According to official data, the movement involved 75 infantry regiments, 23 rifle battalions and 12 artillery regiments. The soldiers not only refused to obey officers but even turned their weapons against the government. However, the soldiers were not prepared for consistent revolutionary action against the war, one reason being the absence of a workers' revolutionary party. The French Government quelled the unrest with the help of social-chauvinists and anarcho-syndicalists. Following this, the French Home Minister Malvy was brought for trial on the charge of failure to deal firmly enough with the "defeatists". p. 82

[32] Lenin refers to the priest Gapon, an agent of the secret police. Bent on provocation, he proposed to hold a peaceful march to the Winter Palace to submit a petition to the tsar on January 9, 1905. The tsar gave the order to open fire on the unarmed workers, their wives and children. Over 1,000 were killed and some 5,000 wounded. On that very day barricades were thrown up in Petrograd and there were armed skirmishes between the workers, and the police and troops. January 9 marked the beginning of the First Russian Revolution. p. 83

[33] The Congress was held in Moscow in the building of the Higher Women's Courses from August 26 to September 4, 1918. The 700-odd delegates represented departments of education, teachers and educationalists. Lenin was elected honorary chairman and invited to attend. He spoke at the Congress on August 28, the third day of the proceedings. The Congress discussed the Regulations on the Single Labour School of the R.S.F.S.R., which were later endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and published in *Izvestia* on October 16. The regulations played a very important part in building the Soviet education system.

In connection with the attempt on Lenin's life made by the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist Fanny Kaplan on August 30, 1918, the Congress met in emergency plenary session the next day and adopted a resolution conveying a message of sympathy to Lenin and Krupskaya and expressing firm conviction in the triumph of the revolutionary cause. p. 85

[34] The Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) asked Lenin to speak at a mass rally in Basmanny District of Moscow on the subject "Two Governments (the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie)". The rally was held at the Grain Exchange. p. 89

[35] *Zemstvos*—local government bodies in the central gubernias of Russia run by the nobility and established in 1864. Their authority was confined to purely local affairs (building of hospitals and roads, statistics, insurance, etc.) They came under the control of

the governors and the Home Minister, who could repeal any decision that did not suit the government. p. 89

[36] The meeting was held in a hand-grenade shop of the works. Lenin came straight from the rally in Basmanny District and spoke on the subject "Two Governments (the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie)". At 7.30 p.m., as he was leaving the premises, the Socialist-Revolutionary Fanny Kaplan shot him. Two bullets found their mark.

The news of the attempt on Lenin's life aroused a storm of indignation throughout the country. People demanded that terrorists and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and landowners be ruthlessly dealt with, and pledged to devote all their strength to defeating the enemy. The men at the front went into battle eager to take revenge on the enemy for the attempt on Lenin's life. The Soviet people rallied behind the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and doubled their war efforts.

On September 4, 1918, *Izvestia* carried a report that Kaplan had been shot by decision of the Cheka. p. 90

[37] Lenin wrote this letter in reply to the message of greetings sent by the Conference.

The First All-Russia Conference of Proletarian Cultural and Educational Organisations was held in Moscow from September 15-20, 1918. According to the figures supplied by the mandate commission, 330 delegates attended. Lenin's letter was read at the fifth session, on September 19. The speakers at the Conference included N. K. Krupskaya, M. N. Pokrovsky and Proletkult leaders A. A. Bogdanov, P. I. Lebedev-Polyansky, F. I. Kalinin and others.

The Conference resolutions reflected the erroneous stand of the Proletkult leaders who attempted to shirk the tasks of mass cultural and educational work, to build up a "proletarian culture" in isolation from past culture, a culture divorced from life and the people.

Recalling the conditions that gave rise to the letter, Krupskaya wrote. "The Proletkult was a great influence in those days. A shortcoming of the Proletkult, in Ilyich's opinion, was that its work was insufficiently linked with the general political tasks of the struggle, that it did not do enough towards stimulating the people, promoting workers and preparing them for state administration through the medium of the Soviets. In his message of greetings to the Conference he made it a point of mentioning the political tasks that confronted the Proletkult." (N. K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, Moscow, 1959, p. 483.) p. 94

[38] The Red Army occupied Simbirsk on September 12, 1918. After the capture of the town the men of the First Army sent the following telegram to Lenin: "Dear Vladimir Ilyich, the capture of your native town is our reply for one of your wounds, the capture of Samara will be for the other!" In reply Lenin sent the telegram published in this volume.

[39] Lenin's letter was read to the garrison troops of the town of Sviyazhsk. p. 100

[40] The letter was read at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and representatives of factory committees and trade unions held on October 3 on Lenin's proposal in connection with the political crisis in Germany. The resolution adopted at the session incorporated the main ideas contained in Lenin's letter. p. 101

[41] *The Socialist Review*—a monthly magazine, organ of the reformist Independent Labour Party of Britain; appeared in London from 1908 till 1934. p. 105

[42] *Fabians*—members of the reformist Fabian Society founded in 1884. It was called after the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus, who earned the nickname Cunctator (the Delayer) for his dilatory tactics and avoidance of a decisive encounter with Hannibal. Its members were chiefly bourgeois intellectuals, scientists, writers and politicians (the Webbs, Ramsay MacDonald, George Bernard Shaw and others). The Fabians rejected the need for the workers to wage the class struggle and rejected the socialist revolution, maintaining that transition from capitalism to socialism could be effected by petty reforms and gradual social evolution. Lenin called Fabianism "an extremely opportunist trend" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 358). In 1900 the Fabian Society formed a part of the Labour Party. "Fabian socialism" is a source of the Labour Party's ideology.

Lenin also mentions Fabianism in his article "British Pacifism and the British Dislike of Theory" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 260-65). p. 107

[43] *Independents*—members of the British Independent Labour Party founded by the leaders of the "new trade unions" in 1893, when there was a revival of strikes and a growing movement for the independence of the working class from the bourgeois parties. The I.L.P. united the "new trade unions", a number of the old trade unions, and also intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie, who were under the influence of the Fabians. The party was led by Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald. From the first days of its existence it pursued a bourgeois reformist policy and concentrated on the parliamentary struggle and parliamentary pacts with the Liberals. Of the Independent Labour Party Lenin wrote: "The Independent Labour Party is actually an opportunist party that has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie." (Lenin, *On Britain*, Moscow, p. 401.) p. 107

[44] Marx referred to this possibility in his letter to Kugelmann of April 12, 1871 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 318-19), and in his speech on the Hague Congress delivered at a meeting in Amsterdam on September 8, 1872 (Marx/Engels,

Werke, Bd. 18, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, p. 160). See also Engels's preface to the English edition of Volume I of *Capital* (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1959, p. 6). p. 108

[45] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 357. p. 108

[46] ibid., p. 307. p. 109

[47] Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 253-54. p. 110

[48] *Zimmerwaldists*—members of the group formed at the First International Socialist Conference held in Zimmerwald on September 5-8, 1915. Lenin described it as a first step in the development of the international anti-war movement. Thirty-eight delegates attended from parties and organisations of eleven European countries. Lenin and Zinoviev represented the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Axelrod and Martov represented the Menshevik Organising Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The International Socialist Committee was elected as a steering body of the Zimmerwald group. The group was a scene of struggle between the Zimmerwald Left, led by the Bolsheviks, and the Kautskyite Centrist majority (the so-called Zimmerwald Right). The Centrists tried to achieve reconciliation with social-chauvinists and to restore the Second International. The Zimmerwald Left called for a rupture with social-chauvinists and insisted on the need to wage a revolutionary struggle against the imperialist war and to found a new, revolutionary, proletarian International. After the Kienthal Conference in 1916, the Zimmerwald Right took up an undisguised social-chauvinist stand. In these conditions Lenin called on the Zimmerwald Left supporters to break with the Right-wing majority of the Zimmerwald group and take practical steps to found a Third, Communist International.

In September 1917 a Third Zimmerwald Conference was held in Stockholm. V. V. Vorovsky addressed the Conference on behalf of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), its Bureau abroad, and Polish Social-Democrats. In his strongly-worded speech he demanded that the Conference define its attitude towards the Russian Mensheviks, who, though they were affiliated to the Zimmerwald group, sent their representatives into the Ministry of Kerensky, the Russian Cavaignac, and were thus fully responsible for the introduction of capital punishment in the army, the June offensive at the front, the suppression of the Bolshevik newspapers, the shooting on the July demonstration, arrests of Bolsheviks, etc. The Bolsheviks got support from a number of delegates, but the majority led by Haase refused to pass a decision on this question. The motley composition of the Conference explained the compromise nature of its resolutions. The Third Zimmerwald Conference fully bore out Lenin's conclusion concerning the bankruptcy of the Zimmerwald movement and the need to immediately break with it and found a Third, Communist International.

The First Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow in March 1919 announced the dissolution of the Zimmerwald group. p. 110

[49] The session was held in the Hall of Columns of Trade Union House, Moscow. It discussed the international situation, the question of convening the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the dispatch to the front of 300 participants in the session. Lenin spoke about the international situation for the first time since his recovery. P. G. Smidovich and Y. M. Sverdlov conveyed a message of greetings to those leaving for the front. The session adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin (see pp. 128-30 of this volume) and endorsed with slight amendments by the Sixth Congress of Soviets on the basis of Lenin's report on the international situation. The session unanimously decided to convene the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and approved the agenda for it. p. 114

[50] *The Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany* was founded at the Inaugural Congress in Gotha in April 1917. Under cover of Centrist phraseology the Independents preached unity with social-chauvinists and renounced the class struggle. The Kautskyite Labour group in the Reichstag formed the core of the party.

For some time the Spartacus group was affiliated with the party, retaining its organisational and political independence and continuing its underground work and the struggle to free the Social-Democratic workers from the influence of the Centrist leaders. In 1918 the Spartacus League left the party and later on it formed the core of the Communist Party of Germany.

At its Congress in Halle in October 1920 the party split. Many Independents joined the Communist Party in December 1920 and the Right wing founded an independent party adopting the old name—the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. It existed until 1922. p. 115

[51] *The Italian Socialist Party* was founded in 1892. From the very outset a sharp ideological struggle ensued between its opportunist and revolutionary wings, which differed over policy and tactics. At the Congress in Reggio-Emilia in 1912 the outspoken reformists supporters of the war and of co-operation with the government and the bourgeoisie (Bonomi, Bissolati and others), were expelled under pressure from the Left forces. After the outbreak of the war and before Italy's entry into the war the Italian Socialist Party opposed the war under the slogan "Against War, for Neutrality!" In December 1914 a group of renegades (Mussolini and others) who defended the imperialist policy of the bourgeoisie and supported the war were expelled from the party. After Italy had joined the war on the side of the Entente in May 1915, three clearly defined trends arose in the party. The Right wing helped the bourgeoisie to wage the war; the Centre, the majority, pursued a policy of "no participation in the war and no sabotage of the war"; the Left wing took a more resolute anti-war stand but failed to conduct a consistent

struggle against the war. The Lefts did not realise the need to turn the imperialist into civil war, and to break decisively with the reformists who were collaborating with the bourgeoisie

The Italian Socialist Party held a joint conference with the Swiss socialists in Lugano in 1914 and took part in the international socialist conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal, where its representatives supported the Centrist majority.

After the October Revolution the Left wing of the party considerably grew in strength. In 1920 its representatives took part in the Second Congress of the Comintern. p. 116

[52] At the Congress of the French Socialist Party, held in Paris from October 6-11, 1918, Longuet, one of the party leaders, read a letter from Captain Sadoul, a member of the French military mission in Russia, to Romain Rolland, in which he condemned the actions of the Entente in Russia. According to the Geneva correspondent of *Pravda*, "the letter produced an enormous impression. There were cries from the left: 'Long live the Soviet Republic!'" (*Pravda* No. 221, October 13.) p. 116

[53] This refers to the British Socialist Party, Socialist Labour Party and Independent Labour Party.

The British Socialist Party was founded in Manchester in 1911 as a result of a merger of the Social-Democratic Party and other socialist groups. The B.S.P. conducted propaganda in the spirit of Marxism. In 1913 Lenin wrote that the party "...is not opportunist and is really independent of the Liberals" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 273).

But its small membership and weak contacts with the people left a sectarian imprint on the party. During the First World War a sharp struggle developed in the party between the internationalist wing (Gallacher, Inkpin, Maclean, Rothstein and others) and the social-chauvinist wing led by Hyndman. The internationalists in the party were inconsistent, Centrist on various questions. In February 1916 a group of B.S.P. members founded the newspaper *The Call*, which played an important role in rallying the internationalists. The annual conference of the party in Salford in April 1916 denounced the social-chauvinist stand of Hyndman and his supporters, who thereupon left the Party.

The British Socialist Party greeted the Great October Socialist Revolution and its members were active in the movement in defence of Soviet Russia against foreign intervention. In 1919 most of the party's branches (98 against 4) declared themselves in favour of affiliating to the Communist International. Together with the Communist Unity Group, the British Socialist Party played a major part in founding the Communist Party. At the Unity Congress in 1920 the overwhelming majority of B.S.P. branches joined the Communist Party.

The Socialist Labour Party—a revolutionary Marxist party founded in 1903 in Scotland by a group of Left, largely Scottish, Social-Democrats, who had broken with the Social-Democratic Federation.

Its chief organ was the monthly *The Socialist*. At first the party engaged mainly in propaganda, and later, as the strike movement developed, it took an active part in it. During the First World War many party members conducted a vigorous anti-war propaganda. The party did much to organise the movement of Shop Stewards Committees (see Note 173). It was in solidarity with the October Revolution and supported Soviet Russia. In its political activity the party committed sectarian mistakes. For example, it refused to become a collective member of the Labour Party, which united trade unions, socialist organisations and groups. Lenin criticised the mistakes of this party and of other "Lefts" in his work "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31). The more advanced members of the party, including Arthur McManus and Tom Bell, actively helped to found the Communist Party of Great Britain.

The Independent Labour Party—see Note 43. p. 116

[54] Reference is to the resolution unanimously adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Spanish workers, held in October 1918, to send greetings to the Soviet Republic. p. 116

[55] *La Victoire*—a daily newspaper published by Gustave Hervé in Paris from early 1916 in place of *La Guerre Sociale* which had come out under his editorship since 1906. During the First World War it pursued an openly social-chauvinist policy. With the Russian white-guard émigré V. Burtsev at the head of its Russian section, the newspaper was hostile towards Soviet Russia. By and large its policy was one of defence of vested interests. p. 120

[56] This evidently means the Military Revolutionary Council which was established in the German army on the Eastern Front and which published the newspaper *Krasny Soldat* (*Red Soldier*). p. 123

[57] The meeting was held in the Hall of Columns of Trade Union House to celebrate the first anniversary of the October Revolution. Representatives of all trade associations attended. Among the speakers were members of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Moscow Council of Trade Unions, etc. p. 132

[58] The Congress was held at the Bolshoi Theatre between November 6 and 9, 1918. Its opening coincided with the celebrations of the anniversary of the October Revolution. There were 1,296 delegates (963 with voting rights and 333 with voice but no vote), of whom 1,260 were Communists. The agenda included the following items: anniversary of the October Revolution, the international situation, military situation building of Soviet power at the centre, Poor Peasants' Committees and local Soviets. Lenin was elected honorary chairman of the Congress. After hearing Lenin's report on the anniversary of the October Revolution at the first sitting on November 6, the delegates sent greetings to workers, peasants and soldiers of

all countries and their leaders who were fighting for peace and socialism, and to the Red Army. On Sverdlov's proposal the Congress adopted an appeal to the governments at war with Soviet Russia to start peace negotiations. In view of the strengthening of Soviet power and the victories of the Red Army the Congress adopted a decision on amnesty.

At the second session of the Congress on November 8 Lenin made a report on the international situation. The Congress unanimously endorsed a resolution that had been drawn up by Lenin and adopted at the joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, factory committees and trade unions on October 22, 1918 (see pp. 128-30 of this volume). On the same day, after hearing the report of People's Commissar of Justice D. I. Kursky, the Congress passed a resolution on revolutionary legality, drawn up on the basis of Lenin's theses. At its last session on November 9 the Congress discussed the military situation and Soviet development, and adopted appropriate resolutions. The Congress decided to merge the Poor Peasants Committees, which had already fulfilled their functions, with volost and village Soviets. The delegates warmly welcomed the news of the revolution in Germany and expressed their solidarity with the German workers, soldiers and sailors.

A new All-Russia Central Executive Committee was elected, consisting of 207 full members and 39 alternate members. The Congress summed up the results achieved by Soviet power in the first year of its existence and drew up a programme of work for the Soviet Government in the near future. p. 135

[59] This refers to the Congress of the Poor Peasants' Committees of the Northern Region, which was held in Petrograd between November 3 and 6, 1918. Over 15,000 representatives of the Poor Peasants' Committees in eight gubernias of the Northern Region and other gubernias took part in Congress work. Party and Soviet organisations of Petrograd and the Northern Region had carried out extensive preparatory work for the Congress under the guidance of the Organising Bureau headed by S. P. Voskov, People's Commissar for Food of the Northern Region. The Congress discussed the current situation, Poor Peasants' Committees and local Soviets, supply and distribution of products, the question of the Red Army, rural education and posts and telegraphs. The Congress adopted a decision to form model regiments from poor peasants, which was later approved by the Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on the proposal of the Regional Congress. Its other resolutions concerned the merger of Poor Peasants' Committees with local Soviets, the Soviet government's food policy, educational and other questions.

The Congress was of vast political importance, as it strengthened the alliance of the working class and the working peasants. p. 143

[60] Reference is to the telegram sent "to all military commissars, military instructors, army commanders and all Soviets" on November 5, 1918, over the signatures of Lenin, Sverdlov and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin in connection with the rupture by

Germany of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. It was published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on November 6. p. 150

[61] In 1848-49 the Russian tsar Nicholas I sent troops to help the Austrian emperor suppress the revolution in Hungary. p. 159

[62] In 1863-64 Russian troops suppressed the liberation insurrection in Poland. p. 159

[63] This refers to the sudden refusal of the Dutch Government to permit the entry of a plenipotentiary envoy of the R.S.F.S.R., who was already on his way to the country. Before his departure from Russia the plenipotentiary had received from the Dutch Consul in Moscow a visa notifying him of his recognition by the Dutch Government as a plenipotentiary envoy of the R.S.F.S.R. at the Hague. p. 160

[64] *L'Echo de Paris*—a reactionary bourgeois paper published in Paris from 1884 to 1938. p. 161

[65] *III-me Internationale*—organ of the French Communists in Soviet Russia, published in Moscow. Its first issue appeared on October 20, 1918. Among its contributors were Jacques Sadoul, Inessa Armand (Y. Blonina) and others. Publication was discontinued in March 1919. p. 162

[66] The total sum of debts incurred by Russia through loans received by the tsarist and Provisional governments (including foreign investments in Russian industry) exceeded 16,000 million rubles in gold. All foreign loans contracted by the tsarist government and the Provisional Government were repudiated by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee's decree of January 21 (February 3), 1918. p. 162

[67] *Manchester Guardian*—a liberal newspaper, one of the most popular and influential bourgeois newspapers. It was founded in 1821 and appeared once a week (in 1857 it became a daily). In the first years after the October Revolution it gave a more or less objective coverage of events in Soviet Russia.

The quotation further on is from the article "The Allies and Russia". p. 162

[68] *Officer cadets*—graduates of officer-training schools in tsarist Russia. During the October Revolution and in the early post-revolutionary period they put up armed resistance to the Soviet government in Petrograd, Moscow and other towns. p. 170

[69] The meeting was called by the editors of *Byednota* in Moscow and was attended by 450 delegates. Lenin spoke about the tasks of the Poor Peasants' Committees in the revolution on November 8. p. 171

[70] *Kerensky notes*—money issued in the summer of 1917 by the Provisional Government headed by Kerensky. p. 174

[71] The First All-Russia Congress of Working Women, called by the C.C. R.C.P.(B.), met at Trade Union House, November 16-21, 1918. There were 1,147 delegates from workers and poor peasants. Lenin spoke on the fourth day of the proceedings. Following his speech, the Congress passed a resolution to the effect that women workers and peasants will justify the hopes placed on them by the Soviet Government and the people in building up a new, communist way of life. Among the speakers at the Congress and its commissions were A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, V. P. Nogin, Y. M. Yaroslavsky, I. F. Armand, A. M. Kollontai, K. N. Samoilova, L. N. Stal and others. The Congress addressed an appeal to all working women to defend the Soviet Republic and adopted decisions on easing women's conditions by developing social services, on the drawing of women into social activities, child upbringing, protection of child labour, etc.

The Congress made a start in the organisation of women workers and peasants. It established commissions for work among women, subordinated to Party committees. Their chief task was to enlighten women politically and draw them into social activity. p. 180

[72] The rally was called by the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Presnya District Party Committee at the cinema Ars. The two reports made at the rally were entitled "V. I. Lenin as Leader of the Russian Communist Party" and "V. I. Lenin as Fighter for the Third International". After Lenin's speech a film was shown, called October Festivities in Moscow. p. 183

[73] *Volya Naroda* (*The People's Will*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; appeared in Petrograd from April 29 to November 1917, when it was closed down. Subsequently it appeared under the titles *Volya*, *Volya Volnaya*, *Volya Narodnaya*, *Volya Svobodnaya* and *Volya Strany*. In February 1918 it was finally suppressed. p. 183

[74] Further on in the article Lenin quotes Pitirim Sorokin's letter as published in *Pravda* No. 251, November 20, 1918, where it was erroneously said that the letter was originally published in *Izvestia of the North Dvina Executive Committee*. Actually the newspaper was called *Krestyanskiye i Rabochiye Dumy* (*Peasants' and Workers' Thoughts*); the letter appeared in issue No. 75 dated October 29, 1918. p. 185

[75] The resolution was adopted by the emergency congress of the Moscow People's Bank shareholders on November 16, 1918, and was directed against the proposed nationalisation of the bank. p. 193

[76] *Red Officers' Day* was appointed for the purpose of popularising the cause of training officers for the Red Army. On November 24,

1918, at 2 p.m., military cadets paraded on Red Square, from where they marched to Sovetskaya Square to be greeted by Lenin from the balcony of the Moscow Soviet building. p. 195

[77] The meeting, held on November 26-27, 1918, heard and discussed reports of the board and auditing commission of the co-operative, a report on the distribution of foodstuffs in Moscow, and elected a new board. Despite Menshevik and S.R. opposition vote was taken on the list of members submitted by the Communist group. At the close of the evening session on the first day of the proceedings Lenin spoke about the role of co-operatives in the socialist economy. p. 196

[78] Reference is to the Menshevik C.C. appeal, published in *Pravda* on November 26, 1918. It called for a campaign against foreign intervention in the Russian revolution. At the same time the Mensheviks favoured the interference of the Second International. Thus the Menshevik change of attitude to the armed intervention was on paper only and due to the successes of Soviet power and the development of the revolutionary movement in Western Europe. They remained in fact implacable enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat and gave support to foreign imperialists and Russian whiteguards in their struggle against the Soviet Republic in the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Siberia and elsewhere.

Lenin criticised the stand of the Mensheviks at that time in his draft resolution for the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, "Closure of the Menshevik Newspaper Undermining the Country's Defence" (pp. 447-48 of this volume), and in other works. p. 198

[79] Lenin refers to the discussion of the draft decree on consumers' co-operatives at the Council of People's Commissars. He wrote the original draft, which was then enlarged upon by the People's Commissariat of Food and published in *Izvestia* on January 19, 1918. The draft aroused frantic opposition from bourgeois co-operators, who were insisting on the independence of co-operatives from the Soviet state. Realising the need to utilise co-operatives in putting trade and distribution on a proper basis, the Council of People's Commissars made several concessions to co-operators. During the talks between representatives of the Supreme Economic Council, co-operatives and food bodies in March and early April 1918, a draft decree was agreed upon. It was this decree that came up for discussion at the Council of People's Commissars, which approved it with Lenin's amendments. On April 11 the All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorsed it and on April 13 it was published in *Pravda*.

Lenin appraised the decree in his work *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 235-77). p. 199

[80] The decree On the Organisation of Supply is meant here. The Council of People's Commissars discussed the decree on November 12, 1918, and finally endorsed it on November 21. On November 24

it was published in *Izvestia*. Lenin directly participated in formulating the decree and introduced several amendments. p. 199

[81] In 1918 the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) regularly called meetings of Party activists to discuss the most important questions of current politics. The meeting in question discussed the proletariat's attitude to petty-bourgeois democrats who swung over to the Soviet government in the autumn of 1918. Lenin's report on the question evoked heated debate. In his concluding speech Lenin summed up the results of the debate. p. 201

[82] Engels's article "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" was published in the magazine *Die Neue Zeit* in November 1894.

Engels wrote the article after Vollmar, one of the leaders of the Right wing of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, had made a speech on the agrarian question at the party Congress in Frankfurt in October 1894, in which he distorted Engels's views on the attitude towards small peasants. In his letter to the editors of *Vorwärts* Engels refuted Vollmar's inventions and added that he was going to write an article in which he would set down and substantiate his views on the agrarian question.

The Frankfurt Congress appointed a special commission to work out an agrarian programme for the next party congress. The draft programme was discussed at the Breslau Congress in October 1895, after Engels's death. The revisionist draft did not get the required majority of votes and was rejected. The Congress adopted a decision stressing the need for a further study of the laws governing the development of agriculture. p. 202

[83] Frederick Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 435). p. 202

[84] ibid., p. 438. p. 202

[85] ibid. p. 214

[86] Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 520-21). p. 215

[87] Frederick Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 433). p. 216

[88] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 469 and 476. p. 217

[89] Lenin refers to the report submitted by the All-Russia Council of the Office Employees' Trade Unions to the Council of People's Commissars and published in the magazine *Vestnik Sluzhashchego* (*Office Employee's Herald*) No. 11-12, 1918. The report pointed to the need to enlist members of the office employees' unions for

food work conducted by the People's Commissariat of Food in pursuance of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 21, 1918, On the Organisation of Supply (see Note 80).

p. 223

[90] Lenin began work on the book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* at the beginning of October 1918, immediately after he had read Kautsky's *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, which distorted and vulgarised the Marxist theory of the proletarian revolution and slandered the Soviet state.

Lenin attached great importance to exposure of Kautsky's opportunist views on the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In August 1918 the magazine *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik* carried Kautsky's article in which he called upon the Social-Democratic parties to light the Bolsheviks. After reading excerpts from the article published in *Pravda* on September 20, Lenin wrote to V. V. Vorovsky in Stockholm: "The disgraceful nonsense, childish twaddle and most vulgar opportunism of Kautsky warrant the question: Why are we doing nothing to combat Kautsky's *theoretical* vulgarisation of Marxism?" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 35).

Lenin asked Vorovsky, the then plenipotentiary envoy of the Soviet Republic in the Scandinavian countries, to send him Kautsky's pamphlet on the dictatorship as soon as it was out and also all his articles about the Bolsheviks.

Bonch-Bruyevich wrote in his reminiscences that Lenin was carried away by his work on *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, "he was literally burning with anger", "sitting up every day till late at night writing this remarkably hard hitting work".... On October 9, before the book's completion Lenin wrote an article under the same title, which appeared in *Pravda* on October 11. On October 10 he sent a note to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin and his deputy L. M. Karakhan asking them to forward his article to A. A. Joffe, Y. A. Berzin and V. V. Vorovsky in Berlin. In the accompanying letter he wrote: "Dear comrades, I realise only too well the defects of this very short article against Kautsky. But it is essential to make a stand *as quickly as possible* and express an opinion. Please see that it is translated and published in leaflet form" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 61-62). The German translation of Lenin's article was published in Berne in 1918 and in Vienna in 1919. In 1919 it was also published in Milan in Italian.

In 1919 Lenin's pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* was published in Britain, France and Germany.

p. 227

[91] *Sotsial-Demokrat*—an illegal newspaper, central organ of the R.S.D.L.P., published from February 1908 till January 1917. No. 1 was published in Russia and the subsequent issues came out abroad: Nos. 2-32 (February 1909-December 1913) in Paris, Nos. 33-58 (November 1914-January 1917) in Geneva. Five issues of the total 58 had

supplements. From December 1911 the paper was edited by Lenin. More than 80 articles and short items by Lenin were published in it.

During the First World War the newspaper played an important part in combating international opportunism, nationalism and chauvinism, in popularising the Bolshevik slogans and in arousing the working class and working people generally for the fight against the imperialist war and its instigators. The paper published Lenin's article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", in which he first stated his conviction that socialism could triumph in a single country. The newspaper's circulation in Russia and the major articles reprinted from it in local Bolshevik newspapers promoted the political enlightenment and internationalist training of the Russian proletariat and helped to prepare the people for the revolution.

Sotsial-Demokrat did much to rally internationalist elements in the Social-Democratic movement the world over. Despite difficulties of wartime, it found its way into many countries. p. 229

[92] *Kommunist*—a journal founded on Lenin's initiative. Only one double issue appeared in September 1915 carrying Lenin's articles "The Collapse of the Second International", "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist" and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy". It was published by the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* jointly with G. L. Pyatakov and Y. B. Bosh, who supplied the funds, and N. I. Bukharin as one of the editors.

Lenin intended to make the journal an international organ of Left Social-Democrats. But in the course of the preparation of the journal for press serious disagreements arose between the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh, which were aggravated after the publication of the first issue. In view of the anti-Party line of the group the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors, on Lenin's suggestion, announced that they considered it impossible to continue publication. p. 229

[93] Reference is to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. Towards the War*). Lenin decided to write it in connection with the First International Socialist Conference that was about to be convened. He wrote it together with Zinoviev, but the main part of the pamphlet belongs to Lenin who also edited it.

The pamphlet was published in Russian and German and circulated among the delegates at the Zimmerwald Conference which met in September 1915. After the Conference it was also published in France, and in Norway in the Left Social-Democratic newspaper. Lenin more than once tried, though without success, to get it published in America in English. p. 229

[94] *The Basle Manifesto* on war was adopted at the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress held in Basle on November 24-25, 1912. It warned against the imminent danger of a world imperialist war, exposing its predatory aims and calling on the workers of all countries to wage a determined struggle for peace, "to pit

against the might of capitalist imperialism the international solidarity of the working class". The Manifesto contained a clause from the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress (1907), which was formulated by Lenin and which said that in the event of an imperialist war socialists should take advantage of the resulting economic and political crisis for effecting a socialist revolution. p. 230

[95] This was the original title of Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. p. 230

[96] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 32-33). p. 233

[97] See Engels's Letter to A. Bebel of March 18-28, 1875 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 357).

Further, on pp. 253, 266 of this volume, Lenin quotes the same letter. p. 237

[98] This proposition is contained in Engels's Introduction to Karl Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 581). p. 240

[99] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 630. p. 240

[100] Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 8-9. p. 241

[101] Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 320). p. 243

[102] Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 585). p. 253 p. 243

[103] Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 332). p. 243

[104] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 520-21. p. 244

[105] In 1895 reactionary monarchist circles in France instituted proceedings against Dreyfus, a Jewish General Staff officer, on a trumped-up charge of espionage and high treason. The trial of Dreyfus, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, served as a pretext for French reactionary circles to fan anti-Semitism and campaign against republican order and democratic liberties. In 1898 socialists and progressive bourgeois democrats (Émile Zola, Jean Jaurès, Anatole France and others) started a campaign for a reconsideration of the Dreyfus case. This gave a political colouring to the matter and the

country split into two camps—republicans and democrats on the one side and the bloc of monarchists, clericals, anti-Semites and nationalists on the other. In 1899, under pressure of public opinion, Dreyfus was pardoned and in 1906 the Court of Appeal acquitted him and reinstated him in the army. p. 245

[106] This refers to the suppression of the Irish rebellion in 1910, an attempt at liberating the country from the British. In 1916 Lenin wrote: "In Europe ... there was a rebellion in Ireland, which the 'freedom-loving' English ... suppressed by executions." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 354.) p. 245

[107] See Marx's article "L'indifferenza in materia politica" ("On Political Indifferentism") (*Almanacco Republicano* for 1874). p. 251

[108] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 639. p. 251

[109] See Engels's letter to A. Bebel of March 18-28, 1875 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 357). p. 251

[110] Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Moscow, 1957, p. 85. p. 260

[111] Lenin refers to Engels's Introduction to *The Civil War in France* by Karl Marx (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 484). p. 260

[112] Lenin's pamphlet *Political Parties in Russia and The Tasks of the Proletariat* was published by *The Evening Post* on January 15, 1918, and by *The Class Struggle*, the organ of the Left wing of the American Socialist Party, in issue No. 4 for November-December 1917. It also appeared as a separate edition.

The Evening Post—a bourgeois newspaper published in New York from 1801 (from 1801 to 1832 it was called *The New York Evening Post*). For a number of years it followed a liberal policy. After the October Socialist Revolution it published the secret treaties concluded between the Allies and the tsarist government. Subsequently it became the mouthpiece of the most reactionary imperialist circles. It now appears as *The New York Post*. p. 265

[113] On June 14 (27), 1917, the Provisional Government decided to bold elections to the Constituent Assembly on September 17 (30), 1917. In August it postponed the elections until November 12 (25).

Elections to the Constituent Assembly took place on the appointed date, November 12 (25), after the October Socialist Revolution. Deputies were elected according to the lists that had been drawn up before the Revolution and in keeping with the regulations endorsed by the Provisional Government. Elections took place at a time when the mass of the people had not yet appreciated the import of

the October Revolution. This put the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries at an advantage and as a result they secured a majority of votes in areas outside the capital and industrial centres. The Constituent Assembly met in Petrograd on January 5 (18), 1918. By decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on January 6 (19), 1918, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved because, through the reactionary majority, it had rejected the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People submitted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and had refused to approve the decrees of the Second Congress of Soviets on peace, land and the transfer of power to the Soviets. p. 267

[114] The All-Russia Democratic Conference was called by the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee of Soviets to decide the question of power and met in Petrograd in September 1917. Actually, however, it was called in order to divert people's attention from the mounting revolution. More than 1,500 delegates attended. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders took all steps to reduce representation of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies and increase the number of delegates from various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois organisations, thereby securing a majority for themselves. Thus, increased representation was granted to municipalities, which sent 300 delegates; Zemstvos sent 200 delegates and the co-operatives, which were under the control of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, sent 120 delegates. But the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which represented the overwhelming majority of the population, had only 230 delegates. The Bolsheviks took part in the Conference for the purpose of utilising it as a platform for exposing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Conference adopted a decision to establish a Pre-Parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic). This was an attempt to create a semblance of a parliamentary system in Russia. According to the regulations worked out by the Provisional Government, the Pre-Parliament was to be an advisory government body. Lenin emphatically insisted on boycotting the Pre-Parliament, as to stay in it would have created the impression it could solve the tasks of the revolution. The Central Committee of the Party discussed Lenin's proposal and decided that Bolsheviks should resign their seats in the Pre-Parliament. Only Kamenev and other capitulators insisted on participating. At the opening session of the Pre-Parliament on October 7 (20) the Bolsheviks road their declaration and walked out. p. 270

[115] This refers to a counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the Russian bourgeoisie in August 1917. Tsarist General Kornilov led the conspirators. Relying on the top army officers, they planned to use officer cadet and Cossack units to seize Petrograd, crush the Bolshevik Party, dissolve the Soviets and establish military dictatorship in the country. The workers of Petrograd and revolutionary soldiers and sailors rose up in response to the appeal of the Central Committee

of the Bolshevik Party and crushed the Kornilov revolt. Popular pressure compelled the Provisional Government to order the arrest of Kornilov and his associates and bring them to court. Thus the attempt of the bourgeoisie and landowners to crush the revolution fell through. After the defeat of the Kornilov revolt the Bolsheviks gained more influence among the people. Bolshevisation of the Soviets began. The Bolsheviks again advanced the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" p. 272

[116] *Petrushka*—a serf servant in Gogol's novel *The Dead Souls*. He could read only by syllables and enjoyed the process of reading, never pausing to think over the contents of a book. p. 273

[117] *Judas Golovlyov*—a hypocritical and sanctimonious feudal landowner in Saltykov-Shchedrin's novel *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 276

[118] *Lieberdans*—nickname for the Menshevik leaders Lieber and Dan and their supporters, which stuck to them after the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* had published in its issue No. 141 on August 25 (September 7), 1917, Demyan Bedny's feuilleton entitled "Lieberdan". p. 276

[119] *Activists*—a group of Mensheviks who resorted to armed struggle against Soviet power and the Bolshevik Party after the October Revolution. They joined various counter-revolutionary conspiratorial organisations, supported Kornilov, Kaledin and the bourgeois nationalist Ukrainian Rada, actively participated in the white-guard Czech revolt and made common front with the foreign interventionists. In 1918, under the pretext of discussing the food situation, the "activists", supported by the Menshevik Party, held a number of conferences of "workers" and their delegates which actually demanded the dissolution of the Soviets. p. 276

[120] August Bebel spoke about this at the Magdeburg Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany on September 20, 1910. Lenin mentions the Congress in his article "Two Worlds" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 305-313). p. 277

[121] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a daily newspaper, mouthpiece of the stock exchange. It was published in Frankfurt-on-Main from 1856 to 1343. In 1949 it resumed publication under the title *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as organ of the West German monopolists. p. 278

[122] Lenin refers to the editorial "Dictatorship or Democracy?" published in *Vorwärts* No. 290, October 21, 1918.

Vorwärts—a daily newspaper, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. By decision of the Halle Party Congress it was published in Berlin from 1891 under the title *Vorwärts Berliner Volksblatt* and replaced the newspaper *Berliner Volksblatt* which appeared from 1884. Through this newspaper Engels combated opportunism in all its manifestations. In the latter half of the 1890s,

after Engels's death, the newspaper fell into the hands of the Right wing of the party and began regularly to feature articles by opportunists. During the First World War it adopted a social-chauvinist line. After the October Revolution it conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. Its publication continued until 1933. p. 278

[123] *Zimmerwald Left group* was formed on Lenin's initiative at the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald in September 1915. It united eight delegates from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Left Social-Democrats of Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Germany, Polish Social-Democratic opposition and Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area. Led by Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left group fought the Centrist majority of the Conference and tabled drafts of a resolution and by a manifesto, which denounced the imperialist war, exposed the treachery of the social-chauvinists and emphasised the need for an active struggle against the war. The drafts were defeated by the Centrist majority. However, several important propositions of the draft resolution submitted by the Zimmerwald Left group were included in the manifesto adopted by the Conference. Regarding the manifesto as a first step in the struggle against the imperialist war, the group voted for it. In a special statement the Zimmerwald Left group gave the reasons for its vote and pointed out that the manifesto was inconsistent. At the same time the group declared that, while staying in the common Zimmerwald association, it would act independently outside of it and spread its own views. It elected its leading organ, the Bureau, consisting of Lenin, Zinoviev and Radek. The group published the magazine *Vorbote* in German, in which a number of Lenin's articles appeared.

The Bolsheviks, who alone adopted a consistent internationalist position, were the guiding force in the Zimmerwald Left group. Lenin combated Radek's opportunist vacillation and the mistakes committed by other Lefts. The Zimmerwald Left group served as the rallying centre for internationalists in the world Social-Democratic movement. At the Second International Socialist Conference, held in the village of Kienthal near Berne in April 1916, the Zimmerwald Left group numbered 12 out of the 43 delegates, and on a number of questions its proposals got as many as half the votes. The Left Social-Democrats who adhered to the Zimmerwald Left group carried on extensive revolutionary work and played a prominent part in founding Communist Parties in their own countries. p. 283

[124] Lenin quotes from Engels's Introduction to Karl Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 475). p. 284

[125] Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 518-19). p. 284

[126] *Spartacists*—members of the revolutionary organisation of the German Left Social-Democrats. The Spartacus group was formed after the outbreak of the First World War by Karl Liebknecht,

Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Leon Jogiches (Tyszka) and Wilhelm Pieck.

In April 1915 Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring started publication of the magazine *Die Internationale*, which catered for the main group of German Left Social-Democrats. In 1916 the *Internationale* group began to publish illegally and circulate "Political Letters" over the signature of Spartacus and assumed the name of Spartacus group. The Spartacists conducted revolutionary propaganda among the people, organised mass anti-war actions, led strikes and exposed the imperialist character of the war and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. The Spartacists, however, committed serious mistakes on questions of theory and politics. They denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the imperialist epoch, failed to take a consistent stand with regard to the slogan of turning the imperialist war into civil war, belittled the role of the proletarian party as the vanguard of the working class, underestimated the role of peasants as allies of the workers and did not make a decisive break with the opportunists. Lenin repeatedly criticised the mistakes of the German Left Social-Democrats and helped them to take a correct stand.

In April 1917 the Spartacists joined the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, retaining their organisational independence. In November 1918, during the revolution in Germany, the Spartacists formed the Spartacus League, published their programme on December 14, 1918, and broke with the Independents. At the Inaugural Congress, held on December 30, 1918-January 1 1919, they founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 291

[127] Karl Marx, *The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 66-69). p. 295

[128] Two new parties—Narodnik Communists and Revolutionary Communists—separated from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party after the provocative assassination by Left Socialist-Revolutionaries of the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, and their revolt on July 6-7, 1918.

The *Narodnik Communists* condemned the anti-Soviet activity of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and formed their own party at a conference in September 1918. Their programme "Manifesto" was published in the newspaper *Znamya Trudovoi Kommuny* (*The Banner of the Labour Commune*) on August 21. They approved the Bolshevik course for an alliance with the middle peasants. Many of the Narodnik Communists were members of Soviet bodies and some of them, for example G. D. Zaks, sat on the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. On November 6, 1918, at its extraordinary congress the party decided to dissolve and merge with the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The Party of Revolutionary Communism was founded at a congress of the newspaper *Volya Truda* (*Freedom of Labour*) supporters held in Moscow, September 25-30, 1918. The first issue of the paper

appeared on September 14, carrying a policy statement for the coming congress, whose authors denounced terrorist acts by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and their attempts to torpedo the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. The Inaugural Congress of the party went on record for co-operation with Soviet power. The programme of the "Revolutionary Communists" was very contradictory. While recognising that the Soviets created the prerequisites for the establishment of socialism, it denied the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition from capitalism to socialism. After the Second Congress of the Communist International had adopted a decision that there must be only one Communist Party in every country, the Party of Revolutionary Communism decided in September 1920 to affiliate to the R.C.P.(B.). In October of the same year the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) allowed Party organisations to admit into their ranks former members of the Party of Revolutionary Communism. p. 296

[129] Heinrich Weber—Otto Bauer. p. 298

[130] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 318-19. p. 300

[131] The treachery of M. A. Muravyov, Commander of Soviet troops on the Eastern Front, was closely connected with the revolt of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in July 1918. According to the plans of the mutineers, Muravyov was to raise a revolt against Soviet power and, joining forces with the whiteguard Czechs, to march on Moscow. On July 10 Muravyov arrived in Simbirsk and stated he did not recognise the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and declared war on Germany. The misguided troops occupied the Post, Telegraph and Radio Station and surrounded the building of the Executive Committee and the staff of the Simbirsk army group. Muravyov sent wireless messages calling on the whiteguards and interventionists between Samara and Vladivostok to march on Moscow.

The Soviet Government took urgent measures to defeat Muravyov's venture. The Communists of Simbirsk carried out extensive explanatory work among the garrison troops and the townsmen. The army units which had formerly supported Muravyov now declared they were ready to fight him. On the night of July 11 Muravyov was summoned to the meeting of the Simbirsk Executive Committee. He interpreted this as the Executive Committee's surrender. When his treacherous messages about the cessation of hostilities against interventionists and whiteguards were read at the meeting, the Communists demanded his arrest. Muravyov resisted and was shot; his associates were arrested. p. 302

[132] By the July crisis, Lenin means kulak counter-revolutionary revolts in the central gubernias, in the Volga area, the Urals and Siberia in the summer of 1918, which were organised by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the assistance of foreign interventionists. p. 303

[133] *Blanquism*—a trend in the French socialist movement led by the prominent revolutionary and exponent of French utopian communism, Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881). Lenin wrote about Blanquism: "Blanquism expects that mankind will be emancipated from wage-slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 392). In substituting the actions of a secret group of conspirators for the activity of a revolutionary party the Blanquists lost sight of the real conditions necessary or a victorious uprising and ignored contacts with the people. p. 304

[134] This refers to the Socialist-Revolutionary bill submitted by the Minister for Agriculture S. L. Maslov to the Provisional Government a few days before the October Revolution. It was called "Rules for the Regulation by Land Committees of Land and Agricultural Relations" and was published in part in the newspaper *Dyelo Naroda* (*People's Cause*), organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, on October 18 (31), 1917.

"This bill of Maslov's," Lenin wrote, "is downright betrayal of the peasants by the S.R. Party, and signifies its complete subservience to the landed proprietors" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 228). The bill set up a special rent fund in the Land Committees, to which state-owned and monastery lands were to be transferred. Landed proprietorship was left intact. Landowners were to turn over to the fund only the land they previously used to rent out and the peasants were to pay the rent for the "rented" land to the landowners.

The Provisional Government arrested members of the Land Committees in retribution for peasant revolts and seizures of landed estates. p. 305

[135] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, Teil 2, Berlin 1959, S. 36. p. 313

[136] For "Theses on the Constituent Assembly" see Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, pp. 379-83. p. 319

[137] *The International Socialist Bureau*—executive organ of the Second International set up by decision of the Paris Congress of 1900. p. 319

[138] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 357. p. 324

[139] Lenin refers to the book by M. Ostrogorsky, *La Democratic et les Partis Politiques*, which was first published in Paris in 1903. The Russian edition of the first volume appeared in 1927 and the second volume in 1930. The book contains rich factual material on the history of Britain and the U.S.A., which exposes the falsehood and hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy. p. 325

[140] This draft decision was submitted by Lenin on December 3, 1918, at a sitting of the commission set up by the Council of Defence (see

Note 151) for the purpose of regulating the work of Soviet bodies and enhancing the country's defence capacity. The commission's decision on the question was based on Lenin's draft. p. 326

[141] The Congress was held in Moscow on December 6-11, 1918. It was attended by 208 voting delegates and 98 non-voting delegates. 121 of the voting delegates were Communists and their sympathisers and the other 87 delegates were supporters of "independent" co-operatives, i.e., Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries who advocated the independence of the co-operatives from the Soviet state. Lenin spoke about the tasks of workers' co-operatives at the evening session on December 9. Among other speakers were V. P. Nogin and V. P. Milyutin. The Congress censured the anti-Soviet demands for "independence" for the co-operatives and decided to get the workers' co-operatives to organise food supplies jointly with state food organs. The Congress elected the All-Russia Council of Workers' Co-operatives of 15 members, 10 of whom were Communists (V. P. Nogin, V. P. Milyutin, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov and others). p. 329

[142] This refers to the Narodnik Communists and Revolutionary Communists who had split away from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (see Note 128). p. 336

[143] The Congress was held in Moscow's Trade Union House on December 11-20, 1918. There were 550 delegates present. Lenin spoke at the evening session on December 11. The Congress was devoted mainly to working out draft regulations on socialist land settlement and measures for transition to socialist farming (the regulations were adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in February 1919 and published in *Izvestia* No. 34, February 14, 1919). p. 338

[144] Lenin wrote these rules for discussion at the Council of Defence. He also drew up a list of comrades to whom they should be forwarded—L. B. Krasin, N. N. Krestinsky, G. I. Petrovsky, D. I. Kursky, Y. M. Sverdlov, V. A. Avanesov, J. V. Stalin and K. I. Lander. In the accompanying note Lenin wrote: "Request you to read this draft which I am proposing for the Council of Defence, show it to comrades and have it discussed by Saturday, December 14. It is desirable to have the amendments in writing by the same date 12.12.18." p. 349

[145] P. A. Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, introduced a new land law aimed at creating a firm rural support for the autocracy in the form of kulaks. The law of November 9, 1906, gave every peasant the right to leave the commune and receive a land allotment as his personal property, which he now could sell, mortgage or dispose of in any other way. Village communes were obliged to allocate land for the peasants leaving communes in one place (homestead). The law enabled the kulaks to buy up the land of

poor peasants very cheaply. The Stolypin reform accelerated the development of capitalism in agriculture and intensified the class struggle in the countryside. p. 355

[146] *Die Rote Fahne* (*The Red Banner*) was founded by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg as the central organ of the Spartacus League; later on it became the central organ of the Communist Party of Germany. It was published in Berlin from November 9, 1918, and was repeatedly banned by the German authorities. Referring to the fight conducted by the paper against the reactionary leaders of German Social-Democracy, Lenin wrote in October 1919: "The heroic struggle waged by *Rote Fahne*, the Berlin communist newspaper, evokes whole-hearted admiration" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 30).

The newspaper largely contributed to the transformation of the Communist Party of Germany into a mass proletarian revolutionary party and its cleansing of opportunist elements. It conducted a staunch fight against the militarisation of the country and championed working-class unity in the struggle against fascism. Ernst Thälmann, Chairman of the C.C. of the German Communist Party regularly contributed articles to the paper. After the establishment of fascist dictatorship it was banned, but continued to appear illegally, resolutely opposing the fascist regime. In 1935 the publication of the newspaper was transferred to Prague, and from October 1936 to the autumn of 1939 it was published in Brussels. p. 360

[147] *Der Weckruf* (*The Call*)—central organ of the Communist Party of German Austria, published in Vienna from November 1918 to January 11, 1919. From January 15, 1919, it appeared under the title *Die Soziale Revolution*, and from July 26, 1919, under the title *Die Rote Fahne*. Until October 13, 1920, it remained the central organ of the Communist Party of German Austria, and beginning with October 14 it appeared as the central organ of the Communist Party of Austria. After its banning in July 1933 it appeared illegally. In August 1945 its name was changed to *Osterreichische Volksstimme*, and, beginning with February 21, 1957, it has been called *Volksstimme*. p. 368

[148] Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 217). p. 372

[149] The Congress was held in the Second House of Soviets (the Metropol Hotel) in Moscow. On the sixth day of the proceedings, December 25, Lenin delivered a speech on the international situation and economic tasks of the Soviet Republic. On the basis of Lenin's report the Congress adopted a resolution on one-man management, which established personal responsibility of heads of enterprises and organisations for their functioning. p. 375

[150] *Kolupayev* and *Razuvayev*—capitalist sharks described by Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 380

[151] The Council of Defence (The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence) was set up by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 30, 1918. It was organised in accordance with the decree of the C.E.C. of September 2, 1918, which proclaimed martial law. The Council of Defence was an emergency organ brought into being by the country's extreme difficulties. It was vested with full powers for mobilising the country's resources. Lenin was appointed Chairman of the Council.

The decisions of the Council of Defence were binding on the central and local departments and institutions and on all Soviet citizens. During the Civil War and foreign intervention it was the chief military, economic and planning centre of the Republic. It exercised constant control over the activity of the Revolutionary Military Council and other military organs. From December 1, 1918, to February 27, 1920, it held 101 sessions and discussed some 2,300 questions relating to the country's defence. Lenin presided at all but two sessions. The Council conducted its work through its members and special commissions which dealt with the most important problems of the country's defence. To settle urgent local problems, the Council delegated its members and prominent Party workers and statesmen.

In early April 1920 the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was reorganised into the Council of Labour and Defence. By decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets held in December 1920, the Council of Labour and Defence began to function as a commission of the Council of People's Commissars, whose main task was to coordinate the work of all departments in the sphere of economic construction. It existed until 1937. p. 381

[152] *Byednota* (*The Poor*)—a daily peasant newspaper published in Moscow from March 27, 1918, till January 31, 1931. It was started by decision of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in place of the newspapers *Derevenskaya Byednota* (*The Village Poor*), *Derevenskaya Pravda* (*The Village Truth*) and *Soldatskaya Pravda* (*The Soldiers' Truth*). It actively fought to strengthen the worker-peasant alliance, and to organise and rally the poor and middle peasants around the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. The paper played an important part in the political enlightenment and cultural development of the working peasants, in promoting active, public-minded peasants from among the poor and middle peasants and training a large band of village correspondents. On February 1, 1931, *Byednota* was merged with *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (*Socialist Agriculture*). p. 386

[153] On January 1, 1919, in view of the critical situation at Perm, the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence set up a special commission to investigate the causes that had led to the town's surrender, and to restore the situation at the front defended by the Third Army. The commission was made up of Dzerzhinsky and Stalin, members of the C.C. of the Party.

Lenin sent the telegram in reply to "The Preliminary Report on the Progress of Investigation into the Causes of the Surrender of Perm", which was compiled by Dzerzhinsky and Stalin and gave account of measures taken by the commission to redress the situation. The measures adopted by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence bolstered up the left flank of the Eastern Front, defended by the Third Army. In the latter half of January 1919 the Third Army units launched an offensive on some sectors of the front. By February 1919 the Third Army had fully recovered its fighting efficiency and took part in the general offensive of troops on the Eastern Front. p. 390

[154] The session was called because of the critical food situation. It was held at the Bolshoi Theatre. In his speech, Lenin explained the draft of his theses on food policy which he submitted to the session on behalf of the Bolshevik group in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The draft was unanimously approved. The resolution recognised that it was correct to introduce a state monopoly of staple foodstuffs like grain, tea, salt and sugar. The products whose monopolisation was recognised as untimely (meat, sea-fish, etc.) were to be procured only by the Food Commissariat's organs at fixed prices. The basic propositions of the resolution were incorporated in the decree On the Procurement of Foodstuffs, which was endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars on January 21, 1919, and published in *Izvestia* on January 24. These government measures formed part of a whole system of measures known as the policy of war communism. p. 391

[155] The year 1861 saw the abolition of serfdom in Russia. p. 393

[156] Lenin refers to the decision of the Moscow Soviet of August 24, 1918, and the decision of the Petrograd Soviet of September 5, which permitted the workers of Moscow and Petrograd free carriage of foodstuffs in quantities up to 1 1/2 poods for personal consumption. This measure was necessitated by the difficult food situation and adopted as an exception from the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on grain monopoly. The Council of People's Commissars made these decisions effective until October 1, 1918. p. 396

[157] The Conference was called to discuss relations between central and local Soviet bodies and between the Party and the Communist groups in the Soviets. I. V. Tsivtsivadze addressed the Conference on behalf of the Moscow Committee and submitted a draft resolution recognising the need for an improvement in the work of the Soviets and rejecting the demands for the dissolution of the Council of People's Commissars and a fundamental revision of the Soviet Constitution, which were contained in the draft submitted by the anti-Party group led by Y. N. Ignatov. In his speech Lenin sharply criticised Ignatov's draft. The Conference adopted by a majority the resolution moved by the Moscow Committee. The Conference resolutely condemned attempts to belittle the Party's authority over the Communist groups in the Soviets. p. 405

[158] The Congress was held in Moscow from January 12 to January 19, 1919. The union of internationalist teachers was formed shortly after the organisation of the People's Commissariat of Education and assisted the latter in its work. The union played a considerable role in the struggle against the former All-Russia Teachers' Union whose Socialist-Revolutionary and Cadet leadership took a counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet stand, and which was dissolved in December 1918. Members of the internationalist teachers' union popularised socialist ideas and actively fought against politically backward teachers who maintained that the school should be divorced from politics and separated from the state.

Speaking at the Congress, Lenin advocated setting up "a wider and, as nearly as possible, an all-embracing teachers' union". The Congress resolution recognised the need for an "All-Russia Union of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture". The Congress heard several reports on a single labour school and worked out measures for the improvement of cultural and educational work in the Red Army. p. 407

[159] On January 15, 1919, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were murdered by officers of Noske's counter-revolutionary troops with the connivance of the government of the Right Social-Democrats Ebert and Scheidemann. News of the murder reached Moscow on January 17 and on the same day it was announced by Y. M. Sverdlov to a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions. On January 18 *Izvestia* and *Pravda* published an appeal "To All Soviets in Germany and All Workers" signed by Sverdlov on behalf of the joint session. The Party's Central Committee and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee called on all Party organisations and all Soviets to hold demonstrations and protest meetings. On January 19 Moscow workers and Red Army units assembled in mourning on Sovetskaya Square. Lenin, Sverdlov, Lunacharsky and others addressed the demonstrators from the balcony of the Moscow Soviet building. p. 411

[160] The Congress met in Moscow's Trade Union House from January 16 to January 25, 1919. At that time the trade unions had 4,420,000 members. The Congress was attended by 648 delegates with the right to vote, of whom 449 were Communists and their sympathisers. The other delegates were Mensheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Bundists and the Left Menshevik group of "internationalist Social-Democrats".

The agenda included a report on the activity of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the question of the tasks of the trade unions and a number of matters concerning organisation.

Lenin spoke on the central item on the agenda—the tasks of trade unions—at the third plenary session which met on January 20. During the debate the Mensheviks and their supporters from other petty-bourgeois parties tried to push through a resolution declaring the "independence of the trade unions from the Soviet state. By a

majority of 430 the Congress adopted a resolution moved by the Communist group. It pointed out that an attempt to set the proletariat against the Soviet state on the plea of the "unity" and "independence" of the trade union movement has led "the groups supporting this slogan to an open struggle against the Soviet government and has divorced them from the working class". The resolution also rejected the anarcho-syndicalist demands that the trade unions be charged with state functions.

The Congress worked out measures for eliminating duplication in the work of the People's Commissariat of Labour and the trade unions. The trade unions were asked to devote particular attention to raising labour productivity and reinforcing labour discipline. The tariff rates of payment were based on the piece rate and bonus system with fixed rates of additional payment for overfulfilling work quotas. The Congress also devoted much attention to social security and labour protection and enhancing the role of trade unions in training skilled workers. It established the production principle of trade union organisation (until then, workers and other employees of one and the same enterprise were members of different trade unions). The Congress emphasised the need for the trade unions to embrace those proletarians and semi-proletarians who had not yet been organised and enlist them for socialist construction. p. 412

[161] The quotation is taken from *The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique* by Marx and Engels (Moscow, 1956, p. 110). p. 419

[162] Lenin's letter to the workers of Europe and America helped the advanced workers to rally round the Communist Parties and unite their forces in the struggle against international imperialism.

The letter was published in Berlin in the March issue of the magazine *Die Aktion* and in the April issue of the magazine *Der Arbeiter-Rat* (*The Workers' Council*) for 1919. It also appeared as a separate pamphlet in English. p. 429

[163] *Die Freiheit*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published in Berlin from November 15, 1918, to September 30, 1922. p. 434

[164] This refers to mass demonstrations in Petrograd on July 3-4 (16-17), 1917. The obviously hopeless offensive launched by the Provisional Government and which ended in expected failure aroused indignation among the workers, soldiers and sailors who turned out for a demonstration. The movement was initiated by the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment which took action on July 3 (16) in the Vyborg District. The demonstration threatened to develop into armed action against the government.

The Bolshevik Party was opposed to armed action, considering that a revolutionary crisis had not yet matured in the country. At a meeting of the Central Committee called on July 3 (16) at 4 p.m. it was decided to attempt to stop the demonstration. A similar

decision was adopted at the Second Petrograd City Conference of the Bolsheviks, which met at the same time. The delegates went to the factories and the districts to dissuade the people from demonstrating. But it was too late, the demonstration had already begun.

Late at night on July 3 (16) the Central and Petrograd Committees and the Military Organisation, taking into account the popular mood, decided to take part in the demonstration with a view to keeping it peaceful and organised. Lenin had been out of town at the time, resting for a few days from the strain of his work. As soon as he learned about the developments in Petrograd, he left for the city where he arrived on the morning of July 4 (17) and took over the leadership of the movement. That same day he addressed the Kronstadt sailors from the balcony of the Kshesinskaya Palace. He called on them to be staunch, steadfast and vigilant.

Over 500,000 people took part in the demonstration under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" and other Bolshevik slogans. The demonstrators demanded that the Central Executive Committee take over power. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders did not comply with the demand.

With the knowledge and connivance of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Central Executive Committee, the Provisional Government ordered officer cadet and Cossack units to deal with the demonstrators. The troops opened fire. Counter-revolutionary units had been brought from the front to crush the demonstration.

The meeting of the Central and Petrograd Committees, which took place on the night of July 4-5 with Lenin in the chair, decided to call off the demonstration in an organised way. It was a wise move, as it enabled the Party to make a timely retreat and stave off the defeat of the main forces of the revolution. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries actually turned out to have aided and abetted the counter-revolutionary repression. They lined up with the bourgeoisie to attack the Bolshevik Party. *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda* and other Bolshevik papers were suppressed and the printing-plant Trud, acquired with workers' money, was wrecked. Workers were disarmed and arrests, house searches and pogroms began. Revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison were withdrawn from the capital and sent to the front.

After the July days power in the country completely passed into the hands of the Provisional Government, and the Soviets became its impotent appendage. Dual power came to an end, as did the peaceful period of the revolution's development. The Bolsheviks were now faced with the task of preparing an armed uprising to overthrow the Provisional Government. Lenin described the July days in his articles "Three Crises", "An Answer", "Marxism and Insurrection", "The Russian Revolution and Civil War" and others (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 171-75 and 211-22, and Vol. 26, pp. 22-27 and 28-42). p. 435

[165] Lenin refers to the murder on July 6 (19), 1917, of the Bolshevik I. A. Voinov, an active correspondent of *Pravda* and a worker at the *Pravda* print-shop. After the *Pravda* offices had been wrecked,

he took part in the publication of *Listok Pravdy* (*Pravda Newssheet*) during the July days and was killed as he was distributing the newspaper on Shpalernaya Street (now Voinov Street). p. 435

[166] In November-December 1918 the Ukrainian workers and peasants rose up against the German invaders and their stooge, Hetman Skoropadsky. On December 14 Skoropadsky fled from Kiev. On January 3, 1919, the Red Army occupied Kharkov, and on February 5, Kiev, capital of the Ukraine. p. 439

[167] On Lenin's instructions this letter was forwarded to the People's Commissariat of Food, the People's Commissariat of Finance and to the Supreme Economic Council. The question of the co-operatives and consumers' communes was discussed at the Council of People's Commissars on January 28, 1919. p. 443

[168] The telegram was sent in reply to the Ufa Gubernia Revolutionary Committee's inquiry as to how it should act with regard to the spokesman of the Bashkir bourgeois nationalist government, Khalikov, who had come for negotiations. Khalikov wanted an amnesty for Bashkirs who had fought Soviet power; he also informed the Committee that Bashkir troops were now joining the Red Army.

The telegram, beginning with the words "But naturally", was written by Lenin. p. 445

[169] The draft was written by Lenin in reply to the wireless message of the German Foreign Ministry of February 19, 1919, which conveyed the request of the Berne Socialist Conference to permit entry for a special fact-finding commission appointed by the Conference. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin made the following addendum to Lenin's draft: "Let us know of the exact date when the commission is arriving so that we can take all steps for facilitating their journey by getting agreement of the Lithuanian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics." The telegram signed by Chicherin was broadcast to Germany.

The Berne Conference was the first post-war conference of the social-chauvinist and Centrist parties, called for the purpose of restoring the Second International. It met in Berne from February 3 to February 10, 1919.

One of the main items on the agenda was the question of democracy and dictatorship. In his report on this question the Centrist Branting tried to prove that the socialist revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat could not lead to socialism. Kautsky and Bernstein wanted the Conference to condemn the Bolsheviks and the socialist revolution in Russia. Branting moved a resolution which, while hypocritically greeting the revolutions in Soviet Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany, actually denounced the dictatorship of the proletariat and extolled bourgeois democracy. In view of the sympathetic attitude of the workers towards Soviet Russia the sponsors of the resolution worded it in very ambiguous terms

and did not dare to refer specifically to Soviet Russia. The Conference did not discuss the question of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. A group of delegates led by Adler and Longuet tabled a resolution suggesting that the Conference refrain from taking a definite stand on Soviet Russia in view of the paucity of information about the situation there. Branting's resolution received a large number of votes.

The Conference decided to send a commission to Russia to study the economic and political situation in the country, and to include the question of Bolshevism in the agenda of the next congress. The commission consisted of Adler, Kautsky, Hilferding and others. While agreeing to admit the commission the Soviet Government requested the admittance of a Soviet commission to the countries whose representatives were on the Berne commission. The Soviet Government, however, received no reply to its request. As it turned out, the commission of "auditing dignitaries from Berne", as Lenin called it, did not come to Russia.

The First Congress of the Communist International adopted a resolution entitled "On the Attitude Towards 'Socialist' Trends and the Berne Conference", which criticised the Berne decisions. In particular, it denounced the attempts of the Right-wing socialist leaders to compel the Conference to adopt a resolution that would provide a cover for the imperialist armed intervention in Soviet Russia. p. 446

[170] Lenin compiled this draft for discussion by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the question of the Menshevik newspaper *Vsegda Vperyod* (*Always Forward*) (the paper was published in Moscow; one issue appeared in 1918, and in 1919 it appeared from January 22 to February 25).

The minutes of the Council of People's Commissars for February 22, 1919, contain a note from Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee Avanesov addressed to Lenin: "Have you received the resolution on the Mensheviks?" It appears that Lenin had seen a preliminary draft of the resolution in question and compiled his own draft.

On February 25, 1919, the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a decision to close down the newspaper. On the following day the plenary session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee confirmed the decision and unanimously passed a lengthy resolution which incorporated the main ideas of Lenin's draft. On February 27 the decision was published in *Izvestia* No. 45 over the signatures of Sverdlov and Avanesov. p. 447

[171] On January 30, 1919, at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin raised the question of the library service. The decision compiled by Lenin and adopted by the Council of People's Commissars instructed the People's Commissariat of Education to publish and send to the Council of People's Commissars brief monthly reports on the progress achieved in

increasing the number of libraries and reading rooms and the circulation of books. p. 451

[172] *The First Congress of the Communist International* met in Moscow from March 2-6, 1919.

In January 1919 a meeting of representatives from a number of Communist Parties and Left-wing Socialist groups, held to discuss the founding of the Third, Communist International, adopted a Manifesto entitled "For the First Congress of the Communist International", which was worked out with Lenin's direct participation. It was published on behalf of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), foreign bureaus of the Communist Workers' Party of Poland, Hungarian Communist Party, Communist Party of German Austria, the Russian bureau of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party, Executive Committee of the Balkan Revolutionary Social-Democratic Federation and the Socialist Labour Party of America.

At the end of February delegates from many countries arrived in Moscow in response to the Manifesto. On March 1 a preliminary meeting was held under Lenin's chairmanship to discuss the agenda of the Congress.

March 2, 1919, was the opening day of the International Communist Conference, attended by 52 delegates (34 delegates with vote and 18 delegates with voice but no vote). Among the delegates were V. I. Lenin, V. V. Vorovsky, G. V. Chicherin, H. Eberlein (M. Albert), O. V. Kuusinen, F. Platten, B. Reinstein, S. Rutgers, I. S. Unshlikht (Yurovsky), Y. Sirola, N. A. Skrypnik, S. I. Gopner, K. Shteingard (I. Gruber), J. Fineberg, J. Sadoul and others. The following Communist and Socialist parties, groups and organisations were represented: the Communist Parties of Russia, Germany, German Austria, Hungary, Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia, Estonia, Armenia, the Volga German region; Swedish Left Social-Democratic Party, Norwegian Social-Democratic Party, Swiss Social-Democratic Party (the Opposition), Balkan Revolutionary Social-Democratic Federation; the Joint Group of the Eastern peoples of Russia, Zimmerwald Left wing of France; Czech, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, British, French and Swiss Communist groups; Dutch Social-Democratic group; Socialist Propaganda League and Socialist Labour Party of America; Socialist Workers' Party of China; Korean Workers' Union; Turkestan, Turkish, Georgian, Azerbaijanian and Persian sections of the Central Bureau of the Eastern peoples, and the Zimmerwald Commission.

The first meeting decided "to hold sessions as an International Communist Conference" and adopted the following agenda: 1) constitution; 2) reports; 3) policy statement of the International Communist Conference; 4) bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat; 5) the Berne Conference and attitude towards socialist trends; 6) the international situation and the Entente's

policy; 7) Manifesto; 8) White terror; 9) elections to the Bureau and other questions of organisation.

Lenin's theses and report on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat attracted much attention. The theses in Russian and German were circulated among the delegates. At the third session on March 4, Lenin read his theses and substantiated the last two points of the theses in his report. The Conference expressed its unanimous approval of Lenin's theses and decided to submit them to the Bureau for wide circulation. It also adopted a resolution moved by Lenin as a supplement to the theses (see p. 475 of this volume).

On March 4, after the adoption of the theses and the resolution on Lenin's report, the question was raised again of founding the Communist International in view of the fact that new delegates had arrived. On the motion of the delegates of the Communist Party of German Austria, Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden, Balkan Revolutionary Social-Democratic Federation and Hungarian Communist Party the Conference resolved "to constitute itself as the Third International and adopt the name of the Communist International". On the same day a unanimous resolution was passed to consider the Zimmerwald association dissolved. The Conference formulated the policy statement of the Communist International, which contained the following main propositions: 1) inevitability of the replacement of the capitalist by the communist social system; 2) necessity of the proletarian revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of bourgeois governments, and 3) destruction of the bourgeois state and its replacement by a new type of state, a proletarian state of the Soviet type, which would ensure the transition to communist society.

The Manifesto to the workers of the world was one of the most important documents of the Congress. It stated that the Communist International carried on the ideas expounded in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. The Congress urged the workers of all countries to support Soviet Russia and demanded from the Entente non-interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic, withdrawal of interventionist troops from her territory, recognition of the Soviet state, lifting of the economic blockade and restoration of trade relations.

The resolution "On the Attitude Towards 'Socialist' Trends and the Berne Conference" condemned attempts to restore the Second International, "a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie", and declared that the revolutionary proletariat had dissociated itself from the Berne Conference.

The founding of the Third, Communist International played an important role in exposing opportunism in the working-class movement, restoring the ties between the working people in different countries, and creating and strengthening Communist Parties. p. 453

[173] *Shop stewards committees*—elective labour organisations in various industries, which were particularly widespread during the First

World War. Unlike the compromising trade unions which pursued a policy of "civil peace" and renounced the strike struggle, the shop stewards committees championed the interests and demands of the workers, led the strike movement and carried on anti-war propaganda. Shop stewards were united in shop, district and city committees. In 1916 the shop stewards committees and workers' committees were united nationally.

After the October Revolution, during the foreign armed intervention in the Soviet Republic, the shop stewards committees actively supported Soviet Russia. Many leaders of the shop stewards committees (William Gallacher, Harry Pollitt, Arthur McManus and others) joined the Communist Party. p. 456

[174] Most probably, it is not the Birmingham Workers' Council that is meant here, but the shop stewards committee. It is very likely that the newspaper which Lenin read contained incorrect information. Speaking at the First Congress of the Communist International on March 3, 1919, J. Fineberg, a delegate from the British Communist group, said: "In industrial areas local workers' committees were formed, including representatives of the shop stewards committees, for instance, the Clyde workers' committee, London and Sheffield workers' committees and so on. The committees served as organisational centres and representatives of organised labour in the localities. For some time the employers and the government refused to recognise the shop stewards committees, but in the end they had to enter into negotiations with these unregistered committees That Lloyd George agreed to recognise the Birmingham committee as an economic organisation proves that the shop stewards committees have become permanent factors in the British movement. In the shop stewards committees, workers' committees and national conferences of shop stewards committees we have an organisation similar to the one forming the basis of the Soviet Republic" (*First Congress of the Communist International. Minutes*, Moscow, 1933, p. 63). p. 456

[175] Engels's Introduction to *The Civil War in France* by Marx (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 485). p. 458

[176] Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 520). p. 459

[177] Lenin has in mind the resolution of the Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on changing the name of the Party and its programme (*Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 140-41). p. 468

[178] *Gazeta Pechatnikov* (*Printers' Newspaper*)—organ of the Moscow Printers' Union, appeared from December 8, 1918. At that time the trade union came under Menshevik influence. In March 1919 the paper was closed down because of its anti-Soviet propaganda. p. 470

[179] Lenin refers to Rosa Luxemburg's article "Der Anfang" ("The Beginning") published in *Die Rote Fahne* No. 3, November 18, 1918. p. 473

[180] *L'Humanité* was founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War it was in the hands of the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party and conducted a social-chauvinist policy.

In 1918 Marcel Cachin, a prominent figure in the French and international labour movement, became its political director. Between 1918 and 1920 the paper exposed the imperialist policy of the French Government which had sent troops to fight against the Soviet Republic. Since December 1920, when the French Socialist Party split and the Communist Party was founded, it has been the central organ of the French Communist Party. p. 481

[181] *Avanti!*—central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in Rome in December 1896. During the First World War the paper took an inconsistent internationalist stand and did not break with the reformists. In 1926 it was closed down by the Mussolini government, but its publication continued abroad. In 1943 it resumed publication in Rome. p. 483

[182] *Poshekhonye*—provincial town in tsarist Russia; after the publication of Saltykov-Shchedrin's novel *Old Times in Poshekhonye* the name came to denote provincial backwaters. p. 483

[183] At its meeting on March 8, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars discussed a decree on State Control and adopted a resolution moved by Lenin, which incorporated the basic ideas set down in his note to Stalin.

A reshaped decree with Lenin's amendments was endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 2, 1919, and published in *Izvestia* No. 79, April 12. p. 486

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*July 1918-March 1919*)

1918

July 29 Lenin speaks on home and foreign affairs at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, factory committees and trade unions of Moscow.

Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are discussed: the introduction of military conscription; supplying the Military Department with transport; assigning money for fighting the Czech mutiny and the Anglo-French intervention, etc.

July 30 Lenin speaks about the immediate tasks of the Soviet government's administrative apparatus at a Congress of Chairmen of Gubernia Soviets.

Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are discussed: monuments to great men of socialism, science, literature and the arts, and the creation of a Volga fleet, and makes amendments in the draft decision.

July 31 Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and submits the draft of an appeal from the Council to workers in Entente countries in connection with the hostile actions of their governments against the Soviet state; the meeting also debates the fuel situation, the procurement of grain via the co-operatives, the question of a scientific and technical department of the Supreme Economic Council, etc.

August 2 Lenin speaks at a meeting of propagandists about to leave for the front to work among troops fighting the Czechs.

Lenin speaks at meetings in Moscow's Butyrsky and Zamoskvorechye districts, to the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment and to Red Army men in Khodynka on the subject "The Soviet Republic Is in Danger".

August 6	Lenin writes "Letter to Yelets Workers" on Party policy in the countryside.
August 7	Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the question of providing for Red Army men and their families is debated.
August 8	An appeal from the Council of People's Commissars, signed by Lenin and addressed to all working people, "Join the Fight for Bread", is published in *Izvestia*.
August 9	Lenin speaks on the subject "The Fifth Year of the World Slaughter" at a meeting in Moscow's Sokolniki District.
August 9-12	In several telegrams to the Penza Gubernia Executive Committee, Lenin orders the merciless suppression of kulak revolts, the confiscation of the kulaks' grain and the mass mobilisation of the poor against them.
August 10	Lenin works on the question of nationalising engineering factories and puts forward his proposals for examination by the Council of People's Commissars.
	Lenin gives orders to the Supreme War Council to reinforce the Eastern Front.
August 11	Appeals from the Council of People's Commissars, signed V. Ulyanov (Lenin), are published, they are addressed to "Russian Citizens in France and Britain" and call on them not to fight in the French or British armies.
First half of August	Lenin writes an appeal to the workers: "Comrade Workers, Forward to the Last, Decisive Fight!"
August 16	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Moscow Party Committee about organising groups of sympathisers.
	Lenin writes the draft of a telegram to all Soviets of Deputies about a worker-peasant alliance.
August 17	Lenin sends a telegram to the Zadonsk Executive Committee of Voronezh Gubernia with instructions to deal severely with kulaks and "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries, and to appeal to and organise the poor.

August 19 Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are debated: the food policy; unification of all the Republic's armed forces; nationalisation of industrial undertakings, etc.

In a telegram to the Zdorovets Executive Committee of Orel Gubernia, Lenin instructs it severely to put down the kulak and "Left" Socialist-Revolutionary revolt, to confiscate the kulaks' grain and to distribute part of it free to the poor.

August 20 Lenin writes his "Letter to American Workers".

August 21 Lenin sends a telegram to the Astrakhan Gubernia Executive Committee demanding their immediate organisation of Astrakhan's defence against a British attack.

August 23 Lenin speaks at the Alexeyev People's House and the Polytechnical Museum on the subject "What Communists Are Fighting For".

August 26 Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are debated: establishment of a Moscow Mining Academy; the conscription of workers who had formerly served in artillery, engineer and maintenance units; restoration of the buildings destroyed by whiteguards in Yaroslavl, etc.

August 28 Lenin speaks on current affairs at the First All-Russia Congress on Education.

August 29 Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are debated: repudiation by the Bolshevik government of treaties signed between the tsarist government and the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary; the accounts of the People's Commissariats. Lenin writes a draft resolution.

August 30 Lenin speaks on the subject "Two Governments (the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie)" at meetings in the Grain Exchange in Moscow's Basmanny District and at the former Michelson Works in Zamoskvorechye District

As Lenin leaves the works he is shot by Fanny Kaplan.

August 30-September 15	Lenin fights for his life.
September 11	In a telegram to the HQ and troops on the Eastern Front, Lenin congratulates them on the capture of Kazan.
September 16	For the first time after his illness Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
September 17	Lenin again presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Lenin writes a congratulatory letter to the Presidium of the Conference of Proletarian Cultural and Educational Organisations.
September 18	In a telegram to officer cadets in Petrograd, Lenin greets the workers on graduating and joining the ranks of the Red Army.
	Lenin adds a postscript to the official bulletin on the state of his health: "On the basis of this bulletin and my general well-being, it is my humble and personal request not to disturb the doctors by telephone calls and questions."
September 19	Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are debated: a ban on the export of objects of artistic and historic value; the further course of nationalisation of the banks, etc.
September 20	Lenin's article "The Character of Our Newspapers" is published in *Pravda* No. 202.
	Lenin writes a letter to V. V. Vorovsky in Stockholm, A. A. Joffe in Berlin and Y. A. Berzin in Berne about the necessity of fighting Kautsky's vulgarisation of Marxist theory.
September 21	Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the imposition of a tax in kind on farms (Lenin formulates the principal clauses of the decree), denunciation of treaties signed by the tsarist government, etc.
September 22	On behalf of all working people, Lenin congratulates the First Army of the Eastern Front on the capture of Simbirsk.
September 24 or 25	Lenin leaves to convalesce at Gorki.

September, not later than 27	In a letter to Red Army men who took part in the 7 capture of Kazan, Lenin congratulates them on their victory.
October 2 or 3	In connection with the political crisis in Germany Lenin sends a letter to a joint meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and representatives of factory committees and trade unions.
October 9	Lenin writes the article "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky".
October, not later than 15	Lenin returns to Moscow from Gorki.
October 22	Lenin delivers a report on the international situation to a joint meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, factory committees and trade unions; Lenin's resolution is approved.
	Lenin writes the preface to the second edition of his pamphlet "Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat", the first edition of which was published in July 1917.
October 23	On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, Lenin sends a telegram to A. A. Joffe in Berlin asking him to convey ardent greetings to Karl Liebknecht on his release from prison.
October 29	Lenin gives a talk to delegates at the First Congress of the Russian Young Communist League; writes to Y. M. Sverdlov asking him to support the League financially.
November 2	Lenin drafts theses of the resolution on strict observance of the laws, for the examination of the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
November 3	Lenin delivers a speech at a rally to mark the Austro-Hungarian revolution.
November 6-9	Lenin conducts the work of the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Cossacks' and Red Army Deputies.
November 6	Lenin speaks at the first session of the Congress on the anniversary of the October Revolution.

Lenin speaks about the anniversary of the October Revolution at the ceremonial meeting of the All-Russia Central and Moscow trade union councils, and at a party organised by the Moscow Proletkult.

November 7 In the afternoon Lenin speaks at the unveiling of a memorial to Marx and Engels on Revolution Square and at the unveiling on Red Square of a memorial plaque to those who fell in the October Revolution.

In the evening Lenin delivers a speech at a rally and concert for the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission staff.

Lenin sends a congratulatory telegram to troops of the Second Army after the capture of Izhevsk.

November 8 Lenin speaks about the international situation at the second session of the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

Lenin speaks about organising the village poor at a meeting of delegates from Poor Peasants' Committees of central gubernias.

November 10 Lenin finishes writing his book The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.

Lenin sends a "Telegram to All Soviets of Deputies, to Everyone" in connection with the commencement of revolution in Germany.

Lenin speaks on current affairs at the inauguration of the October Revolution Club in Moscow's Khamovniki District.

November 11 Lenin speaks about the international situation at a concert for Moscow Communists in the Bolshoi Theatre.

November 13 Lenin sends a telegram with instructions to N. A. Shchors to take urgent steps to liberate the Ukraine from foreign invaders and the whiteguards.

In a telegram to the Orel Gubernia Committee of the Party, Lenin replies to greetings sent him by German revolutionary soldiers in the Ukraine and calls on their help to liberate the Ukraine from German occupation.

November 14 Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars about the international situation.

Pravda No. 246 publishes a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars, signed by Lenin and Sverdlov, annulling the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

November 19 Lenin speaks at the First All-Russia Congress of Working Women.

November 20 Lenin writes the article "The Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin".

Lenin speaks at a meeting held in his honour as Party and state leader.

November 23 Lenin receives representatives of Indian peoples who delivered greetings to the Soviet government from the peoples of India.

November 24 Lenin delivers greetings from the Council of People's Commissars at a meeting held on Red Officers' Day.

November 26 Lenin speaks on the role of the co-operatives in a socialist state to a meeting of delegates from the Moscow Central Workers' Co-operative.

November 27 Lenin reports on the attitude of the proletariat; towards petty-bourgeois democrats at a meeting of Party workers in Moscow.

November 29 Lenin signs telegrams to the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Food Department, the Gubernia Military Commissar and the Economic Council on supplying the Nizhni-Novgorod radio laboratory with food and building materials, and a telegram to Commander-in-Chief I. I. Vatsetis on support by Red Army troops to Soviet governments in Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine and Lithuania.

November 30 Lenin signs the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the formation of a Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence.

December 1 Lenin conducts the first session of the Council of Defence; maps out the immediate tasks of the Council and introduces a number of proposals concerning the food, transport, fuel and other questions.

December 4 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are debated: putting the railways in order; draft decision against pa-

rochialism and bureaucracy etc.; writes the draft decision on stepping up food deliveries and increasing their amount.

December 5 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence commission on cartridges; signs decisions in the name of the Council concerning Tula, Podolsk and Simbirsk munition factories.

December 7 Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are debated: recognition of the independence of the Estonian Soviet Republic; the railway programme, etc., Lenin makes a proposal to appoint a special correspondent from the Council to report the Council's activities in the papers.

December 8 Lenin speaks about the home and international situation at the Moscow Gubernia Congress of Soviets. Poor Peasants' Committees and District Committees of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence, raises the question of taking stock of military materiel; approves and signs a draft decision against parochialism and bureaucracy.

December 9 Lenin speaks at the Third Congress of Workers' Co-operatives about the economic and political tasks of the co-operatives.

December 11 Lenin speaks about the rural situation at the First All-Russia Congress of Land Departments, Poor Peasants' Committees and Communes, held in Moscow's Trade Union House.

Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence; approves and signs a draft decision on putting the railways in order; makes a proposal to take urgent steps to improve the food situation.

December 12 Lenin writes "Rough Draft of Rules for the Administration of Soviet Institutions" for discussion by the Council of Defence.

December 13 Lenin and Sverdlov issue instructions to the Revolutionary Military Council to send reinforcements to Perm.

December 14 Lenin speaks about the home and international situation at a workers' conference at the Alexeyev People's House in Moscow's Presnya District.

December 15 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: the amount of grain stocks on the railways and in elevators; political agitation in the army and the dispatch of commissars to newly formed divisions.

December 17 Lenin writes the preface to the second edition of his book *The State and Revolution*.

December 18 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: determination of army strength; providing the army with cavalry; providing the army with buildings; the construction of an arms factory in Tsaritsyn, etc.

December 22 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: fitting out railway workers; accounts of commissars sent to newly formed divisions; the amount of grain stocks on the railways, etc.

December 23 Lenin writes an article entitled "'Democracy' and Dictatorship".

Lenin sends a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief requesting information about the reinforcements sent to Perm and the reasons for non-compliance with his orders to take Orenburg.

December 24 Lenin's article "Heroism of the Presnya Workers" is published in *Byednota* No. 222.

December 25 Lenin receives a representative from the Melekess Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Samara Gubernia, who reports there are no means of transport in the district for dispatching the grain; in the Council of Defence Lenin raises the question of taking urgent measures to ensure the transport of grain from Samara Gubernia.

Lenin speaks on the international situation and economic tasks at the Second All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils held in the Second House of Soviets (the Metropol Hotel).

December 29 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: plans for transporting army materiel, personnel, and food; moving reinforcements up to the Eastern Front; the Simbirsk and Izhevsk arms factories, etc.

December 30	Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars at which the following questions are debated: financial and economic policy; granting loans to the Government of the Estonian Labour Commune and the worker-peasant Government of Latvia.
1918	Lenin gives instructions to the People's Commissariat of Education about writing and publishing popular books; outlines various subjects.
December 1918-January 1919	Lenin drafts theses for the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), "Tasks of the Trade Unions".
late 1918 or early 1919	Lenin begins the article "A Little Picture in Illustration of Big Problems". It remained unfinished.
	Lenin conducts a commission for drafting a socialist agricultural policy and measures for the transition to socialist agriculture; he delivers a report to the commission and writes notes to the draft concerning common cultivation of the land.

1919

January 2	Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, puts forward for examination the question of libraries; the meeting also discusses the question of provision for Red Army men's families; engineering factories, etc.
	Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: plans for transporting military materiel, personnel and food; permission for the workers to buy unrationed foodstuffs; the Council of Defence created in Astrakhan.
January 3	Lenin sends a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council in connection with preparation for a general assault on Krasnov.
January 8	In a note to the letter written by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky about measures for strengthening the Third Army outside Perm, Lenin writes of his agreement with the demands made in the letter and puts the letter forward as an order to be carried out by the
January 14	After reading "The Preliminary Report on the Progress of Investigation into the Causes of the

Surrender of Perm" drawn up by Dzerzhinsky and Stalin, Lenin instructs them personally to see to the execution of the measures mentioned on the spot for righting the situation on the Third Army's sector.

January 17 Lenin speaks on the food policy of the Soviet government at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions hold in the Bolshoi Theatre; introduces a draft resolution.

January 18 Lenin speaks about relations between Soviet central bodies and those in the districts at a meeting of the Moscow City Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Lenin speaks about the tasks before Soviet teachers at the Second All-Russia Congress of Internationalist Teachers.

January 19 Lenin speaks from the balcony of the Moscow Soviet at a protest meeting following the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

January 20 Lenin delivers a report on the tasks of the trade unions at the Second All-Russia Trade Union Congress, held in Trade Union House.

January 21 Lenin writes "Letter to the Workers of Europe and America".

January 24 Lenin speaks about the tasks of adult education at the Second Conference of Heads of Adult Education Divisions of Gubernia Education Departments.

Lenin instructs the Revolutionary Military Council to do all it can to take Rostov, Chelyabinsk and Omsk in the next month.

January 26 Lenin writes an appeal "Everybody on Food and Transport Work!"

January 27 Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: sending thanks to workers at the Izhevsk works for increasing their output of rifles; fuel for railways, etc.

February 2 Lenin writes a letter to the People's Commissariats of Food, Finance and the Supreme Economic Council about measures governing the transition from

	bourgeois-co-operative to proletarian-communist supply and distribution.
February 5	Lenin grants an interview to Ludovic Naudeau, correspondent of *Le Temps*.
February 10	Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: water transport; repair of steam locomotives; the fuel situation on the railways, etc.
February 17	Lenin conducts a session of the Council of Defence at which the following questions are discussed: organisation of trains for conveying grain and coal; restoration of the railways ruined during the enemy retreat, etc.
February 19	Lenin drafts a reply from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the radio telegram sent by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated February 19, 1919, requesting permission for the entry of a commission from the Berne Conference of the Second International.
February 22	Lenin drafts a resolution for the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the closure of the Menshevik newspaper *Vsegda Vperyod* because of its seditious propaganda.
February	Lenin writes a letter to the People's Commissariat of Education explaining how to correctly arrange the accountability of the libraries.
Latter half of February	Lenin begins an article "Concerning the Appeal of German Independents". The article remained unfinished.
Late February-early March	Lenin writes "Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" for the First Congress of the Communist International.
March 1	Lenin conducts a preparatory session of a group of delegates to the First Congress of the Communist International, convened in connection with the opening of the Congress for debating problems of organisation.
March 2-6	First Congress of the Communist International. Lenin takes a leading part in the work of the Congress; he is elected to the presidium.
March 2	Lenin delivers the opening speech at the Congress.

March 4 Lenin delivers a report to the third session of the Comintern Congress about bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat and reads his theses.

March 5 Lenin writes the article "Won and Recorded" about the founding of the Communist International.

March 6 Lenin delivers the concluding speech at the fifth session of the Comintern Congress.

Lenin speaks about the founding of the Communist International at a joint meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and other organisations, which was held in the Bolshoi Theatre.

March 7 Lenin conducts a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which debates the question of co-operation—the decision is based on Lenin's theses.

March 8 Lenin speaks to the first group finishing six-week courses organised by the Mother and Child Protection Department of the People's Commissariat of Social Security.

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars; in connection with discussion of the report on reorganising State Control, Lenin writes his observations and a note to Stalin. He suggests additions to the decree on reorganisation of State Control.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 28

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

29

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ
МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME
29

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PREFACE

Volume Twenty-Nine covers the period from March to August 1919. The material for the "Draft Programme of the R.C.P.(B.)" was written in February and March 1919; it has been placed before the documents of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) with which it is directly connected.

The volume consists mainly of reports and speeches delivered at congresses, conferences and meetings. They reflect Lenin's activity as a statesman and deal with major issues of the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in that period—the defence of the socialist country, the attitude towards the middle peasants and the combating of economic difficulties.

The reports and speeches at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) make up a large section of the volume; they include the report of the Central Committee, the report on the Party Programme and the speech closing the debate on the Programme and the report on work in the countryside.

A number of items—the "Report on the Domestic and Foreign Situation of the Soviet Republic" delivered to the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet on April 3, 1919, the "Letter to the Petrograd Workers on Aid for the Eastern Front", "Theses of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the Situation on the Eastern Front", "Report on the Tasks of the Trade Unions in the Mobilisation for the Eastern Front" delivered to a Plenary Meeting of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on April 11, 1919, speech on "The Fight Against Kolchak" at a Conference of Moscow Factory Committees and Trade Unions on April 17, 1919, and

others—are devoted to the mobilisation of the working class and the working people as a whole to fight Kolchak.

In his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants Apropos of the Victory over Kolchak" Lenin formulates the main tasks of strengthening the defence potential of the Soviet Republic as suggested by the experience of the victorious struggle against Kolchak.

In his report "The Present Situation and the Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power" delivered to a joint meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies, the All-Russia Council of Trade Unions, and representatives of Moscow factory committees on July 4, 1919, "Report on the Domestic and Foreign Situation of the Republic" delivered to the Moscow Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on July 12, 1919, the speech on "The Food and War Situation" at the Moscow Conference of Factory Committees, Trade Unions and representatives of the Moscow Central Workers' Co-operative delivered on July 30, 1919, and others, Lenin calls on the people to muster their forces for the struggle against Denikin. In these, as in other speeches in this volume, Lenin explains the principles of the Soviet food policy and outlines measures to improve the food situation in the country.

In "The Third International and Its Place in History", "The Tasks of the Third International" and other articles, Lenin shows the epoch-making significance of the Communist International and defines its tasks.

In the speech on the "Deception of the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality" delivered at the First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education on May 19, 1919, and the "Speech at the First All-Russia Congress of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture" delivered on July 31, 1919, Lenin develops the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and shows the contrast between proletarian and bourgeois democracy.

Lenin's lecture on "The State", delivered at the Sverdlov Communist University, explains the fundamentals of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state, its origin, nature and historical forms.

The volume includes Lenin's well-known pamphlet A Great Beginning in which he appraises the role of the early

communist subbotniks and shows the decisive importance of high labour productivity to the victory of communism.

In this volume there are fifteen new documents that had not previously been published in a Russian edition of the Collected Works. In his "Replies to Written Questions" handed up at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on March 12, 1919, Lenin speaks of the work of the Council of People's Commissars. Among writings published for the first time are "Draft C.C. Directives on Army Unity", "Draft Decision of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) on the Petrograd Front" and a telegram to the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine. These documents reflect Lenin's work to strengthen the Soviet state and its defence.

In the appeal "Beware of Spies!" Lenin proposes greater revolutionary vigilance to combat counter-revolution.

The C.C. R.C.P.(B.) letter "All Out for the Fight Against Denikin !" sets the task of reforming all public offices on military lines and transforming the country into a single military camp to organise the victory over Denikin.

The "Addendum to the Draft Appeal to German Workers and to Peasants Who Do not Exploit the Labour of Others" points out the growing sympathy for the Soviet state on the part of working people all over the world, and describes the leaders of the Second International as traitors to socialism and accomplices in the crimes of the bourgeoisie.

A telegram to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (end of April 1919) was not included in earlier Russian editions.

Some new documents have been included under the heading "Draft Programme of the R.C.P.(B.)"—the "Rough Draft of the Programme of the R.C.P.", published according to typewritten and manuscript copies, which covers all sections of the programme; the section on "The Basic Tasks of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Russia" was first printed in full in the Fourth Russian edition. The volume also includes the "Insertion for the Final Draft of the Programme Section on the National Question" and the "Draft Programme of the R.C.P. (Bolsheviks)" which is made up of the first sections of the draft Programme as subsequently edited by Lenin.

SESSION OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET MARCH 12, 1919

1

REPORT ON THE FOREIGN AND HOME POLICY OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Lenin's appearance on the platform is greeted by a lengthy ovation. All rise.*)

"This hall reminds me of the first time I spoke at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries still ruled it. We have forgotten the recent past too soon, but today, the way the revolution is developing in other countries reminds us of what we experienced not so long ago. Formerly it was assumed that in the West, where class antagonisms are much more developed, because of the more intensive development of capitalism, the revolution would proceed on lines differing somewhat from those of this country, and that power would pass directly from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. Events in Germany, however, indicate the contrary. The German bourgeoisie have united to counteract the masses of the proletariat who have raised their heads; they acquire strength from the greater experience gained by the Western bourgeoisie, and are waging a systematic struggle against the proletariat. The German revolutionary masses, however, still lack experience, and can gain it only in the course of this struggle. Everybody remembers the revolution of 1905, when the Russian proletariat entered the struggle without any previous experience. In the present revolution, however, we have taken into account and made use of the experience we gained in the revolution of 1905."

Lenin then proceeded to review the work of the Council of People's Commissars. He recalled the first period of the

revolution when the masses did not yet know what to do and still lacked sufficiently authoritative and powerful guiding centres.

"We knew perfectly well," Lenin continued, "that to achieve success in the struggle that had been started the greatest possible cohesion of the exploited masses and all elements of the entire working population was essential, and this inevitably brought us face to face with the question of forms of organisation. We remembered very well the part the Soviets had played in 1905, and revived them as the most suitable means of uniting the working people in their struggle against the exploiters. Before the revolution in Germany we always said that the Soviets were the most suitable organs of government for Russia. At that time we could not say that they were equally suitable for the West, but events have shown that they are. We see that Soviets are gaining popularity in the West, and that the fight for them is going on not only in Europe, but also in America. Soviet-type councils are being set up everywhere, and sooner or later they will take power into their own hands.

"The present situation in America, where such councils are being set up, is extremely interesting. Perhaps the movement there will not develop as it is developing in this country, but the important thing is that there, too, the Soviet form of organisation has gained extensive popularity. This form has superseded all other forms of proletarian organisation. The anarchists were formerly opposed to all government but after they had got to know the Soviet form they accepted it, and thereby demolished the whole theory of anarchism, which repudiates every form of government. Two years ago the compromising idea of collaboration with the bourgeoisie was dominant in our Soviets. A certain amount of time was required to clear the minds of the masses of the old rubbish that prevented them from understanding what was going on. This could be achieved only when the Soviets had undertaken the practical work of building the state. The masses of the workers in Germany are now in the same position, and their minds, too, must be cleared of the same old rubbish, although in that country the process is more intense, cruel and bloody than in Russia.

"I have digressed somewhat from the subject on which the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet has asked me to speak, but this could not be helped.

"The activities of the Council of People's Commissars during the past year can be understood only by appraising the role of the Soviets in the light of the world revolution. Often the minor daily affairs of administration and the inevitable petty problems of the work of organisation distract our attention and make us forget the great cause of the world revolution. But only by gauging the role of the Soviets on a world scale can we properly understand the minor details of the internal life of our country, and regulate them in proper time. The bigwig inspectors from Berne[1] say that we advocate violence, but they deliberately shut their eyes to the practices of their own bourgeoisie which governs exclusively with the aid of violence.

"Before we adopted the Soviet form of government there was a period of several months during which the masses prepared themselves for this new, hitherto unprecedented form of government. We tore the Kerensky government to shreds; we compelled the Provisional Government to keep on changing its Cabinet, to jump from right to left, up and down, and this definitely proved to the masses that the clique of compromisers with bourgeoisie who claimed the right to power at that time were unfit to govern the country, and only after this did we take power into our hands.

"The matter is much more complicated when taken on a world scale. In that case, revolutionary violence is not enough; revolutionary violence must be preceded by a period of preparation, like the one we passed through, but of somewhat longer duration, of course. At one time the Treaty of Brest[2] was a vexed question, and certain gentlemen called it a compromise and decided to take advantage of this step of the Soviet government to serve their demagogic aims. But if this is called a compromise, it would also be correct to say that we compromised with the tsar when we went into the State Duma in order to disrupt it from within. We concluded the Treaty of Brest because we expected the development of conditions in Germany that would bring about the overthrow of Wilhelm, and this shows how correct our calculations were.

"In the Entente[3] countries we see the awakening of the masses which the governments of these countries are doing their utmost to prevent. For this purpose the thoughts of the as yet politically unenlightened masses are being diverted to 'patriotic' channels. The masses are being lured by promises of the advantages of a victorious peace, they are being promised incalculable blessings when peace is concluded. They are being sustained with illusions. But the extent to which these illusions are likely to become reality may be gauged by the conversation I had recently with an American, a shrewd and level-headed businessman, whose interests differ entirely from ours. He described the situation in France as follows. The French Government is promising the masses piles of gold which, it claims, will be obtained from the Germans but the Germans have to have something to pay with, for if a debtor has nothing, nothing can be got from him and all the illusions based on the prospect of concluding an advantageous peace with Germany will be dispelled, for the peace that has been concluded will be a bankrupt peace. Even the enemies of the revolution realise this, for they see no way out of the present situation except the overthrow of capitalism. In this respect the temper of the Paris crowds, which are extremely sensitive and responsive, is typical. Six months ago people were quite tolerant towards speakers at meetings who roundly abused the Bolsheviks. But now, if any speaker dares to say anything against the Bolsheviks, they refuse to give him a hearing. The bourgeoisie have helped us a great deal to popularise our ideas. Their attacks on us made the masses think and discuss and, as a consequence, those of the masses of Paris who are able to think for themselves have come to the conclusion that since the bourgeoisie detest the Bolsheviks so much the Bolsheviks must know how to fight them. The Entente has now turned its attention to us and wants to pay the bills it owes out of our pocket. We have to reckon with a powerful enemy whose military strength is superior to ours, but not for long. Disillusionment with the victory is bound to set in, and this will lead to the collapse of all the 'Allied' machinations, that is, if they do not quarrel with each other before that. All countries are now suffering from hunger and no victory will help overcome it. We are confronted with complicated problems of foreign

policy. In this respect we have the experience of the Brest peace, the most important step in the foreign policy of the Council of People's Commissars. The Brest peace was concluded with a powerful enemy who was far superior to us in military strength, and this caused disagreement even in our own ranks, but the proletarian state had to take such a first step because it was surrounded on all sides by imperialist predators. The Brest peace sapped the strength of our powerful enemy. In a very short time the Germany which had forced these predatory terms upon us collapsed, and the same the awaits the other countries, the more so that everywhere we see the armies falling to pieces.

"We must recall the time when the disintegration of our army was ascribed to the impatience of the Russians, but this seems to be the lot of all countries that take the path of revolution. The downright robbery now being perpetrated by the 'democratic' governments in Paris is opening the eyes of the masses, the more so that their bickering over the spoils, which at times grows into a serious quarrel, is no longer a secret.[4] Unfavourable though the conditions under which Soviet Russia exists may be, we have this one advantage, which even the bourgeois *Times* lays stress upon. In an article written by its military expert it spoke of the growing disintegration of the armies of all countries except Russia. According to the *Times*, Russia is the only country in which the army is not falling to pieces but is being built up. This has been one of the most important features of our development during the past year. We are surrounded by enemies, we are defending ourselves and fighting to regain every inch of Soviet Russia's territory, and every month of struggle brings us nearer and nearer to the world revolution. We were the first in the world to take power, and today Soviets of working people govern our country. Shall we succeed in retaining power? If we do not, it will prove that historically we were not justified in seizing power. But today we can be justly proud of having withstood this test and of having upheld the power of the working people in spite of the incalculable suffering we have been compelled to undergo."

Lenin then went on to deal with the question of the specialists.

Some of our comrades, he said, express indignation at the fact that former officers and others who served the tsar are at the head of the Red Army. "Naturally, in organising the Red Army this question acquires special significance and success in this work depends on its correct presentation. But the question of specialists must be discussed on a broader scale. We must make use of them in all spheres of organisa ion, wherever we, lacking the experience and scientific training of the old bourgeois specialists, are ourselves naturally unable to cope with our tasks. We are not utopians who think that socialist Russia must be built up by men of a new type; we must utilise the material we have inherited from the old capitalist world. We are placing people of the old type in new conditions, keeping them under proper control, under the vigilant supervision of the proletariat, and making them do the work we need. This is the only way we can build. If you are unable to erect the edifice with the materials bequeathed to us by the bourgeois world, you will not be able to build it at all, and you will not be Communists, but mere phrase-mongers. For the purpose of building socialism, we must make the fullest use of the science, technology and, in general, everything that capitalist Russia bequeathed to us. Of course there will be great difficulties in our way. Mistakes are inevitable. There are deserters and deliberate saboteurs everywhere. Against these, force had to be the primary weapon. But after that we must make use of the moral weight of the proletariat, strong organisation and discipline. There is no need whatever to reject useful specialists, but they must be kept within definite limits so that the proletariat can keep them under control. They must be entrusted with certain work, but a vigilant eye must also be kept on them, commissars must be placed over them to thwart their counter-revolutionary scheming. At the same time we must also learn from them. Above all, no political concessions whatever must be made to these gentlemen whose services we are using wherever possible. We have already succeeded in doing this to some extent. We have passed from the stage of suppressing the capitalists to the stage of using their services, and this, perhaps, is one of the most important achievements in the field of internal development during the past year.

"One of the most serious problems affecting our cultural development is that of the rural districts. Soviet power presupposes the widest possible support of the working people. This sums up our entire rural policy during this period. It was necessary to link up the urban proletariat with the rural poor, and this we have done. Today they are most intimately connected by thousands of imperceptible threads. Here, as elsewhere, we encounter considerable difficulties, for the peasants are accustomed to feel that they are independent proprietors. They are accustomed to sell their grain freely, and every peasant regarded this as his inalienable right. Now a tremendous effort is needed to convince them definitely that only by means of the communist organisation of production shall we be able to cope with the devastation caused by the war. This must be done by persuasion and not by force. Of course, among the peasants too we have open enemies, the kulaks; but the bulk of the poor peasants, and of the middle peasants who are close to them, are on our side. Against the kulaks, who are our inveterate enemies, we have but one weapon—force. When we began to carry out our food policy on the principle that the peasants must surrender their surplus stocks for the benefit of the famine-stricken, some people began to shout to the peasants: 'They're robbing you!' These were the inveterate enemies of the peasants, workers and communism, enemies arrayed in Menshevik, Left Socialist-Revolutionary, or other clownish costumes, and these we shall continue to treat in the same way as we have treated them up to now."

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2
REPLIES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS

Comrades, I now want to reply to the written questions, two of which are not quite clear. However, one of them appears to contain two main ideas. In the first place, its author has a grudge against the Bolsheviks who went at things with a rush, and sympathises with the Mensheviks because of their love of the gradual. Secondly, he asks about peasant revolts.

Insofar as concerns the first question, let me say that if you make this sort of accusation against the Bolsheviks you must say what they did in a rush, and what is good about gradualness. The main thing that distinguishes us from the Mensheviks was our insistence on the transfer of all power to the Soviets and we rushed things to such an extent that in October of the year before last we took power. The Mensheviks advocated procrastination since they did not desire that transfer of power. The well-known socialist Kautsky, for instance, a man who sympathises with the Mensheviks, said in a pamphlet in August 1918 that the Bolsheviks should not take power because they would not be able to hold out, that they would perish and in that way destroy a whole party. I think that view has been disproved by the course of events and that it is not worth while wasting time on it, especially as there have not been any clear objections. In Germany, Kautsky insisted on democracy, on a Constituent Assembly. The German Mensheviks and ours said that power should not be given to the Soviets. The Constituent Assembly assembled in Germany, and in January and March there were several huge workers' revolts, a civil war, the result of which was that the German Mensheviks, headed by Hilferding, proposed in recent articles to combine the Constituent Assembly with Workers' Councils in such a way as to give the Central Committee of the Councils the right to hold up

decisions made by the Constituent Assembly and submit questions to a plebiscite. This shows that the German Mensheviks, even the best of them, are in an absolute muddle. The idea of combining the Constituent Assembly and the Workers' Councils, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat, deserves nothing but ridicule.

With regard to the peasant revolts—there is a question on that subject here. We have, of course, experienced a number of kulak revolts and they are still occurring. Last summer there was a whole string of them. The kulak is our implacable enemy. And here we can hope for nothing unless we crush him. The middle peasant is a different case, he is not our enemy. It is not true that there have been peasant revolts in Russia that involved a large number of peasants who were not kulaks. An individual village or a volost does join the kulaks, but under Soviet power there have been no peasant revolts that involved all the peasants in Russia. There have been kulak revolts and there will be more under a government that insists on surplus grain being sold to the hungry at fixed prices. Such revolts are inevitable because the kulak who has a big stock of grain can sell it at several hundred rubles a pood; we all know what prices the food profiteers are getting. If we allow the kulaks so much freedom, the rich man who has a secret cache of Kerensky paper money[5] will fill his belly, but the majority who have nothing hidden will go hungry. And so we do not close our eyes to the inevitability of kulak revolts against Soviet power. When the capitalists were in power workers' revolts against them and peasant revolts against the landowners were inevitable. Now that the landowners and capitalists have been smashed kulak revolts will occur less and less frequently. You have to take your choice. If there is anyone who wants everything to go smoothly without any revolts, who wants the rich people to hand us a declaration of love on a salver and promise to hand over all surpluses peacefully, I don't think we can take him seriously.

The other unclear note contains the following. What is to be done when workers, misled by the appeals of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, do not work, go on strike, and come out against Soviet power because of the food shortage? I cannot, of course, count on all workers, down to the last, supporting

Soviet power. When the Paris workers revolted in 1871, quite a large number of workers in other towns fought against them in the whiteguard troops and crushed the Paris workers. That did not prevent politically-conscious socialists from asserting that the Paris Communards represented the entire proletariat, that is, all that was best and honest—only backward sections of the workers served in the whiteguard troops. We, too, have backward workers who are not politically conscious and who have not yet understood Soviet power; we are doing our best to enlighten them. No other government has satisfied the demands for standing representative bodies of workers to the extent the Soviets have, which are willing to give any representative of a factory a place in a government institution. We are, as far as possible, drawing workers into the implementation of the policy of the state; under capitalism, even in republics, the workers were kept out of it but Soviet power does its best to attract workers, although some of them will feel the attraction of the old for quite a long time to come.

There are very few people among you, probably only an individual or two, who remember serfdom; only very old people can remember that, but there are people who remember what things were like thirty or forty years ago. Anyone who was in the rural districts knows that some thirty years ago there were quite a number of old people in the villages who said, "It was better under serfdom, there was more order, things were strict and the women did not dress extravagantly." If you now read Gleb Uspensky—we are erecting a monument to him as one of the best writers about peasant life—you will find descriptions dating back to the eighties and nineties of honest old peasants and sometimes just ordinary elderly people who said frankly that it had been better under serfdom. When an old social order is destroyed it cannot be destroyed immediately in the minds of all people, there will always be some who are drawn to the old.

Some workers, printers, for instance, say that capitalism was good, there were a lot of newspapers whereas now there are few, in those days they earned a decent wage and they do not want any socialism. There were quite a number of branches of industry that depended on the rich classes or on the production of articles of luxury. Under capitalism quite

a number of workers in big cities lived by producing articles of luxury. In the Soviet Republic we shall have to leave these workers unemployed for a time. We shall say to them, "Get down to some other, useful work." And the worker will say, "I did delicate work, I was a jeweller, it was clean work, I worked for gentlemen; now the muzhik is in power, the gentlemen have been scattered and I want to go back to capitalism." Such people will preach going back to capitalism, or, as the Mensheviks say, going forward to healthy capitalism and sound democracy. A few hundred workers are to be found who will say, "We lived well under a healthy capitalism." The people who lived well under capitalism were an insignificant minority—we defend the interests of the majority that lived badly under capitalism. (*Applause.*) Healthy capitalism led to world slaughter in the countries with the greatest freedom. There can be no healthy capitalism, there can be capitalism of the sort obtaining in the freest republic, one like the American republic, cultured, rich, technically developed; and that democratic and most republican capitalism, led to the most savage world slaughter over the plunder of the whole world. Out of fifteen million workers you will find a few thousand who lived well under capitalism. In the rich countries there are more such workers because they work for a greater number of millionaires and multimillionaires. They served that handful and received particularly high wages from them. Take hundreds of British millionaires—they have accumulated thousands of millions because they have plundered India and a large number of colonies. It meant nothing to them to make gifts to 10,000 or 20,000 workers, giving them double or higher wages so that they would work well for them. I once read the reminiscences of an American barber whom a multimillionaire paid a dollar a day to shave him. And that barber wrote a whole book praising that multimillionaire and his own wonderful life. For a daily visit of one hour to his financial majesty he received a dollar, was satisfied and did not want anything but capitalism. We have to be on our guard against such an argument. The vast majority of workers were not in such a position. We, the Communists of the whole world, defend the interests of the vast majority of working people, and it was a small minority of working people whom the capitalists bribed with high

wages and made them the loyal servants of capital. Under serfdom there were people, peasants, who said to the landowners, "We are your slaves (that was after emancipation), we shall not leave you." Were there many of them? An insignificant few. Can you deny that there was a struggle against serfdom by reference to them? Of course not. And today communism cannot be denied by reference to the minority of workers who earned good money on bourgeois newspapers, on the production of articles of luxury and for their personal services to multimillionaires.

I shall now deal with the questions that were presented clearly, first of all with the question of concessions in general and of the Great Northern Railway[6] in particular. It is said that it would be allowing predators to plunder the wealth of the nation. In answer to this I say that the question is closely connected with bourgeois specialists and the question of world imperialism. Can we smash world imperialism today? It would be our duty to do it if we could, but you know that we cannot do it today any more than we could have overthrown Kerensky in March 1917; we had to wait for the Soviet organisations to develop, we had to work for that and not revolt against Kerensky immediately. And today, is an offensive war against world imperialism any more possible? Of course not. If we had been strong enough, if we could have obtained a lot of grain quickly, and had machinery and so on, we would not have allowed the Scheidemanns to mow down the Spartacists[7] but would have kicked them out. Today, however, that is misplaced fantasy, today our country alone cannot overthrow world imperialism; other countries are experiencing a period in which there is no Soviet majority and in many countries Soviets are only just beginning to appear so that we have to make concessions to imperialism. Today we cannot build railways on a large scale—God grant that we can handle those already existing. We are short of grain and fuel, we have not got enough locomotives, several million poods of grain are lying on the Volga-Bugulma Railway and we cannot bring it away. In the Council of People's Commissars a few days ago we passed a decision to send representatives with extensive powers to get the grain away from there. The people are hungry in Petrograd and Moscow while millions of poods of

grain are stored there and we cannot get them away because we have not got enough locomotives and there is no fuel. And we say that it is better to pay tribute to foreign capitalists as long as they build railways. We shall not perish on account of that tribute but if we do not organise railway transport we may perish because the people are hungry; great as the endurance of the Russian worker may be, there is a limit to it. It is, therefore, our duty to take measures to improve railway facilities even at the expense of paying tribute to capitalism. Good or bad, there is so far no choice. We shall not ruin Soviet power by paying tribute to world capitalism until it is finally overthrown. We paid gold to the German imperialists, we had to under the terms of the Treaty of Brest, and now the Entente countries are taking that gold away from them—the victorious bandit is robbing the defeated bandit. We say today that as long as the world movement of the proletariat does not bring victory we shall either fight or pay those bandits to buy them off and do not see anything bad in it. While we were buying off the German bandits by paying them a few hundred million we strengthened our Red Army, but the German bandits now have nothing left. That's what will happen to other imperialist bandits. (*Applause.*)

The comrade adds that he was under arrest for four days for opposing the ruin of the middle peasants; he asks what the middle peasant is and refers to a number of peasant revolts. If the comrade was arrested for protesting against the ruin of the middle peasants that was, of course, incorrect, and judging by his speedy release I imagine that either the one who arrested him or some other representative of Soviet power found the action incorrect. Now about the middle peasant. He differs from the kulak in not exploiting the labour of others. The kulak steals other people's money and other people's labour. The poor peasants, the semi-proletarians, are those who are themselves exploited; the middle peasant does not exploit other people, gets his living from his own farm, has approximately enough grain, is no kulak but is not to be classed as poor either. Such peasants waver between us and the kulaks. A few of them may become kulaks if they are lucky, that is why they are attracted to the kulaks, but the majority of them will never be kulaks. If the social-

ists and Communists are able to talk intelligently to the middle peasant they can prove to him that the Soviet government is more advantageous than any other, because other governments oppress and crush the middle peasant. The middle peasant, however, wavers. Today he is for us, tomorrow for some other power; partly for us and partly for the bourgeoisie. In the programme we shall adopt in a few days we are against any kind of force in respect of the middle peasant. Our Party makes this declaration. If there are arrests we condemn them and will put matters right. In respect of the kulak we are for force but in respect of the middle peasant we are against force. To him we say, "If you are on the side of Soviet power we shall not drive you into a commune by force, we have never forced peasants into communes and no decree to that effect exists." If it happens in the localities, it is abuse of power for which the people in office are removed and indicted. This is a big question. The middle peasant stands between two camps. But, comrades, in this case the policy is quite clear—we are against force where the middle peasants are concerned, we favour agreement with them, we favour concessions to them. The middle peasant can and will come to communism by a slow journey. In the freest capitalist republic the middle peasant is threatened by capital that oppresses and crushes him in some way or other.

The next note asks my opinion of the Baltic Fleet. I have not studied the question of the Baltic Fleet and cannot answer at the moment; the speech by the comrade from the fleet probably exhausted that question.

Then there is a question about the mouldiness, moss and red tape that has grown in the localities and about the need to fight it. That is perfectly true. When the October Revolution kicked out the old bureaucrats it did so because it had created the Soviets. It turned out the old judges and made the court a people's court. The court could have been simplified; for this there was no need to know the old laws but simply to be guided by a sense of justice. It was easy to get rid of bureaucratic methods in the courts. In other areas it was much more difficult. We threw out the old bureaucrats, but they have come back, they call themselves "commonists" when they can't bear to say the word Communist, and they wear a red ribbon in their buttonholes and creep into warm

corners. What to do about it? We must fight this scum again and again and if the scum has crawled back we must again and again clean it up, chase it out, keep it under the surveillance of communist workers and peasants whom we have known for more than a month and for more than a year. There is still another question here, a note which says that it is a bad thing to give advantages to members of the Party because scoundrels will worm their way in. We are fighting against that and will continue to do so, comrades; we have passed a decision not to allow members who have been in the Party less than a year to be delegates to a Party congress; we shall continue to adopt such measures. When a party is in power it has to give preference to its members—let us suppose that two men apply, one of them shows a Party membership card and the other has no Party card and both of them are equally unknown; it is natural that preference should be given to the Party member, the one who has the Party card. How can one really decide whether a person is in the Party because of his convictions or for gain? The date he joined the Party must be entered on his Party card, he must not be given the card until he has been tested, until he has been through probation, etc.

There is also a note about the revolutionary tax[8] to the effect that it is a burden on the middle peasant. There has been a special session on this question, there were many complaints, and in order to verify them we did the following. We have a Central Statistical Board in which the best specialists in statistics in Russia are employed, most of them Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and even Cadets; there are very few Communists, Bolsheviks—they were more concerned with the fight against tsarism than with practical work. As far as I have been able to see these specialists are working satisfactorily, although that does not mean that we do not have to fight against some individuals. We gave them the job of making probes in a few volosts to see how the peasants have distributed the revolutionary tax. There are very many complaints; when we realise, however, that they amount to about a thousand for the whole country, then we see that it is an insignificant number for Russia—if there are a thousand complaints to several million farms that is a mere bagatelle; if three people a day come to

the Central Executive Committee that makes 90 complaints a month, but it creates the impression that we are snowed under with complaints. To check up on this we decided to investigate a few volosts and we got a precise answer in Popov's report which was repeated at a sitting of the Central Executive Committee in the presence of workers. The report showed that in the majority of cases the peasants distribute the tax justly. Soviet power demands that the poor do not pay anything, the middle peasants a moderate amount and the rich peasants a lot, although it is, of course, impossible to determine exactly who is rich and who is poor and there have been mistakes, but on the whole the peasants distribute the tax correctly. That's as it should be. (*Applause.*) There have been mistakes, of course. For instance, there was a petty clerk on the railway who complained that the house committee had taxed him unjustly. He informed the Soviet authorities of this. And they said, search his place, he is a profiteer. And they found several sacks containing a million rubles in Kerensky notes. This will continue until we have found a way of changing all the old notes for new ones. When we change these notes for new ones all the profiteers will be exposed. All of them will have to change old notes for new. (*Stormy applause.*) If you present the small amount of money necessary for a working man you will get a ruble for a ruble, if you present one or two thousand—ruble for ruble. If you present more we shall give you some of it in new money and the rest will go into a book—you can wait for it. (*Applause.*) In order to do that sort of thing we have to get the new notes ready. There are about 60,000 million of the old money. We do not need to change such a huge sum for new money, but specialists have computed that we shall need no less than 20,000 million rubles' worth. We already have 17,000 million. (*Applause.*) The question has been raised at the Council of People's Commissars of making the final preparations in the near future for this measure that will strike a blow at the profiteers. This measure will expose those who are concealing Kerensky notes. The measure will require a lot of organisational work, for it is no easy one.

Then there is a question on how matters stand with the sowing, since it is difficult to get enough seed. That, of

course, is true. A Cultivated Land Committee[9] has been set up. Here, at the Commissariat of Agriculture, a Working Committee[10] has been formed in accordance with a Soviet decree and its work will be organised jointly with the trade unions. Its job will be to see that the land is not left vacant and that any land left vacant by the landowners is given to workers. There is an order to the effect that if the peasants do not take the land the government will try to adapt it to its needs. There is a shortage of seed, of course. In this case the poor peasants must drag out into the open those kulaks who have a hidden surplus grain and have not given it up for seed. It is important to the kulak to conceal these surpluses because he will get a thousand rubles a pood for it in the hungry months and it does not worry him that grain will not be planted and that he will be doing harm to thousands of workers. He is an enemy of the people and he must be exposed.

The next question is about wages; the specialist gets three thousand, he goes from place to place and is difficult to catch. I say this about the specialists—they are people who have a knowledge of bourgeois science and engineering at a higher level than the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants; such specialists are needed and we say that at the moment we cannot introduce equalitarian wages, and are in favour of paying more than three thousand. Even if we pay several million a year in wages it will not be too much as long as we learn to work well with their help. We do not see any other way of arranging things so that they do not work under the lash, and as long as there are few specialists we are compelled to retain high wages. I recently had a talk on this question with Schmidt, the Commissar for Labour, and he agrees with our policy and says that formerly, under capitalism, the wages of an unskilled worker were 25 rubles a month and those of a good specialist not less than 500 rubles, a ratio of 20 to 1; now the lowest wages amount to 600 rubles and the specialists get 3,000, a ratio of 5 to 1. We have, therefore, done a lot to equalise low and high wages and we shall continue in the same vein. At the moment we cannot equalise wages and as long as there are few specialists we shall not refuse to raise their wages. We say that it is better to pay out an extra million or a thousand million

as long as we can employ all the specialists, for what they will teach our workers and peasants is worth more than that thousand million.

Next comes a question about agricultural communes and whether former landowners can be allowed to remain in them. That depends on what the landowner was like. There has been no decree forbidding the landowner admission to the commune. The landowner, of course, does not inspire confidence because he has been oppressing the peasants for centuries and they hate him, but if there are landowners that the peasants know as decent people you not only can but must admit them. We must use such specialists, they are used to organising big farms and there is a lot they can teach peasants and farm workers.

Then it is asked whether the middle peasants should be allowed on public ploughlands. Of course they should. Whole uyezds have recently decided to go over to collective ploughing—to what extent it will be carried out I don't know; for this it is important to attract the middle peasants, because the poor peasants are on our side but the middle peasants—not always, and they have to be won over. We are in favour of using force against the capitalists and against the landowners, and are not only in favour of the use of force but of the confiscation of everything they have accumulated; we are in favour of the use of force against the kulak, but not of his complete expropriation, because he farms the land and part of what he has accumulated comes from his own labour. This is a difference that must be fully understood. The complete expropriation of the landowner and capitalists; not all the property of the kulak can be confiscated, there has been no such order; we want to convince the middle peasant and draw him over to us by example and persuasion. That is our programme. If there are deviations from it in the localities, they are infringements of the decrees of Soviet power either by people who do not want to carry out our decrees or by those who do not understand them.

Then there is a question on how to smarten up the railway workers, and also about the cessation of traffic on the railways. This question has been heatedly discussed by the Council of People's Commissars and many measures have been adopted. This is a fundamental question. Millions of

poods of grain are lying on the Volga-Bugulma Railway and may be ruined because in some places the grain is lying in the snow and when the thaw sets in the grain will be spoiled. It is already damp (up to 20 per cent humidity). This grain must be brought away or it will be destroyed. The main thing is that the railwaymen themselves are badly in need of grain. For this purpose it will be necessary, according to the estimate of our comrades in the Commissariat of Railways, to stop passenger traffic from March 18 to April 10. This cancelling of passenger traffic can give us the three and a half million poods of grain that can be brought out using even light passenger locomotives. If profiteers were to carry grain on those trains they would, at most, bring half a million poods. Those who complain about the cessation of passenger traffic are not in the right. Profiteers would, at best, transport half a million poods and we shall bring in three and a half million, if we fill the cars with grain and if the railwaymen help us, and in this way we shall improve the food situation. That is why we say that all comrades who are more developed and more organised must work for the war and for food. Give us people again and again, no matter how difficult it may be. We know very well that Petrograd has given more people than any other town in Russia, because the most developed and best organised workers are in Petrograd. This, however, is going to be a difficult six months. The first half-year of 1918 produced 27 million poods, and in the second we got 67 million poods. We have reached a hungry half-year. March, April, May and June will be difficult months. We must bend all efforts to prevent this. The question must be raised at every factory and at every study circle of whether there is a man who can be sent to work at a railway workshop and replaced by a woman, and if there is, to send him to that work. In every study circle, in every group and in every organisation thought must be given to this, new workers must be supplied if we are to cope with this difficult half-year. (*Applause.*)

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SESSION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF FARM LABOURERS OF PETROGRAD GUBERNIA[11] MARCH 13, 1919

1

SPEECH ON THE ORGANISATION OF A FARM LABOURERS' UNION

Comrades, I am very glad to be able on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars to greet this Congress of Farm Labourers, the object of which is to form a farm labourers' union.

Comrades, the Central Committee of our Party and the All-Russia Council of Trade Unions have on more than one occasion held joint conferences with Comrade Schmidt, People's Commissar for Labour, members of the All-Russia Council of Trade Unions and others, to discuss how to set about organising farm labourers. Nowhere in the world, even in the most advanced capitalist countries, where trade unions have existed not only for decades but for centuries, have farm labourers succeeded in forming anything like permanent trade unions. You know how the conditions of life of the peasants and farm labourers hamper this and the fact that they are scattered and disunited is a great obstacle, so that it is far more difficult for them than for urban workers to unite in a trade union.

The workers' and peasants' government, however, has set to work all along the line to build communist society. It has not only set out to make a clean sweep of the landowners and capitalists—this has been almost completely achieved—but has set out to build a society in which there will

never again be landowners and capitalists. There has been more than one instance in the history of revolutions where, soon after the old landowners and capitalists were swept away, new capitalists sprang up from the ranks of the kulaks, the wealthy peasants, profiteers, who, in many cases, exploited the workers more than the old landowners and capitalists did. The task that confronts us is to sweep away the old capitalists and to make it impossible for new ones to emerge; to see to it that power remains fully, entirely and exclusively in the hands of those who work, who live by their own labour. How can this be done? There is only one way, and that is by organising the rural workers, the proletarians. This organisation must be permanent. Only in a permanent, mass organisation can farm labourers learn the business of managing large-scale farms; for if they do not learn to do this themselves, nobody will do it for them. You remember the words to this effect in our anthem, the *Internationale*. The most the Soviet government can do is to give such an organisation every assistance. The capitalist organisations did everything in their power, resorted to every lawful means, various ruses, police devices, honest and dishonest schemes to prevent labourers from organising. To this day in Germany, the most advanced country in Europe, farm labourers are deprived of the right to organise. There, the ancient master and servant law is still in force, and farm labourers continue to have the status of servants. Quite recently I had a conversation with a prominent Englishman who came to Russia during the war. In the past he sided with capitalism, but in the course of our revolution he developed splendidly, first into a Menshevik and later into a Bolshevik. During our conversation we discussed labour conditions in England—there are no peasants in England, there are only big capitalists and farm workers—and he said, "I am not hopeful, because our farm labourers live under feudal and not capitalist conditions; they are so overburdened, crushed and ground down by toil, that it is difficult for them to unite." And this is in a most advanced country, where a certain farm labourer attempted to form a farm labourers' union quite half a century ago. This is what progress amounts to in the free capitalist countries! Our government, however, decided to help to organise the rural and other workers as soon as it came into being. We must render

every assistance. I am particularly pleased to note that here, in Petrograd, where there are so many beautiful buildings, palaces, which were not built for the right purposes, our comrades have quite properly converted them into premises for meetings, congresses and conferences of precisely those classes of the population which worked to build them, which have built them for centuries, but which were never allowed to come within a mile of them! (*Applause.*) I think, comrades, that now that nearly all the palaces in Petrograd have been converted into meeting halls and premises for unions of workers—primarily urban, but also rural workers, the working section of the peasantry—I think that we may regard this as a first step towards providing the working people, the formerly exploited section of the population, with the opportunity to organise. I repeat, the Soviet government will do all in its power immediately and unconditionally to help such an organisation to remould rural life and leave no room for kulaks or profiteers, so that co-operative labour, labour in common, may become the general rule in the countryside. This is the task we have all set ourselves. You know perfectly well how difficult this task is, that it is impossible to change all the conditions of rural life by means of decrees, laws and ordinances. It was possible by means of ordinances and decrees to overthrow the landowners and capitalists, it is possible by this means to curb the kulaks. But if the millions of farm labourers will not have their own organisation, if they do not learn in this organisation, step by step, to manage their own affairs, political and economic—and the economic affairs are most important—if they do not learn to manage large-scale farms and transform them—since they enjoy a number of privileges which other farms do not—from models of exploitation where formerly the workers had their sweat and blood squeezed out of them, into model co-operative farms, the working people themselves will be to blame for it. The old farms cannot now be restored. It is impossible for us to provide ten good horses and ten good ploughs for every hundred dessiatines of land (if we take ten small farms of ten dessiatines each). We have not that number of horses or ploughs left. But if the same hundred dessiatines are cultivated on a large scale on the basis of co-operative or common tillage, or as a voluntary agricultural

commune, we shall need, probably, not ten horses and ploughs, but only three. This is how a saving in human labour and better results can be achieved. But there is only one way to achieve this, and that is by an alliance of urban and rural workers. The urban workers have taken power in the cities. All the best that has been created in the cities in the shape of palaces, fine buildings and culture, the workers place at the disposal of the rural population, for they know that their power in the cities cannot be durable unless a sound alliance is established with the farm workers. Only such an alliance, the foundations of which you are here laying down, can make a permanent change possible. The middle peasants, too, will voluntarily join this alliance. It will entail a vast amount of effort, of course, but nothing can be done at one stroke. If your union is formed, if it grows, develops and spreads all over Russia, if it maintains the closest contact with the urban workers' union, we shall fulfil this difficult task by the joint efforts of millions of organised farm and urban workers and thus extricate ourselves from the state of ruin into which we and all other nations were plunged by the four years' war. We shall emerge from this state, but we shall not go back to the old system of individual and scattered production—this system of production condemns man to ignorance, poverty, disunity; we shall organise collective, large-scale, co-operative production. For this, all that human knowledge, human skill and human invention have achieved, all the knowledge of the specialists, must be devoted to the service of the united workers. The workers must become the masters in all fields; they must learn to be managers and to direct those who up to now, like many agronomists, for example, acted as stewards for the capitalists against the workers. This is no easy problem, but in the towns very much has been done to solve it. You are now taking the first steps towards solving this problem in the rural districts. Permit me to conclude by repeating my greetings from the Council of People's Commissars and to express once again the firm conviction that the union of which you are here laying the foundations will in the near future grow into a united All-Russia Farm Labourers' Union. This union will serve as a genuine bulwark of Soviet power in the rural districts, as the vanguard in the struggle to remould rural life in such a way

as to prevent the revival of any exploitation, of the rule of the rich over the poor, on the basis of common, united, co-operative labour. This is what I wish you, comrades. (*Applause*.)

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REPLIES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS

Two notes have been handed up, both asking whether workers in state farms are allowed to keep their own small livestock, vegetable plots and poultry. I have just asked for a copy of the act we recently discussed in the Council of People's Commissars and which was passed by the Central Executive Committee. This act is entitled "Statute on Socialist Land Settlement and the Measures for the Transition to Socialist Farming". I don't know whether a copy of this act is available here. I helped to draft it and delivered a report on it to the Commission set up by the Central Executive Committee. If my memory does not betray me—we have so many laws that one cannot remember them all, and many more acts have been passed since then—I think this act contains a clause which prohibits workers in state farms from keeping their own livestock and holding separate vegetable plots. I should like to have a copy of that act and consult it. (A copy of the act is handed to Lenin.) Here is Clause 46: "No worker or office employee in a state farm shall have the right to keep his own livestock, poultry, or vegetable plot." Thus, it turns out that not all of you were aware of the existence of this act. One of the comrades in the Presidium told me that there was a heated debate on this question at this Congress. I do not quite understand why. I have just been handed a copy of *Izvestia* containing this act entitled "Statute on Socialist Land Settlement and the Measures for the Transition to Socialist Farming". Why was this clause inserted in the act? To introduce labour in common on a common farm. If private vegetable plots, animals, poultry, and so forth, were permitted again, we should revert to the small farming that had existed

hitherto. If that were the case, would it be worth while to have all this bother. Would it be worth while establishing state farms? It goes without saying that if you discuss this question and, knowing as you do the conditions prevailing in Petrograd Gubernia—I am told that this Congress consists solely of representatives of Petrograd Gubernia—if on the basis of your experience of what has been done in Petrograd Gubernia, and in spite of all the arguments in favour of common production, you arrive at the conclusion that a temporary exception should be made for this gubernia, we shall re-examine the question. Only, you must try to prove to us that such an exception is really necessary, that special conditions, absent in other gubernias, prevail in Petrograd Gubernia, otherwise, all the others will demand the same exception. Then you must explain that you regard the measure you recommend to the government, or on which you insist, as a temporary one, for there can hardly be any dispute about the fact that a state farm deserving the name must be run on the basis of common labour. We have had the old system of labour whereby each peasant toiled on his own strip of land, had his own farm-house, his own cattle, poultry, harrow, wooden plough, and so forth, for many years, for many centuries. We know perfectly well that in Russia and in other countries this resulted in the peasants remaining ignorant and poverty-stricken with the rich oppressing the poor, for the problems that have to be faced in agriculture cannot be solved on individual lines. If we attempt it, it will only result in a reversion to the former poverty, from which only one in a hundred, or perhaps, five out of a hundred, climb into the ranks of the more well-to-do, while the rest live in want. That is why our task is now to go over to the collective tillage of the land, to large-scale farming in common. But the Soviet government must not under any circumstances resort to coercion. There is no law which makes this compulsory. Agricultural communes are established on a voluntary basis; the adoption of collective tillage must be voluntary; the workers and peasants' government must refrain from exercising the slightest compulsion, and the law prohibits this. If anyone of you here knows of cases of compulsion, then please regard it as an abuse of power, an infringement of the law, which we shall do our utmost to rectify, which we shall

rectify. Organised farm labourers must help us; only with the aid of their organisation shall we be able to prevent such abuses. The state farms, however, are something different. They were never in the hands of individual small farmers. The Soviet government takes them over and says that we shall send the available agronomists to them and transfer to them all the farm implements that have remained intact. If we succeed in bringing the war to a close and conclude peace with America, we shall order a shipload of up-to-date implements and supply the state farms with them so that these large-scale farms may by common labour produce better than before, at lower cost than before, and more than before. It will be the function of the state farms gradually to teach the rural population to work out for themselves the new system, the system of common labour, which will prevent the resurgence of a handful of rich men to exploit the masses of the poor as was always the case in the rural districts, not only in this country but also in the most free of republics. You know perfectly well that there are still large numbers of peasant profiteers in the rural districts who piled up hundreds of thousands of rubles during the war, who are hoarding Kerensky notes in anticipation of being able to invest them again and so exploit the poor peasants. What measures can be taken to combat this? None, except the adoption of collective farming. Agricultural communes must be formed on an entirely voluntary basis; there must be no coercion whatever. The same applies to collective tillage of the land. State farms are established on nationalised land. You know that on the demand of the vast majority of the peasants the private ownership of land was entirely abolished on October 26, 1917, on the first night after our Soviet revolution. These large-scale farms established on nationalised land are called state farms. Can we allow the old system of small farming to revive on state farms? I think you will all agree that we cannot, and must not do so. If the economic conditions prevailing in Petrograd Gubernia, the conditions of practical work with which you are closely familiar, and which we, of course, could not take into account as we were not aware of them—if, after thoroughly discussing the matter from all angles you arrive at the conclusion that these conditions make an exception necessary in the case of Petrograd Gubernia,

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that for a time it should be exempted, then, in order that we may revise our decision you must try to submit the most definite proof possible that this is necessary, and if you do I promise that we shall discuss this matter again in the Council of People's Commissars, in the light of the decision of your Congress, and examine it again in the Central Executive Committee. We shall discuss whether Petrograd Gubernia should be exempted for a time, and under certain conditions, from the operation of Clause 46, which prohibits the possession of vegetable plots, small livestock, poultry, and so forth by state farm employees. Although we agree that it is necessary to adopt farming in common, and although all the work will be conducted on these lines, nevertheless, on the recommendation of people who are familiar with the practical side of the work; we shall make an exception—we shall not refuse to do so, for sometimes it is necessary to make exceptions. We trust that by working on these lines good progress will be made, and that we shall succeed in laying the foundations of real socialist agriculture. (*Applause.*)

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING IN THE PEOPLE'S HOUSE, PETROGRAD MARCH 13, 1919

NEWSPAPER REPORT

"The question that mainly interests most of you is the food situation, and what the Council of People's Commissars has done in the matter. Permit me to tell you briefly what it has done. We have entered into a severe, hungry half-year, and all our enemies at home and abroad, including the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, knowing what hardships the people are suffering, are trying to make capital out of it, are trying to overthrow the Soviet government and thus, whether they realise it or not, restore the rule of the landowners and capitalists. We have entered a period when the collection of grain at its source is exceeding deliveries, and the establishment of Soviet power in the Ukraine gives us grounds for hoping that we shall be able to cope with the food situation in the coming half-year better than we did last year, although we shall now have to pull through a half-year that will be more severe than the preceding one. The fact that a considerable section of the peasant masses has turned in favour of Soviet power is a great gain for us. In those regions where the Czechoslovaks[12] were, the Trans-Volga region and Ufa Gubernia, the attitude of even the well-to-do peasants has changed abruptly in favour of Soviet power, for the Czechoslovaks taught them a severe lesson. Only a few days ago a delegation of peasants representing five volosts in the Sarapul Uyezd came to see me. These are the volosts which quite recently sent 40,000 poods of grain each to Moscow and Petrograd. I asked the delegation to tell me what the

attitude of the peasants was towards the Soviet government, and I received the following reply. 'Yes, the Czechoslovaks taught us a lesson, and now, nobody will turn us away from the Soviet government.' In other regions, too, in the cis-Urals, for example, where, incidentally, there are huge stocks of grain, the peasants are now on the side of the Soviets. At one time, influenced by the Mensheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries—you will remember the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov nearly succeeded in opening our front to the Czechoslovaks—the peasants in these regions were hostile to the Soviets. But the atrocities perpetrated by the officers of the Czechoslovak army, their brutal treatment of the population, their attempts to restore the old tsarist and landowner system in its entirety—all this taught the peasants a lesson. At the present time Soviet activities are being carried on in those gubernias with a zest that you here can scarcely imagine, for here, in the large centres, the people are exhausted by lengthy under-nourishment, whereas in those regions, where there are fairly large stocks of grain, problems of filling the stomach recede into the background.

"I now come to the details. In Ufa Gubernia there are stocks of grain amounting to 60,000,000 poods, procurement is proceeding rapidly, but we are encountering colossal transport difficulties. On the railways, on the Kazan-Sarapul and Volga-Bugulma lines, we have about 10,000,000 poods of grain already collected, but we cannot transport it owing to the shortage of locomotives, trucks and fuel and the exceedingly bad state of the available locomotives. To increase the carrying capacity of our railways we have been obliged to resort to an extremely radical measure: we have decided to suspend all passenger traffic on the railways all over Russia for a period extending from March 18 to April 10. Before deciding on this measure we discussed it three times with our railwaymen comrades and with prominent railway experts. Only after we had discussed the matter from every angle and had weighed up all probable consequences did we make the decision. Our calculations showed that the suspension of passenger traffic will release 220 locomotives; although they are of low power they are capable of transporting 3,500,000 poods of grain. If we cal-

culate the amount of grain the private profiteers carry—there were weeks when we were obliged to allow them to transport food unhindered—we shall find that in a period of three weeks these profiteers might bring in no more than 200,000 poods. That decided the issue. The kulaks, profiteers, and even individual workers, will, of course, raise a howl about this and say that we are depriving the people of the only opportunity they have of bringing in even a pood or so of grain. We know that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks will appear on the scene and try to take advantage of the famine to turn the people against the Soviet government. But here, as in all other cases of difficulty, we rely exclusively on the class-consciousness of the masses of the advanced workers. Better suffer privation, better encounter the hostile agitation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, but face up to the danger and say frankly, 'We shall not extricate ourselves from our food difficulties unless we adopt the most radical measures and strain every nerve to transport the grain.' In many places grain intended for delivery has been piled near the railway stations on the bare ground and is in danger of being swept away by the spring floods. Measures must be taken to accelerate loading and transport. In deciding on this radical measure we took into account all the contingent circumstances. We know that before Easter there is a heavy increase in the number of workingmen passengers on the railways and that is why we decided to restore passenger traffic by that time. We know, too, that the suburban services are absolutely essential for the workers, and we therefore decided not to suspend them. We have sent our most energetic and experienced comrades to various localities. To Ufa Gubernia we have sent Comrade Bryukhanov, Deputy Commissar for Food, who is closely familiar with conditions in that gubernia. He will be assisted by comrades from the War Department, for the front is not far away. We have also sent comrades from the War Department to the other railway line, Kazan-Sarapul. They have been instructed to mobilise the local peasants and to strain every nerve to get the grain moved, at least as far as Kazan. In this way we shall save it and ensure its delivery to the metropolitan cities and the non-agricultural

districts. On this we base our hope of defeating the famine. The attempt of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to make capital out of the people's misfortunes will be thwarted once again.

"Unlike the situation last year, when the Czechoslovaks were attacking us and had deprived us of our most fertile regions, we now have two new sources of grain supply, on which our food supply authorities could not count last autumn when they drew up their food supply plans for the whole year. These sources are the Ukraine and the Don region. Last autumn the Germans were still in occupation of the Ukraine. The German imperialists counted on shipping 60,000,000 poods of grain from the Ukraine to Germany, and with this flood of foodstuff hoped to destroy the germs of Bolshevism among the masses of the German people. But something entirely different happened. Instead of 60,000,000 poods the Germans shipped only 9,000,000 poods from the Ukraine. But they shipped the seeds of Bolshevism with this grain and they are growing splendidly in Germany. In Germany today, Bolshevism is fighting the social-traitors in the streets of Berlin, where workers' blood is flowing, shed by the social-traitors. We are convinced that the German social-traitors will be vanquished just as Kerensky was vanquished in this country. (*Applause.*)

"But in addition to the Ukraine we have the Don region. Krasnov's Cossacks have been able to hold out all this time with the aid of foreign gold, first German and later Anglo-French. But this does not help—our victory over the Cossacks is certain. At the present time we are holding the Tsaritsyn-Likhaya line, the link between grain and coal supplies. Thus, we have two sources of supply—the Ukraine and the Don region. The Ukraine is a fraternal Soviet republic, with which we are on the best of terms. This republic is settling the question of assisting us not as a huckster, not as a profiteer; the Ukraine is guided exclusively by an ardent desire to assist the hungry North. The first socialist duty of every citizen of the Ukraine is to come to the aid of the North. But in the Ukraine, too, we are encountering tremendous difficulties. The Council of People's Commissars has repeatedly invited Comrade Rakovsky to meet us to discuss the matter, and has sent military men to the Ukraine. But it

appears that as regards organisation, matters are in a worse state in the Ukraine than they were here after the October Revolution. Kerensky left us something of a food supply organisation. The food supply officials sabotaged us, of course, and came to the Smolny not to co-operate but to bargain with us. But we broke the resistance of these groups and in the end compelled them to work. In the Ukraine they have no food supply organisation whatever. The Germans, when they were there, only engaged in plunder; they plundered as long as they had the power to do so, and, of course, they left no food supply organisation. The Ukraine has no officials experienced in handling food supplies, or large working-class centres from which capable men could be drawn. The Donets Basin has been devastated to a degree that one cannot even imagine. To this day gangs of Cossacks are roaming in the remoter parts of the region robbing the local population. From all parts of the Ukraine we hear the cry 'Send us workers!' We have set up a food supply bureau there consisting of representatives of the trade union movement. We are transferring there the more experienced food supply officials from Voronezh and Tambov gubernias, and we are enlisting the more capable urban proletarians for the food supply organisations. Nevertheless no grain has been procured in the Ukraine, there are no purchasing organisations, the peasants have no confidence in our currency, and we have no goods with which to barter. Notwithstanding all these unfavourable circumstances, we have given the Ukrainian comrades the assignment to ship to Russia 50,000,000 poods of grain by June 1, 1919. I do not think this will be carried out in full, but it will be good if only a half, or two-thirds is delivered!"

Lenin then went on to say that the victories we have gained in the Don region were due entirely to the intensification of Party activities and to cultural and educational work in the ranks of the Red Army.

"This brought about a psychological change, and as a result our Red Army won the Don region for us." (*Stormy applause.*)

"Generally speaking, our Red Army is growing stronger day after day. Even the bourgeois military experts admit that in the imperialist countries the armies are disintegrat-

ing, whereas our army is becoming sounder, is maturing and growing stronger. In the Don region, too, there are large stocks of grain, and there is no food supply organisation there; but we have there our disciplined army, and this is already an organisation by means of which we shall obtain grain with the minimum of expenditure and the maximum results.

"I must say that the Czechoslovaks and the Cossacks are continuing their tactics of destroying all they can. They blew up the railway bridge across the Volga and then destroyed all other railway bridges and put all the Trans-Volga main lines out of commission. The Council of People's Commissars for a long, time discussed ways and means of restoring at least two lines: Liski-Rostov and Likhaya-Tsaritsyn. Radical measures have been adopted, and at the last meeting of the Council of Defence held on Monday, March 10, it was reported that all the necessary tools and materials had already been delivered to these lines and that they would be restored before the spring thaw makes the roads impassable."

Referring once again to the assistance which the Don region and the Ukraine will render us in the way of food supplies, Lenin exclaimed: "This half-year is the last severe half-year!" (*Applause.*)

"The international situation, though still acute, is nevertheless improving. All of you saw and heard the foreign delegates to the Third International[13] who in their speeches and reports emphasised that the road we have taken is the right one. Bolshevism has become an international force. This is evident from the fact that the most advanced bourgeois democracies, which boast so much of their liberties, are taking stern measures against the Bolsheviks. The United States of America, one of the richest bourgeois republics in the world, with its hundred million population, is hastening to deport several hundred Russian Bolsheviks, most of whom do not even speak English. Whence this horror of Bolshevism? As the newspapers report, at workers' meetings in Paris, even those workers who do not sympathise with the Bolsheviks refuse to give a hearing to speakers who are hostile to Bolshevism. (*Applause.*) Notwithstanding the flood of lies and calumny which the bourgeois press of Western Europe daily turns

against the Bolsheviks, the people have learned the truth and are siding with the Bolsheviks. Let the French bourgeois press say that the Bolsheviks are inhuman monsters who gobble up little children—the French workers do not trust that press.

"We have succeeded in making the word 'Soviet' intelligible in all languages. The masses have realised that their salvation lies in a workers' and peasants' government, in Soviets. That is why it was so easy for us to reach agreement at the Congress of the Third International in Moscow. In the most remote corners, in some Italian Poshekhonye,[14] farm labourers and workers gather together and declare, 'We greet the German Spartacists and the Russian "Sovietists" and demand that their programme shall become the programme of the workers of the world.' I shall repeat here what I have already said in Moscow.[15] This shows that victory will be ours, and there can be no doubt about this whatever. We have won the sympathies of the workers in spite of the lies uttered by the bourgeois press. Meanwhile, the imperialists at the peace conference cannot reach an agreement and are ready to fly at each other's throats. The Bolshevik contagion has already spread to all the countries of Europe and America. Deporting Bolsheviks will be of no avail. Even if Western Europe were to isolate itself from us by means of a Chinese Wall, even if all the Russian Bolsheviks disappeared into the underworld, it would not relieve the position of the Western imperialists. The masses of the people have realised that they cannot improve their conditions with the aid of parliament. A workers' government, Soviets, are needed. Huge debts accrue from the war, and the imperialists have lost their senses to such an extent that they are demanding that the nations should pay their war debts. They say to the nations, 'Pay us millions and millions for having been kind enough to permit the slaughter of 10,000,000 men to settle the question of our profits!' In all countries imperialism is slipping into the abyss into which German imperialism has fallen." (*Stormy applause.*)

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THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND DIFFICULTIES OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Published in pamphlet form
by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers'
and Red Army Deputies,
March-April 1919

Afterword first published in 1922

Published according to
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It is now the right time, when we have succeeded in restoring the revolutionary International, the Communist International, when the Soviet form of the movement has itself become both the theoretical and practical programme of the entire Third International—now that this has been done it is appropriate to review the general course of development of the Soviets. What are the Soviets? What is the significance of this form which was created by the masses, and was not invented by any individual?

It seems to me that the tasks now confronting us, the proletariat that has won power, can be appraised only from this angle, as can also the degree to which we have attempted to fulfil these tasks and the degree to which we have succeeded during the past year under the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

Only in the light of the general role of the Soviets, of their general significance, of the place they occupy in world history, is it possible to understand the situation we found ourselves in, why we had to act in the way we did and in no other, and how, looking back, we must examine the correctness or incorrectness of the steps we took.

And we are now doubly in need of such a more general, broader, and more far-reaching outlook, because it is sometimes painful for Party people in Russia to see faults and defects and feel dissatisfied with their work, because the practical fulfilment of the urgent, current, immediate, everyday administrative duties that have been, and continue to be, the lot of the Soviet authorities often distracts attention, compels us, in spite of ourselves—it is no use rebelling against the conditions under which we have to work—to devote too much attention to the petty details of administration. They cause us to forget the general course of the world-wide development

of the proletarian dictatorship, its evolution through Soviet power or, more correctly, the Soviet movement, through the groping of the proletarian masses within the Soviets—something we all experienced and have forgotten—and through the attempt to achieve the dictatorship within the Soviets.

These are the difficulties we have encountered and the general tasks to which, in my opinion, we must turn our attention so that we may as far as possible get away from the petty details of administration in which everybody who is engaged in practical local government work is absorbed, and so that we may understand what a long way we, as a contingent of the world proletarian army, have still to go.

Complete and final victory on a world scale cannot be achieved in Russia alone; it can be achieved only when the proletariat is victorious in at least all the advanced countries, or, at all events, in some of the largest of the advanced countries. Only then shall we be able to say with absolute confidence that the cause of the proletariat has triumphed, that our first objective—the overthrow of capitalism—has been achieved.

We have achieved this objective in one country, and this confronts us with a second task. Since Soviet power has been established, since the bourgeoisie has been overthrown in one country, the second task is to wage the struggle on a world scale, on a different plane, the struggle of the proletarian state surrounded by capitalist states.

This situation is an entirely novel and difficult one.

On the other hand, since the rule of the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, the main task is to organise the development of the country.

The yellow socialists who have gathered in Berne and now intend to honour us with a visit by distinguished foreigners, are extremely fond of repeating that "the Bolsheviks believe in the almighty power of violence". This phrase only shows that those who use it are people, who in the heat of the revolutionary struggle, when they are being completely crushed by the violence of the bourgeoisie—look at what is going on in Germany—are incapable of teaching their own proletariat the tactics of *necessary violence*.

Under certain circumstances violence is both necessary and useful, but there are circumstances under which violence

cannot produce results. There have been cases, however, of not everyone appreciating this difference, so that it must be discussed. In October violence—the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by Soviet power, the removal of the old government, revolutionary violence—resulted in a brilliant success.

Why? First, because the masses were organised in Soviets, and secondly, because in the long political period, from February to October, the position of the enemy—the bourgeoisie—was undermined, sapped, washed away, like a block of ice by the spring thaw, and internally had been deprived of his strength; and the movement in October, compared, say, with the present revolutionary movement in Germany, brought us such a complete and brilliant victory for revolutionary violence.

May we assume that such a path, such a form of struggle, such an easy victory for revolutionary violence, is possible if these conditions do not exist?

It would be a very great mistake to assume that. And the greater the revolutionary victories achieved under certain specific conditions the more often does the danger arise of our allowing ourselves to be flattered by such victories and not stopping to think coolly, calmly and attentively, about the conditions that made them possible.

When we tore the Kerensky government and Milyukov's coalition ministry to shreds, so to speak, compelled them to shuffle portfolios over and over again, compelled them to play ministerial leapfrog from right to left, from left to right, up and down and down and up, it became obvious that they could not pull together, no matter in what order they sat, and then they were blown away like so much chaff.

Is the situation that now confronts our practical tasks in respect of world imperialism anything like that? Of course not.

That is why the Treaty of Brest created serious difficulties in the sphere of foreign policy, but the mass character of the movement helped us to overcome them.

But what is the source of the mistakes that caused some of our comrades to think that we were committing a heinous crime? There is still an odd crank or two among people able

to wield the pen who imagine that they are somebodies, that they have experience, can teach others, and so forth, who even now assert that this was a compromise with German imperialism.

Yes, we made the same compromise when we "compromised" with the tsar by entering the disgusting, reactionary Duma and undermining it from within.

Can we count on the overthrow of world imperialism merely by force before the proletariat in those imperialist countries has reached the necessary stage of development?

If the question is presented in this way—and we as Marxists have always taught that this is the only way to present the question—we must agree that it would be very absurd and foolish to employ the policy of violence under those circumstances, and complete failure to understand the conditions under which a policy of violence can be successful.

Now we realise this; we have gained experience.

While we, at the time of the Treaty of Brest, were obliged to muster our forces and amidst the most extraordinary difficulties lay the foundations of a new army, the Red Army, in a country ruined and exhausted by war to a greater degree than any other country in the world, while we, in the first half and the beginning of the second half of 1918, were, stone by stone, laying the foundations of a genuine socialist Red Army, the imperialism of other countries was being sapped by internal disintegration and the growing discontent, and was becoming enfeebled.

And revolutionary violence triumphed in Germany after many months of development of the struggle had sapped the strength of imperialism in that country; and the same thing is now being repeated to some extent—to some extent, but not entirely—in the Entente countries.

An American who had watched events in the West-European countries very closely, at first hand, and without prejudice, said to me recently, "France is undoubtedly on the eve of a great disappointment, the collapse of illusions. The French people are being fed with promises—you are the victors, they are told." The bourgeoisie is taking advantage of the old patriotic sentiments of the entire French nation, of their anger at the way they were crushed in 1870, and of their fury at the way the country has been depopulated, bled

white and exhausted by four years of war—the bourgeoisie is taking advantage of all this to divert these sentiments into chauvinist channels: "We have beaten the Germans; our pockets will now be filled, and we shall be able to relax." But the dispassionate American, looking at things like a businessman, says, "The Germans will not pay, for they have nothing to pay with."

That is why the French nation is being fed with promises and fairy-tales about the peace, the final victory, that is coming soon. But peace means the collapse of all hopes of being able to crawl out of this bloody mire at least partly alive—with broken arms and legs, but alive. It will be impossible to crawl out of this peace while the old capitalist system is intact, because the war has piled up such a heap of debts, such a mass of ruins throughout the capitalist world, that it is impossible to crawl out of it without upsetting the whole pile and starting an avalanche.

Even those who are not revolutionaries, who have no faith in revolution, and dread it, are nevertheless discussing it theoretically and will be convinced by the course of events, by the consequences of the imperialist war, that there is no way out except revolution.

I repeat, I was particularly astonished by the American's appraisal of the situation from the point of view of a business man who, of course, has not studied the theory of the class struggle and sincerely thinks it is nonsense, but who is interested in millions and thousands of millions, and being able to count, asks: "Will they pay or not?" And he answers, again from the shrewd businessman's point of view: "They have nothing to pay with! You will not even get 20 kopeks in the ruble!"

It is in such a situation in all the Entente countries that we see profound and widespread unrest stimulated by the workers' sympathy for the Soviet form.

A Paris crowd, for example, is perhaps more sensitive than any assembly of people in any other country, because the people there have had a very good schooling, they have made a number of revolutions—and there, this most responsive crowd, which will not allow a speaker to strike a false note, now interrupts those who dare to say anything against the Bolsheviks. And yet, only a few months ago, nobody

could even as much as hint that he is in favour of Bolshevism without being jeered at by the very same crowd.

Meanwhile the Paris bourgeoisie has set its entire machine of lies, slander and deception in motion against Bolshevism. But now we know what this means, for in 1917 we Bolsheviks experienced the persecution of the entire bourgeois press. The bourgeoisie in our country, however, miscalculated slightly and overdid it in thinking that they could enmesh the Bolsheviks in their net of slander; they overdid things so badly, they went so far in their attacks that they gave us a free advertisement and compelled even the most backward workers to say to themselves: "Well, if the capitalists are abusing the Bolsheviks so much, it shows that those Bolsheviks know how to fight the capitalists!"

That is why the policy which we were obliged to pursue at the time of the Brest peace, a most brutal, violent and humiliating peace, proved to be the only correct policy that could have been pursued.

And I think that it will be useful to recall this policy once again at the present time when a similar situation is arising in the Entente countries, when there, too, the bourgeoisie is filled with a mad desire to thrust their debts, poverty and ruin on Russia, to plunder Russia and crush her in order to divert the rising anger of the masses of their own working people from themselves.

Looking at the situation dispassionately we must say to ourselves very clearly, if we do not want to fool ourselves and others—this is a dangerous thing for revolutionaries to indulge in—we must say that as far as military strength is concerned, the Entente is stronger than we are. But if we look at things in the light of their development, we shall also say very definitely and with a conviction based not only on our revolutionary views but also on our experience, that the strength of the Entente countries will not last, they are on the threshold of a great and abrupt change in the temper of their masses.

They have been feeding both French and British workers with promises, saying, "We shall finish plundering the whole world and you will have enough to eat." This is what the bourgeois press is shouting and dinning into the ears of the ignorant masses.

They will probably conclude peace in a few months—if they do not quarrel among themselves in the meantime, and there are a number of serious symptoms that this is possible. But if they succeed in concluding peace without flying at each other's throats, this peace will be the beginning of an immediate collapse, because these unprecedented debts cannot be paid, and they can do nothing to alleviate the desperate state of ruin, when in France the production of wheat has dropped to less than half and famine is knocking at the door everywhere, and the productive forces have been destroyed; they are unable to do anything about it.

If we look at the situation soberly we shall have to admit that the method of appraising affairs which proved so correct in appraising the Russian revolution is, day after day, indicating the coming of the world revolution. We know that the streams that will carry with them the icebergs of the Entente, of capitalism, of imperialism, are gaining strength day after day.

On the one hand, the Entente countries are stronger than we are; but on the other hand, they cannot possibly hold out long owing to the internal situation.

It is this situation that determines the intricate tasks of international policy—tasks which we may, and probably will, have to tackle in the very near future, and which, though I am insufficiently informed about them in all their detail, I would like to talk to you-about most of all so that a picture of the experience of the work done by the Council of People's Commissars, work in the sphere of foreign policy, will be presented to you, comrades, in a clear and interesting form.

The most important of our experiences is the Brest peace. This is the most significant result of the foreign policy of the Council of People's Commissars. We were obliged to play for time, to retreat, manoeuvre and sign a most humiliating peace treaty, and in this way gain an opportunity to lay the foundation of a new socialist army. This foundation we have laid, while our once mighty and all-powerful enemy is already powerless.

All over the world things are moving in the same direction, and this is the chief and principal lesson that we must learn and try to understand as clearly as possible in order to

avoid making mistakes in the extremely intricate, extremely difficult and extremely involved problems of foreign policy which any day may confront the Council of People's Commissars, the Central Executive Committee, and Soviet power as a whole.

I shall conclude my remarks on foreign policy with this and proceed to deal with some other extremely important questions.

Comrades, as regards activities in the military field—a year ago, in February and March 1918, we had no army at all. We had, perhaps, ten million armed workers and peasants who constituted the old army that had collapsed completely, was fully ready and determined to desert, to flee, to abandon everything, come what may.

At that time this was regarded as an exclusively Russian phenomenon. People thought that owing to the Russians' characteristic impatience, or lack of organisation, they would not hold out, whereas the Germans would.

That is what we were told. And now we see that a few months have passed and the same thing has happened to the German army, which was immeasurably superior to ours in culture, equipment, and discipline, in providing decent conditions for the sick and wounded, as regards home leave, and so forth. Even the most cultured and disciplined masses could not stand the slaughter, the many years of slaughter, and so a period of absolute disintegration set in when even the advanced German army broke down.

Evidently, there is a limit not only for Russia but for all countries. There are different limits for different countries, but for all of them there is a limit beyond which it is impossible to continue to wage war for the sake of the interests of the capitalists. This is what we see today.

German imperialism has completely exposed itself as a predator. The most important thing is that even in America and in France, in these notorious democracies (the traitors to socialism, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, those hapless people who call themselves socialists, are fond of chattering about democracies), in these most advanced democracies of the world, in these republics, imperialism is becoming more arrogant every day and we find there beasts of prey more predatory than anywhere else.

They are plundering the world, fighting each other, and arming against each other. This cannot be concealed for long. It could be concealed when the war fever was at its height. But the fever is subsiding, peace is approaching, and it is precisely in these democracies that the masses see, in spite of all the lies they are being told, that the war has led to fresh plunder, that the most democratic republic is nothing more nor less than a disguise for the most brutal and cynical predator who is ready to ruin hundreds of millions of people in order to pay the debts, that is, to pay the imperialist gentlemen, the capitalists, for being good enough to allow the workers to cut each other's throats. This is becoming clearer to the masses every day.

It is this situation that makes possible political statements such as the article written by the military correspondent of a newspaper that belongs to the richest and most politically experienced bourgeoisie, the London *Times*; the author appraises events by saying that all over the world the armies are breaking up and there is only one country where the army is being built up, and that country is Russia.

The bourgeoisie—which militarily is far stronger than Soviet Bolshevism—is compelled to admit this fact. And this fact serves as a criterion of what we have accomplished in the course of our Soviet activities in the past year.

We succeeded in reaching a turning-point where instead of an army of ten million, the bulk of which had deserted, unable to stand the horrors of war, and which had realised that this was a criminal war, we began to build, one hundred thousand after another, a socialist army, which knows what it is fighting for and is ready to make greater sacrifices and suffer more privation than under tsarism. For this army knows that it is fighting for its own cause, for its own land, for its own power in the factories, that it is defending the power of the working people, and that the working people of other countries are awakening, slowly and with great difficulty, but awakening nevertheless.

This is the situation that characterises the year's experience of Soviet power.

War is an incredible hardship for Soviet Russia, war is an incredible hardship for a people who for four years have borne the horrors of the imperialist war. For Soviet

Russia war is an incredibly heavy burden. But at the present time even our powerful enemies admit that their armies are cracking up, whereas our army is being built. For the first time in history an army is being built on the basis of the closest contact, inseverable contact, coalescence, one might say, of the army and the Soviets. The Soviets unite all the working people, all the exploited, and the army is being built up for the purpose of socialist defence and on the basis of class-consciousness.

An eighteenth-century Prussian monarch once wisely remarked: "If our soldiers knew what we were fighting for, it would be impossible to wage a single war." That old Prussian monarch was no fool. We, however, are prepared to say, comparing our position with that of the monarch, that we can wage war because the masses know what they are fighting for; and they want to fight notwithstanding the incredible burdens—burdens, I repeat, far greater than under tsarism—knowing that they are making these desperate and incredibly heavy sacrifices in defence of their socialist cause, fighting side by side with those workers of other countries who are "disintegrating" and are beginning to understand our position.

Some foolish people are shouting about red militarism. These are political crooks who pretend that they believe this absurdity and throw charges of this kind right and left, exercising their lawyers' skill in concocting plausible arguments and in throwing dust in the eyes of the masses. And the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries shout: "Look, instead of socialism, they are giving you red militarism!"

What a "horrible" crime, indeed! The imperialists of the whole world hurled themselves upon the Russian Republic in order to crush it, and we began to form an army which for the first time in history knows what it is fighting for and what it is making sacrifices for, which is successfully contending against a numerically superior enemy, and which with every month of its resistance on an unprecedented scale is bringing nearer the world revolution, and this is denounced as red militarism!

I repeat, these are either fools to whom no political appraisal can apply, or else political crooks.

Everybody knows that this war was forced upon us. We brought the old war to a close at the beginning of 1918, and did not start a new war. Everybody knows that the whiteguards attacked us in the West, South and East, only because they were assisted by the Entente, which scattered millions right and left. And these advanced countries collected and handed over to the whiteguards the vast stocks of war supplies and ammunition left over from the imperialist war, for those gentlemen, the millionaires and multimillionaires, know that their fate is being decided here, that it is here they will perish if they do not crush us at once.

The socialist, republic is straining every nerve, is making sacrifices and winning victories. And if after a year of civil war you look at the map and compare what Soviet Russia was in March 1918 and in July 1918—when the German imperialists in the West occupied the line laid down by the Treaty of Brest, when the Ukraine was under the heel of the German imperialists, when the Czechoslovaks, bribed by the French and British, lorded it in the East as far as Kazan and Simbirsk—if you look at the map today, you will see that we have expanded immensely, that we have won enormous victories.

In this situation, only sordid and despicable political crooks can use strong language and accuse us of red militarism.

Never in history has there been a revolution in which it was possible to lay down one's arms and rest on one's laurels after the victory. Whoever thinks that such revolutions are possible is not only no revolutionary, but the worst enemy of the working class. There has never been a revolution, even a second-rate one, even a bourgeois revolution in which the only issue was the transfer of power from one propertied minority to another. We know of examples! The French revolution, against which the old powers hurled themselves at the beginning of the nineteenth century in order to crush it, we call great precisely because it succeeded in rousing the vast masses of the people in defence of its gains and they resisted the whole world; this was one of its greatest merits.

Revolutions are subjected to the most serious tests in the fire of battle. If you are oppressed and exploited and think of throwing off the power of the exploiters, if you are deter-

mined to carry this to its logical conclusion, you must understand that you will have to contend against the onslaught of the exploiters of the whole world. If you are ready to offer resistance and to make further sacrifices in order to hold out in the struggle, you are a revolutionary; if not, you will be crushed.

This is how the question is presented by the history of all revolutions.

The real test to which our revolution is being subjected is that we, in a backward country, succeeded in capturing power before the others, succeeded in establishing the Soviet form of government, the power of the working and exploited people. Shall we be able to hold, on at least until the masses in the other countries make a move? If we are not prepared to make fresh sacrifices and do not hold out, it will be said that our revolution was historically unjustified. But democrats in civilised countries who are armed to the teeth dread the presence of a hundred or so Bolsheviks in a free republic with a hundred million population, in the way America does. Bolshevism is so infectious! And it turns out that the democrats cannot cope with a hundred immigrants from starving, ruined Russia who might talk about Bolshevism! The masses sympathise with us! The bourgeoisie have only one path of salvation, and that is, while their hand still grasps the sword, while they still control the guns, to turn these guns against Soviet Russia and to crush her in a few months, because later on nothing will crush her. This is the situation we are in; this is what determined the military policy of the Council of People's Commissars during the past year; and this is why, pointing to the facts, to the results, we have a right to say that we have stood the test only because the workers and peasants, though utterly exhausted by war, are creating a new army under still more arduous conditions and are displaying new heroism.

That is a brief summary of the policy of the Soviet government in the military field. Permit me to say just a few more words about a matter in which military policy overlaps policy in another field—economic policy. I refer to the military experts.

You are probably aware of the controversy that has arisen over this question, and that some comrades, most devoted and

convinced Bolshevik Communists, often expressed vehement protests against the fact that for the purpose of organising our socialist Red Army we are utilising the services of the old military experts, tsarist generals and officers, whose records are blemished by their service to the tsar, and in some cases by the bloody acts of repression against workers and peasants.

The contradiction here is glaring, and indignation, one might say, springs up of its own accord. How can we build a socialist army with the aid of tsarist experts?!

It turned out that this was the way, the only way, we did build up an army. If we give some thought to the task that has fallen to our lot, it will not be difficult to understand that it is the only way we could build it. This is not only a military matter, it is a task that confronts us in all spheres of everyday life, and of the country's economy.

The old utopian socialists imagined that socialism could be built by men of a new type, that first they would train good, pure and splendidly educated people, and these would build socialism. We always laughed at this and said that this was playing with puppets, that it was socialism as an amusement for young ladies, but not serious politics.

We want to build socialism with the aid of those men and women who grew up under capitalism, were depraved and corrupted by capitalism, but steeled for the struggle by capitalism. There are proletarians who have been so hardened that they can stand a thousand times more hardship than any army. There are tens of millions of oppressed peasants, ignorant and scattered, but capable of uniting around the proletariat in the struggle, if the proletariat adopts skilful tactics. And there are scientific and technical experts all thoroughly imbued with the bourgeois world outlook, there are military experts who were trained under bourgeois conditions—if they were only bourgeois it would not be so bad, but there were also conditions of landed proprietorship, serfdom and the big stick. As far as concerns the economy, all the agronomists, engineers and school-teachers were recruited from the propertied class; they did not drop from the skies. Neither under the reign of Tsar Nicholas nor under the Republican President Wilson were the propertyless proletarians at the bench and the peasants at the plough able to get a

university education. Science and technology exist only for the rich, for the propertied class; capitalism provides culture only for the minority. We must build socialism out of this culture, we have no other material. We want to start building socialism at once out of the material that capitalism left us yesterday to be used today, at this very moment, and not with people reared in hothouses, assuming that we were to take this fairy-tale seriously. We have bourgeois experts and nothing else. We have no other bricks with which to build. Socialism must triumph, and we socialists and Communists must prove by deeds that we are capable of building socialism with these bricks, with this material, that we are capable of building socialist society with the aid of proletarians who have enjoyed the fruits of culture only to an insignificant degree, and with the aid of bourgeois specialists.

If you do not build communist society with this material, you will prove that you are mere phrase-mongers and windbags.

This is how the question is presented by the historical legacy of world capitalism! This is the difficulty that confronted us concretely when we took power, when we set up the Soviet machinery of state!

This is only half the task, but it is the greater half. Soviet machinery of state means that the working people are united in such a way as to crush capitalism by the weight of their mass unity. The masses did this. But it is not enough to crush capitalism. We must take the entire culture that capitalism left behind and build socialism with it. We must take all its science, technology, knowledge and art. Without these we shall be unable to build communist society. But this science, technology and art are in the hands and in the heads of the experts.

This is the task that confronts us in all spheres. It is a task with inherent contradictions, like the inherent contradictions of capitalism as a whole. It is a most difficult task, but a practicable one. We cannot wait twenty years until we have trained pure, communist experts, until we have trained the first generation of Communists without blemish and without reproach. No, excuse me, but we must build now, in two months and not in twenty years' time, so as to be able to fight the bourgeoisie, to oppose the bourgeois science and

technology of the whole world. Here we must achieve victory. It is difficult to make the bourgeois experts serve us by the weight of our masses, but it is possible, and if we do it, we shall triumph.

When Comrade Trotsky informed me recently that the number of officers of the old army employed by our War Department runs into several tens of thousands, I perceived concretely where the secret of using our enemy lay, how to compel those who had opposed communism to build it, how to build communism with the bricks which the capitalists had chosen to hurl against us! We have no other bricks! And so, we must compel the bourgeois experts, under the leadership of the proletariat, to build up our edifice with these bricks. This is what is difficult; but this is the pledge of victory.

Naturally, on this path, which is a new and difficult one, we have made more than a few mistakes; on this path we have met with more than a few reverses. Everybody knows that a certain number of experts have systematically betrayed us. Among the experts in the factories, among the agronomists, and in the administration, we have seen and see today at every step a malicious attitude to work, malicious sabotage.

We know that all this presents tremendous difficulties and that we cannot achieve victory by violence alone.... We, of course, are not opposed to violence. We laugh at those who are opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, we laugh and say that they are fools who do not understand that there must be either the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Those who think otherwise are either idiots, or are so politically ignorant that it would be a disgrace to allow them to come anywhere near a meeting, let alone on the platform. The only alternative is either violence against Liebknecht and Luxemburg, the murder of the best leaders of the workers, or the violent suppression of the exploiters; and whoever dreams of a middle course is our most harmful and dangerous enemy. That is how the matter stands at present. Hence, when we talk of utilising the services of the experts we must bear in mind the lesson taught by Soviet policy during the past year. During that year we have broken and defeated the exploiters and we must now solve the prob-

lem of using the bourgeois specialists. Here, I repeat, violence alone will get us nowhere. Here, in addition to violence, after successful violence, we need the organisation, discipline and moral weight of the victorious proletariat, which will subordinate all the bourgeois experts to its will and draw them into its work.

Some people may say that Lenin is recommending moral persuasion instead of violence! But it is foolish to imagine that we can solve the problem of organising a new science and technology for the development of communist society by violence alone. That is nonsense! We, as a Party, as people who have learned something during this year of Soviet activity, will not be so foolish as to think so, and we will warn the masses not to think so. The employment of all the institutions of bourgeois capitalist society requires not only the successful use of violence, but also organisation, discipline, comradely discipline among the masses, the organisation of proletarian influence over the rest of the population, the creation of a new, mass environment, which will convince the bourgeois specialists that they have no alternative, that there can be no return to the old society, and that they can do their work only in conjunction with the Communists who are working by their side, who are leading the masses, who enjoy the absolute confidence of the masses, and whose object is to ensure that the fruits of bourgeois science and technology, the fruits of thousands of years of the development of civilisation, shall be enjoyed not by a handful of people for the purpose of distinguishing themselves and amassing wealth, but by literally all the working people.

This is an immensely difficult task, the fulfilment of which will require decades! But to carry it out ,we must create a force, a discipline, comradely discipline, Soviet discipline, proletarian discipline, such as will not only physically crush the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, but also encompass them completely, subordinate them to our will, compel them to proceed along our lines, to serve our cause.

I repeat that we come up against this problem every day in the work of organising our military forces, in the work of economic development, in the work of every economic council, in the work of every factory committee and of every nationalised factory. There was hardly a week during all

past year that the Council of People's Commissars did not discuss and settle this question in one way or another. I am sure that there was not a single factory committee in Russia, not a single agricultural commune, not a single state farm, not a single uyezd land department which did not come up against this issue scores of times in the course of the past year's Soviet activity.

This is what makes this task so difficult, but it is also what makes it a really gratifying one. This is what we must do now, the day after the exploiters were crushed by the force of the proletarian insurrection. We suppressed their resistance—this had to be done. But this is not the only thing that has to be done. By the force of the new organisation, the comradely organisation of the working people, we must compel them to serve us. We must cure them of their old vices and prevent them from relapsing into their exploiting practices. They have remained bourgeois, and they occupy posts as commanders and staff officers in our army, as engineers and agronomists, and these old, bourgeois people call themselves Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. It does not matter what they call themselves. They are bourgeois through and through, from head to foot, in their outlook and in their habits.

Well, what shall we do, throw them out? You cannot throw out hundreds of thousands! And if we did we should be harming only ourselves. We have no other material with which to build communism than that created by capitalism. We must not throw them out, but break their resistance, watch them at every step, make no political concessions to them, which spineless people are inclined to do every minute. Educated people yield to the policy and influence of the bourgeoisie because they acquired all their education in a bourgeois environment and from that environment. That is why they stumble at every step and make political concessions to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

A Communist who says that he must not get into a state where he will soil his hands, that he must have clean, communist hands, and that he will build communist society with clean communist hands and scorn the services of the contemptible, counter-revolutionary bourgeois co-operators, is a mere phrase-monger, because we cannot help resorting to their services.

The practical task that confronts us now is to enlist the services of all those whom capitalism has trained to oppose us, to watch them day after day, to place worker commissars over them in an environment of communist organisation, day after day to thwart their counter-revolutionary designs, and at the same time to learn from them.

The science which we, at best, possess, is the science of the agitator and propagandist, of the man who has been steeled by the hellishly hard lot of the factory worker, or starving peasant, a science which teaches us how to hold out for a long time and to persevere in the struggle, and this has saved us up to now. All this is necessary, but it is not enough. With this alone we cannot triumph. In order that our victory may be complete and final we must take all that is valuable from capitalism, take all its science and culture.

How can we take it? We must learn from them, from our enemies. Our advanced peasants, the class-conscious workers in their factories, our officials in the uyezd land departments must learn from the bourgeois agronomists, engineers, and others, so as to acquire the fruits of their culture.

In this respect, the struggle that flared up in our Party during the past year was extremely useful. It gave rise to numerous sharp collisions, but there are no struggles without sharp collisions. As a result, however, we gained practical experience in a matter that had never before confronted us but without which it is impossible to achieve communism. I say again that the task of combining the victorious proletarian revolution with bourgeois culture, with bourgeois science and technology, which up to now has been available to few people, is a difficult one. Here, everything depends on the organisation and discipline of the advanced sections of the working people. If, in Russia, the millions of downtrodden and ignorant peasants who are totally incapable of independent development, who were oppressed by the landowners for centuries, did not have at their head, and by their side, an advanced section of the urban workers whom they understood, with whom they were intimate, who enjoyed their confidence, whom they believed as fellow-workers, if there were not this organisation which is capable of rallying the masses of the working people, of influencing them, of explaining to them and convincing them of the importance of the

task of taking over the entire bourgeois culture, the cause of communism would be hopeless.

I say this not from the abstract point of view, but from the point of view of a whole year's daily experience. Although this experience includes a multitude of petty details, sometimes dull and unpleasant, we must learn to see something deeper in them. We must understand that these petty details, these conflicts between, say, a factory committee and an engineer, a Red Army man and some bourgeois officer, a peasant and a bourgeois agronomist—these conflicts, this friction, these petty details contain much that is immeasurably deeper. We have vanquished the prejudice that these bourgeois specialists should be thrown out. We have taken over this machine, it is still running badly, we have no illusions on that score; it keeps stopping, it makes mistakes all the time, it runs into ditches, and we drag it out again, but it is moving, and we shall keep it on the right road. This is the only way we can emerge from this quagmire of destruction, frightful difficulties, ruin, barbarism, poverty and starvation into which we were dragged by the war, and into which the imperialists of all countries are trying to push us and keep us.

But we have begun to emerge, the first steps have been taken.

This year of Soviet activity has taught us clearly to understand the task in every individual case of work in the factories and among the peasants, and we have mastered it. Soviet power has gained tremendously by it in the past year, and it has been worth while spending a year on it. We shall not, as we did in the old days, discuss theoretically and in general terms the importance of bourgeois specialists and the importance of proletarian organisations, but at every step, in every factory committee, and in every land organisation, we shall make use of the experience we have gained. We have laid the foundation of our Red Army, we now have a small foundation, we now have nationalised factories where the workers understand their tasks and have begun to increase labour productivity with the aid of bourgeois specialists (who at every step are trying to turn to the past while the mass organisations of the workers are compelling them to march forward in step with Soviet power)—all this is a great gain for Soviet power. This work is imperceptible, there is

nothing brilliant about it, it is difficult to appraise its real value, but the very fact that from simply suppressing the exploiters we have advanced to a phase where we are learning ourselves and teaching the masses how to build communism with capitalist bricks and compel the capitalist bourgeois specialists to work for us, is a step forward for our movement. Only on this road shall we achieve victory. And now we know that if we proceed as we have been up to now we shall really achieve this victory.

Comrades, I now come to the last question that I want to deal with, if only briefly, for I have already spoken too long. I have in mind the question of our relations with the countryside.

Up to now I have spoken about our activities in the military field, about the dictatorship, and about utilising the services of bourgeois specialists. Now I want to deal with another great difficulty that we encounter in our work of communist construction.

What is to be done if the proletariat has taken power in a country where the urban proletariat constitutes a minority of the population, while the majority are peasants accustomed to work individually and deeply imbued with habits of individual farming?

The majority of these peasants, however, have been so ruined, impoverished and exhausted by the oppression of the landowners and capitalists that they willingly render assistance to the proletariat. When an urban worker approaches a peasant in a reasonable way, tactfully, as man to man, and not as if he wants to be a boss, which arouses legitimate hatred, he wins the peasant's most comradely confidence and complete support. We know that this is a fact, and Soviet power in the villages is based on it. Soviet power has been able to hold out only because it has been receiving the sincere support of the majority of the working people. We have been receiving this support because the urban workers have established contact with the rural poor in thousands of ways, of which we have not even an inkling.

The state, which formerly hindered the establishment of such contacts, is now doing all it can to facilitate it. This alone explains why Soviet power has been able to hold out and this is the sole pledge of victory.

The enormous difficulties I have just referred to are due to the peasants being accustomed to work individually and to sell their grain freely. They think this is quite legitimate. They argue as follows. How can it be that having worked so hard to produce grain at the cost of so much sweat and blood, we have no right to sell it as we please? The peasants consider themselves the injured party.

But we know from the entire development of Russia that freedom to trade means freely breeding capitalists; and freedom to trade in a country which has been exhausted by starvation, where starving people are prepared to give anything, even to sell themselves into slavery, for a crust of bread, freedom to trade when the country is starving means allowing the minority freely to amass wealth and ruin the majority.

We must prove that help for the peasantry is a primary task in a country which has been exhausted by starvation; but we can help the peasantry only by uniting their activities, by uniting the masses, for the peasants are scattered, disunited and accustomed to work and live out of contact with one another.

There are no objective obstacles to the fulfilment of this difficult task. All that had to be done by means of force, has been done; we do not reject force, for we know that there are kulaks among the peasants who are actively resisting us and go to the length of organising whiteguard revolts. This, however, does not apply to peasants in the mass. The kulaks are a minority. As far as they are concerned, the only thing to do is to fight them and to keep on fighting them. They must be crushed, and we are crushing them. But after the successful fulfilment of the task of crushing the rural exploiters problems arise which cannot be solved by the use of force. In this sphere, as in all the others, we can fulfil our task only by means of mass organisation, by means of the prolonged educational influence of the urban proletariat over the peasantry.

Shall we succeed in this tasks? Yes, we know from experience that we shall, and only because the vast majority of the peasants have confidence in the workers' government and on the basis of this confidence in the workers we can reinforce the foundation we have begun to build, and which we must

continue to build, but only by means of comradely influence and discipline.

This is the practical task that now confronts us.

When we established the Poor Peasants' Committees,[16] when we tried to introduce barter with the rural districts, we did so not to enable the rich peasants to obtain goods, but primarily to enable the poor peasants to obtain the small quantities of goods that the cities could provide so that by helping the poor we would be able with their aid to beat the kulaks and take their surplus grain.

It has been an extremely difficult task to supply grain to the population of a vast country with poor transport facilities and a scattered peasantry, and it has given us the most trouble. I recall all the meetings of the Council of People's Commissars and must say that the Soviet government has not worked so persistently on anything as it has on this. Our peasants are extremely scattered and disunited. In the rural districts ignorance and the habit of working individually are more deep rooted than anywhere: The rural population is dissatisfied with not being allowed freedom to trade in grain. And in this situation, of course, political crooks, all sorts of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, incite the peasantry by saying to them, "They are robbing you!"

There are scoundrels who after a year of Soviet activity when, incidentally, food supply authorities have shown that during the past few months we supplied the rural districts with 42,000 carloads of goods and received in exchange only 39,000 carloads of grain—there are scoundrels, I say, who, after this come along and yell, "Peasants, the Soviet government is robbing you!"

At a time when the workers in the towns are on the verge of exhaustion—and nowhere is there such terrible hunger as in the towns and in the non-agricultural parts of Russia—when the peasants have taken all the land and grain that belonged to landowners, and when the bulk of the peasants, as we know, in the first year of Soviet power worked for themselves and not for the landowners and merchants and are now feeding better than they did before, when the population of the urban and non-agricultural districts of the country is starving and all the capitalists are trying to crush us by famine, at such a time people wearing Menshevik, Socialist-

Revolutionary, or other clownish costumes, have the insolence to shout, "They are robbing you!" These people are agents of capitalism, and we must treat them as such and nothing else!

At a time when the main difficulty confronting the Soviet government is the famine, it is the duty of every Soviet citizen to hand over all his surplus grain to the famine-stricken. This is so clear and obvious, so intelligible to every working man, that nobody can say a word against it. One must be a scoundrel, a political crook, to obscure this plain, clear and obvious truth, to make it unintelligible, or distort it!

It is on this truth that the urban workers rely. It is because this truth is so obvious that they are able to do their extremely difficult job. Up to now they have told the poor peasants that they and the workers constitute the real bulwark of Soviet power, that is why the working class has established Poor Peasants' Committees, organised barter, and made it obligatory for the co-operatives to include the whole population. All the decrees on agriculture issued up to now have this main idea running through them. And in all our appeals to the urban workers we have said, "Unite with the rural poor, for unless you do, you will be unable to solve the most important and most difficult problem, namely, the bread problem." And to the peasants we said, "Either you unite with the urban workers, in which case we shall triumph; or you allow yourselves to be misled by the admonitions and exhortations of the capitalists and their servants and flunkeys in Menshevik garb, who say, 'Don't let the towns rob you, trade as you please, the rich get richer, what do you care if people are dying of starvation', in which case you yourselves will perish, you will become the slaves of the capitalists and cause the ruin of Soviet Russia." It was only under capitalism that people argued, "I shall trade, I shall get rich. Every man for himself and God for all." This was the principle of capitalism and it engendered war; that is why the workers and peasants were poor, and an insignificant number of people became multimillionaires.

The problem is how to approach the peasants in the course of practical work, how to organise the poor and middle peasants so as to be able at every step to combat their gravita-

tion towards the past, their attempts to go back to free trading activities, their constant striving to be "free" producers. The word "freedom" is a good word. We meet it at every step: freedom to trade, freedom to sell, freedom to sell oneself, and so forth. And there are Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, rascals, who garble and distort this beautiful word "freedom" in every newspaper and in every speech. But these are all crooks, capitalism's prostitutes, who are trying to drag the people back to the past.

Lastly, the main object of the attention and activities of the Council of People's Commissars as well as of the Council of Defence has recently, during the past few months and weeks, been the fight against the famine.

The famine is particularly disastrous for us at the present time, on the threshold of the spring; and the spring threatens to be a most severe period for us. Just as last year the most severe period was the end of winter, the spring and the beginning of the summer, so, this year, we are now on the threshold of a severe period. The whiteguards, landowners and capitalists have greater hopes of being able to play on the famine as a means of crushing Soviet power since they have been unable to do it in open struggle.

The people who call themselves Mensheviks and Right or Left Socialist-Revolutionaries have sunk so low that they claim to side with the working people but when the food situation becomes more acute and famine is approaching they try to take advantage of it and incite the masses of the people against the workers' and peasants' government. They do not understand that this sort of policy today, this incitement and these attempts by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to make capital out of the famine, ostensibly for the benefit of the workers, are direct assistance to the whiteguards, just as much as was the treachery of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov on the Eastern Front last year, which cost the lives of tens of thousands of workers and peasants. Any such agitation costs thousands more lives in the war against the whiteguards. When Muravyov committed his act of treachery last year, he opened up almost the entire front to the enemy and caused us a number of severe reverses.

That is why I should like primarily and mainly to deal very briefly with the major facts.

Although today our food situation has become worse, just as it did last spring, we have every hope that we shall not only overcome this difficulty but shall cope with it better than we did last year. This hope is based on the fact that the situation in the East and South has greatly improved; and the East and South are the main granaries of Russia. At a number of meetings of the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars held during the past few days we ascertained very definitely that about nine million poods of grain have been piled up on the railways between Kazan and Saratov, and on the Volga-Bugulma line, to the east of Samara, across the Volga.

The great difficulty, and great danger, is that our railways are in such a state of disrepair, and the shortage of locomotives is so considerable, that we are not sure of being able to move all this grain. This is what we have concentrated our main attention and activities on during the past few days, and that is why we resolved to resort to a measure like the suspension of all passenger traffic from March 18 to April 10.

We know that this is a harsh measure. Agitators who are helping the whiteguards will no doubt come along and shout, "Look, the people are starving, and yet passenger traffic has been stopped, to make it impossible to carry grain." Agitators of this type will certainly appear. But we tell ourselves that in all cases of difficulty we rely on the class-consciousness of the honest workers, and they will side with us.

According to the calculations of the experts, the suspension of passenger traffic will release 220 locomotives. These passenger locomotives are less powerful than freight locomotives, they cannot haul as much; but we have estimated that during this period they will be able to haul about three and a half million poods of grain. Individual food profiteers and the starving people who roam all over the country in search of grain, would, at the most, be able to carry half a million poods in such a period. This will be confirmed by every experienced railway worker, by everybody, who has been on the Trans-Volga line and has seen the grain heaped up, sometimes right on the bare snow. The sacks of grain may be damaged; as it is the grain is moist, and the situation will become worse when the spring thaw commences. We therefore resorted to

this harsh measure, convinced that the truth cannot be concealed from the vast masses of the workers, that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries will not succeed in misleading them, that truth will prevail.

This harsh measure, the suspension of passenger traffic, will provide us with several million poods of grain. We must brush aside the lies, slander and fairy-tales to the effect that it is harmful to suspend passenger traffic and say that with the assistance of the Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers who are being sent to the South, it will provide a sufficient quantity of grain. Incidentally, I will remind you that no city has devoted so much effort to the organisation of food supplies as Petrograd. All the best forces in that city have already been mustered for the work, and this is what the workers in the other advanced cities should do, too.

The socialist revolution cannot be accomplished without the working class. It cannot be accomplished if the working class has not accumulated sufficient forces to be able to lead the tens of millions of exhausted, illiterate, and scattered rural people who had been crushed by capitalism. Only the advanced workers can lead them. But our best forces have already been used up, they are weary and exhausted. Their places must be taken by average people and young forces. Probably they will make mistakes, but that does not matter so long as they are devoted to the workers' cause, and so long as they have been brought up in the environment of the proletarian struggle.

We have already taken measures to send our best forces to the Volga-Bugulma Railway. Comrade Bryukhanov has gone there accompanied by a group of workers. Army detachments accompanied by workers have been sent to other lines, too, and, I repeat, there are good grounds for hoping that we shall obtain grain. A severe half-year lies ahead of us, but this will be the last severe half-year, because instead of an enemy who is becoming stronger, we have in front of us an enemy who is disintegrating, for the Soviet movement is growing in all countries.

These are the grounds on which, after discussing the matter most carefully and verifying our calculations again and again, we say that the suspension of passenger traffic will enable us to bring in several million poods of grain and

use the extremely rich granaries of the East and South. In the course of this severe half-year we shall vanquish our chief enemy, the famine. Moreover, our position today is much better than it was last year, because we now have reserves.

Last year the Czechoslovaks reached Kazan and Simbirsk; the Ukraine was under the heel of the Germans; Krasnov, financed by the Germans, was mustering troops in the Don region, and we were cut off from the South. Today the Ukraine is being liberated from the German imperialists. The latter had planned to ship 60,000,000 poods of grain to Germany, but they shipped only 9,000,000 poods, and with it something they cannot digest, namely, Bolshevism. This is what upset the German imperialists, and this is what will upset the French and British imperialists if it becomes possible for them to advance farther into Russia.

We now have a Soviet Ukraine. And when it comes to supplying us with grain, the Soviet Government of the Ukraine will not fix its price like a huckster, a profiteer, or a muzhik who says, "The starving will give me a 1,000 rubles a pood. To hell with the state monopoly. All I want is to get rich. If the people are starving, all the better, they will pay more." This is the way the rural bourgeoisie, the kulaks, the profiteers argue, and they are being assisted by all those who agitate against the state grain monopoly, by those who stand for "freedom" to trade, that is, freedom for the rich muzhik to amass wealth, and freedom for the workers who are getting nothing to starve to death. But the Ukrainian Government said, "Our first task is to help the starving North. The Ukraine cannot hold out if the North, which is exhausted by famine, does not hold out. The Ukraine will hold out, and her victory will be certain, if she helps the starving North."

In the Ukraine there are huge stocks of grain. We cannot ship it all at once. We have sent our best Soviet forces to the Ukraine and already they all report in one voice that the stocks of grain are enormous, but they cannot be dispatched all at once, we haven't the machinery for it. The Germans devastated the Ukraine to such a degree that the machinery of administration must be built entirely anew, and this has only just begun. Complete chaos reigns there. The worst period, the first weeks at Smolny after the October Revolu-

tion when we were trying to overcome the chaos, was nothing compared with the difficulties that are now being experienced in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian comrades are complaining bitterly about the lack of people, lack of forces with which to build up the Soviet government. They have no machinery of administration, they have no proletarian centre like Petrograd or Moscow, for the Ukrainian proletarian centres are occupied by the enemy. Kiev is not a proletarian centre. The Donets Basin, exhausted by starvation, has not yet been liberated from the Cossacks. Our Ukrainian comrades cry, "Workers of the North, come to our assistance!"

And that is why we, on behalf of the Ukrainian comrades, say to the Petrograd workers, knowing that they have done more than the workers of any other city, "Do a little more, make another effort!" Now we can and must come to the aid of our Ukrainian comrades, because they must build up the machinery of the Soviet state on a site that was cleared and laid waste by suffering as no other place has been!

We discussed the situation in the Central Committee of our Party and gave instructions that everything should first be done to help to build up administrative machinery in the Ukraine, and in return for this, when this machinery is available, to set to work to obtain 50,000,000 poods of grain by June 1.

I do not in the least wish to assert that this will be done. We all know that of all the tasks we undertook, not one was fulfilled by the appointed date. Suppose only part of this task is fulfilled; at all events you will know definitely that when things get worse, when the famine here becomes more acute, and when the food supply machinery will be working at top speed in the East and South, we shall be able to obtain urgent aid from the South and improve our situation.

In addition to the Ukraine, we have another source of grain supply—the Don region. There, the victories of the Red Army have already worked miracles. Several weeks ago the situation on the Don, in the war against Krasnov, against our main enemy, against the officers and Cossacks who received millions in bribes, first from the Germans and then from the British and French, who are still continuing to help them—several weeks ago, our position was very serious. But now we have, with tremendous speed, regained territory

not only up to Tsaritsyn, but farther to the south. The forces of Krasnov and the Don counter-revolutionaries have been broken in spite of the assistance they received from the imperialists.

What does this mean? It means that we are getting nearer to coal and grain, for the lack of which we are perishing—owing to the shortage of coal, the railways and factories are coming to a standstill, and owing to the shortage of grain, the workers in the towns, and in the non-agricultural districts generally, are suffering the pangs of starvation.

In the Don area, as in the Ukraine, the grain stocks are enormous. Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is no administrative machinery in the Don area. In every military unit there is a Communist group, worker commissars, and groups of food supply workers. The greatest difficulty there is that neither of the two main railway lines can be used because the whiteguards, on retreating, blew up the bridges.

The last meeting of the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars was attended by experts whom we asked how material could be obtained to repair the lines, and how at least one of them could be repaired. At the last meeting of the Council of Defence we were able to assure ourselves that thanks to an enormous exertion of effort not only were materials provided, but the comrades on the spot assured us, almost guaranteed, that both lines would be repaired before the spring thaw. The resumption of traffic on these two lines is perhaps worth many victories over the Cossacks and enables us to say that we must hold on for another few severe months, we must strain every nerve, obtain the assistance of the Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers. In addition to the East, from where it is difficult to ship anything, in addition to the Ukraine, where there are vast stocks but no administrative machinery, we have the Don region, which has been reconquered by the Red Army. That is why we cautiously, after cool calculation, after verifying all this by means of repeated reports and communications from the people on the spot and hearing the statements of food supply and railway experts, say that we have very good grounds for believing that we can not only hold out as we held out last year, but also greatly improve our conditions.

Our internal enemy is collapsing, and our external enemy cannot possibly hold out for long. Comrades, we were particularly convinced of this by what we heard from our foreign comrades who arrived here, and jointly with whom we recently formed the Communist International in Moscow. In Paris, speakers at public meetings who attack Bolshevism are driven from the platform. Yes, victory will be ours! The imperialists may yet shed the blood of thousands and thousands of workers, murder Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and hundreds of the best representatives of the International, they may fill the prisons in Britain, France, Germany and Italy with socialists, but this will not avail them! Victory will be ours! For in spite of all the lies and the torrents of abuse and filthy slander that are poured out against us, the workers of all countries now understand what is meant by Soviets, by Soviet power. The capitalists of no country have a way out. I repeat that when they conclude peace they will be at loggerheads. France is ready to hurl herself upon Italy, they are quarrelling over the division of the booty. Japan is arming against America. They have imposed upon the peoples an incredible burden of tribute, millions upon millions of war debts. But everywhere the people are exhausted by war, everywhere there is a shortage of food, industry is at a standstill, and starvation reigns. The Entente, which is promising right and left to help the counter-revolutionaries, cannot feed its own countries. The masses of the workers in Paris, in London and in New York have translated the word "Soviet" into their own languages, they have made it intelligible for every worker, for they know that the old bourgeois republic cannot help their cause, that only a workers' government can help them.

Soviet Russia encounters enormous difficulties because the military forces of the most well-armed and most powerful countries of the world have been hurled against her. In spite of this, Soviet power in Russia has succeeded in winning the sympathy, the attention and moral support of the workers of the world. And on the basis of these facts, not exaggerating in the least, and not shutting our eyes to the fact that in Germany and in other countries workers' blood is flowing and many of the best socialist leaders are being brutally done to death—we know this and do not shut our eyes to it—we

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assert that victory, complete victory, will be ours, because the power of the imperialists in the other countries has been shaken, while the workers are emerging from their state of stultification and deception. Soviet power has already won recognition from the workers of all countries. Everywhere the Soviets, the capture of power by the workers themselves, are regarded as the only hope.

And when the workers learn that the united workers even in an underdeveloped and backward country, after capturing power, have succeeded in creating a force that is resisting the imperialists of the whole world, when they learn that these workers have succeeded in taking the factories from the capitalists and in giving to the peasants the land that formerly belonged to the landowners—when this truth reaches the masses of workers of all countries, we shall be able once again to say loudly, and with firm conviction, that our victory on a world scale is assured, for the power of the bourgeoisie has been shaken, it will no longer succeed in deceiving the workers, for the Soviet movement has sprung up everywhere. And just as we saw the birth of the Soviet Republic on October 25, 1917, and the birth of the Third, Communist International a few days ago in Moscow, so we shall soon see the birth of a World Soviet Republic. (*The speech was interrupted by applause and ended in an ovation.*)

I should very much like the Petrograd comrades to print the following as a *foreword* or *afterword* to my speech, even if only in small type.

April 17 *Lenin*

AFTERWORD[17]

After spending no little effort in correcting the verbatim report of my speech, I am compelled to make the following urgent request to all comrades who want to report my speeches for the press.

My request is that they should never rely on the shorthand or any other verbatim reports of my speeches, never

make any endeavour to obtain such reports, and never publish such reports of my speeches.

Instead of publishing the shorthand reports of my speeches let them, if necessary, publish summaries of them. I have seen newspaper summaries of my speeches that were satisfactory; but I have never seen a single verbatim report of my speeches that was at all satisfactory. Whether this is due to the fact that I speak too fast, or that I do not construct my sentences properly, or to some other reason, I will not undertake to say; but the fact remains that I have never seen a single satisfactory shorthand, or any other verbatim report of my speeches.

A good summary of a speech is better than a bad verbatim report. That is why I request that no verbatim report of my speeches should ever be published.

April 17, 1919

N. Lenin

SPEECH IN MEMORY OF Y. M. SVERDLOV AT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MARCH 18, 1919

Comrades, today, when the workers of all countries are honouring the memory of the heroic rise and tragic end of the Paris Commune we have to inter the remains of Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov. In the course of our revolution, and in its victories, Comrade Sverdlov succeeded in expressing more fully and integrally than anybody else the chief and most important features of the proletarian revolution, and this, even more than his boundless devotion to the cause of the revolution, made him significant as a leader of the proletarian revolution.

Comrades, people who judge by what they see on the surface, the numerous enemies of our revolution, and those who to this day vacillate between the revolution and its opponents, consider the most striking feature of our revolution to be the determined and relentlessly firm way it has dealt with the exploiters and the enemies of the working people. There is no doubt that without this, without revolutionary violence, the proletariat could not have triumphed. Nor can there be any doubt that revolutionary violence was a necessary and legitimate weapon of the revolution only at definite stages of its development, only under definite and special conditions, and that a far more profound and permanent feature of this revolution and condition of its victory was, and remains, the organisation of the proletarian masses, the organisation of the working people.

And it is this organisation of millions of working people that constitutes the best stimulant for the revolution, its deepest source of victory. And it is this feature of the proletarian revolution which, in the course of the struggle, brought to the fore those leaders who best expressed that specific feature of our revolution that was never seen in revolutions before, namely, the organisation of the masses. This feature of the proletarian revolution also brought to the fore Yakov Sverdlov, a man who was first and foremost an organiser.

Comrades, we Russian revolutionaries, particularly in the stern days of the prolonged, sometimes painful and excessively long period of preparation for the revolution, suffered because of the gulf between theory, principle and programme and our practical work. We suffered most of all from a too deep engrossment in theory divorced from direct action.

The history of the Russian revolutionary movement over a period of many decades contains a list of martyrs who were devoted to the revolutionary cause, but who had no opportunity to put their revolutionary ideals into practice. In this respect, the proletarian revolution, for the first time, provided these formerly isolated heroes of the revolutionary struggle with real ground, a real basis, a real environment, a real audience, and a real proletarian army in which they could display their talents. And in this respect, the most outstanding leaders are those who, as practical, efficient organisers, have succeeded in winning for themselves an exceptionally prominent place such as Yakov Sverdlov won for himself and rightly occupied.

If we survey the life of this leader of the proletarian revolution we see that his wonderful organising talents developed in the course of long struggle. We see that this leader of the proletarian revolution himself cultivated every one of his wonderful gifts as a great revolutionary who had passed through and experienced different epochs in the severest conditions of revolutionary activity. He dedicated himself entirely to the revolution in the very first period of his activities, when still a youth who had barely acquired political consciousness. In that period, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, Comrade Sverdlov stood before

us as the most perfect type of professional revolutionary, a man who had entirely given up his family and all the comforts and habits of the old bourgeois society, a man who devoted himself heart and soul to the revolution, and who for many years, even decades, passing from prison to exile and from exile to prison, cultivated those characteristics which steeled revolutionaries for many, many years.

However, this professional revolutionary never, not even for a moment, lost contact with the masses. Although the conditions of tsarism condemned him, like all the revolutionaries of those days, mainly to underground, illegal activities, even then, even in those underground and illegal activities, Sverdlov always marched shoulder to shoulder and hand in hand with the advanced workers who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, began to take the place of the earlier generation of revolutionary intellectuals.

It was at this time that scores and hundreds of advanced workers took up activities and acquired that steel-like hardness in the revolutionary struggle which, together with the closest contact with the masses, made it possible to bring about a successful proletarian revolution in Russia. It is precisely this long period of illegal activity that most of all characterises the man who was constantly in the fight, who never lost contact with the masses, who never left Russia, who always worked in conjunction with the best of the workers, and who, in spite of the isolation from general life to which persecution condemned the revolutionary, succeeded in becoming not only a beloved leader of the workers, not only a leader who was most familiar with practical work, but also an organiser of the advanced proletarians. Some people were of the opinion—and this applies mostly to our opponents, or to the waverers—that this complete absorption in illegal activities, this specific feature of the professional revolutionary, cut him off from the masses. But the revolutionary activities of Yakov Sverdlov prove to us how utterly mistaken this opinion was, that, on the contrary, this boundless devotion to the revolutionary cause, which is typical of the lives of people who had seen the inside of many prisons and had been in exile in the remotest regions of Siberia, produced such leaders, the flower of our

proletariat. And when this was combined with a knowledge of men and organisational ability, it produced great organisers. The illegal circles, revolutionary underground work, the illegal Party, which nobody personified or expressed so integrally as Yakov Sverdlov—this was the practical school through which he passed, and the only school that could have enabled him to reach the position of the first man in the first socialist Soviet Republic, the position of the first organiser of the broad proletarian masses.

Comrades, all those who, like myself, have had occasion to work with Comrade Sverdlov day after day, had it vividly brought home to them that it was the exceptional organising talent of this man which gave us that which we have been so proud of, so justly proud of, up to now. He made it possible for us to carry on concerted, efficient, really organised activities, activities worthy of the organised proletarian masses, and answering to the requirements of the proletarian revolution—those concerted, organised activities without which we could not have achieved a single success, without which we could not have overcome any one of the innumerable difficulties which we have had to face, and without which we would not have been able to stand up to any one of the severe trials we experienced in the past, and are experiencing at the present time.

In that seething struggle that is revolution, at that special post which every revolutionary occupies, at a time when the work of even a small body of men takes the form of deliberations, of enormous importance is high moral prestige won in the course of the struggle, unquestionable and unchallenged prestige, the roots of which lie, of course, not in abstract morals, but in the morals of the revolutionary fighter, the morals of the rank and file of the revolutionary masses.

The fact that for over a year we have been able to bear the incredible burdens that have fallen to the lot of a narrow circle of devoted revolutionaries, the fact that the leading groups could so firmly, quickly, and unanimously decide the most difficult problems, is due entirely to the prominent place among them occupied by such an exceptionally talented organiser as Yakov Sverdlov. He alone managed to acquire an amazing knowledge of the leading

men of the proletarian movement, he alone, in the course of the long years of struggle—to which I can refer here only very briefly—succeeded in acquiring the wonderful intuition of the practical worker, the wonderful talent of an organiser, an absolutely unchallenged prestige, thanks to which he was able to take sole charge of some of the largest branches of the work of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee which only a group of ordinary people could cope with. He alone succeeded in winning for himself such a position that on a large number of extremely big and important practical questions of organisation, his mere word was sufficient to secure an unchallenged and final settlement, without conferences, without a formal vote; and everybody felt convinced that the questions had been settled on the basis of such profound practical knowledge and organising intuition that not only hundreds and thousands of advanced workers, but also the masses would accept that settlement as final.

History long ago proved that in the course of the struggle great revolutions bring great men to the forefront and develop talents that had previously seemed impossible. Nobody would have believed that the school of the illegal study circle and underground activities, the school of the small, persecuted Party, the school of Turukhansk prison could produce this organiser who won absolutely unchallenged prestige, the organiser of Soviet power throughout Russia, the man, unique in his knowledge, who organised the work of the Party which created the Soviets and established the Soviet government which is now making its arduous, painful, bloody but triumphant advance to all nations, to all countries throughout the world.

We shall never be able to replace this man who had cultivated such an exceptional organising talent, if by replacement we mean finding one man, one comrade, with all these qualities. Nobody who has been close to Yakov Sverdlov and has watched him constantly at work can have any doubt that in this respect he is irreplaceable. The work he performed as an organiser, in choosing men and appointing them to responsible posts in all the various departments, will be performed in future only if we appoint whole groups of men to handle the different major departments that he had

sole charge of, and if these men, following in his footsteps, come near to doing what this one man did alone.

But the proletarian revolution is strong precisely because its roots run deep. We know that it promotes new men to take the place of those who devotedly sacrificed their lives in the struggle, they are perhaps less experienced, possess less knowledge, and are at first less trained, but they are men who have broad contacts with the masses and who are capable of promoting from their ranks groups of men to take the place of the departed geniuses, to continue their cause, to continue along the road they pursued and to complete what they had begun. In this respect we are fully convinced that the proletarian revolution in Russia and all over the world will promote group after group of men, numerous sections of the proletariat and of the working peasantry, which will possess that practical knowledge of life, that organising talent, collective if not individual, without which the million-strong army of the proletariat cannot achieve victory.

The memory of Comrade Yakov Sverdlov will serve not only as a permanent symbol of the revolutionary's devotion to his cause and as the model of how to combine a practical sober mind, practical skill, close contact with the masses and ability to guide them; it is also a pledge that ever-growing numbers of proletarians, guided by these examples, will march forward to the complete victory of the world communist revolution.

Pravda No. 60,
March 20, 1919

Published according to
the verbatim report,
verified with the *Pravda* text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FUNERAL OF YAKOV SVERDLOV MARCH 18, 1919

NEWSPAPER REPORT

We have lowered into the grave the remains of a proletarian leader who did more than anybody to organise the working class and to ensure victory. Now that Soviet power is spreading throughout the world and the knowledge is rapidly gaining ground of how the proletariat, organised in Soviets, is struggling to put its ideas into effect, we are burying a representative of the proletariat who set an example of how to fight for these ideas.

Millions of proletarians will repeat our words: Long live the memory of Comrade Sverdlov. At his graveside we solemnly vow to fight still harder for the overthrow of capital and for the complete emancipation of the working people....”

Published in *Vecherniye Izvestia Moskovskogo Soveta* No. 196, March 19, 1919

Published according to the newspaper text

DRAFT PROGRAMME OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[18]

First published in 1930

Draft Programme section on the national question first published in 1925

Rough draft of the Programme of the R.C.P. first published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

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1

ROUGH DRAFT OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE R.C.P.

Plan. The programme shall consist of the following sections.

1. Preamble. The proletarian revolution has begun in Russia and is rapidly spreading everywhere. To understand the revolution it is necessary to understand the nature of capitalism and the inevitability of its development towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. 2. Capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. On this point repeat the main section of our old Marxist programme, drawn up by Plekhanov, so as to explain also the "historical roots" of our world outlook. 3. Imperialism. To be taken from the draft programme of May 1917. 4. Three trends in the world working-class movement and the new International. Revision of the draft of May 1917. 5. The fundamental tasks of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. To be taken from the draft of December 1917-January 1918.[19] 6. These tasks in the political sphere to be formulated concretely (new). 7. Ditto in the national, religious, educational spheres (new). 8. Ditto in economic sphere (new). 9. Ditto in agrarian sphere (new). 10. Ditto as regards protection of the working people (to be written by Schmidt). 11 and 12. To be added on other spheres (not yet written).

Much in this rough draft is unfinished, especially the editorial aspect of it, and in some cases, instead of programme formulations, commentaries have been provisionally taken.

(1) The Revolution of October 25 (November 7), 1917 established the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia which began, with the support of the poor peasantry or semi-proletariat, to build a communist society. The growth

of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all advanced countries, the universal emergence and development of the Soviet form of that movement, i.e., a form which aims directly at the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, lastly, the beginning and progress of the revolution in Austria-Hungary and, particularly, in Germany, all goes to show vividly that the era of the world proletarian, communist revolution has begun.

(2) The causes, significance and aims of this revolution can be correctly understood, first, by making clear the real nature, the fundamental character of capitalism and of bourgeois society, and the inevitability of their development towards communism; and secondly, by making clear the nature of imperialism and of imperialist wars, which have accelerated the collapse of capitalism and have placed the proletarian revolution on the order of the day.

* * *

(3) The nature of capitalism and of the bourgeois society which still dominates in most civilised countries and the development of which inevitably leads, and has been leading, to the world communist revolution of the proletariat, was described in our old Marxist programme in the following terms.

(4) "The principal specific feature of this society is commodity production based on capitalist production relations, under which the most important and major part of the means of production and exchange of commodities belongs to a numerically small class of persons while the vast majority of the population is made up of proletarians and semi-proletarians, who, owing to their economic position, are compelled permanently or periodically to sell their labour-power, i.e., to hire themselves out to the capitalists and to create by their labour the incomes of the upper classes of society.

(5) "The ascendancy of capitalist production relations extends its area more and more with the steady improvement of technology, which, by enhancing the economic importance of the large enterprises, tends to eliminate the small independent producers, converting some of them into pro-

letarians and narrowing the role of others in the social and economic sphere, and in some places making them more or less completely, more or less obviously, more or less painfully dependent on capital.

(6) "Moreover, this technical progress enables the employers to make growing use of female and child labour in the process of production and exchange of commodities. And since, on the other hand, it causes a relative decrease in the employers' demand for human labour-power, the demand for labour-power necessarily lags behind its supply, as a result of which the dependence of wage-labour on capital is increased and exploitation of labour rises to a higher level.

(7) "This state of affairs in the bourgeois countries and the steadily growing competition among them in the world market make it more and more difficult for them to sell the goods which are produced in ever-increasing quantities. Over-production, manifesting itself in more or less acute industrial crises followed by more or less protracted periods of industrial stagnation, is an inevitable consequence of the development of the productive forces in bourgeois society. Crises and periods of industrial stagnation, in their turn, still further ruin the small producers, still further increase the dependence of wage-labour on capital, and lead still more rapidly to the relative and sometimes to the absolute deterioration of the condition of the working class.

(8) "Thus, improvement in technology, signifying increased labour productivity and greater social wealth, becomes in bourgeois society the cause of greater social inequality, of widening gulfs between the rich and poor, of greater insecurity, unemployment, and various hardships of the mass of the working people.

(9) "However, in proportion as all these contradictions, which are inherent in bourgeois society, grow and develop, so also does the discontent of the toiling and exploited masses with the existing order of things grow; the numerical strength and solidarity of the proletarians increase and their struggle against their exploiters is sharpened. At the same time, by concentrating the means of production and exchange and socialising the process of labour in capitalist enterprises, the improvement in technology more and more rapidly creates the material possibility of capitalist pro-

duction relations being superseded by communist relations, i.e., the possibility of bringing about the social revolution, which is the ultimate aim of all the activities of the international communist party as the conscious exponent of the class movement of the proletariat.

(10) "By introducing social in place of private ownership of the means of production and exchange, by introducing planned organisation of social production to ensure the well-being and many-sided development of all the members of society, the proletarian social revolution will do away with the division of society into classes and thereby emancipate the whole of oppressed humanity, for it will put an end to all forms of exploitation of one section of society by another.

(11) "A necessary condition for this social revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters. Aiming at making the proletariat capable of fulfilling its great historic mission, the international communist party organises the proletariat in an independent political party opposed to all the bourgeois parties, guides all the manifestations of its class struggle, reveals to it the irreconcilable antagonism between the interests of the exploiters and those of the exploited, and explains to the proletariat the historical significance of and the necessary conditions for the impending social revolution. At the same time it reveals to all the other toiling and exploited masses the hopelessness of their position in capitalist society and the need for a social revolution if they are to free themselves from the yoke of capital. The Communist Party, the party of the working class, calls upon all sections of the working and exploited population to join its ranks insofar as they adopt the standpoint of the proletariat."

* * *

(12) World capitalism has at the present time, i.e., about the beginning of the twentieth century, reached the stage of imperialism. Imperialism, or the epoch of finance capital is a high stage of development of the capitalist economic

system, one in which monopoly associations of capitalists—syndicates, cartels, and trusts—have assumed decisive importance; in which enormously concentrated banking capital has fused with industrial capital; in which the export of capital to foreign countries has assumed vast dimensions; in which the whole world has been divided up territorially among the richer countries, and the economic carve-up of the world among international trusts has begun.

(13) Imperialist wars, i.e., wars for world domination, for markets for banking capital and for the subjugation of small and weaker nations, are inevitable under such a state of affairs. The first great imperialist war, the war of 1914-18, is precisely such a war.

(14) The extremely high level of development which world capitalism in general has attained, the replacement of free competition by monopoly capitalism, the fact that the banks and the capitalist associations have prepared the machinery for the social regulation of the process of production and distribution of products, the rise in the cost of living and increased oppression of the working class by the syndicates due to the growth of capitalist monopolies, the tremendous obstacles standing in the way of the proletariat's economic and political struggle, the horrors, misery, ruin, and brutalisation caused by the imperialist war—all these factors transform the present stage of capitalist development into an era of proletarian socialist revolution.

That era has dawned.

(15) Only a proletarian socialist revolution can lead humanity out of the impasse which imperialism and imperialist wars have created. Whatever difficulties the revolution may have to encounter, whatever possible temporary setbacks or waves of counter-revolution it may have to contend with, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable.

* * *

(16) The victory of the proletarian revolution calls for the complete confidence, the closest fraternal alliance and the greatest possible unity of revolutionary action on the part of the working class of all the advanced countries. These conditions cannot be created without a determined,

principled rupture with, and a relentless struggle against, those bourgeois distortions of socialism that have gained the upper hand in the top echelons of the vast majority of official "Social-Democratic" and "socialist" parties.

(17) One such distortion, on the one hand, is the trend of opportunism and social-chauvinism, socialism in words but chauvinism in deeds, the concealment of the defence of the predatory interests of one's "own" national bourgeoisie behind the slogan of "defence of the fatherland", both in general and during the imperialist war of 1914-18 in particular. This trend has come into being because in nearly all the advanced countries, the bourgeoisie, by plundering the colonial and weak nations, has been able to bribe the upper stratum of the proletariat with crumbs from the superprofits, to ensure them in peace-time a tolerable, petty-bourgeois existence, and to take the leaders of that stratum into its service. The opportunists and social-chauvinists, being servants of the bourgeoisie, are real class enemies of the proletariat.

(18) Another bourgeois distortion of socialism is, on the other hand, the "Centrist" trend, which is equally broad and international, which wavers between the social-chauvinists and the Communists, advocates unity with the former and is attempting to resuscitate the bankrupt and putrid Second International. The only really proletarian and revolutionary International is the new, Third, Communist International, that has actually been founded by the formation of Communist Parties out of the former socialist parties in a number of countries, particularly in Germany, and is gaining the growing sympathy of the proletarian masses in all countries.

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THE BASIC TASKS OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT IN RUSSIA

In Russia today the basic tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat are to carry through to the end, to complete, the expropriation of the landowners and bourgeoisie that has already begun, and the transfer of all factories, railways, banks, the merchant fleet and other means of production and exchange to ownership by the Soviet Republic;

to employ the alliance of urban workers and poor peasants, which has already led to the abolition of private ownership of land, and the law on the transitional form between small-peasant farming and socialism, which modern ideologists of the peasantry that has put itself on the side of the proletarians have called socialisation of the land, for a gradual but steady transition to joint tillage and large-scale socialist agriculture;

to strengthen and further develop the Federative Republic of Soviets as an immeasurably higher and more progressive form of democracy than bourgeois parliamentarism, and as the sole type of state corresponding, on the basis of the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871 and equally of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917-18, to the transitional period between capitalism and socialism, i.e., to the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat;

by employing in every way the torch of world socialist revolution lit in Russia to paralyse the attempts of the imperialist bourgeois states to intervene in the internal affairs of Russia or to unite for direct struggle and war against the socialist Soviet Republic and to carry the revolution into the most advanced countries and in general into all coun-

tries; by a number of gradual but undeviating measures to abolish private trading completely and to organise the regular, planned exchange of products between producers' and consumers' communes to form the single economic entity the Soviet Republic must become.

The Russian Communist Party, developing the general tasks of the Soviet government in greater detail, at present formulates them as follows.

In the Political Sphere

Prior to the capture of political power by the proletariat it was (obligatory) necessary to make use of bourgeois democracy, parliamentarism in particular, for the political education and organisation of the working masses; now that the proletariat has won political power and a higher type of democracy is being put into effect in the Soviet Republic, any step backward to bourgeois parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy would undoubtedly be reactionary service to the interests of the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists. Such catchwords as supposedly popular, national, general, extra-class but actually bourgeois democracy serve the interests of the exploiters alone, and as long as the land and other means of production remain private property the most democratic republic must inevitably remain a bourgeois dictatorship, a machine for the suppression of the overwhelming majority of working people by a handful of capitalists.

The historical task that has fallen to the lot of the Soviet Republic, a new type of state that is transitional until the state disappears altogether, is the following.

(1) The creation and development of universal mass organisations of precisely those classes that are oppressed under capitalism—the proletariat and semi-proletariat. A bourgeois-democratic republic at best permits the organisation of the exploited masses, by declaring them free to organise, but actually has always placed countless obstacles in the way of their organisation, obstacles that were connected with the private ownership of the means of production in a way that made them irremovable. For the first time in history, Soviet power has not only greatly facilitated the

organisation of the masses who were oppressed under capitalism, but has made that organisation the essential permanent basis of the entire state apparatus, local and central, from top to bottom. Only in this way is it possible to ensure democracy for the great majority of the population (the working people), i.e., actual participation in state administration, in contrast to the actual administration of the state mainly by members of the bourgeois classes as is the case in the most democratic bourgeois republics.

(2) The Soviet system of state administration gives a certain actual advantage to that section of the working people that all the capitalist development that preceded socialism has made the most concentrated, united, educated and steeled in the struggle, i.e, to the urban industrial proletariat. This advantage must be used systematically and unswervingly to counteract the narrow guild and narrow trade interests that capitalism fostered among the workers and which split them into competitive groups, by uniting the most backward and disunited masses of rural proletarians and semi-proletarians more closely with the advanced workers, by snatching them away from the influence of the village kulaks and village bourgeoisie, and organising and educating them for communist development.

(3) Bourgeois democracy that solemnly announced the equality of all citizens, in actual fact hypocritically concealed the domination of the capitalist exploiters and deceived the masses with the idea that the equality of exploiters and exploited is possible. The Soviet organisation of the state destroys this deception and this hypocrisy by the implementation of real democracy, i.e., the real equality of all working people, and by excluding the exploiters from the category of members of society possessing full rights. The experience of world history, the experience of all revolts of the exploited classes against their exploiters shows the inevitability of long and desperate resistance of the exploiters in their struggle to retain their privileges. Soviet state organisation is adapted to the suppression of that resistance, for unless it is suppressed there can be no question of a victorious communist revolution.

(4) The more direct influence of the working masses on state structure and administration—i.e., a higher form of

democracy—is also effected under the Soviet type of state, first, by-the electoral procedure and the possibility of holding elections more frequently, and also by conditions for re-election and for the recall of deputies which are simpler and more comprehensible to the urban and rural workers than is the case under the best forms of bourgeois democracy;

(5) secondly, by making the economic, industrial unit (factory) and not a territorial division the primary electoral unit and the nucleus of the state structure under Soviet power. This closer contact between the state apparatus and the masses of advanced proletarians that capitalism has united, in addition to effecting a higher level of democracy, also makes it possible to effect profound socialist reforms.

(6) Soviet organisation has made possible the creation of armed forces of workers and peasants which are much more closely connected with the working and exploited people than before. If this had not been done it would have been impossible to achieve one of the basic conditions for the victory of socialism—the arming of the workers and the disarming of the bourgeoisie.

(7) Soviet organisation has developed incomparably farther and deeper that feature of bourgeois democracy which marks historically its great progressive nature as compared with medieval times, i.e., the participation of the people in the election of individuals to office. In none of the most democratic bourgeois states have the working masses ever been able to enjoy the electoral rights formally granted them by the bourgeoisie (who actually hinder their enjoyment) anywhere near as extensively, frequently, universally, easily and simply as they are enjoyed under Soviet power. Soviet power has, at the same time, swept away those negative aspects of bourgeois democracy that the Paris Commune began to abolish, i.e., parliamentarism, or the separation of legislative and executive powers, the narrow, limited nature of which Marxism has long since indicated. By merging the two aspects of government the Soviets bring the state apparatus closer to the working people and remove the fence of the bourgeois parliament that fooled the masses with hypocritical signboards concealing the financial and stock-exchange deals of parliamentary businessmen and

ensured the inviolability of the bourgeois apparatus of state administration.

(8) Soviet state organisation alone has enabled the proletarian revolution to smash the old bourgeois state apparatus at one blow and destroy it to the very foundations; had this not been done no start could have been made on socialist development. Those strongholds of the bureaucracy which everywhere, both under monarchies and in the most democratic bourgeois republics, has always kept the state bound to the interests of the landowners and capitalists, have been destroyed in present-day Russia. The struggle against the bureaucracy, however, is certainly not over in our country. The bureaucracy is trying to regain some of its positions and is taking advantage, on the one hand, of the unsatisfactory cultural level of the masses of the people and, on the other, of the tremendous, almost superhuman war efforts of the most developed section of the urban workers. The continuation of the struggle against the bureaucracy, therefore, is absolutely necessary, is imperative, to ensure the success of future socialist development.

(9) Work in this field is closely connected with the implementation of the chief historical purpose of Soviet power, i.e., to advance towards the final abolition of the state, and should consist of the following. First, every member of a Soviet must, without fail, do a certain job of state administration; secondly, these jobs must be consistently changed so that they embrace all aspects of government, all its branches; and, thirdly, literally all the working population must be drawn into independent participation in state administration by means of a series of gradual measures that are carefully selected and unfailingly implemented.

(10) By and large, the difference between bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism on the one hand, and Soviet or proletarian democracy on the other, boils down to this: the centre of gravity of the former is in its solemn and pompous declarations of numerous liberties and rights which the majority of the population, the workers and peasants, cannot enjoy to the full. Proletarian, or Soviet, democracy, on the contrary, has transferred the centre of gravity away from the declaration of rights and liberties for the entire people to the actual participation of none but the working

people, who were oppressed and exploited by capital, in the administration of the state, the actual use of the best buildings and other premises for meetings and congresses, the best printing-works and the biggest warehouses (stocks) of paper for the education of those who were stultified and downtrodden under capitalism, and to providing a real (actual) opportunity for those masses gradually to free themselves from the burden of religious prejudices, etc., etc. It is precisely in making the benefits of culture, civilisation and democracy really available to the working and exploited people that Soviet power sees its most important work, work which it must continue unswervingly in the future.

The policy of the R.C.P. on the national question, unlike the bourgeois-democratic declaration of the equality of nations, which cannot be implemented under imperialism, is that of steadily drawing together and merging the proletarians and the working masses of all nations in their revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Among the working people of the nations that entered into the Russian Empire the mistrust of the Great Russians that has been inherited from the epoch of tsarist and bourgeois Great-Russian imperialism is rapidly vanishing, under the influence of their acquaintance with Soviet Russia, but that mistrust has not yet completely disappeared among all nations and among all sections of the working people. It is, therefore, necessary to exercise special caution in respect of national feelings and to ensure the pursuance of a policy of actual equality and freedom to secede so as to remove the grounds for this mistrust and achieve the close voluntary union of the Soviet republics of all nations. Aid to backward and weak nations must be increased by assisting the independent organisation and education of the workers and peasants of all nations in the struggle against medieval and bourgeois oppression and also by assisting in the development of the language and literature of nations that have been oppressed or have been underprivileged.

In respect of the policy on religion the task of the (R.C.P.) dictatorship of the proletariat must not be confined to decreeing the separation of the church from the state and the school from the church, that is, to measures promised by bourgeois democrats but never fully carried out anywhere in

the world because of the many and varied connections actually existing between capital and religious propaganda. The proletarian dictatorship must completely destroy the connection between the exploiting classes—the landowners and capitalists—and the organisation of religious propaganda as something which keeps the masses in ignorance. The proletarian dictatorship must consistently effect the real emancipation of the working people from religious prejudices, doing so by means of propaganda and by raising the political consciousness of the masses but carefully avoiding anything that may hurt the feelings of the religious section of the population and serve to increase religious fanaticism.

In the sphere of public education, the object of the R.C.P. is to complete the work that began with the October Revolution in 1917 to convert the school from an instrument of the class rule of the bourgeoisie into an instrument for the overthrow of that rule and for the complete abolition of the division of society into classes.

In the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., in the period in which conditions are being prepared for the full realisation of communism, the school must be the vehicle, not merely of the general principles of communism but also of the ideological, organisational and educational influence of the proletariat on-the semi-proletarian and non-proletarian sections of the working people, in order to train a generation that is fully capable of building communism.

The immediate tasks in this field are, for the present, the following.

(1) The implementation of free, obligatory general and polytechnical education (acquaintance with all the main branches of production theoretically and in practice) for all children of both sexes up to the age of 16.

(2) The closest connection between schooling and productive social labour.

(3) The provision of food, clothing, books and other teaching aids for all school children at the expense of the state.

(4) Greater agitation and propaganda among schoolteachers.

(5) The training of new teaching staffs imbued with communist ideas.

(6) The working people must be drawn into active participation in the work of education (the development of the public education councils, mobilisation of the educated, etc.).

(7) All-round help on the part of Soviet power in the matter of the self-education and self-development of workers and working peasants (organisation of libraries, schools for adults, people's universities, courses of lectures, cinemas, studios, etc.).

(8) Development of the most extensive propaganda of communist ideas.

The Russian Communist Party, developing the general tasks of the Soviet government in greater detail, at present formulates them as follows.

In the Economic Sphere

The present tasks of Soviet power are:

(1) To continue steadily and finish the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the conversion of the means of production and distribution into the property of the Soviet Republic, i.e., into the common property of all working people, which has in the main been completed.

(2) To pay particularly great attention to the development and strengthening of comradely discipline among the working people and to stimulate their initiative and sense of responsibility in every field. This is the most important if not the sole means of completely overcoming capitalism and the habits formed by the rule of the private ownership of the means of production. This aim can be achieved only by slow, persistent work to re-educate the masses; this re-education has not only become possible now that the masses have seen that the landowner, capitalist and merchant have really been eliminated, but is actually taking place in thousands of ways through the practical experience of the workers and peasants themselves. It is extremely important in this respect to work for the further organisation of the working people in trade unions; never before has this organisation developed as rapidly anywhere in the world as under Soviet power, and it must be developed until literally all working people are organised

in properly constituted, centralised and disciplined trade unions. We must not confine ourselves to the old, stereotyped forms of the trade union movement, but must, on the one hand, systematically convert the trade unions into organs administering the economy, carefully checking every step we take against the results of practical work; there must be greater and stronger bonds between the trade unions and the Supreme Economic Council, the Commissariat of Labour and, later, with all other branches of the state administration; on the other hand, the trade unions must to a greater degree become organs for the labour and socialist education of the working masses as a whole so that the practical experience of participation in the administration spreads to the more backward sections of the workers, under the control of the vanguard of the workers.

(3) One of the basic tasks is to raise the level of labour productivity, for without this the full transition to communism is impossible. In addition to lengthy work to educate the masses and raise their cultural level, the achievement of this goal requires the immediate, extensive and comprehensive employment in science and technology of those specialists who have been left us as our heritage from capitalism and, as a rule, are imbued with the bourgeois world outlook and habits. The Party, in close alliance with the trade union organisations, must continue its former line —on the one hand, there must not be the slightest political concession to this bourgeois section of the population, and any counter-revolutionary attempts on its part must be ruthlessly suppressed, and, on the other hand, there must be a relentless struggle against the pseudo-radical but actually ignorant and conceited opinion that the working people are capable of overcoming capitalism and the bourgeois social system without learning from bourgeois specialists, without making use of their services and without undergoing the training of a lengthy period of work side by side with them.

Although our ultimate aim is to achieve full communism and equal remuneration for all kinds of work, we cannot introduce this equality straightaway, at the present time, when only the first steps of the transition from capitalism to communism are being taken. For a certain period of time,

therefore, we must retain the present higher remuneration for specialists in order to give them an incentive to work no worse, and even better, than they have worked before; and with the same object in view we must not reject the system of paying bonuses for the most successful work, particularly organisational work; bonuses would be impermissible under a full communist system but in the period of transition from capitalism to communism bonuses are indispensable, as is borne out by theory and by a year's experience of Soviet power.

We must, furthermore, work consistently to surround the bourgeois specialists with a comradely atmosphere created by working hand in hand with the masses of rank-and-file workers led by politically-conscious Communists; we must not be dismayed by the inevitable individual failures but must strive patiently to arouse in people possessing scientific knowledge a consciousness of how loathsome it is to use science for personal enrichment and for the exploitation of man by man, a consciousness of the more lofty aim of using science for the purpose of making it known to the working people.

(4) The building of communism undoubtedly requires the greatest possible and most strict centralisation of labour on a nation-wide scale, and this presumes overcoming the scattering and disunity of workers, by trades and locally, which was one of the sources of capital's strength and labour's weakness. The struggle against the narrowness and limitations of the guild and against its egoism is closely connected with the struggle to remove the antithesis between town and country; it presents great difficulties and cannot be begun on a broad scale without first achieving a considerable increase in the productivity of the people's labour. A start on this work must, however, be made immediately, if at first only on a small, local scale and by way of experiment for the purpose of comparing the results of various measures undertaken in different trades and in different places. The mobilisation of the entire able-bodied population by the Soviet government, with the trade unions participating, for certain public works must be much more widely and systematically practised than has hitherto been the case.

(5) In the sphere of distribution, the present task of Soviet power is to continue steadily replacing trade by the planned, organised and nation-wide distribution of goods. The goal is the organisation of the entire population in producers' and consumers' communes that can distribute all essential products most rapidly, systematically, economically and with the least expenditure of labour by strictly centralising the entire distribution machinery. The co-operatives are a transitional means of achieving this aim. The use of them is similar to the use of bourgeois specialists insofar as the co-operative machinery we have inherited from capitalism is in the hands of people whose thinking and business habits are bourgeois. The R.C.P. must systematically pursue the policy of making it obligatory for all members of the Party to work in the co-operatives and, with the aid of the trade unions, direct them in a communist spirit, develop the initiative and discipline of the working people who belong to them, endeavour to get the entire population to join them, and the co-operatives themselves to merge into one single co-operative that embraces the whole of the Soviet Republic. Lastly, and most important, the dominating influence of the proletariat over the rest of the working people must be constantly maintained, and everywhere the most varied measures must be tried with a view to facilitating and bringing about the transition from petty-bourgeois co-operatives of the old capitalist type to producers' and consumers' communes led by proletarians and semi-proletarians.

(6) It is impossible to abolish money at one stroke in the first period of transition from capitalism to communism. As a consequence the bourgeois elements of the population continue to use privately-owned currency notes—these tokens by which the exploiters obtain the right to receive public wealth—for the purpose of speculation, profit-making and robbing the working population. The nationalisation of the banks is insufficient in itself to combat this survival of bourgeois robbery. The R.C.P. will strive as speedily as possible to introduce the most radical measures to pave the way for the abolition of money, first and foremost to replace it by savings-bank books, cheques, short-term notes entitling the holders to receive goods from the public

stores, and so forth, to make it compulsory for money to be deposited in the banks, etc. Practical experience in paving the way for, and carrying out, these and similar measures will show which of them are the most expedient.

(7) In the sphere of finance, the R.C.P. will introduce a graduated income-and-property tax in all cases where it is feasible. But these cases cannot be numerous since private property in land, the majority of factories and other enterprises has been abolished. In the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the state ownership of the principal means of production, the state finances must be based on the direct appropriation of a certain part of the revenue from the different state monopolies to meet the needs of the state. Revenue and expenditure can be balanced only if the exchange of commodities is properly organised, and this will be achieved by the organisation of producers' and consumers' communes and the restoration of the transport system, which is one of the major immediate objects of the Soviet government.

In the Sphere of Agriculture

After the abolition of private property in land and the [almost] complete expropriation of the landowners and the promulgation of a law on the socialisation of the land which regards as preferable the large-scale farming of commonly-owned estates, the chief task of Soviet power is to discover and test in practice the most expedient and practical transitional measures to effect this.

The main line and the guiding principle of the R.C.P. agrarian policy under these circumstances still remains the effort to rely on the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the countryside. They must first and foremost be organised into an independent force, they must be brought closer to the urban proletariat and wrested from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and petty-property interests. The organisation of Poor Peasants' Committees was one step in this direction; the organisation of Party cells in the villages, the re-election of Soviet deputies to exclude the kulaks, the establishment of special types of trade unions for the proletarians and semi-proletarians of the country-

side—all these and similar measures must be effected without fail.

As far as the kulaks, the rural bourgeoisie, are concerned, the policy of the R.C.P. is one of decisive struggle against their attempts at exploitation and the suppression of their resistance to Soviet socialist policy.

As far as the middle peasant is concerned, the policy of the R.C.P. is one of a cautious attitude towards him; he must not be confused with the kulak and coercive measures must not be used against him; by his class position the middle peasant can be the ally of the proletarian government during the transition to socialism, or, at least, he can remain a neutral element. Despite the unavoidable partial failures and waverings of the middle peasant, therefore, we must strive persistently to reach agreement with him, showing a solicitous attitude to all his desires and making concessions in selecting ways of carrying out socialist reforms. In this respect a prominent place must be given to the struggle against the abuses of those representatives of Soviet power who, hypocritically taking advantage of the title of Communist, are carrying out a policy that is not communist but is a policy of the bureaucracy, of officialdom; such people must be ruthlessly banished and a stricter control established with the aid of the trade unions and by other means.

Insofar as concerns measures for the transition to communist farming, the R.C.P. will test in practice three principal measures that have already taken shape—state farms, agricultural communes and societies (and co-operatives) for the collective tilling of the soil, care being taken to ensure their more extensive and more correct application, especially in respect of ways of developing the voluntary participation of the peasants in these new forms of co-operative farming and of the organisation of the working peasantry to carry out control from below and ensure comradely discipline.

The R.C.P. food policy upholds the consolidation and development of the state monopoly, and does not reject the use of co-operatives and private traders or the employees of trading firms, or the application of a system of bonuses, on the condition that it is controlled by Soviet power and serves the purpose of the better organisation of the business.

The partial concessions that have to be made from time to time are only due to the extreme acuteness of need and never imply a refusal to strive persistently to implement the state monopoly. It is very difficult to implement it in a country of small peasant farms, it requires lengthy work and the practical testing of a number of transitional measures that lead to the goal by various ways, i.e., that lead to the universal organisation and correct functioning of producers and consumers' communes that hand over all food surpluses to the state.

2

DRAFT PROGRAMME OF THE R.C.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

(1) The Revolution of October 25 (November 7), 1917 established the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia which began, with the support of the poor peasantry or semi-proletariat, to lay the foundations of a communist society. The growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all advanced countries, the universal emergence and development of the Soviet form of that movement, i.e., a form which aims directly at the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, lastly, the beginning and progress of the revolution in Austria-Hungary and, particularly, in Germany, all goes to show vividly that the era of the world proletarian, communist revolution has begun.

(2) The causes, significance and aims of this revolution can be correctly understood only by making clear the real nature of capitalism and the inevitability of its development towards communism through imperialism and the imperialist wars that are accelerating the collapse of capitalism.

* * *

(3) The nature of capitalism and of the bourgeois society which still dominates in most civilised countries and the development of which inevitably leads to the world communist revolution of the proletariat was correctly described in our old Programme (if we disregard the inaccurate name of Social-Democratic Party) in the following terms.

(4) "The principal specific feature of this society is commodity production based on capitalist production relations, under which the most important and major part of the

means of production and exchange of commodities belongs to a numerically small class of persons while the vast majority of the population is made up of proletarians and semi-proletarians, who, owing to their economic position, are compelled permanently or periodically to sell their labour-power, i.e., to hire themselves out to the capitalists and to create by their labour the incomes of the upper classes of society.

(5) "The ascendancy of capitalist production relations extends its area more and more with the steady improvement of technology, which, by enhancing the economic importance of the large enterprises, tends to eliminate the small independent producers, converting some of them into proletarians and narrowing the role of others in the social and economic sphere, and in some places making them more or less completely, more or less obviously, more or less painfully dependent on capital.

(6) "Moreover, this technical progress enables the employers to make growing use of female and child labour in the process of production and exchange of commodities. And since, on the other hand; it causes a relative decrease in the employers' demand for human labour-power, the demand for labour-power necessarily lags behind its supply, as a result of which the dependence of wage-labour on capital is increased and exploitation of labour rises to a higher level.

(7) "This state of affairs in the bourgeois countries and the steadily growing competition among them in the world market make it more and more difficult for them to sell the goods which are produced in ever-increasing quantities. Over-production, manifesting itself in more or less acute industrial crises followed by more or less protracted periods of industrial stagnation, is an inevitable consequence of the development of the productive forces in bourgeois society. Crises and periods of industrial stagnation, in their turn, still further ruin the small producers, still further increase the dependence of wage-labour on capital, and lead still more rapidly to the relative and sometimes to the absolute deterioration of the condition of the working class.

(8) "Thus, improvement in technology, signifying increased labour productivity and greater social wealth, becomes in

bourgeois society the cause of greater social inequality, of widening gulfs between the rich and poor, of greater insecurity, unemployment, and various hardships of the mass of the working people.

(9) "However, in proportion as all these contradictions, which are inherent in bourgeois society, grow and develop, so also does the discontent of the toiling and exploited masses with the existing order of things grow; the numerical strength and solidarity of the proletarians increase and their struggle against their exploiters is sharpened. At the same time, by concentrating the means of production and exchange and socialising the process of labour in capitalist enterprises, the improvement in technology more and more rapidly creates the material possibility of capitalist production relations being superseded by communist relations, i.e., the possibility of bringing about the social revolution, which is the ultimate aim of all the activities of the international communist party as the conscious exponent of the class movement of the proletariat.

(10) "By introducing social in place of private ownership of the means of production and exchange, by introducing planned organisation of social production to ensure the well-being and many-sided development of all the members of society, the proletarian social revolution will do away with the division of society into classes and thereby emancipate the whole of oppressed humanity, for it will put an end to all forms of exploitation of one section of society by another.

(11) "A necessary condition for this social revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the conquest by the proletariat of such political power as will enable it to suppress all resistance on the part of the exploiters. Aiming at making the proletariat capable of fulfilling its great historic mission, the international communist party organises the proletariat in an independent political party opposed to all the bourgeois parties, guides all the manifestations of its class struggle, reveals to it the irreconcilable antagonism between the interests of the exploiters and those of the exploited, and explains to the proletariat the historical significance of and the necessary conditions for the impending social revolution. At the same time it reveals

to all the other toiling and exploited masses the hopelessness of their position in capitalist society and the need for a social revolution if they are to free themselves from the yoke of capital. The Communist Party, the party of the working class, calls upon all sections of the working and exploited population to join its ranks insofar as they adopt the standpoint of the proletariat."

* * *

(12) The concentration and centralisation of capital which destroys free competition, had, by the turn of the twentieth century, created powerful monopoly associations of capitalists—syndicates, cartels and trusts—that became of decisive importance in all economic life, had led to the merging of bank capital and highly concentrated industrial capital, to the increased export of capital to other countries and to the stage which marked the beginning of the economic division of the world among the trusts that embrace ever-growing groups of capitalist powers when it had already been divided territorially between the richest countries. This epoch of finance capital, the epoch of a struggle between capitalist states unparalleled in its ferocity, is the epoch of imperialism.

(13) The inevitable outcome of this is imperialist wars, wars for markets, spheres of investment, raw materials and cheap labour-power, i.e., for world domination and the crushing of small and weak peoples. The first great imperialist war of 1914-18 was a war of this type.

(14) The extremely high level of development which world capitalism in general has attained, the replacement of free competition by state monopoly capitalism, the fact that the banks and the capitalist associations have prepared the machinery for the social regulation of the process of production and distribution of products, the rise in the cost of living and increased oppression of the working class by the syndicates and its enslavement by the imperialist state due to the growth of capitalist monopolies, the tremendous obstacles standing in the way of the proletariat's economic and political struggle, the horrors, misery, ruin, and brutalisation caused by the imperialist war—all

these factors transform the present stage of capitalist development into an era of proletarian communist revolution.

That era has dawned.

(15) Only a proletarian communist revolution can lead humanity out of the impasse which imperialism and imperialist wars have created. Whatever difficulties the revolution may have to encounter, whatever possible temporary setbacks or waves of counter-revolution it may have to contend with, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable.

* * *

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

(16) The victory of the world proletarian revolution calls for the complete confidence, the closest fraternal alliance and the greatest possible unity of revolutionary action on the part of the working class of the advanced countries. These conditions cannot be created without a determined, principled rupture with, and a relentless struggle against, those bourgeois distortions of socialism that have gained the upper hand in the top echelons of the official "Social-Democratic" and "socialist" parties.

(17) One such distortion, on the one hand, is the trend of opportunism and social-chauvinism, socialism in words but chauvinism in deeds, the concealment of the defence of the predatory interests of one's "own" national bourgeoisie behind the false slogan of "defence of the fatherland", both in general and during the imperialist war of 1914-18 in particular. This trend has come into being because in the advanced capitalist states, the bourgeoisie, by plundering the colonial and weak nations, has been able to bribe the upper stratum of the proletariat with crumbs from the superprofits obtained from this plunder and ensure them in peace-time a tolerable, petty-bourgeois existence, and to take the leaders of that stratum into its service. The opportunists and social-chauvinists, being servants of the bourgeoisie, are real class enemies of the proletariat, especially today, when, in alliance with the capitalists, they are crushing the proletarian revolutionary movement with a mailed fist, both in their own and in other countries.

(18) Another bourgeois distortion of socialism is, on the other hand, the "Centrist" trend, also to be found in all

capitalist countries, which wavers between the social-chauvinists and the Communists, advocates unity with the former and is attempting to resuscitate the bankrupt Second International. The only leader of the proletariat in its struggle for emancipation is the new, Third, Communist International that has actually been founded by the formation of Communist Parties from the truly proletarian elements of the former socialist parties in a number of countries, particularly in Germany, and is gaining the growing sympathy of the proletarian masses in all countries. This International is returning to Marxism, not only in its name, but in all its political and ideological content, and in all its activities is implementing the revolutionary doctrine of Marx, cleansed of bourgeois opportunist distortions.

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3
INSERTION FOR POLITICAL SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME

To avoid making an incorrect generalisation of transient historical needs the R.C.P. must also explain to the working people that in the Soviet Republic the disfranchisement of a section of the citizens does not mean, as was the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, that a definite category of citizens are disfranchised for life. It applies only to the exploiters, to those who, in violation of the fundamental laws of the socialist Soviet Republic, persist in their efforts to cling to their exploiters' status and to preserve capitalist relations. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, as socialism grows daily stronger and the number of those who are objectively able to remain exploiters or preserve capitalist relations is reduced, the number of disfranchised persons will automatically diminish. Even now the disfranchised persons in Russia constitute barely two or three per cent of the population. On the other hand, in the very near future, the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain circumstances, create a situation where the proletarian state will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce unrestricted universal suffrage.

4
FRAGMENT OF THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME

The Soviet Constitution ensures the working people immeasurably larger opportunities than are provided by bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism to *elect and recall* deputies in a way that is most easy and accessible for workers and peasants; it also eliminates the negative aspects of parliamentarism which have been evident since the Paris Commune, particularly the division of *legislative and executive* power, the alienation of parliament from the masses, and so forth.

The Soviet Constitution also brings the machinery of state closer to the masses by making the electoral constituency and the basic unit of the state not territorial but industrial units (the factory, etc.).

The closer contact between the machinery of state and the masses under the Soviet system makes it possible to create...[20]

5
SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME ON NATIONAL RELATIONS

On the national question, the policy of the proletariat which has captured political power—unlike that of the bourgeois-democratic formal proclamation of equality of nations, which is impossible under imperialism—is persistently to bring about the real rapprochement and amalgamation of the workers and peasants of all nations in their revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. To achieve this object, the colonial and other nations which are oppressed, or whose rights are restricted, must be completely liberated and granted the right to secede as a guarantee that the sentiment inherited from capitalism, the distrust of the working people of the various nations and the wrath which the workers of the oppressed nations feel towards the workers of the oppressor nations, will be fully dispelled and replaced by a conscious and voluntary alliance. The workers of those nations which under capitalism were oppressor nations must take exceptional care not to hurt the national sentiments of the oppressed nations (for example, the attitude of the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Poles towards the Jews, the attitude of the Tatars towards the Bashkirs, and so forth) and must not only promote the actual equality, but also the development of the language and literature of the working people of the formerly oppressed nations so as to remove all traces of distrust and alienation inherited from the epoch of capitalism.

6

INSERTION FOR THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE PROGRAMME SECTION ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

On the question of who expresses the will of the nation on the matter of secession, the R.C.P. upholds the historical class view and takes into consideration the level of historical development of the nation concerned—on the way from the Middle Ages to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois to Soviet or proletarian democracy, etc. In any case, on the part of...[21]

7
PREAMBLE TO THE MILITARY SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME

The state of affairs in the sphere of the military tasks and military activities of the Soviet Republic under the dictatorship of the proletariat is as follows.

As our Party long ago foresaw, the imperialist war could not end even with the simple conclusion of a durable peace between the bourgeois governments, let alone with a just peace. This petty-bourgeois illusion entertained by democrats, socialists and Social-Democrats has been fully dispelled by the course of events. The imperialist war inevitably had to be transformed, and is being transformed before our very eyes, into the civil war of the exploited working people, headed by the proletariat, against the exploiters, against the bourgeoisie.

The resistance of the exploiters, which grows simultaneously with the intensification of the onslaught of the proletariat, and is particularly intensified by the victory of the proletariat in individual countries, and the international solidarity and organisation of the bourgeoisie inevitably cause the combination of civil war in individual countries and revolutionary wars between the proletarian countries and bourgeois countries fighting to retain the rule of capital. In view of the class character of such wars, the distinction drawn between defensive and offensive wars becomes utterly meaningless.

By and large, this development of international civil war, a process which has been taking place with exceptional rapidity before our very eyes since the end of 1918 is the legitimate product of the class struggle under capitalism

and a legitimate step towards the victory of the international proletarian revolution.

For this reason, the R.C.P. emphatically rejects the hope of disarmament under capitalism as the reactionary philistine illusion of petty-bourgeois democrats, even though they call themselves socialists and Social-Democrats, and in opposition to this and all similar slogans which actually play into the hands of the bourgeoisie, it advances the slogan of arming the proletariat and disarming the bourgeoisie, the slogan of completely and ruthlessly suppressing the resistance of the exploiters, the slogan of fighting until victory over the bourgeoisie of the whole world is achieved both in civil wars at home and in international revolutionary wars.

The practical experience of more than a year's military activity and of the formation of a proletarian revolutionary army after the incredible weariness and exhaustion of the entire mass of working people as a result of the war, has led the R.C.P. to the following main conclusions:

8

FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME ON THE COURTS

On the road to communism through the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Communist Party, rejecting democratic slogans, completely abolishes also such organs of bourgeois rule as the old courts, and replaces them by the class courts of the workers and peasants. After taking all power into its hands, the proletariat puts forward, instead of the old vague formula, "Election of judges by the people", the class slogan, "Election of judges from the working people by none but the working people", and carries it into practice throughout the judicial system. In the election of judges from none but workers and peasants who do not employ wage-labour for profit, the Communist Party makes no distinction with regard to women but allows the two sexes completely equal rights both in electing judges and in exercising judicial functions. Having repealed the laws of the deposed governments, the Party gives the judges elected by Soviet electors the slogan: enforce the will of the proletariat, apply its decrees, and in the absence of a suitable decree, or if the relevant decree is inadequate, take guidance from your socialist sense of justice, ignoring the laws of the deposed governments.

9
SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME DEALING WITH PUBLIC EDUCATION

In the sphere of public education, the object of the R.C.P. is to complete the work that began with the October Revolution in 1917 to convert the school from an instrument of the class rule of the bourgeoisie into an instrument for the overthrow of that rule and for the complete abolition of the division of society into classes. The schools must become an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., a vehicle not merely of the general principles of communism but also of the ideological, organisational and educational influence of the proletariat on the semi-proletarian and non-proletarian sections of the working people with the object of completely suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and of building the communist system. The immediate tasks in this field are, for the present, the following:

(1) the further development of the initiative of the workers and working peasants in the sphere of education with the all-round assistance of the Soviet government;

(2) securing complete command not only over a section, or the majority, of the school-teachers, as is the case at present, but over all school-teachers by weeding out the incorrigible bourgeois counter-revolutionary elements and securing the conscientious application of communist principles; (policy)

(3) the implementation of free, obligatory general and polytechnical education (acquaintance with all the main branches of production theoretically and in practice) for all children of both sexes up to the age of 16;

(4) the closest connection between schooling and productive social labour of the child;

(5) the provision of food, clothing, books and other teaching aids for all school children at the expense of the state;

(6) the working people must be drawn into active participation in the work of public education (the development of the public education councils, mobilisation of the educated, etc.);

or *ad* 2) (7) to secure the closest contact between schoolteachers and the agitation and propaganda machinery of the R.C.P.

10
SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME DEALING WITH RELIGION

As regards religion, the policy of the R.C.P. is not to be confined to decreeing the separation of the church from the state and the school from the church, that is, to measures promised by bourgeois democrats but never fully carried out anywhere in the world because of the many and varied connections actually existing between capital and religious propaganda.

The Party's object is to completely destroy the connection between the exploiting classes and organised religious propaganda and really liberate the working people from religious prejudices. For this purpose it must organise the most widespread scientific education and anti-religious propaganda. It is necessary, however, to take care to avoid hurting the religious sentiments of believers, for this only serves to increase religious fanaticism.

11
POINTS FROM THE ECONOMIC SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME

The Russian Communist Party, developing the general tasks of the Soviet government in greater detail, at present formulates them as follows.

In the Economic Sphere

The present tasks of Soviet power are:

(1) to continue steadily and finish the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the conversion of the means of production and distribution into the property of the Soviet Republic, i.e., the common property of all working people, which has in the main been completed.

(2) To pay particularly great attention to the development and strengthening of comradely discipline among the working people and to stimulate their initiative and sense of responsibility in every field. This is the most important if not the sole means of completely overcoming capitalism and the habits formed by the rule of the private ownership of the means of production. This aim can be achieved only by slow, persistent work to re-educate the masses; this re-education has not only become possible now that the masses have seen that the landowner, capitalist and merchant have really been eliminated, but is actually taking place in thousands of ways through the practical experience of the workers and peasants themselves. It is extremely important in this respect to work for the further organisation of the working people in trade unions; never before has this organisation developed as rapidly anywhere in the

world as under Soviet power, and it must be developed until literally all working people are organised in properly constituted, centralised and disciplined trade unions.

8.[22] This same task of developing the productive forces calls for the immediate, extensive and comprehensive employment in science and technology of the specialists who have been left us as our heritage by capitalism, although, as a rule, they are imbued with a bourgeois world outlook and habits. The Party, in close alliance with the trade union organisations, must continue its former line—on the one hand, there must not be the slightest political concession to this bourgeois section of the population, and any counter-revolutionary attempts on its part must be ruthlessly suppressed, and, on the other hand, there must be a relentless struggle against the pseudo-radical but actually ignorant and conceited opinion that the working people are capable of overcoming capitalism and the bourgeois social system without learning from bourgeois specialists, without making use of their services and without undergoing the training of a lengthy period of work side by side with them.

Although the ultimate aim of the Soviet government is to achieve full communism and equal remuneration for all kinds of work, it cannot, however, introduce this equality straightaway, at the present time, when only the first steps of the transition from capitalism to communism are being taken. For a certain period of time, therefore, we must retain the present higher remuneration for specialists in order to give them an incentive to work no worse, and even better, than they have worked before; and with the same object in view, we must not reject the system of paying bonuses for the most successful work, particularly organisational work.

It is equally necessary to surround the bourgeois specialist with a comradely atmosphere created by working hand in hand with the masses of rank-and-file workers led by politically-conscious Communists in order to promote mutual understanding and friendship between workers by hand and brain whom capitalism kept apart.

The mobilisation of the entire able-bodied population by the Soviet government, with the trade unions participating,

for certain public works must be much more widely and systematically practised than has hitherto been the case.

In the sphere of distribution, the present task of Soviet power is to continue steadily replacing trade by the planned, organised and nation-wide distribution of goods. The goal is the organisation of the entire population in a single system of consumers' communes that can distribute all essential products most rapidly, systematically, economically and with the least expenditure of labour by strictly centralising the entire distribution machinery.

To achieve this object it is particularly important in the present period, when there are transitional forms based on different principles, for the Soviet food supply organisation to make use of the co-operative societies, the only mass apparatus for systematic distribution inherited from capitalism.

Being of the opinion that in principle the only correct policy is the further communist development of this apparatus and not its rejection, the R.C.P. must systematically pursue the policy of making it obligatory for all members of the Party to work in the co-operatives and, with the aid of the trade unions, direct them in a communist spirit, develop the initiative and discipline of the working people who belong to them, endeavour to get the entire population to join them, and the co-operatives themselves to merge into one single co-operative that embraces the whole of the Soviet Republic. Lastly, and most important, the dominating influence of the proletariat over the rest of the working people must be constantly maintained, and everywhere the most varied measures must be tried with a view to facilitating and bringing about the transition from petty-bourgeois co-operatives of the old capitalist type to consumers' communes led by proletarians and semi-proletarians.

(6) It is impossible to abolish money at one stroke in the first period of transition from capitalism to communism. As a consequence, the bourgeois elements of the population continue to use privately-owned currency notes—these tokens by which the exploiters obtain the right to receive public wealth—for the purpose of speculation, profit-making and robbing the working population. The nationalisation

of the banks is insufficient in itself to combat this survival of bourgeois robbery. The R.C.P. will strive as speedily as possible to introduce the most radical measures to pave the way for the abolition of money, first and foremost to replace it by savings-bank books, cheques, short-term notes entitling the holders to receive goods from the public stores, and so forth, to make it compulsory for money to be deposited in the banks, etc. Practical experience in paving the way for, and carrying out, these and similar measures will show which of them are the most expedient.

(7) In the sphere of finance, the R.C.P. will introduce a graduated income-and-property tax in all cases where it is feasible. But these cases cannot be numerous since private property in land, the majority of factories and other enterprises has been abolished. In the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the state ownership of the principal means of production, the state finances must be based on the direct appropriation of a certain part of the revenue from the different state monopolies to meet the needs of the state. Revenue and expenditure can be balanced only if the exchange of commodities is properly organised, and this will be achieved by the organisation of consumers' communes and the restoration of the transport system, which is one of the major immediate objects of the Soviet government.

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(46) Советская власть, осуществляя новую фазу частной собственности на землю, перешла к проведению в жизнь целого ряда мер, направленных на организацию крупного социалистического земледелия. Значительнейшими из этих мер являются государственные совхозы т.е. крупные социалистические экономии, получение с.-х. коммун т.е. добровольных союзов земледельцев для ведения крупного общего хозяйства, и артелей, а равно товариществ для общественной обработки земли; организация государственных посевов для засева всех, свободных от чьего-нибудь пользования, неиспользованных земель; подчинение (использование всех агрономических сил для практических мер по повышению с.-х. культуры и т.д.

Разъясняя всем этим мерам как средствам путь к абсолютно необходимому повышению производительности земледельческого труда, РКП стремится к возможно более полному проведению в жизнь этих мер, к их распространению на всю территорию страны, и к дальнейшим шагам в этом направлении.

В виду того, что противоположность городом и деревней является одной из самых глубоких основ капиталистической - культурной природы деревни, а в эпоху строительства глубокого социализма, как показали, строительство города так и деревни идет непосредственно опасность вырождения и гибели, РКП видит в устранении этой противоположности одну из коренных задач коммунистического строительства и наряду с большинством мер

First page of Lenin's manuscript "Agrarian Section of the Programme". 1919

Reduced

12
AGRARIAN SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME

Soviet power, having completely abolished private property in land, has already started on the implementation of a whole series of measures aimed at the organisation of large-scale socialist agriculture. The most important of these measures are the organisation of state farms (i.e., large socialist farms), the encouragement of agricultural communes (i.e., voluntary associations of tillers of the land for large-scale farming in common), and societies and co-operatives for the collective cultivation of the land; cultivation by the state of all uncultivated lands, no matter whom they belong to; mobilisation by the state of all agricultural specialists for vigorous measures to raise farming efficiency, etc.

Regarding all these measures as the only way to raise the productivity of agricultural labour, which is absolutely imperative, the R.C.P. seeks to carry them out as fully as possible, to extend them to the more backward regions of the country, and to take further steps in this direction.

Inasmuch as the antithesis between town and country is one of the root causes of the economic and cultural backwardness of the countryside, one which in a period of so deep a crisis as the present confronts both town and country with the direct threat of ruin and collapse, the R.C.P. regards the eradication of this antithesis as one of the basic tasks of building communism and, alongside the above measures, considers it necessary extensively and systematically to enlist industrial workers for the communist development of agriculture, to promote the activities of the nation-wide Working Committee of Assistance set up by the Soviet government with this aim in view, and so on.

In all its work in the countryside the R.C.P. will continue to rely on the proletarian and semi-proletarian sections of the rural population, first organising them into an independent force, setting up Poor Peasants' Committees, Party cells in the villages, a specific type of trade union for rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, etc., exerting every effort to bring them closer to the urban proletariat and wresting them from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and petty-property interests.

As far as the kulaks, the rural bourgeoisie, are concerned, the policy of the R.C.P. is one of decisive struggle against their attempts at exploitation and the suppression of their resistance to Soviet, communist, policy.

With regard to the middle peasants, the policy of the R.C.P. is to draw them into the work of socialist construction gradually and systematically. The Party sets itself the task of separating them from the kulaks, of winning them to the side of the working class by carefully attending to their needs, by combating their backwardness with ideological weapons and not with measures of suppression, and by striving in all cases where their vital interests are concerned to come to practical agreements with them, making concessions to them in determining the methods of carrying out socialist reforms.

EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[23]

MARCH 18-23, 1919

Published in *Pravda*,
March-April 1919

Published according to the
book *Eighth Congress of the
Russian Communist Party
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1
SPEECH OPENING THE CONGRESS
MARCH 18

Comrades, our first words at this Congress must be dedicated to Comrade Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov. Comrades, as many people said at his funeral today, Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov was, for the Party as a whole and for the entire Soviet Republic, the principal organiser, but he was much more valuable for our Party Congress and much closer to it. We have lost a comrade who devoted his last days entirely to this Congress. His absence will affect the whole course of our proceedings, and this Congress will feel it with exceptional acuteness. Comrades, I propose that we honour his memory by rising. (*All rise.*)

Comrades, we are opening our Party Congress at a very difficult, complicated and peculiar stage in the Russian and in the world proletarian revolution. In the first period after the October Revolution the forces of the Party and of the Soviet government were almost entirely absorbed by the tasks of direct defence, of offering direct resistance to our enemies, the bourgeoisie at home and abroad, who could not reconcile themselves to the idea that the socialist republic could exist for any length of time. We nevertheless gradually began to consolidate our position and the tasks of construction, organisational tasks, began to come to the fore. I think that this work of construction and organisation should be the keynote of our Congress. The programme problems which, from the standpoint of theory present a big difficulty and are in the main problems of our development, and those that have a special place on the Congress agenda—the organisational question, the question of the Red Army and, particularly, the question of work in the countryside—all require us to focus and concentrate our attention on the

main question, which is a very difficult but gratifying one for socialists to grapple with, namely, the question of organisation. It must be particularly emphasised here that one of the most difficult problems of communist development, in a country of small peasant farms, one that we must deal with right now, is *the problem of our attitude towards the middle peasants*.

Comrades, it was natural that in the first period, when we had to fight for the Soviet Republic's right to existence, this question should not have been pushed into the foreground on an extensive scale. The relentless war against the rural bourgeoisie and the kulaks gave prominence to the organisation of the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat. But by its next step the Party, which wants to lay the sound foundations of communist society, must take up the task of correctly defining our attitude towards the middle peasants. This is a problem of a higher order. We could not present it on an extensive scale until we had made secure the basis for the existence of the Soviet Republic. This problem is a more complicated one and it involves defining our attitude towards a numerous and strong section of the population. This attitude cannot be defined simply by the answer—struggle or support. As regards the bourgeoisie our task is defined by the words "struggle", "suppression", and as regards the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat our task is defined by the words "our support", but this problem is undoubtedly more complicated. On this point, the socialists, the best representatives of socialism in the old days, when they still believed in the revolution and faithfully adhered to its theory and ideals, talked about *neutralising the peasantry*, i.e., making the middle peasants a social stratum which, if it did not actively help the proletarian revolution, at least would not hinder it, that would remain neutral and not go over to the side of our enemies. This abstract, theoretical formulation of the problem is quite clear but is inadequate. We have reached the stage of socialist development when we must draw up definite and detailed rules and regulations which have been tested by practical experience in the rural districts to guide us in our efforts to place our relations with the middle peasants *on the basis of a firm alliance* and so preclude the pos-

sibility of a repetition of those mistakes and blunders we have repeatedly, made in the past. These blunders estranged the middle peasants from us, although we of the Communist Party, the leading party, were the first who helped the Russian peasants to throw off the yoke of the landowners and establish real democracy, which gave us every ground for counting on their complete confidence. This is not the type of problem that calls for ruthless, swift suppression and attack, it is more complicated. But I shall allow myself to say confidently that after our twelve months of preliminary work we shall be able to cope with this problem.

A few words about our international situation. Comrades, you are all, of course, aware that the founding of the Third, Communist International in Moscow is an event of the greatest significance insofar as our position in the world is concerned. We still have confronting us a vast, real and well-armed military force—all the strongest powers of the world. Nevertheless, we can confidently say to ourselves that what outwardly seems to be a gigantic force, and which physically is immeasurably stronger than we are, has been shaken. It is no longer a force. It no longer has its former stability. Therefore there is nothing utopian in our aim and in the task we set ourselves—to be victorious in the struggle against this giant. On the contrary, although we are now artificially cut off from the whole world, the newspapers every day report the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries. Moreover, we know, we see, that this growing movement is assuming the Soviet form. And this is a guarantee that in establishing the Soviet government we discovered the *international*, *world form of the dictatorship of the proletariat*. We are firmly convinced that the proletariat all over the world has taken this path of struggle, the creation of these forms of proletarian rule, the rule of the workers and of the working people in general, and that no power on earth can halt the progress of the world communist revolution towards the world Soviet republic. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Comrades, permit me now on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to declare the Eighth Congress open and proceed to the election of the presidium.

2
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MARCH 18

(*Stormy prolonged applause. Cries of* "Long live Ilyich!" "Long live Comrade Lenin!")

Comrades, permit me to begin with the political report of the Central Committee. To present a report on the Central Committee's political activities since the last Congress is tantamount to presenting a report on the whole of our revolution; and I think that everybody will agree that not only is it impossible for one individual to perform such a task in so short a time, but that it is, in general, beyond the powers of one individual. I have therefore decided to confine myself to those points which, in my opinion, are particularly important in the history of what our Party was called upon to do during this period and in the light of our present tasks. I must say that at a time like this I find it beyond my powers to devote myself exclusively to history, to reviewing the past without bearing in mind the present and the future.

To begin with foreign policy, it goes without saying that the outstanding features here were our relations with German imperialism and the Brest peace. I think it is worth while dwelling on this question, because its importance is not merely historical. I think that the proposal the Soviet government made to the Allied powers, or, to put it more correctly, our government's consent to the well-known proposal for a conference to be held on Princes Islands[24]—I think that this proposal, and our reply, reflect, in some respects, and in important respects at that, the relations with imperialism that we established at the time of the

Brest peace. That is why I think it important to deal with the history of this matter in view of the rapidity with which events are occurring.

When the Brest peace was decided on, the Soviet system and even Party development were still in the initial stages. You know that at that time our Party as a whole still possessed too little experience to determine, even approximately, how fast we should travel the path we had chosen. The chaotic conditions that, as you know, we had to take over from the past made it extremely difficult at that time to survey events and obtain an exact picture of what was going on. Moreover, our extreme isolation from Western Europe and all other countries deprived us of the objective material necessary to assess the possible rapidity or the ways in which the proletarian revolution in the West would develop. This complex situation made the question of the Brest peace a matter of no little dissension in the ranks of our Party.

But events have proved that this enforced retreat before German imperialism, which had taken cover behind an extremely oppressive, outrageous and predatory peace, was the only correct move in the relations between the young socialist republic and world imperialism (one half of world imperialism). At that time we, who had just overthrown the landowners and the bourgeoisie in Russia, had absolutely no choice but to retreat before the forces of world imperialism. Those who condemned this retreat from the point of view of a revolutionary were actually supporting a fundamentally wrong and non-Marxist position. They had forgotten the conditions, the long and strenuous process of development of the Kerensky period, and the enormous preparatory work done in the Soviets before we reached the stage when, in October, after the severe July defeats, after the Kornilov revolt, the vast mass of working people was at last ready and determined to overthrow the bourgeoisie, and when the organised material forces necessary for this purpose had become available. Naturally, anything like this was then out of the question on an international scale. In view of this, the fight against world imperialism had this aim—to continue the work of disintegrating imperialism and of enlightening and uniting the working class,

which had everywhere begun to stir, but whose actions have still not become completely definite.

Hence, the only correct policy was the one we adopted in respect of the Brest peace, although, of course, at the time, that policy intensified the enmity of a number of petty-bourgeois elements, who are not by any means necessarily hostile to socialism under all conditions, or in all countries. In this respect history offered us a lesson which we must learn thoroughly, for there can be no doubt that we shall often be called upon to apply it. This lesson is that the attitude the party of the proletariat should adopt towards the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, towards those elements, strata, groups and classes which are particularly strong and numerous in Russia, and which exist in all countries, constitutes an extremely complex and difficult problem. Petty-bourgeois elements vacillate between the old society and the new. They cannot be the motive force of either the old society, or the new. On the other hand, they are not bound to the old society to the same degree as the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Patriotism is a sentiment bound up with the economic conditions of life of precisely the small proprietors. The bourgeoisie is more international than the small proprietors. We came up against this fact during the period of the Brest peace, when the Soviet government set a higher value on the world dictatorship of the proletariat and the world revolution than on all national sacrifices, burdensome as they were. This compelled us to enter into a violent and ruthless clash with the petty-bourgeois elements. At that time a number of those elements joined forces with the bourgeoisie and the landowners against us, although, subsequently, they began to waver.

The question that several comrades have raised here as to our attitude towards the petty-bourgeois parties is dealt with extensively in our programme and will, in fact, crop up in the discussion of every point of the agenda. In the course of our revolution this question has ceased to be an abstract and general one, and has become concrete. At the time of the Brest peace our duty as internationalists was at all costs to help the proletarian elements to strengthen and consolidate their positions and this drove the petty-

bourgeois parties away from us. After the German revolution, as we know, the petty-bourgeois elements again began to vacillate. Those events opened the eyes of many who, as the proletarian revolution was maturing, had assessed the situation from the point of view of the old type of patriotism, and had assessed it not only in a non-socialist way, but, in general, incorrectly. At the present time, owing to the difficult food situation and the war which we are still waging against the Entente, a wave of vacillation is again sweeping through the petty-bourgeois democrats. We have been obliged to reckon with these vacillations before; but now we must all learn a tremendously important lesson, namely, that situations never repeat themselves in exactly the same form. The new situation is far more complex. It can be properly assessed, and our policy will be correct, if we draw on the experience of the Brest peace. When we consented to the proposal for a conference on Princes Islands we knew that we were consenting to an extremely harsh peace. On the other hand, however, we now know better how the tide of proletarian revolution is rising in Western Europe, how unrest is changing into conscious discontent, and how the latter is giving rise to a world, Soviet, proletarian movement. At that time we were groping, guessing when the revolution in Europe might break out—we presumed, on the basis of our theoretical conviction, that the revolution must take place—but today we have a number of facts showing how the revolution is maturing in other countries and how the movement began. That is why, in relation to Western Europe, in relation to the Entente countries, we have, or shall have, to repeat a good deal of what we did at the time of the Brest peace. It will be much easier for us to do this now that we have the experience of Brest. When our Central Committee discussed the question of participating in a conference on Princes Islands together with the Whites—which in fact amounted to the annexation of all the territory the Whites then occupied—this question of an armistice did not evoke a single voice of protest among the proletariat; and that also was the attitude of our Party. At any rate, I did not hear of any dissatisfaction, or indignation, from any quarter. The reason for this was that our lesson in international politics had borne fruit.

Insofar as concerns the petty-bourgeois elements, the problem facing the Party has not yet been fully solved. On a number of questions, in fact on all the questions on the agenda, we have, during the past year, laid the foundation for a correct solution of this problem, particularly in relation to the middle peasants. In theory we agree that the middle peasants are not our enemies, that they need special treatment, and that in their case the situations will vary in accordance with numerous circumstances attending the revolution, in particular, the answer to the question "For or against patriotism?" For us such questions are of second-rate importance, even of third-rate importance; but the petty bourgeoisie is completely blinded by them. Furthermore, all these elements waver in the struggle and become absolutely spineless. They do not know what they want, and are incapable of defending their position. Here we need extremely flexible and extremely cautious tactics, for sometimes it is necessary to give with one hand and take away with the other. The petty-bourgeois elements and not we are to blame for this, for they cannot make up their minds. We can see this in practice now. Only today we read in the newspapers what the German Independents,[25] who possess such strong forces as Kautsky and Hilferding, have set out to attain. You know that they wanted to incorporate the workers' councils in the constitution of the German democratic republic, i.e., marry the Constituent Assembly to the dictatorship of the proletariat. From our point of view this is such a mockery of common sense in our revolution, the German Revolution, the Hungarian revolution and the maturing Polish revolution, that we can only express our amazement. It must be said that such vacillating elements are to be found in the most advanced countries. Educated, well-informed, intelligent people, even in such an advanced capitalist country as Germany, are sometimes a hundred times more muddle-headed and hysterical than our backward petty bourgeoisie. In this there is a lesson for Russia in respect of the petty-bourgeois parties and the middle peasants. For a long time we shall have a difficult, double problem. For a long time these parties are bound to take one step forward and two steps back because their economic status compels them to do so, and

because their acceptance of socialism is not due to a definite conviction that the bourgeois system is worthless. We cannot expect them to be loyal to socialism, and it would be absurd to rely on their socialist convictions. They will support socialism only when they are convinced that there is no other way out, when the bourgeoisie is finally defeated and smashed.

I am unable to give you a systematic summary of the experience of the past year and have glanced at the past only in the light of what is required for our policy tomorrow and the day after. The chief lesson is that we must be extremely cautious in our attitude towards the middle peasants and the petty bourgeoisie., The experience of the past demands it, we know it from the experience of Brest. We shall have to change our line of conduct very often, and this may appear strange and incomprehensible to the casual observer. "How is that?" he will say. "Yesterday you were making promises to the petty bourgeoisie, while today Dzerzhinsky announces that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks will be stood against the wall. What a contradiction!" Yes, it is a contradiction. But the conduct of the petty-bourgeois democrats themselves is contradictory: they do not know where to sit, and try to sit between two stools, jump from one to the other and fall now to the right and how to the left. We have changed our tactics towards them, and whenever they turn towards us we say "Welcome" to them. We have not the slightest intention of expropriating the middle peasants; we certainly do not want to use force against the petty-bourgeois democrats. We say to them, "You are not a serious enemy. Our enemy is the bourgeoisie. But if you join forces with them, we shall be obliged to apply the measures of the proletarian dictatorship to you, too."

I shall now deal with questions of internal development, briefly touch on the main features which characterise our political experience and sum up the political activities of the Central Committee during this period. These political activities of the Central Committee manifested themselves daily in questions of immense importance. Were it not for the fact that we worked together so well and so harmoniously, as I have already told you, we would not have been able to act

as we did, we would not have been able to solve these urgent problems. As to the question of the Red Army, which is now rousing so much discussion, and which stands as a special item on the agenda of this Congress, we adopted a host of minor, individual decisions which the Central Committee of our Party submitted to and got carried in the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. A still larger number of important individual assignments were made by the respective People's Commissars, all of which systematically and consistently pursued one common line.

The organisation of a Red Army was an entirely new question which had never been dealt with before, even theoretically. Marx once said that it is to the credit of the Paris Communards that they carried into effect decisions which were not borrowed from some preconceived theories, but were dictated by actual necessity.[26] Marx said this about the Communards in a somewhat ironical vein because there were two predominant trends in the Commune—the Blanquists and the Proudhonists—and both were compelled to act contrary to their doctrines. We, however, acted in conformity with the tenets of Marxism. At the same time, the political activities of the Central Committee in each concrete case were determined entirely by what was absolutely indispensable. We were often obliged to feel our way. This will be strongly emphasised by any historian capable of presenting an integrated picture of the activities of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Soviet government during the past year. This fact becomes all the more striking when we try to embrace our past experience in a single glance. But this did not deter us in the least even on October 10, 1917, when the question of seizing power was decided. We did not doubt that we should have to experiment, as Comrade Trotsky expressed it. We undertook a task which nobody in the world has ever attempted on so large a scale.

This is also true of the Red Army. When the war drew to a close the army began to break up, and many people thought at the time that this was a purely Russian phenomenon. But we see that the Russian revolution was in fact the dress rehearsal, or one of the rehearsals, for the world proletarian revolution. When we discussed the Treaty of Brest,

when the question of peace arose early in January 1918, we did not yet know when, and in which other countries, armies would begin to disintegrate. We proceeded from experiment to experiment; we endeavoured to create a volunteer army, feeling our way, testing the ground and experimenting to find a solution to the problem in the given situation. And the nature of the problem was clear. Unless we defended the socialist republic by force of arms, we could not exist. A ruling class would never surrender its power to an oppressed class. And the latter would have to prove in practice that it is capable not only of overthrowing the exploiters, but also of organising its self-defence and of staking everything on it. We have always said that there are different kinds of wars. We condemned the *imperialist* war, but we did not reject *war in general*. Those who accused us of being militarists were hopelessly muddled. And when in the report of the Berne Conference of yellow socialists I read that Kautsky had said that the Bolsheviks had introduced not socialism but militarism, I smiled and shrugged my shoulders. As if there was ever a big revolution in history that was not connected with war! Of course not! We are living not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes there will have to be a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states. If the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold power, it must, therefore, prove its ability to do so by its military organisation. How was a class which had hitherto served as cannon-fodder for the military commanders of the ruling imperialist class to create its own commanders? How was it to solve the problem of combining the enthusiasm, the new revolutionary creative spirit of the oppressed and the employment of the store of the bourgeois science and technology of militarism in their worst forms without which this class would not be able to master modern technology and modern methods of warfare?

Here we were faced with a problem which a year's experience has now summed up for us. When we included the question of bourgeois specialists in the revolutionary pro-

gramme of our Party, we summed up the Party's practical experience in one of the most important questions. As far as I remember the earlier teachers of socialism, who foresaw a great deal of what would take place in the future socialist revolution and discerned many of its features, never expressed an opinion on this question. It did not exist for them, for it arose only when we proceeded to create a Red Army. That meant creating an army filled with enthusiasm out of an oppressed class which had been used as mere cannon-fodder, and it meant compelling that army to utilise all that was most coercive and abhorrent in what we had inherited from capitalism.

This contradiction, with which we are faced in connection with the Red Army, faces us in every organisational field. Take the question which engaged our attention most of all, namely, the transition from workers' control to workers' management in industry. Following the decrees and decisions passed by the Council of People's Commissars and local Soviet authorities—all of which contributed to our political experience in this field—actually the only thing left for the Central Committee to do was to sum up. In a matter like this it was scarcely able to give a lead in the true sense of the word. One has only to recall how clumsy, immature and casual were our first decrees and decisions on the subject of workers' control of industry. We thought that it was an easy matter; practice showed that it was necessary to build, but we gave no answer whatever to the question as to *how* to build. Every nationalised factory, every branch of nationalised industry, transport, and particularly railway transport—that most striking example of highly centralised capitalist machinery built on the basis of large-scale engineering, and most vital for the state—all embodied the concentrated experience of capitalism, and created immense difficulties for us.

We are still far from having overcome these difficulties. At first we regarded them in an entirely abstract way, like revolutionary preachers, who had absolutely no idea of how to set to work. There were lots of people, of course, who accused us—and all the socialists and Social-Democrats are accusing us today—of having undertaken this task without knowing how to finish it. But these accusations

are ridiculous, made by people who lack the spark of life. As if one can set out to make a great revolution and know beforehand how it is to be completed! Such knowledge cannot be derived from books and our decision could spring only from the experience of the masses. And I say that it is to our credit that amidst incredible difficulties we undertook to solve a problem with which until then we were only half familiar, that we inspired the proletarian masses to display their own initiative, that we nationalised the industrial enterprises, and so forth. I remember that in Smolny we passed as many as ten or twelve decrees at one sitting. That was an expression of our determination and desire to stimulate the spirit of experiment and initiative among the proletarian masses. We now have experience. Now; we have passed, or are about to pass, from workers' control to workers' management of industry. Instead of being absolutely helpless as we were before, we are now armed with experience, and as far as this is possible, we have summed it up in our programme. We shall have to discuss this in detail when we deal with the question of organisation. We would not have been able to do this work had we not had the assistance and collaboration of the comrades from the trade unions.

In Western Europe the situation is different. There our comrades regard the trade unions as an evil, because they are commanded so completely by yellow representatives of the old type of socialism that the Communists do not see that much advantage is to be gained from their support. Many West-European Communists; even Rosa Luxemburg, are advocating the dissolution of the trade unions.[27] That shows how much more difficult this problem is in Western Europe. In this country we could not have held out for a single month had it not been for the support of the trade unions. In this we have the experience of a vast amount of practical work, which enables us to set to work to solve extremely difficult problems.

Take the question of the specialists which faces us at every turn, which arises in connection with every appointment, and which the leaders of our economy, and the Central Committee of the Party, are continually having to face. Under existing conditions the Central Committee of the

Party cannot perform its functions if it adheres to hard and fast forms. If we could not appoint comrades able to work independently in their particular fields, we should be unable to function at all. It was only thanks to the fact that we had organisers like Yakov Sverdlov that we were able to work under war conditions without a single conflict worth noting. And in this work we were obliged to accept the assistance offered us by people who possessed knowledge acquired in the past.

In particular, take the administration of the War Department. We could not have solved that problem had we not trusted the General Staff and the big specialists in organisation. There were differences of opinion among us on particular questions, but fundamentally, there was no room for doubt. We availed ourselves of the assistance of bourgeois experts who were thoroughly imbued with the bourgeois mentality, who were disloyal to us, and will remain disloyal to us for many years to come. Nevertheless, the idea that we can build communism with the aid of pure Communists, without the assistance of bourgeois experts, is childish. We have been steeled in the struggle, we have the forces, and we are united; and we must proceed with our organisational work, making use of the knowledge and experience of those experts. This is an indispensable condition, without which socialism cannot be built. Socialism cannot be built unless we utilise the heritage of capitalist culture. The only material we have to build communism with is what has been left us by capitalism.

We must now build in a practical way, and we have to build communist society with the aid of our enemies. This looks like a contradiction, an irreconcilable contradiction, perhaps. As a matter of fact, this is the only way the problem of building communism can be solved. And reviewing our experience, glancing at the way this problem confronts us every day, surveying the practical activities of the Central Committee, it seems to me that, in the main, our Party has found a solution to this problem. We have encountered immense difficulties, but this was the only way the problem could be solved. The bourgeois experts must be hemmed in by our organised, constructive and united activities so that they will be compelled to fall in line with the proletar-

iat, no matter how much they resist and fight at every step. We must set them to work as a technical and cultural force so as to preserve them and to transform an uncultured and barbarian capitalist country into a cultured, communist country. And it seems to me that during the past year we have learned how to build, that we have taken the right road, and shall not now be diverted from this road.

I should also like to deal briefly with the food question and the question of the countryside. Food has always been our most difficult problem. In a country where the proletariat could only assume power with the aid of the peasantry, where the proletariat had to serve as the agent of a petty-bourgeois revolution, our revolution was largely a bourgeois revolution until the Poor Peasants' Committees were set up, i.e., until the summer and even the autumn of 1918. We are not afraid to admit that. We accomplished the October Revolution so easily because the peasants as a whole supported us and fought the landowners for they saw that as far as they were concerned we would go the limit, because we were giving legal effect to what the Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers had been printing, to that which the cowardly petty bourgeoisie had promised, but could not carry out. But from the moment the Poor Peasants' Committees began to be organised, our revolution became a *proletarian* revolution. We were faced with a problem which even now has not been fully solved, and it is extremely important that we have put it on a practical footing. The Poor Peasants' Committees were a transition stage. The first decree on their organisation was passed by the Soviet government on the recommendation of Comrade Tsyurupa, who at that time was in charge of food affairs. We have to save the non-agricultural population that was tormented by hunger. That could be done only with the aid of Poor Peasants' Committees, which were proletarian organisations. And only when the October Revolution began to spread to the rural districts and was consummated, in the summer of 1918, did we acquire a real proletarian base; only then did our revolution *become a proletarian revolution in fact*, and not merely in our proclamations, promises and declarations.

We have not yet solved the problem that faces our Party of creating the necessary forms of organisation of the rural

proletariat and semi-proletariat. Recently I visited Petrograd and attended the First Congress of Farm Labourers of Petrograd Gubernia.[28] I then saw how we were feeling our way in this matter, but I think that progress will undoubtedly be made. I must say that the principal lesson we learned from our work of political leadership in the past year was that we must find organisational support in this field. We took a step in this direction when we formed the Poor Peasants' Committees, held new elections to the Soviets and revised our food policy, where we had encountered immense difficulties. In those outlying parts of Russia which are now becoming Soviet—the Ukraine and the Don region—this policy may have to be modified. It would be a mistake to draw up stereotyped decrees for all parts of Russia; it would be a mistake for the Bolshevik Communists, the Soviet officials in the Ukraine and the Don, to apply these decrees to other regions wholesale, without discrimination. We shall meet with no few peculiar situations; we shall under no circumstances bind ourselves to uniform patterns; we shall not decide once and for all that our experience, the experience of Central Russia, must be applied in its entirety to every region. We have only just taken up the problems of real development; we are only just taking the first steps in this direction. An immense field of work is opening before us.

I said that the first decisive step the Soviet government took was to create the Poor Peasants' Committees. This measure was carried out by our food supply officials and was dictated by necessity. But in order to complete our tasks we must have something more than temporary organisations like these Committees. Alongside the Soviets we have the trade unions, which we are using as a school for training the backward masses. The top layer of workers who actually administered Russia during the past year, who bore the brunt of the work in carrying out our policy, and who were our mainstay—this layer in Russia is an extremely thin one. We have become convinced of that, we are feeling it. If a future historian ever collects information on the groups which administered Russia during these seventeen months, on how many hundreds, or how many thousands of individuals were engaged in this work and

bore the entire, incredible burden of administering the country—nobody will believe that it was done by so few people. The number was so small because there were so few intelligent, educated and capable political leaders in Russia. This layer was a thin one in Russia, and in the course of the recent struggle it overtaxed its strength, became overworked, did more than its strength allowed. I think that at this Congress we shall devise practical means of utilising ever new forces on a mass scale in industry and—what is more important—in the rural districts, of enlisting in Soviet activities workers and peasants who are on, or even below, the average level. Without their assistance on a mass scale further activities, I think, will be impossible.

Since my time has almost expired, I want to say only a few words about our attitude towards the middle peasants. The attitude we should take towards the middle peasants was, in principle, quite clear to us even before the revolution. The task that faced us was to *neutralise* them. At a meeting in Moscow where the question of our attitude towards petty-bourgeois parties was discussed, I quoted the exact words of Engels, who not only pointed out that the middle peasants were our allies, but also expressed the view that it would be possible, perhaps, to dispense with coercion, with repressive measures even as regards the big peasants.[29] In Russia, this assumption did not prove correct; we were, are, and will be, in a state of open civil war with the kulaks. This is inevitable. We have seen it in practice. But owing to the inexperience of our Soviet officials and to the difficulties of the problem, the blows which were intended for the kulaks very frequently fell on the middle peasants. In this respect we have sinned a great deal, but the experience we have gained will enable us to do everything to avoid this in future. Such is the problem that now faces us not theoretically but practically. You are well aware that the problem is a difficult one. We have no advantages to offer the middle peasant; he is a materialist, a practical man, who demands definite material advantages, which at present we are not in a position to offer and which the country will have to dispense with for, perhaps, many months of a severe struggle that now promises to end in complete victory. But there is a good deal we can do in our

practical administrative work—we can improve our administrative machinery and eliminate a host of abuses. The line of our Party, which has not done enough to form a bloc, an alliance, an agreement with the middle peasants, can and must be corrected.

This, in brief, is all I can say at present about the economic and political work of the Central Committee during the past year. I must now very briefly deal with the second part of the duty entrusted to me by the Central Committee—to make the Central Committee report on organisation. This duty could have been performed in the way it should really be performed only by Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, who had been appointed to make the report on this question on behalf of the Central Committee. His unbelievably phenomenal memory, in which he retained the greater part of his report, and his personal acquaintance with the work of organisation in the various localities would have made it possible for him to deliver this report better than anybody else. I am unable to replace him even in one-hundredth part, for in this work we were obliged to rely, and were absolutely justified in relying, entirely on Comrade Sverdlov, who very often adopted decisions on his own responsibility.

I can give you short excerpts from the written reports now available. The Secretariat of the Central Committee, which was unable to complete its work in time, has most definitely promised that the written reports will be ready for printing next week, that they will be mimeographed and distributed to the Congress delegates. They will supplement the brief, fragmentary remarks which I can make here. In the material of the report available at present in writing, we find, first of all figures relating to the number of incoming documents: 1,483 in December 1918, 1,537 in January 1919 and 1,840 in February. The distribution of these documents in percentages is given, but I will take the liberty of not reading this. Comrades who are interested will see from the report when distributed that, for instance, 490 persons visited the Secretariat in November. And the comrades who handed me the report say it can be only half the number of visitors the Secretariat dealt with, because dozens of delegates were received daily by Comrade Sverdlov,

and more than half of these were probably not Soviet but Party officials.

I must draw attention to the report on the activities of the Federation of Foreign Groups.[30] I know something of the work in this field only insofar as I have been able to cast a glance at the material on the foreign groups. At first there were seven such groups, now there are nine. Comrades living in purely Great-Russian districts, who have not had the opportunity of becoming directly acquainted with these groups and who have not seen the reports in the newspapers, will please read the excerpts from the newspapers, which I shall take the liberty of not reading in full. I must say that here we see the real foundation of what we have done for the Third International. The Third International was founded in Moscow at a short congress, and Comrade Zinoviev will make a detailed report on this and on everything proposed by the Central Committee on all questions concerning the International. The fact that we succeeded in doing so much in so short a time at the congress of Communists in Moscow is due to the tremendous preparatory work that was performed by the Central Committee of our Party and by the organiser of the congress, Comrade Sverdlov. Propaganda and agitation were carried on among foreigners in Russia and a number of foreign groups were organised. Dozens of members of these groups were fully acquainted with the main plans and with the guiding lines of general policy. Hundreds of thousands of war prisoners from armies which the imperialists had created solely in their own interests, upon returning to Hungary, Germany and Austria, thoroughly infected those countries with the germs of Bolshevism. And the fact that groups and parties sympathising with us predominate in those countries is due to work which is not visible on the surface and which is only briefly summed up in the report on the organisational activities of the foreign groups in Russia; it constituted one of the most significant features in the activities of the Russian Communist Party as one of the units of the world communist party.

Further, the material handed to me contains data on the reports received by the Central Committee, and the organisations from which they were received. And here our Russian lack of organisational ability stands out in all

its shameful wretchedness. Reports were received regularly from organisations in four gubernias, irregularly from fourteen, and isolated reports from sixteen. The gubernias in question are enumerated in the list, which permit me not to read. Of course, this lack of organisational ability, these extreme organisational drawbacks, are very largely, but not entirely, to be explained by the conditions of civil war. Least of all should we use this to hide behind, to excuse and defend ourselves. Organisational activity was never a strong point with the Russians in general, nor with the Bolsheviks in particular; nevertheless the chief problem of the proletarian revolution is *that of organisation*. It is not without reason that the question of organisation is here assigned a most prominent place. This is a thing we must fight for, and fight for with firmness and determination, using every means at our disposal. We can do nothing here except by prolonged education and re-education. This is a field in which revolutionary violence and dictatorship can be applied only by way of abuse and I make bold to warn you against such abuse. Revolutionary violence and dictatorship are excellent things when applied in the right way and against the right people. But they cannot be applied in the field of organisation. We have by no means solved this problem of education, re-education and prolonged organisational work, and we must tackle it systematically.

We have here a detailed financial report. Of the various items, the largest is in connection with workers' book publishing and with newspapers: 1,000,000, again 1,000,000 and again 1,000,000—3,000,000; Party organisations, 2,800,000; editorial expenses, 3,600,000. More detailed figures are given in this report, which will be duplicated and distributed to all the delegates. Meanwhile the comrades can get their information from the representatives of the groups. Permit me not to read these figures. The comrades who submitted the reports gave in them what is most important and illustrative—the general results of the propaganda work performed in the sphere of publication. The Kommunist Publishing House released sixty-two books. A net profit of 2,000,000 in 1918 was earned by the newspaper *Pravda*, 25,000,000 copies of which were issued during the year. The newspaper *Bednota*[31] earned a net profit of 2,370,000

and 33,000,000 copies were issued. The comrades of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee have promised to rearrange the detailed figures they possess in such a way as to give at least two comparable criteria. It will then be clear what vast educational work is being performed by the Party, which for the first time in history is using modern large-scale capitalist printing equipment in the interests of the workers and peasants and not in the interests of the bourgeoisie. We have been accused thousands and millions of times of having violated the freedom of the press and of having renounced democracy. Our accusers call it democracy when the capitalists can buy out the press and the rich can use the press in their own interests. We call that plutocracy and not democracy. Everything that bourgeois culture has created for the purpose of deceiving the people and defending the capitalists we have taken from them in order to satisfy the political needs of the workers and peasants. And in this respect we have done more than any socialist party has done in a quarter of a century, or in half a century. Nevertheless, we have done far too little of what has to be done.

The last item in the material handed to me by the Bureau concerns circular letters. Fourteen of these were issued, and the comrades who are not acquainted with them, or who are not sufficiently acquainted with them, are invited to read them. Of course, the Central Committee was far from being as active as it should have been in this respect, but you must bear in mind the conditions under which we worked, when we were obliged to give political instructions on a number of questions every day, and only in exceptional, even rare, cases were we able to do so through the Political Bureau or the plenary meeting of the Central Committee. Under such circumstances it was impossible for us to send out frequent political circulars.

I repeat that we, as the militant organ of a militant party, in time of civil war, cannot work in any other way. If we did, it would be only a half-measure, or a parliament, and in the era of dictatorship questions cannot be settled, nor can the Party, or the Soviet organisations, be directed by parliamentary means. Comrades, now that we have taken over the bourgeois printing-presses and papers the importance of the Central Committee's circular letters is not so great.

We send out in the form of circular letters only such instructions as cannot be published, for in our activities, which were conducted publicly in spite of their vast dimensions, underground work nevertheless remained, still remains, and will remain. We were never afraid of being reproached for our underground methods and secrecy, but on the contrary were proud of them. And when we found ourselves in a situation in which, after overthrowing our bourgeoisie, we were faced with the hostility of the European bourgeoisie, secrecy remained a feature of our activities and underground methods a feature of our work.

With this, comrades, I conclude my report. (*Applause.*)

3
REPORT ON THE PARTY PROGRAMME
MARCH 19

(*Applause.*) Comrades, according to the division of subjects agreed on between Comrade Bukharin and myself, it is my task to explain the point of view of the commission on a number of concrete and most disputed points, or points which interest the Party most at the present time.

I shall begin by dealing briefly with the points which Comrade Bukharin touched on at the end of his report as points of dispute among us in the commission; The first relates to the structure of the preamble to the programme. In my opinion, Comrade Bukharin did not quite correctly explain here the reason the majority on the commission rejected all attempts to draw up the programme in such a way that everything relating to the old capitalism would be deleted. By the way Comrade Bukharin spoke he sometimes seemed to imply that the majority on the commission was apprehensive of what might be said about this, apprehensive that they would be accused of insufficient respect for the past. There can be no doubt that when the position of the majority is presented in this way it seems rather ridiculous. But this is very far from the truth. The majority rejected these attempts because they would be wrong. They would not correspond to the real state of affairs. Pure imperialism, without the fundamental basis of capitalism, has never existed, does not exist anywhere, and never will exist. This is an incorrect generalisation of everything that was said of the syndicates, cartels, trusts and finance capitalism, when finance capitalism was depicted as though it had none of the foundations of the old capitalism under it.

That is wrong. It would be particularly wrong for the era of the imperialist war and for the era following the imperialist war. Engels in his time, in one of his reflections on the future war, wrote that it would involve much more severe devastation than that caused by the Thirty Years' War; that in a large degree mankind would be reduced to savagery, that our artificial apparatus of trade and industry would collapse.[32] At the beginning of the war the traitor-socialists and opportunists boasted of the tenacity of capitalism and derided the "fanatics or semi-anarchists", as they called us. "Look," they said, "these predictions have not come true. Events have shown that they were true only of a very small number of countries and for a very short period of time!" And now, not only in Russia and not only in Germany, but even in the victor countries, a gigantic collapse of modern capitalism is beginning, a collapse, so gigantic that it frequently removes this artificial apparatus and restores the old capitalism.

When Comrade Bukharin stated that an attempt might be made to present an integral picture of the collapse of capitalism and imperialism, we objected to it in the commission, and I must object to it here. Just try it, and you will see that you will not succeed. Comrade Bukharin made one such attempt in the commission, and himself gave it up. I am absolutely convinced that if anybody could do this, it is Comrade Bukharin, who has studied this question very extensively and thoroughly. I assert that such an attempt cannot be successful, because the task is a wrong one. We in Russia are now experiencing the consequences of the imperialist war and the beginning of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, in a number of the regions of Russia, cut off from each other more than formerly, we frequently see a regeneration of capitalism and the development of its early stage. That is something we cannot escape. If the programme were to be written in the way Comrade Bukharin wanted, it would be a wrong programme. At best, it would be a reproduction of all the best that has been said of finance capitalism and imperialism, but it would not reproduce reality, precisely because this reality is not integral. A programme made up of heterogeneous parts is inelegant (but that, of course, is not important), but any

other programme would simply be incorrect. However unpleasant it may be, whatever it may lack in proportion, we shall be unable for a long time to escape this heterogeneity, this necessity of constructing from different materials. When we do escape it, we shall create another programme. But then we shall already be living in a socialist society. It would be ridiculous to pretend that things will be then what they are now.

We are living at a time when a number of the most elementary and fundamental manifestations of capitalism have been revived. Take, for instance, the collapse of transport, which we are experiencing so well, or rather so badly, in our own case. This same thing is taking place in other countries, too, even in the victor countries. And what does the collapse of transport mean under the imperialist system? A return to the most primitive forms of commodity production. We know very well what our profiteers or bagmen are. This latter word, I think, has up to now been unknown to foreigners. And now? Speak to the comrades who have arrived for the Congress of the Third International. It turns out that similar words are beginning to appear in both Germany and Switzerland. And this is a category you cannot fit into any dictatorship of the proletariat; you have to return to the very dawn of capitalist society and commodity production.

To escape from this sad reality by creating a smooth and integral programme is to escape into something ethereal that is not of this world, to write a wrong programme. And it is by no means reverence for the past, as Comrade Bukharin politely hinted, which induced us here to insert passages from the old programme. What appeared to be implied was this: the programme was written in 1903 with the participation of Lenin; the programme is undoubtedly a bad one; but since old people love most of all to recall the past, in a new era a new programme has been drawn up which, out of reverence for the past, repeats the old programme. If it were so, such cranks ought to be laughed at. I assert that it is not so. The capitalism described in 1903 remains in existence in 1919 in the Soviet proletarian republic just because of the disintegration of imperialism, because of its collapse. Capitalism of this kind can be found, for

instance, in Samara and in Vyatka gubernias, which are not very far from Moscow. In a period when civil war is rending the country, we shall not soon emerge from this situation, from this profiteering. That is why any other structure of the programme would be incorrect. We must state what actually exists; the programme must contain what is absolutely irrefutable, what has been established in fact. Only then will it be a Marxist programme.

Theoretically, Comrade Bukharin understands this perfectly and says that the programme must be concrete. But it is one thing to understand and another to act upon this understanding. Comrade Bukharin's concreteness is a bookish description of finance capitalism. In reality we have heterogeneous phenomena to deal with. In every agricultural gubernia there is free competition side by side with monopoly industry. Nowhere in the world has monopoly capitalism existed in a whole series of branches without free competition, nor will it exist. To write of such a system is to write of a system which is false and removed from reality. If Marx said of manufacture that it was a superstructure on mass small production,[33] imperialism and finance capitalism are a superstructure on the old capitalism. If its top is destroyed, the old capitalism is exposed. To maintain that there is such a thing as integral imperialism without the old capitalism is merely making the wish father to the thought.

This is a natural mistake, one very easily committed. And if we had an integral imperialism before us, which had entirely altered capitalism, our task would have been a hundred thousand times easier. It would have resulted in a system in which everything would be subordinated to finance capital alone. It would then only have remained to remove the top and to transfer what remained to the proletariat. That would have been extremely agreeable, but it is not so in reality. In reality the development is such that we have to act in an entirely different way. *Imperialism is a superstructure on capitalism*. When it collapses, we find ourselves dealing with the destruction of the top and the exposure of the foundation. That is why our programme, if it is to be a correct one, must state what actually exists. There is the old capitalism, which in a number of branches has grown to imperialism. Its tendencies are exclusively imperialist.

Fundamental questions can be examined only from the point of view of imperialism. There is not a single major question of home or foreign policy which could be settled in any way except from the point of view of this tendency. This is not what the programme now speaks about. In reality, there exists a vast subsoil of the old capitalism. There is the superstructure of imperialism, which led to the war, and from this war followed the beginnings of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a phase you cannot escape. This fact is characteristic of the very rate of development of the proletarian revolution throughout the world, and will remain a fact for many years to come.

West-European revolutions will perhaps proceed more smoothly; nevertheless, very many years will be required for the reorganisation of the whole world, for the reorganisation of the majority of the countries. And this means that during the present transition period, we cannot escape this mosaic reality. We cannot cast aside this patchwork reality, however inelegant it may be; we cannot cast away one bit of it. If the programme were drawn up otherwise than it has been drawn up, it would be a wrong programme.

We say that we have arrived at the dictatorship. But we must know *how* we arrived at it. The past keeps fast hold of us, grasps us with a thousand tentacles, and does not allow us to take a single forward step, or compels us to take these steps badly in the way we are taking them. And we say that for the situation we are arriving at to be understood, it must be stated how we proceeded and what led us to the socialist revolution. We were led to it by imperialism, by capitalism in its early commodity production forms. All this must be understood, because it is only by reckoning with reality that we can solve such problems as, let us say, our attitude towards the middle peasants. And how is it, indeed, that there is such a category as a middle peasant in the era of purely imperialist capitalism? It did not exist even in countries that were simply capitalist. If we are to solve the problem of our attitude towards this almost medieval phenomenon (the middle peasants) purely from the point of view of imperialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, we shall be absolutely unable to make ends meet, and we shall land in many difficulties. But if we are to change our attitude

towards the middle peasant—then also have the goodness to say in the theoretical part where he came from and what he is. He is a small commodity producer. And this is the ABC of capitalism, of which we must speak, because we have not yet grown out of it. To brush this aside and say, "Why should we study the ABC when we have studied finance capitalism?" would be highly frivolous.

I have to say the same thing about the *national question*. Here too the wish is father to the thought with Comrade Bukharin. He says that we must not recognise the right of nations to self-determination. A nation means the bourgeoisie together with the proletariat. And are we, the proletarians, to recognise the right to self-determination of the despised bourgeoisie? That is absolutely incompatible! Pardon me, it is compatible with what actually exists. If you eliminate this, the result will be sheer fantasy. You refer to the process of differentiation which is taking place within the nations, the process of separation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie. But let us see how this differentiation will proceed.

Take, for instance, Germany, the model of an advanced capitalist country whose organisation of capitalism, finance capitalism, was superior to that of America. She was inferior in many other respects, in technical development and production and in the political sphere, but in respect of the organisation of finance capitalism, in respect of the transformation of monopoly capitalism into state monopoly capitalism, Germany was superior to America. She is a model, it would seem. But what is taking place there? Has the German proletariat become differentiated from the bourgeoisie? No! It was reported that the majority of the workers are opposed to Scheidemann in only a few of the large towns. But how did this come about? It was owing to the alliance between the Spartacists and the thrice-accursed German Menshevik-Independents, who make a muddle of everything and want to wed the system of workers' councils to a Constituent Assembly! And this is what is taking place in that very Germany! And she, mark you, is an advanced country.

Comrade Bukharin says, "Why do we need the right of nations to self-determination?" I must repeat what I said opposing him in the summer of 1917, when he proposed to

delete the minimum programme and to leave only the maximum programme.[34] I then retorted, "Don't halloo until you're out of the wood." When we have conquered power, and even then only after waiting a while, we shall do this.[35] We have conquered power, we have waited a while, and now I am willing to do it. We have gone directly into socialist construction, we have beaten off the first assault that threatened us—now it will be in place. The same applies to the right of nations to self-determination. "I want to recognise only the right of the working classes to self-determination," says Comrade Bukharin. That is to say, you want to recognise something that has not been achieved in a single country except Russia. That is ridiculous.

Look at Finland; she is a democratic country, more developed, more cultured than we are. In Finland a process of separation, of the differentiation of the proletariat is taking a specific course, far more painful than was the case with us. The Finns have experienced the dictatorship of Germany; they are now experiencing the dictatorship of the Allied powers. But thanks to the fact that we have recognised the right of nations to self-determination, the process of differentiation has been facilitated there. I very well recall the scene when, at Smolny, I handed the act to Svinhufvud[36]—which in Russian means "pighead"—the representative of the Finnish bourgeoisie, who played the part of a hangman. He amiably shook my hand, we exchanged compliments. How unpleasant that was! But it had to be done, because at that time the bourgeoisie were deceiving the people, were deceiving the working people by alleging that the Muscovites, the chauvinists, the Great Russians, wanted to crush the Finns. It had to be done.

Yesterday, was it not necessary to do the same thing in relation to the Bashkirian Republic?[37] When Comrade Bukharin said, "We can recognise this right in some cases", I even wrote down that he had included in the list the Hottentots, the Bushmen and the Indians. Hearing this enumeration, I thought, how is it that Comrade Bukharin has forgotten a small tribe, the Bashkirs? There are no Bushmen in Russia, nor have I heard that the Hottentots have laid claim to an autonomous republic, but we have Bashkirs, Kirghiz and a number of other peoples, and to these we cannot deny

recognition. We cannot deny it to a single one of the peoples living within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire. Let us even assume that the Bashkirs have overthrown the exploiters and we have helped them to do so. This is possible only when a revolution has fully matured, and it must be done cautiously, so as not to retard by one's interference that very process of the differentiation of the proletariat which we ought to expedite. What, then, can we do in relation to such peoples as the Kirghiz, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Turkmen, who to this day are under the influence of their mullahs? Here, in Russia, the population, having had a long experience of the priests, helped us to overthrow them. But you know how badly the decree on civil marriage is still being put into effect. Can we approach these peoples and tell them that we shall overthrow their exploiters? We cannot do this, because they are entirely subordinated to their mullahs. In such cases we have to wait until the given nation develops, until the differentiation of the proletariat from the bourgeois elements, which is inevitable, has taken place.

Comrade Bukharin does not want to wait. He is possessed by impatience: "Why should we? When we have ourselves overthrown the bourgeoisie, proclaimed Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, why should we act thus?" This has the effect of a rousing appeal, it contains an indication of our path, but if we were to proclaim only this in our programme, it would not be a programme, but a proclamation. We may proclaim Soviet power, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and express the contempt for the bourgeoisie they deserve a thousand times over, but in the programme we must write just what actually exists with the greatest precision. And then our programme will be incontrovertible.

We hold a strictly class standpoint. What we are writing in the programme is a recognition of what has actually taken place since the time we wrote of the self-determination of nations in general. At that time there were still no proletarian republics. It was when they appeared, and only as they appeared, that we were able to write what is written here: "A federation of states organised after the *Soviet type*." The Soviet type is not yet Soviets as they exist in Russia,

but the Soviet type is becoming international. And this is all we can say. To go farther, one step farther, one hair's breadth farther, would be wrong, and therefore unsuitable for a programme.

We say that account must be taken of the stage reached by the given nation on its way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy, and from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. That is absolutely correct. All nations have the right to self-determination—there is no need to speak specially of the Hottentots and the Bushmen. The vast majority, most likely nine-tenths of the population of the earth, perhaps 95 per cent, come under this description, since all countries are on the way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. This is an absolutely inevitable course. More cannot be said, because it would be wrong, because it would not be what actually exists. To reject the self-determination of nations and insert the self-determination of the working people would be absolutely wrong, because this manner of settling the question does not reckon with the difficulties, with the zigzag course taken by differentiation within nations. In Germany it is not proceeding in the same way as in our country—in certain respects more rapidly, and in other respects in a slower and more sanguinary way. Not a single party in our country accepted so monstrous an idea as a combination of workers' councils and a Constituent Assembly. And yet we have to live side by side with these nations. Now Scheidemann's party is already saying that we want to conquer Germany. That is of course ridiculous, nonsensical. But the bourgeoisie have their own interests and their own press, which is shouting this to the whole world in hundreds of millions of copies; Wilson, too, is supporting this in his own interests. The Bolsheviks, they declare, have a large army, and they want, by means of conquest, to implant their Bolshevism in Germany. The best people in Germany—the Spartacists—told us that the German workers are being incited against the Communists; look, they are told, how bad things are with the Bolsheviks! And we cannot say that things with us are very good. And so our enemies in Germany influence the people with the argument that the proletarian revolution in Germany would result

in the same disorders as in Russia. Our disorders are a protracted illness. We are contending with desperate difficulties in creating the proletarian dictatorship in our country. As long as the bourgeoisie, or the petty bourgeoisie, or even part of the German workers, are under the influence of this bugbear—"the Bolsheviks want to establish their system by force"—so long will the formula "the self-determination of the working people" not help matters. We must arrange things so that the German traitor-socialists will not be able to say that the Bolsheviks are trying to impose their universal system, which, as it were, can be brought into Berlin on Red Army bayonets. And this is what may happen if the principle of the self-determination of nations is denied.

Our programme must not speak of the self-determination of the working people, because that would be wrong. It must speak of what actually exists. Since nations are at different stages on the road from medievalism to bourgeois democracy and from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy, this thesis of our programme is absolutely correct. With us there have been very many zigzags on this road. Every nation must obtain the right to self-determination, and that will make the self-determination of the working people easier. In Finland the process of separation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie is remarkably clear, forceful and deep. At any rate, things will not proceed there as they do in our country. If we were to declare that we do not recognise any Finnish nation, but only the working people, that would be sheer nonsense. We cannot refuse to recognise what actually exists; it will itself compel us to recognise it. The demarcation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is proceeding in different countries in their own specific ways. Here we must act with utmost caution. We must be particularly cautious with regard to the various nations, for there is nothing worse than lack of confidence on the part of a nation. Self-determination of the proletariat is proceeding among the Poles. Here are the latest figures on the composition of the Warsaw Soviet of Workers' Deputies.[38] Polish traitor-socialists—333, Communists—297. This shows that, according to our revolutionary calendar, October in that country is not very far off. It is somewhere about August or September 1917. But, firstly, no decree has yet been issued

stating that all countries must live according to the Bolshevik revolutionary calendar; and even if it were issued, it would not be observed. And, secondly, the situation at present is such that the majority of the Polish workers, who are more advanced than ours and more cultured, share the standpoint of social-defencism, social-patriotism. We must wait. We cannot speak here of the self-determination of the working people. We must carry on propaganda in behalf of this differentiation. This is what we are doing, but there is not the slightest shadow of doubt that we must recognise the self-determination of the Polish nation now. That is clear. The Polish proletarian movement is taking the same course as ours, towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, but not in the same way as in Russia. And there the workers are being intimidated by statements to the effect that the Muscovites, the Great Russians, who have always oppressed the Poles, want to carry their Great-Russian chauvinism into Poland in the guise of communism. Communism cannot be imposed by force. When I said to one of the best comrades among the Polish Communists, "You will do it in a different way", he replied, "No, we shall do the same thing, but better than you." To such an argument I had absolutely no objections. They must be given the opportunity of fulfilling a modest wish—to create a better Soviet power than ours. We cannot help reckoning with the fact that things there are proceeding in rather a peculiar way, and we cannot say: "Down with the right of nations to self-determination! We grant the right of self-determination only to the working people." This self-determination proceeds in a very complex and difficult way. It exists nowhere but in Russia, and, while foreseeing every stage of development in other countries, we must decree nothing from Moscow. That is why this proposal is unacceptable in principle.

I now pass to the other points which I am to deal with in accordance with the plan we have drawn up. I have given the first place to the question of *small proprietors and middle peasants*. In this respect, Clause 47 states:

"With regard to the middle peasants, the policy of the Russian Communist Party is to draw them into the work of socialist construction gradually and systematically. The Party sets itself the task of separating them from the kulaks, of winning them to the side of the

working class by carefully attending to their needs, by combating their backwardness with ideological weapons and under no circumstances with measures of suppression, and by striving in all cases where their vital interests are concerned to come to practical agreements with them, making concessions to them in determining the methods of carrying out socialist reforms."

It seems to me that here we are formulating what the founders of socialism have frequently said regarding the middle peasants. The only defect of this clause is that it is not sufficiently concrete. We could hardly give more in a programme But it is not only questions of programme we must discuss at the Congress, and we must give profound, thrice-profound consideration to the question of the middle peasants. We have information to the effect that in the revolts which have occurred in some places, a *general plan* is clearly discernible, and that this plan is obviously connected with the military plan of the whiteguards, who have decided on a general offensive in March and on the organisation of a number of revolts. In the presidium of the Congress there is a draft of an appeal in the name of the Congress, which will be reported to you.[39] These revolts show as clear as can be that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and a part of the Mensheviks—in Bryansk it was the Mensheviks who worked to provoke the revolt—are acting as actual agents of the whiteguards. A general offensive of the whiteguards, revolts in the villages, the interruption of railway traffic—perhaps it will be possible to overthrow the Bolsheviks in this way? Here the role of the middle peasants stands out especially clearly, forcibly and insistently. At the Congress we must not only lay particular stress on our accommodating attitude towards the middle peasants, but also think over a number of measures, as concrete as possible, which will directly give at least something to the middle peasants. These measures are absolutely essential for self-preservation and for the struggle against all our enemies; they know that the middle peasant vacillates between us and them and they are endeavouring to win him away from us. Our position is now such that we possess vast reserves. We know that both the Polish and the Hungarian revolutions are growing, and very rapidly. These revolutions will furnish us with proletarian reserves, will ease our situation and will to a very large ex-

tent reinforce our proletarian base, which is weak. This may happen in the next few months, but we do not know just when. You know that an acute moment has now come and therefore the question of the middle peasants now assumes tremendous practical importance.

Further, I should like to dwell on the question of *co-operation*—that is Clause 48 of our programme. To a certain extent this clause has become obsolete. When we were drafting it in the commission, co-operatives existed in our country, but there were no consumers' communes; a few days later, however, the decree on the merging of all forms of co-operatives into a single consumers' commune was issued. I do not know whether this decree has been published and whether the majority of those here present are acquainted with it. If not, it will be published tomorrow or the day after. In this respect, this clause is already out of date, but it nevertheless appears to me that it is necessary, for we all know very well that it is a pretty long way from decrees to fulfilment. We have been toiling and moiling over the co-operatives since April 1918, and although we have achieved considerable success, it is not yet a decisive success. We have at times succeeded in organising the population in the co-operatives to such an extent that in many of the uyezds 98 per cent of the rural population are already so organised. But these co-operatives, which existed in capitalist society, are saturated with the spirit of bourgeois society, and are headed by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, by bourgeois experts. We have not yet been able to establish our authority over them, and here our task remains unaccomplished. Our decree is a step forward in that it creates consumers' communes; it orders that all forms of co-operation all over Russia shall be merged. But this decree, too, even if we carry it into effect entirely, leaves the autonomous sections of workers' co-operatives within the future consumers' communes, because representatives of the workers' co-operatives who have a practical knowledge of the matter told us, and proved it, that the workers' co-operatives, as a more highly developed organisation, should be preserved, since their operations are essential. There were quite a few differences and disputes within our Party over the question of co-operation; there was friction between the Bolsheviks in

the co-operatives and the Bolsheviks in the Soviets. In principle, it seems to me that the question should undoubtedly be settled in the sense that this apparatus, the only one for which capitalism paved the way among the people, the only one operating among a rural population still at the level of primitive capitalism, must be preserved at all costs; it must be developed and must not, under any circumstances be discarded. The task here is a difficult one because in the majority of cases the leaders of the co-operatives are bourgeois specialists, very frequently real whiteguards. Hence the hatred for them, a legitimate hatred, hence the fight against them. But it must, of course, be conducted skilfully: *we must put a stop to the counter-revolutionary attempts of the co-operators, but this must not be a struggle against the apparatus of the co-operatives*. While getting rid of the counter-revolutionary leaders, we must establish our authority over the apparatus itself. Here our aim is exactly the same as it is in the case of the bourgeois experts, which is another question I should like to refer to.

The question of the *bourgeois experts* is provoking quite a lot of friction and divergences of opinion. When I recently had occasion to speak to the Petrograd Soviet, among the written questions submitted to me there were several devoted to the question of rates of pay. I was asked whether it is permissible in a socialist republic to pay as much as 3,000 rubles. We have, in fact, included this question in the programme, because dissatisfaction on these grounds has gone rather far. The question of the bourgeois experts has arisen in the army, in industry, in the co-operatives, everywhere. It is a very important question of the period of transition from capitalism to communism. We shall be able to build up communism only when, with the means provided by bourgeois science and technology, we make it more accessible to the people. There is no other way of building a communist society. But in order to build it in this way, we must take the apparatus from the bourgeoisie, we must enlist all these experts in the work. We have intentionally explained this question in detail in the programme in order to have it settled radically. We are perfectly aware of the effects of Russia's cultural underdevelopment, of what it is doing to Soviet power—which in principle has provided an immensely

higher proletarian democracy, which has created a model of such democracy for the whole world—how this lack of culture is reducing the significance of Soviet power and reviving bureaucracy. The Soviet apparatus is accessible to all the working people in word, but actually it is far from being accessible to all of them, as we all know. And not because the laws prevent it from being so, as was the case under the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, our laws assist in this respect. But in this matter laws alone are not enough. A vast amount of educational, organisational and cultural work is required; this cannot be done rapidly by legislation but demands a vast amount of work over a long period. This question of the bourgeois experts must be settled quite definitely at this Congress. The settlement of the question will enable the comrades, who are undoubtedly following this Congress attentively, to lean on its authority and to realise what difficulties we are up against. It will help those comrades who come up against this question at every step to take part at least in propaganda work.

The comrades here in Moscow who are representing the Spartacists at the Congress told us that in western Germany, where industry is most developed, and where the influence of the Spartacists among the workers is greatest, engineers and managers in very many of the large enterprises would come to the Spartacists, although the Spartacists have not yet been victorious there, and say, "We shall go with you." That was not the case in our country. Evidently, there the higher cultural level of the workers, the greater proletarianisation of the engineering personnel, and perhaps a number of other causes of which we do not know, have created relations which differ somewhat from ours.

At any rate, here we have one of the chief obstacles to further progress. We must immediately, without waiting for the support of other countries, immediately, at this very moment develop our productive forces. We cannot do this without the bourgeois experts. That must be said once and for all. Of course, the majority of these experts have a thoroughly bourgeois outlook. They must be placed in an environment of comradely collaboration, of worker commissars and of communist nuclei; they must be so placed that they cannot break out; but they must be given the opportu-

nity of working in better conditions than they did under capitalism, since this group of people, which has been trained by the bourgeoisie, will not work otherwise. To compel a whole section of the population to work under coercion is impossible—that we know very well from experience. We can compel them not to take an active part in counter-revolution, we can intimidate them so as to make them dread to respond to the appeals of the whiteguards. In this respect the Bolsheviks act energetically. This can be done, and this we are doing adequately. This we have all learned to do. But it is impossible in this way to compel a whole section to work. These people are accustomed to do cultural work, they advanced it within the framework of the bourgeois system, that is, they enriched the bourgeoisie with tremendous material acquisitions, but gave them to the proletariat in infinitesimal doses—nevertheless they did advance culture, that was their job. As they see the working class promoting organised and advanced sections, which not only value culture but also help to convey it to the people, they are changing their attitude towards us. When a doctor sees that the proletariat is arousing the working people to independent activity in fighting epidemics, his attitude towards us completely changes. We have a large section of such bourgeois doctors, engineers, agronomists and co-operators, and when they see in practice that the proletariat is enlisting more and more people to this cause, they will be conquered *morally*, and not merely be cut off from the bourgeoisie politically. Our task will then become easier. They will then of themselves be drawn into our apparatus and become part of it. To achieve this, sacrifices are necessary. To pay even two thousand million for this is a trifle. To fear this sacrifice would be childish, for it would mean that we do not comprehend the tasks before us.

The chaos in our transport, the chaos in industry and agriculture are undermining the very life of the Soviet Republic. Here we must resort to the most energetic measures, straining every nerve of the country to the utmost. We must not practise a policy of petty pinpricks with regard to the experts. These experts are not the servitors of the exploiters, they are active cultural workers, who in bourgeois society served the bourgeoisie, and of whom all socialists all over

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the world said that in a proletarian society they would serve us. In this transition period we must accord them the best possible conditions of life. That will be the best policy. That will be the most economical management. Otherwise, while saving a few hundred millions, we may lose so much that no sum will be sufficient to restore what we have lost.

When we discussed the question of rates of pay with the Commissar for Labour, Schmidt, he mentioned facts like these. He said that in the matter of equalising wages we have done more than any bourgeois state has done anywhere, or can do in scores of years. Take the pre-war rates of pay: a manual labourer used to get one ruble a day, twenty-five rubles a month, while an expert got five hundred rubles a month, not counting those who were paid hundreds of thousands of rubles. The expert used to receive twenty times more than the worker. Our present rates of pay vary from six hundred rubles to three thousand rubles—only five times more. We have done a great deal towards equalising the rates. Of course, we are now overpaying experts, but to pay them a little more for giving us their knowledge is not only worth while, but necessary and theoretically indispensable. In my opinion, this question is dealt with in sufficient detail in the programme. It must be particularly stressed. Not only must it be settled here in principle, but we must see to it that every delegate to the Congress, on returning to his locality, should, in his report to his organisation and in all his activities, secure its execution.

We have already succeeded in bringing about a thorough change of attitude among the vacillating intellectuals. Yesterday we were talking about legalising the petty-bourgeois parties, but today we are arresting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; by this switching back and forth we are applying a very definite system. A consistent and very firm line runs through these changes of policy, namely, *to cut off counter-revolution and to utilise the cultural apparatus of the bourgeoisie*. The Mensheviks are the worst enemies of socialism, because they clothe themselves in a proletarian disguise; but the Mensheviks are a non-proletarian group. In this group there is only an insignificant proletarian upper layer, while the group itself consists of petty intellectuals. This group is coming over to our side. We shall

take it over wholly, as a group. Every time they come to us, we say, "Welcome!" With every one of these vacillations, part of them come over to us. This was the case with the Mensheviks and the *Novaya Zhizn* people and with the Socialist-Revolutionaries; this will be the case with all these vacillators, who will long continue to get in our way, whine and desert one camp for the other—you cannot do anything with them. But through all these vacillations we shall be enlisting groups of cultured intellectuals into the ranks of Soviet workers, and we shall cut off those elements that continue to support the whiteguards.

The next question which, according to the division of subjects, falls to my share is the *question of bureaucracy and of enlisting the broad mass of the people in Soviet work.* We have been hearing complaints about bureaucracy for a long time; the complaints are undoubtedly well founded. We have done what no other state in the world has done in the fight against bureaucracy. The apparatus which was a thoroughly bureaucratic and bourgeois apparatus of oppression, and which remains such even in the freest of bourgeois republics, we have destroyed to its very foundations. Take, for example, the courts. Here, it is true, the task was easier; we did not have to create a new apparatus, because anybody can act as a judge basing himself on the revolutionary sense of justice of the working classes. We have still by no means completed the work in this field but in a number of respects we have made the courts what they should be. We have created bodies on which not only men, but also women, the most backward and conservative section of the population, can be made to serve without exception.

The employees in the other spheres of government are more hardened bureaucrats. The task here is more difficult. We cannot live without this apparatus; every branch of government creates a demand for such an apparatus. Here we are suffering from the fact that Russia was not sufficiently developed as a capitalist country. Germany, apparently, will suffer less from this, because her bureaucratic apparatus passed through an extensive school, which sucks people dry but compels them to work and not just wear out armchairs, as happens in our offices. We dispersed these old bureaucrats, shuffled them and then began to place them in new posts.

The tsarist bureaucrats began to join the Soviet institutions and practise their bureaucratic methods, they began to assume the colouring of Communists and, to succeed better in their careers, to procure membership cards of the Russian Communist Party. And so, they have been thrown out of the door but they creep back in through the window. What makes itself felt here most is the lack of cultured forces. These bureaucrats may be dismissed, but they cannot be re-educated all at once. Here we are confronted chiefly with organisational, cultural and educational problems.

We can fight bureaucracy to the bitter end, to a complete victory, only when the whole population participates in the work of government. In the bourgeois republics not only is this impossible, *but the law itself prevents it*. The best of the bourgeois republics, no matter how democratic they may be, have thousands of legal hindrances which prevent the working people from participating in the work of government. What we have done, was to remove these hindrances, but so far we have not reached the stage at which the working people could participate in government. Apart from the law, there is still the level of culture, which you cannot subject to any law. The result of this low cultural level is that the Soviets, which by virtue of their programme are organs of government *by the working people*, are in fact organs of government *for the working people* by the advanced section of the proletariat, but not by the working people as a whole.

Here we are confronted by a problem which cannot be solved except by prolonged education. At present this task is an inordinately difficult one for us, because, as I have had frequent occasion to say, the section of workers who are governing is inordinately, incredibly *small*. We must secure help. According to all indications, such a reserve is growing up within the country. There cannot be the slightest doubt of the existence of a tremendous thirst for knowledge and of tremendous progress in education—mostly attained outside the schools—of tremendous progress in educating the working people. This progress cannot be confined within any school framework, but it is tremendous. All indications go to show that we shall obtain a vast reserve in the near future, which will replace the representatives of the small section of proletarians who have overstrained themselves

in the work. But, in any case, our present situation in this respect is extremely difficult. Bureaucracy has been defeated. The exploiters have been eliminated. But the cultural level has not been raised, and therefore the bureaucrats are occupying their old positions. They can be forced to retreat only if the proletariat and the peasants are organised far more extensively than has been the case up to now, and only if real measures are taken to enlist the workers in government. You are all aware of such measures in the case of every People's Commissariat, and I shall not dwell on them.

The last point I have to deal with is the question of *the leading role of the proletariat and disfranchisement*. Our Constitution recognises the precedence of the proletariat in respect of the peasants and disfranchises the exploiters. It was this that the pure democrats of Western Europe attacked most. We answered, and are answering, that they have forgotten the most fundamental propositions of Marxism, they have forgotten that with them it is a case of bourgeois democracy, whereas we have passed to *proletarian* democracy. There is not a single country in the world which has done even one-tenth of what the Soviet Republic has done in the past few months for the workers and the poor peasants in enlisting them in the work of administering the state. That is an absolute truth. Nobody will deny that in the matter of true, not paper, democracy, in the matter of enlisting the workers and peasants, we have done more than has been done or could be done by the best of the democratic republics in hundreds of years. It was this that determined the significance of the Soviets, it was owing to this that the Soviets have become a slogan for the proletariat of all countries.

But this in no way saves us from stumbling over the inadequate culture of the people. We do not at all regard the question of disfranchising the bourgeoisie from an absolute point of view, because it is theoretically quite conceivable that the dictatorship of the proletariat may suppress the bourgeoisie at every step without disfranchising them. This is theoretically quite conceivable. Nor do we propose our Constitution as a model for other countries. All we say is that whoever conceives the transition to socialism without the suppression of the bourgeoisie is not a socialist. But

while it is essential to suppress the bourgeoisie as a class, it is not essential to deprive them of suffrage and of equality. We do not want freedom for the bourgeoisie, we do not recognise equality of exploiters and exploited, but this question is so handled in the programme that the Constitution does not prescribe such measures as the inequality of workers and peasants. They were embodied in the Constitution *after* they were already in actual practice. It was not even the Bolsheviks who drew up the Constitution of the Soviets; it was drawn up to their own detriment by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries before the Bolshevik revolution. They drew it up in accordance with the conditions actually obtaining. The organisation of the proletariat proceeded much more rapidly than the organisation of the peasants, which fact made the workers the bulwark of the revolution and gave them a virtual advantage. The next task is gradually to pass from these advantages to their equalisation. Nobody drove the bourgeoisie out of the Soviets either before or after the October Revolution. *The bourgeoisie themselves left the Soviets*.

That is how the matter stands with the question of suffrage for the bourgeoisie. It is our task to put the question with absolute clarity. We do not in the least apologise for our behaviour, but give an absolutely precise enumeration of the facts as they are. As we point out, our Constitution was obliged to introduce this inequality because the cultural level is low and because with us organisation is weak. But we do not make this an ideal; on the contrary, in its programme the Party undertakes to work systematically to abolish this inequality between the better organised proletariat and the peasants. We shall abolish this inequality as soon as we succeed in raising the cultural level. We shall then be able to get along without such restrictions. Even now, after some seventeen months of revolution, these restrictions are of very small practical importance.

These, comrades, are the main points on which I believed it necessary to dwell in the general discussion of the programme, in order to leave their further consideration to the debate. (*Applause.*)

4
SPEECH CLOSING THE DEBATE ON THE PARTY PROGRAMME MARCH 19

(*Applause.*) Comrades, I could not divide this part of the question with Comrade Bukharin, after preliminary consultation, in such detail as was the case with the report. Perhaps it will prove unnecessary. I think the debate that unfolded here revealed primarily one thing—the absence of any definite and formulated counter-proposal. Many speakers dealt with separate points in a desultory way, but made no counter-proposals. I shall deal with the chief objections, which were mainly directed against the preamble. Comrade Bukharin told me that he is one of those who believe that it is possible in the preamble to combine a description of capitalism with a description of imperialism in such a way as to form an integral whole, but since this has not been done, we shall have to accept the existing draft.

Many of the speakers argued—and it was particularly emphasised by Comrade Podbelsky—that the draft presented to you is wrong. The arguments Comrade Podbelsky advanced were very strange indeed. For instance, he said that in Clause 1 the revolution is referred to as the revolution of such-and-such a date, and for some reason this suggested to Comrade Podbelsky the idea that even this revolution is numbered. I may say that in the Council of People's Commissars we have to deal with numerous documents with index numbers, and often we get a little tired of them. But why convey this impression here? What has an index number to do with the question? We fix the day of the holiday and celebrate it. Can it be denied that it was precisely on October 25 that we

captured power? If you were to attempt to change this in any way, it would be artificial. If you call the revolution the October-November Revolution, you provide a pretext for saying that it was not accomplished in one day. Of course, it was accomplished in a longer period—not in October, not in November, and not even in one year. Comrade Podbelsky took exception to the fact that one of the clauses speaks of the *impending* social revolution. On these grounds he made it appear that the programme was guilty of the crime of "offending Her Majesty the social revolution". Here we are in the middle of the social revolution and yet the programme says that it is impending! This argument is obviously groundless, because the revolution referred to in our programme is the world social revolution.

We are told that we approach the revolution from the economic point of view. Should we do so or not? Many over-enthusiastic comrades here went as far as to talk about a world Economic Council, and about subordinating all the national parties to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Comrade Pyatakov almost went as far as to say the same. (*Pyatakov*, *from his place*: "Do you think that would be a bad thing?") Since he now says that it would not be a bad thing, I must reply that if there were anything like this in the programme, there would be no need to criticise it: the authors of such a proposal would have dug their own graves. These over-enthusiastic comrades have overlooked the fact that in the programme we must take our stand on what actually exists. One of these comrades—I think it was Sunitsa, who criticised the programme very vigorously and said it was worthless, and so forth—one of these over-enthusiastic comrades said that he did not agree that it must contain what actually exists, and proposed that it should contain what does not exist. (*Laughter*.) I think that this argument is so obviously false that the laughter it evokes is quite natural. I did not say that it must contain only what actually exists. I said that we must *proceed from what has been definitely established*. We must say and prove to the proletarians and working peasants that the communist revolution is inevitable. Did anybody here suggest that it is not necessary to say this? Had anybody made such a suggestion, it would have been proved to him that he was wrong. Nobody made any

such suggestion, nor will anybody do so, because it is an undoubted fact that our Party came to power with the aid not only of the communist proletariat, but also of all the peasants. Shall we confine ourselves to telling these people who are now marching with us: "The Party's only function is to carry on socialist construction. The communist revolution has been accomplished, put communism into effect." Such an opinion would be utterly groundless, it would be wrong from the theoretical point of view. Our Party has absorbed directly, and still more indirectly, millions of people who are now beginning to understand the class struggle, to understand the transition from capitalism to communism.

It may now be said, and it would be no exaggeration at all to do so, of course, that nowhere, in no other country, have the working people displayed such keen interest in the question of transforming capitalism into socialism as the working people in our country today. Our people are giving more thought to this than the people of any other country. Is the Party not to give a reply to this question? We must demonstrate scientifically how this communist revolution will progress. All the other proposals fall short in this respect. Nobody wanted to delete it entirely. There was some vague talk about it being possible to abbreviate it, about not quoting from the old programme because it is wrong. But if the old programme were wrong, how could it have served as the basis of our activities for so many years? Perhaps we shall have a common programme when the world Soviet Republic is set up; by that time we shall probably have drafted several more programmes. But it would be premature to draft one now, when only one Soviet Republic exists in what was formerly the Russian Empire. Even Finland, which is undoubtedly advancing towards a Soviet Republic, has not yet reached it. And yet the Finnish people are the most cultured of the peoples that inhabit what was formerly the Russian Empire. Consequently, it is utterly wrong to demand that the programme should now reflect a finished process. It would be on a par with inserting the demand for a world Economic Council. We ourselves have not yet grown accustomed to this ugly word Sovnarkhoz—Economic Council; as for foreigners, it is said that some of them searched the railway directory, thinking that there was

a station of that name. (*Laughter.*) We cannot dictate such words to the whole world by means of decrees.

To be international, our programme must take into account the class factors which are characteristic of the economy of all countries. It is characteristic of all countries that capitalism is still developing in a great many places. This is true of the whole of Asia, of all countries which are advancing towards bourgeois democracy; it is true of a number of parts of Russia. For instance, Comrade Rykov, who is closely familiar with the facts in the economic field, told us of the new bourgeoisie which have arisen in our country. This is true. The bourgeoisie are emerging not only from among our Soviet government employees—only a very few can emerge from their ranks—but from the ranks of the peasants and handicraftsmen who have been liberated from the yoke of the capitalist banks, and who are now cut off from railway communication. This is a fact. How do you think you will get round this fact? You are only fostering your own illusions, or introducing badly digested book-learning into reality, which is far more complex. It shows that even in Russia, capitalist commodity production is alive, operating, developing and giving rise to a bourgeoisie, in the same way as it does in every capitalist society.

Comrade Rykov said, "We are fighting against the bourgeoisie who are springing up in our country because the peasant economy has not yet disappeared; this economy gives rise to a bourgeoisie and to capitalism." We do not have exact figures about it, but it is beyond doubt that this is the case. So far a Soviet Republic exists only within the boundaries of what was formerly the Russian Empire. It is maturing and developing in a number of countries, but it does not yet exist in any other country. It would, therefore, be fantastic to claim in our programme something we have not yet reached; it would merely express a desire to escape unpleasant reality, which shows that the birth-pangs of other countries bringing forth socialist republics are undoubtedly more severe than those we experienced. We found it easy because on October 27, 1917, we gave legal effect to what the peasants had demanded in the resolutions of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. This is not the case in any other country. A Swiss comrade and a German comrade told us that in Switzerland the

peasants took up arms against the strikers as never before, and that in Germany there is not the faintest indications in the rural districts of the likelihood of the appearance of councils of agricultural labourers and small peasants. In our country, however, Soviets of Peasants' Deputies were formed almost over the entire country in the first few months of the revolution. We, a backward country, created them. Here a gigantic problem arises, for which the people in the capitalist countries have not yet found a solution. Were we a model capitalist nation? Survivals of serfdom were still to be found in this country right up to 1917. But no nation organised on capitalist lines has yet shown how this problem can be solved in practice. We achieved power under exceptional conditions, when tsarist despotism stimulated a great burst of effort to bring about a radical and rapid change; and under these exceptional conditions we were able for several months to rely on the support of all the peasants. This is a historical fact. Right up to the summer of 1918, up to the time of the formation of the Poor Peasants' Committees, we were holding on as a government because we enjoyed the support of all the peasants. This is impossible in any capitalist country. And it is this fundamental economic fact that you forget when you talk about radically redrafting the whole programme. Without this your programme will have no scientific foundation.

We must take as our point of departure the universally recognised Marxist thesis that a programme must be built on a scientific foundation. It must explain to the people how the communist revolution arose, why it is inevitable, what its significance, nature, and power are, and what problems it must solve. Our programme must be a summary for agitational purposes, a summary such as all programmes were, such as, for instance, the Erfurt Programme[40] was. Every clause of that programme contained material for agitators to use in hundreds of thousands of speeches and articles. Every clause of our programme is something that every working man and woman must know, assimilate and understand. If they do not know what capitalism is, if they do not understand that small peasant and handicraft economy constantly, inevitably and necessarily engenders this capitalism—if they do not understand this, then even if they were to

declare themselves Communists a hundred times and flaunt the most radical communism, it would not be worth a brass farthing, because we value communism only when it is based on economic facts.

The socialist revolution will cause many changes even in some of the advanced countries. The capitalist mode of production still exists in all parts of the world, and in many places it still bears its less developed forms in spite of the fact that imperialism has mobilised and concentrated finance capital. There is not a country in the world, even the most developed, where capitalism is to be found exclusively in its most perfect form. There is nothing like it even in Germany. When we were collecting material for our particular assignments, the comrade in charge of the Central Statistical Board informed us that in Germany the peasants *concealed* from the Food Supply Departments 40 per cent of their surplus potatoes. Small peasant farms, which engage in free, petty trading, and petty profiteering, are still to be found in a capitalist country where capitalism has reached its full development. Such facts must not be forgotten. Of the 300,000 members of the Party who are represented here, are there many who fully understand this question? It would be ridiculous conceit to imagine that because we, whose good fortune it was to draft this programme, understand all this, the entire mass of Communists also understands it. They do not, and they need this ABC. They need it a hundred times more than we do, because people who have not grasped, who have not understood what communism is and what commodity production is, are far removed from communism. We come across these cases of small commodity economy every day, in every question of practical economic policy, food policy, agricultural policy, on matters concerning the Supreme Economic Council. And yet we are told that we ought not to speak about it in the programme! If we heeded this advice we would only show that we are incapable of solving this problem, and that the success of the revolution in our country is due to exceptional circumstances.

Comrades from Germany visit us to study the forms of the socialist system. And we must act in such a way as to prove to our comrades from abroad that we are strong, to enable them to see that in our revolution we are not in the

least exceeding the bounds of reality, and to provide them with material that will be absolutely irrefutable. It would be absurd to set up our revolution as the ideal for all countries, to imagine that it has made a number of brilliant discoveries and has introduced a heap of socialist innovations. I have not heard anybody make this claim and I assert that we shall not hear anybody make it. We have acquired practical experience in taking the first steps towards destroying capitalism in a country where specific relations exist between the proletariat and the peasants. Nothing more. If we behave like the frog in the fable and become puffed up with conceit, we shall only make ourselves the laughing-stock of the world, we shall be mere braggarts.

We educated the party of the proletariat with the aid of the Marxist programme, and the tens of millions of working people in our country must be educated in the same way. We have assembled here as ideological leaders and we must say to the people: "We educated the proletariat, and in doing so we always took our stand first and foremost on an exact economic analysis." This cannot be done by means of a manifesto. The manifesto of the Third International is an appeal, a proclamation, it calls attention to the tasks that confront us, it is an appeal to the people's sentiments. Take the trouble to prove scientifically that you have an economic basis, and that you are not building on sand. If you cannot do that, do not undertake to draw up a programme. To do it, we must necessarily review what we have lived through in these fifteen years. Fifteen years ago we said that we were advancing towards the social revolution, and now we have arrived; does that fact weaken our position? On the contrary, it reinforces and strengthens it. It all amounts to this, that capitalism is developing into imperialism, and imperialism leads to the beginning of the socialist revolution. It is tedious and lengthy, and not a single capitalist country has yet gone through this process, but it is necessary to deal with this in the programme.

That is why the theoretical arguments that have been levelled against this hold no water. I have no doubt that if we were to set ten or twenty writers, who are well able to expound their ideas, to work for three or four hours a day, they would, in the course of a month, draw up a better

and more integral programme. But to demand that this should be done in a day or two, as Comrade Podbelsky does, is ridiculous. We worked for more than a day or two, or even a couple of weeks. I repeat that if it were possible to select a commission of thirty persons and set them to work several hours a day for a month, and moreover, not allow them to be disturbed by telephone calls, there can be no doubt that they would produce a programme five times better than this one. But nobody here has disputed essentials. A programme which says nothing about the fundamentals of commodity economy and capitalism will not be a Marxist international programme. To be international it is not enough for it to proclaim a world Soviet republic, or the abolition of nations, as Comrade Pyatakov did when he said: "We don't want any nations. What we want is the union of all proletarians." This is splendid, of course, and eventually it will come about, but at an entirely different stage of communist development. Comrade Pyatakov said in a patronising tone: "You were backward in 1917, but you have made progress." We made progress when we put into the programme something that began to conform to reality. When we said that nations advance from bourgeois democracy to proletarian government, we stated what was a fact, although in 1917 it was merely an expression of what you desired.

When we establish with the Spartacists that complete comradely confidence needed for united communism, the comradely confidence that is maturing day by day, and which, perhaps, will come into being in a few months' time, we shall record it in the programme. But to proclaim it when it does not yet exist, would mean dragging them into something for which their own experience has not yet prepared them. We say that the Soviet type has acquired international significance. Comrade Bukharin mentioned the Shop Stewards' Committees in Britain. These are not quite Soviets. They are developing but they are still in the embryonic stage. When they burst into full bloom, we shall "see what happens". But the argument that we are presenting Russian Soviets to the British workers is beyond all criticism.

I must now deal with the question of self-determination of nations. Our criticism has served to exaggerate the importance of this question. The defect in our criticism was

that it attached special significance to this question, which, in substance, is of less than secondary importance in the programme's general structure, in the sum total of programme demands.

While Comrade Pyatakov was speaking I was amazed and asked myself what it was, a debate on the programme, or a dispute between two Organising Bureaus? When Comrade Pyatakov said that the Ukrainian Communists act in conformity with the instructions of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), I was not sure about the tone in which he said it. Was it regret? I do not suspect Comrade Pyatakov of that, but what he said was tantamount to asking what was the good of all this self-determination when we have a splendid Central Committee in Moscow. This is a childish point of view. The Ukraine was separated from Russia by exceptional circumstances, and the national movement did not take deep root there. Whatever there was of such a movement the Germans killed. This is a fact, but an exceptional fact. Even as regards the language it is not clear whether the Ukrainian language today is the language of the common people or not. The mass of working people of the other nations greatly distrusted the Great Russians whom they regarded as a kulak and oppressor nation. That is a fact. A Finnish representative told me that among the Finnish bourgeoisie, who hated the Great Russians, voices are to be heard saying: "The Germans proved to be more savage brutes, the Entente proved to be more savage, we had better have the Bolsheviks." This is the tremendous victory we have gained over the Finnish bourgeoisie in the national question. This does not in the least prevent us from fighting it as our class enemy and from choosing the proper methods for the purpose. The Soviet Republic, which has been established in the country where tsarism formerly oppressed Finland, must declare that it respects the right of nations to independence. We concluded a treaty with the short-lived Red Finnish Government and agreed to certain territorial concessions, to which I heard quite a number of utterly chauvinistic objections, such as: "There are excellent fisheries there, and you have surrendered them." These are the kind of objections which induce me to say, "Scratch some Communists and you will find Great-Russian chauvinists."

I think that the case of Finland, as well as of the Bashkirs, shows that in dealing with the national question one cannot argue that economic unity should be effected under all circumstances. Of course, it is necessary! But we must endeavour to secure it by propaganda, by agitation, by a voluntary alliance. The Bashkirs distrust the Great Russians because the Great Russians are more cultured and have utilised their culture to rob the Bashkirs. That is why the term Great Russian is synonymous with the terms "oppressor", "rogue" to Bashkirs in those remote places. This must be taken into account, it must be combated, but it will be a lengthy process. It cannot be eliminated by a decree. We must be very cautious in this matter. Exceptional caution must be displayed by a nation like the Great Russians, who earned the bitter hatred of all the other nations; we have only just learned how to remedy the situation, and then, not entirely. For instance, at the Commissariat of Education, or connected with it, there are Communists, who say that our schools are uniform schools, and therefore don't dare to teach in any language but Russian. In my opinion, such a Communist is a Great-Russian chauvinist. Many of us harbour such sentiments and they must be combated.

That is why we must tell the other nations that we are out-and-out internationalists and are striving for the voluntary alliance of the workers and peasants of all nations. This does not preclude wars in the least. War is another question, and-arises out of the very nature of imperialism. If we are fighting Wilson, and Wilson uses a small nation as his tool, we say that we shall oppose that tool. We have never said anything different. We have never said that a socialist republic can exist without military forces. War may be necessary under certain circumstances. But at present, the essence of the question of the self-determination of nations is that different nations are advancing in the same historical direction, but by very different zigzags and bypaths, and that the more cultured nations are obviously proceeding in a way that differs from that of the less cultured nations. Finland advanced in a different way. Germany is advancing in a different way. Comrade Pyatakov is a thousand times right when he says that we need unity. But we must strive for it by means of propaganda, by Party influence,

by forming united trade unions. But here, too, we must not act in a stereotyped way. If we do away with this point, or formulate it differently, we shall be deleting the national question from the programme. This might be done if there were people with no specific national features. But there are no such people, and we cannot build socialist society in any other way.

I think, comrades, that the programme proposed here should be accepted as a basis and then referred back to the commission, which should be enlarged by the inclusion of representatives of the opposition, or rather, of comrades who have made practical proposals, and that the commission should put forward (1) the amendments to the draft that have been enumerated, and (2) the theoretical objections on which no agreement can be reached. I think this will be the most practical way of dealing with the matter, and one that will most speedily lead to a correct decision. (*Applause*.)

5

WIRELESS MESSAGE OF GREETING ON BEHALF OF THE CONGRESS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC[41] MARCH 22

To the Government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Budapest

The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party sends ardent greetings to the Hungarian Soviet Republic. Our Congress is convinced that the time is not far distant when communism will triumph all over the world. The working class of Russia is making every effort to come to your aid. The proletariat throughout the world is watching your struggle with intense interest and will not permit the imperialists to raise their hands against the new Soviet Republic.

Long live the world communist republic!

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6
REPORT ON WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
MARCH 23

(*Prolonged applause.*) Comrades, I must apologise for having been unable to attend all the meetings of the committee elected by the Congress to consider the question of work in the countryside.[42] My report will therefore be supplemented by the speeches of comrades who have taken part in the work of the committee from the very beginning. The committee finally drew up theses which were turned over to a commission and which will be reported on to you. I should like to dwell on the general significance of the question as it confronts us following the work of the committee and as, in my opinion, it now confronts the whole Party.

Comrades, it is quite natural that as the proletarian revolution develops we have to put in the forefront first one then another of the most complex and important problems of social life. It is perfectly natural that in a revolution which affects, and is bound to affect, the deepest foundations of life and the broadest mass of the population, not a single party, not a single government, no matter how close it may be to the people, can possibly embrace all aspects of life *at once*. And if we now have to deal with the question of work in the countryside, and in connection with this question to give prominence to the position of the middle peasants, there is nothing strange or abnormal in this from the standpoint of the development of the proletarian revolution in general. It is natural that the proletarian revolution had to begin with the fundamental relation between two hostile classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The principal task was to transfer power to the working class, to secure its

dictatorship, to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to deprive them of the economic sources of their power which would undoubtedly be a hindrance to all socialist construction in general. Since we are acquainted with Marxism, none of us have ever for a moment doubted the truth of the thesis that the very economic structure of capitalist society is such that the deciding factor in that society must be either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. We now see many former Marxists —from the Menshevik camp, for example—who assert that in a period of decisive struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie *democracy in general* can prevail. This is what is said by the Mensheviks, who have come to a complete agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Although it were not the bourgeoisie themselves who create or abolish democracy as they find most convenient for themselves! And since that is so, there can be no question of democracy in general at a time of acute struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It is astonishing how rapidly these Marxists or pseudo-Marxists—our Mensheviks, for example—expose themselves, and how rapidly their true nature, the nature of petty-bourgeois democrats, comes to the surface.

All his life Marx fought most of all the illusions of petty-bourgeois democracy and bourgeois democracy. Marx scoffed most of all at empty talk of freedom and equality, when it serves as a screen for the freedom of the workers to starve to death, or the equality between the one who sells his labour-power and the bourgeois who allegedly freely purchases that labour in the open market as if from an equal, and so forth. Marx explains this in all his economic works. It may be said that the whole of Marx's *Capital* is devoted to explaining the truth that *the basic forces of capitalist society are, and must be, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat*—bourgeoisie, as the builder of this capitalist society, as its leader, as its motive force, and the proletariat, as its gravedigger and as the only force capable of replacing it. You can hardly find a single chapter in any of Marx's works that is not devoted to this. You might say that all over the world the socialists of the Second International have vowed and sworn to the workers time and again that they understand this truth. But when matters reached the stage of the real and, moreover, decisive struggle for power between the pro-

letariat and the bourgeoisie we find that our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, as well as the leaders of the old socialist parties all over the world, forgot this truth and began to repeat in purely parrot fashion the philistine phrases about democracy in general.

Attempts are sometimes made to lend these words what is considered to be greater force by speaking of the "dictatorship of democracy". That is sheer nonsense. We know perfectly well from history that the dictatorship of the democratic bourgeoisie meant nothing but the suppression of the insurgent workers. That has been the case ever since 1848—at any rate, beginning no later, and isolated examples may be found even earlier. History shows that it is precisely in a bourgeois democracy that a most acute struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie develops extensively and freely. We have had occasion to convince ourselves of this truth in practice. And the measures taken by the Soviet Government since October 1917 have been distinguished by their firmness on all fundamental questions precisely because we have never departed from this truth and have never forgotten it. The issue of the struggle for supremacy waged against the bourgeoisie can be settled only by the dictatorship of one class—the proletariat. Only the dictatorship of the proletariat can defeat the bourgeoisie. Only the proletariat can overthrow the bourgeoisie. And only the proletariat can secure the following of the people in the struggle against the bourgeoisie.

However, it by no means follows from this—and it would be a profound mistake to think it does—that in further building communism, when the bourgeoisie have been overthrown and political power is already in the hands of the proletariat, we can continue to carry on without the participation of the middle, intermediary elements.

It is natural that at the beginning of the revolution—the proletarian revolution—the whole attention of its active participants should be concentrated on the main and fundamental issue, the supremacy of the proletariat and the securing of that supremacy by a victory over the bourgeoisie—making it certain that the bourgeoisie cannot regain power. We are well aware that the bourgeoisie still enjoy the advantages derived from the wealth they possess in other countries or the monetary wealth they possess, sometimes

even in our own country. We are well aware that there are social elements who are more experienced than proletarians and who aid the bourgeoisie. We are well aware that the bourgeoisie have not abandoned the idea of returning to power and have not ceased attempting to restore their supremacy.

But that is by no means all. The bourgeoisie, who put forward most insistently the principle "my country is wherever it is good for me", and who, as far as money is concerned, have always been international—*the bourgeoisie internationally are still stronger than we are*. Their supremacy is being rapidly undermined, they are being confronted with such facts as the Hungarian revolution—about which we were happy to inform you yesterday and are today receiving confirming reports—and they are beginning to understand that their supremacy is shaky. They no longer enjoy freedom of action. But now, if you take into account the material means on the world scale, we cannot help admitting that in the material respect the bourgeoisie are at present still stronger than we are.

That is why nine-tenths of our attention and our practical activities were devoted, and had to be devoted, to this fundamental question—the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the power of the proletariat and the elimination of every possibility of the return of the bourgeoisie to power. That is perfectly natural, legitimate, and unavoidable, and in this field very much has been accomplished.

Now, however, we must decide the question of other sections of the population. We must—and this was our unanimous conclusion in the agrarian committee, and on this, we are convinced, all Party workers will agree, because we merely summed up the results of their observations—we must now decide *the question of the middle peasants* in its totality.

Of course, there are people who, instead of studying the course taken by our revolution, instead of giving thought to the tasks now confronting us, instead of all this, make every step of the Soviet government a butt for the derision and criticism of the type we hear from these gentlemen, the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. These people have still not understood that they must make a choice between us and the bourgeois dictatorship. We have

displayed great patience, even indulgence, towards these people. We shall allow them to enjoy our indulgence once more. But in the very near future we shall set a limit to our patience and indulgence, and if they do not make their choice, we shall tell them in all seriousness to go to Kolchak. (*Applause.*) We do not expect particularly brilliant intellectual ability from such people. (*Laughter.*) But it might have been expected that after experiencing the bestialities of Kolchak they ought to understand that we are entitled to demand that they should choose between us and Kolchak. If during the first few months that followed the October Revolution there were many naïve people who were stupid enough to believe that the dictatorship of the proletariat was something transient and fortuitous, today even the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries ought to understand that there is something logically necessary in the struggle that is being waged because of the onslaught of the whole international bourgeoisie.

Actually only two forces have been created—the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whoever has not learned this from Marx, whoever has not learned this from the works of all the great socialists, has never been a socialist, has never understood anything about socialism, and has only called himself a socialist. We are allowing these people a brief period for reflection and demand that they make their decision. I have mentioned them because they are now saying or will say: "The Bolsheviks have raised the question of the middle peasants; they want to make advances to them." I am very well aware that considerable space is given in the Menshevik press to arguments of this kind, and even far worse. We ignore such arguments, we never attach importance to the jabber of our adversaries. People who are still capable of running to and fro between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat may say what they please. We are following our own road.

Our road is determined above all by considerations of class forces. A struggle is developing in capitalist society between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As long as that struggle has not ended we shall give our keenest attention to fighting it out to the end. It has not yet been brought to the end, although in that struggle much has already been

accomplished. The hands of the international bourgeoisie are no longer free; the best proof of this is that the Hungarian proletarian revolution has taken place. It is therefore clear that our rural organisational work has already gone beyond the limits to which it was confined when everything was subordinated to the fundamental demand of the struggle for power.

This development passed through two main phases. In October 1917 we seized power *together with the peasants as a whole*. This was a bourgeois revolution, inasmuch as the class struggle in the rural districts had not yet developed. As I have said, the real proletarian revolution in the rural districts began only in the summer of 1918. Had we not succeeded in stirring up this revolution our work would have been incomplete. The first stage was the seizure of power in the cities and the establishment of the Soviet form of government. The second stage was one which is fundamental for all socialists and without which socialists are not socialists, namely, to single out the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements in the rural districts and to ally them to the urban proletariat in order to wage the struggle against the bourgeoisie in the countryside. This stage is also in the main completed. The organisations we originally created for this purpose, the Poor Peasants' Committees, had become so consolidated that we found it possible to replace them by properly elected Soviets, i.e., to reorganise the village Soviets so as to make them the organs of class rule, the organs of proletarian power in the rural districts. Such measures as the law on socialist land settlement and the measures for the transition to socialist farming, which was passed not very long ago by the Central Executive Committee and with which everybody is, of course, familiar, sum up our experience from the point of view of our proletarian revolution.

The main thing, the prime and basic talk of the proletarian revolution, we have already accomplished. And precisely because we have accomplished it, a more complicated problem has come to the fore—*our attitude towards the middle peasants*. And whoever thinks that the prominence being given this problem is in any way symptomatic of a weakening of the character of our government, of a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that it is symptomatic of a

change, however partial, however minute, in our basic policy, completely fails to understand the aims of the proletariat and the aims of the communist revolution. I am convinced that there are no such people in our Party. I only wanted to warn the comrades against people not belonging to the workers' party who will talk in this way, not because it follows from any system of ideas, but because they merely want to spoil things for us and to help the whiteguards—or, to put it more simply, to incite against us the middle peasant, who is always vacillating, who cannot help vacillating, and who will continue to vacillate for a fairly long time to come. In order to incite the middle peasant against us they will say, "See, they are making advances to you! That means they have taken your revolts into account, they are beginning to wobble", and so on and so forth. All our comrades must be armed against agitation of this kind. And I am certain that they will be armed—provided we succeed now in having this question treated from the standpoint of the class struggle.

It is perfectly obvious that this fundamental problem—*how precisely to define the attitude of the proletariat towards the middle peasants*—is a more complex but no less urgent problem. Comrades, from the theoretical point of view, which has been mastered by the vast majority of the workers, this question presents no difficulty to Marxists. I will remind you, for instance, that in his book on the agrarian question, written at a time when he was still correctly expounding the teachings of Marx and was regarded as an indisputed authority in this field, Kautsky states in connection with the transition from capitalism to socialism that the task of a socialist party *is to neutralise the peasants*, i.e., to see to it that in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie the peasant should remain neutral and should not be able to give active assistance to the bourgeoisie against us.

Throughout the extremely long period of the rule of the bourgeoisie, the peasants sided with the bourgeoisie and supported their power. This will be understood if you consider the economic strength of the bourgeoisie and the political instruments of their rule. We cannot count on the middle peasant coming over to our side immediately. But if we pursue a correct policy, after a time these vacillations will cease

and the peasant will be able to come over to our side.

It was Engels—who together with Marx laid the foundations of scientific Marxism, that is, the teachings by which our Party has always guided itself, and particularly in time of revolution—it was Engels who established the division of the peasants into small peasants, middle peasants, and big peasants, and this division holds good for most European countries even today. Engels said, "Perhaps it will not everywhere be necessary to suppress even the big peasant by force." And that we might ever use force in respect of the middle peasant (the small peasant is our friend) is a thought that has never occurred to any sensible socialist. That is what Engels said in 1894, a year before his death, when the agrarian question came to the fore.[43] This point of view expresses a truth which is sometimes forgotten, but with which we are all in theory agreed. In relation to the landowners and the capitalists our aim is complete expropriation. *But we shall not tolerate any use of force in respect of the middle peasants*. Even in respect of the rich peasants we do not say as resolutely as we do of the bourgeoisie—absolute expropriation of the rich peasants and the kulaks. This distinction is made in our programme. We say that the resistance of the counter-revolutionary efforts of the rich peasants must be suppressed. That is not complete expropriation.

The basic difference in our attitude towards the bourgeoisie and the middle peasant—complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie and an alliance with the middle peasant who does not exploit others—this basic line is accepted by everybody in theory. But this line is not consistently followed in practice; the people in the localities have not yet learned to follow it. When, after having overthrown the bourgeoisie and consolidated its own power, the proletariat started from various angles to create a new society, the question of the middle peasant came to the fore. Not a single socialist in the world denied that the building of communism would take different courses in countries where large-scale farming prevails and in countries where small-scale farming prevails. That is an elementary truth, an ABC. And from this truth it follows that as we approach the problems of communist construction our principal attention must to a

certain extent be concentrated precisely on the middle peasant.

Much will depend on how we define our attitude towards the middle peasant. Theoretically, that question has been solved; but we know perfectly well from our own experience that there is a difference between solving a problem theoretically and putting the solution into practice. We are now directly confronted with that difference, which was so characteristic of the great French Revolution, when the French Convention launched into sweeping measures but did not possess the necessary support to put them into effect, and did not even know on what class to rely for the implementation of any particular measure.

Our position is an infinitely more fortunate one. Thanks to a whole century of development, we know on which class we are relying. But we also know that the practical experience of that class is extremely inadequate. The fundamental aim was clear to the working class and the workers' party—to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to transfer power to the workers. But *how* was that to be done? Everyone remembers with what difficulty and at the cost of how many mistakes we passed from workers' control to workers' management of industry. And yet that was work within our own class, among the proletarians, with whom we had always had to deal. But now we are called upon to define our attitude towards a new class, a class the urban worker does not know. We have to determine our attitude towards a class which has no definite and stable position. The proletariat in the mass is in favour of socialism, the bourgeoisie in the mass are opposed to socialism. It is easy to determine the relations between these two classes. But when we come up against people like the middle peasants we find that *they are a class that vacillates*. The middle peasant is partly a property-owner and partly a working man. He does not exploit other working people. For decades the middle peasant defended his position with the greatest difficulty, he suffered the exploitation of the landowners and the capitalists, he bore everything. Yet he is a property-owner. Our attitude towards this vacillating class therefore presents enormous difficulties. In the light of more than a year's experience, in the light of more than six months' proletarian work in the

rural districts, and in the light of the class differentiation in the rural districts that has already taken place, we must most of all beware here lest we are too hasty, lest we are inadequately theoretical, lest we regard what is in process of being accomplished, but has not yet been realised, as having been accomplished. In the resolution which is being proposed to you by the commission elected by the committee, and which will be read to you by a subsequent speaker, you will find sufficient warning against this.

From the economic point of view, it is obvious that we must help the middle peasant. Theoretically, there is no doubt of this. But because of our habits, our level of culture, the inadequacy of the cultural and technical forces we are in a position to place at the disposal of the rural districts, and because of the helpless manner in which we often approach the rural districts, comrades frequently resort to coercion and thus spoil everything. Only yesterday a comrade gave me a pamphlet entitled *Instructions and Regulations on Party Work in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia*, issued by the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and in this pamphlet, for example, I find this on p. 41. "The whole burden of the emergency tax decree must be placed on the shoulders of the village kulaks and profiteers and *the middle element of the peasants generally*."[44] Well, well! These people have indeed "understood". This is either a printer's error—and it is impermissible that such printer's errors should be made—or a piece of rushed, hasty work, which shows how dangerous all haste is in this matter. Or—and this is the worst surmise of all, one I would not like to make with regard to the Nizhni-Novgorod comrades—they have simply failed to understand. It may very well be that it is an oversight.

We have, in practice, cases like the one related by a comrade in the commission. He was surrounded by peasants, and every one of them asked: "Tell me, am I a middle peasant or not? I have two horses and one cow.... I have two cows and one horse", etc. And this agitator, who tours the uyezds, is expected to possess an infallible thermometer with which to gauge every peasant and say whether he is a middle peasant or not. To do that you must know the whole history of the given peasant's farm, his relation to higher

and lower groups—and we cannot know that accurately.

Considerable practical ability and knowledge of local conditions are required here, and we do not yet possess them. You need not be ashamed to confess it; it must be admitted frankly. We were never utopians and never imagined that we would build communist society with the immaculate hands of immaculate Communists, born and educated in an immaculately communist society. That is a fairytale. We have to build communism out of the debris of capitalism, and only the class which has been steeled in the struggle against capitalism can do that. The proletariat, as you are very well aware, is not free from the shortcomings and weaknesses of capitalist society. It is fighting for socialism, but at the same time it is fighting against its own shortcomings. The best and foremost section of the proletariat, which carried on a desperate struggle in the cities for decades, was in a position to acquire in the course of that struggle the culture of life in the capital and other cities, and to a certain extent did acquire it. You know that even in advanced countries the rural districts were condemned to ignorance. Of course, we shall raise the level of culture in the rural districts, but that will be the work of many, many years, that is what our comrades everywhere are forgetting and what is being strikingly brought home to us by every word uttered by people who come from the rural districts; not by the intellectuals who work here, not by the officials—we have listened to them a lot—but by people who have in practice observed the work in the rural districts. It was these opinions that we found particularly valuable in the agrarian committee. These opinions will be particularly valuable now—I am convinced of that—for the whole Party Congress, for they come not from books, and not from decrees, but from experience.

All this obliges us to work for the purpose of introducing the greatest possible clarity into our attitude towards the middle peasant. This is very difficult, because *such clarity does not exist in reality*. Not only is this problem unsolved, it is *insoluble*, if you want to solve it *immediately and all at once*. There are people who say that there was no need to write so many decrees. They blame the Soviet Government for setting about writing decrees without knowing how they

were to be put into effect. These people, as a matter of fact, do not realise that they are sinking to the whiteguard position. If we had expected that life in the rural districts could be completely changed by writing a hundred decrees, we would have been absolute idiots. But if we had refrained from indicating in decrees the road that must be followed, we would have been traitors to socialism. These decrees, while in practice they could not be carried into effect fully and immediately, played an important part as propaganda. While formerly we carried on our propaganda by means of general truths, *we are now carrying on our propaganda by our work.* That is also preaching, but it is preaching by action—only not action in the sense of the isolated sallies of some upstarts, at which we scoffed so much in the era of the anarchists and the socialism of the old type. Our decree is a call, but not the old call "Workers, arise and overthrow the bourgeoisie!" No, it is a call to the people, it calls them to practical work. *Decrees are instructions which call for practical work on a mass scale.* That is what is important. Let us assume that decrees do contain much that is useless, much that in practice cannot be put into effect; but they contain material for practical action, and the purpose of a decree is to teach practical steps to the hundreds, thousands, and millions of people who heed the voice of the Soviet government. This is a trial in practical action in the sphere of socialist construction in the rural districts. If we treat matters in this way we shall acquire a good deal from the sum total of our laws, decrees, and ordinances. We shall not regard them as absolute injunctions which must be put into effect instantly and at all costs.

We must avoid everything that in practice may tend to encourage individual abuses. In places careerists and adventurers have attached themselves to us like leeches, people who call themselves Communists and are deceiving us, and who have wormed their way into our ranks because the Communists are now in power, and because the more honest government employees refused to come and work with us on account of their retrograde ideas, while careerists have no ideas, and no honesty. These people, whose only aim is to make a career, resort in the localities to coercion, and imagine they are doing a good thing. But in fact the result

of this at times is that the peasants say, "Long live Soviet power, but *down with the communia*!" (i.e., communism). This is not an invention; these facts are taken from real life, from the reports of comrades in the localities. We must not forget what enormous damage is always caused by lack of moderation, by all rashness, and haste.

We had to hurry and, by taking a desperate leap, to get out of the imperialist war at any cost, for it had brought us to the verge of collapse. We had to make most desperate efforts to crush the bourgeoisie and the forces that were threatening to crush us. All this was necessary, without this we could not have triumphed. But if we were to act in the same way towards the middle peasant it would be such idiocy, such stupidity, it would be so ruinous to our cause, that only provocateurs could deliberately act in such a way. The aim here must be an entirely different one. Here our aim is not to smash the resistance of obvious exploiters, to defeat and overthrow them—which was the aim we previously set ourselves. No, now that this main purpose has been accomplished, more complicated problems arise. You cannot create anything here by coercion. *Coercion applied to the middle peasants would cause untold harm*. This section is a numerous one, it consists of millions of individuals. Even in Europe, where it nowhere reaches such numbers, where technology and culture, urban life and railways are tremendously developed, and where it would be easiest of all to think of such a thing, nobody, not even the most revolutionary of socialists, has ever proposed adopting measures of coercion towards the middle peasant.

When we were taking power we relied on the support of the peasants as a whole. At that time the aim of all the peasants was the same—to fight the landowners. But their prejudice against large-scale farming has remained to this day. The peasant thinks that if there is a big farm, that means he will again be a farm-hand. That, of course, is a mistake. But the peasant's idea of large-scale farming is associated with a feeling of hatred and the memory of how landowners used to oppress the people. That feeling still remains, it has not yet died.

We must particularly stress the truth that here by the very nature of the case coercive methods can accomplish nothing.

The economic task here is an entirely different one; there is no upper layer that can be cut off, leaving the foundation and the building intact. That upper layer which in the cities was represented by the capitalists does not exist in the villages. *Here coercion would ruin the whole cause*. Prolonged educational work is required. We have to give the peasant, who not only in our country but all over the world is a practical man and a realist, concrete examples to prove that the "communia" is the best possible thing. Of course, nothing will come of it if hasty individuals flit down to a village from a city to chatter and stir up a number of intellectual-like and at times unintellectual-like squabbles, and then quarrel with everyone and go their way. That sometimes happens. Instead of evoking respect, they evoke ridicule, and deservedly so.

On this question we must say that we do encourage communes, but they must be so organised *as to gain the confidence of the peasants*. And until then we are pupils of the peasants and not their teachers. Nothing is more stupid than people who know nothing about farming and its specific features, rushing to the village only because they have heard of the advantages of socialised farming, are tired of urban life and desire to work in rural districts—it is most stupid for such people to regard themselves as teachers of the peasants in every respect. *Nothing is more stupid than the very idea of applying coercion in economic relations with the middle peasant.*

The aim is not to expropriate the middle peasant but to bear in mind the specific conditions in which the peasant lives, to learn from him methods of transition to a better system, *and not to dare to give orders*! That is the rule we have set ourselves. (*General applause*.) That is the rule we have endeavoured to set forth in our draft resolution, for in that respect, comrades, we have indeed sinned a great deal. We are by no means ashamed to confess it. We were inexperienced. Our very struggle against the exploiters was taken from experience. If we have sometimes been condemned on account of it, we can say, "Dear capitalist gentlemen, you have only yourselves to blame. If you had not offered such savage, senseless, insolent, and desperate resistance, if you had not joined in an alliance with the world bourgeoi-

sie, the revolution would have assumed more peaceful forms." Now that we have repulsed the savage onslaught on all sides we can change to other methods, because we are acting not as a narrow circle, but as a party which is leading the millions. The millions cannot immediately understand a change of course, and so it frequently happens that blows aimed at the kulaks fall on the middle peasants. That is not surprising. It must only be understood that this is due to historical conditions which have now been outlived and that the new conditions and the new tasks in relation to this class demand a new psychology.

Our decrees on peasant farming are in the main correct. We have no grounds for renouncing a single one of them, or for regretting a single one of them. But if the decrees are right, *it is wrong to impose them on the peasants by force.* That is not contained in a single decree. They are right inasmuch as they indicate the roads to follow, inasmuch as they call to practical measures. When we say, "Encourage associations", we are giving instructions which must be tested many times before the final *form* in which to put them into effect is found. When it is stated that we must strive to gain the peasants' voluntary consent, it means that they must be persuaded, and persuaded by practical deeds. They will not allow themselves to be convinced by mere words, and they are perfectly right in that. It would be a bad thing if they allowed themselves to be convinced merely by reading decrees and agitational leaflets. If it were possible to reshape economic life in this way, such reshaping would not be worth a brass farthing. It must first be proved that such association is better, people must be united in such a way that they become actually united and are not at odds with each other—it must be proved that association is advantageous. That is the way the peasant puts the question and that is the way our decrees put it. If we have not been able to achieve that so far, there is nothing to be ashamed of and we must admit it frankly.

We have so far accomplished only the fundamental task of every socialist revolution—that of defeating the bourgeoisie. That in the main has been accomplished, although an extremely difficult half-year is beginning in which the imperialists of the world are making a last attempt to crush us.

We can now say without in the least exaggerating that *they themselves understand that after this half-year their cause will be absolutely hopeless*. Either they take advantage now of our state of exhaustion and defeat us, an isolated country, or we emerge victorious not merely in regard to our country alone. In this half-year, in which the food crisis has been aggravated by a transport crisis, and in which the imperialist powers are endeavouring to attack us on several fronts, our situation is extremely difficult. But *this is the last difficult half-year*. We must continue to mobilise all our forces in the struggle against the external enemy who is attacking us.

But when we speak of the aims of our work in the rural districts, in spite of all the difficulties, and in spite of the fact that our experience has been wholly concerned with the immediate task of crushing the exploiters, we must remember, and never forget, that our aims in the rural districts, in relation to the middle peasant, are entirely different.

All the class-conscious workers—from Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, or Moscow—who have been to the rural districts related examples of how a number of misunderstandings which appeared to be irremovable, and a number of conflicts which appeared to be very serious, were removed or mitigated when intelligent working men came forward and spoke, not in the bookish language, but in a language understood by the peasants, when they spoke not as commanders who take the liberty of giving orders without knowing anything of rural life, but as comrades, explaining the situation and appealing to their sentiments as working people against the exploiters. And by such comradely explanation they accomplished what could not be accomplished by hundreds of others who conducted themselves like commanders and superiors.

That is the spirit that permeates the resolution we are now submitting to you.

I have endeavoured in my brief report to dwell on the underlying principles, on the general political significance of this resolution. I have endeavoured to show—and I should like to think that I have succeeded—that from the point of view of the interests of the revolution as a whole we are

making no change of policy, we are not changing the line. The whiteguards and their henchmen are shouting, or will shout, that we are. Let them shout. We do not care. We are pursuing our aims in a most consistent manner. We must transfer our attention from the aim of suppressing the bourgeoisie to the aim of arranging the life of the middle peasant. We must live in peace with him. In a communist society the middle peasants will be on our side only when we alleviate and improve their economic conditions. If tomorrow we could supply one hundred thousand first-class tractors, provide them with fuel, provide them with drivers—you know very well that this at present is sheer fantasy—the middle peasant would say, "I am for the communia" (i.e., for communism). But in order to do that we must first defeat the international bourgeoisie, we must compel them to give us those tractors, or so develop our productive forces as to be able to provide them ourselves. That is the only correct way to pose this question.

The peasant needs the industry of the towns; he cannot live without it, and it is in our hands. If we set about the task properly, the peasant will be grateful to us for bringing him these products, these implements and this culture from the towns. They will be brought to him not by exploiters, not by landowners, but by his fellow-workers, whom he values very highly, but values in a practical manner, for the actual help they give, at the same time rejecting—and quite rightly rejecting—all domineering and "orders" from above.

First help, and then endeavour to win confidence. If you set about this task correctly, if every step taken by every one of our groups in the uyezds, the volosts, the food procurement groups, and in every other organisation is made properly, if every step of ours is carefully checked from this point of view, we shall gain the confidence of the peasant, and only then shall we be able to proceed farther; What we must now do is to help him and advise him. This will not be the orders of a commander, but the advice of a comrade. The peasant will then be entirely on our side.

This, comrades, is what is contained in our resolution, and this, in my opinion, must become the decision of the Congress. If we adopt this, if it serves to determine the work

of all our Party organisations, we shall cope with the second great task before us.

We have learned how to overthrow the bourgeoisie, how to suppress them, and we are proud of the fact. But we have not yet learned how to regulate our relations with the millions of middle peasants, how to win their confidence, and we must frankly admit it. But we have understood the task, we have set it, and we say in all confidence, with full knowledge and determination, that we shall cope with this task—and then socialism will be absolutely invincible. (*Prolonged applause.*)

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SPEECH IN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION TO CLOSE THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE MARCH 23

Comrades, I cannot possibly agree with the preceding speaker, because I am sure that under no circumstances will you go straight to work in the rural districts after this evening. We members of the commission assumed that we were not speaking at this Congress only for the benefit of the gathering in this small hall, but for the benefit of the whole of Russia, which will not only peruse the decisions of our Congress, but will also want to know how much interest the Party is displaying in the question of work in the rural districts. Therefore, it is necessary to hear what the comrades from the districts have to say. If you spend an hour or an hour and a half on this, the work in the rural districts will not suffer in the least. Therefore, on behalf of the commission, I earnestly request that you do not grudge this hour or hour and a half. It is not likely that the practical workers who will speak here will add much that is new, but for the newspaper-reading public all over Russia these few hours of our work will be very beneficial.

8
RESOLUTION
ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE MIDDLE PEASANTS

Basing itself on the Party Programme adopted on March 22, 1919, insofar as it concerns work in the rural areas, and giving full support to the law already promulgated by the Soviet government on socialist land settlement and the measures for the transition to socialist farming, the Eighth Congress recognises that at the present time it is particularly important to adhere more strictly to the line of the Party in respect of the middle peasants, to display a more considerate attitude towards their needs, end arbitrary action on the part of the local authorities, and make an effort towards agreement with them.

1) To confuse the middle peasants with the kulaks and to extend to them in one or another degree measures directed against the kulaks is to violate most flagrantly not only all the decrees of the Soviet government and its entire policy, but also all the basic principles of communism, according to which agreement between the proletariat and the middle peasants is one of the conditions for a painless transition to the abolition of all exploitation in the period of decisive struggle waged by the proletariat to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

2) The middle peasants, who have comparatively strong economic roots owing to the lagging of agricultural techniques behind industrial techniques even in the leading capitalist countries, to say nothing of Russia, will continue to exist for quite a long time after the beginning of the proletarian revolution. Therefore, the tactics of the functionaries of the Soviets in the villages, as well as of Party functionaries,

must envisage a long period of co-operation with the middle peasants.

3) The Party must at all costs ensure that all Soviet functionaries in the countryside have a clear and thorough grasp of the axiom of scientific socialism that the middle peasants are not exploiters since they do not profit by the labour of others. Such a class of small producers cannot lose by socialism, but, on the contrary, will gain a great deal by casting off the yoke of capital which exploits it in a thousand different ways even in a most democratic republic.

The correctly applied policy of Soviet power in the countryside, therefore, ensures alliance and agreement between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasants.

4) While encouraging co-operatives of all kinds as well as agricultural communes of middle peasants, representatives of Soviet power must not allow the slightest coercion to be used in setting them up. Associations are only worth while when they have been set up by the peasants themselves, on their own initiative, and the benefits of them have been verified in practice. Undue haste in this matter is harmful, for it can only strengthen prejudices against innovations among the middle peasants.

Representatives of Soviet power who permit themselves to employ not only direct but even indirect compulsion to bring peasants into communes must be brought strictly to account and removed from work in the countryside.

5) All arbitrary requisitioning, i.e., requisitioning not in conformity with the exact provisions of laws issued by the central authority, must be ruthlessly punished. The Congress insists on the strengthening of control in this field by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, People's Commissariat of the Interior, and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

6) At the present time the extreme chaos which has been caused in all countries of the world by the four years of imperialist war in the predatory interests of the capitalists, and which has become particularly acute in Russia, places the middle peasants in a difficult position.

In view of this, the law issued by the Soviet government on the emergency tax, as distinct from all the laws issued by all the bourgeois governments in the world, makes a point

of laying the burden of the tax wholly on the kulaks, the inconsiderable number of peasant exploiters who particularly enriched themselves during the war. The middle peasants must be taxed very mildly, so that the sum levied is fully within their means and not burdensome to them.

The Party demands, in any case, lenience towards the middle peasants in collecting the emergency tax, even if this reduces the total revenue.

7) The socialist state must extend the widest possible aid to the peasants, mainly by supplying the middle peasants with products of urban industries and, especially, improved agricultural implements, seed and various materials in order to raise efficiency in agriculture and ensure improvement of the peasants' working and living conditions.

If the present economic chaos does not allow the immediate and full implementation of these measures, it remains the duty of local Soviet authorities to explore all possible avenues to render the poor and middle peasants any real aid to support them at the present difficult moment. The Party finds it necessary to establish a large state fund for this purpose.

8) In particular, efforts must be made to give real and full effect to the law issued by the Soviet government which requires of state farms, agricultural communes, and all other similar associations that they render immediate and all-round assistance to the middle peasants in their neighbourhood. Only on the basis of such actual assistance is it possible to achieve agreement with the middle peasants. Only in this way can and must their confidence be won.

The Congress draws the attention of all Party workers to the need to put into effect immediately all the points set forth in the agrarian section of the Party Programme, namely:

(a) regulation of the use of land by the peasants (elimination of scattered holdings, the open field system, etc.), (b) supply of improved seeds and artificial fertilisers to the peasants, (c) improvement of the breeds of the peasants' livestock, (d) spreading of agronomical knowledge, (e) agronomical assistance to the peasants, (f) repair of the peasants' farm implements at repair shops belonging to the Soviets, (g) organisation of centres hiring out implements, experi-

mental stations, model fields, etc., (h) improvements to the peasants' land.

9) Peasants' co-operative associations with the object of increasing agricultural production, and especially of processing farm produce, improvements to the peasants' land, support of handicraft industries, etc., must be accorded extensive aid, both financial and organisational, by the state.

10) The Congress reminds all concerned that neither the decisions of the Party nor the decrees of Soviet power have ever deviated from the line of agreement with the middle peasants. In the cardinal matter of the organisation of Soviet power in the countryside, for instance, a circular letter signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissar for Food was issued when the Poor Peasants' Committees were established, pointing to the need to include in these Committees representatives of the middle peasants. When the Poor Peasants' Committees were abolished, the All-Russia Congress of Soviets again pointed to the need to include representatives of the middle peasants in the volost Soviets. The policy of the workers' and peasants' government and the Communist Party must in the future too be permeated by this spirit of agreement between the proletariat and the poor peasants on the one hand, and the middle peasants on the other.

9

SPEECH CLOSING THE CONGRESS
MARCH 23

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Comrades, all the items on our agenda have been dealt with. Permit me to say a few words in closing the Congress.

Comrades, it is not only the loss of one of our best organisers and practical leaders, Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, that has made the time at which we assembled here a very difficult one. It is a particularly difficult time because international imperialism is making a last and exceptionally strenuous effort to crush the Soviet Republic—of this there is now no doubt. We do not doubt that the fierce attacks launched in the West and the East, accompanied as they are by a number of whiteguard revolts and attempts to dismantle the railway line in several places, are deliberate measures apparently decided on in Paris by the Entente imperialists. We all know, comrades, how difficult it was for Russia, after four years of imperialist war, to take up arms in defence of the Soviet Republic against the imperialist plunderers. We all know what a burden this war is, how it is exhausting us. But we also know that this war is being fought with redoubled vigour and dauntless courage only because for the first time in world history, an army, an armed force, has been created, which knows what it is fighting for; and because, for the first time in world history, workers and peasants are making incredible sacrifices in the knowledge that they are defending the Soviet Socialist Republic, the rule of the working people over the capitalists; they know that they are defending the cause of the world proletarian socialist revolution.

Amidst these difficult conditions we accomplished a great deal in a very short time. We managed to endorse our programme unanimously, as was the case with every vital decision of the Congress. We are convinced that in spite of its numerous literary and other shortcomings, this programme has already gone into the history of the Third International as the programme which sums up the results of the new stage in the world movement for the emancipation of the proletariat. We are convinced that in many countries, where we have far more allies and friends than we imagine, the mere translation of our programme will provide the most effective answer to the question as to what has been done by the Russian Communist Party, which is one of the units of the international proletariat. Our programme will serve as extremely effective material for propaganda and agitation; it is a document which will lead the workers to say, "Here are our comrades, our brothers; here our common cause is becoming reality."

Comrades, we succeeded in passing a number of other important decisions at this Congress. We approved of the formation of the Third, Communist International, which was founded here in Moscow. We adopted a unanimous decision on the military question. Vast though the differences of opinion may have appeared at first, diverse as may have been the views of the many comrades who very frankly criticised the shortcomings of our military policy, we on the commission found no difficulty in arriving at an absolutely unanimous decision, and we shall leave this Congress convinced that our chief defender, the Red Army, for the sake of which the whole country is making such incalculable sacrifices, will find in every delegate to the Congress, in every member of the Party, a warm, unselfish and devoted assistant, leader, friend and collaborator.

Comrades, we were able to solve the organisational problems confronting us with such ease because the solutions had been indicated by the entire history of the relations between the Party and the Soviets. All we were called upon to do was sum up. On the subject of our work in the rural districts; the Congress, in a unanimous decision speedily arrived at, laid down our policy on a question that is particularly important and particularly difficult, and one that

in other countries is even regarded as insoluble—the attitude of the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie towards the vast masses of middle peasants. We are all convinced that this Congress decision will help to consolidate our power. We are convinced that in the trying period through which we are now passing, when the imperialists are making their final effort to overthrow the Soviet government by force, and when an acute food shortage and the chaotic state of the transport have once again rendered the position of hundreds, thousands and millions of people desperate, the resolution we adopted and the spirit which animated the delegates to this Congress will help us to bear these trials and to live through this difficult half-year.

We are convinced that *this will be the last difficult half-year*. This conviction of ours is greatly strengthened by the news we announced to the Congress the other day—the news of the success of the proletarian revolution in Hungary. Up to now Soviet power has been victorious in only one country, among the peoples which once constituted the former Russian Empire; and short-sighted people, who found it exceptionally difficult to abandon routine and old habits of thought (even though they may have belonged to the socialist camp), imagined that this surprising swing towards proletarian Soviet democracy was due entirely to the peculiar conditions prevailing in Russia; they thought that perhaps the specific features of this democracy reflected, as in a distorting mirror, the peculiar features of former, tsarist Russia. If there was ever any foundation for such an opinion, there is certainly none whatever now. Comrades, the news received today gives us a picture of the Hungarian revolution. We learn from today's news that the Allied powers have presented a brutal ultimatum to Hungary demanding free passage for their troops. The bourgeois government, seeing that the Allied powers wanted to move their troops through Hungary, seeing that Hungary would be subjected to the frightful sufferings of a new war—this government of bourgeois compromisers voluntarily resigned, voluntarily opened negotiations with the Communists, our Hungarian comrades, who were in prison, and voluntarily admitted that there was no way out of the situation except by transferring power to the working people. (*Applause.*)

It was said that we were usurpers. At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, the only words with which the bourgeoisie and many of their followers described our revolution were "violence" and "usurpation". Even now we hear statements to the effect that the Bolshevik government is holding on by force, although we have repeatedly demonstrated that this is absurd. But if such absurdities could be uttered in the past, they have now been silenced by what has occurred in Hungary. Even the bourgeoisie has realised that there can be no government authority except that of the Soviets. The bourgeoisie of a more cultured country sees more clearly than our bourgeoisie did on the eve of October 25 that the country is perishing, that trials of increasing severity are being imposed on the people, and that, therefore, political power must be transferred to the Soviets, that the workers and peasants of Hungary, the new, Soviet, proletarian democracy must save her.

Comrades, the difficulties which face the Hungarian revolution are immense. Hungary is a small country compared with Russia and can be stifled by the imperialists much more easily. However great the difficulties which undoubtedly still face Hungary, we have achieved a *moral victory* in addition to a victory for Soviet power. A most radical, democratic and compromising bourgeoisie realised that at a moment of extreme crisis, when a new war is menacing a country already exhausted by war, a Soviet government is a historical necessity, that in such a country there can be no government but a Soviet government, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Comrades, behind us there is a long line of revolutionaries who sacrificed their lives for the emancipation of Russia. The lot of the majority of these revolutionaries was a hard one. They suffered the persecution of the tsarist government, but it was not their good fortune to see the triumph of the revolution. A better fortune has fallen to our lot. Not only have we seen the triumph of our revolution, not only have we seen it become consolidated amidst unprecedented difficulties, create new forms of government and win the sympathy of the whole world, but we are also seeing the seed sown by the Russian revolution springing up in Europe. This imbues us with the absolute and unshakable conviction that no mat-

ter how difficult the trials that may still befall us, and no matter how great the misfortunes that may be brought upon us by that dying beast, international imperialism, that beast will perish, and socialism will triumph throughout the world. (*Prolonged applause*.)

I declare the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party closed.

WIRELESS MESSAGE OF GREETING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC MARCH 22, 1919

This is Lenin. Sincere greetings to the proletarian government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and especially to Comrade Béla Kun.[45] I conveyed your greetings to the Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). They were received with tremendous enthusiasm. We shall send you the decisions of the Moscow Congress of the Third Communist International, as well as a report on the military situation, as soon as possible. It is absolutely necessary to maintain constant radio communication between Budapest and Moscow. Accept my communist greetings and hearty handshake, *Lenin*.

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Published according to the Russian translation

RECORD OF WIRELESS MESSAGE TO BÉLA KUN MARCH 23, 1919

Lenin to Béla Kun in Budapest

Please inform us what real guarantees you have that the new Hungarian Government will actually be a communist, and not simply a socialist, government, i.e., one of traitor-socialists.

Have the Communists a majority in the government? When will the Congress of Soviets take place? What does the socialists' recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat really amount to?

It is altogether beyond doubt that it would be a mistake merely to imitate our Russian tactics in all details in the specific conditions of the Hungarian revolution. I must warn you against this mistake, but I should like to know where you see real guarantees.

So that I may be certain that the answer has come to me from you personally, I ask you to indicate in what sense I spoke to you about the National Assembly when you last visited me in the Kremlin.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1932

Published according to the manuscript

REPLY TO AN OPEN LETTER BY A BOURGEOIS SPECIALIST

Today I received the following:

"*An open letter of a 'specialist' to Comrade Lenin.*

"I read in *Izvestia* your report on the specialists, and I cannot suppress a cry of indignation. Don't you really understand that not a single honest specialist, if he has retained the least shred of self-respect, can agree to go to work merely for the sake of the animal comforts with which you are offering to provide him? Have you retired so deeply into the seclusion of the Kremlin that you fail to see the life that is going around you, that you do not see how many of the Russian specialists, though not government Communists, are real workers, who acquired their special knowledge at the cost of extreme effort not from the capitalists and not for the purpose of making money, but in persistent struggle against the deadly conditions of student and academic life under the old system? These conditions have not been improved for them under the communist government (to me this does not coincide with my conception of the communist system). Against these absolutely genuine proletarians—even though they come from different classes—who have served the working people by word, deed and thought from the very first days of their conscious life—against these, whom you lump together in a single contaminated heap of 'intellectuals', you incite ignorant, upstart Communists, former policemen, minor officials and shopkeepers, who in the provinces often constitute a large section of the 'local authorities', and it is difficult to describe the horrors of the humiliation and suffering they are experiencing. Continuous denunciation and accusations of the absurdest description, fruitless but extremely humiliating house searches, threats of shooting, requisitions and confiscations, invasion of the most private sides of personal life (a commander of a unit quartered in an educational establishment at which I teach actually ordered me to sleep in one bed with my wife), these are the conditions under which many specialists in establishments of higher learning were compelled to work until very lately. But all these 'petty-bourgeois' have remained at their posts and faithfully fulfilled the moral obligations they undertook to preserve, no matter at what sacrifice,

culture and knowledge for those who humiliated and insulted them at the instigation of their leaders. They realised that their personal misfortunes and sorrows must not be confused with the question of building a new and better life; and this helped, and is helping them now, to bear it, and continue with their work.

"But believe me, from among these people whom you, without discrimination, have christened bourgeois, counter-revolutionaries, saboteurs, and so forth, only because they conceive of the approach to the future socialist and communist system differently from the way you and your disciples conceive of it, you will not buy a single man at the price that you think of offering. After all, the 'specialists' who go to work for you in order to save their skins will not benefit the country in any way. A specialist is not a machine. He cannot be simply wound up and set going. Without inspiration, without the internal spark of life, without the urge to create, not a single specialist, will produce anything, no matter how highly he is paid. But a volunteer, working and creating among comrades and collaborators who respect him and regard him as a guide who knows his business, and not as a suspect to be kept under the surveillance of a communist commissar of the 1919 crop, will put his heart and soul into his work.

"If you don't want to have 'specialists' working merely for the sake of their salary, if you want new, honest volunteers to join the specialists who are already co-operating with you in some places, not out of fear, but conscientiously, in spite of the fact that they disagree with you on principle on many questions, in spite of the humiliating conditions into which your tactics often place them, in spite of the unprecedented bureaucratic chaos that reigns in many Soviet offices and which sometimes wrecks even most vital undertakings—if you want all this, then first of all purge your Party and your government offices of the unscrupulous *Mitlaüfer*,* comb out these self-seekers, adventurers, scoundrels and bandits who, sheltering under the banners of communism, are either, owing to their despicable natures, grabbing public property, or, owing to their stupidity, are cutting at the roots of public life by their absurd, disruptive fussiness.

"If you want to 'use' the specialists, do not buy them, but learn to respect them as men, and not as livestock and machines that you need for a certain time.

"*M. Dukelsky*,

"Professor at Voronezh Agricultural Institute. President of the Central Board of State Enterprises in the Leather Industry."

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* Casual fellow-travellers.—*Ed.*

This is a wrathful letter, but I think it is sincere, and one I would like to answer.

After all is said and done, I think the author is governed mainly by personal irritation, which has robbed him of the ability to discuss events from the mass point of view, and from the point of view of their actual consecutiveness.

According to the author, we Communists repelled the specialists by "christening" them with all sorts of bad names.

This was not the case.

The workers and peasants set up the Soviet government after overthrowing the bourgeoisie and bourgeois parliamentarism. It is not difficult to see today that this was not a "gamble", not an "act of folly" on the part of the Bolsheviks, but the beginning of a world-wide change of two eras in world history—the era of the bourgeoisie and the era of socialism, the era of capitalist parliamentarism and the era of the Soviet state institutions of the proletariat. If, a year or so ago, the majority of the intellectuals would not (and partly could not) see this, are we to blame?

The sabotage was started by the intelligentsia and the government officials, the bulk of whom are bourgeois and petty bourgeois. These terms are a class characterisation, a historical appraisal, which may be right or wrong, but which must not be regarded as terms of abuse, or vituperation. It was inevitable that the workers and peasants should be enraged by the sabotage of the intelligentsia, and if anybody is to "blame" for this, it can only be the bourgeoisie and their willing and unwilling accomplices.

Had we "incited" anybody against the "intelligentsia", we would have deserved to be hanged for it. Far from inciting the people against the intelligentsia, we on the contrary, in the name of the Party, and in the name of the government, urged the necessity of creating the best possible working conditions for the intelligentsia. I have been doing this since April 1918, if not earlier. I do not know which issue of *Izvestia* the author refers to, but it is very strange for a man who is accustomed to study politics, that is to say, to analyse events, from the mass and not from the personal point of view, to hear that to advocate higher pay necessarily expresses the unworthy, or generally evil, desire to "buy". I hope the respected author will forgive me for saying so, but,

on my word of honour, this reminded me of that literary character the "Muslin Miss".*

Let us assume that the question is one of paying high salaries to a special, hand-picked group, that is, a group which formerly, for general social reasons, did not, and could not receive higher salaries. In that case, there might be grounds for assuming that the government's object is to "buy" this group. But when we are discussing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, who *always* received higher salaries, how is it possible to regard the proposal that it is necessary, for a time, to pay a lower, but higher than the average, salary as a snare, or an "insult" unless one wishes to adopt a tone of furious irritation and carping criticism of everything.

Not only is his whole argument incongruous, but the author defeats himself when he relates, as of some great wrong done to him, as of some deep humiliation, the case when the commander of a unit quartered in a certain educational establishment ordered the professor to sleep in one bed with his wife.

Firstly, to the extent that the desire of intellectual people to have two beds, a bed for the husband and one for the wife, is legitimate (and it is undoubtedly legitimate), to that extent, it is necessary to have a salary higher than the average to satisfy that desire. The author of the letter cannot but know that on the "average" the number of beds in Russia was always less than one per Russian citizen!

Secondly, was the commander of the unit wrong in this case? If he was not rude, offensive, and did not deliberately humiliate the professor, and so forth (which *might have been* the case, and for which he should have been punished), if, I repeat, this was *not the case*, then, in my opinion, *he was right*. The men were worn out, they had not seen a bed, or probably a decent lodging in general, for months on end. They are defending the Socialist Republic under incredible difficulties, under inhuman conditions; did they not have a right to take a bed for a short time to rest in? The soldiers and their commander were right.

* This expression was current in Russia in the nineteenth century; it was applied to young girls with limited interests brought up on patriarchal country estates.—*Ed*.

We do not want to reduce the general conditions of life of the intellectuals to the average, at one stroke, and consequently we are opposed to reducing their salaries to the average. But everything must be subordinated to the needs of the war, and intellectuals must put up with some inconvenience so that the soldiers may be able to rest. This is not a humiliating, but a just demand.

The author demands that intellectuals should be treated like comrades. He is right. We demand that too. The programme of our Party contains such a demand clearly, plainly and precisely formulated. If, on the other hand, groups of non-Party intellectuals, or of intellectuals who because of their party allegiance are politically hostile to the Bolsheviks, as clearly formulate the demand to their adherents, "be comradely towards weary soldiers, and towards over-worked workers who are enraged by centuries of exploitation", then manual and non-manual workers will draw closer together at an extremely rapid rate.

The author demands that we should purge our Party and government offices of "unscrupulous, casual fellow-travellers, of self-seekers, adventurers, scoundrels and bandits".

That is a just demand. We ourselves put it forward long ago, and are fulfilling it. We are not giving a free run to "newcomers" in our Party. The Party Congress even decided on a re-registration of members.[46] We shoot all bandits, self-seekers and adventurers that we catch, and will continue to do so. But if this process of purging is to proceed more thoroughly and quickly, sincere non-Party intellectuals must help us. When they form groups of people personally acquainted with each other, and in their name call for loyal service in Soviet offices, call upon them to "serve the working people", to use the term of the open letter, then the birth-pangs of the new social order will be much shortened and eased.

N. Lenin

March 27, 1919

Pravda No. 67,
March 28, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

ON THE CANDIDACY OF M. I. KALININ FOR THE POST OF CHAIRMAN OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SPEECH AT THE TWELFTH SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MARCH 30, 1919

Comrades! To find a person who could take the place of Comrade Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov in full is an exceedingly difficult task, for it is next to impossible for any one man to be at once a leading Party worker, moreover one who knows the history of the Party, and an excellent judge of people capable of choosing leading functionaries for the Soviets. It would be impossible to expect any one comrade to assume all the functions that Comrade Sverdlov took care of alone—on this all were agreed when candidacies were discussed in the Party—and hence we shall have to entrust the various functions to whole collegiums that will meet daily and direct the different spheres of work. As far as the chairman is concerned, we must ensure that he expresses the Party line in respect of the peasantry.

You know that our approach to the middle peasants as set forth at the Party Congress introduces no change in our general policy. The tasks we have outlined in regard to the middle peasants must be carried out once our primary problem—the suppression of the bourgeoisie—has been solved. The question of the attitude to the middle peasants is a more acute problem for us than for our comrades in Europe, and we must make sure that we have at the head of the Soviet state a comrade who can demonstrate that our decision in this matter will really be carried out.

I believe that we can and must find a comrade who will devote himself wholly to carrying out the line of the leading Party in respect of the middle peasants. We know that at present the problem of gathering and transmitting information is particularly acute. We know that the break-down of transport facilities and the existence of civil war, which at times interrupts communications between the centre and entire regions, not to speak of separate gubernias—we know that under the circumstances this problem requires special attention.

We know that we can solve this problem if we find a comrade with the necessary experience and knowledge of the life of the middle peasants, and I believe that the candidacy of which you read in today's papers meets all these requirements. This is the candidacy of Comrade Kalinin.

Here we have a comrade who has been engaged in Party work for nearly twenty years. He is a peasant from Tver Gubernia, who has close connections with peasant farming which he constantly renews and freshens. Petrograd workers have witnessed his ability to approach wide sections of the working masses who had had no Party experience; where other propagandists and agitators failed to find the right, comradely approach to them, Comrade Kalinin succeeded. All this is especially important at the present time. Of course, the middle peasantry as a whole, all the best elements among them, are giving us the resolute support that will overcome all difficulties and put down the revolt of the rural kulaks and that insignificant minority of the rural masses who follow them. We know that our main task in a country of small peasants is to ensure an indestructible alliance of the workers and the middle peasants. Our agrarian measures—complete abolition of landed proprietorship and determined assistance to the middle peasants—have already produced results, and in the course of the past year have led to an increase in the number of middle peasants. But in the localities people have frequently been appointed to administrative posts who were not up to the job.

There have been cases of abuses, but we are not to blame for them. We know that we have done everything we could to enlist the intelligentsia, but there were political differences

that kept us apart. We know that the epoch of bourgeois parliamentarism has ended, that the sympathy of the workers of the whole world is with Soviet power, and that the victory of Soviet power is inevitable, no matter how many proletarian leaders the bourgeoisie may kill, as they are doing in Germany. The sum total of their experience will, in the long run, inevitably bring the intelligentsia into our ranks, and we shall acquire the material with which we can govern. We shall see to it that alien elements who have attached themselves to Soviet power are removed—indeed, they are one cause of dissatisfaction which we are not afraid to admit is legitimate. We must pay maximum attention to the fight against this evil. At the Party Congress we decided firmly to make this line of conduct obligatory for all functionaries.

We must say that we see no way of introducing socialist farming other than through a series of comradely agreements with the middle peasants, to whom we must turn more and more often.

We know also that comrades who bore the brunt of the work in the period of the revolution and were completely engrossed in this work, were unable to approach the middle peasants as they should have, they could not avoid making mistakes, each of which was seized upon by our enemies, each of which gave rise to certain doubts and complicated the middle peasant's attitude toward us.

That is why it is very important for this purpose to find a comrade possessing the qualities I have mentioned. We must help him with our organisational experience, so that the middle peasants should see that they have one of their own as the highest functionary in the whole Soviet Republic, so that the decision of our Party calling for a proper approach to the middle peasant and declaring our resolve to examine, study every step we make and test it in the light of the experience we have gained will not remain on paper.

We know that the numbers of our allies are growing, that they will increase many times over in the next few months, but for the time being the burden rests wholly on our country, which is greatly ruined and impoverished. The load is more than the middle peasant can carry. We must go to him and do everything we can, we must make him under-

stand and show him in practice that we are firmly resolved to carry out the decisions of our Party Congress.

That is why the candidacy of a man like Comrade Kalinin ought to have the unanimous support of us all. His candidacy will enable us to organise practically a series of direct contacts between the highest representative of Soviet power and the middle peasants; it will help to bring us closer to them.

This aim cannot he achieved at once, but we have no doubt that the decision we propose to make will be the correct one, though we know that we have little practical experience in this respect. Let the highest representative of the Soviet Republic himself be the first, with our joint assistance, to begin acquiring this experience, gather the full sum of knowledge, and check up; then we can be certain that we shall solve the task facing us, that Russia will become not only the model of a country where the dictatorship of the proletariat has been firmly established and the bourgeoisie ruthlessly suppressed—this has already been done—but also the model of a country where the relations between the urban workers and the middle peasants are satisfactorily arranged on the basis of comradely support and new experience; this is one of the main guarantees of the complete victory of the proletarian revolution.

That is why I take it upon myself to recommend to you this candidacy—the candidacy of Comrade Kalinin.

Brief report published in the newspaper *Izvestia* No. 70, April 1, 1919

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SPEECHES ON GRAMOPHONE RECORDS[47]

Recordings made at
the end of March 1919

Published according to
the gramophone records

SPEECHES ON GRAMOPHONE RECORDS[47]

Recordings made at the end of March 1919

Published according to the gramophone records

1

IN MEMORY OF COMRADE YAKOV MIKHAILOVICH SVERDLOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

All those who have worked day after day with Comrade Sverdlov, now realise full well that it was his exceptional organising talent which ensured for us that of which we have been so proud, and justly proud. He made it possible for us to carry on united, efficient, organised activities worthy of the organised proletarian masses, without which we could not have achieved success, and which answered fully the requirements of the proletarian revolution. The memory of Comrade Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov will serve not only as a symbol of the revolutionary's devotion to his cause, not only as the model of how to combine a practical, sober mind, practical ability, the closest contact with the masses and ability to guide them, but also a pledge that ever-growing masses of proletarians will march forward to the complete victory of the communist revolution.

2
THE THIRD, COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

In March of this year of 1919, an international congress of Communists was held in Moscow. This congress founded the Third, Communist International, an association of the workers of the whole world who are striving to establish Soviet power in all countries.

The First International, founded by Marx, existed from 1864 to 1872. The defeat of the heroic workers of Paris—of the celebrated Paris Commune—marked the end of this International. It is unforgettable, it will remain for ever in the history of the workers' struggle for their emancipation. It laid the foundation of that edifice of the world socialist republic which it is now our good fortune to be building.

The Second International existed from 1889 to 1914, up to the war. This was the period of the most calm and peaceful development of capitalism, a period without great revolutions. During this period the working-class movement gained strength and matured in a number of countries. But the workers' leaders in most of the parties had become accustomed to peaceful conditions and had lost the ability to wage a revolutionary struggle. When, in 1914, there began the war, that drenched the earth with blood for four years, the war between the capitalists over the division of profits, the war for supremacy over small and weak nations, these leaders deserted to the side of their respective governments. They betrayed the workers, they helped to prolong the slaughter, they became enemies of socialism, they went over to the side of the capitalists.

The masses of workers turned their backs on these traitors to socialism. All over the world there was a turn towards the

revolutionary struggle. The war proved that capitalism was doomed. A new system is coming to take its place. The old word socialism had been desecrated by the traitors to socialism.

Today, the workers who have remained loyal to the cause of throwing off the yoke of capital call themselves Communists. All over the world the association of Communists is growing. In a number of countries Soviet power has already triumphed. Soon we shall see the victory of communism throughout the world; we shall see the foundation of the World Federative Republic of Soviets.

Published according to
the gramophone record
verified with the manuscript

3
COMMUNICATION ON THE WIRELESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH BÉLA KUN

I knew Comrade Béla Kun very well when he was still a prisoner of war in Russia; and he visited me many times to discuss communism and the communist revolution. Therefore, when news of the Hungarian communist revolution was received, and in a communication signed by Comrade Béla Kun at that, we wanted to speak to him and ascertain exactly how the revolution stood. The first communication we received about it gave us some grounds for fearing that, perhaps, the so-called socialists, traitor-socialists, had resorted to some deception, had got round the Communists, the more so that the latter were in prison. And so, the day after the first communication about the Hungarian revolution was received, I sent a wireless message to Budapest, asking Béla Kun to come to the apparatus, and I put a number of questions to him of such a nature as to enable me to make sure that it was really he who was speaking. I asked him what real guarantees there were for the character of the government and for its actual policy. Comrade Béla Kun's reply was quite satisfactory and dispelled all our doubts. It appears that the Left Socialists had visited Béla Kun in prison to consult him about forming a government. And it was only these Left Socialists, who sympathised with the Communists, and also people from the Centre who formed the new government, while the Right Socialists, the traitor-socialists, the irreconcilables and incorrigibles, so to speak, left the Party, and not a single worker followed them. Later communications showed that the policy of the Hungarian Government was most firm and so Communist in trend that

while we began with workers' control of industry and only gradually began to socialise industry, Béla Kun, with his prestige, his conviction that he was backed by vast masses, could at once pass a law which converted all the industrial undertakings in Hungary that were run on capitalist lines into public property. Two days later we became fully convinced that the Hungarian revolution had at once, with extraordinary rapidity, taken the communist road. The bourgeoisie voluntarily surrendered power to the Communists of Hungary. The bourgeoisie demonstrated to the whole world that when a grave crisis supervenes, when the nation is in danger, the bourgeoisie is unable to govern. And there is only one government that is really a popular government, a government that is really beloved of the people—the government of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Long live Soviet power in Hungary!

4
AN APPEAL TO THE RED ARMY

Comrades, Red Army men! The capitalists of Britain, America and France are waging war against Russia. They are taking revenge on the Soviet workers' and peasants' republic for having overthrown the power of the landowners and capitalists and thereby set an example to all the nations of the globe. The capitalists of Britain, France and America are helping with money and munitions the Russian landowners who are bringing troops from Siberia, the Don and North Caucasus against Soviet power for the purpose of restoring the rule of the tsar and the power of the landowners and capitalists. But this will not happen. The Red Army has closed its ranks, has risen up and driven the landowners' troops and whiteguard officers from the Volga, has recaptured Riga and almost the whole of the Ukraine, and is marching towards Odessa and Rostov. A little more effort, a few more months of fighting the enemy, and victory will be ours. The Red Army is strong because it is consciously and unitedly marching into battle for the peasants' land, for the rule of the workers and peasants, for Soviet power.

The Red Army is invincible because it has united millions of working peasants with the workers who have now learned to fight, have acquired comradely discipline, who do not lose heart, who become steeled after slight reverses, and are more and more boldly marching against the enemy, convinced he will soon be defeated.

Comrades, Red Army men! The alliance of the workers and peasants of the Red Army is firm, close and insoluble.

The kulaks, the very rich peasants, are trying to foment revolts against Soviet power, but they constitute an insignificant minority. They rarely succeed in fooling the peasants, and then not for long. The peasants know that only in alliance with the workers can they vanquish the landowners. Sometimes, in the rural districts people call themselves Communists who are actually the worst enemies of the working people, bullies who hang on to the authorities in pursuit of their own selfish aims, and who resort to deception, commit acts of injustice and wrong the middle peasant. The workers' and peasants' government has firmly decided to fight against these people and clear them out of the countryside. The middle peasants are not enemies but friends of the workers, friends of Soviet power. The class-conscious workers and genuine Soviet people treat the middle peasants as comrades. The middle peasants do not exploit the labour of others, they do not grow rich at other people's expense, as the kulaks do; the middle peasants work themselves, they live by their own labour. The Soviet government will crush the kulaks, will comb out of the villages those who treat the middle peasants unjustly and, come what may, will pursue the policy of alliance between the workers and all the working peasants—both poor and middle peasants.

This alliance is growing all over the world. The revolution is drawing nigh, it is everywhere maturing. A few days ago it was victorious in Hungary. In Hungary, Soviet power, workers' government, has been established. This is what all nations will inevitably do.

Comrades, Red Army men! Be staunch, firm and united. March boldly forward against the enemy. Victory will be ours. The power of the landowners and the capitalists, broken in Russia, will be defeated throughout the world.

March 29

5
THE MIDDLE PEASANTS

The most important question now confronting the Communist Party, the question on which most attention was concentrated at the last Party Congress, is that of the middle peasants.

Naturally, the first question usually asked is, what is a middle peasant?

Naturally, Party comrades have often related how they have been asked this question in the villages. The middle peasant, we say in reply, is a peasant who does not exploit the labour of others, who does not live on the labour of others, who does not take the fruits of other people's labour in any shape or form, but works himself, and lives by his own labour.

Under capitalism there were fewer peasants of this type than there are now, because the majority of the peasants were in the ranks of the impoverished, and only an insignificant minority, then, as now, were in the ranks of the kulaks, the exploiters, the rich peasants.

The middle peasants have been increasing in number since the private ownership of land was abolished, and the Soviet government has firmly resolved at all costs to establish relations of complete peace and harmony with them. It goes without saying that the middle peasant cannot immediately accept socialism, because he clings firmly to what he is accustomed to, he is cautious about all innovations, subjects what he is offered to a factual, practical test and does not decide to change his way of life until he is convinced that the change is necessary

It is precisely for this reason that we must know, remember and put into practice the rule that when Communist workers go into rural districts they must try to establish comradely relations with the middle peasants, it is their duty to establish these comradely relations with them; they must remember that working peasants who do not exploit the labour of others are the comrades of the urban workers and that we can and must establish with them a voluntary alliance inspired by sincerity and confidence. Every measure proposed by the communist government must be regarded merely as advice, as a suggestion to the middle peasants, as an invitation to them to accept the new order.

Only by co-operation in the work of testing these measures in practice, finding out in what way they are mistaken, eliminating possible errors and achieving agreement with the middle peasant—only by such co-operation can the alliance between the workers and the peasants be ensured. This alliance is the main strength and the bulwark of Soviet power; this alliance is a pledge that socialist transformation will be successful, victory over capital will be achieved and exploitation in all its forms will be abolished.

6
WHAT IS SOVIET POWER?

What is Soviet power? What is the essence of this new power, which people in most countries still will not, or cannot, understand? The nature of this power, which is attracting larger and larger numbers of workers in every country, is the following: in the past the country was, in one way or another, governed by the rich, or by the capitalists, but now, for the first time, the country is being governed by the classes, and moreover, by the masses of those classes, which capitalism formerly oppressed. Even in the most democratic and freest republics, as long as capital rules and the land remains private property, the government will always be in the hands of a small minority, nine-tenths of which consist of capitalists, or rich men.

In this country, in Russia, for the first time in the world history, the government of the country is so organised that only the workers and the working peasants, to the exclusion of the exploiters; constitute those mass organisations known as Soviets, and these Soviets wield all state power. That is why, in spite of the slander that the representatives of the bourgeoisie in all countries spread about Russia, the word "Soviet" has now become not only intelligible but popular all over the world, has become the favourite word of the workers, and of all working people. And that is why, notwithstanding all the persecution to which the adherents of communism in the different countries are subjected, Soviet power must necessarily, inevitably, and in the not distant future, triumph all over the world.

We know very well that there are still many defects in the organisation of Soviet power in this country. Soviet

power is not a miracle-working talisman. It does not, overnight, heal all the evils of the past—illiteracy, lack of culture, the consequences of a barbarous war, the aftermath of predatory capitalism. But it does pave the way to socialism. It gives those who were formerly oppressed the chance to straighten their backs and to an ever-increasing degree to take the whole government of the country, the whole administration of the economy, the whole management of production, into their own hands.

Soviet power is the road to socialism that was discovered by the masses of the working people, and that is why it is the true road, that is why it is invincible.

7

HOW THE WORKING PEOPLE CAN BE SAVED FROM THE OPPRESSION OF THE LANDOWNERS AND CAPITALISTS FOR EVER

The enemies of the working people, the landowners and capitalists say that the workers and peasants cannot live without them. "If it were not for us," they say, "there would be nobody to maintain order, to give out work, and to compel people to work. If it were not for us everything would collapse, and the state would fall to pieces. We have been driven away, but chaos will bring us back again." But this sort of talk by the landowners and capitalists will not confuse, intimidate, or deceive the workers and peasants. An army needs the strictest discipline; nevertheless the class-conscious workers succeeded in uniting the peasants, succeeded in taking the old tsarist officers into their service, succeeded in building a victorious army.

The Red Army established unprecedentedly firm discipline—not by means of the lash, but based on the intelligence, loyalty and devotion of the workers and peasants themselves.

And so, to save the working people from the yoke of the landowners and capitalists for ever, to save them from the restoration of their power, it is necessary to build up a great Red Army of Labour. That army will be invincible if it is cemented by labour discipline. The workers and peasants must and will prove that they can properly distribute labour, establish devoted discipline and ensure loyalty in working for the common good, and can do it themselves,

without the landowners and in spite of them, without the capitalists and in spite of them.

Labour discipline, enthusiasm for work, readiness for self-sacrifice, close alliance between the peasants and the workers—this is what will save the working people from the oppression of the landowners and capitalists for ever.

8
ANTI-JEWISH POGROMS

Anti-Semitism means spreading enmity towards the Jews. When the accursed tsarist monarchy was living its last days it tried to incite ignorant workers and peasants against the Jews. The tsarist police, in alliance with the landowners and the capitalists, organised pogroms against the Jews. The landowners and capitalists tried to divert the hatred of the workers and peasants who were tortured by want against the Jews. In other countries, too, we often see the capitalists fomenting hatred against the Jews in order to blind the workers, to divert their attention from the real enemy of the working people, capital. Hatred towards the Jews persists only in those countries where slavery to the landowners and capitalists has created abysmal ignorance among the workers and peasants. Only the most ignorant and downtrodden people can believe the lies and slander that are spread about the Jews. This is a survival of ancient feudal times, when the priests burned heretics at the stake, when the peasants lived in slavery, and when the people were crushed and inarticulate. This ancient, feudal ignorance is passing away; the eyes of the people are being opened.

It is not the Jews who are the enemies of the working people. The enemies of the workers are the capitalists of all countries. Among the Jews there are working people, and they form the majority. They are our brothers, who, like us, are oppressed by capital; they are our comrades in the struggle for socialism. Among the Jews there are kulaks, exploiters and capitalists, just as there are among the Russians, and among people of all nations. The capitalists strive to sow and foment hatred between workers of different faiths, differ-

ent nations and different races. Those who do not work are kept in power by the power and strength of capital. Rich Jews, like rich Russians, and the rich in all countries, are in alliance to oppress, crush, rob and disunite the workers.

Shame on accursed tsarism which tortured and persecuted the Jews. Shame on those who foment hatred towards the Jews, who foment hatred towards other nations.

Long live the fraternal trust and fighting alliance of the workers of all nations in the struggle to overthrow capital.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE ALL-RUSSIA EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION APRIL 1, 1919

The All-Russia Extraordinary Commission reports that information has been received from Petrograd to the effect that agents of Kolchak, Denikin and the Allies made an attempt to blow up the Petrograd water main. In the cellars, explosives and an infernal machine were found, which a special unit took away to destroy, but as a result of a premature explosion the commander of the unit was killed and ten Red Army men were wounded.

In some places attempts are being made to blow up bridges and to dislocate railway traffic.

Attempts are being made to destroy the permanent way and cut off Red Moscow and Petrograd from food supplies.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks are taking an active part in fomenting strikes and in calling for the overthrow of Soviet power.

In view of this information, the Council of Defence orders you to take the most urgent measures to suppress every attempt to cause explosions, to wreck railways and to foment strikes.

The Council of Defence orders you to call upon all Extraordinary Commission workers to be vigilant, and also orders you to inform the Council of Defence of all measures you take.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin),
Chairman of the Council of Defence

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EXTRAORDINARY PLENARY MEETING OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES APRIL 3, 1919

1

REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SITUATION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

Comrades, I must commence my report on the domestic and foreign situation of the Soviet Republic by stating that in the coming few months, with the approach of spring, we shall again be faced with an extremely grave situation. I think that the conditions both of the Civil War and of the war against the Entente—I will deal with them when I speak of the international situation—enable us to say, even if we are very cautious, that the half-year, the middle of which we have now reached, will be the last difficult half-year; the French and British capitalists will not be strong enough to launch another attack similar to the one they are now developing in full. On the other hand, all our Red Army's achievements in the Ukraine and the Don, which we are able to consolidate, will greatly alleviate our internal situation, will provide grain and coal, food and fuel. For the time being, however, while the struggle is still going on and we are encountering enormous difficulties in collecting grain in the Ukraine with the roads now impassable owing to the spring thaw, the situation is extremely grave.

We have said more than once that the whole strength of Soviet power rests on the confidence and class-consciousness of the workers. We have more than once demonstrated that numerous as may be the enemies that surround us now, and the spies that the Entente sends into this country and who are assisted by people who are actually helping the

whiteguards, probably without realising it, we have never for a moment shut our eyes to the fact that every word uttered here will be misinterpreted, that the agents of the whiteguards will carefully take note of our admissions. But we say: let them! We shall benefit far more from the straightforward and candid truth, because we are sure that although this truth is harsh, nevertheless, if it is clearly heard, every class-conscious worker, every working peasant, will draw the only correct conclusion that can be drawn from it.

In the long run, they will draw from it the only possible conclusion that our cause is close to victory all over the world, and desperately hard as the conditions of the masses of the working people may be, weary, starving and exhausted as they are by four years of imperialist war and another two years of the most frightful Civil War—grave and acute though the situation may be at the present time, we have the most serious chances of gaining victory not only in Russia, but all over the world. That is why, although the next four or five months will be very severe, we shall once again succeed in overcoming our difficulties, and thus prove to our enemies, prove to the combined capitalists of the whole world, that their attack on Russia must fail.

At the present moment they are undoubtedly operating according to a preconceived plan, making attempts in the West and the East to crush us by force of arms so as to save Krasnov's doomed gangs. Yesterday we received news of the capture of Mariupol. Thus, Rostov is caught in a half-circle. In short, the Entente countries are exerting all their efforts to rescue Krasnov and to strike us a severe blow this very spring. They are undoubtedly operating in agreement with Hindenburg. A comrade from Latvia told us about the conditions under which our Lettish comrades are living. The greater part of the country has suffered misfortunes such as Moscow workers cannot conceive—the misfortunes of invasion and the repeated devastation of the countryside by hordes of moving troops. The Germans are now marching on Dvinsk in order to cut off Riga. In the North they are being assisted by the Estonian whiteguards using money sent by Britain, and with the aid of volunteers sent by the Swedes and Danes, who are entirely in the pay of the multimillion-

aires of Britain, France and America. They are operating according to a common plan which is quite clear to us; they are taking advantage of the fact that by their bloody suppressions in Germany they have weakened the movement of the Spartacists and revolutionaries. And although they realise that they are at their last gasp, they, nevertheless, find the situation sufficiently opportune to place some troops at Hindenburg's disposal, to step up the attack on tormented and tortured Latvia from the west, and to threaten us. On the other hand, Kolchak has achieved a series of victories in the east, and is thus paving the way for the last and most decisive onslaught of the Entente countries.

And as has always been the case, they are not confining themselves to an attack from without, they are operating inside this country by means of plots, rebellions, attempts at bomb-throwing and blowing up the water main in Petrograd, which you read about in the newspapers, attempts to dismantle railway lines, such as those made not far from Samara, which is now the main line that supplies us with grain from the East. Part of this grain we lost; it was captured by Kolchak. Attempts were made to damage the permanent way of the Kursk-Kharkov Railway, on which we were beginning to transport the coal the Red Army had recaptured in the Donets Basin. When all this is taken together, it becomes clear that the Entente countries, the French imperialists and multimillionaires, are making their last attempt to crush Soviet power by force of arms.

And the Mensheviks and the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries still fail to realise that the struggle is drawing to a close and that we are engaged in a most desperate and relentless war; they continue to advocate either strikes or the cessation of the Civil War, which in any case is helping the whiteguards. I shall speak about them later on; at present I merely want to show that the situation is really grave.

This spring all the forces of the international capitalists want to fight the last battle with us. Fortunately, they are the forces of a decrepit, dying, hopelessly sick old man—international capitalism. But be that as it may, very big military forces have been mustered against us; Kolchak, in particular, is now bringing up all his reserves against us, his

gangs of volunteer whiteguards are of imposing dimensions, and he is receiving the assistance of Britain and America in the form of vast quantities of arms and munitions. That is why the present situation demands a clear realisation of the difficulties that face the Soviet Republic.

We are convinced that the masses of the working people understand what the war is about. They know that the next few months will decide the fate of our revolution, and to a large extent of the world revolution. They understand that the attempts of the capitalists to crush Soviet Russia have become so fierce, that they are attacking us so furiously, because they realise that in their own countries they are faced by the same enemy—the Bolshevik movement. The growth of the movement in those countries is equally rapid and irresistible.

Our difficulties in food and transport make our position particularly grave and compel us again and again to appeal for the aid of all class-conscious workers. For four years the transport system was gradually ruined by the imperialist war, and in Russia, a backward country, traces of this have not yet been removed, and it will take many months, if not years, of persevering effort to remove them. But it is impossible to work without fuel. Only lately have we begun to receive coal from the Donets Basin. You know that the British have robbed us of our Baku oil supplies. They have captured many of the ships in the Caspian Sea, they have occupied Grozny and are preventing us from using the oil. Neither industry nor the railways can work without fuel. We must exert our efforts to the utmost.

Once again we say to all our comrades that we must enlist larger forces for work on food supplies and transport. The transport situation is such that in Eastern Russia, beyond the Volga, we have accumulated millions of poods of grain—10 to 20 million poods have already been acquired and are in store—but cannot transport it. We lost part of this grain as Kolchak's troops advanced, captured Ufa and compelled our forces to retreat. This loss is a very severe one, and we feel it very much. Transport work calls for the utmost exertion of effort; at every meeting the workers should ask themselves how they can help to improve transport. Cannot women do the work here in place of the men, and the men be

sent either to the repair shops or to help the railwaymen? The workers are the best judges of what should be done, because they know which men to put on which job. Practical people know best, and they must devise new ways and means of assisting. We hope, we are convinced, that our Commissariat of Railways, in conjunction with the Commissariat of Food, have already achieved a certain degree of success. No matter what lies our enemies may spread, this goods transport month during which passenger traffic is suspended has already brought about an improvement; but ten times more effort must be exerted to achieve greater success. Some figures were published in yesterday's issue of *Izvestia*, the most important of which I will here quote. At the beginning of March, an average of 118 carloads of food of which 25 consisted of grain, were arriving in Moscow every day. By the end of March, the average daily arrivals had increased to 209 carloads of food, of which 47 contained grain. This is an almost twofold increase. It proves that the stern measure of suspending passenger traffic is correct and justified, and shows that we have assisted the starving population of Moscow, Petrograd and of the whole industrial region. But this is by no means all that can be done. And later, when the roads become quite impassable, we shall be faced with a much more difficult and hungry time. That is why we say that in this field the most unrelaxing, energetic efforts must be made. Mainly, we must rely upon the masses of the workers and not count upon the intellectuals who, although they have come to work for us, have a large number of useless people among them.

We must also reckon with the situation in the Ukraine. During the year when the entire Ukraine was occupied by the Germans, and the whole of the Don region was in a sorry state, we suffered a great deal. Now, however, our position is improving. In the Ukraine there are 258 million poods of grain, of which 100 million have already been earmarked for delivery. But the whole trouble is that the Ukrainian peasants have been frightfully intimidated by the Germans and by German looting. I have heard that the peasants there have been so intimidated by the Germans that although they know what the position of the Soviet power is here, they still hesitate to seize the landed estates.

Meanwhile, the time is approaching for spring field work; but the Ukrainian peasants have suffered the horrors of German looting to such an extent that to this day they are extremely irresolute. I must say that guerrilla warfare has been going on there all the time. In the South it is still going on. There are no regular troops there, owing to which complete victory has not yet been won. We have moved our regular troops in, but this is not enough. We must greatly intensify our efforts, and that is why I insist that at every meeting of workers the question of food supplies and the question of transport definitely must be raised. In the very near future we have to decide the question of how to relieve the situation, and how to utilise what is now available.

We must bear firmly in mind that only with the aid of the forces of the working class can we stand firmly on our feet, and achieve our brilliant victories; and that is why we must send the best forces of the proletariat to the front. We must send leading functionaries to the front and if some office suffers as a result of it, we shall, of course, sustain some loss, but it will not be fatal. If there is a shortage of workers in the army, however, that will certainly be fatal. A defect in our army up to now has been that it lacks cohesion and is not sufficiently organised; all help in this sphere must come from the workers, and on them we must place all our hopes. Only those workers who have gone through the whole struggle, who can relate all their experiences and all they have suffered can influence the army and turn the peasants into the politically-conscious fighters that we need.

That is why we have come here again and decided to call you all together to inform you of the serious state of our transport system, due to the general grave position that we are in. We stress the importance of our holding out for another three or four months, and that only then will complete victory be ours. But for this we need forces. Where are these forces to be found? Is it not clear that only the workers, those who have borne the whole burden of the chaos, bore the whole burden when the struggle changed to whiteguard invasions and thereby acquired great experience—is it not clear that only these workers, only these vanguard contingents, can help us? We know perfectly well that they are terribly exhausted, that they are worn out by the superhuman efforts

they are called upon to make. We know all this, but nevertheless, we now say to you here that we must strain every nerve, we must concentrate our minds on rallying all forces to achieve a brilliant victory for the revolution. We are now entering the most difficult, the most trying period, and we must act like revolutionaries. We must recruit our forces from the masses of the working people.

Yesterday a meeting was held of the influential leaders of the trade union movement—both the Moscow and the national leaders. And at this meeting everybody agreed that it is necessary, at the present moment, to enlist for this work the middle stratum of workers, whom everybody has up to now regarded as being incapable of this type of work. Now, however, it is perfectly clear that we must send this middle stratum to relieve our exhausted functionaries. Before doing so, however, those who have been engaged in this work up to now must instruct the newcomers. We must husband our forces, and for a time we must send the middle stratum of workers to take the place of our leading functionaries. We must send tens of thousands of such workers into the field. We must not be afraid that they will not do the work as well as the experienced functionaries did. If we put them into responsible positions, then the mistakes that they may make at first will not have serious consequences. The important thing for us is to put them in the foremost responsible posts. There they will be able to exert an effort and develop their activities, because they will be able to operate confidently, they will know that they are backed by experienced leading workers who have already had a year's experience of work in Russia. They will know that at critical moments these more experienced comrades will come to their aid and ease their task. This new stratum of workers will be able to do their work well if the advanced workers promote them to leading positions. We can do this without causing any damage, because this large stratum has a proletarian instinct, a proletarian understanding and sense of duty. We may rely upon it, and we may say that it will help us in a time of difficulty. It is a specific feature of Russia that in every critical situation she has always been able to find masses of people who could be moved forward, who were a reserve in which she could find new forces when the

old forces began to grow thin. Yes, the advanced workers are overtired, and the next contingent will not do the work so well; but that is not disastrous, we shall not suffer from it, we shall not ruin our cause if we send these new forces into the field, guide them, and not allow our cause to die.

Under these circumstances I must speak about the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Lately, the Soviet government has begun to close down their newspapers and to arrest them. Some worker comrades, seeing this, say: "So those Bolsheviks"—I among that number—"who induced us to make certain concessions to the petty-bourgeois democrats were wrong. What was the use of making these concessions if we must now close down their newspapers and arrest them? Is this consistency?"

My answer is this. In a country like Russia, where agriculture is concentrated in the hands of the petty-bourgeois elements, we cannot hold out for long without the support of this petty-bourgeois stratum. At the present time, this stratum is marching towards the goal not by a straight road, but in zigzags. If I am pursuing an enemy who is retreating not by a straight road but in zigzags, then I, too, must proceed in zigzags in order to overtake him. To speak in the language of politics, the petty-bourgeois masses stand between labour and capital, and these masses must be beaten a hundred times to make them understand that the alternative is either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the working class. Those who are aware of this, understand the present situation. The workers understand it. Experience and a whole series of observations have taught them that only one or the other of these two systems of government is possible—either the absolute power of the working class, or the absolute power of the bourgeoisie—there can be no middle, or third, course. The working class learned this long ago from its strike and revolutionary struggle; The petty bourgeoisie cannot learn this at once; hundreds of everyday facts have failed to teach and accustom the petty bourgeoisie to this idea, and they continue to dream of uniting with the big bourgeoisie; for they cannot understand that either the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is inevitable.

Experience of Kolchak taught the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that it was no accident that in the midst of a furious and desperate struggle conducted with foreign assistance, democracy had nothing to give. Two forces are operating upon them—and there are no other forces but these—either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, or the power and complete dictatorship of the working class; no middle course was ever of any use, nothing came of it anywhere. Nor did anything come of the Constituent Assembly. This the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and the petty bourgeoisie learned from their own experience.

When the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks said: "We shall abandon Kolchak and all those who support him and the intervention of the Entente," it was not only hypocrisy. It was not only a political ruse, although some of these people did think they would fool the Bolsheviks and get an opportunity to play the old game again. We saw through this ruse and, of course, took measures against it. But when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries said this, it was not only hypocrisy and cunning; many of them did it *in good faith*. Among them there is not only the group of writers, but also a petty-bourgeois stratum of technicians, engineers, and so forth. When the Mensheviks announced that they were opposed to the intervention of the Entente, we invited them to work with us, and they willingly accepted our invitation. But now we are quite right in persecuting them, persecuting the petty-bourgeois stratum, because this stratum is extremely obtuse. This was revealed in the Kerensky period and also by their present conduct. When they came to work for us they said they had abandoned politics, and would work willingly. We told them in reply that we needed Menshevik officials, because they were not embezzlers of state funds, and not Black Hundreds who worm their way into our ranks, call themselves Communists and do us mischief. If these people believe in the Constituent Assembly we tell them to go on believing, not only in the Constituent Assembly, but even in God, but do their work properly and keep out of politics. An increasing number of them realise that they have disgraced themselves in politics. They howled that Soviet power was a monstrous invention, possible only in barbarous Russia. They said that the dissolution of the

Constituent Assembly was an act by barbarians whom tsarism had produced. And this was repeated in Europe. Now news comes from Europe that Soviet power is coming to take the place of bourgeois Constituent Assemblies all over the world. These are lessons that are being taught to all intellectuals who come to work for us. We now have twice as many civil servants working for us as we had six months ago. We have gained by accepting these civil servants who do their work better than Black Hundreds. When we invited them to come to work for us they said they were afraid of Kolchak, they preferred us, but would not help us, they said they would talk like pure parliamentarians, just as if they were sitting in a Constituent Assembly; and we shouldn't dare to touch them, because they were democrats. But we say to these groups who talk about the Constituent Assembly that if they talk like that much longer we shall pack them off to Kolchak and to Georgia. (Applause.) Polemics are started, and the opposition of a legal group takes shape. We shall allow no opposition. The imperialists of the whole world have got us by the throat, they are trying to defeat us by all the force of an armed attack and we must fight a life-and-death struggle. If you have come here to help us, then do so, but if you are going to publish newspapers and incite the workers to strike, and these strikes cause the death of our Red Army men at the front, and every day of a strike causes tens of thousands of our factory workers to suffer privations, pangs of hunger—the pangs which are causing us so much concern—then you may be right from the Constituent Assembly point of view, but from the standpoint of our struggle and the responsibility we bear, you are wrong, you cannot help us, so get out, go to Georgia, go to Kolchak, or else you will go to prison. And that is what we shall do with them.

Comrades, I hope we shall all unanimously adopt the resolution to be submitted to you at the end of the meeting. In it we have endeavoured to formulate the necessary instructions, the reasons for which I have given in my report. I should now like to deal with two questions—the position of the middle peasants, and the International situation, which is extremely important.

We discussed the question of the middle peasants at our Party Congress and decided on the line our Party should

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

pursue towards them. Our Party elected to a responsible post, the post of Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, a post which is all the more responsible for the fact that until recently it was occupied by that exceptionally talented organiser Comrade Sverdlov, for this post our Party chose Comrade Kalinin, a St. Petersburg worker who still has connections with the rural districts. There is a report in the newspapers today that a certain Comrade Kalinin was assassinated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but it is not this Kalinin. This shows what methods the Socialist-Revolutionaries resort to. Comrade Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin is a middle peasant from Tver Gubernia, which he visits every year. The middle peasants constitute the largest stratum of the population, and their numbers have increased since our revolution owing to the fact that we abolished the landed estates. The peasantry benefited by our revolution because they seized all the landed estates and, as a consequence, the number of middle peasants greatly increased. If there is discontent among the middle peasants, we say that it is caused from above, and we must ascertain to what extent it is legitimate, considering our lack of forces. You, here in the capital, know how difficult it is to combat bureaucracy and red tape. We are obliged to employ the old civil servants because no other are available. They must be re-educated, taught; but this takes time. We may appoint new workers to responsible posts in the food supply organisations, but there is still an exceedingly large number of old civil servants in the State Control Commission, and we suffer from red tape and bureaucracy. We are trying to appoint new workers to take part in control in the Commissariat of Railways and to work side by side with the experts. This is the way we are combating bureaucracy and red tape. What effort it costs, even here in Moscow! And what is going on in the rural districts? There, people who call themselves members of the Party are often scoundrels, whose lawlessness is most brazen. And how often we have to contend with inexperienced people, who confuse the kulaks with the middle peasants! A kulak is one who lives on the labour of others, who robs others of the fruits of their labour, and takes advantage of their poverty. The middle peasants do not exploit others and are not exploited themselves; they earn their

livelihood on their small farms by their own labour. Not a single socialist in the world ever proposed that the small farmer should be deprived of his property. The small farmer will exist for many years to come. No decrees will have any effect here; we must wait until the peasants have learned to be guided by experience. When they see that collective farming is far better, they will come over to our side. We must win their confidence. Here we must wage a struggle against abuses. We can fight only with the aid of the urban workers, because they have close connections with the peasants, and they can supply us with hundreds of thousands of functionaries. We know perfectly well that no appointments of comrades to high posts, no circulars, and no decrees will be of any avail, and that the workers of every group, of every circle, must set to work themselves—they have special connections with the rural districts.

I said that the first rule for the workers must be—exert all efforts to help to prosecute the war. The second rule should be—help the middle peasants by keeping in contact with them, so as not to allow a single serious enemy attack in the rural districts to go unpunished. We must point out that the urban workers are bringing assistance to the middle peasants, their comrades, because the middle peasants are also workers, but workers who have been reared under other conditions, who live isolated from each other in rural ignorance from which it is more difficult for them to extricate themselves. And we must know that the perseverance of our comrades will establish contacts with the middle peasants. An infinitesimal number of peasants will become kulaks, will foment rebellion—that we know. That being the case, how can we help, how can we win the confidence of the middle peasants, how can we help them to combat all sorts of abuses? If we have done little in this field it is not our fault, for we had to fight the bourgeoisie. This has to be realised. Every worker must put the question this way—we, the workers as a whole, have contacts with the middle peasants, and we will utilise these contacts, and see to it that every middle peasant learns of our help not only from the appointment of Comrade Kalinin, but also from the fact that he is obtaining some real assistance, if only slight, if only in the form of slight but comradely advice. The peasants will now

appreciate such assistance more than anything else. They must be made to understand why the difficulties of our position prevent us from giving them the assistance they need, assistance in the form of urban culture. The peasants need city-made goods, urban culture, and we must give them these things. Only when the proletariat gives the peasants this form of assistance will they realise that the help of the workers is different from that of the exploiters. To help the peasants to rise to the urban level—this is the task that every worker who has connections with the rural districts must set himself. The urban workers must say to themselves that now, in the spring, when the food situation has become particularly acute, they must go to the peasants' assistance. And if everybody does even a tiny share of this work, we shall see that our edifice has not merely a facade, and that our cause of safeguarding Soviet power will be achieved; for the peasants say: "Long live Soviet power, long live the Bolsheviks, but down with the communia!" They curse the "communia" that is being organised in a stupid way and forced upon them. They are suspicious of everything that is forced upon them, and quite rightly so. We must go to the middle peasants, we must help them, teach them, but only in the field of science and socialism. In the field of agriculture we must learn from them. There you have the task that confronts us directly.

We now come to the international situation. I say that the imperialists of Britain, France and America are making their last attempt to bring us to our knees, but they will fail. Difficult as the situation is, we can say with confidence that we shall defeat international imperialism. We shall defeat the multimillionaires of the whole world. There are two reasons why we shall beat them. First, because they are wild beasts who are so absorbed in fighting among themselves, that they continue to bite each other and fail to see that they are on the brink of a precipice; secondly, because Soviet power is growing uninterruptedly all over the world. Not a day passes but what we read about this in the newspapers. Today we read a message wirelessed from an American press office in Lyons to the effect that the Committee of Ten has now been reduced, and that there are now only four—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando. These are

the leaders of four nations, but even they cannot reach an agreement. Britain and America do not want France to have the coal profits. They are wild beasts who have plundered the whole world and are now quarrelling over the prey. These four men have shut themselves up in close conclave so that, God forbid, rumours may not get about—they are all such great democrats—but they themselves set rumours afloat by sending out wireless messages about not agreeing to give up the coal profits. A French comrade who saw the French prisoners of war told me that these prisoners say: "We were told that we must go to Russia to fight the Germans because the Germans had destroyed our country. But now there is an armistice with Germany; whom are we going to fight?" They were not told a word about that. The number of people who are asking themselves this question is day by day growing into millions and millions. These people have experienced the horrors of the imperialist war, and they say: "What are we going to fight for?" In the past, the Bolsheviks taught them what they were fighting for in underground leaflets; but now the imperialists send out wireless messages saying that Britain does not agree to allow France to have the coal profits. Thus, as a French journalist expressed it, they are rushing from room to room in a vain effort to solve the problem. They are trying to decide who should get most, and they have been fighting each other for five months. These wild beasts have lost their self-control, and will go on fighting until nothing is left of them except their tails. And we say that our international position, which at first was so precarious that they could have crushed us in several weeks, is now, when they are quarrelling over the loot and are beginning to fly at each others' throats—now our position is much better. They promised the soldiers that if they conquered Germany they would receive untold benefits. They are arguing whether to compel Germany to pay sixty or eighty milliard. This is an extremely important question of principle, an extremely interesting one, especially if the workers or peasants are told about it. But if they go on arguing for long they will not get even one milliard. This is what is most interesting!

That is why we say, without exaggerating in the least, not even as socialists, but simply and soberly weighing up the

forces that are mustered against us, that the position of the Soviet Republic is improving day by day and hour by hour. Our enemies cannot agree among themselves. Five months have passed since they won their victory, but they have not concluded peace. Recently, the French Chamber again voted hundreds of millions for war preparations. They are digging their own grave, and there are people over there who will lower them into this grave and pile plenty of earth over them. (*Applause.*) This is because the Soviet movement is growing in all countries. And the Hungarian revolution has shown that when we say that we are fighting not only for ourselves, but for Soviet power all over the world, that blood of the Red Army men is being shed not only for the sake of our starving comrades, but for the victory of Soviet power all over the world—the example of Hungary has shown that this is not merely prophecies and promises, but the most actual and immediate reality.

In Hungary the revolution was most unusual in form. The Hungarian Kerensky, who over there is called Károlyi, voluntarily resigned, and the Hungarian compromisers—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—realised that they must go to the prison where our Hungarian comrade Béla Kun, one of the best of the Hungarian Communists, was confined. They went to him and said: "You must take power!" (*Applause.*) The bourgeois government resigned. The bourgeois socialists, the Hungarian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, merged with the Hungarian Bolshevik Party and formed a united party and a united government. Comrade Béla Kun, our comrade, and a Communist who had trodden the whole practical path of Bolshevism in Russia, said to me when I spoke to him by wireless: "I have not got a majority in the government, but I shall win because the masses are behind me, and we are convening a congress of Soviets." This is a revolution of world-historical importance.

Up to now all the European workers have been told lies about Soviet Russia. They have been told that there is no government but sheer anarchy in Russia. The Bolsheviks are just a crowd of quarrelsome people. Recently, the French Minister, Pichon, said about Soviet Russia, "It is anarchy, they are violators, usurpers!" "Look at Russia," said the German Mensheviks to their workers. "War, famine and ruin!

Is this the sort of socialism you want?" And in this way they have been intimidating the workers. But Hungary was an example of a revolution born in a different way. Hungary will undoubtedly have to go through a severe struggle against the bourgeoisie—that is inevitable. But the fact is that when those beasts, the British and French imperialists, foresaw the possibility of revolution in Hungary they wanted to crush it, to prevent its birth. The difficulty of our position was that we had to give birth to Soviet power in opposition to patriotism. We had to break down this patriotism and conclude the Brest peace. This was a most desperate, furious and sanguinary operation. The bourgeoisie in the neighbouring countries realised who would have to govern. Who, if not the Soviet? It was like the old days when kings, kinglets and princes saw that their power was waning and they said, "We must have a constitution; let the bourgeoisie come and govern!" And if the king was feeble, he was given a pension, or a sinecure. What the kings or kinglets experienced fifty or sixty years ago, the world bourgeoisie is now experiencing. When the British and French imperialists submitted unprecedented demands to the Hungarian capitalists, the latter said, "We cannot fight. The people will not follow us; but we are Hungarian patriots and we want to resist. What kind of government should we have? A Soviet government." The Hungarian bourgeoisie admitted to the world that it had resigned voluntarily and that the only power in the world capable of guiding the nation in a moment of crisis was Soviet power. (*Applause.*) That is why the Hungarian revolution, owing to its having been born in a totally different way from ours, will reveal to the whole world that which was concealed in Russia—i.e., that Bolshevism is bound up with a new, proletarian, workers' democracy, that is taking the place of the old parliament. Time was when the workers were deceived and enslaved by capital. Today, world Soviet power is coming into being to take the place of the old bourgeois parliament; and this Soviet power has won the sympathies of all workers because it is the power of the working people, the power of millions who rule and govern themselves. Perhaps they govern badly, as we do in Russia, but our conditions are exceedingly difficult. In a country where the bourgeoisie will not offer such furious re-

sistance, the tasks of the Soviet government will be easier; it will be able to operate without the violence, without the bloodshed that was forced upon us by the Kerenskys and the imperialists. We shall reach our goal even by this, more difficult, road. Russia may have to make greater sacrifices than other countries; this is not surprising considering the chaos that we inherited. Other countries will travel by a different, more humane road, but at the end of it lies the same Soviet power. That is why the example of Hungary is of decisive importance.

People learn from experience. It is impossible to prove merely by words that Soviet power is just. The example of Russia alone was not sufficiently intelligible to the workers of all countries. They knew that there was a Soviet there, they were all in favour of the Soviet, but they were daunted by the horrors of the sanguinary struggle. The example of Hungary will be decisive for the proletarian masses, for the European proletariat and working peasants. In a moment of difficulty there is no one to rule the country but the Soviet government.

We remember what old people say, "The children have grown up, they have made their way in the world, now we can die." But we do not intend to die. We are marching to victory. But when we see children like Hungary, where Soviet power already exists, we say that we have done our work not only on a Russian, but also on an international scale; that we shall surmount all our desperate difficulties and win full victory, so that we shall live to see the day when the world Soviet republic will be added to the Russian and the Hungarian Soviet Republics. (*Applause.*)

Pravda Nos. 76 and 77,
April 9 and 10, 1919

Published according to
the verbatim report

2

RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SITUATION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

The Soviet Republic, in the harsh but glorious struggle it is waging at the head of all peoples, is entering the most difficult period of its existence. The next few months will be months of crisis. The Entente is making its last, desperate effort to crush us by force of arms. The food situation is becoming extremely acute. The transport system is in a serious state.

Only the greatest effort can save us. Victory is nevertheless fully possible. The revolution in Hungary provides conclusive proof of the rapid growth of the Soviet movement in Europe, and of its impending victory. We have more allies in all countries than we ourselves imagine. To achieve the final victory we must hold on for another four or five months, which, perhaps, will be the bitterest and most dangerous. And in days like these, reckless men and adventurers who call themselves Mensheviks and Left and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, while paying lip-service to Soviet power and protesting against the armed intervention of the Entente, are fomenting strikes or agitating for concessions to freedom to trade or for the cessation of the Civil War, forgetting that we have offered peace to all, and that our war is a just, legitimate and unavoidable war of defence. Obviously, by this sort of agitation they give most active and effective assistance to the whiteguards, who are making a last effort to force us into disaster. The meeting condemns these masked enemies of the people.

It declares to all those Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who are really prepared to help us in our difficult struggle, that the workers' and peasants' government will grant them full liberty, and guarantee them all the rights of citizens of the Soviet Republic.

This meeting declares that the task of the Soviet Government at the present time is to wage relentless war upon those Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who, like the literary and political groups, *Vsegda Vperyod!* and *Dyelo Naroda*,[48] are actually impeding our struggle and are the allies of our inveterate enemies. This meeting calls upon all working-class organisations, all proletarians, and all working peasants to exert every effort to repel the enemies of Soviet power, to defend that power and to improve the food supply and transport systems.

For this purpose, this meeting deems it necessary:

(1) To enlist members of the middle section—i.e., people who are less experienced than the advanced workers and peasants—to replace the weary advanced section.

(2) To engage still further contingents of the advanced and other sections of workers on food supplies, transport, and in the army.

(3) To enlist the largest possible number of politically-conscious workers and peasants to work at the People's Commissariat of Railways and at the State Control Commission, in order to improve the functioning of these bodies and to eliminate bureaucracy and red tape.

(4) To transfer the largest possible number of people from the starving cities to agricultural work in the rural districts—to vegetable gardens, to the Ukraine, to the Don region, and so forth, so as to increase the output of grain and other agricultural produce.

(5) To exert all efforts to help the middle peasants, to put a stop to the abuses from which they suffer so often, and to render them comradely assistance. Those Soviet officials who fail to understand this policy—which is the only correct policy—or who are unable to pursue it, must be immediately dismissed.

(6) The task that confronts everybody at the present time is to combat all signs of weariness, faint-heartedness and vacillation. We must imbue all hearts with courage and

firmness, increase political consciousness, and strengthen comradely discipline.

The working class and the peasantry of Russia have borne incredible burdens. During the past few months their sufferings have been more acute than ever. But this meeting declares that the will of the workers is not broken, that the working class is still at its post, that it is convinced that it will overcome all difficulties, and that it will maintain at all costs the victory of the Soviet Socialist Republic in Russia, and throughout the world.

Pravda No. 73,
April 4, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text, verified
with the manuscript

LETTER TO THE PETROGRAD WORKERS ON AID FOR THE EASTERN FRONT

To the Petrograd workers

Comrades, the situation on the Eastern Front has become extremely grave. Today, Kolchak captured the Votkinsk Iron Works and Bugulma is in danger. Evidently, Kolchak will advance still farther.

The danger is a serious one.

Today, the Council of People's Commissars will decide on a number of urgent measures to assist the Eastern Front; we are increasing the work of agitation.

We request the Petrograd workers *to do everything possible, to mobilise all forces* to help the Eastern Front.

The soldier workers there will obtain food for themselves, and will be able to send food parcels to their families. The main thing, however, is that there the fate of the revolution is being decided.

By victory there, *we shall bring the war to a close*, for *the Whites will get no more assistance from abroad*. In the South, victory is near. We cannot withdraw forces from the South until we have won there completely.

Hence, *help the Eastern Front*!

Both the Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies and the trade unions must exert every effort to mobilise all forces and render all possible assistance to the Eastern Front.

I am certain, comrades, that the Petrograd workers will set an example to the whole of Russia.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Moscow, April 10, 1919

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 81, April 12, 1919

Published according to the newspaper text

THESES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) ON THE SITUATION ON THE EASTERN FRONT

Kolchak's victories on the Eastern Front are creating an extremely grave danger for the Soviet Republic. Our efforts must be exerted to the utmost to smash Kolchak.

The Central Committee therefore instructs all Party organisations to concentrate their efforts first and foremost on the following measures, which must be carried out by the Party organisations and, in particular, by the trade unions in order to enlist wider sections of the working class in the active defence of the country.

1. Support in every way the mobilisation ordered on April 11, 1919.

All the forces of the Party and the trade unions must be mobilised immediately so as to render, within the next few days, without the slightest delay, the most energetic assistance to the mobilisation decreed by the Council of People's Commissars on April 10, 1919.

The mobilised men must at once be made to see the active participation of the trade unions and to feel that they have the support of the working class.

In particular, it must be made clear to every mobilised man that his immediate departure for the front will mean an improvement in his food situation; firstly, because of the better ration received by the soldiers in the grain-producing front-line zone; secondly, because of the fact that the food brought into the hungry gubernias will be distributed among fewer people; thirdly, because of the widely organised dispatch of food parcels by Red Army men in the front areas to their families at home.

The Central Committee demands of every Party and trade union organisation a weekly report, however brief, on what has been done to help mobilisation and the mobilised.

2. In the areas near the front, especially in the Volgaside region, trade union members must be armed to a man, and in the event of a shortage of arms, they must all be mobilised to render every possible aid to the Red Army, to replace casualties, etc.

Such towns as Pokrovsk, where the trade unions themselves decided to mobilise immediately 50 per cent of their members, should serve us as an example. The metropolitan cities and the large industrial centres must not lag behind Pokrovsk.

The trade unions everywhere must, using their own forces and means, carry out a check registration of their members in order that all who are not absolutely indispensable at home may be sent to fight for the Volga and the Urals territory.

3. The most serious attention must be given to intensifying agitational work, especially among those to be mobilised, those already mobilised and Red Army men. The usual methods of agitation—lectures, meetings, etc.—are not enough; agitation should be carried on among Red Army men by workers, singly or in groups; such groups of ordinary workers, members of trade unions, should be appointed specifically to barracks, Red Army units and factories. The trade unions must institute a check to see that every one of their members takes part in house-to-house agitation, distribution of leaflets and personal talks.

4. All male office workers are to be replaced by women, for which purpose a new registration, both Party and trade union, shall be carried out.

Special cards shall be introduced for all trade union members and all office workers, indicating the part they are personally taking in assisting the Red Army.

5. *Aid Bureaus or Committees of Action*, local and central, are to be instituted immediately through the trade unions, factory committees, Party organisations, co-operative societies, etc. Their addresses shall be published. The public shall be informed of them in the widest possible manner. Every man liable to mobilisation, every Red Army man,

and every person desirous of leaving for the South, for the Don or the Ukraine for food supply work should know that there is an aid bureau or a committee of action nearby; that it is accessible to every worker and peasant and he can obtain advice or instruction there, that contact with the army authorities will be facilitated for him, etc.

It shall be the special task of these bureaus to help *to equip the Red Army*. We can greatly increase the strength of our army if we improve the supply of arms, clothing, etc. And among the population there are still considerable quantities of arms which have been hidden or are not being used for the army. There are still considerable factory stocks of goods of various kinds needed by the army, and they must be quickly found and dispatched to the army. The army organisations in charge of supplies should be given immediate, broad and effective assistance by the general public. Every effort must be devoted to this matter.

6. The trade unions must organise the extensive enlistment of peasants, especially of peasant youths in the non-agricultural gubernias, for the ranks of the Red Army, for the formation of food detachments and for the food army in the Don and the Ukraine.

This activity can and should be expanded to many times its present volume; it helps both to assist the hungry population of the metropolitan cities and the non-agricultural gubernias and to strengthen the Red Army.

7. As regards the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Party line in the present situation is to imprison those who assist Kolchak, whether deliberately or unwittingly. In our republic of working people we shall not tolerate anybody who does not help us by deeds in the fight against Kolchak. Among the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries there are people who are willing to render such help. These people should be encouraged and given practical jobs, principally in the way of technical assistance to the Red Army in the rear, and their work must be strictly supervised.

The Central Committee appeals to all Party organisations and all trade unions to set to work in a revolutionary way, and not confine themselves to the old stereotyped methods.

We can defeat Kolchak. We can gain an early and final victory, because our victories in the South and the inter-

national situation, which is daily improving and changing in our favour, guarantee our ultimate triumph.

We must exert every effort, display revolutionary energy, and Kolchak will be rapidly defeated. The Volga, the Urals and Siberia can and must be defended and regained.

Central Committee
of the Russian Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*)

Written April 11, 1919
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Published according to the manuscript

PLENARY MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS[49]

APRIL 11, 1919

Brief report published
in *Izvestia* No. 80,
April 13, 1919

First published in full in 1932

Published according to
the verbatim report

PLENARY MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS[49]

APRIL 11, 1919

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1

REPORT ON THE TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE MOBILISATION FOR THE EASTERN FRONT

Comrades, you, of course, are all familiar with the decree published today on the mobilisation in the non-agricultural gubernias, and there is no need for me to deal at length with the reasons for this decree at a meeting like this; we may take it that you are well aware from what you have read in the newspapers that Kolchak's victories on the Eastern Front have suddenly made our position extremely grave.

You are aware that, in view of the situation at the front, all government instructions have for a long time been directed towards concentrating our main forces on the Southern Front. Krasnov's forces were concentrated in such large numbers on the Southern Front, and the avowedly counter-revolutionary Cossacks, who since 1905 have remained as monarchist as ever, were so strongly entrenched there, that without a victory on the Southern Front, the consolidation of Soviet proletarian power at the centre would have been impossible. It was in the South, in the Ukraine, that the Allied imperialists attempted to launch an offensive, and wanted to convert the Ukraine into a springboard against the Soviet Republic, making the Southern Front still more important for us; consequently, we have no reason to repent of having concentrated our attention and our forces on the Southern Front. I think that we were not mistaken in so doing. The latest news about the capture of Odessa, and the news received today about the capture of Simferopol and Eupatoria show the situation there; this region, which has played the decisive role throughout the war, has now been cleared.

You know perfectly well what tremendous effort it is costing to continue the Civil War after four years of imperialist war, how weary the masses are, how incredibly vast the sacrifices which the workers have been making during two years of Civil War. You know that this war is imposing an immense strain upon us. This concentration of all forces on the Southern Front greatly weakened the Eastern Front. We were unable to send reinforcements there and the army on the Eastern Front endured incredible hardships and sustained heavy losses. It fought for months, and a number of comrades working there sent us telegrams stating that it was becoming exceedingly difficult for the embattled Red Army to bear such an extremely heavy strain; the strength of our forces on the Eastern Front had been overtaxed. Meanwhile, Kolchak, by means of tsarist or "big stick" discipline, had mobilised the Siberian peasants. He weeded all men who had seen active service out of his army, and succeeded in concentrating there the old officers, as leaders, and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Relying on these, he has lately achieved successes on the Eastern Front which place the Volga in jeopardy; it must be admitted that to force him back we shall have to go all out. Forces must be sent from here, for we cannot shift any from the South; that would mean leaving the field to the main enemy, who has not yet been completely smashed.

Since our victories in the South and in the Don region, and because of the international situation, our general position has been improving daily. Not a day passes but what we receive news which indicates that our international situation is improving.

Three months ago, the British, French and American capitalists not only appeared to be, but actually were, a tremendous force, which, of course, could have crushed us had they at that time been in a position to use their vast material resources against us—they could have but did not and now it is obvious that they cannot. Their recent defeat in Odessa clearly shows that vast as the material resources of the imperialists were, from the purely military point of view, their campaign against Russia has collapsed completely. If we bear in mind that there are Soviet Republics in the heart of Europe, and that the growth of the

Soviet form of government is becoming irresistible, we may say without exaggeration, taking an absolutely sober view of the situation, that our victory on an international scale is absolutely certain.

If this were all, we could speak calmly, but in view of Kolchak's recent successes, it must be said that several months of strenuous effort still lie ahead of us before we can defeat his forces. There can be no doubt that we shall fail if we stick to the old methods; during the eighteen months of Soviet power our methods have become so familiar, sometimes even routine, that as a result, the energy of the advanced section of the working class has been largely exhausted. We do not shut our eyes to the extreme weariness that is felt among certain sections of the working class, and to the increasing difficulty of the struggle, but now our prospects are much simpler and clearer. Even those who do not side with Soviet power, and who regard themselves as rather important figures in politics, clearly see that on an international scale our victory is certain.

We have to go through one more phase of fierce civil war against Kolchak. We have therefore decided that the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions—a most authoritative body, which unites the broad masses of the proletariat—should, on its part, propose a number of most rigorous measures which should help us to finish off the war within the next few months. This is quite feasible, because our international situation is improving, we need have no doubts on that score. The European and American rear is in the best possible state for us, although five months ago we could not even dream of such a thing. We might say that Messrs. Wilson and Clemenceau have set out to help us. The cables which every day bring us news about their quarrels, about their desire to slam the door in each other's faces, show that these gentlemen are at each other's throats.

But the more clear it becomes that the victory of our cause on an international scale is certain, the more desperate and fierce become the efforts of the Russian landowners, capitalists and kulaks who fled across the Urals. This disreputable crowd is fighting desperately. You, of course, have read in the newspapers about how far white-

guard terror has gone in Ufa; there is no doubt that these whiteguard elements, these bourgeois, are staking everything on a last attempt. The bourgeoisie are desperate. They believe that by their desperate attack they will compel us to divert part of our forces from the decisive Southern Front. We shall not do that, and we say openly to the workers that this involves ever greater efforts in the East.

Permit me to propose a number of practical measures which, in my opinion, should create a regrouping of forces and set the trade unions new and definite tasks, and which I consider essential in view of the situation I have briefly outlined to you. There is no need for me to deal with this any further, you are all aware of it. It is possible in this situation—looking at it most soberly—to put an end to the war, both internal and international, within the next few months. But during those few months we shall have to bend every effort. The first task that should be set to the trade unions is the following:

"1. Support in every way the mobilisation ordered on April 11, 1919.

"All the forces of the Party and the trade unions must be mobilised immediately so as to render, within the next few days, without the slightest delay, the most energetic assistance to the mobilisation decreed by the Council of People's Commissars on April 10, 1919.

"The mobilised men must at once be made to see the active participation of the trade unions and to feel that they have the support of the working class.

"In particular, it must be made clear to every mobilised man that his immediate departure for the front will mean an improvement in his food situation; firstly, because of the better ration received by the soldiers in the grain-producing front-line zone; secondly, because of the fact that the food brought into the hungry gubernias will be distributed among fewer people; thirdly, because of the widely organised dispatch of food parcels by Red Army men in the front areas to their families at home...."

Of course, I have referred to the food situation here only very briefly; but you all realise that this is our main, internal difficulty, and were it not for the possibility of linking up the mobilisation with our rapid advance in

the areas near the front and the grain-producing districts, with the organisation of the units there, and not here, were it not for this possibility, the mobilisation would be hopeless; that is to say, it would be no use hoping for success. But at present we have this possibility. The mobilisation is to take place mainly in the non-agricultural gubernias, in the districts where the workers and peasants are suffering most from hunger. We can shift them primarily to the Don—the whole of the Don region is now in our hands, the fight against the Cossacks has been going on for a long time; we shall be able to improve the food supplies of our advanced units on the spot, and also organise the sending home of food parcels. Steps have already been taken in this direction, and permission has been given to send food parcels weighing twenty pounds twice a month. An agreement on this point has been reached. Thus, the privilege we were obliged to grant last year in the form of the right to carry one-and-a-half poods[50] can be compared with this wider measure, namely, the sending of food parcels, by means of which the men of the Red Army will be able to support their families at home.

By developing activities of this nature we shall combine assistance to the front with an improvement in the food situation in the chief non-agricultural districts, which are suffering most in this respect. Naturally, the dispatch of men to the Don will be linked up with the movement of men to the Volgaside area, where the enemy has now inflicted such a severe blow on us that beyond the Volga, in the East, we have already lost several million poods of grain that had been collected. There, the war is directly an out-and-out war for grain. The task of the trade unions is to see to it that this mobilisation is not carried out on the ordinary lines, but that it should be combined with trade union assistance to the Soviets. The thesis I have just read to you does not define this concretely enough. I think that this all-round assistance should be at first embodied in a series of tentative measures, which should be followed by definite instructions and a practical plan showing how the trade unions, by mobilising all their forces, should promote the mobilisation in such a way that it assumes the character of a major political measure

rather than a mere military and food supply measure, in such a way that it is made the task of a working class which realises that we can end the war within the next few months, because on an international scale we are assured of the arrival of fresh allies. Only proletarian organisations, only trade unions, can do this. I cannot enumerate the practical measures, I think that only the trade unions can do it. They can carry out the task, making allowances for specific local conditions, and organising the whole business on a practical basis. Our job is to give the main political directions to the working class, which must rally once again and take cognisance of this bitter truth; there will be new burdens to bear, but this is at the same time a truth that indicates the real and practical way to overcome our difficulties as quickly as possible. By sending large numbers of workers to the fertile South, we shall reinforce our forces there, and if the whiteguard and landowners' forces count on being able by their victories in the East to compel us to weaken the South, I think we shall prove to them that they are mistaken. I am quite sure that we shall not weaken the South and shall be able to provide support for the East. The enemy has mobilised the young men of Siberia and has avoided taking men who had seen active service—he is afraid of them and has mobilised the Siberian peasants. That is his last effort, his last resource. He has no support and no manpower. The Allies were unable to help him. It was beyond their power.

That is why I appeal to the representatives of the trade union movement to devote the greatest possible attention to this question and to see to it that the mobilisation is not carried out on the old lines. This must be a huge working-class political campaign; it is not merely a military and food supply campaign, but also a great political campaign. If the situation is weighed up soberly in the light of factors of the war and of class relationships, nobody can doubt that the issue should be settled within the next few months. To achieve this, the trade unions must not confine themselves to activity within the old limits. If they do they will be unable to carry out this task, which requires activity on a wider scale. They must act not only as trade unionists, but also as revolutionaries deciding the basic

question of the Soviet Republic, a question similar to the one decided in October—that of bringing the imperialist war to a close and launching socialist construction. Today, the trade unions must work as revolutionaries on a mass scale; they must not keep within the old limits in settling the practical question of ending the Civil War in Russia. The end is very near, but it is extremely difficult. To proceed—

"2. In the areas near the front, especially in the Volga-side region, trade union members must be armed to a man, and in the event of a shortage of arms, they must all be mobilised to render every possible aid to the Red Army, to replace casualties, etc.

"3. The most serious attention must be given to intensifying agitational work, especially among those to be mobilised, those already mobilised and Red Army men. The usual methods of agitation—lectures, meetings, etc.—are not enough; agitation should be carried on among Red Army men by workers, singly or in groups; such groups of ordinary workers, members of trade unions, should be appointed specifically to barracks, Red Army units and factories. The trade unions must institute a check to see that every one of their members takes part in house-to-house agitation, distribution of leaflets and personal talks."

We, of course, have grown somewhat unaccustomed to the methods of agitation we employed in the old days when we as a party were persecuted, or were fighting for power. Political power has placed a vast state machine in our hands, and through it agitation has been organised on new lines. During the past eighteen months it has been conducted on a different scale; but you know that because of the chaos we inherited from the imperialist war and which was intensified by the Civil War, and the terrible difficulties caused by the invasion of a number of Russian gubernias, our agitation has not done all that it should have done. Compared with past agitation it has done wonders but it is not all that is needed, and things have not been carried through to the end. Vast masses of peasants and workers are practically untouched by our agitation. That is why we must not keep within the old limits; under no circumstances must we depend on our having state

Soviet organisations for this purpose. If we were to rely on that, we would not be able to solve our problem. In this respect we should recall the past, pay more attention to personal initiative and say that if this personal initiative is developed on a mass scale, we shall do more than we did in the past, because the working class, even though most of its members are exhausted, has now instinctively understood the nature of the task. Even the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries who owing to their political ideology fought tooth and nail to prevent themselves from understanding the situation, who hid behind an iron fence and failed to understand reality—even these people now realise that all over the world the struggle is going on between the old bourgeois system and the new Soviet system. Ever since the German revolution revealed its real character, ever since the German Government showed that all it could do was murder the best leaders of the proletariat with the support of the social-patriots of the majority, and ever since Soviet power triumphed in a number of European countries, this question has been settled in practice. The question is—Soviet power or the old bourgeois order? It has been settled in practice on a historical scale. The workers' instinct decided the issue; this must be embodied in agitation increased tenfold.

We cannot increase food supplies when there is no food; we cannot increase the number of professional agitators and intellectuals tenfold when none are available. This we cannot do. But we can tell the broad masses of the workers that today they are not what they were until yesterday. If you set out to conduct personal agitation you will win by sheer weight of numbers.

And we shall have a mobilisation that is not an ordinary one, but is a real campaign to decide the ultimate fate of the working class which realises that only the next few months separate us from the last and decisive battle—not in the sense that this is meant in song and verse, but in the literal sense of the word, for we have weighed up our practical forces in other spheres and not only insofar as concerns the whiteguards.

During this year we have made a practical estimate of our forces relative to international imperialism. At one

time the Germans tried to throttle us, but we knew that they were hampered, that the British and French imperialists were hanging on to them with one hand. At one time we had the British and French against us. They had both hands free. Had they attacked us in December 1918, we could not have held out; we have now stood up to them for several more trying months and we know that their bourgeois order is decaying. Even their best troops were not fit for anything but to retreat before units of insurgents operating in the Ukraine. Our reasoning, therefore, is perfectly clear, and the working class has instinctively realised that we are on the eve of the last battle, that the next few months will decide whether we shall achieve final victory, or whether we shall have to go through fresh difficulties.

I shall read to you those of the other measures that are outlined here:

"4. All male office workers are to be replaced by women, for which purpose a new registration, both Party and trade union, shall be carried out....

"5. *Aid Bureaus or Committees of Action*, local and central, are to be instituted immediately through the trade unions, factory committees, Party organisations, co-operative societies, etc. Their addresses shall be published. The public shall be informed of them in the widest possible manner. Every man liable to mobilisation, every Red Army man, and every person desirous of leaving for the South, for the Don or the Ukraine for food supply work should know that there is an aid bureau or a committee of action nearby; that it is accessible to every worker and peasant and he can obtain advice or instruction there, that contact with the army authorities will be facilitated for him, etc.

"It shall be the special task of these bureaus to help *to equip the Red Army*. We can greatly increase the strength of our army if we improve the supply of arms, clothing, etc. And among the population there are still considerable quantities of arms which have been hidden or are not being used for the army. There are still considerable factory stocks of goods of various kinds needed by the army, and they must be quickly found and dispatched to the army. The army organisations in charge of supplies should be

given immediate, broad and effective assistance by the general public. Every effort must be devoted to this matter."

I shall now touch upon the several different periods of our war tasks. Our first war problem we tackled by guerrilla, irregular insurrections such as the comrades in the Ukraine are now resorting to. There is not so much a regular war in the Ukraine as a guerrilla movement and spontaneous insurrection. It results in very rapid attacks and creates extreme chaos in the midst of which the job of using stocks of food is one of incalculable difficulty. There is no old machinery, not even of the kind that we inherited from the Smolny period of our rule—and that was bad enough, and worked against us rather than for us. But why is there no such machinery in the Ukraine? Because it has not yet passed out of the phase of partisan warfare and spontaneous insurrection into the regular army phase, which is always characteristic of the consolidated power of every class, including the proletariat. We created our machinery after several months of untold difficulties.

We set up special food supply organisations. For a time we made some use of the services of the food supply experts, keeping them under Party supervision; now, however, we have everywhere army organisations in charge of supplies. When a period of extreme exertion of effort sets in, we say that we shall not revert to the old partisan methods, we have suffered enough from them; we urge that members of the working class shall be enlisted into the existing organised bodies, the regular organisations for supplying the Red Army. The working class in the mass can do that. You know that chaos reigns in the matter of equipment, in the matter of finding this equipment, of dispatching it, and so forth. Here help is needed in the work of supplying the Red Army. Our army experts say that we shall make progress if we mobilise a large number of soldiers who will speedily and finally decide the issue on the Eastern Front. But this is being held up mainly by the shortage of supplies, which is not surprising in view of the state of ruin we inherited from the imperialist war and the Civil War. But this means that we must appreciate and understand the new situation with its new tasks. A year ago we began to establish regular organisations, but this

is not enough; these regular organisations must receive the assistance of the mass movement, of the mass energy of the working class. Here we have an approximate outline of what the trade unions could do in this matter. The trade unions alone can do this, because they are closest to industry, and head the largest section of the workers, a section numbering millions. This task calls for a change in the tempo and the character of their activities for the next few months. In this way we shall be certain of complete victory within a few months.

"6. The trade unions must organise the extensive enlistment of peasants, especially of peasant youths in the non-agricultural gubernias, for the ranks of the Red Army, for the formation of food detachments and for the food army in the Don and the Ukraine.

"This activity can and should be expanded to many times its present volume; it helps both to assist the hungry population of the metropolitan cities and the non-agricultural gubernias and to strengthen the Red Army."

I have already said that our food supply and war tasks are closely connected, and you understand perfectly well that they must be. They must be linked up. One cannot be carried out without the other.

"7. As regards the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Party line in the present situation is to imprison those who assist Kolchak, whether deliberately or unwittingly. In our republic of working people we shall not tolerate anybody who does not help us by deeds in the fight against Kolchak. Among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries there are people who are willing to render such help. These people should be encouraged and given practical jobs, principally in the way of technical assistance to the Red Army in the rear, and their work must be strictly supervised...."

In this respect we must say that lately we have been through an exceedingly severe and unpleasant experience. You know that the leading groups of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries looked at the matter in this way—"In spite of everything, we want to remain parliamentarians and condemn the Bolsheviks and Kolchak's followers alike." We had to tell them politely that this

is not the time for parliaments. Our enemies are trying to get us by the throat, and we are fighting the last and decisive battle. We shall not joke with them. When they foment strikes like this, they commit a heinous crime against the working class. Every strike costs the lives of thousands and thousands of Red Army men as we can see. The cessation of arms production in Tula means the death of thousands of workers and peasants; to deprive us of a number of factories in Tula means depriving thousands of workers of their lives. We say that we are fighting, we are spending our last ounce of strength, we regard this war as the only just and legitimate war. We have lit the torch of socialism at home and all over the world. We shall fight ruthlessly against anyone who hinders this struggle in the slightest. He who is not for us is against us. But what if there are people—and we know that there are such among the Mensheviks—who cannot, or will not, understand what is taking place in Russia? Who are not yet convinced that although in Russia the "wicked" Bolsheviks made such a revolution, in Germany, the birth-pangs of the revolution are immeasurably more severe? The democratic republic there—what is it? What is German freedom? It is freedom to murder the genuine leaders of the proletariat—Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and scores of others. In this way the Scheidemann gang is only putting off the hour of its defeat. Obviously, those people cannot govern. Since November 9 there have been five months of freedom in the German Republic, and either the Scheidemann gang or their accomplices have been in power. But you know there is more squabbling among them than ever. This example proves that the only alternative is either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact that there is no middle course is shown, for example, by what we read today in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.[51] It says that the example of Hungary shows we must go forward to socialism. Hungary has proved that the bourgeoisie voluntarily surrenders power to the Soviets when they know that the country is in such a desperate position that nothing can save it, that nothing can lead the people along the difficult path of salvation but the Soviets. And to those who, wavering between the old and the new, say that

although ideologically they do not recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat they are, nevertheless, prepared to assist Soviet power and keep their convictions to themselves because they understand that in the midst of fierce war we must not argue, but fight—to those people we say: "If you want to engage in politics, meaning by politics that you, in front of the weary and tormented masses, will freely criticise Soviet power, not realising that in this way you are helping Kolchak—we say there will be ruthless war against you." It is not easy to grasp the significance of and carry out such a policy at one stroke. We cannot pursue the same policy with regard to all of them. We tell them that if they want to engage in their politics, we shall provide a place for them in prison, or in other countries which are willing to receive them. We shall make these countries a present of several hundred Mensheviks. Or do you, at last, want to offer to help Soviet power, because otherwise there will be several more years of untold disaster, and in the end Soviet power will be victorious anyway. To people who talk like that we must give every encouragement; and we must give them practical work to do. This policy cannot be defined so easily and at one stroke as a policy which proceeds in one, single direction. But I am sure that every worker who has had practical experience of what the burden of war means, who knows what supplying the Red Army means, who knows the horrors every Red Army man at the front must go through—every worker will fully appreciate this lesson in politics. That is why I ask you to adopt these theses, and to concentrate all the efforts of the trade unions on the task of putting them into operation as speedily and vigorously as possible.

2
REPLY TO A QUESTION ON THE TULA STRIKE

I have no definite information about Tula and cannot speak as authoritatively on this matter as the preceding comrades did. But I do know the political physiognomy of the newspaper *Vsegda Vperyod!* This is nothing more nor less than incitement to strike. It is aiding and abetting our enemies, the Mensheviks, who are fomenting strikes. Somebody asked me if this had been proved. My reply is that if I were a barrister, a solicitor, or a member of Parliament, I would be obliged to present proof. But I am not the first, the second, or the third, and so I do not intend to and there is no reason why I should. Even supposing the Menshevik Central Committee is better than the Mensheviks in Tula who have been definitely exposed as fomentors of strikes—in fact I have no doubt some of the regular members of the Menshevik Committee are better—in a political struggle, when the whiteguards are trying to get us by the throat, is it possible to draw distinctions? Have we time for it? Facts are facts. Let us suppose that they were not aiding and abetting, but were weak and yielded to the Right Mensheviks; so what of it? The Right Mensheviks foment strikes, and Martov, or others, condemned these Rights in the newspapers. What does this teach us? We get a note saying "I, too, condemn, but"... (*A voice*: "What else can they do?"). They can do what the Bolshevik Party does—take their stand, not in words, but in deeds. Does not propaganda abroad take advantage of the conduct of the Mensheviks here? Did not the Berne Conference support all the imperialists when they said that the Bolsheviks were usurpers? We say—you have taken this stand at a

time when Kolchak's gangs are striking a blow that is causing the death of thousands of Red Army men in a country which the imperialists of the whole world are trying to crush. In two years' time, perhaps, after we have beaten Kolchak, we shall examine this matter, but not now. Now we must fight in order to defeat the enemy within the next few months; and you know what this enemy will do to the workers. You know this from what happened at Ivashchenkovo.[52] You know what Kolchak is doing.

3
SPEECH CLOSING THE DISCUSSION

Comrades, one of the speakers, who was called the speaker for the Opposition, demanded in a resolution that we should turn to our Constitution. When I heard that I wondered whether the speaker was not confusing our Constitution with the Scheidemann Constitution. Scheidemann's, like that of all democratic republics, promises all citizens all sorts of liberties. Bourgeois republics have promised this to everybody for hundreds and thousands of years. You know what became of these bourgeois republics, you know that on a world-wide scale they have all collapsed. The vast majority of the workers side with the Communists. The word "Sovietist", which does not exist in the Russian language, is heard everywhere in the world. And we can say that no matter what country we go to, if we say the word "Sovietist", everybody will understand us and follow our lead. Clause 23 of the Constitution says:

> "Guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the R.S.F.S.R. deprives individual persons and individual groups of rights used to the detriment of the socialist revolution."

We did not promise liberties right and left; on the contrary, we, in our Constitution, which has been translated into all languages—into German, English, Italian and French—said definitely that we shall deprive socialists of their liberties if they use them to the detriment of the socialist revolution, if they are used to cover up liberties for the capitalists. That is why this reference to the Constitution was wrong even from the formal point of view We have openly stated that in the transition period, the

period of fierce struggle, we not only refrain from promising liberties right and left, but say in advance that we shall deprive of their liberties those citizens who hinder the socialist revolution. Who will judge whether they do so or not? The proletariat will.

Attempts have been made here to turn the question into one of parliamentary struggle. I have always said: parliamentarism is an excellent thing, but these are not parliamentary times. Hearing the government declare that the situation is grave, Comrade Lozovsky says that this is exactly the time for the people to present scores of demands. That is what all parliamentarians did in the "good old days"; but this is not the time for that sort of thing. I know that we suffer from a host of defects, I know that in Hungary Soviet power will be better than in this country. But when we are told in a period of mobilisation that this, that and the other are proposed, and that we should bargain over it, I say that these old parliamentary methods are useless; the class-conscious workers have already rejected them. This is not what we want.

We defined our main line as class struggle against the kulaks, against the rich elements who are opposed to us. Success in this being assured, we say that we must now establish more correct relations with the middle peasants. This is a very difficult job. In a period of grave danger you must help Soviet power, such as it is. We shall not change within the next few months. Here there is not and cannot be any middle course. Any attempt to create this middle course by artificial parliamentary methods would be stepping on to slippery ground. When one speaker said that the peasants are all opposed to us, this was one of those "little" exaggerations which in practice encourage the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The vast majority of the people know that by far most of the peasants are with us. For the first time they have Soviet power. Even the slogans of the insurrection (in which only an insignificant section of the peasant masses was involved) were "For Soviet power. For the Bolsheviks. Down with the communia". We say that the fight against this will be a very stubborn one, because the intelligentsia are sabotaging us on the sly. We have been obliged to take a larger number of

bad elements than good. Since the better elements of the intelligentsia turned their backs on us, we were obliged to take those that are not so good.

Comrade Romanov proposed a resolution which he himself formulated after his comrades had been arrested. "We demand freedom for all..." they declare. (*Lenin reads the resolution.*) The workers later resumed work, but this cost us several thousands of lost days and several thousands of lives of Red Army men, workers and peasants, on the Eastern Front.

I ask calmly and categorically which is better, to imprison several scores or hundreds of instigators, guilty or innocent, deliberate or unwitting, or lose thousands of Red Army men and workers? The first is better. I don't care whether I am accused of committing every mortal sin imaginable and of violating liberties, I plead guilty, but the interests of the workers will be furthered. At a time like this, when the people are exhausted, politically-conscious elements should help them to hold on for the next few months. It was not we who were victorious in Odessa. It is ridiculous to think that we were victorious. We captured Odessa because their soldiers refused to go into battle. I received a telegram from the Northern Front saying, "Send the British prisoners of war to the front." The comrades here say that the British are wailing and saying they will not go back into the army. What does that show? Their troops refuse to go into battle. They are ten times stronger than we are, and yet they refuse to fight.

That is why, when we are told that we promised a lot, but have done nothing, we say that we have done the main thing. We promised to start a revolution which will become a world revolution; it has begun, and it now stands so firmly on its feet that our international position is splendid. We fulfilled our main promise and, evidently, the vast majority of the class-conscious workers realise this. They realise that now only a few months separate us from victory over the capitalists all over the world. What are we to do in these few months if certain elements are exhausted; what should we do, play with them, incite them or, on the contrary, help the exhausted to hold out for those few months that will decide the fate of the entire war. You can see

that in the South we shall get the war over in less than a few months, we shall finish it off completely and release the army for the East. It is obvious, therefore, that the plans of the Entente—of the British, French and Americans—have gone awry. In Odessa, they had ten thousand men and a fleet—that is what the position was. This is not a matter of parliamentarism, or of concessions—on this we make no promises and undertake no obligations. We put the question this way—when the people are war weary, and are hard pressed by hunger, what should the class-conscious proletariat, the class-conscious section of the workers do? Permit people to play on this weariness, for it is becoming a game. If we say stop the war, the ignorant masses will vote for it, but the class-conscious section of the masses says that we can bring the war to a close within the next few months. The weary must be encouraged, sustained and led. The comrades themselves see that every class-conscious worker leads scores of tired people. We say this and we demand it. This is exactly what the dictatorship of the proletariat means—one class leads the other, because it is more organised, more solid and more class-conscious. The ignorant masses fall to every bait, and because of their weariness are ready to yield to anything. But the class-conscious section says that we must hold out, because in a few months we shall be victorious all over the world. This is how the matter stands. I take the liberty of thinking that the time has not yet come for parliamentary debates. We must make another big effort to achieve victory, and this time final victory, within the next few months.

FOREWORD TO HENRI GUILBEAUX'S PAMPHLET *SOCIALISM AND SYNDICALISM IN FRANCE DURING THE WAR*

Comrade Guilbeaux's pamphlet is very well timed. The history of the socialist and trade union movements in a number of countries during the war should be summarised for all countries. This history shows as clearly as possible the slow but steady turn to the left, the progress towards revolutionary thinking and revolutionary action by the working class. This history discloses, on the one hand, the deep-going roots of the Third, Communist International, the preparations made for it, specific within each nation, depending upon its concrete historical features. A knowledge of the deep roots of the Third International is essential for an understanding of the inevitability of the International and of the difference in the paths leading the various national socialist parties to it.

On the other hand, the history of the socialist and trade union movements during the war shows us the beginning of the collapse of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois parliamentarism, the beginning of a turn from bourgeois democracy to Soviet, or proletarian, democracy. This tremendous epochal change is what many, very many socialists simply cannot understand yet, tied as they are by the chains of routine, philistine worship of what exists and existed yesterday, philistine blindness which prevents their seeing what is being brought into existence by the history of dying capitalism in all countries.

Comrade *Guilbeaux* undertook the task of writing an essay on the history of the French socialist and trade union

movements during the war. The clear and accurate enumeration of the facts gives the reader a vivid illustration of the beginning of a great turn, of the turning of the tide in the history of socialism. One may be certain that *Guilbeaux*'s pamphlet will not only be most widely circulated among all class-conscious workers, but that it will also lead to the publication of a number of similar pamphlets on the wartime history of socialism and the working-class movement in other countries.

N. Lenin

Moscow, April 13, 1919

Published in French in 1919
First published in Russian in 1920

Published according to the Russian version of the pamphlet

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST MOSCOW SOVIET COMMANDERS' COURSES APRIL 15, 1919

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin recalled the words of a certain German general who said that if the soldiers knew what they were fighting for, there would be no war. The situation was different in our times. The Red Army had a great and definite task to perform—to emancipate the working class. The workers' and peasants' Red Army was growing and gaining strength day by day. This growth was due to the fact that the workers and peasants were profoundly conscious of their aims. And although they had suffered a number of reverses on the Eastern Front, they still had to halt Kolchak and defeat him. And they would do it. Krasnov's gangs had more than once created a serious situation for Soviet Russia, but in spite of the help they had been receiving from the whole of the bourgeois world, these gangs had been routed, and would soon suffer complete defeat. That had been achieved only because of the political consciousness of the workers and peasants. "In accepting this Red Flag from the District Committee," continued Lenin, "you must firmly and resolutely carry it forward. Every day brings us news to the effect that the Red Flag of liberty has been raised, now in one place, now in another. You have seen the formation of the Soviet Republic of Hungary, of Soviet Bavaria and of the Third, Communist International; and soon you will see the formation of the World Federative Republic of Soviets.

"Long live the World Federative Republic of Soviets!

"Long live the Red Army!

"Long live our Red Commanders!" (*Stormy applause.*)

Pravda No. 83,
April 17, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND ITS PLACE IN HISTORY

The imperialists of the Entente countries are blockading Russia in an effort to cut off the Soviet Republic, as a seat of infection, from the capitalist world. These people, who boast about their "democratic" institutions, are so blinded by their hatred of the Soviet Republic that they do not see how ridiculous they are making themselves. Just think of it, the advanced, most civilised and "democratic" countries, armed to the teeth and enjoying undivided military sway over the whole world, are mortally afraid of the *ideological* infection coming from a ruined, starving, backward, and even, they assert, semi-savage country!

This contradiction alone is opening the eyes of the working masses in all countries and helping to expose the hypocrisy of the imperialists Clemanceau, Lloyd George, Wilson and their governments.

We are being helped, however, not only by the capitalists' blind hatred of the Soviets, but also by their bickering among themselves, which induces them to put spokes in each other's wheels. They have entered into a veritable conspiracy of silence, for they are desperately afraid of the spread of true information about the Soviet Republic in general, and of its official documents in particular. Yet, *Le Temps*, the principal organ of the French bourgeoisie, has published a report on the foundation in Moscow of the Third, Communist International.

For this we express our most respectful thanks to the principal organ of the French bourgeoisie, to this leader of French chauvinism and imperialism. We are prepared to send an illuminated address to *Le Temps* in token of

our appreciation of the effective and able assistance it is giving us.

The manner in which *Le Temps* compiled its report on the basis of our wireless messages clearly and fully reveals the motive that prompted this organ of the money-bags. It wanted to have a dig at Wilson, as if to say, "Look at the people with whom you negotiate!" The wiseacres who write to the order of the money-bags do not see that their attempt to frighten Wilson with the Bolshevik bogey is becoming, in the eyes of the working people, an advertisement for the Bolsheviks. Once more, our most respectful thanks to the organ of the French millionaires!

The Third International has been founded in a world situation that does not allow prohibitions, petty and miserable devices of the Entente imperialists or of capitalist lackeys like the Scheidemanns in Germany and the Renners in Austria to prevent news of this International and sympathy for it spreading among the working class of the world. This situation has been brought about by the growth of the proletarian revolution, which is manifestly developing everywhere by leaps and bounds. It has been brought about by the *Soviet* movement among the working people, which has already achieved such strength as to become really *international*.

The First International (1864-72) laid the foundation of an international organisation of the workers for the preparation of their revolutionary attack on capital. The Second International (1889-1914) was an international organisation of the proletarian movement whose growth proceeded in *breadth*, at the cost of a temporary drop in the revolutionary level, a temporary strengthening of opportunism, which in the end led to the disgraceful collapse of this International.

The Third International actually emerged in 1918, when the long years of struggle against opportunism and social-chauvinism, especially during the war, led to the formation of Communist Parties in a number of countries. Officially, the Third International was founded at its First Congress, in March 1919, in Moscow. And the most characteristic feature of this International, its mission of fulfilling, of implementing the precepts of Marxism, and of achieving

the age-old ideals of socialism and the working-class movement—this most characteristic feature of the Third International has manifested itself immediately in the fact that the new, third, "International Working Men's Association" *has already begun to develop*, to a certain extent, into a *union of Soviet Socialist Republics*.

The First International laid the foundation of the proletarian, international struggle for socialism.

The Second International marked a period in which the soil was prepared for the broad, mass spread of the movement in a number of countries.

The Third International has gathered the fruits of the work of the Second International, discarded its opportunist, social-chauvinist, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois dross, and *has begun to implement* the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The international alliance of the parties which are leading the most revolutionary movement in the world, the movement of the proletariat for the overthrow of the yoke of capital, now rests on an unprecedentedly firm base, in the shape of several *Soviet republics*, which are implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat and are the embodiment of victory over capitalism on an international scale.

The epoch-making significance of the Third, Communist International lies in its having begun to give effect to Marx's cardinal slogan, the slogan which sums up the centuries-old development of socialism and the working-class movement, the slogan which is expressed in the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This prevision and this theory—the prevision and theory of a genius—are becoming a reality.

The Latin words have now been translated into the languages of all the peoples of contemporary Europe—more, into all the languages of the world.

A new era in world history has begun.

Mankind is throwing off the last form of slavery: capitalist, or wage, slavery.

By emancipating himself from slavery, man is for the first time advancing to real freedom.

How is it that one of the most backward countries of Europe was the first country to establish the dictatorship

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

of the proletariat, and to organise a Soviet republic? We shall hardly be wrong if we say that it is this contradiction between the backwardness of Russia and the "leap" she has made over bourgeois democracy to the highest form of democracy, to Soviet, or proletarian, democracy—it is this contradiction that has been one of the reasons (apart from the dead weight of opportunist habits and philistine prejudices that burdened the majority of the socialist leaders) why people in the West have had particular difficulty or have been slow in understanding the role of the Soviets.

The working people all over the world have instinctively grasped the significance of the Soviets as an instrument in the proletarian struggle and as a form of the proletarian state. But the "leaders", corrupted by opportunism, still continue to worship bourgeois democracy, which they call "democracy" in general.

Is it surprising that the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat has brought out primarily the "contradiction" between the backwardness of Russia and her "leap" over bourgeois democracy? It would have been surprising had history granted us the establishment of a *new* form of democracy *without* a number of contradictions.

If any Marxist, or any person, indeed, who has a general knowledge of modern science, were asked whether it is likely that the transition of the different capitalist countries to the dictatorship of the proletariat will take place in an identical or harmoniously proportionate way, his answer would undoubtedly be in the negative. There never has been and never could be even, harmonious, or proportionate development in the capitalist world. Each country has developed more strongly first one, then another aspect or feature or group of features of capitalism and of the working-class movement. The process of development has been uneven.

When France was carrying out her great bourgeois revolution and rousing the whole European continent to a historically new life, Britain proved to be at the head of the counter-revolutionary coalition, although at the same time she was much more developed capitalistically than France. The British working-class movement of that period,

however, brilliantly anticipated much that was contained in the future Marxism.

When Britain gave the world Chartism, the first broad, truly mass and politically organised proletarian revolutionary movement, bourgeois revolutions, most of them weak, were taking place on the European continent, and the first great civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie had broken out in France. The bourgeoisie defeated the various national contingents of the proletariat one by one, in different ways in different countries.

Britain was the model of a country in which, as Engels put it, the bourgeoisie had produced, alongside a bourgeois aristocracy, a very bourgeois upper stratum of the proletariat.[53] For several decades this advanced capitalist country lagged behind in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. France seemed to have exhausted the strength of the proletariat in two heroic working-class revolts of 1848 and 1871 against the bourgeoisie that made very considerable contributions to world-historical development. Leadership in the International of the working-class movement then passed to Germany; that was in the seventies of the nineteenth century, when she lagged economically behind Britain and France. But when Germany had outstripped these two countries economically, i.e., by the second decade of the twentieth century, the Marxist workers' party of Germany, that model for the whole world, found itself headed by a handful of utter scoundrels, the most filthy blackguards—from Scheidemann and Noske to David and Legien—loathsome hangmen drawn from the workers' ranks who had sold themselves to the capitalists, who were in the service of the monarchy and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

World history is leading unswervingly towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, but is doing so by paths that are anything but smooth, simple and straight.

When Karl Kautsky was still a Marxist and not the renegade from Marxism he became when he began to champion unity with the Scheidemanns and to support bourgeois democracy against Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, he wrote an article—this was at the turn of the century—entitled "The Slavs and Revolution". In this article he

traced the historical conditions that pointed to the possibility of leadership in the world revolutionary movement passing to the Slavs.

And so it has. Leadership in the revolutionary proletarian International has passed for a time—for a short time, it goes without saying—to the Russians, just as at various periods of the nineteenth century it was in the hands of the British, then of the French, then of the Germans.

I have had occasion more than once to say that it was easier for the Russians than for the advanced countries *to begin* the great proletarian revolution, but that it will be more difficult for them *to continue* it and carry it to final victory, in the sense of the complete organisation of a socialist society.

It was easier for us to begin, firstly, because the unusual—for twentieth-century Europe—political backwardness of the tsarist monarchy gave unusual strength to the revolutionary onslaught of the masses. Secondly, Russia's backwardness merged in a peculiar way the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie with the peasant revolution against the landowners. That is what we started from in October 1917, and we would not have achieved victory so easily then if we had not. As long ago as 1856, Marx spoke, in reference to Prussia; of the possibility of a peculiar combination of proletarian revolution and peasant war.[54] From the beginning of 1905 the Bolsheviks advocated the idea of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Thirdly, the 1905 revolution contributed enormously to the political education of the worker and peasant masses, because it familiarised their vanguard with "the last word" of socialism in the West and also because of the revolutionary *action* of the masses. Without such a "dress rehearsal" as we had in 1905, the revolutions of 1917—both the bourgeois, February revolution, and the proletarian, October revolution—would have been impossible. Fourthly, Russia's geographical conditions permitted her to hold out longer than other countries could have done against the superior military strength of the capitalist, advanced countries. Fifthly, the specific attitude of the proletariat towards the peasantry facilitated the transition from the bourgeois revolution to

the socialist revolution, made it easier for the urban proletarians to influence the semi-proletarian, poorer sections of the rural working people. Sixthly, long schooling in strike action and the experience of the European mass working-class movement facilitated the emergence—in a profound and rapidly intensifying revolutionary situation—of such a unique form of proletarian revolutionary organisation as the *Soviets*.

This list, of course, is incomplete; but it will suffice for the time being.

Soviet, or proletarian, democracy was born in Russia. Following the Paris Commune a second epoch-making step was taken. The proletarian and peasant Soviet Republic has proved to be the first stable socialist republic in the world. As a *new type of state* it cannot die. It no longer stands alone.

For the continuance and completion of the work of building socialism, much, very much is still required. Soviet republics in more developed countries, where the proletariat has greater weight and influence, have every chance of surpassing Russia once they take the path of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The bankrupt Second International is now dying and rotting alive. Actually, it is playing the role of lackey to the world bourgeoisie. It is a truly yellow International. Its foremost ideological leaders, such as Kautsky, laud *bourgeois* democracy and call it "democracy" in general, or—what is still more stupid and still more crude—"pure democracy".

Bourgeois democracy has outlived its day, just as the Second International has, though the International performed historically necessary and useful work when the task of the moment was to train the working-class masses within the framework of this bourgeois democracy.

No bourgeois republic, however democratic, ever was or could have been anything but a machine for the suppression of the working people by capital, an instrument of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the political rule of capital. The democratic bourgeois republic promised and proclaimed majority rule, but it could never put this

into effect as long as private ownership of the land and other means of production existed.

"Freedom" in the bourgeois-democratic republic was actually freedom *for the rich*. The proletarians and working peasants could and should have utilised it for the purpose of preparing their forces to overthrow capital, to overcome bourgeois democracy, but *in fact* the working masses were, as a general rule, unable to enjoy democracy under capitalism.

Soviet, or proletarian, democracy has for the first time in the world created *democracy* for the masses, for the working people, for the factory workers and small peasants.

Never yet has the world seen political power wielded by the *majority* of the population, power *actually* wielded by this majority, as it is in the case of Soviet rule.

It suppresses the "freedom" of the exploiters and their accomplices; it deprives them of "freedom" to exploit, "freedom" to batten on starvation, "freedom" to fight for the restoration of the rule of capital, "freedom" to compact with the foreign bourgeoisie against the workers and peasants of their own country.

Let the Kautskys champion such freedom. Only a renegade from Marxism, a renegade from socialism can do so.

In nothing is the bankruptcy of the ideological leaders of the Second International, people like Hilferding and Kautsky, so strikingly expressed as in their utter inability to understand the significance of Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, its relation to the Paris Commune, its place in history, its necessity as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The newspaper *Die Freiheit*, organ of the "Independent" (alias middle-class, philistine, petty-bourgeois) German Social-Democratic Party, in its issue No. 74 of February 11, 1919, published a manifesto "To the Revolutionary Proletariat of Germany".

This manifesto is signed by the Party executive and by all its members in the National Assembly, the German variety of our Constituent Assembly.

This manifesto accuses the Scheidemanns of wanting to abolish the *Workers' Councils*, and proposes—don't laugh!—that the Councils be *combined* with the Assembly, that the

Councils be granted certain political rights, a certain place in the Constitution.

To reconcile, to unite the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat! How simple! What a brilliantly philistine idea!

The only pity is that it was tried in Russia, under Kerensky, by the united Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, those petty-bourgeois democrats who imagine themselves socialists.

Anyone who has read Marx and failed to understand that in capitalist society, at every acute moment, in every serious class conflict, the alternative is either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat, has understood nothing of either the economic or the political doctrines of Marx.

But the brilliantly philistine idea of Hilferding, Kautsky and Co. of peacefully combining the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat requires special examination, if exhaustive treatment is to be given to the economic and political absurdities with which this most remarkable and comical manifesto of February 11 is packed. That will have to be put off for another article.[55]

Moscow, April 15, 1919

Published in May 1919

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE RAILWAYMEN OF MOSCOW JUNCTION APRIL 16, 1919

Comrades, we all know that our country is now passing through difficult times. We have had to declare a mobilisation to repel the last onslaught of the counter-revolutionaries and of international imperialism. At the present time we need the effective assistance of the masses of the working people themselves to carry out this mobilisation successfully.

Comrades, all of you, of course, know perfectly well what colossal difficulties the war is causing and what enormous sacrifices it demands, particularly at the present time, when the country has to face the food difficulties and transport chaos as a result of the war. Owing to this, the sufferings that the masses of the working people have to bear as a consequence of this war have now become more acute than ever.

But we have every reason to think and assert that our position has improved, and that we shall surmount all our difficulties. We are not, however, harbouring any illusions. We know that at the present time our enemies, the capitalists of Britain, France and America, who are obviously working jointly with the Russian capitalists, are making a last effort to overthrow Soviet power. We see that the representatives of the landowners and the capitalists have been conferring in Paris for a long time now. We see that day after day and hour after hour they have greater hopes that Soviet power will collapse. But we also see that to this day, five months after their victory over Germany,

they have failed to conclude peace. Why? Because they are quarrelling among themselves over the division of the dainty morsels—who is to get Turkey, who is to get Bulgaria, how is Germany to be plundered, which titbits Britain, France and America are to have, how many billions to take in the form of indemnities from the Germans? It is obvious that they will get nothing from Germany, because that country has been ruined by the war, and the masses of the working people there are more and more vigorously resisting the oppression of the bourgeois government.

Comrades, because of all this we may be sure that at the present time, in view of Kolchak's victory on the Eastern Front, there has been a fresh burst of hope on the part of the Russian and foreign capitalists. But even though Kolchak may succeed in winning partial victories, they will never realise their hopes in respect of the Soviet Russian Republic.

We know that after their victory over Germany, the Allies were left with capital, an army millions strong, and a navy that knows no rival. Immediately after the defeat of Germany they had every opportunity of utilising all these forces for the purpose of conquering the Soviet Russian Republic. All that the Allied imperialists did in South Russia, their landing on the Black Sea coast and their occupation of Odessa, was directed against Soviet power.

But what do we see today, five months later? Did they not have military forces, a million-strong army, and a navy? Why did they have to retreat before the badly armed army of Ukrainian workers and peasants?

Because there is disaffection among their troops; this is proved by the information we have received, and which has been corroborated. A war for the division of capitalists' profits cannot be waged for four years with impunity. And now they have defeated Wilhelm, upon whom they put all the blame, they are unable to continue the war. We know that in the military sense the Entente countries were, and strictly speaking, still are, immeasurably stronger than we are. Nevertheless, we say that they have lost the war against us. This is not merely our imagination, or enthusiasm on our part, it has been proved by the events in the Ukraine. They cannot fight after all countries have been exhausted

by war, worn out by it, when it is becoming obvious to everybody that the war is being continued only for the purpose of preserving the power of capital over the working people. The Allies are still postponing the inevitable conclusion of peace with Russia, for the sake of which we have taken a number of steps, and have even offered terms that will be most burdensome for us. But we know that heavy financial burdens are immeasurably easier to bear than the continuation of the war, which deprives us of the younger generation of the workers and peasants. The imperialist governments know they cannot wage war against us. They know what the advance of Kolchak, who has mobilised several tens of thousands of young Siberian peasants, is really worth. He dared not recruit men who have seen active service, for he knew that they would not follow him, and he is able to keep control over these peasant lads only by brutal discipline and deception.

That is why we say with absolute conviction, although our position has become more acute, that we are in a position to bring this war to a close within the next few months and the Allies will be compelled to conclude peace with us. They are relying on Kolchak, they are counting on the food difficulties causing the collapse of Soviet power; nothing of the kind, we say. Of course, our food situation is by no means an easy one, and we know that still greater difficulties lie ahead. Nevertheless, we say that our position is nowhere near as bad as it was last year. At that time, last spring, the food shortage and the transport chaos were a greater threat than now.

In the first half of 1918 our food supply organisations were able to procure only twenty-eight million poods of grain, but in the second half of that year they obtained sixty-seven million poods. The first half of the year is always more difficult and the food shortage more severe. Last year, when the whole of the Ukraine was under the heel of the Germans, when Krasnov in the Don region received scores of carloads of military supplies from the Germans, and when the Czechoslovaks had captured the Volga area, the food situation was incomparably worse.

Now, the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic has been joined by others. The Latvian Republic has recently con-

solidated its position. There is disaffection among the German troops who advanced so rapidly, and the German soldiers say that they will not fight to restore the power of the barons. And the Ukraine, which Petlyura's gang captured for a short period, has now been entirely cleared of them and our Red troops are marching on to Bessarabia. We know that the international position of the Soviet Republic is becoming more stable every day, we may say, every hour. You all know that Soviet power has been established in Hungary, too, that a Soviet Republic has been set up there, and when it became evident that the Allies intended to plunder the country the bourgeoisie resigned and its place was taken by the workers.

Now, with the conquest of the Ukraine and the consolidation of Soviet power in the Don region, we are gaining strength. We can now say that we have sources of grain and food, and an opportunity of obtaining fuel from the Donets Basin. We are convinced, that, although the most difficult months are approaching, although the food crisis is more acute and our transport system is worn out and ruined, we shall nevertheless get over this crisis. In the Ukraine there are huge stocks of grain, surpluses that are difficult to take all at once; partisan warfare is still raging there, and the peasants, intimidated by the brutal rule of the Germans, are afraid to seize the landed estates. The first organisational steps in the Ukraine are difficult, just as they were here in the period when the Soviet government had its headquarters at Smolny.

We must send no less than three thousand railwaymen and a number of peasants from starving North Russia to the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government has already issued a decree fixing the exact amount of grain that we may take at once at a hundred million poods.

According to our information, in one of the districts of the Donets Basin there are also a million poods of grain at a distance of not more than ten versts from the railway.

Last year we had no such stocks, no such resources, but we have them now. This shows that if we exert all our efforts for a short time we shall be able to bring the war to a close within the next few months. We have decisive preponderance in the South. The Allies—the French and

British—have lost their campaign and have discovered that with the insignificant number of troops at their command they cannot wage war against the Soviet Republic. The lies that they spread about us are being dispelled; nobody now believes the fairy-tale that the Bolsheviks overthrew the former government by force and are maintaining power by force. Everybody knows that the Soviet Republic is gaining strength every day.

We are mobilising you now because the outcome of the war depends on this mobilisation. We have every reason for stating that it will decide this issue in our favour, and the imperialists will be compelled to accept our offer of peace because their strength is waning day by day.

Comrades, this is why the Soviet government has decided to strain every nerve, to mobilise mainly the workers and the peasants of the non-agricultural gubernias. We think that this mobilisation, assuming we make a rapid advance at the front, will enable us also to improve the food situation, for it will reduce the number of consumers in the non-agricultural gubernias, where the famine is more acute. The tens of thousands of men who will be sent to the front—and we are fighting in the most fertile and well-fed districts of the country—will be able to obtain food for themselves, and if we develop the parcel post system, they will be able immediately to assist their families at home to a no less and perhaps even to a larger extent than under the pood-and-a-half system.

The possibility of bringing the war to a speedy close depends on this mobilisation- and on this mobilisation we base our hopes that Kolchak's advance will be checked and his forces routed. We do not want to weaken our forces in the South where they are winding up their victory over the remnants of Krasnov's gangs because we want to make sure of our hold over this most fertile district. We have captured almost the whole of the Don region- in the North Caucasus there are even larger stocks of grain which we are sure of getting hold of if we do not weaken the Southern Front.

Comrades, for the first time in the history of the world we are waging a war in which the workers and peasants, knowing, feeling and seeing that the burden of war is immense, suffering the pangs of starvation in a country which

is surrounded by the imperialists like a besieged fortress, understand that they are fighting for the land and factories. A nation in which the majority of the workers and peasants realise, feel and see that they are fighting for their own Soviet power, for the rule of the working people, for the cause whose victory will ensure them and their children all the benefits of culture, of all that has been created by human labour—such a nation can never be vanquished. And we are convinced, comrades, that this mobilisation will be carried through much better than previous mobilisations, that you will support it, that in addition to speakers at meetings, every one of you, and every one of your friends, will become a propagandist and go to his fellow-workers in the factories and on the railways and explain to them in plain language why it is necessary now to exert all efforts so as to crush the enemy within the next few months. The masses themselves will rise, they will all become agitators to a man, and create an invincible force that will ensure the existence of the Soviet Republic not only in Russia, but all over the world.

Pravda No. 85,
April 23, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

THE FIGHT AGAINST KOLCHAK
SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF MOSCOW FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS
APRIL 17, 1919

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin, in a vigorous speech, called upon the Moscow proletariat to take a direct part in the fight against Kolchak. Kolchak's latest offensive, he said, was undoubtedly instigated by the imperialist powers of the Entente. The fact that the Entente was directing all the movements of the whiteguards in the border regions was proved by the telegram received from Comrade Stučka the day before to the effect that the Germans in Courland had stopped their offensive, but the Soviet Government in Latvia could not conclude peace with them because France, Britain and America were demanding that the Germans remain in Courland and continue the war. The German generals were willing to obey the victors, but the German soldiers emphatically refused to fight. The Allies' last card had been beaten. The victories in the South had shown that the Allies lack the forces with which to wage war against the Soviet Republic, or rather, they had lost control over their forces. The Allies' gamble in the South had ended in a shameful act of plunder when they fled from Odessa. The "enlightened" Allies accused the Soviets of committing acts of robbery and violence, but themselves robbed the Soviets of their merchant fleet which they took from Odessa without any right or justification, thereby dooming the civil population to starvation. This was an act of revenge for the

collapse of their imperialist plans. The Republic had wound up the Southern and Crimean fronts and was on the verge of winding up the Don Front. According to the latest information received, the Red Army was forty versts from Novocherkassk and victory was assured.

Kolchak's offensive had been instigated by the Allies in order to divert Soviet forces from the Southern Front and give the remnants of the whiteguard forces and Petlyura's gangs in the South an opportunity to recuperate, but the plan would fail. The Soviets would not withdraw a single regiment, or a single company, from the Southern Front.

A new army would be organised for the Eastern Front, and for this purpose mobilisation had been ordered. This mobilisation would be the last. It would enable the Soviets to put an end to Kolchak, i.e., to put an end to the war, and this time for good.

The mobilisation had been ordered solely for the non-agricultural, industrial gubernias. In drawing up the plan for this mobilisation attention had been paid not only to the interests of the war, but also to the interests of agriculture and food supplies. People were being transferred from the starving gubernias to the grain-producing regions. To a large extent this mobilisation would relieve the food situation in the metropolitan cities and the northern gubernias. All mobilised men would be allowed to send their families at home two food parcels a month, and in this way the working population would be able to obtain bread from their relatives at the front. According to the report of the Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs, food parcels played an important part in supplying food for the towns; in one day 37 carloads of food parcels had arrived. This measure would undoubtedly be more effective and more palpable than the pood-and-a-half experiment made last year.

The mobilisation had been properly conceived and planned, but to be successful it would have to be carried out in an unbureaucratic way. It had to be borne in mind that the mobilisation would be of decisive importance, and every effort had to be made to carry it out. Every class-conscious working man and every class-conscious working woman

would have to take a direct part in it. Conferences and mass meetings were not enough. What was needed was individual agitation. Every man liable to mobilisation should be personally visited. Every one of them should be convinced individually that the ending of the war depended on his courage, his determination and his devotion.

The proletarian revolution was spreading to all countries of the world, continued Lenin. The fact that the Allies had practically abandoned open military intervention in Russia's affairs was due to their inability to control their own armies, which had instinctively felt the effects of the Russian revolution. They were afraid of their own soldiers and workers, whom they were trying to shield from the influence of the Russian revolution. Lately, even newspaper reports of the successes of Bolshevism had been prohibited in the Allied countries. In Italy, a barrier had been set up to keep out even private letters from Russia. Lenin said that the other day he had received a letter from the well-known Italian socialist, Morgari, who had been very moderate at the Zimmerwald Conference. This letter had been sent through secret channels and was written on tiny scraps of paper, like Party correspondence in tsarist times.

In this secret letter, Morgari wrote: "On behalf of the Italian Party I send most hearty greetings to the Russian comrades and to the Soviet government." (*Stormy applause.*)

Everybody knew that the bourgeois government had voluntarily resigned in Hungary, voluntarily released Béla Kun from prison; he was a Hungarian army officer, a Communist, who had been a prisoner of war in Russia, had fought actively in the ranks of the Russian Communists, and had taken part in the suppression of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary insurrection in July last year. This formerly persecuted, slandered and tormented Hungarian Bolshevik had become practically the leader of the Hungarian Soviet Government. Compared with Russia, Hungary was a small country; but the Hungarian revolution would, perhaps, play a more important role in history than the Russian revolution. The people in that cultured country were taking into account the entire experience of the Russian revolution. They were firmly applying the principle of socialisation, and owing to the ground having been

better prepared there, the edifice of socialism was being built more systematically and successfully.

And at that very moment when it could be said with certainty that the cause of international imperialism was lost for ever, danger was looming in the East in the shape of Kolchak's brutal and desperate whiteguard hordes. This had got to be stopped. By putting an end to Kolchak they would put an end to the war for good. All efforts must be exerted. Every class-conscious proletarian would have to take part in the mobilisation. Every class-conscious working man and working woman would have to devote every spare moment to the work of individual agitation. They would not have to submit to this strain for long; a few months, or a few weeks, perhaps; but it would be the last and final effort, for victory was certain.

Izvestia No. 84,
April 18, 1919

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST STUDENTS APRIL 17, 1919[56]

It gives me great pleasure to greet you. I do not know how many gubernias are represented here, or where you have come from. The important thing is that the youth, the communist youth, are organising. The important thing is that the youth are gathering together to learn to build the new type of school. Now you have a new type of school. The old, bureaucratic school, which you hated and detested, and with which you had no ties, no longer exists. We have planned our work for a very long period. The future society we are striving for, the society in which all must work, the society in which there will be no class distinctions, will take a long time to build. At present we are only laying the foundations of this future society, but you will have to build it when you grow up. At present, work as your strength permits; do not undertake tasks that are too much for you; be guided by your seniors. Once again I greet this Congress and wish your labours every success.

First published in 1923

MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO THE BAVARIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

We thank you for your message of greetings, and on our part whole-heartedly greet the Soviet Republic of Bavaria. We ask you insistently to give us more frequent, definite information on the following. What measures have you taken to fight the bourgeois executioners, the Scheidemanns and Co.; have councils of workers and servants been formed in the different sections of the city; have the workers been armed; have the bourgeoisie been disarmed; has use been made of the stocks of clothing and other items for immediate and extensive aid to the workers, and especially to the farm labourers and small peasants; have the capitalist factories and wealth in Munich and the capitalist farms in its environs been confiscated; have mortgage and rent payments by small peasants been cancelled; have the wages of farm labourers and unskilled workers been doubled or trebled; have all paper stocks and all printing-presses been confiscated so as to enable popular leaflets and newspapers to be printed for the masses; has the six-hour working day with two- or three-hour instruction in state administration been introduced; have the bourgeoisie in Munich been made to give up surplus housing so that workers may be immediately moved into comfortable flats; have you taken over all the banks; have you taken hostages from the ranks of the bourgeoisie; have you introduced higher rations for the workers than for the bourgeoisie; have all the workers been mobilised for defence and for ideological propaganda in the neighbouring villages? The most urgent and most extensive implementation of these and similar measures,

coupled with the initiative of workers', farm labourers' and—acting apart from them—small peasants' councils, should strengthen your position. An emergency tax must be levied on the bourgeoisie, and an actual improvement effected in the condition of the workers, farm labourers and small peasants at once and at all costs.

With sincere greetings and wishes of success.

Lenin

Written April 27, 1919
First published in
Pravda No. 111, April 22, 1930

Published according to
the manuscript

TELEGRAM
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINE

The resolution passed by the Ekaterinoslav Socialist-Revolutionaries shows that those scoundrels are advocates of the kulaks. There must be a newspaper campaign against them on the grounds of their defence of the kulaks and their slogan "oppose centralisation"; it must be required of them that they expose the kulaks and struggle against the free sale of grain by peasants. In the government they must be tied down by precise directives and kept under strict surveillance and in the event of there being the slightest deviation from the government's policy on food, co-operatives and finances and on the question of the closest collaboration with Russia, preparations must be made to expel them in disgrace. Keep me more frequently informed.

Lenin

Written late in April 1919

First published in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Published according to the manuscript

THREE SPEECHES DELIVERED IN RED SQUARE MAY 1, 1919

NEWSPAPER REPORTS

1

Lenin's appearance among the demonstrators was greeted with a lengthy ovation. After greeting the Moscow and world proletariat, Lenin compared the May Day celebrations of the previous year with the present celebrations. In the course of the year, he said, the political situation had changed considerably in favour of Soviet power. On May the First the year before they had been threatened by German imperialism, it had been routed and dispersed.

The conditions under which the proletarian festival was being celebrated had changed in other countries as well. The workers in all countries were taking the path of struggle against imperialism. The emancipated working class was triumphantly celebrating its festival freely and openly not only in Soviet Russia, but also in Soviet Hungary, and in Soviet Bavaria.

"And we can say with certainty," continued Lenin, "that not only in Red Moscow, in Red Petrograd and in Budapest, but in all large proletarian centres, the workers, who have come out into the streets today not merely to take the air but to demonstrate their strength, are talking about the significance of Soviet power and of the early triumph of the proletariat."

Going on to deal with the threats of Anglo-French imperialism, Lenin said that considering that Anglo-French imperialists had been compelled to retire from the battlefield in the Ukraine, where small units of insurgents were

operating, they would certainly be unable to resist the united forces of Soviet Russia, Hungary and Bavaria. Their withdrawal from Odessa and the Crimea had shown that the British and French soldiers did not wish to fight against Soviet Russia, and this was the pledge of Soviet victory.

Lenin then read a telegram he had received from Comrade Kamenev to the effect that Sevastopol had been entirely cleared of French forces.

"Thus, today," he said, "the Red Flag of the proletariat, which is celebrating its day of liberation from the imperialist gangs, is flying over liberated Sevastopol." (*Lengthy ovation. Shouts of* "Hurrah" *repeated for a long time.*)

Dealing with the Kolchak danger, Lenin said that the latest reports from the front gave them grounds to believe that victory over Kolchak was quite near. Tens and hundreds of thousands of men were being sent to the front, and these would completely destroy Kolchak's gangs.

In conclusion, Lenin expressed his confidence in the final victory of Soviet power all over the world and exclaimed: "Long live the world Soviet republic! Long live communism!"

Izvestia No. 93,
May 3, 1919

Published according to
the *Izvestia* text

2

"The majority of those here present are no older than 30 to 35 years of age," said Lenin, "and they will live to see the full bloom of communism, from which we are still remote."

Pointing to the children, Lenin said that they, who were taking part in the celebration of the festival of the emancipation of labour, would fully enjoy the fruits of the labours and sacrifices of the revolutionaries.

"Our grandchildren will examine the documents and other relics of the epoch of the capitalist system with amazement. It will be difficult for them to picture to themselves how the trade in articles of primary necessity could remain in private hands, how factories could belong to individuals, how some men could exploit others, how it was possible for those who did not work to exist. Up to now the story of what our children would see in the future has sounded like a fairy-tale; but today, comrades, you clearly see that the edifice of socialist society, of which we have laid the foundations, is not a utopia. Our children will build this edifice with even greater zeal." (*Stormy applause.*)

Published in *Vecherniye Izvestia Moskovskogo Sovieta* No. 230, May 2, 1919

Published according to the newspaper text

3

SPEECH AT THE UNVEILING OF A MONUMENT TO STEPAN RAZIN ON LOBNOYE MESTO*

(*Stormy applause.*) Comrades, we are today celebrating May Day in company with proletarians throughout the world who thirst for the overthrow of capital. This Lobnoye Mesto is a reminder of how many centuries of torment were suffered by the working people under the yoke of the oppressors, for the power of capital never could be maintained except by the force and oppression that even in past times aroused indignation. This monument is erected to one who represented the rebellious peasants. On this spot he laid down his life in the struggle for freedom. Russian revolutionaries have made many sacrifices in the struggle against capital. The best of the proletarians and the peasants, the freedom fighters, perished, but it was not in the fight for the sort of freedom capital offers, freedom in which the banks, private factories and profiteering are retained. Down with such freedom! What we need is real freedom and that is possible only when society consists entirely of working people. To achieve such freedom much labour and many sacrifices will be required. We shall do everything possible to achieve that great aim, to build socialism. (*Stormy applause.*)

Published in *Vecherniye Izvestia Moskovskogo Sovieta* No. 230, May 2, 1919

Published according to the newspaper text

* Lobnoye Mesto is a round stone dais in Red Square. Royal edicts and death sentences were announced from it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 1671, Stepan Razin, leader of the peasant revolt of 1667-71, was executed there.—*Ed.*

FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS ON ADULT EDUCATION

MAY 6-19, 1919

Published in the pamphlet:
N. Lenin, *Two Speeches at the First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education*,
Moscow, 1919

Published according to the pamphlet

FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS ON ADULT EDUCATION

MAY 6-19, 1919

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N. Lenin, Two Speeches at
the First All-Russia Congress
on Adult Education,
Moscow, 1919

Published according to
the pamphlet

1
SPEECH OF GREETING
MAY 6

Comrades, it gives me pleasure to greet the Congress on adult education. You do not, of course, expect me to deliver a speech that goes deeply into this subject, like that delivered by the preceding speaker, Comrade Lunacharsky, who is well-informed on the matter and has made a special study of it. Permit me to confine myself to a few words of greeting and to the observations I have made and thoughts that have occurred to me in the Council of People's Commissars when dealing more or less closely with your work. I am sure that there is not another sphere of Soviet activity in which such enormous progress has been made during the past eighteen months as in the sphere of adult education. Undoubtedly, it has been easier for us and for you to work in this sphere than in others. Here we had to cast aside the old obstacles and the old hindrances. Here it was much easier to do something to meet the tremendous demand for knowledge, for free education and free development, which was felt most among the masses of the workers and peasants; for while the mighty pressure of the masses made it easy for us to remove the external obstacles that stood in their path, to break up the historical bourgeois institutions which bound us to imperialist war and doomed Russia to bear the enormous burden that resulted from this war, we nevertheless felt acutely how heavy the task of re-educating the masses was, the task of organisation and instruction, spreading knowledge, combating that heritage of ignorance, primitiveness, barbarism and savagery that we took over. In this field the struggle had to be waged by

entirely different methods; we could count only on the prolonged success and the persistent and systematic influence of the leading sections of the population, an influence which the masses willingly submit to, but often we are guilty of doing less than we could do. I think that in taking these first steps to spread adult education, education, free from the old limits and conventionalities, which the adult population welcomes so much, we had at first to contend with two obstacles. Both these obstacles we inherited from the old capitalist society, which is clinging to us to this day, is dragging us down by thousands and millions of threads, ropes and chains.

The first was the plethora of bourgeois intellectuals, who very often regarded the new type of workers' and peasants' educational institution as the most convenient field for testing their individual theories in philosophy and culture, and in which, very often, the most absurd ideas were hailed as something new, and the supernatural and incongruous were offered as purely proletarian art and proletarian culture.[57] (*Applause.*) This was natural and, perhaps, pardonable in the early days, and the broad movement cannot be blamed for it. I hope that, in the long run, we shall try to get rid of all this and shall succeed.

The second was also inherited from capitalism. The broad masses of the petty-bourgeois working people who were thirsting for knowledge, broke down the old system, but could not propose anything of an organising or organised nature. I had opportunities to observe this in the Council of People's Commissars when the mobilisation of literate persons and the Library Department were discussed, and from these brief observations I realised the seriousness of the situation in this field. True, it is not quite customary to refer to something bad in a speech of greeting. I hope that you are free from these conventionalities, and will not be offended with me for telling you of my somewhat sad observations. When we raised the question of mobilising literate persons, the most striking thing was the brilliant victory achieved by our revolution without immediately emerging from the limits of the bourgeois revolution. It gave freedom for development to the available forces, but these available forces were petty bourgeois and their watch-

word was the old one—each for himself and God for all—the very same accursed capitalist slogan which can never lead to anything but Kolchak and bourgeois restoration. If we review what we are doing to educate the illiterate, I think we shall have to draw the conclusion that we have done very little, and that our duty in this field is to realise that the organisation of proletarian elements is essential. It is not the ridiculous phrases which remain on paper that matter, but the introduction of measures which the people need urgently and which would compel every literate person to regard it his duty to instruct several illiterate persons. This is what our decree says[58]; but in this field hardly anything has been done.

When another question was dealt with in the Council of People's Commissars, that of the libraries, I said that the complaints we are constantly hearing about our industrial backwardness being to blame, about our having few books and being unable to produce enough—these complaints, I told myself, are justified. We have no fuel, of course, our factories are idle, we have little paper and we cannot produce books. All this is true, but it is also true that we cannot get at the books that are available. Here we continue to suffer from peasant simplicity and peasant helplessness; when the peasant ransacks the squire's library he runs home in the fear that somebody will take the books away from him, because he cannot conceive of just distribution, of state property that is not something hateful, but is the common property of the workers and of the working people generally. The ignorant masses of peasants are not to blame for this, and as far as the development of the revolution is concerned it is quite legitimate, it is an inevitable stage, and when the peasant took the library and kept it hidden, he could not do otherwise, for he did not know that all the libraries in Russia could be amalgamated and that there would be enough books to satisfy those who can read and to teach those who cannot. At present we must combat the survivals of disorganisation, chaos, and ridiculous departmental wrangling. This must be our main task. We must take up the simple and urgent matter of mobilising the literate to combat illiteracy. We must utilise the books that are available and set to work to organise a network of

libraries which will help the people to gain access to every available book; there must be no parallel organisations, but a single, uniform planned organisation. This small matter reflects one of the fundamental tasks of our revolution. If it fails to carry out this task, if it fails to set about creating a really systematic and uniform organisation in place of our Russian chaos and inefficiency, then this revolution will remain a bourgeois revolution because the major specific feature of the proletarian revolution which is marching towards communism is this organisation—for all the bourgeoisie wanted was to break up the old system and allow freedom for the development of peasant farming, which revived the same capitalism as in all earlier revolutions.

Since we call ourselves the Communist Party, we must understand that only now that we have removed the external obstacles and have broken down the old institutions have we come face to face with the primary task of a genuine proletarian revolution in all its magnitude, namely, that of organising tens and hundreds of millions of people. After the eighteen months' experience that we all have acquired in this field, we must at last take the right road that will lead to victory over the lack of culture, and over the ignorance and barbarism from which we have suffered all this time. (*Stormy applause.*)

2
DECEPTION OF THE PEOPLE WITH SLOGANS OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
MAY 19

Comrades, instead of an appraisal of the current situation, which I think some of you expect today, permit me to answer the most important political questions—not only theoretical, of course, but also practical—which now loom before us, characterise the entire stage of the Soviet revolution and give rise to most controversy; they give rise to most of attacks by people who think they are socialists, and they cause most confusion in the minds of people who think they are democrats and who are particularly fond of accusing us of violating democracy. It seems to me that these general political questions are too often, even constantly, to be found in all present-day propaganda and agitation, and in all anti-Bolshevik literature—when, of course, this literature rises slightly above the level of the downright lying, slander and vituperation of all organs of the bourgeois press. If we take the literature of a slightly higher level I think we shall find that the fundamental questions are the relations between democracy and dictatorship, the tasks of the revolutionary class in a revolutionary period, the tasks of the transition to socialism in general, and the relations between the working class and the peasantry; I think that these questions serve as the main basis for all present-day political controversies, and although it may sometimes seem to you that it is something of a digression from the immediate topics of the day, the explanation of these issues should be our chief duty. I can

not, of course, undertake to cover all these questions in a short lecture. I have chosen some, which I should like to talk to you about.

I

The first point I have chosen is that of the difficulties of every revolution, of every transition to a new system. If you examine the attacks that are made against the Bolsheviks by people who think that they are socialists and democrats—and as examples of such I can quote the groups of writers in *Vsegda Vperyod!* and *Dyelo Naroda*, newspapers which in my opinion have quite rightly been suppressed in the interests of the revolution, and the representatives of which most often resort to theoretical criticism in attacks of the type natural for organs which our authorities regard as counter-revolutionary—if you examine the attacks on Bolshevism made by this camp, you will find that a constant accusation is the following: "The Bolsheviks promised you, the working people, bread, peace and freedom; but they have not given you bread, or peace, or freedom, they have deceived you, and they have deceived you by abandoning democracy." I shall deal with the departure from democracy separately. At present I will take the other side of this accusation—"The Bolsheviks promised bread, peace and freedom, but the Bolsheviks gave you a continuation of the war, an exceptionally fierce and stubborn struggle, a war of all the imperialists, of the capitalists of all the Entente countries—which means of the most civilised and advanced countries—against tormented, tortured, backward and weary Russia." And these accusations, I repeat, you will find in both the newspapers I have mentioned; you will hear them made in conversation with every bourgeois intellectual who, of course, thinks that he is not bourgeois; you will constantly hear them in conversation with every philistine. And so I ask you to give some thought to this sort of accusation.

Yes, the Bolsheviks did set out to make a revolution against the bourgeoisie, to overthrow the bourgeois government violently, to break away from all the traditional customs, promises and commandments of bourgeois democracy; they did set out to wage a most desperate and violent

struggle and war to crush the propertied classes; they did this to extricate Russia, and then the whole of mankind, from the imperialist slaughter and to put an end to all war. Yes, the Bolsheviks did set out to make a revolution in order to achieve all this, and, of course, they have never thought of abandoning this fundamental and main object. Nor is there any doubt that the attempts to emerge from this imperialist slaughter, to smash the rule of the bourgeoisie, prompted all the civilised countries to attack Russia; for such is the political programme of France, Britain and America, no matter how much they insist that they have abandoned the idea of intervention. No matter how much the Lloyd Georges, Wilsons and Clemenceaus may assure us that they have abandoned the idea of intervention, we know that they are lying. We know that the Allied warships which left, and were compelled to leave, Odessa and Sevastopol, are now blockading the Black Sea coast, and are even giving artillery cover to that part of the Crimean Peninsula, near Kerch, where the volunteers[59] are concentrated. They say: "We cannot surrender this to you. Even if the volunteers fail to cope with you, we cannot surrender this part of the Crimean Peninsula, because, if we did, you would be masters of the Azov Sea, you will cut us off from Denikin and prevent us from sending supplies to our friends." Or take the offensive now developing against Petrograd. Yesterday one of our destroyers fought against four enemy destroyers. Is it not clear that this is intervention? Is not the British navy taking part in it? Is not the same thing happening in Archangel and Siberia? The fact is that the whole civilised world is now fighting against Russia.

The question is, did we contradict ourselves when we called upon the working people to make a revolution, promising them peace, and brought things to the pitch that the whole civilised world is now attacking weak, weary, backward and ruined Russia? Or are those who have the presumption to hurl such a reproach at us acting in contradiction to the elementary concepts of democracy and socialism? That is the question. To present this question in its theoretical, general form, I shall draw an analogy. We talk about the revolutionary class, the revolutionary

policy of the people, but I suggest you take an individual revolutionary. Take, for example, Chernyshevsky, and appraise his activities. What would be the appraisal of an absolutely ignorant man? Probably he would say: "Well, the man wrecked his own life, found himself in Siberia, and achieved nothing." This is a sample. If we were to hear an argument like this from some unknown person we would say: "At best it comes from a man who is hopelessly ignorant and who is, perhaps, not to blame for being so ignorant that he cannot understand the importance of the activities of an individual revolutionary in the general chain of revolutionary events; or else it comes from a scoundrel, a supporter of reaction, who is deliberately trying to frighten the working people away from the revolution." I took the example of Chernyshevsky because, no matter which trend the people who call themselves socialists may belong to, there cannot be any serious disagreement in their appraisal of this individual revolutionary. Everybody will agree that if an individual revolutionary is appraised from the point of view of the outwardly useless and often fruitless sacrifices he has made and the nature of his activities and their connection with the activities of preceding and succeeding revolutionaries is ignored—if the importance of his activities is appraised from this point of view, it is due either to complete ignorance, or to a vicious and hypocritical defence of the interests of reaction, oppression, exploitation and class tyranny. On this point there can be no disagreement.

Now I ask you to carry your thoughts from the individual revolutionary to the revolution of a whole nation, of a whole country. Has any Bolshevik ever denied that the revolution can be finally victorious only when it embraces all, or at all events, some of the most important advanced countries? We have always said that. Did we ever say that it was possible to emerge from the imperialist war simply by the men sticking their bayonets into the ground? I deliberately use this expression which, in the Kerensky period, I personally, and all our comrades, constantly used in resolutions, speeches and newspaper articles. We said: The war cannot be brought to a close by the men sticking their bayonets into the ground. If there are Tolstoyans

who think otherwise, they must be pitied as people who have taken leave of their senses, and you can expect nothing better from them.

We said that emergence from this war may involve us in a revolutionary war. We said this from 1915 onwards, and then later, in the Kerensky period. Of course, revolutionary war is also war, just as arduous, sanguinary and painful. And when the revolution develops on a world scale it inevitably arouses resistance on the same world scale. The situation now being such that all the civilised countries in the world are fighting against Russia, we must not be surprised that extremely ignorant peasants are accusing us of failing to keep our promises. Nothing else is to be expected from them. In view of their absolute ignorance, we cannot blame them. Indeed, how can you expect a very ignorant peasant to understand that there are different kinds of wars, that there are just and unjust wars, progressive and reactionary wars, wars waged by advanced classes and wars waged by backward classes, wars waged for the purpose of perpetuating class oppression and wars waged for the purpose of eliminating oppression? To understand this one must be familiar with the class struggle, with the principles of socialism, and at least a little bit familiar with the history of revolution. You cannot expect this from an ignorant peasant.

But when a man who calls himself a democrat, or a socialist, gets up on a platform to make a public statement—irrespective of what he calls himself, Menshevik, Social-Democrat, Socialist-Revolutionary, true socialist, adherent of the Berne International, there are lots of titles of this sort, titles are cheap—when such an individual gets up and charges us with having promised peace and called forth war, what answer should be made to him? Are we to assume that he is as ignorant as the ignorant peasant who cannot distinguish one kind of war from another? Are we to assume that he does not see the difference between the imperialist war, which was a predatory war, and which has now been utterly exposed as such—since the Treaty of Versailles only those who are totally incapable of reasoning and thinking, or who are totally blind, can fail to see that it was a predatory war on both sides—are we to assume that there is even

one literate person who fails to see the difference between that predatory war and the war we are waging and which is assuming world-wide dimensions, because the world bourgeoisie have realised that they must fight their last decisive battle? We cannot assume any of this. And that is why we say that anybody who claims to be a democrat, or a socialist, of whatever shade, is a supporter of the bourgeoisie if he in one way or another, directly or indirectly, spreads among the people the accusation that the Bolsheviks are dragging out the Civil War, which is an arduous and painful war, whereas they promised peace; and this is how we shall answer him, and we shall take our stand against him just as we do against Kolchak. Such is our answer. Such is the entire issue.

The gentlemen of *Dyelo Naroda* express astonishment and say: "But we are opposed to Kolchak; what terrible injustice to persecute us!"

It is a great pity, gentlemen, that you refuse to be logical and do not wish to understand the simple ABC of politics from which certain definite deductions must be made. You say that you are opposed to Kolchak. I take up the newspapers *Vsegda Vperyod!* and *Dyelo Naroda* and read the philistine arguments of this type, these moods that are so numerous and that prevail among the intelligentsia. I say that every one of you who spreads such accusations among the people is supporting Kolchak, because he does not understand the elementary, fundamental difference, which every literate person sees, between the imperialist war which we smashed, and the Civil War in which we have become involved. We never concealed from the people the fact that we were taking this risk. We are straining every nerve to defeat the bourgeoisie in this Civil War and to prevent all possibility of class oppression. There has never been, nor can there ever be, a revolution that was guaranteed against a long and arduous struggle, and perhaps filled with the most desperate sacrifices. Those who are unable to distinguish between the sacrifices made in the course of a revolutionary struggle for the sake of its victory, when all the propertied, all the counter-revolutionary classes are fighting against the revolution, those who cannot distinguish between these sacrifices and the sacrifices involved

in a predatory war waged by the exploiters, are either abysmally ignorant—and such people ought to be made to learn their ABC, before giving them adult education they ought to be given the most elementary education—or they are out-and-out Kolchak-supporting hypocrites, whatever they may call themselves, or under whichever title they may try to disguise themselves. And these accusations against the Bolsheviks are the most common and widespread. They are really linked up with the broad masses of the working people, because the ignorant peasants find it difficult to understand; they suffer from all war, no matter what the war is about. I am not surprised when I hear an ignorant peasant say: "We had to fight for the tsar, we fought for the Mensheviks, and now we have to fight for the Bolsheviks." This does not surprise me. Indeed, war is war, and entails endless heavy sacrifices. "The tsar said that it was a war for freedom and liberation from a yoke; the Mensheviks said that it was a war for freedom and liberation from a yoke. And now the Bolsheviks say the same thing. They all say the same thing; how can we sort this all out?"

Indeed, how can an ignorant peasant sort it all out? Such a man still has to learn elementary politics. But what can we say about a man who uses such words as "revolution", "democracy", and "socialism", and claims that these words should be used with understanding. He cannot juggle with such words unless he wants to be a political faker, for the difference between a war between two groups of robbers and a war waged by an oppressed class which has risen in revolt against all robbery is an elementary, radical and fundamental difference. The issue is not one of a certain party, class or government justifying war—the real point at issue is the nature of the war, its class content, which class is waging it, and what policy is embodied in it.

II

I shall now leave the question of appraising the arduous and difficult period we are now passing through, and which is inevitably connected with the revolution, for another political issue, which also comes up in all debates, and also gives rise to confusion. This is the question of a bloc

with the imperialists, of an alliance, an agreement with the imperialists.

Probably you have read in the newspapers the names of the Socialist-Revolutionaries Volsky and, I believe, Svyatitsky, who recently wrote in *Izvestia*, and issued their manifesto. They regard themselves as Socialist-Revolutionaries who cannot possibly be accused of having supported Kolchak. They left Kolchak, they suffered at the hands of Kolchak, and on coming over to us they rendered us a service against Kolchak. That is true. But examine the arguments these citizens advance. See how they appraise the question of a bloc with the imperialists, of an alliance, or agreement, with the imperialists. I had occasion to read their arguments when the authorities combating counter-revolution confiscated their writings, and when I had to examine their papers to be able to judge correctly the extent of their association with Kolchak. These are undoubtedly the best of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In their writings I found the following argument, "What do you mean? You want us to repent; you are waiting for us to repent. Never! We have nothing to repent of! You accuse us of having entered into a bloc, an agreement with the Entente, with the imperialists. But did you Bolsheviks not enter into an agreement with the German imperialists? What is the Brest peace? Is not the Brest peace an agreement with imperialism? You entered into an agreement with German imperialism at Brest; we entered into an agreement with French imperialism; we are quits, we have nothing to repent of!"

This argument, which I found in the writings of the persons I have mentioned and of their colleagues, is one that I also find when I call to mind the newspapers I mentioned and when I try to sum up my impressions of philistine conversations. We constantly hear arguments of this kind, it is one of the chief political arguments we have to deal with. I therefore ask you to examine and analyse this argument, and to study it theoretically. What does it amount to? Are those right who say: "We democrats and socialists were in a bloc with the Entente; you were in a bloc with Wilhelm, you concluded the Brest peace. We have no grounds for mutual reproach. We are quits"? Or are we

right when we say that those who not merely in words but in deeds are in agreement with the Entente against the Bolshevik revolution are supporters of Kolchak? Although they may deny it a thousand times, although they have personally deserted Kolchak and have proclaimed to the whole people that they are opposed to him, their very roots, the whole nature and significance of their arguments and their deeds make them Kolchak supporters. Who is right? This is the fundamental question of the revolution; and some thought must be given to this.

To explain this point, permit me to draw another analogy, this time, however, not with an individual revolutionary, but with an individual man in the street. Let us suppose that you were riding in an automobile and suddenly your car is surrounded by bandits who point a revolver at your head. Let us suppose that after this you surrender your money and weapons to the bandits, and even let them take the car and ride off. Well? You have given the bandits weapons and money. That is a fact. Now let us suppose that another citizen gave these bandits weapons and money so as to take part in their attacks on peaceful citizens.

In both cases an agreement is reached, whether written or verbal makes no difference. We can picture to ourselves a man giving up his revolver, his weapons and his money, without uttering a word. The nature of the agreement is clear: "I give you my revolver, my weapons and money, and you give me the opportunity to rid myself of your pleasant company." (*Laughter.*) The agreement is a fact. It is also possible for a tacit agreement to be concluded by the man who gives the bandits weapons and money to enable them to rob other people and afterwards give him part of the loot. This, too, is a tacit agreement.

Now I ask you, could any literate person fail to distinguish between these two agreements? You will say that if a man is unable to distinguish between these two agreements and says, "You gave the bandits money and weapons and so don't accuse other people of banditism; what right have you to accuse other people of banditism?"—such a man must be a cretin. If you were to meet such a literate person you would have to admit, or at least 999 out of 1,000 would admit, that he had taken leave of his senses,

and that it is useless to discuss political, or even criminal, subjects with such a man.

I now ask you to carry your thoughts from this example to the comparison between the Brest peace and the agreement with the Entente. What was the Brest peace? Was it not an act of violence on the part of bandits who had attacked us when we were honestly proposing peace and were calling upon all nations to overthrow *their own* bourgeoisie? It would have been ridiculous had we started by trying to overthrow the German bourgeoisie! We denounced this treaty before the whole world as a most predatory, plundering treaty, we condemned it and at first even refused to sign it, as we counted on the assistance of the German workers. But when the robbers put a revolver to our heads we said, take the weapons and the money, we will settle accounts with you later on by other means. We know that German imperialism has another enemy, whom blind people have not noticed, namely, the German workers. Can this agreement with imperialism be put on a par with the agreement entered into by democrats, socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries—don't laugh, the more radical the title the more resonant it sounds—with the agreement they entered into with the Entente to fight against the workers of their own country? But that is what they did, and are doing to this day. The most influential Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, those with European reputations, are living abroad even today, and they are in alliance with the Entente. I do not know whether this is a written agreement; probably not, clever people do such things on the quiet. But it is obvious that such an agreement exists, since they are being made such a fuss of, are given passports, and wireless messages are being sent all over the world stating that Axelrod delivered a speech today, that Savinkov, or Avksentyev, will deliver a speech tomorrow, and that Breshkovskaya will speak the day after tomorrow. Is this not an agreement, even if a tacit one? But is it the same kind of agreement with the imperialists as we concluded? Outwardly it resembles ours as much as the act of a man who gives weapons and money to bandits resembles any act of this nature, irrespective of its object and character, at all events, irrespective of the

object for which I give the bandits money and weapons: whether it is to get rid of them when they attack me and I find myself in a position where if I do not give them my revolver they will kill me; or I give the bandits money and weapons for the purpose of robbery, of which I am aware, and in the proceeds of which I am to share.

"I, of course, call this liberating Russia from the dictatorship of tyrants. I, of course, am a democrat, because I support the famous Siberian or Archangel democracy, and am fighting, of course, for a Constituent Assembly. Don't dare to suspect that I am pursuing some evil object. And even if I am rendering assistance to those bandits, the British, French and American imperialists, I am doing so only in the interests of democracy, of the Constituent Assembly, of government by the people, of the unity of the working classes of the population, and in order to overthrow those tyrants and usurpers, the Bolsheviks!"

Noble aims, no doubt. But has not everybody who engages in politics heard that politics are not judged by bare statements but by real class content? Which class do you serve? If you are in agreement with the imperialists, are you participating in imperialist banditism or not?

In my "Letter to American Workers", I spoke, among other things, about the American revolutionary people fighting to liberate themselves from England in the eighteenth century, when they were waging one of the first and greatest wars for real liberation in human history, one of the few really revolutionary wars in human history—and this great revolutionary American people, in fighting for their liberation, entered into agreements with the bandits of Spanish and French imperialism, who at that time had colonies in neighbouring parts of America. In alliance with these bandits, the American people fought the English and liberated themselves from them. Have you ever met any literate person anywhere in the world, have you seen any socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, representatives of democracy, or whatever it is they call themselves—even the Mensheviks—have you ever heard that any of these have the temerity publicly to blame the American people for this, to say that they violated the principle of democracy, freedom, and so forth? Such a crank has not yet been born.

But today, we get people here who call themselves by these titles, and even claim a right to belong to the same International that we belong to, and say that it is merely a piece of Bolshevik mischievousness—and everybody knows that the Bolsheviks are mischievous—to organise their own International and refuse to join the good, old, common to all, united, Berne International!

And there are people who say: "We have nothing to repent of. You entered into an agreement with Wilhelm, we entered into an agreement with the Entente, we are quits!"

I say that if these people have even an elementary knowledge of politics they are Kolchak supporters, no matter how much they personally may have denied this, no matter how much they personally are sick and tired of Kolchak, no matter how much they have suffered at his hands and in spite of their having come over to our side. They are Kolchak supporters because it is impossible to imagine that they do not see the difference between an agreement one is compelled to make in the course of the struggle against the exploiters—and which the exploited classes have been compelled to make over and over again throughout the history of the revolution—and the conduct of our most influential alleged democrats, representatives of our "socialist" intelligentsia, some of whom yesterday and some today entered into agreements with the bandits and robbers of international imperialism against a *section*—as they say—a section of the working classes of their own country. These are Kolchak people, and the only relations possible with them are those between conscious revolutionaries and Kolchak supporters.

III

I now come to the next question, that of our attitude towards democracy in general.

I have already said that the democrats and socialists plead democracy as the most common justification, the most common defence of the political stand taken against us. The most emphatic supporter of this point of view in European literature is, as you, of course, know, Kautsky,

the ideological leader of the Second International, and to this day a member of the Berne International. "The Bolsheviks have chosen a method which violates democracy; the Bolsheviks have chosen the method of dictatorship. Hence, their cause is unjust," he says. This argument has been repeated a thousand and a million times, it occurs constantly in all periodicals, including the newspapers I have mentioned. It is being constantly repeated by all intellectuals, and sometimes the ordinary man in the street sub-consciously repeats it in his arguments. "Democracy means freedom, it means equality, it means settling questions by a majority. What can be higher than freedom, equality, and majority decisions? Since you Bolsheviks have departed from this, and even have the presumption to say publicly that you stand above freedom, equality and majority decisions, you must not be surprised, nor must you complain, when we call you usurpers and tyrants!"

We are not in the least surprised at this, for what we desire most of all is clarity; and the only thing we rely on is that the advanced section of the working people should really be conscious of its position. Yes, we said, and say it all the time in our programme, in the programme of our Party, that we shall not allow ourselves to be deceived by such high-sounding slogans as freedom, equality and the will of the majority, and that we shall treat as aiders and abettors of Kolchak those who call themselves democrats, adherents of pure democracy, adherents of consistent democracy and who, directly or indirectly, oppose it to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Get this clear—you must get it clear. Are the pure democrats guilty of merely preaching pure democracy, defending it from the usurpers, or are they guilty of being on the side of the propertied classes, on the side of Kolchak?

We shall begin our examination with the question of freedom. Needless to say, for every revolution, socialist or democratic, freedom is a very, very important slogan. But our programme says that if freedom runs counter to the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital, it is a deception. And every one of you who has read Marx—and, I think, even every one who has read at least one popular exposition of Marx's theories—knows that Marx

devoted the greater part of his life, the greater part of his literary work, and the greater part of his scientific studies to ridiculing freedom, equality, the will of the majority, and all the Benthams who wrote so beautifully about these things, and to proving that these phrases were merely a screen to cover up the freedom of the commodity owners, the freedom of capital, which these owners use to oppress the masses of the working people.

At the present time, when things have reached the stage of overthrowing the rule of capital all over the world, or at all events in one country; in this historical epoch, when the struggle of the oppressed working people for the complete overthrow of capital and the abolition of commodity production stands in the forefront, we say that all those who in such a political situation talk about "freedom in general", who in the name of this freedom oppose the dictatorship of the proletariat are doing nothing more nor less than aiding and abetting the exploiters, for unless freedom promotes the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital, it is a deception, as we openly say in our Party programme. Perhaps this is superfluous from the point of view of the outward structure of the programme, but it is most fundamental from the point of view of our propaganda and agitation, from the point of view of the principle of the proletarian struggle and proletarian power. We know perfectly well that we have to contend against world capital; we know perfectly well that at one time it was the task of world capital to create freedom, that it overthrew feudal slavery, that it created bourgeois freedom. We know perfectly well that this was epoch-making progress. And yet we say that we are opposing capitalism in general, republican capitalism, democratic capitalism, free capitalism; and, of course, we know that it will raise the standard of liberty against us. But to this we have our answer, and we deemed it necessary to give this answer in our programme—all freedom is deception if it runs counter to the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

But, perhaps, this is not the case? Perhaps there is no contradiction between freedom and the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital? Take the West-European countries that you have visited, or at least have read about.

Every book you read describes their system as the freest system. And now, these civilised countries of Western Europe—France and Britain—and America have raised this standard, are marching against the Bolsheviks "in the name of freedom". Only the other day—we now get French newspapers but rarely because we are completely surrounded, but we do get wireless information, because, after all, they cannot blockade the air, and we intercept foreign wireless messages—the other day I had the opportunity of reading a wireless message that was sent out by the predatory government of France to the effect that in fighting the Bolsheviks and supporting their opponents, France was remaining true to her "lofty ideals of freedom". We hear this sort of thing at every step, it is the general tone of their polemics against us.

But what do they mean by freedom? By freedom these civilised Frenchmen, Englishmen and Americans mean, say, freedom of assembly. The constitution should contain the clause: "Freedom of assembly for all citizens." "This," they say, "is the substance, this is the principal manifestation of freedom. But you Bolsheviks have violated freedom of assembly."

To this we answer indeed, the freedom that you British, French and American gentlemen preach is a deception if it runs counter to the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital. You have forgotten a detail, you civilised gentlemen. You have forgotten that your freedom is inscribed in a constitution which *sanctions private property*. That is the whole point.

In your constitution you have freedom side by side with private property. The fact that you recognise freedom of assembly, of course, marks vast progress compared with the feudal system, with medievalism, with serfdom. All socialists admitted this when they took advantage of the freedom of bourgeois society to teach the proletariat how to throw off the yoke of capitalism.

But your freedom is only freedom on paper, but not in fact. By that I mean that the large halls that are to be found in big cities—like this hall, for example—belong to the capitalists and landowners, and are sometimes called "Assembly Rooms for the Gentry". You may freely assemble

in these halls, citizens of the Russian Democratic Republic, but remember that they are private property and, pardon me for saying so, you must respect private property, otherwise you will be Bolsheviks, criminals, murderers, robbers and mischief-makers. But we say: "We shall change all this. We shall first convert these Assembly Rooms into premises for workers' organisations and then begin to talk about freedom of assembly." You accuse us of violating freedom. But we say that all freedom is deception if it is not subordinated to the task of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital. The freedom of assembly inscribed in the constitutions of all bourgeois republics is a deception because in order to assemble in a civilised country, which after all has not abolished winter, has not changed its climate, it is necessary to have premises in which to assemble, and the best of these premises are private property. First, we shall confiscate the best premises and then begin to talk about freedom.

We say that to grant freedom of assembly to the capitalists would be a heinous crime against the working people; it would mean freedom of assembly for counter-revolutionaries. We say to the bourgeois intellectual gentlemen, to the gentlemen who advocate democracy—you lie when you throw in our face the accusation of violating freedom. When your great bourgeois revolutionaries made a revolution in England in 1649, and in France in 1792-93, they did not grant freedom of assembly to the royalists. The French revolution is called great because it did not suffer from the flabbiness, half-heartedness and phrase-mongering which distinguished many of the revolutions of 1848, but was an effective revolution which, after overthrowing the royalists, completely crushed them. And we shall do the same thing with the capitalist gentlemen; for we know that in order to emancipate the working people from the yoke of capital we must deprive the capitalists of freedom of assembly; their "freedom" must be abolished, or curtailed. This will help to emancipate labour from the yoke of capital; it will help the cause of that true freedom under which there will be no buildings inhabited by single families, and which belong to private individuals, such as landowners, capitalists, or to joint-stock companies.

When that time comes, when people have forgotten that it was possible for public buildings to be somebody's property, we shall be in favour of complete "freedom". When the world is inhabited only by those who work, and when people have forgotten that it was possible for idlers to have been members of society—this will not be very soon, and the bourgeois and bourgeois intellectual gentlemen are to blame for the delay—we shall then be in favour of freedom of assembly for all. At the present time, however, freedom of assembly would mean freedom of assembly for the capitalists, for counter-revolutionaries. We are fighting against them, we are resisting them, and we say that we deprive them of this freedom.

We are marching into battle—this is the meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Gone is the time of naïve, utopian, fantastic, mechanical and intellectual socialism, when people imagined that it was sufficient to convince the majority, that it was sufficient to paint a beautiful picture of socialist society to persuade the majority to adopt socialism. Gone, too, is the time when it was possible to entertain oneself and others with these children's fairy-tales. Marxism, which recognises the necessity for the class struggle, asserts that mankind can reach the goal of socialism only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The word dictatorship is a cruel, stern, bloody and painful one; it is not a word to play with. Socialists advance this slogan because they know that the exploiters will surrender only after a desperate and relentless struggle, and that they will try to cover up their own rule by means of all sorts of high-sounding words.

Freedom of assembly—what can be loftier, what can be finer than this term? Is the development of the working people and of their mentality conceivable without freedom of assembly? Are the principles of humanity conceivable without freedom of assembly? But we say that the freedom of assembly inscribed in the constitution of Great Britain and the United States of America is a deception because it ties the hands of the masses of the working people during the whole period of their transition to socialism; it is a deception because we know perfectly well that the bourgeoisie will do all in their power to overthrow this new

government, which is so unusual, and which seems so "monstrous" at first. Those who have thought about the class struggle and have anything like a clear and definite idea of the relations between the workers in revolt and the bourgeoisie, who have been overthrown in one country, but have not yet been overthrown in all countries, and who, because they have not been overthrown everywhere, are rushing into the struggle with greater ferocity than ever, will agree that it cannot be otherwise.

It is precisely after the bourgeoisie is overthrown that the class struggle assumes its acutest forms. And we have no use for those democrats and socialists who deceive themselves and deceive others by saying: "The bourgeoisie have been overthrown, the struggle is all over." The struggle is not over, it has only just started, because, to this day, the bourgeoisie have not reconciled themselves to the idea that they have been overthrown. On the eve of the October Revolution they were very nice and polite, and Milyukov, Chernov and the *Novaya Zhizn* people said jestingly: "Now, please, Bolshevik gentlemen, form a Cabinet, take power yourselves for a few weeks, that would be a great help to us!" This is exactly what Chernov wrote on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, what Milyukov wrote in *Rech*, and what the semi-Menshevik *Novaya Zhizn* wrote. They spoke in jest because they did not take matters seriously. But now they see that matters are serious, and the British, French and Swiss bourgeoisie, who thought that their "democratic republics" were armour which protected them, see and realise that matters have become serious, and now they are all arming. If only you could see what is going on in free Switzerland, how, literally, every bourgeois is arming, how they are forming a White Guard, because they know that it is now a matter of preserving the privileges which enable them to keep millions of people in a state of wage-slavery. The struggle has now assumed world-wide dimensions, and therefore, anybody who opposes us with such catchwords as "democracy", and "freedom", takes the side of the propertied classes, deceives the people, for he fails to understand that up to now freedom and democracy have meant freedom and democracy *for the propertied classes* and only crumbs from their table for the propertyless.

What is freedom of assembly when the working people are crushed by slavery to capital and by toil for the benefit of capital? It is a deception; and in order to achieve freedom for the working people it is first of all necessary to overcome the resistance of the exploiters, and since I am faced with the resistance of a whole class, it is obvious that I cannot promise this class either freedom, equality, or majority decisions.

IV

I shall now pass from freedom to equality. This is a much more profound subject. This brings us to a still more serious, a more painful question, one that gives rise to considerable disagreement.

The revolution in its course sweeps away one exploiting class after another. First, it swept away the monarchy, and by equality implied an elected government, a republic. Proceeding further it swept away the landowners; and you know that the keynote of the entire struggle against the medieval system, against feudalism, was the slogan "equality". All are equal irrespective of social-estate; all are equal, millionaires and paupers alike. This is what the great revolutionaries of the period that has gone into history as the period of the great French Revolution said, thought and sincerely believed. The slogan of the revolution against the landowners was equality, and by equality was meant that the millionaires and the workers should have equal rights. The revolution developed. It said that "equality"—we did not specify this in our programme, for one cannot go on repeating the same thing endlessly; it is as clear as what we said about freedom—that equality is a deception if it runs counter to the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital. That is what we say, and it is absolutely true. We say that a democratic republic with present-day equality is a fraud, a deception; here there is no equality, nor can there be. It is prevented by the private ownership of the means of production and money, capital. It is possible, at one stroke, to confiscate privately-owned mansions and fine buildings, it is possible in a relatively short period to confiscate capital and the means

of production. But try to abolish the private ownership of money.

Money is congealed social wealth, congealed social labour. Money is a token which enables its owner to take tribute from all the working people. Money is a survival of yesterday's exploitation. That is what money is. Can it be abolished at one stroke? No. Even before the socialist revolution the socialists wrote that it is impossible to abolish money at one stroke, and our experience corroborates this. There must be very considerable technical and, what is much more difficult and much more important, organisational achievement before we can abolish money; and until then we must put up with equality in words, in the constitution; we must put up with a situation in which everybody who possesses money practically has the right to exploit. We could not abolish money at one stroke. We say that for the time being money will remain, and remain for a fairly long time in the transition period from the old capitalist system to the new socialist system. Equality is a deception if it runs counter to the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital.

Engels was a thousand times right when he said that the concept of equality is a most absurd and stupid prejudice *if it does not imply* the abolition of classes.[60] Bourgeois professors attempted to use the concept equality as grounds for accusing us of wanting all men to be alike. They themselves invented this absurdity and wanted to ascribe it to the socialists. But in their ignorance they did not know that the socialists—and precisely the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels—had said: equality is an empty phrase if it does not imply the abolition of classes. We want to abolish classes, and in this sense we are for equality. But the claim that we want all men to be alike is just nonsense, the silly invention of an intellectual who sometimes conscientiously strikes a pose, juggles with words, but says nothing—I don't care whether he calls himself a writer, a scholar, or anything else.

But we say that our goal is equality, and by that we mean the abolition of classes. Then the class distinction between workers and peasants should be abolished. That is exactly our object. A society in which the class distinction

between workers and peasants still exists is neither a communist society nor a socialist society. True, if the word socialism is interpreted in a certain sense, it might be called a socialist society, but that would be mere sophistry, an argument about words. Socialism is the first stage of communism; but it is not worth while arguing about words. One thing is clear, and that is, that as long as the class distinction between workers and peasants exists, it is no use talking about equality, unless we want to bring grist to the mill of the bourgeoisie. The peasantry constitute a class of the patriarchal era, a class which has been reared by decades and centuries of slavery; and throughout all these decades the peasants existed as *small proprietors*, first, under the heel of other classes, and later, formally free and equal, but as *property-owners and the owners of food products.*

This brings us to the question which most of all rouses the ire of our enemies, which most of all creates doubt in the minds of inexperienced and thoughtless people, and which separates us most of all from those would-be democrats and socialists who are offended because we do not recognise them as such, but call them supporters of the capitalists, perhaps due to their ignorance, but supporters of the capitalists all the same.

Their social conditions, production, living and economic conditions make the peasant half worker and half huckster.

This is a fact. And you cannot get away from this fact until you have abolished money, until you have abolished exchange. And for this years and years of the stable rule by the proletariat is needed; for only the proletariat is capable of vanquishing the bourgeoisie. We are told: "You are violators of equality, you have violated equality not only with the exploiters—'with this I am inclined to agree', some Socialist-Revolutionary or Menshevik who does not know what he is talking about may say—but you have violated equality between the workers and the peasants, you have violated the equality of 'labour democracy', you are criminals!" In answer to this we say: "Yes, we have violated equality between the workers and peasants, and we assert that you who stand for this equality are supporters of Kolchak." Recently I read a splendid article

by Comrade Germanov, in *Pravda*, in which he deals with the theses drawn up by Citizen Sher, one of the most "socialistic" of the Menshevik Social-Democrats. These theses were submitted to one of our co-operative organisations, and they are of such a nature that they deserve to be engraved on a tablet and hung up in every volost executive committee with an inscription underneath stating: "This is Kolchak's man."

I know perfectly well that Citizen Sher and his friends will call me a slanderer for this, and perhaps something worse. Nevertheless, I invite those people who have learned the ABC of political economy and of politics to make a very careful study to see who is right and who is wrong. Citizen Sher says that the Soviet government's food policy, and its economic policy in general, is all wrong; that it is necessary, gradually at first, and then to an increasing degree, to grant freedom to trade in food products, and to safeguard private property.

I say that this is Kolchak's economic programme, his economic basis. I assert that anybody who has read Marx, especially the first chapter of *Capital*, anybody who has read at least Kautsky's popular outline of Marx's theories entitled *The Economic Theories of Karl Marx*, must come to the conclusion that in the midst of a proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie, at a time when landowner and capitalist property is being abolished, when the country that has been ruined by four years of imperialist war is starving, freedom to trade in grain would mean freedom for the capitalists, freedom to restore the rule of capital. This is Kolchak's economic programme, for Kolchak does not rest on air.

It is rather silly to denounce Kolchak only because of the atrocities he committed against the workers, or even because he flogged schoolmistresses for sympathising with the Bolsheviks. This is a vulgar defence of democracy, a silly accusation against Kolchak. Kolchak operates with the means he has at hand. But what is his economic basis? His basis is freedom of trade. This is what he stands for; and *this is why* all the capitalists support him. But you say: "I have left Kolchak, I do not support him." This stands to your credit, of course; but it does not prove that

you have a head on your shoulders and are able to think. This is the answer we give to these people, without casting any slur on the honour of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks who deserted Kolchak when they realised that he is a tyrant. But if such people, in a country which is fighting a desperate struggle against Kolchak, continue to fight for the "equality of labour democracy", for freedom to trade in grain, they are still supporting Kolchak, the only trouble being that they do not understand this and cannot reason logically.

Kolchak—it does not matter whether his name is Kolchak or Denikin, their uniforms may be different, but their natures are the same—is able to hold out because, having captured a region rich in grain, he grants freedom to trade in grain and permits the *free restoration of capitalism*. This was the case in all revolutions, and this will be the case in this country if we abandon the dictatorship of the proletariat for the sake of the "freedom" and "equality" of the democratic, Socialist-Revolutionary, Left-Menshevik and other gentlemen, sometimes including the anarchists—the number of titles is infinite. In the Ukraine at the present time, every gang chooses a political title, each more free and democratic than the other, and there is a gang to every uyezd.

The "advocates of the interests of the working peasantry", mainly the Socialist-Revolutionaries, propose equality between the workers and the peasants. Others, like Citizen Sher, have studied Marxism, but they still do not understand that there can be no equality between the workers and the peasants in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and that those who promise this should be regarded as advocating Kolchak's programme, even if they do so unwittingly. I assert that anybody who gives some thought to the actual conditions prevailing in this completely ruined country will understand this.

The "socialists" who assert that in this country we are in the period of the bourgeois revolution, constantly accuse us of having introduced "consumers'" communism. Some of them say it is communism for soldiers, and imagine that they are superior to this, imagine that they have risen above this "base" form of communism. But these are simply

people who juggle with words. They have seen books, studied hooks, repeat what is in books, but they understand nothing about what the books say. There are scholars, and even very learned scholars, like that. They have read in books that socialism represents the highest development of production. Kautsky does nothing else but repeat this sort of thing even now. The other day I read in a German newspaper, which got here by accident, a report of the last Congress of Workers' Councils in Germany. Kautsky was one of the *rapporteurs* at this Congress, and in his report he emphasised—not he personally, but his wife; he was sick, and so his wife read the report—in this report he emphasised that socialism represents the highest development of production, that without production neither capitalism nor socialism was possible, and that this the German workers did not understand.

Poor German workers. They are fighting Scheidemann and Noske, fighting against the butchers, striving to overthrow the power of Scheidemann and Noske, the butchers who continue to call themselves Social-Democrats, and they think civil war is going on! Liebknecht was murdered, and so was Rosa Luxemburg. All the Russian bourgeois say—and this was stated in an Ekaterinodar newspaper: "This is what ought to be done to our Bolsheviks!" This is exactly what this paper stated. Those who understand what is going on know perfectly well that this is the opinion of the entire world bourgeoisie. We must defend ourselves. Scheidemann and Noske are waging civil war against the proletariat. War is war. The German workers think that they are in a state of civil war and all other questions are of minor importance. The first task is to feed the workers. Kautsky thinks that this is "soldiers'" or "consumers'" communism, and that it is necessary to develop production!...

Oh, how clever you are, gentlemen! But how can production be developed in a country that is being plundered and ruined by the imperialists, and which lacks coal, raw materials and machinery? "Develop production!" There is not a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, or of the Council of Defence that does not share out the last millions of poods of coal or oil, and find ourselves in a terrible fix when the commissars take the last scraps and

even then no one has enough, and we have to decide which factory to close down, in which place to leave the workers without work—a painful question, but one we are compelled to decide because we have no coal. The coal is in the Donets Basin; the coal has been destroyed by the German invaders. This is a typical state of affairs. Take Belgium or Poland. The same thing is happening everywhere as a consequence of the imperialist war. Hence, unemployment and starvation are likely to last many years, for some flooded mines take many years to restore. And yet we are told that socialism means increasing output. You have read books, good, kind gentlemen, you have written books, but you don't understand a scrap of what is in the books. (*Applause.*)

Of course, if it were a case of capitalist society in peacetime, peacefully developing into socialism, there would be no more urgent task before us than that of increasing output. But the little word "if" makes all the difference. *If* only socialism had come into being peacefully, in the way the capitalist gentlemen did not want to see it born. But there was a slight hitch. Even if there had been no war, the capitalist gentlemen would have done all in their power to prevent such a peaceful evolution. Great revolutions, even when they commence peacefully, as was the case with the great French Revolution, end in furious wars which are instigated by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Nor can it be otherwise, if we look at it from the point of view of the class struggle and not from the point of view of philistine phrase-mongering about liberty, equality, labour democracy and the will of the majority, of all the dull-witted, philistine phrase-mongering to which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and all these "democrats" treat us. There can be no peaceful evolution towards socialism. In the present period, after the imperialist war, it is ridiculous to expect peaceful evolution, especially in a ruined country. Take France. France is one of the victors, and yet the production of grain there has dropped to half. In Britain they are saying that they are now paupers—I read this in an English bourgeois newspaper. And yet the Communists in a ruined country are blamed because industry is at a standstill! Whoever says this is either an utter idiot—

even if he thrice calls himself a leader of the Berne International—or else a traitor to the workers.

The primary task in a ruined country is to save the working people. The primary productive force of human society as a whole, is the workers, the working people. If they survive, we shall save and restore *everything*.

We shall have to put up with many years of poverty, retrogression to barbarism. The imperialist war has thrown us back to barbarism; but if we save the working people, if we save the primary productive force of human society—the workers—we shall recover everything, but if we fail to save them, we shall perish, so that those who are now shouting about "consumers'", or "soldiers'", communism, who look down upon others with contempt and imagine that they are superior to these Bolshevik Communists, are, I repeat, absolutely ignorant of political economy, and pick out passages from books like a scholar whose head is a card index box filled with quotations from books, which he picks out as he needs them; but if a new situation arises which is not described in any book, he becomes confused and grabs the wrong quotation from the box.

At the present time, when the country is ruined, our main and fundamental task is to save the lives of the workers, *to save the workers*, for the workers are dying because the factories are at a standstill, and the factories are at a standstill because there is no fuel, and because our production is all artificial, industry is isolated from raw material sources. It is the same thing all over the world. Raw materials for the Russian cotton mills must be transported from Egypt, America, or the nearer Turkestan. Try to obtain these when the counter-revolutionary gangs and the British forces have captured Ashkhabad and Krasnovodsk. Try to obtain them from Egypt or America when the railways lie in ruins, when they are at a standstill because there is no coal.

We must save the workers even if they are unable to work. If we keep them alive for the next few years we shall save the country, save society and socialism. If we don't, we shall slip back into wage-slavery. This is how things stand with the socialism that springs not from the imagination of a peaceful simpleton who calls himself a Social-Democrat, but from actual reality, from the fierce, desper-

ately fierce class struggle. This is a fact. We must sacrifice everything to save the lives of the workers. And in the light of this, when people come to us and say they are in favour of the equality of labour democracy, whereas the Communists do not even allow equality between the workers and peasants, our answer is: the workers and peasants are equal as working people, but the well-fed grain profiteer is not the equal of the hungry worker. This is the only reason why our Constitution says that the workers and peasants are not equal.

Do you say that they ought to be equal? Let us weigh and count it up. Take sixty peasants and ten workers. The sixty peasants possess surplus stocks of grain. They are clothed in rags, but they have bread. Take the ten workers. After the imperialist war they, too, are in rags, but they are also exhausted, they have no bread, fuel or raw materials. The factories are idle. Well, are they equal? Should the sixty peasants have the right to decide and the ten workers be obliged to obey? The great principle of equality, unity of labour democracy and deciding by a majority vote!

That is what they tell us. And we tell them that they are mere clowns who confuse the hunger problem and obscure it with their high-sounding phrases.

We ask you whether the workers in a ruined country where the factories are idle ought to submit to the decision of the majority of peasants when the latter refuse to deliver their surplus stocks of grain. Have they the right to take these surplus stocks, by force, if necessary, if there is no other way? Give us a straightforward answer! But when we get right down to brass tacks they begin to twist and wriggle.

Industry is ruined in all countries, and it will remain in that state for several years, because it is easy to set fire to factories or to flood mines, it is easy to blow up railway wagons and to wreck locomotives—any fool can do that, even if he calls himself a German or French officer, and is very efficient, especially when he has good instruments for causing explosions, good fire-arms, and so forth. But it is a very difficult matter to restore it all. That will take years.

The peasantry constitute a special class. As working people they are hostile to capitalist exploitation; but at

the same time they are property-owners. For centuries the peasant has been brought up to believe that the grain is his and he is at liberty to sell it. "This is my right," each one thinks, "because it is the fruit of my labour, my sweat and blood." This mentality cannot be changed overnight. It can be changed only as a result of a long and stern struggle. Whoever imagines that socialism can be achieved by one person convincing another, and that one a third, is at best an infant, or else a political hypocrite; and, of course, the majority of those who speak on political platforms belong to the latter category.

The whole point is that the peasants are accustomed to having the right to trade in grain. After we had abolished the capitalist institutions we found that there was still another force which kept capitalism going—the force of habit. And the more resolutely we abolished the institutions on which capitalism was based, the more strongly we felt the effects of this other force on which capitalism was based—the force of habit. Under favourable circumstances, institutions can be smashed at one stroke; but habit, never, no matter how favourable circumstances may be. Although we have given all the land to the peasants, have liberated them from landed proprietorship, and have swept away everything that held them in bondage, they nevertheless continue to think that "freedom" means freedom to trade in grain; and they regard as tyranny the compulsory surrendering of surplus stocks of grain at fixed prices. Why, what do you mean by "surrender"? they ask indignantly, especially since our grain supply apparatus is still defective because the entire bourgeois intelligentsia is on the side of Sukharevka.[61] Naturally, this machinery has to rely on people who are only just learning, at best—if they are conscientious and devoted to their task—will learn their business in a few years, and until that time the machinery will be defective, and sometimes all sorts of rascals who call themselves Communists will find their way into it. This danger threatens every ruling party, the victorious proletariat of every country, for it is impossible either to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie or to build up efficient machinery overnight. We know perfectly well that the machinery of the Commissariat of Food is still bad. Re-

cently a scientific statistical investigation was made into the food conditions of the workers in the non-agricultural gubernias. The investigation showed that the workers obtain half their food from the Commissariat of Food and the other half from the profiteers; for the first half they pay one-tenth of their total expenditure on food, and for the other half they pay nine-tenths.

The first half of the food supplies, collected and delivered by the Commissariat of Food, is badly collected, of course, but it is collected on socialist and not on capitalist lines. It is collected by defeating the profiteers, and not by compromising with them; it is collected by sacrificing all other interests in the world, including the interests of the formal "equality" which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Co. make so much fuss about, to the interests of the starving workers. You keep your "equality", gentlemen, and we shall keep our hungry workers we have saved from starvation. No matter how much the Mensheviks may accuse us of violating "equality", the fact is that we have solved half our food problem in spite of unprecedented and incredible difficulties. And we say that if sixty peasants have surplus stocks of grain and ten workers are starving, we must not talk about "equality" in general, or about "the equality of working people", but say that it is the bounden duty of the sixty peasants to submit to the decisions of the ten workers and to give them, or at least to loan them, their surplus stocks of grain.

The science of political economy, if anybody has learned anything from it, the history of revolution, the history of political evolution throughout the whole of the nineteenth century show that the peasants follow the lead of either the workers or the bourgeoisie. Nor can they do otherwise. Some democrats may, of course, take exception to this, others may think that, being a malicious Marxist, I am slandering the peasants. They say the peasants constitute the majority, they are working people, and yet cannot follow their own road. Why?

If you don't know why, I would say to such citizens, read the elements of Marx's political economy in Kautsky's popular exposition, think about the evolution of any of the great revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-

ries, about the political history of any country in the nineteenth century, and you will learn why. The economics of capitalist society are such that the ruling power can be only capital or the proletariat which has overthrown capital.

There are no other forces in the economics of this society.

A peasant is half worker and half huckster. He is a worker because he earns his bread by the sweat of his brow and is exploited by the landowners, capitalists and merchants. He is a huckster because he sells grain, an article of necessity, an article for which a man will give up all his possessions if there is a shortage of it. Hunger is no man's friend. People will pay a thousand rubles, any sum of money, will give up all their property, for bread.

The peasant cannot be blamed for this; he is living under a commodity economy and has been for scores and hundreds of years, and is accustomed to exchange grain for money. You cannot change a habit or abolish money overnight. To abolish money you must organise the distribution of products for hundreds of millions of people, and this is something that must take many years. And so, as long as the commodity system exists, as long as there are starving workers side by side with well-fed peasants who are concealing their surplus stocks of grain, the antagonism of workers' and peasants' interests will persist. And whoever attempts to use phrases like "freedom", "equality" and "labour democracy" to brush aside this real antagonism created by the actual state of affairs, is at best a mere phrase-monger, and at worst a hypocritical champion of capitalism. If capitalism defeats the revolution it will do so by taking advantage of the ignorance of the peasants, by bribing them and luring them with the prospect of a return to freedom of trade. Actually, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries side with capitalism against socialism.

The economic programme of Kolchak, Denikin and all the Russian whiteguards is freedom to trade. They understand this, and it is not their fault that Citizen Sher does not. The economic facts of life do not change because a certain party does not understand them. The slogan of the bourgeoisie is freedom to trade. Efforts are made to beguile the peasants by asking them whether it would not be better

to live in the good old way? Whether it would not be better to live freely by the free sale of the fruits of farm labour? What could be fairer? This is what those who consciously support Kolchak say, and they are right from the point of view of the interests of capital. To restore the power of capital in Russia it is necessary to rely on tradition—on the prejudices of the peasants as against their common sense, on their old habits of trading on the open market, and it is necessary forcibly to crush the resistance of the workers. There is no other way. The Kolchaks are right from the point of view of capital; their economic and political programme ties up neatly, there are no loose ends; they know there is a connection between freedom for peasants to trade and shooting down the workers. They are connected even though Citizen Sher is unaware of it. Freedom to trade in grain is the economic programme of Kolchak; the shooting of tens of thousands of workers—as occurred in Finland—is a necessary means of realising this programme, because the workers will not voluntarily surrender their gains. The connection cannot be broken, yet the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries, who are totally ignorant of economic science and politics, who, being terrified philistines, have forgotten the ABC of socialism, are trying to make us forget this connection by talking about "equality" and "freedom", by shouting about our violating the principle of equality of "labour democracy" and saying that our Constitution is "unfair".

The vote of one worker is equal to several peasant votes. Is that unfair?

No, in the period when it is necessary to overthrow capital it is quite fair. I know where you have borrowed your conception of fairness from; you have borrowed it from yesterday's capitalist era. The equality, the freedom of commodity owners—that is your conception of fairness. A petty-bourgeois survival of petty-bourgeois prejudices—that is what your fairness, your equality, your labour democracy amount to. We, however, subordinate fairness to the interests of defeating capital. And capital can be defeated only by the united efforts of the proletariat.

Can tens of millions of peasants be firmly united against capital, against freedom of trade, overnight? No, economic

conditions would prevent it even if the peasants were quite free and much more cultured. It cannot be done because different economic conditions and long years of preparation are needed for this. And who will make these preparations? Either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.

Owing to their economic status in bourgeois society the peasants must follow either the workers or the bourgeoisie. *There is no middle way*. They may waver, become confused, conjure up all sorts of things; they may blame, swear, curse the "bigoted" representatives of the proletariat and the "bigoted" representatives of the bourgeoisie and say that they are the minority. You may curse them, talk loud about the majority, about the broad universal character of your labour democracy, about pure democracy. There is no end to the number of words you can string together, but they will only serve to obscure the fact that if the peasants do not follow the lead of the workers they will follow the lead of the bourgeoisie. There is not, nor can there be, a middle course. And those people who in this most difficult period of transition in history, when the workers are hungry and their industry is at a standstill, *do not help the workers* to take grain at a fairer *but not a "free" price*, not at a capitalist, hucksters' price, are carrying out the Kolchak programme no matter how much they may deny this to themselves, and no matter how sincerely they may be convinced that they are carrying out their own programme conscientiously.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

V

I will now deal with the last question on my list, that of the defeat and victory of the revolution. Kautsky, whom I mentioned to you as the chief representative of the old, decayed socialism, does not understand the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He reproached us, saying that a decision taken by a majority might have ensured a peaceful issue. A decision by a dictatorship is a decision taken by military means. Hence, if you do not win by force of arms you will be vanquished and annihilated, because in civil war no prisoners are taken, it is a war of extermination. This is how terrified Kautsky tried to "terrify" us.

Quite right. What you say is true. We confirm the correctness of your observation and there is nothing more to be said. Civil war is more stern and cruel than any other war. This has been the case throughout history since the time of the civil wars in ancient Rome; wars between nations always ended in a deal between the propertied classes, and only during civil war does the oppressed class exert efforts to exterminate the oppressing class, to eliminate the economic conditions of this class's existence.

I ask you, what is the "revolutionary" worth who tries to scare those who have started the revolution with the prospect that it might suffer defeat? There has never been, there is none, there will not be, nor can there be a revolution which did not stand some risk of defeat. A revolution is a desperate struggle of classes that has reached the peak of ferocity. The class struggle is inevitable. One must either reject revolution altogether or accept the fact that the struggle against the propertied classes will be sterner than all other revolutions. Among socialists who are at all intelligent there was never any difference of opinion on this point. A year ago, when I analysed the apostasy that lay behind Kautsky's statements I wrote the following. Even if—this was in September last year—even if the imperialists were to overthrow the Bolshevik government tomorrow we would not for a moment repent that we had taken power. And not a single class-conscious worker who represents the interests of the masses of the working people would repent, or have any doubt that, in spite of it all, our revolution had triumphed; the revolution triumphs if it brings to the forefront the advanced class which strikes effectively at exploitation. Under such circumstances, the revolution triumphs even if it suffered defeat. This may sound like juggling with words; but to prove the truth of it, let us take a concrete example from history.

Take the great French Revolution. It is with good reason that it is called a great revolution. It did so much for the class that it served, for the bourgeoisie, that it left its imprint on the entire nineteenth century, the century which gave civilisation and culture to the whole of mankind. The great French revolutionaries served the interests of the bourgeoisie although they did not realise it for their

vision was obscured by the words "liberty, equality and fraternity"; in the nineteenth century, however, what they had begun was continued, carried out piecemeal and finished in all parts of the world.

In a matter of eighteen months our revolution has done ever so much more for our class, the class we serve, the proletariat, than the great French revolutionaries did.

They held out in their own country for two years, and then perished under the blows of united European reaction, under the blows of the united hordes of the whole world, who crushed the French revolutionaries, reinstated the legitimate monarch in France, the Romanov of the period, reinstated the landowners, and for many decades later crushed every revolutionary movement in France. Nevertheless, the great French Revolution triumphed.

Everybody who studies history seriously will admit that although it was crushed, the French Revolution was nevertheless triumphant, because it laid down for the whole world such firm foundations of bourgeois democracy, of bourgeois freedom, that they could never be uprooted.

In a matter of eighteen months our revolution has done ever so much more for the proletariat, for the class which we serve, for the goal towards which we are striving—the overthrow of the rule of capital—than the French Revolution did for its class. And that is why we say that even if we take the hypothetically possible worst contingency, even if tomorrow some lucky Kolchak were to exterminate the Bolsheviks to the last man, the revolution would still be invincible. And what we say is proved by the fact that the new type of state organisation produced by this revolution has achieved a moral victory among the working class all over the world and is already receiving its support. When the prominent French bourgeois revolutionaries perished in the struggle they were isolated, they were not supported in other countries. All the European states turned against them, chief among them England, although it was an advanced country. After only eighteen months of Bolshevik rule, our revolution succeeded in making the new state organisation which it created, the Soviet organisation, comprehensible, familiar and popular to the workers all over the world, in making them regard it as their own.

I have shown you that the dictatorship of the proletariat is an inevitable, essential and absolutely indispensable means of emerging from the capitalist system. Dictatorship does not mean only force, although it is impossible without force, but also a form of the organisation of labour superior to the preceding form. That is why in my brief speech of greeting at the opening of the Congress I emphasised this fundamental, elementary and extremely simple task *of organisation*; and that is why I am so strongly opposed to all these intellectual fads and "proletarian cultures". As opposed to these fads I advocate the ABC of organisation. Distribute grain and coal in such a way as to take care of every pood—this is the object of proletarian discipline. Proletarian discipline is not discipline maintained by the lash, as it was under the rule of the serf-owners, or discipline maintained by starvation, as it is under the rule of the capitalists, but comradely discipline, the discipline of the labour unions. If you solve this elementary and extremely simple problem of organisation, we shall win, for then the peasants—who vacillate between the workers and the capitalists, who cannot make up their minds whether to side with the people of whom they are still suspicious, but can not deny that these people are creating a more just organisation of production under which there will be no exploitation, and under which "freedom" of trade in grain will be a crime against the state, who cannot make up their minds whether to side with these people or with those who, as in the good old days, promise freedom to trade which is alleged to mean also freedom to work in any way one pleased—the peasants, I say, will whole-heartedly side with us. When the peasants see that the proletariat is organising its state power in such a way as to maintain order—and the peasants want this and demand it, and they are right in doing so, although this desire for order is connected with much that is confused and reactionary, and with many prejudices—they, in the long run, after considerable vacillation, will follow the lead of the workers. The peasants-cannot simply and easily pass from the old society to the new overnight. They are aware that the old society ensured "order" by ruining the working people and making slaves of them. But they are not sure that the proletariat can guarantee order.

More cannot be expected of these downtrodden, ignorant and disunited peasants. They will not believe words and programmes. And they are quite right not to believe words, for otherwise there would be no end to frauds of every kind. They will believe only deeds, practical experience. Prove to them that you, the united proletariat, the proletarian state, the proletarian dictatorship, are able to distribute grain and coal in such a way as to husband every pood, that you are able to arrange matters so that every pood of surplus grain and coal is distributed not by the profiteers, shall not profit the heroes of Sukharevka, but shall be fairly distributed, supplied to starving workers, even to sustain them during periods of unemployment when the factories and workshops are idle. Prove that you can do this. This is the fundamental task of proletarian culture, of proletarian organisation. Force can be used even if those who resort to it have no economic roots, but in that case, history will doom it to failure. But force can be applied with the backing of the advanced class, relying on the loftier principles of the socialist system, order and organisation. *In that case, it may suffer temporary failure, but in the long run it is invincible.*

If the proletarian organisation proves to the peasants that it can maintain proper order, that labour and bread are fairly distributed and that care is being taken to husband every pood of grain and coal, that we workers are able to do this with the aid of our comradely, trade union discipline, that we resort to force in our struggle only to protect the interests of labour, that we take grain from profiteers and not from working people, that we want to reach an understanding with the middle peasants, the working peasants, and that we are ready to provide them with all we can at present—when the peasants see all this, their alliance with the working class, their alliance with the proletariat, will be indestructible. And this is what we aim at.

But I have digressed somewhat from my subject and must return to it. Today, in all countries, the word "Bolshevik" and the word "Soviet" have ceased to be regarded as queer terms, as they were only recently, like the word "Boxer", which we repeated without understanding what it meant. The word "Bolshevik" and the word "Soviet" are now being repeated in all the languages of the world. Every day the

class-conscious workers see that the bourgeoisie of all countries release a flood of lies about Soviet power in the millions of copies of their newspapers, but they learn from this vituperation. Recently I read some American newspapers. I read the speech of a certain American parson who said that the Bolsheviks were immoral, that they had nationalised women, that they are robbers and plunderers. And I also read the reply of the American Socialists. They are distributing at five cents a copy the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of Russia, of this "dictatorship", which does not provide "equality of labour democracy". They reply by quoting a clause of the Constitution of these "usurpers", "robbers" and "tyrants" who disrupt the unity of labour democracy. Incidentally, in welcoming Breshkovskaya on the day she arrived in America, the leading capitalist newspaper in New York carried a headline in letters a yard long stating: "Welcome, Granny!" The American Socialists reprinted this and wrote: "She is in favour of political democracy—is there anything surprising, American workers, in the fact that the capitalists praise her?" She stands for political democracy. Why should they praise her? Because she is opposed to the Soviet Constitution. "Well," said the American Socialists, "here is a clause from the Constitution of these robbers." And they always quote the same clause which says that those who exploit the labour of others shall not have the right to elect or be elected. This clause from our Constitution is known all over the world. And it is because Soviet power frankly states that all must be subordinated to the dictatorship of the proletariat, that it is a new type of state organisation—it is precisely for this reason that it has won the sympathies of the workers all over the world. This new state organisation is being born in travail because it is far more difficult, a million times more difficult, to overcome our disruptive, petty-bourgeois laxity than to suppress the tyrannical landowners or the tyrannical capitalists, but the effort bears a million times more fruit in creating the new organisation which knows no exploitation. When proletarian organisation solves this problem, socialism will triumph completely. And it is to this that you must devote all your activities both in the schools and in the field of adult education. Notwithstanding

the extremely difficult conditions that prevail, and the fact that the first socialist revolution in history is taking place in a country with a very low level of culture, notwithstanding this, Soviet power has already won the recognition of the workers of other countries. The phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" is a Latin phrase, and the working people who heard it for the first time did not know what it meant, and did not know how it could be instituted. Now this Latin phrase has been translated into the modern languages and we have shown that the dictatorship or the proletariat is Soviet power, the government under which the workers organise themselves and say that their organisation is superior to every other. No idler, no exploiter can belong to this organisation. This organisation has but one object, and that is, to overthrow capitalism. No false slogans, no fetishes like "freedom", and "equality", will deceive us. We recognise no freedom, no equality, no labour democracy if it conflicts with the cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital. This is what we incorporated in the Soviet Constitution, and we have already won for it the sympathies of the workers of all countries. They know that in spite of the difficulty with which the new order is being born, and in spite of the severe trials and even defeats which may fall to the lot of some of the Soviet republics, no power on earth can compel mankind to turn back. (*Stormy applause.*)

FOREWORD TO THE PUBLISHED SPEECH "DECEPTION OF THE PEOPLE WITH SLOGANS OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY"

The question I dealt with in my speech at the Congress on adult education on May 19—the question of equality in general and the equality of the worker and the peasant in particular—is undoubtedly one of the most pressing and "painful" questions of our time, and one that touches upon the most deep-seated prejudices of the petty bourgeois, the small proprietor, the petty commodity owner, every philistine and nine-tenths of the intelligentsia (including the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary intelligentsia).

Deny the equality of the worker and the peasant! How terrible! Of course, this is something all the friends of the capitalists, all of their hangers-on, and the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries first of all, are trying to seize upon in order to "irritate" the peasant, to "stir him up", to incite him against the workers, against the Communists. Such attempts are inevitable, but since they are founded on lies, they are doomed to disgraceful failure.

Peasants are sober-minded, business-like, practical people. Things must be explained to them in a practical light, through simple, everyday examples. Is the peasant who has a surplus of grain justified in hiding this surplus until prices reach exorbitant, profiteering levels, without any regard for the workers who are going hungry? Or is the state authority, which is in the hands of the workers, justified in taking over all surplus grain not at profiteering, huckstering, exorbitant prices, but at a fixed price set by the state?

That is the point at issue That is the whole thing in a nutshell. To avoid facing up to this fact the various swind-

lers who, like the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, are working for the capitalists, for the return of undivided power to them, are resorting to empty phrase-mongering about "equality" and the "unity of labour democracy".

The peasant must make his choice:

either freedom to trade in grain, which means speculation in grain, freedom for the rich to grow richer, freedom for the poor to be pauperised and to starve, return of undivided power to the landowners and capitalists, dissolution of the alliance of the peasants and the workers,

or delivery of grain surpluses at a fixed price to the state, i.e., the united workers' authority, which means an alliance between the peasants and the workers to get rid of the bourgeoisie altogether and to eliminate any possibility of their rule being restored.

Such is the choice.

The richer peasants, the kulaks, will choose the first alternative; they will want to try their luck in alliance with the capitalists and landowners against the workers, against the poor, but such peasants are a minority in Russia. The majority of the peasants will prefer an alliance with the workers against the restoration of capitalist rule, against "freedom for the rich to grow richer", against "freedom for the poor to starve", against the deceitful camouflage of this accursed capitalist "freedom" (freedom to starve to death) with flowery words about "equality" (the equality of the well-fed, who have a surplus of grain, and the starving).

Our task is to fight the-cunning capitalist deception which the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries practise by means of resounding and flowery phrase-mongering about "freedom" and "equality".

Peasants! Unmask the wolves in sheep's clothing who praise "freedom", "equality", and "unity of labour democracy" and thereby actually champion the "freedom" of the landowner to oppress the peasants, the "equality" of the wealthy capitalist and the worker or the semi-starved peasant, the "equality" of the well-fed man who hides his surplus grain and the worker who is tormented by hunger and unemployment because the country has been ruined by war. Such wolves in sheep's clothing are the working people's worst enemies; whether they call themselves Mensheviks,

Socialist-Revolutionaries, or non-party they are in reality friends of the capitalists.

"The workers and peasants are equal as working people but the well-fed grain profiteer is not the equal of the hungry worker." "We are fighting only to protect the interests of labour, we take grain from profiteers, and not from working people." "We want to reach an understanding with the middle peasants, the working peasants"—this is what I said in my speech, this is the crux of the matter, this is the real truth which is confused by loud-sounding phrases about "equality". Moreover, the vast majority of the peasants know that this is the truth, that the workers' state fights the profiteers and the rich while rendering every assistance to the working people and the poor, whereas *both the landowner' state* (under a monarchy) *and the capitalist state* (under the freest and most democratic republic) have always and everywhere, in all countries, *helped the rich to rob the working people*, *helped the speculators and the rich to grow richer at the expense of the poor who become poorer.*

This is a truth every peasant knows. And hence the greater their awareness, the sooner and more resolutely the majority of the peasants will make their choice and declare for alliance with the workers, for agreement with the workers' government, against the landowner or capitalist state; for Soviet power against the "Constituent Assembly" or the "democratic republic"; for agreement with the Bolshevik Communists, against any support for the capitalists, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries!

* * *

To the "learned" gentlemen, to the democrats, socialists, Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., we say: you all pay lip-service to the "class struggle", but actually you close your eyes to it at the very time when it is growing especially acute. And to do that means to side with capital, with the bourgeoisie, against the working people.

He who recognises the class struggle must also recognise that in a bourgeois republic, even in the freest and most democratic bourgeois republic, "freedom" and "equality" never were, and never could be, anything but an expression

of the equality and freedom of the *commodity owners*, the equality and freedom of *capital*. Marx, in all of his writings and especially in his *Capital* (which you all recognise *in words*), made this clear thousands of times; he ridiculed the abstract conception of "freedom and equality" and the vulgarisers, the Benthams who closed their eyes to the facts, and he revealed the material roots of these abstractions.

Under the bourgeois system (i.e., as long as private property in land and in the means of production persists) and under bourgeois democracy, "freedom and equality" remain purely formal, signifying in practice *wage-slavery* for the workers (who are formally free and equal) and the *undivided rule of capital*, the oppression of labour by capital. This is the ABC of socialism, my learned gentlemen—and you have forgotten it.

It follows from this ABC that during the proletarian revolution, when the class struggle has sharpened to the point of civil war, only fools and traitors will seek to get away with empty talk about "freedom", "equality" and "unity of labour democracy". Actually everything depends on the outcome of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the intermediate, middle classes (including the entire petty bourgeoisie, and hence the entire peasantry) inevitably vacillate between the two camps.

The issue is this—which of the main forces, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, these intermediate sections will join. There *cannot be* any third way; he who has not understood this from reading Marx's *Capital* has understood nothing in Marx, understood nothing in socialism, but is in fact a philistine and a petty bourgeois who blindly follows in the wake of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he who has understood all this, will not allow himself to be deceived by empty phrases about "freedom" and "equality", but will think and speak of *practical things*, that is, of the concrete conditions for a *rapprochement* between the peasants and the workers, their *alliance* against the capitalists, *agreement* between them against the exploiters, the rich and the profiteers.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the end of class struggle but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is class struggle waged by a proletariat

that is victorious and has taken political power into its hands against a bourgeoisie that has been defeated but not destroyed, a bourgeoisie that has not vanished, not ceased to offer resistance, but that has intensified its resistance. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a specific form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of the working people (petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these strata, an alliance against capital, an alliance whose aim is the complete overthrow of capital, complete suppression of the resistance offered by the bourgeoisie as well as of attempts at restoration on its part, an alliance for the final establishment and consolidation of socialism. It is a specific kind of alliance which takes shape in a specific situation, namely, amidst fierce civil war; it is an alliance between firm supporters of socialism and its vacillating allies, sometimes "neutrals" (in which case instead of an agreement on struggle the alliance becomes an agreement on neutrality); an alliance between economically, politically, socially, and spiritually different classes. Only the corrupt heroes of the corrupt Berne or yellow International, people like Kautsky, Martov and Co., can evade examination of the concrete forms, conditions, and tasks of this alliance by resorting to platitudes about "freedom", "equality", and "unity of labour democracy", that is, by snatching fragments from the ideological baggage of the era of commodity economy.

N. Lenin

June 23, 1919

Published in the pamphlet:
N. Lenin, *Two Speeches at the First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education*,
Moscow, 1919

Published according to the pamphlet

TELEGRAM
TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINE

Kiev

The Central Committee of the Party has discussed the critical situation, the almost catastrophic situation, in the Donets Basin and on the Manych, and proposes urgently that the Kiev Council of Defence bend all efforts to accelerate and step up military aid to the Donets Basin, appoint a number of the best comrades to exercise daily, unflagging supervision over the fulfilment of these measures and, especially, carry out the immediate universal mobilisation of the workers of Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Kharkov and Sevastopol as reinforcements for the Southern Front; lastly, make Podvoisky and Antonov personally responsible for the Makhno group. Bear in mind that the defeat of the revolution is inevitable unless Rostov is speedily captured.

On behalf of the C.C.,

Lenin, *Stalin*

Written May 8, 1919
First published in 1942

Published according to the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT APPEAL TO GERMAN WORKERS AND TO PEASANTS WHO DO NOT EXPLOIT THE LABOUR OF OTHERS

Proletarians throughout the world are showing increasing sympathy for Soviet power and there is a growing conviction that only Soviet power, the power of the working people, and not bourgeois parliamentarism, even in the most democratic republic, is capable of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital, the nations from enmity and wars, and mankind from the lawlessness of savage imperialism.

This conviction will break a road for itself, cost what it may. In all countries the workers are becoming convinced that they cannot save themselves from imperialism and wars unless they break with the bourgeoisie, unless they defeat them and overthrow their power, unless they ruthlessly suppress the resistance of the exploiters. A beginning can be made only in one's own country. The Russian Soviet system has met with the sympathy of the working masses throughout the world, and everyone except the exploiters and their lackeys now sees that Soviet power is the one hope of deliverance; this is because we Russian workers and peasants have earned their confidence by having broken with the bourgeoisie, overthrown them and suppressed their resistance, because we have driven out of the ranks of the working people those leaders of traitor-socialism who, like the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, entered into a direct and indirect alliance with the imperialist bourgeoisie, with Kerensky, etc.

As long as the German workers tolerate a government of such traitors to socialism, scoundrels and bourgeois lackeys as the Scheidemanns and all their party there will be no

question of saving the German people; the German people will remain the actual slaves of the bourgeoisie and will be *accomplices* in their crimes—all the "socialist platitudes" and all the "democratic" and "republican" rhetoric notwithstanding—in the same way as the "socialists" of the Entente who are at present members of the Berne yellow International and who answer the atrocities of the Entente with hypocritical well-wishing, kindly empty phrases or compliments paid to Wilson, etc., still remain traitors to socialism, scoundrels and accomplices in the atrocities and crimes of the French, British and American bourgeoisie.

It is inevitable that the German workers will break with the traitors to socialism, the Scheidemanns and their party. It is inevitable that they will break with the senility, hesitancy, lack of ideology and character of the so-called Independents who were dependent on the Scheidemanns yesterday and who today depend on their fear of going over resolutely to the side of Soviet power. The bourgeoisie may slaughter hundreds of leaders and thousands of workers but they are powerless to prevent this break-away.

Written May 11, 1919

First published in 1949 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 1

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN[62]

Stalin,
Smolny,
Petrograd

May 20, 1919

Have received both notes. Have made detailed arrangements with Sklyansky for unflagging supervision over fulfilment. I hope that the universal mobilisation of Petrograd men will be followed by their attack and not by sitting in barracks.

Lenin

First published in 1938

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING FESTIVAL MAY 25, 1919[63]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Today we are celebrating the universal military training of the working people.

Up to now, matters military have been an instrument of the exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalists and landowners. And to this day capitalists all over Europe are holding out with the aid of the remnants of their old armies, commanded by bourgeois officers. But this most reliable prop of the bourgeoisie will collapse when the workers take up the rifle, when they begin to form their own, vast proletarian army, when they begin to train soldiers who know what they are fighting for, who will defend the workers and peasants, their factories and workshops, and prevent the landowners and capitalists from coming back to power.

Today's festival demonstrates the successes we have achieved, the new force that is springing up from the working class. This parade convinces us that Soviet power has won the sympathies of the workers of all countries, that the fraternal alliance of world Soviet republics will take the place of world wars.

Permit me to introduce to you a Hungarian comrade, Tibor Szamuely, Commissar for Military Affairs of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

Long live the Hungarian proletariat!

Long live the world communist revolution!

Izvestia No. 113, May 27, 1919

Published according to the *Izvestia* text

GREETINGS TO THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS

Comrades, the news we have been receiving from the Hungarian Soviet leaders fills us with enthusiasm and pleasure. Soviet government has been in existence in Hungary for only a little over two months, yet as regards organisation the Hungarian proletariat already seems to have excelled us. That is understandable, for in Hungary the general cultural level of the population is higher; furthermore, the proportion of industrial workers to the total population is immeasurably greater (in Budapest there are three million of the eight million population of present-day Hungary), and, lastly, in Hungary the transition to the Soviet system, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been incomparably easier and more peaceful.

This last circumstance is particularly important. The majority of the European socialist leaders, of both the social-chauvinist and Kautskyite trends, have become so much a prey to purely philistine prejudices, fostered by decades of relatively "peaceful" capitalism and the bourgeois-parliamentary system, that they are unable to understand that Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat mean. The proletariat cannot perform its epoch-making liberating mission unless it removes these leaders from its path, unless it sweeps them out of its way. These people believed, or half-believed, the bourgeois lies about Soviet power in Russia and were unable to distinguish the nature of the new, proletarian democracy—democracy for the working people, socialist democracy, as embodied in Soviet government—from bourgeois democracy, which they slavishly worship and call "pure democracy" or "democracy" in general.

These blind people, fettered by bourgeois prejudices, failed to understand the epoch-making change from bourgeois to proletarian democracy, from bourgeois to proletarian dictatorship. They confused certain specific features of Russian Soviet government, of the history of its development in Russia, with Soviet government as an international phenomenon.

The Hungarian proletarian revolution is helping even the blind to see. The form of transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary is altogether different from that in Russia—voluntary resignation of the bourgeois government, instantaneous restoration of working-class unity, socialist unity *on a communist programme*. The nature of Soviet power is now all the clearer; the only form of rule which has the support of the working people and of the proletariat at their head that is now possible anywhere in the world is Soviet rule, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This dictatorship presupposes the ruthlessly severe, swift and resolute use of force to crush the resistance of the exploiters, the capitalists, landowners and their underlings. Whoever does not understand this is not a revolutionary, and must be removed from the post of leader or adviser of the proletariat.

But the essence of proletarian dictatorship is not in force alone, or even mainly in force. Its chief feature is the organisation and discipline of the advanced contingent of the working people, of their vanguard; of their sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, abolish the division of society into classes, make all members of society working people, and remove the basis for all exploitation of man by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganisation of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of running things in a petty-bourgeois and bourgeois way can only be overcome by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.[64]

Throughout the whole of this transition period, resistance to the revolution will be offered both by the capitalists and by their numerous myrmidons among the bourgeois intellectuals, who will resist consciously, and by the vast mass of the working people, including the peasants, who are shackled very much by petty-bourgeois habits and traditions, and who all too often will resist unconsciously. Vacillations among these groups are inevitable. As a working man the peasant gravitates towards socialism, and prefers the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, i.e., back to the "habitual", old, "time-hallowed" capitalism.

What is needed to enable the proletariat *to lead* the peasants and the petty-bourgeois groups in general is the dictatorship of the proletariat, the rule of one class, its strength of organisation and discipline, its centralised power based on all the achievements of the culture, science and technology of capitalism, its proletarian affinity to the mentality of every working man, its prestige with the disunited, less developed working people in the countryside or in petty industry, who are less firm in politics. Here phrase-mongering about "democracy" in general, about "unity" or the "unity of labour democracy", about the "equality" of all "men of labour", and so on and so forth—the phrase-mongering for which the now petty-bourgeois social-chauvinists and Kautskyites have such a predilection—is of no use whatever. Phrase-mongering only throws dust in the eyes, blinds the mind and strengthens the old stupidity, conservatism, and routine of capitalism, the parliamentary system and bourgeois democracy.

The abolition of classes requires a long, difficult and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of capitalist rule, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes fiercer.

The proletariat, by means of a class struggle against the resistance of the bourgeoisie, against the conservatism, routine, irresolution and vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie,

must uphold its power, strengthen its organising influence, "neutralise" those groups which fear to leave the bourgeoisie and which follow the proletariat too hesitantly, and consolidate the new discipline, the comradely discipline of the working people, their firm bond with the proletariat, their unity with the proletariat—that new discipline, that new basis of social ties in place of the serf discipline of the Middle Ages and the discipline of starvation, the discipline of "free" wage-slavery under capitalism.

In order to abolish classes a period of the dictatorship of one class is needed, the dictatorship of precisely that oppressed class which is capable not only of overthrowing the exploiters, not only of ruthlessly crushing their resistance, but also of breaking ideologically with the entire bourgeois-democratic outlook, with all the philistine phrase-mongering about liberty and equality in general (in reality, this phrase-mongering implies, as Marx demonstrated long ago, the "liberty and equality" of *commodity owners*, the "liberty and equality" of *the capitalist and the worker*).

More, classes can be abolished only by the dictatorship of that oppressed class which has been schooled, united, trained and steeled by decades of the strike and political struggle against capital—of that class alone which has assimilated all the urban, industrial, big-capitalist culture and has the determination and ability to protect it and to preserve and further develop all its achievements, and make them available to all the people, to all the working people—of that class alone which will be able to bear all the hardships, trials, privations and great sacrifices which history inevitably imposes upon those who break with the past and boldly hew a road for themselves to a new future—of that class alone whose finest members are full of hatred and contempt for everything petty-bourgeois and philistine, for the qualities that flourish so profusely among the petty bourgeoisie, the minor employees and the "intellectuals"—of that class alone which "has been through the hardening school of labour" and is able to inspire respect for its efficiency in every working person and every honest man.

Hungarian workers! Comrades! You have set the world an even better example than Soviet Russia by your ability to unite all socialists at one stroke on the platform of genuine

proletarian dictatorship. You are now faced with the most gratifying and most difficult task of holding your own in a rigorous war against the Entente. Be firm. Should vacillation manifest itself among the socialists who yesterday gave their support to you, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, or among the petty bourgeoisie, suppress it ruthlessly. In war the coward's legitimate fate is the bullet.

You are waging the only legitimate, just and truly revolutionary war, a war of the oppressed against the oppressors, a war of the working people against the exploiters, a war for the victory of socialism. All honest members of the working class all over the world are on your side. Every month brings the world proletarian revolution nearer.

Be firm! Victory will be yours!

May 27, 1919 *Lenin*

Pravda No. 115,
May 29, 1919

Published according
to the manuscript

THE HEROES OF THE BERNE INTERNATIONAL

In my article, "The Third International and Its Place in History" (*The Communist International*[65] No. 1, May 1, 1919, p. 38 of the Russian edition) I pointed to one of the outstanding symptoms of the ideological bankruptcy of members of the old, putrid, Berne International. This bankruptcy of the theoreticians of the reactionary socialism which did not understand the dictatorship of the proletariat found expression in the proposal made by the German "independent" Social-Democrats to join, unite, combine the bourgeois parliament with a form of Soviet power.

Kautsky, Hilferding, Otto Bauer and Co., the most outstanding theoreticians of the old International, did not realise that they were proposing to combine the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat! The men who made names for themselves and won the sympathies of the workers by their advocacy of the class struggle and by the proofs they advanced of its necessity, failed to realise—at the crucial moment of the struggle for socialism—that they were betraying the whole doctrine of the class struggle, were renouncing it completely and actually deserting to the camp of the bourgeoisie by their attempt to combine the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat. This sounds incredible, but it is a fact.

By way of a rare exception, we have managed to receive in Moscow a fairly large number of foreign newspapers, although not of consecutive dates, so that we are now able to retrace in greater detail—although not in complete detail, of course—the history of the vacillation of those gentlemen, the "Independents", on the most important theoretical and

practical question of the present day. This is the question of the relation between dictatorship (*of the proletariat*) and democracy (*bourgeois*), or between Soviet power and bourgeois parliamentarism.

In his pamphlet *Die Diktatur des Proletariats* (Wien, 1918) Herr Kautsky wrote that "the Soviet form of organisation is one of the most important phenomena of our time. It promises to acquire decisive importance in the great decisive battles between capital and labour towards which we are marching" (p. 33 of Kautsky's pamphlet). And he added that the Bolsheviks made a mistake in converting the Soviets from "a *combat organisation* of one *class*" into "a state organisation" and thereby "destroying democracy" (ibid.).

In my pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (Petrograd and Moscow, 1918) I examined this argument of Kautsky's in detail and showed him to be completely oblivious of the fundamental tenets of Marxism on the state; for the state (every state, including the most democratic republic) is nothing more nor less than a machine in the hands of one class for the suppression of another. To describe the Soviets as the combat organisation of a *class*, and deny them the right to convert themselves into a "state organisation", is *actually* tantamount to renouncing the ABC of socialism, proclaiming, or advocating, that the *bourgeois machine for the suppression of the proletariat* (*that is*, the bourgeois-democratic republic, the bourgeois state) should remain inviolate; it is actual desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie.

The absurdity of Kautsky's position is so glaring, the pressure exerted by the masses of the workers who are demanding Soviet power is so strong, that Kautsky and his followers have been obliged to make an ignominious retreat; they have got themselves into a muddle, for they lack the courage honestly to admit their mistake.

On February 9, 1919, *Freiheit* (Freedom), the organ of the "Independent" (of Marxism, but absolutely dependent on petty-bourgeois democracy) Social-Democrats of Germany, contained an article by Herr Hilferding. In this article the author is *already* demanding that the Workers' Councils should be converted into a state organisation, but that they should exist *side by side with* the bourgeois parlia-

ment, the National Assembly, and together with it. On February 11, 1919, in an appeal to the German proletariat, this slogan was accepted by the *entire* Independent Party (and consequently, also by Herr Kautsky, who thereby contradicted the statements he had made in the autumn of 1918).

This attempt to combine the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat is a complete renunciation of Marxism and of socialism in general; forgotten are the experiences of the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who from May 6, 1917 to October 25, 1917 (old style) made the "experiment" of combining the Soviets as a "state organisation" with the *bourgeois* state and failed ignominiously.

At the Party Congress of the Independents (held at the beginning of March 1919) the entire Party accepted this supremely sagacious proposal to combine Workers' Councils with bourgeois parliamentarism. But *Freiheit* No. 178, of April 13, 1919 (Supplement) reported that the "Independent" group at the Second Congress of Workers' Councils had proposed the following resolution:

> "The Second Congress of Workers' Councils takes its stand on the Workers' Council system. Accordingly, the political and economic structure of Germany shall be based on the Councils (Räteorganisation). The Councils are the elected representative bodies of the working population in all spheres of political and economic life."

In addition to this, the same group submitted to the Congress a draft of "directives" (*Richtlinien*) in which we read the following:

> "All political power is concentrated in the hands of the Congress of Workers' Councils...." "The right to elect and be elected to the Councils shall be enjoyed by all, irrespective of sex, who perform socially necessary and useful labour and do not exploit the labour of others...."

We see, therefore, that the "independent" leaders have turned out to be paltry philistines who are entirely dependent upon the philistine prejudices of the most backward section of the proletariat. In the autumn of 1918, these leaders, through their mouthpiece Kautsky, completely rejected the idea of the Workers' Councils being converted

into state organisations. In March 1919, following in the wake of the masses of the workers, they surrender this position. In April 1919, they throw the decision of their Congress overboard and go over entirely to the position of the Communists: "All Power to the Workers' Councils."

Leaders of this type are not worth very much. There is no need to have leaders to serve as an index of the temper of the most backward section of the proletariat which marches in the rear and not ahead of the vanguard. And considering the spineless way in which they change their slogans, such leaders are worthless. They cannot be trusted. They will *always* be mere ballast, a minus quantity in the working-class movement.

The most "Left" of these leaders, a certain Herr Däumig, argued as follows at the Party Congress (cf. *Freiheit* of March 9):

> "Däumig stated that nothing stands between him and the demand of the Communists for 'All Power to the Workers' Councils'. But he must protest against the putschism practised by the Communist Party and against the Byzantinism they display towards the masses instead of educating them. Putschist, isolated action cannot lead to progress...."

By putschism the Germans mean what the old revolutionaries in Russia, some fifty years ago, called "flashes", "pyrotechnics", i.e., small conspiracies, attempts at assassination, revolts, etc.

By accusing the Communists of being "putschists", Herr Däumig merely betrays his own "Byzantinism", his own servility to the philistine prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie. The "Leftism" of a gentleman of this type, who repeats a "fashionable" slogan because he fears the masses but *does not understand the mass revolutionary* movement is not worth a brass farthing.

A powerful wave of spontaneous strikes is sweeping across Germany. The proletarian struggle is evidently growing in intensity to a degree unprecedented even in Russia in 1905, when the strike movement rose to heights that had never been reached before anywhere in the world. Anybody who speaks of "pyrotechnics" in face of such a movement proves that he is a hopeless vulgariser and a slave to philistine prejudices.

Those philistine gentlemen headed by Däumig are probably dreaming of a revolution (that is, if any idea of revolution ever enters their heads) in which the masses will all rise *at once*, *fully organised*.

Such revolutions never happen, nor can they happen. Capitalism would not be capitalism if it did not keep millions of working people, the vast majority of them, in a state of oppression, wretchedness, want and ignorance. Capitalism cannot collapse except as a result of a revolution which, in the course of struggle, rouses masses who had not hitherto been affected by the movement. Spontaneous outbreaks become inevitable as the revolution matures. There has never been a revolution in which this has not been the case, nor can there be such a revolution.

Herr Däumig lies when he says that the Communists pander to spontaneity; it is the same sort of lie that we heard so often from the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Communists do *not* pander to spontaneity, they are *not* in favour of isolated outbreaks. The Communists urge the masses to take organised, integrated, united, opportune and mature action. The philistine slander of Däumig, Kautsky and Co. cannot refute this fact.

But the philistines cannot understand that the Communists quite rightly regard it as their duty *to be with the fighting masses* of the oppressed and not with the philistine heroes who stand aloof from the struggle, timidly waiting to see how things turn out. Mistakes are inevitable when the masses are fighting, but the Communists *remain with the masses*, see these mistakes, explain them to the masses, try to get them rectified, and strive perseveringly for the victory of class-consciousness over spontaneity. It is better to be with the fighting masses, who, in the course of the struggle, gradually learn to rectify their mistakes, than with the paltry intellectuals, philistines, and Kautskyites, who hold aloof until "complete victory" is achieved—this is the truth that the Däumigs cannot understand.

The worse for them. They have already gone down in the history of the world proletarian revolution as cowardly philistines, reactionary snivellers, yesterday the servants of the Scheidemanns and today the advocates of "social peace", and it does not matter whether that advocacy is

concealed by the combination of the Constituent Assembly with the Workers' Councils or by profound condemnation of "putschism".

Herr Kautsky has broken the record for substituting reactionary philistine snivelling for Marxism. He does nothing else but bewail what is taking place, complain, weep, express horror, and urge conciliation! All his life this Knight of the Rueful Countenance *has been writing* about the class struggle and about socialism; but when the class struggle reached maximum intensity, reached the threshold of socialism, our pundit lost his nerve, burst into tears, and turned out to be a common or garden philistine. In issue No. 98 of the organ of the Vienna traitors to socialism, of the Austerlitzes, Renners and Bauers (*Arbeiterzeitung* [Workers' Gazette], April 9, 1919, Vienna, morning edition), Kautsky for the hundredth, if not the thousandth time, sums up all his lamentations in the following words:

> "...Economic thinking and economic understanding," he wails, "has been knocked out of the heads of all classes...." "The long war has accustomed large sections of the proletariat to treat economic conditions with absolute contempt and to place all their confidence in the almighty power of violence...."

These are the two "favourite points" of this "extremely learned" man! The "cult of violence" and the break-down of industry—this is what has driven him to the usual, age-old, typical whining and snivelling of the philistine instead of analysing the *real* conditions of the class struggle. "We expected", he writes, "that the revolution would come as the product of the proletarian class struggle...", "but the revolution came as a consequence of the collapse of the prevailing system in Russia and Germany in the war...."

In other words, this pundit "expected" a peaceful revolution! This is superb!

But Herr Kautsky has lost his nerve to such a degree that he has forgotten what he himself wrote when he was a Marxist, namely, that in all probability a war would provide the occasion for revolution. Today, instead of calmly and fearlessly investigating what changes must *inevitably* take place in the form of the revolution as a consequence of the war, our "theoretician" bewails the collapse of his "expectations"!

"...Large sections of the proletariat ignore economic conditions!"

What utter piffle! How familiar the Menshevik press of Kerensky days made this philistine refrain to us!

The economist Kautsky as forgotten that when a country has been ruined by war and brought to the brink of disaster, the main, the fundamental, the root "economic condition" is to *save the workers*. If the working class is saved from death, from starvation, saved from perishing, it will be possible to restore disrupted production. But in order to save the working class it is necessary to have the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the only means of preventing the burdens and consequences of the war from being thrust upon the shoulders of the workers.

The economist Kautsky has "forgotten" that the question of how the burdens of defeat are to be distributed is determined by the *class struggle*, and that amidst the conditions prevailing in an absolutely exhausted, ruined, starving and dying country, the class struggle must *inevitably* assume a different form. It is no longer a class struggle for a share of the results of production; it is not a struggle to take charge of production (for production is at a standstill, there is no coal, the railways have been wrecked, the war has knocked people out of their groove, the machines are worn out, and so on and so forth) but a struggle *to save the workers from starvation*. Only simpletons, even if very "learned" ones, can "condemn", under such circumstances, "consumers', soldiers'" communism and superciliously remind the workers of the importance of production.

The first and foremost task is to save the workers. The bourgeoisie want to retain their privileges, to thrust all the consequences of the war upon the workers, and this means starving the workers to death.

The working class wants to save itself from starvation, and for this it is necessary to smash the bourgeoisie, *first* to ensure consumption, even the most meagre, otherwise it will be impossible to *drag out* even an existence of semi-starvation, it will be *impossible to hold out* until industry can be restarted.

"Think of production!" says the well-fed bourgeoisie to the starving and exhausted workers. And Kautsky, repeat-

ing the capitalists' refrain in the guise of "economic science", becomes completely a lackey of the bourgeoisie.

But the workers say that the bourgeoisie, too, should be put on a semi-starvation ration, so that the working people might recuperate somewhat, so that the working people may be *saved from death*. "Consumers' communism" is a means of saving the workers. The workers must be saved, no matter at what sacrifice! Half a pound each for the capitalists, a pound each for the workers—this is the way out of this period of starvation and ruin. Consumption by the starving workers is the basis of, and the condition for, the restoration of industry.

Clara Zetkin was quite right when she told Kautsky that he was "*slipping into bourgeois political economy. Production is for man, and not man for production....*"

Independent Herr Kautsky revealed the same dependence upon petty-bourgeois prejudices when he bewailed the "cult of violence". When, as far back as 1914, the Bolsheviks argued that the imperialist war would become civil war, Herr Kautsky said nothing, but he remained in the same party with David and Co. who denounced this forecast (and slogan) as "madness". Kautsky failed entirely to understand that the imperialist war would inevitably be transformed into civil war; and now he is blaming both combatants in the civil war for his own lack of understanding! Is this not a perfect example of reactionary philistine stupidity?

But while in 1914, failure to understand that the imperialist war must inevitably be transformed into civil war was *only* philistine stupidity, today, in 1919, it is something worse. It is treachery to the working class; for the civil war in Russia, Finland, Latvia, Germany and Hungary, is a fact. Kautsky admitted hundreds and hundreds of times in his former writings that there are periods in history when the class struggle is inevitably transformed into the civil war. There is one now, but Kautsky is found in the camp of the vacillating, cowardly, petty bourgeoisie.

"*The spirit that inspires Spartacus is virtually the spirit of Ludendorff.... Spartacus is not only encompassing the doom of its own cause, but is also causing an intensification of the policy of violence on the part of the Majority Socialists, Noske is the antipode of Spartacus....*"

These words of Kautsky's (quoted from his article in the Vienna *Arbeiterzeitung*) are so infinitely stupid, base and despicable that it is sufficient to point to them without making any comment. The party which tolerates such leaders must be rotten to the core. In the light of these words of Kautsky's, the Berne International, to which Herr Kautsky belongs, must be appraised on its merits as a yellow International.

As a curiosity we shall also quote the argument advanced by Herr Haase, in an article entitled "The International at Amsterdam" (*Freiheit*, May 4, 1919). Herr Haase boasts of having proposed a resolution on the colonial question which states that "it is the function of an alliance of nations organised on the lines proposed by the International ... *before the advent of socialism* ... [please note this!]* ... to administer the colonies primarily in the interests of the natives, and then in the interests of all the nations that are united in the alliance of nations...."

A gem, is it not? According to the resolution proposed by this pundit, *before* the advent of socialism, *the colonies will be administered* not by the bourgeoisie, but by some sort of benevolent, just, sentimental "alliance of nations"! Is this not tantamount to whitewashing the most disgusting capitalist hypocrisy? And these are the "Lefts" in the Berne International....

So that the reader may make a more striking comparison between the stupidity, baseness and despicableness of the writings of Haase, Kautsky and Co. and the real situation in Germany, I shall cite one other brief passage.

The well-known capitalist, Walther Rathenau, recently wrote a book entitled, *Der neue Staat* (The New State). It is dated March 24, 1919. Its value as a theoretical work is nil. But as an observer, Walther Rathenau is compelled to admit the following.

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* Interpolations in square brackets in quoted passages have been introduced by Lenin unless otherwise stated.—*Ed.*

"We are a nation of poets and thinkers, but in our auxiliary occupations [*im Nebenberuf*] we are philistines...."

"Only the extreme monarchists and the Spartacists now have ideals...."

"The unvarnished truth is that we are heading for dictatorship, proletarian or pretorian..." (pp. 29, 52, 65).

Evidently this bourgeois considers himself as "independent" of the bourgeoisie as Kautsky and Haase imagine they are of the petty bourgeoisie and of philistinism.

But Walther Rathenau towers head and shoulders above Karl Kautsky, for the latter snivels, and like a coward hides from the "unvarnished truth", whereas the former frankly admits it.

May 28, 1919

Published in June 1919

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin,
Smolny,
Petrograd

The circumstances of the whiteguard offensive against Petrograd, taken in their totality, compel one to assume the existence of organised treason behind our lines or, perhaps, even at the front. This is the only explanation for the attack with relatively small forces, the rapid advance and the frequent blowing-up of bridges on the main lines leading to Petrograd. It seems that the enemy is confident that we have no organised armed forces of any importance to resist him and that he can depend on help from the hinterland (the fire in the artillery magazines in Novo-Sokolniki, the destruction of bridges, today's news of the revolt at Oredezh). Please pay greater attention to these circumstances and take extraordinary measures to expose the plots.

Lenin

Written May 29, 1919
First published in 1938

Published according to the signed original

BEWARE OF SPIES!

Death to spies!

The whiteguards' advance on Petrograd has made it perfectly clear that in the vicinity of the front line, in every large town, the Whites have a wide organisation for espionage, subversion, the blowing-up of bridges, the engineering of revolts in the rear and the murder of Communists and prominent members of workers' organisations.

Every man should be on the watch.

Everywhere vigilance must be redoubled and a series of measures evolved and carried out with the greatest strictness to track down and capture spies and whiteguard conspirators.

Railwaymen and political workers in all military units without exception must, in particular, redouble their precautions.

All class-conscious workers and peasants must rise up in defence of Soviet power and must fight the spies and whiteguard traitors. Let every man be on the watch and in regular contact, organised on military lines, with the committees of the Party, with the Extraordinary Commission and with the most trusted and experienced comrades among the Soviet officials.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of Workers'
and Peasants' Defence

F. Dzerzhinsky,
People's Commissar of the Interior

Pravda No. 116,
May 31, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

DRAFT C.C. DIRECTIVES ON ARMY UNITY

Whereas:

(1) The R.S.F.S.R., in alliance with the fraternal Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Byelorussia, is compelled to wage a war of defence against the common enemy, world imperialism and the Black-Hundred, whiteguard counter-revolution which imperialism supports;

(2) an essential condition for success in that war is a single command for all contingents of the Red Army, the strictest centralisation of the command of all the forces and resources of the socialist republics, especially of the entire army supply apparatus and also of railway transport which is an important material factor in the war, being of primary importance both for the conduct of operations and for the supply of munitions, equipment and provisions to the Red Army,

the C.C. of the R.C.P. resolves:

(1) to recognise as absolutely essential for the duration of the socialist war of defence the unification of everything connected with supplies for the Red Army under the single guidance of the Council of Defence and other central bodies of the R.S.F.S.R.;

(2) to recognise as absolutely essential for the duration of the socialist war of defence the unification of railway transport and the management of the railway network throughout the entire territory of fraternal socialist republics under the guidance and management of the People's Commissariat of Railways of the R.S.F.S.R.;

(3) to recognise as incompatible with the interests of defence the existence of separate bodies supplying the Red

Army and separate commissariats of railways in the fraternal Soviet republics, and to insist on their being changed for the duration of the war into branches of the R.S.F.S.R. bodies supplying the Red Army and of the People's Commissariat of Railways of the R.S.F.S.R. that shall be under the jurisdiction of and fully subordinated to the central R.S.F.S.R. bodies supplying the Red Army and the People's Commissariat of Railways of the R.S.F.S.R.;

(4) to recognise as subject to annulment all decrees concerning Red Army supplies and railway transport or concerning the management of the railway network wherever they contradict the orders and decrees of the R.S.F.S.R. regulating supplies for the Red Army and the management of railway transport and the railway network of the R.S.F.S.R.

Lenin, *Stalin*

Written May 1919
First published in 1942

Published according
to a typewritten copy

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin,
Smolny,
Petrograd

If the situation on the Petrograd Front is favourable bend all efforts for a speedy and decisive offensive, because troops are greatly needed in other places.

Lenin

Written June 4, 1919
First published in 1938

Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.C. R.C.P.(B.) ON THE PETROGRAD FRONT

The C.C. resolves:

(1) to recognise the priority importance of the Petrograd Front and to be guided by this in allocating troops, etc.;

(2) to dispatch two-thirds of the division withdrawn from the Eastern Front to Petrograd and one-third to the Southern Front;

(3) to instruct the Organising Bureau to adopt the most rigorous emergency measures to step up the removal of Communists from work in the Soviets (central and local) and their transfer to war work, especially in the hinterland and directly behind the front line (combating desertion, army supplies, stores, accelerating mobilisation, etc.);

(4) a similar instruction is given the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars.

Written not later than June 10, 1919

First two points published in 1941

First published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Published according to the manuscript

A GREAT BEGINNING

HEROISM OF THE WORKERS IN THE REAR. "COMMUNIST SUBBOTNIKS"

Published in July 1919
as a separate pamphlet in Moscow
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the manuscript

Published in July 1919
as a separate pamphlet in Moscow
Signed: N. Lenin

Published according to
the manuscript

Великій почин.

(О героизмѣ рабочих в тылу.
По поводу „коммунистических субботников").

Печать сообщает много примѣров героизма красноармейцев. Рабочие и крестьяне в борьбѣ с колчаковцами, деникинцами и другими войсками помѣщиков и капиталистов, проливают кровь на фронтах гражданской войны и внутренних, отстаивая завоеванія социалистической революціи. Медленно и трудно идет изживаніе наследіе, преодолѣніе тяжелого и разрушительного, но оно идет вперед несмотря ни на что. Героизм трудящихся масс, сознательно приносящих жертвы на почвѣ социализма, вот что является основой новой, боеспособной дисциплины в Красной Арміи, ея возрожденія, укрѣпленія, роста.

Не меньшее вниманіе привлекает героизм рабочих в тылу. Прямо-таки замечательные факты в этом отношеніи имеет железнодорожный рабочий, по их собственному почину, коммунистических субботников. Видимо, это только еще начало, но это начало неоценимо большого значенія. Это — начало перелома, более трудная, более существенная, более коренная, более революционная, чем сверженіе буржуазіи, что

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"A Great Beginning".
June 28, 1919

Reduced

The press reports many instances of the heroism of the Red Army men. In the fight against Kolchak, Denikin and other forces of the landowners and capitalists, the workers and peasants very often display miracles of bravery and endurance, defending the gains of the socialist revolution. The guerrilla spirit, weariness and indiscipline are being overcome; it is a slow and difficult process, but it is making headway in spite of everything. The heroism of the working people making voluntary sacrifices for the victory of socialism—this is the foundation of the new, comradely discipline in the Red Army, the foundation on which that army is regenerating, gaining strength and growing.

The heroism of the workers in the rear is no less worthy of attention. In this connection, the *communist subbotniks* organised by the workers on their own initiative are really of enormous significance. Evidently, this is only a beginning, but it is a beginning of exceptionally great importance. It is the beginning of a revolution that is more difficult, more tangible, more radical and more decisive than the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, for it is a victory over our own conservatism, indiscipline, petty-bourgeois egoism, a victory over the habits left as a heritage to the worker and peasant by accursed capitalism. Only when *this* victory is consolidated will the new social discipline, socialist discipline, be created; then and only then will a reversion to capitalism

become impossible, will communism become really invincible.

Pravda in its issue of May 17 published an article by A. J. entitled: "Work in a Revolutionary Way. *A Communist Saturday*". This article is so important that we reproduce it here in full.

"WORK IN A REVOLUTIONARY WAY
"*A COMMUNIST SATURDAY*

"The letter of the Russian Communist Party's Central Committee on working in a *revolutionary way* was a powerful stimulus to communist organisations and to Communists. The general wave of enthusiasm carried many communist railway workers to the front, but the majority of them could not leave their responsible posts or find new forms of working in a revolutionary way. Reports from the localities about the tardiness with which the work of mobilisation was proceeding and the prevalence of red tape compelled the Moscow-Kazan Railway district to turn its attention to the way the railway was functioning. It turned out that, owing to the shortage of labour and low productivity of labour, urgent orders and repairs to locomotives were being held up. At a general meeting of Communists and sympathisers of the Moscow-Kazan Railway district held on May 7, the question was raised of passing from words to deeds in helping to achieve victory over Kolchak. The following resolution was moved:

"'In view of the grave domestic and foreign situation, Communists and sympathisers, in order to gain the upper hand over the class enemy, must spur themselves on again and deduct an extra hour from their rest, i.e., lengthen their working day by one hour, accumulate these extra hours and put in six extra hours of manual labour on Saturday for the purpose of creating real values of immediate worth. Since Communists must not grudge their health and life for the gains of the revolution, this work should be performed without pay. *Communist Saturdays* are to be introduced throughout the district and to continue until complete victory over Kolchak has been achieved.'

"After some hesitation, the resolution was adopted unanimously.

"On Saturday, May 10, at 6 p.m., the Communists and sympathisers turned up to work like soldiers, formed ranks, and without fuss or bustle were taken by the foremen to the various jobs.

"The results of working *in a revolutionary way are evident*. The accompanying table gives the place, of work and the character of the work performed.

Place of work	Character of work	Number Employed	Hours worked		Worked performed
			Per person	Total	
Moscow. Main locomotive shops	Loading materials for the line, devices for repairing locomotives and carriage parts for Perovo, Murom, Alatyr and Syzran	48	5	240	Loaded 7,500 poods Unloaded 1,800 poods
		21	3	63	
		5	4	20	
Moscow. Passenger depot	Complex current repairs to locomotives	26	5	130	Repairs done on 1½ locomotives
Moscow. Shunting yards	Current repairs to locomotives	24	6	144	2 locomotives completed and parts to be repaired dismantled on 4
Moscow. Carriage department	Current repairs to passenger carriages	12	6	72	2 third-class carriages
Perovo. Main carriage workshop	Carriage repairs and minor repairs on Saturday and Sunday	46 23	5 5	230 115	12 box carriages and two flat carriages
	Total	205	—	1,014	4 locomotives and 16 carriages turned out and 9,300 poods unloaded and loaded

"The total value of the work performed at ordinary rates of pay is five million rubles; calculated at overtime rates it would be fifty per cent higher.

"The productivity of labour in loading wagons was 270 per cent higher than that of regular workers, The productivity of labour on other jobs was approximately the same.

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"Jobs (urgent) were done which had been held up for periods ranging from seven days to three months owing to the shortage of labour and to red tape.

"The work was done in spite of the state of disrepair (easily remedied) of implements, as a result of which certain groups were held up from thirty to forty minutes.

"The administration left in charge of the work could hardly keep pace with the men in finding new jobs for them, and perhaps it was only a slight exaggeration when an old foreman said that as much work was done at this *communist Saturday* as would have been done in a week by non-class-conscious and slack workers.

"In view of the fact that many non-Communists, sincere supporters of the Soviet government, took part in the work, and that many more are expected on future Saturdays, and also in view of the fact that many other districts desire to follow the example of the communist railway workers of the Moscow-Kazan Railway, I shall deal in greater detail with the organisational side of the matter as seen from reports received from the localities.

"Of those taking part in the work some ten per cent were Communists permanently employed in the localities. The rest were persons occupying responsible and elective posts, from the commissar of the railway to commissars of individual enterprises, representatives of the trade union, and employees of the head office and of the Commissariat of Railways.

"The enthusiasm and team spirit displayed during work were extraordinary. When the workers, clerks and head office employees, without even an oath or argument, caught hold of the forty-pood wheel tire of a passenger locomotive and, like industrious ants, rolled it into place, one's heart was filled with fervent joy at the sight of this collective effort, and one's conviction was strengthened that the victory of the working class was unshakable. The international bandits will not crush the victorious workers; the internal saboteurs will not live to see Kolchak.

"When the work was finished those present witnessed an unprecedented scene: a hundred Communists, weary, but with the light of joy in their eyes, greeted their success with the solemn strains of the *Internationale*. And it seemed as if the triumphant strains of the triumphant anthem would sweep over the walls through the whole of working-class Moscow and that like the waves caused by a stone thrown into a pool they would spread through the whole of working-class Russia and shake up the weary and the slack.

"A. J."

Appraising this remarkable "example worthy of emulation", Comrade N. R. in an article in *Pravda* of May 20, under that heading, wrote:

"Cases of Communists working like this are not rare. I know of similar cases at an electric power station, and on various railways. On the Nikolayevskaya Railway, the Communists worked overtime several nights to lift a locomotive that had fallen into the turn-table

pit. In the winter, all the Communists and sympathisers on the Northern Railway worked several Sundays clearing the track of snow; and the communist cells at many goods stations patrol the stations at night to prevent stealing. But all this work was casual and unsystematic. The comrades on the Moscow-Kazan line are making this work systematic and permanent, and this is new. They say in their resolution, 'until complete victory over Kolchak has been achieved', and therein lies the significance of their work. They are lengthening the working day of every Communist and sympathiser by one hour for the duration of the state of war; simultaneously, their productivity of labour is exemplary.

"This example has called forth, and is bound to call forth, further emulation. A general meeting of the Communists and sympathisers on the Alexandrovskaya Railway, after discussing the military situation and the resolution adopted by the comrades on the Moscow-Kazan Railway, resolved: (1) to introduce 'subbotniks' for the Communists and sympathisers on the Alexandrovskaya Railway, the first subbotnik to take place on May 17; (2) to organise the Communists and sympathisers in exemplary, model teams which must show the workers how to work and what can really be done with the present materials and tools, and in the present food situation.

"The Moscow-Kazan comrades say that their example has made a great impression and that they expect a large number of *non-Party* workers to turn up next Saturday. At the time these lines are being written the Communists have not yet started working overtime in the Alexandrovskaya Railway workshops, but as soon as the rumour spread that they were to do so the mass of non-Party workers stirred themselves. 'We did not know yesterday, otherwise we would have worked as well!' 'I will certainly come next Saturday,' can be heard on all sides. The impression created by work of this sort is very great.

"The example set by the Moscow-Kazan comrades should be emulated by all the communist cells in the rear; not only the communist cells at Moscow Junction, but the whole Party organisation in Russia. In the rural districts too, the communist cells should in the first place set to work to till the fields of Red Army men and thus help their families.

"The comrades on the Moscow-Kazan line finished their first communist subbotnik by singing the *Internationale*. If the communist organisations throughout Russia follow this example and consistently apply it, the Russian Soviet Republic will successfully weather the coming severe months to the mighty strains of the *Internationale* sung by all the working people of the Republic....

"To work, communist comrades!"

On May 23, 1919, *Pravda* reported the following:

"The first communist 'subbotnik' on the Alexandrovskaya Railway took place on May 17. In accordance with the resolution adopted by their general meeting, ninety-eight Communists and sympathisers worked five hours overtime without pay, receiving in return only the right to purchase a second dinner, and, as manual labourers, half a pound of bread to go with their dinner."

Although the work was poorly prepared and organised the *productivity of labour was* nevertheless *from two to three times higher than usual.*

Here are a few examples.

Five turners turned eighty spindles in four hours. The productivity is 213 per cent of the usual level.

Twenty unskilled workers in four hours collected scrap materials of a total weight of 600 poods, and seventy laminated carriage springs, each weighing 3½ poods, making a total of 850 poods. Productivity, 300 per cent of the usual level.

"The comrades explain this by the fact that ordinarily their work is boring and tiresome, whereas here they worked with a will and with enthusiasm. Now, however, they will be ashamed to turn out less in regular working hours than they did at the communist subbotnik."

"Now many non-Party workers say that they would like to take part in the subbotniks. The locomotive crews volunteer to take locomotives from the 'cemetery', during a subbotnik, repair them and set them going.

"It is reported that similar subbotniks are to be organised on the Vyazma line."

How the work is done at these communist subbotniks is described by Comrade A. Dyachenko in an article in *Pravda* of June 7, entitled "Notes of a Subbotnik Worker". We quote the main passages from this article.

"A comrade and I were very pleased to go and do our 'bit' in the subbotnik arranged by a decision of the railway district committee of the Party; for a time, for a few hours, I would give my head a rest and my muscles a bit of exercise.... We were detailed off to the railway carpentry shop. We got there, found a number of our people, exchanged greetings, engaged in banter for a bit, counted up our forces and found that there were thirty of us.... And in front of us lay a 'monster', a steam boiler weighing no less than six or seven hundred poods; our job was to 'shift' it, i.e., move it over a distance of a quarter or a third of a verst, to its base. We began to have our doubts.... However, we started on the job. Some comrades placed wooden rollers under the boiler, attached two ropes to it, and we began to tug away.... The boiler gave way reluctantly, but at length it budged. We were delighted. After all, there were so few of us.... For nearly two weeks this boiler had resisted the efforts of thrice our number of non-communist workers and nothing could make it budge until we tackled it.... We worked for an hour, strenuously, rhythmically, to the command of our 'foreman'—'one, two, three', and the boiler kept on rolling. Suddenly there was confusion, and a number of our comrades went tumbling on to the ground in the funniest fashion. The rope 'let them down'.... A moment's delay, and a thicker rope

was made fast.... Evening. It was getting dark, but we had yet to negotiate a small hillock, and then our job would soon be done. Our arms ached, our palms burned, we were hot and pulled for all we were worth—and were making headway. The 'management' stood round and somewhat shamed by our success, clutched at a rope. 'Lend a hand, it's time you did!' A Red Army man was watching our labours; in his hands he held an accordion. What was he thinking? Who were these people? Why should they work on Saturday when everybody was at home? I solved his riddle and said to him: 'Comrade, play us a jolly tune. We are not raw hands, we are real Communists. Don't you see how fast the work is going under our hands? We are not lazy, we are pulling for all we are worth!' In response, the Red Army man carefully put his accordion on the ground and hastened to grab at a rope end....

"Suddenly Comrade U. struck up the workers' song 'Dubinushka', '*anglichanin mudrets*', he sang, in an excellent tenor voice and we all joined in the refrain of this labour shanty: '*Eh*, *dubinushka*, *ukhnem*, *podyornem*, *podyornem*....'

"We were unaccustomed to the work, our muscles were weary, our shoulders, our backs ached ... but the next day would be a free day, our day of rest, and we would be able to get all the sleep we wanted. The goal was near, and after a little hesitation our 'monster' rolled almost right up to the base. 'Put some boards under, raise it on the base, and let the boiler do the work that has long been expected of it.' We went off in a crowd to the 'club room' of the local Party cell. The room was brightly lit; the walls decorated with posters; rifles stacked around the room. After lustily singing the *Internationale* we enjoyed a glass of tea and 'rum', and even bread. This treat, given us by the local comrades, was very welcome after our arduous toil. We took a brotherly farewell of our comrades and lined up. The strains of revolutionary songs echoed through the slumbering streets in the silence of the night and our measured tread kept time with the music. We sang 'Comrades, the Bugles Are Sounding', 'Arise Ye Starvelings from Your Slumbers', songs of the International and of labour.

"A week passed. Our arms and shoulders were back to normal and we were going to another 'subbotnik', nine versts away this time, to repair railway waggons. Our destination was Perovo. The comrades climbed on the roof of an 'American' box waggon and sang the *Internationale* well and with gusto. The people on the train listened to the singing, evidently in surprise. The wheels knocked a measured beat, and those of us who failed to get on to the roof clung to the steps pretending to be 'devil-may-care' passengers. The train pulled in. We had reached our destination. We passed through a long yard and were warmly greeted by the commissar, Comrade G.

"'There is plenty of work, but few to do it! Only thirty of us, and in six hours we have to do average repairs to a baker's dozen of waggons! Here are twin-wheels already marked. We have not only empty waggons, but also a filled cistern.... But that's nothing, we'll "make a job of it", comrades!'

"Work went with a swing. Five comrades and I were working with

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hoists. Under pressure of our shoulders and two hoists, and directed by our 'foreman', these twin-wheels, weighing from sixty to seventy poods apiece, skipped from one track to another in the liveliest possible manner. One pair disappeared, another rolled into place. At last all were in their assigned places, and swiftly we shifted the old worn-out junk into a shed.... One, two, three—and, raised by a revolving iron hoist, they were disloged from the rails in a trice. Over there, in the dark, we heard the rapid strokes of hammers; the comrades, like worker bees, were busy on their 'sick' cars. Some were carpentering, others painting, still others were covering roofs, to the joy of the comrade commissar and our own. The smiths also asked for our aid. In a portable smithy a rod with a coupling hook was gleaming white-hot, it had been bent by careless shunting. It was laid on the anvil, scattering white sparks, and, under the experienced direction of the smith, our trusty hammers beat it back into its proper shape. Still red-hot and spitting sparks, we rushed it on our shoulders to where it had to go. We pushed it into its socket. A few hammer strokes and it was fixed. We crawled under the waggon. The coupling system is not as simple as it looks; there are all sorts of contraptions with rivets and springs....

"Work was in full swing. Night was falling. The torches seemed to burn brighter than before. Soon it would be time to knock off. Some of the comrades were taking a 'rest' against some tires and 'sipping' hot tea. The May night was cool, and the new moon shone beautifully like a gleaming sickle in the sky. People were laughing and joking.

"'Knock off, Comrade G., thirteen waggons are enough!'

"But Comrade G. was not satisfied.

"We finished our tea, broke into our songs of triumph, and marched to the door....

The movement of "communist subbotniks" is not confined to Moscow. *Pravda* of June 6 reported the following:

"The first communist subbotnik in Tver took place on May 31. One hundred and twenty-eight Communists worked on the railway. In three and a half hours they loaded and unloaded fourteen waggons, repaired three locomotives, cut up ten sagenes of firewood and performed other work. The productivity of labour of the skilled communist workers was thirteen times above normal."

Again, on June 8 we read in *Pravda*:

"COMMUNIST SUBBOTNIKS

"*Saratov*, June 5. In response to the appeal of their Moscow comrades, the communist railway workers here at a general Party meeting resolved: to work five hours overtime on Saturdays without pay in order to support the national economy."

* * *

I have given the fullest and most detailed information about the communist subbotniks because in this we undoubt-

edly observe one of the most important aspects of communist construction, to which our press pays insufficient attention, and which all of us have as yet failed properly to appreciate.

Less political fireworks and more attention to the simplest but living facts of communist construction, taken from and tested by actual life—this is the slogan which all of us, our writers, agitators, propagandists, organisers, etc., should repeat unceasingly.

It was natural and inevitable in the first period after the proletarian revolution that we should be engaged primarily on the main and fundamental task of overcoming the resistance of the bourgeoisie, of vanquishing the exploiters, of crushing their conspiracy (like the "slave-owners' conspiracy" to surrender Petrograd, in which all from the Black Hundreds and Cadets to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were involved[66]). But simultaneously with this task, another task comes to the forefront just as inevitably and ever more imperatively as time goes on, namely, the more important task of positive communist construction, the creation of new economic relations, of a new society.

As I have had occasion to point out more than once, among other occasions in the speech I delivered at a session of the Petrograd Soviet on March 12, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic foundation of this use of revolutionary force, the guarantee of its effectiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates a higher type of social organisation of labour compared with capitalism. This is what is important, this is the source of the strength and the guarantee that the final triumph of communism is inevitable.

The feudal organisation of social labour rested on the discipline of the bludgeon, while the working people, robbed and tyrannised by a handful of landowners, were utterly ignorant and downtrodden. The capitalist organisation of social labour rested on the discipline of hunger, and, notwithstanding all the progress of bourgeois culture and bourgeois democracy, the vast mass of the working people in the most advanced, civilised and democratic republics remained an ignorant and downtrodden mass of wage-slaves or oppressed peasants, robbed and tyrannised by a handful

of capitalists. The communist organisation of social labour, the first step towards which is socialism, rests, and will do so more and more as time goes on, on the free and conscious discipline of the working people themselves who have thrown off the yoke both of the landowners and capitalists.

This new discipline does not drop from the skies, nor is it born from pious wishes; it grows out of the material conditions of large-scale capitalist production, and out of them alone. Without them it is impossible. And the repository, or the vehicle, of these material conditions is a definite historical class, created, organised, united, trained, educated and hardened by large-scale capitalism. This class is the proletariat.

If we translate the Latin, scientific, historico-philosophical term "dictatorship of the proletariat" into simpler language, it means just the following:

Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory, industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of the working and exploited people in the struggle to throw off the yoke of capital, in actually carrying it out, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system and in the entire struggle for the complete abolition of classes. (Let us observe in parenthesis that the only scientific distinction between socialism and communism is that the first term implies the first stage of the new society arising out of capitalism, while the second implies the next and higher stage.)

The mistake the "Berne" yellow International makes is that its leaders accept the class struggle and the leading role of the proletariat only in word and are afraid to think it out to its logical conclusion. They are afraid of- that inevitable conclusion which particularly terrifies the bourgeoisie, and which is absolutely unacceptable to them. They are afraid to admit that the dictatorship of the proletariat is *also* a period of class struggle, which is inevitable as long as classes have not been abolished, and which changes in form, being particularly fierce and particularly peculiar in the period immediately following the overthrow of capital. The proletariat does not cease the class struggle after it has captured political power, but continues it until

classes are abolished—of course, under different circumstances, in different form and by different means.

And what does the "abolition of classes" mean? All those who call themselves socialists recognise this as the ultimate goal of socialism, but by no means all give thought to its significance. Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.

Clearly, in order to abolish classes completely, it is not enough to overthrow the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, not enough to abolish *their* rights of ownership; it is necessary also to abolish *all* private ownership of the means of production, it is necessary to abolish the distinction between town and country, as well as the distinction between manual workers and brain workers. This requires a very long period of time. In order to achieve this an enormous step forward must be taken in developing the productive forces; it is necessary to overcome the resistance (frequently passive, which is particularly stubborn and particularly difficult to overcome) of the numerous survivals of small-scale production; it is necessary to overcome the enormous force of habit and conservatism which are connected with these survivals.

The assumption that all "working people" are equally capable of doing this work would be on empty phrase, or the illusion of an antediluvian, pre-Marxist socialist; for this ability does not come of itself, but grows historically, and grows *only* out of the material conditions of large-scale capitalist production. This ability, at the beginning of the road from capitalism to socialism, is possessed by the proletariat *alone*. It is capable of fulfilling the gigantic task that confronts it, first, because it is the strongest and most advanced class in civilised societies; secondly, because in the most developed countries it constitutes the majority

of the population, and thirdly, because in backward capitalist countries, like Russia, the majority of the population consists of semi-proletarians, i.e., of people who regularly live in a proletarian way part of the year, who regularly earn a part of their means of subsistence as wage-workers in capitalist enterprises.

Those who try to solve the problems involved in the transition from capitalism to socialism on the basis of general talk about liberty, equality, democracy in general, equality of labour democracy, etc. (as Kautsky, Martov and other heroes of the Berne yellow International do), thereby only reveal their petty-bourgeois, philistine nature and ideologically slavishly follow in the wake of the bourgeoisie. The correct solution of this problem can be found only in a concrete study of the specific relations between the specific class which has conquered political power, namely, the proletariat, and the whole non-proletarian, and also semi-proletarian, mass of the working population—relations which do not take shape in fantastically harmonious, "ideal" conditions, but in the real conditions of the frantic resistance of the bourgeoisie which assumes many and diverse forms.

The vast majority of the population—and all the more so of the working population—of any capitalist country, including Russia, have thousands of times experienced, themselves and through their kith and kin, the oppression of capital, the plunder and every sort of tyranny it perpetrates. The imperialist war, i.e., the slaughter of ten million people in order to decide whether British or German capital was to have supremacy in plundering the whole world, has greatly intensified these ordeals, has increased and deepened them, and has made the people realise their meaning. Hence the inevitable sympathy displayed by the vast majority of the population, particularly the working people, for the proletariat, because it is with heroic courage and revolutionary ruthlessness throwing off the yoke of capital, overthrowing the exploiters, suppressing their resistance, and shedding its blood to pave the road for the creation of the new society, in which there will be no room for exploiters.

Great and inevitable as may be their petty-bourgeois vacillations and their tendency to go back to bourgeois

"order", under the "wing" of the bourgeoisie, the non-proletarian and semi-proletarian mass of the working population cannot but recognise the moral and political authority of the proletariat, who are not only overthrowing the exploiters and suppressing their resistance, but are building a new and higher social bond, a social discipline, the discipline of class-conscious and united working people, who know no yoke and no authority except the authority of their own unity, of their own, more class-conscious, bold, solid, revolutionary and steadfast vanguard.

In order to achieve victory, in order to build and consolidate socialism, the proletariat must fulfil a twofold or dual task: first, it must, by its supreme heroism in the revolutionary struggle against capital, win over the entire mass of the working and exploited people; it must win them over, organise them and lead them in the struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and utterly suppress their resistance. Secondly, it must lead the whole mass of the working and exploited people, as well as all the petty-bourgeois groups, on to the road of new economic development, towards the creation of a new social bond, a new labour discipline, a new organisation of labour, which will combine the last word in science and capitalist technology with the mass association of class-conscious workers creating large-scale socialist industry.

The second task is more difficult than the first, for it cannot possibly be fulfilled by single acts of heroic fervour; it requires the most prolonged, most persistent and most difficult mass heroism in *plain*, *everyday* work. But this task is more essential than the first, because, in the last analysis, the deepest source of strength for victories over the bourgeoisie and the sole guarantee of the durability and permanence of these victories can only be a new and higher mode of social production, the substitution of large-scale socialist production for capitalist and petty-bourgeois production.

* * *

"Communist subbotniks" are of such enormous historical significance precisely because they demonstrate the conscious and voluntary initiative of the workers in developing

the productivity of labour, in adopting a new labour discipline, in creating socialist conditions of economy and life.

J. Jacoby, one of the few, in fact it would be more correct to say one of the exceptionally rare, German bourgeois democrats who, after the lessons of 1870-71, went over not to chauvinism or national-liberalism, but to socialism, once said that the formation of a single trade union was of greater historical importance than the battle of Sadowa.[67] This is true. The battle of Sadowa decided the supremacy of one of two bourgeois monarchies, the Austrian or the Prussian, in creating a German national capitalist state. The formation of one trade union was a small step towards the world victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. And we may similarly say that the first communist subbotnik, organised by the workers of the Moscow-Kazan Railway in Moscow on May 10, 1919, was of greater historical significance than any of the victories of Hindenburg, or of Foch and the British, in the 1914-18 imperialist war. The victories of the imperialists mean the slaughter of millions of workers for the sake of the profits of the Anglo-American and French multimillionaires, they are the atrocities of doomed capitalism, bloated with over-eating and rotting alive. The communist subbotnik organised by the workers of the Moscow-Kazan Railway is one of the cells of the new, socialist society, which brings to all the peoples of the earth emancipation from the yoke of capital and from wars.

The bourgeois gentlemen and their hangers-on, including the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are wont to regard themselves as the representatives of "public opinion", naturally jeer at the hopes of the Communists, call those hopes "a baobab tree in a mignonette pot", sneer at the insignificance of the number of subbotniks compared with the vast number of cases of thieving, idleness, lower productivity, spoilage of raw materials and finished goods, etc. Our reply to these gentlemen is that if the bourgeois intellectuals had dedicated their knowledge to assisting the working people instead of giving it to the Russian and foreign capitalists in order to restore their power, the revolution would have proceeded more rapidly and more peacefully. But this is utopian, for the issue is decided by the class struggle, and the majority of the intellectuals gravitate

towards the bourgeoisie. Not with the assistance of the intellectuals will the proletariat achieve victory, but in spite of their opposition (at least in the majority of cases), removing those of them who are incorrigibly bourgeois, reforming, re-educating and subordinating the waverers, and gradually winning ever larger sections of them to its side. Gloating over the difficulties and setbacks of the revolution, sowing panic, preaching a return to the past—these are all weapons and methods of class struggle of the bourgeois intellectuals. The proletariat will not allow itself to be deceived by them.

If we get down to brass tacks, however, has it ever happened in history that a new mode of production has taken root immediately, without a long succession of setbacks, blunders and relapses? Half a century after the abolition of serfdom there were still quite a number of survivals of serfdom in the Russian countryside. Half a century after the abolition of slavery in America the position of the Negroes was still very often one of semi-slavery. The bourgeois intellectuals, including the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, are true to themselves in serving capital and in continuing to use absolutely false arguments—before the proletarian revolution they accused us of being utopian; after the revolution they demand that we wipe out all traces of the past with fantastic rapidity!

We are not utopians, however, and we know the real value of bourgeois "arguments"; we also know that for some time after the revolution traces of the old ethics will inevitably predominate over the young shoots of the new. When the new has just been born the old always remains stronger than it for some time, this is always the case in nature and in social life. Jeering at the feebleness of the young shoots of the new order, cheap scepticism of the intellectuals and the like—these are, essentially, methods of bourgeois class struggle against the proletariat, a defence of capitalism against socialism. We must carefully study the feeble new shoots, we must devote the greatest attention to them, do everything to promote their growth and "nurse" them. Some of them will inevitably perish. We cannot vouch that precisely the "communist subbotniks" will play a particularly important role. But that is not the point. The point is to foster each and every shoot of the new; and life will

select the most viable. If the Japanese scientist, in order to help mankind vanquish syphilis, had the patience to test six hundred and five preparations before he developed a six hundred and sixth which met definite requirements, then those who want to solve a more difficult problem, namely, to vanquish capitalism, must have the perseverance to try hundreds and thousands of new methods, means and weapons of struggle in order to elaborate the most suitable of them.

The "communist subbotniks" are so important because they were initiated by workers who were by no means placed in exceptionally good conditions, by workers of various specialities, and some with no speciality at all, just unskilled labourers, who are living under *ordinary*, i.e., *exceedingly* hard, conditions. We all know very well the main cause of the decline in the productivity of labour that is to be observed not only in Russia, but all over the world; it is ruin and impoverishment, embitterment and weariness caused by the imperialist war, sickness and malnutrition. The latter is first in importance. Starvation—that is the cause. And in order to do away with starvation, productivity of labour must be raised in agriculture, in transport and in industry. So, we get a sort of vicious circle: in order to raise productivity of labour we must save ourselves from starvation, and in order to save ourselves from starvation we must raise productivity of labour.

We know that in practice such contradictions are solved by breaking the vicious circle, by bringing about a radical change in the temper of the people, by the heroic initiative of the individual groups which often plays a decisive role against the background of such a radical change. The unskilled labourers and railway workers of Moscow (of course, we have in mind the majority of them, and not a handful of profiteers, officials and other whiteguards) are working people who are living in desperately hard conditions. They are constantly underfed, and now, before the new harvest is gathered, with the general worsening of the food situation, they are actually starving. And yet these starving workers, surrounded by the malicious counter-revolutionary agitation of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are organising "communist subbotniks",

working overtime *without any pay*, and achieving *an enormous increase in the productivity of labour* in spite of the fact that they are weary, tormented, and exhausted by malnutrition. Is this not supreme heroism? Is this not the beginning of a change of momentous significance?

In the last analysis, productivity of labour is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of the new social system. Capitalism created a productivity of labour unknown under serfdom. Capitalism can be utterly vanquished, and will be utterly vanquished by socialism creating a new and much higher productivity of labour. This is a very difficult matter and must take a long time; but *it has been started*, and that is the main thing. If in starving Moscow, in the summer of 1919, the starving workers who had gone through four trying years of imperialist war and another year and a half of still more trying civil war could start this great work, how will things develop later when we triumph in the civil war and win peace?

Communism is the higher productivity of labour—compared with that existing under capitalism—of voluntary, class-conscious and united workers employing advanced techniques. Communist subbotniks are extraordinarily valuable as the *actual* beginning of *communism*; and this is a very rare thing, because we are in a stage when "only the *first steps* in the transition from capitalism to communism are being taken" (as our Party Programme quite rightly says).

Communism begins when the *rank-and-file workers* display an enthusiastic concern that is undaunted by arduous toil to increase the productivity of labour, husband *every pood of grain*, *coal*, *iron* and other products, which do not accrue to the workers personally or to their "close" kith and kin, but to their "distant" kith and kin, i.e., to society as a whole, to tens and hundreds of millions of people united first in one socialist state, and then in a union of Soviet republics.

In *Capital*, Karl Marx ridicules the pompous and grandiloquent bourgeois-democratic great charter of liberty and the rights of man, ridicules all this phrase-mongering about liberty, equality and fraternity *in general*, which dazzles the petty bourgeois and philistines of all countries, including the present despicable heroes of the despicable Berne

International. Marx contrasts these pompous declarations of rights to the plain, modest, practical, simple manner in which the question is presented by the proletariat—the legislative enactment of a shorter working day is a typical example of such treatment.[68] The aptness and profundity of Marx's observation become the clearer and more obvious to us the more the content of the proletarian revolution unfolds. The "formulas" of genuine communism differ from the pompous, intricate, and solemn phraseology of the Kautskys, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and their beloved "brethren" of Berne in that they reduce everything to the *conditions of labour*. Less chatter about "labour democracy", about "liberty, equality and fraternity", about "government by the people", and all such stuff; the class-conscious workers and peasants of our day see through these pompous phrases of the bourgeois intellectual and discern the trickery as easily as a person of ordinary common sense and experience, when glancing at the irreproachably "polished" features and immaculate appearance of the "fain fellow, dontcher know", immediately and unerringly puts him down as "in all probability, a scoundrel".

Fewer pompous phrases, more plain, *everyday* work, concern for the pood of grain and the pood of coal! More concern about providing this pood of grain and pood of coal needed by the hungry workers and ragged and barefoot peasants *not* by *haggling*, not in a capitalist manner, but by the conscious, voluntary, boundlessly heroic labour of plain working men like the unskilled labourers and railwaymen of the Moscow-Kazan line.

We must all admit that vestiges of the bourgeois-intellectual phrase-mongering approach to questions of the revolution are in evidence at every step, everywhere, even in our own ranks. Our press, for example, does little to fight these rotten survivals of the rotten, bourgeois-democratic past; it does little to foster the simple, modest, ordinary but viable shoots of genuine communism.

Take the position of women in this field, not a single democratic party in the world, not even in the most advanced bourgeois republic, has done in decades so much as a hundredth part of what we did in our very first year in power. We really razed to the ground the infamous laws placing

women in a position of inequality, restricting divorce and surrounding it with disgusting formalities, denying recognition to children born out of wedlock, enforcing a search for their fathers, etc., laws numerous survivals of which, to the shame of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism, are to be found in all civilised countries. We have a thousand times the right to be proud of what we have done in this field. But the more *thoroughly* we have cleared the ground of the lumber of the old, bourgeois laws and institutions, the clearer it is to us that we have only cleared the ground to build on but are not yet building.

Notwithstanding all the laws emancipating woman, she continues to be a *domestic slave*, because *petty housework* crushes, strangles, stultifies and degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and the nursery, and she wastes her labour on barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery. The real *emancipation of women*, real communism, will begin only where and when an all-out struggle begins (led by the proletariat wielding the state power) against this petty housekeeping, or rather when its *wholesale transformation* into a large-scale socialist economy begins.

Do we in practice pay sufficient attention to this question, which in theory every Communist considers indisputable? Of course not. Do we take proper care of the *shoots* of communism which already exist in this sphere? Again the answer is *no*. Public catering establishments, nurseries, kindergartens—here we have examples of these shoots, here we have the simple, everyday means, involving nothing pompous, grandiloquent or ceremonial, which can *really emancipate women*, really lessen and abolish their inequality with men as regards their role in social production and public life. These means are not new, they (like all the material prerequisites for socialism) were created by large-scale capitalism. But under capitalism they remained, first, a rarity, and secondly—which is particularly important—either *profit-making* enterprises, with all the worst features of speculation, profiteering, cheating and fraud, or "acrobatics of bourgeois charity", which the best workers rightly hated and despised.

There is no doubt that the number of these institutions in our country has increased enormously and that they are

beginning to change in character. There is no doubt that we have far more *organising talent* among the working and peasant women than we are aware of, that we have far more people than we know of who can organise practical work, with the co-operation of large numbers of workers and of still larger numbers of consumers, without that abundance of talk, fuss, squabbling and chatter about plans, systems, etc., with which our big-headed "intellectuals" or half-baked "Communists" are "affected". But we *do not nurse* these shoots of the new as we should.

Look at the bourgeoisie. How very well they know how to advertise what *they* need! See how millions of copies of *their* newspapers extol what the capitalists regard as "model" enterprises, and how "model" bourgeois institutions are made an object of national pride! Our press does not take the trouble, or hardly ever, to describe the best catering establishments or nurseries, in order, by daily insistence, to get some of them turned into models of their kind. It does not give them enough publicity, does not describe in detail the saving in human labour, the conveniences for the consumer, the economy of products, the emancipation of women from domestic slavery, the improvement in sanitary conditions, that can be achieved with *exemplary communist work* and extended to the whole of society, to all working people.

Exemplary production, exemplary communist subbotniks, exemplary care and conscientiousness in procuring and distributing every pood of grain, exemplary catering establishments, exemplary cleanliness in such-and-such a workers' house, in such-and-such a block, should all receive ten times more attention and care from our press, as well as from *every* workers' and peasants' organisation, than they receive now. All these are shoots of communism, and it is our common and primary duty to nurse them. Difficult as our food and production situation is, in the year and a half of Bolshevik rule there has been undoubted progress *all along the line*: grain procurements have increased from 30 million poods (from August 1,1917 to August 1, 1918) to 100 million poods (from August 1, 1918 to May 1, 1919); vegetable gardening has expanded, the margin of unsown land has diminished, railway transport has begun to improve despite the enormous fuel difficulties, and so on. Against

this general background, and with the support of the proletarian state power, the shoots of communism will not wither; they will grow and blossom into complete communism.

* * *

We must give very great thought to the significance of the "communist subbotniks", in order that we may draw all the very important practical lessons that follow from this great beginning.

The first and main lesson is that this beginning must be given every assistance. The word "commune" is being handled much too freely. Any kind of enterprise started by Communists or with their participation is very often at once declared to be a "commune", it being not infrequently forgotten that this *very honourable title* must be *won* by prolonged and persistent effort, by *practical* achievement in genuine communist development.

That is why, in my opinion, the decision that has matured in the minds of the majority of the members of the Central Executive Committee to *repeal* the decree of the Council of People's Commissars, as far as it pertains to the title "consumers' communes",[69] is quite right. Let the title be simpler—and, incidentally, the defects and shortcomings of the *initial* stages of the new organisational work will not be blamed on the "communes", but (as in all fairness they should be) on *bad* Communists. It would be a good thing to eliminate the word "commune" from *common* use, to prohibit every Tom, Dick and Harry from grabbing at it, or to *allow this title to be borne only* by genuine communes, which have really demonstrated in practice (and have proved by the unanimous recognition of the whole of the surrounding population) that they are capable of organising their work in a communist manner. First show that you are capable of working without remuneration in the interests of society, in the interests of all the working people, show that you are capable of "working in a revolutionary way", that you are capable of raising productivity of labour, of organising the work in an exemplary manner, and then hold out your hand for the honourable title "commune"!

In this respect, the "communist subbotniks" are a most valuable exception; for the unskilled labourers and railwaymen of the Moscow-Kazan Railway *first* demonstrated *by deeds* that they are capable of working like *Communists* and then adopted the title of "communist subbotniks" for their undertaking. We must see to it and make sure that in future anyone who calls his enterprise, institution or undertaking a commune *without having proved* this by hard work and practical *success in prolonged effort*, by exemplary and truly communist organisation, is mercilessly ridiculed and pilloried as a charlatan or a windbag.

That great beginning, the "communist subbotniks", must also be utilised for another purpose, namely, to *purge* the Party. In the early period following the revolution, when the mass of "honest" and philistine-minded people was particularly timorous, and when the bourgeois intellectuals to a man, including, of course, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, played the lackey to the bourgeoisie and carried on sabotage, it was absolutely inevitable that adventurers and other pernicious elements should hitch themselves to the ruling party. There never has been, and there never can be, a revolution without that. The whole point is that the ruling party should be able, relying on a sound and strong advanced class, to purge its ranks.

We started this work long ago. It must be continued steadily and untiringly. The mobilisation of Communists for the war helped us in this respect: the cowards and scoundrels fled from the Party's ranks. Good riddance! *Such* a reduction in the Party's membership means an *enormous increase* in its strength and weight. We must continue the purge, and that new beginning, the "communist subbotniks", must be utilised for this purpose: members should be accepted into the Party only after six months', say, "trial", or "probation", at "working in a revolutionary way". A similar test should be demanded of *all* members of the Party who joined after October 25, 1917, and who have not proved by some special work or service that they are absolutely reliable, loyal and capable of being Communists.

The purging of the Party, through the steadily *increasing demands* it makes in regard to working in a genuinely communist way, will improve the state *apparatus* and will

bring much nearer the *final transition* of the peasants to the side of the revolutionary proletariat.

Incidentally, the "communist subbotniks" have thrown a remarkably strong light on the class character of the state apparatus under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Central Committee of the Party drafts a letter on "working in a revolutionary way".[70] The idea is suggested by the Central Committee of a party with from 100,000 to 200,000 members (I assume that that is the number that will remain after a thorough purging; at present the membership is larger).

The idea is taken up by the workers organised in trade unions. In Russia and the Ukraine they number about four million. The overwhelming majority of them are for the state power of the proletariat, for proletarian dictatorship. Two hundred thousand and four million—such is the ratio of the "gear-wheels", if one may so express it. Then follow the *tens of millions* of peasants, who are divided into three main groups: the most numerous and the one standing closest to the proletariat is that of the semi-proletarians or poor peasants; then come the middle peasants, and lastly the numerically very small group of kulaks or rural bourgeoisie.

As long as it is possible to trade in grain and to make profit out of famine, the peasant will remain (and this will for some time be inevitable under the dictatorship of the proletariat) a semi-working man, a semi-profiteer. As a profiteer he is hostile to us, hostile to the proletarian state; he is inclined to agree with the bourgeoisie and their faithful lackeys, up to and including the Menshevik Sher or the Socialist-Revolutionary B. Chernenkov, who stand for freedom to trade in grain. But *as a working man*, the peasant is a friend of the proletarian state, a most loyal ally of the worker in the struggle against the landowner and against the capitalist. As working men, the peasants, the vast mass of them, the peasant millions, support the state "machine" which is headed by the one or two hundred thousand Communists of the proletarian vanguard, and which consists of millions of organised proletarians.

A state more democratic, in the true sense of the word, one more closely connected with the working and exploited people, has *never yet existed.*

It is precisely proletarian work such as that put into "communist subbotniks" that will win the complete respect and love of peasants for the proletarian state. Such work and such work alone will completely convince the peasant that we are right, that communism is right, and make him our devoted ally, and, hence, will lead to the complete elimination of our food difficulties, to the complete victory of communism over capitalism in the matter of the production and distribution of grain, to the unqualified consolidation of communism.

June 28, 1919

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Smolny, Petrograd

Ekaterinoslav captured. Desperate munitions situation in the South. Since you have received three million cartridges and the stocks at Vidlitsa[71] you must exercise the greatest economy of cartridges and other munitions.

Lenin

Written June 30, 1919
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the telegraph form

ALL OUT FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST DENIKIN!

LETTER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) TO PARTY ORGANISATIONS

Comrades,

This is one of the most critical, probably even the most critical moment for the socialist revolution. Those who defend the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, in Russia and abroad (primarily in Britain and France) are making a desperate effort to restore the power of those who seize the results of the people's labour, the landowners and exploiters of Russia, in order to bolster up their power, which is waning all over the world. The British and French capitalists have failed in their plan to conquer the Ukraine using their own troops; they have failed in their support of Kolchak in Siberia; the Red Army, heroically advancing in the Urals with the help of the Urals workers who are rising to a man, is nearing Siberia to liberate it from the incredible tyranny and brutality of the capitalists who rule there. Lastly, the British and French imperialists have failed in their plan to seize Petrograd by means of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy with the participation of Russian monarchists, Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (not excluding even Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).

The foreign capitalists are now making a desperate effort to restore the yoke of capital by means of an onslaught by Denikin, whom they have supplied with officers, shells, tanks, etc., etc., as they once did Kolchak.

All the forces of the workers and peasants, all the forces of the Soviet Republic, must be harnessed to repulse Denikin's onslaught and to defeat him, without checking the Red Army's victorious advance into the Urals and Siberia.

That is the

MAIN TASK OF THE MOMENT

All Communists first and foremost, all sympathisers with them, all honest workers and peasants, all Soviet officials must *pull themselves together like soldiers* and concentrate *to the maximum their work*, their efforts and their concern *directly on the tasks of the war*, on the speedy repulse of Denikin's attack, curtailing and rearranging all their other activities to allow for this task.

The Soviet Republic is besieged by the enemy. It must become *a single military camp*, not in word but in deed.

All the work of all institutions must be adapted to the war and placed on a military footing!

Collegiate methods are essential for the conduct of the affairs of the workers' and peasants' state. But any expansion of these methods, any distortion of them resulting in red tape and irresponsibility, any conversion of collegiate bodies into talk-shops is a supreme evil, an evil which must be halted at all costs as quickly as possible and by whatever the means.

Collegiate methods must not exceed an absolutely indispensable minimum in respect both to the number of members in the committees and to the efficient conduct of work; "speechifying" must be prohibited, opinions must be exchanged as rapidly as possible and confined to information and precisely formulated practical proposals.

Whenever there is the slightest possibility, such methods must be reduced to the briefest discussion of only the most important questions in the narrowest collegiate bodies, while the *practical management* of institutions, enterprises, undertakings or tasks should be entrusted *to one comrade*, known for his firmness, resolution, boldness and ability to conduct practical affairs and who enjoys the greatest confidence. At any rate, and under all circumstances without exception, collegiate management must be accompanied by the precisest definition of the personal responsibility of *every* individual for a *precisely* defined job. To refer to collegiate methods as an excuse for irresponsibility is a most dangerous evil, threatening all who have not had very extensive experience in efficient collective work; in the army

it all too often leads to inevitable disaster, chaos, panic, division of authority and defeat.

A no less dangerous evil is organisational fuss or organisational fantasies. The reorganisation of work necessitated by the war must under no circumstances lead to the reorganisation of institutions, still less to the hasty formation of new institutions. That is absolutely impermissible and would only lead to chaos. The reorganisation of work should consist in suspending for a time institutions which are not absolutely essential, or in reducing their size to a certain extent. But all war work must be conducted *entirely and exclusively through already existing* military institutions, by improving, strengthening, expanding and supporting them. The creation of special "defence committees" or "revcoms" (revolutionary or revolutionary military committees) is permissible, first, only by way of exception, secondly, only with the approval of the military authority concerned or the superior Soviet authority, and, thirdly, only provided this last condition is complied with.

THE TRUTH ABOUT KOLCHAK AND DENIKIN MUST BE EXPLAINED TO THE PEOPLE

Kolchak and Denikin are the chief, and the only serious, enemies of the Soviet Republic. If it were not for the help they are getting from the Entente (Britain, France, America) they would have collapsed long ago. It is only the help of the Entente which makes them strong. Nevertheless, they are still forced to deceive the people, to pretend from time to time that they support "democracy", a "constituent assembly", "government by the people", etc. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are only too willing to be duped.

The truth about Kolchak (and his double, Denikin) has now been revealed in full. The shooting of *tens of thousands* of workers. The shooting even of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The flogging of peasants of entire districts. The public flogging of women. The absolutely unbridled power of the officers, the sons of landowners. Endless looting. Such is the truth about Kolchak and Denikin. Increasing

numbers of people even among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who themselves betrayed the workers and sided with Kolchak and Denikin, are forced to admit this truth.

All our agitation and propaganda must serve to inform the people of the truth. It must be explained that the alternative is either Kolchak and Denikin or Soviet power, the power (dictatorship) of the workers. There is no middle course; there can be no middle course. Particular use must be made of the testimony of non-Bolshevik eyewitnesses, of Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and non-party people who *have been* in the areas overrun by Kolchak or Denikin. Let every worker and peasant know what the issue of the struggle is, what awaits him in the event of a victory for Kolchak or Denikin.

WORK AMONG MEN CALLED UP FOR SERVICE

One of our chief concerns must now be work among those liable to mobilisation, in aid of mobilisation, and among those already mobilised. Wherever mobilised men are concentrated, or where there are garrisons, and especially training depots, etc., every single Communist and sympathiser must be brought into action. They must all without exception unite and work, some daily, others, say, four or eight hours per week, in aid of mobilisation and among mobilised men, among the soldiers of the local garrison; it must be done in a properly organised manner, of course, each person being assigned appropriate work by the local Party organisation and the military authorities.

Non-party people or members of parties other than the Communist Party are naturally not in a position to carry on ideological work against Denikin or Kolchak. But to release them for that reason from all work would be impermissible. Every means must be sought that would compel the whole population (and the *wealthier sections*, both in town and country, in the first place) to contribute their share, in one form or another, to help mobilisation or the mobilised.

Measures to further the quickest and most effective training of the mobilised should form a special category of aid. The Soviet government is calling up all ex-officers,

non-commissioned officers, etc. The Communist Party, as well as all sympathisers and all workers, must assist the workers' and peasants' state, first, by helping to round up all ex-officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., who do not report for service, and, secondly, by organising, under the control of the Party organisation or attached to it, groups of those who have had theoretical or practical (e.g., in the imperialist war) military training and who are capable of doing their share.

WORK AMONG DESERTERS

An obvious change for the better has latterly taken place in the fight against desertion. In a number of gubernias deserters have begun to return to the army en masse; it is no exaggeration to say that deserters are flocking to the Red Army. The reasons are, first, that Party comrades are working more efficiently and systematically, and, secondly, the peasants' growing realisation that Kolchak and Denikin mean the restoration of a regime which is worse than the tsarist, the restoration of *slavery* for the workers and peasants, and of floggings, robbery and insults on the part of the officers and scions of the nobility.

We must therefore everywhere lay special stress on the work among deserters to bring them back into the army, and must *spare no effort* in this work. That is one of the primary and urgent tasks of the day.

Incidentally, the fact that deserters can be influenced by persuasion and that the persuasion can be *effective* shows that the workers' state has a *special* attitude towards the peasants, and in this it differs from the landowner or capitalist state The rule of the bludgeon or the rule of hunger—that is what constitutes the sole source of discipline of the latter two forms of state. A *different* source of discipline is possible in the case of the workers' state, or the dictatorship of the proletariat—that of persuasion of the peasants by the workers, a comradely alliance between them. When you hear the accounts of eyewitnesses that in such-and-such a gubernia (Ryazan, for instance) thousands upon thousands of deserters are returning voluntarily, that the appeal at meetings to "comrades deserters" sometimes has a success

which beggars all description, you begin to realise how much untapped *strength* there is in this comradely alliance between workers and peasants. The peasant has his *prejudice*, which makes him inclined to support the capitalist, the Socialist-Revolutionary, and "freedom to trade", but he also has his *sound judgement*, which is impelling him more and more towards an alliance with the workers.

DIRECT AID TO THE ARMY

What our army needs most is *supplies*—clothing, footwear, arms, shells. With the country impoverished as it is, an immense effort has to be made to satisfy the army's needs, and it is only the assistance which the capitalist robbers of Britain, France and America are so lavishly rendering Kolchak and Denikin that saves them from inevitable disaster due to shortage of supplies.

But impoverished though Russia is, she still has endless resources which we have not yet utilised, and often have shown *no ability* to utilise. There are still many undisclosed or uninspected military stores, plenty of production potentialities which are being overlooked, partly owing to the deliberate sabotage of officials, partly owing to red tape, bureaucracy, inefficiency and incompetence—all those "sins of the past" which so inevitably and so drastically weigh upon every revolution which makes a "leap" into a new social order.

Direct aid to the army in this respect is particularly important. The institutions in charge of it are particularly in need of "fresh blood", of outside assistance, of the voluntary, vigorous and heroic *initiative* of the workers and peasants *in the localities*.

We must appeal as widely as possible to the initiative of all class-conscious workers and peasants, and of all Soviet officials; we must test in different localities and in different fields of work *different* forms of assistance to the army in this respect. "Work in a revolutionary way" is far less in evidence here than in other spheres, yet "work in a revolutionary way" is needed here *far more*.

The collection of arms from the population is an integral part of this work. It is natural that plenty of arms should

have been hidden by the peasants and the bourgeoisie in a country which has been through four years of imperialist war followed by two people's revolutions—it was inevitable that this should happen. But we must combat it *with all our might* now, in face of Denikin's menacing onslaught whoever conceals or helps to conceal arms is guilty of a grave crime against the workers and peasants and deserves to be shot, for he is responsible for the death of thousands upon thousands of the finest Red Army men, who not infrequently perish only because of a shortage of arms at the fronts.

The Petrograd comrades succeeded in unearthing thousands and thousands of rifles when they conducted mass searches in a strictly organised way. The rest of Russia must not lag behind Petrograd and must at all costs overtake and outstrip it.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the largest numbers of rifles are hidden by the peasants, and often without the least evil intention, but solely from an ingrained distrust of any "state", etc. If we have been able to do much, very much (in the best gubernias) by means of *persuasion*, skilful agitation and a proper approach to get deserters to return to the Red Army voluntarily, there can be no doubt that just as much, if not more, can be done, and should be done, to secure a voluntary return of arms.

Workers and peasants, look for concealed rifles and turn them over to the army! By doing so you will save yourselves from being massacred, shot, flogged wholesale and robbed by Kolchak and Denikin!

CURTAILMENT OF WORK NOT FOR THE WAR

To carry out even a part of the work briefly outlined above we shall need more and more workers, drawn, moreover, from the ranks of the most reliable, devoted and energetic Communists. But where are they to come from, bearing in mind the universal complaints about the dearth of such workers and the over-fatigue they are suffering from?

There can be no doubt that these complaints are largely justified. If anyone were to gauge exactly how thin is that stratum of advanced workers and Communists who with the support and sympathy of the worker and peasant masses

have administered Russia in these last twenty months, it would seem truly incredible. Yet we administered with signal success, building socialism, overcoming unparalleled difficulties, and vanquishing enemies, directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie, that raised their heads everywhere. We have already vanquished all enemies except one—the Entente, the all-powerful imperialist bourgeoisie of Britain, France and America. And we have broken one of the arms of this enemy too—Kolchak. We are only threatened by his other arm—Denikin.

Fresh labour-power for the administration of the state and to carry out the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat are rapidly emerging in the shape of the worker and peasant youth who are most earnestly, zealously and fervidly learning, digesting the new impressions of the new order, throwing off the husk of old, capitalist and bourgeois-democratic prejudices, and moulding themselves into even firmer Communists than the older generation.

But however rapidly this new stratum may be emerging, however rapidly it may be learning and maturing in the fire of the Civil War and the frantic resistance of the bourgeoisie, all the same it cannot, in the next few months, supply us with a *trained* staff for the administration of the state. Yet it is precisely the next few months, the summer and autumn of 1919, that count, for it is essential *to decide* the struggle against Denikin, and it must be done *immediately*.

In order to obtain a large number of well-trained workers to strengthen the war effort we must *reduce in size* a whole number of branches and institutions, not doing war work, or, rather, those not directly connected with the war, but doing Soviet work; we must *reorganise* on these lines (i.e., on the lines of reduction) all institutions and enterprises which are *not absolutely indispensable*.

Take, as a case in point, the Scientific and Technological Department of the Supreme Economic Council. This is a highly valuable institution, one indispensable for the building of full-scale socialism and to account for and distribute all our scientific and technological forces properly. But is such an institution absolutely indispensable? Of course not. To assign to it people who could and should be immedi-

ately employed in urgent and absolutely indispensable communist work *in the army* or *directly* for the army would, at the present juncture, be a downright crime.

There are quite a number of such institutions and departments of institutions in the centre and in the localities. In our efforts to achieve socialism in full we had to begin to set up such institutions immediately. But we would be fools or criminals, if, in the face of Denikin's formidable attack, we were unable to *reform our ranks* in such a way as to *suspend* or *reduce everything* that is not absolutely indispensable.

We must not give way to panic or succumb to the organisational urge and must not reorganise any institutions nor close them down altogether nor—which is particularly harmful when being done in haste—must we begin to build new institutions. What we must do is to *suspend* for three, four or five months *all* institutions or departments of institutions, both in the centre and in the localities, which are not absolutely indispensable, or, if it is not possible to suspend them altogether, *reduce* them for the same (approximately) period, reduce them to the greatest possible extent, in other words, reduce the work to an absolutely indispensable minimum.

Inasmuch as our main purpose is to secure at once a large number of well-trained, experienced, devoted and tested Communists or socialist sympathisers for military work, we can incur the risk of temporarily leaving many of the heavily curtailed institutions (or departments of institutions) *without a single Communist*, of placing them exclusively in the hands of bourgeois executives. That is not a big risk, for it is only institutions which are not absolutely indispensable that are involved, and while there will certainly be a loss from the weakening of their (semi-suspended) activities, it will not be a great loss, and one which at any rate will not be fatal to us. Whereas insufficient energy in strengthening war work, and strengthening it immediately and considerably, may prove fatal to us. This must be clearly understood and all the necessary conclusions drawn from it.

If every manager of a government department or of a division of a government department in every gubernia, uyezd,

etc., if every Communist nucleus, without losing a moment, asks, is such-and-such an institution, such-and-such a department absolutely indispensable, shall we perish if we suspend it or reduce its activities by nine-tenths and leave no Communists in it at all?—if the posing of this question is followed by speedy and resolute reduction of work and withdrawal of Communists (together with their absolutely reliable assistants among the sympathisers or non-party people), in a very short time we shall have hundreds upon hundreds of persons for work in the political departments of the army, as commissars, etc. And then we shall have a very good chance of defeating Denikin, just as we have defeated the much stronger Kolchak.

WORK IN THE FRONT ZONE

The front zone in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic has greatly increased in the past few weeks and has undergone an extremely rapid change. This is a harbinger or concomitant of the decisive moment of the war, of its approaching concluding phase.

On the one hand, a vast front zone west of the Urals and in the Ural Mountains proper has become our front zone owing to the victories of the Red Army, the disintegration of Kolchak, and the growth of revolution in Kolchakia. On the other hand, *an even larger* zone near Petrograd and in the South has become a front zone owing to our losses, owing to the immense advance made by the enemy towards Petrograd and the advance from the South into the Ukraine and towards the centre of Russia.

Work in the front zone is assuming cardinal importance.

In the Cis-Urals area, where the Red Army, is rapidly advancing, there is a natural desire among army workers—commissars, members of political departments, etc.—as well as among local workers and peasants, to settle down in the newly won localities for constructive Soviet work, a desire which is the more natural, the greater the war fatigue and the more distressful the picture of the destruction wrought by Kolchak. But nothing could be more dangerous than to yield to this desire. It would threaten to weaken our offensive, to retard it, and to increase Kolchak's chances of

recovering his strength. It would be a downright crime against the revolution on our part.

Under no circumstances must a single extra worker be taken from the Eastern Army for local work!* Under no circumstances can the offensive be weakened! The only chance we have of complete victory is for the entire population of the Urals area, who have experienced the horrors of Kolchak "democracy", to take part in it to a man, and to continue the offensive into Siberia until the *complete victory* of the revolution in Siberia.

Let organisational work in the Cis-Urals and the Urals area be delayed, let it proceed less intensively, being done by local, young, inexperienced and weak forces alone. We shall not perish from that. But if we *weaken* the offensive against the Urals and Siberia *we shall perish*. We must *strengthen* that offensive with the forces of the insurgent workers in the Urals, with the forces of the Cis-Urals peasants, who have now learned to their cost the meaning of the "constituent" promises of the Menshevik Maisky and the Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov, and the real meaning of these promises, *i.e.*, *Kolchak*.

To weaken the offensive against the Urals and Siberia would be to betray the revolution, to betray the cause of the emancipation of the workers and peasants from the Kolchak yoke.

It should be remembered in connection with the work in the front zone which has only just been liberated that the main task there is to make not only the workers, but the peasants as well, put their faith in Soviet power, to explain to them in practice that Soviet power means the power of the workers and peasants, and at once to take the right course, the course adopted by the Party from the experience of twenty months of work. We must not repeat in the Urals the mistakes which were sometimes made in Great Russia and which we are rapidly learning to avoid.

In the front zone outside Petrograd and in that vast front zone which has been growing so rapidly and menacingly in the Ukraine and in the South, absolutely everything

* Unless there is urgent need none at all should be taken, but people should be transferred from the central gubernias!

must be put on a war footing, and all work, all efforts, all thoughts subordinated to the war and only the war. Otherwise it will be impossible to repulse Denikin's attack. That is clear. And this must be clearly understood and fully put into practice.

Incidentally. A feature of Denikin's army is the large number of officers and Cossacks in it. This is an element which, having no mass force behind it, is extremely likely to engage in swift raids, in gambles, in desperate ventures, with the object of sowing panic and causing destruction for destruction's sake.

In fighting such a foe military discipline and military vigilance of the highest degree are necessary. To be caught napping or to lose one's head means losing everything. Every responsible Party and Soviet worker must bear this in mind.

Military discipline in military and all other matters!

Military vigilance and strictness, and firmness in the adoption of all measures of precaution!

ATTITUDE TOWARDS MILITARY EXPERTS

The vast conspiracy hatched at Krasnaya Gorka and whose purpose was the surrender of Petrograd has again brought forward and with particular emphasis the question of the military experts and of combating counter-revolution in the rear. There can be no doubt that the aggravation of the food and war situation is inevitably stimulating, and will continue to stimulate in the immediate future, still greater efforts by the counter-revolutionaries (in the Petrograd plot there participated the League of Regeneration, Cadets, Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries; the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries also participated, as a separate group, it is true, but they did participate nevertheless). Nor can there be any doubt that the military experts, like the kulaks, the bourgeois intellectuals, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, will in the near future give a bigger proportion of traitors.

But it would be an irreparable mistake and unpardonable weakness of character to raise on this account the question

of changing the fundamental principles of our army policy. Hundreds and hundreds of military experts are betraying us and will betray us; we will catch them and shoot them, but thousands and tens of thousands of military experts have been working for us systematically and for a long time, and without them we could not have formed the Red Army, which has grown out of the guerrilla force of evil memory, and has been able to score brilliant victories in the East. Experienced people who head our War Department rightly point out that where the Party policy in regard to the military experts and the extirpation of the guerrilla spirit has been adhered to most strictly, where discipline is firmest, where political work among the troops and the work of the commissars is conducted most thoroughly, there, generally speaking, the number of military experts inclined to betray us is the lowest, there the opportunities for those who are so inclined to carry out their designs are the slightest, there we have no laxity in the army, there its organisation and morale are best, and there we have the most victories. The guerrilla spirit, its vestiges, remnants and survivals have been the cause of immeasurably greater misfortune, disintegration, defeats, disasters and losses in men and military equipment in our army and in the Ukrainian army than all the betrayals of the military experts.

Our Party Programme, both on the general subject of bourgeois experts, and on the particular problem of one of their varieties, the military experts, has defined the policy of the Communist Party with absolute precision. Our Party is waging and will continue to wage "a relentless struggle against the pseudo-radical but actually ignorant and conceited opinion that the working people are capable of overcoming capitalism and the bourgeois social system without learning from bourgeois specialists, without making use of their services and without undergoing the *training of a lengthy period* of work side by side with them".

At the same time, of course, the Party does not make the "slightest political concession to this bourgeois section of the population", the Party suppresses and will continue "ruthlessly to suppress any counter-revolutionary attempts on its part". Naturally, whenever such an "attempt" is made or becomes more or less probable, its "ruthless

suppression" requires other qualities than the deliberateness, the cautiousness of an apprentice, which are demanded for lengthy training, and which the latter inculcates. The contradiction between the attitude of people engaged in the "lengthy period of work side by side" with the military experts, and the attitude of people absorbed in the direct task of "ruthlessly suppressing a counter-revolutionary attempt" of military experts might easily lead, and does lead, to friction and conflict. The same applies to the necessary changes of personnel, the shifting around sometimes of large numbers of military experts which is necessitated by instances of counter-revolutionary "attempts", and all the more by large-scale conspiracies.

We settle, and will continue to settle, such friction and conflicts in the Party way, demanding the same of all the Party organisations and insisting that not the slightest damage to practical work, not the slightest delay in the adoption of essential measures, not a shadow of hesitation in the observance of the established principles of our military policy be tolerated.

If some of our Party bodies adopt an incorrect tone towards the military experts (as was recently the case in Petrograd), or if in some cases "criticism" of military experts turns into direct hindrance to the systematic and persistent work of employing them, the Party immediately rectifies, and will rectify, such mistakes.

The chief and principal means of rectifying them is to intensify political work in the army and among the mobilised, to improve the work of the commissars in the army, to have more highly qualified commissars, to raise their level, to have them carry out *in practice* that which the Party Programme demands and which only too often is carried out far too inadequately, i.e., "the concentration of *all-round* control over the commanders (of the army) in the hands of the working class". Criticism of the military experts by outsiders, attempts to correct matters by "lightning raids" are too easy, and therefore hopeless and harmful. All those who recognise their political responsibility, who take the defects of our army to heart, let them join its ranks, either as privates or commanders, as political workers or commissars; let each work—every Party member will find a place

suited to his abilities—inside the army organisation for its improvement.

The Soviet government has long been paying the greatest attention to making it possible for workers, and also peasants, Communists in particular, to master the art of war in all seriousness. This is being done at a number of establishments, institutions and courses, but still far too little is being done. There is still a lot of room here for personal initiative and personal energy. Communists, in particular, should persistently study the handling of machine-guns, artillery, armoured vehicles, etc., for here our backwardness is more telling, here the enemy's superiority, with his larger number of officers, is greater, here it is possible for an unreliable military expert to do grave harm, here the role of the Communist is important in the extreme.

THE FIGHT AGAINST COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN THE REAR

Counter-revolution is raising its head in our rear and in our midst just as it did in July of last year.

Counter-revolution has been defeated, but by no means destroyed, and is naturally taking advantage of Denikin's victories and of the aggravation of the food shortage. And, as always, in the wake of direct and open counter-revolution, in the wake of the Black Hundreds and the Cadets, whose strength lies in their capital, their direct connections with Entente imperialism, and their understanding of the inevitability of dictatorship and their ability to exercise it (on Kolchak lines)—in their wake follow the wavering, spineless Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who embellish their deeds with words.

There should be no illusions on this score! What is the "nutritive medium" which engenders counter-revolutionary activities, outbreaks, conspiracies and so forth we know full well. The medium is the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intelligentsia, the kulaks in the countryside, and, everywhere, the "non-party" public, as well as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. We must redouble, we must increase tenfold our watch over this medium. We

must multiply tenfold our vigilance, because counter-revolutionary attempts from this quarter are absolutely inevitable, precisely at the present moment and in the near future. For this reason, too, repeated attempts to blow up bridges, to foment strikes, to engage in every kind of espionage and the like, are natural. All precautions of the most intense, systematic, repeated, wholesale and unexpected kind are essential in all centres without exception where the "nutritive medium" of the counter-revolutionaries has the least chance of existing.

In regard to the Mensheviks and the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, we must draw a lesson from our most recent experience. Among their "periphery", among the public which gravitates towards them, there is an undoubted shifting away from Kolchak and Denikin towards Soviet power. We have taken cognisance of this shift, and every time it has assumed any real shape we, on our part, have taken a step to meet it. This policy of ours we shall not change under any circumstances, and generally speaking, there will no doubt be an increase in the number of "migrants" from the type of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism which leans towards Kolchak and Denikin to the type of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism which leans towards Soviet power.

But at the present juncture the petty-bourgeois democrats, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, spineless and wavering as always, are watching to see which way the wind blows, and are swinging in the direction of the victor, Denikin. This is especially true of the "political leaders" of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Mensheviks (of the type of Martov and Co.), of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries (of the type of Chernov and Co.), and of their "literary groups" in general, whose members, apart from all else, are deeply offended at their political bankruptcy, and for whom hazardous ventures against Soviet power, therefore, have an attraction that is hardly likely to be eradicated.

We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the words and ideology of their leaders, by their personal integrity or hypocrisy. This is important from the standpoint of their individual biographies. But it is not important from

the standpoint of politics, i.e., of the relations between classes, of the relations between millions of people. Martov and Co., "in the name of the Central Committee", solemnly condemn their "activists" and threaten (eternally threaten!) to expel them from the party. But this by no means does away with the fact that the "activists" are the strongest of all among the Mensheviks, hide behind them, and carry on their work on behalf of Kolchak and Denikin. Volsky and Co. condemn Avksentyev, Chernov and Co., but this does not in the least prevent the latter from being stronger than Volsky, nor does it prevent Chernov from saying, "If it is not we who are to overthrow the Bolsheviks, and not now, then who is, and when?" The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries may "work independently" without any agreement with the reactionaries, with the Chernovs, but actually they are just as much allies of Denikin and pawns in *his* game as the late Left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov, the ex-commander-in-chief, who for "ideological" reasons opened the front to the Czechoslovaks and to Kolchak.

Martov, Volsky and Co. fancy themselves "superior" to both contending sides; they fancy themselves capable of creating a "third side".

This desire, even when it is sincere, still remains the illusion of the petty-bourgeois democrat, who to this day, seventy years after 1848, has still not learned the most elementary thing, namely, that in a capitalist environment only the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat is possible, and that no third course can exist. Martov and Co. will evidently die with this illusion. That is their affair. And it is our affair to remember that in practice vacillations on the part of these people are inevitable, today in the direction of Denikin, tomorrow in the direction of the Bolsheviks. And today we must do the task of *this* day.

Our task is to put the question bluntly. What is better? To ferret out, to imprison, sometimes even to shoot hundreds of traitors from among the Cadets, non-party people, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who "come out" (some with arms in hand, others with conspiracies, others still with agitation against mobilisation, like the Menshevik printers and railwaymen, etc.) *against* Soviet power,

in other words, *in favour of Denikin*? Or to allow matters to reach such a pass that Kolchak and Denikin are able to slaughter, shoot and flog to death tens of thousands of workers and peasants? The choice is not difficult to make.

That is how the question stands, and not otherwise. Whoever has not yet understood this, whoever is capable of whining over the "iniquity" of such a decision, must be given up as hopeless and held up to public ridicule and shame.

THE POPULATION MUST BE MOBILISED FOR WAR TO A MAN

The Soviet Republic is a fortress besieged by world capital. We can concede the right to use it as a refuge from Kolchak, and the right to live in it generally, only to those who take an active part in the war and help us in every way. Hence our right and our duty to mobilise the whole population for the war to a man, some for army work in the direct meaning of the term, others for subsidiary activities of every kind in aid of the war.

To carry this out in full, an ideal organisation is required. And since our government organisation is very far from perfect (which is not in the least surprising in view of its youth, its novelty and the extraordinary difficulties which accompany its development), to attempt at once and on a wide scale anything complete or even very considerable in this sphere would be a most dangerous indulgence in fantastic organisational schemes.

But much can be done in a partial way to bring us nearer to this ideal, and the "initiative" shown by our Party workers and Soviet officials in this respect is very, very far from enough.

It will suffice here to raise this question and to draw the attention of comrades to it. There is no need to give any specific instructions or proposals.

Let us only observe that the petty-bourgeois democrats who stand nearest to the Soviets and who call themselves, by force of habit, socialists—some of the "Left" Mensheviks and the like, for example—are particularly disposed to wax

indignant at the"barbaric", in their opinion, practice of taking hostages.

Let them wax indignant, but unless this is done war can not be waged, and when the danger grows acute the use of this means must be extended and multiplied in every sense. Not infrequently, for instance, Menshevik or yellow printers, higher railway employees or secret profiteers, kulaks, the wealthy sections of the urban (and rural) population and similar elements look upon defence against Kolchak and Denikin with an infinitely criminal and infinitely brazen attitude of indifference which grows into sabotage. Lists of such groups must be drawn up (or they must be compelled themselves to form groups in which each answers for everybody), and they must not only be put to work digging trenches, as is sometimes practised, but assigned to the most diverse and comprehensive duties for material aid to the Red Army.

The fields of the Red Army men will be better cultivated, the supply of food, tobacco and other necessities to the Red Army men will be better arranged, the danger to the lives of thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants resulting from a single conspiracy, etc., will be considerably reduced if we employ this method more widely, more comprehensively and more skilfully.

"WORK IN A REVOLUTIONARY WAY"

Summing up what was said above, we arrive at a simple conclusion. What is demanded immediately and in the course of the next few months of all Communists, of all class-conscious workers and peasants, of everyone who does not want to see Kolchak and Denikin win, is an extraordinary accession of energy; what is needed is "work in a revolutionary way".

The starving, exhausted and worn-out Moscow railwaymen, both skilled and unskilled, have for the sake of victory over Kolchak inaugurated "communist subbotniks"—work without pay for several hours a week to continue until victory over Kolchak is complete—and have, moreover, developed unprecedented labour productivity, exceeding the

usual productivity many times over; this goes to show that much, very much can still be done.

And we must do it.

Then we shall win.

Central Committee
of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

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THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF SOVIET POWER

REPORT DELIVERED TO A JOINT MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES, THE ALL-RUSSIA COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF MOSCOW FACTORY COMMITTEES JULY 4, 1919[72]

Comrades, when one is confronted with the task of assessing our general situation as it now is, the idea enters one's head, whether one wishes it or not, of comparing July 1919 with July 1918. I think that such a comparison, which naturally suggests itself, can best give us a true conception of those new difficulties—to a certain extent they are also old difficulties—which have grown up and have made our situation a burdensome one demanding a fresh effort; on the other hand this comparison shows us the tremendous step forward that has been made by the world revolution in that year and tells us why, taking a most sober, even a most sceptical view of affairs, we again are quite confident that we are advancing to the complete and final victory.

Recall the situation a year ago, comrades. It was in July 1918 that the menacing black clouds had gathered and that seemingly insurmountable misfortunes threatened the Soviet Republic. The food situation, then as today, had become graver at the end of the farming year, when stocks were running short and the new harvest had not been gathered. Last year the situation was incomparably worse. Then, as today, serious political and war difficulties, both at home and abroad, were added to the food difficulties. The meeting of the Congress of Soviets last year coincided with the revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow and the trea-

son of Muravyov, a Left Socialist-Revolutionary then in command of the army, who left our front almost open. In the summer of 1918 there was the gigantic plot in Yaroslavl which, as has now been proved and is admitted by those participating, was due to the activities of French Ambassador Noulens, who persuaded Savinkov to organise the plot with a guarantee that the French troops landed at Archangel would come to the aid of Yaroslavl and that in the most difficult situation in Yaroslavl the town could expect to link with Archangel and the Allies and, consequently, could expect the early fall of Moscow. At that time the enemy succeeded in capturing Samara, Kazan, Simbirsk, Syzran and Saratov in the East. In the South, Cossack troops reinforced by German imperialism—this has been fully established—obtained money and munitions. The enemy launched an offensive, closed in on us from two sides and began to poke fun at us. From German imperialist quarters it was said that if we could not defeat the Czechoslovaks how could we hope to defeat them. Such was the insolent tone adopted by the imperialists.

Such was the seemingly hopeless way in which the Soviet Republic was surrounded at a time of unprecedented food troubles, at a time when our army was only just beginning to take shape. The army lacked organisation and experience and we had to get it together hastily, contingent by contingent, when systematic, integrated work was out of the question. We lived through that year and, relying on the experience gained and never once forgetting the past, we have every right to say today that although the situation is indeed a difficult one, if we compare what we experienced last year with the present situation—anyone who wishes to make a careful study of it, observe and not give way to his own moods will have no doubts about it—we shall see that our present situation is incomparably more stable even from the point of view of the simple internal balance of forces, even by comparing the facts bearing on our temporary difficulties, and to give way to panic would be criminal a thousand times over. A year ago the situation was incomparably more difficult yet those difficulties were surmounted, so that we may say with absolute confidence and without any exaggeration of our forces or underestimation of our difficulties

that we shall also surmount our present difficulties. I must give you the main comparable figures and speakers who follow me will deal with the question in greater detail.

When the food situation became acute last summer, things were so bad that in July and August there was literally nothing in the warehouses of the Commissariat of Food, the organisation which deals with food supplies, nothing which could be issued to the most war-weary, the most tormented and the most hungry people of the towns and the non-agricultural districts. This year our food distribution machinery has made a tremendous advance. During the year from August 1, 1917 to August 1, 1918 we procured only 30 million poods of grain but between August 1, 1918 and May 1, 1919 we procured as much as 100 million poods. This is very little compared with what we need, and it shows that to win a victory in the struggle for food there are millions of organisational obstacles that have to be overcome; they are being erected against us by every peasant who has grain surpluses and who is used to trading in a free market and who considers it his sacred right to sell grain at uncontrolled prices; this peasant is unable to understand that at such a time, when the country is fighting against Russian and international capital, trading in grain is the most serious state crime. It is a mockery of the poor and the hungry, it is the best service he could do the capitalist and the profiteer. We know that every peasant who has earned his livelihood by toil, sweat and blood, by bending his back, understands what capitalism is. He sympathises with the proletariat, even if only hazily, instinctively, because he sees that the proletariat are devoting their whole lives and forfeiting their blood to overthrow capital. But he will have to make tremendous progress from this level before he is able to uphold the interests of the socialist state and to place those interests higher than the interests of the huckster who wants to profit right now while he can sell grain at unheard-of, unprecedented prices. We are now beginning to get the measure of it. We have made part of the journey and, therefore, know for certain that no matter how difficult and tortuous the road, we are capable of surmounting the difficulties. We have made considerable progress as compared with last year but we have not yet solved all prob-

lems. We cannot promise an immediate improvement, but we know that the situation offers much greater hopes; we now know at any rate that our resources are not cut off as they were last year by Cossack gangs in the South-East, by German imperialism in the South-West and by the Czechoslovaks in the grain-producing East. The situation is much better so that we shall be able to live through and overcome the next few weeks that will undoubtedly bring fresh burdens and claim fresh sacrifices knowing that we did it last year, knowing that our situation is better, knowing that we already have practical experience of the chief difficulty of any socialist revolution, the food difficulty. And we really can say, without relying on assumptions and hopes, but on the basis of our own practical experience, that we have learned to tackle this difficulty and will learn to surmount it.

If you take the present war situation in which the Allies collapsed when they seized the Ukraine after the Germans and when they had Odessa and Sevastopol, we see that the threat which seemed irrevocable to the mass of the petty bourgeoisie and to the scared philistines turned out to be an empty one, that it was nothing more than a giant with feet of clay. They did everything they could to help the whiteguards, landowners and capitalists with arms and ammunition. The British newspapers—and British ministers, too—boasted openly that they had sent reinforcements to Denikin. We have received information that they have sent equipment for 250,000 men and have provided all the arms. We have also received information, and it has been confirmed, to the effect that they have sent dozens of tanks. That made possible the severe attacks by Denikin that were launched at a time when the enemy was pressing on us from the East. We know the difficult time we experienced last July. We do not in the least underestimate the danger and do not close our eyes to the fact that we must go openly to the masses, we must tell them what the situation is, tell them the whole truth and open their eyes, because the more this truth is known to the workers and particularly to the peasants—it is very difficult to convince peasants of the truth—the more determinedly, more steadfastly and class-consciously will they come over to our side. (*Applause.*)

In the Central Committee, comrades, we yesterday decided that Comrade Trotsky would make the report to you on the war situation. Unfortunately the doctors today forbade him absolutely to make that report. I shall, therefore, outline the situation in a few words, although I cannot by any means claim the role of *rapporteur* on these matters, I can, however, tell in brief outline, comrades, what we heard yesterday from Comrade Trotsky who had made a tour of the Southern Front.

The situation there is truly a grave one, extremely heavy attacks have been launched against us and we have suffered huge losses. There is a double reason for our failures. Yes, just two reasons; first, we had to withdraw large numbers of troops and transfer them as reinforcements to the East at a time when Kolchak was attacking. Precisely at this time Denikin carried out universal mobilisation. It is true, as one of the members of the Revolutionary Council of the Southern Front who has been working there a long time told us, that universal mobilisation will be the ruin of Denikin as it was of Kolchak; as long as he had a class army of volunteers who hated socialism it was strong and sound, but when he began universal recruitment he did, of course, get an army together more quickly, but the army became the weaker, and its class character less pronounced. Peasants recruited into Denikin's army will do the same in that army as the Siberian peasants did in Kolchak's army—they brought complete disintegration into the army.

Another reason for the failures, apart from the tremendous increase in Denikin's army, was the development of guerrilla methods on the Southern Front. Comrade Trotsky also described this in detail yesterday. You all know what our armies experienced as a result of Grigoriev's adventure, which resulted from Makhno's banditry and what the Ukrainian peasants and the entire Ukrainian proletariat experienced during the rule of the Hetman. In the Ukraine, owing to the low level of proletarian class-consciousness, owing to weakness and lack of organisation, owing to Petlyura's disorganising tactics and the pressure of German imperialism—on these grounds hostility and guerrilla tactics have emerged spontaneously. In every group the peasants were taking up arms, electing their own ataman, or

"father", to set up an authority, to create it on the spot. They paid no attention whatever to the central authorities and every "father" thought he was the boss on the spot, that he alone could settle all Ukrainian problems, disregarding what was being done at the centre. It is now quite clear to us that in the present circumstances the peasants cannot be won over by enthusiasm alone—such a method is not reliable. We have warned the Ukrainian comrades a thousand times that when it is a matter of the movement of million-strong masses words are not enough; they must have their own day-to-day experience so that people can verify instructions themselves, so that they believe in their own experience. This experience has cost the Ukrainian peasants very dear. During the German occupation they suffered incredible misfortunes, made unbelievable sacrifices, many times greater than what we experienced; nevertheless they still do not know how to achieve an organisation and how to win their independence and state sovereignty. In the first period after the liberation from German imperialism, when Denikin's gangs began to gain strength, our troops did not always deal them a suitable rebuff, and when our troops were held up by the rapid swelling of the rivers in spring, when it was impossible to advance and no reinforcements came from here, there arrived that catastrophic moment in which the first blow fell on the Ukrainian peasantry as a whole and on the peasantry of the zone contiguous to the Ukraine and the Don, but which will fortunately cure them of the defects of guerrilla tactics and chaos. We know full well that the Ukrainian peasants are strong enough to defeat Denikin's forces, and we know that the blows they have received are very grave and will arouse in them a new class-consciousness and fresh strength. And Comrade Trotsky who himself saw the incredible losses suffered there, stated definitely that the experience of the Ukrainians cannot pass without leaving a trace, that it would bring about a complete change in the entire psychology of the Ukrainian peasants—is that not what we have experienced? We know that our situation was no better last year. We know that a number of countries looked upon us, the young Russian republic, with contempt, and that today the same thing is beginning in many countries, the same phenomena are to be observed.

The Ukraine is recuperating with greater difficulty than we did, but she is recuperating. The lessons of collapse, of guerrilla tactics, have been assimilated. This will be an epoch of change in the entire Ukrainian revolution, and that will influence the entire development of the Ukraine. This is the period of change we, too, experienced when we turned our backs on guerrilla tactics and the scattering of revolutionary phrases—we can do anything!—and began to realise the need for sound, sustained, persistent and difficult organising activities. This was the road we took many months after the October Revolution and on which we have achieved considerable success. We look towards the future fully confident that we shall surmount all difficulties.

One of the circumstances that Comrade Trotsky spoke of as being clear evidence of the change is what he observed in respect of deserters. He visited many gubernias where the comrades we had sent to combat desertion from the army had met with no success. He spoke himself at meetings and saw that tens of thousands of deserters in this country had either given way to panic or were trailing along too easily in the wake of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless we had been ready to draw conclusions that were tantamount to despair. Trotsky, who travelled through Kursk and Ryazan, was convinced, on the example of a number of towns, that the change that had taken place in this sphere was beyond description. Some commissars said they were now swamped with deserters pouring into the Red Army. They are joining the Red Army in such numbers that we can suspend our mobilisation as the ranks are filled by old deserters returning to the army.

The peasants have seen what campaigns by the Cossacks and by Denikin mean, and the masses of peasants have begun to show a double degree of class-consciousness—they had wanted an immediate peace and had been unable to understand that the Civil War had been forced on us. The peasants did everything they could to avoid enlistment—they hid in the woods or joined the green bands* and there tried to ig-

* Gangs of bandits in the Ukraine who engaged in plunder under cover of political slogans against Reds and Whites during the Civil War.—*Ed.*

nore everything else. This is the state of affairs that led to collapse in the Ukraine; this was the state of affairs that gave us many thousands of deserters. Trotsky spoke about the change that took place when we granted the deserters a longer period in which to report, when we approached the problem more boldly. Hundreds of comrades turned up for work in Ryazan Gubernia and the change took place. They attended the meeting and deserters poured into the Red Army. The local commissars say they could not keep pace with them. This is the circumstance connected with the recapture of Liski railway station which strengthened our positions at Kursk and Voronezh. This circumstance gave Trotsky reason to say that the position in the South was serious and that we should bend all efforts. I maintain, however, that *the situation is not catastrophic*. That is the conclusion we arrived at yesterday. (*Applause.*)

That conclusion is not open to doubt and we shall do everything to exert all our efforts; we are sure the class-consciousness of the working masses will triumph for we have the experience of the Ukraine which tells us that the closer Denikin approaches and the clearer it becomes what he and the capitalists and landowners are bringing, the easier will it be for us to combat desertion and the more boldly can we offer the deserters a further week in which to report. The day before yesterday the Council of Defence extended the period by a further week because we are now fully confident that the class-consciousness that Denikin is bringing them will not be wasted and the Red Army will continue to grow if we remember that all our efforts during the next few months must be devoted to war work. We must tell you that we shall now help the South and achieve victory there in the same way as we did in the East. There may be people who give way to moods, comrades, those most inclined to panic, who will ask whether we shall not lose what we have gained in the East if we turn our main attention to the South. As far as this is concerned we may say that the conquests made by our troops in the East will, by all accounts, merge with the Siberian revolution. (*Applause.*)

Yesterday a certain Menshevik made a speech in Moscow. You can read Citizen Golosov's report in *Izvestia*; he said that the Mensheviks were leaving for Siberia, believing that

there was a Constituent Assembly and the power of the people there, that universal suffrage and the will of the people ruled, and not some dictatorship of one class, usurpation, violence—as they dub Soviet power. The experience of these people, who flirted with Kerensky for eight months and who gave up everything to Kornilov, who learned nothing and went over to Kolchak—experience has now shown that it was not the Bolsheviks, but the enemies of the Bolsheviks, people who devoted all their activities to the struggle against the Bolsheviks and travelled hundreds of versts to do it, who drew the conclusions that we have heard and which the public learned from the reports of the Mensheviks, conclusions that show that the Mensheviks have repelled not only the workers but the peasants as well, and not only the peasants, but even the kulaks. Even the kulaks are rebelling against Kolchak! (*Applause.*) None of those descriptions of the revolts against Kolchak's rule was in the least bit exaggerated. Not merely workers and peasants, but also patriotically-minded intellectuals, who had all formerly sabotaged our work and who had been allies of the Entente—Kolchak has repelled even them. We are now being told that an insurrection is under way in the Urals, that we have before us an instance of a real workers' uprising; and again we say that there is every chance that victory in the Urals will be a turn towards the complete victory of the entire mass of the Siberian population over Kolchak's government, and that there are grounds for expecting it within the next few months.

Comrades, you read of the capture of Motovilikha in yesterday's newspapers—this is where the Urals factory district begins. The details of the capture of Perm, where several regiments came over to our side, confirm it, and every day we are receiving telegram after telegram indicating that a decisive turning-point has been reached in the Urals. This is corroborated by a telegram I received today from Ufa dated July 2. We have more detailed information which gives us good grounds to assert that a decisive turning-point has been reached and we shall be victorious in the Urals. By the capture of Perm and then of Motovilikha we have achieved a great deal; they are big factory centres where the workers are organising, are coming over to our

side in hundreds and are cutting the railway lines in the rear of the enemy. Probably few of you have had an opportunity of seeing Kolchak's people, workers and peasants who have come from there, but we should like people in Moscow to see more of those who come from there. Were not the Cis-Urals and Siberian peasants ready to turn their backs on the Bolsheviks a year ago? They were discontented and indignant at the Bolsheviks for demanding help in a difficult war and for saying "victory over the landowners and capitalists is not easily won and if they make war on you, you must be prepared to make every sacrifice to defend the gains of the revolution. Revolutions are not easily made, and if you find these sacrifices too much for you, if you have not enough stamina to make these sacrifices, you will ruin the revolution". The peasants did not want to listen to this, they thought it was nothing more than a revolutionary appeal. When the other side offered peace and the help of the Entente they went over to that side. You realise, of course, that the Siberian peasants have never experienced serfdom. They are the best-fed peasants in Russia, they are used to exploiting people exiled from Russia; they are peasants who could not see that there would be anything to gain from the revolution, and these peasants got their leaders from the entire Russian bourgeoisie, from all the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—there were hundreds, thousands of them there. Some people put the present population of Omsk, for instance, at 900,000 bourgeois and others at 500,000. Literally all the bourgeoisie got together there, all those who claimed the right to lead the people because of their possession of knowledge and culture and their habit of ruling—people of all parties, from the Mensheviks to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, gathered there. They had well-fed peasants, solid men not inclined to socialism, they had aid from all the Entente countries, from the all-powerful countries that held power in their hands throughout the world. They had railway lines with free access to the sea, and that meant complete mastery, for the fleet of the Allies has no rival anywhere in the world and rules over the entire globe. What else was wanting? Why was it that these people who had everything that was to be had against the Bolsheviks—a country with strong, solid

peasants and the aid of the Entente—why did they collapse so badly after two years' experience that all that was left in place of the "power of the people" was the barbaric rule of the sons of landowners and capitalists? Kolchakia broke down completely, and this is actually tangible when our Red Army approaches the Urals as the liberator. A year ago the peasants were shouting, "Down with the Bolsheviks, they put burdens on the shoulders of the peasants", and they went over to the side of the landowners and capitalists. At that time they did not believe what we told them, now they have experienced for themselves, now they have seen that the Bolsheviks took one horse away from a peasant whereas the Kolchak people took everything, the horses and everything else, and re-introduced tsarist discipline. Now that the peasants have the experience of the past they welcome the Red Army as their deliverer and say that sound and complete liberty will come to Siberia together with the Bolsheviks. (*Applause.*)

This experience of Kolchakia is a most valuable experience for us; it shows us on a small scale what is going on all over the world, it shows us the real sources—sources that are invincible, sources that are ineradicable—of the strength of the Bolsheviks. We had seemed helpless when Siberia was in the hands of our enemies. Now that gigantic power has collapsed. Why? Because we were right in our appraisal of the imperialist war and its consequences, we were right when we said that mankind would not emerge from this as it had from previous wars—people had suffered so much, had been tormented so much, were so full of wrath against capitalism that the rule of the working class would set in and socialism would be established. The "middle way" has been mentioned here, and I know very well that the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks dream of that middle way, that the best people in those intermediate parties dream sincerely of that middle way, but we know from the experience of whole countries and peoples that it is an empty dream, because there is no middle way in the kingdom of the Constituent Assembly where the Chernovs and Maiskys again began their ministerial careers and were a complete failure. Is this an accident or Bolshevik slander? Nobody will believe that it is! If they started out with such

faith in the Constituent Assembly and ended up with such a failure it only goes to show once again that the Bolsheviks are right when they say that there must be either the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of all working people and a victory over capitalism, or the most filthy and sanguinary rule of the bourgeoisie, even going as far as a monarchy established by Kolchak, as in Siberia. And now I can go over from the lessons and conclusions drawn from Siberia to a brief outline of the international situation.

Comrades, we have made tremendous progress in our internal policy; millions of Russian peasants who a year ago had an absolutely unenlightened view of the wide world, who believed any glib talk about the Constituent Assembly, who lost heart on account of the burdens imposed by Bolshevism, who ran away every time there was an appeal to struggle—since then the peasants have had such an incredibly burdensome and sanguinary experience at the hands of the Germans in the South that they have learned a lot. We have become infinitely strong because millions of people have realised what Kolchak is; millions of peasants in Siberia have come over to Bolshevism—they are waiting for the Bolsheviks, literally all of them—not because of our sermons and doctrines, but because of their own experience; they called for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and put them in power but from their having placed the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in power they got the old Russian monarchy, the old Russian policeman, who introduced incredible lawlessness into the country together with the "democracy". This cure of the people, however, is worth a lot. (*Applause.*)

Take a glance at the world situation. Have we not made a tremendous step forward in this respect during the past year when we compare it with what we had a year ago? Did not even people devoted to the revolution turn against us at that time, did they not say that the Bolsheviks had sold Russia to the German predators, that the Brest peace had demonstrated what a serious mistake had been made, and did they not believe that only the alliance of democratic France and Britain would save Russia? And what happened? A few months after last year's crisis the Brest peace had ceased to exist. Six months passed after November 9,

1918, when Germany was defeated, and it took that six months' effort on the part of the French and British imperialists to conclude peace. And what did the peace bring? What it gave was this: all the workers who had until then been on the side of the champions of the French and British imperialists who had preached war to the end, all of them are now coming over to our side, not even day by day but hour by hour; they tell themselves that they had been deceived into waging war for four years. They had been promised the defeat of Germany in the name of liberty, the victory of liberty and equality, the victory of democracy, and instead of it they had been given the Treaty of Versailles, an unworthily imposed peace for the purpose of plunder and profit. During that year our situation has been one of intense struggle for the victory of the world revolution. And our situation, if you compare it to that of the enemies, has been such that we have acquired ever more allies throughout the world at every step we have taken. We now see that what the Germans, from their imperialist point of view consider a defeat, that what the French and British consider a full victory—we see that this is the beginning of the end for the French and British imperialists. The working-class movement is growing faster and faster. The workers are demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Russia and the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles. We were alone at the time of the Treaty of Brest; it was swept away and its place was taken by the Treaty of Versailles that is strangling Germany.

In appraising the last year's experience, in recognising frankly all difficulties, we are able to say to you calmly, confidently and soberly, "Comrades, we have come again and again to outline to you the general situation and to picture to the advanced workers of Moscow those difficulties that we have again come up against; we invite you to give some thought to the lessons we have learned in this difficult period and on the basis of your thinking and your appraisal, on the basis of this experience, reach, together with us, the firm and unshakable conviction that victory will be ours, on a world and not only on a Russian scale. Again and again we shall muster our forces to make up for the defeats we have suffered in the South. We shall put

forward the tried and tested weapons of organisational ability, discipline and loyalty, and then we are certain that Denikin will be broken, and will collapse in the same way as Kolchak has collapsed and the French and British imperialists are now collapsing. (*Stormy applause.*)

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THE STATE

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY JULY 11, 1919[73]

Comrades, according to the plan you have adopted and which has been conveyed to me, the subject of today's talk is the state. I do not know how familiar you are already with this subject. If I am not mistaken your courses have only just begun and this is the first time you will be tackling this subject systematically. If that is so, then it may very well happen that in the first lecture on this difficult subject I may not succeed in making my exposition sufficiently clear and comprehensible to many of my listeners. And if this should prove to be the case, I would request you not to be perturbed by the fact, because the question of the state is a most complex and difficult one, perhaps one that more than any other has been confused by bourgeois scholars, writers and philosophers. It should not therefore be expected that a thorough understanding of this subject can be obtained from one brief talk, at a first sitting. After the first talk on this subject you should make a note of the passages which you have not understood or which are not clear to you, and return to them a second, a third and a fourth time, so that what you have not understood may be further supplemented and elucidated later, both by reading and by various lectures and talks. I hope that we may manage to meet once again and that we shall then be able to exchange opinions on all supplementary questions and see what has remained most unclear. I also hope that in addition to talks and lectures you Will devote some time to reading at least a few of the most important works of Marx and Engels. I have

no doubt that these most important works are to be found in the lists of books and in the handbooks which are available in your library for the students of the Soviet and Party school; and although, again, some of you may at first be dismayed by the difficulty of the exposition, I must again warn you that you should not let this worry you; what is unclear at a first reading will become clear at a second reading, or when you subsequently approach the question from a somewhat different angle. For I once more repeat that the question is so complex and has been so confused by bourgeois scholars and writers that anybody who desires to study it seriously and master it independently must attack it several times, return to it again and again and consider it from various angles in order to attain a clear, sound understanding of it. Because it is such a fundamental, such a basic question in all politics, and because not only in such stormy and revolutionary times as the present, but even in the most peaceful times, you will come across it every day in any newspaper in connection with any economic or political question it will be all the easier to return to it. Every day, in one context or another, you will be returning to the question: what is the state, what is its nature, what is its significance and what is the attitude of our Party, the party that is fighting for the overthrow of capitalism, the Communist Party—what is its attitude to the state? And the chief thing is that you should acquire, as a result of your reading, as a result of the talks and lectures you will hear on the state, the ability to approach this question independently, since you will be meeting with it on the most diverse occasions, in connection with the most trifling questions, in the most unexpected contexts and in discussions and disputes with opponents. Only when you learn to find your way about independently in this question may you consider yourself sufficiently confirmed in your convictions and able with sufficient success to defend them against anybody and at any time.

After these brief remarks, I shall proceed to deal with the question itself—what is the state, how did it arise and fundamentally what attitude to the state should be displayed by the party of the working class, which is fighting for the complete overthrow of capitalism—the Communist Party?

I have already said that you are not likely to find another question which has been so confused, deliberately and unwittingly, by representatives of bourgeois science, philosophy, jurisprudence, political economy and journalism, as the question of the state. To this day it is very often confused with religious questions; not only those professing religious doctrines (it is quite natural to expect it of them), but even people who consider themselves free from religious prejudice, very often confuse the specific question of the state with questions of religion and endeavour to build up a doctrine—very often a complex one, with an ideological, philosophical approach and argumentation—which claims that the state is something divine, something supernatural, that it is a certain force by virtue of which mankind has lived, that it is a force of divine origin which confers on people, or can confer on people, or which brings with it something that is not of man, but is given him from without. And it must be said that this doctrine is so closely bound up with the interests of the exploiting classes—the landowners and the capitalists—so serves their interests, has so deeply permeated all the customs, views and science of the gentlemen who represent the bourgeoisie, that you will meet with vestiges of it on every hand, even in the view of the state held by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, although they are convinced that they can regard the state with sober eyes and reject indignantly the suggestion that they are under the sway of religious prejudices. This question has been so confused and complicated because it affects the interests of the ruling classes more than any other question (yielding place in this respect only to the foundations of economic science). The doctrine of the state serves to justify social privilege, the existence of exploitation, the existence of capitalism—and that is why it would be the greatest mistake to expect impartiality on this question, to approach it in the belief that people who claim to be scientific can give you a purely scientific view on the subject. In the question of the state, in the doctrine of the state, in the theory of the state, when you have become familiar with it and have gone into it deeply enough, you will always discern the struggle between different classes, a struggle which is reflected or expressed in a conflict

of views on the state, in the estimate of the role and significance of the state.

To approach this question as scientifically as possible we must cast at least a fleeting glance back on the history of the state, its emergence and development. The most reliable thing in a question of social science, and one that is most necessary in order really to acquire the habit of approaching this question correctly and not allowing oneself to get lost in the mass of detail or in the immense variety of conflicting opinion—the most important thing if one is to approach this question scientifically is not to forget the underlying historical connection, to examine every question from the standpoint of how the given phenomenon arose in history and what were the principal stages in its development, arid, from the standpoint of its development, to examine what it has become today.

I hope that in studying this question of the state you will acquaint yourselves with Engels's book *The Origin of the Family*, *Private Property and the State*. This is one of the fundamental works of modern socialism, every sentence of which can be accepted with confidence, in the assurance that it has not been said at random but is based on immense historical and political material. Undoubtedly, not all the parts of this work have been expounded in an equally popular and comprehensible way; some of them presume a reader who already possesses a certain knowledge of history and economics. But I again repeat that you should not be perturbed if on reading this work you do not understand it at once. Very few people do. But returning to it later, when your interest has been aroused, you will succeed in understanding the greater part, if not the whole of it. I refer to this book because it gives the correct approach to the question in the sense mentioned. It begins with a historical sketch of the origin of the state.

This question, like every other—for example, that of the origin of capitalism, the exploitation of man by man, socialism, how socialism arose, what conditions gave rise to it—can be approached soundly and confidently only if we cast a glance back on the history of its development as a whole. In connection with this problem it should first of all be noted that the state has not always existed. There

was a time when there was no state. It appears wherever and whenever a division of society into classes appears, whenever exploiters and exploited appear.

Before the first form of exploitation of man by man arose, the first form of division into classes—slave-owners and slaves—there existed the patriarchal family, or, as it is sometimes called, the *clan* family. (Clan—tribe; at the time people of one kin lived together.) Fairly definite traces of these primitive times have survived in the life of many primitive peoples; and if you take any work whatsoever on primitive civilisation, you will always come across more or less definite descriptions, indications and recollections of the fact that there was a time, more or less similar to primitive communism, when the division of society into slave-owners and slaves did not exist. And in those times there was no state, no special apparatus for the systematic application of force and the subjugation of people by force. It is such an apparatus that is called the state.

In primitive society, when people lived in small family groups and were still at the lowest stages of development, in a condition approximating to savagery—an epoch from which modern, civilised human society is separated by several thousand years—there were yet no signs of the existence of a state. We find the predominance of custom, authority, respect, the power enjoyed by the elders of the clan; we find this power sometimes accorded to women—the position of women then was not like the downtrodden and oppressed condition of women today—but nowhere do we find a special *category* of people set apart to rule others and who, for the sake and purpose of rule, systematically and permanently have at their disposal a certain apparatus of coercion, an apparatus of violence, such as is represented at the present time, as you all realise, by armed contingents of troops, prisons and other means of subjugating the will of others by force—all that which constitutes the essence of the state.

If we get away from what are known as religious teachings, from the subtleties, philosophical arguments and various opinions advanced by bourgeois scholars, if we get away from these and try to get at the real core of the matter, we shall find that the state really does amount to such an apparatus of

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rule which stands outside society as a whole. When there appears such a special group of men occupied solely with government, and who in order to rule need a special apparatus of coercion to subjugate the will of others by force—prisons, special contingents of men, armies, etc.—then there appears the state.

But there was a time when there was no state, when general ties, the community itself, discipline and the ordering of work were maintained by force of custom and tradition, by the authority or the respect enjoyed by the elders of the clan or by women—who in those times not only frequently enjoyed a status equal to that of men, but not infrequently enjoyed an even higher status—and when there was no special category of persons who were specialists in ruling. History shows that the state as a special apparatus for coercing people arose wherever and whenever there appeared a division of society into classes, that is, a division into groups of people some of which were permanently in a position to appropriate the labour of others, where some people exploited others.

And this division of society into classes must always be clearly borne in mind as a fundamental fact of history. The development of all human societies for thousands of years, in all countries without exception, reveals a general conformity to law, a regularity and consistency; so that at first we had a society without classes—the original patriarchal, primitive society, in which there were no aristocrats; then we had a society based on slavery—a slaveowning society. The whole of modern, civilised Europe has passed through this stage—slavery ruled supreme two thousand years ago. The vast majority of peoples of the other parts of the world also passed through this stage. Traces of slavery survive to this day among the less developed peoples; you will find the institution of slavery in Africa, for example, at the present time. The division into slaveowners and slaves was the first important class division. The former group not only owned all the means of production—the land and the implements, however poor and primitive they may have been in those times—but also owned people. This group was known as slave-owners,

while those who laboured and supplied labour for others were known as slaves.

This form was followed in history by another—feudalism. In the great majority of countries slavery in the course of its development evolved into serfdom. The fundamental division of society was now into feudal lords and peasant serfs. The form of relations between people changed. The slave-owners had regarded the slaves as their property; the law had confirmed this view and regarded the slave as a chattel completely owned by the slave-owner. As far as the peasant serf was concerned, class oppression and dependence remained, but it was not considered that the feudal lord owned the peasants as chattels, but that he was only entitled to their labour, to the obligatory performance of certain services. In practice, as you know, serfdom, especially in Russia where it survived longest of all and assumed the crudest forms, in no way differed from slavery.

Further, with the development of trade, the appearance of the world market and the development of money circulation, a new class arose within feudal society—the capitalist class. From the commodity, the exchange of commodities and the rise of the power of money, there derived the power of capital. During the eighteenth century, or rather, from the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, revolutions took place all over the world. Feudalism was abolished in all the countries of Western Europe. Russia was the last country in which this took place. In 1861 a radical change took place in Russia as well; as a consequence of this one form of society was replaced by another—feudalism was replaced by capitalism, under which division into classes remained, as well as various traces and remnants of serfdom, but fundamentally the division into classes assumed a different form.

The owners of capital, the owners of the land and the owners of the factories in all capitalist countries constituted and still constitute an insignificant minority of the population who have complete command of the labour of the whole people, and, consequently, command, oppress and exploit the whole mass of labourers, the majority of whom are proletarians, wage-workers, who procure their livelihood in the process of production only by the sale of

their own worker's hands, their labour-power. With the transition to capitalism, the peasants, who had been disunited and downtrodden in feudal times, were converted partly (the majority) into proletarians, and partly (the minority) into wealthy peasants who themselves hired labourers and who constituted a rural bourgeoisie.

This fundamental fact—the transition of society from primitive forms of slavery to serfdom and finally to capitalism—you must always bear in mind, for only by remembering this fundamental fact, only by examining all political doctrines placed in this fundamental scheme, will you be able properly to appraise these doctrines and understand what they refer to; for each of these great periods in the history of mankind, slave-owning, feudal and capitalist, embraces scores and hundreds of centuries and presents such a mass of political forms, such a variety of political doctrines, opinions and revolutions, that this extreme diversity and immense variety (especially in connection with the political, philosophical and other doctrines of bourgeois scholars and politicians) can be understood only by firmly holding, as to a guiding thread, to this division of society into classes, this change in the forms of class rule, and from this standpoint examining all social questions—economic, political, spiritual, religious, etc.

If you examine the state from the standpoint of this fundamental division, you will find that before the division of society into classes, as I have already said, no state existed. But as the social division into classes arose and took firm root, as class society arose, the state also arose and took firm root. The history of mankind knows scores and hundreds of countries that have passed or are still passing through slavery, feudalism and capitalism. In each of these countries, despite the immense historical changes that have taken place, despite all the political vicissitudes and all the revolutions due to this development of mankind, to the transition from slavery through feudalism to capitalism and to the present world-wide struggle against capitalism, you will always discern the emergence of the state. It has always been a certain apparatus which stood outside society and consisted of a group of people engaged solely, or almost solely, or mainly, in ruling. People are divided into the

ruled, and into specialists in ruling, those who rise above society and are called rulers, statesmen. This apparatus, this group of people who rule others, always possesses certain means of coercion, of physical force, irrespective of whether this violence over people is expressed in the primitive club, or in more perfected types of weapons in the epoch of slavery, or in the firearms which appeared in the Middle Ages, or, finally, in modern weapons, which in the twentieth century are technical marvels and are based entirely on the latest achievements of modern technology. The methods of violence changed, but whenever there was a state there existed in every society a group of persons who ruled, who commanded, who dominated and who in order to maintain their power possessed an apparatus of physical coercion, an apparatus of violence, with those weapons which corresponded to the technical level of the given epoch. And by examining these general phenomena, by asking ourselves why no state existed when there were no classes, when there were no exploiters and exploited, and why it appeared when classes appeared—only in this way shall we find a definite answer to the question of what is the nature and significance of the state.

The state is a machine for maintaining the rule of one class over another. When there were no classes in society, when, before the epoch of slavery, people laboured in primitive conditions of greater equality, in conditions when the productivity of labour was still at its lowest, and when primitive man could barely procure the wherewithal for the crudest and most primitive existence, a special group of people whose function is to rule and to dominate the rest of society, had not and could not yet have emerged. Only when the first form of the division of society into classes appeared, only when slavery appeared, when a certain class of people, by concentrating on the crudest forms of agricultural labour, could produce a certain surplus, when this surplus was not absolutely essential for the most wretched existence of the slave and passed into the hands of the slave-owner, when in this way the existence of this class of slave-owners was secure—then in order that it might take firm root it was necessary for a state to appear.

And it did appear—the slave-owning state, an apparatus which gave the slave-owners power and enabled them to

rule over the slaves. Both society and the state were then on a much smaller scale than they are now, they possessed incomparably poorer means of communication—the modern means of communication did not then exist. Mountains, rivers and seas were immeasurably greater obstacles than they are now, and the state took shape within far narrower geographical boundaries. A technically weak state apparatus served a state confined within relatively narrow boundaries and with a narrow range of action. Nevertheless, there did exist an apparatus which compelled the slaves to remain in slavery, which kept one part of society subjugated to and oppressed by another. It is impossible to compel the greater part of society to work systematically for the other part of society without a permanent apparatus of coercion. So long as there were no classes, there was no apparatus of this sort. When classes appeared, everywhere and always, as the division grew and took firmer hold, there also appeared a special institution—the state. The forms of state were extremely varied. As early as the period of slavery we find diverse forms of the state in the countries that were the most advanced, cultured and civilised according to the standards of the time—for example, in ancient Greece and Rome—which were based entirely on slavery. At that time there was already a difference between monarchy and republic, between aristocracy and democracy. A monarchy is the power of a single person, a republic is the absence of any non-elected authority; an aristocracy is the power of a relatively small minority, a democracy is the power of the people (democracy in Greek literally means the power of the people). All these differences arose in the epoch of slavery. Despite these differences, the state of the slave-owning epoch was a slave-owning state, irrespective of whether it was a monarchy or a republic, aristocratic or democratic.

In every course on the history of ancient times, in any lecture on this subject, you will hear about the struggle which was waged between the monarchical and republican states. But the fundamental fact is that the slaves were not regarded as human beings—not only were they not regarded as citizens, they were not even regarded as human beings. Roman law regarded them as chattels. The law of manslaughter, not to mention the other laws for the protection of the

person, did not extend to slaves. It defended only the slave-owners, who were alone recognised as citizens with full rights. But whether a monarchy was instituted or a republic, it was a monarchy of the slave-owners or a republic of the slave-owners. All rights were enjoyed by the slave-owners, while the slave was a chattel in the eyes of the law; and not only could any sort of violence be perpetrated against a slave, but even the killing of a slave was not considered a crime. Slave-owning republics differed in their internal organisation, there were aristocratic republics and democratic republics. In an aristocratic republic only a small number of privileged persons took part in the elections; in a democratic republic everybody took part—but everybody meant only the slave-owners, that is, everybody except the slaves. This fundamental fact must be borne in mind, because it throws more light than any other on the question of the state and clearly demonstrates the nature of the state.

The state is a machine for the oppression of one class by another, a machine for holding in obedience to one class other, subordinated classes. There are various forms of this machine. The slave-owning state could be a monarchy, an aristocratic republic or even a democratic republic. In fact the forms of government varied extremely, but their essence was always the same: the slaves enjoyed no rights and constituted an oppressed class; they were not regarded as human beings. We find the same thing in the feudal state.

The change in the form of exploitation transformed the slave-owning state into the feudal state. This was of immense importance. In slave-owning society the slave enjoyed no rights whatever and was not regarded as a human being; in feudal society the peasant was bound to the soil. The chief distinguishing feature of serfdom was that the peasants (and at that time the peasants constituted the majority; the urban population was still very small) were considered bound to the land—this is the very basis of "serfdom". The peasant might work a definite number of days for himself on the plot assigned to him by the landlord; on the other days the peasant serf worked for his lord. The essence of class society remained—society was based on class exploitation. Only the owners of the land could enjoy full rights; the peasants had no rights at all. In practice their condition differed

very little from the condition of slaves in the slave-owning state. Nevertheless, a wider road was opened for their emancipation, for the emancipation of the peasants, since the peasant serf was not regarded as the direct property of the lord. He could work part of his time on his own plot, could, so to speak, belong to himself to some extent; and with the wider opportunities for the development of exchange and trade relations the feudal system steadily disintegrated and the scope of emancipation of the peasantry steadily widened. Feudal society was always more complex than slave society. There was a greater development of trade and industry, which even in those days led to capitalism. In the Middle Ages feudalism predominated. And here too the forms of state varied, here too we find both the monarchy and the republic, although the latter was much more weakly expressed. But always the feudal lord was regarded as the only ruler. The peasant serfs were deprived of absolutely all political rights.

Neither under slavery nor under the feudal system could a small minority of people dominate over the vast majority without coercion. History is full of the constant attempts of the oppressed classes to throw off oppression. The history of slavery contains records of wars of emancipation from slavery which lasted for decades. Incidentally, the name "Spartacist" now adopted by the German Communists—the only German party which is really fighting against the yoke of capitalism—was adopted by them because Spartacus was one of the most prominent heroes of one of the greatest revolts of slaves, which took place about two thousand years ago. For many years the seemingly omnipotent Roman Empire, which rested entirely on slavery, experienced the shocks and blows of a widespread uprising of slaves who armed and united to form a vast army under the leadership of Spartacus. In the end they were defeated, captured and put to torture by the slave-owners. Such civil wars mark the whole history of the existence of class society. I have just mentioned an example of the greatest of these civil wars in the epoch of slavery. The whole epoch of feudalism is likewise marked by constant uprisings of the peasants. For example, in Germany in the Middle Ages the struggle between the two classes—the landlords and the

serfs—assumed wide proportions and was transformed into a civil war of the peasants against the landowners. You are all familiar with similar examples of repeated uprisings of the peasants against the feudal landowners in Russia.

In order to maintain their rule and to preserve their power, the feudal lords had to have an apparatus by which they could unite under their subjugation a vast number of people and subordinate them to certain laws and regulations; and all these laws fundamentally amounted to one thing—the maintenance of the power of the lords over the peasant serfs. And this was the feudal state, which in Russia, for example, or in quite backward Asiatic countries (where feudalism prevails to this day) differed in form—it was either a republic or a monarchy. When the state was a monarchy, the rule of one person was recognised; when it was a republic, the participation of the elected representatives of landowning society was in one degree or another recognised—this was in feudal society. Feudal society represented a division of classes under which the vast majority—the peasant serfs—were completely subjected to an insignificant minority—the owners of the land.

The development of trade, the development of commodity exchange, led to the emergence of a new class—the capitalists. Capital took shape at the close of the Middle Ages, when, after the discovery of America, world trade developed enormously, when the quantity of precious metals increased, when silver and gold became the medium of exchange, when money circulation made it possible for individuals to possess tremendous wealth. Silver and gold were recognised as wealth all over the world. The economic power of the landowning class declined and the power of the new class—the representatives of capital—developed. The reconstruction of society was such that all citizens seemed to be equal, the old division into slave-owners and slaves disappeared, all were regarded as equal before the law irrespective of what capital each owned; whether he owned land as private property, or was a poor man who owned nothing but his labour-power—all were equal before the law. The law protects everybody equally; it protects the property of those who have it from attack by the masses who, possessing no property, possessing nothing but their labour-

power, grow steadily impoverished and ruined and become converted into proletarians. Such is capitalist society.

I cannot dwell on it in detail. You will return to this when you come to discuss the Programme of the Party—you will then hear a description of capitalist society. This society advanced against serfdom, against the old feudal system, under the slogan of liberty. But it was liberty for those who owned property. And when feudalism was shattered, which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century—in Russia it occurred later than in other countries, in 1861—the feudal state was then superseded by the capitalist state, which proclaims liberty for the whole people as its slogan, which declares that it expresses the will of the whole people and denies that it is a class state. And here there developed a struggle between the socialists, who are fighting for the liberty of the whole people, and the capitalist state—a struggle which has led to the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic and which is spreading all over the world.

To understand the struggle that has been started against world capital, to understand the nature of the capitalist state, we must remember that when the capitalist state advanced against the feudal state it entered the fight under the slogan of liberty. The abolition of feudalism meant liberty for the representatives of the capitalist state and served their purpose, inasmuch as serfdom was breaking down and the peasants had acquired the opportunity of owning as their full property the land which they had purchased for compensation or in part by quit-rent—this did not concern the state: it protected property irrespective of its origin, because the state was founded on private property. The peasants became private owners in all the modern, civilised states. Even when the landowner surrendered part of his land to the peasant, the state protected private property, rewarding the landowner by compensation, by letting him take money for the land. The state as it were declared that it would fully preserve private property, and the state accorded it every support and protection. The state recognised the property rights of every merchant, industrialist and manufacturer. And this society, based on private property, on the power of capital, on the complete subjection of the

propertyless workers and labouring masses of the peasantry, proclaimed that its rule was based on liberty. Combating feudalism, it proclaimed freedom of property and was particularly proud of the fact that the state had ceased, supposedly, to be a class state.

Yet the state continued to be a machine which helped the capitalists to hold the poor peasants and the working class in subjection. But in outward appearance it was free. It proclaimed universal suffrage, and declared through its champions, preachers, scholars and philosophers, that it was not a class state. Even now, when the Soviet Socialist Republics have begun to fight the state, they accuse us of violating liberty, of building a state based on coercion, on the suppression of some by others, whereas they represent a popular, democratic state. And now, when the world socialist revolution has begun, and when the revolution has succeeded in some countries, when the fight against world capital has grown particularly acute, this question of the state has acquired the greatest importance and has become, one might say, the most burning one, the focus of all present-day political questions and political disputes.

Whichever party we take in Russia or in any of the more civilised countries, we find that nearly all political disputes, disagreements and opinions now centre around the conception of the state. Is the state in a capitalist country, in a democratic republic—especially one like Switzerland or the U.S.A.—in the freest democratic republics, an expression of the popular will, the sum total of the general decision of the people, the expression of the national will, and so forth; or is the state a machine that enables the capitalists of those countries to maintain their power over the working class and the peasantry? That is the fundamental question around which all political disputes all over the world now centre. What do they say about Bolshevism? The bourgeois press abuses the Bolsheviks. You will not find a single newspaper that does not repeat the hackneyed accusation that the Bolsheviks violate popular rule. If our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in their simplicity of heart (perhaps it is not simplicity, or perhaps it is the simplicity which the proverb says is worse than robbery) think that they discovered and invented the accusation that

the Bolsheviks have violated liberty and popular rule, they are ludicrously mistaken. Today every one of the richest newspapers in the richest countries, which spend tens of millions on their distribution and disseminate bourgeois lies and imperialist policy in tens of millions of copies—every one of these newspapers repeats these basic arguments and accusations against Bolshevism, namely, that the U.S.A., Britain and Switzerland are advanced states based on popular rule, whereas the Bolshevik republic is a state of bandits in which liberty is unknown, and that the Bolsheviks have violated the idea of popular rule and have even gone so far as to disperse the Constituent Assembly. These terrible accusations against the Bolsheviks are repeated all over the world. These accusations lead us directly to the question—what is the state? In order to understand these accusations, in order to study them and have a fully intelligent attitude towards them, and not to examine them on hearsay but with a firm opinion of our own, we must have a clear idea of what the state is. We have before us capitalist states of every kind and all the theories in defence of them which were created before the war. In order to answer the question properly we must critically examine all these theories and views.

I have already advised you to turn for help to Engels's book *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. This book says that every state in which private ownership of the land and means of production exists, in which capital dominates, however democratic it may be, is a capitalist state, a machine used by the capitalists to keep the working class and the poor peasants in subjection; while universal suffrage, a Constituent Assembly, a parliament are merely a form, a sort of promissory note, which does not change the real state of affairs.

The forms of domination of the state may vary: capital manifests its power in one way where one form exists, and in another way where another form exists—but essentially the power is in the hands of capital, whether there are voting qualifications or some other rights or not, or whether the republic is a democratic one or not—in fact, the more democratic it is the cruder and more cynical is the rule of capitalism. One of the most democratic republics in the

world is the United States of America, yet nowhere (and those who have been there since 1905 probably know it) is the power of capital, the power of a handful of multi-millionaires over the whole of society, so crude and so openly corrupt as in America. Once capital exists, it dominates the whole of society, and no democratic republic, no franchise can change its nature.

The democratic republic and universal suffrage were an immense progressive advance as compared with feudalism; they have enabled the proletariat to achieve its present unity and solidarity, to form those firm and disciplined ranks which are waging a systematic struggle against capital. There was nothing even approximately resembling this among the peasant serfs, not to speak of the slaves. The slaves, as we know, revolted, rioted, started civil wars, but they could never create a class-conscious majority and parties to lead the struggle, they could not clearly realise what their aims were, and even in the most revolutionary moments of history they were always pawns in the hands of the ruling classes. The bourgeois republic, parliament, universal suffrage—all represent great progress from the standpoint of the world development of society. Mankind moved towards capitalism, and it was capitalism alone which, thanks to urban culture, enabled the oppressed proletarian class to become conscious of itself and to create the world working-class movement, the millions of workers organised all over the world in parties—the socialist parties which are consciously leading the struggle of the masses. Without parliamentarism, without an electoral system, this development of the working class would have been impossible. That is why all these things have acquired such great importance in the eyes of the broad masses of people. That is why a radical change seems to be so difficult. It is not only the conscious hypocrites, scientists and priests that uphold and defend the bourgeois lie that the state is free and that it is its mission to defend the interests of all; so also do a large number of people who sincerely adhere to the old prejudices and who cannot understand the transition from the old, capitalist society to socialism. Not only people who are directly dependent on the bourgeoisie, not only those who live under the yoke of capital or who have been

bribed by capital (there are a large number of all sorts of scientists, artists, priests, etc., in the service of capital), but even people who are simply under the sway of the prejudice of bourgeois liberty, have taken up arms against Bolshevism all over the world because when the Soviet Republic was founded it rejected these bourgeois lies and openly declared: you say your state is free, whereas in reality, as long as there is private property, your state, even if it is a democratic republic, is nothing but a machine used by the capitalists to suppress the workers, and the freer the state, the more clearly is this expressed. Examples of this are Switzerland in Europe and the United States in America. Nowhere does capital rule so cynically and ruthlessly, and nowhere is it so clearly apparent, as in these countries, although they are democratic republics, no matter how prettily they are painted and notwithstanding all the talk about labour democracy and the equality of all citizens. The fact is that in Switzerland and the United States capital dominates, and every attempt of the workers to achieve the slightest real improvement in their condition is immediately met by civil war. There are fewer soldiers, a smaller standing army, in these countries—Switzerland has a militia and every Swiss has a gun at home, while in America there was no standing army until quite recently—and so when there is a strike the bourgeoisie arms, hires soldiery and suppresses the strike; and nowhere is this suppression of the working-class movement accompanied by such ruthless severity as in Switzerland and the U.S.A., and nowhere does the influence of capital in parliament manifest itself as powerfully as in these countries. The power of capital is everything, the stock exchange is everything, while parliament and elections are marionettes, puppets.... But the eyes of the workers are being opened more and more, and the idea of Soviet government is spreading farther and farther afield, especially after the bloody carnage we have just experienced. The necessity for a relentless war on the capitalists is becoming clearer and clearer to the working class.

Whatever guise a republic may assume, however democratic it may be, if it is a bourgeois republic, if it retains private ownership of the land and factories, and if private capital keeps the whole of society in wage-slavery, that is,

if the republic does not carry out what is proclaimed in the Programme of our Party and in the Soviet Constitution, then this state is a machine for the suppression of some people by others. And we shall place this machine in the hands of the class that is to overthrow the power of capital. We shall reject all the old prejudices about the state meaning universal equality—for that is a fraud: as long as there is exploitation there cannot be equality. The landowner cannot be the equal of the worker, or the hungry man the equal of the full man. This machine called the state, before which people bowed in superstitious awe, believing the old tales that it means popular rule, tales which the proletariat declares to be a bourgeois lie—this machine the proletariat will smash. So far we have deprived the capitalists of this machine and have taken it over. We shall use this machine, or bludgeon, to destroy all exploitation. And when the possibility of exploitation no longer exists anywhere in the world, when there are no longer owners of land and owners of factories, and when there is no longer a situation in which some gorge while others starve, only when the possibility of this no longer exists shall we consign this machine to the scrap-heap. Then there will be no state and no exploitation. Such is the view of our Communist Party. I hope that we shall return to this subject in subsequent lectures, return to it again and again.

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THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SITUATION OF THE REPUBLIC

REPORT DELIVERED TO THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) JULY 12, 1919[74]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The previous speaker spoke of the feelings of deep regret with which we have had to contravene our food policy.[75] None of this, of course, is anything more than darning the holes of an old garment instead of acquiring a new one. But what we have done is right. We may recall last year, when the food situation was much worse—we had absolutely no food resources. At that time there was considerable confusion in our ranks because we had to retract from the principles of our food policy. It was thought that small concessions would lead to bigger ones and that a return to a socialist policy would be impossible. That turned out to be untrue. Difficult as the situation was, we got over it, and our enemies' hopes were not fulfilled.

The situation today is much better than last year's; we now have food resources we dared not even dream of last year. The territory occupied by the enemy was much greater last year. We have now scored big victories in the East where a bumper harvest is expected. Apart from that we have experience, and that is the main thing. Having this experience we are able to say with greater confidence that we shall overcome the difficulties that stand in our way. July is the worst month not only as far as food is concerned, but also because counter-revolution raises its head higher than before.

The counter-revolutionary wave inside the country, however, was more powerful last year than this. The activities of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had reached the highest point at that time. The armed struggle that they launched suddenly in place of their verbal support took us by surprise. The difficulties were immense, for they had chosen their time very cleverly. The Socialist-Revolutionaries hoped to play on the mood of the man in the street who was in despair from hunger. At the same time Muravyov betrayed us at the front. The revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was very quickly suppressed but there was serious wavering in the provinces for several days.

We now have a more correct attitude to the petty-bourgeois parties, due to the year's experience. The experience of the revolts led by Makhno and Grigoriev and the waverings of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have shown us that their influence over the worker and peasant masses is only an apparent one. Their actual strength is nil, so that when we are told that Chernov at a recent meeting of the Council of the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party said, "If not we and not today, then who else will kick out the Bolsheviks?" we can only say, "The nightmare was terrible, but God is good." Today we can only express our amazement at their not being tired of repeating their own mistakes. Throughout two years we have been witnessing the complete collapse of all their dreams about "democracy in general", nevertheless every one of their groups considers it its duty to make the experiment in its own way. The development of the revolution shows that their mistakes are being repeated and that the repetition is causing us countless calamities. The peasants in the East supported the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks because they did not want war and realised that the Bolsheviks were a sound government that would insist on their participating in the war. The result was that Kolchak forces appeared and brought countless calamities. Now that they are retreating they are destroying everything in their path, the country is completely ruined and the sufferings there are unimaginable, far worse than anything we are experiencing. To speak of Bolshevik atrocities in face of these facts requires all the hypocrisy of bourgeois writers.

In the Kolchak business, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have again followed the same sanguinary political road as they did with Kerensky; it has brought them back to the starting-point and has demonstrated the falseness of all their coalition ideas.

The masses have now abandoned them and we are witnessing a revolt in Siberia in which not only workers and peasants but even intellectuals and kulaks are taking part. We see the complete collapse of Kolchak's movement. Apparently every one of their mistakes must be repeated before the eyes of the unenlightened masses are opened. When the masses see that the coalition leads to reaction they come to us, battered and tormented but nevertheless taught and steeled by experience. The same may be said of all imperialists. They drag out the war, cause greater exhaustion and thereby merely strengthen in the masses a consciousness of the need for revolution. Difficult as the year has been, it has been useful because not only the leaders but even the broadest masses, even the peasants in the most remote holes and corners have had an experience that has led them to draw the same conclusions as we do. This gives us firm conviction in our victory. Without Kolchak the Siberian peasants would not have become convinced in a single year that they need our workers' government. It took the very sad experience of this year to convince them of that.

It is quite possible that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik literary groups will die out without ever having understood anything about our revolution and for a long time will continue repeating, parrot fashion, that theirs would have been the best government in the world, a truly socialist and truly democratic government without civil war, if it had not been for Kolchak and the Bolsheviks; that, however, is not important, there have also been stubborn cranks in all revolutions. The important thing is that the masses who followed them are now leaving them. The peasant masses have gone over to the Bolsheviks—that is a fact. Siberia demonstrates this best of all. The peasants will not forget what they experienced under Kolchak's government; the greater the trials, the better the Bolsheviks' lessons will have been learned.

We are now gaining important victories on the Eastern Front and these give us reason to hope that we shall have finished with Kolchak in the East in a few weeks. A turning-point has been reached on the Southern Front, and, what is more important, a turning-point in the temper of the peasants in the vicinity of the front has also been reached. These, incidentally, are rich peasants—middle peasants in those parts are like kulaks. But there has been a change in their mood in our favour—this is a fact that is proved by the return of deserters and by the armed resistance we are putting up. The workers living in the towns, where they are close to events, assimilate our ideas from conferences, speeches and newspapers. The peasant cannot do this, he is convinced only from his own experience. The peasants in the South were prepared to curse the Bolsheviks in words, but when Denikin arrived shouting about democracy (for it is not only the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries that shout about it, the word is to be found in every line of Denikin's newspaper) the peasants began to fight against him for they soon realised from their own experience that floggings and plunder lay hidden under the pretty words. The torments and ruination in the districts near the Southern Front are having the same effect as in the East—they are giving us more reliable gains. We have not for a moment forgotten the difficulties that we are experiencing, we have not forgotten that the greatest effort and the mobilisation of our forces are essential, but we can say that the result will be a more sound victory. The experience of the past year has shown the masses that today only one form of power is possible and necessary—the workers' and peasants' power of the Bolsheviks. That is what enables us to say with confidence that this difficult July will be the last difficult July.

A glance at the international situation only serves to strengthen our confidence in victory.

Forces friendly to us are growing up in all hostile states. Take the small countries—Finland, Latvia, Poland, Rumania. All attempts to set up a coalition of the big and petty bourgeoisie in those countries to fight against us have ended in a break-down and ours turns out to be the only form of government possible there.

The same thing is true of big states. Take Germany. Immediately the Treaty of Versailles was signed a big revolutionary movement began. The Entente bogey has gone and the workers are now rising, notwithstanding all the sacrifices that the proletariat has made. During the past year Germany has had the same experience as we and Siberia have had, but in a somewhat different form—experience that will lead to the communist revolution. And what about the Entente, the victors? They say that victory has given them security, but no sooner had they signed the peace treaty than it became clear that in signing it they were signing their own death warrant. The mass movement against them is growing. That is why we say with confidence, taking all our experience, all that has happened in the past year into account, that we shall surmount all difficulties and that this July will be the last difficult July, and that next July we shall welcome the victory of the world Soviet republic and that victory will be full and complete.

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THE TASKS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

RAMSAY MACDONALD ON THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

The French social-chauvinist newspaper *l'Humanité*,[76] issue No. 5475, dated April 14, 1919, contains an editorial by Ramsay MacDonald, the well-known leader of the British so-called Independent Labour Party, which is actually an opportunist party that has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie. This article is so typical of the position taken by the *trend* which it is customary to call the Centre and which was called by that name at the First Congress of the Communist International in Moscow that we quote it *in full* together with the introductory lines of the *l'Humanité* editorial board:

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

Our friend Ramsay MacDonald was the authoritative leader of the Labour Party in the House of Commons before the war. A socialist and a man of convictions, he considered it his duty to condemn the war as imperialist, in contrast to those who welcomed it as a war for a righteous cause. Consequently, after August 4 he resigned from his position of leader of the Labour Party, and together with comrades in the Independent Labour Party and with Keir Hardie whom we all admire, did not fear to declare war on war.

This required day-to-day heroism.

MacDonald showed by his example that courage, in the words of Jaurès, "consists in not submitting to the law of the triumphant lie and in not serving as the echo of the applause of imbeciles and the catcalling of fanatics".

In the khaki* election held at the end of November, MacDonald was defeated by Lloyd George. But we may rest assured that MacDonald will have his revenge, and that in the very near future.

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* Called "khaki" election by soldiers who were ordered to vote for the Government candidates.

The rise of separatist tendencies in the national and international policies of socialism has been a misfortune for the socialist movement.

It is, however, not a bad thing that there are shades of opinion and variations of method within socialism. Our socialism is still in the experimental stage.

Its basic principles are fixed, but the method of best applying them, the combinations which will bring about the triumph of the revolution, the manner in which the socialist state is to be built are still problems to be discussed, and the last word concerning them has not yet been spoken. Only deep study of all these points can lead us to sublimer truth.

Extremes may clash, and such a struggle may serve to fortify socialist views; but evil commences when everybody considers his opponent a traitor, a believer fallen from grace, one who deserves to have the gates of the party paradise slammed in his face.

When socialists are possessed by the spirit of dogmatism, like that which in former days of Christianity preached civil war for the greater glory of God and the discomfiture of the devil, the bourgeoisie may sleep in peace, for the days of its rule are not yet ended, no matter how great the local and international successes achieved by socialism.

At the present moment our movement is unfortunately encountering a new obstacle. A new International has been proclaimed in Moscow.

I am very much grieved over this, for the Socialist International is at present sufficiently open to all forms of socialist thought and in spite of all theoretical and practical disagreements engendered within it by Bolshevism I see no reason why its Left wing should separate from the Centre and form an independent group.

It must first of all be remembered that we are still living, in the infancy of the revolution. The forms of government that have sprung up from the political and social debris wrought by the war have not yet stood the test and have not yet been definitely established.

A new broom sweeps remarkably clean at first, but nobody can be certain beforehand how it will work in the end.

Russia is not Hungary, Hungary is not France, France is not Britain, and therefore anyone who introduces a split in the International after the experience of some one nation displays criminal narrow-mindedness.

Besides, what is Russia's experience really worth? Who can answer that? The Allied governments are afraid to let us enlighten ourselves. But there are two things we do know.

First and foremost, that there was no prepared plan according to which the revolution was accomplished by the present Russian Government. It developed according to the course of events. Lenin started his attack on Kerensky by demanding a Constituent Assembly. Events led him to suppress this Assembly. When the socialist revolution broke out in Russia no one thought the Soviets would take the place in the government which they did.

Subsequently Lenin quite justly exhorted Hungary not to copy Russia slavishly but to allow the Hungarian revolution to evolve freely according to its own character.

The evolution and fluctuations of those experiments we are now witnessing should on no account call forth a split in the International.

All socialist governments need the help and advice of the International. It is necessary that the International should watch their experiences with an alert eye and an open mind.

I have just heard from a friend who recently saw Lenin that no one is more free in his criticism of the Soviet Government than Lenin himself.

* * *

If the post-war disorders and revolutions do not justify a split, does the latter not find justification in the attitude which some socialist factions took during the war? I frankly admit that here the grounds may seem more justified. But if there really is some excuse for split in the International, this question was at any rate presented most unhappily at the Moscow Conference.

I am one of those who consider that the discussion at the Berne Conference on who was responsible for the war *was merely a concession to non-socialist public opinion.*

At Berne it was not only impossible to adopt a decision on this question that would be of some historical value (although it might have some political value), but even the question itself was not broached properly.

The condemnation of the German majority (a condemnation which that majority fully deserved and with which I have very gladly associated myself) could not serve as an exposition of the origin of the war.

The Berne debate was not accompanied by a frank discussion of the views held by other socialists concerning the war.

It produced no formula of conduct for socialists during a war. All the International had said before then was that in a war of national defence socialists must unite with the other parties.

Under these circumstances whom are we going to condemn?

Some of us knew that what the International decided meant nothing and did not constitute a practical guide for action.

We knew that such a war would end in victory for imperialism and, being neither pacifists in the usual sense of the word nor anti-pacifists, we pursued a policy which in our opinion was the only one compatible with internationalism. *But the International* never prescribed any such rule of conduct for us.

That is why the moment the war began the International collapsed. It lost its authority and did not issue a single decision on the basis of which we would now have the right to condemn those who honestly carried out the resolutions of the international congresses.

In consequence, the attitude we should adopt today is the following: instead of parting ways on account of what has taken place, let us create a really active International which will guard the socialist

movement during the period of revolution and reconstruction which we have now entered.

We must restore our socialist principles. We must place our international socialist conduct on firm foundations.

If, however, it appears that we differ essentially on these principles, if we do not arrive at any agreement on the issues of freedom and democracy, if our views on the conditions under which the proletariat may take power are definitely at variance, if finally it turns out that the war has infected some sections of the International with the virus of imperialism, then a split is possible.

But I do not think there should be such a calamity.

That is why I regret the Moscow Manifesto as being premature, to say the least, and certainly useless; and I hope that my French comrades, upon whom as well as upon me during the sombre last four years so much slander and misfortune has been heaped, will not, in an outburst of impatience, be instrumental in breaking up international solidarity.

Otherwise their children will have to set up that solidarity once more, if the proletariat is ever to rule the world.

J. Ramsay MacDonald

The author of this article, as the reader can see, tries to prove that a split is unnecessary. However, its inevitability follows from the very *way* the argument is presented by Ramsay MacDonald—that typical representative of the Second International and worthy colleague of Scheidemann and Kautsky, Vandervelde and Branting, and so on and so forth.

Ramsay MacDonald's article is a fine specimen of the smooth, euphonious, hackneyed, apparently socialistic phrases which have long served in all the advanced capitalist countries to conceal bourgeois policy within the working-class movement.

I

Let us begin with what is least important but especially characteristic. Like Kautsky (in his pamphlet *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*), the author repeats the bourgeois lie that no one in Russia foresaw the role of the Soviets, that the Bolsheviks and I began to fight Kerensky only on the issue of the Constituent Assembly.

That is a bourgeois lie. Actually, as early as April 4, 1917, the first day after my arrival in Petrograd, I presented

"theses" containing the demand for a *Soviet*, and not a *bourgeois-parliamentary*, republic. I repeated this many times under Kerensky in the press and at meetings. The Bolshevik Party solemnly and officially announced this in the decisions of its conference of April 29, 1917. Who does not know this does *not want* to know the truth about the socialist revolution in Russia. If one does not want to understand that a bourgeois-parliamentary republic with a Constituent Assembly is a step forward from the same sort of republic *without* a Constituent Assembly, and that a *Soviet* republic is two steps forward, one is merely closing one's eyes to the difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

To call oneself a socialist and not to see this difference two years after the issue was raised in Russia and one and a half years after the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia means stubbornly to remain completely captive to "non-socialist public opinion", *that is to say*, to the ideas and the policy of the bourgeoisie.

A split with such people is necessary and inevitable, for it is impossible to accomplish the socialist revolution if you join hands with those who pull in the direction of the bourgeoisie.

And if "leaders" like Ramsay MacDonald or Kautsky, etc., have refused to overcome even so very small a "difficulty" as an acquaintance with the *documents* concerning the attitude of the Bolsheviks toward Soviet power, concerning the way this problem was posed before and after October 25 (November 7), 1917, would it not be ridiculous to expect such people to be ready and able to overcome the incomparably greater difficulties of the real struggle for a socialist revolution?

There are none so deaf as those who will not hear.

II

Let us pass on to the second untruth (from among the countless untruths in which the whole article by Ramsay MacDonald abounds, for in this article there are perhaps more untruths than words). This untruth is probably the most important one.

Ramsay MacDonald asserts that until the war of 1914-18 the International only said that "in a war of national defence socialists must unite with the other parties".

That is a monstrous, a glaring deviation from the truth.

Everybody knows that the Basle Manifesto of 1912 was unanimously adopted by all socialists and that of all the documents of the International it alone refers precisely to the war between the British and German groups of imperialist predators, which in 1912 everybody clearly saw was in preparation and which broke out in 1914. It was about this war that the Basle Manifesto said three things which MacDonald now passes over in silence, thereby committing an enormous crime against socialism and proving that with people like him a split is necessary, because in fact they serve the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat.

These three things are the following:

the war that threatens cannot be justified one whit as being in the interest of national freedom;

in this war it would be a crime on the part of the workers to shoot at one another;

the war leads to proletarian revolution.

Here you have the three basic, fundamental truths, by "forgetting" which (though he put his signature to them before the war) MacDonald *in fact* is going over to the bourgeoisie against the proletariat and thereby proves that a split is necessary.

The Communist International will not agree to unity with parties which refuse to admit this truth and are incapable of demonstrating by their *deeds* their determination, readiness and ability to bring these truths home to the masses.

The Treaty of Versailles has proved even to the stupid and blind, even to the mass of short-sighted people, that the Entente was and is as bloody and filthy an imperialist predator as Germany. Only hypocrites and liars could fail to see this, people who deliberately conduct the policy of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement, direct agents and henchmen of the bourgeoisie (labour lieutenants of the capitalist class,* as the American Socialists say), or people

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

who have so far succumbed to bourgeois ideas and bourgeois influence that they are socialists only in words, but in deeds are petty bourgeois, philistines, toadies to the capitalists. The difference between the first and the second category is important from the viewpoint of their personalities, i.e., for an appraisal of the Tom, Dick or Harry of the social-chauvinists of all countries. For the politician, i.e., from the viewpoint of the relations among millions of people, among the classes, this difference is not substantial.

Those socialists who during the war of 1914-18 failed to understand that it was a criminal, reactionary, predatory, imperialist war on both sides, are social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in words and chauvinists in deeds; friends of the working class in words, but in deeds lackeys of "their own" national bourgeoisie, individuals who help to deceive the people by depicting as "national", "emancipatory", "defensive", "righteous" and so forth the war between the British and German groups of imperialist predators, who are *equally* filthy, selfish, blood-thirsty, criminal, reactionary.

Unity with the social-chauvinists is betrayal of the revolution, betrayal of the proletariat, betrayal of socialism, desertion to the bourgeoisie, because it is "unity" with the *national bourgeoisie* of "one's own" country *against* the unity of the international revolutionary proletariat, is unity *with* the bourgeoisie *against* the proletariat.

The war of 1914-18 has definitely proved this. Let anyone who does not understand this remain in the yellow Berne International of traitor-socialists.

III

Ramsay MacDonald, with the amusing naïveté of a "drawing-room" socialist who carelessly uses words without at all understanding their serious significance, giving no thought whatever to the fact that *words commit one to deeds*, declares that in Berne "a concession to non-socialist public opinion" was made.

Precisely! We regard the whole of the Berne International as yellow, treacherous and perfidious because the *whole* of its policy is a "*concession*" to the bourgeoisie.

Ramsay MacDonald knows perfectly well that we have built the Third International and broken unreservedly with the Second International because we became convinced that it was hopeless, incorrigible, played the part of a servant to imperialism, of a vehicle of bourgeois influence, bourgeois lies and bourgeois corruption in the labour movement. If in desiring to discuss The Third International Ramsay MacDonald evades the substance of the matter, beats about the bush, utters empty phrases and does not speak of what should be spoken about, that is his fault and his crime. For the proletariat needs the truth, and there is nothing more harmful to its cause than plausible, respectable, petty-bourgeois lies.

The problem of imperialism and of its *connection* with opportunism in the labour movement, with the betrayal of the workers' cause by labour leaders, was raised long ago, very long ago.

For a period of *forty* years, from 1852 to 1892, Marx and Engels constantly pointed to the fact that the upper stratum of the British working class was becoming increasingly *bourgeois* as a consequence of the country's peculiar economic conditions (colonies, monopoly of the world market, etc.).[77] In the seventies of last century Marx won himself the honourable hatred of the despicable heroes of the Berne International trend of those days, of the opportunists and reformists, for branding many of the British trade union leaders as men who had sold themselves to the bourgeoisie or were in its pay for services rendered to *its* class *from within* the labour movement.

During the Anglo-Boer War, the Anglo-Saxon press quite clearly raised the problem of imperialism as the latest (*and last*) stage of capitalism. If my memory serves me right, it was none other than Ramsay MacDonald who then resigned from the Fabian Society, that prototype of the Berne International, that nursery and model of opportunism, which Engels describes, with the power, brilliancy and truth of genius, in his correspondence with Sorge.[78] "Fabian imperialism"—such was the common expression employed at that time in British socialist literature.

If Ramsay MacDonald has forgotten this, all the worse for him.

"Fabian imperialism" and "social-imperialism" are one and the same thing: socialism in words, imperialism in deeds, *the growth of opportunism into imperialism*. This has now become, during the war of 1914-18 and since, a universal fact. The failure to understand it shows the great blindness of the Berne yellow International, and is its great crime. Opportunism, or reformism, inevitably had to grow into a phenomenon of world-wide importance, *socialist imperialism*, or social-chauvinism, because imperialism brought to the fore a handful of very rich, advanced nations, engaged in plundering the whole world, and thereby enabled the bourgeoisie of those countries, out of their monopolist superprofits (imperialism is monopoly capitalism), *to bribe the upper strata of the working class*.

Only ignoramuses or hypocrites who deceive the workers by repeating *platitudes* about capitalism and in this way cover up the bitter truth that *a whole trend in socialism* has gone over to the imperialist bourgeoisie could fail to see the economic inevitability of this development under imperialism.

And from this fact two indisputable conclusions emerge.

First conclusion: the Berne International is in fact, from the angle of its real historical and political role, and irrespective of the good will and pious wishes of particular members of it, *an organisation of agents of international imperialism* operating *within* the labour movement, permeating *that movement* with bourgeois influence, bourgeois ideas, bourgeois lies, and bourgeois corruption.

In countries where democratic parliamentary culture is of long standing, the bourgeoisie has learned splendidly to use deception, bribery and flattery in their most subtle forms as well as violence. Not for nothing have the "luncheons" given to British "labour leaders" (i.e., lieutenants of the bourgeoisie whose duty is to fool the workers) have acquired notoriety; Engels in his day spoke about them.[79] To the same category of facts belongs the "charming" reception given by M. Clemenceau to the traitor-socialist Merrheim, the courteous receptions given by Entente ministers to the leaders of the Berne International, and so on and so forth. "You train 'em, and we buy 'em," a clever capitalist, an Englishwoman, said to Mr. Social-imperial-

ist Hyndman, who related in his memoirs how this lady, a person shrewder than all the leaders of the Berne International put together, appraised the "labours" of the socialist intellectuals in training workers to become socialist leaders.

During the war, when the Vanderveldes, Brantings and the whole gang of traitors organised "international" conferences, the French bourgeois newspapers were bitingly scornful, and rightly so. They said: "These Vanderveldes seem to be suffering from a sort of tic. Just as those who suffer from tic cannot utter a couple of phrases without strangely twitching the muscles of the face, so the Vanderveldes cannot make a political speech without repeating, parrot-like, the words internationalism, socialism, international working-class solidarity, proletarian revolution, etc. Let them repeat any sacramental formulas they like so long as they help to lead the workers by the nose and serve us, the capitalists, in waging the imperialist war and enslaving the workers."

Sometimes the British and French bourgeoisie are very clever and excellently appraise the servile role played by the Berne International.

Martov wrote somewhere: "You Bolsheviks hurl abuse at the Berne International but 'your own' friend Loriot is a member of it."

That is the argument of a rogue; for everybody knows that Loriot is openly, honestly and heroically fighting for the Third International. In 1902, when Zubatov organised meetings of workers in Moscow in order to hoodwink them with "police socialism", the worker Babushkin, whom I had known since 1894 when he was in my study circle for workers in St. Petersburg, and who was one of the best and most devoted workers of the *Iskra* trend, one of the best leaders of the revolutionary proletariat, and was shot in 1906 by Rennenkampf in Siberia—Babushkin *used to attend the Zubatov meetings* in order to fight Zubatovism and to withdraw the workers from its clutches. Babushkin had no more connection with Zubatov than Loriot with Berne.

IV

The second conclusion is that the Third, Communist, International has been formed so as to prevent "socialists" from confining themselves to the *verbal* recognition of

revolution, examples of which are provided by Ramsay MacDonald in his article. Verbal recognition of revolution, which in fact concealed a thoroughly opportunist, reformist, nationalist, petty-bourgeois policy, was the basic sin of the Second International, and we are waging a life-and-death struggle against this evil.

When it is said that the Second International died after suffering shameful bankruptcy, one must be able to understand what this means. It means that opportunism, reformism, petty-bourgeois socialism went bankrupt and died. For the Second International rendered historic service, it has achievements to its credit that are εἰς ἀεὶ (everlasting) and which the class-conscious worker will never renounce—the creation of mass working-class organisations—co-operative, trade union and political—the utilisation of the bourgeois parliamentary system, and of all the institutions in general of bourgeois democracy, etc.

In order to really defeat opportunism, which caused the shameful death of the Second International, in order to really assist the revolution, the approach of which *even* Ramsay MacDonald is obliged to admit, it is necessary:

Firstly, to conduct all propaganda and agitation from the viewpoint of revolution as opposed to reforms, systematically explaining to the masses, both theoretically and practically, at every step of parliamentary, trade union, co-operative, etc., activity, that they are diametrically opposed. Under no circumstances to refrain (save in special cases, by way of exception) from utilising the parliamentary system and all the "liberties" of bourgeois democracy; not to reject reforms, but to regard them *only* as a *by-product* of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. Not a single party affiliated to the Berne International meets these requirements. Not a single one of them shows that it has any idea of how to conduct its propaganda and agitation *as a whole*, explaining how reform *differs* from revolution; nor do they know how to train both the Party and the masses' *unswervingly for revolution*.

Secondly, legal work must be combined with *illegal* work. The Bolsheviks have always taught this, and did so with particular insistence during the war of 1914-18. The heroes of despicable opportunism ridiculed this and smugly extolled

the "legality", "democracy", "liberty" of the West-European countries, republics, etc. Now, however, only out-and-out swindlers, who deceive the workers with phrases, can deny that the Bolsheviks proved to be right. In every single country in the world, even the most advanced and "freest" of the bourgeois republics, bourgeois terror reigns, and there is no such thing as freedom to carry on agitation for the socialist revolution, to carry on propaganda and organisational work precisely in this sense. The party which to this day has not admitted this under the rule of the bourgeoisie and does not carry on systematic, all-sided *illegal* work in spite of the laws of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois parliaments is a party of traitors and scoundrels who deceive the people by their verbal recognition of revolution. The place for such parties is in the yellow, Berne International. There is no room for them in the Communist International.

Thirdly, unswerving and ruthless war must be waged for the expulsion from the labour movement of all those opportunist leaders who exposed themselves both before and particularly during the war, both in the political sphere and particularly in the trade unions, and the co-operatives. The theory of "neutrality" is a false and despicable evasion, which helped the bourgeoisie to capture the masses in 1914-18. Parties which stand for revolution in words but in deeds fail to carry on undeviating work to spread the influence of precisely the revolutionary and only of the revolutionary party in every sort of mass organisation of the workers are parties of traitors.

Fourthly, there must be no toleration of the verbal condemnation of imperialism while no real revolutionary struggle is waged for the liberation of the colonies (and dependent nations) from one's *own* imperialist bourgeoisie. That is hypocrisy. That is the policy of the agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement (labour lieutenants of the capitalist class). The British, French, Dutch, Belgian, or other party which is hostile to imperialism in words but in deeds does not wage a revolutionary struggle within "its own" colonies for the *overthrow* of "its own" bourgeoisie, does not systematically assist the *revolutionary* work which has already begun everywhere in the colonies, and does not send arms

and literature to the revolutionary parties in the colonies, is a party of scoundrels and traitors.

Fifthly, the extreme hypocrisy of the parties of the Berne International is to be seen in their typical recognition of revolution in words while they flaunt before the workers high-sounding phrases about recognising revolution but as far as deeds are concerned go no farther than adopting a purely reformist attitude to those beginnings, elements, manifestations of the growth of revolution in all mass actions which break bourgeois laws and go beyond the bounds of all legality, as for example, mass strikes, street demonstrations, soldiers' protests, meetings among the troops, leaflet distribution in barracks, camps, etc.

If you ask any hero of the Berne International whether his party does such systematic work, he will answer you either with evasive phrases to conceal that such work is not being done—his party lacks the organisations and the machinery for doing it, is incapable of doing it—or with declamatory speeches against "*putschism*" (pyrotechnics), "anarchism", etc. And it is that which constitutes the betrayal of the working class by the Berne International, its actual desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie.

All the-scoundrelly leaders of the Berne International take great pains to affirm their "sympathy" for revolution in general, and for the Russian revolution in particular. But only hypocrites or simpletons can fail to understand that the particularly rapid successes of the revolution in Russia *are due* to the many years' work by the revolutionary party in the ways indicated; for years illegal machinery was systematically built up to direct demonstrations and strikes, to conduct work among the troops; a detailed study was made of methods; illegal literature was issued summing up experience acquired and educating the whole Party in the idea that revolution was necessary; leaders of the masses were trained for such events, etc., etc.

V

The most profound and radical differences, which sum up all that has been said above and explain the inevitability of an irreconcilable theoretical and practical political strug-

gle of the revolutionary proletariat against the Berne International, centre around two issues—transformation of the imperialist war into civil war, and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The best proof that the Berne International is held captive by bourgeois ideology is its failure to understand (or not desiring to understand, or pretending not to understand) the imperialist character of the war of 1914-18 and the inevitability of its transformation into civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in all the advanced countries.

When the Bolsheviks, as far back as November 1914, pointed to this inevitability, the philistines of all countries retorted with stupid sneers, and among these philistines were all the leaders of the Berne International. Now, the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war has become a fact in a number of countries, not only in Russia but also in Finland, in Hungary, in Germany, and even in neutral Switzerland, and that civil war is maturing is seen, felt, and sensed in all advanced countries without exception.

To ignore this problem now (as Ramsay MacDonald does) or to try *to evade* the issue of the inevitability of civil war with sentimental conciliatory phrases (as Messrs. Kautsky and Co. do) is tantamount to direct betrayal of the proletariat, equivalent to actual desertion to the bourgeoisie. Because the real political leaders of the bourgeoisie have long understood the inevitability of civil war and are making excellent, thoughtful and systematic preparations for it and are strengthening their positions in anticipation of it.

The bourgeoisie of the whole world are exerting all their strength, enormous energy, intellect and determination, hesitating at no crime, and condemning whole countries to famine and complete extinction, in the preparations they are making to crush the proletariat in the impending civil war. The heroes of the Berne International, on the other hand, like simpletons, or hypocritical parsons, or pedantic professors, chant their old, worn-out, threadbare reformist song! No spectacle could be more revolting or more disgusting!

The Kautskys and MacDonalds continue *to frighten* the capitalists with the menace of revolution, *to scare* the bourgeoisie with the menace of civil war in order to obtain concessions from them and get them to agree to follow the

reformist path. This is what all the writings, all the philosophy, all the policy of the entire Berne International amount to. We saw that miserable lackey's trick played in Russia in 1905 by the liberals (Constitutional-Democrats), and in 1917-19 by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The servile souls of the Berne International never think of *inculcating upon* the masses the idea of the inevitability and necessity of *defeating* the bourgeoisie in civil war, of pursuing a policy wholly dedicated to this aim, of elucidating, raising and solving all problems from this, and only from this, point of view. That is why our sole aim should be once and for all to push the incorrigible reformists, i.e., nine-tenths of the leaders of the Berne International, into the cesspool of the hirelings of the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie *needs* hirelings who enjoy the trust of a section of the working class, whitewash and prettify the bourgeoisie with talk about the reformist path being possible, throw dust in the eyes of the people by such talk, and *divert* the people from revolution by giving glowing descriptions of the charms and possibilities of the reformist path.

All the writings of the Kautskys, and of our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, boil down to such whitewashing and to the whining of the cowardly philistine who fears revolution.

We cannot repeat here in detail the main economic causes that have made the revolutionary (and only the revolutionary) path inevitable, and have made impossible any solution other than civil war to the problems history has placed on the order of the day. Volumes must and will be written about this. If the Kautskys and other leaders of the Berne International do not understand this, all that can be said is ignorance is closer to the truth than prejudice.

Now, after the war, ignorant but sincere men of labour and supporters of the working people, understand the inevitability of revolution, of civil war and of the dictatorship of the proletariat far more easily than do the gentlemen stuffed with most learned reformist prejudices, the Kautskys, MacDonalds, Vandervelde, Brantings, Turatis, and *tutti quanti*.*

* All the others.—*Ed.*

As one of the particularly striking confirmations of the phenomenon observable everywhere, on a mass scale, namely, that of the growth of revolutionary consciousness among the masses, we may take the novels of Henri Barbusse, *Le Feu* (Under Fire) and *Clarté* (Light). The former has already been translated into all languages, and in France 230,000 copies have been sold. The transformation of an absolutely ignorant rank-and-filer, utterly crushed by philistine ideas and prejudices, into a revolutionary under the influence of the war is depicted with extraordinary power, talent and truthfulness.

The mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians are on our side and are coming over to us by leaps and bounds. The Berne International is a General Staff without an army, and will collapse like a house of cards if thoroughly exposed to the masses.

The name of Karl Liebknecht was used in the whole of the Entente bourgeois press during the war in order to deceive the masses; the French and British imperialist pirates and plunderers were shown as sympathising with this hero, with this "sole honest German", as they said.

Now the heroes of the Berne International belong to the same organisation as the Scheidemanns who engineered the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the Scheidemanns who fulfilled the role of worker-executioners and rendered hangman's service to the bourgeoisie. In words—hypocritical attempts to "condemn" the Scheidemanns (as if "condemning" makes any difference!). In deeds—belonging to the same organisation as the murderers do.

In 1907 the late Harry Quelch was expelled by the German Government from Stuttgart for describing a gathering of European diplomats as a "thieves' supper".[80] The leaders of the Berne International are not only participants in a thieves' supper, but even in a vile assassins' supper.

They will not escape the justice of the revolutionary workers.

VI

Ramsay MacDonald disposes of the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a couple of words as if it were a subject for a discussion on freedom and democracy.

But it is not. It is time to act, it is too late for discussions.

The most dangerous thing about the Berne International is its verbal recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. These people are capable of recognising everything, of signing everything, as long as they can keep at the head of the labour movement. Kautsky now says that he is not opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat! The French social-chauvinists and Centrists put their names to resolutions in favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat!

But they deserve not the slightest confidence.

It is not verbal recognition that is needed, but a complete rupture *in deeds* with the policy of reformism, with prejudices about bourgeois freedom and bourgeois democracy, the pursuit in deeds of the policy of revolutionary class struggle.

Attempts are being made to recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat in words, in order to smuggle in along with it the "will of the majority", "universal suffrage" (this is exactly what Kautsky does), bourgeois parliamentarism, rejection of the idea that the entire bourgeois machinery of state must be destroyed, smashed, blown up. These new evasions, new loopholes of reformism, are most of all to be feared.

The dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible if the majority of the population did not consist of proletarians and semi-proletarians. Kautsky and Co. try to falsify this truth by arguing that "the vote of the majority is required for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be recognised as "valid".

Comical pedants! They fail to understand that voting within the bounds, institutions and customs of bourgeois parliamentarism is a *part* of the bourgeois state machinery that has to be broken and smashed from top to bottom *in order* to give effect to the dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to pass from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy.

They fail to understand that when history places the dictatorship of the proletariat on the order of the day it is not voting, but civil war that decides *all* serious political problems.

They fail to understand that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule of *one* class, which takes into its hands the *entire* machinery of the new state, and which *defeats* the

bourgeoisie and *neutralises* the whole of the petty bourgeoisie—the peasantry, the lower middle class and the intelligentsia.

The Kautskys and MacDonalds recognise the class struggle in words, but in deeds forget about it at the most decisive moment in the history of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat—at the moment when, having seized state power, and supported by the semi-proletariat, the proletariat with the aid of this power *continues* the class struggle until *classes are abolished.*

Like real philistines, the leaders of the Berne International repeat bourgeois-democratic catchwords about freedom, equality and democracy, but fail to see that they are repeating fragments of ideas concerning the free and equal *commodity owner*, fail to understand that the proletariat needs a state not for the "freedom", but *for the suppression* of its enemy, the exploiter, the capitalist.

The freedom and equality of the *commodity owner* are as dead as capitalism. And the Kautskys and MacDonalds will never be able to revive it.

The proletariat needs the abolition of classes—such is the *real* content of proletarian democracy, of proletarian freedom (freedom *from* the capitalist, from commodity exchange), of proletarian equality (not equality of *classes*—that is the banality which the Kautskys, Vanderveldes and MacDonalds slip into—but the equality of the working people who *overthrow* capital and capitalism).

So long as classes exist the freedom and equality of classes is a bourgeois deception. The proletariat takes power, becomes the *ruling* class, smashes bourgeois parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, suppresses the bourgeoisie, suppresses *all* the attempts of *all* other classes to return to capitalism, gives *real* freedom and equality to the working people (which is practicable only when the private ownership of the means of production *has been abolished*), and gives them not only the "right to", but the *real* use of, *what has been taken* from the bourgeoisie.

He who fails to understand *this* content of the dictatorship of the proletariat (or what is the same thing, Soviet power, or proletarian democracy) is misusing the term dictatorship of the proletariat.

I cannot here develop these ideas in greater detail; I have done so in *The State and Revolution* and in the pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. I shall conclude by dedicating these remarks to the delegates to the Lucerne Congress[81] (August 10, 1919) of the Berne International.

July 14, 1919

Published in August 1919

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SITUATION DELIVERED TO A RED ARMY CONFERENCE HELD IN KHODYNSKOYE CAMP JULY 15, 1919

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin's appearance on the platform was greeted by a storm of applause. Lenin said that they were living at an important moment—the concluding stage of the imperialist war. After the defeat of Germany in November 1918, all the Allies had been busy drawing up peace terms and saying that German imperialism was dead and the peoples had been liberated. The National Assembly had ratified the Treaty and peace had been established after a war in which ten million people had died and twenty million had been maimed for gain, for purposes of plunder.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles the Bolsheviks were proved to have been right—the Treaty of Versailles was worse than the Treaty of Brest that Soviet Russia had at one time concluded with moribund German imperialism. It was becoming clearer and clearer that the day of the Treaty of Versailles would be the day of defeat for British, American and any other imperialism. Immediately the Treaty had been signed the imperialists became busy dividing up the colonies; Britain had taken Persia; Syria and Turkey were being carved up, and the eyes of the workers in capitalist countries had been opened to the fact that the war had been a war between predators. Strange as it might have seemed, information had been received to the effect that Prince Lvov, a former member of Kerensky's Provisional Government who was then in Paris, was demanding that

the Allies give Constantinople and the Straits to Russia on the grounds that Russia had fought in the war only for their sake—naturally this naïve demand received an answer to the effect that they would be given only to old, powerful Russia.

In order to hoodwink the people, the French imperialists had appointed July 14, the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille, as the day on which to celebrate victory over Germany. The French workers, however, had not taken the bait, and on July 14 café and restaurant employees had declared a strike—on the day on which the streets are usually filled with carnival crowds and people dancing all the cafés and restaurants were closed and there was no celebration. British, French and Italian workers had declared a general strike for July 21[82] and one could say that for France and Britain the Treaty of Versailles would end with a defeat of the capitalists and a victory of the proletariat in the same way as the Treaty of Brest had for Germany. The failure of the first Entente offensive in the South of Russia and of the second offensive in Siberia were an indication of this movement of the proletariat in the West, and showed that the proletariat were for Soviet Russia.

The peasantry of Siberia and the Ukraine, who had formerly given their support to Kolchak and Denikin had turned against them after imposition of taxes, wholesale plunder and violence. It had become clear that Kolchak was finished and that victory over Denikin was near; this victory would end with the victory of the proletariat in the West, for the working-class movement in the West was acquiring a Bolshevik character, and although Russia and her Soviet power had at first been alone, she had later been joined by Soviet Hungary. Events were moving towards the transfer of power to the Workers' Councils in Germany and the day was not far distant when all Europe would be united in a single Soviet republic that would remove the rule of the capitalists throughout the world. (*Prolonged applause.*)

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Published according to the newspaper text

ANSWERS TO AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST'S QUESTIONS[83]

I answer the five questions put to me on condition of the fulfilment of the written promise that my answers will be printed in full in over a hundred newspapers in the United States of America.

1. The governmental programme of the Soviet Government was not a reformist, but a revolutionary one. Reforms are concessions obtained from a ruling class that retains its rule. Revolution is the overthrow of the ruling class. Reformist programmes, therefore, usually consist of many items of partial significance. Our revolutionary programme consisted properly of one general item—removal of the yoke of the landowners and capitalists, the overthrow of their power and the emancipation of the working people from those exploiters. This programme we have never changed. Some partial measures aimed at the realisation of the programme have often been subjected to change; their enumeration would require a whole volume. I will only mention that there is one other general point in our governmental programme which has, perhaps, given rise to the greatest number of changes of partial measures. That point is—the suppression of the exploiters' resistance. After the Revolution of October 25 (November 7), 1917 we did not close down even the bourgeois newspapers and there was no mention of terror at all. We released not only many of Kerensky's ministers, but even Krasnov who had made war on us. It was only after the exploiters, i.e., the capitalists, had begun developing their resistance that we began to crush that resistance systematically, applying even terror. This was the proletariat's response to such actions of the bourgeoisie

as the conspiracy with the capitalists of Germany, Britain, Japan, America and France to restore the rule of the exploiters in Russia, the bribery of the Czechoslovaks with Anglo-French money, the bribery of Mannerheim, Denikin and others with German and French money, etc. One of the latest conspiracies leading to "a change"—to put it precisely, leading to increased terror against the bourgeoisie in Petrograd—was that of the bourgeoisie, acting jointly with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; their conspiracy concerned the surrender of Petrograd, the seizure of Krasnaya Gorka by officer-conspirators, the bribing by British and French capitalists of employees of the Swiss Embassy and of many Russian employees, etc.

2. The activities of our Soviet Republic in Afghanistan, India and other Moslem countries outside Russia are the same as our activities among the numerous Moslems and other non-Russian peoples inside Russia. We have made it possible, for instance, for the Bashkirian people to establish an autonomous republic within Russia, we are doing everything possible to help the independent, free development of every nationality, the growth and dissemination of literature in the native language of each of them, we are translating and propagandising our Soviet Constitution which has the misfortune to be more pleasing to more than a thousand million inhabitants of the earth who belong to colonial, dependent, oppressed, underprivileged nations than the constitutions of the West-European and American bourgeois-"democratic" states that perpetuate private property in land and capital, i.e., strengthen the oppression of the working people of their own countries and of hundreds of millions of people in the colonies of Asia, Africa, etc., by a small number of "civilised" capitalists.

3. As far as the United States and Japan are concerned, our first political objective is to repulse their shameless, criminal, predatory invasion of Russia that serves only to enrich their capitalists. We have many times made solemn proposals of peace to both these countries, but they have not even answered us and continue to make war on us, helping Denikin and Kolchak, plundering Murmansk and Archangel, ruining and laying waste to, especially, Eastern Siberia, where the Russian peasants are offering heroic resistance to

the capitalist bandits of Japan and the United States of America.

We have one further political and economic objective in respect of all peoples—including those of the United States and Japan—fraternal alliance with the workers and all working people of all countries without exception.

4. We have, on many occasions, given a precise, clear and written exposition of the terms upon which we agree to conclude peace with Kolchak, Denikin and Mannerheim—for instance to Bullitt[84] who conducted negotiations with us (and with me personally in Moscow) on behalf of the United States Government, in a letter to Nansen,[85] etc. It is not our fault that the governments of the United States and other countries are afraid to publish those documents in full and that they hide the truth from the people. I will mention only our basic condition; we are prepared to pay all debts to France and other countries provided there is a real peace and not peace in words alone, i.e., if it is formally signed and ratified by the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan and Italy—Denikin, Kolchak, Mannerheim and the others being mere pawns in the hands of those governments.

5. More than anything else I should like to state the following to the American public:

Compared to feudalism, capitalism was an historical advance along the road of "liberty", "equality", "democracy" and "civilisation". Nevertheless capitalism was, and remains, a system of *wage-slavery*, of the enslavement of millions of working people, workers and peasants, by an insignificant minority of modern slave-owners, landowners and capitalists. Bourgeois democracy, as compared to feudalism, has changed the form of this economic slavery, has created a brilliant screen for it but has not, and could not, change its essence. Capitalism and bourgeois democracy are wage-slavery.

The gigantic progress of technology in general, and of means of transport in particular, and the tremendous growth of capital and banks have resulted in capitalism becoming mature and overmature. It has outlived itself. It has become the most reactionary hindrance to human progress. It has become reduced to the absolute power of a handful of

millionaires and multimillionaires who send whole nations into a bloodbath to decide whether the German or the Anglo-French group of plunderers is to obtain the spoils of imperialism, power over the colonies, financial "spheres of influence" or "mandates to rule", etc.

During the war of 1914-18 tens of millions of people were killed or mutilated for that reason and for that reason alone. Knowledge of this truth is spreading with indomitable force and rapidity among the working people of all countries, the more so because the war has everywhere caused unparalleled ruin, and because interest on war debts has to be paid *everywhere*, even by the "victor" nations. What is this interest? It is a tribute of thousands of millions to the millionaire gentlemen who were kind enough to allow tens of millions of workers and peasants to kill and maim one another to settle the question of the division of profits by the capitalists.

The collapse of capitalism is inevitable. The revolutionary consciousness of the masses is everywhere growing; there are thousands of signs of this. One small sign, unimportant, but impressive to the man in the street, is the novels written by Henri Barbusse (*Le Feu*, *Clarté*) who was a peaceful, modest, law-abiding petty bourgeois, a philistine, a man in the street, when he went to the war.

The capitalists, the bourgeoisie, can at "best" put off the victory of socialism in one country or another at the cost of slaughtering further hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. But they cannot save capitalism. The *Soviet Republic* has come to take the place of capitalism, the Republic which gives power to the working people and only to the working people, which entrusts the proletariat with the guidance of their liberation, which abolishes private property in land, factories and other means of production, because this private property is the source of the exploitation of the many by the few, the source of mass poverty, the source of predatory wars between nations, wars that enrich only the capitalists.

The victory of the world Soviet republic is certain.

A brief illustration in conclusion: the American bourgeoisie are deceiving the people by boasting of the liberty, equality and democracy of their country. But neither this

nor any other bourgeoisie nor any government in the world can accept, it is afraid to accept, a contest with our government on the basis of real liberty, equality and democracy; let us suppose that an agreement ensured our government and any other government freedom to exchange ... pamphlets published in the name of the government in any language and containing the text of the laws of the given country, the text of its constitution, and an explanation of its superiority over the others.

Not one bourgeois government in the world would dare conclude such a peaceful, civilised, free, equal, democratic treaty with us.

Why? Because all of them, with the exception of Soviet governments, keep in power by the oppression and deception of the masses. But the great war of 1914-18 exposed the great deception.

Lenin

July 20, 1919

Pravda No. 162,
July 25, 1919

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THE FOOD AND WAR SITUATION

SPEECH AT A MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF FACTORY COMMITTEES TRADE UNIONS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MOSCOW CENTRAL WORKERS' CO-OPERATIVE
JULY 30, 1919

(*Applause.*) Comrades, I should like to give you a brief, summarised explanation of the food situation and the war situation. I expect that you are all familiar with the main facts in these spheres and my job seems to be to throw some light on the significance of those facts.

At this very moment when you have to settle problems of the co-operatives we are experiencing a moment of difficulty similar to that of last summer, especially in regard to food. You know that our food policy has been a great success during the past year as compared with that of the previous year. It is hardly likely that we can measure the success of our Soviet activities in other fields as accurately as we can in the field of food supplies. During the first year of Soviet power—it included the last period of the Kerensky regime—state procurements amounted to only 30 million poods. In the following year we procured 107 million poods despite a worse war situation and worse conditions of access to the best grain-growing regions, since Siberia, the Ukraine and the greater part of the distant South were out of reach. Despite this our grain procurements were, as you see, trebled. Viewed from the standpoint of the food supply apparatus, this was an important success, but from the standpoint of actual food supplies for the non-agricultural districts it is very little; when the food conditions of the non-agricultural population, especially those of the urban working popula-

tion, were given a thorough study, it was found that this spring and summer the urban worker obtained about a half his food from the Commissariat of Food and had to buy the rest on the open market, at Sukharevka, and from the profiteers; furthermore, the first half accounts for one-tenth of the worker's expenditure on food, while for the second half he has to pay nine-tenths. The profiteering gentry, as is to be expected, get nine times as much out of the worker as the state does for grain procured. If we examine the exact figures of our food situation we shall have to admit that we are standing with one foot in the old capitalism, that we have clambered only half-way out of that morass, out of that swamp of profiteering, on to the road of genuine socialist grain procurement, where grain ceases to be a commodity, ceases to be the object of profiteering, the object of and reason for squabbles, for struggle and for the impoverishment of the many. As you see very little has been done insofar as concerns the needs of the non-agricultural and working-class population, but you have only to imagine the difficult conditions under which the work had to be done, with the Civil War going on, when the greater part of the grain-growing regions was not in our hands, to realise that the food supply apparatus has been built up at unusually high speed. I think that everybody will agree with me that in this respect the organisational task, the task of collecting grain from the peasantry in a non-capitalist manner has been an extremely difficult one that cannot be carried out by any change of institutions—to say nothing of a change of government—because it is a task that requires organisational changes, it requires the reorganisation of the basis of farm life that has been built up in the course of hundreds, if not thousands, of years. If, in conditions of absolute peace, we were to be given, say, five years to build up an organisational apparatus that would be capable of gathering all the grain into the hands of the state and keeping it out of the hands of profiteers, we would say that such speed of social and economic reorganisation is something unprecedented, something unheard of. If we, however, have been able to solve half the problem in less than two years we have done a lot. This is indisputable proof that Soviet power has taken the right line on the food problem, the most

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

difficult and burdensome of problems, and is on the right road. In any case, I can tell you that Soviet power has decided with the greatest firmness to continue only in this way and not to be put off by the waverings, doubts and criticisms and, sometimes, even the despair we see around us. It is no wonder that we witness the most terrible, tormenting despair among people in the hungry places. It is no wonder, because the figures I have quoted on the food obtained by workers in the non-agricultural and urban regions show that they are dependent on profiteers, on chance, and so on, for half their food.

You know that food profiteering in our country has taken on the character of a fierce struggle and sheer plunder on the part of those who have had an opportunity of getting produce to the market. It is not surprising that we meet with despair among those who have gone under in this savage struggle between the profiteers and the hungry. It is obvious that under prevailing conditions, when the railways are working badly, when typical of the chief grain-growing districts is what is happening in the Ukraine, where we have not succeeded in getting an apparatus going, where the remnants of guerrilla methods prevent any possibility of organisational work, where the population has not yet been able to abandon guerrilla methods—obviously all this is to the advantage of Denikin who has scored his easiest victories there, and makes it more difficult for us to make use of the rich grain markets where there are stocks of grain that could easily get us out of our difficulties. I repeat, that under these circumstances it is no wonder that all around we meet expressions of despair from those who have suffered the greatest loss in this battle for bread. If we take the development of Soviet work in its totality and not in individual cases, and compare what was provided by Soviet power with what was provided by the free market, we shall have to admit that the half of the food supply business in the hands of the profiteers is still the source of fierce oppression and the most fantastic, most disgraceful, absolutely uncontrolled profit for the speculators, and this in circumstances when there are, on the one hand, hungry people, and, on the other hand, opportunities for some people to make a profit—it is a source of the most infamous corruption.

It can be understood that people who are unable to grasp this process in all its aspects should, in many cases, instead of thinking about how to solve this new problem in the struggle against capitalism—the organised procurement of grain at fixed prices due to confidence in the workers' state—instead of giving thought to this they say to us, "Look, if the worker spends nine-tenths of his money on Sukharevka that shows that you exist only owing to food profiteers and speculators. And so you have to conform to it." We sometimes hear this from people who think they have their wits about them and have a profound understanding of events. Actually they are indulging in sophistry. The experience of the revolution shows that changes in the form of government are not difficult, that it is possible to oust the ruling class of landowners and capitalists in a short time, if the revolution develops successfully it may be done in a few weeks, but the reorganisation of the fundamental conditions of economic life, the struggle against habits that in the course of hundreds and thousands of years have become second nature to every petty proprietor is something that requires many long years of persistent organisational work after the exploiting classes have been completely overthrown. And when they point out that alongside us Sukharevka is thriving, and tell us how much Soviet power depends on that market, we ask them what they are surprised at. Could the problem possibly have been solved in a period of less than two years with Russia cut off from the best agricultural regions? Those people who most of all object from the standpoint of principle and who even at times assert that they are speaking from a socialist angle—but God save us from such socialism—accuse the Bolsheviks of utopianism and adventurism because the Bolsheviks said that they could and should not only smash the monarchy and landed proprietorship in a revolutionary manner, but they could and should smash the capitalist class as well, and sweep them and the remnants of the imperialist war away so as to clear the ground for organisational work which will require a lengthy period of working-class rule, the only form of rule capable of giving a lead to the peasant masses. Those people who accuse us of utopianism because we recognised the possibility of smashing the capitalist and landowning classes in a revolutionary manner, are themselves

imposing a utopian task upon us by wanting the organisational questions of the new socialist system and the struggle against old customs that cannot be overcome by any abolition of institutions—by wanting these problems settled at a moment when our hands are tied by the Civil War and wanting them settled in a period too brief for their solution by any earthly forces.

Yes, it is the food policy that demonstrates most clearly that the struggle between socialism and capitalism in its latest form is being fought out right here where we not only have to overcome old institutions, not only the landowners and capitalists, but all the habits and economic conditions, created by capitalism, affecting millions of petty proprietors. We have to make reason stronger than their prejudices. Any peasant who is at all class-conscious will agree that freedom to trade in grain and the sale of grain on the open market when the people are hungry means war between people and the enrichment of the profiteers, while for the masses of the people it means hunger. This class-consciousness, however, is not enough because all the peasant's prejudices and all his habits tell him that it is more profitable to sell grain to a profiteer for several hundred rubles than to give it to the state for a few dozen paper rubles that he cannot get anything for at the moment. We say that since the country is ruined, since there is no fuel and the factories are at a standstill, you, the peasant, must help the workers' state, you must give up your grain as a loan. The paper money you are being given for your grain certifies that you have made the state a loan. And if you, the peasant, make the state a loan and give up your grain, the worker will be able to rehabilitate industry. There is no other way of rehabilitating industry in a country that has been ruined by four years of imperialist war and two years of civil war—there is no other way! Any peasant who is a little bit developed and has emerged from his primordial muzhik darkness will agree that there is no other way. But the class-conscious peasant that you can convince if you speak to him as man to man is one thing and the prejudices of millions of peasants are another; they understand that they have lived under capitalism all their lives and consider they are justified in regarding the grain as their property—they have not had any

experience of the new order and cannot put their trust in it. That is why we say that precisely in this sphere, in the matter of food, there is the most bitter war between capitalism and socialism, a war in actual fact and not merely in words and not in the upper echelons of state organisation. Those upper echelons are easily reorganised, and the significance of such changes is not very great. But here the consciousness of the working people and of their vanguard, the working class, is fighting the last, decisive battle against the prejudices and disunity of the peasant masses. When the advocates of capitalism—no matter whether they call themselves representatives of bourgeois parties, or Mensheviks, or Socialist-Revolutionaries—when they say, "Renounce the implementation of the state grain monopoly, the compulsory requisitioning of grain at fixed prices," we answer them by saying, "You, dear, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, you are perhaps sincere people, but you are defenders of capitalism, you preach nothing but the prejudices of the old, petty-bourgeois democracy that knows nothing but freedom to trade, that stands aside from the fierce war against capitalism and considers that all this can be amicably settled." We have enough experience and we know that those who really belong to the working masses, those who have not risen to the upper echelons, those who have been exploited by the landowners and capitalists all their lives—they know that here it is a matter of the last, decisive battle against capitalism, a battle that does not allow of any conciliation. They know that there cannot be any concessions here, in this particular sphere. When Soviet power said that temporarily—as it did last summer—for so many weeks people would be allowed to carry with them one and a half poods of grain, the food apparatus that was later set working procured more than before. You know that at the present time we have had to make a similar concession and allow such an interval—let the worker during his holidays get his own supplies. By this we are giving ourselves greater opportunities to renew our work and guarantee our socialist activities. We are fighting a real battle against capitalism and we assert that no matter what concessions capitalism may force us to make we are still in favour of the struggle against it and against exploitation. We shall fight in this field as ruthlessly as we are

fighting Denikin and Kolchak, because they draw fresh strength for themselves from the might of capitalism, and this might, of course, does not fall from the sky, it is based on freedom to trade in grain and other goods. We know that one of the main sources of capitalism is freedom to trade in grain in the country, and it is this source that has been the ruin of all previous republics. Today the last, decisive battle against capitalism and against freedom to trade is being fought and for us this is a truly basic battle between capitalism and socialism. If we win in this fight there will be no return to capitalism and the former system, no return to what has been in the past. Such a return will be impossible so long as there is a war against the bourgeoisie, against profiteering and against petty proprietorship, and as long as the principle "every man for himself and God for all" is not retained. We have to forget the principle that every peasant should be for himself and Kolchak for all. We now have a new type of relations and of organisation. It must be remembered that socialism is progressing and no matter to what extent we impose remnants of the old on ourselves they will be nothing but old fragments of old ideas because the peasant must have a completely different attitude to the article of consumption he produces; if, on the other hand, he sells food to workers at uncontrolled prices he will most certainly become a bourgeois and a property-owner, but we say that food must be sold at fixed state prices so that we shall have an opportunity to get away from capitalism. And now that we have to live through this difficult period of hunger and compare the present situation with last year's we have to admit that the situation this year is incomparably better than it was last year. It is true that we have to make certain concessions, but we can always answer for them and explain them. But still, although we have done a lot in twenty months of Soviet power we have not yet found a way out of all the difficulties of the present grave situation.

When we have got the peasant away from his property and when we have made him turn towards the work of our state we shall be able to say that we have covered a difficult section of our road. But we shall not deviate from that road, any more than we shall deviate from the road of struggle against Denikin and Kolchak. We hear such things from those

people who call themselves Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as "the war is hopeless", "there is no way out of the war and we must make every effort to end it"—you will hear such things said everywhere. People say this who do not understand the real state of affairs. They think the Civil War is hopeless because it is too burdensome, but can they not understand that the war is being forced on us by European imperialists because they are afraid of Soviet Russia? Furthermore, they have in their palaces, today Savinkov, tomorrow Maklakov and then Breshkovskaya—and they have not got them there for gossip, they talk to them about the most rational way of sending soldiers and guns and other death-dealing weapons here, to us, how to send help to the Archangel Front, how to link it up with the Southern and Eastern fronts and even the Petrograd Front. All Europe, and all-the European bourgeoisie have taken up arms against Soviet Russia. They have become so insolent that they even make such proposals to the Hungarian Government as, "You reject Soviet power and we'll give you bread." I am thinking that the proposal will serve as powerful propaganda in Hungary when they read about it in the Budapest newspapers! Nevertheless it is better and more frank and honest than all the chiromancy about the struggle for freedom to trade, etc. Here the issue is clear you need bread, reject whatever is not to our advantage and we will give you the bread.

If, therefore, the kind capitalists were to turn to the Russian peasants with the same proposal we would be very grateful to them. We should be able to say that we are short of propagandists but now Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson have come to our aid and have shown themselves to be the best propagandists. There would not be any more speeches about the Constituent Assembly, about freedom of assembly, etc., everything would be above-board. But we shall ask the capitalist gentry—you have so many war debts, your bags are packed tight with promissory notes for so many thousand millions of war debts—do you think the people are going to pay them? You have so many shells, cartridges, guns, that you don't now what to do with them—was firing at Russian workers the best thing you could think of? You bought Kolchak, why didn't you save him? You recently

passed a resolution to the effect that the international League of Nations of the Allied powers recognised Kolchak as the only authoritative Russian ruler.[86] And after that nothing was seen of Kolchak but a pair of clean heels. Why did that happen? (*Applause.*) And so we see from the experience of Kolchakia what the promises of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders are worth. Did not they begin the Kolchak campaign? They held power in Samara. What are their promises worth? And what are we to do if they gather against us forces that from the military point of view are, of course, immeasurably superior to ours—we cannot make even an approximate comparison? The bourgeoisie, great and small, naturally draw the relevant conclusion from this and they say to the weary, hungry masses, "You have been dragged into a civil war from which there is no way out. How can your backward, weary country fight against Britain, France and America?" We are constantly hearing this tune sung all round us—we hear it daily and hourly from the bourgeois intelligentsia. They are trying to prove that the Civil War is a hopeless business. We can find the answer in history—the history of the government in Siberia. We know that there a are affluent peasants living there who have never known serfdom and who cannot, therefore, show gratitude to the Bolsheviks for liberating them from the landowners. We know that a government was organised there and that for a start some beautiful banners prepared by the Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov and the Menshevik Maisky were sent there; these banners bore such slogans as "Constituent Assembly", "Freedom to Trade"—they were willing to inscribe on them everything the ignorant peasant wanted so long as he would help them overthrow the Bolsheviks! And what happened to that government? Instead of a Constituent Assembly they got Kolchak's dictatorship, the worst possible, worse than any tsarist dictatorship. Was that an accident? We are told that it was a mistake. Gentlemen—individuals may make mistakes in some act or another in their lives, but here you had the aid of all the best people, the best there were in your parties. Did you not have the help of the intelligentsia? Even if they were not there—and we know that they were—you still had the intelligentsia of all the advanced countries—France, Britain, America and Japan. You

had land, you had a fleet, you had an army and you had money—why, then, did everything collapse? Was it because of a mistake that was made by some Chernov or Maisky? No, it was because there cannot be any middle way in this desperate war, and in order to hold out the bourgeoisie has to shoot down by scores and hundreds the very best of the working class. This is clear from the example of Finland, and now Siberia is showing another example of it. In order to prove the rootless nature of the Bolsheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks began organising a new power and flopped with it triumphantly directly at the feet of Kolchak's government. That was no accident, for the same thing is happening all over the world, and if all the Bolshevik speeches were to disappear, and with them all their printed publications that are being persecuted in every country where Bolshevik pamphlets are being fished out as something infectious and dangerous to poor Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George—if all that were to disappear we would point to Siberia where their henchmen have only just been operating and we would say, "Here is what works better than any agitation!" This shows that there can be no middle way between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the working class. This is an argument that is penetrating into the heads of the least class-conscious of the peasants to say nothing of the working class. You know that the peasants said that they did not want a Bolshevik government, they wanted freedom to trade in grain. You know that in Samara the peasantry, the middle peasants, were on the side of the bourgeoisie. Who has now driven them away from Kolchak? It seems that the peasant alone cannot create his own....* This is confirmed by the entire history of revolution, and anybody who is familiar with it and with the history of the socialist movement knows that the development of political parties in the nineteenth century leads to this.

The peasant, of course, did not know this. He has never studied the history of socialism or the history of revolution but he recognises and believes in arguments derived from his own experience. When he saw that Bolshevik-imposed hardships were for the sake of victory over the exploiters, and

* This word could not be deciphered in the shorthand notes.—*Ed.*

that Kolchak's government brought back capitalism with its old policemen, he said, fully conscious of what he was saying, "I choose the dictatorship of the working-class masses and will go so far as to help in the full defeat of the dictatorship of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (that is what he calls Kolchak's dictatorship) so that there will be the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the people." The history of Kolchak shows that no matter how long the Civil War may last, how difficult it may be and how hopeless it may seem, it will not lead us into a blind alley. It will lead the masses of the people, those that are farthest removed from the Bolsheviks, to believe through their own experience in the need to go over to the side of Soviet power.

And that, comrades, is the war situation. Now allow me to finish up my report by some indications of the co-operative work that we have before us. Many comrades have spoken who are more competent than I to appraise the practical tasks with which you are faced. I will allow myself to express the hope that the task you have to undertake—the creation of a consumers' co-operative society that embraces the masses of the working people—that this tremendously important task will be carried out successfully. In the conditions of capitalist society the co-operatives naturally produced a top group that formed their leadership, and this top layer were all whiteguards. It turned out this way not only in our country; it was proved by the co-operative leaders who concluded an agreement with Kolchak. It was the same in Britain and Germany, in capitalist countries. When the war broke out, the upper strata of the co-operatives who were accustomed to a luxurious way of life, went over to the imperialists.

It is no accident that throughout the world the upper echelons of the socialist parliamentarians, the upper echelons of the socialist movement went over entirely to the imperialists during the imperialist war. They helped start the war, and they have gone so far that their friends head the government that murdered Liebknecht and Luxemburg and are helping shoot the leaders of the working class. This is not the fault of individual people. It is not the crime of any unfortunate criminal. It is the result of capitalism that has corrupted them. That is how it was everywhere in the

world, and Russia is no holy land; we could not get out of capitalist society in any other way than by engaging in a serious war with those upper echelons. It is still not over today, when it embraces the masses of the people and the masses have arisen in struggle against all forms of profiteering. Those who have personally experienced exploitation will not forget it when they take the business of distribution into their own hands. It is possible that in this field we shall suffer quite a few defeats. We know that in this field there is a great deal of backwardness and ignorance and that we shall fail, first in one place and then in another—we know that we cannot achieve anything at a single blow. But we who are conscientiously carrying on Soviet work, we, class-conscious workers and peasants who are organising socialist Russia, shall continue that war. You will pursue this war together with us, and we shall end that war, difficult as it may be, with full victory, comrades. (*Applause.*)

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SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF WORKERS IN EDUCATION AND SOCIALIST CULTURE JULY 31, 1919[87]

Comrades, it gives me great pleasure to greet your Congress in the name of the Council of People's Commissars.

In the sphere of education we have long had to struggle against the same difficulties that Soviet power encounters in all spheres of work and in all spheres of organisation. We saw that organisations regarded as the only mass organisations were from the very outset headed by people who, for a lengthy period, were under the influence of bourgeois prejudices. In the first days of Soviet power, in October 1917, we even saw how the army swamped us in Petrograd with declarations to the effect that it did not recognise Soviet power, threatened to go against Petrograd and expressed solidarity with bourgeois governments. As long ago as that we were sure that these declarations came from the top people in these organisations, from the army committees of that time, who represented the past in the development of the moods, convictions and views of our army. The situation has since then repeated itself in all mass organisations—in respect of the railway proletariat, and again in respect of the post and telegraph employees. We have always noted that at first the past maintains its power and influence over mass organisations. We were, therefore, not at all surprised at the lengthy and stubborn struggle that went on among the schoolteachers, the majority of whom, if not all, from the very beginning took a stand hostile to Soviet power. We saw how we gradually had to overcome bourgeois prejudices

and how the school-teachers, who were closely connected with the workers and labouring peasantry, had to struggle against the former bourgeois system to win for themselves rights and to break a road to a genuine rapprochement with the working masses, to a genuine understanding of the nature of the socialist revolution that was under way. Until now you have had more than anybody else to deal with the old prejudices of the bourgeois intelligentsia, with their usual methods and arguments, with their defence of bourgeois or capitalist society, with their struggle, not usually direct but carried on under cover of some outwardly pleasant slogans which are advanced to defend capitalism in one way or another.

Comrades, you may remember how Marx describes the way the worker got to the modern capitalist factory, how he analysed the enslavement of the worker in a disciplined, cultured and "free" capitalist society, studied the causes of the oppression of labour by capital, how he approached the fundamentals of the production process, how he described the worker's entry into a capitalist factory where the robbery of surplus-value takes place and the foundation of capitalist exploitation is laid down, where capitalist society is built, the society that gives riches to the few and holds the many in a state of oppression. When Marx reached this most significant, most fundamental place in his book—the analysis of capitalist exploitation—he accompanied his introduction to this analysis with the ironical remark that the place he was taking the reader to, the place where profit was extracted by the capitalists, was the place where liberty, equality and Bentham ruled.[88] By this Marx stressed the ideology upheld by the bourgeoisie in capitalist society and which they justify because from their point of view, from the point of view of the bourgeoisie who had won the fight against the feudals, "Liberty, Equality and Bentham" ruled in capitalist society which was based on the rule of money, the rule of capital and the exploitation of the working people. What they call liberty is liberty to make profit, liberty for the few to become rich, the liberty of the trade turnover; what they call equality is equality between capitalist and worker; and the rule of Bentham is the rule of the petty-bourgeois prejudice about liberty and equality.

If we look around us, if we take a look at those arguments that were used in the struggle against us yesterday and which are being used today by members of the old teachers' union and which we still meet with among our ideological opponents who call themselves socialists (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks), those arguments that we meet with in a not very conscious form in our day-to-day talks with the peasant masses who have not yet understood the significance of socialism—if you take a look at and give some thought to the ideological meaning of these arguments you will find the very same bourgeois motif that Marx stressed in *Capital*. All these people reiterate the catch-phrase that Liberty, Equality and Bentham rule in capitalist society. And when objections to us are raised from this point of view and it is said that we, the Bolsheviks and Soviet power, are contravening freedom and equality, we refer those who say so to the elements of political economy, to the basic doctrines of Marx. We maintain that the freedom you accuse the Bolsheviks of contravening is the freedom of capital, the freedom of an owner to sell grain on the open market, i.e., the freedom for the few to make profit, for those who have grain surpluses. That freedom of the press that the Bolsheviks have constantly been accused of having violated—what is this freedom of the press in a capitalist society? Everybody could see what the press was in our "free" Russia. This was seen to a still greater extent by people who were familiar with, have been able to observe closely or had had dealings with press affairs in the advanced capitalist countries. Freedom of the press in capitalist society means freedom to trade in publications and in their influence on the masses. Freedom of the press means that the press, a powerful medium for influencing the masses, is maintained at the expense of the capitalists. Such is the freedom of the press that the Bolsheviks violated and they are proud of having produced the first press free of the capitalists, that in a gigantic country they have for the first time set up a press that does not depend on a handful of rich men and millionaires—a press that is devoted entirely to the struggle against capital, the struggle to which we must subordinate everything. Only the factory proletariat that is capable of leading the peasant masses

that are not class-conscious can be the leader, the vanguard, of the working people in this struggle.

When we are reproached with having established a dictatorship of one party and, as you have heard, a united socialist front is proposed, we say, "Yes, it is a dictatorship of one party! This is what we stand for and we shall not shift from that position because it is the party that has won, in the course of decades, the position of vanguard of the entire factory and industrial proletariat. This party had won that position even before the revolution of 1905. It is the party that was at the head of the workers in 1905 and which since then—even at the time of the reaction after 1905 when the working-class movement was rehabilitated with such difficulty under the Stolypin Duma—merged with the working class and it alone could lead that class to a profound, fundamental change in the old society." When a united socialist front is proposed to us we say that it is the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties that propose it, and that they have wavered in favour of the bourgeoisie throughout the revolution. We have had a double experience—the Kerensky period when the Socialist-Revolutionaries formed a coalition government that was helped by the Entente, that is, by the world bourgeoisie, the imperialists of France, America and Britain. What did that result in? Was there that gradual transition to socialism they had promised? No, there was collapse, the absolute rule of the imperialists, the rule of the bourgeoisie and the complete bankruptcy of all sorts of illusions about class conciliation.

If that experience is not enough, take Siberia. There we saw the same thing happen again. In Siberia the government was against the Bolsheviks. At the beginning the entire bourgeoisie who had fled from Soviet power came to the help of the Czechoslovak uprising and the uprising of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. They were helped by the entire bourgeoisie and the capitalists of the most powerful countries of Europe and America; their aid was not merely ideological but financial and military aid as well. And what was the result? What came of this rule that was allegedly the rule of the Constituent Assembly, that allegedly democratic government of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks? It led to the Kolchak gamble. Why did it lead to the

collapse that we have witnessed? Because here we saw the effect of the basic truth, which the so-called socialists from the camp of our opponents do not want to understand, that there can be only one of two possible powers in capitalist society, either the power of the capitalists or the power of the proletariat, no matter whether that society is developing, is firmly on its feet, or is declining. Every middle-of-the-road power is a dream, and every attempt to set up something in between leads only to people, even if they are absolutely sincere, shifting to one side or the other. Only the power of the proletariat, only the rule of the workers can ally to itself the majority of those who work, because the peasant masses, although they constitute a mass of working people, are nevertheless to a certain extent the owners of their small properties, of their own grain. And that is the struggle that has unfolded before our eyes, the struggle which shows how the proletariat, in the course of lengthy political trials, during the changes in governments that we see in various places on the outskirts of Russia, is sweeping away everything that serves exploitation, it shows how the proletariat is breaking its own road and is becoming more and more the genuine, absolute leader of the masses of working people in suppressing and eliminating the resistance of capital.

Those who say that the Bolsheviks violate freedom and who propose the formation of a united socialist front, that is, an alliance with those who vacillated, and twice in the history of the Russian revolution went over to the side of the bourgeoisie—these people are very fond of accusing us of resorting to terror. They say that the Bolsheviks have introduced a system of terror in administration, and if Russia is to be saved, the Bolsheviks must renounce it. This reminds me of a witty French bourgeois who, in his bourgeois manner, said with reference to the abolition of the death penalty, "Let the murderers be the first to abolish the death penalty." I recall this when people say, "Let the Bolsheviks renounce the terror." Let the Russian capitalists and their allies, America, France and Britain, that is, those who first imposed terror on Soviet Russia, let them renounce it! They are the imperialists who attacked us and are still attacking us with all their military might, which is a thousand times greater

than ours. Is it not terror for all the Entente countries, all the imperialists of Britain, France and America, to keep in their capitals servitors of international capital—whether their names are Sazonov or Maklakov—who have organised tens and hundreds of thousands of the dissatisfied, ruined, humiliated and indignant representatives of capital and the bourgeoisie? You must have heard about the plots among the military, you must have read about the latest plot in Krasnaya Gorka, which nearly led to the loss of Petrograd; what was this but a manifestation of terror on the part of the bourgeoisie of the whole world, which will commit any violence, crime and atrocity in order to reinstate the exploiters in Russia and stamp out the names of the socialist revolution, which is now threatening even their own countries? There is the source of terror, that is where the responsibility lies! That is why we are sure that those who preach renunciation of terror in Russia are nothing but conscious, or unwitting, tools and agents of the imperialist terrorists, who are trying to crush Russia with their blockades and aid to Denikin and Kolchak. But their cause is a hopeless one.

Russia is the country assigned by history the role of trail-blazer of the socialist revolution, and that is just why so much struggle and suffering has fallen to our lot. The capitalists and imperialists of other countries realise that Russia is up in arms, and that the future not only of Russian but of international capital is being decided in Russia. That is why in all their press—in all the bourgeois world press which they have bribed with their many millions—they spread the most incredible slanders about the Bolsheviks.

They are attacking Russia in the name of the selfsame principles of "Liberty, Equality and Bentham". If you come across someone in this country who thinks that when he speaks of freedom and equality and of their violation by the Bolsheviks, he is championing something that is quite independent, the principles of democracy in general, ask him to have a look at the capitalist press of Europe. What is the screen being used by Denikin and Kolchak, what is the screen being used by European capitalists and the bourgeoisie in their efforts to crush Russia? Liberty and equality—that is all they talk about! When the Americans, British

and French seized Archangel, when they sent their troops to the South, they did so in defence of liberty and equality. That is the kind of slogan they use as camouflage, and that is why the proletariat of Russia has risen against world capital in this fierce struggle. Such is the purpose of these slogans of freedom and equality which all agents of the bourgeoisie use to deceive the people, and which intellectuals who really side with the workers and peasants have to expose.

We see that as the attempts of the Entente imperialists become more desperate and vicious they meet with ever greater resistance on the part of the proletariat of their own countries. The first attempt at an international strike by workers in Britain, France and Italy against their governments that was made on July 21 had as its slogan, "Hands off Russia, and an honest peace with the Republic". This strike failed. Separate strikes broke out in Britain, France and Italy. In America and Canada, everything that looks like Bolshevism is fiercely persecuted. In the last few years, we have gone through two great revolutions. We know how hard it was for the vanguard of the Russian working people in 1905 to rise in the struggle against tsarism. We know that after the first bloody lesson of January 9, 1905, the strike movement developed slowly and laboriously until October 1905, when the mass strike scored its first success in Russia. We know how hard the going was. This was proved by the experience of two revolutions, although the situation in Russia was more revolutionary than in other countries. We know with what difficulty the forces for the struggle against capitalism are mobilised in a series of strikes. That is why we are not surprised by the failure of this first international strike of July 21. We know that there is much greater resistance and opposition to the revolution in the European countries than over here. We know that in fixing July 21 as the date for an international strike, the workers of Britain, France and Italy had to overcome incredible difficulties. It was an experiment unparalleled in history. It is not surprising that it failed. But we also know that the working people of the leading and most civilised countries are on our side despite the European bourgeoisie's rabid hatred of us, that they understand our cause, and whatever the hardship of the revolution and the trials ahead, whatever the atmosphere of lies and deception

in the name of the "freedom and equality" of capital, equality of the starved and the overfed, whatever the atmosphere, we know that our cause is the cause of the workers of all countries, and that is why this cause will inevitably defeat international capital.

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IN THE SERVANTS' QUARTERS

Comrades have brought several Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary and other publications from the South that give us a glimpse of the "ideological life" on the *other side* of the barricades, in the *other camp*. The Kharkov *Mysl* of Bazarov and Martov, *Gryadushchy Dyen* run by Myakotin and Peshekhonov, Bunakov and Vishnyak, Potresov and Grossman, *Yuzhnoye Dyelo* and *Obyedineniye* run by Balabanov, S. Ivanovich, Myakotin and Peshekhonov—these are the names of the publications and of some of their best-known contributors.

Even the few haphazard issues of the above-mentioned periodicals produce such a strong and full aroma that one immediately feels that one is in the servants' quarters. Educated intellectuals who imagine they are socialists and call themselves such, saturated through and through with bourgeois prejudices and fawning before the bourgeoisie—such, if we get down to brass tacks, is that entire clique of writers. There are many trends among them but they have no serious meaning from the political point of view for they differ only in the extent to which they are hypocritical or sincere, crude or astute, clumsy or skilled in doing their servants' duties to the bourgeoisie.

I

The duty of a lackey involves wearing a tail-coat and white gloves and possessing a civilised appearance and the relevant manners. The lackey is permitted to possess a certain love for the people; this, on the one hand, is inevitable because the milieu that provides lackeys must be in needy circum-

stances; on the other hand, it is even to the master's advantage, for it gives him an opportunity to "practise" his philanthropy, in the first place, of course, among those "obedient" sections of the population from which servants, shop assistants and workers are drawn. The cleverer and the better educated the classes that keep servants, the more regularly and thoughtfully they pursue their policy, using their lackeys to spy on the working people, to disunite the working people by granting concessions to a certain part of them, to strengthen their own position and to interest their "faithful servants" in increasing the master's wealth in the hope of receiving a rake-off, etc., etc.

Love for the people is permitted the lackey only to a very modest degree, of course, and only on the imperative condition that he expresses humble and servile feelings in addition to his readiness to comfort the working and exploited people. Let it be said in parenthesis that Feuerbach gave a very neat answer to those who defended religion as a source of comfort for people; to comfort the slave, he said, is to the advantage of the slave-owner, while the real friend of the slaves teaches them indignation and revolt, teaches them to cast off the yoke and does not comfort them. The lackey paints and prettifies the artificial flowers that serve to comfort the slaves who are fettered by wage-slavery. Champions of the emancipation of people from wage-slavery tear away the artificial flowers from the fetters they decorate so that the slave can learn to hate his fetters more consciously and more strongly, the quicker to throw them off and reach out his hand for living flowers.

The necessity to combine a very moderate dose of love for the people with a very big dose of obedience and of protection of the master's interests that is specific to the position of the lackey, inevitably produces the hypocrisy that is typical of the lackey as a social type. Here it is a case of a social type and not of the qualities possessed by individuals. A lackey may be the most honest of men, an exemplary member of his family, an excellent citizen but he is fatally doomed to hypocrisy because the main feature of his trade is the combination of the interests of the master whom he is "pledged to serve truly and faithfully" and those of the milieu from which servants are recruited. If this problem, therefore,

is studied from the political point of view, i.e., from the point of view of millions of people and the relations between millions, one must come to the conclusion that the chief features of the lackey as a social type are hypocrisy and cowardice. These qualities are inculcated by the lackey's trade, and they are the most important from the point of view of the wage-slaves and the mass of working people in any capitalist society.

II

Educated intellectuals who call themselves Mensheviks, Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and what not want to teach the people politics. They had, therefore, to touch upon the fundamental issue of the entire period in which we are living—the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war. See how they argue on this point.

Mr. P. Yushkevich, writing in *Obyedineniye*, devotes a whole article to "Revolution and Civil War". The class of literature—if such it can be called—to which the article belongs may be judged from just the following two statements of the author's.

> "Having as its objective a revolution that is in the interests of the majority and is carried out by that majority, socialism has no grounds [!!] to turn to methods [!!!] of the civil war to which a minority that has seized power is fatally doomed...." "The most advanced class of modern society, when it has become sufficiently mature to understand in full its world mission of emancipation and the tasks accompanying it, must throw it (civil war) aside together with other things inherited from historical barbarity...."

A real gem, is it not?

Immediately after the Bolshevik revolution the Russian bourgeoisie started seeking agreements and concluding agreements with the foreign bourgeoisie against the working people of their own country. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries supported them. The same thing occurred in Finland at the beginning of 1918. And it was the same in the North of Russia and in the South at the beginning of 1918 when the Constitutional-Democrats, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in alliance with the Germans, tried to crush the Bolsheviks. The same again in Georgia. The Germans gave Krasnov money and arms. Then the Entente

bourgeoisie bought over the Czechoslovaks and Denikin and landed their troops in Murmansk, Archangel, Siberia, Baku and Ashkhabad.

The world bourgeoisie—at first the German and then the Anglo-French (often both together)—made war on the victorious proletariat of Russia. And then comes this man who calls himself a socialist, who has gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie and who advises the workers "to throw aside" "civil war methods". Is he not a Judas Golovlyov[89] of the latest capitalist type?

I shall probably be told that Yushkevich is merely a rank-and-file bourgeois journalistic cooly, that he is not typical of any party and they do not accept responsibility for him. That, however, would not be true. In the first place the entire staff and the trend followed by *Obyedineniye* show that this particular sort of servility is typical of the entire Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary brotherhood. In the second place there is the example of L. Martov. This character is a most prominent (and probably the most "Left") of the Mensheviks and also a highly-respected member of the Berne International who is in agreement with its ideological leader, Karl Kautsky.

Take a look at Martov's arguments. In the April 1919 issue of *Mysl* he writes about "world Bolshevism". He has a thorough knowledge of the literature of Bolshevism and about Bolshevism. And this is what that author writes about civil war:

> "In the early days of the war I had occasion to write that the crisis it had called forth in the working-class movement was primarily a 'moral crisis', a crisis of the loss of mutual trust between different sections of the proletariat and loss of the faith of the proletarian masses in the old moral and political values. At that time I could not imagine that this loss of mutual trust, this destruction of ideological bonds that for the last decades had united not only reformists and revolutionaries but had, at certain moments, united socialists and anarchists and both of them with liberal and Christian workers—I could not imagine that this destruction would lead to *civil war* between proletarians...."

The italics belong to Mr. Martov. He stresses that here he is appraising specifically civil war. It may even be that he is stressing his full agreement with Kautsky who, in any case, argues in the same way about civil war.

In this argument there is so much refined corruption, such an abyss of lies, deception of the workers, and despicable betrayal of their interests, such a hypocritical attitude to and defection from socialism that one is amazed at the amount of servility the Kautskys and Martovs have accumulated in the course of decades of "playing" with opportunism!

Firstly, when Kautsky and Martov pharisaically shed tears over "civil war *between proletarians*" they are trying to hide their desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie. Actually, the civil war is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. There never has been in history, nor can there be in a class society, a civil war of the exploited masses against the exploiting minority in which some of the exploited have not gone over to the side of the exploiters and fought with them against their own brothers. Any literate person will admit that a Frenchman who, at the time of the peasant uprising in Vendée in behalf of the monarchy and the landowners, had bewailed the "civil war *between peasants*" would be a lackey of the monarchy, disgusting in his hypocrisy. The Kautskys and Martovs are just such lackeys of the capitalists.

The international bourgeoisie, powerful throughout the world, are crushing the victorious workers of one country for having defeated capital and have the following of some of the deceived, uninformed, downtrodden workers; and such scoundrels as the Kautskys and Martovs are shedding tears over "civil war between proletarians". These characters have to resort to such disgusting hypocrisy since they cannot openly admit that they are on the side of the bourgeoisie in the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie!

In the second place, Martov, like Kautsky and the entire Berne International, knows full well that they enjoyed the sympathy of the workers as socialists because they preached the necessity for proletarian revolution. In 1902 Kautsky wrote about the possible connection between revolution and war and said that the future proletarian revolution would probably coincide with civil war to a greater extent than former revolutions. In 1912 the entire Second International solemnly declared in the Basle Manifesto that the coming war would be connected with the coming proletarian revolution. And when that war broke out the "revolutionaries" of

the Second International turned out to be lackeys of the bourgeoisie!

In November 1914 the Bolsheviks declared that the imperialist war was likely to he transformed into a civil war. This proved to be true. It is now a fact on a world scale. In speaking of world Bolshevism, Martov is compelled to admit this fact. But instead of honestly admitting his complete ideological failure, the collapse of the views on all those who, with the contemptuous grimace of the philistine rejected the idea of turning the imperialist war into a civil war—instead of this Martov "points" hypocritically to the "proletarian masses" who are supposed to have "lost faith in the old moral and political values"!

The renegades are blaming the masses for their own treachery, but the masses sympathise with the Bolsheviks and are everywhere taking the revolutionary path. According to the "theory" of those who all their lives have sworn loyalty to the revolution only to find themselves in the camp of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat when the revolution came, the masses are to blame for this.

In the third place, the two different theories that existed before the war on the question of the internal struggle within socialism were the following. Kautsky and Martov, like most of the opportunists, regarded the reformists and the revolutionaries as two legitimate trends, essential wings of the movement of one class. The divergence of these two trends was condemned. Their rapprochement and merging at every grave moment in the proletarian class struggle was recognised as inevitable. Champions of a split were accused of short-sightedness.

The Bolsheviks had a different view; they regarded the reformists as the vehicle of bourgeois influence among the proletariat, an alliance with them was sanctioned as a temporary evil in situations that were clearly not revolutionary, a break and a split with them was considered inevitable whenever the struggle took on a serious, sharpened form, especially at the beginning of the revolution.

And who proved to be right?

The Bolsheviks.

Throughout the world the war caused a split in the working-class movement when the socialist-patriots went over to the

bourgeoisie. After Russia this was to be seen most clearly in Germany, an advanced capitalist country. To defend the "ideological bonds" of the reformists and revolutionaries today is tantamount to giving support to such hangmen of working-class origin as Noske and Scheidemann, who helped the bourgeoisie murder Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and kill thousands of workers for their revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie.

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SPEECH AT A NON-PARTY CONFERENCE OF WORKERS AND MEN OF THE RED ARMY AUGUST 6, 1919

NEWSPAPER REPORT

FIRST VERSION

Lenin's appearance was greeted with an enthusiastic ovation. He said that he would begin with events they had read about in the newspapers of that day and the day before—the events in Hungary.

A Kerensky-type government had dominated Hungary up to the end of March; at that time the members of that government had resigned, realising that they could not hold out; the socialist-conciliators had then sent representatives to the prison in which Comrade Béla Kun, who had at one time served in the ranks of our Red Army, was confined. They had entered into negotiations with him and he went straight from prison into the government.

Information had recently been received to the effect that things were going wrong inside the Socialist Party of Hungary.

Lenin then said that Rumanian troops had entered Budapest but that no particular attention should be paid to that.

"That is what happened in our country," he said, "on the various fronts. But we had sufficient forces in the country to dig ourselves in and then deal Kolchak a proper blow—or to give an answer as we have done on the Petrograd Front. You know that our troops have captured Yamburg.*"

* The old Russian name of Kingisepp.—*Ed.*

Lenin then spoke about the political experience the Soviet Republic had acquired in that period, an experience which the Hungarians, of course, did not possess.

We shall not," he said, "become downhearted because we know what these temporary triumphs of the Kolchaks and Kornilovs will lead to. Let the Rumanian Kolchaks dance on the bodies of Hungarian workers today, we know that their triumph will be short-lived. It is true that only the steel-like strength of the workers, who give aid to all working people and punish all profiteers, can get us out of this terrible war."

Lenin went on to speak of the actions of the conciliators, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Siberia; they were then accusing the Soviet Government of incorrect tactics but could not themselves produce a model of tactics. In reality everything that had happened in Siberia, all the promises that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had given had brought nothing but suffering to the peasants as well as the workers. But since the Treaty of Versailles had been signed the workers of France, Britain and other countries were beginning more and more to understand the situation.

For this reason, he said, the recent events in Hungary, burdensome as they were, were similar to what had occurred in the camp of Denikin and Kolchak. The events would open the eyes of hundreds of thousands more workers and would show them that capital was stretching out its hand to recover what it had lost on dishonoured bills.

Lenin then spoke about the conspiracies of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and capitalists to recapture power. "They themselves are plotting, and at the same time they are agitating the Soviet Government to renounce terror.

"But we shall not renounce terror because we know that it would only lead to the temporary victory of the Kolchaks and Denikins! Capital is killing itself in the war, and the dying beast is roaring at the workers in its death throes. It cannot, however, prolong its life and it will die!" (*Stormy applause.*)

SECOND VERSION

Lenin said that he would begin with the events they were witnessing in Hungary.

They would remember that until the end of March a Kerensky-type government with all its joys had been dominant. When Soviet power had suddenly been established on March 21—the local Mensheviks incidentally had agreed to support that power—one might have thought that a new era had set in in socialism.... Recent events had shown that the socialist-conciliators had not changed in the least. Apparently what was happening in Hungary was a repetition on a grand scale of what they had recently witnessed in Baku.[90]

Lenin then drew a clear picture of the tragic history of the Baku proletariat; the traitor-socialists had appealed to the British command for help and behind the backs of the workers had entered into a secret agreement with Western imperialists. He drew an analogy between the Baku tragedy and the present revolt in Hungary and spoke of the wireless message that had informed them that the Rumanians had already entered Red Budapest.

Lenin then went on to compare the situation in Hungary with that of Soviet Russia and recalled in brief the temporary Soviet failures; he said that Russia had been saved by her tremendous territory while Hungary was too small to repulse all her enemies. Going over to the question of conciliators in general, Lenin spoke about the Russian socialist parties of conciliators and said:

"If the conciliators of Russia made a mistake under Kerensky that lasted throughout six months of work, why did they not correct that mistake under Kolchak in Siberia?

"The point is that Denikin's crowd are also singing songs about a Constituent Assembly; the counter-revolution does not come out into the open anywhere, so that we can say that temporary failures, like the recent events in Hungary, will not disconcert us. There is no way out of all these misfortunes other than revolution, and there remains only one sure method—the dictatorship of the proletariat. We say that every new defeat of the Red Army only serves to strengthen it, makes it more steadfast and class-conscious, for the workers and peasants have now learned from a sanguinary

experience what to expect from the power of the bourgeoisie and the conciliators. The dying beast of world capital is making its last efforts, but it would nevertheless die!" (*Stormy applause.*)

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Published according to the newspaper texts

TO COMRADES SERRATI AND LAZZARI

Dear Comrades and Friends,

Thanks for the greetings conveyed to us on behalf of your Party. We know very little about your movement; we have no documents whatever. However, the little we do know shows us that we stand together for the Communist International and against the Berne yellow International, which deceives the masses. The negotiations which the leaders of the yellow International conducted with your Party show that they are merely a general staff without an army. The dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet system have already won moral victory throughout the world. Real and final victory will inevitably come in all countries of the world, despite all difficulties and all bloodshed, despite the White terror of the bourgeoisie, etc.

Down with capitalism! Down with false democracy, bourgeois democracy! Long live the world republic of Soviets!

Ever yours,

V. Lenin

Moscow, August 19, 1919

Published in Italian
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September 2, 1919

First published in Russian in 1932

Published according to
the newspaper texts

LETTER TO THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS APROPOS OF THE VICTORY OVER KOLCHAK

Comrades, Red troops have liberated the entire Urals area from Kolchak and have begun the liberation of Siberia. The workers and peasants of the Urals and Siberia are enthusiastically welcoming Soviet power, for it is sweeping away with an iron broom all the landowner and capitalist scum who ground down the people with exactions, humiliations, floggings, and the restoration of tsarist oppression.

Although we all rejoice at the liberation of the Urals and the entry of the Red troops into Siberia we must not allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of security. The enemy is still far from being destroyed. He has not even been definitely broken.

Every effort must be made to drive Kolchak and the Japanese and other foreign bandits out of Siberia, and an even greater effort is needed to destroy the enemy, to prevent him from starting his banditry again and again.

How is that to be achieved?

The harrowing experience of the Urals and Siberia, as well as the experience of all countries which have been through the torments of the four years of imperialist war, must not be without its lessons for us.

Here are the five chief lessons which all workers and peasants, all working people, must draw from this experience so as to ensure themselves against a repetition of the calamities of the Kolchak rule.

First lesson. In order to defend the power of the workers and peasants from the bandits, that is, from the landowners and capitalists, we need a powerful Red Army. We have proved—not by words but by actual deeds—that we are

capable of creating it, that we have learned to direct it and to defeat the capitalists notwithstanding the lavish assistance in arms and equipment they are receiving from the richest countries in the world. That much the Bolsheviks have proved by actual deeds. All workers and peasants—if they are class-conscious—must place their faith in them, not on the strength of their word (for to believe a man on the strength of his word is foolish), but on the strength of the experience of millions upon millions of people in the Urals and Siberia. It is a most difficult problem to combine two elements—arming the workers and peasants and giving the command to ex-officers, who for the most part sympathise with the landowners and capitalists. It can be solved only given splendid organising ability, strict and conscious discipline, and the confidence of the broad masses in the guiding force, the worker commissars. This most difficult problem the Bolsheviks have solved; cases of treachery on the part of ex-officers are very numerous, nevertheless the Red Army is not only in our hands, but has learned to defeat the generals of the tsar and the generals of Britain, France, and America.

Consequently, everyone who seriously wishes to rid himself of the rule of Kolchak must devote all his energies, means and ability without reservation to the task of building up and strengthening the Red Army. Obey all the laws on the Red Army and all orders conscientiously and scrupulously, support discipline in it in every way, and help the Red Army, each to the best of his ability—such is the prime, fundamental, and principal duty of every class-conscious worker and peasant who does not want the rule of Kolchak.

Fear like the plague the unruly guerrilla spirit, the arbitrary actions of isolated detachments and disobedience to the central authorities, for it spells doom as the Urals, Siberia, and the Ukraine have demonstrated.

He who does not unreservedly and selflessly assist the Red Army, or support order and discipline in it with all his might, is a traitor and treason-monger, a supporter of the rule of Kolchak, and should be shown no mercy.

With a strong Red Army we shall be invincible. Without a strong army we shall inevitably fall victim to Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich.

Second lesson. The Red Army cannot be strong without large state stocks of grain, for without them it is impossible to move an army freely or to train it properly. Without them we cannot maintain the workers who are producing for the army.

Every class-conscious worker and peasant must know and remember that the chief reason now that our Red Army successes are not swift and stable enough is precisely the shortage of state stocks of grain. He who does not give his surpluses of grain to the state is helping Kolchak, he is a traitor and betrayer of the workers and peasants and is responsible for the unnecessary death and suffering of tens of thousands of workers and peasants in the Red Army.

Rogues and profiteers and very ignorant peasants argue in this way—better sell my grain at the open market price, I will get far more for it than the fixed price paid by the state.

But the whole point is that free sale promotes profiteering; a few get rich, only the wealthy are sated, while the working masses go hungry. We saw that in practice in the richest grain-bearing districts of Siberia and the Ukraine.

With the free sale of grain capital triumphs, while labour starves and suffers.

With the free sale of grain the price rises to thousands of rubles per pood, money loses its value, a handful of profiteers benefit while the people grow poorer.

With the free sale of grain the government granaries are empty, the army is powerless, industry dies, and the victory of Kolchak and Denikin is inevitable.

Only the rich, only the worst enemies of the workers' and peasants' government are consciously in favour of the free sale of grain. Those who out of ignorance are in favour of the free sale of grain should learn to understand from the example of Siberia and the Ukraine why it means victory for Kolchak and Denikin.

There are still unenlightened peasants who argue as follows: let the state first give me in exchange for my grain good wares at pre-war prices, then I will give up my surplus grain, otherwise I will not. And by this sort of argument the rogues and supporters of the landowners often hoodwink the unenlightened peasants.

It should not be difficult to understand that the workers' state which the capitalists completely devastated by four years of a predatory war for the sake of Constantinople, and which the Kolchaks and Denikins are now devastating again by way of revenge with the help of the capitalists of the whole world—it should not be difficult to understand that such a state cannot at this moment supply the peasants with goods, for industry is at a standstill. There is no food, no fuel, no industry.

Every sensible peasant will agree that the surplus grain must be given to the starving worker as a loan on condition of receiving industrial goods in return.

That is the way it is now. All class-conscious and sensible peasants, all except the rogues and profiteers will agree that *all surplus grain without exception* must be turned over to the workers' state as a loan, because then the state will restore industry and supply industrial goods to the peasants.

But, we may be asked, will the peasants trust the workers' state sufficiently to loan their surplus grain to it?

Our reply is that first, the state gives a bond for the loan in the shape of treasury notes. Secondly, all peasants know by experience that the workers' state, that is, Soviet power, helps the working people and fights the landowners and capitalists. That is why Soviet power is called workers' and peasants' power. Thirdly, the peasants have no other alternative—either they trust the worker or they trust the capitalist; they give their confidence and a loan either to the workers' state or to the capitalist state. There is no other alternative either in Russia or in any country in the world. The more class-conscious the peasants become, the more firmly they stand by the workers and the more resolute they are in their decision to help the workers' state in every way so as to make the return of the power of the landowners and capitalists impossible.

Third lesson. If Kolchak and Denikin are to he completely destroyed the strictest revolutionary order must be maintained, the laws and instructions of the Soviet government must be faithfully observed, and care must be taken that they are obeyed by all.

Kolchak's victories in Siberia and the Urals have been a clear example to all of us that the least disorder, the

slightest infringement of Soviet laws, the slightest laxity or negligence at once serve to strengthen the landowners and capitalists and make for their victory. For the landowners and capitalists have not been destroyed and do not consider themselves vanquished; every intelligent worker and peasant sees, knows, and realises that they have only been beaten and have gone into hiding, are lying low, very often disguising themselves by a "Soviet" "protective" colouring. Many landowners have wormed their way into state farms, and capitalists into various "chief administrations" and "central boards", acting the part of Soviet officials; they are watching every step of the Soviet government, waiting for it to make a mistake or show weakness, so as to overthrow it, to help the Czechoslovaks today and Denikin tomorrow.

Everything must be done to track down these bandits, these landowners and capitalists who are lying low, and to ferret them out, *no matter what guise they take*, to expose them and punish them ruthlessly, for they are the worst foes of the working people, skilful, shrewd, and experienced enemies who are patiently waiting for an opportune moment to set a conspiracy going; they are saboteurs, who stop at no crime to injure Soviet power. We must be merciless towards these enemies of the working people, towards the landowners, capitalists, saboteurs, and counter-revolutionaries.

And in order to be able to catch them we must be skilful, careful, and class-conscious, we must watch out most attentively for the least disorder, for the slightest deviation from the conscientious observance of the laws of the Soviet government. The landowners and capitalists are strong not only because of their knowledge and experience and the assistance they get from the richest countries in the world, but also because of the force of habit and the ignorance of the broad masses who want to live in the "good old way" and do not realise how essential it is that Soviet laws be strictly and conscientiously observed.

The slightest lawlessness, the slightest infraction of Soviet law and order is a *loophole* the foes of the working people take immediate advantage of, it is a *starting-point* for Kolchak and Denikin victories. It would be criminal to forget that the Kolchak movement began through some slight

lack of caution in respect of the Czechoslovaks, with insignificant insubordination on the part of certain regiments.

Fourth lesson. It is criminal to forget not only that the Kolchak movement began with trifles but also that the Mensheviks ("Social-Democrats") and S.R.s ("Socialist-Revolutionaries") assisted its birth and directly supported it. It is time we learned to judge political parties not by their words, but by their deeds.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries call themselves socialists, but they are actually *abettors of the counter-revolutionaries*, abettors of the landowners and capitalists. This was proved in practice not only by isolated facts, but by two big periods in the history of the Russian revolution: (1) the Kerensky period, and (2) the Kolchak period. Both times the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, while professing to be "socialists" and "democrats", actually played the role of *abettors of the whiteguards*. Are we then going to be so foolish as to believe them now they are suggesting we let them "try again", and call our permission a "united socialist (or democratic) front"? Since the Kolchak experience, can there still be peasants other than few isolated individuals, who do not realise that a "united front" with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries means union with the abettors of Kolchak?

It may be objected that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have realised their mistake and renounced all alliance with the bourgeoisie. But that is not true. In the first place, the Right Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have not renounced such an alliance, and there is no definite line of demarcation from these "Rights". There is no such line through the fault of the "Left" Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; for although they verbally "condemn" their "Rights", even the best of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in spite of all they say, are actually *powerless* compared with them. Secondly, what even the best of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries advocate are actually *Kolchak* ideas which assist the bourgeoisie and Kolchak and Denikin and help to mask their filthy and bloody capitalist deeds. These ideas are: A people's government, universal, equal, and direct suffrage, a constituent assembly, freedom of the press, and the like. All

over the world we see capitalist republics which justify capitalist rule and wars for the enslavement of colonies precisely by this lie of "democracy". In our own country we see that Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich or any other general readily hands out such "democratic" promises. Can we trust a man who on the strength of verbal promises helps a known bandit? The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, all without exception, help known bandits, the world imperialists, using pseudo-democratic slogans to paint *their* state power, *their* campaign against Russia, *their* rule and *their* policy in bright colours. All the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries offer us an "alliance" on condition that we make concessions to the capitalists and their leaders, Kolchak and Denikin; as, for example, that we "renounce terror" (when we are faced with the terror of the multimillionaires of the whole Entente, of the whole alliance of the richest countries, that are engineering plots in Russia), or that we open the way for freedom to trade in grain, and so on. What these "conditions" of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries boil down to is this: we, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, are wavering towards the capitalists, and we want a "united front" with the Bolsheviks, against whom the capitalists taking advantage of every concession are fighting! No, my Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary gentlemen, look no more in Russia for people capable of believing you. In Russia class-conscious workers and peasants now realise that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are abettors of the whiteguards—some deliberate and malicious, others unwitting and because of their persistence in their old mistakes, but abettors of the whiteguards nevertheless.

Fifth lesson. If Kolchak and his rule are to be destroyed and not allowed to recur, all peasants must unhesitatingly make their choice in favour of the workers' state. Some people (especially the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries—all of them, even the "Lefts" among them) are trying to scare the peasants with the bogey of the "dictatorship of one party", the Party of Bolsheviks, Communists.

The peasants have learned from the Kolchak regime not to be afraid of this bogey.

FROMMAN TOMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Either the dictatorship (i.e., the iron rule) of the landowners and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class.

There is no middle course. The scions of the aristocracy, intellectualists and petty gentry, badly educated on bad books, dream of a middle course. There is no middle course anywhere in the world, nor can there be. Either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (masked by ornate Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik phraseology about a people's government, a constituent assembly, liberties, and the like), or the dictatorship of the proletariat. He who has not learned this from the whole history of the nineteenth century is a hopeless idiot. And we in Russia have all seen how the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries dreamed of a middle course under Kerensky and under Kolchak.

To whom did these dreams do service? Whom did they assist? Kolchak and Denikin. Those who dream of a middle course are abettors of Kolchak.

In the Urals and Siberia the workers and peasants had an opportunity of comparing the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the working class. The dictatorship of the working class is being implemented by the Bolshevik Party, the party which as far back as 1905 and even earlier merged with the entire revolutionary proletariat.

Dictatorship of the working class means that the workers' state will unhesitatingly suppress the landowners and capitalists and the renegades and traitors who help these exploiters, and will defeat them.

The workers' state is an implacable enemy of the landowner and capitalist, of the profiteer and swindler, an enemy of the private ownership of land and capital, an enemy of the power of money.

The workers' state is the only loyal friend and helper the working people and the peasantry have. No leaning towards capital but an alliance of the working people to fight it, *workers' and peasants' power*, *Soviet power*—that is what the "dictatorship of the working class" means *in practice*.

The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries want to scare the peasants with these words. They won't succeed. After Kolchak, the workers and peasants even in the most

remote backwoods realise that these words mean *precisely that without which there can be no salvation from Kolchak.*

Down with the waverers, with the spineless people who are erring in the direction of helping capital and have been captivated by the slogans and promises of capital! An implacable fight against capital, and an alliance of the working people, an alliance of the peasants and the working class—that is the last and most important lesson of the Kolchak regime.

N. Lenin

August 24, 1919

Pravda No. 190,
August 28, 1919

Published according to
the text of the pamphlet V. I. Lenin,
Letter to the Workers and Peasants
Apropos the Victory
over Kolchak, Moscow, 1919

LETTER TO SYLVIA PANKHURST[91]

To Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst, London

Dear Comrade, August 28, 1919

I received your letter of July 16, 1919, only yesterday. I am extremely grateful to you for the information about Britain and will try to fulfil your request, i.e., reply to your question.

I have no doubt at all that many workers who are among the best, most honest and sincerely revolutionary members of the proletariat are enemies of parliamentarism and of any participation in Parliament. The older capitalist culture and bourgeois democracy in any country, the more understandable this is, since the bourgeoisie in old parliamentary countries has excellently mastered the art of hypocrisy and of fooling the people in a thousand ways, passing off bourgeois parliamentarism as "democracy in general" or as "pure democracy" and so on, cunningly concealing the million threads which bind Parliament to the stock exchange and the capitalists, utilising a venal mercenary press and exercising the power of money, the power of capital in every way.

There is no doubt that the Communist International and the Communist Parties of the various countries would be making an irreparable mistake if they repulsed those workers who stand for Soviet power, but who are against participation in the parliamentary struggle. If we take the problem in its general form, theoretically, then it is this very programme, i.e., the struggle for Soviet power, for the Soviet republic, which is able to unite, and today must certainly unite, all sincere, honest revolutionaries from among the workers. Very many anarchist workers are now becoming

sincere supporters of Soviet power, and that being so, it proves them to be our best comrades and friends, the best of revolutionaries, who have been enemies of Marxism only through misunderstanding, or, more correctly, not through misunderstanding but because the official socialism prevailing in the epoch of the Second International (1889-1914) betrayed Marxism, lapsed into opportunism, perverted Marx's revolutionary teachings in general and his teachings on the lessons of the Paris Commune of 1871 in particular. I have written in detail about this in my book *The State and Revolution* and will therefore not dwell further on the problem.

What if in a certain country those who are Communists by their convictions and their readiness to carry on revolutionary work, sincere partisans of Soviet power (the "Soviet system", as non-Russians sometimes call it), cannot unite owing to disagreement over participation in Parliament?

I should consider such disagreement immaterial at present, since the struggle for Soviet power is the political struggle of the proletariat in its highest, most class-conscious, most revolutionary form. It is better to be with the revolutionary workers when they are mistaken over some partial or secondary question than with the "official" socialists or Social-Democrats, if the latter are not sincere, firm revolutionaries, and are unwilling or unable to conduct revolutionary work among the working masses, but pursue correct tactics in regard to that partial question. And the question of parliamentarism is now a partial, secondary question. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were, in my opinion, correct when they defended participation in the elections to the German bourgeois parliament, to the constituent National Assembly, at the January 1919 Conference of the Spartacists in Berlin, *against* the majority at the Conference.[92] But, of course, they were still more correct when they preferred remaining with the Communist Party, which was making a partial mistake, to siding with the direct traitors to socialism, like Scheidemann and his party, or with those servile souls, doctrinaires, cowards, spineless accomplices of the bourgeoisie, and reformists in practice, such as Kautsky, Haase, Däumig and all this "party" of German "Independents".

I am personally convinced that to renounce participation in the parliamentary elections is a mistake on the part of the revolutionary workers of Britain, but better to make that mistake than to delay the formation of a big workers' Communist Party in Britain out of all the trends and elements, listed by you, which sympathise with Bolshevism and sincerely support the Soviet Republic. If, for example, among the B.S.P.[93] there were sincere Bolsheviks who refused, because of differences over participation in Parliament, to merge at once in a Communist Party with trends 4, 6 and 7, then these Bolsheviks, in my opinion, would be making a mistake a thousand times greater than the mistaken refusal to participate in elections to the British bourgeois parliament. In saying this I naturally assume that trends 4, 6 and 7, taken together, are really connected with the *mass* of the workers, and are not *merely* small intellectual groups, as is often the case in Britain. In this respect particular importance probably attaches to the Workers Committees and Shop Stewards,* which, one should imagine, are closely connected with the *masses*.

Unbreakable ties with the mass of the workers, the ability to agitate unceasingly among them, to participate in every strike, to respond to every demand of the masses—this is the chief thing for a Communist Party, especially in such a country as Britain, where until now (as incidentally is the case in all imperialist countries) participation in the socialist movement, and the labour movement generally, has been confined chiefly to a thin top crust of workers, the labour aristocracy, most of whom are thoroughly and hopelessly spoiled by reformism and are held back by bourgeois and imperialist prejudices. Without a struggle against this stratum, without the destruction of every trace of its prestige among the workers, without convincing the masses of the utter bourgeois corruption of this stratum, there can be no question of a serious communist workers' movement. This applies to Britain, France, America and Germany.

Those working-class revolutionaries who make parliamentarism the centre of their attacks are quite right inasmuch as these attacks serve to express their denial in prin-

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

ciple of bourgeois parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy. Soviet power, the Soviet republic—this is what the workers' revolution has put in place of bourgeois democracy, this is the form of transition from capitalism to socialism, the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And criticism of parliamentarism is not only legitimate and necessary, as giving the case for the transition to Soviet power, but is quite correct, as being the recognition of the historically conditional and limited character of parliamentarism, its connection with capitalism and capitalism alone, of its progressive character as compared with the Middle Ages, and of *its reactionary character as compared with Soviet power.*

But the critics of parliamentarism in Europe and America, when they are anarchists or anarcho-syndicalists, are very often wrong insofar as they reject *all participation* in elections and parliamentary activity. Here they simply show their lack of revolutionary experience. We Russians, who have lived through two great revolutions in the twentieth century, are well aware what importance parliamentarism can have, and actually does have during a revolutionary period in general and *in the very midst of a revolution* in particular. Bourgeois parliaments must be abolished and replaced by Soviet bodies. There is no doubt about that. There is no doubt now, after the experience of Russia, Hungary, Germany and other countries, that this *absolutely must take place* during a proletarian revolution. Therefore, systematically to prepare the working masses for this, to explain to them in advance the importance of Soviet power, to conduct propaganda and agitation for it—all this is the *absolute* duty of the worker who wants to be a revolutionary in deeds. But we Russians fulfilled *that* task, operating in the parliamentary arena, *too*. In the tsarist, fake, landowners' Duma our representatives knew how to carry on revolutionary and republican propaganda. In just the same way *Soviet propaganda* can and must *be carried on* in and from within bourgeois parliaments.

Perhaps that will not be easy to achieve at once in this or that parliamentary country. But that is another question. Steps must be taken to ensure that these correct tactics are mastered by the revolutionary workers in all countries.

And if the workers' party is really *revolutionary*, if it is really a *workers*' party (that is, connected with the masses, with the majority of the working people, with the *rank and file* of the proletariat and not merely with its top crust), if it is really a *party*, i.e., a firmly, effectively knit *organisation of the revolutionary vanguard*, which knows how to carry on revolutionary work among the masses by all possible means, then such a party will surely be able to keep *its own* parliamentarians in hand, to make of them real revolutionary propagandists, such as Karl Liebknecht was, and not opportunists, not those who corrupt the proletariat with bourgeois methods, bourgeois customs, bourgeois ideas or bourgeois poverty of ideas.

If that failed to be achieved in Britain at once, if, in addition, no union of the supporters of Soviet power proved possible in Britain because of a difference over parliamentarism and only because of that, then I should consider a good step forward to complete unity the immediate formation of *two* Communist Parties, i.e., two parties which stand for the transition from bourgeois parliamentarism to Soviet power. Let one of these parties recognise participation in the bourgeois parliament, and the other reject it; this disagreement is now so immaterial that the most reasonable thing would be not to split over it. But even the joint existence of two such parties would be immense progress as compared with the present situation, would most likely be a transition to complete unity and the speedy victory of communism.

Soviet power in Russia has not only shown by the experience of almost two years that the dictatorship of the proletariat is possible *even* in a peasant country and is capable, by creating a strong army (the best proof that organisation and order prevail), of holding out in unbelievably, exceptionally difficult conditions.

Soviet power has done more: it has already achieved a moral victory *throughout* the world, for the working masses everywhere, although they get only tiny fragments of the truth about Soviet power, although they hear thousands and millions of false reports about Soviet power, *are already in favour of Soviet power*. It is already understood by the proletariat of the whole world that this power is the power of the working people, that it alone is salvation from capitalism,

from the yoke of capital, from wars between the imperialists, that it leads to lasting peace.

That is why defeats of individual Soviet republics by the imperialists are possible, but it is impossible to conquer the world Soviet movement of the proletariat.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

P.S.—The following cutting from the Russian press will give you an example of our information about Britain:

"London, 25.8 (via Beloostrov). The London correspondent of the Copenhagen paper *Berlingske Tidende* wires on August 3rd concerning the Bolshevik movement in Britain: "The strikes which have occurred in the last few days and the recent revelations have shaken the confidence of the British in the immunity of their country to Bolshevism. At present the press is vigorously discussing this question, and the government is making every effort to establish that a "conspiracy" has existed for quite a long time and has had for its aim neither more nor less than the overthrow of the existing system. The British police have arrested a revolutionary bureau which, according to the press, had both money and arms at its disposal. *The Times* publishes the contents of certain documents found on the arrested men. They contain a complete revolutionary programme, according to which the entire bourgeoisie are to be disarmed; arms and ammunition are to be obtained for Soviets of Workers' and Red Army Deputies and a Red Army formed; all government posts are to be filled by workers. Furthermore, it was planned to set up a revolutionary tribunal for political criminals and persons guilty of cruelly treating prisoners. All foodstuffs were to be confiscated. Parliament and other organs of public government were to be dissolved and revolutionary Soviets created in their place. The working day was to be lowered to six hours and the minimum weekly wage raised to £7. All state and other debts were to be annulled. All banks, industrial and commercial enterprises and means of transport were to be declared nationalised."

If this is true, then I must offer the British imperialists and capitalists, in the shape of their organ, the richest newspaper in the world, *The Times*, my respectful gratitude and thanks for their excellent propaganda in behalf of Bolshevism. Carry on in the same spirit, gentlemen of *The Times*, you are splendidly leading Britain to the victory of Bolshevism!

Published in September 1919

Published according to the manuscript

FREEDOM TO TRADE IN GRAIN

THE BASIC CONDITION FOR VICTORY

How are we to consolidate our victory over Kolchak? How to complete it by destroying Denikin? How to make it impossible for the landowners, capitalists and kulaks to make any further attempts to regain their power, their land, their capital and their rule over the workers and peasants?

These are the questions that are actually identical with the question of the fate of the socialist revolution in Russia. Every politically-conscious worker and peasant has given some thought to this question, and it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the food question now lies at the bottom of all socialist development.

Collecting all grain surpluses in the hands of the Soviet central authorities and correctly distributing them means making our Red Army invincible, it means the final rout of Kolchak and Denikin, it means the rehabilitation of industry and guarantees proper socialist production and distribution, guarantees the complete victory of the socialist system.

We now have enough experience of food supply work and socialist organisation to get a clear picture of its dimensions and the means of doing it. We know all the difficulties involved, we also know from experience that we have found the right way to surmount them and that by concentrating on this task, by applying greater energy, by mustering our forces and improving the apparatus we *can* solve this problem in its entirety.

Between August 1, 1917 and August 1, 1918, the state procured 30 million poods of grain. Between August 1, 1918 and

August 1, 1919, we procured about 105 million poods, i.e., three and a half times more, although in this latter period we did not have the Don region, the North Caucasus and Western Siberia, and had a very small part of the Ukraine—we did not have the main grain-growing regions.

With a good harvest in 1919 we shall be able to procure very much grain, perhaps 400 million poods or more. Then we shall increase tremendously our output of fuel, timber, coal, etc. Then we shall restore industry and take the broad road of planned socialist development, firmly and irrevocably. Then we shall completely defeat profiteering and shall destroy this disgusting survival of capitalism that is today everywhere damaging the young beginnings of socialism.

THE TRUE ROAD TO VICTORY

The figures given above show that Soviet power has achieved important successes in matters of food; these successes have been achieved in conditions of unprecedented, unheard-of difficulty. Even the clearest figures and the most indisputable facts are either challenged or passed over in silence when it comes to defending the selfish interests of the bourgeoisie, capitalists, profiteers and kulaks.

An exact study of the food situation of the urban worker shows that he obtains only a half (approximately) of his food from the state, from the Commissariat of Food, and the other half he buys in the "free", "open" market, i.e., from the profiteers. Furthermore, for the first half he pays only *one-tenth* of the total amount spent on food and for the second half he pays the other *nine-tenths*.

The profiteers skin the hungry worker nine times over.

The profiteers plunder him unbelievably: We all know that an orgy of profit-making, robbery and crime, that the torments of hunger for the masses of the workers and the enrichment of a few scoundrels are connected with this notorious "*freedom to trade*" in grain.

Notwithstanding this there are people who advocate freedom to trade!

Our workers' and peasants' government, the entire Soviet Republic, all the socialist society of ours now being born, are in a state of war, a brutal, desperate, savage war for

survival against capitalism, against profiteering, against freedom to trade in grain. This is the most profound, most radical, daily and truly mass struggle between capitalism and socialism. The fate of our revolution as a whole depends on the outcome of this struggle. But people who call themselves "socialists", Social-Democrats, Mensheviks, "Socialist-Revolutionaries" are helping capitalism in this struggle against socialism! Even the best of these people, those most hostile to Kolchak, Denikin and the *capitalists*, go over to the side of *capitalism* when it comes to the question of the food policy of Soviet power, and demand minor concessions in favour of the "private commercial apparatus", "individual enterprise" and so on, and so forth.

If you study this carefully, if you think deeply about why, actually, there is a struggle against Soviet power, you come to the conclusion that the enemies of Soviet power may be divided into two big groups both of which defend capitalism against socialism. One of them acts brutally and with the crudest selfishness; this is the group of landowners, capitalists, kulaks, Denikins, Kolchaks, Black Hundreds and Constitutional-Democrats. The other group defends capitalism "ideologically", that is, unselfishly, without any direct, personal profit, but out of prejudice and cowardice in face of the new; this is the group of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. These are the last "ideological" advocates of capitalism. And it was by no means an accident that the Kolchaks and Denikins, the Russian and all foreign capitalists march under cover of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, behind *their* banner, behind *their* flag, and repeat *their* slogans and phrases about "freedom" in general, about "democracy" in general, about "private" (commercial, capitalist) enterprise, etc., etc.

Clever capitalists realise that the "ideological" position of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is of service to them, to their class, to "*their*" capitalism, but the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, like all petty-bourgeois socialists everywhere and at all times, do not realise this. They fear a life-and-death struggle against freedom to trade in grain, they want to make concessions to it, to recognise it at least in part, to be in "peace" and agreement with it.

WHAT IS FREEDOM TO TRADE IN GRAIN?

Freedom to trade in grain is a return to capitalism, to the full power of the landowners and capitalists, to a savage struggle between people for profit, to the "free" enrichment of the few, to the poverty of the masses, to the eternal bondage we see in all bourgeois states, including the freest and most democratic republics.

If we ask any person who works for his living, any factory worker, peasant or even intellectual, whether he wants such a "system" he will certainly say "no". The whole trouble and the whole danger is that a very large number of working people, especially a large number of peasants, *do not realise* that freedom to trade in grain is connected with the universal power of the landowners and capitalists.

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NOTES

[1] This refers to a commission appointed to visit Soviet Russia by the Berne Conference of the Second International which took place from February 3 to February 10, 1919. In reply to a request for the commission to be allowed to enter the country the Soviet Government said on February 19, 1919, that although it did not consider the Berne Conference to be in the least either socialist or representative of the working class, it would nevertheless permit the commission to visit Soviet Russia. The visit did not take place. p. 21

[2] *The Treaty of Brest* was concluded at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 between Soviet Russia and Germany and her allies; the terms were extremely harsh for Russia but gave her the respite she needed, the treaty enabled the Soviet Republic to get out of the imperialist war and muster forces to defeat the attack of the combined forces of the Russian counter-revolution and the British, French, U.S. and Japanese intervention that was shortly to begin. The Treaty of Brest was annulled after the revolution in Germany in November 1918. p. 21

[3] *Entente* or the "*Allies*"—Britain, France, the U.S.A., Japan and other countries that took part in the intervention against Soviet Russia. It should not be confused with the *Entente cordiale*, the alliance of France and Great Britain and, later, tsarist Russia. p. 22

[4] This refers to the Paris Peace Conference that was called on the conclusion of the First World War. The Conference opened on January 18, 1919 and ended its deliberations on June 28, 1919 with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. p. 23

[5] This refers to paper money that was issued by the Provisional Government in the summer of 1917. p. 27

[6] The question of granting a concession to build the Great Northern Railway, to link the River Ob with Petrograd and Murmansk via Kotlas was discussed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on February 4, 1919. The Council adopted Lenin's motion which recognised as permissible the granting of concessions

to foreign capital for the purpose of developing the country's productive forces. No contract for this railway was concluded. p. 30

[7] *Scheidemann, Philipp*—one of the most reactionary leaders of the German Social-Democrats; he took part in suppressing the revolt of Berlin workers in January 1919 and headed the German bourgeois government from February to June 1919.

Spartacists—members of the Spartacus League (Spartakusbund), formed on January 1, 1916, at the time of the First World War. At the beginning of the war the German Left-wing Social-Democrats formed a group called *Internationale* under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin and others. This group became known as the Spartacus League. The Spartacists played an important part in the history of the working-class movement of Germany. In January 1916 an all-Germany conference of Left-wing Social-Democrats adopted theses on the tasks of international Social-Democracy drawn up by Rosa Luxemburg. The League conducted revolutionary propaganda among the masses against the imperialist war and exposed the annexationist policy of German imperialism and the treachery of the Social-Democratic leaders. The League, however, did not get rid of a number of errors in important questions of theory and practice—it rejected the principle of the self-determination of nations in its Marxist aspect (i.e., up to and including secession and the formation of an independent state), denied the possibility of wars of national liberation in the epoch of imperialism, underestimated the role of the revolutionary party, etc. Lenin criticised the errors of the German Lefts in his "The Junius Pamphlet" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19) and "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 77-87) and other writings. In 1917 the Spartacus League entered the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany but retained its organisational independence. After the German revolution in November 1918, the League broke away from the Independents and in December of the same year formed the Communist Party of Germany. p. 30

[8] The decree introducing this tax was passed by a session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on October 30, 1918. The extraordinary tax to raise the sum of 10,000 million rubles was to be imposed mainly on the kulaks and the urban bourgeoisie; the middle strata of the population were lightly taxed. The urban and rural poor and persons whose wages constituted their only source of income were exempted. On April 9, 1919, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted an additional decree granting certain exemptions from this tax to the middle peasants. p. 33

[9] *Cultivated Land Committee* was set up at the People's Commissariat of Agriculture by a decree of the Council of People's Com-

missars of January 28, 1919. The decree stated that all unused arable land would be taken over by the state for the purpose of grain production. The Committee's duties included general guidance and the implementation of measures to extend the area under crops. p. 35

[10] *Working Committee* was organised in February 1919 at the People's Commissariat of Agriculture on the basis of the "Statute on Socialist Land Settlement and the Measures for the Transition to Socialist Farming" that had been approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The Committee was responsible for sending experienced organisers from among the workers to gubernia and district state-farm boards and to individual state farms, recruiting industrial workers for farm work, arranging for all kinds of technical equipment for the state farms and for the neighbouring rural population, helping organise trade unions for farm workers, etc. p. 35

[11] This Congress was held in Petrograd, March 11-13, 1919, and was attended by about 200 delegates. The Congress discussed urgent problems, the work of the Organising Bureau and current agricultural policy, and heard reports from localities. The Congress adopted the Rules of the Farm Labourers' Union and elected its executive. p. 38

[12] This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt of the Czechoslovak Corps engineered by the Entente Imperialists with the active participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Corps was formed in Russia before the October Revolution from Czechoslovak prisoners of war. After the establishment of Soviet power the counter-revolutionary officers of the Corps were used by the Entente imperialists and Russian reactionaries to struggle against the Soviet Republic. The revolt began at Chelyabinsk in May 1918 and by the beginning of June the Czechoslovak troops had occupied Omsk and Samara (now Kuibyshev), where the Committee of the Constituent Assembly Members was formed; the Committee declared itself the provisional authority over the territory occupied by the mutineers. On July 5, the eve of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary revolt in Moscow, the Czechoslovaks occupied Ufa. The position on the Eastern Front was worsened as a result of the treachery of the commander of that front, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov, who on July 11 tried to conclude an agreement with the Czechoslovaks and advance on Moscow to support the revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries there; Muravyov was killed at the very beginning of this venture.

The Czechoslovak mutiny was finally put down at the end of 1919 at the time Kolchak was routed. p. 47

[13] This refers to the First Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow, March 2-6, 1919. p. 52

[14] *Poshekhonye* was an uyezd town in tsarist Russia that became a synonym for everything extremely backward and provincial after M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin published his *Old Times in Poshekhonye*. p. 53

[15] See present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 481-85. p. 53

[16] *Poor Peasants' Committees* were set up during the spring and summer of 1918; the poor peasants in the villages united to fight for Soviet power against the kulaks who were organising counter-revolutionary acts and attempting to prevent the supply of food to the hungry towns. A decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of June 11, 1918 defined the work of the Committees as: the distribution of grain, farm implements and articles of primary necessity and aid to the local food supply organisations in requisitioning grain surpluses from the kulaks. The decree granted various privileges to the poor peasants in the distribution of grain and farm implements.

The Poor Peasants' Committees were the main support of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the countryside where they helped strengthen Soviet power and attract the middle peasants to its side.

The Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (November 1918) passed a decision to merge the Committees with the village Soviets since they had served the purpose for which they were set up. p. 78

[17] Lenin's request notwithstanding, this Afterword was not published in 1919 through the fault of Zinoviev; it was first published in 1922. p. 87

[18] The following documents are included under the general head "Draft Programme of the R.C.P.(B.)"—"Rough Draft of the Programme of the R.C.P." and individual chapters and sections of the programme with Lenin's amendments. The full text of the chapter "The Basic Tasks of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Russia" was first published in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*. In this edition, too, the "Draft Programme of the R.C.P. (Bolsheviks)", which constituted the first sections of the "Rough Draft of the Programme of the R.C.P." with amendments and addenda by Lenin, and the "Insertion for the Final Draft of the Programme Section on the National Question" were first published. Lenin's proposals for the Draft Programme formed the basis of the Programme of the Communist Party adopted at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 97

[19] See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 459-63 and Vol. 27, pp. 152-58. p. 99

[20] The manuscript remained unfinished. This passage, with amendments, was included in the Programme of the R.C.P.(B.) adopted

by the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) as Section 5 of the chapter "The General Political Sphere". p. 126

[21] This insertion was included *in toto* as Section 4 of the chapter "In the Sphere of National Relations". p. 128

[22] This point of the draft of the economic section of the programme was originally placed third; Lenin later recast it and made it point eight, under which number it was included in the Party Programme. p. 136

[23] This Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), held in Moscow, was attended by 301 delegates with the right to vote who represented 313,766 Party members and 102 delegates with voice but no vote. Lenin opened the Congress with a short speech. The Congress agenda was: report of the Central Committee, the Programme of the R.C.P.(B.), the foundation of the Communist International, the war situation and war policy, work in the countryside, organisational problems, and other business.

Lenin delivered the report of the Central Committee and also reported on the Party Programme and work in the countryside.

In a resolution on the report of the Central Committee the Congress expressed its full "approval of the political activities of the Central Committee".

The Congress adopted the new Party Programme that had been drafted by Lenin. During the discussion on the Programme the Congress rejected the anti-Bolshevik views of Bukharin who proposed removing from the Programme the description of pre-monopoly capitalism and petty commodity production. Bukharin's views amounted to the same thing as the denial by the Mensheviks and Trotsky of the role of the middle peasant in socialist construction. Bukharin also slurred over the fact that kulaks emerge and develop from petty commodity economy. The Congress also rejected the anti-Bolshevik views of Bukharin and Pyatakov on the national question; they spoke against the right of nations to self-determination and, therefore, against equal rights for all nations. The Programme adopted by the Congress defined the tasks of the Communist Party in the building of a socialist society in Russia.

The Congress passed a resolution on Lenin's report on work in the countryside which called for a transition from the policy of neutralising the middle peasants to that of a sound alliance with them, placing reliance on the poor peasants in the struggle against the kulaks and retaining in that alliance the leading role of the proletariat. The Congress decision on the alliance with the middle peasants was of great importance in mustering all working people in the struggle against the intervention and the whiteguards and for the building of socialism.

In the sphere of military affairs the Congress adopted a decision to strengthen the regular Red Army, and inculcate iron discipline, stressing especially the role of the proletarian hard core of the army and the role of the commissars and Party cells in the political

and military training of the Red Army. The Congress pointed to the need to employ old army specialists and to make use of the highest achievements of the bourgeois art of war. The Congress vehemently rejected the proposal from the group known as the "army opposition" that was against the formation of a regular Red Army and defended the survivals of the guerrilla spirit in the army. At the same time the Congress condemned Trotsky's non-Party acts in the War Department and demanded an improvement in the work of the central army institutions.

The Congress adopted a decision on Party and Soviet organisation and defeated the opportunist group headed by Sapronov and Osinsky who denied the leading role of the Party in the Soviets.

Owing to the large influx of new members into the Party the Congress decided to carry out the re-registration of the entire membership and to improve the Party's social composition.

Among the members of the Central Committee elected by the Congress were Lenin, Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin and Stasova; among the alternative members were Artyom (Sergeyev), Vladimirsky and Yaroslavsky. p. 141

[24] The conference to be held on Prinkipo, one of the Princes Islands, was proposed by the Entente powers and was to include representatives of all governments existing on the territory of Russia; its purpose was to establish peace. The Soviet Government did not receive a direct invitation to attend the conference and learned from foreign press reviews transmitted by wireless that since there had been no answer from the Soviet Government the imperialist powers were trying to prove to their peoples that this was a refusal to take part in the conference. The Soviet Government, in order to put a stop to all misrepresentations of its actions, on February 4, 1919 sent a wireless telegram to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the U.S.A. consenting to start negotiations immediately and pointing out that it was prepared to make important concessions for the sake of peace. The Entente governments left the Soviet telegram unanswered and the conference did not take place. p. 146

[25] This refers to the *Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*, a Centrist party that was founded in April 1917. At the Halle Congress in October 1920 a split took place and a considerable number of members joined the Communist Party of Germany in December 1920. Right elements formed a separate party and retained the name of Independent Social-Democratic Party; it continued in existence until 1922. p. 150

[26] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 481-82. p. 152

[27] This refers to Rosa Luxemburg's speech at the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Germany held in Berlin from December 30, 1918 to January 1, 1919. She spoke in support of some of the

delegates who favoured the abolition of the trade unions. She was of the opinion that the functions of the trade unions should go to the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to the Council's of Workers and Clerks at factories. p. 155

[28] See pp. 38-46 of this volume. p. 158

[29] See present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 201-24. p. 159

[30] *The Federation of Foreign Groups* was organised in May 1918 as the guiding body of foreign Communists for work among prisoners of war in Russia. The Federation was abolished at the beginning of 1920. p. 161

[31] *Bednota* (Poor Peasants)—a daily newspaper issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party that appeared in Moscow from March 27, 1918 to January 31, 1931. It was founded by a decision of the Central Committee of the Party to replace the newspaper *Derevenskaya Bednota* (Rural Poor), *Derevenskaya Pravda* (Rural Truth) and *Soldatskaya Pravda* (Soldiers' Truth). On February 1, 1931 *Bednota* merged with the newspaper *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (Socialist Farming). p. 162

[32] See F. Engels, Einleitung zu Sigismund Borkheims Schrift *Zur Erinnerung für die deutschen Mordspatrioten 1806-1807* (Introduction to Sigismund Borkheim's Pamphlet *In Memory of the German Arch-Patriots of 1806-1807*); in K. Marx, F. Engels, *Werke*, B. 21, Berlin, 1962, S. 346. p. 166

[33] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1959, p. 368. p. 168

[34] The Programme adopted by the Second Party Congress in 1903 consisted of two parts—the minimum and maximum programmes. The minimum programme contained demands that could be effected within the framework of the capitalist system—the overthrow of tsarism, the establishment of a democratic republic, the introduction of the eight-hour day, etc. The maximum programme formulated the final aims of the working class—the socialist revolution, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialism. p. 171

[35] See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 169-73. p. 171

[36] On December 18 (31), 1917, Lenin handed to Svinhufvud, head of the Finnish bourgeois government, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars to recognise the independence of Finland. The decision was confirmed by a session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918). p. 171

[37] Here Lenin refers to the negotiations in Moscow in March 1919 with a Bashkirian delegation on the question of forming an autonomous Bashkirian Soviet Republic. On March 23, 1919 the newspaper

Izvestia published the "Agreement Between Central Soviet Power and the Bashkirian Government on the Formation of Autonomous Soviet Bashkiria". The agreement set up an Autonomous Bashkirian Soviet Republic on the basis of the Soviet Constitution, defined the Republic's frontiers and its administrative divisions. p. 171

[38] *The Warsaw Soviet of Workers' Deputies* was established on November 11, 1918. Soviets of Workers' Deputies were also set up in many Polish towns and industrial districts. The Warsaw Soviet of Workers' Deputies set about the factual introduction of the eight-hour day in factories, began a struggle against the sabotage of the factory owners, took a decision on contacts with revolutionary Russia, etc. The Soviets were abolished in the summer of 1919 by the Polish bourgeois government. p. 174

[39] This appeal was published on March 20, 1919. p. 176

[40] *The Erfurt Programme* of the German Social-Democratic Party was adopted in October 1891 at a Congress held in Erfurt, it replaced the Gotha Programme of 1875. Engels criticised the errors in the Erfurt Programme in his "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (*Die Neue Zeit*, XX. Jg., Bd. I, 1901-1903, S. 5). p. 190

[41] The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) instructed Lenin to send greetings in the name of the Congress to the Hungarian Soviet Republic in connection with the information received to the effect that a Soviet Republic had been formed there on March 21, 1919 and the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established. The Hungarian Soviet Republic continued in existence until August 1919. p. 197

[42] *The committee on work in the countryside* was set up at the first sitting of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on March 18, 1919. It held three sessions which heard reports on the land policy, and work in the countryside, and elected a commission to draw up resolutions. Lenin's resolution on the attitude to the middle peasantry and a resolution on political propaganda and cultural and educational work in the countryside were then approved by the Congress. p. 198

[43] See Frederick Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 436-39). p. 205

[44] The delegates from the Nizhni-Novgorod (now Gorky) Party organisation handed in a statement to the Presidium of the Eighth Congress in which they pointed out that the pamphlet quoted by Lenin contained a printer's error. p. 207

[45] *Kun, Béla*—Hungarian Communist; one of the organisers and leaders of Soviet power in Hungary in 1919. p. 226

[46] The Eighth Congress ordered the re-registration of all Party members throughout Russia; it was carried out between May and October 1919. p. 232

[47] The making of gramophone records of Lenin's speeches was organised by *Tsentropechat* (the central agency of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for the supply and Distribution of Periodicals). Between 1919 and 1921, 13 of Lenin's speeches were recorded. p. 237

[48] *Vsegda Vperyod!* (Always Forward)—A Menshevik newspaper that was published in Moscow in 1918 (only one issue) and in 1919 from January 22 to February 25.

Dyelo Naroda (People's Cause)—a socialist-Revolutionary newspaper published at intervals between 1917 and 1919.

These two newspapers were suppressed for their counter -revolutionary activities. p. 273

[49] Following Lenin's report to this Plenary Meeting on the tasks of the trade unions in connection with the mobilisation for the Eastern Front, Lenin's "Theses of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the Situation on the Eastern Front" were adopted and were next day published in *Pravda* (see pp. 276-79 of this volume). p. 281

[50] The Moscow Soviet (August 24) and the Petrograd Soviet (September 5, 1918) passed decisions permitting factory and office workers of those cities, in view of the grave food situation, to transport up to one-and-a-half poods of foodstuffs for their personal use. A resolution of the Council of People's Commissars made these decisions effective until October 1, 1918. p. 287

[51] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a German bourgeois newspaper published in Frankfort on the Main from 1856 to 1943. p. 294

[52] Lenin refers to the whiteguards' brutal treatment of workers from the Sergievsky Plant and the Tomylovo Artillery Warehouses at the station of Ivashchenkovo, near Samara, on October 1 and 2 1918. On the approach of Red Army units the workers decided to prevent the whiteguards from removing factory equipment. With the aid of the Czechoslovaks the whiteguards broke the resistance of the workers and shot over a thousand of them. p. 297

[53] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 110. p. 309

[54] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 92. p. 310

[55] See pp. 392-401 of this volume. p. 313

[56] This Congress took place in Moscow between April 15 and April 21, 1919, and was attended by about 200 delegates representing 8,000

members of the Union of Communist Students. The Congress passed a resolution to merge the Union of Communist Students with the Young Communist League. An instruction confirmed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on May 11, 1919 made the Russian Young Communist League responsible for work among the working-class and peasant youth and among the student youth. p. 324

[57] This refers to the anti-Marxist views of A. Bogdanov and others that had been implanted in the Proletcult (Proletarian Culture) literary and art organisations. Bogdanov and his supporters propagandised reactionary bourgeois philosophical views (Machism) in the guise of "proletarian culture", denied the leading role of the Party and the Soviet state in cultural development, separated the development of Soviet culture from the general tasks of socialist construction and denied the need to make use of cultural achievements of the past. They tried to give the Proletcult organisations a position that made them independent of the Party and of Soviet power. Lenin spoke resolutely against attempts to implant anti-Marxist, bourgeois theories in the Proletcult organisations. The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Communist group at the First All-Russia Congress of Proletcult Organisations in October 1920 took a decision to subordinate Proletcult organisations to the People's Commissariat of Education, making them departments of that Commissariat. The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) condemned the anti-Marxist, bourgeois tendencies in the Proletcult organisations in a letter headed "On the Proletcult Organisations". The organisations began to decline in 1922. p. 336

[58] This was a decree on "*The Mobilisation of the Literate and the Organisation of Propaganda of the Soviet System*" issued by the Council of People's Commissars on December 10, 1918. p. 337

[59] This refers to whiteguard units of officer volunteers. p. 341

[60] Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 147-48. p. 358

[61] *Sukharevka*—the name of a market that once existed in Moscow. During the Civil War it was here that profiteers sold their goods. The word "Sukharevka" is used in the broader sense of "freedom to trade in food". p. 366

[62] This telegram was Lenin's answer to notes he had received from Stalin on the situation in the environs of Petrograd. p. 385

[63] This speech was delivered at a parade on Red Square, Moscow, of workers' regiments, communist battalions and students of Moscow army schools. The parade was held in celebration of the first anniversary of the introduction of universal military training launched in accordance with a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive

Committee dated April 22, 1918; the training applied to workers and also to peasants who did not exploit the labour of others. In the course of a year hundreds of thousands of working people received army training and were sent to reinforce the ranks of the Red Army. p. 386

[64] Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 32-33). p. 388

[65] *Communist International*—journal of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, was published from May 1, 1919 to June 1943. p. 392

[66] This refers to the plot to surrender Petrograd that was led by a spy and sabotage organisation which included Constitutional-Democrats, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The organisation was headed by the "national centre" functioning on the instructions of foreign espionage agencies. On June 13, 1919, the conspirators raised a counter-revolutionary revolt at the Krasnaya Gorka (Red Hill) and Seraya Loshad (Grey Horse) forts. The revolt was quickly suppressed by Soviet troops. p. 419

[67] *Sadowa* was a village in Bohemia near the town of Königgratz (now Hradec Kralove, Czechoslovakia), where a battle was fought on July 3, 1866; the battle ended in the victory of the Prussian over the Austrian forces and settled the outcome of the Austro-Prussian war. p. 424

[68] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow, 1959, Vol. 1, p. 302. p. 428

[69] By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of March 16, 1919, the consumers' co-operatives were reorganised as "consumers' communes". This name led to a misunderstanding of the decree among the peasants of some districts. In view of this the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, while approving the decree in a decision of June 30, 1919, changed the name from "consumers' communes" to "consumers' societies", a name to which the public were accustomed. p. 431

[70] See pp. 276-79 of this volume. p. 433

[71] The telegram refers to the stores of ammunition, equipment and food captured by the Red Army on June 27, 1919 when the village of Vidlitsa (on the east bank of Lake Ladoga) and the Vidlitsa Plant were occupied; Vidlitsa was the chief base of the Finnish white-guards operating on the Olonets section of the Petrograd Front. p. 435

[72] This meeting was held in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, when the situation was difficult on account of Denikin's offensive. Lenin's report was followed by the adoption of an appeal "To All Workers, Peasants, Red Army Men and Sailors" to bend all their efforts to

repulse the enemy and achieve a decisive victory over Kolchak, Denikin and all satraps of the counter-revolution. p. 456

[73] *The Sverdlov Communist University* was formed from the training courses for agitators and instructors organised in 1918 at the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and later reformed as a school of Soviet work. Following the decision of the Eighth Party Congress to organise a higher school under the auspices of the Central Committee to train Party functionaries, the school was again reorganised, this time as the Central School for Soviet and Party Work; by a decision of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) it was renamed the Sverdlov Communist University in the second half of 1919.

Lenin delivered two lectures on the state but the record of the second lecture, delivered on August 29, 1919, has been lost. p. 470

[74] This conference was attended by 200 delegates of the Moscow Party organisations. Following Lenin's report the conference passed a resolution indicating the need to improve Party and government work—army, food, social security, agitation and propaganda work, and also cultural, educational and political work among workers and men of the Red Army. It was planned to call regular non-Party conferences of workers and of Red Army soldiers. p. 489

[75] This refers to decisions by the Moscow (August 24) and Petrograd (September 5, 1918) Soviets permitting factory and office workers to transport up to one-and-a-half poods of foodstuffs (until October 1, 1918) and the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of June 30, 1919 on food procurement in Simbirsk Gubernia up to August 15, 1919 by workers' and rural organisations of the central gubernias, etc. The Soviet Government was compelled to adopt these measures because of the grave food situation in the country. p. 489

[76] *l'Humanité*—a daily newspaper founded by Jaurès in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War it was in the hands of the Right wing of the party and took a social-chauvinist stand. Shortly after the split in the party at the Tours Congress (December 1920) and the formation of the Communist Party of France, the newspaper became its official organ and remains such today. p. 494

[77] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 110, 351, 408; Engels's letter to Marx of August 11, 1881 and to F. Sorge of September 21, 1872, Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 414-19. p. 501

[78] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 453-54. p. 501

[79] Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 408. p. 502

[80] Harry Quelch said this in his speech at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907. Harry Quelch called the Hague Conference, held at the same time, "a thieves' supper", and for this was deported by the German Government (see the article "Harry Quelch", present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 369-71). p. 509

[81] This refers to the conference of the Second International held in Lucerne (Switzerland) from August 2 to August 9, 1919. Lenin characterised the speeches of the delegates in his article "How the Bourgeoisie Utilises Renegades" (see present edition, Vol. 30). p. 512

[82] An international political strike was planned for July 21, 1919 in support of the Russian and Hungarian revolutions; it was to demand non-intervention in Russian and Hungarian affairs. There were individual strikes in Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Norway but the strike did not take place as an international act of the proletariat of all countries. p. 514

[83] The five questions put to Lenin by the United Press Agency were 1. Has the Russian Soviet Republic introduced any small or big changes into the original government programme of domestic and foreign policy and into the economic programme, when and what changes? 2. What tactics does the Russian Soviet Republic pursue in respect of Afghanistan, India and other Moslem countries outside the frontiers of Russia? 3. What political and economic aims do you pursue in respect of the United States and Japan? 4. On what terms would you be willing to conclude peace with Kolchak, Denikin and Mannerheim? 5. What else would you care to bring to the notice of American public opinion?

The Left socialist journal *The Liberator* published an article in October 1919 under the heading "A Statement and a Challenge" in which it gave Lenin's answer to the fifth question. In an editorial note the journal said that the United Press Agency had distributed Lenin's answers to the newspapers but had omitted the fifth as being purely Bolshevik propaganda. p. 515

[84] The talks with William Bullitt, who came to Moscow on the instructions of President Wilson of the U.S.A., took place in March 1919 The Soviet Government introduced a number of amendments and addenda to the proposals submitted by the U.S.A. and Britain after which a draft agreement was drawn up. Those governments did not accept the Soviet proposals because Kolchak had begun his offensive in the spring of that year and they hoped for the rout of the Soviet forces. p. 517

[85] The letter to Fridtjof Nansen (the Norwegian Arctic explorer) on the Soviet Government's readiness to start talks with the Entente governments on the cessation of hostilities was dispatched by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on May 7, 1919. The Soviet Governments proposal was transmitted by Nansen to the Entente governments but no replies were received. p. 517

[86] The governments of Britain, France, the U.S.A., Italy and Japan on May 26, 1919 sent Kolchak a Note expressing their readiness to recognise him, give him aid in the shape of equipment, food and munitions so as to help him stand on his feet as the ruler of all Russia. Neither the recognition of the Entente governments nor the help they gave him saved Kolchak from defeat by the Red Army. p. 528

[87] This Congress, held in Moscow from July 28 to August 1, 1919, was attended by 230 delegates from 32 gubernias. The Congress heard reports on the education programme, the current tasks in the field of cultural development, trade union movement, the youth movement in Russia and the West, and other questions. The Congress founded the All-Russia Trade Union of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture; it elected the Central Committee of the Union. p. 532

[88] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow, 1959, Vol. I, p. 176. p. 533

[89] *Judas Golovlyov*—nickname of Porfiry Golovlyov, a serf-owner, hypocrite and blood-sucker in *The Golovlyov Family*, a novel by M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin. p. 543

[90] At a meeting of the Baku Soviet on July 25, 1918, the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks passed, by a small majority, the traitorous decision to ask the British imperialists for aid under pretence of defending Baku from the advancing Turkish forces. Counter-revolutionary subversive activities in Baku, the breakdown in supplies, the counter-revolutionary propaganda in the army and navy were all guided by the British Consul MacDonnell. The Bolshevik group at the July 25 meeting, guided by the instructions of Lenin and Sverdlov given in the name of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to pursue an independent foreign policy and wage a resolute struggle against the agents of foreign capital, tabled a draft resolution demanding that immediate measures be taken to defend Baku, using local forces. This motion was rejected by a majority vote. The Bolsheviks, being in the minority, resigned from the Baku Soviet so that power was actually in the hands of the counter-revolutionary government, which called itself the "Central Caspian Dictatorship". The British, who had been invited, entered Baku a few days later. The Bolshevik members of the Baku Soviet—the twenty-six Baku commissars—were brutally murdered by the British interventionists with the direct participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 549

[91] *Sylvia Pankhurst*, a British politician who was a member of the Communist Party in 1919, wrote to Lenin asking his opinion on the question of participation in parliament. Her letter described the parties and groups in Great Britain, under the following numbers: 1. Trade unionists and working-class politicians of the old type. 2. The Independent Labour Party. 3. The British Socialist Party. 4. Revolutionary industrialists. 5. The Socialist Labour Party.

6. The Socialist Labour Federation. 7. The South Wales Socialist Society. Lenin retained these numbers in his reply. p. 561

[92] This refers to the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, held in Berlin from December 30, 1918 to January 1, 1919. Despite the speeches by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg proposing participation in the elections to the National Assembly, the Congress, by a majority vote (62 against 23) adopted the erroneous decision not to participate in the election campaign. p. 562

[93] *The British Socialist Party* was founded in 1911 in Manchester when the Social-Democratic Party joined forces with other socialist groups. The B.S.P. conducted its propaganda in the spirit of Marxism and, as Lenin said, was "not opportunist" and was "*really* independent of the Liberals" (present edition, Vol. 19, p. 273. The small membership of the party and its poor contact with the masses gave it a somewhat sectarian character.

During the First World War a sharp struggle developed in the party between the internationalist trend (Albert Inkpin, Theodore Rothstein, John MacLean, William Gallacher and others) and the social-chauvinist trend headed by Hyndman. Within the internationalist trend there were inconsistent elements who adopted a Centrist position on some questions.

In February 1916 a group of B.S.P. members founded *The Call*, a weekly paper which played an important part in mustering the internationalists. The annual B.S.P. Conference, held in Salford in April 1916, condemned the social-chauvinist position of Hyndman and his supporters and they withdrew from the party.

The B.S.P. welcomed the October Revolution and its members played an important part in the British workers' movement against intervention in Russia. In 1919, most of the local party organisations (98 for and 4 against) decided to join the Communist International; the B.S.P. and the Communist Unity Group were actually the founders of the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the First Unity Congress in 1920 most local B.S.P. organisations entered the Communist Party. p. 563

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*March-August 1919*)

1919

February-March	Lenin works on the drafting of a programme for the R.C.P.(B.).
March 12-13	Lenin in Petrograd.
March 12	Lenin speaks at a session of the Petrograd Soviet on the foreign and home policy of the Council of People's Commissars.
March 13	Lenin attends the funeral of M . T. Yelizarov at the Volkov Cemetery in Petrograd.
	Lenin visits the Palace of Labour in Petrograd; he speaks at a session of the First Congress of Farm Labourers of Petrograd Gubernia on the organisation of a farm labourers' trade union.
	Lenin speaks at two meetings in the People's House, Petrograd.
March 14	Lenin returns to Moscow from Petrograd.
March 16	Lenin visits Yakov Sverdlov who is lying ill in the Kremlin.
March 17	Lenin participates in drafting and then signs a government statement on measures of struggle in connection with fresh counter-revolutionary acts by Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Petrograd.
March 18	Lenin speaks at a special session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee held in memory of Yakov Sverdlov. After the session Lenin walks to Red Square with the funeral procession and delivers a short speech over Sverdlov's grave.
March 18-23	Lenin guides the work of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 18	Lenin delivers the opening speech at the Congress and is elected to the presidium; he delivers the report of the Central Committee.
March 19	Lenin reports to the second session of the Congress on the Party Programme and closes the discussion on that point at the third session.
March 20	Lenin guides a sitting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the formation of the the Bashkirian Soviet Autonomous Republic, the mobilisation of farming specialists, etc.
March 20-21	Lenin is in the chair at meetings of the Congress Programme Commission.
March 21	Lenin speaks at the fifth (closed) session of the Congress on the war situation.
March 22	Lenin is instructed by the Congress to wireless a message of greeting to the Hungarian Soviet Republic.
March 23	Lenin speaks at the eighth session of the Congress on work in the countryside; the Congress adopts his resolution on the attitude to the middle peasantry.
	Lenin is elected to the Central Committee; delivers a speech closing the Congress.
March 25	At a Plenary Meeting of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) Lenin is elected a member of the Political Bureau of the C.C.
March 27	Lenin writes his "Reply to an Open Letter by a Bourgeois Specialist".
March 30	Lenin speaks at a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the candidacy of Mikhail Kalinin for the post of Chairman of the Executive Committee.
End of March	Lenin makes gramophone records of eight speeches.
April 1	Lenin phones a telegram to the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission on urgent measures to prevent attempts to blow up and damage railways.
April 3	Lenin speaks on the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic at an Extraordinary

Meeting of the Moscow Soviet and writes the draft of a resolution.

Lenin guides a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the Soviet workers' and peasants' militia, increasing the transport of grain from the railways in the East, and a draft decree on the reorganisation of the state control apparatus.

April 8 Lenin guides a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses preferential treatment of middle peasants in respect of the single extraordinary revolutionary tax, fodder and food rations in the consumer gubernias, etc.

April 9 Lenin signs the decree on state control approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

April 10 Lenin writes his "Letter to the Petrograd Workers on Aid for the Eastern Front".

April 11 Lenin writes his "Theses of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the Situation on the Eastern Front".

Lenin speaks at a Plenary Meeting of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on the tasks of the trade unions in the mobilisation for the Eastern Front.

April 13 Lenin attends a Plenary Meeting of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.).

Lenin writes a foreword to Henri Guilbeaux's pamphlet *Socialism and Syndicalism in France During the War.*

April 15 Lenin writes "The Third International and Its Place in History".

Lenin speaks at a ceremonial meeting of the First Moscow Heavy Artillery Commanders' Courses on the occasion of the presentation of the Red Banner of the Rogozhsky District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

April 16 Lenin speaks at a meeting of the railwaymen of Moscow Junction on the mobilisation of all forces to fight against Kolchak.

April 17	Lenin speaks on the fight against Kolchak at a conference of Moscow factory committees and trade unions.
	Lenin writes the Afterword to the pamphlet *The Achievements and Difficulties of the Soviet Government.*
	Lenin delivers a speech of greeting to the First All-Russia Congress of Communist Students.
April 20	In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front Lenin proposes stepping up operations against Denikin in the Donets Basin.
April 21	By a decision of the Council of Defence Lenin is appointed a member of the commission to study accounting for army property by the Extraordinary Commission on Red Army Supplies.
April 25	Lenin instructs the commander of the Ukrainian Front to take Taganrog.
April 27	Lenin writes greetings to the Bavarian Soviet Republic.
April 28	Lenin guides a meeting of the Council of Defence which discusses the extraordinary mobilisation in connection with Kolchak's campaign, urgent measures to economise fuel, etc.
April	In a letter to Petrograd organisations Lenin gives instructions for the dispatch of Petrograd workers to the Don region and the Ukraine and for the organisation of the work of industrial enterprises for war needs.
End of April	Lenin sends a telegram to the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars in which he proposes the establishment of the strictest control over the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Ukrainian government institutions.
May 1	Lenin delivers three speeches in Red Square—two on May Day and the third at the unveiling of a monument to Stepan Razin on Lobnoye Mesto.
May 3	Lenin delivers a report on Party policy in respect of the middle peasants to a meeting of stu-

dents at the All-Russia Central Executive Committee propagandist courses and the Proletarian University.

May 4 Lenin participates in the work of the Plenary Meeting of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.).

May 5 In a telegram to the Ukrainian Soviet Government Lenin demands speedier military aid for the Donets Basin.

Lenin guides a session of the Council of Defence which discusses the results of an inspection of Soviet government institutions and measures being adopted to reduce their staffs, improving the transport of army freights, etc.

May 6 Lenin delivers a speech of greeting to the First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education.

May 8 Lenin sends a telegram in the name of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) to the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars on increasing aid to the Southern Front.

May 9 Lenin sends a telegram in the name of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) to the Council of Defence representative in Kiev with an instruction to mobilise workers immediately and dispatch them to the Southern Front.

May 11 Lenin writes amendments and addenda to the draft appeal to German workers and to peasants who do not exploit the labour of others.

May 12 In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army Lenin demands the speed-up of the offensive and the consolidation of the victory over Kolchak.

May 13 Lenin guides a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses district food supply bodies, the allocation of funds to build the Shatura and Kashira Power Stations, etc.

May 17 Lenin guides a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the State Publishing House, free food for children, etc.

Lenin guides a meeting of the Council of Defence which discusses the situation in Petrograd in connection with the whiteguard offensive.

May 19	Lenin speaks on "Deception of the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality" at the First All-Russia Congress on Adult Education.
May 25	Lenin takes the salute at a parade in Red Square of workers' regiments formed under the universal military training scheme and speaks on the importance of universal military training for the working people.
May 27	Lenin writes his "Greetings to the Hungarian Workers".
May 28	Lenin writes his "The Heroes of the Berne International".
	Lenin demands from the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars that urgent measures of of aid to the Southern Front be taken.
	In a telegram to the Ukrainian Deputy People's Commissar for War, Lenin proposes sending Kharkov workers to defend Lugansk.
May 29	In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front in Simbirsk Lenin demands that all efforts be devoted to the liberation of the Urals by winter.
May 31	The article "Beware of Spies!" is published in *Pravda* over the signatures of Lenin and Dzerzhinsky.
May	Lenin signs a draft directive on the unification of the armies and an alliance between the Soviet republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Byelorussia.
June 1	Lenin takes part in a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. which discusses the question of founding a Ukrainian army.
June 2	Lenin takes part in the work of a joint meeting of the Political and Organising Bureaus of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.)
June 6	In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front in Simbirsk, Lenin proposes a number of urgent measures in connection with a possible break-through by Kolchak in the direction of Vyatka.

June 9	Lenin instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to organise aid for Petrograd from the Eastern Front.
Not later than June 10	Lenin writes the draft decision of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) on the Petrograd Front.
June 10	Lenin participates in the joint meeting of the Political and Organising Bureaus of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.).
June 11	Lenin instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to conduct an inquiry into the delay in sending reinforcements to the Petrograd Front.
June 14	In telegrams to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front and the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army Lenin proposes bending all efforts to retain Tsaritsyn.
	Lenin speaks at a meeting of machine-gun course students in the Moscow Trade Union House.
June 15	Lenin participates in a joint meeting of the Political and Organising Bureaus of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.).
June 18	In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army Lenin greets the defenders of Red Tsaritsyn.
June 19	Lenin guides a meeting of the Council of Defence which discusses measures to increase the food army and the inquiry into the events at Krasnaya Gorka.
June 23	Lenin writes the foreword to the published speech "Deception of the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality".
June 25	In the name of the Council of Defence Lenin thanks the commanders and men of the 5th, 2nd and Turkestan armies for their outstanding valour and great effort in the fighting against Kolchak.
June 28	Lenin completes his pamphlet *A Great Beginning* (*Heroism of the Workers in the Rear. "Communist Subbotniks"*).

June 30	Lenin signs the Council of People's Commissars decision to permit workers' and rural organisations in the central gubernias to procure food in Simbirsk Gubernia independently.
July 1	In a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front Lenin congratulates the liberators of the Urals, the heroic Red troops who captured Perm and Kungur.
July 3-4	Lenin takes part in a Plenary Meeting of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) which approves Lenin's letter "All Out for the Fight Against Denikin!" addressed to all Party organisations.
July 4	Lenin speaks on the present situation and the immediate tasks of Soviet power at a joint meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies, the All-Russia Council of Trade Unions and representatives of Moscow Factory Committees.
July 11	Lenin lectures on the state at the Sverdlov University.
July 12	Lenin delivers a report on the foreign and domestic situation of the Republic at the Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
July 14	Lenin writes his article "The Tasks of the Third International. *Ramsay MacDonald on the Third International*".
July 15	Lenin speaks on the foreign and domestic situation of the Republic at a Red Army Conference at Khodynskoye Camp.
July 20	Lenin writes his "Answers to an American Journalist's Questions".
July 30	Lenin speaks on the food and war situation at a Moscow conference of factory committees, trade unions and representatives of the Moscow Central Workers' Co-operative.
July 31	Lenin speaks at the First All-Russia Congress of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture.
July	Lenin writes his "In the Servants' Quarters"; the article was unfinished.

August 6	Lenin speaks at a non-party conference of workers and Red Army men.
August 7-9	Lenin sends a directive in the name of the Political Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine to defend Odessa and Kiev.
August 19	Lenin writes to the Italian socialists Serrati and Lazzari.
August 24	Lenin writes his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants Apropos of the Victory over Kolchak".
August 28	Lenin writes a letter to the British Communist, Sylvia Pankhurst.
August 29	Lenin delivers a second lecture on the state at Sverdlov University.
August	Lenin writes his article "Freedom to Trade in Grain".

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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LENIN

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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PREFACE

Volume Thirty contains Lenin's speeches and writings for the period between September 1919 and April 1920—the period when foreign armed intervention and the Civil War had reached their peak and were followed by a temporary lull after the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin.

These speeches and articles demonstrate the great variety of the work done by Lenin in guiding the activities of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state.

Most of the speeches, reports and articles deal with questions of the defence of the socialist fatherland, the organisation of the Soviet state and the consolidation of the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. A considerable part of the volume, however, consists of Lenin's speeches at non-party conferences of workers and Red Army soldiers, at congresses of the trade unions of water transport workers, miners and textile workers, and at a congress of working Cossacks. These are speeches addressed to the people, in which Lenin appealed for the greater unity of the people at home and the army at the front, for support for the Red Army and for active participation in the work of restoring the economy and in the government of the country. Lenin's writings inculcated upon the masses a spirit of staunchness, heroism, self-sacrifice and iron discipline, and infused in them faith in their own strength and in victory.

In several of the articles in this volume Lenin develops the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an instrument for the organisation of socialist society. Lenin compares Soviet democracy to false, bourgeois democracy; he exposes the West-European socialists, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries as traitors to socialism and lackeys of imperialism for defending the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie under the flag of "pure democracy".

This is the subject-matter of the articles "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat", "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", "A Publicist's Notes" and others.

In his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine Apropos of the Victories over Denikin", "To the Communists of Turkestan", "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, November 22, 1919", and the "Draft Resolution of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on Soviet Rule in the Ukraine", Lenin explains the nature of the nationalities policy of the Soviet government and stresses the point that victory over the foreign military interventionists and internal counter-revolution is possible only if the formerly oppressed peoples rally around the Russian people.

In his "Speech Delivered at the First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Artels, December 4, 1919" and his "Report on Subbotniks Delivered to a Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), December 20, 1919", and in his article "From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New" Lenin deals with questions of the socialist reconstruction of the country, the creation of new, socialist forms of labour in industry and agriculture. The "Report on the Work of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars Delivered at the First Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Seventh Convocation, February 2, 1920" was first published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*; in this report Lenin gave his reasons why a plan for the electrification of Russia had to be prepared.

The items contained in the present volume include considerable material on questions of the organisation of economic management, the increasing of the proportion of workers in the state apparatus, the participation of trade unions in economic development and the struggle against bureaucratic methods. In his "Letter to R.C.P. Organisations on Preparations for the Party Congress" and his reports and speeches delivered at the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), the Third All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions and others, Lenin took a stand on the necessity for one-man

management, an improvement in labour discipline and enhanced responsibility of the individual in the management of industrial enterprises. Lenin dealt a serious rebuff to the supporters of the anti-Party "democratic centralism" group whose policy would have led to irresponsibility in industrial management.

In his speech on "The Tasks of the Working Women's Movement in the Soviet Republic" and the articles "Soviet Power and the Status of Women", "To the Working Women" and "International Working Women's Day" Lenin shows the hard position of the woman and her lack of rights under capitalism and explains how much Soviet power has given to women; he calls upon women to take an active part in the economic, social and political life of the country.

In the articles "How the Bourgeoisie Utilises Renegades" and "Greetings to Italian, French and German Communists", and in the "Draft (or Theses) of the R.C.P.'s Reply to the Letter of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany" Lenin, as the leader of the world working-class movement, gives guidance to the Communist Parties in the spirit of loyalty to the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and proletarian internationalism, mustering the best of the revolutionary proletariat around the Communist International.

Fourteen documents included in the present volume were published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*.

The group of documents containing answers to correspondents of the newspapers *The Chicago Daily News* and *Daily Express*, and of the Universal Service deal mainly with questions of the foreign policy of Soviet power. In his replies Lenin stressed the consistent desire of Soviet Russia for peace and the establishment of commercial relations with all capitalist countries; he also exposed the imperialists as warmongers.

Two speeches appeared for the first time in an edition of the *Collected Works* in the Fourth (Russian) Edition from which this translation has been made—the "Speech at a Meeting in Presnya District on the Anniversary of the December Uprising, 1905, December 19, 1919", and the "Speech at the Third All-Russia Conference of Directors of Adult

Education Divisions of Gubernia Education Departments, February 25, 1920"; new also are the letter of greetings "To the Bureau of the Women's Congress in Petrograd Gubernia" and the "Draft Decisions and Directives on Co-operatives".

In the letter "To the Communist Comrades Who Belonged to the United 'Communist Party of Germany' and Have Now Formed a New Party" and in the unfinished article "On Compromises" Lenin makes some statements on the tactics of the fraternal Communist Parties.

V. I. LENIN

1920

SPEECH AT A NON-PARTY CONFERENCE OF THE WORKERS AND MEN OF THE RED ARMY OF BASMANNY, LEFORTOVO, ALEXEYEVSKOYE AND SOKOLNIKI DISTRICTS[1] SEPTEMBER 3, 1919

Comrades, permit me to greet your non-party conference of workers and men of the Red Army, together with Red Commanders graduating from the artillery courses. This conference has been called to discuss problems of strengthening our state system and our state machinery.

In all countries the working-class masses are oppressed. They do not enjoy the benefits of capitalist civilisation, although the working people should by rights constitute the basis of all state life. In our country, comrades, the working people are the basis, the foundation of the Soviet Republic. After the triumph of the working people in February 1917, Soviets made their appearance throughout Russia. The idea of the Soviets did not originate in 1917 for they were born as far back as 1905. Even then Soviets of Workers' Deputies existed. After the October Revolution Soviet power met with the sympathy of workers in all countries, something that can be explained by profound internal causes.

Allow me, comrades, to say something about the main principles of political life in Soviet Russia. I am not in possession of exact material demonstrating the economic situation of our Republic; other speakers will no doubt deal with this, especially with the food policy of the workers' and peasants' government; I shall deal only with the political aspect.

To get a better picture of the basic principle of Soviet power we must take a backward glance, we must examine the course taken by our revolution, beginning from 1917. There were two periods in our revolution—one was the period of the Kerensky policy and the Kornilov revolt that preceded Soviet power, the other was the period of Kaledin, Kolchak and Denikin[2] who tried to destroy Soviet power. Non-party workers, members of the working classes, must ask themselves why these two periods occurred and why they are interconnected.

Comrades, every worker, every man of the Red Army, every member of the working classes must give thought to the reason our Soviet power is accused of terrorism, why it is said that the Bolsheviks are dictators, that the Bolsheviks are cut-throats. On the other hand, every member of the working classes should ask himself why the power of Kerensky, Kaledin and Kolchak collapsed so easily. You all know that at the time Kerensky was in power, Russia was covered with a network of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and that side by side with them, the bourgeoisie held all power in their own hands. The bourgeoisie were supported by the Allies, who wanted Russia to continue the war; the Russian bourgeoisie, too, wanted to continue the war in order to get hold of the Dardanelles. That is why Kerensky's bourgeois government, supported by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, did not want to and could not publish the treaties concluded between the government of Nicholas the Bloody and the Allies. In this way the bourgeoisie, by a fraud and with the aid of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, maintained their power over the masses of the working people.

You all remember that there were very few Bolsheviks in the Soviets at the beginning of the 1917 revolution. I remember that at the time of the First Congress of Soviets in June, the Bolsheviks did not make up even a seventh part of the delegates. The bourgeoisie and the so-called socialist parties of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries said of us that the Bolsheviks might have a corrupting influence on the masses. But what was Kerensky's bourgeois government doing at this time? They were feeding the working people with promises that were never fulfilled. The land law was

never promulgated. But when the land committees tried to take over the landed estates for distribution among the poor peasants, the committees were arrested. It became obvious to the working people that this government would give them nothing. They began to realise that only their own power, the power of the workers and poor peasants, would give them anything.

It was at this time that Kornilov launched his attack on Petrograd. It was not something casual, it derived from the fraudulent policy of Kerensky's government that had all the time tried to reconcile landowners and peasants, working people and exploiters, labour and capital. And then the landowners, officers and capitalists wanted to take all power into their own hands. That is why the Kornilov revolt broke out. The Soviets realised the danger and mustered their forces against Kornilov. And when Kerensky's bourgeois government continued its policy of deception even after this, the workers soon became more politically conscious and at the same time the number of Bolsheviks in the Soviets began rapidly to increase, even before the October Revolution. When we took power into our hands in October, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who strutted freely around Smolny,[3] warned us threateningly that the front would move up and wipe us off the face of the earth. We laughed in their faces in reply because we knew that the working people would understand our explanations, that they supported the power of the working people and, consequently, the power of the Soviets. And so it was; when numerous delegations came to Petrograd from the front we explained to them the real state of affairs and they all came over to our side. That is an object lesson for you non-party working people. Everyone who works, every factory worker, every man of the Red Army, must learn a lesson from the history of the Kerensky government, who, I repeat, wanted to reconcile the interests of the landowners and peasants, workers and employers, labour and capital.

It seemed that the Kerensky government ought to have been a strong one because the Allied bourgeois governments promised to support it, nevertheless it collapsed. The Kerensky government collapsed because it was founded on deception and had no ground under its feet. The Kerensky

government promised the working people universal elections, but only to cast dust in their eyes and distract their attention from the real state of affairs. For this reason, when the proletariat took power into its own hands after the October Revolution, it immediately organised its own government bodies, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The workers' and peasants' government straightaway rejected the false policy of Kerensky's bourgeois government. The first act of the Council of People's Commissars was the publication of the secret treaties concluded between the government of Nicholas the Bloody and our former Allies. The workers' and peasants' government declared forthrightly that they did not want to carry on a war waged in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and notwithstanding all the slander by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary hirelings of the bourgeoisie, proposed to all belligerent countries that they commence peace negotiations. The workers of all countries then saw that Soviet power did not wish to continue the war. The rapacious Treaty of Brest[4] was concluded, the treaty that the German predators imposed on unarmed Russia. Sympathy for Soviet power spread and grew strong among the class-conscious working-class masses of all countries. When the bourgeois governments of the countries of the Entente[5] forced the German plunderers to conclude a still more harsh and rapacious treaty,[6] the workers of all countries realised that they had been fooled all the time. Voices were raised and grew in strength and number against those who had all the time been fooling the people. Workers began to demand Soviet power, the power of the working people, the power of the workers and peasants.

That is why the bourgeois governments of Kerensky and Kolchak, that were supported by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, collapsed so rapidly. (You all know that the Menshevik Maisky was a member of the Siberian Government.[7]) And the Mensheviks, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Czechoslovaks,[8] supported by the foreign bourgeoisie, all joined forces, at first against the Bolsheviks, and then to organise a national democratic government. But what do we see? Kolchak-type officers disbanded the Constituent Assembly in Siberia and established the

power of the officers, capitalists and landowners. Thus the working people of Siberia learned from their own experience that they were being deceived, and that is why the Red Army was able to capture the whole of Siberia so easily and in such a short time—the Siberian workers and peasants came to the aid of the Red Army.

Comrades, now we have to give some thought to why it is said that the Bolsheviks use force, that the Bolsheviks are dictators. Why is it that all those who followed the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Czechoslovaks and Kolchak soon turned their backs on them? Why did the landowners, capitalists and officers from the Siberian Government expel the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and put Kolchak in their place immediately they got power into their own hands? Why did that government, supported from all sides, collapse so quickly? Because all their words and all their deeds were false and fraudulent. Because they did not keep their word, did not give the people a constituent assembly, or popular government, or any other kind of democratic government; they established a dictatorship of the landowners and officers.

Comrades, the bourgeoisie, by force of its class interests, had to lie to the working people and deceive them. The workers and peasants understand all this. They realise that there will be no lies and no deception only when power is in the hands of the working people; nor will there be any of the horrors the proletariat and poor peasantry had to put up with and still have to put up with after four years of war during which the bourgeoisie were in power. The proletariat has realised that there is only one way out—to overthrow the power of the capitalists; that there can be no reconciliation between labour and capital such as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are always talking about. The Siberian workers and peasants have paid a truly high price—tens of thousands of people shot and flogged to death—for their gullibility. We have had the sad experience of the blood of Siberian workers and peasants being spilled, but we know that it will be a lesson to them. Experience of this kind is the best way of teaching Bolshevism to the workers and peasants. After it the working people realise that there is no middle way, that they must choose—either the power of

the workers and peasants, Soviet power, or the power of the landowners and capitalists. The bourgeoisie are trying to stultify the consciousness of the working people by force and by deception, but all their efforts will collapse like a house of cards as the political consciousness of the workers and the poor peasants grows.

The venture of Denikin, who, in the Ukraine is repeating the Kolchak lesson, will compel the Ukrainian workers and peasants to understand the mistake they are making in not fighting vigorously enough against him. We know that after Denikin has ruled for a while in the Ukraine, the Ukrainian workers and peasants will be all the stronger for it and will defend the power of the workers and peasants, not in words but in deeds, as our Siberian brothers are now doing. The workers' and peasants' government tells the peasants and all working people, "Come with us, build your own proletarian state. Take a look at the lesson taught by Kolchak and Denikin and you will see the sort of life you get when there is no Soviet power." That lesson is the best agitation on our behalf.

The powerful workers' and peasants' government suppresses whiteguard conspiracies conjured up against it. It sweeps the traitors out of its ranks with an iron broom. The workers' and peasants' government organised the Red Army, put specialists into it and surrounded them with a number of communist commissars. Dozens of specialists who proved to be traitors have been kicked out of the Red Army, and thousands, tens of thousands of them are honestly carrying out their duties and remain in the ranks of the workers' and peasants' Red Army. That is the main, basic lesson to be learned from the political emancipation and liberation of the working people.

Everything that I am telling you today, comrades, is becoming clear to the working people of other countries. Everywhere the movement of the workers who demand the establishment of Soviet power is growing and expanding. You know that Mensheviks now head the government in Germany and that they are maintained in power by the armed force of the Entente; nevertheless, despite this, the German workers are demanding Soviet power. And the German Government was recently forced to add a clause to its constitution intro-

ducing Soviets or Councils of workers' deputies throughout Germany. Those councils, however, do not possess the right to discuss questions of the country's political life. According to the constitution of the socialist-traitors the German Soviets have the right to discuss only the economic situation in the country. We get very little information on other West-European countries, because we are surrounded by enemies on all sides, but the information that does reach us speaks of the spread and strengthening of the movement in favour of the Bolsheviks. Let me tell you of a little incident that occurred in France and which proves more eloquently than any words the correctness of my arguments; it will tell you a great deal. Two Bolshevik newspapers are published in France. One of them wanted to have the title of *Bolshevik* but the censor (in democratic France there is a censor!) forbade it and the newspaper called itself *Le Titre censuré*.[9] Workers who buy the newspaper and see the title add the word *Bolshevik* themselves. (*Stormy applause.*)

In conclusion, comrades, let me tell you of a report I received today from Comrade Zinoviev, Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies. Comrade Zinoviev informs me that a hundred Estonian prisoners have been landed in Petrograd and they told him the following. A non-party conference of trade union workers was held in whiteguard Estonia. It was attended by 417 delegates of whom only 33 were Mensheviks, all the others being Bolsheviks! (*Stormy applause.*) The conference demanded the conclusion of peace with Russia. When the British learned of this their representative appeared at the conference and proposed the overthrow of the whiteguard Government of Estonia, but the workers answered by chasing him away and demanding the conclusion of peace with Russia and the return to peaceful life. The conference was then dispersed and a hundred people were sent to Russia "to seek Bolshevism"; they have arrested 26 people and intend to shoot them. We responded to this act of whiteguard Estonia by a manifesto to the workers and the population of the country, and we informed their government that we shall shoot all hostages in our hands.[10] (*Applause.*) And there, too, the government was supported by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries!

Little Estonia, at her non-party trade union conference, gave powerful Britain a proper answer—Britain that had menaced us with an alliance of fourteen powers.[11]

As I come to the end of my speech, allow me to express my confidence that Soviet Russia, for two years victorious inside the country, will soon conquer the power of the bourgeoisie *throughout the world.* (*Stormy applause.*)

Pravda No. 201,
September 11, 1919

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HOW THE BOURGEOISIE UTILISES RENEGADES

Our wireless stations intercept messages from Carnarvon (Britain), Paris and other European centres. Today Paris is the centre of the world imperialist alliance and its wireless messages are therefore often of particular interest. A few days ago, on September 13, the government wireless station in this centre of world imperialism reported the publication of a new anti-Bolshevik book by Karl Kautsky, the well-known renegade and leader of the Second International.

The millionaires and multimillionaires would not use their government wireless station for nothing. They considered it necessary to publicise Kautsky's new crusade. In their attempt to stem the advancing tide of Bolshevism they have to grasp at everything—even at a straw, even at Kautsky's book. Our heartfelt thanks to the French millionaires for helping Bolshevik propaganda so splendidly, for helping us by making a laughing-stock of Kautsky's philistine anti-Bolshevism.

Today, September 18, I received the September 7 issue of *Vorwärts*, the newspaper of the German social-chauvinists, the murderers of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. It has an article by Friedrich Stampfer on Kautsky's new book (*Terrorism and Communism*) and cites a number of passages from it.[12] When we compare Stampfer's article and the Paris wireless message we see that the latter is in all probability based on the former. Kautsky's book is extolled by the Scheidemanns[13] and Noskes, the bodyguards of the German bour eoisie and murderers of the German Communists, by those who have joined the imperialists of the Entente in fighting international communism. A highly edifying spectacle! And when I called Kautsky a lackey of the bourgeoisie (in my book

The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky), our Mensheviks, those typical representatives of the Berne (yellow) International,[14] could not find words strong enough to express their indignation.

But it is a fact, gentlemen, despite all your indignation. The Scheidemanns of *Vorwärts* and the Entente millionaires are certainly not in collusion with me when they praise Kautsky and hold him up as a weapon in the struggle against world Bolshevism. In relation to the bourgeoisie Kautsky—ven if he did not realise and did not wish it—has proved to be exactly what I described him to be.

Some of the more "thunderous" of his accusations against the Bolsheviks will show how far he has gone in his apostasy from socialism and the revolution, apostasy that hides behind the name of Marxism.

> "Kautsky describes in detail," Stampfer writes, "how the Bolsheviks always, in the end, arrive at the very opposite of their avowed aims: they were opposed to the death sentence, but are now resorting to mass shootings...."

First, it is a downright lie to say that the Bolsheviks were opposed to the death sentence in time of revolution. At the Party's Second Congress in 1903, when Bolshevism first emerged, it was suggested that abolition of the death sentence be made one of the demands in the Party programme then being drawn up, but the minutes record that this only gave rise to the sarcastic question: "For Nicholas II too?" Even the Mensheviks, in 1903, did not venture to call for a vote on the proposal to abolish the death sentence for the tsar. And in 1917, at the time of the Kerensky government, I wrote in *Pravda* that no revolutionary government could dispense with the death sentence; the question was against which class a particular government would use it. Kautsky has so far forgotten how to think in terms of revolution and is so steeped in philistine opportunism that he cannot visualise a proletarian revolutionary party openly acknowledging, long before its victory, the need for capital punishment in relation to counter-revolutionaries. "Honest" Kautsky, being an honest man and an honest opportunist, quite unashamedly writes untruths about his opponents.

Secondly, anyone with the least understanding of revolution will realise that here we are not discussing revolution

in general, but a revolution that is developing out of the great imperialist slaughter of the peoples. Can one conceive of a proletarian revolution that develops from such a war being free of counter-revolutionary conspiracies and attacks by hundreds of thousands of officers belonging to the landowner and capitalist classes? Can one conceive of a working-class revolutionary party that would not make death the penalty for such attacks in the midst of an extremely cruel civil war, with the bourgeoisie conspiring to bring in foreign troops in an attempt to overthrow workers' government? Everyone, save hopeless and ludicrous pedants, must give a negative answer to these questions. But Kautsky is no longer able to see issues in their concrete historical setting in the way he formerly did.

Thirdly. If Kautsky is no longer capable of analysis and writes lies about the Bolsheviks, if he cannot think, or even present the problem of distinctive features of a revolution arising out of four years of war—he could at least take a closer look at what is going on around him. What is proved by the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg by army officers in the democratic republic of Germany? What is proved by the escape from prison of these officers, who were given preposterously lenient sentences? Herr Kautsky and his whole "independent" party (independent of the proletariat but very much dependent on petty-bourgeois prejudices) evade these issues and resort to snivelling condemnation and philistine lamentations. That is precisely why more and more revolutionary workers the world over are turning away from the Kautskys, Longuets, MacDonalds and Turatis and joining the Communists, for the revolutionary proletariat needs *victory* over counter-revolution, not impotent "condemnation" of it.

Fourthly. The question of "terrorism" is, apparently, basic to Kautsky's book. That is evident from the title, also from Stampfer's remark that "Kautsky is doubtlessly right in asserting that the fundamental principle of the Commune was not terrorism, but universal suffrage". In my *Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* I cited ample evidence to show that all this talk of a "fundamental principle" is a sheer travesty of Marxism. My purpose here is a different one. To show what Kautsky's disquisitions on the subject

of "terrorism" are worth, whom, *which class*, they *serve*, I shall cite in full a short article by a *liberal* writer. It is a letter to *The New Republic* (June 25, 1919), a liberal American journal which, generally speaking, expresses the petty-bourgeois viewpoint. However, it is preferable to Kautsky's in not presenting that viewpoint either as revolutionary socialism or Marxism.

This is the full text of the letter:

MANNERHEIM AND KOLCHAK

Sir: The Allied governments have refused to recognise the Soviet Government of Russia because, as they state:

1. The Soviet Government is—or was—pro-German.
2. The Soviet Government is based on terrorism.
3. The Soviet Government is undemocratic and unrepresentative of the Russian people.

Meanwhile the Allied governments have long since recognised the present whiteguard Government of Finland under the dictatorship of General Mannerheim, although it appears:

1. That German troops aided the whiteguards in crushing the Socialist Republic of Finland, and that General Mannerheim sent repeated telegrams of sympathy and esteem to the Kaiser. Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busily undermining the German Government with propaganda among troops on the Russian front. The Finnish Government was infinitely more pro-German than the Russian.
2. That the present Government of Finland on coming into power executed in cold blood within a few days' time 16,700 members of the old Socialist Republic, and imprisoned in starvation camps 70,000 more. Meanwhile the total executions in Russia for the year ended November 1, 1918, were officially stated to have been 3,800, including many corrupt Soviet of officials as well as counter-revolutionists. The Finnish Government was infinitely more terroristic than the Russian.
3. That after killing and imprisoning nearly 90,000 socialists, and driving some 50,000 more over the border into Russia—and Finland is a small country with an electorate of only about 400,000—the whiteguard government deemed it sufficiently safe to hold elections. In spite of all precautions, a majority of socialists were elected, but General Mannerheim, like the Allies after the Vladivostok elections, allowed not one of them to be seated. Meanwhile the Soviet Government had disenfranchised all those who do no useful work for a living. The Finnish Government was considerably less democratic than the Russian.

And much the same story might be rehearsed in respect to that great champion of democracy and the new order, Admiral Kolchak of Omsk, whom the Allied governments have supported, supplied and equipped, and are now on the point of officially recognising.

Thus every argument that the Allies have urged against the recognition of the Soviets, can be applied with more strength and honesty

against Mannerheim and Kolchak. Yet the latter are recognised, and the blockade draws ever tighter about starving Russia.

Stuart Chase

Washington, D.C.

This letter written by a bourgeois liberal, effectively exposes all the vileness of the Kautskys, Martovs, Chernovs, Brantings and other heroes of the Berne yellow International and their betrayal of socialism.

For, first, Kautsky and all these heroes lie about Soviet Russia on the question of terrorism and democracy. Secondly, they do not assess developments from the standpoint of the class struggle as it is actually developing on a world scale and in the sharpest possible form, but from the standpoint of a petty-bourgeois, philistine longing for what might have been if there had been no close link between bourgeois democracy and capitalism, if there were no whiteguards in the world, if they had not been supported by the world bourgeoisie, and so on and so forth. Thirdly, a comparison of this American letter with the writings of Kautsky and Co. will clearly show that Kautsky's *objective* role is servility to the bourgeoisie.

The world bourgeoisie supports the Mannerheims and Kolchaks in an attempt to stifle Soviet power, alleging that it is terrorist and undemocratic. Such are the facts. And Kautsky, Martov, Chernov and Co. are only singing songs about terrorism and democracy in chorus with the bourgeoisie, for the world bourgeoisie is singing this song to deceive the workers and strangle the workers' revolution. The personal honesty of "socialists" who sing the same song "sincerely", i.e., because they are extremely dull-witted, does not in any way alter the objective role played by the song. The "honest opportunists", the Kautskys, Martovs, Longuets and Co., have become "honest" (in their unprecedented spinelessness) *counter-revolutionaries*.

Such are the facts.

An American liberal realises—not because he is theoretically equipped to do so, but simply because he is an attentive observer of developments in a sufficiently broad light, on a world scale—that the *world bourgeoisie has organised and is waging a civil war against the revolutionary proletariat*

and, accordingly, is supporting Kolchak and Denikin in Russia, Mannerheim in Finland, the Georgian Mensheviks, those lackeys of the bourgeoisie, in the Caucasus, the Polish imperialists and Polish Kerenskys in Poland, the Scheidemanns in Germany, the counter-revolutionaries (Mensheviks and capitalists) in Hungary, etc., etc.

But Kautsky, like the inveterate reactionary philistine he is, continues snivelling about the fears and horrors of civil war! All semblance of revolutionary understanding, and all semblance of historical realism (for it is high time the inevitability of imperialist war being turned into civil war were realised) have disappeared. This is, furthermore, directly abetting the bourgeoisie, it is *helping* them, and Kautsky is *actually on the side of the bourgeoisie* in the civil war that is being waged, or is obviously being prepared, throughout the world.

His shouting, groaning, weeping and hysteria about the civil war serve to cover up his dismal failure as a theoretician. For the Bolsheviks have proved to be right; in the autumn of 1914 they declared to the world that the *imperialist war would be transformed into civil war*. Reactionaries of every shade were indignant or laughed; but the Bolsheviks were *right*. To conceal their complete failure, their stupidity and short-sightedness, the reactionaries must try to scare the petty bourgeoisie by showing them the horrors of civil war. That is just what Kautsky as a politician is doing.

To what absurd lengths he has gone can be seen from the following. There is no hope of a world revolution, Kautsky asserts—and what do you think he used as an argument? A revolution in Europe an the Russian pattern would mean "*unleashing* (*Entfessellung*) *civil war throughout the world for a whole generation*", and moreover not simply unleashing a veritable class war, but a "*fratricidal war among the proletarians*". The italicised words belong to Kautsky and are—admiringly of course—quoted by Stampfer.

Yes, Scheidemann's scoundrels and hangmen have good reason to admire them! Here is a "socialist leader" scaring people with the spectre of revolution and scaring them away from revolution! But, curiously enough, there is one thing Kautsky overlooks; for nearly two years the all-powerful Entente has been fighting against Russia and thereby

stirring up revolution in the Entente countries. If the revolution were even to begin now, even if only in its compromising stage and in only one or two of the Entente Great Powers this would *immediately* put an end to the civil war in Russia, would *immediately* liberate *hundreds of millions* in the colonies, where resentment is at boiling-point and is kept in check only by the violence of the European powers.

Kautsky now obviously has another motive for his actions in addition to the foulness of his servile soul that he demonstrated throughout the imperialist war—he *is afraid* of protracted civil war in Russia. And fear prevents him from seeing that the *bourgeoisie of the whole world* is fighting Russia. A revolution in one or two of the European Great Powers would completely *undermine* the rule of the world bourgeoisie, destroy the very *foundations* of its domination and leave it no safe haven *anywhere*.

The two-year war of the world bourgeoisie against Russia's revolutionary proletariat actually *encourages* revolutionaries everywhere, for it *proves* that victory on a *world scale* is very near and easy.

As far as civil war "among the proletarians" is concerned, we have heard that argument from the Chernovs and Martovs. To assess its utter dishonesty, let us take a simple example. During the great French Revolution, part of the peasants, the Vendée peasants, fought for the King against the Republic. In June 1848 and May 1871 part of the workers served in the armies of Cavaignac and Galliffet, the armies that stifled the revolution. What would you say of a man who took this line of argument: I regret the "civil war *among the peasants* in France in 1792 and among the workers in 1848 and 1871"? You would have to say that he was a hypocrite and defender of reaction, the monarchy and the Cavaignacs.

And you would be right.

Today only a hopeless idiot could fail to understand that what has taken place in Russia (and is beginning or maturing in the rest of the world) is a civil war of the proletariat *against the bourgeoisie*. There never has been, and never can be, a class struggle in which *part* of the advanced class does not remain on the side of the reactionary forces. That applies to civil war too. Part of the backward workers are bound to help the bourgeoisie—for a longer or shorter period. But

only scoundrels can use *that* to justify *their* desertion to the bourgeoisie.

Theoretically, this is a refusal to understand what the facts of the development of the world labour movement have been screaming and shouting about since 1914. The breakaway of the *top strata* of the working class, corrupted by a middle-class way of life and opportunism and *bribed* by "soft jobs" and other bourgeois sops, began to take shape on a world scale in the autumn of 1914 and reached its full development between 1915 and 1918. By disregarding this historical fact and blaming the Communists for the split in the movement, Kautsky is only demonstrating, for the thousandth time, his role of lackey of the bourgeoisie.

For forty years, from 1852 to 1892, Marx and Engels spoke of part (i.e., the top strata, the leaders, the "aristocracy") of the workers in Britain *becoming increasingly bourgeois*, *owing to* that country's colonial advantages and her monopolies.[15] It is clear as daylight that the twentieth-century imperialist monopolies in a number of other countries were bound to create the same phenomenon as in Britain. In all the advanced countries we see corruption, bribery, desertion to the bourgeoisie by the *leaders of the working class* and its *top strata* in consequence of the doles handed out by the bourgeoisie, who provide these leaders with "soft jobs", give crumbs from their profits to these upper strata, shift the burden of the worst paid and hardest work to backward workers brought into the country, and enhance the privileges of the "labour aristocracy" as compared with the majority of the working class.

The war of 1914-18 has given conclusive proof of treachery to socialism and desertion to the bourgeoisie by the *leaders and top strata* of the proletariat, by all the social-chauvinists, Gomperses, Brantings, Renaudels, MacDonalds, Scheidemanns, etc. And it goes without saying that for a time part of the workers by sheer inertia follow these bourgeois scoundrels.

The Berne International of the Huysmanses, Vanderveldes and Scheidemanns has now taken full shape as the yellow International of these traitors to socialism. If they are not fought, if a split with them is not effected, there can be no question of any *real* socialism, of any *sincere* work for the benefit of the social revolution.

Let the German Independents try to sit between two stools—such is their fate. The Scheidemanns embrace Kautsky as their "own man". Stampfer advertises this. Indeed, Kautsky is a worthy comrade of the Scheidemanns. When Hilferding, another Independent and friend of Kautsky's, proposed at Lucerne that the Scheidemanns be expelled from the International, the real leaders of the yellow International only laughed at him. His proposal was either a piece of extreme foolishness or a piece of extreme hypocrisy; he wanted to parade as a Left among the worker masses and, at the same time, retain his place in the International of bourgeois servitors! Regardless of what motivated this leader (Hilferding), the following is beyond doubt—the spinelessness of the Independents and the perfidy of the Scheidemanns, Brantings and Vanderveldes are bound to result in a stronger movement of the proletarian masses *away from these traitorous leaders*. In some countries imperialism can continue to divide the workers for a fairly long time to come. The example of Britain is proof of that, but the *unification* of the revolutionaries, and the uniting of the masses with the revolutionaries and the expulsion of the yellow elements are, on a world scale, proceeding steadily and surely. The tremendous success of the Communist International is proof of it: in America, a Communist Party has already been formed,[16] in Paris, the Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts and the Syndicalist Defence Committee[17] have come out for the Third International, and two Paris papers have sided with the Third International: Raymond Péricat's *L'Internationale*[18] and Georges Anquetil's *Le Titre censuré* (*Bolshevik*?). In Britain, we are on the eve of the organisation of a Communist Party with which the best elements in the British Socialist Party,[19] the Shop Stewards Committees,[20] the revolutionary trade-unionists, etc., are in solidarity. The Swedish Lefts, the Norwegian Social-Democrats, the Dutch Communists, the Swiss[21] and Italian[22] Socialist parties stand solid with the German Spartacists[23] and the Russian Bolsheviks.

In the few months since its organisation early this year, the Communist International has become a world organisation leading the masses and unconditionally hostile to the betrayers of socialism in the yellow International of the Berne and Lucerne fraternity.

In conclusion, here is a highly instructive communication that casts light on the part played by the opportunist leaders. The conference of yellow socialists in Lucerne this August was reported by the Geneva paper *La Feuille*[24] in a special supplement appearing in several languages. The English edition (No. 4, Wednesday, August 6) carried an interview with Troelstra, the well-known leader of the opportunist party in Holland.

Troelstra said that the German revolution of November 9 had caused a good deal of agitation among Dutch political and trade union leaders. For a few days the ruling groups in Holland were in a state of panic especially as there was practically universal unrest in the army.

The Mayors of Rotterdam and The Hague, he continues, sought to build up their own organisations as an auxiliary force of the counter-revolution. A committee composed of former generals—among them an old officer who prided himself on having shared in the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China—tried to mislead several of our comrades into taking up arms against the revolution. Naturally, their efforts had the very opposite result and in Rotterdam, at one time, it seemed that a workers' council would be set up. But the political and trade union leaders believed such methods premature and confined themselves to formulating a workers' minimum programme and publishing a strongly worded appeal to the masses.

That is what Troelstra said. He also bragged a good deal, describing how he had delivered revolutionary speeches calling even for the seizure of power, how he realised the inadequacy of parliament and political democracy as such, how he recognised "illegal methods" of struggle and "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the transition period, and so on and so forth.

Troelstra is a typical specimen of the venal, opportunist leader who serves the bourgeoisie and deceives the workers. In words he will accept *everything*—workers' councils, proletarian dictatorship and whatever else you wish. But actually he is a vile betrayer of the workers, an agent of the bourgeoisie. He is the *leader* of those "political and trade union leaders" that *saved the Dutch bourgeoisie* by joining forces with them at the decisive moment.

For the facts revealed by Troelstra are perfectly clear and point in a very definite direction. The Dutch army had been mobilised, the proletariat was armed and united, in the army, with the poor sections of the people. The German revolution

inspired the workers to rise, and there was "practically universal unrest in the army". Obviously, the duty of revolutionary leaders was to lead the masses towards revolution, not to miss the opportune moment, when the arming of the workers and the influence of the German revolution could have decided the issue at one stroke.

But the treasonable leaders, with Troelstra at their head, joined forces with the bourgeoisie. The workers were stalled off with reforms and still more with promises of reforms. "Strongly worded appeals" and revolutionary phrases were used to placate—and deceive—the workers. It was the Troelstras and similar "leaders", who make up the Second International of Berne and Lucerne, that saved the capitalists by helping the bourgeoisie demobilise the army.

The labour movement will march forward, ousting these traitors and betrayers, the Troelstras and the Kautskys, ridding itself of the upper stratum that has turned bourgeois, is misleading the masses and pursuing capitalist policies.

N. Lenin

September 20, 1919

P.S. Judging by Stampfer's article, Kautsky is now silent on the Soviet political system. Has he surrendered on this cardinal issue? Is he no longer prepared to defend the banalities set forth in his pamphlet against *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*? Does he prefer to pass from this *chief* issue to secondary ones? The answer to all these questions must await examination of Kautsky's pamphlet.

Published in September 1919

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TO THE AMERICAN WORKERS

Comrades,

About a year ago, in my letter to the American workers (dated August 20th, 1918) I exposed to you the situation in Soviet Russia and the problems facing the latter. That was before the German revolution. The events which since took place in the world's history proved how right the Bolsheviks were in their estimation of the imperialist war of 1914-18 in general and of the Entente imperialism in particular. As for the Soviet power it has become familiar and dear to the minds and hearts of the working masses of the whole world. Everywhere the working people, in spite of the influence of the old leaders with their chauvinism and opportunism penetrating them through and through, become aware of the rottenness of the bourgeois parliaments and of the necessity of the Soviet power, the power of the working people, the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the sake of the emancipation of humanity from the yoke of capital. And Soviet power will win in the whole world, however furiously, however frantically the bourgeoisie of all countries rages and storms. The bourgeoisie inundates Russia with blood, waging war upon us and inciting against us the counter-revolutionaries, those who wish the yoke of capital to be restored. The bourgeoisie inflicts upon the working masses of Russia unprecedented sufferings through the blockade and through the help it gives to counter-revolution, but we have already defeated Kolchak and we are carrying on the war against Denikin with the firm assurance of our coming victory.

N. Lenin

September 23, 1919

* * *

I am often asked whether those American opponents of the war against Russia—not only workers, but mainly bourgeois—are right, who expect from us, after peace is concluded, not only resumption of trade relations, but also the possibility of receiving concessions in Russia. I repeat once more that they are right. A durable peace would be such a relief to the working people of Russia that they would undoubtedly agree to certain concessions being granted. The granting of concessions under reasonable terms is desirable also for us, as one of the means of attracting into Russia, during the period of the coexistence side by side of socialist and capitalist states, the technical help of the countries which are more advanced in this respect.

N. Lenin

September 23, 1919

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THE TASKS OF THE WORKING WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FOURTH MOSCOW CITY CONFERENCE OF NON-PARTY WORKING WOMEN SEPTEMBER 23, 1919

Comrades, it gives me pleasure to greet a conference of working women. I will allow myself to pass over those subjects and questions that, of course, at the moment are the cause of the greatest concern to every working woman and to every politically-conscious individual from among the working people; these are the most urgent questions—that of bread and that of the war situation. I know from the newspaper reports of your meetings that these questions have been dealt with exhaustively by Comrade Trotsky as far as war questions are concerned and by Comrades Yakovleva and Svidersky as far as the bread question is concerned; please, therefore, allow me to pass over those questions.

I should like to say a few words about the general tasks facing the working women's movement in the Soviet Republic, those that are, in general, connected with the transition to socialism, and those that are of particular urgency at the present time. Comrades, the question of the position of women was raised by Soviet power from the very beginning. It seems to me that any workers' state in the course of transition to socialism is faced with a double task. The first part of that task is relatively simple and easy. It concerns those old laws that kept women in a position of inequality as compared to men.

Participants in all emancipation movements in Western Europe have long since, not for decades but for centuries,

put forward the demand that obsolete laws be annulled and women and men be made equal by law, but none of the democratic European states, none of the most advanced republics have succeeded in putting it into effect, because wherever there is capitalism, wherever there is private property in land and factories, wherever the power of capital is preserved, the men retain their privileges. It was possible to put it into effect in Russia only because the power of the workers has been established here since October 25, 1917. From its very inception Soviet power set out to be the power of the working people, hostile to all forms of exploitation. It set itself the task of doing away with the possibility of the exploitation of the working people by the landowners and capitalists, of doing away with the rule of capital. Soviet power has been trying to make it possible for the working people to organise their lives without private property in land, without privately-owned factories, without that private property that everywhere, throughout the world, even where there is complete political liberty, even in the most democratic republics, keeps the working people in a state of what is actually poverty and wage-slavery, and women in a state of double slavery.

Soviet power, the power of the working people, in the first months of its existence effected a very definite revolution in legislation that concerns women. Nothing whatever is left in the Soviet Republic of those laws that put women in a subordinate position. I am speaking specifically of those laws that took advantage of the weaker position of women and put them in a position of inequality and often, even, in a humiliating position, i.e., the laws on divorce and on children born out of wedlock and on the right of a woman to summon the father of a child for maintenance.

It is particularly in this sphere that bourgeois legislation, even, it must be said, in the most advanced countries, takes advantage of the weaker position of women to humiliate them and give them a status of inequality. It is particularly in this sphere that Soviet power has left nothing whatever of the old, unjust laws that were intolerable for working people. We may now say proudly and without any exaggeration that apart from Soviet Russia there is not a country in the world where women enjoy full equality and where women

are not placed in the humiliating position felt particularly in day-to-day family life. This was one of our first and most important tasks.

If you have occasion to come into contact with parties that are hostile to the Bolsheviks, if there should come into your hands newspapers published in Russian in the regions occupied by Kolchak or Denikin, or if you happen to talk to people who share the views of those newspapers, you may often hear from them the accusation that Soviet power has violated democracy.

We, the representatives of Soviet power, Bolshevik Communists and supporters of Soviet power are often accused of violating democracy and proof of this is given by citing the fact that Soviet power dispersed the Constituent Assembly. We usually answer this accusation as follows: that democracy and that Constituent Assembly which came into being when private property still existed on earth, when there was no equality between people, when the one who possessed his own capital was the boss and the others worked for him and were his wage-slaves—that was a democracy on which we place no value. Such democracy concealed slavery even in the most advanced countries. We socialists are supporters of democracy only insofar as it eases the position of the working and oppressed people. Throughout the world socialism has set itself the task of combating every kind of exploitation of man by man. That democracy has real value for us which serves the exploited, the underprivileged. If those who do not work are disfranchised that would be real equality between people. Those who do not work should not eat.

In reply to these accusations we say that the question must be presented in this way—how is democracy implemented in various countries? We see that equality is proclaimed in all democratic republics but in the civil laws and in laws on the rights of women—those that concern their position in the family and divorce—we see inequality and the humiliation of women at every step, and we say that this is a violation of democracy specifically in respect of the oppressed. Soviet power has implemented democracy to a greater degree than any of the other, most advanced countries because it has not left in its laws any trace of the inequality of women.

Again I say that no other state and no other legislation has ever done for women a half of what Soviet power did in the first months of its existence.

Laws alone, of course, are not enough, and we are by no means content with mere decrees. In the sphere of legislation, however, we have done everything required of us to put women in a position of equality and we have every right to be proud of it. The position of women in Soviet Russia is now ideal as compared with their position in the most advanced states. We tell ourselves, however, that this is, of course, only the beginning.

Owing to her work in the house, the woman is still in a difficult position. To effect her complete emancipation and make her the equal of the man it is necessary for the national economy to be socialised and for women to participate in common productive labour. Then women will occupy the same position as men.

Here we are not, of course, speaking of making women the equal of men as far as productivity of labour, the quantity of labour, the length of the working day, labour conditions, etc., are concerned; we mean that the woman should not, unlike the man, be oppressed because of her position in the family. You all know that even when women have full rights, they still remain factually downtrodden because all housework is left to them. In most cases housework is the most unproductive, the most barbarous and the most arduous work a woman can do. It is exceptionally petty and does not include anything that would in any way promote the development of the woman.

In pursuance of the socialist ideal we want to struggle for the full implementation of socialism, and here an extensive field of labour opens up before women. We are now making serious preparations to clear the ground for the building of socialism, but the building of socialism will begin only when we have achieved the complete equality of women and when we undertake the new work together with women who have been emancipated from that petty, stultifying, unproductive work. This is a job that will take us many, many years.

This work cannot show any rapid results and will not produce a scintillating effect.

We are setting up model institutions, dining-rooms and nurseries, that will emancipate women from housework. And the work of organising all these institutions will fall mainly to women. It has to be admitted that in Russia today there are very few institutions that would help woman out of her state of household slavery. There is an insignificant number of them, and the conditions now obtaining in the Soviet Republic—the war and food situation about which comrades have already given you the details—hinder us in this work. Still, it must be said that these institutions that liberate women from their position as household slaves are springing up wherever it is in any way possible.

We say that the emancipation of the workers must be effected by the workers themselves, and in exactly the same way the emancipation of working women is a matter for the working women themselves. The working women must themselves see to it that such institutions are developed, and this activity will bring about a complete change in their position as compared with what it was under the old, capitalist society.

In order to be active in politics under the old, capitalist regime special training was required, so that women played an insignificant part in politics, even in the most advanced and free capitalist countries. Our task is to make politics available to every working woman. Ever since private property in land and factories has been abolished and the power of the landowners and capitalists overthrown, the tasks of politics have become simple, clear and comprehensible to the working people as a whole, including working women. In capitalist society the woman's position is marked by such inequality that the extent of her participation in politics is only an insignificant fraction of that of the man. The power of the working people is necessary for a change to be wrought in this situation, for then the main tasks of politics will consist of matters directly affecting the fate of the working people themselves.

Here, too, the participation of working women is essential—not only of party members and politically-conscious women, but also of the non-party women and those who are least politically conscious. Here Soviet power opens up a wide field of activity to working women.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

We have had a difficult time in the struggle against the forces hostile to Soviet Russia that have attacked her. It was difficult for us to fight on the battlefield against the forces who went to war against the power of the working people and in the field of food supplies against the profiteers, because of the too small number of people, working people, who came whole-heartedly to our aid with their own labour. Here, too, there is nothing Soviet power can appreciate as much as the help given by masses of non-party working women. They may know that in the old, bourgeois society, perhaps, a comprehensive training was necessary for participation in politics and that this was not available to women. The political activity of the Soviet Republic is mainly the struggle against the landowners and capitalists, the struggle for the elimination of exploitation; political activity, therefore, is made available to the working woman in the Soviet Republic and it will consist in the working woman using her organisational ability to help the working man.

What we need is not only organisational work on a scale involving millions; we need organisational work on the smallest scale and this makes it possible for women to work as well. Women can work under war conditions when it is a question of helping the army or carrying on agitation in the army. Women should take an active part in all this so that the Red Army sees that it is being looked after, that solicitude is being displayed. Women can also work in the sphere of food distribution, on the improvement of public catering and everywhere opening dining-rooms like those that are so numerous in Petrograd.

It is in these fields that the activities of working women acquire the greatest organisational significance. The participation of working women is also essential in the organisation and running of big experimental farms and should not take place only in isolated cases. This is something that cannot be carried out without the participation of a large number of working women. Working women will be very useful in this field in supervising the distribution of food and in making food products more easily obtainable. This work can well be done by non-party working women and its accomplishment will do more than anything else to strengthen socialist society.

We have abolished private property in land and almost completely abolished the private ownership of factories; Soviet power is now trying to ensure that all working people, non-party as well as Party members, women as well as men, should take part in this economic development. The work that Soviet power has begun can only make progress when, instead of a few hundreds, millions and millions of women throughout Russia take part in it. We are sure that the cause of socialist development will then become sound. Then the working people will show that they can live and run their country without the aid of the landowners and capitalists. Then socialist construction will be so soundly based in Russia that no external enemies in other countries and none inside Russia will be any danger to the Soviet Republic.

Pravda No. 213,
September 25, 1919

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THE EXAMPLE OF THE PETROGRAD WORKERS[25]

The newspapers have already reported that the Petrograd workers have begun the intensive mobilisation and dispatch of the best workers to the Southern Front.

Denikin's capture of Kursk and advance on Orel fully explain this energetic action of the Petrograd proletariat, whose example must be followed by the workers of other industrial centres.

The Denikin gang count on sowing panic in our ranks and making us think only of defence, only of the matter in hand. The foreign radio shows how zealously the French and British imperialists are helping Denikin, how they are helping him with armaments and hundreds of millions of rubles. The foreign radio proclaims to the whole world that the road to Moscow lies open. That is how the capitalists would like to frighten us.

But they will not succeed in frightening us. The deployment of our troops has been carefully planned and strictly carried out. Our offensive against the chief source of the enemy's strength steadily continues. The victories recently won—the capture of 20 guns in the Boguchar area, the capture of the village of Veshenskaya—indicate the successful advance of our troops to the centre of the Cossack area, which alone enabled and still enables Denikin to organise a serious force. Denikin will be smashed as Kolchak has been smashed. They cannot frighten us and we shall bring our cause to a victorious conclusion.

The capture of Kursk and the enemy's advance on Orel required the provision of additional forces in order to repel him there. By their example the Petrograd workers have shown that they have correctly understood this task. Without

hiding the dangers from ourselves, and without in any way minimising them, we say: Petrograd has shown that we do have additional forces. In order to repel the attack on Orel and to launch an offensive against Kursk and Kharkov, the best proletarians must be mobilised, over and above the forces we already have at our disposal. The fall of Kursk constitutes a serious danger; never has the enemy been so near to Moscow. In addition to the previous army forces, we are dispatching new contingents of advanced workers capable of changing the mood of the retreating units to ward off this danger.

Among our troops in the South, deserters who have returned to the ranks occupy a prominent place. Most of them have returned voluntarily, under the influence of the propaganda which has explained where their duty lies and shown them how serious is the threat that the power of the landowners and capitalists will be restored. But the deserters do not hold out, they lack staunchness and quite often they begin to retreat without fighting.

That is why it is of prime importance to strengthen the army by a new influx of proletarian forces. The unstable elements will be given strength, morale will be raised, a turning-point will be reached. As has continually happened in our revolution, the proletariat will support and guide the wavering sections of the working population.

For a long time now the Petrograd workers have had to bear much greater burdens than the workers of other industrial centres. The Petrograd proletariat has suffered more than the proletariat in other localities from famine, the perils of war and the withdrawal of the best workers for Soviet duties throughout Russia.

Yet we see that there has not been the slightest dejection, not the slightest diminution of energy among the Petrograd workers. On the contrary, they have become steeled, they have found new strength and have brought new fighters to the fore. They are excellently fulfilling the duty of a leading contingent, sending aid and support where it is most needed.

When such fresh forces go to reinforce units of our army that have wavered, the mass of the working people, the soldiers of peasant origin obtain new leaders from among their own kind, from the more developed, more politically-conscious,

and more staunch-minded working people. That is why such help to our peasant army gives us a decisive superiority over the enemy, for in his case it is only landowners' sons who are sent out to strengthen his peasant army, and we know that this "strengthening" has ruined Kolchak and will ruin Denikin.

Comrade workers! Let all of you set about the new work after the example of the Petrograd comrades! More energy for activities in the army, more initiative and boldness, more emulation so as to equal the Petrograders, and victory will be won by the working people, the landowner and capitalist counter-revolution will be beaten.

N. Lenin

P.S. I have just learned that from Moscow also some dozens of the most devoted comrades have left for the front. Following Petrograd, Moscow has taken action. Following Moscow, all the rest should take action.

N.L.

October 3, 1919

Pravda No. 221,
October 4, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS PUT BY A *CHICAGO DAILY NEWS* CORRESPONDENT[26]

October 5, 1919

I beg to apologise for my bad English. I am glad to answer your few questions.

1. What is the present policy of the Soviet Government on the question of peace?
2. What, in general outline, are the peace terms put forward by Soviet Russia?

Our peace policy is the former, that is, we have accepted the peace proposition of Mr. Bullitt.[27] We have never changed our peace conditions (question 2), which are formulated with Mr. Bullitt.

We have many times officially proposed peace to the Entente before coming of Mr. Bullitt.

3. Is the Soviet Government prepared to guarantee absolute non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states?

We are willing to guarantee it.

4. Is the Soviet Government prepared to prove that it represents the majority of the Russian people?

Yes, the Soviet Government is the most democratic government of all governments in the world. We are willing to prove it.

5. What is the position of the Soviet Government in respect of an economic understanding with America?

We are decidedly for an economic understanding with America—with all countries but *especially* with America.

If necessary we can give you the full text of our peace conditions as formulated by our government with Mr. Bullitt.

Wl. Oulianoff (*N. Lenin*)

Published in the *Chicago Daily News* No. 257, October 27, 1919

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Published according to the newspaper text

GREETINGS TO ITALIAN, FRENCH AND GERMAN COMMUNISTS

Scant indeed is the news we get from abroad. The blockade by the imperialist beasts is in full swing; the violence of the biggest world powers is turned against us in the hope of restoring the rule of the exploiters. And all this bestial fury of the Russian and world capitalists is cloaked, needless to say, in phrases about the lofty significance of "democracy"! The exploiter camp is true to itself; it depicts bourgeois democracy as "democracy" in general. And all the philistines and petty bourgeois, down to Friedrich Adler, Karl Kautsky and the majority of the leaders of the Independent (that is, independent of the revolutionary proletariat but dependent on petty-bourgeois prejudices) Social-Democratic Party of Germany, join in the chorus.

But the more infrequently we in Russia receive news from abroad, the greater the joy with which we follow the gigantic, universal advance of communism among the workers in all the countries of the world, the successful severance of the masses from the corrupt and treacherous leaders who, from Scheidemann to Kautsky, have gone over to the bourgeoisie.

All that we know of the Italian Party is that its Congress has resolved by a huge majority to affiliate to the Third International and to adopt the programme of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, the Italian Socialist Party has, in practice, aligned itself with communism, though to our regret it still retains its old name. Warm greetings to the Italian workers and their party!

All that we know of France is that in Paris alone there are already two communist newspapers: *L'Internationale* edited by Raymond Péricat, and *Le Titre censuré* edited by Georges

Anquetil. A number of proletarian organisations have already affiliated to the Third International. The sympathies of the workers are undoubtedly on the side of communism and Soviet power.

Of the German Communists we know only that communist newspapers are published in a number of towns. Many bear the name *Die Rote Fahne*.[28] The Berlin *Rote Fahne*, an illegal publication, is battling heroically against the Scheidemanns and Noskes, the butchers who play flunkey to the bourgeoisie in deeds, just as the Independents do in words and in their "ideological" (petty-bourgeois ideological) propaganda.

The heroic struggle of *Die Rote Fahne*, the Berlin communist paper, evokes whole-hearted admiration. At last we see in Germany honest and sincere socialists, who, despite all persecution, despite the foul murder of their best leaders, have remained firm and unbending! At last we see in Germany communist workers who are waging a heroic struggle that really deserves to be called "revolutionary"! At last there has emerged from the very midst of the proletarian masses in Germany a force for which the words "proletarian revolution" have become a *truth*!

Greetings to the German Communists!

The Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Renners and Friedrich Adlers, great as the difference between these gentlemen in the sense of personal integrity may probably be, have in equal measure proved to be petty bourgeois, most shameful traitors to and betrayers of socialism, supporters of the bourgeoisie. For in 1912 all of them took part in drafting and signing the Basle Manifesto[29] on the approaching imperialist war, all of them spoke then about "*proletarian* revolution", and all of them proved in practice to be petty-bourgeois democrats, knights of philistine-republican, bourgeois-democratic illusions, accomplices of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The savage persecution to which the German Communists have been subjected has strengthened them. If at the moment they are somewhat disunited, this testifies to the breadth and mass character of their movement, to the vigour with which communism is growing out of the very midst of the masses of workers. It is inevitable that a movement so ruthlessly persecuted by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie

and their Scheidemann-Noske henchmen and forced to organise illegally should be disunited.

And it is natural, too, that a movement which is growing so rapidly and experiencing such desperate persecution should give rise to rather sharp differences. There is nothing terrible in that; it is a matter of growing pains.

Let the Scheidemanns and Kautskys gloat in their *Vorwärts* and *Freiheit* about the differences among the Communists. There is nothing left for these heroes of rotten philistinism but to cover up their rottenness by pointing to the Communists. But if we take the real state of affairs we realise that only the blind can now fail to see the truth. And the truth is that the followers of Scheidemann and Kautsky have shamelessly *betrayed* the proletarian revolution in Germany, *broken faith with it* and have, *in fact*, sided with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Heinrich Laufenberg in his excellent pamphlet, *From the First Revolution to the Second*, demonstrated this and proved it with remarkable force, vividness, clarity and conviction. The differences among the followers of Scheidemann and Kautsky are differences within disintegrating, dying parties of which there remain only leaders without masses, generals without armies. The masses are abandoning the Scheidemanns and going over to the Kautskys, being attracted by their Left wing (this is borne out by any report of a mass meeting), and this Left wing combines—in unprincipled and cowardly fashion—the old prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie about parliamentary democracy with communist recognition of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power.

Under mass pressure, the rotten leaders of the Independents acknowledge all this in words, but in deeds they remain petty-bourgeois democrats, "socialists" of the type of Louis Blanc and the other dolts of 1848 who were so mercilessly ridiculed and branded by Marx.

Here we have differences that are really irreconcilable. There can be no peace, no joint work, between the proletarian revolutionaries and the philistines, who, like those of 1848, worship at the shrine of bourgeois "democracy" without understanding its bourgeois nature. Haase and Kautsky, Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer can twist and squirm as much as they like, use up reams of paper and make endless

speeches, but they cannot get away from the fact that *in practice* they absolutely fail to understand the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power, that *in practice* they are petty-bourgeois democrats, "socialists" of the Louis Blanc and Ledru-Rollin type, that *in practice* they are, at best, puppets in the hands of the bourgeoisie, and, at worst, direct hirelings of the bourgeoisie.

The Independents, the Kautskyites and the Austrian Social-Democrats *seem* to be united parties, actually, on the basic, chief and most essential issue, most of their party members do *not* agree with the leaders. The party membership *will wage* a proletarian revolutionary struggle for Soviet power the very moment a new crisis sets in, and the "leaders" will act as counter-revolutionaries as they do now. To sit between two stools is not a difficult matter in words; Hilferding in Germany and Friedrich Adler in Austria are giving a model display of this noble art.

But people who try to reconcile the irreconcilable will prove to be mere soap-bubbles in the heat of the revolutionary struggle. This was demonstrated by all the "socialist" heroes of 1848, by their Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary kindred in Russia in 1917-19, and is being demonstrated by all the knights of the Berne, or yellow, Second International.

The differences among the Communists are of another kind. Only those who do not want to cannot see the fundamental distinction. The differences among the Communists are differences between representatives of a mass movement that has grown with incredible rapidity; and the Communists have a single, common, granite-like foundation—recognition of the proletarian revolution and of the struggle against bourgeois-democratic illusions and bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism, and recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power.

On *such* a basis differences are nothing to worry about, they represent growing pains, not senile decay. Bolshevism, too, has experienced differences of this kind more than once, as well as minor breakaways caused by such differences, but at the decisive moment, at the moment of taking power and establishing the Soviet Republic, Bolshevism was united; it drew to itself all that was best in the trends of

socialist thought akin to it and rallied round itself the *entire* vanguard of the proletariat and the *overwhelming majority* of the working people.

And so it will be with the German Communists, too.

The followers of Scheidemann and Kautsky still talk about "democracy" in general, they still live in the ideas of 1848, they are Marxists in words, Louis Blancs in deeds. They prattle about the "majority" and believe that equality of ballot-papers signifies equality of exploited and exploiter, of worker and capitalist, of poor and rich, of the hungry and the satiated.

The Scheidemanns and the Kautskys would have us believe that the kind-hearted, honest, noble, peace-loving capitalists have never used the force of wealth, the force of money, the power of capital, the oppression of bureaucracy and military dictatorship, but have decided matters truly "by majority"!

The Scheidemanns and the Kautskys (partly from hypocrisy, partly from extreme stupidity, instilled by decades of reformist activity) *prettify* bourgeois democracy, bourgeois parliamentarism and the bourgeois republic, so as to make it appear that the capitalists decide affairs of state by the will of the majority, and not by the will of capital, not by means of deception and oppression and the violence of the rich against the poor.

The Scheidemanns and Kautskys are ready to "recognise" the proletarian revolution, but only with the proviso that first, while the force, power, oppression and privileges of capital and wealth *are retained*, the majority of the people shall vote (with the voting supervised by the bourgeois apparatus of state power) "*for revolution*"! It is difficult to imagine the extent of the philistine stupidity displayed in these views, or the extent of the philistine gullibility (*Vertrauensduselei*) in the capitalists, in the bourgeoisie, in the generals, and in the bourgeois apparatus of state power.

Actually, it is precisely the bourgeoisie that has always played the hypocrite by characterising formal equality as "democracy", and in practice using force against the poor, the working people, the small peasants and the workers, by employing countless means of deception, oppression, etc. The imperialist war (that the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys

painted in shamelessly bright colours) has made this plain to millions of people. Proletarian dictatorship is the *sole* means of defending the working people against the oppression of capital, the violence of bourgeois military dictatorship, and imperialist war. Proletarian dictatorship is the sole step to equality and democracy *in practice*, not on paper, but in life, not in political phrase-mongering, but in economic reality.

Having failed to understand this, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys proved to be contemptible traitors to socialism and defenders of the ideas of the bourgeoisie.

* * *

The Kautskyite (or Independent) party is dying. It is bound to die and disintegrate soon as a result of the differences between its predominantly revolutionary membership and its counter-revolutionary "leaders".

The Communist Party, experiencing exactly the same (essentially the same) differences as were experienced by Bolshevism, will grow stronger and become as hard as steel.

The differences among the German Communists boil down, so far as I can judge, to the question of "utilising the legal possibilities" (as the Bolsheviks used to say in the 1910-13 period), of utilising the bourgeois parliament, the reactionary trade unions, the law on works' councils (*Betriebsratgesetz*), bodies that have been hamstrung by the Scheidemanns and Kautskys; it is a question of whether to participate in such bodies or boycott them.

We Russian Bolsheviks experienced quite similar differences in 1906 and in the 1910-12 period. And for us it is clear that with many of the young German Communists it is simply a case of a lack of revolutionary experience. Had they experienced a couple of bourgeois revolutions (1905 and 1917), they would not be advocating the boycott so unconditionally, nor fall from time to time into the mistakes of syndicalism.

This is a matter of growing pains; the movement is developing in fine style and as it grows they will pass. And these obvious mistakes must be combated openly; the differences must not be exaggerated since it must be clear to everyone

that in the near future the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Soviet power, will wipe out the greater part of them.

Both from the standpoint of Marxist theory and the experience of three revolutions (1905, February 1917 and October 1917) I regard refusal to participate in a bourgeois parliament, in a reactionary (Legien, Gompers, etc.) trade union, in an ultra-reactionary workers' council hamstrung by the Scheidemanns, etc., as an undoubted mistake.

At times, in individual cases, in individual countries, the boycott is correct, as, for example, was the Bolshevik boycott of the tsarist Duma in 1905. But the selfsame Bolsheviks took part in the much more reactionary and downright counter-revolutionary Duma of 1907. The Bolsheviks contested the elections to the bourgeois Constituent Assembly in 1917, and in 1918 we dispersed it, to the horror of the philistine democrats, the Kautskys and other such renegades from socialism. We worked in the ultra-reactionary, purely Menshevik, trade unions which (in their counter-revolutionary nature) yielded nothing to the Legien unions—the foulest and most reactionary trade unions in Germany. Even now, two years after the conquest of state power, we have not yet finished fighting the remnants of the Menshevik (i.e., the Scheidemann, Kautsky, Gompers, etc.) trade unions—so long is the process! So strong in some places and in some trades is the influence of petty-bourgeois ideas!

At one time we were in a minority in the Soviets, the trade unions and the co-operatives. By persistent effort and long struggle—both *before and after* the conquest of political power—we won a majority, first in *all* workers' organisations, then in non-worker and, finally, even in small-peasant organisations.

Only scoundrels or simpletons can think that the proletariat must first win a majority in elections carried out *under the yoke of the bourgeoisie*, under the *yoke of wage-slavery*, and must then win power. This is the height of stupidity or hypocrisy; it is substituting elections, under the old system and with the old power, for class struggle and revolution.

The proletariat wages its class struggle and does not wait for elections to begin a strike, although for the complete success of a strike it is necessary to have the sympathy of the

majority of the working people (and, it follows, of the majority of the population); the proletariat wages its class struggle and overthrows the bourgeoisie without waiting for any preliminary elections (supervised by the bourgeoisie and carried out under its yoke); and the proletariat is perfectly well aware that for the success of its revolution, for the successful overthrow of the bourgeoisie, it is *absolutely necessary* to have the sympathy of the majority of the working people (and, it follows, of the majority of the population).

The parliamentary cretins and latter-day Louis Blancs "insist" absolutely on elections, on elections that are most certainly supervised by the bourgeoisie, to ascertain whether they have the sympathy of the majority of the working people. But this is the attitude of pedants, of living corpses, or of cunning tricksters.

Real life and the history of actual revolutions show that quite often the "sympathy of the majority of the working people" cannot be demonstrated by any elections (to say nothing of elections supervised by the exploiters, with "equality" of exploiters and exploited!). Quite often the "sympathy of the majority of the working people" is demonstrated not by elections at all, but by the growth of one of the parties, or by its increased representation in the Soviets, or by the success of a strike which for some reason has acquired enormous significance, or by successes won in civil war, etc., etc.

The history of our revolution has shown, for example, that sympathy for the dictatorship of the proletariat on the part of the majority of the working people in the boundless expanses of the Urals and Siberia was ascertained not by means of elections, but by the experience of a year of the tsarist general Kolchak's rule in that area. Incidentally, Kolchak's rule also began with a "coalition" of the Scheidemann and Kautsky crowd (in Russian they are called Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, supporters of the Constituent Assembly), just as in Germany at the moment the Haases and Scheidemanns, through their "coalition", are paving the way to power for von Goltz or Ludendorff and covering up this power and making it look decent. In parenthesis it should be said that the Haase-Scheidemann coalition in the government has ended, but the political coalition of these betrayers

of socialism remains. Proof: Kautsky's books, Stampfer's articles in *Vorwärts*, the articles by the Kautskys and the Scheidemanns about their "unification", and so on.

The proletarian revolution is impossible without the sympathy and support of the overwhelming majority of the working people for their vanguard—the proletariat. But this sympathy and this support are not forthcoming immediately and are not decided by elections. They are *won* in the course of long, arduous and stern class struggle. The class struggle waged by the proletariat *for* the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people does not end with the conquest of political power by the proletariat. *After* the conquest of power this struggle continues, but in *other* forms. In the Russian revolution the circumstances were exceptionally favourable for the proletariat (in its struggle for its dictatorship), since the proletarian revolution took place at a time when all the people were under arms and when the peasantry as a whole, disgusted by the "Kautskyite" policy of the social-traitors, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, wanted the overthrow of the rule of the landowners.

But even in Russia, where things were exceptionally favourable at the moment of the proletarian revolution, where a most remarkable unity of the entire proletariat, the entire army and the entire peasantry was achieved at once—even in Russia, the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship, had to struggle for months and years to win the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people. After two years this struggle has practically, but still not completely, ended in favour of the proletariat. In two years we have won the full sympathy and support of the overwhelming majority of the workers and labouring peasants of Great Russia, including the Urals and Siberia, but as yet we have not won the full support and sympathy of the majority of the working peasants (as distinct from the peasant exploiters) of the Ukraine. We *could* be (but shall not be) crushed by the military might of the Entente, but *inside* Russia we *now* have such sound sympathy, and from such an enormous majority of the working people, that our state is the most democratic state the world has ever seen.

One has only to give some thought to this complex, difficult and long history of proletarian struggle for power—a struggle rich in the extraordinary variety of forms and in the unusual abundance of sharp changes, turns and switches from one form to another—to see clearly the error of those who would "forbid" participation in bourgeois parliaments, reactionary trade unions, tsarist or Scheidemann Shop Stewards Committees or works' councils, and so on and so forth. This error is due to the lack of revolutionary experience among quite sincere, convinced and valiant working-class revolutionaries. Consequently, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were a thousand times right in January 1919 when they realised this mistake, pointed it out, but nevertheless chose to remain with the proletarian revolutionaries, mistaken though they were on a minor question, rather than side with the traitors to socialism, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, who made no mistake on the question of participating in bourgeois parliaments, but had ceased to be socialists and had become philistine democrats and accomplices of the bourgeoisie.

A mistake, however, remains a mistake and it is necessary to criticise it and fight for its rectification.

The fight against the traitors to socialism, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, must be waged mercilessly, but not on the issue of for or against participation in bourgeois parliaments, reactionary trade unions, etc. This would be an obvious mistake, and a bigger mistake still would be to retreat from the ideas of Marxism and its practical line (a strong, centralised political party) to the ideas and practice of syndicalism. It is necessary to work for the Party's participation in bourgeois parliaments, in reactionary trade unions and in "works' councils" that have been mutilated and castrated in Scheidemann fashion, for the Party to be wherever workers are to be found, wherever it is possible to talk to workers, to influence the working masses. Legal and illegal work must at all costs be combined, the illegal Party, through its workers' organisations, must exercise systematic, constant and strict control over legal activity. This is no easy matter, but the proletarian revolution, generally speaking, knows nothing and can know nothing of "easy" tasks or "easy" means of struggle.

This difficult task must be carried out at all costs. The Scheidemann and Kautsky gang differ from us not only (and not chiefly) because they do not recognise the armed uprising and we do. The chief and radical difference is that in *all* spheres of work (in bourgeois parliaments, trade unions, co-operatives, journalistic work, etc.) they pursue an inconsistent, opportunist policy, even a policy of downright treachery and betrayal.

Fight against the social-traitors, against reformism and opportunism—this political line can and must be followed without exception in *all* spheres of our struggle. And then we shall win the working masses. And the vanguard of the proletariat, the Marxist centralised political party together with the working masses will take the people along the true road to the triumph of proletarian dictatorship, to proletarian instead of bourgeois democracy, to the Soviet Republic, to the socialist system.

In the space of a few months the Third International has won a number of glorious, unprecedented victories. The speed of its growth is astonishing. Particular mistakes and growing pains give no grounds for alarm. By criticising them directly and openly, we shall ensure that the working masses of all cultured countries, educated in the spirit of Marxism, quickly rid themselves of the betrayers of socialism, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys of *all* nations (for these traitors are to be found in all nations).

The victory of communism is inevitable. Communism will triumph.

N. Lenin

October 10, 1919

Published in October 1919

Published according to the manuscript

THE WORKERS' STATE AND PARTY WEEK

Moscow Party Week[30] comes at a time of difficulty for the Soviet government. Denikin's successes have given rise to a frenzied increase in plots by the landowners, capitalists and their friends, and increased efforts on the part of the bourgeoisie to sow panic and undermine the strength of the Soviet rule by every means in their power. The vacillating, wavering, politically backward petty bourgeois, and with them the intelligentsia, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, have, as usual, become more shaky than ever and were the first to allow themselves to be intimidated by the capitalists.

Moscow Party Week at such a difficult time is, I think, something of an advantage to us, for it is much better for the cause. We do not need a Party Week for show purposes. We do not need fictitious Party members even as a gift. Our Party, the party of the revolutionary working class, is the only government party in the world which is concerned not with increasing its membership but with improving its quality, and purging itself of "self-seekers". We have more than once carried out the re-registration of Party members in order to get rid of these "self-seekers" and to leave in the Party only politically-conscious elements who are sincerely devoted to communism.[31] We have further taken advantage of the mobilisations for the front and of the subbotniks to purge the Party of those who are only "out for" the benefits accruing to membership of a government party and do not want to bear the burden of devoted work on behalf of communism.

And at this juncture, when intensified mobilisation for the front is in progress, Party Week is a good thing because

it offers no temptation to the self-seekers. We extend a broad invitation into the Party only to rank-and-file workers and poor peasants, to labouring peasants, *but not* to the peasant profiteers. We do not promise and do not give these rank-and-file members any advantages from joining the Party. On the contrary, just now harder and more dangerous work than usual falls to the lot of Party members.

So much the better. Only sincere supporters of communism, only persons who are conscientiously devoted to the workers' state, only honest working people, only genuine representatives of the masses that were oppressed under capitalism will join the Party.

And it is only such members that we need in the Party.

We need new Party members not for advertising purposes but for serious work. These are the people we invite into the Party. To the working people we throw the doors of the Party wide open.

Soviet power is the power of the working people that is fighting for the complete overthrow of the yoke of capital. The first to engage in this fight were the working class of the towns and the factory centres. They won the first victory and conquered state power.

The working class is winning to their side the majority of the peasants. For it is only the peasant huckster, the peasant profiteer, and not the labouring peasant who is drawn to the side of capital, to the side of the bourgeoisie.

The workers of Petrograd, the most advanced, the most politically-conscious workers, have been contributing most of all to the administration of Russia. But we know that among the rank-and-file workers and peasants there are very many people devoted to the interests of the working masses and capable of undertaking the work of leadership. Among them there are many with a talent for organisation and administration to whom capitalism gave no opportunity and whom we are helping and must help in every way to come to the fore and take up the work of building socialism. To discover these new, modest and unperceived talents is no easy matter. It is no easy matter to enlist for state administrative work rank-and-file workers and peasants who for centuries had been downtrodden and intimidated by the landowners and capitalists.

But this difficult work has to be done, it must be done, so as to draw more deeply on the working class and the labouring peasantry for new forces.

Comrades, non-party workers and labouring peasants, join the Party! We promise you no advantages from joining; it is hard work we are calling you to, the work of organising the state. If you are sincere supporters of communism, set about this work boldly, do not fear its novelty and the difficulty it entails, do not be put off by the old prejudice that only those who have received formal training are capable of this work. That is not true. The work of building socialism can and must be directed by rank-and-file workers and labouring peasants in ever-growing numbers.

The mass of the working people are with us. That is where our strength lies. That is the source of the invincibility of world communism. More new workers from among the masses for the ranks of the Party to take an independent part in building the new life—that is our method of combating all difficulties, that is our path to victory.

October 11, 1919

Pravda No. 228,
October 12, 1919
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the manuscript

SPEECH TO MOBILISED WORKER COMMUNISTS DELIVERED FROM THE BALCONY OF MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES OCTOBER 16, 1919

NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Lenin is greeted with stormy applause.*) Comrades, permit me to greet the workers of Yaroslavl and Vladimir gubernias who have once again answered our call and given their best forces for the defence of the workers' and peasants' republic. You know from the newspapers in which we print the whole truth, concealing nothing, what new and ominous danger is embodied in the capture of Orel by the tsarist general Denikin and the threat to Red Petrograd by Yudenich. But we regard this danger, and we struggle against it, in the way we always have—we appeal to the politically-conscious proletariat and working peasantry to stand firm in defence of their gains.

The situation is extremely grave. But we do not despair, for we know that every time a difficult situation for the Soviet Republic arises the workers display miracles of valour and by their example encourage and inspire the troops and lead them on to fresh victories.

We know that throughout the world, in all countries, the revolutionary movement is growing, slower than we would like, but definitely growing. We also know that the victory of the working class throughout the world is certain.

Great as the sacrifices made by Russia are, greatly as she has been tormented and mutilated, she is nevertheless fighting persistently for the cause of all workers. The impe-

rialists may crush another republic or two, but they cannot save world imperialism, for it is doomed and will be swept away by the coming socialism.

That is why I greet you, workers of Vladimir and Yaroslavl gubernias, in the firm conviction that you will, by your personal example, strengthen the spirit of the Red Army and lead it to victory.

Long live the workers and peasants!

Long live the world workers' republic!

Pravda No. 232,
October 12, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TO THE WORKERS AND RED ARMY MEN OF PETROGRAD

Comrades, the decisive moment has arrived. The tsarist generals have again been provided with munitions and other supplies by the capitalists of Britain, France and America, and with gangs of landowners' sons are again trying to capture Red Petrograd. The enemy launched his attack at the time of the peace negotiations with Estonia, attacked our Red Army troops who believed in these negotiations. The treacherous nature of the attack partly explains the rapid successes of the enemy. Krasnoye Selo, Gatchina and Vyritsa have been captured. Two railway lines to Petrograd have been cut. The enemy is trying to cut the third, Nikolayevskaya, line, and the fourth, Vologda, line so as to starve Petrograd into surrender.

Comrades, you all know and can see for yourselves the tremendous threat hanging over Petrograd. A few days will decide the fate of the city, and that means half the fate of Soviet power in Russia.

There is no need for me to remind Petrograd workers and Red Army soldiers of their duty. The entire history of the two years' struggle of the Soviet Republic against the bourgeoisie of the whole world, a struggle of unprecedented difficulty that has brought unprecedented victories, has demonstrated that the Petrograd workers are not only a model in the fulfilment of their duty but have also shown examples of the greatest heroism and of revolutionary enthusiasm and devotion such as the world has never before seen.

Comrades, the fate of Petrograd is being decided! The enemy is trying to catch us unawares. His forces are weak, insignificant even, but he is strong because he is swift,

because his officers are insolent and because he is well supplied and well armed. Help for Petrograd is near at hand, we have sent reinforcements. We are much stronger than the enemy. Fight to the last drop of blood, comrades, hold fast to every inch of land, be firm to the end, victory is near! Victory will be ours!

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

October 17

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 237, October 19, 1919

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE RED ARMY MEN

Comrades, Red Army men! The tsarist generals—Yudenich in the North and Denikin in the South—are once again bending every effort in an attempt to vanquish Soviet power and restore the power of the tsar, the landowners and the capitalists.

We know how a similar attempt by Kolchak ended. He did not succeed in deceiving the workers of the Urals and the peasants of Siberia for long. Having seen through the deception and having suffered endless violence, floggings and robbery at the hands of the officers, the sons of landowners and capitalists, the Ural workers and Siberian peasants helped our Red Army defeat Kolchak. The Orenburg Cossacks came straight over to the side of Soviet power.

That is why we are fully confident in victory over Yudenich and Denikin. They will not succeed in restoring the power of the tsar and the landowners. That will never be! The peasants are already rising in Denikin's rear. The flames of revolt against Denikin are burning brightly in the Caucasus. The Kuban Cossacks are grumbling and stirring to action, resentful of Denikin's violence and robbery on behalf of the landowners and the British.

Let us then be firm, comrades, Red Army men! The workers and peasants are rallying ever more solidly, consciously and resolutely to the side of the Soviet government.

Forward, comrades, Red Army men, to the fight for the workers' and peasants' rule, against the landowners and the tsarist generals! Victory will be ours!

October 19, 1919 *N. Lenin*

Published in 1919

Published according to the manuscript

RESULTS OF PARTY WEEK IN MOSCOW AND OUR TASKS

During Party Week in Moscow, 13,600 people were enrolled in the Party.

This is a huge, quite unexpected success. The entire bourgeoisie, and especially the urban petty bourgeoisie, including the specialists, officials and office workers who lament the loss of their privileged "ruling" position—all these gentlemen have recently, particularly during Party Week in Moscow, been doing their best to sow panic and to prophesy the imminent collapse of Soviet power and the imminent victory of Denikin.

And with what consummate artistry this "intellectualist" public wields the weapon of sowing panic! And it has indeed become a real weapon in the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. In periods such as the one we are passing through, the petty bourgeoisie merges in "one reactionary mass" with the bourgeoisie and "passionately" seizes on this weapon.

It is Moscow, where the trading element was especially strong, where there was a greater concentration of exploiters, landowners, capitalists and rentiers than anywhere else, where capitalist development brought together a mass of bourgeois intellectuals, where the central state administration produced an especially large body of officials—it is Moscow that has furnished an exceptionally convenient field for bourgeois tittle-tattle, bourgeois malicious talk and bourgeois panic-sowing. The successful offensive of Denikin and Yudenich was a 'factor" that favoured to an extraordinary extent the "successes" of this bourgeois weapon.

And yet, when the mass of the proletarians saw Denikin's "successes" and realised all the difficulties, burdens and dangers attaching to the title and duties of a Communist at the present time, thousands and thousands of them rose up to reinforce the Party of Communists, to undertake the incredibly heavy burden of state administration.

The success of Soviet power, the success of our Party, is truly remarkable!

This success has proved and vividly demonstrated to the people of the capital, and then to the whole Republic and the whole world, that it is in the proletarian milieu, among the genuine representatives of the working people, that the most reliable source of the strength and durability of Soviet power is to be found. This successful voluntary enrolment in the Party at a time of maximum difficulty and danger is a real demonstration of *that aspect* of the dictatorship of the proletariat which its enemies, in their malice, refuse to see but which is valued above all by the real friends of the emancipation of labour from the capitalist yoke, namely, the special strength of the *moral* (in the best sense of the word) influence of the proletariat (which wields state power) on the masses, the *ways* this influence is exerted.

With state power in their hands, the foremost sections of the proletariat have by their example shown the mass of the working people, shown them throughout two whole years (an immense period for our exceptionally rapid tempo of political development), a *model* of such devotion to the interests of the working people, such vigour in the struggle against the enemies of the working people (against the exploiters in general and against "property-owners" and profiteers in particular), such firmness in difficult moments, such self-sacrificing resistance to the bandits of world imperialism, that the strength of the workers' and peasants' *sympathy* for their vanguard has proved *by itself* capable of *performing miracles*.

It is indeed a miracle. Workers, who have suffered unprecedented torments of hunger, cold, economic ruin and devastation, are not only maintaining their cheerful spirit, their entire devotion to Soviet power, all the energy of self-sacrifice and heroism, but also, despite their lack of

training and experience, are undertaking the burden of steering the ship of state! And this at a moment when the storm has reached the peak of its fury....

The history of our proletarian revolution is full of such miracles. They will lead, surely and inevitably, no matter what severe trials may be in store, to the full victory of the world Soviet republic.

We must take care now that *proper* use is made of the new Party members. Particularly great attention must be devoted to this task, for it is not an easy one; it is a new task and cannot be accomplished by old routines.

Capitalism stifled, suppressed and killed a wealth of talent among the workers and working peasants. These talents perished under the oppression of want, poverty and the outrage of human dignity. It is our duty now to bring out these talents and put them to work. The new members who have joined the Party during Party Week are undoubtedly for the most part inexperienced and ignorant in matters of state administration. Equally undoubtedly these are most devoted, most sincere and capable people from the sections of society that capitalism artificially *held down*, reduced to the lowest level and did not allow to rise. Among them, however, there is *more* strength, vigour, staunchness, directness and sincerity than among other sections.

It follows that all Party organisations must give especial thought to the employment of these new Party members. They must be *more boldly* given the most varied kinds of state work, they must be tested in practice as rapidly as possible.

Boldness, of course, must not be taken to mean that the new members are to be entrusted *at once* with responsible posts requiring knowledge they do not possess. We must be bold in combating red tape not for nothing has our Party Programme very definitely raised the question of the causes of a certain revival of bureaucratic methods and indicated methods of combating it. We must be bold in establishing, first of all, *supervision* over office workers, officials and specialists by new Party members who are well acquainted with the condition of the people, their needs and requirements. We must be bold in *immediately* affording these

new members opportunities for developing and displaying their abilities in work *on a broad scale*. We must be bold in breaking with customary routine (among us too—quite often, alas!—there is an excessive fear of encroaching on established Soviet routine, although sometimes the "establishing" has been done not by class-conscious Communists, but by old officials and office workers); we must be bold in the sense that we must be prepared with revolutionary speed to alter the form of work for new Party members so as to test them more quickly and to find the appropriate place for them.

In many cases new Party members can be given posts where, in the course of checking up the conscientiousness with which old officials perform their tasks, these Party members will quickly learn the job themselves and be able to take it over independently. In other cases they can be placed so as to renovate and refresh the intermediary links between the mass of workers and peasants on the one hand, and the state apparatus on the other. In our industrial "chief administrations and central boards", in our agricultural "state farms" there are still many, far too many, saboteurs, landowners and capitalists in hiding, who harm Soviet power in every way. Experienced Party workers in the centre and the localities should show their efficiency through their ability to make intensive use of the new Party forces for a determined fight against this evil.

The Soviet Republic must become a single armed camp where there is a maximum of effort, a maximum economy of forces, a maximum reduction of all red tape and unnecessary formalism and a maximum simplification of the apparatus which must be not only as close as possible to the needs of the masses, but also something they can readily understand and participate in independently.

Increased mobilisation of old Party members for army work is taking place. This activity must not be weakened in any way, but more and more intensified. At the same time, however, and with the aim of achieving success in the war, we must improve, simplify and revitalise our civil administration.

Victory in war goes to the side whose people has greater reserves, greater sources of strength and greater endurance.

We have more of all these qualities than the Whites, more than the "all-powerful" Anglo-French imperialism, this colossus with feet of clay. We have more of them because we can draw, and for a long time will continue to draw, more and more deeply upon the workers and working peasants, upon those classes which were oppressed by capitalism and which everywhere form the overwhelming majority of the population. We can draw from this most capacious reservoir, for it gives us leaders of the workers and peasants in the building of socialism who are most sincere, the most steeled by the burdens of life, the closest to the workers and peasants.

Our enemies, whether the Russian or the world bourgeoisie, have nothing remotely resembling this reservoir; the ground is more and more giving way under their feet; they are being deserted by ever greater number of their former supporters among the workers and peasants.

That is why, in the last analysis, the victory of Soviet power throughout the world is certain and inevitable.

October 21, 1919

Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
No. 7, October 22, 1919
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)*

SPEECH
TO STUDENTS OF THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY LEAVING FOR THE FRONT
OCTOBER 24, 1919

Comrades, you know it is not only the desire to celebrate the completion of the course of instruction at the Soviet school by the majority of you that has brought us here together, but also the decision taken by about a half the graduates to leave for the front to render fresh, extraordinary and substantial aid to the troops in action there.

Comrades, we are well aware of the great difficulties being experienced by our entire administration in the towns and, especially, in the rural areas because of the shortage of experienced, knowledgeable comrades. We are also well aware that the advanced workers of Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other towns, those advanced comrades who until now have been bearing what one might call the main burden of administering the country under unprecedentedly difficult conditions, who have been bearing the main burden of uniting the workers and peasants and giving them guidance—we are well aware that these comrades are extremely exhausted by the superhuman efforts at times required of them for the defence of the Soviet Republic. Therefore, the opportunity to gather together here several hundred workers and peasants and give them the possibility of studying regularly for a few months, to complete a course of Soviet studies and then leave here in a body, organised, mustered, politically-conscious to do the work of government and to make good the tremendous defects that still remain—such an oppor-

tunity is of great value to us and it was with great difficulty and reluctance, and after considerable wavering that we took a decision to permit half the present graduation class to go to work at the front. The conditions obtaining at the front, however, are such that we were left with no other choice. And we were of the opinion that the decision, adopted voluntarily and for the purpose of dispatching to the front a number of the best people who would have been valuable in all administrative and organising work—this decision was called for by circumstances of undoubted necessity.

Comrades, permit me to give you a short review of the situation now obtaining on the various fronts so that you may judge how urgent this necessity has become.

On a number of fronts that were formerly extremely important and on which the enemy had placed great hopes, victory for our side has recently drawn nearer and it will, by all the signs, be complete and irrevocable. On the Northern Front, where the offensive against Murmansk promised the enemy particularly great advantages and where the British had long ago mustered huge, excellently equipped forces and where we had unbelievable difficulty in fighting because of the lack of food and equipment—there, it seemed, the prospects for the British and French imperialists were of the brightest. It was there, however, that the enemy offensive collapsed completely. The British had to withdraw their troops, and we now have full confirmation that the British workers do not want war against Russia and even now, when Britain is far from the revolutionary struggle, they are able to bring such pressure to bear on their government of predators and plunderers that they can force them to withdraw their troops from Russia. They have been forced to abandon this front which was particularly dangerous because the enemy there was in possession of a sea route and was in a most favourable position. There are Russian whiteguard forces of practically no significance left there.

Take another front—the Kolchak front. You know that when Kolchak's army advanced towards the Volga the capitalist press of Europe hurried to inform the whole world of the collapse of Soviet power and to recognise

Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler of Russia. Before the document announcing this recognition reached Kolchak, however, our troops had pushed him back into Siberia and, as you know, we approached Petropavlovsk and the River Irtysh and Kolchak was compelled to deploy his forces differently from the way he had intended. Time was when we had to withdraw because the local workers and peasants were late in mustering their forces. Information received from behind Kolchak's lines tells of his undoubted debacle, and the population, even the affluent peasants, are rising against him to a man. We are approaching the time when the last stronghold of Kolchak's forces will be smashed and that will bring us to the end of a year of revolution in the course of which all Siberia was under Kolchak's rule and when he was helped by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks who again went through the business of coming to an agreement with a bourgeois government. You know that all the European bourgeoisie helped Kolchak. You know that the Siberian line was held by the Poles and Czechs, that there were also Italians there and American officer volunteers. Everything that might paralyse the revolution came to the aid of Kolchak. And it all collapsed because the peasants, the Siberian peasants, who least of all submit to the influence of communism because they see least of it, were given such a lesson by Kolchak, such a *practical* comparison (and peasants like practical comparisons) that we may say that Kolchak has given us a million supporters in districts the farthest removed from industrial centres where we should have had difficulty in winning them over. That is how Kolchak's power came to an end and that is why we feel our position to be most stable on that front.

We can see that the Polish offensive on the Western Front is coming to an end. The Poles got help from Britain, France and America who all tried to arouse Poland's ancient hatred towards her Great-Russian oppressors, tried to transfer the Polish workers' hatred of the landowners and tsars, a hundred times deserved, to the Russian workers and peasants, and tried to make the Polish workers think that the Bolsheviks, like the Russian chauvinists, dream of conquering Poland. For the time being they were

successful in this. But there are definite signs that the time when this fraud was effective is now over and that disintegration has set in in the Polish army. American reports that cannot be suspected of sympathy for communism affirm that there is a growing demand among the Polish peasants to finish the war by October I at all costs, and that this demand is supported by even the most patriotic of the Polish social-chauvinists (P.S.P.)[32] who occupy the same position as our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and are offering greater and greater opposition to their government. In recent times the mood of the Poles has changed considerably.

That leaves two other fronts, the Petrograd and Southern fronts, where the most important events are taking place. Here, too, all the signs indicate that the enemy is mustering his last forces. We have precise information to the effect that Secretary for War Churchill and the capitalist party in Britain undertook this military venture against Petrograd to demonstrate the possibility of making a speedy end of Soviet Russia, and that the British press regards this venture as the last stake made by Mr. Churchill and the chauvinists against the undoubted will of the majority of the people.

We may regard the Petrograd attack as a measure of help to Denikin; this conclusion may be drawn from the situation on the Petrograd Front.

You know the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian governments have agreed to our proposal to start peace negotiations. Naturally this last piece of news has caused some wavering among our troops, giving them hopes that the war is drawing to an end. The negotiations have begun. In the meantime Britain collected her remaining vessels and landed several thousand whiteguards equipped with magnificent war materiel. They cannot transport them to us, however, unless they lull the people by deception, because in both Britain and France there have been cases of attempts to load war materiel on to ships having failed because the dockers struck work and said that they would not allow steamers carrying weapons of destruction to Soviet Russia to be loaded. The British imperialists had to get armaments from other countries, hoodwinking their

own people. No wonder, then, that they dispatched against Soviet Russia a few hundred or a few thousand Russian whiteguard officers. There are camps in Britain where these whiteguard officers are housed, fed and trained for the invasion of Russia; and then they say that this is an internal war brought about by the terrorism of the Bolsheviks. Camps that were once full of Russian prisoners of war are now full of Russian whiteguard officers. This accounts for the tremendous successes achieved by the enemy when he brought these forces up to the Petrograd Front at a time when we were expecting Latvia and Lithuania to conclude an armistice. You now know that the turning-points has been reached on the Petrograd Front. You know from the reports of Zinoviev and Trotsky that losses have been made up, that the former wavering has come to an end and that our forces are attacking, and attacking successfully, overcoming the most desperate resistance. These battles are outstanding in their extraordinary ferocity. Comrade Trotsky informed me by telephone from Petrograd that in Detskoye Selo, which we recently captured, whiteguards, and bourgeois who had remained behind, fired from individual houses, offering stubborn resistance, greater resistance than in any previous battles. The enemy feels that a turning-point has been reached in the entire war and that Denikin is in a position in which he must be helped and our forces attacking him diverted. It can be said definitely that they did not succeed in doing this. Everything we sent to help Petrograd was obtained without the slightest weakening of the Southern Front. Not a single unit for Petrograd was withdrawn from the Southern Front and that victory which we have begun to achieve and which we shall pursue to the end will be achieved without any weakening of the Southern Front where the outcome of the war against the landowners and the imperialists is being decided. That outcome will be there on the Southern Front, and in the near future.

Comrades, you know that on the Southern Front, on the one hand, the enemy relied mainly on the Cossacks who were fighting for their privileges, and on the other hand, more regiments of the volunteer army had been formed there than elsewhere; these were troops full of savage resentment

who fought for the interests of their class, for the restoration of the power of the landowners and capitalists. It is here, therefore, that we have to engage them in the decisive battle, and here we see the same as we saw in the case of Kolchak; at first he achieved tremendous success, but the longer the fighting went on, the thinner became the ranks of the officers and politically-conscious kulaks who formed the backbone of Kolchak's army, and the more workers and peasants he had to enlist. They like other people to do their fighting for them, they do not like making sacrifices themselves and prefer that the workers risk their necks in their interests. And when Kolchak had to expand his army, the expansion led to hundreds of thousands coming over to our side. Dozens of whiteguard officers and Cossacks who deserted to our side said that they had become convinced that Kolchak was selling Russia right and left, and although they did not share the views of the Bolsheviks they came over to the side of the Red Army. That is how Kolchak finished up and that is how Denikin will end up, too. Today you were able to read in the evening newspapers that there had been risings behind Denikin's lines—the Ukraine is aflame. We have reports of the events in the Caucasus where the mountain people, driven to despair, attacked Shkuro's regiments and took their rifles and ammunition away from them. Yesterday we received a foreign wireless message that admitted that Denikin's situation was a difficult one—he had been compelled to send his best forces into battle because the Ukraine was aflame and there was an uprising in the Caucasus. The time is coming when Denikin will have to stake everything. Never before have there been such ferocious, bloody battles as that at Orel, where the enemy sent his best regiments, the so-called "Kornilov" regiments, into battle; one-third of them were the most counter-revolutionary officers, the best trained and fiercest in their hatred of the workers and peasants, officers who were defending the restoration of their own landowners' rule. That is why we have every reason to believe that the decisive moment is approaching on the Southern Front. The victories at Orel and Voronezh where the pursuit of the enemy continues, show that here, as on the Petrograd Front, the turning-point has been reached.

We must ensure that our offensive will develop from a petty, partial attack into a gigantic mass offensive that will bring us the final victory.

That is why, no matter how great this sacrifice may be for us—the dispatch to the front of the hundreds of students gathered here and very obviously needed for work in Russia—we have nevertheless granted you your wish. There, on the Petrograd and Southern fronts, the fate of the war will be decided, if not in weeks, then at most in months. At such a moment every politically-conscious Communist should say to himself, "My place is there, ahead of the others at the front, where every politically-conscious Communist who has graduated from this school is of value."

If there has been some wavering among the troops it is only because the people have become tired of war. You are well aware of the hunger, ruination and torment that the workers and peasants have endured during these two years of struggle against the imperialists of the whole world. You know that those suffering mostly from fatigue will not stand up to the tension for long, and this is taken advantage of by the enemy who has better communications, a better staff and no traitors, and he attacks in full force. This is the reason for our failures on the Southern Front. That is why the most politically-conscious of the workers and peasants, those who have had courses of military training or courses similar to yours, must go to the front organised and solid, dividing up into large or small groups as agreed upon by the military authorities, and distributing duties among themselves so as to help the troops among whom a certain instability is manifest and where the enemy is pressing most strongly. Throughout the two years' existence of Soviet power, whenever a certain instability has made its appearance among the peasant masses who have never seen and do not know Soviet work, we have always appealed to the more organised section of the urban proletariat for help and have received the most heroic support from them.

Today I saw comrades from among the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers who have allotted half the Party officials in responsible posts for dispatch to the front. One of them told me today of the enthusiasm with which tens of thous-

ands of non-party workers saw them off; one old man, a non-party worker, came up to them and said, "Don't worry, you may go, your place is there, we'll work for you here." When this mood makes itself apparent among non-party workers, when the non-party masses who are not yet quite clear on political questions see that we are sending the best of the workers and peasants to the front where they undertake the most difficult and most burdensome duties, duties of the greatest responsibility, where they will fight in the front ranks and make the greatest number of sacrifices, will die in desperate battles, then the number of our supporters among the less-developed non-party workers and peasants will increase tenfold and miracles will occur among troops that are wavering, weak and tired.

That, comrades, is the magnificent, onerous and difficult task with which you are faced. There is no choice for those who are leaving for the front as representatives of the workers and peasants. Their slogan must be victory or death. Each of you must be able to approach the most backward, the least developed Red Army men in order to explain the situation to them in the most comprehensible language, from the standpoint of a man of labour, help them in a moment of difficulty, eliminate all wavering, teach them to fight against numerous manifestations of inertia, sabotage, deception or treachery. You know that there are still many such manifestations in the ranks and among the commanders. Here people are needed who have been through a certain course of study, who understand the political situation and are able to help the masses of workers and peasants in their struggle against treachery and sabotage. Soviet power expects that you, in addition to displaying personal courage, will afford all-round help to those masses and so put an end to all wavering among them and show them that Soviet power possesses forces to resort to in a moment of difficulty. Those forces we possess in sufficient numbers.

I repeat that we must now make this great sacrifice only because this is the main and the last front where, by all the signs, the fate of the whole Civil War will be decided within the next few weeks or months. Here we can once

and for all deliver the enemy a blow that he will never recover from. After this bloody struggle against the white-guards, a struggle that they imposed on us, we shall at last be able to get on with our own affairs, with real development, more freely and with redoubled energy. That is why I greet those of you, comrades, who have taken upon yourselves the difficult and magnificent task of fighting to the end in the ranks at the front, and I bid you farewell in the full confidence that you will bring us complete and final victory.

Pravda Nos. 240 and 241,
October 26 and 28, 1919

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TO COMRADE LORIOT AND ALL THE FRENCH FRIENDS WHO ADHERED TO THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

October 28, 1919

Dear Friend,

I thank you with all my heart for your letter, which is the more precious because we very rarely receive any from you.

In France, as in England, victorious imperialism has not only enriched a certain number of small capitalists, but it has also been able to give alms to the upper grade of workers, the aristocracy of the working class, by throwing it a few crumbs from the imperialist exploit, won by the pillage of the colonies, and so on.

But the crisis caused by the war is so serious that even in the conquering countries the working masses are inevitably condemned to appalling misery. From this springs the rapid growth of communism and the increasing movement of sympathy towards the Soviet power and towards the Third International.

It follows that you must maintain a long struggle still, especially with the very refined opportunists of the Longuet type; in the same way the experimenters and politicians will continue making effort after effort to make words suffice where it is a question of revolutionary tactics and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In fact, they will continue to deceive the proletariat by means of new subterfuges, as Longuet, Merrheim and company did regarding the 21st of July. They will adhere to their old opportunist policy which consists in hindering the revolution and in

prejudicing it in all ways. In France and in England the old rotten (*pourris*) leaders of the workers will make thousands of such attempts.

But we are sure that the Communists who are working in close contact with the proletarian masses will succeed in paralysing and in breaking these attempts. The more the Communists are firm and energetic in their attitude, the sooner they will gain a complete victory.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

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the manuscript

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY REGARDING THE SPLIT[33]

TO COMRADES PAUL LEVI, CLARA ZETKIN, EBERLEIN AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE C.C. OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

October 28, 1919

Dear Friends

I have forwarded to you for publication a letter dated October 10, 1919, "Greetings to French, Italian and German Communists", in which I have referred, among other things, to your disagreements with the supporters of the boycott, the semi-syndicalists, etc. Today I have learned from the German government wireless message (from Nauen) about a split in your party: although the source is a filthy one, it is probably telling the truth in this case, because letters from our friends in Germany speak of the possibility of a split.

The only thing that seems incredible is this radio report that with 25 votes against 18, you *expelled* the minority, which, they tell us, then set up a party of its own. I know very little about this breakaway opposition, for I have seen only a few issues of the Berlin *Rote Fahne*. My impression is that they are very gifted propagandists, inexperienced and young, like our own Left Communists ("Left" due to lack of experience and youth) of 1918. Given agreement *on the basic issue* (for Soviet rule, against bourgeois parliamentarism), unity, in my opinion, is possible and necessary, just as a split is necessary with the Kautskyites. If the split was inevitable, efforts should be made not to deepen it, but to approach the Executive Committee of the Third

International for mediation and to make the "Lefts" formulate their differences in theses and in a pamphlet. Restoration of unity in the Communist Party of Germany is both possible and necessary from the international standpoint. I would be extremely glad to get a letter from you on this subject. I am enclosing a letter to the breakaway group, and hope that you will forward it at the time of publishing my article, which, written *before* the news of the split was received, fully recognises the correctness of your standpoint.

A hearty handshake and warm wishes for success to you in your difficult work. The communist movement is growing splendidly throughout the world. It is slower than we would like, but broad, powerful, deep and invincible. As was the case in Russia, the stage of the dominance of the "Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries" (of the Second International) is discernible everywhere. This dominance will be succeeded by that of the Communists and the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Soviet government.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

First published in 1932

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE COMMUNIST COMRADES WHO BELONGED TO THE UNITED "COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY" AND HAVE NOW FORMED A NEW PARTY

October 28, 1919

Dear Comrades,

Only today have I learned of the split from the brief wireless message of the German Government (from Nauen). My article, "Greetings to French, Italian and German Communists", was written before the news of the split arrived.

In that article I tried, from the standpoint of international communism, to appraise your position, insofar as I could acquaint myself with it in some issues of the Berlin *Rote Fahne*. I am convinced that the Communists who are agreed on the basic issue (the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for Soviet government) and are implacably hostile to the Scheidemann and the Kautsky groups in all nations, could and should have acted in unison. In my opinion, differences on less important issues can, and unfailingly will, vanish; this will result from the logic of the joint struggle against the really formidable enemy, the bourgeoisie, and its overt (Scheidemann) and covert (Kautsky) servitors.

I am not a member of the Executive Committee of the Third International, but I believe it will offer the German Communists its good services in restoring German communist unity. It is not surprising that the furious persecutions, which have made the Party illegal, impeded its work and hindered a proper exchange of ideas and the elaboration of common tactics. A careful discussion of

differences and an exchange of views on an international scale could assist in advancing the cause of German communism and in mustering its forces.

I shall be very glad if we manage to exchange opinions on these questions.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

First published in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Published according to the manuscript

TO COMRADE SERRATI AND TO ALL ITALIAN COMMUNISTS

October 28, 1919

Dear Friend,

The news we get from Italy is extremely scanty. It is only from the foreign (non-communist) press that we have learned of your Party Congress at Bologna and of the splendid victory of communism. I send my heartfelt greetings to you and all the Italian Communists, and wish you every success. The example of the Italian Party will be of enormous significance to the whole world. In particular, the resolution of your Congress on participating in elections to the bourgeois parliament is in my opinion perfectly correct, and I hope that it will help to achieve unity in the Communist Party of Germany, which has just split on this issue.

There is no doubt that the overt and the covert opportunists, who are so numerous among the parliamentarians in the Italian Party, will try to circumvent and nullify the Bologna resolutions. The struggle against these trends is by no means over, but the victory at Bologna will facilitate further victories.

Difficult tasks lie ahead for the Italian proletariat owing to Italy's position in the international field. Britain and France, with the co-operation of the Italian bourgeoisie, may possibly try to provoke the Italian proletariat to a premature uprising in order the easier to crush it. But their provocation will fail. The brilliant work of the Italian Communists guarantees that they will be just as successful in winning the entire industrial and the *entire rural* proletariat plus the small peasants, and then, if the proper

moment is chosen internationally, victory for the dictatorship of the proletariat in Italy will be enduring. That is also guaranteed by the successes of the Communists in France, Britain and throughout the world.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

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Published according to the manuscript

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT[34]

Written September-October 1919
First published in 1925

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the manuscript

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For treatment in the pamphlet the question falls into *4* main sections:

(*A*) The dictatorship of the proletariat as new forms of the class struggle of the proletariat (in other words: its new stage and new tasks).

(*B*) The dictatorship of the proletariat as the destruction of bourgeois democracy and the creation of proletarian democracy.

(*C*) The dictatorship of the proletariat and the distinguishing features of imperialism (or the imperialist stage of capitalism).

(*D*) The dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power.

Plan for the elaboration of these 4 sections:

I (A) THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AS NEW FORMS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

1. The chief reason why the "socialists" do not understand the dictatorship of the proletariat is that they do not carry the idea of the class struggle to its logical conclusion (cf. Marx, 1852).[35]

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the *continuation* of the class struggle of the

proletariat in *new* forms. That is the crux of the matter, and that is what they do not understand.

The proletariat, as a *special* class, alone *continues* to wage its class struggle.

2. The state is only a *weapon* of the proletariat in its class struggle. A special kind of cudgel, *rien de plus*!*

Old prejudices regarding the state (cf. *The State and Revolution*). New forms of the state—the subject of section *B*; here only the *approach* to it.

3. The forms of the class struggle of the proletariat, under its dictatorship, cannot be what they were before. *Five* new (principal) tasks and correspondingly five new forms:

4. (1) *Suppression of the resistance of the exploiters*. This, as the task (and content) of the *epoch*, is entirely forgotten by the opportunists and the "socialists".

Hence:

(αα) the special (higher) severity of the class struggle

(ββ) new forms of resistance corresponding to capitat-

The resistance of the exploiters begins *before* their overthrow and afterwards becomes *intensified* from *two* sides. A fight to a *finish*,

* Nothing more.—*Ed*.

ism and its highest stage (plots+sabotage+influence on the petty bourgeoisie, etc., etc.) and, in particular, or "talk one's way out" (Karl Kautsky, the petty bourgeoisie, the socialists).

5. (2) (γγ) *Civil war.*

Revolution in general and civil war (1649, 1793) (cf. Karl Kautsky, 1902, in *The Social Revolution*).

Civil war in the epoch of the international ties of capitalism.

Civil war and the "destruction" of the party (Karl Kautsky).

Terror and civil war.

Transformation of imperialist war into civil war. (Ignorance and despicable cowardice of the "socialists".)

Cf. Marx, 1870[36]: give the proletariat practice in arms. The *epoch* 1871-1914 and the *epoch* of civil wars.

α) **Russia**, *Hungary*, *Finland*, **Germany**.
β) Switzerland and America.

+Inevitability of a combination of civil war with revolutionary wars (cf. Programme of the R.C.P.).

6. (3) "*Neutralisation*" *of the petty bourgeoisie*, *especially the peasantry*.

Communist Manifesto (reactionary and revolutionary "only in view of").

Karl Kautsky in the *Agrarfrage*. The same idea of neutralisation, only *verballhornt*.*

The "ruling class". Rule precludes "liberty and equality".

"To head", "to lead", "to take with", the class meaning of these concepts.

* Bowdlerised.—*Ed.*

"Neutralisation" in practice means

{ suppression by force (Engels, 1895)
example
persuasion, etc., etc.

enlisting+suppression, "only in view of".

NB — Peasant and worker. The peasant as a toiler and the peasant as an exploiter (profiteer, property-owner). "Only in view of." Vacillations in the course of the struggle. *Experience* of the struggle.

"One reactionary mass": Engels, 1875, in respect of the Commune.[37]

7. (4) "*Utilisation*" *of the bourgeoisie*.

"Specialists." Not only suppression of resistance, not only "neutralisation", but setting them to work, compelling them to serve the proletariat.

Cf. Programme of the R.C.P. "Military Specialists."

8. (5) *Inculcation of a new discipline*.

(α) The dictatorship of the proletariat and the trade unions.

(β) Bonuses and piece rates.

(γ) Party purge and its role.

(δ) "Communist subbotniks."

II (B) THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AS THE DESTRUCTION OF BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY AND THE CREATION OF PROLETARIAN DEMOCRACY

9. Dictatorship and democracy as "general" ("pure", according to Karl Kautsky) concepts.

Dictatorship as the denial of democracy. For whom?
Abstract (petty-bourgeois) democratic view and Marxism (class struggle).
Definition. Force (Engels).

State and "liberty" (cf, Engels, 1875).[38]

10. "Liberty." = Liberty for the commodity owner.
Real liberty for the wage-workers, for the peasants.
Liberty for the exploiters.
Liberty for whom?
from whom? from what?
Liberty in what?

11. "Equality." Engels in *Anti-Dühring* (prejudice, if it goes beyond the abolition of classes).[39]
Equality between the exploited and the exploiter.
Equality between hungry and satiated.
Equality between worker and peasant.
Equality between whom? In what?

Equality of the *commodity owners*.

12. Decision by majority.
Its conditions: real equality (culture)

real freedom.
Cf. press, assembly, etc.
All are equal, *leaving out of account* money, capital, land....

13. Decision by majority. Another condition for it= "conscientious" subordination.
Utopia of reformism.
Gilding of capitalism.

First throw off the yoke of money, the power of capital, abolish private property, then the *slow growth* of "conscientiousness" on *this* new basis.

14. Reality of the *bourgeois*-democratic republic.
Engels on the connection of the government with the stock exchange and *capital*.[40]

Corruption
deceit
press
assembly
parliament
custom
pressure of capital
(public opinion, etc.).

Formal equality while bourgeois oppression, the yoke of capital, and wage-slavery are preserved.

15. The imperialist war of 1914-18 as the "last word" in bourgeois democracy.
The "peace" of 1918-19.
Foreign policy.
Army and Navy.

16. The bureaucracy. The courts. Militarism.
Dictatorship of the bourgeoisie masked by parliamentary forms.

17. Decision by majority and *strength* of majority. 51 per cent of the "proletariat".

Decision of "*all*"? *despite* waverers and *excluding* exploiters.

{ Imperialist influence status of petty bourgeoisie, etc., "semi-proletariat". } versus 20 per cent + 40 ½ per cent?

Motives of referendums (bourgeois surroundings).

18. Peaceful voting and sharpened class struggle.

[First "decide", then quietly vote?
First the development of the class struggle.

Economic and political conditions for sharpening of class struggle.

Destruction of the bourgeois surroundings, their real conditions of motivation of will.

19. Reality of democracy under *proletarian* democracy.
Achievements of democracy: congresses, meetings, press, religion, women, oppressed nations.

20. The historical change from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy.
"Growing over", "creeping into", or the break-up of the former and birth of the latter? = Revolution, or without revolution? Conquest of political power by the new class, overthrow of the bourgeoisie, or a deal, a compromise between classes?

III (C) THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF IMPERIALISM

21. Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism.
Resume of my book.
Definition.

22. The colonies and dependent countries.
Revolt of the *proletariat* against the bourgeoisie of its own country+revolt of the *nations* in the colonies and dependent countries.
Revolutionary proletarian wars and national wars (cf. Programme of the R.C.P.).

23. Seizure of territory by the League of Nations.
A "single" oppressor. Concentration of the struggle.
Variety of stages.

24. The bourgeois upper layer of the proletariat.
1852-92, Engels and Marx.[41]
1872, Marx on the leaders of the British trade unions.[42]
Labour lieutenants of the capitalist class.*
Social-chauvinism.

Two chief "streams": the corrupt and the philistines.

* This sentence is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

Split of 1915-17, "Centre".
" " 1917-19 (cf. Programme of the R.C.P.).

Vorwärts ("*Radikalisierung der englischen Arbeiter*") ... "*eine gewisse Grösse*"* of Bolsheviks.

Wiener Arbeiter Zeitung No. 180 (July 2, 1919)

Friedrich Adler in his speech. ΣΣΣ [in its totality]—the sophistry of a turncoat.

25. Two *Internationals*. Dictatorship of the *revolutionary* elements of the class.

One country and the whole world.

IV (D) THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND SOVIET POWER

26. Origin of the Soviets. 1905 and 1917.

27. Peculiarities of Russia.

Kautsky: "Slavs and Revolution."

28. Soviets and "compromise"

March-October 1917.

Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

{ 1894 (Struve) and 1899 (Bernstein)
Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries
(1917)-1918-19-20
... (in Europe). }

29. Ignorance and stupidity of *leaders* of the Second International. Nothing about Soviets.

Kautsky in his pamphlet, *August 1918*.

Soviets for the struggle, *but not* for state power!

* Radicalisation of the British workers ... a certain number.—*Ed*.

30. But the *proletarian masses* see it differently: class instinct!

31. Triumphal march of the Soviet idea through the world.

Direct and *indirect* (inclusion in the German Constitution) victory of the Soviet idea.

The form of the dictatorship of the proletariat discovered (by the mass movement of the proletariat)!

The idea has won over the masses.

The Third International.

32. Soviet Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.

N.B. its §*23*[43]

1793-94 versus 1917-19.



First page of Lenin's manuscript "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". October 30, 1919. *Reduced*

First page of Lenin's manuscript "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". October 30, 1919. Reduced

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN THE ERA OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

I had intended to write a short pamphlet on the subject indicated in the title on the occasion of the second anniversary of Soviet power. But owing to the rush of everyday work I have so far been unable to get beyond preliminary preparations for some of the sections. I have therefore decided to essay a brief, summarised exposition of what, in my opinion, are the most essential ideas on the subject. A summarised exposition, of course, possesses many disadvantages and shortcomings. Nevertheless, a short magazine article may perhaps achieve the modest aim in view, which is to present the problem and the groundwork for its discussion by the Communists of various countries.

1

Theoretically, there can be no doubt that between capitalism and communism there lies a definite transition period which must combine the features and properties of both these forms of social economy. This transition period has to be a period of struggle between dying capitalism and nascent communism—or, in other words, between capitalism which has been defeated but not destroyed and communism which has been born but is still very feeble.

The necessity for a whole historical era distinguished by these transitional features should be obvious not only to Marxists, but to any educated person who is in any degree acquainted with the theory of development. Yet all the talk on the subject of the transition to socialism which

we hear from present-day petty-bourgeois democrats (and such, in spite of their spurious socialist label, are all the leaders of the Second International, including such individuals as MacDonald, Jean Longuet, Kautsky and Friedrich Adler) is marked by complete disregard of this obvious truth. Petty-bourgeois democrats are distinguished by an aversion to class struggle, by their dreams of avoiding it, by their efforts to smooth over, to reconcile, to remove sharp corners. Such democrats, therefore, either avoid recognising any necessity for a whole historical period of transition from capitalism to communism or regard it as their duty to concoct schemes for reconciling the two contending forces instead of leading the struggle of one of these forces.

FROM MARX TO MAO

2

In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain particulars from what it would be in the advanced countries, owing to the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our country. But the basic forces—and the basic forms of social economy—are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so that the peculiarities can apply only to what is of lesser importance.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The basic forms of social economy are capitalism, petty commodity production, and communism. The basic forces are the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (the peasantry in particular) and the proletariat.

The economic system of Russia in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat represents the struggle of labour, united on communist principles on the scale of a vast state and making its first steps—the struggle against petty commodity production and against the capitalism which still persists and against that which is newly arising on the basis of petty commodity production.

In Russia, labour is united communistically insofar as, first, private ownership of the means of production has been abolished, and, secondly, the proletarian state power is organising large-scale production on state-owned land and in state-owned enterprises on a national scale, is dis-

tributing labour-power among the various branches of production and the various enterprises, and is distributing among the working people large quantities of articles of consumption belonging to the state.

We speak of "the first steps" of communism in Russia (it is also put that way in our Party Programme adopted in March 1919), because all these things have been only partially effected in our country, or, to put it differently, their achievement is only in its early stages. We accomplished instantly, at one revolutionary blow, all that can, in general, be accomplished instantly; on the first day of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for instance, on October 26 (November 8),1917, the private ownership of land was abolished without compensation for the big landowners—the big landowners were expropriated. Within the space of a few months practically all the big capitalists, owners of factories, joint-stock companies, banks, railways, and so forth, were also expropriated without compensation. The state organisation of large-scale production in industry and the transition from "workers' control" to "workers' management" of factories and railways—this has, by and large, already been accomplished; but in relation to agriculture it has only just begun ("state farms", i.e., large farms organised by the workers' state on state-owned land). Similarly, we have only just begun the organisation of various forms of co-operative societies of small farmers as a transition from petty commodity agriculture to communist agriculture.* The same must be said of the state-organised distribution of products in place-of private trade, i.e., the state procurement and delivery of grain to the cities and of industrial products to the countryside. Available statistical data on this subject will be given below.

Peasant farming continues to be petty commodity production. Here we have an extremely broad and very sound, deep-rooted basis for capitalism, a basis on which capitalism persists or arises anew in a bitter struggle against

* The number of "state farms" and "agricultural communes" in Soviet Russia is, as far as is known, 3,536 and 1,961 respectively, and the number of agricultural artels is 3,696. Our Central Statistical Board is at present taking an exact census of all state farms and communes. The results will begin coming in in November 1919.

communism. The forms of this struggle are private speculation and profiteering versus state procurement of grain (and other products) and state distribution of products in general.

3

To illustrate these abstract theoretical propositions, let us quote actual figures.

According to the figures of the People's Commissariat of Food, state procurements of grain in Russia between August 1, 1917, and August 1, 1918, amounted to about 30,000,000 poods, and in the following year to about 110,000,000 poods. During the first three months of the next campaign (1919-20) procurements will presumably total about 45,000,000 poods, as against 37,000,000 poods for the same period (August-October) in 1918.

These figures speak clearly of a slow but steady improvement in the state of affairs from the point of view of the victory of communism over capitalism. This improvement is being achieved in spite of difficulties without world parallel, difficulties due to the Civil War organised by Russian and foreign capitalists who are harnessing all the forces of the world's strongest powers.

Therefore, in spite of the lies and slanders of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of their open or masked henchmen (the "socialists" of the Second International), one thing remains beyond dispute—as far as the basic economic problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat is concerned, the victory of communism over capitalism in our country is assured. Throughout the world the bourgeoisie is raging and fuming against Bolshevism and is organising military expeditions, plots, etc., against the Bolsheviks, because it realises full well that our success in reconstructing the social economy is inevitable, provided we are not crushed by military force. And its attempts to crush us in this way are not succeeding.

The extent to which we have already vanquished capitalism in the short time we have had at our disposal, and despite the incredible difficulties under which we have had to work, will be seen from the following summarised figures.

The Central Statistical Board has just prepared for the press data on the production and consumption of grain—not for the whole of Soviet Russia, but only for twenty-six gubernias.

The results are as follows:

26 gubernias of Soviet Russia	Population in millions		Production of grain (excluding seed and fodder), millions poods	Grain delivered, millions poods		Total amount of grain at disposal of population millions poods	Grain consumption, poods per capita
				Commissariat of food	Profiteers		
Producing gubernias	Urban	4.4	—	20.9	20.6	41.5	9.5
	Rural	28.6	625.4	—	—	481.8	16.9
Consuming gubernias	Urban	5.9	—	20.0	20.0	40.0	6.8
	Rural	13.8	114.0	12.1	27.8	151.4	11.0
Total (26 gubernias)		52.7	739.4	53.0	68.4	714.7	13.6

Thus, approximately half the amount of grain supplied to the cities is provided by the Commissariat of Food and the other half by profiteers. This same proportion is revealed by a careful survey, made in 1918, of the food consumed by city workers. It should be borne in mind that for bread supplied by the state the worker pays *one-ninth* of what he pays the profiteer. The profiteering price for bread is *ten times* greater than the state price; this is revealed by a detailed study of workers' budgets.

4

A careful study of the figures quoted shows that they present an exact picture of the fundamental features of Russia's present-day economy.

The working people have been emancipated from their age-old oppressors and exploiters, the landowners and capitalists. This step in the direction of real freedom and real equality, a step which for its extent, dimensions and

rapidity is without parallel in the world, is ignored by the supporters of the bourgeoisie (including the petty-bourgeois democrats), who, when they talk of freedom and equality, mean parliamentary bourgeois democracy, which they falsely declare to be "democracy" in general, or "pure democracy" (Kautsky).

But the working people are concerned only with real equality and real freedom (freedom from the landowners and capitalists), and that is why they give the Soviet government such solid support.

In this peasant country it was the peasantry as a whole who were the first to gain, who gained most, and gained immediately from the dictatorship of the proletariat. The peasant in Russia starved under the landowners and capitalists. Throughout the long centuries of our history, the peasant never had an opportunity to work for himself: he starved while handing over hundreds of millions of poods of grain to the capitalists, for the cities and for export. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat the peasant *for the first time* has been working for himself and *feeding better than the city dweller*. For the first time the peasant has seen real freedom—freedom to eat his bread, freedom from starvation. In the distribution of the land, as we know, the maximum equality has been established; in the vast majority of cases the peasants are dividing the land according to the number of "mouths to feed".

Socialism means the abolition of classes.

In order to abolish classes it is necessary, first, to overthrow the landowners and capitalists. This part of our task has been accomplished, but it is only a part, and moreover, *not* the most difficult part. In order to abolish classes it is necessary, secondly, to abolish the difference between factory worker and peasant, to make *workers of all of them*. This cannot be done all at once. This task is incomparably more difficult and will of necessity take a long time. It is not a problem that can be solved by overthrowing a class. It can be solved only by the organisational reconstruction of the whole social economy, by a transition from individual, disunited, petty commodity production to large-scale social production. This transition must of necessity be extremely protracted. It may only be delayed

and complicated by hasty and incautious administrative and legislative measures. It can be accelerated only by affording such assistance to the peasant as will enable him to effect an immense improvement in his whole farming technique, to reform it radically.

In order to solve the second and most difficult part of the problem, the proletariat, after having defeated the bourgeoisie, must unswervingly conduct its policy towards the peasantry along the following fundamental lines. The proletariat must separate, demarcate the working peasant from the peasant owner, the peasant worker from the peasant huckster, the peasant who labours from the peasant who profiteers.

In this demarcation lies the *whole essence* of socialism.

And it is not surprising that the socialists who are socialists in word but petty-bourgeois democrats in deed (the Martovs, the Chernovs, the Kautskys and others) do not understand this essence of socialism.

The demarcation we here refer to is an extremely difficult one, because in real life all the features of the "peasant", however diverse they may be, however contradictory they may be, are fused into one whole. Nevertheless, demarcation is possible; and not only is it possible, it inevitably follows from the conditions of peasant farming and peasant life. The working peasant has for ages been oppressed by the landowners, the capitalists, the hucksters and profiteers and by *their* state, including even the most democratic bourgeois republics. Throughout the ages the working peasant has trained himself to hate and loathe these oppressors and exploiters, and this "training", engendered by the conditions of life, *compels* the peasant to seek an alliance with the worker against the capitalist and against the profiteer and huckster. Yet at the same time, economic conditions, the conditions of commodity production, inevitably turn the peasant (not always, but in the vast majority of cases) into a huckster and profiteer.

The statistics quoted above reveal a striking difference between the working peasant and the peasant profiteer. That peasant who during 1918-19 delivered to the hungry workers of the cities 40,000,000 poods of grain at fixed state prices, who delivered this grain to the state agencies

despite all the shortcomings of the latter, shortcomings fully realised by the workers' government, but which were unavoidable in the first period of the transition to socialism—that peasant is a working peasant, the comrade and equal of the socialist worker, his most faithful ally, his blood brother in the fight against the yoke of capital. Whereas that peasant who clandestinely sold 40,000,000 poods of grain at ten times the state price, taking advantage of the need and hunger of the city worker, deceiving the state, and everywhere increasing and creating deceit, robbery and fraud—that peasant is a profiteer, an ally of the capitalist, a class enemy of the worker, an exploiter. For whoever possesses surplus grain gathered from land belonging to the whole state with the help of implements in which in one way or another is embodied the labour not only of the peasant but also of the worker and so on—whoever possesses a surplus of grain and profiteers in that grain is an exploiter of the hungry worker.

You are violators of freedom, equality, and democracy—they shout at us on all sides, pointing to the inequality of the worker and the peasant under our Constitution, to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, to the forcible confiscation of surplus grain, and so forth. We reply—never in the world has there been a state which has done so much to remove the actual inequality, the actual lack of freedom from which the working peasant has been suffering for centuries. But we shall never recognise equality with the peasant profiteer, just as we do not recognise "equality" between the exploiter and the exploited, between the sated and the hungry, nor the "freedom" for the former to rob the latter. And those educated people who refuse to recognise this difference we shall treat as whiteguards, even though they may call themselves democrats, socialists, internationalists, Kautskys, Chernovs, or Martovs.

5

Socialism means the abolition of classes. The dictatorship of the proletariat has done all it could to abolish classes. But classes cannot be abolished at one stroke.

And classes still *remain* and *will remain* in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship will become unnecessary when classes disappear. Without the dictatorship of the proletariat they will not disappear.

Classes have remained, but in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat *every* class has undergone a change, and the relations between the classes have also changed. The class struggle does not disappear under the dictatorship of the proletariat; it merely assumes different forms.

Under capitalism the proletariat was an oppressed class, a class which had been deprived of the means of production, the only class which stood directly and completely opposed to the bourgeoisie, and therefore the only one capable of being revolutionary to the very end. Having overthrown the bourgeoisie and conquered political power, the proletariat has become the *ruling* class; it wields state power, it exercises control over means of production already socialised; it guides the wavering and intermediary elements and classes; it crushes the increasingly stubborn resistance of the exploiters. All these are *specific* tasks of the class struggle, tasks which the proletariat formerly did not and could not have set itself.

The class of exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, has not disappeared and cannot disappear all at once under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The exploiters have been smashed, but not destroyed. They still have an international base in the form of international capital, of which they are a branch. They still retain certain means of production in part, they still have money, they still have vast social connections. Because they have been defeated, the energy of their resistance has increased a hundred- and a thousandfold. The "art" of state, military and economic administration gives them a superiority, and a very great superiority, so that their importance is incomparably greater than their numerical proportion of the population. The class struggle waged by the overthrown exploiters against the victorious vanguard of the exploited, i.e., the proletariat, has become incomparably more bitter. And it cannot be otherwise in the case of a revolution, unless this concept is replaced (as it is by all the heroes of the Second International) by reformist illusions.

Lastly, the peasants, like the petty bourgeoisie in general, occupy a half-way, intermediate position *even* under the dictatorship of the proletariat: on the one hand, they are a fairly large (and in backward Russia, a vast) mass of working people, united by the common interest of all working people to emancipate themselves from the landowner and the capitalist; on the other hand, they are disunited small proprietors, property-owners and traders. Such an economic position inevitably causes them to vacillate between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In view of the acute form which the struggle between these two classes has assumed, in view of the incredibly severe break-up of all social relations, and in view of the great attachment of the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie generally to the old, the routine, and the unchanging, it is only natural that we should inevitably find them swinging from one side to the other, that we should find them wavering, changeable, uncertain, and so on.

In relation to this class—or to these social elements—the proletariat must strive to establish its influence over it, to guide it. To give leadership to the vacillating and unstable—such is the task of the proletariat.

If we compare all the basic forces or classes and their interrelations, as modified by the dictatorship of the proletariat, we shall realise how unutterably nonsensical and theoretically stupid is the common petty-bourgeois idea shared by all representatives of the Second International, that the transition to socialism is possible "by means of democracy" in general. The fundamental source of this error lies in the prejudice inherited from the bourgeoisie that "democracy" is something absolute and above classes. As a matter of fact, democracy itself passes into an entirely new phase under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the class struggle rises to a higher level, dominating over each and every form.

General talk about freedom, equality and democracy is in fact but a blind repetition of concepts shaped by the relations of commodity production. To attempt to solve the concrete problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat by such generalities is tantamount to accepting the theories and principles of the bourgeoisie in their entirety.

From the point of view of the proletariat, the question can be put only in the following way: freedom from oppression by which class? equality of which class with which? democracy based on private property, or on a struggle for the abolition of private property?— and so forth.

Long ago Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* explained that the concept "equality" is moulded from the relations of commodity production; equality becomes a prejudice if it is not understood to mean the *abolition of classes*. This elementary truth regarding the distinction between the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist conception of equality is constantly being forgotten. But if it is not forgotten it becomes obvious that by overthrowing the bourgeoisie the proletariat takes the most decisive step towards the abolition of classes, and that in order to complete the process the proletariat must continue its class struggle, making use of the apparatus of state power and employing various methods of combating, influencing and bringing pressure to bear on the overthrown bourgeoisie and the vacillating petty bourgeoisie.

(*To be continued*)[44]

October 30, 1919

Pravda No. 250,
November 7, 1919
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the manuscript

GREETINGS TO THE WORKERS OF PETROGRAD

The workers of Petrograd deserve the first message of greeting on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Soviet Republic. The Petrograd workers, as the vanguard of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, as the vanguard of the working people of Russia and the whole world, were the first to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and raise the banner of the proletarian revolution against capitalism and imperialism.

For two years the workers and labouring peasants of the Soviet Republic have triumphantly held high that banner despite all difficulties and all the torments of hunger, cold, chaos and economic ruin. Two years of socialist development have given us extensive experience, have enabled us to consolidate Soviet power despite the malicious fury and resistance of the bourgeoisie and the military attack by world imperialism.

On our side we have the sympathy of the world's workers. The proletarian revolution is maturing slowly and with difficulty, but persistently in all countries, and the brutal violence of the bourgeoisie only exacerbates the struggle, only hastens the victory of the proletariat.

Very recently the British reactionaries, the imperialists, made their last stake on the capture of Petrograd. The bourgeoisie of the entire world, especially the Russian bourgeoisie, already had a foretaste of victory. But instead of victory they met with defeat at Petrograd.

Yudenich's forces have been beaten and are retreating.

Comrades, workers and Red Army soldiers! Bend all your efforts! Keep on the heels of the retreating troops at all costs, crush them, do not allow them to rest for an hour,

for a single minute. At this moment we can and must strike harder than ever in order to finish off the enemy.

Long live the Red Army that is defeating the tsarist generals, whiteguards and capitalists! Long live the international Soviet Republic!

N. Lenin

November 5, 1919

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 255, November 7, 1919

Published according to the manuscript

SOVIET POWER AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN

The second anniversary of Soviet power is an occasion for taking stock of what has been done during this period and for reflecting on the significance and the aims of the revolution that has been accomplished.

The bourgeoisie and its supporters charge us with having violated democracy. We, on the other hand, assert that the Soviet revolution has given an unprecedented impulse to the development of democracy in breadth and in depth, democracy, that is, for the working people oppressed by capitalism, democracy for the overwhelming majority of the people, socialist democracy (for the working people), as distinct from bourgeois democracy (for the exploiters, for the capitalists, for the rich).

Who is right?

To give proper thought to this question and achieve a deeper understanding of it one must take stock of the experience of these two years and make better preparations for further development.

The status of women makes clear in the most striking fashion the difference between bourgeois and socialist democracy and furnishes a most effective reply to the question posed.

In a bourgeois republic (i.e., where there is private ownership of land, factories, shares, etc.), be it the most democratic republic, women have never had rights fully equal to those of men, *anywhere in the world*, *in any one of the more advanced countries*. And this despite the fact that more than 125 years have passed since the great French (bourgeois-democratic) Revolution.

In words bourgeois democracy promises equality and freedom, but in practice *not a single* bourgeois republic, even the more advanced, has granted women (half the human race) and men complete equality in the eyes of the law, or delivered women from dependence on and the oppression of the male.

Bourgeois democracy is the democracy of pompous phrases, solemn words, lavish promises and high-sounding slogans about *freedom and equality*, but in practice all this cloaks the lack of freedom and the inequality of women, the lack of freedom and the inequality for the working and exploited people.

Soviet or socialist democracy sweeps away these pompous but false words and declares ruthless war on the hypocrisy of "democrats", landowners, capitalists and farmers with bursting bins who are piling up wealth by selling surplus grain to the starving workers at profiteering prices.

Down with this foul lie! There is no "equality", nor can there be, of oppressed and oppressor, exploited and exploiter. There is no real "freedom", nor can there be, so long as women are handicapped by men's legal privileges, so long as there is no freedom for the worker from the yoke of capital, no freedom for the labouring peasant from the yoke of the capitalist, landowner and merchant.

Let the liars and the hypocrites, the obtuse and the blind, the bourgeois and their supporters, try to deceive the people with talk about freedom in general, about equality in general and about democracy in general.

We say to the workers and peasants—tear the mask from these liars, open the eyes of the blind. Ask them:

Is there equality of the two sexes?

Which nation is the equal of which?

Which class is the equal of which?

Freedom from what yoke or from the yoke of which class? Freedom for which class?

He who speaks about politics, democracy and freedom, about equality, about socialism, *without posing* these questions, without giving them priority, who does not fight against hushing them up, concealing and blunting them, is the worst enemy of the working people, a wolf in sheep's clothing, the rabid opponent of the workers and

peasants, a lackey of the landowners, the tsars and the capitalists.

In the course of two years of Soviet power in one of the most backward countries of Europe more has been done to emancipate woman, to make her the equal of the "strong" sex, than has been done during the past 130 years by all the advanced, enlightened, "democratic" republics of the world taken together.

Education, culture, civilisation, freedom—all these high-sounding words are accompanied in all the capitalist, bourgeois republics of the world with incredibly foul, disgustingly vile, bestially crude laws that make women unequal in marriage and divorce, that make the child born out of wedlock and the "legally born" child unequal and that give privileges to the male and humiliate and degrade womankind.

The yoke of capital, the oppression of "sacred private property", the despotism of philistine obtuseness, the avarice of the small property-owner—these are the things that have prevented the most democratic bourgeois republics from abolishing these foul and filthy laws.

The Soviet Republic, the republic of workers and peasants, wiped out these laws at one stroke and did not leave standing a single stone of the edifice of bourgeois lies and bourgeois hypocrisy.

Down with this lie! Down with the liars who speak about freedom and equality *for all*, while there is an oppressed sex, oppressing classes, private ownership of capital and shares and people with bursting bins who use their surplus grain to enslave the hungry. Instead of freedom for all, instead of equality for all, let there be *struggle* against the oppressors and exploiters, *let the opportunity* to oppress and exploit *be abolished*. That is our slogan!

Freedom and equality for the oppressed sex!

Freedom and equality for the workers and labouring peasants!

Struggle against the oppressors, struggle against the capitalists, struggle against the kulak profiteers!

This is our fighting slogan, this is our proletarian truth, the truth of the fight against capital, the truth that we hurl in the face of the world of capital with its honeyed, hypo-

critical and pompous phrases about freedom and equality *in general*, about freedom and equality *for all*.

And it is because we have laid bare this hypocrisy, because, with revolutionary vigour, we are ensuring freedom and full rights for the oppressed working people, against the oppressors, against the capitalists, against the kulaks—precisely because of this Soviet rule has become so dear to the workers of the whole world.

It is because of this, the sympathies of the working masses, the sympathies of the oppressed and exploited in all countries of the world are with us on this occasion of the second anniversary of Soviet rule.

Because of this, on the occasion of the second anniversary of Soviet rule, despite the famine and cold, despite all the suffering caused by the imperialists' invasion of the Russian Soviet Republic, we are fully convinced of the justness of our cause, firmly convinced of the inevitable victory of Soviet power on a world scale.

Pravda No. 249,
November 6, 1919
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TWO YEARS OF SOVIET POWER

The newspaper *Bednota*[45] is read mostly by peasants. On this, the second, anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power, I wish to extend greetings to the many millions of working peasants who have been liberated from landowner and capitalist oppression and say a few words about that liberation.

Soviet power, which overthrew the rule of capital and placed power in the hands of the working people, has to contend in Russia with unparalleled and incredible difficulties.

The landowners and capitalists of Russia, now joined by the landowners and capitalists of the whole world, are still making frenzied attempts to destroy Soviet power. They fear the example it has set; they fear that it will win the sympathy and support of workers the world over.

Conspiracies within the country, the bribing of the Czechoslovak forces, the landing of foreign troops in Siberia, Archangel, the Caucasus, South Russia and near Petrograd, the hundreds of millions of rubles being spent to help Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and other tsarist generals—every conceivable method is being employed by the capitalists of all countries, who have accumulated millions and thousands of millions from war contracts, in an attempt to overthrow the Soviet government.

But all in vain. The Soviet government stands firm, overcoming all these unparalleled and incredible difficulties, despite the measureless suffering caused by war, blockade, famine, shortages, break-down of the transport system and general economic dislocation.

Soviet power in Russia has already won the support of the workers of the whole world. There is not a single country where the people do not talk of Bolshevism and Soviet power.

The capitalists talk of it with hatred and rabid malice, slandering and vilifying it without end. But this malice gives them away, and the mass of workers are turning their backs on the old leaders and coming out in support of Soviet power.

Despite the crushing, painful burden imposed by the enemy assault on Russia, Soviet power has triumphed throughout the world—triumphed in the sense that everywhere the sympathy of the working people is already on our side.

The victory of Soviet power throughout the world is assured. It is only a question of time.

Why is Soviet power so firm and stable, despite the incredible ordeals, the terrible famine and the difficulties created by war and economic dislocation?

Because it is the power of the working people themselves, of the millions of workers and peasants.

The workers hold state power. The workers help the millions of labouring peasants.

The Soviet government has overthrown the landowners and capitalists and is steadfastly defending the people against attempts to restore their rule.

The Soviet government gives all the aid it is capable of to the labouring peasants, the poor and middle peasants, who make up the vast majority.

The Soviet government holds a tight rein on the kulak, the village money-bag, the proprietor, the profiteer, on everyone who wants to get rich without having to work, everyone who battens on the misery and hunger of the people.

The Soviet government is *for* the labouring people, *against* the profiteers, proprietors, capitalists and landowners.

That is the source of the strength, stability and invincibility of Soviet power throughout the world.

Tens and hundreds of millions of workers and peasants all over the world are suffering oppression, humiliation and plunder at the hands of landowners and capitalists. The old state apparatus, whether of a monarchy or a "democratic"

(pseudo-democratic) republic, helps the exploiters and oppresses the workers.

Tens and hundreds of millions of workers and peasants in all lands know this; they see it and experience it in their everyday life.

The imperialist war lasted over four years, tens of millions were killed and crippled. What for? For the division of the capitalists' spoils, for markets, profits, colonies and the power of the banks.

The Anglo-French imperialist predators defeated the German imperialist predators. With every passing day they are exposing themselves for what they are—robbers and plunderers, oppressors of the working folk who batten on the misery of the people and tyrannise weak nations.

That is why support for Soviet power is growing among the workers and peasants of the world.

The severe and arduous struggle against capital was victoriously begun in Russia. It is now spreading in all countries.

It will end in the victory of the World Soviet Republic.

Bednota No. 478,
November 7, 1919
Signed: *Lenin*

Published according to
the *Bednota* text

TWO YEARS OF SOVIET RULE

SPEECH AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES, THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS, AND FACTORY COMMITTEES, ON THE OCCASION OF THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 7, 1919

Comrades, two years ago, when the imperialist war was still raging, it seemed to all the supporters of the bourgeoisie in Russia, to the masses of the people and, I dare say, to most of the workers in other countries, that the uprising of the Russian proletariat and their conquest of political power was a bold but hopeless enterprise. At that time world imperialism appeared such a tremendous and invincible force that it seemed stupid of the workers of a backward country to attempt to revolt against it. Now, however, as we glance back over the past two years, we see that even our opponents are increasingly admitting that we were right. We see that imperialism, which seemed such an insuperable colossus, has proved before the whole world to be a colossus with feet of clay, and the two years through which we have passed and during which we have had to fight, mark with ever-growing clarity the victory not only of the Russian, but also of the international proletariat.

Comrades, during the first year of the existence of Soviet power we had to experience the might of German imperialism, to suffer the coercive and predatory peace that was forced on us; we were alone in issuing our call to revolution, and met with no support or response. The first year of our

rule was also the first year of our struggle against imperialism, and we soon became convinced that the struggle of the different parts of this gigantic international imperialism was nothing but its death throes, and that both German imperialism and the imperialism of the Anglo-French bourgeoisie had an interest in this struggle. During that year we established that this struggle only strengthened, only increased and restored our forces and enabled us to direct them against imperialism as a whole. We created such a situation during the first year but, during the whole of the second year, we stood face to face with our enemy. There were pessimists who even last year severely attacked us; even last year they said that Britain, France and America were such a huge, such a colossal force that they would crush our country. The year has passed, and as you see, while the first year may be called that of the might of international imperialism, the second year will be called that of the onslaught of Anglo-American imperialism and of victory over that onslaught, of victory over Kolchak and Yudenich, and the beginning of victory over Denikin.

Now we know perfectly well that all the military forces sent against us have been directed from a definite source. We know that the imperialists have given them all the military supplies, all the arms needed; we know that they have handed over their global navies in part to our enemies, and now are doing all they can to help and build up forces both in the South of Russia and in Archangel. But we know perfectly well that all these seemingly huge and invincible forces of international imperialism are unreliable, and hold no terrors for us, that at the core they are rotten, that they are making us stronger and stronger, and that this added strength will enable us to win victory on the external front and to make it a thorough-going one. I shall not dwell on this point as it will be dealt with by Comrade Trotsky.

It seems to me that we must now try to draw general lessons from the two years of heroic constructive work.

What, in my opinion, is the most important conclusion to be drawn from the two years of developing the Soviet Republic, what, in my view, is most important for us, is the lesson we have had in organising working-class power. It seems to me that in this we must not confine ourselves

to the various concrete facts that concern the work of some commissariat and which most of you know of from your own experience. It seems to me that, in glancing back over what we have gone through, we must draw a general lesson from this work of construction, a lesson that we shall learn and carry further afield among working people. The lesson is that only workers' participation in the general administration of the state has enabled us to hold out amidst such incredible difficulties, and that only by following this path shall we achieve complete victory. Another lesson to be drawn is that we must maintain the right attitude to the peasantry, to the many millions of peasants, for that attitude alone has made it possible for us to carry on successfully amid all our difficulties, and it alone shows us the path along which we are achieving one success after another.

If you recall the past, if you recall the first steps of Soviet power, if you recall the entire work of developing all branches of the administration of the Republic, not excluding the military branch, you will see that the establishment of working-class rule two years ago, in October, was only the beginning. Actually, at that time, the machinery of state power was not yet in our hands, and if you glance back over the two years that have since elapsed you will agree with me that in each sphere—military, political and economic—we have had to win every position inch by inch, in order to establish real machinery of state power, sweeping aside those who before us had been at the head of the industrial workers and working people in general

It is particularly important for us to understand the development that has taken place in this period, because there is development along the same lines all over the world. The industrial workers and other working people do not take their first steps with their real leaders; the proletariat themselves are now taking over the administration of state, political power, and at their head we see everywhere leaders who are destroying the old prejudices of petty-bourgeois democracy, old prejudices the vehicles of which in our country are the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and throughout Europe are the representatives

of bourgeois governments. Previously this was an exception, now it has become the general rule. Two years ago, in October, the bourgeois government in Russia—their alliance or coalition with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—was smashed, but we know how, in carrying on our work, we had subsequently to reorganise every branch of administration in such a way that genuine representatives, revolutionary workers, the vanguard of the proletariat, really took in hand the organisation of state power. That was in October, two years ago, when the work went on at terrific pressure, nevertheless we know, and we must say it, that this work is not finished even now. We know how those who formerly ran the state resisted us, how officials at first tried refusing to administrate, but this gross sabotage was stopped in a few weeks by the proletarian government. It showed that not the slightest impression could be made on it by such refusal, and after we had put an end to this gross sabotage this same enemy tried other methods.

Time and again it has happened that supporters of the bourgeoisie have been found even at the head of workers' organisations; we had to get down to the business of making the fullest use of the workers' strength. Take, for example, what we experienced when the railway administration, the railway proletariat were headed by people who led them along the bourgeois, and not the proletarian path.[46] We know that in all spheres wherever we could get rid of the bourgeoisie, we did so, but at what a price! In each sphere we gained ground inch by inch, and promoted the best of our workers, those who had gone through the hard school of organising the administration. Viewed from the side, all this is, perhaps, not very difficult, but actually, if you go into the matter, you will see with what difficulty the workers, who had been through all the stages of the struggle, asserted their rights, how they set things going—from workers' control to workers' management of industry, or how on the railways, beginning from the notorious Vikzhel,* they got an efficient organisation working; you will see

* Vikzhel—All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Trade Union.—*Ed.*

how representatives of the working class are gradually making their way into all our organisations and strengthening them by their activity. Take the co-operatives, for example, where we see huge numbers of workers' representatives. We know that formerly they consisted almost entirely of non-working-class people. Furthermore, in the old co-operatives, there were people steeped in the views and interests of the old bourgeois society. In this respect the workers had to wage a long struggle before they could take power into their own hands and subordinate the co-operatives to their interests, before they could carry on more fruitful work.

But our most important work has been the reorganisation of the old machinery of state, and although this has been a difficult job, over the last two years we have seen the results of the efforts of the working class and we can say that in this sphere we have thousands of working-class representatives who have been all through the fire of the struggle, forcing out the representatives of bourgeois rule step by step. We see workers not only in state bodies; we see them in the food supply services, in the sphere that was controlled almost exclusively by representatives of the old bourgeois government, of the old bourgeois state. The workers have created a food supply apparatus, and although a year ago we could not yet fully cope with the work, although a year ago workers made up only 30 per cent of it, we now have as many as 80 per cent workers in the food supply organisations. These simple and striking figures express the step taken by our country, and for us the important thing is that we have achieved great results in organising proletarian power after the political revolution.

Furthermore, the workers have done and are continuing to do the important job of producing proletarian leaders. Tens and hundreds of thousands of valiant workers are emerging from our midst and are going into battle against the whiteguard generals. Step by step we are gaining power from our enemy; formerly workers were not very skilful in this field, but we are now gradually winning area after area from our enemy, and there are no difficulties that can stop the proletariat. The proletariat is gaining in every sphere, gradually, one after another, despite all difficulties, and

is attracting representatives of the proletarian masses so that in every branch of administration, in every little unit, from top to bottom, representatives of the proletariat themselves go through the school of administration, and then train tens and hundreds of thousands of people capable of independently conducting all the affairs of state administration, of building the state by their own efforts.

Comrades ! Lately we have witnessed a particularly brilliant example of success in our work. We know how widespread subbotniks have become among class-conscious workers. We know those representatives of communism who most of all have suffered the torments of famine and bitter cold, but whose contribution in the rear is no smaller than that of the Red Army at the front; we know how, at the critical moment when the enemy was advancing on Petrograd, and Denikin took Orel, when the bourgeoisie were in high spirits and resorted to their last and favourite weapon, the spreading of panic, we announced a Party Week. At that moment the worker Communists went to the industrial workers and other working people, to those who most of all had endured the burden of the imperialist war and were starving and freezing, to those on whom the bourgeois panic-mongers counted most of all, to those who bore most of the burden on their backs; it was to them that we addressed ourselves during the Party Week and said: "You are scared by the burdens of working-class rule, by the threats of the imperialists and capitalists; you see our work and our difficulties; we appeal to you, and we open wide the doors of our Party only to you, only to the representatives of the working people. At this difficult moment we count on you and call you into our ranks there to undertake the whole burden of building the state." You know that it was a terribly difficult moment, both materially and because of the enemy's successes in foreign policy and in the military sphere. And you know what unparalleled, unexpected and unbelievable success marked the end of this Party Week in Moscow alone, where we got over 14 thousand new Party members. There you have the result of the Party Week that is totally transforming, that is remaking the working class, and by the experience of work is turning those who were the passive, inert instruments of the bourgeois

government, the exploiters, and the bourgeois state into real creators of the future communist society. We know that we have a reserve of tens and hundreds of thousands of working-class and peasant youths, those who saw and know to the full the old oppression of landowner and bourgeois society, who have seen the unparalleled difficulties of our constructive work, who saw what heroes the first contingent of Party functionaries proved to be in 1917 and 1918, who have been coming to us in bigger numbers and whose devotion is the greater the severer our difficulties. These reserves give us confidence that in these two years we have achieved a firm and sound cohesion and now possess a source from which we shall for a long time be able to draw still more extensively, and so ensure that the working people themselves undertake to develop the state. In this respect we have had such experience during these two years in applying working-class administration in all spheres, that we can say boldly and without any exaggeration that now all that remains is to continue what has been begun, and things will proceed as they have done these two years, but at an ever faster pace.

In another sphere, that of the relation of the working class to the peasantry, we have had far greater difficulties. Two years ago, in 1917, when power passed to the Soviets, the relation was still totally unclear. The peasantry as a whole had already turned against the landowners, and supported the working class, because it saw they were fulfilling the wishes of the peasant masses, that they were real working-class fighters, and not those who, in league with the landowners, had betrayed the peasantry. But we know perfectly well that a struggle was only just beginning within the peasantry. In the first year the urban proletariat still had no firm foothold in the countryside. This is to be seen with particular clarity in those border regions where the rule of the whiteguards was for a time consolidated. We saw it last summer, in 1918, when they won easy victories in the Urals. We saw that proletarian rule was not yet established in the countryside itself, and that it was not enough to introduce it from outside. What was needed was that the peasantry should, by their own experience, by their own organisational work, arrive at the same conclusions,

and although this work is immeasurably more difficult, slower and harder, it is incomparably more fruitful so far as results go. This is our main achievement of the second year of Soviet rule.

I shall not speak of the military significance of our victory over Kolchak, but I shall say that had the peasantry not undergone the experience of comparing the rule of the bourgeois dictators with that of the Bolsheviks, that victory would not have been won. Yet the dictators began with a coalition, with a Constituent Assembly; in that government apparatus there participated the same Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks whom we meet at every step in our work as the people of yesterday, as the people who built co-operatives, trade unions, teachers' organisations and a host of other organisations which we have to reorganise. Kolchak began in alliance with them, with individuals for whom the Kerensky experiment was not enough—they undertook a second. They did so in order to get the border regions, those farthest from the centre, to rise against the Bolsheviks. We could not give the peasants in Siberia what the revolution gave them in the rest of Russia. In Siberia the peasants did not get landed estates, because there were none of them there, and that was why it was easier for them to put faith in the whiteguards. All the forces of the Entente and the imperialist army which had suffered least of all in the war, i.e., the Japanese army, were drawn into the struggle. We know that hundreds of millions of rubles were expended on assisting Kolchak, that all means were employed to support him. Was there anything he lacked on his side? He had everything. Everything possessed by the strongest powers in the world, as well as a peasantry and a huge territory almost devoid of an industrial proletariat. What caused the destruction of all this? The fact that the experience of the workers, soldiers and peasants showed once again that the Bolsheviks were right in their forecasts, in their appraisal of the relation of social forces, when they said that the alliance of the workers and peasants is effected with difficulty, but that at any rate it is the only invincible alliance against the capitalists.

This is science, comrades, if one may use that term here. This experience is one of the greatest difficulty, one that takes account of everything and consolidates everything—it is the experience of communism; we can only establish communism if the peasantry arrive consciously at a definite conclusion. We can do this only when we enter into alliance with the peasants. We were able to convince ourselves of this by the Kolchak experience. The Kolchak revolt was an experience of great bloodshed, but that was no fault of ours.

You are now perfectly familiar with the second trouble that afflicts us; you know that famine and cold have affected our country more severely than any other. You know that the blame for this is thrown on communism, but you also know perfectly well that communism has nothing to do with it. In all countries we see increasing and growing famine and cold and soon everybody will be convinced that this situation in Russia is not the consequence of communism, but of four years of world-wide war. It is the war that has caused all the horror we are enduring, that has caused this famine and cold. But we believe that we shall soon emerge from this state of affairs. The whole problem is only that the workers must work, but work for themselves and not for those who for four years have been engaged in throat-cutting. As for the fight against famine and cold, it is going on everywhere. The most powerful states are now subject to this affliction.

We have had to resort to state requisitioning to collect grain from the many millions of our peasantry, and have done so not the way it was done by the capitalists, who operated along with the profiteers. In settling this problem we went with the workers, we went against the profiteers. We used the method of persuasion, we went to the peasantry and told them that all we were doing was in support of them and the workers. The peasant who has a grain surplus and delivers it to us at a fixed price, is our ally. The one, however, who does not do so is our enemy, is a criminal, is an exploiter and profiteer, and we can have nothing in common with him. We went with a message to the peasant, and this message has increasingly drawn the peasantry to our side. We have got quite definite results in this field. Between August and October of last year we procured 37

million poods of grain, but this year we have procured 45 million poods, and that without undertaking a special and careful check. An improvement, as you see, is taking place, a slow but undoubted one. And even if we reckon with the gaps made by Denikin's occupation of our fertile region, there are nevertheless signs of our being able to carry through our plan of procurement and plan of distribution at state prices. In this respect, too, our machinery has in a sense become established, and we are now taking the socialist path.

Now we are faced with the problem of a fuel crisis. The grain problem is no longer so acute; the position is that we have grain, but have no fuel. We have been deprived of our coal-field by Denikin. The loss of this coal-field has brought us unprecedented difficulties, and in this case we are doing just what we did in relation to grain. As we did previously we are again addressing ourselves to the workers. In the same way as we reorganised our food supply machinery, which, after being strengthened and set going, fulfilled quite a definite job that has yielded splendid results, so we are now improving our fuel supply machinery day by day. We are telling the workers from what direction this or that danger is advancing on us, in which direction and from what region we must send new forces, and we are confident that, just as we conquered our grain difficulties last year, so now we shall conquer our fuel difficulties.

Allow me for the moment to confine myself to this summary of our work. In conclusion, I shall take the liberty of saying just a few words about how our international situation is improving. We have examined the path we have followed, and the results show that our path has been the right and proper one. When we took power in 1917, we were alone. In 1917 it was said in all countries that Bolshevism could not take root. Now there is a powerful communist movement in those same countries. In the second year after we conquered power, six months after we founded the Third International, the Communist International, this International has in fact become the main force in the labour movement of all countries. In this respect the experience we have undergone has yielded the most splendid, unparalleled and rapid results, True, the movement to

freedom in Europe is not proceeding in the same way as in our country. But if you recall our two years of struggle, you will see that in the Ukraine too, and even in some parts of Russia proper, where the population was of a specific composition—for instance, in the Cossack and Siberian areas, or in the Urals—the movement to victory was not so rapid and did not follow the same road as in Petrograd and in Moscow, in the heart of Russia. Of course, we cannot be surprised at the slower pace of the movement in Europe, where pressure of jingoism and imperialism that has to be surmounted is greater; nonetheless the movement is proceeding unswervingly, along the very road being indicated by the Bolsheviks. Everywhere we are witnessing this forward movement. The mouthpieces of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are yielding place everywhere to representatives of the Third International. The old leaders are falling, and the communist movement has risen everywhere, and that is why, after two years of Soviet rule, we can say, supported by the facts, we have every right to say, that not only on the scale of the Russian state, but also on an international scale we now have the following of all the politically conscious, all that are revolutionary among the masses, in the revolutionary world. And we can say that after what we have endured no difficulties hold any terrors for us, that we shall withstand all these difficulties, and then conquer them all. (*Stormy applause.*)

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TO THE COMMUNISTS OF TURKESTAN[47]

Comrades, permit me to address you not as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence, but as a member of the Party.

It is no exaggeration to say that the establishment of proper relations with the peoples of Turkestan is now of immense, epochal importance for the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

The attitude of the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic to the weak and hitherto oppressed nations is of very practical significance for the whole of Asia and for all the colonies of the world, for thousands and millions of people.

I earnestly urge you to devote the closest attention to this question, to exert every effort to set an effective example of comradely relations with the peoples of Turkestan, to demonstrate to them by your actions that we are sincere in our desire to wipe out all traces of Great-Russian imperialism and wage an implacable struggle against world imperialism, headed by British imperialism. You should show the greatest confidence in our Turkestan Commission and adhere strictly to its directives, which have been framed precisely in this spirit by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

I would very much appreciate a reply to this letter indicating your attitude.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Turkestansky Kommunist, *Izvestia TsIK Sovetov Turkestanskoi Respubliki* and *Krasny Front* (jubilee edition), November 7-10, 1919

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THE FIGHT TO OVERCOME THE FUEL CRISIS

CIRCULAR LETTER TO PARTY ORGANISATIONS[48]

Comrades, to our Party, as the organised vanguard of the proletariat, has fallen the duty of uniting the working class in its struggle and of leading it in the fight for the victory of the workers' and peasants' Soviet power. We have carried on that fight triumphantly for two years and now know by what means we succeeded in overcoming the incredible difficulties placed in our way by the impoverishment of the country that resulted from four years of imperialist war and the resistance of all exploiters, Russian and international.

Comrades, the chief source of our strength is the class-consciousness and heroism of the workers, who had, and still have, the sympathies and support of the labouring peasants. Our victories were due to the direct appeal made by our Party and by the Soviet government to the working masses, with every new difficulty and problem pointed out as it arose; to our ability to explain to the masses why it was necessary to devote all energies first to one, then to another aspect of Soviet work at a given moment; to our ability to arouse the energy, heroism and enthusiasm of the masses and to concentrate every ounce of revolutionary effort on the most important task of the hour.

Comrades, at this juncture the most important task of the hour is the struggle to overcome the fuel crisis. We are finishing off Kolchak, we have vanquished Yudenich, we have begun a successful offensive against Denikin. We have considerably improved matters as regards the procurement and storage of grain. But the fuel crisis threatens

to disrupt all Soviet work: factory workers and office employees are abandoning their jobs to escape cold and hunger, trains carrying grain are brought to a standstill, and veritable disaster is impending precisely on account of the fuel shortage.

The fuel problem has become the central problem. The fuel crisis must be overcome at all costs, otherwise it will be impossible to solve the food problem, or the war problem, or the general economic problem.

And the fuel crisis can be overcome. For although we have lost the coal of the Donets Basin, and although we are not in a position rapidly to increase the output of coal in the Urals and Siberia, we still have plenty of forests and we can cut and deliver a sufficient quantity of wood.

The fuel crisis can be overcome. The thing now is to concentrate our main forces against what is (at present) our main enemy: the fuel shortage. We must arouse enthusiasm in the working masses and achieve a revolutionary harnessing of energies for the swiftest possible procurement and delivery of the largest possible quantity of fuel of every kind—coal, shale, peat, etc., and in the first place wood, wood and wood.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party is confident that all Party organisations and all Party members, who in the past two years have demonstrated their capacity and ability to solve problems no less and even more difficult in a revolutionary way, will solve this problem too.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party proposes in particular the following measures to all Party organisations:

1. All Party organisations must henceforth make the fuel problem and measures to combat the fuel crisis a permanent item on the agenda of Party meetings and especially meetings of Party committees. What more can be done, what must be done to combat the fuel crisis, how can the work be intensified, how can it be made more productive?—let these questions now occupy the attention of all Party organisations.

2. The same applies to all gubernia, city, uyezd and volost executive committees—in a word, to all leading

Soviet bodies. Party people must assume the initiative in strengthening, co-ordinating and intensifying the work on a country-wide scale.

3. The widest possible propaganda must be carried on everywhere, especially in the countryside, to explain what the fuel problem means to the Soviet state. In particular, local, parochial, narrow egoistical interests in the matter of fuel supplies must be combated. It must be explained that without devoted effort to meet the general need of the state it will be impossible to save the Soviet Republic, to uphold the power of the peasants and workers.

4. The most careful supervision must be exercised over the way the assignments of the Party and the instructions, demands and commissions of the Soviet government are carried out. New members of the Party who joined during the last Party Week should all be enlisted in the work of checking up on the way everyone is performing his duties.

5. Labour conscription for the whole population must be carried out, or certain age categories must be mobilised as quickly as possible and in the most imperative fashion for the work of procuring and carting coal and shale or cutting wood and carting it to the railway station. Fix labour quotas and see that they are carried out at all costs. Punish with ruthless severity those who despite repeated insistence, demands and orders are found to have shirked the work. Any lenience or weakness will be a crime against the revolution.

We have improved discipline in the army. We must also improve labour discipline.

6. Subbotniks must be arranged more frequently, energetically and systematically, and must be better organised, primarily for fuel work. Party members must set an example to all in labour discipline and energy. Decisions of the Council of People's Commissars, of the Council of Defence and of other central and also local Soviet bodies on the fuel question must be carried out conscientiously and scrupulously.

7. Local fuel bodies must be reinforced with the best of the Party workers. For this purpose the distribution of forces should be revised and appropriate changes made.

8. Comrades sent from the centre must be given the utmost assistance and the largest possible number of young people must be trained—and practically trained at that—in organising, arranging and maintaining fuel work. The local press must devote more attention to this work and must take pains to bring to public attention examples of really fine work and wage an implacable campaign against backwardness, lack of zeal or lack of ability displayed by any particular district, department or institution. Our press must become an instrument for bringing the backward into line and for inculcating industry, labour discipline and organisation.

9. The chief task of the food bodies must be to supply food and fodder for those engaged on fuel supply work. They must be given every assistance, their work must be intensified, and a check kept on the way it is carried out.

10. Indefatigable efforts must be made to ensure that in every fuel body (as in every Soviet institution generally) everyone is held *personally* responsible for a definite, strictly and precisely defined job or part of a job. Committee discussion must be reduced to an absolute minimum and never be allowed to interfere with swiftness and firmness of decision or minimise the responsibility of each and every worker.

11. The clerical work connected with fuel matters must be particularly prompt and accurate. The slightest tendency towards red tape must be punished ruthlessly. Reporting to the centre must be put on exemplary lines.

12. All fuel work in general must be organised in military fashion, with the energy, speed and strict discipline that is demanded in war. Without that we shall never overcome the fuel shortage. Without it we shall not escape from the crisis.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party is confident that all comrades will bend every effort to carry out these instructions energetically and faithfully.

The fuel shortage must be fought and overcome!

Central Committee,
Russian Communist Party

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE ON PARTY WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE[49] NOVEMBER 18, 1919

Comrades, unfortunately I have not been able to take part in the conference you have arranged, that is, in this conference on work in the countryside. Hence I shall have to limit myself to some general, basic considerations, and I am certain that you will be able gradually to apply these general considerations and fundamental principles of our policy to the various tasks and practical questions that come up before you.

The question of our work in the countryside is now, strictly speaking, the basic question of socialist construction in general, for insofar as the work among the proletariat and the question of uniting its forces are concerned, we can safely say that during the two years of Soviet power communist policy has not only taken definite shape but has unquestionably achieved lasting results. At first we had to fight a lack of understanding of the common interests among the workers, to fight various manifestations of syndicalism when the workers of some factories or some branches of industry tended to place their own interests, the interests of their factory or industry, above the interests of society. We had to fight a lack of discipline in the new organisation of labour, and still have to. I believe you all remember the major stages through which our policy has passed, when, as we promoted more and more workers to new posts, we gave them an opportunity to familiarise

themselves with the tasks facing us, with the general mechanism of government. The organisation of the communist activity of the proletariat and the entire policy of the Communists have now acquired a final, lasting form; I am certain that we are on the right path and that progress along that path is fully ensured.

As regards work in the countryside, the difficulties here are undoubtedly great, and we gave this question full consideration at the Eighth Congress of the Party[50] as one of the most important issues. In the countryside as well as in the towns we can rely only on the working and exploited people, only on those who, under capitalism, bore the whole burden of the landowner and capitalist yoke. Since the time when the conquest of power by the workers abolished private property and enabled the peasants to sweep away the power of the landowners at one blow, they divided up the land and, of course, gave effect to the fullest equality and thus considerably improved the exploitation of the soil, raising it to a level above the average. It goes without saying, however, that we could not achieve everything we would have wished in this respect, for it would take tremendous funds to provide each with sufficient seed, livestock and implements as long as the land is tilled by individual peasants. Moreover, even if our industry were to achieve extraordinary progress and increase the production of agricultural machines, even if we were to imagine all our wishes fulfilled, it would still be obvious that to supply each small peasant with sufficient means of production is impossible and most irrational since it would mean a terrible fragmentation of resources; only joint, artel, co-operative labour can help us to emerge from the blind alley in which the imperialist war has driven us.

In the mass, the peasants, whose economic position under capitalism made them the most downtrodden, find it hardest of all to believe in the possibility of sharp changes and transitions. The peasant's experience of Kolchak, Yudenich, and Denikin compels him to show especial concern about his gains. All peasants know that the permanence of their gains is not finally guaranteed, that their enemy—the landowner—has not yet been destroyed, but has gone into hiding and is waiting for his friends, the international

capitalist brigands, to come to his aid. And although international capital is becoming weaker day by day and our international position has greatly improved in the recent period, if we soberly weigh all the circumstances, we have to admit that international capital is still undoubtedly stronger than we are. It no longer can openly wage war against us—its wings have already been clipped. Indeed, all these gentlemen in the European bourgeois press have latterly begun to say, "You are likely to get bogged down in Russia, perhaps it is better to make peace with her." That is the way it always is—when the enemy is beaten, he begins talking peace. Time and again we have told these gentlemen, the imperialists of Europe, that we agree to make peace, but they continued to dream of enslaving Russia. Now they realise that their dreams are not fated to come true.

The international millionaires and multimillionaires are still stronger than we are. And the peasants see perfectly well that the attempts to seize power by Yudenich, Kolchak, and Denikin were financed by the imperialists of Europe and America. And the mass of the peasants know very well what the slightest weakness will cost them. The vivid memory of the rule of the landowners and capitalists makes the peasants reliable supporters of Soviet power. With each passing month Soviet power becomes more stable and there is growing political consciousness among the peasants who formerly laboured and were exploited and who themselves experienced the full weight of the landowner and capitalist yoke.

Things, of course, are different with the kulaks, with those who hired workers, made money by usury, and enriched themselves at the expense of the labour of others. Most of these side with the capitalists and are opposed to the revolution that has taken place. We must clearly realise that we still have a long and stubborn fight to wage against this group of peasants. Between the peasants who shouldered the full load of the landowner and capitalist yoke and those who exploited others there is, however, a mass of middle peasants. Here lies our most difficult task. Socialists have always pointed out that the transition to socialism will raise this difficult problem—the attitude

of the working class to the middle peasantry. Here it is to be expected that Communists, more than anyone else, will show a serious understanding and intelligent approach to this complicated and difficult task, and will not try to solve it at one stroke.

The middle peasants are undoubtedly accustomed to farming each for himself. They are peasant proprietors, and although they have no land as yet, although private property in land has been abolished, they remain proprietors, primarily because this group of peasants remain in possession of food products. The middle peasant produces more food than he needs for himself, and since he has surplus grain he becomes the exploiter of the hungry worker. Herein lies the main task and the main contradiction. The peasant as a working man, as a man who lives by his own labour, as one who has borne the yoke of capitalism, sides with the worker. But the peasant as a proprietor with a surplus of grain is accustomed to regarding it as his property which he can sell freely. Anyone who sells grain surpluses in a hunger-ridden country becomes a profiteer, an exploiter, because the starving man will give everything he has for bread. It is here that the biggest and hardest battle has to be fought, a battle which demands of all of us representatives of Soviet power, and especially the Communists working in the countryside, the greatest attention and most serious thought to the issue in hand and the way to approach it.

We have always said that we do not seek to force socialism on the middle peasant, and the Eighth Party Congress fully confirmed this. The election of Comrade Kalinin as Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee was prompted by the need to build the closest of bonds between Soviet power and the peasantry. Thanks to Comrade Kalinin our work in the countryside has gained considerable momentum. The peasant is now undoubtedly in a position to keep in closer contact with the Soviet government through Comrade Kalinin, who represents the supreme authority of the Soviet Republic. In this way we said in effect to the middle peasant: "There can be no question of forcibly imposing socialism on anyone." But we must make him understand this, we must know how to tell him this in a language the peasant understands best of all. Here we must rely only

on the force of example, successfully organised socialised farming. To give an example of artel, co-operative labour we must first achieve success in organising such farming ourselves. In these past two years the movement to set up agricultural communes and co-operatives has acquired tremendous scope. Looking at things soberly, however, we must say that a great many of the comrades who tackled the organisation of communes started to farm without sufficient knowledge of the economic conditions of peasant life. Undue haste and wrong approach to the question led to a tremendous number of mistakes which have had to be rectified. Time and again the old exploiters, former landowners, wormed their way into state farms. They no longer dominate there, but they have not been eliminated. It is necessary either to squeeze them out or put them under the control of the proletariat.

This is a task that confronts us in all spheres of life. You have heard of the series of brilliant victories won by the Red Army. There are tens of thousands of old colonels and officers of other ranks in that army and if we had not accepted them in our service and made them serve us, we could not have created an army, And despite the treachery of some military specialists, we have defeated Kolchak and Yudenich, and are winning on all fronts. The reason for this is the existence of communist cells in the Red Army; they conduct propaganda and agitation carrying a tremendous impact, and thanks to them the small number of old officers find themselves in such an environment, under such a tremendous pressure from the Communists, that the majority of them are unable to break out of the communist organisation and propaganda with which we have surrounded them.

Communism cannot be built without knowledge, technique, and culture, and this knowledge is in possession of bourgeois specialists. Most of them do not sympathise with Soviet power, yet without them we cannot build communism. They must be surrounded with an atmosphere of comradeship, a spirit of communist work, and won over to the side of the workers' and peasants' government.

Among the peasants there have been frequent manifestations of extreme distrust and resentment of state farms,

even complete rejection of them; we do not want state farms, they say, for the old exploiters are to be found there. We have told them—if you are unable to organise farming along new lines yourselves, you have to employ the services of old specialists; otherwise there is no way out of poverty. We shall weed out old experts who violate the decisions of the Soviet government as ruthlessly as we do in the Red Army; the struggle goes on, and it is a struggle without mercy. But we shall force the majority of the experts to work as we want them to.

This is a difficult, complex task, a task that cannot be solved at one blow. Here conscious working-class discipline and closer contact with the peasants are needed. The peasants must be shown that we are not blind to any of the abuses on the state farms, but at the same time we tell them that scientists and technicians must be enlisted in the service of socialised farming, for small-scale farming will not bring deliverance from want. And we shall do what we are doing in the Red Army—we may be beaten a hundred times, but the hundred-and-first we defeat all our enemies. But to do this, work in the countryside must proceed by joint efforts, smoothly, in the same strict, orderly way as it has proceeded in the Red Army and as it is proceeding in other fields of economy. We shall slowly and steadily prove to the peasants the superiority of socialised farming.

This is the struggle we must wage on the state farms, this is where the difficulty of transition to socialism lies, and it is thus that Soviet power can be really and finally consolidated. When the majority of the middle peasants come to see that unless they ally themselves with the workers they are helping Kolchak and Yudenich, that in all the world only the capitalists remain with them—the capitalists who hate Soviet Russia and for years to come will repeat their attempts to restore their power—even the most backward middle peasants will realise that either they must forge ahead in alliance with the revolutionary workers toward complete emancipation or, if they vacillate even slightly, the enemy, the old capitalist exploiter, will gain the upper hand. Victory over Denikin is not enough to destroy the capitalists once and for all. This is something we all must realise. We know full well that they will try time and

again to throw the noose around Soviet Russia's neck. Hence the peasant has no choice; he must help the workers, for the slightest hesitation will bring victory to the landowners and capitalists. Our primary, basic task is to help the peasants understand this. The peasant who lives by his own labour is a loyal ally of Soviet power, and the worker regards such a peasant as his equal, the workers' government does everything it can for him, indeed there is no sacrifice the workers' and peasants' government is not ready to make to satisfy the needs of such a peasant.

But the peasant who makes use of the surplus grain he possesses to exploit others is our enemy. To satisfy the basic needs of a hungry country is a duty to the state. Yet far from all peasants realise that freedom to trade in grain is a crime against the state. "I have raised this grain, it is my product, and I have a right to do business with it," the peasant reasons out of habit, as he used to. But we say *this is a crime against the state*. Freedom to trade in grain means enriching oneself by means of this grain, i.e., a return to the old way of life, to capitalism, and this we shall not allow, this we shall fight against at all costs.

In the transition period we shall carry out state purchases of grain and requisition grain surpluses. We know that only in this way shall we be able to do away with want and hunger. The vast majority of the workers suffer hardship because of the incorrect distribution of grain; to distribute it properly, the peasants must deliver their quotas to the state as assessed, exactly, conscientiously, and without fail. Here Soviet power can make no concessions. This is not a matter of the workers' government fighting the peasants, but an issue involving the very existence of socialism, the existence of Soviet power. Today we cannot give the peasants any goods, because there is a shortage of fuel and railway traffic is being held up. We must start with the peasants lending the workers grain at fixed prices, not at profiteering prices, so that the workers can revive production. Every peasant will agree to this if it is a question of an individual worker dying from starvation before his eyes. But when millions of workers are in question, they do not understand this and the old habits of profiteering gain the upper hand.

Prolonged and persistent struggle against such habits, agitation and propaganda, explanatory work, checking up on what has been done—these are the components of our policy toward the peasantry.

We must render every support to the working peasant, treat him as an equal, without the slightest attempt to impose anything on him by force—that is our first task. Our second task is to wage an unswerving struggle against profiteering, huckstering, ruination.

When we began to build the Red Army, we had only separate, scattered groups of guerrillas to start with. Lack of discipline and unity resulted in many unnecessary sacrifices, but we overcame these difficulties and built up a Red Army millions strong in place of the guerrilla detachments. If we were able to do this in the brief period of two years, and in a sphere as difficult and hazardous as the army, we are all the more certain that we can achieve similar results in all spheres of economic endeavour.

I am certain that although this problem of the proper attitude of the workers to the peasantry and of the correct food policy is one of the most difficult, we shall solve it and win a victory in this field such as we have won at the front.

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ADDRESS TO THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST[51] NOVEMBER 22, 1919

Comrades, I am very glad of the opportunity to greet this Congress of Communist comrades representing Moslem organisations of the East, and to say a few words about the situation now obtaining in Russia and throughout the world. The subject of my address is current affairs, and it seems to me that the most essential aspects of this question at present are the attitude of the peoples of the East to imperialism, and the revolutionary movement among those peoples. It is self-evident that this revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism. Owing to a number of circumstances, among them the backwardness of Russia and her vast area, and the fact that she constitutes a frontier between Europe and Asia, between the West and the East, we had to bear the whole brunt—and we regard that as a great honour—of being the pioneers of the world struggle against imperialism. Consequently, the whole course of development in the immediate future presages a still broader and more strenuous struggle against international imperialism, and will inevitably be linked with the struggle of the Soviet Republic against the forces of united imperialism—of Germany, France, Britain and the U.S.A.

As regards the military aspect of the matter, you know how favourable our situation now is on all the fronts. I shall not dwell in detail on this question; I shall only say that the Civil War which was forced upon us by international imperialism has in two years inflicted incalculable hardship upon the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and imposed upon the peasants and workers a burden so intolerable that it often seemed they would not be able to endure it. But at the same time, because of its brute violence, because of the ruthlessly brutal onslaught of our so-called allies, turned wild beasts, who robbed us even before the socialist revolution, this war has performed a miracle and turned people weary of fighting and seemingly incapable of bearing another war into warriors who have not only withstood the war for two years but are bringing it to a victorious end. The victories we are now gaining over Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin signify the advent of a new phase in the history of the struggle of world imperialism against the countries and nations which have risen up to fight for their emancipation. In this respect, the two years of our Civil War have fully confirmed what has long been known to history—that the character of a war and its success depend chiefly upon the internal regime of the country that goes to war, that war is a reflection of the internal policy conducted by the given country before the war. All this is inevitably reflected in the prosecution of a war.

Which class waged the war, and is continuing to wage it, is a very important question. Only due to our Civil War being waged by workers and peasants who have emancipated themselves, and to its being a continuation of the political struggle for the emancipation of the working people from the capitalists of their own country and of the whole world—only thanks to this were people to be found in such a backward country as Russia, worn out as she was by four years of imperialist war, who were strong-willed enough to carry on that war during two years of incredible and unparalleled hardship and difficulty.

This was very strikingly illustrated in the history of the Civil War in the case of Kolchak. Kolchak was an enemy who had the assistance of all the world's strongest powers; he had a railway which was protected by some hundred

thousand foreign troops, including the finest troops of the world imperialists, such as the Japanese, for example, who had been trained for the imperialist war, but took practically no part in it and therefore suffered little; Kolchak had the backing of the Siberian peasants, who were the most prosperous and had never known serfdom, and therefore, naturally, were farthest of all from communism. It seemed that Kolchak was an invincible force, because his troops were the advance guard of international imperialism. To this day, Japanese and Czechoslovak troops and the troops of a number of other imperialist nations are operating in Siberia. Nevertheless, the more than a year's experience of Kolchak's rule over Siberia and her vast natural resources, which was at first supported by the socialist parties of the Second International, by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who set up the Constituent Assembly Committee front, and which therefore, under these conditions, from the standpoint of the man in the street and of the ordinary course of history, appeared to be firm and invincible—that experience actually revealed the following. The farther Kolchak advanced into the heart of Russia, the more he wore himself out, and in the end we have witnessed Soviet Russia's complete triumph over Kolchak. Here we undoubtedly have practical proof that the united forces of workers and peasants who have been emancipated from the capitalist yoke can perform real miracles. Here we have practical proof that when a revolutionary war really does attract and interest the working and oppressed people, when it makes them conscious that they are fighting the exploiters—such a revolutionary war engenders the strength and ability to perform miracles.

I think that what the Red Army has accomplished, its struggle, and the history of its victory, will be of colossal, epochal significance for all the peoples of the East. It will show them that, weak as they may be, and invincible as may seem the power of the European oppressors, who in the struggle employ all the marvels of technology and of the military art—nevertheless, a revolutionary war waged by oppressed peoples, if it really succeeds in arousing the millions of working and exploited people, harbours such potentialities, such miracles, that the emancipation of the peoples

of the East is now quite practicable, from the standpoint not only of the prospects of the international revolution, but also of the direct military experience acquired in Asia, in Siberia, the experience of the Soviet Republic, which has suffered the armed invasion of all the powerful imperialist countries.

Furthermore, the experience of the Civil War in Russia has shown us and the Communists of all countries that, in the crucible of civil war, the development of revolutionary enthusiasm is accompanied by a powerful inner cohesion. War tests all the economic and organisational forces of a nation. In the final analysis, infinitely hard as the war has been for the workers and peasants, who are suffering famine and cold, it may be said on the basis of these two years' experience that we are winning and will continue to win, because we have a hinterland, and a strong one, because, despite famine and cold, the peasants and workers stand together, have grown strong, and answer every heavy blow with a greater cohesion of their forces and increased economic might. And it is this alone that has made possible the victories over Kolchak, Yudenich and their allies, the strongest powers in the world. The past two years have shown, on the one hand, that a revolutionary war can be developed, and, on the other, that the Soviet system is growing stronger under the heavy blows of the foreign invasion, the aim of which is to destroy quickly the revolutionary centre, the republic of workers and peasants who have dared to declare war on international imperialism. But instead of destroying the workers and peasants of Russia, these heavy blows have served to harden them.

That is the chief lesson, the chief content of the present period. We are on the eve of decisive victories over Denikin, the last enemy left on our soil. We feel strong and may reiterate a thousand times over that we are not mistaken when we say that internally the Republic has become consolidated, and that we shall emerge from the war against Denikin very much stronger and better prepared for the task of erecting the socialist edifice—to which we have been able to devote all too little time and energy during the Civil War, but to which, now that we are setting foot on a free road, we shall undoubtedly be able to devote ourselves entirely.

In Western Europe we see the decay of imperialism. You know that a year ago it seemed even to the German socialists, and to the vast majority of socialists—who did not understand the state of affairs—that what was in progress was a struggle of two world imperialist groups, and they believed that this struggle constituted the whole of history, that there was no force capable of producing anything else. It seemed to them that even socialists had no alternative but to join sides with one of the groups of powerful world predators. That is how it seemed at the close of October 1918. But we find that in the year that has since elapsed world history has witnessed unparalleled events, profound and far-reaching events, and these have opened the eyes of many socialists who during the imperialist war were patriots and justified their conduct on the plea that they were faced with an enemy; they justified their alliance with the British and French imperialists on the grounds that these were supposedly bringing delivery from German imperialism. See how many illusions were shattered by that war! We are witnessing the decay of German imperialism, a decay which has led not only to a republican, but even to a socialist revolution. You know that in Germany today the class struggle has become still more acute and that civil war is drawing nearer and nearer—a war of the German proletariat against the German imperialists, who have adopted republican colours, but who remain imperialists.

Everyone knows that the social revolution is maturing in Western Europe by leaps and bounds, and that the same thing is happening in America and in Britain, the countries ostensibly representing culture and civilisation, victors over the Huns, the German imperialists. Yet when it came to the Treaty of Versailles, everyone saw that it was a hundred times more rapacious than the Treaty of Brest which the German robbers forced upon us, and that it was the heaviest blow the capitalists and imperialists of those luckless victor countries could possibly have struck at themselves. The Treaty of Versailles opened the eyes of the people of the victor nations, and showed that in the case of Britain and France, even though they are democratic states, we have before us not representatives of culture and civilisation, but countries ruled by imperialist predators.

The internal struggle among these predators is developing so swiftly that we may rejoice in the knowledge that the Treaty of Versailles is only a seeming victory for the jubilant imperialists, and that in reality it signifies the bankruptcy of the entire imperialist world and the resolute abandonment by the working people of those socialists who during the war allied themselves with the representatives of decaying imperialism and defended one of the groups of belligerent predators. The eyes of the working people have been opened because the Treaty of Versailles was a rapacious peace and showed that France and Britain had actually fought Germany in order to strengthen their rule over the colonies and to enhance their imperialist might. That internal struggle grows broader as time goes on. Today I saw a wireless message from London dated November 21, in which American journalists—men who cannot be suspected of sympathising with revolutionaries—say that in France an unprecedented outburst of hatred towards the Americans is to be observed, because the Americans refuse to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.

Britain and France are victors, but they are up to their ears in debt to America, who has decided that the French and the British may consider themselves victors as much as they like, but that she is going to skim the cream and exact usurious interest for her assistance during the war; and the guarantee of this is to be the American Navy which is now being built and is overtaking the British Navy in size. And the crudeness of the Americans' rapacious imperialism may be seen from the fact that American agents are buying white slaves, women and girls, and shipping them to America for the development of prostitution. Just think, free, cultured America supplying white slaves for brothels! Conflicts with American agents are occurring in Poland and Belgium. That is a tiny illustration of what is taking place on a vast scale in every little country which received assistance from the Entente. Take Poland, for instance. You find American agents and profiteers going there and buying up all the wealth of Poland, who boasts that she is now an independent power. Poland is being bought up by American agents. There is not a factory or branch of industry which is not in the pockets of the Americans. The Americans have become so brazen that they are beginning to enslave that "great and

free victor", France, who was formerly a country of usurers, but is now deep in debt to America, because she has lost her economic strength, and has not enough grain or coal of her own and cannot develop her material resources on a large scale, while America insists that the tribute be paid unreservedly and in full. It is thus becoming increasingly apparent that France, Britain and other powerful countries are economically bankrupt. In the French elections the Clericals have gained the upper hand. The French people, who were deceived into devoting all their strength supposedly to the defence of freedom and democracy against Germany, have now been rewarded with an interminable debt, with the sneers of the rapacious American imperialists and, on top of it, with a Clerical majority consisting of representatives of the most savage reaction.

The situation all over the world has become immeasurably more complicated. Our victory over Kolchak and Yudenich, those lackeys of international capital, is a big one; but far bigger, though not so evident, is the victory we are gaining on an international scale. That victory consists in the internal decay of imperialism, which is unable to send its troops against us. The Entente tried it, but to no purpose, because its troops become demoralised when they contact our troops and acquaint themselves with our Russian Soviet Constitution, translated into their languages. Despite the influence of the leaders of putrid socialism, our Constitution will always win the sympathy of the working people. The word "Soviet" is now understood by everybody, and the Soviet Constitution has been translated into all languages and is known to every worker. He knows that it is the constitution of working people, the political system of working people who are calling for victory over international capital, that it is a triumph we have achieved over the international imperialists. This victory of ours has had its repercussions in all imperialist countries, since we have deprived them of their own troops, won them over, deprived them of the possibility of using those troops against Soviet Russia.

They tried to wage war with the troops of other countries—Finland, Poland, and Latvia—but nothing came of it. British Minister Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons several weeks ago, boasted—and it was cabled all

over the world—that a campaign of fourteen nations against Soviet Russia had been organised, and that this would result in victory over Russia by the New Year. And it is true that many nations participated in it—Finland, the Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, as well as the Czechoslovaks, the Japanese, the French, the British, and the Germans. But we know what came of it! We know that the Estonians left Yudenich's forces in the lurch; and now a fierce controversy is going on in the press because the Estonians do not want to help him, while Finland, much as her bourgeoisie wanted it, has not assisted Yudenich either. Thus the second attempt to attack us has likewise failed. The first stage was the dispatch by the Entente of its own troops, equipped according to all the rules of military technique, so that it seemed they would defeat the Soviet Republic. They have already withdrawn from the Caucasus, Archangel and the Crimea; they still remain in Murmansk, as the Czechoslovaks do in Siberia, but only as isolated groups. The first attempt of the Entente to defeat us with its own forces ended in victory for us. The second attempt consisted in launching against us nations which are our neighbours, and which are entirely dependent financially on the Entente, and in trying to force them to crush us, as a nest of socialism. But that attempt, too, ended in failure: it turned out that not one of these little countries is capable of waging such a war. What is more, hatred of the Entente has taken firm root in every little country. If Finland did not set out to capture Petrograd when Yudenich had already captured Krasnoye Selo, it was because she hesitated, realising that she could live independently side by side with Soviet Russia, but could not live in peace with the Entente. All little nations have felt that. It is felt in Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, where chauvinism is rampant, but where there is hatred of the Entente, which is expanding its exploitation in those countries. And now, accurately assessing the course of developments, we may say without exaggeration that not only the first, but also the second stage of the international war against the Soviet Republic has failed. All that remains for us to do now is to defeat Denikin's forces, and they are already half-defeated.

Such is the present Russian and international situation which I have summarised briefly in my address. Permit me

in conclusion, to say something about the situation that is developing in respect of the nationalities of the East. You are representatives of the communist organisations and Communist Parties of various Eastern peoples. I must say that the Russian Bolsheviks have succeeded in forcing a breach in the old imperialism, in undertaking the exceedingly difficult, but also exceedingly noble task of blazing new paths of revolution, whereas you, the representatives of the working people of the East, have before you a task that is still greater and newer. It is becoming quite clear that the socialist revolution which is impending for the whole world will not be merely the victory of the proletariat of each country over its own bourgeoisie. That would be possible if revolutions came easily and swiftly. We know that the imperialists will not allow this, that all countries are armed against their domestic Bolshevism and that their one thought is how to defeat Bolshevism at home. That is why in every country a civil war is brewing in which the old socialist compromisers are enlisted on the side of the bourgeoisie. Hence, the socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie—no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism. Characterising the approach of the world social revolution in the Party Programme we adopted last March, we said that the civil war of the working people against the imperialists and exploiters in all the advanced countries is beginning to be combined with national wars against international imperialism. That is confirmed by the course of the revolution, and will be more and more confirmed as time goes on. It will be the same in the East.

We know that in the East the masses will rise as independent participants, as builders of a new life, because hundreds of millions of the people belong to dependent, underprivileged nations, which until now have been objects of international imperialist policy, and have only existed as material to fertilise capitalist culture and civilisation. And when they talk of handing out mandates for colonies, we know very well that it means handing out mandates for spoliation and plunder—handing out to an insignificant

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

section of the world's population the right to exploit the majority of the population of the globe. That majority, which up till then had been completely outside the orbit of historical progress, because it could not constitute an independent revolutionary force, ceased, as we know, to play such a passive role at the beginning of the twentieth century. We know that 1905 was followed by revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China, and that a revolutionary movement developed in India. The imperialist war likewise contributed to the growth of the revolutionary movement, because the European imperialists had to enlist whole colonial regiments in their struggle. The imperialist war aroused the East also and drew its peoples into international politics. Britain and France armed colonial peoples and helped them to familiarise themselves with military technique and up-to-date machines. That knowledge they will use against the imperialist gentry. The period of the awakening of the East in the contemporary revolution is being succeeded by a period in which all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world, so as not to be simply objects of the enrichment of others. The peoples of the East are becoming alive to the need for practical action, the need for every nation to take part in shaping the destiny of all mankind.

That is why I think that in the history of the development of the world revolution—which, judging by its beginning, will continue for many years and will demand much effort—that in the revolutionary struggle, in the revolutionary movement you will be called upon to play a big part and to merge with our struggle against international imperialism. Your participation in the international revolution will confront you with a complicated and difficult task, the accomplishment of which will serve as the foundation for our common success, because here the majority of the people for the first time begin to act independently and will be an active factor in the fight to overthrow international imperialism.

Most of the Eastern peoples are in a worse position than the most backward country in Europe—Russia. But in our struggle against feudal survivals and capitalism, we succeeded in uniting the peasants and workers of Russia;

and it was because the peasants and workers united against capitalism and feudalism that our victory was so easy. Here contact with the peoples of the East is particularly important, because the majority of the Eastern peoples are typical representatives of the working people—not workers who have passed through the school of capitalist factories, but typical representatives of the working and exploited peasant masses who are victims of medieval oppression. The Russian revolution showed how the proletarians, after defeating capitalism and uniting with the vast diffuse mass of working peasants, rose up victoriously against medieval oppression. Our Soviet Republic must now muster all the awakening peoples of the East and, together with them, wage a struggle against international imperialism.

In this respect you are confronted with a task which has not previously confronted the Communists of the world: relying upon the general theory and practice of communism, you must adapt yourselves to specific conditions such as do not exist in the European countries; you must be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism. That is a difficult and specific task, but a very thankful one, because masses that have taken no part in the struggle up to now are being drawn into it, and also because the organisation of communist cells in the East gives you an opportunity to maintain the closest contact with the Third International. You must find specific forms for this alliance of the foremost proletarians of the world with the labouring and exploited masses of the East whose conditions are in many cases medieval. We have accomplished on a small scale in our country what you will do on a big scale and in big countries. And that latter task you will, I hope, perform with success. Thanks to the communist organisations in the East, of which you here are the representatives, you have contact with the advanced revolutionary proletariat. Your task is to continue to ensure that communist propaganda is carried on in every country in a language the people understand.

It is self-evident that final victory can be won only by the proletariat of all the advanced countries of the world,

and we, the Russians, are beginning the work which the British, French or German proletariat will consolidate. But we see that they will not be victorious without the aid of the working people of all the oppressed colonial nations, first and foremost, of Eastern nations. We must realise that the transition to communism cannot be accomplished by the vanguard alone. The task is to arouse the working masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organisation, regardless of the level they have reached; to translate the true communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to join the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle.

Such are the problems whose solution you will not find in any communist book, but will find in the common struggle begun by Russia. You will have to tackle that problem and solve it through your own independent experience. In that you will be assisted, on the one hand, by close alliance with the vanguard of the working people of other countries, and, on the other, by ability to find the right approach to the peoples of the East whom you here represent. You will have to base yourselves on the bourgeois nationalism which is awakening, and must awaken, among those peoples, and which has its historical justification. At the same time, you must find your way to the working and exploited masses of every country and tell them in a language they understand that their only hope of emancipation lies in the victory of the international revolution, and that the international proletariat is the only ally of all the hundreds of millions of the working and exploited peoples of the East.

Such is the immense task which confronts you, and which, thanks to the era of revolution and the growth of the revolutionary movement—of that there can be no doubt—will, by the joint efforts of the communist organisations of the East, be successfully accomplished and crowned by complete victory over international imperialism.

Bulletin of the C.C., *R.C.P.(B.)* No. 9, December 20, 1919

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DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON SOVIET RULE IN THE UKRAINE[52]

(1) The C.C., R.C.P.(B.), having discussed the question of relations with the working people of the Ukraine now being liberated from the temporary conquest of Denikin's bands, is pursuing persistently the principle of the self-determination of nations and deems it essential to again affirm that the R.C.P. holds consistently to the view that the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic be recognised.

(2) The R.C.P. will work to establish federal relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R., basing itself on the decisions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of June 1, 1919, and the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of May 18, 1919[53] (resolution attached).

(3) In view of the fact that Ukrainian culture (language, school, etc.) has been suppressed for centuries by Russian tsarism and the exploiting classes, the C.C., R.C.P. makes it incumbent upon all Party members to use every means to help remove all barriers in the way of the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture. Since the many centuries of oppression have given rise to nationalist tendencies among the backward sections of the population, R.C.P. members must exercise the greatest caution in respect of those tendencies and must oppose them with words of comradely explanation concerning the identity of interests of the working people of the Ukraine and Russia. R.C.P. members on Ukrainian territory must put into practice the right of the working people to study in the Ukrainian language and to speak their native language in all Soviet institutions; they

must in every way counteract attempts at Russification that push the Ukrainian language into the background and must convert that language into an instrument for the communist education of the working people. Steps must be taken immediately to ensure that in all Soviet institutions there are sufficient Ukrainian-speaking employees and that in future all employees are able to speak Ukrainian.

(4) It is essential to ensure the closest contact between Soviet institutions and the native peasant population of the country, for which purpose it must be made the rule, even at the earliest stages, that when revolutionary committees and Soviets are being established the labouring peasants must have a majority in them with the poor peasants exercising a decisive influence.

(5) Since the population of the Ukraine is predominantly peasant to an even greater extent than that of Russia, it is the task of the Soviet government in the Ukraine to win the confidence, not only of the poor peasants, but also of the broad sections of the middle peasantry whose real interests link them very closely with Soviet power. In particular, while retaining the food policy in principle (the state procurement of grain at fixed prices) the methods of its application must be changed.

The immediate purpose of the food policy in the Ukraine must be the requisitioning of grain surpluses to the strictly limited extent necessary to supply the Ukrainian rural poor, the workers and the Red Army. When requisitioning surpluses, special attention must be paid to the interests of the middle peasants, who must be carefully distinguished from kulak elements. It is essential to expose to the Ukrainian peasantry the counter-revolutionary demagogy that tries to impress on them that the purpose of Soviet Russia is to channel grain and other food products from the Ukraine into Russia.

It must be made incumbent on all agents of the central authorities, all Party officials, Party instructors, etc, to draw the poor and middle peasantry extensively into the work of government.

For the same purpose (the establishment of the real power of the working people) measures must be immediately taken to prevent Soviet institutions from being flooded

with Ukrainian urban petty bourgeoisie, who have no conception of the living conditions of the peasant masses and who frequently masquerade as Communists.

A condition for the admission of such elements into the ranks of the Party and into Soviet institutions must be a preliminary practical verification of their competence and their loyalty to the interests of the working people, primarily at the front, in the ranks of the army. Everywhere and under all circumstances such elements must be placed under the strict class control of the proletariat.

We know from experience that due to the unorganised state of the poor the large number of weapons in the hands of the Ukrainian rural population is inevitably being concentrated in the hands of the kulaks and counter-revolutionaries which actually leads to the domination of kulak bandits instead of the dictatorship of the working people; in view of this a primary task in organising Soviet Ukraine is to withdraw all weapons and concentrate them in the hands of the workers' and peasants' Red Army.

(6) In the same way, the land policy must be effected with special attention paid to the farming of the poor and middle peasantry.

The tasks of the land policy in the Ukraine are:

(1) The complete abolition of the landed proprietorship re-established by Denikin and the transfer of the landed estates to peasants possessing little or no land.

(2) State farms to be organised in strictly limited numbers and of limited size and in each case in conformity with the interests of the surrounding peasantry.

(3) In organising peasants in communes, artels, etc., the Party policy must be strictly adhered to, which in this respect does not permit any coercion, leaving it to the peasants to decide freely for themselves and penalising all attempts to introduce the principle of coercion.

* * *

2. Regarding it as beyond dispute for every Communist and for every politically-conscious worker that the closest alliance of all Soviet republics in their struggle against

the menacing forces of world imperialism is essential, the R.C.P. maintains that the form of that alliance must be finally determined by the Ukrainian workers and labouring peasants themselves.

Written November 1919

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EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[54]

DECEMBER 2-4, 1919

1

SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE DECEMBER 2

Comrades, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) I declare the All-Russia Party Conference open.

Comrades, according to Party Rules this type of conference should be convened every three months, but the difficult situation obtaining a few months ago in connection with the war forced us to bend our efforts and to reduce all bodies, both government and Party, to such an extent that we were unfortunately unable to carry out the Rules to the letter and the conference was postponed.

Comrades, we are calling this conference in connection with the Congress of Soviets[55] at a time when we have succeeded in achieving a tremendous improvement on the fronts, and when we are certain that we are on the eve of a gigantic change for the better in the international situation, in respect of the war and in respect of our internal development. The tasks that are unfolding before us have been frequently discussed at Party meetings and in the press, and we shall return to them when discussing definite individual items on the agenda. I shall, therefore, get right down to business and propose that you elect a presidium for the conference.

Let me have your proposals on that point, please.

Izvestia No. 217,
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the verbatim report,
verified with the *Izvestia* text

2

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECEMBER 2

(*Applause.*) Comrades, the present report of the Central Committee should, from the formal point of view, give you mainly a summary of experience acquired during the period under review. I must say that such an approach—confining oneself to history or, at any rate, making a report that turns mainly on history—is too far removed from the spirit of the times in which we live and from the tasks that confront us. In the present report, which I should also like to present to the Congress of Soviets, I intend to transfer the centre of gravity more to the lessons we are receiving, and which we must receive for our immediate practical activity, rather than to a description of what we have passed through.

Although we may say, without any exaggeration, that in the period under review we have achieved tremendous successes, although our main difficulty is now behind us, we still have ahead of us difficulties that are without doubt very, very great. The Party must naturally concentrate its attention wholly on the solution of those problems and may permit itself excursions into history only insofar as it is absolutely necessary for the solution of the problems facing us.

It stands to reason that in the past period of Soviet power the war question has persistently been the one on which we have mostly fixed our attention. The Civil War has involved everyone and everything, of course, and it goes without saying that in our struggle for existence we had to divert the Party's best forces from other work and other

activities and use them for war work. It was all we could do under war conditions. And no matter how much we have suffered from this withdrawal of creative forces from many spheres of government and Party activity, in the military sphere we have actually managed to effect a concentration of forces and achieve excellent results such as not only our enemies, not only the waverers, but probably even most of our own milieu would formerly have considered impossible. To hold out for two years against all our enemies who were supported directly and indirectly, first by German imperialism and then by the much more powerful Entente imperialism that has mastered the whole world—to hold out for two years in a country so badly ruined and so backward was such a problem that its solution was an undoubted "miracle". It seems to me, therefore, that we must look closely to see how this "miracle" was effected and what practical deductions are to be made from it, deductions which will enable us to say conclusively—and I think we may say conclusively—that great as the difficulties of internal organisation are we shall surmount them in the near future with a success equal to that with which we have solved the problems of military defence.

World imperialism, that in reality brought about the Civil War in our country and is responsible for protracting it, has suffered defeat in these two years, and we must first of all ask ourselves the question, how could it have happened that we were able to achieve such tremendous success in the struggle against world imperialism that even today is undoubtedly many times stronger than we are? To find an answer to this question we must make a general review of the history of the Civil War in Russia, the history of Entente intervention. In this war we must distinguish two periods that differ radically according to the methods of Entente activity employed, two periods or two basic methods of conducting military operations against Russia.

When the Entente had defeated Germany, at first it naturally relied on its own troops to crush the Soviet Republic in Russia. It stands to reason that if the Entente had used but a fraction of the gigantic armies that were released after the defeat of Germany, if it had been able to use even one-tenth of those armies in a proper manner against

the Russian Soviet Republic we should not, of course, have been able to hold out. It is typical of the first period of the Civil War in Russia that the attempt of the Entente to smash the Soviet Republic using its own troops was a failure. The Entente had to withdraw the British troops operating on the Archangel Front. The landing of French forces in the South of Russia ended in a number of mutinies on the part of French sailors, and today, no matter how frantically the war-time censor may operate—there is no war but the former war-time censor, now the non-war-time censor, continues to function in the supposedly free countries, Britain and France—and although copies of newspapers reach us on rare occasions we have very precise documentary evidence from Britain and France to the effect that information concerning, for instance, the mutiny of the sailors on French warships in the Black Sea has got into the French press, that the sentencing of several French sailors to penal servitude has become known in France, that the entire communist, the entire revolutionary working-class press in France and Britain refers to the facts; the name of Comrade Jeanne Labourbe, whom the French shot in Odessa for Bolshevik propaganda, has become a slogan for the French working-class socialist press, not only for the Communist wing, but even for a newspaper like *l'Humanité*[56] that in its basic principles is actually closer to the point of view of our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, even for that newspaper the name of Labourbe has become a slogan of struggle against French imperialism, for non-intervention in Russian affairs. In the same way letters from British soldiers on the Archangel Front have been discussed in the British working-class press. We have very exact documentary evidence of this. It is quite obvious to us, therefore, that the tremendous change that formerly we always spoke of and which we so deeply hoped for has taken place; it has undoubtedly become a fact even though the process is an unusually slow one.

This change had to be evoked by the very course of events. It is specifically those countries that always have been and still are regarded as the most democratic, civilised and cultured that conducted a war against Russia by the most brutal means, without even a shade of legality. The Bolsheviks

are accused of violating democracy—this is the most popular argument against us among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and in the entire European bourgeois press. But not one of those democratic states has taken or would dare to take the risk under the laws of its own country of declaring war on Soviet Russia. Parallel to this there is a protest, outwardly unnoticeable but nevertheless a profound protest on the part of the working-class press which asks where, in their constitution, in the constitution of France, Britain or America, are to be found laws permitting the conduct of war without having declared war and without having consulted parliament? The press of Britain, France and America has proposed to arraign their heads of state for a crime against the state, for declaring war without the permission of parliament. Such proposals have been made, although it is true that it was in papers that come out not more than once a week and are probably confiscated not less than once a month and have a circulation of a few hundred or a few thousand copies. The leaders of the responsible government parties could afford to ignore such papers. But here we have to consider two different tendencies; the ruling classes throughout the world publish well-known capitalist dailies in millions of copies and these are packed with unprecedented lies and slander against the Bolsheviks. But down below, the working-class masses learn about the falsity of that whole campaign from the soldiers who have returned from Russia. That is why it became necessary for the Entente to withdraw its forces from Russia.

When we said at the very outset that we place our stakes on the world revolution we were laughed at, and hundreds of times it was said and is still being said that it cannot be realised. During the past two years we have obtained precise material with which to verify it. If we speak of that stake as meaning hopes for a rapid, immediate insurrection in Europe, then we know there has not been one. That stake, however, proved to be fundamentally a true one and from the very outset it removed all possibility of an armed intervention on the part of the Entente; after two years and especially since the defeat of Kolchak and since the withdrawal of British forces from Archangel and from the entire Northern Front this has become an undoubted historical

fact. A very small part of the armies at the disposal of the Entente would have been enough to crush us. But we were able to defeat the enemy because the sympathy of the workers of the whole world made itself felt at the most difficult moment. And thus we succeeded in emerging honourably from this first period of the Entente invasion. I remember some article, Radek's I think, said that the Entente troops' contact with the hot soil of Russia, the country that had started the fire of the socialist revolution, would also set those troops on fire. Events showed that this really did happen. It goes without saying, furthermore, that the processes that are taking place among the British and French soldiers and sailors who know the names of those who have been shot for Bolshevik agitation, no matter how weak these processes are, no matter how weak the communist organisations are over there, are doing a gigantic job. The results are visible—they have compelled the Entente countries to withdraw their forces. This alone gave us our first major victory.

The second method or second system employed by the Entente in its struggle was to use small states against us. It was reported in a Swedish newspaper[57] at the end of last August that the British Secretary for War, Churchill, had said that fourteen states would attack Russia so that the fall of Petrograd and Moscow was certain in the near future, at any rate by the end of the year. I believe Churchill later denied having made this statement and said that the Bolsheviks had invented it. We have, however, exact information as to which Swedish newspaper published it. We therefore insist that the report came from European sources. Furthermore it is supported by facts. We know from the example of Finland and Estonia that the Entente has bent all its efforts to force them to attack Soviet Russia. I personally read one leading article in the British newspaper *The Times* on the question of Finland[58] at the time when Yudenich's troops were a few versts from Petrograd and the city was in tremendous danger. The article was seething with wrath and indignation, and was written in an unprecedentedly impassioned style, unusual for that newspaper (such newspapers usually write in diplomatic language similar to that used in Milyukov's *Rech*[59] in Russia). It was the wildest proclamation addressed to Finland and presenting the question bluntly—the

fate of the world depended on Finland and the eyes of all civilised capitalist countries were fixed on her. We know that that was the decisive moment when Yudenich's troops were a few versts from Petrograd. It makes no difference whether Churchill made the statement quoted or not, he certainly pursued that policy. It is well known what pressure the Entente brought to bear on those small countries that had been hastily formed, were weak and wholly dependent on the Entente even in such basic questions as that of food and in all other respects. They cannot break away from that dependence. All kinds of pressure—financial, food, military—have been applied to force Estonia, Finland, and no doubt Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as well, to force that whole group of states to make war on us. The history of Yudenich's last campaign against Petrograd has shown to the full that the Entente's second method of conducting war has failed. There can be no doubt that the least bit of aid from Finland or—a little more aid—from Estonia would have been enough to decide the fate of Petrograd. Nor is there any doubt that the Entente, realising the gravity of the situation, did everything it could to obtain that aid but nevertheless suffered defeat.

This was the second major international victory that we achieved and it was a more complicated victory than the first. The first was achieved because it turned out that British and French troops could not be retained on the territory of Russia; they did not fight but provided Britain and France with rebels who raised the British and French workers against their own governments. And so it has happened that although Russia has been deliberately encircled by a ring of small states obviously created and maintained for the struggle against Bolshevism, this weapon, too, has turned against the Entente. There are bourgeois governments in all these states and almost everywhere there are bourgeois collaborators in those governments, people who, because of their class position, go against the Bolsheviks. Every one of these nations, of course, is definitely hostile to the Bolsheviks, but we, nevertheless, have managed to turn those bourgeois and collaborators to our side. This seems improbable, but it is true, because each of those states, after what it has experienced in the imperialist war, is bound to

hesitate on the question of whether it is now worth its while to fight against the Bolsheviks when the only other claimant to power in Russia—a claimant that they have reason to consider serious—is either Kolchak or Denikin, that is, representatives of old imperialist Russia; and there is no doubt that Kolchak and Denikin represent old Russia. We have, therefore, been given an opportunity to rely on another crack in the imperialist camp. During the first months following our revolution we were able to hold out because the German and British imperialists were at each other's throats, but after those six months we were able to hold out for more than another six months because the troops of the Entente were in no condition to fight against us; the following year, however, the year that we now have mainly to render account for, we held out successfully because the attempt of the Great Powers under whose influence the small countries undoubtedly are, the attempt of those Great Powers to mobilise the small countries against us has been a failure because of the contradiction between the interests of world imperialism and the interests of those countries. The Entente has already had its paws on each of the small countries. They know that when the French, American or British capitalists say, "We guarantee you independence", that means in practice, "We shall buy from you all the sources of your wealth and shall hold you in bondage. Furthermore, we shall treat you with the insolence of an officer who has come to a foreign country to administer it and to speculate in it and who will not consider anybody's opinion". They know that the British Ambassador in almost all such countries is of greater significance than a local king or parliament. And if petty-bourgeois democrats have so far been unable to comprehend this verity, reality has now compelled them to understand it. It has turned out that as far as concerns the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements of the small countries the imperialists are plundering, we are, maybe, not allies, but at any rate more reliable and more valuable neighbours than the imperialists.

That is the second victory over world imperialism that we have won.

That is why we now have every right to say that the main difficulties are behind us. There is no doubt that

the Entente will make many more attempts at armed intervention in our affairs. Although the latest victories over Kolchak and Yudenich have now given spokesmen of all those powers cause to say that a campaign against Russia is hopeless and to offer us peace, we must realise clearly the meaning of such statements. What I am now going to say is not for the record....

Since we have managed to extract admissions of this kind from bourgeois intellectuals, from our merciless enemies, we have every right to say that the sympathies, not only of the working class, but also of extensive circles of bourgeois intellectuals are on the side of Soviet power. The philistines, the petty bourgeoisie, those who wavered in the savage fight between labour and capital, have now come over definitely to our side, and we may to some extent anticipate their support.

We must take this victory into consideration and if we link it up with the way we, in the long run, achieved the victory over Kolchak, the conclusion becomes more convincing ... now you may begin writing again, the diplomacy is finished.

If we ask the question as to what forces made our victory over Kolchak possible, we have to admit that the victory over Kolchak, despite his having operated on territory where the proletariat was in a minority and we were unable to give the peasantry direct, real help to overthrow the power of the landowners as we did in Russia, despite Kolchak's having begun on a front supported by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who established the front of the Constituent Assembly, despite there having been the most favourable conditions for the formation of a government that could rely on the aid of world imperialism—despite all this the experiment ended in the complete defeat of Kolchak. We have the right to draw the following conclusion from this, a conclusion that is very significant to us and should guide us in all our activities—*the class that can lead the mass of the population must triumph historically*. The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries are still talking about the Constituent Assembly, about the will of the nation, and so on, but during this period experience has convinced us that in revolutionary times the class struggle is carried on in the

most terrible forms but can lead to victory only when the class conducting the struggle is capable of giving leadership to the majority of the people. In this respect, the comparison that was made, not by voting with tickets, but by more than a year's experience of the most arduous, most bloody struggle that demanded a hundred times more sacrifices than any political struggle—this experience in respect of Kolchak has shown that more than any other party we are putting into effect the rule of that class the majority of which we have proved capable of leading and that we are adding the peasantry to our ranks as friends and allies. The example of Kolchak demonstrated this. In the social sphere this example has been the latest lesson for us; it shows on whom we can depend and who will go against us.

No matter how greatly the working class may have been weakened by the imperialist war and the economic ruin it is nevertheless effecting political leadership, but it would not be able to if it had not gained the majority of the working population, under Russian conditions the peasantry, as friends and allies. This has taken place in the Red Army where we have been able to employ specialists, the majority of whom were against us, and create the army which, according to the admission of our enemies, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, as evidenced by a resolution of the last Council of their party, is a people's and not a mercenary army.[60] The working class was able to build up an army the majority of which does not belong to that class and was able to employ specialists hostile to it only because it led and made friends and allies of that mass of working people connected with petty proprietorship, who have property connections and who, therefore, have a profound interest in free trading, i.e., in capitalism, in the return to the power of money. This is at the bottom of everything we have achieved in the past two years. In all our further work, in all our further activities, in those activities that must be begun in the Ukraine now being liberated, in all the organisational work that will be developing in all its difficulty and importance after the victory over Denikin, we must keep this basic lesson always before our eyes, we must remember it more than anything else. This, in my opinion, sums up the political results of all our work.

Comrades, it has been said that war is a continuation of politics. We have experienced that in our own war. The imperialist war that was a continuation of the politics of the imperialists, of the ruling classes, of landowners and capitalists, brought forth the hostility of the masses of the people and was the best means of revolutionising them. Here in Russia the war helped overthrow the monarchy, helped abolish landed proprietorship and overthrow the bourgeoisie, all of which was done with unparalleled ease only because the imperialist war was a continuation and an aggravation of imperialist politics that had become more insolent. And our war was a continuation of our communist politics, the politics of the proletariat. We still read in the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary papers and we hear from non-party and from wavering people, "You promised peace and have given us war, you have deceived the working people." And we say that the masses of the working people who have not studied Marxism have nevertheless learned full well the difference between imperialist and civil war, learned it through their class instinct, the instinct of oppressed people who have themselves for decades experienced what the landowner and capitalist are. Those who have experienced oppression for decades all realise that there is a difference between wars. The imperialist war was a continuation of imperialist politics; it aroused the masses against their masters. The Civil War is a war against the landowners and capitalists and is a continuation of the policy of overthrowing the power of those landowners and capitalists, and each month the development of the war has strengthened the bonds between the mass of working people and the proletariat that has assumed the leadership in the war. No matter how great the trials may have been, no matter how frequent the big defeats, no matter how serious those defeats have been, no matter how many times the enemy has achieved tremendous victories and the existence of Soviet power has hung by a thread—there have been such moments, and there is no doubt the Entente will again try to fight against us—it must be said that the experience we have gained is a very sound one. That experience has shown that war strengthens the political consciousness of the working people and shows them the advantages of Soviet power. Naïve people or those who are

wholly wrapped up in the prejudices of the old petty bourgeoisie or of the old bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism expect the peasant to decide through an election slip whether he will follow the Bolshevik Communists or the Socialist-Revolutionaries; they do not want to recognise any other decision because they are in favour of rights for the people, freedom, the Constituent Assembly, etc. Events made it necessary for the peasant to verify the issue in practice. After having given the Socialist-Revolutionaries the majority in the Constituent Assembly, after the policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries had failed and the peasants had to deal with the Bolsheviks in practice, they realised that our government is a sound one, it is a government that demands rather a lot, it is a government that is able to ensure the fulfilment of those demands at all costs, it is a government that regards the loan of bread to the hungry to be the absolute duty of the peasants even if they receive no equivalent in return, they realised that ours is a government that will ensure the supply of bread to the hungry no matter at what cost The peasant saw this and compared our government with that of Kolchak and Denikin, and he made his choice, not through the ballot-box but by deciding the issue in practice, when he had had the experience of both kinds of government. The peasant is deciding and will continue to decide the question in our favour.

That is what the history of Kolchak's defeat has taught us and that is what our victories in the South have proved. That is why we say that literally masses, millions of people living in the villages, millions of peasants are coming over completely to our side I think this is the chief political lesson that we have learned in this period and which we must apply to the problems of internal organisation that will, with the victory over Denikin near, be placed on the order of the day now that it has become possible for us to concentrate on internal development.

The chief accusation made against us by the European petty bourgeoisie concerns our terrorism, our crude suppression of the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie. "You and your governments have forced all that upon us," we say in reply. When people shout about terror we answer, "When countries who have the world's fleets at their disposal

and have armed forces that are a hundred times greater than ours pounced upon us and compelled small states to make war on us—was that not terrorism?"

That was real terrorism when all the powers united against a country that was one of the most backward and most weakened by war. Even Germany kept helping the Entente from the time before her defeat when she was supplying Krasnov and up to the present day, when that same Germany is blockading us and giving direct help to our enemies. This attack by world imperialism, this campaign against us, this bribery of conspirators inside the country—was this not terrorism? The reason for our terrorism was that we were attacked by armed forces against which we had to bend all our efforts. Inside the country we had to act with all persistence, we had to muster all our forces. In this case we did not want to be—and we decided that we would not be—in the position in which those who collaborated with Kolchak in Siberia found themselves, the position in which the German collaborationists will find themselves tomorrow, those who imagine they represent a government and are relying on the Constituent Assembly although at any moment a hundred or a thousand officers can push that government out of office. This can be understood because those officers constitute a trained, organised mass with an excellent knowledge of the art of war, that holds all the strings in its hands, that is well-informed about the bourgeoisie and the landowners and enjoys their sympathies.

This has been demonstrated by the history of all countries since the imperialist war, and today, when faced with such terrorism on the part of the Entente, we have the right to resort to terror ourselves.

It follows from this that the accusation of terror, insofar as it is justified, should be against the bourgeoisie and not against us. They forced terror upon us. And we shall be the first to take steps to confine it to the lowest possible minimum as soon as we put an end to the chief source of terrorism—the invasion of world imperialism, the war plots and the military pressure of world imperialism on our country.

While speaking of terrorism we must say something about our attitude to that middle stratum, the intelligentsia, that

mostly complain about the brutality of Soviet power and that Soviet power puts them in a worse position than before.

Whatever we, with the meagre means at our disposal, can do for the intelligentsia we are doing. We know, of course, the little significance of the paper ruble, but we also know the significance of the black market as an aid to those who cannot get enough food through our food organisations. In this respect we give the bourgeois intelligentsia an advantage. We know that at the moment when world imperialism pounced on us we had to introduce strict military discipline and defend ourselves with all the forces we could muster. When we are pursuing a revolutionary war we cannot, of course, do what all bourgeois states do—leave the working people to hear the brunt of the war. The burden of the Civil War must be and will be shared by the entire intelligentsia, all the petty bourgeoisie, and all middle-class elements—all of them will bear the burden. It will naturally be more difficult for them to bear that burden because they have been privileged for decades, but in the interests of the social revolution we must place that burden on their shoulders, too. This is the way we reason and the way we act, and we cannot do otherwise.

The end of the Civil War will be a step towards improving the conditions of those groups. We have already shown by our tariff policy and by the declaration in our programme that we recognise the need to give these groups better conditions because the transition from capitalism to communism is impossible unless the bourgeois specialists are used; and all our victories—all the victories of the Red Army led by the proletariat that has drawn over to its side the peasantry who are half labourers and half property-owners—were achieved partly because of our ability to use bourgeois specialists. This policy of ours as expressed in matters military must become the policy of our internal development.

The experience gained in this period tells us that while laying the foundations of the building we have often undertaken work on the dome, on all sorts of ornament, etc. Perhaps this was, to a certain extent, necessary for a socialist republic. Perhaps we had to build up in all spheres of national life. The craving to build up in all spheres is perfectly natural. If we were to look at what has been done

in the sphere of state organisation we would see almost everywhere many things begun and abandoned; these are the sort that make one want to say when looking at them that they could have waited and we should have begun with the main thing. It is quite natural that all our leading people should be interested in the tasks that can be carried out only after the foundations have been laid. But on the basis of this experience we can now say that in future we shall concentrate our efforts more on the main job, on the foundation, on those simple problems that are the most difficult to solve but which we shall nevertheless solve. These are the problem of bread, the problem of fuel and the problem of fighting the lice. These are three simple problems that will make possible the building of a socialist republic and then our victory throughout the world will be a hundred times more certain and more triumphant than that with which we repulsed the attack of the Entente.

The bread problem. We have achieved much with our requisitioning system. Our food policy has made it possible in the second year to acquire three times as much grain as in the first. During three months of the last campaign more grain was procured than during three months of last year, although, as you will hear in the report by the People's Commissar for Food, it was accompanied by what were, without doubt, great difficulties. One raid by Mamontov that took in the whole southern part of the central agricultural zone cost us very dear. But we have learned to carry out the requisitioning system, i.e., we have learned to make the peasants sell their grain to the state at fixed prices, without an equivalent in exchange. We know full well, of course, that paper money is not the equivalent of grain. We know that the peasant is loaning us his grain, and we ask him, "Should you hold back your grain waiting for an equivalent so that the workers can die of starvation? Do you want to trade on a free market and take us thereby back to capitalism?" Many intellectuals who have read Marx do not understand that freedom to trade is a return to capitalism; the peasant, however, understands it more easily. He knows that to sell bread at free prices, when the starving are prepared to pay anything for it, are prepared to give up all they have to escape death from starvation—he knows that this is a return to

exploitation, that it is freedom for the rich to make a profit and ruination for the poor. We say that this is a crime against the state and we shall not yield an inch in this struggle.

In this struggle to requisition grain the peasant will have to loan his grain to the hungry worker—that is the only way to begin proper organisation, to restore industry, etc. If the peasant does not do this, there will be a return to capitalism. If the peasant feels that he has ties with the workers he will be prepared to surrender his grain surpluses at fixed prices, i.e., for a simple piece of coloured paper—this is something essential without which the starving worker cannot be saved from death, without which industry cannot be rehabilitated. It is an extremely difficult problem and it cannot be solved by force alone. No matter how much shouting there may be about the Bolsheviks being a party that coerces the peasantry, we still say, "Gentlemen, it is a lie!" If we were a party that coerces the peasantry, how could we have held out against Kolchak, how could we have formed a conscript army in which four-fifths of the soldiers are peasants, all of whom are armed and who have the example of the imperialist war to show them that a rifle can easily be turned in any direction? How can we be a party that coerces the peasants—we, a party that is putting into effect the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, a party that tells the peasantry that the transition to free trading is a return to capitalism and that our requisitioning of surpluses by force is directed against the profiteer and not against the working people?

The requisitioning of grain must be the basis of all our activity. The food problem is at the basis of all problems. We have to devote a great deal of effort to defeat Denikin. There must not be the slightest hesitation or carelessness until the victory is complete, for all sorts of turns are possible. Whenever there is the slightest improvement in the war situation, however, we must devote greater effort to the work of food supplies because that is the basis of everything. The requisitioning must be carried out in full. Only when we have solved that problem shall we have a socialist foundation, and on that socialist foundation we shall be able to erect the splendid edifice of socialism that we have so often begun to build from the top and which has so often collapsed.

Another basic problem is that of fuel, the main foundation for our development. This is the problem we have come up against now, since we cannot take advantage of our successes in food supplies, since we cannot transport the grain, cannot make full use of our victories because there is no fuel. We still do not have a proper apparatus to settle the fuel problem, but it is possible to settle it.

There is a shortage of coal throughout Europe today. If the fuel problem is so acute in the richest of the victor countries, even those like America that has never been attacked or invaded, it naturally affects us too. It will take us several years to rehabilitate the coal industry, even under the best conditions.

We have to save ourselves with firewood. We are devoting more and more Party forces to this work. During the last week the greatest attention has been paid to this problem in the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence and a number of measures have been adopted that should effect a turning-point in this sphere similar to that effected by our armies on the Southern Front. Our activities in this field must not slacken and every step must bring us closer to victory in the battle against the fuel hunger. The material supplies are available. Until we have restored the coal industry we can manage with firewood and keep industry supplied with fuel. We must devote all Party forces, comrades, to that basic problem.

Our third problem is that of the fight against lice, against the lice that carry typhus. Typhus among a population that is exhausted by hunger, is ill, has no bread, soap or fuel, may prove a calamity that will prevent our tackling any sort of socialist development.

This is the first step in our struggle for culture and this, too, is a struggle for existence.

These are the main problems. To these I should like to draw the attention, more than to anything else, of comrades who are members of the Party. So far the attention we have been paying to these problems is so little as to be out of all proportion. Nine-tenths of the forces that are not engaged in war activities—which must not be lessened for a single minute—must be directed to these priority tasks. We now have a clear picture of the issues at stake. Everyone

must make the best possible effort; all our forces must be devoted to these tasks.

With this I shall end the political section of the report. As far as the international part is concerned, Comrade Chicherin will report on that in detail and will read you the proposal we should like to make to the belligerent countries in the name of the Congress of Soviets.

I shall deal very briefly with Party tasks. In the course of the revolution our Party has been confronted with a most important task. It is natural, on the one hand, that all the worst elements should cling to the ruling party merely because it is the ruling party. On the other hand, the working class is exhausted and is naturally weak in a country that is in ruins. Nevertheless it is only the advanced section of the working class, its vanguard, that is capable of leading the country. To accomplish this task in the sphere of state organisation we have employed subbotniks as one of the means. The slogan we have put forward is this—the first who can join our Party are those who have volunteered for the front; those who cannot fight must show in their own places that they understand what the workers' party is, they must show it by applying the principles of communism in practice. And communism, if you take that word in its strict meaning, is voluntary unpaid work for the common good that does not depend on individual differences, that wipes out all memories of everyday prejudices, wipes out stagnation, tradition, differences between branches of work, differences in the rate of pay for labour, etc. This is one of the greatest guarantees that we are drawing the working class and all working people into the work of peace-time organisation as well as into war-time activities. The further development of communist subbotniks must be a school. Every step must be accompanied by the attraction into the Party of working-class elements and the most reliable people from other classes. We achieve this by means of re-registration. We are not afraid to remove those who are not fully reliable. We also achieve this by trusting a Party member who comes to us in a difficult time. Those Party members, as today's Central Committee report shows, who came to us in hundreds and thousands when Yudenich was a few versts from Petrograd and Denikin was north of Orel, when the bourgeoisie were

already jubilant—those Party members are worthy of our trust. We value the extension of the Party on these lines.

After we have carried out the expansion of the Party on these lines we must shut the gates, we must be particularly cautious. We must say that now the Party is victorious we do not need new Party members. We know full well that in a disintegrating capitalist society a mass of harmful people will try to worm their way into the Party. We must create a party that will be a party of workers in which there is no place for alien elements, but we must also draw the masses into the work, those who are outside the Party. How is this to be done? The means to this end—workers' and peasants' non-party conferences. An article on non-party conferences[61] was recently published in *Pravda*. This article, written by Comrade Rostopchin, deserves special attention. I do not know any other way of solving this problem of profound historical importance. The Party cannot throw its doors wide open, because it is absolutely inevitable that in the epoch of disintegrating capitalism it will gather to itself the worst elements. The Party must be so narrow that it draws into its ranks only those elements from other classes that it has an opportunity to test with great caution.

But we have several hundred thousand Party members in a country with a population of more than a hundred million. How can such a party govern? In the first place there are, and must be, the trade unions to assist it, and these have millions of members; the second assistant is non-party conferences. At these non-party conferences we must be able to approach the non-proletarian section, we must overcome prejudice and petty-bourgeois vacillation—that is one of our most important, fundamental tasks.

We must assess the success of our Party organisations, not only by the number of Party members engaged in some kind of work, not only by the degree of success in carrying out the re-registration, but by non-party workers' and peasants' conferences, whether they are arranged correctly and often enough, that is, by the ability of the organisation to approach those masses that cannot at the moment join the Party but which we must draw into the work.

If we have beaten the Entente it is probably because we have earned the sympathy of the working class, and of the

non-party masses. If we have succeeded in defeating Kolchak it is probably because he was no longer able to draw more forces from the reservoir of the working people. We have a reservoir that no other government in the world has and which no government in the world except the government of the working class can have, because only the government of the working class can draw with absolute confidence on the most downtrodden and most backward working people. We can and must draw our forces from among the non-party workers and peasants because they are our true friends. For the solution of the bread and fuel problems and for the fight against typhus we can draw forces from these masses that were the most oppressed by the capitalists and landowners. And we are assured of the support of those masses. We shall continue to draw more and more forces from these masses and we may say that in the end we shall defeat all our enemies. And we shall work miracles in the sphere of peaceful construction (to be developed in proper style after Denikin has been defeated) that will be greater than those we have worked in the military sphere in the past two years.

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3

CONCLUDING SPEECH ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECEMBER 2

I should have declined to reply to the discussion if Comrade Sapronov had not egged me on; I want to polemise a little with him. There is no doubt that we should listen to what experienced local functionaries have to say. All their advice is valuable to us. But I ask you, what is there bad in what is written here? I was not acquainted with that point. Sapronov gave it to me. It says here, "Draft Instructions to Gubernia, Uyezd and Volost Committees on Work in the Countryside."[62] So the instructions are addressed to those local functionaries through whom the work in the localities is carried on. When agitators, commissars, agents or representatives of the Central Committee are sent they are undoubtedly always given instructions. Clause 9 here says: "Obtain from state farms and from communes help for the neighbouring peasants, immediate and real help." I assumed that even an agent of the Central Committee would have a head on his shoulders. If regulations have been approved, how can he demand that they give up a cart, a horse or something? On this score we have instructions enough—some people say there are too many of them. And an agent of the C.C. can make demands only insofar as the instructions allow it, and no commune manager would allow a cart, a horse or a cow to be given away. But this is a serious question, because it often spoils our relations with the peasants, and in the Ukraine they may be spoiled a second time, if we are unable to put our political line into effect. It is not difficult to carry

it out, and the peasant will be glad of even a little help. It is not enough to adopt an instruction, you must be able to carry it out. If Comrade Sapronov is afraid that a state farm will be robbed of a cow, a horse or a cart, let him share his tremendous experience in this field with us and say "Let us give the peasants implements free of charge or at low cost". That I can understand. And in any case Clause 9 will not be abolished by that, it will, on the contrary, receive confirmation. The relations between the communes and state farms and the neighbouring peasants is one of the most painful aspects of our entire policy. It will be still more serious in the Ukraine and tomorrow it will be the same in Siberia. Today we have won over the Siberian peasant ideologically by liberating him from Kolchak. But it will not be of any duration unless we can so arrange matters that the peasant gets real assistance, and it stands to reason that every agent working in the countryside must be given the relevant instructions. And when an agent makes his report he must be asked: "Where and in what way did the state farms help the peasant?" Comrade Sapronov's directives on this point were incorrect. It is our basic, unconditional duty to make use of the experience of local Party functionaries. (*Applause.*)

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4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON FOREIGN POLICY[63]

The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic wishes to live in peace with all peoples and devote all its efforts to internal development so as to put production, transport and government affairs in order on the basis of the Soviet system; this has so far been prevented by the intervention of the Entente and the starvation blockade.

The workers' and peasants' government has made repeated peace proposals to the Entente powers—the message from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the American representative, Mr. Poole, on August 5, 1918; to President Wilson on October 24, 1918; to all Entente governments, through representatives of neutral countries on November 3, 1918; a message from the Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on November 7, 1918; Litvinov's Note in Stockholm to all Entente representatives on December 23, 1918; then there were the messages of January 12, January 17 and February 4, 1919, and the draft treaty drawn up jointly with Bullitt on March 12, 1919; and a message through Nansen on May 7, 1919.

The Seventh Congress of Soviets fully approves these many steps taken by the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, once more confirms its lasting desire for peace and again proposes to the Entente powers, Britain, France, the United States of America, Italy and Japan, individually and collectively, to begin immediately negotiations on peace; the Congress instructs the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the

Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to continue this peace policy systematically (or: to continue this peace policy systematically, taking all appropriate measures to ensure its success).

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SPEECH SUMMING UP THE DEBATE ON SOVIET POWER IN THE UKRAINE DECEMBER 3

Comrades, there is little for me to say, although unfortunately I shall have to raise objections, not so much to Comrade Yakovlev who spoke before me, as to Comrades Bubnov and Drobnis who spoke after me. Nevertheless I shall have to make only a partial comment.

Insofar as Comrade Rakovsky's speech is concerned, I must say that when he said that state farms must be the basis of our communist construction he was wrong. Under no circumstances can we organise our affairs in that way. We must accept the fact that we should convert only a very small part of the progressive farms into state farms, otherwise we shall not effect a bloc with the petty peasants—and we need that bloc. When some of the comrades said that I recommend a bloc with the *Borotba* Party[64] they mistook my meaning. Here I compared the policy that must be pursued in respect of the *Borotba* Party with the policy we had pursued in respect of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. We were then accused, in the first week after October—at peasant congresses, incidentally—of not wanting to use the forces of the peasantry once we had seized power. In reply I said that we had taken over their programme in its entirety so as to use the forces of the peasantry—we want to do that, but we don't want an alliance with Socialist-Revolutionaries. Comrade Manuilsky, like Comrades Drobnis and Bubnov, was, therefore, making an extremely strange mistake in asserting that I recommend a bloc with the *Borotba* Party. My opinion is that we must

demonstrate that we need a bloc with the Ukrainian peasantry, and in order to achieve that bloc we must polemise with the Borotba people in a way that differs from the present polemics. All those who spoke about the national question—Comrades Drobnis and Bubnov and many others spoke about it—show by their criticism of the C.C. resolution that they are pursuing the very same policy of "independence" we reproved the Kiev people for. Comrade Manuilsky is making a peculiar mistake in thinking that we accused them of independence in the national sense, in the sense of Ukrainian self-determination. We reproved them for their "independence" in the sense of their not wanting to consider Moscow's views, the views of the Central Committee in Moscow. The word was used jokingly and had a completely different meaning.

The issue is now the following. Do we need a bloc with the Ukrainian peasantry, do we need a policy of the type we needed at the end of 1917 and for many months in 1919? I maintain that we do and that for this reason most of the state farms must be handed over for actual distribution. We need a struggle against kulak farms, we need a struggle against petty-bourgeois prejudices, we need a struggle against the guerrilla bands. The Borotba Party talk a lot about the national question but they say nothing about the guerrillas. We must demand that the Borotba people disband the teachers' union even though it uses the Ukrainian language and bears the state seal of the Ukraine—it must be disbanded for the sake of those principles of proletarian communist policy for which we disbanded our own All-Russia Teachers' Union; we disbanded it because it did not implement the principles of proletarian dictatorship but defended the interests and pursued the policy of the petty bourgeoisie.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF AGRICULTURAL COMMUNES AND AGRICULTURAL ARTELS[65]
DECEMBER 4, 1919

Comrades, I am very glad to greet your first congress of agricultural communes and agricultural artels on behalf of the government. Of course, from all the activities of the Soviet government you know what tremendous significance we attach to the communes, artels, and all organisations generally that aim at transforming and at gradually assisting the transformation of small, individual peasant farming into socialised, co-operative, or artel farming. You are aware that the Soviet government long ago allotted the sum of one thousand million rubles to assist efforts of this kind.[66] The Statute on Socialist Agrarian Measures[67] particularly stresses the significance of communes, artels, and all enterprises for the joint cultivation of the land, and the Soviet government is exerting every effort to ensure that this law shall not remain on paper only, but shall really produce the benefits it is intended to produce.

The importance of all enterprises of this kind is tremendous, because if the old, poverty-stricken peasant farming remains unchanged there can be no question of building up a stable socialist society. Only if we succeed in proving to the peasants in practice the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative or artel farming, will the working class, which wields state power, be really able to convince the peasant that its policy is correct and thus secure the real and lasting following of the millions

of peasants. It is therefore impossible to exaggerate the importance of every measure intended to encourage co-operative, artel forms of farming. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed throughout remote rural districts. It would be absolutely absurd to attempt to reshape these farms in any rapid way, by issuing an order or bringing pressure to bear from without. We fully realise that we can influence the millions of small peasant farms only gradually and cautiously and only by a successful practical example, for the peasants are far too practical and cling far too tenaciously to the old methods of farming to consent to any serious change merely on the basis of advice or book instructions. That is impossible, and it would be absurd. Only when it has been proved in practice, by experience comprehensible to the peasants, that the transition to the co-operative, artel form of farming is essential and possible, shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken. Consequently, the vast importance that attaches to communes, artels, and co-operative farms lays on all of you tremendous state and socialist obligations and naturally makes it imperative for the Soviet government and its representatives to treat this question with especial attention and caution.

In our law on socialist agrarian measures it is stated that we consider it the absolute duty of all co-operative, artel agricultural enterprises not to isolate and sever themselves from the surrounding peasant population, but to afford them assistance. This is stipulated in the law, it is repeated in the rules of all the communes, artels, and co-operatives; it is constantly stressed in the instructions and rulings of our Commissariat of Agriculture and of all Soviet government bodies. But the whole point is to find a really practical method of putting this into effect. I am still not convinced that we have overcome this principal difficulty. And I should like your congress, at which practical workers in collective farming from all parts of Russia have the opportunity of sharing their experience, to put an end to all doubts and to prove that we are mastering, are beginning to master in practice, the task of consolidating the artels, co-operative farms, and communes and every form of enterprise for

collective and socialised farming generally. But in order to prove this, *practical* results are required.

When we read the rules of the agricultural communes, or books devoted to this question, it might appear that we devote too much space in them to propaganda and the theoretical justification of the need to organise communes. Of course, that is necessary, for without detailed propaganda, without explaining the advantages of co-operative farming, and without repeating this idea thousands and thousands of times we cannot expect the broad masses of peasants to take an interest in it and undertake practical tests of the methods of carrying it into effect. Of course, propaganda is necessary, and there is no need to fear repetition, for what may appear to us to be repetition is most likely for hundreds and thousands of peasants not repetition, but a truth revealed for the first time. You may think that we are devoting too much attention to propaganda, but it must be said that we ought to devote a hundred times more. And when I say this, I mean it in the sense that if we go to the peasant with general explanations of the advantages of organising agricultural communes, and at the same time are unable in actual fact to show the practical advantage that will accrue to him from co-operative, artel farms, he will not have the slightest confidence in our propaganda.

The law says that the communes, artels, and co-operative farms must assist the surrounding peasant population. But the state, the workers' government, is providing a fund of one thousand million rubles for the purpose of assisting the agricultural communes and artels. And, of course, if any commune were to assist the peasants out of this fund I am afraid it would only arouse ridicule among the peasants. And it would be absolutely justified. Every peasant will say: "It goes without saying that if you are getting a fund of one thousand million rubles it means nothing to you to throw a little our way." I am afraid the peasant will only jeer, for he pays considerable attention to this matter, and is very distrustful of it. He has been accustomed for centuries to expect only oppression from the state, and he is therefore in the habit of regarding everything that comes from the state with suspicion. And if the agricultural communes give assistance to the peasants merely for the purpose of

fulfilling the letter of the law, such assistance will be not only useless but harmful. For the name "agricultural commune" is a great one; it is associated with the conception of communism. It will be a good thing if the communes; show in practice that they are indeed seriously working for the improvement of peasant farming; that will undoubtedly enhance the prestige of the Communists and the Communist Party. But it has frequently happened that the communes have only succeeded in provoking a negative attitude among the peasantry, and the word "commune" has even at times become a call to fight communism. And this happened not only when stupid attempts were made to drive the peasants into the communes by force. The absurdity of this was so obvious that the Soviet government long ago forbade it. And I hope that if isolated examples of such coercion are to be met with now, they are very few, and that you will take advantage of the present congress to see to it that the last trace of this outrage is swept from the face of the Soviet Republic, and that the neighbouring peasant population may not be able to point to a single instance in support of the old opinion that membership of a commune is in one way or another associated with coercion.

But even if we eliminate this old shortcoming, completely suppress this outrage, it will still be only a small fraction of what has to be done. For it will still be necessary for the state to help the communes, and we would not be Communists and champions of socialist economy if we did not give state aid to every kind of collective agricultural enterprise. We must do so because it is in accordance with all our aims, and because we know perfectly well that these co-operatives, artels, and collective organisations are innovations, and if support is not given them by the working class in power they will not take root. In order that they should take root, and in view of the fact that the state is affording them monetary and every other kind of support, we must see to it that they do not provoke the ridicule of the peasants. What we must be most careful about is that the peasants should not say of members of communes, artels and co-operatives that they are state pensioners, that they differ from the peasants only by the fact that they are receiving privileges. If we are to give land and subsidies for building

purposes out of the thousand-million-ruble fund, any fool will live somewhat better than the ordinary peasant. What is there communistic here, the peasant will ask, and where is the improvement? What are we to respect them for? If you pick out a few score or a few hundred individuals and give them a thousand million, of course they will work.

Such an attitude on the part of the peasants is most to be feared, and I should like to draw the attention of the comrades assembled at the congress to this. The problem must be solved practically, so as to enable us to say that we have not only averted this danger, but have also found means whereby the peasant will not be led to think in this way, but will, on the contrary, find in every commune and artel something which the state is assisting, will find in them new methods of farming which show their advantages over the old methods not by books and speeches (that is not worth much) but in practice. That is why the problem is so difficult to solve, and that is why it is hard for us, who have only dry figures before us, to judge whether we have proved in practice that every commune and every artel is really superior to every enterprise of the old system and that the workers' government is here helping the peasant.

I think that for the practical solution of this problem, it would be very desirable for you, who have a practical acquaintance with a number of neighbouring communes, artels and co-operatives, to work out real, practical methods for the verification of the implementation of the law demanding that the agricultural communes give assistance to the surrounding population, the way the transition to socialist farming is being put into effect and what concrete forms it is taking in each commune, artel and co-operative farm, how it is actually being put into practice, how many co-operatives and communes are in fact putting it into practice, and how many are only preparing to do so, how many cases have been observed when the communes have given assistance, and what character this assistance bears—philanthropic or socialist.

If out of the aid given them by the state the communes and artels set aside a portion for the peasants, that will only give the peasants grounds far believing that they are merely being helped by kind-hearted people, but will not by any means be proof of transition to a socialist system. The

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peasants have for ages been accustomed to regard such "kind-hearted people" with suspicion. We must know how to keep a check on the way this new social order has manifested itself, by what methods it is being proved to the peasants that co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil is better than individual peasant farming, and that it is better *not* because of state aid. We must be able to show the peasants the practical realisation of this new order even *without* state aid.

Unfortunately, I shall not be able to stay till the end of your congress and I shall therefore be unable to take part in elaborating these methods of control. But I am certain that with the aid of the comrades in charge of our Commissariat of Agriculture you will succeed in finding these methods. I have read with great satisfaction an article by the People's Commissar of Agriculture, Comrade Sereda, in which he stresses that the communes and co-operatives must not isolate themselves from the surrounding peasant population but must endeavour to improve the latter's farms. A commune must be organised so that it will serve as a model, and the neighbouring peasants will be attracted to it. We must be able to set them a practical example of how to assist people who are running their farms under the difficult conditions of a shortage of goods and general economic chaos. In order to define the practical methods of effecting this, instructions must be drawn up in the greatest detail and should enumerate all forms of assistance that can be given to neighbouring peasants; the instructions should ask each commune to give an account of what it has done to help the peasants, and indicate methods whereby each of the existing two thousand communes and nearly four thousand artels may become a nucleus capable of strengthening the peasants' conviction that collective farming, as a form of transition to socialism, is something of benefit to them, and not a whim or the ravings of a disordered mind.

I have already said that the law requires the communes to render assistance to the surrounding peasant population. We could not express ourselves otherwise in the law, or give any practical instructions in it. It was our business to establish the general principles, and to count on politically-conscious comrades in the localities scrupulously applying the law and being able to find a thousand ways of

applying it practically in the concrete economic conditions of each given locality. But, of course, every law can be evaded, even under pretence of observing it. And so the law on assisting the peasants, if it is not scrupulously applied, may become a mere game, and lead to results quite contrary to those intended.

The communes must develop in such a way that peasant farming conditions will begin to change by contact with them and by the economic help they give, so that every commune, artel, and co-operative will be able to make the beginnings of an improvement in these conditions and put them into effect, thereby proving to the peasants in practice that this change can be only of benefit to them.

Naturally, you may think we shall be told that in order to improve farming we need conditions that differ from the present economic chaos caused by four years of imperialist war and the two years of civil war forced on us by the imperialists. With such conditions as now exist in our country, how can one think of any widespread improvement in farming—God grant that we may carry on somehow and not die of starvation!

It will be only natural for doubts of this kind to be expressed. But if I had to reply to such objections, I would say this: assume that owing to the disorganisation of economic life, to economic chaos, goods shortage, poor transport and the destruction of cattle and implements, an extensive improvement of farming cannot be effected. But there is no doubt that a certain, not extensive, improvement is possible in a number of individual cases. But let us assume that even this cannot be done. Does that mean that the communes cannot produce changes in the life of the neighbouring peasants and cannot prove to the peasants that collective agricultural enterprises are not an artificial hothouse growth, but a new form of assistance to the working peasants on the part of the workers' government, and an aid to the working peasants in their struggle against the kulaks? I am convinced that even if the matter is regarded in this way, even if we grant the impossibility of effecting improvements under the present conditions of economic chaos, a very great deal may nevertheless be accomplished if there are conscientious Communists in the communes and artels.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

To bear this out, I would refer to what in our cities has been called subbotniks. This is the name given to the several hours' unpaid voluntary work done by city workers over and above the usual working day and devoted to some public need. The subbotniks were initiated in Moscow by the workers of the Moscow-Kazan Railway. One of the appeals of the Soviet government pointed out that the Red Army men at the front are making unprecedented sacrifices, and that, in spite of all the hardships they are obliged to undergo, they are gaining unprecedented victories over our enemies, and at the same time stated that we can clinch our victories only if such heroism and such self-sacrifice are displayed not only at the front, but also in the rear. The Moscow workers responded to this appeal by organising subbotniks. There can be no doubt that the workers of Moscow are experiencing greater privation and want than the peasants. If you were to acquaint yourselves with their conditions of life and give some thought to the fact that in spite of these incredibly hard conditions they were able to organise subbotniks, you would agree that no reference to arduous conditions can serve as an excuse for not doing what can be done under any conditions by applying the method of the Moscow workers. Nothing helped so much to enhance the prestige of the Communist Party in the towns, to increase the respect of non-party workers for the Communists, as these subbotniks when they ceased to be isolated instances and when non-party workers saw in practice that the members of the governing Communist Party have obligations and duties, and that the Communists admit new members to the Party not in order that they may enjoy the advantages connected with the position of a governing party, but that they may set an example of real communist labour, i.e., labour performed gratis. Communism is the highest stage in the development of socialism, when people work because they realise the necessity of working for the common good. We know that we cannot establish a socialist order now—God grant that it may be established in our country in our children's time, or perhaps in our grandchildren's time. But we say that the members of the governing Communist Party assume the greater burden of the difficulties in the fight against capitalism, mobilise the best Communists for the front, and

demand of such as cannot be used for this purpose that they take part in subbotniks.

By organising these subbotniks, which have become widespread in every large industrial city, participation in which the Party now demands from every one of its members, punishing non-fulfilment even by expulsion from the Party—by applying this method in the communes, artels, and co-operatives, you can, and must, even under the very worst conditions, see to it that the peasant regards every commune, artel, and co-operative as an association which is distinguished not by the fact that it receives state subsidies, but by the fact that within it are gathered some of the best working-class people who not only preach socialism for others, but are themselves capable of realising it, who are capable of showing that even under the worst conditions they can conduct their farms on communist lines and help the surrounding peasant population in every possible way. On this question there can be no such excuses as the goods shortage, or absence of seed, or loss of cattle. This will be a test which, at all events, will enable us to say definitely to what extent the difficult task we have taken on ourselves has been carried out in practice.

I am certain that this general meeting of representatives of communes, co-operatives and artels will discuss this and will realise that the application of this method will really serve as a powerful instrument for the consolidation of the communes and co-operatives, and will achieve such practical results that nowhere in Russia will there be a single case of hostility towards the communes, artels, and co-operatives on the part of the peasants. But that is not enough. What is required is that the peasants should show a sympathetic attitude towards them. For our part, we representatives of the Soviet government will do everything in our power to help to bring this about and to see to it that state assistance from the thousand-million-ruble fund, or from other sources, shall be forthcoming only in cases when the labour communes or artels have actually established closer contacts with the life of their peasant neighbours. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, we consider any assistance given to the artels and the co-operatives not only useless, but definitely harmful. Assistance given by the communes to

the neighbouring peasants must not be regarded as assistance which is merely given out of superfluity; this assistance must be socialist assistance, i.e., it must enable the peasants to replace their isolated, individual farming by co-operative farming. And this can be done only by the subbotnik method of which I have here spoken.

If you learn from the experience of the city workers, who, although living in conditions immeasurably worse than those of the peasants, initiated the movement for subbotniks, I am certain that, with your general and unanimous support, we shall bring about a situation when each of the several thousand existing communes and artels will become a genuine nursery for communist ideas and views among the peasants, a practical example showing them that, although it is still a small and feeble growth, it is nevertheless not an artificial, hothouse growth, but a true growth of the new socialist system. Only then shall we gain a lasting victory over the old ignorance, impoverishment and want, and only then will the difficulties we meet in our future course hold out no terrors for us.

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SEVENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[68]

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REPORT OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS DECEMBER 5

(*Applause. Delegates greet Lenin with a standing ovation.*) Comrades, in accordance with a decision of the Presidium the political report I am making is to be the joint report of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. I trust that you are not expecting me to enumerate the laws and administrative measures introduced by us during the year under review. No doubt the newspapers have made you familiar with them. Furthermore, small booklets published by most of our commissariats and describing their main activities during the period under review are being distributed to all Congress delegates; I should like to draw your attention to a number of summarised results, which in my opinion may be deduced from our experience and which may serve as useful instructions and material for the future work of all comrade delegates in the localities.

When speaking of the political results and lessons of our activities, the Soviet Republic's international position naturally takes first place. Both prior to October and during the October Revolution, we always said that we regard ourselves and can only regard ourselves as one of the contingents of the international proletarian army, a contingent which came to the fore, not because of its level of development and preparedness, but because of Russia's exceptional conditions; we always said that the victory of the socialist

revolution, therefore, can only be regarded as final when it becomes the victory of the proletariat in at least several advanced countries. It was in this respect that we experienced the greatest difficulties.

Our banking on the world revolution, if you can call it that, has on the whole been fully justified. But from the point of view of the speed of its development we have endured an exceptionally difficult period; we have seen for ourselves that the revolution's development in more advanced countries has proved to be considerably slower, considerably more difficult, considerably more complicated. This should not surprise us for it was naturally easier for a country such as Russia to start a socialist revolution than it is for the advanced countries. But, in any case, this slower, more complicated, more zigzag development of the socialist revolution in Western Europe has burdened us with incredible difficulties. The question that primarily comes to mind is: how was it possible for such a miracle to have occurred, for Soviet power to have held out for two years in a backward, ruined and war-weary country, in the face of the stubborn struggle waged against it first by German imperialism, which at that time was considered omnipotent, and then by Entente imperialism, which a year ago settled accounts with Germany, had no rivals and lorded it over all the countries on earth? From the point of view of a simple calculation of the forces involved, from the point of view of a military assessment of these forces, it really is a miracle, because the Entente was and continues to be immeasurably stronger than we are. Nevertheless, the year under review is noteworthy most of all for our having won a tremendous victory, so great a victory that I think we may say without exaggeration that our *main difficulties are already behind us*. No matter how great the dangers and difficulties in store for us, the main ones are evidently behind us. We must understand the reasons for this, and, what is most important, must correctly determine our future policy, since the future will almost certainly bring many further attempts by the Entente at intervention, and possibly a rebirth of the previous predatory alliance between international and Russian capitalists to restore the power of the landowners and capitalists, to overthrow Soviet rule in Russia, in short, an alliance

pursuing the old aim of extinguishing the centre of the world socialist conflagration—the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

Examining the history of the Entente intervention and its political lesson for us from this point of view, I would say that it could be divided into three main stages, each of which has successively given us full and lasting victory.

The first stage, naturally the most convenient and easiest for the Entente countries, involved their attempt to settle matters with Soviet Russia by using their own troops. Of course, after the Entente countries had defeated Germany they had armies of millions of men who had not yet openly declared for peace and who did not immediately recover from the fright given them by the bogey of German imperialism, which had been used to scare them in all the Western countries. At that time, of course, from the military point of view, and from the point of view of foreign policy, it would have been easy for the Entente countries to take a tenth part of their armies and dispatch them to Russia. Note that they completely dominated at sea, that they had complete naval supremacy. Troop transportation and supplies were always completely under their control. Had the Entente countries, who hated us as only the bourgeoisie can hate the socialist revolution, then been able to fling even a tenth part of their armies against us with any success, there cannot be the slightest doubt that Soviet Russia would have been doomed and would have met the same fate as Hungary.

Why did the Entente countries fail to achieve this? They landed troops in Murmansk. The drive into Siberia was undertaken with the aid of Entente troops, and Japanese troops continue to hold a distant slice of Eastern Siberia, while there were military units, even if not big ones, from all the Entente states in all parts of Western Siberia. Then French troops were landed in the South of Russia. That was the first stage of international intervention in our affairs, the first attempt, so to speak, to crush the Soviets with troops from the Entente's own countries, i.e., with the aid of workers and peasants of the more advanced countries, who were splendidly equipped; generally speaking the Entente countries lacked nothing in the way of technical and material

means for the campaign. There were no obstacles confronting them. How, then, are we to explain the failure of that attempt? It ended in the Entente countries having to withdraw their troops, because they proved incapable of waging a struggle against revolutionary Soviet Russia. That, comrades, has always been our main and principal argument. From the very outset of the revolution we have said that we constitute a party of the international proletariat, and that, however great the difficulties facing the revolution, there would come a time when, at the most decisive moment, the sympathy, the solidarity of the workers oppressed by international imperialism would make itself felt. For this we were accused of being utopians. But experience has shown that while we cannot always and in all cases rely on action by the proletariat, at any rate we may say that during these two years of the world's history we have been proved correct a thousand times. The attempt by the British and French to crush Soviet Russia with their own troops, an attempt that promised them certain and very easy success in a minimum of time, ended in failure: the British troops have left Archangel, and the French troops that had landed in the South have all been sent home. Despite the blockade, despite the ring drawn around us, news does reach us from Western Europe, we do get British and French newspapers, even if only sporadically, from which we learn that letters sent by British soldiers from Archangel Region have somehow reached Britain and been published there. We know that the name of the Frenchwoman, Comrade Jeanne Labourbe, who engaged in communist activity among French soldiers and workers and was shot in Odessa, became known to the entire French proletariat and became a battle-cry, a name around which all French workers united for action against international imperialism despite the apparently insurmountable factional trends of syndicalism. The words of Comrade Radek, who fortunately, as today's reports state, has been liberated by Germany and whom we shall perhaps see soon, that the soil of Russia, aflame with the fire of revolution, would prove inaccessible to the Entente troops—these words, which seemed to be just a writer's flight of fancy, were actually realised. Despite all our backwardness, despite all the burden of our struggle, the troops of Britain and France

proved incapable of fighting us on our own soil. The result was a victory for us. The first time that they tried to send massive military forces against us—and without them victory is impossible—the only result was that, thanks to their correct class instinct, the French and British soldiers brought home from Russia the very ulcer of Bolshevism that the German imperialists were fighting when they expelled our envoys from Berlin.[69] They thought they would protect themselves in this way against the ulcer of Bolshevism, which now spreads over the whole of Germany in the shape of a strengthened labour movement. The victory we won in compelling the evacuation of the British and French troops was the greatest of our victories over the Entente countries. We deprived them of their soldiers. Our response to the unlimited military and technical superiority of the Entente countries was to deprive them of it through the solidarity of the working people against the imperialist governments.

This revealed how superficial and uncertain it is to judge these so-called democratic countries by accepted criteria. Their parliaments have stable bourgeois majorities. This they call "democracy". Capital dominates and weighs down everything and they still resort to military censorship. And they call that "democracy". Among the millions of copies of their newspapers and magazines you would be hard put to find any but an insignificant few that contain even a hint of anything favourable about the Bolsheviks. That is why they say: "We are protected against the Bolsheviks, there is order in our countries", and they call it "democracy". How could it happen that a small section of British soldiers and French sailors were able to compel the withdrawal of the Entente troops from Russia? There is something wrong here. It means that even in Britain, France and America the mass of the people are for us; it means that all these external features, as socialists who refuse to betray socialism have always asserted, are a deception; it means that the bourgeois parliamentary system, bourgeois democracy, bourgeois freedom of the press are merely freedom for the capitalists, freedom to bribe public opinion, to exert pressure on it by all the power of money. That is what socialists always said until the imperialist war scattered them to their national camps and turned each national group of socialists into

lackeys of their own bourgeoisie. That was said by socialists before the war, that was always said by the internationalists and Bolsheviks during the war—and it all proved to be absolutely correct. All the external features, all the window-dressings, are a fraud; and this is becoming increasingly obvious to the people. They all shout about democracy, but in no parliament in the world did they dare to say that they were declaring war on Soviet Russia. That is why we read in the numerous French, British and American publications now available the proposal to "place the heads of state in the dock for having violated the Constitution, for waging war on Russia without declaring war". When and where was it sanctioned, what article of the Constitution, what parliament sanctioned it? Where did they gather their parliamentary representatives together, even after taking the precaution to imprison all Bolsheviks and near-Bolsheviks, to use the expression of the French press? Even under those conditions they did not dare to state in their parliaments that they were fighting Russia. That was why the splendidly armed, previously undefeated troops of Britain and France were unable to defeat us and departed from Archangel Region in the North, and from the South.

That was our first and chief victory, because it was not only a military victory, it was not really a military victory at all—it was actually a victory of that international solidarity of the working people for which we began the whole revolution, and which we pointed to and said that, however numerous the trials we would have to undergo, all these sacrifices would be repaid a hundredfold by the development of the world revolution, which is inevitable. It was apparent from the fact that in the sphere where the grossest material factors play the greatest part, namely, in the military sphere, we defeated the Entente countries by depriving them of the workers and peasants in soldiers' uniforms.

The first victory was followed by the second period of Entente intervention in our affairs. Each nation is headed by a group of politicians who possess wonderful experience, and that is why, after losing this stake, they placed another, taking advantage of their dominant position in the world. There is not a single country, not a single bit of the earth's surface, which is not in fact totally dominated by British,

French and American finance capital. That was the basis for the new attempt they made, namely, to compel the small countries surrounding Russia, many of which had been liberated and had been able to declare themselves independent only during the war—Poland, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, the Ukraine, etc.—to compel these small states to go to war against Russia on British, French and American money.

You may remember, comrades, that our newspapers reported a speech by Churchill, the well-known British Cabinet Minister, in which he said that 14 states would attack Russia and that September would see the fall of Petrograd, and December that of Moscow. I heard that Churchill then disclaimed this report, but it was taken from the Swedish *Folkets Dagblad—Politiken* of August 25. But even if this source proved unreliable we know full well that Churchill and the British imperialists acted precisely in this way. We are perfectly well aware that everything was done to exert pressure on Finland, Estonia and other small countries, in order to persuade them to wage war on Soviet Russia. I happened to read a leading article in *The Times*, the most influential bourgeois newspaper in Britain, a leader written when Yudenich's troops, obviously supplied, equipped and conveyed on board Entente transports, were a few versts from Petrograd, and Detskoye Selo had been taken. The article was a veritable onslaught, in which the maximum pressure was exerted—military, diplomatic and historical. British capital flung itself on Finland and faced her with an ultimatum: The eyes of the whole world are on Finland, said the British capitalists, the entire fate of Finland depends on whether she understands her role, whether she will help to crush the filthy, dirty, bloody wave of Bolshevism and liberate Russia. And in return for this "great and moral" work, for this "noble, civilised" work, Finland was promised so many million pounds, such-and-such a piece of territory, and such-and-such benefits. And what was the result? There was a time when Yudenich's troops were a few versts away from Petrograd, when Denikin stood to the north of Orel, when the slightest assistance to them would have quickly settled the fate of Petrograd to the advantage of our enemies, in a minimum of time and at negligible cost.

The entire pressure of the Entente countries was brought to bear on Finland, a country that is up to its neck in debt to them. And not only in debt: Finland cannot carry on for one month without the aid of these countries. But how did the "miracle" of our having won the battle against such an enemy happen? And win it we did. Finland did not enter the war, Yudenich was defeated, so was Denikin, and that at a time when joint action by them would most surely, most swiftly have settled the whole struggle to the advantage of international capitalism. We won the battle with international imperialism in this most serious and desperate trial of strength. But how did we do it? How could such a "miracle" have taken place? It took place because the Entente backed the same card as all capitalist states, which operate wholly and solely by deception and pressure; that was why everything they did aroused such resistance that the result was to our advantage. We were very poorly armed, worn out, and we said to the Finnish workers, whom the Finnish bourgeoisie had crushed, "You must not fight against us." The Entente countries appeared strong in their armaments, with all their outward might, with the food they were in a position to supply to these countries, and demanded that they fight against us. We won this battle. We won because the Entente countries had no troops of their own to fling against us, they had to resort to the forces of the small nations, but here, not only the workers and peasants, but even the considerable section of that very bourgeoisie that had crushed the working class did not in the end go against us.

When the Entente imperialists spoke of democracy and independence, these nations had the impudence from the Entente viewpoint, and foolishness from our viewpoint, to take these promises seriously and to understand independence as really implying independence, and not a means of enriching the British and French capitalists. They thought that democracy meant living as free men, and not that all American multimillionaires would be able to plunder their country, or that every tinpot aristocrat of an officer should be able to behave like a swine and turn into a brazen black-marketeer prepared, for the sake of a few hundred per cent profit, to do the filthiest of jobs. That was how we won! The Entente encountered opposition to its pressure on these

small countries, on each of these 14 countries. The Finnish bourgeoisie who employed White Terror to crush tens of thousands of Finnish workers know that this will not be forgotten, and that the German bayonets that made it possible no longer exist—these Finnish bourgeois hate the Bolsheviks as intensely as an exploiter would hate the workers who kicked him out. Nevertheless the Finnish bourgeoisie said to themselves, "If we follow the instructions of the Entente, that means we shall undoubtedly lose all hope of independence." And this independence was given to them by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, when Finland had a bourgeois government. The attitude of wide sections of the Finnish bourgeoisie, therefore, proved to be one of vacillation. We won the battle with the Entente countries because they counted on the small nations and at the same time repelled them.

This experience confirms, on an enormous, global scale, what we have always said. There are two forces on earth that can decide the destiny of mankind. One force is international capitalism, and should it be victorious it will display this force in countless atrocities as may be seen from the history of every small nation's development. The other force is the international proletariat that is fighting for the socialist revolution through the dictatorship of the proletariat, which it calls workers' democracy. Neither the vacillating elements here in Russia, nor the bourgeoisie of the small countries believed us; they called us utopians or bandits or even worse, for there is no stupid and monstrous accusation that they will not fling at us. But when they faced up squarely to the issue of either going with the Entente countries and helping them to crush the Bolsheviks, or of helping the Bolsheviks by neutrality, we proved to have won the battle and to have got that neutrality. We had no treaties, whereas Britain, France and America had all sorts of promissory notes, all sorts of treaties; nevertheless the small nations did as we wanted them to; they did so not because the Polish, Finnish, Lithuanian or Latvian bourgeoisie derived satisfaction from conducting their policy in a way that suited the Bolsheviks—that, of course, is nonsense—but because our definition of the historical forces involved was correct, namely, that either brute capital would be

victorious, and then, even if it were in the most democratic republic, it would crush all the small nations of the world—or the dictatorship of the proletariat would be victorious, which is the sole hope of all working people and of the small, downtrodden and weak nations. It turned out that we were right not only in theory, but also in practical world politics. When this battle for the troops of Finland and Estonia took place we won it, although they could have crushed us with insignificant forces. We won the battle despite the Entente countries having thrown the enormous weight of their financial pressure, their military might, and their food supplies into the fray in order to compel Finland to take action.

That, comrades, was the second stage of international intervention, our second historic victory. First, we won the workers and peasants away from Britain, France and America. These troops could not fight against us. Secondly, we won away from them these small countries, all of which are against us, and in which not Soviet, but bourgeois rule dominates. They displayed friendly neutrality towards us and acted contrary to the desires of that mighty world force, the Entente, for it was a beast that wanted to crush them.

We witness here on a world scale the same thing that happened to the Siberian peasants, who believed in the Constituent Assembly and helped the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to join forces with Kolchak and to strike at us. When they learned to their own cost that Kolchak represented the dictatorship of the very worst exploiters, a plunderous dictatorship of landowners and capitalists which was worse than that of the tsar, they organised the tremendous number of revolts in Siberia about which comrades have given us reliable information, and which now guarantee the complete return to us of Siberia, this time politically conscious. What happened to the Siberian peasant, with all his backwardness and political ignorance, has now happened on a broader scale, on a world scale, to all the small nations. They hated the Bolsheviks; some of them had suppressed the Bolsheviks with a bloody hand, with furious White Terror, but when they saw their "liberators", the British officers, they understood the meaning of British and American "democracy". When representatives of the British and American bourgeoisie appeared in Finland and Estonia, the acts of

suppression they began were more brazen than those of the Russian imperialists had been, because the Russian imperialists had belonged to an older period and did not know how to suppress properly, whereas these people do know, and go about it thoroughly.

That is why this victory at the second stage is a far more lasting one than is apparent at the moment. I am not exaggerating at all, and consider exaggerations to be extremely dangerous. I have not the slightest doubt that further attempts will be made by the Entente to set against us now one, now another of the small states that are our neighbours. Such attempts will occur because the small states are wholly dependent on the Entente, because all this talk about freedom, independence and democracy is sheer hypocrisy, and the Entente may compel them once again to raise their hand against us. But if this attempt was foiled at such a convenient moment when it was so easy to wage a struggle against us, we may, I think, say definitely that in this respect the main difficulty is undoubtedly behind us. We are entitled to say this, and to say it without the slightest exaggeration, fully conscious that the Entente countries possess a tremendous advantage in strength. We have won a lasting victory. Attempts will be made against us, but we shall defeat them with greater ease, because the small states, despite their bourgeois system, have become convinced by experience, not theory—these gentlemen are theory-proof—that the Entente is a more brazen and predatory brute than the one they have in their minds when they think of the Bolsheviks, the bogey used to scare children and cultured philistines all over Europe.

But our victories were not limited to this. In the first place we won over to our side the workers and peasants of the Entente countries; secondly, we gained the neutrality of the small nations under the Entente's domination and, thirdly, we began to win over, within the Entente countries, the petty bourgeoisie and educated townsfolk who had been completely opposed to us. To prove this I will quote the newspaper *l'Humanité* of October 26 which I have here. This newspaper has always belonged to the Second International, was rabidly chauvinistic during the war, adhered to the viewpoint of socialists similar to our Mensheviks and Right

Socialist-Revolutionaries, and still plays the role of a conciliator; it now announces that it has become convinced of a change in mood among the workers. The paper did not see this in Odessa but on the streets and at meetings in Paris, when the workers stopped everyone who dared say a word against Bolshevik Russia. As politicians who have learned a fair amount during the course of several revolutions, as persons who understand what sort of force the people are, they dare not say a word in favour of intervention, and are all speaking against it. Moreover, it is not only the socialists who say this (they call themselves socialists, but for a long time we have been aware what sort of socialists they are); the same issue of *l'Humanité* of October 26, which I quoted, contains a statement by a large number of French intellectuals, representative of French public opinion. The signatories to this statement are headed by Anatole France and include Ferdinand Buisson; altogether I counted the names of 71 bourgeois intellectuals famed throughout France, who state that they are against intervention in Russia's affairs, because the blockade of Russia, the attempt to starve her out from which children and the aged are perishing, cannot be tolerated—it is incompatible with culture and civilisation. The well-known French historian Aulard, who supports the bourgeois point of view in full, writes in his letter, "As a Frenchman I am an enemy of the Bolsheviks, as a Frenchman I support democracy, it is ridiculous to suspect me of the contrary, but when I read that France has invited Germany to participate in the blockade of Russia, when I read that France has approached Germany with this proposal—then I feel myself blushing with shame." It may be that this is just an expression of an intellectual's feelings but we are justified in saying that this is our third victory, a victory over imperialist France within the country itself. Such is the implication of this statement, feeble and pathetic as it is, the statement of intellectuals whose bark, as we know from hundreds of examples, is far worse than their bite, but who serve as a good barometer, an indicator of the trend developing amongst the petty bourgeoisie, of the way in which public opinion is reacting, permeated as it is with bourgeois sentiment. If we have achieved such results within France herself, where all the bourgeois papers write about

us only in the most lying terms, then we say to ourselves: it looks as if a second Dreyfus case[70] is beginning in France, only on a much larger scale. At that time the bourgeois intellectuals fought against clerical and military reactionaries, while the working class could not consider it their business, as the objective conditions were absent, the deep revolutionary feeling of today did not then exist. And now? If, after the recent electoral victory of the most rabid reactionaries and in the face of a regime hostile to the Bolsheviks, the French bourgeois intellectuals say that they are ashamed of the alliance between reactionary France and reactionary Germany for the purpose of starving out the workers and peasants of Russia, then we can say to ourselves that this is the third and greatest of our victories. And I should like to see how, with this situation within the country, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson will carry out the plan of fresh attacks on Russia they dream of. Just try it, gentlemen! (*Applause.*)

Comrades, I repeat that it would be a great mistake to jump to hasty conclusions because of all this. There can be no doubt that the imperialists will resume their attempts, but we are absolutely confident that these attempts, no matter by what powerful forces they may be undertaken, will end in failure. We can say that the Civil War which we conducted with such tremendous sacrifices has ended in victory. It has been victorious, not only on a Russian scale, but on a world-historical scale. Every argument I have presented to you has been based on the results of the military campaign. That is why, I repeat, new attempts are doomed to failure because the imperialists have become much weaker and we have become much stronger after our victory over Kolchak, over Yudenich, and when there are signs that the victory over Denikin, now in its early stages, is imminent. Did not Kolchak have the aid of the all-powerful Entente? Did not the peasants of the Urals and Siberia, who returned the smallest number of Bolsheviks to the Constituent Assembly, solidly support the Constituent Assembly front, which at that time was the front of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries? Were not they the best human material against the Communists? Is it not a fact that Siberia was a country with no landed estates and where we were not immediately

able to assist the mass of peasants in the same way as we were able to help all other Russian peasants? What did Kolchak lack to defeat us? He lacked what all imperialists lack. He remained an exploiter and had to act in the backwash of a world war, in circumstances in which he could only babble about democracy and freedom, but which made possible one of two dictatorships—either the dictatorship of the exploiters which frenziedly defends their privileges and insists on payment of interest on the bills, whereby they wish to squeeze millions out of all peoples, or the dictatorship of the workers which fights the power of the capitalists and wishes to establish firmly the power of the working people. It was only because of this that Kolchak came to grief. It was in this way—not by voting, which is, of course, in certain circumstances not a bad way—that the Siberian and Ural peasants actually determined their destiny. In the summer of 1918 they were dissatisfied with the Bolsheviks. They saw that the Bolsheviks forced them to sell their surplus grain at a non-speculative price and so they turned to Kolchak. Now the peasant has seen, compared and arrived at a different conclusion. Despite all he was taught in the past, he has understood, because he has learned from his own experience what many Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks do not want to understand from theory (*applause*)—that there must be one of two dictatorships, that he must choose either the dictatorship of the workers—and this means to assist all working people to throw off the yoke of the exploiters—or the dictatorship of the exploiters. We have won the peasants to our side, we have proved in practice through the most bitter experience, through unprecedented difficulties that we, as representatives of the working class, can give the peasants better and more successful leadership than any other party. Other parties like to accuse us of carrying on a struggle against the peasants, of being unable to arrive at a proper agreement with them, and they all offer their kind and noble services to reconcile us with the peasants. We are most grateful to you, gentlemen, but we do not think that you will manage it. We, at any rate, showed long ago that we were able to do this. We did not paint the peasant rosy pictures that told him he would be able to make the transition from capitalist society without iron discipline and

the firm rule of the working class; or that merely gathering votes would decide the world-historical problem of the struggle against capital. We said openly that dictatorship is a harsh, severe and even bloody word, but we said that the dictatorship of the workers will ensure the end of the yoke of the exploiters, and we proved to be correct. The peasant, having experienced both dictatorships, chose the dictatorship of the working class, and will go forward with it to complete victory. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, from what I have said about our international successes it follows—and, I think, it is not necessary to dwell at length on this—that we must repeat our peace proposal in a manner that is calm and business-like to the maximum degree. We must do this because it is a proposal we have made many times, and each time we gained something in the eyes of every educated man, even if he was our enemy, that made him blush with shame. That was the case when Bullitt came here, was received by Comrade Chicherin, talked with him and with me, and when we concluded a preliminary agreement on peace in the course of a few hours. And he assured us (those gentlemen like to boast) that America is everything, and who would worry about France in face of America's strength? But when we signed the agreement the French and British ministers did this. (*Lenin makes an expressive gesture with his foot. Laughter.*) Bullitt was left with a useless piece of paper and he was told, "Who would have thought you were naïve and foolish enough to believe in the democracy of Britain and France?" (*Applause.*) The result is that in the same issue I read the full text of the agreement with Bullitt in French[71]—and it was published in all the British and American newspapers. The result is that they are showing themselves to the whole world to be either rogues or infants—let them take their choice! (*Applause.*) All the sympathies even of the petty bourgeoisie, even of those bourgeois who have any sort of an education and who recall how they once fought their own tsars and kings, are on our side, because we signed the hardest possible peace terms in a business-like manner and said, "The price of the blood of our workers and soldiers is too high for us; we shall pay you businessmen a heavy tribute as the price of peace; we consent to a heavy tribute to preserve the

lives of our workers and peasants." That is why I think there is no reason for us to dwell long on this, and in conclusion I shall read a draft resolution that will express, in the name of the Congress of Soviets, our unwavering desire to pursue a policy of peace. (*Applause.*)

Now I wish to pass from the international and military to the political section of the report.

We have gained three tremendous victories over the Entente, and they were not only military victories. They were victories achieved by the dictatorship of the working class, and each victory strengthened our position, and not only because it weakened our enemy and lost him his troops; our international position was strengthened because on each occasion we won out in the eyes of all working people and even of many bourgeois. In this connection, the victories which we won over Kolchak and Yudenich, and are now winning over Denikin, will make it possible in the future to gain much greater sympathy by peaceful means.

We have always been accused of terrorism. This is a favourite accusation that is never absent from the columns of the press. We are accused of making terrorism a principle. To this we reply, "You yourselves do not believe this slander." The historian Aulard, who sent a letter to *l'Humanité*, writes, "I have studied history and taught it. When I read that the Bolsheviks are freaks, monsters and scarecrows, I say that the same things were written about Robespierre and Danton. By no means do I compare these great men to the present Russians, nothing of the sort, there is absolutely no resemblance between them. But I say as a historian that you must not believe every rumour." When a bourgeois historian begins speaking in this way we see that the lie being spread about us is fizzling out. We say that terror was thrust upon us. They forget that terror was provoked by the attack of the all-powerful Entente. Is it not terror for the world's fleet to blockade a starving country? Is it not terror for foreign representatives, relying on their so-called diplomatic immunity, to organise whiteguard insurrection? You must, after all, take something of a sober view of things. It must be realised that international imperialism has staked everything on suppressing the revolution, that it stops at nothing, and says, "For one officer—one Communist, and we

shall will." And they are right. If we had attempted to influence these troops, brought into being by international banditry and brutalised by war—if we had attempted to influence them by words and persuasion or by any means other than terror, we would not have held out for even two months and we would have been fools. The terror was forced on us by the terror of the Entente, the terror of mighty world capitalism which has been throttling the workers and peasants, and is condemning them to death by starvation because they are fighting for their country's freedom. Our every victory over this prime cause of and reason for the terror will inevitably and invariably mean that we shall be able to run the country without this method of persuasion and influence.

What we say about terrorism also applies to our attitude towards all waverers. We are accused of having created extraordinarily difficult conditions for the middle sections of the population, for the bourgeois intellectuals. We reply that the imperialist war was a continuation of the imperialist politics and for this reason it led to revolution. During the imperialist war everyone felt that the war was being conducted by the bourgeoisie in their own selfish interests, that in this war the people died while the bourgeoisie profited. Profit is the basic motive behind the policy of the bourgeoisie in all countries, and it is ruining them and will seal their fate. Our war is the continuation of the politics of revolution, and every worker and peasant knows (and if he does not know, then he instinctively feels and sees) that this is a war of defence against the exploiters, a war demanding the greatest sacrifices from the workers and peasants, but which stops at nothing in order to ensure that these sacrifices are also borne by the other classes. We know that it is more difficult for them than it is for the workers and peasants, because they formerly belonged to a privileged class. But we say that when it is a case of freeing millions of working people from exploitation, a government that did not make other classes bear the burden would not be a socialist government but a traitor government. We have burdened the middle classes because we have been placed in extraordinarily difficult conditions by the Entente governments. Every step in our victories—as we see it from the experience of our

revolution, though I cannot deal with this in detail—is characterised by the fact that through all the waverings and innumerable attempts to return to the past, more and more waverers are becoming convinced that the only real choice is between the dictatorship of the working people and the rule of the exploiters. If these waverers have had a hard time, it is not the fault of the Bolshevik government, but the fault of the whiteguards, the fault of the Entente; a victory over them will be a real and sound condition for improving the lot of all these classes. In this connection, comrades, I should like, in passing on to the lessons of the political experience inside the country, to say a few words about the significance of the war.

Our war is the continuation of the politics of revolution, the politics of overthrowing the exploiters, capitalists and landowners. The workers and peasants are therefore drawn to our side despite the infinite gravity of our war. War is not only a continuation of politics, it is the epitome of politics; this unprecedentedly difficult war which the landowners and capitalists have brought down on us with the aid of the mighty Entente is political education. The workers and peasants have learned a great deal during this ordeal. The workers have learned how to use state power, and how to utilise every step for propaganda and education, how to make the Red Army, consisting mainly of peasants, an instrument for their education, how to make it an instrument for the employment of bourgeois specialists. We know that in their overwhelming majority these bourgeois specialists are, and must be, against us because of their class character; we need have no doubts on this score. Hundreds and thousands of these specialists have betrayed us, and tells of thousands have come to serve us more faithfully, drawn to us in the course of the struggle itself because that revolutionary enthusiasm which did wonders in the Red Army came from our having served and satisfied the interests of the workers and peasants. This situation, in which masses of workers and peasants act in harmony and know what they are fighting for, has had its effect, and still larger and larger sections of the people who came over to our side from the other camp, some of them unknowingly, have turned and are turning into our conscious supporters.

Comrades, the task which now confronts us is to transfer our war-time experience to the sphere of peaceful construction. There is nothing which gives us so much pleasure or provides us with such an opportunity of greeting the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets as the turning-point in the history of Soviet Russia, as the fact that the main period of the civil wars we have been fighting lies behind us, and that ahead of us lies the main period of peaceful construction which means so much to all of us, which we desire, which we must carry out and to which we shall dedicate all our energies and our whole lives. We can now say, on the basis of the severe ordeals of the war, that in the main, in the military and in the international sphere, we have been victorious. The path of peaceful construction opens up before us. We have, of course, to remember that the enemy is always watching every step we take and will make many more attempts to overthrow us by all the means in his power—force, fraud, bribery, conspiracies, etc. Our task is to direct all the experience gained in war towards the solution of the main problems of peaceful construction which I shall now enumerate. First and foremost there is *the question of food supplies*, *the question of grain*.

We have pursued a most difficult struggle against prejudices and old customs. On the one hand, the peasant is a working man, who for decades suffered the oppression of the landowner and the capitalist; with the instinct of the oppressed man he knows that they are beasts who will walk through seas of blood to regain their power. On the other hand, the peasant is a proprietor. He wants to sell his grain freely, he wants "freedom of trade", he does not understand that the free sale of grain in a starving country means freedom to profiteer, freedom for the rich to make profits. And we say that we shall never agree to this, all of us would sooner die than make this concession.

We know that in this case we conduct a policy whereby the workers persuade the peasants to loan them grain, because the piece of paper the peasants receive in return is not the equivalent of the grain's value. The peasant sells us grain at fixed prices but does not receive goods in return because we have none; instead he receives a piece of coloured paper. He is giving us the grain as a loan and we say to him "If

you are a working man, can you deny that this is fair? How can you not agree that it is essential to loan the existing grain surpluses at fixed prices and not to dispose of them by profiteering, which means a return to capitalism, a return to exploitation, to all that we have fought against?" It was extremely difficult to do this, and we hesitated a good deal. We have taken many steps gropingly and continue to do so but we have gained some fundamental experience. When you hear the report of Comrade Tsyurupa or of others concerned with food supplies you will see that when the government says to the peasants they must loan their grain they are becoming accustomed to this system of requisitioning, for we have information from a number of volosts of its 100 per cent fulfilment. Although the successes are meagre, they are nevertheless successes, and our food supply policy enables the peasants to understand more and more clearly—if you want free sale of grain in a ruined country, go back, try out Kolchak and Denikin! We shall fight against this to the last drop of blood. There can be no concessions in this matter. On this fundamental question, the question of grain, we shall fight with all our might to prevent profiteering, to ensure that the sale of grain does not enrich the already rich, and that all grain surpluses raised on state land by the efforts of generations of working people become the property of the state and that now, when the state is impoverished, these surpluses should be loaned by the peasants to the workers' state. If the peasant does this, we shall emerge from all our difficulties, we shall rehabilitate industry, and the worker will repay his debt to the peasant a hundredfold. He, the worker, will guarantee the peasant and his children a livelihood without their having to work for the landowner and the capitalist. That is what we tell the peasant, and he is becoming convinced there is no alternative. The peasant is being convinced of this, not so much by us, as by our enemies, Kolchak and Denikin. They, more than anybody else, are giving the peasant practical lessons in living and sending him to our side.

However, comrades, after the problem of grain comes the second *question—that of fuel*. At the moment sufficient stocks of grain have been collected in the grain-growing regions to feed the starving workers of Petrograd and Moscow.

But if you walk through the workers' districts of Moscow you will find them in the grip of the most frightful cold, terrible privations intensified by the fuel problem. Here we are suffering from a desperate crisis, we are lagging behind requirements. Recently a number of meetings of the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars were devoted entirely to the elaboration of measures to solve the fuel crisis. Comrade Ksandrov has supplied me with figures for my speech which show that we have begun to emerge from this desperate crisis. At the beginning of October 16,000 railway trucks were loaded in a week; by the end of October this figure had dropped to 10,000 a week. This was a crisis, a catastrophe; it meant hunger for the workers of a whole number of factories in Moscow, Petrograd and many other places. The results of this catastrophe are still being felt. And then we came to grips with the problem, bent all our energies on solving it, and did the same as we had done in military matters. We said that all politically-conscious people must throw their full weight into solving the fuel problem, not in the old, capitalist way, when the profiteers were given a bonus and enriched themselves on contracts—no, we said, solve this problem in a socialist way, by self-sacrifice; solve this problem in the same way as we saved Red Petrograd, liberated Siberia, the way we gained victory in all those difficult moments, in the face of all the difficult problems of the revolution, the way that will always bring us victory. We have advanced from loading 12,000 trucks in the last week of October and now load 20,000. We are emerging from this catastrophe, but we are far from having solved the problem. It is essential that all workers know and bear in mind that without bread for the people, without bread for industry, that is, without fuel, the country is doomed to calamity. And this applies not only to us. Today's newspapers carry the news that in France, a victor country, the railways are grinding to a halt. What can you expect of Russia? France will crawl out of the crisis the capitalist way, that is, through the enrichment of the capitalists and the continued deprivation of the people. Soviet Russia will emerge from the crisis through the discipline and devotion of the workers, through a firm attitude towards the peasants, that firm attitude which, in the final analysis, the peasant

can always understand. The peasant is learning from experience that no matter how difficult the transition, no matter how firm the state rule of the workers, it is the rule of the working man who is fighting for the alliance of the working people, for the complete abolition of all exploitation.

A third scourge is assailing us, *lice*, and the *typhus* that is mowing down our troops. Comrades, it is impossible to imagine the dreadful situation in the typhus regions, where the population is broken, weakened, without material resources, where all life, all public life ceases. To this we say, "Comrades, we must concentrate everything on this problem. *Either the lice will defeat socialism, or socialism will defeat the lice!*" And here too, comrades, by using the same methods as elsewhere, we are beginning to achieve success. There are still some doctors, of course, who hold preconceived notions and have no faith in workers' rule, who prefer to draw fees from the rich rather than fight the hard battle against typhus. But these are a minority, they are becoming fewer, and the majority see that the people are struggling for their very existence, they realise that by their struggle the people desire to solve the fundamental question of preserving civilisation. These doctors are behaving in this arduous and difficult matter with no less devotion than the military specialists. They are willing to put themselves at the service of the working people. I must say that we are beginning to emerge also from this crisis. Comrade Semashko has given me some information about this work. According to news from the front, 122 doctors and 467 assistants had arrived at the front by October 1. One hundred and fifty doctors have been sent from Moscow. We have reason to believe that by December 15 another 800 doctors will have arrived at the front to help in the battle against typhus. We must pay great attention to this affliction.

We must concentrate on consolidating our foundation—grain, fuel, and the battle against typhus. I particularly wish to mention these matters because a certain lack of co-ordination has been noted in our socialist construction, and understandably so. When people have decided to transform the whole world, it is only natural that inexperienced workers and inexperienced peasants should be drawn into this work. There can be no doubt that a considerable period

must elapse before we are able to determine where our chief attention should be concentrated. It is not surprising that such great historical tasks frequently give rise to great visions, which develop side by side with many small, unsuccessful dreams. There have been many instances when we wanted to build a house from above, starting from a small upper wing, a cornice, but paid no real attention to the foundations. I must tell you that from my own experience, from my observations of the work being performed, it is my opinion that the essential task for our policy is to lay that foundation. It is necessary for every worker, every organisation, every institution to bear this in mind at every meeting. If we are able to supply grain, if we succeed in increasing the fuel supply, if we devote all our efforts to wiping out typhus in Russia—the typhus which comes from a lack of culture, from poverty, backwardness and ignorance—if we devote to this bloodless war all the strength and experience gained in a bloody war we can be certain that we shall achieve ever greater successes in this work, which is, after all, much easier and much more humane than a war.

We have carried out military mobilisation. The parties which were our most uncompromising opponents, which to a far greater extent than others supported and still support the ideas of capitalism (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, for instance), have had to recognise, despite all the accusations rained on us by the bourgeois imperialists, that the Red Army has become a people's army. This indicates that in this most difficult task we have achieved the alliance of the working class with the great mass of peasants who are coming over to the side of the working class, and we have, by this means, shown the peasants what is meant by the leadership of the working class.

The words "dictatorship of the proletariat" frighten the peasants. In Russia it was a bogey for the peasants but these words now recoil on the heads of people who try to use them as a bogey. The peasants now realise that, while the words "dictatorship of the proletariat" are perhaps too fancy Latin words, in practice they stand for that selfsame Soviet power which transfers the stale apparatus to the workers. This being the case, the dictatorship is the true friend and ally of the working people and the merciless enemy of any form

of exploitation. That is why we shall ultimately defeat all imperialists, for we possess a profound source of strength, a deep and extensive reservoir of human material, such as has never been accessible to any bourgeois government and never will be. We possess the material from which we can draw ever greater and more profound strength starting from the most advanced workers and continuing with average workers, and even lower down the scale, with labouring peasants, poor and greatly impoverished peasants. The Petrograd comrades have recently said that Petrograd has given up all its workers and can supply no more. But when a critical hour struck, Petrograd showed itself to be remarkable, as Comrade Zinoviev justly said, it proved to be a town that seemed able to give birth to new forces. Workers, who had no experience in politics or government, who were considered below the average in political consciousness, drew themselves up to their full stature, provided the huge forces for propaganda, agitation, organisation, and performed new miracles. We still have a great deal of this source of new miracles. Every new section of workers and peasants that has not yet been drawn into our work is, nevertheless, our true friend and ally. At the present moment we frequently have to rely on a very small section of leading workers in government work. In the course of our Party work and our Soviet practice we must approach non-party people, non-party workers and peasants, more boldly, approach them again and again, not for the purpose of winning them over to our side immediately, or of drawing them into the Party—that is not so important for us—but of making them understand that their help is needed to save the country. When those whom the landowners and capitalists least of all permitted to participate in running the state are brought to realise that we are calling on them to join us in building the solid foundation for the Socialist Republic our cause will be really invincible.

That is why, on the basis of two years' experience, we can say to you with absolute certainty that every one of our military victories will greatly hasten the approach of the time—now very near—when we can devote the whole of our energy to peaceful construction. On the basis of experience gained, we can guarantee that in the next few years we shall

perform even greater miracles in peaceful construction than we did in the two years of victorious war against the all-powerful Entente. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, in conclusion, allow me to read to you the draft of a motion which I now put before you.

"The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic wishes to live in peace with all peoples and devote all its efforts to internal development in order to establish the smooth running of production, transport and government affairs on the basis of the Soviet system; this has so far been prevented by the intervention of the Entente and the starvation blockade.

"The workers' and peasants' government has made frequent peace proposals to the Entente powers—the message from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the American representative, Mr. Poole, on August 5, 1918; to President Wilson on October 24, 1918; to all Entente governments through representatives of neutral countries on November 3, 1918, a message from the Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on November 7, 1918; Litvinov's Note in Stockholm to all Entente representatives on December 23, 1918; then there were the messages of January 12, January 17 and February 4, 1919, and the draft treaty drawn up jointly with Bullitt on March 12, 1919; and a message through Nansen on May 7, 1919.

"The Seventh Congress of Soviets fully approves these many steps taken by the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, once more confirms its unwavering desire for peace and again proposes to the Entente powers, Britain, France, the United States of America, Italy and Japan, individually and collectively, to begin immediately negotiations on peace; the Congress instructs the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to continue this peace policy systematically, taking all appropriate measures to ensure its success."

2

CONCLUDING SPEECH ON THE REPORT OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS DECEMBER 6

(*Voices*: "Long live Comrade Lenin! Hurrah!" *Applause*.) Comrades, it seems to me that in his speech and by his declaration, Martov has managed to give us an extraordinarily fine sample of the attitude towards Soviet power of the groups and parties that formerly belonged, and still belong, to the Second International, and against which we have now founded the Communist International. The difference between Martov's speech and his declaration must have struck each one of you—the difference that Comrade Sosnovsky stressed in the remark he shouted to Martov from the presidium, "Isn't that last year's declaration you have?" Martov's speech, indeed, most certainly belongs to 1919, to the end of that year, but his declaration is so compiled that it contains a complete repetition of what was said in 1918. (*Applause*.) And when Martov replied to Sosnovsky by saying that the declaration was "for all eternity" I was quite ready to take the Mensheviks under my wing and defend them from Martov. (*Applause. Laughter*.) I, comrades, have watched the development and activities of the Mensheviks, probably longer and more attentively—which has by no means been pleasant—than anybody else. On the basis of this fifteen years of study I assert that the declaration, far from being "for all eternity", will not last a single year (*applause*), because the entire development of the Mensheviks, especially in a great period such as has begun in the history of the

Russian revolution, reveals the greatest vacillation among them and, taken by and large, this boils down to their parting company with the bourgeoisie and their prejudices, only with the greatest difficulty and against their own will. A number of times they have fought shy of the dictatorship of the proletariat but they are now beginning to approach it—to approach it very slowly but very surely—and I am certain that in another year they will take a few more steps. And then it will be impossible to repeat that declaration, because if you remove its envelope of general democratic phrases and parliamentary expressions that would do credit to the leader of a parliamentary opposition, if you cast aside those speeches that so many people like but which we find boring, and get down to the real root of the matter, then the entire declaration says "Back to bourgeois democracy" and nothing more. (*Applause.*) And when we hear people who profess sympathy with us making such declarations we say to ourselves, "Yes, the terror and the Cheka[72] are absolutely indispensable." (*Applause.*)

Comrades, so that you will not now accuse me, and so that nobody will be able to accuse me, of picking holes in that declaration, I assert, on the basis of political facts, that a Right Menshevik and a Right Socialist-Revolutionary would readily subscribe to it with both hands. I have proof of this. The Council of the Party of Right Socialist-Revolutionaries from which Volsky and his group had to break away—Volsky is the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly Committee, you heard him speak here—the Council of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries which met this year has resolved that they wish to merge with the Menshevik Party which they consider close to them. Why? Because Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, who support Mensheviks whose declaration is construed throughout on the same principles as that of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, stand behind the printing of the things that are in the declaration and in Menshevik publications (which are supposed to be purely theoretical and which we are wrong in prohibiting, as the Bund[73] representative said when she complained that the country does not enjoy full freedom of the press). At that time, after a long struggle, Volsky's group had to break away. That is the mess which shows quite clearly that the matter

is not one of our cavilling at the Mensheviks but of the real state of affairs—this is shown by the Socialist-Revolutionary minority group. Here, quite rightly, the Menshevik Rozanov was mentioned, whom Martov and the party would probably have expelled—and it is this declaration the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks subscribe to.

This means that until now there are two different trends among them—one of them is sorry, weeps, condoles and wishes to return to democracy theoretically, while the other acts. And Martov was wrong in saying I was trying to justify myself on the question of terrorism. That one expression alone shows how infinitely far the views of the petty-bourgeois democrats are from ours and how close they are to those of the Second International. Actually there is nothing at all socialist in them, but the exact opposite. Now that socialism is near, old bourgeois views are again being preached to us. I did not try to justify myself, I spoke about a special party, a party that has been created by the war, a party of officers who were in command throughout the imperialist war, who have come to the fore in this war and who know what real politics are. When we are told "You must either abolish your Cheka or organise it better" we reply, comrades, by saying that we do not claim that everything we are doing is of the best and we are ready and willing to learn without the slightest bias. But as those people who were in the Constituent Assembly want to teach us how to organise a security force against sons of landowners, against whiteguard officers, we tell them, "You were in power and fought with Kerensky against Kornilov, and you were with Kolchak, and those same whiteguards kicked you out like little children without a struggle. And after that you still say that our Cheka is badly organised!" (*Applause.*) Oh, no, our Cheka is magnificently organised. (*Applause.*) And when the conspirators in Germany now mistreat workers, when officers led by Field Marshals over there shout "Down with the Berlin government", when, over there, they can murder Communist leaders with impunity and when a crowd of whiteguards treats leaders of the Second International like children, we see clearly that this collaborationist government is nothing more than a plaything in the hands of the group of plotters. When we have this example before us, when we

are only just stepping out on to the road, these people say "You have exaggerated terror". How many weeks is it since we discovered the conspiracy in Petrograd?[74] How many weeks is it since Yudenich was a few versts from Petrograd and Denikin a few versts from Orel? Spokesmen of those wavering parties and of that wavering democracy say to us "We are glad that Yudenich and Kolchak have been defeated". I am quite willing to believe that they are glad because they know what Yudenich and Kolchak had in store for them. (*Applause.*) I do not suspect these people of insincerity. But I ask them: when the Soviet government is experiencing a difficult period and plots are being hatched by bourgeois elements and when at a critical moment we manage to lay bare these plots—do they think they are discovered accidentally? Oh, no, not accidentally. They are discovered because the plotters live among the masses, because they cannot succeed in their plots without the workers and peasants and it is there that, in the long run, they run up against people who go to that badly organised, as they said here, Cheka and say that exploiters are gathered in a certain place. (*Applause.*) And when some people come to us a short time after we have been in mortal danger and when we are faced with a conspiracy that is obvious to everyone, and tell us that the Constitution is not being observed and that the Cheka is badly organised, one may say that they have not learned any politics during the struggle against the whiteguards, they have not given any thought to their experience of Kerensky, Yudenich and Kolchak and have not been able to draw any practical conclusions from it. But since, gentlemen, you are beginning to understand that Kolchak and Denikin constitute a serious danger, that you must choose in favour of Soviet power, it is time for you to drop Martov's declaration "for all eternity". (*Laughter.*) The Constitution contains all the experience of our two years of rule, and without that rule, as I said in my speech, and nobody even tried to refute it, without it we could not have held out for two months, let alone two years. Let anyone who wishes to be at all objective about Soviet power, if only from the standpoint of an historian and not of a politician who wishes to talk to the working-class masses, act with them and influence them—let him try to refute that.

It is said that the Soviets meet rarely and are not re-elected often enough. It seems to me that such reproaches should not be answered by speeches and resolutions but by deeds. In my opinion the best answer would be for you to finish the work begun by the Soviet government of assessing how many elections to uyezd and urban Soviets there have been, how many congresses of Soviets, etc. Comrade Vladimirsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, has published material on the history of those congresses. When I saw that material I said that this is historical material that proves, among other things, that there has never been in the history of civilised nations a country that has applied proletarian democracy as widely as we have in Russia. It is said that Soviets are not re-elected often enough, that we rarely convene congresses, but I invite every delegate to apply to the relevant bodies for additional questionnaires to be distributed at this Congress on which every delegate can record on which day, month and year and in which uyezd, town or village congresses of Soviets met. If you do this simple job and each of you fills in a questionnaire of that sort you will obtain material to complement our incomplete data and which will show that in a time as difficult as war-time, when the century-old European constitutions that have become a matter of habit for the West-European people have been almost completely suspended, the Soviet Constitution is in force in the localities to a greater degree than a constitution anywhere else in the world insofar as concerns the participation of the masses in government and in the independent solution of government matters at congresses, in the Soviets and at elections. And if it is still said that this is not enough, and if there is criticism and it is asserted that "it is really a terrible crime if your Central Executive Committee has not met", well, Comrade Trotsky gave a splendid answer to the Bund representative on this score when he said that the Central Executive Committee was at the front. The representative of the Bund—that Bund which upholds the Soviet platform and for that reason might really be expected at long last to understand what the foundation of Soviet power is—said this (I wrote it down), "How strange that the Central Executive Committee was at the front, it could have sent others."

We are fighting against Kolchak, Denikin and the others—there have been a lot of them! It ends with Russian troops chasing them away like children. We are conducting a difficult and victorious war. You know that with every invasion we had to send all the members of the Central Executive Committee to the front and then we are told "How strange, they should have found others". Were we functioning outside time and space, or what? Or are we supposed to give birth to Communists (*applause*) at the rate of a few every week? That is something we cannot do; workers who have been tempered by several years of struggle and who have acquired the necessary experience to be able to lead are fewer in our country than in any other. We have to adopt all measures to train young workers, trainees, and that will take several months, years even. And when this is taking place under very difficult circumstances, we are treated to grins for our trouble. These grins only prove a complete failure to understand these conditions. It is really a ridiculous intellectualist lack of understanding, when we are compelled in these war conditions to act differently from the way we have acted up to now. We have to strain our forces to the utmost and for this reason have to give up our best officials and Central and local Executive Committee members for the front. I am sure that nobody who has any practical experience in administration will condemn us; he will, on the contrary, approve of our having done the maximum possible to reduce collegiate bodies belonging to executive committees to a minimum until, under pressure of war, only the executive committee itself was left, because the functionaries hurried to the front in the same way as they are now rushing in hundreds and thousands to engage in fuel supply work. That is the foundation without which the Soviet Republic cannot exist. And if the less frequent meetings of the Soviets for a few months is the price at which this has to be purchased, then any sensible worker or peasant will understand the need for it and will approve of it.

I have said that in respect of democracy and the democrats we are still being offered the prejudices of bourgeois democracy in their entirety. An opposition party has said here that the suppression of the bourgeoisie must be stopped. One should think of what one is saying. What does the suppression

of the bourgeoisie mean? The landowner could be suppressed and destroyed by abolishing landed proprietorship and transferring the land to the peasants. But can the bourgeoisie be suppressed and destroyed by the abolition of big capital? Anyone who knows the ABC of Marxism knows that the bourgeoisie cannot be suppressed in this way, knows that the bourgeoisie is born of commodity production; the peasant who has a surplus of hundreds of poods of grain that he does not need for his family and does not deliver to the workers' state as a loan to help the hungry worker, and profiteers under the prevailing conditions of commodity production—what is he? Is he not a bourgeois? Is the bourgeoisie not born in this way? On this issue, the grain issue, and on the question of the torments of hunger being suffered by all industrial Russia, do we get any assistance from those who reproach us with not observing the Constitution, with having suppressed the bourgeoisie? No! Do they help us in this respect? They hide behind the words "concord of the workers and peasants". That concord, of course, is necessary. We showed how we achieve it on October 26, 1917, when we took that part of the programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries which supports the peasants and put it into operation in full. In that way we showed that the peasant who had been exploited by the landowners, who lives by his own labour and does not profiteer, finds a true protector in the worker sent to him by the central state authority. In this way we have effected concord with the peasants. When we pursue a food policy requiring that surplus grain not needed by the peasant family be given to the workers as a state loan, any objection to it supports profiteering. This still exists among the petty-bourgeois masses who are accustomed to living in the bourgeois way. This is a terrible thing, this is a danger to the social revolution! Have the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries ever done anything to help us in this respect, even the most Left of them? No, they never have! And their publications, that we are supposed to permit for the sake of "principles of liberty" and samples of which we have in our possession, show that they never by a single word—to say nothing of deeds—do anything to help us. Until we have fully conquered the old habit, the accursed old gospel of everyone for himself and God for all, we have no

alternative but to requisition grain surpluses as a loan to the hungry workers. It is terribly difficult to do this—we know that. Here nothing can be accomplished by force. Nevertheless it is ridiculous to say that we represent a minority of the working class—that can only make one laugh. That could be said in Paris, although workers' meetings there would not listen to such statements either. In a country where the government has been overthrown with unusual ease, where the workers and peasants are defending their own interests arms in hand, where they employ the rifle as the instrument of their will—to say in such a country that we represent a minority of the working class is absurd. I can understand such statements on the lips of Clemenceau, Lloyd George or Wilson. They are their words and their ideas! But when the speeches of Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George, the worst of the predators, the wild beasts of imperialism, are repeated here by Martov in the name of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (*laughter*), then I say to myself that we have to be on the alert and to realise that the Cheka is indispensable! (*Applause.*)

All the opposition speakers, the Bund representatives included, accuse us of not abiding by the Constitution. I maintain that we observe the Constitution most strictly. (*Voice from a box*: "Oho!") And although I hear an ironic "Oho!" from a box that was once the royal box and is now the opposition box (*laughter*) I shall nevertheless prove it. (*Applause.*) I will read to you the article of the Constitution that we observe most strictly and which shows that in all our activities we stick to the Constitution. Whenever I have had to speak about the Constitution at meetings attended by followers of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries there has always been difficulty in finding the text of the Constitution to quote. The meetings, however, were mostly held in halls where there was a Constitution hanging on the wall. In this hall there is none, but Comrade Petrovsky has saved the situation by lending me a pamphlet entitled *Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.* I shall read Article 23: "Guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the R.S.F.S.R. deprives certain persons and certain groups of rights they use to the detriment of the interests of the socialist revolution."

I say once again, comrades, that we have never regarded our activity in general and our Constitution in particular us models of perfection. The question of changes to the Constitution has been raised at this Congress. We agree to make changes, let us take a look at the changes; they will not, however, remain constant "for all eternity". If you still want to fight, let it be a clean fight. If you want us to abide by the Constitution, why don't you want us to abide by Article 23? (*Applause.*) If this is not what you want, then let us discuss whether it is necessary to annul the article which says we should not go to the people with talk about universal freedom and the universal equality of the working people. You have made an excellent study of constitutional law, but you have learned from old bourgeois textbooks. You recall words about "democracy and freedom", you refer to the Constitution and you recall former words, and you promise the people everything in order not to fulfil that promise. We do not promise anything of the sort, we do not propose equality of workers and peasants. You do, so let's dispute the issue. There shall be complete equality, friendship and a fraternal alliance with those peasants who were exploited by the landowners and capitalists and who are now working to support their families on land taken from the landowners. We shall not, however, grant equality to those peasants who, because of their old habits, ignorance and avarice, are pulling back towards the bourgeoisie. You use general phrases about freedom and equality for the working people, about democracy and about the equality of workers and peasants. We do not promise that the Constitution will guarantee liberty and equality in general. Freedom—but for which class and for what purpose? Equality—who shall be equal to whom? For those who labour, who were exploited for dozens and hundreds of years by the bourgeoisie and who are now fighting against the bourgeoisie? It is so stated in the Constitution: "The dictatorship of the workers and poor peasants for the suppression of the bourgeoisie." When you speak about the Constitution, why don't you quote those words: "for the suppression of the bourgeoisie, for the suppression of the profiteers"? Show us a model country, a model of your splendid Menshevik constitution. Perhaps you will find such a model in the history, say, of Samara, where the

Mensheviks were in power. Perhaps you will find it in Georgia where the Mensheviks are in power today, where the suppression of the bourgeoisie, the profiteers, is proceeding under conditions of complete freedom and equality, under conditions of consistent democracy and without a Cheka. Show us such a model and we shall learn from it. You cannot, however, demonstrate such a model for you know that in all places where the collaborationists hold power, where the government is Menshevik or semi-Menshevik, feverish, unhampered speculation reigns. And the Vienna that Trotsky justly spoke about in his speech, where people like Friedrich Adler are in the government and which does not know "the horrors of Bolshevism", is as hungry and tormented as Petrograd and Moscow, but without the knowledge that the Viennese workers at the cost of hunger are breaking a road to victory over the bourgeoisie. Vienna is suffering more from hunger than Petrograd or Moscow and right there the Austrian and Viennese bourgeoisie are committing monstrous acts of speculation and plunder in the Viennese streets, in the Nevsky Prospekt and Kuznetsky Most* of Vienna. You do not abide by the Constitution, but we do when we recognise freedom and equality only for those who help the proletariat defeat the bourgeoisie. And in Article 23 we say that the land will not flow with milk and honey during the transition period. We say that we have to hold out, not for months, but for years, in order to complete the transition period. After two years we can say (and we shall most likely be believed) that we are able to hold out for several years only because we have inscribed in the Constitution that certain persons and groups are deprived of rights. We do not conceal from whom we have taken away the rights, we say openly that it is the group of Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. The leaders of the Second International condemned us for this, but we say outright to the group of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries that we are ready to grant everything, but they must help us pursue the policy of the working people against the profiteers, against those who are helping food profiteering, those who are helping the bourgeoisie. Insofar

* Nevsky Prospekt and Kuznetsky Most were the shopping centres of pre-revolutionary Petrograd and Moscow respectively.—*Ed.*

as you prove this to us by deeds we shall free you from what has been done to you by the Constitution, but until then your empty words are mere evasion. Our Constitution is not noted for its rhetoric, it says to the peasants—if you are a labouring peasant you possess all rights, but there can be no equality of rights for all in a society in which workers are starving and where a fight against the bourgeoisie is under way. And it says to the workers—equality for those peasants who are helping in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, but no generalisations! In this field there will be a hard struggle. We accept with the greatest pleasure anyone who wants to help, irrespective of his past and irrespective of all titles. And we know that more and more such people are coming to us from other parties and from among the non-party people and this is a guarantee of our victory. (*Loud applause. Shouts of* "Bravo".)

3

SPEECH IN THE ORGANISATION SECTION[75]
DECEMBER 8

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Comrades, I have received a number of notes from delegates asking me to speak on this issue. I did not think there was any need for it, and I refrained from speaking until I received these invitations because I unfortunately have had no opportunity of acquiring a practical knowledge of work in the localities and it stands to reason that the knowledge obtained through work in the Council of People's Commissars is insufficient. I am, furthermore, in complete agreement with what Comrade Trotsky has said and shall, therefore, confine myself to some brief comments.

When the question was raised in the Council of People's Commissars of the state farms and their transfer to gubernia land departments, and when the question of chief administrations and central boards was raised, there was no doubt in my mind that there are more than a few counter-revolutionary elements in both types of institution. But when attempts are made to accuse the state farms of being particularly counter-revolutionary institutions it has always seemed to me, and still does, that it is missing the mark, for neither the state farms, nor the chief administrations and central boards, nor any kind of big industrial establishment, or, in general, any central or local organisation administering a branch of economy of any importance, can and does manage without solving the problem of the employment of bourgeois specialists. It seems to me that attacks on the chief administrations and boards, though fully justified because a thorough purge of them is needed, are nevertheless mistaken, because in the present case this type of institution is chosen

indiscriminately from a number of similar institutions. It is, however, as clear as daylight from the work of the Economic Council that on no account must the chief administrations and boards and the state farms be specially selected in this matter because all our Soviet work, whether in the military field, or in the health services, or in education, has everywhere been up against, and is still up against, problems of this sort. We cannot recast the state apparatus and train a sufficient number of workers and peasants to make them fully acquainted with the government of the state without the aid of the old specialists. This is the main lesson to be learned from all our organisational work, and this experience tells us that in all spheres, including the military sphere, the old specialists—they are called old because of this—cannot be taken from anywhere except from capitalist society. That society made possible the training of specialists from far too narrow strata of the population, those that belonged to the families of landowners and capitalists, with only an insignificant number of peasant origin and only from among the wealthy peasants at that. If, therefore, we take into consideration the situation in which those people grew up and that in which they are now working, it is absolutely inevitable that these specialists, i.e., those skilled in administration on a broad, national scale, are to nine-tenths permeated with old bourgeois views and prejudices and even in those cases when they are not downright traitors (and this is not something that happens occasionally but is a regular feature), even then they are not capable of understanding the new conditions, the new tasks and the new requirements. On these grounds friction, failures and disorder are apparent everywhere, in all commissariats.

It seems to me, therefore, that people are missing the mark when they shout about reactionaries in the state farms, chief administrations and boards, attempting to separate this question from the general one of how to teach a large number of workers and peasants to administrate on a broad national scale. We are doing this at a speed that, if you take into consideration the backwardness of the country and the difficulty of our conditions, is certainly unknown in world history. No matter how great that speed is, it still does not satisfy us, because our requirements in workers and peasants

capable of administrative work and acquainted with special branches of administration are tremendous and are not being met even ten, even one per cent. When we are told, or when it is demonstrated at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, that the state farms everywhere are hiding-places for old landowners who are slightly disguised or are not disguised at all, that nests of the bureaucracy are being built there, and that similar things are often to be observed in chief administrations and central boards, I never doubt that it is true. But I did say that if you think you can remedy this evil by handing the state farms over to the gubernia land departments you are mistaken.

Why are there more counter-revolutionary elements left in the chief administrations and central boards and in the state farms than there are in the army? Why are there fewer of them among the military? Because greater attention was, on the whole, paid to the military sphere and more Communists, more workers and peasants were sent there, political departments worked on a broader scale there, in short, the influence of advanced workers and peasants on the entire military apparatus was broader, more profound and more regular. Owing to this we have succeeded, if not in eradicating the evil, at least in being close to eradicating it. To this, I say, the greatest attention should be paid.

We are taking only the first steps towards getting the state farms in close contact with the neighbouring peasants and with communist groups so that there will be commissars everywhere, not only in the army and not only on paper. No matter whether they will be called members of a collegium, assistant managers or commissars, there must be individual responsibility—this and individual management are as necessary as collectivism is essential in discussing basic questions if there is to be no red tape and no opportunity to evade responsibility. We need people who will learn to administer independently in all cases. If this is done we shall overcome the evil in the best manner.

I am in complete agreement, let me say in conclusion, with Comrade Trotsky when he says that here many incorrect attempts have been made to present our disputes as being between workers and peasants and that the question of the administrations and boards has been woven into the question

of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In my opinion this is radically wrong. The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat may be raised when the issue is that of suppressing the bourgeoisie. Then we have to think about this question, then we need the dictatorship because only through it can we suppress the bourgeoisie and place power in the hands of that section of the working people that is capable of acting unwaveringly and attracting to itself ever greater numbers of the vacillating. In the present case we are not faced with anything of the sort. We are discussing how much more or how much less centralism is needed in a certain field at a certain moment. Since the comrades from the localities assure us (and Comrade Trotsky and many people's commissars confirm it) that in recent times in the gubernias and, to a considerable degree, in the uyezds, functionaries of a higher type have appeared (I am constantly hearing such an assertion also from Comrade Kalinin who has visited many places, and from comrades arriving here from the provinces), we shall have to take that into consideration and ask ourselves whether the matter of centralism is rightly understood in the present instance. I am sure we shall have to undertake a very great deal of this sort of correcting in the work of Soviet institutions. We are only now beginning to acquire organisational experience in this field. Insofar as we can see this experience from inside the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars, it is quite obvious that it cannot be expressed by any figures and that it is impossible to talk about it in a short speech. We are sure, however, that in the localities work is being done in accordance with the general instructions of the central authorities. This has been achieved only in recent times.

This is by no means a question of a conflict between the dictatorship of the proletariat and other social elements. It is a matter of the experience of our Soviet organisational work, experience which, in my opinion, does not even concern the Constitution. Much has been said here about changes to the Constitution. But I do not think it has anything to do with this. The Constitution speaks of centralism as the basic principle. This basic principle is so indisputable for all of us (we all learned it from the impressive and even brutal object-lesson of Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin and guer-

rilla bands) that here it cannot come into question. Nor does Comrade Sapronov reject the basic principle of centralism when it is a matter of granting a people's commissar or the Council of People's Commissars the right to challenge a candidate. It is not a constitutional question but one of practical convenience. We have to bring pressure to bear, first in one, then in another direction, in order to achieve positive results. When we are talking about gubernia state farm boards, or gubernia land departments, the stress is on placing them under the control of workers and neighbouring peasants. This is irrespective of whom they are subordinated to. It seems to me that no changes to the Constitution will ever enable you to kick out the hidden landowners or the disguised capitalists and bourgeois. We must introduce into our institutions a sufficient number of workers and peasants who are loyal beyond all doubt and who have practical experience as members of small collegiums, as assistants to some managers or as commissars. That's the crux of the matter! In this way you will have an ever greater number of workers and peasants who are learning to administer, and if they go through a complete schooling side by side with the old specialists they will take their places, carry out the same tasks and will train for our civil business, for the management of industry, for the direction of economic activities, a corps of officers to replace the personnel in the same way as that is being done in our war department. Therefore, I do not think there is any reason to proceed from considerations of principle as has here sometimes been the case; we must examine the question as one of practical experience and not as a constitutional one. If the majority of local functionaries, after an all-round discussion of the problem, come to the conclusion that gubernia state farm boards should be subordinated to the gubernia land departments—so well and good, we'll experiment on those lines and then decide the issue from the point of view of practical experience. First of all, however, we have to decide whether we shall get rid of the disguised landowners in this way, whether we shall make better use of the specialists. Shall we in this way train a larger number of workers and peasants to take over the management themselves? Shall we be drawing the neighbouring peasantry into the practical check-up of the state farms?

Shall we be elaborating practical forms for that check-up? That is what really matters! If we solve these problems I do not think we shall have wasted our time and our labour. Let us try different systems in the different people's commissariats; let us establish one system for state farms, chief administrations and central boards and another for the army or the Commissariat of Health. Our job is to attract, by way of experiment, large numbers of specialists, then replace them by training a new officers' corps, a new body of specialists who will have to learn the extremely difficult, new and complicated business of administration. The forms this will take will not necessarily be identical. Comrade Trotsky was quite right in saying that this is not written in any of the books we might consider our guides, it does not follow from any socialist world outlook, it has not been determined by anybody's experience but will have to be determined by our own experience. It seems to me that in this respect we must pool experience of communist organisation and test it by its practical implementation, so that we shall fully determine how we must tackle the problems that confront us.

4

SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE CLOSING OF THE CONGRESS DECEMBER 9

(*Prolonged applause. Delegates and visitors rise and applaud stormily for several minutes.*) Comrades, I should like to say a few words apropos of the most important items we have dealt with at this Congress.

We had a brief discussion, comrades, on the question of democracy and Soviet power. Although it may seem at first glance that this discussion was far removed from the burning, practical, day-to-day problems of the Soviet Republic, I nevertheless think that it was far from useless. Comrades, in workers' organisations throughout the world and very often in bourgeois parliaments, and, in any case, during elections to bourgeois parliaments, there is today the same basic discussion on democracy—which, although many people do not realise it, is the old bourgeois democracy —and on the new, Soviet, power. Old or bourgeois democracy proclaims freedom and equality, equality irrespective of whether a person owns anything or not, irrespective of whether he is the owner of capital or not; it proclaims freedom for private owners to dispose of land and capital and freedom for those who have neither to sell their workers' hands to a capitalist.

Comrades, our Soviet power has made a determined break with that freedom and that equality which is a lie (*applause*) and has said to the working people that socialists who understand freedom and equality in the bourgeois way have forgotten the germ, the ABC and all the content of socialism. We, and all the socialists who have not yet betrayed socialism,

have always exposed the lies, fraud and hypocrisy of bourgeois society that talk about freedom and equality, or, at any rate, about the freedom and equality of elections, although actually the power of the capitalists, the private ownership of land and factories, predetermines not freedom but the oppression and deception of the working people under every possible kind of "democratic and republican" system.

We say that our aim, being the aim of world socialism, is the abolition of classes and that classes are groups of people, one of which lives by the labour of another, one of which appropriates the labour of another. And so, if we are to speak of that freedom and that equality we shall have to admit, as most of the working people in Russia do, that no other country has as yet given as much in such a short time for real freedom and real equality, no other country has, in such a short time, given the working people freedom from the main class that oppresses them, the class of landowners and capitalists, and no other country has granted such equality in respect of the chief means of subsistence, the land. It is along this road, that of emancipation from the exploiting bourgeois classes up to the complete abolition of the classes, that we have begun and are continuing a resolute struggle for the complete abolition of classes. We know full well that those classes have been defeated but not destroyed. We know full well that the landowners and capitalists have been defeated but not destroyed. The class struggle continues, and the proletariat, together with the poor peasantry, must continue the struggle for the complete abolition of classes, attracting to their side all those who stand in the middle, and by their entire experience, their example of struggle they must ensure that all those who until now have stood in the ranks of the wavering are attracted to their side.

Comrades, going over to the business of our Congress, I must say that the Seventh Congress, is the first that has been able to devote a lot of time to the practical tasks of organisation, for the first time we have succeeded in making a start on a practical discussion, based directly on practical experience, of those tasks that concern the better organisation of Soviet economy and the better organisation of Soviet government.

We have, of course, had too little time to deal with this problem in great detail but we have, nevertheless, done a lot here, and all the further work of the Central Executive Committee and of the comrades in the localities will follow the lines laid down here.

In conclusion, comrades, I should like to make special mention of the way the present Congress is to become effective insofar as our international situation is concerned.

Comrades, we have here repeated our peace proposal to all the powers and countries of the Entente. We have here expressed confidence based on experience that is already very rich and of a very serious nature—our confidence that the main difficulties are behind us and that we are undoubtedly emerging victorious from the war forced on us by the Entente, the war that we have been fighting for two years against an enemy considerably stronger than we are.

But I think, comrades, that the appeal we have just heard from a representative of our Red Army was nevertheless very timely. If the main difficulties have been left behind, comrades, we have to admit that ahead of us, too, organisational tasks are developing on an extremely broad scale. There can be no doubt that there are still very influential and very strong capitalist groups, groups that are obviously dominant in many countries and that have decided to continue the war against Soviet Russia to the end, cost what it may. There can be no doubt that now we have achieved a certain decisive victory we shall have to devote additional efforts, we shall have to bend still greater effort in order to exploit that victory and carry it through to the end. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, there are two things you must not forget—first, our general weakness connected, perhaps, with the Slav character—we are not stable enough, not persistent enough in pursuing the aims we set ourselves—and secondly, experience has shown, once in the East and again in the South, that in a decisive moment we were unable to press hard enough on a fleeing enemy and have allowed him to rise to his feet again. There can be not a shadow of doubt that governments and the military classes of Western Europe are now drawing up new plans to save Denikin. There cannot be the slightest doubt that they will try to increase tenfold the

aid they have been giving him because they realise how great is the danger threatening him from Soviet Russia. We must, therefore, tell ourselves at a time when the victories are beginning, as we did in times of difficulty, "Comrades, remember that it may now depend on a few weeks or perhaps two or three months whether we end this war, not merely with a decisive victory, but with the complete destruction of the enemy, or whether we shall condemn tens and hundreds of thousands of people to a lengthy and tormenting war. On the basis of the experience we have acquired we can now say with full confidence that if we can redouble our efforts the possibility of not only achieving a final victory, but also of destroying the enemy and gaining for ourselves a durable and lengthy peace depends on a few weeks or on two or three months...."

Therefore, comrades, I should like more than anything to ask each of you on arriving in your locality to present this question to every Party organisation, to every Soviet institution and to every meeting of workers and peasants—comrades, this winter campaign will most certainly lead to the complete destruction of the enemy if we, encouraged by success and by the clear prospects for Soviet development that now open up before us, regard the forthcoming weeks and months as a period of hard work in which we must redouble our war effort and other work connected with it, and we shall then in the shortest time destroy the enemy, and put an end to the Civil War, which will open up before us the possibility for peaceful socialist construction for a long time. (*Applause.*)

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The symposium issued by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *A Year of the Russian Revolution. 1917-18* (Moscow, Zemlya i Volya Publishers, 1918), contains an extremely interesting article by N. V. Svyatitsky: "Results of the All-Russia Constituent Assembly Elections (Preface)". The author gives the returns for 54 constituencies out of the total of 79.

The author's survey covers nearly all the gubernias of European Russia and Siberia, only the following being omitted: Olonets, Estonian, Kaluga, Bessarabian, Podolsk, Orenburg, Yakut and Don gubernias.

First of all I shall quote the main returns published by N. V. Svyatitsky and then discuss the political conclusions to be drawn from them.

I

The total number of votes polled in the 54 constituencies in November 1917 was 36,262,560. The author gives the figure of 36,257,960, distributed over seven regions (plus the Army and Navy), but the figures he gives for the various parties total up to what I give.

The distribution of the votes according to parties is as follows: the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries polled 16.5 million votes; if we add the votes polled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries of the other nations (Ukrainians, Moslems,

and others), the total will be 20.9 million, i.e., 58 per cent.

The Mensheviks polled 668,064 votes, but if we add the votes polled by the analogous groups of Popular Socialists (312,000), *Yedinstvo* (25,000), Co-operators (51,000), Ukrainian Social-Democrats (95,000), Ukrainian socialists (507,000), German socialists (44,000) and Finnish socialists (14,000), the total will be 1.7 million.

The Bolsheviks polled 9,023,963 votes.

The Cadets polled 1,856,639 votes. By adding the Association of Rural Proprietors and Landowners (215,000), the Right groups (292,000), Old Believers (73,000), nationalists—Jews (550,000), Moslems (576,000), Bashkirs (195,000), Letts (67,000), Poles (155,000), Cossacks (79,000), Germans (130,000), Byelorussians (12,000)—and the "lists of various groups and organisations" (418,000), we get a total for the landowning and bourgeois parties of 4.6 million.

We know that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks formed a bloc during the whole period of the revolution from February to October 1917. Moreover, the entire development of events during that period and after it showed definitely that those two parties together represent petty-bourgeois democracy, which mistakenly imagines it is, and calls itself, socialist, like all the parties of the Second International.

Uniting the three main groups of parties in the Constituent Assembly elections, we get the following total:

Party of the Proletariat (Bolsheviks)	9.02	million	= 25	per cent
Petty-Bourgeois democratic parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc.)	22.62	"	= 62	"
Parties of landowners and bourgeoisie (Cadets, etc.)	4.62	"	= 13	"
Total	36.26	million	= 100	per cent

Here are N. V. Svyatitsky's returns by regions.

Votes Polled (thousands)

Regions* (and armed forces separately)	S.R.s (Russian)	Per cent	Bolsheviks	Per cent	Cadets	Per cent	*Total*
Northern	1,140.0	38	1,172.2	40	393.0	13	2,975.1
Central-Industrial.	1,987.9	38	2,305.6	44	550.2	10	5,242.5
Volga-Black Earth.	4,733.9	70	1,115.6	16	267.0	4	6,764.3
Western	1,242.1	43	1,282.2	44	48.1	2	2,961.0
East-Urals . . .	1,547.7	43(62)**	443.9	12	181.3	5	3,583.5
Siberia	2,094.8	75	273.9	10	87.5	3	2,786.7
The Ukraine . . .	1,878.1	25(77)***	754.0	10	277.5	4	7,581.3
Army and Navy. .	1,885.1	43	1,671.3	38	51.9	1	4,363.6

From these figures it is evident that during the Constituent Assembly elections the Bolsheviks were the party of the proletariat and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party of the peasantry. In the purely peasant districts, Great-Russian (Volga-Black Earth, Siberia, East-Urals) and Ukrainian, the Socialist-Revolutionaries polled 62-77 per cent. In the industrial centres the Bolsheviks had a majority over the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This majority is understated in the district figures given by N. V. Svyatitsky, for he combined the most highly industrialised districts with little industrialised and non-industrial areas. For example, the gubernia figures of the votes polled by the Socialist-Revolutionary, Bolshevik, and Cadet parties, and by the "national and other groups", show the following:

In the Northern Region the Bolshevik majority seems to be insignificant: 40 per cent against 38 per cent. But in this region non-industrial areas (Archangel, Vologda, Novgorod and Pskov gubernias), where the Socialist-Revolutionaries predominate, are combined with industrial areas:

* The author divides Russia into districts in a rather unusual way: *Northern*: Archangel, Vologda, Petrograd, Novgorod, Pskov, Baltic. *Central-Industrial*: Vladimir, Kostroma, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ryazan, Tula, Tver Yaroslavl. *Volga-Black Earth*: Astrakhan, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel Penza Samara, Saratov, Simbirsk, Tambov. *Western*: Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev, Smolensk. *East-Urals*: Vyatka, Kazan, Perm, Ufa. *Siberia*: Tobolsk, Tomsk, Altai, Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, Transbaikal, Amur. *The Ukraine*: Volhynia, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, Poltava, Taurida, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov.

** Svyatitsky obtains the figure in brackets, 62 per cent, by adding the Moslem and Chuvash Socialist-Revolutionaries.

*** The figure in brackets, 77 per cent, is mine, obtained by adding the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Petrograd City—Bolsheviks 45 per cent (of the votes), Socialist-Revolutionaries 16 per cent; Petrograd Gubernia—Bolsheviks 50 per cent, Socialist-Revolutionaries 26 per cent; Baltic—Bolsheviks 72 per cent, Socialist-Revolutionaries—0.

In the Central-Industrial Region the Bolsheviks in Moscow Gubernia polled 56 per cent and the Socialist-Revolutionaries 25 per cent; in Moscow City the Bolsheviks polled 50 per cent and the Socialist-Revolutionaries 8 per cent; in Tver Gubernia the Bolsheviks polled 54 per cent and the Socialist-Revolutionaries 39 per cent; in Vladimir Gubernia the Bolsheviks polled 56 per cent and the Socialist-Revolutionaries 32 per cent.

Let us note, in passing, how ridiculous, in face of such facts, is the talk about the Bolsheviks having only a "minority" of the proletariat behind them! And we hear this talk from the Mensheviks (668,000 votes, and with Transcaucasia another 700,000-800,000, against 9,000,000 votes polled by the Bolsheviks), and also from the social-traitors of the Second International.

II

How could such a miracle have occurred? How could the Bolsheviks, who polled one-fourth of the votes, have won a victory over the petty-bourgeois democrats, who were in alliance (coalition) with the bourgeoisie, and who together with the bourgeoisie polled three-fourths of the votes?

To deny this victory now, after the Entente—the all-mighty Entente—has been helping the enemies of Bolshevism for two years, is simply ridiculous.

The point is that the fanatical political hatred of those who have been defeated, including all the supporters of the Second International, prevents them from even raising seriously the extremely interesting historical and political question of why the Bolsheviks were victorious. The point is that this is a "miracle" only from the standpoint of vulgar petty-bourgeois democracy, the abysmal ignorance and deep-rooted prejudices of which are exposed by this question and the answer to it.

From the standpoint of the class struggle and socialism, from that standpoint, which the Second International has abandoned, the answer to the question is indisputable.

The Bolsheviks were victorious, first of all, because they had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, which included the most class-conscious, energetic and revolutionary section, the real vanguard, of that advanced class.

Take the two metropolitan cities, Petrograd and Moscow. The total number of votes polled during the Constituent Assembly elections was 1,765,100, of which Socialist-Revolutionaries polled 218,000, Bolsheviks—837,000 and Cadets—515,400.

No matter how much the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves socialists and Social-Democrats (the Chernovs, Martovs, Kautskys, Longuets, MacDonalds and Co.) may beat their breasts and bow to the Goddesses of "equality", "universal suffrage", "democracy", "pure democracy", or "consistent democracy", it does not do away with the economic and political fact of the *inequality* of town and country.

That fact is inevitable under capitalism in general, and in the period of transition from capitalism to communism in particular.

The town cannot be equal to the country. The country cannot be equal to the town under the historical conditions of this epoch. The town inevitably *leads* the country. The country inevitably *follows the town*. The only question is which class, of the "urban" classes, will succeed in leading the country, will cope with this task, and what forms will *leadership by the town* assume?

In November 1917, the Bolsheviks had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat. By that time, the party which competed with the Bolsheviks among the proletariat, the Menshevik party, had been utterly defeated (9,000,000 votes against 1,400,000, if we add together 668,000 and 700,000-800,000 in Transcaucasia). Moreover, that party was defeated in the fifteen-year struggle (1903-17) which *steeled*, enlightened and organised the vanguard of the proletariat, and *forged* it into a genuine revolutionary vanguard. Furthermore, the first revolution, that of 1905, prepared the subsequent development, determined in a *practical* way the relations between-the two parties, and served as the general rehearsal of the great events of 1917-19.

The petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves socialists of the Second International are fond of dismissing this extremely important historical question with honeyed phrases about the benefits of proletarian "unity". When they use these honeyed phrases they forget the historical fact of the *accumulation of opportunism* in the working-class movement of 1871-1914; they forget (or do not want) to *think* about the causes of the collapse of opportunism in August 1914, about the causes of the split in international socialism in 1914-17.

Unless the *revolutionary* section of the proletariat is thoroughly prepared in every way for the expulsion and suppression of opportunism it is useless even thinking about the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is the lesson of the Russian revolution which should be taken to heart by the leaders of the "independent" German Social-Democrats,[76] French socialists, and so forth, who now want to evade the issue by means of verbal recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To continue. The Bolsheviks had behind them not only the majority of the proletariat, not only the *revolutionary* vanguard of the proletariat which had been steeled in the long and persevering struggle against opportunism; they had, if it is permissible to use a military term, a powerful "striking force" in the metropolitan cities.

An overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment—this "law" of military success is also the law of political success, especially in that fierce, seething class war which is called revolution.

Capitals, or, in general, big commercial and industrial centres (here in Russia the two coincided, but they do not everywhere coincide), to a considerable degree decide the political fate of a nation, provided, of course, the centres are supported by sufficient local, rural forces, even if that support does not come immediately.

In the two chief cities, in the two principal commercial and industrial centres of Russia, the Bolsheviks had an overwhelming, decisive superiority of forces. Here our forces were *nearly four times* as great as those of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. We had here *more than the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Cadets put together*. Moreover, our adver-

saries were split up, for the "coalition" of the Cadets with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks (in Petrograd and Moscow the Mensheviks polled only 3 per cent of the votes) was utterly discredited among the working people. Real unity between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and the Cadets against us was quite out of the question at that time.* It will be remembered that in November 1917, even the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who were a hundred times nearer to the idea of a bloc with the Cadets than the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik workers and peasants, even those leaders thought (and bargained with us) about a bloc with the Bolsheviks *without* the Cadets!

We were certain of winning Petrograd and Moscow in October-November 1917, for we had an overwhelming superiority of forces and the most thorough political preparation, insofar as concerns both the assembly, concentration, training, testing and battle-hardening of the Bolshevik "armies", and the disintegration, exhaustion, disunity and demoralisation of the "enemy's" "armies".

And being *certain* of winning the two metropolitan cities, the two centres of the capitalist state machine (economic and political), by a swift, decisive blow, we, in spite of the furious resistance of the bureaucracy and intelligentsia, despite sabotage, and so forth, were able with the aid of the central apparatus of state power to *prove by deeds* to the *non*-proletarian working people that the proletariat was their only reliable ally, friend and leader.

III

But before passing on to this most important question—that of the attitude of the proletariat towards the non-proletarian working people—we must deal with the *armed forces*.

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* It is interesting to note that the above figures also reveal the unity and solidarity of the party of the proletariat and the extremely fragmented state of the parties of the petty bourgeoisie and of the bourgeoisie.

The flower of the people's forces went to form the army during the imperialist war; the opportunist scoundrels of the Second International (not only the social-chauvinists, i.e., the Scheidemanns and Renaudels who directly went over to the side of "defence of the fatherland", but also the Centrists[77]) by their words and deeds strengthened the subordination of the armed forces to the leadership of the imperialist robbers of both the German and Anglo-French groups, but the real proletarian revolutionaries never forgot what Marx said in 1870: "The bourgeoisie will give the proletariat practice in arms!"[78] Only the Austro-German and Anglo-Franco-Russian betrayers of socialism could talk about "defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war, i.e., a war that was predatory on both sides; the proletarian revolutionaries, however (from August 1914 onwards), turned all their attention to revolutionising the armed forces, to utilising them *against* the imperialist robber bourgeoisie, to converting the unjust and predatory war between the two groups of imperialist predators into a just and legitimate war of the proletarians and oppressed working people in each country against "their own", "national" bourgeoisie.

During 1914-17 the betrayers of socialism *did not make preparations* to use the armed forces *against* the imperialist government of *each* nation.

The Bolsheviks prepared for this by the whole of their propaganda, agitation and underground organisational work from August 1914 onwards. Of course, the betrayers of socialism, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys of all nations, got out of this by talking about the *demoralisation* of the armed forces by Bolshevik agitation, but we are *proud* of the fact that we performed our duty in demoralising the forces of our class enemy, in winning away *from him* the armed masses of the workers and peasants *for the struggle* against the exploiters.

The results of our work were seen in, among other things, the votes polled in the Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917, in which, in Russia, the armed forces also participated.

The following are the principal results of the voting as given by N. V. Svyatitsky:

Number of Votes Polled in the Constituent Assembly Elections, November 1917
(thousands)

Army and Navy units	S.R.s	Bolsheviks	Cadets	National and other groups	*Total*
Northern Front	240.0	480.0	?	60.0**	780.0
Western "	180.6	653.4	16.7	125.2	976.0
South-Western "	402.9	300.1	13.7	290.6	1,007.4
Rumanian "	679.4	167.0	21.4	260.7	1,128.6
Caucasian "	360.4	60.0	?	—	420.0
Baltic Fleet	—	(120.0)*	—	—	(120.0)*
Black Sea Fleet	22.2	10.8	—	19.5	52.5
Total	1,885.1	1,671.3	51.8	756.0	4,364.5
		+(120.0)*	+?		+(120.0)*
		1,791.3			+?

Summary: the Socialist-Revolutionaries polled 1,885,100 votes; the Bolsheviks polled 1,671,300 votes. If to the latter we add the 120,000 votes (approximately) polled in the Baltic Fleet, the total votes polled by the Bolsheviks will be 1,791,300.

The Bolsheviks, therefore, polled *a little less* than the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

And so, by October-November 1917, the armed forces were *half Bolshevik*.

If that had not been the case we could not have been victorious.

We polled nearly half the votes of the armed forces as a whole, but had an overwhelming majority on the fronts *nearest to the metropolitan cities* and, in general, on those not too far away. If we leave out the Caucasian Front, the Bolsheviks obtained on the whole a majority over the Socialist-Revolutionaries. And if we take the Northern and Western fronts, the votes polled by the Bolsheviks will amount to *over one million*, compared with 420,000 votes polled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

* The figure is Approximate. Two Bolsheviks were elected. N. V. Svyatitsky counts an average of 60,000 votes per elected person. That is why I give the figure 120,000.

** No information is given as to which party polled 19,500 votes in the Black Sea Fleet. The other figures in this column evidently apply almost entirely to the Ukrainian socialists for 10 Ukrainian socialists and one Social-Democrat (i.e., a Menshevik) were elected.

Thus, in the armed forces, too, the Bolsheviks already had a *political "striking force"*, by November 1917, which ensured them an overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment. Resistance on the part of the armed forces to the October Revolution of the proletariat, to the winning of political power by the proletariat, was entirely out of the question, considering that the Bolsheviks had an enormous majority on the Northern and Western fronts, while on the other fronts, far removed from the centre, the Bolsheviks had the time and opportunity to *win the peasants away from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*. With this we shall deal later.

IV

On the basis of the returns of the Constituent Assembly elections we have studied the three conditions which determined the victory of Bolshevism: (1) an overwhelming majority among the proletariat; (2) almost half of the armed forces; (3) an overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive moment at the decisive points, namely: in Petrograd and Moscow and on the war fronts near the centre.

But these conditions could have ensured only a very short-lived and unstable victory had the Bolsheviks been unable to win to their side the majority of the *non-*proletarian working masses, to win them from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the other petty-bourgeois parties.

That is the main thing.

And the chief reason why the "socialists" (read: petty-bourgeois democrats) of the Second International fail to understand the dictatorship of the proletariat is that they fail to understand that

> *state power in the hands of one class, the proletariat, can and must become an instrument for winning to the side of the proletariat the non-proletarian working masses, an instrument for winning those masses from the bourgeoisie and from the petty-bourgeois parties.*

Filled with petty-bourgeois prejudices, forgetting the most important thing in the teachings of Marx about the state, the "socialists" of the Second International regard *state power* as something holy, as an idol, or as the result of formal voting, the absolute of "consistent democracy" (or what-

ever else they call this nonsense). They fail to see that state power is simply an *instrument* which *different* classes can and must use (and know how to use) *for their class aims*.

The bourgeoisie has used state power as an instrument of the capitalist class against the proletariat, against all the working people. That has been the case in the most democratic bourgeois republics. Only the betrayers of Marxism have "forgotten" this.

The proletariat must (after mustering sufficiently strong political and military "striking forces") overthrow the bourgeoisie, take state power from it in order to use that *instrument* for *its* class aims.

What are the class aims of the proletariat?

Suppress the resistance of the bourgeoisie;

Neutralise the peasantry and, if possible, win them over—at any rate the majority of the labouring, non-exploiting section—to the side of the proletariat;

Organise large-scale machine production, using factories, and means of production in general, expropriated from the bourgeoisie;

Organise socialism on the ruins of capitalism.

* * *

In mockery of the teachings of Marx, those gentlemen, the opportunists, including the Kautskyites, "teach" the people that the proletariat must first win a majority by means of universal suffrage, then obtain state power, by the vote of that majority, and only after that, on the basis of "consistent" (some call it "pure") democracy, organise socialism.

But we say on the basis of the teachings of Marx and the experience of the Russian revolution:

the proletariat must first overthrow the bourgeoisie and win *for itself* state power, and then use that state power, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an instrument of its class for the purpose of winning the sympathy of the majority of the working people.

* * *

How can state power in the hands of the proletariat become the instrument of its class struggle for influence over the non-proletarian working people, of the struggle to draw them to its side, to win them over, to wrest them from the bourgeoisie?

First, the proletariat achieves this *not* by putting into operation the old apparatus of state power, but by *smashing* it to pieces, levelling it with the ground (in spite of the howls of frightened philistines and the threats of saboteurs) and building a *new* state apparatus. That new state apparatus is adapted to the dictatorship of the proletariat and to its struggle against the bourgeoisie to *win* the non-proletarian working people. That new apparatus is not anybody's invention, it *grows* out of the proletarian class struggle as that struggle becomes more widespread and intense. That new apparatus of state power, the new *type* of state power, is *Soviet power*.

The Russian proletariat, immediately, a few hours after winning state power, proclaimed the dissolution of the old state apparatus (which, as Marx showed, had been for centuries adapted to serve the class interests of the bourgeoisie, even in the most democratic republic[79]) and transferred *all power to the Soviets*; and only the working and exploited people could enter the Soviets, all exploiters of every kind were excluded.

In that way the proletariat at once, at one stroke, immediately *after* it had taken state power, *won* from the bourgeoisie *the vast mass* of its supporters in the petty-bourgeois and "socialist" parties; for that mass, the working and exploited people who had been deceived by the bourgeoisie (and by its yes-men, the Chernovs, Kautskys, Martovs and Co.), *on obtaining Soviet power*, acquired, *for the first time*, an instrument of mass struggle for their interests against the bourgeoisie.

Secondly, the proletariat can, and must, at once, or at all events very quickly, win from the bourgeoisie and from petty-bourgeois democrats "*their*" *masses*, i.e., the masses which follow them—win them by *satisfying their most urgent economic needs in a revolutionary way by expropriating the landowners and the bourgeoisie*.

The bourgeoisie *cannot* do that, no matter how "mighty" its state power may be.

The proletariat *can* do that on the very next day after it has won state power, because for this it has both an apparatus (the Soviets) and economic means (the expropriation of the landowners and the bourgeoisie).

That is exactly how the Russian proletariat *won the peasantry* from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and won them literally *a few hours after* achieving state power; a few hours after the victory over the bourgeoisie in Petrograd, the victorious proletariat issued a "decree on land",[80] and in that decree it entirely, at once, with revolutionary swiftness, energy and devotion, *satisfied* all the most urgent economic needs of the *majority* of the peasants, it expropriated the landowners, entirely and without compensation.

To prove to the peasants that the proletarians did not want to steam-roller them, did not want to boss them, but to help them and be their friends, the victorious Bolsheviks did not put a *single word of their own* into that "decree on land", but copied it, word for word, from the peasant mandates (the most revolutionary of them, of course) which the *Socialist-Revolutionaries* had published in the *Socialist-Revolutionary* newspaper.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries fumed and raved, protested and howled that "the Bolsheviks had stolen their programme", but they were only laughed at for that; a fine party, indeed, which had to be defeated and driven from the government in order that everything in its programme that was revolutionary and of benefit to the working people could be carried out!

The traitors, blockheads and pedants of the Second International could never understand such dialectics; the proletariat cannot achieve victory if it does not win the majority of the population to its side. But to limit that winning to polling a majority of votes in an election *under the rule of the bourgeoisie*, or to make it the condition for it, is crass stupidity, or else sheer deception of the workers. In order to win the majority of the population to its side the proletariat must, in the first place, overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power; secondly, it must introduce Soviet power and completely smash the old state apparatus, whereby it immediately undermines the rule, prestige and influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the non-

proletarian working people. Thirdly, it must *entirely destroy* the influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the *majority* of the non-proletarian masses by satisfying *their* economic needs *in a revolutionary way at the expense of the exploiters*.

It is possible to do this, of course, only when capitalist development has reached a certain level. Failing that fundamental condition, the proletariat cannot develop into a separate class, nor can success be achieved in its prolonged training, education, instruction and trial in battle during long years of strikes and demonstrations when the opportunists are disgraced and expelled. Failing that fundamental condition, the centres will not play that economic and political role which enables the proletariat, after their capture, to lay hold of state power in its entirety, or more correctly, of its vital nerve, its core, its node. Failing that fundamental condition, there cannot be the kinship, closeness and bond between the position of the proletariat and that of the non-proletarian working people which (kinship, closeness and bond) are necessary for the proletariat to influence those masses, for its influence over them to be effective.

V

Let us proceed further.

The proletariat can win state power, establish the Soviet system, and satisfy the economic needs of the majority of the working people at the expense of the exploiters.

Is that sufficient for achieving complete and final victory? No, it is not.

The petty-bourgeois democrats, their chief present-day representatives, the "socialists" and "Social-Democrats", are suffering from illusions when they imagine that the working people are capable, under capitalism, of acquiring the high degree of class-consciousness, firmness of character, perception and wide political outlook that will enable them to decide, *merely by voting*, or at all events, to *decide in advance*, without long experience of struggle, that they will follow a particular class, or a particular party.

It is a mere illusion. It is a sentimental story invented by pedants and sentimental socialists of the Kautsky, Longuet and MacDonald type.

Capitalism would not be capitalism if it did not, on the one hand, condemn the *masses* to a downtrodden, crushed and terrified state of existence, to disunity (the countryside!) and ignorance, and if it (capitalism) did not, on the other hand, place in the hands of the bourgeoisie a gigantic apparatus of falsehood and deception to hoodwink the masses of workers and peasants, to stultify their minds, and so forth.

That is why only the proletariat can *lead the working people* out of capitalism to communism. It is no use thinking that the petty-bourgeois or semi-petty-bourgeois masses can decide in advance the extremely complicated political question: "to be with the working class or with the bourgeoisie". The *vacillation* of the non-proletarian sections of the working people is inevitable; and inevitable also is their own *practical experience*, which will enable them to *compare* leadership by the bourgeoisie with leadership by the proletariat.

This is the circumstance that is constantly lost sight of by those who worship "consistent democracy" and who imagine that extremely important political problems can be solved by voting. Such problems are actually solved by *civil war* if they are acute and aggravated by struggle, and the *experience* of the non-proletarian masses (primarily of the peasants), their experience of comparing the rule of the proletariat with the rule of the bourgeoisie, is of tremendous importance in that war.

The Constituent Assembly elections in Russia in November 1917, compared with the two-year Civil War of 1917-19, are highly instructive in this respect.

See which districts proved to be the least Bolshevik. First, the East-Urals and the Siberian where the Bolsheviks polled 12 per cent and 10 per cent of the votes respectively. Secondly, the Ukraine where the Bolsheviks polled 10 per cent of the votes. Of the other districts, the Bolsheviks polled the smallest percentage of votes in the peasant district of Great Russia, the Volga-Black Earth district, but even there the Bolsheviks polled 16 per cent of the votes.

It was precisely in the districts where the Bolsheviks polled the lowest percentage of votes in November 1917 that the counter-revolutionary movements, the revolts and the

organisation of counter-revolutionary forces had the greatest success. It was precisely in those districts that the rule of Kolchak and Denikin lasted for months and months.

The vacillation of the petty-bourgeois population was particularly marked in those districts where the influence of the proletariat is weakest. Vacillation was at first in favour of the Bolsheviks when they granted land and when the demobilised soldiers brought the news about peace; later—against the Bolsheviks when, to promote the international development of the revolution and to protect its centre in Russia, they agreed to sign the Treaty of Brest and thereby "offended" patriotic sentiments, the deepest of petty-bourgeois sentiments. The dictatorship of the proletariat was particularly displeasing to the peasants in those places where there were the largest stocks of surplus grain, when the Bolsheviks showed that they would strictly and firmly secure the transfer of those surplus stocks to the state at fixed prices. The peasants in the Urals, Siberia and the Ukraine turned to Kolchak and Denikin.

Further, the experience of Kolchak and Denikin "democracy", about which every hack writer in Kolchakia and Denikia shouted in every issue of the whiteguard newspapers, showed the peasants that phrases about democracy and about the "Constituent Assembly" serve only as a screen to conceal the dictatorship of the landowners and capitalists.

Another turn towards Bolshevism began and peasant revolts spread in the rear of Kolchak and Denikin. The peasants welcomed the Red troops as liberators.

In the long run, it was this vacillation of the peasantry, the main body of the petty-bourgeois working people, that decided the fate of Soviet rule and of the rule of Kolchak and Denikin. But this "long run" was preceded by a fairly lengthy period of severe struggle and painful trial, which have not ended in Russia after two years, have not ended precisely in Siberia and in the Ukraine. And there is no guarantee that they will end *completely* within, say, another year or so.

The supporters of "consistent" democracy have not given thought to the importance of this historic fact. They invented, and are still inventing, nursery tales about the proletariat under capitalism being able to "convince" the majority

of the working people and win them firmly to its side by voting. But reality shows that only in the course of a long and fierce struggle does the stern experience of the *vacillating* petty bourgeoisie *lead it* to the conclusion, after comparing the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the capitalists, that the former is better than the latter.

In theory, all socialists who have studied Marxism and are willing to take into account the lessons of the nineteenth-century political history of the advanced countries recognise that the *vacillation* of the petty bourgeoisie between the proletariat and the capitalist class is inevitable. The economic roots of this vacillation are clearly revealed by economic science, the truths of which have been repeated millions of times in the newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets issued by the socialists of the Second International.

But these people cannot apply those truths to the peculiar epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They substitute petty-bourgeois-democratic prejudices and illusions (about class "equality", about "consistent" or "pure' democracy, about solving great historic problems by voting, and so forth) for the class struggle. They will not understand that after capturing state power the proletariat does not thereby cease its *class struggle*, but continues it in a different form and by different means. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class struggle of the proletariat conducted with the aid of an instrument like state power, a class struggle, one of whose aims is to demonstrate to the non-proletarian sections of the working people by means of their long experience and a long list of practical examples that it is more to their advantage to side with the dictatorship of the proletariat than with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and that there can be no third course.

The returns of the Constituent Assembly elections held in November 1917 give us the main background to the picture of the development of the Civil War that has raged for two years since those elections. The main forces in that war were *already* clearly evident during the Constituent Assembly elections—the role of the "striking force" of the proletarian army, the role of the vacillating peasantry, and the role of the bourgeoisie were already apparent. In his article

N .V. Svyatitsky writes: "The Cadets were most successful in the same regions where the Bolsheviks were most successful—in the Northern and Central-Industrial regions" (p. 116). Naturally, in the most highly developed capitalist centres, the intermediary elements standing between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were the weakest. Naturally, in those centres, the class struggle was most acute. It was there that the main forces of the bourgeoisie were concentrated and there, only there, could the proletariat defeat the bourgeoisie. Only the proletariat could rout the bourgeoisie, and only after routing the bourgeoisie could the proletariat definitely win the sympathy and support of the petty-bourgeois strata of the population by using an instrument like state power.

If properly used, if correctly read, the returns of the Constituent Assembly elections reveal to us again and again the fundamental truths of the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle.

These returns, incidentally, also reveal the role and importance of the national question. Take the Ukraine. At the last conferences on the Ukrainian question some comrades accused the writer of these lines of giving too much "prominence" to the national question in the Ukraine. The returns of the Constituent Assembly elections show that in the Ukraine, as early as November 1917, the *Ukrainian* Socialist-Revolutionaries and socialists polled a majority (3.4 million votes + 0.5 = 3.9 million against 1.9 million polled by the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, out of a total poll in the whole of the Ukraine of 7.6 million votes). In the army on the South-Western and Rumanian fronts the Ukrainian socialists polled 30 per cent and 34 per cent of the total votes (the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries polled 40 per cent and 59 per cent).

Under these circumstances, to ignore the importance of the national question in the Ukraine—a sin of which Great Russians are often guilty (and of which the Jews are guilty perhaps only a little less often than the Great Russians)—is a great and dangerous mistake. The division between the Russian and Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries as early as 1917 could not have been accidental. As internationalists it is our duty, first, to combat very vigorously the survivals (sometimes unconscious) of Great-Russian imperialism and

chauvinism among "Russian" Communists; and secondly, it is our duty, precisely on the national question, which is a relatively minor one (for an internationalist the question of state frontiers is a secondary, if not a tenth-rate, question), to make concessions. There are other questions—the fundamental interests of the proletarian dictatorship; the interests of the unity and discipline of the Red Army which is fighting Denikin; the leading role of the proletariat in relation to the peasantry—that are more important; the question whether the Ukraine will be a separate state is far less important. We must not be in the least surprised, or frightened, even by the prospect of the Ukrainian workers and peasants trying out different systems, and in the course of, say, several years, testing by practice union with the R.S.F.S.R., or seceding from the latter and forming an independent Ukrainian S.S.R., or various forms of their close alliance, and so on, and so forth.

To attempt to settle this question in advance, once and for all, "firmly" and "irrevocably", would be narrow-mindedness or sheer stupidity, for the vacillation of the non-proletarian working people on *such* a question is quite natural, even inevitable, but not in the least frightful for the proletariat. It is the duty of the proletarian who is really capable of being an internationalist to treat *such* vacillation with the greatest caution and tolerance, it is his duty to leave it to the non-proletarian masses *themselves* to *get rid* of this vacillation as a result of their own experience. We must be intolerant and ruthless, uncompromising and inflexible on other, more fundamental questions, some of which I have already pointed to above.

VI

The comparison of the Constituent Assembly elections in November 1917 with the development of the proletarian revolution in Russia from October 1917 to December 1919 enables us to draw conclusions concerning bourgeois parliamentarism and the proletarian revolution in every capitalist country. Let me try briefly to formulate, or at least to outline, the principal conclusions.

1. Universal suffrage is an index of the level reached by the various classes in their understanding of their problems.

It shows how the various classes are *inclined* to solve their problems. The actual *solution* of those problems is not provided by voting, but by the class struggle in all its forms including civil war.

2. The socialists and Social-Democrats of the Second International take the stand of vulgar petty-bourgeois democrats and share the prejudice that the fundamental problems of the class struggle can be solved by voting.

3. The party of the revolutionary proletariat must take part in bourgeois parliaments in order to enlighten the masses; this can be done during elections and in the struggle between parties in parliament. But limiting the class struggle to the parliamentary struggle, or regarding the latter as the highest and decisive form, to which all the other forms of struggle are subordinate, is actually desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.

4. All the representatives and supporters of the Second International, and all the leaders of the German, so-called "independent", Social-Democratic Party, actually go over to the bourgeoisie in this way when they recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat in words, but in deeds, by their propaganda, imbue the proletariat with the idea that it must first obtain a formal expression of the will of the majority of the population under capitalism (i.e., a majority of votes in the bourgeois parliament) to transfer political power to the proletariat, which transfer is to take place later.

All the cries, based on this premise, of the German "independent" Social-Democrats and similar leaders of decayed socialism against the "dictatorship of a minority", and so forth, merely indicate that those leaders fail to understand the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, which actually reigns even in the most democratic republics, and that they fail to understand the conditions for its destruction by the class struggle of the proletariat.

5. This failure to understand consists, in particular, in the following: they forget that, to a very large degree, the bourgeois parties are able to rule because they deceive the masses of the people, because of the yoke of capital, and to this is added self-deception concerning the nature of capitalism, a self-deception which is characteristic mostly

of the petty-bourgeois parties, which usually want to substitute more or less disguised forms of class conciliation for the class struggle.

"First let the majority of the population, while private property still exists, i.e., while the rule and yoke of capital still exist, express themselves in favour of the party of the proletariat and only then can and should the party take power"—so say the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves socialists but who are in reality the servitors of the bourgeoisie.

"Let the revolutionary proletariat first overthrow the bourgeoisie, break the yoke of capital, and smash the bourgeois state apparatus, then the victorious proletariat will be able rapidly to gain the sympathy and support of the majority of the non-proletarian working people by satisfying their needs at the expense of the exploiters"—say we. The opposite will be rare exception in history (and even in such an exception the bourgeoisie can resort to civil war, as the example of Finland showed[81]).

6. Or in other words:

"First we shall pledge ourselves to recognise the principle of equality, or consistent democracy, while preserving private property and the yoke of capital (i.e., actual inequality under formal equality), and try to obtain the decision of the majority on this basis"—say the bourgeoisie and their yes-men, the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves socialists and Social-Democrats.

"First the proletarian class struggle, winning state power, will destroy the pillars and foundations of actual inequality, and then the proletariat, which has defeated the exploiters, will lead all working people to the *abolition of classes*, i.e., to socialist *equality*, the only kind that is not a deception"—say we.

7. In all capitalist countries, besides the proletariat, or that part of the proletariat which is conscious of its revolutionary aims and is capable of fighting to achieve them, there are numerous politically immature proletarian, semi-proletarian, semi-petty-bourgeois strata which follow the bourgeoisie and bourgeois democracy (including the "socialists" of the Second International) because they have been deceived, have no confidence in their own strength, or

in the strength of the proletariat, are unaware of the possibility of having their urgent needs satisfied by means of the expropriation of the exploiters.

These strata of the working and exploited people provide the vanguard of the proletariat with allies and give it a stable majority of the population; but the proletariat can win these allies only with the aid of an instrument like state power, that is to say, only after it has overthrown the bourgeoisie and has destroyed the bourgeois state apparatus.

8. The strength of the proletariat in any capitalist country is far greater than the proportion it represents of the total population. That is because the proletariat economically dominates the centre and nerve of the entire economic system of capitalism, and also because the proletariat expresses economically and politically the real interests of the overwhelming majority of the working people under capitalism.

Therefore, the proletariat, even when it constitutes a minority of the population (or when the class-conscious and really revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat constitutes a minority of the population), is capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and, after that, of winning to its side numerous allies from a mass of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeoisie who never declare in advance in favour of the rule of the proletariat, who do not understand the conditions and aims of that rule, and only by their subsequent experience become convinced that the proletarian dictatorship is inevitable, proper and legitimate.

9. Finally, in every capitalist country there are always very broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie which inevitably vacillate between capital and labour. To achieve victory, the proletariat must, first, choose the right moment for its decisive assault on the bourgeoisie, taking into account, among other things, the disunity between the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois allies, or the instability of their alliance, and so forth. Secondly, the proletariat must, after its victory, utilise this vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie in such a way as to neutralise them, prevent their siding with the exploiters; it must be able to hold on for some time *in spite of this vacillation*, and so on, and so forth.

10. One of the necessary conditions for preparing the proletariat for its victory is a long, stubborn and ruthless struggle against opportunism, reformism, social-chauvinism, and similar bourgeois influences and trends, which are inevitable, since the proletariat is operating in a capitalist environment. If there is no such struggle, if opportunism in the working-class movement is not utterly defeated beforehand, there can be no dictatorship of the proletariat. Bolshevism would not have defeated the bourgeoisie in 1917-19 if before that, in 1903-17, it had not learned to defeat the Mensheviks, i.e., the opportunists, reformists, social-chauvinists, and ruthlessly expel them from the party of the proletarian vanguard.

At the present time, the verbal recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the leaders of the German "Independents", or by the French Longuetists,[82] and the like, who are *actually* continuing the old, habitual policy of big and small concessions to and conciliation with opportunism, subservience to the prejudices of bourgeois democracy ("consistent democracy" or "pure democracy" as they call it) and bourgeois parliamentarism, and so forth, is the most dangerous self-deception—and sometimes sheer fooling of the workers.

December 16, 1919

Published in December 1919

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE YOUNGER GENERATION[83]

Greetings to the working-class and peasant youth of Petrograd Gubernia on the occasion of their communist labour week.

Intensify your work in this field, my young comrades, so that you can apply your fresh, young forces to the building of a new and brighter life.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Smena No. 1,
December 18, 1919

Published according to
the *Smena* text

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN PRESNYA DISTRICT ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECEMBER UPRISING, 1905
DECEMBER 19, 1919

Comrades, we are gathered here today to celebrate the anniversary of the December uprising in Moscow and the battle that took place in Presnya District fourteen years ago.

Comrades, the 1905 insurrection in Moscow was one of the greatest movements by Russian worker revolutionaries and although it could not have been a success at that time it was nevertheless of tremendous significance. It is only today, when we have before us a picture of the many years of historical preparatory work for the Russian revolution, that we can properly appreciate the significance of the December uprising in 1905 and of the battles that the workers of Red Presnya then fought against the forces of tsarism. Comrades, we now see clearly how insignificant the forces of the Russian workers then were; and we see that the sacrifices made at that time have been repaid a hundredfold.

I must say, however, that in December 1905, tsarism had to muster all its forces in order to suppress the still weak, embryonic revolt of the workers. The Moscow organisation of our Party has recently published two collections of reminiscences of the December insurrection, the events in Presnya, and about the way the weak underground Party organisation of that time prepared the insurrection and about the tremendous enthusiasm with which not only factory workers, but all the working people of Moscow supported it. Among these newly published articles there is a particularly interesting one by a gendarme and police officer

which admits that the revolutionaries in December 1905 still did not know how weak they, the supporters of tsarism, were at that time. "If the blow struck by the revolutionaries had been a little more powerful and had lasted a little longer," admits this servant of the tsar, "we should not have been able to hold out, with the disorder that was beginning to make itself felt among us." This admission, made by a member of the secret police, is especially interesting; it shows that the sacrifices made by the workers of Presnya in the cause of freedom and the emancipation of the workers were not made in vain, that even then their heroic example demonstrated the strength of the working class to all enemies and at the same time ignited those millions of sparks that later, in a long and toilsome manner, over a period of many years, burst into flame and produced the victorious revolution.

After 1905 the working-class movement in Russia experienced the most difficult and bloody period of its history. Tsarism showed unprecedented brutality in dealing with the heroes who revolted in Moscow in 1905. After the suppression of the Moscow uprising the working class of Russia made several more attempts to rise to the level of a mass struggle. In the spring of 1906 there were mass strikes and the beginnings of a peasant movement; in 1907 another attempt was made—these attempts, however, could only slow down the forces of reaction but were unable to check them. And long years passed during which the movement was forced to hide in the underground, when hundreds and thousands of the sons of the working class perished on the gallows, in prisons, in exile and in penal colonies.

Then we saw that in 1910, 1911 and 1912 the working class again began to muster its forces and we saw how, after the Lena massacre in April 1912, a wave of powerful mass strikes began to rise which spread from one end of the country to the other and gave tsarism such a jolt that by the summer of 1914 events went as far as barricades in Petrograd; it is possible that one of the reasons accelerating the tsarist government's desperate decision to start the war was their hope of crushing the revolutionary movement in that way. Instead of crushing it, however, the war was the cause of the revolutionary movement spreading to all advanced countries.

As we can see clearly enough, the four-year war was carried on by predators, not only by German but also by British and French imperialism, for the purpose of plunder. When the Germans, in 1918, imposed the plundering Treaty of Brest-Litovsk upon us, there was no end to the shouts disapproving of that treaty in France and Britain, and when a year later, in that same year of 1918, Germany was defeated and the German Empire collapsed, the French and British capitalists then imposed the Treaty of Versailles on conquered Germany; this is now an example of measures still more brutal, more violent, than we had at Brest-Litovsk.

We now see how, week by week, the eyes of hundreds, thousands and millions of workers in France, Britain and America are being opened; they were duped and were assured that the~ were fighting a war against German imperialism and they have now seen that millions of people were killed and maimed in that war. And for what? For the enrichment of an insignificant handful of millionaires who since the war have become multimillionaires and who have brought all countries to the brink of ruin.

Comrades, we are living in difficult times insofar as concerns the misfortunes that have overtaken the industrial, especially the urban, workers. You know how difficult this situation is and how hungry and cold our working class is. And we also know that not only backward Russia who was torn by war for four years and after that has had for another two years to pursue a war imposed on her with the help of Britain and France—Russia was not the only country that has been ruined, but the most advanced and wealthy countries, the victor countries such as, for instance, France and the U.S.A., have also been brought to the brink of ruin. They are experiencing a coal crisis, they have to curtail the railway services because their industry and transport were crushed and ruined to an unparalleled degree by four years of war. Huge productive forces were destroyed in that imperialist war and we see as a result that the road which the Russian working class showed all workers, showed the whole world as far back as 1905 when it revolted against tsarism, the path which was followed by the Russian working class when it overthrew the bourgeoisie—that path

is now attracting the attention and winning the sympathy of workers of all, even the most advanced, countries.

I have already said, comrades, that this winter we have to endure unparalleled hardships and calamities. We say to ourselves, however, that we shall stand firm to the end, because the best of the workers, the most politically-conscious workers and peasants, have, despite all calamities and hardships, been helping us, helping us by forming the Red Army which is bringing us to final victory. We know that now that Kolchak's forces have been completely routed and the recent revolts in Siberia have seemingly deprived the remnants of Kolchak's army of the possibility of joining up with Denikin, and now that huge military forces have been captured at Novo-Nikolayevsk, there is obviously no longer Kolchak's army. In the South, where Denikin was able to boast of his successes, we now see the steadily growing offensive of our Red Army. You know that Kiev, Poltava and Kharkov have been captured and our advance on the Donets Basin, the source of coal supplies, is proceeding at an extremely rapid rate.

We therefore see, comrades, that all those terrible misfortunes which the working class has borne for the sake of our full victory over capital, all the sacrifices that have been made are now bringing good results. We see that capitalists abroad who have, until now, been handing out millions of rubles and every kind of war materiel, first to Kolchak, and then to Yudenich and Denikin, are now beginning to hesitate.

You know that they cut Russia off from other countries by the iron ring of the blockade and you know that they did not let our representatives go to other countries. You know that Comrade Litvinov, one of the revolutionaries who fought with the Bolsheviks against tsarism even before 1905, was our Ambassador to Great Britain and that there was not a workers' meeting that did not greet him with such applause and with such stormy protests against their own government, that the British went to the trouble of deporting him. Today, those people who hate Litvinov so heartily have given him permission to go to Copenhagen, and not merely permission, but also the means (Comrade Litvinov arrived there on a British cruiser). We also know that

every day of Comrade Litvinov's stay in Copenhagen is an ever greater victory for Russia. Workers' representatives and the correspondents of thousands of bourgeois newspapers are constantly approaching him for an explanation of the change that has taken place. We know that the change has come because the Western bourgeoisie can no longer keep up the blockade and help the Russian counter-revolutionary generals with millions of rubles because the working class of each of those rich and advanced countries will not let them.

Perhaps the most vivid expression of the turn that has come in the politics of the European countries is the voting of the deputies in the Italian chamber which we know of from the report sent by wireless from France to America and picked up by our wireless station. The report was this. When the question of Russia was discussed in the Italian chamber, and when the socialists proposed the immediate recognition of the Soviet Republic, a hundred voted for and two hundred against the proposal; that means that only the workers were in favour of recognising the Soviet Republic and all the bourgeois deputies rejected it. After that, however, the Italian chamber passed a unanimous motion to the effect that the Italian Government approach the allies with a view to stop the blockade altogether and put an end to all intervention in Russian affairs. That was a decision adopted by a chamber that consists to the extent of two-thirds, if not three-quarters, of landowners and capitalists, that was adopted in one of the victor countries and that was adopted simply under pressure from the working-class movement.

The decision shows clearly that a real turning point in international politics is approaching and that the tremendous inner forces of the working-class movement of every country have actually brought about what we have always hoped for, which we told the workers of Russia would happen, and for the sake of which, we told them, it was worth while struggling and making heavy sacrifices, that the sacrifices would have to be made, so that the troubles and torments, the hunger and cold that we are suffering from will not have been in vain. In this way we are not merely saving Russia, we are winning the sympathy and support of millions and millions of workers of other countries with every week of

struggle. That is why today, when we remember our comrades who fell, the heroes of Red Presnya, the memory of them gives us greater enthusiasm and firm resolution to bring victory near.

Despite all difficulties and all sacrifices we shall go forward ourselves and will lead the workers of all countries to full victory over capital. (*Applause*.)

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REPORT ON SUBBOTNIKS DELIVERED TO A MOSCOW CITY CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[84] DECEMBER 20, 1919

Comrades, the organisers of the conference inform me that you have arranged for a report on subbotniks and divided it into two parts so that it would be possible to discuss the main thing in this field in detail; first, the organisation of subbotniks in Moscow and results achieved, and secondly, practical conclusions for their further organisation. I should like to confine myself to general propositions, to the ideas born of the organisation of subbotniks as a new phenomenon in our Party and governmental development. I shall, therefore, dwell only briefly on the practical aspect.

When the first communist subbotniks had just been organised it was difficult to judge to what extent such a phenomenon deserved attention and whether anything big would come of it. I remember that when the first news of them began to appear in the Party press, the appraisals of comrades close to trade union organisational affairs and the Commissariat of Labour were at first extremely restrained, if not pessimistic. They did not think there were any grounds for regarding them as important. Since then subbotniks have become so widespread that their importance to our development cannot be disputed by anyone.

We have actually been using the adjective "communist" very frequently, so frequently that we have even included it in the name of our Party. But when you give this matter some thought, you arrive at the idea that together with the good that has followed from this, a certain danger for us

may have been created. Our chief reason for changing the name of the Party was the desire to draw a clear line of distinction between us and the dominant socialism of the Second International. After the overwhelming majority of the official socialist parties, through their leaders, had gone over to the side of the bourgeoisie of their own countries or of their own governments during the imperialist war, the tremendous crisis, the collapse of the old socialism, became obvious to us. And in order to stress as sharply as possible that we could not consider socialists those who took sides with their governments during the imperialist war, in order to show that the old socialism had gone rotten, had died—mainly for that reason the idea of changing the Party's name was put forward. This the more so, since the name of "Social-Democratic" has from the theoretical point of view long ceased to be correct. As far back as the forties, when it was first widely used politically in France, it was applied to a party professing petty-bourgeois socialist reformism and not to a party of the revolutionary proletariat. The main reason, the motive for changing the name of our Party which has given its new name to the new International was the desire to cut ourselves off decisively from the old socialism.

If we were to ask ourselves in what way communism differs from socialism, we should have to say that socialism is the society that grows directly out of capitalism, it is the first form of the new society. Communism is a higher form of society, and can only develop when socialism has become firmly established. Socialism implies work without the aid of the capitalists, socialised labour with strict accounting, control and supervision by the organised vanguard, the advanced section of the working people; the measure of labour and remuneration for it must be fixed. It is necessary to fix them because capitalist society has left behind such survivals and such habits as the fragmentation of labour, no confidence in social economy, and the old habits of the petty proprietor that dominate in all peasant countries. All this is contrary to real communist economy. We give the name of communism to the system under which people form the habit of performing their social duties without any special apparatus for coercion, and when unpaid work for

the public good becomes a general phenomenon. It stands to reason that the concept of "communism" is a far too distant one for those who are taking the first steps towards complete victory over capitalism. No matter how correct it may have been to change the name of the Party, no matter how great the benefit the change has brought us, no matter how great the accomplishments of our cause and the scale on which it has developed—Communist Parties now exist throughout the world and although less than a year has passed since the foundation of the Communist International,[85] from the point of view of the labour movement it is incomparably stronger than the old, dying Second International—if the name "Communist Party" were interpreted to mean that the communist system is being introduced immediately, that would be a great distortion and would do practical harm since it would be nothing more than empty boasting.

That is why the word "communist" must be treated with great caution, and that is why communist subbotniks that have begun to enter into our life are of particular value, because it is only in this extremely tiny phenomenon that something communist has begun to make its appearance. The expropriation of the landowners and capitalists enabled us to organise only the most primitive forms of socialism, and there is not yet anything communist in it. If we take our present-day economy we see that the germs of socialism in it are still very weak and that the old economic forms dominate overwhelmingly; these are expressed either as the domination of petty proprietorship or as wild, uncontrolled profiteering. When our adversaries, the petty-bourgeois democrats, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, assert in their objections to us that we have smashed large-scale capitalism but that the worst kind of profiteering, usury capitalism, persists in its place, we tell them that if they imagine that we can go straight from large-scale capitalism to communism they are not revolutionaries but reformists and utopians.

Large-scale capitalism has been seriously undermined everywhere, even in those countries where no steps towards socialism have yet been taken. From this point of view, none of the criticisms or the objections levelled against us by our opponents are serious. Obviously the beginnings

of a new, petty, profiteering capitalism began to make their appearance after large-scale capitalism had been crushed. We are living through a savage battle against the survivals of large-scale capitalism which grasps at every kind of petty speculation where it is difficult to counteract it and where it takes on the worst and most unorganised form of trading.

The struggle has become much fiercer under war conditions and has led to the most brutal forms of profiteering, especially in places where capitalism was organised on a larger scale, and it would be quite incorrect to imagine that the revolutionary transition could have any other form. That is how matters stand in respect of our present-day economy. If we were to ask ourselves what the present economic system of Soviet Russia is, we should have to say that it consists in laying the foundations of socialism in large-scale industry, in reorganising the old capitalist economy with the capitalists putting up a stubborn resistance in millions and millions of different ways. The countries of Western Europe that have emerged from the war as badly off as we are—Austria, for instance—differ from us only in that the disintegration of capitalism and speculation are more pronounced there than in our country and that there are no germs of socialist organisation to offer resistance to capitalism. There is, however, not yet anything communist in our economic system. The "communist" begins when subbotniks (i.e., unpaid labour with no quota set by any authority or any state) make their appearance; they constitute the labour of individuals on an extensive scale for the public good. This is not helping one's neighbour in the way that has always been customary in the countryside; it is work done to meet the needs of the country as a whole, and it is organised on a broad scale and is unpaid. It would, therefore, be more correct if the word "communist" were applied not only to the name of the Party but also to those economic manifestations in our reality that are actually communist in character. If there is anything communist at all in the prevailing system in Russia, it is only the subbotniks, and everything else is nothing but the struggle against capitalism for the consolidation of socialism out of which, after the full victory of socialism, there should grow that

communism that we see at subbotniks, not with the aid of a book, but in living reality.

Such is the theoretical significance of subbotniks; they demonstrate that here something quite new is beginning to emerge in the form of unpaid labour, extensively organised to meet the needs of the entire state, something that is contrary to all the old capitalist rules, something that is much more lofty than the socialist society that is conquering capitalism. When the workers on the Moscow-Kazan Railway, people who were living under conditions of the worst famine and the greatest need, first responded to the appeal of the Central Committee of the Party to come to the aid of the country,[86] and when there appeared signs that communist subbotniks were no longer a matter of single cases but were spreading and meeting with the sympathy of the masses, we were able to say that they were a phenomenon of tremendous theoretical importance and that we really should afford them all-round support if we wanted to be Communists in more than mere theory, in more than the struggle against capitalism. From the point of view of the practical construction of a socialist society that is not enough. It must be said that the movement can really be developed on a mass scale. I do not undertake to say whether we have proved this since no general summaries of the extent of the movement we call communist subbotniks have yet been prepared. I have only fragmentary information and have read in the Party press that these subbotniks are developing more and more widely in a number of towns. Petrograd comrades say that subbotniks are far more widespread in their city than in Moscow. As far as the provinces are concerned many of the comrades who have a practical knowledge of this movement have told me that they are collecting a huge amount of material on this new form of social labour. However, we shall only be able to obtain summarised data after the question has been discussed many times in the press and at Party conferences in different cities; on the basis of those data we shall be able to say whether the subbotniks have really become a mass phenomenon, and whether we have really achieved important successes in this sphere.

Whatever may be the case, whether or not we shall soon obtain that sort of complete and verified data, we should not doubt that from the theoretical point of view the subbotniks are the only manifestation we have to show that we do not only call ourselves Communists, that we do not merely want to be Communists, but are actually doing something that is communist and not merely socialist. Every Communist, therefore, everyone who wants to be true to the principles of communism should devote all his attention and all his efforts to the explanation of this phenomenon and to its practical implementation. That is the theoretical significance of the subbotniks. At every Party conference, therefore, we must persistently raise this question and discuss both its theoretical and its practical aspect. We must not limit this phenomenon to its theoretical significance. Communist subbotniks are of tremendous importance to us not only because they are the practical implementation of communism. Apart from this, subbotniks have a double significance—from the standpoint of the state they are purely practical aid to the state, and from the standpoint of the Party—and for us, members of the Party, this must not remain in the shade—they have the significance of purging the Party of undesirable elements and are of importance in the struggle against the influences experienced by the Party at a time when capitalism is decaying.

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

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Letter to the Workers and Peasants
of the Ukraine Apropos of the
Victories over Denikin". December 28, 1919

Reduced

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Reduced

LETTER
TO THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF THE UKRAINE APROPOS OF THE VICTORIES OVER DENIKIN

Comrades, four months ago, towards the end of August 1919, I had occasion to address a letter to the workers and peasants in connection with the victory over Kolchak.

I am now having this letter reprinted in full for the workers and peasants of the Ukraine in connection with the victories over Denikin.

Red troops have taken Kiev, Poltava and Kharkov and are advancing victoriously on Rostov. The Ukraine is seething with revolt against Denikin. All forces must be rallied for the final rout of Denikin's army, which has been trying to restore the power of the landowners and capitalists. We must destroy Denikin to safeguard ourselves against even the slightest possibility of a new incursion.

The workers and peasants of the Ukraine should familiarise themselves with the lessons which all Russian workers and peasants have drawn from the conquest of Siberia by Kolchak and her liberation by Red troops after many months of landowner and capitalist tyranny.

Denikin's rule in the Ukraine has been as severe an ordeal as Kolchak's rule was in Siberia. There can be no doubt that the lessons of this severe ordeal will give the Ukrainian workers and peasants—as they did the workers and peasants of the Urals and Siberia—a clearer understanding of the tasks of Soviet power and induce them to defend it more staunchly.

In Great Russia the system of landed estates has been completely abolished. The same must be done in the Ukraine,

and the Soviet power of the Ukrainian workers and peasants must effect the complete abolition of the landed estates and the complete liberation of the Ukrainian workers and peasants from all oppression by the landowners, and from the landowners themselves.

But apart from this task, and a number of others which confronted and still confront both the Great-Russian and the Ukrainian working masses, Soviet power in the Ukraine has its own special tasks. One of these special tasks deserves the greatest attention at the present moment. It is the national question, or, in other words, the question of whether the Ukraine is to be a separate and independent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic bound in alliance (federation) with the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, or whether the Ukraine is to amalgamate with Russia to form a single Soviet republic. All Bolsheviks and all politically-conscious workers and peasants must give careful thought to this question.

The independence of the Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic) and by the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). It is therefore self-evident and generally recognised that only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can and will decide at their All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets whether the Ukraine shall amalgamate with Russia, or whether she shall remain a separate and independent republic, and, in the latter case, what federal ties shall be established between that republic and Russia.

How should this question be decided insofar as concerns the interests of the working people and the promotion of their fight for the complete emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital?

In the first place, the interests of labour demand the fullest confidence and the closest alliance among the working people of different countries and nations. The supporters of the landowners and capitalists, of the bourgeoisie, strive to disunite the workers, to intensify national discord and enmity, in order to weaken the workers and strengthen the power of capital.

Capital is an international force. To vanquish it, an international workers' alliance, an international workers' brotherhood, is needed.

We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists. We stand for the close union and the complete amalgamation of the workers and peasants of all nations in a single world Soviet republic.

Secondly, the working people must not forget that capitalism has divided nations into a small number of oppressor, Great-Power (imperialist), sovereign and privileged nations and an overwhelming majority of oppressed, dependent and semi-dependent, non-sovereign nations. The arch-criminal and arch-reactionary war of 1914-18 still further accentuated this division and as a result aggravated rancour and hatred. For centuries the indignation and distrust of the non-sovereign and dependent nations towards the dominant and oppressor nations have been accumulating, of nations such as the Ukrainian towards nations such as the Great-Russian.

We want a *voluntary* union of nations—a union which precludes any coercion of one nation by another—a union founded on complete confidence, on a clear recognition of brotherly unity, on absolutely voluntary consent. Such a union cannot be effected at one stroke; we have to work towards it with the greatest patience and circumspection, so as not to spoil matters and not to arouse distrust, and so that the distrust inherited from centuries of landowner and capitalist oppression, centuries of private property and the enmity caused by its divisions and redivisions may have a chance to wear off.

We must, therefore, strive persistently for the unity of nations and ruthlessly suppress everything that tends to divide them, and in doing so we must be very cautious and patient, and make concessions to the survivals of national distrust. We must be adamant and uncompromising towards everything that affects the fundamental interests of labour in its fight for emancipation from the yoke of capital. The question of the demarcation of frontiers now, for the time being—for we are striving towards the complete abolition of frontiers—is a minor one, it is not fundamental or important.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In this matter we can afford to wait, and must wait, because the national distrust among the broad mass of peasants and small owners is often extremely tenacious, and haste might only intensify it, in other words, jeopardise the cause of complete and ultimate unity.

The experience of the workers' and peasants' revolution in Russia, the revolution of October-November 1917, and of the two years of victorious struggle against the onslaught of international and Russian capitalists, has made it crystal-clear that the capitalists have succeeded for a time in playing upon the national distrust of the Great Russians felt by Polish, Latvian, Estonian and Finnish peasants and small owners, that they have succeeded for a time in sowing dissension between them and us on the basis of this distrust. Experience has shown that this distrust wears off and disappears only very slowly, and that the more caution and patience displayed by the Great Russians, who have for so long been an oppressor nation, the more certainly this distrust will pass. It is by recognising the independence of the Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian and Finnish states that we are slowly but steadily winning the confidence of the labouring masses of the neighbouring small states, who were more backward and more deceived and downtrodden by the capitalists. It is the surest way of wresting them from the influence of "their" national capitalists, and leading them to full confidence, to the future united international Soviet republic.

As long as the Ukraine is not completely liberated from Denikin, her government, until the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets meets, is the All-Ukraine Revolutionary Committee.[87] Besides the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communists, there are Ukrainian *Borotba* Communists[88] working on this Revolutionary Committee as members of the government. One of the things distinguishing the Borotbists from the Bolsheviks is that they insist upon the unconditional independence of the Ukraine. The Bolsheviks will not make *this* a subject of difference and disunity, they do not regard *this* as an obstacle to concerted proletarian effort. There must be unity in the struggle against the yoke of capital and for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and there should be no parting of the ways among Communists on the ques-

tion of national frontiers, or whether there should be a federal or some other tie between the states. Among the Bolsheviks there are advocates of complete independence for the Ukraine, advocates of a more or less close federal tie, and advocates of the complete amalgamation of the Ukraine with Russia.

There must be no differences over these questions. They will be decided by the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets.

If a Great-Russian Communist insists upon the amalgamation of the Ukraine with Russia, Ukrainians might easily suspect him of advocating this policy not from the motive of uniting the proletarians in the fight against capital, but because of the prejudices of the old Great-Russian nationalism, of imperialism. Such mistrust is natural, and to a certain degree inevitable and legitimate, because the Great Russians, under the yoke of the landowners and capitalists, had for centuries imbibed the shameful and disgusting prejudices of Great-Russian chauvinism.

If a Ukrainian Communist insists upon the unconditional state independence of the Ukraine, he lays himself open to the suspicion that he is supporting this policy not because of the temporary interests of the Ukrainian workers and peasants in their struggle against the yoke of capital, but on account of the petty-bourgeois national prejudices of the small owner. Experience has provided hundreds of instances of the petty-bourgeois "socialists" of various countries—all the various Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian pseudo-socialists, Georgian Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and the like—assuming the guise of supporters of the proletariat for the sole purpose of deceitfully promoting a policy of compromise with "their" national bourgeoisie against the revolutionary workers. We saw this in the case of Kerensky's rule in Russia in the February-October period of 1917, and we have seen it and are seeing it in all other countries.

Mutual distrust between the Great-Russian and Ukrainian Communists can, therefore, arise very easily. How is this distrust to be combated? How is it to be overcome and mutual confidence established?

The best way to achieve this is by working together to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power in the fight against the landowners and capitalists of all

countries and against their attempts to restore their domination. This common fight will clearly show in practice that whatever the decision in regard to state independence or frontiers may be, there must be a close military and economic alliance between the Great-Russian and Ukrainian workers, for otherwise the capitalists of the "Entente", in other words, the alliance of the richest capitalist countries—Britain, France, America, Japan and Italy—will crush and strangle us separately. Our fight against Kolchak and Denikin, whom these capitalists supplied with money and arms, is a clear illustration of this danger.

He who undermines the unity and closest alliance between the Great-Russian and Ukrainian workers and peasants is helping the Kolchaks, the Denikins, the capitalist bandits of all countries.

Consequently, we Great-Russian Communists must repress with the utmost severity the slightest manifestation in our midst of Great-Russian nationalism, for such manifestations, which are a betrayal of communism in general, cause the gravest harm by dividing us from our Ukrainian comrades and thus playing into the hands of Denikin and his regime.

Consequently, we Great-Russian Communists must make concessions when there are differences with the Ukrainian Bolshevik Communists and Borotbists and these differences concern the state independence of the Ukraine, the forms of her alliance with Russia, and the national question in general. But all of us, Great-Russian Communists, Ukrainian Communists, and Communists of any other nation, must be unyielding and irreconcilable in the underlying and fundamental questions which are the same for all nations, in questions of the proletarian struggle, of the proletarian dictatorship; we must not tolerate compromise with the bourgeoisie or any division of the forces which are protecting us against Denikin.

Denikin must be vanquished and destroyed, and such incursions as his not allowed to recur. That is to the fundamental interest of both the Great-Russian and the Ukrainian workers and peasants. The fight will be a long and hard one, for the capitalists of the whole world are helping Denikin and will help all other Denikins.

In this long and hard fight we Great-Russian and Ukrainian workers must maintain the closest alliance, for separately we shall most definitely be unable to cope with the task. Whatever the boundaries of the Ukraine and Russia may be, whatever may be the forms of their mutual state relationships, that is not so important; that is a matter in which concessions can and should be made, in which one thing, or another, or a third may be tried—the cause of the workers and peasants, of the victory over capitalism, will not perish because of that.

But if we fail to maintain the closest alliance, an alliance against Denikin, an alliance against the capitalists and kulaks of our countries and of all countries, the cause of labour will most certainly perish for many years to come in the sense that the capitalists *will be able* to crush and strangle both the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia.

And what the bourgeoisie of all countries, and all manner of petty-bourgeois parties—i.e., "compromising" parties which permit alliance with the bourgeoisie against the workers—try most of all to accomplish is to disunite the workers of different nationalities, to evoke distrust, and to disrupt a close international alliance and international brotherhood of the workers. Whenever the bourgeoisie succeeds in this the cause of the workers is lost. The Communists of Russia and the Ukraine must therefore by patient, persistent, stubborn and concerted effort foil the nationalist machinations of the bourgeoisie and vanquish nationalist prejudices of every kind, and set the working people of the world an example of a really solid alliance of the workers and peasants of different nations in the fight for Soviet power, for the overthrow of the yoke of the landowners and capitalists, and for a world federal Soviet republic.

N. Lenin

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the *Pravda* text, verified
with the manuscript

STOP SPOILING THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

SOME THOUGHTS AT LEISURE, i.e., WHILE LISTENING TO SPEECHES AT MEETINGS[89]

We are spoiling the Russian language. We are using foreign words unnecessarily. And we use them incorrectly. Why use the foreign word *defekty* when we have three Russian synonyms—*nedochoty*, *nedostatki*, *probely*.

A man who has recently learned to read in general, and to read newspapers in particular, will, of course, if he reads them diligently, willy-nilly absorb journalistic turns of speech. However, it is the language of the newspapers that is beginning to suffer. If a man who has recently learned to read uses foreign words as a novelty, he is to be excused, but there is no excuse for a writer. Is it not time for us to declare war on the unnecessary use of foreign words?

I must admit that the unnecessary use of foreign words annoys me (because it makes it more difficult for us to exercise our influence over the masses) but some of the mistakes made by those who write in the newspapers make me really angry. For instance—the word *budirovat* is used in the meaning of arouse, awaken, stir up. It comes from the French word *bouder* which means to sulk, to pout, which is what *budirovat* should really mean. This adoption of Nizhni-Novgorod French is the adoption of the worst from the worst representatives of the Russian landowning class, who learned some French but who, first, did not master the language, and who, secondly, distorted the Russian language.

Is it not time to declare war on the spoiling of Russian?

First published in *Pravda* No. 275, December 3, 1924
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE BUREAU OF THE WOMEN'S CONGRESS IN PETROGRAD GUBERNIA[90]

Comrades, since I have no opportunity of attending your Congress I should like to send you in writing my greetings and my best wishes for success.

We are now happily ending the Civil War. The Soviet Republic is becoming stronger through its victories over the exploiters. The Soviet Republic can and must, from now on, concentrate its forces on a more important task, one that is nearer and dearer to us, to all working people—on a bloodless war, a war for victory over hunger, cold and economic chaos. In this bloodless war, women workers and peasants have an especially big role to play.

May the Women's Congress in Petrograd Gubernia help found, consolidate and organise an army of working women for this bloodless war which should and will bring still greater victories to Soviet power.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

January 10, 1920

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 11, January 16, 1920

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REMARKS ON AND ADDENDA TO DRAFTS FOR "RULES FOR THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION"

To Comrade Stalin. Copies to Avanesov and Tomsky, and also to Kiselyov, Member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

On the basis of directive given by the Central Committee[91] the three drafts should, in my opinion, be worked up into one.

I think you should add:

(1) The "Department" of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection at the State Control Commission should be a temporary one for the purpose of involving the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection *in all* departments of the State Control Commission, and should then disappear as a special department.

(2) Purpose: *all* working people, both men and *particularly women*, should serve in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

(3) For this draw up lists in the localities (in accordance with the Constitution), excluding clerks, etc.

—all others *in turn* to participate in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

(4) Participation to vary according to the degree of development of the participants—beginning with the role of "listener", or witness, or learner for the illiterate and completely undeveloped workers and peasants, and ending with the granting of all right (or almost all) to the literate and developed who have been *tested* in some way or another.

(5) Pay special attention to (and make strictly precise rules for), and *extend* control by the Workers' and Peasants'

Inspection over accounting for food, *goods*, warehouses, tools, materials, fuel, etc., etc. (in dining-rooms, etc., especially).

Women, literally *every woman*, *must* be drawn into this work.

(6) So as not to get into a mess with the involvement of masses of participants they must be drawn into the work gradually, in turn, etc. The ways in which they participate must also be carefully planned (two or three at a time, rarely, in special cases, more, so that they will not waste the working time of the clerks).

(7) Detailed instructions must be compiled.

(8) Officials of the State Control Commission must (in accordance with a special instruction), first, invite representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to all their operations, and secondly, deliver lectures to *non-party* conferences of workers and peasants (popular lectures according to a specially approved programme on the principles of the State Control Commission and its methods; perhaps the lectures could be replaced by the reading of a pamphlet that we shall publish—that is, the State Control Commission, Stalin and Avanesov, will publish it with the special participation of the Party—and commenting on that pamphlet).

(9) *Gradually* summon peasants from the localities (they must be non-party peasants) to participate in the State Control Commission at the centre; begin with at least (if it is impossible to do more) one or two from each gubernia and then, depending on transport and other conditions, *increase the number*. The same thing for non-party workers.

(10) Gradually introduce the verification of the participation of working people in the State Control Commission by the Party and the trade unions, i.e., through these organisations verify whether everyone participates and what results come from the participation insofar as learning the business of state administration is concerned.

Lenin

January 24, 1920

First published in 1928

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A NON-PARTY CONFERENCE OF WORKERS AND RED ARMY MEN OF PRESNYA DISTRICT, MOSCOW JANUARY 24, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

"In connection with the recent victories of the Red Army there has been a marked change in our international situation, and we must seek new ways of solving our international problems.

"As soon as the Soviet government was formed all the forces of international capital were hurled against it. These forces are far stronger than those of the Soviet government, so that waverers might have doubted whether the Soviet government could be victorious. Yet it has been victorious. And it is worth reflecting on the reasons for the Soviet government's victory in order to know what must be done to be victorious in the future."

Comrade Lenin shows how great has been the victory over the forces of capital and how complete the rout of Kolchak, which has compelled the Allies to remove the blockade and to abandon their plan to strangle Russia.

"This victory over a far stronger enemy has shown that the Bolsheviks were right, and not those who asserted that in taking up arms against the world bourgeoisie we were embarking on a hopeless cause. Although the removal of the blockade has eased our position somewhat, the bourgeoisie of the West will probably attempt to fight us again. Even though they have now removed the blockade, they are inciting the Polish whiteguards against us. We must, therefore, be once more on our guard, prepare for new attacks, draw

the lessons from the two years of struggle and employ the methods by which we have been victorious hitherto.

"The Mensheviks have often said that the proletarians of the West are not supporting us, are allowing us to be strangled as they allowed Hungary to be strangled.[92] That would seem to be true. But why did the Entente troops quit the North and Odessa? Because the more deeply their soldiers, who were themselves workers, penetrated into Soviet Russia, the more emphatically they refused to fight against us. That means that one of the reasons for our victory was this: we can be fought only by a big force, but a big army can be recruited only from among the workers and peasants, and the workers of the West do not want to fight us. We were therefore victorious not because we were the stronger, but because the working folk of the Entente countries proved to be closer to us than to their own governments.

"The second reason for our victory was the failure of the 'Campaign of the Fourteen States'.[93] This shows that the small states cannot unite to fight the Bolsheviks, because they are afraid that their own victory and the simultaneous victory of Denikin's forces would mean the restoration of the Russian Empire which would again rob the little nations of the right to live. We are concluding peace with Estonia, which is already a virtual breach in the blockade, even if the formal removal of the blockade is just a blind.

"The big powers of the Entente cannot unite to fight the Soviet government because they are too hostile to each other. Germany is harbouring thoughts of vengeance against France for the predatory Peace of Versailles, France is inciting Poland against us, while Britain is allowing Estonia to make peace with us, as long as Estonia trades with her. Japan, who has a stronger army than ours in Siberia, cannot fight us because she fears attack by America, with whom she is at loggerheads over imperialist, colonialist interests in China. That means that a second reason for our victory was this: whereas the workers are united, the bourgeoisie, being bourgeois, cannot help getting at each other's throats and fighting for an extra bit of profit.

"And so we have emerged victorious from the first two years of the Civil War, which were the hardest years of all,

because we had been ruined by the imperialist war and were cut off from grain and coal supplies. But now we have grain and fuel in abundance. In Siberia the grain requisitioned alone amounted to twenty-one million poods. It is true that we cannot get it out immediately, but then, the transport system has broken down all over Europe, and in our country it was deliberately disrupted by the whiteguards. They blew up all the bridges on the Dnieper, except the Kiev bridge, and this explains both the delay in the military operations and the delay in the transport of grain. We have the Guryev oil and shall transport it as soon as the offshore ice on the Caspian melts. We are bearing all this in mind, and are preparing to transport the oil. We are creating labour armies to restore the railways; one of them has already started to build a railway from Alexandrov-Gai to Guryev for the transport of oil. We cannot demobilise the army because we still have enemies, such as Poland. Demobilisation is also being hampered by the transport break-down. We shall therefore use the army to restore the railways.

"The whiteguards keep saying in their sheets that the Bolsheviks are doing fine propaganda and are sparing no money for the purpose. But the people have heard all sorts of propaganda—they have heard the propaganda of the whiteguards and the propaganda of the Constituent Assembly supporters. It is absurd to think that they have followed the Bolsheviks because their propaganda was the more skilful. No, the point is that their propaganda was truthful.

"The very deeds of Denikin and Kolchak were propaganda against them and in favour of the Soviet system. That is why we won. We overthrew the tsar easily in a few hours. We overthrew the landowners and capitalists in a few weeks. But that was only half the job. We have to learn to work in a new way. Formerly it was the exploiter who organised labour and hunger that united labour; now labour must be united by the workers and peasants realising that they must work in order to escape from this dire situation.

"But this is not yet implanted in everyone's mind, and we are starting a new and bloodless fight to bring it home. All previous revolutions ended to the advantage of a handful of capitalists and exploiters. That was because the insurrectionary working people had no sense of solidarity, each thought

only of himself, they all fought one another, and it was the swindlers and profiteers who came out on top.

"You have a peasant who has grain, and side by side with him there is a hungry man, and the peasant prefers to sell grain to the hungry man for a thousand rubles rather than loan it to the workers' government. Somebody here even says 'Hear, hear!' Well, both Denikin and Kolchak tried freedom of trade, but the best, politically-conscious workers and peasants saw what this meant in practice and turned their backs on them.

"In the old days they used to say, 'Each for himself, and God for all.' And how much misery resulted from it.

"We say, 'Each for all, and we'll somehow manage without God.' And we shall strive for a fraternal alliance between the workers and the peasants who loan their grain to the state—it has to be a loan, because at present we are unable to give anything in return; bits of coloured paper are not money. Hitherto we have had to fight just to prevent the enemy from strangling us; but now, when an enemy much stronger than us has been defeated, our hands are free, and we must set about the job of building a new life and, in the first place, must restore the railways.

"In the South we have repair shops captured by the Red Army in places where grain is close, so let these repair shops work at full speed, in three shifts, and not in the way starving people work.

"We must concentrate the whole force of our Communist propaganda, with the help of which we defeated the foreign enemy, on the restoration of the railways.

"We once had a 'splendid' foreign trade and used to export 700,000,000 poods of grain annually. Russian and foreign millionaires made fortunes on this business, while the Russian workers and peasants starved. Now we must convince everybody that the only salvation is, 'Everyone for all!' We must, whatever the cost, abolish freedom of trade and profiteering, which mean bread for a small handful and starvation for the rest. We must convince the peasants—and they will believe us, because Denikin demonstrated to them the 'blessings' of freedom of profiteering, they will understand that the only salvation is for them to give grain as a loan to the worker and artisan, and that these will

repay the loan not in bits of coloured paper but in textiles and other goods.

"We have started a great war, a war which we shall not end soon. This is a bloodless war waged by the armies of labour on starvation, cold and typhus, a war for an enlightened, bright, well-fed and healthy Russia. But we shall end this war with a victory as decisive as the one with which we ended the struggle against the whiteguards...."

In reply to a question about the terms of the peace with Estonia, Comrade Lenin said that we had made many concessions, the chief of which was the cession of disputed territory inhabited by a mixed population—Russians and Estonians. But we did not want to shed the blood of workers and Red Army soldiers for the sake of a piece of land, all the more that this concession was not being made for ever. Estonia was passing through a Kerensky period; the workers were beginning to realise the vileness of their Constituent Assembly leaders, who had plundered the trade unions and had murdered twenty Communists. They would soon overthrow this government and set up a Soviet Estonia, he said, which would conclude a new peace with us.

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DRAFT DECISIONS AND DIRECTIVES ON CO-OPERATIVES[94]

Tomorrow at the Council of People's Commissars table a draft decree, not on a merger for the co-operatives but on the completion of the unification of all types of co-operative, rewriting O. J. Schmidt's proposal so that a most cautious attitude is displayed to local producers' co-operatives, and the Council of Co-operative Congresses is abolished in the shortest period.

Directives:

(α) More attention to be paid to the needs of the working people and not only of the affluent and kulak section. Change the formula of the preamble in this spirit.

(β) More extensive aid for producers' co-operatives with local initiative specially developed, and improved methods of farming and industry encouraged.

(γ) Concrete steps by the new Central Co-operative Society for the unification of producers' co-operatives to be carried out with the approval of the Council of People's Commissars.

(a) Instruct Tsyurupa and Lezhava to table a draft decision at the Council of People's Commissars (without deciding in advance whether it is to be published) formulating more precise, systematic and concrete rules for the participation of co-operatives in the procurement of various foodstuffs, and for the ways and forms, terms and methods by which this participation is to be effected.

(b) Instruct the Central Statistical Board, in agreement with the Central Union of Consumers' Societies, the People's Food Commissariat and the Supreme Economic Council, to draw up by ... a programme of sample surveys of the methods

and results of food procurement in the localities with and without the participation of the co-operatives.

The programme to be tabled at the Council of People's Commissars for approval and for the actual appointment of the survey.

Think about whether a questionnaire can be used, and if it can, submit a brief draft of it to the Council of People's Commissars.

Purpose of the survey: the detailed analysis of facts that may be few but are typical and properly verified of how products were gathered, which products and in what quantities, how they were delivered, guarded and transported, over what distance, etc. Number of cases of coercion, and what sort of coercion. Supply of goods in exchange, what sort, and what quantities. The percentage of compulsory deliveries and surpluses obtained and in what period. The participation of various groups of peasants in the delivery of grain (and in receiving goods, if they were available).

Written on January 26, 1920
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Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF ECONOMIC COUNCILS[95] JANUARY 27, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin said that he would only touch lightly on those questions which he had had lately to deal with most. One of them was the organisation of administration—the question of corporate management or one-man management.[96] In the controversies on this subject the question had been discussed on the basis of abstract reasoning in which the superiority of corporate management over individual management was argued. But this led very far away from the practical tasks of the moment. Such arguments went back to an early stage in the development of the Soviet system, a stage that had already passed. It was time to put the matter on a more business-like footing.

"Corporate management," continued Lenin, "as the chief type of organisation of Soviet administration, is something embryonic, something needed in the early stages, when you have to start from scratch. But when more or less stable forms have been established, the transition to practical work involves individual management, for that system best ensures the most effective utilisation of human abilities, and a real, not verbal, verification of work done.

"The experience of the Soviet government in army organisation must not be regarded as something isolated. War embraces all forms of organisation in all spheres. The development of our army led to successful results only because it was carried on in the spirit of general Soviet organisation,

on the basis of class relations that affect all development. We find here the same thin layer of the leading class, the proletariat, and the peasantry forming the mass. The nature of this relationship may not have been so fully apparent in other spheres, but it was thoroughly tested in the army, which stands face to face with the enemy and pays dearly for every mistake. This experience is worth thinking about. Developing systematically, it passed from a corporate form that was casual and vague to a corporate form elevated to the status of a system of organisation and permeating all the institutions of the army; and now, as a general tendency, it has arrived at the principle of one-man responsibility as the only correct method of work. In any sphere of Soviet work you will find a small number of politically-conscious proletarians, a mass of less developed proletarians and, as the substratum, a huge mass of peasants, all of whose habits tend towards private enterprise and, consequently, towards freedom of trade and profiteering, which the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-party people call freedom, but which we call the heritage of capitalism. These are the conditions under which we have to act, and they call for relevant methods. And taking the experience of the army, we find in the organisation of its administration a systematic development from the original forms, from the corporate principle to the individual principle, which is now being applied there in at least a half of all cases.

"At best, corporate management involves a tremendous waste of forces and is not suited to the rapid and accurate work demanded by the conditions of centralised large-scale industry. If you take the advocates of corporate management, you will find that their resolutions formulate, in an extremely abstract way, the concept that every member of a collegium must be held individually responsible for the fulfilment of its tasks. That for us is now elementary. But those of you who have had practical experience know that only in one case out of a hundred is this actually adhered to. In the vast majority of cases it remains on paper. No member of a collegium is assigned precise duties and held personally responsible for the performance of those duties. Generally, there is no verification of work done. Let us assume that the Central Committee of a trade union nominates Vasily

Vasilyevich Vasilyev for some office, and you ask to see a list of assignments performed by him and verified by efficient people—you will not get anything of the kind. We are all of us only just beginning to adopt really efficient methods.

"Our fault is that we imagine we can do everything ourselves. Our most acute shortcoming is a lack of executives, yet we do not know how to draw them from the rank-and-file workers and peasants, among whom there is an abundance of talented administrators and organisers. It would be much better if we abandoned general, and in most cases absolutely sterile, controversy for business-like methods, and that as soon as possible. We would then really be carrying out the duties of organisers of the advanced class, and would pick out hundreds and thousands of new talented organisers. We must promote them, test them, assign them tasks, tasks of greater and greater complexity. I hope that after the Congress of the Economic Councils, after having reviewed the work done, we shall take this path and increase and multiply the number of organisers, so as to reinforce and enlarge that exceedingly thin layer which has been worn to shreds during the past two years. For in order to accomplish the task we are setting ourselves, that of saving Russia from poverty, hunger and cold, we need ten times more organisers, who would be answerable to tens of millions of people.

"The second of the questions which interest us most is that of the labour armies.

"The task confronting us here concerns the transition from one stage of activity to another. The stage that was wholly taken up by war is not yet over but there are a number of signs which show that the Russian capitalists will not be able to continue the war, although there is no doubt that they will attempt to invade Russia. And we must be on our guard. Nevertheless, the war they launched against us two years ago has, by and large, ended in victory for us, and we are now going over to peaceful tasks.

"The peculiar character of this transition must be understood. Here we have a country which is in a state of utter ruin, a country suffering from hunger and cold, where poverty has reached desperate extremes, and in that country the people have risen in their might, and gained confidence

in themselves when they realised that they are capable of withstanding the entire world—without exaggeration, the entire world, for the entire capitalist world has suffered defeat. And in these peculiar conditions we are proposing to form a labour army to solve urgent problems.

"We must concentrate on the main thing, namely, on collecting grain and transporting it to the centre. Every deviation from this task, the least diffusion of effort, will entail the gravest peril, the ruin of our cause. And in order to utilise our apparatus with the greatest possible dispatch, we must create a labour army. You already have the theses of the Central Committee and the reports on this subject, and I shall not go into the actual details of the question. I only want to say that at this moment of transition from civil war to the new tasks we must transfer everything to the labour front and there concentrate all our forces, with the utmost effort and with ruthless, military determination. We shall not allow any deviations now. In launching this slogan we declare that we must strain all the live forces of the workers and peasants to the utmost and demand that they give us every help in this matter. And then, by creating a labour army, by harnessing all the forces of the workers and peasants, we shall accomplish our main task. We shall succeed in procuring hundreds of millions of poods of grain. We have them already. But it will require incredible effort, devilish effort, the harnessing of all the forces of the country, added to military determination and energy, to get these hundreds of millions of poods of grain and transport them to the centre. Here, in the centre, we shall be engaged chiefly in drawing up a plan for this and shall be talking chiefly of this; as to all other questions—finance, industrial development and all questions relating to broad programmes—they should not be allowed to divert our attention at the moment. That is the chief thing facing us today—to resist the danger of being carried away by far-reaching plans and schemes. We must concentrate on the chief and fundamental thing, and not permit attention to be diverted from the main task we have set ourselves, namely, to procure grain and foodstuffs, to procure them through the state, at fixed prices, in the socialist way of the workers' state—and not in the capitalist way, by means of profiteering—and to transport them

to the centre, overcoming the chaos on the railways. It would be a crime on anybody's part to forget this task.

"In order to place the performance of our main task on more or less correct lines, the leaders of all our government bodies, and of the economic councils in particular, must rouse the activities of tens of millions of workers and peasants. For this purpose a broad plan for the reconstruction of Russia will be drawn up. We have sufficient means for it: resources, technical potentialities, raw materials, everything required to enable us to begin this work of reconstruction everywhere, enlisting all the workers and peasants. We shall launch a persistent struggle, comrades, a struggle which will demand heavy sacrifices during this period on the labour front, but it is a struggle we must inevitably wage, because we are suffering from hunger, cold, transport dislocation and typhus. We must combat these evils and begin everywhere to build up our state on the basis of large-scale, machine-industry methods, so as to make our country a cultured country and, by a correct socialist struggle, get out of the quagmire in which the countries of world capitalism and imperialism are at present submerged."

Pravda No. 19,
January 29, 1920

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TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE

February 1

The situation on the railways is catastrophic in the extreme. *The delivery of grain has ceased*. Truly urgent measures are needed to save the country. In the course of two months (February and March) the following measures must be effected (and other relevant measures of a similar nature must be sought):

I. The personal bread ration to be *reduced* for those not working on the railways and *increased* for those working on them.

Let more thousands perish but the country will be saved.

II. Three-fourths of the leading executives of all departments, except the Commissariats of Food and the Army, to be taken for the railways and for repair work for these two months. The work of other commissariats to be discontinued (or reduced to one-tenth) correspondingly for these two months.

III. *Introduce martial law* over an area stretching to 30-50 versts *on either side of the railway line* to mobilise labour to clear the line, and transfer to the *volosts within that area* three-fourths of all high-ranking functionaries of the volost and uyezd executive committees of the gubernia concerned.

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REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS DELIVERED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, SEVENTH CONVOCATION[97] FEBRUARY 2, 1920

Comrades, my report on the activities of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, whose functions in periods between meetings have been carried out by the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, falls naturally into two main subdivisions—the first on foreign policy, the Soviet Republic's international position, and the second on internal development and our main economic tasks. Allow me to present to you in that order the main facts of our work during the period under review, i.e., during the past two months.

As far as the Soviet Republic's international position is concerned, it has been determined in the main by the successes of the Red Army. As you know, the last remnants of Kolchak's army in the Far East have been almost wiped out, while the rivalry and enmity between Japan and America, nominally allies, are becoming more and more obvious and prevent them from fully developing their onslaught against the Soviet Republic. After the annihilation of Yudenich's troops and after the capture, in the South, of Novocherkassk and Rostov-on-Don in early January, their main forces suffered so decisive a blow that the Soviet Republic's

military position radically changed, and although the war was not over, every country saw clearly that its former hopes of crushing the military forces of the Soviet Republic had collapsed.

Acknowledgement of this radical change in the Soviet Republic's international position was shown by the wireless message to us (not delivered officially) of the decision of the Allied Council adopted on January 16 to lift the blockade against the Soviet Republic. The main section of the decision taken by the Council says ... (*reads*).[98]

There is no need for me to criticise the diplomacy contained in this formulation; it is so striking that it is not worth wasting time saying that the attitude of the Allies to Russia remains unchanged. If that is how the Allies understand their policy—that the lifting of the blockade does not change it—then it shows how unsound their policy is. The importance of this decision for us, however, is in its economic, not its political, aspect. Lifting the blockade is a fact of major international significance showing that a new stage in the socialist revolution has begun. For the blockade was in fact the principal, really strong weapon with which the imperialists of the world wanted to strangle Soviet Russia.

At the last Congress of Soviets I had occasion to state and expand the idea that the struggle against Soviet Russia had resulted, not only in the workers and peasants of France, Britain and other advanced countries forcing the imperialists to renounce the struggle, but in the mass of the petty bourgeoisie within these countries becoming opponents of the blockade. And of course, this opposition by the middle sections of the population in countries like Britain and France was bound to influence international imperialist policy. Knowing their brand of diplomacy, we cannot expect them to act in a straightforward manner, without any reservations, without wanting to restore the past, or by some cunning trick or other return to their previous policy, which they cannot pursue openly at the moment. It must be said, however, that on the whole we have gained tremendous victories, that we have even been able to deprive the Allies of a weapon which only they possessed—the navy, despite the fact that waverers tried to scare us by saying the navy

was invincible. Nevertheless, the development of political relations showed that even this invincible navy was in no fit state to fight us. We, who were unable to put up any naval resistance, forced the imperialist powers to abandon this weapon.

Of course, this change in policy on the international scene does not have an immediate effect, but the fact remains that we have now entered the sphere of world-wide international relations, and this enables us to get support from the more advanced countries. It is true that economically and financially these countries are in a sorry plight, they are all going downhill, and we cannot expect much from them; but with the opportunity to develop our own industry, we can count on receiving machinery for production, machinery for the restoration of our industry. And above all, that which had cut us off completely, by means of the blockade, from the advanced countries, has been broken down.

After the Allied Council had been forced to abandon this weapon our victories in the field of international politics continued, the greatest of them being that we succeeded in concluding peace with Estonia. We received a communication from Joffe and Gukovsky today saying: "Today, February 2, at 2 a.m. Moscow time, peace was concluded between Russia and Estonia. The Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Birk, arrived from Revel to sign the document."

Comrades, the text of this peace document which was discussed at great length and is of tremendous importance has been sent by messenger who should arrive tomorrow morning, but we have now received the exact text by telegraph, and it will be distributed tomorrow. It will be discussed and ratified. This document is of the highest importance to us. The peace treaty between Russia and Estonia is of epoch-making significance. We have succeeded in concluding a peace treaty with a government which is also becoming democratic and whose relations with us will now be stable, but which up to now has been supported by the whole imperialist world. Therefore we must regard this as an act of tremendous historical importance.

We know that people who stand between imperialism and democracy usually go over to one side or the other. So you

see, we have undoubtedly gained a victory, because peace has been concluded, and this government must now proceed against our enemy. The theoretical significance of this fact is that in the imperialist epoch the whole world is split into a vast number of big and small states, the small states being absolutely helpless, an insignificant group compared to the rich powers which completely dominate a number of small, weak states. Imperialism is the epoch in which the division of the whole world takes place, when the whole of the world's population is divided into a minority of exploiting, oppressor countries, and a majority of countries with small, weak populations that exist in a state of colonial dependence on the minority.

When we won peace with Estonia we proved that we were able to go forward as a proletarian and communist state. How have we done this? We have shown all the belligerent Entente powers who are opposed to peace that the sympathy we are able to evoke among our opponents and bourgeois governments, the sympathy of a small country, is more powerful than all that military oppression, all that financial aid and all those economic ties which link that small country to the powerful world states. The Entente has seen that it is not only when we use force that we are able to win; we are in a position to refute the lie and slander spread against us by the bourgeois governments of the world when they say the Bolsheviks retain power by force alone. What was it that enabled us to prevail over the combined forces of world imperialism in regard to Estonia, a country which had always suffered violence at the hands of the Russia of the tsars and landowners? It was our proving our ability to renounce, in all sincerity, the use of force at the appropriate moment, in order to change to a peace policy, and so win the sympathy of the bourgeois government of a small country, regardless of all the support given it by international capital. This is a fact of historical significance. Estonia is a small country, a small republic, but she is oppressed economically and militarily in a thousand and one ways by world imperialist capital, so much so that her entire population comes under this oppression. And this peace now proves that we can, in spite of our exhaustion, weakness and disarray, gain the upper hand over the

whiteguard army with its imperialist backing. The powerful Entente knows how to reply to force with even more triumphant force, but this peace proves that we do not have to resort to force to win the sympathy and support of the bourgeoisie.

A most difficult international problem has arisen here. The rate of capitalist development in different countries varies; this development takes place under different conditions, in various ways and by various means. A socialist republic in one country exists alongside all the capitalist countries of the world and causes their bourgeoisie to waver. From this they concluded that our position was a hopeless one; we had defeated the whiteguards by force, but what, they asked, were we going to do about the rest of the world? We shall defeat that too. The peace with Estonia proves that this is no empty phrase. The entire pressure of international capital was overcome in that area where our rejection of the use of force was recognised to be sincere. "Don't make peace with the Bolsheviks, otherwise we shall conquer you by starvation; we shall give you neither financial nor economic aid," said world capital. And Estonia proved to be one of the small, formally independent countries which said to herself, "We rely more on the fact that the Bolsheviks are able to live in peace with other, weaker nations, even with a bourgeois government, than we do on the whole powerful democratic countries of the Entente."

Democracy is most clearly manifested in the fundamental question of war and peace. All the powers are preparing a fresh imperialist war, and this is seen daily by the workers of the world. Any day now America and Japan will hurl themselves at each other; Britain grabbed so many colonies after her victory over Germany that the other imperialist powers will never resign themselves to this. A new fanatical war is being prepared, and the people are aware of this. And just at this moment Russia, with her huge forces, who is accused of intending to fling those forces against a small state as soon as she has finished with Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin—Russia has concluded a democratic peace with Estonia. Furthermore, the terms of the peace treaty provide for a number of territorial concessions on our part which

do not completely correspond to the strict observance of the principle of self-determination of nations, and prove in practice that the question of frontiers is of secondary importance to us, the question of peaceful relations, however, the question of our ability to await the development of the conditions of life of each nation, is not only an important question of principle, it is also a matter in which we have succeeded in winning the confidence of nations hostile to us. It is no accident that we have achieved this in relation to Estonia; it is evidence that the weak proletarian republic, existing in isolation and apparently helpless, has begun to win to its side countries dependent on the imperialist states—and they constitute the vast majority. That is why our peace with Estonia is of such great historical significance. No matter how the Entente strives to start a war—even if it succeeds in turning peace once again into war—the fact will remain, firmly established in history, that despite all the pressure of international capital we were able to inspire greater confidence in a small country ruled by the bourgeoisie than the so-called democratic, but in reality predatory, imperialist bourgeoisie.

We by chance came to possess some very interesting documents showing how our policy compared with that of the allegedly democratic, but in actual fact predatory, powers of the whole world, which please permit me to read to you. These documents were furnished by a whiteguard officer or official named Oleinikov who was commissioned by one whiteguard government to hand over some highly important documents to another. But he handed them over to us instead.[99] (*Applause.*) It proved possible to send these documents to Russia, and I shall read them to you, although it will take some time to do so. Nevertheless, they are very interesting for they very clearly reveal the hidden springs of policy. The first document is a telegram to Minister Gulkevich from Sazonov:

Paris, October 14, 1919, No. 668.

S. D. Sazonov conveys his respects to Konstantin Nikolayevich, and has the honour to enclose for his information copies of a telegram from B. A. Bakhmetev, No. 1050, and a telegram from I. I. Sukin, No. 23, on the situation in the Baltic Provinces.

Then comes a more interesting document—a telegram from Washington dated October 11:

Received October 12, 1919. File No. 3346.
Bakhmetev to the Minister.
Washington, October 11, 1919, No. 1050.
Further to my telegram No. 1045.
(In code) The State Department acquainted me verbally with the instructions given to Gade. He is appointed the Commissar of the American Government in the Baltic Provinces of Russia. He is not accredited to any Russian Government. His mission is to observe and inform. His behaviour must not lead the local population to expect that the American Government could agree to support separatist trends going beyond autonomy. On the contrary, the American Government trusts that the population of the Baltic Provinces will help their Russian brothers in their work of general state importance. The instructions are based on the interpretation of the agreement of the Allied governments with the Supreme Ruler as outlined in my memorandum of June 17 to the government. Gade has been given extracts from the recent speeches of the President in which he fulminates against Bolshevism.

So, the American Government intimates that its representative can issue any kind of instructions but may not support independence, i.e., may not guarantee the independence of these states. This is what directly or indirectly came to light, and Estonia could not be kept in ignorance of the fact that she was being deceived by the Great Powers. Of course, everyone could have guessed this, but now we have the documents and they will be published:

Received October 12, 1919. File No. 3347
Sukin to the Minister.
Omsk, October 9, 1919, No. 28.
(In code) Knox has given the Supreme Ruler the message of the British War Office in which the latter warns of the inclination of the Baltic states to conclude a peace with the Bolsheviks who guarantee them immediate recognition of their independence. At the same time the British War Office raises the question of the advisability of paralysing this pledge by satisfying, in its turn, the wishes of the states indicated. We replied to Knox by referring to the principles outlined in the Note of the Supreme Ruler to the Powers on June 4, and, in addition, we pointed out that the conclusion of a peace between the Baltic states and the Bolsheviks would be undoubtedly fraught with danger since this would permit the release of part of the Soviet forces and would clear the way to the infiltration of Bolshevism in the West. The mere fact that they are ready to talk peace is in our opinion evidence of the utter demoralisation of the parties of these self-governing entities

which cannot protect themselves from the penetration of aggressive Bolshevism.

Expressing the conviction that the Powers could not approve of the further spread of Bolshevism, we pointed to the necessity of withdrawing all aid from the Baltic states since this would be a real means of exerting influence by the Powers, and is more advisable than competition in promises with the Bolsheviks, who now have nothing to lose.

In transmitting the above, I would request you to make similar representations in Paris and London; we are making a special approach to Bakhmetev.

Received October 9, 1919. File No. 3286.

Sablin to the Minister.

London, October 7, 1919, No. 677.

(In code) In a letter to Guchkov, the Director of Military Operations of the War Office, to whom Guchkov made an offer of our shipping in order to facilitate the delivery of supplies to Yudenich by the British, states that in the opinion of the War Office Yudenich has all that he requires at the moment, and that Britain is experiencing some difficulty in providing further supplies. He adds, however, that as we have shipping, we could arrange supplies for Yudenich on a commercial basis, providing we obtain credits. At the same time General Radcliffe admits that Yudenich's army must be properly equipped since it is "the only force among the Baltic states able to engage in active operations against the Bolsheviks".

Minister to Bakhmetev in Washington.

Paris, September 30, 1919, No. 2442.

(In code) From a strictly confidential Swedish source I learn that the American envoy in Stockholm, Morris, is talking about growing sympathy in America towards the Bolsheviks and of intentions to cease aid to Kolchak in order to enter into contacts with Moscow in the interests of American trade. Such statements on the part of an official representative make a strange impression.

Received October 5, 1919. File No. 3244.

Bakhmetev to the Minister.

Washington, October 4, 1919, No. 1021.

Further to your telegram No. 2442.

(In code) The State Department informed me in confidence that it is true that the envoy in Stockholm, Morris, and particularly Hapgood in Copenhagen, are well known for their Left sympathies, but that they have no influence or authority here, and that the government is obliged to admonish them from time to time, categorically pointing out that American policy is one of undeviating support of our government in the struggle against the Bolsheviks.

Here are all the documents which we shall publish and which clearly show how the battle went on around Estonia, how the Entente, Britain and France, together with Kol-

chak and America, all brought pressure to bear on Estonia with the one aim of preventing the signing of a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, and how the Bolsheviks, pledging themselves to territorial concessions and guaranteeing independence, won this trial of strength. I state that this victory is of gigantic historical significance, because it has been gained without the use of force. This victory over world imperialism is a victory that is bringing the Bolsheviks the sympathy of the whole world. This victory by no means denotes that universal peace will be concluded immediately; but it does show that we-represent the peace interests of the majority of the world's population against the imperialist war-mongers. Such an assessment of the situation has induced bourgeois Estonia, an opponent of communism, to conclude peace with us. Since we, a proletarian state, a Soviet republic, are concluding a peace treaty, since we are acting in a spirit of peace towards bourgeois governments oppressed by the great magnates of imperialism, we must be able to decide from this how our international policy is to be shaped.

The main task we set ourselves is to defeat the exploiters and to win to our side the waverers—this is a task of historic significance. Among the waverers are a whole number of bourgeois states which, as bourgeois states, detest us, but which, on the other hand, as oppressed states, prefer peace with us. This explains the peace with Estonia. This peace is, of course, only a first step, and its influence will only be felt in the future, but that it will be felt is a fact. Up to now we have negotiated with Latvia only through the Red Cross,[100] and the same is true of our negotiations with the Polish Government. I repeat—the peace with Estonia is bound to influence events because the basis is identical; the same attempts are being made to goad Latvia and Poland into making war on Russia as were made in the case of Estonia. Perhaps these attempts will prove successful, and since war with Poland is possible, we must be vigilant, but we are certain—this has been demonstrated by our main achievements—that we can conclude peace and make concessions which permit the development of any form of democracy. This is now especially important because the Polish question is particularly acute. We have received a

number of communications indicating that apart from bourgeois, conservative, landowning Poland, apart from the pressure being exerted by all capitalist parties in Poland, all the Entente powers are doing their utmost to incite Poland to make war against us.

As you know, the Council of People's Commissars has issued an appeal to the working people of Poland.[101] We are going to ask you to endorse this appeal as a means of fighting that campaign of calumny in which Polish landowning circles are engaged. We shall submit an additional text of an appeal to the working people of Poland. This appeal will be a blow to the imperialist powers, who are doing their utmost to incite Poland against us; for us the interests of the majority of the people take first place.

I shall now acquaint you with a telegram intercepted by us yesterday, which illustrates the attempts of American capital to present us in a certain light and thereby drag us into a war with Poland. The telegram says (*reads*). I have said and heard nothing of the sort, but they are able to lie because it is not for nothing that they spend their money on spreading lying rumours that have a definite aim. Their bourgeois government guarantees them this. (*Continues reading the telegram.*) This telegram was sent from Europe to America and was paid for out of capitalist funds; it serves as a shameless means of provoking a war with Poland. American capital is doing its utmost to bring pressure to bear on Poland and does this unashamedly, making it appear that the Bolsheviks want to finish with Kolchak and Denikin in order to throw all their "iron troops" against Poland.

It is important that we should here and now endorse the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, and then we must do what we did previously in relation to other states, and also what we did in regard to the troops of Kolchak and Denikin. We must immediately appeal to the Polish people and explain the real state of affairs. We know full well that this method of ours has a most positive effect in tending to disrupt the ranks of our enemy. And in the end, this method will lead on to the path we need, the path on to which it has led the working population of all countries. This policy must make a definite beginning—no matter

how difficult this may prove—and once a beginning is made, we shall carry it through to completion.

I must mention that we have been pursuing the same policy in respect of all other countries. We invited Georgia and Azerbaijan to conclude an agreement against Denikin. They refused, pleading non-interference in the affairs of other countries. We shall see how the workers and peasants of Georgia and Azerbaijan regard this.

This policy has been applied even more cautiously in respect of the Western nations than in dealing with the nations of Russia. It involved such countries as Latvia, Estonia, Poland and, on the other hand, a number of Eastern countries whose developmental level is the same as that of most of those colonial countries which constitute the majority of the world's population. They are kept down by Britain, who continues to hold colonial slaves under her sway. Our policy in relation to West-European countries has been very cautious—it will take some time for them to get over their own Kerensky period—but our policy in the East must be even more cautious and patient, for here we are dealing with countries that are much more backward, are under the oppressive influence of religious fanaticism, are imbued with greater distrust of the Russian people, and for decades and centuries were oppressed by the tsarist government's capitalist and imperialist policy, by the policy conducted towards these nations by Russia as the dominant nation.

We have granted autonomy to the Bashkir Republic.[102] We must found an autonomous Tatar Republic.[103] We shall continue the same policy in relation to all the Eastern peoples, and say to ourselves that we, who are faced by a huge front of imperialist powers, we, who are fighting imperialism, represent an alliance that requires close military unity, and any attempt to violate this unity we regard as absolutely impermissible, as a betrayal of the struggle against international imperialism. However, in implementing this policy we must be even more cautious. For if the European countries have to go through a Kerensky period, in the countries that are at a lower developmental level there are even greater elements of distrust, and it will require more time to influence them. We support the independence

and sovereignty of these countries. We appeal to their working people. We say: unity of the military forces is imperative; any deviation from this unity is impermissible.

We are confident that, by systematically pursuing our policy of close alliance, we shall achieve greater success than before in our relations with the peoples of the East. And our success is already great. The Soviet Republic enjoys tremendous popularity among all the Eastern peoples for the same reason that made it possible for us to conclude a peace treaty with a small Western state, because they see in us an unswerving fighter against imperialism, because ours is the only republic which is waging a war against imperialism and is capable of utilising every situation without the use of force, and which is also able to gain a victory by renouncing the use of force.

Needless to say, a far more perfected variety of this policy is being implemented in relation to the Ukrainian Republic. Here the problem has been simplified by the prior conclusion of an agreement between the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[104] On the basis of this agreement, which implies a close federation of both republics in the struggle against the imperialist countries, we are building an ever closer alliance. As a result of their bitter experience of Denikin's rule, the mass of Ukrainian peasants and workers are becoming convinced that only the closest alliance between the Ukraine and the Russian Republic will be really invincible in the face of international imperialism, and that at the time of struggle against imperialism there is nothing to be gained by the separation of the Ukrainian state, since imperialism will take advantage of every division to crush Soviet power. Such a division is criminal. Our policy is taking deep root in the Ukraine, and we are confident that the forthcoming All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets of Workers and Peasants will officially endorse this policy. These are the few remarks to which I must limit myself on the question of the international situation. I shall ask this session to endorse all the practical proposals I have to make (I have enumerated them) on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In passing on to the work of internal development I must first deal with certain measures taken by our government, and then proceed to the most important matter of all—the change-over to a new course, the transition from military tasks to those of state organisation.

In regard to our internal policy for the two months under review, among the main measures which more or less stand out from a number of current tasks, the following decision requiring the endorsement of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee is of particular importance. This is the decision to abolish the death penalty. As you know, immediately after the main victory over Denikin, after the capture of Rostov, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, who is in charge of the Cheka, submitted a proposal to the Council of People's Commissars, and had it endorsed in his own department, that the passing of all death sentences by the Cheka be abolished. When bourgeois democracy in Europe does all in its power to spread the lies that Soviet Russia is predominantly terrorist, when this lie is spread about us by bourgeois democracy and by the socialists of the Second International, when Kautsky writes a special book entitled *Terrorism and Communism* in which he declares that communist power is based on terrorism, then you can well imagine the kind of lies spread on this subject. In order to refute this lie we have decided on the step taken by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars, and which now needs the approval of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

We were forced to use terror in response to the terror employed by the Entente, when the mighty powers of the world flung their hordes against us, stopping at nothing. We could not have lasted two days had we not replied to these attempts of officers and whiteguards in a merciless fashion. This meant the use of terror, but this was forced on us by the terrorist methods of the Entente. But as soon as we had gained a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after the capture of Rostov, we renounced capital punishment, and have therefore proved that we intend to carry out our own programme as we had promised. We say that the use of violence arises from the need to crush the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists.

When this is accomplished we shall renounce all extraordinary measures. We have proved this in practice. And I think, I hope, and I am confident that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee will unanimously endorse this measure of the Council of People's Commissars and will implement it in such a way that it will be impossible to apply the death penalty in Russia. Needless to say, any attempt by the Entente to resume methods of war will force us to reintroduce the former terror; we know that we are living in a time of the law of the jungle, when kind words are of no avail. This is what we had in mind, and as soon as the decisive struggle was over, we immediately began to abolish measures which all other powers apply without any time limit having been set.

Further, I should like to refer to the discussion on Workers' Inspection. There is to be a special report on this subject, and it would be wrong of me to dwell too long on it. The most important problem confronting us here is that of drawing the mass of people into administrative work. This is a more acute problem than the task of large-scale development. You will be presented with detailed plans, and when you have discussed and amended them, you will understand that this development must continue with far greater participation by the mass of the workers. This is our main task, with which it is extremely difficult to get to grips in the existing chaos, but nevertheless we are approaching it steadily.

There is another question before us—the question of the co-operatives. We have set ourselves the task of uniting the whole population in co-operatives that differ from those previously existing and which at best embraced only the upper sections of the population.

Socialism would be impossible if it did not make use of the technical knowledge, culture and the apparatus created by bourgeois, capitalist civilisation. Part of this apparatus is the co-operative movement whose growth is all the greater the higher the level of capitalist development in a country. We have set our co-operative movement the task of embracing the whole country. Up to now the co-operative movement involved only top sections and benefited those able to pay their dues. The working people, however, were

unable to make use of its services. We have resolutely broken with this type of co-operative, but not so that the co-operative movement as such is completely wiped out, for in March and April 1918 we set the co-operatives the task of drawing in the whole population. If there are any co-operators who value the ideas of the founders of the co-operative movement (the old aims of co-operation were to satisfy the needs of the working people), they will sympathise with this aim. We are certain that we have the sympathy of the majority of the members of the co-operative organisations, although we are by no means under the illusion that we have won to our side the majority of the leaders, who subscribe to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views, who see co-operation merely as another form of capitalist economy and as the notorious freedom of trade which means fortunes for the few and ruin for the majority. Instead of this, we announced the country-wide task of the co-operatives to really begin catering for the working people so that they embrace the whole population. This could not be accomplished at once. We have set ourselves this aim and have worked systematically, and will go on working, to achieve it, so that ultimately all the population will be united in co-operatives; and we can say with certainty that the whole of the Soviet Republic, perhaps in a few weeks, or in a few months, will become one great co-operative of working people. After this the development of independent activity by the working people, their participation in state development will proceed along even broader lines.

In accomplishing this, we have decided that all types, not only consumers', but producers', credit, and other co-operatives should, by appropriate stages and with due care, be amalgamated into a Central Union of Consumers' Societies. We are confident that our steps in this direction will meet with the approval of the Central Executive Committee and functionaries in the localities who, after the formal amalgamation of the co-operatives, will, by their work of economic development, into which they will draw the majority of the workers and peasants, achieve what we regard as one of the major tasks—that of making the co-operative movement another prime factor in the struggle against red tape, this legacy from the old capitalist state, a struggle

which our programme also declares to be of the highest importance. We shall carry on this struggle in all offices and departments by every means and, incidentally, through the amalgamation of the co-operatives and by shifting the appeal from the bourgeois top people in the co-operatives to the genuine working people, who must all undertake independent work in co-operative organisation.

From among the problems of internal development I now wish to refer to what has been done in the sphere of agriculture. In order to place land tenure on a proper basis, the People's Commissar for Agriculture in July 1919 issued a circular on measures against the frequent redistribution of allotted land. This circular was published on July 1 in *Izvestia* and was included in the *Collection of Statutes and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government*. This circular is important because it meets the many suggestions and demands of the peasants who pointed out that the frequent reallotment of the land in conditions of small-scale farming prevented better labour discipline and the higher productivity of labour. This view is shared by the Council of People's Commissars which has instructed the Commissariat of Agriculture to work out a draft decree on reallotment procedures. This draft will be considered shortly. Similarly, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture has set itself the task of implementing a number of urgent measures to restore livestock and farm equipment. In this connection the systematic efforts of local officials themselves are extremely important, and we hope that the members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee will bring the appropriate pressure to bear on the authorities and render assistance, so that these measures of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture can be put into effect in the shortest space of time.

I shall now turn to the last, and in reality, the most important problem of our development—the problem of the labour armies and the labour mobilisation of the population. The most difficult task in the sharp turns and changes of social life is that of taking due account of the peculiar features of each transition. How socialists should fight within a capitalist society is not a difficult problem and has long since been settled. Nor is it difficult to visualise

advanced socialist society. This problem has also been settled. But the most difficult task of all is how, in practice, to effect the transition from the old, customary, familiar capitalism to the new socialism, as yet unborn and without any firm foundations. At best this transition will take many years, in the course of which our policy will be divided into a number of even smaller stages. And the whole difficulty of the task which falls to our lot, the whole difficulty of politics and the art of politics, lies in the ability to take into account the specific tasks of each of these transitions.

We have only just solved—though not yet fully—the problem of the war in its principal and basic features. Our main task was to repel at all costs the attack of the whiteguards. Everything for the war effort, we said, and this was the correct policy. We are fully aware that it caused unparalleled hardships in the rear such as cold, famine and devastation. But the very fact that the Red Army—which, incidentally, is appreciated in the way shown by the examples I have read out to you—has resolved this problem in a most backward country proves that new forces do exist in the country. Otherwise the creation of this model army, and its victory over far better equipped armies, would have been inconceivable. But now we have geared the entire state apparatus to this task and have succeeded in surmounting the specific features of the problem—the subordination of everything to the war effort—the situation demands a swift and sharp change in policy. We have not yet finished the war. We must maintain our military readiness intact, we must destroy Denikin's troops, we must show the landowners and capitalists of every country that if they want to deal with Russia by war, they will meet the same fate as Kolchak and Denikin. We must not take a single step, therefore, which would weaken our military strength. At the same time, however, we must switch the whole country on to a different course, reconstruct its whole mechanism. We can no longer gear everything to the war effort, and we have no need to, because in the main the problem of the war has been solved.

The task of the transition from war to peaceful development arises in such peculiar conditions that we cannot

disband the army, since we have to allow, say, for the possibility of an attack by that selfsame Poland or any of the powers which the Entente continues to incite against us. This specific feature of the problem of not being able to reduce our military forces, yet at the same time having to switch the whole of the Soviet state machine which is geared to war on to the new course of peaceful economic development, demands exceptional attention. It is the type of problem that general formulas, the general provisions of a programme, general communist principles cannot cope with, but which requires that the specific features of the transition from capitalism to communism be taken into consideration, the transition from the position of a country whose whole attention has been concentrated on the war to the position of a country which has won a decisive military victory and must go on to solve economic questions by military methods, because the situation, as you all realise, is extremely grave. The end of the winter will bring, has already brought, the working people unbelievable hardships—cold, famine, devastation. We must overcome this at all costs. We know that we can do this. It has been proved by the enthusiasm of the Red Army.

If, up to the present, we were able to battle on, surrounded on all sides and cut off from the richest areas of grain and coal, now that we possess all this, now that it is possible to solve the problems of economic development jointly with the Ukraine, we can solve the main problem—to acquire large quantities of grain and foodstuffs, deliver them to the industrial centres so that industrial development can begin. We must concentrate all our efforts on this task. It is inadmissible to allow ourselves to be diverted from it to any other practical task. It has to be solved by military methods, with absolute ruthlessness and by the absolute suppression of all other interests. We know that a whole number of perfectly legitimate demands and interests will go by the board, but if it were not for these sacrifices, we should not have won the war. The situation now demands that we make a sharp and swift turn towards the creation of a basis for peaceful economic development. This basis must be the acquisition of great stocks of food and their transportation to the central region; it is the task of the railways to

deliver raw materials and provisions. From August 1917 to August 1918 we collected 30 million poods of grain, in the second year 110 million, and now in five months 90 million have been collected by our Commissariat of Food, collected by socialist, not capitalist methods, by compulsory delivery of grain by the peasants at fixed prices, and not by selling on the free market—and this means that we have found the way. We are certain that it is the correct way and that it will enable us to achieve results which will ensure tremendous economic development.

All our forces must be dedicated to this task, all our military forces, which came to the fore in war-time organisation, must be switched on to this new path. This is the specific situation, the specific transition, which engendered the idea of labour armies and led to the law on the creation of the first labour army in the Urals and of the Ukrainian labour army. It was followed by the law on the utilisation of the army reserves for civilian labour and the decree issued by the Soviet government on the Committees for Labour Conscription.[105] All these laws will be outlined to you by a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in a fully detailed report. I naturally cannot trespass on this ground because the special report will throw sufficient light upon it. I only emphasise its significance in relation to our general policy, the significance of this transition which confronts us with its specific tasks, for which we must redouble our efforts like soldiers, to organise them so that we can lay in large stocks of food and deliver them to the industrial centres. To achieve this we must at all costs create labour armies, organise ourselves like an army, reduce, even close down a whole number of institutions so that in the next few months, no matter what happens, we can overcome transport dislocation, and emerge from this desperate situation of cold, famine and impoverishment brought by the end of winter. We must and can get out of this situation. When the All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorses all the measures connected with labour conscription and the labour armies, when it has succeeded in instilling these ideas in the broad mass of the population and demands that they be put into practice by local officials—we are absolutely convinced that then we shall be able

to cope with this most difficult of tasks, while not in the least degree weakening our military readiness.

We must at all costs, without weakening our military readiness, switch the Soviet Republic on to the new course of economic development. This task must be accomplished in the next few weeks, possibly months. Every Soviet or Party organisation must do everything in its power to end the transport dislocation and increase the grain stocks.

Then, and only then, shall we have a basis, a sound basis for industrial development on a wide scale, for the electrification of Russia. In order to prove to the population, and in particular to the peasants, that our extensive plans in this field are not fantasies, but are borne out by and based on technology and science, I think we should adopt a resolution—I hope the Central Executive Committee will endorse it—recommending that the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat of Agriculture jointly draft a plan for the electrification of Russia.

Thanks to the aid of the State Publishing House and the energy of the workers at the former Kushnerev Printing Works, now the 17th State Printing Works, I succeeded in getting Krzhizhanovsky's pamphlet *The Main Tasks of the Electrification of Russia* published at very short notice, and tomorrow it will be distributed to all members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. This pamphlet of Comrade Krzhizhanovsky's, who works in the Electro-Technical Sub-Department of the Supreme Economic Council, summarises what has already been achieved and raises questions, the popularisation of which, not the practical application, is now one of the most important tasks.

I hope that the Central Executive Committee will adopt this resolution which, in the name of the Central Executive Committee, instructs the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to work out in the course of the next few months—our practical tasks during this period will be different—with the aid of scientists and engineers a broad and complete plan for the electrification of Russia. The author of this pamphlet is absolutely correct in choosing as its motto the saying: "The age of steam is the age of the bourgeoisie, the age of electricity is the age of socialism." We must have a new technical foun-

dation for the new economic development. This new technical foundation is electricity, and everything will have to be built on this foundation, but it will take many long years. We shall not be afraid of working ten or twenty years, but we must prove to the peasants that in place of the old separation of industry from agriculture, this very deep contradiction on which capitalism thrived and which sowed dissension between the industrial and agricultural workers, we set ourselves the task of returning to the peasant the loan we received from him in the form of grain, for we know that paper money, of course, is not the equivalent of bread. We must repay this loan by organising industry and supplying the peasants with its products. We must show the peasants that the organisation of industry on the basis of modern, advanced technology, on electrification which will provide a link between town and country, will put an end to the division between town and country, will make it possible to raise the level of culture in the countryside and to overcome, even in the most remote corners of the land, backwardness, ignorance, poverty, disease and barbarism. We shall tackle the problem as soon as we have dealt with our current, basic task, and we shall not allow ourselves to be deflected for a single moment from the fundamental practical task.

In the next few months all our energies must be concentrated on food deliveries and the extension of our resources of food supplies. There must not be the slightest departure from this. At the same time let the scientists and technicians produce a long-term plan for the electrification of all Russia.[106] Let the links which we have established with the outside world, with capitalist Europe, that gateway which we made for ourselves by concluding peace with Estonia, serve to provide us immediately with essential technical aid. When, in the next few months, we have solved the basic problems of transport and foods supplies, when we have solved the problem of labour conscription, on which problems we shall wholly concentrate all our energies, not allowing ourselves to be deflected from this by anything else for a few months—when we have accomplished this we shall prove that we can go on with developmental tasks that will last many years and put the whole of Russia on to

an advanced technological footing, abolishing the division between town and country, and making it possible to conquer completely and decisively the backwardness of the countryside, its scattered economy and its ignorance, from which stem all the stagnation, all the backwardness, all the oppression that have existed up to now. And in this matter, that of the peaceful struggle on the bloodless front of the reorganisation of industry, we shall, if we employ all our military skill and all our energy, and concentrate all our forces on the fulfilment of this task, achieve success that will be even more decisive, even more glorious, than those we have won in the military field. (*Applause*.)

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Published according to the verbatim report

DRAFT (OR THESES) OF THE R.C.P.'S REPLY TO THE LETTER OF THE INDEPENDENT SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY[107]

Having at last received an *official* proposal from the Independents (German) to conduct negotiations we, as a party, must now answer them with complete frankness, without the diplomacy that is, to a certain extent, obligatory for the Communist International.

The answer must be such as will explain the issue to the masses of workers who sympathise with the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet system—workers that not only in Germany, but also in France and Britain and a number of other countries, are being *deceived* (deliberately and unwittingly, i.e., by force of self-deception) by leaders who in words alone subscribe to the slogans that are popular among the workers (dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power) but are actually conducting their work, propaganda, agitation, etc., in the old way, not in the spirit of these slogans but in a spirit that contradicts these slogans.

The following is a rough draft of the theses for this answer (from the R.C.P. to the German Independent Social-Democratic Party):

(the sequence of the points must also be changed)

1. The dictatorship of the proletariat implies the ability, readiness and determination to attract to our side (to the side of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat) the entire mass of working and exploited people by means of revolutionary measures, by expropriating the exploiters.

There is nothing of this in the day-to-day agitation of the German Independents (in *Freiheit*,[108] for instance). Nor do the Longuetists have anything of it.

2. In particular, such agitation is especially necessary for rural proletarians and semi-proletarians and also for small peasants (peasants who do not employ hired labour even at the height of the harvest, etc., peasants who sell little or no grain). These sections of the population must have explained to them daily, popularly, with extreme simplicity and concreteness that when the proletariat has seized state power, it will *give* them an immediate improvement in their conditions *by expropriating the landowners*. It will deliver them from the yoke of the big landowners, will hand over big estates to them in their entirety, will free them from debt, etc., etc. The same applies to the urban non-proletarian, or not fully proletarian, mass of working people.

The German Independents (like the Longuetists) do not carry on such agitation.

3. The Soviet system is the destruction of that bourgeois falsehood known as "freedom of the press"—i.e., freedom to bribe the press, freedom for the rich, the capitalists, to buy up newspapers, freedom for the capitalists to buy up hundreds of newspapers and in this way fabricate the so-called public opinion.

The German Independents (when speaking of them it is always to be understood that the Longuetists, the British Independents, etc., etc., are included) do not admit this truth, do not spread it, do not agitate daily for the abolition by revolutionary means of the enslavement by capital of the press which bourgeois democrats falsely call freedom of the press.

The Independents do not carry on any such agitation and recognise Soviet power by way of lip-service alone (*Lippenbekenntniss*); in actual fact they are fully weighed down by the prejudices of bourgeois democracy.

They cannot explain *the main thing*, the expropriation of the printing works and warehouses and the supplies of paper, because they do not understand it.

4. The same applies to freedom of assembly (which is a falsehood as long as the rich own the best buildings and buy up public buildings), to "arming of the *people*", to

freedom of conscience (=freedom for capital to buy or bribe whole church organisations for the purpose of doping the masses with the opium of religion), and to all other bourgeois-democratic liberties.

5. The dictatorship of the proletariat means the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by a *single* class, the proletariat, and by its revolutionary vanguard at that. To demand that this vanguard should *first* ensure the support of the *majority of the people* through elections to bourgeois parliaments, bourgeois constituent assemblies, etc., i.e., by elections held *while wage-slavery still exists*, while the exploiters exist and exercise their oppression, and while the means of production are privately owned—to demand this or to assume it is actually abandoning the standpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat and going over to the standpoint of bourgeois democracy.

That is how the German Independents and the French Longuetists act. These parties' repetition of the petty-bourgeois democrats' phrases about the majority of the "people" (deceived by the bourgeoisie and crushed by capital) places them objectively on the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.

6. The dictatorship of the proletariat implies and signifies a clear concept of the truth that the proletariat, because of its objective economic position in every capitalist society, *correctly* expresses the interests of the *entire mass* of working and exploited people, all semi-proletarians (i.e., those who live partly by the sale of their labour-power), all small peasants and similar categories.

These sections do not follow the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties (including the "socialist" parties of the Second International) by the free expression of their will (as petty-bourgeois democrats assume) but because they are directly deceived by the bourgeoisie, because of pressure by capital and because of the self-deception of the petty-bourgeois leaders.

The proletariat will attract these sections of the population (semi-proletarians and small peasants) to its side, and can attract them to its side, only *after* it has achieved a victory, only after it has won state power, that is, after the proletariat has overthrown the bourgeoisie, and emancipated

all working people from the yoke of capital and *shown* them in practice the benefits (the benefits of freedom from the exploiters) accruing from proletarian state power.

This is the concept that constitutes the basis and essence of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the German Independents and French Longuetists do not understand it, do not spread it among the masses and do not propagandise it daily.

7. The dictatorship of the proletariat implies a recognition of the necessity to suppress the resistance of the exploiters by force, and the readiness, ability and determination to do it. The bourgeoisie, even the most republican and democratic bourgeoisie (for instance, in Germany, Switzerland and the U.S.A.), have regular recourse to pogroms, lynching, assassination, armed violence and terror against Communists and actually against all revolutionary steps taken by the proletariat; to reject force or terror under such circumstances is tantamount to turning into a snivelling petty bourgeois, to spreading reactionary petty-bourgeois illusions about social peace and, to put it concretely, is tantamount to fear of the belligerent army officer.

The most criminal and most reactionary imperialist war of 1914-18 trained many tens of thousands of reactionary officers and pushed them into the forefront of politics in all countries, even the most democratic republics; these officers prepare and effect acts of terror for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, for the benefit of capital against the proletariat.

The attitude to terror displayed by the German Independents and the French Longuetists in their parliamentary speeches, in newspaper articles and in all their propaganda and agitation is nothing less than the complete rejection of the real dictatorship of the proletariat, is an actual changeover to the position of the petty-bourgeois democrat and is *corrupting* the revolutionary consciousness of the workers.

8. The same is true of civil war. Following the imperialist war, when we are confronted with reactionary generals and officers who employ terror against the proletariat, when we are confronted with the fact that the present policy of all bourgeois states is the *preparation* of *fresh* imperialist

wars—wars are not only being deliberately prepared but are objectively inevitable as a result of all their politics—under these conditions, in such circumstances to bemoan a civil war against the exploiters, to condemn it and to fear it is tantamount to becoming a reactionary.

It means fearing the victory of the workers that may possibly cost tens of thousands of lives and allowing for certain another imperialist bloodbath that yesterday cost millions of lives and will tomorrow cost millions more.

It means giving real *encouragement* to the reactionary and rapacious tendencies, schemes and preparations of the bourgeois generals and officers.

Such is the reactionary nature of the sugary, petty-bourgeois, sentimental position of the German Independents and the French Longuetists in the question of the civil war. They close their eyes to the intrigues of the White Guard and to its training and formation by the bourgeoisie and hypocritically, pharisaically (or cowardly) turn their backs on work to create a Red Guard, a proletarian Red Army that is capable of crushing the resistance of the exploiters.

9. The dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power imply a clear notion of the need to *break*, to smash to smithereens the bourgeois (even if it is republican-democratic) state machinery, the courts, the bureaucracy, both civil and military, etc.

The German Independents and the French Longuetists do not display any consciousness of this truth, nor do they carry on day-to-day agitation on behalf of it. Worse even—they conduct *all* their agitation in the *contrary* spirit.

10. Every revolution (as distinguished from a reform) by its very nature implies a crisis, and a very deep crisis at that, both political and economic. This is irrespective of the crisis brought about by the war.

It is the task of the revolutionary party of the proletariat to explain to the workers and peasants that they must have the courage to meet this crisis boldly and find in revolutionary measures *a source of strength* with which to overcome the crisis. Only by surmounting the greatest crises with revolutionary enthusiasm, with revolutionary energy, with revolutionary preparedness to make the greatest sacrifices, can the proletariat defeat the exploiters and

liberate mankind entirely from wars, the oppression of capital and wage-slavery.

There is no other way, because the reformist attitude to capitalism yesterday engendered the imperialist bloodbath (and will certainly-do the same tomorrow) involving millions of people and endless crises.

This is the main idea without which the dictatorship of the proletariat is an empty phrase; the Independents and the Longuetists do not understand it and do not include it in their agitation and propaganda, do not explain it to the masses.

11. The Independents and the Longuetists do not develop and do not make more profound the consciousness of the masses that the reformism that factually dominated in the Second International (1889-1914) and destroyed it was decadent and ruinous; on the contrary they dull that consciousness, they hide the disease and do not reveal it, do not expose it.

12. On leaving the Second International and condemning it verbally (in Crispien's pamphlet, for instance) the Independents actually held out a hand to Friedrich Adler, a member of the Austrian party of the Noskes and Scheidemanns.

The Independents tolerate among their number writers who completely reject the basic concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This divergence of word and deed is typical of the entire policy of the *leaders* of the Independent Party in Germany and of the Longuetists in France. It is precisely the leaders who share the prejudices of the petty-bourgeois democrats and of the upper stratum of the proletariat that has been corrupted by reformism, contrary to the revolutionary sympathies of the *masses* of workers who gravitate towards the Soviet system.

13. The Independents and the Longuetists do not understand and do not explain to the masses that the imperialist superprofits of the advanced countries enabled them (and still enable them) to *bribe* the top stratum of the proletariat, to throw them some crumbs from the superprofits (obtained from the colonies and from the financial exploitation of weak countries), to create a privileged section of skilled workers, etc.

Without the exposure of this evil, without a struggle against both the trade union bureaucracy and all manifestations of petty-bourgeois guildism, against the working-class aristocracy, the privileges of the upper stratum of workers, without the ruthless removal from the revolutionary party of those imbued with this spirit, without an appeal to the *lower strata*, to ever wider sections of the *masses*, to the real *majority* of the exploited—without all this there can be no question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

14. This unwillingness or inability to break with the top stratum of workers who are infected with imperialism, is also found among the Independents and the Longuetists in their not conducting agitation for the direct, unqualified support for *all* insurrections and revolutionary movements of *colonial* peoples.

Under such circumstances the condemnation of colonial policy and of imperialism is either sheer hypocrisy or the empty sighing of a stupid philistine.

15. The Independents and Longuetists do not carry on agitation among the troops (that they join the forces *for the purpose* of preparing their going over to the side of the workers *against* the bourgeoisie). They do not create organisations for this work.

They do not respond to the violence of the bourgeoisie, to *their* endless contraventions of "legality" (both during the imperialist war and *after* it) using for this the regular propaganda of *illegal organisations* and *creating* such organisations.

Unless there is a combination of legal and illegal work, of legal and illegal organisations, there can be no question of a truly revolutionary party of the proletariat in Germany, in Switzerland, in Britain, in France or in the U.S.A.

16. By and large, all propaganda and agitation, all organisational work of the Independents and the Longuetists is more petty-bourgeois-democratic than revolutionary-proletarian—it is pacifist and not social-revolutionary.

In view of this the "recognition" of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Soviet power remains purely verbal.

Summary. In the prevailing situation the R.C.P. deems the only correct solution to be not to unite with the Independents and the Longuetists in one International, but to *bide our time* until the revolutionary masses of the French and German workers *correct* the weakness, errors, prejudices and inconsistencies of such parties as the Independents and the Longuetists.

In the opinion of the R.C.P. there is no place for such parties in the Communist International.

The R.C.P., however, does not reject *conferences* with all parties that desire to confer with it and know its opinion.

Published in March 1920

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE RAILWAYMEN OF MOSCOW JUNCTION[109] FEBRUARY 5, 1920

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

V. I. Lenin, greeted with stormy applause, delivered a long speech.

"The most outstanding fact in the world situation," said Comrade Lenin, "is the peace with Estonia. This peace is a window into Europe. It opens up before us the possibility of beginning an exchange of goods with the West. Our enemies maintained that the revolution in the West is far away and that we would not be able to hold out without it. We have not only held out, however, we have won a victory.

"We won without obtaining a single cartridge from anywhere, we won only because the workers and Red Army soldiers know what they are fighting for.

"If the small nations that are playthings in the hands of the Entente begin to wish for peace with Soviet Russia, this is to be explained by our having shown in practice how the imperialists have deceived them and how gladly the Russian proletariat extends to them the hand of peace. Poland will follow Estonia. Information has been received that Soviet Russia's peace proposals will be discussed in Poland. This bloodless victory is of tremendous importance."

Lenin went over to the internal situation and showed that it boiled down to a struggle against chaos on the railways. Railway transport was hanging by a hair. If the trains stopped running that would mean the end of the proletarian centres. Heroic efforts on the part of the masses of

workers would be needed to maintain transport and facilitate the struggle against hunger and cold. Unparalleled heroism proved possible during the Civil War which claimed so many victims, and that heroism and those sacrifices that decided the war in our favour were still essential now that the war had shifted to another front, the industrial front. Victory was now essential on this bloodless front.

"It must be understood that sacrifices are also needed here," continued the speaker. "Sacrifices must be made to restore the country's economy. 'Victory or Death' must become the slogan on the industrial front. It is necessary for workers to be conscious of the need for the tensest struggle for victory on this front. There is a hard struggle ahead and it will have to be carried on by tired and hungry workers; if, however, they realise that the fate of the working class depends on the outcome of this struggle, they will win out."

The question of transport was being discussed by the Council of Defence, but the workers themselves would have to muster for the struggle against the transport chaos and the profiteering that intensified the chaos. Those who did not give their grain surpluses to the state were turning the railways into an instrument for profiteering, they were enemies, and politically-conscious workers should muster for the struggle against them.

"We led the Red Army to victory by strict, iron discipline as well as agitation. What has been organised in the Red Army must also be created on all the fronts of labour. The entire experience of the creation of the Red Army must be transferred to the army of railway workers so that it can rise to the same heights as the Red Army. Without sacrifice, without iron discipline, without the employment of specialists the Red Army would not have been victorious, and without them the railway army will not be victorious." (*Applause.*)

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 28,
February 7, 1920

Published according to
the *Petrogradskaya Pravda* text

À LA GUERRE COMME À LA GUERRE!

The landowners and capitalists, who have been overthrown by the workers and peasants of Russia, have forced two years of civil war upon us with the help of the capitalists of the whole world.

We are ending this war victoriously.

We have already gained the first peace, which has demonstrated the superiority of our foreign policy over the policy of the united capitalists of all countries. These capitalists did their utmost to prevent peace between Estonia and us. We have beaten them. We have concluded peace with Estonia—the first peace; it will be followed by others, opening up for us the possibility of trading with Europe and America.

The bloody war which the exploiters forced upon us we are ending victoriously. During these two years we have learned how to win; and we have won.

Now comes the turn of a bloodless war.

Let us work for victory on the front of the bloodless war against hunger and cold, against typhus and destruction, against ignorance and economic chaos!

This bloodless war has been forced upon us by the destruction caused by four years of imperialist war and two years of civil war. In order to defeat the poverty and want, the hunger and hardships caused by these wars, we must keep firmly in mind, must thoroughly grasp and everywhere and at all costs observe the maxim, *à la guerre comme à la guerre!*

The workers and peasants were able to create a Red Army without the landowners and capitalists and against them, and were able to defeat the exploiters.

The workers and peasants will be able to create Red armies of peaceful labour—they will be able to win new happiness for themselves by restoring agriculture and industry.

The first and chief step towards this is the *restoration of the transport system* which must be done at all costs, immediately, with revolutionary energy, and must be carried out with military determination, solidarity, speed and selfless devotion.

Let's get on with the job, comrades!

Let us show that in the sphere of peaceful labour we can display even greater marvels of heroism and victory than in the arena of war against the exploiters!

February 7, 1920

Pravda No. 28,
February 8, 1920
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A NON-PARTY CONFERENCE IN BLAGUSHA-LEFORTOVO DISTRICT FEBRUARY 9, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

In his speech Lenin dealt with two burning questions of present-day Soviet life—the international situation and the labour front.

"By its victories," Lenin said, "our Red Army has consolidated the position of Soviet Russia and has secured for us the first victory over the Entente imperialists. How is this victory to be explained? It is clear that it was not achieved by the victories at the front alone, but by our having won over the soldiers of the countries warring against us. The Allies corrupted their own armies by landing troops in our country and were soon forced to withdraw them. The soldiers refused to fight us. The very expression 'Soviet government,' that is, a government of the working people, brings joy to the hearts of the proletarians all over the world.

"By means of agitation and propaganda, we deprived the Entente of its own troops. We defeated the imperialists not only with the aid of our soldiers, but also by relying on the sympathy the Entente soldiers felt for us. On the other hand, we gave a practical demonstration to the small neighbouring states that our policy is a peaceful one. Britain, through its mouthpiece, Churchill, threatened to send fourteen states against us; but this campaign collapsed when concurrently with our victories, we kept making proposals for peace. We proposed peace to Estonia without insisting on any particular frontiers, knowing only that we did not want

to shed the blood of workers and peasants for the sake of any frontiers.

"The removal of the blockade is exclusively to be attributed to the sympathy which Soviet power inspires among the workers of the hostile countries. In Italy, matters have gone so far that a congress of socialist parties has unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the raising of the blockade of Soviet Russia and the resumption of trade relations. Although they do not love the Bolsheviks, the bourgeois governments of the small countries have become convinced that the Bolsheviks want to live on good-neighbourly terms with them, whereas those on whose side General Denikin or any other general is, would tear up all the scraps of paper promising independence to the small nations immediately after gaining victory. Without a single gun, without a single machine-gun, without firing a single shot, we have concluded peace; we have laid the foundation for the conclusion of peace with all the countries that are waging war on us. We have shown that all governments have to lay down their arms in face of the peace policy of the Soviet government.

"We have already cut a window opening on to Europe, and we shall try to make wide use of it. Attempts are being made to incite Poland against us. But these attempts will fail, and the time is not far off when we shall conclude peace with all of them, although they say that they will not recognise us. They are mortally afraid of the spread of the Bolshevik infection at home; but although they have surrounded themselves with a Chinese Wall the Bolshevik infection already exists in each of these countries, it lurks in their midst. This infection was brought by the French and British soldiers who had been to Soviet Russia and had breathed her air. We have thus gained two victories. We have smashed the whiteguard hordes on all fronts, and we are winning peace on a world scale, winning it not with guns, but by the sympathy we have been able to inspire not only in the workers but even in the bourgeois governments of the small nationalities."

Lenin then went on to deal briefly with the labour front.

"Comrades," he said, "spring is approaching; we have been through an extraordinarily difficult winter of cold, hunger, typhus and railway chaos. We must be victorious on this

front too. Just as we were able to sacrifice everything during the war and to give our best forces—the advanced workers, Communists and political and military students died in the front ranks and thus raised the morale of the whole army—so now we say that we must win on the front of economic chaos, the Communists and the advanced workers, the most honest and conscientious, the finest and staunchest, must be in the forefront, as they were then; every train, every locomotive must be won by struggle, must be fought for. That is my appeal to the non-party conference.

"Comrades, before concluding my speech I would like to say a few words about the measures decided on at the last session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The session decided on a number of measures which will shortly be published in the newspapers, and which should be read and discussed at all meetings of workers, in clubs, factories and Red Army units. One of the most important decisions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, one to which in my opinion the most profound attention should be directed, concerns the fight against red tape in our institutions. One of the measures is the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to transform our state control into a workers' and peasants' control, or a workers' inspection.[110] We shall not drive out the old officials—just as we did not drive the experts out of the army, but attached worker commissars to them—we must attach groups of workers to these bourgeois experts, to look on, to learn and to take this work into their own hands. Workers must enter all the government establishments so as to supervise the entire government apparatus. And this should be done by the non-party workers, who should elect their representatives at non-party conferences of workers and peasants. They must come to the assistance of the Communists who are being overtaxed by the tremendous burden they have to bear. We must pour as many workers and peasants as possible into this apparatus. We shall tackle this job and accomplish it, and thus drive red tape out of our institutions. The broad non-party masses must keep a check on all government affairs, and must themselves learn to govern."

Pravda No. 32,
February 13, 1920

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

A PUBLICIST'S NOTES

I

Citizen Jean Longuet has sent me a letter consisting mainly of the same complaints as those contained in his article, "How Are the Russians Deceived?" (*Populaire*,[111] January 10, 1920.) Longuet has also sent me this issue of his newspaper together with a leaflet of the Committee for the Reconstruction of the International (Comité pour la reconstruction de l'Internationale)[112]. The leaflet contains two draft resolutions for the forthcoming congress of the French Socialist Party[113] in Strasbourg. It is signed on behalf of the Committee for the Reconstruction of the International by 24 persons: Amédée Dunois, Citizeness Fanny Clar, Caussy, Maurice Delépine, Paul Faure, Ludovic-Oscar Frossard, Eugène Frot, Henri Gourdeaux, Citizeness Leyciagnre, André Le Troquer, Paul Louis, Jean Longuet, Maurice Maurin, Barthélemy Mayéras, Joan Mouret, Georges Mauranges, Palicot, Pécher, Citizeness Marianne Rauze, Daniel Renault, Servantier, Sixte Quenin, Tommasi, Raoul Verfeuil.

It seems to me superfluous to reply to Jean Longuet's complaints and attacks: adequate replies have been given in F. Loriot's article in *Vie Ouvrière*[114] of January 16, 1920, entitled "Gently, Longuet!" ("Tout doux, Longuet!"), and in Trotsky's article in the *Communist International*[115] No. 7-8, entitled "Jean Longuet". Very little remains to be added; perhaps only that it would be a good thing to collect material for a history of the failure of the strike of July 21, 1919.[116] But I cannot do this from Moscow. All I have seen is a quotation from *Avanti!*[117] published in an Austrian

Communist paper, exposing the despicable role played in this affair by one of the most despicable of the social-traitors (or anarcho-traitors?), the former syndicalist and anti-parliamentary windbag, Jouhaux. Why should not Longuet give somebody the job, which can be easily done in Paris, of collecting all the documents, all the comments and articles in the European Communist papers, and all the special interviews with the leaders and participants concerned, on the failure of the strike of July 21, 1919? We would be delighted to publish such a work. The "socialist education" about which the "Centrists" of the whole world (the Independents in Germany, the Longuetists in France, the I.L.P.[118] in Britain, etc.) talk so often and so readily must be understood to mean the firm *exposure of the mistakes* of the leaders and the mistakes of the movement and not the pedantic and doctrinaire repetition of general socialist phrases, which everybody is tired of hearing and which, since 1914-18, nobody trusts.

An example of this—all the leaders and all the prominent members of the socialist parties, the trade unions and the workers' co-operative societies who advocated the "defence of the fatherland" in the war of 1914-18, acted as traitors to socialism. The real work of "socialist education" implies the persistent exposure of their mistake, the systematic explanation that this war was, in respect of *both* sides, a war between bandits for the division of the spoils, and that a repetition of such a war is *inevitable* unless the proletariat overthrows the bourgeoisie by revolutionary means.

The resolutions I have referred to speak about such work of education, but what is actually being done is a work of socialist corruption, for treason, treachery, routine, inertia, careerism, philistinism and mistakes are hushed up, whereas real education consists in overcoming and removing them.

II

Neither of the resolutions of the Longuetists is of any use—although, incidentally, they are very useful in one particular sphere, that of showing what, at the present moment, is perhaps the most dangerous evil for the working-class

movement in the West. The evil is this: the old leaders, observing what an irresistible attraction Bolshevism and Soviet government have for the masses, are seeking (*and often finding!*) a way of escape in the *verbal* recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government, although they actually either remain enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or are unable or unwilling to understand its significance and to carry it into effect.

The fall of the first Soviet Republic in Hungary (the first, which fell, will be followed by a second, which will be victorious) shows clearly how vast, how immense is the danger of this evil. A number of articles in the Vienna *Rote Fahne*,[119] the Central Organ of the Austrian Communist Party, have revealed one of the chief reasons for its fall, namely, the treachery of the "socialists", who went over to Béla Kun[120] verbally and proclaimed themselves Communists, but who actually did not pursue a policy consonant with the dictatorship of the proletariat; they vacillated, played the coward, made advances to the bourgeoisie, and in part directly sabotaged and betrayed the proletarian revolution. Naturally, the powerful brigands of imperialism (i.e., the bourgeois governments of Britain, France, etc.) that surrounded the Hungarian Soviet Republic made good use of these vacillations *within* the Hungarian Soviet government and used the Rumanian butchers to crush it.

There can be no doubt that some of the Hungarian socialists went over to Béla Kun *sincerely*, and *sincerely* proclaimed themselves Communists. But that changes nothing essential: a man who "sincerely" proclaims himself a Communist, but who in practice vacillates and plays the coward instead of pursuing a ruthlessly firm, unswervingly determined and supremely courageous and heroic policy (and only such a policy is consonant with recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat)—such a man, in his weakness of character, vacillations and irresolution, is just as much guilty of treachery as a direct traitor. As far as the individual is concerned, there is a very great difference between a man whose weakness of character makes him a traitor and one who is a deliberate, calculating traitor; but in politics there is no such difference, because politics involves the actual fate of millions of people, and it makes no difference whether

the millions of workers and poor peasants are betrayed by those who are traitors from weakness of character or by those whose treachery pursues selfish aims.

We cannot yet say which of the Longuetists who signed the resolutions we are discussing will prove to belong to the first category, which to the second and which to some third, and it would be idle to speculate on it. The important thing is that these Longuetists, *as a political trend*, are now pursuing exactly the same policy as the Hungarian "socialists" and "Social-Democrats" who brought about the fall of the Soviet government in Hungary. It is precisely this policy that the Longuetists are pursuing, for verbally they proclaim themselves supporters of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government, but actually they continue to behave in the old way and to defend in their resolutions and to carry out in practice the old policy of petty concessions to social-chauvinism, opportunism and bourgeois democracy, the policy of vacillation, irresolution, evasiveness, subterfuge, suppression of facts, and the like. In their totality, these petty concessions, this vacillation, irresolution, evasiveness, subterfuge and suppression of facts inevitably constitute a *betrayal* of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Dictatorship is a big, harsh and bloody word, one which expresses a relentless life-and-death struggle between two classes, two worlds, two historical epochs.

Such words must not be uttered frivolously.

To place the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the order of the day, and at the same time to "fear to offend" men like Albert Thomas, the Brackes Sembats and the other champions of the vilest French social-chauvinism, the heroes of the traitor newspapers *l'Humanité*, *La Bataille*[121] and the like, is to betray the working class—be it from lack of thought, lack of understanding, weakness of character, or some other cause, it is nevertheless betrayal of the working class.

It was the divergence between word and deed that caused the collapse of the Second International. The Third International is not yet a year old, but it is already becoming fashionable and is a lure to those politicians who go wherever the masses go. The Third International is already in

danger of its word and deed diverging. This danger must be exposed everywhere and at all costs, and every manifestation of this evil must be eradicated.

The resolutions of the Longuetists (like the resolutions of the recent congress of the German Independents, who are German Longuetists) have transformed "dictatorship of the proletariat" into just such an icon as the resolutions of the Second International used to be for the leaders, the officials of the trade unions, the parliamentarians and the functionaries of the co-operative societies. An icon is something you pray to, something you cross yourself before, something you bow down to; but an icon has no effect on practical life and practical politics.

No, gentlemen, we shall not allow the slogan "dictatorship of the proletariat" to be turned into an icon; we shall not consent to the Third International tolerating any divergence between word and deed.

If you stand for the dictatorship of the proletariat, then do not pursue that evasive, equivocal, compromising policy towards social-chauvinism which you are pursuing and which is expressed in the very first lines of your first resolution: the war, you see, "has rent" (*a déchirée*) the Second International, has severed it from the work of "socialist education" (*éducation socialiste*), while "certain sections of this International" (*certaines de ses fractions*) have "weakened themselves" by sharing power with the bourgeoisie, and so on and so forth.

That is not the language of people who consciously and sincerely support the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the language either of people who take one step forward and two steps back, or of politicians. If you want to talk this language—or rather, as long as you talk this language, as long as this is your policy—stay in the Second International, where you belong. Or let the workers, whose mass pressure is pushing you towards the Third International, leave you behind in the Second International and themselves come over, *without you*, to the. Third International. On the same terms we shall say "Welcome" to these workers, whether of the French Socialist Party, the German Independent Social-Democratic Party, or the British Independent Labour Party.

If you recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat, and at the same time talk about the war of 1914-18, then you must talk differently and say that this war was a war between the brigands of Anglo-Franco-Russian imperialism and the brigands of Austro-German imperialism for the division of spoils, of colonies and "spheres" of financial influence. Preaching "defence of the fatherland" in such a war was treason to socialism. If this truth is not thoroughly explained, if this treason is not eradicated from the minds, hearts and policy of the workers, it will be *impossible* to escape the miseries of capitalism, it will be *impossible* to escape new wars, which are *inevitable* as long as capitalism persists.

You do not want to talk this language, you cannot talk this language or carry on *this* propaganda, do you? You want to "spare" yourselves or your friends who yesterday preached the "defence of the fatherland" in Germany under Wilhelm or Noske and in Britain and France under the rule of the bourgeoisie, don't you? Then *spare* the Third International! Gladden it with your absence!

III

I have so far spoken of the first of the two resolutions. The second is no better: "solemn" ("*solennelle*") condemnation of "confusionism", and even of "all compromise" ("*toute compromission*"—this is an empty revolutionary phrase, because one cannot be opposed to *all* compromise), and, alongside of this, evasive, equivocal repetition of general phrases—phrases which do not explain the concept "dictatorship of the proletariat" but obscure it—attacks upon the "policy of M. Clemenceau" (the usual trick of bourgeois politicians in France, who represent a change of cliques to be a change of regime), and the exposition of a programme which is fundamentally *reformist*—taxes, "nationalisation of the capitalist monopolies", etc.

The Longuetists do not understand and *do not want* to understand (partly, are *incapable* of understanding) that reformism, masked by revolutionary phrase-mongering, was the chief evil of the Second International, the chief reason for its disgraceful collapse, for the support given by the

"socialists" to the war in which ten million people were slaughtered in order to settle the great question whether the Anglo-Russo-French group or the German group of capitalist depredators should plunder the world.

The Longuetists have in fact remained the reformists they were, masking their reformism by revolutionary phrases and employing the new tag "dictatorship of the proletariat" merely as a revolutionary phrase. The proletariat does not need such leaders, nor does it need the leaders of the German Independent Social-Democratic Party, or the leaders of the British Independent Labour Party. The proletariat cannot bring about its dictatorship with such leaders.

Recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean undertaking an assault, an uprising, at all costs and at *any* moment. That is nonsense. A successful insurrection demands prolonged, skilful and persistent preparations, preparations entailing great sacrifice.

Recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat means making a determined, relentless, and, what is most important, a fully conscious and consistent break with the opportunism, reformism, equivocation and evasiveness of the Second International—a break with the leaders who *cannot help* carrying on the old tradition, with the old (not in age, but in methods) parliamentarians, trade union and co-operative society officials, etc.

A break with them is essential. To pity them would be criminal; it would mean betraying the fundamental interests of tens of millions of workers and small peasants for the paltry interests of some ten thousand or hundred thousand people.

Recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat requires the fundamental reconstruction of the day-to-day work of the Party, it means getting among the millions of workers, *agricultural labourers* and small peasants whom only *Soviets*, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, can save from the miseries of capitalism and war. The dictatorship of the proletariat means explaining this concretely, simply, clearly, to the masses, to tens of millions of people; it means telling them that *their* Soviets must take over state power *in its entirety*, and that their vanguard, the party of the revolutionary proletariat, must *lead* the struggle.

The Longuetists have not the faintest inkling of this truth, nor have they the least desire or ability to give daily effect to it.

IV

In Austria, communism has passed through an extremely difficult period, which it seems is not quite over yet—growing pains, the illusion that by proclaiming themselves Communists a group can become a force without waging a profound struggle for influence over the masses, and mistakes in the cboice of people (mistakes that are *inevitable* at first in every revolution; we made a *number* of similar mistakes).

Die Rote Fahne, the daily organ of the Communists edited by Koritschoner and Tomann, shows that the movement is taking the right road.

And to what depths of stupidity, vileness and sordidness the Austrian Social-Democrats are sinking is only too clearly shown by the whole policy of Renner and similar Austrian Scheidemanns, who are helped—partly out of utter stupidity and weakness of character—by the Otto Bauers and Friedrich Adlers, who have become rank traitors.

Take, for example, Otto Bauer's pamphlet, *The Path to Socialism*.* I have before me a Berlin edition by *Freiheit*—apparently the publishing house of the Independent Party, which is entirely on the same wretched, vulgar and despicable level as this pamphlet.

A glance at a couple of passages from §9 ("Expropriation of the Expropriators") will be enough:

> "Expropriation cannot and must not take the form of the brutal [*brutaler*] confiscation of the property of the capitalists and landowners; for in this form it could be accomplished only at the cost of a tremendous destruction of the productive forces, which would ruin the masses of the people themselves and would choke the sources of national income. On the contrary, the expropriation of the expropriators must take place in a systematic and regular way" ... by means of taxation.

And this learned man goes on to illustrate how "four-ninths" of the income of the wealthy classes could be extracted by means of taxation....

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* *Der Weg zum Sozialismus.—Ed.*

Enough, is it not? As for myself, after these words (and I began reading the pamphlet from §9) I read nothing more; and I do not intend to read any more of Mr. Otto Bauer's pamphlet unless there is special need to. For it is clear that this, the best of the social-traitors, is at most a learned and utterly hopeless fool.

He is a typical pedant, a thorough petty bourgeois at heart. Before the war he wrote useful and learned books and articles in which he "theoretically" admitted that the class struggle might attain the acuteness of a civil war. He even had a hand (if I am correctly informed) in drawing up the Basle Manifesto of 1912, which directly foretold a *proletarian revolution* in connection with that very war which actually broke out in 1914.

But when this proletarian revolution became a reality, the soul of the pedant and philistine got the upper hand, and he grew frightened and *began to pour* the oil of *reformist phrase-mongering on the troubled waters of the revolution*.

He had got it firmly fixed in his mind (pedants cannot think, they can only commit to memory, learn by rote) that the expropriation of the expropriators without confiscation is theoretically possible. He was always repeating this. He had learned it by rote. He knew it by heart in 1912. He repeated it from memory in 1919.

He cannot think. After an imperialist war, a war which has brought even the victors to the verge of ruin, after civil war has broken out in a number of countries, after facts have proved on a world-wide scale the inevitability of the conversion of imperialist war into civil war, to preach, in the year of our Lord 1919, in the city of Vienna, the "systematic" and "regular" extraction from the capitalists of "four-ninths" of their income—to do this one must be either an imbecile or that old hero of grand old German poetry who flitted rapturously "from book to book"....

This dear old gentleman, no doubt a most virtuous paterfamilias, a most honest citizen and most conscientious reader and writer of learned works, has forgotten one tiny detail; he has forgotten that such a "systematic" and "regular" transition to socialism (the transition which undoubtedly would be the most advantageous to "the people", abstractly

speaking) presumes an absolutely secure victory of the proletariat, the absolute hopelessness of the position of the capitalists, the absolute necessity for them to display the most scrupulous obedience and their readiness to do so.

Is such a conjunction of circumstances possible?

Speaking theoretically, which in this case means speaking quite abstractly, it is possible, of course. For example, let us assume that in nine countries, including all the Great Powers, the Wilsons, Lloyd Georges, Millerands, and other champions of capitalism are already in the same position as Yudenich, Kolchak, Denikin, and their Ministers in our country. Let us assume that after this, in a tenth country, a small country, the capitalists propose to the workers: "Look here, we will conscientiously help you, in obedience to your decisions, to carry out a 'systematic' and peaceful (without destruction!) 'expropriation of the expropriators', for which you will let us have five-ninths of our former income in the first year and four-ninths in the second year."

It is quite conceivable that under the circumstances I have mentioned the capitalists in the tenth country, one of the smallest and most "peaceful" countries, might make such a proposal, and there would be absolutely nothing wrong in the workers of this country discussing this proposal in a business-like way and (after bargaining a bit, for a merchant cannot help asking more than his wares are worth) accepting it.

Now, after this popular explanation, perhaps the thing will be clear even to the learned Otto Bauer and to the philosopher Friedrich Adler (who is as successful a philosopher as he is a politician).

No, not clear yet?

Just think, dear Otto Bauer and dear Friedrich Adler, does the position of world capitalism and of its leaders at the present moment resemble that of Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin in Russia?

No, it does not. In Russia the capitalists have been smashed, after having put up a most desperate resistance. In the rest of the world they are still in power. They are the masters.

If, dear Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler, it is not clear to you yet, let me add something in an even more popular form.

Just imagine that at the time when Yudenich stood at the gates of Petrograd, when Kolchak held the Urals and Denikin the whole of the Ukraine, and when the pockets of these three heroes were stuffed with telegrams from Wilson, Lloyd George, Millerand and Co. informing them of the dispatch of money, guns, officers and soldiers—just imagine that at this moment a representative of the Russian workers were to come to Yudenich, Kolchak or Denikin, and say: "We, the workers, are in the majority. We will let you have five-ninths of your income, and later will take away the rest as well, 'systematically' and peacefully. Let's shake hands on it! 'Without destruction!' Is it a go?"

If this representative of the workers were simply clad, and if the Russian general, Denikin, for example, were alone when he received him, he would very likely commit the worker to a lunatic asylum, or just drive him away.

But if the representative of the workers were an intellectual wearing a decent suit of clothes, and, in addition, were the son of a respectable papa (like our good friend Friedrich Adler), and if, moreover, Denikin were not alone, but received him in the presence of a French or British "adviser"—this adviser would undoubtedly say to Denikin:

"Look here, general, this representative of the workers is a sensible fellow. He is just the man for one of our ministerial jobs, like Henderson in Britain, Albert Thomas in France, and Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler in Austria."

February 14, 1920

Published in 1920

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin,

Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, Kharkov

Priority. By direct line

February 16, 1920

Today I heard you and all the others very clearly, every word. Threaten to shoot the incompetent person in charge of communications who cannot give you a good amplifier and ensure uninterrupted telephone communication with me. I approve the reduced requisitioning and the obligatory distribution among the poor of a part of the requisitioned grain. You must first of all interest the poor.

Lenin

First published in 1938

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin,

Ukrainian Council of the Labour Army, Kharkov

Copy to the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee

I am glad to learn that you have requisitioned a moderate amount—158 [million poods]—and are leaving ten per cent for the poor, and that you have already detailed three regiments and four squadrons for the Ukrainian Council of the Labour Army.

My advice: (1) protect the coal that is ready and send reinforcements quickly to the Caucasian Front. That is most important of all; (2) protect the salt and let regiments and squadrons occupy one volost after another in the vicinity of the Donets Basin and carry out requisitioning fully, awarding bread and salt to the poor; (3) immediately mobilise part of the Kharkov and Donets Basin workers for the Food Army to work together with the regiments and squadrons; (4) the work of the Ukrainian Council of the Labour Army to be measured by the daily amount of grain and coal delivered and the number of locomotives repaired.

Lenin

Written on February 18, 192
First published in 1942

Published according to
the manuscript

IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS PUT BY KARL WIEGAND, BERLIN CORRESPONDENT OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE[122]

1. Do we intend to attack Poland and Rumania?

No. We have declared most emphatically and officially, in the name of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, our peaceful intentions. It is very much to be regretted that the French capitalist government is instigating Poland (and presumably Rumania, too) to attack us. This is even mentioned by a number of American radios from Lyons.

2. What are our plans in Asia?

They are the same as in Europe: peaceful coexistence with all peoples; with the workers and peasants of all nations awakening to a new life—a life without exploiters, without landowners, without capitalists, without merchants. The imperialist war of 1914-18, the war of the capitalists of the Anglo-French (and Russian) group against the German-Austrian capitalist group for the partition of the world, has awakened Asia and has strengthened there, as everywhere else, the urge towards freedom, towards peaceful labour and against possible future wars.

3. What would be the basis of peace with America?

Let the American capitalists leave us alone. We shall not touch them. We are even ready to pay them in gold for any machinery, tools, etc., useful to our transport and industries We are ready to pay not only in gold, but in raw materials too.

4. What are the obstacles to such a peace?

None on our part; imperialism on the part of the American (and of any other) capitalists.

5. What are our views of the deportation of Russian revolutionaries from America?

We have accepted them. We are not afraid of revolutionaries here in this country. As a matter of fact, we are not afraid of anybody, and if America is afraid of a few more hundred or thousand of its citizens, we are ready to begin negotiations with a view of receiving any citizens whom America thinks dangerous (with the exception of criminals, of course).

6. What possibilities are there of an economic alliance between Russia and Germany?

Unfortunately, they are not great. The Scheidemanns are bad allies. We stand for an alliance with all countries without exception.

7. What are our views upon the allied demand for the extradition of war criminals?

If we are to speak seriously on this matter of war guilt, the guilty ones are the capitalists of all countries. Hand over to us all your landed proprietors owning more than a hundred hectares and capitalists having a capital of more than 100,000 francs, and we shall educate them to useful labour and make them break with the shameful, base and bloody role of exploiters and instigators of wars for the partition of colonies. Wars will then soon become absolutely impossible.

8. What would be the influence of peace with Russia upon the economic conditions in Europe?

Exchange of machinery for grain, flax and other raw materials—I ask, can this be disadvantageous for Europe? Clearly, it cannot be anything but beneficial.

9. What is our opinion regarding the future development of the Soviets as a world force?

The future belongs to the Soviet system all the world over. The facts have proved it. One has only to count by quarterly periods, say, the growth in the number of pamphlets, books, leaflets and newspapers standing for or sympathising with the Soviets published in any country. It cannot be otherwise. Once the workers in the cities, the workers, landless peasants and the handicraftsmen in the villages as well as the small peasants (i.e., those who do not exploit hired labour)—once this enormous majority of working people have understood that the Soviet system gives all power into their hands, releasing them from the yoke of landlords and capitalists—how could one prevent the victory of the Soviet system all over the world? I, for one, do not know of any means of preventing it.

10. Has Russia still to fear counter-revolution from without?

Unfortunately, it has, for the capitalists are stupid, greedy people. They have made a number of such stupid, greedy attempts at intervention and one has to fear repetitions until the workers and peasants of all countries thoroughly *re-educate* their own capitalists.

11. Is Russia ready to enter into business relations with America?

Of course she is ready to do so, and with all other countries. Peace with Estonia, to whom we have conceded a great deal, has proved our readiness, for the sake of business relations, to give even industrial concessions on certain conditions.

February 18, 1920

V. Ulyanov (N. Lenin)

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Published according to
the manuscript

IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS PUT BY A CORRESPONDENT OF THE *DAILY EXPRESS*[123]

1. What is our attitude towards the raising of the blockade?

We consider it a big step forward. The possibility is being opened for us to pass from a war that was forced on us by the capitalist governments of the Entente to peaceful reconstruction. This is of the greatest importance to us. Straining all our efforts towards the restoration of the economic life of the country, ruined first by the war between capitalists over the Dardanelles and the colonies, then by the war of the capitalists of the Entente and Russia against the workers of Russia, we are now, among other measures, working out, with the aid of a number of scientists and experts, a plan of electrification of the whole country. This plan is to be realised over a period of many years. The electrification will rejuvenate Russia. Electrification based on the Soviet system will mean the complete success of the foundations of communism in our country—foundations of a cultured life, without exploiters, without capitalists, without landlords, without merchants.

The raising of the blockade will help to accomplish Russia's electrification.

2. What influence will the Allies' decision to cease offensive action have on the offensive actions of the Soviet power?

The Allies, together with their allies and their lackeys—Kolchak, Denikin, and the capitalists of the surrounding

countries—have attacked us. We did not attack anyone. We concluded peace with Estonia even at the cost of material sacrifices.

We are impatiently waiting to see the Allies' "decision" supported by their *deeds*, but the story of the Versailles Peace and of its consequences, unfortunately, indicates that in most cases the Allies' words disagree with their deeds and the decisions remain scraps of paper.

3. Is the present *status quo* satisfactory from the standpoint of Soviet policy?

Yes, because every *status quo* in politics is a transition from old forms to new ones. The present *status quo* is, from many points of view, a transition from war to peace. Such a change is desirable to us for this reason, and insofar do we consider the *status quo* satisfactory.

4. What are our aims in connection with the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Allies?

Our aims, as already mentioned, are peaceful economic building. A detailed plan of it, on the basis of electrification, is being at present worked out by a committee of scientists and technicians—or rather, by a number of committees—in accordance with the resolution of the February (1920) session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

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Published according to
the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To Comrade Stalin,

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front

By direct line

Moscow, February 20

The situation on the Caucasian Front is assuming a more serious character. In the situation obtaining today we may possibly lose Rostov and Novocherkassk and the enemy may attempt to develop his successes further to the north and threaten the Donets area. Adopt exceptional measures to hasten the transfer of the 42nd and the Latvian divisions and strengthen their fighting potential. I expect that you will appreciate the general situation and bend all your efforts to achieve important results.

Lenin

First published on January 21, 1935 in *Pravda* No. 21

Published according to the telegram

TO THE WORKING WOMEN

Comrades, the elections to the Moscow Soviet show that the Communist Party is gaining ground among the working class.

Working women must take a bigger part in the elections. The Soviet government is the first and only government in the world to have completely abolished all the old, despicable bourgeois laws which placed women in a position of inferiority to men, which placed men in a privileged position, for example, in respect of marital rights and of children. The Soviet government, the government of the working people, is the first and only government in the world to have abolished all the privileges of men in property questions, privileges which the marriage laws of all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic, still preserve.

Wherever there are landowners, capitalists and merchants, women cannot be the equal of men even before the law.

Where there are no landowners, capitalists or merchants, and where the government of the working people is building a new life without these exploiters, men and women are equal before the law.

But that is not enough.

Equality before the law is not necessarily equality in fact.

We want the working woman to be the equal of the working man not only before the law but in actual fact. For this working women must take an increasing part in the administration of socialised enterprises and in the administration of the state.

By taking part in administration, women will learn quickly and will catch up with the men.

Elect more working women to the Soviet, both Communist women and non-party women. As long as they are honest working women capable of performing their work sensibly and conscientiously, even if they are not members of the Party—elect them to the Moscow Soviet!

Send more working women to the Moscow Soviet! Let the Moscow proletariat show that it is prepared to do everything, and is doing everything, to fight for victory, to fight the old inequality, the old bourgeois humiliation of women!

The proletariat cannot achieve complete liberty until it has won complete liberty for women.

N. Lenin

February 21, 1920

Pravda No. 40,
February 22, 1920

Published according
to the *Pravda* text

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin

Kharkov

February 22

It is essential immediately to arrange for interpreters at all headquarters and army institutions, and make it the duty of all to accept applications and other papers written in Ukrainian. This is absolutely essential—as far as language is concerned there must be every concession and the maximum of equality. I'll tell you soon about the wages of the railwaymen. I hear you quite well when you speak distinctly so please answer my two telegrams by telephone.

Lenin

First published in 1942

Published according to a typewritten copy

SPEECH AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF ADULT EDUCATION DIVISIONS OF GUBERNIA EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS FEBRUARY 25, 1920

Permit me to greet your conference on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and to share a few ideas with you.

As far as the international situation is concerned, I can tell you of a wireless message received today from Britain which better than anything else typifies it. The message says that yesterday, the twenty-fourth, the Allied Council decided that in the event of the states bordering on Russia asking its advice on policy it would say that it could not advise a war that would probably injure their interests, still less could it advise an aggressive war against Russia; if, however, the Russian Soviet Republic attacked their legitimate frontiers, the Allied Council would give them its support. The Allied gentlemen also want to send to Russia a commission that belongs to the Washington labour committee. The organisers of the conference, social-traitors headed by Albert Thomas, have agreed on certain social reforms and want to send this crowd, which constitutes part of the League of Nations,[124] to Russia to investigate how far conditions in Russia coincide with the normal requirements of "civilised" states.

The report of yesterday's decision by the Allies shows clearly enough that those gentlemen have got themselves into a mess, and also what benefit we can gain from that

mess. They have wasted hundreds of millions (the British Government has) on support for the war and have now announced that they can no longer support it. Their offensive spirit is played out, although they are still delivering war materiel to Poland; they are still delivering armaments and we have authentic information that Poland is regrouping her forces for an offensive so that we cannot place any great reliance on their announcement. A certain threat still remains, although the external danger from the Allies has diminished by ninety per cent; we shall have to retain our military preparedness after the end of the war against Denikin; we cannot count on full demobilisation.

Nine-tenths of the danger of an attack on Russia by international capitalism has, therefore, disappeared: they have suffered such a thorough collapse that are proposing for the umpteenth time to send a commission to Russia. If that commission is to consist of gentlemen like Albert Thomas, who visited Russia during the war, it will end in nothing but a scandal for them and will be an excellent basis for agitation for us. We'll give them such a welcome that they will leave Russia as quickly as possible and the only gain will be agitation for the workers of other countries. They want to scare us, but when we say we are welcoming them as honoured guests, they will hide this attempt of theirs. That shows the extent to which they are dismayed. We now have a window open on to Europe, thanks to the peace with Estonia, and are able to obtain the basic goods from there. There is, indeed, tremendous progress and improvement in our international situation; nine-tenths of all external danger to the Soviet Republic has been removed.

The more the danger is removed the more shall we be able to get on with our peaceful development, and we expect a lot from you and from your activities in the sphere of adult education. A number of material changes are necessary to put education in schools on a better footing—schools must be built, teachers selected and internal reforms carried out in organising and in selecting the staff. These are all things that require lengthy preparation. You are not hampered by this lengthy preparation in adult education. The demand of the people for an education outside

the regular school system and the need for workers in this field are increasing very greatly. We are sure that with the common aid and by our common efforts more will be done than has hitherto been the case.

In conclusion I shall speak about the nature of adult education, which is connected with propaganda and agitation. One of the fundamental faults of education in the capitalist world was its alienation from the basic task of organising labour, since the capitalist had to train and educate obedient and disciplined workers. There was no connection in capitalist society between the actual tasks of the organisation of social labour and teaching. There was dead, scholastic, routine teaching befouled by the influence of the clergy which everywhere, even in the most democratic republics, functioned in such a way that everything fresh and healthy was compelled to withdraw. Direct, vital work was made difficult because no extensive education was possible without a state apparatus and without material and financial aid. Since we can and must prepare to transfer our entire Soviet life from the path of military training and defence to that of peaceful development it is essential for you, workers in the field of adult education, to take this change into consideration, and your propaganda work, its aims and programme should be made to fit this change.

To show you how I understand the tasks and the entire character of education, of teaching, training and upbringing, in their connection with the changing tasks of the Soviet Republic, I would remind you of the resolution on electrification that was adopted at the last session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, you are probably all familiar with it. A few days ago there was an announcement in the papers that within two months (in the official printed report it said two weeks, but that was a mistake)—that within two months a plan for the electrification of the country would be elaborated to cover a minimum period of two to three years and a maximum period of ten years. The character of all our propaganda, which includes purely Party propaganda, and school teaching, and adult education, must change, not in the sense that the fundamentals and general direction of teaching should be changed, but

in the sense that the character of the work must be adapted to the transition to peaceful development with an extensive plan for the industrial and economic reconstruction of the country, because the general economic difficulty and the general task is the rehabilitation of the country's economic forces so that the proletarian revolution can create the new foundations of economic life side by side with petty peasant economy. Up to now the peasant has been compelled to loan grain to the workers' state; the pieces of coloured paper called money received in return for grain do not satisfy the peasant. The peasant, being dissatisfied, is demanding his legitimate rights—in exchange for grain he wants the industrial goods that we cannot give him until we have rehabilitated the economy. Rehabilitation—that is the basic task, but we cannot rehabilitate on the old economic and technical basis. This is technically impossible and would be absurd; we have to find a new basis. This new basis is our electrification plan.

We are talking to the peasants, to the mass of less-developed people, showing them that the new transition to a higher stage of culture and technical education is necessary for the success of all Soviet development. And so, it is essential to restore the economy. The most ignorant peasant will understand that the economy has been wrecked by the war and that he cannot overcome poverty and obtain the necessary goods in exchange for grain unless we restore it. All our work in the sphere of propaganda, school and adult education must be linked up closely with this most immediate and urgent need of the peasant in order not to be isolated from the most urgent requirements of our daily life; it should present them and their development in a way the peasant understands; it must be stressed that the way out of the situation is only through the rehabilitation of industry. Industry, however, cannot be rehabilitated on the old basis, it must be rehabilitated on the basis of modern technology, which means the electrification of industry and a higher culture. Electrification takes up to ten years' work, but it is work at a higher cultural and political level.

We shall evolve an extensive plan of work which must, in the minds of the peasantry, have a clearly defined practi-

cal aim. This cannot be done in a few months. The minimum programme should cover no less than three years. Without lapsing into utopias we may say that in ten years we shall be able to cover all Russia with a network of power stations and go over to an industry based on electricity that will meet the requirements of modern technology and put an end to the old peasant farming. This, however, requires a higher level of education and culture.

Without hiding from ourselves the fact that the immediate practical task is the restoration of transport and the delivery of food, and that with productivity at its present level we cannot undertake any extensive activites, you must nevertheless keep in mind and carry out, in the sphere of propaganda and education, the task of full rehabilitation on a basis commensurate with cultural and technical requirements. The old methods of propaganda are outmoded and until recently approached the peasants with general phrases about the class struggle; they served as grounds for the invention of all sorts of nonsense about proletarian culture,[125] etc., but we shall very rapidly cure ourselves of all this nonsense which seems very much like an infantile disorder. In propaganda and agitation, and in school and adult education, we shall present the question in a more sober and business-like manner, a manner worthy of the people of Soviet power who have learned something in the course of two years and who will go to the peasants with a practical, business-like and clear-cut plan for the reconstruction of all industry and will demonstrate that with education at its present level the peasant and the worker will not be able to carry out this task and will not escape from filth, poverty, typhus and disease. This practical task is clearly connected with cultural and educational improvements and must serve as the central point around which we must group all our Party propaganda and activities, all our school and extra-mural teaching. This will help to get a sound grasp of the most urgent interests of the peasant masses and will link up the general improvement in culture and knowledge with burning economic requirements to such an extent that we shall increase a hundredfold the demand of the working-class masses for education. We are

absolutely certain that if we have solved the difficult war problem in two years, we shall solve a still more difficult problem—the cultural and educational problem—in five to ten years.

These are the ideas I wished to express to you. (*Applause*.)

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF WORKING COSSACKS[126] MARCH 1, 1920

Comrades, allow me first of all to greet the Congress on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. I very much regret that I was unable to attend your meeting on the opening day and did not hear Comrade Kalinin's report. But from what he has told me I conclude that many things relating to the direct and immediate tasks of Soviet development, and especially to the Cossacks, were dealt with in his speech. I should, therefore, like to deal mostly with the international situation of the Soviet Republic and the tasks which confront all the working masses, including the Cossacks, because of this situation.

Never has the international position of the Soviet Republic been as favourable and as triumphant as it is now. If some thought is given to the way our international situation has evolved in the course of two years of untold difficulties and incredible sacrifices, if some thought is given to the reasons for it, any intelligent person will discern the main forces, the mainsprings, and the chief alignment of forces in the incipient world revolution.

When, over two years ago, at the very beginning of the Russian revolution, we spoke about this approaching international, world revolution, it was a prevision, and to a certain extent a prediction. And the vast majority of the working people who did not live in the large cities and who had not had a schooling in the Party greeted this talk of an

approaching world revolution with either mistrust or indifference, and at any rate with scanty understanding. And, indeed, it was impossible and would have been unnatural to expect the vast mass of the working population, especially the peasant, farming population, who are scattered over an immense territory, to form in advance anything like a correct idea of why world revolution was approaching, and whether it really was international. Our experience during these two incredibly difficult years and the experience of the working masses of remote border regions are worthy of attention, and not of merely being brushed aside with the remark that times were hard but have now become easier. Yes, we must give thought to the reason why things happened as they did, to the significance of their happening as they did, and to the lessons that are to be drawn from this; we must see which party's views have been borne out by what our own history and world history have demonstrated during these two years. That is what I would like to deal with first of all.

From the standpoint of the international situation the issue is quite clear, when the matter is taken on a broad scale and regarded not from the standpoint of one party or of one country, but from the standpoint of all countries together, when the matter is taken on a broad scale, then particular and trifling details recede into the background and the chief motive forces of world history become apparent.

When we began the October Revolution by overthrowing the power of the landowners and capitalists, appealing for the termination of the war, and addressing this appeal to our enemies; when after this we came under the yoke of the German imperialists; when after this, in October and November 1918, Germany was crushed, and Britain, France, America and the other Entente countries became the lords of the earth—what was our situation then? The vast majority asked whether it was not then obvious that the cause of the Bolsheviks was hopeless. And many added, "Not only is it hopeless, but the Bolsheviks have turned out to be frauds. They promised peace, but instead, after the German yoke had been thrown off and Germany defeated, they were found to be enemies of the whole Entente—that is, of Britain, France,

America and Japan, the most powerful countries in the world; and Russia, ruined, weakened and exhausted by the imperialist war, and moreover by the Civil War, has now to hold out in a fight against the foremost countries of the world." This was easy to believe; and it is not surprising that lack of faith made indifference and often actual hostility to the Soviet government more and more widespread. There is nothing surprising in it. What is surprising is that we emerged victorious from the struggle against Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin who were supported in every possible way by all the wealthiest powers in the world, powers which no other military force on earth can even approximately equal. The truth of this is clear to everybody, even to the blind, and even to those who are worse than blind, those who refuse to see at any price—even to them it is clear that we have emerged from this struggle victorious.

How did this miracle happen? It is to this question that I would like most of all to direct your attention, because it most clearly reveals the chief motive forces of the entire international revolution. By analysing this question in a practical way, we can supply an answer to it, for this is something we have already been through; we are able to say what happened after the event.

We were victorious because we could be and were united, and because we were able to win over allies from the camp of our enemies. And our enemies, who are immeasurably stronger than we are, suffered defeat because they were not, never could be and never will be united, and because every month they fought against us brought them further disintegration within their own camp.

I shall now speak about the fact which proves these statements.

You know that after Germany was defeated, there was nobody in the world to oppose Britain, France and America. They had robbed Germany of her colonies, and there was no corner on earth, there was not a single country, where the military might of the Entente did not prevail. It would seem that under such circumstances, enemies of Soviet Russia as they were, they must have clearly realised that Bolshevism aims at world revolution. We have never made a

secret of the fact that our revolution is only the beginning, that its victorious end will come only when we have lit up the whole world with these same fires of revolution. And we realised quite clearly that the capitalists were frenzied enemies of the Soviet government. It should be mentioned that when the European struggle was over they had an army of millions, and a powerful navy, to which we could not oppose even the semblance of a navy or an army of any strength. And all they had to do was to employ a few hundred thousand soldiers of this army of millions in the war against us in the same way as they were employed in the war against Germany, and the Entente would have crushed us. There cannot be the slightest doubt of this in the minds of those who have examined this question from the theoretical standpoint, and especially of those who went through the last war and know it from their own experience and observation.

Both Britain and France tried to seize Russia in this way. They concluded a treaty with Japan, who had taken practically no direct part in the imperialist war but who supplied a hundred thousand or so soldiers to crush the Soviet Republic, acting from the Far East. Britain at that time landed troops at Murmansk and Archangel, not to mention the movement in the Caucasus, while France landed soldiers and sailors in the South. This was the first historical phase of the struggle we sustained.

The Entente at that time had an army of millions and its soldiers were, of course, far superior to the whiteguard troops which were mustering in Russia and which had neither organisers nor arms. And it sent these soldiers against us. But what the Bolsheviks had predicted happened. They said that it was not only the Russian revolution that was concerned, but the world revolution as well, and that the Bolsheviks had allies in the workers of all civilised countries. These prophecies were not realised in their direct form at the time we proposed peace to all countries.[127] Our appeal did not meet with a general response. But the strike in Germany in January 1918[128] showed us that there we had the support of fairly large forces of workers and not only of Liebknecht, who even in the days of the Kaiser had the courage to declare publicly that the government and the

bourgeoisie of Germany were robbers. This strike ended in bloodshed and the suppression of the workers. In the Entente countries, of course, the bourgeoisie deceived the workers, either lying about our appeal or not publishing it at all. For this reason the appeal we made in November 1917 to all the nations produced no direct result, and those who thought that this appeal alone would call forth revolution were bound, of course, to be bitterly disappointed. But we did not count only upon the appeal; we counted upon more profound motive forces. We said that the revolution would proceed differently in different countries, and that of course it was not merely a matter of removing a protege of Rasputin or a villainous landowner, but of a struggle against the more developed and enlightened bourgeoisie.

And so, when the British landed troops in the North and the French in the South, the decisive test and the final denouement began. The question of who was right was now to receive its answer. Were the Bolsheviks right when they said that in order to win the fight they had to rely upon the workers? Or were the Mensheviks right when they said that an attempt to make a revolution in one country would be senseless and foolhardy, because it would be crushed by other countries? You heard this kind of talk not only from Party people but even from people who were just beginning to think about politics. And then came the acid test. For a long time we did not know what the result would be; for a long time we could not judge the result; but now, after the event, we know what it was. Even in the English newspapers, in spite of the frenzied lies about the Bolsheviks told by all the bourgeois papers—even in those papers letters began to appear from British soldiers near Archangel, saying that on Russian soil they had come across leaflets in English explaining to them that they had been deceived, that they were being led against workers and peasants who had set up their own state. These soldiers wrote that they did not want to fight. As for France, we know that there was a mutiny in the navy for which tens, hundreds, and perhaps thousands of Frenchmen are still doing penal servitude. These sailors declared that they would not fight the Soviet Republic. We can now see why neither French troops nor British troops are fighting us at present, why the British soldiers have been

removed from Archangel, and why the British Government dare not bring them on to our soil.

One of our political writers, Comrade Radek, wrote that the Russian soil would prove to be such that no soldier from any other country who set foot on it would be able to fight. This seemed to be too boastful a promise, it seemed a delusion. But it proved correct. The soil on which the Soviet revolution had taken place proved to be very dangerous to all countries. It seems that the Russian Bolsheviks were right; they had already managed to bring about unity among the workers during the time of the tsar, and the workers had managed to create small cells, which greeted all who believed them, whether French workers or British soldiers, with propaganda in their own languages. True, we had only tiny sheets, whereas in the British and French press propaganda was carried on by thousands of newspapers and every phrase was publicised in tens of thousands of columns. We issued only two or three quarto sheets a month; at best it worked out at only one copy for every ten thousand French soldiers.[129] I am not certain whether even that many reached their destination. Why, then, did the French and British soldiers believe them? Because we told the truth, and because when they came to Russia they saw that they had been deceived. They had been told that they were to defend their own country; but when they came to Russia they found that they were to defend the rule of the landowners and capitalists, that they were to crush the revolution. The reason we were able to win over these people in two years was that although they had forgotten that they had once executed their own kings, the moment they stepped on to Russian soil, the Russian revolution and the victories of the Russian workers and peasants reminded the soldiers of France and Britain of their own revolutions, and, thanks to the events in Russia, they recalled what had once happened in their own countries.

And this showed that the Bolsheviks were right, that our hopes were better founded than those of the capitalists, although we had neither funds nor arms, while the Entente had both arms and an invincible army. But we won the sympathy of these invincible armies, so much so that they dare not bring either British soldiers or French soldiers against us,

knowing from experience that every such attempt turns against them. That is one of the miracles that have occurred in Soviet Russia.

Now, after four years of war, when ten million people have been killed and twenty million crippled, when the imperialists are asking themselves what the war was for—such questions lead to some very interesting revelations. Certain negotiations which took place in 1916 were recently made public in France—the Austrian monarch began peace negotiations with France as early as 1916, but France kept quiet about it, and Albert Thomas, who called himself a socialist and who was then a member of the Cabinet, came to Russia to promise Constantinople, the Dardanelles and Galicia to Nicholas II. All these facts have now become widely known, they have been published in a French newspaper. The French workers are now saying to Albert Thomas: "You said that you had joined the Cabinet in order to protect our French fatherland and the interests of the French workers; yet in 1916, when the Austrian monarch proposed peace, you, Albert Thomas, concealed the fact, and as a result millions of people perished in order that the French capitalists might make more profit." These exposures are not ended yet. We began them by publishing the secret treaties, and the whole world saw why millions of people had perished, why millions of people had been sacrificed, they had been sacrificed in order that Nicholas II might secure the Dardanelles and Galicia. All the imperialists knew this. So did the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; and if they did not, they were downright idiots not to have studied politics and diplomacy enough to have known what has now been made public in the French papers. These exposures are now becoming more profound, and there will be no end to them. Thanks to this, the workers and peasants in every country are beginning more and more keenly to sense the truth and to realise what the imperialist war was about. That is why they are beginning to believe us, to see that we spoke the truth, and to see that the imperialists were lying when they led them to defend the fatherland.

That explains the miracle of our having won the sympathies of the soldiers of Britain and France, weak and helpless as we were from the military standpoint. It is no longer a

prediction, but a fact. True, the victory cost us untold hardships and incredible sacrifices. During the past two years we have suffered untold torments of starvation which became particularly acute when we were cut off from the grain of the East and the South. Nevertheless, we gained a victory, and a victory that is not only for our country, but for all countries, for all mankind. Never before has there been a case in history when powerful military states have been unable to fight a country so helpless in the military field as the Soviet Republic. Why did this miracle happen? Because when we, the Bolsheviks, led the Russian people into the revolution, we knew very well that this revolution would be a painful one, that it would cost millions of lives; but we knew that we would have the working masses of all countries behind us, and that our truth, by exposing all lies, would triumph more and more as time went on.

After the campaign of the powers against Russia had failed, they tried another weapon. The bourgeoisie of those countries have hundreds of years of experience, and were able to replace their own unreliable weapons by others. At first they tried to use their own soldiers to crush and stifle Russia; now they are trying it with the help of the border states.

Tsarism, the landowners and the capitalists used to oppress a number of the border nations—Latvia, Finland, and so on, where they aroused hatred by centuries of oppression. "Great Russian" became a most hateful word to all these nations which had been drenched in blood. And so the Entente, having failed in fighting the Bolsheviks with the help of its own soldiers, is now banking on the small states, hoping to strangle Soviet Russia with their help.

Churchill, who is pursuing the same sort of policy as Nicholas Romanov, wants to fight, and is fighting, without paying the slightest heed to parliament. He boasted that he would lead fourteen states against Russia—that was in 1919—and that Petrograd would be captured in September and Moscow in December. He was a little too boastful. He banked on the hatred of Russia in all these small states; but he forgot that in these small states there is a clear understanding of what Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin mean. They were once within a few weeks of complete victory.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

During Yudenich's campaign, when he was quite close to Petrograd, an article appeared in *The Times*, the richest of the British newspapers—I read this editorial myself—which implored, ordered, demanded that Finland help Yudenich—the eyes of the whole world are upon you; you will save liberty, civilisation and culture all over the world. Take the field against the Bolsheviks! This is what Britain said to Finland, and Britain has Finland completely in her pocket; it was said to Finland, who is up to her ears in debt, and who dares not utter a squeak because without Britain she has not enough grain to last her a week.

Such was the pressure brought to bear on all these small states to make them fight Bolshevism. And it failed twice. It failed because the peace policy of the Bolsheviks turned out to be a serious one, and was judged by its enemies to be more honest than the peace policy of any other country, and because a number of countries thought, "Much as we hate Great Russia, which used to suppress us, we know that it was Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin who suppressed us, and not the Bolsheviks." The former head of the Finnish whheguard government has not forgotten that in November 1917 he personally received a document from my hands in which we said without the slightest hesitation that we unreservedly recognised Finland's independence.[130]

At that time this seemed a mere gesture. It was thought that the revolt of the Finnish workers would cause it to be forgotten. But no, such things are not forgotten when they are corroborated by the whole policy of a definite party. And even the Finnish bourgeois government said, "Let's think it over. After all, we have learned something during a hundred and fifty years of oppression by the Russian tsars. If we take the field against the Bolsheviks, we shall help to install Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin. And who are they? Don't we know? Are they not the same breed of tsarist generals who stifled Finland, Latvia, Poland and many other nationalities? And shall we help these enemies of ours to fight the Bolsheviks? No, let us wait!"

They did not dare to refuse outright—they are dependent on the Entente. They did not help us directly; they waited, temporised, wrote Notes, sent delegations, formed commis-

sions, sat in conference, and did so until Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin had been crushed and the Entente defeated in the second campaign too. We were the victors.

If all these small states had taken the field against us—they were supplied with hundreds of millions of dollars and the finest guns and weapons, and had British instructors who had been through the war—if they had taken the field against us, there is not the slightest doubt that we would have been defeated. Everybody knows that very well. But they did not take the field against us, because they realised that the Bolsheviks are more honest. When the Bolsheviks say that they recognise the independence of any nation, that tsarist Russia was based on the oppression of other nations, and that the Bolsheviks never supported this policy, do not support it and never will support it, and that they will never go to war to oppress other nations—when they say that, they are believed. We know this not from the Latvian or Polish Bolsheviks, but from the bourgeoisie of Poland, Latvia, the Ukraine and so on.

Here the international significance of the Bolshevik policy had its effect. It was a test on international and not on Russian soil. It was a test by fire and sword, and not by words. It was a test in the last decisive struggle. The imperialists realised that they had no soldiers of their own, that they could strangle Bolshevism only by mustering international forces; but all international forces were beaten.

What does imperialism mean? It means that a handful of rich powers have a stranglehold on the whole world, when they know that they have the fifteen hundred million people of the world in their hands and have a stranglehold on them, and when these fifteen hundred million feel what British culture, French culture and American civilisation mean—rob for all you are worth! Today three-quarters of Finland has already been bought up by American multimillionaires. The officers who came from Britain and France to our border states to instruct their troops behaved like insolent scions of the Russian nobility in a defeated country. They all profiteered right and left. And the more the Finnish, Polish and Latvian workers starve, the more they are squeezed by a handful of British, American and

French multimillionaires and their henchmen. And this is going on all over the world.

The Russian Socialist Republic alone has raised the standard of war for real emancipation; and sympathy is turning in its favour all over the world. Through the small countries, we have won the sympathy of all the nations of the world, and they represent hundreds of millions of people. They are at present oppressed and downtrodden, they are the most backward part of the population; but the war has enlightened them. Huge masses of people were drawn into the imperialist war. Britain brought regiments from India to fight the Germans. France called millions of Africans to the colours to fight the Germans. They were formed into shock units and hurled into the most dangerous sectors, where they were mown down like grass by machine-guns. But they learned something. Under the tsar the Russian soldiers said, "If die we must, then let it be fighting the landowners"—now the Africans say, "If die we must, then let it not be to help the French predators rob the German capitalist predators, but to emancipate ourselves from the capitalists, German and French." In every country of the world, even in India, where three hundred million people are oppressed and treated as labourers by the British, minds are awakening and the revolutionary movement is growing from day to day. They all look towards one star, the star of the Soviet Republic, because they know that it made tremendous sacrifices in order to fight the imperialists, and that it has withstood the most severe trials.

This was the significance of the second card of the Entente to be beaten—victory on an international scale. It means that our peace policy is approved by the vast majority of people all over the world. It means that the number of our allies in all countries is growing—much more slowly than we would like, it is true, but growing nevertheless.

The victory we won in the offensive engineered against us by Churchill shows that ~ur policy was right. And after that we won a third victory—a victory over the bourgeois intelligentsia, over the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who in all countries were rabidly hostile to us. They all began to oppose the war against Soviet Russia. In all countries the bourgeois intelligentsia, the Socialist-

Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—this breed, unfortunately, is to be found in all countries (*applause*)—condemned interference in Russian affairs. They declared in all countries that it was a disgrace.

When Britain proposed that the Germans blockade Soviet Russia, and Germany refused, this exhaused the patience of the British and other Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. They said, "We are enemies of the Bolsheviks and regard them as violators and robbers. But we cannot support the proposal that the Germans join us in strangling Russia by a hunger blockade." And so, within the camp of the enemies, inside their own countries, in Paris, London and so on, where Bolsheviks are being hounded and treated in the way revolutionaries were treated under the tsar—in all cities, the bourgeois intelligentsia have issued the call "Hands off Soviet Russia!" In Great Britain this is the slogan under which the bourgeois intelligentsia are summoning meetings and issuing manifestos.

That is why the blockade had to be lifted. They could not restrain Estonia, and we have concluded peace and can trade with her. We have cut a window open on the civilised world. We have the sympathy of the majority of the working people, and the bourgeoisie are anxious to start trade with Russia as soon as possible.

Now the imperialists are afraid of us, and they have reason to be, for Soviet Russia has emerged from this war stronger than ever. British writers have written that the armies all over the world are disintegrating, and that if there is any country in the world whose army is gaining strength, that country is Soviet Russia. They tried to slander Comrade Trotsky and said that this was so because the Russian army is being kept under iron discipline, which is enforced by ruthless measures, as well as by skilful and widespread agitation.

We have never denied this. War is war, and it demands iron discipline. Have you capitalist gentlemen not employed the same methods? Have you not carried on agitation? Have you not a hundred times more paper and printing works? To compare our literature with yours is like comparing a molehill to a mountain. Yet your propaganda has failed, and ours has succeeded.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks tried an experiment to see whether it was not possible to get along with the capitalists peacefully, and to pass from them to social reform. In Russia they wanted to go over to social reform in an amicable way, so as not to offend the capitalists. They forgot that capitalists are capitalists, and that the only thing to do with them is to vanquish them. They say that in the Civil War the Bolsheviks have drenched the country in blood. But, my dear Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, did you not have eight months to experiment in? Were you not in power with Kerensky from February to October 1917, during which period you had the help of all the Cadets, of the whole Entente, of all the richest countries in the world? Your programme then was one of social reform, without civil war. Is there a fool in the world who would have resorted to revolution if you had really begun social reform? Why did you not do so? Because your programme was a blank, an absurd dream. Because it is impossible to come to terms with the capitalists and secure their obedience peacefully, especially after four years of imperialist war. Do you think there are no clever people in Britain, France and Germany who understand that they went to war for the division of colonies, and that ten million people were killed and twenty million crippled over the division of the spoils? That is what capitalism means. How can you expect to persuade, how can you expect to come to terms with this capitalism which has crippled twenty million people and killed ten million? And we say to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, "You had the opportunity of trying your experiment. Why did nothing come of it? Because your programme was a sheer utopia, a utopia not only for Russia, but even for Germany, the Germany where the German Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, whom nobody will listen to, are now in power, the Germany where a German Kornilov, armed from head to foot, is preparing reaction,[131] the German republic where fifteen thousand workers have been slaughtered in the streets of the cities. And this is called a democratic republic!" Yet the German Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have the hardihood to say that the Bolsheviks are a wicked lot, that they have reduced the country

to a state of civil war, whereas in their own country social peace prevails and only fifteen thousand workers have been killed in the streets!

They say that the Civil War and bloodshed in Russia are due to the fact that it is a backward country. But tell us, why is the same thing happening in countries like Finland which are not backward? Why is there a White Terror in Hungary which has shocked the whole world? Why were Luxemburg and Liebknecht assassinated in the German republic, where since the overthrow of the Kaiser, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have been in power? And why is it not the Mensheviks who are strong there, but Kornilov—and the Bolsheviks too, who, although they are crushed, are strong because of their faith in the justice of their cause and because of their influence over the masses?

There you have the world revolution—which they said the Bolsheviks were using to deceive the people with, when as a matter of fact all hopes of compromise proved to be sheer nonsense.

A big tussle is developing among the bourgeois countries themselves. America and Japan are on the verge of flinging themselves at each other's throats because Japan sat snug during the imperialist war and has grabbed nearly the whole of China, which has a population of four hundred million. The imperialist gentlemen say. "We are in favour of a republic, we are in favour of democracy; but why did the Japanese grab more than they should under our very noses?" Japan and America are on the verge of war, and there is absolutely no possibility of preventing that war, in which another ten million will be killed and twenty million crippled. France, too, says, "Who got the colonies?—Britain." France was victorious, but she is up to her ears in debt; she is in a hopeless position, whereas Britain has piled up wealth. Over there, new combinations and alliances are already being engineered. They want to fling themselves at each other's throats again over the division of colonies. And an imperialist war is again brewing and cannot be prevented. It cannot be prevented, not because the capitalists, taken individually, are vicious—individually they are just like other people—but because they cannot free themselves of the financial meshes in any other way, because the whole

world is in debt, in bondage, and because private property has led and always will lead to war.

All this is causing the roots of the international revolution to strike deeper and deeper. Because of this we have won over the French and British soldiers; because of this we have won the confidence of the small states, and our international position is now better than ever before. And on the basis of a simple calculation we can say that though many hardships still await us, the worst difficulties have already been overcome. The all-powerful Entente no longer holds out any terrors for us: we have defeated it in decisive battles. (*Applause.*)

True, they may still incite Poland against us. The Polish landowners and capitalists are growling and threatening, saying that they want to get back the territory of 1772,[132] that they want to subjugate the Ukraine. We know that France is inciting Poland, flinging millions into that country, because France is bankrupt anyhow and is now putting her last stake on Poland. And we say to the comrades in Poland that we respect her liberty as we respect the liberty of every other nation, and that the Russian workers and peasants, who have experienced the yoke of tsarism, know very well what that yoke meant. We know that it was a heinous crime to divide Poland up among the German, Austrian and Russian capitalists, and that this division doomed the Polish nation to long years of oppression, when the use of the native language was regarded as a crime, and when the whole Polish nation was brought up in one idea, namely, to throw off this treble yoke. We therefore understand the hatred the Poles feel, and we declare to them that we shall never cross the line on which our troops are now stationed—and they are stationed a long way from any Polish population. We are proposing peace on this basis, because we know that this will be a tremendous acquisition for Poland. We do not want war on account of frontiers, because we want to obliterate that accursed past when every Great Russian was regarded as an oppressor.

But since Poland responds to our peace proposal by silence, since she continues to give a free hand to French imperialism, which is inciting her to a war against Russia since fresh trainloads of munitions are arriving in Poland

every day and the Polish imperialists threaten to start a war on Russia, we say, "Just try it! You'll get a lesson you'll never forget." (*Applause.*)

When soldiers died during the imperialist war for the enrichment of the tsar and the landowners, we said frankly and openly that defence of the fatherland in the imperialist war was treachery, that it meant defence of the Russian tsar, who was to get the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and so on. But now that we have published the secret treaties, now that we have embarked on a revolution against imperialist war, now that we have borne untold hardships for the sake of that revolution, now that we have shown that the capitalists in Russia have been suppressed and dare not even dream of returning to the old system, we say that we are not defending the right to plunder other nations, but are defending our proletarian revolution, and will defend it to the very end. The Russia which has been emancipated and which for two years has borne untold suffering for the sake of her Soviet revolution—that Russia we shall defend to our last drop of blood! (*Applause.*)

We know that the time is gone when we were pressed on all sides by imperialist armies and when the working folk of Russia still did not understand the tasks that confronted us. Guerrilla methods prevailed then, each tried to grab a weapon for himself without consideration for the cause as a whole, and disorder and robbery prevailed in the localities. In the course of these two years we have created a united and disciplined army. It has been a very difficult task. You know that the science of war cannot be learned all at once and you also know that only the officers, the colonels and generals, who have remained from the tsarist army, know that science. You have heard, of course, that these old colonels and generals have been responsible for a great deal of treachery, which cost us tens of thousands of lives. All such traitors had to be cleared out, and at the same time we had to select a corps of commanders from among the former officers, so that the workers and peasants might learn from them- for a modern army cannot be built up without science, and we have had to put it in the hands of military experts. It has been a difficult task, but that, too, we have accomplished.

We have created a united army, an army which is now directed by the advanced section, by experienced Communists, who have everywhere succeeded in putting agitation and propaganda on a proper footing. True, the imperialists are also carrying on propaganda, but the peasants are already beginning to understand that there are different kinds of propaganda. They are beginning to tell by instinct what is true and what is false. At any rate, the propaganda which is being carried on by the Mensheviks and which was carried on by Kolchak and Denikin is no longer as successful as it was. Take their posters and pamphlets. They talk about a Constituent Assembly, they talk about liberty and a republic. But the workers and peasants, who have secured liberty at the price of their blood, now understand that the term "Constituent Assembly" serves as a screen for the capitalists; and if anything decided the issue of the struggle against Kolchak and Denikin in our favour, despite the fact that they were supported by the Great Powers, it was that both the peasants and working Cossacks, who for a long time remained in the other camp, have in the end come over to the workers and peasants—and it was only this that finally decided the war and brought about our victory.

With this victory behind us, we must now do our utmost to consolidate it on another front, the bloodless front, the front of the war against the economic chaos to which we have been reduced by the war against the landowners and capitalists, against Kolchak and Denikin. You know what this victory has cost us; you know what a desperate fight we had to put up when we were cut off from the grain-growing regions, from the Urals and Siberia. At that time the Moscow and Petrograd workers had to suffer intolerable torments of hunger. Attempts were made to frighten you with the term "dictatorship of the proletariat", to frighten the peasants and working Cossacks, and instil into their minds the idea that dictatorship meant the arrogant rule of the worker. Actually, however, while Britain and America were doing all they could to support Kolchak and Denikin, the workers of the central cities, exercising their dictatorship, did their best to show everyone by their example how to break away from the landowners and capitalists and march with the working people; for labour unites, while property disunites.

That was the thesis we stuck to throughout these two years, and it led us to victory. We were united by labour, whereas the Entente is steadily disintegrating, because property has turned the imperialists into wild beasts, who from first to last are always squabbling over the division of spoils. Labour has made us a force that is uniting all the working people. And now "dictatorship" is a word that can frighten only utterly ignorant people, if such are still to be found in Russia.

I do not know if any person still remains who has not been taught a lesson by Kolchak and Denikin, and who has not come to realise what the dictatorship of the proletariat means—it means that never has the proletariat of Petrograd, Moscow and the industrial centres suffered such hardships as during these past two years. The peasants of the producing gubernias are now in such a position that they, having possession of the land, get the whole product for themselves. Since the Bolshevik revolution the Russian peasants, for the first time in thousands of years, are working for themselves and can feed better. Yet at the same time, during these two years of struggle the workers, the proletariat, while exercising their dictatorship, have been suffering untold torments of hunger. You now see that dictatorship means leadership, the union of the disunited and scattered working masses, a single, closely-knit whole directed against the capitalists in order to defeat them and to prevent a recurrence of the bloodshed in which ten million people perished and twenty million were crippled. The union of all the labouring people, a single iron will is required to defeat a force like this, which can rely on mighty armies and modern culture. This single iron will can be furnished only by the working masses, only by the workers, the proletariat, only by those class-conscious workers whom decades of strikes and demonstrations have trained in struggle, and who have succeeded in overthrowing tsarism. It can be furnished only by the workers who have borne the brunt of the two years of unparalleled civil war, fighting in the front ranks and creating a united Red Army, which has been joined by tens of thousands of the finest workers, peasants and military and political students, who have been the first to perish and who, in Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tver, Yaroslavl and all the industrial cities, have been suffering the terrible

torments of hunger. And this hunger has welded the workers together and brought the peasants and working Cossacks of the producing gubernias to see for themselves that the Bolsheviks were right, for the workers were thus enabled to hold their own in the struggle against the whiteguards.

That is why the working class is entitled to say that by these two years of sacrifice and war it has proved to all the working peasants and to every working Cossack that we must unite and join forces. We must fight those who are profiteering on the famine because they find it more profitable to sell grain at a thousand rubles a pood than to sell it at the fixed price. There is money to be made that way, but it leads back to the old times,-and we shall once more find ourselves in that accursed pit where tsarism ruled and where the capitalists condemned humanity to the imperialist slaughter for the sake of their profits. It would turn us back, and that is something that cannot be allowed. After the struggle against Kolchak and Denikin, the working peasants and Cossacks came to realise the truth that we need unity, and they are taking their places by the side of the workers and looking upon the working class as their leaders. The working peasants saw that no injury derived from the workers' government for there was none to see; it was only the landowners, capitalists and kulaks who did, but then, they are the worst enemies of the working people, they are the allies of those imperialists who were the cause of the bloody war and all the miseries of the people. All working people must unite—only then shall we be victorious.

The bloody war is over and we are now waging a bloodless war, a war against the economic chaos, ruin, poverty and disease to which we have been reduced by four years of imperialist war and two years of civil war. You know that the economic chaos is terrible. In the border regions of Russia, in Siberia and in the South there are today tens of millions of poods of grain; millions of poods have already been collected and transported, yet there is a terrible famine in Moscow, people are dying of starvation because grain cannot be delivered, and it cannot be delivered because the Civil War has completely devastated the country, wrecked the railways and destroyed scores of bridges. Locomotives have broken down, and we are unable to repair them quickly. We

are now trying with great difficulty to secure aid from abroad. We know, however, that it is now possible to start on the complete restoration of industry.

How are we going to restore industry when we cannot exchange manufactured goods for grain because there aren't any?

We know that when the Soviet government takes grain from the peasants at a fixed price it pays them only in paper. What is this paper worth? Although it is not the price of the grain we can only pay in paper money. But we say that this is essential, that the peasants must give their grain as a loan. Is there a single well-fed peasant who would refuse bread to a hungry worker if he knew that this worker, once he had been fed, would repay him in goods? No honest and politically-conscious peasant would refuse to give grain as a loan. Peasants who have surplus grain must let the state have it for paper money—and that means a loan. The only people who do not understand, who do not realise this, are the supporters of capitalism and exploitation, those who want the well-fed man to profit even more at the expense of the hungry man. The workers' government cannot tolerate that, and we shall stop at no sacrifice to combat it. (*Applause.*)

We have now concentrated all our forces on the restoration of industry and are steadfastly waging this new war, in which we shall be as victorious as we have been hitherto. We have instructed a commission of scientists and engineers to draw up a plan for the electrification of Russia. The plan will be ready in two months and will enable us to get a full and clear picture of how, in a few years, the whole of Russia will be covered by a network of electric transmission lines, will be restored in a new way, not the old way, and how she will achieve that culture which our prisoners of war saw in Germany.

That is the way we must restore our industry, and that is the way we shall return a hundredfold the loan of grain we are taking from the peasants. We know that this cannot be done in a year or two; the minimum programme of electrification is calculated for a period of not less than three years, and the complete success of this advanced industry will require not less than ten years. But if we were able to

hold on for two years in such a bloody war, we shall be able to hold on for ten years and more in face of any difficulties. We have gained that experience in leading the masses with the help of urban workers which will carry us through all difficulties on this bloodless front of struggle against economic chaos and will lead to greater victories than those we gained in the war against international imperialism. (Applause.)

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Published according to the
the booklet, V. I. Lenin,
Speech Delivered at the
First All-Russia Congress
of Working Cossacks, Moscow,
1920

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF MEDICAL WORKERS[133] MARCH 1, 1920

MINUTES

(*Comrade Lenin, who was greeted by prolonged applause and by the singing of the* Internationale, *delivered a brief speech of greeting*.) Comrades, allow me to greet your Congress on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. There is no need to speak here at length about the purposes of the Congress and the work you have done. With the exception of the war front, there is perhaps no field of work that has involved so many sacrifices as yours. Four years of imperialist war have given mankind several million cripples and a number of epidemics.

A tremendous, difficult and responsible task has fallen on our shoulders. The struggle on the war front has shown that the attempts of the imperialists have produced no results The greatest difficulties in the military field are behind us, but we must now set about the task of peaceful development. The experience we gained on the bloody front we shall apply to the bloodless front, where we shall meet with far greater sympathy.

We have succeeded in enlisting the services of thousands of experts, of a vast number of officers and generals, who are occupying responsible posts side by side with Communist workers. We must apply all the determination and all the experience of the Civil War to the fight against epidemics.

Time was when members of the medical profession, too, entertained a distrust of the working class; time was when they, too, dreamed of the restoration of the bourgeois system. But now they, too, are convinced that only together with the proletariat will it be possible to achieve a flourishing state of culture in Russia. Only collaboration between scientists and workers can put an end to oppressive poverty, disease and dirt. And this will be done.

No forces of darkness can withstand an alliance of the scientists, the proletariat and the technologists.

Brief report published in *Izvestia* No. 51, March 6, 1920

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A LETTER TO R.C.P. ORGANISATIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS

Dear Comrades,

The Party Congress has been appointed for March 27. The agenda of the Congress has been published, and no doubt all Party organisations have already begun to prepare for the Congress. The Central Committee of the Party deems it its duty to express certain views in connection with this work.

Our Party, which by its persistent struggle over a period of fifteen years (1903-17) had proved its bonds with the working class of Russia, its ability to combat bourgeois influences within the working class and to lead the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in the most diverse and most difficult circumstances, naturally had to take upon itself the direct implementation of the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat after the October Revolution. The Congress of our Party is therefore of the utmost importance not only for the entire working-class movement, but also for the entire development of Soviet power and for the guidance of the Russian—and to a certain extent the international—communist movement.

The importance of our Party Congress in this respect is still further enhanced by the specific features of the present moment, when the Soviet government has to accomplish a most difficult transition from the military tasks that formerly absorbed its entire attention to the tasks of peaceful economic development.

The membership of our Party has greatly increased, chiefly owing to the immense influx of workers and peasants during the Party Weeks that were organised at the most

difficult period of our revolution, when Yudenich and Denikin were closest to Petrograd and Moscow. The workers and peasants who joined the Party at such a critical moment constitute a fine and reliable body of leaders of the revolutionary proletariat and of the non-exploiting section of the peasantry. We are confronted with the task of helping, as rapidly, successfully and efficiently as possible, to complete the training of these new members of the Party, of helping to mould them into a body of builders of communism, people who are the most politically conscious and capable of filling the most responsible posts, and at the same time most closely connected with the masses, i.e., with the majority of the workers and of the peasants who do not exploit the labour of others.

Relevant to the specific nature of the present moment, the chief item on the agenda of the forthcoming Congress will be the question of economic development and, in particular, of the measures, ways and means, and results of having a greater proportion of workers in our chief administrations, central boards and Soviet government apparatus in general.

This must be the principal question at the Party Congress, for the principal question in the entire Soviet development in Russia (and—inasmuch as she has become the centre of the world revolution—to a large extent in international communism as well) is the transition from the fight on the bloody front to the fight on the bloodless front, the front of labour, the front of the war against economic chaos, the war for the restoration, improvement, reorganisation and development of Russia's entire economy.

The procurement and transportation of large state supplies of foodstuffs, the restoration of the ruined transport system, the implementation of these measures with military speed, energy and discipline; side by side with this and indivisibly from it, the greater proportion of workers employed in the Soviet government apparatus, the elimination of sabotage and red tape from this apparatus, the achievement of the maximum productivity of labour, the utmost exertion of all the forces of the country for the restoration of the economy—such is the task imperatively dictated by circumstances, an urgent task demanding methods involving the

supreme revolutionary energy of millions and millions of workers and peasants.

The Party Congress must take into account the experience of the labour armies, that young and new institution; it must take into account the experience gained by the entire apparatus of Soviet government over a period of more than two years, and adopt a number of decisions permitting the whole of our Socialist Republic to concentrate all the forces of the working people with redoubled firmness, determination, energy and efficiency on achieving the best possible solution of the urgent problem of rapidly and thoroughly overcoming economic chaos.

We invite all Party members and all Party organisations to concentrate the maximum effort on this problem, both in the practical work of all Soviet institutions and in the work of preparation for the Congress. For these tasks merge into one indivisible whole.

Happily, the time for purely theoretical discussions, disputes over general questions and the adoption of resolutions on principles has passed. That stage is over; it was dealt with and settled yesterday and the day before yesterday. We must march ahead, and we must realise that we are now confronted by a *practical* task, the *business* task of rapidly overcoming economic chaos, and we must do it with all our strength, with truly revolutionary energy, and with the same devotion with which our finest worker and peasant comrades, the Red Army men, defeated Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin.

We must march ahead, we must look ahead, and we must bring to the Congress the *practical experience* of economic development to which thought has been given and which has been carefully *analysed* by the common labour and common effort of all members of the Party.

We have learned something, and in order to march ahead and to overcome economic chaos, what we have to do is not to start anew, not to reconstruct everything right and left, but to *utilise* to the utmost what has already been created. There must be as little general reconstruction as possible and as many as possible business-like measures, ways, means and directions for the attainment of our chief aim which have been tested in practice and verified by results—we must

have more workers in our apparatus, and see that it is done still more widely, still more rapidly and still better, we must enlist an even greater number of workers and labouring peasants in the work of administering industry and the national economy generally; not only must we enlist individual workers and peasants who have best proved themselves on the job, but we must enlist to a larger extent the *trade unions* and conferences of non-party workers and peasants; we must enlist literally all bourgeois specialists (because there are incredibly few of them)—i.e., specialists who have been trained under bourgeois conditions and who have reaped the fruits of bourgeois culture. We must organise things so that, in conformity with the demands of our Party Programme, our working masses may really *learn from these bourgeois specialists* and at the same time place them "in a comradely environment of common labour hand in hand with the masses of rank-and-file workers led by class-conscious Communists" (as our Party Programme puts it); such are our chief aims.

Comrades, we have hitherto been able to surmount the untold difficulties which history has placed in the way of the first socialist republic because the proletariat has properly understood its tasks as dictator, i.e., as the leader, organiser and teacher of all the working people. We won because we have always correctly defined the most urgent, insistent and pressing task and have really concentrated on this task the forces of all the working people of the whole nation.

Military victories are easier to win than economic victory. It was much easier to defeat Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin than to defeat the old petty-bourgeois customs relations, habits and economic conditions upheld and reproduced by millions and millions of small owners, alongside of the workers, together with them, and in the midst of them.

Victory in this field requires greater endurance, greater patience, greater persistence, greater steadfastness, greater system in work, greater organisational and administrative skill on the grand scale. This is what we, a backward nation lack most of all.

Let all members of the Party exert their efforts to bring to the Party Congress *practical* experience, tested, analysed

and summarised. If we bend all our efforts and succeed in pooling, testing and analysing in a careful, thoroughgoing and business-like way this *practical* experience, exactly what each of us has attempted and completed, or has seen others attempt and complete, then, and only then, will our Party Congress, and, following it, all our Soviet institutions, accomplish the *practical* task of overcoming economic chaos as rapidly and surely as possible.

From congresses and meetings to discuss general questions to congresses and meetings to summarise *practical experience*—that is the slogan of our times. The task of the moment and the task of the Party Congress, as we conceive it, is to learn from practical experience, to discard what is harmful, to combine all that is valuable, in order to determine precisely a number of immediate practical measures, and to carry out these measures at all costs, not hesitating at any sacrifices.

Bulletin of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) No. 13, March 2, 1920

Published according to the manuscript

INTERNATIONAL WORKING WOMEN'S DAY

Capitalism combines formal equality with economic and, consequently, social inequality. That is one of the principal features of capitalism, one that is deliberately obscured by the supporters of the bourgeoisie, the liberals, and is not understood by petty-bourgeois democrats. This feature of capitalism, incidentally, renders it necessary for us in our resolute fight for economic equality openly to admit capitalist inequality, and even, under certain conditions, to make this open admission of inequality the basis of the proletarian statehood (the Soviet Constitution).

But even in the matter of formal equality (equality before the law, the "equality" of the well-fed and the hungry, of the man of property and the propertyless), capitalism cannot be consistent. And one of the most glaring manifestations of this inconsistency is the *inequality* of women. Complete equality has not been granted even by the most progressive republican, and democratic bourgeois states.

The Soviet Republic of Russia, on the other hand, at once swept away all legislative traces of the inequality of women without exception, and immediately ensured their complete equality before the law.

It is said that the best criterion of the cultural level is the legal status of women. This aphorism contains a grain of profound truth. From this standpoint only the dictatorship of the proletariat, only the socialist state could attain, as it has attained, the highest cultural level. The new, mighty and unparalleled stimulus given to the working women's movement is therefore inevitably associated with the foundation (and consolidation) of the first Soviet

Republic—and, in addition to and in connection with this, with the Communist International.

Since mention has been made of those who were oppressed by capitalism, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, it must be said that the Soviet system, and only the Soviet system, guarantees democracy. This is clearly shown by the position of the working class and the poor peasants. It is clearly shown by the position of women.

But the Soviet system is the last decisive struggle for the *abolition of classes*, for economic and social equality. Democracy, even democracy for those who were oppressed by capitalism, including the oppressed sex, *is not enough for us*.

It is the chief task of the working women's movement to fight for economic and social equality, and not only formal equality, for women. The chief thing is to get women to take part in socially productive labour, to liberate them from "domestic slavery", to free them from their stupefying and humiliating subjugation to the eternal drudgery of the kitchen and the nursery.

This struggle will be a long one, and it demands a radical reconstruction both of social technique and of morals. But it will end in the complete triumph of communism.

March 4, 1920

Pravda, March 8, 1920
(special issue)
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES MARCH 6, 1920

Comrades, I very much regret that there is little probability of my being able to discharge the duties hinted at by the Chairman in reference to my membership of the Moscow Soviet.[134] I am nevertheless very glad to have the opportunity of greeting the new Moscow Soviet. Permit me to say a few words about the tasks which, owing to the general situation in the country, fall particularly to the lot of the Moscow workers, and first and foremost of the Moscow Soviet.

Comrades, it seems there is every hope that we shall, in the near future, emerge completely victorious from the war which was forced upon us by the landowners and capitalists of Russia in alliance with the capitalists of the whole world. I have just received a telegram from a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, the last remaining front of any importance. This telegram states that the resistance of the enemy has been broken in all directions (*applause*), so that now that we have finished with the Kolchak front and the Archangel front, the day is apparently not far off when the Denikin front, too, will be completely eliminated. But, comrades, no matter how greatly the results of the Civil War and the international situation may favour us, and even though the imperialist powers are obviously on the eve of a complete breakdown, and all their attempts to unite anybody at all for a war against us have ended in failure—no matter how favourable this

situation may be, it must be said that the danger, even the foreign danger, is not yet over. Attempts are still being made, especially by imperialist France, to incite Poland to make war on Russia. You all know, of course, from the press, from the decisions of the Central Executive Committee, and from all the statements made at the Cossack Congress and many other congresses, that the Soviet Republic, on its part, has done all it could to prevent this war, that we have proposed peace to the Polish nation not only officially but in the most friendly way, and have most solemnly recognised the independence of the Polish state, and have made the most positive declarations to this effect. From the military standpoint, we have done everything we could to prevent the Polish landowners and capitalists from carrying out their designs—perhaps not so much their own designs as those of imperialist France, who stands behind their back and to whom they are up to their ears in debt. We have done everything we could to prevent these capitalists and landowners from carrying out their design of inciting the Polish nation to make war on Russia. But although we have done everything we could, future action does not depend upon us. Even the Polish landowners and capitalists themselves do not know what they will do tomorrow. The internal situation in Poland is so grave that they may embark on such a dubious venture because of the obvious danger to their class position, because they feel their end approaching. Consequently, although we have won many victories, we have no guarantee at all that we are secure against foreign attack, and we must be on our guard, we must preserve, develop and strengthen our military preparedness, so as to accomplish the task that confronts the working class. If, in spite of all our efforts, the Polish imperialists, supported by France, embark on a war against Russia, if they launch their military venture, they must receive, and will receive, such a rebuff that their fragile capitalism and imperialism will fall to pieces.

We do not conceal from ourselves, especially from the Moscow and other Russian workers, that fresh effort and new and gigantic sacrifices are now demanded of us, which will be all the more severe because we are just now at the end of a winter—February and March—that has brought

a new aggravation of want, hunger and suffering owing to the ruined state of our railway system. And I must tell you that the war on the bloody front, the civil war directed against the imperialists, is to all appearances coming to an end, and that anyway the enemy can offer no serious menace to us since the attempts of the Entente to launch a general war against us have suffered decisive defeat; the war on the bloodless front, however, still continues and will continue for a long time to come. For the more we leave the military danger behind us the more we are faced with the tasks of internal development; and these have to be carried out by the working class, which has taken upon itself the mission of leading the working masses. These tasks—the restoration of a ruined country and a ruined economy, and the organisation of a socialist society—cannot be accomplished without a war on the bloodless front. That is what the advanced workers, who are now forming the new Moscow Soviet, must impress most firmly on their minds, for the Moscow workers have always been a model, and for some time to come must continue to be a model, which will be followed by the workers of other cities.

We must remember that we are grappling with the task of making a socialist revolution in a country where peasants form the greater part of the population. We have now been joined by the peasant masses of Siberia, where the peasants have surpluses of grain, where they have been corrupted by capitalism, cling to the old freedom of trade, and consider it their sacred right—in this respect they are being led astray by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (that is their sad lot—there is nothing else for them to do)—they consider it their sacred right to practise freedom of trade in grain surpluses, believing that they can retain this right. It does not matter to them that this supposed civil equality implies the exploitation of the hungry by the well-fed; for peasants who have grain surpluses and refuse to let the starving have them are putting into effect the principles of capitalist relations. They are people who, after having been exploited for hundreds of years, have now become their own masters for the first time, and are in a position, owing to their grain surpluses, to enslave the workers, who, as a result of the collapse of industry, are

unable to give any equivalent in return for the grain. For this reason our attitude towards these petty-bourgeois property-owners, towards the small profiteers, who number millions and who think that because they possess surpluses of grain the farther we go the more they will make, and that the worse the famine the more profitable it will be for those who have grain—our attitude towards them must be one of war. This we say bluntly, and this is the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which openly declares to the worker and peasant masses: "The working peasant is our ally, our friend and brother; but when the peasant acts as a property-owner holding a surplus of grain not required by his household, and acts towards us as a property-owner, as a well-fed man towards a hungry man, such a peasant is our enemy, and we will fight him with the utmost determination, the utmost ruthlessness." Victory over the small property-owners, over the small profiteers, is no easy matter. They cannot be eliminated in one year, many years will be required; it will take organised resistance, stubborn and steadfast work, step by step over a long period of time—it will take an incessant day-to-day struggle, which it is particularly difficult to wage and in which the profiteering peasant is very often victorious over the worker. But we will fight on the bloodless front so that the hungry may secure from the well-fed the surpluses they possess, despite all obstacles and despite the desire of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to introduce freedom of trade and leave these surpluses in the possession of the well-fed.

We have done a great deal of work during the past two years. We have enlisted the peasant and worker masses in this work, and have everywhere been able to secure what we needed. At a time when the whiteguard officers, the former tsarist officers, were fighting us on the side of our enemies, we enlisted tens and hundreds of these experts in our work, which helped to remake them. They helped us do our work, in conjunction with our commissars. They themselves learned from us how the work should be done, and in return gave us the benefit of their technical knowledge. And it was only with their help that the Red Army was able to win the victories it did. We must now divert all this work into

another channel. It must be work of a peaceful character; we must devote everything to the work on the labour front. We must direct our former property-owners, who were our enemies. We must mobilise all who are capable of working and compel them to work with us. We must at all costs wipe from the face of the earth the last traces of the policy of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—the policy which talks of personal freedom, etc.—because it would doom us to starvation. This attitude must be adopted in all our work. The advanced section of the proletariat is assuming the leadership of the rest of the population, and it says: "We must get you to understand our ideas fully and to put them into effect, just as we got you to come over more and more to our side."

The first task that confronts us here is to clean up Moscow, to put an end to the filth and state of neglect into which it has sunk. We must do this so as to set an example to the whole country, where this filth, which brings with it epidemics and disease, is becoming more and more prevalent. We must set this example here, in Moscow, an example such as Moscow has set many times before.

We must bear in mind that we are faced with the task of restoring the transport system. In the spring we must introduce control by the worker masses. We must effect it in respect of those market gardeners in the vicinity of Moscow who are taking advantage of the fact that there are starving fellow-beings around them to pocket millions. The fact that any rich market gardener can squeeze untold profits out of his poor neighbours is an atrocious injustice, which we cannot tolerate.

What must we do? Specialists must give us the benefit of their knowledge so that we may carry our ideas into effect. The class which has just elected the new Moscow Soviet must tackle this work, and carry it out more practically and in greater detail than hitherto.

We know that the proletariat is not very large numerically; but we also know that the Petrograd workers, who were in the front ranks of the Red Army, gave us their best forces whenever we needed them, gave them for the fight against the enemy in greater numbers than we thought possible. We have said that Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-

Voznesensk have given us a vast number of people. But that is not enough; they must give us all we need. We have to utilise all the bourgeois specialists who accumulated knowledge in the past and who must pay with this knowledge now. It is with the help of these people that we must do our work; it is with their help that we must conquer all we need—conquer, and create our own militant contingents of workers who will learn from them and direct them, and who will always turn to the broad masses of the workers to explain this experience. That is what the Moscow Soviet, as one of the most important and one of the biggest of the proletarian Soviets, must accomplish at all costs. The fifteen hundred members of the Moscow Soviet, plus the alternate members, constitute an apparatus through which you can draw upon the masses and constantly enlist them, inexperienced though they are, in the work of administering the state.

The worker and peasant masses who have to build up our entire state must start by organising state control. You will obtain this apparatus from among the worker and peasant masses, from among the young workers and peasants who have been fired as never before with the independent desire, the readiness and determination to set about the work of administering the state themselves. We have learned from the experiences of the war and shall promote thousands of people who have passed through the school of the Soviets and are capable of governing the state. You must recruit the most diffident and undeveloped, the most timid of the workers for the workers' inspection and promote them. Let them progress in this work. When they have seen how the workers' inspection participates in state affairs, let them gradually proceed from the simple duties they are able to carry out—at first only as onlookers—to more important functions of state. You will secure a flow of assistants from the widest sources who will take upon themselves the burden of government, who will come to lend a hand and to work. We need tens of thousands of new advanced workers. Turn for support to the non-party workers and peasants, turn to them, for our Party must remain a narrow party, surrounded as it is by enemies on all sides. At a time when hostile elements are trying by every method of warfare, deceit and provocation to cling to us and to take

advantage of the fact that membership of a government party offers certain privileges, we must act in contact with the non-party people. The laws on the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection grant the right to enlist non-party workers and peasants and their conferences in the work of government. This apparatus is one of the means whereby we can increase the number of workers and peasants who will help us to achieve victory on the internal front in a few years. For a long time this victory will not be as simply, decisively and clearly apparent as the victory on the war front. This victory demands vigilance and effort, and you can ensure it by carrying out the job of development of Moscow and its environs and helping in the general work of restoring the transport system, of restoring that general economic organisation which will help us to get rid of the direct and indirect influence of the profiteers and to vanquish the old traditions of capitalism. We should not grudge a few years for this. Even if we had these conditions, such social reforms as these would be without parallel, and here to set ourselves tasks designed only for a short period of time would be a great mistake.

Allow me to conclude by expressing the hope and assurance that the new Moscow Soviet, bearing in mind all the experience gained by its predecessor in the course of the Civil War, will draw new forces from among the youth and will tackle the affairs of economic development with all the energy, firmness and persistence with which we tackled military affairs, and so gain victories which, if not as brilliant, will be more solid and substantial.

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Published according to the book

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET IN CELEBRATION OF THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL MARCH 6, 1920

Comrades, a year has passed since the founding of the Communist International. During this year the Communist International has been successful beyond all expectation; we may say boldly that at the time of its foundation no one expected such immense successes.

In the early period of the revolution many entertained the hope that the socialist revolution would begin in Western Europe immediately the imperialist war ended; at the time when the masses were armed there could have been a successful revolution in some of the Western countries as well. It could have taken place, had it not been for the split within the proletariat of Western Europe being deeper and the treachery of the former socialist leaders greater than had been imagined.

To this day we lack exact information on how the demobilisation proceeded and how the war is being wound up. We do not know, for example, what happened in Holland, and only from an article containing an account of a Dutch Communist's speech (from one chance article—there were many such articles) have I been able to learn that the revolutionary movement in Holland, a neutral country that was less involved in the imperialist war, assumed such dimensions that the formation of Soviets was started, and Troelstra, one of the most important figures in the opportunist Dutch Social-Democratic Party, admitted that the workers could have seized power.

Had the International not been in the hands of traitors who worked to save the bourgeoisie at the critical moment, there would have been many chances of a speedy revolution in many belligerent countries as soon as the war ended and also in some neutral countries, where the people were armed; then the outcome would have been different.

Things did not turn out that way, revolution did not succeed so quickly, and it now has to follow the whole path of development that we began even before the first revolution, before 1905; for it was only due to more than ten years having passed before 1917 that we were capable of leading the proletariat.

What happened in 1905 was, so to speak, a rehearsal for the revolution, and it was partly because of this that we in Russia succeeded in using the moment of the collapse of the imperialist war for the proletariat to seize power. Owing to historical developments, owing to the utter rottenness of the autocracy, we were able to begin the revolution with ease; but the easier it was to begin it the harder it has been for this solitary country to continue it, and with the experience of this year behind us we can say to ourselves that in other countries, where the workers are more developed, where there is more industry, where the workers are far more numerous, the revolution has developed more slowly. It has taken our path, but at a much slower pace.

The workers are continuing this slow development, paving the way for the proletarian victory which is advancing with undoubtedly greater speed than was the case with us; because when you look at the Third International you wonder that it has spread so rapidly, moving from success to success.

Look at the way our ugly words, such as "Bolshevism", for example, are spreading throughout the world. Despite the fact that we call ourselves the Communist Party, and that the name "Communist" is a scientific, European term, it is not as widespread in European and other countries as the word "Bolshevik" is. Our Russian word "Soviet" is one of the most widely used, it is not even translated into other languages, but is pronounced everywhere in Russian.

Despite the lies in the bourgeois press, despite the furious resistance offered by the entire bourgeoisie, the sympathies

of the masses of the workers are on the side of the Soviets, Soviet power and Bolshevism. The more the bourgeoisie lied the more they helped to spread throughout the world what we had experienced with Kerensky.

On their arrival from Germany, some of the Bolsheviks were met here with attacks and persecutions, organised in the "democratic republic" in real American style. Kerensky, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks did their best to assist this witch-hunt. In this way they stirred up sections of the proletariat and made them think that there must be something good about the Bolsheviks if they are subjected to such persecution. (*Applause.*)

And when you get fragmentary information from abroad from time to time, when—being unable to follow the entire press—you read, for example, Britain's richest newspaper, *The Times*, and find it quoting Bolshevik statements to prove that during the war the Bolsheviks were preaching civil war, you draw the conclusion that even the cleverest representatives of the bourgeoisie have completely lost their heads. This British newspaper directs attention to the book *Against the Stream*, recommends it to British readers and gives quotations to show that the Bolsheviks are the very worst of people, who speak of the criminal character of the imperialist war and preach civil war; it convinces you that the entire bourgeoisie, while they hate us, are helping us—and we bow to them and thank them. (*Applause.*)

We have no daily press either in Europe or in America; information about our work is very meagre, and our comrades are suffering the most severe persecution. But when you see that the very wealthy Allied imperialist press, from which hundreds of thousands of other newspapers draw their information, has lost its sense of proportion to such a degree that in its desire to injure the Bolsheviks it prints numerous quotations from the writings of Bolsheviks, digging them up from war-time publications in order to prove that we spoke of the criminal character of the war and worked to transform it into a civil war, it shows that these very clever gentlemen will become as stupid as our Kerensky and his comrades were. We can therefore vouch for it that these people, the leaders of British imperialism, will make a

clean and enduring job of helping the communist revolution. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, before the war it seemed that the main division in the working-class movement was the division into socialists and anarchists. Not only did it seem so; it was so. In the protracted period that preceded the imperialist war and the revolution, no objective revolutionary situation existed in the overwhelming majority of European countries. What had to be done at that time was to use this slow process for revolutionary preparation. The socialists began it, but the anarchists did not see the need for it. The war created a revolutionary situation, and the old division proved to be outdated. On the one hand, the top leaders of anarchism and socialism became chauvinists; they showed what it meant to defend their own bourgeois robbers against other bourgeois robbers, both of whom were responsible for the loss of millions of lives in the war. On the other hand, new trends arose among the rank and file of the old parties—against the war, against imperialism and for social revolution. A most profound crisis thus developed owing to the war; both the anarchists and the socialists split, because the parliamentary leaders of the socialists were in the chauvinist wing while an ever-growing minority of the rank and file left them and began to take the side of the revolution.

Thus the working-class movement in all countries followed a new line, not the line of the anarchists and the socialists, but one that could lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This split had become apparent throughout the world and had started before the Third International was founded.

If our party has been successful it is because it came into being when the situation was revolutionary and when the labour movement was already in existence in all countries; and we therefore see now that a split has taken place in socialism and anarchism. All over the world, this is leading to communist workers participating in the formation of new organisations and to their uniting in the Third International. That is the most correct attitude.

Disagreements are again arising, for example, over the question of using parliaments, but since the experience of the Russian revolution and the Civil War, since the figure

of Liebknecht and his role and importance among parliamentarians, have become known to the world, it is absurd to reject the revolutionary use of parliaments. It has become clear to people of the old way of thinking that the question of the state cannot be presented in the old way, that the old, bookish approach to this question has been succeeded by a new one based on practice and born of the revolutionary movement.

A united and centralised force of the proletariat must be counterposed to the united and centralised force of the bourgeoisie. The question of the state has thus now been shifted to a new plane, and the old disagreement has begun to lose its meaning. The old division of the working-class movement has yielded to new ones, the attitude towards Soviet government and to the dictatorship of the proletariat having assumed prime importance.

The Soviet Constitution is clear evidence of what the Russian revolution has produced. Our experience and the study of it have shown that all the groups of the old issues are now reduced to one: for or against Soviet rule, either for bourgeois rule, for democracy (for those forms of democracy which promise equality between the well-fed and the hungry, equality between the capitalist and the worker at the ballot-box, between the exploiters and the exploited, and serve to camouflage capitalist slavery), or for proletarian rule, for the ruthless suppression of the exploiters, for the Soviet state.

Only supporters of capitalist slavery can favour bourgeois democracy. We can see that in the whiteguard literature of Kolchak and Denikin. Many Russian cities have been cleared of this filth, and the literature collected and sent to Moscow. When you scan the writings of Russian intellectuals like Chirikov, or of bourgeois thinkers like Y. Trubetskoi, it is interesting to see that they help Denikin and at the same time argue about the Constituent Assembly, equality, etc. These arguments about the Constituent Assembly are of service to us; when they conducted this propaganda among the whiteguard rank and file they helped us in the same way as the entire course of the Civil War, all the events, helped us. By their own arguments they proved that Soviet rule is backed by sincere revolutionaries who

sympathise with the struggle against the capitalists. That has been made perfectly clear during the Civil War.

After the experience gained, after what has happened in Russia, Finland and Hungary, after a year's experience in the democratic republics, in Germany, one cannot object to, and write disquisitions about, the need for a central authority, for dictatorship and a united will to ensure that the vanguard of the proletariat shall close its ranks, develop the state and place it upon a new footing, while firmly holding the reins of power. Democracy has completely exposed itself; that is why signs of the strengthening of the communist movement for Soviet rule, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, have increased tremendously in all countries and have taken on the most diverse forms.

This has reached a point where such parties as the German Independents and the French Socialist Party, which are dominated by leaders of the old type who have failed to understand either the new propaganda or the new conditions, and have not in the least changed their parliamentary activity, but are turning it into a means of dodging important issues and engaging the workers' attention with parliamentary debates—even these leaders have to recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power. This is because the masses of the workers are making themselves felt and forcing them to recognise it.

You know from the speeches of other comrades that the breakaway of the German Party of Independents, the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Soviet government was the last decisive blow dealt to the Second International. Taking the existing state of affairs into consideration, it may be said that the Second International has been killed, and that the proletarian masses in Germany, Britain and France are taking the side of the Communists. In Britain there is also a party of Independents which persists in adhering to legality and in condemning the violence of the Bolsheviks. A discussion forum was recently opened in their newspaper. Well, the question of Soviets is being discussed there, and next to an article printed in British working-class newspapers we see an article by an Englishman who refuses to reckon with the theory of socialism and persists in his stupid contempt for theory, but who, taking the

conditions of life in Britain into consideration, reaches a definite conclusion and says that they cannot condemn the Soviets, but should support them.

This shows that things have begun to change even among the backward sections of the workers in countries like Britain, and it may be said that the old forms of socialism have been killed for ever.

Europe is not moving towards revolution the way we did, although essentially Europe is going through the same experience. In its own way, every country must go through, and has begun to go through, an internal struggle against its own Mensheviks and against its own opportunists and Socialist-Revolutionaries, which exist under different names to a greater or lesser degree in all countries.

And it is because they are experiencing this independently that we can be sure the victory of the communist revolution in all countries is inevitable and that the greater the vacillations in the enemies' ranks, and the uncertainty in their declarations that the Bolsheviks are criminals and that they will never conclude peace with them, the better for us.

They are now saying that even if they do trade with the Bolsheviks they will not recognise them. We have nothing against that; try it, gentlemen, please. As for your not recognising us, we can understand that. We would consider it a mistake on your part if you did recognise us. But if you have become so muddled that you first declare that the Bolsheviks are violators of all the laws of God and man, and that you will not talk or make peace with them, and then say that you will begin exchanges, without recognising our policy, that is a victory for us which will give an impulse to and strengthen the communist movement among the masses in every country. So deep is the movement that, in addition to those that are officially affiliated to the Third International, a number of movements are to be seen in the advanced countries, movements that do not adhere either to socialism or communism, but which are being drawn towards Bolshevism by the force of circumstances although they continue to condemn it.

War in the twentieth century, in a civilised country, compels governments to expose their own actions. A French newspaper has published some documents belonging to the

ex-Emperor Charles of Austria who in 1916 offered peace to France. Now that his letter has been published, the workers are asking Albert Thomas, the socialist leader, who was in the government at the time, what he did when an offer of peace- was made to that government. When Albert Thomas was asked about it, he made no reply.

These exposures have only just begun. The masses of the people are literate, and neither in Europe nor in America can they retain the old attitude towards war. They are asking for what cause 10 million people were killed and 20 million crippled. The presentation of this question makes the popular masses turn towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. To present this question is to answer it: 10 million people were killed and 20 million crippled in order to settle the issue of who would amass the greater wealth, the German or the British capitalists. That is the truth, and no matter what efforts are made to conceal it, it is spreading.

The fall of the capitalist governments is unavoidable, because everybody can see that another war like the last is inevitable if the imperialists and the bourgeoisie remain in power. New disputes and conflicts are developing between Japan and America. They have been prepared by decades in the diplomatic history of the two countries. Wars are inevitable because of private property. War is inevitable between Britain, which has acquired colonies through plunder, and France, which considers herself robbed of her full share. No one knows where and how it will break out, but everybody sees, knows and says that war is inevitable, and is being prepared again.

This situation in the twentieth century, in countries with a totally literate population, is our guarantee that the old reformism and anarchism are out of the question. They were killed by the war. To talk of using reforms in order to remake the capitalist society which spent thousands of millions of rubles on the war, to talk of remaking this society without a revolutionary government and without force, without tremendous upheavals, is impermissible. Anyone who speaks and thinks that way is of no importance.

The Communist International is strong because it is based on the lessons of the world imperialist slaughter. In every country the correctness of its position finds increasing con-

firmation in the experience of millions of people, and the movement towards the Communist International is now a hundred times wider and deeper than before. It has brought about the complete break-down of the Second International in one year.

In every country (even the most undeveloped) in the world, all thinking workers are aligning themselves with the Communist International, and are accepting its ideas. Therein lies the full guarantee that the victory of the Communist International throughout the world, in the not very distant future, is assured. (*Applause.*)

Communist International
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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF WATER TRANSPORT WORKERS[135] MARCH 15, 1920

The water transport system is at the moment of the greatest importance and significance to Soviet Russia, and the Congress will certainly devote the most serious attention and care to the tasks that confront water transport workers. Allow me to dwell on the question which the Communist Party and the trade unions are more interested in than in any other, and which you too no doubt are keenly debating; I refer to the management of industry. This question figures as a special point on the agenda of the Party Congress. Theses on the subject are being published. The comrades in the water transport system must also discuss it.

You know that one of the points in dispute, one that arouses the liveliest discussion both in the press and at meetings, is that of one-man management or corporate management. I think that the preference for corporate management not infrequently betrays an inadequate comprehension of the tasks confronting the Republic; what is more, it often testifies to insufficient class-consciousness. When I reflect on this question, I always feel like saying that the workers have not yet learned enough from the bourgeoisie. This is graphically shown by the countries where the democratic socialists, or Social-Democrats, prevail, who are now participating in governments in Europe and America, under various guises and in some form of alliance with the bourgeoisie. They have been ordained by God himself to share the old prejudices; but in our country, after two years of proletarian rule, we should not only want, but should strive to inculcate upon the proletariat a class-consciousness that does not fall short of that of the bourgeoisie. Look how the

bourgeoisie administer the state; how they have organised the bourgeois class. In the old days, could you have found anyone who shared the views of the bourgeoisie and was their loyal defender, and yet argued that individual authority is incompatible with the administration of the state? If there had been such a blockhead among the bourgeoisie he would have been laughed to scorn by his own class fellows, and would not have been allowed to talk or hold forth at any important meeting of capitalists and bourgeois. They would have asked him what the question of administration through one person or through a corporate body had to do with the question of class.

The shrewdest and richest bourgeoisies are the British and American; the British are in many respects more experienced, and they know how to rule better than the Americans. And do they not furnish us with examples of maximum individual dictatorship, of maximum speed in administration, and yet they keep the power fully and entirely in the hands of their own class? There you have a lesson, comrades, and I think that if you give it some thought, if you recall the not very distant past, when the Ryabushinskys, Morozovs and other capitalists ruled Russia—if you recall how, after the overthrow of the autocracy, during the eight months Kerensky, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power, they managed so perfectly and with such remarkable rapidity to change their hue, to assume every kind of label, to make every kind of outward, formal concession, and yet keep the power fully and completely in the hands of their own class—I think that a little reflection on the lesson of Britain and on this concrete example will do much more to help understand the matter of one-man management than many abstract, purely theoretical resolutions, compiled in advance.

It is claimed that corporate management means management by the workers, and that individual management means non-worker management. The mere fact that the question is presented in this way, the mere fact that this sort of argument is used shows that we still lack a sufficiently clear class-consciousness; and not only so, but that we are less clear about our class interests than the bourgeois gentry are. And that is natural. They did not learn to rule in two

years, but in two hundred years, and much more than two hundred years if you take the European bourgeoisie. We must not give way to despair because we have been unable to learn everything in two years; but it is important—events demand it—that we should learn more rapidly than our enemies have. They have had hundreds of years to learn in; they have opportunities to learn all over again and correct their mistakes, because on a world scale they are infinitely stronger than we are. We have no time to learn; we must approach the question of corporate management from the standpoint of positive and concrete facts. I am sure you will come to adopt the policy on this question outlined by the Central Committee of the Party; it has been published and is being discussed at every Party meeting, but for the men on the job, for the water transport workers, who have been at it for two years the truth of this is obvious. And I hope the vast majority of those present here, who are familiar with practical management, will understand that we must not confine ourselves to a general discussion of the question, but must act like serious practical men, abolishing the collegiums and managing without them.

All administrative work requires special qualifications. You may be the very best of revolutionaries and propagandists, and yet be absolutely useless as an administrator. But anybody who studies real life and has practical experience knows that management necessarily implies competency, that a knowledge of all the conditions of production down to the last detail and of the latest technology of your branch of production is required; you must have had a certain scientific training. These are the conditions we must satisfy at any cost. And when we move general resolutions in which we talk with the pomposity of experts about corporate management and one-man management, the conviction gradually dawns upon us that we know practically nothing about management, but we are beginning to learn a little from experience, to weigh every step and to promote every administrator who shows any ability.

You know from the debates in the Central Committee that we are not opposed to placing workers at the head, but we say that this question must be settled in the interests of production. We cannot wait. The country is so badly ruined,

calamities—famine, cold and general want—have reached such a pitch that we cannot continue like this any longer. No devotion, no self-sacrifice can save us if we do not keep the workers alive, if we do not provide them with bread, if we do not succeed in procuring large quantities of salt, so as to recompense the peasants by properly organised exchange and not with pieces of coloured paper which cannot keep us going for long. The very existence of the power of the workers and peasants, the very existence of Soviet Russia is at stake. With management in the hands of incompetent people, with fuel not delivered in time, with locomotives, steamers and barges standing unrepaired, the very existence of Soviet Russia is at stake.

Our rail transport system is in a far worse state than our water transport system. It has been ruined by the Civil War, which was mainly conducted along the land routes; both sides destroyed mostly bridges, and this has put the whole railway system in a desperate state of ruin. We shall restore it. Almost daily we are doing a little bit towards restoring it. But it will be some time before the system is completely restored. If even advanced and cultured countries are suffering from disrupted transport systems, how are we to restore ours in Russia? But repaired it must be, and quickly, for the population cannot endure another winter like the last. Whatever the heroism of the workers, whatever their spirit of self-sacrifice, they cannot go on enduring all the torments of hunger, cold, typhus and so on. So tackle the question of management like practical men. See to it that management is conducted with the minimum expenditure of forces; see to it that the administrators, whether experts or workers, are capable men, that they all work and manage, and let it be considered a crime for them not to take part in the work of management. Learn from your own practical experience. Learn from the bourgeoisie as well. They knew how to maintain their class rule; they have the experience we cannot do without and to ignore it would be sheer conceit and entail the utmost danger to the revolution.

Earlier revolutions perished because the workers were unable to retain power by means of a firm dictatorship and did not realise that they could not retain power by dicta-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

torship, by force, by coercion alone; power can be maintained only by adopting the whole experience of cultured, technically-equipped, progressive capitalism and by enlisting the services of all these people. When workers undertaking the job of management for the first time adopt an unfriendly attitude towards the expert, the bourgeois, the capitalist who only recently was a director, who raked in millions and oppressed the workers, we say—and no doubt the majority of you also say—that these workers have only just begun to move towards communism. If communism could be built with experts who were not imbued with the bourgeois outlook, that would be very easy; but such communism is a myth. We know that nothing drops from the skies; we know that communism grows out of capitalism and can be built only from its remnants, they are bad remnants, it is true, but there are no others. Whoever dreams of a mythical communism should be driven from every business conference, and only those should be allowed to remain who know how to get things done with the remnants of capitalism. There are tremendous difficulties in the work, but it is fruitful work, and every expert must be treasured as being the only vehicle of technology and culture, without whom there can be nothing, without whom there can be no communism.

Our Red Army was victorious in another sphere because we solved this problem in relation to the Red Army. Thousands of former officers, generals, and colonels of the tsarist army betrayed and sold us, and thousands of the finest Red Army men perished as a result—that you know. But tens of thousands are serving us although they remain supporters of the bourgeoisie, and without them there would have been no Red Army. And you know that when two years ago we tried to create a Red Army without them, it ended in guerrilla methods and disorder; the result was that our ten to twelve million soldiers did not make up a single division. There was not a single division fit to fight, and with our millions of soldiers we were unable to cope with the tiny regular army of the whiteguards. We learned this lesson at the cost of much bloodshed, and it must now be applied to industry.

Experience tells us that everyone with a knowledge of bourgeois culture, bourgeois science and bourgeois technology

must be treasured. Without them we shall be unable to build communism. The working class, as a class, rules; it created Soviet power, holds that power as a class, and can take every supporter of bourgeois interests and fling him out neck and crop. Therein lies the strength of the proletariat. But if we are to build a communist society, let us frankly admit our complete inability to conduct affairs, to be organisers and administrators. We must approach the matter with the greatest caution, bearing in mind that only that proletarian is class-conscious who is able to prepare the bourgeois expert for the forthcoming navigation season and who does not waste his time and energy, more than enough of which is always wasted on corporate management.

I repeat, our fate may depend more on the forthcoming navigation season than on the forthcoming war with Poland, if it is forced upon us. War too, you know, is hampered by the break-down of the transport system. We have plenty of troops, but we cannot transport them, we cannot supply them with food; we cannot bring up salt, of which we have large quantities, and without an exchange of goods, proper relations with the peasants are inconceivable. That is why the entire Republic, Soviet power as a whole, the very existence of the power of the workers and peasants, imposes on the present navigation season tasks of great and exceptional importance. Not one week, not one day, not one minute must be lost; we must put an end to this chaos and increase our possibilities three- and fourfold.

Everything, perhaps, depends on fuel, but the fuel situation is now better than it was last year. We can float more timber, if we do not allow mismanagement. Things are much better with regard to oil, to say nothing of the fact that in the near future Grozny will most likely be in our hands; and although this is still problematical, the Emba fields are ours, and there we have ten to fourteen million poods of oil already. And if the water transport system helps us to deliver large quantities of building material to Saratov quickly and in good time, we shall cope with the railway to the Emba fields. And you know what it means to have oil for the water transport system. We shall not be able to get the railways going in a short time. God grant—not God, of course, but our ability to overcome the old prejudices of the

workers—that we improve the railways a little in four or five months. And so, the water transport system must carry out a task of heroic proportions during this year's navigation period.

Dash, ardour and enthusiasm alone can do nothing; organisation, endurance and honest effort are what will help, when the loudest voice is not that of the man who fears the bourgeois expert and treats us to general talk, but that of the man who is able to establish and to exercise firm authority—let it be even individual authority, provided it is used in the interests of the proletariat—and who realises that everything depends on the water transport system.

To make progress we must erect a ladder; in order to get the sceptical to climb that ladder, we must put things in order, we must select and promote people who are able to put the water transport system in order. There are some who say in reference to military discipline: "The idea! What do we want it for?" Such people do not realise the situation in Russia and do not realise that although the fight on the bloody front is coming to an end, the fight on the bloodless front is only beginning, that no less effort, exertion and sacrifice is required here, and that the stakes are no smaller and the resistance greater rather than less. Every wealthy peasant, every kulak and every member of the old administration who does not want to act in the interests of the workers is our enemy. Do not cherish any illusions. Victory demands a tremendous struggle and iron, military discipline. Whoever does not understand this understands nothing about the conditions needed to maintain the power of the workers, and his ideas do great harm to this power of the workers and peasants.

That is why, comrades, I will conclude my speech by expressing the hope and certainty that you will devote the greatest attention to the tasks of the forthcoming navigation season, and will make it your aim, and will stop at no sacrifice, to create real, iron, military discipline and to perform in the sphere of water transport miracles as great as those performed during the past two years by our Red Army. (*Applause.*)

Pravda Nos. 59 and 60,
March 17 and 18, 1920

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN MEMORY OF Y. M. SVERDLOV[136] MARCH 16, 1920

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Referring to the late Comrade Sverdlov's great talent as an organiser, Lenin said that this reminded one of the significance of organisation and of the role of organisers in Soviet development. Describing the extreme importance of organisation, Lenin pointed out that organisation was, in fact, the principal weapon of the working class in the revolutionary struggle. He spoke of the alignment of social forces at various periods since the October Revolution, and declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible had the working people not been united. He drew the conclusion that organisation was the mainspring of all our successes on the war fronts, as well as of the successes gradually being achieved in combating economic disruption. Lenin gave an appreciation from this angle of the work of the late Comrade Sverdlov as an organiser, and went on to say that we had such a vanguard of organisers because they had passed through a severe school of life when they had to work in underground organisations. Such a vanguard of organisers was particularly needed at that moment in Germany, which was passing through a stage of Kornilovism. Lenin said that there were many talented organisers among the working people, even among the non-party workers and peasants, but that we had not yet learned to find them and to place them in suitable posts. He expressed the conviction that increasing numbers of organisers

would in future emerge from among the working people, and that they would remember the work of Comrade Sverdlov and firmly follow in his footsteps.

Pravda Nos. 59
March 17, 1920

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TWO RECORDED SPEECHES[137]

1

WORK FOR THE RAILWAYS

Comrades, the great victories of the Red Army have delivered us from the onslaught of Kolchak and Yudenich and have almost put an end to Denikin.

The troops of the landowners and capitalists who wanted, with the aid of the capitalists of the whole world, to re-establish their rule in Russia have been routed.

The imperialist war and then the war against counter-revolution, however, have laid waste to and ruined the entire country.

We must bend all efforts to conquer the chaos, to restore industry and agriculture, and to give the peasants the goods they need in exchange for grain.

Now that we have defeated the landowners and liberated Siberia, the Ukraine, and the North Caucasus, we have every opportunity of restoring the country's economy.

We have a lot of grain, and we now have coal and oil. We are being held up by transport. The railways are out of action. Transport must be rehabilitated. Then we can bring grain, coal and oil to the factories, then we can deliver salt, then we shall begin to restore industry and put an end to the hunger of the factory and railway workers.

Let all workers and peasants set about rehabilitating the railways, let them set about the work with persistence and enthusiasm.

All the work necessary for the restoration of transport must be carried out with the greatest zeal, with revolutionary fervour, with unreserved loyalty.

We have been victorious on the front of the bloody war.

We shall be victorious on the bloodless front, on the labour front.

All out for work to restore transport!

Recorded at the end of
March 1920

First published in *Pravda* No. 18,
January 21, 1928

Published according to
the gramophone record

2
LABOUR DISCIPLINE

Why was it we defeated Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin although the capitalists of all the world helped them?

Why are we confident that we shall now defeat the economic chaos and rehabilitate industry and agriculture?

We overthrew the landowners and capitalists because the men of the Red Army, workers and peasants, knew they were fighting for their own vital interests.

We won because the best people from the entire working class and from the entire peasantry displayed unparalleled heroism in the war against the exploiters, performed miracles of valour, withstood untold privations, made great sacrifices and got rid of scroungers and cowards.

We are now confident that we shall conquer the chaos because the best people from the entire working class and from the entire peasantry are joining this struggle with the same political consciousness, the same firmness and the same heroism.

When millions of working people unite as one and follow the best people from their class, victory is assured.

We drove the scroungers out of the army. And now we say, "Down with the scroungers, down with those who think of their own advantage, of speculation and of shirking work, those who are afraid of the sacrifices necessary for victory!"

Long live labour discipline, zeal in work and loyalty to the cause of the workers and peasants!

Eternal glory to those who died in the front ranks of the Red Army!

Eternal glory to those who are now leading millions of working people and who with the greatest zeal march in the front ranks of the army of labour!

Recorded at the end of March 1920

First published in *Pravda* No. 18, January 21, 1928

Published according to the gramophone record

Российская Коммунистическая Партия (большевиков).

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!

Личная анкета

для делегатов 9-го С'езда Р. К. П. (большевиков).

1. Имя, отчество и фамилия. Владимир Ильич Ульянов (Ленин)

2. № делегатского билета ~~решающий~~ ~~совещ.~~ 381

3. В какой организации числитесь (уезд, губерния). Минск

4. Число членов вашей организации 35 000

5. Как избраны (на губконференции, уездконференции, общем собрании и т. д.) и когда. Моск. горкофеция

6. Число представленных членов партии на губконференции, уездконференции, общем собрании, на которой вы были избраны на С'езд. 35.000

7. Возраст 50

8. Образование. высшее

9. Бывшая профессия (указать вполне определенно), или какие специальности знаете. Отвеч.: нарм. юрис. повер. Нуж. Ленин

10. Национальность. Великорусс

11. Семейное положение. женат

Партийная работа.

12. С какого времени состоите членом Р. К. П. (год, месяц). с 1893 года

13. На каких Всероссийских партийных С'ездах вы участвовали. Кандидат-делегат на всех

14. Какую партийную работу исполняли, когда и где. член ЦК. и ред. ц.о.

First page
of the questionnaire filled in
by Lenin as delegate
to the Ninth Congress
of the R,C.P.(B.)
March 29, 1920

Reduced

NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[138]

MARCH 29-APRIL 5, 1920

Published in the book
Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Verbatim Report.
Moscow, 1920

Published according to the book, verified with the shorthand notes

Published in the book
Ninth Congress of the Russian
Communist Party. Verbatim Report.
Moscow, 1920

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the shorthand notes

1

OPENING SPEECH
MARCH 29

First of all allow me on behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to greet the delegates who have assembled for the Party Congress.

Comrades, we are opening this present Congress of the Party at a highly important moment. The internal development of our revolution has led to very big and rapid victories over the enemy in the Civil War, and, in view of the international situation, these victories, we find, are nothing more nor less than the victory of the Soviet revolution in the first country to make this revolution—a very weak and backward country—a victory over the combined forces of world capitalism and imperialism. And after these victories we may now proceed with calm and firm assurance to the immediate tasks of peaceful economic development, confident that the present Congress, having reviewed the experience of over two years of Soviet work, will be able to utilise the lesson gained in order to cope with the more difficult and complex task of economic development that now confronts us. From the international standpoint, our position has never been as favourable as it is now; and what fills us with particular joy and vigour is the news we are daily receiving from Germany, which shows that, however difficult and painful the birth of a socialist revolution may be, the proletarian Soviet power in Germany is spreading irresistibly. The part played by the German Kornilov-type putsch was similar to that of Kornilov revolt in Russia. After that a swing towards a workers' government began, not only among the masses of urban workers, but also among the rural proletariat of Ger-

many. And this swing is of historic importance. Not only is it one more absolute confirmation of the correctness of the line, but it gives us the assurance that the time is not far off when we shall be marching hand in hand with a German Soviet government. (*Applause*.)

I hereby open the Congress and request you to nominate a presidium.

2

REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MARCH 29

Comrades, before beginning my report I must say that, like the report at the preceding Congress, it is divided into two parts: political and organisational. This division first of all leads one to think of the way the work of the Central Committee has developed in its external aspect, the organisational aspect. Our Party has now been through its first year without Y. M. Sverdlov, and our loss was bound to tell on the whole organisation of the Central Committee. No one has been able to combine organisational and political work in one person so successfully as Comrade Sverdlov did and we have been obliged to attempt to replace his work by the work of a collegium.

During the year under review the current daily work of the Central Committee has been conducted by the two collegiums elected by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee—the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. In order to achieve co-ordination and consistency in the decisions of these two bodies, the Secretary was a member of both. In practice it has become the main and proper function of the Organising Bureau to distribute the forces of the Party, and that of the Political Bureau to deal with political questions. It goes without saying that this distinction is to a certain extent artificial; it is obvious that no policy can be carried out in practice without finding expression in appointments and transfers. Consequently, every organisational question assumes a political significance; and it has become the established practice for the request of a single member of the

Central Committee to be sufficient to have any question, for one reason or another, examined as a political question. To have attempted to divide the functions of the Central Committee in any other way would hardly have been expedient and in practice would hardly have achieved its purpose.

This method of conducting business has produced extremely good results: no difficulties have arisen between the two bureaus on any occasion. The work of these bodies has on the whole proceeded harmoniously, and practical implementation has been facilitated by the presence of the Secretary who acted, furthermore, solely and exclusively in pursuance of the will of the Central Committee. It must be emphasised from the very outset, so as to remove all misunderstanding, that only the corporate decisions of the Central Committee adopted in the Organising Bureau or the Political Bureau, or by a plenary meeting of the Central Committee—only these decisions were carried out by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. The work of the Central Committee cannot otherwise proceed properly.

After these brief remarks on the arrangement of work within the Central Committee, I shall get on with my job, which is the report of the Central Committee. To present a report on the political work of the Central Committee is a highly difficult task if understood literally. A large part of the work of the Political Bureau has this year consisted in making the current decision on the various questions of policy that have arisen, questions of co-ordinating the activities of all the Soviet and Party institutions and all organisations of the working class, of co-ordinating and doing their utmost to direct the work of the entire Soviet Republic. The Political Bureau adopted decisions on all questions of foreign and domestic policy. Naturally, to attempt to enumerate these questions, even approximately, would be impossible. You will find material for a general summary in the printed matter prepared by the Central Committee for this Congress. To attempt to repeat this summary in my report would be beyond my powers, and I do not think it would be interesting to the delegates. All of us who work in a Party or Soviet organisation keep daily track of the extraordinary succession of political questions, both foreign and domestic. The way these questions have been decided, as expressed in the decrees

of the Soviet government, and in the activities of the Party organisations, at every turn, is in itself an evaluation of the Central Committee of the Party. It must be said that the questions were so numerous that they frequently had to be decided under conditions of extreme haste, and it was only because the members of the body concerned were so well acquainted with each other, knew every shade of opinion and had confidence in each other, that this work could be done at all. Otherwise it would have been beyond the powers of a body even three times the size. When deciding complex questions it frequently happened that meetings had to be replaced by telephone conversations. This was done in the full assurance that obviously complicated and disputed questions would not be overlooked. Now, when I am called upon to make a general report, instead of giving a chronological review and a grouping of subjects, I shall take the liberty of dwelling on the main and most essential points, such, moreover, as link up the experience of yesterday, or, more correctly, of the past year, with the tasks that now confront us.

The time is not yet ripe for a history of Soviet government. And even if it were, I must say for myself—and I think for the Central Committee as well—that we have no intention of becoming historians. What interests us is the present and the future. We take the past year under review as material, as a lesson, as a stepping-stone, from which we must proceed further. Regarded from this point of view, the work of the Central Committee falls into two big categories—work connected with war problems and those determining the international position of the Republic, and work of internal, peace-time economic development, which only began to come to the fore at the end of the last year perhaps, or the beginning of this year, when it became quite clear that we had won a decisive victory on the decisive fronts of the Civil War. Last spring our military situation was an extremely difficult one; as you remember, we were still to experience quite a number of defeats, of new, huge and unexpected offensives on the part of the counter-revolution and the Entente, none of which could have been anticipated by us. It was therefore only natural that the greater part of this period was devoted to the military

problem, the problem of the Civil War, which seemed unsolvable to all the faint-hearted, not to speak of the parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and other petty-bourgeois democrats, and to all the intermediate elements; this induced them to declare quite sincerely that the problem could not be solved, that Russia was backward and enfeebled and could not vanquish the capitalist system of the entire world, seeing that the revolution in the West had been delayed. And we therefore had to maintain our position and to declare with absolute firmness and conviction that we would win, we had to implement the slogans "Everything for victory!" and "Everything for the war!"

To carry out these slogans it was necessary to deliberately and openly leave some of the most essential needs unsatisfied, and time and again to deny assistance to many, in the conviction that all forces had to be concentrated on the war, and that we had to win the war which the Entente had forced upon us. It was only because of the Party's vigilance and its strict discipline, because the authority of the Party united all government departments and institutions, because the slogans issued by the Central Committee were adopted by tens, hundreds, thousands and finally millions of people as one man, because incredible sacrifices were made—it was only because of all this that the miracle which occurred was made possible. It was only because of all this that we were able to win in spite of the campaigns of the imperialists of the Entente and of the whole world having been repeated twice, thrice and even four times. And, of course, we not only stress this aspect of the matter; we must also bear in mind that it teaches us that without discipline and centralisation we would never have accomplished this task. The incredible sacrifices that we have made in order to save the country from counter-revolution and in order to ensure the victory of the Russian revolution over Denikin, Yudenich and Kolchak are a guarantee of the world social revolution. To achieve this, we had to have Party discipline, the strictest centralisation and the absolute certainty that the untold sacrifices of tens and hundreds of thousands of people would help us to accomplish all these tasks, and that it really could be done, could be accomplished. And for this purpose it was essential that our Party and the class which

is exercising the dictatorship, the working class, should serve as elements uniting millions upon millions of working people in Russia and all over the world.

If we give some thought to what, after all, was the underlying reason for this historical miracle, why a weak, exhausted and backward country was able to defeat the most powerful countries in the world, we shall find that it was centralisation, discipline and unparalleled self-sacrifice. On what basis? Millions of working people in a country that was anything but educated could achieve this organisation, discipline and centralisation only because the workers had passed through the school of capitalism and had been united by capitalism, because the proletariat in all the advanced countries has united—and united the more, the more advanced the country; and on the other hand, because property, capitalist property, small property under commodity production, disunites. Property disunites, whereas we are uniting, and increasingly uniting, millions of working people all over the world. This is now clear even to the blind, one might say, or at least to those who will not see. Our enemies grew more and more disunited as time went on. They were disunited by capitalist property, by private property under commodity production, whether they were small proprietors who profiteered by selling surplus grain at exorbitant prices and enriched themselves at the expense of the starving workers, or the capitalists of the various countries, even though they possessed military might and were creating a League of Nations, a "great united league" of all the foremost nations of the world. Unity of this kind is a sheer fiction, a sheer fraud, a sheer lie. And we have seen—and this was a great example—that this notorious League of Nations, which attempted to hand out mandates for the government of states, to divide up the world—that this notorious alliance proved to be a soap-bubble which at once burst, because it was an alliance founded on capitalist property. We have seen this on a vast historical scale, and it confirms that fundamental truth which told us that our cause was just, that the victory of the October Revolution was absolutely certain, and that the cause we were embarking on was one to which, despite all difficulties and obstacles, millions and millions of working people in all countries

would rally. We knew that we had allies, that it was only necessary for the one country to which history had presented this honourable and most difficult task to display a spirit of self-sacrifice, for these incredible sacrifices to be repaid a hundredfold—every month we held out in our country would win us millions and millions of allies in all countries of the world.

If, after all, we give some thought to the reason we were able to win, were bound to win, we shall find that it was only because all our enemies—who were formally tied by all sorts of bonds to the most powerful governments and capitalists in the world—however united they may have been formally, actually turned out to be disunited. Their internal bond in fact disunited them, pitted them against each other. Capitalist property disintegrated them, transformed them from allies into savage beasts, so that they failed to see that Soviet Russia was increasing the number of her followers among the British soldiers who had been landed in Archangel, among the French sailors in Sevastopol, among the workers of all countries, of all the advanced countries without exception, where the social-compromisers took the side of capital. In the final analysis this was the fundamental reason, the underlying reason, that made our victory certain and which is still the chief, insuperable and inexhaustible source of our strength; and it permits us to affirm that when we in our country achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat in full measure, and the maximum unity of its forces, through its vanguard, its advanced party, we may expect the world revolution. And this in fact is an expression of will, an expression of the proletarian determination to fight; it is an expression of the proletarian determination to achieve an alliance of millions upon millions of workers of all countries.

The bourgeoisie and the pseudo-socialist gentry of the Second International have declared this to be mere propagandist talk. But it is not, it is historical reality, borne out by the bloody and painful experience of the Civil War in Russia. For this Civil War was a war against world capital; and world capital disintegrated of itself, devoured itself, amidst strife, whereas we, in a country where the proletariat was perishing from hunger and typhus, emerged more

hardened and stronger than ever. In this country we won the support of increasing numbers of working people. What the compromisers formerly regarded as propagandist talk and the bourgeoisie were accustomed to sneer at, has been transformed in these years of our revolution, and particularly in the year under review, into an absolute and indisputable historical fact, which enables us to say with the most positive conviction that our having accomplished this is evidence that we possess a world-wide basis, immeasurably wider than was the case in any previous revolution. We have an international alliance, an alliance which has nowhere been registered, which has never been given formal embodiment, which from the point of view of "constitutional law" means nothing, but which, in the disintegrating capitalist world, actually means everything. Every month that we gained positions, or merely held out against an incredibly powerful enemy, proved to the whole world that we were right and brought us millions of new supporters.

This process has been a difficult one; it has been accompanied by tremendous defeats. In this very year under review the monstrous White terror in Finland[139] was followed by the defeat of the Hungarian revolution, which was stifled by the governments of the Entente countries that deceived their parliaments and concluded a secret treaty with Rumania.

It was the vilest piece of treachery, this conspiracy of the international Entente to crush the Hungarian revolution by means of a White terror, not to mention the fact that in order to strangle the German revolution they were ready for any understanding with the German compromisers,[140] and that these people, who had declared Liebknecht to be an honest German, pounced on this honest German like mad dogs together with the German imperialists. They exceeded all conceivable bounds; but every such act of suppression on their part only strengthened and consolidated us, while it undermined them.

And it seems to me that we must first and foremost draw a lesson from this fundamental experience. Here we must make a special point of basing our agitation and propaganda on an analysis, an explanation of why we were victorious, why the sacrifices made in the Civil War have been repaid a hundredfold, and how we must act, on the basis of this

experience, in order to succeed in another war, a war on a bloodless front, a war which has only changed its form, but which is being waged against us by those same representatives, lackeys and leaders of the old capitalist world, only still more vigorously, still more furiously, still more zealously. More than any other, our revolution has proved the rule that the strength of a revolution, the vigour of its assault, its energy, determination, its victory and its triumph intensify the resistance of the bourgeoisie. The more victorious we are the more the capitalist exploiters learn to unite and the more determined their onslaught. For, as you all distinctly remember—it was not so long ago when judged by the passage of time, but a long time ago when judged by the march of events—at the beginning of the October Revolution Bolshevism was regarded as a freak; this view, which was a reflection of the feeble development and weakness of the proletarian revolution, very soon had to be abandoned in Russia and has now been abandoned in Europe as well. Bolshevism has become a world-wide phenomenon, the workers' revolution has raised its head. The Soviet system, in creating which in October we followed the traditions of 1905, developing our own experience—this Soviet system has become a phenomenon of world-historic importance.

Two camps are now quite consciously facing each other all over the world; this may be said without the slightest exaggeration. It should be noted that only this year have they become locked in a decisive and final struggle. And now, at the time of this very Congress, we are passing through what is perhaps one of the greatest, most acute but not yet completed periods of transition from war to peace.

You all know what happened to the leaders of the imperialist powers of the Entente who loudly announced to the whole world: "We shall never stop fighting those usurpers, those bandits, those arrogators of power, those enemies of democracy, those Bolsheviks"—you know that first they lifted the blockade, that their attempt to unite the small states failed, because we succeeded in winning over not only the workers of all countries, but also the bourgeoisie of the small countries, for the imperialists oppress not only the workers of their own countries but the bourgeoisie of the small states as well. You know that we won over the vacil-

lating bourgeoisie in the advanced countries. And the present position is that the Entente is breaking its former promises and assurances and is violating the treaties which, incidentally, it concluded dozens of times with various Russian whiteguards. And now, as far as these treaties are concerned, the Entente is the loser, for it squandered hundreds of millions on them but failed to complete the job.

It has now lifted the blockade and has virtually begun peace negotiations with the Soviet Republic. But it is not completing these negotiations, and therefore the small states have lost faith in it and in its might. So we see that the position of the Entente, its position in foreign affairs, defies all definition from the standpoint of the customary concepts of law. The states of the Entente are neither at peace with the Bolsheviks nor at war with them; they have recognised us and they have not recognised us. And this utter confusion among our opponents, who were so convinced that they represented something, proves that they represent nothing but a pack of capitalist beasts who have fallen out among themselves and are absolutely incapable of doing us any harm.

The position today is that Latvia has officially made peace proposals[141] to us. Finland has sent a telegram which officially speaks of a demarcation line but actually implies a swing to a policy of peace.[142] Lastly, Poland, the Poland whose representatives have been, and still are, sabre-rattling so vigorously, the Poland that has been, and still is, receiving so many trainloads of artillery and promises of help in everything, if only she would continue the war with Russia—even Poland, the unstable position of whose government compels her to consent to any military gamble, has invited us to begin negotiations for peace.[143] We must be extremely cautious. Our policy demands the most careful thought. Here it is hardest of all to find the proper policy, for nobody as yet knows on what track the train is standing; the enemy himself does not know what he is going to do next. The gentlemen who represent French policy and who are most zealous in egging Poland on, and the leaders of landowner and bourgeois Poland do not know what will happen next; they do not know what they want. Today they say, "Gentlemen, let us have a few trainloads of guns and a few hundred

millions and we are prepared to fight the Bolsheviks." They are hushing up the news of the strikes that are spreading in Poland; they are tightening up the censorship so as to conceal the truth. But the revolutionary movement in Poland is growing. The spread of revolution in Germany, in its new phase, in its new stage, now that the workers, after the German Kornilov-type putsch, are creating Red Armies, plainly shows (as can be seen from the recent dispatches from Germany) that the temper of the workers is rising more and more. The Polish bourgeoisie and landowners are themselves beginning to wonder whether it is not too late, whether there will not be a Soviet Republic in Poland before the government acts either for war or for peace. They do not know what to do. They do not know what the morrow will bring.

But we know that our forces are growing vastly every month, and will grow even more in future. The result is that our international position is now more stable than ever. But we must watch the international crisis with extreme care and be prepared for any eventuality. We have received a formal offer of peace from Poland. These gentlemen are in desperate straits, so desperate that their friends, the German monarchists, people with better training and more political experience and knowledge, plunged into a venturous gamble, a Kornilov-type putsch. The Polish bourgeoisie are throwing out offers of peace because they know that any venturous gamble may prove to be a Polish Kornilov-type affair. Knowing that our enemy is in desperate straits, that our enemy does not know what he wants to do or what he will do tomorrow, we must tell ourselves quite definitely that in spite of the peace overtures war is possible. It is impossible to foretell what their future conduct will be. We have seen these people before, we know these Kerenskys, these Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. During the past two years we have seen them one day drawn towards Kolchak, the next day almost towards the Bolsheviks, and then towards Denikin—and all this camouflaged by talk about freedom and democracy. We know these gentlemen, and therefore we grasp at the proposal of peace with both hands and are prepared to make the maximum concessions, in the conviction that the conclusion of peace with the small states will further our cause infinitely more than war. For the

imperialists used war to deceive the working masses, they used it to conceal the truth about Soviet Russia. Any peace, therefore, will open channels for our influence a hundred times wider, which, as it is, has grown considerably in these past few years. The Third, Communist International has achieved unparalleled successes. But at the same time we know that war may be forced upon us any day. Our enemies do not themselves know as yet what they are capable of doing in this respect.

That war preparations are under way, of that there is not the slightest doubt. Many of the states bordering on Russia—and perhaps many of those not bordering on Russia—are now arming. That is why we must manoeuvre so flexibly in our international policy and adhere so firmly to the course we have taken, that is why we must be prepared for anything. We have waged the war for peace with extreme vigour. This war is yielding splendid results. We have made a very good showing in this sphere of the struggle, at any rate, not inferior to the showing made by the Red Army on the front where blood is being shed. But the conclusion of peace with us does not depend on the will of the small states even if they desire it. They are up to their ears in debt to the countries of the Entente, who are wrangling and competing desperately among themselves. We must therefore remember that peace is of course possible from the point of view of the world situation, the historical situation created by the Civil War and by the war against the Entente.

But the measures we take for peace must be accompanied by intensified preparedness for defence, and in no case must our army be disarmed. Our army offers a real guarantee that the imperialist powers will not make the slightest attempt or encroachment on us; for although they might count on certain ephemeral successes at first, not one of them would escape defeat at the hands of Soviet Russia. That we must realise, that must be made the basis of our agitation and propaganda, that is what we must prepare for, in order to solve the problem which, in view of our growing fatigue, compels us to combine the one with the other.

I now pass to those important considerations of principle which induced us to direct the working masses so resolutely along the lines of using the army for the solution

of certain basic and immediate problems. The old source of discipline, capital, has been weakened, the old source of unity has disappeared. We must create a different kind of discipline, a different source of discipline and unity. Coercion evokes the indignation, the howls, the yells and outcries of the bourgeois democrats, who make great play of the words "freedom" and "equality", but do not understand that freedom for capital is a crime against the working people, that equality between the rich and the destitute is a crime against the working people. In our fight against falsehood, we introduced labour conscription and proceeded to unite the working people, not hesitating to use coercion. For no revolution has ever been effected without coercion, and the proletariat has a right to exercise coercion in order to hold its own at all costs. When those gentry, the bourgeois, the compromisers, the German Independents, the Austrian Independents, and the French Longuetists, argued about the historical factor, they always forgot such a factor as the revolutionary determination, firmness and steadfastness of the proletariat. And that factor is precisely the steadfastness and firmness of the proletariat of our country, which declares, and has proved by its deeds, that we are prepared to perish to a man rather than yield our territory, rather than yield our principle, the principle of discipline and firm policy, for the sake of which everything else must be sacrificed. At the time when the capitalist countries and the capitalist class are disintegrating, at this moment of crisis and despair, this political factor is the only decisive one. Talk about minority and majority, about democracy and freedom decides nothing, however much the heroes of a past historical period may invoke them. It is the class-consciousness and firmness of the working class that count here. If the working class is prepared to make sacrifices, if it shows that it is able to strain every nerve, the problem will be solved. Everything must be directed to the solution of this problem. The determination of the working class, its inflexible adherence to the watchword "Death rather than surrender!" is not only a historical factor, it is the decisive, the winning factor.

We are now going over from this victory and this conviction to problems of peaceful economic development, the

solution of which is the chief function of our Congress. In this respect we cannot, in my opinion, speak of a report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, or, rather, of a political report of the Central Committee. We must say frankly and bluntly that this, comrades, is a question which you must decide, which you must weigh with all your authority as the supreme Party body. We have laid the question before you quite clearly. We have taken up a definite stand. It is your duty finally to endorse, correct or amend our decision. But in its report the Central Committee must say that on this fundamental and urgent question it has adopted an absolutely definite stand. Yes, the thing now is to apply to the peaceful work of economic development, to the restoration of our shattered industry, everything that can weld the proletariat into an absolute unity. Here we need the iron discipline, the iron system, without which we could not have held on for two months, let alone over two years. We must be able to utilise our success. On the other hand, it must be realised that this transition will demand many sacrifices, of which the country has already made so many.

On the principle involved the Central Committee was quite clear. Our activities were entirely governed by this policy and conducted in this spirit. Take, for example, the question of corporate management versus individual management, which you will have to settle—a question which may appear to be a subsidiary one, and which in itself, if torn from its context, cannot of course claim to be a fundamental question of principle. This question should be examined only from the point of view of our basic knowledge, experience and revolutionary practice. For instance, we are told that "corporate management is one of the forms in which the masses participate in the work of administration". But we on the Central Committee discussed this question and took our decision, which we have to report to you—comrades, such theoretical confusion cannot be tolerated. Had we permitted a tenth part of this theoretical confusion in the fundamental question of our military activities, of our Civil War, we would have been beaten, and would have deserved to be beaten.

Permit me, comrades, in connection with the report of the Central Committee and with this question of whether the

new class should participate in the work of administration on a corporate or an individual basis, to introduce a little bit of theory, to point out how a class governs and what class domination actually is. After all, we are not novices in these matters, and what distinguishes our revolution from former revolutions is that there is nothing utopian about it. The new class, having replaced the old class, can maintain itself only by a desperate struggle against other classes; and it will finally triumph only if it can bring about the abolition of classes in general. That is what the vast and complex process of the class struggle demands; otherwise you will sink into a morass of confusion. What is class domination? In what way did the bourgeoisie dominate over the feudal lords? The Constitution spoke of freedom and equality. That was a lie. As long as there are working men, property-owners are in a position to profiteer, and indeed, as property-owners, are compelled to profiteer. We declare that there is no equality, that the well-fed man is not the equal of the hungry man, that the profiteer is not the equal of the working man.

How is class domination expressed today? The domination of the proletariat consists in the fact that the landowners and capitalists have been deprived of their property. The spirit and basic idea of all previous constitutions, even the most republican and democratic, amounted to one thing—property. Our Constitution has the right, has won itself the right, to a place in history by virtue of the fact that the abolition of property is not confined to a paper declaration. The victorious proletariat has abolished property, has completely annulled it—and therein lies its domination as a class. The prime thing is the question of property. As soon as the question of property was settled practically, the domination of the class was assured. When, after that, the Constitution recorded on paper what had been actually effected, namely, the abolition of capitalist and landed property, and added that under the Constitution the working class enjoys more rights than the peasantry, while exploiters have no rights whatever—that was a record of the fact that we had established the domination of our class, thereby binding to ourselves all sections and all small groups of working people.

The petty-bourgeois property-owners are disunited; those who have more property are the enemies of those who have less property; and the proletarians, by abolishing property, have declared open war on them. There are still many unenlightened and ignorant people who are wholly in favour of any kind of freedom of trade, but who cannot fight when they see the discipline and self-sacrifice displayed in securing victory over the exploiters; they are not with us, but are powerless to come out against us. It is only the domination of a class that determines property relations and which class is to be on top. Those who, as we so frequently observe, associate the question of the nature of class domination with the question of democratic centralism create such confusion that all successful work on this basis becomes impossible. Clarity in propaganda and agitation is a fundamental condition. When our enemies said and admitted that we had performed miracles in developing agitation and propaganda, that was not to be understood in the superficial sense that we had large numbers of agitators and used up large quantities of paper, but in the intrinsic sense that the truth contained in that propaganda penetrated to the minds of all; there is no escaping from that truth.

Whenever classes displaced each other, they changed property relations. When the bourgeoisie superseded the feudals, it changed property relations; the Constitution of the bourgeoisie says: "The man of property is the equal of the beggar." That was bourgeois freedom. This kind of "equality" ensured the domination of the capitalist class in the state. But do you think that when the bourgeoisie superseded the feudals they confused the state with the administration? No, they were no such fools. They declared that the work of administration required people who knew how to administer, and that they would adapt feudal administrators for that purpose. And that is what they did. Was it a mistake? No, comrades, the art of administration does not descend from heaven, it is not inspired by the Holy Ghost. And the fact that a class is the leading class does not make it at once capable of administering. We have an example of this: while the bourgeoisie were establishing their victory they took for the work of administration members of another class, the feudal class; there was nowhere else to get them from.

We must be sober and face the facts. The bourgeoisie had recourse to the old class; and we, too, are now confronted with the task of taking the knowledge and training of the old class, subordinating it to our needs, and using it all for the success of our class. We, therefore, say that the victorious class must be mature, and maturity is attested not by a document or certificate, but by experience and practice.

When the bourgeoisie triumphed, they did not know how to administer; and they made sure of their victory by proclaiming a new constitution and by recruiting, enlisting administrators from their own class and training them, utilising for this purpose administrators of the old class. They began to train their own new administrators, fitting them for the work with the help of the whole machinery of state; they sequestrated the feudal institutions and admitted only the wealthy to the schools; and in this way, in the course of many years and decades, they trained administrators from their own class. Today, in a state which is constructed on the pattern and in the image of the dominant class, we must act as every state has acted. If we do not want to be guilty of sheer utopianism and meaningless phrase-mongering, we must say that we must take into account the experience of the past; that we must safeguard the Constitution won by the revolution, but that for the work of administration, of organising the state, we need people who are versed in the art of administration, who have state and business experience, and that there is nowhere we can turn to for such people except the old class.

Opinions on corporate management are all too frequently imbued with a spirit of sheer ignorance, a spirit of opposition to the specialists. We shall never succeed with such a spirit. In order to succeed we must understand the history of the old bourgeois world in all its profundity; and in order to build communism we must take technology and science and make them available to wider circles. And we can take them only from the bourgeoisie—there is nowhere else to get them from. Prominence must be given to this fundamental question, it must be treated as one of the basic problems of economic development. We have to administer with the help of people belonging to the class we have overthrown; they are imbued with the prejudices of their class and we must re-educate them. At the same time we must recruit our own

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

administrators from our own class. We must use the entire machinery of state to put the schools, adult education, and all practical training at the service of the proletarians, the factory workers and the labouring peasants, under the guidance of the Communists.

That is the only way to get things going. After our two years' experience we cannot argue as though we were only just setting about the work of socialist construction. We committed follies enough in and around the Smolny period. That is nothing to be ashamed of. How were we to know, seeing that we were undertaking something absolutely new? We first tried one way, then another. We swam with the current, because it was impossible to distinguish the right from the wrong; that requires time. Now that is all a matter of the recent past, which we have got beyond. That past, in which chaos and enthusiasm prevailed, is now over. One document from that past is the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It is a historic document—more, it was a period of history. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was forced upon us because we were helpless in every way. What sort of period was it? It was a period of impotence, from which we emerged victorious. It was a period in which corporate management was universal. You cannot escape that historical fact by declaring that corporate management is a school of administration. You cannot stay for ever in the preparatory class of a school! (Applause.) That will not do. We are grown-up now, and we shall be beaten and beaten again in every field if we behave like schoolboys. We must push forward. We must push higher with energy and unanimity of will. Tremendous difficulties face the trade unions. We must get them to regard this task in the spirit of the fight against the survivals of the celebrated democracy. All these outcries against appointees, all this old and dangerous rubbish which finds its way into various resolutions and conversations must be swept away. Otherwise we cannot succeed. If we have failed to master this lesson in these two years, we are lagging, and those who lag, get beaten.

The task is an extremely difficult one. Our trade unions have been of tremendous assistance in building the proletarian state. They were a link between the Party and the unenlightened millions. Let us not close our eyes to the fact

that the trade unions bore the brunt of the struggle against all our troubles when the state needed help in food work. Was this not a tremendous task? The recent issue of the *Bulletin of the Central Statistical Board* contains summaries by statisticians who certainly cannot be suspected of Bolshevism. Two interesting figures are given: in 1918 and 1919 the workers in the consuming gubernias received seven poods a year, while the peasants in the producing gubernias consumed seventeen poods a year. Before the war they used to consume sixteen poods a year. There you have two figures illustrating the relation of classes in the struggle for food. The proletariat continued to make sacrifices. People shout about coercion! But the proletariat justified and legitimatised coercion; it justified it by making the greatest sacrifices. The majority of the population, the peasants of the producing gubernias of our starving and impoverished Russia, for the first time had more food than throughout the centuries of tsarist and capitalist Russia. And we say that the masses will go on starving until the Red Army is victorious. The vanguard of the working class had to make this sacrifice. This struggle is a school; but when we leave this school we must go forward. This step must now be taken at all costs. Like all trade unions, the old trade unions have a history and a past. In the past they were organs of resistance to those who oppressed labour, to capitalism. But now that their class has become the governing class, and is being called upon to make great sacrifices, to starve and to perish, the situation has changed.

Not everybody understands this change, not everybody grasps its significance. And certain Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who are demanding that corporate management be substituted for individual management have helped us in this matter. No, comrades, that won't work. We have got beyond that. We are now faced with a very difficult task; having gained victory on the bloody front, we must now gain victory on the bloodless front. This war is a more difficult one. This front is the most arduous. We say this frankly to all class-conscious workers. The war which we have withstood at the front must be followed by a bloodless war. The fact is that the more we were victorious, the more regions we secured like Siberia, the Ukraine and the

Kuban. In those regions there are rich peasants; there are no proletarians, and what proletariat there is, has been corrupted by petty-bourgeois habits. We know that everybody who has a piece of land in those parts says: "A fig for the government, I'll get all I can out of the starving. A fat lot I care for the government." The peasant profiteer who, when left to the tender mercies of Denikin, was swinging towards us will now be aided by the Entente. The war has changed its front and its forms. It is now taking the form of trade, of food profiteering, which it has made international. In Comrade Kamenev's theses published in the *Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* the underlying principles are stated fully. They want to make food profiteering international. They want to turn peaceful economic development into the peaceful disintegration of Soviet power. No you don't, my imperialist gentlemen! We are on our guard. We declare: we have fought and won, and we shall therefore retain as our basic slogan the one which helped us to victory; we shall fully preserve that slogan and apply it to the field of labour. That slogan is the firmness and unity of will of the proletariat. The old prejudices, the old habits that still remain, must be discarded.

I should like in conclusion, to dwell on Comrade Gusev's pamphlet,[144] which in my opinion deserves attention for two reasons. It is a good pamphlet not only from the formal standpoint, not only because it has been written for our Congress. Somehow, up to now we have all been accustomed to writing resolutions. They say that all literature is good except tedious literature. Resolutions, I take it, should he classed as tedious literature. It would be better if we followed Comrade Gusev's example and wrote fewer resolutions and more pamphlets, even though they bristled with errors as his does. The pamphlet is good in spite of these errors, because it centres attention on a fundamental economic plan for the restoration of industry and production throughout the country, and because it subordinates everything to this fundamental economic plan. The Central Committee has introduced into the theses distributed today a whole paragraph taken entirely from Comrade Gusev's theses. This fundamental economic plan can be worked out in greater detail with the help of experts. We

must remember that the plan is designed for many years to come. We do not promise to deliver the country from hunger all at once. We say that the struggle will be much harder than the one on the war front. But it is a struggle that interests us more; it brings us nearer to our immediate and main tasks. It demands that maximum exertion of effort and that unity of will which we have displayed before and must display now. If we accomplish this, we shall gain no less a victory on the bloodless front than on the front of civil war. (*Applause.*)

3

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MARCH 30

Comrades, the part of the political report of the Central Committee which evoked chief attack was the one Comrade Sapronov called vituperation. Comrade Sapronov lent a very definite character and flavour to the position he defended; and in order to show you how matters actually stand, I would like to begin by reminding you of certain basic dates. Here I have before me *Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* for March 2 in which we printed a letter from the Central Committee to R.C.P. organisations on the subject of the organisation of the Congress. And in this first letter we said: "Happily, the time for purely theoretical discussions, disputes over general questions and the adoption of resolutions on principles has passed. That stage is over; it was dealt with and settled yesterday and the day before yesterday. We must march ahead, and we must realise that we are now confronted by a *practical task*, the *business* task of rapidly overcoming economic chaos, and we must do it with all our strength, with truly revolutionary energy, and with the same devotion with which our finest worker and peasant comrades, the Red Army men, defeated Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin."

I must confess that I was guilty of optimism in thinking that the time of theoretical discussions had passed. We had theorised for fifteen years before the revolution, we had been administering the state for two years, and it was about time we displayed practical, business-like efficiency; and so, on March 2 we appealed to comrades with practical experience.

In reply, Tomsky's theses were published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* on March 10, the theses of Comrades Sapronov, Osinsky and Maximovsky on March 23, and on March 27 the theses of the Moscow Gubernia Committee appeared—that is, all after our appeal to the Party. And in all the theses the question was treated wrongly from the theoretical standpoint. The view we expressed in the letter was optimistic, mistaken; it had seemed to us that this period had already passed, but the theses showed that it had not yet passed, and the comrades from the trade unions have no right to complain of having been treated unfairly. The question now is, which is right—our view, or the position advocated after our appeal of March 2 by all these theses? All of them contain a lot of practical material to which attention must be given. If the Central Committee did not give it serious attention, it would be an absolutely worthless institution.

But listen to what Comrade Tomsky says.

"§7. The basic structural principle of the regulation and management of industry, the only one that can ensure the participation of broad masses of non-party workers through the trade unions, is the existing principle of corporate management of industry, from the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council down to the factory managements. Only in special cases, and by mutual agreement between the Presidiums of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council, or the Central Committees of the trade unions concerned, should one-man management be permitted in certain enterprises, but only on the obligatory condition that control be exercised over the administrators by the trade unions and their bodies.

"§8. To ensure a single plan of economic development and co-ordination of the activities of the trade unions and the economic bodies, the participation of the trade unions in the management and regulation of industry should be based on the following principles: (a) general questions of economic policy shall be discussed by the Supreme Economic Council and its organs with the participation of the trade unions; (b) the directing economic collegiums shall be formed by the Supreme Economic Council and its organs in conjunction with the relevant trade union bodies; (c) the collegiums of economic bodies, while discussing general questions of the economic policy of any branch of production in conjunction with the trade unions and furnishing them with periodical reports on their activities, shall be regarded as organs of the Supreme Economic Council only, and shall be obliged to carry out the decisions only of that body, (d) all collegiums of economic bodies shall unreservedly carry out the decisions of the higher organs of the Supreme Economic Council, individually and corporately, and be accountable for their fulfilment only to the Supreme Economic Council."

Here the most elementary theoretical questions are terribly muddled.

It is true that management is the job of the individual administrator; but who exactly that administrator will be—an expert or a worker—will depend on how many administrators we have of the old and the new type. That is elementary theory. Well, then, let us talk about that. But if you want to discuss the political line of the Central Committee, do not attribute to us things we did not suggest and did not say. On March 2 we appealed to the comrades to give us practical support, and what did we get in reply? From the comrades in the localities we got in reply things that are obviously wrong from the theoretical standpoint. The theses of Comrades Osinsky, Maximovsky and Sapronov that appeared on March 23 contain nothing but theoretical blunders. They say that corporate management in one form or another is an indispensable basis of democracy. I assert that you will find nothing like it in the fifteen years' pre-revolutionary history of the Social-Democratic movement. Democratic centralism means only that representatives from the localities get together and elect a responsible body, which is to do the administering. But how? That depends on how many suitable people, how many good administrators are available. Democratic centralism means that the congress supervises the work of the Central Committee, and can remove it and appoint another in its place. But if we were to go into the theoretical errors contained in these theses, we should never be done. I personally will not deal with this any more, and will only say that the Central Committee adopted the only line that could be adopted on this question. I know very well that Comrade Osinsky, and the others do not share the views of Makhno and Makhaisky, but Makhno's followers are bound to seize upon their arguments. They are connected with them. Take the theses of the Moscow Gubernia Committee of the Party that we have been given. It says there that in a developed socialist society, where there will be no social division of labour or fixed professions, the periodical replacement of people performing administrative functions in rotation will be possible only on the basis of a broad corporate principle, and so on and so forth. This is a sheer muddle!

We appealed to the experienced people in the localities to help us with their practical advice. Instead, we are told that the Central Committee ignores the localities. What does it ignore? Dissertations on socialist society? There is not a trace of anything practical or business-like here. Of course, we have some splendid workers, who are borrowing a lot from the intelligentsia; but sometimes they borrow the worst, not the best. Then something has to be done about it. But if in reply to an appeal of the Central Committee for practical advice you bring up questions of principle, we have to talk about those questions. We have to say that errors of principle must be combated. And the theses published since March 2 contain preposterous errors of principle.

That is what I affirm. Well, let us talk about that and argue it out. Don't try to evade it! It is no use claiming that you are not theoreticians. Pardon me, Comrade Sapronov, your theses are the theses of a theoretician. You would see if they were put into practice that you would have to turn back and settle questions in an unbusiness-like manner. Anybody who tried to take the theses of Comrades Maximovsky, Sapronov and Tomsky as practical guidance, would be profoundly mistaken; they are fundamentally wrong. I consider that their idea of the attitude of the class to the structure of the state is fundamentally wrong and would drag us back. Naturally, it is backed by all the elements who are lagging behind and have not yet got beyond all this. And the authors of these theses are to be blamed not for deliberately advocating inefficiency, but for their theoretical mistake on the question the Central Committee asked them to discuss, a mistake which in a way provides a banner, a justification, for the worst elements. And why? From want of thought. Authentic documents prove this beyond all doubt.

I now pass to the accusation made by Comrade Yurenev in connection with Comrade Shlyapnikov. If the Central Committee had removed Comrade Shlyapnikov, as a representative of the opposition, just before the Congress, that certainly would have been infamous. When we had established that Comrade Shlyapnikov was leaving, we said in the Political Bureau that we were not giving him any instructions before his departure; and on the eve of his departure Comrade Shlyapnikov came to me and said that he was not

going on the instructions of the Central Committee. And so Comrade Yurenev simply heard a rumour and is now spreading it. (*Yurenev*: "Shlyapnikov told me so himself....")

I do not know how he could have told you so himself, seeing that he came to me before he left and said that he was not going on the instructions of the Central Committee. Yes, of course, if the Central Committee had banished the opposition before the Congress that would have been an unpardonable thing. But, in general, when there is talk about banishing people, I say: "Well, then, just try to elect a Central Committee which could distribute forces properly without giving any cause for complaint." How can forces be distributed so that everybody is satisfied? If forces are not distributed, how can you talk about centralism? And if there were distortions of principles, let us have instances. If you say that we banished representatives of the opposition, give us an instance, and we shall examine it, for there may have been mistakes. Perhaps Comrade Yurenev, who complained to the Political Bureau of having been wrongfully withdrawn from the Western Front—perhaps he was banished? The Political Bureau examined the matter and found it correct. And whatever Central Committee you elected, it would have to distribute its forces.

Further, as regards the division of business between the Organising Bureau and the Political Bureau. Comrade Maximovsky is more experienced in matters of organisation than I am, and he says that Lenin is mixing Organising Bureau and Political Bureau questions. Well, let us see. In our opinion, the Organising Bureau should distribute forces and the Political Bureau deal with policy. If such a division is wrong, how are the functions of these two bodies to be divided? Do you want us to write a constitution? It is difficult to draw a hard and fast line between the Political Bureau and the Organising Bureau, to delimit their functions precisely. Any question may become a political one, even the appointment of the superintendent of a building. If anyone has any other solution to suggest, please let us have it. Comrades Sapronov, Maximovsky and Yurenev, let us have your proposals; just try to divide, to delimit the Organising Bureau and the Political Bureau. As we have it, the protest of a single member of the Central Committee is

enough for us to treat the question as a political one. Yet in all this time there has not been a single protest. Independence is not hampered in any way: any member of the Central Committee may declare a question to be a political one. And anybody who has any practical experience in organisation, even if he is not as competent as Comrade Maximovsky, even if he has worked in this field only six months, ought to have made a different sort of criticism from the one Comrade Maximovsky made. Let the critics make definite recommendations. We shall accept them, and advise the election of a new Central Committee, which will carry out these recommendations. But all we have had is abstract criticism and false assertions.

Let us suppose you keep the Organising Bureau away from political leadership. What, then, I ask, will political leadership amount to? Who does the leading, if not people? And how can you lead except by distributing forces? How can you compel a man to carry out instructions if he is incompetent? He is given certain instructions, his work is checked, and finally he is put on another job. What more must we do to bring this home to Comrades Maximovsky, Sapronov and Osinsky, who in their theses propose a theoretical amendment that was rejected long ago? What they are doing in practice is even worse, and they are making it quite clear that they have no material for serious criticism.

I heard one practical point in Comrade Sapronov's speech and jumped at it. Comrade Sapronov said: "The Seventh Congress of Soviets gave a ruling, and we are violating it; the decree on requisitioning flax is an infringement of the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee." I cannot remember even a tenth of the decrees we pass. But I made inquiries in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars about the regulations governing flax procurements. The decree was passed on February 10. And what has happened? There is not a comrade, whether on the Political Bureau or on the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, who is opposed to independent initiative. We have seen them all here on this platform. Comrades know that they can speak for themselves. Why did they not appeal against this decision? Let us have your complaints! There was no such complaint after February 10. After a long fight,

we adopted this decision, which was proposed by Comrade Rykov and agreed to by Comrade Sereda and the People's Commissariat of Food. "You have made a mistake!" we are told. Perhaps we have. Correct us. Submit this question to the Political Bureau. That will be a formal decision. Let us have the minutes. If they show that we have violated a decision of the Congress, we ought to be put on trial. Where is the charge? On the one hand, they reproach us on account of Shlyapnikov; on the other, they say that the flax business was a violation of a decision. Be good enough to bring facts to show that we violated the decision. But you do not bring any facts. All your words are mere words: initiative, appointments, and so on. Why then have centralism? Could we have held out for even two months if we had made no appointments during this period, during these two years when in various places we passed from complete exhaustion and disruption to victory again? Just because you are displeased with the recall of Comrade Shlyapnikov or Comrade Yurenev, you fling these words among the crowd, among the unenlightened masses. Comrade Lutovinov says that the question has not been settled. It will have to be settled. If two people's commissars differ in their opinion of Ivan Ivanovich, and one says that a question of policy is involved, what is to be done? What method do you propose? Do you think that it is only in the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee that tedious questions arise? Let me tell you that there is not a single institution where tedious questions do not arise, and we all have to deal with questions of Maria Ivanovna and Sidor Ivanovich. But you cannot say that no politics are involved here, for politics fill all minds. Comrade Lutovinov had—I do not know how to put it; I fear to offend Comrade Sapronov's delicate ear and I shrink from using a polemical expression—but he said that Comrade Krestinsky threatened to bring about a split. A meeting of the Bureau was held on the subject. We have the minutes of the Bureau, and I would ask all the Congress delegates to take these minutes and read them. We came to the conclusion that Comrade Krestinsky was hot-headed and that you, Comrade Lutovinov and Comrade Tomsky, had raised a very malodorous scandal. Perhaps we were wrong—then correct our decision; but it is preposterous to say what

you said, without having read the documents and without mentioning that there was a special meeting and that the matter was investigated in the presence of Tomsky and Lutovinov.

There are two other points I still have to deal with. First, the appointment of Comrades Bukharin and Radek. It is said that we sent them to the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council as political commissars, and the attempt is being made here to represent this as a violation of independence, as bureaucracy. Perhaps you know better theoreticians than Radek and Bukharin. Then by all means let us have them. Perhaps you know people better acquainted with the trade union movement. Let us have them. Do you mean to say that the Central Committee has no right to reinforce a trade union with people who have the best theoretical knowledge of the trade union movement, who are acquainted with the experience of the Germans, and who can counteract an incorrect line? A Central Committee which did not do that could not be a directing body. The more we are surrounded by peasants and Kuban Cossacks the more difficulties we have with the proletarian dictatorship. Therefore the line must be straightened out at all costs and made as hard as steel, and this is the line we recommend to the Party Congress.

Comrade Bubnov told us here that he has close connections with the Ukraine and thereby betrayed the true character of his objections. He said that the Central Committee is responsible for the growing strength of the *Borotba* Party. This is a very complex and important issue, and I think in this important issue, which demanded manoeuvring, and very complex manoeuvring at that, we emerged victorious. When we said in the Central Committee that the maximum concessions should be made to the Borotbists, we were laughed at and told that we were not following a straight line. But you can fight in a straight line when the enemy's line is straight. But when the enemy moves in zigzags, and not in a straight line, we have to follow him and catch him at every turn. We promised the maximum concessions to the Borotbists, but on condition that they pursued a communist policy. In this way we showed that we are in no way intolerant. And that these concessions were made quite rightly

is shown by the fact that all the best elements among the Borotbists have now joined our Party. We have carried out a re-registration of this party, and instead of a revolt of the Borotbists, which seemed inevitable, we find that, thanks to the correct policy of the Central Committee, which was carried out so splendidly by Comrade Rakovsky, all the best elements among the Borotbists have joined our Party under our control and with our recognition, while all the rest have disappeared from the political scene. This victory was worth a couple of good tussles. So anybody who says that the Central Committee is guilty of strengthening the Borotbists does not understand the political line on the national question.

I shall just touch on the speech of the last comrade, who said that everything in the programme about the trade unions should be deleted. There you have an example of hastiness. We don't do things so simply. We say that nothing should be deleted, that the question should be discussed in pamphlets, articles in the press, and so on. The trade unions are heading for the time when they will take economic life, namely industry, into their hands. The talk about not admitting bourgeois specialists into the trade unions is a prejudice. The trade unions are educational bodies, and strict demands must be made on them. The Central Committee will not tolerate bad educators. Education is a long and difficult business. A decree is not enough here; patient and skilful handling is required. And that is what we are aiming at and will continue to aim at. It is a matter in which we must be cautious but firm.

4

SPEECH ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MARCH 31

Comrades, first two brief remarks. Comrade Sapronov continued to accuse me of forgetfulness, but the question he raised he left unexplained. He continued to assure us that the flax requisitioning decree is a violation of the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. I maintain that you cannot hurl unsupported accusations, very serious accusations, at a Party Congress in that way. Of course, if the Council of People's Commissars has violated a decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee it should be put on trial. But how is it that from February 10 to this day no complaint has been received that this decree is a violation? All we get is an absolutely unsupported accusation of the sort that are handed out easily enough, but such methods of fighting are not to be taken seriously.

Comrade Milyutin says that there are practically no points of difference between us, and that therefore it looks as if Lenin opposes squabbling and himself provokes this squabble. But Comrade Milyutin is distorting things somewhat, which he ought not to do. The first draft of the resolution, compiled by Comrade Trotsky, was then edited corporately in the Central Committee. We sent this draft to Comrades Milyutin and Rykov. They returned it with the statement that they would give battle on it. This is what actually happened. After we had developed agitation and obtained allies, they organised an all-round opposition at the Congress; and it was only when they saw that nothing would come of it that they began to say they were almost in agreement. That is so, of course; but you must carry it

through to the end and admit that your agreement means that you failed completely after the opposition came forward here and tried to consolidate itself on the issue of corporate management. Only after Comrade Milyutin had spoken for fifteen minutes, and his time was up, did it occur to him that it would be well to put the matter on a practical footing. He was quite right there. But I am afraid it is too late: although Comrade Rykov has still to close the discussion, the opposition cannot be saved. If the advocates of corporate management had during the past two months practised what they preached, if they had given us even a single example—not by saying there is a certain director and an assistant, but by an inquiry promoting a detailed investigation of the problem, comparing corporate management with individual management as was decided by the Congress of Economic Councils and by the Central Committee—we would have been much the wiser; at the Congress we would then have had something more than not very relevant discussions of principle, and the advocates of corporate management might have furthered matters. Their position would have been a strong one if they could have produced even ten factories with similar conditions managed on the corporate principle and compared them in a practical manner with the state of affairs in factories with similar conditions, but managed on the individual principle. We could have allowed any speaker an hour for such a report, and he would have furthered matters considerably. We might perhaps have established practical gradations in this question of corporate management. But the whole point is that none of them, neither the Economic Council members nor the trade unionists, who should have had practical data at their disposal, gave us anything, because they had nothing to give. They have nothing, absolutely nothing!

Comrade Rykov objected here that I want to remake the French Revolution, that I deny that the bourgeoisie grew up within the feudal system. That is not what I said. What I said was that when the bourgeoisie replaced the feudal system they took the feudal lords and learned from them how to administer; and this in no way contradicts the fact that the bourgeoisie grew up within the feudal system. And as for my thesis that, after it has seized power, the working

class begins to put its principles into effect, nobody, absolutely nobody, has refuted it. After it has seized power, the working class maintains it, preserves it and consolidates it as every other class does, namely, by a change of property relations and by a new constitution. That is my first and fundamental thesis; and it is incontrovertible. My second thesis that every new class learns from its predecessor and takes over administrators from the old class, is also an absolute truth. And, lastly, my third thesis is that the working class must increase the number of administrators from its own ranks, establish schools, and train executives on a nation-wide scale. These three theses are indisputable, and they fundamentally contradict the theses of the trade unions.

At the meeting of the group, when we examined their theses, and when Comrade Bukharin and I were defeated,[145] I told Comrade Tomsky that article 7 in the theses is the result of complete theoretical confusion. It says:

> "The basic structural principle of the regulation and management of industry, the only one that can ensure the participation of broad masses of non-party workers through the trade unions, is the existing principle of corporate management of industry, from the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council down to the factory managements. Only in special cases, and by mutual agreement between the Presidiums of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council, or the Central Committees of the trade unions concerned should one-man management be permitted in certain enterprises but only on the obligatory condition that control be exercised over the administrators by the trade unions and their bodies."

This is sheer nonsense, because everything—the role of the working class in winning state power, the interrelation of methods—everything is muddled! Such things cannot be tolerated. Such things drag us back theoretically. The same must be said of the democratic centralism of Comrades Sapronov, Maximovsky and Osinsky. Comrade Osinsky forgets that when he comes forward and claims that I call democratic centralism nonsense. You cannot distort things in that way! What has the question of appointments, of endorsement by local organisations, got to do with it? You can have things endorsed by collegiums and you can also appoint collegiums. That has nothing to do with the case. They say that democratic centralism consists not only in the

All-Russia Central Executive Committee ruling; but in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee ruling through the local organisations. What has corporate management or individual management got to do with it?

Comrade Trotsky recalled his report made in 1918 and, reading the speech he then made, pointed out that at that time not only did we argue about fundamental questions but a definite decision was taken by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. I dug up my old pamphlet *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*, which I had completely forgotten, and find that the question of individual management was not only raised but even approved in the theses of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. We work in such a way that we forget not only what we ourselves have written but even what has been decided by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, and subsequently dig up these decisions. Here are some passages from this pamphlet.

"Those who deliberately (although most of them probably do not realise it) promote petty-bourgeois laxity would like to see in this granting of 'unlimited' (i.e., dictatorial) powers to individuals a departure from the collegiate principle, from democracy and from the principles of Soviet government. Here and there, among Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, a positively hooligan agitation, i.e., agitation appealing to the base instincts and to the small proprietor's urge to 'grab all he can', has been developed against the dictatorship decree....[146]

"Large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict *unity of will*, which directs the joint labours of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it as one of the conditions of socialism" ... this is the only way in which "strict unity of will can be ensured....

"But be that as it may, *unquestioning subordination* to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of processes organised on the pattern of large-scale machine industry. On the railways it is twice and three times as necessary....

"And our whole task, the task of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which is the class-conscious vehicle of the strivings of the exploited for emancipation, is to appreciate this change, to understand that it is necessary, to stand at the head of the exhausted people who are wearily seeking a way out and lead them along the true path, along the path of labour discipline, along the path of co-ordinating the task of arguing at mass meetings *about* the conditions of work with the task of unquestioningly obeying the will of the Soviet leader, of the dictator, *during* the work....

"It required precisely the October victory of the working people over the exploiters, it required a whole historical period in which the working people themselves could first of all discuss the new conditions of life and the new tasks, in order to make possible the durable transition to superior forms of labour discipline, to the conscious appreciation of the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat, to unquestioning obedience to the orders of individual representatives of the Soviet government during the work....

"We must learn to combine the 'public meeting' democracy of the working people—turbulent, surging, overflowing its banks like a spring nood with *iron* discipline while at work, with *unquestioning obedience* to the will of a single person, the Soviet leader, while at work."

On April 29, 1918, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution fully endorsing the basic propositions set forth in this report and instructed its Presidium to recast them as theses representing the principal tasks of the Soviet government. We are thus reiterating what was approved two years ago in an official resolution of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee! And we are now being dragged back on a matter that was decided long ago, a matter which the All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorsed and explained, namely, that Soviet socialist democracy and individual management and dictatorship are in no way contradictory, and that the will of a class may sometimes be carried out by a dictator, who sometimes does more alone and is frequently more necessary. At any rate, the attitude towards the principles of corporate management and individual management was not only explained long ago, but was even endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive

Committee. In this connection our Congress is an illustration of the sad truth that instead of advancing from the explanation of questions of principle to concrete questions, we are advancing backward. Unless we get away from this mistake we shall never solve the economic problem.

I should also like to say a few words about certain remarks of Comrade Rykov's. He asserts that the Council of People's Commissars is putting obstacles in the way of the amalgamation of the commissariats running the economy. And when Comrade Rykov is told that he wants to swallow up Comrade Tsyurupa, he replies, "I don't care if it is Tsyurupa that swallows me up, as long as the economic commissariats are amalgamated." I know where this leads, and I must say that the attempt of the Supreme Economic Council to form a sort of separate bloc of the economic commissariats, separate from the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars, did not pass unnoticed by the Central Committee, and met with disfavour. The Council of Defence has now been renamed the Council of Labour and Defence. You want to separate yourselves from the Commissariat of the Army, which is giving its best forces to the war and is an institution without which you cannot even carry out labour conscription. And we cannot carry out labour conscription without the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs either. Take the post office; we cannot send a letter without the Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs. Take the People's Commissariat of Health. How will you conduct the economy if seventy per cent are down with typhus? What it amounts to is that every matter must be co-ordinated and referred to an economic commissariat. Is not such a plan absolutely absurd? Comrade Rykov had no serious argument. That is why it was opposed and the Central Committee did not support it.

Further, Comrade Rykov joked about a bloc with Comrade Holtzmann, which Comrade Trotsky seems to be forming. I should like to say a few words on this. A bloc is always needed between Party groups that are in the right. That should always be regarded as an essential condition for a correct policy. If Comrade Holtzmann, whom, I regret to say, I know very little, but of whom I have heard as a representative of a certain trend among the metalworkers, a trend that

particularly insists on sensible methods—which I stress in my theses, too—if it, is on these grounds that he insists on individual management, that, of course, can only be extremely useful. A bloc with this trend would be an exceedingly good thing. If the representation of the trade unions on the Central Committee is to be increased, it would be useful to have on it representatives of this trend too—though it may be wrong on certain points, it is at least original and has a definite shade of opinion of its own—side by side with the extremist champions of corporate management who are battling in the name of democracy but who are mistaken. Let them both be represented on the Central Committee—and you will have a bloc. Let the Central Committee be so constituted that, with the help of a bloc, a field of operation may be found that functions all the year round, and not only during the week a Party Congress is held. We have always rejected the principle of regional representation, because it leads to a lot of regional cliquism. When it is a question of closer fusion with the trade unions, of being alive to every shade of opinion in the trade unions, of maintaining contacts—it is essential for the Central Committee to be constituted in such a way as to have a transmission belt to the broad masses of the trade unions (we have 600,000 Party members and 3,000,000 trade union members) to connect the Central Committee simultaneously with the united will of the 600,000 Party members and the 3,000,000 trade union members. We cannot govern without such a transmission belt. The more we won back of Siberia, the Kuban area and the Ukraine, with their peasant population, the more difficult the problem became, and the more laboriously the machine revolved, because in Siberia the proletariat is numerically small, and it is weaker in the Ukraine too. But we know that the Donets Basin and Nikolayev workers have bluntly refused to defend the semi-demagogic corporate principle into which Comrade Sapronov has lapsed. There can be no question but that the proletarian element in the Ukraine differs from the proletarian element in Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk—not because it is no good, but for purely historical reasons. They did not have occasion to become, so steeled by hunger, cold and strife as the proletarians of Moscow and Petrograd. We therefore need such a bond with the trade

unions, such a form of organisation of the Central Committee, as would enable it to know every shade of opinion, not only among the 600,000 Party members, but also among the 3,000,000 trade union members, so that it may be able at any moment to lead them all as one man! Such an organisation is essential. That is the basic factor, the political factor without which the dictatorship of the proletariat will not be a dictatorship. If we are to have a bloc, let it be a real bloc! We should not be afraid of it, but should welcome it and practise it more vigorously and more extensively right in the central institutions of the Party.

5

SPEECH ON THE CO-OPERATIVES[147]
APRIL 3

It was only last night and today that I have had an opportunity of partially acquainting myself with the two resolutions. I think that the resolution of the minority of the commission is the more correct. Comrade Milyutin attacked it with a great battery of terrifying words: he discovered half-measures in it, even quarter-measures; he accused it of opportunism. But it seems to me that the devil is not as black as he is painted. If you get down to the root of the matter you will see that Comrade Milyutin, who tried to give the matter a basis in principle, showed by his own arguments that the resolution he advocated was incorrect and unsuitable specifically from the standpoint of practice and of Marxism. It is incorrect for the following reasons; Milyutin stated that his resolution, the resolution of the majority of the commission, advocated fusion with the volost executive committees, subordination to the volost executive committees, and that is why he sees in his resolution directness and decisiveness as compared with the insufficiently revolutionary character of the minority resolution. During the long course of our revolutionary campaign we have seen that whenever we made proper preparations for our revolutionary actions they were crowned with success; but that when they were merely imbued with revolutionary fervour they ended in failure.

What does the resolution of the minority of the commission say? The resolution of the minority says: direct your attention to intensifying communist work in the consumers' societies and to securing a majority within them; first make

ready the organs to which you want to hand them over, then you can hand them over. Compare this with the line pursued by Milyutin. He says: the co-operatives are no good, therefore hand them over to the volost executive committees. But have you a communist basis in the co-operatives you want to hand over? The essence of the matter—preparation—is ignored; only the ultimate slogan is given. If this communist work has been done, and organs have been set up to take them over and guide them, the transfer is quite natural, and there is no need to proclaim it at a Party congress. But have you not been threatening the peasants enough? Has not the Supreme Economic Council shaken its fist enough at the peasants and the co-operatives in the matter of the flax procurement? If you recall the practical experience of our work in the localities and in the Council of People's Commissars, you will admit that this is a wrong attitude to take, and that the right resolution is the one which declares that the work of communist education and the training of executives are necessary, for otherwise the transfer will be impossible.

The second question of cardinal importance is that of contacts with the consumers' co-operatives. Here Comrade Milyutin says something utterly inconsistent. If the consumers' co-operatives are not fulfilling all their assignments—which is what we have been saying for two years in a number of decrees directed against the kulaks—it must be remembered that government measures against the kulaks can also be applied against the co-operative societies. And this is being done in full. The most important thing at the moment is to increase production and the quantity of goods. If the consumers' co-operatives do not get this done, they will be punished for it. But if, owing to their connection with the producers' co-operatives, they give even a small increase of products, we must welcome it and foster the initiative. If the consumers' co-operatives, in spite of their closer, intimate local connections with production, do not show an increase, it will mean that they have not fulfilled the direct assignment of the Soviet government. If there are even two or three energetic comrades in a district who are prepared to combat the kulaks and the bourgeoisie, victory is assured. In what way was Comrade Chuchin's initiative thwarted? He did not cite a single instance. But the idea

that we must link up the producers' co-operatives with the consumers' co-operatives and agree to any concession that may increase the amount of products in the near future follows logically from our experience of the past two years. It in no way hampers either communist functionaries or Soviet officials in their war on the kulak co-operative, the bourgeois type of co-operative. Far from hampering them, it provides them with a new weapon. If you succeed in organising anything at all we shall give you a bonus; but if you do not fulfil this assignment we shall punish you, not only because you are counter-revolutionary—we have the Cheka for that, as was rightly pointed out here—no, we shall punish you for not fulfilling the assignment of the state, of the Soviet government and the proletariat.

Comrade Milyutin has not produced a single sound argument against amalgamating the consumers' co-operatives—all he said was that this seemed to him to be opportunism or a half-measure. This is strange coming from Comrade Milyutin, who, with Comrade Rykov, was prepared to make big strides, but discovered that he cannot even make a tenth of one stride. From this aspect, connections with the consumers' co-operatives will be an advantage; they will make it possible to tackle production immediately. All means are available to prevent interference in political matters; and as to obedience in the production and economic sphere, that depends entirely on the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the Supreme Economic Council. These means are adequate for you to be able to control the co-operatives.

I now come to the third question, the question of nationalisation, which Milyutin advocated in a way that was strange to hear. A commission was set up. Comrade Krestinsky was in a minority on the commission and Comrade Milyutin was the victor. But now he says: "On the question of nationalisation I am prepared not to argue." Then what was the commission arguing about? If your standpoint is the same as Comrade Chuchin's you are wrong in renouncing nationalisation. It has been asked here why, if the capitalists have been nationalised, the kulaks cannot be nationalised too. It is not surprising that this argument evoked hilarity. For however you count the well-to-do peasants, those who exploit the labour of others, you will find there are no less

than half a million, perhaps even something like a million. How do you propose to nationalise them? It is fantastic. We have not the means for that as yet.

Comrade Chuchin is quite right when he says that there are a lot of counter-revolutionaries in the co-operatives. But that is a horse of another colour. What was said about the Cheka was quite in place here. If you are too short-sighted to expose individual leaders of the co-operatives, then just install one Communist to detect the counter-revolution; if he is a good Communist—and a good Communist has the qualities of a good member of the Cheka—he should, when assigned to a consumers' society, bag at least two counter-revolutionary co-operators.

That is why Comrade Chuchin is wrong when he advocates immediate nationalisation. It would be a good thing, but it is impossible, for we are dealing with a class which is least susceptible to our influence and which certainly cannot be nationalised. We have not even nationalised all the industrial enterprises. By the time an order of the chief administrations and central boards reaches the localities it becomes absolutely ineffective; it is completely lost in a sea of documents, because of lack of roads and telegraph, etc. It is therefore impossible to speak of the nationalisation of the co-operatives as yet. Comrade Milyutin is wrong in principle too. He feels that his position is weak and thinks that he can simply withdraw this point. But in that case, Comrade Milyutin, you are undermining your own resolution, you are issuing a certificate to the effect that the resolution of the minority is right; for the spirit of your resolution—to subordinate them to the volost executive committees (that is exactly what is said in the first clause—"take measures")—is a Cheka spirit, wrongly introduced into an economic issue. The other resolution says that the first thing to do is to increase the number of Communists, to intensify communist propaganda and agitation—that a basis must be created. There is nothing grandiloquent here, no immediate promises of a land flowing with milk and honey. But if there are Communists in the localities, they will know what has to be done, and there will be no need for Comrade Chuchin to explain where counter-revolutionaries should be taken to. Secondly, an organ must be created. Create an

organ and test it in action, check whether production is increasing—that is what the resolution of the minority says. First of all create a basis, and then—then we shall see. What has to be done will follow from this of itself. We have enough decrees saying that counter-revolutionaries should be handed over to the Cheka, and if there is no Cheka, to the Revolutionary Committee. We need less of this fist-shaking. We must adopt the resolution of the minority, which lays down a basic line of policy.

6

SPEECH CLOSING THE CONGRESS
APRIL 5

Comrades, in making a brief summary of the work of our Congress we must, in my opinion, first of all dwell upon the tasks of our Party. The Congress has adopted a detailed resolution on the question of organisation, and as might have been expected, a very important place in that resolution is occupied by the question of the education, the training, the organisational deployment of the members of our Party. The Credentials Committee has reported that over 600,000 members of our Party are represented at this Congress. We are all fully aware of the tremendous difficulties the Party has had to cope with in these strenuous times, when measures had to be taken to prevent the worst elements, the offal of the old capitalist system, from seeping into the government party, from fastening themselves on to it—t is naturally an open party, for it is the government party, and as such opens the way to power. One of these measures was the institution of Party Weeks. Under such conditions, at such moments, when the Party and the movement were in exceptionally trying situations, when Denikin stood north of Orel, and Yudenich within fifty versts of Petrograd, it was only people who were sincerely devoted to the cause of the emancipation of the working people who could have joined the Party.

Such conditions will not occur again, at least not in the near future, and it must be said that the huge membership (as compared with previous congresses) our Party has attained gives rise to a certain apprehension. And there is one very real danger, which is that the rapid growth of our

Party has not always been commensurate with the extent to which we have educated this mass of people for the performance of the tasks of the moment. We must always bear in mind that this army of 600,000 must be the vanguard of the working class, and that we should scarcely have been able to carry out our tasks during these two years if it had not been for iron discipline. The basic condition for the maintenance and continuance of strict discipline is loyalty; all the old means and sources of discipline have ceased to exist, and we base our activities solely on a high degree of understanding and political consciousness. This has enabled us to achieve a discipline which is superior to that of any other state and which rests on a basis different from that of the discipline which is being maintained with difficulty, if it can be maintained at all, in capitalist society. We must therefore remember that our task in the coming year, after the brilliant successes achieved in the war, is not so much the growth of the Party as work inside the Party, the education of the membership of our Party. It is not for nothing that our resolutions on organisation devote as much space as possible to this question.

We must spare no effort to make this vanguard of the proletariat, this army of 600,000 members, capable of coping with the tasks that confront it. And it is confronted by tasks of gigantic international and internal importance. As to the international tasks, our international position has never been as good as it is now. News about the life of the workers abroad seldom reaches us, yet every time you receive a couple of letters or a few issues of European or American working-class socialist newspapers you experience real pleasure, because everywhere, in all parts of the world, you see among masses formerly entirely untouched by propaganda, or steeped in wretched opportunism, in purely parliamentary socialism, a tremendous growth of interest in the Soviet power, in the new tasks, a growth much greater than we imagine; everywhere you see intense revolutionary movement, ferment, and revolution has become a current issue.

I had occasion yesterday to glance through an issue of the newspaper of the British Socialist Labour Party. The British workers, whose leaders were intellectuals and who for decades were distinguished by their contempt for theory,

are talking in quite definite tones; and the paper shows that the British workers are now taking an interest in the question of revolution, that there is a growing interest in the fight against revisionism, opportunism, and parliamentary socialism, the social-treachery we have got to know so well. This struggle is becoming an issue of the day. We can say quite definitely that our American Comrade R., who has published a voluminous book containing a number of articles by Trotsky and myself, thus giving a summary of the history of the Russian revolution, was quite right when he said that the French Revolution was victorious on a world-wide scale, and that, if it was directly crushed, it was only because it was surrounded on the European continent by more backward countries, in which a movement of emulation, sympathy and support could not immediately arise. The Russian revolution, which, owing to the yoke of tsarism and a number of other factors (continuity with 1905, etc.), started before the others, is surrounded by countries which are on a higher level of capitalist development and are approaching the revolution more slowly, but more surely, durably and firmly. We find that with every year, and even with every month, the number of supporters and friends of the Soviet Republic is increasing tenfold, a hundredfold, a thousandfold in every capitalist country; and it must be said that we have more friends and allies than we imagine!

The attempt of world imperialism to crush us by military force has collapsed completely. The international situation has now given us a much longer and more durable respite than the one we had at the beginning of the revolution. But we must remember that this is nothing more than a respite. We must remember that the whole capitalist world is armed to the teeth and is only waiting for the moment, choosing the best strategical conditions, and studying the means of attack. We must never under any circumstances forget that all the economic power and all the military power is still on its side. We are still weak on an international scale, but we are rapidly growing and gaining strength, wresting one weapon after another from the hands of the enemy. But the enemy is lurking in wait for the Soviet Republic at every step. International capital has definite designs, a calculated plan, now that the blockade has been removed,

to unite, to fuse, to weld together international food speculation, international freedom of trade, with our own internal food speculation, and on the basis of this speculation to pave the way for a new war against us, to prepare a new series of traps and pitfalls.

And this brings us to that fundamental task which constituted the chief theme, the chief object of attention of our Congress. That is the task of development. In this respect the Congress has done a lot. A resolution has been unanimously adopted on the principal question, the question of economic development and transport. And now, by means of Party education, we shall be able to get this resolution carried into effect by the three million working-class members of the trade unions, acting as one man. We shall ensure that this resolution channels all our strength, discipline and energy to the restoration of the country's economic life—first of all to the restoration of the railways, and then to the improvement of the food situation.

We have now quite a number of subjects for propaganda, and every item of news we get from abroad and every new dozen members of the Party provide us with fresh material. Propaganda must be carried on systematically, without the dispersion and division of forces. We must bear firmly in mind that we achieved successes and performed miracles in the military sphere because we always concentrated on the main and fundamental thing, and solved problems in a way that capitalist society could not solve them. The point is that in capitalist society everything that particularly interests the citizens—their economic conditions, war and peace—is decided secretly, apart from society itself. The most important questions—war, peace, diplomatic questions—are decided by a small handful of capitalists, who deceive not only the masses, but very often parliament itself. No parliament in the world has ever said anything of weight on the question of war and peace. In capitalist society the major questions affecting the economic life of the working people—whether they are to live in starvation or in comfort—are decided by the capitalist—who is the lord, a god! In all capitalist countries, including the democratic republics, the attention of the people is diverted at such times by the corrupt bourgeois press, which wears the label of freedom of

speech, and which will invent and circulate anything to fool and deceive the masses. In our country, on the other hand, the whole apparatus of state power, the whole attention of the class-conscious worker have been entirely and exclusively centred on the major and cardinal issue, on the chief task. We have made gigantic progress in this way in the military sphere, and we must now apply our experience to the economic sphere.

We are effecting the transition to socialism, and the most urgent question—bread and work—is not a private question, not the private affair of an employer, but the affair of the whole of society, and any peasant who thinks at all must definitely realise and understand that if the government raises the question of the railways in its whole press, in every article, in every newspaper issue, it is because it is the common affair of all. This work to develop the country will lead the peasant out of the blindness and ignorance that doomed him to slavery; it will lead him to real liberty, to a state of affairs in which the working folk will be aware of all the difficulties that confront them and will direct all the forces of public organisation, all the forces of the state apparatus, all the forces of agitation to the simplest and most essential things, rejecting all the tinsel and trimmings, all the playing at resolutions and the artful promises which form the subject of the newspaper agitation of all capitalist countries. All our forces, all our attention must be centred on these simple economic tasks, which are clear to every peasant, to which the middle, even the well-to-do, peasant, if he is at all honest, cannot object, and which we are always absolutely right in raising at every meeting. Even the masses of the least politically-conscious workers and peasants will confirm that the chief thing at the moment is to restore the economy in a way that will prevent it from falling again into the hands of the exploiters and will not offer the slightest indulgence to those who, having a surplus of grain in a starving country, use it to enrich themselves and to make the poor starve. You will not find a single man, however ignorant and unenlightened, who does not have the feeling that this is unjust, to whom the idea has not occurred, vague and unclear perhaps, that the arguments of the supporters of the Soviet government fully accord with the interests of the working people.

It is to these simple tasks, which in the big capitalist societies are kept in the background and are regarded as the private affair of the bosses, that we must direct the attention of the whole army of 600,000 Party members, among whom we must not tolerate a single one who does not do his duty; and for the sake of this we must get the whole mass of the workers to join us and to display the greatest self-sacrifice and devotion. It will be difficult to organise this, but since, from the point of view of the working people it is just, it has tremendous moral weight and immense power of conviction. And so, confident that, thanks to the work of the Congress, this task can now be accomplished as brilliantly as we accomplished the military task (although again at the price of a number of defeats and mistakes), we may say that the workers of all European and American countries are now looking towards us, looking with expectancy to see whether we shall accomplish the more difficult task confronting us—for it is more difficult than the achievement of military victory. It cannot be accomplished by enthusiasm, by self-sacrifice and heroic fervour alone. In this work of organisation, in which we Russians have been weaker than others, in this work of self-discipline, in this work of rejecting the incidental and striving for the main thing, nothing can be done in a hurry. And in this sphere of requisitioning grain, repairing the railways, restoring the economy, where progress is made only inch by inch, where the ground is being prepared, and where what is being done is perhaps little, but is durable—in this work, the eyes of the workers of all countries are upon us, they expect new victories of us. I am convinced that, guided by the decisions of our Congress, with the 600,000 members of the Party working like one man, and establishing closer ties with the economic bodies and the trade union bodies, we shall accomplish this task as successfully as we accomplished the military task, and shall march swiftly and surely towards the victory of the World Socialist Soviet Republic! (*Applause.*)

ON COMPROMISES[148]

In a talk with me, Comrade Lansbury laid particular stress on the following argument of the British opportunist leaders in the labour movement.

> The Bolsheviks are compromising with the capitalists, agreeing, in the Peace Treaty with Estonia, for instance, to timber concessions; if that is the case, compromises with capitalists concluded by the moderate leaders of the British labour movement are equally legitimate.

Comrade Lansbury considers this argument, very widespread in Britain, of importance to the workers and urgently requiring examination.

I shall try to meet this desire.

I

May an advocate of proletarian revolution conclude compromises with capitalists or with the capitalist class?

This, apparently, is the question underlying the above argument. But to present it in this general way shows either the extreme political inexperience and low level of political consciousness of the questioner, or his chicanery in using a sophism to veil his justification of brigandage, plunder and every other sort of capitalist violence.

Indeed, it would obviously be silly to give a negative reply to this general question. Of course, an advocate of proletarian revolution may conclude compromises or agreements with capitalists. It all depends on *what kind* of agreement is concluded and *under what circumstances*. Here and

here alone can and must one look for the difference between an agreement that is legitimate from the angle of the proletarian revolution and one that is treasonable, treacherous (from the same angle).

To make this clear I shall first recall the argument of the founders of Marxism and then add some very simple and obvious examples.

It is not for nothing that Marx and Engels are considered the founders of scientific socialism. They were ruthless enemies of all phrase-mongering. They taught that problems of socialism (including problems of socialist tactics) must be presented scientifically. In the seventies of last century, when Engels analysed the revolutionary manifesto of the French Blanquists, Commune fugitives, he told them in plain terms that their boastful declaration of "no compromise" was an empty phrase.[149] The idea of compromises must not be renounced. The point is through all the compromises which are sometimes necessarily imposed by force of circumstance upon even the most revolutionary party of even the most revolutionary class, to be able to preserve, strengthen, steel and develop the revolutionary tactics and organisation, the revolutionary consciousness, determination and preparedness of the working class and its organised vanguard, the Communist Party.

Anybody acquainted with the fundamentals of Marx's teachings must inevitably draw this conclusion from the totality of those teachings. But since in Britain, due to a number of historical causes, Marxism has ever since Chartism[150] (which in many respects was something preparatory to Marxism, the "last word but one" before Marxism) been pushed into the background by the opportunist, semi-bourgeois leaders of the trade unions and co-operatives, I shall try to explain the truth of the view expounded by means of typical examples drawn from among the universally-known facts of ordinary, political, and economic life.

I shall begin with an illustration I gave once before in one of my speeches. Let us suppose the car you are travelling in is attacked by armed bandits. Let us suppose that when a pistol is put to your temple you surrender your car, money and revolver to the bandits, who proceed to use this car, etc., to commit other robberies.

Here is undoubtedly a case of compromising with highwaymen, of agreement with them. The agreement, though unsigned and tacitly concluded, is nevertheless quite a definite and precise one: "I give you, Mr. Robber, my car, weapon and money; you rid me of your pleasant company."

The question arises: do you call the man who concluded such an agreement with highwaymen an *accomplice* in banditry, an *accomplice* in a robbers' assault upon third persons despoiled by the bandits with the aid of the car, money and weapon received by them from the person who concluded this agreement?

No, you do not.

The matter is absolutely plain and simple, down to the smallest detail.

And it is likewise clear that under other circumstances the tacit surrender to the highwaymen of the car, money and weapon would be considered by every person of common sense to be complicity in banditry.

The conclusion is clear: it is just as silly to renounce the idea of literally all agreements or compromises with robbers as it is to acquit a person of complicity in banditry on the basis of the abstract proposition that, generally speaking, agreements with robbers are sometimes permissible and necessary.

Let us now take a political illustration....

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Published according to
the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

April 2, 1920

Orjonikidze,

Revolutionary Military Council,
Caucasian Front

Again urge you to display caution and maximum good will towards the Moslems, especially on advancing into Daghestan. Do everything to demonstrate, and in the most emphatic manner, our sympathy for the Moslems, their autonomy, independence, etc. Give me more precise and more frequent information on how things stand.

Lenin

First published in 1942

Published according to a typewritten copy

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST (INAUGURAL) ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF MINEWORKERS[151]

Comrades, allow me first of all to convey the greetings of the Council of People's Commissars to the First Congress of Mineworkers.

Comrades, this Congress and this whole branch of industry are of the highest importance to the Soviet Republic. You all know, of course, that without the coal industry there would be no modern industry, no factories. Coal is the veritable bread of industry; without it industry comes to a standstill; without it the railways are in a sorry state and can never be restored; without it the large-scale industry of all countries would collapse, fall to pieces and revert to primitive barbarity; today the coal shortage and crisis are having the most dire effects even in the victor countries, even in countries far more advanced than Russia and which have suffered far less in the war. It is, therefore, all the more necessary to us that you, comrades, who have assembled to form a solid, strong, powerful and class-conscious union of mineworkers, should clearly realise the tremendous tasks with which the entire Soviet Republic, the workers' and peasants' government confront this Congress, confront the mineworkers. After two years of desperate struggle against the whiteguards and capitalists, who were supported by the capitalists of the whole world, today, after all the victories we have won, we are again faced with a stern struggle, as severe as the previous one but a more grateful one—the struggle on the bloodless front, on the front of labour.

When, on the bloody front of war, the landowners and capitalists tried to break the Soviet power in Russia, it

seemed as if the cause of the Soviet Republic was hopeless, as if Soviet Russia, the weakest, most backward and most devastated of all countries, would be unable to hold its own against the capitalists of the whole world. The richest powers in the world assisted the Russian whiteguards in this struggle, assigned hundreds of millions of rubles to help them, supplied them with munitions, established special camps abroad for the training of officers—and to this day these recruiting bureaus still exist abroad, where, with the help of the richest capitalists in the world, Russian prisoners of war and volunteers are being recruited for the war against Soviet Russia. It naturally looked as if this was a hopeless undertaking, as if Russia could not hold out against the military powers of the world, who are stronger than we are. Nevertheless, this miracle proved possible; Soviet Russia performed this miracle in two years.

Soviet Russia proved to be the victor in a war against all the richest powers in the world. Why? Not because we were stronger from the military standpoint, of course—that is not the case—but because in the civilised countries there were soldiers who could no longer be deceived, although reams of paper were devoted to proving to them that the Bolsheviks were German agents, usurpers, traitors and terrorists. As a result of this, we find that soldiers returned from Odessa either convinced Bolsheviks or declaring that they "would not fight the workers' and peasants' government". The chief reason for our victory was that the workers of the advanced West-European countries understood and sympathised with the working class of the world so strongly that, despite the lies of the bourgeois press, which in publications issued in millions of copies showered disgusting calumnies on the Bolsheviks—despite all this, the workers were on our side; and this fact determined the issue of our war. Everybody realised that if hundreds of thousands of soldiers had fought against us as they had fought against Germany, we would not have been able to hold on. This was obvious to anybody who knows what war means. Nevertheless, a miracle happened: we defeated them, they were split owing to their wrangling, and their famous League of Nations turned out to resemble a league of mad dogs who are snatching each other's bones and cannot come to terms over a single question;

however, the number of Bolshevik supporters, direct and indirect, conscious and not altogether so, is growing daily and hourly in every country.

Everybody who sympathises with socialism knows what happened to the Second International: for twenty-five years, from 1889 to 1914, it directed the socialist movement in all countries, but when the imperialist war broke out the socialists of the Second International went over to the side of their governments, each defending his own. All those who called themselves republicans, Socialist-Revolutionaries or Mensheviks, in every country, took the side of their own governments, defended their own fatherland and helped to conceal the secret treaties—did not publish them. The socialists who were considered the leaders of the working class went over to the capitalists, went against the Russian working class. The German Government is headed by the Scheidemann gang, who to this day call themselves Social-Democrats but who are the foulest of butchers; in alliance with the landowners and capitalists, they have murdered the leaders of the German working class, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and slaughtered fifteen thousand German proletarians. In the period since its foundation a year ago, the Third (Communist) International has gained a complete victory. The Second International has fallen to pieces.

So you see what a strong influence the Soviet power in Russia has had on the workers of the whole world, despite all the lies and calumnies directed against it. The soldiers and workers hold that power should be vested in those who work—he who does not work, shall not eat, but he who does work is entitled to a voice in the state, he can influence matters of state. That is a simple truth, and millions of working-class people have understood it.

You are now faced with a difficult task, namely, to follow up our military victories by a much more difficult victory This will be all the more difficult because here mere heroism is not enough; here results can be achieved only by persistent work, and years of intense effort will be required.

All over the world the capitalists are mustering labour-power and increasing output. But the workers say in reply, first feed the workers first put a stop to the wrangling for which the workers pay with their lives, first put an end

to the carnage, for millions of people perished in the recent bloodbath to decide whether the British or some other predators were to rule. As long as power is in the hands of the capitalists we are not thinking of increasing production but of overthrowing them.

But now that the capitalists have been overthrown, prove that you are able to increase productivity without them; refute the lie which the capitalists spread about the class-conscious workers, when they say that this is not a revolution, not a new order, but sheer destruction, mere revenge on the capitalists; they say the workers alone can never organise the country and lead it out of economic chaos, that they will only create anarchy. That is the lie which the capitalists of all countries are spreading in millions of ways, and which non-party people, opponents of the Bolsheviks, are conveying in thousands of ways to Russian workers too, especially to those who are under-educated, have been most corrupted by capitalism or are most ignorant. But if, as we have seen, we have been able, in the two years of Soviet power, to stand up to the whole world, it has been largely due to the heroism of the workers.

We are reproached for having established the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the iron, relentless and firm rule of the workers, which stops at nothing and which says that whoever is not with us is against us, and that the slightest resistance to this rule will be crushed. But we are proud of it and say that were it not for this iron rule of the workers, of this workers' vanguard, we should not have been able to hold out for two months, let alone two years. What this dictatorship has given us is this—every time a difficult situation arose during the war, the Party mobilised Communists, and it was they who were the first to perish in the front ranks; they perished in thousands on the Yudenich and Kolchak fronts. The finest members of the working class perished; they sacrificed themselves, realising that although they perished they would save future generations, that they would save thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants. They ruthlessly pilloried and hounded the self-seekers—those who during the war were concerned only for their own skins—and shot them without mercy. We are proud of this dictatorship, of this iron rule of the

workers, which said: "We have overthrown the capitalists and we will lay down our lives to prevent any attempt of theirs to restore their rule." Nobody during these two years went as hungry as the workers of Petrograd, Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk. It has now been computed that during these two years they received not more than seven poods of bread a year, whereas the peasants of the grain-producing gubernias consumed no less than seventeen poods. The workers have made great sacrifices, they have suffered epidemics, and mortality among them has increased. But they will prove that the workers did not rise up against the capitalists out of vengeance, but with the inflexible determination to create a social system in which there will be no landowners and capitalists. It was for the sake of this that these sacrifices were made. It was only because of these unparalleled sacrifices that were made consciously and voluntarily and were backed up by the discipline of the Red Army, without recourse to old methods of discipline—it was only because of these tremendous sacrifices that the advanced workers were able to maintain their dictatorship and earned the right to the respect of the workers of the whole world. Those who are so eager to slander the Bolsheviks should not forget that the dictatorship entailed the greatest sacrifice and starvation on the part of the workers who were exercising it. During these two years the workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Petrograd and Moscow suffered more than anybody fighting on the Red fronts did.

This is what should be, first and foremost, borne in mind and well remembered by the comrades in the coal industry. You are a vanguard. We are continuing the war—not the bloody war, that, fortunately, is over, nobody will now dare to attack Soviet Russia, because they know that they will be defeated since the class-conscious workers cannot be led against us; they will blow up ports, as they did in Archangel under the British and also in Odessa. This has been proved; this much we have gained. But we are continuing the war, we are nevertheless continuing it as an economic war. It is the speculators we are now fighting, the handful of workers who have been corrupted by the old capitalist system and who say to themselves, "I must have higher pay, and to hell with the rest." "Give me double pay, give me two or three

pounds of bread a day," they say, heedless of the fact that they are working for the defence of the workers and peasants, for the defeat of the capitalists. They must be combated by means of comradely education, by comradely persuasion, and there is nobody to do this except the trade unions. It must be explained to such workers that if they side with the speculators and profiteers, with the rich peasants who say, "the more grain I have the more money I shall make" and "each for himself, and God for all", they will be following the precepts of the capitalist gentry and of all who preserve the old capitalist traditions; they must be told that we regard all who act on the old precepts as apostates and traitors whom the working class must brand and put to shame. There are mostly capitalist countries surrounding us and all over the world they are uniting against us, they are joining forces with our speculators; they want to overthrow us by force, and think they are stronger than we are. We continue to be a besieged fortress towards which the eyes of the world's workers are turned, for they know that their freedom will come from here, and in this besieged fortress we must act with military ruthlessness, with military discipline and self-sacrifice. In the ranks of the workers we cannot tolerate self-seekers who refuse to combine the interests of their group with the interests of the workers and peasants in general.

We must, with the help of the trade unions, create the comradely discipline which existed in the Red Army, which is being worked out by the best of our trade unions, and which I am convinced you who have now founded the mineworkers' union will also establish.

Your union will be one of the foremost unions, and it will have all the state assistance we can possibly give. And I am sure that you too will make similar sacrifices to create a firm labour discipline, raise the productivity of labour and foster the spirit of self-sacrifice among the workers in the coal industry, among those who are engaged in what is probably the hardest, dirtiest and most exhausting labour, and which technicians are striving to abolish altogether.

But in order to save Soviet power now, industry must be fed, that is, provided with coal. Unless this is done, it will be impossible to restore the economy and the railways,

it will be impossible to set the factories going and provide goods to be exchanged for the peasants' grain; the peasants cannot, of course, be content with bits of coloured paper, they are granting us a loan, because it is their duty to grant a loan to the hungry workers. But it is our duty to repay this loan, and production, therefore, must be increased tenfold and all the factories started.

That, comrades, is the tremendous task which faces all class-conscious workers, i.e., those workers who realise that the issue is one of preserving and consolidating Soviet power and socialism in order to save all future generations from the yoke of the landowners and capitalists for all time. Those who refuse to understand this must be driven from the ranks of the workers. The trade unions, with their training, influence and propaganda, and their deep concern for production and discipline, will see to those who do not understand it sufficiently. That is the way to strengthen the workers' and peasants' government. And by this slow but most important work you will achieve, you must achieve, victories even more important than those gained by our Red Army at the front.

Published in 1920 in the pamphlet *Resolutions and Decisions of the First (Inaugural) All-Russia Congress of Mineworkers*, Moscow

Published according to the pamphlet

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA TRADE UNION CONGRESS[152] APRIL 7, 1920

(*Prolonged*, *stormy applause*. *Ovation*.) Comrades, permit me to begin by conveying greetings from the Council of People's Commissars to the Third All-Russia Congress. (*Applause*.) Comrades, Soviet power is now passing through a phase of outstanding importance, which in many respects confronts us with the highly complex and interesting tasks that belong to a period of change. And it is the specific nature of the period that provides the trade unions with special tasks and special responsibilities in the work of building socialism.

That is why I should now like to dwell not so much on certain decisions of the Party Congress which has just ended (on this subject you will receive a more detailed report) as on those changes in the conditions of Soviet policy which link up all the tasks of socialist construction and the activities of the trade unions. The chief feature of the present phase is the transition from war tasks, which have hitherto absorbed all the attention and effort of the Soviet government, to tasks of peaceful economic development. And it should be mentioned right away that this is not the first time that the Soviet government and the Soviet Republic are passing through such a phase. We are reverting to this question once more—this is the second time since the dictatorship of the proletariat was established that history has brought the work of peaceful construction into the foreground.

The first time was at the beginning of 1918, when, after the brief but very impetuous offensive of German imperialism, at a time when the old capitalist army had completely

collapsed and when we had no army of our own and could not create one rapidly, the German imperialist predators forced the Peace of Brest-Litovsk upon us. It seemed as if war tasks had receded into the background, owing to the weakness of the available forces of the Soviet government. It seemed as if we could proceed to the work of peaceful construction. I had occasion to make a report to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee at that time, too. That was on April 29, 1918, nearly two years ago. The Central Committee adopted a number of theses based on my report and had them published. I remind you of this because even at that time the theses enumerated a number of questions—on labour discipline and so forth—which are included in the agenda of this Congress. There is a similarity between that time and the present. I assure you that our attention is again being concentrated on the disputes and differences which were aired in the trade union movement two years ago. It would be a profound mistake to assert that the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party arose out of the present disputes. Such an assertion would only tend to distort the true picture of events. And, therefore, in order to understand the true nature of the question and to set about its solution in a proper way, it would be useful to compare and give some thought to conditions as they were at the beginning of 1918 and as they are today.

At that time, during the brief suspension of the war against German imperialism, the tasks of peace-time development assumed prominence. It looked as if we might enjoy a long period of peaceful constructive work. Civil war had not yet begun. Krasnov had, with German aid, only just appeared on the Don. There were no hostilities in the Urals and in the North. The Soviet Republic included a vast territory—all except what it had been deprived of by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Conditions were such that we might count upon a long period of peaceful work. And, under these conditions, the primary question taken up by the Communist Party and stressed in a number of resolutions (particularly that of April 29, 1918) was the need for widespread propaganda of, and greater insistence on, labour discipline.

Dictatorial powers and one-man management are not contradictory to socialist democracy. This must now be borne

in mind, if the decisions adopted by the recent Party Congress and the general tasks that confront us are to be understood. And this is not an answer to questions that have only just arisen; it has its deep roots in the very conditions of the period in which we live. Let anyone who doubts this compare the situation with what it was two years ago, and he will understand that the present phase demands that all attention be devoted to labour discipline, to the labour armies, although two years ago there was no mention of labour armies. Only by comparing the issue as it stands today with the way it stood then, can we draw a proper conclusion, ignoring minor details and singling out what is general and fundamental. The whole attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government is centred on peaceful economic development, on problems of the dictatorship and of one-man management. Not only the experience we have had in the stubborn civil war of the past two years leads us to such a solution of these problems.

When we tackled them for the first time in 1918, there was no civil war and no experience to speak of.

It was, therefore, not only the experience of the Red Army and of the victorious Civil War, but something more profound, something bound up with the tasks of the dictatorship of the working class in general, that has induced us now, as it did two years ago, to concentrate all our attention on labour discipline as the crucial factor in the economic development of socialism, and as the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat as we understand it. Since capitalism was overthrown, every day of our revolution has taken us further and further away from the idea about which the old internationalists, who were thoroughly petty-bourgeois, made so much ado; they believed that the decision of a majority in the democratic institutions of bourgeois parliamentarism—with private property in land, the means of production and capital still retained—could settle the issue, when as a matter of fact it can be decided only by a bitter class struggle. The significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in actual practice unfolded before us when, after the conquest of power, we set about putting it into practice and saw that the struggle between classes had not ceased with this, that the victory over the capitalists and landowners had not

destroyed these classes, that it had only smashed them, but had not completely destroyed them; suffice it to mention the international ties of capital, which are of much longer standing and more solid than the ties of the working class are as yet.

On an international scale, capital is still stronger, both from the military and the economic standpoint, than Soviet power and the Soviet system. That is the fundamental premise from which we must proceed, and we must never forget it. Forms of the struggle against capital change—at one time they acquire an open international character, at another they are centred in one country. The forms change, but the struggle goes on whether it be in the military, the economic, or some other sphere of the social system; and our revolution confirms the basic law of the class struggle. The greater the cohesion achieved by the proletariat in overthrowing the bourgeois classes, the more it learns. The revolution develops in the course of the struggle itself. And the struggle does not cease with the overthrow of the capitalists. Only after the defeat of the capitalists has been consolidated in one country does it acquire practical significance for the whole world. At the beginning of the October Revolution the capitalists regarded our revolution as a freak—any queer thing may happen in those distant parts, they thought.

For the dictatorship of the proletariat to acquire world significance, it had to be consolidated in practice in some one country. Only then did the capitalists—not only the Russian capitalists, who at once rushed to seek the aid of other capitalists, but the capitalists of all other countries—become convinced that this matter was acquiring international significance. Only then did the resistance of the capitalists on a world scale attain the force it did. Only then did civil war develop in Russia and all the victorious countries do their utmost to assist the Russian capitalists and landowners in the Civil War.

The class struggle in Russia had taken full shape by 1900, whereas the socialist revolution became victorious in 1917. Not only did the resistance of the overthrown class continue to develop after its overthrow, but it acquired a new source of strength in the relations between the pro-

letariat and the peasantry. This is known to anybody who has made any study of Marxism, who has based socialism on the international movement of the working class, as its only scientific foundation. Everyone knows that Marxism gives the theoretical reason for the abolition of classes. What does this mean? For the victory of socialism it is not enough to overthrow the capitalists; the difference between the proletariat and the peasantry must be abolished. The position of the peasantry is this—on the one hand, it is a class of working people, who for decades and centuries were oppressed by the landowners and capitalists, and it will therefore be a long time before they can forget that the workers alone liberated them from this oppression. This question could be discussed for decades; reams of paper have been filled on the subject, and many factional groups have taken shape around it. But we now see that these differences have paled before reality. As working people, the peasants will not forget for many years to come that it was the workers alone who liberated them from the landowners. That cannot be contested; but they remain property-owners in a commodity-producing economy. Every case of a sale of grain on the open market, of speculation and profiteering is the restoration of a commodity-producing economy, and hence of capitalism. By overthrowing the capitalists we liberated the peasantry, a class which in old Russia undoubtedly comprised the majority of the population. The peasants have remained property-owners in their form of production, and they are continuing to develop new capitalist relations after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. These are the basic features of our economic position. Hence the absurdity of the talk we hear from those who do not understand the state of affairs. The talk of equality, liberty and democracy under present conditions is nonsense. We are waging a class struggle, and our aim is to abolish classes. As long as workers and peasants remain, socialism has not been achieved. And, in practice, we find an irreconcilable struggle going on everywhere. We must think about how and under what conditions the proletariat, wielding so powerful an apparatus of coercion as the state, can attract the peasant as a working man and overcome his resistance as a property-owner, or render it harmless.

Here the class struggle is continuing, and this throws new light on the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It appears before us not only, and not even largely, as the employment of the coercive means of the state apparatus for the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters. It is, of course, right to say that we have done a lot by taking this as the basis, but we also have another method, in which the proletariat plays the part of an organiser, of one who has been through the school of labour and the training and discipline of the capitalist factory. We must organise economic life on a new and more perfect basis, counting on and utilising all the achievements of capitalism. Without this we shall never be able to build socialism and communism. This is much more difficult than the war tasks. In many respects the war tasks are easier to accomplish. They can be accomplished by enthusiasm, energy and self-sacrifice. It was easier for the peasant to fight his inveterate enemy, the landowner, and more within his understanding. He did not have to understand the connection between the power of the workers and the necessity to put down freedom of trade. It was easier to beat the Russian whiteguards, the landowners and capitalists, and their henchmen, the Mensheviks. This victory will cost us more, both in time and effort.

You cannot win in economic matters in the same way as in a war. Freedom of trade cannot be defeated by enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. Here, prolonged work is required; the ground has to be won inch by inch; the organising forces of the proletariat are required. Victory may be achieved only if the proletariat wields its dictatorship as a great, organised and organising force, a force of moral influence on all the working people, including the non-proletarian working masses. Now that we have been successful—and will continue to be equally successful—in carrying out the first and simplest task, the suppression of the exploiters who directly attempt to sweep away Soviet power, a second and more complex task arises, which is to organise the forces of the proletariat, to learn to be good organisers. Labour must be organised in a new way; new ways of stimulating people to work and to observe labour discipline must be devised. Even capitalism took decades to accomplish this. All too often the worst

mistakes are made in this field. Many of our opponents show a complete failure to understand this question. They said we were utopians when we maintained that power could be seized. On the other hand, they expect us to complete the organisation of labour in a few months and to show results that require several years to produce. That is absurd. Given the political conditions, power can be retained by the sheer enthusiasm of the workers, perhaps even in the face of the whole world. That we have proved. But the creation of new forms of social discipline requires decades. Even capitalism required many decades to transform the old system of organisation. From the theoretical standpoint it is sheer nonsense to expect that we can reconstruct the organisation of labour in short order, and to instil this idea into the minds of the, workers and peasants.

And not only is it nonsense, it is extremely harmful, because it prevents the workers from clearly understanding the difference between the new tasks and the old. The new task is to organise industry, and first of all our own forces—and as far as organisation is concerned, we are weak, weaker than any of the advanced nations. The ability to do this is developed by large-scale machine industry, and it has never, in all history, had any other material basis than the productive labour of millions employing large-scale machine industry in accordance with a previously established plan. And here the interests of the proletariat and the peasantry do not coincide. A difficult period of struggle begins—a struggle against the peasantry. We must, however, make it clear to the peasants that they have no other course; they must either march with the workers, they must help the proletariat, or again succumb to the rule of the landowners. There is no middle course; the Mensheviks have a middle course, but it is a thoroughly rotten one and is failing everywhere, including Germany. The peasant masses cannot get an understanding of this by theory or by observing the Second and Third Internationals. The peasant masses—comprising tens of millions of people—can get an understanding of this only from their own experience, from their daily practical life. The peasants could understand the victory over Kolchak and Denikin. They were able to compare in practice Kolchak and Denikin with the dictatorship of the

working class which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had tried very hard and are still trying to scare the peasants with. But actually the peasants could never study theory, and cannot now. The peasant masses see that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are all lying; and they see the struggle we are waging against profiteering. It must be confessed that the Mensheviks too have made some progress in propaganda, having learned something from our political departments in the army. The peasants saw a banner on which was inscribed, not dictatorship of the proletariat, but Constituent Assembly, the power of the people; they did not see the word "dictatorship", they did not even understand the word. But experience has taught them that Soviet government is better.

And we are now faced with a second task, that of bringing moral influence to bear on the peasantry. Coercive methods towards the peasantry will help us little. It is the economic differentiation of the peasantry that is involved here. Since the overthrow of the capitalists, the struggle has drawn the workers close together; they have been cemented by two years of civil war. The peasantry, on the other hand, is splitting up more and more. The peasants cannot forget the landowners and capitalists; they remember them. Nevertheless, the peasantry of today are disunited; the interests of one section clash with those of another. The peasantry are not united. For one thing, not every peasant has food surpluses. There is no such equality. It is nonsense to say there is. To divide the peasantry and win over the non-kulak elements will require a lot of time. It will involve a long struggle, in which we shall employ all our forces, every means at our disposal. But force alone cannot ensure victory; moral means must be employed too. And from this follow all the questions of dictatorial power and individual authority which to many, or to some at any rate, it may be safely said, appear to have arisen only out of our recent disputes. But that is a mistake. Compare the situation with that of 1918. There were no disputes then.

When, after the peace with Germany, the question arose as to what should be the basis of power, we Communists replied—it must he made clear that democracy under the Soviet system does not contradict dictatorship. This was not to the

liking of many leaders of the old International. Even Kautsky cursed me.

The peasants are half labourers and half property-owners, and in order to win them over to us there must be unity of will, all must act in unison on every practical issue. Unity of will must not be a catchword, a symbol. We demand it in practice. This is how unity of will was expressed during the war—anybody who placed his own interests (or the interests of his village or group) above the common interests, was branded as a self-seeker and was shot; this was justified by the moral consciousness of the working class that it must achieve victory. We spoke about these shootings openly; we said that we made no secret of coercion, because we realised that we could not emerge from the old society without resorting to compulsion as far as the backward section of the proletariat was concerned. That is the way unity of will was expressed, and it was maintained in practice by punishing every deserter; in every battle and every campaign it was maintained by the Communists marching in the forefront and setting an example. The present task is to try to apply this unity of will to industry and agriculture. We have a territory stretching thousands of versts and huge numbers of factories. You must realise, therefore, that we cannot achieve our purpose by force alone; you must realise what a colossal task confronts us and what unity of will means today. It is not only a slogan. It must be given thought, careful thought. It is a slogan that entails prolonged, day-to-day effort. Take 1918, when there were no such disputes; even then I pointed to the necessity for individual authority, to the need to recognise the dictatorial authority of individuals in order to carry out the Soviet idea. All talk about equality of rights is nonsense. We are not waging the class struggle on the basis of equality of rights, nor can we if the proletariat is to prevail. Prevail it can, because we have hundreds of thousands of disciplined people expressing a single will; and it can prevail over the peasantry, which have been dispersed economically, and which have no common basis such as welds together the proletariat in the factories and the cities. The peasants are economically disunited. They are partly property-owners and partly labourers. Property drags them towards capitalism: "The more profitably I sell, the better.

If they're starving, I'll sell at a higher price." But, as a working man, the peasant knows that he suffered oppression at the hands of the landowner, from which he was liberated by the worker. Here we have a conflict of two souls, resulting from the economic status of the peasantry. These two souls must be separated one from the other. And we shall win only when we pursue a firm policy. All working people will always be working people to us; but as for the peasant proprietors, we have to fight them. Not only are they always at each other's throats, but they are ignorant into the bargain. The gentlemen at the League of Nations, thank God, are not ignorant; they are probably better educated than our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. But what do we find? Japan glorifies the League of Nations, yet tries to trip up America, and so on.

They are all at loggerheads, whereas we are united. And that is why workers in all countries are joining us. Since we have been able to defeat such enlightened gentlemen as the directors of international policy, who have so much experience, so much wealth, and a hundred guns and battleships for every one of ours, it is absurd to think that we cannot solve the peasant problem. It is discipline, loyalty, and united will that will win here. The will of tens and hundreds of thousands of people can be expressed by one person. This composite will is achieved in the Soviet way. In no other country have there been so many congresses of peasants and workers as in ours. That is the way we develop an enlightened attitude. What the Soviet Constitution gives us no other state has been able to give in two hundred years. (Applause.) To take only the number of congresses—no other state has summoned so many in a century of democracy. In this way we arrive at common decisions and mould a common will.

This is the broad way in which our Soviet Constitution, our Soviet form of government are to he understood. Its effect is that the decisions of the Soviet government have power of authority without parallel in the world, the power of the workers and peasants. But that is not enough for us. We are materialists, and you cannot satisfy us with power of authority, so please take the trouble to put it into effect. And here we find the old bourgeois instinct gaining the upper

hand, and we must frankly admit that it is stronger than we are. The old petty-bourgeois habit of conducting enterprises on individual lines and trying to strengthen freedom of trade is stronger than we are.

The trade unions arose out of capitalism as a means of developing the new class. Class is a concept which is evolved in struggle and development. There is no wall dividing one class from another. The workers and peasants are not separated by a Chinese Wall. How did man learn to form associations? First through the guild, and then according to different trades. Having become a class, the proletariat grew so strong that it took over the whole state machine, proclaimed war on the whole world and emerged victorious. The guilds and craft unions have now become backward institutions. Time was when the proletarians, under capitalism amalgamated along the lines of guild and craft. This was progressive at that time because the proletariat could not have amalgamated in any other way. It is absurd to say that the proletariat could have amalgamated to form a class at once. Such amalgamation requires decades. Marx, more than anybody, fought such sectarian and short-sighted views. The class grows under capitalist conditions, and when the suitable moment for revolution arrives, it takes state power into its own hands. And then all the guilds and craft unions become obsolete, they play a backward role, they are retrograde, not because they are run by bad people, but because bad people and enemies of communism find in them fertile soil for their propaganda. We are surrounded by the petty bourgeoisie who are reviving freedom of trade and capitalism. Karl Marx fought vigorously against the old utopian socialism and advocated the scientific view, which shows that the class struggle fosters the growth of the class, and the class must be helped to mature. Marx also fought the working-class leaders who went astray. In the Federal Council, in 1872, a vote of censure was passed on Marx for saying that the British leaders had been bribed by the bourgeoisie. Of course, Marx did not mean this in the sense that certain people were traitors. That is nonsense. He spoke about a bloc of a certain section of the workers with the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie supports this section of the workers directly and indirectly. That is the way in which it bribes them.

As far as getting its representatives elected to parliament is concerned, the British bourgeoisie has worked miracles, and excels all others. Marx and Engels exposed the bourgeoisie over a period of forty years, from 1852 to 1892, and the bourgeoisie acts in the same way in all countries. The fact that throughout the world trade unions have passed from the role of slaves to the role of builders marks a turning-point. We have existed for two years and what do we see? We see today that the working class has suffered most from hunger. In 1918 and 1919 the country's industrial workers received only seven poods of bread each, whereas the peasants of the grain-producing gubernias each had seventeen poods. Under the tsar the peasant used to get sixteen poods of bread at the best, whereas under our rule he gets seventeen poods. There is statistical evidence of this. The proletariat has been hungry for two years but this hunger has shown that the worker is capable of sacrificing not only his craft interests, but even his life. The proletariat was able to stand famine for two years because it had the moral support of all the labouring folk, and it bore these sacrifices for the sake of the victory of the workers' and peasants' government. It is true that the division of workers according to trade continues, and that many of these trades were necessary to the capitalist but are not necessary to us. And we know that the workers in these trades are suffering more severely from hunger than others. And it cannot be otherwise. Capitalism has been smashed, but socialism has not yet been built; and it will take a long time to build. Here we come up against all sorts of misunderstandings, which are not fortuitous, but are the result of the difference in the historical role of the trade unions as an instrument of craft amalgamation under capitalism and the trade unions as an instrument of the class amalgamation of the workers after they have taken over the state power. The workers are prepared to make any sacrifice; they create the discipline which compels people to say and feel, perhaps vaguely, that class interests are higher than craft interests. Workers who are incapable of making such sacrifices we regard as self-seekers, and we drive them out of the proletarian fold.

Such was the fundamental question of labour discipline, of one-man management in a general sense, as discussed by

the Party Congress. That is the gist of the decisions of the Party Congress, which you are all familiar with and which will be spoken of in greater detail in special reports. Their meaning is that the working class has grown and matured; it has taken over the power and is fighting the whole bourgeois world; and this struggle is becoming more and more difficult. It was easier to fight in the war. What is now required is organisation and moral education. Numerically the proletariat in Russia is at present not very strong. Its ranks have grown thinner during the war and our very victories have made it harder for us to govern the country. Both the trade unionists and the masses of the workers must realise this. When we talk about dictatorship, it is not the whim of centralists. The regions we have won have greatly enlarged the territory of Soviet Russia. We have won Siberia, the Don and the Kuban areas. There the percentage of proletarians is very small, smaller than it is here. We must go straight to the worker and tell him frankly that conditions of work have grown more complicated. We need more discipline, more individual authority and more dictatorship. Without that, we cannot even dream of a bigger victory. We have an organised army of three million members. The 600,000 Communists, the members of the Party, must act as its vanguard.

But it must be realised that we have no other army with which to gain a victory than the 600,000 Communists and the three million trade union members. The acquisition of territories with a peasant-kulak population demands a new exertion of proletarian effort. We are faced with a new ratio of proletarian to non-proletarian masses, of their social and class interests. Nothing can be done here by force alone, organisation and moral authority are all that is needed. Hence our absolute conviction, which was expressed by our Party Congress and which I deem it my duty to uphold. Our chief slogan is—let us have more one-man management, let us get closer to one-man management, let us have more labour discipline, let us pull ourselves together and work with military determination, staunchness and loyalty, brushing aside all group and craft interests, sacrificing all private interests. We cannot succeed otherwise. But if we carry out this decision of the Party, carry it out to a man among the three million workers, and then among the tens of mil-

lions of peasants, who will feel the moral authority and strength of the people who have sacrificed themselves for the victory of socialism, we shall be absolutely and completely invincible. (*Stormy applause.*)

Bulletin of the Third All-Russia Trade Union Congress No. 2, April 8, 1920

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FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD SOCIAL SYSTEM TO THE CREATION OF THE NEW

Our newspaper[153] is devoted to the problem of communist labour.

This is the paramount problem in the building of socialism. First of all, we must make it quite clear to ourselves that this question *could* be raised in a practical way only after the proletariat had captured political power, only after the landowners and capitalists had been expropriated, only after the proletariat, having captured state power, had achieved decisive victories over the exploiters who put up a desperate resistance and organised counter-revolutionary rebellions and civil war.

It seemed that the time had arrived early in 1918—and it had indeed arrived after the February (1918) military campaign of German imperialism against Russia. But on that occasion the period was so short-lived, a new and more powerful wave of counter-revolutionary rebellions and invasions swept over us so quickly, that the Soviet government had no opportunity, to devote itself at all closely and persistently to problems of peaceful development.

We have now passed through two years of unprecedented and incredible difficulties, two years of famine, privation, and distress, accompanied by the unprecedented victories of the Red Army over the hordes of international capitalist reaction.

Today there are serious grounds for hoping (if the French capitalists do not incite Poland to make war on us) that we shall get a more durable and lasting peace.

During these two years we have acquired some experience in organisation on the basis of socialism. That is why we can, and should, get right down to the problem of communist labour, or rather, it would be more correct to say, not communist, but socialist labour; for we are dealing not with the higher, but the lower, the primary stage of development of the new social system that is growing out of capitalism.

Communist labour in the narrower and stricter sense of the term is labour performed gratis for the benefit of society, labour performed not as a definite duty, not for the purpose of obtaining a right to certain products, not according to previously established and legally fixed quotas, but voluntary labour, irrespective of quotas; it is labour performed without expectation of reward, without reward as a condition, labour performed because it has become a habit to work for the common good, and because of a conscious realisation (that has become a habit) of the necessity of working for the common good—labour as the requirement of a healthy organism.

It must be clear to everybody that we, i.e., our society, our social system, are still a very long way from the application of *this* form of labour on a broad, really mass scale.

But the very fact that this question has been raised, and raised both by the whole of the advanced proletariat (the Communist Party and the trade unions) and by the state authorities, is a step in this direction.

To achieve big things we must start with little things.

On the other hand, after the "big things", after the revolution which overthrew capitalist ownership and placed the proletariat in power, the organisation of economic life on the *new* basis *can* only start from *little* things.

Subbotniks, labour armies, labour conscription—these are the practical realisation of socialist and communist labour in various forms.

This practical realisation still suffers from numerous defects. Only people who are totally incapable of thinking, if we leave aside the champions of capitalism, can laugh scornfully (or rage) at them.

Defects, mistakes, blunders in such a new, difficult and great undertaking are inevitable. Those who are afraid of

the difficulties of building socialism, those who allow themselves to be scared by them, those who give way to despair or cowardly dismay, are no socialists.

It will take many years, decades, to create a new labour discipline, new forms of social ties between people, and new forms and methods of drawing people into labour.

It is a most gratifying and noble work.

It is our good fortune that, by overthrowing the bourgeoisie and suppressing its resistance, we have been able to win the ground on which this work *has become possible*.

And we will set about this work with all our might. Perseverance, persistence, willingness, determination and ability to test things a hundred times, to correct them a hundred times, but to achieve the goal come what may—these are qualities which the proletariat acquired in the course of the ten, fifteen or twenty years that preceded the October Revolution, and which it has acquired in the two years that have passed since this revolution, years of unprecedented privation, hunger, ruin and destitution. These qualities of the proletariat are a guarantee that the proletariat will conquer.

April 8, 1920

Kommunistichesky Subbotnik,
April 11, 1920
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the newspaper text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF TEXTILE WORKERS[154] APRIL 19, 1920

(*Stormy applause. Ovation.*) Comrades, permit me to thank you for your welcome and to convey to you the greetings of the Council of People's Commissars.

The Party Congress just concluded and the resolutions it has passed are still fresh in our minds. And you are all aware, too, of the important tasks which the Party Congress has set before the workers, the peasants and the working people of the Soviet Republic generally. The sum and substance of these tasks is to create a united labour front.

It is fortunate for the Russian proletariat that the Civil War has been brought to a successful close; now that there only remains the menace of Poland, directed by the zeal of the imperialists of Western Europe, we have to make an incredibly difficult transition, we have to start building up our internal life.

In order to explain the tremendous change, in order to explain the difficulties that are now confronting the working class, I shall outline the chief stages in the development towards the communist system through which the Russian proletariat has passed.

Ignorant and unenlightened peasants, finding themselves for the first time in a factory, well equipped and supplied with wonderful modern machinery, used to be filled with amazement, overwhelmed by its unaccustomed magnificence. The peasant, in his ignorance, would regard the factory-Owner as his benefactor and provider, who furnished him with work, and without whom the working man could not subsist.

The helpless worker, coming from the stagnant, rustic life of the village into the seething cauldron of the factory, where he secured more bearable conditions of life, and the chance of making some kind of a living, would fall under the oppressive yoke of capitalist exploitation. Everybody knows what the workers of Russia and other countries experienced during this painful period. But then we see that the worker gradually sheds his backward and crushed peasant manner and begins to rise to a higher level of development; we see him making the first attempts to combat the oppressors by means of strikes, the attempts of the disunited proletarian masses to organise in trade unions; we see the worker beginning to show signs of a new strength within him; we see that any strike, no matter how insignificant results, always created something invaluable, something new, important and significant. Strikes taught the worker to realise that there is strength only in union with other workers, a powerful force capable of bringing the machines to a standstill and transforming the slave into a free man able to take advantage of the goods which belong by right to their producer. We are all familiar with the picture of development of the strike movement during the past few decades, its gradual progression from small, disunited local strikes to wide organised actions. In 1905, a mighty strike wave swept over Russia. With the growth of the organised strike struggle against the capitalists, the worker acquired a hitherto unknown strength. The trade unions played a foremost part in this. The workers came to realise that all the achievements of technology, all the machines and implements of production, which the capitalists used in their own interests and to the detriment of the proletariat, could and should become the property of the proletariat. That was a new phase, a phase of organised resistance to the capitalists through the trade unions; it was a new step forward in the development of the proletariat's consciousness of its existence as a class. The worker was no longer a meek and helpless tool in the hands of the oppressors. His whole environment led him to the conviction that a constant, tireless and unyielding struggle was essential. The worker fought to secure a certain improvement in his economic condition, an increase of wages, a reduction of hours. At this stage of the trade union movement his hopes

and dreams were directed to securing at least the elements of a decent life.

But although the proletariat's consciousness of itself as a class even to this extent had at one time represented a tremendous step forward, there came a time when it, too, became inadequate. Conditions demanded a new advance.

The capitalists of the world had grown more insolent and after suppressing the working masses they held them fast in the grip of a world war, engineered in order both to continue oppressing the proletariat, which was struggling for emancipation, and to rob each other of territory. The imperialist predators, armed to the teeth, fell upon each other. They tried to persuade the workers that the war was being waged in the great cause of human emancipation. But the workers did not remain blind for long. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Peace of Versailles, the seizure of all the colonies by Great Britain and France opened their eyes sufficiently for them to realise the true state of affairs. It became known that during the world war ten million people had been killed and twenty million maimed, and all this only for the further enrichment of the predators.

Once their eyes had been opened the workers rose against the yoke of capital; the social revolution broke out, started by the October events. Our duty now is not merely to be members of our trade unions—that is not enough. The workers must rise to a higher level, to develop from an oppressed class into a ruling class. We cannot count on the peasants as yet. They are disunited and helpless, and it will be some time before they emerge from their state of ignorance. The peasants can be brought out of the slough of ignorance only by the class which itself sprang from the peasantry, which has learned to understand the power of organisation and has been able to secure a better life—and not only under capitalism, for that was secured by the workers of Western Europe, but it did not save them from war. The workers must understand that they are facing a new and far more difficult task, namely, to take the entire administration of the state into their own hands. The workers must say to themselves that as long as private property remains, as long as capitalism is not smashed, no one who lives at the expense of others should be allowed to wield power.

That is the object of the Soviet government's activities, a government for which the world proletariat is showing a rapidly developing sympathy. When it created the new proletarian state, the working class assumed a tremendous burden. The workers can destroy the exploiting classes and bring about socialism only by going hand in hand with the peasants. The peasants are still working each for himself, selling their surplus in the open market and thereby helping a handful of robbers to become still richer. They do not do this wittingly; it is because they live under conditions entirely different from those of the workers. But freedom of trade means a return to capitalist slavery. In order to avoid it, labour must be organised in a new way, and there is nobody to do it but the proletariat.

The worker is now not only a member of his trade union organisation. Such a view would imply a return to the past. The fight against capital is not yet over. Capitalism is still impeding the measures of the Soviet government; it is doing so by profiteering, Sukharevka Market,[155] and so on. This force can be countered only by the force of workers' organisations built on new principles, based, not on their narrow production interests, but on the interests of the whole state. Only when the whole working class, irrespective of trade or craft, succeeds in uniting as a ruling class and creating a united army of labour, will it win the respect of the world.

The peasants, convinced that Kolchak and Denikin have been smashed by the strength of the proletariat, are now feeling the firm hand of a good manager. But they will gain complete confidence in the proletariat only when attempts to restore capitalism will no longer be possible. Only then will the peasant understand that there is no place for kulaks and parasites in a proletarian country. But the peasant does not as yet believe in his heart of hearts that the proletariat can cope with its great task.

The unparalleled privations of the past two years, consciously shouldered by the proletariat of Russia fighting in the front ranks of the Red Army, are not yet over. New privations and new tasks face us, which will be the more difficult the greater the number of victories we win on the Red front. Extensive territories have been won in Siberia and

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the Ukraine, where there is no proletariat like that of Moscow, Petrograd and Ivanovo-Voznesensk, which has shown in practice that it will defend the gains of the revolution at any price. Class-conscious workers must penetrate every pore of the state; they must know how to approach the peasants and organise them in the cause of the class which has flung off the yoke of the landowners and is building up a state without capitalists. Devotion and iron discipline are required. The entire proletariat, like one man, must achieve unparalleled miracles on the labour front like those achieved on the war front. Many at first thought that the revolution was a hopeless cause. The army in a state of complete collapse, mass desertions from the front, lack of ammunition—that is what we inherited from Kerensky. The Russian proletariat succeeded in rallying and knitting together scattered forces and in creating a united and stalwart Red Army. The Red Army worked miracles in repulsing the onslaught of the capitalists, who were supported by the capitalists of the whole world. The tasks of the labour front are even more difficult, immeasurably so. But while for the Red Army only men were required, we must now throw into the labour front all the able-bodied forces of the country—men, women, and even adolescents. We need iron discipline, and that is a weak point with us Russians. We must display determination, endurance, firmness and unanimity. We must stop at nothing. Everybody and everything must be used to save the rule of the workers and peasants, to save communism.

The war is not over, it is continuing on the bloodless front. Here the enemy is still stronger than we are; that must be admitted. The petty producers, who sell their products in the open market, are being assisted by world capital, which with one hand is prepared to re-establish trade relations, and with the other is prepared to crush the proletariat and Soviet Russia.

All the four millions of our proletariat must be prepared for new sacrifices, new privations and new hardships, no smaller than those of the war. Only thus can we hope to smash the enemy for good. The peasant, who is still temporising and vacillating, will then finally become convinced of the strength of the proletariat. The memory of the landowners, of Denikin and Kolchak is still fresh in the mind of the

peasant; but he also sees laziness and idleness around him, and he says: "Yes, it may be a good thing, but not for the likes of us."

The peasants must be shown something else. Let the working class organise production as it organised the Red Army. Let every worker realise that he is ruling the country. The fewer we are the greater the demands made on us. Russia must be transformed into a vast army of labour heroically conscious that everything must be sacrificed for the common cause—the emancipation of the working people.

Everybody knows that the textile industry is at a complete standstill because today we have no cotton—it has to be imported—owing to the fact that Western Europe, too, is suffering from an acute shortage of raw materials. Our one source of supply is Turkestan, which has recently been won from the whiteguards, but the transport system has not yet been properly organised.

One means of salvation at the present time is to extract and prepare peat as quickly as possible, which will enable us to start all the power stations at full capacity and save us from being completely dependent on coal regions remote from Central Russia.

To rely on wood fuel in the present state of disorganisation is out of the question. The peat deposits are situated mainly in the textile districts. And one of the chief duties of the textile workers must be to organise peat extraction. I know that this is extremely arduous work: you have to stand up to your knees in water, and, what with the shortage of boots and living quarters, the difficulties are immense. But did the Red Army have everything it needed? How many sacrifices, how many hardships the men of the Red Army bore when for two months they marched up to their waists in water, capturing tanks from the British ! The capitalists are hoping that the workers, exhausted and starving, will not be able to hold out. The capitalists are waiting to pounce on the workers' state, and their one hope is that the proletariat will be unable to cope with the task of creating a united labour front and will restore them to power.

I am very far from thinking that the work that faces us is easy, but all difficulties must and can be overcome. Every worker must help to organise labour, he must show

the peasants that he is an organiser, and that work must be regarded as the only means of maintaining the rule of the workers and peasants. When Kerensky was still in power, the capitalists, realising even then that they would be unable to retain the factories, began to do damage to production, to conclude agreements with the capitalists of other countries for the destruction of Russian industry so as not to surrender it to the workers, and endeavoured to exhaust the proletariat by civil war.

The working class is facing a very severe test, and every working man and woman must achieve even greater miracles than the Red Army soldiers achieved at the front. A victory on the labour front, devotion under the drab workaday conditions, are immeasurably more difficult, but are a hundred times more valuable than sacrificing one's life.

Away with the old isolation ! Only the worker who has proved worth his salt as a member of the Red Army of labour is worthy of being a trade union member. Even though we commit hundreds of mistakes, even though we suffer thousands of defeats, that will not daunt us. We must realise that only the persistent onslaught of the proletariat can secure victory.

For two years now the proletariat has been defending the rule of the workers and peasants. All over the world the social revolution is maturing. If we want to prove that we can cope with the task confronting us, we must, however difficult the situation may be, maintain all our energy and assurance, all our proletarian enthusiasm, and achieve on the peaceful front of labour miracles as great as those of the Red Army on the bloody front of struggle against the imperialists and their henchmen. (*Stormy applause.*)

Pravda No. 83, April 20, 1920

Published according to the pamphlet *Minutes of the Third All-Russia Congress of the Textile Workers' Union*, Moscow, 1920, verified with the verbatim report

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING ORGANISED BY THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) IN HONOUR OF LENIN'S FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY[156] APRIL 23, 1920

(*Stormy applause.*) Comrades, I must naturally begin by thanking you for two things: firstly, for the congratulations addressed to me today, and, secondly, even more for having spared me congratulatory speeches. (*Applause.*) I think that perhaps in this way we may gradually, not all at once, of course, devise a more suitable method of celebrating anniversaries than the one hitherto in vogue, which has sometimes formed the subject of remarkably good cartoons. Here is one such cartoon drawn by a prominent artist in celebration of such a jubilee. I received it today with an extremely cordial letter. And as the comrades have been kind enough to spare me congratulatory speeches, I will hand this cartoon round for all to see, so as to save us in future from such jubilee celebrations altogether.[157]

Next, I would like to say a few words about the present status of the Bolshevik Party. What brought these thoughts to my mind was some lines written by a certain writer eighteen years ago, in 1902. This writer is Karl Kautsky, with whom we have now had to part ways very definitely, and whom we have to fight, but who in the struggle against German opportunism used to be one of the leaders of the proletarian party, and with whom we at one time collaborated. There were no Bolsheviks then, but all the future Bolsheviks who collaborated with him appraised him very highly. Here is what this writer wrote in 1902:

"At the present time [in contrast to 1848] it would seem that not only have the Slavs entered the ranks of the revolutionary nations, but that the centre of revolutionary thought and revolutionary action is shifting more and more to the Slavs. The revolutionary centre is shifting from the West to the East. In the first half of the nineteenth century it was located in France, at times in England. In 1848 Germany too joined the ranks of the revolutionary nations.... The new century opens with events which induce us to think that we are approaching a further shift of the revolutionary centre, namely, to *Russia*.... Russia, who has borrowed so much revolutionary initiative from the West, is now perhaps herself ready to serve as a source of revolutionary energy for the West. The Russian revolutionary movement that is now flaring up will perhaps prove to be a most potent means of exorcising that spirit of flabby philistinism and temperate politics which is beginning to spread in our midst, and it may cause the thirst for battle and the passionate devotion to our great ideals to flare up in bright flames again. Russia has long ceased to be merely a bulwark of reaction and absolutism in Western Europe. It might be said that today the very opposite is the case. Western Europe is becoming a bulwark of reaction and absolutism in Russia.... The Russian revolutionaries might perhaps have settled with the tsar long ago had they not been compelled at the same time to fight his ally, European capital. Let us hope that this time they will succeed in settling with both enemies, and that the new 'Holy Alliance' will collapse more quickly than its predecessors. But no matter how the present struggle in Russia ends, the blood and happiness of the martyrs, whom, unfortunately, she is producing in too great numbers, will not have been sacrificed in vain. They will nourish the shoots of social revolution throughout the civilised world and cause them to grow more luxuriantly and rapidly. In 1848 the Slavs were a black frost which blighted the flowers of the peoples' spring. Perhaps they are now destined to be the storm that will break the ice of reaction and will irresistibly bring a new and happy spring for the nations." (K. Kautsky, "The Slavs and Revolution", *Iskra* No. 18, March 10, 1902.)

That is what a prominent socialist, with whom we have now had to break so drastically, wrote about the revolutionary movement in Russia eighteen years ago. These words lead me to think that our Party may now find itself in a very dangerous position—the position of a man with a swelled head. It is a very stupid, shameful and ridiculous position. We know that the failure and decline of political parties have very often been preceded by a state of affairs in which a swelled head is possible. And, indeed, what was expected of the Russian revolution by the man I have quoted and who is now our bitterest enemy, was immense beyond measure. But after all, the brilliant successes and brilliant victories we have gained so far were gained at a time when it was still impossible to grapple with our main difficulties. It was a time when we were confronted by war tasks, the tasks of waging a most profound and most energetic struggle against the landowner and tsarist reactionaries, and against reactionary generals. And so, the tasks that are the substance of the socialist revolution had to be postponed in order to grapple with the task of organising the struggle against the common, everyday manifestations of petty-bourgeois instincts, division and disunity, that is, against everything that would drag us back to capitalism. These tasks were postponed both in the economic and political spheres; we were unable to tackle them properly. And therefore the danger suggested to us by the words I have quoted should be seriously borne in mind by all Bolsheviks, both severally and as an integral political party. We must realise that the decisions of our last Party Congress must be carried out at all costs, and this means that a tremendous job faces us, and that a far greater exertion of effort will be demanded than hitherto.

Let me conclude with the hope that under no circumstances will we allow our Party to contract swelled head. (*Applause.*)

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Published according to the pamphlet

NOTES

[1] The non-party conference of the workers and Red Army men of Basmanny, Lefortovo, Alexeyevskoye and Sokolniki districts of Moscow was held September 3-4, 1919, about 3,000 people attending. The resolution adopted on Lenin's report said that the workers and peasants were in danger of being hurled back into most severe slavery under the yoke of landowners and capitalists and that only ruthless struggle against the enemies could thwart the danger (*Pravda* No. 195, September 4, 1919). The conference resolved to continue building up the Red Army, to strain every effort in developing all branches of the national economy, maintain revolutionary discipline, and carry out all the directives of the Soviet government faithfully and without fail. p. 19

[2] The *Kerensky period*—a period from May to October 1917 when the bourgeois Provisional Government headed by Kerensky, a Socialist-Revolutionary, was in power.

The *Kornilov revolt* was a counter-revolutionary conspiracy organised by the Russian bourgeoisie in August 1917 and headed by the tsarist general Kornilov. The conspirators, relying on higher army officers, hoped, with the aid of the officer cadets and Cossack units, to seize revolutionary Petrograd, smash the Bolshevik Party, disband the Soviets and establish a military dictatorship in the country. Answering the call of the Bolshevik Central Committee the Petrograd workers and revolutionary soldiers and sailors suppressed the Kornilov revolt. Under pressure from the masses the Provisional Government was forced to order Kornilov's arrest and to indict him and his accomplices for mutiny. The attempt by the bourgeoisie and the landowners to crush the revolution failed. After the defeat of the Kornilov revolt, the prestige of the Bolshevik Party among the masses grew rapidly; the Bolshevisation of the Soviets throughout the country began. The Bolsheviks again issued the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!"

Kaledin—tsarist general and Cossack ataman who organised a counter-revolutionary revolt in the Don area at the end of 1917.

Kolchak—Admiral of the tsarist navy and a hireling of British, American and French imperialism; organised a counter-revolutionary uprising against Soviet Power. In November 1918 he proclaimed himself "Supreme Ruler of Russia", seized Siberia and established a military dictatorship. In 1919 the Kolchak army was

routed by the Red Army, and Soviet rule was restored throughout the territory occupied by Kolchak.

Denikin—tsarist general, headed the counter-revolutionary insurrection in the South of Russia and in the Ukraine. In the summer and autumn of 1919, aided by Britain, France and the U.S.A., Denikin ventured an offensive against the Soviet Republic from the South, heading for Moscow. By the beginning of 1920 Denikin's army had been defeated by the Red Army. p. 20

[3] *Smolny*—the building of the former Smolny Institute in Petrograd; in October 1917 the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet were housed in it. After the revolution it was the seat of the Soviet Government until it moved to Moscow in March 1918. p. 21

[4] Lenin refers to the peace treaty between the Soviet Republic and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey), concluded on March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk and ratified by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on March 15. The peace terms were extremely harsh for Soviet Russia. Under the treaty, Poland, nearly all the Baltic area and part of Byelorussia were annexed to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the Ukraine became a separate state dependent on Germany. Moreover, Soviet Russia had to pay considerable indemnities under a rapacious supplementary treaty and finance agreement imposed on her by Germany in August 1918.

Despite its harsh terms, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave the Soviet state a breathing-space, enabled it to demobilise the old, disintegrating army and create a new, Red Army, start socialist construction and build up the forces for the coming battles against internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention.

Trotsky and the anti-Party group of "Left Communists" stubbornly resisted the conclusion of the treaty and it was only thanks to Lenin's tremendous efforts that it was signed.

After the November revolution in Germany in 1918 the Brest Treaty was annulled. p. 22

[5] *Entente*—the imperialist bloc of Britain, France and tsarist Russia which took final shape in 1907, and was opposed to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The emergence of the Triple Entente was preceded by the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-93 and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. The formation of the Entente was concluded by the signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. During the First World War the military and political alliance of Britain, France and Russia was joined by the United States, Japan, Italy and other countries. This alliance of imperialist powers, that later took part in the intervention against Soviet Russia, was known at the time as "the Entente"; this the meaning given to the word by Lenin. p. 22

[6] Lenin refers to the Treaty of Versailles which put an end to the First World War of 1914-18. It was signed in June 1919 between Britain, France, Italy, Japan on the one side and the defeated Germany, on the other.

The Versailles Treaty legalised the redivision of the world in favour of the victor countries. Germany had to pay huge reparations and indemnities in the form of a great number of ships, tens of millions of tons of coal, half of the country's stock of dyes and other chemicals, and so on.

The Versailles Treaty was a heavy burden for the German people. They had to pay high taxes and suffered chronic unemployment. As far as the German imperialists and heavy industry magnates were concerned, they retained their dominant position in the country and continued to extract colossal profits. p. 22

[7] The *Siberian Government* was formed on June 30, 1918 in Omsk with the aid of the British, French and American interventionists. Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Cadets participated in the government. Under the guise of hypocritical phrases about democracy it pursued a counter-revolutionary policy. It returned factories, commercial enterprises and landed estates to their former owners, repealed the eight-hour working day, introduced courts martial, passed a decision on the dissolution and prohibition of the Soviets, repealed the Soviet Government's decrees and enforced the laws of the tsarist and the bourgeois provisional governments. The rout of the counter-revolutionary and interventionist armies by the Red Army in 1919 put an end to the Siberian Government. p. 22

[8] This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt of the Czechoslovak Army Corps organised by the Entente imperialists with the active participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Czechoslovak Corps was formed in Russia prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution from Czech and Slovak prisoners of war. After the establishment of Soviet power in Russia the president of the Czechoslovak National Council, Tomáš Masaryk, proclaimed the Corps part of the French army, and representatives of the Entente raised the question of its evacuation to France. The Soviet Government agreed to send it to France through Vladivostok on the condition that it surrendered its arms. But the counter-revolutionary commanders of the Corps violated the agreement with the Soviet Government and at the end of May 1918 began an insurrection against Soviet power. The governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France supported the insurrection. French officers took part in it openly. Acting in close contact with the whiteguards and kulaks, the Czechoslovak Corps seized a large part of the Urals, the Volga area and Siberia, everywhere restoring bourgeois rule. Whiteguard governments were formed in the occupied districts, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries participating—the so-called Siberian Government in Omsk, the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly in Samara and others.

Soon after the outbreak of the insurrection, on June 11, the Central Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist groups in Russia issued an appeal to the soldiers of the Corps in which it exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the insurrection and called upon Czech and Slovak workers and peasants to suppress the revolt and to enrol in the Czechoslovak units of the Red Army. About 12,000 Czech and Slovak soldiers fought in the ranks of the Red Army.

In autumn 1918 the Red Army liberated the Volga area. The Czechoslovak revolt was finally suppressed in 1919 when the Kolchak revolt was crushed. p. 22

[9] *Le Titre censuré!!!* (Title Forbidden!!!)—a weekly newspaper published in Paris by Georges Anquetil from April 19 to June 21, 1919. Altogether ten issues were published. Beginning with issue No. 8 it co-operated with *Le Titre enchaîné* (Fettered Title) and offered some of its pages to the latter.

Le Titre censuré published mainly Anquetil's articles or reprints from other newspapers. p. 25

[10] This refers to the appeal "To the Workers of Estonia from the Petrograd Soviet" published in connection with the arrival in Petrograd of the Workers banished from Estonia, and to the radio message to the Estonian Government of September 3, 1919. p. 25

[11] Lenin apparently refers to Churchill's speech, a report on which was published in the Swedish newspaper *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* No. 195, August 25, 1919. It stated that Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, had spoken about the preparations for an offensive against Soviet Russia by the armies of fourteen states. In his opinion, the offensive might begin at the end of August or in the beginning of September and end by the New Year. He hoped that Latvia, Estonia and Finland, would participate in the campaign (America was to deliver the supplies).

The ROSTA telegraph agency text of Churchill's speech which differs slightly from the newspaper report has the following list of fourteen states made by Lenin: Britain, the U.S.A., France, Italy, Japan, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and in parentheses "Kolchakia and Denikia" (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 197). p. 26

[12] *Vorwärts* (Forward)—a daily newspaper, Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. In accordance with a decision of the Halle Congress of the party, it was published in Berlin from 1891 under the name of *Vorwärts Berliner Volksblatt* as a continuation of the newspaper *Berliner Volksblatt* issued since 1884. Engels used the columns of this paper to combat all manifestations of opportunism. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* was controlled by the Right wing of the party and regularly published articles by opportunists. During the First World War *Vorwärts*

took a social-chauvinist stand; after the Great October Socialist Revolution the paper carried on anti-Soviet propaganda. It was published in Berlin till 1933.

Lenin refers to Friedrich Stampfer's article "Kautsky gegen Spartakus" published in *Vorwärts* No. 457 of September 7, 1919. p. 27

[13] *Scheidemann*—one of the leaders of the extreme Right, opportunist wing of German Social-Democracy. In February-June 1919 he was the head of the coalition government of the Weimar republic. He was one of those who organised the suppression of the German workers' movement which was drowned in blood between 1918 and 1921. p. 27

[14] *Berne International* is the name given to a union of the social-chauvinist and Centrist parties formed at the conference in Berne in February 1919 with the aim of restoring the Second International. p. 28

[15] See record of Karl Marx's speech on the Barry Mandate (*Minutes of the Hague Congress of 1872*, Madison, 1958); Engels's Preface to the English edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, Preface to the second German edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*; Engels's letters to Marx of September 24, 1852 and of October 7, 1858; letters by Engels to Sorge of September 21, 1872 and of October 5, 1872; Marx's letter to Sorge of August 4, 1874; Engels's letter to Marx of August 11, 1881; Engels's letters to Kautsky of September 12, 1882 and to Sorge of December 7, 1889. p. 34

[16] In 1919 two Communist Parties were founded in the U.S.A.—their core was the Left wing of the Socialist Party—the Communist Labour Party headed by John Reed and the Communist Party of the United States headed by Charles Ruthenberg. The two parties had no programme disagreements. Both parties passed decisions at their inaugural congresses on affiliation to the Third International. In May 1921 they united to form one Communist Party. At the end of the Second World War the Communist Party of the United States suffered a severe crisis as a result of the anti-party activity of Earl Browder who advocated the theory of "American exceptionalism" and of establishment of "class peace" in the U.S.A. In 1944 he succeeded in carrying through a decision on the substitution of the non-party Communist Political Association for the Communist Party. Thanks to the efforts of the Marxist core of the party the Communist Party of the United States was restored in July 1945. From the first days of its existence the Communist Party suffered persecution which was intensified after the Second World War. p. 35

[17] The *Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts* was formed in January 1916 by French internationalists. This was the first attempt to set up in France an internationalist revolutionary organisation of socialists to counterbalance the social-chauvinist organisations. Lenin regarded the Committee as a

factor in rallying the internationalist forces; he proposed that Inessa Armand participate in the Committee.

Under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia and the growth of the French labour movement, the Committee became the centre of the revolutionary internationalist forces in France, and in 1920 merged with the Communist Party of France.

The *Syndicalist Defence Committee* was formed in autumn of 1916 by a group of syndicalists who broke away from the Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts because they rejected parliamentary activity. In May 1919 it resolved to join the Communist International. p. 35

[18] *L'Internationale*—a weekly newspaper of the French syndicalists, organ of the Syndicalist Defence Committee, appeared in Paris from February to July 1919; edited by Raymond Péricat. p. 35

[19] The *British Socialist Party* was founded at Manchester in 1911 by the union of the Social-Democratic Party with other socialist groups. The B.S.P. conducted its agitation in the spirit of Marxism, it was not opportunist and was *really* independent of the Liberals" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 273). The small membership of the party and its poor contacts with the masses made for a certain sectarianism.

During the First World War there was a sharp struggle between the internationalists (William Gallacher, Albert Inkpin, John Maclean, Theodore Rothstein and others) and the social-chauvinist trend headed by Hyndman. Some of the internationalists followed an inconsistent policy and adopted a Centrist position on certain questions.

In February 1916, a group of B.S.P. members founded a newspaper, *The Call*, which played an important part in mustering the internationalists. In April 1916, the party's annual conference, held at Salford, condemned the social-chauvinist position of Hyndman and his supporters, and they left the party.

The British Socialist Party welcomed the October Revolution, and its members were active in the British workers' movement in defence of Soviet Russia against the interventionists. In 1919 most of the party's local organisations (98 against 4) voted for affiliation to the Communist International. The B.S.P., together with the Communist Unity Group, formed the core of the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the First (Unity) Congress in 1920 almost all local B.S.P. organisations entered the Communist Party. p. 35

[20] The *Shop Stewards Committees* and *Workers' Committees*—elected working-class organisations which were set up at many factories in Britain during the First World War. In conditions of the rise of the workers' movement and the mounting dissatisfaction with the reformist policy of the trade union leaders, the shop stewards, united in district and town committees and in the National Committee, led strikes for the improvement of the workers' living conditions

and carried out propaganda against the imperialist war. The centre of the shop stewards' movement was the Clydeside where the Clydeside Workers' Committee was set up, a body whose influence was felt by all the workers of that district. The programme of the Clydeside Committee called for the organisation of the workers on a class principle and the continuation of the struggle until the wage-labour system was completely abolished. Similar committees sprang up in other towns.

In the period of foreign armed intervention against the Soviet Republic, the Shop Stewards Committees came out actively in support of Soviet Russia. A number of leaders of the shop stewards' movement (William Gallacher, Harry Pollitt, Arthur McManus and others) became founder members of the C.P.G.B. Lenin described the shop stewards' movement as a mass and profoundly proletarian movement. p. 35

[21] The *Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland* (known as the Socialist Party) was founded in the 1870s and affiliated to the First International; a new party was founded in 1888. The party was strongly influenced by opportunists, who took a social-chauvinist position during the First World War. In the autumn of 1916 the Right wing broke away from the Party and founded its own organisation. The party majority, led by Robert Grimm, followed a Centrist social-pacifist policy. The Left wing adhered to the internationalist stand. After the October Revolution in Russia the Left wing became much more influential. In December 1920 the Left withdrew from the party and in 1921 merged with the Communist Party of Switzerland. p. 35

[22] The *Socialist Party of Italy* was founded in 1892 and from the very start was the scene of a sharp struggle on all basic political and tactical issues between the opportunist and revolutionary trends. At its Congress in Reggio-Emilia (1912), the more outspoken reformists, who supported the war and co-operation with the government and the bourgeoisie (Ivanoe Bonomi, Leonida Bissolati and others), were expelled from the party under pressure from the Left. Prior to Italy's entry into the First World War, the party opposed war and advocated neutrality. In December 1914 it expelled a group of renegades (among them Mussolini) for supporting the imperialist policy of the bourgeoisie and urging Italy's entry into the war. In May 1915, when Italy did enter the war on the side of the Entente, the party split into three distinct factions: (1) the Right wing, which helped the bourgeoisie prosecute the war, (2) the Centrists, who made up the majority of the party and pursued the policy of "non-participation in the war and no sabotage of the war", and (3) the Left wing, which took a more resolute stand against the war, but failed to organise a consistent struggle against it. The Lefts did not realise the necessity to convert the imperialist war into a civil war, or to break resolutely with the reformists. The Italian socialists held a joint conference with the Swiss socialists in Lugano (1914), took part in the international socialist conferences at Zim-

merwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916), where they sided with the Centrist majority.

After the October Socialist Revolution in Russia the Left wing of the Italian Socialist Party became more influential. The 16th party congress, held October 5-8, 1919 in Bologna, passed a decision to join the Third International. The I.S.P. delegates took part in the Second Congress of the Communist International. After the Congress, Serrati, head of the delegation and a Centrist, declared against the break with the reformists. In January 1921, at the 17th party congress in Livorno the Centrists who were in the majority refused to break with the reformists and to recognise all the terms of admittance to the Communist International. On January 21 the Left-wing delegates left the congress and founded the Communist Party of Italy. p. 35

[23] *Spartacists*—members of a revolutionary organisation of German Left Social-Democrats formed at the beginning of the First World War by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Léon Jogiches (Jan Tyszka) and Wilhelm Pieck. They carried on revolutionary propaganda among the people, organised mass anti-war manifestations, led strikes, and exposed the imperialist character of the world war and the treachery of the opportunist leaders of Social-Democracy. The Spartacists, however, made grave blunders in certain important questions of theory and practical policy. Lenin criticised the errors of the German Left Social-Democrats many a time, thus helping them to take the correct position (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19 and Vol. 23, pp. 77-87.

In April 1917, the Spartacists joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany in which they retained their organisational independence. In November 1918, in the course of the revolution in Germany, however, they formed the Spartacus League, published their own programme on December 14, 1918 and broke with the Independents. At its inaugural congress, held from December 30, 1918 to January 1, 1919, the Spartacists founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 35

[24] *La Feuille*—a daily newspaper published in Geneva from August 1917 to 1920. Its editor was Jean Debrit. The newspaper did not formally belong to any party, but in fact it adhered to the positions of the Second International. p. 36

[25] This article was written in connection with the beginning of the mobilisation of the Petrograd Communists for the front. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War there were a number of such mobilisations. Lenin wrote, "We concentrated our best Party forces in the Red Army; we mobilised the best of our workers; we looked for new forces at the deepest roots of our dictatorship" (see present edition, Vol. 33, "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection").

In view of the difficult situation of the Southern Front the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B:), held September 21 and 26, 1919 resolved to mobilise Communists and send the best Party and working-class people to the front. The Party Central Committee in its letter published in *Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* No. 6, September 30, 1919 pointed out that Communists should be sent to the front from those institutions where they might be replaced by non-party workers, women and ex-servicemen disabled in the Civil War. The Communist Party appeal met with a warm response among the working people. The Petrograd Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) decided to mobilise 1,200 Communists for the Southern Front. That same day the first group of mobilised Petrograd Communists left for the front, the second group on the following day and the third on October 2. Mobilisation continued during the following days. On October 2, Lenin sent a telegram of greetings to the Petrograd workers in which he praised them for energetic measures in rendering assistance to the Southern Front. Between September and November the Petrograd Party organisation dispatched for the front over 4,000 Communists, of whom 1,800 were assigned to leading posts in the army. p. 47

[26] The *Chicago Daily News* correspondent I. Levin, who was in Soviet Russia, asked Lenin to answer five questions. The questions and Lenin's answers were published in the *Chicago Daily News* No. 257, October 27, 1919. p. 50

[27] Lenin refers to peace talks with William Bullitt who came to Soviet Russia in March 1919 to discuss the possible terms of peace treaties between Soviet Russia and the Allies, and the whiteguard governments then existing on the territory of Russia. Bullitt submitted the proposals put forward by President Woodrow Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George.

Guided by the desire to conclude peace as soon as possible, the Soviet Government agreed to negotiate, and introduced a number of amendments and addenda to the proposals put forward by the U.S.A. and Britain, after which a final joint draft was prepared.

Soon after Bullitt's departure from Soviet Russia Kolchak's army launched an offensive, and the imperialist governments refused to accept the Soviet proposals in the hope that Soviet Russia would be defeated. Wilson prohibited the publication of the draft agreement brought by Bullitt, and Lloyd George announced in Parliament that he had not authorised anyone to negotiate with the Soviet Government. p. 50

[28] *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Flag)—a newspaper founded by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg as the Central Organ of the Spartacus League, later it became the Central Organ of the Communist Party of Germany. The newspaper was published in Berlin from November 9, 1918; it was repeatedly subjected to persecution and banned by the German authorities.

Die Rote Fahne played an important part in the struggle to make the Communist Party of Germany a mass proletarian revolutionary party and to purge it of opportunist elements. The newspaper carried on extensive propaganda against the militarisation of the country and for unity of action of the working class in the struggle against fascism. Ernst Thälmann, Chairman of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Germany, was a frequent contributor. When Hitler came to power in 1933 the newspaper was banned, but continued publication illegally and resolutely protested against the fascist regime. In 1935 it began to be published in Prague from October 1936 to the autumn of 1939 *Die Rote Fahne* was published in Brussels. p. 53

[29] The *Basle Manifesto* was adopted at an international socialist congress (the Emergency Congress of the Second International), convened in November 1912 in Basle to voice the protest against the Balkan war and the preparations for a world imperialist war. The resolution (Manifesto) called upon the socialists of all countries to "prevent the outbreak of war". "The workers consider it a crime to shoot each other down in the interest and for the profit of capitalism, for the sake of dynastic honour and of diplomatic secret treaties," the Basle Manifesto declared. In the event of imperialist war breaking out, socialists "shall be bound to intervene for its being brought to a speedy end, and to employ all their forces for utilising the economical and political crisis created by the war, in order to rouse the masses of people and to hasten the downbreak of the predominance of the capitalist class".

When the world imperialist war broke out in July 1914, the majority of leaders of the socialist parties of the Second International betrayed the cause of socialism, went back on the Basle resolution and sided with their imperialist governments. The Russian Bolsheviks led by Lenin, as well as German Left Social-Democrats (Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and others) and some groups in other socialist parties, remained true to the principles of internationalism and, in conformity with the Basle Manifesto, called upon the workers of their countries to fight against their own imperialist governments and against the imperialist war. p. 53

[30] *Party Week* was conducted in accordance with the decision of the Eighth Party Congress to enlarge the Party membership. It was carried out in a period of the intense struggle of the Soviet state against foreign military intervention and internal counter-revolution. "To get our Party card in such conditions signified, to a certain extent, becoming a candidate to the Denikin gallows," wrote *Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* No. 8, December 2, 1919. The first Party Week was held by the Petrograd Party organisation from August 10 to 17 (the second Party Week took place in October-November 1919); the Party Week in the Moscow Gubernia Party organisation was conducted from September 20 to 28. At the end of September the Central Committee sent a circular letter to all Party organisations, in which it stated that as the re-registration and purge was over in

almost all Party organisations the C.C. considered it opportune to start admitting new members to the Party. The C.C. stressed that only men and women workers, Red Army men, sailors and peasant men and women should be admitted to the Party during Party Week. In 38 gubernias of the European part of the R.S.F.S.R. alone Party Week brought over 200,000 new members, of whom more than half were workers. At the front up to 25 per cent of the army and navy personnel joined the Party. Lenin wrote that workers and peasants who entered the Party at such a difficult period made up "a fine and reliable body of leaders of the revolutionary proletariat and of the non-exploiting section of the peasantry" (see p. 404 of this volume). p. 63

[31] The re-registration of Party members was held in May-September 1919 by decision of the Eighth Party Congress which pointed to its necessity and to the need for special measures of control in respect to those members who joined the Party after the October Socialist Revolution. For this purpose a special instruction was worked out by the Central Committee. It said, "The aim of the re-registration is to purge the Party of non-Communist elements, chiefly of persons who wormed their way into the Party because it is the ruling party and who use their position of Party members in their own interests" (Pravda No. 88, April 24, 1919). During re-registration Party members were to return their Party cards, fill in the questionnaires, and submit the recommendations of two Party members who had been in the Party for not less than six months and whom the Party Committee knew to be reliable Communists. The admittance of new members to the Party was discontinued during re-registration. Party members who were convicted of behaviour unworthy of Communists, or who violated Party decisions, or did not pay Party dues, or who proved to be deserters were liable to expulsion. This re-registration was the first purge of the Party. As a result Party discipline was strengthened, the Party links with the masses grew stronger and the membership and the fighting capacity of the Party improved. p. 63

[32] The *Polish Socialist Party* (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)—a reformist nationalist organisation founded in 1892.

In 1906 the party split into the P.S.P. Left wing and the Right, chauvinist wing (the so-called "revolutionary faction"). Under the influence of the Bolsheviks and the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Left wing gradually adopted a consistent revolutionary stand.

During the First World War a considerable section of the P.S.P. Left wing adopted an internationalist stand. In December 1918 it united with the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania to form the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. The P.S.P. Right wing continued its policy of national chauvinism, and, after the establishment of the Polish bourgeois state (1918), the Right P.S.P. formed the Polish bourgeois government and supported the policy

of the aggressive circles who started a war against Soviet Russia in 1920. In 1919 the Right P.S.P. resumed the name of P.S.P.

After Pilsudski's fascist coup d'état (May 1926), the P.S.P. was nominally a parliamentary opposition, but actually it did not carry on any active fight against the fascist regime, and continued its anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. During that period the Left-wing elements of the P.S.P. collaborated with the Polish Communists.

During the Second World War the P.S.P. again split. Its reactionary and chauvinist faction, which assumed the name "*Wolność, Równość, Niepodległość*" (Liberty, Equality, Independence), took part in the reactionary Polish émigré government in London. The Left faction, which called itself the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists, under the influence of the Polish Workers' Party (P.W.P.), which was founded in 1942, joined the popular front against the nazi invaders, fought for Poland's liberation, and pursued a policy of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

In 1944, after the liberation of Poland's eastern territories and the formation of a Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists resumed the name of P.S.P. and together with the P.W.P. participated in the building up of a people's democratic Poland. In December 1948 the P.W.P. and the P.S.P. amalgamated and formed the Polish United Workers' Party. p. 79

[33] The Communist Party of Germany split at its Second Congress, held in October 1919, in Heidelberg. It was attended by 46 delegates representing 16,000 party members. The Congress recognised the error of the boycott tactics of the elections to the Constituent Assembly and passed a decision to take part in parliamentary elections. A group of the "Lefts" came out at the Congress against its decisions and in defence of anarcho-syndicalist views—the boycott of parliament, repudiation of the political struggle, refusal to work in reactionary trade unions and so on. The "Lefts" were in the minority and were expelled from the party, after which they founded the so-called Communist Workers' Party of Germany. Subsequently the C.W.P.G. became an insignificant sectarian group without any influence in the working class. Simultaneously with this letter addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany Lenin sent a letter to the breakaway group too (see pp. 89-90 of this volume). p. 87

[34] This article is apparently a draft of a pamphlet planned but not written by Lenin. p. 93

[35] Lenin refers to Karl Marx's letter to Joseph Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 85). p. 95

[36] Lenin refers to Karl Marx's letter to Ludwig Kugelmann of December 13, 1870 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 307). p. 97

[37] Lenin refers to Engels's letter to August Bebel of March 18-28, 1875 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 353). p. 98

[38] Lenin refers to Engels's letter to August Bebel of March 18-28 1875 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 356-57). p. 99

[39] See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1954, Part I, Philosophy. Chapter X, pp. 134-49. p. 99

[40] See Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Moscow, Chapter IX, Barbarism and Civilisation, pp. 307-27. p. 100

[41] Lenin refers to statements by Marx and Engels in the period between 1852 and 1892 concerning the development of the upper stratum of the working class into bourgeois (references are given in Note 15). p. 102

[42] Lenin refers to Marx's address to the Hague Congress of the First International in September 1872. Engels wrote about it in letters to Sorge of September 21 and October 5, 1872. p. 102

[43] The Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. was adopted on July 10, 1918 by the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Its Clause 23 reads as follows, "Prompted by the interests of the working class as a whole, the R.S.F.S.R. deprives of rights certain individuals and certain groups who use such rights to the detriment of the socialist revolution." This clause remained in force till the Eighth (Extraordinary) Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. which in 1936 adopted a new Constitution according to which all citizens were granted equal rights to elect and be elected to the Soviets. p. 104

[44] This article remained unfinished. p. 117

[45] *Bednota* (The Poor)—a daily for the peasants published in Moscow from March 1918 to January 1931. p. 124

[46] Lenin refers to the *All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Trade Union* (*Vikzhel*) elected at the First (Inaugural) All-Russia Congress of Railwaymen held in Moscow in July-August 1917. The Railwaymen's Executive Committee was dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. After the October Revolution, the Railwaymen's Executive became one of the centres of counter-revolution. In January 1918 the All-Russia Extraordinary Congress of Railwaymen dismissed the Vikzhel and elected the central body of the railwaymen's union called Vikzhedor, which was composed mainly of Bolsheviks. p. 130

[47] This letter was written by Lenin in connection with the dispatch to Turkestan of a commission of the All-Russian Central Executive

Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. The commission included G. I. Bokia, F. I. Goloshchokin, V. V. Kuibyshev, Y. E. Rudzutak, M. V. Frunze and S. Z. Eliava. It was vested with the powers of a state and Party body. Its main tasks were to strengthen the union of the peoples of Turkestan with Soviet Russia, to consolidate Soviet power, to rectify mistakes in the national policy in Turkestan, and to improve Party work. The members of the commission were to follow the instruction of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of October 8, 1919, which pointed out that self-determination of the peoples of Turkestan and the abolition of all national inequality and of the privileges of one nationality group at the expense of another form the basis of the policy of the Soviet Government of Russia and serve as the guiding principle in the entire work of all its bodies. Only by such work can we overcome the old mistrust of the local working masses of Turkestan for the workers and peasants of Russia due to the many years of the rule of Russian tsarism. The working people of Turkestan welcomed this decision of the All-Russia C.E.O. and C.P.C. The joint meeting of the Territorial Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan, Territorial Moslem Bureau of the C.P.T. and the Presidium of the Turkestan C.E.C. studied Lenin's letter and heard the report by Eliava, chairman of the commission, and adopted a resolution, which read as follows: "We promise to carry out all the tasks with which history has presented us in accordance with the instructions of the C.C. of our Party and the Third International." In January 1920 Lenin's letter was discussed at the Fifth General Territorial Conference of the Communist Party of Turkestan. The Conference sent a letter to Lenin in which the Communists promised to rectify their blunders and render unanimous support to the Turkestan commission. p. 138

[48] The Central Committee's letter was drafted by Lenin, and was published in *Pravda* on November 13. The appeal of the C.C. of the Party met with a warm response in the country. On November 14 the Communists of Red Presnya district in Moscow adopted a decision to hold a "fuel week" of communist labour and instructed all Party members to take part in subbotniks. The Moscow City Party Committee mobilised 200 Communists to the fuel front on November 18. The Vladimir Gubernia Party Conference resolved to send hundreds of worker Communists to the countryside to mobilise the local population to supply fuel and horses to deliver it to the cities. Labour enthusiasm in organising fuel supplies that swept the cities spread to the countryside. The week from November 24 to December 1 was proclaimed "fuel week" by the Red Army. Measures adopted by the Party led to the easing of the fuel crisis. In October an average of 1,941 wagons were loaded per day and in December this figure rose to 2,895 wagonloads. p. 139

[49] The *First All-Russia Conference on Party Work in the Countryside* was held from November 16 to November 19, 1919, in Moscow.

Representatives of all gubernia and regional Party Committees (except Orenburg, Urals, Don, Orel, Voronezh, Astrakhan and Archangel) and from many uyezd and some volost Party Committees attended the Conference. The Conference was convened for the purpose of pooling experience of Party work in the countryside and for working out practical measures for its improvement. The agenda of the Conference was the following: reports by local Party organisations, report on organisational questions, work among peasant women and the peasant youth, cultural and educational work in the countryside, a newspaper for peasants, publishing literature for the countryside, Party Week in the countryside, and others.

The Conference approved the proposal submitted by the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Rural Department to muster Party forces for work among the peasants, and also adopted, with some amendments, a draft instruction for work in the countryside. The Conference pointed out the necessity of drawing women into all spheres of state organisation, and of drawing peasant youths into the All-Russia Communist Youth League. The Conference passed a decision to hold a Party Week in the countryside, and approved of the practice of convening non-party conferences.

On the first day the Conference adopted a decision to ask Lenin to take part in the Conference. Lenin made a speech at the Conference on November 18, in which he congratulated the delegates on the occasion of the liberation of Kursk by the Red Army. p. 143

[50] The *Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)* was held March 18-23, 1919 in Moscow. One of the most important questions discussed at the Congress was the attitude towards the middle peasants. In all his speeches and particularly in his report on work in the countryside, Lenin explained the Party's new policy in relation to the middle peasants—passing from the policy of neutralising the middle peasants to one of firm alliance with them, while relying on the poor peasants and carrying the struggle against the kulaks, and preserving the leading role of the proletariat in that alliance. That slogan had been advanced by Lenin in November 1918. The Congress adopted a "Resolution on the Attitude Towards the Middle Peasants" written by Lenin. Lenin's policy helped to strengthen the military and political alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and played a decisive role in achieving victory over the interventionists and whiteguards, and later on in building socialism by the joint efforts of workers and peasants. p. 144

[51] This Congress was held in Moscow from November 22 to December 3, 1919, on the initiative of the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). On the eve of the Congress, November 21, a preliminary meeting of the Central Committee members with a group of delegates was held with Lenin presiding. The Congress was attended by 71 delegates with the right to vote and by 11 delegates with voice but no vote. On the opening day of the Congress, November 22, Lenin delivered a

report on the current situation. The resolution adopted on his report was submitted to the presidium "for concretisation and drafting of the chief theses that should serve as a basis for work in the East". The Congress heard the report on the work of the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, reports from the localities, the reports of the Central Moslem War Collegium, Central Moslem Commissariat of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities; it discussed the national question of the Bashkirs and Tatars and heard reports of sections on state organisation and Party work, on work among women in the East and among the youth, etc. The Congress outlined the tasks of the Party and the government in the East, and elected a new Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East. p. 151

[52] This resolution was based on theses written by Lenin. On November 21, 1910, the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) discussed the theses and submitted them to a commission for final editing. On the basis of the theses the commission drafted the resolution which, with the addition of Clause 2 introduced by Lenin, was adopted by the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on November 29, 1919 and later endorsed by the Eighth All-Russia Party Conference. p. 163

[53] On May 18, 1819 the joint meeting of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Kiev Soviet of Workers' Deputies, trade unions, factory committees and the Kiev Uyezd Congress of Peasant Deputies passed a resolution which stressed the necessity of uniting all the forces of the Soviet Republics for the armed struggle against the enemies of Soviet power and of concentrating material resources at a single centre. The Ukrainian C.E.C. instructed its Presidium to submit a proposal to the All-Russia C.E.C. "to work out concrete forms for the organisation of a united front of revolutionary struggle". Similar proposals were submitted by the Soviet governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia.

In compliance with the wishes expressed by the supreme bodies of Soviet Republics the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a decree on June 1, 1919 "On the Union of the Soviet Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia for the Struggle Against World Imperialism". The decree said that, while fully recognising the independence, freedom and self-determination of the working people of the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Crimea ... the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets considers it necessary to effect a close amalgamation of (1) military organisation and army command, (2) economic councils, (3) railways, (4) finances and (5) commissariats of labour of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Crimea so as to concentrate the management of these branches in single bodies."

This military and political alliance of the Soviet Socialist Republics was of tremendous significance in promoting victory over the interventionists and the internal counter-revolution. p. 163

[54] The Conference was held in Moscow, and was attended by 45 delegates with the right to vote. The agenda consisted of the following items: (1) Report of the C.C., (2) Report on the international situation; (3) The agenda of the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets (state organisation); (4) Soviet power in the Ukraine; (5) The Party Rules; (6) Work with new Party members; (7) Fuel question.

Lenin directed the work of the Conference. He made a speech at the opening session, delivered the political report of the C.C. of the Party and closed the debate on it. Lenin spoke on Soviet power in the Ukraine and closed the discussion on this subject. The Conference delegates unanimously approved the C.C. political line and organisational work. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, delivered a detailed report on the international situation explaining the foreign policy of the Soviet state and the efforts being made for the immediate conclusion of peace. Another important question discussed at the Conference was state organisation. M. F. Vladimirsky made a report on this subject on behalf of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and T. V. Sapronov delivered a co-report. Vladimirsky summed up the results in organising the Soviet state and submitted concrete proposals for amending the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. Sapronov, Osinsky and their adherents opposed the C.C. line; they rejected one-man management and demanded preservation of "the unlimited corporate principle". This group of opportunists tried to impose their views on the Conference which would have undermined centralism and the leading role of the Party in the Soviets. The Conference rejected the views of Sapronov and his followers as being contrary to the interests of the Party, and approved Lenin's principle of democratic centralism in the organisation of government bodies and in the interrelations of those bodies.

The Conference adopted a number of decisions directed at consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and at involving working masses in Soviet state development.

The Conference adopted new Party Rules which contained a new section on "Candidates to Party Membership" introducing a probationary period for all new members, the length of which depended on social category; it was two months for factory workers and peasants, and no less than six months for other categories. A new section on "Groups in the Extra-Party Institutions and Organisations" was added to the Party Rules in order to spread Party influence to the extra-Party organisations and institutions, conduct them in accordance with the Party line and establish Party control over their activities. The new Party Rules had a special section on "Party Discipline", which stated that strict observance of Party discipline was the prime duty of all Party members and all Party organisations.

The Conference approved the "Theses on the Employment of New Party Members" which outlined measures to raise the educational and ideological level of Communists, give them military training, and strengthen Party discipline. The Eighth Party Conference was of great significance; it summed up the experience gained by the

Party in the two-year struggle to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and implement the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress. The decisions of the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets were based on the Conference's decisions on state, economic and military organisation. p. 167

[55] Lenin refers to the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets held from December 5 to 9, 1919 in Moscow. p. 169

[56] *l'Humanité*—a daily newspaper founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War the paper was controlled by the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party and took a social-chauvinist stand. In December 1920, after the split of the French Socialist Party, it became the Central Organ of the Communist Party of France. p. 172

[57] Lenin refers to *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* a newspaper of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats, who in 1911 founded the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden. It was published in Stockholm from April 1916, at first every other day, subsequently, daily (up to November 1917 it appeared under the name *Politiken*). In 1918-19 it was edited by Fredrik Ström. In 1921 the Left Social-Democratic Party joined the Communist International and became the Communist Party of Sweden, and the newspaper became its Central Organ. After the Communist Party of Sweden split in October 1929 the newspaper was taken over by the Right wing. Its publication ceased in May 1945. p. 174

[58] Lenin refers to the article "Finland and the Bolshevists", published in *The Times* No. 42239 on October 24, 1919. p. 174

[59] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily published in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906, as the Central Organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. Its actual editors wore P. N. Milyukov and I. V. Hessen, and its close collaborators were M. M. Vinaver, P. D. Dolgorukov, P. B. Struve and others. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917 it actively supported the home and foreign policy of the Provisional Government and conducted a vicious campaign of slander against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. The newspaper was closed on October 26 (November 8), 1917 by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. p. 174

[60] This refers to the resolution of the Ninth Council of the S.R. Party "On the Attitude to the Red Army" published in the Supplement to *Listok Dyela Naroda* No. 2. p. 178

[61] Lenin refers to N. P. Rostopchin's article "Peasants' Non-Party Conferences" published in *Pravda* No. 260 on November 20, 1919. p. 187

[62] The Draft Instructions to Gubernia, Uyezd and Volost Committees of the R.C.P. on Work in the Countryside were drawn up by the relevant department of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and published for

discussion in *Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* on September 20 1919; it defined the duties of local Party organisers who were to secure help for local peasants from neighbouring state farms and farming co-operatives. The draft was adopted with slight amendments by the First All-Russia Conference on Party Work in the Countryside and finally endorsed by the Eighth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 189

[63] The draft resolution on Foreign policy was written by Lenin at the session of the Eighth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) December 2, 1919. It was adopted by the Conference with slight amendments and afterwards (on December 5) read out by Lenin in his report at the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets (see p. 231 of this volume), which adopted it unanimously as a peace proposal to the countries of the Entente. The resolution of the Congress was published in the press on December 6, 1919.

The peace proposal of the Congress was sent to the Entente powers on December 10, 1919. The governments of Britain, France, the U.S.A. and Italy refused to examine it. p. 191

[64] *Borotba* Party—a petty-bourgeois nationalist party formed in May 1918 after the split in the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The party took its name from the newspaper *Borotba* (Struggle), its Central Organ. (See Note 88.) p. 193

[65] The *First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Artels* was convened by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and was held December 3-10, 1919 in Moscow. The Congress was attended by 140 delegates, of whom 93 were Communists. Lenin spoke on the second day of the Congress. The Congress adopted the Rules of the All-Russia Association of Agricultural Producers' Collectives (Communes and Artels) which were later endorsed by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. The Rules stated that the main objects of the Association were the union of all agricultural collectives in a single producers' association, propaganda of the idea of collective farming and practical help for the neighbouring peasantry, especially the poor peasants and the families of Red Army men. p. 195

[66] The *thousand-million-ruble fund* was established by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars dated November 2, 1918 "for the purpose of improving and developing agriculture and for its speediest reconstruction on socialist lines". Grants and loans from this fund were given to farming communes, producers' co-operatives and village societies and groups of peasants, provided they went over to collective farming. The People's Commissars of Agriculture and of Finance elaborated detailed rules for granting loans to develop agriculture (see *Izvestia* No. 42, February 23, 1919). p. 195

[67] *The Statute on Socialist Land Settlement and the Measures for the Transition to Socialist Farming* was adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in February 1919. It took for its basis the decisions of the First All-Russia Congress of Land

Departments, Poor Peasants' Committees and Communes held December 1918. Lenin directly participated in drafting and editing the Statute. It outlined a number of measures for the reconstruction of agriculture on a socialist basis, for raising agricultural productivity and extending the areas under crops. The Statute reads, "In order to put an end to all exploitation of man by man, to reconstruct agriculture on a socialist basis, to apply all the achievements of science and technology, to educate the working masses in the spirit of socialism and to unite the proletariat and poor peasants in their struggle against capital, it is necessary to go over from individual to collective forms of land tenure. Large state farms and communes, collective tilling and other types of collective work are the best ways of attaining this purpose, therefore all forms of individual land tenure should be regarded as transitory and outliving themselves" (*Izvestia* No. 34, February 14, 1919). p. 195

68 The *Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets* was held in Moscow. It was attended by 1,366 delegates (1,002 with the right to vote and 364 with voice but no vote), of them 1,278 Communists. The agenda of the Congress was the following: (1) Report of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, (2) War Situation, (3) the Communist International, (4) Food Situation, (5) Fuel Question, (6) Work of Soviet Bodies in the Centre and the Provinces, (7) Elections to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

On the opening day of the Congress Lenin delivered the report on the work of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the C.P.C.; on the following day he closed the debate on the report, on December 8 he took part in a discussion of the report on the work of Soviet bodies at the session of the organisation section and on December 9 he made a speech closing the Congress. Lenin introduced addenda to the draft resolution on Soviet organisation.

The Congress of Soviets approved the home and foreign policy of the Soviet Government. The detailed discussion of the reports on Soviet organisation, the food situation and the fuel question was entrusted to respective sections in view of their practical importance. The draft resolutions on the reports submitted by the sections were approved by the closing plenary meeting of the Congress on December 9. The resolution on "Soviet Organisation" envisaged the further consolidation of Soviet government bodies, and gave an exact formulation of their rights and duties in the centre and in the provinces.

On Lenin's proposal the Congress adopted a resolution on peace and an appeal to the governments of Britain, France, the U.S.A., Italy and Japan to begin peace negotiations (see p. 231 of this volume). The Congress of Soviets passed a resolution on "Oppressed Nations" in which it once again confirmed the principles of the Soviet national policy. In a special resolution the Congress expressed its indignation at the reign of White Terror in Hungary. The Congress greeted the foundation of the Third International and stressed its tremendous international significance. p. 205

[69] On November 5, 1918, the German Government broke off diplomatic relations with the R.S.F.S.R. and expelled the staff of the Soviet Embassy from Berlin on the pretext that official Soviet representatives had been conducting revolutionary agitation in Germany. Diplomatic relations were not resumed until 1922. p. 211

[70] The *Dreyfus case*—a provocative trial engineered in 1894 by reactionary French militarists. Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the French General Staff, was sentenced to life imprisonment by a court martial on a clearly fictitious charge of espionage and high treason. The trial was used by reactionary circles in France to incite anti-Semitism and to attack the republican regime and democratic liberties. When socialists and prominent bourgeois democrats (Émile Zola, Jean Jaurès, Anatole France and others) launched a campaign in 1898 for a review of the Dreyfus case, it immediately became a political issue and split the country into two camps—republicans and democrats on one side and the bloc of royalists, clericals, anti-Semites and nationalists on the other. In 1899 Dreyfus was pardoned and released under pressure of public opinion, but it was not until 1906 that the Court of Cassation found him not guilty and reinstated him in the army. p. 219

[71] Lenin refers to the *Texte intégral des propositions acceptées par Lénine* published in *l'Humanité* No. 5669 of October 26, 1919. p. 221

[72] *Cheka* (the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission) was set up on December 7 (20), 1917 by a decision of the Council of People's Commissars for the purpose of "ruthlessly combating counter-revolution, sabotage and profiteering". As one of the most important levers of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission played an important part in checking counter-revolutionary sabotage and in protecting the security of the Soviet Republic. Appraising the work of this commission, Lenin pointed out in his report to the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1921, "...this is the institution which has been our effective weapon against the innumerable conspiracies, against the innumerable attacks on Soviet power". In its resolution on the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission the Ninth Congress noted the commission's heroic work in protecting the gains of the October Revolution and, in view of the consolidation of Soviet power, proposed curtailing the commission's activity. This resolution reflected proposals made by Lenin in a draft decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) on the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, which he wrote on December 1, 1921 (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 369). On February 6, 1922, the All-Russia C.E.C. passed a decree abolishing the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission. p. 233

[73] The *Bund* (the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) was founded in 1897 at the Inaugural Congress of

Jewish Social-Democratic groups in Vilna. It consisted mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans of Western Russia.

During the First World War (1914-18), the Bundists took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917 the Bund supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and sided with the enemies of the Great October Socialist Revolution. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War, the Bund leaders made common cause with the counter-revolutionary forces. At the same time a tendency towards co-operation with the Soviets became apparent among the Bund rank and file. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself. p. 233

[74] Lenin refers to the counter-revolutionary conspiracy exposed in Petrograd in November 1919. The conspiracy was organised by a counter-revolutionary organisation linked up with Yudenich and subsidised by the Entente. Among its members were tsarist high officials, generals and admirals of the tsarist army and navy, Cadets, and people associated with the S.R.s and Mensheviks. They aimed at timing their revolt to Yudenich's offensive on Petrograd and setting up a whiteguard government. p. 235

[75] The *organisation section* was set up at the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets to examine the innovations in the practical work of building up the Soviet state that took place after the adoption of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. by the Fifth Congress of Soviets in June 1918.

Lenin took part in the debate on the report on Soviet development in the organisation section. The resolution of the section was endorsed at the closing plenary session of the Congress. p. 243

[76] The *Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*—a Centrist party formed in April 1917 at the inaugural congress in Gotha. It advocated unity with social-chauvinists and went as far as to deny the class struggle. Kautsky's group (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) in Reichstag formed the core of the party. In October 1920 a split took place at a party congress in Halle. A considerable section of the party united with the Communist Party of Germany in December 1920 and the Right wing formed a separate party, retaining its old name. It existed till 1922. p. 258

[77] *Centrists*, *Centrism*—a variety of opportunism in the labour movement, hostile to Marxism-Leninism. It arose in Social-Democratic parties of the Second International prior to the First World War.

The Centrists used Marxist phrases and posed as "orthodox Marxists", but in fact emasculated Marxism of its revolutionary content, and tried to retain the influence of open opportunism and hence of the bourgeoisie over the workers. The ideology of Centrism is the ideology of adaptation, of the subordination of the class interests of the proletariat to those of the bourgeoisie. Lenin said that Centrism was much more dangerous, much more harmful

to the working-class movement than open opportunism; he described Centrism as "the social product of the contradictions within the Second International, a blend of loyalty to Marxism in word, and subordination to opportunism in deed" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 312).

During the First World War the Centrists supported the policy of the opportunists, the social-chauvinists and at the same time they advanced pacifist slogans, in this way diverting the workers from the revolutionary struggle against the imperialist war. Kautsky was one of the chief theoreticians of Centrism. Centrism in Russia was represented by Trotsky, Martov, Chkheidze and others.

The Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin was an irreconcilable and consistent fighter against Centrism, against its Russian and international varieties. Exposing Centrism in Russia, the Bolsheviks helped the revolutionary elements in the parties of the Second International to get rid of Centrism, to break with the opportunists and to found genuinely Marxist, Communist Parties. p. 260

[78] See Marx's letter to Ludwig Kugelmann of December 13, 1870 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 305). p. 260

[79] See Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1960, pp. 332-33, 483-85). p. 264

[80] The Decree on Land was adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets on October 26 (November 8), 1917, the day following the establishment of Soviet power in Russia. The Decree on Land abolished the landed estates and all private ownership of land and gave the land to the peasants for their use. p. 265

[81] This refers to the civil war waged by the Finnish bourgeoisie against the proletarian revolution in Finland. The revolution began in the middle of January 1918 in the southern industrial districts of the country. On January 15 (28),1918 the Finnish Red Guard captured the capital—Helsingfors (Helsinki), and the bourgeois government of Svinhufvud was overthrown. The workers seized power and set up a revolutionary government known as the Council of People's Representatives; among its members were O. Kuusinen, J. Sirola, A. Taimi. Seims of workers' organisations formed the basic type of state power in the country. Lenin called them a new type of power, "proletarian power" (see present edition, Vol. 27, p. 133). Among the most important steps taken by the workers' government were the adoption of a law on the transfer without compensation of the lands tilled by the peasants to their ownership, exemption from taxation of the poor sections of the population, expropriation of the enterprises the owners of which had fled from the country, the establishment of state control over private banks (their functions were transferred to the state bank).

On March 1, 1918 a treaty was signed in Petrograd between the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic and the R.S.F.S.R. It was based on the principles of complete equality and sovereignty, and was the first treaty in the world between two socialist countries.

However the proletarian revolution was victorious only in the towns and countryside of the South of Finland. The Svinhufvud government established itself in the North and appealed to the German Government for assistance. As a result of the intervention of the German armed forces, the revolution in Finland was defeated in May 1918 after a bitter civil war. p. 273

82 *Longuetists*—a minority group of the French Socialist Party led by Jean Longuet. During the First World War of 1914-18 they held Centrist views and pursued a conciliatory policy towards the social-chauvinists. The Longuetists rejected revolutionary struggle and advocated "defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war Lenin called them petty-bourgeois nationalists (see present edition; Vol. 28, p. 286). After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Longuetists declared that they supported the dictatorship of the proletariat, but in practice they were against it. p. 275

83 This letter of greetings in the magazine *Smena* (The Younger Generation) was addressed to the youth of Petrograd Gubernia in connection with the "youth week" organised by the Young Communist League to enlist young workers and peasants in voluntary work for the public good on a widest possible scale. p. 276

84 The *Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* was held December 20-21, 1919. The Conference discussed the convocation of an All-Russia Party Conference, the fuel problem, subbotniks, measures of combating typhus epidemics, the food situation in Moscow, universal military training, and special detachments.

A resolution on subbotniks underscored their tremendous significance as the first practical steps in building communism. The Party Conference recognised the great importance of subbotniks in achieving tangible results in raising labour productivity and in alleviating the transport, fuel, food and other crises of the Soviet Republic and made it incumbent upon all Party members to take part in subbotniks and make their work the most productive.

After Lenin's report the Conference heard the report on the organisation of subbotniks and approved an instruction. The Moscow Party Committee worked out and approved the "Statute on Subbotniks" published in *Pravda* on December 27, 1919. A special department was formed at the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) for their supervision. p. 283

85 The *Third, Communist International* (*Comintern*) was founded at the First (Inaugural) Congress of the Comintern held March 2-6, 1919. It was attended by 52 delegates, of whom 34 had the right to vote and 18 with voice but no vote. These delegates represented the Communist Parties of Russia, Germany, German Austria, Hungary,

Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Estonia, Armenia, of the Volga Region Germans, the Swedish Left Social-Democratic Party, the Norwegian Social-Democratic Party, the Swiss Social-Democratic Party (the Opposition), the Balkan Revolutionary Social-Democratic Federation, the united group of the peoples of the East of Russia, the French Zimmerwald Left wing, the Czech, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, British, French and Swiss Communist groups, the Dutch Social-Democratic group, the American League of Socialist Propaganda, the Socialist Labor Party of America, the Chinese Socialist Labour Party, the Korean Workers' Union, the Turkestan, Turkish, Georgian, Azerbaijan and Persian sections of the Central Bureau of the Peoples of the East and the Zimmerwald Commission.

The first session passed a decision "to consider this meeting as the international communist conference", and adopted the following agenda: (1) inauguration, (2) reports, (3) platform of the international communist conference, (4) bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat, (5) Berne Conference and the attitude towards socialist trends, (6) international situation and the policy of the Entente, (7) the Manifesto, (8) the White Terror, (9) elections of the Bureau and miscellaneous organisational questions.

The central item in the work of the conference was Lenin's theses and report on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The conference unanimously expressed its agreement with Lenin's theses and passed a decision to refer them to the Bureau for the widest distribution in various countries. The conference also adopted the resolution proposed by Lenin as a supplement to the theses.

On March 4, after the conference had endorsed Lenin's theses and passed a resolution on Lenin's report, it passed a decision to "constitute itself as the Third International and assume the name of the Communist International". On the same day the Congress unanimously proclaimed the dissolution of the Zimmerwald Left. On March 4, it approved the platform of the Communist International, main planks of which were: (1) the inevitability of the transition from capitalism to communism, (2) the necessity of a revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of bourgeois governments, (3) the abolition of the bourgeois state and its substitution by a state of a new type, the proletarian state, a state of the Soviet type, which will ensure the transition to a communist society.

One of the most important Congress documents was the Manifesto to the world proletariat, which stated that the Communist International was the successor of the ideas of Marx and Engels espressed in the *Communist Manifesto*. The Congress called upon the workers of all countries to support Soviet Russia, demanded noninterference of the Entente in the internal affairs of the Republic of Soviet, withdrawal of the interventionist troops from the territory of Russia, recognition of the Soviet state, cessation of the economic blockade and restoration of trade relations. In the resolution on "The Attitude Towards 'Socialist' Trends and the Berne Conference" the Congress condemned the attempts to restore the Second

International, which was "a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie" and declared that the revolutionary proletariat had nothing in common with that conference.

The Third International played a great role in exposing opportunism in the labour movement, in restoring contacts between the working people of various countries, in founding and strengthening the Communist Parties. p. 285

[86] Lenin refers to the "Theses of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Situation on the Eastern Front" written on April 11, 1919, in which the Central Committee appealed to all Party organisations and all trade unions "to set to work in a revolutionary way" (see present edition, Vol. 29). p. 287

[87] The *All-Ukraine Revolutionary Military Committee* was a provisional revolutionary government in the Ukraine set up by decision of the C.E.C. and C.P.C. of the Ukraine on December 11, 1919 (the day Poltava and Kharkov were liberated). Among its members were G. I. Petrovsky (Chairman) and V. P. Zatonsky and D. Z. Manuilsky. The Committee was entrusted with the functions of the C.E.C. and C.P.C. of the Ukraine and was to give all-round assistance to the Red Army in finally routing the whiteguards; its tasks included abolition of land proprietorship; establishment of strong workers' and peasants' power on the territory of Soviet Ukraine; convocation of the Fourth All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets immediately after the liberation of the greater part of the Ukrainian lands. p. 294

[88] The *Borotba* Party (see Note 64) assumed the name of the Ukrainian Communist Party of Borotbists in August 1919. It was led by V. Blakitny, G. Grinko, A. Shumsky and others. In the party there were a few counter-revolutionary Petlyura adherents who disguised their real stand by revolutionary phrases, declarations of recognition of the communist programme but in fact were against the dictatorship of the proletariat and pursued a policy directed at splitting the single revolutionary front of the working peoples of Russia and the Ukraine.

The Borotbists addressed the Executive of the Comintern twice with a request to be admitted to the membership and be recognised as the main Communist Party in the Ukraine. On February 26, 1920, the Communist International passed a special decision on this question, in which it proposed to the Borotbists to dissolve their party and merge with the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine. The resolution said that the Executive of the Communist International could only regard the attempt to found a second, parallel party as an attempt to split the ranks of the working people.

On account of the growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the peasantry and the successes of the Soviet government in the Ukraine, the Borotbists had to pass a decision on voluntary dissolution.

The Fourth Conference of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, held March 17-23, 1920, agreed to admit the Borot-

bists into its ranks. Later on however, many Borotbists resumed their anti-Soviet activity, and headed the struggle of the counter-revolutionary, bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Ukraine. p. 294

[89] This item was written by Lenin in 1919 or 1920 at one of the meetings of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). It was found at the end of 1924 and first published in *Pravda*. The exact time when it was written has not been established. p. 298

[90] The *First Congress of Women Workers and Peasants of Petrograd Gubernia* was held January 15-16, 1920. It was attended by 403 delegates, of whom 157 were Communists and 246 non-party; among them were 91 peasant women, 131 workers, 133 intellectuals, 15 dressmakers, 11 housewives and two militia women. Though the non-party delegates constituted the majority, the Congress was communist in spirit. The agenda was as follows: the present situation, the Communist Party and its attitude to women workers and peasants, the land question, the consumers' commune, social education, etc. On the opening day a telegram of greetings from Lenin was read out to which the Congress sent a reply. Yelena Stasova greeted the Congress on behalf of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and the central department of women workers and peasants. She stressed the importance of the coming "week for the front" and called upon women delegates to strain every effort to restore normal life to the country. The Congress demonstrated the striving of the women workers and peasants to take an active part in building up the Soviet Republic. p. 299

[91] This refers to the directive adopted on Lenin's proposal by the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on January 23, 1920 on the organisation of a workers' and peasants' inspection. On February 7, 1920 the All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorsed the Rules for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection according to which the state control bodies were reorganised "into a single body of socialist control by workers and peasants".

Lenin attached great importance to workers' and peasants' inspection. In the articles written in 1923, "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" and "Better Fewer, but Better", Lenin proposed to unite the workers' and peasants' inspection bodies with the Central Control Commission. In April 1923, the Twelfth Party Congress adopted a decision that followed Lenin's proposal to found a joint body with Party and state control functions.

At the time of the Stalin cult Lenin's principles of the organisation of Party and state control were grossly violated and a bureaucratic control apparatus was substituted for the Leninist system of control.

In November 1962 a plenary meeting of the C.C., C.P.S.U. considered it necessary to reorganise the system of supervision on Leninist principles. It decided to set up a Committee of Party and State Control of the C.C., C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers of

the U.S.S.R. to unite and direct the entire work of supervision in the country. p. 300

[92] This refers to the armed intervention of the Entente imperialists in the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. The republic was formed on March 21, 1919 and in August 1919 was crushed by the united efforts of the imperialist intervention and internal counter-revolution. p. 303

[93] This refers to the negotiations between Britain and France and the small bourgeois states, neighbours of the Soviet Republic, concerning a joint and simultaneous attack on Soviet Russia. According to Churchill "fourteen states" were to take part in the campaign (see Note 11). The initiators of the campaign planned to capture Petrograd and Moscow in December 1919. But the campaign failed, although, as Lenin pointed out, "all kinds of pressure—financial, food, military—have been applied to force Estonia, Finland, and no doubt Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as well, to force that whole group of states to make war on us" (see p. 175 of this volume).

The bourgeois governments of the Baltic states avoided active participation in hostilities against Soviet Russia, because the Soviet Republic repeatedly proposed peace and did not violate the sovereignty and independence of the small states which formerly belonged to the Russian Empire, whereas Kolchak and Denikin proclaimed the slogan of "a united and indivisible" Russia. In addition, the participation of the Baltic states in the anti-Soviet campaign was hindered by the protests of the people who came out for the cessation of the war against Soviet Russia and for the conclusion of a peace treaty. In autumn 1919 the British Government, the initiator and inspirer of the campaign, had to withdraw its troops from Archangel under the pressure of the British workers, and on January 16, 1920, the Allied Council resolved to lift the economic blockade and resume trade and commercial relations with the "population of Soviet Russia". p. 303

[94] These documents were written by Lenin during the conference on co-operatives held on January 26, 1920. They formed the basis of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 27, 1920 on "The Unification of All Types of Co-operative Organisations".

The decree envisaged the fusion of the credit and savings co-operatives, their district, gubernia and regional societies, with consumers' co-operatives and their societies. The All-Russia Central Board of Agricultural, Trades and Other Co-operative Societies merged with the Central Union of Consumers' Societies (Tsentrosoyuz) as its affiliated sections. The Chief Committee for Co-operatives set up at the People's Commissariat of Food was to supervise all activities. On the same day, January 27, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on "The Abolition of Councils of Co-operative Congresses" in view of the merger of all-Russia co-operative centres with the Tsentrosoyuz and the amalgamation of the

credit and consumers' co-operatives; the functions and property of the all-Russia and gubernia councils of co-operative congresses were transferred to the Tsentrosoyuz and its branches. p. 307

[95] The *Third All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils* was held in Moscow, January 23-29, 1920. It was attended by some 500 delegates and included workers from large industrial enterprises and representatives of trade unions and gubernia economic councils. The Congress agenda was the following: the economic situation in Soviet Russia; the war industry and Red Army supplies; organisation of economic management; organisation of labour; labour conscription transport; the fuel problem and others. On January 27 Lenin delivered a speech at a plenary session. The Congress adopted the theses of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on "Mobilisation of the Industrial Proletariat, Labour Conscription, Militarisation of the Economy and Utilisation of Army Units for the Needs of the Economy". In its decisions the Congress stressed the need to maintain the centralised management of the country's economy, Simultaneously local economic councils were granted greater independence in economic activities. The Third Congress of Economic Councils drew up a plan for the further rehabilitation and development of the economy of the Soviet Republic. p. 309

[96] The transition of nationalised enterprises and branches of economy to one-man management started in the spring of 1918; by this time the working class had acquired certain experience in management, the first Soviet business executives had been trained in workers control bodies and elective collegiums. Lenin formulated the theoretical grounds for the one-man management of production coupled with extensive enrolment of working people into economic management in his article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" published on April 28, 1918.

At the end of 1919 when questions of economic organisation came to the fore, a discussion was held in the Party on the corporate or one-man management of enterprises. The so-called group of Democratic Centralism (T. V. Sapronov, N. Osinsky [V. V. Obolensky], V. N. Maximovsky, V. M. Smirnov and others) came out against the Leninist principle of one-man management and in favour of corporate management. They were supported by the Moscow Gubernia Party Committee. At the Kharkov Gubernia Party Conference the Democratic Centralists succeeded in carrying a resolution against one-man management. At the Fourth Conference of the C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine, held March 17-23, 1920, the vote was split evenly.

The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) put an end to this discussion. Its resolution on "The Immediate Tasks of Economic Development" underscored that "the main task in organisation of management is setting up competent, firm and efficient management for every individual industrial enterprise and for an industry as a whole". The Congress resolved "to approximate the management of production to one-man management, that is, to introduce unre-

stricted one-man management in factory shops and departments, set the goal of one-man management in factory administrations and reduce collegiums at medium and high levels of production administration". p. 309

[97] The *first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Seventh Convocation*, was held in Moscow, February 2-7, 1920. The agenda of the session was the following: report of the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C.; international situation; economic policy in connection with the organisation of labour and supplies; labour mobilisation and utilisation of the Army; transport; food problem; Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; peace negotiations with Estonia, and other questions. On February 2, Lenin delivered a report on the work of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of people's Commissars. The session endorsed the Rules for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, according to which the People's Commissariat of State Control was to be reorganised into workers' and peasants' inspection with the enrolment of broad masses of workers and peasants into this work. The session passed a resolution on "Transport" which stated that the restoration of transport and improvement of its work were the primary task of the Soviet government. Another resolution underscored the tremendous importance of the electrification of the economy. The session endorsed the appeal to the Polish people and resolved to ratify the peace treaty with Estonia. p. 315

[98] Lenin read the report published in the central newspapers of January 18, 1920, that the governments of the Entente countries intended to lift the blockade and sanction trade with Soviet Russia. The decision passed by the Allied Council on January 16, 1920 stressed however that these measures did not mean any change in the policy of the Allied governments towards the Soviet Government. p. 316

[99] *Oleinikov*, the whiteguard officer mentioned, was carrying documents from S. D. Sazonov in Paris, through Sweden to Yudenich. He came over to the side of the revolution and handed the documents over to the Soviet authorities. The persons mentioned in the documents were: Sazonov, Foreign Minister in the tsarist government and Kolchak's government and the representative of Kolchak and Denikin in Paris; Gulkevich, Kolchak's envoy in Sweden; Bakhmetev, Kolchak's ambassador in Washington; Sukin, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kolchak's government in Omsk; Sablin, Kolchak's chargé d'affaires in London; Knox, an English general, the British representative to Kolchak's government. p. 320

[100] Lenin refers to the Red Cross negotiations on an exchange of prisoners, the return of refugees, and so on. p. 323

[101] Lenin refers to the Declaration of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. addressed to the Government of Poland and the Polish people on January 28, 1920.

The Poland of the bourgeoisie and landowners depended entirely on the imperialists of the Entente. At the instigation of the British and French governments she made preparations for a criminal war against the young Soviet Republic. The Soviet Declaration stated that the policy of the R.S.F.S.R. in respect of Poland proceeded from the principle of the right of nations to self-determination and unreserved recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Poland. The Soviet Government confirmed that it had no aggressive designs against Poland. On February 2, 1920, a meeting of the First Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Seventh Convocation, endorsed an appeal to the Polish people. This appeal exposed the lies spread by the imperialist powers that Soviet Russia intended annexing parts of Poland, and stressed the Soviet Government's unwavering effort to achieve peace and establish friendly, good-neighbourly relations with independent Poland. p. 324

[102] The *Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic* was formed by an agreement between the central Soviet authorities and the Bashkir Government. The agreement confirmed the formation of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic in conformity with the Soviet Constitution and defined its boundaries and administrative division. The agreement was published in *Izvestia* No. 63, March 23, 1919. p. 325

[103] The *Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic* was formed on May 27, 1920, the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the formation of the republic was signed by Lenin and Kalinin. p. 325

[104] See Note 53. p. 326

[105] Lenin refers to a number of government decrees aimed at combating the economic disruption and at rehabilitating the national economy. The decision to use the Third Army, renamed the First Revolutionary Army of Labour, on the labour front in the Urals was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on January 15, 1920. The Statute of the Ukrainian Soviet Army of Labour was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. in agreement with the All-Ukraine Revolutionary Committee on January 21. The decision to make use of the reserve army forces of the Republic to improve the railway transport in the area served by the Moscow-Kazan Railway was passed by the Council of Defence on January 23. The decree on labour conscription and the Statute of the Committees for Labour Conscription were adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on January 29, 1920. p. 333

[106] The *plan for the electrification of all Russia* was the first scientifically based, long-term state plan for the rehabilitation and development of the economy of the Soviet Republic. It was elaborated by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) in 1920 on Lenin's instructions. The plan was calculated for 10 to 15

years and provided for the building of 20 thermal power stations (Kizel, Kashira, Shterovka and others) and 10 hydropower stations (on the Dnieper, Svir, Volkhov and other rivers); total planned capacity was 1.5 million kw. The total yearly output of electric power was to be 8,800 million kwh; in 1913 Russia produced 1,900 million kwh. The plan envisaged rational, proportionate deployment of industry throughout the country. It envisaged an increase of 80-100 per cent in industrial output over the 1913 level, and a huge increase over the 1920 level. The GOELRO plan was in the main completed by 1931. The output of electric power in the U.S.S.R. reached 10,700 million kwh, which was twenty times more than in 1921. p. 335

[107] The theses were written by Lenin in reply to the proposal of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany to start negotiations on the terms of their joining the Communist International. On January 20, 1920, Lenin's theses were discussed at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) which decided to accept them as a basis and set up a commission with Lenin as a member for the final editing of the reply and its presentation in the form of a letter. p. 337

[108] *Die Freiheit* (Freedom)—a daily paper, organ of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published in Berlin from November 15, 1918 to September 30, 1922. p. 338

[109] The meeting was held in Moscow, February 5-6, 1920. It was attended by more than 1,000 people. The agenda was the following: the international situation; the fight against economic dislocation; labour conscription; transport; social security; tasks of the R.C.P. in the proletarian revolution; public health services; food problem.

The Conference was held at a time when transport was the main sector of the labour front. The supply of raw material and fuel to factories and food for the population depended on the work of the railways. In a very short time thousands of locomotives and trucks and many railway lines and bridges had to be repaired. The Party mobilised Communists and assigned them to work on the railways. Lenin delivered the opening speech at this Conference. The resolution adopted by the Conference proposed to concentrate the entire attention of the country and the efforts of the working class on the internal development of Soviet Russia and particularly on the industrial and economic front. The Conference called upon all railwaymen to form "the Red Labour Transport Army with strict labour discipline". p. 345

[110] See Note 91. p. 351

[111] *Le Populaire*—a French Centrist newspaper published in Limoges from 1916 and in Paris from July 1917. In 1921 it became the official organ of the French Socialist Party and at present is controlled by the party's Right wing. p. 352

[112] *Comité pour la reconstruction de l'Internationale* was founded at the end of 1919 by the Centrist elements of the French Socialist Party, led by Jean Longuet. p. 352

[113] The *French Socialist Party* was founded in 1905 by the merger of the Socialist Party of France led by Guesde and the French Socialist Party led by Jaurès. On the outbreak of the imperialist war, the party leadership took a chauvinist stand. It openly supported the imperialist war, and justified participation in the bourgeois government. The Centrist wing, led by Longuet, took a social-pacifist line and a conciliatory attitude towards the social-chauvinists. The Left, revolutionary wing, consisting mainly of the rank and file, adhered to internationalist positions.

After the October Revolution in Russia, a sharp struggle unfolded in the party between the open reformists and Centrists, on the one hand, and the Left, revolutionary wing, which grew more influential thanks to the influx into the party of rank-and-file workers on the other. At the party congress held in Tours in December 1920 the revolutionary wing received the majority vote. The congress passed a decision to join the Communist International, and founded the Communist Party of France. The majority of reformists and Centrists split away from the party and founded an independent party that retained the old name of the French Socialist Party. p. 352

[114] *La Vie Ouvrière* (Workers' Life)—a weekly newspaper of the revolutionary syndicalists of France published in Paris from April 1919 to 1939, when it was banned. The newspaper resumed its publication in 1944. At present it is the organ of the French General Confederation of Labour (*Confédération générale du Travail*). p. 352

[115] *Communist International*—a periodical, organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, published from May 1, 1919 to June 1943 in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish and Chinese. The journal carried theoretical articles and documents of the Communist International, including a number of articles by Lenin. The journal treated questions of Marxist-Leninist theory in the light of the problems of the international workers' and communist movement, published articles on the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and carried on a struggle against various anti-Leninist trends. Its publication ceased owing to the decision of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern of May 15, 1943 to dissolve the Communist International. p. 352

[116] This refers to the international political strike planned for July 21, 1919 under the slogans of support for the Russian and Hungarian revolutions and demand of non-interference on the part of the imperialist governments in Russian and Hungarian internal affairs. Separate strikes took place on the appointed day in Britain, Italy, Germany, Norway, and other countries. But this action by the proletariat of various countries lacked unity.

The Right-wing leaders of socialist parties and trade unions did everything to prevent the international strike. The conduct of French social-collaborators was treacherous. To mislead the workers, Léon Jouhaux, Alphonse Merrheim and other leaders of the General Confederation of Labour expressed in favour of the strike, but on the eve of the strike they proposed to postpone it, and in this way prevented it. p. 352

[117] *Avanti!* (Forward!)— a daily newspaper, Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in December 1896 in Rome. During the First World War the newspaper took an inconsistent internationalist stand and did not break off relations with the reformists. In 1926 it was suppressed by Mussolini's fascist government, but continued to appear abroad. Since 1943 it has again been published in Italy. p. 352

[118] The *I.L.P.*—Independent Labour Party of Britain, a reformist organisation founded by the leaders of the "new trades unions" in 1893 at the time of the revival of the strike movement and the intensification of the workers' struggle to break away from the bourgeois parties. Members of the "new trades unions" and of a number of the old trades unions, intellectuals and petty bourgeois who were under the influence of the Fabians joined the I.L.P. Its leaders were James Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald. Ever since its foundation the I.L.P. has adhered to bourgeois-reformist principles, concentrating on parliamentary struggle and parliamentary deals with the Liberal Party. Lenin wrote of the I.L.P. that it "was an opportunist party always dependent on the bourgeoisie" (see present edition, Vol. 29, "The Tasks of the Third International"). p. 353

[119] *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Flag)—a newspaper, Central Organ of the Communist Party of Austria, published in Vienna since November 1918. It changed its name several times; at first it was published under the name of *Der Weckruf* (Reveille); from January 1919 under the name of *Die Soziale Revolution* (The Social Revolution); from July 1919, *Die Rote Fahne*. From 1933 it had to go underground. From August 1945 it appeared under the title of *Österreichische Volksstimme* (The Austrian People's Voice). On February 21, 1957 It began to appear as *Volksstimme*. p. 354

[120] *Kun*, *Béla* (1886-1939)—prominent leader of the Hungarian and international communist movement. In 1919 he headed the Hungarian Soviet Government. p. 354

[121] *La Bataille* (The Struggle)—a newspaper, mouthpiece of the French anarcho-syndicalists, was published in Paris from 1915 to 1920 in place of the suppressed *La Bataille Sindicaliste*. Its leading spirits were Grave, Jouhaux, Cornelissen and others. During the first World War it adopted a social-chauvinist stand. p. 355

[122] Lenin's answers were wired to Berlin, and from there to New York on February 21, 1920. That same evening they were published in

the *New York Evening Journal*. Lenin's answers were reprinted in the German communist and socialist press. p. 365

[123] A special correspondent of the London conservative newspaper *Daily Express* in Copenhagen addressed a request to Lenin to answer his four questions. Lenin's reply was received in Copenhagen on February 22 and on the following day published in *Daily Express*. p. 368

[124] The *League of Nations*—an international organisation which existed between the First and Second World wars. It was founded in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference of the victor countries. Its Charter formed part of the Versailles Peace Treaty and was signed by 44 states. The working bodies of the League of Nations were the Assembly, the League of Nations Council and the permanent Secretariat headed by the Secretary General. The League Charter was calculated to create the impression that the organisation had as its aims the struggle against aggression, the reduction of armaments and the strengthening of peace and security. In reality the leaders of the League of Nations shielded aggressors, and instigated the arms drive and preparations for a second world war.

Between 1920 and 1934 the League's activities were hositile to the Soviet Union. During 1920-21 it was one of the centres of the organisation of armed intervention against Soviet Russia.

On September 15, 1934, on the initiative of French diplomats, thirty-four member states of the League approached the Soviet Union with an invitation to join the organisation. The U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations in order to carry on the struggle for peace but its attempts to establish a peace front encountered the resistance of the reactionary circles of the Western powers. From the beginning of the Second World War the League of Nations in effect ceased to exist. The formal decision to dissolve the League was taken at a specially convened Assembly in April 1946. p. 374

[125] Lenin here refers to *Proletcult* (Proletarian Culture Organisation) formed in September 1917 as an independent workers' cultural and educational organisation. After the October Revolution A. A. Bogdanov and other leaders of the Proletcult continued to uphold its "independence" and thus counterposed it to the interests of the proletarian state. As a result, bourgeois intellectuals made their way into the organisation and began to influence it. The Proletcult members practically rejected the cultural legacy of previous generations, strove to cut themselves off from mass cultural and educational work, isolated themselves from life and advocated the need to create a special "proletarian culture" by "laboratory methods". Bogdanov, the main ideologist of the Proletcult, recognised Marxism in words, but actually advocated subjective idealism and Machism. The Proletcult was not a homogeneous organisation. Besides bourgeois intellectuals who made up the leadership of many of its organisations, there was also working youth who sincerely wanted to help the cultural development of the Soviet state. The Proletcult organisations made progress in 1919, but in the early

twenties they went into decline. In 1932 the Proletcult ceased to exist.

Lenin sharply criticised its erroneous principles in a draft resolution on "Proletarian Culture" (see present edition, Vol. 31, "On Proletarian Culture") and in a number of other works. p. 378

[126] The *First All-Russia Congress of Working Cossacks* was held February 29-March 6, 1920. It was attended by 339 delegates from nearly all Cossack regions. The agenda of the Congress was the following: Soviet development in Cossack regions; food policy; organisation of national economy, etc. Lenin took part in the work of the Congress, and showed the true road for the working Cossacks in his speech on March 1. The Congress denounced the attempts of the upper strata of Cossacks, in company with the landowners and bourgeoisie, to separate the Cossacks from the common cause of all the working people. The Congress resolution stressed that the chief task of the working Cossacks was to unite with the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia. The Congress expressed in favour of the participation of working Cossacks in Soviet governmental bodies on the same conditions as all workers and peasants, called upon the Cossacks to strengthen the union of workers and peasants and concentrate all efforts on overcoming the economic devastation in the country. p. 380

[127] Lenin refers to the Decree on Peace adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on October 26 (November 8), 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 249-53).

The Decree on Peace proposed to all belligerent nations and their governments that they immediately sign an armistice and start negotiations on a just democratic peace. p. 383

[128] Lenin refers to a strike of workers in Germany which began on January 28, 1918 in protest against the rapacious peace terms proposed by the German delegation during the Brest-Litovsk peace talks. Over 500,000 workers at armaments factories went on strike. The strikers demanded peace without annexations and indemnities as proposed by the Soviet delegation, the participation of worker representatives of all countries in peace talks, the repeal of the war-time laws in the country and granting of democratic civil rights to the people. The workers of Hamburg, Kiel, Leipzig, the Ruhr region and other industrial centres also went on strike. All in all, over 1,000,000 people took part in the January political strike. *Arbeiterräte* were set up in a number of cities during the strike.

At the head of the strike were revolutionary stewards elected by workers mainly from among the active trade unionists. However, the majority of revolutionary stewards were members of the Independent Social-Democratic Party, the activities of which were directed by collaborators. This weakened the forces of the strikers.

Though the January political strike ended in the defeat of the workers, its significance was very great. Lenin considered that this, strike "marks a turn of sentiment among the German proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 27, p. 546). p. 383

[129] This refers to the newspapers published in 1918-19 in English, German and French by the groups of foreign Communists set up at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.); they were for distribution among soldiers of the interventionist armies and among prisoners of war. The English newspaper *The Call* was distributed on the Northern Front. Two German publications, *Der Völkerfriede* (Peace of the Peoples) and *Weltrevolution* (World Revolution), were distributed among the German prisoners of war and in the Ukraine. The French weekly *La Lanterne* was distributed in the South of Russia. p. 385

[130] On December 18 (31), 1917, Lenin handed Svinhufvud, head of the Finnish bourgeois government, the decree of the Council of People's Commissars granting independence to Finland. The decree was endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918). p. 388

[131] Lenin refers to the preparations for a military-monarchist putsch in Germany. The leader of the German reactionaries, Kapp, gave his name to the revolt known as the "Kapp putsch" to which the Social-Democratic government offered no resistance. On March 13, 1920, army units were moved to Berlin and meeting with no resistance from the government declared it dissolved and set up a military junta. The German working class responded with a general strike and on March 17, under pressure from the working class, Kapp's government fell and state power again passed into the hands of the Social-Democrats, who by deceit succeeded in frustrating the general strike. p. 392

[132] The slogan calling for restoration of the 1772 frontiers implied the seizure of Byelorussia, Lithuania, part of the Ukraine as far as the middle Dnieper, and the southern part of Latvia; it reflected the aggressive tendencies of the Polish bourgeoisie and landowners. p. 394

[133] The *Second All-Russia Congress of Medical Workers* was held February 25-March 2, 1920. It was attended by 312 delegates, of whom 125 were Communists. The agenda of the Congress was the following: report of the C.C. of the All-Russia Union of Medical Workers, elections of the auditing commission, organisational report, sanitary service in the Republic, medical service and others. Lenin addressed the Congress with a brief speech of greeting on March 1. The Congress paid special attention to the organisation of the medical services. It also dealt with the questions of training new medical personnel and drafted a plan for the organisation of medical education. p. 401

[134] On February 16, 1920, Lenin was elected deputy to the Moscow Soviet from State Confectionery Factory No. 3 (now the Bolshevik Factory) and from the workers and employees of Khovrino Station, Nikolayevskaya (now Oktyabrskaya) Railway. On February 20 his

rights as member of the Moscow Soviet were confirmed by the credentials commission and he was issued with Deputy's Identification Card No. 1. Ever since then at every convocation of the Moscow City Soviet Deputy's Identification Card No. 1 has been issued in Lenin's name. p. 410

[135] The *Third All-Russia Congress of Water Transport Workers* was held in Moscow, March 15-23, 1920. It was attended by 161 delegates, of whom 144 were Communists. The agenda of the Congress included: the current situation and the tasks of the trade unions, reports of the C.C. and of the auditing commission, the international trade union movement, the food situation, trade unions and management of the country's economy, vocational and technical education, cultural and educational work. On March 15 Lenin delivered a speech on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 426

[136] On March 16 1920, a meeting dedicated to the memory of Y. M. Sverdlov was held in the Bolshoi Theatre. It was attended by members of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), All-Russia C.E.C., Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), representatives of trade unions and factory committees, and delegates of the gubernia congress of Soviets which was going on at the same time. Comrades who knew Sverdlov closely spoke of their work with him. Lenin spoke on behalf of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). p. 433

[137] The recording of Lenin's speeches was organised by the Central Press Agency. In 1919-21, 16 of his speeches were recorded. Gramophone records with his speeches were distributed in tens of thousands at agitation centres, peasant meetings, clubs, Red Army units and were of tremendous significance for mass agitation work. Particularly popular were his speeches "The Middle Peasants", "What Is Soviet Power?" and "The Tax in Kind". p. 435

[138] The Ninth Party Congress was held in Moscow from March 29 to April 5, 1920. The Congress opened in the Bolshoi Theatre with an introductory speech by Lenin. The following meetings of the Congress took place in one of the buildings of the Kremlin. Present at the Congress were 715 delegates, of whom 553 had the right to vote and 162 were delegates with voice but no vote; they represented 611,973 Party members. At the Congress there were delegates from the Party organisations of Central Russia, the Ukraine, Urals Siberia and of other districts recently liberated by the Red Army. Many delegates came to the Congress straight from the front.

The Congress adopted the following agenda: (1) Report of the Central Committee; (2) Immediate tasks of economic development; (3) Trade union movement; (4) Organisational questions; (5) Tasks of the Communist International; (6) Attitude to the co-operatives; (7) Transition to the militia system; (8) Election to the Central Committee; (9) Other business.

Lenin guided the work of the Congress. He delivered the report on the political work of the Central Committee and closed the debate on the report. He also spoke on economic development and on co-

operation, and made the speech on the closing of the Congress. He submitted a proposal on the list of candidates for membership to the C.C.

In its resolution "The Immediate Tasks of Economic Construction" the Congress pointed out that "the basic condition of economic rehabilitation of the country is steady implementation of the single economic plan for the coming historical epoch".

The Ninth Congress directives were taken as the basis for a plan by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO), the final draft of which was approved in December 1920 by the All-Russia Congress of Soviets. It was the first long-term scientific plan in history for the economic development of a vast country; it was calculated to create the production and technical basis of socialism.

Special attention was devoted to the organisation of production management. The resolution on the question pointed out the necessity of competent, firm and energetic one-man management.

The Congress emphasised the importance of utilising the achievements of science, technology and culture in the interests of socialist economy. The Congress put forward the task of enlisting specialists into the sphere of production and of establishing the atmosphere of comradely co-operation between workers and specialists.

The anti-Party group of Democratic Centralists (Sapronov, Osinsky, V. Smirnov and others) opposed the Party line on economic development. Using phrases about democratic centralism, this group spoke against the use of specialists, against centralised state administration, against one-man management and the personal responsibility of managers of enterprises; they insisted on unlimited corporate management. That group was supported at the Congress by Rykov, Tomsky, Milyutin, and Lomov, who also spoke against the principle of one-man management and claimed that corporate management was the only principle of management of industry from the Supreme Economic Council down to the management of a single factory.

The Congress resolutely denounced the democratic centralism group and rejected their anti-Party proposals.

Another important question discussed at the Congress was that of trade unions in connection with the adaptation of their work for economic tasks. The Congress severely criticised anarcho-syndicalist elements (Shlyapnikov, Lozovsky, Tomsky, Lutovinov), who advocated the "independence" of trade unions and counterposed them to the Communist Party and the Soviet power. Guided by Lenin's teaching the Congress pointed out that the trade unions, as school of communism, should organise the proletarian masses, train them in the work of management, raise their cultural and political level to the standards of communism, and prepare them for the role of active builders of communism.

At its closed meeting on April 4, the Congress elected a new Central Committee of 19 members and 12 alternate members. A. A. Andreyev, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. I. Kalinin, V. I. Lenin, Y. E. Rudzutak, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom) were among the newly elected C.C. members. p. 439

[139] Lenin refers to the savage terror resorted to by the Finnish bourgeoisie to suppress the proletarian revolution in 1918. Over 90,000 people were imprisoned or sent to concentration camps, nearly 18,000 were executed and nearly as many died of hunger or tortures. The number of victims of White Terror ten times exceeded the number of Finnish workers killed in the battles for the revolution. p. 449

[140] After the November revolution of 1918 in Germany the Right-wing leaders of German Social-Democracy exerted every effort to save the capitalist system. The Right Social-Democrats and the Independents seized the majority of seats in the *Arbeiterräte* which had sprung up during the revolution, and at their First All-Germany Congress, held December 16-21, 1918, in Berlin, succeeded in carrying through a resolution on handing over power to a government representing the interests of the bourgeoisie and on convening a Constituent Assembly. This actually meant the end of the *Arbeiterräte*. In January 1919 counter-revolutionary detachments set up by the War Minister Noske, Right Social-Democrat, brutally suppressed the revolutionary action of the Berlin proletariat. On January 15, armed detachments arrested and brutally murdered the leaders of the German working class, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Having crushed the January uprising and destroyed the best leaders of the German working class, the German bourgeoisie ensured the victory of the bourgeois parties during the elections to the Constituent Assembly on January 19, 1919. p. 449

[141] The rout of the foreign interventionists and whiteguards in 1919 and the consolidation of Soviet Russia's position in the world compelled the bourgeois rulers of Latvia to seek a peace treaty with the R.S.F.S.R. On March 25, 1920, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Latvia addressed a proposal to the Soviet Government to start peace negotiations. The peace conference of R.S.F.S.R. and Latvian representatives opened on April 16 in Moscow. The peace treaty was signed in Riga on August 11. p. 451

[142] By the beginning of 1920 Soviet Russia's position at home and abroad had been consolidated, and the ruling circles of Finland had to conclude a peace treaty with the R.S.F.S.R. On March 25 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland proposed to the Soviet Government to demarcate the frontier that was tantamount to starting negotiations on peace. The peace treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and Finland was signed on October 14, 1920 in the town of Yuryev (now Tartu). It confirmed the independence and sovereignty of Finland granted her by the Soviet Government in 1917. p. 451

[143] The Polish Government's agreement to start negotiations was merely a manoeuvre to cover war preparations against the Soviet Republic. In reply to the Soviet Government's many proposals (December 22, 1919, January 28, February 2, March 6 1920), the Po-

lish Government gave its consent only on March 2, 1920. But the Polish reactionaries sabotaged the negotiations and started hostilities on April 25, 1920. In the autumn of 1920, however, as a result of the Red Army's offensive the Polish Government had to agree to sign a peace treaty. The Treaty on an Armistice and Preliminary Peace Terms was signed in Riga on October 12, and the Peace Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. on the one side and Poland on the other was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921. p. 451

[144] Lenin refers to S. I. Gusev's pamphlet "Immediate Problems of Economic Development (On C.C., R.C.P.[B.] Theses. Materials for the Ninth Party Congress, Saratov, 1920)". The paragraph referred to by Lenin was included in the draft resolution with slight alterations.

In Gusev's pamphlet this point is worded as follows: "All enterprises which are not subsidiary to the chief economic task of the period should be developed to the extent that they do not interfere with the fulfilment of the main task. Subsidiary enterprises should be developed as required by the main task. In view of this a single economic plan should not be the sum total of production programmes worked out by individual industries and local economic councils on the basis of orders received from central and local organisations, but, on the contrary, such a plan should envisage the volume of production for each industry. p. 461

[145] Lenin refers to the meeting of the group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on March 15, 1920, at which Tomsky's theses on the "Tasks of the Trade Unions" were discussed. Lenin sharply criticised the theses, particularly article 7 on corporate management as the main method. But the All-Russia C.C.T.U. group took up an incorrect stand, and its majority voted for Tomsky's theses. p. 474

[146] The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On Centralisation of Management, Protection of Roads and Raising Their Traffic Capacity", published in *Izvestia* No. 59, March 28, 1918, was demagogically called the "Decree on Dictatorship" by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 475

[147] The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) set up a special committee to discuss the co-operative movement. At its meeting of April 2, 1920, the committee examined several variants of the theses on the co-operatives submitted for discussion at the Congress. The committee took as the basis the theses by V. P. Milyutin, who proposed to subordinate co-operatives to the state. After Lenin's speech against Milyutin's theses, the Congress by a majority vote passed a resolution which Lenin had supported. p. 480

[148] The document "On Compromises" is the beginning of an article which was not finished. The ideas set forth in this document were

elucidated in greater detail by Lenin in his book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism*, *an Infantile Disorder*.

The talk with the pacifist Lansbury, one of the leaders of the British Labour Party, took place in the Kremlin, February 21, 1920. p. 491

[149] See Engels, "Programm des blanquistischen Kommuneflüchtlinge", Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 18, S. 532. Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958. p. 492

[150] *Chartism*—a mass revolutionary movement of the British workers in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century. Its organisational centre was the London Workingmen's Association, which in 1838 drew up a petition (People's Charter) to be presented to Parliament, demanding universal franchise for men over 21, a secret ballot, repeal of the property qualifications for Parliamentary candidates, annual re-election of Parliament, and so forth. In 1840 the National Chartist Association was founded, which was the first mass party of workers in the labour movement. On May 2, 1842 the Chartists sent a second petition to Parliament, which included demands for a shorter working day, higher wages, and the like. The petition was rejected by Parliament. In reply the Chartists organised a general strike. In 1848 the Chartists planned a mass march to Parliament with a third petition, but the government brought in the troops to prevent it. Many months passed before the petition was examined and rejected. After 1848 the Chartist movement began to decline. The main reason for its failure was the absence of a clear programme and tactics and the lack of consistently revolutionary leadership. However, the Chartists had a tremendous influence on the political history of Britain and on the international working-class movement. Lenin described Chartism as "the first broad, truly mass and politically organised proletarian revolutionary movement" (see present edition, Vol. 29, "The Third International and Its Place in History"). p. 492

[151] The *First* (*Inaugural*) *All-Russia Congress of Mineworkers* was held in Moscow, April 1-6,1920. It met at the height of the struggle for the rehabilitation of the national economy. It was attended by 173 people, of whom 153 were delegates with the right to vote and 13 with voice but no vote; 85 were Communists. The Congress represented about 200,000 workers in the mining industry. Delegates from the oil industry could not attend the Congress, because the Caucasus was not yet freed from the whiteguards.

The delegates endorsed the following agenda: report of the organising bureau, tasks of the trade unions, the organisational question, tariffs, the state of the mining industry, the state of the coal industry, forms of participation of the unions in the organisation and management of industry, elections. Lenin, who was elected honorary chairman of the Congress, made a speech at one of its meetings. The Congress addressed greetings to miners in all countries. p. 495

[152] The *Third All-Russia Trade Union Congress* was held in Moscow, April 6-13, 1920, in the House of Trade Unions. It was attended by nearly 1,600 delegates, who represented over 4 million trade union members. The Bolsheviks constituted a majority at the Congress; 1,180 delegates were Bolsheviks and their supporters, 57 were Mensheviks, and 69 represented other parties.

The Congress based its work on the programme of economic development mapped out by the Ninth Party Congress. The agenda included the following items: report on the activities of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, report on the activities of the People's Commissariat of Labour, the tasks of the trade unions, organisational question, tariff policy, the supply of goods for workers, the role of the trade unions in the national economy, the international trade union movement, cultural and educational activities.

At the second plenary meeting of the Congress on April 7 Lenin delivered a speech in the name of the Council of People's Commissars. He was greeted with an ovation and the audience sang the *Internationale*. He defined the tasks of the Soviet Republic in peacetime and drew attention to the work of the trade unions in economic development. After Lenin's speech the Congress adopted a decision to issue an appeal to the workers and to all working people generally calling upon them to combat economic chaos by their joint efforts, to introduce strict discipline immediately in all trade union organisations and to intensify the work of drawing the masses in the building of communism through the medium of the trade unions and under the guidance of the Communist Party.

The Third All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions fully approved of the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in the sphere of economic development. The Congress condemned the Mensheviks who advocated the independence of the trade unions and attempted to oppose them to the Communist Party. p. 502

[153] This refers to the newspaper *Kommunistichesky Subbotnik* issued on one occasion only on the initiative of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). It was prepared by the editors of and contributors to the Moscow newspapers *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Bednota*, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, *Kommunistichesky Trud* and the ROSTA telegraph agency during the subbotnik of April 10, 1920. The initiative was supported by printers who participated with great enthusiasm in the first "newspaper" subbotnik. The newspaper was set and printed in the printing-shop of the All-Russia C.E.C. and circulated on April 11. Among its contributors were Lenin, Yaroslavsky, Kollontai, Demyan Bedny, Serafimovich and Timiryazev. p. 516

[154] The *Third All-Russia Congress of Textile Workers* was held in Moscow April 16-20, 1920. It was attended by 358 delegates, of whom 148 were Communists and 23 Communist supporters. The agenda of the Congress included the following: report of the Central Committee of the Union, the tasks of the trade unions, raw materials supplies, the state of the flax and woollen industries, the tasks

of the Union in rehabilitating transport, the food question, and safety regulations.

Lenin made a speech at its plenary meeting on April 19. On behalf of the Congress participants the Presidium congratulated Lenin on his fiftieth birthday, the delegates greeted him with loud applause. The Congress sent greetings to the Red Army and the Communist International. p. 519

[155] *Sukharevka Market* was a street market on Sukharevskaya (now Kolkhoznaya) Square, it was situated around the Sukharev tower built by Peter the First in 1692 . During the years of foreign military intervention and the Civil War it was the centre of speculation. The name became the synonym for profiteering. In 1932 the Sukharevka Market was finally abolished and in 1934 the Sukharev tower was demolished because it interfered with traffic. p. 522

[156] On April 23, 1920 the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) organised a meeting in honour of Lenin's fiftieth birthday. It was attended by Moscow Party functionaries. People who knew Lenin well, who had worked with him before the October Revolution, spoke at the meeting. Gorky, Lunacharsky, Olminsky and the proletarian poets Kirillov and Alexandrovsky spoke of Lenin with great warmth and deep respect. Lenin was given an ovation when he appeared. p. 526

[157] Lenin refers to a cartoon by the well-known artist Karrik who drew it in 1900 on the birthday of the Narodnik N. K. Mikhailovsky. Yelena Stasova sent the cartoon to Lenin on his fiftieth birthday. The drawing depicted Marxists as children who came to congratulate Mikhailovsky. Stasova wrote on the cartoon that at the time of Mikhailovsky's birthday the Party had been in its childhood, had few members, whereas it had since grown, "and this is the result of your work, this is thanks to your mind and talent". p. 526

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*September 1919–April 1920*)

1919

September 3	Lenin speaks on the current situation at a non-party conference of workers and Red Army men of Basmanny, Lefortovo, Alexeyevskoye and Sokolniki districts of Moscow.
September 5	Lenin telegraphs the Bashkirian Revolutionary Committee on the urgent need to transfer Bashkirian units for the defence of Petrograd; sends greetings to Bashkirian Red Army men.
September 12	Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of Defence which discusses the results of the work of the Moscow Coalfield, the supply of food for the workers of Petrograd and Kronstadt engaged on especially important defence work, etc.
September 16	Lenin writes to Gusev sharply criticising the conduct of operations by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and Trotsky for bad work on the Southern front.
September 18-20	Lenin writes "How the Bourgeoisie Utilises Renegades".
September 23	Lenin writes his letter "To the American Workers".
	Lenin speaks at the Fourth Moscow City Conference of Non-Party Working Women.
September 24	Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of Defence which discusses the area in which martial law is to be introduced in connection with Denikin's offensive and the preparations for the defence of that area, the organisation of universal military training, the supply of arms and clothing to the food army, etc.
September 26	Lenin gives guidance to a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) which discusses the organisation of a Party Week, measures to strengthen the Southern Front, the attitude towards the Cossacks, etc.

September-October	Lenin works on plans and notes for his pamphlet *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*.
October 2	Lenin sends a telegram to the Petrograd workers welcoming their efforts in carrying out mobilisation for the Southern Front.
October 3	Lenin writes his article "The Example of the Petrograd Workers".
October 5	Lenin writes his answers to questions put by the correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*.
October 6	Lenin sends greetings to the Second All-Russia Congress of the Russian Communist Youth League.
October 8	Lenin gives a directive to the Orenburg Gubernia Party Committee and the Orenburg Gubernia Executive Committee to provide reinforcements for the Southern Front.
October 10	Lenin writes his article "Greetings to Italian, French and German Communists".
	In a telegram to Ufa workers Lenin thanks them for restoring the bridge over the River Belaya ahead of schedule.
October 11	Lenin writes his article "The Workers' State and Party Week".
October 13	Lenin sends a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Fifth Army and to M. V. Frunze, commander of the Turkestan Front, conveying the C.C. directive to help the Southern Front.
October 14	In a telegram to the Petrograd Soviet's Executive Committee Lenin directs it to mobilise the workers of Soviet institutions for the front, repulse Yudenich's attack and continue helping the Southern Front.
October 15	Lenin instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to send wireless stations to the Southern Front without delay.
	Lenin instructs N. A. Semashko to compile a draft decree on the formation of a Committee for Aid to the Wounded at the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

October 16	Lenin speaks from the balcony of the Moscow Soviet building greeting worker Communists from Yaroslavl and Vladimir gubernias who are on their way to the Southern Front.
October 17	Lenin writes his appeal "To the Workers and Red Army Men of Petrograd".
October 17-18	Lenin requests the People's Commissariat of Food for information on food dispatched to Petrograd and transmits that information to the Petrograd Soviet.
October 18	Lenin sends directive to Petrograd Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to speed up the defeat of Yudenich; informs the committee of the dispatch of troops to the Petrograd Front.
October 19	Lenin writes his appeal "To the Red Army Men".
October 20	Lenin instructs the chairman of the Tula Gubernia Executive Committee and the Gubernia Military Committee to concentrate all forces on the war and war supplies, re-organising all work on war-time lines.
October 21	Lenin writes his "Results of Party Week in Moscow and Our Tasks".
October 22	Lenin instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to mobilise a further 20,000 Petrograd workers to crush Yudenich completely.
October 24	In the Blue Hall of the Moscow Trade Union House Lenin addresses worker Communists from Ivanovo-Voznesensk who have been mobilised for the front.
	Lenin addresses students of the Sverdlov Communist University who are leaving for the front.
October 28	Lenin addresses students at Adult Education Courses who are leaving for the front.
	Lenin writes letters to foreign Communists—to French and Italian Communists, to members of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Germany and to a group of Communists who have broken away from the C.P. of Germany.
October 30	Lenin writes his "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".

November 1 Lenin, on the direct line to Petrograd, gives instructions for the concentration of big forces to rout Yudenich.

November 5 Lenin writes his article "Greetings to the Workers of Petrograd" on the occasion of the second anniversary of Soviet power.

November 6 Lenin's "Soviet Power and the Status of Women" is published; the article was written on the occasion of the second anniversary of Soviet power.

Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) at which it is decided to call an All-Russia Party Conference and an All-Russia Congress of Soviets. It was also decided to provide reinforcements for the Southern Front.

November 7 Lenin's "Two Years of Soviet Power" is published.

Lenin speaks at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and factory committees on the occasion of the second anniversary of the October Revolution.

November 10 Lenin's letter "To the Communists of Turkestan" is published.

November 11 Lenin telegraphs to the Chairman of the Special Food Commission of the Eastern Front on the need to arrange food supplies for the Urals workers.

Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the organisation of a single forestry body (Lenin drafts the resolution), the mobilisation of Soviet office workers to get in stores of firewood, the provision of fuel for the Tretyakov Gallery, the libraries and other cultural and educational institutions, the organisation of comrades' disciplinary courts, etc.

November 13 The circular letter from the C C., R.C.P.(B.) to Party organisations, "The Fight to Overcome the Fuel Crisis", written by Lenin, is published.

November 18 Lenin speaks at the First All-Russia Conference on Party Work in the Countryside.

November 21 Lenin conducts a preliminary meeting of a group of delegates who have arrived for the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East.

Lenin takes the chair at a meeting of the Political Bureau which discusses a draft resolution on Soviet rule in the Ukraine written by Lenin and adopts it.

November 22 Lenin delivers a report to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East.

November 27 Lenin instructs the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council to discuss the question of printing in the newspaper *Ekonomichcskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) periodical reports on the development of the main branches of the economy.

November 29 Lenin gives guidance to the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) which discusses preparations for the All-Russia Party Conference and the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the question of Soviet power in the Ukraine, etc.

December 2-4 Eighth All-Russia Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); Lenin guides the work of the Conference.

December 2 Lenin delivers the opening speech at the Conference and is elected a member of the presidium; he takes the chair at the first (morning) session.

At the second (evening) session of the Conference Lenin delivers the report on the political work of the Central Committee and closes the debate on the report.

Lenin writes a draft resolution on foreign policy; the draft is accepted by the Conference.

December 3 Lenin speaks at the third (morning) session of the Conference on Soviet power in the Ukraine.

At the fourth (evening) session of the Conference Lenin sums up the debate on Soviet power in the Ukraine.

December 4 Lenin speaks at the First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Artels.

December 5-9 Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Red Army and Cossack Deputies. Lenin guides the work of the Congress.

December 5 Lenin is elected to the presidium of the Congress at the first session, and delivers the report of the

	All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars; he tables a draft resolution on foreign policy which is unanimously adopted.
December 6	At the second session Lenin closes the debate on the report of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.
December 8	Lenin takes part in the discussion on the report on Soviet development at the second meeting of the organisation section of the Congress.
December 9	Lenin is elected a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee at the fifth session of the Seventh Congress of Soviets.
	Lenin delivers a speech closing the Congress.
December 11	Lenin telegraphs Orel Gubernia Food Commissar to investigate the complaint of the peasants of Lavrovo Volost that grain requisitioning quotes are too high, and if it is true, to reduce them.
December 16	Lenin writes "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".
December (not earlier than 17th)	In two notes to D. I. Kursky! People's Commissar of Justice, Lenin indicates measures to combat red tape.
December 18	The newspaper *Smena* (The Younger Generation) prints Lenin's message of greeting sent on the occasion of the Petrograd Komsomol's "youth week".
December 19	Lenin speaks in Presnya District, Moscow, at a meeting in the Prokhorov (now Trekhgornaya) Textile Mill devoted to the December 1905 insurrection in Moscow.
December 20	Lenin speaks on subbotniks at the Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
	Lenin issues instructions to the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern Front and the Fifth Army, and also to bodies of the People's Commissariat of Railways to adopt urgent measures to send to the centre no fewer than 200 locomotives needed to move army and food-supply trains.
December 21	Lenin sends instructions to Tula Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Gubernia Executive Committee on the organisation of the urgent supply of food for Moscow.

December 23	Lenin is chairman of a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the question of improving conditions for scientists, the obligatory implementation of the laws adopted by the Sixth Congress of Soviets, etc.
December 26	Lenin telegraphs instructions to the Kharkov Gubernia Executive Committee to bend all efforts to deliver coal to the centre and speed up the repair of locomotives.
December 28	Lenin writes "Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine Apropos of the Victories over Denikin".
December	Lenin writes the draft resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the Borotba Party; he raises the question of dissolving that party which has acted against the interests of the proletariat.
Second half of December	Lenin compiles the draft of a comparative table of food consumption by the people of the R.S.F.S.R. before the imperialist war and after the Great October Socialist Revolution; he sends the draft to the Central Statistical Board for review.
December 31	Lenin attends a New Year's Eve meeting in the Corn Exchange in Basmanny District, Moscow, where he speaks of the victories of the Red Army and of the coming struggle to overcome economic chaos.

1920

January 5	Lenin entrusts A. I. Svidersky, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Food, to receive representatives of the workers of the Balashin Factory to discuss the question of supplies of food for the workers, and to inform him of the decision taken.
January 9	Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of Defence which discusses measures to improve the coal industry of the Urals and others.
January 10	Lenin writes a letter of greetings to a congress of women workers and peasants of Petrograd Gubernia.
January 12	In telegrams to the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Third and Fifth Armies Lenin sends

greetings to the Third Army on the occasion of its conversion into an Army of Labour; in a note to A. D. Tsyurupa, People's Commissar for Food, he drafts decision of the Council of People's Commissars on this question.

January 13 Lenin speaks at a meeting of the communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on discipline and one-man or corporate management of enterprises.

January 16 Lenin speaks on the question of labour conscription at a meeting of the communist group of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

In a letter to Tomsky at the Central Council of Trade Unions Lenin sharply criticises the red tape, bureaucratic methods and inefficiency of the trade Union leadership in respect of the employment of skilled workers to restore the railways; Lenin demands practical measures to combat bureaucratic methods.

January 17 Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses an increase in the area under crops, the work of the post and telegraph department (Lenin proposes amendments to the draft resolution), the abolition of the death penalty, measures to perpetuate the memory of Alesander Herzen, measures to improve the position of Soviet office workers, etc.

Lenin instructs M. V. Frunze, commander of the Turkestan Front, to speed up the building of the railway from Alexandrov-Gai to Emba and the transport of oil to the centre.

January 23 Lenin gives guidance to a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C.; introduces a draft directive on the compilation of Rules for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

In a letter to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky Lenin gives instructions on the compilation of a plan for the electrification of the R.S.F.S.R.

January 24 Lenin makes marginal notes on the drafts for the Rules for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

Lenin speaks at a non-party conference of workers and Red Army men in Presnya District, Moscow.

January 26 Lenin gives guidance to a conference on the co-operative movement; the conference discusses the unification of the various types of co-operatives and the abolition of the Council of Co-operative Congresses, and also the question of the role of consumers' co-operatives in the matter of food supplies; Lenin writes draft decisions and directives on the co-operative movement.

January 27 Lenin speaks at the Third All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils.

Lenin is chairman at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars; he submits for discussion a draft message to the Polish Government in connection with the preparations being made by bourgeois Poland to attack the Soviet Republic. The meeting adopts decrees on the co-operatives and discusses questions of the management of state farms, foreign trade, etc.

January 31 Lenin guides the work of the plenary meeting of the Party C.C. that approves the resolution on Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

February 1 Lenin writes a letter to members of the Council of Defence in which he outlines a number of urgent measures arising out of the catastrophic state of railway transport.

Lenin writes a note about a draft instruction on bonuses for factory and office workers.

Lenin speaks at a conference of chairmen of gubernia and uyezd executive committee on the question of the tasks of the committees.

February 2 At the first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Seventh Convocation, Lenin delivers the report on the work of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

February 3 Lenin gives instruction to the chairman of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Executive Committee to help the work of the Nizhni-Novgorod radio laboratory.

Before February 5 Lenin writes his "Draft (or Theses) of the R.C.P.'s Reply to the Letter of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany".

February 5 Lenin speaks at a meeting of the railwaymen of Moscow Junction.

February 7 Lenin writes "*À la guerre comme à la guerre!*"

February 9 Lenin speaks at a non-party conference of workers and Red Army men of Blagusha-Lefortovo District.

February 14 Lenin writes "A Publicist's Notes'.

February 17 Lenin enquires of G. K. Orjonihidze about the state of the Soviet troops of the Caucasian Front; he insists on the adoption of urgent measures to improve their fighting potential.

February 18 Lenin writes answers to the questions of the correspondents of the American Universal Service Agency and the British *Daily Express*.

February 21 Lenin writes a message "To the Women Workers" on the occasion of the elections to the Moscow Soviet.

Lenin instructs the executives of the Alexandrov-Gai-Emba Railway construction job to take urgent measures to accelerate the building of the railway; he proposes that the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic provide the necessary funds, transport, fuel and materials.

February 25 Lenin speaks at the Third All-Russia Conference of Directors of Adult Education Divisions of Gubernia Education Departments.

In a letter to the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Food Lenin proposes the urgent discussion of the question of improving the food supply of the workers of the Ukhtomsky (Lyubertsy) Factory, Moscow Gubernia.

February 27 Lenin instructs the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to turn all attention to the strengthening of the Western Front due to the need to prepare for war against bourgeois Poland in the event of her attack on Soviet Russia.

In a letter to the members of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Food, Lenin requests information on the possibility of increasing the food

rations of schoolteachers of Vesyegonsk Uyezd, Tver Gubernia.

February 28 Lenin's reply to J. Longuet is read at the Strassburg Congress of the French Socialist Party; in this letter Lenin says that the French Socialist Party can be accepted into the Third International only on condition that the opportunists are expelled from the party.

February Lenin is elected deputy to the Moscow Soviet by the workers of State Confectionery Factory No. 3 (now the Bolshevik Factory) and by the workers and office employees of Khovrino Station.

March 1 Lenin receives a delegation of workers from the Glukhovo Textile Mills; he requests information from the People's Commissariat of Food, the Central Textile Board and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture concerning the food situation among the workers of that concern.

Lenin delivers a report to the First All-Russia Congress of Working Cossacks.

Lenin speaks at the Second All-Russia Congress of Medical Workers.

March 2 The letter from the C.C. to R.C.P.(B.) organisations, written by Lenin, on the preparations for the Party Congress is published.

March 4 Lenin writes his article "International Working Women's Day".

March 6 Lenin speaks at a session of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies.

Lenin speaks at a special session of the Moscow Soviet on the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the Third International.

March 9 Lenin issues a directive to the Siberian Revolutionary Committee not to make any concessions to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks during negotiations concerning their participation in the government that is being set up in the Far East.

March 10 Lenin issues instructions to the people's commissariats on the convocation of a conference to elaborate urgent measures to improve the food situation of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers.

Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of Defence which discusses railway transport, the organisation of administrative sessions of the Council of Defence (tables amendments to the draft decision), the provision of workers to build the Kashira power station, the supply of food for the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers, etc.

March 11 In a telegram to G. K. Orjonikidze on the Caucasian Front Lenin gives instructions to transfer troops to the Western Front because of a possible attack of bourgeois-landowner Poland on Soviet Russia.

March 14 Lenin writes a note to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky about the first draft of a programmatic announcement on the work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO).

In a telegram to S. M. Kirov in Astrakhan Lenin asks his opinion concerning methods of transporting oil.

March 15 Lenin speaks at the Third All-Russia Congress of Water Transport Workers.

Lenin speaks at a meeting of the communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions where he defends the principle of one-man management of enterprises.

March 16 Lenin speaks at a Sverdlov memorial meeting held in the Bolshoi Theatre.

March 17 Lenin sends a telegram to G. K. Orjonikidze at the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front containing a directive to concentrate all efforts on the capture of Baku.

March 19 Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of Defence which discusses urgent measures for the security of the Republic's frontiers, water transport, and the setting up of a commission to compute the losses sustained by the Soviet Republic as a result of the attack by the imperialist powers and the blockade.

In a telegram to Maxim Gorky in Petrograd Lenin informs him of measures to improve supplies of food for scientists in compliance with his request.

March 22 Lenin receives representatives of the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East and talks with them about the formation of a Tatar Republic.

March 23	Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the draft rules for the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia, factories that are to be placed directly under the central bodies of the Supreme Economic Council (Lenin drafts the resolution), timber concessions to Estonia, etc.
March 25	Lenin is elected delegate to the Ninth All-Russia Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) by the Moscow City Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
	Lenin gives guidance to sessions of the Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars which discuss the transport of goods by water, increased deliveries of grain and fish to the centre, the formation of a Committee to Improve Scientists' Living Conditions, etc.
End of March	Lenin makes gramophone records of two speeches —"Work for the Railways" and "Labour Discipline".
March 29-April 5	Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Lenin guides the work of the Congress.
March 29	Lenin makes the opening speech at the Congress.
	Lenin is elected to the presidium.
	Lenin delivers a report on the political activities of the Central Committee of the Party.
March 30	Lenin closes the discussion on the Central Committee's report at the second (morning) session of the Congress.
March 31	Lenin speaks on economic development at the fourth (morning) session of the Congress.
March-April	Lenin writes his article "On Compromises".
April 2	Lenin sends a telegram to. G. K. Orjonikidze at the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front containing directives on the attitude to the Moslems, especially when advancing into Daghestan.
April 3	Lenin speaks on the co-operative movement at the eighth (evening) session of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

April 4-6	Lenin speaks at the First (Inaugural) All-Russia Congress of Mineworkers.
April 5	Lenin's election to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) is announced at the tenth (morning) session of the Congress.
	Lenin delivers a speech closing the Congress.
	Lenin makes a short speech on the list of candidates for membership of the Central Committee.
	The Congress delegates congratulate Lenin on his forthcoming fiftieth birthday; speeches are delivered by M. I. Kalinin, Y. M. Yaroslavsky, F. Y. Kon and others. It is decided to issue Lenin's *Collected Works*.
April 6	Lenin writes a letter to Adoratsky in Kazan asking whether it is possible for him to gather material on the history of the Civil War and the history of the Soviet Republic.
	Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses the nationalisation of stocks of books and the greater utilisation of books from Moscow and Petrograd to meet the requirements of the provinces and the rural areas.
April 7	Lenin speaks at the Third All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions.
April 8	Lenin writes his article "From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New".
April 16	Lenin gives guidance to a session of the Council of Labour and Defence which discusses measures to increase the delivery of oil, the establishment of control over the consumption of fuel on the railways, the situation in the Donets Basin coal industry, and others.
April 19	Lenin speaks at the Third All-Russia Congress of Textile Workers.
April 20	In a telegram to the Baltic Fleet in Petrograd Lenin orders an immediate start to be made on preparing Petrograd port for the export of timber.
April 23	Lenin speaks on the tasks of the Bolshevik Party at a meeting organised in honour of his fiftieth birthday by the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 30

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

31

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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PREFACE

Volume 31 contains Lenin's writings of the period between April and December 1920, during the conclusive defeat of the interventionists' basic forces in the war against the White Poles and Wrangel, the Entente's last puppets.

The bulk of the volume is made up of writings dealing with the defence of the Soviet Republic, the tasks of socialist construction, and problems of the international communist movement.

The volume includes "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* in which—from the experience of the history of Bolshevism, the three Russian revolutions, and the first years of the Soviet state—Lenin further developed the theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, set forth the strategy and the tactics of Leninism, and revealed the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the revolutionary experience of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin showed that international opportunism was the chief enemy within the working-class movement, branded the Second International's leaders as accomplices in the imperialists' banditry, and subjected to an exhaustive criticism the anti-Marxist sectarian tactics of the "Left-wing" Communists in the international working-class movement.

A considerable part of the volume consists of documents pertaining to preparations for the Second Congress of the Communist International, as well as Lenin's reports and speeches to the Congress. Among these are: "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions", Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question",

"Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International", "The Terms of Admission into the Communist International", "Report on the International Situation and the Fundamental Tasks of the Communist International, July 19, 1920" and others. These documents substantiated the programme and the organisational and tactical principles of the world communist movement.

The documents: "Letter to the Austrian Communists", "Letter to the German and the French Workers. Regarding the Discussion on the Second Congress of the Communist International". "On the Struggle Within the Italian Socialist Party" reflect the struggle waged by Lenin for the implementation of the Comintern's fundamental decisions in the world working-class movement.

In speeches on international and home situation delivered at the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Moscow Gubernia Conference, and trade union congresses, Lenin unmasked the Entente's new plan to strangle Soviet Russia with the aid of bourgeois-landowner Poland and Wrangel, and called upon the working class and the working masses to bend every effort to organise for victory over the interventionists, and summed up the Red Army's successes in smashing the military forces of Wrangel and bourgeois-landowner Poland.

A group of documents, viz., "Report on Concessions Delivered to the R.C.P.(B.) Group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, December 21, 1920", "Report on the Work of the Council of People's Commissars, December 22, 1920", "Draft Resolution of the Eighth Congress of Soviets on the Report on Electrification" and others deal with questions of state and economic construction and substantiate the part to be played by electrification in the restoration and socialist development of the national economy.

In the draft resolution for the Proletcult Congress, entitled "On Proletarian Culture", and in "Speech Delivered at an All-Russia Conference of Political Education Workers of Gubernia and Uyezd Education Departments, November 3, 1920" Lenin criticised Proletcult's distortion of the Party line in the sphere of culture, showed the role of the

Party and the proletarian state in building up a socialist culture, set forth the Marxist attitude towards the finest achievements of human thought and culture, and defined the tasks confronting art and education in the struggle for the consolidation of the proletariat's dictatorship.

In his speech "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues", delivered at the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League on October 2, 1920, Lenin named the fundamental task confronting the League—the communist upbringing of the rising generation, revealed the close links between that work and the struggle waged by the proletariat and all working people to build up a communist society, and formulated the principles of communist morality.

This volume contains twenty-one documents first published in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*. In his "Speech to Men of the Red Army Leaving for the Polish Front, May 5, 1920", and in his "Speech at an Enlarged Conference of Workers and Red Army Men in Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District of Moscow, May 13, 1920" Lenin called upon the workers and Red Army men to spare no effort to bring about the defeat of the enemy.

The documents, "To the Indian Revolutionary Association", "Reply to a Letter from the Joint Provisional Committee for the Communist Party of Britain", "Article Twenty of the Terms of Admission into the Communist International"—all deal with problems of the world communist movement.

A number of documents: "Speech at a Meeting Dedicated to the Laying of the Foundation Stone of a Monument to Liberated Labour, May 1, 1920", "To the Poor Peasants of the Ukraine", "Telegram to the Soviet Government of the Ukraine and the General Headquarters of the Southern Front", "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Cells' Secretaries of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), November 26, 1920", "Concluding Remarks" to the report at a general meeting of Communists of Zamoskvorechye District, November 29, 1920, "Telegram to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee of Armenia" have as their subject the tasks set by the rehabilitation and development of the national economy.

The following documents were published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*: "Draft Resolution on 'The Tasks of the Trade Unions, and the Methods of Their Accomplishment'" and "Speech Delivered at the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on Elections to the Moscow Committee, November 21, 1920". These deal with problems of Party and trade union work, and the foreign policy of the Soviet Government.

V. I. LENIN
May 1920

"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM—AN INFANTILE DISORDER*[1]

Written in April-May 1920

Published in pamphlet form, in June 1920

Published according to the text of the pamphlet, as checked against the manuscript

* Revised translation by Julius Katzer

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

The first page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript
"*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*,
April-May 1920

Reduced

The first page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript "Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder, April-May 1920

Reduced

I

IN WHAT SENSE WE CAN SPEAK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

In the first months after the proletariat in Russia had won political power (October 25 [November 7], 1917), it might have seemed that the enormous difference between backward Russia and the advanced countries of Western Europe would lead to the proletarian revolution in the latter countries bearing very little resemblance to ours. We now possess quite considerable international experience, which shows very definitely that certain fundamental features of our revolution have a significance that is not local, or peculiarly national, or Russian alone, but international. I am not speaking here of international significance in the broad sense of the term: not merely several but all the primary features of our revolution, and many of its secondary features, are of international significance in the meaning of its effect on all countries. I am speaking of it in the narrowest sense of the word, taking international significance to mean the international validity or the historical inevitability of a repetition, on an international scale, of what has taken place in our country. It must be admitted that certain fundamental features of our revolution do possess that significance.

It would, of course, be grossly erroneous to exaggerate this truth and to extend it beyond certain fundamental features of our revolution. It would also be erroneous to lose sight of the fact that, soon after the victory of the proletarian revolution in at least one of the advanced countries, a sharp change will probably come about: Russia will cease to be the model and will once again become a backward country (in the "Soviet" and the socialist sense).

At the present moment in history, however, it is the Russian model that reveals to *all* countries something —and something highly significant—of their near and inevitable future. Advanced workers in all lands have long realised this; more often than not, they have grasped it with their revolutionary class instinct rather than realised it. Herein lies the international "significance" (in the narrow sense of the word) of Soviet power, and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics. The "revolutionary" leaders of the Second International, such as Kautsky in Germany and Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler in Austria, have failed to understand this, which is why they have proved to be reactionaries and advocates of the worst kind of opportunism and social treachery. Incidentally, the anonymous pamphlet entitled *The World Revolution* (*Weltrevolution*), which appeared in Vienna in 1919 (*Sozialistische Bücherei*, Heft 11; Ignaz Brand*), very clearly reveals their entire thinking and their entire range of ideas, or, rather, the full extent of their stupidity, pedantry, baseness and betrayal of working-class interests—and that, moreover, under the guise of "defending" the idea of "world revolution".

We shall, however, deal with this pamphlet in greater detail some other time. We shall here note only one more point: in bygone days, when he was still a Marxist and not a renegade, Kautsky, dealing with the question as an historian, foresaw the possibility of a situation arising in which the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat would provide a model to Western Europe. This was in 1902, when Kautsky wrote an article for the revolutionary *Iskra*,[2] entitled "The Slavs and Revolution". Here is what he wrote in the article:

"At the present time [in contrast with 1848]** it would seem that not only have the Slavs entered the ranks of the revolutionary nations, but that the centre of revolutionary thought and revolutionary action is shifting more and more to the Slavs. The revolutionary centre is shifting from the West to the East. In the first half of the nineteenth

* Ignaz Brand, *Socialist Library*, Vol. 11.—*Ed.*

** Interpolations in brackets within quotations are by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

century it was located in France, at times in England. In 1848 Germany too joined the ranks of the revolutionary nations.... The new century has begun with events which suggest the idea that we are approaching a further shift of the revolutionary centre, namely, to Russia.... Russia, which has borrowed so much revolutionary initiative from the West, is now perhaps herself ready to serve the West as a source of revolutionary energy. The Russian revolutionary movement that is now flaring up will perhaps prove to be the most potent means of exorcising the spirit of flabby philistinism and coldly calculating politics that is beginning to spread in our midst, and it may cause the fighting spirit and the passionate devotion to our great ideals to flare up again. To Western Europe, Russia has long ceased to be a bulwark of reaction and absolutism. I think the reverse is true today. Western Europe is becoming Russia's bulwark of reaction and absolutism.... The Russian revolutionaries might perhaps have coped with the tsar long ago had they not been compelled at the same time to fight his ally—European capital. Let us hope that this time they will succeed in coping with both enemies, and that the new 'Holy Alliance' will collapse more rapidly than its predecessors did. However the present struggle in Russia may end, the blood and suffering of the martyrs whom, unfortunately, it will produce in too great numbers, will not have been in vain. They will nourish the shoots of social revolution throughout the civilised world and make them grow more luxuriantly and rapidly. In 1848 the Slavs were a killing frost which blighted the flowers of the people's spring. Perhaps they are now destined to be the storm that will break the ice of reaction and irresistibly bring with it a new and happy spring for the nations" (Karl Kautsky, "The Slavs and Revolution", *Iskra*, Russian Social-Democratic revolutiodary newspaper, No. 18, March 10, 1902).

How well Karl Kautsky wrote eighteen years ago!

II

AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION OF THE BOLSHEVIKS' SUCCESS

It is, I think, almost universally realised at present that the Bolsheviks could not have retained power for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years, without the most rigorous and truly iron discipline in our Party, or without the fullest and unreserved support from the entire mass of the working class, that is, from all thinking, honest, devoted and influential elements in it, capable of leading the backward strata or carrying the latter along with them.

The dictatorship of the proletariat means a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against

a *more powerful* enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased *tenfold* by their overthrow (even if only in a single country), and whose power lies, not only in the strength of international capital, the strength and durability of their international connections, but also in the *force of habit*, in the strength of *small-scale production*. Unfortunately, small-scale production is still widespread in the world, and small-scale production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale. All these reasons make the dictatorship of the proletariat necessary, and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate life-and-death struggle which calls for tenacity, discipline, and a single and inflexible will.

I repeat: the experience of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has clearly shown even to those who are incapable of thinking or have had no occasion to give thought to the matter that absolute centralisation and rigorous discipline of the proletariat are an essential condition of victory over the bourgeoisie.

This is often dwelt on. However, not nearly enough thought is given to what it means, and under what conditions it is possible. Would it not be better if the salutations addressed to the Soviets and the Bolsheviks were *more frequently* accompanied by a *profound analysis* of the reasons *why* the Bolsheviks have been able to build up the discipline needed by the revolutionary proletariat?

As a current of political thought and as a political party, Bolshevism has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during the *entire* period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it has been able to build up and maintain, under most difficult conditions, the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat.

The first questions to arise are: how is the discipline of the proletariat's revolutionary party maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? First, by the class-consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its tenacity, self-sacrifice and heroism. Second, by its ability to link up, maintain the closest contact, and—if you wish—merge, in certain measure, with the broadest masses of the working people—primarily

with the proletariat, *but also with the non-proletarian* masses of working people. Third, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided the broad masses have seen, *from their own experience*, that they are correct. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, all attempts to establish discipline inevitably fall flat and end up in phrase-mongering and clowning. On the other hand, these conditions cannot emerge at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated by a correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement.

The fact that, in 1917-20, Bolshevism was able, under unprecedentedly difficult conditions, to build up and successfully maintain the strictest centralisation and iron discipline was due simply to a number of historical peculiarities of Russia.

On the one hand, Bolshevism arose in 1903 on a very firm foundation of Marxist theory. The correctness of this revolutionary theory, and of it alone, has been proved, not only by world experience throughout the nineteenth century, but especially by the experience of the seekings and vacillations, the errors and disappointments of revolutionary thought in Russia. For about half a century—approximately from the forties to the nineties of the last century—progressive thought in Russia, oppressed by a most brutal and reactionary tsarism, sought eagerly for a correct revolutionary theory, and followed with the utmost diligence and thoroughness each and every "last word" in this sphere in Europe and America. Russia achieved Marxism—the only correct revolutionary theory—through the *agony* she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with

European experience. Thanks to the political emigration caused by tsarism, revolutionary Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed.

On the other hand, Bolshevism, which had arisen on this granite foundation of theory, went through fifteen years of practical history (1903-17) unequalled anywhere in the world in its wealth of experience. During those fifteen years, no other country knew anything even approximating to that revolutionary experience, that rapid and varied succession of different forms of the movement—legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, underground and open, local circles and mass movements, and parliamentary and terrorist forms. In no other country has there been concentrated, in so brief a period, such a wealth of forms, shades, and methods of struggle of all classes of modern society, a struggle which, owing to the backwardness of the country and the severity of the tsarist yoke, matured with exceptional rapidity, and assimilated most eagerly and successfully the appropriate "last word" of American and European political experience.

III

THE PRINCIPAL STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM

The years of preparation for revolution (1903-05). The approach of a great storm was sensed everywhere. All classes were in a state of ferment and preparation. Abroad, the press of the political exiles discussed the theoretical aspects of *all* the fundamental problems of the revolution. Representatives of the three main classes, of the three principal political trends—the liberal-bourgeois, the petty-bourgeois-democratic (concealed behind "social-democratic" and "social-revolutionary" labels[3]), and the proletarian-revolutionary—anticipated and prepared the impending open class struggle by waging a most bitter struggle on issues of programme and tactics. *All* the issues on which the masses waged an armed struggle in 1905-07 and 1917-20 can (and should) be studied, in their embryonic form, in

the press of the period. Among these three main trends there were, of course, a host of intermediate, transitional or half-hearted forms. It would be more correct to say that those political and ideological trends which were genuinely of a class nature crystallised in the struggle of press organs, parties, factions and groups; the classes were forging the requisite political and ideological weapons for the impending battles.

The years of revolution (1905-07). All classes came out into the open. All programmatical and tactical views were tested by the action of the masses. In its extent and acuteness, the strike struggle had no parallel anywhere in the world. The economic strike developed into a political strike, and the latter into insurrection. The relations between the proletariat, as the leader, and the vacillating and unstable peasantry, as the led, were tested in practice. The Soviet form of organisation came into being in the spontaneous development of the struggle. The controversies of that period over the significance of the Soviets anticipated the great struggle of 1917-20. The alternation of parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of struggle, of the tactics of boycotting parliament and that of participating in parliament, of legal and illegal forms of struggle, and likewise their interrelations and connections—all this was marked by an extraordinary wealth of content. As for teaching the fundamentals of political science to masses and leaders, to classes and parties alike, each month of this period was equivalent to an entire year of "peaceful" and "constitutional" development. Without the "dress rehearsal" of 1905, the victory of the October Revolution in 1917 would have been impossible.

The years of reaction (1907-10). Tsarism was victorious. All the revolutionary and opposition parties were smashed. Depression, demoralisation, splits, discord, defection, and pornography took the place of politics. There was an ever greater drift towards philosophical idealism; mysticism became the garb of counter-revolutionary sentiments. At the same time, however, it was this great defeat that taught the revolutionary parties and the revolutionary class a real and very useful lesson, a lesson in historical dialectics, a lesson in an understanding of the political struggle, and

in the art and science of waging that struggle. It is at moments of need that one learns who one's friends are. Defeated armies learn their lesson.

Victorious tsarism was compelled to speed up the destruction of the remnants of the pre-bourgeois, patriarchal mode of life in Russia. The country's development along bourgeois lines proceeded apace. Illusions that stood outside and above class distinctions, illusions concerning the possibility of avoiding capitalism, were scattered to the winds. The class struggle manifested itself in a quite new and more distinct way.

The revolutionary parties had to complete their education. They were learning how to attack. Now they had to realise that such knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge of how to retreat in good order. They had to realise—and it is from bitter experience that the revolutionary class learns to realise this—that victory is impossible unless one has learned how to attack and retreat properly. Of all the defeated opposition and revolutionary parties, the Bolsheviks effected the most orderly retreat, with the least loss to their "army", with its core best preserved, with the least significant splits (in point of depth and incurability), with the least demoralisation, and in the best condition to resume work on the broadest scale and in the most correct and energetic manner. The Bolsheviks achieved this only because they ruthlessly exposed and expelled the revolutionary phrase-mongers, those who did not wish to understand that one had to retreat, that one had to know how to retreat, and that one had absolutely to learn how to work legally in the most reactionary of parliaments, in the most reactionary of trade unions, co-operative and insurance societies and similar organisations.

The years of revival (1910-14). At first progress was incredibly slow, then, following the Lena events of 1912, it became somewhat more rapid. Overcoming unprecedented difficulties, the Bolsheviks thrust back the Mensheviks, whose role as bourgeois agents in the working-class movement was clearly realised by the entire bourgeoisie after 1905, and whom the bourgeoisie therefore supported in a thousand ways against the Bolsheviks. But the Bolsheviks

would never have succeeded in doing this had they not followed the correct tactics of combining illegal work with the utilisation of "legal opportunities", which they made a point of doing. In the elections to the arch-reactionary Duma, the Bolsheviks won the full support of the worker curia.

The First Imperialist World War (1914-17). Legal parliamentarianism, with an extremely reactionary "parliament", rendered most useful service to the Bolsheviks, the party of the revolutionary proletariat. The Bolshevik deputies were exiled to Siberia.[4] All shades of social-imperialism social-chauvinism, social-patriotism, inconsistent and consistent internationalism, pacifism, and the revolutionary repudiation of pacifist illusions found full expression in the Russian emigre press. The learned fools and the old women of the Second International, who had arrogantly and contemptuously turned up their noses at the abundance of "factions" in the Russian socialist movement and at the bitter struggle they were waging among themselves, were unable—when the war deprived them of their vaunted "legality" in *all* the advanced countries—to organise anything even approximating such a free (illegal) interchange of views and such a free (illegal) evolution of correct views as the Russian revolutionaries did in Switzerland and in a number of other countries. That was why both the avowed social-patriots and the "Kautskyites" of all countries proved to be the worst traitors to the proletariat. One of the principal reasons why Bolshevism was able to achieve victory in 1917-20 was that, since the end of 1914, it has been ruthlessly exposing the baseness and vileness of social-chauvinism and "Kautskyism" (to which Longuetism[5] in France, the views of the Fabians[6] and the leaders of the Independent Labour Party[7] in Britain, of Turati in Italy, etc., correspond), the masses later becoming more and more convinced, from their own experience, of the correctness of the Bolshevik views.

The second revolution in Russia (February to October 1917). Tsarism's senility and obsoleteness had (with the aid of the blows and hardships of a most agonising war) created an incredibly destructive force directed against it. Within a few days Russia was transformed into a democratic bourgeois republic, freer—in war conditions—than

any other country in the world. The leaders of the opposition and revolutionary parties began to set up a government, just as is done in the most "strictly parliamentary" republics- the fact that a man had been a leader of an opposition party in parliament—even in a most reactionary parliament—*facilitated* his subsequent role in the revolution.

In a few weeks the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries thoroughly assimilated all the methods and manners, the arguments and sophistries of the European heroes of the Second International, of the ministerialists[8] and other opportunist riff-raff. Everything we now read about the Scheidemanns and Noskes, about Kautsky and Hilferding, Renner and Austerlitz, Otto Bauer and Fritz Adler, Turati and Longuet, about the Fabians and the leaders of the Independent Labour Party of Britain—all this seems to us (and indeed is) a dreary repetition, a reiteration, of an old and familiar refrain. We have already witnessed all this in the instance of the Mensheviks. As history would have it, the opportunists of a backward country became the forerunners of the opportunists in a number of advanced countries.

If the heroes of the Second International have all gone bankrupt and have disgraced themselves over the question of the significance and role of the Soviets and Soviet rule; if the leaders of the three very important parties which have now left the Second International (namely, the German Independent Social-Democratic Party,[9] the French Longuetists and the British Independent Labour Party) have disgraced themselves and become entangled in this question in a most "telling" fashion; if they have all shown themselves slaves to the prejudices of petty-bourgeois democracy (fully in the spirit of the petty-bourgeois of 1848 who called themselves "Social-Democrats")—then we can only say that we have *already* witnessed *all this* in the instance of the Mensheviks. As history would have it, the Soviets came into being in Russia in 1905; from February to October 1917 they were turned to a false use by the Mensheviks, who went bankrupt because of their inability to understand the role and significance of the Soviets; today the idea of Soviet power has emerged *throughout the world* and is spreading

among the proletariat of all countries with extraordinary speed. Like our Mensheviks, the old heroes of the Second International are *everywhere* going bankrupt, because they are incapable of understanding the role and significance of the Soviets. Experience has proved that, on certain very important questions of the proletarian revolution, *all* countries will inevitably have to do what Russia has done.

Despite views that are today often to be met with in Europe and America, the Bolsheviks began their victorious struggle against the parliamentary and (in fact) bourgeois republic and against the Mensheviks in a very cautious manner, and the preparations they made for it were by no means simple. At the beginning of the period mentioned, we did *not* call for the overthrow of the government but explained that it was impossible to overthrow it *without* first changing the composition and the temper of the Soviets. We did not proclaim a boycott of the bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, but said—and following the April (1917) Conference of our Party began to state officially in the name of the Party—that a bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly would be better than a bourgeois republic without a Constituent Assembly, but that a "workers' and peasants'" republic, a Soviet republic, would be better than any bourgeois-democratic, parliamentary republic. Without such thorough, circumspect and long preparations, we could not have achieved victory in October 1917, or have consolidated that victory.

IV

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHICH ENEMIES WITHIN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT HELPED BOLSHEVISM DEVELOP, GAIN STRENGTH, AND BECOME STEELED

First and foremost, the struggle against opportunism, which in 1914 definitely developed into social-chauvinism and definitely sided with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. Naturally, this was Bolshevism's principal enemy within the working-class movement. It still remains the principal enemy on an international scale. The Bolsheviks have been devoting the greatest attention to this enemy.

This aspect of Bolshevik activities is now fairly well known abroad too.

It was, however, different with Bolshevism's other enemy within the working-class movement. Little is known in other countries of the fact that Bolshevism took shape, developed and became steeled in the long years of struggle against *petty-bourgeois revolutionism*, which smacks of anarchism, or borrows something from the latter and, in all essential matters, does not measure up to the conditions and requirements of a consistently proletarian class struggle. Marxist theory has established—and the experience of all European revolutions and revolutionary movements has fully confirmed—that the petty proprietor, the small master (a social type existing on a very extensive and even mass scale in many European countries), who, under capitalism, always suffers oppression and very frequently a most acute and rapid deterioration in his conditions of life, and even ruin, easily goes to revolutionary extremes, but is incapable of perseverance, organisation, discipline and steadfastness. A petty bourgeois driven to frenzy by the horrors of capitalism is a social phenomenon which, like anarchism, is characteristic of all capitalist countries. The instability of such revolutionism, its barrenness, and its tendency to turn rapidly into submission, apathy, phantasms, and even a frenzied infatuation with one bourgeois fad or another—all this is common knowledge. However, a theoretical or abstract recognition of these truths does not at all rid revolutionary parties of old errors, which always crop up at unexpected occasions, in somewhat new forms, in a hitherto unfamiliar garb or surroundings, in an unusual—a more or less unusual—situation.

Anarchism was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist sins of the working-class movement. The two monstrosities complemented each other. And if in Russia—despite the more petty-bourgeois composition of her population as compared with the other European countries—anarchism's influence was negligible during the two revolutions (of 1905 and 1917) and the preparations for them, this should no doubt stand partly to the credit of Bolshevism, which has always waged a most ruthless and uncompromising struggle against opportunism. I say "partly",

since of still greater importance in weakening anarchism's influence in Russia was the circumstance that in the past (the seventies of the nineteenth century) it was able to develop inordinately and to reveal its absolute erroneousness, its unfitness to serve the revolutionary class as a guiding theory.

When it came into being in 1903, Bolshevism took over the tradition of a ruthless struggle against petty-bourgeois, semi-anarchist (or dilettante-anarchist) revolutionism, a tradition which had always existed in revolutionary Social-Democracy and had become particularly strong in our country during the years 1900-03, when the foundations for a mass party of the revolutionary proletariat were being laid in Russia. Bolshevism took over and carried on the struggle against a party which, more than any other, expressed the tendencies of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, namely, the "Socialist-Revolutionary" Party, and waged that struggle on three main issues. First, that party, which rejected Marxism, stubbornly refused (or, it might be more correct to say: was unable) to understand the need for a strictly objective appraisal of the class forces and their alignment, before taking any political action. Second, this party considered itself particularly "revolutionary", or "Left", because of its recognition of individual terrorism, assassination—something that we Marxists emphatically rejected. It was, of course, only on grounds of expediency that we rejected individual terrorism, whereas people who were capable of condemning "on principle" the terror of the Great French Revolution, or, in general, the terror employed by a victorious revolutionary party which is besieged by the bourgeoisie of the whole world, were ridiculed and laughed to scorn by Plekhanov in 1900-03, when he was a Marxist and a revolutionary. Third, the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" thought it very "Left" to sneer at the comparatively insignificant opportunist sins of the German Social-Democratic Party, while they themselves imitated the extreme opportunists of that party, for example, on the agrarian question, or on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

History, incidentally, has now confirmed on a vast and world-wide scale the opinion we have always advocated,

namely, that German *revolutionary* Social-Democracy (note that as far back as 1900-03 Plekhanov demanded Bernstein's expulsion from the Party, and in 1913 the Bolsheviks, always continuing this tradition, exposed Legien's[10] baseness, vileness and treachery) *came closest* to being the party the revolutionary proletariat needs in order to achieve victory. Today, in 1920, after all the ignominious failures and crises of the war period and the early post-war years, it can be plainly seen that, of all the Western parties, the German revolutionary Social-Democrats produced the finest leaders, and recovered and gained new strength more rapidly than the others did. This may be seen in the instances both of the Spartacists[11] and the Left, proletarian wing of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, which is waging an incessant struggle against the opportunism and spinelessness of the Kautskys, Hilferdings, Ledebours and Crispiens. If we now cast a glance to take in a complete historical period, namely, from the Paris Commune to the first Socialist Soviet Republic, we shall find that Marxism's attitude to anarchism in general stands out most definitely and unmistakably. In the final analysis, Marxism proved to be correct, and although the anarchists rightly pointed to the opportunist views on the state prevalent among most of the socialist parties, it must be said, first, that this opportunism was connected with the distortion, and even deliberate suppression, of Marx's views on the state (in my book, *The State and Revolution*, I pointed out that for thirty-six years, from 1875 to 1911, Bebel withheld a letter by Engels,[12] which very clearly, vividly, bluntly and definitively exposed the opportunism of the current Social-Democratic views on the state); second, that the rectification of these opportunist views, and the recognition of Soviet power and its superiority to bourgeois parliamentary democracy proceeded most rapidly and extensively among those trends in the socialist parties of Europe and America that were most Marxist.

The struggle that Bolshevism waged against "Left" deviations within its own Party assumed particularly large proportions on two occasions: in 1908, on the question of whether or not to participate in a most reactionary "parliament" and in the legal workers' societies, which were

being restricted by most reactionary laws; and again in 1918 (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk[13]), on the question of whether one "compromise" or another was permissible.

In 1908 the "Left" Bolsheviks were expelled from our Party for stubbornly refusing to understand the necessity of participating in a most reactionary "parliament".[14] The "Lefts"—among whom there were many splendid revolutionaries who subsequently were (and still are) commendable members of the Communist Party—based themselves particularly on the successful experience of the 1905 boycott. When, in August 1905, the tsar proclaimed the convocation of a consultative "parliament",[15] the Bolsheviks called for its boycott, in the teeth of all the opposition parties and the Mensheviks, and the "parliament" was in fact swept away by the revolution of October 1905.[16] The boycott proved correct at the time, not because non-participation in reactionary parliaments is correct in general, but because we accurately appraised the objective situation, which was leading to the rapid development of the mass strikes first into a political strike, then into a revolutionary strike, and finally into an uprising. Moreover, the struggle centred at that time on the question of whether the convocation of the first representative assembly should be left to the tsar, or an attempt should be made to wrest its convocation from the old regime. When there was not, and could not be, any certainty that the objective situation was of a similar kind, and when there was no certainty of a similar trend and the same rate of development, the boycott was no longer correct.

The Bolsheviks' boycott of "parliament" in 1905 enriched the revolutionary proletariat with highly valuable political experience and showed that, when legal and illegal, parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of struggle are combined, it is sometimes useful and even essential to reject parliamentary forms. It would, however, be highly erroneous to apply this experience blindly, imitatively and uncritically to *other* conditions and *other* situations. The Bolsheviks' boycott of the Duma in 1906 was a mistake, although a minor and easily remediable one.* The boycott

* What applies to individuals also applies—with necessary modifications—to politics and parties. It is not he who makes no mistakes

of the Duma in 1907, 1908 and subsequent years was a most serious error and difficult to remedy, because, on the one hand, a very rapid rise of the revolutionary tide and its conversion into an uprising was not to be expected, and, on the other hand, the entire historical situation attendant upon the renovation of the bourgeois monarchy called for legal and illegal activities being combined. Today, when we look back at this fully completed historical period, whose connection with subsequent periods has now become quite clear, it becomes most obvious that in 1908-14 the Bolsheviks *could not have* preserved (let alone strengthened and developed) the core of the revolutionary party of the proletariat, had they not upheld, in a most strenuous struggle, the viewpoint that it was *obligatory* to combine legal and illegal forms of struggle, and that it was *obligatory* to participate even in a most reactionary parliament and in a number of other institutions hemmed in by reactionary laws (sick benefit societies, etc.).

In 1918 things did not reach a split. At that time the "Left" Communists formed only a separate group or "faction" within our Party, and that not for long. In the same year, 1918, the most prominent representatives of "Left Communism", for example, Comrades Radek and Bukharin, openly acknowledged their error. It had seemed to them that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a compromise with the imperialists, which was inexcusable on principle and harmful to the party of the revolutionary proletariat. It was indeed a compromise with the imperialists, but it was a compromise which, under the circumstances, *had to be made*.

Today, when I hear our tactics in signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty being attacked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, for instance, or when I hear Comrade Lansbury say, in a conversation with me, "Our British trade union leaders say that if it was permissible for the Bolsheviks to compromise, it is permissible for them to compromise too", I usually reply by first of all giving a simple and "popular" example:

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that is intelligent. There are no such men, nor can there be. It is he whose errors are not very grave and who is able to rectify them easily and quickly that is intelligent.

Imagine that your car is held up by armed bandits. You hand them over your money, passport, revolver and car. In return you are rid of the pleasant company of the bandits. That is unquestionably a compromise. "*Do ut des*" (I "give" you money, fire-arms and a car "so that you give" me the opportunity to get away from you with a whole skin). It would, however, be difficult to find a sane man who would declare such a compromise to be "inadmissible on principle", or who would call the compromiser an accomplice of the bandits (even though the bandits might use the car and the fire-arms for further robberies). Our compromise with the bandits of German imperialism was just that kind of compromise.

But when, in 1914-18 and then in 1918-20, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia, the Scheidemannites (and to a large extent the Kautskyites) in Germany, Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler (to say nothing of the Renners and Co.) in Austria, the Renaudels and Longuets and Co. in France, the Fabians, the Independents and the Labourites in Britain entered into *compromises* with the bandits of their own bourgeoisie, and sometimes of the "Allied" bourgeoisie, and *against* the revolutionary proletariat of their own countries, all these gentlemen were actually acting as *accomplices in banditry*.

The conclusion is clear: to reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which it is difficult even to consider seriously. A political leader who desires to be useful to the revolutionary proletariat must be able to distinguish *concrete* cases of compromises that are inexcusable and are an expression of opportunism and *treachery*; he must direct all the force of criticism, the full intensity of merciless exposure and relentless war, against *these concrete* compromises, and not allow the past masters of "practical" socialism and the parliamentary Jesuits to dodge and wriggle out of responsibility by means of disquisitions on "compromises in general". It is in this way that the "leaders" of the British trade unions, as well as of the Fabian society and the "Independent" Labour Party, dodge responsibility *for the treachery they have perpetrated*, for having made *a compromise* that is really

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

tantamount to the worst kind of opportunism, treachery and betrayal.

There are different kinds of compromises. One must be able to analyse the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to share in the loot. In politics this is by no means always as elementary as it is in this childishly simple example. However, anyone who is out to think up for the workers some kind of recipe that will provide them with cut-and-dried solutions for all contingencies, or promises that the policy of the revolutionary proletariat will never come up against difficult or complex situations, is simply a charlatan.

To leave no room for misinterpretation, I shall attempt to outline, if only very briefly, several fundamental rules for the analysis of concrete compromises.

The party which entered into a compromise with the German imperialists by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been evolving its internationalism in practice ever since the end of 1914. It was not afraid to call for the defeat of the tsarist monarchy and to condemn "defence of country" in a war between two imperialist robbers. The parliamentary representatives of this party preferred exile in Siberia to taking a road leading to ministerial portfolios in a bourgeois government. The revolution that overthrew tsarism and established a democratic republic put this party to a new and tremendous test—it did not enter into any agreements with its "own" imperialists, but prepared and brought about their overthrow. When it had assumed political power, this party did not leave a vestige of either landed or capitalist ownership. After making public and repudiating the imperialists' secret treaties, this party proposed peace to *all* nations, and yielded to the violence of the Brest-Litovsk robbers only after the Anglo-French imperialists had torpedoed the conclusion of a peace, and after the Bolsheviks had done everything humanly possible to hasten the revolution in Germany and other countries.

The absolute correctness of this compromise, entered into by such a party in such a situation, is becoming ever clearer and more obvious with every day.

The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia (like all the leaders of the Second International throughout the world, in 1914-20) began with treachery—by directly or indirectly justifying "defence of country", i.e., the defence of *their own* predatory bourgeoisie. They continued their treachery by entering into a coalition with the bourgeoisie of *their own* country, and fighting, together with *their own* bourgeoisie, against the revolutionary proletariat of their own country. Their bloc, first with Kerensky and the Cadets, and then with Kolchak and Denikin in Russia—like the bloc of their *confrères* abroad with the bourgeoisie of *their* respective countries—was in fact desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. From beginning to end, *their* compromise with the bandits of imperialism meant their becoming *accomplices* in imperialist banditry.

V

"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM IN GERMANY. THE LEADERS, THE PARTY, THE CLASS, THE MASSES

The German Communists we must now speak of call themselves, not "Left-wingers" but, if I am not mistaken, an "opposition on principle".[17] From what follows below it will, however, be seen that they reveal all the symptoms of the "infantile disorder of Leftism".

Published by the "local group in Frankfurt am Main", a pamphlet reflecting the point of view of this opposition, and entitled *The Split in the Communist Party of Germany* (*The Spartacus League*) sets forth the substance of this Opposition's views most saliently, and with the utmost clarity and concision. A few quotations will suffice to acquaint the reader with that substance:

"The Communist Party is the party of the most determined class struggle...."

"...Politically, the transitional period [between capitalism and Socialism]: is one of the proletarian dictatorship...."

"...The question arises: who is to exercise this dictatorship: *the Communist Party or the proletarian class*? ... *Fundamentally*, should we strive for a dictatorship of the Communist Party, or for a dictatorship of the proletarian class?..."

(All italics as in the original.)

The author of the pamphlet goes on to accuse the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany of seeking ways of achieving a *coalition with the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*, and of raising "*the question of recognising*, *in principle*, *all political means*" of struggle, including parliamentarianism, with the sole purpose of concealing its actual and main efforts to form a coalition with the Independents. The pamphlet goes on to say:

"The opposition have chosen another road. They are of the opinion that the question of the rule of the Communist Party and of the dictatorship of the Party is merely one of tactics. In any case, rule by the Communist Party is the ultimate form of any party rule. *Fundamentally*, we must work for the dictatorship of the proletarian class. And all the measures of the Party, its organisations, methods of struggle, strategy and tactics should be directed to that end. Accordingly, all compromise with other parties, all reversion to parliamentary forms of struggle, which have become historically and politically obsolete, and any policy of manoeuvring and compromise must be emphatically rejected." "Specifically proletarian methods of revolutionary struggle must be strongly emphasised. New forms of organisation must be created on the widest basis and with the widest scope in order to enlist the most extensive proletarian circles and strata to take part in the revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party. A *Workers' Union*, based on factory organisations, should be the rallying point for all revolutionary elements. This should unite all workers who follow the slogan: 'Get out of the trade unions!' It is here that the militant proletariat musters its ranks for battle. Recognition of the class struggle, of the Soviet system and of the dictatorship should be sufficient for enrolment. All subsequent political education of the fighting masses and their political orientation in the struggle are the task of the Communist Party, which stands outside the Workers' Union....

"...Consequently, two Communist parties are now arrayed against each other:

"*One is a party of leaders*, which is out to organise the revolutionary struggle and to direct it from *above*, accepting compromises and parliamentarianism so as to create a situation enabling it to join a coalition government exercising a dictatorship.

"*The other is a mass party*, which expects an upsurge of the revolutionary struggle from *below*, which knows and applies a single method in this struggle—a method which clearly leads to the goal—

and rejects all parliamentary and opportunist methods. That single method is the unconditional *overthrow of the bourgeoisie*, so as then to set up the proletarian class dictatorship for the accomplishment of socialism....

"...There—the dictatorship of leaders; here—the dictatorship of the masses! That is our slogan."

Such are the main features characterising the views of the opposition in the German Communist Party.

Any Bolshevik who has consciously participated in the development of Bolshevism since 1903 or has closely observed that development will at once say, after reading these arguments, "What old and familiar rubbish! What 'Left-wing' childishness!"

But let us examine these arguments a little more closely.

The mere presentation of the question—"dictatorship of the party *or* dictatorship of the class; dictatorship (party) of the leaders, *or* dictatorship (party) of the masses?"—testifies to most incredibly and hopelessly muddled thinking. These people want to *invent* something quite out of the ordinary, and, in their effort to be clever, make themselves ridiculous. It is common knowledge that the masses are divided into classes; that the masses can be contrasted with classes only by contrasting the vast majority in general, regardless of division according to status in the social system of production, with categories holding a definite status in the social system of production; that as a rule and in most cases—at least in present-day civilised countries—classes are led by political parties; that political parties, as a general rule, are run by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions, and are called leaders. All this is elementary. All this is clear and simple. Why replace this with some kind of rigmarole, some new Volapük? On the one hand, these people seem to have got muddled when they found themselves in a predicament, when the party's abrupt transition from legality to illegality upset the customary, normal and simple relations between leaders, parties and classes. In Germany, as in other European countries, people had become too accustomed to legality, to the free and proper election of "leaders" at regular party congresses,

to the convenient method of testing the class composition of parties through parliamentary elections, mass meetings, the press, the sentiments of the trade unions and other associations, etc. When, instead of this customary procedure, it became necessary, because of the stormy development of the revolution and the development of the civil war, to go over rapidly from legality to illegality, to combine the two, and to adopt the "inconvenient" and "undemocratic" methods of selecting, or forming, or preserving "groups of leaders"—people lost their bearings and began to think up some unmitigated nonsense. Certain members of the Communist Party of Holland,* who were unlucky enough to be born in a small country with traditions and conditions of highly privileged and highly stable legality, and who had never seen a transition from legality to illegality, probably fell into confusion, lost their heads, and helped create these absurd inventions.

On the other hand, one can see simply a thoughtless and incoherent use of the now "fashionable" terms: "masses" and "leaders". These people have heard and memorised a great many attacks on "leaders", in which the latter have been contrasted with the "masses"; however, they have proved unable to think matters out and gain a clear understanding of what it was all about.

The divergence between "leaders" and "masses" was brought out with particular clarity and sharpness in all countries at the end of the imperialist war and following it. The principal reason for this was explained many times by Marx and Engels between the years 1852 and 1892, from the example of Britain. That country's exclusive position led to the emergence, from the "masses", of a semi-petty-bourgeois, opportunist "labour aristocracy". The leaders of this labour aristocracy were constantly going over to the bourgeoisie, and were directly or indirectly on its pay roll. Marx earned the honour of incurring the hatred of these disreputable persons by openly branding them as traitors. Present-day (twentieth-century) imperialism has given a few advanced countries an exceptionally privileged position, which, everywhere in the Second International, has produced a certain type of traitor, opportunist, and

* See Note No. 41.—*Ed.*

social-chauvinist leaders, who champion the interests of their own craft, their own section of the labour aristocracy. The opportunist parties have become separated from the "masses", i.e., from the broadest strata of the working people, their majority, the lowest-paid workers. The revolutionary proletariat cannot be victorious unless this evil is combated, unless the opportunist, social-traitor leaders are exposed, discredited and expelled. That is the policy the Third International has embarked on.

To go so far, in this connection, as to contrast, *in general*, the dictatorship of the masses with a dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd, and stupid. What is particularly amusing is that, in fact, instead of the old leaders, who hold generally accepted views on simple matters, *new leaders* are brought forth (under cover of the slogan "Down with the leaders!"), who talk rank stuff and nonsense. Such are Laufenberg, Wolffheim, Horner,[18] Karl Schröder, Friedrich Wendel and Karl Erler,* in Germany. Erler's attempts to give the question more "profundity" and to proclaim that in general political parties are unnecessary and "bourgeois" are so supremely absurd that one can only shrug one's shoulders. It all goes to drive home the truth that a minor error can always assume monstrous proportions if it is persisted in, if profound justifications are sought for it, and if it is carried to its logical conclusion.

Repudiation of the Party principle and of Party discipline—that is what the opposition has *arrived at*. And this is tantamount to completely disarming the proletariat *in*

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* Karl Erler, "The Dissolution of the Party", *Kommunistische Arbeiterzeitung*,[19] Hamburg, February 7, 1920, No. 32: "The working class cannot destroy the bourgeois state without destroying bourgeois democracy, and it cannot destroy bourgeois democracy without destroying parties."

The more muddle-headed of the syndicalists and anarchists in the Latin countries may derive "satisfaction" from the fact that solid Germans, who evidently consider themselves Marxists (by their articles in the above-mentioned paper K. Erler and K. Horner have shown most plainly that they consider themselves sound Marxists, but talk incredible nonsense in a most ridiculous manner and reveal their failure to understand the ABC of Marxism), go to the length of making utterly inept statements. Mere acceptance of Marxism does not save one from errors. We Russians know this especially well, because Marxism has been very often the "fashion" in our country.

the interests of the bourgeoisie. It all adds up to that petty-bourgeois diffuseness and instability, that incapacity for sustained effort, unity and organised action, which, if encouraged, must inevitably destroy any proletarian revolutionary movement. From the standpoint of communism, repudiation of the Party principle means attempting to leap from the eve of capitalism's collapse (in Germany), not to the lower or the intermediate phase of communism, but to the higher. We in Russia (in the third year since the overthrow of the bourgeoisie) are making the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism or the lower stage of communism. Classes still remain, and will remain everywhere *for years after* the proletariat's conquest of power. Perhaps in Britain, where there is no peasantry (but where petty proprietors exist), this period may be shorter. The abolition of classes means, not merely ousting the landowners and the capitalists—that is something we accomplished with comparative ease; it also means *abolishing the small commodity producers*, and they *cannot be ousted*, or crushed; we *must learn to live* with them. They can (and must) be transformed and re-educated only by means of very prolonged, slow, and cautious organisational work. They surround the proletariat on every side with a petty-bourgeois atmosphere, which permeates and corrupts the proletariat, and constantly causes among the proletariat relapses into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternating moods of exaltation and dejection. The strictest centralisation and discipline are required within the political party of the proletariat in order to counteract this, in order that the *organisational* role of the proletariat (and that is its *principal* role) may be exercised correctly, successfully and victoriously. The dictatorship of the proletariat means a persistent struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit in millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle

cannot be waged successfully. It is a thousand times easier to vanquish the centralised big bourgeoisie than to "vanquish" the millions upon millions of petty proprietors; however, through their ordinary, everyday, imperceptible, elusive and demoralising activities, they produce the *very* results which the bourgeoisie need and which tend to *restore* the bourgeoisie. Whoever brings about even the slightest weakening of the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during its dictatorship), is actually aiding the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.

Parallel with the question of the leaders—the party—the class—the masses, we must pose the question of the "reactionary" trade unions. But first I shall take the liberty of making a few concluding remarks based on the experience of our Party. There *have always been* attacks on the "dictatorship of leaders" in our Party. The first time I heard such attacks, I recall, was in 1895, when, officially, no party yet existed, but a central group was taking shape in St. Petersburg, which was to assume the leadership of the district groups.[20] At the Ninth Congress of our Party (April 1920)[21] there was a small opposition, which also spoke against the "dictatorship of leaders", against the "oligarchy", and so on. There is therefore nothing surprising, new, or terrible in the "infantile disorder" of "Left-wing communism" among the Germans. The ailment involves no danger, and after it the organism even becomes more robust. In our case, on the other hand, the rapid alternation of legal and illegal work, which made it necessary to keep the general staff—the leaders—under cover and cloak them in the greatest secrecy, sometimes gave rise to extremely dangerous consequences. The worst of these was that in 1912 the *agent provocateur* Malinovsky got into the Bolshevik Central Committee. He betrayed scores and scores of the best and most loyal comrades, caused them to be sentenced to penal servitude, and hastened the death of many of them. That he did not cause still greater harm was due to the correct balance between legal and illegal work. As member of the Party's Central Committee and Duma deputy, Malinovsky was forced, in order to gain our confidence, to help us establish legal daily papers, which even under tsarism were able to wage a struggle

against the Menshevik opportunism and to spread the fundamentals of Bolshevism in a suitably disguised form. While, with one hand, Malinovsky sent scores and scores of the finest Bolsheviks to penal servitude and death, he was obliged, with the other, to assist in the education of scores and scores of thousands of new Bolsheviks through the medium of the legal press. Those German (and also British, American, French and Italian) comrades who are faced with the task of learning how to conduct revolutionary work within the reactionary trade unions would do well to give serious thought to this fact.*

In many countries, including the most advanced, the bourgeoisie are undoubtedly sending *agents provocateurs* into the Communist parties and will continue to do so. A skilful combining of illegal and legal work is one of the ways to combat this danger.

VI

SHOULD REVOLUTIONARIES WORK IN REACTIONARY TRADE UNIONS?

The German "Lefts" consider that, as far as they are concerned, the reply to this question is an unqualified negative. In their opinion, declamations and angry outcries (such as uttered by K. Horner in a particularly "solid" and particularly stupid manner) against "reactionary" and "counter-revolutionary" trade unions are sufficient "proof" that it is unnecessary and even inexcusable for revolutionaries and Communists to work in yellow, social-chauvinist, compromising and counter-revolutionary trade unions of the Legien type.

* Malinovsky was a prisoner of war in Germany. On his return to Russia when the Bolsheviks were in power he was instantly put on trial and shot by our workers. The Mensheviks attacked us most bitterly for our mistake—the fact that an *agent provocateur* had become a member of the Central Committee of our Party. But when, under Kerensky, we demanded the arrest and trial of Rodzyanko, the Chairman of the Duma, because he had known, even before the war, that Malinovsky was an *agent provocateur* and *had not informed* the Trudoviks and the workers in the Duma, neither the Mensheviks nor the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Kerensky government supported our demand, and Rodzyanko remained at large and made off unhindered to join Denikin.

However firmly the German "Lefts" may be convinced of the revolutionism of such tactics, the latter are in fact fundamentally wrong, and contain nothing but empty phrases.

To make this clear, I shall begin with our own experience, in keeping with the general plan of the present pamphlet, which is aimed at applying to Western Europe whatever is universally practicable, significant and relevant in the history and the present-day tactics of Bolshevism.

In Russia today, the connection between leaders, party, class and masses, as well as the attitude of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its party to the trade unions, are concretely as follows: the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organised in the Soviets; the proletariat is guided by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which, according to the figures of the latest Party Congress (April 1920), has a membership of 611,000. The membership varied greatly both before and after the October Revolution, and used to be much smaller, even in 1918 and 1919.[22] We are apprehensive of an excessive growth of the Party, because careerists and charlatans, who deserve only to be shot, inevitably do all they can to insinuate themselves into the ranks of the ruling party. The last time we opened wide the doors of the Party—to workers and peasants only—was when (in the winter of 1919) Yudenich was within a few versts of Petrograd, and Denikin was in Orel (about 350 versts from Moscow), i.e., when the Soviet Republic was in mortal danger, and when adventurers, careerists, charlatans and unreliable persons generally could not possibly count on making a profitable career (and had more reason to expect the gallows and torture) by joining the Communists.[23] The Party, which holds annual congresses (the most recent on the basis of one delegate per 1,000 members), is directed by a Central Committee of nineteen elected at the Congress, while the current work in Moscow has to be carried on by still smaller bodies, known as the Organising Bureau and the Political Bureau, which are elected at plenary meetings of the Central Committee, five members of the Central Committee to each bureau. This, it would appear, is a full-fledged "oligarchy". No important political or organisational question is decided by any state

institution in our republic without the guidance of the Party's Central Committee.

In its work, the Party relies directly on the *trade unions*, which, according to the data of the last congress (April 1920), now have a membership of over four million and are formally *non-Party*. Actually, all the directing bodies of the vast majority of the unions, and primarily, of course, of the all-Russia general trade union centre or bureau (the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions), are made up of Communists and carry out all the directives of the Party. Thus, on the whole, we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is L closely linked up with the *class* and the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *class dictatorship* is exercised. Without close contacts with the trade unions, and without their energetic support and devoted efforts, not only in economic, *but also in military* affairs, it would of course have been impossible for us to govern the country and to maintain the dictatorship for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years. In practice, these very close contacts naturally call for highly complex and diversified work in the form of propaganda, agitation, timely and frequent conferences, not only with the leading trade union workers, but with influential trade union workers generally; they call for a determined struggle against the Mensheviks, who still have a certain though very small following to whom they teach all kinds of counter-revolutionary machinations, ranging from an ideological defence of (*bourgeois*) democracy and the preaching that the trade unions should be "independent" (independent of proletarian state power!) to sabotage of proletarian discipline, etc., etc.

We consider that contacts with the "masses" through the trade unions are not enough. In the course of our revolution, practical activities have given rise to such institutions as *non-Party workers' and peasants' conferences*, and we strive by every means to support, develop and extend this institution in order to be able to observe the temper of the masses, come closer to them, meet their requirements, promote the best among them to state posts, etc. Under a

recent decree on the transformation of the People's Commissariat of State Control into the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, non-Party conferences of this kind have been empowered to select members of the State Control to carry out various kinds of investigations, etc.

Then, of course, all the work of the Party is carried on through the Soviets, which embrace the working masses, irrespective of occupation. The district congresses of Soviets are *democratic* institutions, the like of which even the best of the democratic republics of the bourgeois world have never known; through these congresses (whose proceedings the Party endeavours to follow with the closest attention), as well as by continually appointing class-conscious workers to various posts in the rural districts, the proletariat exercises its role of leader of the peasantry, gives effect to the dictatorship of the urban proletariat, wages a systematic struggle against the rich, bourgeois, exploiting and profiteering peasantry, etc.

Such is the general mechanism of the proletarian state power viewed "from above", from the standpoint of the practical implementation of the dictatorship. We hope that the reader will understand why the Russian Bolshevik, who has known this mechanism for twenty-five years and has seen it develop out of small, illegal and underground circles, cannot help regarding all this talk about "from above" or "from below", about the dictatorship of leaders or the dictatorship of the masses, etc., as ridiculous and childish nonsense, something like discussing whether a man's left leg or right arm is of greater use to him.

We cannot but regard as equally ridiculous and childish nonsense the pompous, very learned, and frightfully revolutionary disquisitions of the German Lefts to the effect that Communists cannot and should not work in reactionary trade unions, that it is permissible to turn down such work, that it is necessary to withdraw from the trade unions and create a brand-new and immaculate "Workers' Union" invented by very pleasant (and, probably, for the most part very youthful) Communists, etc., etc.

Capitalism inevitably leaves socialism the legacy, on the one hand, of the old trade and craft distinctions among the workers, distinctions evolved in the course of centuries;

on the other hand, trade unions, which only very slowly, in the course of years and years, can and will develop into broader industrial unions with less of the craft union about them (embracing entire industries, and not only crafts, trades and occupations), and later proceed, through these industrial unions, to eliminate the division of labour among people, to educate and school people, give them *all-round development and an all-round* training, so that they are able to do everything. Communism is advancing and must advance towards that goal, and *will reach* it, but only after very many years. To attempt in practice, today, to anticipate this future result of a fully developed, fully stabilised and constituted, fully comprehensive and mature communism would be like trying to teach higher mathematics to a child of four.

We can (and must) begin to build socialism, not with abstract human material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material bequeathed to us by capitalism. True, that is no easy matter, but no other approach to this task is serious enough to warrant discussion.

The trade unions were a tremendous step forward for the working class in the early days of capitalist development, inasmuch as they marked a transition from the workers' disunity and helplessness to the *rudiments* of class organisation. When the *revolutionary party of the proletariat*, the *highest* form of proletarian class organisation, began to take shape (and the Party will not merit the name until it learns to weld the leaders into one indivisible whole with the class and the masses) the trade unions inevitably began to reveal *certain* reactionary features, a certain craft narrow-mindedness, a certain tendency to be non-political, a certain inertness, etc. However, the development of the proletariat did not, and could not, proceed anywhere in the world otherwise than through the trade unions, through reciprocal action between them and the party of the working class. The proletariat's conquest of political power is a gigantic step forward for the proletariat as a class, and the Party must more than ever and in a new way, not only in the old, educate and guide the trade unions, at the same time bearing in mind that they are

and will long remain an indispensable "school of communism" and a preparatory school that trains proletarians to exercise their dictatorship, an indispensable organisation of the workers for the gradual transfer of the management of the whole economic life of the country to the working class (and not to the separate trades), and later to all the working people.

In the sense mentioned above, a *certain* "reactionism" in the trade unions is *inevitable* under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not to understand this means a complete failure to understand the fundamental conditions of the *transition* from capitalism to socialism. It would be egregious folly to fear *this* "reactionism" or to try to *evade* or leap over it, for it would mean fearing that function of the proletarian vanguard which consists in training, educating, enlightening and drawing into the new life the most backward strata and masses of the working class and the peasantry. On the other hand, it would be a still graver error to postpone the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat until a time when there will not be a single worker with a narrow-minded craft outlook, or with craft and craft-union prejudices. The art of politics (and the Communist's correct understanding of his tasks) consists in correctly gauging the conditions and the moment when the vanguard of the proletariat can successfully assume power, when it is able—during and after the seizure of power—to win adequate support from sufficiently broad strata of the working class and of the non-proletarian working masses, and when it is able thereafter to maintain, consolidate and extend its rule by educating, training and attracting ever broader masses of the working people.

Further. In countries more advanced than Russia, a certain reactionism in the trade unions has been and was bound to be manifested in a far greater measure than in our country. Our Mensheviks found support in the trade unions (and to some extent still do so in a small number of unions), as a result of the latter's craft narrow-mindedness, craft selfishness and opportunism. The Mensheviks of the West have acquired a much firmer footing in the trade unions; there the *craft-union*, *narrow-minded*, *selfish*, *case-hardened*, *covetous*, *and petty-bourgeois* "*labour*

aristocracy", *imperialist-minded*, *and imperialist-corrupted*, has developed into a much stronger section than in our country. That is incontestable. The struggle against the Gomperses, and against the Jouhaux, Hendersons, Merrheims, Legiens and Co. in Western Europe is much more difficult than the struggle against our Mensheviks, who are an *absolutely homogeneous* social and political type. This struggle must be waged ruthlessly, and it must unfailingly be brought—as we brought it—to a point when all the incorrigible leaders of opportunism and social-chauvinism are completely discredited and driven out of the trade unions. Political power cannot be captured (and the attempt to capture it should not be made) until the struggle has reached a certain stage. This "certain stage" will be *different* in different countries and in different circumstances; it can be correctly gauged only by thoughtful, experienced and knowledgeable political leaders of the proletariat in each particular country. (In Russia the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, a few days after the proletarian revolution of October 25, 1917, were one of the criteria of the success of this struggle. In these elections the Mensheviks were utterly defeated; they received 700,000 votes—1,400,000 if the vote in Transcaucasia is added—as against 9,000,000 votes polled by the Bolsheviks. See my article, "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat",[24] in the *Communist International*[25] No. 7-8.)

We are waging a struggle against the "labour aristocracy" in the name of the masses of the workers and in order to win them over to our side; we are waging the struggle against the opportunist and social-chauvinist leaders in order to win the working class over to our side. It would be absurd to forget this most elementary and most self-evident truth. Yet it is this very absurdity that the German "Left" Communists perpetrate when, *because* of the reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the trade union *top leadership*, they jump to me conclusion that ... we must withdraw from the trade unions, refuse to work in them, and create new and *artificial* forms of labour organisation! This is so unpardonable a blunder that it is tantamount to the greatest service Communists could render the bourgeoisie. Like all the opportunist,

social-chauvinist, and Kautskyite trade union leaders, our Mensheviks are nothing but "agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement" (as we have always said the Mensheviks are), or "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class", to use the splendid and profoundly true expression of the followers of Daniel De Leon in America. To refuse to work in the reactionary trade unions means leaving the insufficiently developed or backward masses of workers under the influence of the reactionary leaders, the agents of the bourgeoisie, the labour aristocrats, or "workers who have become completely bourgeois" (cf. Engels's letter to Marx in 1858 about the British workers[26]).

This ridiculous "theory" that Communists should not work in reactionary trade unions reveals with the utmost clarity the frivolous attitude of the "Left" Communists towards the question of influencing the "masses", and their misuse of clamour about the "masses". If you want to help the "masses" and win the sympathy and support of the "masses", you should not fear difficulties, or pinpricks, chicanery, insults and persecution from the "leaders" (who, being opportunists and social-chauvinists, are in most cases directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie and the police), but must absolutely *work wherever the masses are to be found*. You must be capable of any sacrifice, of overcoming the greatest obstacles, in order to carry on agitation and propaganda systematically, perseveringly, persistently and patiently in those institutions, societies and associations—even the most reactionary—in which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses are to be found. The trade unions and the workers' co-operatives (the latter sometimes, at least) are the very organisations in which the masses are to be found. According to figures quoted in the Swedish paper *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* of March 10, 1920, the trade union membership in Great Britain increased from 5,500,000 at the end of 1917 to 6,600,000 at the end of 1918, an increase of 19 per cent. Towards the close of 1919, the membership was estimated at 7,500,000. I have not got the corresponding figures for France and Germany to hand, but absolutely incontestable and generally known facts testify to a rapid rise in the trade union membership in these countries too.

These facts make crystal clear something that is confirmed by thousands of other symptoms, namely, that class-consciousness and the desire for organisation are growing among the proletarian masses, among the rank and file, among the backward elements. Millions of workers in Great Britain, France and Germany are *for the first time* passing from a complete lack of organisation to the elementary, lowest, simplest, and (to those still thoroughly imbued with bourgeois-democratic prejudices) most easily comprehensible form of organisation, namely, the trade unions; yet the revolutionary but imprudent Left Communists stand by, crying out "the masses", "the masses!" but *refusing to work within the trade unions*, on the pretext that they are "reactionary", and invent a brand-new, immaculate little "Workers' Union", which is guiltless of bourgeois-democratic prejudices and innocent of craft or narrow-minded craft-union sins, a union which, they claim, will be (!) a broad organisation. "Recognition of the Soviet system and the dictatorship" will be the *only* (!) condition of membership. (See the passage quoted above.)

It would be hard to imagine any greater ineptitude or greater harm to the revolution than that caused by the "Left" revolutionaries! Why, if we in Russia today, after two and a half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, were to make "recognition of the dictatorship" a condition of trade union membership, we would be doing a very foolish thing, damaging our influence among the masses, and helping the Mensheviks. The task devolving on Communists is to *convince* the backward elements, to work *among* them, and not to *fence themselves off* from them with artificial and childishly "Left" slogans.

There can be no doubt that the Gomperses, the Hendersons, the Jouhaux and the Legiens are very grateful to those "Left" revolutionaries who, like the German opposition "on principle" (heaven preserve us from such "principles"!), or like some of the revolutionaries in the American Industrial Workers of the World[27] advocate quitting the reactionary trade unions and refusing to work in them. These men, the "leaders" of opportunism, will no doubt resort to every device of bourgeois diplomacy and to the aid of

bourgeois governments, the clergy, the police and the courts, to keep Communists out of the trade unions, oust them by every means, make their work in the trade unions as unpleasant as possible, and insult, bait and persecute them. We must be able to stand up to all this, agree to make any sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to various stratagems, artifices and illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, as long as we get into the trade unions, remain in them, and carry on communist work within them at all costs. Under tsarism we had no "legal opportunities" whatsoever until 1905. However, when Zubatov, agent of the secret police, organised Black-Hundred workers' assemblies and workingmen's societies for the purpose of trapping revolutionaries and combating them, we sent members of our Party to these assemblies and into these societies (I personally remember one of them, Comrade Babushkin, a leading St. Petersburg factory worker, shot by order of the tsar's generals in 1906). They established contacts with the masses, were able to carry on their agitation, and succeeded in wresting workers from the influence of Zubatov's agents.* Of course, in Western Europe, which is imbued with most deep-rooted legalistic, constitutionalist and bourgeois-democratic prejudices, this is more difficult of achievement. However, it can and must be carried out, and systematically at that.

The Executive Committee of the Third International must, in my opinion, positively condemn, and call upon the next congress of the Communist International to condemn both the policy of refusing to work in reactionary trade unions in general (explaining in detail why such refusal is unwise, and what extreme harm it does to the cause of the proletarian revolution) and, in particular, the line of conduct of some members of the Communist Party of Holland, who—whether directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, wholly or partly, it does not matter—have supported this erroneous policy. The Third Interna-

* The Gomperses, Hendersons, Jouhaux and Legiens are nothing but Zubatovs, differing from our Zubatov only in their European garb and polish, and the civilised, refined and democratically suave manner of conducting their despicable policy.

tional must break with the tactics of the Second International; it must not evade or play down points at issue, but must pose them in a straightforward fashion. The whole truth has been put squarely to the "Independents" (the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany); the whole truth must likewise be put squarely to the "Left" Communists.

VII

SHOULD WE PARTICIPATE IN BOURGEOIS PARLIAMENTS?

It is with the utmost contempt—and the utmost levity—that the German "Left" Communists reply to this question in the negative. Their arguments? In the passage quoted above we read:

> "...All reversion to parliamentary forms of struggle, which have become historically and politically obsolete, must be emphatically rejected...."

This is said with ridiculous pretentiousness, and is patently wrong. "Reversion" to parliamentarianism, forsooth! Perhaps there is already a Soviet republic in Germany? It does not look like it! How, then, can one speak of "reversion"? Is this not an empty phrase?

Parliamentarianism has become "historically obsolete". That is true in the propaganda sense. However, everybody knows that this is still a far cry from overcoming it in practice. Capitalism could have been declared—and with full justice—to be "historically obsolete" many decades ago, but that does not at all remove the need for a very long and very persistent struggle on the basis of capitalism. Parliamentarianism is "historically obsolete" from the standpoint of world history, i.e., the era of bourgeois parliamentarianism is over, and the era of the proletarian dictatorship has begun. That is incontestable. But world history is counted in decades. Ten or twenty years earlier or later makes no difference when measured with the yardstick of world history; from the standpoint of world history it is a trifle that cannot be considered even approximately. But for that very reason, it is a glaring theoretical error to apply the yardstick of world history to practical politics.

Is parliamentarianism "politically obsolete"? That is quite a different matter. If that were true, the position of the "Lefts" would be a strong one. But it has to be proved by a most searching analysis, and the "Lefts" do not even know how to approach the matter. In the "Theses on Parliamentarianism", published in the *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* No. 1, February 1920, and obviously expressing the Dutch-Left or Left-Dutch strivings, the analysis, as we shall see, is also hopelessly poor.

In the first place, contrary to the opinion of such outstanding political leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the German "Lefts", as we know, considered parliamentarianism "politically obsolete" even in January 1919. We know that the "Lefts" were mistaken. This fact alone utterly destroys, at a single stroke, the proposition that parliamentarianism is "politically obsolete". It is for the "Lefts" to prove why their error, indisputable at that time, is no longer an error. They do not and cannot produce even a shred of proof. A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils *in practice* its obligations towards its *class* and the *working people*. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of its rectification—that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate and train its *class*, and then the *masses*. By failing to fulfil this duty and give the utmost attention and consideration to the study of their patent error, the "Lefts" in Germany (and in Holland) have proved that they are not a *party of a class*, but a circle, not a *party of the masses*, but a group of intellectualists and of a few workers who ape the worst features of intellectualism.

Second, in the same pamphlet of the Frankfurt group of "Lefts", which we have already cited in detail, we read:

"...The millions of workers who still follow the policy of the Centre [the Catholic "Centre" Party] are counter-revolutionary. The rural proletarians provide the legions of counter-revolutionary troops." (Page 3 of the pamphlet.)

Everything goes to show that this statement is far too sweeping and exaggerated. But the basic fact set forth here is incontrovertible, and its acknowledgement by the "Lefts" is particularly clear evidence of their mistake. How can one say that "parliamentarianism is politically obsolete", when "millions" and "legions" of *proletarians* are not only still in favour of parliamentarianism in general, but are downright "counter-revolutionary"!? It is obvious that parliamentarianism in Germany is *not yet* politically obsolete. It is obvious that the "Lefts" in Germany have mistaken *their desire*, their politico-ideological attitude, for objective reality. That is a most dangerous mistake for revolutionaries to make. In Russia—where, over a particularly long period and in particularly varied forms, the most brutal and savage yoke of tsarism produced revolutionaries of diverse shades, revolutionaries who displayed amazing devotion, enthusiasm, heroism and will power—in Russia we have observed this mistake of the revolutionaries at very close quarters; we have studied it very attentively and have a first-hand knowledge of it; that is why we can also see it especially clearly in others. Parliamentarianism is of course "politically obsolete" to the Communists in Germany; but—and that is the whole point—we must *not* regard what is obsolete *to us* as something obsolete *to a class*, *to the masses*. Here again we find that the "Lefts" do not know how to reason, do not know how to act as the party of a *class*, as the party of the *masses*. You must not sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. That is incontestable. You must tell them the bitter truth. You are in duty bound to call their bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices what they are—prejudices. But at the same time you must *soberly* follow the *actual* state of the class-consciousness and preparedness of the entire class (not only of its communist vanguard), and of all the *working people* (not only of their advanced elements).

Even if only a fairly large *minority* of the industrial workers, and not "millions" and "legions", follow the lead of the Catholic clergy—and a similar minority of rural workers follow the landowners and kulaks (Grossbauern)—it *undoubtedly* signifies that parliamentarianism in Germany

has *not yet* politically outlived itself, that participation in parliamentary elections and in the struggle on the parliamentary rostrum is *obligatory* on the party of the revolutionary proletariat *specifically* for the purpose of educating the backward strata of *its own class*, and for the purpose of awakening and enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden and ignorant rural *masses*. Whilst you lack the strength to do away with bourgeois parliaments and every other type of reactionary institution, you *must* work within them because *it is there* that you will still find workers who are duped by the priests and stultified by the conditions of rural life; otherwise you risk turning into nothing but windbags.

Third, the "Left" Communists have a great deal to say in praise of us Bolsheviks. One sometimes feels like telling them to praise us less and to try to get a better knowledge of the Bolsheviks' tactics. We took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Russian bourgeois parliament in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? If not, then this should be clearly stated and proved, for it is necessary in evolving the correct tactics for international communism. If they were correct, then certain conclusions must be drawn. Of course, there can be no question of placing conditions in Russia on a par with conditions in Western Europe. But as regards the particular question of the meaning of the concept that "parliamentarianism has become politically obsolete", due account should be taken of our experience, for unless concrete experience is taken into account such concepts very easily turn into empty phrases. In September-November 1917, did we, the Russian Bolsheviks, not have *more* right than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarianism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long time or a short time, but how far the masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to dissolve the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dissolved). It is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact that, in September-November 1917, the urban working-class and the soldiers and peasants

of Russia were, because of a number of special conditions, exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disband the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before *and after* the proletariat conquered political power. That these elections yielded exceedingly valuable (and to the proletariat, highly useful) political results has, I make bold to hope, been proved by me in the above-mentioned article, which analyses in detail the returns of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia.

The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible: it has been proved that, far from causing harm to the revolutionary proletariat, participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament, even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic and even *after* such a victory, actually helps that proletariat to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be done away with; it *facilitates* their successful dissolution, and *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarianism "politically obsolete". To ignore this experience, while at the same time claiming affiliation to the Communist *International*, which must work out its tactics internationally (not as narrow or exclusively national tactics, but as international tactics), means committing a gross error and actually abandoning internationalism in deed, while recognising it in word.

Now let us examine the "Dutch-Left" arguments in favour of non-participation in parliaments. The following is the text of Thesis No. 4, the most important of the above-mentioned "Dutch" theses:

> "When the capitalist system of production has broken down, and society is in a state of revolution, parliamentary action gradually loses importance as compared with the action of the masses themselves. When, in these conditions, parliament becomes the centre and organ of the counter-revolution, whilst, on the other hand, the labouring class builds up the instruments of its power in the Soviets, it may even prove necessary to abstain from all and any participation in parliamentary action."

The first sentence is obviously wrong, since action by the masses, a big strike, for instance, is more important than parliamentary activity at *all* times, and not only

during a revolution or in a revolutionary situation. This obviously untenable and historically and politically incorrect argument merely shows very clearly that the authors completely ignore both the general European experience (the French experience before the revolutions of 1848 and 1870; the German experience of 1878-90, etc.) and the Russian experience (see above) of the importance of *combining* legal and illegal struggle. This question is of immense importance both in general and in particular, because in *all* civilised and advanced countries the time is rapidly approaching when such a combination will more and more become—and has already partly become—mandatory on the party of the revolutionary proletariat, inasmuch as civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is maturing and is imminent, and because of savage persecution of the Communists by republican governments and bourgeois governments generally, which resort to any violation of legality (the example of America is edifying enough), etc. The Dutch, and the Lefts in general, have utterly failed to understand this highly important question.

The second sentence is, in the first place, historically wrong. We Bolsheviks participated in the most counter-revolutionary parliaments, and experience has shown that this participation was not only useful but indispensable to the party of the revolutionary proletariat, after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905), so as to pave the way for the second bourgeois revolution (February 1917), and then for the socialist revolution (October 1917). In the second place, this sentence is amazingly illogical. If a parliament becomes an organ and a "centre" (in reality it never has been and never can be a "centre", but that is by the way) of counter-revolution, while the workers are building up the instruments of their power in the form of the Soviets, then it follows that the workers must prepare—ideologically, politically and technically—for the struggle of the Soviets against parliament, for the dispersal of parliament by the Soviets. But it does not at all follow that this dispersal is hindered, or is not facilitated, by the presence of a Soviet opposition *within* the counter-revolutionary parliament. In the course of our victorious struggle against Denikin and Kolchak, we never found that the existence

of a Soviet and proletarian opposition in their camp was immaterial to our victories. We know perfectly well that the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918 was not hampered but was actually facilitated by the fact that, within the counter-revolutionary Constituent Assembly which was about to be dispersed, there was a consistent Bolshevik, as well as an inconsistent, Left Socialist-Revolutionary Soviet opposition. The authors of the theses are engaged in muddled thinking; they have forgotten the experience of many, if not all, revolutions, which shows the great usefulness, during a revolution, of a *combination* of mass action outside a reactionary parliament with an opposition sympathetic to (or, better still, directly supporting) the revolution within it. The Dutch, and the "Lefts" in general, argue in this respect like doctrinaires of the revolution, who have never taken part in a real revolution, have never given thought to the history of revolutions, or have naively mistaken subjective "rejection" of a reactionary institution for its actual destruction by the combined operation of a number of objective factors. The surest way of discrediting and damaging a new political (and not only political) idea is to reduce it to absurdity on the plea of defending it. For any truth, if "overdone" (as Dietzgen Senior put it), if exaggerated, or if carried beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be reduced to an absurdity, and is even bound to become an absurdity under these conditions. That is just the kind of disservice the Dutch and German Lefts are rendering to the new truth of the Soviet form of government being superior to bourgeois-democratic parliaments. Of course, anyone would be in error who voiced the outmoded viewpoint or in general considered it impermissible, in all and any circumstances, to reject participation in bourgeois parliaments. I cannot attempt here to formulate the conditions under which a boycott is useful, since the object of this pamphlet is far more modest, namely, to study Russian experience in connection with certain topical questions of international communist tactics. Russian experience has provided us with one successful and correct instance (1905), and another that was incorrect (1906), of the use of a boycott by the Bolsheviks. Analysing the first case, we

see that we succeeded in *preventing* a reactionary government from *convening* a reactionary parliament in a situation in which extra-parliamentary revolutionary mass action (strikes in particular) was developing at great speed, when not a single section of the proletariat and the peasantry could support the reactionary government in any way, and when the revolutionary proletariat was gaining influence over the backward masses through the strike struggle and through the agrarian movement. It is quite obvious that *this* experience is not applicable to present-day European conditions. It is likewise quite obvious—and the foregoing arguments bear this out—that the advocacy, even if with reservations, by the Dutch and the other "Lefts" of refusal to participate in parliaments is fundamentally wrong and detrimental to the cause of the revolutionary proletariat.

In Western Europe and America, parliament has become most odious to the revolutionary vanguard of the working class. That cannot be denied. It can readily be understood, for it is difficult to imagine anything more infamous, vile or treacherous than the behaviour of the vast majority of socialist and Social-Democratic parliamentary deputies during and after the war. It would, however, be not only unreasonable but actually criminal to yield to this mood when deciding *how* this generally recognised evil should be fought. In many countries of Western Europe, the revolutionary mood, we might say, is at present a "novelty", or a "rarity", which has all too long been vainly and impatiently awaited; perhaps that is why people so easily yield to that mood. Certainly, without a revolutionary mood among the masses, and without conditions facilitating the growth of this mood, revolutionary tactics will never develop into action. In Russia, however, lengthy, painful and sanguinary experience has taught us the truth that revolutionary tactics cannot be built on a revolutionary mood alone. Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective appraisal of *all* the class forces in a particular state (and of the states that surround it, and of all states the world over) as well as of the experience of revolutionary movements. It is very easy to show one's "revolutionary" temper merely by hurling abuse at parliamentary opportunism, or merely by repudiating participation in parliaments;

its very ease, however, cannot turn this into a solution of a difficult, a very difficult, problem. It is far more difficult to create a really revolutionary parliamentary group in a European parliament than it was in Russia. That stands to reason. But it is only a particular expression of the general truth that it was easy for Russia, in the specific and historically unique situation of 1917, to *start* the socialist revolution, but it will be more difficult for Russia than for the European countries to *continue* the revolution and bring it to its consummation. I had occasion to point this out already at the beginning of 1918, and our experience of the past two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this view. Certain specific conditions, viz., (1) the possibility of linking up the Soviet revolution with the ending, as a consequence of this revolution, of the imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree; (2) the possibility of taking temporary advantage of the mortal conflict between the world's two most powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; (3) the possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; (4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat was able to adopt the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the majority of whose members were definitely hostile to Bolshevism) and realise them at once, thanks to the conquest of political power by the proletariat—all these specific conditions do not at present exist in Western Europe, and a repetition of such or similar conditions will not occur so easily. Incidentally, apart from a number of other causes, that is why it is more difficult for Western Europe to *start* a socialist revolution than it was for us. To attempt to "circumvent" this difficulty by "skipping" the arduous job of utilising reactionary parliaments for revolutionary purposes is absolutely childish. You want to create a new society, yet you fear the difficulties involved in forming a good parliamentary group made up of convinced, devoted and heroic Communists, in a reactionary parliament! Is that

not childish? If Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Z. Höglund in Sweden were able, even without mass support from below, to set examples of the truly revolutionary utilisation of reactionary parliaments, why should a rapidly growing revolutionary mass party, in the midst of the post-war disillusionment and embitterment of the masses, be unable to forge a communist group in the worst of parliaments? It is because, in Western Europe, the backward masses of the workers and—to an even greater degree—of the small peasants are much more imbued with bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices than they were in Russia; because of that, it is *only* from within such institutions as bourgeois parliaments that Communists can (and must) wage a long and persistent struggle, undaunted by any difficulties, to expose, dispel and overcome these prejudices.

The German "Lefts" complain of bad "leaders" in their party, give way to despair, and even arrive at a ridiculous "negation" of "leaders". But in conditions in which it is often necessary to hide "leaders" underground, the evolution of good "leaders", reliable, tested and authoritative, is a very difficult matter; these difficulties *cannot* be successfully overcome without combining legal and illegal work, and *without testing the "leaders", among other ways*, in parliaments. Criticism—the most keen, ruthless and uncompromising criticism—should be directed, not against parliamentarianism or parliamentary activities, but against those leaders who are unable—and still more against those who are *unwilling*—to utilise parliamentary elections and the parliamentary rostrum in a revolutionary and communist manner. Only such criticism—combined, of course, with the dismissal of incapable leaders and their replacement by capable ones—will constitute useful and fruitful revolutionary work that will simultaneously train the "leaders" to be worthy of the working class and of all working people, and train the masses to be able properly to understand the political situation and the often very complicated and intricate tasks that spring from that situation.*

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* I have had too little opportunity to acquaint myself with "Left-wing" communism in Italy. Comrade Bordiga and his faction of Abstentionist Communists (*Comunista astensionista*) are certainly wrong

VIII

NO COMPROMISES?

In the quotation from the Frankfurt pamphlet, we have seen how emphatically the "Lefts" have advanced this slogan. It is sad to see people who no doubt consider themselves Marxists, and want to be Marxists, forget the fundamental truths of Marxism. This is what Engels—who, like Marx, was one of those rarest of authors whose every sentence in every one of their fundamental works contains a remarkably profound content—wrote in 1874, against the manifesto of the thirty-three Blanquist Communards:

"'We are Communists' [the Blanquist Communards wrote in their manifesto], 'because we want to attain our goal without stopping at intermediate stations, without any compromises, which only postpone the day of victory and prolong the period of slavery.'

"The German Communists are Communists because, through all the intermediate stations and all compromises created, not by them but by the course of historical development, they clearly perceive and constantly pursue the final aim—the abolition of classes and the creation of a society in which there will no longer be private ownership of land

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in advocating non-participation in parliament. But on one point, it seems to me, Comrade Bordiga is right—as far as can be judged from two issues of his paper, *Il Soviet* (Nos. 3 and 4, January 18 and February 1, 1920), from four issues of Comrade Serrati's excellent periodical, *Comunismo* (Nos. 1-4, October 1-November 30, 1919), and from separate issues of Italian bourgeois papers which I have seen. Comrade Bordiga and his group are right in attacking Turati and his partisans, who remain in a party which has recognised Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and yet continue their former pernicious and opportunist policy as members of parliament. Of course, in tolerating this, Comrade Serrati and the entire Italian Socialist Party[28] are making a mistake which threatens to do as much harm and give rise to the same dangers as it did in Hungary, where the Hungarian Turatis sabotaged both the party and the Soviet government[29] from within. Such a mistaken, inconsistent, or spineless attitude towards the opportunist parliamentarians gives rise to "Left-wing" communism, on the one hand, and *to a certain extent* justifies its existence, on the other. Comrade Serrati is obviously wrong when he accuses Deputy Turati of being "inconsistent" (*Comunismo* No. 3), for it is the Italian Socialist Party itself that is inconsistent in tolerating such opportunist parliamentarians as Turati and Co.

or of the means of production. The thirty-three Blanquists are Communists just because they imagine that, merely because *they* want to skip the intermediate stations and compromises, the matter is settled, and if 'it begins' in the next few days—which they take for granted—and they take over power, 'communism will be introduced' the day after tomorrow. If that is not immediately possible, they are not Communists.

"What childish innocence h is to present one's own impatience as a theoretically convincing argument!" (Frederick Engels, "Programme of the Blanquist Communards",[30] from the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Volksstaat*, 1874, No. 73, given in the Russian translation of *Articles, 1871-1875*, Petrograd, 1919, pp. 52-53).

In the same article, Engels expresses his profound esteem for Vaillant, and speaks of the "unquestionable merit" of the latter (who, like Guesde, was one of the most prominent leaders of international socialism until their betrayal of socialism in August 1914). But Engels does not fail to give a detailed analysis of an obvious error. Of course, to very young and inexperienced revolutionaries, as well as to petty-bourgeois revolutionaries of even very respectable age and great experience, it seems extremely "dangerous", incomprehensible and wrong to "permit compromises". Many sophists (being unusually or excessively "experienced" politicians) reason exactly in the same way as the British leaders of opportunism mentioned by Comrade Lansbury: "If the Bolsheviks are permitted a certain compromise, why should we not be permitted any kind of compromise?" However, proletarians schooled in numerous strikes (to take only this manifestation of the class struggle) usually assimilate in admirable fashion the very profound truth (philosophical, historical, political and psychological) expounded by Engels. Every proletarian has been through strikes and has experienced "compromises" with the hated oppressors and exploiters, when the workers have had to return to work either without having achieved anything or else agreeing to only a partial satisfaction of their demands. Every proletarian—as a result of the conditions of the mass struggle and the acute intensification of class antagonisms he lives among—sees the difference between a compromise

enforced by objective conditions (such as lack of strike funds, no outside support, starvation and exhaustion)—a compromise which in no way minimises the revolutionary devotion and readiness to carry on the struggle on the part of the workers who have agreed to such a compromise—and, on the other hand, a compromise by traitors who try to ascribe to objective causes their self-interest (strike-breakers also enter into "compromises"!), their cowardice, desire to toady to the capitalists, and readiness to yield to intimidation, sometimes to persuasion, sometimes to sops, and sometimes to flattery from the capitalists. (The history of the British labour movement provides a very large number of instances of such treacherous compromises by British trade union leaders, but, in one form or another, almost all workers in all countries have witnessed the same sort of thing.)

Naturally, there are individual cases of exceptional difficulty and complexity, when the greatest efforts are necessary for a proper assessment of the actual character of this or that "compromise", just as there are cases of homicide when it is by no means easy to establish whether the homicide was fully justified and even necessary (as, for example, legitimate self-defence), or due to unpardonable negligence, or even to a cunningly executed perfidious plan. Of course, in politics, where it is sometimes a matter of extremely complex relations—national and international—between classes and parties, very many cases will arise that will be much more difficult than the question of a legitimate "compromise" in a strike or a treacherous "compromise" by a strike-breaker, treacherous leader, etc. It would be absurd to formulate a recipe or general rule ("No compromises!") to suit all cases. One must use one's own brains and be able to find one's bearings in each particular instance. It is, in fact, one of the functions of a party organisation and of party leaders worthy of the name, to acquire, through the prolonged, persistent, variegated and comprehensive efforts of all thinking representatives of a given class,* the knowledge, experience and—in addition to

* Within every class, even in the conditions prevailing in the most enlightened countries, even within the most advanced class,

knowledge and experience—the political flair necessary for the speedy and correct solution of complex political problems.

Naïve and quite inexperienced people imagine that the permissibility of compromise *in general* is sufficient to obliterate any distinction between opportunism, against which we are waging, and must wage, an unremitting struggle, and revolutionary Marxism, or communism. But if such people do not yet know that in nature and in society *all* distinctions are fluid and up to a certain point conventional, nothing can help them but lengthy training, education, enlightenment, and political and everyday experience. In the practical questions that arise in the politics of any particular or specific historical moment, it is important to single out those which display the principal type of intolerable and treacherous compromises, such as embody an opportunism that is fatal to the revolutionary class, and to exert all efforts to explain them and combat them. During ..the 1914-18 imperialist war between two groups of equally predatory countries, social-chauvinism was the principal and fundamental type of opportunism, i.e., support of "defence of country", which in *such* a war was really equivalent to defence of the predatory interests of one's "own" bourgeoisie. After the war, defence of the robber League of Nations,[31] defence of direct or indirect alliances with the bourgeoisie of one's own country against the revolutionary proletariat and the "Soviet" movement, and defence of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois parliamentarianism against "Soviet power" became the principal manifestations of those intolerable and treacherous compromises, whose sum total constituted an opportunism fatal to the revolutionary proletariat and its cause.

"...All compromise with other parties ... any policy of manoeuvring and compromise must be emphatically rejected,"

the German Lefts write in the Frankfurt pamphlet.

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and even when the circumstances of the moment have aroused all its spiritual forces to an exceptional degree, there always are—and inevitably *will be* as long as classes exist, as long as a classless society has not fully consolidated itself, and has not developed on its own foundations—representatives of the class who do *not* think, and are incapable of thinking, for themselves. Capitalism would not be the oppressor of the masses that it actually is, if things were otherwise.

It is surprising that, with such views, these Lefts do not emphatically condemn Bolshevism! After all, the German Lefts cannot but know that the entire history of Bolshevism, both before and after the October Revolution, is *full* of instances of changes of tack, conciliatory tactics and compromises with other parties, including bourgeois parties!

To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complex than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to renounce in advance any change of tack, or any utilisation of a conflict of interests (even if temporary) among one's enemies, or any conciliation or compromise with possible allies (even if they are temporary, unstable, vacillating or conditional allies)—is that not ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not like making a difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain and refusing in advance ever to move in zigzags, ever to retrace one's steps, or ever to abandon a course once selected, and to try others? And yet people so immature and inexperienced (if youth were the explanation, it would not be so bad; young people are preordained to talk such nonsense for a certain period) have met with support—whether direct or indirect, open or covert, whole or partial, it does not matter—from some members of the Communist Party of Holland.

After the first socialist revolution of the proletariat, and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in some country, the proletariat of that country remains *for a long time weaker* than the bourgeoisie, simply because of the latter's extensive international links, and also because of the spontaneous and continuous restoration and regeneration of capitalism and the bourgeoisie by the small commodity producers of the country which has overthrown the bourgeoisie. The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and *obligatory* use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally

is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modem scientific socialism *in general*. Those who have not proved *in practice*, over a fairly considerable period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period *before* and *after* the proletariat has won political power.

Our theory is not a dogma, but a *guide to action*, said Marx and Engels.[32] The greatest blunder, the greatest crime, committed by such "out-and-out" Marxists as Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer, etc., is that they have not understood this and have been unable to apply it at crucial moments of the proletarian revolution. "Political activity is not like the pavement of Nevsky Prospekt" (the well-kept, broad and level pavement of the perfectly straight principal thoroughfare of St. Petersburg), N. G. Chernyshevsky, the great Russian socialist of the pre-Marxist period, used to say. Since Chernyshevsky's time, disregard or forgetfulness of this truth has cost Russian revolutionaries countless sacrifices. We must strive at all costs to *prevent* the Left Communists and West-European and American revolutionaries that are devoted to the working class from paying *as dearly* as the backward Russians did to learn this truth.

Prior to the downfall of tsarism, the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats made repeated use of the services of the bourgeois liberals, i.e., they concluded numerous practical compromises with the latter. In 1901-02, even prior to the appearance of Bolshevism, the old editorial board of *Iskra* (consisting of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Martov, Potresov and myself) concluded (not for long, it is true) a formal political alliance with Struve, the political leader of bourgeois liberalism, while at the same time being able to wage an unremitting and most merciless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois liberalism and against the slightest manifestations of its influence in the working-class movement. The Bolsheviks have

always adhered to this policy. Since 1905 they have systematically advocated an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, against the liberal bourgeoisie and tsarism, never, however, refusing to support the bourgeoisie against tsarism (for instance, during second rounds of elections, or during second ballots) and never ceasing their relentless ideological and political struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the bourgeois-revolutionary peasant party, exposing them as petty-bourgeois democrats who have falsely described themselves as socialists. During the Duma elections of 1907, the Bolsheviks entered briefly into a formal political bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Between 1903 and 1912, there were periods of several years in which we were formally united with the Mensheviks in a single Social-Democratic Party, but we *never stopped* our ideological and political struggle against them as opportunists and vehicles of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. During the war, we concluded certain compromises with the Kautskyites, with the Left Mensheviks (Martov), and with a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Chernov and Natanson); we were together with them at Zimmerwald and Kienthal,[33] and issued joint manifestos. However, we never ceased and never relaxed our ideological and political struggle against the Kautskyites, Martov and Chernov (when Natanson died in 1919, a "Revolutionary-Communist" Narodnik,[34] he was very close to and almost in agreement with us). At the very moment of the October Revolution, we entered into an informal but very important (and very successful) political bloc with the petty-bourgeois peasantry by adopting the *Socialist-Revolutionary* agrarian programme *in its entirety*, without a single alteration—i.e., we effected an undeniable compromise in order to prove to the peasants that we wanted, not to "steam-roller" them but to reach agreement with them. At the same time we proposed (and soon after effected) a formal political bloc, including participation in the government, with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who dissolved this bloc after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and then, in July 1918, went to the length of armed rebellion, and subsequently of an armed struggle, against us.

It is therefore understandable why the attacks made by

the German Lefts against the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany for entertaining the idea of a bloc with the Independents (the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany—the Kautskyites) are absolutely inane, in our opinion, and clear proof that the "Lefts" are in the *wrong*. In Russia, too, there were Right Mensheviks (participants in the Kerensky government), who corresponded to the German Scheidemanns, and Left Mensheviks (Martov), corresponding to the German Kautskyites and standing in opposition to the Right Mensheviks. A gradual shift of the worker masses from the Mensheviks over to the Bolsheviks was to be clearly seen in 1917. At the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, held in June 1917, we had only 13 per cent of the votes; the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks had a majority. At the Second Congress of Soviets (October 25, 1917, old style) we had 51 per cent of the votes. Why is it that in Germany the *same* and absolutely *identical* shift of the workers from Right to Left did not immediately strengthen the Communists, but first strengthened the midway Independent Party, although the latter never had independent political ideas or an independent policy, but merely wavered between the Scheidemanns and the Communists?

One of the evident reasons was the *erroneous* tactics of the German Communists, who must fearlessly and honestly admit this error and learn to rectify it. The error consisted in their denial of the need to take part in the reactionary bourgeois parliaments and in the reactionary trade unions; the error consisted in numerous manifestations of that "Left-wing" infantile disorder which has now come to the surface and will consequently be cured the more thoroughly, the more rapidly and with greater advantage to the organism.

The German Independent Social-Democratic Party is obviously not a homogeneous body. Alongside the old opportunist leaders (Kautsky, Hilferding and apparently, to a considerable extent, Crispien, Ledebour and others)—these have revealed their inability to understand the significance of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and their inability to lead the proletariat's revolutionary struggle—there has emerged in this party a Left and proletarian wing, which is growing most

rapidly. Hundreds of thousands of members of this party (which has, I think, a membership of some three-quarters of a million) are proletarians who are abandoning Scheidemann and are rapidly going over to communism. This proletarian wing has already proposed—at the Leipzig Congress of the Independents (1919)—immediate and unconditional affiliation to the Third International. To fear a "compromise" with this wing of the party is positively ridiculous. On the contrary, it is the *duty* of Communists to seek *and find* a suitable form of compromise with them, a compromise which, on the one hand, will facilitate and accelerate the necessary complete fusion with this wing and, on the other, will in no way hamper the Communists in their ideological and political struggle against the opportunist Right wing of the Independents. It will probably be no easy matter to devise a suitable form of compromise—but only a charlatan could promise the German workers and the German Communists an "easy" road to victory.

Capitalism would not be capitalism if the proletariat *pur sang* were not surrounded by a large number of exceedingly motley types intermediate between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labour-power), between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and petty artisan, handicraft worker and small master in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to territorial origin, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. From all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, for the Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, its class-conscious section, to resort to changes of tack, to conciliation and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters. It is entirely a matter of *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*—not lower—the *general* level of proletarian class-consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win. Incidentally, it should be noted that the Bolsheviks' victory over the Mensheviks called for the application of tactics of changes of tack, conciliation and compromises, not only before *but also after* the

October Revolution of 1917, but the changes of tack and compromises were, of course, such as assisted, boosted and consolidated the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Mensheviks. The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the Mensheviks) inevitably vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between bourgeois democracy and the Soviet system, between reformism and revolutionism, between love for the workers and fear of the proletarian dictatorship, etc. The Communists' proper tactics should consist in *utilising* these vacillations, not ignoring them; utilising them calls for concessions to elements that are turning towards the proletariat—whenever and in the measure that they turn towards the proletariat—in addition to fighting those who turn towards the bourgeoisie. As a result of the application of the correct tactics, Menshevism began to disintegrate, and has been disintegrating more and more in our country; the stubbornly opportunist leaders are being isolated, and the best of the workers and the best elements among the petty-bourgeois democrats are being brought into our camp. This is a lengthy process, and the hasty "decision"—"No compromises, no manoeuvres"—can only prejudice the strengthening of the revolutionary proletariat's influence and the enlargement of its forces.

Lastly, one of the undoubted errors of the German "Lefts" lies in their downright refusal to recognise the Treaty of Versailles. The more "weightily" and "pompously", the more "emphatically" and peremptorily this viewpoint is formulated (by K. Horner, for instance), the less sense it seems to make. It is not enough, under the present conditions of the international proletarian revolution, to repudiate the preposterous absurdities of "National Bolshevism" (Laufenberg and others), which has gone to the length of advocating a bloc with the German bourgeoisie for a war against the Entente. One must realise that it is utterly false tactics to refuse to admit that a Soviet Germany (if a German Soviet republic were soon to arise) would have to recognise the Treaty of Versailles for a time, and to submit to it. From this it does not follow that the Independents—at a time when the Scheidemanns were in the government, when the Soviet government in Hungary had not yet been overthrown, and when it was still possible that a

Soviet revolution in Vienna would support Soviet Hungary—were right, *under the circumstances*, in putting forward the demand that the Treaty of Versailles should be signed. At that time the Independents tacked and manoeuvred very clumsily, for they more or less accepted responsibility for the Scheidemann traitors, and more or less backslid from advocacy of a ruthless (and most calmly conducted) class war against the Scheidemanns, to advocacy of a "classless" or "above-class" standpoint.

In the present situation, however, the German Communists should obviously not deprive themselves of freedom of action by giving a positive and categorical promise to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles in the event of communism's victory. That would be absurd. They should say: the Scheidemanns and the Kautskyites have committed a number of acts of treachery hindering (and in part quite ruining) the chances of an alliance with Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary. We Communists will do all we can to *facilitate* and *pave the way* for such an alliance. However, we are in no way obligated to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles, come what may, or to do so at once. The possibility of its successful repudiation will depend, not only on the German, but also on the international successes of the Soviet movement. The Scheidemanns and the Kautskyites have hampered this movement; we are helping it. That is the gist of the matter; therein lies the fundamental difference. And if our class enemies, the exploiters and their Scheidemann and Kautskyite lackeys, have missed many an opportunity of strengthening both the German and the international Soviet movement, of strengthening both the German and the international Soviet revolution, the blame lies with them. The Soviet revolution in Germany will strengthen the international Soviet movement, which is the strongest bulwark (and the only reliable, invincible and world-wide bulwark) against the Treaty of Versailles and against international imperialism in general. To give absolute, categorical and immediate precedence to liberation from the Treaty of Versailles and to give it *precedence over the question* of liberating *other* countries oppressed by imperialism, from the yoke of imperialism, is philistine nationalism (worthy of the Kautskys, the Hilferdings, the Otto Bauers

and Co.), not revolutionary internationalism. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie in any of the large European countries, including Germany, would be such a gain for the international revolution that, for its sake, one can, and if necessary should, tolerate a *more prolonged existence of the Treaty of Versailles*. If Russia, standing alone, could endure the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for several months, to the advantage of the revolution, there is nothing impossible in a Soviet Germany, allied with Soviet Russia, enduring the existence of the Treaty of Versailles for a longer period, to the advantage of the revolution.

The imperialists of France, Britain, etc., are trying to provoke and ensnare the German Communists: "Say that you will not sign the Treaty of Versailles!" they urge. Like babes, the Left Communists fall into the trap laid for them, instead of skilfully manoeuvring against the crafty and, *at present*, stronger enemy, and instead of telling him, "We shall sign the Treaty of Versailles now" It is folly, not revolutionism, to deprive ourselves m advance of any freedom of action, openly to inform an enemy who is at present better armed than we are whether we shall fight him, and when. To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy, but not to us, is criminal; political leaders of the revolutionary class are absolutely useless if they are incapable of "changing tack, or offering conciliation and compromise" in order to take evasive action in a patently disadvantageous battle.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

IX

"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM IN GREAT BRITAIN

There is no Communist Party in Great Britain as yet, but there is a fresh, broad, powerful and rapidly growing communist movement among the workers, which justifies the best hopes. There are several political parties and organisations (the British Socialist Party,[35] the Socialist Labour Party, the South Wales Socialist Society, the Workers' Socialist Federation[36]), which desire to form a Communist Party and are already negotiating among themselves to this end. In its issue of February 21, 1920, Vol. VI,

No. 48, *The Workers' Dreadnought*, weekly organ of the last of the organisations mentioned, carried an article by the editor, Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst, entitled "Towards a Communist Party". The article outlines the progress of the negotiations between the four organisations mentioned, for the formation of a united Communist Party, on the basis of affiliation to the Third International, the recognition of the Soviet system instead of parliamentarianism, and the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It appears that one of the greatest obstacles to the immediate formation of a united Communist Party is presented by the disagreement on the questions of participation in Parliament and on whether the new Communist Party should affiliate to the old, trade-unionist, opportunist and social-chauvinist Labour Party, which is mostly made up of trade unions. The Workers' Socialist Federation and the Socialist Labour Party* are opposed to taking part in parliamentary elections and in Parliament, and they are opposed to affiliation to the Labour Party; in this they disagree with all or with most of the members of the British Socialist Party, which they regard as the "Right wing of the Communist parties" in Great Britain. (Page 5, Sylvia Pankhurst's article.)

Thus, the main division is the same as in Germany, notwithstanding the enormous difference in the forms in which the disagreements manifest themselves (in Germany the form is far closer to the "Russian" than it is in Great Britain), and in a number of other things. Let us examine the arguments of the "Lefts".

On the question of participation in Parliament, Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst refers to an article in the same issue, by Comrade Gallacher, who writes in the name of the Scottish Workers' Council in Glasgow.

"The above council," he writes, "is definitely anti-parliamentarian, and has behind it the Left wing of the various political bodies. We represent the revolutionary movement in Scotland, striving continually to build up a revolutionary organisation within the industries [in various branches of production], and a Communist Party, based on social committees, throughout the country. For

* I believe this party is opposed to affiliation to the Labour Party but not all its members are opposed to participation in Parliament.

a considerable time we have been sparring with the official parliamentarians. We have not considered it necessary to declare open warfare on them, and they are *afraid* to open an attack on us.

"But this state of affairs cannot long continue. We are winning all along the line.

"The rank and file of the I.L.P. in Scotland is becoming more and more disgusted with the thought of Parliament, and the Soviets [the Russian word transliterated into English is used] or Workers' Councils are being supported by almost every branch. This is very serious, of course, for the gentlemen who look to politics for a profession, and they are using any and every means to persuade their members to come back into the parliamentary fold. Revolutionary comrades must not [all italics are the author's] give any support to this gang. Our fight here is going to be a difficult one. One of the worst features of it will be the treachery of those whose personal ambition is a more impelling force than their regard for the revolution. Any support given to parliamentarism is simply assisting to put power into the hands of our British Scheidemanns and Noskes. Henderson, Clynes and Co. are hopelessly reactionary. The official I.L.P. is more and more coming under the control of middle-class Liberals, who ... have found their 'spiritual home' in the camp of Messrs. MacDonald, Snowden and Co. The official I.L.P. is bitterly hostile to the Third International, the rank and file is for it. Any support to the parliamentary opportunists is simply playing into the hands of the former. The B.S.P. doesn't count at all here.... What is wanted here is a sound revolutionary industrial organisation, and a Communist Party working along clear, well-defined, scientific lines. If our comrades can assist us in building these, we will take their help gladly; if they cannot, for God's sake let them keep out altogether, lest they betray the revolution by lending their support to the reactionaries, who are so eagerly clamouring for parliamentary 'honours' (?) [the query mark is the author's] and who are so anxious to prove that they *can rule* as effectively as the 'boss' class politicians themselves."

In my opinion, this letter to the editor expresses excellently the temper and point of view of the young Communists, or of rank-and-file workers who are only just beginning to accept communism. This temper is highly gratifying and valuable; we must learn to appreciate and support it for, in its absence, it would be hopeless to expect the victory of the proletarian revolution in Great Britain, or in any other country for that matter. People who can give expression to this temper of the masses, and are able to evoke such a temper (which is very often dormant, unconscious and latent) among the masses, should be appreciated and given every assistance. At the same time, we must tell them openly and frankly that a state of mind is *by itself*

insufficient for leadership of the masses in a great revolutionary struggle, and that the cause of the revolution may well be harmed by certain errors that people who are most devoted to the cause of the revolution are about to commit, or are committing. Comrade Gallacher's letter undoubtedly reveals the rudiments of *all* the mistakes that are being made by the German "Left" Communists and were made by the Russian "Left" Bolsheviks in 1908 and 1918.

The writer of the letter is full of a noble and working-class hatred for the bourgeois "class politicians" (a hatred understood and shared, however, not only by proletarians but by all working people, by all *Kleinen Leuten** to use the German expression). In a representative of the oppressed and exploited masses, this hatred is truly the "beginning of all wisdom", the basis of any socialist and communist movement and of its success. The writer, however, has apparently lost sight of the fact that politics is a science and an art that does not fall from the skies or come gratis, and that, if it wants to overcome the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must train its *own* proletarian "class politicians", of a kind in no way inferior to bourgeois politicians.

The writer of the letter fully realises that only workers' Soviets, not parliament, can be the instrument enabling the proletariat to achieve its aims; those who have failed to understand this are, of course, out-and-out reactionaries, even if they are most highly educated people, most experienced politicians, most sincere socialists, most erudite Marxists, and most honest citizens and fathers of families. But the writer of the letter does not even ask—it does not occur to him to ask—whether it is possible to bring about the Soviets' victory over parliament without getting pro-Soviet politicians *into* parliament, without disintegrating parliamentarianism from *within*, without working within parliament for the success of the Soviets in their forthcoming task of dispersing parliament. Yet the writer of the letter expresses the absolutely correct idea that the Communist Party in Great Britain must act on *scientific* principles. Science demands, first, that the experience of other countries be taken into account,

* "Small folk, little people" (Germ.).—*Ed.*

especially if these other countries, which are also capitalist, are undergoing, or have recently undergone, a very similar experience; second, it demands that account be taken of *all* the forces, groups, parties, classes and masses operating in a given country, and also that policy should not be determined only by the desires and views, by the degree of class-consciousness and the militancy of one group or party alone.

It is true that the Hendersons, the Clyneses, the MacDonalds and the Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary. It is equally true that they want to assume power (though they would prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to "rule" along the old bourgeois lines, and that when they are in power they will certainly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. But it does not at all follow that to support them means treachery to the revolution; what does follow is that, in the interests of the revolution, working-class revolutionaries should give these gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support. To explain this idea, I shall take two contemporary British political documents: (1) the speech delivered by Prime Minister Lloyd George on March 18, 1920 (as reported in *The Manchester Guardian* of March 19, 1920), and (2) the arguments of a "Left" Communist, Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst, in the article mentioned above.

In his speech Lloyd George entered into a polemic with Asquith (who had been especially invited to this meeting but declined to attend) and with those Liberals who want, not a coalition with the Conservatives, but closer relations with the Labour Party. (In the above-quoted letter, Comrade Gallacher also points to the fact that Liberals are joining the Independent Labour Party.) Lloyd George argued that a coalition—and a *close* coalition at that—between the Liberals and the Conservatives was essential, otherwise there might be a victory for the Labour Party, which Lloyd George prefers to call "Socialist" and which is working for the "common ownership" of the means of production. "It is ... known as communism in France," the leader of the British bourgeoisie said, putting it popularly for his audience, Liberal M.P.s who probably never knew it before. In Germany it was called socialism, and in Russia it is called

Bolshevism, he went on to say. To Liberals this is unacceptable on principle, Lloyd George explained, because they stand in principle for private property. "Civilisation is in jeopardy," the speaker declared, and consequently Liberals and Conservatives must unite....

"...If you go to the agricultural areas," said Lloyd George, "I agree you have the old party divisions as strong as ever. They are removed from the danger. It does not walk their lanes. But when they see it they will be as strong as some of these industrial constituencies are now. Four-fifths of this country is industrial and commercial; hardly one-fifth is agricultural. It is one of the things I have constantly in my mind when I think of the dangers of the future here. In France the population is agricultural, and you have a solid body of opinion which does not move very rapidly, and which is not very easily excited by revolutionary movements. That is not the case here. This country is more top-heavy than any country in the world, and if it begins to rock, the crash here, for that reason, will be greater than in any land."

From this the reader will see that Mr. Lloyd George is not only a very intelligent man, but one who has also learned a great deal from the Marxists. We too have something to learn from Lloyd George.

Of definite interest is the following episode, which occurred in the course of the discussion after Lloyd George's speech:

"*Mr. Wallace, M.P.:* I should like to ask what the Prime Minister considers the effect might be in the industrial constituencies upon the industrial workers, so many of whom are Liberals at the present time and from whom we get so much support. Would not a possible result be to cause an immediate overwhelming accession of strength to the Labour Party from men who at present are our cordial supporters?

"*The Prime Minister:* I take a totally different view. The fact that Liberals are fighting among themselves undoubtedly drives a very considerable number of Liberals in despair to the Labour Party, where you get a considerable body of Liberals, very able men, whose business it is to discredit the Government. The result is undoubtedly to bring a good accession of public sentiment to the Labour Party. It does not go to the Liberals who are outside, it goes to the Labour Party, the by-elections show that."

It may be said, in passing, that this argument shows in particular how muddled even the most intelligent members of the bourgeoisie have become and how they cannot help committing irreparable blunders. That, in fact, is what will

bring about the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Our people, however, may commit blunders (provided, of course, that they are not too serious and are rectified in time) and yet, in the long run, will prove the victors.

The second political document is the following argument advanced by Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst, a "Left" Communist:

> "...Comrade Inkpin [the General Secretary of the British Socialist Party] refers to the Labour Party as 'the main body of the working-class movement'. Another comrade of the British Socialist Party, at the Third International, just held, put the British Socialist Party position more strongly. He said: 'We regard the Labour Party as the organised working class.'
>
> "We do not take this view of the Labour Party. The Labour Party is very large numerically though its membership is to a great extent quiescent and apathetic, consisting of men and women who have joined the trade unions because their workmates are trade unionists, and to share the friendly benefits.
>
> "But we recognise that the great size of the Labour Party is also due to the fact that it is the creation of a school of thought beyond which the majority of the British working class has not yet emerged, though great changes are at work in the mind of the people which will presently alter this state of affairs....
>
> "The British Labour Party, like the social-patriotic organisations of other countries, will, in the natural development of society, inevitably come into power. It is for the Communists to build up the forces that will overthrow the social patriots, and in this country we must not delay or falter in that work.
>
> "We must not dissipate our energy in adding to the strength of the Labour Party; its rise to power is inevitable. We must concentrate on making a communist movement that will vanquish it. The Labour Party will soon be forming a government; the revolutionary opposition must make ready to attack it...."

Thus the liberal bourgeoisie are abandoning the historical system of "two parties" (of exploiters), which has been hallowed by centuries of experience and has been extremely advantageous to the exploiters, and consider it necessary for these two parties to join forces against the Labour Party. A number of Liberals are deserting to the Labour Party like rats from a sinking ship. The Left Communists believe that the transfer of power to the Labour Party is inevitable and admit that it now has the backing of most workers. From this they draw the strange conclusion which Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst formulates as follows:

"The Communist Party must not compromise.... The Communist Party must keep its doctrine pure, and its independence of reformism inviolate, its mission is to lead the way, without stopping or turning, by the direct road to the communist revolution."

On the contrary, the fact that most British workers still follow the lead of the British Kerenskys or Scheidemanns and have not yet had experience of a government composed of these people—an experience which was necessary in Russia and Germany so as to secure the mass transition of the workers to communism—undoubtedly indicates that the British Communists *should* participate in parliamentary action, that they should, from *within* parliament, help the masses of the workers see the results of a Henderson and Snowden government in practice, and that they should help the Hendersons and Snowdens defeat the united forces of Lloyd George and Churchill. To act otherwise would mean hampering the cause of the revolution, since revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority of the working class, a change brought about by the political experience of the masses, never by propaganda alone. "To lead the way without compromises, without turning"—this slogan is obviously wrong if it comes from a patently impotent minority of the workers who know (or at all events should know) that given a Henderson and Snowden victory over Lloyd George and Churchill, the majority will soon become disappointed in their leaders and will begin to support communism (or at all events will adopt an attitude of neutrality, and, in the main, of sympathetic neutrality, towards the Communists). It is as though 10,000 soldiers were to hurl themselves into battle against an enemy force of 50,000, when it would be proper to "halt", "take evasive action", or even effect a "compromise" so as to gain time until the arrival of the 100,000 reinforcements that are on their way but cannot go into action immediately. That is intellectualist childishness, not the serious tactics of a revolutionary class.

The fundamental law of revolution, which has been confirmed by all revolutions and especially by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is as follows: for a revolution to take place it is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to realise the impossibility of

living in the old way, and demand changes; for a revolution to take place it is essential that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. It is only when the "*lower classes*" *do not want* to live in the old way and the "upper classes" *cannot carry on in the old way* that the revolution can triumph. This truth can be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters). It follows that, for a revolution to take place, it is essential, first, that a majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, and politically active workers) should fully realise that revolution is necessary, and that they should be prepared to die for it; second, that the ruling classes should be going through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics (symptomatic of any genuine revolution is a rapid, tenfold and even hundredfold increase in the size of the working and oppressed masses—hitherto apathetic—who are capable of waging the political struggle), weakens the government, and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to rapidly overthrow it.

Incidentally, as can also be seen from Lloyd George's speech, both conditions for a successful proletarian revolution are clearly maturing in Great Britain. The errors of the Left Communists are particularly dangerous at present, because certain revolutionaries are not displaying a sufficiently thoughtful, sufficiently attentive, sufficiently intelligent and sufficiently shrewd attitude toward each of these conditions. If we are the party of the revolutionary class, and not merely a revolutionary group, and if we want the masses to follow us (and unless we achieve that, we stand the risk of remaining mere windbags), we must, first, help Henderson or Snowden to beat Lloyd George and Churchill (or, rather, compel the former to beat the latter, because the former *are afraid of their victory!*); second, we must help the majority of the working class to be convinced by their own experience that we are right, i.e., that the Hendersons and Snowdens are absolutely good for nothing, that they are petty-bourgeois and treacherous by nature, and that their bankruptcy is inevitable; third, we must bring nearer the moment when, *on the basis* of the disappointment of most

of the workers in the Hendersons, it will be possible, with serious chances of success, to overthrow the government of the Hendersons at once; because if the most astute and solid Lloyd George, that big, not petty, bourgeois, is displaying consternation and is more and more weakening himself (and the bourgeoisie as a whole) by his "friction" with Churchill today and with Asquith tomorrow, how much greater will be the consternation of a Henderson government!

I will put it more concretely. In my opinion, the British Communists should unite their four parties and groups (all very weak, and some of them very, very weak) into a single Communist Party on the basis of the principles of the Third International and of *obligatory* participation in parliament. The Communist Party should propose the following "compromise" election agreement to the Hendersons and Snowdens: let us jointly fight against the alliance between Lloyd George and the Conservatives; let us share parliamentary seats in proportion to the number of workers' votes polled for the Labour Party and for the Communist Party (not in elections, but in a special ballot), and let us retain *complete freedom* of agitation, propaganda and political activity. Of course, without this latter condition, we cannot agree to a bloc, for that would be treachery; the British Communists must demand and get complete freedom to expose the Hendersons and the Snowdens in the same way as (*for fifteen years*—1903-17) the Russian Bolsheviks demanded and got it in respect of the Russian Hendersons and Snowdens, i.e., the Mensheviks.

If the Hendersons and the Snowdens accept a bloc on these terms, we shall be the gainers, because the number of parliamentary seats is of no importance to us; we are not out for seats. We shall yield on this point (whilst the Hendersons and especially their new friends—or new masters—the Liberals who have joined the Independent Labour Party are most eager to get seats). We shall be the gainers, because we shall carry *our* agitation among the *masses* at a time when Lloyd George *himself* has "incensed" them, and we shall not only be helping the Labour Party to establish its government sooner, but shall also be helping the masses sooner to understand the communist propaganda that we

shall carry on against the Hendersons, without any reticence or omission.

If the Hendersons and the Snowdens reject a bloc with us on these terms, we shall gain still more, for we shall at once have shown the *masses* (note that, even in the purely Menshevik and completely opportunist Independent Labour Party, the *rank and file* are in favour of Soviets) that the Hendersons prefer *their* close relations with the capitalists to the unity of all the workers. We shall immediately gain in the eyes of the *masses*, who, particularly after the brilliant, highly correct and highly useful (to communism) explanations given by Lloyd George, will be sympathetic to the idea of uniting all the workers against the Lloyd George-Conservative alliance. We shall gain immediately, because we shall have demonstrated to the masses that the Hendersons and the Snowdens are afraid to beat Lloyd George, afraid to assume power alone, and are striving to secure the *secret* support of Lloyd George, who is *openly* extending a hand to the Conservatives, against the Labour Party. It should be noted that in Russia, after the revolution of February 27, 1917 (old style), the Bolsheviks' propaganda against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (i.e., the Russian Hendersons and Snowdens) derived benefit precisely from a circumstance of this kind. We said to the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries: assume full power without the bourgeoisie, because you have a majority in the Soviets (at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, in June 1917, the Bolsheviks had only 13 per cent of the votes). But the Russian Hendersons and Snowdens were afraid to assume power without the bourgeoisie, and when the bourgeoisie held up the elections to the Constituent Assembly, knowing full well that the elections would give a majority to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks* (who formed a close political bloc and in

* The results of the November 1917 elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia, based on returns embracing over 36,000,000 voters, were as follows: the Bolsheviks obtained 25 per cent of the votes; the various parties of the landowners and the bourgeoisie obtained 13 per cent, and the petty-bourgeois-democratic parties, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and a number of similar small groups obtained 62 per cent.

fact represented *only* petty-bourgeois democracy), the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were unable energetically and consistently to oppose these delays.

If the Hendersons and the Snowdens reject a bloc with the Communists, the latter will immediately gain by winning the sympathy of the masses and discrediting the Hendersons and Snowdens; if, as a result, we do lose a few parliamentary seats, it is a matter of no significance to us. We would put up our candidates in a very few but absolutely safe constituencies, namely, constituencies where our candidatures would not give any seats to the Liberals at the expense of the Labour candidates. We would take part in the election campaign, distribute leaflets agitating for communism, and, in *all* constituencies where we have no candidates, we would urge the electors *to vote for the Labour candidate and against the bourgeois candidate*. Comrades Sylvia Pankhurst and Gallacher are mistaken in thinking that this is a betrayal of communism, or a renunciation of the struggle against the social-traitors. On the contrary, the cause of communist revolution would undoubtedly gain thereby.

At present, British Communists very often find it hard even to approach the masses, and even to get a hearing from them. If I come out as a Communist and call upon them to vote for Henderson and against Lloyd George, they will certainly give me a hearing. And I shall be able to explain in a popular manner, not only why the Soviets are better than a parliament and why the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the dictatorship of Churchill (disguised with the signboard of bourgeois "democracy"), but also that, with my vote, I want to support Henderson in the same way as the rope supports a hanged man—that the impending establishment of a government of the Hendersons will prove that I am right, will bring the masses over to my side, and will hasten the political death of the Hendersons and the Snowdens just as was the case with their kindred spirits in Russia and Germany.

If the objection is raised that these tactics are too "subtle" or too complex for the masses to understand, that these tactics will split and scatter our forces, will prevent us from concentrating them on Soviet revolution, etc., I will reply

to the "Left" objectors: don't ascribe your doctrinairism to the masses! The masses in Russia are no doubt no better educated than the masses in Britain; if anything, they are less so. Yet the masses understood the Bolsheviks, and the fact that, in September 1917, *on the eve* of the Soviet revolution, the Bolsheviks put up their candidates for a bourgeois parliament (the Constituent Assembly) and on *the day after* the Soviet revolution, in November 1917, took part in the elections to this Constituent Assembly, which they got rid of on January 5, 1918—this did not hamper the Bolsheviks, but, on the contrary, helped them.

I cannot deal here with the second point of disagreement among the British Communists—the question of affiliation or non-affiliation to the Labour Party. I have too little material at my disposal on this question, which is highly complex because of the unique character of the British Labour Party, whose very structure is so unlike that of the political parties usual in the European continent. It is beyond doubt, however, first, that in this question, too, those who try to deduce the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat from principles such as: "The Communist Party must keep its doctrine pure, and its independence of reformism inviolate; its mission is to lead the way, without stopping or turning, by the direct road to the communist revolution"—will inevitably fall into error. Such principles are merely a repetition of the mistake made by the French Blanquist Communards, who, in 1874, "repudiated" all compromises and all intermediate stages. Second, it is beyond doubt that, in this question too, as always, the task consists in learning to apply the general and basic principles of communism to the *specific relations* between classes and parties, to the *specific features* in the objective development towards communism, which are different in each country and which we must be able to discover, study, and predict.

This, however, should be discussed, not in connection with British communism alone, but in connection with the general conclusions concerning the development of communism in all capitalist countries. We shall now proceed to deal with this subject.

X

SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Russian bourgeois revolution of 1905 revealed a highly original turn in world history: in one of the most backward capitalist countries, the strike movement attained a scope and power unprecedented anywhere in the world. In the *first month* of 1905 *alone*, the number of strikers was ten times the *annual* average for the previous decade (1895-1904); from January to October 1905, strikes grew all the time and reached enormous proportions. Under the influence of a number of unique historical conditions, backward Russia was the first to show the world, not only the growth, by leaps and bounds, of the independent activity of the oppressed masses in time of revolution (this had occurred in all great revolutions), but also that the significance of the proletariat is infinitely greater than its proportion in the total population; it showed a combination of the economic strike and the political strike, with the latter developing into an armed uprising, and the birth of the Soviets, a new form of mass struggle and mass organisation of the classes oppressed by capitalism.

The revolutions of February and October 1917 led to the all-round development of the Soviets on a nation-wide scale and to their victory in the proletarian socialist revolution. In less than two years, the international character of the Soviets, the spread of this form of struggle and organisation to the world working-class movement and the historical mission of the Soviets as the grave-digger, heir and successor of bourgeois parliamentarianism and of bourgeois democracy in general, all became clear.

But that is not all. The history of the working-class movement now shows that, in all countries, it is about to go through (and is already going through) a struggle waged by communism—emergent, gaining strength and advancing towards victory—against, primarily, Menshevism, i.e., opportunism and social-chauvinism (the home brand in each particular country), and then as a complement, so to say, Left-wing communism. The former struggle has developed in all countries, apparently without any exception, as a duel between the Second International (already virtually

dead) and the Third International. The latter struggle is to be seen in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, America (at any rate, a certain *section* of the Industrial Workers of the World and of the anarcho-syndicalist trends uphold the errors of Left-wing communism alongside of an almost universal and almost unreserved acceptance of the Soviet system), and in France (the attitude of a section of the former syndicalists towards the political party and parliamentarianism, also alongside of the acceptance of the Soviet system); in other words, the struggle is undoubtedly being waged, not only on an international, but even on a worldwide scale.

But while the working-class movement is everywhere going through what is actually the same kind of preparatory school for victory over the bourgeoisie, it is achieving that development in its *own way* in each country. The big and advanced capitalist countries are travelling this road *far more rapidly* than did Bolshevism, to which history granted fifteen years to prepare itself for victory, as an organised political trend. In the brief space of a year, the Third International has already scored a decisive victory; it has defeated the yellow, social-chauvinist Second International, which only a few months ago was incomparably stronger than the Third International, seemed stable and powerful, and enjoyed every possible support—direct and indirect, material (Cabinet posts, passports, the press) and ideological—from the world bourgeoisie.

It is now essential that Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the fundamental objectives of the struggle against opportunism and "Left" doctrinairism, and the *concrete features* which this struggle assumes and must inevitably assume in each country, in conformity with the specific character of its economics, politics, culture, and national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, and so on and so forth. Dissatisfaction with the Second International is felt everywhere and is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability or incapacity to create a really centralised and really leading centre capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet

republic. It should be clearly realised that such a leading centre can never be built up on stereotyped, mechanically equated, and identical tactical rules of struggle. As long as national and state distinctions exist among peoples and countries—and these will continue to exist for a very long time to come, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world-wide scale—the unity of the international tactics of the communist working-class movement in all countries demands, not the elimination of variety of the suppression of national distinctions (which is a pipe dream at present), but an application of the *fundamental* principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat), which will *correctly modify* these principles in certain *particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state distinctions. To seek out, investigate, predict, and grasp that which is nationally specific and nationally distinctive, in the *concrete manner* in which each country should tackle a *single* international task: victory over opportunism and Left doctrinarism within the working-class movement; the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship—such is the basic task in the historical period that all the advanced countries (and not they alone) are going through. The chief thing—though, of course, far from everything—the chief thing, has already been achieved: the vanguard of the working class has been won over, has ranged itself on the side of Soviet government and against parliamentarianism, on the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat and against bourgeois democracy. All efforts and all attention should now be concentrated on the *next* step, which may seem—and from a certain viewpoint actually is—less fundamental, but, on the other hand, is actually closer to a practical accomplishment of the task. That step is: the search after forms of the *transition* or the *approach* to the proletarian revolution.

The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this, not even the first step towards victory can be made. But that is still quite a long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with a vanguard alone. To throw only the vanguard into

the decisive battle, before the entire class, the broad masses, have taken up a position either of direct support for the vanguard, or at least of sympathetic neutrality towards it and of precluded support for the enemy, would be, not merely foolish but criminal. Propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for an entire class, the broad masses of the working people, those oppressed by capital, to take up such a stand. For that, the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, which has been confirmed with compelling force and vividness, not only in Russia but in Germany as well. To turn resolutely towards communism, it was necessary, not only for the ignorant and often illiterate masses of Russia, but also for the literate and well-educated masses of Germany, to realise from their own bitter experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, .the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, and the utter vileness of the government of the paladins of the Second International; they had to realise that a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov[37] in Russia; Kapp[38] and Co. in Germany) is inevitably the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The immediate objective of the class-conscious vanguard of the international working-class movement, i.e., the Communist parties, groups and trends, is to be able to *lead* the broad masses (who are still, for the most part, apathetic, inert, dormant and convention-ridden) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead, *not only* their own party but also these masses in their advance and transition to the new position. While the first historical objective (that of winning over the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not have been reached without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second and immediate objective, which consists in being able to lead the *masses* to a new position ensuring the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, cannot be reached without the liquidation of Left doctrinairism, and without a full elimination of its errors.

As long as it was (and inasmuch as it still is) a question

of winning the proletariat's vanguard over to the side of communism, priority went and still goes to propaganda work; even propaganda circles, with all their parochial limitations, are useful under these conditions, and produce good results. But when it is a question of practical action by the masses, of the disposition, if one may so put it, of vast armies, of the alignment of *all* the class forces in a given society *for the final and decisive battle*, then propagandist methods alone, the mere repetition of the truths of "pure" communism, are of no avail. In these circumstances, one must not count in thousands, like the propagandist belonging to a small group that has not yet given leadership to the masses; in these circumstances one must count in millions and tens of millions. In these circumstances, we must ask ourselves, not only whether we have convinced the vanguard of the revolutionary class, but also whether the historically effective forces of *all* classes—positively of all the classes in a given society, without exception—are arrayed in such a way that the decisive battle is at hand—in such a way that: (1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength; (2) all the vacillating and unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats, as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy, and (3) among the proletariat, a mass sentiment favouring the most determined, bold and dedicated revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has emerged and begun to grow vigorously. Then revolution is indeed ripe; then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated and summarised above, and if we have chosen the right moment, our victory is assured.

The differences between the Churchills and the Lloyd Georges—with insignificant national distinctions, these political types exist in *all* countries—on the one hand, and between the Hendersons and the Lloyd Georges on the other, are quite minor and unimportant from the standpoint of pure (i.e., abstract) communism, i.e., communism

that has not yet matured to the stage of practical political action by the masses. However, from the standpoint of this practical action by the masses, these differences are most important. To take due account of these differences, and to determine the moment when the inevitable conflicts between these "friends", which weaken and enfeeble *all the "friends" taken together*, will have come to a head—that is the concern, the task, of a Communist who wants to be, not merely a class-conscious and convinced propagandist of ideas, but a practical leader of the *masses* in the revolution. It is necessary to link the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to effect all the necessary practical compromises, tacks, conciliatory manoeuvres, zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to speed up the achievement and then loss of political power by the Hendersons (the heroes of the Second International, if we are not to name individual representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy who call themselves socialists); to accelerate their inevitable bankruptcy in practice, which will enlighten the masses in the spirit of our ideas, in the direction of communism; to accelerate the inevitable friction, quarrels, conflicts and complete disintegration among the Hendersons, the Lloyd Georges and the Churchills (the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Constitutional-Democrats, the monarchists; the Scheidemanns, the bourgeoisie and the Kappists, etc.); to select the proper moment when the discord among these "pillars of sacrosanct private property" is at its height, so that, through a decisive offensive, the proletariat will defeat them all and capture political power.

History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of

classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master *all* forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power—sometimes at great risk and with very great danger—what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.

One will readily agree that any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner. This applies to politics even more than it does to the art of war. In politics it is even harder to know in advance which methods of struggle will be applicable and to our advantage in certain future conditions. Unless we learn to apply all the methods of struggle, we may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeat, if changes beyond our control in the position of the other classes bring to the forefront a form of activity in which we are especially weak. If, however, we learn to use all the methods of struggle, victory will be certain, because we represent the interests of the really foremost and really revolutionary class, even if circumstances do not permit us to make use of weapons that are most dangerous to the enemy, weapons that deal the swiftest mortal blows. Inexperienced revolutionaries often think that legal methods of struggle are opportunist because, in this field, the bourgeoisie has most frequently deceived and duped the workers (particularly in "peaceful" and non-revolutionary times), while illegal methods of struggle are revolutionary. That, however, is wrong. The truth is that those parties and leaders are opportunists and traitors to the working class that are unable or unwilling (do not say, "I can't"; say, "I shan't") to use illegal methods of struggle in conditions such as those which prevailed, for example, during the imperialist war of 1914-18, when the bourgeoisie of the freest democratic countries most brazenly and brutally deceived the workers, and smothered the truth about the predatory character of the war. But revolutionaries who are incapable of combining illegal forms of

struggle with *every* form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed. It is not difficult to be a revolutionary when revolution has already broken out and is in spate, when all people are joining the revolution just because they are carried away, because it is the vogue, and sometimes even from careerist motives. After its victory, the proletariat has to make most strenuous efforts, even the most painful, so as to "liberate" itself from such pseudo-revolutionaries. It is far more difficult—and far more precious—to be a revolutionary when the conditions for direct, open, really mass and really revolutionary struggle *do not yet exist*, to be able to champion the interests of the revolution (by propaganda, agitation and organisation) in non-revolutionary bodies, and quite often in downright reactionary bodies, in a non-revolutionary situation, among the masses who are incapable of immediately appreciating the need for revolutionary methods of action. To be able to seek, find and correctly determine the specific path or the particular turn of events that will *lead* the masses to the real, decisive and final revolutionary struggle—such is the main objective of communism in Western Europe and in America today.

Britain is an example. We cannot tell—no one can tell in advance—how soon a real proletarian revolution will flare up there, and *what immediate cause* will most serve to rouse, kindle, and impel into the struggle the very wide masses, who are still dormant. Hence, it is our duty to carry on all our preparatory work in such a way as to be "well shod on all four feet" (as the late Plekhanov, when he was a Marxist and revolutionary, was fond of saying). It is possible that the breach will be forced, the ice broken, by a parliamentary crisis, or by a crisis arising from colonial and imperialist contradictions, which are hopelessly entangled and are becoming increasingly painful and acute, or perhaps by some third cause, etc. We are not discussing the kind of struggle that will *determine* the fate of the proletarian revolution in Great Britain (no Communist has any doubt on that score; for all of us this is a foregone conclusion): what we are discussing is the *immediate cause* that will bring into motion the now dormant proletarian masses, and lead them right up to revolution.

Let us not forget that in the French bourgeois republic, for example, in a situation which, from both the international and the national viewpoints, was a hundred times less revolutionary than it is today, such an "unexpected" and "petty" cause as one of the many thousands of fraudulent machinations of the reactionary military caste (the Dreyfus case[39]) was enough to bring the people to the brink of civil war!

In Great Britain the Communists should constantly, unremittingly and unswervingly utilise parliamentary elections and all the vicissitudes of the Irish, colonial and world-imperialist policy of the British Government, and all other fields, spheres and aspects of public life, and work in all of them in a new way, in a communist way, in the spirit of the Third, not the Second, International. I have neither the time nor the space here to describe the "Russian" "Bolshevik" methods of participation in parliamentary elections and in the parliamentary struggle; I can, however, assure foreign Communists that they were quite unlike the usual West-European parliamentary campaigns. From this the conclusion is often drawn: "Well, that was in Russia; in our country parliamentarianism is different." This is a false conclusion. Communists, adherents of the Third International in all countries, exist for the purpose of *changing*—all along the line, in all spheres of life—the old socialist, trade unionist, syndicalist, and parliamentary type of work into a *new* type of work, the communist. In Russia, too, there was always an abundance of opportunism, purely bourgeois sharp practices and capitalist rigging in the elections. In Western Europe and in America, the Communist must learn to create a new, uncustomary, non-opportunist, and non-careerist parliamentarianism; the Communist parties must issue their slogans; true proletarians, with the help of the unorganised and downtrodden poor, should distribute leaflets, canvass workers' houses and cottages of the rural proletarians and peasants in the remote villages (fortunately there are many times fewer remote villages in Europe than in Russia, and in Britain the number is very small); they should go into the public houses, penetrate into unions, societies and chance gatherings of the common people, and speak to the people, not in

learned (or very parliamentary) language; they should not at all strive to "get seats" in parliament, but should everywhere try to get people to think, and draw the masses into the struggle, to take the bourgeoisie at its word and utilise the machinery it has set up, the elections it has appointed, and the appeals it has made to the people; they should try to explain to the people what Bolshevism is, in a way that was never possible (under bourgeois rule) outside of election times (exclusive, of course, of times of big strikes, when in Russia a *similar* apparatus for widespread popular agitation worked even more intensively). It is very difficult to do this in Western Europe and extremely difficult in America, but it can and must be done, for the objectives of communism cannot be achieved without effort. We must work to accomplish *practical* tasks, ever more varied and ever more closely connected with all branches of social life, *winning* branch after branch, and sphere after sphere *from the bourgeoisie*.

In Great Britain, further, the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation among the armed forces and among the oppressed and underprivileged nationalities in their "*own*" state (Ireland, the colonies) must also be tackled in a new fashion (one that is not socialist, but communist; not reformist, but revolutionary). That is because, in the era of imperialism in general and especially today after a war that was a sore trial to the peoples and has quickly opened their eyes to the truth (i.e., the fact that tens of millions were killed and maimed for the sole purpose of deciding whether the British or the German robbers should plunder the largest number of countries), all these spheres of social life and heavily charged with inflammable material and are creating numerous causes of conflicts, crises and an intensification of the class struggle. We do not and cannot know which spark—of the innumerable sparks that are flying about in all countries as a result of the world economic and political crisis—will kindle the conflagration, in the sense of raising up the masses; we must, therefore, with our new and communist principles, set to work to stir up all and sundry, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks, shall not be comprehensively prepared,

shall not be in possession of all the weapons and shall not prepare ourselves either to gain victory over the bourgeoisie (which arranged all aspects of social life—and has now disarranged them—in its bourgeois fashion), or to bring about the impending communist reorganisation of every sphere of life, following that victory.

Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoisie nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too. It is terrified of "Bolshevism", exasperated by it almost to the point of frenzy, and for that very reason it is, on the one hand, precipitating the progress of events and, on the other, concentrating on the forcible suppression of Bolshevism, thereby weakening its own position in a number of other fields. In their tactics the Communists in all the advanced countries must take both these circumstances into account.

When the Russian Cadets and Kerensky began furiously to hound the Bolsheviks—especially since April 1917, and more particularly in June and July 1917—they overdid things. Millions of copies of bourgeois papers, clamouring in every key against the Bolsheviks, helped the masses to make an appraisal of Bolshevism; apart from the newspapers, all public life was full of discussions about Bolshevism, as a result of the bourgeoisie's "zeal". Today the millionaires of all countries are behaving on an international scale in a way that deserves our heartiest thanks. They are hounding Bolshevism with the same zeal as Kerensky and Co. did; they, too, are overdoing things and *helping* us just as Kerensky did. When the French bourgeoisie makes Bolshevism the central issue in the elections, and accuses the comparatively moderate or vacillating socialists of being Bolsheviks; when the American bourgeoisie, which has completely lost its head, seizes thousands and thousands of people on suspicion of Bolshevism, creates an atmosphere of panic, and broadcasts stories of Bolshevik plots, when, despite all its wisdom and experience, the British bourgeoisie—the most "solid" in the world—makes incredible blunders, founds richly endowed "anti-Bolshevik societies", creates a special literature on Bolshevism, and

recruits an extra number of scientists, agitators and clergymen to combat it, we must salute and thank the capitalists. They are working for us. They are helping us to get the masses interested in the essence and significance of Bolshevism, and they cannot do otherwise, for they have *already* failed to ignore Bolshevism and stifle it.

But at the same time, the bourgeoisie sees practically only one aspect of Bolshevism—insurrection, violence, and terror; it therefore strives to prepare itself for resistance and opposition primarily in *this* field. It is possible that, in certain instances, in certain countries, and for certain brief periods, it will succeed in this. We must reckon with such an eventuality, and we have absolutely nothing to fear if it does succeed. Communism is emerging in positively every sphere of public life; its beginnings are to be seen literally on all sides. The "contagion" (to use the favourite metaphor of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois police, the one mostly to their liking) has very thoroughly penetrated the organism and has completely permeated it. If special efforts are made to block one of the channels, the "contagion" will find another one, sometimes very unexpectedly. Life will assert itself. Let the bourgeoisie rave, work itself into a frenzy, go to extremes, commit follies, take vengeance on the Bolsheviks in advance, and endeavour to kill off (as in India, Hungary, Germany, etc.) more hundreds, thousands, and hundreds of thousands of yesterday's and tomorrow's Bolsheviks. In acting thus, the bourgeoisie is acting as all historically doomed classes have done. Communists should know that, in any case, the future belongs to them; therefore, we can (and must) combine the most intense passion in the great revolutionary struggle, with the coolest and most sober appraisal of the frenzied ravings of the bourgeoisie. The Russian revolution was cruelly defeated in 1905; the Russian Bolsheviks were defeated in July 1917; over 15,000 German Communists were killed as a result of the wily provocation and cunning manoeuvres of Scheidemann and Noske, who were working hand in glove with the bourgeoisie and the monarchist generals; White terror is raging in Finland and Hungary. But in all cases in all countries, communism is becoming steeled and is growing; its roots are so

deep that persecution does not weaken or debilitate it, but only strengthens it. Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march forward more confidently and firmly to victory, namely, the universal and thorough awareness of all Communists in all countries of the necessity to display the utmost *flexibility* in their tactics. The communist movement, which is developing magnificently, now lacks, especially in the advanced countries, this awareness and the ability to apply it in practice.

That which happened to such leaders of the Second International, such highly erudite Marxists devoted to socialism as Kautsky, Otto Bauer and others, could (and should) provide a useful lesson. They fully appreciated the need for flexible tactics; they themselves learned Marxist dialectic and taught it to others (and much of what they have done in this field will always remain a valuable contribution to socialist literature); however, *in the application* of this dialectic they committed such an error, or proved to be so *un*dialectical in practice, so incapable of taking into account the rapid change of forms and the rapid acquisition of new content by the old forms, that their fate is not much more enviable than that of Hyndman, Guesde and Plekhanov. The principal reason for their bankruptcy was that they were hypnotised by a definite form of growth of the working-class movement and socialism, forgot all about the one-sidedness of that form, were afraid to see the break-up which objective conditions made inevitable, and continued to repeat simple and, at first glance, incontestable axioms that had been learned by rote, like: "three is more than two". But politics is more like algebra than arithmetic, and still more like higher than elementary mathematics. In reality, all the old forms of the socialist movement have acquired a new content, and, consequently, a new symbol, the "minus" sign, has appeared in front of all the figures; our wiseacres, however, have stubbornly continued (and still continue) to persuade themselves and others that "minus three" is more than "minus two".

We must see to it that Communists do not make a similar mistake, only in the opposite sense, or rather, we must see to it that a *similar mistake*, only made in the opposite sense by the "Left" Communists, is corrected

as soon as possible and eliminated as rapidly and painlessly as possible. It is not only Right doctrinairism that is erroneous; Left doctrinairism is erroneous too. Of course, the mistake of Left doctrinairism in communism is at present a thousand times less dangerous and less significant than that of Right doctrinairism (i.e., social-chauvinism and Kautskyism); but, after all, that is only due to the fact that Left communism is a very young trend, is only just coming into being. It is only for this reason that, under certain conditions, the disease can be easily eradicated, and we must set to work with the utmost energy to eradicate it.

The old forms burst asunder, for it turned out that their new content—anti-proletarian and reactionary—had attained an inordinate development. From the standpoint of the development of international communism, our work today has such a durable and powerful content (for Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) that it can *and must* manifest itself in any form, both new and old; it can and must regenerate, conquer and subjugate all forms, not only the new but also the old—not for the purpose of reconciling itself with the old, but for the purpose of making all and every form—new and old—a weapon for the complete and irrevocable victory of communism.

The Communists must exert every effort to direct the working-class movement and social development in general along the straightest and shortest road to the victory of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world-wide scale. That is an incontestable truth. But it is enough to take one little step farther—a step that might seem to be in the same direction—and truth turns into error. We have only to say, as the German and British Left Communists do, that we recognise only one road, only the direct road, and that we will not permit tacking, conciliatory manoeuvres, or compromising—and it will be a mistake which may cause, and in part has already caused and is causing, very grave prejudice to communism. Right doctrinairism persisted in recognising only the old forms, and became utterly bankrupt, for it did not notice the new content. Left doctrinairism persists in the unconditional repudiation of certain old forms, failing to see that

the new content is forcing its way through all and sundry forms, that it is our duty as Communists to master all forms, to learn how, with the maximum rapidity, to supplement one form with another, to substitute one for another, and to adapt our tactics to any such change that does not come from our class or from our efforts.

World revolution has been so powerfully stimulated and accelerated by the horrors, vileness and abominations of the world imperialist war and by the hopelessness of the situation created by it, this revolution is developing in scope and depth with such splendid rapidity, with such a wonderful variety of changing forms, with such an instructive practical refutation of all doctrinairism, that there is every reason to hope for a rapid and complete recovery of the international communist movement from the infantile disorder of "Left-wing" communism.

April 27, 1920

APPENDIX

Before publishing houses in our country—which has been plundered by the imperialists of the whole world in revenge for the proletarian revolution, and which is still being plundered and blockaded by them regardless of all promises they made to their workers—were able to bring out my pamphlet, additional material arrived from abroad. Without claiming to present in my pamphlet anything more than the cursory notes of a publicist, I shall dwell briefly upon a few points.

I

THE SPLIT AMONG THE GERMAN COMMUNISTS

The split among the Communists in Germany is an accomplished fact. The "Lefts", or the "opposition on principle", have formed a separate Communist Workers' Party, as distinct from the Communist Party. A split also seems imminent in Italy—I say "seems", as I have only two additional issues (Nos. 7 and 8) of the Left newspaper, *Il Soviet*, in which the possibility of and necessity for a split is openly discussed, and mention is also made of a congress of the "Abstentionist" group (or the boycottists, i.e., opponents of participation in parliament), which group is still part of the Italian Socialist Party.

There is reason to fear that the split with the "Lefts", the anti-parliamentarians (in part anti-politicals too, who are opposed to any political party and to work in the trade unions), will become an international phenomenon, like the split with the "Centrists" (i.e., Kautskyites, Longuetists, Independents, etc.). Let that be so. At all events, a split is better than confusion, which hampers the ideological, theoretical and revolutionary growth and maturing of the party, and its harmonious, really organised practical work which actually paves the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Let the "Lefts" put themselves to a practical test on a national and international scale. Let them try to prepare for (and then implement) the dictatorship of the proletariat, without a rigorously centralised party with iron discipline, without the ability to become masters of every sphere, every branch, and every variety of political and cultural work. Practical experience will soon teach them.

Only, every effort should be made to prevent the split with the "Lefts" from impeding—or to see that it impedes

as little as possible—the necessary amalgamation into a single party, inevitable in the near future, of all participants in the working-class movement who sincerely and conscientiously stand for Soviet government and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was the exceptional good fortune of the Bolsheviks in Russia to have had fifteen years for a systematic and consummated struggle both against the Mensheviks (i.e., the opportunists and "Centrists") and against the "Lefts", long before the masses began direct action for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Europe and America the same work has now to be done by forced marches, so to say. Certain individuals, especially among unsuccessful aspirants to leadership, may (if they lack proletarian discipline and are not honest towards themselves) persist in their mistakes for a long time; however, when the time is ripe, the masses of the workers will themselves unite easily and rapidly and unite all sincere Communists to form a single party capable of establishing the Soviet system and the dictatorship of the proletariat.*

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* With regard to the question of future amalgamation of the "Left" Communists, the anti-parliamentarians, with the Communists in general, I would make the following additional remarks. In the measure in which I have been able to familiarise myself with the newspapers of the "Left" Communists and the Communists in general in Germany, I find that the former have the advantage of being better able than the latter to carry on agitation among the masses. I have repeatedly observed something similar to this in the history of the Bolshevik Party, though on a smaller scale, in individual local organisations, and not on a national scale. For instance, in 1907-08 the "Left" Bolsheviks, on certain occasions and in certain places, carried on more successful agitation among the masses than we did. This may partly have been due to the fact that at a revolutionary moment, or at a time when revolutionary recollections are still fresh, it is easier to approach the masses with tactics of sheer negation. This, however, is not an argument to prove the correctness of such tactics. At all events, there is not the least doubt that a Communist *party* that wishes to be the real vanguard the advanced detachment, of the revolutionary *class*, of the proletariat—and which, in addition wishes to learn to lead the *masses*, not only the proletarian, but also the *non*-proletarian masses of working and exploited people—must know how to conduct propaganda, how to organise, and how to carry on agitation in a manner most simple and comprehensible, most clear and vivid, both to the urban, factory masses and to the rural masses.

II

THE COMMUNISTS AND THE INDEPENDENTS IN GERMANY

In this pamphlet I have expressed the opinion that a compromise between the Communists and the Left wing of the Independents is necessary and useful to communism, but will not be easy to bring about. Newspapers which I have subsequently received have confirmed this opinion on both points. No. 32 of *The Red Flag*, organ of the Central Committee, the Communist Party of Germany (*Die Rote Fahne*, Zentralorgan der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands, Spartakusbund,* of March 26, 1920) published a "statement" by this Central Committee regarding the Kapp-Lüttwitz military *putsch* and on the "socialist government". This statement is quite correct both in its basic premise and its practical conclusions. The basic premise is that at present there is no "objective basis" for the dictatorship of the proletariat because the "majority of the urban workers" support the Independents. The conclusion is: a promise to be a "loyal opposition" (i.e., renunciation of preparations for a "forcible overthrow") to a "socialist government if it excludes bourgeois-capitalist parties".

In the main, this tactic is undoubtedly correct. Yet, even if minor inaccuracies of formulation should not be dwelt on, it is impossible to pass over in silence the fact that a government consisting of social-traitors should not (in an official statement by the Communist Party) be called "socialist", that one should not speak of the exclusion of "bourgeois-capitalist parties", when the parties both of the Scheidemanns and of the Kautskys and Crispiens are petty-bourgeois-democratic parties; that things should never be written that are contained in § 4 of the statement, which reads:

"...A state of affairs in which political freedom can be enjoyed without restriction, and bourgeois democracy cannot operate as the

* The Spartacus League.—*Ed.*

dictatorship of capital is, from the viewpoint of the development of the proletarian dictatorship; of the utmost importance in further winning the proletarian masses over to the side of communism....”

Such a state of affairs is impossible. Petty-bourgeois leaders, the German Hendersons (Scheidemanns) and Snowdens (Crispiens), do not and cannot go beyond the bounds of bourgeois democracy, which, in its turn, cannot but be a dictatorship of capital. To achieve the practical results that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had been quite rightly working for, there was no need to write such things, which are wrong in principle and politically harmful. It would have been sufficient to say (if one wished to observe parliamentary amenities): “As long as the majority of the urban workers follow the Independents, we Communists must do nothing to prevent those workers from getting rid of their last philistine-democratic (i.e., ‘bourgeois-capitalist’) illusions by going through the experience of having a government of their ‘own’.” That is sufficient ground for a compromise, which is really necessary and should consist in renouncing, for a certain period, all attempts at the forcible overthrow of a government which enjoys the confidence of a majority of the urban workers. But in everyday mass agitation, in which one is not bound by official parliamentary amenities, one might, of course, add: “Let scoundrels like the Scheidemanns, and philistines like the Kautskys and Crispiens reveal by their deeds how they have been fooled themselves and how they are fooling the workers; their ‘clean’ government will itself do the ‘cleanest’ job of all in ‘cleansing’ the Augean stables of socialism, Social-Democracy and other forms of social treachery.”

The real nature of the present leaders of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany (leaders of whom it has been wrongly said that they have already lost all influence, whereas in reality they are even more dangerous to the proletariat that the Hungarian Social-Democrats who styled themselves Communists and promised to “support” the dictatorship of the proletariat) was once again revealed during the German equivalent of the Korni-

lov revolt, i.e., the Kapp-Lüttwitz *putsch*.* A small but striking illustration is provided by two brief articles—one by Karl Kautsky entitled "Decisive Hours" ("Entscheidende Stunden") in *Freiheit* (*Freedom*), organ of the Independents, of March 30, 1920, and the other by Arthur Crispien entitled "On the Political Situation" (in the same newspaper, issue of April 14, 1920). These gentlemen are absolutely incapable of thinking and reasoning like revolutionaries. They are snivelling philistine democrats, who become a thousand times more dangerous to the proletariat when they claim to be supporters of Soviet government and of the dictatorship of the proletariat because, in fact, whenever a difficult and dangerous situation arises they are sure to commit treachery ... while "sincerely" believing that they are helping the proletariat! Did not the Hungarian Social-Democrats, after rechristening themselves Communists, also want to "help" the proletariat when, because of their cowardice and spinelessness, they considered the position of Soviet power in Hungary hopeless and went snivelling to the agents of the Entente capitalists and the Entente hangmen?

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

III

TURATI AND CO. IN ITALY

The issues of the Italian newspaper *Il Soviet* referred to above fully confirm what I have said in the pamphlet about the Italian Socialist Party's error in tolerating such members and even such a group of parliamentarians in their ranks. It is still further confirmed by an outside observer like the Rome correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, organ of the British liberal bourgeoisie, whose interview with Turati is published in its issue of March 12, 1920. The correspondent writes:

* Incidentally, this has been dealt with in an exceptionally clear, concise, precise and Marxist way in the excellent organ of the Austrian Communist Party, *The Red Banner*, of March 28 and 30, 1920. (*Die Rote Fahne*, Wien, 1920, Nos. 266 and 267; L.L.: "*Ein neuer Abschnitt der deutschen Revolution*" ["A New Stage of the German Revolution"—*Ed.*]).

"...Signor Turati's opinion is that the revolutionary peril is not such as to cause undue anxiety in Italy. The Maximalists are fanning the fire of Soviet theories only to keep the masses awake and excited. These theories are, however, merely legendary notions, unripe programmes, incapable of being put to practical use. They are likely only to maintain the working classes in a state of expectation. The very men who use them as a lure to dazzle proletarian eyes find themselves compelled to fight a daily battle for the extortion of some often trifling economic advantages so as to delay the moment when the working classes will lose their illusions and faith in their cherished myths. Hence a long string of strikes of all sizes and with all pretexts up to the very latest ones in the mail and railway services—strikes which make the already hard conditions of the country still worse. The country is irritated owing to the difficulties connected with its Adriatic problem, is weighed down by its foreign debt and by its inflated paper circulation, and yet it is still far from realising the necessity of adopting that discipline of work which alone can restore order and prosperity...."

It is clear as daylight that this British correspondent has blurted out the truth, which is probably being concealed and glossed over both by Turati himself, and his bourgeois defenders, accomplices and inspirers in Italy. That truth is that the ideas and political activities of Turati, Trèves, Modigliani, Dugoni and Co. are really and precisely of the kind that the British correspondent has described. It is downright social treachery. Just look at this advocacy of order and discipline among the workers, who are wage-slaves toiling to enrich the capitalists ! And how familiar to us Russians are all these Menshevik speeches! What a valuable admission it is that the masses are *in favour of* Soviet government! How stupid and vulgarly bourgeois is the failure to understand the revolutionary role of strikes which are spreading spontaneously! Indeed, the correspondent of the British bourgeois-liberal newspaper has rendered Turati and Co. a disservice and has excellently confirmed the correctness of the demand by Comrade Bordiga and his friends on *Il Soviet*, who are insisting that the Italian Socialist Party, if it really wants to be *for* the Third International, should drum Turati and Co. out of its ranks and become a Communist Party both in name and in deed.

IV

FALSE CONCLUSIONS FROM CORRECT PREMISES

However, Comrade Bordiga and his "Left" friends draw from their correct criticism of Turati and Co. the wrong conclusion that any participation in parliament is harmful in principle. The Italian "Lefts" cannot advance even a shadow of serious argument in support of this view. They simply do not know (or try to forget) the international examples of really revolutionary and communist utilisation of bourgeois parliaments, which has been of unquestionable value in preparing for the proletarian revolution. They simply cannot conceive of any "new" ways of that utilisation, and keep on repeatedly and endlessly vociferating about the "old" non-Bolshevik way.

Herein lies their fundamental error. In *all* fields of activity, and not in the parliamentary sphere alone, communism *must introduce* (and without long and persistent effort it will be *unable* to introduce) something new in principle that will represent a radical break with the traditions of the Second International (while retaining and developing what was good in the latter).

Let us take, say, journalistic work. Newspapers, pamphlets and leaflets perform the indispensable work of propaganda, agitation and organisation. No mass movement in any country at all civilised can get along without a journalistic apparatus. No outcries against "leaders" or solemn vows to keep the masses uncontaminated by the influence of leaders will relieve us of the necessity of using, for this work, people from a bourgeois-intellectual environment or will rid us of the bourgeois-democratic, "private property" atmosphere and environment in which this work is carried out under capitalism. Even two and a half years after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, after the conquest of political power by the proletariat, we still have this atmosphere around us, this environment of mass (peasant, artisan) bourgeois-democratic private property relations.

Parliamentarianism is one form of activity; journalism is another. The content of both can and should be communist if those engaged in these two spheres are genuine Communists, really members of a proletarian mass party.

Yet, in neither sphere—and *in no other sphere of activity* under capitalism and during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism—is it possible to avoid those difficulties which the proletariat must overcome, those special problems which the proletariat must solve so as to use, for its own purposes, the services of people from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, eradicate bourgeois-intellectualist prejudices and influences, and weaken the resistance of (and, ultimately, completely transform) the petty-bourgeois environment.

Did we not, before the war of 1914-18, witness in all countries innumerable cases of extreme "Left" anarchists, syndicalists and others fulminating against parliamentarianism, deriding bourgeois-vulgarised parliamentary socialists, castigating their careerism, and so on and so forth, and yet themselves pursuing the *same kind* of bourgeois career *through* journalism and *through* work in the syndicates (trade unions)? Is not the example of Jouhaux and Merrheim, to limit oneself to France, typical in this respect?

The childishness of those who "repudiate" participation in parliament consists in their thinking it possible to "*solve*" the difficult problem of combating bourgeois-democratic influences *within* the working-class movement in such a "simple", "easy", allegedly revolutionary manner, whereas they are actually merely running away from their own shadows, only closing their eyes to difficulties and trying to shrug them off with mere words. The most shameless careerism, the bourgeois utilisation of parliamentary seats, glaringly reformist perversion of parliamentary activity, and vulgar petty-bourgeois conservatism are all unquestionably common and prevalent features engendered everywhere by capitalism, not only outside but also within the working-class movement. But the selfsame capitalism and the bourgeois environment it creates (which disappears very slowly even after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, since the peasantry constantly regenerates the bourgeoisie) give rise to what is essentially the same bourgeois careerism, national chauvinism, petty-bourgeois vulgarity, etc.—merely varying insignificantly in form—in positively every sphere of activity and life.

You think, my dear boycottists and anti-parliamentarians

that you are "terribly revolutionary", but in reality *you are frightened* by the comparatively minor difficulties of the struggle against bourgeois influences within the working-class movement, whereas your victory—i.e., the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the conquest of political power by the proletariat—will create *these very same* difficulties on a still larger, an infinitely larger scale. Like children, you are frightened by a minor difficulty which confronts you today, but you do not understand that tomorrow, and the day after, you will still have to learn, and learn thoroughly, to overcome the selfsame difficulties, only on an immeasurably greater scale.

Under Soviet rule, your proletarian party and ours will be invaded by a still larger number of bourgeois intellectuals. They will worm their way into the Soviets, the courts, and the administration, since communism cannot be built otherwise than with the aid of the human material created by capitalism, and the bourgeois intellectuals cannot be expelled and destroyed, but must be won over, remoulded, assimilated and re-educated, just as we must—in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat—re-educate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty-bourgeois prejudices at one stroke, by a miracle, at the behest of the Virgin Mary, at the behest of a slogan, resolution or decree, but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences. Under Soviet rule, these same problems, which the anti-parliamentarians now so proudly, so haughtily, so lightly and so childishly brush aside with a wave of the hand—*these selfsame* problems are arising anew *within* the Soviets, within the Soviet administration, among the Soviet "pleaders" (in Russia we have abolished, and have rightly abolished, the bourgeois legal bar, but it is reviving again under the cover of the "Soviet pleaders"[40]). Among Soviet engineers, Soviet school-teachers and the privileged, i.e., the most highly skilled and best situated, *workers* at Soviet factories, we observe a constant revival of absolutely *all* the negative traits peculiar to bourgeois parliamentarianism, and we are conquering this evil—gradually—only by a tireless, prolonged and persistent struggle based on proletarian organisation and discipline.

Of course, under the rule of the bourgeoisie it is very "difficult" to eradicate bourgeois habits from our own, i.e., the workers', party; it is "difficult" to expel from the party the familiar parliamentary leaders who have been hopelessly corrupted by bourgeois prejudices; it is "difficult" to subject to proletarian discipline the absolutely essential (even if very limited) number of people coming from the ranks of the bourgeoisie; it is "difficult" to form, in a bourgeois parliament, a communist group fully worthy of the working class; it is "difficult" to ensure that the communist parliamentarians do not engage in bourgeois parliamentary inanities, but concern themselves with the very urgent work of propaganda, agitation and organisation among the masses. All this is "difficult", to be sure; it was difficult in Russia, and it is vastly more difficult in Western Europe and in America, where the bourgeoisie is far stronger, where bourgeois-democratic traditions are stronger, and so on.

Yet all these "difficulties" are mere child's play compared with the *same sort* of problems which, in any event, the proletariat will have most certainly to solve in order to achieve victory, both during the proletarian revolution and after the seizure of power by the proletariat. Compared with *these* truly gigantic problems of re-educating, under the proletarian dictatorship, millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials and bourgeois intellectuals, of subordinating them all to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership, of eradicating their bourgeois habits and traditions—compared with these gigantic problems it is childishly easy to create, under the rule of the bourgeoisie, and in a bourgeois parliament, a really communist group of a real proletarian party.

If our "Left" and anti-parliamentarian comrades do not learn to overcome even such a small difficulty now, we may safely assert that either they will prove incapable of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, and will be unable to subordinate and remould the bourgeois intellectuals and bourgeois institutions on a wide scale, or they will have to *hastily complete their education*, and, by that haste, will do a great deal of harm to the cause of the pro-

letariat, will commit more errors than usual, will manifest more than average weakness and inefficiency, and so on and so forth.

Until the bourgeoisie has been overthrown and, after that, until small-scale economy and small commodity production have entirely disappeared, the bourgeois atmosphere, proprietary habits and petty-bourgeois traditions will hamper proletarian work both outside and within the working-class movement, not only in a single field of activity—the parliamentary—but, inevitably, in every field of social activity, in all cultural and political spheres without exception. The attempt to brush aside, to fence oneself off from *one* of the "unpleasant" problems or difficulties in some one sphere of activity is a profound mistake, which will later most certainly have to be paid for. We must learn how to master every sphere of work and activity without exception, to overcome all difficulties and eradicate all bourgeois habits, customs and traditions everywhere. Any other way of presenting the question is just trifling, mere childishness.

May 12, 1920

V

In the Russian edition of this book I somewhat incorrectly described the conduct of the Communist Party of Holland as a whole, in the sphere of international revolutionary policy. I therefore avail myself of the present opportunity to publish a letter from our Dutch comrades on this question and to correct the expression "Dutch Tribunists", which I used in the Russian text, and for which I now substitute the words "certain members of the Communist Party of Holland".[41]

N. Lenin

LETTER FROM WIJNKOOP

Moscow, June 30, 1920

Dear Comrade Lenin,

Thanks to your kindness, we members of the Dutch delegation to the Second Congress of the Communist International were able to read your "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* prior to its publication in the European languages. In several

places in the book you emphasise your disapproval of the part played by some members of the Communist Party of Holland in international politics.

We feel, nevertheless, that we must protest against your laying the responsibility for their actions on the Communist Party. This is highly inaccurate. Moreover, it is unjust, because these members of the Communist Party of Holland take little or no part in the Party's current activities and are endeavourng, directly or indirectly, to give effect, in the Communist Party of Holland, to opposition slogans against which the Party and all its organs have waged, and continue to wage to this day, a most energetic struggle.

Fraternally yours,
D. J. Wijnkoop
(on behalf of the Dutch delegation)

SPEECH DELIVERED AT AN ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF GLASS AND PORCELAIN WORKERS APRIL 29, 1920

Yesterday brought us two pieces of news: the first is very bad—a report about a manifesto by Pilsudski, head of the Polish Government. I have not yet seen the text of this manifesto; I was told of it on the telephone. One thing is certain, however, that it is tantamount to Poland's declaration of war on the Ukraine. The French imperialists' influence has evidently gained the upper hand in Poland's government circles. The Polish Government has decided to drop its recent policy of tacking and manoeuvring around the peace negotiations with us, and to start hostilities on a wider front. The Poles have already captured Zhitomir and are marching on Kiev. This demands of us the most determined and urgent defence of the interests of the proletariat. We do not doubt that we shall be able to defend those interests; we do not doubt that this new attempt by the Entente imperialists to strangle Soviet Russia will fall through just as the Denikin and the Kolchak ventures have. Poland is obviously getting all her military support from France, Britain, and the entire Entente. It is highly characteristic, in this connection, that in the last stage of the negotiations with us about the Crimea the British Government has considerably changed its originally favourable attitude. In reply to Great Britain's call to us to show clemency to Denikin's soldiers, who are being driven into the sea, we have said that we were prepared to spare the lives of the Crimean whiteguards if, for its part, the Entente shows clemency to the defeated Hungarian Communists and allows them to enter Soviet Russia.

We do not need to shed the blood of these Crimean white-guards; we are not vindictive. We have, however, received no reply to our Note from the British Government, which, in connection with Poland's action, seems in no hurry to reply. But we are sure that no supporters of intervention are to be found among the British workers, even the most opportunistically minded.

We have information to the effect that even in Poland the Polish Socialist Party, which has persecuted Polish Communists, has stated in its newspaper that Poland should not break off peace negotiations with Soviet Russia by presenting an ultimatum demanding that these talks should be conducted in Borisov. This newspaper considers such conduct by the Polish Government a crime. The Poles have proposed that the peace talks should take place in Borisov without any cessation of hostilities. Conducting negotiations in this particular place would prevent us from continuing hostilities during the talks, while giving Poland complete freedom of action in this respect. Of course, we could not conduct peace negotiations on such terms, and we proposed that they should be transferred to Paris, Revel, Warsaw, Moscow or some other city mutually agreed upon with Poland. The reply to this proposal was an extensive Polish offensive along the entire front. We have no doubt that the Polish Government started this war of aggression in defiance of the wishes of its workers. That is why we face this new military gamble quite calmly; we know that we shall emerge the victors. But you know, comrades, that any war is accompanied by tremendous difficulties, to overcome which we have more than once appealed to the worker masses for support. The war with Poland has been forced upon us. We have no designs whatever on Poland's independence, just as we have no designs on the independence of Lithuania or Byelorussia. Yet, despite an our willingness to come to terms, war has been forced upon us; that being the case, we must rise up as one man to defend both ourselves and the Ukraine from the onslaught of the Polish imperialists. (*Loud applause.*) For that purpose we must again make a certain change of plans. However much we might desire to go over to peaceful construction as soon as possible and on the greatest

possible scale, the fact that war has been forced upon us makes it imperative that we subordinate everything to the demands of that war so as to achieve the most successful and rapid results. We must explain to the workers and peasants why an Entente-instigated Poland has launched a war against us. We must explain that this has been done in order to widen the barrier and deepen the gulf separating the proletariat of Germany from us.

On the other hand, we received news from Baku yesterday which shows that the position of Soviet Russia is improving. We know that our industry is at a standstill owing to lack of fuel. News has come in that the Baku proletariat has taken over power and overthrown the Azerbaijan Government. This means that we now have an economic base that may put life into our whole industry. In Baku there is a million poods* of oil which could not be sold, with the result that even Nobel, the oil magnate, tried to start talks with us for the delivery of this oil to Soviet Russia. Thus our railways and industry will receive very substantial aid from the Baku oilfields.

Comrade Tsyurupa, the People's Commissar for Food, informed me today that in Kuban Region and in the Caucasus there are vast stocks of grain which we can count on having sent here. That means that we shall have fuel for industry and bread for the people. By exerting every effort to restore the transport system, we shall be able to secure bread and oil, which will serve as a sound economic basis for relations between the workers and the peasants. We say that the peasants must give their surplus grain to the workers because under present-day conditions, the sale of these surpluses would be a crime. Consequently, as soon as we get our industry going, we shall make every effort to satisfy the peasants' need of manufactured goods from the cities.

After outlining the Republic's general position today in these few words and to the extent permitted by the time, I shall take the liberty of concluding by expressing the conviction that at the present moment, at this new stage of our relations with Poland, when both Kuban grain and Baku oil have been made available to us, the four

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* 1 pood is approximately 36 lbs. avoirdupois.—*Ed.*

million workers organised in the trade unions, through whom we have conducted our Soviet policy with the backing of the broad strata of the peasants, will, without confining themselves to the narrow limits of their trade union life, go on giving every support to the further success and development of the proletariat's common cause. We know that the workers' class-consciousness and unity and the complete solidarity of the trade unions have been the only force that have made possible the brilliant victories of the Red Army, an army which has been the finest medium of spreading political enlightenment among the peasants, teaching them to oust self-seekers from their ranks so as to keep power in the hands of the workers. Now, too, we need that class-consciousness, that unity and complete solidarity of the trade unions in the war against Poland and in the work of restoring industry. What we need today is the further maintenance and tightening of the discipline necessary in all branches of production. The class-conscious workers know that if you, the workers, had not displayed this discipline hitherto, we might have suffered the fate of Hungary. Let the comrades remember that and, in their localities, ensure the complete subordination of all to the one fundamental task: we must abolish, we must eliminate as soon as possible the accursed motto—every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost. Proletarian labour discipline must be raised to the highest pitch of intensity—and then we shall be invincible. We will show that the Soviet Republic cannot be overthrown and that we shall succeed in winning the aid of all the other republics of the world. (*Continuous applause from all members of the congress*; *cries of* "Long live our leader Comrade Lenin!")

Pravda No. 92,
April 30, 1920

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

FROM THE FIRST SUBBOTNIK ON THE MOSCOW-KAZAN RAILWAY TO THE ALL-RUSSIA MAY DAY SUBBOTNIK[42]

The distance indicated in the above title has been covered in a single year. This is an enormous distance. Although all our subbotniks are still weak, and each subbotnik reveals a host of defects in arrangement, organisation and discipline, the main thing has been done. A heavy and ponderous mass has been shifted, and that is the essence of the matter.

We are not deceiving ourselves in the least about the little that has yet been done and about the infinite amount of work that has yet to be done; however, only malicious enemies of the working people, only malicious supporters of the bourgeoisie, can treat the May 1 subbotnik with disdain; only the most contemptible people, who have irrevocably sold themselves to the capitalists, can condemn the utilisation of the great First of May festival for a mass-scale attempt to introduce communist labour.

This is the very first time since the overthrow of the tsars, the landowners and the capitalists that the ground is being cleared for the actual building of socialism, for the development of new social links, a new discipline of work in common and a new national (and later an international) system of economy of world-historic importance. This is a matter of transforming the very habits of the people, habits which, for a long time to come, have been defiled and debased by the accursed private ownership of the means of production, and also by the entire atmosphere of bickering, distrust, enmity, disunity and mutual intrigue that is inevitably generated—and constantly regenerated—

by petty individual economy, the economy of private owners in conditions of "free" exchange among them. For hundreds of years, freedom of trade and of exchange has been to millions of people the supreme gospel of economic wisdom, the most deep-rooted habit of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people. This freedom is just as utterly false, serving to mask capitalist deception, coercion and exploitation, as are the other "freedoms" proclaimed and implemented by the bourgeoisie, such as the "freedom to work" (actually the freedom to starve), and so on.

In the main we have broken irrevocably with this "freedom" of the property-owner to be a property-owner, with this "freedom" of capital to exploit labour, and we shall finish the job. We are combating its remnants ruthlessly, with all our might.

Down with the old social links, the old economic relationships, the old "freedom" of labour (*subordinated to capital*), the old laws, the old habits!

Let us build a new society!

We were not daunted by defeats during the great revolutionary war against tsarism, against the bourgeoisie, against the omnipotent imperialist world powers.

We shall not be daunted by the gigantic difficulties and by the errors that are inevitable at the outset of a most difficult task; the transformation of all labour habits and customs requires decades. We solemnly and firmly promise one another that we shall make every sacrifice, that we shall hold out and win in this most arduous struggle—the struggle against the force of habit—that we shall work indefatigably for years and decades. We shall work to do away with the accursed maxim: "Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost", the habit of looking upon work merely as a duty, and of considering rightful only that work which is paid for at certain rates. We shall work to inculcate in people's minds, turn into a habit, and bring into the day-by-day life of the masses, the rule: "All for each and each for all"; the rule: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"; we shall work for the gradual but steady introduction of communist discipline and communist labour.

We have shifted a huge mountain, a huge mass of conserv-

atism, ignorance, stubborn adherence to the habits of "freedom of trade" and of the "free" buying and selling of human labour-power like any other commodity. We have begun to undermine and destroy the most deep-rooted prejudices, the firmest, age-long and ingrained habits. In a single year our subbotniks have made an immense stride forward. They are still infinitely weak, but that will not daunt us. We have seen our "infinitely weak" Soviet state, before our very eyes, gaining strength and becoming a mighty world force, as a result of our own efforts. We shall work for years and decades practising subbotniks, developing them, spreading them, improving them and converting them into a habit. We shall achieve the victory of communist labour.

Pervomaisky Subbotnik,
May 2, 1920
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the newspaper text

SPEECH AT A MEETING DEDICATED TO THE LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION STONE OF A MONUMENT TO LIBERATED LABOUR MAY 1, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

(Comrade Lenin mounts the platform to unanimous applause from the audience.) Comrades, this was once the site of the monument to a tsar. Today we are laying the foundation stone of a monument to the glory of liberated labour. The capitalists used to speak of the freedom of labour, while the workers and the peasants were obliged to sell them their labour and, in consequence, were free to die of starvation. We call that kind of labour wage-slavery. We know that it is no easy matter to organise free labour in the proper way and to work in the conditions of the difficult times we are living through. Today's subbotnik is the first step along that road, but if we carry on in the same way we shall create a kind of labour that is genuinely free. (*Prolonged and unanimous applause.*)

Pravda No. 94,
May 4, 1920

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH TO MEN OF THE RED ARMY LEAVING FOR THE POLISH FRONT MAY 5, 1920[43]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades: You know that, instigated by the Entente, the Polish landowners and capitalists have forced a new war on us. Remember, comrades, that we have no quarrel with the Polish peasants and workers; we have recognised Poland's independence and the Polish People's Republic, and shall continue to do so. We have proposed peace to Poland on the basis of the integrity of her frontiers, although these frontiers extend far beyond the purely Polish population. We have agreed to make all concessions, which is something each of you should remember at the front. Let your attitude to the Poles there prove that you are soldiers of a workers' and peasants' republic, that you are coming to them, not as aggressors but as liberators. Now that, despite our efforts, the Polish magnates have concluded an alliance with Petlyura, launched an offensive, are approaching Kiev, and are spreading rumours in the foreign press that they have already captured Kiev—which is the sheerest fabrication since only yesterday I was talking on the direct line with F. Kon, who is in Kiev—we say: Comrades, we have been able to repel a more terrible enemy; we have been able to defeat our own landowners and capitalists, and we shall defeat the Polish landowners and capitalists too! All of us here today should pledge ourselves, give a solemn promise, that we shall stand as one man so as not to allow a victory of the Polish magnates and

capitalists. Long live the peasants and workers of a free independent Polish Republic! Down with the Polish magnates, landowners and capitalists! Long live our Red Workers' and Peasants' Army! (*The mighty strains of the "Internationale" and cries of "Hurrah" drown Comrade Lenin's final words.*)

Pravda No. 96,
May 6, 1920

Published according to
the newspaper text

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS', PEASANTS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES, TRADE UNIONS, AND FACTORY COMMITTEES MAY 5, 1920[44]

(*Applause.*) Comrades, I should like to draw your attention to a feature that, from the international point of view or more correctly from the point of view of Russia's international position, distinguishes the present war from previous wars. Of course, none of you doubt, or could doubt, that this war is a link in a long chain of events revealing the international bourgeoisie's frantic resistance to the victorious proletariat, a frantic attempt by the international bourgeoisie to crush Soviet Russia, to overthrow the first Soviet state at all costs and by all means. There cannot be the least doubt that there is a connection between these events, between the international bourgeoisie's previous attempts and the present war. At the same time, however, we see the tremendous difference between this war and previous wars, from the point of view of our international position. We see the tremendous impetus our struggle has given to the international working-class movement. We see how the international proletariat reacts to Soviet Russia's victories, how the world proletarian struggle is mounting and gaining strength, and what gigantic work has been carried out in the little more than the two years of the Soviet Republic's existence.

You remember how the most responsible and most powerful ministers of the mightiest and unrivalled capitalist

powers announced quite recently that they had prepared an alliance of fourteen powers against Russia; you know how, under pressure from the powerful capitalists of France and Britain, this alliance brought Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin together, and how it drew up a really grandiose and comprehensive war plan. If we destroyed that plan, it was because the imperialists' unity was illusory, and the forces of the international bourgeoisie cannot stand up to a single trial when it comes to sacrificing oneself. It appeared that, after four years of the imperialist slaughter, the working people do not recognise the justice of a war against us, and in them we have a great ally. The Entente's plan was really destructive, but it came to grief because, despite their most powerful alliance, the capitalist states could not carry it through, proved powerless to give it effect. None of the powers, any one of which could have the advantage over us, could show unity, because the organised proletariat does not support it; no army—neither the French nor the British—could get its soldiers to fight on Russian soil, against the Soviet Republic.

If, in our mind's eye, we follow the desperate situations our republic was faced with when, in fact, it was standing up to the whole world, against powers far more powerful than it, and if we recollect how we emerged fully victorious from these formidable trials, then these recollections will give us a clear idea of what we are confronted with now. Here we see a plan that is not new and at the same time does not at all resemble the really comprehensive and single plan we were faced with six months ago. What we have is the relics of the former plan and, in the light of the international alignment of forces, this is the greatest assurance of the futility of the present attempt. The former plan was an attempt on the part of all the imperialist powers to crush the workers' and peasants' republic, in alliance with all the small border states of the former Russian Empire, which had been shamelessly and outrageously oppressed by the tsarist and capitalist government of Great Russia. At present, several powers, in alliance with one of the border states, are attempting to accomplish that which proved impossible to all the imperialist powers in alliance with

all the border states, and was undertaken by them twelve and six months ago in alliance with Kolchak, Denikin and others. We now see the relics of the imperialists' plan. The great tenacity being shown by the bourgeoisie is a feature of the imperialist plans. They know that they are fighting to retain power at home, and that it is not the Russian or the Polish question that is being decided, but the question of their own survival. It is therefore to be expected that they will try to salvage the former and unsuccessful plan from the wreck.

We can all clearly see the clash of the imperialist states' interests. Despite all pronouncements by their ministers about the peaceful settlement of questions in dispute, the imperialist powers cannot in reality take a single serious step in political matters without disagreeing. The French need a powerful Poland and a powerful Russia of the tsarist brand, and they are prepared to make every sacrifice to this end. Because of her geographical position, Britain wants something else—the break-up of Russia and a weak Poland, so as to ensure a balance between France and Germany which would give the imperialist victors control of colonies acquired by robbing Germany as a consequence of the world war. Here the clash of interests is really striking; no matter how the representatives of the imperialist powers at San Remo[45] try to assure us that there is full unanimity among the Allies, we know that this is not the case.

We know that Poland's offensive is a relic of the old plan that once united the entire international bourgeoisie. If that ambitious plan failed at that time, even though from the purely military standpoint it was assured of success, it is hopeless today, even in that aspect. Furthermore, we know that the imperialist powers, who have entered into an alliance with the Polish bourgeoisie, and the Polish Government are in a bigger mess than ever. Each political move made by the Polish bourgeoisie over the past months, weeks and days has shown them up to their own working people. They have been quarrelling with their allies, and cannot make a single consistent move in their policy. At one moment they announce their unyielding attitude to Soviet Russia and the impossibility of conducting any

kind of talks with her, while at the next moment they raise the blockade, and solemnly announce this on behalf of an allegedly existing alliance, an allegedly existing League of Nations, and then they again commence a policy of vacillation. In consequence of all this, the imperialists have enabled us to prove that our policy is peaceful, and that our international policy has nothing in common either with tsarist policies or those of the Russian capitalists or the Russian bourgeoisie, even a democratic bourgeoisie. We have proved to the entire world that our foreign policy has nothing in common with the policy constantly ascribed to us by all the bourgeois press. Consequently, the Poles themselves have exposed every piece of deception in their policy. The experience of three Russian revolutions has shown us how they were prepared, and how each served as the basis for the further development of home and foreign policy. This experience has proved that in the preparation of revolution those ruling classes are our most faithful assistants which, laying claim to all kinds of coalitions, constituent assemblies and so on, and asserting that they represent the will of the people, in fact reveal—through their own policy at every serious, difficult or crucial moment in the life of the country—the self-interest of squabbling bourgeois groups that cannot come to terms, rival capitalist groups that unmask themselves a hundred times more effectively than communist propaganda can do. In no country or state can the working class—even if it is most revolutionary—ever be revolutionised by any propaganda and agitation unless that agitation is backed up in practice by the behaviour of the ruling classes of that country.

What is now taking place in all capitalist countries (and this will develop even more with time, particularly in a country like Poland) makes us confident that, if we emerged victorious from a war undoubtedly far more arduous, and if we have correctly assessed the discord and the impossibility of reconciliation among the bourgeoisie of various groups and parties at times when they stand in particular need of such unity, the present improvement in our international position is enormous. This fills us with confidence, not only in view of the internal alignment of forces, but also of our international position. If we consider the entire

system of present-day imperialist states, and all their strivings—and we know that their urge to use any moment for an attack on Russia is irresistible—and appraise them quite objectively in the light of the incontrovertible facts of the history of recent years and particularly of the past six months, we shall see that the international enemy is weakening, that all attempts at an alliance between the imperialists are becoming more and more futile, and that, from this aspect, our victory is assured.

However, comrades, while working on economic problems and concentrating all our attention on peaceful economic construction, we must rapidly re-form our ranks as we face the approach of a new war. Our entire army, which has recently been a labour army,[46] must now turn its attention to other matters. We must discontinue everything else and concentrate on this new war. We are perfectly aware that, after all that we have been through, we do not have to fear the enemy now facing us, but he may impose new and heavy sacrifices on the workers and peasants, may greatly impede our economic construction, and bring about the devastation and ruin of tens, hundreds and thousands of peasant households. He may also, by his temporary success, revive the extinct hopes of the imperialists we have defeated, who will of course not fail to join forces with this enemy. We must, therefore, declare that the rule we have followed throughout all previous wars must be resolutely reinforced. Since, despite all our most conciliatory intentions and the fact that we made great concessions and renounced all national claims, the Polish landowners and the Polish bourgeoisie have forced a war on us; since we are certain, and we must be certain, that the bourgeoisie of all countries, even those that at present are not helping the Poles, will help them when the war flares up, because it is not only a Russian or a Polish issue, but one of the survival of the entire bourgeoisie—then we must remember and at all costs implement the rule which we have followed in our policy and which has always been a guarantee of our success. That rule is: once things have led to war, everything must be subordinated to the war effort; the entire internal life of the country must be subordinated to wartime needs; the slightest hesitation on this score is inexcusable. No matter how hard it is for the great

majority of comrades to tear themselves away from their work, which has only recently been switched onto a new course, more gratifying and essential to the tasks of peaceful construction, it must be remembered that the least oversight or inattention may often mean the deaths of tens of thousands of our best comrades, our younger generation of workers and peasants, our Communists who, as always, are in the front ranks of the fighters. Therefore, once more—everything for the war effort. No meeting, no conference should be held without having as its first item the question: have we done everything possible to help the war effort; have our forces been sufficiently mobilised; have we sent sufficient help to the front? Only those people who cannot help at the front should remain here. Every sacrifice, every assistance for the front, without the least hesitation! And, by concentrating all efforts and making every sacrifice, we shall undoubtedly triumph again. (*Applause.*)

Published in 1920 in the book *Verbatim Reports of the Plenary Meetings of the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies*

Published according to the text in the book

TELEGRAM TO THE SOVIET SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT OF AZERBAIJAN

Baku

The Council of People's Commissars welcomes the liberation of the toiling masses of the independent Azerbaijan Republic and expresses its firm confidence that, under the leadership of its Soviet Government, the independent Republic of Azerbaijan will, together with the R.S.F.S.R., uphold its freedom and independence against imperialism, the sworn enemy of the oppressed nations of the East.

Long live the independent Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan!

Long live the workers and peasants of Azerbaijan!

Long live the alliance of the workers and peasants of Azerbaijan and Russia!

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

May 5, 1920

Kommunist (Baku) No. 7,
May 9, 1920

Published according to
the newspaper text

SPEECH AT AN ENLARGED CONFERENCE OF WORKERS AND RED ARMY MEN IN ROGOZHSKO-SIMONOVSKY DISTRICT OF MOSCOW MAY 13, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The Soviet Republic is again going through a difficult period. After dealing with Kolchak and Denikin, the Russian proletariat was preparing to devote all its spiritual and material forces to the restoration of the country's economic life. We thought that the bourgeois government of Poland would not hazard a new venture. The Polish Communists, it is true, had said that, just because the Polish Government had nothing more to lose, it would not hesitate to drive its workers and peasants into any kind of adventure. We, however, think that the Polish proletariat, together with the proletariat of Lithuania and Byelorussia, will see to it that the Polish bourgeoisie and nobility are driven out of the country. The Russian workers' and peasants' government has made enormous concessions to Poland, wishing thereby to prove to the Polish people that it has ended with tsarism's policy towards small states.

Behind the Polish bourgeoisie stand the capitalists of France, who are manoeuvring to sell military supplies to Poland at good prices, thus recovering the losses incurred with Kolchak and Denikin.

It is significant that no Entente power dares to come out openly against Soviet Russia, for fear of showing the workers its true colours. At present it is of the utmost importance for us to make the politically illiterate and backward citizens realise that we have done everything to avoid

fresh bloodshed, that the Polish worker and peasant are no enemies of ours, but that we shall fight and fight ruthlessly if the Polish bourgeoisie is out for war, hand in glove with Petlyura. In the final analysis, victory in any war depends on the spirit animating the masses that spill their own blood on the field of battle. The conviction that the war is in a just cause and the realisation that their lives must be laid down for the welfare of their brothers strengthen the morale of the fighting men and enable them to endure incredible hardships. Tsarist generals say that our Red Army men are capable of enduring hardships that the tsar's army could never have stood up to. The reason is that every mobilised worker or peasant knows what he is fighting for and is ready to shed his own blood for the triumph of justice and socialism.

The realisation by the masses of the causes and aims of the war is of tremendous importance and ensures victory.

Our country has been exhausted by war, and we are prepared to make great concessions to end the bloodshed and apply ourselves to peaceful labour. That was why, when Bullitt came to Russia and proposed a harsh peace, the Soviet Government signed it[47] so as to enable the Soviets to gain strength.

At present we are again obliged to issue the call, "Everything for the war effort!" All trade union and Party organisations must bend every effort to help the heroic Red Army.

We shall very soon convince the whole world of the justice of our cause.

A British trade union delegation arrived in Petrograd yesterday. Few of its members are in sympathy with us, but we are sure that when they return home they will be our best propagandists.[48] Even former tsarist generals consider Poland's claims unjust and are helping us. The Russian workers and peasants join us in saying, "Everything for the war effort, everything for victory". Let us devote all our forces to secure victory. (*A storm of applause.*)

Kommunistichesky Trud No. 44,
May 14, 1920

Published according to
the newspaper text

TO THE INDIAN REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION[49]

I am glad to hear that the principles of self-determination and the liberation of oppressed nations from exploitation by foreign and native capitalists, proclaimed by the Workers' and Peasants' Republic, have met with such a ready response among progressive Indians, who are waging a heroic fight for freedom. The working masses of Russia are following with unflagging attention the awakening of the Indian workers and peasants. The organisation and discipline of the working people and their perseverance and solidarity with the working people of the world are an earnest of ultimate success. We welcome the close alliance of Moslem and non-Moslem elements. We sincerely want to see this alliance extended to all the toilers of the East. Only when the Indian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Persian, and Turkish workers and peasants join hands and march together in the common cause of liberation—only then will decisive victory over the exploiters be ensured. Long live a free Asia!

Pravda No. 108,
May 20, 1920

Published according to
the newspaper text

LETTER TO THE BRITISH WORKERS[50]

Comrades:

First of all permit me to thank you for sending your delegation here to acquaint themselves with Soviet Russia. When your delegation suggested to me that I should send a letter through them to the British workers and perhaps also proposals to the British Government, I replied that I gratefully accepted the first suggestion but that I must address myself to the government, not through a workers' delegation but directly, on behalf of our government, through Comrade Chicherin. We have on very many occasions addressed ourselves this way to the British Government, making the most formal and solemn proposals to start peace talks. All our representatives—Comrade Litvinov, Comrade Krasin and the rest—are unceasingly continuing to make these proposals. The British Government stubbornly refuses to accept them. It is not surprising, therefore, that I desired to speak to the delegates of the British workers exclusively as delegates of the workers, not as a representative of the government of Soviet Russia, but simply as a Communist.

I was not surprised to find that several members of your delegation hold a standpoint, not of the working class but of the bourgeoisie, of the exploiting class: in all capitalist countries the imperialist war fully revealed an old ulcer, namely, the desertion of the majority of the workers' parliamentary and trade union leaders to the side of the bourgeoisie. On the false pretext of "defence of country" they were actually defending the predatory interests of either of the two groups of robbers of the entire world—the Anglo-American-French group, or the German group;

they entered into an alliance with the bourgeoisie, against the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat; they covered up this treachery with sentimental petty-bourgeois reformist and pacifist phrases about peaceful evolution, constitutional methods, democracy, etc. This is what happened in all countries; it is not surprising that in Britain this state of affairs has also been reflected in the composition of your delegation.

Members of your delegation, Shaw and Guest—obviously surprised and hurt by my statement that Britain, notwithstanding our peace proposals and notwithstanding the declarations of her government, is continuing her intervention, waging war against us and helping Wrangel in the Crimea and whiteguard Poland—asked me whether I had proof of this, and whether I could show how many trainloads of military supplies Britain had provided Poland with, etc. I replied that, to obtain the secret treaties of the British Government, it was necessary to overthrow it in a revolutionary manner and to seize all its foreign policy documents in the same way as we did in 1917. Any educated man, anybody sincerely interested in politics, was aware even prior to our revolution that the tsar had secret treaties with the predatory governments of Britain, France, America, Italy and Japan concerning the division of the spoils, concerning Constantinople, Galicia, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, etc. Only liars and hypocrites (excluding, of course, absolutely ignorant, backward and illiterate people) could deny this, or pretend not to know of this. However, without a revolution, we could never have obtained the secret documents of the predatory governments of the capitalist class. Those leaders or representatives of the British proletariat—whether they are members of Parliament, trade union leaders, journalists, or others—who pretend ignorance of the secret treaties between Britain, France, America, Italy, Japan and Poland concerning the plunder of other countries, concerning the division of the spoils, and who do not wage a revolutionary struggle in order to expose these treaties, are merely once again showing that they are faithful servants of the capitalists. We have known this for a long time; we are exposing this in our own country and in all other countries of the world. The visit to Russia

of a delegation of the British workers will hasten the exposure of such leaders in Britain too.

I had a conversation with your delegation on Wednesday, May 26. On the following day telegrams arrived stating that Bonar Law had admitted in the British Parliament that military aid had been given to Poland in October "for defence against Russia" (of course only for defence, and only in October! There are still "influential labour leaders" in Britain who are helping the capitalists to dupe the workers!), but the *New Statesman*, the most moderate of moderate petty-bourgeois newspapers or journals, wrote of tanks being supplied to Poland, which were more powerful than those used against the Germans during the war. After this, can one refrain from ridiculing such "leaders" of the British workers that ask with an air of injured innocence whether there is any "proof" that Britain is fighting against Russia and is helping Poland and the whiteguards in the Crimea?

Members of the delegation asked me which I considered more important: the formation in Britain of a consistently revolutionary Communist Party, or obtaining the immediate aid of the masses of the workers in Britain for the cause of peace with Russia. I replied that this is a matter of one's convictions. Sincere supporters of the emancipation of the workers from the yoke of capital cannot possibly be opposed to the formation of a Communist Party, which alone is capable of training the workers in a non-bourgeois and non-petty-bourgeois manner, and is alone capable of genuinely exposing, ridiculing and disgracing "leaders" who can doubt whether Britain is helping Poland, etc. There is no need to fear the Communists will be too numerous in Britain, because there is not even a small Communist Party there. But if anyone continues to remain in intellectual slavery to the bourgeoisie, and continues to share petty-bourgeois prejudices about "democracy" (*bourgeois* democracy), pacifism, etc., then of course such people would only do more harm to the proletariat if they took it into their heads to call themselves Communists, and affiliate to the Third International. All that these people are capable of doing is to pass sentimental "resolutions" against intervention couched exclusively in philistine phrases. In

a certain sense these resolutions are also useful, namely, in the sense that the old "leaders" (adherents of bourgeois democracy, of peaceful methods, etc., etc.) will make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the masses, and the more they pass empty, non-committal resolutions unaccompanied by revolutionary action, the sooner will they expose themselves. Let each man stick to his job: let the Communists work directly through their Party, awakening the revolutionary consciousness of the workers. Let those who supported the "defence of country" during the imperialist war for the partitioning of the world, "defence" of the secret treaty between the British capitalists and the tsar to plunder Turkey, let those who "do not see" that Britain is helping Poland and the whiteguards in Russia—let such people hasten to increase the number of their "peace resolutions" to the point of becoming ridiculous; the more they do that, the sooner will they meet with the fate of Kerensky, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia.

Several members of your delegation questioned me with surprise about the Red terror, about the absence of freedom of the press in Russia, of freedom of assembly, about our persecution of Mensheviks and pro-Menshevik workers, etc. My reply was that the real cause of the terror is the British imperialists and their "allies", who practised and are still practising a White terror in Finland and in Hungary, in India and in Ireland, who have been supporting Yudenich, Kolchak, Denikin, Pilsudski and Wrangel. Our Red terror is a defence of the working class against the exploiters, the crushing of resistance from the exploiters with whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and an insignificant number of pro-Menshevik workers have sided. Freedom of the press and assembly under bourgeois democracy is freedom for the wealthy to conspire against the working people, freedom for the capitalists to bribe and buy up the press. I have explained this in newspaper articles so often that I have derived no pleasure in repeating myself.

Two days after my talk with your delegation, the newspapers reported that, besides the arrests of Monatte and Loriot in France, Sylvia Pankhurst had been arrested in Britain. This is the best possible reply the British Government could give to a question that the non-Communist

British labour "leaders", who are captives to bourgeois prejudices, are afraid even to ask, namely, which class the terror is directed against—the oppressed and exploited, or the oppressors and exploiters? Is it a question of the "freedom" of the capitalists to rob, deceive and dupe the working people, or of the "freedom" of the toilers from the yoke of the capitalists, the speculators and the property-owners? Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst represents the interests of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of people that are oppressed by the British and other capitalists. That is why she is subjected to a White terror, has been deprived of liberty, etc. The labour "leaders" who pursue a non-Communist policy are 99 per cent representatives of the bourgeoisie, of its deceit, its prejudices.

In conclusion, I want to thank you once again, comrades, for having sent your delegation here. Despite the hostility of many of the delegates towards the Soviet system and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and although many of them are in the grip of bourgeois prejudices, their acquaintance with Soviet Russia will inevitably accelerate the collapse of capitalism throughout the world.

N. Lenin

30.5.1920

Pravda No. 130,
June 17, 1920

Published according to
the newspaper text

PRELIMINARY DRAFT THESES ON THE NATIONAL AND THE COLONIAL QUESTIONS[51]

FOR THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

In submitting for discussion by the Second Congress of the Communist International the following draft theses on the national and the colonial questions I would request all comrades, especially those who possess concrete information on any of these very complex problems, to let me have their opinions, amendments, addenda and concrete remarks *in the most concise form* (*no more than two or three pages*), particularly on the following points:

Austrian experience;
Polish-Jewish and Ukrainian experience;
Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium;
Ireland;
Danish-German, Italo-French and Italo-Slav relations;
Balkan experience;
Eastern peoples;
The struggle against Pan-Islamism;
Relations in the Caucasus;
The Bashkir and Tatar Republics;
Kirghizia;
Turkestan, its experience;
Negroes in America;
Colonies;
China-Korea-Japan.

N. Lenin

June 5, 1920

1) An abstract or formal posing of the problem of equality in general and national equality in particular is in the very nature of bourgeois democracy. Under the guise of the equality of the individual in general, bourgeois democracy proclaims the formal or legal equality of the property-owner and the proletarian, the exploiter and the exploited, thereby grossly deceiving the oppressed classes. On the plea that all men are absolutely equal, the bourgeoisie is transforming the idea of equality, which is itself a reflection of relations in commodity production, into a weapon in its struggle against the abolition of classes. The real meaning of the demand for equality consists in its being a demand for the abolition of classes.

2) In conformity with its fundamental task of combating bourgeois democracy and exposing its falseness and hypocrisy, the Communist Party, as the avowed champion of the proletarian struggle to overthrow the bourgeois yoke, must base its policy, in the national question too, not on abstract and formal principles but, first, on a precise appraisal of the specific historical situation and, primarily, of economic conditions; second, on a clear distinction between the interests of the oppressed classes, of working and exploited people, and the general concept of national interests as a whole, which implies the interests of the ruling class; third, on an equally clear distinction between the oppressed, dependent and subject nations and the oppressing, exploiting and sovereign nations, in order to counter the bourgeois-democratic lies that play down this colonial and financial enslavement of the vast majority of the world's population by an insignificant minority of the richest and advanced capitalist countries, a feature characteristic of the era of finance capital and imperialism.

3) The imperialist war of 1914-18 has very clearly revealed to all nations and to the oppressed classes of the whole world the falseness of bourgeois-democratic phrases, by practically demonstrating that the Treaty of Versailles of the celebrated "Western democracies" is an even more brutal and foul act of violence against weak nations than was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of the German Junkers and the Kaiser. The League of Nations and the entire post-war policy of the Entente reveal this truth with even greater

clarity and distinctness. They are everywhere intensifying the revolutionary struggle both of the proletariat in the advanced countries and of the toiling masses in the colonial and dependent countries. They are hastening the collapse of the petty-bourgeois nationalist illusions that nations can live together in peace and equality under capitalism.

4) From these fundamental premises it follows that the Communist International's entire policy on the national and the colonial questions should rest primarily on a closer union of the proletarians and the working masses of all nations and countries for a joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie. This union alone will guarantee victory over capitalism, without which the abolition of national oppression and inequality is impossible.

5) The world political situation has now placed the dictatorship of the proletariat on the order of the day. World political developments are of necessity concentrated on a single focus—the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic, around which are inevitably grouped, on the one hand, the Soviet movements of the advanced workers in all countries, and, on the other, all the national liberation movements in the colonies and among the oppressed nationalities, who are learning from bitter experience that their only salvation lies in the Soviet system's victory over world imperialism.

6) Consequently, one cannot at present confine oneself to a bare recognition or proclamation of the need for closer union between the working people of the various nations; a policy must be pursued that will achieve the closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the national and colonial liberation movements. The form of this alliance should be determined by the degree of development of the communist movement in the proletariat of each country, or of the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement of the workers and peasants in backward countries or among backward nationalities.

7) Federation is a transitional form to the complete unity of the working people of different nations. The feasibility of federation has already been demonstrated in practice both by the relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and other

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Soviet Republics (the Hungarian, Finnish[52] and Latvian[53] in the past, and the Azerbaijan and Ukrainian at present), and by the relations within the R.S.F.S.R. in respect of nationalities which formerly enjoyed neither statehood nor autonomy (e.g., the Bashkir and Tatar autonomous republics in the R.S.F.S.R., founded in 1919 and 1920 respectively).

8) In this respect, it is the task of the Communist International to further develop and also to study and test by experience these new federations, which are arising on the basis of the Soviet system and the Soviet movement. In recognising that federation is a transitional form to complete unity, it is necessary to strive for ever closer federal unity, bearing in mind, first, that the Soviet republics, surrounded as they are by the imperialist powers of the whole world—which from the military standpoint are immeasurably stronger—cannot possibly continue to exist without the closest alliance; second, that a close economic alliance between the Soviet republics is necessary, otherwise the productive forces which have been ruined by imperialism cannot be restored and the well-being of the working people cannot be ensured; third, that there is a tendency towards the creation of a single world economy, regulated by the proletariat of all nations as an integral whole and according to a common plan. This tendency has already revealed itself quite clearly under capitalism and is bound to be further developed and consummated under socialism.

9) The Communist International's national policy in the sphere of relations within the state cannot be restricted to the bare, formal, purely declaratory and actually noncommittal recognition of the equality of nations to which the bourgeois democrats confine themselves—both those who frankly admit being such, and those who assume the name of socialists (such as the socialists of the Second International).

In all their propaganda and agitation—both within parliament and outside it—the Communist parties must consistently expose that constant violation of the equality of nations and of the guaranteed rights of national minorities which is to be seen in all capitalist countries, despite

their "democratic" constitutions. It is also necessary, first, constantly to explain that only the Soviet system is capable of ensuring genuine equality of nations, by uniting first the proletarians and then the whole mass of the working population in the struggle against the bourgeoisie; and, second, that all Communist parties should render direct aid to the revolutionary movements among the dependent and underprivileged nations (for example, Ireland, the American Negroes, etc.) and in the colonies.

Without the latter condition, which is particularly important, the struggle against the oppression of dependent nations and colonies, as well as recognition of their right to secede, are but a false signboard, as is evidenced by the parties of the Second International.

10) Recognition of internationalism in word, and its replacement in deed by petty-bourgeois nationalism and pacifism, in all propaganda, agitation and practical work, is very common, not only among the parties of the Second International, but also among those which have withdrawn from it, and often even among parties which now call themselves communist. The urgency of the struggle against this evil, against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole). Petty-bourgeois nationalism proclaims as internationalism the mere recognition of the equality of nations, and nothing more. Quite apart from the fact that this recognition is purely verbal, petty-bourgeois nationalism preserves national self-interest intact, whereas proletarian internationalism demands, first, that the interests of the proletarian struggle in any one country should be subordinated to the interests of that struggle on a world-wide scale, and, second, that a nation which is achieving victory over the bourgeoisie should be able and willing to make the greatest national sacrifices for the overthrow of international capital.

Thus, in countries that are already fully capitalist and have workers' parties that really act as the vanguard of the proletariat, the struggle against opportunist and petty-bourgeois pacifist distortions of the concept and policy of internationalism is a primary and cardinal task.

11) With regard to the more backward states and nations, in which feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate, it is particularly important to bear in mind:

first, that all Communist parties must assist the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement in these countries, and that the duty of rendering the most active assistance rests primarily with the workers of the country the backward nation is colonially or financially dependent on;

second, the need for a struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries;

third, the need to combat Pan-Islamism and similar trends, which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with an attempt to strengthen the positions of the khans, landowners, mullahs, etc.;*

fourth, the need, in backward countries, to give special support to the peasant movement against the landowners, against landed proprietorship, and against all manifestations or survivals of feudalism, and to strive to lend the peasant movement the most revolutionary character by establishing the closest possible alliance between the West-European communist proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East, in the colonies, and in the backward countries generally. It is particularly necessary to exert every effort to apply the basic principles of the Soviet system in countries where pre-capitalist relations predominate—by setting up "working people's Soviets", etc.;

fifth, the need for a determined struggle against attempts to give a communist colouring to bourgeois-democratic liberation trends in the backward countries; the Communist International should support bourgeois-democratic national

* In the proofs Lenin inserted a brace opposite points 2 and 3 and wrote "2 and 3 to be united".—*Ed.*

movements in colonial and backward countries only on condition that, in these countries, the elements of future proletarian parties, which will be communist not only in name, are brought together and trained to understand their special tasks, i.e., those of the struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own nations. The Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries, but should not merge with it, and should under all circumstances uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic form;

sixth, the need constantly to explain and expose among the broadest working masses of all countries, and particularly of the backward countries, the deception systematically practised by the imperialist powers, which, under the guise of politically independent states, set up states that are wholly dependent upon them economically, financially and militarily. Under present-day international conditions there is no salvation for dependent and weak nations except in a union of Soviet republics.

12) The age-old oppression of colonial and weak nationalities by the imperialist powers has not only filled the working masses of the oppressed countries with animosity towards the oppressor nations, but has also aroused distrust in these nations in general, even in their proletariat. The despicable betrayal of socialism by the majority of the official leaders of this proletariat in 1914-19, when "defence of country" was used as a social-chauvinist cloak to conceal the defence of the "right" of their "own" bourgeoisie to oppress colonies and fleece financially dependent countries, was certain to enhance this perfectly legitimate distrust. On the other hand, the more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably lend particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices, i.e., to national egoism and national narrow-mindedness. These prejudices are bound to die out very slowly, for they can disappear only after imperialism and capitalism have disappeared in the advanced countries, and after the entire foundation of the backward countries' economic life has radically changed.

It is therefore the duty of the class-conscious communist proletariat of all countries to regard with particular caution and attention the survivals of national sentiments in the countries and among nationalities which have been oppressed the longest; it is equally necessary to make certain concessions with a view to more rapidly overcoming this distrust and these prejudices. Complete victory over capitalism cannot be won unless the proletariat and, following it, the mass of working people in all countries and nations throughout the world voluntarily strive for alliance and unity.

Published in June 1920

Published according to the manuscript and checked against the text of the proof-sheet, as emended by V. I. Lenin

PRELIMINARY DRAFT THESES ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

FOR THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

In his article,[54] Comrade Marchlewski gave an excellent explanation of the reasons why the Second International, which has now become the yellow International, failed, not only to define the revolutionary proletariat's tactics on the agrarian question, but even to pose that question properly. Comrade Marchlewski then went on to set forth the theoretical fundamentals of the Third International's communist agrarian programme.

These fundamentals can (and, I think, should) serve as the basis of the general resolution on the agrarian question for the Communist International Congress, which will meet on July 15, 1920.

The following is a preliminary draft of that resolution:

1) Only the urban and industrial proletariat, led by the Communist Party, can liberate the working masses of the countryside from the yoke of capital and landed proprietorship, from ruin and the imperialist wars which will inevitably break out again and again if the capitalist system remains. There is no salvation for the working masses of the countryside except in alliance with the communist proletariat, and unless they give the latter devoted support in its revolutionary struggle to throw off the yoke of the landowners (the big landed proprietors) and the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, the industrial workers cannot accomplish their epoch-making mission of emancipating mankind from the yoke of capital and from wars if they confine themselves to their narrow craft, or trade interests,

and smugly restrict themselves to attaining an improvement in their own conditions, which may sometimes be tolerable in the petty-bourgeois sense. This is exactly what happens to the "labour aristocracy" of many advanced countries, who constitute the core of the so-called socialist parties of the Second International; they are actually the bitter enemies and betrayers of socialism, petty-bourgeois chauvinists and agents of the bourgeoisie within the working-class movement. The proletariat is a really revolutionary class and acts in a really socialist manner only when it comes out and acts as the vanguard of all the working and exploited people, as their leader in the struggle for the overthrow of the exploiters; this, however, cannot be achieved unless the class struggle is carried into the countryside, unless the rural working masses are united about the Communist Party of the urban proletariat, and unless they are trained by the proletariat.

2) The working and exploited people of the countryside, whom the urban proletariat must lead into the struggle or, at all events, win over, are represented in all capitalist countries by the following classes:

first, the agricultural proletariat, wage-labourers (by the year, season, or day), who obtain their livelihood by working for hire at capitalist agricultural enterprises. The organisation of this class (political, military, trade union, co-operative, cultural, educational, etc.) independently and separately from other groups of the rural population, the conduct of intensive propaganda and agitation among this class, and the winning of its support for the Soviets and the dictatorship of the proletariat constitute the *fundamental* tasks of the Communist parties in all countries;

second, the semi-proletarians or peasants who till tiny plots of land, i.e., those who obtain their livelihood partly as wage-labourers at agricultural and industrial capitalist enterprises and partly by working their own or rented plots of land, which provide their families only with part of their means of subsistence. This group of the rural working population is very numerous in all capitalist countries; its existence and special position are played down by the representatives of the bourgeoisie and by the yellow "socialists" belonging to the Second International, partly

by deliberately deceiving the workers and partly by blindly submitting to the routine of petty-bourgeois views and lumping together this group with the mass of the "peasantry". This bourgeois method of duping the workers is to be seen mostly in Germany and in France, but also in America and other countries. If the work of the Communist Party is properly organised, this group will become its assured supporter, for the lot of these semi-proletarians is a very hard one and they stand to gain enormously and immediately from Soviet government and the dictatorship of the proletariat:

third, the small peasantry, i.e., the small-scale tillers who, either as owners or as tenants, hold small plots of land which enable them to satisfy the needs of their families and their farms, and do not hire outside labour. This stratum, as such, undoubtedly stands to gain by the victory of the proletariat, which will fully and immediately bring it: (a) deliverance from the necessity of paying the big landowners rent or a share of the crop (for example, the *métayers* in France, also in Italy and other countries); (b) deliverance from mortgages; (c) deliverance from the numerous forms of oppression by and dependence on the big landowners (forest lands and their use, etc.); (d) immediate aid for their farms from the proletarian state (the use of the agricultural implements and part of the buildings on the big capitalist farms confiscated by the proletariat and the immediate conversion, by the proletarian state, of the rural co-operative societies and agricultural associations from organisations which under capitalism served above all the rich and middle peasants, into organisations that will primarily assist the poor, i.e., proletarians, semi-proletarians, small peasants, etc.), and many other things.

At the same time the Communist Party must clearly realise that during the transitional period from capitalism to communism, i.e., during the dictatorship of the proletariat, this stratum, or at all events part of it, will inevitably vacillate towards unrestricted freedom of trade and the free enjoyment of the rights of private property. That is because this stratum, which, if only in a small way, is a seller of articles of consumption, has been corrupted by

profiteering and by proprietary habits. However, if a firm proletarian policy is pursued, and if the victorious proletariat deals very resolutely with the big landowners and the big peasants, this stratum's vacillation cannot be considerable and cannot alter the fact that, on the whole, it will side with the proletarian revolution.

3) Taken together, the three groups enumerated above constitute the majority of the rural population in all capitalist countries. That is why the success of the proletarian revolution is fully assured, not only in the cities but in the countryside as well. The reverse view is widespread; however, it persists only, first, because of the deception systematically practised by bourgeois science and statistics, which do everything to gloss over both the gulf that separates the above-mentioned classes in the countryside from the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, and that which separates the semi-proletarians and small peasants from the big peasants; second, it persists because of the inability and unwillingness of the heroes of the yellow Second International and of the "labour aristocracy" in the advanced countries, which has been corrupted by imperialist privileges, to conduct genuinely proletarian revolutionary work of propaganda, agitation and organisation among the rural poor; the attention of the opportunists has always been and still is wholly concentrated on inventing theoretical and practical compromises with the bour eoisie, including the big and middle peasants (who are dealt with below), and not on the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois government and the bourgeoisie by the proletariat; it persists, third, because of the obstinate refusal to understand—so obstinate as to be equivalent to a prejudice (connected with all the other bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices)—a truth which has been fully proved by Marxist theory and fully corroborated by the experience of the proletarian revolution in Russia, namely, that although the three enumerated categories of the rural population—who are incredibly downtrodden, disunited, crushed, and doomed to semi-barbarous conditions of existence in all countries, even the most advanced—are economically, socially, and culturally interested in the victory of socialism, they are capable of giving resolute

support to the revolutionary proletariat only *after* the latter has won political power, only *after* it has resolutely dealt with the big landowners and capitalists, and only *after* these downtrodden people see *in practice* that they have an organised leader and champion, strong and firm enough to assist and lead them and to show them the right path.

4) In the economic sense, one should understand by "middle peasants" those small farmers who, (1) either as owners or tenants, hold plots of land that are also small but, under capitalism, are sufficient not only to provide, as a general rule, a meagre subsistence for the family and the bare minimum needed to maintain the farm, but also produce a certain surplus which may, in good years at least, be converted into capital; (2) quite frequently (for example, one farm out of two or three) resort to the employment of hired labour. A concrete example of the middle peasants in an advanced capitalist country is provided by the group of farms of five to ten hectares in Germany, in which, according to the census of 1907, the number of farms employing hired labourers is about one-third of the total number of farms in this group.* In France, where the cultivation of special crops is more developed—for example, grape-growing, which requires a very large amount of labour—this group probably employs outside hired labour to a somewhat greater extent.

The revolutionary proletariat cannot set itself the task—at least not in the immediate future or in the initial period of the dictatorship of the proletariat—of winning over this stratum, but must confine itself to the task of neutralising it, i.e., rendering it neutral in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This stratum inevitably

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* Here are the exact figures: the number of farms of five to ten hectares—652,798 (out of a total of 5,736,082), these employed 487,704 hired labourers of various kinds, while members of the farmers' families (*Familienangehörige*) working on the farms numbered 2,003,633. In Austria, according to the census of 1902, this group comprised 383,331 farms, of which 126,136 employed hired labour; the hired labourers working on these farms numbered 146,044 and the working members of the farmers' families 1,265,969. The total number of farms in Austria was 2,856,349.

vacillates between these two forces; in the beginning of the new epoch and in the developed capitalist countries, it will, in the main, incline towards the bourgeoisie. That is because the world outlook and the sentiments of the property-owners are prevalent among this stratum, which has a direct interest in profiteering, in "freedom" of trade and in property, and stands in direct antagonism to the wage-workers. By abolishing rent and mortgages, the victorious proletariat will immediately improve the position of this stratum. In most capitalist countries, however, the proletarian state should not at once completely abolish private property; at all events, it guarantees both the small and the middle peasantry, not only the preservation of their plots of land but also their enlargement to cover the total area they usually rented (the abolition of rent).

A combination of such measures with a ruthless struggle against the bourgeoisie fully guarantees the success of the policy of neutralisation. The proletarian state must effect the transition to collective farming with extreme caution and only very gradually, by the force of example, without any coercion of the middle peasant.

5) The big peasants (*Grossbauern*) are capitalist *entrepreneurs* in agriculture, who as a rule employ several hired labourers and are connected with the "peasantry" only in their low cultural level, habits of life, and the manual labour they themselves perform on their farms. These constitute the biggest of the bourgeois strata who are open and determined enemies of the revolutionary proletariat. In all their work in the countryside, the Communist parties must concentrate their attention mainly on the struggle against this stratum, on liberating the toiling and exploited majority of the rural population from the ideological and political influence of these exploiters, etc.

Following the victory of the proletariat in the cities, all sorts of manifestations of resistance and sabotage, as well as direct armed action of a counter-revolutionary character on the part of this stratum, are absolutely inevitable. The revolutionary proletariat must therefore immediately begin the ideological and organisational preparation of the forces necessary to completely disarm this stratum and, simultaneously with the overthrow of the capitalists

in industry, to deal this stratum a most determined, ruthless and smashing blow at the very first signs of resistance; for this purpose, the rural proletariat must be armed and village Soviets organised, in which the exploiters must have no place, and in which proletarians and semi-proletarians must be ensured predominance.

However, the expropriation even of the big peasants can in no way be made an immediate task of the victorious proletariat, because the material and especially the technical conditions, as well as the social conditions, for the socialisation of such farms are still lacking. In individual and probably exceptional cases, those parts of their land which they rent out in small plots or which are particularly needed by the surrounding small-peasant population will be confiscated; the small peasants should also be guaranteed, on certain terms, the free use of part of the agricultural machinery belonging to the big peasants, etc. As a general rule, however, the proletarian state must allow the big peasants to retain their land, confiscating it only if they resist the power of the working and exploited people. The experience of the Russian proletarian revolution, in which the struggle against the big peasantry was complicated and protracted by a number of special conditions, showed nevertheless that, when taught a severe lesson for the slightest attempt at resistance, this stratum is capable of loyally fulfilling the tasks set by the proletarian state, and even begins to be imbued although very slowly with respect for the government which protects all who work and is ruthless towards the idle rich.

The special conditions which, in Russia, complicated and retarded the struggle of the proletariat against the big peasants after it had defeated the bourgeoisie were, in the main, the following: after October 25 (November 7), 1917, the Russian revolution passed through the stage of the "general democratic"—that is, basically the bourgeois-democratic—struggle of the peasantry as a whole against the landowners; the cultural and numerical weakness of the urban proletariat; and, lastly, the enormous distances and extremely poor means of communication. Inasmuch as these retarding conditions do not exist in the advanced countries, the revolutionary proletariat of Europe and America should

prepare far more energetically, and achieve far more rapidly, resolutely, and successfully, complete victory over the resistance of the big peasantry, completely depriving it of the slightest possibility of offering resistance. This is imperative because, until such a complete and absolute victory is achieved, the masses of the rural proletarians, semi-proletarians, and small peasants cannot be brought to accept the proletarian state as a fully stable one.

6) The revolutionary proletariat must immediately and unreservedly confiscate all landed estates, those of the big landowners, who, in capitalist countries—directly or through their tenant farmers—systematically exploit wage-labour and the neighbouring small (and, not infrequently, part of the middle) peasantry, do not themselves engage in manual labour, and are in the main descended from the feudal lords (the nobles in Russia, Germany, and Hungary, the restored seigneurs in France, the lords in Britain, and the former slave-owners in America), or are rich financial magnates, or else a mixture of both these categories of exploiters and parasites.

Under no circumstances is it permissible for Communist parties to advocate or practise compensating the big landowners for the confiscated lands, for under present-day conditions in Europe and America this would be tantamount to a betrayal of socialism and the imposition of new tribute upon the masses of working and exploited people, to whom the war has meant the greatest hardships, while it has increased the number of millionaires and enriched them.

As to the mode of cultivation of the land that the victorious proletariat confiscates from the big landowners, the distribution of that land among the peasantry for their use has been predominant in Russia, owing to her economic backwardness; it is only in relatively rare and exceptional cases that state farms have been organised on the former estates which the proletarian state runs at its own expense, converting the former wage-labourers into workers for the state and members of the Soviets, which administer the state. The Communist International is of the opinion that in the case of the advanced capitalist countries it would be correct to keep *most* of the big agricultural enterprises

intact and to conduct them on the lines of the "state farms" in Russia.

It would, however, be grossly erroneous to exaggerate or to stereotype this rule and never to permit the free grant of *part* of the land that belonged to the expropriated expropriators to the neighbouring small and sometimes middle peasants.

First, the objection usually raised to this, namely, that large-scale farming is technically superior, often amounts to an indisputable theoretical truth being replaced by the worst kind of opportunism and betrayal of the revolution. To achieve the success of this revolution, the proletariat should not shrink from a temporary decline in production, any more than the bourgeois opponents of slavery in North America shrank from a temporary decline in cotton production as a consequence of the Civil War of 1863-65. What is most important to the bourgeois is production for the sake of production; what is most important to the working and exploited population is the overthrow of the exploiters and the creation of conditions that will permit the working people to work for themselves, and not for the capitalists. It is the primary and fundamental task of the proletariat to ensure the proletarian victory and its stability. There can, however, be no stable proletarian government unless the middle peasantry is neutralised and the support is secured of a very considerable section of the small peasantry, if not all of them.

Second, not merely an increase but even the preservation of large-scale production in agriculture presupposes the existence of a fully developed and revolutionarily conscious rural proletariat with considerable experience of trade union and political organisation behind it. Where this condition does not yet exist, or where this work cannot expediently be entrusted to class-conscious and competent industrial workers, hasty attempts to set up large state-conducted farms can only discredit the proletarian government. Under such conditions, the utmost caution must be exercised and the most thorough preparations made when state farms are set up.

Third, in all capitalist countries, even the most advanced, there still exist survivals of medieval, semi-feudal

exploitation of the neighbouring small peasants by the big landowners as in the case of the *Instleute** in Germany, the *métayers* in France, and the sharecroppers in the United States (not only Negroes, who, in the Southern States, are mostly exploited in this way, but sometimes whites too). In such cases it is incumbent on the proletarian state to grant the small peasants free use of the lands they formerly rented, since no other economic or technical basis exists, and it cannot be created at one stroke.

The implements and stock of the big farms must be confiscated without fail and converted into state property, with the absolute condition that, *after* the requirements of the big state farms have been met, the neighbouring small peasants may have the use of these implements gratis, in compliance with conditions drawn up by the proletarian state.

In the period immediately following the proletarian revolution, it is absolutely necessary, not only to confiscate the estates of the big landowners at once, but also to deport or to intern them all as leaders of counter-revolution and ruthless oppressors of the entire rural population. However, with the consolidation of the proletarian power in the countryside as well as in the cities, systematic efforts should be made to employ (under the special control of highly reliable communist workers) those forces within this class that possess valuable experience, know-how, and organising skill, to build large-scale socialist agriculture.

7) The victory of socialism over capitalism and the consolidation of socialism may be regarded as ensured only when the proletarian state power, having completely suppressed all resistance by the exploiters and assured itself complete subordination and stability, has reorganised the whole of industry on the lines of large-scale collective production and on a modern technical basis (founded on the electrification of the entire economy). This alone will enable the cities to render such radical assistance, technical and social, to the backward and scattered rural population as will create the material basis necessary to boost the

* Tenant farmers.—*Ed.*

productivity of agricultural and of farm labour in general, thereby encouraging the small farmers by the force of example and in their own interests to adopt large-scale, collective and mechanised agriculture. Although nominally recognised by all socialists, this indisputable theoretical truth is in fact distorted by the opportunism prevalent in the yellow Second International and among the leaders of the German and the British "Independents", the French Longuetists, etc. This distortion consists in attention being directed towards the relatively remote, beautiful, and rosy future; attention is deflected from the immediate tasks of the difficult practical transition and approach to that future. In practice, it consists in preaching a compromise with the bourgeoisie and a "class truce", i.e., complete betrayal of the proletariat, which is now waging a struggle amidst the unprecedented ruin and impoverishment created everywhere by the war, and amidst the unprecedented enrichment and arrogance of a handful of millionaires resulting from that war.

It is in the countryside that a genuine possibility of a successful struggle for socialism demands, first, that all Communist parties should inculcate in the industrial proletariat a realisation of the need to make sacrifices, and be prepared to make sacrifices so as to overthrow the bourgeoisie and consolidate proletarian power—since the dictatorship of the proletariat implies both the ability of the proletariat to organise and lead all the working and exploited people, and the vanguard's ability to make the utmost sacrifices and to display the utmost heroism to that end; second, success demands that, as a result of the workers' victory, the labouring and most exploited masses in the countryside achieve an immediate and considerable improvement in their conditions at the expense of the exploiters—for without that the industrial proletariat cannot get the support of the rural areas and, in particular, will be unable to ensure the supply of food for the cities.

8) The enormous difficulty of organising and training for the revolutionary struggle the masses of rural working people, whom capitalism has reduced to a state of great wretchedness, disunity and frequently semi-medieval dependence, makes it necessary for the Communist parties

to devote special attention to the strike struggle in the rural districts, give greater support to mass strikes by the agricultural proletarians and semi-proletarians, and help develop the strike movement in every way. The experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and of 1917, now confirmed and extended by the experience of Germany and other advanced countries, shows that the growing mass strike struggle (into which, under certain conditions, the small peasants can and should also be drawn) is alone capable of rousing the countryside from its lethargy, awakening the class-consciousness of the exploited masses in the countryside, making them realise the need for class organisation, and revealing to them in a vivid and practical manner the importance of their alliance with the urban workers.

This Congress of the Communist International brands as traitors and renegades those socialists—to be found, unfortunately, not only in the yellow Second International, but also in the three very important European parties which have withdrawn from that International—who are not only capable of remaining indifferent to the strike struggle in the countryside, but even (like Karl Kautsky) of opposing it on the grounds that it threatens to reduce the output of articles of consumption. Neither programmes nor the most solemn declarations are of any value whatever unless it is proved in practice, in deed, that the Communists and workers' leaders are able to place above everything else in the world the development and the victory of the proletarian revolution, and to make the greatest sacrifices for it, for otherwise there is no way out, no salvation from starvation, ruin, and new imperialist wars.

In particular, it should be pointed out that the leaders of the old socialist movement and representatives of the "labour aristocracy"—who now often make verbal concessions to communism and even nominally side with it in order to preserve their prestige among the worker masses, which are rapidly becoming revolutionary—should be tested for their loyalty to the cause of the proletariat and their suitability for responsible positions in those spheres of work where the development of revolutionary consciousness and the revolutionary struggle is most marked, the resistance of the landowners and the bourgeoisie (the big peasants,

the kulaks) most fierce, and the difference between the socialist compromiser and the communist revolutionary most striking.

9) The Communist parties must exert every effort to begin, as speedily as possible, to set up Soviets of Deputies in the countryside, and in the first place Soviets of hired labourers and semi-proletarians. Only if they are linked up with the mass strike struggle and with the most oppressed class can the Soviets perform their functions, and become consolidated enough to influence (and later to incorporate) the small peasants. If, however, the strike struggle has not yet developed, and the agricultural proletariat is as yet incapable of strong organisation owing both to the severe oppression by the landowners and the big peasants and to lack of support from the industrial workers and their unions, then the formation of Soviets of Deputies in the rural areas will require lengthy preparation by means of the organisation of communist cells, even if only small ones, intensified agitation—in which the demands of communism are enunciated in the simplest manner and illustrated by the most glaring examples of exploitation and oppression—and the arrangement of systematic visits of industrial workers to the rural districts, and so on.

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KOMMUNISMUS

JOURNAL OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL FOR THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE (IN GERMAN), VIENNA, NO. 1-2 (FEBRUARY 1, 1920) TO NO. 18 (MAY 8, 1920)

This excellent journal, which is published in Vienna under the above title, contains a great deal of highly interesting material on the growth of the communist movement in Austria, Poland and other countries, together with a chronicle of the international movement, and articles on Hungary and Germany, on general tasks and tactics, etc. A shortcoming that strikes the eye even at a cursory examination cannot, however, be disregarded—the indubitable symptoms of the "infantile disorder of Left-wing Communism" that has affected the journal, a subject on which I have written a short pamphlet that has just appeared in Petrograd.

The excellent journal *Kommunismus* reveals three symptoms of this malady, which I would like at once to deal with briefly. No. 6 (March 1, 1920) contains an article by Comrade G. L.[55] entitled "On the Question of Parliamentarianism", which the editors designate as controversial, and from which Comrade B. K.,[56] the author of an article entitled "On the Question of the Parliamentary Boycott" (No. 18, May 8, 1920), directly dissociates himself (fortunately), i.e., declares that he is in disagreement with it.

G. L.'s article is very Left-wing, and very poor. Its Marxism is purely verbal; its distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" tactics is artificial; it gives no concrete analysis of precise and definite historical situations; it takes no account of what is most essential (the need to take over and to learn to take over, all fields of work and all institutions in which the bourgeoisie exerts its influence over the masses, etc.).

No. 14 (April 17, 1920), carries an article by Comrade B. K., entitled "The Events in Germany", in which he criticises a statement made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany on March 21, 1920, which statement I too criticised in the pamphlet mentioned above. However, our criticisms differ radically in character. Comrade B. K. criticises on the basis of quotations from Marx, which refer to a situation unlike the present one, he wholly rejects the tactics of the German Communist Party's Central Committee and absolutely evades what is most important, that which constitutes the very gist, the living soul, of Marxism—a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. Since most of the urban workers have abandoned the Scheidemannites for the Kautskyites, and since, within the Kautskian party (a party "independent" of correct revolutionary tactics) they are continuing to abandon its Right wing in favour of the Left, i.e., in fact, of communism—since that is the case, is it permissible to take no account of the transitional and compromise measures to be adopted with regard to *such workers*? Is it permissible to disregard and to gloss over the experience of the Bolsheviks, who, in April and May 1917, pursued what was in fact a policy of compromise, when they declared that the Provisional Government (Lvov, Milyukov, Kerensky and the rest) could not be overthrown at once, since in the Soviets, they still had the backing of the workers and it was first of all necessary to bring about a *change in views* in the majority, or a considerable part, of those workers?

I consider that impermissible.

Lastly, Comrade B. K.'s article in *Kommunismus* No. 18, which I have mentioned, very vividly, strikingly and effectively reveals his error in sympathising with the tactics of boycotting parliaments in present-day Europe. When the author dissociates himself from the "syndicalist boycott" and the "passive" boycott, but at the same time invents a special kind of "active" (Ah, how "Left"!...) boycott, the full extent of the errors in his argument is brought out very strikingly.

"An active boycott," the author writes, "means that the Communist Party does not confine itself to disseminating the slogan advocating non-participation in elections, but, in the interests of the

boycott, engages in revolutionary agitation just as extensively as if it were participating in the elections and as if its agitation and action were designed to secure the greatest possible number of proletarian votes." (P. 552).

This is a gem. This demolishes the anti-parliamentarians better that any criticism could. An "active" boycott is devised "as though" we were participating in elections!! The mass of unenlightened and semi-enlightened workers and peasants take a serious part in elections, for they still entertain bourgeois-democratic prejudices, are still under the sway of those prejudices. And instead of helping the unenlightened (although at times "highly-cultured") petty bourgeois to get rid of their prejudices by their own experience, we are to hold aloof from taking part in parliaments and to amuse ourselves by *inventing* tactics free of all commonplace and bourgeois contamination!!

Bravo, bravo, Comrade B. K.! By your defence of anti-parliamentarianism you will help us to destroy this folly much sooner than I can through my criticism.

N. Lenin

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF ORGANISERS RESPONSIBLE FOR RURAL WORK JUNE 12, 1920[57]

Comrades, I am very glad to be able to greet you who have come to this conference to discuss work in the rural areas. Permit me first to dwell briefly on the international position of the Soviet Republic and our tasks in connection with it, and then to say a few words about the tasks in the rural districts, which, in my opinion, should now assume prime importance to Party workers.

As regards the Republic's international standing, you are of course well aware of the main facts about the Polish offensive. An incredible number of lies are being spread on this subject abroad, due to the so-called freedom of the press, which consists in all the most important organs of the press abroad being bought up by the capitalists, and being filled 99 per cent with articles by mercenary hacks. That is what they call freedom of the press, due to which there is no limit to the lies that are being spread. With regard to the Polish offensive in particular, they are trying to make out that the Bolsheviks presented impossible demands to Poland and launched an offensive, whereas you all know very well that we fully consented even to the immense frontiers held by the Poles before the offensive began. We set more store by the lives of our Red Army men than by a war for Byelorussia and Lithuania, which the Poles had seized. We declared in the most solemn terms—not only in the name of the Council of People's Commissars, but also in a special manifesto of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee,[58] the supreme body in the Soviet

Republic—we declared to the Polish Government, to the bourgeois and landowner government, besides appealing to the Polish workers and peasants, that we proposed negotiations for peace on the basis of the front that existed at the time, i.e., the front that left Lithuania and Byelorussia—non-Polish territory—in the hands of the Poles. We were and still are convinced that the Polish landowners and capitalists will be unable to retain foreign territory, and that we shall gain more even from the most unfavourable peace, since we shall save the lives of our Red Army men, and every month of peace makes us ten times as strong, whereas to every other government, including the bourgeois government of Poland, every month of peace means greater and greater disintegration. Although our peace proposals were very far-reaching, and although certain very hasty and, as far as talking goes, highly revolutionary revolutionaries, even called our proposals Tolstoyan—when, as a matter of fact, the Bolsheviks' actions have, I think, shown sufficiently that there is not a jot of Tolstoyanism in us—we considered it our duty, in the face of such a thing as war, to show that we were prepared to make the maximum possible concessions, and especially to show that we would not wage war for boundaries for which so much blood had been spilt, since to us that was a matter of little significance.

We were prepared to make concessions no other government can make; we offered Poland territory which it would be useful to compare with that described in a document published yesterday, I think, and coming from the supreme organ of the Allies, the British, French and other imperialists, in which Poland's eastern frontiers are indicated.[59]

These capitalists in Britain and France imagine that it is they who lay down boundaries. But, thank goodness, there are others besides them who do that—the workers and peasants have learnt to establish their boundaries themselves.

These capitalists have fixed the Polish boundaries much farther to the west than those we proposed. This document, coming from the Allies in Paris, is clear proof that they have arrived at a deal with Wrangel. They assure us that they want peace with Soviet Russia, that they support neither Poland nor Wrangel. We, however, say that it is an

unscrupulous lie with which they are trying to shield themselves; for they say that they are not supplying any more arms, when as a matter of fact they are supplying them just as they did several months ago. Today's reports state that rich trophies have been captured—a carload of new British machine guns; Comrade Trotsky reports that brand-new French cartridges were captured the other day. What other confirmation do we need that Poland is acting with the aid of British and French equipment, with the aid of British and French cartridges, that she is acting with the aid of British and French money? If they now declare that Poland will herself establish her eastern borders, then that is in consequence of a direct deal with Wrangel. That is obvious to anybody. The entire situation makes it perfectly clear that the Polish landowners and bourgeoisie are fighting exclusively with the aid of the British and the French. The latter, however, are lying brazenly, just as they did when they assured us that they had not sent Bullitt, until he finally returned to America and came out and published the documents he had gathered here.

These gentlemen, these capitalist tradesmen, cannot act contrary to their nature. That is obvious. They can only reason like tradesmen. When our diplomats do not act like tradesmen, and when we say that the lives of our Red Army men are more precious to us than any vast boundary changes they, of course, with their purely tradesmen's reasoning, cannot understand it. When, a year ago, we proposed to Bullitt a treaty which was extremely favourable to them and extremely unfavourable to us, a treaty that would have left huge territories in the hands of Denikin and Kolchak, we did so in the certainty that, if peace were concluded, the whiteguard government would never be able to retain power.

With their tradesmen's reasoning, they could only interpret this as a confession of our weakness. "If the Bolsheviks agree to such a peace," they argued, "it must mean that they are at their last gasp." And the bourgeois press exulted, the diplomats rubbed their hands with glee, and millions of pounds sterling were advanced to Kolchak and Denikin. True, they did not give them hard cash, but supplied them with arms at usurious prices, fully convinced

that the Bolsheviks could not cope with them at all. The upshot was that Kolchak and Denikin were routed and their hundreds of millions of pounds went up in smoke. We are now getting trainload after trainload of excellent British equipment; you can often meet entire divisions of Russian Red Army men clad in excellent British uniforms; the other day a comrade who arrived from the Caucasus told me that an entire division of Red Army men are wearing Italian bersagliere uniforms. I am very sorry that I am unable to show you photographs of these Russian Red Army men clad in bersagliere uniforms. All I can say is that, after all, the British equipment has been of some use and that Russian Red Army men are grateful to the British tradesmen who have fitted them out because they reasoned like tradesmen, and who have been thrashed, are being thrashed, and will be thrashed time and time again. (*Applause.*)

We find the same thing with the Polish offensive. This is another instance of God (if he exists, of course) first depriving of reason those whom he would punish. The Entente is undoubtedly headed by very shrewd men, excellent politicians, yet these people commit folly after folly. They raise up against us one country after another, enabling us to smash them one by one. Why, if only they succeeded in uniting—and they do have the League of Nations and there is no corner of the earth to which their military power does not extend. Nobody, it would seem, could unite all the enemy forces better and launch them against the Soviets. Yet they cannot unite them. They go into battle part by part. They merely threaten, boast and bluff. Six months ago they declared that they had mustered fourteen states against the Soviets, and that in a matter of months they would be in Moscow and Petrograd. But today I received a pamphlet from Finland, containing the reminiscences of a certain whiteguard officer about the offensive against Petrograd; prior to that I received a statement of protest from several Russians of the Cadet brand, members of the North-Western Government, which tells of how certain British generals invited them to a conference and suggested to them through an interpreter, and sometimes in excellent Russian, that they should form a government right away, on the spot—a Russian govern-

ment, of course, a democratic government, it goes without saying, in the spirit of the Constituent Assembly—and how they were told to sign on the dotted line. And, though they were bitter enemies of the Bolsheviks, these Russian officers, these Cadets, were outraged by the brazen insolence of the British officers, who dictated to them, and ordered them, in a tone of a drill sergeant (and only like a Russian one can), to sign what they were told to—and they go on to relate how the whole affair fell through. I regret that we are unable to give extensive distribution to these documents, to these confessions of whiteguard officers who took part in the advance on Petrograd.

Why is that so? It is because their League of Nations is a league only in name; in fact it is a pack of wolves that are all the time at each other's throats and do not trust one another in the least.

As a matter of fact, they are even now boasting that Latvia, Rumania and Finland will join Poland in the attack; it is clear from the diplomatic negotiations that when Poland began her offensive the powers that were conducting peace negotiations with us changed their tone, and came out with statements whose insolence was sometimes amazing. They reason like tradesmen—and you cannot expect anything else from a tradesman. It seemed to them that this was the time to square accounts with Soviet Russia, so they turned high and mighty. Let them do so. We have seen the same thing in the case of other states, far bigger ones, but we have paid no heed to that because, as experience has shown, all the threats from Finland, Rumania, Latvia and the other bourgeois states that are wholly dependent on the Entente, have come to nought. Poland signed a treaty only with Petlyura, a general without an army, which has evoked even greater bitterness among the Ukrainian population and has induced more and more semi-bourgeois elements to side with Soviet Russia. So, once again, instead of a general offensive, you have isolated action by Poland alone. And now we see that although our forces had to spend a lot of time on the move because they were farther away from the frontiers than the Poles were and we needed more time to bring up our troops, the latter have begun to advance. Some days ago our cavalry captured

Zhitomir. Our forces have cut the last road linking Kiev with the Polish front both in the south and the north, which means that the Poles have lost Kiev irrevocably. At the same time we learn that Skólski has resigned, that the Polish Government are in a state of uncertainty and agitation and are already declaring that they will offer us new peace terms. Just as you please, you landowner and capitalist gentlemen! We will give the Polish peace terms due consideration. What we see is that their government are waging war against the wishes of their own bourgeoisie; that the Polish National Democrats,[60] who correspond to our Cadets and Octobrists—the most bitter counter-revolutionary landowners and bourgeois—are opposed to the war, for they realise that they cannot win such a war, and that it is being run by Polish adventurers, by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialist Party,[61] people marked most by features characterising the Socialist-Revolutionaries, namely, revolutionary talk, boastfulness, patriotism, chauvinism, buffoonery and sheer claptrap. We are familiar with such people. When, after they have bitten off more than they can chew in this war, they begin to reshuffle their Cabinet and to say that they propose peace talks to us, we say: "Just as you please, gentlemen, have a try. We, however, are counting only on the Polish workers and peasants. We shall also talk peace, only not with you, the Polish landowners and bourgeois, but with the Polish workers and peasants, and we shall see what will come of such negotiations."

Comrades, despite the successes we are gaining on the Polish front, the position at present demands every effort of us. The most dangerous thing in a war that breaks out in conditions like those in the present war with Poland is to underrate the enemy and to reassure ourselves with the thought that we are the stronger. That is a most dangerous thing, which may lead to defeat in the war; it is the worst feature in the Russian character, which expresses itself in enervation and flabbiness. It is important, not only to begin but to carry on and hold out; that is what we Russians are not good at. Only by long training, through a proletarian disciplined struggle against all wavering and vacillation, only through such endurance can the Russian

working masses be brought to rid themselves of this bad habit.

We have given Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich a sound thrashing, but we have not yet finished the job. Wrangel is still in the Crimea. We said to ourselves: "Well, now we are the stronger"—and that has led to instance after instance of slackness and slovenliness. Meanwhile, Wrangel is receiving aid from Great Britain. This is done through traders, but it cannot be proved. Only the other day he landed troops and captured Melitopol. True, according to the latest reports we have re-captured it; but in this case, too, we had let it slip from our hands most shamefully just because we were strong. Just because Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin have been smashed, the Russian begins to reveal his nature and take things easy, with the result that we let things slide. His slovenliness leads to tens of thousands of his comrades losing their lives. Here is a fundamental Russian trait: when not a single job has been carried through to the end he is apt to let things slide unless he is prodded. This trait must be ruthlessly combated, for it leads to tens of thousands of the finest Red Army men and peasants losing their lives, and the continued sufferings of famine. And so, though we are stronger than the Poles, our slogan in the war that has been imposed on us must be—an end to all slackness! Since war has proved inevitable, everything must be devoted to the war effort; the least slackness or lack of drive must be punished by wartime laws. War means war, and let nobody in the rear or in any peaceful occupation dare shirk this duty!

The slogan must be—everything for the war effort! Otherwise we shall be unable to cope with the Polish nobles and bourgeoisie. To finish with this war, we must teach a conclusive lesson to the last of the neighbouring powers that still dares to play at this game. We must give them so severe a lesson that they will warn their children, their grandchildren and their great-grandchildren to refrain from such things. (*Applause.*) And so, comrades, at every meeting, assembly and business conference, in all groups at all party institutions and on all executive bodies, it is the prime duty of those who are working in the country-

side, of propagandists and agitators, and all the comrades engaged in any field of peaceful labour to give top priority and full effect to the slogan: "Everything for the war effort!"

Until complete victory is won in this war, we must guarantee ourselves against the errors and follies we have been committing for years. I do not know how many mistakes a Russian has to make before he learns his lesson. We have already had an instance of our thinking that the war was over before we had crushed the enemy, and we left Wrangel in the Crimea. I repeat, the slogan, "Everything for the war effort!" must be the chief item on the agenda at every conference, at every meeting, on every executive body.

We must ask ourselves: have we bent every effort, have we made every sacrifice to bring the war to an end? This is a question of saving the lives of tens of thousands of our finest comrades, who are perishing at the front, in the foremost ranks. It is a matter of saving ourselves from the famine which is imminent just because we are not fighting the war to a finish, when we can and must do that and quickly, too. For this, discipline and subordination must be enforced at all costs and with the utmost severity. The least condonement, the least slackness displayed here, in the rear, in any peaceful pursuit, will mean the loss of thousands of lives, and starvation in the rear.

That is why faults like these must be treated with ruthless severity. That is the first and principal lesson to be drawn from the civil war in Soviet Russia. It is the first and principal lesson which every Party worker must bear in mind under all circumstances, especially if his job is one of agitation and propaganda; he must know that he will be a worthless Communist and a traitor to the Soviet state if he does not, in respect to every shortcoming, however slight, implement this slogan with inflexible firmness and with ruthless determination. If this condition is observed, an early victory will be assured, and we shall be fully guaranteed against famine.

We receive reports about the situation in the outlying regions, from comrades arriving from remote parts of the country. I have seen comrades from Siberia, and also Comrades Lunacharsky and Rykov, who have returned from

the Ukraine and the North Caucasus. They speak with boundless amazement of the wealth of these regions. In the Ukraine pigs are being fed on wheat; in the Northern Caucasus the peasant women, when selling milk, rinse their cans with milk. Trainloads of wool, leather and other wealth are on their way from Siberia; tens of thousands of poods of salt are lying in Siberia. In our parts, on the other hand, the peasants have been worn down, and refuse to give grain in exchange for paper money, which, as they see it, cannot restore their farms. Here, in Moscow, we may find starving workers carrying on at their machines. The continuation of the war is the chief obstacle to our keeping the workers better fed and restoring their shattered health. Just because we have slipped up on the Crimea, tens of thousands will go short of food for another six months. This is all due to poor organisation and discipline on our part. People here are dying, while in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus and in Siberia we have wealth untold, with which we could feed the hungry workers and restore industry. To restore our economic life, we need discipline. The proletarian dictatorship should display itself primarily in the advanced, the most class-conscious and most disciplined of the urban and industrial workers—the greatest sufferers from hunger who have made great sacrifices during these two years—educating, training and disciplining all the other proletarians, who are often not class-conscious, and all working people and the peasantry. All sentimentality, all claptrap about democracy must be scrapped. Let us leave the claptrap to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks; they have spoken enough about democracy to Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich. Let them clear out and go over to Wrangel. He will complete their schooling. But that schooling must be given to those who have not yet learnt the lesson.

We maintain that the workers who have assumed the burdens and have ensured the tranquility and strength of the Soviets through their untold sacrifices, should regard themselves as a vanguard that will raise up the rest of the working masses by education and discipline. We know that the working man, as we have inherited him from capitalism, is in a state of utter benightedness and ignorance, and

does not realise that work can be done, not only under the lash of capital, but also under the guidance of the organised worker. He is, however, capable of believing all that if we demonstrate it in practice. The working man cannot learn that from books but he can learn it if we demonstrate it to him in practice: he will have either to work under the guidance of the class-conscious industrial worker, or submit to the yoke of Kolchak, Wrangel and the rest. And so, we must, at any cost, have the strictest discipline, and conscious performance of what the vanguard of the proletariat prescribes, of what it has learnt from its hard experience. If all steps are taken for the achievement of our aim, that will fully guarantee our emergence from the economic chaos and disruption caused by the imperialist war. Grain collections yielded 30,000,000 poods in the season following August 1, 1917, and 110,000,000 poods in the season following August 1918. That shows that we have begun to emerge from our difficulties. Since August 1,1919, over 150,000,000 poods have been brought in to date. That shows that we are making it. But we have not yet properly seen to the Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Siberia. If that is done we shall really be able to provide the worker with a good two pounds of bread a day.

I should also like to dwell, comrades, on a question of importance to you, rural Party workers, with whom I am in some measure acquainted from Party documents. I want to tell you that instruction, Party activities, agitation and propaganda will be your principal work. One of the main shortcomings in this work is that we do not know how to run state affairs, and that with our comrades, even with those who are in charge of work here, the habits of the old underground conditions are still too strong, i.e., habits of the time when we used to gather in small circles here or abroad, and did not have the slightest idea or inkling of how the work of the state has to be carried on. That, however, is something we have got to know, for we must remember that we have to govern millions. Any person in authority who goes to the rural districts, as delegate or representative of the Central Committee, must remember that we have a tremendous machinery of state which is still functioning poorly because we do not know how to run it properly.

In the rural districts there are hundreds of thousands of teachers who are browbeaten and intimidated by the kulaks, or who have been frightened out of their wits by the old tsarist officials, and cannot understand, are not in a position to understand, the principles of Soviet government. We have a huge military apparatus. Without the military commissars we would not have had a Red Army.

We also have the apparatus of the *Vsevobuch*,[62] which, together with its military functions, should be carrying on cultural work, should be educating the peasants. This state machinery functions very poorly; it contains no really devoted and convinced people, no real Communists. And you, who are going to the rural districts as Communists, must work not in isolation from this apparatus, but, on the contrary, in close conjunction with it. Every Party agitator who goes to a rural district must at the same time be an inspector of schools: not an inspector in the old sense of the word, not in the sense of meddling in educational affairs—that must not be permitted—but in the sense of co-ordinating his work with that of the People's Commissariat of Education, with the work of the *Vsevobuch*, with the work of the military commissars; he must regard himself as representative of the state, as representative of a party that is governing Russia. When he comes to a rural district he must not only act as propagandist and teacher; he must at the same time see to it that the school-teachers, who have never heard a living word, and those scores and hundreds of military commissars, all play a part in the Party agitator's work. Every school-teacher should have agitational pamphlets, and should not only have them, but read them to the peasants. He should know that he will lose his job unless he does that. The same applies to the military commissars; they should have these pamphlets and read them out to the peasants.

The Soviet government employs hundreds of thousands of office workers, who are either bourgeois or semi-bourgeois, or else have been so downtrodden that they have absolutely no confidence in our Soviet government, or feel so far removed from that government that they think it is

somewhere far-off, over there in Moscow, while next to them are the kulaks, who have grain, but hold on to it and will not let them have any, so that they are starving. Here the Party worker has a double job. He must remember that he is not only a propagandist, that he must not only come to the assistance of the most downtrodden strata of the population —that is his principal job, not to do which means that he is no Party worker and has no right to call himself a Communist—but that, in addition, he must act as a representative of the Soviet government, he must establish contacts with the teachers, and co-ordinate his work with that of the People's Commissariat of Education. He must not be an inspector in the sense of exercising control and supervision; he must act as a representative of the governing Party, which is now administering all Russia through part of the proletariat; in this capacity he must remember that his job is one of instruction, and that he must enlist and educate all the teachers and military commissars to do the same work as his. They are not familiar with this work; you must teach it to them. They are at present defenceless against the well-fed peasant. You must help them to shake off this dependence. You must firmly remember that you are not only propagandists and agitators, but also representatives of the state; you must not destroy the existing apparatus, or interfere with it and muddle its organisation, but must organise your work so that, as efficient instructors, propagandists and agitators, even after a brief period of work in the rural districts, you will leave your mark, not only in the papers of the peasant Communists you have educated, but also in the minds of the people whose work you inspect and guide, and to whom you give assignments, demanding that every teacher and military commissar should work in the Soviet spirit under all circumstances, that he should know that this is his duty, that he must remember that if he does not perform that duty, he will lose his job; they should all sense and see in every agitator a fully empowered representative of the Soviet government.

If this is done, and if you employ your forces properly, you will multiply them, with the result that every body of agitators will leave a mark behind them in the shape of an

apparatus of organisation, which already exists, but as yet functions imperfectly and unsatisfactorily.

In this sphere too, as in all others, I wish you success. (*Prolonged applause*.)

Published in 1920
in the pamphlet *Speech by V. I. Lenin at the Second All-Russia Conference of Organisers Responsible for Rural Work*

Published according to the pamphlet text

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ALL-RUSSIA FOOD CONFERENCE JULY 1, 1920

Comrades, I would have liked very much to attend your meeting and say something on the main food problems on your agenda. But, unfortunately, I am unable to indulge my wish and am obliged to content myself with addressing you briefly in this telephone message. I must inform you, comrades, that the successful outcome of your work, which is extremely onerous and responsible, recently induced the Council of People's Commissars to adopt a resolution expressing satisfaction with the results achieved by the food bodies in the matter of produce procurements. It is beyond question that the food bodies have grown in organisational strength during the past two years and more. This is largely due to your efforts.

But we cannot, of course, rest content with the results achieved. The hunger front, the next in importance after the war front, is imposing a number of new tasks upon you, and unless they are accomplished it will be impossible either to go on consolidating the workers' and peasants' government or to solve the immediate and urgent problems of economic development.

I also hope that you will help our economic development by establishing proper relations with the co-operative societies on the basis of the decisions of the Party Congress,[63] so as to properly accomplish the difficult but grateful task of transforming the petty-bourgeois co-operatives into socialist co-operatives.

The successes you have already achieved in food affairs oblige you more than ever to cope with the new tasks at

all costs, and thus approach a real solution of the food problem. For to whom much has been given, of him much shall be demanded; and your work has shown that you have already been given quite a lot. Permit me then, to wish you success in solving the problems on the agenda of your conference, and also in your daily work, which I am sure, when the conference is over, you will tackle on the spot with redoubled energy.

Written on June 30, 1920

Published in *Pravda* No. 163, July 2, 1920

Published according to the newspaper text

AID FOR THE WOUNDED OF THE RED ARMY!

Thanks to the heroism of the factory workers and of all working people, and despite the extraordinary difficulties and the terribly slow rate of progress, we are succeeding in reviving and restoring the economic life, which was shattered by the tsar and the capitalists. Matters are on the upgrade if ever so slowly. However, all our difficulties and hardships are as nothing compared with what has fallen to the lot of the wounded Red Army men, who are spilling their own blood in defence of the workers' and peasants' government, against the Polish nobles and capitalists, who are being egged on by the capitalists of Great Britain, France and America.

Let each man in the rear be mindful of his duty and help the wounded Red Army men to the best of his ability.

N. Lenin

July 2, 1920

A facsimile of the manuscript published in the magazine *Raneny Krasnoarmeyets* No. 1, July 5, 1920

Published according to the magazine text

THESES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

1. The present stage in the development of the international communist movement is marked by the fact that the finest representatives of the revolutionary proletariat in all capitalist countries have fully grasped the fundamental principles of the Communist International, viz., dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power, and have ranged themselves with unbounded enthusiasm on the side of the Communist International. An even bigger and more important step forward is the definite sympathy with these fundamental principles that has everywhere taken shape among the broadest masses; not only of the urban proletariat, but of the advanced section of the rural workers as well.

On the other hand, two errors, or failings, are to be observed in the very rapidly growing international communist movement. One, which is very grave and constitutes an immense and immediate danger to the success of the cause of proletarian emancipation, is that a section of the old leaders and of the old parties of the Second International—some yielding half-unconsciously to the wishes and pressure of the masses, and some deliberately deceiving the masses in order to retain their function of agents and assistants of the bourgeoisie within the working-class movement—declare their qualified or even unqualified adherence to the Third International, while actually remaining in all their practical party and political work, on the level of the Second International. Such a state of affairs is absolutely intolerable, because it leads to downright

corruption of the masses, detracts from the Third International's prestige, and threatens a repetition of the same acts of treachery as were perpetrated by the Hungarian Social-Democrats, who so hastily assumed the title of Communists. The other error, which is far less significant and is more in the nature of growing pains of the movement, consists in a tendency towards "Leftism" which results in a wrong appraisal of the role and the tasks of the party with regard to the class and the masses, and a wrong attitude towards the revolutionary Communists' obligation to work in bourgeois parliaments and reactionary trade unions.

Communists are in duty bound, not to gloss over shortcomings in their movement, but to criticise them openly so as to remedy them the more speedily and radically. For this purpose it is necessary: first, to define as concretely as possible, particularly on the basis of the practical experience already acquired, the content of the concepts "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "Soviet power"; second, to specify the precise content of the immediate and systematic preparatory work to be carried on in all countries so as to give effect to these slogans; and third, to specify the methods and means of rectifying the faults in our movement.

I

THE ESSENCE OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND OF SOVIET POWER

2. The victory of socialism (as the first stage of communism) over capitalism requires that the proletariat, as the only really revolutionary class, shall accomplish the following three tasks. First—overthrow the exploiters, and first and foremost the bourgeoisie, as their principal economic and political representative; utterly rout them; crush their resistance; absolutely preclude any attempt on their part to restore the yoke of capital and wage-slavery. Second—win over and bring under the leadership of the Communist Party, the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat, not only the entire proletariat, or its vast majority, but all who labour and are exploited by capital; educate, organise, train and discipline them in the actual course of

a supremely bold and ruthlessly firm struggle against the exploiters; wrest this vast majority of the population in all the capitalist countries from dependence on the bourgeoisie; imbue it, through its own practical experience, with confidence in the leading role of the proletariat and of its revolutionary vanguard. Third—neutralise, or render harmless, the inevitable vacillation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between bourgeois democracy and Soviet power, to be seen in the class of petty proprietors in agriculture, industry and commerce—a class which is still fairly numerous in nearly all advanced countries, although comprising only a minority of the population—as well as in the stratum of intellectuals, salary earners, etc., which corresponds to this class.

The first and second tasks are independent ones, each requiring its own special methods of action with regard to the exploiters and to the exploited respectively. The third task follows from the first two, and merely requires a skilful, timely and flexible combination of methods of the first and second type, depending on the specific circumstances in each separate instance of vacillation.

3. In the concrete situation created throughout the world, and above all in the most advanced, powerful, enlightened and free capitalist countries, by militarism, imperialism, the oppression of colonies and weak countries, the world-wide imperialist butchery and the "Peace" of Versailles—in that situation the very idea of the capitalists peacefully submitting to the will of the majority of the exploited, the very idea of a peaceful, reformist transition to socialism, is not merely sheer philistine stupidity but also downright deception of the workers, embellishment of capitalist wage-slavery, and concealment of the truth. That truth consists in the bourgeoisie, even the most enlightened and democratic, no longer hesitating at any fraud or crime, even the massacre of millions of workers and peasants, so as to preserve private ownership of the means of production. Only the forcible overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the confiscation of its property, the destruction of the entire bourgeois state apparatus from top to bottom—parliamentary, judicial, military, bureaucratic, administrative, municipal, etc.—right down to the wholesale deportation or internment

of the most dangerous and stubborn exploiters and the institution of strict surveillance over them so as to foil their inevitable attempts to resist and to restore capitalist slavery—only such measures can ensure real submission of the whole class of exploiters.

On the other hand, the idea, common among the old parties and the old leaders of the Second International, that the majority of the exploited toilers can achieve complete clarity of socialist consciousness and firm socialist convictions and character under capitalist slavery, under the yoke of the bourgeoisie (which assumes an infinite variety of forms that become more subtle and at the same time more brutal and ruthless the higher the cultural level in a given capitalist country) is also idealisation of capitalism and of bourgeois democracy, as well as deception of the workers. In fact, it is only after the vanguard of the proletariat, supported by the whole or the majority of this, the only revolutionary class, overthrows the exploiters, suppresses them, emancipates the exploited from their state of slavery and-immediately improves their conditions of life at the expense of the expropriated capitalists—it is only after this, and only in the actual process of an acute class struggle, that the masses of the toilers and exploited can be educated, trained and organised around the proletariat under whose influence and guidance, they can get rid of the selfishness, disunity, vices and weaknesses engendered by private property; only then will they be converted into a free union of free workers.

4. Victory over capitalism calls for proper relations between the leading (Communist) party, the revolutionary class (the proletariat) and the masses, i.e., the entire body of the toilers and the exploited. Only the Communist Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, if it really comprises all the finest representatives of that class, if it consists of fully conscious and staunch Communists who have been educated and steeled by the experience of a persistent revolutionary struggle, and if it has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class and, through it, with the whole mass of the exploited, and in completely winning the confidence of this class and this mass—only such a party is capable of leading the

proletariat in a final, most ruthless and decisive struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, it is only under the leadership of such a party that the proletariat is capable of displaying the full might of its revolutionary onslaught, and of overcoming the inevitable apathy and occasional resistance of that small minority, the labour aristocracy, who have been corrupted by capitalism, the old trade union and co-operative leaders, etc.—only then will it be capable of displaying its full might, which, because of the very economic structure of capitalist society, is infinitely greater than its proportion of the population. Finally, it is only after they have been really emancipated from the yoke of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois machinery of state, only after they have found an opportunity of organising in their Soviets in a really free way (free from the exploiters), that the masses, i.e., the toilers and exploited as a body, can display, for the first time in history, all the initiative and energy of tens of millions of people who have been crushed by capitalism. Only when the Soviets have become the sole state apparatus is it really possible to ensure the participation, in the work of administration, of the entire mass of the exploited, who, even under the most enlightened and freest bourgeois democracy, have always actually been excluded 99 per cent from participation in the work of administration. It is only in the Soviets that the exploited masses really begin to learn—not in books, but from their own practical experience—the work of socialist construction, of creating a new social discipline and a free union of free workers.

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II

WHAT IMMEDIATE AND UNIVERSAL PREPARATION FOR THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT SHOULD CONSIST IN

5. The present stage in the development of the international communist movement is marked by the fact that in the vast majority of capitalist countries, the proletariat's preparations to effect its dictatorship have not been completed, and, in many cases, have not even been systematically

begun. From this it does not, however, follow that the proletarian revolution is impossible in the immediate future; it is perfectly possible, since the entire economic and political situation is most inflammable and abounds in causes of a sudden flare-up; the other condition for revolution, apart from the proletariat's preparedness, viz., a general state of crisis in all the ruling and in all bourgeois parties, also exists. However, it does follow that the Communist Parties' current task consists not in accelerating the revolution, but in intensifying the preparation of the proletariat. On the other hand, the facts cited above from the history of many socialist parties make it incumbent on us to see that "recognition" of the dictatorship of the proletariat shall not remain a more matter of words.

Hence, from the point of view of the international proletarian movement, it is the Communist parties' principal task at the present moment to unite the scattered Communist forces, to form a single Communist Party in every country (or to reinforce or renovate the already existing Party) in order to increase tenfold the work of preparing the proletariat for the conquest of political power—political power, moreover, in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The ordinary socialist work conducted by groups and parties which recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat has by no means undergone that fundamental reorganisation, that fundamental renovation, which is essential before this work can be considered communist work and adequate to the tasks to be accomplished on the eve of proletarian dictatorship.

6. The proletariat's conquest of political power does not put a stop to its class struggle against the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, it renders that struggle most widespread, intense and ruthless. Owing to the extreme intensification of the struggle all groups, parties and leaders in the working-class movement who have fully or partly adopted the stand of reformism, of the "Centre", etc., inevitably side with the bourgeoisie or join the waverers, or else (what is the most dangerous of all) land in the ranks of the unreliable friends of the victorious proletariat. Hence, preparation for the dictatorship of the proletariat calls, not only for an intensification of the struggle against reformist and

"Centrist" tendencies, but also for a change in the character of that struggle. The struggle cannot be restricted to explaining the erroneousness of these tendencies; it must unswervingly and ruthlessly expose any leader of the working-class movement who reveals such tendencies, for otherwise the proletariat cannot know who it will march with into the decisive struggle against the bourgeoisie. This struggle is such that at any moment it may—and actually does, as experience has shown—substitute criticism with weapons for the weapon of criticism.[64] Any inconsistency or weakness in exposing those who show themselves to be reformists or "Centrists" means directly increasing the danger of the power of the proletariat being overthrown by the bourgeoisie, which tomorrow will utilise for the counter-revolution that which short-sighted people today see merely as "theoretical difference".

7. In particular, we must not restrict ourselves to the usual repudiation, in principle, of all collaboration between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, of all "collaborationism". Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, which will never be able, at one stroke, to abolish private property completely, mere defence of "liberty" and "equality", while private ownership of the means of production is preserved, turns into "collaboration" with the bourgeoisie, and undermines the rule of the working class. The dictatorship of the proletariat means that the state uses its whole machinery of power to uphold and perpetuate "no-liberty" for the exploiters to continue their oppression and exploitation, "inequality" between the owner of property (i.e., one who has appropriated for himself certain means of production created by social labour) and the non-owner. That which, prior to the victory of the proletariat, seems merely a theoretical difference on the question of "democracy" inevitably becomes, on the day following victory, a question that is settled by force of arms. Consequently, even preliminary work in preparing the masses to effect the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a radical change in the entire character of the struggle against the "Centrists" and the "champions of democracy".

8. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the most deter-

mined and revolutionary form of the proletariat's class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This struggle can be successful only when the most revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat has the backing of the overwhelming majority of the proletariat. Hence, preparation for the dictatorship of the proletariat entails not only explanation of the bourgeois character of all reformism, of all defence of democracy, while private ownership of the means of production is preserved; it entails, not only exposure of such trends, which are in fact a defence of the bourgeoisie within the labour movement; it also calls for old leaders being replaced by Communists in proletarian organisations of absolutely every type—not only political, but also trade union, co-operative, educational, etc. The more complete, lengthy and firmly established the rule of bourgeois democracy has been in a given country, the more the bourgeoisie will have succeeded in securing the appointment to such leading posts of people whose minds have been moulded by it and imbued with its views and prejudices, and who have very often been directly or indirectly bought by it. These representatives of the labour aristocracy, bourgeoisified workers, should be ousted from all their posts a hundred times more sweepingly than hitherto, and replaced by workers—even by wholly inexperienced men, provided they are connected with the exploited masses and enjoy their confidence in the struggle against the exploiters. The dictatorship of the proletariat will require the appointment of such inexperienced workers to the most responsible posts in the state; otherwise the workers' government will be impotent and will not have the support of the masses.

9. The dictatorship of the proletariat means that all toiling and exploited people, who have been disunited, deceived, intimidated, oppressed, downtrodden and crushed by the capitalist class, come under the full leadership of the only class trained for that leadership by the whole history of capitalism. That is why the following is one of the methods whereby preparations for the dictatorship of the proletariat should be started everywhere and immediately:

In all organisations, unions and associations without exception, and first and foremost in proletarian organi-

sations, but also in those of the non-proletarian toiling and exploited masses (political, trade union, military, co-operative, educational, sports, etc., etc.), groups or cells of Communists should be formed—preferably open groups, but underground groups as well, the latter being essential whenever there is reason to expect their suppression, or the arrest or banishment of their members on the part of the bourgeoisie; these cells, which are to be in close touch with one another and with the Party centre, should, by pooling their experience, carrying on work of agitation, propaganda and organisation, adapting themselves to absolutely every sphere of public life and to every variety and category of the toiling masses, systematically educate themselves, the Party, the class, and the masses by means of such diversified work.

In this connection, it is of the utmost importance that necessary distinctions between the methods of work should be evolved in practice: on the one hand, in relation to the "leaders", or "responsible representatives", who are very often hopelessly beset with petty-bourgeois and imperialist prejudices—such "leaders" must be ruthlessly exposed and expelled from the working-class movement—and, on the other hand, in relation to the masses, who, particularly after the imperialist holocaust, are for the most part inclined to listen to and accept the doctrine that the guidance from the proletariat is essential, as the only way of escape from capitalist slavery. We must learn to approach the masses with particular patience and caution so as to be able to understand the distinctive features in the mentality of each stratum, calling, etc., of these masses.

10. In particular, there is a group or cell of Communists that deserves exceptional attention and care from the Party, i.e., the parliamentary group of Party members, who are deputies to bourgeois representative institutions (primarily the national, but also local, municipal, etc., representative institutions). On the one hand, it is this tribune which is held in particular regard by large sections of the toiling masses, who are backward or imbued with petty-bourgeois prejudices; it is therefore imperative for Communists to utilise this tribune to conduct propaganda, agitation and organisational work and to explain to the masses why the

dispersal of the bourgeois parliament by the national congress of Soviets was legitimate in Russia (and, at the proper time, will be legitimate in any country). On the other hand, the entire history of bourgeois democracy, particularly in the advanced countries, has converted the parliamentary rostrum into one of the principal, if not the principal, venues of unparalleled fraudulency, financial and political deception of the people, careerism, hypocrisy and oppression of the working people. The intense hatred of parliaments felt by the best representatives of the revolutionary proletariat is therefore quite justified. The Communist parties and all parties affiliated to the Third International—especially those which have not arisen by splitting away from the old parties and by waging a long and persistent struggle against them, but through the old parties accepting (often nominally) the new stand—should therefore adopt a most strict attitude towards their parliamentary groups; the latter must be brought under the full control and direction of the Central Committees of the Parties; they must consist, in the main, of revolutionary workers; speeches by members of parliament should be carefully analysed in the Party press and at Party meetings, from a strictly communist standpoint; deputies should be sent to carry on agitational work among the masses; those who manifest Second International leanings should be expelled from the parliamentary groups, etc.

11. One of the chief causes hampering the revolutionary working-class movement in the developed capitalist countries is the fact that because of their colonial possessions and the super-profits gained by finance capital, etc., the capitalists of these countries have been able to create a relatively larger and more stable labour aristocracy, a section which comprises a small minority of the working class. This minority enjoys better terms of employment and is most-imbued with a narrow-minded craft spirit and with petty-bourgeois and imperialist prejudices. It forms the real social pillar of the Second International, of the reformists and the "Centrists"; at present it might even be called the social mainstay of the bourgeoisie. No preparation of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie is possible, even in the preliminary sense,

unless an immediate, systematic, extensive and open struggle is waged against this stratum, which, as experience has already fully shown, will no doubt provide the bourgeois White guards with many a recruit after the victory of the proletariat. All parties affiliated to the Third International must at all costs give effect to the slogans: "Deeper into the thick of the masses", "Closer links with the masses" —meaning by the masses all those who toil and are exploited by capital, particularly those who are least organised and educated, who are most oppressed and least amenable to organisation.

The proletariat becomes revolutionary only insofar as it does not restrict itself to the narrow framework of craft interests, only when in all matters and spheres of public life, it acts as the leader of all the toiling and exploited masses; it cannot achieve its dictatorship unless it is prepared and able to make the greatest sacrifices for the sake of victory over the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the experience of Russia is significant both in principle and in practice. The proletariat could not have achieved its dictatorship there, or won the universally acknowledged respect and confidence of all the toiling masses, had it not made the most sacrifices, or starved more than any other section of those masses at the most crucial moments of the onslaught, war and blockade effected by the world bourgeoisie.

In particular, the Communist Party and all advanced proletarians must give all-round and unstinted support especially to the spontaneous and mass strike movement, which, under the yoke of capital, is alone capable of really rousing, educating and organising the masses, of imbuing them with complete confidence in the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat. Without such preparation, no dictatorship of the proletariat is possible; those who are capable of publicly opposing strikes, such as Kautsky in Germany and Turati in Italy, cannot possibly be tolerated in the ranks of parties affiliated to the Third International. This applies even more, of course, to those trade union and parliamentary leaders who so often betray the workers by using the experience of strikes to teach them reformism, and not revolution (for instance, in Britain and in France in recent years).

12. In all countries, even in those that are freest, most "legal", and most "peaceful" in the sense that the class struggle is least acute there, it is now absolutely indispensable for every Communist Party to systematically combine legal and illegal work, legal and illegal organisations. Notwithstanding their false and hypocritical declarations, the governments of even the most enlightened and freest of countries, where the bourgeois-democratic system is most "stable", are already systematically and secretly drawing up blacklists of Communists and constantly violating their own constitutions so as to give secret or semi-secret encouragement to the whiteguards and to the murder of Communists in all countries, making secret preparations for the arrest of Communists, planting *agents provocateurs* among the Communists, etc., etc. Only a most reactionary philistine, no matter what cloak of fine "democratic" and pacifist phrases he may don, will deny this fact or the conclusion that of necessity follows from it, viz., that all legal Communist parties must immediately form illegal organisations for the systematic conduct of illegal work and for complete preparations for the moment the bourgeoisie resorts to persecution. Illegal work is most necessary in the army, the navy and the police because, since the imperialist holocaust, governments the world over have begun to stand in dread of people's armies which are open to the workers and peasants, and are secretly resorting to all kinds of methods to set up military units specially recruited from the bourgeoisie and equipped with the most up-to-date weapons.

On the other hand, it is likewise necessary that, in all cases without exception, the parties should not restrict themselves to illegal work, but should conduct legal work as well, overcoming all obstacles, starting legal publications, and forming legal organisations under the most varied names, which should be frequently changed if necessary. This is being practised by the illegal Communist parties in Finland, Hungary, partly in Germany, Poland, Latvia, etc. It should be practised by the Industrial Workers of the World in the U.S.A. and by all Communist parties at present legal, should public prosecutors see fit to take proceedings against them on the grounds of resolutions

adopted by Congresses of the Communist International, etc.

A combination of illegal and legal work is an absolute principle dictated, not only by all features of the present period, that of the eve of the proletarian dictatorship, but also by the necessity of proving to the bourgeoisie that there is not, nor can there be, any sphere of activity that cannot be won by the Communists; above all, it is dictated by the fact that broad strata of the proletariat and even broader strata of the non-proletarian toiling and exploited masses still exist everywhere, who continue to believe in bourgeois-democratic legality and whom we must undeceive without fail.

13. In particular, the conditions of the working-class press in most advanced capitalist countries strikingly reveal the utter fraudulency of liberty and equality under bourgeois democracy, as well as the necessity of systematically combining legal work with illegal work. Both in vanquished Germany and in victorious America, the entire power of the bourgeoisie's machinery of state and all the machinations of the financial magnates are employed to deprive the workers of their press, these including legal proceedings, the arrest (or murder by hired assassins) of editors, denial of mailing privileges, the cutting off of paper supplies, and so on and so forth. Besides, the news services essential to daily newspapers are run by bourgeois telegraph agencies, while advertisements, without which a large newspaper cannot pay its way, depend on the "good will" of the capitalists. To sum up: through skulduggery and the pressure of capital and the bourgeois state, the bourgeoisie is depriving the revolutionary proletariat of its press.

To combat this, the Communist parties must create a new type of periodical press for mass distribution among the workers: first, legal publications, which, without calling themselves communist and without publicising their links with the Party, must learn to make use of any legal opportunity, however slight, just as the Bolsheviks did under the tsar, after 1905; secondly, illegal leaflets, even the briefest and published at irregular intervals, but reprinted at numerous printshops by workers (secretly,

or, if the movement has become strong enough, by the revolutionary seizure of printshops), and providing the proletariat with outspoken revolutionary information and revolutionary slogans.

Preparations for the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a revolutionary struggle, into which the masses are drawn, for the freedom of the communist press.

III

RECTIFICATION OF THE POLITICAL LINE—PARTLY ALSO OF THE COMPOSITION—OF PARTIES AFFILIATED OR DESIRING TO AFFILIATE TO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

14. The measure in which the proletariat in countries most important from the viewpoint of world economics and politics is prepared to establish its dictatorship can be seen with the greatest objectivity and precision in the fact that the most influential parties of the Second International, viz., the French Socialist Party, the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain and the Socialist Party of America,[65] have withdrawn from this yellow International, and have decided—the first three conditionally, the latter even unconditionally—to affiliate to the Third International. This proves that not only the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat but its majority too have begun to come over to our side, convinced by the entire course of events. The main thing now is the ability to consummate this process and to consolidate firmly in point of organisation what has been achieved, so as to advance all along the line, without the slightest wavering.

15. All the activities of the parties mentioned (to which should be added the Socialist Party of Switzerland,[66] if the telegraph reports of its decision to join the Third International are true) show—as any periodical of these parties will strikingly confirm—that they are not yet communist, and quite often run directly counter to the fundamental principles of the Third International, viz., the recognition

of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government in place of bourgeois democracy.

Accordingly, the Second Congress of the Communist International must resolve that it cannot immediately accept the affiliation of these parties; that it endorses the reply given by the Executive Committee of the Third International to the German "Independents"[67]; that it confirms its readiness to conduct negotiations with any party that withdraws from the Second International and desires to enter into closer relations with the Third International; that it will admit the delegates of such parties in a deliberative capacity to all its congresses and conferences; that it sets the following conditions for the complete adhesion of these (and similar), parties with the Communist International:

1) All decisions of all Congresses of the Communist International and of its Executive Committee to be published in all the periodicals of the parties concerned;

2) These decisions to be discussed at special meetings of all sections or local organisations of the parties;

3) After such discussion, special congresses of the parties to be convened to sum up the results, and for the purpose of—

4) Purging the parties of elements that continue to act in the spirit of the Second International;

5) All periodical publications of the parties to be placed under exclusively Communist editorship.

The Second Congress of the Third International should instruct its Executive Committee formally to accept these and similar parties into the Third International after ascertaining that all these conditions have actually been met and that the activities of the parties have assumed a communist character.

16. As to the question of the conduct of Communists now holding a minority of the responsible posts in these and similar parties, the Second Congress of the Communist International should resolve that, in view of the obvious growth of sincere sympathy for communism among workingmen belonging to these parties, it would be undesirable for Communists to resign from the latter, as long as they can carry on work within them for the recognition of the

dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government, and as long as it is possible to criticise the opportunists and Centrists who still remain in these parties.

At the same time, the Second Congress of the Third International should declare in favour of Communist groups and organisations, or groups and organisations sympathising with communism, joining the Labour Party in Great Britain, despite its membership in the Second International. As long as this party ensures its affiliated organisations their present freedom of criticism and freedom to carry on work of propaganda, agitation and organisation in favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government, and as long as this party preserves the character of a federation of all trade union organisations of the working class, it is imperative for Communists to do everything and to make certain compromises in order to be able to exercise their influence on the broadest masses of the workers, to expose their opportunist leaders from a higher tribune, that is in fuller view of the masses, and to hasten the transfer of political power from the direct representatives of the bourgeoisie to the "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class", so that the masses may be more quickly weaned away from their last illusions on this score.

17. Concerning the Socialist Party of Italy, the Second Congress of the Third International considers that the criticism of that party and the practical proposals submitted to the National Council of the Socialist Party of Italy in the name of the party's Turin section,[68] as set forth in *L'Ordine Nuovo* of May 8, 1920, are in the main correct and are fully in keeping with the fundamental principles of the Third International.

Accordingly, the Second Congress of the Third International requests the Socialist Party of Italy to convene a special congress to discuss these proposals and also all the decisions of the two Congresses of the Communist International for the purpose of rectifying the party's line and of purging it, particularly its parliamentary group, of non-Communist elements.

18. The Second Congress of the Third International considers erroneous the views on the Party's relation to the class and to the masses, and the view that it is not

obligatory for Communist parties to participate in bourgeois parliaments and in reactionary trade unions. These views have been refuted in detail in special decisions of the present Congress, and advocated most fully by the Communist Workers' Party of Germany, and partly by the Communist Party of Switzerland[69], by *Kommunismus*, organ of the East-European Secretariat of the Communist International in Vienna, by the now dissolved secretariat in Amsterdam, by several Dutch comrades, by several Communist organisations in Great Britain, as, for example, the Workers' Socialist Federation, etc., and also by the Industrial Workers of the World in the U.S.A. and the Shop Stewards' Committees in Great Britain, etc.

Nevertheless, the Second. Congress of the Third International considers it possible and desirable that those of the above-mentioned organisations which have not yet officially affiliated to the Communist International should do so immediately; for in the present instance, particularly as regards the Industrial Workers of the World in the U.S.A. and Australia, as well as the Shop Stewards' Committees in Great Britain, we are dealing with a profoundly proletarian and mass movement, which in all essentials actually stands by the basic principles of the Communist International. The erroneous views held by these organisations regarding participation in bourgeois parliaments can be explained, not so much by the influence of elements coming from the bourgeoisie, who bring their essentially petty-bourgeois views into the movement—views such as anarchists often hold—as by the political inexperience of proletarians who are quite revolutionary and connected with the masses.

For this reason, the Second Congress of the Third International requests all Communist organisations and groups in the Anglo-Saxon countries, even if the Industrial Workers of the World and the Shop Stewards' Committees do not immediately affiliate to the Third International, to pursue a very friendly policy towards these organisations, to establish closer contacts with them and the masses that sympathise with them, and to explain to them in a friendly spirit—on the basis of the experience of all revolutions, and particularly of the three Russian revolutions of the

twentieth century—the erroneousness of their views as set forth above, and not to desist from further efforts to amalgamate with these organisations to form a single Communist party.

19. In this connection, the Congress draws the attention of all comrades, particularly in the Latin and Anglo-Saxon countries, to the fact that, since the war, a profound ideological division has been taking place among anarchists all over the world regarding the attitude to be adopted towards the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government. Moreover, a proper understanding of these principles is particularly to be seen among proletarian elements that have often been impelled towards anarchism by a perfectly legitimate hatred of the opportunism and reformism of the parties of the Second International. That understanding is growing the more widespread among them, the more familiar they become with the experience of Russia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Germany.

The Congress therefore considers it the duty of all Communists to do everything to help all proletarian mass elements to abandon anarchism and come over to the side of the Third International. The Congress points out that the measure in which genuinely Communist parties succeed in winning mass proletarian elements rather than intellectual, and petty-bourgeois elements away from anarchism, is a criterion of the success of those Parties.

July 4, 1920

Published in July 1920

REPLY TO A LETTER FROM THE JOINT PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BRITAIN[70]

I have received a letter from the Joint Provisional Committee for the Communist Party of Britain, dated June 20, and, in accordance with their request, I hasten to reply that I am in complete sympathy with their plans for the immediate organisation of a single Communist Party of Britain. I consider erroneous the tactics pursued by Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst and the Workers' Socialist Federation, who refuse to collaborate in the amalgamation of the British Socialist Party, the Socialist Labour Party and others to form a single Communist party. Personally I am in favour of participation in Parliament and of affiliation to the Labour Party, given wholly free and independent communist activities. I shall defend these tactics at the Second Congress of the Third International on July 15, 1920 in Moscow. I consider it most desirable that a single Communist party be speedily organised on the basis of the decisions of the Third International, and that such a party should establish the closest contact with the Industrial Workers of the World and the Shop Stewards' Committees, in order to bring about a complete merger with them in the near future.

N. Lenin

8.7.1920

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TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO J. V. STALIN

By telephone to *Stalin*, *Kharkov*

A Note has been received from Curzon. He proposes an armistice with Poland on the following terms: the Polish army to withdraw beyond the line fixed by last year's peace conference,[71] viz., Grodno, Yalovka, Nemirov, Brest-Litovsk, Dorogusk, Ustilug, Krylov. This line cuts across Galicia between Przemysl and Rava-Russkaya, right up to the Carpathians. We keep everything east of this line. Our army is to withdraw 50 kilometres east of *this* line. A conference of representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland is to be held in London under the auspices of the peace conference. Representatives of Eastern Galicia will be allowed to attend. We can send anybody we like as our representative. It has been proposed to us that we conclude an armistice with Wrangel, provided he withdraws to the Crimea. Wrangel is going to London to discuss the fate of his army, but not as member of the conference. We have been given a week for our reply. Besides, the Curzon Note says that the Polish Government has given its consent to a peace with Russia, on the basis of these terms.

Such is the Curzon Note. I ask Stalin:

1) to expedite execution of the order to furiously intensify the offensive;
2) to inform me of his (Stalin's) opinion.

For my part, I think that all this is a piece of knavery aimed at the annexation of the Crimea, which is advanced so insolently in the Note. The idea is to snatch victory out of our hands with the aid of false promises.

Lenin

Stalin's *reply* to be recorded and sent on to me by *telephone*.

Lenin

Written July 12 or 13, 1920
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Published according to the manuscript copy revised and emended by V. I. Lenin

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Kharkov

Revolutionary Council of the South-Western Front
To Stalin, urgent

17.7.1920

The Central Committee plenum has adopted almost in full the proposals I have made.[72] You will receive the full text. Keep me informed without fail, twice weekly in cipher and in detail, regarding the development of operations and the course of events.

Lenin

First published in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Published according to the manuscript copy

THE TERMS OF ADMISSION INTO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The First, Inaugural Congress of the Communist International[73] did not draw up precise conditions for the admission of parties into the Third International. When the First Congress was convened, only communist *trends* and *groups* existed in most countries.

It is in a different situation that the Second World Congress of the Communist International is meeting. In most countries, Communist *parties* and *organisations*, not merely trends, now exist.

Parties and groups only recently affiliated to the Second International are more and more frequently applying for membership in the Third International, though they have not become really Communist. The Second International has definitely been smashed. Aware that the Second International is beyond hope, the intermediate parties and groups of the "Centre" are trying to lean on the Communist International, which is steadily gaining in strength. At the same time, however, they hope to retain a degree of "autonomy" that will enable them to pursue their previous opportunist or "Centrist" policies. The Communist International is, to a certain extent, becoming the vogue.

The desire of certain leading "Centre" groups to join the Third International provides oblique confirmation that it has won the sympathy of the vast majority of class-conscious workers throughout the world, and is becoming a more powerful force with each day.

In certain circumstances, the Communist International may be faced with the danger of dilution by the influx of

wavering and irresolute groups that have not as yet broken with their Second International ideology.

Besides, some of the big parties (Italy, Sweden), in which the majority have adopted the communist standpoint, still contain a strong reformist and social-pacifist wing that is only waiting for an opportune moment to raise its head again, begin active sabotage of the proletarian revolution, and thereby help the bourgeoisie and the Second International.

No Communist should forget the lessons of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The Hungarian proletariat paid dearly for the Hungarian Communists having united with the reformists.

In view of all this, the Second World Congress deems it necessary to lay down absolutely precise terms for the admission of new parties, and also to set forth the obligations incurred by the parties already affiliated.

The Second Congress of the Communist International resolves that the following are the terms of Comintern membership:

* * *

1. Day-by-day propaganda and agitation must be genuinely communist in character. All press organs belonging to the parties must be edited by reliable Communists who have given proof of their devotion to the cause of the proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat should not be discussed merely as a stock phrase to be learned by rote; it should be popularised in such a way that the practical facts systematically dealt with in our press day by day will drive home to every rank-and-file working man and working woman, every soldier and peasant, that it is indispensable to them. Third International supporters should use all media to which they have access—the press, public meetings, trade unions, and co-operative societies—to expose systematically and relentlessly, not only the bourgeoisie but also its accomplices—the reformists of every shade.

2. Any organisation that wishes to join the Communist International must consistently and systematically *dismiss* reformists and "Centrists" from positions of any responsibility in the working-class movement (party organisations,

editorial boards, trade unions, parliamentary groups, co-operative societies, municipal councils, etc.), replacing them by reliable Communists. The fact that in some cases rank-and-file workers may at first have to replace "experienced" leaders should be no deterrent.

3. In countries where a state of siege or emergency legislation makes it impossible for Communists to conduct their activities legally, it is absolutely essential that legal and illegal work should be combined. In almost all the countries of Europe and America, the class struggle is entering the phase of civil war. In these conditions, Communists can place no trust in bourgeois legality. They must *everywhere* build up a parallel illegal organisation, which, at the decisive moment, will be in a position to help the Party fulfil its duty to the revolution.

4. Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be conducted in the armed forces, and Communist cells formed in every military unit. In the main Communists will have to do this work illegally; failure to engage in it would be tantamount to a betrayal of their revolutionary duty and incompatible with membership in the Third International.

5. Regular and systematic agitation is indispensable in the countryside. The working class cannot consolidate its victory without support from at least a section of the farm labourers and poor peasants, and without neutralising, through its policy, part of the rest of the rural population. In the present period communist activity in the countryside is of primary importance. It should be conducted, in the main, through revolutionary *worker*-Communists who have contacts with the rural areas. To forgo this work or entrust it to unreliable semi-reformist elements is tantamount to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

6. It is the duty of any party wishing to belong to the Third International to expose, not only avowed social-patriotism, but also the falsehood and hypocrisy of social-pacifism. It must systematically demonstrate to the workers that, without the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, no international arbitration courts, no talk about a reduction of armaments, no "democratic" reorganisation of the League of Nations will save mankind from new imperialist wars.

7. It is the duty of parties wishing to belong to the Communist International to recognise the need for a complete and absolute break with reformism and "Centrist" policy, and to conduct propaganda among the party membership for that break. Without this, a consistent communist policy is impossible.

The Communist International demands imperatively and uncompromisingly that this break be effected at the earliest possible date. It cannot tolerate a situation in which avowed reformists, such as Turati, Modigliani and others, are entitled to consider themselves members of the Third International. Such a state of affairs would lead to the Third International strongly resembling the defunct Second International.

8. Parties in countries whose bourgeoisie possess colonies and oppress other nations must pursue a most well-defined and clear-cut policy in respect of colonies and oppressed nations. Any party wishing to join the Third International must ruthlessly expose the colonial machinations of the imperialists of its "own" country, must support—in deed, not merely in word—every colonial liberation movement, demand the expulsion of its compatriot imperialists from the colonies, inculcate in the hearts of the workers of its own country an attitude of true brotherhood with the working population of the colonies and the oppressed nations, and conduct systematic agitation among the armed forces against all oppression of the colonial peoples.

9. It is the duty of any party wishing to join the Communist International to conduct systematic and unflagging communist work in the trade unions, co-operative societies and other mass workers' organisations. Communist cells should be formed in the trade unions, and, by their sustained and unflagging work, win the unions over to the communist cause. In every phase of their day-by-day activity these cells must unmask the treachery of the social-patriots and the vacillation of the "Centrists". The cells must be completely subordinate to the party as a whole.

10. It is the duty of any party belonging to the Communist International to wage a determined struggle against the Amsterdam "International" of yellow trade unions.[74] Its indefatigable propaganda should show the organised

workers the need to break with the yellow Amsterdam International. It must give every support to the emerging international federation of Red trade unions[75] which are associated with the Communist International.

11. It is the duty of parties wishing to join the Third International to re-examine the composition of their parliamentary groups, eliminate unreliable elements and effectively subordinate these groups to the Party Central Committees. They must demand that every Communist proletarian should subordinate all his activities to the interests of truly revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

12. The periodical and non-periodical press, and all publishing enterprises, must likewise be fully subordinate to the Party Central Committee, whether the party as a whole is legal or illegal at the time. Publishing enterprises should not be allowed to abuse their autonomy and pursue any policies that are not in full accord with that of the Party.

13. Parties belonging to the Communist International must be organised on the principle of democratic *centralism*. In this period of acute civil war, the Communist parties can perform their duty only if they are organised in a most centralised manner, are marked by an iron discipline bordering on military discipline, and have strong and authoritative party centres invested with wide powers and enjoying the unanimous confidence of the membership.

14. Communist parties in countries where Communists can conduct their work legally must carry out periodic membership purges (re-registrations) with the aim of systematically ridding the party of petty-bourgeois elements that inevitably percolate into them.

15. It is the duty of any party wishing to join the Communist International selflessly to help any Soviet republic in its struggle against counter-revolutionary forces. Communist parties must conduct incessant propaganda urging the workers to refuse to transport war materials destined for the enemies of the Soviet republics; they must conduct legal or illegal propaganda in the armed forces dispatched to strangle the workers' republics, etc.

16. It is the duty of parties which have still kept their old Social-Democratic programmes to revise them as speedily as possible and draw up new communist programmes

in conformity with the specific conditions in their respective countries, and in the spirit of (Communist International decisions. As a rule, the programmes of all parties belonging to the Communist International must be approved by a regular Congress of the Communist International or by its Executive Committee. In the event of the Executive Committee withholding approval, the party is entitled to appeal to the Congress of the Communist International.

17. All decisions of the Communist International's congresses and of its Executive Committee are binding on all affiliated parties. Operating in conditions of acute civil war, the Communist International must be far more centralised than the Second International was. It stands to reason, however, that in every aspect of their work the Communist International and its Executive Committee must take into account the diversity of conditions in which the respective parties have to fight and work, and adopt decisions binding on all parties only on matters in which such decisions are possible.

18. In view of the foregoing, parties wishing to join the Communist International must change their name. Any party seeking affiliation must call itself the *Communist* Party of the country in question (Section of the Third, Communist International). The question of a party's name is not merely a formality, but a matter of major political importance. The Communist International has declared a resolute war on the bourgeois world and all yellow Social-Democratic parties. The difference between the Communist parties and the old and official "Social-Democratic", or "socialist", parties, which have betrayed the banner of the working class, must be made absolutely clear to every rank-and-file worker.

19. After the conclusion of the proceedings of the Second World Congress of the Communist International, any party wishing to join the Communist International must at the earliest date convene an extraordinary congress for official acceptance of the above obligations on behalf of the entire party.

Published in July 1920

ARTICLE TWENTY OF THE TERMS OF ADMISSION INTO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[76]

Parties which now wish to join the Third International but have not yet radically changed their previous tactics must do everything necessary, before joining the International, for at least two-thirds of their respective Central Committees and all the principal central Party bodies to be made up of comrades who came out publicly, prior to the Second Congress of the Communist International, with unambiguous statements in favour of joining the Third International. Exceptions may be allowed with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International. The latter has the right to make exceptions also for representatives of the "Centre", named in § 7.

First published in 1921
in the book *The Second Congress of the Communist International. Verbatim Report*. Published by the Communist International, Petrograd

Published according to the text of the book

THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[77]

JULY 19-AUGUST 7, 1920

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1

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

JULY 19

(*An ovation breaks out. All present rise to their feet and applaud. The speaker tries to begin, but the applause and cries in all languages continue. The ovation does not abate.*) Comrades, the theses on the questions of the fundamental tasks of the Communist International have been published in all languages and contain nothing that is materially new (particularly to the Russian comrades). That is because, in a considerable measure, they extend several of the main features of our revolutionary experience and the lessons of our revolutionary movement to a number of Western countries, to Western Europe. My report will therefore deal at greater length, if in brief outline, with the first part of my subject, namely, the international situation.

Imperialism's economic relations constitute the core of the entire international situation as it now exists. Throughout the twentieth century, this new, highest and final stage of capitalism has fully taken shape. Of course, you all know that the enormous dimensions that capital has reached are the most characteristic and essential feature of imperialism. The place of free competition has been taken by huge monopolies. An insignificant number of capitalists have, in some cases, been able to concentrate in their hands entire branches of industry; these have passed into the hands of combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts, not infrequently of an international nature. Thus, entire

branches of industry, not only in single countries, but all over the world, have been taken over by monopolists in the field of finance, property rights, and partly of production. This has formed the basis for the unprecedented domination exercised by an insignificant number of very big banks, financial tycoons, financial magnates who have, in fact, transformed even the freest republics into financial monarchies. Before the war this was publicly recognised by such far from revolutionary writers as, for example, Lysis in France.

This domination by a handful of capitalists achieved full development when the whole world had been partitioned, not only in the sense that the various sources of raw materials and means of production had been seized by the biggest capitalists, but also in the sense that the preliminary partition of the colonies had been completed. Some forty years ago, the population of the colonies stood at somewhat over 250,000,000, who were subordinated to six capitalist powers. Before the war of 1914, the population of the colonies was estimated at about 600,000,000, and if we add countries like Persia, Turkey, and China, which were already semi-colonies, we shall get, in round figures, a population of a thousand million people oppressed through colonial dependence by the richest, most civilised and freest countries. And you know that, apart from direct political and juridical dependence, colonial dependence presumes a number of relations of financial and economic dependence, a number of wars, which were not regarded as wars because very often they amounted to sheer massacres, when European and American imperialist troops, armed with the most up-to-date weapons of destruction, slaughtered the unarmed and defenceless inhabitants of colonial countries.

The first imperialist war of 1914-18 was the inevitable outcome of this partition of the whole world, of this domination by the capitalist monopolies, of this great power wielded by an insignificant number of very big banks—two, three, four or five in each country. This war was waged for the repartitioning of the whole world. It was waged in order to decide which of the small groups of the biggest states—the British or the German—was to obtain the

opportunity and the right to rob, strangle and exploit the whole world. You know that the war settled this question in favour of the British group. And, as a result of this war, all capitalist contradictions have become immeasurably more acute. At a single stroke the war relegated about 250,000,000 of the world's inhabitants to what is equivalent to colonial status, viz., Russia, whose population can be taken at about 130,000,000, and Austria-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria, with a total population of not less than 120,000,000. That means 250,000,000 people living in countries, of which some, like Germany, are among the most advanced, most enlightened, most cultured, and on a level with modern technical progress. By means of the Treaty of Versailles, the war imposed such terms upon these countries that advanced peoples have been reduced to a state of colonial dependence, poverty, starvation, ruin, and loss of rights: this treaty binds them for many generations, placing them in conditions that no civilised nation has ever lived in. The following is the post-war picture of the world: at least *1,250 million* people are at once brought under the colonial yoke, exploited by a brutal capitalism, which once boasted of its love for peace, and has some right to do so some fifty years ago, when the world was not yet partitioned, the monopolies did not as yet rule, and capitalism could still develop in a relatively peaceful way, without tremendous military conflicts.

Today, after this "peaceful" period, we see a monstrous intensification of oppression, the reversion to a colonial and military oppression that is far worse than before. The Treaty of Versailles has placed Germany and the other defeated countries in a position that makes their economic existence physically impossible, deprives them of all rights, and humiliates them.

How many nations are the beneficiaries? To answer this question we must recall that the population of the United States—the only full beneficiary from the war, a country which, from a heavy debtor, has become a general creditor—is no more than 100,000,000. The population of Japan—which gained a great deal by keeping out of the European-American conflict and by seizing the enormous Asian continent—is 50,000,000. The population of Britain,

which next to the above-mentioned countries gained most, is about 50,000,000. If we add the neutral countries with their very small populations, countries which were enriched by the war, we shall get, in round figures, some 250,000,000 people.

Thus you get the broad outlines of the picture of the world as it appeared after the imperialist war. In the oppressed colonies—countries which are being dismembered, such as Persia, Turkey and China, and in countries that were defeated and have been relegated to the position of colonies—there are 1,250 million inhabitants. Not more than 250,000,000 inhabit countries that have retained their old positions, but have become economically dependent upon America, and all of which, during the war, were militarily dependent, once the war involved the whole world and did not permit a single state to remain really neutral. And, finally, we have not more than 250,000,000 inhabitants in countries whose top stratum, the capitalists alone, benefited from the partition of the world. We thus get a total of about 1,750 million comprising the entire population of the world. I would like to remind you of this picture of the world, for all the basic contradictions of capitalism, of imperialism, which are leading up to revolution, all the basic contradictions in the working-class movement that have led up to the furious struggle against the Second International, facts our chairman has referred to, are all connected with this partitioning of the world's population.

Of course, these figures give the economic picture of the world only approximately, in broad outline. And, comrades, it is natural that, with the population of the world divided in this way, exploitation by finance capital, the capitalist monopolies, has increased many times over.

Not only have the colonial and the defeated countries been reduced to a state of dependence; within each victor state the contradictions have grown more acute; all the capitalist contradictions have become aggravated. I shall illustrate this briefly with a few examples.

Let us take the national debts. We know that the debts of the principal European states increased no less than sevenfold in the period between 1914 and 1920. I shall quote another

economic source, one of particular significance—Keynes, the British diplomat and author of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, who, on instructions from his government, took part in the Versailles peace negotiations, observed them on the spot from the purely bourgeois point of view, studied the subject in detail, step by step, and took part in the conferences as an economist. He has arrived at conclusions which are more weighty, more striking and more instructive than any a Communist revolutionary could draw, because they are the conclusions of a well-known bourgeois and implacable enemy of Bolshevism, which he, like the British philistine he is, imagines as something monstrous, ferocious, and bestial. Keynes has reached the conclusion that after the Peace of Versailles, Europe and the whole world are heading for bankruptcy. He has resigned, and thrown his book in the government's face with the words: "What you are doing is madness". I shall quote his figures, which can be summed up as follows.

What are the debtor-creditor relations that have developed between the principal powers? I shall convert pounds sterling into gold rubles, at a rate of ten gold rubles to one pound. Here is what we get: the United States has assets amounting to 19,000 million, its liabilities are nil. Before the war it was in Britain's debt. In his report on April 14, 1920, to the last congress of the Communist Party of Germany, Comrade Levi very correctly pointed out that there are now only two powers in the world that can act independently, viz., Britain and America. America alone is absolutely independent financially. Before the war she was a debtor; she is now a creditor only. All the other powers in the world are debtors. Britain has been reduced to a position in which her assets total 17,000 million, and her liabilities 8,000 million. She is already half-way to becoming a debtor nation. Moreover, her assets include about 6,000 million owed to her by Russia. Included in the debt are military supplies received by Russia during the war. When Krasin, as representative of the Russian Soviet Government, recently had occasion to discuss with Lloyd George the subject of debt agreements, he made it plain to the scientists and politicians, to the British Government's leaders, that they were labouring under a strange delusion

if they were counting on getting these debts repaid. The British diplomat Keynes has already laid this delusion bare.

Of course, it is not only or even not at all a question of the Russian revolutionary government having no wish to pay the debts. No government would pay, because these debts are usurious interest on a sum that has been paid twenty times over, and the selfsame bourgeois Keynes, who does not in the least sympathise with the Russian revolutionary movement, says: "It is clear that these debts cannot be taken into account."

In regard to France, Keynes quotes the following figures: her assets amount to 3,500 million, and her liabilities to 10,500 million! And this is a country which the French themselves called the world's money-lender, because her "savings" were enormous; the proceeds of colonial and financial pillage—a gigantic capital—enabled her to grant thousands upon thousands of millions in loans, particularly to Russia. These loans brought in an enormous revenue. Notwithstanding this and notwithstanding victory, France has been reduced to debtor status.

A bourgeois American source, quoted by Comrade Braun, a Communist, in his book *Who Must Pay the War Debts*? (Leipzig, 1920), estimates the ratio of debts to national wealth as follows: in the victor countries, Britain and France, the ratio of debts to aggregate national wealth is over 50 per cent; in Italy the percentage is between 60 and 70, and in Russia 90. As you know, however, these debts do not disturb us, because we followed Keynes's excellent advice just a little before his book appeared—we annulled all our debts. (*Stormy applause.*)

In this, however, Keynes reveals the usual crankiness of the philistine: while advising that all debts should be annulled, he goes on to say that, of course, France only stands to gain by it, that, of course, Britain will not lose very much, as nothing can be got out of Russia in any case; America will lose a fair amount, but Keynes counts on American "generosity"! On this point our views differ from those of Keynes and other petty-bourgeois pacifists. We think that to get the debts annulled they will have to wait for something else to happen, and will have to try working

in a direction other than counting on the "generosity" of the capitalists.

These few figures go to show that the imperialist war has created an impossible situation for the victor powers as well. This is further shown by the enormous disparity between wages and price rises. On March 8 of this year, the Supreme Economic Council, an institution charged with protecting the bourgeois system throughout the world from the mounting revolution, adopted a resolution which ended with an appeal for order, industry and thrift, provided, of course, the workers remain the slaves of capital. This Supreme Economic Council, organ of the Entente and of the capitalists of the whole world, presented the following summary.

In the United States of America food prices have risen, on the average, by 120 per cent, whereas wages have increased only by 100 per cent. In Britain, food prices have gone up by 170 per cent, and wages 130 per cent; in France, food prices—300 per cent, and wages 200 per cent; in Japan—food prices 130 per cent, and wages 60 per cent (I have analysed Comrade Braun's figures in his pamphlet and those of the Supreme Economic Council as published in *The Times* of March 10, 1920).

In such circumstances, the workers' mounting resentment, the growth of a revolutionary temper and ideas, and the increase in spontaneous mass strikes are obviously inevitable, since the position of the workers is becoming intolerable. The workers' own experience is convincing them that the capitalists have become prodigiously enriched by the war and are placing the burden of war costs and debts upon the workers' shoulders. We recently learnt by cable that America wants to deport another 500 Communists to Russia so as to get rid of "dangerous agitators".

Even if America deports to our country, not 500 but 500,000 Russian, American, Japanese and French "agitators" that will make no difference, because there will still be the disparity between prices and wages, which they can do nothing about. The reason why they can do nothing about it is because private property is most strictly safeguarded, is "sacred" there. That should not be forgotten, because it is only in Russia that the exploiters' private property has

been abolished. The capitalists can do nothing about the gap between prices and wages, and the workers cannot live on their previous wages. The old methods are useless against this calamity. Nothing can be achieved by isolated strikes, the parliamentary struggle, or the vote, because "private property is sacred", and the capitalists have accumulated such debts that the whole world is in bondage to a handful of men. Meanwhile the workers' living conditions are becoming more and more unbearable. There is no other way out but to abolish the exploiters' "private property".

In his pamphlet *Britain and the World Revolution*, valuable extracts from which were published by our *Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs* of February 1920, Comrade Lapinsky points out that in Britain coal export prices have doubled as against those anticipated by official industrial circles.

In Lancashire things have gone so far that shares are at a premium of 400 per cent. Bank profits are at least 40-50 per cent. It should, moreover, be noted that, in determining bank profits, all bank officials are able to conceal the lion's share of profits by calling them, not profits but bonuses, commissions, etc. So here, too, indisputable economic facts prove that the wealth of a tiny handful of people has grown prodigiously and that their luxury beggars description, while the poverty of the working class is steadily growing. We must particularly note the further circumstance brought out very clearly by Comrade Levi in the report I have just referred to, namely, the change in the value of money. Money has everywhere depreciated as a result of the debts, the issue of paper currency, etc. The same bourgeois source I have already mentioned, namely, the statement of the Supreme Economic Council of March 8, 1920, has calculated that in Britain the depreciation in the value of currency as against the dollar is approximately one-third, in France and Italy two-thirds, and in Germany as much as 96 per cent.

This fact shows that the "mechanism" of the world capitalist economy is falling apart. The trade relations on which the acquisition of raw materials and the sale of commodities hinge under capitalism cannot go on; they cannot continue to be based on the subordination of a number of

countries to a single country—the reason being the change in the value of money. No wealthy country can exist or trade unless it sells its goods and obtains raw materials.

Thus we have a situation in which America, a wealthy country that all countries are subordinate to, cannot buy or sell. And the selfsame Keynes who went through the entire gamut of the Versailles negotiations has been compelled to acknowledge this impossibility despite his unyielding determination to defend capitalism, and all his hatred of Bolshevism. Incidentally, I do not think any communist manifesto, or one that is revolutionary in general, could compare in forcefulness with those pages in Keynes's book which depict Wilson and "Wilsonism" in action. Wilson was the idol of philistines and pacifists like Keynes and a number of heroes of the Second International (and even of the "Two-and-a-Half" International[78]), who exalted the "Fourteen Points" and even wrote "learned" books about the "roots" of Wilson's policy; they hoped that Wilson would save "social peace", reconcile exploiters and exploited, and bring about social reforms. Keynes showed vividly how Wilson was made a fool of, and all these illusions were shattered at the first impact with the practical, mercantile and huckster policy of capital as personified by Clemenceau and Lloyd George. The masses of the workers now see more clearly than ever, from their own experience—and the learned pedants could see it just by reading Keynes's book—that the "roots" of Wilson's policy lay in sanctimonious piffle, petty-bourgeois phrase-mongering, and an utter inability to understand the class struggle.

In consequence of all this, two conditions, two fundamental situations, have inevitably and naturally emerged. On the one hand, the impoverishment of the masses has grown incredibly, primarily among 1,250 million people, i.e., 70 per cent of the world's population. These are the colonial and dependent countries whose inhabitants possess no legal rights, countries "mandated" to the brigands of finance. Besides, the enslavement of the defeated countries has been sanctioned by the Treaty of Versailles and by existing secret treaties regarding Russia, whose validity, it is true, is sometimes about as real as that of the scraps of paper stating that we owe so many thousands of millions.

For the first time in world history, we see robbery, slavery, dependence, poverty and starvation imposed upon 1,250 million people by a legal act.

On the other hand, the workers in each of the creditor countries have found themselves in conditions that are intolerable. The war has led to an unprecedented aggravation of all capitalist contradictions, this being the origin of the intense revolutionary ferment that is ever growing. During the war people were put under military discipline, hurled into the ranks of death, or threatened with immediate wartime punishment. Because of the war conditions people could not see the economic realities. Writers, poets, the clergy, the whole press were engaged in nothing but glorifying the war. Now that the war has ended, the exposures have begun: German imperialism with its Peace of Brest-Litovsk has been laid bare; the Treaty of Versailles, which was to have been a victory for imperialism but proved its defeat, has been exposed. Incidentally, the example of Keynes shows that in Europe and America tens and hundreds of thousands of petty-bourgeois, intellectuals, and simply more or less literate and educated people, have had to follow the road taken by Keynes, who resigned and threw in the face of the government a book exposing it. Keynes has shown what is taking place and will take place in the minds of thousands and hundreds of thousands of people when they realise that all the speeches about a "war for liberty", etc., were sheer deception, and that as a result only a handful of people were enriched, while the others were ruined and reduced to slavery. Is it not a fact that the bourgeois Keynes declares that, to survive and save the British economy, the British must secure the resumption of free commercial intercourse between Germany and Russia? How can this be achieved? By cancelling all debts, as Keynes proposes. This is an idea that has been arrived at not only by Keynes, the learned economist; millions of people are or will be getting the same idea. And millions of people hear bourgeois economists declare that there is no way out except annulling the debts; therefore "damn the Bolsheviks" (who have annulled the debts), and let us appeal to America's "generosity"! I think that, on behalf of the Congress of the Communist International,

we should send a message of thanks to these economists, who have been agitating for Bolshevism.

If, on the one hand, the economic position of the masses has become intolerable, and, on the other hand, the disintegration described by Keynes has set in and is growing among the negligible minority of all-powerful victor countries, then we are in the presence of the maturing of the two conditions for the world revolution.

We now have before us a somewhat more complete picture of the whole world. We know what dependence upon a handful of rich men means to 1,250 million people who have been placed in intolerable conditions of existence. On the other hand, when the peoples were presented with the League of Nations Covenant, declaring that the League had put an end to war and would henceforth not permit anyone to break the peace, and when this Covenant, the last hope of working people all over the world, came into force, it proved to be a victory of the first order for us. Before it came into force, people used to say that it was impossible not to impose special conditions on a country like Germany, but when the Covenant was drawn up, everything would come out all right. Yet, when the Covenant was published, the bitterest opponents of Bolshevism were obliged to repudiate it. When the Covenant came into operation, it appeared that a small group of the richest countries, the "Big Four"—in the persons of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson—had been put on the job of creating the new relations! When the machinery of the Covenant was put into operation, this led to a complete breakdown.

We saw this in the case of the wars against Russia. Weak, ruined and crushed, Russia, a most backward country, fought against all the nations, against a league of the rich and powerful states that dominate the world, and emerged victorious. We could not put up a force that was anything like the equal of theirs, and yet we proved the victors. Why was that? Because there was not a jot of unity among them, because each power worked against the other. France wanted Russia to pay her debts and become a formidable force against Germany; Britain wanted to partition Russia, and attempted to seize the Baku oilfields and conclude a treaty with the border states of Russia. Among the official

British documents there is a Paper which scrupulously enumerates all the states (fourteen in all) which some six months ago, in December 1919, pledged themselves to take Moscow and Petrograd. Britain based her policy on these states, to whom she granted loans running into millions. All these calculations have now misfired, and all the loans are unrecoverable.

Such is the situation created by the League of Nations. Every day of this Covenant's existence provides the best propaganda for Bolshevism, since the most powerful adherents of the capitalist "order" are revealing that, on every question, they put spokes in one another's wheels. Furious wrangling over the partitioning of Turkey, Persia, Mesopotamia and China is going on between Japan, Britain, America and France. The bourgeois press in these countries is full of the bitterest attacks and the angriest statements against their "colleagues" for trying to snatch the booty from under their noses. We see complete discord at the top, among this handful, this very small number of extremely rich countries. There are 1,250 million people who find it impossible to live in the conditions of servitude which "advanced" and civilised capitalism wishes to impose on them: after all, these represent 70 per cent of the world's population. This handful of the richest states—Britain, America and Japan (though Japan was able to plunder the Eastern, the Asian countries, she cannot constitute an independent financial and military force without support from another country)—these two or three countries are unable to organise economic relations, and are directing their policies toward disrupting policies of their colleagues and partners in the League of Nations. Hence the world crisis; it is these economic roots of the crisis that provide the chief reason of the brilliant successes the Communist International is achieving.

Comrades, we have now come to the question of the revolutionary crisis as the basis of our revolutionary action. And here we must first of all note two widespread errors. On the one hand, bourgeois economists depict this crisis simply as "unrest", to use the elegant expression of the British. On the other hand, revolutionaries sometimes try to prove that the crisis is absolutely insoluble.

This is a mistake. There is no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation. The bourgeoisie are behaving like barefaced plunderers who have lost their heads; they are committing folly after folly, thus aggravating the situation and hastening their doom. All that is true. But nobody can "prove" that it is absolutely impossible for them to pacify a minority of the exploited with some petty concessions, and suppress some movement or uprising of some section of the oppressed and exploited. To try to "prove" in advance that there is "absolutely" no way out of the situation would be sheer pedantry, or playing with concepts and catchwords. Practice alone can serve as real "proof" in this and similar questions. All over the world, the bourgeois system is experiencing a tremendous revolutionary crisis. The revolutionary parties must now "prove" in practice that they have sufficient understanding and organisation, contact with the exploited masses, and determination and skill to utilise this crisis for a successful, a victorious revolution.

It is mainly to prepare this "proof" that we have gathered at this Congress of the Communist International.

To illustrate to what extent opportunism still prevails among parties that wish to affiliate to the Third International, and how far the work of some parties is removed from preparing the revolutionary class to utilise the revolutionary crisis, I shall quote the leader of the British Independent Labour Party, Ramsay MacDonald. In his book, *Parliament and Revolution*, which deals with the basic problems that are now engaging our attention, MacDonald describes the state of affairs in what is something like a bourgeois pacifist spirit. He admits that there is a revolutionary crisis and that revolutionary sentiments are growing, that the sympathies of the workers are with the Soviets and the dictatorship of the proletariat (note that this refers to Britain) and that the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the present dictatorship of the British bourgeoisie.

But MacDonald remains a thorough-paced bourgeois pacifist and compromiser, a petty bourgeois who dreams of a government that stands above classes. Like all bourgeois liars, sophists and pedants, MacDonald recognises the class

struggle merely as a "descriptive fact". He ignores the experience of Kerensky, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries of Russia, the similar experience of Hungary, Germany, etc., in regard to creating a "democratic" government allegedly standing above classes. MacDonald lulls his party and those workers who have the misfortune to regard this bourgeois as a socialist, this philistine as a leader, with the words: "We know that all this [i.e., the revolutionary crisis, the revolutionary ferment] will pass ... settle down." The war, he says, inevitably provoked the crisis, but after the war it will all "settle down", even if not at once!

That is what has been written by a man who is leader of a party that wants to affiliate to the Third International. This is a revelation—the more valuable for its rare outspokenness—of what is no less frequently to be seen in the top ranks of the French Socialist Party and the German Independent Social-Democratic Party, namely, not merely an inability, but also an unwillingness to take advantage, in a revolutionary sense, of the revolutionary crisis, or, in other words, both an inability and an unwillingness to really prepare the party and the class in revolutionary fashion for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is the main evil in very many parties which are now leaving the Second International. This is precisely why, in the theses I have submitted to the present Congress, I have dwelt most of all on the tasks connected with *preparations* for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and have given as concrete and exact a definition of them as possible.

Here is another example. A new book against Bolshevism was recently published. An unusually large number of books of this, kind are now coming out in Europe and America; the more anti-Bolshevik books are brought out, the more strongly and rapidly mass sympathy for Bolshevism grows. I am referring to Otto Bauer's *Bolshevism or Social-Democracy?* This book clearly demonstrates to the Germans the essence of Menshevism, whose shameful role in the Russian revolution is understood well enough by the workers of all countries. Otto Bauer has produced a thoroughgoing Menshevik pamphlet, although he has concealed his own sympathy

with Menshevism. In Europe and America, however, more precise information should now be disseminated about what Menshevism actually is, for it is a generic term for all allegedly socialist, Social-Democratic and other trends that are hostile to Bolshevism. It would be dull writing if we Russians were to explain to Europeans what Menshevism is. Otto Bauer has shown that in his book, and we thank in advance the bourgeois and opportunist publishers who will publish it and translate it into various languages. Bauer's book will be a useful if peculiar supplement to the textbooks on communism. Take any paragraph, any argument in Otto Bauer's book and indicate the Menshevism in it, where the roots lie of views that lead up to the actions of the traitors to socialism, of the friends of Kerensky, Scheidemann, etc.—this is a question that could be very usefully and successfully set in "examinations" designed to test whether communism has been properly assimilated. If you cannot answer this question, you are not yet a Communist, and should not join the Communist Party. (*Applause.*)

Otto Bauer has excellently expressed in a single sentence the essence of the views of world opportunism; for this, if we could do as we please in Vienna, we would put up a monument to him in his lifetime. The use of force in the class struggle in modern democracies, Otto Bauer says, would be "violence exercised against the social factors of force".

You may think that this sounds queer and unintelligible. It is an example of what Marxism has been reduced to, of the kind of banality and defence of the exploiters to which the most revolutionary theory *can* be reduced. A German variety of philistinism is required, and you get the "theory" that the "social factors of force" are: number; the degree of organisation; the place held in the process of production and distribution; activity and education. If a rural agricultural labourer or an urban working man practices revolutionary violence against a landowner or a capitalist, that is no dictatorship of the proletariat, no violence against the exploiters and the oppressors of the people. Oh, no! This is "violence against the social factors of force".

Perhaps my example sounds something like a jest. However, such is the nature of present-day opportunism that its struggle against Bolshevism becomes a jest. The task of involving the working class, all its thinking elements, in the struggle between international Menshevism (the MacDonalds, Otto Bauers and Co.) and Bolshevism is highly useful and very urgent to Europe and America.

Here we must ask: how is the persistence of such trends in Europe to be explained? Why is this opportunism stronger in Western Europe than in our country? It is because the culture of the advanced countries has been, and still is, the result of their being able to live at the expense of a thousand million oppressed people. It is because the capitalists of these countries obtain a great deal more in this way than they could obtain as profits by plundering the workers in their own countries.

Before the war, it was calculated that the three richest countries—Britain, France and Germany—got between eight and ten thousand million francs a year from the export of capital alone, apart from other sources.

It goes without saying that, out of this tidy sum, at least five hundred millions can be spent as a sop to the labour leaders and the labour aristocracy, i.e., on all sorts of bribes. The whole thing boils down to nothing but bribery. It is done in a thousand different ways: by increasing cultural facilities in the largest centres, by creating educational institutions, and by providing co-operative, trade union and parliamentary leaders with thousands of cushy jobs. This is done wherever present-day civilised capitalist relations exist. It is these thousands of millions in superprofits that form the economic basis of opportunism in the working-class movement. In America, Britain and France we see a far greater persistence of the opportunist leaders, of the upper crust of the working class, the labour aristocracy; they offer stronger resistance to the Communist movement. That is why we must be prepared to find it harder for the European and American workers' parties to get rid of this disease than was the case in our country. We know that enormous successes have been achieved in the treatment of this disease since the Third International was formed, but we have not yet finished the job; the purg-

ing of the workers' parties, the revolutionary parties of the proletariat all over the world, of bourgeois influences, of the opportunists in their ranks, is very far from complete.

I shall not dwell on the concrete manner in which we must do that; that is dealt with in my published theses. My task consists in indicating the deep economic roots of this phenomenon. The disease is a protracted one; the cure takes longer than the optimists hoped it-would. Opportunism is our principal enemy. Opportunism in the upper ranks of the working-class movement is bourgeois socialism, not proletarian socialism. It has been shown in practice that working-class activists who follow the opportunist trend are better defenders of the bourgeoisie than the bourgeois themselves. Without their leadership of the workers, the bourgeoisie could not remain in power. This has been proved, not only by the history of the Kerensky regime in Russia; it has also been proved by the democratic republic in Germany under its Social-Democratic government, as well as by Albert Thomas's attitude towards his bourgeois government. It has been proved by similar experience in Britain and the United States. This is where our principal enemy is, an enemy we must overcome. We must leave this Congress firmly resolved to carry on this struggle to the very end, in all parties. That is our main task.

Compared with this task, the rectification of the errors of the "Left" trend in communism will be an easy one. In a number of countries anti-parliamentarianism is to be seen, which has not been so much introduced by people of petty-bourgeois origin as fostered by certain advanced contingents of the proletariat out of hatred for the old parliamentarianism, out of a legitimate, proper and necessary hatred for the conduct of members of parliament in Britain, France, Italy, in all lands. Directives must be issued by the Communist International and the comrades must be made more familiar with the experience of Russia, with the significance of a genuinely proletarian political party. Our work will consist in accomplishing this task. The fight against these errors in the proletarian movement, against these shortcomings, will be a thousand times easier than fighting against those bourgeois who, in the guise of

reformists, belong to the old parties of the Second International and conduct the whole of their work in a bourgeois, not proletarian, spirit.

Comrades, in conclusion I shall deal with one other aspect of the subject. Our comrade, the chairman, has said that our Congress merits the title of a World Congress. I think he is right, particularly because we have here quite a number of representatives of the revolutionary movement in the colonial and backward countries. This is only a small beginning, but the important thing is that a beginning has been made. At this Congress we see taking place a union between revolutionary proletarians of the capitalist, advanced countries, and the revolutionary masses of those countries where there is no or hardly any proletariat, i.e., the oppressed masses of colonial, Eastern countries. It is on ourselves that the consolidation of unity depends, and I am sure we shall achieve it. World imperialism shall fall when the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited and oppressed workers in each country, overcoming resistance from petty-bourgeois elements and the influence of the small upper crust of labour aristocrats, merges with the revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of millions of people who have hitherto stood beyond the pale of history, and have been regarded merely as the object of history.

The imperialist war has helped the revolution: from the colonies, the backward countries, and the isolation they lived in, the bourgeoisie levied soldiers for this imperialist war. The British bourgeoisie impressed on the soldiers from India that it was the duty of the Indian peasants to defend Great Britain against Germany; the French bourgeoisie impressed on soldiers from the French colonies that it was their duty to defend France. They taught them the use of arms, a very useful thing, for which we might express our deep gratitude to the bourgeoisie—express our gratitude on behalf of all the Russian workers and peasants, and particularly on behalf of all the Russian Red Army. The imperialist war has drawn the dependent peoples into world history. And one of the most important tasks now confronting us is to consider how the foundation-stone of the organisation of the Soviet movement Can be laid in the non-capitalist countries. Soviets are possible there; they

will not be workers' Soviets, but peasants' Soviets, or Soviets of working people.

Much work will have to be done; errors will be inevitable; many difficulties will be encountered along this road. It is the fundamental task of the Second Congress to elaborate or indicate the practical principles that will enable the work, till now carried on in an unorganised fashion among hundreds of millions of people, to be carried on in an organised, coherent and systematic fashion.

Now, a year or a little more after the First Congress of the Communist International, we have emerged victors over the Second International; it is not only among the workers of the civilised countries that the ideas of the Soviets have spread; it is not only to them that they have become known and intelligible. The workers of all lands are ridiculing the wiseacres, not a few of whom call themselves socialists and argue in a learned or almost learned manner about the Soviet "system", as the German systematists are fond of calling it, or the Soviet "idea" as the British Guild Socialists[79] call it. Not infrequently, these arguments about the Soviet "system" or "idea" becloud the workers' eyes and their minds. However, the workers are brushing this pedantic rubbish aside and are taking up the weapon provided by the Soviets. A recognition of the role and significance of the Soviets has now also spread to the lands of the East.

The groundwork has been laid for the Soviet movement all over the East, all over Asia, among all the colonial peoples.

The proposition that the exploited must rise up against the exploiters and establish their Soviets is not a very complex one. After our experience, after two and a half years of the existence of the Soviet Republic in Russia, and after the First Congress of the Third International, this idea is becoming accessible to hundreds of millions of people oppressed by the exploiters all over the world. We in Russia are often obliged to compromise, to bide our time, since we are weaker than the international imperialists, yet we know that we are defending the interests of this mass of a thousand and a quarter million people. For the time being, we are hampered by barriers, prejudices and ignorance which

are receding into the past with every passing hour; but we are more and more becoming representatives and genuine defenders of this 70 per cent of the world's population, this mass of working and exploited people. It is with pride that we can say: at the First Congress we were in fact merely propagandists; we were only spreading the fundamental ideas among the world's proletariat; we only issued the call for struggle; we were merely asking where the people were who were capable of taking this path. Today the advanced proletariat is everywhere with us. A proletarian army exists everywhere, although sometimes it is poorly organised and needs reorganising. If our comrades in all lands help us now to organise a united army, no shortcomings will prevent us from accomplishing our task. That task is the world proletarian revolution, the creation of a world Soviet republic. (*Prolonged applause*.)

2
SPEECH ON THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
JULY 23

Comrades, I would like to make a few remarks concerning the speeches of Comrades Tanner and McLaine. Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but he does not see the dictatorship of the proletariat quite in the way we do. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we actually mean the dictatorship of the organised and class-conscious minority of the proletariat.

True enough, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are subjected to constant exploitation and cannot develop their human capacities, the most characteristic feature of working-class political parties is that they can involve only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of a class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in any capitalist society constitute only a minority of all workers. We are therefore obliged to recognise that it is only this class-conscious minority that can direct and lead the broad masses of the workers. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favour of a minority that represents the best organised and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the entire proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us. What is this organised minority? If this minority is really class-conscious, if it is able to lead the masses, if it is able to reply to every question that appears on the order of the day, then it is a party in reality. But if comrades like

Tanner, to whom we pay special heed as representatives of a mass movement—which cannot, without a certain exaggeration, be said of the representatives of the British Socialist Party—if these comrades are in favour of there being a minority that will fight resolutely for the dictatorship of the proletariat and will educate the masses of the workers along these lines, then this minority is in reality nothing but a party. Comrade Tanner says that this minority should organise and lead the entire mass of workers. If Comrade Tanner and the other comrades of the Shop Stewards' group and the Industrial Workers of the World accept this—and we see from the daily talks we have had with them that they do accept it—if they approve the idea that the class-conscious Communist minority of the working class leads the proletariat, then they must also agree that this is exactly the meaning of all our resolutions. In that case the only difference between us lies in their avoidance of the word "party" because there exists among the British comrades a certain mistrust of political parties. They can conceive of political parties only in the image of the parties of Gompers and Henderson,[80] parties of parliamentary smart dealers and traitors to the working class. But if, by parliamentarianism, they mean what exists in Britain and America today, then we too are opposed to such parliamentarianism and to such political parties. What we want is new and different parties. We want parties that will be in constant and real contact with the masses and will be able to lead those masses.

I now come to the third question I want to touch upon in connection with Comrade McLaine's speech. He is in favour of the British Communist Party affiliating to the Labour Party. I have already expressed my opinion on this score in my theses on affiliation to the Third International.[81] In my pamphlet I left the question open.[82] However, after discussing the matter with a number of comrades, I have come to the conclusion that the decision to remain within the Labour Party is the only correct tactic. But here is Comrade Tanner, who declares, "Don't be too dogmatic." I consider his remark quite out of place here. Comrade Ramsay says: "Please let us British Communists decide this question for ourselves." What would

the International be like if every little group were to come along and say: "Some of us are in favour of this thing and some are against; leave it to us to decide the matter for ourselves"? What then would be the use of having an International, a congress, and all this discussion? Comrade McLaine spoke only of the role of a political party. But the same applies to the trade unions and to parliamentarianism. It is quite true that a larger section of the finest revolutionaries are against affiliation to the Labour Party because they are opposed to parliamentarianism as a means of struggle. Perhaps it would be best to refer this question to a commission, where it should be discussed and studied, and then decided at this very Congress of the Communist International. We cannot agree that it concerns only the British Communists. We must say, in general, which are the correct tactics.

I will now deal with some of Comrade McLaine's arguments concerning the question of the British Labour Party. We must say frankly that the Party of Communists can join the Labour Party only on condition that it preserves full freedom of criticism and is able to conduct its own policy. This is of supreme importance. When, in this connection Comrade Serrati speaks of class collaboration, I affirm that this will not be class collaboration. When the Italian comrades tolerate, in their party, opportunists like Turati and Co., i.e., bourgeois elements, that is indeed class collaboration. In this instance, however, with regard to the British Labour Party, it is simply a matter of collaboration between the advanced minority of the British workers and their vast majority. Members of the Labour Party are all members of trade unions. It has a very unusual structure, to be found in no other country. It is an organisation that embraces four million workers out of the six or seven million organised in trade unions. They are not asked to state what their political opinions are. Let Comrade Serrati prove to me that anyone there will prevent us from exercising our right of criticism. Only by proving that, will you prove Comrade McLaine wrong. The British Socialist Party can quite freely call Henderson a traitor and yet remain in the Labour Party. Here we have collaboration between the vanguard of the working class and

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the rearguard, the backward workers. This collaboration is so important to the entire movement that we categorically insist on the British Communists serving as a link between the Party, that is, the minority of the working class, and the rest of the workers. If the minority is unable to lead the masses and establish close links with them, then it is not a party, and is worthless in general, even if it calls itself a party or the National Shop Stewards' Committee—as far as I know, the Shop Stewards' Committees in Britain have a National Committee, a central body, and that is a step towards a party. Consequently, until it is refuted that the British Labour Party consists of proletarians, this is co-operation between the vanguard of the working class and the backward workers; if this co-operation is not carried on systematically, the Communist Party will be worthless and there can be no question of the dictatorship of the proletariat at all. If our Italian comrades cannot produce more convincing arguments, we shall have to definitely settle the question later here, on the basis of what we know —and we shall come to the conclusion that affiliation is the correct tactic.

Comrades Tanner and Ramsay tell us that the majority of British Communists will not accept affiliation. But must we always agree with the majority? Not at all. If they have not yet understood which are the correct tactics, then perhaps it would be better to wait. Even the parallel existence for a time of two parties would be better than refusing to reply to the question as to which tactics are correct. Of course, acting on the experience of all Congress delegates and on the arguments that have been brought forward here, you will not insist on passing a resolution here and now, calling for the immediate formation of a single Communist Party in each country. That is impossible. But we can frankly express our opinion, and give directives. We must study in a special commission the question raised by the British delegation and then we shall say: affiliation to the Labour Party is the correct tactic. If the majority is against it, we must organise a separate minority. That will be of educational value. If the masses of the British workers still believe in the old tactics, we shall verify our conclusions at the next congress. We cannot, however, say that

this question concerns Britain alone—that would mean copying the worst habits of the Second International. We must express our opinion frankly. If the British Communists do not reach agreement, and if a mass party is not formed, a split is inevitable one way or another.*

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* Issue No. 5 of the *Bulletin of The Second Congress of the Communist International* gave the concluding sentences of this speech as follows:

"We must express our opinion frankly, whatever it may be. If the British Communists do not reach agreement on the question of the organisation of the mass movement, and if a split takes place in this issue, then better a split than rejection of the organisation of the mass movement. It is better to rise to definite and sufficiently clear tactics and ideology than to go on remaining in the previous chaos."—*Ed.*

3

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL AND THE COLONIAL QUESTIONS JULY 26[83]

Comrades, I shall confine myself to a brief introduction, after which Comrade Maring, who has been secretary to our commission, will give you a detailed account of the changes we have made in the theses. He will be followed by Comrade Roy, who has formulated the supplementary theses. Our commission have unanimously adopted both the preliminary theses, as amended, and the supplementary theses. We have thus reached complete unanimity on all major issues. I shall now make a few brief remarks.

First, what is the cardinal idea underlying our theses? It is the distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations. Unlike the Second International and bourgeois democracy, we emphasise this distinction. In this age of imperialism, it is particularly important for the proletariat and the Communist International to establish the concrete economic facts and to proceed from concrete realities, not from abstract postulates, in all colonial and national problems.

The characteristic feature of imperialism consists in the whole world, as we now see, being divided into a large number of oppressed nations and an insignificant number of oppressor nations, the latter possessing colossal wealth and powerful armed forces. The vast majority of the world's population, over a thousand million, perhaps even 1,250 million people, if we take the total population of the world as 1,750 million, in other words, about 70 per cent of the world's population, belong to the oppressed nations, which are either in a state of direct colonial dependence or are

semi-colonies, as, for example, Persia, Turkey and China, or else, conquered by some big imperialist power, have become greatly dependent on that power by virtue of peace treaties. This idea of distinction, of dividing the nations into oppressor and oppressed, runs through the theses, not only the first theses published earlier over my signature, but also those submitted by Comrade Roy. The latter were framed chiefly from the standpoint of the situation in India and other big Asian countries oppressed by Britain. Herein lies their great importance to us.

The second basic idea in our theses is that, in the present world situation following the imperialist war, reciprocal relations between peoples and the world political system as a whole are determined by the struggle waged by a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states headed by Soviet Russia. Unless we bear that in mind, we shall not be able to pose a single national or colonial problem correctly, even if it concerns a most outlying part of the world. The Communist parties, in civilised and backward countries alike, can pose and solve political problems correctly only if they make this postulate their starting-point.

Third, I should like especially to emphasise the question of the bourgeois-democratic movement in backward countries. This is a question that has given rise to certain differences. We have discussed whether it would be right or wrong, in principle and in theory, to state that the Communist International and the Communist parties must support the bourgeois-democratic movement in backward countries. As a result of our discussion, we have arrived at the unanimous decision to speak of the national-revolutionary movement rather than of the "bourgeois-democratic" movement. It is beyond doubt that any national movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, since the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consist of peasants who represent bourgeois-capitalist relationships. It would be utopian to believe that proletarian parties in these backward countries, if indeed they can emerge in them, can pursue communist tactics and a communist policy, without establishing definite relations with the peasant movement and without

giving it effective support. However, the objections have been raised that, if we speak of the bourgeois-democratic movement, we shall be obliterating all distinctions between the reformist and the revolutionary movements. Yet that distinction has been very clearly revealed of late in the backward and colonial countries, since the imperialist bourgeoisie is doing everything in its power to implant a reformist movement among the oppressed nations too. There has been a certain *rapprochement* between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and that of the colonies, so that very often—perhaps even in most cases—the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries, while it does support the national movement, is in full accord with the imperialist bourgeoisie, i.e., joins forces with it against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes. This was irrefutably proved in the commission, and we decided that the only correct attitude was to take this distinction into account and, in nearly all cases, substitute the term "national-revolutionary" for the term "bourgeois-democratic". The significance of this change is that we, as Communists, should and will support bourgeois-liberation movements in the colonies only when they are genuinely revolutionary, and when their exponents do not hinder our work of educating and organising in a revolutionary spirit the peasantry and the masses of the exploited. If these conditions do not exist, the Communists in these countries must combat the reformist bourgeoisie, to whom the heroes of the Second International also belong. Reformist parties already exist in the colonial countries, and in some cases their spokesmen call themselves Social-Democrats and socialists. The distinction I have referred to has been made in all the theses with the result, I think, that our view is now formulated much more precisely.

Next, I would like to make a remark on the subject of peasants' Soviets. The Russian Communists' practical activities in the former tsarist colonies, in such backward countries as Turkestan, etc., have confronted us with the question of how to apply the communist tactics and policy in pre-capitalist conditions. The preponderance of pre-capitalist relationships is still the main determining feature in these countries, so that there can be no question

of a purely proletarian movement in them. There is practically no industrial proletariat in these countries. Nevertheless, we have assumed, we must assume, the role of leader even there. Experience has shown us that tremendous difficulties have to be surmounted in these countries. However, the practical results of our work have also shown that despite these difficulties we are in a position to inspire in the masses an urge for independent political thinking and independent political action, even where a proletariat is practically non-existent. This work has been more difficult for us than it will be for comrades in the West-European countries, because in Russia the proletariat is engrossed in the work of state administration. It will readily be understood that peasants living in conditions of semi-feudal dependence can easily assimilate and give effect to the idea of Soviet organisation. It is also clear that the oppressed masses, those who are exploited, not only by merchant capital but also by the feudalists, and by a state based on feudalism, can apply this weapon, this type of organisation, in their conditions too. The idea of Soviet organisation is a simple one, and is applicable, not only to proletarian, but also to peasant feudal and semi-feudal relations. Our experience in this respect is not as yet very considerable. However, the debate in the commission, in which several representatives from colonial countries participated, demonstrated convincingly that the Communist International's theses should point out that peasants' Soviets, Soviets of the exploited, are a weapon which can be employed, not only in capitalist countries but also in countries with precapitalist relations, and that it is the absolute duty of Communist parties and of elements prepared to form Communist parties, everywhere to conduct propaganda in favour of peasants' Soviets or of working people's Soviets, this to include backward and colonial countries. Wherever conditions permit, they should at once make attempts to set up Soviets of the working people.

This opens up a very interesting and very important field for our practical work. So far our joint experience in this respect has not been extensive, but more and more data will gradually accumulate. It is unquestionable that the proletariat of the advanced countries can and should

give help to the working masses of the backward countries, and that the backward countries can emerge from their present stage of development when the victorious proletariat of the Soviet Republics extends a helping hand to these masses and is in a position to give them support.

There was quite a lively debate on this question in the commission, not only in connection with the theses I signed, but still more in connection with Comrade Roy's theses, which he will defend here, and certain amendments to which were unanimously adopted.

The question was posed as follows: are we to consider as correct the assertion that the capitalist stage of economic development is inevitable for backward nations now on the road to emancipation and among whom a certain advance towards progress is to be seen since the war? We replied in the negative. If the victorious revolutionary proletariat conducts systematic propaganda among them, and the Soviet governments come to their aid with all the means at their disposal—in that event it will be mistaken to assume that the backward peoples must inevitably go through the capitalist stage of development. Not only should we create independent contingents of fighters and party organisations in the colonies and the backward countries, not only at once launch propaganda for the organisation of peasants' Soviets and strive to adapt them to the pre-capitalist conditions, but the Communist International should advance the proposition, with the appropriate theoretical grounding, that with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage.

The necessary means for this cannot be indicated in advance. These will be prompted by practical experience. It has, however, been definitely established that the idea of the Soviets is understood by the mass of the working people in even the most remote nations, that the Soviets should be adapted to the conditions of a pre-capitalist social system, and that the Communist parties should immediately begin work in this direction in all parts of the world.

I would also like to emphasise the importance of revolutionary work by the Communist parties, not only in their own, but also in the colonial countries, and particularly among the troops employed by the exploiting nations to keep the colonial peoples in subjection.

Comrade Quelch of the British Socialist Party spoke of this in our commission. He said that the rank-and-file British worker would consider it treasonable to help the enslaved nations in their uprisings against British rule. True, the jingoist and chauvinist-minded labour aristocrats of Britain and America present a very great danger to socialism, and are a bulwark of the Second International. Here we are confronted with the greatest treachery on the part of leaders and workers belonging to this bourgeois International. The colonial question has been discussed in the Second International as well. The Basle Manifesto[84] is quite clear on this point, too. The parties of the Second International have pledged themselves to revolutionary action, but they have given no sign of genuine revolutionary work or of assistance to the exploited and dependent nations in their revolt against the oppressor nations. This, I think, applies also to most of the parties that have withdrawn from the Second International and wish to join the Third International. We must proclaim this publicly for all to hear, and it is irrefutable. We shall see if any attempt is made to deny it.

All these considerations have formed the basis of our resolutions, which undoubtedly are too lengthy but will nevertheless, I am sure, prove of use and will promote the development and organisation of genuine revolutionary work in connection with the national and the colonial questions. And that is our principal task.

4

SPEECH ON THE TERMS OF ADMISSION INTO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL JULY 30[85]

Comrades, Serrati has said that we have not yet invented a sincerometer—meaning by this French neologism an instrument for measuring sincerity. No such instrument has been invented yet. We have no need of one. But we do already have an instrument for defining trends. Comrade Serrati's error, which I shall deal with later, consists in his having failed to use this instrument, which has been known for a long time.

I would like to say only a few words about Comrade Crispien. I am very sorry that he is not present. (*Dittmann*: "He is ill.") I am very sorry to hear it. His speech is a most important document, and expresses explicitly the political line of the Right wing of the Independent Social-Democratic Party. I shall speak, not of personal circumstances or individual cases but only of the ideas clearly expressed in Crispien's speech. I think I shall be able to prove that the entire speech was thoroughly in the Kautskian spirit, and that Comrade Crispien shares the Kautskian views on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Replying to a rejoinder, Crispien said: "Dictatorship is nothing new, it was already mentioned in the Erfurt Programme."[86] The Erfurt Programme says nothing about the dictatorship of the proletariat, and history has proved that this was not due to chance. When in 1902-03, we were drawing up our Party's first programme, we always had before us the example of the Erfurt Programme; Plekhanov, that very Plekhanov who rightly said at the time, "Either Bernstein will bury Social-Democracy, or Social-Democracy will bury Bernstein", laid special emphasis on the fact that the Erfurt Programme's

failure to mention the dictatorship of the proletariat was erroneous from the standpoint of theory and, in practice was a cowardly concession to the opportunists. The dictatorship of the proletariat has been in our programme since 1903.[87]

When Comrade Crispien now says that the dictatorship of the proletariat is nothing new, and goes on to say: "We have always stood for the conquest of political power", he is evading the gist of the matter. Conquest of political power is recognised, but not dictatorship. All the socialist literature—not only German, but French and British as well—shows that the leaders of the opportunist parties, for instance, MacDonald in Britain, stand for the conquest of political power. They are, in all conscience, sincere socialists, but they are against the dictatorship of the proletariat! Since we have a good revolutionary party worthy of the name of Communist, it should conduct propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as distinct from the old conception of the Second International. This has been glossed over and obscured by Comrade Crispien, which is the fundamental error common to all of Kautsky's adherents.

"We are leaders elected by the masses," Comrade Crispien continues. This is a formal and erroneous point of view, since a struggle of trends was clearly to be seen at the latest Party congress of the German Independents. There is no need to seek for a sincerometer and to wax humorous on the subject, as Comrade Serrati does, in order to establish the simple fact that a struggle of trends must and does exist: one trend is that of the revolutionary workers who have just joined us and are opposed to the labour aristocracy; the other is that of the labour aristocracy, which in all civilised countries is headed by the old leaders. Does Crispien belong to the trend of the old leaders and the labour aristocracy, or to that of the new revolutionary masses of workers, who are opposed to the labour aristocracy? That is a question Comrade Crispien has failed to clarify.

In what kind of tone does Comrade Crispien speak of the split? He has said that the split was a bitter necessity, and deplored the matter at length. That is quite in the Kautskian spirit. Who did they break away from? Was

it not from Scheidemann? Of course, it was. Crispien has said: "We have split away." In the first place, this was done too late. Since we are on the subject, that has to be said. Second, the Independents should not deplore this, but should say: "The international working class is still under the sway of the labour aristocracy and the opportunists." Such is the position both in France and in Great Britain. Comrade Crispien does not regard the split like a Communist, but quite in the spirit of Kautsky, who is supposed to have no influence. Then Crispien went on to speak of high wages. The position in Germany, he said, is that the workers are quite well off compared with the workers in Russia or in general, in the East of Europe. A revolution, as he sees it, can be made only if it does not worsen the workers' conditions "too much". Is it permissible, in a Communist Party, to speak in a tone like this, I ask? This is the language of counter-revolution. The standard of living in Russia is undoubtedly lower than in Germany, and when we established the dictatorship, this led to the workers beginning to go more hungry and to their conditions becoming even worse. The workers' victory cannot be achieved without sacrifices, without a temporary deterioration of their conditions. We must tell the workers the very opposite of what Crispien has said. If, in desiring to prepare the workers for the dictatorship, one tells them that their conditions will not be worsened "too much", one is losing sight of the main thing, namely, that it was by helping their "own" bourgeoisie to conquer and strangle the whole world by imperialist methods, with the aim of thereby ensuring better pay for themselves, that the labour aristocracy developed. If the German workers now want to work for the revolution they must make sacrifices, and not be afraid to do so.

In the general and world-historical sense, it is true that in a backward country like China, the coolie cannot bring about a proletarian revolution; however, to tell the workers in the handful of rich countries where life is easier, thanks to imperialist pillage, that they must be afraid of "too great" impoverishment, is counter-revolutionary. It is the reverse that they should be told. The labour aristocracy that is afraid of sacrifices, afraid of "too great" impover-

ishment during the revolutionary struggle, cannot belong to the Party. Otherwise the dictatorship is impossible, especially in West-European countries.

What does Crispien say about terror and coercion? He has said that these are two different things. Perhaps such a distinction is possible in a manual of sociology, but it cannot be made in political practice, especially in the conditions of Germany. We are forced to resort to coercion and terror against people who behave like the German officers did when they murdered Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, or against people like Stinnes and Krupp, who buy up the press. Of course, there is no need to proclaim in advance that we shall positively resort to terror but if the German officers and the Kappists remain the same as they now are and if Krupp and Stinnes remain the same as they now are, the employment of terror will be inevitable. Not only Kautsky, but Ledebour and Crispien as well, speak of coercion and terror in a wholly counter-revolutionary spirit. A party that makes shift with such ideas cannot participate in the dictatorship. That is self-evident.

Then there is the agrarian question. Here Crispien has got very worked up and tried to impute a petty-bourgeois spirit to us: to do anything for the small peasant at the expense of the big landowner is alleged to be petty-bourgeois action. He says the landed proprietors should be dispossessed and their land handed over to co-operative associations. This is a pedantic viewpoint. Even in highly developed countries, including Germany, there are a sufficient number of latifundia, landed estates that are cultivated by semi-feudal, not large-scale capitalist, methods. Part of such land may be cut off and turned over to the small peasants, without injury to farming. Large-scale farming can be preserved, and yet the small peasants can be provided with something of considerable importance to them. No thought is given to this, unfortunately, but in practice that has to be done, for otherwise you will fall into error. This has been borne out, for example, in a book by Varga (former People's Commissar for the National Economy in the Hungarian Soviet Republic), who writes that the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship hardly changed anything in the Hun-

garian countryside, that the day-labourers saw no changes, and the small peasants got nothing. There are large latifundia in Hungary, and a semi-feudal economy is conducted in large areas. Sections of large estates can and must always be found, part of which can be turned over to the small peasants, perhaps not as their property, but on lease, so that even the smallest peasant may get some part of the confiscated estates. Otherwise, the small peasant will see no difference between the old order and the dictatorship of the Soviets. If the proletarian state authority does not act in this way, it will be unable to retain power.

Although Crispien did say: "You cannot deny that we have our revolutionary convictions", I shall reply that I do deny them. I do not say that you would not like to act in revolutionary manner, but I do say that you are unable to reason in a revolutionary fashion. I am willing to wager that if we chose any commission of educated people, and gave them a dozen Kautsky's books and then Crispien's speech, the commission would say: "The whole speech is thoroughly Kautskian, is imbued through and through with Kautsky's views." The entire method of Crispien's argumentation is fundamentally Kautskian, yet Crispien comes along and says, "Kautsky no longer has any influence whatever in our party." No influence, perhaps, on the revolutionary workers who have joined recently. However, it must be accepted as absolutely proved that Kautsky has had and still has an enormous influence on Crispien, on his entire line of thought, all his ideas. This is manifest in his speech. That is why, without inventing any sincerometers, any instruments for measuring sincerity, we can say that Crispien's orientation is not that of the Communist International. In saying this, we are defining the orientation of the entire Communist International.

Comrades Wijnkoop and Münzenberg have expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that we have invited the Independent Socialist Party and are holding talks with its representatives. I think they are wrong. When Kautsky attacks us and brings out books against us, we polemise with him as our class enemy. But when the Independent Social-Democratic Party, which has expanded as a result of an influx of revolutionary workers, comes here for negoti-

ations, we must talk to its representatives, since they are a section of the revolutionary workers. We cannot reach an immediate agreement with the German Independents, or with the French and the British, regarding the International. In every speech he delivers, Comrade Wijnkoop reveals that he shares almost all the errors of Comrade Pannekoek. Wijnkoop has stated that he does not share Pannekoek's views; but his speeches prove the reverse. Herein lies the main error of this "Left" group, but this, in general, is an error of a proletarian movement that is developing. The speeches of Comrades Crispien and Dittmann are imbued with a bourgeois spirit which will not help us prepare for the dictatorship of the proletariat. When Comrades Wijnkoop and Münzenberg go still further on the subject of the Independent Social-Democratic Party, we are not in agreement with them.

Of course, we have no instrument for measuring sincerity, as Serrati has put it, for testing a man's conscience; we quite agree that the matter is not one of forming an opinion of people, but of appraising a situation. I am sorry to say that although Serrati did speak he said nothing new. His was the sort of speech we used to hear in the Second International as well.

Serrati was wrong in saying: "In France the situation is not revolutionary; in Germany it is revolutionary; in Italy it is revolutionary."

Even if the situation is non-revolutionary, the Second International is in error and carries a heavy responsibility if it is really unwilling to organise revolutionary propaganda and agitation, since, as has been proved by the entire history of the Bolshevik Party, revolutionary propaganda can and should be conducted even in a situation that is not revolutionary. The difference between the socialists and the Communists consists in the former refusing to act in the way we act in any situation, i.e., conduct revolutionary work.

Serrati merely repeats what Crispien has said. We do not mean to say that Turati should be expelled on such and such a date. That question has already been touched upon by the Executive Committee, and Serrati has said to us: "Not expulsions, but a Party purge." We must simply tell

the Italian comrades that it is the line of *L'Ordine Nuovo* members that corresponds to the line of the Communist International, and not that of the present majority of the Socialist Party's leaders and their parliamentary group. They claim that they want to defend the proletariat against the reactionaries. Chernov, the Mensheviks and many others in Russia are also "defending" the proletariat against the reactionaries, but that is not sufficient reason for accepting them into our midst.

That is why we must say to the Italian comrades and all parties that have a Right wing: this reformist tendency has nothing in common with communism.

We ask our Italian comrades to call a congress and have our theses and resolutions submitted to it. I am sure that the Italian workers will want to remain in the Communist International.

5
SPEECH ON PARLIAMENTARIANISM
AUGUST 2

Comrade Bordiga seems to have wanted to defend the Italian Marxists' point of view here, yet he has failed to reply to any of the arguments advanced by other Marxists in favour of parliamentary action.

Comrade Bordiga has admitted that historical experience is not created artificially. He has just told us that the struggle must be carried into another sphere. Is he not aware that every revolutionary crisis has been attended by a parliamentary crisis? True, he has said that the struggle must be carried into another sphere, into the Soviets. Bordiga, however, has himself admitted that Soviets cannot be created artificially. The example of Russia shows that Soviets can be organised either during a revolution or on the eve of a revolution. Even in the Kerensky period, the Soviets (which were Menshevik Soviets) were organised in such a way that they could not possibly constitute a proletarian government. Parliament is a product of historical development, and we cannot eliminate it until we are strong enough to disperse the bourgeois parliament. It is only as a member of the bourgeois parliament that one can, in the given historical conditions, wage a struggle against bourgeois society and parliamentarianism. The same weapon as the bourgeoisie employs in the struggle must also be used by the proletariat, of course, with entirely different aims. You cannot assert that that is not the case, and if you want to challenge it, you will have thereby to erase the experience of all revolutionary developments in the world.

You have said that the trade unions are also opportunist, that they, too, constitute a danger. On the other hand,

however, you have said that an exception must be made in the case of trade unions, because they are workers' organisations. But that is true only up to a certain point. There are very backward elements in the trade unions too: a section of the proletarianised petty bourgeoisie, the backward workers, and the small peasants. All these elements really think that their interests are represented in parlia ent. This idea must be combated by work within parliament and by citing the facts, so as to show the masses the truth. Theory will have no effect on the backward masses; they need practical experience.

This was to be seen in the case of Russia too. We were obliged to convene the Constituent Assembly even after the victory of the proletariat, so as to prove to the backward proletarians that they had nothing to gain from that Assembly. To bring home the difference between the two, we had to concretely contrapose the Soviets and the Constituent Assembly and to show the Soviets as the only solution.

Comrade Souchy, a revolutionary syndicalist, advocated the same theory, but he had no logic on his side. He said that he was not a Marxist, so everything can be readily understood. But you, Comrade Bordiga, assert that you are a Marxist, so we must expect more logic from you. You must know how parliament can be smashed. If you can do it by an armed uprising in all countries, well and good. You are aware that we in Russia proved our determination to destroy the bourgeois parliament, not only in theory, but in practice as well. You, however, have lost sight of the fact that this is impossible without fairly long preparations, and that in most countries it is as yet impossible to destroy parliament at one stroke. We are obliged to carry on a struggle within parliament for the destruction of parliament. For the conditions determining the political line of all classes in modern society you substitute your revolutionary determination; that is why you forget that to destroy the bourgeois parliament in Russia we were first obliged to convene the Constituent Assembly, even after our victory. You say: "It is a fact that the Russian revolution is a case that is not in accord with conditions in Western Europe", but you have not produced a single weighty argument

to prove that to us. We went through a period of bourgeois democracy. We went through it rapidly at a time when we had to agitate for elections to the Constituent Assembly. Later, when the working class was able to seize power, the peasants still believed in the necessity of a bourgeois parliament.

Taking account of these backward elements, we had to proclaim the elections and show the masses, by example and by facts, that the Constituent Assembly, which was elected at a time of dire and universal need, did not express the aspirations and demands of the exploited classes. In this way the conflict between Soviet and bourgeois government became quite clear, not only to us, the vanguard of the working class, but also to the vast majority of the peasantry, to the petty office employees, the petty bourgeoisie, etc. In all capitalist countries there are backward elements in the working class who are convinced that parliament is the true representative of the people and do not see the unscrupulous methods employed there. You say that parliament is an instrument with the aid of which the bourgeoisie deceive the masses. But this argument should be turned against you, and it does turn against your theses. How will you reveal the true character of parliament to the really backward masses, who are deceived by the bourgeoisie? How will you expose the various parliamentary manoeuvres, or the positions of the various parties, if you are not in parliament, if you remain outside parliament? If you are Marxists, you must admit that, in capitalist society, there is a close link between the relations of classes and the relations of parties. How, I repeat, will you show all this if you are not members of parliament, and if you renounce parliamentary action? The history of the Russian revolution has clearly shown that the masses of the working class, the peasantry, and petty office employees could not have been convinced by any arguments, unless their own experience had convinced them.

It has been claimed here that it is a waste of time to participate in the parliamentary struggle. Can one conceive of any other institution in which all classes are as interested as they are in parliament? This cannot be created artificially. If all classes are drawn into the parliamentary

struggle, it is because the class interests and conflicts are reflected in parliament. If it were possible everywhere and immediately to bring about, let us say, a decisive general strike so as to overthrow capitalism at a single stroke, the revolution would have already taken place in a number of countries. But we must reckon with the facts, and parliament is a scene of the class struggle. Comrade Bordiga and those who share his views must tell the masses the truth. Germany provides the best example that a Communist group in parliament is possible. That is why you should have frankly said to the masses: "We are too weak to create a party with a strong organisation." That would be the truth that ought to be told. But if you confessed your weakness to the masses, they would become your opponents, not your supporters; they would become supporters of parliamentarianism.

If you say: "Fellow workers, we are so weak that we cannot form a party disciplined enough to compel its members of parliament to submit to it", the workers would abandon you, for they would ask themselves: "How can we set up a dictatorship of the proletariat with such weaklings?"

You are very naïve if you think that the intelligentsia, the middle class, and the petty bourgeoisie will turn Communist the day the proletariat is victorious.

If you do not harbour this illusion, you should begin right away to prepare the proletariat to pursue its own line. You will find no exceptions to this rule in any branch of state affairs. On the day following the revolution, you will everywhere find advocates of opportunism who call themselves-Communists, i.e., petty bourgeois who refuse to recognise the discipline of the Communist Party or of the proletarian state. Unless you prepare the workers for the creation of a really disciplined party, which will compel its members to submit to its discipline, you will never prepare for the dictatorship of the proletariat. I think that this accounts for your unwillingness to admit that the repudiation of parliamentary action by a great many of the new Communist parties stems from their weakness. I am convinced that the vast majority of the really revolutionary workers will follow us and speak up against your anti-parliamentary theses.

6

SPEECH ON AFFILIATION TO THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY[88]
AUGUST 6

Comrades, Comrade Gallacher began his speech by expressing regret at our having been compelled to listen here for the hundredth and the thousandth time to sentences that Comrade McLaine and other British comrades have reiterated a thousand times in speeches, newspapers and magazines. I think there is no need for regret. The old International used the method of referring such questions for decision to the individual parties in the countries concerned. That was a grave error. We may not be fully familiar with the conditions in one country or another, but in this case we are dealing with the principles underlying a Communist Party's tactics. That is very important and, in the name of the Third International, we must herewith clearly state the communist point of view.

First of all, I should like to mention a slight inaccuracy on the part of Comrade McLaine, which cannot be agreed to. He called the Labour Party the political organisation of the trade union movement, and later repeated the statement when he said that the Labour Party is "the political expression of the workers organised in trade unions". I have met the same view several times in the paper of the British Socialist Party. It is erroneous, and is partly the cause of the opposition, fully justified in some measure, coming from the British revolutionary workers. Indeed, the concepts "political department of the trade unions" or "political expression" of the trade union movement, are erroneous. Of course, most of the Labour Party's members are workingmen. However, whether or not a party is really a political party of the workers does not depend solely upon a mem-

bership of workers but also upon the men that lead it, and the content of its actions and its political tactics. Only this latter determines whether we really have before us a political party of the proletariat. Regarded from this, the only correct, point of view, the Labour Party is a thoroughly bourgeois party, because, although made up of workers, it is led by reactionaries, and the worst kind of reactionaries at that, who act quite in the spirit of the bourgeoisie. It is an organisation of the bourgeoisie, which exists to systematically dupe the workers with the aid of the British Noskes and Scheidemanns.

We have also heard another point of view, defended by Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst and Comrade Gallacher, who have voiced their opinion in the matter. What was the substance of the speeches delivered by Gallacher and many of his friends? They have told us that they are insufficiently linked with the masses. But take the instance of the British Socialist Party, they went on. It is still less linked with the masses and it is a very weak party. Comrade Gallacher has told us here how he and his comrades have organised, and done so really splendidly, the revolutionary movement in Glasgow, in Scotland, how in their wartime tactics they manoeuvred skillfully, how they gave able support to the petty-bourgeois pacifists Ramsay MacDonald and Snowden when they came to Glasgow, and used this support to organise a mass movement against the war.

It is our aim to integrate this new and excellent revolutionary movement—represented here by Comrade Gallacher and his friends—into a Communist Party with genuinely communist, i.e., Marxist tactics. That is our task today. On the one hand, the British Socialist Party is too weak and incapable of properly carrying on agitation among the masses; on the other hand, we have the younger revolutionary elements so well represented here by Comrade Gallacher, who, although in touch with the masses, are not a political party, and in this sense are even weaker than the British Socialist Party and are totally unable to organise their political work. Under these circumstances, we must express our frank opinion on the correct tactics. When, in speaking of the British Socialist Party, Comrade Gallacher said that it is "hopelessly reformist", he was undoubtedly exaggerat-

ing. But the general tenor and content of all the resolutions we have adopted here show with absolute clarity that we demand a change, in this spirit, in the tactics of the British Socialist Party; the only correct tactics of Gallacher's friends will consist in their joining the Communist Party without delay, so as to modify its tactics in the spirit of the resolutions adopted here. If you have so many supporters that you are able to organise mass meetings in Glasgow, it will not be difficult for you to bring more than ten thousand new members into the Party. The latest Conference of the British Socialist Party, held in London three or four days ago, decided to assume the name of the Communist Party and introduced into its programme a clause providing for participation in parliamentary elections and affiliation to the Labour Party. Ten thousand organised members were represented at the Conference. It will therefore not be at all difficult for the Scottish comrades to bring into this "Communist Party of Great Britain" more than ten thousand revolutionary workers who are better versed in the art of working among the masses, and thus to modify the old tactics of the British Socialist Party in the sense of better agitation and more revolutionary action. In the commission, Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst pointed out several times that Britain needed "Lefts". I, of course, replied that this was absolutely true, but that one must not overdo this "Leftism". Furthermore she said that they were better pioneers, but for the moment were rather noisy. I do not take this in a bad sense, but rather in a good one, namely, that they are better able to carry on revolutionary agitation. We do and should value this. We expressed this in all our resolutions, for we always emphasise that we can consider a party to be a workers' party only when it is really linked up with the masses and fights against the old and quite corrupt leaders, against both the Right-wing chauvinists and those who, like the Right Independents in Germany, take up an intermediate position. We have asserted and reiterated this a dozen times and more in all our resolutions, which means that we demand a transformation of the old party, in the sense of bringing it closer to the masses.

Sylvia Pankhurst also asked: "Is it possible for a Communist Party to join another political party which still

belongs to the Second International?" She replied that it was not. It should, however, be borne in mind that the British Labour Party is in a very special position: it is a highly original type of party, or rather, it is not at all a party in the ordinary sense of the word. It is made up of members of all trade unions, and has a membership of about four million, and allows sufficient freedom to all affiliated political parties. It thus includes a vast number of British workers who follow the lead of the worst bourgeois elements, the social-traitors, who are even worse than Scheidemann, Noske and similar people. At the same time, however, the Labour Party has let the British Socialist Party into its ranks, permitting it to have its own press organs, in which members of the selfsame Labour Party can freely and openly declare that the party leaders are social-traitors. Comrade McLaine has cited quotations from such statements by the British Socialist Party. I, too, can certify that I have seen in *The Call*, organ of the British Socialist Party, statements that the Labour Party leaders are social-patriots and social-traitors. This shows that a party affiliated to the Labour Party is able, not only to severely criticise but openly and specifically to mention the old leaders by name, and call them social-traitors. This is a very original situation: a party which unites enormous masses of workers, so that it might seem a political party, is nevertheless obliged to grant its members complete latitude. Comrade McLaine has told us here that, at the Labour Party Conference, the British Scheidemanns were obliged to openly raise the question of affiliation to the Third International, and that all party branches and sections were obliged to discuss the matter. In such circumstances, it would be a mistake not to join this party.

In a private talk, Comrade Pankhurst said to me: "If we are real revolutionaries and join the Labour Party, these gentlemen will expel us." But that would not be bad at all. Our resolution says that we favour affiliation insofar as the Labour Party permits sufficient freedom of criticism. On that point we are absolutely consistent. Comrade McLaine has emphasised that the conditions now prevailing in Britain are such that, should it so desire, a political party may remain a revolutionary workers' party even if

it is connected with a special kind of labour organisation of four million members, which is half trade union and half political and is headed by bourgeois leaders. In such circumstances it would be highly erroneous for the best revolutionary elements not to do everything possible to remain in such a party. Let the Thomases and other social-traitors, whom you have called by that name, expel you. That will have an excellent effect upon the mass of the British workers.

The comrades have emphasised that the labour aristocracy is stronger in Britain than in any other country. That is true. After all, the labour aristocracy has existed in Britain, not for decades but for centuries. The British bourgeoisie, which has had far more experience—democratic experience—than that of any other country, has been able to buy workers over and to create among them a sizable stratum, greater than in any other country, but one that is not so great compared with the masses of the workers. This stratum is thoroughly imbued with bourgeois prejudices and pursues a definitely bourgeois reformist policy. In Ireland, for instance, there are two hundred thousand British soldiers who are applying ferocious terror methods to suppress the Irish. The British Socialists are not conducting any revolutionary propaganda among these soldiers, though our resolutions clearly state that we can accept into the Communist International only those British parties that conduct genuinely revolutionary propaganda among the British workers and soldiers. I emphasise that we have heard no objections to this either here or in the commissions.

Comrades Gallacher and Sylvia Pankhurst cannot deny that. They cannot refute the fact that, in the ranks of the Labour Party, the British Socialist Party enjoys sufficient freedom to write that certain leaders of the Labour Party are traitors; that these old leaders represent the interests of the bourgeoisie; that they are agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement. They cannot deny all this because it is the absolute truth. When Communists enjoy such freedom, it is their duty to join the Labour Party if they take due account of the experience of revolutionaries in all countries, not only of the Russian revolution (for here we are not at a Russian congress but at one that is international). Comrade

Gallacher has said ironically that in the present instance we are under the influence of the British Socialist Party. That is not true; it is the experience of all revolutions in all countries that has convinced us. We think that we must say that to the masses. The British Communist Party must retain the freedom necessary to expose and criticise the betrayers of the working class, who are much more powerful in Britain than in any other country. That is readily understandable. Comrade Gallacher is wrong in asserting that by advocating affiliation to the Labour Party we shall repel the best elements among the British workers. We must test this by experience. We are convinced that all the resolutions and decisions that will be adopted by our Congress will be published in all British revolutionary socialist newspapers and that all the branches and sections will be able to discuss them. The entire content of our resolutions shows with crystal clarity that we are representatives of working-class revolutionary tactics in all countries and that our aim is to fight against the old reformism and opportunism. The events reveal that our tactics are indeed defeating the old reformism. In that case the finest revolutionary elements in the working class, who are dissatisfied with the slow progress being made—and progress in Britain will perhaps be slower than in other countries—will all come over to us. Progress is slow because the British bourgeoisie are in a position to create better conditions for the labour aristocracy and thereby to retard the revolutionary movement in Britain. That is why the British comrades should strive, not only to revolutionise the masses—they are doing that splendidly (as Comrade Gallacher has shown), but must at the same time strive to create a real working-class political party. Comrade Gallacher and Comrade Sylvia Pankhurst, who have both spoken here, do not as yet belong to a revolutionary Communist Party. That excellent proletarian organisation, the Shop Stewards' movement, has not yet joined a political party. If you organise politically you will find that our tactics are based on a correct understanding of political developments in the past decades, and that a real revolutionary party can be created only when it absorbs the best elements of the revolutionary class and uses every opportunity to

fight the reactionary leaders, wherever they show themselves.

If the British Communist Party starts by acting in a revolutionary manner in the Labour Party, and if the Hendersons are obliged to expel this Party, that will be a great victory for the communist and revolutionary working-class movement in Britain.

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To Stalin

We have just decided, in the Political Bureau, that the Army Groups shall be separated, so that you will deal exclusively with Wrangel. Following the uprisings, especially in the Kuban and then in Siberia, the Wrangel danger is becoming enormous, and the opinion is mounting in the Central Committee that peace with bourgeois Poland should be concluded immediately. Please study the Wrangel situation very carefully and let us know your conclusions. I have arranged with the Commander-in-Chief that you are to get more ammunition, reinforcements and aircraft. Together with his friends, Dzerzhinsky has set up a Polish revolutionary committee and has issued a manifesto.

Lenin

Written on August 2, 1920

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Published according to
the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To Stalin

A plenary session of the Central Committee has been called for 1800 hours tomorrow. Try to send us, before that hour, your conclusions on the nature of the difficulties encountered by Budyonny and those on the Wrangel front, as well as the military prospects on both fronts. Political decisions of the utmost importance may depend on your conclusions.

Lenin

Written on August 4, 1920
First published in 1942

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To Stalin

We have just received a dispatch from the head of the Soviet delegation in London. Great Britain has flinched from a general strike, and Lloyd George has declared that he advises Poland to accept our armistice terms, including disarmament, the handing over of weapons to the workers, land distribution, etc. Our victory is a great one, and will be complete if we smash Wrangel. Here we are taking all measures. You, for your part, should make every effort to take the whole of the Crimea without fail, during the present offensive. Everything now depends on that. The Poles are temporising, and have not arrived in time. This is of tremendous advantage to us.

Lenin

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LETTER TO THE AUSTRIAN COMMUNISTS[89]

The Austrian Communist Party has decided to boycott the elections to the bourgeois-democratic parliament. The Second Congress of the Communist International which ended recently recognised as the correct tactics Communist *participation* in elections to and the activities in bourgeois parliaments.

Judging by reports of the Austrian Communist Party's delegates, I have no doubt that it will set a decision by the Communist International above that of one of the parties. Neither can it be doubted that the Austrian Social-Democrats, those traitors to socialism who have gone over to the bourgeoisie, will gloat over the Communist International decision, which is at variance with the Austrian Communist Party's boycott decision. However, politically-conscious workers will, of course, pay no heed to the malicious glee of people like the Austrian Social-Democrats, those confederates of the Scheidemanns and Noskes, Thomases and Gomperses. The Renners' servility to the bourgeoisie has revealed itself sufficiently, and in all countries the workers' indignation at the heroes of the yellow Second International is ever mounting and spreading.

The Austrian Social-Democrats are behaving in the bourgeois parliament, as in all spheres of their "work", including their own press, in the manner of petty-bourgeois democrats who are capable only of spineless vacillation, while in fact they are totally dependent on the capitalist class. We Communists enter bourgeois parliaments in order to unmask from their rostrums the deception practised by these thoroughly corrupt capitalist institutions, which dupe the workers and all working people.

One of the Austrian Communists' arguments against participation in the bourgeois parliaments deserves somewhat more careful consideration. Here it is:

"Parliament is of importance to Communists only as a platform for agitation. We in Austria have the Council of Workers' Deputies as a platform for agitation. We therefore refuse to take part in elections to the bourgeois parliament. In Germany there is no Council of Workers' Deputies which can be taken in earnest. That is why the German Communists pursue different tactics."

I consider this argument erroneous. As long as we are unable to disband the bourgeois parliament, we must work against it both from without and within. As long as a more or less appreciable number of working people (not only proletarians, but also semi-proletarians and small peasants) still have confidence in the bourgeois-democratic instruments employed by the bourgeoisie for duping the workers, we must expose that deception *from the very platform* which the backward sections of the workers, particularly of the non-proletarian working people, consider most important, and authoritative.

As long as we Communists are unable to take over state power and hold elections, with working people alone voting for *their* Soviets against the bourgeoisie; as long as the bourgeoisie exercise state power and call upon the different classes of the population to take part in the elections, we are in duty bound to take part in the elections with the purpose of conducting agitation among all working people, not only among proletarians. As long as the bourgeois parliament remains a means of duping the workers, and phrases about "democracy" are used to cover up financial swindling and every kind of bribery (the particularly "subtle" brand of bribery the bourgeoisie practise with regard to writers, M.P.s, lawyers, and others is nowhere to be seen on so wide a scale as in the bourgeois parliament), we Communists are in duty bound to be in this very institution (which is supposed to *express the people's will* but actually covers up the *deception of the people by the wealthy*) to untiringly expose this deception, and expose each and every case of the Renners and Co.'s desertion to the capitalists, against the workers. It is in parliament that the relations between bourgeois parties and groups manifest

themselves most frequently and reflect the relations between all the classes of bourgeois society. That is why it is in the bourgeois parliament, from within it, that we Communists must tell the people the *truth* about the relation between classes and parties, and the attitude of the landowners to the farm labourers, of the rich peasants to the poor peasants, of big capital to employees and petty proprietors, etc.

The proletariat *must* know all this, so as to learn to see through all the vile and refined machinations of the capitalists, and to learn to influence the petty-bourgeois masses, the non-proletarian masses of the working people. Without this "schooling" the proletariat cannot cope successfully with the tasks of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, for even then the bourgeoisie, operating from its new position (that of a deposed class), will carry on, in different forms and in different fields, its policy of duping the peasants, of bribing and intimidating employees, of covering up its self-seeking and unsavoury aspirations with phrases about "democracy".

No, the Austrian Communists will not be frightened by the malicious glee of the Renners and similar lackeys of the bourgeoisie. The Austrian Communists will not be afraid to declare their open and forthright recognition of international proletarian discipline. We are proud that we settle the great problems of the workers' struggle for their emancipation by submitting to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat, with due account of the experience of the workers in different countries, reckoning with their knowledge and their will, and thus giving effect in deed (and not in word, as the Renners, Fritz Adlers and Otto Bauers do) to the unity of the workers' class struggle for communism throughout the world.

N. Lenin

August 15, 1920

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the manuscript

THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The Second Congress of the Communist International ended on August 7. A little over a year has elapsed since its foundation, during which brief period immense and decisive successes have been achieved.

Held a year ago, the First Congress only unfurled the banner of communism, around which the forces of the revolutionary proletariat were to rally. War was declared on the yellow Second International, which unites the social-traitors, who have sided with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat and are in alliance with the capitalists against the workers' revolution.

The huge measure of success achieved in a year can be seen, among other things, in the fact that the growing sympathy with communism among the masses of workers has compelled the withdrawal from the Second International of some of its leading European and American parties, namely, the French Socialist Party, the German and the British "Independent" parties, and the American Socialist Party.

In every country of the world the finest representatives of the revolutionary workers have already ranged themselves on the side of communism, Soviet rule and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In all the advanced countries of Europe and America, there already exist Communist parties or numerous Communist groups. At the Congress which ended on August 7, it was not only the heralds of the proletarian revolution who joined forces, but delegates from strong and powerful organisations linked with the proletarian masses. A world army of the revolutionary proletariat—that is what now stands for communism, and, at the Congress just ended,

received organisational form and a clear, precise and detailed programme of action.

The Congress refused to admit immediately into the Communist International such parties that still retain in their ranks influential representatives of "Menshevism", social-treachery and opportunism, similar to the above-mentioned parties which have withdrawn from the yellow Second International.

In a number of precisely worded resolutions, the Congress blocked every avenue of access for opportunism, and demanded a total break with it. The incontestable facts reported to the Congress showed that the working-class masses are with us, and that the opportunists shall now be utterly routed.

The Congress rectified the errors committed in certain countries by Communists who were bent on turning to the "Left" and denied the need to work in bourgeois parliaments, reactionary trade unions, and wherever there are millions of workers who are still being duped by the capitalists and by their lackeys from among the workers, i.e., by members of the yellow Second International.

The Congress created a degree of unity and discipline among the world's Communist parties such as has never before existed and will make it possible for the vanguard of the workers' revolution to march forward with giant strides to its great goal, the overthrow of the yoke of capital.

Thanks to the international conference of working women which was organised simultaneously, the Congress will strengthen ties with the communist women's movement.

Communist parties and groups in the East, in the colonial and backward countries, which are so brutally robbed, oppressed and enslaved by the "civilised" league of predatory nations, were likewise represented at the Congress. The revolutionary movement in the advanced countries would in fact be nothing but a sheer fraud if, in their struggle against capital, the workers of Europe and America were not closely and completely united with the hundreds upon hundreds of millions of "colonial" slaves, who are oppressed by that capital.

Great are the military victories of the workers' and peasants' Soviet Republic over the landowners and the

capitalists, over the Yudeniches, the Kolchaks, and the Denikins, the Polish Whites and their accomplices—France, Britain, America and Japan.

But greater still is our victory over the minds and hearts of the masses of the workers, of all those who toil and are oppressed by capital—the victory of the communist ideas and communist organisations all over the world.

The revolution of the proletariat, the overthrow of the yoke of capitalism, is on the march and shall come about in every country in the world.

Kommunistka No. 3-4,
August-September 1920

Signed: *V. I. Lenin*

Published according to
the journal text

REPLY TO MR. SEGRUE, *DAILY NEWS* CORRESPONDENT

With reference to your telegraphic inquiry of September 3, 1920,[90] I would like to inform you that the attacks on Bolshevism on the part of the German Independents' Right wing, by people like Dittmann, for instance, do not surprise me. In my speech at the Comintern Congress in Moscow, I showed that Crispien's ideas are quite Kautskian. Kautskians like Crispien and Dittmann are, of course, dissatisfied with Bolshevism. It would be deplorable if such people were satisfied with us. It is quite natural that, in the decisive struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeois democrats like Dittmann, who is very similar to our Mensheviks, are often to be found on the side of the bourgeoisie. Dittmann is indignant at the shootings, but it is natural that, in such cases, Mensheviks are shot at by revolutionary workers, which cannot be altogether to Dittmann's liking. The Third, Communist International would not be worth much if it admitted into its ranks Dittmanns of the German, French or any other variety.

If, however, you consider that the reports by the French, the German and the British workers' delegations have done more harm to Bolshevism than the entire anti-Bolshevik propaganda has done, I willingly accept the conclusion that logically follows.

Let the two of us reach an understanding—you on behalf of the anti-Bolshevik bourgeoisie of all countries, and I on behalf of the Russian Soviet Republic. Accordingly, let delegations consisting of workers and small peasants (i.e., of working people, those whose labour creates profit on capital) be sent to Russia from all countries, each delegation

to stay here for about two months. If these delegations' reports are useful to the cause of anti-Bolshevik propaganda, the entire cost of their visit shall be borne by the international bourgeoisie. However, as the bourgeoisie is very weak and poor in all countries in the world, while we in Russia are rich and strong, I agree to secure the consent of the Soviet Government to defray three-quarters of the expenses, a mere quarter to be borne by the millionaires of all lands.

I hope that you, who in your telegram call yourself an honest journalist, will not refuse always and everywhere to publicise this understanding between the Soviet Republic and the international bourgeoisie—of course, in the interests of anti-Bolshevik propaganda.

Lenin

September 8, 1920

Pravda No. 202 and *Izvestia* No. 202, September 12, 1920

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH
DELIVERED AT THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)[91]
SEPTEMBER 22, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The war against Poland, or, to be more precise, the July-August campaign, has radically changed the international political situation.

The Poles' attack against us was preceded by an episode typical of the international relations existing at the time. When, in January, we offered Poland peace terms that were most favourable to her and most unfavourable to us, the diplomatists of all lands interpreted the fact in their own way: since the Bolsheviks were making such tremendous concessions, that should be taken to mean that they were very weak. This was merely more confirmation of bourgeois diplomacy's inability to understand the methods employed by our new diplomacy, that of direct and frank declarations. That was why our proposals evoked merely an outburst of savage chauvinism in Poland, France and other countries, and prompted Poland to attack us. At first the Poles captured Kiev, but our forces' counter-attack then brought them right up to Warsaw. Then came a turn in the events, and we fell back for over a hundred versts.

The undoubtedly difficult situation that resulted has not been a total loss to us. We have completely upset the diplomatists' expectations to make use of our weakness and have proved that Poland cannot defeat us, whereas we have never been and are not far from victory over Poland. At present we still hold a hundred versts of captured territory.

Finally, our advance on Warsaw has had such a powerful effect on Western Europe and on the entire world situation that it has profoundly changed the alignment of the struggling internal and external political forces.

Our army's close approach to Warsaw has incontestably shown that the centre of world imperialism's entire system, which rests on the Treaty of Versailles, lies somewhere very close to the Polish capital. Poland, the last anti-Bolshevik stronghold fully controlled by the Entente, is such an important element in that system that when the Red Army threatened that stronghold the entire structure was shaken. The Soviet Republic has become a major factor in world politics.

The new situation which has arisen has, in the first place, revealed the tremendously significant fact that the bourgeoisie of the Entente-oppressed countries is in the main for us, and these countries contain seventy per cent of the world's population. We have already seen that the small states, which have had such a bad time under Entente tutelage (Estonia, Georgia, etc.), and have been hanging their Bolsheviks, have made peace with us, against the will of the Entente. This has been manifesting itself with special force throughout the world. All Germany began to seethe when our forces approached Warsaw. In that country a situation arose very much like that which could be seen in Russia in 1905, when the Black Hundreds aroused and involved in political life large and most backward sections of the peasantry, which were opposed to the Bolsheviks one day, and on the next were demanding all the land from the landed proprietors. In Germany too we have seen a similar unnatural bloc between the Black Hundreds and the Bolsheviks. There has appeared a strange type of Black-Hundred revolutionary, like the backward rustic youth from East Prussia who, as I read in a German non-Bolshevik newspaper the other day, says that the Kaiser will have to return because there is no order, but one has to follow the Bolsheviks.

Our presence at the walls of Warsaw has had, as another consequence, a powerful effect on the revolutionary movement in Europe, particularly in Britain. Though we have not been able to affect the industrial proletariat of Poland

beyond the Vistula and in Warsaw (this being one of the main reasons for our defeat), we have succeeded in influencing the British proletariat and in raising the movement there to an unprecedented level, to an absolutely new stage in the revolution. When the British Government presented an ultimatum to us, it transpired that it would first have to consult the British workers. The latter, nine-tenths of whose leaders are out-and-out Mensheviks, replied to the ultimatum by forming a Council of Action.[92]

Alarmed by these developments, the British press raised a hullabaloo about what it called this "duality of government". It had every reason to say so. Britain found herself at the same stage of political relationships as Russia after February 1917, when the Soviets were obliged to scrutinise every step taken by the bourgeois government. This Council of Action unites all workers, irrespective of party, just like our All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the period when Gotz, Dan and others were running things, a kind of association which runs parallel with the government, and in which the Mensheviks are forced to act in a semi-Bolshevik way. Just as our Mensheviks finally got confounded and helped win over the masses to our side, the Mensheviks in the Council of Action have been forced by the inexorable course of events to clear the way to the Bolshevist revolution for the worker masses of Britain. According to testimony by competent persons, the British Mensheviks already consider themselves a government, and are prepared to replace the bourgeois government in the near future. This will be the next step in the general process of the British proletarian revolution.

These tremendous changes in the British working-class movement are exerting a powerful influence on the world working-class movement, and first and foremost on the working-class movement in France.

Such are the results of our recent Polish campaign in its effect on world politics and the relations emerging in Western Europe.

We are now faced with the question of war or peace with Poland. We want to avoid a winter campaign that will be hard on us, and are again offering Poland a peace that is to her advantage and our disadvantage. However, the bourgeois

diplomatists, following their old habit, may possibly interpret our frank statement as a sign of weakness. They have probably decided on a winter campaign. At this stage we have to ascertain the conditions in which we shall probably have to enter a new period of the war.

In Western Europe our defeat has brought about certain changes and rallied against us heterogeneous elements that are hostile to us. However, we have on more than one occasion seen even more powerful groups and currents hostile to us, which nevertheless could not achieve anything.

We have against us a bloc consisting of Poland, France and Wrangel. France pins her hopes on the latter. However, this bloc suffers from the same old malady—the antagonism among its elements, and the fear felt by the Polish petty bourgeoisie with regard to Black-Hundred Russia and to Wrangel, its typical representative. Petty-bourgeois and patriotic Poland, the Polish Socialist Party, the Ludowa Party, i.e., the well-to-do peasants—all of these want peace. Here is what spokesmen of these parties said to us in Minsk, "We know that it was not the Entente that saved Warsaw and Poland; it was unable to save us. It was the upsurge of patriotism that saved us." Such lessons are not to be forgotten. The Poles realise very clearly that this war will ruin them financially. War has to be paid for, and France upholds the "sanctity of private property". The representatives of the petty-bourgeois parties are aware that Poland was on the eve of a crisis even before the war, and that a war will mean further ruination; that is why they prefer peace. We want to make use of this by offering peace to Poland.

Another factor of the utmost importance has appeared—the change in the social composition of the Polish army. We defeated Kolchak and Denikin only after the social composition of their armies had changed, when their basic cadres were watered down in the mass of mobilised peasants. The same kind of process is under way in the Polish army, the government has been obliged to call up workers and peasants of the older age groups, who have gone through the even harsher imperialist war. This army is now made up, not of youngsters, who can easily be "brain-washed", but of older men, who will not let themselves be talked over.

Poland has passed the point which at first assured her total victory, and then total defeat.

If we have to wage a winter campaign, we shall win despite exhaustion and fatigue. There can be no doubt on that score. Our economic situation also vouches for that outcome. It has improved considerably. Compared with last year, we have acquired a firm economic basis. In 1917-18 we gathered in 30 million poods of grain, in 1918-19—110 million poods, and in 1919-20—260 million; next year we expect to collect 400 million poods. These are far higher figures than those of the time when we struggled desperately to make both ends meet. No longer shall we look with such horror upon the multi-coloured banknotes that run into the thousands of millions, and today clearly show us that they are the wreckage, the tatters, of the old bourgeois vestments.

We now have over a hundred million poods of oil. The Donets Basin now provides us with between twenty and thirty million poods of coal a month. The firewood situation has greatly improved. As recently as last year we had only firewood—no oil or coal.

All this gives us the right to say that, if we close our ranks and bend every effort, we shall win the victory.

Pravda No. 216,
September 29, 1920

Published according to
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LETTER TO THE GERMAN AND THE FRENCH WORKERS

REGARDING THE DISCUSSION ON THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[93]

Comrades, the bourgeois press of Germany and France is devoting much attention to the discussion within the German Independent Social-Democratic Party and the Socialist Party of France on affiliation to the Communist International. It is vigorously supporting the views of the Right-wing opportunist sections in the two parties.

That can be readily understood, for these Right-wing elements are in essence petty-bourgeois democrats, who, like Dittmann and Crispien, cannot think in terms of revolution, and are incapable of helping the working class prepare for and carry out the revolution. A break with these Right-wing and opportunist elements is necessary; it is the only way to rally all the genuinely revolutionary and genuinely proletarian masses.

All the clamour about Moscow's "dictates", etc., is simply a red herring. As a matter of fact, only five of the twenty members of the Communist International's Executive Committee belong to the Russian Communist Party. All this talk about "dictates", etc., is either self-deception or deception of the workers. It serves to cover up the bankruptcy of certain opportunist leaders, just as similar talk in the *K.A.P.D.* (Communist *Workers*' Party of Germany) has served to cover up the bankruptcy of several of its leaders, who have abandoned the path of proletarian revolutionism. The outcry that the "Moscow dictators", making use of the terms of admission to the Communist International, are persecuting certain individuals is likewise self-deception

or deception of others. Article 20 of the terms of admission says clearly in black and white that "*exceptions*" (*Ausnahmen*) *to the strict rules* in regard of Right-wing leaders and members of central bodies *can be made with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International*.

Since exceptions are expressly declared to be permissible, there can be no talk of an absolute bar against specific individuals. Consequently, there is full recognition of the need to take into account, not the past but the present, the change in the views and conduct of individuals, of individual leaders. Since exceptions are declared to be permissible with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International—in which Russians constitute only one-fourth of the membership—it follows that the clamour about "dictates", etc., is stuff and nonsense, sheer falsehood.

All this clamour is simply a red herring. In fact, a struggle is going on between the revolutionary *proletarian* elements and the opportunist *petty-bourgeois* elements. Today as in the past, the latter include the Hilferdings, the Dittmanns, the Crispiens, numerous members of the parliamentary groups in Germany and France, etc. A struggle between these two *political trends* is in progress in every country without exception. This struggle has a long history. It grew extremely acute everywhere during the imperialist war, and has become aggravated since then. Opportunism is represented by elements of the "labour aristocracy", the old bureaucracy in the trade unions, co-operative societies, etc., by the intellectualist petty-bourgeois strata, etc. Without the elimination of this *trend*—which, by its vacillation and its "Menshevism" (the Dittmanns and Crispiens fully resemble our Mensheviks) in fact exerts the bourgeoisie's influence on the proletariat *from within* the working-class movement, *from within* the socialist parties—without the elimination of this trend, a break with it, and the expulsion of all its prominent representatives, it will be impossible to rally the revolutionary proletariat.

By their constant veering towards reformism and Menshevism, and their inability to think and act in terms of revolution, the Dittmanns, the Crispiens, etc., without realising the fact, are actually carrying bourgeois influence into the proletariat from within the proletarian party—they

subordinate the proletariat to *bourgeois reformism*. Only a break with such and similar people can lead to *international unity* of the revolutionary proletariat, *against* the bourgeoisie, and for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

The events in Italy should open eyes most stubbornly closed to the harmfulness of "unity" and "peace" with the Crispiens and the Dittmanns. The Italian Crispiens and Dittmanns (Turati, Prampolini and D'Aragona) began at once to *hinder* the revolution in Italy as soon as things *reached the stage of a real revolution*. Throughout Europe and the world things are moving in that direction more or less rapidly, and more or less arduously and painfully.

It is high time to discard, once and for all, these most harmful illusions about the possibility of "unity" or "peace" with the Dittmanns and the Crispiens, with the Right wing of the German Independent Social-Democratic Party, the British Independent Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, etc. It is high time for all revolutionary workers to purge their parties of these trends, and form genuinely united Communist parties of the proletariat.

N. Lenin

September 24, 1920

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September 25, 1920

Published according to
the manuscript

THE TASKS OF THE YOUTH LEAGUES*

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE OCTOBER 5, 1920[94]

(*The Congress greets Lenin with a tremendous ovation.*) Comrades, today I would like to talk on the fundamental tasks of the Young Communist League and, in this connection, on what the youth organisations in a socialist republic should be like in general.

It is all the more necessary to dwell on this question because in a certain sense it may be said that it is the youth that will be faced with the actual task of creating a communist society. For it is clear that the generation of working people brought up in capitalist society can, at best, accomplish the task of destroying the foundations of the old, the capitalist way of life, which was built on exploitation. At best it will be able to accomplish the tasks of creating a social system that will help the proletariat and the working classes retain power and lay a firm foundation, which can be built on only by a generation that is starting to work under the new conditions, in a situation in which relations based on the exploitation of man by man no longer exist.

And so, in dealing from this angle with the tasks confronting the youth, I must say that the tasks of the youth in general, and of the Young Communist Leagues and all other organisations in particular, might be summed up in a single word: learn.

Of course, this is only a "single word". It does not reply to the principal and most essential questions: what to learn,

* Revised translation by Julius Katzer.

and how to learn? And the whole point here is that, with the transformation of the old, capitalist society, the upbringing, training and education of the new generations that will create the communist society cannot be conducted on the old lines. The teaching, training and education of the youth must proceed from the material that has been left to us by the old society. We can build communism only on the basis of the totality of knowledge, organisations and institutions, only by using the stock of human forces and means that have been left to us by the old society. Only by radically remoulding the teaching, organisation and training of the youth shall we be able to ensure that the efforts of the younger generation will result in the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e., in the creation of a communist society. That is why we must deal in detail with the question of what we should teach the youth and how the youth should learn if it really wants to justify the name of communist youth, and how it should be trained so as to be able to complete and consummate what we have started.

I must say that the first and most natural reply would seem to be that the Youth League, and the youth in general, who want to advance to communism, should learn communism.

But this reply—"learn communism"—is too general. What do we need in order to learn communism? What must be singled out from the sum of general knowledge so as to acquire a knowledge of communism? Here a number of dangers arise, which very often manifest themselves whenever the task of learning communism is presented incorrectly, or when it is interpreted in too one-sided a manner.

Naturally, the first thought that enters one's mind is that learning communism means assimilating the sum of knowledge that is contained in communist manuals, pamphlets and books. But such a definition of the study of communism would be too crude and inadequate. If the study of communism consisted solely in assimilating what is contained in communist books and pamphlets, we might all too easily obtain communist text jugglers or braggarts, and this would very often do us harm, because such people, after learning by rote what is set forth in communist books

and pamphlets, would prove incapable of combining the various branches of knowledge, and would be unable to act in the way communism really demands.

One of the greatest evils and misfortunes loft to us by the old, capitalist society is the complete rift between books and practical life; we have had books explaining everything in the best possible manner, yet in most cases these books contained the most pernicious and hypocritical lies, a false description of capitalist society.

That is why it would be most mistaken merely to assimilate book knowledge about communism. No longer do our speeches and articles merely reiterate what used to be said about communism, because our speeches and articles are connected with our daily work in all fields. Without work and without struggle, book knowledge of communism obtained from communist pamphlets and works is absolutely worthless, for it would continue the old separation of theory and practice, the old rift which was the most pernicious feature of the old, bourgeois society.

It would be still more dangerous to set about assimilating only communist slogans. Had we not realised this danger in time, and had we not directed all our efforts to averting this danger, the half million or million young men and women who would have called themselves Communists after studying communism in this way would only greatly prejudice the cause of communism.

The question arises: how is all this to be blended for the study of communism? What must we take from the old schools, from the old kind of science? It was the declared aim of the old type of school to produce men with an all-round education, to teach the sciences in general. We know that this was utterly false, since the whole of society was based and maintained on the division of people into classes, into exploiters and oppressed. Since they were thoroughly imbued with the class spirit, the old schools naturally gave knowledge only to the children of the bourgeoisie. Every word was falsified in the interests of the bourgeoisie. In these schools the younger generation of workers and peasants were not so much educated as drilled in the interests of that bourgeoisie. They were trained in such a way as to be useful servants of the bourgeoisie, able to create profits for it

without disturbing its peace and leisure. That is why, while rejecting the old type of schools, we have made it our task to take from it only what we require for genuine communist education.

This brings me to the reproaches and accusations which we constantly hear levelled at the old schools, and which often lead to wholly wrong conclusions. It is said that the old school was a school of purely book knowledge, of ceaseless drilling and grinding. That is true, but we must distinguish between what was bad in the old schools and what is useful to us, and we must be able to select from it what is necessary for communism.

The old schools provided purely book knowledge; they compelled their pupils to assimilate a mass of useless, superfluous and barren knowledge, which cluttered up the brain and turned the younger generation into bureaucrats regimented according to a single pattern. But it would mean falling into a grave error for you to try to draw the conclusion that one can become a Communist without assimilating the wealth of knowledge amassed by mankind. It would be mistaken to think it sufficient to learn communist slogans and the conclusions of communist science, without acquiring that sum of knowledge of which communism itself is a result. Marxism is an example which shows how communism arose out of the sum of human knowledge.

You have read and heard that communist theory—the science of communism created in the main by Marx, this doctrine of Marxism—has ceased to be the work of a single socialist of the nineteenth century, even though he was a genius, and that it has become the doctrine of millions and tens of millions of proletarians all over the world, who are applying it in their struggle against capitalism. If you were to ask why the teachings of Marx have been able to win the hearts and minds of millions and tens of millions of the most revolutionary class, you would receive only one answer: it was because Marx based his work on the firm foundation of the human knowledge acquired under capitalism. After making a study of the laws governing the development of human society, Marx realised the inevitability of capitalism developing towards communism. What is most important is that he proved this on the sole basis of a most precise,

detailed and profound study of this capitalist society, by fully assimilating all that earlier science had produced. He critically reshaped everything that had been created by human society, without ignoring a single detail. He reconsidered, subjected to criticism, and verified on the working-class movement everything that human thinking had created, and therefrom formulated conclusions which people hemmed in by bourgeois limitations or bound by bourgeois prejudices could not draw.

We must bear this in mind when, for example, we talk about proletarian culture.[95] We shall be unable to solve this problem unless we clearly realise that only a precise knowledge and transformation of the culture created by the entire development of mankind will enable us to create a proletarian culture. The latter is not clutched out of thin air; it is not an invention of those who call themselves experts in proletarian culture. That is all nonsense. Proletarian culture must be the logical development of the store of knowledge mankind has accumulated under the yoke of capitalist, landowner and bureaucratic society. All these roads have been leading, and will continue to lead up to proletarian culture, in the same way as political economy, as reshaped by Marx, has shown us what human society must arrive at, shown us the passage to the class struggle, to the beginning of the proletarian revolution.

When we so often hear representatives of the youth, as well as certain advocates of a new system of education, attacking the old schools, claiming that they used the system of cramming, we say to them that we must take what was good in the old schools. We must not borrow the system of encumbering young people's minds with an immense amount of knowledge, nine-tenths of which was useless and one-tenth distorted. This, however, does not mean that we can restrict ourselves to communist conclusions and learn only communist slogans. You will not create communism that way. You can become a Communist only when you enrich your mind with a knowledge of all the treasures created by mankind.

We have no need of cramming, but we do need to develop and perfect the mind of every student with a knowledge of fundamental facts. Communism will become an empty

word, a mere signboard, and a Communist a mere boaster, if all the knowledge he has acquired is not digested in his mind. You should not merely assimilate this knowledge, but assimilate it critically, so as not to cram your mind with useless lumber, but enrich it with all those facts that are indispensable to the well-educated man of today. If a Communist took it into his head to boast about his communism because of the cut-and-dried conclusions he had acquired, without putting in a great deal of serious and hard work and without understanding facts he should examine critically, he would be a deplorable Communist indeed. Such superficiality would be decidedly fatal. If I know that I know little, I shall strive to learn more, but if a man says that he is a Communist and that he need not know anything thoroughly, he will never become anything like a Communist.

The old schools produced servants needed by the capitalists; the old schools turned men of science into men who had to write and say whatever pleased the capitalists. We must therefore abolish them. But does the fact that we must abolish them, destroy them, mean that we should not take from them everything mankind has accumulated that is essential to man? Does it mean that we do not have to distinguish between what was necessary to capitalism and what is necessary to communism?

We are replacing the old drill-sergeant methods practised in bourgeois society, against the will of the majority, with the class-conscious discipline of the workers and peasants, who combine hatred of the old society with a determination, ability and readiness to unite and organise their forces for this struggle so as to forge the wills of millions and hundreds of millions of people—disunited, and scattered over the territory of a huge country—into a single will, without which defeat is inevitable. Without this solidarity, without this conscious discipline of the workers and peasants, our cause is hopeless. Without this, we shall be unable to vanquish the capitalists and landowners of the whole world. We shall not even consolidate the foundation, let alone build a new, communist society on that foundation. Likewise, while condemning the old schools, while harbouring an absolutely justified and necessary hatred for the old

schools, and appreciating the readiness to destroy them, we must realise that we must replace the old system of instruction, the old cramming and the old drill, with an ability to acquire the sum total of human knowledge, and to acquire it in such a way that communism shall not be something to be learned by rote, but something that you yourselves have thought over, something that will embody conclusions inevitable from the standpoint of present-day education.

That is the way the main tasks should be presented when we speak of the aim: learn communism.

I shall take a practical example to make this clear to you, and to demonstrate the approach to the problem of how you must learn. You all know that, following the military problems, those of defending the republic, we are now confronted with economic tasks. Communist society, as we know, cannot be built unless we restore industry and agriculture, and that, not in the old way. They must be re-established on a modern basis, in accordance with the last word in science. You know that electricity is that basis, and that only after electrification of the entire country, of all branches of industry and agriculture, only when you have achieved that aim, will you be able to build for yourselves the communist society which the older generation will not be able to build. Confronting you is the task of economically reviving the whole country, of reorganising and restoring both agriculture and industry on modern technical lines, based on modern science and technology, on electricity. You realise perfectly well that illiterate people cannot tackle electrification, and that elementary literacy is not enough either. It is insufficient to understand what electricity is; what is needed is the knowledge of how to apply it technically in industry and agriculture, and in the individual branches of industry and agriculture. This has to be learnt for oneself, and it must be taught to the entire rising generation of working people. That is the task confronting every class-conscious Communist, every young person who regards himself a Communist and who clearly understands that, by joining the Young Communist League, he has pledged himself to help the Party build communism and to help the whole younger generation create a communist society. He must realise that he can create it only

on the basis of modern education, and if he does not acquire this education communism will remain merely a pious wish.

It was the task of the older generation to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The main task then was to criticise the bourgeoisie, arouse hatred of the bourgeoisie among the masses, and foster class-consciousness and the ability to unite their forces. The new generation is confronted with a far more complex task. Your duty does not lie only in assembling your forces so as to uphold the workers' and peasants' government against an invasion instigated by the capitalists. Of course, you must do that; that is something you clearly realise, and is distinctly seen by the Communist. However, that is not enough. You have to build up a communist society. In many respects half of the work has been done. The old order has been destroyed, just as it deserved, it has been turned into a heap of ruins, just as it deserved. The ground has been cleared, and on this ground the younger communist generation must build a communist society. You are faced with the task of construction, and you can accomplish that task only by assimilating all modern knowledge, only if you are able to transform communism from cut-and-dried and memorised formulas, counsels, recipes, prescriptions and programmes into that living reality which gives unity to your immediate work, and only if you are able to make communism a guide in all your practical work.

That is the task you should pursue in educating, training and rousing the entire younger generation. You must be foremost among the millions of builders of a communist society in whose ranks every young man and young woman should be. You will not build a communist society unless you enlist the mass of young workers and peasants in the work of building communism.

This naturally brings me to the question of how we should teach communism and what the specific features of our methods should be.

I first of all shall deal here with the question of communist ethics.

You must train yourselves to be Communists. It is the task of the Youth League to organise its practical activities in such a way that, by learning, organising, uniting and fighting, its members shall train both themselves and all

those who look to it for leadership; it should train Communists. The entire purpose of training, educating and teaching the youth of today should be to imbue them with communist ethics.

But is there such a thing as communist ethics? Is there such a thing as communist morality? Of course, there is. It is often suggested that we have no ethics of our own; very often the bourgeoisie accuse us Communists of rejecting all morality. This is a method of confusing the issue, of throwing dust in the eyes of the workers and peasants.

In what sense do we reject ethics, reject morality?

In the sense given to it by the bourgeoisie, who based ethics on God's commandments. On this point we, of course, say that we do not believe in God, and that we know perfectly well that the clergy, the landowners and the bourgeoisie invoked the name of God so as to further their own interests as exploiters. Or, instead of basing ethics on the commandments of morality, on the commandments of God, they based it on idealist or semi-idealist phrases, which always amounted to something very similar to God's commandments.

We reject any morality based on extra-human and extra-class concepts. We say that this is deception, dupery, stultification of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landowners and capitalists.

We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle. Our morality stems from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

The old society was based on the oppression of all the workers and peasants by the landowners and capitalists. We had to destroy all that, and overthrow them but to do that we had to create unity. That is something that God cannot create.

This unity could be provided only by the factories, only by a proletariat trained and roused from its long slumber. Only when that class was formed did a mass movement arise which has led to what we have now—the victory of the proletarian revolution in one of the weakest of countries, which for three years has been repelling the onslaught of the bourgeoisie of the whole world. We can see how the proletarian revolution is developing all over the world. On

the basis of experience, we now say that only the proletariat could have created the solid force which the disunited and scattered peasantry are following and which has withstood all onslaughts by the exploiters. Only this class can help the working masses unite, rally their ranks and conclusively defend, conclusively consolidate and conclusively build up a communist society.

That is why we say that to us there is no such thing as a morality that stands outside human society; that is a fraud. To us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle.

What does that class struggle consist in? It consists in overthrowing the tsar, overthrowing the capitalists, and abolishing the capitalist class.

What are classes in general? Classes are that which permits one section of society to appropriate the labour of another section. If one section of society appropriates all the land, we have a landowner class and a peasant class. If one section of society owns the factories, shares and capital, while another section works in these factories, we have a capitalist class and a proletarian class.

It was not difficult to drive out the tsar—that required only a few days. It was not very difficult to drive out the landowners—that was done in a few months. Nor was it very difficult to drive out the capitalists. But it is incomparably more difficult to abolish classes; we still have the division into workers and peasants. If the peasant is installed on his plot of land and appropriates his surplus grain, that is, grain that he does not need for himself or for his cattle, while the rest of the people have to go without bread, then the peasant becomes an exploiter. The more grain he clings to, the more profitable he finds it; as for the rest, let them starve: "The more they starve, the dearer I can sell this grain." All should work according to a single common plan, on common land, in common factories and in accordance with a common system. Is that easy to attain? You see that it is not as easy as driving out the tsar, the landowners and the capitalists. What is required is that the proletariat re-educate a section of the peasantry; it must win over the working peasants in order to crush the resistance of those peasants who are rich and are profiting

from the poverty and want of the rest. Hence the task of the proletarian struggle is not quite completed after we have overthrown the tsar and driven out the landowners and capitalists; to accomplish that is the task of the system we call the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The class struggle is continuing; it has merely changed its forms. It is the class struggle of the proletariat to prevent the return of the old exploiters, to unite in a single union the scattered masses of unenlightened peasants. The class struggle is continuing and it is our task to subordinate all interests to that struggle. Our communist morality is also subordinated to that task. We say: morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society and to unite all the working people around the proletariat, which is building up a new, a communist society.

Communist morality is that which serves this struggle and unites the working people against all exploitation, against all petty private property; for petty property puts into the hands of one person that which has been created by the labour of the whole of society. In our country the land is common property.

But suppose I take a piece of this common property and grow on it twice as much grain as I need, and profiteer on the surplus? Suppose I argue that the more starving people there are, the more they will pay? Would I then be behaving like a Communist? No, I would be behaving like an exploiter, like a proprietor. That must be combated. If that is allowed to go on, things will revert to the rule of the capitalists, to the rule of the bourgeoisie, as has more than once happened in previous revolutions. To prevent the restoration of the rule of the capitalists and the bourgeoisie, we must not allow profiteering; we must not allow individuals to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest; the working people must unite with the proletariat and form a communist society. This is the principal feature of the fundamental task of the League and the organisation of the communist youth.

The old society was based on the principle: rob or be robbed; work for others or make others work for you; be a slave-owner or a slave. Naturally, people brought up in such a society assimilate with their mother's milk, one

might say, the psychology, the habit, the concept which says: you are either a slave-owner or a slave, or else, a small owner, a petty employee, a petty official, or an intellectual—in short, a man who is concerned only with himself, and does not care a rap for anybody else.

If I work this plot of land, I do not care a rap for anybody else; if others starve, all the better, I shall get the more for my grain. If I have a job as a doctor, engineer, teacher, or clerk, I do not care a rap for anybody else. If I toady to and please the powers that be, I may be able to keep my job, and even get on in life and become a bourgeois. A Communist cannot harbour such a psychology and such sentiments. When the workers and peasants proved that they were able, by their own efforts, to defend themselves and create a new society—that was the beginning of the new and communist education, education in the struggle against the exploiters, education in alliance with the proletariat against the self-seekers and petty proprietors, against the psychology and habits which say: I seek my own profit and don't care a rap for anything else.

That is the reply to the question of how the young and rising generation should learn communism.

It can learn communism only by linking up every step in its studies, training and education with the continuous struggle the proletarians and the working people are waging against the old society of exploiters. When people tell us about morality, we say: to a Communist all morality lies in this united discipline and conscious mass struggle against the exploiters. We do not believe in an eternal morality, and we-expose the falseness of all the fables about morality. Morality serves the purpose of helping human society rise to a higher level and rid itself of the exploitation of labour.

To achieve this we need that generation of young people who began to reach political maturity in the midst of a disciplined and desperate struggle against the bourgeoisie. In this struggle that generation is training genuine Communists; it must subordinate to this struggle, and link up with it, each step in its studies, education and training. The education of the communist youth must consist, not in giving them suave talks and moral precepts. This is not what education consists in. When people have seen the way in

which their fathers and mothers lived under the yoke of the landowners and capitalists; when they have themselves experienced the sufferings of those who began the struggle against the exploiters; when they have seen the sacrifices made to keep what has been won, and seen what deadly enemies the landowners and capitalists are—they are taught by these conditions to become Communists. Communist morality is based on the struggle for the consolidation and completion of communism. That is also the basis of communist training, education, and teaching. That is the reply to the question of how communism should be learnt.

We could not believe in teaching, training and education if they were restricted only to the schoolroom and divorced from the ferment of life. As long as the workers and peasants are oppressed by the landowners and capitalists, and as long as the schools are controlled by the landowners and capitalists, the young generation will remain blind and ignorant. Our schools must provide the youth with the fundamentals of knowledge, the ability to evolve communist views independently; they must make educated people of the youth. While they are attending school, they must learn to become participants in the struggle for emancipation from the exploiters. The Young Communist League will justify its name as the League of the young communist generation only when every step in its teaching, training and education is linked up with participation in the common struggle of all working people against the exploiters. You are well aware that, as long as Russia remains the only workers' republic and the old, bourgeois system exists in the rest of the world, we shall be weaker than they are, and be constantly threatened with a new attack; and that only if we learn to be solidly united shall we win in the further struggle and—having gained strength—become really invincible. Thus, to be a Communist means that you must organise and unite the entire young generation and set an example of training and discipline in this struggle. Then you will be able to start building the edifice of communist society and bring it to completion.

To make this clearer to you, I shall quote an example. We call ourselves Communists. What is a Communist? Communist is a Latin word. *Communis* is the Latin for

"common". Communist society is a society in which all things—the land, the factories—are owned in common and the people work in common. That is communism.

Is it possible to work in common if each one works separately on his own plot of land? Work in common cannot be brought about all at once. That is impossible. It does not drop from the skies. It comes through toil and suffering; it is created in the course of struggle. The old books are of no use here; no one will believe them. One's own experience of life is needed. When Kolchak and Denikin were advancing from Siberia and the South, the peasants were on their side. They did not like Bolshevism because the Bolsheviks took their grain at a fixed price. But when the peasants in Siberia and the Ukraine experienced the rule of Kolchak and Denikin, they realised that they had only one alternative: either to go to the capitalists, who would at once hand them over into slavery under the landowners; or to follow the workers, who, it is true, did not promise a land flowing with milk and honey, and demanded iron discipline and firmness in an arduous struggle, but would lead them out of enslavement by the capitalists and landowners. When even the ignorant peasants saw and realised this from their own experience, they became conscious adherents of communism, who had gone through a severe school. It is such experience that must form the basis of all the activities of the Young Communist League.

I have replied to the questions of what we must learn, what we must take from the old schools and from the old science. I shall now try to answer the question of how this must be learnt. The answer is: only by inseparably linking each step in the activities of the schools, each step in training, education and teaching, with the struggle of all the working people against the exploiters.

I shall quote a few examples from the experience of the work of some of the youth organisations so as to illustrate how this training in communism should proceed. Everybody is talking about abolishing illiteracy. You know that a communist society cannot be built in an illiterate country. It is not enough for the Soviet government to issue an order, or for the Party to issue a particular slogan, or to assign a certain number of the best workers to this

task. The young generation itself must take up this work. Communism means that the youth, the young men and women who belong to the Youth League, should say: this is our job; we shall unite and go into the rural districts to abolish illiteracy, so that there shall be no illiterates among our young people. We are trying to get the rising generation to devote their activities to this work. You know that we cannot rapidly transform an ignorant and illiterate Russia into a literate country. But if the Youth League sets to work on the job, and if all young people work for the benefit of all, the League, with a membership of 400,000 young men and women, will be entitled to call itself a Young Communist League. It is also a task of the League, not only to acquire knowledge itself, but to help those young people who are unable to extricate themselves by their own efforts from the toils of illiteracy. Being a member of the Youth League means devoting one's labour and efforts to the common cause. That is what a communist education means. Only in the course of such work do young men and women become real Communists. Only if they achieve practical results in this work will they become Communists.

Take, for example, work in the suburban vegetable gardens. Is that not a real job of work? It is one of the tasks of the Young Communist League. People are starving; there is hunger in the factories. To save ourselves from starvation, vegetable gardens must be developed. But farming is being carried on in the old way. Therefore, more class-conscious elements should engage in this work, and then you will find that the number of vegetable gardens will increase, their acreage will grow, and the results will improve. The Young Communist League must take an active part in this work. Every League and League branch should regard this as its duty.

The Young Communist League must be a shock force, helping in every job and displaying initiative and enterprise. The League should be an organisation enabling any worker to see that it consists of people whose teachings he perhaps does not understand, and whose teachings he may not immediately believe, but from whose practical work and activity he can see that they are really people who are showing him the right road.

If the Young Communist League fails to organise its work in this way in all fields, it will mean that it is reverting to the old bourgeois path. We must combine our education with the struggle of the working people against the exploiters, so as to help the former accomplish the tasks set by the teachings of communism.

The members of the League should use every spare hour to improve the vegetable gardens, or to organise the education of young people at some factory, ana so on. We want to transform Russia from a poverty-stricken and wretched country into one that is wealthy. The Young Communist League must combine its education, learning and training with the labour of the workers and peasants, so as not to confine itself to schools or to reading communist books and pamphlets. Only by working side by side with the workers and peasants can one become a genuine Communist. It has to be generally realised that all members of the Youth League are literate people and at the same time are keen at their jobs. When everyone sees that we have ousted the old drill-ground methods from the old schools and have replaced them with conscious discipline, that all young men and women take part in subbotniks, and utilise every suburban farm to help the population—people will cease to regard labour in the old way.

It is the task of the Young Communist League to organise assistance everywhere, in village or city block, in such matters as—and I shall take a small example—public hygiene or the distribution of food. How was this done in the old, capitalist society? Everybody worked only for himself and nobody cared a straw for the aged and the sick, or whether housework was the concern only of the women, who, in consequence, were in a condition of oppression and servitude. Whose business is it to combat this? It is the business of the Youth Leagues, which must say; we shall change all this; we shall organise detachments of young people who will help to assure public hygiene or distribute food, who will conduct systematic house-to-house inspections, and work in an organised way for the benefit of the whole of society, distributing their forces properly and demonstrating that labour must be organised.

The generation of people who are now at the age of fifty

cannot expect to see a communist society. This generation will be gone before then. But the generation of those who are now fifteen will see a communist society, and will itself build this society. This generation should know that the entire purpose of their lives is to build a communist society. In the old society, each family worked separately and labour was not organised by anybody except the landowners and capitalists, who oppressed the masses of the people. We must organise all labour, no matter how toilsome or messy it may be, in such a way that every worker and peasant will be able to say: I am part of the great army of free labour, and shall be able to build up my life without the landowners and capitalists, able to help establish a communist system. The Young Communist League should teach all young people to engage in conscious and disciplined labour from an early age. In this way we can be confident that the problems now confronting us will be solved. We must assume that no less than ten years will be required for the electrification of the country, so that our impoverished land may profit from the latest achievements of technology. And so, the generation of those who are now fifteen years old, and will be living in a communist society in ten or twenty years' time, should tackle all its educational tasks in such a way that every day, in every village and city, the young people shall engage in the practical solution of some problem of labour in common, even though the smallest or the simplest. The success of communist construction will be assured when this is done in every village, as communist emulation develops, and the youth prove that they can unite their labour. Only by regarding your every step from the standpoint of the success of that construction, and only by asking ourselves whether we have done all we can to be united and politically-conscious working people will the Young Communist League succeed in uniting its half a million members into a single army of labour and win universal respect. (*Stormy applause.*)

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT A CONGRESS OF LEATHER INDUSTRY WORKERS OCTOBER 2, 1920[96]

Comrades, in compliance with the wish expressed by the organisers of your congress, the political position of our Republic will be the subject of my report. In this respect, the chief thing I have to deal with is undoubtedly our war with Poland, the general course of events in connection with that war, and what has consequently become revealed concerning the domestic and international position of our Republic.

You are all, of course, aware of the present gravity of our position at the front. In this connection it will be natural if we examine the circumstances that have made the situation so acute, and given it such a turn for the worse. You will of course remember that last April, when the Polish offensive had not yet begun, the line of the front lay farther eastward, in many places very much farther eastward, than at present. As it then was, the line left Minsk in Polish hands; the Poles held the whole of Byelorussia. Not only the Council of People's Commissars, but the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee itself—the highest body in the R.S.F.S.R.—solemnly declared in a manifesto to the Polish people that they proposed peace, and rejected the idea of deciding by force of arms the fate of Byelorussia, which had never been Polish, and whose peasant population had long suffered from the Polish landowners and did not regard themselves as Poles. Nevertheless, we declared in the most official and solemn terms that we proposed peace on the basis of the then existing line,

since we set so high a value on the workers who would have to lay down their lives in case of war that we considered no concessions too important by comparison. We presumed that the question of Byelorussia would be settled, not by force of arms, but exclusively through the development of the struggle within Poland. We knew that we could contribute to the liberation of Poland's toilers, not so much by the force of arms as through the force of our propaganda.

That was last April, and you know that at first Poland replied to our solemn offer of peace with a manoeuvre, a proposal that peace should be signed in Borisov, a highly important strategic point, which was in their hands. Negotiations in Polish-held Borisov would have meant that the Poles could advance in the south-west while we would have been prevented from advancing in the north-west. Any other city but Borisov, was our reply. The Poles refused. I remind you of this so that, whenever you have to speak on this subject, you may the more emphatically stress the point that at first we proposed peace on the basis of a line lying farther eastward than the present one, that is, we agreed to a peace which was most disadvantageous to ourselves.

The Poles have forced the war on us; we know that it was not even the Polish landowners or the Polish capitalists that have played the chief role here, since Poland's position was as desperate then as it is now. She has embarked on this venture in sheer desperation. But, of course, international capital, and in the first place French capital, was the chief force driving the Poles into a war with us. It has so far been established that hundreds of French officers have been serving with the Polish army, and that all the weapons, all the financial and military support Poland has received, have come from France.

Such are the conditions in which this war began. It marked a new attempt by the Allies to destroy the Soviet Republic, an attempt, following the collapse of the Yudenich plan, to crush the Soviet Republic, this time with the help of Poland. You are acquainted with the main events in this war with Poland, which began against our wish. You know that at first the Poles were successful, and captured Kiev in the south-west. Then there was a fairly

long interval in which the Red Army was able to concentrate its forces and to start an offensive, whereupon the Poles began to lose one point after another. They lost Polotsk, and so on. But it was not until July that the Red Army began a decisive offensive, which proved so successful that we effected an advance almost unparalleled in military history. The Red Army advanced 500, 600, and in many cases even 800 versts without a stop, and almost reached Warsaw. Warsaw was considered practically lost to Poland. That, at least, was the opinion of the world press. Then the tide turned. By the time our troops had got within reach of Warsaw they were too exhausted to press home the victory, whereas the Polish troops supported by a wave of patriotism in Warsaw, and with a feeling that they were now on their own soil, found encouragement and a fresh opportunity to advance. The war, as it turned out, had enabled us almost to rout Poland completely, but at the decisive moment our strength failed us.

I could speak of this at greater length, but, in keeping with the topic of my report, I must dwell on the political situation that had developed at the time. We have seen that when, before the April offensive, we proposed peace to the Polish Republic on terms that were most advantageous to the Poles and disadvantageous to us, the bourgeois press all over the world raised a hullabaloo, and our outspoken declaration was taken as a sign of weakness. If the Bolsheviks were proposing peace on the basis of the line then held by the Polish troops, and if the Bolsheviks were even surrendering Minsk, then they must surely be weak. On the outbreak of the war, even the British monarch sent a message of congratulations to the head of the Polish landowner government.

On July 12, as you very likely remember, we suddenly received a telegram from the Secretary of the League of Nations to the effect that the Polish Government were willing to start negotiations for peace on the basis of ethnographic boundaries, and provided the whole of Galicia were given to Poland. An unparalleled uproar was raised in the world press. This time they were all for peace. When we proposed peace in April, or even earlier, in the spring of 1920, all these newspapers were silent, or else urged Poland

to fight. But when we had defeated Poland and it was Poland that was asking for peace—to which we replied by clearly and frankly stating our opinion that the League of Nations did not represent any force and that we could not rely on any promise it made—they all raised a hullabaloo and demanded that we should call a halt. Now that the fortunes of war have changed, and we announced yesterday that we were offering Poland peace on terms more favourable than the League of Nations had proposed, on condition peace was signed before October 5, the whole bourgeois press has again fallen silent. They are silent about peace when the Bolsheviks are attacked, but raise an outcry when it is the Bolsheviks who are attacking. And after all this, they want us to believe that the bourgeois press wants peace. At our Party's conference, which ended a few days ago, we were able to hear a report by a Polish worker, representative of one of the largest trade unions in Poland,[97] who managed to get through from Warsaw. He told us of the persecution of the workers in Poland, how the Warsaw workers looked to the Red Army as their liberator, and how they were waiting for the coming of the Russian Red Army, which they regard, not as their enemy but, on the contrary, as their friend in their struggle against the landowners and the bourgeois oppressors of Poland. It is quite clear that Poland is the Entente's cat's-paw in a new attempt to destroy the Soviet Republic; however, when this attempt threatened to lead to a diametrically opposite result and we were on the point of helping the Polish workers overthrow their government, the entire European bourgeois press turned on us. Comrade Kamenev, who visited London, has told us here in the Bolshoi Theatre how he daily heard ultimatums and threats from the British Government, which was already prepared to mobilise its whole navy against Petrograd and concentrate it at Kronstadt, allegedly to defend Poland against us. Now that the fortunes of war have changed and we are withdrawing from our terms everything Poland has declared unacceptable, the bourgeois press has fallen silent. It is quite clear that French and British imperialism is inciting Poland to make a fresh attempt to overthrow the Soviets.

I think that this is a last attempt (and this is undoubtedly

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

important) at an offensive against Soviet Russia. It appears that Poland is too closely bound up with the whole system of international imperialism. You know that, after defeating Germany, the Allied imperialists—France, Great Britain, America and Japan—signed the Peace of Versailles, which, to say the least, was far more brutal than the infamous Peace of Brest-Litovsk, over which such an outcry was raised. But while the French, the Americans and the British proclaimed from the house-tops that this was a war of liberation, that its purpose was to save Europe and the world from the barbarian Huns, as they called the Germans, to save the world from German militarism and the German Kaiser, we now find that the Peace of Versailles outdoes in atrocity anything the Kaiser was capable of when he was victor. The interference of British and French officers in economic life has proved to all the defeated countries, to Germany and to all the countries that made up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that it is impossible to live under such conditions. One of the pillars of this monstrous peace is Poland's cutting across Germany, since Polish territory stretches to the sea. Relations between Germany and Poland are at present strained to the utmost. In oppressing the German population, the Poles have the support of the Entente troops and officers. The Versailles Peace has turned Poland into a buffer state which is to guard against German contact with Soviet communism and is regarded by the Entente as a weapon against the Bolsheviks. Through Poland and with the help of Poland, the French are hoping to recover the tens of thousands of millions loaned to the tsarist government. That is why, when the war with Poland broke out, which we tried to avert even at the price of heavy concessions, it proved to be a more direct war against the Entente than previous wars had been. The latter, in which Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich attacked us, were also conducted with the aid of officers and hundreds of millions provided by the Allies, with the aid of their guns and tanks. The previous wars were also wars against the Entente, but they were fought on Russian territory against Russian whiteguard officers and the peasants they had mobilised and they could not become wars that could shake the Peace of Versailles. That is where they differed from

the war against Poland. The war against Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin was also a war against the Entente, but at the same time it was a war of working-class Russia against the whole of bourgeois Russia. When it ended in victory and when we smashed Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin, this was not a direct attack on the Peace of Versailles. The reverse is true of Poland; that is what distinguishes the war against Poland, and constitutes Poland's international significance.

When we were victoriously pressing our offensive on Poland, the whole of Europe began to vociferate that they wanted peace, that the whole world was tired of war, and that it was time to make peace. But now that the Poles are advancing, there is no outcry that people are tired of war. Why is that? It is because, by defeating Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin, we could not destroy the Peace of Versailles; we were merely falling upon Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin and driving them into the sea. However, in attacking Poland we are thereby attacking the Entente itself; by destroying the Polish army we are destroying the Peace of Versailles, on which the whole present system of international relations rests.

Had Poland turned Soviet, had the Warsaw workers received from Soviet Russia help they awaited and welcomed, the Peace of Versailles would have been smashed, and the entire international system set up as a result of the victory over Germany would have collapsed. France would then not have had a buffer protecting Germany against Soviet Russia. She would not have had a battering-ram against the Soviet Republic. She would have had no hope of recovering her tens of thousands of millions, and would be heading for disaster even more rapidly than she now is. France is up to her ears in debt. Once the wealthiest of money-lenders, she now owes America three times as much as other countries do. She is heading for bankruptcy. Her position is hopeless. That is why the approach of the Red troops to Warsaw meant an international crisis; that is why the entire bourgeois press was so agitated by it. Such was the position that, had the Red Army advanced victoriously another few days, not only would Warsaw have been captured (that would not have mattered so

much), but the Peace of Versailles would have been destroyed.

Therein lies the international significance of this Polish war; You know that we harboured no plans of conquest. I said at the beginning of my speech that in April 1920 we stood east of Minsk and proposed peace on those terms, if only we could save the workers and peasants of Russia from a new war. But since war has been forced upon us, we must fight it to a victorious finish. The Peace of Versailles is oppressing hundreds of millions of people. It is robbing Germany of coal, robbing her of her milch herds, and is reducing her to an unparalleled and unprecedented state of servitude. Even the most backward sections of Germany's peasant population have declared that they are for the Bolsheviks, that they are allies of the Bolsheviks; that is quite natural, for, in its struggle for existence, the Soviet Republic is the only force in the world which is combating imperialism—and imperialism now means an alliance of France, Britain and America. We are approaching the hub of the present international system. When the Red troops approached the frontier of Poland, the Red Army's victorious advance created an unprecedented political crisis. The main feature of this crisis was that, when the British Government threatened us with war, and told us that if we advanced any farther they would fight us and send their warships against us, the British workers declared that they would not permit this war. Let me tell you that Bolshevism is spreading among the British workers. However, the Communists there are just as weak today as we were in March, April and May 1917, when we had one-tenth of the votes at conferences and congresses. At the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets in June 1917, we had no more than 13 per cent of the votes. A similar situation exists in Great Britain: there the Bolsheviks are in an insignificant minority. But the point is that the British Mensheviks have always been opposed to Bolshevism and direct revolution, and have favoured an alliance with the bourgeoisie. Today, however, the old leaders of the British workers have begun to waver and have changed their minds: they were opposed to the dictatorship of the working class, but now they have come over to our side. They have set up

a Council of Action over there in Britain. This is a radical change in British politics. Alongside of Parliament, which in Great Britain is now elected by almost universal suffrage (since 1918), there has arisen a self-appointed Council of Action which relies on support from the workers' trade unions with a membership of over six million. When the government wanted to begin a war against Soviet Russia, the workers declared that they would not allow it, and said they would not let the French fight either, because the French depend upon British coal, and should this industry come to a standstill it would be a severe blow to France.

I repeat that this was a tremendous turning-point in British politics. Its significance to Great Britain is as great as the revolution of February 1917 was to us. The revolution of February 1917 overthrew tsarism and set up a bourgeois republic in Russia. There is no republic in Great Britain, but her thoroughly bourgeois monarchy has existed for many centuries. The workers can vote in the parliamentary elections, but all foreign policy is conducted outside Parliament, for it is the province of the Cabinet. We have long known that the British Government are waging an undercover war on Russia and are helping Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin. We have often met with statements in the British press to the effect that Great Britain has no right to send a single soldier to Russia. Who, then, voted for this measure? What act of Parliament authorised war on Russia in aid of Yudenich and Kolchak? There have been no such acts, and by actions like this Great Britain has violated her own constitution. What then is this Council of Action? Independently of Parliament, this Council of Action has presented an ultimatum to the government on behalf of the workers. This is a step towards dictatorship, and there is no other way out of the situation. This is taking place in Great Britain, which is an imperialist country with 400 or 500 million people enslaved in her colonies. She is a most important country, which rules the greater part of the population of the earth. The advance on Poland has led to such a turn of affairs that the British Mensheviks have entered into an alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks. That is what this offensive has done.

The entire British bourgeois press declared that the Council of Action meant the Soviets. They were right. It did not call itself by that name, but actually that is what it was. It is the same kind of dual power as we had under Kerensky from March 1917 onwards, a time when the Provisional Government was considered the only government, but actually could do nothing of significance without the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, a time when we said to the Soviets: "Take over all power." A similar situation has now arisen in Britain, and the Mensheviks on this "Council of Action" have been obliged to adopt an anti-constitutional course. This will give you some idea of what our war with Poland has meant. Though the international bourgeoisie are still immeasurably stronger than we are, and the British Government has put the whole blame on Kamenev, expelled him from Great Britain, and will not let him return, this is but an empty and ridiculous threat, for the best defenders of the American and British capitalists, the moderate British labour leaders—those Right Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries—have joined the Council of Action, and Great Britain is now facing a new crisis. She is now threatened with a coal miners' general strike. The strikers are demanding, not only higher pay but a cut in coal prices. One wave of strikes is following another in Great Britain. The strikers are demanding higher wages. However, if the workers win a 10 per cent wage rise today, prices go up 20 per cent tomorrow. Prices are rising, and the workers see that their struggle gets them nowhere and that, despite wage increases, they are losing, because of the higher prices. So the workers are demanding, not only higher pay for the coal miners but lower coal prices as well. This has led to the British bourgeois press panicking in even greater horror than when the Red Army entered Poland.

You know how the European crisis has affected Italy. Italy is one of the victor powers, and when the Red Army's successes led to a movement in Germany and a change in British policy, the struggle in Italy became so acute that the workers began to seize the factories, take over the factory owners' dwellings, and rouse the rural population.

The present situation in Italy is far removed from any form of class peace.

That was the course taken by the Polish war. That is why, while realising that the Polish war was closely linked up with the international imperialism's entire position, we agreed to make the greatest concessions to save the workers and peasants from the hardships of war. Then we clashed with the Peace of Versailles, and found that the bourgeoisie was just as incensed against us as ever; however, we also found that the workers were maturing daily and hourly, and that the workers' revolution was steadily approaching, although all too slowly as compared with the speed of developments in Russia. It was possible to accomplish the revolution so rapidly in Russia because it took place in wartime. During the war tens of millions of Russian workers and peasants were armed, and against such a force the bourgeoisie and the officers were powerless. During the October days they threatened to lead an army against Petrograd. We used to receive tens of thousands of telegrams from all the fronts saying: "We are marching against you to wipe you out." "Well have a try", we said to ourselves. When delegates arrived from each of the armies, a thirty minutes' talk was enough to show that the soldiers were with us, and the officers had to hold their tongues. The attempts at resistance, the plots of Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin came later, after the army had been demobilised. That is why the revolution could succeed so rapidly in Russia. The people were armed. The workers and peasants proved to be on our side to a man. In Europe, however, the war is over. The armies have been demobilised; the soldiers have returned to their homes; the workers and peasants are disarmed. Developments there are slow now, but they are on the move. The international bourgeoisie has only to raise a hand against us to have it seized by its own workers. That is the international significance of the war with Poland. That is the source of the international crisis. That, too, is the source of our new difficulties now. It was when, as you know, we lacked just a little strength to reach Warsaw, hand over power to the Warsaw workers, convene Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in Warsaw, and say to them "We have come to your aid",

when, after heroic efforts without parallel or precedent in the past, our army's strength was spent, that the moment of our military defeat came.

We have now fallen back very far to the east. In the north we have even lost the town of Lida; in the south we are almost on the line we held in April 1919—the Pilsudski line. In the north we are retreating very rapidly, and in the meantime Wrangel is making ever new attempts to advance. He recently threatened Ekaterinoslav, approached Sinelnikovo and got control of it. He has now captured Slavgorod. In the east, he has captured Mariupol, is approaching Taganrog and threatening the Donets Basin. We are again in difficult straits, and again we see the international imperialists attempting to strangle the Soviet Republic with both hands: the Polish offensive and the Wrangel offensive. In fact, Poland and Wrangel are the two hands of the French imperialists, who are supplying the troops both of Poland and of Wrangel with munitions. But these three forces are not getting along very well together. France tells the Poles that they should not grab too many resources, too much territory, because a tsarist Russia will never let them keep it. Then she tells Wrangel that he must not act so as to restore the power of the old landowners, for the example of Denikin, Kolchak and Yudenich shows that when the old landowners direct the whiteguard armies, or when their officers command the armies, the more territory they seize, the sooner that leads to their ruin, because in the end the peasants rise up in revolt against them.

As long as Wrangel has a crack officer army he can rely on it; Wrangel's strength lies in his possessing splendid weapons of the most up-to-date type and a crack officer army. When he effected a landing in the Kuban region, his army was so selected that every company and regiment could be developed into an entire division, because it consisted entirely of officers. But as soon as he attempts to repeat what Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich did in the past, i.e., seize more territory, so as to mobilise a larger peasant population and create a mass army, his success will at once give way to defeat; just as the peasant army was opposed to Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich, so it will

never march with Wrangel's officer army. The Warsaw worker who addressed the Party Conference formulated it as follows: the Polish army, which formerly consisted of youngsters (raw lads just called up for service), has been destroyed. Men up to the age of 35 have now been mobilised; these are adults who have been through the imperialist war, and this army, as far as the Polish landowners and capitalists are concerned, is by no means as reliable as an army of youngsters.

That is how matters stand with regard to the international situation. In the war against the Entente, owing to the defeat we have suffered at Warsaw and the offensive now continuing on the Western and Wrangel fronts, our position is again highly critical. I must therefore conclude my brief report by appealing to our comrades in the leather industry and pointing out to them that we must once again bend every effort, for the defeat of Wrangel is now our principal task. This will call for tremendous effort and initiative on the part of the workers, the trade unions, the proletarian masses, and first and foremost of those workers who are closely associated with the branches of industry that are connected with defence. Our chief difficulty in the present war is not manpower—we have enough of that—but supplies. The chief difficulty on all the fronts is the shortage of supplies, the shortage of warm clothing and footwear. Greatcoats and boots—that is the main thing our soldiers lack, and it is on that account that quite successful advances have so often failed. That is the difficulty which prevents us from rapidly utilising for a victorious advance the new units, which we possess in sufficient numbers, but which, without sufficient supplies, cannot be formed and cannot be of any real combat value.

Both the leather workers' union and this assembly, which represents the entire proletariat in this industry, must give their most serious attention to this. Comrades, it depends on you to make the forthcoming offensive against Wrangel, for which we are mustering all our forces, as rapid and successful as it can possibly be. It depends on you, because the measures being taken by the Soviet Government and the Communist Party are not enough. To give real help to the Red Army men, to secure a decisive turn for the

better, and to improve supplies, the assistance of Soviet institutions, the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence,[98] and Party decisions are not enough: what is required is help from the trade unions. The trade unions must realise that, despite our repeated offers of peace, the very existence of the workers' and peasants' power is once more at stake. You know how this power gained in strength after the collapse of Denikin, Kolchak and Yudenich. You know how the grain collections improved thanks to the recovery of Siberia and the Kuban region; you know that the capture of Baku has now enabled us to secure over a hundred million poods of oil, and how our industry has at last begun to acquire the foundation on which it is possible to create stocks of grain and bring the workers back to the factories, accumulate raw material and provide fuel, so that the factories may be started and economic life restored at last. But for all these possibilities to materialise, we must at all costs put an end to the war, and speed up the offensive against Wrangel. The Crimea must be recovered before winter comes in the south and that will depend on the energy and initiative of the workers themselves, and above all, perhaps, on the energy and initiative of every Russian leather worker and of the Leather Workers' Union.

I appeal to you to follow the example of our Petrograd workers, who recently, after a report by a representative of the Communist International on the situation at the fronts, once more began to make tremendous efforts to help the cause, again beginning with munitions for the Red Army men, and building up the strength of the Red Army. You know that each step taken in the rear to help the Red Army has an immediate effect on the morale of the Red Army men. You know that the autumn cold affects the Red Army men, depresses them, creates new difficulties, increases the number of sick men and results in great hardships. All aid given by the rear to the Red Army men immediately helps strengthen the Red Army, fortify its morale, bring down the number of sick and increase its offensive power. At every meeting and in every workshop, every worker must now make the slogan "Everything for the Red Army!" the chief topic of his talks, reports and meetings.

What we must ask ourselves is: have we done everything in our power to help the Red Army? On this help depends how soon we settle final accounts with Wrangel and fully ensure for ourselves peace and the possibility of constructive work in the economic field. (*Applause.*)

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October 9 and 10, 1920

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TO THE POOR PEASANTS OF THE UKRAINE

Comrades, the tsarist general Wrangel is building up his offensive against the Ukraine and Russia. With backing from the French capitalists, he is pushing forward, threatening the Donets Basin and Ekaterinoslav. The danger is grave. Once again the landowners are trying to re-establish their power, get their estates back, and re-enslave the peasants.

Comrades, the Ukrainian countryside has endured unparalleled sufferings under the yoke of the landowners. The latter have more than once been able to overthrow the Soviets, the workers' and peasants' power; more than once they have been helped by the kulaks, the rich peasants, who either went over openly to their side or hampered the poor and working peasants' efforts to introduce the new order, the new way of life, the new organisation in the villages. Each such attempt to restore the rule of the landowners has ended in a new victory for the workers and peasants. Today, all over the Ukraine, the poor villagers have begun to set up their committees so as to smash the resistance of the handful of the rich, and finally to establish the rule of the working people. Wrangel, general of the landowners, is increasing his pressure with the intention of routing these organisations of the working people.

Comrades, rise up to a man to hurl Wrangel back. Let all committees of poor peasants bend every effort to help the Red Army crush Wrangel. Not a single working peasant should stand aside in the struggle for the cause of the workers and peasants, or remain inactive or indifferent. Comrades,

remember that this is a matter of saving the lives of your families, of defending the peasants' land and their rule.

Rally for aid to the Red Army!

Death to the oppressor landowners!

Lenin

2.10.1920

Kommunist (Kiev) No. 199, October 13, 1920

Published according to the manuscript

ON PROLETARIAN CULTURE[99]

We see from *Izvestia* of October 8 that, in his address to the Proletcult Congress, Comrade Lunacharsky said things that were *diametrically opposite* to what he and I had agreed upon yesterday.[100]

It is necessary that a draft resolution (of the Proletcult Congress) should be drawn up with the utmost urgency, and that it should be endorsed by the Central Committee, in time to have it put to the vote *at this very* session of the Proletcult. On behalf of the Central Committee it should be submitted not later than today, for endorsement both by the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education and by the Proletcult Congress, because the Congress is closing today.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

1) All educational work in the Soviet Republic of workers and peasants, in the field of political education in general and in the field of art in particular, should be imbued with the spirit of the class struggle being waged by the proletariat for the successful achievement of the aims of its dictatorship, i.e., the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of classes, and the elimination of all forms of exploitation of man by man.

2) Hence, the proletariat, both through its vanguard—the Communist Party—and through the many types of proletarian organisations in general, should display the utmost activity and play the leading part in all the work of public education.

3) All the experience of modern history and, particularly, the more than half-century-old revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of all countries since the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* has unquestionably demonstrated

that the Marxist world outlook is the only true expression of the interests, the viewpoint, and the culture of the revolutionary proletariat.

4) Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture. Only further work on this basis and in this direction, inspired by the practical experience of the proletarian dictatorship as the final stage in the struggle against every form of exploitation, can be recognised as the development of a genuine proletarian culture.

5) Adhering unswervingly to this stand of principle, the All-Russia Proletcult Congress rejects in the most resolute manner, as theoretically unsound and practically harmful, all attempts to invent one's own particular brand of culture, to remain isolated in self-contained organisations, to draw a line dividing the field of work of the People's Commissariat of Education and the Proletcult, or to set up a Proletcult "autonomy" within establishments under the People's Commissariat of Education and so forth. On the contrary, the Congress enjoins all Proletcult organisations to fully consider themselves in duty bound to act as auxiliary bodies of the network of establishments under the People's Commissariat of Education, and to accomplish their tasks under the general guidance of the Soviet authorities (specifically, of the People's Commissariat of Education) and of the Russian Communist Party, as part of the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship.

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Comrade Lunacharsky says that his words have been distorted. In that case this resolution is needed *all the more* urgently.

Written on October 8, 1920
First published in 1926

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A CONFERENCE OF CHAIRMEN OF UYEZD, VOLOST AND VILLAGE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF MOSCOW GUBERNIA OCTOBER 15, 1920[101]

Comrades, in my report on the domestic and the external position of the Republic, which you wished to hear, I shall naturally have to devote most of my remarks to the war with Poland and its causes. It was this war which in the main determined the Republic's domestic and external position during the past six months. Now that the preliminaries for a peace with Poland have just been signed, it is possible and necessary to take a general look at this war and its significance and try to give thought to the lessons we have all learnt from the war which has just ended, though nobody knows whether it has ended for good. I would therefore like first to remind you that it was on April 26 of this year that the Poles began their offensive. The Soviet Republic solemnly and formally proposed a peace to the Poles, the Polish landowners and the Polish bourgeoisie, on terms more favourable than those we have offered them now, despite the tremendous reverses our troops suffered at Warsaw, and the even greater reverses during the retreat from Warsaw. At the end of the April of this year, the Poles held a line between 50 and 150 versts to the east of the one they now regard as the line of a preliminary peace; though at that time the line was manifestly an unfair one, we solemnly proposed peace to them on behalf of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, since, as you all of course know and remember, the Soviet government was mainly concerned at the time with ensuring the transition to peaceful construction. We had no reason for wishing to resort to arms in settling questions in dispute between ourselves and the Polish state. We were fully aware

that the Polish state was, and still is, a state of the landowners and capitalists, and that it is fully dependant on the capitalists of the Entente countries, in particular on France. Though at the time Poland controlled, not only the whole of Lithuania but also Byelorussia, to say nothing of Eastern Galicia, we considered it our duty to do everything possible to avert a war, so as to give the working class and the peasantry of Russia at least a brief respite from imperialist and civil wars, and at last enable them to get down in earnest to peaceful work. The events that ensued have happened all too frequently: our straightforward and public offer of peace on the line the Poles actually held was taken as a sign of weakness. Bourgeois diplomats of all countries are unaccustomed to such frank statements and our readiness to accept a peace along a line so disadvantageous to us was taken and interpreted as proof of our extreme weakness. The French capitalists succeeded in inciting the Polish capitalists to go to war. You will remember how, after a brief interval following upon the Polish offensive, we replied by dealing a counter-blow and almost reached Warsaw, after which our troops suffered a heavy defeat, and were thrown back.

For over a month and right down to the present, our troops were retreating and suffered reverses, for they were utterly worn out, exhausted by their unparalleled advance from Polotsk to Warsaw. But, I repeat, despite this difficult situation, peace was signed on terms less advantageous to Poland than the earlier ones. The earlier frontier lay 50 versts to the east, whereas it is now 50 versts to the west. Thus, though we signed a peace at a time favourable only to the enemy, when our troops were on the retreat and Wrangel was building up his offensive, we signed a peace treaty on more favourable terms. This once again proves to you that when the Soviet Government proposes peace, its words and statements have to be treated seriously; otherwise what will happen is that we shall offer peace on terms less favourable to us, and get this peace on better terms. This is a lesson the Polish landowners and capitalists will not, of course, forget; they realise that they have gone too far; the peace terms now give them less territory than was offered previously. This is not the first lesson

either. You all probably remember that, in the spring of 1919, a representative of the U.S. Government came to Moscow and proposed a preliminary peace with us and with all the whiteguard commanders at the time: Kolchak, Denikin and others, a peace which would have been extremely unfavourable to us. When he returned and reported on our peace terms, they were not considered advantageous, and the war went on. You are aware of the outcome of the war. This is not the first time that the Soviet state has proved that it is considerably stronger than it appears, and that our diplomatic Notes do not contain the boasts and threats that are usual with all bourgeois governments; consequently, rejecting an offer of peace from Soviet Russia means getting that peace some time later on terms that are far worse. Such things are not forgotten in international politics; after proving to the Polish landowners that they have now obtained a peace worse than the one which we originally offered, we shall teach the Polish people, the Polish peasants and workers, to weigh and compare the statements of their government and ours.

Many of you may have read in the newspapers the American Government's Note, in which it declares: "We do not wish to have any dealings with the Soviet Government because it does not honour its obligations."[102] This does not surprise us, because it has been said for many years, the only outcome being that all their attempts to invade Soviet Russia have ended in disaster. The Polish newspapers, nearly all of which are in the pay of the landowners and the capitalists—there this is called freedom of the press—assert that the Soviet government cannot be trusted, since it is a government of tyrants and frauds. All Polish newspapers say the same thing, but the Polish workers and peasants compare these words with the facts, and the facts show that we demonstrated our attachment to peace the very first time we made our peace offer; by concluding peace in October we proved this again. You will not find proof of this kind in the history of any bourgeois government, a fact that cannot but leave its impress on the minds of the Polish workers and peasants. The Soviet Government signed a peace when it was not to its advantage to do so. It is only in this way that we shall teach the governments

that are controlled by the landowners and capitalists to stop lying; only in this way shall we destroy the faith the workers and peasants have in them. We must give more thought to this than to anything else. Soviet power in Russia is surrounded by countless enemies, and yet these enemies are impotent. Think of the course and outcome of the Polish war. We now know that the French capitalists stood behind Poland, that they supplied Poland with money and munitions, and sent them French officers. We quite recently received information that African troops, namely French colonial troops, had appeared on the Polish front. This means that the war was waged by France with aid from Britain and America. At the same time, France recognised the lawful government of Russia in the person of Wrangel—so Wrangel too was backed by France, who provided him with the means to equip and maintain an army. Britain and America are also aiding Wrangel's army. Consequently, three allies stood against us: France, supported by the world's wealthy countries, Poland, and Wrangel—yet we have emerged from this war by concluding a favourable peace. In other words, we have won. Anyone who examines the map will see that we have won, that we have emerged from this war with more territory than we had before it started. But is the enemy weaker than we are? Is he weaker in the military sense? Has he got fewer men and munitions? No, he has more of everything. This enemy is stronger than we are, and yet he has been beaten. This is what we must give thought to in order to understand Soviet Russia's position with respect to all other countries.

When we Bolsheviks started the revolution, we said that h could and should be started, but at the same time we did not forget that it could be successfully ended and brought to an absolutely victorious conclusion, without confining ourselves to Russia alone, but, in alliance with a number of countries, after defeating international capital. Russian capital is linked up with international capital. When our enemies say to us: even if you were to win in Russia, your cause will nevertheless perish because the other capitalist states will crush you, we now have an answer—the highly important experience of the war with Poland, which shows how things have actually turned out. Indeed, why did it happen

that, within six months and even less, if we take April as the beginning of the offensive, France, Poland and Wrangel, who were stronger than we are, were full of hatred of Bolshevism, and were determined to overthrow Soviet power, have been defeated, and the war has ended in our favour? How could it have happened that Soviet Russia, exhausted by the imperialist and civil wars, surrounded by enemies, and cut off from every source of supplies and equipment—this Soviet Russia has proved the victor? We must reflect on this because, if we go deeper into this question, we begin to understand the mechanism, not only of the Russian but of the world revolution as well. We see confirmation of the fact that the Russian revolution is but a single link in the chain of the world revolution, and that our cause is strong and invincible because the cause of revolution is developing throughout the world; economic conditions are evolving in a way that is making our enemies weaker and us stronger with every day. The Polish war has again proved that this is neither exaggeration, boasting nor over-enthusiasm. Three allies were fighting against us. One might have thought that uniting these three allies should present no difficulty but it appeared that, taught by the great experience of Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin campaigns, they were unable to unite against us and squabbled at every step. In this connection, the history of the Polish war, which has only just ended, is particularly instructive. Our march on Warsaw—the Red Army's march, in which weary, exhausted and poorly-clad soldiers covered over 600 versts, inflicting one defeat after another on the Polish troops, who were excellently trained, with hundreds of the best French officer instructors—showed us the kind of relations that existed among our enemies. On July 12, when the Red Army troops were approaching the Polish frontier, we received a telegram from Britain's Foreign Secretary, Curzon, on behalf of the League of Nations, that notorious League of Nations, an alliance which professes to unite Britain, France, America, Italy and Japan, countries with a tremendous military potential and possessing all the navies of the world, and against whom military resistance might seem perfectly impossible and absurd. On behalf of this League of Nations, Curzon proposed that

we stop the war and enter into negotiations with the Poles in London. According to this telegram, the boundary should pass near Grodno, Byelostok, Brest-Litovsk and along the River San in Eastern Galicia. To this proposal we replied that we recognised no League of Nations, since we had seen its insignificance and the disregard that even its members had for its decisions. The French Government considered our reply insolent, and one would have thought that this League of Nations would come out against us. But what happened? The League of Nations fell apart at our very first declaration, and Britain and France fell on each other.

For several years Britain's Secretary for War Churchill has been employing every means, both lawful and more often unlawful from the viewpoint of British law, to help the whiteguards against Russia, so as to supply them with military equipment. He hates Soviet Russia bitterly, yet immediately after our declaration Britain fell out with France, because France needs the forces of a whiteguard Russia to protect her against Germany, while Britain needs no such protection. Britain, a naval power, fears no such action because she has a most powerful navy. Thus, the League of Nations, which has sent such unprecedented threats to Russia, was itself helpless from the very outset. At every step the interests of the League's member states are patently in conflict. France desires the defeat of Britain, and vice versa. When Comrade Kamenev was negotiating with the British Government in London and asked the British Prime Minister, "Let us suppose that you will really do what you say, what about France?", the British Prime Minister had to reply that France would go her own way. He said that Britain could not take the same road as France. It became plain that the League of Nations was non-existent, that the alliance of the capitalist powers is sheer fraud, and that in actual fact it is an alliance of robbers, each trying to snatch something from the others. When at the conclusion of peace in Riga, we discovered what divided Poland, Britain, France and Wrangel, and why they could not act in unison, we learnt that their interests differed: Britain wanted to have the small succession states—Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—in her

sphere of influence and was not interested in the restoration of tsarist or whiteguard or even bourgeois Russia; she even stood to lose from it. That was why Britain was acting counter to France and could not unite with Poland and Wrangel.' France's concern was to fight to the last Polish soldier for her interests and the debts owed to her. She hoped we would pay her the 20-thousand-million debt incurred by the former tsar and recognised by the Kerensky government. Any sensible person will realise that the French capitalists will never see the colour of their money; the French capitalists realise that the French workers and peasants cannot be made to fight, while Polish soldiers are plentiful and can be driven into battle—so let them die that the French capitalists may get their millions back. However, the Polish workers too can see that the French, British and other officers behave in Poland just as if they were in a conquered country. That was why, during the Riga negotiations, we saw that the party of the Polish workers and peasants which is undoubtedly patriotic and undoubtedly hostile to Bolshevism, just like our Right-wing Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, stood for peace and was opposed to the government of the Polish landowners and capitalists, who up to the last moment tried to wreck the peace treaty, and even now want to do so and will go on doing so for a long time to come. I shall have to speak on this point when I come to the question of whether the preliminary peace we have just concluded will last.

The third ally, Wrangel, who fought for the return of the whole of Russia to the landowners and the capitalists, regards Poland as part of Russia. All the Russian tsars, landowners and capitalists were accustomed to regarding Poland as their prey; they never forgot that Poland had long ago been crushed by the Russian serf army led to war by the tsar. That meant that, had Wrangel been victorious, he would have used his victory in order to restore full power, both in Russia and in Poland, to the landowners. What happened, however, was that, when the three allies stood ready to attack us, they began by falling out among themselves. France's aims are alien to both the Polish peasant and the Polish worker, while Wrangel's aims are alien even to any Polish landowner. And now, when we hear Wrangel's

radio or the French Government radio from Paris, we learn that France and Wrangel are gnashing their teeth because they realise the implication of this peace which we have concluded with Poland, though they assert that this is no peace, and that Poland cannot sign it. We shall see what we shall see, but meanwhile a peace has been signed. Actually, neither Wrangel nor France understands how it could have come about. They cannot stomach the miracle of a devastated Soviet Russia defeating civilised countries far stronger than she is. They do not understand that these victories stem from the fundamental doctrine of the Communists, which says that property divides whereas labour unites. Private property is robbery, and a state based on private property is a state of robbers, who are fighting for a share of the spoils. Though they have not yet finished this war, they are already fighting among themselves. A year ago fourteen states were threatening us, yet the alliance of these fourteen states at once fell apart. Why did it fall apart? Simply because the agreement between these states only existed on paper, and not one of them went to war. When a war started and France, Poland and Wrangel joined forces, their alliance too fell apart, because they were trying to trip one another up. As the Russian proverb says, they were trying to share out the skin of a bear they had not yet killed. They were, in fact, squabbling over a bear they would never kill.

The experience of world politics has shown that the alliance against Soviet Russia is irretrievably doomed to failure, because it is an imperialist alliance, an alliance of plunderers who are not united, and are bound by no genuine or permanent interests. They lack that which unites the working class; they have no common interests, which was again revealed during the Polish war. When our Red Army crushed the resistance of the Poles, captured Byelostok and Brest-Litovsk and approached the Polish frontier, this signified the collapse of the entire established system of international politics, for it is based on the Treaty of Versailles, which is a treaty of robbers and plunderers. When the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was imposed on us, a burden we bore so long, there was a world-wide outcry that is was a robber's peace. After Germany's defeat, the

League of Nations which had declared, during the war against Germany, that it was being fought for liberation and democracy, imposed a peace on the vanquished country, but it was a usurer's peace, an oppressor's peace, a butcher's peace, because Germany and Austria were looted and carved up. They deprived them of all means of subsistence, and left the children hungry and starving; this was a predatory peace, without any parallel. What then is the Treaty of Versailles? It is an unparalleled and predatory peace, which has made slaves of tens of millions of people, including the most civilised. This is no peace, but terms dictated to a defenceless victim by armed robbers. Through the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's enemies have deprived her of all her colonies. Turkey, Persia and China have been enslaved. A situation has arisen wherein seven-tenths of the world's population are in a condition of servitude. These slaves are to be found throughout the world and are at the mercy of a handful of countries—Britain, France and Japan. That is why this international system in its entirety, the order based on the Treaty of Versailles, stands on the brink of a volcano, for the enslaved seven-tenths of the world's population are waiting impatiently for someone to give them a lead in a struggle which will shake all these countries. France hopes that her loans will be repaid to her, but is herself in debt to America whom she cannot repay because she has not the wherewithal, and private property is sacred over there. What is the essence of this sacrosanct private property? It is that the tsars and capitalists borrow money, while the workers and the peasants have to repay the debt for them. They are on the verge of bankruptcy. They cannot meet their debts. At that very moment, the Red Army broke through the Polish frontier and approached the German borders. At the time it was common talk in Germany, even among the reactionaries and the monarchists, that the Bolsheviks would save them, it being evident that the Versailles peace was falling apart, that there existed a Red Army which had declared war on all capitalists. What has come to pass? It has come to pass that the Peace of Versailles now hinges on Poland. True, we lacked the strength to bring the war to an end. It should, however, be remembered that our workers and peasants were ill-

clad and practically barefooted, yet they marched on and overcame all difficulties, fighting in conditions never before experienced by any other army in the world. We lacked the strength to take Warsaw and finish off the Polish landowners, whiteguards and capitalists, but our army showed the whole world that the Treaty of Versailles is not the force it is made out to be, that hundreds of millions of people are condemned to repay loans for many years to come and have their grandchildren and great-grandchildren do the same in order that the French, British and other imperialists may be enriched. The Red Army proved that the Treaty of Versailles is not so very stable. After the Treaty of Versailles our army showed that in the summer of 1920, the Soviet land, devastated as it was, was on the eve of complete victory thanks to that Red Army. The world saw that a force exists to which the Treaty of Versailles holds no terror, and that no Versailles treaties will subdue the power of the workers and peasants once they have learnt to deal with the landowners and capitalists.

Thus, the campaign against the Peace of Versailles, the campaign against all the capitalists and landowners of every country and against their oppression of other countries, has not been in vain. Millions upon millions of workers and peasants in all lands have been watching this and giving it thought, and they now look upon the Soviet Republic as their deliverer. They say: the Red Army has shown that it can give blow for blow, though it was not strong enough for victory in the first year or, you might even say, in the first month of its peaceful construction. That first month of peaceful construction, however, will be followed by many years, and with each passing year its strength will multiply tenfold. It was thought that the Peace of Versailles was one of the all-powerful imperialists, but after the summer of 1920 it became clear that they were weaker than the workers and peasants of even a weak country who know how to unite their forces and repulse the capitalists. In the summer of 1920 Soviet Russia showed herself as a force that not only defended herself against attack, against the onslaught of the Polish whiteguards, but showed herself in fact as a world force capable of smashing the Treaty of Versailles and freeing hundreds of millions of

people in most countries of the world. That is the significance of the Red Army's campaign of this summer. That is why events took place in Britain during this war, which marked a turning-point in the whole of British policy. When we refused to halt our troops Britain replied by threatening to send her fleet against Petrograd. The order was given to attack Petrograd. That is what the British Prime Minister announced to Comrade Kamenev, and all countries were notified. But on the day following the dispatch of this telegram, mass meetings were held throughout Britain, and Councils of Action sprang up. The workers united. All the British Mensheviks, who are even viler than the Russian brand, and fawn upon the capitalists far more assiduously—even they had to join in, because the workers were demanding it, because the British workers said they would not tolerate a war against Russia. All over Britain Councils of Action were formed, the British imperialists' war plans were frustrated, and it once more turned out that, in her war against the imperialists of all lands, Soviet Russia has allies in each of them. When we Bolsheviks said: "We are not alone in our revolt against the landowners and capitalists of Russia, because in every country we have allies—the worker and peasant; moreover, those allies are to be found in most countries", we were ridiculed and were asked: "Where are these working people?" Yes, it is true that in Western Europe, where the capitalists are far stronger and live by fleecing hundreds of millions in the colonies, it is far more difficult to rise up in revolt. There the working-class revolution is developing incomparably more slowly. Nevertheless, it is developing. When, in July 1920, Britain threatened Russia with war, the British workers prevented that war from taking place. The British Mensheviks followed the lead of the British Bolsheviks. They had to do so and come out against the Constitution, against the law declaring they would not tolerate the war. If the latter was declared on the morrow, they would call a strike and give no coal to Britain and to France as well. The British workers declared that they wanted to determine foreign policy; they are directing it in the same way as the Bolsheviks in Russia, and not like the capitalists in other countries.

That is an example of what the Polish war has brought to light. That is why we have emerged victorious within six months. That is why devastated, weak and backward Soviet Russia is defeating an alliance of states infinitely more powerful than she is. That is because they lack strength at home, and the workers, the working people in general, are against them. This is apparent at every crisis. This is apparent because they are robbers who attack each other and cannot unite against us; because, in the final analysis, private property divides people and brutalises them, whereas labour unites them. Labour has not only united the workers and peasants of Russia, it has united them with the workers and peasants of all lands. Consequently, in all these countries the people can now see that Soviet Russia is a force that is smashing the Peace of Versailles. Soviet Russia will become stronger, and the Treaty of Versailles will collapse just as it all but collapsed at the first blow by the Red Army in July 1920. That is why the Polish war has ended in a manner no imperialist state had bargained for. This is a lesson of the utmost importance to us, for it shows by the example and behaviour of all countries taking part in international politics that our cause is strong; that no matter what attempts are made to invade Russia and no matter what military moves are made against us—and in all probability many more will be made—all these attempts will go up in smoke as we know from our actual experience, which has steeled us. After every such attempt by our enemies, we shall emerge stronger than ever.

I shall now turn from international politics, where the clash with the Peace of Versailles demonstrated our strength, to problems that are more immediate and practical, to the situation which has arisen in connection with the Treaty of Versailles. I shall not dwell on the significance of the Second Congress of the Communist International, which took place in Moscow in July, a congress of the Communists of the whole world, and also of the Congress of the Peoples of the East, which took place afterwards in Baku.[103] These were international congresses which united the Communists and showed that in all civilised countries and in all the backward countries of the East, the banner of Bolshevism, the programme of Bolshevism,

the line of Bolshevik action are an emblem of salvation, an emblem of struggle to the workers of all civilised countries and the peasants of all the backward colonial countries. They showed that, during the past three years, Soviet Russia not only beat off those who fell upon her in order to throttle her, but won the sympathy of the working people of the whole world; that we not only defeated our enemies, but acquired and are still acquiring new allies daily and by the hour. That which was achieved by the congress of Communists in Moscow and by the Baku congress of Communist representatives of the peoples of the East cannot be immediately assessed or directly calculated, but it has been an achievement of greater significance than some military victories are, because it proves to us that the Bolsheviks' experience, their activities and programme, and their call for a revolutionary struggle against the capitalists and imperialists have won world-wide recognition; that which was achieved in Moscow in July and in Baku in September will for many months to come provide food for thought and assimilation by the workers and peasants of the world. This is a force which, in any conflict or crisis, will come out for Soviet Russia, as we have seen on more than one occasion. Such is the fundamental lesson of the Polish war, from the angle of the alignment of world forces.

In dealing with events at home, I must say that Wrangel is the chief force in the field against us. France, Poland and Wrangel joined forces against us. While our forces were wholly engaged in the war on the Western front, Wrangel mustered his forces, aided by the French and British navies. When Wrangel was approaching the Kuban, he was counting on support from the rich Cossack kulaks. Who helped Wrangel at the time? Who supplied him with fuel and a fleet to enable him to hold on to the Donets Basin? It was the British and the American navies. We know, however, that this landing operation failed, because the Kuban Cossack, though he was rich in grain, saw perfectly through those promises of a constituent assembly, rule by the people and the other fine things that the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., try to fool simpletons with. Perhaps the Kuban peasants believed them while they were holding forth so eloquently, but in the long run

they put their faith in action not words, and saw that though the Bolsheviks were severe people to deal with, they were to be preferred. As a result, Wrangel fled from the Kuban, and many hundreds and thousands of his troops were shot. Despite this, Wrangel assembled more and more of his forces in the Crimea, his troops consisting in the main of officers. He hoped that, at the first favourable moment, it would be possible to build up these forces, provided they had the backing of the peasants.

Wrangel's troops are better equipped with guns, tanks, and aircraft than all the other armies that fought in Russia. Wrangel was assembling his forces when we were fighting the Poles; that is why I say that the peace with Poland is unstable. According to the preliminary peace signed on the 12th, the armistice will come into force only on the 18th, and the Poles still have two days in which they can repudiate it.[104] The entire French press and the capitalists there are striving to get Poland to start a new war against Soviet Russia; Wrangel is hastening to use all his connections in order to wreck this peace, because he can see that when the war with Poland is ended the Bolsheviks will turn against him. The only practical conclusion for us, therefore, is to direct all our forces against Wrangel. In April this year we proposed peace on terms which were unfavourable to us, only in order to spare tens of thousands of workers and peasants the carnage of a new war. To us frontiers do not matter so much; we do not mind losing some territory in the frontier regions. To us it is more important to preserve the lives of tens of thousands of workers and peasants and to retain the possibility of peaceful construction, than to keep a small piece of territory. That is why we submitted this peace proposal and now repeat that Wrangel is the main threat, that his troops, which have meanwhile grown enormously in strength, are fighting desperately, at points have crossed the Dnieper and have assumed the offensive. The Wrangel front and the Polish front are one and the same thing, and the question of the war against Wrangel is a question of the war against Poland; to convert the preliminary peace with Poland into a permanent peace we must crush Wrangel in the shortest possible space of time. If that is not done, we cannot be certain that the Polish

landowners and capitalists, under pressure from the French landowners and capitalists and with their help, will not once again try to embroil us in war. That is why I am taking advantage of this broadly representative meeting to draw your attention to this fundamental question and to ask you to make use of your position and authority in order to influence the masses of workers and peasants and ensure that the greatest possible efforts are made towards the full accomplishment of our immediate task—at all costs to crush Wrangel in the shortest space of time, because the possibility of our engaging in the work of peaceful construction depends only on this.

We know that in our devastated country the peasant economy has been destroyed, and that the peasant needs goods, and not the paper money which is being showered on him in such profusion. However, to supply him with goods such as paraffin oil, salt, clothing, etc., industry must be restored. We are approaching a position in which that can be done. We know that we now have more grain than last year; we now have fuel for industry: over 100 million poods of oil from Baku; the Donets Basin, which provides an enormous quantity of fuel, has been rehabilitated, though some industrial enterprises had to be evacuated during Wrangel's advance to the south of the Donets Basin. Donets industry can be considered completely restored. Supplies of firewood are growing. Last year they totalled seven million cubic metres; we now have considerably more. Our industry is reviving. In Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, where for a number of years the mills were at a standstill, putting all the workers in low spirits, the mills are now being supplied with fuel and are beginning to operate. Thanks to the victories in Turkestan, they have received Turkestan cotton, and are starting to work. We are now confronted with a vast field of productive work, and we must do everything possible to rehabilitate industry, and supply the peasant with clothing, footwear and food and thus commence a fair exchange of the peasants' grain for urban products. We must begin to give aid to agriculture. Yesterday, in the Council of People's Commissars, we decided to encourage with extra rations the workers of the factory that will manufacture the first plough that proves best suited

to our Russian conditions, so that we may restore our agriculture and raise it to a higher level, despite the shortage of cattle.

The workers and peasants are working together, without the landowners and the capitalists, and are achieving successes. However, the main thing in tackling this problem in earnest is the need to remember firmly that tens of thousands of workers and peasants are giving up their lives on the Wrangel front that the enemy is better armed than we are, and that it is there, on the Wrangel front, that the last desperate battle is being fought out; it is there that the matter is being decided whether Soviet Russia will be able to strengthen herself for peaceful labour, so that no imperialist world-wide alliance, and not only the Polish white-guards, will be able to threaten her. It is up to you, comrades. You must bend every effort, and remember that Soviet Russia has been able to solve all the problems in her struggle, not because decrees have been issued from the centre, but because these decrees have met with the enthusiastic and ardent sympathy of the workers and peasants throughout the country. Only when the workers and peasants saw that they were fighting against Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel for their own land, their own factories and workshops, for their own interests and against the landowners and capitalists—only then did every one of them give the Red Army every possible support and assistance. When the Red Army men saw that the people in the rear were doing all they could for them, they were filled with the spirit which led them to victory. Everything depends on our defeating Wrangel, and I call on you to do everything possible in your organisations and factories, and your villages, voluntarily and in accordance with the interests of the workers and peasants of the whole of Russia to come to the aid of the Wrangel front, and then we shall be victorious, both on the Wrangel and on the international fronts. (*Stormy applause.*)

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CONCLUDING REMARKS AT A CONFERENCE OF CHAIRMEN OF UYEZD, VOLOST AND VILLAGE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF MOSCOW GUBERNIA OCTOBER 15, 1920

Comrades, I shall have to confine myself to some brief concluding remarks, because from the very beginning of the meeting it has been clear that there is quite a strong desire, in fact a very strong desire, to upbraid the central government. That would, of course, have been useful, and I have considered it my duty to listen to everything said in criticism of the government and its policy. I think that the discussion should not have been wound up. (*Hear, hear!*) However, while listening to your remarks, I have been surprised to see how few precise and specific proposals you have put forward. Of the two questions—the foreign affairs and the home affairs of our Republic—I think that home affairs interest you more. That is how it should be. But, comrades, you forget that home affairs depend on foreign affairs, and I therefore have thought it my duty to tell you how and why the Polish war brought us up against the international imperialists and then led to peace; how and why this peace is precarious, and what has to be done to consolidate it. I hope that, in this matter, after you have discussed all the other questions and set forth all the problems in a calm fashion, you will not behave like certain personages in the fable mentioned by one of the speakers,[105] about the lynx which waits for the goat and the ram to fall out, so as to devour them both. You will not give that satisfaction to the lynx—of that I am sure. However furiously the goat and the ram may clash, we shall give no

satisfaction to the lynx. (*Applause and cheers.*) Comrades, if extreme dissatisfaction and impatience have been expressed here so often, we all know that freedom of speech is the primary rule of procedure at meetings. At this meeting you have broken this rule—it is because the majority of the peasants are experiencing all too severely the effects of the very grave situation that has arisen in the localities. Most of the peasants are feeling all too severely the effects of famine, cold and excessive taxation. ("*Hear, Hear!*" *and applause.*) It was, in the main, for this that most of the speakers upbraided the central government, directly and indirectly. One got a feeling that the comrades did not even want to give a full hearing to speakers in whose speeches they heard no replies to this acute problem. One of the speakers, I do not remember which, said that in his opinion I had evaded this issue. I consider this assertion groundless.

The position of the Soviet Republic is most grave, which made us hurry to conclude peace before the winter campaign set in. That haste stemmed from a desire to avoid a winter campaign, a realisation that it is better to have a worse frontier, that is to say, to get less Byelorussian territory and be in a position to wrest fewer Byelorussian peasants from the yoke of the bourgeoisie, than to impose fresh hardships and another winter campaign on the peasants of Russia. Such were our reasons. You know that the poor harvest of this year has aggravated the peasants' need. However, the measure in which this ties us in our home policy is not generally realised. I think that you will all be fully informed on the subject of taxation. You will also hear what the speaker on the food policy will have to say. And all I want is to draw your attention to the close connection between the internal situation and the external. Let us take, for example, the sittings of our Council of Defence and the Council of People's Commissars. At these meetings we even have to deal with the question of the running of each train, the grain-requisitioning quotas imposed upon the Great Russia gubernias—quotas that are often extremely rigorous. Two or three weeks ago the Council of People's Commissars considered the question of the excessively rigorous quotas, established by the central authorities; it decided that they should be reduced. At

whose expense is this to be done? There can be only one reply to this question: only at the expense of outlying regions that are richer in grain, namely, Siberia and the Kuban, and by making it possible to obtain grain from the Ukraine. We are getting grain from Siberia and from the Kuban, but we cannot get grain from the Ukraine because warfare is raging there, and the Red Army has to fight the bands that infest that area. We have to settle the problem of almost every train. We have seen what this meeting has turned into, the dissatisfaction expressed here, and the voices raised in loud protest. We know the reason for all this. We know that all those who have revealed such emotion here are sick at heart because there is no fodder, livestock is perishing, and taxation is so heavy. The comrade who said that these cries of protest were something new to us was wrong. Both from telegrams and reports from the provinces we know of the heavy loss of cattle as a result of the grave fodder situation, and we all realise the difficulties. But we also know the solution. There is only one solution—Siberia, the Kuban and the Ukraine.

From Siberia we had to bring up troops to the Wrangel front, and in the Council of Defence there were two or three very painful meetings when comrades came with the demand that we should cancel the special food trains. After the most bitter wrangling and bargaining, we ended by deciding to somewhat curtail the number of food trains. However, we would like to hear more weighty and serious criticism. We know all about the outcries and lamentations that the farms are being ruined. That is why even the truce that comes into force on the 18th, even though the Poles are entitled to cancel it at forty-eight hours' notice, will give us some respite and relief; in any case there will be more trainloads of grain from Siberia and the Kuban in the next few weeks. Of course, the need is so acute and the crop shortage so severe that the relief this will provide will not be very great. We should not, of course, deceive ourselves and say that it will remove all our difficulties and enable us to discontinue the grain requisitioning quotas.

That is something I cannot and will not say. State your views precisely, let us have your definite suggestions for relieving the heavy taxation, and the representatives of

the workers' and peasants' government will examine them with the closest attention; because we must find a way of easing this exceedingly painful situation. There is no less grain in the Ukraine than in the Kuban; there is perhaps even more, but so far we have been able to get hardly anything from the Ukraine under the grain quotas, which have been fixed at 600,000,000 poods, and which could meet all the needs of our industries and help restore them. We have struck the Ukraine off our accounts: not a single pood can be expected from the Ukraine, because of the bandits there, and because the war with Wrangel compels us to say that we cannot be sure of getting a single pood from the Ukraine. Such is the situation, which, notwithstanding your legitimate impatience and quite justified indignation, makes us divert all our attention to the Polish and the Wrangel fronts. That is why when comrades say that they are not against giving help, but they want that help to be given freely, we say: "Go and help the front!"

I shall conclude my brief remarks by reminding you of what I said at the end of my report, namely, that every time the Soviets have had to get out of a difficult situation—when Denikin was in Orel, or when Yudenich was within five versts of Petrograd—when the situation seemed not only difficult, but desperate, a hundred times as difficult as it is now, the Soviet government got out of that situation by calling together meetings of workers and peasants like the present one and telling them the unvarnished truth. That is why I say that whether or not Wrangel will soon be crushed depends, not on a decision of the central government but on the way in which the representatives from the localities, after giving vent to their dissatisfaction, after finishing the struggle which the above-mentioned comrade has called a clash between the goats and the rams—an indispensable thing—and after voicing their complaints, accusations and recriminations—the way in which local representatives reply to the question whether they themselves want freedom, quite apart from any decision by the central government. Here we cannot give orders; it will depend on your own decisions, when you come to discuss the state of affairs, the grain-requisitioning quotas, taxation, Wrangel, etc.—it will depend on you. Let each man

have his say; give vent to all your reproaches; censure us ten times more severely—that is your right and your duty. You have come here to express your opinion plainly and bluntly. But when you have done all that, just reflect calmly what you want to contribute and do so as to finish with Wrangel as quickly as possible. I think that we shall reach such thorough agreement on this question that—I repeat in conclusion—never will the lynx benefit from our arguments, recriminations and accusations. (*Applause.*)

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TELEGRAM
TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE UKRAINE AND THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

In reply to your telegram concerning the poor peasants I am informing you of my *personal* opinion. If their temper is really revolutionary, the following should be regarded as a programme: 1) collective cultivation; 2) hiring stations; 3) confiscation of the kulaks' money over and above the labour norm; 4) grain surpluses to be collected in full, part of the grain to be turned over to the poor peasants; 5) the kulaks' agricultural implements to be handed over to the hiring stations; 6) these measures to be applied only given successful collective cultivation of the soil, and effective control. The question of communes should be posed last, since nothing is more dangerous than the formation of pseudo-communes, with the participation of individual militants who thus become detached from the main body of the peasantry. The greatest prudence should be exercised in introducing innovations, and the possibility of achieving what is being undertaken should be triple-checked.

Lenin

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION OF THE DICTATORSHIP[106]

A NOTE

The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fundamental question of the modern working-class movement in all capitalist countries without exception. To elucidate this question fully, a knowledge of its history is required. On an international scale, the history of the doctrine of revolutionary dictatorship in general, and of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular, coincides with the history of revolutionary socialism, and especially with the history of Marxism. Moreover—and this, of course, is the most important thing of all—the history of all revolutions by the oppressed and exploited classes, against the exploiters, provides the basic material and source of our knowledge on the question of dictatorship. Whoever has failed to understand that dictatorship is essential to the victory of any revolutionary class has no understanding of the history of revolutions, or else does not want to know anything in this field.

With reference to Russia, special importance attaches, as far as theory is concerned, to the Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party as drafted in 1902-03 by the editorial board of *Zarya* and *Iskra*, or, more exactly, drafted by G. Plekhanov, and edited, amended and endorsed by that editorial board. In this Programme, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is stated in clear and definite terms, and, moreover, is linked up with the struggle against Bernstein, against opportunism. Most important of all, however, is of course the experience of revolution, i.e., in the case of Russia, the experience of the year 1905.

The last three months of that year—October, November and December—were a period of a remarkably vigorous and broad mass revolutionary struggle, a period that saw a combination of the two most powerful methods of that struggle: the mass political strike and an armed uprising. (Let us note parenthetically that as far back as *May* 1905 the Bolshevik congress, the "Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party", declared that "the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of the armed uprising" was "one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party", and instructed all Party organisations to "explain the role of mass political strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during the progress of the uprising".[107])

For the first time in world history, the revolutionary struggle attained such a high stage of development and such an impetus that an armed uprising was combined with that specifically proletarian weapon—the mass strike. This experience is clearly of world significance to *all* proletarian revolutions. It was studied by the Bolsheviks with the greatest attention and diligence in both its political and its economic aspects. I shall mention an analysis of the month-by-month statistics of economic and political strikes in 1905, of the relations between them, and the level of development achieved by the strike struggle for the first time in world history. This analysis was published by me in 1910 and 1911 in the *Prosveshcheniye* journal, a summary of it being given in Bolshevik periodicals brought out abroad at the time.[108]

The mass strikes and the armed uprisings raised, as a matter of course, the question of the revolutionary power and dictatorship, for these forms of struggle inevitably led—initially on a local scale—to the ejection of the old ruling authorities, to the seizure of power by the proletariat and the other revolutionary classes, to the expulsion of the landowners, sometimes to the seizure of factories, and so on and so forth. The revolutionary mass struggle of the time gave rise to organisations previously unknown in world history, such as the *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*, followed by the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies, Peasants' Committees, and the like. Thus the fundamental questions (Soviet power

and the dictatorship of the proletariat) that are now engaging the minds of class-conscious workers all over the world were posed in a practical form at the end of 1905. While such outstanding representatives of the revolutionary proletariat and of unfalsified Marxism as Rosa Luxemburg, immediately realised the significance of this practical experience and made a critical analysis of it at meetings and in the press, the vast majority of the official representatives of the official Social-Democratic and socialist parties—including both the reformists and people of the type of the future "Kautskyites", "Longuetists", the followers of Hillquit in America, etc.—proved absolutely incapable of grasping the significance of this experience and of performing their duty as *revolutionaries*, i.e., of setting to work to study and propagate the lessons of this experience.

In Russia, immediately after the defeat of the armed uprising of December 1905, both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks set to work to sum up this experience. This work was especially expedited by what was called the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, held in Stockholm in April 1906, where both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were represented, and formally united. The most energetic preparations for this Congress were made by both these groups. Early in 1906, prior to the Congress, both groups published drafts of their resolutions on all the most important questions. These draft resolutions—reprinted in my pamphlet, *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* (*A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers*), Moscow, 1906 (110 pages, nearly half of which are taken up with the draft resolutions of both groups and with the resolutions finally adopted by the Congress)—provide the most important material for a study of the question as it stood at the time.

By that time, the disputes as to the significance of the Soviets were already linked up with the question of dictatorship. The Bolsheviks had raised the question of the dictatorship even *prior to* the revolution of October 1905 (see my pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, Geneva, July 1905; reprinted in a volume of collected articles entitled *Twelve Years*). The Mensheviks took a negative stand with regard to the "dicta-

torship" slogan; the Bolsheviks emphasised that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies were "*actually an embryo of a new revolutionary power*", as was literally said in the draft of the Bolshevik resolution (p. 92 of my *Report*). The Mensheviks acknowledged the importance of the Soviets; they were in favour of "helping to organise" them, etc., but they did not regard them as embryos of revolutionary power, did not in general say anything about a "new revolutionary power" of this or some similar type, and flatly rejected the slogan of dictatorship. It will easily be seen that this attitude to the question already contained the seeds of all the present disagreements with the Mensheviks. It will also be easily seen that, in their attitude to this question, the Mensheviks (both Russian and non-Russian, such as the Kautskyites, Longuetists and the like) have been behaving like reformists or opportunists, who recognise the proletarian revolution in word, but *in deed reject what is most essential and fundamental in the concept of "revolution"*.

Even before the revolution of 1905, I analysed, in the afore-mentioned pamphlet, *Two Tactics*, the arguments of the Mensheviks, who accused me of having "imperceptibly substituted 'dictatorship' for 'revolution'" (*Twelve Years*, p. 459). I showed in detail that, by this very accusation, the Mensheviks revealed their opportunism, their true political nature, as toadies to the liberal bourgeoisie and conductors of its influence in the ranks of the proletariat. When the revolution becomes an unquestioned force, I said, even its opponents begin to "recognise the revolution"; and I pointed (in the summer of 1905) to the example of the Russian liberals, who remained constitutional monarchists. At present, in 1920, one might add that in Germany and Italy the liberal bourgeois—or at least the most educated and adroit of them—are ready to "recognise the revolution". But by "recognising" the revolution, and at the same time refusing to recognise the *dictatorship* of a definite class (or of definite classes), the Russian liberals and the Mensheviks of that time, and the present-day German and Italian liberals, Turatists and Kautskyites, have revealed their *reformism*, their absolute unfitness to be revolutionaries.

Indeed, when the revolution has already become an unquestioned force, when even the liberals "recognise" it, and when the ruling classes not only see but also feel the invincible might of the oppressed masses, then the *entire question*—both to the theoreticians and the leaders of practical policy—reduces itself *to an exact class definition of the revolution*. However, without the concept of "dictatorship", this precise class definition *cannot* be given. One cannot be a revolutionary *in fact* unless one prepares for dictatorship. This truth was not understood in 1905 by the Mensheviks, and it is not understood in 1920 by the Italian, German, French and other socialists, who are afraid of the severe "conditions" of the Communist International; this truth is feared by people who are capable of recognising the dictatorship *in word*, but are incapable of *preparing for it in deed*. It will therefore not be irrelevant to quote at length the explanation of Marx's views, which I published in July 1905 in opposition to the Russian Mensheviks, but is equally applicable to the West-European Mensheviks of 1920. (Instead of giving titles of newspapers, etc., I shall merely indicate whether Mensheviks or Bolsheviks are referred to.)

"In his notes to Marx's articles in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of 1848, Mehring tells us that one of the reproaches levelled at this newspaper by bourgeois publications was that it had allegedly demanded 'the immediate introduction of a dictatorship as the sole means of achieving democracy' (Marx, *Nachlass*, Vol. III, p. 53). From the vulgar bourgeois standpoint the terms of dictatorship and democracy are mutually exclusive. Failing to understand the theory of class struggle and accustomed to seeing in the political arena the petty squabbling of the various bourgeois circles and coteries, the bourgeois understands by dictatorship the annulment of all liberties and guarantees of democracy, arbitrariness of every kind, and every sort of abuse of power, in a dictator's personal interests. In fact, it is precisely this vulgar bourgeois view that is to be observed among our Mensheviks, who attribute the partiality of the Bolsheviks for the slogan of 'dictatorship' to Lenin's passionate desire to try his luck' (*Iskra* No. 103, p. 3, column 2). In order to explain to the Mensheviks the mean-

ing of the term class dictatorship as distinct from a personal dictatorship, and the tasks of a democratic dictatorship as distinct from a socialist dictatorship, it would not be amiss to dwell on the views of *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.[109]

"'After a revolution,' *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* wrote on September 14, 1848, 'every provisional organisation of the state requires a dictatorship, and an energetic dictatorship at that. From the very beginning we have reproached Camphausen [the head of the Ministry after March 18, 1848] for not acting dictatorially, for not having immediately smashed up and eliminated the remnants of the old institutions. And while Herr Camphausen was lulling himself with constitutional illusions, the defeated party [i.e., the party of reaction] strengthened its positions in the bureaucracy and in the army, and here and there even began to venture upon open struggle.'[110]

"These words, Mehring justly remarks, sum up in a few propositions all that was propounded in detail in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in long articles on the Camphausen Ministry. What do these words of Marx tell us? That a provisional revolutionary government *must* act dictatorially (a proposition which the Mensheviks were totally unable to grasp since they were fighting shy of the slogan of dictatorship), and that the task of such a dictatorship is to destroy the remnants of the old institutions (which is precisely what was clearly stated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party [Bolsheviks] on the struggle against counter-revolution, and was omitted in the Mensheviks' resolution as shown above). Third, and last, it follows from these words that Marx castigated the bourgeois democrats for entertaining 'constitutional illusions' in a period of revolution and open civil war. The meaning of these words becomes particularly obvious from the article in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of June 6, 1848.

"'A Constituent National Assembly', Marx wrote, 'must first of all be an active, revolutionary active assembly. The Frankfurt Assembly,[111] however, is busying itself with school exercises in parliamentarianism while allowing the government to act. Let us assume that this learned assembly succeeds, after mature consideration, in evolving the best

possible agenda and the best constitution, but what is the use of the best possible agenda and of the best possible constitution, if the German governments have in the meantime placed the bayonet on the agenda?'[112]

"That is the meaning of the slogan: dictatorship....

"Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force. The reactionary classes themselves are usually the first to resort to violence, to civil war; they are the first to 'place the bayonet on the agenda', as the Russian autocracy has systematically and unswervingly been doing everywhere ever since January 9.[113] And since such a situation has arisen, since the bayonet has really become the main point on the political agenda, since insurrection has proved imperative and urgent—the constitutional illusions and school exercises in parliamentarianism become merely a screen for the bourgeois betrayal of the revolution, a screen to conceal the fact that the bourgeoisie is 'recoiling' from the revolution. It is precisely the slogan of dictatorship that the genuinely revolutionary class must advance, in that case."[114]

That was how the Bolsheviks reasoned on the dictatorship before the revolution of October 1905.

After the experience of this revolution, I made a detailed study of the question of dictatorship in the pamphlet, *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*, St. Petersburg, 1906 (the pamphlet is dated March 28, 1906). I shall quote the most important arguments from this pamphlet, only substituting for a number of proper names a simple indication as to whether the reference is to the Cadets or to the Mensheviks. Generally speaking, this pamphlet was directed against the Cadets, and partly also against the non-party liberals, the semi-Cadets, and the semi-Mensheviks. But, actually speaking, everything said therein about dictatorship applies in fact to the Mensheviks, who were constantly sliding to the Cadets' position on this question.

"At the moment when the firing in Moscow was subsiding, and when the military and police dictatorship was indulging in its savage orgies, when repressions and mass torture were raging all over Russia, voices were raised in the Cadet press against the use of force by the Left, and against the strike committees organised by the revolu-

tionary parties. The Cadet professors on the Dubasovs' payroll, who are peddling their science, went to the length of translating the word 'dictatorship' by the words 'reinforced security'. These 'men of science' even distorted their high-school Latin in order to discredit the revolutionary struggle. Please note once and for all, you Cadet gentlemen, that dictatorship means unlimited power, based on force, and not on law. In civil war, any victorious power can only be a dictatorship. The point is, however, that there is the dictatorship of a minority over the majority, the dictatorship of a handful of police officials over the people; and there is the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority of the people over a handful of tyrants, robbers and usurpers of the people's power. By their vulgar distortion of the scientific concept 'dictatorship', by their outcries against the violence of the Left at a time when the Right are resorting to the most lawless and outrageous violence the Cadet gentlemen have given striking evidence of the position the 'compromisers' take in the intense revolutionary struggle. When the struggle flares up, the 'compromiser' cravenly runs for cover. When the revolutionary people are victorious (October 17), the 'compromiser' creeps out of his hiding-place, boastfully preens himself, shouting and raving until he is hoarse: 'That was a "glorious" political strike!' But when victory goes to the counter-revolution, the 'compromiser' begins to heap hypocritical admonitions and edifying counsel on the vanquished. The successful strike was 'glorious'. The defeated strikes were criminal, mad, senseless, and anarchistic. The defeated insurrection was folly, a riot of surging elements, barbarity and stupidity. In short, his political conscience and political wisdom prompt the 'compromiser' to cringe before the side that for the moment is the strongest, to get in the way of the combatants, hindering first one side and then the other, to tone down the struggle and to blunt the revolutionary consciousness of the people who are waging a desperate struggle for freedom."[115]

To proceed. It would be highly opportune at this point to quote the explanations on the question of dictatorship, directed against Mr. R. Blank. In 1906, this R. Blank, in a newspaper actually Menshevik though formally non-partisan,[116] set forth the Mensheviks' views and extolled their

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efforts "to direct the Russian Social-Democratic movement along the path that is being followed by the whole of the international Social-Democratic movement, led by the great Social-Democratic Party of Germany".

In other words, like the Cadets, R. Blank contraposed the Bolsheviks, as unreasonable, non-Marxist, rebel, etc., revolutionaries, to the "reasonable" Mensheviks, and presented the German Social-Democratic Party as a Menshevik party as well. This is the usual method of the international trend of social-liberals, pacifists, etc., who in all countries extol the reformists and opportunists, the Kautskyites and the Longuetists, as "reasonable" socialists in contrast with the "madness" of the Bolsheviks.

This is how I answered Mr. R. Blank in the abovementioned pamphlet of 1906:

"Mr. Blank compares two periods of the Russian revolution. The first period covers approximately October-December 1905. This is the period of the revolutionary whirlwind. The second is the present period, which, of course, we have a right to call the period of Cadet victories in the Duma elections, or, perhaps, if we take the risk of running ahead somewhat, the period of a Cadet Duma.

"Regarding this period, Mr. Blank says that the turn of intellect and reason has come again, and it is possible to resume deliberate, methodical and systematic activities. On the other hand, Mr. Blank describes the first period as a period in which theory diverged from practice. All Social-Democratic principles and ideas vanished; the tactics that had always been advocated by the founders of Russian Social-Democracy were forgotten, and even the very pillars of the Social-Democratic world outlook were uprooted.

"Mr. Blank's main assertion is merely a statement of fact: the whole theory of Marxism diverged from 'practice' in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind.

"Is that true? What is the first and main 'pillar' of Marxist theory? It is that the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, and therefore, the advanced class in every revolution, is the proletariat. The question is then: has the revolutionary whirlwind uprooted this 'pillar' of the Social-Democratic world outlook? On the contrary, the whirlwind has vindicated it in the most brilliant fashion.

It was the proletariat that was the main and, at first, almost the only *fighter* in this period. For the first time in history, perhaps, a bourgeois revolution was marked by the employment of a purely proletarian weapon, i.e., the mass political strike, on a scale unprecedented even in the most developed capitalist countries. The proletariat marched into battle that was definitely revolutionary, at a time when the Struves and the Blanks were calling for participation in the Bulygin Duma and when the Cadet professors were exhorting the students to keep to their studies. With its proletarian weapon, the proletariat won for Russia the whole of that so-called 'constitution', which since then has only been mutilated, chopped about and curtailed. The proletariat in October 1905 employed those tactics of struggle that *six months before* had been laid down in the resolution of the *Bolshevik* Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which had strongly emphasised the necessity of combining the mass political strike with insurrection; and it is this combination that characterises the whole period of the 'revolutionary whirlwind', the whole of the last quarter of 1905. Thus our ideologist of petty bourgeoisie has distorted reality in the most brazen and glaring manner. He has not cited a single fact to prove that Marxist theory diverged from practical experience in the period of the 'revolutionary whirlwind'; he has tried to obscure the main feature of this whirlwind, which most brilliantly confirmed the correctness of 'all Social-Democratic principles and ideas', of 'all the pillars of the Social-Democratic world outlook'.

"But what was the real reason that induced Mr. Blank to come to the monstrously wrong conclusion that all Marxist principles and ideas vanished in the period of the 'whirlwind'? It is very interesting to examine this circumstance; it still further exposes the real nature of philistinism in politics.

"What is it that mainly distinguished the period of the 'revolutionary whirlwind' from the present 'Cadet' period, as regards the various forms of political activity and the various methods by which the people make history? First and mainly it is that during the period of the 'whirlwind' certain special method~ of making history were employed

which are foreign to other periods of political life. The following were the most important of these methods: 1) the '*seizure' by the people of political liberty*—its exercise without any rights and laws, and without any limitations (freedom of assembly, even if only in the universities, freedom of the press, freedom of association, the holding of congresses, etc.); 2) the creation of new organs of *revolutionary authority*—Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Railwaymen's and Peasants' Deputies, new rural and urban authorities, and so on, and so forth. These bodies were set up exclusively by the *revolutionary* sections of the people, they were formed irrespective of all laws and regulations, entirely in a revolutionary way , as a product of the native genius of the people, as a manifestation of the independent activity of the people which had rid itself, or was ridding itself, of its old police fetters. Lastly, they were indeed organs of *authority*, for all their rudimentary, spontaneous, amorphous and diffuse character, in composition and in activity. They acted as a government, when, for example, they seized printing plants (in St. Petersburg), and arrested police officials who were preventing the revolutionary people from exercising their rights (such cases also occurred in St. Petersburg, where the new organ of authority concerned was weakest, and where the old government was strongest). They acted as a government when they appealed to the whole people to withhold money from the old government. They confiscated the old government's funds (the railway strike committees in the South) and used them for the needs of the new, the people's government. Yes, these were undoubtedly the embryos of a new, people's, or, if you will, revolutionary government. In their social and political character, they were the rudiments of the dictatorship of the revolutionary elements of the people. This surprises you, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter! You do not see here the 'reinforced security', which for the bourgeois is tantamount to dictatorship? We have already told you that you have not the faintest notion of the scientific concept 'dictatorship'. We will explain it to you in a moment; but first we will deal with the *third* 'method' of activity in the period of the 'revolutionary whirlwind': *the use by the people of force against those who used force against the people.*

"The organs of authority that we have described represented a dictatorship in embryo, for they recognised *no* other authority, *no* law and *no* standards, no matter by whom established. Authority—unlimited, outside the law, and based on force in the most direct sense of the word—is dictatorship. But the force on which this new authority was based, and sought to base itself, was not the force of bayonets usurped by a handful of militarists, not the power of the 'police force', not the power of money, nor the power of any previously established institutions. It was nothing of the kind. The new organs of authority possessed neither arms, nor money, nor old institutions. Their power—can you imagine it, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter?—had nothing in common with the old instruments of power, nothing in common with 'reinforced security', if we do not have in mind the reinforced security established to protect the people from the tyranny of the police and of the other organs of the old regime.

"What was the power based on, then? It was based on the mass of the people. That is the *main* feature that distinguished this new authority from all preceding organs of the old regime. The latter were the instruments of the rule of the minority over the people, over the masses of workers and peasants. The former was an instrument of the rule of the people, of the workers and peasants, over the minority, over a handful of police bullies, over a handful of privileged nobles and government officials. That is the difference between dictatorship *over* the people and dictatorship *of* the revolutionary people: mark this well, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter! As the dictatorship of a minority, the old regime was able to maintain itself solely with the aid of police devices, solely by preventing the masses of the people from taking part in the government, and from supervising the government. The old authority persistently distrusted the masses, feared the light, maintained itself by deception. As the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority, the new authority maintained itself and could maintain itself solely because it enjoyed the confidence of the vast masses, solely because it, in the freest, widest, and most resolute manner, enlisted all the masses in the task of government. It concealed nothing, it had no secrets, no

regulations, no formalities. It said, in effect: are you a working man? Do you want to fight to rid Russia of the gang of police bullies? You are our comrade. Elect your deputy. Elect him at once, immediately, whichever way you think best. We will willingly and gladly accept him as a full member of our Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Peasant Committee, Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, and so forth. It was an authority open to all, it carried out all its functions before the eyes of the masses, was accessible to the masses, sprang directly from the masses; and was a direct and immediate instrument of the popular masses, of their will. Such was the new authority, or, to be exact, its embryo, for the victory of the old authority trampled down the shoots of this young plant very soon.

"Perhaps, Mr. Blank or Mr. Kiesewetter, you will ask: why 'dictatorship', why 'force'? Is it necessary for a vast mass to use force against a handful? Can tens and hundreds of millions be dictators over a thousand or ten thousand?

"That question is usually put by people who for the first time hear the term 'dictatorship' used in what to them is a new connotation. People are accustomed to see only a police authority and only a police dictatorship. The idea that there can be government without any police, or that dictatorship need not be a police dictatorship, seems strange to them. You say that millions need not resort to force against thousands? You are mistaken; and your mistake arises from the fact that you do not regard a phenomenon in its process of development. You forget that the new authority does not drop from the skies, but grows up, arises parallel with, and in opposition to the old authority, in struggle against it. Unless force is used against tyrants armed with the weapons and instruments of power, the people cannot be liberated from tyrants.

"Here is a very simple analogy, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter, which will help you to grasp this idea, which seems so remote and 'fantastic' to the Cadet mind. Let us suppose that Avramov is injuring and torturing Spiridonova. On Spiridonova's side, let us say, are tens and hundreds of unarmed people. On Avramov's side there is a handful of Cossacks. What would the people do if Spiridonova were being tortured, not in a dungeon but in public? They would

resort to force against Avramov and his body-guard. Perhaps they would sacrifice a few of their comrades, shot down by Avramov; but in the long run they would forcibly disarm Avramov and his Cossacks, and in all probability would kill on the spot some of these brutes in human form; they would clap the rest into some gaol to prevent them from committing any more outrages and to bring them to judgement before the people.

"So you see, Mr. Blank and Mr. Kiesewetter, when Avramov and his Cossacks torture Spiridonova, that is military and police dictatorship over the people. When a revolutionary people (that is to say, a people capable of fighting the tyrants, and not only of exhorting, admonishing, regretting, condemning, whining and whimpering; not a philistine narrow-minded, but a revolutionary people) resorts to force against Avramov and the Avramovs, that is a dictatorship of the revolutionary people. It is a *dictatorship*, because it is the authority of the people over Avramov, an authority unrestricted by any laws (the philistines, perhaps, would be opposed to rescuing Spiridonova from Avramov by force, thinking it to be against the 'law'. They would no doubt ask: Is there a 'law' that permits the killing of Avramov? Have not some philistine ideologists built up the 'resist not evil' theory?). The scientific term 'dictatorship' means nothing more nor less than authority untrammeled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force. The term 'dictatorship' *has no other meaning but this*—mark this well, Cadet gentlemen. Again, in the analogy we have drawn, we see the dictatorship *of the people*, because the people, the mass of the population, unorganised, 'casually' assembled at the given spot, itself appears on the scene, exercises justice and metes out punishment, exercises power and creates a new, revolutionary law. Lastly, it is the dictatorship of the *revolutionary* people. Why only of the revolutionary, and not of the whole people? Because among the whole people, constantly suffering, and most cruelly, from the brutalities of the Avramovs, there are some who are physically cowed and terrified; there are some who are morally degraded by the 'resist not evil' theory, for example, or simply degraded not by theory, but by prejudice,

habit, routine; and there are indifferent people, whom we call philistines, petty-bourgeois people who are more inclined to hold aloof from intense struggle, to pass by or even to hide themselves (for fear of getting mixed up in the fight and getting hurt). That is why the dictatorship is exercised, not by the whole people, but by the revolutionary people who, however, do not shun the whole people, who explain to all the people the motives of their actions in all their details, and who willingly enlist the *whole* people not only in 'administering' the state, but in governing it too, and indeed in organising the state.

"Thus our simple analogy contains *all the elements* of the scientific concept 'dictatorship of the revolutionary people', and also of the concept 'military and police dictatorship'. We can now pass from this simple analogy, which even a learned Cadet professor can grasp, to the more complex developments of social life.

"Revolution, in the strict and direct sense of the word, is a period in the life of a people when the anger accumulated during centuries of Avramov brutalities breaks forth into *actions*, not merely into words; and into the actions of *millions of the people*, not merely of individuals. The people awaken and rise up to rid themselves of the Avramovs. The people rescue the countless numbers of Spiridonovas in Russian life from the Avramovs, use force against the Avramovs, and establish their authority over the Avramovs. Of course, this does not take place so easily, and not 'all at once', as it did in our analogy, simplified for Professor Kiesewetter. This struggle of the people against the Avramovs, a struggle in the strict and direct sense of the word, this act of the people in throwing the Avramovs off their backs, stretches over months and years of 'revolutionary whirlwind'. This act of the people in throwing the Avramovs off their backs is the real content of what is called the great Russian revolution. This act, regarded from the standpoint of the methods of making history, takes place in the forms we have just described in discussing the revolutionary whirlwind, namely: the people seize political freedom, that is, the freedom which the Avramovs had prevented them from exercising; the people create a new, revolutionary authority, authority over the Avra-

movs, over the tyrants of the old police regime; the people use force against the Avramovs in order to remove, disarm and make harmless these wild dogs, all the Avramovs, Durnovos, Dubasovs, Mins, etc., etc.

"Is it good that the people should apply such unlawful, irregular, unmethodical and unsystematic methods of struggle as seizing their liberty and creating a new, formally unrecognised and revolutionary authority, that it should use force against the oppressors of the people? Yes, it is very good. It is the supreme manifestation of the people's struggle for liberty. It marks that great period when the dreams of liberty cherished by the best men and women of Russia *come true*, when liberty becomes the cause of the masses of the people, and not merely of individual heroes. It is as good as the rescue by the crowd (in our analogy) of Spiridonova from Avramov, and the forcible disarming of Avramov and making him harmless.

"But this brings us to the very pivot of the Cadets' hidden thoughts and apprehensions. A Cadet is the ideologist of the philistines precisely because he looks at politics, at the liberation of the whole people, at revolution, through the spectacles of that same philistine who, in our analogy of the torture of Spiridonova by Avramov, would try to restrain the crowd, advise it not to break the law, not to hasten to rescue the victim from the hands of the torturer, since he is acting in the name of the law. In our analogy, of course, that philistine would be morally a monster; but in social life as a whole, we repeat, the philistine monster is not an individual, but a social phenomenon, conditioned, perhaps, by the deep-rooted prejudices of the bourgeois-philistine theory of law.

"Why does Mr. Blank hold it as self-evident that all Marxist principles were forgotten during the period of 'whirlwind'? Because he distorts Marxism into Brentano-ism,[117] and thinks that such 'principles' as the seizure of liberty, the establishment of revolutionary authority and the use of force by the people are not Marxist. This idea runs through the whole of Mr. Blank's article; and not only Mr. Blank's, but the articles of all the Cadets, and of all the writers in the liberal and radical camp who, today, are praising Plekhanov for his love of the Cadets; all of

them, right up to the Bernsteinians of *Bez Zaglaviya*,[118] the Prokopoviches, Kuskovas and *tutti quanti*.

"Let us see how this opinion arose and why it was bound to arise.

"It arose directly out of the Bernsteinian or, to put it more broadly, the opportunist concepts of the West-European Social-Democrats. The fallacies of these concepts, which the 'orthodox' Marxists in Western Europe have been systematically exposing all along the line, are now being smuggled into Russia 'on the sly', in a different dressing and on a different occasion. The Bernsteinians accepted and accept Marxism *minus* its directly revolutionary aspect. They do not regard the parliamentary struggle as one of the weapons particularly suitable for definite historical periods, but as the main and almost the sole form of struggle making 'force', 'seizure', 'dictatorship' unnecessary. It is this vulgar philistine distortion of Marxism that the Blanks and other liberal eulogisers of Plekhanov are now smuggling into Russia. They have become so accustomed to this distortion that they do not even think it necessary to prove that Marxist principles and ideas were forgotten in the period of the revolutionary whirlwind.

"Why was such an opinion bound to arise? Because it accords very well with the class standing and interests of the petty bourgeoisie. The ideologists of 'purified' bourgeois society agree with *all* the methods used by the Social-Democrats in their struggle *except those to which the revolutionary people resort in the period of a 'whirlwind'*, and which revolutionary Social-Democrats approve of and help in using. The interests of the bourgeoisie demand that the proletariat should take part in the struggle against the autocracy, but only in a way that does not lead to the supremacy of the proletariat and the peasantry, and does not completely eliminate the old, feudal-autocratic and police organs of state power. The bourgeoisie wants to preserve these organs, only establishing its direct control over them. It needs them *against the proletariat*, whose struggle would be too greatly facilitated if they were completely abolished. That is why the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class require both a monarchy and an Upper Chamber, and the prevention of the dictatorship of the revolutionary people.

Fight the autocracy, the bourgeoisie says to the proletariat, but do not touch the old organs of state power, for I need them. Fight in a 'parliamentary' way, that is, within the limits that we will prescribe by agreement with the monarchy. Fight with the aid of organisations, only not organisations like general strike committees, Soviets of Workers', Soldiers ' Deputies, etc., but organisations that are recognised, restricted and made safe for capital by a law that we shall pass by agreement with the monarchy.

"It is clear, therefore, why the bourgeoisie speaks with disdain, contempt, anger and hatred about the period of the 'whirlwind', and with rapture, ecstasy and boundless philistine infatuation for ... reaction, about the period of constitutionalism as protected by Dubasov. It is once again that constant, invariable quality of the Cadets: seeking to lean on the people and at the same time dreading their revolutionary initiative.

"It is also clear why the bourgeoisie is in such mortal fear of a repetition of the 'whirlwind', why it ignores and obscures the elements of the new revolutionary crisis, why it fosters constitutional illusions and spreads them among the people.

"Now we have fully explained why Mr. Blank and his like declare that in the period of the 'whirlwind' all Marxist principles and ideas were forgotten. Like all philistines, Mr. Blank accepts Marxism *minus* its revolutionary aspect; he accepts Social-Democratic methods of struggle *minus* the most revolutionary and directly revolutionary methods.

"Mr. Blank's attitude towards the period of 'whirlwind' is extremely characteristic as an illustration of bourgeois failure to understand proletarian movements, bourgeois horror of acute and resolute struggle, bourgeois hatred for every manifestation of a radical and directly revolutionary method of solving social historical problems, a method that breaks up old institutions. Mr. Blank has betrayed himself and all his bourgeois narrow-mindedness. Somewhere he heard and read that during the period of whirlwind the Social-Democrats made 'mistakes'—and he had hastened to conclude, and to declare with self-assurance, in tones that brook no contradiction and require no proof, that all the 'principles' of Marxism (of which he has not the least

notion!) were forgotten. As for these 'mistakes', we will remark: Has there been a period in the development of the working-class movement, in the development of Social-Democracy, when no mistakes were made, when there was no deviation to the right or the left? Is not the history of the parliamentary period of the struggle waged by the German Social-Democratic Party—the period which all narrow-minded bourgeois all over the world regard as the utmost limit—filled with such mistakes? If Mr. Blank were not an utter ignoramus on problems of socialism, he would easily call to mind Mülberger, Dühring, the *Dampfersubvention*[119] question, the 'Youth',[120] and Bernsteiniad and many, many more. But Mr. Blank is not interested in studying the actual course of development of the Social-Democratic movement; all he wants is to minimise the scope of the proletarian struggle in order to exalt the bourgeois paltriness of his Cadet Party.

"Indeed, if we examine the question in the light of the deviations that the Social-Democratic movement has made from its ordinary, 'normal' course, we shall see that even in this respect there was *more* and not less solidarity and ideological integrity among the Social-Democrats in the period of 'revolutionary whirlwind' than there was before it. The tactics adopted in the period of 'whirlwind' did not further estrange the two wings of the Social-Democratic Party, but brought them closer together. Former disagreements gave way to unity of opinion on the question of armed uprising. Social-Democrats of both factions were active in the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, these peculiar instruments of embryonic revolutionary authority; they drew the soldiers and peasants into these Soviets, they issued revolutionary manifestos jointly with the petty-bourgeois revolutionary parties. Old controversies of the pre-revolutionary period gave way to unanimity on practical questions. The upsurge of the revolutionary tide pushed aside disagreements, compelling Social-Democrats to adopt militant tactics; it swept the question of the Duma into the background and put the question of insurrection on the order of the day; and it brought closer together the Social-Democrats and revolutionary bourgeois democrats in carrying out immediate tasks. In *Severny Golos*,[121] the Men-

sheviks, jointly with the Bolsheviks, called for a general strike and insurrection; and they called upon the workers to continue this struggle until they had captured power. The revolutionary situation itself suggested practical slogans. There were arguments only over matters of detail in the appraisal of events: for example, *Nachalo*[122] regarded the Soviets of Workers' Deputies as organs of revolutionary local self-government, while *Novaya Zhizn*[123] regarded them as embryonic organs of revolutionary state power that united the proletariat with the revolutionary democrats. *Nachalo* inclined towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. *Novaya Zhizn* advocated the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But have not disagreements of this kind been observed at every stage of development of every socialist party in Europe?

"Mr. Blank's misrepresentation of the facts and his gross distortion of recent history are nothing more nor less than a sample of the smug bourgeois banality, for which periods of revolutionary whirlwind seem folly ('all principles are forgotten', 'even intellect and reason almost vanish'), while periods of suppression of revolution and philistine 'progress' (protected by the Dubasovs) seem to be periods of reasonable, deliberate and methodical activity. This comparative appraisal of two periods (the period of 'whirlwind' and the Cadet period) runs through the whole of Mr. Blank's article. When human history rushes forward with the speed of a locomotive, he calls it a 'whirlwind', a 'torrent', the 'vanishing' of all 'principles and ideas'. When history plods along at dray-horse pace, it becomes the very symbol of reason and method. When the masses of the people themselves, with all their virgin primitiveness and simple, rough determination begin to make history, begin to put 'principles and theories' immediately and directly into practice, the bourgeois is terrified and howls that 'intellect is retreating into the background' (is not the contrary the case, heroes of philistinism? Is it not the intellect of the masses, and not of individuals, that invades the sphere of history at such moments? Does not mass intellect at such a time become a verile, effective, and not an armchair force?). When the direct movement of the masses has been crushed by shootings, repressive measures,

floggings, unemployment and starvation, when all the parasites of professorial science financed by Dubasov come crawling out of their crevices and begin to administer affairs *on behalf of* the people, *in the name of the masses*, selling and betraying their interests to a privileged few—then the knights of philistinism think that an era of calm and peaceful progress has set in and that 'the turn of intellect and reason has come'. The bourgeois always and everywhere remains true to himself: whether you take *Polyarnaya Zvezda* or *Nasha Zhizn*,[124] whether you read Struve or Blank, you will always find this same narrow-minded, professorially pedantic and bureaucratically lifeless appraisal of periods of revolution and periods of reform. The former are periods of madness, *tolle Jahre*, the disappearance of intellect and reason. The latter are periods of 'deliberate and systematic' activities.

"Do not misinterpret what I am saying. I am not arguing that the Blanks prefer some periods to others. It is not a matter of preference; our subjective preferences do not determine the changes in historical periods. The thing is that *in analysing the characteristics* of this or that period (quite apart from our preferences or sympathies), the Blanks shamelessly *distort the truth*. The thing is that it is just the revolutionary periods which are distinguished by wider, richer, more deliberate, more methodical, more systematic, more courageous and more vivid making of history than periods of philistine, Cadet, reformist progress. But the Blanks turn the truth inside out! They palm off paltriness as magnificent making of history. They regard the inactivity of the oppressed or downtrodden masses as the triumph of 'system' in the work of bureaucrats and bourgeois. They shout about the disappearance of intellect and reason when, instead of the picking of draft laws to pieces by petty bureaucrats and liberal *penny-a-liner** journalists, there begins a period of direct political activity of the 'common people', who simply set to work without more ado to smash all the instruments for oppressing the people, seize power and take what was regarded as belonging to all kinds of robbers of the people—in short, when the intellect and

* In the original these words are in English.—*Ed.*

reason of millions of downtrodden people awaken not only to read books, but for action, vital human action, to make history."[125]

Such was the controversy that was waged in Russia in the years 1905 and 1906 on the question of the dictatorship.

Actually, the Dittmanns, Kautskys, Crispiens, and Hilferdings in Germany, Longuet and Co. in France, Turati and his friends in Italy, the MacDonalds and Snowdens in Britain, etc., argue about the dictatorship exactly as Mr. R. Blank and the Cadets did in Russia in 1905. They do not understand what dictatorship means, do not know how to prepare for it, and are incapable of understanding it and implementing it.

20.10.1920

Published in 1920

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To Stalin, Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, *Baku* (wherever he may be)

29.10

I consider it beyond doubt that Georgia will hand Batum over to the Entente, probably secretly, and that the Entente will march on Baku. Study the matter and take urgent steps to fortify the land and sea approaches to Baku, and to bring up heavy artillery, etc. Communicate your decisions.

Lenin

Written on October 29, 1920
First published in 1942

Published according to the manuscript

SPEECH DELIVERED AT AN ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL EDUCATION WORKERS OF GUBERNIA AND UYEZD EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS NOVEMBER 3, 1920[126]

Comrades, allow me to speak on several ideas, some of which were dealt with by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and by the Council of People's Commissars in connection with the formation of the Chief Committee for Political Education, while others came to me in connection with the draft submitted to the Council of People's Commissars. This draft was adopted yesterday as a basis; its details have still to be discussed.

I shall permit myself only to say, for my part, that at first I was highly averse to any change in the name of your institution. In my opinion, the function of the People's Commissariat of Education is to help people learn and teach others. My Soviet experience has taught me to regard titles as childish jokes; after all, any title is a joke in its way. Another name has now been endorsed: the Chief Committee for Political Education.

As this matter has already been decided, you must take this as nothing more than a personal remark. If the matter is not limited merely to a change of label, it is only to be welcomed.

If we succeed in drawing new people into cultural and educational work, it will not be just a change of title, and then we can reconcile ourselves to the "Soviet" weakness of sticking a label on every new undertaking and every new institution. If we succeed, we shall have achieved something more than ever before.

The link between education and our policy should be the chief inducement in making people join us in our cultural and educational work. A title may express something if there is a need for it, for along the whole line of our educational work we have to abandon the old standpoint that education should be non-political; we cannot conduct educational work in isolation from politics.

That idea has always predominated in bourgeois society. The very term "apolitical" or "non-political" education is a piece of bourgeois hypocrisy, nothing but humbuggery practised on the masses, 99 per cent of whom are humiliated and degraded by the rule of the church, private property and the like. That, in fact, is the way the bourgeoisie, still in the saddle in all bourgeois countries, is deceiving the masses.

The greater the importance of a political apparatus in such countries, the less its independence of capital and its policy.

In all bourgeois states the connection between the political apparatus and education is very strong, although bourgeois society cannot frankly acknowledge it. Nevertheless, this society indoctrinates the masses through the church and the institution of private property.

It is one of our basic tasks to contrapose our own truth to bourgeois "truth", and win its recognition.

The transition from bourgeois society to the policy of the proletariat is a very difficult one, all the more so for the bourgeoisie incessantly slandering us through its entire apparatus of propaganda and agitation. It bends every effort to play down an even more important mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat, its educational mission, which is particularly important in Russia, where the proletariat constitutes a minority of the population. Yet in Russia this mission must be given priority, for we must prepare the masses to build up socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat would have been out of the question if, in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the proletariat had not developed a keen class-consciousness, strict discipline and profound devotion, in other words, all the qualities required to assure the proletariat's complete victory over its old enemy.

We do not hold the utopian view that the working masses are ready for a socialist society. From precise facts provided by the entire history of working-class socialism we know that this is not the case, and that preparedness for socialism is created only by large-scale industry, by the strike struggle and by political organisation. To win the victory and accomplish the socialist revolution, the proletariat must be capable of concerted action, of overthrowing the exploiters. We now see that it has acquired all the necessary qualities, and that it translated them into action when it won power.

Education workers, and the Communist Party as the vanguard in the struggle, should consider it their fundamental task to help enlighten and instruct the working masses, in order to cast off the old ways and habituated routine we have inherited from the old system, the private property habits the masses are thoroughly imbued with. This fundamental task of the entire socialist revolution should never be neglected during consideration of the particular problems that have demanded so much attention from the Party's Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. What kind of structure should the Chief Committee for Political Education have? How should it be linked up with other institutions? How should it be linked up, not only with the centre but with local bodies? These questions will be answered by comrades who are more competent in the matter, have already gained considerable experience, and have made a special study of the matter. I would like merely to stress the main principles involved. We must put the matter frankly and openly affirm, despite all the old untruths, that education cannot but be linked up with politics.

We are living in an historic period of struggle against the world bourgeoisie, which is far stronger than we are. At this stage of the struggle, we have to safeguard the development of the revolution and combat the bourgeoisie in the military sense and still more by means of our ideology through education, so that the habits, usages and convictions acquired by the working class in the course of many decades of struggle for political liberty—the sum total of these habits, usages and ideas—should serve as an instru-

ment for the education of all working people. It is for the proletariat to decide how the latter are to be educated. We must inculcate in the working people the realisation that it is impossible and inexcusable to stand aside in the proletariat's struggle, which is now spreading more and more to all capitalist countries in the world, and to stand aside in international politics. An alliance of all the world's powerful capitalist countries against Soviet Russia—such is the real basis of international politics today. And it must, after all, be realised that on this will depend the fate of hundreds of millions of working people in the capitalist countries. We know that, at the present moment, there is not a corner of the earth which is not under the control of a small group of capitalist countries. Thus the situation is shaping in such a way that one is faced with the alternative of standing aloof from the present struggle and thereby proving one's utter lack of political consciousness, just like those benighted people who have held aloof from the revolution and the war and do not see the bourgeoisie's gross deception of the masses, the deliberate way in which the bourgeoisie is keeping the masses in ignorance; or else of joining the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is with absolute frankness that we speak of this struggle of the proletariat; each man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue must end in fiasco.

Observation of the many remnants of the Kerensky gang, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats, as represented by the Yudeniches, Kolchaks, Petlyuras, Makhnos and others, has shown us such a variety of forms and shades of counter-revolution in various parts of Russia that we have every reason to consider ourselves far more steeled in the struggle than anybody else is. A glance at Western Europe shows the same thing happening there as in our country—a repetition of our own history. Almost everywhere elements similar to the Kerensky gang are to be met alongside the bourgeoisie. They predominate in a number of countries, especially Germany. One can see the same thing everywhere—the impossibility of taking an intermediate position, and a clear realisation that there must be either a whiteguard dictatorship (for which the bourgeoisie of all

the countries of Western Europe are preparing by arming against us), or the dictatorship of the proletariat. We have experienced this so acutely and profoundly that there is no need for me to talk at length about the Russian Communists. Hence there can be only a single conclusion, one that should be the corner-stone of all arguments and theories about the Chief Committee for Political Education: the primacy of the Communist Party's policy must be frankly recognised in the work of that body. We know of no other form of guidance, and no other has been evolved in any country. Parties may represent the interests of their class in one degree or another; they may undergo changes or modifications, but we do not yet know of any better form. The entire course of the struggle waged by Soviet Russia, which for three years has withstood the onslaught of world imperialism, is bound up with the fact that the Party has consciously set out to help the proletariat perform its function of educator, organiser and leader, without which the collapse of capitalism is impossible. The working masses, the masses of peasants and workers, must oust the old intellectualist habits and re-educate themselves for the work of building communism. Otherwise the work of construction cannot be undertaken. Our entire experience shows that this is a very serious matter, and we must therefore give prominence to Party primacy and never lose sight of it when discussing our activities and our organisational development. How this is to be done will still have to be discussed at length; it will have to be discussed in the Party's Central Committee and in the Council of People's Commissars. The decree which was endorsed yesterday laid down the fundamentals in respect of the Chief Committee for Political Education, but it has not yet gone through all the stages in the Council of People's Commissars. The decree will be published within the next few days, and you will see that its final form makes no direct mention of relations with the Party.

We must, however, know and remember that, in law and in practice, the Constitution of the Soviet Republic is based on the tenet that the Party rectifies, prescribes and builds according to a single principle—to enable the communist elements linked with the proletariat to imbue the proletariat

with their own spirit, win its adherence, and open its eyes to the bourgeois deceit which we have been trying so long to eliminate. The People's Commissariat of Education has gone through a long struggle; for a long time the teachers' organisation resisted the socialist revolution. Bourgeois prejudices have struck very deep root among the teachers. There has been a long struggle in the form of direct sabotage and of tenacious bourgeois prejudices, and we have to fight for the communist positions slowly, step by step and win them. The Chief Committee for Political Education, which is concerned with extra-mural education, the work of educating and enlightening the masses, is faced with the clear task of combining Party leadership with the effort to gain the adherence of, to imbue with its spirit and to animate with its initiative, this half-million strong army of teachers, this vast institution which is now in the service of the workers. Education workers—the teachers—were trained in the spirit of bourgeois prejudices and habits, in a spirit hostile to the proletariat, with which they have had no ties whatever. We must now train a new army of teachers and instructors who must be in close touch with the Party and its ideas, be imbued with its spirit, and attract the masses of workers, instilling the spirit of communism into them and arousing their interest in what is being done by the Communists.

Since the old customs, habits and ideas must be discarded, the Chief Committee for Political Education and its personnel are faced with a most important task, which they must keep uppermost in their minds. Here we indeed have a dilemma: how can we establish a link between the teachers, most of whom are of the old school, with Party members, with the Communists? That is an extremely difficult problem, one that will require a considerable amount of thought.

Let us consider the means of establishing organisational links between people who are so different. In principle, we cannot for a moment doubt the need of the Communist Party's primacy. Consequently, the purpose of political culture, of political instruction, is to train genuine Communists capable of stamping out falsehood and prejudices and helping the working masses to vanquish the old system and build up a state without capitalists, without exploiters,

and without landowners. How can that be done? Only by acquiring the sum total of knowledge that the teachers have inherited from the bourgeoisie. Without this the technical achievements of communism will be impossible, and all hopes for those achievements would be pipe dreams. So the question arises: how are we to organise these people, who are not used to bringing politics into their work, especially the politics that is to our advantage, i.e., politics essential to communism? That, as I have said, is a very difficult problem. We have discussed the matter in the Central Committee, and in discussing it have tried to take into account the lessons of experience. We think that a congress like the one I am addressing today, a conference like yours, will be of great value in this respect. Every Party Committee now has to look from a new angle upon every propagandist, who used to be regarded merely as a man belonging to a definite circle, a definite organisation. Each of them belongs to a ruling party which directs the whole state, and the Soviet Russia's world struggle against the bourgeois system. He is a representative of a fighting class and of a party which runs, and must run, an enormous machine of state. Many a Communist who has been through the splendid school of underground work and has been tested and steeled in the struggle is unwilling or unable to understand the full significance of this change, of this transition, which turns the agitator and propagandist into a leader of agitators, a leader in a huge political organisation. The kind of title he is given, even if it is an embarrassing one—such as superintendent of general schools—does not matter much; what is important is that he should be capable of directing the mass of teachers.

It should be said that the hundreds of thousands of teachers constitute a body that must get the work moving, stimulate thought, and combat the prejudices that to this day still persist among the masses. The heritage of capitalist culture, the fact that the mass of the teachers are imbued with its defects, which prevent them from being Communists, should not deter us from admitting these teachers into the ranks of the political education workers, for these teachers possess the knowledge without which we cannot achieve our aim.

We must put hundreds of thousands of useful people to work in the service of communist education. That is a task that was accomplished at the front, in our Red Army, into which tens of thousands of representatives of the old army were incorporated. In the lengthy process of re-education, they became welded with the Red Army, as they ultimately proved by their victories. This is an example that we must follow in our cultural and educational work. True, this work is not so spectacular, but it is even more important. We need every agitator and propagandist; he will be doing his job if he works in a strictly Party spirit but at the same time does not limit himself to Party work, and remembers that it is his duty to direct hundreds of thousands of teachers, whet their interest, overcome their old bourgeois prejudices, enlist them in the work we are doing, and make them realise the immensity of our work. It is only by tackling that job that we can lead this mass of people, whom capitalism suppressed and drew away from us, along the right path.

Such are the aims that every agitator and propagandist working in the sphere of extra-mural education must pursue and constantly keep in sight. A host of practical difficulties will be encountered in the process, and you must help the cause of communism by becoming representatives and leaders, not only of Party study-circles, but of the entire state administration, which is now in the hands of the working *class.*

We must overcome resistance from the capitalists in all its forms, not only in the military and the political spheres, but also ideological resistance, which is the most deep-seated and the strongest. It is the duty of our educational workers to accomplish the re-education of the masses. The interest, the thirst for education and knowledge of communism which are to be seen among them are a guarantee of our victory in this field too, although, perhaps, not as rapid as at the front and only after great difficulties and at times even reverses. However, we shall ultimately win.

Last, I should like to dwell on one more point. Perhaps the title of Chief Committee for Political Education is not properly understood. Inasmuch as it makes mention of the political concept, politics is the main thing here.

But how is politics to be understood? If politics is understood in the old sense, one may fall into a grave and profound error. Politics means a struggle between classes; means the relations of the proletariat in its struggle for its emancipation, against the world bourgeoisie. However, in our struggle two aspects of the matter stand out: on the one hand, there is the task of destroying the heritage of the bourgeois system, of foiling the repeated attempts of the whole bourgeoisie to crush the Soviet state. This task has absorbed most of our attention hitherto and has prevented us from proceeding to the other task, that of construction. According to the bourgeois world-outlook, politics was divorced, as it were, from economics. The bourgeoisie said: peasants, you must work for your livelihood; workers, you must work to secure your means of subsistence on the market; as for economic policy, that is the business of your masters. That, however, is not so; politics should be the business of the people, the business of the proletariat. Here we must emphasise the fact that nine-tenths of our time and our work is devoted to the struggle against the bourgeoisie. The victories over Wrangel, of which we read yesterday, and of which you will read today and probably tomorrow, show that one stage of the struggle is coming to an end and that we have secured peace with a number of Western countries; every victory on the war front leaves our hands freer for the internal struggle, for the politics of state organisation. Every step that brings us closer to victory over the whiteguards gradually shifts the focus of the struggle to economic policy. Propaganda of the old type describes and illustrates what communism is. This kind of propaganda is now useless, for we have to show in practice how socialism is to be built. All our propaganda must be based on the political experience of economic development. That is our principal task; whoever interprets it in the old sense will show himself to be a retrograde, one who is incapable of conducting propaganda work among the masses of the peasants and workers. Our main policy must now be to develop the state economically, so as to gather in more poods of grain and mine more poods of coal, to decide how best to utilise these poods of grain and coal and preclude starvation—that is our

policy. All our agitation and propaganda must be focussed on this aim. There must be less fine talk, for you cannot satisfy the working people with fine words. As soon as the war enables us to shift the focus from the struggle against the bourgeoisie, from the struggle against Wrangel and the whiteguards, we shall turn to economic policy. And then agitation and propaganda will play a role of tremendous and ever growing importance.

Every agitator must be a state leader, a leader of all the peasants and workers in the work of economic development. He must tell them what one should know, what pamphlets and books one should read to become a Communist.

That is the way to improve our economic life and make it more secure, more social; that is the way to increase production, improve the food situation and distribution of the goods produced, increase coal output, and restore industry without capitalism and without the capitalist spirit.

What does communism consist in? All propaganda for communism must be conducted in a way that will amount to practical guidance of the state's development. Communism must be made comprehensible to the masses of the workers so that they will regard it as their own cause. That task is being poorly accomplished, and thousands of mistakes are being made. We make no secret of the fact. However, the workers and the peasants must themselves build up and improve our apparatus, with our assistance, feeble and inadequate as it is. To us, that is no longer a programme, a theory, or a task to be accomplished; it has become a matter of actual and practical development. Although we suffered some cruel reverses in our war, we have at least learnt from these reverses and won complete victory. Now, too, we must learn a lesson from every defeat and must remember that the workers and peasants have to be instructed by taking the work already performed as an example. We must point out what is bad, so as to avoid it in future.

By taking constructive work as an example, by repeating it time and again, we shall succeed in turning inefficient communist managers into genuine builders, and, in the first place, into builders of our economic life. We shall achieve our targets and overcome all the obstacles which

we have inherited from the old system and cannot be eliminated at a single stroke. We must re-educate the masses; they can be re-educated only by agitation and propaganda. The masses must be brought, in the first place, into the work of building the entire economic life. That must be the principal and basic object in the work of each agitator and propagandist, and when he realises this, the success of his work will be assured. (*Loud applause.*)

Bulletin of the All-Russia Conference of Political Education Workers (*November 1-8, 1920*), Moscow

Published according to the text of the Bulletin

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON "THE TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS, AND THE METHODS OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT"[127]

In accordance with the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Russia, the Conference once again draws the attention of the trade unions to the necessity of these decisions being scrupulously fulfilled, and points out in particular that the imperative need of a single economic plan establishing the order of priority of objectives in the general scheme of economic construction is indisputable. At the same time, as was recognised by the Party Conference of September 1920, a gradual but steady transition must be effected from urgency procedures to a more even distribution of forces, particularly in the secondment of the individual unions' best organisers to the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions with a view to consolidating that body as a whole, improving the functioning of its apparatus, achieving greater system in the work of all trade unions, and thereby strengthening the entire trade union movement.

This measure should be applied in particular to the Central Committee of the General Transport Workers' Union (*Tsektran*)[128]; an end must be put to its disproportionate growth as compared with the other unions, and the best elements thus released should extend to the entire trade union movement those methods of the broader application of democracy, the promotion of initiative, participation in the management of industry, the development of emulation, and so forth, which have yielded the best practical results.

In conformity with the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Russia, and recognising as absolutely indispensable the development, extension and consolidation of trade union participation in production management, the Conference instructs the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions to sum up immediately the practical experience gained in this respect by the leading unions and enterprises, and to draw up detailed instructions, which will help all trade unions make use of that practical experience and will enjoin them to utilise the latter in a more energetic and systematic fashion.

This refers especially to the utilisation of specialists.

Written in early November 1920

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ON THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY[129]

Published in 1920

Published according to the manuscript

ON THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY[129]

Published in 1920

Published according to the manuscript

Pravda No. 213 of September 25, 1920, published a short letter of mine entitled: "Letter to the German and the French Workers Regarding the Discussion on the Second Congress of the Communist International."[130] In its issue of October 5, *Avanti!*, the central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, carried a reprint of this letter with comments of its own, which are worth examining since they strikingly reveal the fallacy of the stand taken by Comrade Serrati, editor of *Avanti!*

"Lenin's explanation," we read, "to some extent mitigates the draconic conditions dictated by comrades who are not quite in a position to correctly appraise men and circumstances at such a distance and in such a different situation...."

"...Lenin spared one of his victims: Modigliani...."

"...Lenin now says—whether on his own behalf or on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, we do not know—that 'exceptions' [to the general rule] are permissible [with the consent of the Executive Committee]."

The ironical remark about the "victim", which Modigliani, one of the reformists, is supposed to be, is pointless. Despite Serrati's opinion, my failure to mention the name of Modigliani (and of Longuet) was unintentional. I took one name or another as an example, in order to characterise a *trend*, leaving aside, as I still do, the question of *individuals*; I did not undertake to decide this question, considering it of secondary importance, and spoke of the possibility of exceptions. Notwithstanding his statement, Serrati is fully aware (for he makes precise reference to my article in *Pravda*) that I speak, and can do so, *only* on my own behalf, and in no way on behalf of the Executive Committee.

By his remarks, Serrati distracts *Avanti!* readers from the principal, basic and vital question of whether reformists can now be tolerated in the ranks of the Italian party of the revolutionary proletariat. Serrati covers up the falseness of his stand by trying to divert attention from the essential to the secondary and insignificant.

That must be combated. The essentials must be elucidated.

Both in the comment we are dealing with and in other articles, Serrati says that the Moscow Congress (the Second Congress of the Communist International) was not adequately informed about Italian affairs. One might think that the gist of the matter did not lie in the struggle between two fundamental trends, or in the answer to the fundamental question of whether "unity" with the reformists is permissible, but in differences over points that "Moscow" is not precisely informed about!

The glaring fallacy of this view—and of this attempt to distract attention from the main point—is best of all exposed in the *official report* of the discussion *in the Central Committee* of the Italian Socialist Party. This discussion took place in Milan on September 28, 29 and 30 and October 1, only a few days prior to the publication of the issue of *Avanti!* referred to above.

The discussion closed with a vote on two resolutions, one of which may be called a communist, and the other a "Centrist" or evasive resolution, which in a masked form advocated an alliance ("unity"!) with the reformists. The first resolution was carried, seven voting for it (Terracini, Gennari, Regent, Tuntar, Casucci, Marziali, and Bellone); the second resolution was rejected (five in favour: Baratono, Zannerini, Bacci, Giacomini and Serrati).

The first resolution is of a remarkable clarity and precision. It opens with a reference to the "present conditions" of the revolutionary struggle in Italy calling for "greater homogeneity" in the party. It goes on to say that the right to remain in the party was extended to all, on condition of submission to party discipline; however, this condition has not been observed. It would be erroneous, it goes on to say, to expect submission to discipline from those whose convictions are opposed to the principles and

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tactics of the Third International; consequently, since the twenty-one points of the Moscow conditions have been accepted, a "radical purge" of the party is necessary so as to *eliminate* all reformist and opportunist elements.

Here no reference is made to names or particular instances. A clear political line is laid down. The grounds for the decision are precisely stated, viz., concrete facts from the history of the party in Italy, and concrete features in the revolutionary situation there.

The second resolution is a model of evasiveness and poor diplomacy: we accept the twenty-one points, but consider that "these conditions leave a loop-hole for dubious interpretations", and that "the political criterion of each section of the Third, Communist International should be adapted to the historical conditions and the actual specific features of its country, and submitted for approval to this International". The resolution emphasises "the need to preserve the unity of the Italian Socialist Party on the basis of the twenty-one points"; individual breaches of discipline are to be sternly punished by the Central Committee of the Party.

The communist resolution says that the revolutionary situation calls for greater homogeneity in the party. That is undeniable. The resolution of those who advocate "unity" with the reformists attempts to *evade* this undeniable truth, without daring to dispute it.

The Communist resolution says that it is a feature of the situation in Italy that the condition demanding submission to party decisions by the reformists *has not been observed*. That is the gist of the matter. That being so, it is not merely a mistake *but a crime* to allow the reformists to remain in the party at a time when the general revolutionary situation is *becoming acute*, and the country may even be on the eve of decisive revolutionary battles.

Is this true or not? Have the reformists carried out party decisions? Have they in fact submitted to the party? Have they pursued its policy? The resolution of the defenders of the reformists cannot give an affirmative answer; it cannot challenge the Communists' negative answer, and avoids a reply. It twists and turns, makes general references to the different specific features in the various countries,

and does so *in order* to evade and to present in a false light the most important "specific feature" of Italy herself at the moment. What constitutes this specific feature of Italy is the fact that the reformists have already proved incapable in practice of carrying out party decisions and pursuing party policy. By evading this fundamental issue, the resolution of the advocates of unity with the reformists utterly defeats itself.

By this fact alone, Serrati, Baratono, Zannerini, Bacci, and Giacomini have already shown quite clearly and irrefutably that they are *fundamentally* wrong, that their political line is *fundamentally false*.

The discussion in the Italian party's Central Committee has ever more forcefully revealed the total falsity of Serrati's line. The Communists were right in saying that as long as the reformists remained what they were they could not but sabotage the revolution, as they had already sabotaged it during the recent revolutionary movement of the Italian workers who were taking over the factories.

That is the pith and marrow of the matter! How is it possible to prepare for revolution and advance towards decisive battles, when there are people in the party who sabotage the revolution? That is not merely a mistake but a crime.

If, as he frankly declared in his letter to *l'Humanité*[131] of October 14, Serrati counted on the expulsion of Turati alone,* this mistake of his has also *already* been revealed by the *facts*. The Italian reformists not only held a factional congress of their own (in Reggio Emilia on October 11, 1920); at this congress they not only reiterated the essence of their reformist views; not only did they give a triumphant reception to Filippo Turati at the congress, but they also declared, through Trèves: "We shall either remain in the

* Here is the principal passage in this letter: "We all stand for the Moscow conditions. *The question is how the are to be applied*. I assert that the party must be purged of harmful elements, and I proposed that Turati be expelled; but we must not lose the masses belonging to the syndicates [trade unions] and co-operative societies. Others want a *radical split*. That is where we differ." (*l'Humanité*, October 14, Serrati's italics.)

party, or to a man leave it." Let us note in this connection that the bourgeois press and the reformists themselves did their utmost to play up the importance of their factional congress. But in *Avanti!* of October 13 (the Milan edition) we find it frankly stated that the reformists were able to get representatives from only two hundred branches of a party with *thousands* of branches.

But let us dwell in greater detail on Serrati's main argument on the essence of the question. Serrati fears a split that may weaken the party and especially the trade unions, the co-operative societies and the municipalities. These institutions, which are essential to the construction of socialism, must not be destroyed—that is Serrati's main idea. He asks (*Avanti!*, October 2, 1920, the Milan edition): "Where shall we find enough 'Communists', even if only the most ardent new-fledged Communists, to fill the public posts from which we shall drive their holders, as Terracini proposes?" The same idea is expressed by Serrati in an article on the Second Congress of the Third International, in the journal *Comunismo* (No. 24, p. 1627), which he edits: "Picture to yourselves the Milan commune [i.e., the Milan municipality] administered, not by competent people but by novices who only yesterday declared themselves ardent Communists."

Serrati fears the destruction of the trade unions, the co-operative societies and municipalities, and the inefficiency and mistakes of the novices.

What the Communists fear is the reformists' sabotage of the revolution.

This difference reveals Serrati's error of principle. He keeps reiterating a simple idea: the need for flexible tactics. This idea is incontestable. The trouble is that Serrati *leans to the right* when, in the present-day conditions in Italy one should *lean to the left*. To successfully accomplish the revolution and safeguard it, the Italian party must take a *definite step to the left* (without in any way keeping its hands tied or forgetting that subsequent events may well call for definite steps to the right).

Victory in the proletarian revolution *cannot* be achieved, and that revolution *cannot* be safeguarded, while there are reformists and Mensheviks in one's ranks. That is obvious

in principle, and has been strikingly confirmed by the experience both of Russia and of Hungary. This is a decisive consideration. It is simply ridiculous to compare with this danger the danger of "losing" the trade unions co-operative societies, municipalities, etc., or of their failures, mistakes, or collapse. It is not only ridiculous but criminal. Anyone who would subject the entire revolution to risk for fear of injuring the municipal affairs of Milan and so forth, has completely lost his head, has no idea of the fundamental task of the revolution, and is totally incapable of preparing its victory.

We in Russia made thousands of mistakes and suffered thousands of reverses, losses, etc., owing to the inefficiency of novices and incompetent people in the co-operative societies, municipalities, trade unions, etc. We have no doubt that other and more civilised nations will make *fewer* mistakes of this kind. Notwithstanding these mistakes, we have achieved what is most important, viz., the conquest of power by the proletariat. Moreover, we have maintained that power for three years.

The mistakes mentioned by Comrade Serrati are minor ones and are infinitely easier to rectify than the "mistake" of allowing the sabotage of the revolution by the Mensheviks and the wrecking of the revolution itself. That is self-evident. It has been strikingly demonstrated in the case of Hungary. It has also been confirmed by our experience; during the three years of proletarian government in Russia difficult situations have arisen *many times*, when the Soviet regime would *most certainly* have been overthrown if Mensheviks, reformists, petty-bourgeois democrats had remained in our Party, or even if they had remained in any considerable numbers in the central Soviet bodies, such as the Central Executive Committee.

Serrati has failed to understand the specific features of the transitional situation that exists in Italy, where, as is generally admitted, decisive battles are in store between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for possession of state power. At such a moment, it is not only absolutely essential to remove the Mensheviks, reformists, Turatists from the party, but it may even be useful to remove some very good Communists too, to remove them from all

responsible posts, if they are inclined to waver, and reveal a tendency to drift towards "unity" with the reformists.

Let me give a practical illustration. On the eve of the October Revolution in Russia, and immediately after it, a number of very good Communists in Russia committed an error, one which our people are now loth to recall. Why are they loth to recall it? Because, unless there is particular reason for it, it is wrong to recall mistakes which have been completely set right. But it will be useful to recall this mistake for the benefit of the Italian workers. At the time mentioned, prominent Bolsheviks and Communists, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Nogin and Milyutin, wavered and expressed the fear that the Bolsheviks were isolating themselves excessively, were taking too much risk in heading for an uprising, and were too unyielding in their attitude towards a certain section of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The conflict became so acute that these comrades demonstratively resigned from all responsible posts in Party and government, to the great glee of the enemies of the Soviet revolution. It developed so far that the Central Committee of our Party conducted a very heated controversy in the press with the comrades who had resigned. But a few weeks later—at most a few months—all these comrades realised their mistake and returned to their posts, some of the most responsible in the Party and the Soviets.

Why this happened can readily be understood. On the eve of revolution or at the height of the struggle for its victory, the slightest wavering in the ranks of the Party may *wreck everything*, frustrate the revolution, and wrest power from the hands of the proletariat, for that power has not yet been consolidated, and the onslaught against it is still very strong. If wavering leaders resign at *such* a time, that does not weaken the party, the working-class movement and the revolution, but strengthens them.

Italy is going through a similar period. It is generally seen and admitted that a nation-wide revolutionary crisis is maturing. The proletariat has proved in deed that it is capable of rising spontaneously, and of rousing the masses for a mighty revolutionary movement. The poor peasants, or semi-proletarians (it is a pity that Comrade Serrati has

acquired the bad habit of putting a question mark after this word whenever he uses it; it is a correct Marxist term and expresses a correct idea, which has been confirmed by facts both in Russia and in Italy, viz., that the poor peasants are half property-owners and half proletarians)—the poor peasants in Italy have shown in deed that they are capable of rising for a revolutionary struggle, in the wake of the proletariat. What is most essential now, in fact absolutely essential for the victory of the revolution in Italy, is that the Italian revolutionary proletariat should have a real vanguard in the shape of a truly Communist Party, one that is *incapable* of wavering and flinching at the decisive moment, a party that will concentrate within itself the utmost fervour, devotion to the revolution, energy and boundless courage and determination. Victory has to be achieved in a very hard and painful struggle that will entail great sacrifice; when captured, power will have to be upheld in the face of incredibly fierce attacks, intrigues, slander, calumny, intimidation and violence on the part of the bourgeoisie of the *whole world*, in the face of the most dangerous waverings on the part of every petty-bourgeois democrat, every Turati supporter, every "Centrist", every Social-Democrat, socialist and anarchist. At such a time and in such surroundings, the Party must be a hundred times firmer, bolder, more determined, devoted and ruthless than in ordinary or in less difficult times. At such a time and in such surroundings, the Party will become a hundred times *stronger*, not weaker, if Mensheviks, like those who foregathered in Reggio Emilia on October 11, 1920, withdraw from it altogether, and even if some excellent Communists—such as Baratono, Zannerini, Bacci, Giacomini and Serrati, members of the present Central Committee of the party, probably are—withdraw from its leadership.

Even if the people of the latter category resigned now, most of them would undoubtedly very soon see their mistake and return after the victory of the proletariat, after its victory had been consolidated. In all probability, even a section of the Italian Mensheviks, of the Turati supporters, would return, too, and be received into the party when the period of greatest difficulties had passed, just as a section of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who

were on the other side of the barricades in 1917-18, have come over to us now (after we have been through three difficult years since the revolution).

The Italian revolutionary proletariat is about to face a period of battles that will be not merely extremely difficult, as I have said, but truly the most difficult of all. The greatest trials lie ahead. I would consider it frivolous and criminal to shrug off these difficulties. It surprises me how Comrade Serrati could have published in his journal *Comunismo* (No. 24, September 15-30, 1920), without any comment, such a superficial article as that by G. C. entitled "Will We Be Blockaded?" Despite what the author of this article says, I personally think that in the event of the proletariat's victory in Italy, the blockade of that country by Great Britain, France and America is possible and probable. In my opinion, Comrade Graziadei was much closer to the truth in his speech at the meeting of the Italian party's Central Committee (*Avanti!*, October 1, 1920, the Milan edition), when he admitted that the problem of a possible blockade was "very grave" ("*problema gravissima*"). He said that Russia had held out despite the blockade, partly because of the sparseness of her population and her enormous territory, but the revolution in Italy "could not resist (*resistere*) for long if it were not co-ordinated with a revolution in some other country in Central Europe", and that "such co-ordination is difficult but not impossible", because the whole of continental Europe is passing through a revolutionary period.

Though put very cautiously, this is true. I would merely add that Italy is *assured* of a *certain amount* of co-ordination—although that may as yet be inadequate and incomplete—and that *complete* co-ordination will have to be *fought* for. When the reformists speak of the possibility of a blockade they do so in order to sabotage the revolution, instil apprehension of the revolution, and imbue the masses with *their own* panic, fear, indecision and vacillation. Revolutionaries and Communists must not deny the dangers and difficulties of the struggle in order to put *greater* firmness into the masses, *purge* the party of those that are weak, wavering and unstable, and inspire the entire movement with greater enthusiasm, a higher spirit of internation-

alism, and a greater preparedness to make sacrifices for the sake of a great aim, namely, hastening the revolution in Great Britain, France and America *should* these countries dare to blockade the proletarian and Soviet Italian republic.

The question of replacing experienced reformist or "Centrist" leaders by novices is not a particular question, of concern to a single country in special circumstances. It is a general question which arises in every proletarian revolution, and as such it is formulated and quite specifically answered in the resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist International on "The Fundamental Tasks of the Communist International". In point 8 we read: "Preparation for the dictatorship of the proletariat, not only entails explaining the bourgeois character of all reformism; ... it also entails replacing the old leaders by Communists in proletarian organisations of absolutely every type—not only political, but also trade union, co-operative, educational, etc. ...These representatives of the labour aristocracy, or the bourgeoisified workers, should be eliminated from all their posts a hundred times more boldly than hitherto, and replaced by workers, even if wholly inexperienced, as long as they are connected with the exploited masses and enjoy the latter's confidence in the struggle against the exploiters. The dictatorship of the proletariat will require the appointment of such inexperienced workers to the most responsible posts in the state; otherwise the workers' government will be impotent, and will not have the support of the masses."[132]

Serrati is therefore wrong in saying that "all" in the Italian party agree to accept the decisions of the Communist Congress. In fact the reverse is to be seen.

In the above-mentioned letter to *l'Humanité* Serrati says among other things:

"...As for the recent events, one should know that the leaders of the General Confederation of Labour (the Italian variant of the T.U.C.) proposed that the leadership of the movement should be turned over to those who wanted to expand it to a revolution. Our comrades of the General Confederation of Labour declared that they were willing to remain disciplined soldiers if the extremists assumed

leadership of the insurrection. But the latter did not assume leadership of the movement....”

It would be highly naïve on Serrati’s part to take at its face value this statement from the reformists in the General Confederation of Labour. In fact, threatening to resign at crucial moments is a variety of sabotage of the revolution. This is in no way a question of loyalty, but simply of the victory of the revolution being *impossible* if at every difficult turn the leaders are faced with hesitation, vacillation and resignations on the part of their “own” colleagues, those at the top, the “leaders”. It may be useful to Comrade Serrati to know that at the end of September 1917, when the coalition of Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the bourgeoisie had obviously fallen through politically, none other than our Socialist-Revolutionaries, Chernov’s party, wrote in their newspaper: “The Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a cabinet.... Let them not make futile attempts to hide behind a hastily concocted theory that it is impossible for them to take power. The democracy will not accept these theories. At the same time, the advocates of coalition must guarantee them full support” (the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper, the newspaper of their party, Chernov’s newspaper—*Dyelo Naroda*, September 21, 1917, quoted in my pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*, Petrograd, 1917, p. 4)[133]

It would be just as fatal a mistake for the revolutionary workers to believe in the loyalty of such statements as it was to believe the Hungarian Turatists, who promised Béla Kun their help and joined the Communist Party, but, nevertheless, proved to be saboteurs of the revolution and wrecked it by their vacillation.

* * *

To sum up:

1) The party of the revolutionary proletariat in Italy should display the utmost self-restraint, circumspection and coolness for a correct appraisal of the conditions in general, and the appropriate moment in particular, in the impending decisive battles for political power between the Italian working class and the bourgeoisie.

2) At the same time, all propaganda and agitation conducted by that party should be imbued with the firmest determination to wage that struggle to a victorious conclusion, come what may, in a united and centralised manner, and with supreme heroism, ruthlessly eliminating the vacillation, indecision and wavering with which the Turati supporters are so thoroughly imbued.

3) The propaganda conducted by the Milan edition of *Avanti!*, which is edited by Serrati, does not prepare the proletariat for the struggle, but brings disintegration into its ranks. At a moment like the present, the party's Central Committee should give the workers leadership, prepare them for the revolution, and challenge wrong views. This can (and should) be done, while allowing all trends to express themselves. Serrati is giving leadership, but doing so in the wrong direction.

4) The expulsion from the party of all who attended the Reggio Emilia Congress on October 11, 1920, will not weaken the party but strengthen it; such "leaders" are capable only of wrecking the revolution in the "Hungarian style", *even if they do remain loyal*. The whiteguards and the bourgeoisie will be able to utilise the hesitation, vacillation, doubts, uncertainty, etc., of even quite "loyal" socialists, Social-Democrats, etc.

5) If people such as Baratono, Zannerini, Bacci, Giacomini and Serrati display vacillation and resign, they should not be asked to remain; their resignations should be immediately accepted. They will return after the period of decisive battles and will then be of greater use to the proletariat.

6) Comrades, workers of Italy, do not forget the lessons of the history of all revolutions, the lessons of Russia and Hungary in 1917-20. Great battles, great difficulties and great sacrifices await the proletariat in Italy. Victory over the bourgeoisie, the assumption of power by the proletariat and the consolidation of the Soviet Republic in Italy all depend on the outcome of these battles, and on the solidarity, discipline and devotion of the masses of the workers. The bourgeoisie of Italy and of all countries of the world will do their utmost and resort to any crime and atrocity to prevent the proletariat from taking power, and to over-

throw its power. The hesitation, vacillation and irresolution of the reformists and of all who attended the Reggio Emilia Congress on October 11, 1920, are inevitable, because, even though many of them are quite honest, such people have always and in all countries, wrecked the cause of revolution by their vacillation. It was such as these who wrecked the revolution (the first revolution; it will be followed by another ...) in Hungary, and would have wrecked the revolution in Russia had they not been removed from all responsible posts and surrounded by a wall of proletarian distrust, vigilance and surveillance.

The toiling and exploited masses of Italy will follow the revolutionary proletariat. It will prove victorious in the end, for its cause is that of the workers of the whole world, and there is no way to avoid the continuation of the present imperialist wars, the advent of the new imperialist wars that are being prepared, and the horrors of capitalist slavery and oppression, otherwise than in a Soviet Workers' Republic.

4.11.1920

FALSE TALK ON FREEDOM (INSTEAD OF AN EPILOGUE)

Comrade Nobs, editor of *Volksrecht*, the Swiss Left-Socialist newspaper in Zurich, recently published a letter by Zinoviev on the need to break with the opportunists, together with his own lengthy reply to this letter. Nobs's reply amounts to an emphatic rejection of the twenty-one conditions and of affiliation to the Communist International, this, of course, being done in the name of "freedom"—the freedom to criticise, freedom from excessive demands or the dictatorship of Moscow (I have not kept Nobs's article and am therefore obliged to quote from memory; I can vouch for the idea but not for the exact wording).

Incidentally, Comrade Nobs has enrolled Comrade Serrati as an ally, who is also known to be displeased with "Moscow", i.e., particularly with the Russian members of the Communist International's Executive Committee and who also complains that Moscow violates the "freedom" of the

constituent sections, the individual parties and individual members of the Communist International. It will not be superfluous, therefore, to say a few words about freedom.

After three years of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we may safely say that the most common and popular objection to it all over the world is its alleged violation of freedom and equality. The entire bourgeois press in all countries, including the press of the petty-bourgeois democrats, i.e., of the Social-Democrats and socialists, among them Kautsky, Hilferding, Martov, Chernov, Longuet, etc., etc., rail against the Bolsheviks for the latter's violation of freedom and equality. From the standpoint of theory, this can be readily understood. The reader will recall Marx's celebrated and sarcastic words in *Capital*:

"This sphere [of the circulation or exchange of commodities], within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham." (*Capital*, Vol. I, Part II, end of Chapter 4, Russian language edition, 1920, p. 152.)[134]

This sarcastic remark has a profound historical and philosophical meaning. It should be compared with the popular explanation of the same question given by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, particularly with what Engels said about the idea of equality being a prejudice or an absurdity, if it does not mean the abolition of classes.[135]

The abolition of feudalism and of its vestiges, and the establishment of the foundations of the bourgeois order (one may quite correctly say: the bourgeois-democratic order) occupied an entire epoch of world history. It was inevitable for freedom, equality, property and Bentham to become the slogans of this epoch of world history. The abolition of capitalism and its vestiges, and the establishment of the fundamentals of the communist order comprise the content of the new era of world history that has set in. It is inevitable that the slogans of our era are and must be: the abolition of classes; the dictatorship of the proletariat for the purpose of achieving that aim; the ruthless exposure of petty-bourgeois democratic prejudices concerning freedom and equality and ruthless war on these prejudices. Whoever does not understand this has no

understanding of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Soviet government, and the fundamental principles of the Communist International.

Until classes are abolished, all talk about freedom and equality in general is self-deception, or else deception of the workers and of all who toil and are exploited by capital; in any case, it is a defence of the interests of the bourgeoisie. Until classes are abolished, all arguments about freedom and equality should be accompanied by the questions: freedom for which class, and for what purpose; equality between which classes, and in what respect? Any direct or indirect, witting or unwitting evasion of these questions inevitably turns into a defence of the interests of the bourgeoisie, the interests of capital, the interests of the exploiters. If these questions are glossed over, and nothing is said about the private ownership of the means of production, then the slogan of freedom and equality is merely the lies and humbug of bourgeois society, whose formal recognition of freedom and equality conceals actual economic servitude and inequality for the workers, for all who toil and are exploited by capital, i.e., for the overwhelming majority of the population in all capitalist countries.

Thanks to the fact that, in present-day Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat has posed in a practical manner the fundamental and *final* problems of capitalism, one can see with particular clarity *whose interests are served* (*cui prodest*?—"who benefits?") by talk about freedom and equality in general. When the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, the Chernovs and the Martovs, favour us with arguments about freedom and equality *within the limits of labour democracy* (for, you see, they are never guilty of reasoning about freedom and equality in general! They never forget Marx!) we ask them: what about the distinction between the class of wage-workers and the class of small property-owners in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Freedom and equality *within the limits of labour democracy* mean freedom for the small peasant owner (even if he farms on nationalised land) to sell his surplus grain at profiteering prices, i.e., *to exploit the workers*. Anyone who talks about freedom and equality within the limits of

labour democracy when the capitalists have been overthrown but private property and freedom to trade still survive is a champion of the exploiters. In exercising its dictatorship, the proletariat must treat these champions as it does the exploiters, even though they say they are Social-Democrats or socialists, or admit that the Second International is putrid, and so on and so forth.

As long as private ownership of the means of production (e.g., of agricultural implements and livestock, even if private ownership of land has been abolished) and freedom to trade remain, so does the economic basis of capitalism. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the only means of successfully fighting for the demolition of that basis, the only way to abolish classes (without which abolition there can be no question of genuine freedom for the individual—*and not for the property-owner*—of real equality, in the social and political sense, between man and man—*and not the humbug of equality between those who possess property and those who do not*, between the well-fed and the hungry, between the exploiters and the exploited). The dictatorship of the proletariat leads to the abolition of classes; it leads to that end, on the one hand, by the overthrow of the exploiters and the suppression of their resistance, and on the other hand by neutralising and rendering harmless the small property-owner's vacillation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The falsity of Comrade Nobs's and Comrade Serrati's statements does not, of course, consist in their being falsely or insincerely meant. Nothing of the kind. They are quite sincere, and there is nothing subjectively false in what they have said. However, their statements are false objectively, in content, for they are a defence of the prejudices of petty-bourgeois democracy; they amount to a defence of the bourgeoisie.

The Communist International cannot under any circumstances recognise freedom and equality for all who wish to subscribe to certain statements, irrespective of their political conduct. To Communists this would be no less suicidal both as regards theory and practical politics than the recognition of freedom and equality "within the limits of labour democracy", etc. To anyone able to read and

willing to understand what he reads, it must be quite clear that *none* of the decisions, theses, resolutions and conditions of the Communist International recognise the *absolute* "freedom and equality" of those who desire to affiliate to the Communist International.

What is our stipulation for recognising "freedom and equality", the freedom and equality of members of the Communist International?

It is that no opportunists and "Centrists", such as the well-known representatives of the Right wing of the Swiss and Italian socialist parties, shall be able to become members. No matter how these opportunists and "Centrists" may claim that they recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat, they actually remain advocates and defenders of the prejudices, weaknesses and vacillations of the petty-bourgeois democrats.

You must first break with these prejudices, weaknesses and vacillations, with those who preach, defend and give practical expression to these views and qualities. Then, and only on this condition, can you be "free" to join the Communist International, only then can the genuine Communist, a Communist in deed and not merely in word, be the "equal" of any other Communist, of any other member of the Communist International.

Comrade Nobs, you are "free" to defend the views you hold. But we, too, are "free" to declare that these views are petty-bourgeois prejudices, which are injurious to the proletarian cause and of use to capitalism; we, too, are "free" to refuse to join in an alliance or league with people who defend those views or a policy that corresponds to them. We have *already* condemned that policy and those views on behalf of the Second Congress of the Communist International as a whole. We have already said that we absolutely demand a rupture with the opportunists as a first and preliminary step.

Do not talk of freedom and equality in general, Comrade Nobs and Comrade Serrati! Talk of freedom *not to carry out* the decisions of the Communist International on the absolute duty of breaking with the opportunists and the "Centrists" (who cannot but undermine, cannot but sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat). Talk of the equality of

the opportunists and "Centrists" with the Communists. Such freedom and such equality cannot be recognised by us for the Communist International; as for any other kind of freedom and equality—you may enjoy them to your heart's content!

On the eve of the proletarian revolution, the liberation, the freedom, of the parties of the revolutionary proletariat from opportunists and "Centrists", from their influence, their prejudices, their weaknesses and vacillations, is the main and essential condition of success.

11.12.1920

SPEECH AT A JOINT PLENUM OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS', PEASANTS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES, THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) AND THE MOSCOW CITY TRADE UNION COUNCIL, DEDICATED TO THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 6, 1920

(*Prolonged applause.*) Comrades, we have gathered here today to commemorate our proletariat's days of struggle and our revolutionary achievements. Today we can celebrate our victory. Despite the unparalleled difficulties of life and the unparalleled efforts of our enemies, we have won. We have been winning for three years. This is a gigantic victory, one that previously none of us would have believed possible. Three years ago, when we were at Smolny, the Petrograd workers' uprising showed us that it was more unanimous than we could have expected, but had we been told that night that, three years later, we would have what now exists, that we would have this victory of ours, nobody, not even the most incurable optimist, would have believed it. We knew at that time that our victory would be a lasting one only when our cause had triumphed the world over, and so when we began working for our cause we counted exclusively on the world revolution. The imperialist war changed all the forms of life we had lived in till then, and we had no way of knowing what forms would be assumed by the struggle, which had dragged on much longer than could have been expected. Now, after three

years, it turns out that we are immeasurably stronger than we were before, but the world bourgeoisie are still very strong, too; yet, despite the fact that they are far stronger than we are, we can say that we have won. We have directed all our energies to disintegrating this bourgeoisie, and in this respect our work has not been without success. The reason for this is that we staked our chances on world revolution, and were undoubtedly right in doing so. We knew that the whole world was heading for destruction, we knew that, after the imperialist war, things could not go on in the old way because the imperialist war had thoroughly destroyed all the old economic and legal relations, all the conditions of existence on which the old order had till then been based. And if, at a time when the imperialist war had done a thousand times more than our propaganda did to pave the way for a *débâcle*, the proletariat in even a single country took action ending in victory, this would be sufficient to undermine the forces of the world bourgeoisie.

If we now cast a glance at the international situation—and we have always stressed that we regard things from the international standpoint—and examine the history of the wars that have been waged against Soviet Russia, we shall see that we are at peace with almost all the little bourgeois states bordering on us, states in which Bolsheviks are persecuted and executed. These states are servants and slaves to the Entente, and they want to ruin and destroy Soviet Russia, yet we have concluded peace with them—against the Entente's wishes. Three such mighty powers as Britain, France and America could not unite against us, and were defeated in a war they had begun against us with their joint forces. Why has that been? It has been because their economies and life in their countries have been undermined, because they are moribund, because they cannot go on living in the old way, and because the class at whose will they exist—the bourgeois class—has gone rotten. That class drove over 10 million people into the imperialist war and to destruction. For what purpose? For the purpose of partitioning the world among a handful of capitalists. In doing so, however, it has come to the end of its strength, and has undermined

the foundations of its own existence; however strong it may seem militarily, it is internally impotent. This is no longer a proclamation in the Bolshevik spirit, but a fact that has been proved with fire and sword. However rich and strong that class may be, it is doomed, whereas we are a class that is advancing towards victory. Even though we are weaker than our enemies, we have been winning for three years, and we have the right to say, without the least boasting, that we have won.

In saying that, we should not forget another aspect of the matter. We should not forget that we have won no more than half of the victory. We have won because we have been able to hold out against states that are stronger than we are, and moreover have joined forces with our émigré exploiters—the landowners and capitalists. We have always known and shall never forget that ours is an international cause, and until the revolution takes place in all lands, including the richest and most highly civilised ones, our victory will be only a half-victory, perhaps still less. At present we are gaining the upper hand in the fighting against Wrangel; we are expecting news that will bear out our expectations.[136] We are confident that if we do not succeed in capturing the Crimea within the next few days, we shall do so several days later, but we have no guarantee that this is the last effort against us on the part of the world bourgeoisie. On the contrary, facts in our possession show that this effort will be repeated in the spring. We know that their chances of success will be negligible, and we know too that our military forces will be more powerful than those of any other country. For all that, however, the danger is not yet over; it still exists and will continue to do so until the revolution is victorious in one or in several advanced countries.

We know that things are moving in that direction; we know that the Second Congress of the Third International, which was held in Moscow during the summer, did an immense job, one that has no precedent. Some of you may have been present when Comrade Zinoviev delivered his report, in which he dealt in detail with the congress of German Independents at Halle.[137] Many of you may have heard his graphic description of developments in a country

in which the chances of a revolution are the greatest. Similar things are taking place in all countries. Communism has developed, grown strong, and created parties in all the leading countries. During this period, the cause of the international revolution has suffered a number of reverses in some small countries, where assistance in crushing the movement has come from such huge predators as Germany, which helped to crush the Finnish revolution, or those giants of capitalism, Britain. France and Austria, which crushed the revolution in Hungary. By doing so, however, they have multiplied a thousandfold the elements of revolution in their own countries. Today the main reason why they have been weakened by the struggle is that their rear lines are not assured, because in all countries the workers and peasants do not want to fight against us, and heroic sailors have come to the fore, not only in our country, in Kronstadt, but also in their countries. Throughout France the names of the sailors who served in our Black Sea are associated with recollections of the Russian revolution; the French workers know that those who are now serving terms of penal servitude in France mutinied in the Black Sea because they refused to become butchers of the Russian workers and peasants.[138] That is why the Entente has grown weak; that is why we say with confidence that our position is secure in the international field.

However, our victory is far from complete, comrades; we have won less than half of it. Yes, we have won a gigantic victory thanks to the self-sacrifice and enthusiasm of the Russian workers and peasants; we have been able to show that Russia is capable of producing not only the individual heroes who entered the struggle against tsarism and died at a time when the workers and peasants did not support them. We were right when we said that Russia would produce such heroes from among the masses, that she would be able to do so by the hundreds and thousands. We said that it would come about, and that then capitalism would be a lost cause. The main reason of our victory, its chief source, is the heroism, the self-sacrifice, and the unparalleled tenacity displayed by our Red Army men who have laid down their lives at the front, and by the workers and peasants who have suffered so much, espe-

cially the industrial workers, most of whom have suffered more during these three years than the workers did during the early years of capitalist slavery. They have endured cold, hunger and suffering—all this in order to retain power. Thanks to this tenacity and this heroism, they have created a rear that has proved the only strong rear existing at the moment among the belligerent forces. That is why we are strong and firm, whereas the Entente is steadily disintegrating before our very eyes.

However, with this enthusiasm and heroism alone, the cause of the revolution cannot be completed, carried on to full victory. These qualities were sufficient to hurl back the enemy when he flung himself on us and tried to strangle us; they were sufficient for victory in a bloody conflict, but not for the ultimate goal. They are not enough because we are now faced with the second half of our task, the major and more difficult part. Our triumph of today, our confidence that we shall win, must be imbued with a quality that will enable us to gain a victory just as decisive in the second half of the task. Mere enthusiasm, the mere readiness of the workers and peasants to face death m accomplishing the second half of our task are not enough, because the second task is a most difficult one of constructive and creative work. From capitalism we inherited not only a ruined culture, not only wrecked factories, not only a despairing intelligentsia; we inherited a disunited and backward mass of individual proprietors; we inherited inexperience, an absence of the team spirit and of an understanding that the past must be buried.

Such are the problems we have to solve today. We must remember that today's temper has to be put to work for a long time to come, so that fragmentation of our economic life may be done away with. We cannot return to the old ways. By overthrowing the rule of the exploiters we have already accomplished the greater part of the job. We must now unite all working men and women and get them to work together. We have come here like conquerors entering new territory, yet, despite difficult conditions we are working in, we have been victorious at the front. We see that our work is progressing today better than it did a year ago. We know that we cannot provide sufficient food for all,

and we are not certain that hunger and cold will not knock at the doors of homes and cottages, but we do know that we have won. We know that our productive power is enormous even now, after the severe imperialist and civil wars; we know that we shall not let the workers and peasants starve and freeze; however, to be able to do that, we must count all our resources and share them out properly. We do not yet know how to do that because capitalism taught every petty proprietor to look after his own interests, to think of how to get rich, and become one of the moneybags as quickly as possible; it did not teach anybody how to wage a common struggle for some definite idea. We must now be guided by another principle. The other and more difficult part of our task now faces us. The enthusiasm that now fills us may last another year, perhaps even five years. However we should remember that the struggle we shall have to wage is made up of ordinary workaday tasks. Around us are small-scale economic tasks. Furthermore, you know that the little units that keep our economic life going are the same that served in the past—petty officials, petty bureaucrats accustomed to the old and selfish way of doing things. The struggle against such things must become the task of the hour. On the occasion of these festivities, the occasion of this triumphant mood of ours, the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of Soviet rule we must become imbued with the labour enthusiasm, the will to work, and the persistence on which the speedy salvation of the workers and peasants, the salvation of the national economy now depends. We shall then see that our victory in the accomplishment of this task will be more effective and lasting than in all bloody battles of the past. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Published in 1920 in *Verbatim Reports of the Plenums of the Moscow Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies*

Published according to the text in the book

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To Stalin

How is the struggle against the bands progressing? Is it true that they have over 20,000 rifles and sabres? Are the reinforcements designated for the Caucasus front sufficient? Do you consider a peaceful settlement of relations with Georgia and Armenia possible, and on what basis? Then, is the work on the fortification of the approaches to Baku being conducted in real earnest? I also ask for information on Turkey and Persia, briefly by telegram, and in detail by letter.

Lenin

Written on November 13, 1920

First published in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1937

Published according to the manuscript

THESES ON PRODUCTION PROPAGANDA[139]

ROUGH DRAFT

1. In connection with the R.S.F.S.R.'s military victories and its international position in general, production propaganda must now be given special prominence, and be accentuated and organised.

2. The leading newspapers, *Izvestia* and *Pravda* in the first place, should: a) reduce the space devoted to politics, and increase space for production propaganda; b) influence all the work of the Party and of Soviet institutions, in the sense of mobilising greater forces for production propaganda; c) endeavour to work systematically to place production propaganda on a nation-wide footing, and evolve extensive measures for its encouragement and improvement, with a special view to verifying the successes actually achieved in practice.

3. In just the same way, work should be systematised, extended and developed in selecting able administrators, organisers and inventors from the masses of workingmen and peasants.

4. Throughout the R.S.F.S.R. production propaganda should be placed under the direction of a single body, with the aim of economising forces and improving guidance of this work. In this, the greatest autonomy, both local and within each trade, is indispensable. Any marked success should be systematically and judiciously rewarded (bonuses in kind, etc.). Verification of successes to be organised impartially and competently.

5. The editorial board of a mass newspaper with a circulation of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 should be made the sole body guiding production propaganda.

Bednota[140] is the right newspaper for the purpose.

It would be harmful to have a division into an industrial newspaper and an agricultural newspaper, since it is the aim of socialism to bring industry and agriculture closer together and unite them. In practice, the guiding role of the industrial proletariat both in the cities and in the rural areas, particularly in the urbanisation of agriculture and the electrification of the entire country, calls precisely for a single newspaper devoted to problems of production (and for a single body in charge of production propaganda) both for the workers and the peasants.

6. This guiding collegiate body should consist of five members representing: 1) the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions; 2) the Supreme Council of the National Economy; 3) the People's Commissariat of Agriculture; 4) the Chief Committee for Political Education; 5) the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (or an editor-in-chief). This collegiate body and the newspaper should be attached to the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions (perhaps there should also be a representative of the Central Board for Vocational Training?).

7. This newspaper, devoted to matters of production, should be a popular one, in the sense of being understood by millions of readers, without falling into vulgarisation. The paper should not descend to the level of the uncultivated reader, but should work steadily—and by very gradual degrees—to promote his development. Little space—not exceeding a quarter of the total—should be devoted to politics. Top priority should be given to a single economic plan, to the labour front, production propaganda, the training of workers and peasants in the work of administration, to seeing that Soviet laws and measures established by Soviet institutions are given due effect, and to an extensive and properly organised-exchange of opinions with the rank-and-file reader.

8. Materials published in the newspaper or addressed to it, as well as all other kinds of material, should be systematically and periodically brought out in pamphlet or leaflet form and compulsorily supplied to libraries, as well as to factories and enterprises in the given field of production (the pamphlets and leaflets should systematise all the

material relating to each particular branch of production). Together with manuals and reviews of foreign technology, this material should serve to spread vocational training and *polytechnical* education.

A more rational distribution of the newspaper, as well as of pamphlets and leaflets dealing with questions of production, among all libraries in the R.S.F.S.R. should, in particular, be the object of special attention.

9. It is indispensable that engineers, agronomists, schoolteachers, and also Soviet functionaries possessing definite professional qualifications, should be drawn into systematic participation in production propaganda (this in connection with the liquidation of illiteracy).

The organisation of lectures, talks, reports, etc.

Compulsory labour service on the part of all those who are able to acquaint the population with problems of electrification, with the Taylor system, etc.

10. The more extensive and systematic use of films for production propaganda. Joint work with the cinema section.

Soviet gramophone records. Displays of diagrams and cartograms at clubs, village reading-rooms, in streets, etc. Bills and placards to be displayed near factories, workshops, technical schools, etc.

11. The organisation, jointly with the People's Commissariat of Labour and other institutions, of an inspectorate of production. The latter's work to be co-ordinated with that of production propaganda, as well as with the work of instructors, exhibition trains and ships, and the like.

12. Extensive publicity for exemplary enterprises. Organisation of factory workers with foreign industrial experience—this to be done in special workshops, sections or groups, etc. Such workers to be utilised for the training of backward workingmen, for the dissemination of vocational-technical and polytechnical instruction, etc.

N. Lenin

18.11.1920

Published in 1928

Published according to the manuscript

EXTRACT FROM DIRECT-LINE TALK BETWEEN V. I. LENIN AND J. V. STALIN

I can give no reply without convening the Political Bureau. I advise that you immediately submit a concrete proposal and at once table it for the Political Bureau, or act independently on the basis of the powers conferred on Stalin, or else expedite your coming to Moscow to settle the entire Caucasus question as a whole. In any case, the bringing up of reinforcements should be intensified and speeded up. Communicate your exact opinion.

Lenin

November 20, 1920 or earlier

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Published according to
the text
of the telegraph tape

OUR FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POSITION AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY

SPEECH DELIVERED TO THE MOSCOW GUBERNIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.), NOVEMBER 21, 1920[141]

(*Applause*.) Comrades, in speaking of the international position of the Soviet Republic we naturally have to deal mainly with the Polish war and Wrangel's defeat. I think that at a meeting of Party workers who have, of course, followed the Party press and have frequently heard major reports on this question, there is no need and indeed it would be superfluous, for me to speak in detail on this period or on each phase of the war against Poland, on the character of our offensives, or on the significance of our defeat at Warsaw. I presume that most of the comrades are so familiar with this aspect of the matter that I would only be repeating myself, which would be unsatisfactory to these comrades. I shall therefore speak, not on the various episodes and turns of our Polish campaign but on the results we now have before us.

After the Red Army's brilliant victories in the summer, the serious defeat at Warsaw, and the conclusion of a preliminary peace with Poland, which at this very moment, in Riga, is being or at least should be turned a conclusive peace, the chances of that preliminary peace really becoming conclusive have greatly increased as a result of Wrangel's *débâcle*. Now that the latter has become an established fact the imperialist press in the Entente countries is beginning to show its cards and disclose what it has most of all kept in the dark.

I do not know whether you noticed a brief news item published in the papers today or some days ago to the effect

that the newspaper *Temps*, mouthpiece of the French imperialist bourgeoisie, now speaks of the peace with Poland having been signed against France's advice. There can be no doubt that the French bourgeoisie's spokesmen are admitting a truth they would have preferred to cover up and indeed have covered up for a very long time. Despite the unfavourable terms of the Polish peace (which are more advantageous than those we ourselves offered to the Polish landowners this April in order to avoid any war), and they are indeed unfavourable as compared to what might have been achieved but for the extremely serious situation at Warsaw, we succeeded in getting terms that frustrate the greater part of the imperialists' over-all plan. The French bourgeoisie have now acknowledged that they insisted on Poland continuing the war, and were opposed to the conclusion of a peace, because they feared the rout of Wrangel's army and wished to support a new intervention and campaign against the Soviet Republic. Though Polish imperialism's conditions have impelled it to go to war against Russia—despite this—the French imperialists' plans have collapsed, and as a result we now have gained something more than a mere breathing-space.

Of the small states formerly belonging to the Russian Empire, Poland has been among those that have been most of all at odds with the Great-Russian nation during the last three years, and made the greatest claims to a large slice of territory inhabited by non-Poles. We concluded peace with Finland, Estonia and Latvia[142] also against the wishes of the imperialist Entente, but this was easier because the bourgeoisie of Finland, Estonia and Latvia entertained no imperialist aims that would call for a war against the Soviet Republic, whereas the Polish bourgeois republic had an eye, not only to Lithuania and Byelorussia but the Ukraine as well. Furthermore, it was impelled along the same direction by the age-old struggle of Poland, who used to be a great power and is now pitting herself against another great power—Russia. Even at present, Poland cannot hold back from this age-long struggle. That is why Poland has been far more bellicose and stubborn in her war plans against our Republic, and why our present success in concluding peace against the wishes of the Entente is so

much more resounding. Among the states which have preserved the bourgeois system and border on Russia, there is no other country but Poland on which the Entente can rely in a long-term plan of military intervention; that is why in their common hate of the Soviets, all the bourgeois states are directly interested in having Eastern Galicia under the control of the Polish landed proprietors.

Moreover, Poland lays claim to the Ukraine and Lithuania. This gives the campaign a particularly acute and stubborn character. Keeping Poland supplied with war materials has, naturally, been the main concern of France and certain other powers, and it is quite impossible to estimate just how much money has gone into this. Therefore, the importance of the Red Army's final victory despite our defeat at Warsaw, is particularly great, for it has placed Poland in a position in which she is unable to prosecute the war. She has had to agree to peace terms that have given her less than those we proposed in April 1920, before the Polish offensive, when we, unwilling to discontinue our work of economic construction, proposed boundaries that were highly disadvantageous to us. At that time, the press of the petty-bourgeois patriots, to whose number both our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks belong, accused the Bolsheviks of submissiveness, and an almost Tolstoyan attitude displayed by the Soviet government. The latter term was used to qualify our acceptance of peace along the proposed Pilsudski line, which left Minsk in Polish hands, the boundary lying some 50 vests and at places some 100 vests east of the present line. Of course, I do not have to tell a meeting of Party workers why we accepted, and had to accept, worse boundaries if indeed our work of economic construction was to go on. The outcome was that, by waging war, Poland, which had retained her bourgeois system, brought about an acute dislocation of her entire economy, a tremendous growth of discontent, and a bourgeois reign of terror, not only against the industrial workers but against the farm labourers as well. Poland's entire position as a bourgeois state became so precarious that there could be no question of continuing the war.

The successes scored in this respect by the Soviets have been tremendous. When, three years ago, we raised the

question of the tasks and the conditions of the proletarian revolution's victory in Russia, we always stated emphatically that victory could not be permanent unless it was followed up by a proletarian revolution in the West, and that a correct appraisal of our revolution was possible only from the international point of view. For victory to be lasting, we must achieve the victory of the proletarian revolution in all, or at any rate in several, of the main capitalist countries. After three years of desperate and stubborn struggle, we can see in what respect our predictions have or have not materialised. They have not materialised in the sense that there has been no rapid or simple solution of the problem. None of us, of course, expected that such an unequal struggle as the one waged by Russia against the whole of the capitalist world could last for three years. It has emerged that neither side—the Russian Soviet Republic or the capitalist world—has gained victory or suffered defeat; at the same time it has turned out that, while our forecasts did not materialise simply, rapidly and directly, they were fulfilled insofar as we achieved the main thing—the possibility has been maintained of the existence of proletarian rule and the Soviet Republic even in the event of the world socialist revolution being delayed. In this respect it must be said that the Republic's international position today provides the best and most precise confirmation of all our plans and all our policy.

Needless to say, there can be no question of comparing the military strength of the R.S.F.S.R. with that of all the capitalist powers. In this respect we are incomparably weaker than they are, yet, after three yeas of war, we have forced almost all of these states to abandon the idea of further intervention. This means that what we saw as possible three years ago, while the imperialist war was not yet over, i.e., a highly protracted situation, without any final decision one way or the other, has come about. That has been, not because we have proved militarily stronger and the Entente weaker, but because throughout this period the disintegration in the Entente countries has intensified, whereas our inner strength has grown. This has been confirmed and proved by the war. The Entente was unable to fight us with its own forces. The workers and

peasants of the capitalist countries could not be forced to fight us. The bourgeois states were able to emerge from the imperialist war with their bourgeois regimes intact. They were able to stave off and delay the crisis hanging over them, but basically they so undermined their own position that, despite all their gigantic military forces, they had to acknowledge, after three years, that they were unable to crush the Soviet Republic with its almost non-existent military forces. It has thus turned out that our policy and our predictions have proved fundamentally correct in all respects and that the oppressed people in any capitalist country have indeed shown themselves our allies, for it was they who stopped the war. Without having gained an international victory, which we consider the only sure victory, we are in a position of having won conditions enabling us to exist side by side with capitalist powers, who are now compelled to enter into trade relations with us. In the course of this struggle we have won the right to an independent existence.

Thus a glance at our international position as a whole will show that we have achieved tremendous successes and have won, not only a breathing-space but something much more significant. By a breathing-space we understand a brief period during which the imperialist powers have had many opportunities to renew in greater force the war against us. Today, too, we do not underestimate the danger and do not deny the possibility of future military intervention by the capitalist countries. It is essential for us to maintain our military preparedness. However, if we cast a glance at the conditions in which we defeated all attempts made by the Russian counter-revolutionaries and achieved a formal peace with all the Western states, it will be clear that we have something more than a breathing space: we have entered a new period, in which we have won the right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states. Domestic conditions have not allowed a single powerful capitalist state to hurl its army against Russia; this has been due to the revolution having matured within such countries, preventing them from overcoming us as quickly as they might have done. There were British, French and Japanese armies on Russian

territory for three years. There can be no doubt that the most insignificant concentration of forces by these three powers would have been quite enough to win a victory over us in a few months, if not in a few weeks. We were able to contain that attack only on account of the demoralisation among the French troops and the unrest that set in among the British and Japanese. We have made use of this divergence of imperialist interests all the time. We defeated the interventionists only because their interests divided them, thereby enhancing our strength and unity. This gave us a breathing-space and rendered impossible the complete victory of German imperialism at the time of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

These dissensions have become more aggravated of late, especially because of the project of an agreement on concessions with a group of American capitalist sharks, with the toughest of them, headed by a multimillionaire who expects to form a group of multimillionaires.[143] We know that almost all reports from the Far East bear witness to the extreme resentment felt in Japan over the conclusion of this agreement, although so far there has been no agreement, but only the draft of one. Japanese public opinion, however, is already seething, and today I read a communication which said that Japan is accusing Soviet Russia of wanting to set Japan against America.

We have correctly appraised the intensity of the imperialist rivalry and have told ourselves that we must make systematic use of the dissension between them so as to hamper their struggle against us. Political dissension is already apparent in the relations between Britain and France. Today we can speak, not merely of a breathing-space, but of a real chance of a new and lengthy period of development. Until now we have actually had no basis in the international sense. We now have this basis, the reason being the attitude of the smaller powers that are completely dependent on the Great Powers both in the military and in the economic sense. It now appears that, despite the pressure brought to bear by France, Poland has signed a peace with us. The Polish capitalists have a hate of Soviet power; they crush the most ordinary strikes with unparalleled ferocity. They want war with Soviet Russia more

than anything else, yet they prefer to make peace with us rather than carry out the conditions set by the Entente. We see that the imperialist powers dominate the whole world although they comprise an insignificant part of the world's population. The fact that a country has appeared that for three years has resisted world imperialism has considerably changed the international situation; the minor powers—and they form the majority of the world's population—are therefore all inclined to make peace with us.

The entry of the socialist country into trade relations with capitalist countries is a most important factor ensuring our existence in such a complex and absolutely exceptional situation.

I have had occasion to observe a certain Spargo, an American social-chauvinist close to our Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, one of the leaders of the Second International and member of the American Socialist Party, a kind of American Alexinsky, and author of a number of anti-Bolshevik books, who has reproached us—and has quoted the fact as evidence of the complete collapse of communism—for speaking of transactions with capitalist powers. He has written that he cannot imagine better proof of the complete collapse of communism and the breakdown of its programme. I think that anybody who has given thought to the matter will say the reverse. No better proof of the Russian Soviet Republic's material and moral victory over the capitalists of the whole world can be found than the fact that the powers that took up arms against us because of our terror and our entire system have been compelled, against their will, to enter into trade relations with us in the knowledge that by so doing they are strengthening us. This might have been advanced as proof of the collapse of communism only if we had promised, with the forces of Russia alone, to transform the whole world, or had dreamed of doing so. However, we have never harboured such crazy ideas and have always said that our revolution will be victorious when it is supported by the workers of all lands. In fact, they went half-way in their support, for they weakened the hand raised against us, yet in doing so they were helping us.

I shall not dwell any further on this question but shall only remark that at the moment conditions in the Caucasus are becoming most complex and extremely difficult to analyse, with the likelihood that war may be forced on us any day. But with the peace with Poland almost assured and Wrangel wiped out, this war cannot be so alarming and, if forced on us, only promises to strengthen and fortify our position even more. Newspaper reports of events in Armenia and Turkey give us some idea of this.[144] An extremely confused situation has arisen, but I am absolutely confident that we shall emerge from it, preserving peace on the present basis, which in some respects is extremely favourable, on a basis that is satisfactory to us and permits our economic existence. We are doing all we can to ensure this. It is, however, quite likely that circumstances may arise which will directly force war on us or indirectly lead to it. We can view this prospect quite calmly—this will be a war in a distant region, with the balance of forces fully in our favour, probably ensuring greater advantages than the Polish war. The Polish war was a war on two fronts, with a threat from Wrangel, and it could not be called peripheral, because the Pilsudski line did not run so far from Moscow. With this, I shall conclude my review of the international situation.

I now turn to the state of affairs at home. The failure of a number of attempts at military intervention has led to a considerable improvement in our economic position. The main cause of our former desperate position was that we in Central Russia, industrial Russia, proletarian Russia—Petrograd, Moscow, and Ivanovo-Voznesensk—were cut off from all the main grain-producing areas such as Siberia, the South and the South-East; we were cut off from the Donets Basin, one of the main sources of fuel, and from the sources of oil, and it seemed absolutely impossible for the Republic to hold out. You know what appalling distress, what extreme privation, what grain shortages and famine we experienced because we were cut off from the richest grain-producing areas and the most important economic regions. The return of these territories is to a considerable extent responsible for the improvement now to be seen. Thanks to the possibility of drawing on Siberia

and the Caucasus, and to the social changes developing in our favour in the Ukraine, there is promise that with the state food procurements in the forthcoming food campaign we shall not only emerge without an actual shortage as we did this year, but shall have sufficient food for all industrial workers. This is the first campaign when we can hope that, as a result of the doubtless improvement in the transport system, the government will dispose of such food stocks—between 250 and 300 million poods of grain—that we shall not merely be talking about socialist construction and doing precious little, as at present, but shall actually operate with real armies of labour; we shall be able to transfer hundreds of thousands of industrial workers, or workers now engaged in provisioning for industry, to really urgent and essential work, and to improve that work in the same way as the improved fuel situation made it possible to restore the textile industry. The Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia mills have begun to work. At first, not more than a quarter of a million spindles were operating but at present there are already half a million, perhaps 600,000, and by the end of the year we count on a million spindles in operation. We think the number will go up to four million next year. Whereas quite recently we made both ends meet with the greatest difficulty by using up old stocks, conditions have now set in in which we are starting to rehabilitate Russia's ruined industry, and shall be able, while collecting grain from the countryside, to supply the peasants in return with salt and paraffin oil, and, though in small quantities, with textiles. Without this it is useless to talk of socialist construction.

While in the international sense we have gained a footing by concluding a series of military campaigns and by wresting peace treaties from a number of states, it has only now become economically possible for us to supply the industrial workers with bread and to provide the bread of industry, namely fuel, on a scale enabling us to set about the construction of socialism. That is our main task, the root of the problem, a transition we have several times tried to make. I remember that at a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in April 1918, I said that our military tasks appeared to be ending and that we

had not only convinced Russia, not only won her from the exploiters, for the working people but had now to tackle other tasks in order to govern Russia in the interests of her economic construction.[145] Our breathing-space at the time proved quite brief. The war that was forced on us, starting with the Czechoslovak revolt in the summer of 1918, was most ferocious. However, we made several attempts, both in the spring of 1918 and, on a broader scale, in the spring of this year when the question of labour armies was posed in practice. We must now once again give top priority to this transitional stage and exert every effort to achieve it. Regarded from the international point of view, from the standpoint of victory over capitalism in general, this is a paramount task of the entire socialist revolution To defeat capitalism in general, it is necessary, in the first place, to defeat the exploiters and to uphold the power of the exploited, namely, to accomplish the task of overthrowing the exploiters by revolutionary forces; in the second place, to accomplish the constructive task, that of establishing new economic relations, of setting an example of how this should be done. These two aspects of the task of accomplishing a socialist revolution are indissolubly connected, and distinguish our revolution from all previous ones, which never went beyond the destructive aspect.

If we do not accomplish this second task, nothing will follow from our successes, from our victories in overthrowing the exploiters, and from our military rebuff to international imperialism, and a return to the old system will be inevitable. In the theoretical sense, that is beyond question. In this instance, the transitional stage is abrupt and most difficult, and calls for new methods, a different deployment and use of forces, a different emphasis, a new psychological approach, and so on. In the place of methods of the revolutionary overthrow of the exploiters and of repelling the tyrants, we must apply the methods of constructive organisation; we must prove to the whole world that we are a force capable, not only of resisting any attempt to crush us by force of arms but of setting an example to others. All the writings of the greatest socialists have always provided guidance on these two aspects of the task of the socialist revolution which, as two aspects of the same

task, refer both to the outside world, to those states that have remained in capitalist hands, and to the non-proletarians of one's own country. We have convinced the peasants that the proletariat provides them with better conditions of existence than the bourgeoisie did; we have convinced them of this in practice. When the peasants, though they were dissatisfied with Bolshevik government, compared it in practice with the rule of the Constituent Assembly, Kolchak and the others they drew the conclusion that the Bolsheviks guaranteed them a better existence and defended them militarily from violence by world imperialism. Yet, under conditions of bourgeois rule, half of the peasantry lived in a bourgeois fashion, and this could not have been otherwise. The proletariat must now solve the second problem: it must prove to the peasant that the proletariat can provide him with the example and practice of economic relations of a higher level than those under which every peasant family farms on its own. The peasant still believes only in this old system; he still considers this the normal state of affairs. That is beyond doubt. It would be absurd to think that the peasant will change his attitude to vital economic problems, as a result of our propaganda. His is a wait-and-see attitude. From being neutrally hostile, he has become neutrally sympathetic. He prefers us to any other form of government because he sees that the workers', the proletarian state, the proletarian dictatorship, does not mean brute force or usurpation, as it has been described, but is a better defender of the peasants than Kolchak, Denikin, and the rest are.

But all that is not enough; we have not achieved the main object: to show that the proletariat will restore large-scale industry and the national economy so that the peasants can be transferred to a higher economic system. After proving that, by revolutionary organisation, we can repel any violence directed against the exploited, we must prove the same thing in another field by setting an example that will convince the vast mass of the peasants and petty-bourgeois elements, and other countries as well, not in word but in deed, that a communist system and way of life, can be created by a proletariat which has won a war. This is a task of world-wide significance. To achieve the

second half of the victory in the international sense, we must accomplish the second half of the task, that which bears upon economic construction. We discussed this at the last Party conference, so I think there is hardly any need or possibility to go into detail on the various points; this is a task that embraces every aspect of economic construction. I have briefly described the conditions ensuring bread for the industrial workers and fuel for industry. These conditions are fundamental in providing the possibility of further construction. I should add that, as you have seen from the agenda published in the newspapers, the question of economic construction will be the main item to be discussed at the forthcoming Congress of Soviets. The entire agenda has been drawn up so that the entire attention and concern of all delegates and of the whole mass of Government and Party workers throughout the Republic will be concentrated on the economic aspect, on the restoration of transport and industry, on what is cautiously termed "aid to the peasant economy" but which implies far more—a system of carefully thought-out measures to raise to the appropriate level the peasant economy, which will continue to exist for some time to come.

The Congress of Soviets will, therefore, discuss a report on the electrification of Russia, so that an all-over economic plan for the rehabilitation of the national economy, of which we have spoken, can be drawn up in the technological aspect. There can be no question of rehabilitating the national economy or of communism unless Russia is put on a different and a higher technical basis than that which has existed up to now. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country, since industry cannot be developed without electrification. This is a long-term task which will take at least ten years to accomplish, provided a great number of technical experts are drawn into the work. A number of printed documents in which this project[146] has been worked out in detail by technical experts will be presented to the Congress. We cannot achieve the main objects of this plan—create so large regions of electric power stations which would enable us to modernise our industry—in less than ten years. Without this reconstruction of all industry on lines of large-scale

machine production, socialist construction will obviously remain only a set of decrees, a political link between the working class and the peasantry, and a means of saving the peasants from the rule by Kolchak and Denikin; it will remain an example to all powers of the world, but it will not have its own basis. Communism implies Soviet power as a political organ, enabling the mass of the oppressed to run all state affairs—without that, communism is unthinkable. We see proof of this throughout the world, because the idea of Soviet power and its programme are undoubtedly becoming victorious throughout the world. We see this in every phase of the struggle against the Second International, which is living on support from the police, the church and the old bourgeois functionaries in the working-class movement.

This guarantees political success. Economic success, however, can be assured only when the Russian proletarian state effectively controls a huge industrial machine built on up-to-day technology; that means electrification. For this, we must know the basic conditions of the application of electricity, and accordingly understand both industry and agriculture. This is an enormous task, to accomplish which will require a far longer period than was needed to defend our right to existence against invasion. However, we are not afraid of such a period and we think we have won a victory by attracting to this work tens and hundreds of engineers and scientists imbued with bourgeois ideas, whom we have given the mission of reorganising the entire economy, industry and agriculture, in whom we have aroused interest and from whom we have received a great deal of information being summarised in a number of pamphlets. Each region earmarked for electrification is dealt with in a separate pamphlet. The plan for the electrification of the Northern region is ready, and those interested may receive it. Pamphlets dealing with each region, with the over-all plan for reorganisation, will be published by the time the Congress of Soviets meets. It is now our task to carry on systematic work throughout the country, in all Party cells, in every Soviet institution, according to this all-over plan covering many years, so that we may in the near future have a clear idea of how and in what measure we are progressing, without deceiving ourselves or conceal-

ing the difficulties confronting us. The entire Republic is faced with the task of accomplishing this single economic plan at any cost. All the Communist Party's activities, propaganda and agitation must be focussed on this task. From the angle of theory, it has been dealt with on more than one occasion; nobody argues against it, but scarcely a hundredth part of what has to be done has been accomplished.

It is natural that we have grown used to a period of political warfare; we have all been steeled in the political and military struggle and, therefore, what has been accomplished by the present Soviet government is only an approach to a task which demands that the train should be switched over to other rails; this is a train which has to carry tens of millions of people. The switching of this heavy load on to other rails, along a track on which there are no rails at all in places, calls for concentrated attention, knowledge and very great persistence. The cultural level of the peasants and the workers has not been high enough for this task and, at the same time, we have become almost totally accustomed to tackling political and military tasks; this has led to a revival of bureaucratic methods. This is generally admitted. It is the task of the Soviet government to completely destroy the old machinery of state as it was destroyed in October, and to transfer power to the Soviets. However, our Programme recognises that there has been a revival of bureaucratic methods and that at present no economic foundation yet exists for a genuinely socialist society. A cultural background, literacy, and in general a higher standard of culture are lacking in the mass of workers and peasants. That is because the best forces of the proletariat have been engaged with military tasks. The proletariat has made tremendous sacrifices to assure the success of military tasks into which tens of millions of peasants had to be drawn, and elements imbued with bourgeois views had to be put to work, because no others were available. That is why we had to state in the Programme—in a document like the Party Programme—that there has been a revival of bureaucratic methods, against which a systematic struggle has to be waged. It is natural that the bureaucratic methods that have reappeared in Soviet institutions were bound to have a pernicious effect even or

Party organisations, since the upper ranks of the Party are at the same time the upper ranks of the state apparatus; they are one and the same thing. Since we recognise that the evil consists in the old bureaucratic methods which have been able to appear in the Party apparatus, it is obvious and natural that all the symptoms of this evil have revealed themselves in the Party organisations. Since that is so, the question has been placed on the agenda of the Congress of Soviets and has received a great deal of attention from this Conference. That is how it should be, because a disease that has affected the Party and has been acknowledged in the resolutions of the general Party Conference[147] exists, not in Moscow alone, but has spread throughout the entire republic. It is a result of the need to carry on political and military work, when we had to involve the peasant masses and were unable to increase our demands for a broader plan to raise the level of the peasant economy, and that of the mass of peasants.

Allow me in conclusion to say a few words about the situation within the Party, about the struggle and the appearance of an opposition, of which all those present are fully aware and which took up a great deal of energy and attention at the Moscow City and Gubernia Conference, perhaps considerably more than we would have all liked. It is quite natural that the great transition now in progress at a time when all the forces drawn by the Republic from the proletariat and the Party during three years of struggle have been exhausted, has placed us in a difficult position in the face of a task to accurately assess which is beyond our powers. We have to acknowledge that we do not know the real extent of the evil, and that we cannot determine the relationships and the exact groupings. The Party Conference's main task is to raise the question, not cover up the existing evil, but to draw the Party's attention to it, and call on all Party members to work on remedying the evil. From the point of view of the Central Committee and also, I think, of the immense majority of Party comrades, it is perfectly natural and beyond doubt (as far as I am aware of the views, which nobody has repudiated), that in connection with the crisis in the Party the opposition which exists, not only in Moscow but throughout

Russia, reveals many tendencies that are absolutely healthy, necessary and inevitable at a time of the Party's natural growth and the transition from a situation in which all attention was concentrated on political and military tasks to a period of construction and organisation, when we have to take care of dozens of bureaucratic institutions, this at a time when the cultural level of the majority of the proletariat and the peasants is unequal to the task. After all, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection exists more as a pious wish; it has been impossible to set it in motion because the best workers have been sent to the front, and the cultural level of the peasant masses is such that they have been unable to produce a sufficient number of officials.

Of course the opposition, whose slogan urges a more speedy transition, the enlistment of the greatest number of fresh and young forces and the promotion of local workers to more responsible posts, has extremely sound aspirations, trend and programme. No doubts on this score exist either in the Central Committee or among comrades who hold positions of any responsibility, as far as can be seen from their statements. It is, however, equally beyond doubt that, besides the sound elements which are united on the platform of fulfilment of Conference decisions, others also exist. At all meetings, including preliminary meetings attended by a larger number of delegates than this Conference, opinions on this question were unanimous. Our general Programme must be carried out—that is beyond doubt, and difficult work awaits us. Of course, the important thing is not to confine ourselves to overthrowing the opponent and repelling him. Here we have petty-bourgeois elements surrounding us and numbering tens of millions. We are fewer in number; there are very few of us compared with this petty-bourgeois mass. We must educate this mass and prepare it, but it has so happened that all the organised forces engaged in such preparatory work have had to be directed elsewhere and employed in an undertaking that is essential, arduous and very risky, involving great sacrifices, i.e., warfare. War calls for every ounce of effort, and there is no getting away from this fact.

The question we must ask ourselves in connection with this state of affairs is; is the Party quite healthy again?

Have we a complete victory over bureaucratic methods so as to place economic construction on a more correct foundation, and get the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection operating, not only in the sense of issuing decrees but by actually drawing the masses of workers into the work? This is a difficult matter, and our main task—if we are to speak of Party tasks—must be the speediest possible elimination of the so-called line of the opposition. If this is a question of diverging views, differing interpretations of current events, different programmes or even of future activities, the Central Committee must devote the greatest attention to the matter at all meetings of the Political Bureau and at plenary meetings, where various shades of opinion are voiced. Harmonious work by the entire Party will ensure the accomplishment of this task. We regard this as a matter of the utmost importance. We now face an economic effort that is more taxing than the military task we have accomplished thanks to the enthusiasm of the peasants, who undoubtedly preferred the workers' state to that of Kolchak. Things are quite different today when the peasant masses have to be switched over to construction work that is quite unfamiliar to them, which they do not understand and cannot have any faith in. This task calls for more systematic work, greater perseverance, and greater organising skill, and so far as the latter quality is concerned, the Russian is not in the picture. This is our weakest point, so we must try rapidly to eliminate everything that hampers this work. The opposition, which is a reflection of this period of transition, no doubt contains a sound element, but when it turns into an opposition for the sake of opposition, we should certainly put an end to it. We have wasted a great deal of time on altercations, quarrels and recrimination and we must put an end to all that, and try to come to some agreement to work more effectively. We must make certain concessions, better greater than smaller, to those who are dissatisfied, who call themselves the opposition, but we must succeed in making our work harmonious, for otherwise we cannot exist when we are surrounded by enemies at home and abroad.

There can be no doubt that the old petty-bourgeois elements—small property-owners—outnumber us. They are

stronger than the socialist sector of an economy geared to meet the requirements of the workers. Anyone who has had contacts with the rural areas and has seen the speculation in the cities, realises perfectly well that this social sector, which is based on small-scale economy units is stronger than we are: hence the necessity of absolutely harmonious effort. We must achieve it at all costs. When I had occasion to observe the controversies and the struggle in the Moscow organisations, and saw the numerous debates at meetings, and the altercations, and quarrels there, I came to the conclusion that it was high time to put an end to all this and to achieve general unity on the Conference platform. It should be said that we have paid a heavy price for this. It was sad, for example, to see hours wasted at Party meetings on altercation as to whether someone had arrived at the meeting punctually or not, or whether a particular individual had made his stand clear in one way or another. Do people attend meetings for this sort of thing? For that we have a special commission, which decides whether or not an individual on the list of delegates has made his stand clear in one way or another. Here, however, it is a question of the content of the meeting. For instance, take an experienced Party comrade like Bubnov. I heard his speech on the platform proposed by the Conference. This platform boils down to greater freedom of criticism. The Conference, however, was held in September, and it is now November. Freedom of criticism is a splendid thing—but once we are agreed on this, it would be no bad thing to concern ourselves with the content of criticism. For a long time the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and others tried to scare us with freedom of criticism, but we were not afraid of that. If freedom of criticism means freedom to defend capitalism then we shall suppress it. We have passed that stage. Freedom of criticism has been proclaimed, but thought should be given to the content of criticism.

And here we have to admit something that is highly regrettable: criticism is devoid of content. You visit a district and ask yourself what criticism actually contains. The Party organisations cannot overcome illiteracy by using the old bureaucratic methods. What methods of defeating red tape are there other than bringing workers and peasants

into the work? Meanwhile, criticism at district meetings is concerned with trifles, and I have not heard a single word about the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. I have not heard of a single district encouraging workers and peasants to take part in this work. Genuine construction work means applying criticism which must be constructive. For instance, the management of every small block of flats, every large plant, every factory in Moscow must have its own experience. If we wish to combat bureaucratic methods, we must draw people from below into this work. We must acquaint ourselves with the experience of certain factories, learn what steps they have taken to remove their bureaucrats, and study the experience of a house management or of a consumers' society. A most rapid functioning of the entire economic machine is needed, but meanwhile you do not hear a word about this, although there is plenty of altercation and recrimination. Of course, such a gigantic upheaval could not have taken place without a certain amount of dirt and some scum coming to the surface. It is time we posed the question, not only of freedom of criticism but also of its content. It is time we said that, in view of our experience, we must make a number of concessions but that in future we shall not tolerate the slightest tendency to recrimination. We must break with the past, set about genuine economic construction, and completely overhaul all Party work so as to enable it to guide Soviet economic construction, ensure practical successes, and conduct propaganda more by example than by precept. Today neither the worker nor the peasant will be convinced by words; that can be done only by example. They have to be persuaded that they can improve the economy without the capitalists, and that conflicts can be abolished without the policeman's truncheon or capitalist starvation; for that they need Party leadership. This is the attitude we must adopt; if we do so, we shall achieve successes in future economic construction which will lead to our complete victory on a world-wide scale.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE MOSCOW GUBERNIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) ON ELECTIONS TO THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 21, 1920

Comrades, I have often—perhaps too often—had to take part in elections: in Party elections following on a struggle waged by various groups, trends and even factions, and in conditions of a most furious struggle marked by mutual control to such a degree that no voting at any Party cell was considered valid unless conducted in the presence of scrutineers from both groups, who counted the votes cast. Never, however, has the principle of proportional representation been practised in the election of guiding bodies—the Petrograd Committee, the Moscow Committee or the Central Committee. When two groups, two trends or factions, are contesting elections, proportional representation is essential in calling a Party conference as a directing body, or a Party congress. When, however, it is a question of setting up an executive body charged with the conduct of practical work, proportional representation has never been applied, and can hardly be considered justified. I think that, in this connection, the preceding speaker departed from the proportional principle when he declared, together with Ignatov, that it stood to the credit of the list presented by him that it proposed eleven candidates, as he said. I am not in a position to verify eleven out of the thirty-eight, but I think that the concession should be greater than that desired by the effective majority at this assembly, or by the group that consider themselves adherents of the Moscow Committee. I have already elaborated on the motives behind this view, but what should stand first now is

the selection of persons. I do not know most of the comrades on these lists, but you, who have the decisive votes at this Conference, evidently know them all. I think that, in choosing the comrades you know personally, you will no doubt be guided exclusively by a desire to set up a group that will be able to work harmoniously, a group that will give expression to any Party trend with something healthy in it, whether or not it has assumed definite shape, or has perhaps remained indeterminate in some respects; however, it has to be a group that, on the whole, directs practical politics, does not proportionally represent all the shades of opinion at this assembly, but carries on militant work—the struggle against the internal and external enemies, in the spirit of Conference decisions, and in a way that leaves no room for discord or lack of harmony. That is why the decisive consideration must be that you, members of this Conference, should have a personal knowledge of each candidate, and give preference to that group which may be expected to work harmoniously, and not the principle of proportionality in the election of an executive body, a principle that has never been applied, and to apply which would hardly be right at present.

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Published according to the verbatim report

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A CONFERENCE OF FACTORY TRADE UNION COMMITTEES OF MOSCOW ENTERPRISES OF THE PRINTING AND PUBLISHING INDUSTRY NOVEMBER 25, 1920[148]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*Comrade Lenin, who was met with a storm of applause from all present, spoke on the first item on the agenda—the international and domestic situation of the Republic and the immediate tasks of the working class.*) Comrade Lenin indicated the causes that have prevented world imperialism from carrying out its plan to crush the proletarian republic, causes stemming in the main from the decay of the capitalist system and the development of the revolutionary movement among the workers of all lands. The language used by our Red Army is the one that is most convincing and comprehensible to the plunderers and robbers, and they have now been forced to talk to us about trade. However, the Red Army's victory will not be complete or lasting unless we cope with the next task, which is more formidable and gigantic, that of rehabilitating industry and improving the national economy.

Lenin touched on the question of electrification, without which the renascence of the country is impossible. After dealing with the question of the invitation of foreign capital and the granting of concessions, the speaker went on to the part played by the printing and publishing industry in the national economy as a whole, and concluded by expressing the confidence that the workers and peasants of Russia will show a splendid example of victory on the peace front, just as they have done so often on the war fronts. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Pravda No. 269,
November 30, 1920

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the *Pravda* text

SPEECH
DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF CELLS' SECRETARIES OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.) NOVEMBER 26, 1920[149]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

In the first written question submitted, a comrade asks whether it is true that all institutions of administration are to be transferred to Petrograd. That is inaccurate. The rumour has arisen from the fact that the Moscow Soviet has had the idea of transferring non-essential institutions from Moscow to Petrograd because of the housing shortage in the capital. It appears that Petrograd can accept up to 10,000 Soviet office workers, who number 200,000 in Moscow. To study all aspects of the matter, a committee has been set up, which is now working. Its findings will be submitted to the Council of People's Commissars.[150] So you see that this rumour is inaccurate in some respects.

The second question and the third ask about concessions. You will allow me to dwell on the subject.

In one of his books, Spargo, the American Socialist, a man who is something like our Alexinsky, and has a vindictive hate of the Bolsheviks, speaks of concessions as proof of the collapse of communism. Our Mensheviks say the same thing. The challenge has been made, and we are ready to take it up. Let us consider the question in terms of the facts. Who has got the worse of it, we or the European bourgeoisie? For three years they have been calumniating us, calling us usurpers and bandits; they have had recourse to all and every means to overthrow us, but have

now had to confess to failure, which is in itself a victory for us. The Mensheviks assert that we are pledged to defeating the world bourgeoisie on our own. We have, however, always said that we are only a single link in the chain of the world revolution, and have never set ourselves the aim of achieving victory by our own means. The world revolution has not yet come about, but then we have not yet been overcome. While militarism is decaying, we are growing stronger; not we, but they have had the worse of it.

They now want to subdue us by means of a treaty. Until the revolution comes about, bourgeois capital will be useful to us. How can we speed up the development of our economy whilst we are an economically weaker country? We can do that with the aid of bourgeois capital. We now have before us two drafts of concessions. One of them is for a ten-year concession in Kamchatka. We were recently visited by an American multimillionaire, who told us very frankly of the reasons behind the treaty, viz., that America wants to have a base in Asia in case of a war against Japan. This multimillionaire said that if we sold Kamchatka to America, he could promise us such enthusiasm among the people of the United States that the American Government would immediately recognise the Soviets of Russia. If we gave them only the lease, there would be less enthusiasm. He is now on his way to America, where he will make it known that Soviet Russia is a far cry from what people believed her to be.

We have till now been more than a match for the world bourgeoisie, because they are incapable of uniting. The Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles[151] have both divided them. An intense hostility is now developing between America and Japan. We are making use of this and are offering a lease of Kamchatka instead of giving it away gratis; after all, Japan has taken a huge expanse of our territory in the Far East,[152] this by force of arms. It is far more to our advantage to run no risk, grant a lease of Kamchatka, and receive part of its products, the more so for our being unable, in any case, to run or exploit it. The treaty has not been signed, but it is already being spoken of in Japan with the utmost anger. Through this treaty we have aggravated the differences between our enemies.

The second kind of concession is represented by our granting the lease of several million dessiatines* of timberland in Archangel Gubernia which, despite all our efforts, we cannot fully exploit. We are arranging a kind of checkerboard pattern, with sections of timberland we shall be exploiting alternating with the leased sections, so that our workers will be able to learn the use of felling equipment from their neighbours. All this is very much to our advantage.

And now for the final aspect of the question.

Concessions do not mean peace; they too are a kind of warfare, only in another form, one that is to our advantage. Previously war was waged with the aid of tanks, cannon and the like, which hindered our work; the war will now be conducted on the economic front. They may perhaps try to restore the freedom to trade, but they cannot get along without us. Besides, they have to submit to all our laws, and our workers can learn from them; in case of war—and we must always be prepared for war against the bourgeoisie—the property will remain in our hands by virtue of the laws of war. I repeat: concessions are a continuation of war on the economic front, but here we do not destroy our productive forces, but develop them. They will no doubt try to evade our laws and deceive us, but we have the appropriate bodies to deal with that, such as the All-Russia Cheka, the Moscow Cheka, the Gubernia Cheka, and so on, and we are sure that we shall win.

Eighteen months ago we wanted to sign a peace that would have given Denikin and Kolchak a vast territory. They turned this down and in consequence lost everything.[153] We have mapped out the right road to the world revolution, but this road is not a straight one, but goes in zigzags. We have weakened the bourgeoisie, so that it cannot overcome us by force of arms. They used to ban our conduct of communist propaganda; but there can be no question of that at present, and it would be ridiculous to demand such things. They are decaying from within, and that gives us strength. We do not imagine that we shall defeat the world bourgeoi-

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* *Dessiatine*—a Russian unit of land measure equal to 2.7 acres.—*Ed.*

sie by force of arms alone, and the Mensheviks are wrong in ascribing that intention to us.

I did not hear Comrade Kamenev's report on the Conference, but I shall say that the latter teaches us a lesson: no matter how the struggle proceeded and whatever memories remain, we must put a complete end to everything. It should be remembered that the consolidation of our forces is the main and most important task. Tasks of economic construction await us. That transition will be difficult after six years of war, and we have to tackle the problem with united forces, on the platform of the All-Russia Conference's resolutions, which must be carried out. The struggle against red-tape methods, and economic and administrative work call for unity. What is expected of us is propaganda by example; the non-Party masses have to be set an example. It will be no easy matter to carry out the resolutions, but we must concentrate all our forces on that task and set about working in all earnest. I call upon you to do that.

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against the verbatim report

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A GENERAL MEETING OF COMMUNISTS OF ZAMOSKVORECHYE DISTRICT, MOSCOW NOVEMBER 29, 1920

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin dwelt in detail on the problem of the struggle against bureaucratic methods which, in its differences with the majority at the gubernia conference, our so-called "opposition" is advancing almost as a matter of principle. Though he thought that the fact that the "opposition" had raised this question was in itself a healthy sign, Lenin at the same time attacked the opposition for its frivolous attitude to the question. Indicating the causes of the recrudescence of bureaucratic methods in our Soviet state and the roots now nourishing them, Lenin very emphatically warned the comrades against the idea that this evil could be combated by resolutions on paper and by abstract criticism devoid of any substance. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were out to make capital out of this question, both reproached us with being unable to combat red tape in our Soviet apparatus. There had been a time when these gentlemen had said that we would be unable to preserve our Soviet state; now they said: "They have preserved it, it is true, but bureaucratic methods remain in the Soviet institutions, even though Lenin said in such-and-such a book that red tape would be abolished under the rule of the Soviets."

But that was not how the matter stood.

First of all, general living standards had to be raised, so that the worker would not have to go about in search of flour, with a sack on his back, and hundreds of thousands

and millions of working people should pass through the school of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and learn to administer the state (which was something nobody had taught us), so that they might replace hundreds of thousands of bourgeois bureaucrats.

Incidentally, a reference to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. That body had been set up nearly a year before, but it had so far made itself felt very little as a school training people in the administration of the state. It would not be amiss for comrades who really wanted to expedite the fight against bureaucratic methods to work in this sphere and learn some useful lessons.

Lenin remarked that the question of combating red tape was particularly acute in Moscow, because there the comrades came up against, not only Moscow bureaucrats but bureaucrats on a national scale, since central institutions were concentrated there. There were 200,000 Soviet functionaries in Moscow, of whom only 10,000 could be transferred with their institutions to Petrograd in the near future.

It was only to be expected that red tape in the Soviet apparatus would penetrate into the Party apparatus, for these apparatuses are interwoven most intimately. The fight against the evil could and should be placed on the order of the day—not, however, in the sense of criticism for criticism's sake, but of practical suggestions as to the methods of waging that struggle, and better still, of a real struggle in the institutions in which the criticising comrades were working, and of publicity for the results and lessons of the struggle.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his concluding remarks Comrade Lenin pointed out to his "opponents", in sharp terms, that it was not befitting for Communists to indulge in such unsubstantiated criticism, such sweeping accusations against the Central Committee, without citing a single fact, such bandying about of

names even of experts, and lumping them all together as "bourgeois elements", without even trying to find out what kind of people they were. Lenin mentioned by name a number of workers who had been able to make a success of joint work with experts, establish correct relations with the latter, and obtain from them what was needed. Such workers did not complain of the experts; the grumbling came from those who had not coped with the work. An example was Shlyapnikov (one of the opponents, who had presented himself as a member of the Workers' Opposition[154]), a man who was sparing no effort, as Lenin put it, "to hatch differences", a man who objected to what Lenin had said in his report about our deep debt to the peasantry, and went on to say that the "opposition disagrees with Comrade Lenin". The selfsame Shlyapnikov would turn a blind eye to his own poor work, and was out to present his mission to Archangel as exile imposed by the Central Committee. Another instance was Comrade Bubnov, who spoke so much about the struggle against red tape, without saying a single word about the way he was combating the evil at least in the Central Administration of the Textile Industry which he headed, and where there was no less red tape, perhaps even more, than in other institutions. That was why Vladimir Ilyich warned the Zamoskvorechye comrades in the following terms: "When you hear such criticism, criticism without any content, criticism for the sake of criticism, be on your guard; make inquiry to find out whether the criticising comrade's vanity has not been injured in some way; perhaps he has been offended or is irritated, which drives him towards groundless opposition, opposition for its own sake."

In conclusion, Comrade Lenin replied to written questions handed to him, and then dealt in detail with the question of concessions.

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TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMITTEE OF ARMENIA[155]

To Comrade Kasyan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee of Armenia, Yerevan

Through you I send greetings to the Soviet Armenia of the working people, liberated from the yoke of imperialism. I have no doubt that you will exert every effort to establish fraternal solidarity between the working people of Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Lenin
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Moscow, December 2, 1920

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF ACTIVISTS OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.) DECEMBER 6, 1920

Comrades, I have noticed with great pleasure, although, I must confess, with surprise, that the question of concessions is arousing enormous interest. Cries are to be heard on all sides, mostly from the rank and file. "How can that be?" they ask. "We have driven out our own exploiters, and yet we are inviting others from abroad."

It will readily be understood why these outcries give me pleasure. The fact that a cry of alarm has gone up from the rank and file about the possibility of the old capitalists returning, and that this cry has gone up in connection with an act of such tenth-rate significance as the decree on concessions, shows that there is a very keen consciousness of the danger of capitalism and the great danger of the struggle against it. That is excellent, of course, and it is all the more excellent because, as I have already said, alarm is being voiced by the rank and file.

From the political point of view, the fundamental thing in the question of concessions—and here there are both political and economic considerations—is a rule we have not only assimilated in theory, but have also applied in practice, a rule which will remain fundamental with us for a long time until socialism finally triumphs all over the world: we must take advantage of the antagonisms and the contradictions that exist between the two imperialisms, the two groups of capitalist states, and play them off against each other. Until we have conquered the whole world, and as long as we are economically and militarily weaker than

the capitalist world, we must stick to the rule that we must be able to take advantage of the antagonisms and contradictions existing among the imperialists. Had we not adhered to this rule, every one of us would have long ago been strung up by the neck, to the glee of the capitalists. We gained our chief experience in this respect when we concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It should not be inferred that all treaties must be like that of Brest-Litovsk, or the Treaty of Versailles. That is not true. There may be a third kind of treaty, one that is advantageous to us.

Brest-Litovsk was significant in being the first time that we were able, on an immense scale and amidst vast difficulties, to take advantage of the contradictions among the imperialists in such a way as to make socialism the ultimate gainer. During the Brest-Litovsk period there were two immensely powerful groups of imperialist predators—the Austro-German and the Anglo-Franco-American. They were locked in a furious struggle which was to decide the fate of the world for the immediate future. That we were able to hold on—though from the military standpoint our forces were non-existent, we possessed nothing and were steadily sinking into the depths of economic chaos—the fact that we were able to hold on was a miracle that resulted from our having taken due advantage of the conflict between German and American imperialism. We made a tremendous concession to German imperialism; by doing so we at once safeguarded ourselves against persecution by both imperialisms. Germany was unable to concentrate on stifling Soviet Russia either economically or politically; she was too busy for that. We let her have the Ukraine, from which she could get all the grain and coal she wanted—provided, of course, she was able to get them, and had the strength for the purpose. Anglo-Franco-American imperialism was unable to attack us because we first made an offer of peace. A big book by Robins has just appeared in America, in which the author describes the U.S. talks with Lenin and Trotsky, who gave their consent to the conclusion of peace. Although the Americans were helping the Czechoslovaks and making them take part in the military intervention, they were unable to interfere because they were busy with their own war.

The outcome might have seemed something like a bloc between the first Socialist Republic and German imperialism, against another imperialism. However, we did not conclude a bloc of any kind; we nowhere exceeded the borderline that would undermine or defame the socialist state; we simply took advantage of the conflict between the two imperialisms in such a way that both were ultimately the losers. Germany obtained nothing from the Brest Peace except several million poods of grain, but she brought the disintegrating force of Bolshevism into the country. We, however, gained time, in the course of which the formation of the Red Army began. Even the tremendous distress suffered by the Ukraine proved reparable, although at a heavy price. What our antagonists had counted on, namely, the rapid collapse of Soviet rule in Russia, did not come to pass. We made use of the interval history had accorded us as a breathing-space in order to consolidate ourselves to a degree that would make it impossible to vanquish us by military force. We gained time, a little time, but in return had to sacrifice a great deal of territory. In those days, I recall, people used to philosophise and say that to gain time we must surrender territory. It was in accordance with the philosophers' theory of time and space that we acted in practice and in policy: we sacrificed a great deal of territory, but won sufficient time to enable us to muster strength. Then, when all the imperialists wanted to launch a full-scale war against us, that proved impossible: they had neither the means nor the forces for such a war. At that time we sacrificed no fundamental interests; we conceded minor interests and preserved what was fundamental.

This, incidentally, raises the question of opportunism. Opportunism means sacrificing fundamental interests so as to gain temporary and partial advantages. That is the gist of the matter, if we consider the theoretical definition of opportunism. Many people have gone astray on this point. In the case of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, we sacrificed Russia's interests, as understood in the patriotic sense, which were, in fact, secondary from the socialist point of view. We made immense sacrifices, yet they were only minor ones. The Germans hated Britain implacably. They hated the Bolsheviks too, but we held out a bait, and they fell for it.

They had all the time asserted that they would not go as far as Napoleon did. Indeed, they did not reach Moscow, but they penetrated into the Ukraine where they came to grief. They thought they had learnt a lot from Napoleon, but things worked out otherwise. We, on the other hand, gained a great deal.

The example of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk has taught us a lot. At present, we stand between two foes. If we are unable to defeat both of them, we must be able to dispose our forces in such a way as to make them fall out among themselves; whenever thieves fall out, honest men come into their own. However, as soon as we are strong enough to overcome capitalism as a whole, we shall immediately seize it by the scruff of the neck. Our strength is growing, and very rapidly. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was a lesson we shall never forget, one which, in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from it, was worth more than any propaganda or preaching. We have now won in the sense that we stand on our own feet. We are surrounded by imperialist states, which detest the Bolsheviks and are spending vast sums of money, using ideological means, the power of the press, and so on, and yet have been unable to defeat us in three years of war, although we are infinitely weak from the military and economic standpoint. We do not possess one-hundredth of the forces of the combined imperialist states, yet they are unable to stifle us. They cannot crush us because their soldiers will not obey; their war-weary workers and peasants do not want a war against the Soviet Republic. Such is the position now, and that is what we must proceed from. We do not know what the position will be like several years from now, since with every year the Western powers are recovering from the war.

Since the Second Congress of the Third International we have secured a firm foothold in the imperialist countries, not only in the sphere of ideology but also in that of organisation. In all countries there are groups which are carrying on independent work and will continue to do so. That has been accomplished. But the rate, the tempo of development of the revolution in the capitalist countries is far slower than in our country. It was evident that the revolutionary movement would inevitably slow down when the nations

secured peace. Therefore, without surmising as to the future, we cannot now rely on this tempo becoming rapid. We have to decide what we are to do at the present time. Every people lives in a state, and every state belongs to a system of states, which are in a certain system of political equilibrium in relation to one another.

Let us bear in mind that all over the world the capitalists have bought up the vast majority of the richest sources of raw materials, or, if they have not actually bought them, they have seized them politically; since there is a balance based on capitalism, that must be reckoned with and turned to account. We cannot go to war with the present-day Entente. Our agitation has been and is being conducted splendidly—of that we are certain. We must take political advantage of the differences among our opponents, but only of major differences that are due to profound economic causes. If we try to exploit minor and fortuitous differences, we shall be behaving like petty politicians and cheap diplomats. There is nothing of value to be gained by that. There are swarms of diplomats who play this game; they do so for several months, make careers, and then come to grief.

Are there any radical antagonisms in the present-day capitalist world that must be utilised? Yes, there are three principal ones, which I should like to enumerate. The first, the one that affects us closest, is the relations between Japan and America. War is brewing between them. They cannot live together in peace on the shores of the Pacific, although those shores are three thousand versts apart. This rivalry arises incontestably from the relation between their capitalisms. A vast literature exists on the future Japanese-American war. It is beyond doubt that war is brewing, that it is inevitable. The pacifists are trying to ignore the matter and obscure it with general phrases, but no student of the history of economic relations and diplomacy can have the slightest doubt that war is ripe from the economic viewpoint and is being prepared politically. One cannot open a single book on this subject without seeing that a war is brewing. The world has been partitioned. Japan has seized vast colonies. Japan has a population of fifty million, and she is comparatively weak economically. America has a population of a hundred and ten million,

and although she is many times richer than Japan she has no colonies. Japan has seized China, which has a population of four hundred million and the richest coal reserves in the world. How can this plum be kept? It is absurd to think that a stronger capitalism will not deprive a weaker capitalism of the latter's spoils. Can the Americans remain indifferent under such circumstances? Can strong capitalists remain side by side with weak capitalists and not be expected to grab everything they can from the latter? What would they be good for if they did not? But that being the case, can we, as Communists, remain indifferent and merely say: "We shall carry on propaganda for communism in these countries." That is correct, but it is not everything. The practical task of communist policy is to take advantage of this hostility and to play one side off against the other. Here a new situation arises. Take the two imperialist countries, Japan and America. They want to fight and will fight for world supremacy, for the right to loot. Japan will fight so as to continue to plunder Korea, which she is doing with unprecedented brutality, combining all the latest technical inventions with purely Asiatic tortures. We recently received a Korean newspaper which gives an account of what the Japanese are doing. Here we find all the methods of tsarism and all the latest technical perfections combined with a purely Asiatic system of torture and unparalleled brutality. But the Americans would like to grab this Korean titbit. Of course, defence of country in such a war would be a heinous crime, a betrayal of socialism. Of course, to support one of these countries against the other would be a crime against communism; we Communists have to play one off against the other. Are we not committing a crime against communism? No, because we are doing that as a socialist state which is carrying on communist propaganda and is obliged to take advantage of every hour granted it by circumstances in order to gain strength as rapidly as possible. We have begun to gain strength, but very slowly. America and the other capitalist countries are growing in economic and military might at tremendous speed. We shall develop far more slowly, however we muster our forces.

We must take advantage of the situation that has arisen. That is the whole purpose of the Kamchatka concessions.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

We have had a visit from Vanderlip, a distant relative of the well-known multimillionaire, if he is to be believed; but since our intelligence service in the Cheka, although splendidly organised, unfortunately does not yet extend to the United States of America, we have not yet established the exact kinship of these Vanderlips. Some even say there is no kinship at all. I do not presume to judge: my knowledge is confined to having read a book by Vanderlip, not the one that was in our country and is said to be such a very important person that he has been received with all the honours by kings and ministers—from which one must infer that his pocket is very well lined indeed: He spoke to them in the way people discuss matters at meetings such as ours, for instance, and told them in the calmest tones how Europe should be restored. If ministers spoke to him with so much respect, it must mean that Vanderlip is in touch with the multimillionaires. His book reveals the outlook of a man of business who knows nothing else but business and who, after observing Europe, says: "It looks as if nothing will come of it and everything will go to the devil." The book is full of hatred of Bolshevism, but it does take up the matter of establishing business contacts. It is a most interesting book from the point of view of agitation too, better than many a communist book, because its final conclusion is: "I'm afraid this patient is incurable—though we have lots of money and the means for his treatment."

Well, Vanderlip brought a letter to the Council of People's Commissars. It was a very interesting letter, for, with the utter frankness, cynicism and crudity of an American tightfist, the writer of the letter said: "We are very strong now in 1920, and in 1923 our navy will be still stronger. However, Japan stands in the way of our growing might and we shall have to fight her, and you cannot fight without oil. Sell us Kamchatka, and I can vouch that the enthusiasm of the American people will be so great that we shall recognise you. The presidential elections in March will result in a victory for our party. If, however, you let us have only the lease of Kamchatka, I assure you there will be no such enthusiasm." That is almost literally what he said in his letter. Here we have an unblushing imperialism, which does not even consider it necessary to veil itself in any way because it

thinks it is magnificent just as it is. When this letter was received, we said that we must grasp at the opportunity with both hands. That he is right, economically speaking, is shown by the fact that in America the Republican Party is on the eve of victory. For the first time in the history of America, people in the South have voted against the Democrats. It is therefore clear that here we have the economically correct reasoning of an imperialist. Kamchatka belonged to the former Russian Empire. That is true. Who it belongs to at the present moment is not clear. It seems to be the property of a state called the Far Eastern Republic, but the boundaries of that state have not been precisely fixed.[156] True, certain documents are being drawn up on the subject, but, first, they have not yet been drawn up, and, second, they have not yet been ratified. The Far East is dominated by Japan, who can do anything she pleases there. If we lease to America Kamchatka, which legally belongs to us but has actually been seized by Japan, we shall clearly be the gainers. That is the basis of my political reasoning, and on that basis we at once decided to conclude an immediate agreement with America. Of course, we have to bargain, as no businessman will respect us if we do not. Comrade Rykov accordingly began to bargain, and we drafted an agreement. But when it came to the actual signing, we said: "Everybody knows who we are, but who are you?" It transpired that Vanderlip could provide no guarantee, whereupon we said that we were ready to accommodate. Why, we said, this is merely a draft, and you said yourself that it would come into force when your party gained the upper hand; it has not gained the upper hand as yet, so we shall wait. Things worked out as follows: we drew up a draft of the treaty, as yet unsigned, giving Kamchatka—a big slice of the territory of the Far East and North-East Siberia to America for a period of sixty years, with the right to build a naval harbour in a port that is ice-free the year round, and has oil and coal.

A draft agreement is not binding in any way. We can always say that it contains unclear passages, and back out at any moment. In that case we shall only have lost time in negotiating with Vanderlip, and a few sheets of paper; yet we have already gained something. One has only to take

the reports from Europe to see that. There is hardly a report from Japan which does not speak of the great concern caused by the expected concessions. "We shall not tolerate it," Japan declares, "it infringes our interests." Go ahead then, and defeat America; we have no objections. We have already set Japan and America at loggerheads, to put it crudely, and have thereby gained a point. We have also gained as far as the Americans are concerned.

Who is Vanderlip? We have not established who he is—but it is a fact that in the capitalist world telegrams are not dispatched all over the world about rank-and-file citizens. And when he left us, telegrams went to all corners of the earth. Well, he went about saying that he had obtained a good concession and, wherever he went, began to praise Lenin. That was rather funny, but let me tell you that there is a bit of politics in this funny situation. When Vanderlip had concluded all his negotiations here, he wanted to meet me. I consulted representatives of the appropriate departments and asked whether I should receive him. They said, "Let him leave with a sense of satisfaction." Vanderlip came to see me. We talked about all these things, and when he began to tell me that he had been in Siberia, that he knew Siberia and came of a worker's family, just like most American multimillionaires, and so on, that they valued only practical things, and that they believed a thing only when they saw it, I replied, "Well, you are a practical people, and when you see the Soviet system you will introduce it in your own country." He stared at me in amazement at this turn in the conversation, and said to me in Russian (the whole conversation had been in English), "Mozhet byt."* I asked in surprise where he had got his knowledge of Russian. Why, I covered most of Siberia on horseback when I was twenty-five". I will tell you of a remark by Vanderlip which belongs to the sphere of the humorous. At parting he said: "I shall have to tell them in America that Mr. Lenin has no horns." I did not grasp his meaning at once, as I don't understand English very well. "What did you say? Will you please repeat that?" He is a spry old fellow; pointing to his temple, he said, "No horns here."

* Perhaps.—*Ed.*

There was an interpreter present who said, "That is exactly what he says." In America they are convinced that I have horns here, that is, the bourgeois say that I have been marked by the devil. "And now I shall have to tell them that you have no horns," said Vanderlip. We parted very amicably. I expressed the hope that friendly relations between the two states would be a basis not only for the granting of a concession, but also for the normal development of reciprocal economic assistance. It all went off in that kind of vein. Then telegrams came telling what Vanderlip had said on arriving home from abroad. Vanderlip had compared Lenin with Washington and Lincoln. Vanderlip had asked for my autographed portrait. I had declined, because when you present a portrait you write, "To Comrade So-and-so", and I could not write, "To Comrade Vanderlip". Neither was it possible to write: "To the Vanderlip we are signing a concession with" because that concession agreement would be concluded by the Administration when it took office. I did not know what to write. It would have been illogical to give my photograph to an out-and-out imperialist. Yet these were the kind of telegrams that arrived; this affair has clearly played a certain part in imperialist politics. When the news of the Vanderlip concessions came out, Harding—the man who has been elected President, but who will take office only next March issued an official denial, declaring that he knew nothing about it, had no dealings with the Bolsheviks and had heard nothing about any concessions. That was during the elections, and, for all we know, to confess, during elections, that you have dealings with the Bolsheviks may cost you votes. That was why he issued an official denial. He had this report sent to all the newspapers that are hostile to the Bolsheviks and are on the pay roll of the imperialist parties. The political advantages we can gain in respect of America and Japan are perfectly clear to us. This report is significant because it concretely shows the kind of concessions we want to sign, and on what terms. Of course this cannot be told to the press. It can be told only to a Party meeting. We must not be silent in the press about this agreement. It is to our advantage, and we must not say a single word that may hamper the conclusion of such an agreement because

it promises us tremendous advantages and a weakening of both U.S. and Japanese imperialism with regard to us.

All this deal means deflecting the imperialist forces away from us—while the imperialists are sighing and waiting for an opportune moment to strangle the Bolsheviks, we are deferring that moment. When Japan was becoming involved in the Korean venture, the Japanese said to the Americans: "Of course we can beat the Bolsheviks, but what will you give us for it? China? We shall take her anyway, whereas here we have to go ten thousand versts to beat the Bolsheviks, with you Americans in our rear. No, that is not politics." Even then the Japanese could have beaten us in a few weeks, had there been a double-track railway and America's aid in transport facilities. What saved us was the fact that while Japan was busy gobbling up China she could not advance westward, through all of Siberia, with America in her rear; moreover, she did not want to pull America's chestnuts out of the fire.

A war between the imperialist powers would have saved us even more. If we are obliged to put up with such scoundrels as the capitalist robbers, each of whom is ready to knife us, it is our prime duty to make them turn their knives against each other. Whenever thieves fall out, honest men come into their own. The second gain is purely political Even if this concession agreement does not materialise, it will be to our advantage. As for the economic gain, it will provide us with part of the products. If the Americans received part of the products, it would be to our advantage. There is so much oil and ore in Kamchatka that we are obviously not in a position to work them.

I have shown you one of the imperialist antagonisms we must take advantage of—that which exists between Japan and America. There is another—the antagonism between America and the rest of the capitalist world. Practically the entire capitalist world of "victors" emerged from the war tremendously enriched. America is strong; she is everybody's creditor and everything depends on her; she is being more and more detested; she is robbing all and sundry and doing so in a unique fashion. She has no colonies. Britain emerged from the war with vast colonies. So did France. Britain offered America a mandate—that is the

language they use nowadays—for one of the colonies she had seized, but America did not accept it. U.S. businessmen evidently reason in some other way. They have seen that, in the devastation it produces and the temper it arouses among the workers, war has very definite consequences, and they have come to the conclusion that there is nothing to be gained by accepting a mandate. Naturally, however, they will not permit this colony to be used by any other state. All bourgeois literature testifies to a rising hatred of America, while in America there is a growing demand for an agreement with Russia. America signed an agreement with Kolchak giving him recognition and support but here they have already come to grief, the only reward for their pains being losses and disgrace. Thus we have before us the greatest state in the world, which by 1923 will have a navy stronger than the British, and this state is meeting with growing enmity from the other capitalist countries. We must take this trend of things into account. America cannot come to terms with the rest of Europe—that is a fact proved by history. Nowhere has the Versailles Treaty been analysed so well as in the book by Keynes, a British representative at Versailles. In his book Keynes ridicules Wilson and the part he played in the Treaty of Versailles. Here, Wilson proved to be an utter simpleton, whom Clemenceau and Lloyd George twisted round their little fingers. Thus everything goes to show that America cannot come to terms with the other countries because of the profound economic antagonism between them, since America is richer than the rest.

We shall therefore examine all questions of concessions from this angle: if the least opportunity arises of aggravating the differences between America and the other capitalist countries, it should be grasped with both hands. America stands in inevitable contradiction with the colonies, and if she attempts to become more involved there she will be helping us ten times as much. The colonies are seething with unrest, and when you touch them, whether or not you like it, whether or not you are rich—and the richer you are the better—you will be helping us, and the Vanderlips will be sent packing. That is why to us this antagonism is the main consideration.

The third antagonism is that between the Entente and Germany. Germany has been vanquished, crushed by the Treaty of Versailles, but she possesses vast economic potentialities. Germany is the world's second country in economic development, if America is taken as the first. The experts even say that as far as the electrical industry is concerned she is superior to America, and you know that the electrical industry is tremendously important. As regards the extent of the application of electricity, America is superior, but Germany has surpassed her in technical perfection. It is on such a country that the Treaty of Versailles has been imposed, a treaty she cannot possibly live under. Germany is one of the most powerful and advanced of the capitalist countries. She cannot put up with the Treaty of Versailles. Although she is herself imperialist, Germany is obliged to seek for an ally against world imperialism, because she has been crushed. That is the situation we must turn to our advantage. Everything that increases the antagonism between America and the rest of the Entente or between the entire Entente and Germany should be used by us from the viewpoint of the concessions. That is why we must try and attract their interest; that is why the pamphlet Milyutin promised to bring, and has brought and will distribute, contains the decrees of the Council of People's Commissars written in a way that will attract prospective concessionaires. The booklet contains maps with explanations. We shall get it translated into all languages and encourage its distribution with the aim of setting Germany against Britain, because concessions will be a lifeline to Germany. We shall likewise set America against Japan, the entire Entente against America, and all Germany against the Entente.

These, then, are the three antagonisms that are upsetting the imperialists' apple-cart. That is the crux of the matter; that is why, from the political standpoint, we should be heart and soul—or rather with all our wits—in favour of concessions.

I now go over to the economics. When we were speaking of Germany we came up to the question of economics. Germany cannot exist from the economic standpoint following the Peace of Versailles; neither can all the defeated coun-

tries, such as Austria-Hungary in her former boundaries, for although parts of that country now belong to the victor states, she cannot exist under the Treaty of Versailles. These countries form, in Central Europe, a vast group with enormous economic and technical might. From the economic standpoint they are all essential to the restoration of the world economy. If you carefully read and re-read the Decree on Concessions of November 23, you will find that we stress the significance of the world economy, and we do so intentionally. That is undoubtedly correct. For the world economy to be restored, Russian raw materials must be utilised. You cannot get along without them—that is economically true. It is admitted even by a bourgeois of the first water, a student of economics, who regards things from a purely bourgeois standpoint. That man is Keynes, author of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. Vanderlip, who has travelled all over Europe as a financial magnate, also admits that the world economy cannot be restored because it appears that there is very little raw material available in the world, it having been dissipated in the war. He says that Russia must be relied on. And Russia now comes forward and declares to the world: we undertake to restore the international economy—here is our plan. That is sound economics. During this period Soviet government has grown stronger; not only has it grown stronger, but it has advanced a plan for the restoration of the entire world economy. The rehabilitation of the international economy by means of a plan of electrification is scientifically sound. With our plan we shall most certainly attract the sympathy, not only of all the workers but of sensible capitalists as well, regardless of the fact that in their eyes we are "those terrible Bolshevik terrorists", and so forth. Our economic plan is therefore correct; when they read this plan, all the petty-bourgeois democrats will swing over towards us, for while the imperialists have already fallen out among themselves, here is a plan to which engineers and economists can offer no objection. We are entering the field of economics and are offering the world a positive programme of construction; we are opening up prospects based on economic considerations, prospects which Russia regards not as a selfish plan to destroy the economies of other lands, as was

the rule in the past, but as a way to restore those economies in the interests of the whole world.

We are shifting the question to the anti-capitalist plane. We say that we undertake to build the whole world on a rational economic foundation; there can be no doubt that this idea is a correct one. There can be no doubt that if we set to work properly, with modern machinery and the help of science, the whole world economy can be restored at once.

We are conducting a kind of industrial propaganda when we say to the master class: "You capitalists are useless; while you are going to rack and ruin, we are building in our own way; so don't you think, gentlemen, it is time to come to terms with us?" To which all the capitalists of the world will have to reply, though grudgingly: "Yes, perhaps it is. Let us sign a trade agreement."

The British have already made a draft and sent it to us.[157] It is under discussion. New times are setting in. Their war schemes have miscarried and they now have to fight in the economic field. We fully understand that. We never imagined that with the fighting over and the advent of peace, the capitalist wolf would lie down with the socialist lamb. No, we did not. Yet the fact that you have to fight us in the economic field is a tremendous step forward. We have presented you with a world programme by regarding concessions from the standpoint of the world economy. That is indisputable from the viewpoint of economics. No engineer or agronomist who has anything to do with the national economy will deny that. Many capitalists say there cannot be a stable system of capitalist states without Russia. Yet we have advanced such a programme in the capacity of builders of a world economy based on a different plan. That is of tremendous propaganda value. Even if they do not sign a single concession—which I regard as quite possible—even if the sole outcome of all this talk of concessions will be a certain number of Party meetings and decrees, without a single concession being granted, we shall still have gained something. Besides advancing a plan of economic reconstruction, we are winning over all states that have been ruined by the war. At the congress of the Third, Communist International I said that the whole world is divided into oppressed and oppressor nations.

The oppressed nations constitute not less than seventy per cent of the population of the earth. To these the Peace of Versailles has added another hundred or hundred and fifty million people.

We now stand, not only as representatives of the proletarians of all countries but as representatives of the oppressed peoples as well. A journal of the Communist International recently appeared under the title of *Narody Vostoka*.[158] It carries the following slogan issued by the Communist International for the peoples of the East: "Workers of all countries and all oppressed peoples, unite!" "When did the Executive Committee give orders for slogans to be modified?" one of the comrades asked. Indeed, I do not remember that it ever did. Of course, the modification is wrong from the standpoint of the *Communist Manifesto*, but then the *Communist Manifesto* was written under entirely different conditions. From the point of view of present-day politics, however, the change is correct. Relations have become tense. All Germany is seething; so is all of Asia. You have read how the revolutionary movement is developing in India. In China there is a fierce hatred of the Japanese, and also of the Americans. In Germany there is such seething hatred of the Entente as can only be understood by those who have seen the hatred of the German workers for their own capitalists. As a result, they have made Russia the immediate representative of the entire mass of the oppressed population of the earth; the events are teaching the peoples to regard Russia as a centre of attraction. A Menshevik newspaper in Georgia recently wrote: "There are two forces in the world: the Entente and Soviet Russia." What are the Mensheviks? They are people who trim their sails to the wind. When we were weak internationally, they cried, "Down with the Bolsheviks!" When we began to grow stronger, they cried, "We are neutral!" Now that we have beaten off the enemies, they say, "Yes, there are two forces."

In the concessions decree we come forward, on behalf of all humanity, with an economically irreproachable programme for the restoration of the world's economic forces by utilising all raw materials, wherever they are to be found. What we consider important is that there should be no

starvation anywhere. You capitalists cannot eliminate it; we can. We are speaking for seventy per cent of the population of the earth. This is sure to exert an influence. Whatever comes of the project, no exception can be taken to it from the angle of economics. The economic aspect of concessions is important, regardless of whether they are signed or not.

As you see, I have been obliged to make a rather long introduction and to demonstrate the advantages of concessions. Of course, concessions are important to us also as a means of obtaining commodities. That is unquestionably true, but the chief thing is the political aspect. By the time the Congress of Soviets meets you will receive a book of six hundred pages—the plan for the electrification of Russia. This plan has been devised by the leading agronomists and engineers. We cannot expedite its realisation without the help of foreign capital and means of production. But if we want assistance, we must pay for it. So far, we have been fighting the capitalists, and they said that they would either strangle us or compel us to pay up twenty thousand millions. However they are in no position to strangle us, and we shall not pay the debts. For the time being we are enjoying a certain respite. As long as we are in need of economic assistance we are willing to pay you—that is the way we put the matter, and any other way would be economically unsound. Russia is in a state of industrial ruin; she is ten times or more worse off than before the war. Had we been told three years ago that we would be fighting the entire capitalist world for three years, we would not have believed it. But now we shall be told that to restore the economy, with only one-tenth of the pre-war national wealth is a still more difficult task. And indeed it is more difficult than fighting. We could fight with the help of the enthusiasm of the working-class masses and the peasants, who were defending themselves against the landowners. At present it is not a question of defence against the landowners, but of restoring economic life along lines the peasants are not accustomed to. Here victory will not depend on enthusiasm, dash, or self-sacrifice, but on day-by-day, monotonous, petty and workaday effort. That is undoubtedly a more difficult matter. Where are we to procure the means of

production we need? To attract the Americans, we must pay: they are men of business. And what are we to pay with? With gold? But we cannot throw gold about. We have little gold left. We have too little even to cover the programme of electrification. The engineer who drew up the programme has estimated that we need at least a thousand and one hundred million rubles of gold to carry it out. We do not have such a stock of gold. Neither can we pay in raw materials, because we have not yet fed all our own people. When, in the Council of People's Commissars, the question arises of giving 100,000 poods of grain to the Italians, the People's Commissar for Food gets up and objects. We are bargaining for every trainload of grain. Without grain we cannot develop foreign trade. What then shall we give? Rubbish? They have enough rubbish of their own. They say, let us trade in grain; but we cannot give them grain. We therefore propose to solve the problem by means of concessions.

I pass to the next point. Concessions create new dangers. I shall mention what I said at the beginning of my speech, namely, that an outcry is going up from the rank and file, from the working-class masses: "Don't yield to the capitalists; they are clever and crafty." It is good to hear that, because it is a sign of the development of that vast mass which will fight the capitalists tooth and nail. There are some sound ideas in the articles of Comrade Stepanov, which he planned on pedagogical lines (first set forth all the arguments against concessions, and then say that they must be accepted; but certain readers, before they get to the good part, may stop reading, convinced that concessions are unnecessary); but when he says that we must not give concessions to Britain because that will mean some Lockhart coming here, I cannot agree. We coped with him at a time when the Cheka was still in its infancy, not as effective as it is now. If we cannot catch spies after three years of war, then all that can be said is that such people should not undertake to run the state. We are solving far more difficult problems. For instance, there are at present 300,000 bourgeois in the Crimea. These are a source of future profiteering, espionage and every kind of aid to the capitalists. However, we are not afraid of them. We say

that we shall take and distribute them, make them submit, and assimilate them.

To say after this that foreigners who will be attached to the various concessions will be a danger to us, or that we shall not be able to keep an eye on them, is ridiculous. Why, then, should we have started the whole business? Why, then, should we have undertaken to run the state? The task here is purely one of organisation, and it is not worth dwelling on at length.

It would, of course, be a great mistake to think that concessions imply peace. Nothing of the kind. Concessions are nothing but a new form of warfare. Europe waged war on us, and now the war is shifting to a new sphere. Previously, the war was conducted in a field in which the imperialists were infinitely stronger than we were—the military field. If you count the number of cannon and machine-guns they have and the number we have, the number of soldiers their governments can mobilise and the number our government can mobilise, then we certainly ought to have been crushed in a fortnight. Nevertheless, we held our own in this field, and we undertake to continue the fight and are going over to an economic war. We definitely stipulate that next to a concession area, a concession square of territory, there will be our square, and then again their square; we shall learn from them how to organise model enterprises by placing what is ours next to theirs. If we are incapable of doing that, there is no use talking about anything. Operating up-to-date equipment nowadays is no easy matter, and we have to learn to do so, learn it in practice. That is something that no school, university or course will teach you. That is why we are granting concessions on the chequer-board system. Come and learn on the job.

We shall get a tremendous economic gain from concessions. Of course, when their dwelling areas are created they will bring capitalist customs along with them and will try to demoralise the peasantry. We must be on the alert and exercise our communist counter-influence at every step. That too is a kind of war, a duel between two methods, two political and economic systems—the communist and the capitalist. We shall prove that we are the stronger. We are told: "Very good, you have held your own on the external

front; well, start construction, go ahead and build, and we shall see who wins....” Of course, the task is a difficult one, but we have said, and still say, that socialism has the force of example. Coercion is effective against those who want to restore their rule. But at this stage the significance of force ends, and after that only influence and example are effective. We must show the significance of communism in practice, by example. We have no machinery; the war has impoverished us and deprived Russia of her economic resources. Yet we do not fear this duel, because it will be advantageous to us in all respects.

That, too, will be a war in which we will not yield an inch. This war will be to our advantage in every respect; the transition from the old war to this new one will also be of advantage, to say nothing of the fact that there is a certain indirect guarantee of peace. At the-meeting which was so poorly reported in *Pravda*, I said that we had passed from war to peace, but that we had not forgotten that war will return. While capitalism and socialism exist side by side, they cannot live in peace: one or the other will ultimately triumph—the last obsequies will be observed either for the Soviet Republic or for world capitalism. This is some respite from war. The capitalists will seek pretexts for going to war. If they accept our proposal and agree to concessions, that will be harder for them. On the one hand, we shall have the best conditions in the event of war; on the other hand, those who want to go to war will not agree to take concessions. The existence of concessions is an economic and political argument against war. States that might go to war with us will not be able to do so if they take concessions. This will bind them. We set such a high value by this that we shall not be afraid to pay, the more so that we shall be paying from the means of production that we cannot develop. For Kamchatka we shall pay in terms of 100,000 poods of oil, taking only 2 per cent for ourselves. If we do not pay up we shall not get even two poods. This is an exorbitant price, but while capitalism exists we cannot expect a fair price from it. Yet the advantages are beyond doubt. From the angle of the danger of a collision between capitalism and Bolshevism, it can be said that concessions are a continuation of the war, but in a different sphere.

Each step of the enemy will have to be watched. Every means of administration, supervision, influence and action will be required. And that is also warfare. We have fought a much bigger war; in this war we shall mobilise even larger numbers of people than in the preceding. In this war all working people will be mobilised to a man. They will be told and given to understand: "If capitalism does this or that, you workers and peasants who have overthrown the capitalists must do no less. You must learn!"

I am convinced that the Soviets will overtake and outstrip the capitalists and that our gain will not be a purely economic one. We shall get the miserable two per cent—very little indeed, yet it is something. But then we shall be getting knowledge and training; no school or university is worth anything without practical knowledge. You will see from the map appended to the pamphlet Comrade Milyutin will show you that we are granting concessions principally in the outlying regions. In European Russia there are 70,000,000 dessiatines of northern forest land. About 17,000,000 dessiatines are being set aside for concessions. Our timber enterprises are mapped out chequerwise: these forests are in West Siberia and in the Far North. We have nothing to lose. The principal enterprises are located in West Siberia, whose wealth is immense. We cannot develop a hundredth part of it in ten years. However, with the help of foreign capitalists, by letting them have, say, a single mine, we shall be able to work our own mines. In granting concessions, we do the choosing of the locations.

How are the concessions to be organised as regards supervision? They will try to demoralise our peasantry, our masses. A small master by his very nature, the peasant is inclined to freedom of trade, something we consider criminal. That is a matter for the state to combat. Our task here is to contrapose the socialist system of economy to the capitalist system. That, too, will be a war in which we shall have to fight a decisive battle. We are suffering from a tremendous crop failure, lack of fodder and loss of livestock, yet at the same time vast areas of land are uncultivated. In a few days a decree will be issued providing that every effort be exerted to achieve the largest possible sowing of crops and the greatest possible improvement of agriculture.[159]

Next, we have a million dessiatines of virgin soil which we cannot bring under the plough because we have not enough draught animals and implements, whereas with tractors this land can be ploughed to any depth. It is therefore to our advantage to let out this land on lease. Even if we surrender half of the produce, or even three-quarters, we shall be the gainers. That is the policy we are guided by, and I can say that our actions must be guided, not only by economic considerations and the trend of the world economy, but also by profound political considerations. Any other approach to the matter would be short-sighted. If it is a question of whether concessions are economically advantageous or disadvantageous, the reply is that the economic advantages are beyond dispute. Without concessions, we shall not be able to carry out our programme and the electrification of the country; without them, it will be impossible to restore our economic life in ten years; once we have restored it we shall be invincible to capital. Concessions do not mean peace with capitalism, but war in a new sphere. The war of guns and tanks yields place to economic warfare. True, it also holds out new difficulties and new dangers, but I am certain that we shall overcome them. I am convinced that if the question of concessions is posed in this way, we shall easily be able to convince the vast majority of the Party comrades of the necessity of concessions. The instinctive apprehension I have spoken of is a good and healthy sentiment, which we shall convert into a driving force that will secure us a more rapid victory in the impending economic war.

First published in 1923

Published according to the verbatim report

MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF GUBERNIA DEPARTMENTS FOR WORK AMONG WOMEN[160]

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Comrades, I very much regret that I have not been able to attend your conference. Please convey to the delegates, both men and women, my sincere greetings and wishes for every success.

The participation of women in Party and Soviet activities has acquired a gigantic significance today, when the war has ended, and the peaceful work of organisation has—for a long time to come, as I hope—advanced into the foreground. In this work the women must play a leading part, and will of course do so.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

December 6, 1920

Pravda No. 286,
December 19, 1920

Published according to
the manuscript

THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[161]

DECEMBER 22-29, 1920

Report on concessions; speech to the R.C.P.(B.) group on December 24 and draft resolutions of the Congress were first published in 1930; report on the work of the Council of People's Commissars, and reply to the debate were published in 1921 in the book *The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Verbatim Report*

Report on concessions and speech to the R.C.P.(B.) group are published according to the verbatim report; report on the work of the Council of People's Commissars, and reply to the debate—according to the text in the book

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1

REPORT ON CONCESSIONS DELIVERED TO THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 21

Comrades, I think you have made a fully correct decision by preferring the discussion on concessions to be held first in the Party group. To the best of our knowledge, the question of concessions has everywhere aroused considerable concern and even anxiety, not only in Party circles and among the working-class masses but also among the masses of the peasantry. All comrades have pointed out that, since the decree of November 23 of this year, the questions most frequently raised and the written questions submitted at most meetings held on a variety of subjects have dealt with concessions, and the general tone of the questions, as well as of talk on the subject, has been one of apprehension: we have driven out our own capitalists, and now we want to admit others. I believe that this apprehension, this widespread interest in concessions—displayed, not only by Party comrades but by many others—is a good sign, which shows that in three years of incredibly hard struggle the workers' and peasants' state power has become so strong and our experience of the capitalists has become so fixed in the mind that the broad masses consider the workers' and peasants' state power stable enough to manage without concessions; they also consider their lesson learnt well enough to avoid any deals with the capitalists unless there is a dire necessity to do so. This sort of supervision from below, this kind of apprehension emanating from the masses, and this kind of anxiety among non-Party circles show the highly vigilant attention that is being paid to relations between

us and the capitalists. I believe that on this score we should absolutely welcome this apprehension as revealing the temper of the masses.

Yet I think that we shall come to the conclusion that, in the question of concessions, we cannot be guided by this revolutionary instinct alone. When we have analysed all aspects of the question we shall see that the policy we have adopted—the policy of offering concessions—is the correct one. I can tell you briefly that the main subject of my report—or rather the repetition of a talk I had very recently in Moscow with several hundred leading executives,[162] because I have not prepared a report and cannot present it to you—the main subject of this talk is to offer proof of two premises: first, that any war is merely the continuation of peacetime politics by other means, and second, that the concessions which we are giving, which we are forced to give, are a continuation of war in another form, using other means. To prove these two premises, or rather to prove only the second because the first does not require any special proof, I shall begin with the political aspect of the question. I shall dwell on those relations existing between the present-day imperialist powers, which are important for an understanding of present-day foreign policy in its entirety, and of our reasons for adopting this policy.

The American Vanderlip sent a letter to the Council of People's Commissars in which he said that the Republicans, members of the Republican Party of America, the party of the banking interests, which is linked with memories of the war against the Southern States for liberation, were not in power at the time. He wrote this before the November elections, which he hoped the Republicans would win (they have won them) and have their own president in March. The Republicans' policy, he went on, would not repeat the follies that had involved America in European affairs, they would look after their own interests. American interests would lead them to a clash with Japan, and they would fight Japan. It might interest you to know, he went on, that in 1923 the U.S. navy would be stronger than Britain's. To fight, they needed control of oil, without which they could not wage a modern war. They not only needed oil,

but also had to take steps to ensure that the enemy did not get any. Japan was in a bad way in that respect. Somewhere near Kamchatka there is an inlet (whose name he had forgotten) with oil deposits, and they did not want the Japanese to get that oil. If we sold them that land, Vanderlip could vouch that the Americans would grow so enthusiastic that the U.S. would immediately recognise our government. If we offered a concession, and did not sell them the land, he could not say that they would refuse to examine the project, but he could not promise the enthusiasm that would guarantee recognition of the Soviet Government.

Vanderlip's letter is quite outspoken; with unparalleled cynicism he outlines the point of view of an imperialist who clearly sees that a war with Japan is imminent, and poses the question openly and directly—enter into a deal with us and you will get certain advantages from it. The issue is the following: the Far East, Kamchatka and a piece of Siberia are *de facto* in the possession of Japan insofar as her troops are in control there, and circumstances made necessary the creation of a buffer state, the Far Eastern Republic. We are well aware of the unbelievable sufferings that the Siberian peasants are enduring at the hands of the Japanese imperialists and the atrocities the Japanese have committed in Siberia. The comrades from Siberia know this; their recent publications have given details of it.[163] Nevertheless, we cannot go to war with Japan and must make every effort, not only to put off a war with Japan but, if possible, to avert it because, for reasons known to you, it is beyond our strength. At the same time Japan is causing us tremendous losses by depriving us of our links with world trade through the Pacific Ocean. Under such conditions, when we are confronted with a growing conflict, an imminent clash between America and Japan—for a most stubborn struggle has been going on for many decades between Japan and America over the Pacific Ocean and the mastery of its shores, and the entire diplomatic, economic and trade history of the Pacific Ocean and its shores is full of quite definite indications that the struggle is developing and making war between America and Japan inevitable—we return to a situation we were in for three years: we are a Socialist Republic surrounded by imperialist countries that

are far stronger than us in the military sense, are using every means of agitation and propaganda to increase hatred for the Soviet Republic, and will never miss an opportunity for military intervention, as they put it, i.e., to strangle Soviet power.

If, remembering this, we cast a glance over the history of the past three years from the point of view of the international situation of the Soviet Republic, it becomes clear that we have been able to hold out and have been able to defeat the Entente powers—an alliance of unparalleled might that was supported by our whiteguards—only because there has been no unity among these powers. We have so far been victorious only because of the most profound discord among the imperialist powers, and only because that discord has not been a fortuitous and internal dissension between parties, but a most deep-seated and ineradicable conflict of economic interests among the imperialist countries which, based on private property in land and capital, cannot but pursue a predatory policy which has stultified their efforts to unite their forces against the Soviets. I take Japan, who controlled almost the whole of Siberia and could, of course, have helped Kolchak at any time. The main reason she did not do so was that her interests differ radically from those of America, and she did not want to pull chestnuts out of the fire for U.S. capital. Knowing this weakness, we could of course pursue no other policy than that of taking advantage of this enmity between America and Japan so as to strengthen ourselves and delay any possibility of an agreement between Japan and America against us; we have had an instance of the possibility of such an agreement: American newspapers carried the text of an agreement between all countries who had promised to support Kolchak[164]

That agreement fell through, of course, but it is not impossible that an attempt will be made to restore it at the first opportunity. The deeper and more formidable the communist movement grows, the greater will be the number of new attempts to strangle our Republic. Hence our policy of utilising the discord among the imperialist powers so as to hamper an agreement or to make one temporarily impossible. This has been the fundamental line of our policy for

three years; it necessitated the conclusion of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, as well as the signing, with Bullitt, of a peace treaty and an armistice agreement most disadvantageous to us. This political line of conduct enjoins us to grasp at a proposal on the granting of concessions. Today we are giving America Kamchatka, which in any case is not actually ours because it is held by Japanese troops. At the moment we are in no condition to fight Japan. We are giving America, for economic exploitation, a territory where we have absolutely no naval or military forces, and where we cannot send them. By doing so we are setting American imperialism against Japanese imperialism and against the bourgeoisie closest to us, the Japanese bourgeoisie, which still maintains its hold on the Far Eastern Republic.

Thus, our main interests were political at the concessions negotiations. Recent events, moreover, have shown with the greatest clarity that we have been the gainers from the mere fact of negotiations on concessions. We have not yet granted any concessions, and shall not be able to do so until the American president takes office, which will not be before March; besides, we reserve the possibility of renouncing the agreement when the details are being worked out.

It follows, therefore, that in this matter the economic interest is secondary, its real value lying in its political interest. The contents of the press we have received goes to show that we have been the gainers. Vanderlip himself insisted that the concessions plan should be kept secret for the time being, until the Republican Party had won the elections. We agreed not to publish either his letter or the entire preliminary draft. However, it appeared that such a secret could not be kept for long. No sooner had Vanderlip returned to America than exposures of various kinds began. Before the elections Harding was candidate for the presidency; he has now been elected. The selfsame Harding published in the press a denial of the report that he was in touch with the Soviets through Vanderlip. That denial was categorical, almost in the following words: I don't know Vanderlip and recognise no relations with the Soviets. The reason behind this denial is quite obvious. On the eve of the elections in bourgeois America, it might have meant losing

several hundred thousand votes for Harding to become known as a supporter of an agreement with the Soviets, and so he hastened to announce in the press that he did not know any Vanderlip. As soon as the elections were over, however, information of a quite different kind began to come in from America. In a number of newspaper articles Vanderlip came out in full support of an agreement with the Soviets and even wrote in one article that he compared Lenin to Washington. It turns out, therefore, that in the bourgeois countries we have propagandists for an agreement with us, and have won these propagandists from among representatives of exploiters of the worst type, such as Vanderlip, and not in the person of the Soviet ambassador or among certain journalists.

When I told a meeting of leading executives what I am now telling you, a comrade just back from America where he had worked in Vanderlip's factories, said he had been horrified; nowhere had he seen such exploitation as at Vanderlip's factories. And now in the person of this capitalist shark we have won a propagandist for trade relations with Soviet Russia, and even if we do not get anything except the proposed agreement on concessions we shall still be able to say that we have gained something. We have received a number of reports, secret ones, of course, to the effect that the capitalist countries have not given up the idea of launching a new war against Soviet Russia in the spring. We have learnt that preliminary steps are being taken by some capitalist states, while whiteguard elements are, it may be said, making preparations in all countries. Our chief interest therefore, lies in achieving the re-establishment of trade relations, and for that purpose we need to have at least a section of the capitalists on our side.

In Britain the struggle has been going on for a long time. We have gained by the mere fact that among those who represent the worst capitalist exploitation we have people who back the policy of restoring trade relations with Russia. The agreement with Britain—a trade agreement—has not yet been signed. Krasin is now actively negotiating it in London. The British Government has submitted its draft to us and we have presented our counterdraft, but all the same we see that the British Government is dragging

out the negotiations and that there is a reactionary military group hard at work there which is hindering the conclusion of trade agreements and has so far been successful. It is our prime interest and prime duty to support anything that can strengthen the parties and groups working for the conclusion of this agreement with us. In Vanderlip we have gained such a supporter, not by mere chance or because Vanderlip is particularly enterprising or knows Siberia very well. The causes here lie much deeper and are linked with the development of the interests of British imperialism, which possesses a huge number of colonies. This rift between American and British imperialism is deep, and it is our imperative duty to base ourselves on it.

I have mentioned that Vanderlip is particularly knowledgeable in respect of Siberia. When our talks were coming to a close, Comrade Chicherin pointed out that Vanderlip should be received because it would have an excellent effect on his further actions in Western Europe. Of course, the prospect of talking to such a capitalist shark was not of the pleasantest, but then I had had to talk very politely, by way of duty, even to the late Mirbach, so I was certainly not afraid of a talk with Vanderlip. It is interesting that when Vanderlip and I exchanged all sorts of pleasantries and he started joking and telling me that the Americans are an extremely practical people and do not believe what they are told until they see it with their own eyes, I said to him, half in banter: "Now you can see how good things are in Soviet Russia and you can introduce the same in America." He answered me, not in English but in Russian: "Mozhet byt."* Why, you even know Russian?" He answered: "A long time ago I travelled five thousand versts through Siberia and the country interested me greatly." This humorous exchange of pleasantries with Vanderlip ended by his saying as he was leaving, "Yes, it is true Mr. Lenin has no horns and I must tell that to my friends in America." It would have seemed simply ridiculous had it not been for the further reports in the European press to the effect that the Soviets are a monster no relations can be established with. We were given an opportunity to throw

* Perhaps.—*Ed.*

into that swamp a stone in the person of Vanderlip, who favours the re-establishment of trade relations with us.

There has not been a single report from Japan that has not spoken of the extraordinary alarm in Japanese commercial circles. The Japanese public say that they will never go against their own interests, and are opposed to concessions in Soviet Russia. In short, we have a terrific aggravation of the enmity between Japan and America and thus an undoubted slackening of both Japanese and American pressure on us.

At the meeting of executives in Moscow where I had to mention the fact, the following question was asked. "It appears," one of the comrades wrote, "that we are driving Japan and America to war, but it is the workers and peasants who will do the fighting. Although these are imperialist powers, is it worthy of us socialists to drive two powers into a war against each other, which will lead to the shedding of workers blood?" I replied that if we were really driving workers and peasants to war that would be a crime. All our politics and propaganda, however, are directed towards putting an end to war and in no way towards driving nations to war. Experience has shown sufficiently that the socialist revolution is the only way out of eternal warfare. Our policy, therefore, is not that of involving others in a war. We have not done anything justifying, directly or indirectly, a war between Japan and America. All our propaganda and all our newspaper articles try to drive home the truth that a war between America and Japan would be just as much an imperialist war as the one between the British and the German groups in 1914, and that socialists should think, not of defending their respective countries but of overthrowing the power of the capitalists; they should think of the workers' revolution. Is it the correct policy for us to use the discord between the imperialist bandits to make it more difficult for them to unite against us, who are doing everything in our power to accelerate that revolution, but are in the position of a weak socialist republic that is being attacked by imperialist bandits? Of course, it is the correct policy. We have pursued that policy for four years. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the chief expression of this policy. While the German imperialists

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

were offering resistance, we were able to hold out even when the Red Army had not yet been formed, by using the contradictions existing between the imperialists.

Such was the situation in which our concessions policy in respect to Kamchatka emerged. This type of concession is quite exceptional. I shall speak later of the way the other concessions are taking shape. For the moment I shall confine myself to the political aspect of the question. I want to point out that the relations between Japan and America show why it is to our advantage to offer concessions or to use them as an inducement. Concessions presume some kind of re-establishment of peaceful agreements, the restoration of trade relations; they presume the possibility for us to begin direct and extensive purchases of the machinery we need. We must turn all our efforts to achieving this. That has not yet been done.

The comrade who has asked about the resumption of trade relations with Britain wants to know why the signing of the agreement with that country has been held up. My answer is that it is being delayed because the British Government is hesitant. Most of the trade and industrial bourgeoisie in Britain are in favour of relations being resumed and clearly realise that any action for war means taking enormous risks and speeding up the revolution. You will remember that during our drive on Warsaw the British Government presented us with an ultimatum, threatening to order its navy to sail against Petrograd. You will remember that Councils of Action sprang up all over Britain at the time and the Menshevik leaders of the British working class declared that they were against war and would not permit one. On the other hand, the reactionary section of the British bourgeoisie and the military clique at court are in favour of the war continuing. The delay in signing the trade agreement must undoubtedly be ascribed to their influence. I shall not go into all the details of these trade relations with Britain, or of this agreement on trade relations with Britain, because it would take me too far afield. This delicate problem had recently to be very thoroughly discussed by the Central Committee of the Party. We have returned to it again and again, and our policy in this matter has been marked by the greatest degree of accommodation. Our aim

now is to obtain a trade agreement with Britain so as to start more regular trade and be able to buy as soon as possible the machinery necessary for our extensive plan to rehabilitate the national economy. The sooner we do this the greater will be the basis ensuring our economic independence of the capitalist countries. At present, after having burnt their fingers in the armed invasion of Russia, they cannot think of an immediate resumption of the war. We must seize the opportunity and bend every effort to achieve trade relations even at the cost of maximum concessions, for we cannot for a moment believe in lasting trade relations with the imperialist powers; the respite will be temporary. The experience of the history of revolutions and great conflicts teaches us that wars, a series of wars, are inevitable. The existence of a Soviet Republic alongside of capitalist countries—a Soviet Republic surrounded by capitalist countries—is so intolerable to the capitalists that they will seize any opportunity to resume the war. The peoples are weary of the imperialist war and threaten to make their indignation felt if war continues, but the possibility of the capitalists being able to resume it in a few years is not precluded. That is why we must exert every effort to utilise the opportunity, since it exists, and conclude trade agreements. I can say the following here (this is not for the record). I think that we shall ultimately emerge on top as a result of our firm stand that the Communist International is not a governmental institution. That is the more probable for the British bourgeoisie having to realise the ridiculousness of rising up against the Third International. The Third International was formed in March 1919. Its Second Congress was held in July 1920, following which the terms proposed in Moscow were made publicly known in all countries. An open struggle is going on for adhesion to the Communist International. The organisational foundations for the formation of Communist parties exist everywhere. In these circumstances, any attempt to present us seriously with an ultimatum that we get rid of the Communist International is inexcusable. However, the emphasis laid on the matter shows where the shoe pinches and what displeases them in our policy. Even without that, we have known what it is in our policy that is not to their liking. The East is

nother question that can be spoken of at a Party meeting, and is alarming Britain. The latter wants us to give assurances that we will do nothing against Britain's interests in the East. We are willing and ready to give such an undertaking. As an example I might mention that the Congress of Peoples of the East, a Communist congress, took place, not in the R.S.F.S.R. but in Baku, in the independent republic of Azerbaijan. The British Government will have no reason to accuse us of doing anything against British interests. In their ignorance of our Constitution, they sometimes confuse the Azerbaijan Republic with the Russian Soviet Republic. Our laws are definite and precise on that score, and it will be easy to refute the false interpretations of the British ministers. However, there are still differences on this subject, and Krasin is engaged with the ministers in talks on these two sore points.

In July, when Poland was threatened with utter defeat, and the Red Army was about to crush her, the complete text of an agreement was presented by Britain, which in effect said that we had to declare as a matter of principle that we would not carry on official propaganda or do anything contrary to British interests in the East. That was to be laid down at a subsequent political conference, but at the moment they were concluding a definite trade agreement. They asked whether we would like to sign it. We replied that we would. Today we say again that we will sign such an agreement. The political conference will specify Britain's interests in the East. We also have certain interests in the East, and we shall set them forth in detail when the need arises. Britain cannot say outright that she is abandoning her July proposal and so she is dragging things out and concealing from her own people the truth about the negotiations. The outcome of the negotiations is uncertain and we cannot guarantee that an agreement will be signed. The very powerful court and military circles in Britain are opposed to the agreement. We are, however, proposing maximum concessions, and we believe it to be in our interests to sign a trade pact and purchase with all possible dispatch some of the essentials for the restoration of the railways (i.e., locomotives), for the rehabilitation of industry, and for electrification. This is more important to us than anything

else. If we achieve that, we shall become so strong in a few years that even, if the worst comes to the worst and there is armed intervention in a few years' time, it will fail because we shall be stronger than we are now. The line we in the Central Committee are following is one of maximum concessions to Britain. If these gentlemen think they will catch us breaking promises, we declare that our government will not carry on any official propaganda and that we have no intention of infringing on any of Britain's interests in the East. If they hope to derive some advantage from this, let them try; we shall not be the losers.

I now come to the question of the relations between Britain and France. These are confused. On the one hand, Britain and France belong to the League of Nations and are obliged to act jointly; on the other hand, whenever any tension arises they fail to do so. When Comrade Kamenev was in London conducting negotiations together with Krasin, this became quite obvious. France was in favour of supporting Poland and Wrangel, but the British Government declared it would not support France. Concessions are more acceptable to Britain than to France, which still aspires to get her debts paid back, while in Britain capitalists with any business sense no longer think about it. From that angle, too, it is to our advantage to use the dissension between Britain and France, and we must therefore insist on the political proposal of concessions to Britain. We now have a draft agreement on timber concessions in the Far North. Since there is no political unity between Britain and France, our position imposes on us the duty of even incurring a certain risk, if only we succeed in hampering a military alliance between Britain and France against us. A new war that Britain and France will support against us will be an immense burden on us (even if it ends, as the war with Wrangel has done, in our complete victory); it will hinder our economic development and worsen the condition of the workers and peasants. We must therefore be ready to do whatever involves the least loss. Obviously, the losses from concessions are negligible compared with those that would arise from a delay in our economic development and the loss of thousands of workers and peasants that would ensue were we unable to withstand the alliance

of the imperialists. Negotiations on concessions with Britain are one of the means of standing up to their alliance. That is the political aspect of the issue.

Last, the final aspect of the matter is the attitude of Britain and the entire Entente to Germany. If we exclude America, Germany is the most advanced country. In the development of electricity her technical level is even higher than America's. The conditions obtaining in Germany in consequence of the Treaty of Versailles make her existence impossible. Because of that situation it is natural for Germany to be prompted towards an alliance with Russia. When the Russian troops were approaching Warsaw, all Germany was seething. An alliance between Russia and Germany, a country that has been strangled, a country that is able to set gigantic productive forces in motion—this situation has led to a political mix up in Germany: the German Black Hundreds sympathise with the Russian Bolsheviks in the same way as the Spartacus League does. This can well be understood because it derives from economic causes, and is the basis of the entire economic situation and of our foreign policy.

While we stand alone and the capitalist world is strong, our foreign policy consists, on the one hand, in our having to utilise disagreements (to vanquish all the imperialist powers would, of course, be a most pleasant thing, but for a fairly long time we shall not be in a position to do so). On the one hand, our existence depends on the presence of radical differences between the imperialist powers, and, on the other, on the Entente's victory and the Peace of Versailles having thrown the vast majority of the German nation into a situation it is impossible for them to live in. The Peace of Versailles has created a situation in which Germany cannot even dream of a breathing-space, or of not being plundered, of not having the means of subsistence taken away from her, of her people not being doomed to starvation and extinction; Germany cannot even dream of any of these things, so that, naturally, her only means of salvation lies in an alliance with Soviet Russia, a country towards which her eyes are therefore turning. They are furiously opposing Soviet Russia; they detest the Bolsheviks, and shoot down their own Communists in the manner of real whiteguards. The

German bourgeois government has an implacable hatred of the Bolsheviks, but such is its international position that, against its own desires, the government is driven towards peace with Soviet Russia. That, comrades, is the second corner-stone of our international policy, our foreign policy; it is to show peoples that are conscious of the bourgeois yoke that there is no salvation for them without the Soviet Republic. Since the Soviet Republic withstood the onslaught of the imperialists for three years, this goes to show that one country, and that country alone, has been successful in hurling back this imperialist yoke. That country has been called a country of "robbers", "plunderers", "bandits", Bolsheviks, etc.—let that be so, but still it is impossible to improve the economic situation without that country.

In a situation such as this, the question of concessions acquires still another aspect. The pamphlet I have in my hands is the Decree on Concessions of November 23. It will be distributed to all members of the Congress. We intend to publish this pamphlet abroad, in several languages.[165] It is our immediate object to do everything possible to arouse interest in concessions among the population of the greatest number of countries, to interest those countries that are the most oppressed. The divergence of interests between Japan and America is very great. They are unable to agree between themselves over China, a number of islands, etc. The divergence of interests between Germany and the Entente is of another kind. Germany's existence has been made impossible by the conditions in which the Entente has placed her. People are dying there because the Entente has been requisitioning their motors and their cattle. Such a situation urges Germany towards a *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia. I do not know the details of the treaty between Germany and the Entente, but in any case the treaty is known to ban direct trade relations between Germany and Soviet Russia. When we arranged for the purchase of German locomotives, that was done through the agency of Sweden. Germany will hardly be able to restore direct trade relations with us before April 1921. However, progress in restoring our trade relations with Germany is more rapid than with the Entente. The conditions of existence in

Germany are compelling the German people as a whole, including the Black Hundreds and the capitalists, to seek relations with Soviet Russia. Germany is already linked with us by certain trade relations. These links can become closer inasmuch as we are offering Germany agricultural concessions. It is therefore clear that we must advance concessions as an economic method, even irrespective of the measure in which we are able to put the project into effect. The interest in concessions is so obvious that even if we do not succeed in granting a single concession, or none of our agreements are put into effect (and even that is quite possible)—even in that case we shall still have gained something, and we still have to pursue our policy because by so doing we make it more difficult for the imperialist countries to attack us.

Irrespective of this, we must tell all the oppressed peoples that a handful of countries are overtly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously, strangling other peoples—this derives from the Treaty of Versailles—and these peoples are turning to us for help, and are becoming more and more aware of the economic necessity of an alliance with Soviet Russia against international imperialism. Agricultural concessions, therefore, are of a wider scope than the old bourgeois concessions; they are different from the old capitalist concessions. They remain capitalist in character inasmuch as we tell the German capitalists to bring so many tractors into our country, in exchange for which we shall give them so much excellent virgin land and grain. We are attracting capital with the prospect of tremendous profits. In this respect the concessions are a purely capitalist undertaking, but they acquire an immeasurably greater significance because Germany as a nation, Austria and other countries cannot exist because they need aid in food and because the entire people, irrespective of whether the capitalists make a profit of a hundred or two hundred per cent, can, despite anti-Bolshevik prejudices, see that the Bolsheviks are establishing completely different international relations which make it possible for all oppressed peoples to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke. That is why our successes of the last three years will lead to still greater successes in foreign policy during the coming year. Our policy is grouping around the Soviet Republic those capitalist

countries which are being strangled by imperialism. That is why our concessions proposal has more than a capitalist significance; that is why it is a hand held out, not only to the German capitalists with the offer, "Bring us hundreds of tractors and make as much as three hundred per cent on each ruble if you like"; it is a hand held out to oppressed peoples, an alliance of the oppressed masses, which is a factor in the future proletarian revolution. The doubts and fears that still exist in the advanced countries, which assert that Russia could risk a socialist revolution because she is a vast country with her own means of subsistence while they, the industrial countries of Europe, cannot do so because they have no allies—these doubts and fears are groundless. We say: "You now have an ally, Soviet Russia." Since we are granting concessions, this will be an alliance that will consolidate the alliance against world imperialism. This is a postulate that must not be lost sight of, it justifies our concessions policy and proves the need to grant concessions.

And now for several purely economic considerations. I shall now go on to these considerations and read out the stipulations of the law, although I hope that the comrades present here have read the law of November 23. I shall, however, remind you briefly that it says that concessionaires shall be paid with part of the products, that when special technical improvements have been introduced, we are prepared to offer trade advantages, and that the term of concessions will be more or less prolonged, depending on the volume and character of the expenditures involved. We guarantee that property invested in an enterprise shall not be confiscated or requisitioned.

Without such a guarantee owners of private capital and private property will not, of course, enter into relations with us. The question of courts, which was at first raised in the draft agreement, was subsequently removed, since we saw that this was not to our advantage. Thus the judicial authority on our territory remains in our hands. In the event of a dispute, the issue will be settled by our judges. This will be not requisitioning but the lawful exercise of jurisprudence by our judicial bodies.

The fifth clause in the agreement deals with the code of labour laws. In the original draft of the agreement, which

was discussed with Vanderlip, provision was made for the withdrawal of the application of the labour code in localities inhabited by underdeveloped tribes, we cannot say which. In such places no code of labour laws is possible. The labour code was to be replaced in such areas by a special agreement on guarantees for the workers.

In the final clause we guarantee the concessionaire against any unilateral changes. Without this guarantee, there can, of course, be no question of granting concessions. The question of what is meant by non-unilateral changes has, however, been left open. That will depend on the text of the agreement on each individual concession. Arbitration may be possible through some of the neutral powers. This is a point that may lead to differences, and leaves a certain latitude in determining the actual terms of a concession. It should, incidentally, be pointed out that in the capitalist countries the Menshevik leaders of the working class are considered reliable people. They enter bourgeois governments, and it is very difficult for bourgeois governments to challenge such mediators or arbitrators as the Mensheviks or social-traitors of the European countries. Experience has shown, however, that when any serious tension arises, the American and European Mensheviks behave just like the Russian Mensheviks do, i.e., they do not know how to behave, and are obliged to yield to the pressure of the revolutionary masses, though they themselves remain opposed to the revolution. The question remains open; we shall not decide it in advance.

From the terms that I have read out to you, you will see that economic relations between the capitalist concessionaires and the Socialist Republic are far from stable or durable. It is obvious that a capitalist who retains private property and exploitation relations cannot be anything but a foreign body in a socialist republic. Hence one of the main themes in my report: concessions are a continuation of war by other means. I shall deal with that in detail in a moment, but first I want to mention the three main forms or kinds of the concessions.

In this pamphlet we have given a list of the chief concessions; the comrades from the Supreme Council of the National Economy who provided the material for the pam-

phlet and edited it, have appended maps showing these objects. These maps show that the concessions fall into three main groups—first, timber concessions in the Far North, second, agricultural concessions and third, mining concessions in Siberia.

Our economic interest in timber concessions in the Far North of European Russia is obvious; there are tens and even hundreds of millions of dessiatines of forest land which we are quite unable to exploit because we lack the railways, the means of production and the possibility of providing the workers there with food, but which could be exploited by a country that owns a big merchant fleet and could fell and saw timber properly and export it in tremendous quantities.

If we want to trade with foreign countries—and we do want to, because we realise its necessity—our chief interest is in obtaining as quickly as possible, from the capitalist countries, the means of production (locomotives, machinery, and electrical equipment) without which we cannot more or less seriously rehabilitate our industry, or perhaps may even be unable to do so at all, because the machinery needed by our factories cannot be made available. It is with the motive of extra profit that we must attract the capitalist. He will get surplus profit—well, let him have that surplus profit; we shall obtain the fundamentals that will help strengthen us; we shall stand firmly on our own feet, and shall win in the economic field. We shall have to pay up if we want to get the best machinery, etc. What are we to pay with? We still dispose of gold reserves totalling several millions. You will see from the special plan for the electrification of Russia, drawn up for several decades, that this plan, together with the additional work for the rehabilitation of industry, will involve an approximate expenditure of something like 17,000 million gold rubles. Electrification alone will require the direct expenditure of more than 1,000 million rubles in gold. We cannot cover this with our gold reserves; it is extremely undesirable and dangerous for us to export foodstuffs because we have not got sufficient for our own industry, and yet this need has to be met. In this case there is no concession project economically more suitable for us than the forests of the Far North which cover an enormous area, and where the timber is rotting away

and a total loss because we are economically unable to exploit these timber reserves. Timber, however, is of tremendous value on the world market. Besides, the Far North is also convenient politically because it is an outlying border area. This concession is convenient to us both politically and economically, and we must make the best possible use of it. At the Moscow Conference I have told you about,[166] Milyutin said that negotiations with Britain about concessions in the north of European Russia are progressing. There are several scores of millions of dessiatines of standing timber there. If we grant three or five million dessiatines disposed chequerwise, we shall get an opportunity to derive advantage from up-to-date enterprises, an opportunity to learn, by stipulating that our technicians take part in the work; we shall thus gain a lot and make it difficult for capitalist powers that enter into deals with us to take part in military action against us, because war cancels everything, and should one break out we shall get possession of all the buildings, installations and railways. Any possible action against us by new Kolchaks, Denikins and others will not be made the easier.

The second type is agricultural concessions. With the exception of West Siberia with its vast expanses of excellent land, inaccessible to us because of its great distance from railways, there are in European Russia and along the River Ural alone (our Commissariat of Agriculture has taken the necessary steps and has calculated the amount of land we cannot cultivate, which is no less than 3,000,000 dessiatines along the River Ural, abandoned by entire Cossack villages as a result of the victorious culmination of the Civil War) excellent lands that must be brought under the plough, but which we cannot cultivate because of the shortage of draught animals and our weakened productive forces.

The state farms of the Don Region have about 800,000 dessiatines which we cannot cultivate; to cultivate this land we shall need a tremendous number of draught animals or entire tractor columns that we cannot put on the fields, while some capitalist countries, including those that urgently need foodstuffs—Austria, Germany and Bohemia—could put tractors to work and obtain excellent wheat in good season. We do not know to what extent we shall be

able to carry that out. At present we have two tractor plants functioning, in Moscow and Petrograd, but in consequence of the difficult conditions that obtain they cannot produce tractors in large numbers. We could ease the situation by purchasing a greater number of tractors. Tractors are the most important means of effecting a radical change in the old farming methods and of extending the area cultivated. By such concessions we shall show a large number of countries that we are able to develop the world economy on a gigantic scale.

If our propaganda and our proposal do not meet with success, and if our proposal is not accepted, we shall still reap an advantage that is not only political but socialist as well. What is going on in the capitalist world is not only a waste of wealth, but madness and a crime, for in some countries there is a food surplus that cannot be sold because of currency revolutions, since money has depreciated in a number of countries that have suffered defeat. Huge stocks of foodstuffs are rotting away, while tens of millions of people in countries like Germany are actually starving. This absurdity, this crime of capitalism, is becoming obvious to all capitalist countries and to the small countries that surround Russia. To the capitalist countries the Soviet Republic says: "We have hundreds of thousands of dessiatines of excellent land that can be ploughed with tractors; you have the tractors, the petrol and the trained technicians; we propose to all peoples, including the peoples of the capitalist countries, to make the rehabilitation of the economy and the salvation of all peoples from hunger their main object." If the capitalists do not understand this, it is an argument demonstrating the corruption, madness and criminal nature of the capitalist system. That will be of more than mere propaganda value: it will be a communist call for revolution, for it shows beyond doubt that capitalism is falling apart and cannot satisfy the people's needs, a fact that is more and more penetrating into the consciousness of all peoples. An insignificant minority of imperialist countries are growing rich, while a large number of other countries are actually on the verge of ruin. The world economy needs reorganisation, and the Soviet Republic comes forward with a plan of reconstruction, with

the following incontestable business-like, and realisable proposal: "You are starving under capitalism, despite the fabulous wealth of machinery. We can solve the crisis by bringing together your machinery and our raw materials, but the capitalists are in the way. We have proposed to them that they should accept our offer, but they are holding back and wrecking our plan." That is the second type of concession, the agricultural or tractor type.

Mining concessions are the third type. These are indicated on the map of Siberia, with details of each area in which concessions are being considered. Siberia's mineral wealth is literally boundless, and at best, even given significant progress, we cannot exploit even a hundredth part of it for many years. The minerals are to be found in conditions that demand the best machinery. There are such products as copper ore, which the capitalists need badly for their electrical industry because it is in such short supply. It is possible to rehabilitate the world economy and improve the world's technology if they enter into regular relations with us.

It is, of course, more difficult to implement these concessions, i.e., they present greater difficulties than timber or agricultural concessions do. As far as agricultural concessions are concerned, it is only a matter of a brief working period with tractors being used. Timber concessions are also easier, especially as they concern an area we cannot avail ourselves of; but mining concessions are frequently at no great distance from the railways, frequently in densely populated areas. Here the danger is serious and we shall weigh the pros and cons very carefully to see whether or not they should be granted; we shall do so on definite terms, for there is no doubt that concessions are a new kind of war. The capitalists are coming to us to wage a new kind of war—the very existence of the capitalists is in itself a war against the socialist world surrounding them. Capitalist enterprises in a socialist state are in the economic sense a war for freedom of trade, against the policy of compulsory deliveries, a war for private property against a republic that has abolished that property. On this economic basis there develop a variety of relationships (similar to the hostility between the Sukharevka Market[167] and

our institutions). We may be told that we are closing down the Sukharevka black market but opening up a number of other "Sukharevkas" by letting the capitalists in. We have not closed our eyes to this, and say: if we have been victorious till now, if we were victorious when our enemies used every means to disrupt our enterprises, when there was disruption from within combined with that from without, then we must surely be able to deal with such things, to keep an eye on them when they are in certain limited areas and there are definite conditions and relations. We have practical experience of the struggle against military espionage and against capitalist sabotage. We fought against them when they were under cover in our own institutions; surely we shall be able to handle them when the capitalists have been let in according to a definite list and under definite conditions. We know, of course, that they will try to break these conditions, and we shall combat such infractions. But, comrades, concessions on a capitalist foundation means war. Until we have overthrown capital in other countries, and while capital is much stronger than we are, its forces can be sent against us at any time and it can start another war against us. For this reason we have to make ourselves stronger, and to do that we must develop large-scale industry and get our transport going. In carrying this out, we are taking a risk; here we again have relations of warfare, of struggle, and if they try to undermine our policy, we shall fight them. It would be grossly mistaken to think that a peaceful agreement on concessions is a peaceful agreement with capitalists. It is an agreement concerning war, but an agreement that is less dangerous to us, besides being less burdensome for the workers and peasants, less burdensome than at the time when the best tanks and guns were being thrown into action against us; we must therefore use all methods, and, at the cost of economic concessions, develop our economic forces and facilitate our economic rehabilitation. The capitalists will, of course, not honour their agreements, say comrades who are afraid of concessions. It is quite impossible, of course, to be sure that the capitalists will honour agreements. It will be a war, and war is the ultimate argument, which in general remains an argument entering the relations of the socialist republic.

War threatens us at any hour. We are conducting peace negotiations with Poland, and there is every chance that peace will be concluded, or at least, to be more exact, the vast majority of chances are that peace will be concluded. There is no doubt, however, that the Savinkovs and the French capitalists are working to prevent the treaty from being signed. To the capitalists war is possible tomorrow if not today, and they would willingly start a war today if they had not learnt something from three years' experience. Concessions constitute a certain risk; they are a loss; they are the continuation of war. There is no doubt of this, but it is a war that is more to our advantage. When we have obtained a certain minimum of the means of production, locomotives and machines, then we shall be different, in the economic sense, from what we have been till now, and the imperialist countries will be still less dangerous to us.

We have been told that the concessionaires will create exclusive conditions for their workers, and supply them with better clothes, better footwear, and better food. That will be their propaganda among our workers, who are suffering privation and will have to suffer privation for a long time to come. We shall then have a socialist republic in which the workers are poverty-stricken and next to it a capitalist island, in which the workers get an excellent livelihood. This apprehension is frequently voiced at our Party meetings. Of course, there is a danger of that kind, and it shows that concessions are a continuation of war and do not constitute peace. We have, however, experienced far greater deprivations and have seen that workers from capitalist countries nevertheless come to our country, knowing that the economic conditions awaiting them in Russia are far worse; surely, then, we ought to be able to defend ourselves against such propaganda with counter-propaganda; surely we should be able to show the workers that capitalism can, of course, provide better conditions for certain groups of its workers, but that this does not improve the conditions of the rest of the workers. And lastly, why is it that at every contact with bourgeois Europe and America we, not they, have always won? Why is it that to this day it is they who fear to send delegations to us, and not we to them? To this day we have always managed to win over to our side at least

a small part of the delegations, despite the fact that such delegations consisted in the main of Menshevik elements, and that they were people who came to us for short periods. Should we be afraid of being unable to explain the truth to the workers?! We should be in a bad way if we had such fears, if we were to place such considerations above the direct interest which is a matter of the greatest significance as far as concessions are concerned. The position of our peasants and workers remains a difficult one. It must be improved. We cannot have any doubt on that score. I think we shall agree that the concessions policy is a policy of continuation of the war, but we must also agree that it is our task to ensure the continued existence of an isolated socialist republic surrounded by capitalist enemies, to preserve a republic that is infinitely weaker than the capitalist enemies surrounding it, thereby eliminating any possibility of our enemies forming an alliance among themselves for the struggle against us, and to hamper their policies and not give them an opportunity to win a victory. It is our task to secure for Russia the necessary machinery and funds for the restoration of the economy; when we have obtained that, we shall stand so firmly on our own feet that no capitalist enemies can overawe us. That is the point of view which has guided us in our policy on concessions, the policy I have outlined.

2

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS DECEMBER 22

(*Shouts from the hall*: "Long live Comrade Lenin!" *Storm of applause. An ovation.*) Comrades, I have to present a report on the home and foreign policy of the government. I do not think it is the purpose of my report to give you a list of at least the most outstanding or most important laws and measures adopted by the workers' and peasants' government. Nor do I think that you would be interested in an account of the events of this period, or that it is very important that I should give one. As I see it, general conclusions should be drawn from the principal lessons we have learnt during this year, which was no less abundant in abrupt political changes than the preceding years of the revolution were. From the general lessons of this year's experience we must deduce the most urgent political and economic tasks that face us, tasks to which the Soviet government—both through the legislative acts which are being submitted for your examination and endorsement and through the sum total of its measures—at present attaches the greatest hopes and significance, and from the fulfilment of which it expects important progress in our economic development. Permit me, therefore, to confine myself to brief comments on the Republic's international situation and on the chief results of our foreign policy during the past year.

You all know, of course, how the Polish landowners and capitalists forced a war on us under the pressure and at the insistence of the capitalist countries of Western Europe, and not of Western Europe alone. You know that in April

of this year we made peace proposals to the Polish Government, on terms which were incomparably more advantageous to it than the present terms, and that it was only under pressure of dire necessity, after our negotiations for an armistice with Poland had ended in a complete breakdown, that we were obliged to fight. Despite the heavy defeat our forces suffered near Warsaw, as a result of their undoubted exhaustion, this war has ended in a peace that is far more favourable to us than the one we proposed to Poland in April. A preliminary treaty with Poland has been signed, and negotiations are now under way for the conclusion of a final peace treaty. We certainly do not conceal from ourselves the danger presented by the pressure being exerted by some of the more stubborn capitalist countries and by certain Russian whiteguard circles with the aim of preventing these negotiations from ending in a peace. It should, however, be said that the Entente's policy, which aims at military intervention and the armed suppression of the Soviets, is steadily coming to nought, and that we are winning over to our policy of peace a steadily increasing number of states which are undoubtedly hostile towards the Soviets. The number of countries that have signed peace treaties is increasing, and there is every probability that a final peace treaty with Poland will be signed in the immediate future. Thus, another severe blow will be struck at the alliance of the capitalist forces which are trying to wrench the power of government from us by means of war.

Comrades, you also know, of course, that the temporary setbacks we suffered in the war with Poland and the difficulty of our position at certain moments of the war were due to our being obliged to fight Wrangel, who was officially recognised by one imperialist power,[168] and received vast material, military and other aid. To end the war as quickly as possible, we had to effect a rapid concentration of troops so as to strike a decisive blow at Wrangel. You, of course, know what dauntless heroism was displayed by the Red Army in surmounting obstacles and fortifications which even military experts and military authorities considered impregnable. The complete, decisive and remarkably swift victory the Red Army gained over Wrangel is one

of the most brilliant pages in its history. That was how the war forced on us by the whiteguards and the imperialists ended.

It is with far greater assurance and determination that we can now set about a task that is dear to us, an essential task, one that has long been attracting us—that of economic development. We can do so with the assurance that the capitalist tycoons will not find it as easy to frustrate this work as in the past. Of course, we must be on our guard. In no case can we say that we are already guaranteed against war. It is not because of the absence of formal peace treaties that we are still without that guarantee. We are very well aware that the remnants of Wrangel's army have not been destroyed, that they are lying low close at hand, that they are under ward and tutelage, and are being re-formed with the aid of the capitalist powers. We know that the white-guard Russian organisations are working actively to re-create certain military units and, together with Wrangel's forces, to prepare them for a new onslaught on Russia at a favourable moment.

That is why we must maintain our military preparedness under all circumstances. Irrespective of the blows already struck at imperialism, we must keep our Red Army in a state of combat readiness at all costs, and increase its fighting efficiency. The release of a certain section of the army and its rapid demobilisation does not, of course, militate against this. We rely on the tremendous experience gained by the Red Army and its leaders during the war to enable us now to improve its quality. And we shall see to it that although the army is reduced we shall retain a cadre whose maintenance will not entail an undue burden on the Republic, while at the same time, with the reduction in the number of effectives, we shall be in a better position than before, in case of need, to mobilise and equip a still larger military force.

We are certain that all the neighbouring states, which have already lost a great deal by supporting the whiteguard conspiracies against us, have learnt the hard lesson of experience and have duly appreciated our conciliatory spirit, which was generally considered as weakness on our part. Three years of experience have no doubt shown them

that, while we are persistently striving for peace, we are prepared from the military point of view. Any attempt to start a war against us will mean, to the states involved, that the terms they will get following such a war will be worse than those they could have obtained without a war or prior to it. This has been proved in respect of several countries. This is an achievement we shall not forego, one that will not be forgotten by any of the powers surrounding us or in political contact with Russia. Thanks to this, our relations with neighbouring countries are steadily improving. You know that a final peace has been signed with a number of states bordering on the Western frontiers of Russia. These were part of the former Russian Empire, and the Soviet government has unequivocally recognised their independence and sovereignty, in conformity with the fundamental principles of our policy. Peace on such a basis has every chance of being far more durable than is to the liking of the capitalists and certain West-European states.

As regards the Latvian Government, I must say that at one time there was a danger of our relations becoming strained, so much so that the idea even arose of severing diplomatic relations. But the latest report from our representative in Latvia indicates that a change of policy has already taken place, and that many misunderstandings and legitimate causes of dissatisfaction have been removed. There is good reason to hope that in the near future we shall have close economic ties with Latvia, which will naturally be even more useful to us in our trade with Western Europe than Estonia and the other states bordering on the R.S.F.S.R.

I must also say, comrades, that during this year our policy in the East has been very successful. We must welcome the formation and consolidation of the Soviet Republics of Bokhara, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which have not only recovered their complete independence, but have placed the power of government in the hands of the workers and peasants. These republics are proof and corroboration of the fact that the ideas and principles of Soviet government are understood and immediately applicable, not only in the industrially developed countries, not only in those which have a social basis like the proletariat, but also in those which have the peasantry as their basis. The idea

of peasants' Soviets has triumphed. The peasants' power has been assured: they own the land and the means of production. The friendly relations between the peasant Soviet Republics and the Russian Socialist Republic have already been consolidated by the practical results of our policy.

We can also welcome the forthcoming signing of a treaty with Persia,[169] friendly relations with whom are assured by the fact that the fundamental interests of all peoples suffering from the yoke of imperialism coincide.

We must also note that friendly relations with Afghanistan, and still more so with Turkey, are being steadily established and strengthened. As for the latter power, the Entente countries have done everything they could to render impossible any more or less normal relations between her and the West-European countries. This circumstance, coupled with consolidation of the Soviets, is steadily strengthening the alliance and the friendly relations between Russia and the oppressed nations of the East, despite the bourgeoisie's resistance and intrigues and the continuing encirclement of Russia by bourgeois countries. The chief factor in politics today is the violence being used by the imperialists against peoples which have not had the good fortune to be among the victors; this world policy of imperialism is leading to closer relations, alliance and friendship among all the oppressed nations. The success we have achieved in this respect in the West as well, in relation to more Europeanised states, goes to show that the present principles of our foreign policy are correct and that the improvement in our international position rests on a firm basis. We are confident that, by continuing our peace policy and by making concessions (and we must do so if we wish to avoid war), the basic line of our policy and the fundamental interests which stem from the very nature of imperialist policy will come into their own and will make it more and more imperative for the R.S.F.S.R. to establish closer relations with a growing number of neighbouring states, despite the intrigues and machinations of the imperialists, who, of course, are always capable of provoking a quarrel between us and some other state. Such relations are our guarantee that we shall be able to devote ourselves whole-heartedly to economic development and that

we shall be able, for a longer period, to work calmly, steadfastly and confidently.

I must add that negotiations for the conclusion of a trade agreement with Great Britain are now under way. Unfortunately, these negotiations have been dragging out much longer than we would wish, but we are not at all to blame for that. When, as far back as July—at the moment the Soviet troops were achieving their greatest successes—the British Government officially submitted to us the text of an agreement assuring the establishment of trade relations, we replied by giving our full consent, but since then the conflict of the various trends within the British Government and the British state has held this up. We see how the British Government is vacillating, and is threatening to sever relations with us and immediately to dispatch warships to Petrograd. We have seen all this, but at the same time we have seen that, in reply to this threat, Councils of Action have sprung up all over Great Britain. We have seen how, under pressure from the workers, the most extreme adherents of the opportunist trend and their leaders have been obliged to resort to this quite "unconstitutional" policy, one that they had themselves condemned a short while before. It appears that, despite the Menshevik prejudices which have hitherto prevailed in the British trade union movement, the pressure brought to bear by the working people and their political consciousness have become strong enough to blunt the edge of the imperialists' bellicose policy. Continuing our policy of peace, we have taken our stand on the proposals made by the British Government in July. We are prepared to sign a trade agreement at once; if it has not yet been signed, the blame rests wholly with those trends and tendencies in British ruling circles that are anxious to frustrate the trade agreement and, against the will of the majority, not only of the workers but even of the British bourgeoisie, want a free hand to attack Soviet Russia again. That is their affair.

The longer this policy is pursued by certain influential circles in Great Britain, by financial and imperialist circles there, the more it will aggravate the financial situation, the longer it will delay the semi-agreement which has now become essential between bourgeois Britain and the Soviet

Republic, and the nearer it will bring the imperialists to a situation that will oblige them to accept a full agreement, not merely a semi-agreement.

Comrades, I must say that this trade agreement with Great Britain is connected with one of the most important questions in our economic policy, that of concessions. One of the important acts passed by the Soviet government during the period under review is the law on concessions of November 23, this year. You are, of course, all familiar with the text of this law. You all know that we have now published additional material, from which delegates to the Congress of Soviets can obtain full information on this question. We have published a special pamphlet containing, not only the text of the decree but also a list of the chief concessions we are offering: agricultural, timber and mining. We have taken steps to make the published text of this decree available in the West-European countries as early as possible, and we hope that our concessions policy will also be a practical success. We do not in the least close our eyes to the dangers this policy presents to the Socialist Soviet Republic, a country that, moreover, is weak and backward. While our Soviet Republic remains the isolated borderland of the capitalist world, it would be absolutely ridiculous, fantastic and utopian to hope that we can achieve complete economic independence and that all dangers will vanish. Of course, as long as the radical contrasts remain, the dangers will also remain, and there is no escaping them. What we have to do is to get firmly on our feet in order to survive these dangers; we must be able to distinguish between big dangers and little dangers, and incur the lesser dangers rather than the greater.

We were recently informed that, at a Congress of Soviets of Arzamas Uyezd in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, a peasant, not a member of the Party, said on the subject of concessions: "Comrades, we are delegating you to the All-Russia Congress and declare that we peasants are prepared to endure hunger and cold and do our duty for another three years, but don't sell Mother Russia in the form of concessions." I heartily welcome such sentiments, which are very widespread. I think it is highly indicative that during these three years the masses of non-Party working people—not only

industrial workers but peasants as well—have acquired the political and economic experience which enables and compels them to value their liberation from the capitalists above all else, which compels them to exercise redoubled caution and to treat with extreme suspicion every step that involves the possibility of new dangers of the restoration of capitalism. Of course, we give the greatest consideration to all declarations of this kind, but we must say that there is no question of selling out Russia to the capitalists. It is a question of concessions; any concessions agreement is limited to a definite period and by definite terms. It is hedged around with all possible guarantees, by guarantees that have been carefully considered and will be considered and discussed with you again and again, at the present Congress and at various other conferences. These temporary agreements have nothing to do with any selling out. There is not a hint in them of selling Russia. What they do represent is a certain economic concession to the capitalists, the purpose of which is to enable us, as soon as possible, to secure the necessary machinery and locomotives without which we cannot effect the restoration of our economy. We have no right to neglect anything that may, in however small a measure, help us to improve the conditions of the workers and peasants.

We must do all we possibly can to bring about the rapid restoration of trade relations, and negotiations are at present being carried on in a semi-legal framework. We are ordering locomotives and machines in far from adequate numbers, but we have begun to order them. When we conduct these negotiations officially, the possibilities will be vastly expanded. With the aid of industry we shall achieve a great deal, and in a shorter period; but even if the achievements are very great, the period will cover years, a number of years. It must be borne in mind that although we have now gained a military victory and have secured peace, history teaches us that no big question has ever been settled, and no revolution accomplished, without a series of wars. And we shall not forget this lesson. We have already taught a number of powerful countries not to wage war on us, but we cannot guarantee that this will be for long. The imperialist predators will attack us again if there is the

slightest change in the situation. We must be prepared for it. Hence, the first thing is to restore the economy and place it firmly on its feet. Without equipment, without machinery obtained from capitalist countries, we cannot do this rapidly. And we should not grudge the capitalist a little extra profit if only we can effect this restoration. The workers and peasants must share the sentiments of those non-Party peasants who have declared that they are not afraid to face sacrifice and privation. Realising the danger of capitalist intervention, they do not regard concessions from a sentimental point of view, but as a continuation of the war, as the transfer of the ruthless struggle to another plane; they see in them the possibility of fresh attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie to restore the old capitalism. That is splendid; it is a guarantee that not only the organs of Soviet power but all the workers and peasants will make it their business to keep watch and ward over our interests. We are, therefore, confident that we shall be able to place the protection of our interests on such a basis that the restoration of the power of the capitalists will be totally out of the question even in carrying out the concessions agreements; we shall do everything to reduce the danger to a minimum, and make it less than the danger of war, so that it will be difficult to resume the war and easier for us to restore and develop our economy in a shorter period, in fewer years (and it is a matter of a good many years).

Comrades, economic tasks, the economic front, are again and again assuming prominence as the chief and fundamental factor. While studying the texts of the various laws on which I have to report to you, I saw that the vast majority of the measures and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence consist at present of specific, detailed and frequently minute measures connected with this economic activity. You, of course, do not expect me to give you a list of these measures. It would be extremely tedious and quite uninteresting. I should only like to remind you that this is by no means the first time that we are attaching primary importance to the labour front. Let us recall the resolution passed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 29, 1918.[170] That was a time

when Russia was economically dismembered by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk that was forced upon us, and when this extremely rapacious treaty had placed us in an extremely difficult position. It then appeared possible to count on a respite which would create conditions for the restoration of peaceful economic activities, and—although we now know that this respite was a very brief one—the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, in its resolution of April 29, at once focussed all attention on economic development. This resolution, which has not been rescinded and remains one of our laws, provides a proper perspective, enabling us to judge how we approached this task and to what we must now devote greater attention in the interests of our work and in order to complete it successfully.

An examination of this resolution clearly shows that many of the problems we now have to tackle were presented in a clear-cut, firm and sufficiently decisive way as far back as April 1918. Remembering this, we say that repetition is the mother of learning. We are not dismayed by our having to repeat the basic axioms of economic development. We shall repeat them time and again, but see what a difference there is between the declaration of abstract principles in 1918 and the practical economic work that has already been begun. Despite the tremendous difficulties and the constant interruptions in our work, we are approaching closer and closer lo a concrete and practical solution of our economic problems. We shall repeat things over and over again. In constructive work you cannot avoid a vast number of repetitions, or avoid turning back every now and again, testing what you have done, making certain corrections, adopting new methods, and bending every effort to convince the backward and the untrained.

The essential feature of the present political situation is that we are now passing through a crucial period of transition, something of a zigzag transition from war to economic development. This has occurred before, but not on such a wide scale. This should constantly remind us of what the general political tasks of the Soviet government are, and what constitutes the particular feature of this transition. The dictatorship of the proletariat has been successful because it has been able to combine compulsion with

persuasion. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not fear any resort to compulsion and to the most severe, decisive and ruthless forms of coercion by the state. The advanced class, the class most oppressed by capitalism, is entitled to use compulsion, because it is doing so in the interests of the working and exploited people, and because it possesses means of compulsion and persuasion such as no former classes ever possessed, although they had incomparably greater material facilities for propaganda and agitation than we have.

If we ask ourselves what the results of our experience in these three years have been (for it is difficult, on certain fundamental points, to sum up the results of a single year), if we ask ourselves how, after all, our victory over an enemy much stronger than ourselves is to be explained, it must be said that it was because the organisation of the Red Army splendidly embodied the consistency and firmness of proletarian leadership in the alliance of the workers and the working peasantry against all exploiters. What was the reason? Why did the vast masses of the peasantry willingly consent to this? Because they were convinced, though their vast majority were not Party members, that there was no way of salvation except by supporting the Soviet government. It was, of course, not books that convinced them of this, nor was it propaganda. It was all through experience. They were convinced by the experience of the Civil War, in particular by the alliance between our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, which is more closely akin to certain fundamental features of small-scale peasant economy. Their experience of the alliance between these parties of the small property-owners and the landowners and the capitalists, and their experience of Kolchak and Denikin, convinced the peasant masses that no middle course was possible, that the plain and straightforward Soviet policy was the right one, and that the iron leadership of the proletariat was their only means of salvation from exploitation and violence. It has been only because of our ability to convince the peasants of this that our policy of coercion, which is based on this firm and absolute conviction, has met with such tremendous success.

We must now bear in mind that, in going over to the labour front, we are faced with the same problem, under new conditions and on a much wider scale, that confronted us when we were fighting the whiteguards and witnessed a degree of enthusiasm and concentration of energy on the part of the worker and peasant masses such as has never been, and never could have been, displayed in any war in any other state. From their own observations and their knowledge of life, the non-Party peasants, like the Arzamas peasant whose words I have just quoted, did really come to the conclusion that the exploiters are ruthless enemies and that a ruthless state power is required to crush them. We succeeded in rousing unprecedented numbers of people to display an intelligent attitude towards the war, and to support it actively. Never before, under any political regime, has there been even one-tenth of the sympathy with a war and an understanding of it as that unanimously displayed by our Party and non-Party workers and non-Party peasants (and the mass of the peasants are non-Party) under Soviet power. That is the main reason for our having ultimately defeated a powerful enemy. That is corroboration of one of the most profound and at the same time most simple and comprehensible precepts of Marxism. The greater the scope and extent of historical events, the greater is the number of people participating in them, and, contrariwise, the more profound the change we wish to bring about, the more must we rouse an interest and an intelligent attitude towards it, and convince more millions and tens of millions of people that it is necessary. In the final analysis, the reason our revolution has left all other revolutions far behind is that, through the Soviet form of government, it has aroused tens of millions of people, formerly uninterested in state development, to take an active part in the work of building up the state. Let us now consider, from this aspect, the new tasks which confronted us and were expressed in tens and hundreds of decisions passed by the Soviet government during this period; they accounted for nine-tenths of the work of the Council of Labour and Defence (we shall speak of this later), and probably more than half of the work of the Council of People's Commissars, namely, the economic tasks, the elaboration of a single economic plan, the reorganisation of the very

foundations of the economy of Russia, the very foundations of small-scale peasant economy. These tasks require that all members of trade unions, without exception, should be drawn into this absolutely new work, something that was alien to them under capitalism. Now ask yourselves whether we at present have the condition for the rapid and unequivocal success that we had during the war, the condition of the masses being drawn into the work. Are the members of the trade unions and the majority of the non-Party people convinced that our new methods and our great tasks of economic development are necessary? Are they as convinced of this as they were of the necessity of devoting everything to the war, of sacrificing everything for the sake of victory on the war front? If the question is presented in that way, you will be compelled to answer that they are certainly not. They are far from being as fully convinced of this as they should be.

War was a matter which people understood and were used to for hundreds and thousands of years. The acts of violence and brutality formerly committed by the landowners were so obvious that it was easy to convince the people; it was not difficult to convince even the peasants of the richer grain regions, who are least connected with industry, that we were waging war in the interests of the working people, and it was therefore possible to arouse almost universal enthusiasm. It will be more difficult to get the peasant masses and the members of the trade unions to understand these tasks now, to get them to understand that we cannot go on living in the old way, that however firmly capitalist exploitation has been implanted in the course of decades, it must be overcome. We must get everybody to understand that Russia belongs to us, and that only we, the masses of workers and peasants, can by our activities and our strict labour discipline remould the old economic conditions of existence and put a great economic plan into practice. There can be no salvation apart from this. We are lagging behind the capitalist powers and shall continue to lag behind them; we shall be defeated if we do not succeed in restoring our economy. That is why we must repeat the old truths I have just reminded you of, the old truths regarding the importance of organisational

problems, of labour discipline, regarding the immense role of the trade unions—an absolutely exclusive role in this sphere, because there is no other organisation which unites the broad masses; that is why we must not only repeat these old truths, but must with every fibre of our being realise that the transition from military tasks to economic tasks has begun.

We have been completely successful in the military sphere, and we must now prepare to achieve similar successes in tasks which are more difficult and which demand enthusiasm and self-sacrifice from the vast majority of workers and peasants. The conviction that the new tasks are necessary must be instilled in hundreds of millions of people who from generation to generation have lived in a state of slavery and oppression and whose every initiative has been suppressed. We must convince the millions of workers who belong to trade unions but who are still not politically conscious and are unaccustomed to regarding themselves as masters. They must be organised, not to resist the government but to support and develop the measures of their workers' government and to carry them out to the full. This transition will be accompanied by difficulties. Regarded merely as a formulation, it is not a new task; it is a new task insofar as the economic problem is being raised on such a vast scale for the first time; we must realise and remember that the war on the economic front will be more difficult and prolonged. To achieve success on this front, a larger number of workers and peasants must be educated to be self-reliant, active and devoted. This can be done, as is borne out by the experience we have gained in economic development, because the masses fully realise that the misfortunes, cold, hunger and privation have been caused by the inadequacy of our productive forces. We must now transfer all our agitation and propaganda from political and military interests to economic development. We have proclaimed this many times, but insufficiently; it seems to me that the most outstanding measures adopted by the Soviet government during the past year are the creation of the Central Bureau for Production Propaganda of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions,[171] the amalgamation of its work with that of the Chief Committee

for Political Education, and the publication of additional newspapers for the respective industries, which are to devote attention, not only to production propaganda but also to its organisation on a country-wide scale.

The necessity of organising production propaganda on a nation-wide scale follows from the special features of the political situation. It is equally necessary to the working class, the trade unions, and the peasantry. It is absolutely essential to our state apparatus, which we have used far from enough for this purpose. We have a thousand times more knowledge, book knowledge, of how to run industry and how to interest the masses than is being applied in practice. We must see to it that literally every member of the trade unions becomes interested in production, and remembers that only by increasing production and raising labour productivity will Soviet Russia be in a state to win. Only in this way will Soviet Russia be able to shorten by about ten years the period of the frightful conditions she is now experiencing, the hunger and cold she is now suffering. If we do not understand this task, we may all perish, because we shall have to retreat owing to the weakness of our apparatus, since, after a short respite, the capitalists may at any moment renew the war, while we shall not be in a state to continue it. We shall not be able to bring the pressure of the millions of our masses to bear, and in this last war we shall be smashed. That is how the matter stands. Hitherto, the fate of all revolutions, of all great revolutions, has been decided by a long series of wars. Our revolution too is such a great revolution. We have passed through one period of wars, and we must prepare for another. We do not know when it will come, but we must see to it that when it does come we shall be prepared for all contingencies. That is why we must not give up measures of compulsion, and not merely because we are preserving the dictatorship of the proletariat, which the mass of peasants and non-Party workers already understand. They know all about our dictatorship, and it holds out no terrors to them. It does not frighten them. They regard it as a bulwark and a stronghold, that is, something with which they can resist the landowners and capitalists, and without which victory is impossible.

This realisation, this conviction, which has already become deep-rooted among the peasant masses as far as military and political tasks are concerned, must now be extended to economic problems. We may not, perhaps, succeed in bringing about this transition at once. It may, possibly, not be effected without certain vacillations and reversions to the old flabbiness and petty-bourgeois ideology. We must tackle this work with still greater energy and zeal, remembering that we can convince the non-Party peasants and insufficiently class-conscious trade union members, because the truth is on our side, and because it cannot be denied that in the second period of wars we shall not be able to defeat our enemies unless the country's economy is restored. Let us only see to it that the millions take a more enlightened attitude towards the war on the economic front. This is the task of the Central Bureau of Production Propaganda, the task of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the task of all Party workers, the task of all the departments of the Soviet government, the task of all our propaganda, with the help of which we have secured successes of world-wide significance, because our propaganda throughout the world has always told the workers and peasants the truth, while all other propaganda tells them lies. We must now switch our propaganda over to something which is far more difficult and concerns the everyday work of the workers in the factory shop, no matter how difficult the conditions of this work may be, and no matter how strong the memories of the old capitalist system may be, which taught the workers and peasants to mistrust governments. We must convince both workers and peasants that, without a new combination of forces, new forms of state amalgamation, and the new forms associated with compulsion, we shall not cope with our difficulties, and we shall not escape the abyss of economic collapse on the brink of which we are standing—and we have already begun to cope with the situation.

Comrades, I shall now deal with certain facts of our economic policy and the economic problems which seem to me to be characteristic of the present political situation and of the transition now confronting us. I must first mention our agrarian bill, the bill of the Council of People's Commissars for the consolidation and development of

agricultural production and for assistance to peasant farms. This bill was published on December 14 of this year, and before that date the substance and principles of it were communicated to all local officials by wireless.

Arrangements should at once be made to have this bill thoroughly discussed—in the light of local experience (on which it is actually based), and this is being done in the localities—by the Congress and also by the representatives of the local Executive Committees and the departments of the latter. I think that no comrade now doubts the necessity of specific and very energetic measures of assistance—not only in the form of encouragement but also in the form of compulsion—to improve our agricultural production.

Our country has been and still is a country of small peasants, and the transition to communism is far more difficult for us than it would be under any other conditions. To accomplish this transition, the peasants' participation in it must be ten times as much as in the war. The war could demand, and was bound to demand, part of the adult male population. However, our country, a land of peasants which is still in a state of exhaustion, has to mobilise the entire male and female population of workers and peasants without exception. It is not difficult to convince us Communists, workers in the Land Departments, that state labour conscription is necessary. In the discussion of the bill of December 14, which has been submitted for your consideration, I hope that on this point there will not be even a shadow of difference in principle. We must realise that there is another difficulty, that of convincing the non-Party peasants. The peasants are not socialists. To base our socialist plans on the assumption that they are would be building on sand; it would mean that we do not understand our tasks and that, during these three years, we have not learnt to adjust our programmes and carry out our new undertakings with due account of the poverty and often squalor that surround us. We must have a clear picture of the problems that face us. The first task is to unite the Communists working in the Land Departments, draw general conclusions from their experience, grasp what has been done in the localities, and embody it in the legislative acts which will be promulgated at the centre, by government

departments, and by the All-Russia Congress of Soviets. We hope that we shall be able to do that. However, that is only the first step. The second step is to convince the non-Party peasants, yes, the non-Party peasants, because they form the majority and because what we are in a position to do can be done only by making this mass, which is in itself active and full of initiative, realise to a greater degree that the task must be tackled. Peasant farming cannot continue in the old way. While we were able to extricate ourselves from the first period of wars, we shall not extricate ourselves so easily from the second period, and must therefore pay special attention to this aspect.

Every non-Party peasant must be made to understand this undoubted truth, and we are sure that he will understand it. He has not lived through these last six painful and difficult years in vain. He is not like the pre-war muzhik. He has suffered severely, has done a lot of thinking, and has borne many political and economic hardships that have induced him to give up a good deal of their old habits. It seems to me that he already realises that he cannot live in the old way, that he must live in a different way. All our means of propaganda, all the resources of the state, all our educational facilities and all our Party resources and reserves must be devoted in full force to convincing the non-Party peasant. Only then will our agrarian bill—which I hope you will adopt unanimously, with necessary amendments and addenda, of course—be placed on a sound basis. Only when we convince the majority of the peasants and draw them into this work will this measure become just as firm as our policy is. That is because—as Comrade Kurayev has rightly said in an article based on the experience of the Tatar Republic—the working middle peasant and poor peasant are friends of the Soviet government, while the idlers are its enemies. That is the real truth, a truth in which there is nothing socialist, but which is so indisputable and obvious that any village assembly and any meeting of non-Party peasants will understand it, and it will become the conviction of the overwhelming majority of the working peasants.

Comrades, here is what I particularly want to bring home to you now that we have turned from the phase of war

to economic development. In a country of small peasants, our chief and basic task is to be able to resort to state compulsion in order to raise the level of peasant farming, beginning with measures that are absolutely essential, urgent and fully intelligible and comprehensible to the peasant. We shall be able to achieve this only when we are able to convince more millions of people who are not yet ready for it. We must devote all our forces to this and see to it that the apparatus of compulsion, activated and reinforced, shall be adapted and developed for a new drive of persuasion. Another campaign in the war will then end in victory. We are now declaring war on the relics of inertness, ignorance and mistrust that prevail among the peasant masses. We shall achieve nothing by the old methods, but we shall achieve victory by the methods of propaganda, agitation and organised influence which we have learnt. We shall also see to it that, besides decrees being adopted, institutions created and documents written—it is not enough to send orders flying all over the country—all the fields are sown better than before by the spring, and a definite improvement is achieved in small peasant farming. Let it be even the most elementary improvement—the more cautious we are the better—but it must be achieved at all costs and on a mass scale. If we correctly understand the task that faces us, and if we devote our whole attention to the non-Party peasant, and concentrate on this all the skill and experience we have gained during these three years, we shall succeed. And unless we succeed, unless we achieve a practical and massive improvement in small-scale peasant farming, there is no salvation for us. Unless this basis is created, no economic development will be possible and the most ambitious plans will be valueless. The comrades must remember this and must bring it home to the peasants. They must tell the non-Party peasants of Arzamas—and there are about ten or fifteen million of them—that we cannot go on starving and freezing endlessly, for then we shall be overthrown in the next period of wars. This is a state matter; it concerns the interests of our state. Whoever reveals the least weakness, the least slackness in this matter, is an out-and-out criminal towards the workers' and peasants' government; he is helping the landowner and the capitalist. And the landowner

and the capitalist have their armies nearby, holding them in readiness to launch against us the instant they see us weakening. There is no way to strengthen ourselves otherwise than by building up our main bulwark—agriculture and urban industry. These cannot be improved except by convincing the non-Party peasant of the need to do so, by mobilising all our forces to help him, and by actually helping him in practice.

We admit that we are in debt to the peasant. We have had grain from him in return for paper money, and have taken it from him on credit. We must repay that debt, and we shall do so when we have restored our industry. To restore it we need a surplus of agricultural products. That is why the agrarian bill is important, not only because we must secure practical results, but also because around it, as on a focal point, are grouped hundreds of decisions and legislative measures of the Soviet government.

I now pass on to the question of how the basis for our industrial development is being created to enable us to begin restoring Russia's economic forces. In this connection I must first draw your attention—from among the mass of reports which you have received or will receive in the next few days from all the Commissariats—to a passage in the report of our Commissariat of Food. In the next few days each Commissariat will present you with a profusion of figures and reports, which taken together are overwhelming in their abundance. We must extract from them what is most essential to success, however modest it may be, and what is fundamental for the realisation of our economic plan, for the restoration of our economy and our industry. One of these essentials is the state of our food procurements. In the booklet which has been distributed to you—the report of the Commissariat of Food for three years—you will find a table from which I shall read only the totals, and even those in round figures, because reading figures, and particularly listening to figures, is a difficult matter. These are the figures showing the total procurements for each year. From August 1, 1916 to August 1, 1917, 320,000,000 poods were procured; 50,000,000 were procured in the following year, then 100,000,000 and then 200,000,000 poods. These figures—320, 50, 100 and 200—give you the basis of

the economic history of Soviet government, of the work of the Soviet government in the economic field, the preparations for that foundation which, when laid down, will enable us to really start developing. The pre-revolutionary 320,000,000 poods is the approximate minimum without which development is impossible. In the first year of the revolution, with only 50,000,000 poods, there was starvation, cold and poverty. In the second year we had 100,000,000 poods; in the third year, 200,000,000 poods. The total has doubled with each year. According to figures I received yesterday from Svidersky, we had 155,000,000 poods on December 15. We are beginning to stand on our feet for the first time, but with the utmost efforts, with unparalleled difficulties, very often having to accomplish the task without any supplies from Siberia, the Caucasus and the South. At present, with a procurement of over 150,000,000 poods, we can say without any exaggeration that despite the tremendous difficulties, this task has been accomplished. We shall have a total of about 300,000,000 poods, perhaps more. Without such a supply, however, it will be impossible to restore the country's industry; it will be hopeless to expect the revival of the transport system and it will be impossible even to approach the great task of electrifying Russia. There can be no socialist country, no state with a workers' and peasants' government unless, by the joint efforts of the workers and peasants, it can accumulate a stock of food sufficient to guarantee the subsistence of the workers engaged in industry and to make it possible to send tens and hundreds of thousands of workers wherever the Soviet government deems it necessary. Without this there can be nothing but empty talk. Food stocks are the real basis of the economic system. In this we have achieved a signal success. Having achieved this success and with such a reserve, we can set about restoring our economy. We know that these successes have been achieved at the cost of tremendous privation, hunger and lack of cattle fodder among the peasants, which may become still more acute. We know that the year of drought increased the hardships and privations of the peasants to an unparalleled extent. We therefore lay prime stress on the measures of assistance contained in the bill I have referred to. We regard stocks

of food as a fund for the restoration of industry, as a fund for helping the peasants. Without such a fund the state power is nothing. Without such a fund socialist policy is but a pious wish.

We must remember that the production propaganda which we have firmly decided to launch will be supplemented with a different kind of persuasion, namely, bonuses in kind.[172] The law on bonuses in kind has been one of the most important decrees and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence. We were not able to pass this law immediately. If you examine the matter, you will find that ever since April there has been a long chain of decisions and resolutions, and that this law was passed only when, as the result of strenuous efforts on the part of our transport system, we were able to accumulate a food reserve of 500,000 poods. Five hundred thousand poods is a very modest figure. The reports which you no doubt read in *Izvestia* yesterday show that out of these 500,000 poods 170,000 poods have already been expended. As you see the reserve is nothing to boast of, and is far from adequate; nevertheless, we have entered on a road along which we shall advance. It is proof that we are not relying on persuasion alone in the transition to new methods of work. It is not enough to tell the peasants and the workers to maintain the utmost labour discipline. We must also help them; we must reward those who, after suffering tremendous hardships, continue to display heroism on the labour front. We have already created a reserve fund, but it is being utilised in a way that is far from satisfactory. We in the Council of People's Commissars have numerous indications that in practice a bonus in kind often amounts simply to an increase in wages. A good deal still remains to be done in this respect. The work of conferences and of drafting supplementary schemes at the centre must be coupled with very important work of another kind, namely, on the spot and among the masses. When the state not only persuades, but also rewards good workers by creating better living conditions for them, that is something that is not hard to understand; one does not have to be a socialist to understand it, and here we are assured in advance of the sympathy of the non-Party masses of workers and peasants. We have

only to make this idea much more widely known and to organise this work in a more practical way in the localities.

Now with regard to fuel; you will find in Comrade Rykov's theses figures that show the improvement that has been achieved, not only in firewood, but also in oil supplies. Thanks to the great zeal displayed by the workers in the Azerbaijan Republic, the friendly relations we have established with them and the capable managers provided by the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the oil situation is now favourable, so that we are beginning to stand on our own feet in the matter of fuel as well. Coal deliveries from the Donets Basin are being increased from 25,000,000 poods to 50,000,000 poods per month, thanks to the work of the authorised commission which was sent there under the chairmanship of Comrade Trotsky. This commission has decided to send responsible and experienced men to the Donets Basin, and Comrade Pyatakov has now been sent there to take charge.

Thus, to achieve success, we have adopted certain measures with regard to fuel. The Donets Basin, one of the largest sources, is already under our control. In the minutes of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence, decisions may be found relating to the Donets Basin. These make reference to the dispatch of commissions invested with considerable powers and consisting of representatives of the central government and of local officials. We must stimulate work in the localities, and it appears to me that we can do so with the help of these commissions. You will see the results of the work of these commissions, which we shall continue to set up in the future. We must give a definite boost to fuel production, the principal branch of our industry.

I must say that, in the matter of fuel, the hydraulic method of extracting peat is a great achievement. Peat is a fuel we possess in very large quantities, but which we have been unable to utilise till now because of the deplorable working conditions. This new method will enable us to overcome the fuel shortage, which presents one of the greatest dangers on our economic front. We shall not be able to get out of this impasse for many years to come, if we stick to the old methods and do not restore our industry

and transport. The members of our Peat Committee have helped two Russian engineers to perfect this new invention, with the result that the new method is on the verge of completion. We are thus on the eve of a great revolution, which will be an important aid to us economically. It must not be forgotten that we possess vast deposits of peat, which we cannot utilise because we cannot send people to do such back-breaking work. The capitalist system could send people to work under such harsh conditions. In the capitalist state people were driven to work there by hunger, but in the socialist state we cannot consign people to such intolerable work, and nobody will go there voluntarily. The capitalist system did everything for the upper crust. It was not concerned with the lower classes.

We must introduce more machines everywhere, and resort to machine technology as widely as possible. The extraction of peat by the hydraulic method, which has been so successfully promoted by the Supreme Council of the National Economy, makes it possible to extract fuel in vast quantities and eliminates the need for skilled workers, since even unskilled workers can perform the work under this method. We have produced these machines; I would advise the delegates to see the cinema film on peat extraction which has been shown in Moscow and which can be demonstrated for the Congress delegates. It will give you a definite idea of one of the means for coping with the fuel shortage. We have made the machines required for the new method, but we have made them badly. If we send our people abroad, with the establishment of trade with foreign countries, with even the existing semi-legal trade relations, the machines designed by our inventors could be made properly there. The number of these machines and the success gained in this field by the Chief Peat Committee and the Supreme Council of the National Economy will serve as a measure of all our economic achievements. Unless we overcome the fuel shortage, it will be impossible to win on the economic front. Vital success in restoring the transport system will also depend on this.

Incidentally, you have already seen from the theses of Comrades Yemshanov and Trotsky that in this field we have a real plan worked out for a number of years. Order No. 1042 was designed for a period of five years[173]; in five years

we can restore our transport and reduce the number of broken-down locomotives. I should like to stress as probably the most difficult problem the statement made in the ninth thesis, to the effect that this period has already been reduced.

When extensive plans appear, designed for a number of years, sceptics are frequently to be found who say: how can we plan for a number of years ahead? The best we can hope for is to do what is required at the moment. Comrades, we must be able to combine the two things; we cannot work without a long-term plan that envisages important achievements. The truth of this is borne out by the undoubted improvement in the work of the transport system. I draw your attention to the passage in the ninth thesis which says that the period for the restoration of transport was fixed at five years, but it has already been reduced because we are ahead of the schedule. The period is now being fixed at three and a half years. That is the way to work in the other branches of economic activity too. The real and practical task of the Council of Labour and Defence is being steadily reduced to that. We must avail ourselves of the progress of science and practice, and must steadfastly strive to get the plan fulfilled in the localities ahead of schedule, so that the masses will see that the long period separating us from the complete restoration of industry can be reduced in practice. It depends on us. Let us improve our methods in every workshop, in every railway depot, in every sphere, and we shall shorten this period. It is already being reduced. Do not be afraid of long-term plans, for without them you cannot achieve an economic revival; let us devote all our energies in the localities to their fulfilment.

Economic plans must be carried out in accordance with a definite programme, and the increasing fulfilment of this programme must be noted and encouraged. The masses must not only realise, but also feel that the shortening of the period of hunger, cold and poverty depends entirely upon how quickly they fulfil our economic plans. The plans of the various branches of production must be soundly co-ordinated, and linked up so as to constitute the single economic plan we stand in such great need of.

In this connection, we are confronted with the task of unifying the People's Commissariats for the various branches

of the economy under a single economic centre. We have begun to tackle this task and we are submitting for your consideration a decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence regarding the reorganisation of the latter body.

You will examine this project, and I trust that with the necessary amendments it will be adopted unanimously. Its contents are very modest but its significance is great, because we need a body which definitely knows what its position is and unites all economic work; it is on economic work that the chief stress is now being laid.

This has been dealt with in the literature which appeared before and in connection with the Congress, in a pamphlet by Comrade Gusev, which, incidentally, is not as well written as his earlier one. The pamphlet contains a sweeping plan for the organisation of the Council of Labour and Defence, to which it is proposed to transfer many prominent workers, among whom we find the names of Trotsky and Rykov. I would say that we need somewhat fewer flights of fancy like this. We cannot burst out of an apparatus which it has taken three years to build up. We realise its immense shortcomings, of which we shall speak in detail at this Congress. This question has been placed on the agenda; it is one of the most important questions. I am referring to the question of improving the Soviet apparatus. But we must at present act with circumspection, confine ourselves to what is essential, and change our apparatus on the basis of practical experience. Comrade Gusev has derided the project we have submitted and says that we are proposing to add the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to the Council of Labour and Defence. Quite right, we are proposing such a project. In it we assign a very modest place to the Council of Labour and Defence, making it a Commission of Labour and Defence under the Council of People's Commissars. Until now we have been working in the Council of Labour and Defence without any constitution. The powers of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence have been poorly defined; we have sometimes exceeded these powers and acted as a legislative body. But there has never been any conflict on these grounds. Such cases have been settled by immediately referring them to

the Council of People's Commissars. When it became apparent that the Council of Labour and Defence must be converted into a body for the closer co-ordination of economic policy, the question arose how to give legal definition to these relations. There are two plans before us. One of them calls for the demarcation of the competence of the Council of People's Commissars and that of the Council of Labour and Defence. To do this, numerous codifiers must be engaged and reams of paper used, and even then there will be no guarantee that mistakes will not be made.

Let us set about it in a different way. The Council of Labour and Defence has been regarded as something almost equal to the Council of People's Commissars. Let us abandon that idea. Let it be a commission of the Council of People's Commissars. We shall avoid a great deal of friction and shall achieve more rapid practical realisation. If any member of the Council of People's Commissars is dissatisfied, let him bring his complaint before the Council of People's Commissars; it can be summoned in a few hours, as you know. In this way we shall avoid friction between departments and will make the Council of Labour and Defence a rapidly acting body. That is no easy problem. It is bound up with the actual creation of a single economic plan. The problem, for the solution of which we have done something and for which we have been preparing for two years, is to achieve the unification of the Commissariats for the various branches of the economy. That is why I draw your attention to this bill on the Council of Labour and Defence, and I hope that, with the necessary amendments, you will endorse it. The work of uniting these Commissariats will then proceed more smoothly, rapidly, firmly and energetically.

I now come to the last item—the question of electrification, which stands on the agenda of the Congress. You are to hear a report on this subject. I think that we are witnessing a momentous change, one which in any case marks the beginning of important successes for the Soviets. Henceforth the rostrum at All-Russia Congresses will be mounted, not only by politicians and administrators but also by engineers and agronomists. This marks the beginning of that very happy time when politics will recede into the

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

background, when politics will be discussed less often and at shorter length, and engineers and agronomists will do most of the talking. To really proceed with the work of economic development, this custom must be initiated at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and in all Soviets and organisations, newspapers, organs of propaganda and agitation, and all institutions, from top to bottom.

We have, no doubt, learnt politics; here we stand as firm as a rock. But things are bad as far as economic matters are concerned. Henceforth, less politics will be the best politics. Bring more engineers and agronomists to the fore, learn from them, keep an eye on their work, and turn our congresses and conferences, not into propaganda meetings but into bodies that will verify our economic achievements, bodies in which we can really learn the business of economic development.

You will hear the report of the State Electrification Commission, which was set up in conformity with the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of February 7, 1920. On February 21, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy signed the final ordinance determining the composition of the commission, and a number of leading experts and workers, mainly from the Supreme Council of the National Economy, over a hundred of them, and also from the People's Commissariat of Railways and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, are devoting their entire energy to this work. We have before us the results of the work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia in the shape of this small volume which will be distributed to you today or tomorrow.[174] I trust you will not be scared by this little volume. I think I shall have no difficulty in convincing you of the particular importance of this book. In my opinion it is the second programme of our Party. We have a Party programme which has been excellently explained by Comrades Preobrazhensky and Bukharin in the form of a book which is less voluminous, but extremely useful. That is the political programme; it is an enumeration of our objectives, an explanation of the relations between classes and masses. It must, however, also be realised that the time has come to take this road in actual fact and to measure the practical

results achieved. Our Party programme must not remain solely a programme of the Party. It must become a programme of our economic development, or otherwise it will be valueless even as a programme of the Party. It must be supplemented with a second Party programme, a plan of work aimed at restoring our entire economy and raising it to the level of up-to-date technical development. Without a plan of electrification, we cannot undertake any real constructive work. When we discuss the restoration of agriculture, industry and transport, and their harmonious co-ordination, we are obliged to discuss a broad economic plan. We must adopt a definite plan. Of course, it will be a plan adopted as a first approximation. This Party programme will not be as invariable as our real Party programme is, which can be modified by Party congresses alone. No, day by day this programme will be improved, elaborated, perfected and modified, in every workshop and in every volost. We need it as a first draft, which will be submitted to the whole of Russia as a great economic plan designed for a period of not less than ten years and indicating how Russia is to be placed on the real economic basis required for communism. What was one of the most powerful incentives that multiplied our strength and our energies to a tremendous degree when we fought and won on the war front? It was the realisation of danger. Everybody asked whether it was possible that the landowners and capitalists might return to Russia. And the reply was that it was. We therefore multiplied our efforts a hundredfold, and we were victorious.

Take the economic front, and ask whether capitalism can be restored economically in Russia. We have combated the Sukharevka black market. The other day, just prior to the opening of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, this not very pleasant institution was closed down by the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies. (*Applause.*) The Sukharevka black market has been closed but it is not that market that is so sinister. The old Sukharevka market on Sukharevskaya Square has been closed down, an act that presented no difficulty. The sinister thing is the "Sukharevka" that resides in the heart and behaviour of every petty proprietor. This is the "Sukharevka" that must be

closed down. That "Sukharevka" is the basis of capitalism. While it exists, the capitalists may return to Russia and may grow stronger than we are. That must be clearly realised. It must serve as the mainspring of our work and as a condition and yardstick of our real success. While we live in a small-peasant country, there is a firmer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. That must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the cities, knows that we have not torn up the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis, of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, that of modern large-scale production. Only electricity provides that basis.

Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we must clearly realise that. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on the world scale, but also within the country. That is common knowledge. We have realised it, and we shall see to it that the economic basis is transformed from a small-peasant basis into a large-scale industrial basis. Only when the country has been electrified, and industry, agriculture and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then shall we be fully victorious.

We have already drawn up a preliminary plan for the electrification of the country; two hundred of our best scientific and technical men have worked on it. We have a plan which gives us estimates of materials and finances covering a long period of years, not less than a decade. This plan indicates how many million barrels of cement and how many million bricks we shall require for the purpose of electrification. To accomplish the task of electrification from the financial point of view, the estimates are between 1,000 and 1,200 million gold rubles. You know that we are far from being able to meet this sum from our gold reserves. Our stock of foodstuffs is not very large either. We must therefore meet the expenditure indicated in these estimates by means of concessions, in accordance with the plan I have

mentioned. You will see the calculation showing how the restoration of our industry and our transport is being planned on this basis.

I recently had occasion to attend a peasant festival held in Volokolamsk Uyezd, a remote part of Moscow Gubernia, where the peasants have electric lighting.[175] A meeting was arranged in the street, and one of the peasants came forward and began to make a speech welcoming this new event in the lives of the peasants. "We peasants were unenlightened," he said, "and now light has appeared among us, an 'unnatural light, which will light up our peasant darkness'." For my part, these words did not surprise me. Of course, to the non-Party peasant masses electric light is an "unnatural" light; but what we consider unnatural is that the peasants and workers should have lived for hundreds and thousands of years in such backwardness, poverty and oppression under the yoke of the landowners and the capitalists. You cannot emerge from this darkness very rapidly. What we must now try is to convert every electric power station we build into a stronghold of enlightenment to be used to make the masses electricity-conscious, so to speak. All should be made aware of the reason why these small electric power stations, whose numbers run into the dozens, are linked up with the restoration of industry. We have an established plan of electrification, but the fulfilment of this plan is designed to cover a number of years. We must fulfil this plan at all costs, and the period of its fulfilment must be reduced. Here we must have the same thing as was the case with one of our first economic plans, the plan for the restoration of transport—Order No. 1042—which was designed to cover a period of five years, but has now been reduced to three and a half years because we are ahead of the schedule. To carry out the electrification plan we may need a period of ten or twenty years to effect the changes that will preclude any return to capitalism. This will be an example of rapid social development without precedent anywhere in the world. The plan must be carried out at all costs, and its deadline brought nearer.

This is the first time that we have set about economic work in such a fashion that, besides separate plans which have arisen in separate sections of industry as, for instance,

in the transport system and have been brought into other branches of industry, we now have an all-over plan calculated for a number of years. This is hard work, designed to bring about the victory of communism.

It should, however, be realised and remembered that we cannot carry out electrification with the illiterates we have. Our commission will endeavour to stamp out illiteracy—but that is not enough. It has done a good deal compared with the past, but it has done little compared with what has to be done. Besides literacy, we need cultured, enlightened and educated working people; the majority of the peasants must be made fully aware of the tasks awaiting us. This programme of the Party must be a basic book to be used in every school. You will find in it, in addition to the general plan of electrification, separate plans for every district of Russia. Thus every comrade who goes to the provinces will have a definite scheme of electrification for his district, a scheme for transition from darkness and ignorance to a normal life. And, comrades, you can and must compare the theses you have been presented with, elaborate and check them on the spot; you must see to it that when the question "What is communism?" is asked in any school and in any study circle, the answer should contain not only what is written in the Party programme but should also say how we can emerge from the state of ignorance.

Our best men, our economic experts, have accomplished the task we set them of drawing up a plan for the electrification of Russia and the restoration of her economy. We must now see to it that the workers and peasants should realise how great and difficult this task is, how it must be approached and tackled.

We must see to it that every factory and every electric power station becomes a centre of enlightenment; if Russia is covered with a dense network of electric power stations and powerful technical installations, our communist economic development will become a model for a future socialist Europe and Asia. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

3

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS DECEMBER 23

(*Applause.*) Comrades, I must confine myself to a few remarks on the speeches and declarations you have just heard. One of the notes I have received expresses perplexity and asks what is the use of the Congress of Soviets hearing such declarations and speeches. I think most of you will disagree with this opinion. It is no doubt always very useful to have a reminder of what some catchwords, now perhaps quite popular—as set forth by certain parties, sections of which have just made their declarations—may lead to in the present political situation. Take for example the reasoning of the representative of the Menshevik Party, or to be more exact, a certain section of that party. It is not our fault that the Menshevik Party and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, which still preserve their old titles, constitute a conglomeration of heterogeneous parts that are constantly changing camps, which turns them into voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious, accomplices of international imperialism. This is evident from their declarations and speeches at this Congress.

For example, I have been reproached for advancing a new theory about an impending new period of wars. I need not go far back into history to show what my statements were based upon. We have only just finished with Wrangel; but Wrangel's troops exist somewhere, not very far from the frontiers of our Republic, and are biding their time. Therefore, whoever forgets about the danger that is con-

stantly threatening us and will never cease as long as world imperialism exists, whoever forgets about this forgets about our working people's republic. To say to us that we are conducting secret diplomacy; to say that we must wage only a war of defence, at a time when the sword still hangs over us, when to this day, despite the hundreds of offers we have made and the incredible concessions we are prepared to make, not a single big power has concluded peace with us—to say such things means repeating the old phrases of petty-bourgeois pacifism which have long become meaningless. If, in the face of these ever actively hostile forces, we pledged ourselves—as we have been advised to do—never to resort to certain actions which from a military-strategical point of view may prove to be aggressive, we would be, not only fools but criminals. This is whet these pacifist phrases and resolutions lead to. They lead to a situation wherein the Soviets, surrounded by enemies, will be tied hand and foot and thrown to the predators of world imperialism to be torn to pieces.

When, further, we hear talk about the unity of the proletariat and about our disrupting that unity, it is hard not to smile. We in this country have heard about the unity of the proletariat and now see in fact that the unity of the proletariat in the epoch of social revolution can be achieved only by the extreme revolutionary party of Marxism, and only through a relentless struggle against all other parties. (*Stormy applause.*)

Further, we are told about the arming of the whole people; we hear the ABC of the old bourgeois-democratic slogan repeated at a time when a most decisive class struggle is raging among the people.

Yesterday I had the pleasure of being present—regrettably, for only a short while—at a small private conference of non-Party peasant delegates to our Congress and I learned a great deal from their discussion of some of the most burning questions of rural life, the questions of food supplies, of their destitution and want, of which you all know.[176] The most striking impression that I obtained from this discussion was the depth of the struggle between the poor peasants—the real toilers—and the kulaks and idlers. The supreme significance of our revolution lies in

our having helped the lowest sections in the rural districts, the mass of politically the least educated, the mass of the non-Party peasantry, to raise this fundamental question of the social revolution, not only from the theoretical but also from the broad and practical point of view. In all the villages and hamlets throughout our boundless Soviet Russia, people are discussing and finding out who benefits from our political and economic measures. Everywhere, even in the most remote villages, people understand the problem of the working peasantry and the kulaks. Sometimes they accuse each other too heatedly and passionately, but at any rate they look into the matter and realise that it is necessary, imperatively necessary, to help the working peasant and put him on his feet and to repulse all sorties by the insolent kulaks.

The class struggle has become a reality in the rural districts, deep down among the masses of the peasantry; we have been doing all we can to make this struggle a conscious one. And when, after all this, the leaders of a certain special "International" come before us and talk about arming the people, one feels as if one has been transformed into a pupil of a preparatory class on questions of Marxism and socialism. To forget about the class struggle which is raging all over the world means involuntarily aiding the imperialists of the whole world against the fighting proletariat. The arming of the people is the slogan of our enemies; we stand on the basis of an armed class; we have achieved victory on this basis, and on it we will always win. (*Stormy applause.*)

The representatives of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries asked how we could think of such a thing as granting concessions without a special referendum, and why we did not make labour equality the corner-stone of our economic policy (in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' resolution this labour equality was called "rule of labour", while in the Mensheviks' resolution it was paraphrased and called equality between toilers of town and countryside). But what else are these phrases about the "rule of labour" but agitation for the trade unions' independence of the class rule of the proletariat? Jointly with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the whole of the West-European

bourgeois press is showing concern for, and wailing about, this "independence" of the trade unions.

What happened when Martov appeared at the Congress of the Independent Social-Democrats in Halle, where, free of any constraint from the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, which he dislikes, he said everything he wanted to say? A few days later Martov's speech was published in its entirety, as a titbit, in the most reactionary and imperialist newspapers in Britain. These newspapers thanked Citizen Martov for having disclosed the designs of the Bolsheviks. (Incidentally, over there they use Mr., not Citizen as the form of address.) When such speeches are made in the thick of a world-wide struggle against us, what are they but a piece of Entente politics? You may, of course, say that such a presentation of your ideas of the rule of labour, etc., is petty-bourgeois nonsense, but in actual fact, I repeat, it is nothing more and nothing less than a piece of Entente politics. Tomorrow, if there is an agent of the Entente present here, your speech will be sent to all the capitalist countries and there printed in millions of copies, so that your speech, Citizen Dan, may mislead and dupe the politically unintelligent section of the European workers.

Citizen Dan argued that when I spoke about labour discipline, I was advocating only coercion. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party's representative was more explicit and said that I advocated compulsion based on persuasion. Our entire policy is a clear reply to this. We do not claim that we make no mistakes; but please point out these mistakes and show us better ways of doing things. We have heard nothing like that here. Neither the Mensheviks nor the Socialist-Revolutionaries say: "Here there is want, here there is destitution among the peasants and workers; here is the way to get rid of this poverty." No, they do not say anything of the kind. They only say that what we are doing is compulsion. Yes, that cannot be denied. But we ask you, Citizen Dan: Are you for or against? That is the essence, the crux of the matter. Answer categorically: yes or no? "Neither yes nor no," is the reply. You see, they only want to talk about the rule of labour, to say that we are encroaching on the freedom of the peasants. But who are

the peasants? Does not our Soviet Constitution say that the peasants are toilers, working people? We respect such peasants and regard them as the equals and brothers of the workers. Without such a peasantry we could not take a single step in our Soviet policy. Between the working peasantry and the workers there is a fraternal understanding, embodied in our Constitution. But there is another element in the peasantry, the element that constitutes a vast "Sukharevka". I hope that any assembly, even of non-Party people, will be able to see that after careful examination. Do the profiteering peasants represent the working people? This is the crux of the economic problems in the rural districts. The peasants, as petty proprietors, and the workers are two different classes, and we shall abolish the difference between them when we abolish the basis of small-scale production, and create a new basis of gigantic, large-scale, machine production, as I have already pointed out in my report. This is economically inevitable, but the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who spoke here came out with incoherent talk of some kind of labour equality between all the peasants and the workers. These are mere phrases, which are fallacious in terms of economics and are refuted by scientific Marxism. Take our revolution in Siberia and in Georgia, take the experience of the international revolution, and you will see for yourselves that these resonant words about labour equality are false. They are part and parcel of the policy the bourgeoisie is pursuing against us, and nothing more.

Dan has asserted here that, in the offices of the Cheka, there is a document to the effect that the Mensheviks are not to come under the October amnesty; from this Citizen Dan draws the conclusion that the Cheka instructs and controls the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Can we, who are in power, believe a thing like that? Do not the Communists here, who constitute 70 to 80 per cent of all delegates, know that the Cheka is headed by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, a member of the Central Executive Committee and of the Central Committee of the Party, and that in the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee there are six members of the Central Committee of our Party? There are no grounds whatever for

believing that, under these circumstances, the Presidium of the Cheka or its Operations Department instructs and runs the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. That is simply ridiculous. Of course, there is nothing of interest in this, and the representative of the Menshevik Party was simply putting on a comedy. I would, however, like you to take up, in a few days' time, any bourgeois newspaper published in Western Europe or America in half a million or a million copies. There you will find printed in the boldest type that Citizen Dan has disclosed that the Cheka instructs and controls the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

4

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 24[177]

Comrades, in the first place I will say a word or two about the wrong construction that has been put on the question of force. To bring out this wrong construction, I shall read three lines from the minutes of the Eighth Congress.[178]

The whole argument against force was connected with the question of the communes. I think that the slightest use of force in this sphere will be harmful. Attempts have been made to apply this argument—i.e., that it is foolish to resort to force in establishing communes—to the entire question of persuasion and compulsion in general. This is obviously stretching the point, and is wrong. As regards the bill we are introducing and the exchange of opinions that has commenced, I must say that I think that the effort to give the question a more Leftist bias is the least business-like. I saw nothing concrete or business-like in the proposal made by Comrade Khanov, who claimed to belong to the extreme Left. I considered that Comrade Schlichter's advice to refrain from passing the bill, and leave it to the next session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to do so, was most reprehensible. We in the Council of People's Commissars tried to lick the bill into shape as quickly as possible so that the Congress of Soviets, consisting in the main of representatives from the localities, might adopt a final decision. We are threatened with the danger of being too late in conducting this campaign at district level. To

conduct the campaign instructions are needed. It must take at least two or three weeks to draw up such instructions. There can be nothing more injurious than the advice given by Schlichter in his speech on another item of the agenda, regarding the rights of the Gubernia Executive Committees. In substance, the bill proposes that practical measures should at once be taken to assist individual peasant farming, which is the predominating system, and that this assistance should take the form, not only of encouragement but of compulsion as well.

I must say that the bill definitely indicates the measures we have in mind. Clause 11, the most important one, states that the Gubernia Sowing Committees may, under the direction and control of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, issue "compulsory regulations governing the principal methods of mechanical cultivation of the fields and of improving meadows, sowing, and the methods of preserving the natural fertility of the soil". Where are these compulsory regulations to come from? The bill goes on to say that the methods mainly employed by the more efficient farmers should be adopted. What methods should we make compulsory by law? Well-known methods of improving agriculture—these must be made compulsory by law and popularised. At the end we read the following: "It is forbidden to introduce regulations and demands: 1) that will cause a radical change in peasant farming, unless such regulations and demands are proposed by volost congresses, or unless the state supplies the given locality with improved implements and means of production; 2) that are difficult of fulfilment by the household of average means, and 3) that involve risks."

A comrade expressed the opinion that the shortcoming in Comrade Osinsky's report consisted in its being too practical and specific; this, he said, prevented him from presenting the problem properly. On the contrary, the most valuable feature of Comrade Osinsky's report was that he took the bull by the horns and called upon you to set to work and discuss immediate practical questions, such as the question of seeds, of taking measures to prevent seed grain from being consumed. In European Russia this will be much more difficult than in the extremely rich Altai

Region, where, it appears, it is so easy to issue orders. If it is so easy to issue orders there, and if you can achieve practical results by issuing orders, then every gubernia land department—the Altai or any other—will deserve the utmost encouragement.

Unfortunately, this is far from being the case in the poorer gubernias of European Russia. Here, the whole task of the present campaign, like the whole task of our Congress, is to keep this question as far away as possible from all arguments of a general character, which Schlichter and other comrades called upon us to indulge in. I would like to call for a more practical and business-like presentation of questions, and I welcome the turn which Osinsky has given to the matter. Let us discuss the question of seeds. They will be consumed, unless we do something about preserving them. What is the most practical method of doing that? They must be stored in the public granaries, and the peasants must be given guarantees that they will not be tied up by red tape and improperly distributed. We must convince them that our object at present is to put in the safekeeping of the state the quantity of seeds required to sow all the fields. We shall certainly convince the middle peasant of this, because it is an obvious necessity. If any objection is raised, and if some say that they cannot work for Tsyurupa, and try to depict him as some sort of beast of prey, we will say: "Stop joking; give us a straight reply to the question: How do you propose to restore industry?" The peasants must be supplied with agricultural machinery and implements. If the state is to be in a position to meet all requirements and to provide all the necessary agricultural and technical equipment it will need a steadily growing fund. But we are reaching this position very slowly. That is why I think it is wrong to confuse the issue with the tasks of the state farms and collective farms. The collective farms are not an immediate problem. I know that the collective farms are still in such a state of disorganisation, in such a deplorable position, that they deserve the name of alms-houses. I have no objection to the delegates of the Eighth All-Russia Congress impressing on the Council of People's Commissars or the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the necessity of taking special measures to im-

prove the work of the All-Russia Union of Land and Forest Workers. In this respect, this union is a bulwark, if only it unites in its ranks real semi-proletarian elements who are capable of helping us to become real business-like organisers. I have no objection to that whatever.

However, the object of the present bill is a different one. The present condition of the overwhelming majority of the state farms is below the average. We must base ourselves on the individual peasant; we must take him as he is, and he will remain what he is for some time to come, and so it is no use dreaming about going over to socialism and collectivisation at present. We must drop general arguments and discuss the first practical steps we must take this very spring, and no later; only such a presentation of the question will be business-like. To do that, we must at once pass this bill in the form it has been drafted by the Council of People's Commissars, introduce the necessary changes and amendments at once, and not delay matters for a moment.

As for the socialisation of agricultural implements, I think you are best able to judge what compulsory regulations may be issued in the name of the state. I would warn you against that. We already have a law which grants the right to socialise the implements of the rich peasants.[179] In the districts where this can be successfully carried out, complete freedom to municipalise these implements is allowed by this law; however, the methods to be used are not always and everywhere fully established. Therefore, to introduce that into an act whose immediate object is different would create the danger of scattering our forces instead of concentrating on the most urgent tasks and wherever pressure may be needed. Let us rather concentrate all our efforts on what is absolutely urgent, on collecting a sufficient quantity of seeds at all costs so as to ensure that the entire plan of sowing is carried out, and on introducing, on a mass scale, and wherever the toilers, the poor and middle peasants, predominate, improved methods of farming that have been tested by experience. That is the point. The fewer measures of this kind we draw up now, the better, because, by making sure of carrying out a few measures, we shall put on the proper basis the entire machinery for impro-

ving agriculture, and thoroughly convince the peasants that the road we have taken is the right one. If, however, we undertake more than we can do we shall discredit ourselves in the eyes of the peasants. If there are gubernias where more can be done by issuing orders, there is nothing to prohibit that. The bill says: take into account your own peasant experience; consider what you are able to do in the way of collecting livestock and implements. If agricultural implements in good condition are still available in the gubernia, that will be done successfully. However, to apply the law in gubernias where the situation in this respect is far worse and where the peasants are unable to carry out such orders means that the orders will remain a dead letter and will be left hanging in mid-air, as it were; instead of understanding the importance of these measures, the peasants will be disappointed, and that is what I fear most of all for the future. That is why we must first of all start with what is absolutely essential, that is, with preserving the seeds.

Let us now go over to the measures for improving small-peasant individual farming, which are quite feasible and must be discussed immediately, in detail, and here decreed and made compulsory by law, to be enforced by order and compulsion, so that what is passed after repeated discussion shall be carried out without fail. I would propose that we at once set up committees, without waiting until the committees are formed officially at the plenary session of the Congress after the report. This unofficial committee can be set up at once, or at all events some time today. The official committee can be set up later, but it would be a mistake to put this off for a day, or even half a day. We have a total of 2,500 delegates, and I think that at least one-tenth of this number have a practical knowledge of this question, after several years of work; if we have 250, that is, over 25 for each district, since our Republic is divided up into nine agricultural districts, I think this number of representatives is sufficient to enable us to proceed at once to a discussion of the practical questions, the concrete measures we should adopt.

What measures to improve agriculture should be adopted in the various districts? In one district, perhaps, steps

may be taken towards compulsory sowing; in another, perhaps, the ground may be prepared for a more vigorous order, like the one proposed by the comrade who investigated conditions in the Altai Gubernia only this spring. In still another district, perhaps, measures could be taken, with the help of agronomists and non-Party peasants, for more timely ploughing and harrowing. I think we ought at once to form committees and divide the regions into districts, since the same measures cannot be employed in all districts, and devote a half a day or a day to the discussion of questions that are not directly mentioned in the decree, but constitute the most important part of the bill. This bill says: appropriate measures should be taken to convince the non-Party peasants. If we are lagging behind in this respect, then, with the mass agitation which we are developing and will develop a hundred times more vigorously and widely than we have done up to now, we can draw up measures for each district and each gubernia; we shall endeavour to make them successful, and do that no less strenuously than we did when we strove to achieve success in our food policy. In the latter case the task was not so complex: we demanded that the peasants yield up a certain quantity of foodstuffs. Here, however, we are demanding that the peasants introduce on their own farms the changes which the state regards as necessary. The chief thing is to make no mistake in defining these changes. That is the most important thing. The fact that Comrade Kurayev put these questions concretely indicates that he is on the right track; however to go over from this to arguments about the general plan of collectivisation, the role of the state farms, which sometimes play a very nasty role, and the Marxist method of approach to purchases, means dragging us away from the immediately practical affairs, back to general arguments which may be useful, but not at a Congress of Soviets which is to pass a law of supreme importance. To prepare the ground for this step, we must carefully consider what the activities and role of the village Soviets should be. We must carefully consider whether the chairman of a village Soviet is the person to be consulted, since he is mainly responsible for carrying out these measures among the peasants. Will it be useful to combine the functions of chairman

of the village Soviet and of chairman of the Committee of Assistance in one person? I am throwing this out as a suggestion. I would like the comrades who are familiar with the work at district level to pay careful attention to this question. The Committees of Assistance ought to discuss what measures should be made compulsory by law. In discussing this question there is no need to be afraid of non-Party people. We shall carefully weigh all their proposals, and we shall know definitely who is for us and who is against us. Clarity must be achieved in every volost and every village. The demands proposed are quite feasible and, with a certain amount of effort, they can be carried out this spring. I would propose that this conference of the group now adjourn. When you consider that the general debate has ended, we should form committees for the various districts with specific agricultural conditions, and immediately proceed to discuss the question. That will be the proper thing to do from the practical point of view, and will ensure the success of the bill.

5

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON THE REPORT ON ELECTRIFICATION

The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets,

after hearing the report of the Chairman of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia, expresses its thanks, in the first place, to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and also to the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the People's Commissariat of Railways, and particularly to the Commission for the Electrification of Russia for their work in drawing up the plan for the electrification of Russia.

The Congress instructs the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labour and Defence, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and also the other People's Commissariats to complete the elaboration of this plan and to endorse it without fail at the earliest date.

The Congress further instructs the government and requests the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions to take all measures to conduct the widest possible propaganda for this plan and to make the broadest sections of the population in town and countryside familiar with it. The study of this plan must be introduced into all educational establishments in the Republic without exception; every electric power station and every tolerably well organised factory and state farm must become a centre for teaching the principles of electricity and modern industry, a centre of propaganda for the plan of electrification, and of its systematic study.

All persons possessing sufficient scientific or practical knowledge must be mobilised for the purpose of conducting propaganda for the electrification plan and for imparting to others the knowledge necessary to understand it.

The Congress expresses its firm conviction that all Soviet institutions, all Soviets, and all industrial workers and working peasants will exert every effort and shrink from no sacrifice to carry out the plan for the electrification of Russia at all costs, and despite all obstacles.

Published according to
the manuscript

6

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

It is obligatory upon all members of the R.C.P., by the time the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. is held (February 6, 1921):

1) to make the fullest possible study of the plan of electrification;

2) to take measures to ensure the widest and most detailed study of the local plan in every district;

3) to draw up, for the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P., practical proposals:

for methods of making all working people more widely familiar with the plan of electrification,

as well as for ways and means of immediately proceeding with the practical fulfilment of this plan in all its aspects.

Published according to the manuscript

LETTER TO THE WORKERS OF RED PRESNYA DISTRICT OF MOSCOW DECEMBER 25, 1920

Fifteen years ago the proletariat of Moscow raised the banner of revolt against tsarism.[180] This was the culmination in the development of the first working-class revolution against tsarism. The workers suffered defeat and workers' blood was shed in Presnya District. The unmatched heroism of the Moscow workers provided the toiling masses of Russia with a model in the struggle. However, the masses were then as yet too unprepared and too divided, and did not give support to the heroes of Presnya District and Moscow, who had risen up in an armed struggle against the tsarist monarchy of landowners.

The defeat of the Moscow workers was followed by the defeat of the first revolution. For twelve long years the most ferocious reaction maintained by the landowners tormented all the workers and peasants, all the peoples of Russia.

The exploit of the Presnya workers was not useless. Their sacrifices were not in vain. The first breach was made in the edifice of the tsarist monarchy, a breach that slowly but steadily grew wider and undermined the old and medieval order.

The exploit of the Moscow workers deeply agitated the urban and rural working masses, a frame of mind whose impress has persisted despite all persecution.

Prior to the armed uprising of December 1905, the people of Russia had proved incapable of a mass armed struggle against the exploiters.

The December events brought about profound changes in the people. It became transformed. It had gone through its baptism of fire. It had become steeled in the insurrection, and brought forth numerous fighters who triumphed in 1917 and today—despite immense difficulties, the torments of famine, and the destruction caused by the imperialist war—are defending the cause of socialism's world-wide victory.

Long live the workers of Red Presnya District, a detachment in the vanguard of the world working-class revolution!

N. Lenin

Daily Bulletin of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets
No. 5, December 25, 1920

Published according to the *Bulletin* text

NOTES

[1] "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* was written by Lenin in April, and the appendix—on May 12, 1920. It came out on June 8-10, in Russian and almost simultaneously in July in German, English and French. Lenin gave personal attention to the book's type-setting and printing schedule so that it should be published before the opening of the Second Congress of the Communist International, each delegate receiving a copy. Between July and November 1920, the book was re-published in Leipzig, Paris and London, in the German, French and English languages respectively.

The manuscript of the book is subtitled: "An Attempt to Con-. duct a Popular Discussion on Marxist Strategy and Tactics." This subtitle was deleted in all editions published in Lenin's lifetime. In the fourth (Russian) edition of Lenin's *Works*, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* is published according to the first edition, the proofs of which were read by Lenin himself. p. 17

[2] The old *Iskra*—the first illegal Marxist newspaper in Russia. It was founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900, and played a decisive role in the formation of revolutionary Marxist party of the working class in Russia. *Iskra*'s first issue appeared in Leipzig in December 1900, the following issues being brought out in Munich, and then beginning with July 1902—in London, and after the spring of 1903—in Geneva.

On Lenin's initiative and with his participation, the editorial staff drew up a draft of the Party's Programme (published in *Iskra* No. 21), and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., at which the Russian revolutionary Marxist party was actually founded.

Soon after the Second Congress, the Mensheviks, supported by Plekhanov, won control of *Iskra*. Beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* ceased to be an organ of the revolutionary Marxists. p. 22

[3] The reference is to the Mensheviks (who formed the Right and opportunist wing of Social-Democracy in the R.S.D.L.P.), and to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 26

[4] The reference is to the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma, namely, A. Y. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov and N. R. Shagov. At the Duma's session of July 26 (August 8), 1914, at which the representatives of all the bour-

geois-landowner Duma groups approved tsarist Russia's entry into the imperialist war, the Bolshevik Duma group declared firm protest: they refused to vote for war credits and launched revolutionary propaganda among the people. In November 1914 the Bolshevik deputies were arrested, in February 1915 they were brought to trial, and exiled for life to Turukhansk Territory in Eastern Siberia. The courageous speeches made by the Bolshevik deputies at their trial, exposing the autocracy, played an important part in anti-war propaganda and in revolutionising the toiling masses. p. 29

[5] *Longuetism*—the Centrist trend within the French Socialist Party, headed by Jean Longuet. During the First World War of 1914-18, the Longuetists conducted a policy of conciliation with the social-chauvinists. They rejected the revolutionary struggle and came out for "defence of country" in the imperialist war. Lenin called them petty-bourgeois nationalists. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the Longuetists called themselves supporters of the proletarian dictatorship, but in fact they remained opposed to it. In December 1920 the Longuetists, together with the avowed reformists, broke away from the Party and joined the so-called Two-and-a-Half International. p. 29

[6] *Fabians*—members of the Fabian Society, a British reformist organisation founded in 1884. The membership consisted, in the main, of bourgeois intellectuals. The Fabians denied the necessity of the proletariat's class struggle and the socialist revolution, and contended that the transition from capitalism to socialism was possible only through petty reforms and the gradual reorganisation of society. In 1900 the Fabian Society joined the Labour Party. The Fabians are characterised by Lenin in "British Pacifism and British Dislike of Theory" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 260-65) and elsewhere. p. 29

[7] The *Independent Labour Party of Britain* (I.L.P.)—a reformist organisation founded in 1893 by leaders of the "new trade unions", in conditions of a revival of the strike struggle and the mounting movement for British working-class independence of the bourgeois parties. The I.L.P. included members of the "new trade unions" and those of a number of the old trade unions, as well as intellectuals and Petty bourgeoisie who were under the influence of the Fabians. The I.L.P. was headed by James Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald. From its very inception, the I.L.P. took a bourgeois-reformist stand, laying particular stress on parliamentary forms of struggle and parliamentary deals with the Liberals. Lenin wrote of the I.L.P. that "in reality it is an opportunist party always dependent on the bourgeoisie". p. 29

[8] *Ministerialism* (or "ministerial socialism", or else Millerandism)—the opportunist tactic of socialists' participation in reactionary bourgeois governments. The term appeared when in 1899, the

French socialist Millerand joined the bourgeois government of Waldeck-Rousseau. p. 30

[9] The *Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*—a Centrist party founded in April 1917.

A split took place at the Congress of the Independent Social-Democratic Party, held in Halls in October 1920, the majority joining the Communist Party of Germany in December 1920. The Right wing formed a separate party, retaining the old name of the Independent Social-Democratic Party. In 1922 the "Independents" rejoined the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 30

[10] Lenin is referring probably to his article "What Should Not Be Copied from the German Labour Movement", published in the Bolshevik magazine *Prosveshcheniye* in April 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 254-58). Here Lenin exposed the treacherous behaviour of Karl Legien, the German Social-Democrat who in 1912, in addressing the Congress of the U.S.A., praised U.S. official circles and bourgeois parties. p. 34

[11] *Spartacists*—members of the Spartacus League founded in January 1916, during the First World War, under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin. The Spartacists conducted revolutionary anti-war propaganda among the masses, and exposed the expansionist policy of German imperialism and the treachery of the Social-Democratic leaders. However, the Spartacists—the German Left wing—did not get rid of their semi-Menshevik errors on the most important questions of theory and tactics. A criticism of the German Left-wing's mistakes is given in Lenin's works "On Junius's Pamphlet" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 297-305), "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (see Vol. 23, pp. 28-76) and elsewhere.

In April 1917, the Spartacists joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, preserving their organisational independence. After the November 1918 revolution in Germany, the Spartacists broke away from the "Independents", and in December of the same year founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 34

[12] The reference is to Frederick Engels's letter to August Bebel, written on March 18-28, 1875. p. 34

[13] The *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk* was signed between Soviet Russia and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) on March 3, 1918, at Brest-Litovsk and ratified on March 15 by the Fourth (Extraordinary) All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The peace terms were very harsh for Soviet Russia. According to the treaty, Poland, almost all the Baltic states, and part of Byelorussia were placed under the control of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Ukraine was

separated from Soviet Russia, becoming a state dependent on Germany. Turkey gained control of the cities of Kars, Batum and Ardagan. In August 1918, Germany imposed on Soviet Russia a supplementary treaty and a financial agreement containing now and exorbitant demands.

The signing of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was linked with a persistent struggle against Trotsky and the anti-Party group of "Left-wing Communists". It was only through great efforts on the part of Lenin that the peace treaty with Germany was signed. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was a splendid instance of the wisdom and flexibility of Lenin's tactics and skill in working out the only correct policy in an extremely complex situation.

The treaty was a reasonable political compromise. It gave the Soviet state a breathing-space, an opportunity to disband the old decaying army and create the new Red Army, develop socialist construction, and muster strength for the struggle against the counter-revolution at home and military intervention by other countries. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk promoted the struggle for peace among the broad masses of all the warring nations. On November 13, 1918, following the November revolution in Germany, which overthrew the monarchist regime, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee annulled the predatory Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. p. 35

[14] The reference is to the otzovists* and ultimatumists, the struggle against whom developed in 1908, and in 1909 resulted in the expulsion of A. Bogdanov, the otzovist leader, from the Bolshevik Party. Behind a screen of revolutionary phrases, the otzovists demanded the recall of the Social-Democrat deputies from the Third Duma and the cessation of activities in legal organisations such as the trade unions, the co-operatives, etc. Ultimatumism was a variety of otzovism. The ultimatumists did not realise the necessity of conducting persistent day-by-day work with the Social-Democrat deputies, so as to make them consistent revolutionary parliamentarians. They proposed that an ultimatum should be presented to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, demanding their absolute subordination to decisions of the Party's Central Committee, should the deputies fail to comply, they were to be recalled from the Duma. A conference of the enlarged editorial board of the Bolshevik paper *Proletary*, held in June 1909, pointed out in its decision that "Bolshevism, as a definite trend in the R.S.D.L.P., had nothing in common either with otzovism or with ultimatumism". The conference urged the Bolsheviks "to wage a most resolute struggle against these deviations from the path of revolutionary Marxism" (*KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakk syezdou, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*], Part I, 1954, p. 221). p. 35

* The term *otzorist* derives from the Russian verb "otozvat", meaning "to recall".—*Ed.*

[15] On August 6 (19), 1905, tsar's manifesto was made public, proclaiming the law on the setting up of the Duma and the election procedures. This body was known as the Bulygin Duma, after A. G. Bulygin, the Minister of the Interior, whom the tsar entrusted with drawing up the Duma draft. According to the latter, the Duma had no legislative functions, but could merely discuss certain questions as a consultative body under the tsar. The Bolsheviks called upon the workers and peasants to actively boycott the Bulygin Duma, and concentrate all agitation on the slogans of an armed uprising, a revolutionary army, and a provisional revolutionary government. The boycott campaign against the Bulygin Duma was used by the Bolsheviks to mobilise all the revolutionary forces, organise mass political strikes, and prepare for an armed uprising. Elections to the Bulygin Duma were not held and the government was unable to convene it. The Duma was swept away by the mounting tide of the revolution and the all-Russia October political strike of 1905. p. 35

[16] Lenin is referring to the *all-Russia October political strike of 1905*, during the first Russian revolution. This strike, which involved over two million people, was conducted under the slogan of the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy, an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma, the summoning of a Constituent Assembly and the establishment of a democratic republic. The all-Russia political strike showed the strength of the working-class movement, fostered the development of the revolutionary struggle in the countryside, the army and the navy. The October strike led the proletariat to the December armed uprising. Concerning the October strike, see the article by V. I. Lenin "The All-Russia Political Strike" (present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 392-95). p. 35

[17] The "*opposition on principle*"—a group of German Left-wing Communists advocating anarcho-syndicalist views. When the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, which was held in Heidelberg in October 1919, expelled the opposition, the latter formed the so-called Communist Workers' Party of Germany, in April 1920. To facilitate the unification of all German communist forces and win over the finest proletarian elements in the C.W.P.G., the opposition was temporarily admitted into the Communist International in November 1920 with the rights of a sympathising member.

However, the Executive Committee of the Communist International still considered the United Communist Party of Germany to be the only authoritative section of the Comintern. C.W.P.G.'s representatives were admitted into the Comintern on the condition that they merged with the United Communist Party of Germany and supported all its activities. The C.W.P.G. leaders, however, failed to observe these conditions. The Third Congress of the Communist International, which was held in June-July 1921, and wanted solidarity with workers who still followed the C.W.P.G. leaders, resolved to give the C.W.P.G. two months to

call a congress and settle the question of affiliation. The C.W.P.G. leaders did not obey the Third Congress's resolution and thus placed themselves outside the Communist International. Later the C.W.P.G. degenerated into a small sectarian group without any support in the working class. p. 39

[18] *Horner*, *Karl*—Anton Pannekoek. p. 43

[19] *Kommunistische Arbeiterzeitung* (The Communist Workers' Newspaper)—organ of the anarcho-syndicalist group of the German Left-wing Communists (see Note 17). The newspaper was published in Hamburg from 1919 till 1927. Karl Erler, who is mentioned by V. I. Lenin, was Heinrich Laufenberg's pen-name. p. 43

[20] The reference is to the *League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class* organised by V. I. Lenin in the autumn of 1895. The League of Struggle united about twenty Marxist circles in St. Petersburg. It was headed by the Central Group including V. I. Lenin, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. K. Krupskaya, L. Martov, M. A. Silvin, V. V. Starkov, and others; five mernbers headed by V. I. Lenin directed the League's activities. The organisation was divided into district groups. Progressive workers such as I. V. Babushkin, V. A. Shelgunov and others linked these groups with the factories.

The St. Petersburg League of Struggre far the Emancipation of the Working Class was, in V. I. Lenin's words, the embryo of a revolutionary party based on the working-class movement and giving leadership to the class struggle of the proletariat. p. 45

[21] The Congress was held in Moscow from March 29 to April 5, 1920. The Ninth Congress was more numerous than any previous Party congresses. It was attended by 715 delegates—553 of them with full votes, and 162 with deliberative votes representing a membership of 611,978. Represented were the Party organisations of Central Russia, the Ukraine, the Urals, Siberia and other regions recently liberated by the Red Army. Many of the delegates came to the Congress straight from the front.

The agenda of the Congress was as follows: 1. The report of the Central Committee. 2. The immediate tasks of economic construction. 3. The trade union movement. 4. Organisational questions. 5. The tasks of the Communist International. 6. The attitude towards the co-operatives. 7. The change-over to the militia system. 8. Elections to the Central Committee. 9. Miscellaneous.

The Congress was held under the guidance of V. I. Lenin, who was the main speaker on the political work of the Central Committee and replied to the debate on the report. He also spoke on economic construction and co-operation, made the speech at the closing of the Congress, and submitted a proposal on the list of candidates to the Party's Central Committee.

In the resolution "The Immediate Tasks of Economic Development" the Congress noted that "the basic condition of eco-

nomic rehabilitation of the country is a steady implementation of the single economic plan for the coming historical epoch" (*KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*], Part I, 1954, p. 478). The kingpin of the single economic plan was electrification, which V. I. Lenin considered a great programme for a period of 10 to 20 years. The directives of the Ninth Congress were the basis of the plan conclusively drawn up by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (the GOELRO plan) and approved by the All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920.

The Congress paid particular attention to the organisation of industrial management. The resolution on this question called for the establishment of competent, firm and energetic one-man management. Taking its guidance from Lenin, the Congress especially stressed the necessity to extensively enlist old and experienced experts.

The anti-Party group of Democratic Centralists, consisting of Sapronov, Osinsky, V. Smirnov and others, came out against the Party line. Behind a cover of phrases about Democratic Centralism but in fact distorting that principle, they denied the need for one-man management at factories, came out against strict Party and state discipline, and alleged that the Central Committee did not give effect to the principle of collective leadership.

The group of Democratic Centralists was supported at the Congress br Rykov, Tomsky, Milyutin and Lomov. The Congress rebuffed the Democratic Centralists and rejected their proposals.

The Congress gave special attention to labour emulation and communist *Subbotniks*. To stimulate such emulation, the extensive application of the bonus system of wages was recommended. The Congress resolved that May 1, the international proletarian holiday, which in 1920 fell on Saturday, should be a mass Subbotnik organised throughout Russia

An important place in the work of the Congress was held by the question of trade unions, which was considered from the viewpoint of adapting the entire work of the trade unions to the accomplishment of the economic tasks. In a resolution on this question, the Congress distinctly defined the trade unions' role, their relations with the state and the Party, forms and methods of guidance of trade unions by the Communist Party, as well as forms of their participation in commumst construction. The Congress decisively rebuffed the anarcho-syndicalist elements (Shlyapnikov, Lozovsky, Tomsky and Lutovinov), who advocated the "independence" of the trade unions and contraposed them to the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

At a closed meeting held on April 4, the Congress elected a new Central Committee of 19 members and 12 candidate members. The former included V. I. Lenin, A. A. Andreyev, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. I. Kalinin, Y. E. Rudzutak, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), and J. V. Stalin. On April 5 the Congress concluded its work. p. 45

[22] Between the February 1917 Revolution and 1919 inclusively, the Party's membership changed as follows: by the Seventh All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (April 1917) the Party numbered 80,000 members; by the Sixth R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Congress in July-August 1917—about 240,000; by the Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in March 1918—not less than 270,000; by the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in March 1919—313,766 members. p. 47

[23] The reference is to *Party Week*, which was held in accordance with the resolution of the Eighth Congress of thc R.C.P.(B.) on building up the Party's membership. The Party Week was conducted in conditions of the bitter struggle waged by the Soviet state against the foreign intervention and domestic counter-revolution. Party Week was first held in the Petrograd organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), August 10-17, 1919 (the second Party Week was held in Petrograd in October-November 1919); between September 20 and 28 a Party Week was held in the Moscow Gubernia organisation. Summarising the experience of the first Party Weeks, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), held on September 26, 1919, resolved that Party Weeks should be held in cities, the countryside and the army. At the end of September, the Central Committee addressed a circular to all Party organisations pointing out that, as the re-registration and purge of the membership had been accomplished in almost all Party organisations, new members might be enrolled. The Central Committee stressed that during Party Weeks only industrial workers, peasants, and Red Army and Navy men should be admitted into the Party. As a result of Party Weeks, over 200,000 joined the Party in 38 gubernias of the European part of the R.S.F.S.R., more than a half of them being industrial workers. Over 25 per cent of the armed forces' strength joined the Party at the fronts. p. 47

[24] See present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 253-75. p. 52

[25] The *Communist International*—a journal, organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. It was published in Russian, German, French, English, Spanish and Chinese, the first issue appearing on May 1, 1919.

The journal published theoretical articles and documents of the Comintern, including a number of articles by Lenin. It elucidated the fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist theory in connection with problems confronting the international ~orking-class and communist movement and the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. It also waged a struggle against various anti-Leninist tendencies.

Publication of the journal ceased in June 1943 in connection with the resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Comintern's Executive Committee on May 15, 1943, on the dissolution of the Communist International. p. 52

[26] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 110. p. 53

[27] The *Industrial Workers of the World* (*I.W.W.*)—a workers' trade union organisation, founded in the U.S.A. in 1905, and in the main organising unskilled and low-paid workers of various trades. Among its founders were such working-class leaders as Daniel De Leon, Eugene Debs and William Haywood. I.W.W. organisations were also set up in Canada, Australia, Britain, Latin America and South Africa. In conditions of the mass strike movement in the U.S.A., which developed under the influence of the Russian revolution of 1905-07, the I.W.W. organised a number of successful mass strikes, waged a struggle against the policy of class collaboration conducted by reformist leaders of the American Federation of Labor and Right-wing socialists. During the First World War of 1914-18, the organisation led a number of mass anti-war actions by the American working class. Some I.W.W. leaders, among them William Haywood, welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution and joined the Communist Party of the U.S.A. At the same time, anarcho-syndicalist features showed up in I.W.W. activities: it did not recognise the proletariat's political struggle, denied the Party's leading role and the necessity of the proletarian dictatorship, and refused to carry on work among the membership of the American Federation of Labor. In 1920 the organisation's anarcho-syndicalist leaders took advantage of the imprisonment of many revolutionaries and, against the will of the trade union masses, rejected appeal by the Comintern's Executive Committee that they join the Communist International. As a result of the leaders' opportunist policy, the I.W.W. degenerated into a sectarian organisation, which soon lost all influence on the working-class movement. p. 54

[28] From its foundation in 1892, the *Italian Socialist Party* saw a bitter ideological struggle between the opportunist and the revolutionary trends within it. At the Reggio Emilia Congress of 1912, the most outspoken reformists who supported the war and collaboration with the government and the bourgeoisie (Ivanoe Bonomi, Leonida Bissorati and others) were expelled from the party under pressure from the Left wing. After the outbreak of the First World War and prior to Italy's entry into it, the I.S.P. came out against the war and advanced the slogan: "Against war, for neutrality!" In December 1914, a group of renegades including Benito Mussolini, who advocated the bourgeoisie's imperialist policy and supported the war, were expelled from the party. When Italy entered the war on the Entente's side (May 1915), three distinct trends emerged in the Italian Socialist Party: 1) the Right wing, which aided the bourgeoisie in the conduct of the war; 2) the Centre, which united most of party members and came out under the slogan: "No part in the war, and no sabotage of the war" and 3) the Left wing, which took a firmer anti-war stand, but could not organise a consistent struggle

against the war. Tho Left wing did not realise the necessity of converting the imperialist war into a civil war, and of a decisive break with the reformists.

After the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the Left wing of the I.S.P. grew stronger, and the 16th Party Congress held on October 5-8, 1919, in Bologna, adopted a resolution on affiliation to the Third International. I.S.P. representatives took part in the work of the Second Congress of the Comintern. After the Congress Centrist Serrati, head of the delegation, declared against a break with the reformists. At the 17th Party Congress in Leghorn in January 1921, the Centrists, who were in the majority, refused to break with the reformists and to accept all the terms of admission into the Comintern. On January 21, 1921, the Left-wing delegates walked out of the Congress and founded the Communist Party of Italy. p. 66

[29] Soviet rule was established in Hungary on March 21, 1919. The socialist revolution in Hungary was a peaceful one, the Hungarian bourgeoisie being unable to resist the people. Incapable of overcoming its internal and external difficulties, it decided to hand over power for a while to the Right-wing Social-Democrats so as to prevent the development of the revolution. However, the Hungarian Communist Party's prestige had grown so great, and the demands of rank-and-file Social-Democrats for unity with the Communists had become so insistent that the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party proposed to the arrested Communist leaders the formation of a joint government. The Social-Democratic leaders were obliged to accept the terms advanced by the Communists during the negotiations, i.e., the formation of a Soviet government, disarmament of the bourgeoisie, the creation of a Red Army and people'smilitia, confiscation of the landed estates, the nationalisation of industry, an alliance with Soviet Russia, etc.

An agreement was simultaneously signed on the merging of the two parties to form the Hungarian Socialist Party. While the two parties were being merged, errors were made which later became clear. The merger was carried out mechanically, without isolation of the reformist elements.

At its first meeting, the Revolutionary Governmental Council adopted a resolution on the formation of the Red Army. On March 26, the Soviet Government of Hungary issued decrees on the nationalisation of industrial enterprises, transport, and the banks; on April 2, a decree was published on the monopoly of foreign trade. Workers' wages were increased by an average of 25 per cent, and an 8-hour working day was introduced. On April 3, land-reform law was issued, by which all estates exceeding 57 hectares in area were confiscated. The confiscated land, however, was not distributed among the land-starved and landless peasants, but was turned over to agricultural producers' co-operatives and state farms organised after the reform. The poor peasants, who had hoped to get land, were disappointed. This prevented the estab-

lishment of a firm alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, and weakened Soviet power in Hungary.

The Entente imperialists instituted an economic blockade of the Soviet Republic. Armed intervention against the Hungarian Soviet RepubIic was organised, the advance of interventionist troops stirring up the Hungarian counter-revolutionaries. The treachery of the Right-wing Social-Democrats, who entered into an alliance with international imperialism, was one of the causes of the Hungarian Soviet Republic's downfall.

The unfavourable international situation in the summer of 1919, when Soviet Russia was encircled by enemies and therefore could not help the Hungarian Soviet Republic, also played a definite role. On August 1, 1919, as a result of joint actions by the foreign imierialist interventionists and the domestic counter-revolutionaries, Soviet power in Hungary was overthrown. p. 66

[30] See Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, Bd. 18, S. 533. p. 67

[31] The *League of Nations* was an international body which existed between the First and the Second World Wars. It was founded in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference of the victor powers of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of Nations formed part of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, and was signed by 44 nations. The Covenant was designed to produce the impression that this organisation's aim was to combat aggression, reduce armaments, and consolidate peace and security. In practice, however, its leaders shielded the aggressors, fostered the arms race and preparations for the Second World War.

Between 1920 and 1934, the League's activities were hostile towards the Soviet Union. It was one of the centres for the organising of armed intervention against the Soviet state in 1920-21.

On September 15, 1934, on French initiative, 34 member states invited the Soviet Union to join the League of Nations, which the U.S.S.R. did, with the aim of strengthening peace. However, the Soviet Union's attempts to form a peace front met with resistance from reactionary circles in the Western powers. With the outbreak of the Second World War the League's activities came to an end, the formal dissolution taking place in April 1946, according to a decision by the specially summoned Assembly. p. 69

[32] Lenin is referring to a passage from Frederick Engels's letter to F. A. Sorge of November 29, 1886, in which, criticising German Social-Democrat political exiles living in America, Engels wrote that for them the theory was "a credo, not a guide to action" (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 395). p. 71

[33] The reference is to the international socialist conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal (Switzerland).

The *Zimmerwald Conference*, the first international socialist conference, was held on September 5-8, 1915. The *Kienthal Conference*, the second international socialist conference, was held in the small town of Kienthal on April 24-30, 1916.

The Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences contributed to the ideological unity, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, of the Left-wing elements in West-European Social-Democracy, who later played an active part in the formation of Communist parties in their countries and the establishment of the Third, Communist International. p. 72

[34] "*Revolutionary Communists*"—a Narodnik group which broke away from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries after the latter's mutiny in July 1918. In September 1918, they formed the "Party of Revolutionary Communism", which favoured co-operation with the R.C.P.(B.), and pledged support for Soviet power. Their programme, which remained on the platform of Narodnik utopianism, was muddled and eclectic. While recognising that Soviet rule created preconditions for the establishment of a socialist system, the "revolutionary communists" denied the neccssity of the proletarian dictatorship during the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. Throughout the lifetime of the "Party of Revolutionary Communism", certain of its groups broke away from it, some of them joining the R.C.P.(B.) (A. Kolegayev, A. Bitsenko, M. Dobrokhotov and others), and others, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Two representatives of the "Party of Revolutionary Communism" were allowed to attend the Second Congress of the Comintern, in a deliberative capacity, but with no votes. In September 1920, following the Congress decision that there must be a single Communist Party in each country, the "Party of Revolutionary Communism" decided to join the R.C.P.(B.). In October of the same year, the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee permitted Party organisations to enrol members of the former "Party of Revolutionary Communism" in the R.C.P.(B.). p. 72

[35] The *British Socialist Party* was founded in 1911, in Manchester, as a result of a merger of the Social-Democratic Party and other socialist groups. The B.S.P. conducted agitation in the spirit of Marxism; it was "not opportunist and was *really* independent of the Liberals" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 273). However, its small membership and its poor links with the masses gave the B.S.P. a somewhat sectarian character. During the First World War, a bitter struggle developed within the British Socialist Party between the internationalists (William Gallacher, Albert Inkpin, John Maclean, Theodore Rothstein and others), and the social-chauvinists, headed by Hyndman. Within the internationalist trend were inconsistent elements that took a Centrist stand on a number of issues. In February 1916, a group of B.S.P. leaders founded the newspaper *The Call*, which played an important role in uniting the internationalists. The B.S.P.'s annual

conference, held in Salford in April 1916, condemned the social-chauvinist stand of Hyndman and his supporters, who, after the conference, left the party.

The British Socialist Party welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution, its members playing an important part in the "Hands Off Russia" movement. In 1919, the overwhelming majority of its organisations (98 against 4) declared for affiliation to the Communist International. The British Socialist Party, together with the Communist Unity Group formed the core of the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the First (Unity) Congress, held in 1920, the vast majority of B.S.P. local organisations entered the Communist Party. p. 77

[36] The *Socialist Labour Party* was organised in 1903 by a group of the Left-wing Social-Democrats who had broken away from the Social-Democratic Federation. The *South Wales Socialist Society* was a small group consisting mostly of Welsh coal miners. The *Workers' Socialist Federation* was a small organisation which emerged from the Women's Suffrage League and consisted mostly of women.

The Leftist organisations did not join the Communist Party of Great Britain when it was formed (its Inaugural Congress was held on July 31-August 1, 1920) since the Party's programme contained a clause on the Party participation in parliamentary elections and on affiliation to the Labour Party. At the Communist Party's Congress in January 1921, the South Wales Socialist Society and the Workers' Socialist Federation, which had assumed the names of the Communist Workers' Party and the Communist Party respectively, united with the Communist Party of Great Britain under the name of the United Communist Party of Great Britain. The leaders of the Socialist Labour Party refused to join. p. 77

[37] This refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny organised in August 1917 by the bourgeoisie and the landowners, under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the tsarist General Kornilov. The conspirators hoped to seize Petrograd, smash the Bolshevik Party, break up the Soviets, establish a military dictatorship in the country, and prepare the restoration of the monarchy.

The mutiny began on August 25 (September 7), Kornilov sending the 3rd Cavalry Corps against Petrograd, where Kornilov counter-revolutionary organisations were ready to act.

The Kornilov mutiny was crushed by the workers and peasants led by the Bolshevik Party. Under pressure from the masses, the Provisional Government was forced to order that Kornilov and his accomplices be arrested and brought to trial. p. 93

[38] The reference is to the military-monarchist coup d'état, the so-called Kapp *putsch* organised by the German reactionary militarists. It was headed by the monarchist landowner Kapp and Generals Ludendorff, Seeckt and Lüttwitz. The conspirators

prepared the coup with the connivance of the Social-Democratic government. On March 13, 1920, the mutinous generals moved troops against Berlin and, meeting with no resistance from the government, proclaimed a military dictatorship. The German workers replied with a general strike. Under pressure from the proletariat, the Kapp government was overthrown on March 17, and the Social-Democrats again took power. p. 93

[39] The *Dreyfus Case*—a provocative trial organised in 1894 by the reactionary-monarchist circles of the French militarists. On trial was Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the French General Staff, falsely accused of espionage and high treason. Dreyfus's conviction—he was condemned to life imprisonment—was used by the French reactionaries to rouse anti-Semitism and to attack the republican regime and democratic liberties. When, in 1898, socialists and progressive bourgeois democrats such as Emile Zola, Jean Jaurès, and Anatole France launched a campaign for Dreyfus's re-trial, the case became a major political issue and split the country into two camps—the republicans and democrats on the one hand, and a bloc of monarchists, clericals, anti-Semites and nationalists, on the other. Under the pressure of public opinion, Dreyfus was released in 1899, and in 1906 was acquitted by the Court of Cassation and reinstated in the Army. p. 98

[40] "*Soviet pleaders*"—collegiums of advocates established in February 1918, under the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies. In October 1920, these collegiums were abolished. p. 115

[41] On the basis of this directive from Lenin the words "certain members of the Communist Party of Holland" have been substituted everywhere in this volume, in the text of "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* for the expression "Dutch Tribunists". p. 117

[42] The first communist subbotnik was held on April 12, 1919, by railwaymen of the Sortirovochnaya marshalling yards of the Moscow-Kazan Railway. Subbotniks were soon being held at many other enterprises in various cities. The experience of the first communist subbotniks was summed up by V. I. Lenin in *A Great Beginning* (*Heroism of the Workers of the Rear*. "*Communist Subbotniks*") (see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 409-34).

An all-Russia subbotnik was held on May 1, 1920, with over 425,000 people in Moscow alone participating, including V. I. Lenin, who, together with Kremlin army cadets, worked on clearing away building rubble on the territory of the Kremlin.

Lenin's article "From the First Subbotnik on the Moscow-Kazan Railway to the All-Russia May Day Subbotnik" was brought out on May 2, 1920, in a specially published handbill *Pervomaisky Subbotnik*, which was drawn up, set and printed during the May Day subbotnik by the staff of the newspapers *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, *Bednota*, the ROSTA Telegraph Agency,

and by workers at the printing-house of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. p. 123

[43] This speech was made by V. I. Lenin on May 5, 1920, in Teatralnaya Square (now Sverdlov Square), where a parade of the Moscow Garrison troops took place. Petrograd Communists leaving for the Polish front were also present at the parade. p. 127

[44] The *joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, and representatives of Moscow trade unions and factory committees*, held on May 5, 1920, was called in connection with the offensive launched by the whiteguard Poles against Soviet Russia. The session was also attended by 300 worker Communists from Petrograd who were going to the Polish front. A single item was discussed—the position on the Polish front. The session unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the workers and peasants to bend every effort for the defeat of bourgeois-landowner Poland. p. 129

[45] The reference is to the *Conference of the Entente Powers* held at San Remo (Italy) in April 1920. Among questions discussed at the Conference were the draft peace treaty with Turkey, and Germany's observation of the Treaty of Versailles. p. 131

[46] The use of Red Army regular units as labour detachments for construction work was occasioned by the situation in the country during the peaceful respite early in 1920, when any day could bring a resumption of the imperialists' armed intervention. In February 1920, in connection with the formation of the labour army, Lenin pointed out, "The task of the transition from war to peaceful development arises in such peculiar conditions that we cannot disband the army, since we have to allow, say for the possibility of an attack by that selfsame Poland or any of the powers which the Entente continues to incite against us" (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 331-32).

The war that broke out against bourgeois-landowner Poland and Wrangel made necessary the transfer of the labour detachments to a wartime footing. p. 133

[47] Lenin has in view the arrival in Moscow, in March 1919, of Bullitt, on instructions from U.S. President Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George, with the proposal that the Soviet Government should sign a peace with the whiteguard Governments existing at the time on the territory of Russia. A draft of the treaty was drawn up, but then the imperialists, who, in view of the temporary successes of Kolchak's army, hoped that the Soviet Republic would be crushed, refused to continue peace talks. p. 137

[48] The *British trade union delegation* was sent to Russia by decision of the British Trade Unions Congress held in December 1919, for a first-hand study of the economic and political situation in Soviet

Russia. The delegation consisted of: Ben Turner (head of the delegation), Ethel Snowden, Tom Shaw, Robert Williams—from the Labour Party, and Margaret Bondfield, A. Purcell, and H. Skinner, from the trade unions; Charles Roden Buxton and Haden L. Guest were secretaries to the delegation. R. C. Wallhead and Allen Clifford, representing the Independent Labour Party, came to Russia together with the delegation, but were not official members.

V. I. Lenin attached great importance to the delegation's visit to Russia. He instructed the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions to give the delegation a hearty welcome and acquaint them with the life of the Soviet people, so that they could tell the truth about Soviet Russia when they returned home.

The delegation arrived in Petrograd on May 12, 1920, and went to Moscow on May 17. They were warmly welcomed by the working people of Soviet Russia, as representatives of the British working masses. Meetings were held in their honour, as well as a great rally in the Bolshoi Theatre and a parade of the Moscow Garrison. The delegation became acquainted in detail with the life of the Soviet Republic, visited a number of cities along the Volga, went to the front, and took part in *Subbotniks*. The delegation members expressed their determination to strengthen fraternal solidarity between British and Soviet working people, and voiced a protest against any aid, whether overt, or covert, given by Britain to the Polish Government in the new offensive, and against any threat to force Russia to meet Polish demands. The delegation were received by V. I. Lenin on May 26. On their return home, the British workers' delegation published a report on the situation in Russia (see "British Labour Delegation to Russia. 1920. Report". London, 1920). p. 137

[49] Lenin's message of greetings "To the Indian Revolutionary Association" was broadcasted on May 10, 1920, in reply to the resolution of the Assembly of Indian Revolutionaries held in Kabul on February 17, 1920. The Assembly's resolution, which was addressed to Lenin, read as follows: "The Indian revolutionaries express their deep gratitude and their admiration of the great struggle carried on by Soviet Russia for the liberation of all oppressed classes and peoples, and especially for the liberation of India. Great thanks to Soviet Russia for her having heard the cries of agony from the 315,000,000 people suffering under the yoke of imperialism. The mass meeting accepts with joy the hand of friendship and help extended to oppressed India" (*Pravda* No. 108, May 20, 1920). p. 138

[50] "Letter to the British Workers" was published on June 17, 1920, in *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Kommuniitichesky Trud*, and *Gudok*; on the same day it was published in Britain in *The Call*, the weekly of the British Socialist Party. On June 19, the letter was published in *The Workers' Dreadnought*, organ of the Workers' Socialist Federation of England and in the journal *The Russia Outlook*,

and on June 22, in the Labour *The Daily Herald*. Later the "Letter to the British Workers" was repeatedly published both in Russia and abroad. p. 139

[51] Notes to "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions" were received by Lenin from G. V. Chicherin, N. N. Krestinsky, J. V. Stalin, M. G. Rafes, Y. A. Preobrazhensky, N. D. Lapinsky, and I. Nedelkov (N. Shablin), representative of the Bulgarian Communists, as well as from a number of leaders in Bashkiria, Kirghizia, and Turkestan. Along with correct ideas, the notes contained certain grave errors. Thus, Chicherin gave a wrong interpretation to Lenin's theses on the necessity of support for national liberation movements and on agreements with the national bourgeoisie, without due regard for Lenin's distinction between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. With regard to this Lenin wrote: "I lay *greater* stress on the alliance with the *peasantry* (which does *not quite* mean the bourgeoisie)" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U.). Referring to the relations between the future socialist Europe and the economically underdeveloped and dependent countries, Preobrazhensky wrote: "...if it proves impossible to reach economic agreement with the leading national groups, the latter will inevitably be suppressed by force and economically important regions will be compelled to join a union of European Republics." Lenin decisively objected to this remark: "...it goes too far. It cannot be proved, and it is wrong to say that *suppression* by force is "inevitable". That is radically wrong" (see *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* [*Problems of the C.P.S.U. History*] 1958, No. 2, p. 16).

A grave error was made by Stalin, who did not agree with Lenin's proposition on the difference between federal relations among the Soviet republics based on autonomy, and federal relations among independent republics. In a letter to Lenin, dated June 12, 1920, he declared that in reality "there is no difference between these two types of federal relations, or else it is so small as to be negligible". Stalin continued to advocate this later, when, in 1922, he proposed the "autonomisation" of the independent Soviet republics. These ideas were criticised in detail by Lenin in his article "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", and in his letter to members of the Political Bureau "On the Formation of the U.S.S.R" (see present edition, Vol. 36, and *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 496-98). p. 144

[52] As a result of the revolution which commenced in Finland on January 27, 1918, the bourgeois government of Svinhufvud was overthrown and the working class assumed power. On January 29, the revolutionary government of Finland, the Council of People's Representatives was formed by Edvard Gylling, Yrjö Sirola, Otto Kuusinen, A. Taimi and others. The following were among the most important measures taken by the workers' government: the law on the transfer to landless peasants, without indemnification,

of the land they actually tilled; tax-exemption for the poorest sections of the population; the expropriation of enterprises whose owners had fled the country; the establishment of state control over private banks (their functions being assumed by the State Bank).

On March 1, 1918, a treaty between the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic and the R.S.F.S.R. was signed in Petrograd. Based on the principle of complete equality and respect for the sovereignty of the two sides, this was the first treaty in world history to be signed between two socialist countries.

The proletarian revolution, however, was victorious only in the south of Finland. The Svinhufvud government concentrated all counter-revolutionary forces in the north of the country, and appealed to the German Kaiser's government for help. As a result of German armed intervention, the Finnish revolution was put down in May 1918, after a desperate civil war. White terror reigned in the country, thousands of revolutionary workers and peasants were executed or tortured to death in the prisons.

p. 147

[53] As a result of mass action by the Lettish proletariat and peasantry against the German invaders and the counter-revolutionary government of Ulmanis, a provisional Soviet government was established in Latvia on December 17, 1918, which issued a Manifesto on the assumption of state power by the Soviets. Soviet Russia gave fraternal help to the Lettish people in their struggle to establish Soviet rule and strengthen the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Under the leadership of the Latvian Communist Party and the Latvian Soviet Government, a Red Army was formed, the landed estates were confiscated, the banks and big commercial and industrial enterprises were nationalised, social insurance and an eight-hour working day were introduced, and a system of public catering for working people was organised.

In March 1919, German troops and the whiteguards, armed and equipped by the U.S. and the Entente imperialists, attacked Soviet Latvia. In May they captured Riga, the capital of Soviet Latvia. After fierce fighting the entire territory of Latvia had been overrun by the interventionists by the beginning of 1920. The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie established a regime of bloody terror, thousands of revolutionary workers and peasants being killed or thrown into prison. p. 147

[54] Lenin is referring to the article by J. Marchlewski "The Agrarian Question and World Revolution" published in the journal The Communist International No. 12, July 20, 1920. Lenin read the article before the issue appeared. p. 152

[55] *G. L.*—György Lukács (b. 1885). After 1919 he was several times elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Hungary. In the early twenties made Left-sectarian

mistakes. Author of a number of works on philosophy, aesthetics, history, and the theory of literature. p. 165

[56] *B. K.*—Béla Kun (1886-1939), an outstanding figure in the Hungarian and the international working-class movement; one of the founders and leaders of the Communist Party of Hungary. p. 165

[57] Called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the *Second All-Russia Conference of Organisers Responsible for Rural Work* was held in Moscow from June 10 to 15, 1920. It was attended by gubernia, uyezd and volost organisers for rural work, a total of over 300 delegates from 61 gubernias. The third meeting of the Conference, held on June 12, was addressed by Lenin. M. I. Kalinin greeted the delegates on behalf of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

A report on the activities of the Department for Rural Work under the Party's Central Committee was made by V. I. Nevsky. The Conference adopted a resolution on this report; it stressed the importance of Party work in the countryside, and expressed the firm confidence that "the Department for Rural Work will unswervingly carry out the directive of the Party's Ninth Congress, on improving agitation and propaganda work among the peasantry" (see *Rezolutsii Vtorogo Vserossiiskogo Soveshchaniya rabotnikov v derevne*. [*Resolutions of the Second All-Russia Conference of Party Rural Workers*], Moscow, 1920, pp. 4-5). Reports from the various localities were also heard, and organisational and other matters discussed. The Conference adopted an appeal "To All Workers of the World", greeting the British, Hungarian, Italian and other workers who had decided to prevent the dispatch of troops and military supplies to help bourgeois-landowner Poland in her war against Soviet Russia. p. 168

[58] Lenin is referring to the Declaration by the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars addressed to the Government of Poland and the Polish people, made on January 28, 1920, and the Appeal of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to the Polish people on February 2, 1920. p. 168

[59] The reference is to the declaration of the Entente's Supreme Council "On the Temporary Eastern Borders of Poland", made on December 8, 1919, and published on June 11, 1920, in the newspaper *Izvestia* No. 125. p. 169

[60] *National Democrats* ("*Narodowa Democracya*")—the main reactionary and nationalist party of the Polish landowners and bourgeoisie, founded in 1897 and closely connected with the Catholic church. The National Democrats advanced the slogans of "class harmony" and "the national interests", trying to influence the masses and draw them into the wake of their reactionary policy. They propagated extreme militant nationalism and chauvinism

as a means of struggle against the socialist and democratic movement of the Polish people, which they strove to isolate from the Russian revolutionary movement. During the First World War (1914-18) the National Democrats unreservedly supported the Entente, counting on the victory of tsarist Russia, the unification of the Polish territories then under the yoke of Austria and Germany, and autonomy for Poland within the framework of the Russian Empire. The downfall of tsarism drove the National Democrats towards a pro-French orientation. Though bitterly opposed to the October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet state, the National Democrats, following their traditional anti-German policy, did not always support the adventurist anti-Soviet foreign policy of the Pilsudski clique, which ruled the country after 1926. At present, separate National-Democrat groups are carrying on their activities among reactionary émigré elements. p. 173

[61] The *Polish Socialist Party* (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*, the P.S.P.)— a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. Throughout its history, Left-wing groups arose in it under the influence of the worker rank and file in the party. Some of these groups subsequently joined the revolutionary wing of the Polish working-class movement. p. 173

[62] *Vsevobuch*—the universal military training of the population of the Soviet Republic. The question of organising the *Vsevobuch* was raised in the resolution "On War and Peace" adopted by the Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), which was held in March 1918. The resolution said that one of the most important and urgent tasks of the Party was the all-round, systematic and universal military training of the adult population, irrespective of sex. The Decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of April 22, 1918, authorised the calling up of all citizens between the ages of 18 and 40, who did not exploit the labour of others. The *Vsevobuch* bodies were entrusted with the registration of all working people of military age, their unified military training, and the formation army units. On June 5-25 1918, the first conference on universal military training was held; it drew up a programme for the training and testing of *Vsevobuch* instructors and discussed the organisation of *Vsevobuch* departments, the calling of conferences on the military training and the registration of the population. The conference also adopted a resolution on permanent bureaus of *Vsevobuch* conferences and the statute of inspections. p. 178

[63] Lenin is referring to the resolution adopted by the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) "On the Attitude to the Co-operatives" (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov*, *konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [*The C P S.U in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses*, *Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*], Part I, 1940, pp. 340-42). p. 181

[64] Lenin is quoting from Marx's work "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie" (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 385). p. 190

[65] The *American Socialist Party* was formed in July 1901 at a congress held in Indianapolis, as the result of a merger of groups that had broken away from the Socialist Workers' Party and the Social-Democratic Party of the U.S.A. Among the new party's organisers was Eugene Debs, a popular figure in the U.S. labour movement. The social composition of the party was not uniform, it contained native-born and immigrant workers, as well as small farmers and people of petty-bourgeois origin. The Centrist and the Right-wing opportunist leaders of the party (Victor Berger, Morris Hillquit and others) denied the necessity of the proletarian dictatorship, renounced revolutionary methods of struggle, and reduced all party activities to participation in election campaigns. During the First World War (1914-18) three trends appeared in the Socialist Party: the social-chauvinists, who supported the imperialist policy of the Administration, the Centrists, who opposed the imperialist war only in word, and the revolutionary minority, who took an internationalist stand and struggled against the war.

The Socialist Party's Left wing, headed by Charles Ruthenberg, William Foster, William Haywood and others, relying on the proletarian elements, waged a struggle against the party's opportunist leadership, for independent proletarian action and the formation of industrial trade unions based on the principles of the class struggle. In 1919 a split took place in the Socialist Party. The party's Left wing broke away, bccoming the initiator and nucleus of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. At present the Socialist Party is a small sectarian organisation. p. 197

[66] The *Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland* (known as the *Swiss Socialist Party*) was formed in the seventies of the last century and affiliated to the First International. The party was re-formed in 1888. The opportunists were very influential in the party, and during the First World War took a social-chauvinist stand. In the autumn of 1916, the Party's Right wing broke away to form their own organisation. The majority, headed by Robert Grimm, took a Centrist, social-pacifist stand, while the Left wing of the party adhered to an internationalist stand. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia influenced and strengthened the Left wing which, in December 1920, broke away and joined the Communist Party of Switzerland in 1921 (see Note 69). p. 197

[67] "Draft (or the Theses) of the R.C.P.'s Reply to a Letter from the German Independent Social-Democratic Party" (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 337-44). p. 198

[68] The *Turin section* accused the Italian Socialist Party with its conciliatory leadership, of failing to give a correct analysis of events, in the conditions of the revolutionary upsurge in Italy

(1919-20) that had created the possibility of the seizure of political power by the proletariat, and of having failed to advance any slogan acceptable to the revolutionary masses, and expel the reformists from its ranks. The section made a number of practical proposals: the expulsion of the opportunists from the party; the formation of communist groups in each factory, in the trade unions, co-operatives, and army barracks, the setting-up of factory T.U. committees to organise control of production in industry and agriculture. The section demanded that work to prepare the working masses for the creation of Soviets should be begun at once. p. 199

69 In October 1918, part of the Social-Democrat Left wing united to form the *Communist Party of Switzerland*. It was not a big party at the time, being represented by two delegates at the Second Congress of the Comintern.

In December 1920, the Left wing of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party broke away from it, and raised the question of forming a strong section of the Communist International in Switzerland. At a congress held in Zurich in March 1921, attended by 28 delegates from the Communist Party and 145 delegates representing the former Left wing of the Social-Democratic Party, the two groups officially united to form a single Communist Party of Switzerland. p. 200

70 "Reply to a Letter from the Joint Provisional Committee for the Commlmist Party of Britain" was broadcasted and published in English in *The Call* (No. 224, July 22, 1920), organ of the British Socialist Party. The reply was also read to the Congress of British Communists, which took place on July 31-August 1 1920. p. 202

71 The reference is to the *Paris Peace Conference* called after the First World War of 1914-18. Its deliberations ended in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Among the questions discussed was that of Poland's boundaries. The temporary eastern frontiers of Poland were arbitrarily established by decision of the Allies' Supreme Council on December 8, 1919. p. 203

72 The reference is to Lenin's proposals regarding the reply to the Curzon Note of July 12, 1920. These proposals were accepted by the Central Committee Plenum on July 16, 1920. p. 205

73 The *First Congress of the Communist International* was held on March 2-6, 1919, in Moscow. Fifty-two delegates attended, 34 with the right to vote and 18—with voice but no vote. The following Communist and Socialist parties, organisations and groups were represented: the Communist Parties of Russia, Germany, German Austria, Hungary, Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia, Estonia, Armenia, of the German colonies in Russia, the Swedish Left Social-Democratic Party, the Nor-

wegian Social-Democratic Party, the Swiss Social-Democratic Party (Opposition), the Revolutionary Balkan Federation, the United Group of the Eastern Tribes of Russia, the French Zimmerwaldian Left, the Czech, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, British, French, and Swiss Communist groups, the Dutch Social-Democratic Party, the American League of Socialist Propaganda, the American Socialist Labour Party, the Chinese Socialist Labour Party, the Korean Workers' League, the Turkestan, Turkish, Georgian, Azerbaijan and Persian Sections of the Central Bureau of Eastern Nations and the Zimmerwald Commission.

The first meeting of the Comintern passed a decision "to consider this meeting as an international communist conference", and adopted the following agenda: 1) the inauguration, 2) reports, 3) the platform of the international communist conference, 4) bourgeois democracy and prolotarian dictatorship, 5) the Berne Conference and the attitude towards socialist trends, 6) the international situation and the policy of the Entente, 7) the Manifesto, 8) the White terror, 9) elections to the Bureau, and various organisational questions.

The conference, whose work centred on Lenin's theses and report on bourgeois democracy and proletarian dictatorship, unanimously expressed solidarity with Lenin's theses and adopted a decision to refer them to the Bureau for dissemination in the various countries. The conference also adopted a resolution tabled by Lenin, in addition to the theses.

On March 4, after the theses and the resolution on Lenin's report had been adopted, the conference decided to constitute itself as the Third International, and to take the name of the Communist International. On the same day a rosolution was unanimously passed to consider the Zimmerwald Left dissolved, and the Comintern platform was approved, on the following main principles: 1) the inevitability of the capitalist social system being replaced by a communist system; 2) the necessity of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle to overthrow bourgeois governments; 3) the abolition of the bourgeois state and its replacement by a state of a new type, i.e., the state of the proletariat, of the Soviet type, which will ensure the transition to a communist society.

One of the most important documents of the Congress was the Manifesto to the world proletariat, which declared that the Communist International was the successor of Marx's and Engels's ideas as expressed in the Communist Manifesto. The Congress called upon the workers of the world to support Soviet Russia, and demanded non-interference by the Entente in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic, the withdrawal of the interventionist troops from Russian territory, recognition of the Soviet state, the raising of the economic blockade, and the resumption of trade relations.

In its resolution on "The Attitude Towards the 'Socialist' Parties and the Berne Conference", the Congress condemned the attempts to re-establish the Second International, which was "an instrument of the bourgeoisle only", and declared that the revolutionary proletariat had nothing in common with that conference.

The establishment of the Third, Communist International played a tremendous part in restoring links between the working people of many countries, in forming and consolidating Communist partles, and in exposing opportunism in the working-class movement. p. 206

[74] The *Amsterdam "International" of yellow trade unions* (the International Federation of Trade Unions) was established by reformist trade union leaders of a number of countries, at a conference held in Amsterdam on July 26-August 2, 1919. The trade union organisations of 14 countries merged to form this federation, viz., Britain, France, Germany, the U.S.A., Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Spain. The reactionary trade union leaders of Britain and France were predominant in the Amsterdam International of trade unions, whose entire activities were connected with the policies of the opportunist parties of the Second International. The Amsterdam International came out in favour of the proletariat's collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and rejected revolutionary forms of the proletariat's struggle. The leaders of the Amsterdam International pursued a policy of splitting the working-class movement, excluded Left-wing trade unions from the organisation, and rejected all proposals by the Red International of Labour Unions for joint action against capital, the threat of war, reaction and fascism, and to establish world-wide trade union unity. The leaders of the Amsterdam International supported the anti-Soviet policy of the ruling circles of the imperialist states.

During the Second World War the Amsterdam International's activities ceased. p. 209

[75] The *Red International of Labour Unions* (the *Profintern*)—an international organisation of revolutionary trade unions. It was organised in 1921, and existed till the end of 1937. It amalgamated trade union centres which had not entered the reformist Amsterdam International of trade unions, i.e., the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the Unitary General Confederation of Labour of France, the national revolutionary trade union centres of Australia, Belgium, Holland, Indonesia, Ireland, Canada, China, Colombia, Korea, Lithuania, Mongolia, Iran, Peru, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia, Chile and Estonia, as well as opposition groups and trends within the reformist trade unions in a number of capitalist countries. The Red Trade Union International waged a struggle for unity in the trade union movement, on the basis of a revolutionary struggle, in defence of the demands of the working class, against capital and fascism, against the danger of imperialist war, and for solidarity with the working class of Soviet Russia. p. 210

[76] This article was proposed by Lenin at a sitting of the commission of the Comintern Second Congress on July 25, 1920, during

the discussion of his theses on the terms of admission into the Communist International. Both the commission and the Congress approved the article. Lenin's theses entitled "The Terms of Admission into the Communist International" and published before the Congress met contained 19 articles. The Congress adopted 21 articres, the last article reading as follows: "Party members who reject in principle the obligations and theses laid down by the Communist International shall be expelled from the Party.

"This shall also apply to delegates to extraordinary Party congresses." p. 212

[77] The *Second Congress of the Communist International* met from July 19 to August 7, 1920. The opening session was held in Petrograd and the subsequent sessions in Moscow. It was attended by over 200 delegates who represented workers ' organisations of 37 countries. Apart from delegates representing the Communist parties and organisations of 31 countries, there were delegates from the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Socialist parties of Italy and France, Industrial Workers of the World (Australia, Britain and Ireland), the National Confederation of Labour of Spain and other organisations.

Lenin directed all the preparatory work before the Congress. At its first session he made a report on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International. Throughout the Congress, in his reports and speeches, Lenin fought uncompromisingly against the opportunist Centrist parties, who were attempting to penetrate into the Third International, and levelled sharp criticism at the anarcho-syndicalist trends and "Left" sectarianism of a number of communist organisations. Lenin took part in the work of various commissions and delivered reports and speeches on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International, the national and the colonial questions, the agrarian question and the terms of admission into the Communist International. Lenin's theses on the fundamental tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International, the national and the colonial questions, the agrarian question and the terms of admission into the Communist International were endorsed as Congress decisions.

The Second Congress laid the foundations of the programme, organisational principles, strategy and tactics of the Communist International. p. 213

[78] This international organisation was being set up at the time by the Centrist socialist parties and groups which had left the Second International under pressure from the revolutionary masses. The International Union of the Socialist Parties, as the new organisation was officially called was formed at a conference in Vienna in February 1921 and; was also known as the Two-and-a-Half or Vienna International. Professing opposition to the Second International, the leaders of the Two-and-a-Half International actually pursued the same opportunist and splitting

policy on the most important questions of the proletarian movement and tried to make the new organisation a counter-balance to the growing innuence of the Communists among the workers. Lenin wrote, "The gentlemen of the Two-and-a-Half International pose as revolutionaries; but in every serious situation they prove to be counter-revolutionaries because they shrink from the violent destruction of the old state machine; they have no faith in the forces of the working class" (see present edition, Vol. 33, "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise").

In May 1923 the Second International and the Two-and-a-Half International united to form the so-called Labour and Socialist International. p. 223

[79] *Guild socialists*—a reformist trend in the British trade unions, which arose before the First World War. They denied the class character of the state and sowed illusions among the workers that it was possible to get rid of exploitation without the class struggle, by establishing, on the basis of the existing trade unions, special associations of producers, so-called guilds whose federation was to take over industrial management. In this way the guild socialists hoped to build socialism.

After the October Socialist Revolution the Guild socialists stepped up their propaganda, contraposing the "theory" of guild socialism to the ideas of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the 1920s guild socialism lost all its influence on the British workers. p. 233

[80] The reference is to the American Federation of Labor and the British Labour Party.

The *American Federation of Labor* was formed in 1881, on the guild principle. In the main it organised the labour aristocracy. The reformist A.F.L. Ieaders denied the principles of socialism and the class struggle, preached "class co-operation" and championed the capitalist system. They followed a splitting policy in the international working-class movement, giving active support to the aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists. In 1955 the A.F.L. merged with the C.I.O. p. 236

[81] See pp. 198-99 in this volume. p. 236

[82] See p. 89 in this volume. p. 236

[83] The commission on the national and the colonial questions, formed by the Second Congress of the Communist International, included representatives of the Communist parties of Russia, Bulgaria, France, Holland, Germany, Hungary, the U.S.A., India, Persia, China, Korea and Britain. The work of the commission was guided by Lenin, whose theses on the national and the colonial questions were discussed at the fourth and fifth sessions of the Congress, and were adopted on July 28. p. 240

[84] The *Basle Manifesto* was adopted by the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress held in Basle on November 24-25, 1912. It gave a warning against the imminent world imperialist war, whose predatory aims it unmasked, and called upon the workers of all countries to wage a determined fight for peace and "to pit against the might of capitalist imperialism the international solidarity of the proletariat". The Manifesto denounced the expansionist policy of the imperialist countries and urged socialists to fight against all oppression of small nations and manifestations of chauvinism. p. 245

[85] The terms of admission into the Communist International were first discussed by a commission appointed by the Congress. The commission included representatives of the Communist parties of Russia, Germany, Bulgaria, the U.S.A., Hungary, Austria, Holland, the Irish I.W.W., the Left wing of the Socialist Party of Switzerland and the French Communist group. In its work the commission proceeded from Lenin's theses "The Terms of Admission into the Communist International". Lenin also worked on the commission. The terms of admission into the Communist International were discussed at three Congress sessions, July 29 and 30, and were adopted on August 6. p. 246

[86] Lenin is referring to the German Social-Democratic Party's programme which was adopted at its congress in Erfurt in October 1891. This programme marked an advance over the Gotha Programme of 1875, since it was based on the Marsist thesis that the capitalist mode of production was doomed and would be inevitably replaced by the socialist mode of production; it stressed the need for the working class to wage a political struggle and defined the party's role as leader in that struggle, but it too made serious concessions to opportunism. Engels gave a profound criticism of the draft of the programme in his work "*Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891*" (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, Bd. 22, S. 225-40). In fact, Engels criticised the opportunism of the entire Second International. However, in working out the final version of the programme, the German Social-Democratic leaders concealed Engels's criticism from the Party rank and file and disregarded his most important remarks. According to Lenin, the fact that the Erfurt Programme made no mention of the dictatorship of the proletariat was the main defect in the programme, and a cowardly concession to opportunism. p. 246

[87] See *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*), Part I, 1954, p. 39. p. 247

[88] The question of the Communist Party's affiliation to the Labour Party was dealt with during the discussion on Lenin's theses on

the fundamental tasks of the Communist International, at the closing session of the Congress on August 6. Following Lenin's speech the majority (58 votes against 24, with 2 abstentions) approved affiliation. The Labour leaders, however, refused to grant membership to the Communist Party. p. 257

[89] Lenin wrote this letter in connection with the Austrian Communist Party's decision to boycott parliamentary elections. On September 1,1920, the Party Conference decided to participate in the elections. The Party's election campaign was conducted under the slogan of the revolutionary unity of the working class. p. 267

[90] The radio message of the correspondent of the London *Daily News* Mr. Segrue was published in *Pravda* No. 202, September 12, 1920, along with Lenin's reply. In his message, Segrue pointed out that some socialists who had visited Soviet Russia had published anti-Soviet articles, and asked Lenin to comment on this. p. 273

[91] The *Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)*, held in Moscow from September 22 to September 25, 1920, was attended by 241 delegates (116 with the right to vote and 125 with voice but no vote). Among the items on the agenda were: the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee; the immediate tasks of Party development; a report of the commission in charge of the Party history studies, and a report on the Second Congress of the Communist International. The Conference also heard a report from the Polish Communists' delegate. Lenin opened the Conference, delivered the Central Committee's political report, and took the floor during the debate on the immediate tasks of Party development. The political report dealt mainly with the two subjects—the question of war and peace with Poland, and the organisation of Wrangel's defeat. The Conference passed a unanimous resolution on the conditions of peace with Poland, and approved the statement by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the specific peace terms drawn up on Lenin's instructions and edited by Lenin. The resolution on "The Immediate Tasks of Party Development" provided for practical measures to extend inner-Party democracy, strengthen Party unity and discipline, combat red tape in government and economic bodies and improve the communist training of young Party members. The Conference deemed it necessary to set up a Control Commission, to be elected at Party congresses, and Party commissions under gubernia Party committees, to be elected at gubernia Party conferences. The Conference gave a rebuff to the "Democratic Centralism" group, who denied Party discipline and the Party's guiding role in the Soviets and the trade unions. p. 275

[92] The Council of Action was set up at a joint conference of representatives from the Parliamentary Committee of the trade unions, the Labour Party Executive Committee and the Parliamentary

Labour Party on August 9, 1920. Its aim was to prevent Britain making war on Russia. Besides the Central Council of Action in London, local councils of action were also set up. There were 150 councils by the end of August, the figure doubling within the next month. The Communist Party was largely instrumental in getting councils organised. It called upon its members to extend Communist representation in the councils and to win key positions on the strike committees in order to "withstand any attempts by trade union and Labour leaders to frustrate the desires of the rank and file, by capitulating at the crucial moment" (*The Communist* No. 2, London, August 12, 1920). p. 277

[93] The letter was published in *Die Rote Fahne*, organ of the Communist Party of Germany, *l'Humanité*, organ of the Socialist Party of France and *The Communist*, organ of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in the period from September to November 1920. p. 280

[94] The *Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League* took place in Moscow between October 2 and 10, and was attended by some 600 delegates. Lenin addressed the Congress at the first session in the evening of October 2. p. 283

[95] Lenin is referring to *Proletcult*, a cultural and educational organisation which arose in September 1917 as an independent workers' organisation. After the October Revolution Proletcult, whose leadership fell into the hands of Bogdanov and his supporters, continued to insist on independence, thus setting itself in opposition to the proletarian state. This led to the infiltration of bourgeois intellectuals, who began to exert a decisive influence on Proletcult. Its members actually denied the cultural legacy of the past, neglected cultural and educational work among the masses, isolated themselves from life and aimed at setting up a special "proletarian culture". Bogdanov, the chief Proletcult ideologist, paid lip service to Marxism, but actually preached subjective idealism, Machism. Besides bourgeois intellectuals who held leading positions in many organisations, Proletcult also included young workers who sincerely wished to promote cultural development in the Soviet state. Proletcult organisations had their heyday in 1919. In the early 1920s they began to decline, ceasing to exist in 1932. p. 287

[96] This was the *Third All-Russia Congress of Leather Industry Workers*. It was held in Moscow between October 2 and 6, 1920, and was attended by some 300 delegates. It discussed the tasks of the trade unions, a report by the Central Committee of the Leather Industry Workers' Union, the organisation of management in leather industry, wages policy, labour protection, the cultural and educational work of the union, organisational questions, etc. Lenin spoke at the first sitting of the Congress. p. 300

[97] Lenin is referring to the speech made by the Polish Communist Uljanowski at the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 303

[98] The *Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence* was formed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 30, 1918. Its task was to implement the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of September 2, 1918, which proclaimed the country a military camp. The Council of Defence was an extraordinary organ brought into being by the extremely difficult situation in the country. It was vested with full powers to mobilise manpower and resources for the country's defence. Lenin was appointed Chairman of the Council.

Decisions of the Council were binding on all central and local bodies and all citizens of the Soviet Republic. The Council became the main military, economic and planning body of the Republic during the foreign intervention and the Civil War. The Revolutionary Military Council and other military bodies were brought under its control.

Early in April 1920, it was reorganised as the Council of Labour and Defence. By a decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, adopted in December 1920, it was vested with the rights of a commission of the Council of People's Commissars and set the task of co-ordinating the work of all departments in the shere of economic development. It existed until 1937. p. 312

[99] Lenin drew up this draft resolution for the First All-Russia Congress of Proletcult, which met in Moscow from October 5 to October 12, 1920. When the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party discussed the question of Proletcult on October 9 and 11, it proceeded from Lenin's draft resolution. It was proposed to the Communist group of the Congress that it pass a resolution putting central and local Proletcult organisations under the control of the People's Commissariat of Education. The resolution was in keeping with Lenin's ideas and was unanimously approved by the Congress. However, after the Congress, some Proletcult leaders began to voice disagreement with the resolution and misinterpreted it to the rank and file, alleging that the Central Committee of the Communist Party was hamstringing the workers in the sphere of the arts and aiming at dissolving Proletcult. The Central Committee of the Party refuted these demagogical insinuations in its letter "On Proletcult Organisations" which gave a detailed analysis of Proletcult mistakes. The letter was published in *Pravda* No. 270 on December 1, 1920. p. 316

[100] On October 8, 1920, *Izvestia* reported Lunacharsky as saying in his speech at the Proletcult Congress that Proletcult must be assured a special status and complete autonomy. Recalling this episode, Lunacharsky wrote in his reminiscences: "At the time of the Proletcult Congress in October 1920, Vladimir Ilyich instructed me to attend it and pointed out quite definitely that

Proletcult should be subordinated to the People's Commissariat of Education, should regard itself as one of its institutions, and so on. In short, he wanted us to bring Proletcult closer to the state. At the same time, he took steps to bring it closer to the Party. I spoke at the Congress in a rather non-committal and conciliatory way, and the version sent to Vladimir Ilyich was even milder. He summoned me and gave me a good talking-to." p. 316

[101] The conference was held between October 15 and 17, 1920, and was attended by some 3,000 delegates. Following Lenin's report a resolution was passed expressing satisfaction with the signing of a peace with Finland and a preliminary truce with Poland. It also recognised as correct the peaceful policy of the Soviet Government which "has set out to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russian and Polish workers and peasants and to spare the Russian and Polish working people the hardships and privations of a winter campaign". The conference went on record that "the immediate task in winning a lasting peace is the complete rout of surviving bands in the South" and urged the working people of Russia "to give all possible help to the fronts and to bend every effort to wipe out Wrangel" (*Pravda* No. 231, October 16, 1920). The conference also discussed the organisation of aid for the Western front, the food situation, labour and cart service, and education. p. 318

[102] Lenin is referring to a Note from the U.S. Secretary of State B. Colby to the Italian Government, on the attitude of the U.S. Administration towards Soviet Russia. The Note was published in *Izvestia* No. 198 of September 8, 1920. p. 320

[103] Lenin is referring to the *First Congress of the Peoples of the East*, which was held in Baku between September 1 and 7, 1920, and attended by 1,891 delegates representing 37 nationalities (1,273 delegates were Communists). On the national and the colonial questions the Congress expressed solidarity with the relevant resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist International. p. 329

[104] Under the armistice and the preliminary conditions of peace signed in Riga on October 12, 1920, between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland on the other, the latter received the western regions of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. The parties to the treaty undertook to abstain from giving support to hostile activities directed against any of the parties, and disclaimed indemnities. The Soviet Government also agreed to return to Poland the cultural treasures appropriated by the tsarist government. p. 331

[105] The reference is to a speech made by the peasant Belayev, who said that the lynx (world capital) was lying low waiting for a clash between the goat and the ram (the workers and the peasants). p. 334

[106] Lenin sent the manuscript of this article to the editors of the journal The Communist International in Petrograd. On the next day he informed the editors that he had sent the article, and requested them to register, check up and set the material (everything to be returned to me)" (Central Party Archives at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U.). He himself read and made a number of corrections in the proofs, which he had received from Petrograd.

A large part of the article was taken by Lenin from his pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party* which he wrote in 1906 (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276). He used Chapter V of the pamphlet entitled "A Sample of Cadet Smugness". p. 340

[107] See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 373-74. p. 341

[108] See present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 374-92 and 393-421. p.341

[109] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was a daily published in Cologne under the editorship of Marx, from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849. The editorial board consisted of Frederick Engels, Wilhelm Wolff, Georg Weerth, Ferdinand Wolff, Ernst Dronke, Ferdinand Freiligrath and Heinrich Burgers. This militant organ of the proletarian wing of democracy did much to educate the masses and rouse them for struggle against the counter-revolution. Most of the leading articles defining the newspaper's stand on the key problems of the German and European revolution were written by Marx and Engels.

Despite police persecution, the newspaper boldly championed the interests of revolutionary democracy and the proletariat. Publication of the newspaper was discontinued following Marx's deportation from Prussia in May 1849 and reprisals against other editors. p. 345

[110] Karl Marx, "Die Krisis und die Konterrevolution" (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1959, Bd. 5, S. 402). p. 345

[111] This refers to the All-Germany National Agsembly convened after the March 1848 revolution in Germany in Frankfort-on-the-Main in May of the same year. The Assembly faced the task of putting an end to the political fragmentation of Germany and of drawing up a constitution for all Germany. Due to the cowardice and the vacillation of its Liberal majority, and the irresoluteness and inconsistency of the petty-bourgeois Left wing, the Assembly did not dare to assume supreme power in the country and failed to take a resolute stand on the major questions of the German revolution of 1848-49. It did nothing to alleviate the position of the workers and peasants and did not support the national liberation movement in Poland and Bohemia, but approved the policy of oppression of subject peoples pursued by Austria and Prussia. The deputies did not have the courage to mobilise the

people for the defeat of the counter-revolutionary offensive and the defence of the Imperial Constitution which they had framed in March 1849.

Shortly afterwards the Austrian and then the Prussian governments recalled their deputies, and the Liberal deputies of other German states followed suit. The remaining deputies,who belonged to the petty-bourgeois Left wing, had the Assembly moved to Stuttgart. In June 1849 the Assembly was disbanded by the troops of the Württemberg Government. p. 345

[112] See Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1959, Bd. 5, S 40. p. 346

[113] On January 9, 1905, over 140,000 St. Petersburg workers carrying gonfalons and icons, marched to the Winter Palace to submit a petition to the tsar. The march was staged by the priest Gapon, an agent of the secret police, at a time when the strike of the Putilov workers, which began on January 3 (16), had already spread to the other factories in the city. The Bolsheviks exposed Gapon's venture, warning the workers that the tsar might unleash a massacre. The Bolsheviks were right. On orders from the tsar, the troops met the demonstrating workers, their wives and children with rifle shots, sabres and Cossack whips. More than a thousand workers were killed and five thousand wounded. January 9, or Bloody Sunday as it came to be known, sparked off the 1905 Revolution. p. 346

[114] See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 131-32. p. 346

[115] See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 216-17. p. 347

[116] Lenin is referring to the daily newspaper *Nasha Zhizn* (Our Life) which was published at intervals in St. Petersburg, from November 6 (19), 1904 to July 11 (24), 1906. p. 347

[117] *Brentanoism*—a political trend originated by the German bourgeois economist Lujo Brentano (1844-1931), who preached "class peace" in capitalist society and maintained that it was possible to eliminate social contradictions without the class struggle and that the labour question could be settled and the interests of the workers and the capitalists reconciled through the establishment of reformist trade unions, and factory legislation. p. 355

[118] *Bez Zaglaviya* (Without a Title)—political weekly published in St. Petersburg from January 24 (February 6) to May 14 (27), 1906. It was edited by Prokopovich, who worked in close cooperation with Kuskova, Bogucharsky, Khizhnyakov and others. The *Bez Zaglaviya* supporters formed a semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik group of Russian bourgeois intellectuals who, under the guise of non-partisanship, propagated the ideas of bourgeois liberalism

and opportunism, and supported revisionists in tho Russian and international Social-Democratic movement. p. 356

[119] Lenin is referring to the disagreements in the Social-Democrat group of the German Reichstag over the shipping subsidies (*Dampfersubvention*). Late in 1884 Bismarck, in pursuance of the expansionist colonial policy, demanded from the Reichstag that it approve subsidies to shipping companies for establishing regular shipping routes to East Asia, Australia and Africa. The Left wing of the Social-Democratic group led by Bebel and Liebknecht rejected the subsidies, but the Right wing, under Auer, Dietz and others, which constituted the majority, declared themselves in favour of granting subsidies, even before the official debate on the question. During the Reichstag debate in March 1885, the Social-Democratic Right wing voted for subsidies for shipping lines to East Asia and Australia, making a number of reservations, in particular that the ships for the new lines should be built at German shipyards. Only after the Reichstag declined this demand did the whole group unanimously come out against the government bill. The behaviour of the majority of the group came in for criticism from the newspaper *Sozialdemokrat* and Social-Democratic organisations. At one time the disagreements within the group were so acute that they threatened to lead to a split in the Party. Engels sharply criticised the opportunist stand taken by the group's Right wing (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, Bd. 36). p. 358

[120] The "*Youth*" group in the German Social-Democratic Party—a petty-bourgeois, semi-anarchist opposition which took shape in 1890. The nucleus of the opposition was made up of young writers and students, who posed as Party theoreticians and leaders. Blind to the changes brought about by the abrogation of the Anti-Socialist Law in 1878, they denied the need for the Party to make use of legal forms of struggle, opposed the participation of Social-Democrats in parliament, and accused the Party of opportunism and defending the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Engels wrote that the theoretical views and tactics of the opposition were "'Marxism' distorted beyond recognition". Their unrealistic and adventurist tactics, he said, might "ruin even the strongest party numbering millions of members" (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, Bd. 22, S. 69). Some leaders of the "Left" opposition were expelled from the Party at the Erfurt Congress in October 1891. p. 358

[121] *Severny Golos* (Voice of the North)—a legal daily newspaper, organ of the R.S.D.L.P., which appeared in St. Petersburg from December 6 (19), 1905 and was edited jointly by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. It was closed down after its third issue had appeared, on December 8 (21), 1905. p. 358

[122] *Nachalo* (The Beginning)—a legal daily Menshevik newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from November to December 1905. p. 359

[123] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper published daily in St. Petersburg from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. From the beginning of November, after Lenin's return to St. Petersburg from abroad, it was published under his direct guidance. The paper was actually the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 359

[124] *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (The Pole Star)—a weekly journal, mouthpiece of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. It was edited by P. B. Struve and appeared in St. Petersburg in 1905-06.

Nasha Zhizn (Our Life)—a daily newspaper that was close to the Left wing of the Constitutional-Democratic Party; appeared in St. Petersburg at intervals, from 1904 to 1906. p. 360

[125] See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 241-54. p. 361

[126] The Conference met in Moscow from November 2 to 8, 1920, with 283 delegates attending. The main question discussed was the establishment of the Chief Committee for Political Education. A. V. Lunacharsky delivered the opening address, in which he dealt with the work done in the sphere of political education. The Conference also heard a report by N. K. Krupskaya on the current plan of work of the Chief Committee for Political Education, and Y. A. Litkens's report on the organisation of local political education departments. Other items on the agenda concerned the food campaign and political education, production propaganda in the light of the rehabilitation of economic activity, and the elimination of illiteracy. Lenin spoke after Krupskaya at the third session of the Conference, on the second day of the proceedings. p. 363

[127] This document formed the basis of the resolution on the tasks of the trade union movement, which was passed by the R.C.P.(B.) group of the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions on November 8, 1920, and published in *Pravda* on November 13. 200 delegates supported the resolution, with 12 delegates abstaining.

At the Conference, which took place in Moscow between November 2 and 6, the Party raised the question of reorganising the work of the trade unions in keeping with the tasks of peaceful socialist construction, extending democracy and abandoning purely administrative methods. Trotsky came out against the proposed reorganisation. At a sitting of the Communist group on November 3, he spoke "fine word", as Lenin said, about "shaking up" the trade unions, "tightening the screws" and immediate "governmentalisation of trade unions". Trotsky's speech, which sparked off a discussion in the Party, was duly rebuffed by the Communist delegates. Disagreement with Trotsky over trade unions concerned the methods of approaching the masses, of winning over and establishing ties with them. Had Trotsky had his way, the trade unions would have been ruined and the dictatorship of the proletariat

undermined. The Central Committee of the Party, therefore, could not leave the matter at that. On November 8 Lenin read his theses at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, in which he opposed Trotsky's views. Trotsky's theses won 7 votes, and Lenin's, 8 votes.

Lenin's theses formed the basis of his draft resolution on "The Tasks of the Trade Unions, and the Methods of Their Accomplishment", which was passed by 10 votes against 4, with 1 abstention. p. 374

[128] The *Central Committee of the Ceneral Transport Workers' Union* was formed in September 1920. The amalgamation was necessitated by the need to provide a stable centralised leadership capable of coping with the speedy rehabilitation of transport, whose dislocation threatened to disrupt the country's economy. This called for temporary extraordinary measures, and made it necessary to put the trade unions on a wartime footing. The new body did much to rehabilitate the transport facilities, but then lost its ties with the trade union rank and file. The red tape and the purely administrative methods of the Trotskyite union leaders who made arbitrary appointments and abandoned democratic methods of work—all this set the transport workers against the Party and tended to create a split among them. The Central Committee of the Party condemned these reprehensible methods, and the plenary meetings of the Central Committee held on November 8 and December 7, 1920, decided to incorporate the union in the system of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on an equal footing with the other trade unions, recommending to the union leaders that they change their methods of work: extend democracy within the union, apply the principle of election of trade union bodies on a broad scale, discontinue the practice of arbitrary appointments, etc. The First All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers, which was called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in March 1921, expelled the Trotskyites from the union leadership and defined various measures to improve the work of the union. p. 374

[129] This work consists of two articles on a single subject. The first article, whose title covers the two articles in the present edition, was written on November 4, 1920, and first published in *Pravda* No. 250 on November 7, 1920. In the note to the article, the editors wrote: "Comrade Lenin wrote the article before he received the news of the despicable behaviour of D'Aragona and the opportunist trade unionists, Party members, who insisted on their policy in opposition to the Central Committee of their own Party and, acting in collusion with Minister Giolitti, frustrated an immense movement of the working class. These facts, of which we shall speak in greater detail in one of our next issues, confirm still more strikingly that Lenin is right." The second article, which Lenin entitled "False Talk on Freedom (Instead of an Epilogue)" was written on December 11, 1920. The following note

is to be found in the MS: "NB: if you are going to publish it at all, then publish it as an epilogue to the article on the struggle in the Italian Socialist Party. NB" (Central Party Archives at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U.). Both articles were published in issue No. 15 of the journal *The Communist International* in December 1920 under a common title "False Talk on Freedom". p. 377

[130] See pp. 280-82 in this volume. p. 379

[131] *l'Humanité*—French daily founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War it was the mouthpiece of the extreme Right wing of the Party and took a social-chauvinist stand. Shortly after the split in the Party at the congress in December 1920 and the formation of the Communist Party, it became the organ of the latter and has since then been published as such. p. 382

[132] See p. 191 in this volume. p. 388

[133] See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 91-92. p. 389

[134] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow, Vol. I, 1962, p. 176. p. 392

[135] See Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 148. p. 392

[136] The Red Army's drive against Wrangel began at the end of October 1920. After heavy fighting Wrangel was hurled back into the Crimea. On the night of November 7 the Red Army troops launched an offensive on the Perekop Isthmus and by November 16 cleared the Crimea of the whiteguards. Thus the period of the Civil war and foreign intervention was in the main brought to an end. p. 399

[137] The extraordinary congress of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany met in Halle on October 12-17, 1920. The main question on the agenda was the terms of admission into the Communist International. The fierce struggle over this question caused a split in the party, 237 delegates voting for affiliation to the Comintern, and 156 against. The Right wing called its own congress and elected an executive committee, retaining the old name of the party. The Left wing and the Communist Party (the Spartacists) formed the United Communist Party of Germany. p. 399

[138] The mutiny in the Second Black Sea squadron of the French navy, which broke out in April-May 1919, was directed against the French Government's policy in sending 300,000 soldiers and sailors to Russia to crush Soviet power. The interventionists' troops in the South numbered over 130,000 men. The Odessa underground committee of the Bolshevik Party headed by Smirnov (Lastoch-

kin), and its Foreign Collegium with Jeanne Labourbe as a member of its Bureau, played an important role in fostering the revolutionary spirit of the soldiers and sailors of the interventionist troops. The Collegium included such experienced Communist agitators as Yakov Yelin, Vladimir Dyogot and others, who established contacts with soldiers and the crews of a number of ships. The mutiny began on April 20 on the battleships *France* and *Jean Bart*, which were riding off Sevastopol harbour. Other ship crews and soldiers of the 175th French Infantry Regiment supported their action. Then the mutiny spread to the ships in Odessa harbour. The mutineers demanded that the intervention should be stopped at once and the troops sent home, threatening to join the Red Army if their demands were not granted. The French command arrestet the mutineers' leaders and sent them off to France, where they were treated most harshly. The mutiny was defeated because the mutineers did not have a clear revolutionary aim or capable leadership, and no Communigt Party yet existed in France. However, the action of the French soldiers and sailors, who gave revolutionary support to the world's first working people's state stimulated the growth of the revolutionary movement in France.

The successes of the Red Army, revolutionary action in the French army and navy, and the workers' pressure compelled the French Government to withdraw its troops from Russia. p. 400

[139] This document served as a basis for the draft theses of the Chief Committee for Political Education, which were published in *Pravda* No. 267 on November 27, 1920, under the heading "Production Propaganda (Draft Theses of the Chief Committee for Political Education)".

The question of production propaganda was first raised in connection with the discussion of the immediate tasks of economic development, at the Ninth Party Congress held from March 29 to April 5, 1920. But after Poland's attack on the Soviet Republic, the brief respite came to an end and the questions of economic development receded into the background. Only at the end of 1920, after the signing of a preliminary peace with Poland and the defeat of Wrangel, did the question of production propaganda aimed at drawing the masses into the work of economic rehabilitation come up again with renewed urgency. Production propaganda, first suggested by Lenin, remains to this day one of the main tasks of the political, cultural and educational activities of the Party and the Soviet state. p. 404

[140] *Bednota* (The Poor)—a daily newspaper published by the C.C. C.P.S.U.(B.) from March 27, 1918 to January 31, 1931. On February 1, 1931 it merged with *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (Socialist Farming), which is published to this day. p. 405

[141] The Conference was held in the Kremlin between November 20 and 22, 1920, during the discussion on trade unions, which had begun

in the Party. The acute struggle waged by opposition groups against the Party's policy created a tense atmosphere at the Conference. The anti-Party "Democratic Centralism", "Workers' Opposition" and Ignatov's groups demagogically attacked the Party's policy. Before and during the Conference they tried to gain decisive influence in the Party's Moscow organisation. In an attempt to get the maximum number of their supporters elected to the Moscow Committee the "Workers' Opposition" group held a special conference of their supporters from among the worker delegates.

Directed by Lenin, the Conference repulsed the anti-Party attacks and pointed to the need of combating the unscrupulous groups bred by an atmosphere of recriminations. After hearing the report of the Moscow Committee, the Conference passed a resolution reflecting the viewpoint of the Central Committee. The list of candidate members of the Moscow Committee, drawn up by the opposition at the private conference was blackballed, and only those delegates were elected who had been nominated by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. p. 408

142 *Peace between the R.S.F.S.R. and Finland* was signed on October 14, 1920. The treaty terminated the state of war, confirmed Finland's independence and sovereignty as granted by the Soviet Government in 1917, and laid down the state frontiers between the two countries.

Peace between the R.S.F.S.R. and Estonia was signed in Yuryev (now Tartu) on February 2, 1920. Under the treaty Soviet Russia recognised Estonia's independence.

Latvian ruling circles were also compelled to sign peace with the R.S.F.S.R., following the defeat of the foreign interventionists and the whiteguards in 1919 and the resulting consolidation of Soviet Russia's international position. On March 25, 1920, the Latvian Foreign Ministry approached the Soviet Government suggesting that peace talks be started. On April 16, the Soviet and Latvian representatives started peace talks in Moscow and on August 11 a treaty was signed with Latvia in Riga. p. 409

143 In the autumn of 1920 Washington Vanderlip, who represented the U.S. Vanderlip Syndicate, arrived in Moscow to negotiate a concession for fishing, prospecting and extracting oil and coal in Kamchatka and elsewhere in Siberia, east of the 160th meridian.

In agreeing to the concession, the Soviet Government intended not only to establish mutually advantageous co-operation with American businessmen but also to normalise relations between Soviet Russia and the United States. Vanderlip's move, however, did not get the support of the U.S. Administration and financial tycoons, and the agreement was never signed. p. 413

144 To incite Turkey against Soviet Russia and torpedo the talks between the two countries on the establishment of friendly

relations, the Entente diplomats provoked Dashnak Armenia's attack on Turkey. The Dashnak nationalist party, then in power in Armenia (1918-20), pursued an aggressive policy with regard to Turkey and aimed at establishing a "Greater Armenia" that would include nearly half of Asia Minor. On September 24, 1920 the Dashnak government began hostilities against Turkey, but five days later the Turkish troops checked the Dashnak offensive and, in a counter-offensive lasting from September to November occupied Sarykamysh, Kars and Alexandropol. The Turkish Government decided to take advantage of the adventurist Dashnak policy and occupy the whole of Armenia.

On November 11 the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. offered its mediation to the warring parties. Turkey rejected Soviet mediation, and the Dashnak government had to agree to a shackling treaty which made Armenia a Turkish protectorate. The treaty, however, did not go into force, because by November 29, when it was to be signed, the Dashnak government bad been overthrown and Soviet power proclaimed in Armenia. Claiming that the treaty was still valid, the Turkish Government held up the evacuation of Alexandropol district. Only after the Soviet Government had, in the middle of May 1921, firmly demanded the evacuation of the district, were the Turkish forces withdrawn. p. 415

[145] Lenin is referring to his "Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" which he delivered at a session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 29, 1918 (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 281-305). p. 417

[146] The reference is to the book *Plan for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. Report of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia to the Eighth Congress of Soviets* published in Moscow in 1920. The outcome of collective work by leading scientists and specialists, the plan was the first long-term plan for the creation of the material foundation of socialism on the basis of the country's electrification. Lenin called this plan "the Party's second programme". p. 419

[147] Lenin is referring to the resolutions of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) (see *VKP(B) v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [*the C.P.S.U.(B.) in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*], Part. I, 1940, pp. 349-54). p. 422

[148] This Conference was held in the Hall of Columns, the House of Trade Unions, on November 25, 1920, and was attended by more than 2,000 delegates. Lenin delivered a report on the international and domestic position of the Soviet Republic and the immediate tasks of the working class. p. 429

[149] Held in the Hall of Columns, the House of Trade Unions, on November 26, 1920, this meeting discussed reports on the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and the war situation. Lenin spoke at the meeting in connection with the publication of the decree on concessions, on November 25. p. 430

[150] The *Council of People's Commissars*, with Lenin as chairman, was formed by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets in October 1917. It was occasionally called the great, or full, Council to distinguish it from the small, or limited, Council, which functioned under its auspices from December 1917 to 1926 as a commission dealing with minor questions and preparing various questions for consideration by the full Council of People's Commissars. p. 430

[151] The *Peace Treaty of Versailles* which concluded the First World War, was signed on June 28, 1919, by the U.S.A., the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and other Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other.

Lenin wrote, "this is an unparalleled and predatory peace, which has made slaves of tens of millions of people, including the most civilised", (see p. 326 in this volume). The treaty consolidated the re-partition of thc capitalist world in favour of the victors, and established a system of relationships between countries which was aimed at strangling Soviet Russia and suppressing the world revolutionary movement. p. 431

[152] The imperialist government of Japan, in collusion with U.S. and British ruling circles, invaded the Far East in the spring of 1918 in an attempt to seize Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal. On April 5, Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok. Operating from their main strategic base in Vladivostok, they occupied the Maritime Province, Northern Sakhalin and the Trans-Baikal region. The rout of Kolchak at the end of 1919, the growing guerilla movement and the economic crisis in Japan in 1920-21, which was aggravated by the Japanese-American contradictions, spelled the doom of the interventionists. By the autumn of 1922 their rout was complete and on October 25 the last interventionists left Vladivostok. p. 431

[153] The reference is to the talks with Bullitt (see Note 47). p. 432

[154] The *Workers' Opposition* was an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist factional group led by Shlyapnikov, Medvedev, Kollontai, Kutuzov, Lutovinov and others. Demagogically calling itself the "Workers' Opposition", the group came out into the open for the first time at the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) in September 1920. In November, during the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), the group called a special conference, thus taking the path of factional struggle and the subversion of the Party's unity. The "Workers' Opposition" group was

finally constituted during the discussion on the trade unions in 1920-21. The views of the group, as an anarcho-syndicalist deviation in the Party, were most fully set forth in the pamphlet by Kollontai entitled *Workers' Opposition*, published on the eve of the Tenth Congress of the Party. The opposition suggested that the management of the economy should be entrusted to "the All-Russia Congress of Producers" united in producers' trade unions, which were to elect their central organ to manage the economy. The opposition demanded that all economic management bodies be elected by the respective trade unions, whose candidates could not be revoked by Party or government bodies. This amounted to the denial of the Party's leading role and the dictatorship of the proletariat as the main instrument in socialist construction. The opposition set the trade unions against the Soviet state and the Communist Party, regarding trade unions, and not the Party, as the highest form of the organisation of the working class.

On inner-Party questions the platform of the Workers' Opposition amounted to slanderous accusations that the Party leadership had "lost links with the Party rank and file", "underestimated the creative power of the proletariat", and "degenerated".

There was a time when the Workers' Opposition had some support from backward sections of the workers, who more than any others succumbed to the influence of the petty-bourgeois environment. The opposition took advantage of the vacillation in this unstable section of the workers to further their ends. The opposition got support from a number of central and local Party organisations, its platform gaining 21 per cent of the votes at the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) in November 1920 and 30 per cent at a meeting of the Communist group of the Second All-Russia Congress of Mine Workers at the beginning of 1921. As a result of the Party's explanatory work exposing the demagogical anti-Party slogans of the opposition, the number of its supporters declined. Less than 8 per cent of the delegates to the Tenth Party Congress voted for its platform. The Congress dealt a crushing blow at the opposition's views. The resolution "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party" tabled by Lenin pointed out that these views were incorrect theoretically and "in practice weakened the sustained guiding line of the Communist Party and served the interests of the class enemies of the proletarian revolution" (*KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*], Part I, 1954, p. 532). The Congress recognised propaganda of the views of the Workers' Opposition to be incompatible with Party membership. The resolution on Party unity adopted by the Congress demanded the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception, which had a political platform of their own. After the Congress most of the Party rank and file broke with the Workers' Opposition and unreservedly supported the line of the Party. Under Shlyapnikov and Medvedev, the remnants of the opposition, however, retained their

illegal organisation and continued their anti-Party propaganda under cover of arch-revolutionary phrases. In February 1922 they sent "a statement of 22" to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which was nothing short of a slanderous lampoon against the Party. After a thorough study of the statement, the Executive Committee condemned the group's actions and warned them that, if continued, their actions would place the group outside the Third International. At the Eleventh Party Congress held in 1922 the group was defeated organisationally. p. 436

[155] This telegram was sent in reply to greetings from the Revolutionary Military Committee of Armenia on the occasion of the establishment of Soviet power there. The Committee sent its greetings on November 30, 1920. p. 437

[156] The *Far Eastern Republic* was set up in April 1920 and included the Trans-Baikal, Amur, Maritime and Kamchatka regions and Northern Sakhalin. Formally a bourgeois-democratic state, it actually pursued a Soviet policy. Its formation was in keeping with the interests of Soviet Russia, which needed a prolonged respite from war in the Far East and wanted to stave off war with Japan. At the same time, however, its creation was a step the Soviet Government had been compelled to take by the pressure of circumstances (see p. 465 in this volume).

After the interventionists and whiteguards were driven out of the Soviet Far East (except Northern Sakhalin), the People's Assembly of the Republic voted for entry into the R.S.F.S.R. on November 14, 1922. p. 445

[157] This refers to the draft of a trade agreement between Great Britain and the R.S.F.S.R., which President of the Board of Trade Edward F. Wise presented to L. B. Krasin, head of the Soviet trade delegation in London, on November 29, 1920. The talks to normalise economic and political contacts, which had started in May 1920, dragged on and nearly broke down on several occasions. On March 16, 1921, they ended in the signing of a trade agreement. p. 452

[158] *Narody Vostoka* (Peoples of the East)—a monthly journal, organ of the Council for Propaganda and Guiding the Activities of the Peoples of the East, published by a decision of the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, which was held in Baku from September 1 to September 7, 1920. Only one issue appeared—in October 1920. It came out in Russian, Turkish, Persian and Arabic. p. 453

[159] Lenin is referring to the bill "On Measures to Strengthen and Develop Peasant Farming" which the Council of People's Commissars submitted to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for consideration by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. It was published in *Izvestia* No. 281 on December 14, 1920).

The bill combined measures for the state regulation of agricultural development and incentives for the peasants to raise output on their farms. The Eighth Congress of Soviets passed the bill by a unanimous vote. p. 458

[160] The Conference met in Moscow from December 1 to 6, 1920, with over 200 women delegates participating, representing 5 republics, 65 gubernias and 5 administrative regions. The Conference discussed a report on the foreign and domestic, situation of the country, a report of the C.C.'s Department on work among women, the immediate tasks of departments' for work among women, and the question of mother and child protection. The Conference emphasised the need to boost production and extend production propaganda and the enrolment of working women in the trade unions and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

Lenin's message of greetings, conveyed by telephone, was read at a sitting of the Conference on December 6. p. 460

[161] The Congress was held in Moscow from December 22 to 29, 1920. There was a record attendance of 2,537 delegates, of whom 1,728 had full voting rights, and 809 had deliberative votes.

The Congress met at a time when the Soviet Republic had won victory over the foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolution, and the economic front, as Lenin said, had become "the main, the principal front".

The Congress was guided by Lenin, who delivered a report on the work of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, and a speech closing the debate on his report at plenary sessions of the Congress on December 22 and 23. He also took the floor six times at sittings of the Communist group of the Congress on December 21, 22, 24 and 27 to deal with the question of concessions and the bill on measures to strengthen and develop peasant farming.

After the debate on Lenin's report, the Congress passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority, approving the activities of the Soviet Government. The delegates gave a concerted rebuff to representatives of the petty-bourgeois parties who made a number of anti-Soviet declarations at the Congress and tabled a draft resolution of their own.

The Congress adopted the plan for the electrification of Russia which was drawn up on Lenin's initiative and in keeping with his directions. This was the first long-term economic plan of the Soviet state, which Lenin called "the Party's second programme". The resolution adopted on Krzhizhanovsky's report was drafted by Lenin (see p. 532 in this volume).

One of the most important questions on the agenda was the bill on measures to strengthen and develop peasant farming, passed by the Council of People's Commissars on December 1-4, 1920. Lenin participated in the discussion of the main clauses of the law at a private meeting of non-Party peasant delegates on

December 22 and in the Communist group of the Congress on December 24 and 27. The Congress unanimously approved the bill.

The transition to peaceful construction called for the improvement and reorganisation of the entire Soviet apparatus. The Congress passed a detailed resolution on the question, setting up proper relations between central and local administrative bodies. The Congress dealt extensively with questions relating to the reorganisation of the entire system of economic management to meet the new tasks. The delegates discussed and approved a new statute of the Council of Labour and Defence.

The Congress instituted the Order of the Red Banner of Labour to be awarded for labour heroism, initiative and organisation in solving economic tasks. p. 461

[162] Lenin is referring to his speech at the meeting of activists of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) on December 6, 1920 (see pp. 438-59 in this volume). p. 464

[163] Lenin is apparently referring to the collection *Red Calvary* put out in memory of the victims of the Japanese intervention. p. 465

[164] On May 26, 1919, the Supreme Council sent a Note to Kolchak over the signatures of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando and Saionji informing him of the Allies' readiness to recognise Kolchak and supply him with food and munitions to enable him to become ruler of all Russia. In return Kolchak was to convene a constituent assembly after he took Moscow, recognise the independence of Poland and Finland and, unless agreement could be reached on the relations between Russia, on the one hand, and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasian and Trans-Caspian territories, on the other, to submit this question to the League of Nations and to recognise their autonomy pending a decision by the League, etc. In his reply Kolchak accepted a number of conditions. On July 12 Britain, France, the U.S.A. and Italy, considering Kolchak's reply satisfactory, reaffirmed their readiness to give him help. p. 466

[165] The decree of the Council of People's Commissars on concessions, the accompanying maps of forest, agricultural and mining concessions and several articles by leading Soviet specialists were published in the journal *Russische Korrespondenz* No. 1-2 for 1921. p. 476

[166] The reference is to a meeting of activists of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) on December 6, 1920. p. 481

[167] "Sukharevka" was the name of a market-place near the Sukharev Tower built under Peter I in 1692. At the time of the foreign military intervention and the Civil War it became a centre and symbol of black marketeering. In December 1920 the Moscow Soviet decided to close the market.

When the New Economic Policy was introduced, the market reappeared and existed till 1932. In 1934 the Sukharev Tower was demolished as a hindrance to traffic. p. 483

[168] On August 10, 1920, the French Government officially recognised Wrangel as the ruler of South Russia. p. 488

[169] This agreement, which established friendly relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and Persia was signed in Moscow on February 26, 1921, despite opposition from British ruling circles. It was based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and co-operation—equality, respect for the sovereignty of the two-countries, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage. All the treaties concluded by tsarist Russia with Persia and third parties which infringed on the sovereignty of the Persian people were revoked. Persia got back all the concessions of the tsarist government on her territory. The Soviet Government renounced claims to the loans granted to Persia by the tsarist government. Especially important were the articles pledging both parties to preclude the formation or the existence on their respective territories of organisations or groups with aims subversive to Russia or Persia. This was the first equal treaty in the history of Persia. p. 491

[170] See present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 314-17. p. 495

[171] The *All-Russia Bureau for Production Propaganda* of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions was set up by a decision of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) on December 8, 1920. It consisted of representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the Chief Committee for Political Education, the Central Board for Vocational Training, and the Commissariat of Agriculture. On January 21, 1921, the Organising Bureau of the Party's Central Committee approved the statute of the bureau which defined the aims and tasks of central and local bodies in charge of production propaganda and their structure. The bureau was instructed to work out a general plan of propaganda, and direct and supervise various organs and bodies in carrying out their production propaganda. p. 500

[172] The decree of the Council of People's Commissars on "Provisional Rules on Bonuses in Kind" was published on October 23, 1920. p. 508

[173] Order No. 1042 was issued by the Chief Department of Railways on May 22, 1920. It dealt with the repair of locomotives damaged during the First World War and the Civil War. Railway depots were ordered to lower the percentage of locomotives under repair from 60 to 20 per cent in four and a half years, beginning from July 1, 1920. p. 510

[174] The first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the seventh convocation held on February 2-7, 1920, instructed the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to work out a plan for the construction of a network of power stations. On February 21, 1920, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, by agreement with the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, appointed a State Commission for the Electrification of Russia. The Commission began its work on March 20 and by the time the Eighth Congress of Soviets met it had compiled an over-all plan for the electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. The State Commission was set up on Lenin's initiative and in keeping with his directives. p. 514

[175] On November 14, 1920, Lenin attended the ceremony of the opening of an electric power station in the village of Kashino, Yaropolets Volost, Volokolamsk Uyezd, where he had been invited by the local peasants. Lenin spoke to the latter and then gave an address on the importance of electrification for the national economy. p. 517

[176] On December 22, 1920, Lenin attended a private conference of non-Party peasant delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, which was called on Lenin's request by M. I. Kalinin, then Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The conference discussed the bill on measures to strengthen and develop agriculture adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on December 14, and submitted for consideration by the Congress. Lenin closely followed the debate, and took notes of the speeches. p. 520

[177] The meeting of the Communist group of the Congress, called in the morning of December 24, 1920, was devoted to a discussion of the bill presented by the Council of People's Commissars on measures to promote peasant farming. p. 525

[178] Lenin is referring to the following passage in his report on work in the countryside, which he delivered at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on March 23, 1919: "Coercion applied to the middle peasants would cause untold harm" (see present edition, Vol. 29, p. 210). p. 525

[179] The reference is to the law on the socialisation of the land passed on January 18 (31), 1918, by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets which was held on January 10-18 (23-31), 1918.

Clause 6 of the law read: "All livestock and agricultural implements in private possession shall pass, without indemnification, from the hands of the non-working farmers exploiting the labour of others into the hands of uyezd, gubernia, regional and federative Soviets, depending on the importance of the implements and livestock transferred." p. 528

[180] The reference is to the armed uprising in Moscow in December 1905, during the first Russian revolution. In December 1905 and

January 1906 the uprising spread to Nizhni-Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossiisk, the Donets coal basin, Ekaterinoslav, Perm (Motovilikha Plant), Ufa, Krasnoyarsk, and Chita. Large-scale armed uprisings took place in the Trans-Caucasus, Poland, the Baltic provinces and Finland, which were ruthlessly suppressed by the tsarist government.

The December armed uprising was the peak of the first Russian revolution. Lenin wrote about the uprising in his article "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising" (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 171-78). p. 535

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*April–December 1920*)

1920

April-May — Lenin writes "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.

In a letter to K. A. Timiryazev Lenin gives a high appraisal of the latter's book *Science and Democracy*.

April 29 — Lenin speaks on the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic at the Fourth All-Russia Congress of glass and porcelain workers.

May 1 — In the morning Lenin participates in a subbotnik in the Kremlin.

At 2 p.m. Lenin speaks at a meeting dedicated to the laying of the foundation stone of a monument to Karl Marx in Teatralnaya Square (now Sverdlov Square).

At 3 p.m. Lenin speaks at a meeting dedicated to the laying of the foundation stone of a monument to Liberated Labour on the Moskva River embankment, visits an exhibition of the designs for the future monument at the Museum of Fine Arts (now the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts).

Lenin speaks at meetings in Zamoskvorechye and Baumansky districts in Moscow at the inauguration of the Zagorsky Workers' Palace of Blagusha-Lefortovo district and at the meeting of workers of the Prokhorov manufacture in Red Presnya district.

May 2 — Lenin's article "From the First Subbotnik on the Moscow-Kazan Railway to the All-Russia May Day Subbotnik" is published in the handbill *Pervomaisky Subbotnik*.

May 4 — Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars; submits for approval the message of greetings to the Government of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, which is endorsed

by the Council. The meeting also discusses the measures to help the Western front, the composition of a commission to be appointed to prepare materials on the formation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and other questions.

May 4 or 5 — Lenin sends a telegram to all gubernia executive committees, the Moscow and the Petrograd city executive committees and gubernia revolutionary committees, instructing them to assist the Central Statistical Board and its local branches in taking an all-Russia census of the population.

May 5 — Lenin addresses a parade of troops leaving for the Polish front, in Teatralnaya Square.

Lenin speaks on the tasks in the defence of the Soviet Republic against the attack of bourgeois-landowner Poland, at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and representatives of the trade unions and factory committees of Moscow.

Lenin sends a message of greetings to the Soviet Socialist Government of Azerbaijan on the formation of an independent Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.

In a letter to M. N. Pokrovsky, Lenin writes about the need to publish a dictionary of present-day Russian.

May 7 — In a letter to the 30th Regiment of Red Communards of the Turkestan front Lenin thanks them for the macaroni and flour sent to him. The products were given to the children of Moscow.

May 10 — Lenin directs an emergency session of the Council of Labour and Defence to discuss the supply of the armies on the Western front with munitions and clothing.

May 12 — Lenin writes the Appendix to his "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.

Lenin sends a directive to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus front demanding the immediate dispatch of divisions to help the Western front.

May 13 — Lenin delivers a speech on the international situation at an enlarged conference of workers and Red Army men of Rogozhsko-Simonovsky district.

May 14 Lenin directs a session of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses the supply of armies on the Western front with clothes, the food situation in the Donets Basin, and production of cartridges, rifles and machine-guns. Lenin raises the question of building narrow-gauge railway lines for the transportation of timber.

May 18 Lenin presides over a session of the Council of People's Commissars, reports on Stalin's appointment as member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Y. S. Hanecki's co-optation into the Central Union of Consumers' Societies and the extension of the sphere of activity of the Caucasian Soviet Labour Army to include the Don region and the whole of the Soviet Caucasus.

May 20 Lenin's reply to the Indian Revolutionary Association is published.

May 21 Lenin writes a letter to Serafimovich conveying his condolences on the death of the latter's son.

Lenin directs a session of the Council of Labour and Defence which discusses the supply of the army with cartridges, rifles and machine-guns the shipment of motor vehicles for the army, food supplies for the workers of the Chief Leather Committee, and of the oilfields in Baku and Astrakhan, supply of fuel to Petrograd, etc.

May 23 Lenin writes his letter "To Petrograd Party Workers" containing instructions on the publication of "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.

May 25 Lenin writes his comments on the draft decree on measures for proper distribution of housing accommodations among working people.

May 26 Lenin writes a draft decision of the Council of People's Commissars on food procurements.

Lenin talks with a delegation of British workers.

May 27 Lenin writes amendments and addenda to the draft decision of the Council of People's Commissars on higher technical educational establishments.

May 30 Lenin writes his "Letter to the British Workers".

June 1 — Lenin draws up a plan of theses on the national and the colonial questions for the Second Congress of the Communist International.

June 2 — Lenin sends a telegram to Stalin, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western front, informing him of the situation on the Western and the Caucasus fronts and indicating the need of vigorously prosecuting the offensive to Kiev, and of sensing reinforcements there from the Crimea.

June 4 — Lenin receives Mr. Fuse, correspondent of the Japanese newspapers *Osaka Mainichi* and *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi*.

Lenin writes a note to the State Publishing House and the Supreme Council of the National Economy asking that comrades from Kirghizia be provided with a typefoundry, a printing press and stocks of paper.

June 5 — Lenin writes "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)".

Beginning of June — Lenin writes "Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)".

June 8-10 — "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* is published.

June 12 — Lenin writes a review of issues Nos. 1-18 of the journal *Kommunismus*, organ of the Communist International for the countries of South-Eastern Europe, published in German in Vienna

Lenin speaks on the international situation of the Soviet Republic and the current tasks of the Party in the countryside, at the Second All-Russia Conference of organisers responsible for rural work.

June 13 — Lenin writes amendments and addenda to the draft decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the tasks of the R.C.P.(B.) in Turkestan.

June 18 — Lenin directs a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses the defence of the country against the Polish offensive, revision of the list of militarised enterprises and other questions.

June 19	Speaking at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Lenin criticises the policy of the French Socialist Party and of the Right wing of the Italian Socialist Party.
June 20	Lenin instructs the Deputy People's Commissar of Education to give help to the Pulkovo Observatory.
June 29	Lenin writes a note to the Secretariat of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) proposing to obligate the State Publishing House to arrange for the translation and publication of new economic works and a number of works by materialist philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
June	Lenin writes "The Plan of the Resolution on the Content of the Concept 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' and on the Struggle Against the 'Fashionable' Distortion of This Slogan".
July 2	Lenin writes the appeal "Aid the Wounded of the Red Army!"
July 4	Lenin writes his "Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International".
July 6	Lenin writes the preface to the French and German editions of his *Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism*.
July 8	Lenin gives directives on checking the English, French and German translations of the pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.
July 10	Lenin writes a letter to Chicherin concerning the text of the treaty with Lithuania.
Between July 10 and 19	Lenin prepares his report on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International for the Second Congress of the Communist International.
Not later than July 18	In a letter to the Communist International Executive Committee, Lenin sets forth his plan of theses on the economic and political situation in the world for the Second Congress of the Third, Communist International.
July 18	Lenin leaves for Petrograd to take part in the proceedings of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

July 19-August 7	The Second Congress of the Communist International is held. Its work is directed by Lenin.
July 19	At the first session of the Congress, Lenin is elected to the Presidium; he delivers a report on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International.
	Lenin speaks at a meeting dedicated to the laying of the foundation stone of a monument to Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on Uritsky Square in Petrograd. The meeting is attended by delegates to the Congress.
	Lenin and Congress delegates lay wreaths on the graves of revolutionary fighters on the Mars Field in Petrograd.
July 20	Lenin returns to Moscow.
July 23	Lenin presides over the second session of the Second Congress of the Comintern, which has moved to Moscow; he speaks on the role of the Communist Party.
July 24	The third session of the Congress elects Lenin to the commission on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International, the commission on the national and the colonial questions, and the commission on the agrarian question.
July 25	Lenin directs the work of the commission on the national and the colonial questions and delivers a speech.
	Lenin's theses on the terms of admission into the Communist International and his proposal concerning the formation of the leading bodies of the parties applying for admission (Article 20 of the terms of admission into the Comintern) are discussed and approved at a meeting of the commission of the Congress.
	Lenin writes critical remarks on Levi's theses on the national and the colonial questions, exposing his nationalist stand.
July 26	Lenin directs the work of the Congress commissions on the agrarian question and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International. The commissions approve Lenin's theses on the questions under discussion.

Lenin addresses the fourth session of the Congress on behalf of the commission on the national and the colonial questions and submits his theses approved by the commission.

July 28 Lenin's theses on the national and the colonial questions are unanimously adopted at the fifth session of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

July 30 Lenin addresses the eighth session of the Congress during the debate on the terms of admission into the Communist International. Lenin's theses are approved by the Congress.

July Lenin writes a note to Kursky asking him if steps have been taken to establish Soviet power without delay, drive out the landowners and transfer their lands to the poor peasants and the Soviets of farm labourers in the areas liberated by the Red Army.

Lenin writes his critical comments on the French Socialist Party's declaration to the Second Congress of the Communist International.

August 2 Lenin sends a telegram to Stalin informing him of the decision of the Political Bureau of the Party C.C. to constitute a separate Southern front, in view of the increased threat from Wrangel.

Lenin addresses the tenth session of the Congress during the debate on parliamentarianism.

August 3 Lenin replies to the telegram by Stalin who expressed his dissatisfaction with the Party C:C.'s decision to constitute a separate Southern front, emphasising the correctness of the C.C. decision.

August 4 The thirteenth session of the Second Congress of the Communist International discusses and unanimously approves Lenin's theses on the agrarian question.

Lenin sends a telegram to Stalin asking for the appraisal of the situation on the South-Western and the Wrangel fronts.

August 6 Lenin addresses the sixteenth session of the Second Congress of the Communist International on the British Communist Party's affiliation to the Labour Party.

August 7 Lenin attends the first sitting of the newly elected Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Lenin writes to the State Publishing House, indicating the need to translate the material appearing in Soviet newspapers, as well as in Communist and bourgeois newspapers of various countries and publish monthly pamphlets in foreign languages exposing the imperialist policy of the Entente.

August 11 Lenin sends a telegram to Stalin informing him of the progress of the peace talks with Poland and instructing him to intensify the offensive on the Crimean front in order to complete the rout of Wrangel and liberate the whole of the Crimea.

August 16 Lenin writes his "Letter to the Austrian Communists".

August 18 Lenin sends a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western front instructing it to intensify the offensive against the Poles.

Lenin forwards to the "small" Council of People's Commissars Gorky's request that the Petrograd scientists be provided with increased food rations, proposing that the request be granted.

August 19 Lenin sends a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western front, instructing it to send without delay reinforcements of Byelorussian workers and peasants to the front.

August 20 Lenin directs a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence which discusses the Kashira power project, special measures to be taken in the case of the retreat of the Soviet troops on the Wrangel front, the supplying of Moscow with firewood and other questions.

August 28 Lenin fills in a registration form of the all-Russia census of the population.

September 1 In a note to the Rumyantsev Museum library (now the Lenin Library) Lenin asks to be lent two best available Greek-German, Greek-French, Greek-Russian or Greek-English dictionaries, the best philosophical dictionaries, dictionaries of philosophical terms in German, French, English or Russian and books on the history of Greek philosophy.

	Lenin reports to the Second All-Russia Congress of the Union of Workers of Education and Socialist Culture on the current situation.
September 2	Lenin writes the preface to the second edition of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.
September 6	Lenin sends on to the Podolsk Uyezd Food Committee an appeal by the peasants of the village of Bogdanovo to cut down the food requisitioning quotas and writes a telephone message ordering an immediate consideration of the appeal and reducing the quotas as much as possible.
September 14	Lenin directs a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which discusses grain requisitioning, the establishment of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, etc.
September 17	Lenin receives a peasant delegate from Siberia and in the course of the talk makes notes on the measures to improve the condition of the peasants in Siberia.
September 20	Lenin directs a plenary meeting of the Party C.C. which discusses the peace talks with Poland, the All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and other questions.
September 22-25	Lenin directs the work of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
September 22	Lenin opens the Conference and is elected to the Presidium; he delivers the political report of the C.C. and, makes amendments to the resolution on the Polish question.
	At the evening session of the Conference Lenin closes the debate on the political report of the C.C.
Before September 23	Lenin edits the draft declaration of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the terms of peace with Poland.
September 24	Lenin writes the draft resolution "The Immediate Tasks of Party Development" for the All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
	Lenin addresses the evening session of the Conference during the debate on the report on the immediate tasks of Party development.

	Lenin writes the "Letter to the German and the French Workers. Regarding the Discussion on the Second Congress of the Communist International"
Not later than September 28	Lenin writes a letter to the Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
September 29	Lenin writes proposals for the Conference resolution "The Immediate Tasks of Party Development".
October 2	Lenin speaks on the tasks of the youth leagues, at the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League.
	Lenin speaks on the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic at the Congress of leather industry workers.
	Lenin writes an appeal "To the Poor Peasants of the Ukraine".
October 8	Lenin writes a draft resolution for the Proletcult congress and submits it for consideration by the Party's C.C.
October 12	Lenin takes part in the funeral of Inessa Armand on Red Square.
The middle of October	Lenin receives H. G. Wells, the British writer.
October 15	Lenin reports on the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic, at a conference of chairmen of uyezd, volost and village Executive Committees of the Soviets of Moscow Gubernia.
October 16	Lenin telegraphs instructions to Frunze on preparations for capture of the Crimea.
October 19	Lenin writes notes on the immediate tasks of the Party after the termination of the war against Wrangel.
October 20	Lenin writes the article "A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship".
October 21	In a letter to the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, Lenin directs that scientists would be provided with additional accommodation (for study rooms and laboratories) in the distribution of flats.

Lenin receives a delegation of Stavropol peasants who have brought grain for Moscow children, discusses their needs and addresses a letter to the People's Commissariat of Food asking it to prepare, by the next morning, its conclusions as to the possibility of meeting the peasants' requests.

October 24 Lenin telegraphs a directive to the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry Army for steps to be taken for the speedy defeat of Wrangel.

October 27 Lenin talks to a delegation of the Party Conference of Alexandrov Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, after learning of abuses at the Troitsky Factory, he writes a letter to the Vladimir Gubernia Committee of the Party and directs the delegation to Dzerzhinsky, head of the Central Control Commission.

Lenin attends a show of a film about the operation of a new hydraulic peat-suction machine designed by engineer Klasson and then calls a conference to discuss the invention.

October 28 In a telegram to Frunze, Lenin gives directives for measures to be immediately taken for the dispatch of heavy artillery to the Crimean front-line, so as to ensure the success of the operation aimed at the liberation of the Crimea.

October 29 Lenin sends a telegram to Stalin in Baku instructing him to take urgent steps to fortify the approaches to Baku from the land and the sea.

Before November 1 Lenin writes amendments and addenda to the draft decree on the centralisation of libraries in the R.S.F.S.R.

Beginning of November Lenin writes his theses for the resolution "The Tasks of the Trade Unions, and the Methods of Their Accomplishment" and a draft resolution for the R.C.P.(B.) group of the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions.

November 3 Lenin delivers a speech on the main tasks of the Chief Committee for Political Education and local political education departments at an All-Russia Conference of Political Education Workers of Gubernia and Uyezd Education Departments.

November 4 Lenin writes the article "On the Struggle Within the Italian Socialist Party".

November 6 Lenin writes to Krzhizhanovsky on the tasks of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia.

Lenin delivers a speech on the third anniversary of the October Revolution, at a joint plenum of the Moscow Soviet, the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). and the Moscow City Trade Union Council.

November 7 Lenin delivers a speech on the third anniversary of the October Revolution, at a plenary meeting of the Sokolniki District Soviet attended by representatives of factory trade union committees.

November 9 Lenin directs a plenary meeting of the Party C.C. which discusses and approves in a preliminary way the draft theses on the tasks of trade unions, drawn up by Lenin.

November 12 Lenin sends a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern front, in which he formulates the conditions of Wrangel's capitulation.

November 13 In a telegram to Stalin, Lenin asks about the progress of the struggle against the bands in the Caucasus and the fortification of the approaches to Baku; he also asks Stalin's opinion as to the prospects of a peaceful settlement of relations between the R.S.F.S.R., and Georgia and Armenia.

Lenin receives the chairman of the group committee of the Grozny oilfields, who has brought a message of greetings from the workers.

November 14 Lenin attends the commissioning of a power electric station in the village of Kashino in Volokolamsk Uyezd of Moscow Gubernia, talks to the peasants, and makes a speech on the importance of electrification for the country's economy; in the evening, Lenin addresses a meeting of peasants in the People's House in the village of Yaropolets.

November 16 Lenin has a talk with a peasant delegate from Mosalsk Uyezd of Kaluga Gubernia, makes notes of the peasants' needs and writes to the People's Com-

missariat of Food and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, asking for information on the possibility of satisfying the peasants' needs.

November 18 Lenin writes his "Theses on Production Propaganda (Rough Draft)".

Lenin speaks at a meeting of delegates of Party organisations of Baumansky district in Moscow.

November 19 Lenin directs and addresses a meeting of delegates to the Moscow Gubernia Party Conference, which discusses nominations for the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

November 20 Lenin writes notes on the electrification of Yaropolets Volost, Volokolamsk Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia.

November 20-22 Lenin takes part in the Moscow Gubernia Party Conference.

November 21 Lenin delivers a speech on "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and the Tasks of the Party" at the Conference.

Lenin speaks on the elections to the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

November 25 Lenin speaks on the foreign and domestic-situation of the Soviet Republic, at a conference of factory T.U. committees of Moscow printing and publishing enterprises.

November 26 Lenin speaks on concessions at a meeting of cells' secretaries of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.).

November 29 Lenin writes to Lunacharsky on the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat of Education.

Lenin reports on the results of the work of the Moscow Gubernia Party Conference at a general meeting of Communists of Zamoskvorechye district and closes the debate on his report.

December 2 Lenin sends a telegram to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee of Armenia conveying greetings to Soviet Armenia on her liberation from the imperialist yoke.

December 6	Lenin speaks on concessions at a meeting of activists of the Moscow Party organisation.
	Lenin sends greetings to the All-Russia Conference of Gubernia Departments for Work Among Women.
December 8	Lenin directs a plenary meeting of the Party C.C. which discusses the conflict between water transport workers and the Central Committee of the Railway and Water Transport Union. The meeting approves Lenin's proposal for calling the Tenth Party Congress on February 6, 1921.
	Lenin directs a plenary meeting of the Party C.C., submits his theses on production propaganda, and writes a draft decision of the C.C. "Statute of the People's Commissariat of Education".
December 11	Lenin writes the epilogue "False Talk on Freedom" to his article "On the Struggle Within the Italian Socialist Party".
December 16	Lenin reports on the foreign and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic, at a meeting of the peasants of the village of Modenovo, Bogorodsk Volost, Vereya Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia.
	Lenin sends a telegram to the Vladikavkaz Revolutionary Committee instructing it to take urgent steps to provide Civil War refugees with permanent housing.
Between December 19 and 21	At Gorki Lenin works on the plan of his report on the work of the Council of People's Commissars for the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
	In a letter to Krzhizhanovsky, Lenin outlines practical measures for the electrification of Russia.
December 21	Lenin reports on concessions at a meeting of the Communist group of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. After the report, he replies to the questions from delegates.
December 22-29	The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets is held. Its work is directed by Lenin.

December 22	The first session of the Congress elects Lenin to the Presidium; Lenin reports on the work of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Lenin speaks on the foreign and home policy of the Soviet Government, at a meeting of the Communist group of the Congress.
	Lenin attends a conference of non-Party peasant delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets.
December 23	Lenin closes the debate on his report on the work of the Council of People's Commissars, at the second session of the Congress.
December 24	Lenin addresses the Communist group of the Congress.
December 27	Lenin addresses the Communist group of the Congress during the debate on the draft law on measures to strengthen and develop peasant farming and replies to the questions of delegates.
December 29	The seventh session of the Congress adopts Lenin's resolution on the report on electrification.
	The seventh session of the Congress elects Lenin member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (Eighth Convocation).
December 30	Lenin delivers a speech on the trade unions, the current situation, and Trotsky's mistakes, at a joint meeting of R.C.P.(B.) members elected delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, members of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, and the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions.
December 31	The plenary meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (Eighth Convocation) elects Lenin Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
December	Lenin writes to Krzhizhanovsky on the drawing up of a plan for supplying electricity to every house in the R.S.F.S.R.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 31

На английскот языке

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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PREFACE

Volume 32 contains the works V. I. Lenin wrote between December 30, 1920, and August 14, 1921.

These works show Lenin's Party and government activities—his leadership of the Bolshevik Party and guidance of the Soviet state—in the period of transition from the policy of War Communism to the New Economic Policy.

The volume contains his articles and speeches, "The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes", "The Party Crisis", and the report and summing-up. speech on the role and tasks of the trade unions at the Second All-Russia Congress of Miners, his pamphlet, Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin, his "Speech Delivered at the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Garment Workers", and others. These works substantiate the forms and methods of the Party's work among the masses in the new conditions of transition to the peace-time effort of economic recovery, and define the role and tasks of the trade unions as a school of communism in socialist construction. In his uncompromising struggle against the Workers ' Opposition, Democratic Centralists and Left Communists, who tried to erode the Party and undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Party's leading role in the Soviets and trade unions, Lenin directed his main blow at the Trotskyites as the core of the anti-Party groupings.

A considerable section of the volume consists of reports, speeches and draft resolutions at the Tenth Party Congress. Among them are the report and summing-up speech on the political work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); speech on the trade unions; report and summing up speech

on the tax in kind; "Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on Party Unity"; "Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party"; report and summing-up speech on Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, etc. These works characterise Lenin's struggle for the Party's unity, the consolidation of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry on the new economic basis, and the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The volume includes Lenin's well-known pamphlet, The Tax in Kind (The Significance of the New Policy and Its Conditions), in which he gave an all-round substantiation of the New Economic Policy as a special policy of the proletarian state securing the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy, and as a way for the successful construction of socialism. This question is also dealt with in other works appearing in this volume, including "Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting of Secretaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) Cells of Moscow and Moscow Gubernia", report and summing-up speech on the tax in kind at the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), and recorded speeches.

There are many works showing Lenin's direction of national economic planning and organisation. Among them are "Integrated Economic Plan"; draft Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence to Local Soviet Bodies, "Speech on Local Economic Bodies Delivered at a Sitting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee", "Speech Delivered at the Third All-Russia Food Conference", and others.

A number of speeches and documents in the volume show Lenin's activity in building up the state apparatus, and in training and drawing the broad mass of working people into government. They are: "Instructions of the Central Committee to Communists Working in the People's Commissariat for Education", "The Work of the People's Commissariat for Education", "Speech Delivered at an Enlarged Conference of Moscow Metalworkers", "Speech at a Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies", Speech Delivered at the All-

Russia Congress of Transport Workers", "To the Petrograd City Conference of Non-Party Workers", and others.

The volume contains Lenin's theses, reports and speeches at the Third Congress of the Communist International: theses for a report on the tactics of the R.C.P. at the Third Congress of the Communist International; speech on the Italian question, speech in defence of the tactics of the Communist International, and report on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.). These documents define the tasks of the Communist Parties and their methods of winning over the working people.

Nine items in this volume are included in the Collected Works for the first time. They are: "Rough Draft of Theses Concerning the Peasants", "Preliminary Draft Resolution on Improving the Condition of Workers and Needy Peasants", speech and proposal on the fuel question at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), report on concessions at a meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, "Letter on Oil Concessions", and "To the Trade Union Committee and All Workers of the First State Motor Works". "Draft Resolution on Questions of the New Economic Policy" is also published in full for the first time. All these works deal with the rehabilitation and development of the national economy and improvement of the working people's living standards.

Another document published here for the first time is the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "Concerning the Conditions Ensuring the Research Work of Academician I. P. Pavlov and His Associates". This decree shows the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for the development of Soviet science.



V. I. LENIN
May 1921

THE TRADE UNIONS, THE PRESENT SITUATION AND TROTSKY'S MISTAKES[1]

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A JOINT MEETING OF COMMUNIST DELEGATES TO THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS AND COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE MOSCOW CITY COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS DECEMBER 30, 1920

Comrades, I must first of all apologise for departing from the rules of procedure, for anyone wishing to take part in the debate should have heard the report, the second report and the speeches. I am so unwell, unfortunately, that I have been unable to do this. But I was able yesterday to read the principal printed documents and to prepare my remarks. This departure from the rules will naturally cause you some inconvenience; not having heard the other speeches, I may go over old ground and leave out what should be dealt with. But I had no choice.

My principal material is Comrade Trotsky's pamphlet, *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*. When I compare it with the theses he submitted to the Central Committee, and go over it very carefully, I am amazed at the number of theoretical mistakes and glaring blunders it contains. How could anyone starting a big Party discussion on this question produce such a sorry excuse for a carefully thought out statement? Let me go over the main points which, I think, contain the original fundamental theoretical errors.

Trade unions are not just historically necessary; they are historically inevitable as an organisation of the industrial proletariat, and, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, embrace nearly the whole of it. This is basic, but Comrade Trotsky keeps forgetting it; he neither appreciates it nor makes it his point of departure, all this while dealing with "The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions", a subject of infinite compass.

It follows from what I have said that the trade unions have an extremely important part to play at every step of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But what is their part? I find that it is a most unusual one, as soon as I delve into this question, which is one of the most fundamental theoretically. On the one hand, the trade unions, which take in all industrial workers, are an organisation of the ruling, dominant, governing class, which has now set up a dictatorship and is exercising coercion through the state. But it is not a state organisation; nor is it one designed for coercion, but for education. It is an organisation designed to draw in and to train; it is, in fact, a school: a school of administration, a school of economic management, a school of communism. It is a very unusual type of school, because there are no teachers or pupils; this is an extremely unusual combination of what has necessarily come down to us from capitalism, and what comes from the ranks of the advanced revolutionary detachments, which you might call the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. To talk about the role of the trade unions without taking these truths into account is to fall straight into a number of errors.

Within the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the trade unions stand, if I may say so, between the Party and the government. In the transition to socialism the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitable, but it is not exercised by an organisation which takes in all industrial workers. Why not? The answer is given in the theses of the Second Congress of the Communist International on the role of political parties in general. I will not go into this here. What happens is that the Party, shall we say, absorbs the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship cannot be exercised or the functions of government performed without a foundation such as the trade unions. These functions, however, have to be performed through the medium of special institutions which are also of a new type, namely, the Soviets. What are the practical conclusions to be drawn from this peculiar situation? They are, on the one hand, that the trade unions are a *link* between the vanguard and the masses, and by their daily work bring conviction to the masses, the masses of the class

which alone is capable of taking us from capitalism to communism. On the other hand, the trade unions are a "reservoir" of the state power. This is what the trade unions are in the period of transition from capitalism to communism. In general, this transition cannot be achieved without the leadership of that class which is the only class capitalism has trained for large-scale production and which alone is divorced from the interests of the petty proprietor. But the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised through an organisation embracing the whole of that class, because in all capitalist countries (and not only over here, in one of the most backward) the proletariat is still so divided, so degraded, and so corrupted in parts (by imperialism in some countries) that an organisation taking in the whole proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship. It can be exercised only by a vanguard that has absorbed the revolutionary energy of the class. The whole is like an arrangement of cogwheels. Such is the basic mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of the essentials of transition from capitalism to communism. From this alone it is evident that there is something fundamentally wrong in principle when Comrade Trotsky points, in his first thesis, to "ideological confusion", and speaks of a crisis as existing specifically and particularly in the trade unions. If we are to speak of a crisis, we can do so only after analysing the political situation. It is Trotsky who is in "ideological confusion", because in this key question of the trade unions' role, from the standpoint of transition from capitalism to communism, he has lost sight of the fact that we have here a complex arrangement of cogwheels which cannot be a simple one; for the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be exercised by a mass proletarian organisation. It cannot work without a number of "transmission belts" running from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working people. In Russia, this mass is a peasant one. There is no such mass anywhere else, but even in the most advanced countries there is a non-proletarian, or a not entirely proletarian, mass. That is in itself enough to produce ideological confusion. But it's no use Trotsky's pinning it on others.

When I consider the role of the trade unions in production, find that Trotsky's basic mistake lies in his always dealing with it "in principle", as a matter of "general principle". All his theses are based on "general principle", an approach which is in itself fundamentally wrong, quite apart from the fact that the Ninth Party Congress said enough and more than enough about the trade unions' role in production,[2] and quite apart from the fact that in his own theses Trotsky quotes the perfectly clear statements of Lozovsky and Tomsky, who were to be his "whipping boys" and an excuse for an exercise in polemics. It turns out that there is, after all, no clash of principle, and the choice of Tomsky and Lozovsky, who wrote what Trotsky himself quotes, was an unfortunate one indeed. However hard we may look, we shall not find here any serious divergence of principle. In general, Comrade Trotsky's great mistake, his mistake of principle, lies in the fact that by raising the question of "principle" at this time he is dragging back the Party and the Soviet power. We have, thank heaven, done with principles and have gone on to practical business. We chatted about principles—rather more than we should have—at the Smolny. Today, three years later, we have decrees on all points of the production problem, and on many of its components; but such is the sad fate of our decrees: they are signed, and then we ourselves forget about them and fail to carry them out. Meanwhile, arguments about principles and differences of principle are invented. I shall later on quote a decree dealing with the trade unions' role in production, a decree all of us, including myself, I confess, have forgotten.

The actual differences, apart from those I have listed, really have nothing to do with general principles. I have had to enumerate my "differences" with Comrade Trotsky because, with such a broad theme as "The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions", he has, I am quite sure, made a number of mistakes bearing on the very essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But, this apart, one may well ask, why is it that we cannot work together, as we so badly need to do? It is because of our different *approach* to the mass, the different way of winning it over and *keeping in touch* with it. That is the whole point. And this makes the trade

union a very peculiar institution, which is set up under capitalism, which inevitably exists in the transition from capitalism to communism, and whose future is a question mark. The time when the trade unions are actually called into question is a long way off: it will be up to our grandchildren to discuss that. What matters now is how to approach the mass, to establish contact with it and win it over, and how to get the intricate transmission system working (how to run the dictatorship of the proletariat). Note that when I speak of the intricate transmission system I do not mean the machinery of the Soviets. What it may have in the way of intricacy of transmission comes under a special head. I have only been considering, in principle and in the abstract, class relations in capitalist society, which consists of a proletariat, a non-proletarian mass of working people, a petty bourgeoisie and a bourgeoisie. This alone yields an extremely complicated transmission system owing to what has been created by capitalism, quite apart from any red-tape in the Soviet administrative machinery. And that is the main point to be considered in analysing the difficulties of the trade unions' "task". Let me say this again: the actual differences do not lie where Comrade Trotsky sees them but in the question of how to approach the mass, win it over, and keep in touch with it. I must say that had we made a detailed, even if small-scale, study of our own experience and practices, we should have managed to avoid the hundreds of quite unnecessary "differences" and errors of principle in which Comrade Trotsky's pamphlet abounds. Some of his theses, for instance, polemicise against "Soviet trade-unionism". As if we hadn't enough trouble already, a new bogey has been invented. Who do you think it is? Comrade Ryazanov, of all people. I have known him for twenty odd years. You have known him less than that, but equally as well by his work. You are very well aware that assessing slogans is not one of his virtues, which he undoubtedly has. Shall we then produce theses to show that "Soviet trade-unionism" is just something that Comrade Ryazanov happened to say with little relevance? Is that being serious? If it is, we shall end up with having "Soviet trade-unionism", "Soviet anti-peace-signing", and what not!

A Soviet "ism" could be invented on every single point. (*Ryazanov*: "Soviet anti-Brestism.") Exactly, "Soviet anti-Brestism".

While betraying this lack of thoughtfulness, Comrade Trotsky falls into error himself. He seems to say that in a workers' state it is not the business of the trade unions to stand up for the material and spiritual interests of the working class. That is a mistake. Comrade Trotsky speaks of a "workers' state". May I say that this is an abstraction. It was natural for us to write about a workers' state in 1917; but it is now a patent error to say: "Since this is a workers' state without any bourgeoisie, against whom then is the working class to be protected, and for what purpose?" The whole point is that it is not quite a workers' state. That is where Comrade Trotsky makes one of his main mistakes. We have got down from general principles to practical discussion and decrees, and here we are being dragged back and prevented from tackling the business at hand. This will not do. For one thing, ours is not actually a workers' state but a workers' and peasants' state. And a lot depends on that. (*Bukharin*: "What kind of state? A workers' and peasants' state?") Comrade Bukharin back there may well shout "What kind of state? A workers' and peasants' state?" I shall not stop to answer him. Anyone who has a mind to should recall the recent Congress of Soviets,[3] and that will be answer enough.

But that is not all. Our Party Programme—a document which the author of the *ABC of Communism* knows very well—shows that ours is a workers' state *with a bureaucratic twist to it*. We have had to mark it with this dismal, shall I say, tag. There you have the reality of the transition. Well, is it right to say that in a state that has taken this shape in practice the trade unions have nothing to protect, or that we can do without them in protecting the material and spiritual interests of the massively organised proletariat? No, this reasoning is theoretically quite wrong. It takes us into the sphere of abstraction or an ideal we shall achieve in 15 or 20 years' time, and I am not so sure that we shall have achieved it even by then. What we actually have before us is a reality of which we have a good deal of knowledge, provided, that is, we keep our

heads, and do not let ourselves be carried away by intellectualist talk or abstract reasoning, or by what may appear to be "theory" but is in fact error and misapprehension of the peculiarities of transition. We now have a state under which it is the business of the massively organised proletariat to protect itself, while we, for our part, must use these workers' organisations to protect the workers from their state, and to get them to protect our state. Both forms of protection are achieved through the peculiar interweaving of our state measures and our agreeing or "coalescing" with our trade unions.

I shall have more to say about this coalescing later on. But the word itself shows that it is a mistake to conjure up an enemy in the shape of "Soviet trade-unionism", for "coalescing" implies the existence of *distinct* things that *have yet to be* coalesced: "coalescing" implies the need to be able to use measures of the state power to protect the material and spiritual interests of the massively organised proletariat *from* that very same state power. When the coalescing has produced *coalescence* and *integration*, we shall meet in congress for a business-like discussion of actual experience, instead of "disagreements" on principle or theoretical reasoning in the abstract. There is an equally lame attempt to find differences of principle with Comrades Tomsky and Lozovsky, whom Comrade Trotsky treats as trade union "bureaucrats"—I shall later on say which side in this controversy tends to be bureaucratic. We all know that while Comrade Ryazanov may love a slogan, and must have one which is all but an expression of principle, it is not one of Comrade Tomsky's many vices. I think, therefore, that it would be going a bit too far to challenge Comrade Tomsky to a battle of principles on this score (as Comrade Trotsky has done). I am positively astonished at this. One would have thought that we had grown up since the days when we all sinned a great deal in the way of factional, theoretical and various other disagreements—although we naturally did some good as well. It is time we stopped inventing and blowing up differences of principle and got down to practical work. I never knew that Tomsky was eminently a theoretician or that he claimed to be one; it may be one of his failings, but that is something else

again. Tomsky, who has been working very smoothly with the trade union- movement, must in his position provide a reflection of this complex transition—whether he should do so consciously or unconsciously is quite another matter and I am not saying that he has always done it consciously—so that if something is hurting the mass, and they do not know what it is, and he does not know what it is (*applause*, *laughter*) but raises a howl, I say that is not a failing but should be put down to his credit. I am quite sure that Tomsky has many partial theoretical mistakes. And if we all sat down to a table and started thoughtfully writing resolutions or theses, we should correct them all; we might not even bother to do that because production work is more interesting than the rectifying of minute theoretical disagreements.

I come now to "industrial democracy", shall I say, for Bukharin's benefit. We all know that everyone has his weak points, that even big men have little weak spots, and this also goes for Bukharin. He seems to be incapable of resisting any little word with a flourish to it. He seemed to derive an almost sensuous pleasure from writing the resolution on industrial democracy at the Central Committee Plenum on December 7. But the closer I look at this "industrial democracy", the more clearly I see that it is half-baked and theoretically false. It is nothing but a hodge-podge. With this as an example, let me say once again, at a Party meeting at least: "Comrade N. I. Bukharin, the Republic, theory and you yourself will benefit from less verbal extravagance." (*Applause*.) Industry is indispensable. Democracy is a category proper only to the political sphere. There can be no objection to the use of this word in speeches or articles. An article takes up and clearly expresses one relationship and no more. But it is quite strange to hear you trying to turn this into a thesis, and to see you wanting to coin it into a slogan, uniting the "ayes" and the "nays"; it is strange to hear you say, like Trotsky, that the Party will have "to choose between two trends". I shall deal separately with whether the Party must do any "choosing" and who is to blame for putting the Party in this position of having to "choose". Things being what they are, we say: "At any rate, see that you

choose fewer slogans, like 'industrial democracy', which contain nothing but confusion and are theoretically wrong." Both Trotsky and Bukharin failed to think out this term theoretically and ended up in confusion. "Industrial democracy" suggests things well beyond the circle of ideas with which they were carried away. They wanted to lay greater emphasis and focus attention on industry. It is one thing to emphasise something in an article or speech; it is quite another to frame it into a thesis and ask the Party to choose, and so I say: cast your vote against it, because it is confusion. Industry is indispensable, democracy is not. Industrial democracy breeds some utterly false ideas. The idea of one-man management was advocated only a little while ago. We must not make a mess of things and confuse people: how do you expect them to know when you want democracy, when one-man management, and when dictatorship. But on no account must we renounce dictatorship either—I hear Bukharin behind me growling: "Quite right." (*Laughter. Applause.*)

But to go on. Since September we have been talking about switching from the principle of priority to that of equalisation, and we have said as much in the resolution of the all-Party conference, which was approved by the Central Committee.[4] The question is not an easy one, because we find that we have to combine equalisation with priority, which are incompatible. But after all we do have some knowledge of Marxism and have learned how and when opposites can and must be combined; and what is most important is that in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined opposites again and again.

The question obviously requires thoughtfulness and circumspection. After all, we did discuss these questions of principle at those deplorable plenary meetings of the Central Committee*—which yielded the groups of seven and eight, and Comrade Bukharin's celebrated "buffer group"[6]—and we did establish that there was no easy tran-

* The reference is to the November and December plenary meeting of the Central Committee in 1920. For the text of their resolutions see *Pravda* No. 255 of November 13, and No. 281 of December 14, and also *Izvestia of the C.C., R.C.P.*[5] No. 26 of December 20.

sition from the priority principle to that of equalisation. We shall have to put in a bit of effort to implement the decision of the September Conference. After all, these opposite terms can be combined either into a cacophony or a symphony. Priority implies preference for one industry out of a group of vital industries because of its greater urgency. What does such preference entail? How great can it be? This is a difficult question, and I must say that it will take more than zeal to solve it; it may even take more than a heroic effort on the part of a man who is possibly endowed with many excellent qualities and who will do wonders on the right job; this is a very peculiar matter and calls for the correct approach. And so if we are to raise this question of priority and equalisation we must first of all give it some careful thought, but that is just what we fail to find in Comrade Trotsky's work; the further he goes in revising his original theses, the more mistakes he makes. Here is what we find in his latest theses:

> "The equalisation line should be pursued in the sphere of *consumption*, that is, the conditions of the working people's existence as individuals. In the sphere of *production*, the principle of priority will long remain decisive for us"... (thesis 41, p. 31 of Trotsky's pamphlet).

This is a real theoretical muddle. It is all wrong. Priority is preference, but it is nothing without preference in consumption. If all the preference I get is a couple of ounces of bread a day I am not likely to be very happy. The preference part of priority implies preference in consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe dream, a fleeting cloud, and we are, after all, materialists. The workers are also materialists; if you say shock work, they say, let's have the bread, and the clothes, and the beef. That is the view we now take, and have always taken, in discussing these questions time without number with reference to various concrete matters in the Council of Defence,[7] when one would say: "I'm doing shock work", and would clamour for boots, and another: "I get the boots, otherwise your shock workers won't hold out, and all your priority will fizzle out."

We find, therefore, that in the theses the approach to equalisation and priority is basically wrong. What is more,

it is a retreat from what has actually been achieved and tested in practice. We can't have that; it will lead to no good.

Then there is the question of "coalescing". The best thing to do about "coalescing" right now is to keep quiet. Speech is silver, but silence is golden. Why so? It is because we have got down to coalescing in practice; there is not a single large gubernia economic council, no major department of the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Communications, etc., where something is not being coalesced *in practice*. But are the results all they should be? Ay, there's the rub. Look at the way coalescence has *actually* been carried out, and what it has produced. There are countless decrees introducing coalescence in the various institutions. But we have yet to make a business-like study of our own practical experience; we have yet to go into the actual results of all this; we have yet to discover what a certain type of coalescence has produced in a particular industry, what happened when member X of the gubernia trade union council held post Y in the gubernia economic council, how many months he was at it, etc. What we have not failed to do is to invent a disagreement on coalescence as a principle, and make a mistake in the process, but then we have always been quick at that sort of thing; but we were not up to the mark when it came to analysing and verifying our own experience. When we have congresses of Soviets with committees not only on the application of the better-farming law in the various agricultural areas but also on coalescence and its results in the Saratov Gubernia flour-milling industry, the Petrograd metal industry, the Donbas coal industry, etc., and when these committees, having mustered the facts, declare: "We have made a study of so and so", then I shall say: "Now we have got down to business, we have finally grown up." But could anything be more erroneous and deplorable than the fact that we are being presented with "theses" splitting hairs over the principle of coalescence, after we have been at it for three years? We have taken the path of coalescence, and I am sure it was the right thing to do, but we have not yet made an adequate study of the results of our experience. That is why keeping quiet

is the only common sense tactics on the question of coalescence.

A study must be made of practical experience. I have signed decrees and resolutions containing instructions on practical coalescence, and no theory is half so important as practice. That is why when I hear: "Let's discuss 'coalescence'", I say: "Let's analyse what we have done." There is no doubt that we have made many mistakes. It may well be that a great part of our decrees need amending. I accept that, for I am not in the least enamoured of decrees. But in that case let us have some practical proposals as to what actually has to be altered. That would be a business-like approach. That would not be a waste of time. That would not lead to bureaucratic projecteering. But I find that that is exactly what's wrong with Trotsky's "Practical Conclusions", Part VI of his pamphlet. He says that from one-third to one-half of the members of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council should serve on both bodies, and from one-half to two-thirds, on the collegiums, etc. Why so? No special reason, just "rule of thumb". It is true, of course, that rule of thumb is frequently used to lay down similar proportions in our decrees, but then why is it inevitable in decrees? I hold no brief for all decrees as such and have no intention of making them appear better than they actually are. Quite often rule of thumb is used in them to fix such purely arbitrary proportions as one-half or one-third of the total number of members, etc. When a decree says that, it means: try doing it this way, and later on we shall assess the results of your "try-out". We shall later sort out the results. After sorting them out, we shall move on. We are working on coalescence and we expect to improve it because we are becoming more efficient and practical-minded.

But I seem to have lapsed into "production propaganda". That can't be helped. It is a question that needs dealing with in any discussion of the role of the trade unions in production.

My next question will therefore be that of production propaganda. This again is a practical matter and we approach it accordingly. Government agencies have already

been set up to conduct production propaganda. I can't tell whether they are good or had; they have to be tested and there's no need for any "theses" on this subject at all.

If we take a general view of the part trade unions have to play in industry, we need not, in this question of democracy, go beyond the usual democratic practices. Nothing will come of such tricky phrases as "industrial democracy", for they are all wrong. That is the first point. The second is production propaganda. The agencies are there. Trotsky's theses deal with production propaganda. That is quite useless, because in this case theses are old hat. We do not know as yet whether the agencies are good or bad. But we can tell after testing them in action. Let us do some studying and polling. Assuming, let us say, that a congress has 10 committees with 10 men on each, let us ask: "You have been dealing with production propaganda, haven't you? What are the results?" Having made a study of this, we should reward those who have done especially well, and discard what has proved unsuccessful. We do have some practical experience; it may not be much but it is there; yet we are being dragged away from it and back to these "theses on principles". This looks more like a "reactionary" movement than "trade unionism".

There is then the third point, that of bonuses. Here is the role and task of the trade unions in production: distribution of bonuses *in kind*. A start on it has been made. Things have been set in motion. Five hundred thousand poods of grain had been allocated for the purpose, and one hundred and seventy thousand has been distributed. How well and how correctly, I cannot tell. The Council of People's Commissars was told that they were not making a good job of this distribution, which turned out to be an additional wage rather than a bonus. This was pointed out by officials of the trade unions and the People's Commissariat for Labour. We appointed a commission to look into the matter but that has not yet been done. One hundred and seventy thousand poods of grain has been given away, but this needs to be done in such a way as to reward those who display the heroism, the zeal, the talent, and the dedication of the thrifty manager, in a word, all the qualities that Trotsky extols. But the task now is

not to extol this in theses but to provide the bread and the beef. Wouldn't it be better, for instance, to deprive one category of workers of their beef and give it as a bonus to workers designated as "shock" workers? We do not renounce that kind of priority. That is a priority we need. Let us take a closer look at our practices in the application of priority.

The fourth point is disciplinary courts. I hope Comrade Bukharin will not take offence if I say that without disciplinary courts the role of the trade unions in industry, "industrial democracy", is a mere trifle. But the fact is that there is nothing at all about this in your theses. "Great grief!" is therefore the only thing that can be said about Trotsky's theses and Bukharin's attitude, from the standpoint of principle, theory and practice.

I am confirmed in this conclusion when I say to myself: yours is not a Marxist approach to the question. This quite apart from the fact that there are a number of theoretical mistakes in the theses It is not a Marxist approach to the evaluation of the "role and tasks of the trade unions", because such a broad subject cannot be tackled without giving thought to the peculiar political aspects of the present situation. After all, Comrade Bukharin and I did say in the resolution of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. on trade unions that politics is the most concentrated expression of economics.

If we analysed the current political situation, we might say that we were going through a transition period within a transition period. The whole of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a transition period, but we now have, you might say, a heap of new transition periods: the demobilisation of the army, the end of the war, the possibility of having a much longer breathing space in peace than before, and a more solid transition from the war front to the labour front. This—and this alone—is causing a change in the attitude of the proletarian class to the peasant class. What kind of change is it? Now this calls for a close examination, but nothing of the sort follows from your theses. Until we have taken this close look, we must learn to wait. The people are overweary, considerable stocks that had to be used for certain priority industries have been so used;

the proletariat's attitude to the peasantry is undergoing a change. The war weariness is terrible, and the needs have increased, but production has increased insufficiently or not at all. On the other hand, as I said in my report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, our application of coercion was correct and successful whenever we had been able to back it up from the start with persuasion. I must say that Trotsky and Bukharin have entirely failed to take account of this very important consideration.

Have we laid a sufficiently broad and solid base of persuasion for all these new production tasks? No, indeed, we have barely started doing it. We have not yet made the masses a party to them. Now I ask you, can the masses tackle these new assignments right away? No, they cannot, because while there is now no need for special propaganda on the question of, say, whether Wrangel the landowner should be overthrown or whether any sacrifices should be spared for the purpose, we have just started to work on this question of the role of the trade unions in production, and I mean the business aspect of the matter and not the question of "principle", the reasoning about "Soviet trade-unionism" and such like trifles; we have just set up the agency for production propaganda, but we have as yet no experience. We have introduced the payment of bonuses in kind, but we lack the experience. We have set up the disciplinary courts, but we are not yet aware of the results. Still, from the political standpoint it is the preparedness of the masses that is crucial. Has the question been prepared, studied, weighed, and considered from this angle? No, far from it. And that is a basic, deep-going and dangerous political mistake, because if ever there was need to act according to the rule of measuring your cloth seven times before cutting it once, it is in this question. We find instead that the cutting has been started in earnest without a single measure having been taken. We are told that "the Party must choose between two trends", but the false slogan of "industrial democracy" was invented without a single measuring.

We must try to understand the meaning of this slogan, especially in the present political situation, when the masses are confronted with bureaucratic practices in visual

form, and when we have the question itself on the agenda. Comrade Trotsky says in his theses that on the question of workers' democracy it remains for the Congress to "enter it unanimously in the record". That is not correct. There is more to it than an entry in the record; an entry in the record fixes what has been fully weighed and measured, whereas the question of industrial democracy is far from having been fully weighed, tried and tested. Just think how the masses may interpret this slogan of "industrial democracy".

"We, the rank and file who work among the masses, say that there is need for new blood, that things must be corrected and the bureaucrats ousted, and here you are beating about the bush, talking about getting on with production and displaying democracy in achieving success in production; we refuse to get on with production under such a bureaucratic set-up of central and other boards, we want a different one." You have not given the masses a chance to discuss things, to see the point, and to think it over; you have not allowed the Party to gain fresh experience but are already acting in haste, overdoing it, and producing formulas which are theoretically false. Just think how this mistake will be further amplified by unduly zealous functionaries! A political leader is responsible not only for the quality of his leadership but also for the acts of those he leads. He may now and again be unaware of what they are about, he may often wish they had not done something, but the responsibility still falls on him.

I now come to the November 9 and December 7 plenary meetings of the Central Committee, which gave expression to all these mistakes in action, rather than in logical categories, premises and theoretical reasoning. This threw the Central Committee into confusion; it is the first time this has happened in our Party's history, in time of revolution, and it is dangerous. The crux was that there was a division, there was the "buffer" group of Bukharin, Preobrazhensky and Serebryakov, which did the most harm and created the most confusion.

You will recall the story of Glavpolitput[8] and Tsektran.[9] The resolution of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. in April 1920 said that Glavpolitput was being set up as a "tempo-

rary" institution, and that conditions should be brought back to normal "*as soon as possible*". In September you read, "Return to normal conditions".* The plenary meeting was held in November (November 9), and Trotsky came up with his theses and ideas about trade-unionism. However fine some of his points about production propaganda may be, he should have been told that all this was neither here nor there, quite beside the mark, and a step backward; it is something the C.C. should not be dealing with at present. Bukharin says: "It is very good." It may be very good, but that is no answer to the question. After a heated debate, a resolution is adopted by 10 to 4 saying in a polite and comradely way that Tsektran has itself "already got down to ... strengthening and developing methods of proletarian democracy within the union". It adds that Tsektran must "take an active part in the general work of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, being incorporated in it on an equal footing with other trade union bodies".

What is the gist of the Central Committee's decision? It is obviously this: "Comrades of Tsektran! You must do more than go through the motions of carrying out Congress and C.C. decisions, you must actually do so to help all trade unions by your work, wipe out every trace of red-tape, favouritism, arrogance, the we-are-better-than-you attitude, and boasts of being richer and getting more aid."

We then get down to brass tacks. A commission is set up, and the names of its members are published. Trotsky walks out, refuses to serve on the commission, and disrupts its work. What are his reasons? There is only one. Lutovinov is apt to play at opposition. That is true, and that also goes for Osinsky. Frankly speaking, it is not a pleasant

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* See *Izvestia of the C.C., R.C.P.* No. 26, p. 2, the Resolution of the September Plenum of the C.C., Paragraph 3, which said: "The C.C. further believes that there has been a great improvement in the grave situation in the transport workers' unions, which produced Glavpolitput and Politvod,[10] as temporary levers for assisting and organising the work. Therefore, incorporation of these organisations in the union, as union agencies being adapted to and absorbed by the union apparatus, can and must now proceed."

game. But do you call that a reason? Osinsky was making an excellent job of the seed campaign. The thing to do was to work with him, in spite of his "opposition campaign", for this business of disrupting the work of a commission is bureaucratic, un-Soviet, un-socialist, incorrect and politically harmful. Such methods are doubly incorrect and politically harmful at a time when there is need to separate the wheat from the chaff within the "opposition". When Osinsky conducts an "opposition campaign", I tell him: "This is a harmful campaign", but it is a pleasure to see him conduct the seed campaign. I shall not deny that, like Ishchenko and Shlyapnikov, Lutovinov is making a mistake in his "opposition campaign", but that is no reason to disrupt the work of a commission.

What did the commission in fact signify? It signified transition to practical work from intellectualist talk about sterile disagreements. What the commission was due to discuss and deal with was production propaganda, bonuses, and disciplinary courts. It was then that Comrade Bukharin, the head of the "buffer group", together with Preobrazhensky and Serebryakov, seeing the Central Committee dangerously divided, set out to create a buffer, one that I find difficult to describe in parliamentary terms. If I could draw cartoons as well as Comrade Bukharin does, I would depict him as a man pouring a bucket of kerosene on the flames, and give the following caption: "Buffer kerosene". Comrade Bukharin wanted to create something, and his intentions were no doubt most sincere and entirely in the "buffer" spirit. But the buffer failed to materialise; the upshot was that he failed to take account of the political situation and, what is more, made some theoretical mistakes.

Should all such disputes have been brought up for broad discussion? Was it worth going into these trifles? Was it worth wasting the few precious weeks before a Party congress? We could have used the time to analyse and study the question of bonuses, disciplinary courts and coalescence. Those are the questions we could have given a practical solution to in the C.C. commission. If Comrade Bukharin wished to create a buffer, instead of giving a display of barking up the wrong tree, he should have demanded and

insisted that Comrade Trotsky remained on the commission. If he had said and done that, we should have been on the right track, with the commission looking into the practical aspects of such things as one-man management, democracy, appointees, etc.

But to go on. By December (the December 7 Plenary Meeting), we were already faced with this flare-up of the watermen, which intensified the conflict, and as a result there were now eight votes in the Central Committee to our seven. Comrade Bukharin, in an effort to bring about a "reconciliation" through the use of his "buffer", hastily wrote the "theoretical" part of the December plenum's resolution, but with the commission a shambles, nothing, of course, could come of it.

Where did Glavpolitput and Tsektran err? Certainly not in their use of coercion; that goes to their credit. Their mistake was that they failed to switch to normal trade union work at the right time and without conflict, as the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. required; they failed to adapt themselves to the trade unions and help them by meeting them on an equal footing. Heroism, zeal, etc., are the positive side of military experience; red-tape and arrogance are the negative side of the experience of the worst military types. Trotsky's theses, whatever his intentions, do not tend to play up the best, but the worst in military experience. It must be borne in mind that a political leader is responsible not only for his own policy but also for the acts of those he leads.

The last thing I want to tell you about—something I called myself a fool for yesterday—is that I had altogether overlooked Comrade Rudzutak's theses. His weak point is that he does not speak in ringing tones; he is not an impressive or eloquent speaker. He is liable to be overlooked. Unable to attend the meetings yesterday, I went through my material and found a printed leaflet issued for the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference, which was-held from November 2 to 6, 1920.[11] It is called: *The Tasks of the Trade Unions in Production*. Let me read it to you, it is not long.

FIFTH ALL-RUSSIA TRADE UNION CONFERENCE

The tasks of the trade unions in production

(THESES OF COMRADE RUDZUTAK'S REPORT)

1. Immediately after the October Revolution, the trade unions proved to be *almost the only* bodies which, while exercising workers' *control*, were able and bound to undertake the work of organising and *managing production*. In that early period of the Soviet power, no state apparatus for the management of the national economy had yet been set up, while sabotage on the part of factory owners and senior technicians brought the working class squarely up against the task of safeguarding industry and getting the whole of the country's economic apparatus back into normal running order.

2. In the subsequent period of the Supreme Economic Council's work, when a considerable part of it consisted in liquidating private enterprises and organising state management to run them, *the trade unions carried on this work jointly and side by side with the state* economic management *agencies*.

This *parallel set-up* was explained and justified by the weakness of the state agencies; historically it was vindicated by the establishment of full contact between the trade unions and the economic management agencies.

3. *The centre of gravity in the management of industry* and the drafting of a production programme *shifted to these agencies* as a result of their administration, the gradual spread of their control over production and management and the co-ordination of the several parts. In view of this, the work of the trade unions in organising production was reduced to *participation in forming the collegiums* of chief administrations, central boards, and factory managements.

4. At the present time, we are once again squarely faced with the question of establishing the closest possible ties between the economic agencies of the Soviet Republic and the trade unions, for the best use must be made of every working individual, and the whole mass of producers must be induced to take a conscious part in production, for the state apparatus of economic management, gradually gaining in size and complexity, has been transformed into a huge bureaucratic machine which is out of all proportion to the scale of industry, and is inevitably impelling the trade unions to take direct part in organising production not only through its men in the economic agencies but also as an organised whole.

5. While the Supreme Economic Council's point of departure in drawing up an overall production programme is *the availability of the material elements of production* (raw materials, fuel, the state of machinery, etc.), the trade unions must look at it *from the standpoint of organising labour* for the tasks of production and its best use. Therefore, the overall *production programme*, *in whole and in part*, *must be drawn up with the participation of the trade unions* in order to combine the use of the material resources of production and manpower in the best possible way.

6. Only if the whole mass of those engaged in production *consciously take a hand* in establishing real labour discipline, fighting deserters from the labour front, etc., can these tasks be fulfilled. *Bureaucratic methods and orders* will not do; it must be brought home to each participant in production that his production tasks are appropriate and important; that each must take a hand not only in fulfilling his assignments, but also play an intelligent part in correcting any technical and organisational defects in the sphere of production.

The tasks of the trade unions in this sphere are tremendous. They must teach *their members in each shop* and in each factory to *react to and take account of all defects in the use of manpower arising from improper handling* of technical means or unsatisfactory management. *The sum total of the experience gained by separate* enterprises and industry as a whole must be used to combat red-tape, bureaucratic practices and carelessness.

7. In order to lay special emphasis on the importance of these production tasks, they must be organisationally worked into current operations. As the *economic departments* of the trade unions, which are being set up in pursuance of the decision of the Third All-Russia Congress, extend their activity, they must gradually explain and define the nature of all trade union work. Thus, in the present social conditions, when all of production is geared to the satisfaction of the working people's needs, *wage rates and bonuses must be closely tied in with and must depend on the extent to which the production plan is fulfilled*. Bonuses in kind and partial payment of wages in kind must be gradually transformed into a *system of workers' supply* which depends on the level of labour productivity.

8. Trade union work on these lines would, on the one hand, put an end to the existence of *parallel bodies* (*political departments*, *etc.*) and, on the other, restore the close ties between the masses and the economic management agencies.

9. After the Third Congress, the trade unions largely failed to carry out their programme for participation in economic construction, owing, first, to the *military conditions*, and second, to their *organisational weakness* and isolation from the administrative and practical work of the economic bodies.

10. In view of this, the trade unions should set themselves the following immediate practical tasks: a) the most active participation in solving production and management problems; b) direct participation, with the respective economic agencies, *in setting up competent* administrative bodies; c) careful consideration of the various *types of management bodies*, and their influence on production; d) unfailing participation in working out and laying down economic plans and production programmes; e) *organisation of labour* in accordance with the economic priorities; f) development of an extensive organisation for production *agitation and propaganda*.

11. The economic departments of the *trade unions* and of their organisations must be actually transformed into powerful and expeditious levers for the trade unions' systematic participation in organising production.

12. In the matter of providing workers with steady material supplies, the trade unions must shift their *influence onto the distribution bodies of the Commissariat for Food*, both local and central, taking a practical and business-like part and exercising *controI* in all the distributive bodies, and paying special attention to the activity of central and gubernia *workers' supply commissions*.

13. In view of the fact that the narrow departmental interests of some chief administrations, central boards, etc., have plunged the so-called "priority" into a state of utter confusion, the trade unions must everywhere uphold the real order of economic priorities and review the existing system so as to determine them in accordance with the actual importance of the various industries and the availability of material resources in the country.

14. Special attention must be given to the so-called model group of factories to help them set an example through the organisation of efficient management, labour discipline and trade union activities.

15. In labour organisation, apart from the introduction of a harmonious wage-rate system and the overhaul of output rates, the trade unions should take a firm hand in fighting the various *forms of labour desertion* (absenteeism, lateness, etc.). The disciplinary courts, which have not received due attention until now, must be turned into a real means of combating breaches of proletarian labour discipline.

16. The economic departments must be entrusted with the fulfilment of these tasks and also the drafting of a practical plan for production propaganda and a number of measures to improve the economic condition of the workers. It is necessary, therefore, to authorise the economic department of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions to call a special *All-Russia Conference of Economic Departments* in the near future to discuss the practical problems of economic construction in connection with the world of state economic agencies.

I hope you see now why I called myself names. There you have a platform, and it is very much better than the one Comrade Trotsky wrote after a great deal of thinking, and the one Comrade Bukharin wrote (the December 7 Plenum resolution) without any thinking at all. All of us members of the Central Committee who have been out of touch with the trade union movement for many years would profit from Comrade Rudzutak's experience, and this also goes for Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Bukharin. The trade unions have adopted this platform.

We all entirely forgot about the disciplinary courts, but "industrial democracy", without bonuses in kind or disciplinary courts, is nothing but empty talk.

I make a comparison between Rudzutak's theses and those submitted by Trotsky to the Central Committee. At the end of thesis 5, I read:

> "...a reorganisation of the unions must be started right away, that is, a selection of functionaries must be above all made from precisely that angle"....

There you have an example of the real bureaucratic approach: Trotsky and Krestinsky selecting the trade union "functionaries"!

Let me say this once again: here you have an explanation of Tsektran's mistake. It was not wrong to use pressure; that goes to its credit. It made the mistake of failing to cope with the general tasks of all the trade unions, of failing to act itself and to help all the trade unions to employ the disciplinary comrades' courts more correctly, swiftly and successfully. When I read about the disciplinary courts in Comrade Rudzutak's theses it occurred to me that there might be a decree on this matter. And in fact there was. It is the *Regulations* Governing Workers' Disciplinary Comrades' Courts, issued on November 14, 1919 (*Collection of Statutes* No. 537).

The trade unions have the key role in these courts. I don't know how good these courts are, how well they function, and whether they always function. A study of our own practical experience would be a great deal more useful than anything Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin have written.

Let me end by summing up everything there is on the question. I must say that it was a great mistake to put up these disagreements for broad Party discussion and the Party Congress. It was a political mistake. We should have had a business-like discussion in the commission, and only there, and would have in that case moved forward; as it is we are sliding back, and shall keep sliding back to abstract theoretical propositions for several weeks, instead of dealing with the problem in a business-like manner. Personally, I am sick and tired of it, and quite apart from my illness, it would give me great pleasure to get away from it all. I am prepared to seek refuge anywhere.

The net result is that there are a number of theoretical

mistakes in Trotsky's and Bukharin's theses: they contain a number of things that are wrong in principle. Politically, the whole approach to the matter is utterly tactless. Comrade Trotsky's "theses" are politically harmful. The sum and substance of his policy is bureaucratic harassment of the trade unions. Our Party Congress will, I am sure, condemn and reject it. (*Prolonged*, *stormy applause*.)

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THE PARTY CRISIS

The pre-Congress discussion is in full swing. Minor differences and disagreements have grown into big ones, which always happens when someone persists in a minor mistake and balks at its correction, or when those who are making a big mistake seize on the minor mistake of one or more persons.

That is how disagreements and splits always grow. That is how we "grew up" from minor disagreements to syndicalism, which means a complete break with communism and an inevitable split in the Party if it is not healthy and strong enough to purge itself of the malaise.

We must have the courage to face the bitter truth. The Party is sick. The Party is down with the fever. The whole point is whether the malaise has affected only the "feverish upper ranks", and perhaps only those in Moscow, or the whole organism. And if the latter is the case, is it capable of healing itself completely within the next few weeks, before the Party Congress and at the Party Congress, making a relapse impossible, or will the malaise linger and become dangerous?

What is it that needs to be done for a rapid and certain cure? *All* members of the Party must make a calm and painstaking *study* of 1) the essence of the disagreements and 2) the development of the Party struggle. A study must be made of both, because the essence of the disagreements is revealed, clarified and specified (and very often transformed as well) in the *course of the struggle*, which, passing through its various stages, always shows, at every stage, a *different* line-up and number of combatants, *different* positions in the struggle, etc. A *study* must be made

of both, and a demand made for the most exact, printed documents that can be thoroughly verified. Only a hopeless idiot will believe oral statements. If *no* documents are available, there must be an examination of witnesses on *both* or several sides and the grilling must take place in the presence of witnesses.

Let me outline the essence of the disagreements and the successive stages in the struggle, as I see them.

Stage one. The Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference November 2-6. The battle is joined. Trotsky and Tomsky are the only Central Committee "combatants". Trotsky lets drop a "catchy phrase" about "shaking up" the trade unions. Tomsky argues very heatedly. The majority of the Central Committee members are on the fence. The serious mistake they (and I above all) made was that we "overlooked" Rudzutak's theses, *The Tasks of the Trade Unions in Production*, adopted by the Fifth Conference. That is the *most* important document in the whole of the controversy.

Stage two. The Central Committee Plenum of November 9. Trotsky submits his "draft theses", *The Trade Unions and Their Future Role*, advocating the "shake-up" policy camouflaged or adorned with talk of a "severe crisis" gripping the trade unions, and their new tasks and methods Tomsky, strongly supported by Lenin, considers that in view of Tsektran's irregularities and bureaucratic excesses it is the "shake-up" that is the crux of the whole controversy. In the course of it, Lenin makes a number of obviously exaggerated and therefore mistaken "attacks", which produces the need for a "buffer group", and this is made up of ten members of the Central Committee (the group includes Bukharin and Zinoviev, but neither Trotsky nor Lenin). It resolves "not to put the disagreements up for broad discussion", and, *cancelling Lenin's report* (to the trade unions), appoints Zinoviev as the rapporteur and instructs him to "present a business-like and non-controversial report.

Trotsky's theses are rejected. Lenin's theses are adopted. In its final form, the resolution is adopted by ten votes to four (Trotsky, Andreyev, Krestinsky and Rykov). And this resolution advocates "sound forms of the militarisa-

tion of labour", condemns "the degeneration of centralism and militarised forms of work into bureaucratic practices, petty tyranny, red-tape", etc. Tsektran is instructed to "take a more active part in the general work of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, being incorporated in it on an equal footing with other trade union bodies".

The Central Committee sets up a trade union commission and elects Comrade Trotsky to it. He refuses to work on the commission, magnifying by this step *alone* his original mistake, which subsequently leads to factionalism. Without that step, his mistake (in submitting incorrect theses) remained a very minor one, such as every member of the Central Committee, without exception, has had occasion to make.

Stage three. The conflict between the water transport workers and Tsektran in December. The Central Committee Plenary Meeting of December 7. It is no longer Trotsky and Lenin, but Trotsky and Zinoviev who are the chief "combatants". As chairman of the trade union commission, Zinoviev inquires into the December dispute between the water transport workers and Tsektran. The Central Committee Plenary Meeting of December 7. Zinoviev makes a practical proposal for an immediate change in the composition of Tsektran. This is opposed by a majority of the Central Committee. Rykov goes over to Zinoviev's side. Bukharin's resolution—the substantive part of which is three-quarters in favour of the water transport workers, while the preamble, rejecting the proposal to "reconstruct" the trade unions "from above" (§ 3), approves of the celebrated "industrial democracy" (§ 5)—is adopted. Our group of Central Committee members is in the minority, being opposed to Bukharin's resolution chiefly because we consider the "buffer" a paper one; for Trotsky's non-participation in the trade union commission's work actually implies a continuation of the struggle and its transfer outside the Central Committee. We propose that the Party Congress be convened on February 6, 1921. That is adopted. The postponement to March 6 was agreed to later, on the demand of the outlying areas.

Stage four. The Eighth Congress of Soviets. On December 25, Trotsky issues his "platform pamphlet", *The Role*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

and Tasks of the Trade Unions. From the standpoint of formal democracy, Trotsky had an uncontested right to issue his platform, for on December 24 the Central Committee had permitted free discussion. From the standpoint of revolutionary interest, this was blowing up the mistake out of all proportion and *creating a faction* on a faulty platform. The pamphlet quotes from the Central Committee resolution of December 7 only that part which refers to "industrial democracy" but does *not* quote what was said against "reconstruction from above". The buffer created by Bukharin on December 7 with Trotsky's aid was wrecked by Trotsky on December 25. The pamphlet from beginning to end is shot through with the "shake-up" spirit. Apart from its intellectualist flourishes ("production atmosphere", "industrial democracy"), which are wrong in theory and in practice fall within the concept, ambit and tasks of production propaganda, it *fails* to indicate any "new" "tasks or methods" that were to gild or camouflage or justify the "shake-up".

Stage five. The discussion before thousands of responsible Party workers from all over Russia at the R.C.P. group of the Eighth Congress of Soviets on December 30. The controversy flares up to full blast. Zinoviev and Lenin on one side, Trotsky and Bukharin on the other. Bukharin wants to play the "buffer, but speaks only against Lenin and Zinoviev, and not a word against Trotsky. Bukharin reads out an excerpt from his theses (published on January 16), but only that part which says nothing about the rupture with communism and the switch to syndicalism. Shlyapnikov (on behalf of the Workers' Opposition[12]) reads out the syndicalist platform, which Trotsky had demolished before hand (thesis 16 of his platform) and which (partly, perhaps, for that reason) no one is inclined to take seriously.

In my opinion, the climax of the whole discussion of December 30 was the reading of Comrade Rudzutak's theses. Indeed, Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin, far from being able to object to them, even invented the legend that the "best part" of the theses had been drawn up by *members of Tsektran*—Holtzmann, Andreyev and Lyubimov. And that is why Trotsky humorously and amiably twitted Lenin on his unsuccessful "diplomacy", by which, he said, Lenin

had wanted to "call off or disrupt" the discussion, and find a "lightning conductor", "accidentally catching hold of Tsektran instead of the lightning conductor".

The legend was exploded that very day, December 30, by Rudzutak, who pointed out that Lyubimov "did not exist" on the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, that in its presidium Holtzmann had voted against these theses, and that they had been drawn up by a commission consisting of Andreyev, Tsiperovich and himself.[13]

But let us for a moment assume that Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin's legend is true. Nothing so completely defeats them as such an assumption. For what is the conclusion if the "Tsektranites" had inserted their "new" ideas into Rudzutak's resolution, if Rudzutak had accepted them, if all the trade unions had adopted this resolution (November 2-6!), and if Bukharin and Trotsky have nothing to say against it?

It is that all of Trotsky's disagreements are artificial, that *neither* he *nor* the "Tsektranites" *have any* "new tasks or methods", and that everything practical and substantive had been said, adopted and *decided upon* by the trade unions, *even before the question was raised in the Central Committee.*

If anyone ought to be taken thoroughly to task and "shaken up", it is not the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions but the Central Committee of the R.C.P., for having "overlooked" Rudzutak's theses, a mistake which allowed an altogether empty discussion to flare up. There is nothing to *cover up* the mistake of the Tsektranites (which is not an excessive one but is, in essence, a very common one, consisting in some exaggeration of bureaucracy). What is more, it needs to be rectified, and not covered up, toned down or justified. That's all there is to it.

I summed up the substance of Rudzutak's theses on December 30 in four points: 1) Ordinary democracy (without any exaggerations, without denying the Central Committee's right of "appointment", etc., but also without any obstinate defence of the mistakes and excesses of certain "appointees", which need to be rectified); 2) Production propaganda (this includes all that is practical in clumsy, ridiculous, theoretically wrong "formulas" like "industrial democracy", "production atmosphere", etc.). We have

established a *Soviet institution*, the All-Russia Production Propaganda Bureau. We must do everything to support it and not spoil production work by *producing ... bad theses*. That's all there is to it; 3) Bonuses in kind and 4) Disciplinary comrades' courts. Without Points 3 and 4, all talk about "the role and tasks in production", etc., is empty, highbrow chatter; and it is these two points that are omitted from Trotsky's "platform pamphlet". But they are in Rudzutak's theses.

While dealing with the December 30 discussion, I must correct another mistake of mine. I said: "Ours is not actually a workers' state but a workers' and peasants' state." Comrade Bukharin immediately exclaimed: 'What kind of a state?" In reply I referred him to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, which had just closed. I went back to the report of that discussion and found that I was wrong and Comrade Bukharin was right. What I should have said is: "A workers' state is an abstraction. What we actually have is a workers' state, with this peculiarity, firstly, that it is not the working class but the peasant population that predominates in the country, and, secondly, that it is a workers' state with bureaucratic distortions." Anyone who reads the whole of my speech will see that this correction makes no difference to my reasoning or conclusions.

Stage six. The Petrograd organisation issues an "Appeal to the Party" against Trotsky's platform, and the Moscow Committee issues a counter-statement (*Pravda*, January 13[14]).

This is a transition from the struggle between factions, formed from above, to the intervention of lower organisations. It is a big step towards recovery. Curiously enough, the Moscow Committee noticed the "dangerous" side of the *Petrograd organisation*'s issuing a platform, but refused to notice the *dangerous side* of Comrade Trotsky's forming a faction on December 25! Some wags have said this is "buffer" (one-eyed) blindness.

Stage seven. The trade union commission concludes its work and issues a platform (a pamphlet, entitled *Draft Decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*,[15] dated January 14 and signed by nine members of the Central Committee—

Zinoviev, Stalin, Tomsky, Rudzutak, Kalinin, Kamenev, Petrovsky, Artyom and Lenin, and also by Lozovsky, a member of the trade union commission; Comrades Shlyapnikov and Lutovinov seem to have "fled" to the Workers' Opposition). It was published in *Pravda* on January 18, with the following additional signatures: Schmidt, Tsiperovich and Milyutin.

On January 16, *Pravda* carries the Bukharin platform (signed: "On behalf of a group of comrades, Bukharin, Larin, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Yakovleva") and the Sapronov platform (signed: "A group of comrades standing for democratic centralism", Bubnov, Boguslavsky, Kamensky, Maximovsky, Osinsky, Rafail, Sapronov).[16] The enlarged meeting of the Moscow Committee on January 17 was addressed by spokesmen for these platforms, and also by the "Ignatovites"[17] (theses published in *Pravda* on January 19 and signed by Ignatov, Orekhov, Korzinov, Kuranova, Burovtsev, Maslov).*

What we find here is, on the one hand, increased solidarity (for the platform of the nine Central Committee members is in complete accord with the decision of the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions); and, on the other, confusion and disintegration, with Bukharin and Co.'s theses being an all-time low in *ideological* disintegration. We have here one of those "turns" which in the old days Marxists used to call "not so much historical as hysterical". Thesis 17 says: "At the present time, these nominations must be made *mandatory*" (that is, the trade unions' nominations to the respective "chief administrations and central boards").

This is a clean break with communism and a transition to syndicalism. It is, in essence, a repetition of Shlyapnikov's "unionise the state" slogan, and means transferring the Supreme Economic Council apparatus

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* Incidentally, the Party should demand that every "platform" be issued with the full signatures of all the comrades responsible for it. This demand is met by the "Ignatovites" and the "Sapronovites" but not by the "Trotskyites", the "Bukharinites" and the "Shlyapnikovites", who refer to anonymous comrades allegedly responsible for their platforms.

piecemeal to the respective trade unions. To say, "I propose *mandatory* nominations", is exactly the same as saying, "I appoint".

Communism says: The Communist Party, the vanguard of the proletariat, leads the non-Party workers' masses, educating, preparing, teaching and training the masses ("school" of communism)—first the workers and then the peasants—to enable them eventually to concentrate in their hands the administration of the whole national economy.

Syndicalism hands over to the mass of non-Party workers, who are compartmentalised in the industries, the management of their industries ("the chief administrations and central boards"), thereby making the Party superfluous, and failing to carry on a sustained campaign either in training the masses or in *actually* concentrating in *their* hands the management *of the whole national economy*.

The Programme of the R.C.P. says: "The trade unions *should eventually arrive*" (which means that they are not yet there or even on the way) "at a *de facto* concentration in their hands" (in *their*, that is, the hands of the trade unions, that is, the hands of the fully organised *masses*; anyone will see how far we have still to go even to the very first approaches to this *de facto* concentration) ... concentration of what? "of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity" thence, not branches of industry, or even industry as a whole, but industry *plus* agriculture, etc. Are we anywhere near to actually concentrating the management of agriculture in the hands of the trade unions?). The R.C.P. Programme then speaks of the "ties" between the "central state administration" and the "broad masses of toilers", and of the "*participation* of the trade unions in running the economy".

Why have a Party, if industrial management is to be appointed ("mandatory nomination") by the trade unions nine-tenths of whose members are non-Party workers? Bukharin has talked himself into a logical, theoretical and practical implication of a split in the Party, or, rather, a breakaway of the syndicalists from the Party.

Trotsky, who had been "chief" in the struggle, has now been "outstripped" and entirely "eclipsed" by Bukharin, who has thrown the struggle into an altogether new balance

by talking himself into a mistake that is much more serious than all of Trotsky's put together.

How could Bukharin talk himself into a break with communism? We know how soft Comrade Bukharin is; it is one of the qualities which endears him to people, who cannot help liking him. We know that he has been ribbed for being as "soft as wax". It turns out that any "unprincipled" person, any "demagogue" can leave any mark he likes on this "soft wax". The sharp words in quotation marks were used by Comrade Kamenev, during the January 17 discussion, and he had a perfect right to do so. But, of course, neither Kamenev nor anyone else would dream of *attributing* or reducing it all to unprincipled *demagogy*.

On the contrary, there is an objective logic in factional struggles which inevitably leads even the best of men—if they persist in their mistaken attitude—into a state which differs little if at all from unprincipled demagogy. That is the lesson of the entire history of factional wars (for example, the alliance of the Vperyodists and the Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks[18]). That is why we must make a study not only of the nature of the disagreements in the abstract, but also of their concrete development and change at the various stages of the struggle. This development was summed up in the January 17 discussion.[19] Neither the "shake-up" nor the "new production tasks" can any longer be advocated (because all the efficient and sensible ideas went into Rudzutak's theses). The alternative then is to find what Lassalle called "the physical strength of mind" (and character) to admit the mistake, rectify it and turn over this page of the history of the R.C.P., or—to cling to the remaining allies, no matter who they are, and "ignore" the principles altogether. There remain only the adherents of "democracy" *ad nauseam*. And Bukharin is sliding down towards them and syndicalism.

While we are slowly absorbing what was sound in the "democratic" Workers' Opposition, Bukharin has to cling to what is *unsound*. On January 17, Comrade Bumazhny, a prominent Tsektranite, or Trotskyite, expressed his readiness to accept Bukharin's syndicalist proposals. The "Sapronovites" have gone so far as to insist in the same thesis (3) on a "profound crisis" and a "bureaucratic necrosis"

of the trade unions, while proposing, as being "absolutely" necessary, the "extension of the trade unions' *rights* in production" ... probably because of their "bureaucratic necrosis"? Can this group be taken seriously? They had heard the talk about the *role* of the trade unions in production, and wishing to outshout the others, blurted out: "extension of rights" on the occasion of "bureaucratic necrosis". You need read no more than the first few lines of their "practical" proposals: "The presidium of the Supreme Economic Council shall be nominated by the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and confirmed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee." And what is their *democratic* position in "principle"? Listen to this (thesis 2): "They [Zinoviev and Trotsky]* in fact express two trends within the same group of *ex-militarisers of the economy*."

Taken seriously, this is Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism at their worst. But Sapronov, Osinsky and Co. should not be taken seriously, when, before every Party congress ("every blessed time on this very same spot"), these, I believe, superlative workers have a sort of paroxysmal seizure and try to outshout the others (the "champion shouter" faction) and solemnly make a hash of things. The "Ignatovites" try to keep up with the "Sapronovites". It is, of course, quite permissible (specially before a congress) for various groups to form blocs (and also to go vote chasing). But this should he done within the framework of communism (and not syndicalism) and in such a way as to avoid being ridiculous. Who is the highest bidder? Promisers of more "rights" to non-Party people, unite on the occasion of the congress of the Russian Communist Party!...

Our platform up to now has been: Do not defend but rectify the bureaucratic excesses. The fight against bureaucracy is a long and arduous one. Excesses can and must be rectified at once. It is not those who point out harmful excesses and strive to rectify them but those who resist rectification that undermine the prestige of the military workers and appointees. Such were the excesses of certain

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Tsektranites who, however, will continue to be (and have been) valuable workers. There is no need to harass the trade unions by inventing disagreements with them, when they themselves have decided upon and accepted all that is new, business-like and practical in the tasks of the trade unions in production. On this basis, let us vigorously work together for practical results.

We have now added to our platform the following: We must combat the ideological discord and the unsound elements of the opposition who talk themselves into repudiating all "militarisation of industry", and not only the "appointments method", which has been the prevailing one up to now, but all "appointments", that is, in the last analysis, repudiating the Party's leading role in relation to the non-Party masses. We must combat the syndicalist deviation, which will kill the Party unless it is entirely cured of it.

The Entente* capitalists will surely try to take advantage of our Party's malaise to mount another invasion, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, to hatch plots and rebellions. We need have no fear of this because we shall all unite as one man, without being afraid to admit the malaise, but recognising that it demands from all of us a greater discipline, tenacity and firmness at every post. By the time the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. meets in March, and after the Congress, the Party will not be weaker, but stronger.

January 19, 1921

Pravda No. 13, January 21, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text collated with the text of the pamphlet: N. Lenin, *Party Crisis*, 1921

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* *Entente* or the "Allies"—Britain, France, the U.S.A., Japan and other countries that took part in the intervention against Soviet Russia. It should not be confused with *Entente cordiale*, the alliance of France and Great Britain and, later, tsarist Russia.—*Tr.*

THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF MINERS[20]

1

REPORT ON THE ROLE AND TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS DELIVERED ON JANUARY 23 AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE CONGRESS

The morbid character of the question of the role and tasks of the trade unions is due to the fact that it took the form of a factional struggle much too soon. This vast, boundless question should not have been taken up in such haste, as it was done here, and I put the chief blame on Comrade Trotsky for all this fumbling haste and precipitation. All of us have had occasion to submit inadequately prepared theses to the Central Committee and this is bound to go on because all our work is being done in a rush. This is not a big mistake, for all of us have had to act in haste. Taken by itself, it is a common mistake and is unavoidable because of the extremely difficult objective conditions. All the more reason, therefore, to treat factional, controversial issues with the utmost caution; for in such matters even not very hot-headed persons—something, I'm afraid, I cannot say about my opponent—may all too easily fall into this error. To illustrate my point, and to proceed at once to the heart of the matter, let me read you the chief of Trotsky's theses.

In his pamphlet, towards the end of thesis No. 12, he writes:

> "We observe the fact that as economic tasks move into the foreground, many trade unionists take an ever more aggressive and uncompromising stand against the prospect of 'coalescence' and the practical conclusions that follow from it. Among them we find Comrades Tomsky and Lozovsky.
>
> "What is more, many trade unionists, balking at the new tasks and methods, tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of corporative exclusiveness and hostility for the new men who are being drawn into the given branch of the economy, thereby actually fostering the survivals of craft-unionism among the organized workers."

I could quote many similar passages from Trotsky's pamphlet. I ask, by way of factional statement: Is it becoming for such an influential person, such a prominent leader, to attack his Party comrades in this way? I am sure that 99 per cent of the comrades, excepting those involved in the quarrel, will say that this should not be done.

I could well understand such a statement if Comrades Tomsky and Lozovsky were guilty, or could be suspected of being guilty, of, say, having flatly refused to sign the Brest Peace Treaty, or of having flatly opposed the war. The revolutionary interest is higher than formal democracy. But it is fundamentally wrong to approach the subject in such haste at the present moment. It won't do at all. This point says that many trade unionists tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility and exclusiveness. What does that mean? What sort of talk is this? Is it the right kind of language? Is it the right approach? I had earlier said that I might succeed in acting as a "buffer" and staying out of the discussion, because it is harmful to fight with Trotsky—it does the Republic, the Party, and all of us a lot of harm—but when this pamphlet came out, I felt I had to speak up.

Trotsky writes that "many trade unionists tend to cultivate a spirit of hostility for the new men". How so? If that is true, those who are doing so should be named. Since this is not done, it is merely a shake-up, a bureaucratic approach to the business. Even if there is a spirit of hostility for the new men, one should not say a thing like that. Trotsky accuses Lozovsky and Tomsky of bureaucratic practices. I would say the reverse is true. It is no use reading any further because the approach has spoiled everything; he has poured a spoonful of tar into the honey, and no matter how much honey he may add now, the whole is already spoiled.

Whose fault is it that many trade unionists tend to cultivate a spirit of hostility for the new men? Of course, a bufferite or a Tsektranite will say it is the trade unionists'.

The fact is that in this case idle fancy and invention have accumulated like the snowdrifts in the storm outside. But, comrades, we must sort things out and get at the substance. And it is that a spirit of hostility has been aroused

among the masses by a number of tactless actions. My opponent asserts that certain people have been cultivating a spirit of hostility. This shows that the question is seen in the wrong light. We must sort things out. The All-Russia Conference was held in November, and that is where the "shake-up" catchword was launched. Trotsky was wrong in uttering it. Politically it is clear that such an approach will cause a split and bring down the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We must understand that trade unions are not government departments, like People's Commissariats, but comprise the whole organised proletariat; that they are a special type of institution and cannot be approached in this way. And when there arose this question of a wrong approach, latent with the danger of a split, I said: "Don't talk about any broad discussion for the time being; go to the commission and examine the matter carefully over there." But the comrades said: "No, we can't do that; it is a violation of democracy." Comrade Bukharin went so far as to talk about the "sacred slogan of workers' democracy". Those are his very words. When I read that I nearly crossed myself. (*Laughter.*) I insist that a mistake always has a modest beginning and then grows up. Disagreements always start from small things. A slight cut is commonplace, but if it festers, it may result in a fatal illness. And this thing here is a festering wound. In November, there was talk about a shake-up; by December, it had become a big mistake.

The December Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee was against us. The majority sided with Trotsky and carried Trotsky and Bukharin's resolution, which you must have read. But even the C.C. members who did not sympathise with us had to admit that the water transport workers had more right on their side than Tsektran. That is a fact. When I ask what Tsektran's fault was, the answer is not that they had brought pressure to bear—that goes to their credit—but that they had allowed bureaucratic excesses.

But once you have realised that you had allowed excesses you ought to rectify them, instead of arguing against rectification. That is all there is to it. It will take decades to overcome the evils of bureaucracy. It is a very difficult struggle, and anyone who says we can rid ourselves of bureau-

cratic practices overnight by adopting anti-bureaucratic platforms is nothing but a quack with a bent for fine words. Bureaucratic excesses must be rectified right away. We must detect and rectify them without calling bad good, or black white. The workers and peasants realise that they have still to learn the art of government, but they are also very well aware that there are bureaucratic excesses, and it is a double fault to refuse to correct them. This must be done in good time, as the water transport workers have pointed out, and not only when your attention is called to it.

Even the best workers make mistakes. There are excellent workers in Tsektran, and we shall appoint them, and correct their bureaucratic excesses. Comrade Trotsky says that Comrades Tomsky and Lozovsky—trade unionists both—are guilty of cultivating in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new men. But this is monstrous. Only someone in the lunatic fringe can say a thing like that.

This haste leads to arguments, platforms and accusations, and eventually creates the impression that everything is rotten.

You know when people fall out it only takes them a couple of days to start abusing each other's relatives down to the tenth generation. You ask: "What are you quarrelling over?" "Oh, his aunt was this, and his grandfather was that." "I don't mean now; how did the whole thing start?" It turns out that in the course of two days a heap of disagreements has piled up.

Tsektran has allowed excesses in a number of cases, and these were harmful and unnecessary bureaucratic excesses. People are liable to allow excesses everywhere. There are departments with a staff of 30,000 in Moscow alone. That is no joke. There's something to be corrected, there's a wall to be scaled. There must be no fear, no thought of causing offence or dissension. To start a factional struggle and accuse Tomsky of cultivating among the masses a spirit of hostility for the Tsektranites is utterly to distort the facts, absolutely to spoil all the work, and entirely to damage all relations with the trade unions. But the trade unions embrace the whole proletariat. If this thing is persisted in and voted on by platforms, it will lead to the downfall of the Soviet power.

If the Party falls out with the trade unions, the fault lies with the Party, and this spells certain doom for the Soviet power. We have no other mainstay but the millions of proletarians, who may not be class conscious, are often ignorant, backward and illiterate, but who, being proletarians, follow their own Party. For twenty years they have regarded this Party as their own. Next comes a class which is not ours, which may side with us, if we are wise and if we pursue a correct policy within our own class. We have now reached the supreme moment of our revolution: we have roused the proletarian masses and the masses of poor peasants in the rural areas to give us their conscious support. No revolution has ever done this before. There is no class that can overthrow us: the majority of the proletarians and the rural poor are behind us. Nothing can ruin us but our own mistakes. This "but" is the whole point. If we cause a split, for which we are to blame, everything will collapse because the trade unions are not only an official institution, but also the source of all our power. They are the class which the economics of capitalism has converted into the economic amalgamator, and which through its industry brings together millions of scattered peasants. That is why one proletarian has more strength than 200 peasants.

That is just why Trotsky's whole approach is wrong. I could have analysed any one of his theses, but it would take me hours, and you would all be bored to death. Every thesis reveals the same thoroughly wrong approach: "Many trade unionists tend to cultivate a spirit of hostility." There is a spirit of hostility for us among the trade union rank and file because of our mistakes, and the bureaucratic practices up on top, including myself, because it was I who appointed Glavpolitput. What is to be done? Are things to be set right? We must correct Tsektran's excesses, once we realise that we are a solid workers' party, with a firm footing, and a head on its shoulders. We are not renouncing either the method of appointment, or the dictatorship. This will not be tolerated by workers with a twenty years' schooling in Russia. If we condone this mistakes we shall surely be brought down. It is a mistake, and that is the root of the matter.

Trotsky says Lozovsky and Tomsky are balking at the new tasks. To prove this will put a new face on the matter. What are the new tasks?

Here we are told: "production atmosphere", "industrial democracy" and "role in production". I said, at the very outset, in the December 30 discussion, that that was nothing but words, which the workers did not understand, and that it was all part of the task of production propaganda. We are not renouncing the dictatorship, or one-man management; these remain, I will support them, but I refuse to defend excesses and stupidity. "Production atmosphere" is a funny phrase that will make the workers laugh. Saying it more simply and clearly is all part of production propaganda. But a special institution has been set up for the purpose.

About enhancing the role of the trade unions in production, I replied on December 30 and in the press, and said that we have Comrade Rudzutak's resolution, which was adopted at the Conference on November 5. Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin said that Tsektran had drafted this resolution. Although this has been refuted, let me ask: if they had drafted it, who, in that case, is kicking? The trade unions adopted it and Tsektran drafted it. Well and good. There's no point, therefore, in quarrelling like children and raising factional disagreements. Has Comrade Trotsky brought up any new tasks? No, he hasn't. The fact is that his new points are all worse than the old ones. Comrade Trotsky is campaigning to get the Party to condemn those who are balking at new tasks, and Tomsky and Lozovsky have been named as the greatest sinners.

Rudzutak's resolution is couched in clearer and simpler language, and has nothing in it like "production atmosphere" or "industrial democracy". It says clearly that every trade union member must be aware of the vital necessity of increasing productivity in the country. It is put in simple and intelligible language. All this is stated better than in Trotsky's theses, and more fully, because bonuses in kind and disciplinary courts have been added. Without the latter, all this talk of getting the transport system going and improving things is humbug. Let us set up commissions and disciplinary courts. In this matter Tsektran has allowed

excesses. We propose calling a spade a spade: it is no use covering up excesses with new tasks; they must be corrected. We have no intention of renouncing coercion. No sober-minded worker would go so far as to say that we could now dispense with coercion, or that we could dissolve the trade unions, or let them have the whole of industry. I can imagine Comrade Shlyapnikov blurting out a thing like that.

In the whole of his speech there is one excellent passage on the experience of the Sormovo Works, where, he said, absenteeism was reduced by 30 per cent. This is said to be true. But I am a suspicious sort, I suggest that a commission be sent there to investigate and make a comparison of Nizhni-Novgorod and Petrograd. There is no need to have a meeting about this: it can all be done in commission. Trotsky says that there is an attempt to prevent coalescence, but that is nonsense. He says we must go forward. Indeed, if the engine is good; but if it isn't, we must put it into reverse. The Party will benefit from this, because we must study experience.

Production is at a standstill, but some people have been busy producing bad theses. This question requires study and experience. You are trade unionists and miners who are doing their job. Now since you have taken up this question, you must inquire, demand figures, verify them over and over again—don't take any statements for granted—and when you have done that, let us know the result. If it is good, then go on; if it is bad, go back. This means work, not talk. All this should have been done at Party meetings.

At the Eighth Congress of Soviets, I said that we ought to have less politics. When I said that I thought we would have no more political mistakes, but here we are, three years after the Soviet revolution, talking about syndicalism. This is a shame. If I had been told six months ago that I would be writing about syndicalism, I would have said that I preferred to write about the Donbas. Now we are being distracted, and the Party is being dragged back. A small mistake is growing into a big one. That is where Comrade Shlyapnikov comes in. Point 16 of Comrade Trotsky's theses gives a correct definition of Shlyapnikov's mistake.

In an effort to act the buffer, Bukharin clutched at Shlyapnikov, but it would have been better for him to clutch at

a straw. He promises the unions mandatory nominations, which means they are to have the final say in appointments. But that is exactly what Shlyapnikov is saying. Marxists have been combating syndicalism all over the world. We have been fighting in the Party for over twenty years, and we have given the workers visual proof that the Party is a special kind of thing which needs forward-looking men prepared for sacrifice; that it does make mistakes, but corrects them; that it guides and selects men who know the way and the obstacles before us. It does not deceive the workers. It never makes promises that cannot be kept. And if you skip the trade unions you will make a hash of everything we have achieved over the past three years. Comrade Bukharin, with whom I discussed this mistake, said. "Comrade Lenin, you are picking on us."

I take mandatory nominations to mean that they will be made under the direction of the Party's Central Committee. But in that case, what are the rights we are giving them? There will then be no chance of having a bloc. The workers and the peasants are two distinct classes. Let us talk about vesting the rights in the trade unions when electricity has spread over the whole country—if we manage to achieve this in twenty years it will be incredibly quick work, for it cannot be done quickly. To talk about it before then will be deceiving the workers. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the most stable thing in the world because it has won confidence by its deeds, and because the Party took great care to prevent diffusion.

What does that mean?

Does every worker know how to run the state? People working in the practical sphere know that this is not true, that millions of our organised workers are going through what we always said the trade unions were, namely, a school of communism and administration. When they have attended this school for a number of years they will have learned to administer, but the going is slow. We have not even abolished illiteracy. We know that workers in touch with peasants are liable to fall for non-proletarian slogans. How many of the workers have been engaged in government? A few thousand throughout Russia and no more. If we say that it is not the Party but the trade unions that put up

the candidates and administrate, it may sound very democratic and might help us to catch a few votes, but not for long. It will be fatal for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Read the decision of the Second Congress of the Comintern.[21] Its resolutions and decisions have gone round the world. The recent Socialist Congress in France revealed that we have won a majority in a country where chauvinism is most virulent; we have split the Party and ejected the corrupt leaders, and we did this in opposition to the syndicalists.[22] And all the best workers and leaders there have adopted our theory. Even syndicalists—revolutionary syndicalists—are siding with us all over the world. I myself have met American syndicalists who, after a visit to this country, say: "Indeed, you cannot lead the proletariat without a Party." You all know that this is a fact. And it is quite improper for the proletariat to rush into the arms of syndicalism and talk about mandatory nominations to "all-Russia producers' congresses". This is dangerous and jeopardizes the Party's guiding role. Only a very small percentage of the workers in the country are now organised. The majority of the peasants will follow the Party because its policy is correct, and because, during the Brest peace ordeal, it was capable of making temporary sacrifices and retreats, which was the right thing to do. Are we to throw all this away? Was it all a windfall? No, it was all won by the Party in decades of hard work. Everybody believes the word of the Bolsheviks, who have had twenty years of Party training.

To govern you need an army of steeled revolutionary Communists. We have it, and it is called the Party. All this syndicalist nonsense about mandatory nominations of producers must go into the wastepaper basket. To proceed on those lines would mean thrusting the Party aside and making the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia impossible. This is the view I believe it to be my Party duty to put to you. It is, in my opinion, enunciated in the form of practical propositions in the platform called *Draft Decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.* and signed by Lenin, Zinoviev, Tomsky, Rudzutak, Kalinin, Kamenev, Lozovsky, Petrovsky, Sergeyev and Stalin. Lozovsky, who

is not a member of the Central Committee, was included because he was on the trade union commission from which Shlyapnikov and Lutovinov, unfortunately, resigned. It is up to the workers to decide whether Shlyapnikov was right in resigning, and he will be censured, if he was wrong. I am convinced that all class-conscious workers will accept this platform and that the present disagreements in our Party will be confined to fever at the top. I am sure the workers will put them right, remain at their posts, maintain Party discipline and join in an efficient but careful drive to increase production and secure full victory for our cause. (*Prolonged applause.*)

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2

SPEECH CLOSING THE DISCUSSION DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE CONGRESS JANUARY 24

Comrades, I should like to begin by speaking about who is trying to intimidate whom, and about Comrade Shlyapnikov, who has tried hard to scare us. Everyone here said Lenin was trying to raise the bogey of syndicalism. This is ridiculous because the very idea of using syndicalism as a bogey is ridiculous. I think we ought to start with our programmes, by reading the Programme of the Communist Party to see what it says. Comrades Trotsky and Shlyapnikov referred to the same passage which happens to be its Paragraph 5. Let me read it to you in full:

> "5. The organisational apparatus of socialised industry should rely chiefly on the trade unions, which must to an ever increasing degree divest themselves of the narrow craft-union spirit and become large industrial associations, embracing the majority, and eventually all of the workers in the given branch of industry."

Comrade Shlyapnikov quoted this passage in his speech. But, if the figures were correct, those who were managing the organisations constituted 60 per cent, and these consisted of workers. Furthermore, when reference is made to the Programme, this should be done properly, bearing in mind that Party members know it thoroughly, and do not confine themselves to reading one extract, as Trotsky and Shlyapnikov have done. Comrades, there is much history to show that the workers cannot organise otherwise than by industries. That is why the idea of industrial unionism has been adopted all over the world. That is for the time being, of course. There is talk about the need to cast off the narrow craft-union spirit. I ask you, has this been done to, say, a tenth? Of course, not, is the sincere answer. Why forget this?

Who is it who says to the unions: "You have not yet divested yourselves of the narrow craft-union spirit, and must get on with it"? It is the R.C.P. which does this in its Programme. Read it. To depart from this is to abandon the Programme for syndicalism. Despite the hints at Lenin's "intimidation", the Programme is still there. You depart from it by quoting the first part and forgetting the second. In which direction? Towards syndicalism. Let me read further:

> "The trade unions being, on the strength of the laws of the Soviet Republic and established practice, participants in all the local and central organs of industrial management, should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity."

Everyone makes references to this paragraph. What does it say? Something that is absolutely indisputable: "should eventually arrive." It does not say that they are arriving. It does not contain the exaggeration which, once made, reduces the whole to an absurdity. It says, "should eventually arrive". Arrive where? At a *de facto* concentration and administration. When are you due to arrive at this point? This calls for education, and it must be so organised as to teach everyone the art of administration. Now can you say, with a clear conscience, that the trade unions are able to fill any number of executive posts with suitable men at any time? After all, it is not six million, but sixty thousand or, say, a hundred thousand men that you need to fill all the executive posts. Can they nominate this number? No, they cannot—not yet—as anyone will say who is not chasing after formulas and theses and is not misled by the loudest voices. Years of educational work lie ahead for the Party, ranging from the abolition of illiteracy to the whole round of Party work in the trade unions. An enormous amount of work must be done in the trade unions to achieve this properly. This is exactly what it- says: "should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy". It does not say branches of industry, as Trotsky does in his theses. One of his first theses quotes the Programme correctly, but another one says: organisation of industry. I'm afraid that is no way to quote. When you are

writing some theses and you want to quote the Programme, you must read it to the end. Anyone who takes the trouble to read this Paragraph 5 right through and give it ten minutes' thought will see that Shlyapnikov has departed from the Programme, and that Trotsky has leaped over it. Let's read Paragraph 5 to the end:

"The trade unions, ensuring in this way indissoluble ties between the central state administration, the national economy and the broad masses of working people, should draw the latter into direct economic management on the widest possible scale. At the same time, the participation of the trade unions in economic management and their activity in drawing the broad masses into this work are the principal means of combating the bureaucratisation of the economic apparatus of the Soviet power and making possible the establishment of truly popular control over the results of production."

You find that you must first achieve *de facto* concentration. But what are you ensuring now? First, there are the ties within the central state administration. This is a huge machine. You have not yet taught us to master it. And so, you must ensure ties between the central state administration—that's one; national economy—that's two; and the masses—that's three. Have we got those ties? Are the trade unions capable of administration? Anybody over thirty years of age with some little practical experience of Soviet organisation will laugh at this. Read the following:

"At the same time, the participation of the trade unions in economic management and their activity in drawing the broad masses into this work are the principal means of combating the bureaucratisation of the economic apparatus of the Soviet power and making possible the establishment of truly popular control over the results of production."

First, there is need to create ties between the central state organisations. We have no intention of concealing this malaise, and our Programme says: ensure ties with the masses, and ensure the participation of the trade unions in economic management. There are no loud words in this. When you have done that in such a way as to reduce absenteeism by, say, 3 per cent—let alone 30—we shall say: you have done a fine job. Our present Programme says: "...the participation of the trade unions in economic management and their activity in drawing the broad masses into this work...." It does not contain a single promise

or a single loud word; nor does it say anything about your doing the electing. It does not resort to demagogy, but says that there is an ignorant, backward mass, that there are trade unions, which are so strong that they are leading the whole of the peasantry, and which themselves follow the lead of the Party, with a twenty-year schooling in the fight against tsarism. No country has gone through what Russia has, and that is the secret of our strength. Why is this regarded as a miracle? Because in a peasant country, only the trade unions can provide the economic bonds to unite millions of scattered farms, if this mass of six million has faith in its Party, and continues to follow it as it had hitherto. That is the secret of our strength, and the way it works is a political question. How can a minority govern a huge peasant country, and why are we so composed? After our three years' experience, there is no external or internal force that can break us. Provided we do not make any extra-stupid mistakes leading to splits, we shall retain our positions; otherwise everything will go to the dogs. That is why, when Comrade Shlyapnikov says in his platform:

> "The All-Russia Congress of Producers shall elect a body to administer the whole national economy,"

I say: read the whole of Paragraph 5 of our Programme, which I have read out to you, and you will see that there is no attempt at intimidation either on Lenin's or anyone else's part.

Shlyapnikov concluded his speech by saying: "We must eliminate bureaucratic methods in government and the national economy." I say this is demagogy. We have had this question of bureaucratic practices on the agenda since last July. After the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. last July, Preobrazhensky also asked: Are we not suffering from bureaucratic excesses? Watch out! In August, the Central Committee endorsed Zinoviev's letter: Combat the evils of bureaucracy. The Party Conference met in September, and endorsed it. So, after all, it was not Lenin who invented some new path, as Trotsky says, but the Party which said: "Watch out: there's a new malaise." Preobrazhensky raised this question in July; we had Zinoviev's letter in August; there was the Party Conference in September and we had a

long report on bureaucratic practices at the Congress of Soviets in December. The malaise is there. In our 1919 Programme we wrote that bureaucratic practices existed. Whoever comes out and demands a stop to bureaucratic practices is a demagogue. When you are called upon to "put a stop to bureaucratic practices", it is demagogy. It is nonsense. We shall be fighting the evils of bureaucracy for many years to come, and whoever thinks otherwise is playing demagogue and cheating, because overcoming the evils of bureaucracy requires hundreds of measures, wholesale literacy, culture and participation in the activity of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.[23] Shlyapnikov has been People's Commissar for Labour and People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. Has *he* put a stop to bureaucratic practices? Kiselyov has been on the Central Board of the Textile Industry. Has *he* put a stop to the evils of bureaucracy?

Let me say this once again: We shall have grown up when all our congresses resolve themselves into sections and marshal the facts about coalescence among the millers and the Donbas miners. But writing a string of useless platforms shows up our poor economic leadership. I repeat that nothing can break us, neither external nor internal forces, if we do not lead things up to a split. I say that Tsektran is more than a bludgeon, but exaggerating this has led up to a split. Anyone can be guilty of an excess of bureaucratic practices, and the Central Committee is aware of it, and is responsible for it. In this respect, Comrade Trotsky's mistake lies in that he drew up his theses in the wrong spirit. They are all couched in terms of a shake-up, and they have all led to a split in the union. It is not a matter of giving Trotsky bad marks—we are not schoolchildren and have no use for marks—but we must say that his theses are wrong in content and must therefore be rejected.

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Published according to the *Bulleten* text

CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS ENSURING THE RESEARCH WORK OF ACADEMICIAN I. P. PAVLOV AND HIS ASSOCIATES

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

In view of Academician I. P. Pavlov's outstanding scientific services, which are of tremendous importance to the working people of the world, the Council of People's Commissars decrees:

1. To set up, on the strength of the Petrograd Soviet's proposal, a special commission with broad powers, consisting of Comrade M. Gorky, chief of Petrograd's institutions of higher learning, Comrade Kristi, and member of the collegium of the Petrograd Soviet's Administrative Department, Comrade Kaplun; whose task is to create, as soon as possible, the best conditions to ensure the research work of Comrade Pavlov and his associates.

2. To authorise the State. Publishers to print, in the best printing-house, a de luxe edition of the scientific work prepared by Academician Pavlov, summing up the results of his research over the past twenty years, leaving to Academician I. P. Pavlov the right of property in this work in Russia and abroad.

3. To authorise the Workers' Supply Commission to issue to Academician Pavlov and his wife a special ration equal in caloricity to two academic rations.

4. To authorise the Petrograd Soviet to assure Professor Pavlov and his wife of the use for life of the flat they now occupy, and to furnish it and Academician Pavlov's laboratory with every possible facility.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Moscow, the Kremlin,
January 24, 1921

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February 11, 1921

Published according
to the original
signed by Lenin

ONCE AGAIN ON THE TRADE UNIONS, THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE MISTAKES OF TROTSKY AND BUKHARIN[24]

The Party discussion and the factional struggle, which is of a type that occurs before a congress—before and in connection with the impending elections to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.—are waxing hot. The first factional pronouncement, namely, the one made by Comrade Trotsky on behalf of "a number of responsible workers" in his "platform pamphlet" (*The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*, with a preface dated December 25, 1920), was followed by a sharp pronouncement (the reader will see from what follows that it was deservedly sharp) by the Petrograd organisation of the R.C.P. ("Appeal to the Party", published in *Petrogradskaya Pravda*[25] on January 6, 1921, and in the Party's Central Organ, the Moscow *Pravda*, on January 13, 1921). The Moscow Committee then came out against the Petrograd organisation (in the same issue of *Pravda*). Then appeared a verbatim report, published by the bureau of the R.C.P. group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, of the discussion that took place on December 30, 1920, at a very large and important Party meeting, namely, that of the R.C.P. group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets. It is entitled *The Role of the Trade Unions in Production* (with a preface dated January 6, 1921). This, of course, is by no means all of the discussion material. Party meetings to discuss these issues are being held almost everywhere. On December 30, 1920, I spoke at a meeting in conditions in which, as I put it then, I "departed from the rules of procedure", i.e., in conditions in which I could

not take part in the discussion or hear the preceding and subsequent speakers. I shall now try to make amends and express myself in a more "orderly" fashion.

THE DANGER OF FACTIONAL PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE PARTY

Is Comrade Trotsky's pamphlet The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions a factional pronouncement? Irrespective of its content, is there any danger to the Party in a pronouncement of this kind? Attempts to hush up this question are a particularly favourite exercise with the members of the Moscow Committee (with the exception of Comrade Trotsky, of course), who see the factionalism of the Petrograd comrades, and with Comrade Bukharin, who, however, felt obliged, on December 30, 1920, to make the following statement on behalf of the "buffer group":

> "...when a train seems to be heading for a crash, a buffer is not a bad thing at all" (report of the December 30, 1920 discussion, p. 45).

So there is some danger of a crash. Can we conceive of intelligent members of the Party being indifferent to the question of how, where and when this danger arose?

Trotsky's pamphlet opens with the statement that "it is the fruit of collective work", that "a number of responsible workers, particularly trade unionists (members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union, Tsektran and others)" took part in compiling it, and that it is a "platform pamphlet". At the end of thesis 4 we read that "the forthcoming Party Congress will have to *choose* [Trotsky's italics] between the two trends within the trade union movement".

If this is not the formation of a faction by a member of the Central Committee, if this does not mean "heading for a crash", then let Comrade Bukharin, or anyone of his fellow-thinkers, explain to the Party any other possible meaning of the words "factionalism ", and the Party "seems to be heading for a crash". Who can be more purblind than men wishing to play the "buffer" and *closing their eyes* to *such* a "danger of a crash"?

Just imagine: after the Central Committee had spent

two plenary meetings (November 9 and December 7) in an unprecedentedly long, detailed and heated discussion of Comrade Trotsky's original draft theses and of the entire trade union policy that he advocates for the Party, one member of the Central Committee, *one out of nineteen*, forms a group outside the Central Committee and presents its "collective work" as a "platform", inviting the Party Congress "to choose between *two* trends"! This, incidentally, quite apart from the fact that Comrade Trotsky's announcement of two and only two trends on December 25, 1920, despite Bukharin's coming out as a "buffer" on November 9, is a glaring exposure of the Bukharin group's true role as abettors of the worst and most harmful sort of factionalism. But I ask any Party member: Don't you find this attack and insistence upon "choosing" between two trends in the trade union movement rather sudden? What is there for us to do but stare in astonishment at the fact that after three years of the proletarian dictatorship even one Party member can be found to "attack" the two trends issue *in this way*?

Nor is that all. Look at the factional attacks in which this pamphlet abounds. In the very first thesis we find a threatening "gesture" at "certain workers in the trade union movement" who are thrown "back to trade-unionism, pure and simple, which the Party repudiated in principle long ago" (evidently the Party is represented by only one member of the Central Committee's nineteen). Thesis 8 grandiloquently condemns "the craft conservatism prevalent among the top trade union functionaries" (note the truly bureaucratic concentration of attention on the "top"!). Thesis 11 opens with the astonishingly tactful, conclusive and business-like (what is the most polite word for it?) "hint" that the "majority of the trade unionists ... give only formal, that is, *verbal*, recognition" to the resolutions of the Party's Ninth Congress.

We find that we have some very authoritative judges before us who say the *majority* (!) of the trade unionists give only verbal recognition to the Party's decisions.

Thesis 12 reads:

> "...many trade unionists take an ever more aggressive and uncompromising stand against the prospect of 'coalescence'.... Among them we find Comrades Tomsky and Lozovsky.

"What is more, many trade unionists, balking at the new tasks, and methods, tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of corporative exclusiveness and hostility for the new men who are being drawn into the given branch of the economy, thereby actually fostering the survivals of craft-unionism among the organised workers."

Let the reader go over these arguments carefully and ponder them. They simply abound in "gems". Firstly, the pronouncement must be assessed from the standpoint of factionalism! Imagine what Trotsky would have said, and how he would have said it, if Tomsky had published a platform accusing Trotsky and "many" military workers of cultivating the spirit of bureaucracy, fostering the survivals of savagery, etc. What is the "role" of Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and the others who fail to see—positively fail to note, utterly fail to note—the aggressiveness and factionalism of all *this*, and refuse to see how much more factional it is than the pronouncement of the Petrograd comrades?

Secondly, take a closer look at the approach to the subject: many trade unionists "tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit".... This is an out-and-out bureaucratic approach. The whole point, you see, is not the level of development and living conditions of the masses in their millions, but the "spirit" which Tomsky and Lozovsky tend to cultivate "in their midst".

Thirdly, Comrade Trotsky has unwittingly revealed the *essence* of the whole controversy which he and the Bukharin and Co. "buffer" have been evading and camouflaging with such care.

What is the point at issue? Is it the fact that many trade unionists are balking at the new tasks and methods and tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new officials?

Or is it that the masses of organised workers are legitimately protesting and inevitably showing readiness to throw out the new officials who refuse to rectify the useless and harmful excesses of bureaucracy?

Is it that someone has refused to understand the "new tasks and methods"?

Or is it that someone is making a clumsy attempt to cover up his defence of certain useless and harmful

excesses of bureaucracy with a lot of talk about new tasks and methods?

It is this *essence* of the dispute that the reader should bear in mind.

FORMAL DEMOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY INTEREST

"Workers' democracy is free from fetishes", Comrade Trotsky writes in his theses, which are the "fruit of collective work". "Its sole consideration is the revolutionary interest" (thesis 23).

Comrade Trotsky's theses have landed him in a mess. That part of them which is correct is not new and, what is more, turns *against* him. That which is new is all wrong.

I have written out Comrade Trotsky's correct propositions. They turn against him not only on the point in thesis 23 (Glavpolitput) but on the others as well.

Under the rules of formal democracy, Trotsky *had a right* to come out with a factional platform even against the whole of the Central Committee. That is indisputable. What is also indisputable is that the Central Committee had endorsed this formal right by its decision on freedom of discussion adopted on December 24, 1920. Bukharin, the buffer, recognises this formal right for Trotsky, but not for the Petrograd organisation, probably because on December 30, 1920, he talked himself into "the sacred slogan of workers' democracy" (verbatim report, p. 45)....

Well, and what about the revolutionary interest?

Will any serious-minded person who is not blinded by the factional egotism of Tsektran" or of the "buffer" faction, will anyone in his right mind say that *such* a pronouncement on the trade union issue by *such* a prominent leader as Trotsky does promote *the revolutionary interest*?

Can it be denied that, even if Trotsky's "new tasks and methods" were as sound as they are in fact unsound (of which later), his very approach would be damaging to himself, the Party, the trade union movement, the training of millions of trade union members and the Republic?

It looks as if the kind Bukharin and his group call themselves a "buffer" because they have firmly decided *not to think* about the obligations this title imposes upon them.

THE POLITICAL DANGER OF SPLITS IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

Everyone knows that big disagreements sometimes grow out of minute differences, which may at first appear to be altogether insignificant. A slight cut or scratch, of the kind everyone has had scores of in the course of his life, may become very dangerous and even fatal *if* it festers and *if* blood poisoning sets in. This may happen in any kind of conflict, even a purely personal one. This also happens in politics.

Any difference, even an insignificant one, may become politically dangerous if it has a chance to grow into a split, and I mean the kind of split that will shake and destroy the whole political edifice, or lead, to use Comrade Bukharin's simile, to a crash.

Clearly, in a country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, a split in the ranks of the proletariat, or between the proletarian party and the mass of the proletariat, is not just dangerous; it is extremely dangerous, especially when the proletariat constitutes a small minority of the population. And splits in the trade union movement (which, as I tried hard to emphasise in my speech on December 30, 1920, is a movement of the almost completely organised proletariat) mean precisely splits in the mass of the proletariat.

That is why, when the whole thing started at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions on November 2-6, 1920 (and that is exactly where it did start), and when right after the Conference—no, I am mistaken, *during* that Conference—Comrade Tomsky appeared before the Political Bureau in high dudgeon and, fully supported by Comrade Rudzutak, the most even-tempered of men, began to relate that at the Conference Comrade Trotsky had talked about "shaking up" the trade unions and that he, Tomsky, had opposed this—when that happened, I decided there and then that policy (i.e., the Party's trade union policy) lay at the root of the controversy, and that Comrade Trotsky, with his "shake-up" policy against Comrade Tomsky, was entirely in the wrong. For, *even if the "shake-up" policy were partly justified* by the "new tasks and methods" (Trotsky's thesis 12), it cannot be tolerated at the present time, and in the present situation, because it threatens a split.

It now seems to Comrade Trotsky that it is "an utter travesty" to ascribe the "shake-up-from-above" policy to him (L. Trotsky, "A Reply to the Petrograd Comrades", Pravda No. 9, January 15, 1921). But "shake-up" is a real "catchword", not only in the sense that after being uttered by Comrade Trotsky at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions it has, you might say, "caught on" throughout the Party and the trade unions. Unfortunately, it remains true even today in the much more profound sense that it alone epitomises *the whole spirit*, *the whole trend* of the platform pamphlet entitled *The Role and Tactics of the Trade Unions*. Comrade Trotsky's platform pamphlet is shot through with the spirit of the "shake-up-from-above" policy. Just recall the accusation made against Comrade Tomsky, or "many trade unionists", that they "tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new men"!

But whereas the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions (November 2-6, 1920) only saw the makings of the atmosphere fraught with splits, the split within Tsektran became a fact in early December 1920.

This event is basic and essential to an understanding of the political essence of our controversies; and Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin are mistaken if they think hushing it up will help matters. A hush-up in this case does not produce a "buffer" effect but rouses passions; for the question has not only been placed on the agenda by developments, but has been emphasised by Comrade Trotsky in his platform pamphlet. It is this pamphlet that repeatedly, in the passages I have quoted, particularly in thesis 12, raises the question of whether the essence of the matter is that "many trade unionists tend to cultivate in their midst a spirit of hostility for the new men", or that the "hostility" of the *masses* is legitimate in view of certain useless and harmful excesses of bureaucracy, for example, in Tsektran.

The issue was bluntly and properly stated by Comrade Zinoviev in his very first speech on December 30, 1920, when he said that it was "Comrade Trotsky's immoderate adherents" who had brought about a split. Perhaps that is why Comrade Bukharin abusively described Comrade Zinoviev's speech as "a lot of hot air"? But every Party member who reads the verbatim report of the December 30, 1920

discussion will see that that is not true. He will find that it is Comrade Zinoviev who quotes and operates with the facts, and that it is Trotsky and Bukharin who indulge most in intellectualist verbosity minus the facts.

When Comrade Zinoviev said, "Tsektran stands on feet of clay and has already split into three parts", Comrade Sosnovsky interrupted and said:

"That is something you have encouraged" (verbatim report, p. 15).

Now this is a serious charge. If it were proved, there would, of course, be no place on the Central Committee, in the R.C.P., or in the trade unions of our Republic for those who were guilty of *encouraging a split* even in one of the trade unions. Happily, this serious charge was advanced in a thoughtless manner by a comrade who, I regret to say, has now and again been "carried away" by thoughtless polemics before this. Comrade Sosnovsky has even managed to insert "a fly in the ointment" of his otherwise excellent articles, say, on production propaganda, and this has tended to negate all its pluses. Some people (like Comrade Bukharin) are so happily constituted that they are incapable of injecting venom into their attacks even when the fight is bitterest; others, less happily constituted, are liable to do so, and do this all too often. Comrade Sosnovsky would do well to watch his step in this respect, and perhaps even ask his friends to help out.

But, some will say, the charge is there, even if it has been made in a thoughtless, unfortunate and patently "factional" form. In a serious matter, the badly worded truth is preferable to the hush-up.

That the matter is serious is beyond doubt, for, let me say this again, the *crux* of the issue lies in this area to a greater extent than is generally suspected. Fortunately, we are in possession of sufficiently objective and conclusive facts to provide an answer *in substance* to Comrade Sosnovsky's point.

First of all, there is on the same page of the verbatim report Comrade Zinoviev's statement denying Comrade Sosnovsky's allegation and making precise references to conclusive facts. Comrade Zinoviev showed that Comrade Trotsky's accusation (made obviously, let me add, in an

outburst of factional zeal) was quite a different one from Comrade Sosnovsky's; Comrade Trotsky's accusation was that Comrade Zinoviev's *speech at the September All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.* had helped to bring about or had brought about the split. (This charge, let me say in parenthesis, is quite untenable, if only because Zinoviev's September speech was approved in substance by the Central Committee and the Party, and there has been no formal protest against it since.)

Comrade Zinoviev replied that at the Central Committee meeting Comrade Rudzutak had used the minutes to prove that "*long before* any of my [Zinoviev's] speeches and the All-Russia Conference the question [concerning certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy in Tsektran] had been examined in Siberia, on the Volga, in the North and in the South".

That is an absolutely precise and clear-cut statement of fact. It was made by Comrade Zinoviev in his first speech before thousands of the most responsible Party members, and his facts were *not* refuted either by Comrade Trotsky, who spoke *twice later*, or by Comrade Bukharin, who *also spoke later*.

Secondly, the December 7, 1920 *resolution of the Central Committee's Plenary Meeting concerning the dispute between the Communists working in water transport and the Communist group at the Tsektran Conference*, given in the same verbatim report, was an even more definite and official refutation of Comrade Sosnovsky's charges. The part of the resolution dealing with Tsektran says:

> "In connection with the dispute between Tsektran and the water transport workers, the Central Committee resolves: 1) To set up a Water Transport Section within the amalgamated Tsektran; 2) To convene a congress of railwaymen and water transport workers in February to hold normal elections to a new Tsektran; 3) To authorise the old Tsektran to function until then; 4) To abolish Glavpolitvod and Glavpolitput immediately and to transfer all their funds and resources to the trade union on normal democratic lines."

This shows that the water transport workers, far from being censured, are deemed to be *right* in every essential. Yet *none* of the C.C. members who had signed the common platform of January 14, 1921 (except Kamenev) voted for

the resolution. (The platform referred to is the *Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions. Draft Decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.*, submitted to the Central Committee by a group of members of the Central Committee and the trade union commission. Among those who signed it was Lozovsky, a member of the trade union commission but not of the Central Committee. The others were Tomsky, Kalinin, Rudzutak, Zinoviev, Stalin, Lenin, Kamenev, Petrovsky and Artyom Sergeyev.)

This resolution was carried *against* the C.C. members listed above, that is, against our group, for we would have voted against allowing the old Tsektran to continue temporarily. Because we were sure to win, Trotsky was forced to vote for Bukharin's resolution, as otherwise our resolution would have been carried. Comrade Rykov, who had been for Trotsky in November, took part in the trade union commission's examination of the dispute between Tsektran and the water transport workers in December, and saw that the latter were right.

To sum up: the December 7 majority in the Central Committee consisted of Comrades Trotsky, Bukharin, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov and other C.C. members who are above suspicion of being biased *against* Tsektran. Yet the substance of their resolution did not censure the water transport workers but Tsektran, which they just stopped short of dissolving there and then. This proves Sosnovsky's charge to be quite groundless.

There is one other point to be dealt with, if we are to leave no room for ambiguity. What were these "certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy" to which I have repeatedly referred? Isn't *this* last charge unsupported or exaggerated?

Once again it was Comrade Zinoviev who, in his very first speech on December 30, 1920, provided the answer which was as precise as one could wish. He quoted from Comrade Zoff's water transport circular of May 3, 1920: "Committee treadmill abolished."[26] Comrade Zinoviev was quite right in saying this was a fundamental error. It exemplified the unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy and the "appointments system". But he said there and then that some appointees were "not half as experienced

or as tried" as Comrade Zoff. I have heard Comrade Zoff referred to in the Central Committee as a most valuable worker, and this is fully borne out by my own observations in the Council of Defence. It has not entered anyone's mind either to make scapegoats of such comrades or to undermine their authority (as Comrade Trotsky suggests, without the least justification, on page 25 of his report). Their authority is not being undermined by those who try to correct the "appointees'" mistakes, but by those who would defend them even when they are wrong.

We see, therefore, that the danger of splits within the trade union movement was not imaginary but real. And we find that the actual disagreements really boiled down to a demand that certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy, and the appointments system should not be justified or defended, but corrected. That is all there is to it.

DISAGREEMENTS ON PRINCIPLE

There being deep and basic disagreements on principle—we may well be asked—do they not serve as vindication for the sharpest and most factional pronouncements? Is it possible to vindicate such a thing as a split, provided there is need to drive home some entirely new idea?

I believe it is, provided of course the disagreements are truly very deep and there is no other way to rectify a wrong trend in the policy of the Party or of the working class.

But the whole point is that there are no such disagreements. Comrade Trotsky has tried to point them out, and failed. A tentative or conciliatory approach had been possible—and necessary—*before* the publication of his pamphlet (December 25) ("such an approach is ruled out even in the case of disagreements and vague new tasks"); but *after* its publication we had to say: Comrade Trotsky is essentially wrong on all his new points.

This is most evident from a comparison of his theses with Rudzutak's which were adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions (November 2-6). I quoted the latter in my December 30 speech and in the January 21 issue of *Pravda*. They are fuller and more correct than

Trotsky's, and wherever the latter differs from Rudzutak, he is wrong.

Take this famous "industrial democracy", which Comrade Bukharin hastened to insert in the Central Committee's resolution of December 7. It would, of course, be ridiculous to quibble about this ill-conceived brainchild ("tricky flourishes"), if it merely occurred in an article or speech. But, after all, it was Trotsky and Bukharin who put themselves into the ridiculous position by *insisting in their theses* on this very term, which is the one feature that distinguishes their "platforms" from Rudzutak's theses adopted by the trade unions.

The term is theoretically wrong. In the final analysis, every kind of democracy, as political superstructure in general (which must exist until classes have been abolished and a classless society established), serves production and is ultimately determined by the relations of production in a given society. It is, therefore, meaningless to single out "industrial democracy", for this leads to confusion, and the result is a dummy. That is the first point.

The second is that if you look at Bukharin's own explanation given in the resolution of the C.C. Plenary Meeting on December 7, which he drafted, you will find that he says: "Accordingly, the methods of workers' democracy must be those of industrial democracy, which means...." Note the "which means"! The fact is that Bukharin opens his appeal to the masses with such an outlandish term that he must *give a gloss on* it. This, I think, is *undemocratic* from the democratic standpoint. You must write for the masses without using terms that require a glossary. This is bad from the "production" standpoint because time is wasted in explaining unnecessary terms. "Which means," he says, "that nomination and seconding of candidates, elections, etc., must proceed with an eye not only to their political staunchness, but also business efficiency, administrative experience, leadership, and proved concern for the working people's material and spiritual interests."

The reasoning there is obviously artificial and incorrect. For one thing, democracy is more than "nomination and seconding of candidates, elections, etc." Then, again, not all elections should be held with an eye to political

staunchness and business efficiency. Comrade Trotsky notwithstanding, an organisation of many millions must have a certain percentage of canvassers and bureaucrats (we shall not be able to make do without good bureaucrats for many years to come). But we do not speak of "canvassing" or "bureaucratic" democracy.

The third point is that it is wrong to consider only the elected, the organisers, the administrators, etc. After all, they constitute a minority of outstanding men. It is the mass, the rank and file that we must consider. Rudzutak has it in simpler, more intelligible and theoretically more correct terms (thesis 6):

> "...it must be brought home to each participant in production that his production tasks are appropriate and important; that each must not only take a hand in fulfilling his assignments, but also play an intelligent part in correcting any technical and organisational defects in the sphere of production."

The fourth point is that "industrial democracy" is a term that lends itself to misinterpretation. It may be read as a repudiation of dictatorship and individual authority. It may be read as a suspension of ordinary democracy or a pretext for evading it. Both readings are harmful, and cannot be avoided without long special commentaries.

Rudzutak's plain statement of the same ideas is more correct and more handy. This is indirectly confirmed by Trotsky's parallel of "war democracy" which he draws with his own term in an article, "Industrial Democracy", in *Pravda* of January 11, and which fails to refute that his term is inaccurate and inconvenient (for he side-steps the whole issue and fails to compare his theses with Rudzutak's). Happily, as far as I can recall, we have never had any factional controversy over that kind of term.

Trotsky's "production atmosphere" is even wider of the mark, and Zinoviev had good reason to laugh at it. This made Trotsky very angry, and he came out with this argument: "We once had a war atmosphere.... We must now have a production atmosphere and not only on the surface but deep down in the workers' mass. This must be as intense and practical an interest in production as was earlier displayed in the fronts...." Well, there you are: the message must be carried "deep down into the workers' mass"

in the language of Rudzutak's theses, because "production atmosphere" will only earn you a smile or a shrug. Comrade Trotsky's "production atmosphere" has essentially the same meaning as production propaganda, but such expressions must be avoided when production propaganda is addressed to the workers at large. The term is an example of how *not* to carry it on among the masses.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. DIALECTICS AND ECLECTICISM

It is strange that we should have to return to such elementary questions, but we are unfortunately forced to do so by Trotsky and Bukharin. They have both reproached me for "switching" the issue, or for taking a "political" approach, while theirs is an "economic" one. Bukharin even put that in his theses and tried to "rise above" either side, as if to say that he was combining the two.

This is a glaring theoretical error. I said again in my speech that politics is a concentrated expression of economics, because I had earlier heard my "political" approach rebuked in a manner which is inconsistent and inadmissible for a Marxist. Politics must take precedence over economics. To argue otherwise is to forget the ABC of Marxism.

Am I wrong in my political appraisal? If you think so, say it and prove it. But you forget the ABC of Marxism when you say (or imply) that the political approach is equivalent to the "economic", and that you can take "the one and the other".

What the political approach means, in other words, is that the wrong attitude to the trade unions will ruin the Soviet power and topple the dictatorship of the proletariat. (In a peasant country like Russia, the Soviet power would surely go down in the event of a split between the trade unions and a Party in the wrong.) This proposition can (and must) be tested in substance, which means looking into the rights and wrongs of the approach and taking a decision. To say: I "appreciate" your political, approach, "*but*" it is only a political one and we "*also* need an economic one", is tantamount to saying: I "appreciate" your

point that in taking that particular step you are liable to break your neck, *but* you must also take into consideration that it is better to be clothed and well-fed than to go naked and hungry.

Bukharin's insistence on combining the political *and* the economic approach has landed him in theoretical *eclecticism*.

Trotsky and Bukharin make as though they are concerned for the growth of production whereas we have nothing but formal democracy in mind. This picture is wrong, because the *only* formulation of the issue (which the Marxist standpoint *allows*) is: without a correct political approach to the matter the given class will be unable to stay on top, *and*, *consequently*, will be incapable of solving *its production problem* either.

Let us take a concrete example. Zinoviev says: "By carrying things to a split within the trade unions, you are making a political mistake. I spoke and wrote about the growth of production back in January 1920, citing the construction of the public baths as an example." Trotsky replies: "What a thing to boast of: a pamphlet with the public baths as an example (p. 29), 'and not a single word' about the tasks of the trade unions" (p. 22).

This is wrong. The example of the public baths is worth, you will pardon the pun, a dozen "production atmospheres", with a handful of "industrial democracies" thrown in. It tells the masses, the whole bulk of them, what the trade unions are to do, and does this in plain and intelligible terms, whereas all these "production atmospheres" and "democracies" are so much murk blurring the vision of the workers' masses, and *dimming* their understanding.

Comrade Trotsky also rebuked me for not "saying a word" (p. 66) about "the role that has to be played—and is being played—by the levers known as the trade union apparatus".

I beg to differ, Comrade Trotsky. By reading out Rudzutak's theses *in toto* and endorsing them, I made a statement on the question that was *fuller*, *plainer*, *clearer and more correct* than all your theses, your report or co-report, and speech in reply to the debate. I insist that bonuses in kind and disciplinary comrades' courts mean a great deal more to economic development, industrial manage-

ment, and wider trade union participation in production than the absolutely abstract (and therefore empty) talk about "industrial democracy", "coalescence", etc.

Behind the effort to present the "production" standpoint (Trotsky) or to overcome a one-sided political approach and combine it with an economic approach (Bukharin) we find:

1) Neglect of Marxism, as expressed in the theoretically incorrect, eclectic definition of the relation between politics and economics;

2) Defence or camouflage of the political mistake expressed in the shake-up policy, which runs through the *whole* of Trotsky's platform pamphlet, and which, unless it is admitted and corrected, *leads* to the collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat;

3) A step back in purely economic and production matters, and the question of how to increase production; it is, in fact, a step back from Rudzutak's *practical* theses, with their concrete, vital and urgent tasks (develop production propaganda; learn proper distribution of bonuses in kind and correct use of coercion through disciplinary comrades' courts), to the highbrow, abstract, "empty" and theoretically incorrect general *theses* which *ignore* all that is most practical and business-like.

That is where Zinoviev and myself, on the one hand, and Trotsky and Bukharin, on the other, actually stand on this question of politics and economics.

I could not help smiling, therefore, when I read Comrade Trotsky's objection in his speech of December 30: "In his summing-up at the Eighth Congress of Soviets of the debate on the situation, Comrade Lenin said we ought to have less politics and more economics, but when he got to the trade union question he laid emphasis on the political aspect of the matter" (p. 65). Comrade Trotsky thought these words were "very much to the point". Actually, however, they reveal a terrible confusion of ideas, a truly hopeless "ideological confusion". Of course, I have always said, and will continue to say, that we need more economics and less politics, but if we are to have this we must clearly be rid of political dangers *and political mistakes*. Comrade Trotsky's political mistakes, aggravated by Comrade Bukharin, *distract* our Party's attention from economic tasks and

"production" work, and, *unfortunately*, *make us waste time* on correcting them and arguing it out with the syndicalist deviation (which leads to the collapse of the dictatorship of the proletariat), objecting to the incorrect approach to the trade union movement (which leads to the collapse of the Soviet power), and debating general "theses", instead of having a practical and business-like "economic" discussion as to whether it was the Saratov millers, the Donbas miners, the Petrograd metalworkers or some other group that had the best results in coalescing, distributing bonuses in kind, and organising comrades' courts, on the basis of Rudzutak's theses, adopted by the Fifth All-Russia-Trade Union Conference on November 2-6.

Let us now consider what good there is in a "broad discussion". Once again we find political mistakes distracting attention from economic tasks. I was against this "broad" discussion, and I believed, and still do, that it was a mistake—a political mistake—on Comrade Trotsky's part to disrupt the work of the trade union commission, which ought to have held a business-like discussion. I believe Bukharin's buffer group made the political mistake of misunderstanding the tasks of the buffer (in which case they had once again substituted eclecticism for dialectics), for from the "buffer" standpoint they should have vigorously opposed any broad discussion and demanded that the matter should be taken up by the trade union commission. Here is what came of this.

On December 30, Bukharin went so far as to say that "we have proclaimed the new and sacred slogan of workers' democracy, which means that questions are no longer to be discussed in the board-room within the corporation or at small meetings but are to be placed before big meetings. I insist that by taking the trade union issue before such a large meeting as this one we are not taking a step backward but forward" (p. 45). And this man has accused Zinoviev of spouting "hot air" and overdoing the democracy! I say that he himself has given us a lot of hot air and has shown some unexampled bungling; he has completely failed to understand that formal democracy must be subordinate to the revolutionary interest.

Trotsky is in the same boat. His charge is that "Lenin

wants at all costs to disrupt or shelve the discussion of the matter in essence" (p. 65). He declares: "My reasons for refusing to serve on the commission were clearly stated in the Central Committee: until such time as I am permitted, on a par with all other comrades, to air these questions fully in the Party press, I do not expect any good to come of any cloistered examination of these matters, and, consequently, of work on the commission" (p. 69).

What is the result? Less than a month has passed since Trotsky started his "broad discussion" on December 25, and you will be hard put to find one responsible Party worker in a hundred who is not fed up with the discussion and has not realised its futility (to say no worse). For Trotsky has made the Party waste time on a discussion of words and bad theses, and has ridiculed as "cloistered" the *business-like* economic discussion in the commission, which was to have studied and verified practical experience and projected its lessons for *progress* in real "production" work, in place of the *regress* from vibrant activity to scholastic exercises in all sorts of "production atmospheres".

Take this famous "coalescence". My advice on December 30 was that we should keep mum on this point, because we had *not studied* our own practical experience, and without that any discussion was bound to degenerate into "hot air" and draw off the Party's forces *from* economic work. I said it was bureaucratic projecteering for Trotsky to propose in his theses that from one-third to one-half and from one-half to two-thirds of the economic councils should consist of trade unionists.

For this I was upbraided by Bukharin who, I see from p. 49 of the report, made a point of proving to me at length and in great detail that "when people meet to discuss something, they should not act as deaf-mutes" (*sic*). Trotsky was also angry and exclaimed:

> "Will every one of you please make a note that on this particular date Comrade Lenin described this as a bureaucratic evil. I take the liberty to predict that within a few months we shall have accepted for our guidance and consideration that the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Supreme Economic Council, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union and the Metals Department, etc., are to have from one-third to one-half of their members in common" (p. 68).

When I read that I asked Comrade Milyutin (Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council) to let me have the available *printed* reports on coalescence. I said to myself: why not make a small start on the *study of our practical experience*; it's so dull engaging in "general Party talk" (Bukharin's expression, p. 47, which has every chance of becoming a catchword like "shake-up") to no useful purpose, without the facts, and inventing disagreements, definitions and "industrial democracies".

Comrade Milyutin sent me several books, including *The Report of the Supreme Economic Council to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets* (Moscow, 1920; preface dated December 19, 1920). On its p. 14 is a table showing workers' participation in administrative bodies. Here is the table (covering only part of the gubernia economic councils and factories):

Administrative body	Total members	Workers		Specialists		Office workers and others	
		Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Presidium of Supreme Economic Council and gubernia economic councils . .	187	107	57.2	22	11.8	58	31.0
Collegiums of chief administrations, departments, central boards and head offices	140	72	51.4	31	22.2	37	26.4
Corporate and one-man management of factories	1,143	726	63.5	398	34.8	19	1.7
Total . .	1,470	905	61.6	451	30.7	114	7.7

It will be seen that 61.6 per cent, that is, closer to two-thirds than to one-half, of the staff of administrative bodies now consists of workers. And this *already proves* that what Trotsky wrote on this matter in his theses was an exercise in bureaucratic projecteering. To talk, argue and write

platforms about "one-third to one-half" and "one-half to two-thirds" is the most useless sort of "general Party talk", which diverts time, attention and resources from *production* work. It is empty politicking. All this while, a great deal of good could have been done in the commission, where men of experience would have refused to write any theses without a study of the facts, say, by polling a dozen or so "common functionaries" (out of the thousand), by comparing their impressions and conclusions with objective statistical data, and by making an attempt to obtain practical guidance for the future: that being our experience, do we go straight on, or do we make some change in our course, methods and approach, and how; or do we call a halt, for the good of the cause, and check things over and over again, make a few changes here and there, and so on and so forth.

Comrades, a real "executive" (let me also have a go at "production propaganda") is well aware that even in the most advanced countries, the capitalists and their executives take years—sometimes ten and more—to study and test their own (and others') practical experience, making innumerable starts and corrections to tailor a system of management, select senior and junior executives, etc., fit for their particular business. That was the rule under capitalism, which throughout the civilised world based its business practices on *the experience and habits of centuries*. We who are breaking new ground must put in a long, persistent and patient effort to retrain men and change the old habits which have come down to us from capitalism, but this can only be done little by little. Trotsky's approach is quite wrong. In his December 30 speech he exclaimed: "Do or do not our workers, Party and trade union functionaries have any production training? Yes or no? I say: No" (p. 29). This is a ridiculous approach. It is like asking whether a division has enough felt boots: Yes or no?

It is safe to say that even ten years from now we shall have to admit that all our Party and trade union functionaries do not have enough production training, in much the same way as the workers of the Military Department, the trade unions and the Party will not have had

enough military experience. But we have made a *start* on production training by having about a thousand workers, and trade union members and delegates take part in management and run factories, head offices and other bodies higher up the scale. The basic principle underlying "production training"—which is the training of *our own selves*, of the old underground workers and professional journalists—is that we should start a painstaking and detailed study of our own practical experience, and teach others to do so, according to the rule: Look before you leap. The fundamental and absolute rule behind "production training" is systematic, circumspect, practical and business-like verification of what this one thousand have done, and even more efficient and careful correction of their work, taking a step forward only when there is ample proof of the usefulness of a given method, system of management, proportion, selection of men, etc. And it is this rule that Comrade Trotsky has broken by his theses and approach. All his theses, his entire platform pamphlet, are so wrong that they have diverted the Party's attention and resources from practical "production" work to a lot of empty talk.

DIALECTICS AND ECLECTICISM. "SCHOOL" AND "APPARATUS"

Among Comrade Bukharin's many excellent traits are his theoretical ability and keen interest in getting at the theoretical roots of every question. That is a very valuable trait because you cannot have a proper understanding of any mistake, let alone a political one, unless you dig down to its theoretical roots among the basic premises of the one who makes it.

Responding to this urge, Comrade Bukharin tended to shift the controversy into the theoretical sphere, beginning from December 30, if not earlier.

In his speech on that day he said: "That neither the political nor the economic factor can be ignored is, I believe, absolutely incontrovertible—and that is the theoretical essence of what is here known as the 'buffer group' or its ideology" (p. 47).

The gist of his theoretical mistake in this case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: "on the one hand, and on the other", "the one and the other". That is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown this to be so on the example of politics and economics.

That of the "buffer" has gone to reinforce the point. You need a buffer, and it is useful when the Party train is heading for a crash. No question about that at all. Bukharin has built up his "buffer" problem eclectically, by collecting odd pieces from Zinoviev and Trotsky. As a "buffer", Bukharin should have decided for himself just where, when and how each individual or group had made their mistake, whether it was a theoretical mistake, one of political tact, factional pronouncement, or exaggeration, etc. He should have done that and gone *hammer and tongs at every* such mistake. But he has failed to understand his task of "buffer", and here is good proof of it.

The Communist group of Tsektran's Petrograd Bureau (the C.C. of the Railwaymen's and Water Transport Workers' Union), an organisation sympathising with Trotsky, has stated its opinion that, "on the main issue of the trade unions' role in production, Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin hold views which are variations of one and the same standpoint". It has issued Comrade Bukharin's report in Petrograd on January 3, 1921, in pamphlet form (N. Bukharin, *The Tasks of the Trade Unions*, Petrograd, 1921). It says:

> "Comrade Trotsky's original formulation was that the trade union leadership should be removed and suitable comrades found to take their place, etc. He had earlier advocated a 'shake-up', but he has now abandoned the idea, and it is therefore quite absurd to use it as an argument against him" (p. 5).

I will let pass the numerous factual inaccuracies in this statement. (Trotsky used the term "shake-up" at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions, November 2-6. He mentions "selection of leadership" in Paragraph 5 of his theses which he submitted to the Central Committee on

November 8, and which, incidentally, some of his supporters have published as a leaflet. The whole of Trotsky's pamphlet, *The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions*, December 25, reveals the same kind of mentality, the same spirit as I have pointed out before. When and how he "abandoned" this attitude remains a mystery.) I am now dealing with a different matter. When the "buffer" is an eclectic, he passes over some mistakes and brings up others; he says nothing of them in Moscow on December 30, 1920, when addressing thousands of R.C.P. functionaries from all over Russia; but he brings them up in Petrograd on January 3, 1921. When the "buffer" is a dialectician, he directs the full brunt of his attack at every mistake he sees on either side, or on all sides. And that is something Bukharin does not do. He does not even try to examine Trotsky's pamphlet in the light of the "shake-up" policy. *He simply says nothing about it*. No wonder his buffer performance has made everyone laugh.

To proceed. In that same Petrograd speech he says (p. 7):

> "Comrade Trotsky's mistake is insufficient support for the school-of-communism idea."

During the December 30 discussion, Bukharin reasoned as follows:

> "Comrade Zinoviev has said that the trade unions are a school of communism, and Trotsky has said that they are a technical and administrative apparatus for industrial management. I see no logical grounds for proof that either proposition is wrong; both, and a combination of both, are right" (p. 48).

Bukharin and his "group" or "faction" make the same point in their thesis 6: "On the one hand, they [the trade unions] are a school of communism ... and on the other, they are—increasingly—a component part of the economic apparatus and of state administration in general" (*Pravda*, January 16).

That is where we find Comrade Bukharin's fundamental theoretical mistake, which is substitution of eclecticism (especially popular with the authors of diverse "fashionable" and reactionary philosophical systems) for Marxist dialectics.

When Comrade Bukharin speaks of "logical" grounds, his whole reasoning shows that he takes—unconsciously,

perhaps—the standpoint of formal or scholastic logic, and not of dialectical or Marxist logic. Let me explain this by taking the simple example which Comrade Bukharin himself gives. In the December 30 discussion he said:

> "Comrades, many of you may find that the current controversy suggests something like this: two men come in and invite each other to define the tumbler on the lectern. One says: 'It is a glass cylinder, and a curse on anyone who says different.' The other one says: 'A tumbler is a drinking vessel, and a curse on anyone who says different'" (p. 46).

The reader will see that Bukharin's example was meant to give me a popular explanation of the harm of one-track thinking. I accept it with gratitude, and in the one-good-turn-deserves-another spirit offer a popular explanation of the difference between dialectics and eclecticism.

A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of "mediacies" and inter-relationships with the rest of the world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can serve as a paper-weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth.

Moreover, if I needed a tumbler just now for drinking, it would not in the least matter how cylindrical it was, and whether it was actually made of glass; what would matter though would be whether it had any holes in the bottom, or anything that would cut my lips when I drank, etc. But if I did not need a tumbler for drinking but for a purpose that could be served by any glass cylinder, a tumbler with a cracked bottom or without one at all would do just as well, etc.

Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass

cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more.

Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and "mediacies". That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in "self-movement" (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and *connection* with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full "definition" of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that "truth is always concrete, never abstract", as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (Let me add in parenthesis for the benefit of young Party members that you *cannot* hope to become a *real*, intelligent Communist without making a study—and I mean *study*—of all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, because nothing better has been written on Marxism anywhere in the world.*)

I have not, of course, run through the whole notion of dialectical logic, but what I have said will do for the present. I think we can return from the tumbler to the trade unions and Trotsky's platform.

"A school, on the one hand, and an apparatus on the other", says Bukharin, and writes as much in his theses. Trotsky's mistake is "insufficient support for the school-

* By the way, it would be a good thing, first, if the current edition of Plekhanov's works contained a special volume or volumes of all his philosophical articles, with detailed indexes, etc., to be included in a series of standard textbooks on communism; secondly, I think the workers' state must demand that professors of philosophy should have a knowledge of Plekhanov's exposition of Marxist philosophy and ability to impart it to their students. But all that is a digression from "propaganda" to "administration".

of-communism idea"; Zinoviev errs by being lukewarm on the apparatus "factor".

Why is Bukharin's reasoning no more than inert and empty eclecticism? It is because he does not even try to make an independent analysis, from his own standpoint, either of the whole course of the current controversy (as Marxism, *that is*, dialectical logic, unconditionally demands) or of the whole approach to the question, the whole presentation—the whole trend of the presentation, if you will—of the question at the present time and in these concrete circumstances. You do not see Bukharin doing that at all! His approach is one of pure abstraction: he makes no attempt at concrete study, and takes bits and pieces from Zinoviev and Trotsky. That is eclecticism.

Here is another example to clarify the picture. I know next to nothing about the insurgents and revolutionaries of South China (apart from the two or three articles by Sun Yat-sen, and a few books and newspaper articles I read many years ago). Since there are these uprisings, it is not too far-fetched to assume a controversy going on between Chinese No. 1, who says that the insurrection is the product of a most acute nation-wide class struggle, and Chinese No. 2, who says that insurrection is an art. That is all I need to know in order to write theses *à la* Bukharin: "On the one hand, ... on the other hand". The one has failed to reckon with the art "factor", and the other, with the "acuteness factor", etc. Because no *concrete* study is made of *this particular* controversy, question, approach, etc., the result is a dead and empty eclecticism.

On the one hand, the trade unions are a school, and on the other, an apparatus; but they also happen to be an organisation of working people, an almost exclusive organisation of industrial workers, an organisation by industry, etc.* Bukharin does not make any analysis for himself, nor does he produce a shred of evidence to prove why it is that we should consider the first two "facets" of the question

* Incidentally, here again Trotsky makes a mistake. He thinks that an industrial union is designed to control industry. That is wrong. When you say that a union is an industrial one you mean that it admits to membership workers in one industry, which is inevitable at the present level of technology and culture (in Russia and elsewhere).

or object, instead of the third, the fourth, the fifth, etc. That is why his group's theses are an eclectic soap bubble. His presentation of the "school-apparatus" relationship is fundamentally eclectic and wrong.

The only way to view this question in the right light is to descend from empty abstractions to the concrete, that is, the present issue. Whether you take it in the form it assumed at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions, or as it was presented and *slanted* by Trotsky himself in his platform pamphlet of December 25, you will find that his *whole* approach is quite wrong and that he has gone off at a tangent. He has failed to understand that the trade unions can and must be viewed as a school both when raising the question of "Soviet trade-unionism", and when speaking of production propaganda in general, and even when considering "coalescence" and trade union participation in industrial management, *as Trotsky does*. On this last point, as it is presented in Trotsky's platform pamphlet, the mistake lies in his failure to grasp that the trade unions are a *school of technical and administrative management of production*. In the context of the controversy, you cannot say: "a school, on the one hand, and something else on the other"; given Trotsky's approach, the trade unions, whichever way you look at them, are a school. They are a school of unity, solidarity, management and administration, where you learn how to protect your interests. Instead of making an effort to comprehend and correct Comrade Trotsky's fundamental mistake, Comrade Bukharin has produced a funny little amendment: "On the one hand, and on the other."

Let us go deeper into the question. Let us see what the present trade unions are, as an "apparatus" of industrial management. We have seen from the incomplete returns that about 900 workers—trade union members and delegates—are engaged in industrial management. If you multiply this number by 10 or even by 100—if it helps to clarify your fundamental mistake let us assume this incredible speed of "advance" in the immediate future—you still have an insignificant proportion of those directly engaged in *management*, as compared with the mass of six million trade union members. This makes it even clearer that it

is quite wrong to look to the "leading stratum", and talk about the trade unions' role in production and industrial management, as Trotsky does, forgetting that 98.5 per cent (6 million minus 90,000 equals 5,910,000 or 98.5 per cent of the total) *are learning, and will have to continue to do so for a long time to come.* Don't say school and management, say *school of management.*

In his December 30 argument against Zinoviev, whom he accused, quite groundlessly and incorrectly, of denying the "appointments system", that is, the Central Committee's right and duty to make appointments, Comrade Trotsky inadvertently drew the following telltale comparison:

> "Zinoviev tends to overdo the propaganda angle on every practical matter, forgetting that it is not only a source of material for agitation, but also a problem requiring an administrative solution" (p. 27).

Before I explain in detail the *potential* administrative approach to the issue, let me say that Comrade Trotsky's fundamental mistake is that he treats (rather, maltreats) *the questions* he himself had brought up in his platform pamphlet as *administrative* ones, whereas they could be and ought to be viewed *only from the propaganda angle.*

In effect, what are Trotsky's good points? One undoubtedly good and useful point is his *production propaganda*, but that is not in his theses, but in his *speeches*, specially when he forgets about his unfortunate polemics with the allegedly "conservative" wing of the trade-unionists. He would undoubtedly have done (and I believe he will do) a great deal of good in the trade union commission's practical business, as speaker and writer, and as a member of the All-Russia Production Propaganda Bureau. His platform theses were a mistake, for through them, like a scarlet thread, runs the administrative approach to the "crisis" and the "two trends" within the trade unions, the interpretation of the R.C.P. Programme, "Soviet trade-unionism", "production training" and "coalescence". I have listed all the main points of Trotsky's "platform" and they all happen to be topics which, considering the material at Trotsky's disposal, can be correctly approached at the present time only from the propaganda angle.

The state is a sphere of coercion. It would be madness

to renounce coercion, especially in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so that the administrative approach and "steerage" are indispensable. The Party is the leader, the vanguard of the proletariat, which rules directly. It is not coercion but expulsion from the Party that is the specific means of influence and the means of purging and steeling the vanguard. The trade unions are a reservoir of the state power, a school of communism and a school of management. The specific and cardinal thing in this sphere is *not* administration but the "*ties*" "*between* the central state administration" (and, of course, the local as well), "the national economy and the *broad masses* of the working people" (see Party Programme, economic section, § 5, dealing with the trade unions).

The whole of Trotsky's platform pamphlet betrays an incorrect approach to the problem and a misunderstanding of this relationship.

Let us assume that Trotsky had taken a different approach to this famous question of "coalescence" in connection with the other topics of his platform, and that his pamphlet was entirely devoted to a detailed investigation of, say, 90 of the 900 cases of "coalescence" where trade union officials and members concurrently held elective trade union posts and Supreme Economic Council posts in industrial management. Let us say these 90 cases had been analysed together with the returns of a selective statistical survey, the reports of inspectors and instructors of Rabkrin and the People's Commissariats concerned: let us say they had been analysed in the light of the data supplied by the administrative bodies, the results of the work, the headway in production, etc. That would have been a correct administrative approach, and would have fully indicated the "shake-up" line, which implies concentrating attention on removals, transfers, appointments and the immediate demands to be made on the "leading stratum". When Bukharin said in his January 3 speech, published by the Tsektran people in Petrograd, that Trotsky had at first wanted a "shake-up" but had now abandoned the idea, he made another one of his eclectical mistakes, which is ridiculous from the practical standpoint and theoretically inadmissible for a Marxist. He takes the question in the abstract, being unable (or

unwilling) to get down to brass tacks. So long as we, the Party's Central Committee and the whole Party, continue to run things, that is, govern, we shall never—we cannot—dispense with the "shake-up", that is, removals, transfers, appointments, dismissals, etc. But Trotsky's platform pamphlet deals with something else, and does not raise the "question of practical business" at all. It is not this but the "*trends* within the trade union movement" (Trotsky's thesis 4, end) that was being debated by Zinoviev and Trotsky, Bukharin and myself, and in fact the whole Party.

This is essentially a political question. Because of the substance of the case—this concrete, particular "case "—it is impossible to correct Trotsky's mistake by means of eclectic little amendments and addenda, as Bukharin has been trying to do, being moved undoubtedly by the most humane sentiments and intensions.

There is only one answer.

First, there must be a correct solution of the political question of the "trends within the trade union movement", the relationship between classes, between politics and economics, the specific role of the state, the Party, the trade unions, as "school" and apparatus, etc.

Second, once the correct political decision has been adopted, a diversified nation-wide production propaganda campaign must be carried through, or, rather, systematically carried forward with persistence and patience over a long term, under the sponsorship and direction of a state agency. It should be conducted in such a way as to cover the same ground over and over again.

Third, the "questions of practical business" must not be confused with trend issues which properly belong to the sphere of general Party talk" and broad discussions; they must be dealt with as practical matters in the working commissions, with a hearing of witnesses and a study of memoranda, reports and statistics. And any necessary "shake-up" must be carried out only on that basis and in those circumstances: only under a decision of the competent Soviet or Party organ, or of both.

Trotsky and Bukharin have produced a hodgepodge of political mistakes in approach, breaks in the middle of the transmission belts, and unwarranted and futile attacks

on "administrative steerage". It is now clear where the "theoretical" source of the mistake lies, since Bukharin has taken up that aspect of it with his example of the tumbler. His theoretical—in this case, gnosiological—mistake lies in his substitution of eclecticism for dialectics. His eclectic approach has confused him and has landed him in syndicalism. Trotsky's mistake is one-track thinking, compulsiveness, exaggeration and obstinacy. His platform says that a tumbler is a drinking vessel, but this particular tumbler happens to have no bottom.

CONCLUSION

It remains for me to go over a few more points which must be dealt with to prevent misunderstanding.

Thesis 6 of Trotsky's platform quotes Paragraph 5 of the economic section of the R.C.P. Programme, which deals with the trade unions. Two pages later, his thesis 8 says:

"Having lost the old basis of their existence, the class economic struggle, the trade unions..." (that is wrong, and is a hasty exaggeration: the trade unions no longer have to face the *class* economic struggle but the *non-class* "economic struggle", which means combating bureaucratic distortions of the Soviet apparatus, safeguarding the working people's material and spiritual interests in ways and means inaccessible to this apparatus, etc. This is a struggle they will unfortunately have to face for many more years to come). "The trade unions," says Trotsky, "have, for various reasons, not yet succeeded in mustering the necessary forces and working out the necessary methods enabling them to solve the new task, that of *organising production*" (Trotsky's italics, p. 9, thesis 8), "set before them by the proletarian revolution and formulated in our Programme."

That is yet another hasty exaggeration which is pregnant with grave error. The Programme does not contain any such formulation nor does it set the trade unions the task of "organising production". Let us go over the propositions in the Party's Programme as they unfold in the text:

(1) "The organisational apparatus" (but not the others) "of socialised industry should rely chiefly" (but not exclusively) "on the trade unions." (2) "They must to an ever

increasing degree divest themselves of the narrow craft-union spirit" (how? under the leadership of the Party and through the proletariat's educational and other influence on the non-proletarian mass of working people) "and become large industrial associations, embracing the majority, and eventually all of the workers in the given industry."

That is the first part of the section of the Party Programme dealing with the trade unions. You will have noted that it starts by laying down very "*strict* conditions" demanding a long sustained effort for what is to follow. And what follows is this:

"The trade unions being, on the strength of the laws of the Soviet Republic and established practice, participants" (note the cautious statement: participants only) "in all the local and central organs of industrial management, should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity" (note this: should arrive at a *de facto* concentration of management not of branches of industry and not of industry as a whole, but of the whole national economy, and moreover, as an economic entity. In economic terms, this condition may be considered fulfilled only when the petty producers both in industry and agriculture account for less than one-half of the population and the national economy). "The trade unions ensuring in this way" (the way which helps to realise all the conditions listed earlier) "indissoluble ties between the central state administration, the national economy and the broad masses of working people, should draw the latter" (that is, the masses, the majority of the population) "into direct economic management on the widest possible scale. At the same time, the participation of the trade unions in economic management and their activity in drawing the broad masses into this work are the principal means of combating the bureaucratisation of the economic apparatus of the Soviet power and making possible the establishment of truly popular control over the results of production."

There again, in that last sentence, we find a very cautious phrase: "participation in economic management"; and another reference to the recruitment of the broad masses as the chief (but not the only) means of combating

bureaucratic practices; finally, we find a highly cautious statement: "*making possible*" the establishment of "*popular*"—that is, workers' and peasants', and not just purely proletarian—"*control*".

It is obviously wrong to boil this down to the Party Programme "formulating" the trade unions' task as "organisation of production". And if you insist on this error, and write it into your platform theses, you will get nothing but an anti-communist, syndicalist deviation.

Incidentally, Comrade Trotsky says in his theses that "over the last period we have not made any headway towards the goal set forth in the Programme but have in fact retreated from it" (p. 7, thesis 6). That statement is unsupported, and, I think, wrong. It is no proof to say, as Trotsky did in the discussions, that the trade unions "themselves" admit this. That is not the last resort, as far as the Party is concerned, and, generally speaking, the proof lies only in a serious and objective study of a great number of facts. Moreover, even if such proof were forthcoming, there would remain this question: Why have we retreated? Is it because "many trade-unionists" are "balking at the new tasks and methods", as Trotsky believes, or because "we have not yet succeeded in mustering the necessary forces and working out the necessary methods" to cut short and correct certain unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy?

Which brings me to Bukharin's rebuke of December 30 (repeated by Trotsky yesterday, January 24, during our discussion in the Communist group of the Second Miners' Congress) that we have "dropped the line laid down by the Ninth Party Congress" (p. 46 of the report on the December 30 discussion). He alleged that at that Congress I had defended the militarisation of labour and had jeered at references to democracy, all of which I now "repudiate". In his reply to the debate on December 30, Comrade Trotsky added this barb: "Lenin takes account of the fact that ... there is a grouping of opposition-minded comrades within the trade unions" (p. 65); that I view it from the "diplomatic angle" (p. 69), and that there is "manoeuvring inside the Party groups" (p. 70), etc. Putting such a complexion on the case is, of course, highly flattering for Trotsky, and

worse than unflattering for me. But let us look at the facts.

In that same discussion on December 30, Trotsky and Krestinsky established the fact that "as long ago as July (1920), Comrade Preobrazhensky had proposed to the Central Committee that we should switch to a new track in respect of the internal life of our workers' organisations" (p. 25). In August, Comrade Zinoviev drafted a letter, and the Central Committee approved a *C.C. letter* on combating red-tape and extending democracy. In September, the question was brought up at a Party conference whose decisions were endorsed by the Central Committee. In December, the question of combating red-tape was laid before the Eighth Congress of Soviets. Consequently, the whole Central Committee, the whole Party and the whole workers' and peasants' Republic had recognised that the question of the bureaucracy and ways of combating its evils was high on the agenda. Does any "repudiation" of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. follow from all this? Of course, not. The decisions on the militarisation of labour, etc., are incontestable, and there is no need for me at all to withdraw any of my jibes at the references to democracy by those who challenged these decisions. What does follow is that we shall be extending democracy in the workers' organisations, without turning it into a fetish; that we shall redouble our attention to the struggle against bureaucratic practices; and that we shall take special care to rectify any unwarranted and harmful excesses of bureaucracy, no matter who points them out.

One final remark on the minor question of priority and equalisation. I said during the December 30 discussion that Trotsky's formulation of thesis 41 on this point was theoretically wrong, because it implied priority in production and equalisation in consumption. I replied that priority implied preference and that that was nothing unless you also had it in consumption. Comrade Trotsky reproached me for "extraordinary forgetfulness" and "intimidation" (pp. 67 and 68), and I am surprised to find that he has not accused me also of manoeuvring, diplomatic moves, etc. He has made "concessions" to my equalitarian line, but I have attacked him.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Actually, however, anyone who takes an interest in Party affairs, can turn to indisputable Party documents: the November resolution of the C.C. Plenum, point 4, and Trotsky's platform pamphlet, thesis 41. However "forgetful" I may be, and however excellent Comrade Trotsky's memory, it is still a fact that thesis 41 contains a theoretical error, which the C.C. resolution of November 9 does not. The resolution says: "While recognising the necessity of keeping to the principle of priority in carrying out the economic plan, the Central Committee, in complete solidarity with the decisions of the last All-Russia Conference (September), deems it necessary to effect a gradual but steady transition to equality in the status of various groups of workers and their respective trade unions, all the while building up the organisation on the scale of the union as a whole." That is clearly aimed against Tsektran, and it is quite impossible to put any other construction on the exact meaning of the resolution. Priority is here to stay. Preference is still to be given to enterprises, trade unions, trusts and departments on the priority list (in regard to fulfilment of the economic plan), but at the same time, the "equalitarian line"—which was supported not by "Comrade Lenin alone", but was approved *by the Party Conference and the Central Committee, that is, the entire Party*—makes this clear-cut demand: get on with the gradual but steady *transition* to equalisation. That Tsektran failed to carry out this C.C. resolution (November) is evident from the Central Committee's December resolution (on Trotsky and Bukharin's motion), which contains another reminder of the "principles of ordinary democracy". The theoretical error in thesis 41 is that it says: equalisation in consumption, priority in production. That is an economic absurdity because it implies a gap between production and consumption. I did not say—and could never have said—anything of the sort. If you don't need a factory, close it down. Close down all the factories that are not absolutely essential, and give preference to those that are. Give preference to, say, transport. Most certainly. But the preference must not be overdone, as it was in Tsektran's case, which was why the *Party* (and not just Lenin) issued this directive: *get on with the gradual* but steady *transition* to equality.

And Trotsky has no one but himself to blame for having come out—after the November Plenary Meeting, which gave a clear-cut and theoretically correct solution—with a factional pamphlet on "the two trends" and proposed a formulation in his thesis 41 which is wrong in economic terms.

Today, January 25, it is exactly one month since Comrade Trotsky's factional statement. It is now patent that this pronouncement, inappropriate in form and wrong in essence, has diverted the Party from its practical economic and production effort into rectifying political and theoretical mistakes. But, it's an ill wind, as the old saying goes.

Rumour has it that some terrible things have been said about the disagreements on the Central Committee. Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries undoubtedly shelter (and have sheltered) behind the opposition, and it is they who are spreading the rumours, incredibly malicious formulations, and inventions of all sorts to malign the Party, put vile interpretations on its decisions, aggravate conflicts and ruin its work. That is a political trick used by the bourgeoisie, including the petty-bourgeois democrats, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, for very obvious reasons, hate—and cannot help hating—the Bolsheviks' guts. Every intelligent member of the Party is familiar with this political trick, and knows its worth.

Because of the disagreements on the Central Committee, it had to appeal to the Party, and the discussions that followed clearly revealed the essence and scope of these disagreements. That killed the rumours and the slander. The Party learns its lessons and is tempered in the struggle against factionalism, a new malaise (it is new in the sense that after the October Revolution we had forgotten all about it). Actually, it is an old malaise, with relapses apparently bound to occur over the next few years, but with an easier cure now well in sight.

The Party is learning not to blow up its disagreements. Let me quote at this point Comrade Trotsky's correct remark about Comrade Tomsky: "I have always said

—even when the polemic against Comrade Tomsky was at its bitterest—that it is quite clear to me that only men with his experience and authority ought to be our trade union leaders. I told this to the Party group of the Fifth Conference of the Trade Unions, and repeated it at the Zimin theatre a few days ago. Ideological struggle within the Party does not mean mutual ostracism but mutual influence"[27] (p. 34 of the report on the December 30 discussion). The Party will naturally apply this correct approach to Comrade Trotsky himself.

During the discussion it was Comrade Shlyapnikov and his group, the so-called Workers' Opposition, who showed the most pronounced syndicalist trend. This being an obvious deviation from communism and the Party, we shall have to reckon with it, talk it over, and make a special propaganda effort to explain the error of these views and the danger of making such mistakes. Comrade Bukharin, who actually coined the syndicalist phrase "mandatory nominations" (by trade unions to management bodies) tries to vindicate himself in today's issue of *Pravda*, but I'm afraid his line of defence is highly ineffective and quite wrong. He wants us to know, you see, that he deals with the role of the Party in his other points. I should think so! If it were otherwise it would have been more than just a *mistake*, requiring correction and allowing some slight rectification: it would have been withdrawal from the Party. When you say "mandatory nominations" but neglect to add, there and then, that they are *not* mandatory for the Party, you have a syndicalist deviation, and that is incompatible with communism and the Party Programme. If you add: "mandatory but *not* for the Party" you are giving the non-Party workers a false sense of having some increase in their rights, whereas in fact there will be no change at all. The longer Comrade Bukharin persists in his deviation from communism—a deviation that is wrong theoretically and deceptive politically—the more deplorable will be the fruits of his obstinacy. You cannot maintain an untenable proposition. The Party does not object to the extension of the rights of the non-Party workers in general, but a little reflection will show what can and what cannot be done in this respect.

In the discussion by the Communist group of the Second All-Russia Miners ' Congress, Shlyapnikov's platform was defeated despite the backing it got from Comrade Kiselyov, who commands special prestige in that union: our platform won 137 votes, Shlyapnikov's, 62, and Trotsky's, 8. The syndicalist malaise must and will be cured.

In this one month, Petrograd, Moscow and a number of provincial towns have shown that the Party responded to the discussion and has rejected Comrade Trotsky's wrong line by an overwhelming majority. While there may have been some vacillation "at the top" and "in the provinces", in the committees and in the offices, the rank-and-file membership—the mass of Party workers—came out solidly against this wrong line.

Comrade Kamenev informed me of Comrade Trotsky's announcement, during the discussion in the Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow on January 23, that he was withdrawing his platform and joining up with the Bukharin group on a new platform. Unfortunately, I heard nothing of this from Comrade Trotsky either on January 23 or 24, when he spoke against me in the Communist group of the Miners' Congress. I don't know whether this is due to another change in Comrade Trotsky's platform and intentions, or to some other reason. In any case, his January 23 announcement shows that the Party, without so much as mustering all its forces, and with only Petrograd, Moscow and a minority of the provincial towns going on record, has corrected Comrade Trotsky's mistake promptly and with determination.

The Party's enemies had rejoiced too soon. They have not been able—and will never be able—to take advantage of some of the inevitable disagreements within the Party to inflict harm on it and on the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT AN ENLARGED CONFERENCE OF MOSCOW METALWORKERS FEBRUARY 4, 1921[28]

I regret that I am unable to participate in the work of your Conference and that I must confine myself to a brief statement of my views.

From the speeches the comrades have delivered here I gather that you want to know all about the sowing campaign. Very many people think that there is something tricky about the Soviet government's policy towards the peasants. Our policy in this sphere is one that we are always ready to reveal to the masses. The fundamental problem of the Soviet power is that our own victories have not yet been followed by victories in other countries. If you give our Constitution a careful reading, you will see that we have not made any fantastic promises, but insist on the need for dictatorship, because the whole bourgeois world is against us.

We are told: the peasants' condition is not the same as that of the workers, there is some trick in this. But it is one that we have openly proclaimed.

Anyone who has stopped to think of the relation of forces between ourselves and the bourgeoisie knows that they are stronger; yet, for three years, they have been unable to crush us. That is not a miracle; we do not believe in miracles. The simple truth is that they cannot unite, and are quarrelling over the division of the spoils. Most of the oppressed countries are colonies, and a minority live on their labour, but atop a volcano.

They are stronger, but the movement is growing over there as well. The capitalists have a stronger military force, but they have had a set-back, and we say: the worst

is over, but the enemy will make further attempts. Of the Europeans who have visited us none has claimed that his country could have avoided the rags and the queues; and they all agree that, after six years of war, even Britain would have been in a similar state.

We must do our best to establish proper relations between the workers and the peasants. The peasants are another class. We shall have socialism when there are no classes, when all the means of production belong to the working people. We still have classes, it will take many, many years to abolish them, and only a quack will promise to do it overnight. The peasants prefer to go it alone, each one on his own farm, and with his own stock of corn. This gives them power over everybody. An armed enemy is lying in wait for us, and if we are to prevent him from overthrowing us, we must establish proper relations between the workers and the peasants.

If you take the workers and the peasants, you will find that the latter are more numerous. The capitalists claim to have a democracy under which workers and peasants enjoy equal rights. So long as the peasants follow the bourgeoisie and the workers are isolated, they will be defeated. If we forget that, the capitalists will beat us. We have not promised equality, and we have not got it. There can be no equality so long as one has plenty of corn and the other has none

The capitalists realised that you can share out the land, but not the factories. We have a dictatorship of the proletariat, a term that scares the peasants, but it is the only means of uniting them and making them follow the lead of the workers. We believe this is the correct solution, and the working class will succeed in uniting the peasantry. Only then will the road be open to further advance towards the abolition of classes

What is the policy of the American capitalists? They are doling out land, and the peasants follow them and are lulled by their talk of equality. Either you are duped in this fashion, or you see through it, unite with the workers and drive out the capitalists.

This is our policy, and you will find it in our Constitution. I was told here that we ought to review the sowing

campaign plans. I know that this spring the peasants are having it very bad. For the workers, the worst is over. We have not promised equality to anyone: if you want to be with the workers, come with us, come over to the socialist side; if not, go over to the Whites. We never promised a liberal regime; the one we have has helped us to escape the bondage of the landowners and capitalists. During these three years the workers starved and froze, and took over the idle factories. But they also got the power. Even the peasants in the fertile areas came to see the difference between the workers' rule and Denikin's, and they have made their choice. Our victory over Denikin was not a miracle; it was due to the fact that even the rich peasants realised what the Constituent Assembly had come to; this drove home the point that the proof of the pudding was in the eating.

The peasants realised that the more territory the Whites seized, the more peasants would be drafted into the army, and as soon as enough of them had been collected in the army, they overthrew Denikin.

We do not promise a land flowing with milk and honey. But over there you are promised equality, and get saddled with a landowner. That is why we won.

We are told we ought to review our plans for the sowing campaign. I say: nobody has suffered as much as the workers. During this period, the peasants received land and could obtain corn. This winter the peasants are in desperate straits and their discontent is understandable.

Let us review the relations between the workers and the peasants. We have said that the workers have made incredible sacrifices. This year the peasants are in a terrible plight, and we know it. We are not opposed to reviewing these relations. What is the main goal of the sowing campaign? It is to sow all the land, otherwise we are surely doomed. Do you know how much grain has been taken from the peasants this year? About three hundred million poods. What would the working class have done without it? Even so it starved. We know that the conditions of the peasants are hard, but there is no other way out of the situation. We have completely suspended the surplus grain appropriation system in thirteen gubernias. Last

year we supplied eight million poods of seed grain, and after the harvest we got back six million poods. Now we have supplied approximately fifteen million. To cancel the sowing campaign would be like jumping out of a fifth storey window. We cannot promise the peasants to relieve them of want at a stroke; to do that our factories would have to multiply their output a hundredfold.

If we did not give the workers even the short ration they are now getting, industry would have ground down to a stop.

It is true that for three years the workers got nothing at all. But there is no cure-all.

The working class has been exhausted by these three years, and this spring will be a very hard one for the peasants. But you help us with the sowing campaign—to sow all the fields—then we shall manage to overcome our difficulties.

In Hungary, the peasants failed to help the Hungarian workers and fell under the power of the landowners.

There is the alternative before you. What is the way out of this difficult situation? It is to concentrate efforts on the sowing campaign, point out the mistakes, and make corrections; otherwise there is no way out of the difficulties.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FOURTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF GARMENT WORKERS FEBRUARY 6, 1921[29]

Comrades, it gives me great pleasure to greet your Congress on behalf of the Central Committee of our Party and of the Council of People's Commissars. What gives me even greater pleasure is your unanimous decision of yesterday, following the happy reconciliation and successful resolution of the conflict and the friction among you, which required such strenuous efforts from all, and some from our Party as well. I am sure, comrades, that this slight clash and its successful settlement will be an earnest that in your future work, as members of the union and of the Party, you will be able to solve all the numerous difficulties and problems that still lie ahead of us.

Comrades, speaking of the position of our Republic in general—of the internal and external position of the Soviet power—the greatest difficulties that confronted us were, of course, those of our external positions. The greatest difficulties of the entire proletarian revolution in Russia arose from our having had to take the initiative in the socialist revolution due to the course of the imperialist war and the preceding development of the first revolution in 1905; this imposed unprecedented difficulties on us, and on our country. You all know, of course—I think that in your branch of industry this is more evident to you than to the workers of other industries—you all know to what extent capital is an international force, to what extent all the big capitalist enterprises, factories, shops, etc., all over the world are linked up together; this makes it

obvious that in substance capital cannot be completely defeated in one country. It is an international force, and in order to rout it the workers must also make a concerted effort on an international scale. Ever since 1917, when we fought the bourgeois-republican governments in Russia, and ever since the power of the Soviets was established at the end of 1917, we have been telling the workers again and again that the cardinal task, and the fundamental condition of our victory is to spread the revolution to, at least, a few of the most advanced countries. And our main difficulties over the past four years have been due to the fact that the West European capitalists managed to bring the war to an end and stave off revolution.

We in Russia had particularly striking evidence of the extremely precarious position of the bourgeoisie during the imperialist war. We also heard that in all other countries it was the end of the war that marked the intensification of the political crisis, for then the people were armed and it was an opportune moment for the proletariat to have done with the capitalists at one stroke. For a number of reasons the West European workers failed to do this, and for nearly four years now we have had to defend our positions single-handed.

As a consequence, the difficulties that fell to the lot of the Soviet Republic of Russia were without number, because the military forces of the capitalists of the whole world (vastly superior to our own, of course) did all they possibly could to help our landowners. We know full well of the incredible hardships and privations the working class of Russia has had to bear, but if we are emerging today from more than three years of successfully repulsing their military invasions and overcoming their obstructions, we have a perfect right to say without any exaggeration that the worst of our difficulties are behind us. If in spite of their overwhelming military superiority, the capitalists of the world have failed to crush this weak and backward country in the course of three years, it was only because we have had the dictatorship of the proletariat and enjoyed the massive sympathy of the working people all over the world, we can safely say, in every country without exception. And if the capitalists of the whole world have failed in

their attempt to crush Soviet Russia, which was not a hard task for them because of their enormous military superiority, we can say, I repeat, that in the international sphere, the greatest danger-point of the whole Soviet revolution is past, the worst difficulties are over.

The danger is still there, of course; the negotiations for final peace are still dragging on and there are signs that a rather difficult period in these negotiations is setting in, for the French imperialists, in particular, are pressing on with their efforts to push Poland into another war, and are spreading all sorts of false rumours about Soviet Russia not wanting peace.

Actually, we have done everything to prove that we do; we signed the provisional terms several months ago, and they were such that everyone was surprised by our spirit of compromise. We are not going back on any point of these terms, but we shall certainly refuse to be soaked under the pretext of a division of the property which under tsarism had belonged to the Polish and to the Russian people, which at the time both groaned under the yoke of tsarism. That is something we cannot have. We accept a fair division of the property, which is to be regarded as common, and a part of the railway property, and consider as indisputable the need to restore to the Polish people all objects of cultural value to which they attach especial importance, and which had been stolen and carried off to Russia in the days of the tsar. We have always anticipated that difficult problems would arise in the settlement of this matter; but if under the pressure of the French imperialists the Poles want to create a conflict and sabotage peace at all costs, there is nothing we can do about it. If there is to be peace, good will must be shown on both sides, whether in the case of a very serious conflict within a separate alliance or between two states. If the Poles once again yield to the pressure of the French imperialists, then, I repeat, the effort to conclude peace may be frustrated. You are well aware, of course, what new difficulties will confront us if the French imperialists succeed in sabotaging this peace; and we all know from a number of sources and reports that attempts are being made and enormous efforts are being exerted to this end, and that the foreign capitalists are spending

millions upon millions to organise another invasion of Soviet Russia in the spring. We now have over three years' experience of the way these invasions are organised. We know that unless they have the aid of a neighbouring state, the foreign capitalists cannot hope to organise anything like a serious expedition, and the millions they have been handing out to the various groups headed by Savinkov, or to the group of Socialist-Revolutionaries who are publishing their newspaper in Prague[30] and sometimes speak in the name of the Constituent Assembly, these millions will go down the drain, and they will have nothing to show for it but a lot of spoiled newsprint and wasted ink in various printing offices in Prague.

But there are countries like Rumania, which has not tried to fight Russia, and Poland, which is ruled by an exploiting class and a military clique of adventurers. We know that they cannot muster large forces against us, but we also know that what we prize most is peace and an opportunity to devote all our efforts to restoring our economy. So we must be extremely careful. We have the right to tell ourselves that the worst difficulties in international politics are behind us, but it would be extremely thoughtless to shut our eyes to the possibility of fresh attempts. Of course, now that we have eliminated the Wrangel front, and Rumania had not risked war when the odds were on her side, it is hardly likely that she will risk it now, but we must not forget that the ruling classes in Rumania and Poland are in a position which may be said to be bordering on the desperate. Both countries have been sold to foreign capitalists lock, stock, and barrel. Both are up to their ears in debt, and have no means of paying up. Their bankruptcy is inevitable. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants is growing steadily. Bourgeois governments in such straits have been known to rush headlong into the craziest adventures, for which there was no other explanation but their desperate and hopeless situation. That is why we must still reckon with the possibility of fresh attempts at armed invasion.

Our conviction that these attempts will be frustrated, and that the position of the capitalist powers all over the world is, generally speaking, precarious, springs chiefly

from the mounting economic crisis in all countries, and the growth of the communist working-class movement. In Europe, the revolution has not been following the same lines as ours. As I have said, the workers and peasants of the West European countries, who were in arms when the war ended, failed to strike in a swift revolution that would have been the least painful. The imperialist war, however, had so shaken the position of these states that not only has the economic crisis there not yet run its course, but there are signs that in every country without exception, even in the richest and most advanced, it will become even more acute next spring. Capital is an international evil, and just because of this all countries find themselves so grappled to each other that when some go down they tend to drag down the rest.

The rich countries have naturally waxed richer: during the war their capitalists piled up huge profits. But in the overwhelming majority of the European countries, trade has been dislocated and disrupted owing to the complete devastation not only of Russia, but even of Germany, and owing to the depression and the currency depreciation. The richest countries are suffocating, being unable to sell their industrial goods because of the depreciating currency, unemployment is growing to incredible proportions everywhere, and an unprecedented economic crisis is looming all over the world.

Meanwhile, the working class—which its capitalists had bribed by giving sizable hand-outs from their profits to the upper strata of the working class to entice it away from the revolution—is recovering from its blindness after the three-and-a-half-year war against Soviet Russia, while the communist movement is growing steadily and taking on depth not only in the parties, but also in the trade unions all over the world, although not as fast as we should like. The ruling classes all over the world are particularly apprehensive of the changes that are taking place in the trade union movement. In Europe, they are not afraid of the prospect of facing a party that could lead the revolutionary proletariat, as was the case in the Russian revolution, when in the course of a few months, no, weeks, the Party was transformed from an illegal one into one commanding

nation-wide forces, and backed by millions of people. Europe has not had such a party for years. But every capitalist sees the trade unions, and knows that they unite millions of workers and that the machinery of capitalism is bound to break down, unless the capitalists control them through the leaders who call themselves socialists but pursue the policy of the capitalists. This they know, feel and sense. The most telltale fact, for instance, was that in Germany the whole bourgeois press and the whole press of the social-traitors meeting in the Second International and calling themselves socialists, but loyally serving the capitalists, was whipped into a frenzy not so much because of Zinoviev's visit to Germany, as of that of the Russian trade unionists, for no one has stirred up the German trade unions to such an extent as they did on their first short visit to that country. This savage fury of the German bourgeois press and all the Communist-hating capitalists shows how precarious their position is. An international, world-wide struggle has flared up for influence with the trade unions, with millions of members in all civilised countries, for on them depends this inner work, which is not always readily perceptible. The inexorable growth of the economic crisis is deciding the fate of the capitalist countries.

The attempted coup[31] by the German monarchist party was thwarted by the resistance of the German trade unions, when the workers who had followed Scheidemann and the murderers of Liebknecht and Luxemburg rose and crushed the military forces. As the economic crisis gains momentum, we find the same thing happening in Great Britain, and to a large extent in America as well. That is why it is the international situation that gives us most hope and conviction that the internal situation in the capitalist countries tends to sap all of their strength, and that our international position, which was difficult yesterday and remains such today, despite our great successes, will undoubtedly improve, and that we shall be able to devote all our efforts to solving our internal tasks. I shall not enlarge on these tasks, because all of you who are engaged in industry are more familiar with the tasks of construction than I am, and it would be superfluous for me to deal with them at length.

I heard the final remark made by the preceding speaker, and I join him in saying that every member must now concentrate most attention on the practical tasks of production and economic construction now before us. The trade unions now unite nearly all the industrial workers; they unite the class that has borne the brunt of the burden of the past three years. In Russia, the working class is exercising its dictatorship; it is the ruling class in a country where workers are in a minority. But it is precisely because the working class is ruling the country and because the workers had borne the brunt of capitalist exploitation, that it is assured of the sympathy and massive support of the working peasantry and all those who do not live on the labour of others. This explains what is a sealed book not only to the capitalists but also to the socialists who have remained enemies of the Third International, and what they take to be a trick on the part of our government. They cannot understand how the working class could fight on for three years, against enormous odds, and beat them. But the majority of the peasants must support the working class because the workers have come to power for the first time in history, and because power has been taken by the class that had been most exploited. They have realised that the working class is right, and have withdrawn their support from the bourgeoisie, which, by the way, they regard as a term of abuse. I met a peasant who complained about present conditions and was obviously not in sympathy with the Soviet government's food policy, and certain other issues. The poor peasants of his district had called him a "bourgeois", and he felt this to be an affront. "I refuse to be called by such a disgraceful name," he said. And there is a world of meaning in the fact that this term has come to be regarded as an odious one by the peasants—even the well-to-do middle peasants who have worked with their own hands, who know what it takes to earn a living, and who have been exploited by landowners and capitalists (and that is something they have all experienced). It is the basis of our propaganda and agitation, and the influence exercised by the working class through the state. It is this support of the peasant masses that the working class is assured of in spite of the resistance of the rich and

profiteering crowd. And that is why our trade unions are not only associations of working people, not only the builders of our economy—that is their main task—but also a political force building a new state without landowners and capitalists. Although a minority, they can and will build a new communist society, because we are assured of the support of the millions upon millions of those who have always lived by their own labour. In greeting your Congress, I want to say that I am quite sure that we shall succeed in our tasks despite all the difficulties confronting us. (*Prolonged applause.*)

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(*The Fourth All-Russia Congress of Garment Workers, February 1-6, 1921. Verbatim Report*),
Petrograd

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to the text of the book

INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO COMMUNISTS WORKING IN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR EDUCATION

1. Unreservedly adhering to the position de fined by the Programme of the R.C.P. in regard to polytechnical education (see, in particular, §§1 and 8 of the section dealing with education), the Party must regard the lowering of the age for general and polytechnical education from seventeen to fifteen as only a practical expedient necessitated by the country's poverty and ruin caused by the wars imposed upon us by the Entente.

Vocational training for persons of fifteen years of age and upwards "in conjunction with ... general polytechnical education" (§8 mentioned above) is absolutely compulsory all over the country, wherever there is the slightest opportunity to introduce it.

2. The main failing of the People's Commissariat for Education is its lack of practical efficiency, inadequate attention to the recording and verification of practical experience, lack of systematic application of its lessons, and prevalence of general arguments and abstract slogans. The People's Commissar and the Collegium must concentrate on combating these defects.

3. The enlistment of specialists, i.e., of teachers with theoretical and long practical experience, and of persons having such experience in technical (including agronomic) vocational training for work at the centre, is improperly organised in the People's Commissariat for Education in general, and in Glavprofobr,* in particular.

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* The Chief Administration for Vocational Training under the People's Commissariat for Education.—*Tr.*

The registration of such workers, the study of their experience, the verification of the results of their work, and their systematic enlistment for responsible posts in local, and specially central, work must be organised immediately. Not a single serious measure should be carried out without canvassing the opinion of these specialists and obtaining their continued co-operation.

It goes without saying that the enlistment of specialists must be carried out under these two indispensable conditions: first, specialists who are not Communists must work under the control of Communists; secondly, Communists alone must determine the content of the curricula, in so far as this concerns general educational subjects, and particularly philosophy, the social sciences and communist education.

4. Curricula for the main types of educational establishments and for courses, lectures, readings, colloquia and practice periods must be drawn up and endorsed by the collegium and the People's Commissar.

5. The Standard Labour School Department, and, in particular, Glavprofobr, must devote greater attention to the wider and more systematic enlistment of all suitable technical and agronomic forces for the promotion of technical vocational and polytechnical education and to the utilisation for that purpose of every tolerably well-organised industrial and agricultural enterprise (state farm, agricultural experimental station, well-organised farm, etc., electric power stations, etc.).

To avoid disruption of normal operations, the forms and the order in which economic enterprises and establishments are to be used for polytechnical education are to be determined by agreement with the economic agencies concerned.

6. Clear, concise and practical forms of reporting must be devised to make it possible to estimate the scale and verify the results of the work. The organisation of this work in the People's Commissariat for Education is highly unsatisfactory.

7. The distribution of newspapers, pamphlets, magazines and books to libraries and reading-rooms in schools and elsewhere is also highly unsatisfactory. The result is that

newspapers and books reach only a small section of Soviet office workers and extremely few factory workers and peasants. This whole system must be reorganised from top to bottom.

Pravda No. 25, February 5, 1921

Published according to the manuscript

THE WORK OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR EDUCATION

Pravda No. 25 of February 5 carried "*Instructions* of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. to Communists Working in the People's Commissariat for Education (in connection with the reorganisation of the Commissariat)".

Unfortunately, there are three misprints in Point 1 distorting the meaning: the text said "political" instead of "polytechnical" education.

I should like to draw our comrades-' attention to these instructions and to call for an exchange of opinion on some of the more important points.

A five day Party Conference on educational questions was held in December 1920. It was attended by 134 delegates with voice and vote, and 29 with voice. A report of its proceedings is given in a *Supplement to the Bulletin of the Eighth Congress of Soviets on the Party Conference on Education* (published by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, January 10, 1921). The resolutions of the Conference, the report of the proceedings, all the articles published in the above-mentioned *Supplement*—except for the introductory article by Comrade Lunacharsky and the article by Comrade Grinko—reveal a wrong approach to polytechnical education. They suffer from the very defect on combating which the Central Committee in its instructions urges the People's Commissar and the Collegium to concentrate their attention, namely, too many general arguments and abstract slogans.

The question of polytechnical education has in the main been settled by our Party Programme in its paragraphs 1

and 8 of the section dealing with the people's education. It is these paragraphs that are dealt with in the Central Committee's Instructions. Paragraph 1 deals with *polytechnical education* up to the age of seventeen; and Paragraph 8 speaks of "the extensive development of vocational training for persons of the age of seventeen and upwards *in conjunction with general polytechnical education*".

Thus, the Party Programme puts the question squarely. The arguments about "*polytechnical or monotechnical* education" (the words I have put in quotes and italics, monstrously absurd though they are, are the very words that we find on page 4 of the *Supplement*) are fundamentally wrong and downright impermissible for a Communist; they betray ignorance of the Programme and an idle inclination for abstract slogans. While we are *temporarily* compelled to lower the age (for passing from general polytechnical education to polytechnical vocational training) from seventeen to fifteen, the "*Party must regard*" this lowering of the age "as only" (point 1 of the Central Committee's Instructions) a practical expedient necessitated by the "*country's poverty and ruin*".

General arguments with futile efforts to "substantiate" this lowering are claptrap. Let us stop this game of general arguments and "theorising"! Attention must be concentrated on the "recording and verification of *practical* experience" and the "systematic *application of its lessons*".

We may have very few competent people with knowledge and practical pedagogical experience but we do have some. We suffer from our inability to find them, install them in the proper executive posts, and join them in *studying* the *practical* experience of Soviet state development. Now this is precisely what the Party Conference in December 1920 failed to do, and if this was not done at a conference of 163—one hundred and sixty-three!—educational workers, it is quite evident that there must be a general, fundamental flaw in the organisation of this work, which made it necessary for the Party's Central Committee to issue special instructions.

In the Commissariat for Education there are two—just two—comrades who have special assignments. These are

the People's Commissar, Comrade Lunacharsky, who exercises general direction, and Deputy Commissar, Comrade Pokrovsky, who directs affairs, firstly, as Deputy People's Commissar, and secondly, as official adviser (and director) on scientific matters and questions of Marxism in general. The whole Party knows both Comrade Lunacharsky and Comrade Pokrovsky very well and has no doubt, of course, that in this respect both are, in their way, "specialists" in the People's Commissariat for Education. None of the other workers of the Commissariat can afford to "*specialise*" in this way: their "speciality" must lie in skilfully organising the enlistment of expert teachers, in organising their work properly, and in systematically applying the lessons of practical experience. The Central Committee's instructions refer to this in points 2, 3 and 5.

The Party workers' conference should have heard reports by specialists—teachers with some ten years' practical experience—who could have told us what is being done and has been done in the various spheres, say, vocational training, how we are coping with it in our Soviet organisation, what has been achieved, illustrated with examples (which could surely be found, even if in small number), what were the main defects, and how these could be removed, stated in concrete terms.

The Party workers' conference made *no* such record of *practical* experience, and heard no teachers on their application of this experience; but fatuous efforts were made to produce "general arguments" and appraise "abstract slogans". The whole Party, all the workers of the People's Commissariat for Education, must realise this defect and correct it in a common effort. Local workers should exchange experience and help the Party to give publicity to the exemplary gubernias, uyezds, districts, schools, or expert teachers who have achieved good results in a relatively narrow, local or special field. Taking as a basis the achievements that have stood the test of practice, we must press on and, after proper verification, apply this local experience on a nation-wide scale, promoting talented, or simply capable, teachers to more responsible posts, giving them a wider sphere of activity, etc.

The touchstone of a Communist's work in education (and educational institutions) should be his efforts in organising the enlistment of specialists, his ability to find them, utilise their knowledge, secure the co-operation of expert teachers with the Communist leadership, and verify what and how much *is being done*. He must show ability to make progress—even if very slowly and on a very small scale—so long as it is achieved in *practical* matters, on the basis of *practical* experience. But we shall not move forward if the People's Commissariat for Education continues to be full of people who pretend to provide "Communist leadership" while there is a vacuum in the practical sphere, a shortage, or total lack, of practical specialists, inability to promote them, hear what they have to say and take account of their experience. The Communist leader must prove his claim to leadership by *recruiting* a growing number of experienced teachers to help him, and by showing his *ability* to help *them* in their work, to promote *them*, and take account of and bring out *their* experience.

In *this* sense the invariable slogan must be: *less* "leadership", more practical work, that is to say, fewer general arguments and more facts, and I mean verified facts, showing where, when and what progress we are making or whether we are marking time, or retreating. The Communist who is a real leader will correct the curricula drawn up by the experienced teachers, compile a good textbook and achieve *practical*, even if slight, improvements in the content of the work of a *score*, *a hundred*, *or a thousand* expert teachers. But there is not much use in the Communist who *talks* about "leadership", *but is incapable* of enlisting any specialists for practical work, getting them to achieve practical results in *their* work, and utilising the practical experience gained by hundreds upon hundreds of teachers.

That this is the main flaw in the work of the People's Commissariat for Education is evident from a paging through the fine booklet, *The People's Commissariat for Education. October 1917-October 1920. Brief Report.* Comrade Lunacharsky admits this when he refers in the preface (p. 5) to the "obvious lack of the practical approach". But much

more effort will be needed to drive this home to all the Communists in the People's Commissariat for Education and make them practise these truths. This booklet shows that our knowledge of the facts is poor, very poor indeed; we do not know how to collect them; we are unable to judge how many questions we ought to raise and the number of answers we can expect to get (taking into consideration our level of culture, our customs, and our means of communication). We don't know how to collect evidence of practical experience and sum it up. We indulge in empty "general arguments and abstract slogans", but do not know how to utilise the services of competent teachers, in general, and of competent engineers and agronomists for technical education, in particular; we don't know how to utilise factories, state farms, tolerably well-organised enterprises and electric power stations for the purpose of polytechnical education.

In spite of these defects, the Soviet Republic is making progress in public education; there is no doubt about that. There is a mighty urge for light and knowledge "down below", that is to say, among the mass of working people whom capitalism had been hypocritically cheating out of an education and depriving of it by open violence. We can be proud that we are promoting and fostering this urge. But it would be a real crime to ignore the defects in our work, and the fact that we have not yet learned properly to *organise* the state apparatus of education.

Take also the distribution of newspapers and books, the question dealt with in the last point of the Central Committee's Instructions, point 7.

The Council of People's Commissars issued its decree on "The Centralisation of Libraries" (p. 439, *Collection of Statutes*, 1920, No. 87) on November 3, 1920, providing for the creation of *a single network of libraries of the R.S.F.S.R.*

Here are some of the data I have been able to obtain on the question from Comrade Malkin of the Central Periodicals Administration, and from Comrade Modestov of the Library Section of the Moscow Department of Education. In 38 gubernias, 305 uyezds, the number of libraries in central Soviet Russia (excluding Siberia and North Caucasus) was as follows:

Central libraries	342
District urban "	521
Volost "	4,474
Travelling "	1,661
Village reading-rooms	14,739
Miscellaneous ("rural juvenile reference, libraries of various institutions and organisations")	12, 203
Total	33,940

Comrade Modestov believes, on the basis of his experience, that about three-quarters of this number actually exist, while the rest are only listed as such. For Moscow Gubernia, the Central Periodicals Administration gives the figure of 1,223 libraries, while Comrade Modestov's figure is 1,018; of these 204 are in the city proper and 814 in the gubernia, not counting the trade union libraries (probably about 16) and the army libraries (about 125).

As far as can be judged from a comparison of the different gubernias, these figures are not very reliable—let us hope the actual figure does not turn out to be under 75 per cent! In Vyatka Gubernia, for example, there are 1,703 village reading-rooms, in Vladimir Gubernia—37, in Petrograd Gubernia—98, in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia—75, etc. Of the "miscellaneous" libraries there are 36 in Petrograd Gubernia, 378 in Voronezh Gubernia, 525 in Ufa Gubernia, 31 in Pskov Gubernia, etc.

These figures seem to show that the thirst for knowledge among the mass of workers and peasants is tremendous, and that the striving for education and the establishment of libraries is mighty and "popular" in the real sense of the word. But we are still very short of ability in organising, regulating, shaping and properly satisfying this popular urge. Much remains to be done in creating a real *integrated network* of libraries.

How are we distributing the newspapers and books? According to the Administration's 1920 figures for eleven months, we distributed 401 million copies of newspapers and 14 million books. Here are the figures for three newspapers (January 12, 1921), compiled by the Periodicals Section of the Central Administration for the Distribution of Books.[32]

	Izvestia	*Pravda*	*Bednota*
Branches of the Central Periodicals Administration	191,000	139,000	183,000
Military Bureau for the Supply of Literature and Newspapers to Divisional Dispatch Offices . . .	50,000	40,000	85,000
Railway organisations, Railway Dept., Central Periodicals Administration and Agitation Centres	30,000	25,000	16,000
Offices and Organisations in the City of Moscow	65,000	35,000	8,000
Commandant of the City of Moscow	8,000	7,000	6,000
Passenger trains	1,000	1,000	1,000
Public Reading Stands and Files	5,000	3,000	1,000
Total . . .	350,000	250,000	300,000

The figure for public reading stands, i.e., the really massive distribution, is astonishingly small, as against the enormous figures for the "establishments", etc., in the capital, evidently the papers grabbed and bureaucratically utilised by "Soviet bureaucrats", both military and civilian.

Here are a few more figures taken from the reports of the local branches of the Central Periodicals Administration. In September 1920, its Voronezh Gubernia branch received newspapers twelve times (that is to say, there were no papers on eighteen of the thirty days in September). Those received were distributed as follows: *Izvestia* (to branches of the C.P.A.): uyezd—4,986 copies (4,020; 4,310)*; district—7,216 (5,860; 10,064); volost—3,370 (3,200; 4,285); Party organisations—447 (569; 3,880); Soviet establishments—1,765 (1,641; 509)—note that Soviet establishments received nearly three times as many copies of *Pravda* as Party organisations! Then follow: Agitation and Educational Department of the Military Commissariat—5,532 (5,793; 12,332); agitation centres—352 (400; 593); village reading-rooms—*nil*. Subscribers—7,167 (3,080; 764). Thus, "subscribers" (actually, of course, "Soviet bureaucrats") received a fat slice. Public reading stands—460 (508; 500). Total: 32,517 (25,104; 37,237).

* First figure—*Pravda*, second, *Bednota*.

In November 1920, Ufa Gubernia received 25 consignments, that is to say, there was no delivery on five days only. Distribution: Party organisations—113 (1,572; 153); Soviet establishments—2,763 (1,296; 1,267); Agitation and Educational Department of the Military Commissariat—687 (470; 6,500); Volost Executive Committees—903 (308; 3,511); village reading-rooms—36 (*Pravda*—8, eight copies! —2,538); subscribers—*nil*; "various uyezd organisations"—1,044 (219; 991). Total: 5,841 (4,069; 15,429).

Lastly, the report of the branch in Pustoshensk Volost, Sudogoda Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia for December 1920. Party organisations—1 (1; 2); Soviet offices—2 (1; 3); Agitation and Educational Department of the Military Commissariat—2 (1; 2); Volost Executive Committees—2 (1; 3); post and telegraph offices—1 (1; 1); Urshelsky Works Committee—1 (1; 2); District Department of Social Maintenance—1 (0; 3). Total: 10 (6; 16).

What is the conclusion to be drawn from these fragmentary data? I believe it is what our Party Programme says, namely: "Only the first steps in the transition from capitalism to communism are being taken ... at the present time.

Under capitalism, a newspaper is a capitalist enterprise, a means of enrichment, a medium of information and entertainment for the rich, and an instrument for duping and cheating the mass of working people. We have smashed this instrument of profit-making and deceit. We *have begun* to convert the newspapers into an instrument for educating the masses and for teaching them to live and run their economy *without* the landowners and capitalists. But we are only at the start of the road. Not much has been done during the last three years or so. A great deal remains to be done: the road ahead is very long indeed. Let us have less political fireworks, fewer general arguments and abstract slogans from inexperienced Communists who fail to understand their tasks; let us have more production propaganda and, above all, more efficient and capable application of practical experience to fit the development of the masses.

We have abolished newspaper subscriptions (I have no data on the distribution of books; there the situation is probably even worse). This is a step from capitalism to

communism. But capitalism cannot be killed at one stroke; it rears its head in the form of "Soviet bureaucrats" grabbing the newspapers on various pretexts—they must be grabbing a great number, though we cannot say just how many There must be a sustained drive in this field against the Soviet bureaucrats, who must be "rapped over the knuckles" for grabbing books and newspapers. Their share—and they themselves—must be steadily reduced. Unfortunately, we are unable to slash their number down to one-tenth, or one-hundredth—it would be a fraud to promise this at our present level of culture, but we can and must whittle it down. No real Communist will fail to do this

We must see to it that books and newspapers are, as a rule, distributed gratis *only* to the libraries and reading-rooms, which provide a proper reading service for the whole country and the whole mass of workers, soldiers and peasants. This will accelerate, intensify and make more effective the people's eager quest for knowledge. That is when education will advance by leaps and bounds.

Here is some simple arithmetic by way of illustration: there are 350,000 copies of *Izvestia* and 250,000 copies of *Pravda* for the whole of Russia. We are poor. We have no newsprint. The workers are short of fuel, food, clothes and footwear. The machines are worn out. The buildings are falling apart. Let us assume that we actually have for the country as a whole—that is some 10,000 odd volosts—50,000 libraries and reading-rooms. This would give no less than three for each volost, and certainly one for each factory and military unit. Let us further assume that we have not only learned to take "the first step from capitalism to communism", but also the second and the third. Let us assume that we have learned to distribute three copies of newspapers to every library and reading-room, of which, say, two go on the "public reading stands" (assuming that we have taken the fourth step from capitalism to communism, I make the bold assumption that instead of pasting newspapers on walls in the barbarous way which spoils them, we fix them with wooden pegs—we have no metal tacks, and there will be a shortage of metal even at the "fourth step"!—to a smooth board for convenient reading and to keep the papers from spoiling). And so, two copies each for 50,000

libraries and reading-rooms for "pasting up" and one copy to be kept in reserve. Let us also assume that we have learned to allow the Soviet bureaucrats, the pampered "grandees" of the Soviet Republic, a *moderate* number of newspapers for them to waste, let us say, no more than a few thousand copies.

On these bold assumptions the country will have a much better service with 160,000, or, say, 175,000 copies. The papers will be there for everyone to read the news (if the "travelling libraries" which, in my opinion, Comrade F. Dobler so successfully defended in *Pravda* just the other day, are properly organised[33]). All this needs is 350,000 copies of two newspapers. Today, there are 600,000 copies, a large part of which is being grabbed by the "Soviet bureaucrats", wasted as "cigarette paper", etc., simply through the habits acquired under capitalism. This would give us a saving of 250,000 copies, or, despite our extreme poverty, a saving equal to *two* dailies with a circulation of 125,000 each. Each of these could carry to the people every day serious and valuable literary material and the best modern and classical fiction, and textbooks on general educational subjects, agriculture and industry. Long before the war, the French bourgeoisie learned to make money by publishing popular fiction, not at 3.50 francs a volume for the gentry, but at 10 centimes (i.e., 35 times as cheap, 4 kopeks at the pre-war rate) in the form of a proletarian newspaper; why, in that case, can't we do the same—at the second step from capitalism to communism. Why can't we do the same thing and learn, within a year, even in our present state of poverty, to give the people two copies of a newspaper through each of the 50,000 libraries and reading-rooms, all the necessary textbooks and world classics, and books on modern science and engineering.

We shall learn to do this, I am sure.

February 7, 1921

Pravda No. 28, February 9, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

ROUGH DRAFT OF THESES CONCERNING THE PEASANTS[34]

1. Satisfy the wish of the non-Party peasants for the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system (the confiscation of surplus grain stocks).

2. Reduce the size of this tax as compared with last year's appropriation rate.

3. Approve the principle of making the tax commensurate with the farmer's effort, reducing the rate for those making the greater effort.

4. Give the farmer more leeway in using his after-tax surpluses in local trade, provided his tax is promptly paid up in full.

Written on February 8, 1921
First published in 1932

Published according to the manuscript

LETTER ON OIL CONCESSIONS

To Members of the Political Bureau
and Comrade Rykov,

Stalin,
Bukharin,
Kamenev,
Krestinsky,
Rykov

We are in receipt of replies to the Political Bureau's query concerning oil concessions both from Krasin (and Bogdatyan) and Chairman of Glavneft* Dosser and his four experts.

In connection with the report, *The State of the Oil Industry by the End of 1920* (Baku, 1920), I am sending these replies on to Comrade Stalin, and request all members of the Political Bureau to ring him up to obtain all this material and read it in good time. (All you have to do with regard to the printed report is to read through what I have marked off with a blue pencil on the pages listed on the cover, that is, on the page before the text.)

This material needs to be read urgently, because it is desirable to have a Political Bureau decision (8.00 p.m . Monday, February 14).

The material gives ample proof that:

(a) disaster is *imminent*;

(b) everything must be done to lease out the concessions in Baku (that is, find the concessionaires);

(c) the Glavneft Chairman is extremely stupid. Stupidity in such high quarters is a menace.

These three points summed up:

(a) Disaster is looming. This point is driven home *by the Glavneft experts*. The fool Dosser tries to *mi-*

* Chief Oil Industry Administration.—*Tr*.

nimise the danger in his "memo". That is the height of stupidity. The opinions of *all* the Glavneft *experts* should be read and compared with Dosser's toned-down conclusion.

(b) Dosser formulates his conclusion as follows: "There is doubtful benefit in inviting a concessionaire." It looks as though he has, like the truly well-intentioned fool that he is, scared his experts into believing that an anti-concession stand is the only decent one to take for a "Soviet" citizen. That's a really "good turn" he has done us!

In the practical plane, the reports of the Glavneft experts (which are business-like and are strictly borne out by the "end of 1920" printed report) clarify *the kind of terms* we should lay down for the concessionaire.

It is, of course, "doubtful" whether a concessionaire can be found on these terms. But no politician in his right mind would consult Dosser or the experts on that.

It is up to us to make every effort to find such concessionaires.

If we don't, so much the worse for us.

If we fail to make an all-out effort to find a concessionaire, we shall find ourselves bankrupt.

The working out of the terms must be speeded up.

An immediate start must be made in fighting a highly dangerous prejudice which could easily carry a section of the workers and which must be debunked at any cost. It is this "idea": "We don't want to work for the capitalists", or its variant, "We don't want to work for the capitalists when workers nearby are not doing it".

The harm of it (refuted by the R.C.P. Programme and Marxism in general) is evident from this rough calculation, which epitomises the conclusion given in the experts' reports.

We are extracting $100a$ of oil.

Output is dropping.

Flooding threatens disaster.

If we get a concessionaire, who will help to extract $100a+100b$ of oil, and if we have to pay him $98b$ for this, our output will rise, instead of dropping, even if ever so slowly ($100a+2b$).

Here is the question: are the workers who give the concessionaire 98*b* out of the 100*b* working for "the capitalists" or for the Soviet power?

There is no difficulty about the answer.

Please go over the enclosed material and reports urgently, to allow us to take a decision as soon as possible. There is extreme danger in any delay.

February 12, 1921

Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Published according
to the manuscript

INTEGRATED ECONOMIC PLAN

What is being said and written on this subject leaves a very painful impression. Take L. Kritsman's articles in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*[35] (I—December 14, 1920; II—December 23; III—February 9; IV—February 16; and V—February 20). There is nothing there but empty talk and word-spinning, a refusal to consider and look into what has been done in this field. Five long articles of reflection on how to approach the study of facts and data, instead of any actual examination of them.

Take Milyutin's theses (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, February 19), or Larin's (ibid., February 20); listen to the speeches of "responsible" comrades: they all have the same basic defects as Kritsman's articles. They all reveal the dullest sort of scholasticism, including a lot of twaddle about the law of concatenation, etc. It is a scholasticism that ranges from the literary to the bureaucratic, to the exclusion of all practical effort.

But what is even worse is the highbrow bureaucratic disdain for the vital work that has been done and that needs to be continued. Again and again there is the emptiest "drawing up of theses" and a concoction of plans and slogans, in place of painstaking and thoughtful study of our own practical experience.

The only serious work on the subject is the *Plan for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R.*, the report of GOELRO (the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia) to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, published in December 1920 and distributed at the Congress. It outlines an integrated economic plan which has been worked out—only as a rough approximation, of course—by the best brains in

the Republic on the instructions of its highest bodies. We have to make a very modest start in fighting the complacency born of the ignorance of the grandees, and the intellectualist conceit of the Communist literati, by telling the story of this book, and describing its content and significance . More than a year ago—February 2-7, 1920—the All-Russia Central Executive Committee met in session and adopted a resolution on electrification which says:

> "Along with the most immediate, vital and urgent tasks in organising transport, coping with the fuel and food crises, fighting epidemics, and forming disciplined labour armies, Soviet Russia now has, for the first time, an opportunity of starting on more balanced economic development, and working out a nation-wide state economic plan on scientific lines and consistently implementing it. In view of the prime importance of electrification ... mindful of the importance of electrification for industry, agriculture and transport, ... and so on and so forth ..., the Committee resolves: to authorise the Supreme Economic Council to work out, in conjunction with the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, a project for the construction of a system of electric power stations...."

This seems to be clear enough, doesn't it? "A nation-wide state economic plan on scientific lines": is it possible to misread these words in the decision adopted by our highest authority? If the literati and the grandees, who boast of their communism before the "experts", are ignorant of this decision it remains for us to remind them that ignorance of our laws is no argument.

In pursuance of the All-Russia C.E.C. resolution, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, on February 21, 1920, confirmed the Electrification Commission set up under the Electricity Department, after which the Council of Defence endorsed the statute on GOELRO, whose composition the Supreme Economic Council was instructed to determine and confirm by agreement with the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. On April 24, 1920, GOELRO issued its *Bulletin* No. 1,[36] containing a detailed programme of works and a list of the responsible persons, scientists, engineers, agronomists and statisticians on the several subcommissions to direct operations in the various areas, together with the specific assignments each had undertaken. The list of persons and their assignments runs

to ten printed pages of *Bulletin* No. 1. The best talent available to the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the People's Commissariat for Communications has been recruited.

The GOELRO effort has produced this voluminous—and first-class—scientific publication. Over 180 specialists worked on it. There are more than 200 items on the list of works they have submitted to GOELRO. We find, first, a summary of these works (the first part of the volume, running to over 200 pages): a) electrification and a state economic plan; followed by b) fuel supply (with a detailed "fuel budget" for the R.S.F.S.R. *over the next ten years*, with an estimate of the manpower required); c) water power; d) agriculture; e) transport; and f) industry.

The plan ranges over about ten years and gives an indication of the number of workers and capacities (in 1,000 hp). Of course, it is only a rough draft, with possible errors, and a "rough approximation", but it is a real scientific plan. We have precise calculations by experts for every major item, and every industry. To give a small example, we have their calculations for the output of leather, footwear at two pairs a head (300 million pairs), etc. As a result, we have a material and a financial (gold rubles) balance-sheet for electrification (about 370 million working days, so many barrels of cement, so many bricks, poods of iron, copper, and other things; turbine generator capacities, etc.). It envisages ("at a very rough estimate") an 80 per cent increase in manufacturing, and 80-100 per cent, in extracting industry over the next ten years. The gold balance deficit (+11,000 million — 17,000 million leaves a total deficit of about 6,000 million) "can be covered by means of concessions and credit operations".

It gives the site of the first 20 steam and 10 water power district electric stations, and a detailed description of the economic importance of each.

The general summary is followed, in the same volume, by a list of works for each area (with a separate paging): Northern, Central Industrial (both of which are especially well set out in precise detail based on a wealth of scientific data), Southern, Volga, Urals? Caucasian (the Caucasus is taken as a whole in anticipation of an economic agreement

between its various republics), Western Siberia and Turkestan. For each of the areas, electric power capacities are projected beyond the first limits; this is followed by the "GOELRO Programme A", that is, the plan for the use of *existing* electric power stations on the most rational and economic lines. Here is another small example: it is estimated that a grid of the Petrograd stations (Northern Area) could yield the following economy (p. 69): up to one-half of the capacities could be diverted to the logging areas of the North, such as Murmansk and Archangel, etc. The resulting increase in the output and export of timber could yield "*up to 500 million rubles' worth of foreign exchange a year in the immediate period ahead*".

"Annual receipts from the sale of our northern timber could very well equal our gold reserves over the next few years" (ibid., p. 70), provided, of course, we stop talking about plans and start studying and *applying* the plan already worked out by our scientists.

Let me add that we have an embryonic calendar programme for a number of other items (though not for all, of course). This is more than a general plan: it is an estimate for each year, from 1921 to 1930, of the number of stations that can be run in, and the proportions to which the existing ones can be enlarged, provided again we start doing what I have just said, which is not easy in view of the ways of our intellectualist literati and bureaucratic grandees.

A look at Germany will bring out the dimensions and value of GOELRO's effort. Over there, the scientist Ballod produced a similar work: he compiled a scientific plan for the socialist reconstruction of the whole national economy of Germany.[37] But his being a capitalist country, the plan never got off the ground. It remains a lone-wolf effort, and an exercise in literary composition. With us over here it was a state assignment, mobilising hundreds of specialists and producing an integrated economic plan on scientific lines within 10 months (and not two, of course, as we had originally planned). We have every right to be proud of this work, and it remains for us to *understand* how it should be used. What we now have to contend with is failure to understand *this fact*.

The resolution of the Eighth Congress of Soviets says:

TRANSMARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"The Congress ... *approves the work of the Supreme Economic Council*, etc., especially that of GOELRO *in drawing up the plan for the electrification of Russia* ... regards this plan *as the first step in a great economic endeavour*, authorises the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, etc., *to put the finishing touches to the plan and to endorse it*, at the very earliest date.... It authorises the adoption of all measures for *the most extensive popularisation* of this plan.... A study of this plan must be an item in the curricula of *all educational establishments of the Republic, without exception*",[38] etc.

The bureaucratic and intellectualist defects of our apparatus, especially of its top drawer, are most glaringly revealed by the attitude to this resolution taken by some people in Moscow and their efforts to twist it, to the extent of ignoring it altogether. Instead of advertising the plan, the literati produce theses and empty disquisitions on how to start working out a plan. The grandees, in purely bureaucratic fashion, lay stress on the need to "approve" the plan, by which they do not mean concrete assignments (the dates for the construction of the various installations, the purchase of various items abroad, etc.) but some muddled idea, such as working out a *new* plan. The misunderstanding this produces is monstrous, and there is talk of partially restoring the old before getting on with the new. Electrification, it is said, is something of an "electrification". Why not gasification, we are asked; GOELRO, they also say, is full of bourgeois specialists, with only a handful of Communists; GOELRO should provide the cadre of experts, instead of staffing the general planning commission, and so forth.

The danger lies in this discord, for it betrays an inability to work, and the prevalence of intellectualist and bureaucratic complacency, to the exclusion of all real effort. The conceited ignoramus is betrayed by his jibes at the "fantastic" plan, his questions about gasification, etc. The nerve of their trying, offhand, to pick holes in something it took an army of first-class specialists to produce! Isn't it a shame to try to shrug it off with trite little jokes, and to put on airs about one's right "to withhold approval"?

It is time we learned to put a value on science and got

rid of the "communist" conceit of the dabbler and the bureaucrat; it is time we learned to work systematically, making use of our own experience and practice.

Of course, "plans" naturally give rise to endless argument and discussion, but when the task is to get down to the study of the only scientific plan before us, we should not allow ourselves to engage in general statements and debates about underlying "principles". We should get down to correcting it on the strength of *practical* experience and a more detailed study. Of course, the grandees always retain the right to "give or withhold approval". A sober view of this right, and a reasonable reading of the resolution of the Eighth Congress concerning the approval of the plan, which it endorsed and handed down to us for the broadest popularisation, show that approval must be taken to mean the placing of a series of orders and the issue of a set of instructions, such as the items to be purchased, the building to be started, the materials to be collected and forwarded, etc. Upon the other hand, "approval" from the bureaucratic standpoint means arbitrary acts on the part of the grandees, the red-tape runaround, the commissions-of-inquiry game, and the strictly bureaucratic foul-up of anything that is going.

Let us look at the matter from yet another angle. There is a special need to tie in the scientific plan for electrification with existing short-term plans and their actual implementation. That this must be done is naturally beyond doubt. But how is it to be done? To find out, the economists, the literati, and the statisticians should stop their twaddle about the plan in general, and get on with a detailed study of the implementation of our plans, our mistakes in this practical business, and ways of correcting them. Otherwise we shall have to grope our way long. Over and above such a study of our practical experience, there remains the very small matter of administrative technique. Of planning commissions we have more than enough. Take two men from the department under Ivan Ivanovich and integrate them with one from the department under Pavel Pavlovich, or vice versa. Link them up with a subcommission of the general planning commission. All of which boils down to administrative technique. Various combinations

should be tried out, and the best selected. That is elementary.

The whole point is that we have yet to learn the art of approach, and stop substituting intellectualist and bureaucratic projecteering for vibrant effort. We have, and have had, short-term food and fuel plans, and there are glaring mistakes in both. That is unquestionable. But the efficient economist, instead of penning empty theses, will get down to a study of the facts and figures, and analyse our own practical experience. He will pin-point the mistakes and suggest a remedy. This kind of study will suggest to the efficient administrator the transfers, alterations of records, recasting of the machinery, etc., to be proposed or put through. You don't find us doing anything of the sort.

The main flaw is in the wrong approach to the relationships between the Communists and the specialists, the administrators and the scientists and writers. There is no doubt at all that some aspects of the integrated economic plan, as of any other undertaking, call for the administrative approach or for decisions by Communists alone. Let me add that new aspects of that kind can always come to the fore. That, however, is the purely abstract way of looking at it. Right now, our communist writers and administrators are taking quite the wrong approach, because they have failed to realise that in this case we should be learning all we can from the bourgeois specialists and scientists, and cutting out the administrative game. GOELRO's is the only integrated economic plan we can hope to have just now. It should be amplified, elaborated, corrected and applied in the light of well scrutinised practical experience. The opposite view boils down to the purely "pseudo-radical conceit, which in actual fact is nothing but ignorance", as our Party Programme puts it.[39] Ignorance and conceit are equally betrayed by the view that we can have another general planning commission in the R.S.F.S.R. in addition to GOELRO, which, of course, is not to deny that some advantage may be gained from partial and business-like changes in its membership. It is only on this basis—by continuing what has been started—that we can hope to make any serious improvements in the general economic

plan; any other course will involve us in an administrative game, or high-handed action, to put it bluntly. The task of the Communists inside GOELRO is to issue fewer orders, rather, to refrain from issuing any at all, and to be very tactful in their dealings with the scientists and technicians (the R.C.P. Programme says: "Most of them inevitably have strong bourgeois habits and take the bourgeois view of things"). The task is to learn from them and to help them to broaden their world-view on the basis of achievements in their particular field, always bearing in mind that the engineer's way to communism is *different* from that of the underground propagandist and the writer; he is guided along *by the evidence of his own science*, so that the agronomist, the forestry expert, etc., each have *their own path* to tread towards communism. The Communist who has failed to prove his ability to bring together and guide the work of specialists in a spirit of modesty, going to the heart of the matter and studying it in detail, is a potential menace. We have many such Communists among us, and I would gladly swap dozens of them for one conscientious qualified bourgeois specialist.

There are two ways in which Communists outside GOELRO can help to establish and implement the integrated economic plan. Those of them who are economists, statisticians or writers should start by making a study of our own practical experience, and suggest corrections and improvements only after such a detailed study of the facts. Research is the business of the scientist, and once again, because we are no longer dealing with general principles, but with practical experience, we find that we can obtain much more benefit from a "specialist in science and technology", even if a bourgeois one, than from the conceited Communist who is prepared, at a moment's notice, to write "theses", issue "slogans" and produce meaningless abstractions. What we need is more factual knowledge and fewer debates on ostensible communist principles.

Upon the other hand, the Communist administrator's prime duty is to see that he is not carried away by the issuing of orders. He must learn to start by looking at the achievements of science, insisting on a verification of the facts, and locating and studying the mistakes (through

reports, articles in the press, meetings, etc.), before proceeding with any corrections. We need more practical studies of our mistakes, in place of the Tit Titych[40] type of tactics ("I might give my approval, if I feel like it").

Men's vices, it has long been known, are for the most part bound up with their virtues. This, in fact, applies to many leading Communists. For decades, we had been working for the great cause, preaching the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, teaching men to mistrust the bourgeois specialists, to expose them, deprive them of power and crush their resistance. That is a historic cause of world-wide significance. But it needs only a slight exaggeration to prove the old adage that there is only one step from the sublime to the ridiculous. Now that we have convinced Russia, now that we have wrested Russia from the exploiters and given her to the working people, now that we have crushed the exploiters, we must learn to run the country. This calls for modesty and respect for the efficient "specialists in science and technology", and a business-like and careful analysis of our numerous *practical* mistakes, and their gradual but steady correction. Let us have less of this intellectualist and bureaucratic complacency, and a deeper scrutiny of the practical experience being gained in the centre and in the localities, and of the available achievements of science.

February 21, 1921

Pravda No. 39, February 22, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text collated with the proofs containing Lenin's corrections

GREETINGS TO THE FIFTH ALL-UKRAINE CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[41]

Comrades, I send my heartfelt greetings to the Fifth All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets. I am sure that the alliance between the poor peasants and Ukrainian workers will strengthen Soviet Ukraine and consolidate the Ukrainian Republic, despite the enemy's traps and machinations.

I have asked Comrade Petrovsky to convey my regret at being unable to accept your invitation to attend the Congress. Nevertheless, I hope to be able to visit Soviet Ukraine in the near future. I wish the Congress success in consolidating the power of the workers and peasants and in restoring the national economy.

Yours, *Lenin*

Kommunist (Kharkov) No. 45, February 27, 1921

Published according to the *Kommunist* text

SPEECH AT A PLENARY MEETING OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES FEBRUARY 28, 1921[42]

(*Prolonged applause.*) Before going on to the domestic situation—a subject which, quite naturally, arouses great interest and much concern—let me run over the salient international developments. To be brief, I shall deal with only three. The first is our conference with Turkish delegates which has opened here in Moscow.[43] This is an especially welcome fact, because there had been many obstacles to direct negotiations with the Turkish Government delegation, and now that there is an opportunity of reaching an understanding here in Moscow, we feel sure that a firm foundation will be laid for closer relations and friendship. Of course, this will not be achieved through diplomatic machinations (in which, we are not afraid to admit, our adversaries have the edge on us), but through the fact that over the past few years both nations have had to endure untold suffering at the hands of the imperialist powers. A previous speaker referred to the harm of isolation from the imperialist countries. But when a wolf attacks a sheep, there is hardly any point in advising the sheep to avoid isolation from the wolf. (*Laughter*, *applause.*) Up to now, the Eastern peoples may have been like sheep before the imperialist wolf, but Soviet Russia was the first to show that, despite her unparalleled military weakness, it is not so easy for the wolf to get his claws and teeth into her. This example has proved to be catching for many nations, regardless of whether or not they sympathise with the "Bolshevik rumour-mongers". We are a popular topic all over the world, and, in relation to Turkey, have even been

described as malicious rumour-mongers. Of course, we have so far been unable to do anything in this sphere, but the Turkish workers and peasants have demonstrated that the resistance on the part of modern nations to plunder is a thing that has to be reckoned with: Turkey herself resisted plunder by the imperialist governments with such vigour that even the strongest of them have had to keep their hands off her. That is what makes us regard the current negotiations with the Turkish Government as a very great achievement. We have no hidden motives. We know that these negotiations will proceed within a very modest framework, but they are important because the workers and peasants of all countries are drawing steadily closer together, despite all the formidable obstructions. This is something we should bear in mind when assessing our present difficulties.

The second thing worth recalling in connection with the international situation is the state of the peace talks in Riga.[44] You know that in order to conclude a peace with any degree of stability we have been making the greatest possible concessions to all the states formerly within the Russian Empire. This is very natural because national oppression is one of the main factors which arouses hatred for the imperialists and unites the peoples against them, and few states in the world have sinned as much in this respect as the old Russian Empire and the bourgeois republic of Kerensky, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in alliance with the bourgeoisie. That is why it is in respect of these nations that we have shown the greatest willingness to make concessions and readiness to accept such peace terms, for which some Socialist-Revolutionaries have virtually called us Tolstoyans. We don't care, because we have to show the greatest willingness to compromise with these nations, to dispel the age-old suspicions generated by the old oppression, and to lay the foundation for a union of workers and peasants of various nations which once suffered together at the hands of tsarism and the Russian landowners, and now suffer at the hands of imperialism. In respect of Poland, this policy has been largely frustrated by the Russian whiteguards, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who enjoy "freedom of

the press", "freedom of speech" and other wonderful "freedoms", alongside the extraordinary freedom of the French and other capitalists to buy up a larger part of Poland, where they are at liberty to spread their propaganda in an effort to push Poland into a war against us. The capitalists are now doing their utmost to disrupt the peace that has been concluded. One of the reasons why we cannot demobilise our army, as we should like to do, is that we must reckon with the possibility of war on a much larger scale than some people imagine. Those who say that we need not put so much into defence are wrong, because our enemies are resorting to all sorts of machinations and intrigues to break up the final peace with Poland, the provisional terms of which have already been signed. These negotiations have lately been dragging on, and although a few weeks ago things had come to such a pass that there was reason to fear a serious crisis, we recently decided to make some further concessions, not because we thought they were warranted, but because we considered it necessary to thwart the intrigues of the Russian whiteguards, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in Warsaw, and of the Entente imperialists, who are making the greatest efforts to prevent peace. It has not yet been signed, but let me say that we have every reason to be optimistic: it will be signed in the near future, and we shall succeed in thwarting the intrigues against its conclusion. Although this is only guesswork on my part, I believe the prospect will gladden us all. But let us not count our chickens before they are hatched. That is why we shall not slacken or weaken our military effort however slightly, but we shall not be afraid to make a few more concessions to bourgeois Poland, so as to wrest the workers and peasants of Poland from the Entente and prove to them that the workers' and peasants' government does not deal in national strife. We shall defend this peace even at the price of considerable sacrifice.

The third international question is the events in the Caucasus. There have been large-scale developments there recently, and although we do not yet know the details their implication is that we are on the brink of a major war. We were, of course, disturbed at the clash between Armenia and Georgia, for these events turned the Armenian-Georgian

war into an insurrection, with a section of the Russian troops taking part. The upshot of all this was that, for the time being, the tables have been turned on the Armenian bourgeoisie, which had been scheming against us, so that, according to the latest but still unconfirmed reports, Soviet power has been established in Tiflis. (*Applause.*) We know that the insurrection began in the neutral zone of Armenia, which lies between Georgia and Armenia, and which Georgia had occupied with the consent of the Entente imperialists. When the Mensheviks, particularly the Georgian Mensheviks, speak of the harm of isolation from the Western powers, they usually mean the reliance on the Entente imperialists, who are stronger than anyone else. But some whiteguards tend to forget that the advanced capitalists are more deceitful than anyone else, and say to themselves: can Armenia, the Armenian peasants, etc., or the ravaged Soviet Republic be compared to the united imperialist powers of the world? Let us turn to the advanced capitalists for they are the civilised forces of the world. That is how the Georgian Mensheviks seek to justify their unseemly defence of the capitalists, and they had control of the only railway line, the Armenian peasants' food supply line.

No one will have the patience to read all the telegrams, statements and protests we exchanged with Georgia on this question. If we had had a peace treaty with Georgia, our policy would have been to procrastinate as long as possible. You must understand, however, that the Armenian peasants did not view the treaty question in that light, and things culminated in the terrible insurrection which broke out in early February and spread with astonishing rapidity, involving not only Armenians, but also Georgians. There has been hardly any news from over there, but our assumptions have been borne out by the latest available report. We know perfectly well that the Georgian bourgeoisie and the Georgian Mensheviks do not rely for support on their working people, but on their capitalists, who are only looking for a pretext to start hostilities. Upon the other hand, we have had our stake on the working people for three years and we shall continue to have it on them to the last even in this backward and oppressed country.

With all our circumspection and all our efforts to strengthen the Red Army, we shall ultimately do everything possible to put out the flames in the Caucasus. We shall demonstrate in the East what we have been able to demonstrate in the West: when Soviet power is in, national Oppression is out. On this, in the final analysis, depends the outcome of the struggle, and because of their superior numbers the workers and peasants will ultimately prove to be stronger than the capitalists.

Let me now turn from foreign policy to home affairs. I have been unable, unfortunately, to hear the whole of Comrade Bryukhanov's report. He has given you the facts in detail and I need not go over that again. I want to deal with the main thing, which may possibly show us the causes of our terrible crisis. We shall have to set ourselves a task and find a way to solve it. There is a path, we have found it, but we are not yet strong enough to follow it with the persistence and the regularity demanded by the difficult post-war conditions. We are in every respect poverty-stricken, and yet we are no more destitute than the workers of Vienna. They and their children are starving and dying, but they have not the main thing that we have: they have no hope. They are dying, crushed by capitalism; they are in a position where they have to endure sacrifices, but not as we do. We make sacrifices for the war which we have declared on the whole capitalist world. That is the difference between the position of the workers of Petrograd and Moscow and that of the workers of Vienna. Now, in the spring, our hardships due to the food shortage have once again become more acute, after the improvement earlier on. The fact is that we had miscalculated. When the plan for surplus-food appropriation was drawn up, we thought we could improve on our success. The people had gone-hungry for so long that their condition had to be improved at all costs. It was essential not only to help, but to improve things. We had failed to see that if we improved things then, we should be hard pressed later on, and it was due to this mistake that we now face a food crisis. We have made the same mistake elsewhere: in the Polish war, and in fuel. The procurement of food and fuel—coal, oil, firewood—are all different types of work, but in all three we

have made identical mistakes. At the time of the severest hardships, we overestimated our resources and failed to take stock of them properly. We failed to realise that we were using up our resources all at once, we failed to estimate our reserves, and we put nothing by for a rainy day. This is, generally speaking, a good rule of thumb that any peasant follows in his simple, everyday economy. But there we were, acting on a nation-wide scale as if we gave no thought to the reserves so long as we had enough for today, so that when we were finally faced with and brought up short by this question of reserves we were quite unable to put anything by for a rainy day.

During the Polish war we had a vigorous, daring Red Army, but we advanced too far—to the very gates of Warsaw, and then had to roll back, almost to Minsk. The same thing has happened with the food supply. True enough, we emerged from the war as victors. In 1920, we offered the Polish landowners and bourgeoisie peace on terms more advantageous to them than the present terms. They were taught a lesson, and the whole world was taught a lesson, which nobody had previously bargained for. When we speak about our position we tell the truth; if anything, we tend to exaggerate the negative side. In April 1920, we said: transport is falling to pieces, there is no food. We said this frankly in our newspapers and spoke about it openly at mass meetings in the best halls of Moscow and Petrograd. The spies of Europe rushed to cable the news, and over there some people rubbed their hands in glee and said: "Get on with the job, you Poles: you see how badly things are going with them, we shall soon crush them." But we were telling the truth, sometimes tending to exaggerate the negative side. Let the workers and peasants know that our difficulties are not over. And when the Polish army, with French, British and other military advisers and arms and money, went into battle, it was defeated. And now, when we say that our affairs are in poor shape, when our ambassadors report that the whole of the bourgeois press is saying "The Soviet power is doomed", when even Chernov has said that it will undoubtedly fall, we say: "You can shout your heads off, that's what freedom of the press on capitalist money is for, you have as much of

this freedom as you want, but we are still not in the least afraid to speak the bitter truth." Indeed, the situation this spring has worsened again, and our papers are full of admissions of this bad situation. But we say to the foreign capitalists, the Mensheviks, the S.R.s, the Savinkovites,[45] or whatever else they are called: just you try to cash in on this and you will find yourselves in a far deeper hole. (*Applause.*) It is obviously a difficult transition from our state of utter destitution in 1918-19, when it was very hard to think about a year's reserve or allocation, and when all we could do was to look one or two weeks ahead and say "we'll see" about the third one. It is obviously difficult to change over from this situation to that of 1920, when we saw that our army was bigger than that of the Poles, when we had twice as much grain as the previous year, when we had fuel, and when there was one and a half times more Donets and Siberian coal. We were unable to distribute this on a nation-wide scale. You must remember that annual estimates require a special approach and special conditions. We knew that the spring would be worse than the autumn, but how much worse, we could not know. It is not a matter of figures or distribution but a matter of the degree to which the workers and peasants have starved, and the extent of the sacrifice they are still able to make for the common cause of all workers and peasants. Who can estimate this? Some may point out this error—it is an error, and we make no effort to conceal the fact, just as we did not conceal it in the case of the Polish war—but let those who blame us for it—and justly so—give us an estimate for projecting the national amount to be set aside from the first six months' grain reserves, so as to leave something in stock for the six months after that. No such estimates have been made. We first tried to work out some in 1920 and miscalculated. In certain respects, a revolution is a miracle. If we had been told in 1917 that we would hold out in three years of war against the whole world, that, as a result of the war, two million Russian landowners, capitalists and their children would find themselves abroad, and that we would turn out to be the victors, no one of us would have believed it. A miracle took place because the workers and peasants rose against the attack of the

landowners and capitalists in such force that even powerful capitalism was in danger. But just because of the miracle we lost the habit of taking the long view of things. That is why all of us now have to limp along. The forthcoming Party Congress is to be called earlier, because we need to sum up this new experience in earnest. The defence of the workers' and peasants' power was achieved by a miracle, not a divine miracle—it was not something that fell from the skies—but a miracle in the sense that, no matter how oppressed, humiliated, ruined and exhausted the workers and peasants were, precisely because the revolution went along with the workers, it mustered very much more strength than any rich, enlightened and advanced state could have mustered. But this will not work in economics, where—perhaps the word is not altogether appropriate—you need "thrift". We have not yet learned to practise "thrift". We must bear in mind that we have defeated the bourgeoisie, but that they are still with us and so the struggle goes on. And spreading panic is one of their ways of fighting us. We must not forget that they are past masters at it. They have their newspapers, although not printed ones, but splendidly distributed, and they are doing much more than making mountains out of molehills. But under no circumstances must we succumb to panic. The situation has been aggravated because we have made mistakes in every field of work. Let us not be afraid of these mistakes, let us not be afraid to admit them; let us not indulge in mutual recrimination; but if we are to make use of all our resources and put in the greatest effort in every field, we must know how to reckon. Reckoning will give us control of the whole Republic, for proper reckoning alone will give us an estimate of the large amounts of available grain and fuel. The bread ration will be short for a lusty appetite, but the amount cannot be increased all at once. There will be a shortage only if we do not lay in stocks, but we shall have enough if we make a correct estimate and give to the most needy, and take from those who have large surpluses rather than from those who, over the last three years, may have given away their last crust. Have the peasants of the Ukraine and Siberia seen the point of this reckoning? Not yet, I'm afraid. Their present and past grain surpluses have

never been matched in central Russia, nor have they ever experienced such a plight. The peasants of the Ukraine, Siberia and Northern Caucasus have never known such destitution and hunger as the peasants of Moscow and Petrograd gubernias (who received far less than the Ukrainian peasants) have endured for three years. Their surpluses usually ran to hundreds of poods, and they were accustomed to receive goods at once for that kind of surplus. There is nowhere to obtain the goods from, now that the factories are at a standstill. To set them going once again will take time and preparation, and workers. Our tremendous sacrifices are not made in a state of desperation, but in a fight that wins one victory after another. This is a distinction that makes all the difference.

That is the main point that I wished to make here, not in terms of the exact figures given by the comrade responsible for food supplies and by the comrade responsible for fuel, but in terms of economics and politics, to help understand how our recent mistakes differ from earlier ones, and while they are different they still have this in common, that we have tried to jump two rungs when we only had the possibility of climbing one. Nevertheless, we are now at a higher stage. That is good. This year we shall have a much better fuel balance than last year. And let me give you one final fact in regard to the food supply: the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the republican forces in Siberia has cabled that communications have been restored and that seven train-loads of grain are on their way to Moscow. At one time there were disturbances and kulak revolts. Of course, it is possible to joke about rumour-mongers, but it is necessary to appreciate that after all we have learned a thing or two in the course of the class struggle. We know that the tsarist government called us rumour-mongers, but when we speak of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik rumour-mongers, we are speaking of another class, of people who support the bourgeoisie and who take advantage of every difficulty to issue leaflets and say: "Look, 300 poods of grain surpluses are being confiscated from you; you give everything away, and get nothing in return but coloured bits of paper." Don't we know these rumour-mongers! What is their class? No matter what they

call themselves, Socialist-Revolutionaries, lovers of liberty, of people's power, constituent assemblies, and so on, they are the same old landowners. We have heard all they have to say and have learned to understand their true meaning. These revolts indicate that there are people among the peasants who do not wish to reconcile themselves either to surplus food requisitioning or to the tax. Someone here has mentioned the tax. Much of what he said was common sense, but he should have added that before we said anything about it from this platform, the newspaper *Pravda*, which is the Central Organ of the Russian Communist Party, carried tax proposals signed not only by casual contributors but by staff correspondents.[46] When the non-Party peasant says to us: "Make your calculations conform to the needs of the small peasant; he needs confidence; I shall give so much and then I shall look to my own affairs," we say: "Yes, that is business-like, that is common sense and is in keeping with local conditions." So long as we have no machines, so long as the peasant himself has no wish to change over from small-scale to large-scale farming, we are inclined to take this idea into account and we shall place this question before the Party Congress due to be held in a week's time, sort it out and take a decision satisfactory to the non-Party peasant and to the mass of the people. In our apparatus there is, of course, much that is imperfect and inexcusable, because a great deal, a very, very great deal of the bureaucratic practices has seeped in. But weren't there the same kind of mistakes and imperfections in our Red Army? We could not rid ourselves of them right away, but thanks to the help of the workers and peasants, the Army was, nevertheless, victorious. What took place in the Red Army is bound to happen in another form in all spheres, and we shall be cured of these bureaucratic distortions—condemned on every hand because they are evidence of our mistakes and misfortunes—by persistent work, not succumbing to panic and not turning a blind eye to those who, taking advantage of these mistakes, are trying to repeat the Kolchak and Denikin affairs. Any amount of scandalous practices in the way of the pilfering of coal is taking place in the Ukraine, while here we are suffering from a great shortage. Over there they have had 120 govern-

ments, and the rich peasants have been corrupted. They cannot understand that there is a workers' and peasants' government and that, if it confiscates grain, it does so in order to ease the position of the workers and peasants. Until we are able to achieve full clarity on all these questions in that area, we shall continue to receive news of disturbances, banditry and revolts. This is inevitable because we have inherited from capitalism a peasant who is isolated and cannot help being ignorant and full of resentment, and it will take us years to re-educate him. We see this every spring, and we shall continue to see it every spring for some time to come.

The south-eastern railways are quite another matter. This year we have mainly existed on the resources supplied us by Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. Here is a five-day report. It says 8 cars were sent in every day from February 1; the second five-day report gives the figure of 32 cars; the third, 60; the fourth, 109; but we should be receiving 200 cars a day, and only in the last five days, from February 20 to 24, have we been getting 120 cars a day. That is three train-loads. Today Comrade Fomin reports that during the past two days we have received four train-loads. As one comrade has said, the position in the Donets Basin is that there is no grain because there is no coal, and there is no coal because there is no grain. This vicious circle must be broken at some point by the energy, pressure and heroism of the working people, so that all the wheels start turning. We are beginning to emerge from the enormous difficulties that we have experienced in this respect. A ray of light has appeared. I do not at all wish, comrades, to lull you with promises and I have no intention of announcing that this difficult period has ended. Nothing of the sort! There are signs of improvement, but the period remains incredibly difficult, and, in comparison with last autumn, it need not have been as difficult as it is now, despite the fact that we are cut off from Western Europe. In order not to be cut off, we have had to accept the idea of granting concessions: here's your 500 per cent profit, and let's have more grain, paraffin oil, etc. We are prepared to grant concessions, and will grant them. This will mean a new struggle, because we are not going to give them 500 per cent,

or perhaps even more, without bargaining, and to switch to this struggle is equivalent to switching all our trains onto new rails.

For this it is essential to convince the capitalists that they cannot butt in on us with a war. We have decisively accepted the policy of concessions. You know that we have had many arguments with the peasants and workers about this, you know that the workers have said: "Have we got rid of our own bourgeoisie only to let the foreigners in?" We have explained to them that we cannot switch all at once from scarcity to abundance, and in order to ease this transition, in order to obtain the necessary amount of grain and textiles, we must be able to make every necessary sacrifice. Let the capitalists benefit from their own greed, so long as we are able to improve the position of the workers and peasants. It is no easy thing, however, to get this concession business going. We published a decree about this in November, but so far not a single concession has been granted. Of course, this is due to the influence of the white-guard and Menshevik press. Russian newspapers are now published in every country in the world, and in all of them the Mensheviks are clamouring against any concessions and saying that in Moscow things are not going well, that the Soviet power is about to collapse, and that the capitalists should not believe the Bolsheviks and should have nothing to do with them. But we shall not abandon the fight: we have defeated the capitalists, but we have not destroyed them; they have now moved on to Warsaw, which once used to be the centre of the struggle against the Russian autocracy, and is now the rallying point of the whiteguards against Soviet Russia. We shall fight them everywhere, both on the foreign and on the home front.

I have here a telegram from Comrade Zinoviev in Petrograd which says that, in connection with the arrests there, a leaflet found in the possession of one of those detained makes it clear that he is a spy of foreign capitalists. There is another leaflet, headed *To the Faithful*, which is also counter-revolutionary in content. Further, Comrade Zinoviev informs us that Menshevik leaflets posted up in Petrograd call for strikes, and over here in Moscow this has been blown up into a rumour about some kind of demonstration.

In actual fact, one Communist was killed by an agent provocateur, and he is the only victim of these unhappy days. When Denikin was at Orel, the whiteguard papers said he was advancing at almost 100 versts an hour. These papers will not surprise us. We take a sober view of things. We must rally closer, comrades. Otherwise, what are we to do? Try another Kerensky or Kolchak "coalition" government? Kolchak, let us say, is no longer with us, but another might take his place. There are any number of Russian generals, quite enough for a large army. We must speak frankly and have no fear of the newspapers being published in all the cities of the world. These are all trifles, and we shall not keep silent about our difficult position because of them. But we shall say this: comrades, we are carrying on this difficult and bloody struggle, and if at the moment they cannot attack us with guns, they attack us with lies and slander, taking advantage of every instance of need and poverty in order to help our enemies. I repeat, all of this we have experienced and survived. We have lived through far greater difficulties; we know this enemy extremely well, and we shall defeat him this spring; we shall defeat him by working more successfully, and by calculating more carefully. (*Applause.*)

Pravda No. 46,
March 2, 1921

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to the *Pravda* text
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verbatim report

LETTER TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

March 2, 1921

Sergo Orjonikidze

Please convey to the Georgian Communists, and in particular to all members of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, my warm greetings to Soviet Georgia. My special request to them is to inform me whether or not we are in complete agreement on the following three questions:

First, immediate arming of the workers and poor peasants and formation of a strong Georgian Red Army.

Second, there is need for a special policy of concessions with regard to the Georgian intelligentsia and small merchants. It should be realised that it is not only imprudent to nationalise them, but that there is even need for certain sacrifices in order to improve their position and enable them to continue their small trade.

Third, it is of tremendous importance to devise an acceptable compromise for a bloc with Jordania or similar Georgian Mensheviks, who before the uprising had not been absolutely opposed to the idea of Soviet power in Georgia on certain terms.

Please bear in mind that Georgia's domestic and international positions both require that her Communists should avoid any mechanical copying of the Russian pattern. They must skilfully work out their own flexible tactics, based on bigger concessions to all the petty-bourgeois elements.

Please reply,

Lenin

Pravda Gruzii No. 5, March 6, 1921

Published according to the manuscript

INTERNATIONAL WORKING WOMEN'S DAY

The gist of Bolshevism and the Russian October Revolution is getting into politics the very people who were most oppressed under capitalism. They were downtrodden, cheated and robbed by the capitalists, both under the monarchy and in the bourgeois-democratic republics. So long as the land and the factories were privately owned this oppression and deceit and the plunder of the people's labour by the capitalists were inevitable.

The essence of Bolshevism and the Soviet power is to expose the falsehood and mummery of bourgeois democracy, to abolish the private ownership of land and the factories and concentrate all state power in the hands of the working and exploited masses. They, these masses, get hold of politics, that is, of the business of building the new society. This is no easy task: the masses arc downtrodden and oppressed by capitalism, but there is no other way—and there can be no other way—out of the wage-slavery and bondage of capitalism.

But you cannot draw the masses into politics without drawing in the women as well. For under capitalism the female half of the human race is doubly oppressed. The working woman and the peasant woman are oppressed by capital, but over and above that, even in the most democratic of the bourgeois republics, they remain, firstly, deprived of some rights because the law does not give them equality with men; and secondly—and this is the main thing—they remain in "household bondage", they continue to be "household slaves", for they are overburdened with the drudgery of the most squalid, backbreaking and stultifying toil in the kitchen and the family household.

No party or revolution in the world has aver dreamed of striking so deep at the roots of the oppression and inequality of women as the Soviet, Bolshevik revolution is doing. Over here, in Soviet Russia, no trace is left of any inequality between men and women under the law. The Soviet power has eliminated all there was of the especially disgusting, base and hypocritical inequality in the laws on marriage and the family and inequality in respect of children.

This is only the first step in the liberation of woman. But none of the bourgeois republics, including the most democratic, has dared to take even this first step. The reason is awe of "sacrosanct private property".

The second and most important step is the abolition of the private ownership of land and the factories. This and this alone opens up the way towards a complete and actual emancipation of woman, her liberation from "household bondage" through transition from petty individual housekeeping to large-scale socialised domestic services.

This transition is a difficult one, because it involves the remoulding of the most deep-rooted, inveterate, hidebound and rigid "order" (indecency and barbarity would be nearer the truth). But the transition has been started, the thing has been set in motion, we have taken the new path.

And so on this international working women's day countless meetings of working women in all countries of the world will send greetings to Soviet Russia, which has been the first to tackle this unparalleled and incredibly hard but great task, a task that is universally great and truly liberatory. There will be bracing calls not to lose heart in face of the fierce and frequently savage bourgeois reaction. The "freer" or "more democratic" a bourgeois country is, the wilder the rampage of its gang of capitalists against the workers' revolution, an example of this being the democratic republic of the United States of North America. But the mass of workers have already awakened. The dormant, somnolent and inert masses in America, Europe and even in backward Asia were finally roused by the imperialist war.

The ice has been broken in every corner of the world.

Nothing can stop the tide of the peoples' liberation from the imperialist yoke and the liberation of working men and women from the yoke of capital. This cause is being carried forward by tens and hundreds of millions of working men and women in town and countryside. That is why this cause of labour's freedom from the yoke of capital will triumph all over the world.

March 4, 1921

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[47]

MARCH 8-16, 1921

First published in full in 1921 in the book: *Desiaty syezd rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii. Stenograficheski otchot* (*The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. Verbatim Report*, *March 8-16*, *1921*), Moscow

Published according to to the text of the book collated with the verbatim report

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1
SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE CONGRESS
MARCH 8

(*Prolonged applause.*) Comrades, allow me to declare the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party open. We have passed through a very eventful year both in international and in our own internal history. To begin with the international situation, let me say that this is the first time we have met in conditions in which the Communist International has ceased to be a mere slogan and has really been converted into a mighty organisation with foundations —real foundations—in the major advanced capitalist countries. What had only been a set of resolutions at the Second Congress of the Communist International[48] has been successfully implemented during the past year and has found expression, confirmation and consolidation in such countries as Germany, France and Italy. It is enough to name these three countries to show that the Communist International, since its Second Congress in Moscow last summer, has become part and parcel of the working-class movement in all the major advanced countries of Europe—more than that, it has become the chief factor in international politics. This is such a great achievement, comrades, that however difficult and severe the various trials ahead of us—and we cannot and must not lose sight of them—no one can deprive us of it!

Furthermore, comrades, this is the first congress that is meeting without any hostile troops, supported by the capitalists and imperialists of the world, on the territory of the Soviet Republic. The Red Army's victories over the past year have enabled us to open a Party Congress in such conditions for the first time. Three and a half years of

unparalleled struggle, and the last of the hostile armies has been driven from our territory—that is our achievement! Of course, that has not won us everything, not by a long shot; nor have we won all that we have to—real freedom from imperialist invasion and intervention. On the contrary, their warfare against us has taken a form that is less military but is in some respects more severe and more dangerous. The transition from war to peace—which we hailed at the last Party Congress[49] and in the light of which we have tried to organise our work—is still far from completed. Our Party is still confronted with incredibly difficult tasks, not only in respect of the economic plan—where we have made quite a few mistakes—or the basis of economic construction, but also the basis of relations between the classes remaining in our society, in this Soviet Republic. These relations have undergone a change, and this—you will all agree—should be one of the chief questions for you to examine and decide here.

Comrades, we have passed through an exceptional year, we have allowed ourselves the luxury of discussions and disputes within the Party.[50] This was an amazing luxury for a Party shouldering unprecedented responsibilities and surrounded by mighty and powerful enemies uniting the whole capitalist world.

I do not know how you will assess that fact now. Was it fully compatible with our resources, both material and spiritual? It is up to you to appraise this. At all events, however, I must say that the slogan, task and aim which we should set ourselves at this Congress and which we must accomplish at all costs, is to emerge from the discussions and disputes stronger than before. (*Applause.*) You, comrades, cannot fail to be aware that all our enemies—and their name is legion—in all their innumerable press organs abroad repeat, elaborate and multiply the same wild rumour that our bourgeois and petty-bourgeois enemies spread here inside the Soviet Republic, namely: discussion means disputes; disputes mean discord; discord means that the Communists have become weak; press hard, seize the opportunity, take advantage of their weakening. This has become the slogan of the hostile world. We must not forget this for a moment. Our task now is to show that, to whatever

extent we have allowed ourselves this luxury in the past, whether rightly or wrongly, we must emerge from this situation in such a way that, having properly examined the extraordinary abundance of platforms, shades, slight shades and almost slight shades of opinion, that have been formulated and discussed, we at our Party Congress could say to ourselves: at all events, whatever form the discussion has taken up to now, however much we have argued among ourselves—and we are confronted with so many enemies—the task of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a peasant country is so vast and difficult that formal cohesion is far from enough. (Your presence here at the Congress is a sign that we have that much.) Our efforts should be more united and harmonious than ever before; there should not be the slightest trace of factionalism—whatever its manifestations in the past. That we must not have on any account. That is the only condition on which we shall accomplish the immense tasks that confront us. I am sure that I express the intention and firm resolve of all of you when I say: at all events, the end of this Congress must find our Party stronger, more harmonious, and more sincerely united than ever before. (*Applause.*)

2

REPORT ON THE POLITICAL WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) MARCH 8

Comrades, the question of the Central Committee's political work, as you are, of course, aware, is so closely bound up with the whole work of the Party and Soviet institutions, and with the whole course of the revolution, that in my view, at any rate, there can be no question of a report in the full sense of the word. Accordingly, I take it to be my task to try to single out some of the more important events which, I think, represent the cardinal points of our work and of Soviet policy over the past year, which are most typical of what we have gone through and which provide most food for thought concerning the reasons for the course taken by the revolution, the significance of our mistakes—and these have been many—and the lessons for the future. For no matter how natural it is to report on the events of the past year, no matter how essential it is for the Central Committee, and no matter how interesting such a report in itself may be for the Party, the tasks of the current and forthcoming struggle are so urgent, difficult and grave, and press so hard upon us that all our attention is unwittingly concentrated on how to draw the appropriate conclusions from past experience and how best to solve present and future problems on which all our attention is focused.

Of all the key problems of our work in the past year, which chiefly hold our attention and with which, in my opinion, our mistakes are mainly connected, the most important is the transition from war to peace. All, or possibly most of you, will recall that we have attempted this transition several times during the past three and a half years, without once having completed it; and apparently we shall not accomplish it this time either because international

capitalism is too vitally interested in preventing it. I recall that in April 1918, i.e., three years ago, I had occasion to speak to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee about our tasks, which at the time were formulated as if the Civil War had in the main come to an end, when in actual fact it had only just begun. You will all recall that at the previous Party Congress we based all our plans on the transition to peaceful construction, having assumed that the enormous concessions then made to Poland[51] would assure us of peace. As early as April, however, the Polish bourgeoisie, which, with the imperialists of the capitalist countries, interpreted our peaceful stand as a sign of weakness, started an offensive for which they paid dearly: they got a peace that was much worse. But we were unable to switch to peaceful construction and had once again to concentrate on the war with Poland and subsequently on wiping out Wrangel. That is what determined the substance of our work in the year under review. Once again all our work turned on military problems.

Then followed the transition from war to peace when the last enemy soldier was finally driven from the territory of the R.S.F.S.R.

This transition involved upheavals which we had certainly never foreseen. That is undoubtedly one of the main causes of all our mistakes in policy during the period under review, from which we are now suffering. We now realise that some of the tasks we had grossly underrated were posed by the demobilisation of the army, which had to be created in a country that had suffered unparalleled strains and stresses, and that had gone through several years of imperialist war. Its demobilisation put a terrible strain on our transport facilities, and this was intensified by the famine due to the crop failure and the fuel shortage, which largely brought the railways to a standstill. That is largely the source of the series of crises—economic, social and political—that hit us. At the end of last year I had occasion to point out that one of the main difficulties of the coming spring would be that connected with the demobilisation of the army. I also pointed this out at the big discussion on December 30, which many of you may have attended. I must say that at the time we had scarcely any idea of the scale of these

difficulties. We had not yet seen the extent of the possible technical difficulties; but then neither had we realised the extent to which the demobilisation would intensify all the misfortunes which befell the Soviet Republic, exhausted as it was by the old imperialist war and the new civil war. To some extent it would be right to say that the demobilisation brings out these difficulties to an even greater degree. For a number of years, the country had been dedicated to the solution of war tasks and had given its all to solve them. It had ungrudgingly sacrificed all it had, its meagre reserves and resources, and only at the end of the war were we able to see the full extent of that devastation and poverty which now condemn us to the simple healing of wounds for a long time to come. But even to this we cannot devote ourselves entirely. The technical difficulties of army demobilisation show a good part of the depth of that devastation which inevitably breeds, apart from other things, a whole series of economic and social crises. The war had habituated us—hundreds of thousands of men, the whole country—to war-time tasks, and when a great part of the army, having solved these military tasks, finds very much worse conditions and incredible hardships in the countryside, without any opportunity—because of this and the general crisis—to apply its labour, the result is something midway between war and peace. We find that it is a situation in which we cannot very well speak of peace. For it is the demobilisation—the end of the Civil War—that makes it impossible for us to concentrate on peaceful construction, because it brings about a continuation of the war, but in a new form. We find ourselves involved in a new kind of war, a new form of war, which is summed up in the word "banditism"—when tens and hundreds of thousands of demobilised soldiers, who are accustomed to the toils of war and regard it almost as their only trade, return, impoverished and ruined, and are unable to find work.

Failure to reckon with the scale of the difficulties connected with the demobilisation was undoubtedly a mistake on the part of the Central Committee. It must, of course, be said that we had nothing to go on, for the Civil War was so arduous an effort that there was only one guiding principle: everything for victory on the Civil War front,

and nothing else. It was only by observing this principle, and by the Red Army's unparalleled efforts in the struggle against Kolchak, Yudenich and others, that we could hope to, achieve victory over the imperialists who had invaded Soviet Russia.

From this crucial fact, which determined a whole series of mistakes and intensified the crisis, I should like to turn to the question of how a whole number of even more profound discrepancies, erroneous calculations or plans were brought to light in the work of the Party and the struggle of the entire proletariat. These were not only mistakes in planning, but in determining the balance of forces between our class and those classes in collaboration with which, and frequently in struggle against which, it had to decide the fate of the Republic. With this as a starting-point, let us turn to the results of the past, to our political experience, and to what the Central Committee, as the policy-making body, must understand and try to explain to the whole Party. These questions range from the course of our war with Poland to food and fuel. Our offensive, our too swift advance almost as far as Warsaw, was undoubtedly a mistake. I shall not now analyse whether it was a strategic or a political error, as this would take me too far afield. Let us leave it to future historians, for those of us who have to keep beating off the enemy in hard struggle have no time to indulge in historical research. At any rate, the mistake is there, and it was due to the fact that we had overestimated the superiority of our forces. It would be too difficult to decide now to what extent this superiority of forces depended on the economic conditions, and on the fact that the war with Poland aroused patriotic feelings even among the petty-bourgeois elements, who were by no means proletarians or sympathisers with communism, by no means giving unconditional support to the dictatorship of the proletariat; sometimes, in fact, they did not support it at all. But the fact remains that we had made a definite mistake in the war with Poland.

We find a similar mistake in food. With regard to surplus food appropriation and its fulfilment there can be no doubt that the year under review was more favourable than the previous one. This year the amount of grain collected is

over 250 million poods. By February 1, the figure was estimated at 235 million poods, as against the 210 million poods for the whole of the previous year; that is to say, more was collected in a much shorter period than for the whole of the previous year. It turned out, however, that of these 235 millions collected by February 1, we had used up 155 million poods within the first six months, that is, an average of 25 million or even more poods a month. Of course, we must on the whole admit that we were unable to space out our reserves properly, even when they were better than last year's. We failed to see the full danger of the crisis approaching with the spring, and succumbed to the natural desire to increase the starving workers' ration. Of course, it must be said that there again we had no basis for our estimates. All capitalist countries, in spite of the anarchy and chaos intrinsic to capitalism, have as a basis for their economic planning, the experience of many decades which they can compare, for they have the same economic system differing only in details. From this comparison it is possible to deduce a genuinely scientific law, a certain regularity and uniformity. We cannot have and have not had anything of the kind, and it was quite natural that when at the end of the war the possibility finally arose to give the starving population a little more, we were unable all at once to establish the correct proportion. We should have obviously limited the increase in the ration, so as to create a certain reserve fund for a rainy day, which was due to come in the spring, and which has now arrived. That we failed to do. Once again it is a mistake typical of all our work, a mistake which shows that the transition from war to peace confronted us with a whole number of difficulties and problems, and we had neither the experience, the training, nor the requisite material to overcome them, and this worsened, intensified and aggravated the crisis to an extraordinary extent.

We undoubtedly had something similar in fuel. It is crucial to economic construction. The output estimates and proper distribution of fuel had, of course, to be the basis for the entire transition from war to peace—to economic construction—which was discussed at the previous Party Congress and which has been the main concern and the focal

point of all our policy during the year under review. There can be no question of overcoming our difficulties or rehabilitating our industry without it. In this respect, we are clearly in a better position now than we were last year. We used to be cut off from the coal and oil districts, but we got the coal and oil after the Red Army's victories. In any case, our fuel resources have increased. We know that the fuel resources with which we entered upon the year under review were greater than before. Accordingly, we made the mistake of immediately permitting such a wide distribution of fuel that these resources were exhausted and we were faced with a fuel crisis before we had put everything in proper working order. You will hear special reports on all these problems, and I cannot even give you any approximate figures. But in any case, bearing in mind the experience of the past, we must say that this mistake was due to a wrong understanding of the state of affairs and the rapid pace of transition from war to peace. It turned out that the transition could only be made at a much slower pace than we had imagined. The lesson driven home to us over the past year is that the preparations had to be longer, and the pace slower. It is a lesson that the whole Party will need particularly to learn in order to determine our main tasks for the year ahead, if we are to avoid similar mistakes in the future.

I must add that the crop failure aggravated these mistakes and especially the resultant crises. I have pointed out that the food effort during the year under review gave us very much better food reserves, but that too was one of the main sources of the crises, because the crop failure had led to an acute feed shortage, a great loss of cattle and widespread ruin among the peasants, so that these grain procurements fell mainly in places where the grain surplus was not very large. There are far greater surpluses in various outlying areas of the Republic, in Siberia and in the Northern Caucasus, but it is there that the Soviet power was less stable, the Soviet government apparatus least efficient, and transportation from over there was very difficult. That is why it turned out that we collected the increased food reserves from the gubernias with the poorer crops and this went to intensify the crisis in the peasant economy considerably.

Here again we clearly see that our estimates were not as accurate as they should have been. But then we were in such a tight corner that we had no choice. A country which, after a devastating imperialist war, survived such a thing as a long civil war, could not, of course, exist without giving the front everything it had. And, once ruined, what could it do but take the peasants' surpluses, even without compensating them by any other means. We had to do this to save the country, the army, and the workers' and peasants' government. We said to the peasants: "Of course, you are lending your grain to the workers' and peasants' state, but unless you do, you cannot expect to save the country from the landowners and the capitalists." We could do nothing else in the circumstances forced upon us by the imperialists and the capitalists through their war. We had no choice. But these circumstances led to such a weakening of the peasant economy after the long war that the crop failure was due also to the smaller sown area, worsening equipment, lower crop yields, shortage of hands, etc. The crop failure was disastrous, but the collection of surplus grain, which was rather better than we had expected, was accompanied by an aggravation of the crisis that may bring us still greater difficulties and calamities in the months to come. We must carefully reckon with this fact when analysing our political experience of the past year, and the political tasks we set ourselves for the year ahead. The year under review has left the following year with the same urgent problems.

I shall now deal with another point from a totally different sphere—the trade union discussion, which has taken up so much of the Party's time. I mentioned it earlier on today, and could naturally only venture the cautious remark that I thought many of you would consider this discussion as being too great a luxury. I must add, for my part, that I think it was quite an impermissible luxury, and we certainly made a mistake when we allowed it, for we had failed to realise that we were pushing into the forefront a question which for objective reasons cannot be there. We allowed ourselves to indulge in this luxury, failing to realise how much attention we distracted from the vital and threatening question before us, namely, this question of the crisis.

What are the actual results of this discussion, which has been going on for so many months and which must have bored most of you? You will hear special reports on it, but I should like to draw your attention to one aspect of the matter. It is that in this case the saying, "Every cloud has a silver lining", has been undoubtedly justified.

Unfortunately, there was rather a lot of cloud, and very little silver lining. (*Laughter*.) Still, the silver lining was there, for although we lost a great deal of time and diverted the attention of our Party comrades from the urgent tasks of the struggle against the petty-bourgeois elements surrounding us, we did learn to discern certain relationships which we had not seen before. The good thing was that the Party was bound to learn something from this struggle. Although we all knew that, being the ruling party, we had inevitably to merge the Party and government leadership—they are merged and will remain so—the Party nevertheless learned a certain lesson in this discussion which cannot be ignored. Some platforms mostly got the votes of the "top" section of the Party. Some platforms which were sometimes called "the platforms of the Workers' Opposition", and sometimes by other names, clearly proved to be an expression of a syndicalist deviation. That is not just my personal opinion, but that of the vast majority of those present. (*Voices*: "That's right.")

In this discussion, the Party proved itself to have matured to such an extent that, aware of a certain wavering of the "top" section and hearing the leadership say: "We cannot agree—sort us out," it mobilised rapidly for this task and the vast majority of the more important Party organisations quickly responded: "We do have an opinion, and we shall let you know it."

During the discussion we got a number of platforms. There were so many of them that, although in view of my position I should have read them all, I confess I had not. (*Laughter*.) I do not know whether all those present had found the time to read them, but, in any case, I must say that this syndicalist, and to a certain degree even semi-anarchist, deviation, which has crystallised, gives food for thought. For several months we allowed ourselves to wallow in the luxury of studying shades of opinion.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Meanwhile, the demobilisation of the army was producing banditry and aggravating the economic crisis. The discussion should have helped us to understand that our Party, with at least half a million members and possibly even more, has become, first, a mass party, and, second, the government party, and that as a mass party it reflects something of what is taking place outside its ranks. It is extremely important to understand this.

There would be nothing to fear from a slight syndicalist or semi-anarchist deviation; the Party would have swiftly and decisively become aware of it, and would have set about correcting it. But it is no time to argue about theoretical deviations when one of them is bound up with the tremendous preponderance of peasants in the country, when their dissatisfaction with the proletarian dictatorship is mounting, when the crisis in peasant farming is coming to a head, and when the demobilisation of the peasant army is setting loose hundreds and thousands of broken men who have nothing to do, whose only accustomed occupation is war and who breed banditry. At the Congress, we must make it quite clear that we cannot have arguments about deviations and that we must put a stop to that. The Party Congress can and must do this; it must draw the appropriate lesson, and add it to the Central Committee's political report, consolidate and confirm it, and make it a Party law and duty. The atmosphere of the controversy is becoming extremely dangerous and constitutes a direct threat to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

A few months ago, when I had occasion to meet and argue with some comrades in a discussion and said, "Beware, this constitutes a threat to working-class rule and the dictatorship of the proletariat," they replied, "This is intimidation, you are terrorising us." On several occasions I have had to hear my remarks being labelled in this manner, and accusations of intimidation thrown about, and I replied that it would be absurd for me to try to intimidate old revolutionaries who had gone through all sorts of ordeals. But when you see the difficulties the demobilisation is producing you can no longer say it was an attempt at intimidation, or even an unavoidable exaggeration in the heat of the controversy; it was, in fact, an absolutely exact indication

of what we now have, and of our need for unity, discipline and restraint. We need all this not only because otherwise a proletarian party cannot work harmoniously, but because the spring has brought and will bring even more difficult conditions in which we cannot function without maximum unity. These two main lessons, I think, we shall still be able to learn from the discussion. I think it necessary to say, therefore, that whilst we did indulge in luxury and presented the world with a remarkable example of a party, engaged in a most desperate struggle, permitting itself the luxury of devoting unprecedented attention to the detailed elucidation of separate points of platforms—all this in face of a crop failure, a crisis, ruin and demobilisation—we shall now draw from these lessons a political conclusion—not just a conclusion pointing to some mistake, but a political conclusion—concerning the relations between classes, between the working class and the peasants. These relations are not what we had believed them to be. They demand much greater unity and concentration of forces on the part of the proletariat, and under the dictatorship of the proletariat they are a far greater danger than all the Denikins, Kolchaks and Yudeniches put together. It would be fatal to be deluded on this score! The difficulties stemming from the petty-bourgeois element are enormous, and if they are to be overcome, we must have great unity, and I don't mean just a semblance of unity. We must all pull together with a single will, for in a peasant country only the will of the mass of proletarians will enable the proletariat to accomplish the great tasks of its leadership and dictatorship.

Assistance is on its way from the West-European countries but it is not coming quickly enough. Still it is coming and growing.

I pointed out this morning that one of the most important factors of the period under review, one closely related to the work of the Central Committee, is the organisation of the Second Congress of the Comintern. Of course, compared with last year, the world revolution has made considerable headway. Of course, the Communist International, which at the time of last year's Congress existed only in the form of proclamations, has now begun to function as an independent

party in each country, and not merely as an advanced party —communism has become central to the working-class movement as a whole. In Germany, France and Italy the Communist International has become not only the centre of the working-class movement, but also the focus of political life in these countries. Any German or French newspaper you picked up last autumn contained abuse of Moscow and the Bolsheviks, who were called all sorts of names; in fact, the Bolsheviks and the 21 conditions for admission to the Third International[52] were made the central issue of their entire political life. That is an achievement no one can take away from us! It shows how the world revolution is growing and how it is paralleled by the aggravation of the economic crisis in Europe. But in any case, it would be madness on our part to assume that help will shortly arrive from Europe in the shape of a strong proletarian revolution, and I am sure no one here is making such an assumption. In these last three years, we have learned to understand that placing our stake on the world revolution does not mean relying on a definite date, and that the accelerating pace of development may or may not lead to a revolution in the spring. Therefore, we must be able to bring our work in line with the class balance here and elsewhere, so as to be able to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat for a long time, and, however gradually, to remedy all our numerous misfortunes and crises. This is the only correct and sober approach.

I shall now turn to an item concerning the work of the Central Committee during the present year which is closely related to the tasks facing us. It is the question of our foreign relations.

Prior to the Ninth Party Congress, our attention and all our endeavours were aimed at switching from our relations of war with the capitalist countries to relations of peace and trade. For that purpose we undertook all sorts of diplomatic moves and bested men who were undoubtedly skilled diplomats. When, for instance, the representatives of America or of the League of Nations[53] proposed that we halt hostilities against Denikin and Kolchak on certain stated terms, they thought we would land in difficulties. In actual fact, it was they who landed in difficulties and we who scored a great diplomatic victory. They were made to look silly,

they had to withdraw their terms, and this was subsequently exposed in all the diplomatic writings and press of the world. But we cannot rest content with a diplomatic victory. We need more than that: we need genuine trade relations. However, only this year has there been some development in trade relations. There is the question of trade relations with Britain, which has been central since the summer of last year. In this connection, the war with Poland was a considerable setback for us. Britain was ready to sign a trade agreement. The British bourgeoisie wanted it, but court circles in Britain were against it and hampered it, and the war with Poland delayed it. It so happens that the matter has not been settled yet.

Today's papers, I think, say that Krasin has told the press in London that he expects the trade agreement to be signed shortly.[54] I do not know whether these hopes are fully justified. I cannot be certain that it will actually take place, but for my part I must say that we in the Central Committee have devoted a great deal of attention to this question and considered it correct for us to compromise in order to achieve a trade agreement with Britain. Not only because we could obtain more from Britain than from other countries—she is, in this respect, not as advanced as, say, Germany or America. She is a colonial power, with too great a stake in Asian politics, and is sometimes too sensitive to the successes of the Soviet power in certain countries lying near her colonies. That is why our relations with Britain are especially tenuous. This tenuousness arises from such an objective tangle of causes that no amount of skill on the part of the Soviet diplomatists will help. But we need a trade treaty with Britain owing to the possibility opening up for a treaty with America, whose industrial capacity is so much greater.

The concession issue is bound up with this. We devoted far more attention to it last year than before. A decree of the Council of People's Commissars issued on November 23 set out the concession question in a form most acceptable to foreign capitalists. When certain misinterpretations or insufficient understanding of this problem arose in Party circles, a number of meetings of senior Party workers were held to discuss it. On the whole, there was not a great deal

of disagreement, although we did hear of many protests from workers and peasants. They said: "We got rid of our own capitalists, and now they want to call in some foreign capitalists." Of course, the Central Committee had no statistics at its disposal to decide to what extent these protests were due to ignorance, or expressed the hopes of the kulak or outright capitalist section of the non-Party people who believe they have a legitimate right to be capitalists in Russia, and not like the foreign capitalists who are invited in without any power, but with real power. Indeed, it is most unlikely that statistics on such factors are available anywhere in the world. But this decree was, at any rate, a step towards establishing relations with a view to granting concessions. I must add that in practice—and this is something we must never forget—we have not secured a single concession. The point at issue is whether we should try to get them at all costs. Whether we get them or not does not depend on our arguments or decisions, but on international capital. On February 1 of this year, the Council of People's Commissars took another decision on the concessions. Its first clause says: "To approve in principle the granting of oil concessions in Grozny and Baku and at other working oilfields and to open negotiations which should be pressed forward."

There was some difference of opinion on this point. Some comrades thought it was wrong to grant concessions in Grozny and Baku, as this would arouse opposition among the workers. The majority on the Central Committee, including myself, took the view that there were possibly no grounds for the complaints.

The majority on the Central Committee and I myself took the view that it was essential to grant these concessions, and we shall ask you to back it up with your authority. It is vital to have such an alliance with the state trusts of the advanced countries because our economic crisis is so deep that we cannot, on our own, rehabilitate our ruined economy without machinery and technical aid from abroad. Getting the equipment out here is not enough. We could grant concessions to the biggest imperialist trusts on a wider basis: say, a quarter of Baku, a quarter of Grozny, and a quarter of our best forest reserves, so as to assure ourselves of an

essential basis by the installation of the most modern machinery; on the other hand, in return for this we shall be getting badly needed machinery for the remaining part. In this way we shall be able to close a part—say, a quarter or a half—of the gap between us and the modern, advanced trusts of other countries. No one, with anything like a sober view of the present situation, will doubt that unless we do this we shall be in a very difficult position indeed, and shall be unable to overtake them without a superhuman effort. Negotiations with some of the largest world trusts have already begun. Naturally, for their part they are not simply doing us a good turn: they are in it only for the fantastic profits. Modern capitalism—as a non-belligerent diplomat would put it—is a robber, a ring. It is not the old capitalism of pre-war days: because of its monopoly of the world market its profit margins run to hundreds of per cents. Of course, this will exact a high price, but there is no other way out because the world revolution is marking time. There is no other way for us to raise our technology to the modern level. And if one of the crises were to give a sharp spur to the world revolution, and if it were to arrive before the concession terms ran out, our concession obligations would turn out to be less onerous than they appear on paper.

On February 1, 1921, the Council of People's Commissars decided to purchase 18,500,000 poods of coal abroad, for our fuel crisis was already in evidence. It had already become clear by then that we would have to expend our gold reserves not only on the purchase of machinery. In the latter case, our coal output would have increased, for we would have boosted our production if, instead of coal, we had bought machines abroad to develop our coal industry, but the crisis was so acute that we had to opt for the worse economic step and spend our money on the coal we could have produced at home. We shall have to make further compromises to buy consumer goods for the peasants and workers.

I should now like to deal with the Kronstadt events.[55] I have not yet received the latest news from Kronstadt, but I have no doubt that this mutiny, which very quickly revealed to us the familiar figures of whiteguard generals, will be put down within the next few days, if not hours.

There can be no doubt about this. But it is essential that we make a thorough appraisal of the political and economic lessons of this event.

What does it mean? It was an attempt to seize political power from the Bolsheviks by a motley crowd or alliance of ill-assorted elements, apparently just to the right of the Bolsheviks, or perhaps even to their "left"—you can't really tell, so amorphous is the combination of political groupings that has tried to take power in Kronstadt. You all know, undoubtedly, that at the same time whiteguard generals were very active over there. There is ample proof of this. A fortnight before the Kronstadt events., the Paris newspapers reported a mutiny at Kronstadt. It is quite clear that it is the work of Socialist-Revolutionaries and whiteguard émigrés, and at the same time the movement was reduced to a petty-bourgeois counter-revolution and petty-bourgeois anarchism. That is something quite new. This circumstance, in the context of all the crises, must be given careful political consideration and must be very thoroughly analysed. There is evidence here of the activity of petty-bourgeois anarchist elements with their slogans of unrestricted trade and invariable hostility to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This mood has had a wide influence on the proletariat. It has had an effect on factories in Moscow and a number of provincial centres. This petty-bourgeois counter-revolution is undoubtedly more dangerous than Denikin, Yudenich and Kolchak put together, because ours is a country where the proletariat is in a minority, where peasant property has gone to ruin and where, in addition, the demobilisation has set loose vast numbers of potentially mutinous elements. No matter how big or small the initial, shall I say, shift in power, which the Kronstadt sailors and workers put forward—they wanted to correct the Bolsheviks in regard to restrictions in trade—and this looks like a small shift, which leaves the same slogans of "Soviet power" with ever so slight a change or correction. Yet, in actual fact the whiteguards only used the non-Party elements as a stepping stone to get in. This is politically inevitable. We saw the petty-bourgeois, anarchist elements in the Russian revolution, and we have been fighting them for decades. We have seen them in action since February

1917, during the great revolution, and their parties' attempts to prove that their programme differed little from that of the Bolsheviks, but that only their methods in carrying it through were different. We know this not only from the experience of the October Revolution, but also of the outlying regions and various areas within the former Russian Empire where the Soviet power was temporarily replaced by other regimes. Let us recall the Democratic Committee in Samara.[56] They all came in demanding equality, freedom, and a constituent assembly, and every time they proved to be nothing but a conduit for whiteguard rule. Because the Soviet power is being shaken by the economic situation, we must consider all this experience and draw the theoretical conclusions a Marxist cannot escape. The experience of the whole of Europe shows the practical results of trying to sit between two stools. That is why in this context we must say that political friction, in this case, is a great danger. We must take a hard look at this petty-bourgeois counter-revolution with its calls for freedom to trade. Unrestricted trade—even if it is not as bound up initially with the whiteguards as Kronstadt was—is still only the thin end of the wedge for the whiteguard element, a victory for capital and its complete restoration. We must, I repeat, have a keen sense of this political danger.

It shows what I said in dealing with our platforms discussion: in face of this danger we must understand that we must do more than put an end to Party disputes as a matter of form—we shall do that, of course. We need to remember that we must take a much more serious approach to this question.

We have to understand that, with the peasant economy in the grip of a crisis, we can survive only by appealing to the peasants to help town and countryside. We must bear in mind that the bourgeoisie is trying to pit the peasants against the workers; that behind a façade of workers' slogans it is trying to incite the petty-bourgeois anarchist elements against the workers. This, if successful, will lead directly to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, consequently, to the restoration of capitalism and of the old landowner and capitalist regime. The political danger here is obvious. A number of revolutions have clearly gone

that way; we have always been mindful of this possibility and have warned against it. This undoubtedly demands of the ruling party of Communists, and of the leading revolutionary elements of the proletariat a different attitude to the one we have time and again displayed over the past year. It is a danger that undoubtedly calls for much greater unity and discipline; it undoubtedly requires that we should all pull harder together. Otherwise we shall not cope with the dangers that have fallen to our lot.

Then there are the economic problems. What is the meaning of the unrestricted trade demanded by the petty-bourgeois elements? It is that in the proletariat's relations with the small farmers there are difficult problems and tasks we have yet to solve. I am-speaking of the victorious proletariat's relations with the small proprietors when the proletarian revolution unfolds in a country where the proletariat is in a minority, and the petty bourgeoisie, in a majority. In such a country the proletariat's role is to direct the transition of these small proprietors to socialised and collective work. Theoretically this is beyond dispute. We have dealt with this transition in a number of legislative acts, but we know that it does not turn on legislative acts, but on practical implementation, which, we also know, can be guaranteed when you have a very powerful, large-scale industry capable of providing the petty producer with such benefits that he will see its advantages in practice.

That is how Marxists and all socialists who have given thought to the social revolution and its tasks have always regarded the question in theory. But Russia's most pronounced characteristic of which I have spoken is that we have, on the one hand, not only a minority, but a considerable minority of proletarians, and, on the other, a vast majority of peasants. And the conditions in which we have had to defend the revolution made the solution of our problems incredibly difficult. We have not been able to show all the advantages of large-scale production, for it lies in ruins, and is dragging out a miserable existence. It can only be rehabilitated by demanding sacrifices from these very same small farmers. To get industry on its feet you need fuel; if you need fuel, you must rely on firewood; and if you rely on firewood, you must look to the peasant and

his horse. In conditions of crisis, the fodder shortage and the loss of cattle, the peasant must give his produce on credit to the Soviet power for the sake of a large-scale industry which has not yet given him a thing. That is the economic situation which gives rise to enormous difficulties and demands a deeper analysis of the conditions of transition from war to peace. We cannot run a war-time economy otherwise than by telling the peasants: "You must make loans to the workers' and peasants' state to help it pull through." When concentrating on economic rehabilitation, we must understand that we have before us a small farmer, a small proprietor and producer who will work for the market until the rehabilitation and triumph of large-scale production. But rehabilitation on the old basis is impossible; it will take years, at least a decade, and possibly longer, in view of the havoc. Until then we shall have to deal, for many long years, with the small producer as such, and the unrestricted trade slogan will be inevitable. It is dangerous, not because it covers up the aspirations of the whiteguards and Mensheviks, but because it may become widespread in spite of the peasants' hatred for the whiteguards. It is apt to spread because it conforms to the economic conditions of the small producer's existence. It is out of such considerations that the Central Committee adopted its decision to start a discussion on the substitution of a tax for surplus food appropriation and today placed this question squarely before the Congress, a motion which today's resolution approves.[57] The tax and appropriation problem had been brought up in our legislation a long time ago, back in late 1918. The tax law was dated October 30, 1918. The law on a tax in kind on the farmer was enacted, but never became operative. A number of instructions were issued in the few months after its promulgation, but it was never applied. On the other hand, the confiscation of surpluses from the peasants was a measure with which we were saddled by the imperative conditions of war-time, but which no longer applies to anything like the peace-time conditions of the peasant's economy. He needs the assurance that, while he has to give away a certain amount, he will have so much left to sell locally.

The whole of our economy and its various branches were

affected throughout by war-time conditions. With this in mind, our task was to collect a definite quantity of food, regardless of what it did to the national turnover. As we turn from problems of war to those of peace, we take a different view of the tax in kind: we see it not only from the standpoint of meeting the needs of the state, but also those of the small farms. We must try to understand the economic forms of the petty farmer's indignation against the proletariat which has been in evidence and which is being aggravated in the current crisis. We must try to do our utmost in this respect for it is a matter of vital importance. We must allow the peasant to have a certain amount of leeway in local trade, and supplant the surplus food appropriation by a tax, to give the small farmer a chance to plan his production and determine its scale in accordance with the tax. We know quite well, of course, that in our conditions this is a very difficult thing to do. The sown area, the crop yield, and the farm implements have all been reduced, the surpluses have undoubtedly decreased, and in very many cases have disappeared altogether. These circumstances must be regarded as a fact. The peasant will have to go hungry for a while in order to save the towns and factories from famine. That is something quite understandable on a country-wide scale, but we do not expect the poverty-stricken lone-wolf farmer to understand it. And we know that we shall not be able to do without coercion, on which the impoverished peasants are very touchy. Nor must we imagine that this measure will rid us of the crisis. But we do regard it as our task to make the maximum concessions, to give the small producer the best conditions to come into his own. Up to now, we have been adapting ourselves to the tasks of war; we must now adapt ourselves to the conditions of peace. The Central Committee is faced with this task—the task of switching to the tax in kind in conditions of proletarian power, and it is closely bound up with the question of concessions. You will be having a special discussion on this problem, and it requires your special consideration. By granting concessions, the proletarian power can secure an agreement with advanced capitalist states. On it depends our industrial growth, without which we cannot hope to advance towards communism.

On the other hand, in this period of transition in a country where the peasants predominate, we must manage to go over to measures giving economic security to the peasants, and do the most we can to ease their economic condition. Until we have remoulded the peasant, until large-scale machinery has recast him, we must assure him of the possibility of running his economy without restrictions. We are now in a transitional phase, and our revolution is surrounded by capitalist countries. As long as we are in this phase, we are forced to seek highly complex forms of relationships. Oppressed by war, we were unable to concentrate on how to establish economic relations between the proletarian state power, with an incredibly devastated large-scale industry, and the small farmers, and how to find forms of coexistence with them, who, as long as they remain small farmers, cannot exist without their small economy having some system of exchange. I believe this to be the Soviet Government's most important question in the sphere of economics and politics at the present time. I believe that it sums up the political results of our work, now that the war period has ended and we have begun, in the year under review, to make the transition to peace.

This transition is bound up with such difficulties and has so clearly delineated this petty-bourgeois element, that we must take a sober view of it. We view this series of events in terms of the class struggle, and we have never doubted that the relations between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie are a difficult problem, demanding complex measures or, to be more accurate, a whole system of complex, transitional measures, to ensure the victory of the proletarian power. The fact that we issued our tax in kind decree at the end of 1918 proves that the Communists were aware of this problem, but were unable to solve it because of the war. With the Civil War on, we had to adopt war-time measures. But it would be a very great mistake indeed if we drew the conclusion that these are the only measures and relations possible. That would surely lead to the collapse of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. When the transition to peace takes place in a period of economic crisis, it should be borne in mind that it is easier to build up a proletarian state in a country with large-

scale production than in one with a predominantly small-scale production. This problem has to be approached in a whole number of ways, and we do not close our eyes to these difficulties, or forget that the proletariat is one thing, and the small-scale producer, another. We have not forgotten that there are different classes, that petty-bourgeois, anarchist counter-revolution is a political step to whiteguard rule. We must face this squarely, with an awareness that this needs, on the one hand, maximum unity, restraint and discipline within the proletarian party, and on the other, a series of economic measures which we have not been able to carry out so far because of the war. We must recognise the need to grant concessions, and purchase machinery and equipment to satisfy agriculture, so as to exchange them for grain and re-establish relations between the proletariat and the peasants which will enable it to exist in peacetime conditions. I trust that we shall return to this problem, and I repeat that, in my view, we are dealing here with an important matter, and that the past year, which must be characterised as a period of transition from war to peace, confronts us with some extremely difficult problems.

Let me say a few words in conclusion about combating bureaucratic practices, the question which has taken up so much of our time. It came up before the Central Committee last summer; in August the Central Committee sent a circular to all organisations, and the matter was put before a Party conference in September. Finally, at the December Congress of Soviets, it was dealt with on a wider scale.[58] We do have a bureaucratic ulcer; it has been diagnosed and has to be treated in earnest. Of course, in the discussion that we have had some platforms dealt with the problem quite frivolously, to say the least, and, by and large, from a petty-bourgeois viewpoint. There is no doubt that some discontent and stirrings have recently been in evidence among non-Party workers. Non-Party meetings in Moscow have clearly turned "democracy" and "freedom" into slogans leading up to the overthrow of the Soviet power. Many, or, at any rate, some representatives of the Workers' Opposition have battled against this petty-bourgeois, counter-revolutionary evil, and have said: "We shall unite against this." And in actual fact they have been able to display

the maximum unity. I cannot tell whether all the supporters of the Workers' Opposition group and other groups with semi-syndicalist platforms are like them. We need to learn more about this at the Congress, we need to understand that the struggle against the evils of bureaucracy is absolutely indispensable, and that it is just as intricate as the fight against the petty-bourgeois element. The bureaucratic practices of our state system have become such a serious malaise that they are dealt with in our Party Programme, because they are connected with this petty-bourgeois element, which is widely dispersed. This malaise can only be cured by the working people's unity and their ability not only to welcome the decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (have you seen many decrees that have not been welcomed?) but to exercise their right through the Inspection, something you don't find either in the villages, the towns, or even the capital cities. Those who shout loudest against the evils of bureaucracy very frequently do not know how to exercise this right. Very great attention needs to be paid to this fact.

In this area, we often see those who battle against this evil, possibly with a sincere desire to help the proletarian party, the proletarian dictatorship and the proletarian movement, actually helping the petty-bourgeois, anarchist element, which on more than one occasion during the revolution has shown itself to be the most dangerous enemy of the proletarian dictatorship. And now—and this is the main conclusion and lesson of the past year—it has once again shown itself to be the most dangerous enemy, which is most likely to have followers and supporters in a country like ours, to change the mood of the broad masses and to affect even a section of the non-Party workers. That is when the proletarian state finds itself in a very difficult position. Unless we understand this, learn our lesson, and make this Congress a turning-point both in economic policy and in the sense of maximum unity of the proletariat, we shall have to apply to ourselves the unfortunate saying: we have forgotten nothing of what—small and trifling at times—deserves to be forgotten, and have learned nothing of the serious things this year of the revolution should have taught us. I hope that will not be the case! (*Stormy applause.*)

3

SUMMING-UP SPEECH ON THE REPORT OF THE C.C. OF THE R.C.P.(B.) MARCH 9

(*Prolonged applause.*) Comrades, one would have expected the criticism, remarks, additions and amendments, etc., elicited by the report on the political activity of the Central Committee to concentrate on political work and political mistakes, and to give political advice.

Unfortunately, when you take a closer look at the debate and go over the main points made in it, you cannot help asking yourself: Was it not because the speeches were so strangely vapid, and almost all the speakers were from the Workers' Opposition, that the Congress folded up its debate so quickly? Indeed, just what has been said of the Central Committee's political work and current political tasks? Most of the speakers said they belonged to the Workers' Opposition. This is no trifling title. And it is no trifling matter to form an opposition in such a Party and at such a moment!

Comrade Kollontai, for example, said bluntly: "Lenin's report evaded Kronstadt." When I heard that I didn't know what to say. Everyone present at this Congress knows perfectly well—newspaper reports will naturally not be as explicit as the speeches here are—that my report tied in everything —from beginning to end—with the lessons of Kronstadt. If anything, I deserve to be reproached for devoting the greater part of my report to the lessons that flow from the Kronstadt events, and the smaller part to past mistakes, political facts and crucial points in our work, which, in my opinion, determine our political tasks and help us to avoid such mistakes in the future.

What did we hear of the lessons of Kronstadt?

When people come forward in the name of an opposition, which they call a "workers'" opposition, and say that the

Central Committee has failed to steer the Party's policy properly, we must tell them that we need pointers indicating what was wrong on the main questions, and ways of rectifying it. Unfortunately, we heard absolutely nothing, not a word or sound, about the present situation and its lessons. No one even touched upon the conclusion that I drew. It may be wrong, but the whole point of making reports at congresses is precisely to rectify what is wrong. The political conclusion to be drawn from the present situation is that the Party must be united and any opposition prevented. The economic conclusion is that we must not rest content with what has been achieved in the policy of reaching an agreement between the working class and the peasantry; we must seek new ways and put them to the test. I was quite specific about what we needed to do. Perhaps I was wrong, but nobody said a word about that. One of the speakers, I think it was Ryazanov, reproached me only for having suddenly sprung the tax on the Congress, before the ground had been prepared for it by discussion. That is not true. The surprising thing is that responsible comrades can make such statements at a Party Congress. The tax discussion was started in Pravda a few weeks ago. If the comrades who are fond of the game of opposition and like to complain that we are not providing an opportunity for broad discussion did not choose to take part in it, they have no one to blame but themselves. We are connected with *Pravda*'s editorial board not only through Comrade Bukharin's being a member of the Central Committee, but also through the Central Committee discussions of all the most important subjects and lines of policy. Otherwise there can be no political work. The Central Committee submitted the tax question for discussion. Articles were published in *Pravda*. Nobody replied to them. Those who refrained from replying showed that they did not wish to go into the matter. When, at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet—after these articles had been published—somebody, I do not remember whether it was a non-Party man or a Menshevik, got up and began to talk about the tax, I said: You don't seem to know what's being said in Pravda. It was more natural to say that sort of thing to a non-Party man than to a member of the Party. It was no accident that the discussion was started in *Pravda*; and

we shall have to deal with it here. The criticism has been altogether unbusiness-like. The question was put up for discussion, and the critics should have taken part in it; because they had failed to do so, their criticism is groundless. The same may be said of the political question. I repeat: all my attention was concentrated on drawing the correct conclusion from recent events.

We are passing through a period of grave danger: as I have said the petty-bourgeois counter-revolution is a greater danger than Denikin. The comrades did not deny this. The peculiar feature of this counter-revolution is that it is petty-bourgeois and anarchistic. I insist that there is a connection between its ideas and slogans and those of the Workers' Opposition. There was no response to this from any of the speakers, although most of them belonged to the Workers' Opposition. And yet, the Workers' Opposition pamphlet, which Comrade Kollontai published for the Congress, serves to confirm my assertion better than anything else. And I suppose I shall have to deal chiefly with this pamphlet to explain why the counter-revolution, to which I have referred, is assuming an anarchist, petty-bourgeois form, why it is so vast and dangerous, and why the speakers from the Workers' Opposition have failed entirely to realise the danger.

But before replying to them I want to say a word or two, before I forget, on another subject, namely Osinsky. This comrade, who has written a great deal and has brought out his own platform, gets up and criticises the Central Committee's report. We could have expected him to criticise our principal measures, and this would have been very valuable for us. Instead, he said that we had "thrown out" Sapronov, which showed that our calls for unity were at variance with our deeds; and he made a point of stressing that two members of the Workers' Opposition had been elected to the Presidium. I am surprised that an extremely prominent Party worker and writer, who occupies a responsible post, can talk about such trifles, which are of tenth-rate importance! Osinsky has the knack of seeing political trickery in everything. He sees it also in the fact that two seats on the Presidium were given to the Workers' Opposition.

At a Party meeting in Moscow I called attention to the rise of the Workers' Opposition, and I regret that I must do so again now, at the Party Congress. It had revealed itself in October and November by bringing in the two-room system, and the formation of factions.

We have repeatedly said, and I have, in particular, that our task is to separate the wheat from the chaff in the Workers' Opposition, because it has spread to some extent, and has damaged our work in Moscow. There was no difference of opinion in the Central Committee on that score. There was evidence of damage to our work, the start of factionalism and a split in November, during the two-room conference[59]—when some met here and others down at the other end of the floor, and when I had my share of the trouble, for I had to act as errand-boy and shuttle between the rooms.

Back in September, during the Party Conference,[60] we regarded it as our task to separate the wheat from the chaff for the group could not be regarded as consisting entirely of good stuff. When we hear complaints about inadequate democracy, we say: it is absolutely true. Indeed, it is not being practised sufficiently. We need assistance and advice in this matter. We need real democracy, and not just talk. We even accept those who call themselves the Workers' Opposition, or something worse, although I think that for members of the Communist Party no name can be worse or more disreputable. But even if they had adopted a much worse title, we say to ourselves: since this is a malaise that has affected a section of the workers we must pay the closest attention to it. And we should be given credit for the very thing that Comrade Osinsky has accused us of, though why he should have done so, I don't know.

I now come to the Workers' Opposition. You have admitted that you are in opposition. You have come to the Party Congress with Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet which is entitled *The Workers' Opposition*. When you sent in the final proofs, you knew about the Kronstadt events and the rising petty-bourgeois counter-revolution. And it is at a time like this that you come here, calling yourselves a Workers' Opposition. You don't seem to realise the responsibility you are undertaking, and the way you are disrupting our

unity! What is your object? We will question you and put you through a test right here.

Comrade Osinsky used this expression in a polemical sense; he seemed to think that we were guilty of some mistake or misdemeanour. Like Ryazanov, he saw political trickery in our policy towards the Workers' Opposition. It is not political trickery; it is the policy the Central Committee has been pursuing, and will continue to pursue. Since unhealthy trends and groups have arisen, let us more than redouble our attention to them.

If there is anything at all sound in that opposition, we must make every effort to sift it from the rest. We cannot combat the evils of bureaucracy effectively, or practise democracy consistently because we lack the strength and are weak. We must enlist those who can help us in this matter, and expose and sift out those who produce such pamphlets on the pretext of helping us.

This task of sifting is being facilitated at the Party Congress. Representatives of the ailing group have been elected to the Presidium and these "poor", "wronged", and "banished" people will no longer dare to complain and wail. There's the rostrum, up on it, and let's have your answer! You have spoken more than anyone else. Now let us see what you have in store for us, with this looming danger, which, you admit, is a greater one than Denikin! What have you come up with? What is the nature of your criticism? We must have this test now, and I think it will be the final one. We have had enough of that sort of thing! The Party will not be trifled with in this way! Whoever comes to the Congress with such a pamphlet is trifling with the Party. You can't play that kind of game when hundreds of thousands of demoralised veterans are playing havoc with our economy—the Party will not stand for such treatment. You can't behave that way. You must realise that, and put a stop to it!

After these preliminary remarks about the election to the Presidium and the character of the Workers' Opposition I want to draw your attention to Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet. It really deserves your attention, for it sums up the activity this opposition has been carrying on for several months, or the disintegration it has caused. It was

said here, by a comrade from Samara, I think, that I had stuck the label of syndicalism on the Workers' Opposition, in an "administrative" fashion. The reference is altogether misplaced, and we must investigate which of the questions calls for an administrative solution. Comrade Milonov tried to score with a terrifying catchword, but it fell flat. He said that I stuck on a label in "administrative" fashion. I have said before that at our meetings Comrade Shlyapnikov and others have accused me of "intimidating" people with the word "syndicalism". When this was mentioned at one of our discussions, at the Miners' Congress, I think, I replied to Comrade Shlyapnikov: "Do you hope to take in any grown-ups?" After all, Comrade Shlyapnikov and I have known each other for many, many years, ever since the period of our underground work and emigration—how can he say that I am trying to intimidate anyone by characterising certain deviations? And when I say that the stand of the Workers' Opposition is wrong, and that it is syndicalism—what has administrating got to do with it?! And why does Comrade Kollontai write that I have been bandying the word "syndicalism" about in frivolous fashion? She ought to produce some proof before saying anything like that. I am prepared to allow that my proof is wrong, and that Comrade Kollontai's statement is weightier—I am prepared to believe that. But we must have some little proof—not in the form of words about intimidating or administrating (which, unfortunately, my official duties compel me to engage in a great deal), but in the form of a definite reply, refuting my accusation that the Workers' Opposition is a deviation towards syndicalism.

I made it before the whole Party, with a full sense of responsibility, and it was printed in a pamphlet in 250,000 copies, and everyone has read it. Evidently, all the comrades have prepared for this Congress, and they should know that the syndicalist deviation is an anarchist deviation, and that the Workers' Opposition, which is hiding behind the backs of the proletariat, is a petty-bourgeois, anarchist element.

That it has been penetrating into the broad masses is evident, and the Party Congress has thrown light on this fact. That this element has become active is proved by

Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet and Comrade Shlyapnikov's theses. And this time you can't get away with talk about being a true proletarian, as Comrade Shlyapnikov is in the habit of doing.

Comrade Kollontai starts her pamphlet with the following: "The opposition," we read on page one, "consists of the advanced section of the class-organised proletarians, who are Communists." A delegate from Siberia told the Miners' Congress[61] that over there they had discussed the same questions as were being discussed in Moscow, and Comrade Kollontai mentions this in her pamphlet:

> "'We had no idea that there were disagreements and discussions in Moscow about the role of the trade unions,' a delegate from Siberia told the Miners' Congress, 'but we were set astir by the same questions that you are faced with over here.'"

Further:

> "The Workers' Opposition has the backing of the proletarian masses, or, to be more precise: it is the class-welded, class-conscious and class-consistent section of our industrial proletariat."

Well, thank heaven, we now know that Comrade Kollontai and Comrade Shlyapnikov are "class-welded" and "class-conscious". But, comrades, when you say and write such things you must have some sense of proportion! Comrade Kollontai writes on page 25, and this is one of the main points of the Workers' Opposition theses, the following:

> "The organisation of the management of the national economy is the function of an All-Russia Congress of Producers organised in trade and industrial unions, which shall elect a central body to run the whole of the national economy of the Republic."

That is the very thesis of the Workers' Opposition that I have quoted in every case in the discussion and in the press. I must say that after reading it I did not trouble to read the rest, as that would have been a waste of time; for that thesis made it quite clear that these people had reached the limit, and that theirs is a petty-bourgeois, anarchist element. Now, in the light of the Kronstadt events, that thesis sounds queerer than ever.

At the Second Congress of the Comintern last summer,

I pointed to the significance of the resolution on the role of the Communist Party. It is a resolution uniting the Communist workers and the Communist Parties of the world. It explains everything. Does that mean that we are fencing off the Party from the whole of the working class, which is definitely exercising a dictatorship? That is what certain "Leftists" and very many syndicalists think, and the idea is now widespread. It is the product of petty-bourgeois ideology. The theses of the Workers' Opposition fly in the face of the decision of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the Communist Party's role in operating the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is syndicalism because—consider this carefully—our proletariat has been largely declassed; the terrible crises and the closing down of the factories have compelled people to flee from starvation. The workers have simply abandoned their factories; they have had to settle down in the country and have ceased to be workers. Are we not aware of the fact that the unprecedented crises, the Civil War, the disruption of proper relations between town and country and the cessation of grain deliveries have given rise to a trade in small articles made at the big factories—such as cigarette lighters—which are exchanged for cereals, because the workers are starving, and no grain is being delivered? Have we not seen this happen in the Ukraine, or in Russia? That is the economic source of the proletariat's declassing and the inevitable rise of petty-bourgeois, anarchist trends.

The experience of all our hardships tells us how desperately hard it is to combat them. After two and a half years of the Soviet power we came out in the Communist International and told the world that the dictatorship of the proletariat would not work except through the Communist Party. At the time, the anarchists and syndicalists furiously attacked us and said: "You see, this is what they think —a Communist Party is needed to operate the proletarian dictatorship.[62] But we said this before the whole Communist International. After all this, you have these "class-conscious and class-welded" people coming and telling us that "the organisation of the management of the national economy is the function of an All-Russia Congress of Producers" (Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet). What is this "All-

Russia Congress of Producers"? Are we going to waste more time on that sort of opposition in the Party? I think we have had enough of this discussion! All the arguments about freedom of speech and freedom to criticise, of which the pamphlet is full and which run through all the speeches of the Workers' Opposition, constitute nine-tenths of the meaning of these speeches, which have no particular meaning at all. They are all words of the same order. After all, comrades, we ought to discuss not only words, but also their meaning. You can't fool us with words like "freedom to criticise". When we were told that there were symptoms of a malaise in the Party, we said that this deserved our redoubled attention: the malaise is undoubtedly there, let us help to cure it; but tell us how you intend to go about it. We have spent quite a lot of time in discussion, and I must say that the point is now being driven farther home with "rifles" than with the opposition's theses. Comrades, this is no time to have an opposition. Either you're on this side, or on the other, but then your weapon must be a gun, and not an opposition. This follows from the objective situation, and you mustn't blame us for it. Comrades, let's not have an opposition just now! I think the Party Congress will have to draw the conclusion that the opposition's time has run out and that the lid's on it. We want no more oppositions! (*Applause.*)

This group has long been free to criticise. And now, at this Party Congress, we ask: What are the results and the content of your criticism? What have you taught the Party by your criticism? We are prepared to enlist the services of those of you who stand closest to the masses, the really class-welded and class-mature masses. If Comrade Osinsky regards this as political trickery he will be isolated, for the rest will regard it as a real help to Party members. We must really help those who live with the workers' masses, who have intimate knowledge of them, who have experience and can advise the Central Committee. Let them call themselves what they like—it makes no difference—as long as they help in the work, as long as they help us, instead of playing at opposition and insisting on having groups and factions at all costs. But if they continue this game of opposition, the Party will have to expel them.

And when on this very same page of her pamphlet Comrade Kollontai writes in bold type about "lack of confidence in the working class", the idea is that they are a real "workers'" opposition. There is an even more striking expression of this idea on page 36:

> "The Workers' Opposition cannot, and must not, make any concessions. This does not mean calling for a split.... No, its aim is different. Even in the event of defeat at the Congress, it must remain within the Party and firmly defend its point of view, step by step, saving the Party and straightening out its line."

"Even in the event of defeat at the Congress"—my word, what foresight! (*Laughter.*) You will pardon me if I take he liberty of saying, on my own behalf, that I am sure that is something the Party Congress will certainly not permit! (*Applause.*) Everyone has the right to straighten out the Party's line, and you have had every opportunity of doing so.

The condition has been laid down at the Party Congress that there must not be the slightest suspicion that we want to expel anybody. We welcome every assistance in getting democracy working, but when the people are exhausted it will take more than talk to do it. Everyone who wants to help is to be welcomed; but when they say that they will "make no concessions" and will make efforts to save the Party, while remaining in it, we say: yes, if you are allowed to stay! (*Applause.*)

In this case, we have no right to leave any room for ambiguity. We certainly need help in combating bureaucracy, safeguarding democracy, and extending contacts with the truly working-class masses. We can and must make "concessions" in this respect. And though they keep saying that they will not make any concessions, we shall repeat: We will. That's not making concessions but helping the workers' Party. In this way, we shall win over all the sound and proletarian elements in the Workers' Opposition to the side of the Party, leaving outside the "class-conscious" authors of syndicalist speeches. (*Applause.*) This has been done in Moscow. The Moscow Gubernia Conference last November ended up in two rooms: some met in one, others, in another. That was the eve of a split. The last Moscow Conference said, "We will take from the Workers'

Opposition those we want, and not those they want", because we need the assistance of men who are connected with the masses of workers and who can teach us how to combat the evils of bureaucracy in practice. This is a difficult task. I think the Party Congress should take note of the Muscovites' experience and stage a test, not only on this point, but on all the points of the agenda. As a result, the people who declare that they "will make no concessions" must be told: "But the Party will." We must all pull together. By means of this policy we shall sift the sound elements from the unsound in the Workers' Opposition, and the Party will be strengthened.

Just think: it was said here that production should be run by an "All-Russia Congress of Producers". I find myself groping for words to describe this nonsense, but am reassured by the fact that all the Party workers present here are also Soviet functionaries who have been doing their work for the revolution for one, two or three years. It is not worth criticising that sort of thing in their presence. When they hear such tedious speeches they close the discussion, because it is frivolous to speak of an "All-Russia Congress of Producers" running the national economy. A proposal of that kind could be made in a country where the political power has been taken but no start has been made on the work. We have made a start. And it is a curious fact that on page 33 of this pamphlet we find the following:

> "The Workers' Opposition is not so ignorant as to disregard the great role of technique and of technically trained forces.... It has no intention to set up its organs of administration of the national economy elected by the Producers' Congress and then to dissolve the economic councils, chief administrations and central boards. No, the idea is quite different: it is to subordinate these necessary, technically valuable centres of administration to its guidance, assign theoretical tasks to them and use them in the same way as the factory owners once used the services of technical experts."

In other words, Comrade Kollontai and Comrade Shlyapnikov, and their "class-welded" followers, are to subordinate to their necessary guidance the economic councils, chief administrations and central boards—all the Rykovs, Nogins and other "nonentities"—and assign to them theoretical tasks! Comrades, are we to take that seriously? If

you have had any "theoretical tasks", why had you not assigned them before? Why did we proclaim freedom of discussion? It was not merely to engage in verbal exchanges. During the war we used to say: "This is not the time for criticism: Wrangel is out there. We correct our mistakes by beating Wrangel." After the war, we hear shouts of "We want freedom of discussion!" When we ask, "Tell us our mistakes!", we are told, "The economic councils and chief administrations must not be dissolved; they must be assigned theoretical tasks." Comrade Kiselyov, as a representative of the "class-welded" Workers' Opposition, was left in an insignificant minority at the Miners' Congress, but, when he was head of the Chief Administration of the Textile Industry, why did he not teach us how to combat the evils of bureaucracy? Why did not Comrade Shlyapnikov, when he was a People's Commissar, and Comrade Kollontai, when she too was a People's Commissar, why did they not teach us how to combat the evils of bureaucracy? We know that we have a touch of bureaucracy, and we, who have to deal with this bureaucratic machine at first hand, suffer as a result. You sign a paper—but how is it applied in practice? How do you check up on it, when the bureaucratic machine is so enormous? If you know how to make it smaller, dear comrades, please share your knowledge with us! You have a desire to argue, but you give us nothing apart from general statements. Instead, you indulge in demagogy pure and simple. For it is sheer demagogy to say: "The specialists are ill-treating the workers; the workers are leading a life of penal servitude in a toilers' republic."

Comrades, I entreat you all to read this pamphlet. You could not find a better argument against the Workers' Opposition than Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet, *The Workers' Opposition*. You will see that this is really no way to approach the question. We all admit that bureaucratic practices are a vexed question, and as much is stated in our Party Programme. It is very easy to criticise the chief administrations and economic councils, but your kind of criticism leads the masses of non-Party workers to think they should be dissolved. The Socialist-Revolutionaries seize upon this. Some Ukrainian comrades have told me

that Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, at their conference,[63] formulated their proposals in exactly the same way. And what about the Kronstadt resolutions[64]? You have not all read them? We will show them to you: they say the same thing. I emphasised the danger of Kronstadt because it lies precisely in the fact that the change demanded was apparently very slight: "The Bolsheviks must go ... we will correct the regime a little." That is what the Kronstadt rebels are demanding. But what actually happened was that Savinkov arrived in Revel, the Paris newspapers reported the events a fortnight before they actually occurred, and a whiteguard general appeared on the scene. That is what actually happened. All revolutions have gone that way. That is why we are saying: Since we are faced with that sort of thing, we must unite, and, as I said in my first speech, counter it with rifles, no matter how innocent it may appear to be. To this the Workers' Opposition does not reply, but says: "We shall not dissolve the economic councils but 'subordinate them to our guidance'." The "All-Russia Congress of .Producers" is to subordinate to its guidance the Economic Council's 71 chief administrations. I ask you: is that a joke? Can we take them seriously? This is the petty-bourgeois, anarchist element not only among the masses of the workers, but also in our own Party; and that is something we cannot tolerate in any circumstances. We have allowed ourselves a luxury: we gave these people the opportunity to express their opinions in the greatest possible detail and have heard their side of it several times. When I had occasion to debate with Comrades Trotsky and Kiselyov at the Second Miners' Congress, two points of view were definitely revealed. The Workers' Opposition said: "Lenin and Trotsky will unite." Trotsky came out and said: "Those who fail to understand that it is necessary to unite are against the Party; of course we will unite, because we are men of the Party." I supported him. Of course, Comrade Trotsky and I differed; and when more or less equal groups appear within the Central Committee, the Party will pass judgement, and in a way that will make us unite in accordance with the Party's will and instructions. Those are the statements Comrade Trotsky and I made at the Miners' Congress, and repeat here; but the Workers'

Opposition says: "We will make no concessions, but we will remain in the Party." No, that trick won't work! (*Applause.*) I repeat that in combating the evils of bureaucracy we welcome the assistance of every worker, whatever he may call himself, if he is sincere in his desire to help. This help is highly desirable if sincere. In this sense we will make "concessions" (I take the word in quotation marks). No matter how provocative the statements against us, we shall make "concessions" because we know how hard the going is. We cannot dissolve the economic councils and chief administrations. It is absolutely untrue to say that we have no confidence in the working class and that we are keeping the workers out of the governing bodies. We are on the look-out for every worker who is at all fit for managerial work; we are glad to have him and give him a trial. If the Party has no confidence in the working class and does not allow workers to occupy responsible posts, it ought to be ousted! Go on, be logical and say it! I have said that that is not true: we are on our last legs for want of men and we are prepared to take any assistance, with both hands, from any efficient man, especially if he is a worker. But we have no men of this type, and this creates the ground for anarchy. We must keep up the fight against the evils of bureaucracy —and it demands hundreds of thousands of men.

Our Programme formulates the task of combating the evils of bureaucracy as one of extremely long duration. The wider the dispersal of the peasantry, the more inevitable are bureaucratic practices at the centre.

It is easy to write things like this: "There is something rotten in our Party." You know what weakening the Soviet apparatus means when there are two million Russian émigrés abroad. They were driven out by the Civil War. They have gratified us by holding their meetings in Berlin, Paris, London, and all the other capitals but ours. They support this element that is called the small producer, the petty-bourgeois element.

We shall do everything that can be done to eliminate bureaucratic practices by promoting workers from below, and we shall accept every piece of practical advice on this matter. Even if we give this the inappropriate name of "concessions", as some here have done, there is no doubt

that, despite this pamphlet, 99 per cent of the Congress will say, "In spite of this we will make 'concessions' and win over all that is sound." Take your place by the side of the workers and teach us how to combat the evils of bureaucracy, if you know how to do it better than we do; but don't talk as Shlyapnikov has done. That is not the sort of thing that one can brush aside. I shall not deal with the theoretical part of his speech because Kollontai said the same thing. I shall deal with the facts he quoted. He said that potatoes were rotting, and asked why Tsyurupa was not being prosecuted.

But I ask: Why is Shlyapnikov not prosecuted for making such statements? Are we seriously discussing discipline and unity in an organised Party, or are we at a meeting of the Kronstadt type? For his is a Kronstadt, anarchist type of statement, to which the response is a gun. We organised members of the Party, have come here to rectify our mistakes. If Shlyapnikov thinks that Tsyurupa ought to be prosecuted, why had he not, as an organised member of the Party, lodged a complaint with the Control Commission? When we were setting up the Control Commission, we said: The Central Committee is swamped with administrative work. Let us elect people who enjoy the confidence of the workers, who will not have so much administrative work and will be able to examine complaints on behalf of the Central Committee. This created a means of developing criticism and rectifying mistakes. If Tsyurupa was so wrong why was not a complaint lodged with the Control Commission? Instead, Shlyapnikov comes to the Congress, the most responsible assembly of the Party and the Republic, and starts hurling accusations about rotting potatoes, and asking why Tsyurupa is not being prosecuted. But I ask, doesn't the Defence Department make any mistakes? Are not battles lost and waggons and supplies abandoned? Shall we then prosecute the military workers? Comrade Shlyapnikov comes here and hurls accusations which he himself does not believe, and which he cannot prove. Potatoes are rotting. Of course, many mistakes will be made, for our machinery wants adjustment, and our transport is not running smoothly. But when instead of a rectification of our mistakes such accusations are hurled at random, and when,

in addition—as several comrades here have noted—there is an undertone of malice in this question of why Tsyurupa is not being prosecuted, then I say: Why not prosecute us, the Central Committee? We think that such talk is demagogy. Either proceedings should be started against Tsyurupa and us, or against Shlyapnikov; but no work can be done in such a spirit. When Party comrades talk as Shlyapnikov has done here—and he always talks like that at other meetings—and Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet says the same thing, although she mentions no names, we say: We cannot go on like this, for it is the kind of demagogy that the Makhno anarchists and the Kronstadt elements jump at. We are both members of the Party, and both of us are standing before this most responsible tribunal. If Tsyurupa has committed an unlawful act and we, the Central Committee, have condoned it, then why not come out with a definite charge, instead of throwing about words that will be caught up here, in Moscow, tomorrow, and immediately carried by the grapevine telegraph to the bourgeoisie. Tomorrow all the gossips in the Soviet offices will be rubbing their hands in glee and repeating your words with delight. If Tsyurupa is the kind of man Shlyapnikov accuses him of being, and if, as he demands, he ought to be prosecuted, then I say that we must seriously ponder over his words; such accusations are not lightly made. Those who make accusations of this sort should be either removed from the Party or told: We are putting you on this potato job; you go to such and such a gubernia and let's see whether you have less rotting potatoes than in the gubernias under Tsyurupa's charge.

4

PRELIMINARY DRAFT RESOLUTION ON IMPROVING THE CONDITION OF WORKERS AND NEEDY PEASANTS

The exhaustion caused by the privation and the calamities and havoc of the seven-year war, and the overstrain due to the virtually superhuman exertions on the part of the working class of Russia over the past three and a half years, have now been so aggravated that they demand urgent measures on the part of the Soviet power.

The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. accordingly demands that the whole Party and all Party and Soviet establishments should redouble their attention to this question and immediately work out measures to improve the condition of the workers and ease their hardships at all costs.

The Congress approves of the decision taken by the Central Committee and the Soviet Government to release a part of the gold reserve for the purchase of consumer goods for the workers, and demands an extension of this measure and an immediate amendment, with that end in view, of our import plan.

The Congress authorises the Central Committee to set up a special Central Commission to implement urgent measures to improve the condition of the workers, which should be organised in such a way as to work in close contact with, on the one hand, the Central Committee of the R.C.P. and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, and, on the other, with the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, for the swiftest implementation of the measures to be adopted, and to allow the workers themselves to exercise control over the implementation of these measures. The Commission must set up subcommissions in the Commissariats which are in the best position right away to assign a part of their machinery and

resources to help improve the condition of the workers (People's Commissariats for Foreign Trade, Food, Defence, and Health, the Government Buildings Committee, etc.). Sub-commissions are especially needed in the gubernias where industrial workers are chiefly concentrated. The Congress entrusts the Central Committee and Party workers of the Commissariats concerned to work out an ordinance governing the operation of these commissions without delay.

In view of the acute hardships inflicted on the peasantry by the crop failure—in very many cases aggravated by the demobilisation of the army—the Tenth Congress authorises the Central Committee to take, through the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, measures similar to those outlined above to improve the condition of needy peasants, without confining itself to the commission earlier set up for that purpose by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

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5
SPEECH ON THE TRADE UNIONS
MARCH 14

Comrades, Comrade Trotsky was particularly polite in his polemics with me today and reproached me for being, or said that I was, extremely cautious. I thank him for the compliment, but regret that I cannot return it. On the contrary, I must speak of my incautious friend, so as to express my attitude to the mistake which has caused me to waste so much time, and which is now making us continue the debate on the trade union question, instead of dealing with more urgent matters. Comrade Trotsky had his final say in the discussion on the trade union question in *Pravda* of January 29, 1921. In his article, "There Are Disagreements, But Why Confuse Things?", he accused me of being responsible for this confusion by asking who started it all. The accusation recoils on Trotsky, for he is trying to shift the blame. The whole of his article was based on the claim that he had raised the question of the role of the trade unions in production, and that this is the subject that ought to have been discussed. This is not true; it is not this that has caused the disagreements, and made them painful. And however tedious it may be after the discussion to have to repeat it again and again—true, I took part in it for only one month—I must restate that that was not the starting-point; it started with the "shake-up" slogan that was proclaimed at the Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions on November 2-6.[65] Already at that time it was realised by everyone who had not overlooked Rudzutak's resolution—and among those were the members of the Central Committee, including myself—that no disagreements could be found on the role of the trade unions in production. But the three

month discussion revealed them. They existed, and they were a political mistake. During a discussion at the Bolshoi Theatre, Comrade Trotsky accused me before responsible Party workers of disrupting the discussion.[66] I take that as a compliment: I did try to disrupt the discussion in the form it was being conducted, because with a severe spring ahead of us such pronouncements were harmful. Only the blind could have failed to see that.

Comrade Trotsky now laughs at my asking who started it all, and is surprised that I should reproach him for refusing to serve on the commission. I did it because this is very important, Comrade Trotsky, very important, indeed; your refusal to serve on the trade union commission was a violation of Central Committee discipline. And when Trotsky talks about it, the result is not a controversy, but a shake-up of the Party, and a generation of bitter feeling; it leads to extremes—Comrade Trotsky used the expression "diabolical rage". I recall an expression used by Comrade Holtzmann—I will not quote it because the word "diabolical" calls to mind something fiendish, whereas Holtzmann reminds one of something angelic. There is nothing "diabolical" about it, but we must not forget that both sides go to extremes, and, what is much more monstrous, some of the nicest comrades have gone to extremes. But when Comrade Trotsky's authority was added to this, and when in a public speech on December 25 he said that the Congress must choose between two trends, such words are unpardonable! They constitute the political mistake over which we are fighting. And it is naïve for people to try to be witty about two-room conferences. I should like to see the wag who says that Congress delegates are forbidden to confer to prevent their votes from being split. That would be too much of an exaggeration. It was Comrade Trotsky and Tsektran's political mistake to raise the "shake-up" question and to do it in an entirely wrong way. That was a political mistake, and it is yet to be rectified. As regards transport, we have a resolution.[67]

What we are discussing is the trade union movement, and the relationship between the vanguard of the working class and the proletariat. There is nothing discreditable in our dismissing anybody from a high post. This casts no reflec-

tion upon anybody. If you have made a mistake the Congress will recognise it as such and will restore mutual relations and mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the workers' mass. That is the meaning of the "Platform of Ten".[68] It is of no importance that there are things in it that can be substituted, and that this is emphasised by Trotsky and enlarged upon by Ryazanov. Someone said in a speech that there is no evidence of Lenin's having taken a hand in the platform or of his having taken any part in drafting it. I say to this: If I had a hand, by writing or phoning, in everything I sign, I would have gone mad long ago. I say that in order to establish mutual relations and mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the workers' mass, it was necessary, if Tsektran had made a mistake—and anyone can make a mistake—to rectify it. But it is a source of political danger to defend the mistake. We would have been faced with political bankruptcy if we had not done everything we could to turn the attitudes expressed here by Kutuzov to the service of democracy. Persuasion must come before coercion. We must make every effort to persuade people before applying coercion. We were not able to carry conviction to the broad masses, and disturbed the correct relationship between them and the vanguard.

When people like Kutuzov devote part of a business-like speech to pointing out the scandalous bureaucratic practices in our machinery we say: That is true, our state is one with bureaucratic distortions. And we invite the non-Party workers to join us in righting them. I must say here that we should enlist comrades like Kutuzov for this work and promote them. That is the lesson of our experience.

As for the syndicalist deviation—it is ridiculous. That is all we have to say to Shlyapnikov, who maintained that the "All-Russia Congress of Producers", a demand set down in black and white in their platform and confirmed by Kollontai, can be upheld by a reference to Engels. Engels speaks of a communist society which will have no classes, and will consist only of producers.[69] Do we now have classes? Yes, we do. Do we have a class struggle? Yes, and a most furious one! To come in the midst of this furious class struggle and talk about an "All-Russia Congress of Producers"—

isn't that a syndicalist deviation which must be emphatically and irrevocably condemned? We saw that in this platform hurly-burly even Bukharin was tripped up by the one-third nomination proposal. Comrades, in the history of the Party we must not forget such waverings.

And now, since the Workers' Opposition has defended democracy, and has made some sound demands, we shall do our utmost to mend our fences with it; and the Congress as such should make a definite selection. You say that we are not doing enough to combat the evils of bureaucracy—come and help us, come closer and help us in the fight; but it is not a Marxist, not a communist notion to propose an "All-Russia Congress of Producers". The Workers' Opposition, with Ryazanov's help, is putting a false construction on our Programme which says: "The trade unions *should eventually* arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity."[70] Exaggerating, as he always does, Shlyapnikov thinks that it will take us twenty-five centuries.... The Programme says: the trade unions "should eventually arrive", and when a Congress says that this has been done, the demand will have been carried out.

Comrades, if the Congress now declares before the proletariat of the whole of Russia and of the whole world that it regards the proposals of the Workers' Opposition as a syndicalist semi-deviation, I am sure that all the truly proletarian and sound elements in the opposition will follow us and help us to regain the confidence of the masses, which has been shaken by Tsektran's slight mistake. I am sure that we shall strengthen and rally our ranks in a common effort and march forward together to the hard struggle that lies ahead. And marching forward unanimously, with firmness and resolution, we shall win out. (*Applause*.)

6

REPORT ON THE SUBSTITUTION OF A TAX IN KIND FOR THE SURPLUS GRAIN APPROPRIATION SYSTEM MARCH 15

Comrades, the question of substituting a tax for surplus-grain appropriation is primarily and mainly a political question, for it is essentially a question of the attitude of the working class to the peasantry. We are raising it because we must subject the relations of these two main classes, whose struggle or agreement determines the fate of our revolution as a whole, to a new or, I should perhaps say, a more careful and correct re-examination and some revision. There is no need for me to dwell in detail on the reasons for it. You all know very well of course what totality of causes, especially those due to the extreme want arising out of the war, ruin, demobilisation, and the disastrous crop failure—you know about the totality of circumstances that has made the condition of the peasantry especially precarious and critical and was bound to increase its swing from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie.

A word or two on the theoretical significance of, or the theoretical approach to, this issue. There is no doubt that in a country where the overwhelming majority of the population consists of small agricultural producers, a socialist revolution can be carried out only through the implementation of a whole series of special transitional measures which would be superfluous in highly developed capitalist countries where wage-workers in industry and agriculture make up the vast majority. Highly developed capitalist countries have a class of agricultural wage-workers that has taken shape over many decades. Only such a class can socially, economically, and politically support a direct transition to socialism. Only in countries where this class

is sufficiently developed is it possible to pass directly from capitalism to socialism, without any special country-wide transitional measures. We have stressed in a good many written works, in all our public utterances, and all our statements in the press, that this is not the case in Russia, for here industrial workers are a minority and petty farmers are the vast majority. In such a country, the socialist revolution can triumph only on two conditions. First, if it is given timely support by a socialist revolution in one or several advanced countries. As you know, we have done very much indeed in comparison with the past to bring about this condition, but far from enough to make it a reality.

The second condition is agreement between the proletariat, which is exercising its dictatorship, that is, holds state power, and the majority of the peasant population. Agreement is a very broad concept which includes a whole series of measures and transitions. I must say at this point that our propaganda and agitation must be open and above-board. We must condemn most resolutely those who regard politics as a series of cheap little tricks, frequently bordering on deception. Their mistakes have to be corrected. You can't fool a class. We have done very much in the past three years to raise the political consciousness of the masses. They have been learning most from the sharp struggles. In keeping with our world outlook, the revolutionary experience we have accumulated over the decades, and the lessons of our revolution, we must state the issues plainly—the interests of these two classes differ, the small farmer does not want the same thing as the worker.

We know that so long as there is no revolution in other countries, only agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia. And that is how it must be I stated, frankly, at all meetings and in the entire press. We know that this agreement between the working class and the peasantry is not solid—to put it mildly, without entering the word "mildly" in the minutes—but, speaking plainly, it is very much worse. Under no circumstances must we try to hide anything; we must plainly state that the peasantry is dissatisfied with the form of our relations, that it does not want relations of this type and will not continue to

live as it has hitherto. This is unquestionable. The peasantry has expressed its will in this respect definitely enough. It is the will of the vast masses of the working population. We must reckon with this, and we are sober enough politicians to say frankly: let us re-examine our policy in regard to the peasantry. The state of affairs that has prevailed so far cannot be continued any longer.

We must say to the peasants: "If you want to turn back, if you want to restore private property and unrestricted trade in their entirety, it will certainly and inevitably mean falling under the rule of the landowners and the capitalists. This has been proved by a number of examples from history and examples of revolutions. The briefest examination of the ABC of communism and political economy will prove that this is inevitable. Let us then look into the matter. Is it or is it not in the interest of the peasantry to part ways with the proletariat only to slip back—and let the country slip back—to the rule of the capitalists and landowners? Consider this, and let us consider it together."

We believe that if the matter is given proper consideration, the conclusion will be in our favour, in spite of the admittedly deep gulf between the economic interests of the proletariat and the small farmer.

Difficult as our position is in regard to resources, the needs of the middle peasantry must be satisfied. There are far more middle peasants now than before, the antagonisms have been smoothed out, the land has been distributed for use far more equally, the kulak's position has been undermined and he has been in considerable measure expropriated —in Russia more than in the Ukraine, and less in Siberia. On the whole, however, statistics show quite definitely that there has been a levelling out, an equalisation, in the village, that is, the old sharp division into kulaks and cropless peasants has disappeared. Everything has become more equable, the peasantry in general has acquired the status of the middle peasant.

Can we satisfy this middle peasantry as such, with its economic peculiarities and economic roots? Any Communist who thought the economic basis, the economic roots, of small farming could be reshaped in three years was, of course, a dreamer. We need not conceal the fact that there

were a good many such dreamers among us. Nor is there anything particularly bad in this. How could one start a socialist revolution in a country like ours without dreamers? Practice has, of course, shown the tremendous role all kinds of experiments and undertakings can play in the sphere of collective agriculture. But it has also afforded instances of these experiments as such playing a negative role, when people, with the best of intentions and desires, went to the countryside to set up communes but did not know how to run them because they had no experience in collective endeavour. The experience of these collective farms merely provided examples of how not to run farms: the peasants around either laughed or jeered.

You know perfectly well how many cases there have been of this kind. I repeat that this is not surprising, for it will take generations to remould the small farmer, and recast his mentality and habits. The only way to solve this problem of the small farmer—to improve, so to speak, his mentality—is through the material basis, technical equipment, the extensive use of tractors and other farm machinery and electrification on a mass scale. This would remake the small farmer fundamentally and with tremendous speed. If I say this will take generations, it does not mean centuries. But you know perfectly well that to obtain tractors and other machinery and to electrify this vast country is a matter that may take decades in any case. Such is the objective situation.

We must try to satisfy the demands of the peasants who are dissatisfied and disgruntled, and legitimately so, and who cannot be otherwise. We must say to them: "Yes, this cannot go on any longer." How is the peasant to be satisfied and what does satisfying him mean? Where is the answer? Naturally it lies in the demands of the peasantry. We know these demands. But we must verify them and examine all that we know of the farmer's economic demands from the standpoint of economic science. If we go into this, we shall see at once that it will take essentially two things to satisfy the small farmer. The first is a certain freedom of exchange, freedom for the small private proprietor, and the second is the need to obtain commodities and products. What indeed would free exchange amount to if there was nothing to exchange, and freedom of trade, if there was

nothing to trade with! It would all remain on paper, and classes cannot be satisfied with scraps of paper, they want the goods. These two conditions must be clearly understood. The second—how to get commodities and whether we shall be able to obtain them—we shall discuss later. It is the first condition—free exchange—that we must deal with now.

What is free exchange? It is unrestricted trade, and that means turning back towards capitalism. Free exchange and freedom of trade mean circulation of commodities between petty proprietors. All of us who have studied at least the elements of Marxism know that this exchange and freedom of trade inevitably lead to a division of commodity producers into owners of capital and owners of labour-power, a division into capitalists and wage-workers, i.e., a revival of capitalist wage-slavery, which does not fall from the sky but springs the world over precisely from the agricultural commodity economy. This we know perfectly well in theory, and anyone in Russia who has observed the small farmer's life and the conditions under which he farms must have seen this.

How then can the Communist Party recognise freedom to trade and accept it? Does not the proposition contain irreconcilable contradictions? The answer is that the practical solution of the problem naturally presents exceedingly great difficulties. I can foresee, and I know from the talks I have had with some comrades, that the preliminary draft on replacing surplus-grain appropriation by a tax—it has been handed out to you—gives rise to legitimate and inevitable questions, mostly as regards permitting exchange of goods within the framework of local economic turnover. This is set forth at the end of Point 8. What does it mean, what limits are there to this exchange, how is it all to be implemented? Anyone who expects to get the answer at this Congress will be disappointed. We shall find the answer in our legislation; it is our task to lay down the principle to be followed and provide the slogan. Our Party is the government party and the decision the Party Congress passes will be obligatory for the entire Republic: it is now up to us to decide the question in principle. We must do this and inform the peasantry of our decision, for the sowing

season is almost at hand. Further we must muster our whole administrative apparatus, all our theoretical forces and all our practical experience, in order to see how it can be done. Can it be done at all, theoretically speaking: can freedom of trade, freedom of capitalist enterprise for the small farmer, be restored to a certain extent without undermining the political power of the proletariat? Can it be done? Yes, it can, for everything hinges on the extent. If we were able to obtain even a small quantity of goods and hold them in the hands of the state—the proletariat exercising political power—and if we could release these goods into circulation, we, as the state, would add economic power to our political power. Release of these goods into circulation would stimulate small farming, which is in a terrible state and cannot develop owing to the grievous war conditions and the economic chaos. The small farmer, so long as he remains small, needs a spur, an incentive that accords with his economic basis, i.e., the individual small farm. Here you cannot avoid local free exchange. If this turnover gives the state, in exchange for manufactured goods, a certain minimum amount of grain to cover urban and industrial requirements, economic circulation will be revived, with state power remaining in the hands of the proletariat and growing stronger. The peasants want to be shown in practice that the worker who controls the mills and factories—industry—is capable of organising exchange with the peasantry. And, on the other hand, the vastness of our agricultural country with its poor transport system, boundless expanses, varying climate, diverse farming conditions, etc., makes a certain freedom of exchange between local agriculture and local industry, on a local scale, inevitable. In this respect, we are very much to blame for having gone too far; we overdid the nationalisation of industry and trade, clamping down on local exchange of commodities. Was that a mistake? It certainly was.

In this respect we have made many patent mistakes, and it would be a great crime not to see it, and not to realise that we have failed to keep within bounds, and have not known where to stop. There has, of course, also been the factor of necessity—until now we have been living in the conditions of a savage war that imposed an unprecedented

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burden on us and left us no choice but to take war-time measures in the economic sphere as well. It was a miracle that the ruined country withstood this war, yet the miracle did not come from heaven, but grew out of the economic interests of the working class and the peasantry, whose mass enthusiasm created the miracle that defeated the landowners and capitalists. But at the same time it is an unquestionable fact that we went further than was theoretically and politically necessary, and this should not be concealed in our agitation and propaganda. We can allow free local exchange to an appreciable extent, without destroying, but actually strengthening the political power of the proletariat. How this is to be done, practice will show. I only wish to prove to you that theoretically it is conceivable. The proletariat, wielding state power, can, if it has any reserves at all, put them into circulation and thereby satisfy the middle peasant to a certain extent—on the basis of local economic exchange.

Now a few words about local economic exchange. First of all, the co-operatives. They are now in an extreme state of decline, but we naturally need them as a vehicle of local economic exchange. Our Programme stresses that the co-operatives left over from capitalism are the best distribution network and must be preserved. That is what the Programme says. Have we lived up to this? To a very slight extent, if at all, again partly because we have made mistakes, partly because of the war-time necessity. The co-operatives brought to the fore the more business-like, economically more advanced elements, thereby bringing out the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the political sphere. This is a law of chemistry—you can't do anything about it! (*Laughter.*) The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are people who either consciously or unconsciously work to restore capitalism and help the Yudeniches. This too is a law. We must fight them. And if there is to be a fight, it must be done the military way; we had to defend ourselves, and we did. But do we have to perpetuate the present situation? No, we do not. It would be a mistake to tie our hands in this way. Because of this I submit a resolution on the question of the co-operatives; it is very brief and I shall read it to you:

"Whereas the resolution of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. on the co-operatives is based entirely on the principle of surplus-grain appropriation, which is now superseded by a tax in kind, the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. resolves:

"That the said resolution be rescinded.

"The Congress instructs the Central Committee to draw up and carry out through Party and Soviet channels decisions to improve and develop the structure and activity of the co-operatives in conformity with the Programme of the R.C.P. and with a view to substituting the tax in kind for the surplus-grain appropriation system."[71]

You will say that this is rather vague. Yes, it is, and should necessarily be so to some extent. Why necessarily? Because if we are to be absolutely definite, we must know exactly what we are going to do over the year ahead. Who knows that? No one.

But the resolution of the Ninth Congress ties our hands by calling for "subordination to the Commissariat for Food". This is a fine institution, but it would be an obvious political mistake to subordinate the co-operatives to it and to no other, and to tie our hands at a time when we are reviewing our attitude to the small farmers. We must instruct the newly elected Central Committee to elaborate and carry out definite measures and changes, and to check up on every step we take forward or back—to what extent we must act, how to uphold our political interests, how much relaxation there must be to make things easier, how to check up on the results of our experience. Theoretically speaking, in this respect we are facing a number of transitional stages, or transitional measures. One thing is clear: the resolution of the Ninth Congress assumed that we would be advancing in a straight line, but it turned out, as has happened again and again throughout the history of revolutions, that the movement took a zigzag course. To tie one's hands with such a resolution would be a political mistake. Annulling it, we say that we must be guided by our Programme, which stresses the importance of the co-operative machinery.

As we annul the resolution, we say: work with a view to replacing surplus-grain appropriation by a tax. But when are we to do this? Not before the harvest, that is, in a few months' time. Will it be done the same way

everywhere? In no circumstances. It would be the height of stupidity to apply the same pattern to central Russia, the Ukraine, and Siberia. I propose that this fundamental idea of unrestricted local exchange be formulated as a decision of this Congress.[72] I presume that following this decision the Central Committee will without fail send out a letter within the next few days and will point out—doing it better than I can do here (we shall find the best writers to polish up the style)—that there are to be no radical changes, no undue haste, or snap decisions, and that things should be done so as to give maximum satisfaction to the middle peasantry, without damaging the interests of the proletariat. Try one thing and another, study things in practice, through experience, then share your experience with us, and let us know what you have managed to do, and we shall set up a special commission or even several commissions to consider the experience that has been accumulated. I think we should issue a special invitation to Comrade Preobrazhensky, the author of *Paper Money in the Epoch of the Proletarian Dictatorship*. This is a highly important question, for money circulation is a splendid test of the state of commodity circulation in the country; when it is unsatisfactory, money is not worth the paper it is printed on. In order to proceed on the basis of experience, we must check and recheck the measures we have adopted.

We shall be asked where the goods are to come from, for unrestricted trade requires goods, and the peasants are shrewd people and very good at scoffing. Can we obtain any goods now? Today we can, for our international economic position has greatly improved. We are waging a fight against the international capitalists, who, when they were first confronted by this Republic, called us "brigands and crocodiles" (I was told by an English artiste[73] that she had heard these very words spoken by one of the most influential politicians). Crocodiles are despicable. That was the verdict of international capital. It was the verdict of a class enemy and quite correct from his point of view. However, the correctness of such conclusions has to be verified in practice. If you are world capital —a world power—and you use words like "crocodile" and have all the technical means at your disposal; why not try

and shoot it! Capital did shoot—and got the worst of it. It was then that the capitalists, who are forced to reckon with political and economic realities, declared: "We must trade." This is one of our greatest victories. Let me tell you that we now have two offers of a loan to the amount of nearly one hundred million gold rubles. We have gold, but you can't sell gold, because you can't eat it. Everybody has been reduced to a state of impoverishment, currency relations between all the capitalist countries are incredibly chaotic as a result of the war. Moreover, you need a merchant marine to communicate with Europe, and we have none. It is in hostile hands. We have concluded no treaty with France; she considers that we are her debtors and, consequently, that every ship we have is hers. They have a navy and we have none. In these circumstances we have so far been in a position to make use of our gold on a limited and ridiculously insignificant scale. Now we have two offers from capitalist bankers to float a loan of one hundred million. Of course, they will charge us an exorbitant rate of interest. Still it is their first offer of this kind; so far they have said: "I'll shoot you and take everything for nothing." Now, being unable to shoot us, they are ready to trade with us. Trade agreements with America and Britain can now be said to be almost in the bag; the same applies to concessions. Yesterday I received another letter from Mr. Vanderlip, who is here and who, besides numerous complaints, sets forth a whole series of plans concerning concessions and a loan. He represents the shrewdest type of finance capitalist connected with the Western States of the U.S.A., those that are more hostile to Japan. So it is economically possible for us to obtain goods. How we shall manage to do it is another question, but a certain possibility is there.

I repeat, the type of economic relations which on top looks like a bloc with foreign capitalism makes it possible for the proletarian state power to arrange for free exchange with the peasantry below. I know—and I have had occasion to say this before—that this has evoked some sneers. There is a whole intellectual-bureaucratic stratum in Moscow, which is trying to shape "public opinion". "See what communism has come to!" these people sneer. "It's like a man

on crutches and face all bandaged up—nothing but a picture puzzle." I have heard enough of gibes of this kind—they are either bureaucratic or just irresponsible. Russia emerged from the war in a state that can most of all be likened to that of a man beaten to within an inch of his life; the beating had gone on for seven years, and it's a mercy she can hobble about on crutches! That is the situation we are in! To think that we can get out of this state without crutches is to understand nothing! So long as there is no revolution in other countries, it would take us decades to extricate ourselves, and in these circumstances we cannot grudge hundreds of millions' or even thousands of millions' worth of our immense wealth, our rich raw material sources, in order to obtain help from the major capitalists. Later we shall recover it all and to spare. The rule of the proletariat cannot be maintained in a country laid waste as no country has ever been before—a country where the vast majority are peasants who are equally ruined—without the help of capital, for which, of course, exorbitant interest will be extorted. This we must understand. Hence, the choice is between economic relations of this type and nothing at all. He who puts the question otherwise understands absolutely nothing in practical economics and is side-stepping the issue by resorting to gibes. We must recognise the fact that the masses are utterly worn-out and exhausted. What can you expect after seven years of war in this country, if the more advanced countries still feel the effects of four years of war?!

In this backward country, the workers, who have made unprecedented sacrifices, and the mass of the peasants are in a state of utter exhaustion after seven years of war. This condition borders on complete loss of working capacity. What is needed now is an economic breathing space. We had hoped to use our gold reserve to obtain some means of production. It would be best of all to make our own machines, but even if we bought them, we would thereby build up our industry. To do this, however, you must have a worker and a peasant who can work; yet in most cases they are in no condition for it, they are exhausted, worn-out. They must be assisted, and contrary to our old Programme the gold reserve must be used for consumer goods. That Programme was theoretically correct, but practically unsound.

I shall pass on to you some information I have here from Comrade Lezhava. It shows that several hundred thousand poods of various items of food have already been bought in Lithuania, Finland, and Latvia and are being shipped in with the utmost speed. Today we have learned that a deal has been concluded in London for the purchase of 18,500,000 poods of coal, which we decided to buy in order to revive the industry of Petrograd and the textile industry. If we obtain goods for the peasant, it will, of course, be a violation of the Programme, an irregularity, but we must have a respite, for the people are exhausted to a point where they are not able to work.

I must say a few words about the individual exchange of commodities. When we speak of free exchange, we mean individual exchange of commodities, which in turn means encouraging the kulaks. What are we to do? We must not close our eyes to the fact that the switch from the appropriation of surpluses to the tax will mean more kulaks under the new system. They will appear where they could not appear before. This must not be combated by prohibitive measures but by association under state auspices and by government measures from above. If you can give the peasant machines you will help him grow, and when you provide machines or electric power, tens or hundreds of thousands of small kulaks will be wiped out. Until you can supply all that, you must provide a certain quantity of goods. If you have the goods, you have the power; to preclude, deny or renounce any such possibility means making all exchange unfeasible and not satisfying the middle peasant, who will be impossible to get along with. A greater proportion of peasants in Russia have become middle peasants, and there is no reason to fear exchange on an individual basis. Everyone can give something in exchange to the state: one, his grain surplus; another, his garden produce; a third, his labour. Basically the situation is this: we must satisfy the middle peasantry economically and go over to free exchange; otherwise it will be impossible—economically impossible—in view of the delay in the world revolution, to preserve the rule of the proletariat in Russia. We must clearly realise this and not be afraid to say it. In the draft decision to substitute a tax in kind for the surplus

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appropriation system (the text has been handed out to you) you will find many discrepancies, even contradictions, and that is why we have added these words at the end: "The Congress, approving in substance [this is a rather loose word covering a great deal of ground] the propositions submitted by the Central Committee to substitute a tax in kind for surplus-grain appropriation, instructs the Central Committee of the Party to co-ordinate these propositions with the utmost dispatch." We know that they have not been co-ordinated, for we had no time to do so. We did not go into the details. The ways of levying the tax in practice will be worked out in detail and the tax implemented by a law issued by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. The procedure outlined is this: if you adopt the draft today, it will be given the force of a decision at the very first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, which will not issue a law either, but modified regulations; the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence will later make them into a law, and, what is still more important, issue practical instructions. It is important that people in the localities should understand the significance of this and help us.

Why must we replace surplus appropriation by a tax? Surplus appropriation implied confiscation of all surpluses and establishment of a compulsory state monopoly. We could not do otherwise, for our need was extreme. Theoretically speaking, state monopoly is not necessarily the best system from the standpoint of the interests of socialism. A system of taxation and free exchange can be employed as a transitional measure in a peasant country possessing an industry—if this industry is running—and if there is a certain quantity of goods available.

The exchange is an incentive, a spur to the peasant. The proprietor can and will surely make an effort in his own interest when he knows that all his surplus produce will not be taken away from him and that he will only have to pay a tax, which should whenever possible be fixed in advance. The basic thing is to give the small farmer an incentive and a spur to till the soil. We must adapt our state economy to the economy of the middle peasant,

which we have not managed to remake in three years, and will not be able to remake in another ten.

The state had to face definite responsibilities in the sphere of food. Because of this the appropriation quotas were increased last year. The tax must be smaller. The exact figures have not been defined, nor can they be defined. Popov's booklet, *Grain Production of the Soviet and Federated Republics*, gives the exact data issued by our Central Statistical Board and shows why agricultural production has fallen off.

If there is a crop failure, surpluses cannot be collected because there will be none. They would have to be taken out of the peasants' mouths. If there is a crop, everybody will go moderately hungry and the state will be saved, or it will perish, unless we take from people who do not eat their fill as it is. This is what we must make clear in our propaganda among the peasants. A fair harvest will mean a surplus of up to five hundred million poods. This will cover consumption and yield a certain reserve. The important thing is to give the peasants an economic incentive. The small proprietor must be told: "It is your job as a proprietor to produce, and the state will take a minimum tax." My time is nearly up, I must close; I repeat: we cannot issue a law now. The trouble with our resolution is that it is not sufficiently legislative—laws are not written at Party congresses. Hence we propose that the resolution submitted by the C.C. be adopted as a basis and that the C.C. be instructed to co-ordinate the various propositions contained in it. We shall print the text of the resolution and Party officials in the various localities will try to co-ordinate and correct it. It cannot be co-ordinated from beginning to end; this is an insoluble problem, for life is too varied. To find the transitional measures is a very difficult task. If we are unable to do this quickly and directly, we must not lose heart, for we shall win through in the end. No peasant with the slightest glimmer of political consciousness will fail to understand that we, as the government, represent the working class and all those working people with whom the labouring peasants (and they make up nine-tenths of the total) can agree, that any turn back will mean a return to the old, tsarist government.

The experience of Kronstadt proves this. There they do not want either the whiteguards or our government—and there is no other—and as a result they find themselves in a situation which speaks best of all in our favour and against any new government.

We are now in a position to come to an agreement with the peasants, and this must be done in practice, skilfully, efficiently, and flexibly. We are familiar with the apparatus of the Commissariat for Food and know that it is one of the best we have. We see that it is better than that of the others and we must preserve it. Administrative machinery, however, must be subordinated to politics. The splendid apparatus of the Commissariat for Food will be useless if we cannot establish proper relations with the peasants, for otherwise this splendid apparatus will be serving Denikin and Kolchak, and not our own class. Since resolute change, flexibility and skilful transition have become politically necessary, the leaders must realise it. A strong apparatus must be suitable for any manoeuvre, but struggle is inevitable when its strength makes it unwieldy and hampers change. All efforts must, therefore, be turned to achieving our aim: the complete subordination of the apparatus to politics. Politics are relations between classes, and that will decide the fate of our Republic. The stronger the apparatus, as an auxiliary, the better and more suitable it is for manoeuvring. If it cannot manoeuvre, it is of no use to us.

I ask you to bear in mind this basic fact—it will take several months to work out the details and interpretations. The chief thing to bear in mind at the moment is that we must let the whole world know, by wireless this very night, of our decision; we must announce that this Congress of the government party is, in the main, replacing the surplus appropriation system by a tax and is giving the small farmer certain incentives to expand his farm and plant more; that by embarking on this course the Congress is correcting the system of relations between the proletariat and the peasantry and expresses its conviction that in this way these relations will be made durable. (*Stormy applause.*)

7
SUMMING-UP SPEECH ON THE TAX IN KIND
MARCH 15

Comrades, I think I can confine myself to a few fairly brief remarks. First of all, the question of the Siberian food supply workers. Yaroslavsky and Danishevsky have asked me to make the following statement. Drozhzhin has been put on trial to prove that he is not guilty. I can hear sceptical remarks, but at all events it must be said that this course is correct. We hear a lot of scandal and gossip, and this is the proper way of proving them to be false. Then again, a number of food supply workers in Tyumen have been shot for flogging, torture, rape and other crimes. Consequently, in no circumstances can this be connected with food supply work, but should be regarded as criminal outrages calling for harsher penalties than usual, in view of the conditions in which the food supply work is proceeding. From this aspect, therefore, the measures adopted were correct.

I should now like to start by saying a few words about the question of the co-operatives. Comrade Tsyurupa's report—as we all heard him say here—was not a co-report presenting a point of view opposite to that of the chief rapporteur. The Central Committee's decision to substitute a tax for the surplus-grain appropriation system was adopted with such obvious unanimity—and what is most important, we saw at once, even before the Congress opened, that various comrades in the localities had arrived at the same conclusions independently of this decision, on the basis of their own practical experience—that it is essentially impossible to doubt that as a measure it is proper and necessary. In his report, Comrade Tsyurupa added

a few suggestions and warnings on a number of questions, but he did not propose a different policy.

The only departure from this general line in his report was made on the question of the co-operatives. He opposed my draft resolution, but I'm afraid his arguments do not carry conviction. We can hardly determine just now how relations in local free economic exchange will develop, and how the fund is to be handled—through co-operative societies or the restoration of small private trade. This question must certainly be examined, and in this respect we must make a careful study of local experience; that, of course, is something we all agree upon. I think, however, that the co-operative societies still present certain advantages. In so far as, politically—I have already pointed this out—they serve as centres for the organisation, centralisation and amalgamation of elements politically hostile to us and are in effect pursuing a Kolchak and Denikin policy, the co-operatives are only another form of small economy and small trade. Every emergence of the kulaks and the development of petty-bourgeois relations evidently give rise to corresponding political parties, which had been developing in Russia for decades, and with which we are quite familiar. The choice before us is not whether or not to allow these parties to grow—they are inevitably engendered by petty-bourgeois economic relations. The only choice before us, and a limited one at that, is between the forms of concentration and co-ordination of these parties' activities. It cannot possibly be proved that the co-operatives are worse in this respect. On the contrary, the Communists will have somewhat greater opportunities to exert systematic influence and control over the co-operatives.

The resolution on the co-operatives passed by the Ninth Congress was strongly defended here by Comrade Tsyurupa, and strongly opposed by Comrade Milyutin.

Incidentally, Comrade Tsyurupa said that I had been a witness to the struggle over the question of co-operatives before it was settled by the Congress. I must corroborate this. Indeed, there was a struggle, and the resolution adopted by the Ninth Congress put a stop to it by ensuring greater predominance, or it would be more exact to say complete predominance, for the Food Supply Department.

But it would, undoubtedly, be politically wrong, on these grounds, to forego greater freedom of action and freedom of choice of political measures in respect of the co-operatives. In my capacity of, say, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, I find it much more unpleasant to have to watch this petty strife, and even bickering, at scores of meetings, than to have the backing of a Congress resolution, which is binding on all and which puts a stop to this struggle. But we must not be swayed by such conveniences, but must look to the interests of a definite economic policy. You have all seen here, and the large number of notes—a great pile of notes—that I have received confirm it even more strikingly, that in this concrete question a vast number of difficulties of detail arise in the course of changing our policy. That is the whole point. And there is no doubt whatever that we shall be unable to solve them at one stroke. If we allow the resolution on the co-operatives adopted by the Ninth Congress to remain in force we shall have our hands tied. We shall put ourselves in a position where, being entirely subordinate to the Congress and bound to pursue its policy, we shall be unable to depart from the letter of this resolution. The resolution repeatedly refers to the surplus-grain appropriation system, but we are substituting a tax for it.

We have no idea how much latitude we shall leave to economic exchange.

That we must allow some is beyond doubt, and we must take account of and verify the economic conditions for it. That is why, of course, if we rescind the resolution of the Ninth Congress we shall be back where the question, which seems to have been closed to some extent, becomes an open one again. This is absolutely inevitable. To evade it would mean basically to prejudice the economic policy relations which we have outlined and which are, undoubtedly, more acceptable to the peasants.

There is evidently no difference of opinion at this Congress, or among Communists in general, as to whether the switch from appropriation to a tax is a more acceptable economic policy for the peasants. And we have a number of statements to this effect from non-Party peasants as well. This has been definitely established, and it alone

suggests that we ought to have the change. Let me, therefore, read you the resolution on the co-operatives again:

"Whereas the resolution of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. on the co-operatives is based entirely on the principle of surplus-grain appropriation, which is now superseded by a tax in kind, the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. resolves:

"That the said resolution be rescinded.

"The Congress instructs the Central Committee to draw up and carry out through Party and Soviet channels decisions to improve and develop the structure and activity of the co-operatives in conformity with the Programme of the R.C.P. and with a view to substituting the tax in kind for the surplus-grain appropriation system."

On behalf of the Central Committee, I shall ask the Congress to adopt the first resolution—the preliminary draft on substituting a tax for the surplus-grain appropriation system—to adopt it as a basis and instruct the Central Committee of the Party to co-ordinate the proposals, make the final draft and submit it to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; and also the second resolution on the co-operatives.

I now come to the remarks made here. I must say that the questions I have received in writing are so numerous, there is such a heap of them, that not only am I unable to enumerate the subjects they touch upon, but I am compelled to give up the effort to classify them all in a suitable way for discussion here. I regret to say that I am compelled to abandon this task, but I will keep these notes as material for any future discussion of the subject.

Perhaps it will be possible to utilise them in greater detail in the press, or, at all events, to collect and classify them and then compile a detailed and really full summary for the benefit of the comrades economists, executives and political leaders who will be directly engaged in the task of drafting the law substituting the tax for surplus appropriation. At present, I can only select the two main trends and say a few words about the two main objections or remarks about the two main types or groups of questions raised in these notes.

The first deals with technical questions: these are numerous and detailed references to the difficulties and the

many problems that will arise in carrying out these measures. I pointed out in my report that this was absolutely inevitable and that it is quite impossible at present to determine at once how we shall proceed to solve these difficulties.

The second deals with general principles of economic policy. Many, I should say most, of the speakers, and these written questions, all pointed to the inevitable increase in the strength of the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and capitalism. A number of comrades wrote in their notes: "This is throwing open the door for the development of a bourgeoisie, small industry and capitalist relationships." In answer to this, comrades, I must say, repeating something of what I said in my report: There is no doubt whatever that the transition from capitalism to socialism is conceivable in different forms, depending upon whether big capitalist or small production relationships predominate in the country. And I must say on this score that criticism was expressed of certain conclusions drawn from my speech on the relation between state capitalism and free small-scale exchange; but no one has criticised my propositions, nor were they criticised in any of the notes I have received (I have read most of them, and they run to several dozen). Direct transition to communism would have been possible if ours was a country with a predominantly—or, say, highly developed—large-scale industry, and a high level of large-scale production in agriculture, otherwise the transition to communism is economically impossible. Comrade Milyutin said that we had a harmonious system, and that our laws represented, as he put it, to a certain extent, a harmonious system for such a transition, which, however, did not take account of the necessity of having to make a number of concessions to the petty bourgeoisie. But having said that, Comrade Milyutin drew a different conclusion from mine. The harmonious system that has been created was dictated by war and not by economic requirements, considerations or conditions. There was no other way out in the conditions of the unexampled ruin in which we found ourselves, when after a big war we were obliged to endure a number of civil wars. We must state quite definitely that in pursuing our policy, we may have made mistakes and gone to extremes in a number of cases. But in the war-time

conditions then prevailing, the policy was in the main a correct one. We had no alternative but to resort to wholesale and instant monopoly, including the confiscation of all surplus stocks, even without compensation. That was the only way we could tackle the task. That was not a harmonious economic system; it was not a measure called forth by economic conditions, but one largely dictated to us by war conditions. The main economic consideration now is to increase the quantity of products. Our principal productive forces, the peasants and workers, are in such a state of impoverishment, ruin, weariness and exhaustion that for a time we must subordinate everything to this main consideration—increasing the quantity of products at all costs.

Some ask: What connection is there between the substitution of a tax for the surplus-grain appropriation system and the sowing campaign now in progress? In their notes, the comrades strive to expose a number of contradictions. I think that, in the main, there is economic consistency here, and not contradiction. The sowing campaign is based on a number of measures directed towards taking the utmost possible advantage of all economic opportunities to increase the sown area. For this purpose, we must redistribute the seed, store it properly and transport it. But scanty as our seed stocks are, we are unable to transport them; very often we are compelled to resort to various forms of mutual aid to reduce the area left unsown to a minimum and to eliminate it altogether, in spite of the appalling shortage of implements. That is out of the question in a number of gubernias. If the non-Party peasants, who in very many cases have themselves demanded the switch to the tax—for it gives them an incentive to develop their farms on the present economic basis—are definitely told by the state authorities before the spring campaign that this measure has been decided upon and will be applied—does that run counter to the general policy of the sowing campaign? No, it does not; it is a measure that introduces an element of encouragement. I know that it will be said that this is a very small element of encouragement. But that is not the point. It would, of course, be something much more real, if we could immediately show the peasants dozens of ships on their way from Britain with

goods to be exchanged for the grain they collect in the coming harvest. But it would be ridiculous to attempt to deceive people who have practical knowledge of the state of our commerce. We know that ships loaded with coal and a small quantity of foodstuffs are leaving Britain; we have the information from Comrade Krasin. We know that pending the conclusion of a trade agreement, which has not been signed yet, semi-legal commerce is being carried on with individual merchants whom the bourgeois government cannot, of course, prohibit from trading with us. It is a difficult task to break through the economic blockade, and, of course, we cannot make any great promises. At all events, we are doing all we can, and we are altering the imports plan accordingly.

From the standpoint of the small proprietor, the small farmer, the tax, which is to be smaller than surplus appropriation, will be more definite and will enable him to sow more, and assure him of the opportunity of using his surplus to improve his farm. From his standpoint, it is a policy of rendering the utmost assistance to the industrious farmer, and this is being emphasised in the sowing campaign. In the last analysis, all the objections can be reduced to the following: Who will gain most by this—the petty bourgeoisie, which is economically hostile to communism, or large-scale industry, which is the basis of the transition to socialism and—in the light of the state of the productive forces, that is, the touchstone of social development—is the basis of socialist economic organisation, for it unites the advanced industrial workers, the class which is exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Several speakers tried to prove or draw the economic deduction that the petty bourgeoisie—handicraft commodity production—will undoubtedly gain most; and they urged this particularly on the grounds that as a result of our granting concessions, large-scale industry will cease to be socialist. I think there is fundamental economic error in these arguments. Even if it could be definitely proved that small industry will gain most, relatively, or even, say, absolutely, it would not, either theoretically or practically, disprove the correctness of the steps we are taking. The fact is that there is no other basis for the eco-

nomic consolidation of our work of building socialism. Let us assume—purely for the sake of example and illustration—that small industry has a value of 100 (100 million work units, or 100 units of any other kind, it makes no difference) and large-scale industry, 200. Let us assume that on a capitalist basis small industry increases to 175, while large-scale industry remains at 200. We are assuming stagna ion in large-scale industry and an enormous development of small industry. I think that even this worst assumption that I have made would represent an undoubted gain for us because at present, as this year's experience has shown, as our fuel and transport conditions indicate, and as the food distribution—which Comrade Milyutin very opportunely reminded us of—is showing, we are barely holding on.

Speakers here have asked, and I have received written questions to the same effect: "How will you retain the workers' state, if capitalism develops in the rural areas?" This peril—the development of small production and of the petty bourgeoisie in the rural areas—is an extremely serious one.

I now come to concessions. They signify a bloc with capitalism in the advanced countries. We must be clear in our minds about the nature of concessions. They signify an economic alliance, a bloc, a contract with advanced finance capital in the advanced countries, a contract that will give us a slight increase in products, but will also result in an increase in the products of the concessionaires. If we give the latter ore or timber, they will take the lion's share and leave us a small share. But it is so important for us to increase the quantity of products at our command that even a small share will be an enormous gain for us. Even a slight improvement in the condition of the urban workers, which will be guaranteed in the concessions agreement, and will not present the slightest difficulty to foreign capital, will be a gain and will serve to strengthen our large-scale industry. And this, as a result of its economic influence, will serve to improve the condition of the proletariat, the class which is wielding political power.

There is no ground to fear that small-scale agriculture and small industry will grow to dimensions that may prove

dangerous for our large-scale industry. There must be certain signs for the rise of industry.

If we have a bad harvest (I have already mentioned Popov's pamphlet), and our resources are as scanty as they were last year, an abatement of the crisis and development of small industry are out of the question: capitalist relations can be restored only if agricultural industry yields a surplus. That is possible, and this is very important, for it represents a material gain for us. The question of whether small or large-scale production will gain more will be determined by the extent to which we succeed in co-ordinating and combining the utilisation of our funds and the development of the market, which we shall achieve by means of concessions agreements with capitalism; and this will result in an increase in agricultural production for us. The result will depend upon which side makes the best use of these resources. I think that if the working class, which controls the most important branches of large-scale industry, concentrates on the key ones, it will gain more than small industry, even if the latter does have a relatively faster growth. The situation in our textile industry was such that at the end of 1920 there were obvious signs of an improvement, but there was a shortage of fuel. Otherwise we should have obtained about 800 million arshins* of cloth, and would have had materials of our own manufacture to exchange for farm products.

Owing to the fuel crisis, however, there has been an enormous drop in production. Although we have succeeded in purchasing coal abroad, and ships with this cargo will arrive in a week or two, we have nevertheless lost several weeks or even months.

Every improvement in the state of large-scale production and the possibility of starting some large factories will strengthen the position of the proletariat to such an extent that there will be no need to fear the petty-bourgeois element, even if it is growing. We must not be afraid of the growth of the petty bourgeoisie and small capital. What we must fear is protracted starvation, want and food shortage, which create the danger that the proletariat will

* Arshin is equal to 28 inches.—*Tr.*

be utterly exhausted and will give way to petty-bourgeois vacillation and despair. This is a much more terrible prospect. If output is increased the development of the petty bourgeoisie will not cause great harm, for the increased output will stimulate the development of large-scale industry. Hence, we must encourage small farming. It is our duty to do all we can to encourage small farming. The tax is one of the modest measures to be taken in this direction, but it is a measure that will undoubtedly provide such encouragement, and we certainly ought to adopt it. (*Applause*.)



First page of Lenin's "Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on Party Unity". March 1921

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8

PRELIMINARY DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. ON PARTY UNITY

1. The Congress calls the attention of all members of the Party to the fact that the unity and cohesion of the ranks of the Party, the guarantee of complete mutual confidence among Party members and genuine team-work that really embodies the unanimity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat, are particularly essential at the present time, when a number of circumstances are increasing the vacillation among the petty-bourgeois population of the country.

2. Notwithstanding this, even before the general Party discussion on the trade unions, certain signs of factionalism had been apparent in the Party—the formation of groups with separate platforms, striving to a certain degree to segregate and create their own group discipline. Such symptoms of factionalism were manifested, for example, at a Party conference in Moscow (November 1920) and at a Party conference in Kharkov,[74] by the so-called Workers' Opposition group, and partly by the so-called Democratic Centralism group.

All class-conscious workers must clearly realise that factionalism of any kind is harmful and impermissible, for no matter how members of individual groups may desire to safeguard Party unity, factionalism in practice inevitably leads to the weakening of team-work and to intensified and repeated attempts by the enemies of the governing Party, who have wormed their way into it, to widen the cleavage and to use it for counter-revolutionary purposes.

The way the enemies of the proletariat take advantage of every deviation from a thoroughly consistent commu-

nist line was perhaps most strikingly shown in the case of the Kronstadt mutiny, when the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries and whiteguards in all countries of the world immediately expressed their readiness to accept the slogans of the Soviet system, if only they might thereby secure the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, and when the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries in general resorted in Kronstadt to slogans calling for an insurrection against the Soviet Government of Russia ostensibly in the interest of the Soviet power. These facts fully prove that the whiteguards strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as Communists, and even as the most Left-wing Communists, solely for the purpose of weakening and destroying the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia. Menshevik leaflets distributed in Petrograd on the eve of the Kronstadt mutiny likewise show how the Mensheviks took advantage of the disagreements and certain rudiments of factionalism in the Russian Communist Party actually in order to egg on and support the Kronstadt mutineers, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the whiteguards, while claiming to be opponents of mutiny and supporters of the Soviet power, only with supposedly slight modifications.

3. In this question, propaganda should consist, on the one hand, in a comprehensive explanation of the harmfulness and danger of factionalism from the standpoint of Party unity and of achieving unanimity of will among the vanguard of the proletariat as the fundamental condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and, on the other hand, in an explanation of the peculiar features of the latest tactical devices of the enemies of the Soviet power. These enemies, having realised the hopelessness of counter-revolution under an openly whiteguard flag, are now doing their utmost to utilise the disagreements within the Russian Communist Party and to further the counter-revolution in one way or another by transferring power to a political group which is outwardly closest to recognition of the Soviet power.

Propaganda must also teach the lessons of preceding revolutions, in which the counter-revolution made a point of supporting the opposition to the extreme revolutionary

party which stood closest to the latter, in order to undermine and overthrow the revolutionary dictatorship and thus pave the way for the subsequent complete victory of the counter-revolution, of the capitalists and landowners.

4. In the practical struggle against factionalism, every organisation of the Party must take strict measures to prevent all factional actions. Criticism of the Party's shortcomings, which is absolutely necessary, must be conducted in such a way that every practical proposal shall be submitted immediately, without any delay, in the most precise form possible, for consideration and decision to the leading local and central bodies of the Party. Moreover, every critic must see to it that the form of his criticism takes account of the position of the Party, surrounded as it is by a ring of enemies, and that the content of his criticism is such that, by directly participating in Soviet and Party work, he can test the rectification of the errors of the Party or of individual Party members in practice. Analyses of the Party's general line, estimates of its practical experience, check-ups of the fulfilment of its decisions, studies of methods of rectifying errors, etc., must under no circumstances be submitted for preliminary discussion to groups formed on the basis of "platforms", etc., but must in all cases be submitted for discussion directly to all the members of the Party. For this purpose, the Congress orders a more regular publication of *Diskussionny Listok*[75] and special symposiums to promote unceasing efforts to ensure that criticism shall be concentrated on essentials and shall not assume a form capable of assisting the class enemies of the proletariat.

5. Rejecting in principle the deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism, which is examined in a special resolution,[76] and instructing the Central Committee to secure the complete elimination of all factionalism, the Congress at the same time declares that every practical proposal concerning questions to which the so-called Workers' Opposition group, for example, has devoted special attention, such as purging the Party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, combating bureaucratic practices, developing democracy and workers' initiative, etc., must be examined with the greatest care and tested in practice. The Party

must know that we have not taken all the necessary measures in regard to these questions because of various obstacles, but that, while ruthlessly rejecting impractical and factional pseudo-criticism, the Party will unceasingly continue—trying out new methods—to fight with all the means at its disposal against the evils of bureaucracy, for the extension of democracy and initiative, for detecting, exposing and expelling from the Party elements that have wormed their way into its ranks, etc.

6. The Congress, therefore, hereby declares dissolved and orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception formed on the basis of one platform or another (such as the Workers' Opposition group, the Democratic Centralism group, etc.). Non-observance of this decision of the Congress shall entail unconditional and instant expulsion from the Party.

7. In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity in eliminating all factionalism, the Congress authorises the Central Committee, in cases of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee, reduction to the status of alternate members and, as an extreme measure, expulsion from the Party. A necessary condition for the application of such an extreme measure to members of the Central Committee, alternate members of the Central Committee and members of the Control Commission is the convocation of a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, to which all alternate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party deems it necessary by a two-thirds majority to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of alternate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately.[77]

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PRELIMINARY DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. ON THE SYNDICALIST AND ANARCHIST DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY

1. A syndicalist and anarchist deviation has been definitely revealed in our Party in the past few months. It calls for the most resolute measures of ideological struggle and also for purging the Party and restoring its health.

2. The said deviation is due partly to the influx into the Party of former Mensheviks, and also of workers and peasants who have not yet fully assimilated the communist world outlook. Mainly, however, this deviation is due to the influence exercised upon the proletariat and on the Russian Communist Party by the petty-bourgeois element, which is exceptionally strong in our country, and which inevitably engenders vacillation towards anarchism, particularly at a time when the condition of the masses has greatly deteriorated as a consequence of the crop failure and the devastating effects of war, and when the demobilisation of the army numbering millions sets loose hundreds and hundreds of thousands of peasants and workers unable immediately to find regular means of livelihood.

3. The most theoretically complete and clearly defined expression of this deviation (*or*: one of the most complete, etc., expressions of this deviation) is the theses and other literary productions of the so-called Workers' Opposition group. Sufficiently illustrative of this is, for example, the following thesis propounded by this group: "The organisation of the management of the national economy is the function of an All-Russia Congress of Producers organised in industrial unions which shall elect a central body to run the whole of the national economy of the Republic."

The ideas at the bottom of this and numerous similar statements are radically wrong in theory, and represent a complete break with Marxism and communism, with the practical experience of all semi-proletarian revolutions and of the present proletarian revolution.

First, the concept "producer" combines proletarians with semi-proletarians and small commodity producers, thus radically departing from the fundamental concept of the class struggle and from the fundamental demand that a precise distinction be drawn between classes.

Secondly, the bidding for or flirtation with the non-Party masses, which is expressed in the above-quoted thesis, is an equally radical departure from Marxism.

Marxism teaches—and this tenet has not only been formally endorsed by the whole of the Communist International in the decisions of the Second (1920) Congress of the Comintern on the role of the political party of the proletariat, but has also been confirmed in practice by our revolution—that only the political party of the working class, i.e., the Communist Party, is capable of uniting, training and organising a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of this mass and the inevitable traditions and relapses of narrow craft unionism or craft prejudices among the proletariat, and of guiding all the united activities of the whole of the proletariat, i.e., of leading it politically, and through it, the whole mass of the working people. Without this the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

The wrong understanding of the role of the Communist Party in its relation to the non-Party proletariat, and in the relation of the first and second factors to the whole mass of working people, is a radical theoretical departure from communism and a deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism, and this deviation permeates all the views of the Workers' Opposition group.

4. The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party declares that it also regards as radically wrong all attempts on the part of the said group and of other persons to defend their fallacious views by referring to Paragraph 5 of the economic section of the Programme of the Russian Com-

munist Party, which deals with the role of the trade unions. This paragraph says that "the trade unions should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity" and that they will "ensure in this way indissoluble ties between the central state administration, the national economy and the broad masses of working people", "drawing" these masses "into direct economic management".

This paragraph in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party also says that a prerequisite for the state at which the trade unions "should eventually arrive" is the process whereby they increasingly "divest themselves of the narrow craft-union spirit" and embrace the majority "and eventually all" of the working people.

Lastly, this paragraph in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party emphasises that "on the strength of the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., and established practice, the trade unions participate in all the local and central organs of industrial management".

Instead of studying the practical experience of participation in administration, and instead of developing this experience further, strictly in conformity with successes achieved and mistakes rectified, the syndicalists and anarchists advance as an immediate slogan "congresses or a congress of producers" "to elect" the organs of economic management. Thus, the leading, educational and organising role of the Party in relation to the trade unions of the proletariat, and of the latter to the semi-petty-bourgeois and even wholly petty-bourgeois masses of working people, is completely evaded and eliminated, and instead of continuing and correcting the practical work of building new forms of economy already begun by the Soviet state, we get petty-bourgeois-anarchist disruption of this work, which can only lead to the triumph of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

5. In addition to the theoretical fallacies and a radically wrong attitude towards the practical experience of economic organisation already begun by the Soviet government, the Congress of the Russian Communist Party discerns in the views of this and similar groups and persons a gross

political mistake and a direct political danger to the very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In a country like Russia, the overwhelming preponderance of the petty-bourgeois element and the devastation, impoverishment, epidemics, crop failures, extreme want and hardship inevitably resulting from the war, engender particularly sharp vacillations in the temper of the petty-bourgeois and semi-proletarian masses. First they incline towards a strengthening of the alliance between these masses and the proletariat, and then towards bourgeois restoration. The experience of all revolutions in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries shows most clearly and convincingly that the only possible result of these vacillations—if the unity, strength and influence of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat is weakened in the slightest degree—will be the restoration of the power and property of the capitalists and landowners.

Hence, the views of the Workers' Opposition and of like-minded elements are not only wrong in theory, but are an expression of petty-bourgeois and anarchist wavering in practice, and actually weaken the consistency of the leading line of the Communist Party and help the class enemies of the proletarian revolution.

6. In view of all this, the Congress of the R.C.P., emphatically rejecting the said ideas, as being expressive of a syndicalist and anarchist deviation, deems it necessary:

First, to wage an unswerving and systematic struggle against these ideas;

Secondly, to recognise the propaganda of these ideas as being incompatible with membership of the R.C.P.

Instructing the C.C. of the Party strictly to enforce these decisions, the Congress at the same time points out that special publications, symposiums, etc., can and should provide space for a most comprehensive exchange of opinion between Party members on all the questions herein indicated.

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REPORT ON PARTY UNITY AND THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST DEVIATION MARCH 16[78]

Comrades, I do not think there is any need to say a great deal on this question because the subjects on which an official pronouncement must now be made on behalf of the Party Congress, that is, on behalf of the whole Party, were touched upon in all the questions discussed at the Congress. The resolution "On Unity" largely contains a characterisation of the political situation. You must have all read the printed text of this resolution that has been distributed. Point 7, which introduces an exceptional measure, namely, the right to expel a member from the Central Committee by a two-thirds majority of a general meeting of members of the C.C., alternate members and members of the Central Control Commission, is not for publication. This measure was repeatedly discussed at private conferences at which representatives of all shades expressed their opinions. Let us hope, comrades, that it will not be necessary to apply this point; but it is necessary to have it, in view of the new situation, when we are on the eve of a new and fairly sharp turn, and want to abolish all traces of separatism.

Let me now deal with the resolution on syndicalist and anarchist deviations. It is the question touched upon in point 4 of the Congress agenda. The definition of our attitude to certain trends, or deviations in thinking, is the pivot of the whole resolution. By saying "deviations", we emphasise that we do not as yet regard them as something that has crystallised and is absolutely and fully defined, but merely as the beginning of a political trend of which the Party must give its appraisal. Point 3 of the resolution on the syndicalist and anarchist deviation, copies of which you

all probably have, evidently contains a misprint (judging by the remarks, it has been noticed). It should read: "illustrative of this is, for example, the following thesis of the Workers' Opposition: 'The organisation of the management of the national economy is the function of an All-Russia Congress of Producers organised in industrial unions which shall elect a central body to run the whole of the national economy of the Republic.'" We have repeatedly discussed this point during the Congress, at restricted conferences as well as at the open general sessions of the Congress. I think we have already made it clear that it is quite impossible to defend this point on the plea that Engels had spoken of an association of producers, because it is quite obvious, and an exact quotation of the appropriate passage will prove, that Engels was referring to a classless communist society. That is something we all take for granted once society is rid of classes, only the producers remain, without any division into workers and peasants. And we know perfectly well from all the works of Marx and Engels that they drew a very clear distinction between the period in which classes still exist and that in which they no longer do. Marx and Engels used to ridicule the idea that classes could disappear before communism, and said that communism alone meant their abolition.[79]

The position is that we are the first to raise the question of abolishing classes in the practical plane, and that two main classes remain in this peasant country—the working class and the peasantry. Alongside of them, however, are whole groups left over from capitalism.

Our Programme definitely says that we are taking the first steps and shall have a number of transitional stages. But in the practical work of Soviet administration and in the whole history of the revolution we have constantly had graphic illustrations of the fact that it is wrong to give theoretical definitions of the kind the opposition has given in this case. We know perfectly well that classes have remained in our country and will remain for a long time to come; and that in a country with a predominantly peasant population they are bound to remain for many, many years. It will take us at least ten years to organise large-scale industry to produce a reserve and secure control of agri-

culture. This is the shortest period even if the technical conditions are exceptionally favourable. But we know that our conditions are terribly unfavourable. We have a plan for building up Russia on the basis of modern large-scale industry: it is the electrification plan drawn up by our scientists. The shortest period provided for in that plan is ten years, and this is based on the assumption that conditions will be something like normal. But we know perfectly well that we do not have such conditions and it goes without saying that ten years is an extremely short period for us. We have reached the very core of the question: the situation is such that classes hostile to the proletariat will remain, so that in practice we cannot now create that which Engels spoke about. There will be a dictatorship of the proletariat. Then will come the classless society.

Marx and Engels sharply challenged those who tended to forget class distinctions and spoke about producers, the people, or working people in general. Anyone who has read Marx and Engels will recall that in all their works they ridicule those who talk about producers, the people, working people in general. There are no working people or workers in general; there are either small proprietors who own the means of production, and whose mentality and habits are capitalistic—and they cannot be anything else—or wage-workers with an altogether different cast of mind, wage-workers in large-scale industry, who stand in antagonistic contradiction to the capitalists and are ranged in struggle against them.

We have approached this question after three years of struggle, with experience in the exercise of the political power of the proletariat, and knowledge of the enormous difficulties existing in the relationships between classes, which are still there, and with remnants of the bourgeoisie filling the cracks and crevices of our social fabric, and holding office in Soviet institutions. In the circumstances the appearance of a platform containing the theses I have read to you is a clear and obvious syndicalist-anarchist deviation. That is no exaggeration: I have carefully weighed my words. A deviation is not yet a full-blown trend. A deviation is something that can be rectified. People have somewhat strayed or are beginning to stray from the path,

but can still be put right. That, in my opinion, is what the Russian word *uklon* means. It emphasises that there is nothing final in it as yet, and that the matter can be easily rectified; it shows a desire to sound a warning and to raise the question on principle in all its scope. If anyone has a better word to express this idea, let us have it, by all means. I hope we shall not start arguing over words. We are essentially examining this thesis as the main one, so as not to go chasing after a mass of similar ideas, of which the Workers' Opposition group has a great many. We will leave our writers, and the leaders of this trend to go into the matter, for at the end of the resolution we make a point of saying that special publications and symposiums can and should give space to a more comprehensive exchange of opinion between Party members on all the questions indicated. We cannot now afford to put off the question. We are a party fighting in acute difficulties. We must say to ourselves: if our unity is to be more solid, we must condemn a definite deviation. Since it has come to light, it should be brought out and discussed. If a comprehensive discussion is necessary, let us have it, by all means; we have the men to give chapter and verse on every point, and if we find it relevant and necessary, we shall raise this question internationally as well, for you all know and have just heard the delegate of the Communist International say in his report that there is a certain Leftist deviation in the ranks of the international revolutionary working-class movement. The deviation we are discussing is identical with the anarchist deviation of the German Communist Workers' Party, the fight against which was clearly revealed at the last Congress of the Communist International.[80] Some of the terms used there to qualify it were stronger than "deviation". You know that this is an international question. That is why it would be wrong to have done with it by saying, "Let's have no more discussions. Full stop." But a theoretical discussion is one thing, and the Party's political line—a political struggle—is another. We are not a debating society. Of course, we are able to publish symposiums and special publications and will continue to do so but our first duty is to carry on the fight against great odds, and that needs unity. If we are to have proposals, like organising an "All-Russia Congress

of Producers", introduced into the political discussion and struggle, we shall be unable to march forward united and in step. That is not the policy we have projected over the next few years. It is a policy that would disrupt the Party's team-work, for it is wrong not only in theory, but also in its incorrect definition of the relations between classes—the crucial element which was specified in the resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist International,[81] and without which there is no Marxism. The situation today is such that the non-Party element is yielding to the petty-bourgeois vacillations which are inevitable in Russia's present economic condition. We must remember that in some respects the internal situation presents a greater danger than Denikin and Yudenich; and our unity must not be formal but must go deep down below the surface. If we are to create this unity, a resolution like the one proposed is indispensable.

The next very important thing in my opinion is Point 4 of this resolution, which gives an interpretation of our Programme. It is an authentic interpretation, that is, the author's interpretation. Its author is the Congress, and that is why it must give its interpretation in order to put a stop to all this wavering, and to the tricks that are sometimes being played with our Programme, as if what it says about the trade unions is what some people would like it to say. You have heard Comrade Ryazanov's criticism of the Programme—let us thank the critic for his theoretical researches. You have heard Comrade Shlyapnikov's criticism. That is something we must not ignore. I think that here, in this resolution, we have exactly what we need just now. We must say on behalf of the Congress, which endorses the Programme and which is the Party's supreme organ: here is what we understand the Programme to mean. This, I repeat, does not cut short theoretical discussion. Proposals to amend the Programme may be made; no one has suggested that this should be prohibited. We do not think that our Programme is so perfect as not to require any modification whatever; but just now we have no formal proposals, nor have we allocated any time for the examination of this question. If we read the Programme carefully we shall find the following: "The trade unions ... should

eventually arrive at a de facto concentration", etc. The words, "should eventually arrive at a de facto concentration", should be underlined. And a few lines above that we read: "On the strength of the laws ... the trade unions participate in all the local and central organs of industrial management." We know that it took decades to build up capitalist industry, with the assistance of all the advanced countries of the world. Are we so childish as to think that we can complete this process so quickly at this time of dire distress and impoverishment, in a country with a mass of peasants, with workers in a minority, and a proletarian vanguard bleeding and in a state of prostration? We have not even laid the main foundation, we have only begun to give an experimental definition of industrial management with the participation of the trade unions. We know that want is the principal obstacle. It is not true to say that we are not enlisting the masses; on the contrary, we give sincere support to anyone among the mass of workers with the least sign of talent, or ability. All we need is for the conditions to ease off ever so little. We need a year or two, at least, of relief from famine. This is an insignificant period of time in terms of history but in our conditions it is a long one. A year or two of relief from famine, with regular supplies of fuel to keep the factories running, and we shall receive a hundred times more assistance from the working class, and far more talent will arise from its ranks than we now have. No one has or can have any doubts about this. The assistance is not forthcoming at present, but not because we do not want it. In fact, we are doing all we can to get it. No one can say that the government, the trade unions, or the Party's Central Committee have missed a single opportunity to do so. But we know that the want in the country is desperate, that there is hunger and poverty everywhere, and that this very often leads to passivity. Let us not be afraid to call a spade a spade: it is these calamities and evils that are hindering the rise of mass energy. In such a situation, when the statistics tell us that 60 per cent of the members of management boards are workers, it is quite impossible to try to interpret the words in the Programme—"The trade union ... should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration", etc.—*à la* Shlyapnikov.

An authentic interpretation of the Programme will enable us to combine the necessary tactical solidarity and unity with the necessary freedom of discussion, and this is emphasised at the end of the resolution. What does it say in essence? Point 6 reads:

"In view of all this, the Congress of the R.C.P., emphatically rejecting the said ideas, as being expressive of a syndicalist and anarchist deviation, deems it necessary, first, to wage an unswerving and systematic struggle against these ideas; secondly, to recognise the propaganda of these ideas as being incompatible with membership of the R.C.P.

"Instructing the C.C. of the Party strictly to enforce these decisions, the Congress at the same time points out that special publications, symposiums, etc., can and should provide space for a most comprehensive exchange of opinion between Party members on all the questions herein indicated."

Do you not see—you all who are agitators and propagandists in one way or another—the difference between the propaganda of ideas within political parties engaged in struggle, and the exchange of opinion in special publications and symposiums? I am sure that everyone who takes the trouble to understand this resolution will see the difference. And we hope that the representatives of this deviation whom we-are taking into the Central Committee will treat the decisions of the Party Congress as every class-conscious disciplined Party member does. We hope that with their assistance we, in the Central Committee, shall look into this matter, without creating a special situation. We shall investigate and decide what it is that is going on in the Party—whether it is the propaganda of ideas within a political party engaged in struggle, or the exchange of opinion in special publications and symposiums. There is the opportunity for anyone interested in a meticulous study of quotations from Engels. We have theoreticians who can always give the Party useful advice. That is necessary. We shall publish two or three big collections—that is useful and absolutely necessary. But is this anything like the propaganda of ideas, or a conflict of platforms? How can these two things be confused? They will not be confused by anyone who desires to understand our political situation.

Do not hinder our political work, especially in a difficult situation, but go on with your scientific research. We shall be very happy to see Comrade Shlyapnikov supplement his recent book on his experiences in the underground revolutionary struggle with a second volume written in his spare time over the next few months and analysing the concept of "producer". But the present resolution will serve as our landmark. We opened the widest and freest discussion. The platform of the Workers' Opposition was published in the central organ of the Party in 250,000 copies. We have weighed it up from all sides, we have elected delegates on its basis, and finally we have convened this Congress, which, summing up the political discussion, says: "The deviation has come to light, we shall not play hide-and-seek, but shall say openly: a deviation is a deviation and must be straightened out. We shall straighten it out, and the discussion will be a theoretical one."

That is why I renew and support the proposal that we adopt both these resolutions, consolidate the unity of the Party, and give a correct definition to what should be dealt with by Party meetings, and what individuals—Marxists, Communists who want to help the Party by looking into theoretical questions—are free to study in their spare time. (*Applause.*)

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SUMMING-UP SPEECH ON PARTY UNITY AND THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST DEVIATION MARCH 16

Comrades, we have heard some incredibly harsh expressions here, and the harshest, I think, was the accusation that our resolution is slanderous. But some harsh expressions tend to expose themselves. You have the resolution. You know that we took two representatives of the Workers' Opposition into the Central Committee and that we used the term "deviation". I emphasise the meaning of this term. Neither Shlyapnikov nor Medvedyev proposed any other. The theses we have criticised here have been criticised by the representatives of all shades of opinion. After this, how can one talk of slander? If we had ascribed to someone something which is not true there would have been some sense in this harsh expression. As it is, it is simply a sign of irritation. That is not a serious objection!

I now come to the points that have been mentioned here. It has been stated that the Democratic Centralism group was given unfair treatment. You have followed the development of the agreement between groups and the exchange of opinion on the question of the election to the Central Committee brought up by the representatives of the Democratic Centralism group. You know that ever since the private conference that was attended by the whole of the Workers' Opposition group and a number of very prominent comrades, representatives of all shades, I, for one, have publicly urged that it would be desirable to have representatives of the Workers' Opposition and Democratic Centralism groups on the Central Committee. No one opposed this at the conference, which was attended by all the comrades of the Workers' Opposition and representatives of all shades. It is quite clear that the election of a representative of the Democratic Centralism group as an alternate and not as

a full member of the Central Committee was the result of a lengthy exchange of opinion, and an agreement arrived at among the groups. It is captious to regard this as a sign of mistrust in or unfairness to the Democratic Centralism group. We in the Central Committee have done everything to emphasise our desire to be fair. This is a fact that cannot be obliterated. It is cavilling to draw the conclusion that someone has been unfairly treated. Or take the argument of a comrade from the Democratic Centralism group that Point 7 of the resolution was superfluous because the Central Committee already had that right. We propose that Point 7 be withheld from publication because we hope it will not be necessary to apply it; it is an extreme measure. But when the comrade from the Democratic Centralism group says: "The Rules give you this right",[82] he shows that he does not know the Rules, and is ignorant of the principles of centralism and democratic centralism. No democracy or centralism would ever tolerate a Central Committee elected at a Congress having the right to expel its members. (A voice: "Bypassing the Party.") Particularly bypassing the Party. The Congress elects the Central Committee, thereby expressing its supreme confidence and vesting leadership in those whom it elects. And our Party has never allowed the Central Committee to have such a right in relation to its members. This is an extreme measure that is being adopted specially, in view of the dangerous situation. A special meeting is called: the Central Committee, plus the alternate members, plus the Control Commission, all having the same right of vote. Our Rules make no provision for such a body or plenum of 47 persons; and never has anything like it been practised. Hence, I repeat that the comrades of the Democratic Centralism group know neither the Rules, nor the principles of centralism or democratic centralism. It is an extreme measure. I hope we shall not have to apply it. It merely shows that the Party will resort to what you have heard about in the event of disagreements which in one aspect verge on a split. We are not children, we have gone through some hard times, we have seen splits and have survived them; we know what a trial they are, and are not afraid of giving the danger its proper name.

Have we had at previous congresses, even amidst the

sharpest disagreements, situations which, in one aspect, verged on a split? No, we have not. Do we have such a situation now? Yes, we do. This point has been made repeatedly. Now, I think, these are disagreements we can combat.

It has also been said that unity is not created by such resolutions; that according to the resolution criticism must be expressed only through the medium of the gubernia committee; that lack of confidence has been expressed in the comrades of the Workers' Opposition and that this has hampered their presence on the Central Committee. But all of this is not true either. I explained from the very outset why we had chosen the word "deviation". If you don't like the word, accept the resolution as a basis and send it up to the Presidium for possible modification. If we find a milder term I would propose that it be substituted for the word "deviation", and also that other parts be modified. We shall not object to that. We cannot discuss such details here, of course. Hand in the resolution to the Presidium for editing and toning down. It is certainly impossible to couch it in stronger terms—I agree with that. But it is not true to say that the resolution means inciting one section of the Party against another.

I do not know the composition of the Workers' Opposition group in Samara, I have not been there; but I am sure that if any member of the Central Committee or delegate to the Congress of whatever shade of opinion—except the Workers' Opposition—were to set out to prove at a meeting of the Samara organisation that there is no incitement in the resolution, but a call for unity and for winning over the majority of the members of the Workers' Opposition, he would certainly succeed. When people here use the term "incitement" they forget about Point 5 of the resolution on unity, which notes the services of the Workers' Opposition. Are these not set down alongside each other? On the one hand, there is the "guilty of a deviation", and on the other, Point 5 says: "The Congress at the same time declares that every practical proposal concerning questions to which the so-called Workers' Opposition group, for example, has devoted special attention, such as purging the Party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, combating bureaucratic practices, developing democracy and

workers' initiative, etc., must be examined with the greatest care", etc. Is that incitement? It is a recognition of services. We say: On the one hand, in the discussion, you have shown a deviation which is politically dangerous, and even Comrade Medvedyev's resolution[83] admits this, although his wording is different. And then we go on to say: As for combating bureaucratic practices, we agree that we are not yet doing all that can be done. That is recognition of services and not incitement!

When a comrade from the Workers' Opposition is taken into the Central Committee, it is an expression of comradely confidence. And after this, anyone attending a meeting not inflamed with factional strife will hear it say that there is no incitement in this, and that it is an expression of comradely confidence. As for the extreme measure, it is a matter for the future: we are not resorting to it now, and are expressing our comradely confidence. If you think that we are wrong in theory, we can issue dozens of special publications on the subject. And if there are any young comrades, in the Samara organisation, for example, who have anything new to say on this question, then let's have it, Comrades Samarians! We shall publish a few of your articles. Everyone will see the difference between speeches at a Congress and words being bandied outside it. If you examine the precise text of the resolution you will find a theoretical definition of principle, which is not offensive in the least. Alongside of it is recognition of services in combating bureaucratic practices, a request for assistance and, what is more, inclusion of the representatives of this group in the Central Committee, which is the Party's greatest expression of confidence. Therefore, comrades, I move that both resolutions be adopted, by a roll-call vote, and then sent on to the Presidium for revision and modification of the formulations. As Comrade Shlyapnikov is a member of the Presidium, perhaps he will find a more appropriate substitute for the word "deviation ".

As regards the notices of resignation, I move we adopt the following resolution: "The Congress calls upon all members of the dissolved Workers' Opposition group to submit to Party discipline, binding them to remain at their posts, and rejects Comrade Shlyapnikov's and all other resignations."[84]

12

REMARKS ON RYAZANOV'S AMENDMENT TO THE RESOLUTION ON PARTY UNITY MARCH 16[85]

I think that, regrettable as it may be, Comrade Ryazanov's suggestion is impracticable. We cannot deprive the Party and the members of the Central Committee of the right to appeal to the Party in the event of disagreement on fundamental issues. I cannot imagine how we can do such a thing! The present Congress cannot in any way bind the elections to the next Congress. Supposing we are faced with a question like, say, the conclusion of the Brest peace? Can you guarantee that no such question will arise? No, you cannot. In the circumstances, the elections may have to be based on platforms. (*Ryazanov*: "On one question?") Certainly. But your resolution says: No elections according to platforms. I do not think we have the power to prohibit this. If we are united by our resolution on unity, and, of course, the development of the revolution, there will be no repetition of elections according to platforms. The lesson we have learned at this Congress will not be forgotten. But if the circumstances should give rise to fundamental disagreements, can we prohibit them from being brought before the judgement of the whole Party? No, we cannot! This is an excessive desire, which is impracticable, and I move that we reject it.

13
SPEECH ON THE FUEL QUESTION
MARCH 16

Allow me to take the floor to refer the fuel question to a commission. The fuel crisis is undoubtedly one of the—if not the—most important issue in all our economic development. But I ask myself: shall we be able to reach a final decision on such an important question on the basis of the report and co-report—the one setting forth the view of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, which is to be given by Comrade Rykov, and the other, criticising that policy, Comrade Larin's standpoint—without referring it to a commission and studying documents which explain the essence of the matter and help to find out whether the whole depends on flaws in the machinery, scandalous practices and crimes, or the weakness of the peasant economy and the peasant horse, without which the supply of firewood is impossible? I ask myself: can we adopt a decision without a commission? And I say that we cannot. It would therefore be much better for us to elect an enlarged commission consisting mostly of comrades from the provinces, who are familiar with the fuel, and specifically the firewood, business, who have more than a book knowledge of it, and have actually had experience in the line. The commission would hear not only the rapporteurs but would summon a number of persons and see that the statements made by the rapporteur and co-rapporteur are documented. It will then report to the Central Committee, which will, on that basis, have to adopt a number of crucial decisions in that sphere. This procedure will yield much more productive and useful results than discussions at the Congress which could make us waste a whole day and eventually lead us up to no further than reference of the question to a commission.

14

PROPOSAL ON THE FUEL QUESTION
MARCH 16

I move that we instruct the Central Timber Board immediately to confer with delegates to the Congress who have practical experience in the work of fuel and firewood enterprises, with the view of working out right away urgent measures, especially in floating.

15

SPEECH IN CLOSING THE CONGRESS
MARCH 16

Comrades, we have concluded the work of the Party Congress, which has been meeting at an extremely important moment for the fate of our revolution. The Civil War, coming in the wake of so many years of imperialist war, has so torn and dislocated this country, that its revival is taking place in incredibly difficult conditions. Hence, we should not be surprised that there is a resurgence of the elements of disintegration and decay and of petty-bourgeois and anarchistic elements. One of the fundamental conditions for this is the extreme and unprecedented intensification of want and despair that has now gripped tens and hundreds of thousands, and possibly even larger numbers, of people who see no way out of this disastrous situation. But we know, comrades, that this country has had it even worse. Without shutting our eyes to the danger, or entertaining any sort of false optimism, we say frankly to ourselves and our comrades that the danger is great, but we have great trust in the solidarity of the vanguard of the proletariat. We know that no other force but the class-conscious proletariat can unite the millions of scattered small farmers, many of whom are suffering incredible hardships; no other force can unite them economically and politically against the exploiters. We are convinced that this force has emerged from the experience of the struggle—the gruelling experience of the revolution—sufficiently steeled to withstand all severe trials and the difficulties that lie ahead.

Comrades, apart from the decisions we have adopted on these lines, there is the exceptionally important decision our Congress has adopted on relations with the peasantry.

In it we make a most sober appraisal of the relations between classes, and are not afraid openly to admit that this is a most difficult task, namely, that of establishing proper relations between the proletariat and the predominating peasantry while normal relations are unfeasible. You can call relations normal only when the proletariat has control of large-scale industry and its products and fully satisfies the needs of the peasantry and, providing them with the means of subsistence, so alleviates their condition that there is a tangible and obvious improvement over the capitalist system. That is the only way to create a basis for a normally functioning socialist society. We cannot do this at present because of the crushing ruin, want, impoverishment and despair. But to help to rid ourselves of this accursed legacy we are reacting in a definite way to the relations established during the disastrous war. We will not conceal the fact that the peasantry have some very deep grounds for dissatisfaction. We shall explain the situation more fully, and tell them that we shall do all we can to improve it and pay more heed to the small proprietor's living conditions.

We must do everything to alleviate his condition, to give more to the small farmer, and assure him of greater security in private farming. We are not afraid of the anti-communist trend this measure is bound to produce.

Comrades, we have now been working for several years to lay, for the first time in history, the foundations of a socialist society and a proletarian state, and it is in the spirit of sober appraisal of these relations that we have expressed our full readiness to reconsider this policy and even to modify it. I think that the results of our Congress in this respect will be all the more successful because we have been solidly united on this fundamental question from the very outset. There was need for unanimity in the solution of two fundamental questions, and we have had no disagreements on the relations between the vanguard of the proletariat and its mass, and the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry In spite of the very difficult political conditions, we have been more united in our decisions on these points than ever before.

Permit me now to deal with two points, which I ask not

to be entered into the minutes. The first is the question of concessions in Baku and Grozny. It was dealt with only in passing at this Congress. I was unable to attend that session, but I have been told that some comrades have their doubts or have been left with a sense of dissatisfaction. I don't think there are any grounds for this. The Central Committee thrashed out this question of granting concessions in Grozny and Baku. Several special commissions were set up and special reports from the departments concerned were called for. There was some disagreement, several votes were taken, but after the last one not a single member or group in the Central Committee wished to exercise their incontestable right to appeal to the Congress. The new Central Committee will, I think, have full formal and actual right to decide this big question on the strength of a Congress decision. Unless we grant concessions, we cannot hope to obtain the assistance of well-equipped modern capitalist industry. And unless we utilise the latter, we shall be unable to lay a proper foundation for our own large-scale production in such industries as oil, which is of exceptional importance for the whole of the world economy. We have not yet concluded a single concession agreement, but we shall do all we can to do so. Have you read in the newspapers about the opening of the Baku-Tiflis oil pipeline? There will soon be news of a similar pipeline to Batum. This will give us an outlet to the world market. We have to improve our economic position, and the technical equipment of our Republic, and give our workers more food and goods. Everything that helps to ease things in this respect is of tremendous value to us. That is why we are not afraid of leasing parts of Grozny and Baku. By leasing out one-fourth of Grozny and one-fourth of Baku, we shall be able—if we succeed—to raise the rest of them to the modern technical level of advanced capitalism. There is no other way for us to do this at present. Those who know the state of our economy will understand this. But once we have a base, even if it costs us hundreds of millions of gold rubles, we shall do everything to develop the rest.

The second question that I ask not to be published is the Presidium's special decision concerning the manner

of reporting. You know that at this Congress we have repeatedly had to work in an atmosphere of excessive tension and a larger number of delegates were kept away from the sittings of the Congress than has usually been the case. We must, therefore, be more calm and thoughtful in drawing up a plan of how the reports are to be made in the localities, and we must be guided by a definite decision. Let me read you a comrade's draft of the Presidium's instructions to the delegates returning home (*reads*).[86] I have summed it up, and I think these few lines are sufficient to cause every delegate to ponder over the question and in his report to exercise the necessary caution, taking care not to exaggerate the danger of the situation or allow himself or those around him to panic, whatever the circumstances.

Now that world capitalism has started its incredibly frenzied, hysterical campaign against us, it would be particularly inappropriate for us to panic, and there is no reason to do so. Yesterday, by arrangement with Comrade Chicherin, I received a summary of the news on this question, and I think you will find it instructive. It is a summary of the news on the slander campaign about the situation in Russia. The comrade who made the summary writes: "Never before has the West-European press indulged in such an orgy of lies or engaged in the mass production of fantastic inventions about Soviet Russia as in the last fortnight. Since the beginning of March, the whole of the West-European press has been daily pouring out torrents of fantastic reports about insurrections in Russia; a counter-revolutionary victory; Lenin and Trotsky's flight to the Crimea; the white flag over the Kremlin; barricades in Petrograd and Moscow and their streets running with blood; hordes of workers converging on Moscow from the hills to overthrow the Soviet government; Budyonny's defection to the rebels; a counter-revolutionary victory in a number of Russian towns, a succession of names adding up to virtually all the gubernia capitals of Russia. The scope and method of the campaign betray it as a far-reaching plan adopted by all the leading governments. On March 2, the British Foreign Office announced through the *Press Association* that it regarded these reports as improbable, but immediately thereafter issued its own bulletin about a

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rising in Petrograd, a bombardment of Petrograd by the Kronstadt fleet, and fighting in the streets of Moscow.

On March 2, all the British newspapers published cabled reports about uprisings in Petrograd and Moscow: Lenin and Trotsky have fled to the Crimea; 14,000 workers in Moscow are demanding a constituent assembly; the Moscow arsenal and the Moscow-Kursk railway station are in the hands of the insurgent workers; in Petrograd, Vasilyevsky Ostrov is entirely in the hands of the insurgents.

Let me quote a few of the radio broadcasts and cables received on the following days: on March 3, Klyshko cabled from London that *Reuter* had picked up some absurd rumours about a rising in Petrograd and was assiduously circulating them.

March 6. The Berlin correspondent Mayson cables to New York that workers from America are playing an important part in the Petrograd revolution, and that Chicherin has radioed an order to General Hanecki to close the frontier to émigrés from America.

March 6. Zinoviev has fled to Oranienbaum; Red artillery is shelling the working-class quarter in Moscow; Petrograd is beleaguered (cable from Wiegand).

March 7. Klyshko cables that according to reports from Revel, barricades have been erected in the streets of Moscow; the newspapers carry reports from Helsingfors that anti-Bolshevik troops have taken Chernigov.

March 7. Petrograd and Moscow are in the hands of the insurgents; insurrection in Odessa; Semyonov advancing in Siberia at the head of 25,000 Cossacks; a Revolutionary Committee in Petrograd is in control of the fortifications and the fleet (reported by the Poldhu wireless station in England).

Nauen, March 7. The factory quarter in Petrograd is in revolt; an anti-Bolshevik insurrection has broken out in Volhynia.

Paris, March 7. Petrograd in the hands of a Revolutionary Committee; *Le Matin*[87] quotes reports from London saying the white flag is flying over the Kremlin.

Paris, March 8. The rebels have captured Krasnaya Gorka; Red Army regiments have mutinied in Pskov Gubernia; the Bolsheviks are sending Bashkirs against Petrograd.

March 10. Klyshko cables: the newspapers are asking whether Petrograd has fallen or not. According to reports from Helsingfors three-quarters of Petrograd is in the hands of the insurgents. Trotsky, or according to other reports, Zinoviev is in command of operations and has his headquarters in Tosna, or else in the Peter and Paul Fortress. According to other reports, Brusilov has been appointed Commander-in-Chief. Reports from Riga say that Petrograd, except for the railway stations, was captured on the 9th; the Red Army has retreated to Gatchina; strikers in Petrograd have raised the slogan: "Down with the Soviets and the Communists." The British War Office states that it is not yet known whether or not the Kronstadt rebels have joined up with the Petrograd rebels but, according to information at its disposal, Zinoviev is in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he is in command of the Soviet troops.

Of a vast number of fabrications in this period I am taking only a few samples: Saratov has become an independent anti-Bolshevik republic (Nauen, March 11). Fierce anti-Communist riots in towns along the Volga (same source). Fighting between Byelorussian detachments and the Red Army in Minsk Gubernia (same source).

Paris, March 15. *Le Matin* reports that large numbers of Kuban and Don Cossacks are in revolt.

Nauen reported on March 14 that Budyonny's cavalry has joined up with the rebels near Orel. At various times insurrections were reported in Pskov, Odessa and other towns.

Krasin cabled on March 9 that the Washington correspondent of *The Times* said the Soviet regime was on its last legs and America was therefore deferring establishment of relations with the border states. Reports at various times quoted American banking circles as saying that in the circumstances trade with Russia would be a gamble.

The New York correspondent of *The Daily Chronicle* reported as early as March 4 that business circles and the Republican Party in America considered trade relations with Russia at the present time to be a gamble.

This campaign of lies is being undoubtedly conducted not only with an eye to America, but also to the Turkish delegation in London, and the plebiscite in Silesia.

Comrades, the picture is absolutely clear. The world press syndicate—over there they have a free press, which means that 99 per cent of the press is in the pay of the financial magnates, who have command of hundreds of millions of rubles—has launched a world-wide campaign on behalf of the imperialists with the prime object of disrupting the negotiations for a trade agreement with Britain, which Krasin has initiated, and the forthcoming trade agreement with America, which, as I have stated, we have been negotiating here, and reference to which was made at this Congress. This shows that the enemies around us, no longer able to wage their war of intervention, are now pinning their hopes on a rebellion. And the Kronstadt events revealed their connection with the international bourgeoisie. Moreover, we see that what they fear most, from the practical angle of international capital, is the resumption of proper trade relations. But they will fail in their attempts to disrupt them. There are some big businessmen here in Moscow, and they have stopped believing these false rumours. They have told us that a group of citizens in America has used an original method of propaganda in favour of Soviet Russia.

It has collected the diverse press reports about Russia over the past few months—about the flight of Lenin and Trotsky, about Trotsky shooting Lenin, and vice versa—and has published them in a pamphlet. You couldn't find a better way of popularising the Soviet power. Day after day they collected reports of the assassination of Lenin and Trotsky and showed how many times each had been shot or killed; such reports were repeated month after month. Finally, all these reports were collected in a pamphlet and published. The American bourgeois press has got a bad name for itself. That is the enemy whom two million Russian émigrés, landowners and capitalists, are serving; this is the army of the bourgeoisie confronting us. Let them try to disrupt trade relations and belittle the practical achievements of the Soviet power. We know that they will fail. And the reports of the international press, which controls hundreds of thousands of newspapers and supplies news to the whole world, show once again how we are surrounded by enemies and how much weaker they are as compared with last year.

That, comrades, is what we must understand. I think that the majority of the delegates present here have realised just how far we can let our disagreements go. It was naturally impossible to keep within these bounds during the struggle at the Congress. Men who have just emerged from the heat of battle cannot be expected to see these limits all at once. But we must have no doubts in our own mind when we look at our Party as the nucleus of the world revolution, and at the campaign which the world syndicate of states is now waging against us. Let them wage their campaign. We have sized it up, and we have exactly sized up our own disagreements. We know that by closing our ranks at this Congress we shall emerge from our disagreements solidly united, with the Party much stronger and marching with ever greater resolution towards international victories! (*Stormy applause.*)

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF TRANSPORT WORKERS MARCH 27, 1921[88]

Comrades, may I thank you all for your greetings and ask you to accept my greetings to your Congress. (*Stormy applause.*) Allow me to digress before dealing with the subject that directly concerns the work and tasks of this Congress and what the Soviet state expects of it.

As I was coming in through your hall just now, I saw a placard with this inscription: "The reign of the workers and peasants will last for ever." When I read this odd placard, which, it is true, was not up in the usual place, but stood in a corner—perhaps it had occurred to someone that it was not very apt and he had moved it out of the way—when I read this strange placard, I thought to myself: there you have some of the fundamental and elementary things we are still confused about. Indeed, if the reign of the workers and peasants would last for ever, we should never have socialism, for it implies the abolition of classes; and as long as there are workers and peasants, there will be different classes and, therefore, no full socialism: And as I pondered over the fact that three and a half years after the October Revolution we still have such odd placards (even if they are shifted out of the way) it occurred to me that there may still be great misunderstanding of the most common slogans in popular use. Take one of our most popular slogans which we all variously repeat: we all sing about our present fight being the last and decisive one. But I am afraid that if we were to ask a large section of the Communists against whom they are now waging this last battle (not the last one, of course, that's putting it on a bit thick, but one of the last and crucial ones) I am afraid

only a few would give the right answer showing a clear understanding against what, or whom, we are now waging one of our last and decisive battles. It also seems to me that, in view of the political events which have caught the attention of the broad masses of workers and peasants, we ought once again to ascertain, or, at any rate, try to ascertain, against whom we are waging one of our last and crucial battles this spring, at this very moment. Let me go over this point.

To sort it out we should, I think, start by reviewing as precisely and as soberly as possible, the opposed forces on whose struggle hinges the fate of the Soviet power, and, generally speaking, the course and development of the proletarian revolution, which is a revolution for the overthrow of the capitalists in Russia and elsewhere. What are these forces? How are they grouped against one another? How are they deployed at present? Any marked aggravation of the political situation, every new turn in the political events, even if it is not considerable, should always cause every thinking worker and peasant to ask himself: "What are the forces involved? How are they grouped?" And only when we are able to estimate these forces correctly and quite soberly, irrespective of our sympathies and desires, shall we be able to draw the proper conclusions concerning our policy in general, and our immediate tasks in particular. Let me, therefore, give you a brief description of these forces.

There are basically three such forces. Take first the proletariat, the force that is closest to us. It is the first force, the first discrete class. You all know this very well, living in the very midst of it. What is its condition now? In the Soviet Republic it is the class that took power three and a half years ago, that has, since then, been exercising its domination—dictatorship—and has suffered and endured exhaustion, want and privation more than any other class. To the working class, to the proletariat, this period, during the greater part of which the Soviet state was engaged in a relentless civil war against the whole capitalist world, brought calamities, privation, sacrifice and intense want on a scale unparalleled in world history. A strange thing happened. The class that took political power did so in the knowledge that it was doing so alone.

That is intrinsic to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It has meaning only when one class knows that it is taking political power alone, and does not deceive others or itself with talk about "popular government by popular consent through universal suffrage". You all know that there are very many—far too many—people who love to hold forth on that subject, but, at any rate, you will not find them among proletarians, because they have realised that theirs is a dictatorship of the proletariat, and they say as much in their Constitution, the fundamental law of the Republic. This class was well aware that it was taking power alone, under extremely difficult conditions. It has exercised its political power as any dictatorship does, that is, with grim determination. In these three and a half years, it has suffered distress, want, starvation and a worsening of economic positions such as no other class in history has suffered. It is not surprising that as a result of its superhuman effort it is uncommonly weary, exhausted and strained.

How was a single class able to exercise its power in the teeth of the resistance and attacks of the world bourgeoisie, in a country where the proletariat is numerically so much smaller than the rest of the population? How was it able to do that in a backward country artificially cut off by armed force from countries with a more numerous, class-conscious, disciplined and organised proletariat? How could it hold on for three and a half years? What was its mainstay? We know that it was the mass of the peasants, at home. About this second force more in a moment, after we finish our examination of the first. I have said that never has its suffering been so great and acute as in this epoch of its dictatorship; and you all know it, having observed the life of your mates in the factories, railway depots, and workshops. Never before has the country been so weary and worn out. Where did this class get the moral strength to bear these privations? Clearly it had to draw on some source for the moral strength to overcome these material privations. As you know, the question of moral strength and support is a vague one; you can give any reading to moral strength. To avoid the danger of reading anything vague or fantastic into "moral strength", I ask myself:

Is there a precise definition of that which gave the proletariat the moral strength to bear the unprecedented material privations connected with its political rule? I think this will give us a precise answer. Ask yourself: Could the Soviet Republic have borne its trials over three and a half years, and withstood the onslaught of the whiteguards supported by the capitalists of the world, if it had had to face backward instead of advanced countries? You have only to put the question to see the obvious answer.

You know that for three and a half years the wealthiest powers of the world fought against us. The armed forces that were ranged against us and that supported Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin and Wrangel—you all know this very well, for you all fought in the war—were immensely and clearly superior to our forces. You know perfectly well that these states are still very much stronger than we are. How is it, then, that they set out to vanquish the Soviet power, and failed? How did this happen? We have an exact answer: the proletariat of all the capitalist countries was on our side. Even when it was patently under the influence of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—in the European countries they go by another name—it refused to support the fight against us. Eventually, the leaders were compelled to yield to the masses, and the workers disrupted the war. It was not we who won, for our armed forces were insignificant; the victory was won because the powers could not hurl the whole of their armed force against us. The course of a war depends on the workers of the advanced countries to such an extent that it cannot be waged against their will, and their passive and semi-passive resistance eventually disrupted the war against us. This incontrovertible fact gives the exact answer to the question as to the source on which the Russian proletariat drew for moral strength to hold out for three and a half years and win. The moral strength of the Russian worker lay in his knowledge and awareness of the tangible assistance and support which the proletariat of all the advanced countries of Europe was giving him in this struggle. The direction which the working-class movement in these countries is taking is indicated by this most important recent event: the split in the Socialist parties of Britain, France, Italy,

and other countries (both vanquished and victors) which differ in cultural and economic development. The main development of the year in all countries has been the formation of Communist Parties, with the support of all that is most advanced in the working class, on the ruins of the Socialist and Social-Democratic parties—which in Russia are called Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary. And, of course, there can be no doubt that if we had been attacked by backward countries, without mighty proletarian masses, and not by advanced countries, we would have been unable to hold out for three and a half months, let alone three and a half years. Would our proletariat have had the moral strength if it had not relied on the sympathy of the workers of the advanced countries, who supported us in spite of the lies about the Soviet power circulated by the imperialists in millions of copies, and in spite of the efforts of the "labour leaders"—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—who could have been expected to, and did, hamper the workers' struggle for us? With this support, our proletariat—numerically weak and tormented by poverty and privation—won out because it had the moral strength.

That is the first force.

The second is that which stands between developed capital and the proletariat. It is the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, which in Russia constitute the overwhelming majority of the population—the peasantry. They are mainly small proprietors and small farmers. Nine-tenths of them are that way, and can be nothing else. They do not take part in the acute struggle daily waged by capital and labour. They have not been schooled; their economic and political conditions do not bring them together, but rather tend to separate, alienating them from each other, and transforming them into millions of lone-wolf small proprietors. Such are the facts and you are all perfectly well aware of them. It will take collectives, collective farms and communes years to change this. Thanks to the revolutionary energy and devotion of the proletarian dictatorship, this force was able to dispose of its enemies on the right—the landowner class—to sweep them right out and abolish their rule more swiftly than has ever been done before. But the more quickly it abolished the rule of the landowners,

the more quickly it turned to its farming on the nationalised land, the more resolutely it settled accounts with the small minority of kulaks, the sooner it itself became transformed into small proprietors. You know that there has been a levelling-off in the Russian countryside in this period. The number of peasants with large areas under crop and without any at all has decreased, while the number of medium farms has increased. The countryside has become more petty bourgeois. This is an independent class, which, once the landowners and capitalists are expelled and eliminated, is the only class capable of opposing the proletariat. That is why it is absurd to write on placards that the reign of the workers and peasants will last for ever.

You know the political mood of this force. It is a vacillating force. We saw this to be true during our revolution all over the country. There were some local features in Russia proper, Siberia and the Ukraine, but the result was the same everywhere: it is a vacillating force. For a long time it was in the leading strings of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, with the aid of Kerensky, in the Kolchak period, under the Constituent Assembly in Samara, when the Menshevik Maisky was a Minister of Kolchak or of one of his predecessors, etc. This force wavered between the leadership of the proletariat and that of the bourgeoisie. Why didn't it lead itself? After all, it is the overwhelming majority. The fact is that the economic conditions of these masses are such that they are unable to organise and unite by their own efforts. This is clear to anyone who is not misled by empty talk about "universal suffrage", a constituent assembly and such like "democracy" which has served to dupe the people in all countries for hundreds of years and which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in our own country played up for hundreds of weeks but fell through "on this very spot every blessed time". (*Applause.*) We know from our own experience—and revolutions all over the world confirm it if we take the modern epoch of, say, a hundred and fifty years—that the result has always been the same everywhere: the petty bourgeoisie in general, and the peasants in particular, have failed in all their attempts to realise

their strength, and to direct economics and politics their own way. They have had to follow the leadership either of the proletariat, or the capitalists—there is no middle way open to them. Anyone who thinks of a middle way is an empty dreamer. There is much politics, economics, and history to prove it. The teachings of Marx show that once the small proprietors-become owners of the means of production and land, exchange between them necessarily gives rise to capital, and simultaneously to the antagonisms between capital and labour. The struggle between capital and the proletariat is inevitable; it is a law manifesting itself all over the world. This must be accepted by anyone-who refuses to fool himself.

These fundamental economic facts explain why this force cannot manifest itself through its own efforts, and why it has always failed in all its attempts to do so in the history of all revolutions. Whenever the proletariat was unable to lead the revolution, this force always followed the leadership of the bourgeoisie. That was the case in all revolutions. The Russians, of course, are of the same clay, and if they choose to pretend they are not, they will only look ridiculous. History metes out the same treatment to all. We, in particular, saw the truth of this under the rule of Kerensky. At that time, the government had the support of very many more political leaders than the Bolsheviks have. They were clever, educated men, with vast experience in politics and state administration. If we were to count all the officials who sabotaged us, but who did not make it their business to sabotage the Kerensky government, which relied on the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, we would find that they made up an overwhelming majority. Still that government collapsed. That shows that there were factors which offset the enormous preponderance of intellectual and educated forces accustomed to administering the state, an art they had acquired decades before they actually took over. Events ran the same course, with some modifications, in the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban regions, and the result was exactly the same. That could not have been a coincidence. Such is the economic and political law governing the second force: hence, either the leadership of the proletariat—a hard

road, but one which can help it to escape the rule of the landowners and capitalists—or the leadership of the capitalists, as it does in the advanced democratic republics, and even in America, where the free distribution of land (every settler was allotted sixty dessiatines* free of charge—better conditions can hardly be imagined!) has not yet entirely stopped, and where this has led to the complete domination of capital.

That is the second force.

Over here it is wavering, and is particularly weary. It has had to bear the burdens of the revolution, and in the past few years fresh burdens have been thrust upon it: a year of crop failure, surplus-grain appropriations, with cattle dying off because of the fodder shortage, etc. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that this second force—the masses of the peasantry—should give way to despair. They could not think of improving their condition although three and a half years have passed since the landowners were driven out, yet the improvement is becoming an urgent necessity. The dispersing army fails to find proper employment for its labour-power, and so this petty-bourgeois force is being transformed into an anarchic element, whose restiveness is an expression of its demands.

You are all familiar with the third force: the landowners and capitalists. It is no longer conspicuous in this country. But one crucial event, one critical lesson of the past few weeks—the Kronstadt events—was like a flash of lightning which threw more of a glare upon reality than anything else.

There is now no country in Europe without some white-guard elements. Russian émigrés in Europe have been estimated to total about seven hundred thousand. These are fugitive capitalists and the mass of office workers who could not adapt themselves to Soviet rule. We see nothing of this third force, it has emigrated, but it lives and operates in alliance with the capitalists of the world, who are assisting it as they assisted Kolchak, Yudenich and Wrangel, with money and in other ways, because they have their international bonds. We all remember these people. You must have noticed the abundance of extracts from the

* about 160 acres.—*Tr.*

whiteguard press in our newspapers over the last few days, explaining the events in Kronstadt. In the last few days, they have been described by Burtsev, who puts out a newspaper in Paris, and have been appraised by Milyukov—you must have all read this. Why have our newspapers devoted so much attention to it? Was it right to do so? It was, because we must have a clear view of our enemy. Abroad, they are not so conspicuous, but you will find that they have not moved very far away, just a few thousand versts at most; and having moved that far, have taken cover. They are alive and kicking, and lying in wait. That is why we must keep a close watch on them, especially because they are more than just refugees. Indeed, they are the agents of world capital, who work with it hand in glove.

You must have noticed that these extracts from the whiteguard newspapers published abroad appeared side by side with extracts from British and French newspapers. They are one chorus, one orchestra. It is true that such orchestras are not conducted by a man with a score. International capital uses less conspicuous means than a conductor's baton, but that it is one orchestra should be clear from any one of these extracts. They have admitted that if the slogan becomes "Soviet power without the Bolsheviks" they will all accept it. Milyukov explains this with particular clarity. He has made a close study of history, and has had a refresher course in Russian history at first hand. He has supplemented his twenty years of book learning with twenty months of personal experience: He says he is prepared to accept the "Soviet power without the Bolsheviks" slogan. He cannot see from over there in Paris whether this is to be a slight shift to the right or to the left, towards the anarchists. From over there, he cannot see what is going on in Kronstadt, but asks the monarchists not to rush and spoil things by shouting about it. He declares that even if the shift is to be to the left, he is prepared to back the Soviet power against the Bolsheviks.

This is what Milyukov says, and it is absolutely right. When he says that the Kronstadt events reveal an urge to set up a Soviet regime without the Bolsheviks, he shows that he has learned something from Russian history and from the landowners and capitalists. It is a demand for

a slight shift to the right, with a little bit of unrestricted trade, and a little bit of a constituent assembly—listen to any Menshevik, and you will hear it all, perhaps even without leaving this hall. If the slogan of the Kronstadt events is a slight deviation to the left—Soviet power with the anarchists, begotten by distress, war, the demobilisation of the army—why is Milyukov in favour of it? Because he knows that a deviation leads either to the proletarian dictatorship or to the capitalists.

Political power cannot exist in any other way. Although we are not waging our last battle but one of the last and decisive battles, the only correct answer to the question "Against whom shall we wage one of the decisive battles today?" is: "Against petty-bourgeois anarchy at home." (*Applause.*) As for the landowners and capitalists, we beat them in the first campaign, but only in the first one: the second is to be waged on an international scale. Modern capitalism cannot fight against us, even if it were a hundred times stronger, because over there, in the advanced countries, the workers disrupted its war yesterday and will disrupt it even more effectively today, because over there the consequences of the war are beginning to tell more and more. We have defeated the petty-bourgeois element at home, but it will make itself felt again. And that is taken into account by the landowners and the capitalists, particularly the clever ones, like Milyukov, who has told the monarchists: "Sit still, keep quiet, otherwise you will only strengthen the Soviet power." This has been proved by the general course of the revolutions in which the toilers, with temporary peasant support, set up short-lived dictatorships but had no consolidated power, so that after a brief period everything tended to slip back. This happened because the peasants, the toilers, the small proprietors, can have no policy of their own and must retreat after a period of vacillation. That was the case in the Great French Revolution, and, on a smaller scale, in all revolutions. And, of course, everyone has learned this lesson. Our whiteguards crossed the frontier, rode off a distance of three days' journey, and, backed and supported by West-European capital, are lying in wait and watching. Such is the situation. It makes clear the tasks and duties of the proletariat.

Weariness and exhaustion produce a certain mood, and sometimes lead to desperation. As usual, this tends to breed anarchism among the revolutionary elements. That was the case in all capitalist countries, and that is what is taking place in our own country. The petty-bourgeois element is in the grip of a crisis because it has had it hard over the past few years; not as hard as the proletariat had it in 1919, but hard, nevertheless. The peasantry had to save the state by accepting the surplus-grain appropriations without remuneration, but it can no longer stand the strain. That is why there is confusion and vacillation in its midst, and this is being taken into account by the capitalist enemy, who says: "All it needs is a little push, and it will start snowballing." That is the meaning of the Kronstadt events in the light of the alignment of class forces in the whole of Russia and on the international scale. That is the meaning of one of our last and crucial battles, for we have not beaten this petty-bourgeois-anarchist element, and the immediate fate of the revolution now depends on whether or not we succeed in doing so. If we do not, we shall slide down as the French Revolution did. This is inevitable, and we must not let ourselves be misled by phrases and excuses. We must do all we can to alleviate the position of these masses and safeguard the proletarian leadership. If we do this, the growing movement of the communist revolution in Europe will be further reinforced. What has not yet taken place there today, may well take place tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, but in world history such periods, as between today and tomorrow, mean no less than a few years.

That is my answer to the question as to what we are now fighting for, in one of our last and crucial battles. That is my reading of recent events and the significance of the class struggle in Russia. It is now clear why it has become so acute and why we find it so hard to see that the chief enemy is not Yudenich, Kolchak or Denikin, but our own conditions.

I can now go on to the concluding part of my speech (which is already too long), namely, the state of railway and water transport, and the tasks of the Railway and Water Transport Workers' Congress. I think that what

I have had to describe here is very intimately bound up with these tasks. There is hardly another section of the proletariat which comes so closely into contact with industry and agriculture in its everyday economic activity as the railway and water transport workers. You must supply the cities with food, and revive the rural areas by carrying the manufactured goods to them. That is clear to everyone, but it is much clearer to railway and water transport workers, because that is their everyday work. And from this, I think, follow the exceptionally important tasks and the responsibility now falling to the railway and water transport workers.

You all know that your Congress has been meeting just after some friction between the upper and the lower echelons of the union. When this question was brought up at the last Party Congress, decisions were adopted to reconcile them by subordinating the upper echelons to the lower, by rectifying the upper echelons' mistakes, which I think were of a minor nature but needed rectifying. You know that the Party Congress rectified these mistakes, that the Congress closed on a note of greater solidarity and unity in the ranks of the Communist Party than before. That is the legitimate, necessary and only correct reply that the vanguard, i.e., the leading section of the proletariat, can give to the movement of the petty-bourgeois-anarchist element. If we class-conscious workers realise the danger of this movement, if we rally our forces, work much more harmoniously and show a great deal more of solidarity, we shall multiply our forces. After our victory over the military attack, we shall conquer the vacillations and wavering of this element that is disturbing the whole of our everyday life and for that reason is, I repeat, dangerous. The decisions of the Party Congress, which rectified what was called to its attention, signify a great step forward in increasing the solidarity and unity of the proletarian army. Your Congress must do the same thing and implement the decisions of the Party Congress.

I repeat: the fate of the revolution depends more immediately upon the work of this section of the proletariat than upon any other. We must restore the exchange between agriculture and industry, and we need a material basis to

do so. What is it? It is railway and water transport. That is why it is your duty to dedicate yourselves to your work and this applies not only to those of you who are members of the Communist Party, and are therefore conscious vehicles of the proletarian dictatorship, but also to those of you who do not belong to the Party, but represent a transport workers trade union with a million, or a million and a half, members. All of you, learning the lessons of our revolution and of all preceding revolutions, must understand the full gravity of the present situation. If you do not allow yourselves to be blinded by all sorts of slogans, such as "Freedom", "Constituent Assembly", "Free Soviets"—it is so easy to switch labels that even Milyukov has turned up as a supporter of the Soviets of a Kronstadt republic—if you do not close your eyes to the alignment of class forces, you will acquire a sound and firm basis for all your political conclusions. You will then see that we are passing through a period of crisis in which it depends on us whether the proletarian revolution continues to march to victory as surely as before, or whether the vacillations and waverings lead to the victory of the whiteguards, which will not alleviate the situation, but will set Russia back from the revolution for many decades. The only conclusion that you, representatives of railway and water transport workers, can and should draw is—let's have much more proletarian solidarity and discipline. Comrades, we must achieve this at all costs, and win. (*Stormy applause.*)

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TO THE TRADE UNION COMMITTEE AND ALL WORKERS OF THE FIRST STATE MOTOR WORKS[89]

Dear comrades,

Comrade Smirnov, Chairman of your Trade Union Committee, has informed me of the production of motors and has invited me to attend the ceremony on April 7.

Please accept my congratulations, comrades, on the success of your efforts and the anniversary of the courses for mechanics. With all my heart, I wish you vigorous pursuit of your work, in which you are sure to score further successes. They are of especial significance from the standpoint of the whole mass of workers and peasants, because the development of motor production in Russia, with her abundant oil resources, holds out the possibility of organising the supply of peasant farms with efficient and low-cost machines. You must do all you can to make motor manufacture an even greater success.

With best wishes and communist greetings,

Lenin

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to the manuscript

REPORT ON THE TAX IN KIND DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF SECRETARIES AND RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATIVES OF R.C.P.(B.) CELLS OF MOSCOW AND MOSCOW GUBERNIA APRIL 9, 1921[90]

Comrades, one hears the most varied and highly confusing opinions on the question of the tax in kind and the change in our food policy, and also on the Soviet government's economic policy. Permit me, by arrangement with Comrade Kamenev, to share our subjects in such a way that he will give a detailed outline of the laws which have just been issued. This will be all the more appropriate for he chaired the commission which was appointed by the Party's Central Committee and later endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars, and which drew up all the recent laws at a number of conferences with representatives of the departments concerned. The last of these laws was issued yesterday, and we saw it in the newspapers this morning. There is no doubt that each of these laws raises a number of practical questions, and it will take some work to familiarise all the local Party and Soviet workers with them and to devise the proper methods of applying them in the localities.

I should like to draw your attention to their general significance, or the principle behind them. How are we to explain the fact that the Soviet government and the dictatorship of the proletariat are about to accept some freedom of trade? To what extent can unrestricted trade and individual enterprise be permitted side by side with the socialist economy? To what extent can we permit such a revival of capitalism, which may seem to be inevitable with a free market, however restricted? What has called

forth this change? What is its real meaning, character and significance? And how should members of the Communist Party understand it? How is it to be explained, and what are the limits of its practical application? This, approximately, is the task I have set myself.

The first question is: what has called forth this change, which many think to be too drastic and not sufficiently justified?

The fundamental and principal reason for the change is the extraordinarily acute crisis of peasant farming, and its very difficult condition, which has proved to be much harder by the spring of 1921 than could have been expected. On the other hand, its consequences have affected the restoration of our transport system and of our industry. I should like to point out that most mistakes on the question of substituting the tax in kind for the surplus-grain appropriation system, and on the significance of the change, are made because there is no effort to analyse the nature of the change and its implications. Here is a picture of peasant farming by the spring of 1921: an extremely severe crisis caused by the war-time ruin and aggravated by a disastrous crop failure and the resultant fodder shortage (for the failure also affected the hay crop) and loss of cattle; and the weakening of the productive forces of peasant farming, which in many places was doomed to utter ruin. And here we come to this question: what is the connection between this terribly acute crisis of peasant farming and the Soviet government's abolition of the surplus-grain appropriation system? I say that if we are to understand this measure we must ask ourselves: what is the transition we are making?

In the event of a workers' revolution in a country with a predominantly peasant population, with the factories, works and railways taken over by the working class, what, in essence, should be the economic relations between the working class and the peasantry? They should obviously be the following: the workers producing in the factories and works, which now belong to them, all that is necessary for the country—and that means also for the peasants, who constitute the majority of the population—should transport all these things on their railroads and river vessels and deliver them to the peasants, in return for the surplus

agricultural produce. This is absolutely obvious and hardly requires detailed explanation although it is constantly forgotten in the tax discussions. But it should be borne in mind, because if we are to explain the significance of the tax in kind, which is only a transitional measure, we must have a clear understanding of what we want to achieve. What I have said makes it clear that we do not want the peasants' products to be delivered to the workers' state as appropriations of surplus grain, or a tax. We want them in exchange for all the goods the peasants need delivered to them by our transport system. We must have such an arrangement. It is a basis for the economy of a country which has adopted socialism. If peasant farming is to develop, we must also assure its transition to the next stage which must inevitably be one of gradual amalgamation of the small, isolated peasant farms—the least profitable and most backward—into large-scale collective farms. That is how socialists have always visualised it, and that is exactly how our own Communist Party sees it. I repeat, the greatest source of error and confusion is in appraising the tax in kind without making allowance for the specific features of the transitional measures which we must take, if we are to attain the goals which we can and must reach.

What, then, is the tax in kind? It is a measure in which we see something of the past and something of the future. A tax is something the state takes from the population without compensation. If it is fixed at approximately one-half of last year's rate of surplus-grain appropriations it alone will not suffice for the workers' state to maintain its Red Army, the whole of industry, and the whole of the non-agricultural population, and to develop production and relations with foreign countries, whose assistance in the way of machinery and equipment we need. On the one hand, the workers' state wants to rely on the tax at approximately one-half the surplus-grain appropriations rate, and on the other, on the exchange of manufactured goods for the surplus products of peasant farming. Hence, the tax contains a moiety of the old appropriation system and a moiety of that which is the only correct system, namely, the exchange of the manufactures of big socialist factories for the products of peasant farming through the medium

of food supply organisations of the working-class state and workers' and peasants' co-operative societies.

Why are we compelled to resort to a measure of which a moiety belongs to the past and a moiety only is put on proper lines? After all, we are not at all sure that we shall be able to put it on proper lines at once, or that it will be at all considerable. Why are we compelled to resort to such a half-measure? Why must we rely on such measures in our food and economic policy? What is it that makes it imperative? Everyone knows, of course, that it is not the Soviet government's preference for some particular policy. It is the grinding need and the desperate situation. You know that for several years after the victory of the workers' revolution in Russia, after the imperialist war, we had to endure a civil war, and it is now no exaggeration to say that Russia suffered more than any other country involved in the imperialist war, including those which had suffered because it was fought on their territory. For after four years of imperialist war we endured three years of civil war, which brought more havoc and industrial dislocation than any external war, because it was fought in the very heart of the country. This terrible devastation is the main reason why initially during the war—particularly when the Civil War cut us off from grain areas, like Siberia, the Caucasus and the whole of the Ukraine, and from our supplies of coal and oil, and reduced our possibilities of obtaining other types of fuel—we could hold out—in a besieged fortress—only through the surplus-grain appropriation system, that is, by taking from the peasant whatever surplus produce was available, and sometimes even a part of his necessaries, in order to keep the army in fighting trim and to prevent industry from going to pieces altogether. During the Civil War, this problem was one of extraordinary difficulty, and was declared insoluble by all the other parties. Take the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, i.e., the parties of the petty bourgeoisie and the kulaks. At the most acute moments of the Civil War they did the most shouting about the Bolsheviks' having undertaken a crazy task, and the impossibility of holding out when all the powers were assisting the white-guards. Indeed, the problem was one of exceptional diffi-

culty, and called for a supreme effort. It was successfully solved only because of what, you might say, was the superhuman sacrifices on the part of the working class and the peasantry. The working class never suffered such malnutrition, such starvation, as it did in the first years of its dictatorship. This naturally left as the only alternative the appropriation system, which meant taking from the peasant all of his surplus and a part of his necessaries. He was told: "You, too, will have to go hungry for a while, but together we shall save our cause and drive off Denikin and Wrangel." That was the only conceivable solution.

This was not an economic system or an economic plan for a policy, adopted from a number of possible choices. That was not the case at all. We could not think of restoring industry without ensuring a minimum of food and fuel. Appropriation of surpluses without remuneration—because you can't call paper currency remuneration—was the only answer to the task we set ourselves to preserve the remnants of industry, to keep the workers from dispersing altogether, and to maintain the army. We had no other way out. That is what we are discarding, and I have already told you what we are adopting. The tax is to help us make the transition. If it were possible to restore our industry faster, then perhaps, with a better harvest, we could make an earlier transition to the exchange of manufactured goods for agricultural products.

Many of you may remember that the question of switching efforts to the economic front was raised at the Ninth Party Congress. At the time, all attention was focused on it. We thought that we had finished with the war: after all, we did offer bourgeois Poland incredibly favourable peace terms. But the peace was disrupted, and there followed the Polish war and its sequel—Wrangel, etc. The period between the Ninth and the Tenth congresses was almost entirely a period of war. You know that we signed a final peace treaty with the Poles only very recently; and a few days ago we signed a peace agreement with the Turks, which alone will rid us of interminable wars in the Caucasus. We have only now concluded a trade agreement with Britain, which is of world-wide significance. Only now has Britain been compelled to enter into

commercial relations with us. America, for example, still refuses to do so. This will give you an idea of how hard it was for us to extricate ourselves from the war. Had we been able to realise the anticipations of the Ninth Congress right away, we would, of course, have been able to provide a much larger quantity of goods.

Today I had a visit from Comrade Korolyov of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, our most industrial, proletarian, Red gubernia. He gave me some facts and figures. In the first year only six factories were in operation, and not one of them ran for a month without stoppages. Industry was grinding down to a standstill. During the past year, 22 factories were started for the first time, some running for several months, others up to half a year, without stoppages. The planned target was set at 150 million arshins, and according to the latest figures they produced 117 million arshins, getting only half the fuel they had been allocated. That is how production plans were disrupted, not only in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, but all over Russia. This was due to a large extent to the decline of peasant farming, to loss of cattle, and the impossibility of transporting a sufficient quantity of firewood to the railway stations and river wharves, all of which gave Ivanovo-Voznesensk less firewood, less peat, and less oil than it should have had. The miracle is that, with only half the fuel they should have got, they turned out 117 million arshins of the planned 150 million. They increased the productivity of labour and transferred the workers to the best factories, obtaining a high percentage of output. Here is a pretty good example, on our own doorstep, illustrating our position. The Ninth Congress fixed the textile target output at over 600 million arshins, but we produced less than one-third of this because even Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, which proved to be the best, made only 117 million arshins. Picture to yourselves Russia's millions and these 117 million arshins of cotton goods! This is poverty! The rehabilitation of industry lagged on such a scale that by the spring of 1921 it seemed to be quite hopeless. We had to have a huge army, and it was built up to several millions. Because of the dislocation of transport, it was very hard to demobilise it quickly in the winter. We did it only by a supreme effort.

That was the situation we faced. Was there any other way out but to cut food appropriations to the limit, taking 240 million poods of grain instead of 423 million? That is the least we must collect with a medium harvest, if we are to get by. If we are to have more, we must give peasant farming an opportunity to revive. This requires some measures, and the best one, of course, would be to restore large-scale industry. The best and the only economically correct measure would be to increase industrial output and give the peasant more of the things he needs, not only cotton goods for the farmer and his family, but also badly needed machines and implements, even if they are of the simplest kind. But the metal industry was in the same state as the textile industry. That was the situation we faced. We failed to restore industry after the Ninth Congress because we were hit by a year of war, fuel shortage, lack of transport facilities, and the prostration of peasant farming. What can be done to give the utmost assistance to peasant farming? Only a reduction of food appropriations and their conversion into a tax of 240 million poods, given a medium harvest, and even less, if the harvest is bad. The peasant must be sure that after paying a certain amount, fixed at the minimum level, he will be absolutely free to grow as much as he can and use the rest of his products to get what he needs and improve his farm not only with the help of industry, which would be the best and most rational way, but would take more resources than we now command. The tax is fixed at the minimum, and its enforcement in the localities will stimulate small industry, for we cannot set large-scale industry to rights as soon as we should like. This has been proved by the Ivanovo-Voznesensk programme, which yielded the largest portion of what we had planned for. We must wait another year until fuel stocks are large enough to ensure the operation of all the factories. We shall be lucky to do it in a year, or even two. Can we assure the peasant of supplies? We can, if the harvest turns out to be a good one.

When the question of the tax in kind was being decided at the Party Congress the delegates were given a pamphlet by Comrade Popov, Director of our Central Statistical Board, on grain output in Russia. An enlarged edition will be

published within a few days, and all of you should read it. It gives an idea of grain production, with the figures calculated from the returns of our census, which gave us the exact figures of the population and an estimate of the size of farms. It says that with a yield of 40 poods per dessiatine, peasant farming on Soviet Russia's present area could provide 500 million poods of surplus grain that would cover the 350 million poods required by the urban population and leave us a fund for foreign trade and the improvement of peasant farming. The harvest was so bad that the yield was no more than an average of twenty-eight poods per dessiatine. This produced a deficit. If we accept the statisticians' figure of requirements at eighteen poods per head, we must subtract three poods per head and oblige every peasant to go on short rations in order to keep the army and the industrial workers on half-rations. In that situation, we could do nothing but reduce the surplus appropriations to a minimum and convert them into a tax. We must concentrate on improving small peasant farming. We had no cotton goods, machines or other goods produced by large factories to give the peasant farmers, but it is a problem requiring urgent solution, and we have to solve it with the aid of small industry. We should have some results from the new measure this very first year.

Now, why is peasant farming the focus? Because it alone can give us the food and the fuel we need. If the working class, as the ruling class exercising its dictatorship, wants to run the economy properly, it must say: the crisis of peasant farming is the weakest spot. It must be remedied, and another start made on the revival of large-scale industry, 90 that in Ivanovo-Voznesensk district, for instance, all 70 factories—and not just 22—are running again. These large factories will then satisfy national demand, and the working class will deliver the goods to the peasants in exchange for farm produce, instead of taking it in the form of a tax. That is the transition we are making, and the price is short rations all round, if we are to save those who alone can keep what is left of industry and the railways going, and the army in the field to fight off the whiteguards.

Our grain appropriations-were maligned by the Mensheviks, who said that the Soviet power had given the

population nothing but grain appropriations, want and destruction. They gloated over the fact that after the partial restoration of peace, after the end of the Civil War, the swift rehabilitation of our industry had proved to be impossible. But even the richest countries will take years to get their industry going full blast again. Even a rich country like France will take a long time to revive her industry, and she did not suffer as much from the war as we did, because only a small part of her territory was devastated. The astonishing thing is that in the first year of a partial peace we were able to start 22 factories out of 70 in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and to produce 117 million arshins of cotton goods out of an anticipated 150 million. The grain appropriations had once been inevitable, but now we have had to change our food policy: we have had to switch from the surplus appropriation system to the tax. This will undoubtedly improve the peasant's condition, and give him an assurance and a sense of certainty that he will be free to exchange all his available grain surplus at least for local handicraft wares. This explains why the Soviet government must conduct an economic policy on these lines.

Now, in conclusion, let me explain how this policy can be reconciled with the communist standpoint and how it has come about that the communist Soviet power is promoting a free market. Is it good from the standpoint of communism? To answer this question we must make a careful examination of the changes that have taken place in peasant farming. First, we witnessed the assault of the whole of the peasantry on the rule of the landowners, who were fought both by the poor peasants and the kulaks, although, of course, their motives were different: the kulaks wanted to take the land away from the landowners to develop their own farms. That was when it became clear that the kulaks and the poor peasants had divergent interests and aims. In the Ukraine, this divergence of interests is still much more in evidence than it is over here. The poor peasants could derive very little direct benefit from the transfer of land from the landowners to themselves, because they had neither the materials nor the implements. We find the poor peasants organising to prevent the kulaks from seizing the land taken away from the landowners. The Soviet government

helped the Poor Peasants' Committees that sprang up in Russia and in the Ukraine.[91] As a result, the middle peasants have become the predominant element in the rural areas. We know this from statistics, and everyone who lives in the country knows it from his own observations. The extremes of kulak and poor have been rounded off, and the majority of the population have come closer to the status of the middle peasant. If we want to raise the productivity of our peasant farming we must reckon chiefly with the middle peasant. The Communist Party has had to shape its policy accordingly.

Since the middle peasants now predominate in the rural areas, we must help them to improve their farming; moreover, we must make the same demands on them as we do on the workers. The principal question discussed at the last Party Congress was that of food propaganda: concentrate on the economic front, raise the productivity of labour and increase output. No progress is possible unless these tasks are fulfilled. If we say this to the worker, we must say as much to the peasant, but will demand in return that, after paying the tax, he should enlarge his farm, in the knowledge that no more will be exacted from him and that he will be free to use the whole of his surplus to develop his farm. Consequently, the change in policy in respect of the peasants is due to the change in their status. There are more middle peasants in the make-up of the rural areas and we must reckon with this, if we are to boost the productive forces.

Let me also remind you of the arguments I had with the "Left Communist" group in 1918, after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace.[92] Those who were in the Party at the time will remember that some Communists feared that the conclusion of the Brest Peace would disrupt all communist policy. In the course of the argument with these comrades I said, among other things: State capitalism is nothing to fear in Russia; it would be a step forward. That sounded very strange: How could state capitalism be a step forward in a Soviet socialist republic? I replied: Take a close look at the actual economic relations in Russia. We find at least five different economic systems, or structures, which, from bottom to top, are: first, the patriarchal

economy, when the peasant farms produce only for their own needs, or are in a nomadic or semi-nomadic state, and we happen to have any number of these; second, small commodity production, when goods are sold on the market; third, capitalist production, the emergence of capitalists, small private capital; fourth, state capitalism, and fifth, socialism. And if we do take a close look we shall find all these relations in Russia's economic system even today. In no circumstances must we forget what we have occasion to see very often, namely, the socialist attitude of workers at state factories, who collect fuel, raw materials and food, or try to arrange a proper distribution of manufactured goods among the peasants and to deliver them with their own transport facilities. That is socialism. But alongside is small enterprise, which very often exists independently of it. Why can it do so? Because large-scale industry is not back on its feet, and socialist factories are getting perhaps only one-tenth of what they should be getting. In consequence, small enterprise remains independent of the socialist factories. The incredible havoc, the shortage of fuel, raw materials and transport facilities allow small enterprise to exist separately from socialism. I ask you: What is state capitalism in these circumstances? It is the amalgamation of small-scale production. Capital amalgamates small enterprises and grows out of them. It is no use closing our eyes to this fact. Of course, a free market means a growth of capitalism; there's no getting away from the fact. And anyone who tries to do so will be deluding himself. Capitalism will emerge wherever there is small enterprise and free exchange. But are we to be afraid of it, if we have control of the factories, transport and foreign trade? Let me repeat what I said then: I believe it to be incontrovertible that we need have no fear of this capitalism. Concessions are that kind of capitalism.

We have been trying hard to conclude concession agreements, but, unfortunately, have not yet concluded a single one. Nevertheless, we are nearer to them now than we were several months ago, when we last discussed concessions. What are concessions from the standpoint of economic relations? They are state capitalism. The Soviet government concludes an agreement with a capitalist. Under it,

the latter is provided with certain things: raw materials, mines, oilfields, minerals, or, as was the case in one of the last proposals, even a special factory (the ball-bearing project of a Swedish enterprise). The socialist state gives the capitalist its means of production such as factories, mines and materials. The capitalist operates as a contractor leasing socialist means of production, making a profit on his capital and delivering a part of his output to the socialist state.

Why is it that we badly need such an arrangement? Because it gives us, all at once, a greater volume of goods which we need but cannot produce ourselves. That is how we get state capitalism. Should it scare us? No, it should not, because it is up to us to determine the extent of the concessions. Take oil concessions. They will give us millions of poods of paraffin oil right away, and that is more than we produce ourselves. This is to our advantage, because in exchange for the paraffin oil—and not paper money—the peasant will give us his grain surplus, and we shall immediately be able to improve the situation in the whole country. That is why the capitalism that is bound to grow out of a free market holds no terrors for us. It will be the result of growing trade, the exchange of manufactured goods, even if produced by small industry, for agricultural produce.

Today's law tells you that workers in some industries are to be issued a certain part of the articles manufactured in their factories in the form of a bonus in kind which they can exchange for grain. For example, provided they satisfy the requirements of the state, textile workers will receive a part of the textile goods they manufacture and will be able to exchange them for grain. This must be done to improve the condition of the workers and of the peasants as soon as possible. We cannot do this on a nation-wide scale, but it must be done at all costs. That is why we do not shut our eyes to the fact that a free market entails some development of capitalism, and we say: This capitalism will be under the control and surveillance of the state. We need have no fear of it because the workers' state has taken possession of the factories and railways. It will help to stimulate the economic exchange of peasant produce for the manufactures of neighbouring craftsmen, who will

satisfy some, if not all, of the peasants' requirements in manufactured goods. The peasant economy will improve, and that is something we need to do desperately. Let small industry grow to some extent and let state capitalism develop—the Soviet power need have no fear of that. We must face the facts squarely and call a spade a spade, but we must also control and determine the limits of this development.

Concessions are nothing to be afraid of. There is nothing terrible about giving the concessionaires a few factories and retaining the bulk in our own hands. Of course, it would be absurd for the Soviet power to hand out the bulk of its property in the form of concessions. That would not be concessions, but a return to capitalism. There is nothing to fear in concessions so long as we retain possession of all the state enterprises and weigh up exactly and strictly the concessions we grant, and the terms and scale on which we grant them. Growing capitalism will be under control and supervision, while political power will remain in the hands of the working class and of the workers' state. The capital which will exist in the form of concessions and the capital which will inevitably grow through the medium of the co-operatives and a free market, have no terrors for us. We must try to develop and improve the condition of the peasantry, and make a great effort to have this benefit the working class. We shall be able to do all that can be done to improve peasant farming and develop local trade more quickly with concessions than without them, while planning our national economy for a much faster rehabilitation of large-scale socialist industry. We shall be able to do this more quickly with the help of a rested and recuperated peasant economy than with the absolutely poverty-stricken peasant farming we have had up to now.

That is what I have to say on the communist appreciation of this policy, on why it was necessary, and why, if properly applied, it will bring improvement immediately, or, at all events, more quickly than if it had not been applied.

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MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO THE CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF WOMEN'S DEPARTMENTS OF THE PEOPLES OF SOVIET REGIONS AND REPUBLICS IN THE EAST[93]

I deeply regret that I am unable to attend your conference because of the pressure of work. Please accept my heartfelt greetings and best wishes of success in your work, particularly in preparing for the forthcoming First All-Russia Non-Party Congress of Women of the East, which, correctly prepared and conducted, must greatly help *the cause of awakening the women of the East and uniting them organisationally.*

Lenin

Pravda No. 77, April 10, 1921

Published according to the *Pravda* text collated with the original signed by Lenin

REPORT ON CONCESSIONS AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS APRIL 11, 1921[94]

Comrades, the concessions question has, rather unexpectedly, brought out some differences among us, for it appeared to have been finally settled in principle as long ago as the autumn of last year, and when the Council of People's Commissars issued its concessions decree on November 23, there was no sign of protest, or of any disagreement, in Party circles, among the responsible workers, at any rate. You are, of course, aware that the Party Congress had to take a special decision confirming the concessions decree and specifically extending it to cover any concessions in Baku and Grozny.[95] This had to be done at the Party Congress to prevent any vacillation on policy in the Central Committee, whose division on this very question has to some extent proved to be quite out of line with earlier groupings, but which is largely connected with Baku. Some Baku comrades resented the idea that Baku too—or, perhaps, specifically—is to have concessions, and that it is desirable to lease out a major part of its oilfields. Their arguments were highly diverse, and ranged from references to their own "exploration", which could be done without any foreigners, to assertions that the old workers, who spent a lifetime fighting the capitalists, refuse to be saddled with their yoke once again, etc.

I am not going to say offhand how much of these arguments was based on general principles and how much on Baku "patriotism" and localism. Let me say for my part that I have opposed this view most vigorously in the belief that if we do not manage to conduct a concessions policy and attract foreign capital to our concessions, we can hardly

consider any serious practical measures to improve our economic position. We cannot seriously entertain the idea of an immediate improvement of the economic situation, unless we operate a policy of concessions, unless we discard our prejudices, our local patriotism, discard to some extent our craft patriotism, and to some extent the idea that we can do our own "exploring". We must be prepared for inconveniences, hardships and sacrifices; we must be ready to break our habits and possibly our addictions as well, for the sole purpose of working a marked change and improvement in the economic state of the key industries. This must be done at all costs.

The Party Congress concentrated on the policy in respect of the peasants and on the tax in kind, which has, in general, a high legislative priority and is, in particular, central to the Party's political efforts. In the context of both these issues, we have become aware that we are unable to boost productivity in large-scale industry as swiftly as the satisfaction of peasant needs demands, without the makeshifts of unrestricted trade and free production. These are the two crutches we must now use to move on, for, otherwise, as everyone in his right mind will see, we shall be unable to keep abreast of developments. After all, the situation is worsening, if only because the floating this spring has been largely hampered by various factors, chiefly the weather. There is a looming fuel crisis. The spring also holds out the threat of another crop failure, again because of the weather; this is liable to create a fodder shortage, which may, in its turn, still further reduce the fuel supply. If on top of this we happen to have a drought, the crisis threatens to be truly exceptional. We must understand that in these conditions what the Programme says—chiefly about the great need to increase the food supply—is not intended for admiration or for a show of great love for various resolutions (which the Communists have been doing with great zeal), but as a call to increase the quantity of foodstuffs at any cost. That is something we cannot do without the help of foreign capital. This should be plain to everyone who takes a realistic view of things. That is why the concessions question became important enough to be dealt with by the Party Congress.

After a short debate, the Council of People's Commissars adopted the basic principles of concessions agreements.[96] I shall now read them and underscore those which are of especial importance or have given rise to disagreements. We cannot seriously entertain the idea of economic development unless all members of the Party, specially the leaders of the trade union movement, that is, of the organised masses of the proletariat—its organised majority—understand the present situation and draw the appropriate conclusions. I shall read out the basic principles of the concessions agreement one by one, as they were adopted by the Council of People's Commissars. Let me add that we have not yet concluded a single concessions agreement. We have already given expression to our disagreements of principle—we are past masters at that sort of thing—but have not yet secured any concessions. I suppose this will make some people happy, which is unfortunate, because if we fail to attract capital to our concessions, we shall merely prove that we are poor businessmen. But then, of course, the Communists can always have a field day with resolutions, filling up all the stocks of paper that we have. Here is Point One:

"1. The concessionaire shall improve the condition of the workers employed at the concession enterprises (as compared with that of other workers employed at similar enterprises in the area) up to the average standard abroad."

We have inserted this basic provision in the agreement to bring out the gist of the matter at once for our Communists and chiefs of economic agencies. What is the most important aspect of any concession? It is, of course, an increase in the quantity of goods. That is self-evident. But what is also highly—if not much more—important is that we can secure an immediate improvement in the condition of the workers employed at the oil concession enterprises. These provisions of the concession agreement were adopted after several discussions, in particular, on the basis of the talks the plenipotentiaries of the R.S.F.S.R., specifically Comrade Krasin, have had with some of the financial magnates of modern imperialism. Let me say—and you are of course all aware of this—that the great majority of our Communists have a book knowledge of capitalism and finance capital; they may even have written a pamphlet or two on the

subject, but 99 per cent of them don't know how to do business with financial magnates and, I'm afraid, will never learn.

In that respect, Comrade Krasin has had some exceptional experience, for he has made a study of the practices and organisation of industry in Germany and Russia. We informed him of these terms, and he replied that they were, on the whole, acceptable. The concessionaire is above all duty bound to improve the condition of the workers. This very point was discussed by Krasin in his exploratory talks with an oil king, and the West-European capitalists were quite clear on the point that, the condition of the workers being what it is, it was absolutely impossible to expect greater productivity. The proviso that the concessionaire must improve the workers' condition is not a humanitarian but a purely business proposition. Point Two:

"2. Account shall be taken of the lower productivity of the Russian worker and provision made for the possibility of a revision of the Russian worker's rate of labour productivity, depending on the improvement of his living conditions."

We had to make this reservation to prevent a one-sided reading of the clause. All these provisions are rules and directives for any representatives of the Soviet power who may have to deal with the concessions, and are the basis on which the agreements are to be worked out. We have drafts of an oil agreement, an agreement on ball-bearing plants, a draft timber concession, and an agreement on Kamchatka, which is being aired for a long time but is not being implemented for various reasons. Point Two was required to prevent a literal reading of Point One. We must consider the fact that labour productivity will not rise until the workers' condition improves. Refusal to consider this would be so unbusiness-like that the capitalist would not even bother to negotiate. Point Three:

"3. It shall be the duty of the concessionaire to supply the workers employed at the concession enterprises with the necessary means of subsistence from abroad, selling them to the workers at no higher than cost price plus a certain percentage for overhead expenses."

There was a proposal to set the figure at 10 per cent, but it was discarded in the final discussion. The important

thing here is that we stipulate the supply of the means of subsistence for the workers from abroad. We know that with the present state of peasant farming and the fuel problem we shall be unable, within the next few years, to effect a radical improvement in the workers' condition, and, consequently, to increase labour productivity. It is, therefore, necessary for the concessionaire to include in the agreement a provision covering the supply of all the means of consumption from abroad, something he can easily do, and we already have the tentative consent of some capitalist sharks on this point. The concessionaires will accept these terms because they are extremely anxious to obtain the tremendously valuable raw materials. For them the supply of raw materials is a prime necessity. Whether these priority enterprises will be employing 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 workers, the concessionaires will have no trouble in obtaining the necessaries for the workers, considering the ties between modern syndicates and trusts, for very few capitalists today are not syndicated and trustified, and all large enterprises are based on monopoly, instead of the free market; consequently, they can always block supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs for other capitalists and obtain all they require under all manner of provisional agreements. These syndicates operate with hundreds of millions of dollars. They will have vast stocks of food at their disposal, and will, consequently, be able to obtain foodstuffs and other necessaries for several tens of thousands of workers, and transport them to Russia.

They will not find it an economic problem at all. They will regard these enterprises as being on the priority list—they will make a profit of 100, if not 1,000, per cent—and supply them with food. I repeat, that will be no economic problem for them at all. We must put at the heart of our concessions policy the task of improving the condition of the workers at the enterprises of the first category, and then at the rest. Here is Point Four:

"4. It shall also be the duty of the concessionaire, in the event of a request on the part of the R.S.F.S.R. Government, to import another 50-100 per cent over and above the supplies he brings in for the workers employed at the concession enterprises, handing it over to the R.S.F.S.R. Govern-

ment in return for a payment of similar size (cost plus a certain percentage for overhead expenses). The R.S.F.S.R. Government shall have the right to meet this payment with a part of the product extracted by the concessionaire (that is, to deduct it from its own share)."

This stipulation was also accepted by the financial magnates in the exploratory talks because they put the concession enterprises on the priority list.

They will be in a position to monopolise the marketing of the oil which they can obtain from us, and this is why they can supply foodstuffs not only to the workers employed at their enterprises but also a certain percentage over and above that. A comparison of this clause with Point One shows that the pivot of our concessions policy is improvement of the condition of the workers, initially of those employed at the concession enterprises, and then, to a somewhat lesser extent, of the other workers as well, with some of the consumer goods being obtained from abroad. Even if we had the wherewithal to pay for them, we ourselves are not in a position to purchase them in the international market. You may have the currency, say, gold, but you must bear in mind that there is no free market, for it is all, or nearly all, controlled by the syndicates, cartels and trusts, which are ruled by their imperialist profits. They will supply consumer goods only to workers of their own enterprises, and not for those of others, because the old capitalism—meaning the free market—is no longer there. That shows the essence of our concessions policy in the context of the present conditions of finance capital and the behemoth struggle between the trusts. The concessions policy is an alliance concluded by one side against another, and so long as we are not strong enough, we must play off their hostile rivalry, so as to hold out until the victory of the international revolution. They can assure the workers of their maintenance because it is no trouble at all for a large modern enterprise to supply an extra 20,000 or 30,000 workers. This would allow us to meet the expenditure with raw materials, say, oil. If we were able to pay for this additional quantity of necessaries for the workers with an additional quantity of timber or ore—our chief resources—we should be in a position to start by

improving the condition of the workers employed at the concession enterprises and use what is left to improve, to a lesser extent, the condition of other workers. Point Five:

"5. It shall be the duty of the concessionaire to abide by the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., in particular, those relating to working conditions, terms of payment, etc.; and enter into agreements with the trade unions (in the event of the concessionaire's demand we are prepared to add that under such agreements both parties shall be bound by the average norm of American or West-European workers)."

This reservation is being made to remove any fears the capitalists may have in respect of our trade unions. We say that agreements must be entered into with our trade unions because their participation is stipulated by all the relevant laws—all essential laws stipulate the participation of trade unions which enjoy statutory status in accordance with socialist principles. The well-informed capitalist is aware that the trade unions are guided by Communist groups and, through them, by the Party, and he would be highly suspicious if we told him that he would have to enter into agreements with our trade unions, because he would be apprehensive of all sorts of absurdities on the part of these Communists, and would, in consequence, make the most incredible demands. Such fears are quite natural from the capitalist standpoint. That is why we must say that we favour a business agreement—otherwise there is nothing to discuss. That is why we say we are prepared to make that addendum. We are prepared to accept, for ourselves and our trade unions, a norm equal to the average American or West-European labour norm. Otherwise, I repeat, there can be no question at all of any agreement adapted to capitalist relations. Point Six:

"6. It shall be the duty of the concessionaire strictly to observe the scientific and technical regulations in conformity with Russian and foreign legislation (details to be stated in each agreement)."

This point is to be elaborated in the agreement in particular detail. The oil agreement, for instance, contains 10 clauses setting forth and describing detailed scientific regulations. Inability to attend to the proper scientific

exploitation of labour-power, as of the land, is the hallmark of capitalist economic operations. Scientific and technical regulations are a way of overcoming it. Incorrect or insufficiently correct working of oilfields is known to result in their flooding. It is clearly very important for us to obtain the technical equipment. You will recall that *The Plan for the Electrification of Russia* estimated just how much of that equipment we needed. I do not remember the exact figure, but the overall expenditures for electrification were estimated at 17,000 million gold rubles, with the priority projects taking about a decade to fulfil. We expect to cover up to 11,000 million from our own resources—gold and exports—which leaves 6,000 million outstanding. The authors of the plan say that we shall either have to borrow or lease. The deficit has to be made good. The plan was worked out for the whole Republic by the best brains and provides for a balanced development of all branches of industry. The chief problem is fuel and its most economic, rational and efficient use in the key industries. We should be unable to solve it if we did not have any concessions or credit facilities. These conditions may suddenly turn out to be non-existent, and that at the most welcome moment, say, after a large strike, like the one now on in Britain, or the one which was recently defeated in Germany.[97] But a successful strike and a successful revolution will come in the wake of an unsuccessful one, and we shall then find ourselves with socialist, instead of capitalist, relations.

Stoppages in oil extraction may prove to be disastrous. The capitalists have failed to reach Baku's 1905 rate. It turns out that the danger of flooding is also reckoned with abroad, for instance, in California and Rumania. Insufficient pump-off of water results in ever greater flooding.

There are detailed regulations on this score in Russian and foreign legislation. When dealing with this matter in Baku, we sought the opinion of our experts on Rumanian and Californian legislation. If we are to safeguard our oil resources, we must see that the scientific and technical regulations are observed. If we are to lease, say, a tract of forest we must see that the lumbering is done in a proper manner. If it should be an oil lease, we must stipulate measures to prevent flooding. In each case, there must be

observance of scientific and technical regulations and rational exploitation. Where are the regulations to come from? They are to be taken from Russian and foreign legislation, and this will allay any suspicions that they are our own invention, in which case no capitalist will bother to negotiate with us. We intend to take what there is in Russian and foreign legislation. If we take the best of what there is in Russian and any foreign legislation, we shall have a basis to guarantee the standards attained by the leading capitalists. These are well-known business standards borrowed from capitalist practice, and not a Communist flight of fancy which the capitalists fear most of all. We guarantee that none of the terms, aspects or clauses of our concession agreement will go beyond the framework of capitalist legislation. We must never lose sight of this key proposition. We must take capitalist relationships as a basis to show that the capitalists will find these terms acceptable and profitable, but we, for our part, must turn them to good advantage. Otherwise, it is a waste of time to talk about concessions. But to return to what is recognised in capitalist legislation. Advanced capitalism is known to be superior to our own industry in technical organisation and improvements. For that reason, we are not confining ourselves to Russian legislation, and in the case of oil we have started to borrow from Russian, Rumanian and Californian legislation. We are entitled to take any law, which will dispel any suspicions of arbitrariness or whim. That will be easily understood by the modern advanced capitalist and financial magnate, in fact, finance capital as a whole, for our terms and standards will conform to those prevalent abroad, and we are proposing them with an eye to the business practices of capitalism. In this case, we are not indulging in any flights of fancy, but are setting ourselves the practical goal of improving our industry and raising it to the levels of modern advanced capitalism. Anyone who has an idea of the state of our industry will see that this will be a tremendous improvement. If we were to do this even in respect of a certain section of our industry, say, one-tenth of it, we should still be taking a great step forward, which would be feasible for them, and highly desirable for us. Point Seven:

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"7. A rule similar to that set forth in Point Four shall also apply to the equipment imported by the concessionaire from abroad."

Point Four says that the concessionaire shall be bound, in the event the clause is written into the agreement, to import a certain quantity of goods for sale, against a special payment, over and above what he imports for his own operations. If the capitalist should import improved types of bores and tools for himself, we shall be entitled to demand that he import, say, an extra 25 per cent for us, over and above the bores he imports for himself, the payment arrangements to be the same as those specified in Point Four, that is, cost plus a definite percentage for overhead expenses.

The future is very bright, but we should never confuse our activity in these two planes: on the one hand, there is the agitation which brings nearer this future, and on the other, the ability now to adapt ourselves to and exist in the capitalist encirclement. If we fail to do that we might find ourselves in the position of one who has had his chance but was not alert enough to act in time. We must manage, by taking advantage of the peculiarities of the capitalist world and the capitalist avidity for raw materials, to derive all the benefits that would help us to consolidate our economic positions among the capitalists, strange as that may sound. The task seems to be an odd one: How can a socialist republic improve its positions with capitalist support? We had an instance of this during the war. We did not win the war because we were stronger, but because, while being weaker, we played off the enmity between the capitalist states. Either we now succeed in playing off the rivalry between the trusts, or we shall find ourselves unadapted to capitalist conditions and unable to exist in the capitalist encirclement. Point Eight:

"8. A special clause in each agreement shall regulate the question of payment to the workers employed at the concession enterprises of wages in foreign currency special coupons, Soviet currency, etc."

You see that in this case we are prepared to accept payment in any currency, whether foreign or Soviet, or in coupons, and show goodwill by being prepared to consider

any of the businessmen's proposals. Of the concrete proposals there is the one Vanderlip made to our representatives. He said: "I should like to pay the workers an average wage of, say, a dollar and a half a day. On my concession territory I would set up stores carrying all the goods the workers may need, and these will be available to those who receive special coupons; these coupons will be issued only to workers who are employed at my concession enterprises." Whether things work out as he says, remains to be seen, but we find this acceptable in principle. A great many difficulties naturally arise. It is, of course, no easy task to harmonise a concession geared to capitalist production with the Soviet standpoint, and every effort of that kind is, as I have said, a continuation of the struggle between capitalism and socialism. This struggle has assumed new forms, but it remains a struggle nonetheless. Every concessionaire remains a capitalist, and he will try to trip up the Soviet power, while we, for our part, must try to make use of his rapacity. We say: "We shall not grudge him even 150 per cent in profits, provided the condition of our workers is improved." That is the pivot of the struggle. In this sphere, of course, you need to be even more skilled than in struggling for the conclusion of a peace treaty. The capitalist powers behind the scenes take part in the struggle for the conclusion of any peace treaty. There was a foreign power pulling the strings behind each of the countries with whom we have signed a peace treaty—Latvia, Finland and Poland. We had to conclude these treaties in such a way that, on the one hand, they allowed the bourgeois republics to exist, and on the other, they secured advantages for the Soviet power from the standpoint of world diplomacy. Every peace treaty with a capitalist power is a record of certain war clauses. In much the same way, each clause of a concession agreement records some aspect of a war, and we should organise things in such a way as to safeguard our own interests in that war. This can be done because the capitalist will be receiving big profits from the concession enterprise, while we shall be obtaining some improvement in the condition of our workers, and some increase in the quantity of goods from our share in the output. If the wages should be paid in foreign currency, this will give rise to a number

of complex problems: how is this currency to be exchanged for Soviet currency? how are we to fight speculation? etc. We have accepted the idea that we have an answer to all these problems, and need not fear any of them. This point tells the capitalists that they are free to invent anything they like. It makes no difference to us whether you bring in the goods and sell them for special coupons, on special terms, or only upon presentation of special certificates issued personally to workers employed at the concession. We shall manage to adapt ourselves to any terms in such a way as to fight the capitalists on these terms and secure a certain improvement in the condition of our workers. This is the task we have set ourselves. We can't tell how it will be resolved in a concession agreement, for we can't very well offer the same terms of payment in some place like Kamchatka as over here or in Baku. If the concession should be located in the Donets Basin, the forms of payment cannot conceivably be the same as for one in the far North. We are not holding down the capitalists to some specific form of payment. Every clause of the agreement will contain an element of struggle between capitalists and socialists. We are not afraid of this struggle, and are sure that we shall manage to derive every possible benefit from the concessions. Point Nine:

"9. The concessionaire shall be free to make his own terms of employment, living conditions and remuneration with foreign skilled workers and employees.

"The trade unions shall not have the right to demand application of Russian pay rates or of Russian rules of employment to that category of workers."

We believed Point Nine to be absolutely indispensable because it would be quite absurd to expect the capitalists to trust the Communists. This is clearly stated both from the standpoint of principle and especially from the businessman's standpoint. For if we insisted on trade union endorsement of these terms of employment, if we told the capitalists that we accepted any foreign technician or specialist but only within the framework of the Labour Code of the R.S.F.S.R., it would be too much to expect any of the latter to accept, and the demand would be a mere formality. It could be said that the government says one thing and the trade unions another,

because they are two distinct bodies, thereby leaving a legal loophole. But this was not written for lawyers but for Communists, and it was done on the basis of the decisions of the Tenth Party Congress on how to conduct the concessions policy. All of our writings, to which people in Europe have access, say that the concessions policy is being directed by the Communist Party, which is the ruling party. This has been rendered into all foreign languages, and there is no catch in it. We would not be in a position to consider any concessions policy at all, if we, being the political leadership, failed to say that in this case we were unable and unwilling to make use of our influence with the trade unions. There is no sense in teaching communism to the capitalists. We are fine Communists, but we are not going to usher in the communist order through concessions. After all, a concession is an agreement with a capitalist power. We would surely have committed to a lunatic asylum any Communist who decided to go and conclude a treaty with a capitalist power on the basis of communist principles. We would tell him that he was a fine Communist in his way but a complete flop as a diplomatist in a capitalist country. The Communist who tried to demonstrate his communism in respect of the concessions policy in an agreement would be just as near to being committed to a lunatic asylum. What you need to have is a good idea of capitalist trade, and if you haven't got it, you're no good. Either don't go in for concessions at all, or make an effort to understand that we must try to use these capitalist conditions in our own interest, by allowing the foreign technicians and workers complete freedom. That we shall not insist on any restrictions in this sphere goes without saying.

Section Three of Point Nine, which follows, does contain a restriction:

"The proportion of foreign workers and employees to Russians, both in total and within the several categories, shall be agreed upon by the parties in concluding each concession agreement separately."

We cannot, of course, object to the importation of foreign workers into areas which we are unable to supply with Russian workers, as, for instance, in the Kamchatka timber

industry. In the case of, say, the mining industry, where there is a lack of drinking water or foodstuffs, and where the capitalists would wish to build, we shall also allow them to bring in the greater part. On the other hand, where Russian workers are available, we stipulate a proportion to give our workers a chance, a) to learn, and b) to improve their condition. After all, we do want our workers to benefit from an improvement of our enterprises according to the last word in capitalist technology. The capitalists have not raised any objections in principle to any of these provisions. And here is Point Ten, the last one:

"10. The concessionaire may, by agreement with the government organs of the R.S.F.S.R., be granted the right to invite highly skilled specialists from among Russian citizens, the terms of employment being agreed with central government bodies in each case."

Plainly, we cannot guarantee full scope in this respect, as we can in respect of foreign technicians and workers. In the latter case, we refrain from interfering, and they are left entirely within the framework of capitalist relations. We promise no such scope for our specialists and technicians, for we cannot have our best men working at the concession enterprises. We have no desire to shut off all access for them to that area, but there must be supervision over the performance of the agreement from above and from below. The workers, members of the Communist Party, who will be employed at these enterprises, must supervise the performance of the terms of the agreement, both in respect of their technical training and observance of our laws. There were no objections in principle on this point in the exploratory talks with some of the magnates of modern capitalism.

All these points have been confirmed by the Council of People's Commissars, and I hope they give you a clear picture of the concessions policy we intend to conduct.

Each concession will undoubtedly be a new kind of war—an economic war—the fight carried into another plane. This calls for adaptation, but one that is in line with the Party Congress. If we are to attain our goal, we must have a respite and must be prepared to make sacrifices and endure hardships. Our goal is: in the capitalist encirclement

to make use of the greed of the capitalists for profit and the rivalry between the trusts, so as to create conditions for the existence of the socialist republic, which cannot exist without having ties with the rest of the world, and must, in the present circumstances, adjust its existence to capitalist relations. There is the question of actual terms. For oil agreements, they are as follows: from one-quarter to one-third of the whole of Grozny and of the whole of Baku. We have worked out our share of the output: we shall be retaining from 30 to 40 per cent of the oil extracted. We have inserted a commitment to increase output within a certain period to, say, 100 million, and another commitment to extend the oil pipeline from Grozny and Petrovsk to Moscow. Whether we shall have to make any extra payments is to be stipulated in each agreement. But we should be quite clear on the type of agreement concluded in these conditions. The important thing, from the trade union standpoint, is for the Party leadership to see the specific features of this policy and set themselves the task of securing such concessions at any cost, in pursuance of the decisions of the Party Congress, in the context of tasks facing the socialist system in the capitalist encirclement. Every concession will be a gain and an immediate improvement in the condition of a section of the workers and peasants. The latter will stand to gain because each concession will mean the production of additional goods, which we are unable to produce ourselves, and which we shall be exchanging for their products, instead of taking them through a tax.

This is a very difficult operation, especially for the organs of the Soviet power. With this point as pivotal we must set about to secure concessions, overriding the prejudices, inertia, ingrained customs, and the inconvenience of some workers having a bigger pay packet than the others. We could invent any number of excuses, in the way of objections and inconveniences, to frustrate any practical improvement, and that is what the foreign capitalists are really banking on. I know of no other point that has drawn so many objections from the most intelligent writers in the Russian whiteguard press, the men the Kronstadt events proved to be head and shoulders above Martov and Chernov. They are very well aware that if we fail to improve the

condition of our workers and peasants because of our prejudices, we shall multiply our difficulties and altogether undermine the prestige of the Soviet power. You know that we must have that improvement at all costs. We shall not grudge the foreign capitalist even a 2,000 per cent profit, provided we improve the condition of the workers and peasants. It is imperative that we do it.

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Published according to the verbatim report

TO THE COMRADES COMMUNISTS OF AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA, ARMENIA, DAGHESTAN, AND THE MOUNTAINEER REPUBLIC

I send my warmest greetings to the Soviet Republics of the Caucasus, and should like to express the hope that their close alliance will serve as a model of national peace, unprecedented under the bourgeoisie and impossible under the capitalist system.

But important as national peace among the workers and peasants of the Caucasian nationalities is, the maintenance and development of the Soviet power, as the transition to socialism, are even more important. The task is difficult, but fully feasible. The most important thing for its successful fulfilment is that the Communists of the Transcaucasus should be fully alive to the *singularity* of their position, and of the position of their Republics, as distinct from the position and conditions of the R.S.F.S.R.; that they should appreciate the need to refrain from copying our tactics, but thoughtfully vary them in adaptation to the differing concrete conditions.

The Soviet Republic of Russia had no outside political or military assistance. On the contrary, for years and years it fought the Entente military invasions and blockade.

The Soviet Republics of the Caucasus have had political and some military assistance from the R.S.F.S.R. This alone has made a vast difference.

Second, there is now no cause to fear any Entente invasion or military assistance to the Georgian, Azerbaijan, Armenian, Daghestan and mountaineer whiteguards. The Entente "burnt their fingers" in Russia and that will probably compel them to be more cautious for some time.

Third, the Caucasian Republics have an even more pronounced peasant character than Russia.

Fourth, Russia has been, and to a considerable extent still is, economically isolated from the advanced capitalist countries. The Caucasus is in a position to start trading and "living together" with the capitalist West sooner and with greater ease.

These are not all the differences, but they are sufficient to demonstrate the need for different tactics.

You will need to practise more moderation and caution, and show more readiness to make concessions to the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and particularly the peasantry. You must make the swiftest, most intense and all possible economic use of the capitalist West through a policy of concessions and trade. Oil, manganese, coal (Tkvarcheli mines) and copper are some of your immense mineral resources. You have every possibility to develop an extensive policy of concessions and trade with foreign countries.

This must be done on a wide scale, with firmness, skill and circumspection, and it must be utilised to the utmost for improving the condition of the workers and peasants, and for enlisting the intelligentsia in the work of economic construction. Through trade with Italy, America and other countries, you must exert every effort to develop the productive forces of your rich land, your water resources and irrigation which is especially important as a means of advancing agriculture and livestock farming.

What the Republics of the Caucasus can and must do, as distinct from the R.S.F.S.R., is to effect a slower, more cautious and more systematic transition to socialism. That is what you must understand, and what you must be able to carry out, as distinct from our own tactics.

We fought to make the first breach in the wall of world capitalism. The breach has been made. We have maintained our positions in a fierce and superhuman war against the Whites, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who were supported by the Entente countries, their blockade and military assistance.

You, Comrades Communists of the Caucasus, have no need to force a breach. You must take advantage of

the favourable international situation in 1921, and learn to build the new with greater caution and more method. In 1921, Europe and the world are not what they were in 1917 and 1918.

Do not copy our tactics, but analyse the reasons for their peculiar features, the conditions that gave rise to them, and their results; go beyond the letter, and apply the spirit, the essence and the lessons of the 1917-21 experience. You must make trade with the capitalist countries your economic foundation right away. The cost should be no object even if it means letting them have tens of millions' worth of valuable minerals.

You must make immediate efforts to improve the condition of the peasants and start on extensive electrification and irrigation projects. What you need most is irrigation, for more than anything else it will revive the area and regenerate it, bury the past and make the transition to socialism more certain.

I hope you will pardon my slipshod style. I have had to write the letter at very short notice, so as to send it along with Comrade Myasnikov. Once again I send my best greetings and wishes to the workers and peasants of the Soviet Republics of the Caucasus.

N. Lenin

Moscow, April 14, 1921

Pravda Gruzii No. 55,
May 8, 1921

Published according
to the newspaper text

TO THE PETROGRAD CITY CONFERENCE OF NON-PARTY WORKERS[98]

Comrades, I very much regret that I have been unable to go to Petrograd at your invitation. I send heartfelt greetings to the non-Party conference, and I welcome your work. The assistance of the non-Party masses and co-operation with them is of especial importance today, when the bourgeoisie of the world is conducting an incredible campaign of lies against Soviet Russia, in an effort to prevent us from concluding any trade agreements with foreign countries. The Kronstadt events have brought home to the workers and peasants the fact that any shift of power in Russia tends to favour the whiteguards; no wonder Milyukov and all intelligent leaders of the bourgeoisie welcomed the Kronstadt "Soviets without the Bolsheviks" slogan.

In conveying my greetings to the non-Party conference, I should like to wish you every success in your work, and ask you to pay special attention to the present need—in fact a constant need—of drawing more non-Party workers and peasants into economic construction. A regional economic centre has been set up in Petrograd. Let us intensify our effort. Local functionaries are being vested with broader powers and should show more initiative. The non-Party people should set to work, and let us have more and more men.

Greetings,

Lenin

Written on April 14, 1921
Published in 1921

Published according
to the manuscript

PLAN OF THE PAMPHLET
THE TAX IN KIND[99]

I

Etwa*:

1. General significance of the tax.
   Retreat? Advance? (to commodity exchange).
   Is it another "Brest"?
   Transition from surplus-grain appropriation (*appropriation of surplus stocks*) *to commodity exchange*.
   "War" Communism versus *proper* economic relations.

2. The tax and unrestricted trade.

   The tax and unrestricted trade.
   Unrestricted trade *versus* the economic base ("local trade") of small-scale economy.
   " " versus the political power of the proletariat.
   " " versus concessions
   Scope and conditions for a free market.

3. The middle peasant

   Is it a "stake" on the kulak?
   or the *middle peasant*
   Levelling up.
   The industrious peasant.
   Greater output.

4. Methods of transition to socialist agriculture.

   the small peasant
   collective farms
   electrification.

5. Co-operatives

* Approximately—*Ed*.

6. The struggle against the evil of bureaucracy (its economic roots).
7. [*The international situation and internal relations.*
8. Party and political crisis (1920-21).

   Mensheviks + Socialist-Revolutionaries + anarchists (Kronstadt)
9. "*Agreement*" with the peasantry? or *dictatorship*?
10. Non-Party conferences.

II

Plan of Pamphlet:

To convey the meaning more precisely

The substitution of a tax for the appropriation system in view of the general tasks and conditions of the present political situation.

hard!

The substitution of a tax for the appropriation system in view of the specific conditions of the present political situation.

The substitution of a tax for surplus-grain appropriation and agreement with the peasantry (or the tasks of a workers' government in a peasant country) and the tasks of the working class in respect of the peasantry.

The substitution of a tax for the appropriation system, its significance in principle: from "War" Communism to a *proper* socialist foundation.

The economic *essence* and foundation of socialism is neither appropriation nor tax, but exchange of the products of large-scale ("socialised") industry for peasant produce.

The appropriation system is not an "ideal", but a sad and bitter necessity. The opposite view is a dangerous mistake.

The appropriation system and the "apparatus". We should have perished long ago but for the "apparatus". Unless we wage a systematic and persevering struggle to

improve it we shall perish before we manage to lay the foundations of socialism.

The alliance of the workers and peasants = α and ω of the Soviet power. "Necessary and adequate" condition for its stability.

This alliance against Denikin & Co. is *not the same* as the alliance (the same one) in *economic* organisation.

The first = bourgeois revolution
The second = socialist revolution.

Transition from war to construction.

Ninth Congress 1920 (cf. April 1918) versus Tenth Congress (March 1921).

Switch from appropriation to regular commodity exchange.

The tax is in principle compatible with a free market in grain and other products.

Formal democracy versus the reality of class relations over the tax and similar questions.

Coercion + persuasion (in appropriation)—in the tax—in "commodity exchange".

How much "free trade" is there to be? *After* paying the tax.

Scope for experiment, practice. Small trade	Tasks of local officials. Tasks of local authorities.

Type of economic relations or the economic system *before* the proletarian revolution in a number of major countries = concentration at the top
unrestricted peasant trade at the bottom . . .
a species of *state* capitalism (cf. April 1918)

"Stake" on the middle peasant? On the kulak? Restoration of bourgeois relationships?

Levelling up of the rural areas

"the poor peasants"	were given an equalitarian redistribution " " landowners' land " " opportunity to take from the kulaks " " extraordinary assistance by the state.

The *pivot and touchstone* will now be (is) an increase in products (cf. Programme of the R.C.P.).[100] *Inde**: the "stake on the middle peasant in agriculture.

The industrious peasant as the "central figure" of our economic revival.

Individual commodity exchange.

Role of collective farms: many stupid things have been done. Prosecution for failure to implement the law and *incompetence* (three years).

Is socialism to fear the "individualism" of the peasant and his "free trade"? No.

Electrification: the yardstick. A long-range plan, but a *plan* and (ergo) a criterion. (Every plan is a yardstick, a criterion, a beacon, a landmark, etc.)

If we have electrification within 10 to 20 years, there is nothing to fear from the individualism of the small farmer and *his* unrestricted trade in local exchange. *If* we have no electrification, a return to capitalism is inevitable *in any case*.

The international situation is now favourable: a new equilibrium.

Their disintegration, our consolidation	Entente versus Germany. America versus Japan (and Britain). America versus Europe. The imperialist world versus "Asia". (1/7) (4/7) (0.250×7=1.75) (a thousand million out of 1.750)[101]

Ten or twenty years of regular relations with the peasantry and victory is assured on a world scale (even if there is delay in the proletarian revolutions, which are maturing); otherwise 20-40 years of tormenting whiteguard terror.

* Hence.—*Ed.*

*Aut-aut. Tertium non datur.**

"Agreement" with the peasantry? Constituent Assembly (overt or covert), voting, change of Constitution, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks + anarchists.	*Co-operatives.* Their economic and political (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries) aspects.	Ambiguity of the notion of "agreement", particularly versus "dictatorship".
Experience and lessons of Kronstadt (new features in the political history of the Soviet power).	Uncompromising struggle against Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists.	

*Quid est "politica"?***
(1) the vanguard of the proletariat and *its* mass.
(2) the proletariat and the *peasantry*.
(3) the proletariat (and the peasantry) and the *bourgeoisie*.

NB

Weariness, exhaustion, despair.... Lack of strength.... "Respite" ... *evils of bureaucracy* (*Gegenstück**** of peasantry).	among working class *and* among the peasants.	"Top section" worn out, promotion of new people from "lower ranks" = (α) young people; (β) non-Party people.

NB NB:

Anarchism and the "Marxist" struggle against it. "Despair"?
The pace is not what it should be (in war-time and peace-time construction).

* Either or. There is no third road.—*Ed.*
** What is "politics"?—*Ed.*
*** Counterpart.—*Ed.*

In April 1918 and in April 1920, we imagined transition from war to peace-time construction to be a simple one on the same lines of *policy*.

The transition is a complex one: relations with the peasantry are different, the pace is different, the situation is different.

Demobilisation of the army.

Banditry. (Devastation. Seven years of war.)

Either a whiteguard reign of terror, or the *dictatorship* of the proletariat, its (relaxing) leadership.

What is so *terrible* about the word "dictatorship"?

NB:

The non-Party peasant as a yardstick, a criterion, a counsellor—and a political slogan (=Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks). Vote? Overthrow the government? Or seek accord *with it*?

Non-Party conferences are *not* an absolute political weapon of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries+ anarchists. *Caveant consules!**

It is a well-tried trick of conventional bourgeois party politics and bourgeois parliamentarism to try to "*catch one*" through concessions. But we reject the *very basis* of bourgeois parliamentarism, and conventional (bourgeois) party politics"!!

NB

NB: NB:

"The economic foundations for the withering away of the state (*The State and Revolution*): *in this case* we also have the economic *foundations*"
for the *withering away* of bureaucracy, the top section and the lower ranks, inequality (cf. "First Steps from Capitalism to Communism"). The ***economic*** *basis of socialism is not yet there*. What is the basis? *It is commodity exchange with the peasantry*!!

NB

Combating the evils of bureaucracy.

NB

* Let the consuls beware!—*Ed.*

NB

+ ***Note***. Significance of the political crisis in spring (Feb.-March) 1921 ("transitions") and Party crisis (Nov. or Sept. 1920-March 1921). Adapt the Party's top section to its mass and vice versa? The Party to the masses (proletariat + then the peasantry) or vice versa.

III

State capitalism not terrible but *desirable*.

Learning from state capitalism.

Examples:
1) Concessions.
2) Co-operatives.
3) Commission agents.
4) Leases.

Unorganised capitalism

"Elemental" *c'est le mot* 17*94* versus 19*21*

All *within proper limits* and on *definite* terms
What are these limits?
Experience will show.

$\frac{1}{4}$ etwa.

"Trade" mainly and primarily.

Combating profiteering.
Quid est?

Tax in kind and trade.

instructions to food supply workers:
100 + 100 = 200%
?Σ100 + 25
60 + 60

These (3 and 4) forms are weak, because we are *weak and stupid*. Cf. bureaucratic practices. . . .

Free market α) to develop the productive forces of peasant farming β) to develop small industry γ) to combat the evils of bureaucracy.

Limits? Terms?
Practice will show.
Food supply worker: collect 100%

$$100 + 100 = 200$$

$$\text{Etwa:} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 100 + \ \ 25 = 125 \\ \ \ 60 + \ \ 60 = 120 \end{array} \right\}$$

Combating profiteering?
Quid est?

Political aspect:
Petty-bourgeois element will overthrow (May 5, 1918).
"Example" of the French Revolution, cf. November 10, 1918
Anti-Kautsky

Pessimism or optimism?
Calculation of forces. Sober approach and fervent dedication.

IV

Conclusion Etwa:

Transition to politics.
Economics in the spring of 1921 transformed into politics: "Kronstadt".

Role of Socialist-Revolutionaries + Mensheviks (Dan, Rozhkov & Co., Martov & Co.). A "slight shift", to the right or the left, makes no difference.

Milyukov is more intelligent than Chernov and Martov: it is not so difficult to be more intelligent than these conceited fools, phrase-mongers and knights of the petty-bourgeois doctrine (1789-1948-1920).
Their place is in prison and not at a *non-Party* conference.
1794 versus 1921.
Vacillation of the "elements" (*Quid est* elements) and firmness.
Selection and
promotion of men.

Pessimism or optimism? A most sober appraisal of the evil and the difficulties.

Dedication in the struggle. ΣΣ=

Summary:

1) "Trade". *Quid est*?
2) Small industry. Where are the raw materials?
3) Exchange.
4) Capitalism.
5) State capitalism.
6) Local initiative.
7) Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries+non-Party people.

Written in late March-early April 1921

Published according to the manuscript

THE TAX IN KIND

(THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW POLICY AND ITS CONDITIONS)[102]

IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION

The question of the tax in kind is at present attracting very great attention and is giving rise to much discussion and argument. This is quite natural, because in present conditions it is indeed one of the principal questions of policy.

The discussion is somewhat disordered, a fault to which, for very obvious reasons, we must all plead guilty. All the more useful would it be, therefore, to try to approach the question, not from its "topical" aspect, but from the aspect of general principle. In other words, to examine the general, fundamental background of the picture on which we are now tracing the pattern of definite practical measures of present-day policy.

In order to make this attempt I will take the liberty of quoting a long passage from my pamphlet, *The Chief Task of Our Day. "Left-Wing" Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality*. It was published by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in 1918 and contains, first, a newspaper article, dated March 11, 1918, on the Brest Peace, and, second, my polemic against the then existing group of Left Communists, dated May 5, 1918. The polemic is now superfluous and I omit it, leaving what appertains to the discussion on ,"state capitalism" an the main elements of our present-day economy, which is transitional from capitalism to socialism.

Here is what I wrote at the time:

THE PRESENT-DAY ECONOMY OF RUSSIA
(EXTRACT FROM THE 1918 PAMPHLET)

State capitalism would be a step forward as compared with the present state of affairs in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months' time state capitalism became established in our Republic, this would be a great success and a sure guarantee that within a year socialism will have gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible in this country.

I can imagine with what noble indignation some people will recoil from these words.... What! The transition to state *capitalism* in the Soviet Socialist Republic would be a step forward?... Isn't this the betrayal of socialism?

We must deal with this point in greater detail.

Firstly, we must examine the nature of the *transition* from capitalism to socialism that gives us the right and the grounds to call our country a Socialist Republic of Soviets.

Secondly, we must expose the error of those who fail to see the petty-bourgeois economic conditions and the petty-bourgeois element as the *principal* enemy of socialism in our country.

Thirdly, we must fully understand the economic implications of the distinction between the *Soviet* state and the bourgeois state.

Let us examine these three points.

No one, I think, in studying the question of the economic system of Russia, has denied its transitional character. Nor, I think, has any Communist denied that the term Soviet Socialist Republic implies the determination of the Soviet power to achieve the transition to socialism, and not that the existing economic system is recognised as a socialist order.

But what does the word "transition" mean? Does it not mean, as applied to an economy, that the present system contains elements, particles, fragments of both capitalism and socialism? Everyone will admit that it does. But not all who admit this take the trouble to consider what elements actually constitute the various socio-economic structures that exist in Russia at the present time. And this is the crux of the question.

Let us enumerate these elements:

(1) patriarchal, i.e., to a considerable extent natural, peasant farming;

(2) small commodity production (this includes the majority of those peasants who sell their grain);

(3) private capitalism;

(4) state capitalism;

(5) socialism.

Russia is so vast and so varied that all these different types of socio-economic structures are intermingled. This is what constitutes the specific feature of the situation.

The question arises: What elements predominate? Clearly, in a small-peasant country, the petty-bourgeois element predominates and it must predominate, for the great majority—those working the land—are small commodity producers. The shell of state capitalism (grain monopoly, state-controlled entrepreneurs and traders, bourgeois co-operators) is pierced now in one place, now in another by *profiteers*, the chief object of profiteering being *grain*.

It is in this field that the main struggle is being waged. Between what elements is this struggle being waged if we are to speak in terms of economic categories such as "state capitalism"? Between the fourth and fifth in the order in which I have just enumerated them? Of course not. It is not state capitalism that is at war with socialism, but the petty bourgeoisie plus private capitalism fighting together against state capitalism and socialism. The petty bourgeoisie oppose *every kind* of state interference, accounting and control, whether it be state-capitalist or state-socialist. This is an unquestionable fact of reality whose misunderstanding lies at the root of many economic mistakes. The profiteer, the commercial racketeer, the disrupter of monopoly—these are our principal "internal" enemies, the enemies of the economic measures of the Soviet power. A hundred and twenty-five years ago it might have been excusable for the French petty bourgeoisie, the most ardent and sincere revolutionaries, to try to crush the profiteer by executing a few of the "chosen" and by making thunderous declarations. Today, however, the purely French approach to the question assumed by some Left Socialist-Revolutionaries can arouse nothing but disgust and re-

vulsion in every politically conscious revolutionary. We know perfectly well that the economic basis of profiteering is both the small proprietors, who are exceptionally widespread in Russia, and private capitalism, of which every petty bourgeois is an agent. We know that the million tentacles of this petty-bourgeois octopus now and again encircle various sections of the workers, that instead of state monopoly, profiteering forces its way into every pore of our social and economic organism.

Those who fail to see this show by their blindness that they are slaves of petty-bourgeois prejudices....

The petty bourgeoisie have money put away, the few thousands that they made during the war by "honest" and especially by dishonest means. They are the characteristic economic type, that is, the basis of profiteering and private capitalism. Money is a certificate entitling the possessor to receive social wealth; and a vast section of small proprietors, numbering millions, cling to this certificate and conceal it from the "state". They do not believe in socialism or communism, and "mark time" until the proletarian storm blows over. Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-proletarians, round the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will overthrow our workers' power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of petty proprietorship. That is how the question stands. That is the only view we can take of the matter....

The petty bourgeois who hoards his thousands is an enemy of state capitalism. He wants to employ these thousands just for himself, against the poor, in opposition to any kind of state control. And the sum total of these thousands, amounting to many thousands of millions, forms the base for profiteering, which undermines our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then assume that 200 of this total vanishes owing to petty profiteering, various kinds of embezzlement and the evasion by the small proprietors of Soviet decrees and regulations. Every

politically conscious worker will say that if better order and organisation could be obtained at the price of 300 out of the 1,000 he would willingly give 300 instead of 200, for it will be quite easy under the Soviet power to reduce this "tribute" later on to, say, 100 or 50, once order and organisation are established and the petty-bourgeois disruption of state monopoly is completely overcome.

This simple illustration in figures, which I have deliberately simplified to the utmost in order to make it absolutely clear, explains the present correlation of state capitalism and socialism. The workers hold state power and have every legal opportunity of "taking" the whole thousand, without giving up a single kopek, except for socialist purposes. This legal opportunity, which rests upon the actual transition of power to the workers, is an element of socialism. But in many ways, the small-proprietary and private-capitalist element undermines this legal position, drags in profiteering and hinders the execution of Soviet decrees. State capitalism would be a gigantic step forward *even if* we paid *more* than we are paying at present (I took the numerical example deliberately to bring this out more sharply), because it is worth paying for "tuition", because it is useful for the workers, because victory over disorder, economic ruin and laxity is the most important thing, because the continuation of the anarchy of small ownership- is the greatest, the most serious danger, and it will *certainly* be our ruin (unless we overcome it), whereas not only will the payment of a heavier tribute to state capitalism not ruin us, it will lead us to socialism by the surest road. When the working class has learned how to defend the state system against the anarchy of small ownership, when it has learned to organise large-scale production on a national scale along state-capitalist lines, it will hold, if I may use the expression, all the trump cards, and the consolidation of socialism will be assured.

In the first place *economically* state capitalism is immeasurably superior to our present economic system.

In the second place there is nothing terrible in it for the Soviet power, for the Soviet state is a state in which the power of the workers and the poor is assured....

* * *

To make things even clearer, let us first of all take the most concrete example of state capitalism. Everybody knows what this example is. It is Germany. Here we have "the last word" in modern large-scale capitalist engineering and planned organisation, *subordinated to Junker-bourgeois imperialism*. Cross out the words in italics, and in place of the militarist, Junker, bourgeois, imperialist state put also a state, but of a different social type, of a different class content—a Soviet state, that is, a proletarian state, and you will have the sum total of the conditions necessary for socialism.

Socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering based on the latest discoveries of modern science. It is inconceivable without planned state organisation which keeps tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard in production and distribution. We Marxists have always spoken of this, and it is not worth while wasting two seconds talking to people who do not understand even this (anarchists and a good half of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).

At the same time socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state. This also is ABC. And history (which nobody, except Menshevik blockheads of the first order, ever expected to bring about "complete" socialism smoothly, gently, easily and simply) has taken such a peculiar course that it has given birth in 1918 to two unconnected halves of socialism existing side by side like two future chickens in the single shell of international imperialism. In 1918, Germany and Russia had become the most striking embodiment of the material realisation of the economic, the productive and the socio-economic conditions for socialism, on the one hand, and the political conditions, on the other.

A victorious proletarian revolution in Germany would immediately and very easily smash any shell of imperialism (which unfortunately is made of the best steel, and hence cannot be broken by the efforts of any chicken) and would bring about the victory of world socialism for certain, without any difficulty, or with only slight difficulty—if, of course, by "difficulty" we mean difficulty on a world historical scale, and 44 not in the parochial philistine sense.

While the revolution in Germany is still slow in "coming forth", our task is to *study* the state capitalism of the Germans, to *spare no effort* in copying it and not shrink from adopting dictatorial methods to hasten the copying of Western culture by barbarian Russia, without hesitating to use barbarous methods in fighting barbarism. If there are anarchists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (I recall offhand the speeches of Karelin and Ghe at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee) who indulge in Karelin-like reflections and say that it is unbecoming for us revolutionaries to "take lessons" from German imperialism, there is only one thing we can say in reply: the revolution that took these people seriously would perish irrevocably (and deservedly).

At present petty-bourgeois capitalism prevails in Russia, and it is *one and the same road* that leads from it to both large-scale state capitalism and to socialism, *through one and the same* intermediary station called "national accounting and control of production and distribution". Those who fail to understand this are committing an unpardonable mistake in economics. Either they do not know the facts of life, do not see what actually exists and are unable to look the truth in the face, or they confine themselves to abstractly comparing "socialism" with "capitalism" and fail to study the concrete forms and stages of the transition that is taking place in our country.

Let it be said in parenthesis that this is the very theoretical mistake which misled the best people in the *Novaya Zhizn* and *Vperyod*[103] camp. The worst and the mediocre* of these, owing to their stupidity and spinelessness, tag along behind the bourgeoisie, of whom they stand in awe; the best of them have failed to understand that it was not without reason that the teachers of socialism spoke of a whole period of transition from capitalism to socialism and emphasised the "prolonged birth pangs" of the new society.[104] And this new society is again an abstraction which can come into being only by passing through a series of varied, imperfect and concrete attempts to create this or that socialist state.

It is because Russia cannot advance from the economic situation now existing-here without traversing the ground

which is common to state capitalism and to socialism (national accounting and control) that the attempt to frighten others as well as themselves with "evolution *towards* state capitalism" is utter theoretical nonsense. This is letting one's thoughts wander away from the true road of "evolution", and failing to understand what this road is. In practice, it is equivalent to *pulling us back* to small-proprietary capitalism.

In order to convince the reader that this is not the first time I have given this "high" appreciation of state capitalism and that I gave it *before* the Bolsheviks seized power, I take the liberty of quoting the following passage from my pamphlet, *The Impending Catastrophe and How To Combat It*, written in September 1917.

"Try to substitute for the Junker-capitalist state, for the landowner-capitalist state, a revolutionary-democratic state, i.e., a state which in a revolutionary way abolishes all privileges and does not fear to introduce the fullest democracy in a revolutionary way. You will find that, given a really revolutionary-democratic state, state-monopoly capitalism inevitably and unavoidably implies a step ... towards socialism....

"For socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly....

"State-monopoly capitalism is a complete material preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism there are no intermediate rungs" (pp. 27 and 28).

Please note that this was written when Kerensky was in power, that we are discussing *not* the dictatorship of the proletariat, *not* the socialist state, but the "revolutionary-democratic" state. Is it not clear that *the higher* we stand on this political ladder, *the more completely* we incorporate the socialist state and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviets, *the less* ought we to fear "state capitalism"? Is it not clear that from the *material*, economic and productive point of view, we are not yet on the "threshold" of socialism? Is it not clear that we cannot pass through the door of socialism without crossing the "threshold" we have not yet reached?...

* * *

The following is also extremely instructive.

When we argued with Comrade Bukharin in the Central Executive Committee, he declared, among other things, that on the question of high salaries for specialists "they" were "to the right of Lenin", for in this case "they" saw no deviation from principle, bearing in mind Marx's words that under certain conditions it is more expedient for the working class to "buy out the whole lot of them"[105] (namely, the whole lot of capitalists, i.e., to *buy* from the bourgeoisie the land, factories, works and other means of production).

That is a very interesting statement....

Let us consider Marx's idea carefully.

Marx was talking about the Britain of the seventies of the last century, about the culminating point in the development of pre-monopoly capitalism. At that time Britain was a country in which militarism and bureaucracy were less pronounced than in any other, a country in which there was the greatest possibility of a "peaceful" victory for socialism in the sense of the workers "buying out" the bourgeoisie. And Marx said that under certain conditions the workers would certainly not refuse to buy out the bourgeoisie. Marx did not commit himself, or the future leaders of the socialist revolution, to matters of form, to ways and means of bringing about the revolution. He understood perfectly well that a vast number of new problems would arise, that the whole situation would change in the course of the revolution, and that the situation would change radically and often in the course of the revolution.

Well, and what about Soviet Russia? Is it not clear that *after* the seizure of power by the proletariat and *after* the crushing of the exploiters' armed resistance and sabotage—*certain* conditions prevail which correspond to those which might have existed in Britain half a century ago had a peaceful transition to socialism begun there? The subordination of the capitalists to the workers in Britain would have been assured at that time owing to the following circumstances: (1) the absolute preponderance of workers, of proletarians, in the population owing to the absence of a peasantry (in Britain in the seventies there where signs that gave hope of an extremely rapid spread of socialism among agricultural labourers); (2) the excellent organisation of the proletariat

in trade unions (Britain was at that time the leading country in the world in this respect); (3) the comparatively high level of culture of the proletariat, which had been trained by centuries of development of political liberty; (4) the old habit of the well-organised British capitalists of settling political and economic questions by compromise—at that time the British capitalists were better organised than the capitalists of any country in the world (this superiority has now passed to Germany). These were the circumstances which at the time gave rise to the idea that the *peaceful* subjugation of the British capitalists by the workers was possible.

In our country, at the present time, this subjugation is assured by certain premises of fundamental significance (the victory in October and the suppression, from October to February, of the capitalists' armed resistance and sabotage). But *instead of* the absolute preponderance of workers, of proletarians, in the population, and *instead of* a high degree of organisation among them, the important factor of victory in Russia was the support the proletarians received from the poor peasants and those who had experienced sudden ruin. Finally, we have neither a high degree of culture nor the habit of compromise. If these concrete conditions are carefully considered, it will become clear that we now can and ought to employ a *combination* of two methods. On the one hand, we must ruthlessly suppress the uncultured capitalists who refuse to have anything to do with "state capitalism" or to consider any form of compromise, and who continue by means of profiteering, by bribing the poor peasants, etc., to hinder the realisation of the measures taken by the Soviets. On the other hand, we must use the *method of compromise*, or of buying out the cultured capitalists who agree to "state capitalism", who are capable of putting it into practice and who are useful to the proletariat as intelligent and experienced organisers of the largest types of enterprises, which actually supply products to tens of millions of people.

Bukharin is an extremely well-read Marxist economist. He therefore remembered that Marx was profoundly right when he taught the workers the importance of preserving the organisation of large-scale production, precisely for the

purpose of facilitating the transition to socialism. Marx taught that (as an exception, and Britain was then an exception) the idea was conceivable of *paying the capitalists well*, of buying them out, if the circumstances were such as to compel the capitalists to submit peacefully and to come over to socialism in a cultured and organised fashion, provided they were paid well.

But Bukharin went astray because he did not go deep enough into the specific features of the situation in Russia at the present time—an exceptional situation when we, the Russian proletariat, are *in advance* of any Britain or any Germany as regards political system, as regards the strength of the workers' political power, but are *behind* the most backward West-European country as regards organising a good state capitalism, as regards our level of culture and the degree of material and productive preparedness for the "introduction" of socialism. Is it not clear that the specific nature of the present situation creates the need for a specific type of "buying out" operation which the workers must offer to the most cultured, the most talented, the most capable organisers among the capitalists who are ready to enter the service of the Soviet power and to help honestly in organising "state" production on the largest possible scale? Is it not clear that in this specific situation we must make every effort to avoid two mistakes, both of which are of a petty-bourgeois nature? On the one hand, it would be a fatal mistake to declare that since there is a discrepancy between our economic "forces" and our political strength, it "follows" that we should not have seized power. Such an argument can be advanced only by a "man in a muffler", who forgets that there will always be such a "discrepancy", that it always exists in the development of nature as well as in the development of society, that only by a series of attempts—each of which, taken by itself, will be one-sided and will suffer from certain inconsistencies—will complete socialism be created by the revolutionary co-operation of the proletarians of *all* countries.

On the other hand, it would be an obvious mistake to give free rein to ranters and phrase-mongers who allow themselves to be carried away by the "dazzling" revolutionary spirit, but who are incapable of sustained, thoughtful and

deliberate revolutionary work which takes into account the most difficult stages of transition.

Fortunately, the history of the development of revolutionary parties and of the struggle that Bolshevism waged against them has left us a heritage of sharply defined types, of which the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists are striking examples of bad revolutionaries. They are now shouting hysterically, choking and shouting themselves hoarse, against the "compromise" of the "Right Bolsheviks". But they are incapable of understanding *what* is bad in "compromise", and *why* "compromise" has been justly condemned by history and the course of the revolution.

Compromise in Kerensky's time meant the surrender of power to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and the question of power is the fundamental question of every revolution. Compromise by a section of the Bolsheviks in October-November 1917 either meant that they feared the proletariat seizing power or wished to *share* power equally, not only with "unreliable fellow-travellers" like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but also with enemies, with the Chernovists and the Mensheviks. The latter would inevitably have hindered us in fundamental matters, such as the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the ruthless suppression of the Bogayevskys, the universal setting up of the Soviet institutions, and in every act of confiscation.

Now power has been seized, retained and consolidated in the hands of a single party, the party of the proletariat, even without the "unreliable fellow-travellers". To speak of compromise at the present time when there is no question, and can be none, of sharing *power*, of renouncing the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, is merely to repeat, parrot-fashion, words which have been learned by heart but not understood. To describe as "compromise" the fact that, having arrived at a situation when we can and must rule the country, we try to win over to our side, not grudging the cost, the most efficient people capitalism has trained and to take them into our service against small proprietary disintegration, reveals a total incapacity to think about the economic tasks of socialist construction.

TAX IN KIND, FREEDOM TO TRADE AND CONCESSIONS

In the arguments of 1918 quoted above there are a number of mistakes as regards the periods of time involved. These turned out to be longer than was anticipated at that time. That is not surprising. But the basic elements of our economy have remained the same. In a very large number of cases the peasant "poor" (proletarians and semi-proletarians) have become middle peasants. This has caused an increase in the small-proprietor, petty-bourgeois "element". The Civil War of 1918-20 aggravated the havoc in the country, retarded the restoration of its productive forces, and bled the proletariat more than any other class. To this was added the 1920 crop failure, the fodder shortage and the loss of cattle, which still further retarded the rehabilitation of transport and industry, because, among other things, it interfered with the employment of peasants' horses for carting wood, our main type of fuel.

As a result, the political situation in the spring of 1921 was such that immediate, very resolute and urgent measures had to be taken to improve the condition of the peasants and to increase their productive forces.

Why the peasants and not the workers?

Because you need grain and fuel to improve the condition of the workers. This is the biggest "hitch" at the present time, from the standpoint of the economy as a whole. For it is impossible to increase the production and collection of grain and the storage and delivery of fuel except by improving the condition of the peasantry, and raising their productive forces. We must start with the peasantry. Those who fail to understand this, and think this putting the peasantry in the forefront is "renunciation" of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or something like that, simply do not stop to think, and allow themselves to be swayed by the power of words. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the direction of policy by the proletariat. The proletariat, as the leading and ruling class, must be able to direct policy in such a way as to solve first the most urgent and "vexed" problem. The most urgent thing at the present time is to take measures that will immediately increase the productive forces of peasant farming. Only *in this way* will it be possible to improve the condition of the workers, strengthen

the alliance between the workers and peasants, and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletarian or representative of the proletariat who *refused* to improve the condition of the workers *in this way* would *in fact* prove himself to be an accomplice of the whiteguards and the capitalists; to refuse to do it in this way means putting the craft interests of the workers above their class interests, and sacrificing the interests of the whole of the working class, its dictatorship, its alliance with the peasantry against the landowners and capitalists, and its leading role in the struggle for the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital, for the sake of an immediate, short-term and partial advantage for the workers.

Thus, the first thing we need is immediate and serious measures to raise the productive forces of the peasantry.

This cannot be done without making important changes in our food policy. One such change was the replacement of the surplus appropriation system by the tax in kind, which implies a free market, at least in local economic exchange, after the tax has been paid.

What is the essence of this change?

Wrong ideas on this point are widespread. They are due mainly to the fact that no attempt is being made to study the meaning of the transition or to determine its implications, it being assumed that the change is from communism in general to the bourgeois system in general. To counteract this mistake, one has to refer to what was said in May 1918.

The tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from that peculiar War Communism, which was forced on us by extreme want, ruin and war, to regular socialist exchange of products. The latter, in its turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism, with the peculiar features due to the predominantly small-peasant population, to communism.

Under this peculiar War Communism we actually took from the peasant all his surpluses—and sometimes even a part of his necessaries—to meet the requirements of the army and sustain the workers. Most of it we took on loan, for paper money. But for that, we would not have beaten the landowners and capitalists in a ruined small-peasant country. The fact that we did (in spite of the help our exploiters got from the most powerful countries of the world) shows

not only the miracles of heroism the workers and peasants can perform in the struggle for their emancipation; it also shows that when the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Kautsky and Co. *blamed* us for this War Communism they were acting as lackeys of the bourgeoisie. We deserve credit for it.

Just how much credit is a fact of equal importance. It was the war and the ruin that forced us into War Communism. It was not, and could not be, a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a makeshift. The correct policy of the proletariat exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country is to obtain grain in exchange for the manufactured goods the peasant needs. That is the only kind of food policy that corresponds to the tasks of the proletariat, and can strengthen the foundations of socialism and lead to its complete victory.

The tax in kind is a transition to this policy. We are still so ruined and crushed by the burden of war (which was on but yesterday and could break out anew tomorrow, owing to the rapacity and malice of the capitalists) that we cannot give the peasant manufactured goods in return for *all* the grain we need. Being aware of this, we are introducing the tax in kind, that is, we shall take the minimum of grain we require (for the army and the workers) in the form of a tax and obtain the rest in exchange for manufactured goods.

There is something else we must not forget. Our poverty and ruin are so great that we cannot restore large-scale socialist state industry *at one stroke*. This can be done with large stocks of grain and fuel in the big industrial centres, replacement of worn-out machinery, and so on. Experience has convinced us that this cannot be done at one stroke, and we know that after the ruinous imperialist war even the wealthiest and most advanced countries will be able to solve this problem only over a fairly long period of years. Hence, it is necessary, to a certain extent, to help to restore *small* industry, which does not demand of the state machines, large stocks of raw material, fuel and food, and which can immediately render some assistance to peasant farming and increase its productive forces right away.

What is to be the effect of all this?

It is the revival of the petty bourgeoisie and of capitalism on the basis of some freedom of trade (if only local). That much is certain and it is ridiculous to shut our eyes to it.

Is it necessary? Can it be justified? Is it not dangerous?

Many such questions are being asked, and most are merely evidence of simple-mindedness, to put it mildly.

Look at my May 1918 definition of the elements (constituent parts) of the various socio-economic structures in our economy. No one can deny the existence of all these five stages (or constituent parts), of the five forms of economy—from the patriarchal, i.e., semi-barbarian, to the socialist system. That the small-peasant "structure", partly patriarchal, partly petty bourgeois, predominates in a small-peasant country is self-evident. It is an incontrovertible truth, elementary to political economy, which even the layman's everyday experience will confirm, that once you have exchange the small economy is bound to develop the petty-bourgeois-capitalist way.

What is the policy the socialist proletariat can pursue in the face of this economic reality? Is it to give the small peasant *all* he needs of the goods produced by large-scale socialist industries in exchange for his grain and raw materials? This would be the most desirable and "correct" policy—and we have started on it. But we cannot supply *all* the goods, very far from it; nor shall we be able to do so very soon—at all events not until we complete the first stage of the electrification of the whole country. What is to be done? One way is to try to prohibit entirely, to put the lock on all development of private, non-state exchange, i.e., trade, i.e., capitalism, which is inevitable with millions of small producers. But such a policy would be foolish and suicidal for the party that tried to apply it. It would be foolish because it is economically impossible. It would be suicidal because the party that tried to apply it would meet with inevitable disaster. Let us admit it: some Communists have sinned "in thought, word and deed" by adopting just *such* a policy. We shall try to rectify these mistakes, and this must be done without fail, otherwise things will come to a very sorry state.

The alternative (and this is the only sensible and the last *possible* policy) is not to try to prohibit or put the lock

on the development of capitalism, but to channel it into *state capitalism*. This is economically possible, for state capitalism exists—in varying form and degree—wherever there are elements of unrestricted trade and capitalism in general.

Can the Soviet state and the dictatorship of the proletariat be combined with state capitalism? Are they compatible?

Of course they are. This is exactly what I argued in May 1918. I hope I had proved it then. I had also proved that state capitalism is a step forward compared with the small-proprietor (both small-patriarchal and petty-bourgeois) element. Those who compare state capitalism only with socialism commit a host of mistakes, for in the present political and economic circumstances it is essential to compare state capitalism also with petty-bourgeois production.

The whole problem—in theoretical and practical terms—is to find the correct methods of directing the development of capitalism (which is to some extent and for some time inevitable) into the channels of state capitalism, and to determine how we are to hedge it about with conditions to ensure its transformation into socialism in the near future.

In order to approach the solution of this problem we must first of all picture to ourselves as distinctly as possible what state capitalism will and can be in practice inside the Soviet system and within the framework of the Soviet state.

Concessions are the simplest example of how the Soviet government directs the development of capitalism into the channels of state capitalism and "implants" state capitalism. We all agree now that concessions are necessary, but have we all thought about the implications? What are concessions under the Soviet system, viewed in the light of the above-mentioned forms of economy and their interrelations? They are an agreement, an alliance, a bloc between the Soviet, i.e., proletarian, state power and state capitalism against the small-proprietor (patriarchal and petty-bourgeois) element. The concessionaire is a capitalist. He conducts his business on capitalist lines, for profit, and is willing to enter into an agreement with the proletarian government in order to obtain superprofits or raw materials which he cannot otherwise obtain, or can obtain only with great difficulty. Soviet power gains by the development

of the productive forces, and by securing an increased quantity of goods immediately, or within a very short period. We have, say, a hundred oilfields, mines and forest tracts. We cannot develop all of them for we lack the machines, the food and the transport. This is also why we are doing next to nothing to develop the other territories. Owing to the insufficient development of the large enterprises the small-proprietor element is more pronounced in all its forms, and this is reflected in the deterioration of the surrounding (and later the whole of) peasant farming, the disruption of its productive forces, the decline in its confidence in the Soviet power, pilfering and widespread petty (the most dangerous) profiteering, etc. By "implanting" state capitalism in the form of concessions, the Soviet government strengthens large-scale production as against petty production, advanced production as against backward production, and machine production as against hand production. It also obtains a larger quantity of the products of large-scale industry (its share of the output), and strengthens state-regulated economic relations as against the anarchy of petty-bourgeois relations. The moderate and cautious application of the concessions policy will undoubtedly help us quickly to improve (to a modest extent) the state of industry and the condition of the workers and peasants. We shall, of course, have all this at the price of certain sacrifices and the surrender to the capitalist of many millions of poods of very valuable products. The scale and the conditions under which concessions cease to be a danger and are turned to our advantage depend on the relation of forces and are decided in the struggle, for concessions are also a form of struggle, and are a continuation of the class struggle in another form, and in no circumstances are they a substitution of class peace for class war. Practice will determine the methods of struggle.

Compared with other forms of state capitalism within the Soviet system, concessions are perhaps the most simple and clear-cut form of state capitalism. It involves a formal written agreement with the most civilised, advanced, West-European capitalism. We know exactly what our gains and our losses, our rights and obligations are. We know exactly the term for which the concession is granted. We know the

terms of redemption before the expiry of the agreement if it provides for such redemption. We pay a certain "tribute" to world capitalism; we "ransom" ourselves under certain arrangements, thereby immediately stabilising the Soviet power and improving our economic conditions. The whole difficulty with concessions is giving the proper consideration and appraisal of all the circumstances when concluding a concession agreement, and then seeing that it is fulfilled. Difficulties there certainly are, and mistakes will probably be inevitable at the outset. But these are minor difficulties compared with the other problems of the social revolution and, in particular, with the difficulties arising from other forms of developing, permitting and implanting state capitalism.

The most important task that confronts all Party and Soviet workers in connection with the introduction of the tax in kind is to apply the principles of the "concessions" policy (i.e., a policy that is similar to "concession" state capitalism) to the other forms of capitalism—unrestricted trade, local exchange, etc.

Take the co-operatives. It is not surprising that the tax in kind decree immediately necessitated a revision of the regulations governing the co-operatives and a certain extension of their "freedom" and rights. The co-operatives are also a form of state capitalism, but a less simple one; its outline is less distinct, it is more intricate and therefore creates greater practical difficulties for the government. The small commodity producers' co-operatives (and it is these, and not the workers' co-operatives, that we are discussing as the predominant and typical form in a small-peasant country) inevitably give rise to petty-bourgeois, capitalist relations, facilitate their development, push the small capitalists into the foreground and benefit them most. It cannot be otherwise, since the small proprietors predominate, and exchange is necessary and possible. In Russia's present conditions, freedom and rights for the co-operative societies mean freedom and rights for capitalism. It would be stupid or criminal to close our eyes to this obvious truth.

But, unlike private capitalism, "co-operative" capitalism under the Soviet system is a variety of state capitalism, and as such it is advantageous and useful for us at the present

time—in certain measure, of course. Since the tax in kind means the free sale of surplus grain (over and above that taken in the form of the tax), we must exert every effort to direct *this* development of capitalism—for a free market is development of capitalism—into the channels of co-operative capitalism. It resembles state capitalism in that it facilitates accounting, control, supervision and the establishment of contractual relations between the state (in this case the Soviet state) and the capitalist. Co-operative trade is more advantageous and useful than private trade not only for the above-mentioned reasons, but also because it facilitates the association and organisation of millions of people, and eventually of the entire population, and this in its turn is an enormous gain from the standpoint of the subsequent transition from state capitalism to socialism.

Let us make a comparison of concessions and co-operatives as forms of state capitalism. Concessions are based on large-scale machine industry; co-operatives are based on small, handicraft, and partly even on patriarchal industry. Each concession agreement affects one capitalist, firm, syndicate, cartel or trust. Co-operative societies embrace many thousands and even millions of small proprietors. Concessions allow and even imply a definite agreement for a specified period. Co-operative societies allow of neither. It is much easier to repeal the law on the co-operatives than to annul a concession agreement, but the annulment of an agreement means a sudden rupture of the practical relations of economic alliance, or economic coexistence, with the capitalist, whereas the repeal of the law on the co-operatives, or any law, for that matter, does not immediately break off the practical coexistence of Soviet power and the small capitalists, nor, in general, is it able to break off the actual economic relations. It is easy to "keep an eye" on a concessionaire but not on the co-operators. The transition from concessions to socialism is a transition from one form of large-scale production to another. The transition from small-proprietor co-operatives to socialism is a transition from small to large-scale production, i.e., it is more complicated, but, if successful, is capable of embracing wider masses of the population, and pulling up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old, pre-socialist and even

pre-capitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all "innovations". The concessions policy, if successful, will give us a few model—compared with our own—large enterprises built on the level of modern advanced capitalism. After a few decades these enterprises will revert to us in their entirety. The co-operative policy, if successful, will result in raising the small economy and in facilitating its transition, within an indefinite period, to large-scale production on the basis of voluntary association.

Take a third form of state capitalism. The state enlists the capitalist as a merchant and pays him a definite commission on the sale of state goods and on the purchase of the produce of the small producer. A fourth form: the state leases to the capitalist entrepreneur an industrial establishment, oilfields, forest tracts, land, etc., which belong to the state, the lease being very similar to a concession agreement. We make no mention of, we give no thought or notice to, these two latter forms of state capitalism, not because we are strong and clever but because we are weak and foolish. We are afraid to look the "vulgar truth" squarely in the face, and too often yield to "exalting deception".[106] We keep repeating that "we" are passing from capitalism to socialism, but do not bother to obtain a distinct picture of the "we". To keep this picture clear we must constantly have in mind the whole list—without any exception—of the constituent parts of our national economy, of all its diverse forms that I gave in my article of May 5, 1918. "We", the vanguard, the advanced contingent of the proletariat, are passing directly to socialism; but the advanced contingent is only a small part of the whole of the proletariat while the latter, in its turn, is only a small part of the whole population. If "we" are successfully to solve the problem of our immediate transition to socialism, we must understand what *intermediary* paths, methods, means and instruments are required for the transition from *pre-capitalist* relations to socialism. That is the whole point.

Look at the map of the R.S.F.S.R. There is room for dozens of large civilised states in those vast areas which lie to the north of Vologda, the south-east of Rostov-on-Don and Saratov, the south of Orenburg and Omsk, and the north of Tomsk. They are a realm of patriarchalism,

and semi- and downright barbarism. And what about the peasant backwoods of the rest of Russia, where scores of versts of country track, or rather of trackless country, lie between the villages and the railways, i.e., the material link with the big cities, large-scale industry, capitalism and culture? Isn't that also an area of wholesale patriarchalism, Oblomovism[107] and semi-barbarism?

Is an immediate transition to socialism from the state of affairs predominating in Russia conceivable? Yes, it is, to a certain degree, but on one condition, the precise nature of which we now know thanks to a great piece of scientific work[108] that has been completed. It is electrification. If we construct scores of district electric power stations (we now know where and how these can and should be constructed), and transmit electric power to every village, if we obtain a sufficient number of electric motors and other machinery, we shall not need, or shall hardly need, any transition stages or intermediary links between patriarchalism and socialism. But we know perfectly well that it will take at least ten years only to complete the first stage of this "one" condition; this period can be conceivably reduced only if the proletarian revolution is victorious in such countries as Britain, Germany or the U.S.A.

Over the next few years we must learn to think of the intermediary links that can facilitate the transition from patriarchalism and small production to socialism. "We" continue saying now and again that "capitalism is a bane and socialism is a boon". But such-an argument is wrong, because it fails to take into account the aggregate of the existing economic forms and singles out only two of them.

Capitalism is a bane compared with socialism. Capitalism is a boon compared with medievalism, small production, and the evils of bureaucracy which spring from the dispersal of the small producers. Inasmuch as we are as yet unable to pass directly from small production to socialism, some capitalism is inevitable as the elemental product of small production and exchange; so that we must utilise capitalism (particularly by directing it into the channels of state capitalism) as the intermediary link between small production and socialism, as a means, a path, and a method of increasing the productive forces.

Look at the economic aspect of the evils of bureaucracy. We see nothing of them on May 5, 1918. Six months after the October Revolution, with the old bureaucratic apparatus smashed from top to bottom, we feel none of its evils.

A year later, the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 18-23, 1919)[109] adopted a new Party Programme in which we spoke forthrightly of "*a partial revival of bureaucracy within the Soviet system*"—not fearing to admit the evil, but desiring to reveal, expose and pillory it and to stimulate thought, will, energy and action to combat it.

Two years later, in the spring of 1921, after the Eighth Congress of Soviets (December 1920), which discussed the evils of bureaucracy, and after the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 1921), which summed up the controversies closely connected with an analysis of these evils, we find *them* even more distinct and sinister. What are their economic roots? They are mostly of a dual character: on the one hand, a developed bourgeoisie needs a bureaucratic apparatus, primarily a military apparatus, and then a judiciary, etc., to use against the revolutionary movement of the workers (and partly of the peasants). That is something we have not got. Ours are class courts directed against the bourgeoisie. Ours is a class army directed against the bourgeoisie. The evils of bureaucracy are not in the army, but in the institutions serving it. In our country bureaucratic practices have different economic roots, namely, the atomised and scattered state of the small producer with his poverty, illiteracy, lack of culture, the absence of roads and *exchange* between agriculture and industry, the absence of connection and interaction between them. This is largely the result of the Civil War. We could not restore industry when we were blockaded, besieged on all sides, cut off from the whole world and later from the grain-bearing South, Siberia, and the coalfields. We could not afford to hesitate in introducing War Communism, or daring to go to the most desperate extremes: to save the workers' and peasants' rule we had to suffer an existence of semi-starvation and worse than semi-starvation, but to hold on at all costs, in spite of unprecedented ruin and the absence of economic intercourse. We did not allow ourselves

to be frightened, as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks did (who, in fact, followed the bourgeoisie largely because they were scared). But the factor that was crucial to victory in a blockaded country—a besieged fortress—revealed its negative side by the spring of 1921, just when the last of the whiteguard forces were finally driven from the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. In the besieged fortress, it was possible and imperative to "lock up" all exchange; with the masses displaying extraordinary heroism this could be borne for three years. After that, the ruin of the small producer increased, and the restoration of large-scale industry was further delayed, and postponed. Bureaucratic practices, as a legacy of the "siege" and the superstructure built over the isolated and downtrodden state of the small producer, fully revealed themselves.

We must learn to admit an evil fearlessly in order to combat it the more firmly, in order to start from scratch again and again; we shall have to do this many a time in every sphere of our activity, finish what was left undone and choose different approaches to the problem. In view of the obvious delay in the restoration of large-scale industry, the "locking up" of exchange between industry and agriculture has become intolerable. Consequently, we must concentrate on what we can do: restoring small industry, helping things from that end, propping up the side of the structure that has been half-demolished by the war and blockade. We must do everything possible to develop trade at all costs, without being afraid of capitalism, because the limits we have put to it (the expropriation of the landowners and of the bourgeoisie in the economy, the rule of the workers and peasants in politics) are sufficiently narrow and "moderate". This is the fundamental idea and economic significance of the tax in kind.

All Party and Soviet workers must concentrate their efforts and attention on generating the utmost local initiative in economic development—in the gubernias, still more in the uyezds, still more in the volosts and villages—for the special purpose of immediately improving peasant farming, even if by "small" means, on a small scale, helping it by developing small local industry. The integrated state economic plan demands that this should become the focus

of concern and "priority" effort. Some improvement here, closest to the broadest and deepest "foundation", will permit of the speediest transition to a more vigorous and successful restoration of large-scale industry.

Hitherto the food supply worker has known only one fundamental instruction: collect 100 per cent of the grain appropriations. Now he has another instruction: collect 100 per cent of the tax in the shortest possible time and then collect another 100 per cent in exchange for the goods of large-scale *and small* industry. Those who collect 75 per cent of the tax and 75 per cent (of the second hundred) in exchange for the goods of large scale and small industry will be doing more useful work of national importance than those who collect 100 per cent of the tax and 55 per cent (of the second hundred) by means of exchange. The task of the food supply worker now becomes more complicated. On the one hand, it is a fiscal task: collect the tax as quickly and as efficiently as possible. On the other hand, it is a general economic task: try to direct the co-operatives, assist small industry, develop local initiative in such a way as to increase the exchange between agriculture and industry and put it on a sound basis. Our bureaucratic practices prove that we are still doing a very bad job of it. We must not be afraid to admit that in this respect *we still have a great deal to learn from the capitalist*. We shall compare the practical experience of the various gubernias, uyezds, volosts and villages: in one place private capitalists, big and small, have achieved so much; those are their approximate profits. That is the tribute, the fee, we have to pay for the "schooling". We shall not mind paying for it if we learn a thing or two. That much has been achieved in a neighbouring locality through co-operation. Those are the profits of the co-operatives. And in a third place, that much has been achieved by purely state and communist methods (for the present, this third case will be a rare exception).

It should be the primary task of every regional economic centre and economic conference of the gubernia executive committees immediately to organise various experiments, or systems of "exchange" for the surplus stocks remaining after the tax in kind has been paid. In a few months' time practical results must be obtained for comparison and study.

Local or imported salt; paraffin oil from the nearest town; the handicraft wood-working industry; handicrafts using local raw materials and producing certain, perhaps not very important, but necessary and useful, articles for the peasants; "green coal" (the utilisation of small local water power resources for electrification), and so on and so forth—all this must be brought into play in order to stimulate exchange between industry and agriculture at all costs. Those who achieve the best results in this sphere, even by means of private capitalism, even without the co-operatives, or without directly transforming this capitalism into state capitalism, will do more for the cause of socialist construction in Russia than those who "ponder over" the purity of communism, draw up regulations, rules and instructions for state capitalism and the co-operatives, but do nothing practical to stimulate trade.

Isn't it paradoxical that private capital should be helping socialism?

Not at all. It is, indeed, an irrefutable economic fact. Since this is a small-peasant country with transport in an extreme state of dislocation, a country emerging from war and blockade under the political guidance of the proletariat—which controls the transport system and large-scale industry—it inevitably follows, first, that at the present moment local exchange acquires first-class significance, and, second, that there is a possibility of assisting socialism by means of private capitalism (not to speak of state capitalism).

Let's not quibble about words. We still have too much of that sort of thing. We must have more variety in practical experience and make a wider study of it. In certain circumstances, the exemplary organisation of local work, even on the smallest scale, is of far greater national importance than many branches of central state work. These are precisely the circumstances now prevailing in peasant farming in general, and in regard to the exchange of the surplus products of agriculture for industrial goods in particular. Exemplary organisation in this respect, even in a single volost, is of far greater national importance than the "exemplary" improvement of the central apparatus of any People's Commissariat; over the past three and a half years our central

apparatus has been built up to such an extent that it has managed to acquire a certain amount of harmful routine; we cannot improve it quickly to any extent, we do not know how to do it. Assistance in the work of radically improving it, securing an influx of fresh forces, combating bureaucratic practices effectively and overcoming this harmful routine must come from the localities and the lower ranks, with the model organisation of a "complex", even if on a small scale. I say "complex", meaning not just one farm, one branch of industry, or one factory, but a *totality* of economic relations, a *totality* of economic exchange, even if only in a small locality.

Those of us who are doomed to remain at work in the centre will continue the task of improving the apparatus and purging it of bureaucratic evils, even if only on a modest and immediately achievable scale. But the greatest assistance in this task is coming, and will come, from the localities. Generally speaking, as far as I can observe, things are better in the localities than at the centre; and this is understandable, for, naturally, the evils of bureaucracy are concentrated at the centre. In this respect, Moscow cannot but be the worst city, and in general the worst "locality", in the Republic. In the localities we have deviations from the average to the good and the bad sides, the latter being less frequent than the former. The deviations towards the bad side are the abuses committed by former government officials, landowners, bourgeois and other scum who play up to the Communists and who sometimes commit abominable outrages and acts of tyranny against the peasantry. This calls for a terrorist purge, summary trial and the firing squad. Let the Martovs, the Chernovs, and non-Party philistines like them, beat their breasts and exclaim: "I thank Thee, Lord, that I am not as 'these', and have never accepted terrorism." These simpletons "do not accept terrorism" because they choose to be servile accomplices of the whiteguards in fooling the workers and peasants. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks "do not accept terrorism" because under the flag of "socialism" they are fulfilling their function of *placing* the masses *at the mercy of the whiteguard terrorism*. This was proved by the Kerensky regime and the Kornilov

putsch in Russia, by the Kolchak regime in Siberia, and by Menshevism in Georgia. It was proved by the heroes of the Second International and of the "Two-and-a-Half"[110] International in Finland, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Italy, Britain, etc. Let the flunkey accomplices of whiteguard terrorism wallow in their repudiation of all terrorism. We shall speak the bitter and indubitable truth: in countries beset by an unprecedented crisis, the collapse of old ties, and the intensification of the class struggle after the imperialist war of 1914-18—and that means all the countries of the world—terrorism cannot be dispensed with, notwithstanding the hypocrites and phrase-mongers. Either the whiteguard, bourgeois terrorism of the American, British (Ireland), Italian (the fascists), German, Hungarian and other types, or Red, proletarian terrorism. There is no middle course, no "third" course, nor can there be any.

The deviations towards the good side are the success achieved in combating the evils of bureaucracy, the great attention shown for the needs of the workers and peasants, and the great care in developing the economy, raising the productivity of labour and stimulating local exchange between agriculture and industry. Although the good examples are more numerous than the bad ones, they are, nevertheless, rare. Still, they are there. Young, fresh communist forces, steeled by civil war and privation, are coming forward in all localities. We are still doing far too little to promote these forces regularly from lower to higher posts. This can and must be done more persistently, and on a wider scale than at present. Some workers can and should be transferred from work at the centre to local work. As leading men of uyezds, and of *volosts*, where they can organise economic work *as a whole* on *exemplary* lines, they will do far more good, and perform work of far greater *national* importance, than by performing some junction at the centre. The exemplary organisation of the work will help to train new workers and provide examples that other districts could follow with relative ease. We at the centre shall be able to do a great deal to encourage the other districts all over the country to "follow" the good examples, and even make it mandatory for them to do so.

By its very nature, the work of developing "exchange"

between agriculture and industry, the exchange of after-tax surpluses for the output of small, mainly handicraft, industry, calls for independent, competent and intelligent local initiative. That is why it is now extremely important from the national standpoint to organise the work in the uyezds and volosts on exemplary lines. In military affairs, during the last Polish war, for example, we were not afraid of departing from the bureaucratic hierarchy, "downgrading", or transferring members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to lower posts (while allowing them to retain their higher rank at the centre). Why not now transfer several members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, or members of collegiums, or other high-ranking comrades, to uyezd or even volost work? Surely, we have not become so "bureaucratised" as to "be ashamed" of that. And we shall find scores of workers in the central bodies who will be glad to accept. The economic development of the whole Republic will gain enormously; and the exemplary volosts, or uyezds, will play not only a great, but a positively crucial and historic role.

Incidentally, we should note as a small but significant circumstance the necessary change in our attitude to the problem of combating profiteering. We must foster "proper" trade, which is one that does not evade state control; it is to our advantage to develop it. But profiteering, in its politico-economic sense, *cannot* be distinguished from "proper" trade. Freedom of trade is capitalism; capitalism is profiteering. It would be ridiculous to ignore this.

What then should be done? Shall we declare profiteering to be no longer punishable?

No. We must revise and redraft all the laws on profiteering, and declare all *pilfering* and every direct or indirect, open or concealed *evasion of state control*, *supervision and accounting* to be a punishable offence (and in fact prosecuted with redoubled severity). It is by presenting the question in this way (the Council of People's Commissars has already started, that is to say, it has ordered that work be started, on the revision of the anti-profiteering laws) that we shall succeed in directing the rather inevitable but necessary development of capitalism into the channels of *state* capitalism.

POLITICAL SUMMARY AND DEDUCTIONS

I still have to deal, if briefly, with the political situation, and the way it has taken shape and changed in connection with the economic developments outlined above.

I have already said that the fundamental features of our economy in 1921 are the same as those in 1918. The spring of 1921, mainly as a result of the crop failure and the loss of cattle, brought a sharp deterioration in the condition of the peasantry, which was bad enough because of the war and blockade. This resulted in political vacillations which, generally speaking, express the very "nature" of the small producer. Their most striking expression was the Kronstadt mutiny.

The vacillation of the petty-bourgeois element was the most characteristic feature of the Kronstadt events. There was very little that was clear, definite and fully shaped. We heard nebulous slogans about "freedom", "freedom to trade", "emancipation", "Soviets without the Bolsheviks", or new elections to the Soviets, or relief from "Party dictatorship", and so on and so forth. Both the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries declared the Kronstadt movement to be "their own". Victor Chernov sent a messenger to Kronstadt. On the latter's proposal, the Menshevik Valk, one of the Kronstadt leaders, voted for the *Constituent Assembly*. In a flash, with lightning speed, you might say, the whiteguards mobilised all their forces "*for Kronstadt*". Their military experts in Kronstadt, a number of experts, and not Kozlovsky alone, drew up a plan for a landing at Oranienbaum, which scared the vacillating mass of Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and non-party elements. More than fifty Russian whiteguard newspapers published abroad conducted a rabid campaign "*for Kronstadt*". The big banks, all the forces of finance capital, collected funds to assist Kronstadt. That shrewd leader of the bourgeoisie and the landowners, the Cadet Milyukov, patiently explained to the simpleton Victor Chernov directly (and to the Mensheviks Dan and Rozhkov, who are in jail in Petrograd for their connection with the Kronstadt events, indirectly) that there is no need to hurry with the Constituent Assembly, and that

Soviet power can and must be supported—*only without the Bolsheviks.*

Of course, it is easy to be cleverer than conceited simpletons like Chernov, the petty-bourgeois phrase-monger, or like Martov, the knight of philistine reformism doctored to pass for Marxism. Properly speaking, the point is not that Milyukov, as an individual, has more brains, but that, because of his class position, the party leader of the big bourgeoisie sees and understands the class essence and political interaction of things more clearly than the leaders of the petty bourgeoisie, the Chernovs and Martovs. For the bourgeoisie is really a class force which, under capitalism, inevitably rules both under a monarchy and in the most democratic republic, and which also inevitably enjoys the support of the world bourgeoisie. But the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., all the heroes of the Second International and of the "Two-and-a-Half" International, cannot, by the very economic nature of things, be anything else than the expression of class impotence; hence the vacillation, phrase-mongering and helplessness. In 1789, the petty bourgeois could still be great revolutionaries. In 1848, they were ridiculous and pathetic. Their actual role in 1917-21 is that of abominable agents and out-and-out servitors of reaction, be their names Chernov, Martov, Kautsky, MacDonald, or what have you.

Martov showed himself to be nothing but a philistine Narcissus when he declared in his Berlin journal[111] that Kronstadt not only adopted Menshevik slogans but also proved that there could be an anti-Bolshevik movement which did not entirely serve the interests of the whiteguards, the capitalists and the landowners. He says in effect: "Let us shut our eves to the fact that all the genuine whiteguards hailed the Kronstadt mutineers and collected funds in aid of Kronstadt through the banks!" Compared with the Chernovs and Martovs, Milyukov is right, for he is revealing the *true* tactics of the *real* whiteguard force, the force of the capitalists and landowners. He declares: "It does not matter whom we support, be they anarchists or any sort of Soviet government, *as long as* the Bolsheviks are overthrown, *as long as there is a shift in power*; it does not matter whether to the right or to the left, to the

Mensheviks or to the anarchists, as long as it is away from the Bolsheviks. As for the rest—'we', the Milyukovs, 'we', the capitalists and landowners, will do the rest 'ourselves'; we shall slap down the anarchist pygmies, the Chernovs and the Martovs, as we did Chernov and Maisky in Siberia, the Hungarian Chernovs and Martovs in Hungary, Kautsky in Germany and the Friedrich Adlers and Co. in Vienna." The real, hard-headed bourgeoisie have made fools of hundreds of these philistine Narcissuses—whether Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary or non-party—and have driven them out scores of times in all revolutions in all countries. History proves it. The facts bear it out. The Narcissuses will talk; the Milyukovs and whiteguards will act.

Milyukov is absolutely right when he says, "If only there is a power shift away from the Bolsheviks, no matter whether it is a little to the right or to the left, the rest will take care of itself." This is class truth, confirmed by the history of revolutions in all countries, and by the centuries of modern history since the Middle Ages. The scattered small producers, the peasants, are economically and politically united either by the bourgeoisie (this has always been—and will always be—the case under capitalism in all countries, in all modern revolutions), or by the proletariat (that was the case in a rudimentary form for a very short period at the peak of some of the greatest revolutions in modern history; that has been the case in Russia in a more developed form in 1917-21). Only the Narcissuses will talk and dream about a "third" path, and a "third force".

With enormous difficulty, and in the course of desperate struggles, the Bolsheviks have trained a proletarian vanguard that is capable of governing; they have created and successfully defended the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the test of four years of practical experience, the relation of class forces in Russia has become as clear as day: the steeled and tempered vanguard of the only revolutionary class; the vacillating petty-bourgeois element; and the Milyukovs, the capitalists and landowners, lying in wait abroad and supported by the world bourgeoisie. It is crystal-clear: only the latter are able to take advantage of any "shift of power ", and will certainly do so.

In the 1918 pamphlet I quoted above, this point was put very clearly: "the principal enemy" is the "petty-bourgeois element". "Either we subordinate it to our control and accounting, or it will overthrow the workers' power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of petty proprietorship. This is how the question stands. That is the only view we can take of the matter." (Excerpt from the pamphlet of May 5, 1918, cf. above.)

Our strength lies in complete clarity and the sober consideration of *all* the existing class magnitudes, both Russian and international; and in the inexhaustible energy, iron resolve and devotion in struggle that arise from this. We have many enemies, but they are disunited, or do not know their own minds (like all the petty bourgeoisie, all the Martovs and Chernovs, all the non-party elements and anarchists). But we are united—directly among ourselves and indirectly with the proletarians of all countries; we know just what we want. That is why we are invincible on a world scale, although this does not in the least preclude the possibility of defeat for individual proletarian revolutions for longer or shorter periods.

There is good reason for calling the petty-bourgeois element an element, for it is indeed something that is most amorphous, indefinite and unconscious. The petty-bourgeois Narcissuses imagine that "universal suffrage" abolishes the nature of the small producer under capitalism. As a matter of fact, it *helps* the bourgeoisie, through the church, the press, the teachers, the police, the militarists and a thousand and one forms of economic oppression, to *subordinate* the scattered small producers. Ruin, want and the hard conditions of life give rise to vacillation: one day for the bourgeoisie, the next, for the proletariat. Only the steeled proletarian vanguard is capable of withstanding and overcoming this vacillation.

The events of the spring of 1921 once again revealed the role of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks: they help the vacillating petty-bourgeois element to recoil from the Bolsheviks, to cause a "shift of power" in favour of the capitalists and landowners. *The Mensheviks and*

Socialist-Revolutionaries have now learned to don the "non-party" disguise. This has been fully proved. Only fools now fail to see this and understand that we must not allow ourselves to be fooled. Non-Party conferences are not a fetish. They are valuable if they help us to come closer to the impassive masses—the millions of working people still outside politics. They are harmful if they provide a platform for the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries masquerading as "non-party" men. They are helping the mutinies, and the whiteguards. The place for Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, avowed or in non-party guise, is not at a non-Party conference but in prison (or on foreign journals, side by side with the whiteguards; we were glad to let Martov go abroad). We can and must find other methods of testing the mood of the masses and coming closer to them. We suggest that those who want to play the parliamentary, constituent assembly and non-Party conference game, should go abroad; over there, by Martov's side, they can try the charms of "democracy" and ask Wrangel's soldiers about them. We have no time for this "opposition" at "conferences" game. We are surrounded by the world bourgeoisie, who are watching for every sign of vacillation in order to bring back "their own men", and restore the landowners and the bourgeoisie. We will keep in prison the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, whether avowed or in "non-party" guise.

We shall employ every means to establish closer contacts with the masses of working people untouched by politics—except such means as give scope to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the *vacillations that benefit Milyukov*. In particular, we shall zealously draw into Soviet work, primarily economic work, hundreds upon hundreds of non-Party people, real non-Party people from the masses, the rank and file of workers and peasants, and not those who have adopted non-party colours in order to crib Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary instructions which are so much to Milyukov's advantage. Hundreds and thousands of non-Party people are working for us, and scores occupy very important and responsible posts. We must pay more attention to the way they work. We must do more to promote and test thousands and thousands of

rank-and-file workers, to try them out systematically and persistently, and appoint hundreds of them to higher posts, if experience shows that they can fill them.

Our Communists still do not have a sufficient understanding of their real duties of administration: they should not strive to do "everything themselves", running themselves down and failing to cope with everything, undertaking twenty jobs and finishing none. They should check up on the work of scores and hundreds of assistants, arrange to have their work checked up from below, i.e., by the real masses. They should *direct* the work and *learn* from those who have the knowledge (the specialists) and the experience in organising large-scale production (the capitalists). The intelligent Communist will not be afraid to learn from the military expert, although nine-tenths of the military experts are capable of treachery at every opportunity. The wise Communist will not be afraid to learn from a capitalist (whether a big capitalist concessionaire, a commission agent, or a petty capitalist co-operator, etc.), although the capitalist is no better than the military expert. Did we not learn to catch treacherous military experts in the Red Army, to bring out the honest and conscientious, and, on the whole, to utilise thousands and tens of thousands of military experts? We are learning to do the same thing (in an unconventional way) with engineers and teachers, although we are not doing it as well as we did it in the Red Army (there Denikin and Kolchak spurred us on, compelled us to learn more quickly, diligently and intelligently). We shall also learn to do it (again in an unconventional way) with the commission agents, with the buyers working for the state, the petty capitalist co-operators, the entrepreneur concessionaires, etc.

The condition of the masses of workers and peasants needs to be improved right away. And we shall achieve this by putting new forces, including non-Party forces, to useful work. The tax in kind, and a number of measures connected with it, will facilitate this; we shall thereby cut at the economic root of the small producer's inevitable vacillations. And we shall ruthlessly fight the political vacillations, which benefit no one but Milyukov. The waverers are many, we are few. The waverers are disunited, we

are united. The waverers are not economically independent, the proletariat is. The waverers don't know their own minds: they want to do something very badly, but Milyukov won't let them. We know what we want.

And that is why we shall win.

CONCLUSION

To sum up.

The tax in kind is a transition from War Communism to a regular socialist exchange of products.

The extreme ruin rendered more acute by the crop failure in 1920 has made this transition urgently necessary owing to the fact that it was impossible to restore large-scale industry rapidly.

Hence, the first thing to do is to improve the condition of the peasants. The means are the tax in kind, the development of exchange between agriculture and industry, and the development of small industry.

Exchange is freedom of trade; it is capitalism. It is useful to us inasmuch as it will help us overcome the dispersal of the small producer, and to a certain degree combat the evils of bureaucracy; to what extent this can be done will be determined by practical experience. The proletarian power is in no danger, as long as the proletariat firmly holds power in its hands, and has full control of transport and large-scale industry.

The fight against profiteering must be transformed into a fight against stealing and the evasion of state supervision, accounting and control. By means of this control we shall direct the capitalism that is to a certain extent inevitable and necessary for us into the channels of state capitalism.

The development of local initiative and independent action in encouraging exchange between agriculture and industry must be given the fullest scope at all costs. The practical experience gained must be studied; and this experience must be made as varied as possible.

We must give assistance to small industry servicing peasant farming and helping to improve it. To some extent, this assistance may be given in the form of raw materials

from the state stocks. It would be most criminal to leave these raw materials unprocessed.

We must not be afraid of Communists "learning" from bourgeois experts, including merchants, petty capitalist co-operators and capitalists, in the same way as we learned from the military experts, though in a different form. The results of the "learning" must be tested only by practical experience and by doing things better than the bourgeois experts at your side; try in every way to secure an improvement in agriculture and industry, and to develop exchange between them. Do not grudge them the "tuition" fee: none will be too high, provided we learn something.

Do everything to help the masses of working people, to come closer to them, and to promote from their ranks hundreds and thousands of non-Party people for the work of economic administration. As for the "non-party" people who are only Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries disguised in fashionable non-party attire *à la* Kronstadt, they should be kept safe in prison, or packed off to Berlin, to join Martov in freely enjoying all the charms of pure democracy and freely exchanging ideas with Chernov, Milyukov and the Georgian Mensheviks.

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RECORDED SPEECHES[112]

1
THE TAX IN KIND

The surplus-food appropriation system has been replaced by a tax in kind. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee has issued a decree to that effect. In pursuance of this decree, the Council of People's Commissars has issued a law introducing the tax in kind.[113] It is now the duty of all Soviet institutions to inform the peasants of the law as broadly as possible and explain what it means.

Why was it necessary to substitute a tax in kind for the surplus-grain appropriation system? It is because the surplus appropriation system proved to be extremely inconvenient and onerous for the peasants, whose want and ruin were further aggravated by the 1920 crop failure. Furthermore, the fodder shortage led to greater loss of cattle; less firewood was transported from the forests; and there was a slowdown in the factories producing the goods to be exchanged for the peasants' grain. The workers' and peasants' government had to take steps immediately to alleviate the condition of the peasants.

The tax in kind amounts to only about one-half of the surplus-grain appropriation rate: grain, for example, will amount to 240 million poods instead of 423 million. Every peasant will know the exact amount of tax he has to pay beforehand, that is, in the spring. This will reduce the abuses in tax collection. It will be an incentive for the peasant to cultivate a larger area, to improve his farm, and try to raise yields.

This country has been devastated unbelievably first by the tsarist war, and then by the Civil War, that is, by the landowners' and capitalists' invasion against the Soviet

power of workers and peasants. The national economy must be put on its feet at all costs. And the first thing to do is to restore, consolidate and improve peasant farming.

The tax in kind will help to improve peasant farming. The peasants will now set to work on their farms with greater confidence and with a will, and that is the main thing.

April 25, 1921 *N. Lenin*

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2
CONCESSIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

The Soviet government is inviting foreign capitalists to obtain concessions in Russia.

What is a concession? It is a contract between the government and a capitalist who undertakes to organise or improve production (for example, felling and floating timber, extracting coal, oil, ore, etc.) and to pay the government a share of the product obtained, keeping the rest as his profit.

Is it right for the Soviet government to invite foreign capitalists after expelling the Russian landowners and capitalists? Yes, it is, because, seeing that the workers' revolution in other countries is delayed, we have to make some sacrifices in order to achieve a rapid and even immediate improvement in the condition of the workers and peasants. The sacrifice is that over a number of years we shall be giving away to the capitalists tens of millions of poods of valuable products. The improvement in the condition of the workers and peasants is that we shall immediately obtain additional quantities of petroleum, paraffin oil, salt, coal, farming implements, and so forth. We have no right to forego the opportunity of immediately improving the condition of the workers and peasants, for our impoverishment makes it essential, and our sacrifices will not be fatal.

But is it not dangerous to invite the capitalists? Does it not imply a development of capitalism? Yes, it does imply a development of capitalism, but this is not dangerous, because power will still be in the hands of the workers and peasants, and the landowners and capitalists will not

be getting back their property. A concession is something in the nature of a contract of lease. The capitalist becomes, for a specified period, the lessee of a certain part of state property under a contract, but he does not become the owner. The state remains the owner.

The Soviet government will see to it that the capitalist lessee abides by the terms of the contract, that the contract is to our advantage, and that, as a result, the condition of the workers and peasants is improved. On these terms the development of capitalism is not dangerous, and the workers and peasants stand to gain by obtaining a larger quantity of products.

April 25, 1921 *N. Lenin*

First published in 1924

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3
CONSUMERS' AND PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES

Consumers' co-operative societies are associations of workers and peasants for the purpose of supplying and distributing the goods they need. Producers' co-operative societies are associations of small farmers or artisans for the purpose of producing and marketing products, whether agricultural (such as vegetables, dairy produce and the like) or non-agricultural (all sorts of manufactured goods, woodwork, ironware, leather goods, and so forth).

The substitution of the tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system will give the peasants grain surpluses which they will freely exchange for all sorts of manufactured goods.

Producers' co-operatives will help to develop small industry, which will supply the peasants with greater quantities of necessary goods. Most of these do not have to be transported by rail over long distances and do not need large factories for their manufacture. Everything must be done to foster and develop producers' co-operatives, and it is the duty of Party and Soviet workers to render them every assistance, for this will give the peasants immediate relief and improve their condition. At the present time, the revival and restoration of the national economy of the workers' and peasants' state depends most of all on the improvement of peasant life and farming.

There must also be support and development of consumers' co-operative societies, for they will ensure swift, regular and low-cost distribution of products. It remains for the Soviet authorities to supervise the activity of the co-operative societies to see that there are no fraudulent practices, no concealment from the government, no abuses. In no circumstances should they hamper the co-operative societies but should help and promote them in every way.

Written on April 25, 1921
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Published according to a transcript from the record

TO COMRADE KRZHIZHANOVSKY, THE PRESIDIUM OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

There is still hardly any evidence of the operation of an integrated state economic plan. The predominating tendency is to "revive" everything, all branches of the national economy indiscriminately, even all the enterprises that we have inherited from capitalism.

The State Planning Commission should organise its work in such a way as to have drawn up, at least by harvest time, the main principles of a state economic plan for the next year or two.

It should start with food, for this is the taproot of all our difficulties. An attempt must be made to draw up a national economic plan for three contingencies: a state reserve of (1) 200; (2) 250 and (3) 300 million poods of grain for the year (September 1, 1921 to September 1, 1922). Perhaps, if the difficulties of working out detailed calculations for the three contingencies prove too great, it would be more rational to confine ourselves to one detailed calculation based on the assumption that we obtain 250 million poods, with a surplus (300 minus 250) provided against a rainy day, and only approximate the details for the contingency of a complete shortage of grain (200 million poods) (so much to be bought from abroad, so much to be "tightened up" in industry, transport, the army, etc.).

Assume that the state grain reserve amounts to so much; deduct a reserve for the contingency of war, interruptions in railway communication, etc.

Then comes fuel. The prospects ranging from so much to so much. Minimum and maximum amount of food required for this purpose. The possibility of increasing fuel

supplies to such-and-such dimensions if the grain reserve is increased by so much.

Possibility of economising so much fuel by concentrating production in a few of the best factories. These calculations are essential. In this connection, estimate the possibilities of economising food by closing down unnecessary factories, or those not absolutely essential, and by transferring the workers (Where? Is such transfer feasible? If not—consider the minimum task of putting such workers on shorter rations).

Economising fuel by paying a bonus for saving it and by tighter supervision of consumption. Approximate estimate of such economy—if there are any data to base it on.

The army (as distinct from the navy, for which special calculations must be made for maximum reduction, verging on abolition, and reduction of expenditure). Basis of calculation—1.6 million by Sept. 1, 1921, and a provisional estimate for half the amount.

Soviet office staffs. Present size. Possibility of reducing by 25 or 50 per cent. Bonus for one-fourth (of present number of employees, those absolutely essential) for reducing the total number. This question of giving a bonus to the remaining fourth (or third, or half) for reducing the total number of mouths (and for reducing fuel consumption by, say, introducing a three-shift system and closing two out of three offices) must be examined with particular care in view of its exceptional importance.

Industry, divided into several groups with the smallest possible number of the main groups. Water and light. Minimum necessary to cover minimum requirements: (α) productive consumption, (β) individual consumption. Estimates for a definite number of main groups (the task of working out detailed calculations for the respective branches of industry, districts and towns may, perhaps, be assigned to special subcommissions, or special local agents, or to the gubernia statistical bureaus, etc.)—calculate how many large factories all production can be concentrated in, and how many should be closed. Obviously, this extremely important question requires particularly careful study: firstly, purely statistical (data for 1920, and, if possible, also for 1918 and 1919; sometimes, in

exceptional cases, pre-war statistics may be of auxiliary use); secondly, economic, which must solve the following special problem:

Is it possible to find for the redundant urban and industrial workers whom the state ought not to feed, and for whom other employment cannot be provided in the towns, temporary employment—for a year or two—in the grain districts on the understanding that they satisfy the needs of the surrounding farming population?

After industry, from which the building industry must be singled out, comes transport (perhaps this should be put before industry?), and electrification as a distinct item.

And so forth.

The estimates must be first drawn up at least in rough outline, as a first approximation; but they must be ready at an early date—within a month, or two, at the outside. They must give an overall picture of the total food and fuel expenditure for the year. This rough plan can afterwards be filled in, corrected, amended; but at this early date we must have the main plan for the year even if only in rough outline (or perhaps separate plans for each of the quarters, or thirds, of the year: Sept. 1, 1921 to Jan. 1, 1922; Jan. 1 to May 1, and May 1 to Sept. 1, 1922).

Nineteen-twenty must be taken as a basis for comparison throughout. Perhaps a number of estimates can and must be made on the basis of a comparative statistical and economic study of the data for 1920 and the "prospects" for 1921-22.

I request that the Presidium of the State Planning Commission inform me of the opinions on this letter of the majority and of its individual members, before submitting my proposal to the Plenum of the State Planning Commission.

Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence,
V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

May 14, 1921

P.S. 1) Special attention must be paid to the industries producing articles that can be exchanged for grain, in order to obtain grain within the country. At all events these industries must be grouped separately so as to provide a definite answer to the question: In the event of a general

shortage of grain, will it be possible, by setting aside a given quantity of food and fuel for certain branches of industry, or certain factories, to obtain a given quantity of goods which can be exchanged for a given quantity of grain? This provisional estimate must be drawn up beforehand, for application, in certain cases, after the harvest.

2) An attempt must be made to single out and count up: (a) the factories (and number of workers) that are absolutely essential for the state and (b) the factories—and number of workers—which are being kept running by tradition, routine, and the unwillingness of the workers to change their occupation and domicile, etc., and which should be closed down to rationalise production and concentrate industry in a few of the best factories operating in several shifts. Total number of factories and workers in each category. Estimate reduction of ration for second category as an incentive for closing these factories.

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INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE TO LOCAL SOVIET BODIES[114]

DRAFT

The primary task of the Soviet Republic is to restore the productive forces and revive agriculture, industry and transport. The ruin and impoverishment caused everywhere by the imperialist war are so vast that an economic crisis is raging throughout the world, and even in the advanced countries, which before the war were way ahead of Russia in their development and which suffered much less from the war than she did, economic rehabilitation is proceeding with enormous difficulty and will take many long years. This situation prevails even in many of the "victor" countries, despite the fact that they are allied with the richest capitalist powers and are exacting a fat tribute from the defeated, dependent and colonial countries.

Backward Russia, which in addition to the imperialist war endured more than three years of civil war, imposed upon the workers and peasants by the landowners and capitalists with the help of the world bourgeoisie, naturally finds the difficulties of economic rehabilitation so much more formidable. The heavy crop failure in 1920, the lack of fodder and the loss of cattle have had a disastrous effect on peasant farming.

In conformity with the law passed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, a tax in kind has been substituted for the surplus appropriation system. The farmer is free to exchange his surplus produce for various goods. The tax rates have been announced by order of the Council of People's Commissars. The tax amounts to approximately one-half of the produce obtained under the surplus appropriation system. The Council of People's Commissars has issued a new law on the co-operative

societies giving them wider powers in view of the free exchange of surplus farm produce.

These laws have done a great deal for the immediate improvement of the condition of peasant farming and stimulation of peasant interest in enlarging the area under crop and improving methods of farming and livestock breeding. They have also done much to help revive and develop small local industry which can do without the procurement and transportation of large state stocks of food, raw materials and fuel.

Particularly great importance now attaches to independent local initiative in improving peasant farming, developing industry and establishing exchange between agriculture and industry. Great opportunities are being created for the application of new forces and fresh energy to the work of restoring the country's economy.

The Council of Labour and Defence, upon whom, in pursuance of the decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, devolves the duty of co-ordinating and directing the activity of the People's Commissariats for the various sectors of the economy, insistently urges all local bodies to do their utmost to develop extensive activities for the all-round improvement of peasant farming and the revival of industry, in strict conformity with the new laws and in the light of the fundamental propositions and instructions given below.

We now have two main criteria of success in our work of economic development on a nation-wide scale. First success in the speedy, full and, from the state point of view, proper collection of the tax in kind; and second—and this is particularly important—success in the exchange of manufactured goods for agricultural produce between industry and agriculture.

This is most vital, urgent and imperative. It will put all our efforts to the test and lay the foundations for implementing our great electrification plan, which will result in the restoration of our large-scale industry and transport to such proportions and on such a technical basis that we shall overcome starvation and poverty once and for all.

We must collect 100 per cent of the tax in kind, and, in addition, an equal quantity of food products through the



First page of Lenin's "Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence to Local Soviet Bodies. Draft."
May 1921

Reduced

First page of Lenin's "Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence
to Local Soviet Bodies. Draft."
May 1921

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free exchange of surplus farm produce for manufactured goods. Of course, this will not be achieved everywhere all at once, but it should be our short-term goal. We can achieve it in a very short time if we take the right view of the state of our economy and put our hearts into reviving it the right way. All local authorities and bodies in every gubernia, uyezd, regional centre and autonomous republic must join forces and co-ordinate their efforts to stimulate the exchange of surplus produce. Experience will show how far we can do this by increasing the output and delivery of goods made by the state in the big socialist factories. It will show how far we succeed in encouraging and developing small local industry, and what part will be played in this by the co-operative societies and the private traders, manufacturers and capitalists who are under state control. We must try out every method, giving the utmost scope to local initiative. The new task before us has never been tackled anywhere else before. We are trying to solve it in the conditions of post-war ruin, which prevent any precise estimation of our resources or of the effort we can expect of the workers and peasants, who have made such incredible sacrifices to defeat the landowners and capitalists. We must be bolder in widely applying a variety of methods and taking different approaches, giving rein to capital and private trade in varying degree, without being afraid to implant some capitalism, as long as we succeed in stimulating exchange at once and thereby revive agriculture and industry. We must ascertain the country's resources by practical experience, and determine the best way to improve the condition of the workers and peasants to enable us to proceed with the wider and more fundamental work of building up the economy and implementing the electrification plan.

The two main questions to which every Soviet official engaged in economic work must pay attention are: how much of their surplus farm produce, over and above the tax, have the peasants exchanged for the manufactures of small industry and private trade, and how much for manufactured goods provided by the state? These are the main lines to follow over the short haul in order to achieve the greatest results. They will provide the success indicators and enable us to decide on the subsequent tasks. Every aspect of

economic construction in general must be geared to these two immediate tasks.

To attain this co-ordination, encourage local initiative, enterprise and large-scale operations to the utmost, and make sure that central bodies are guided by local experience and local supervision, and vice versa, thereby eliminating red tape and bureaucratic practices, the Council of Labour and Defence has ordered (see text of the order) that:

first, regular economic conferences should be convened in all districts for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of the local departments of all the People's Commissariats for the various sectors of the economy;

second, proper records of the local economic conferences should be kept to facilitate the pooling of experience and the organising of emulation, and mainly, to utilise the work of the local organisations and its results as a means of checking up on the methods and organisation of the central bodies.

The local economic conferences should be organised on the lines of the C.L.D. (Council of Labour and Defence) and their relationship with the local executive committees should be similar to those between the C.L.D. and the Council of People's Commissars. The C.L.D. functions as a commission of the Council of People's Commissars. The appointment of members of the Council of People's Commissars to the C.L.D. ensures the fullest co-ordination of the work of both bodies, eliminates the possibility of any friction between them, expedites matters and simplifies procedures. Having no staff of its own, the C.L.D. utilises that of various government departments, striving to simplify their procedures and co-ordinate their operations.

Gubernia economic councils should stand in the same relationship to the gubernia executive committees, and that is the actual trend in practice. The C.L.D., in confirming the appointment of members and chairmen of regional and territorial economic councils, strives to take account of the experience of local workers and consults with them on all its confirmations. The regional economic councils must certainly strive, and will continue to strive, to co-ordinate their work with that of the gubernia economic councils, securing their fullest co-operation, keeping them informed and stimulating their interest. This is hardly

the time to try to reduce these relationships to a set of regulations, for experience is still very short and any such attempt might result in a purely bureaucratic exercise. It is far more appropriate to allow practice to determine initially the most suitable form of relationship (the C.L.D. worked side by side with the Council of People's Commissars for about a year, virtually without a constitution). Let these forms be at first not absolutely stable: variety is desirable, useful and even necessary to enable us to make a more precise study and a fuller comparison of the various systems of relationships.

Uyezd and volost economic councils should be organised on the same lines, naturally with a lot of leeway in modifying the main type, that is, the executive committees may assume all the functions and duties of the economic conferences, convert their own "executive" or "economic" meetings into economic conferences, appoint (say, in the volosts and sometimes in the uyezds) special committees or even individuals to exercise all or some of the functions of the economic conferences, and so on and so forth. The *village committees* should be the bottom rung and should operate as the lower units of the C.L.D. in the rural districts. The Council of People's Commissars has already passed a law, issued in May 1921, which gives the village committees wider powers and defines their relationship with the village Soviets. The gubernia executive committees must draw up provisional regulations suitable for the given locality which, however, must not restrict, but give *the greatest possible scope* to "local" initiative in general, and that of the lowest units *in particular*.

In industrial uyezds and settlements, the district committees and factory committees, or the management boards of factories, should serve as the lower units of the C.L.D., depending on whether one or more branches of industry are being dealt with. In any case, *co-operation* with the uyezd executive committees, volost executive committees and village committees in directing *all* local economic life is absolutely essential in one form or another.

Furthermore, it is exceptionally important that local organisations should submit to the C.L.D. regular and precise information on their activity, for one of our main

evils is the inadequate study of practical experience, inadequate exchange of experience and mutual control—putting orders from the centre to the test of local experience, and subjecting local work to control by the centre. One of the most important means of combating bureaucratic practices and red tape should be to check the way the laws and orders from the centre are carried out locally, and this requires the printing of *public* reports, with *non-Party people* and people not working in the departments necessarily *taking a greater hand. Nashe Khozyaistvo*, "the fortnightly journal of the Tver Gubernia Economic Council" (No. 1, April 15, 1921; No. 2, April 30, 1921), is evidence that the local need to study, elucidate and publicise the results of our economic experience is being realised and satisfied the correct way. It will not be possible, of course, to publish a journal in every gubernia, not within the next few months, at any rate; nor will it be possible everywhere to have a fortnightly printing of 3,000 copies, as is the case in Tver. But every gubernia, and every uyezd even, can—and should—compile a report on local economic activities once every two months (or initially at longer intervals, by way of exception) and issue it in a printing of, say, 100 to 300 copies. The paper and the printing facilities for such a small operation will surely be found everywhere, provided we realise its urgency and importance, and see the necessity to satisfy this need by taking the paper from many of the departments which print a mass of useless and hardly urgent material. The copy could be set up in small type and printed in two columns (as the comrades in Tver are doing); the feasibility and urgency of this will be quite clear if we realise the simple truth that even a hundred copies, distributed one to every gubernia library and all the major state libraries, will provide a source of information for *the whole of Russia*, which may perhaps be scanty but *sure*, and will serve as a record of experience.

These reports must be published regularly, even if in small printings, in order to maintain a proper record of experience, and actually pool it, and enlist all the prominent and capable organisers among the non-Party people. This is something we can and must do immediately.

When drawing up the reports, the questions put must

be answered as briefly and precisely as possible. The questions fall into four groups, the first being those especially prominent at the present time. They must be answered in every report with the maximum precision and in the greatest detail. That is particularly necessary because this group of questions is extremely vital and urgent for most uyezds at this very moment. Other questions will come to the fore for the smaller part of the uyezds and districts, that is, the purely industrial ones. The second group consists of questions which must also be answered in every report, but the answers can and should frequently be given in the form of brief summaries of reports already submitted to the government departments concerned. In all such cases, the reports to the C.L.D. must give: the dates on which the reports were sent off; the departments to which they were sent; and a brief summary of the reports in figures. The C.L.D. requires such reports for supervision over the various departments, as well as for the totals indicating the results in food supplies, fuel, industry, and so forth. The third group contains questions that need not be answered in every report. The answers to these questions must be given initially, that is, in the first report, but subsequent reports should add only the supplementary and new information as it accumulates. In many cases, there will be nothing to report at all on these questions every two months. The fourth group consists of miscellaneous, supplementary questions, which are not indicated in advance; they are not formulated by the centre but arise locally. This group must be compiled by the local bodies, and is not limited in any-way. It goes without saying that questions pertaining to state secrets (army, or such as are connected with military operations, security, etc.) must be answered in special reports not for publication, but intended exclusively for the C.L.D. as confidential reports.

Here is a list of these questions:

FIRST GROUP OF QUESTIONS

1. COMMODITY EXCHANGE WITH THE PEASANTRY

At present, this question ranks first in importance and urgency. First, the state cannot carry on any economic development unless the army and the urban workers have

regular and adequate supplies of food; the exchange of commodities must become the principal means of collecting foodstuffs. Secondly, commodity exchange is a test of the relationship between industry and agriculture and the foundation of all our work to create a fairly well regulated monetary system. All economic councils and all economic bodies must now concentrate on commodity exchange (which also includes the exchange of manufactured goods, for the manufactured goods made by socialist factories and exchanged for the foodstuffs produced by the peasants are not commodities in the politico-economic sense of the word; at any rate, they are not only commodities, they are no longer commodities, they are ceasing to be commodities).

What preparations have been made for commodity exchange? What has been done specifically to prepare for it? By the Commissariat for Food? By the co-operative societies? The number of co-operative shops available for this purpose? Are there such shops in every volost? In how many villages? Stock of goods for commodity exchange? Prices on the "free" market? Surplus stocks of grain and other farm produce? Is there any, and how much, experience in commodity exchange? Totals and results? What is being done to prevent the pilferage of goods stocks earmarked for exchange, and of food stocks (a particularly important point demanding investigation of every case of pilferage)?

Salt and paraffin oil as articles for commodity exchange? Textiles? Other goods? What items are needed most? What are the chief peasant shortages? What can be supplied by local, small, handicraft industry? Or by developing local industry?

Facts and figures showing how commodity exchange is organised and the results achieved are most important for the conduct of the experiment on a country-wide scale.

Has the proper relationship been established between the Commissariat for Food, the body controlling and supervising commodity exchange, and the co-operative societies, the bodies carrying on commodity exchange? How does this relationship operate in practice? In each locality?

What part does private trade play in commodity

exchange? To what extent is private trade developing, or developed? Number of private traders; their turnover in the major items, particularly foodstuffs?

2. THE STATE'S ATTITUDE TO THE CAPITALISTS

Commodity exchange and freedom of trade inevitably imply the appearance of capitalists and capitalist relationships. There is no reason to fear this. The workers' state has enough resources to keep within the proper bounds and control these relationships, which are useful and necessary in conditions of small-scale production. The thing to do at present is to make a close study of their dimensions and devise suitable methods (not restrictive, or rather, not prohibitive) of state control and accountancy.

To what extent is private trade developing as a result of the substitution of the tax for the surplus appropriation system? Can it be estimated or not? Is it only profiteering or regular trade as well? Is it registered, and if so, what are the results?

Private enterprise: have there been any offers from capitalists and entrepreneurs to lease enterprises or establishments, or commercial premises? Exact number of such offers and an analysis of them? How are the results of trading operations assessed (if only approximately)? Ditto as regards the accounts of leaseholders and commission agents, if any?

Have there been any offers from commission agents? To buy produce for the state on a commission basis? Or to market and distribute it? Or to organise industrial enterprises?

Handicraft industry: changes since the introduction of the tax in kind? Extent of development? Source of information?

3. ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISE IN COMMODITY EXCHANGE, AND IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL

This question is closely bound up with the preceding one. The encouragement of initiative may often prove to have no connection with capitalist relationships. All economic councils and economic bodies in general should ask them-

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

selves: how is this to be encouraged? In view of the novelty of the task, it is scarcely possible to issue any definite instructions at present. The thing is to pay great attention to the question, encourage all initiative in economic matters, make a careful study of practical experience and let the country know what is being done.

When the small farmer pays his tax to the state and enters into commodity exchange with it (with the socialist factory) the economic situation created imperatively demands that the state, through its local bodies, should give all possible encouragement to enterprise and initiative. The exchange of the observations and experience of local bodies will enable us to collect material, and later on, perhaps, to supplement this general and inadequate formulation of the question with a number of examples and detailed instructions.

4. CO-ORDINATION OF THE ECONOMIC WORK OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS IN THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS: VOLOSTS, UYEZDS AND GUBERNIAS

One of the great evils hindering our economic development is the absence of co-ordination in the work of the various local departments. Great attention must be devoted to this question. It is the function of the economic councils to eliminate this flaw and to stimulate the enterprise of local bodies. There must be a collection of practical examples to secure improvements and hold out the successful cases as a model for all. During the extreme food shortage, for instance, it was natural and inevitable that local bodies should be highly restricted in making decisions on the use of grain collected. As grain stocks increase, and under appropriate control, they must have a freer hand to do so. This can and should help to reduce red tape, cut down haulage of goods, encourage production and improve the condition of the workers and peasants. The food supply, small local industry, fuel, large-scale state industry, etc., are all bound up together, and their necessary division into "departments" for the purposes of state administration will cause harm unless constant efforts are made to co-ordinate them, remove friction, red tape, departmental narrow-mindedness and

bureaucratic methods. The local bodies, which are closer to the mass of workers and peasants, have a better view of these defects, and it is therefore their business to devise methods of eliminating them by pooling their experience.

It is absolutely essential that definite, careful and detailed replies should be submitted to the following question: What has been done and how to co-ordinate the activity of the local state farms, timber committees, uyezd land departments, economic councils, and so forth?

How are officials penalised for satisfying local requirements to the detriment of the centre and in violation of orders from the centre? The names of those penalised? Is the number of such offences diminishing? Have the penalties been increased? If so, in what way?

5. IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE WORKERS AND 6. DITTO OF THE PEASANTS

Every success achieved in economic development improves the condition of the workers and peasants. But, first, here again departmental narrow-mindedness and the lack of co-ordination are doing a great deal of harm. And, second, these questions must be brought up well to the fore to allow a careful observation of the results achieved in this sphere. What exactly has been achieved? In what way? Answers to these questions are essential.

Weariness and in some cases downright exhaustion as a result of the long years of war, first the imperialist war and then the Civil War, are so great that it is absolutely essential to make special efforts to improve the condition of the workers and peasants. Very far from everything is being done that could and should be done, even with our meagre resources. By no means all the departments and agencies are concentrating on it. It is therefore a matter of urgent necessity to collect and study local experience in this field. The reports should be compiled as precisely, fully and carefully as possible. If that is done, it will at once become evident which departments lag most and where. We shall then secure an improvement more quickly through a common effort.

7. INCREASING THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It is extremely important for us to enlarge this group of workers, but very little systematic effort is being made to do so. Under capitalism, the individual proprietors strove to obtain—secretly from one another, and tripping each other up—the services of good salesmen, managers and directors. It took them decades to do this, and only a few of the best firms achieved good results. Today, the workers' and peasants' state is the "proprietor", and it must select the best men for economic development; it must select the best administrators and organisers on the special and general, local and national scale, doing this publicly, in a methodical and systematic manner and on a broad scale. Now and again we still see traces of the initial period of the Soviet power—the period of fierce civil war and intense sabotage, traces of Communists isolating themselves in a narrow circle of rulers, being fearful or incapable of enlisting the services of sufficient numbers of non-Party people.

We must set to work quickly and energetically to correct this. A number of capable and honest non-Party people are coming to the fore from the ranks of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, and they should be promoted to more important positions in economic work, with the Communists continuing to exercise the necessary control and guidance. Conversely, we must have non-Party people controlling the Communists. For this purpose, groups of non-Party workers and peasants, whose honesty has been tested, should be invited to take part, on the one hand, in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and on the other, in the informal verification and appraisal of work, quite apart from any official appointment.

In their reports to the C.L.D., the local bodies, particularly in the volosts, uyezds and districts, which have the best knowledge of the worker and peasant masses, should give lists of non-Party people who have proved their honesty at work, or who have simply become prominent at non-Party conferences, or who command universal respect in their factory, village, volost, etc., and should indicate their assignments in economic construction. By work is meant

official position as well as *unofficial participation in control and verification*, regular attendance at informal conferences, etc.

There must be regular replies to these questions, for otherwise the socialist state will be unable to organise correctly the enlistment of the masses in the work of economic development. There are any number of honest and loyal workers. There are many of them among the non-Party people, but we do not know them. Only local reports can help us to find them and try them out in wider and gradually expanding fields of work, and cure the evil of isolation of Communist Party cells from the masses, an evil that is in evidence in many places.

8. METHODS AND RESULTS OF COMBATING BUREAUCRATIC PRACTICES AND RED TAPE

At first, most answers to this question will probably be very simple: methods—nil; results—nil. The decisions of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets have been read and forgotten.

But although the situation in this field is deplorable, we shall certainly not imitate those who give way to despair. We know that in Russia bureaucratic routine and red tape are mostly due to the low standard of culture and the consequences of the extreme ruin and impoverishment resulting from the war. This evil can be overcome only by strenuous and persistent effort over a long period of years. Therefore, we must not give way to despair, but make a new start every time, pick it up where it was abandoned, and try diverse ways of achieving our goal.

The reorganisation of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; enlistment of the services of non-Party people with and without this inspection; legal proceedings; reduction and careful selection of staffs; verification and coordination of the work of the various departments, and so on and so forth—all these measures, everything indicated in the decisions of the Eighth Congress of Soviets, all the measures and methods mentioned in the press must be systematically, steadily and repeatedly tried out, compared and studied.

The gubernia economic councils, and all the other bodies co-ordinating and directing economic development in the localities, must insist on the implementation of measures prescribed by the law and indicated by practical experience. Local experience must be pooled. Answers to this question must be sent in to the C.L.D., regardless of how hard it may be at first to teach people to give exact, full and timely answers. The C.L.D. will see to it that this is done. It will undoubtedly produce good results, even if not as quickly as is expected by those who tend to reduce the "combating of red tape" to a mere phrase (or to a repetition of whiteguard, Socialist-Revolutionary and also Menshevik, gossip) instead of working hard to take definite steps.

SECOND GROUP OF QUESTIONS

9. REVIVAL OF AGRICULTURE: A) PEASANT FARMING; B) STATE FARMS; C) COMMUNES; D) ARTELS; E) CO-OPERATIVES; F) OTHER FORMS OF COLLECTIVE FARMING

The briefest summaries, giving the figures of the reports sent to the respective departments, with the date on which each report was sent.

More detailed information—not in every report, but periodically, every four or six months, and so forth—on the more important aspects of local farming, results of surveys, the major measures adopted, and their verified results.

Exact information must be given at least twice a year on the number of collective farms (all types, b-f), classified according to the degree of organisation—good, fair and unsatisfactory. A typical farm in each of the three groups must be described in detail at least twice a year, with exact data on size, location, production performance, its assistance to peasant farming, etc.

10. REVIVAL OF INDUSTRY: A) LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY ENTIRELY CONTROLLED BY THE CENTRE; B) LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY CONTROLLED WHOLLY OR PARTLY BY LOCAL BODIES; C) SMALL, HANDICRAFT, DOMESTIC, ETC., INDUSTRIES

The answers should be on the same lines as those for the preceding section. As regards category A, the local bodies, which have opportunities for making a close observation

of the work of large national establishments, their influence on the neighbouring population, and the attitude of the population to them, must, in every report, give information on these establishments, the assistance given to them by local bodies, the results of this assistance, the assistance rendered to the local population by these establishments, their most urgent requirements, defects in their organisation, etc.

11. FUEL: A) FIREWOOD; B) COAL; C) OIL; D) SHALE; E) OTHER TYPES OF FUEL (WASTE FUEL, ETC.)

The same as for the two preceding questions: the briefest summaries, giving the figures of the reports sent to the respective departments and dates on which they were sent.

Detailed information on major points, on what is outside the scope of the department, on local co-ordination of work, etc.

Special attention must be paid to economising fuel. What measures are being taken? What are the results?

12. FOOD SUPPLIES

Summary of reports to the Commissariat for Food, following the same rules as above.

Market gardening and suburban farming (connected with industrial establishments). Results.

Local experience in organising school meals, the feeding of children, dining-rooms, public catering in general, etc.

Bi-monthly summaries in two figures are obligatory, that is, total number of persons receiving food, and total quantity of foodstuffs distributed.

In every large consuming centre (large or medium towns, military institutions in special settlements, etc.) we are feeding many extra people, former government officials who have crept into Soviet agencies, bourgeois lying low, profiteers, etc. There must be a determined drive to sift out these superfluous mouths who are breaking the fundamental law: He who does not work shall not eat. For this purpose, a responsible statistician must be appointed in all such places to study the returns of the census of August 28, 1920, and current statistical returns, and submit a signed report on the number of extra consumers every two months.

13. BUILDING INDUSTRY

Answers must be on the same lines as the preceding. Local initiative and self-reliance are particularly important in this sphere and must be given particularly wide scope. Detailed information on the major measures and results is obligatory.

14. MODEL AND HOPELESS ENTERPRISES AND ESTABLISHMENTS

A description of every enterprise, establishment and office connected with economic development and meriting the designation of model, or at least outstanding, or successful (in the event of there being none in the first two categories) is obligatory. Names of the members of the management boards of these establishments. Their methods. Results. Attitude of the workers and the population.

The same as regards hopeless and useless enterprises.

Of special importance is the question of closing down enterprises that are not absolutely essential (hopeless ones, such as might be closed down and their operations transferred to a smaller number of larger enterprises, etc.). Statistical summary of such superfluous establishments, their number and the order in which the Republic should gradually dispense with them.

15. IMPROVEMENT IN ECONOMIC WORK

Enumerate major and model cases of improvements introduced by inventors and workers of exceptional ability. Give names; enumerate experiments which the local bodies regard as important, and so forth.

16. BONUSES IN KIND

This is one of the most important factors in socialist development. The enlistment of labour is one of the most important and difficult problems of socialism.

Practical experience in this field must be systematically collected, recorded and studied.

Obligatory bi-monthly reports showing how many bonuses issued, what the bonuses consist of, what branch of

industry (separately forestry and all other branches of work). A comparison of the results, output, with the number of bonuses in kind issued?

Have there been any cases of bonuses being converted into a wage reserve? Report each case separately.

Have bonuses been issued to conspicuously successful enterprises and individual workers? Give exact details of each case.

Investigate: can a local product be obtained (for export, or one particularly valuable for use in Russia) by increasing the bonuses in kind by a given quantity? This is highly important, because if this survey is properly conducted across the country we shall discover many valuable products which we could profitably export, even if we have to import a certain quantity of goods for the bonuses in kind.

17. THE TRADE UNIONS. THEIR PART IN PRODUCTION

The gubernia trade union councils and the uyezd trade union bodies must immediately appoint reporters and their deputies who must, on their own, and with the help of local statisticians, draw up bi-monthly reports on the subject.

As regards production propaganda, give exact facts and figures on lectures, meetings and demonstrations, with the names of organisers, etc.

But of even greater importance than production propaganda are the facts about the part the factory committees and the trade unions in general actually play in production. Forms of participation? Describe every typical case. Practical results. Compare establishments where the participation of the trade union in production is well, or fairly well, organised, with those where it is not.

The question of labour discipline is particularly important. Reports on the number of absentees are obligatory. Compare factories where labour discipline is bad with those where it is good.

Methods of improving labour discipline.

Comrades' disciplinary courts. How many, and when established? How many cases examined per month? Results?

18. STEALING

While some organisations are aware of this widespread evil and are fighting it, there are others which report that "in the department, office or factory in our charge, there is no stealing", "everything is in order".

Precise bi-monthly reports are obligatory. How many offices, establishments, and so forth, send in information? How many do not?

Brief summary of this information.

The measures taken to combat stealing.

Are managers, management boards, or factory committees called to account (for laxity in combating stealing)?

Are people searched? Are other methods of control employed; if so, what are they?

Is the new law on commodity exchange, and on the permission given the workers to retain part of their output for this purpose, having the effect of reducing stealing? Give precise details.

Local warehouses, that is, warehouses located in the given district, and belonging to the state or to the local authorities. Brief summary of the reports on these warehouses, giving the date on which each was sent.

Reports by the local authorities on state warehouses. Methods of protection. Stealing. Number of persons employed, etc.

19. PROFITEERING

Extent of this according to local information. Predominating type of profiteer. Workers? Peasants? Railway employees? Other Soviet employees? And so forth.

State of the railways and waterways.

Measures to combat profiteering and results obtained.

What records are being kept of profiteers and profiteering?

20. USE OF ARMY UNITS FOR LABOUR

Labour armies. Composition, numerical strength, and performance. Methods of accounting? Attitude of the local population?

Other forms of using army units—ditto universal military training units—for labour purposes.

Numerical strength of local army units—ditto local universal military training administration, and number of youths undergoing training in the units.

Concrete cases of employment of youths undergoing universal military training and Red Army men for definite forms of control work, sanitary inspection, help to the local population, various economic operations. Give a detailed description of each case, or if there are a number of cases give two typical ones: the most and the least successful.

21. LABOUR SERVICE AND LABOUR MOBILISATION

How are the local departments of the People's Commissariat for Labour organised? What are they doing?

Brief summaries of their reports sent to the People's Commissariat for Labour; give date on which each report was sent.

Describe, not less than once in four months, two typical cases of labour mobilisation; the most and the least successful.

Enumerate purposes for which labour service was enforced. Total figures of the number engaged and results of work done.

What part do the local departments of the Central Statistical Board play in organising labour service and labour mobilisation?

THIRD GROUP OF QUESTIONS

22. REGIONAL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC COUNCILS

When and how were the economic councils established in the localities at region, gubernia, uyezd and volost level? How is their work co-ordinated between themselves and with the village committees, the factory committees?

Economic councils of district Soviets in big towns. Their composition, work, how is the work organised, relations with the city Soviets?

Are there any district committees and district economic councils? Are they necessary? Is it necessary to set up the larger factory or industrial settlements, with their environs, as separate areas, and so forth?

23. GOSPLAN (THE STATE GENERAL PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE C.L.D.) AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL ECONOMIC BODIES

Are there any regional bodies of Gosplan? Or special representatives of the latter? Or groups of experts acting in such a capacity?

Is the work of the local bodies co-ordinated with Gosplan's? If so, how? Is such co-ordination necessary?

24. ELECTRIFICATION

Have the gubernia and uyezd libraries copies of the Plan for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R., which was submitted as a report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets? If so, how many copies? If not, it shows that the local delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets are dishonest and ought to be expelled from the Party and dismissed from their responsible posts, or else they are idlers who should be taught to do their duty by a term of imprisonment (at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, 1,500-2,000 copies were handed out for local libraries).

What measures have been taken to carry out the decision of the Eighth Congress of Soviets to conduct extensive propaganda of the electrification plan? How many articles on the subject have appeared in the local newspapers? How many lectures have been delivered? Number of persons attending these?

Have all local workers with theoretical or practical knowledge of electricity been mobilised for the purpose of delivering lectures on, or teaching, the subject? Number of such persons? How is their work being conducted? Are the local or nearest electric power stations utilised for lectures and purposes of instruction? Number of such stations?

How many educational establishments have included the electrification plan in their syllabus, in conformity with the decision of the Eighth Congress of Soviets?

Has anything practical been done towards carrying out this plan? Or any electrification work outside the plan? If so, what has been done?

Is there a local plan and schedule of work on electrification?

25. COMMODITY EXCHANGE WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

It is absolutely obligatory for all border areas to answer this question, but not only for them. Uyezds and gubernias adjacent to border areas also have opportunities for engaging in such commodity exchange and observing how it is organised. Furthermore, as indicated above (Point 16: Bonuses in Kind), localities even very remote from the border have opportunities to engage in commodity exchange with foreign countries.

State of the ports? Protection of the border? Volume and forms of trade? Brief summaries of the reports on this sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, giving the date on which each report was sent.

Supervision of the work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade by the local economic councils? Their opinions on practical organisation and results?

26. RAILWAY, WATER AND LOCAL TRANSPORT

Brief summaries of the reports sent to the appropriate department, giving date on which each report was sent.

State of affairs appraised from the local standpoint.

Defects in the transport system. Measures taken to improve it and their results?

The state of local transport facilities, and measures taken to improve them.

27. PRESS PUBLICITY FOR ECONOMIC WORK

Local publications and *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*. How is economic work treated in the press? Participation of non-Party people? Verification and appraisal of practical experience?

Circulation of local publications and of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*? Are they available at the libraries and accessible to the public?

Publication of pamphlets and books on economic development. Give list of the publications issued.

Demand for foreign literature: to what extent is it satisfied.? Are the publications of the Bureau of Foreign Science

and Technology delivered? If so, what opinion is expressed about them? Other foreign publications in Russian and other languages?

FOURTH GROUP OF QUESTIONS

This group should include questions chosen at the discretion of and suggested by the local bodies themselves, and by individuals; moreover, these questions may have a direct or indirect, close or remote, connection with economic development.

These reports must be drawn up in co-operation with the members of the local staffs of the Central Statistical Board. Whether this is done by them, or any other persons, is up to the local economic council to decide, but the co-operation of the gubernia statistical bureau and uyezd statisticians is obligatory. Every report and every answer to a question, if written by different persons, must be signed by the author, giving his official position, if he holds one. Responsibility for the reports rests on the authors, and the local economic councils as a whole, and it shall be their duty to send in regular, punctual and truthful reports.

Wherever there is a shortage of local workers, courses of instruction in the compilation of reports must be organised under the supervision of statisticians and comrades, specially appointed for the purpose (from the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and other bodies). The names of the persons responsible for these courses and the schedule of instruction must be published.

May 21, 1921

Lenin

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TENTH ALL-RUSSIAN CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[115]

MAY 26-28, 1921

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1
SPEECH IN OPENING THE CONFERENCE
MAY 26

Comrades, permit me to declare the All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P. open.

You are aware, comrades, that this conference has been convened earlier than is prescribed by the Rules. Consequently, it is not an ordinary, or at least, not quite an ordinary conference. You are also aware that the main item on the agenda—the main question—that has compelled us to convene the conference before the planned date is that of economic policy—the tax in kind. It is central at the present time.

I propose that we proceed to elect the presidium of the conference.

2
REPORT ON THE TAX IN KIND
MAY 26

Comrades, I had occasion to discuss, for the benefit of the Party, the question of the tax in kind in a pamphlet with which, I suppose, the majority of you are familiar. That this question has been brought up for discussion at a Party conference came as a surprise to me, for I had not seen anything to indicate that this was called for. But very many of the comrades who have visited the localities, notably Comrade Osinsky upon his return from a tour of a number of gubernias, informed the Central Committee—and this was corroborated by several other comrades—that locally the policy which had taken shape in connection with the tax in kind remained largely unexplained and partly even misunderstood. In view of its exceptional importance, additional discussion at a Party conference seemed so necessary that it was decided to convene the conference earlier than scheduled. You are aware that we in the Central Committee have decided to divide the report on this point into four parts, to be given by four rapporteurs: Kamenev, on the work of the co-operatives; Milyutin, on small-scale industry; Comrade Svidersky, on the precise calculations and proposals of the People's Commissariat for Food, and the related organisational measures; the instructions and regulations on the tax system, partly approved, and partly to be approved shortly, by the Council of People's Commissars, are of especial importance in this connection. Finally, Comrade Khinchuk is to be the fourth rapporteur; he has been relieved of all his duties in the People's Commissariat for Food to allow him to concentrate entirely on the co-operatives, as Chairman of Tsentrosoyuz.*

* Central Council of Co-operative Societies.—*Tr.*

It has been decided, as the chief principle, that the commodity exchange in this case is to be handled by the People's Commissariat for Food, mostly and even chiefly, through Tsentrosoyuz and the co-operatives. These relations between the People's Commissariat for Food and Tsentrosoyuz should be formalised in an agreement, stating that all the goods available for exchange shall be handed over by the People's Commissariat for Food to Tsentrosoyuz. This makes the latter's role quite clear, and there is no need to go into it in detail. Thus, it has fallen to me to introduce the question of the general significance of this policy, and I should merely like to supplement what I have already said in the pamphlet. I have no direct information as to how this question is being presented in the localities or to the flaws, defects and unclarity that there prevail. I may have to elaborate certain points later on, when it becomes clearer from the questions that are raised at the conference, or from the subsequent debate, how the local officials and the Party are to be oriented.

As far as I can see, the misunderstandings and lack of clarity on the political tasks connected with the tax in kind and the New Economic Policy are perhaps due to the exaggeration of this or that aspect of the matter. But until we have organised this work on practical lines, these exaggerations are absolutely inevitable; and until we have carried out at least one food campaign on the new lines, it will hardly be possible at all to give any precise definition to the real limits for the application of this or that specific feature of this policy. I shall deal only in general outline with some of the contradictions which, as far as I could judge from several notes sent up at the meeting, have given rise to most misunderstanding. The tax in kind and the attendant changes in our policy are often interpreted as a sign of a drastic reversal of policy. It is not surprising that this interpretation is taken up and made most of by the whiteguard, particularly the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik, press abroad. I do not know whether it is due to the operation of similar influences which have made themselves felt on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R., or to the acute discontent which was, and perhaps still is, evident in certain circles, owing to the extreme aggrava-

tion of the food situation, but this sort of perplexity may have spread to some extent even in this country and created what is largely a wrong conception of the significance of the change that has been brought about and of the character of the new policy.

Naturally, in view of the fact that the peasantry preponderates enormously among the population, the principal task—of our policy in general, and of our economic policy in particular—is to establish definite relations between the working class and the peasantry. For the first time in modern history we have a social system from which the exploiting class has been eliminated but in which there are two different classes—the working class and the peasantry. The enormous preponderance of the peasantry could not but have an effect on our economic policy, and our policy in general. The principal problem that still confronts us—and will inevitably confront us for many years to come—is that of establishing proper relations between these two classes, proper from the standpoint of abolishing classes. The enemies of the Soviet power discuss the formula of agreement between the working class and the peasantry with such frequency, and so very often use it against us, because it is so vague. Agreement between the working class and the peasantry may be taken to mean anything. Unless we assume that, from the working-class standpoint, an agreement is possible in principle, permissible, and correct only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures aimed at the abolition of classes, then, of course, it remains a formula on which all the enemies of the Soviet-power, all the enemies of the dictatorship, operate. How is this agreement to be realised in the first period of our revolution, i.e., the period which we can now approximately consider as coming to a close? How was the dictatorship of the proletariat maintained and consolidated amidst the enormous preponderance of the peasant population? It is the Civil War that was the principal reason, the principal motive force, and the principal determinant of our agreement. Although, in many cases, the Civil War was started with the whiteguards, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Mensheviks jointly participating in the alliance against us, it invariably led to all the Socialist-Revolution-

ary Constituent Assembly and Menshevik elements finding themselves—either through a *coup d'état* or otherwise—driven into the background, which left the capitalist and landowner elements to head the whiteguard movement. That was the case under Kolchak and Denikin, and all the numerous smaller regimes and during campaigns against us. It was the principal factor that determined the form of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. This circumstance multiplied our incredible difficulties, but upon the other hand, it spared us the necessity of racking our brains over how to apply the alliance formula, for it and the conditions of its realisation were both dictated by the circumstances of war, leaving us no choice whatsoever.

Only the working class could exercise the dictatorship in the form demanded by the Civil War and its conditions. The participation of the landowners in this war united the working class and the peasantry absolutely, unreservedly and irrevocably. In that respect there was no internal political wavering whatsoever. Amidst the gigantic difficulties that confronted us because Russia was cut off from her principal grain areas and food hardships had been aggravated to the extreme, we could not have carried out our food policy in practice without the appropriation of surplus grain. This meant taking not only the surplus stocks of grain, which would hardly have sufficed even if they had been properly distributed. I cannot here deal in detail with the irregularities which the system brought in its train. At all events, it served its main purpose—keeping industry going even when we were almost completely cut off from the grain districts. But this could have been at all satisfactory only in conditions of war. As soon as we had finally done away with the external enemy—and this became a fact only in 1921—another task confronted us, the task of establishing an *economic* alliance between the working class and the peasantry. It was only in the spring of 1921 that we actually got down to this task, and that was when the 1920 crop failure had worsened the condition of the peasantry to an incredible degree, and when we first witnessed some internal political wavering, which did not result from external enemy pressure, but from the relations between the working class and the peasantry. If we

had had a very good, or at least a good, harvest in 1920, if the surplus appropriations had yielded 400 million out of the planned 420 million poods of grain, we would have been able to fulfil the greater part of our industrial programme and would have had a stock of manufactured urban goods to exchange for agricultural produce. But the opposite happened. A fuel crisis, even more acute than the food crisis, developed in some places and it was utterly impossible to satisfy the needs of the peasant farms in urban manufactures. Peasant farming was gripped by an incredibly acute crisis. Those were the circumstances that suggested that we could not possibly continue with the old food policy. We had to bring up the question of what economic basis we required immediately for the alliance between the working class and the peasantry as a stepping stone to further measures.

The stepping stone is to prepare the exchange of industrial goods for agricultural produce; to create a system under which the peasant would not have to surrender his produce otherwise than in exchange for urban and factory-made goods, but which would not subordinate him to any of the forms existing under the capitalist system. In view of the prevailing economic conditions, however, we could not even think about that. That is why we have adopted the transitional form I have spoken about, namely, to take produce in the form of a tax without giving any equivalent, and to obtain additional produce through the medium of exchange. But this requires an appropriate fund; ours is extremely small, and the possibility of augmenting it through foreign trade has arisen only this year, as a result of a number of agreements with capitalist countries. It is true that these are as yet a mere introduction, a foreword; no real trade has yet begun. There is continued sabotage and all sorts of attempts to disrupt these agreements by most or the greater part of the capitalist circles, and the most characteristic thing is that the Russian whiteguard press, including the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press, is hammering away at these agreements with more venom than at anything else. It is absolutely clear that the bourgeoisie is better prepared for the fight, that it is more developed than the proletariat, that its class-consciousness

has been given a keener edge by all the "trouble" it has had to put up with, and that it is betraying an abnormal sensitiveness. A close look at the whiteguard press will show that it is hitting out at the very point that is the centre, the pivot, of our policy.

After the failure of the military invasion, which has quite obviously collapsed, although the struggle is still on, the whole of the whiteguard Russian press has set itself an unattainable aim: to tear up the trade agreements. The campaign which was started this spring on an extremely extensive scale, with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the forefront of the counter-revolutionary forces, had a definite aim—to tear up the economic agreements between Russia and the capitalist world by this spring; and to a considerable extent they succeeded in achieving their aim. It is true that we have concluded the principal agreements—their number is increasing—and we are overcoming the growing resistance to them. But there has been a very dangerous delay; for, without some assistance from abroad, rehabilitation of large-scale industry and restoration of regular exchange of commodities will either be impossible or will mean very dangerous delay. These are the conditions in which we are obliged to act, and these are the conditions which for the peasants have brought the question of restoring trade to the forefront. I shall not deal with the question of concessions, because it has been debated most at Party meetings, and has not lately given rise to any perplexity. The position is that we are continuing our assiduous offers of concessions, but the foreign capitalists have not yet received a single sizable concession, and we have not yet concluded any really serious concessions agreement. The whole difficulty lies in finding a way of enlisting West-European capital that has been tested in practice.

Theoretically, it is absolutely indisputable—and it seems to me that everyone's doubts on this score have been dispelled—theoretically, I say, it is absolutely clear that it would be to our advantage to pay off European capital with a few score or hundreds of millions, which we could give it in order to augment, in the shortest possible time, our stocks of equipment, materials, raw materials and machinery for the purpose of restoring our large-scale industry.

Large-scale industry is the one and only real basis upon which we can multiply our resources and build a socialist society. Without large factories, such as capitalism has created, without highly developed large-scale industry, socialism is impossible anywhere; still less is it possible in a peasant country, and we in Russia have a far more concrete knowledge of this than before; so that instead of speaking about restoring large-scale industry in some indefinite and abstract way, we now speak of the definite, precisely calculated and concrete plan of electrification. We have a precise plan projected by the best Russian specialists and scientists, a plan which gives us a definite picture of the resources, considering Russia's natural features, with which we can, must and will lay the basis of large-scale industry for our economy. Without it, no real socialist foundation for our economic life is possible. This remains absolutely indisputable, and if, in connection with the tax in kind, we have lately spoken about it in abstract terms, we must now say definitely that we must first of all restore large-scale industry. I myself have heard statements of this kind from several comrades, and all I could do in reply was, of course, to shrug my shoulders. It is absolutely ridiculous and absurd to assume that we could ever lose sight of this fundamental aim. The only question that arises here is: how could such doubts and perplexity arise in the minds of comrades, and how could they think that this key task, without which the material production basis of socialism is impossible, has been pushed into the background? These comrades must have misunderstood the relation between our state and small industry. Our main task is to restore large-scale industry, but in order to approach this task at all seriously and systematically we must restore small industry. Both this year, 1921, and last year, we had great gaps in our efforts to restore large-scale industry.

In the autumn and winter of 1920 we started several important branches of our large-scale industry, but we had to suspend them again. Why? Many factories were able to obtain enough manpower and sufficient supplies of raw materials; why then was work at these factories suspended? Because we were short of food and fuel. Without a state reserve of 400 million poods of grain (I take an approximate

figure) backed up by regular monthly allotments, it is difficult to talk about any sort of regular economic development or of restoring large-scale industry. Without it we find that after having started work on restoring large-scale industry and continuing it for several months we have had to suspend it again. Most of the few factories that were started are now idle. Without fully assured and adequate food stocks the state cannot concentrate on systematically organising the rehabilitation of large-scale industry, organising it on a modest scale, perhaps, but in such a way as to keep it going continuously.

As regards fuel, until the Donbas is restored, and until we obtain a regular supply of oil, we shall have to continue to rely on timber, on firewood, which again means dependence on small-scale production.

That explains the mistake of those comrades who failed to understand why it is the peasant who must now be placed in the centre of things. Some workers say: the peasants are being favoured, but we get nothing. I have heard such talk, but I must say I think it is not very widespread, for such talk is dangerous, because it echoes the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It is an obvious political provocation; and is, besides, a survival of craft—not class—but craft-union prejudices of workers, when the working class regards itself a part of equitable capitalist society and fails to realise that it still stands on the old capitalist basis. These workers say, in fact: the peasant is being favoured, he has been relieved of surplus-grain appropriation, he is allowed to retain his grain surplus for the purpose of exchange; we workers at the bench want to have the same thing.

What is at the bottom of this point of view? It is, in essence, the old petty-bourgeois ideology: since the peasants are a component part of capitalist society, the working class also remains a component part of this society; hence, if the peasant trades, we too must trade. Here we undoubtedly see a revival of the old prejudices which grapple the worker to the old world. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are the most ardent and, in fact, the only sincere, champions of the old capitalist world. You will find none among the hundreds, the thousands, and even the hundreds of thousands in all the other camps. But these rare

specimens remain among the so-called pure democrats, whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks represent. And the more persistently they advocate their views, the more dangerous is their influence over the working class. They are doubly dangerous when the working class has to go through periods of suspended production. The principal material basis for the development of proletarian class-consciousness is large-scale industry, where the worker sees the factories running, and daily feels the power that can really abolish classes.

When the workers lose their footing in this material production basis, some of them are beset by a sense of instability, uncertainty, despair and skepticism, and this has a definite effect when combined with outright provocations by our bourgeois democrats, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. This produces a mentality which makes people, even in the ranks of the Communist Party, reason in this way: the peasants were given a handout; for the same reasons, and by the same methods, a handout should be given to the workers. We have had to yield to this mentality to some extent. The decree on bonuses to workers in the form of a part of the goods they produce is, of course, a concession to these sentiments, which have their roots in the past and are engendered by skepticism and despair. Within certain small limits, this concession was necessary. It has been made. But we must not for a moment forget that we have been making a concession that is necessary from no other standpoint but the economic one: the interests of the proletariat. Its basic and most vital interests are bound up with the rehabilitation of large-scale industry as a solid economic foundation. When that is done, it will consolidate its dictatorship, it will be sure to carry its dictatorship to success, in the teeth of all the political and military difficulties. Why, then, were we obliged to make a concession, and why would it be extremely dangerous to give it a wider interpretation than it deserves? It is only because temporary food and fuel difficulties compelled us to take this path.

What is the principal economic determinant of the policy when we say, "We must not base our relations with the peasants on surplus-grain appropriation but on a tax"? It

is that under the surplus-grain appropriation system the small peasant farms have no proper economic basis and are doomed to remain dead for many years. Small farming cannot exist and develop, because the petty farmer loses interest in consolidating and developing his activity and in increasing his output, all of which leaves us without an economic basis. We have no other basis or source, and unless the state is able to accumulate large stocks of food it is no use thinking about the rehabilitation of large-scale industry. That is why we are first of all applying this policy which is changing our food relations.

We are conducting this policy so as to have a fund for the rehabilitation of large-scale industry; to relieve the working class from all interruption of work, which should not be experienced even by our large-scale industry, miserable though it is when compared with that of the advanced countries; to relieve the proletarian of the need to find the means of subsistence by resorting to the petty-bourgeois method of profiteering, which is not a proletarian method and threatens us with the gravest economic dangers. Owing to our present deplorable conditions, proletarians are obliged to earn a living by methods which are not proletarian and are not connected with large-scale industry. They are obliged to procure goods by petty-bourgeois profiteering methods, either by stealing, or by making them for themselves in a publicly-owned factory, in order to barter them for agricultural produce—and that is the main economic danger, jeopardising the existence of the Soviet system. The proletariat must now exercise its dictatorship in such a way as to have a sense of security as a class, with a firm footing. But the ground is slipping from under its feet. Instead of large, continuously running factories, the proletarian sees something quite different, and is compelled to enter the economic sphere as a profiteer, or as a small producer.

We must spare no sacrifice in this transitional period to save the proletariat from this. To ensure the continuous, if slow, rehabilitation of large-scale industry we must not hesitate to throw sops to the greedy foreign capitalists, because, from the standpoint of building socialism, it is at present to our advantage to overpay the foreign capitalists some hundreds of millions in order to

obtain the machines and materials for the rehabilitation of large-scale industry, which will restore the economic basis of the proletariat, and will transform it into a steadfast proletariat, instead of one engaged in profiteering. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have deafened us with their shouts that since the proletariat has been declassed, we ought to abandon the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They have been shouting that since 1917, and the surprising thing is that they have not grown tired of shouting it up to 1921. But when we hear these attacks we do not say that there has been no declassing, and that there are no flaws. What we say is that Russian and international realities are such that even though the proletariat has to go through a period when it is declassed, and has to suffer from these handicaps, it can nevertheless fulfil its task of winning and holding political power.

It would be absurd and ridiculous to deny that the fact that the proletariat is declassed is a handicap. By 1921, we realised that after the struggle against the external enemy, the main danger and the greatest evil confronting us was our inability to ensure the continuous operation of the few remaining large enterprises. This is the main thing. Without such an economic basis, the working class cannot firmly hold political power. In order to ensure the continued rehabilitation of large-scale industry we must organise the food supply in such a way as to collect and properly distribute a fund of, say, 400 million poods. It would be utterly impossible for us to collect it through the old surplus-grain appropriation system: 1920 and 1921 are proof of this. Now we see that we can nonetheless fulfil this extremely difficult task by means of the tax in kind. We cannot fulfil it with the old methods, and so we must try some new ones. It can be done by means of the tax in kind and by establishing proper relations with the peasant as a small producer. We have devoted considerable effort to prove this theoretically.

I think, judging by the Party press and by what is being said at meetings, that it has been fully proved theoretically that this task can be fulfilled if the proletariat retains possession of the transport system, the big factories, the economic basis as well as political power. We must give the

peasant a fair amount of leeway as a small producer. Unless we revive peasant farming we shall not solve the food problem.

It is within this framework that we must deal with the question of developing small industry on the basis of unrestricted trade and free turnover. This free turnover is a means to establish economically stable relations between the working class and the peasantry. We now have more and more precise data on agricultural output. A pamphlet on grain output was distributed at the Party Congress; it was still in proofs when it was distributed to the delegates. Since then the material contained in it has been supplemented and circulated. The pamphlet in its final form has now been sent to the press, but it is not yet ready for the conference, and I am unable to say whether it will be ready before the conference comes to a close and the delegates disperse. We shall do all we can to get it out in time, but we cannot promise to do so.

This is a small part of our effort to determine, as precisely as possible, the position in regard to agricultural output, and the resources at our disposal.

Still, we can say that there is evidence that we are quite able to solve this economic problem, particularly this year, when the harvest prospects are not too bad, or not as bad as we anticipated in spring. This assures us of the possibility of accumulating an agricultural reserve that will enable us to devote ourselves entirely to the task of steadily, even if slowly, restoring our large-scale industry.

In order to solve the problem of accumulating food stocks for industry we must devise a form of relations with the peasant, the small proprietor, and there is no other form except that of the tax in kind; no one has come up with another form, and one can be imagined. But we must have a practical solution of this problem: we must arrange to have the tax collected in a proper manner, and not in the old way, when grain was taken two or three times, leaving the peasant in a worse plight than ever, inflicting the most suffering on the more industrious and destroying every possibility of establishing economically stable relations. The tax in kind, while also a levy on every peasant, must be collected in a different way. On the basis of the collected and published

data we can say that the tax in kind will now bring about a crucial change, but whether it will cover everything is still, to some extent, an open question. Of one thing we can be quite certain, however, and it is that we must bring about an immediate improvement in the condition of the peasant.

The task that confronts the local workers is to collect the tax in kind in full, and do so in the shortest possible time. The difficulties are increased by the fact that the harvest promises to be an unusually early one this year, and if our preparations are based on the customary dates, we run the risk of being too late. That is why the early convocation of the Party conference was important and opportune. We must work more quickly than before to prepare the apparatus for collecting the tax in kind. The accumulation of a minimum state fund of 240 million poods of grain and the possibility of making the position of the peasant secure depend on the speed with which the tax in kind is collected. Delay in collecting it will cause a certain amount of inconvenience to the peasant. The tax will not be paid voluntarily, we shall not be able to dispense with coercion, for the levy imposes some restrictions on the peasant farm. If we drag out the process of collecting the tax, the peasant will be discontent and will say that he is not free to dispose of his surplus. If the freedom is to be such in practice, the tax must be collected quickly; the tax-collector must not hover over the peasant for long, and so the period between the harvesting and the collection of the tax in full must be reduced to a minimum.

That is one task. The other is to maximise the peasant's freedom of trade and the revival of small-scale industry, so as to allow some leeway to the capitalism that grows up on the basis of small private property and petty trade. We should not be afraid of it, for it is not dangerous to us in the least.

We need not fear it at all in view of the general economic and political situation that has now arisen, with the proletariat controlling all the sources of large-scale production, and denationalisation in any shape or form entirely out of the question. At a time when we are suffering most of all from a severe shortage of goods and utter impoverish-

ment, it is ridiculous to fear the threat of capitalism based on small commercial agriculture. To fear it is to fail altogether to take account of the relation of forces in our economy. It means to fail to understand that the peasant economy, as a small-scale peasant economy, cannot be stable at all without some free exchange and the attendant capitalist relations.

This is what you must firmly impress on your minds, comrades. And our main task is to give a push to the comrades in all the localities, to give them the utmost scope for initiative, to stimulate them to display the utmost self-reliance and boldness. In this respect we are still suffering from the fear of doing things on a really wide scale. We have no more or less definitely tabulated local data showing from practical experience what the situation is in regard to local goods exchange and trade, what success has been achieved in restoring and developing small industry—which can alleviate the condition of the peasant right away, without the great effort of transporting large stocks of food and fuel to the industrial centres that large-scale industry entails. From the general economic standpoint, not enough is being done locally in this respect. We have no information on this from the localities, we do not know what the position is all over the Republic, we have no examples of really well-organised work; and my impression is that the Trade Union Congress and the Congress of the Supreme Economic Council[116] have none either.

Here again, the principal defect of these congresses is that we devote ourselves mainly to such threadbare things as theses, general programmes and arguments, instead of giving the participants a chance to swap local experience and say, on returning home: "Out of a thousand examples we heard one good one, and we shall follow it." Actually, we have not only one good example in a thousand, we have many more; but least of all do we see congress work arranged in this way.

I have no wish to forestall events, but I must say a word or two about collective supplies for the workers, i.e., about the proposal to substitute for the ration system a system under which certain factories that are actually in operation will be assured of a certain quantity of food in proportion

to their output. The idea is an excellent one, but we have turned it into something semi-fantastic, without however doing any real preparatory work for it. We have no example as yet of any particular factory, even one employing a small number of workers, in a particular uyezd, having tried out this system and having secured such-and-such results. That is something we do not as yet have, and it is one of the greatest drawbacks in our work. We must keep repeating that instead of discussing general problems, which was all very well in 1918, i.e., in the long distant past, we must, in this 1921, discuss practical problems. By telling congresses first of all about the examples of well-organised work—there are quite enough of them—we would make it an obligation for the rest to strive to imitate the best that has been achieved in a few rare and exceptional localities. I have in mind the work of the Trade Union Congress, but it also applies to all work connected with the food problem.

Quite a lot has been done in some cases, in a few localities, to prepare for the collection of the tax in kind, the organisation of trade, etc., but we have not managed to study this experience; and the great task that confronts us now is to induce the vast majority of the localities to follow the example of the best. Our task now is to study practical experience and raise the backward and medium uyezds and volosts, the standard of which is absolutely unsatisfactory, to the level of the insignificant number of highly satisfactory ones. At our congresses we must shift our main attention from the study of general theses and programmes of meetings to the study of practical experience, to the study of the examples set by the satisfactory and highly satisfactory districts, and to raising the backward and medium ones, which predominate, to the level of these good ones, which may be few but are still there.

Those are the remarks to which I must confine myself. (*Applause*.)

3
SUMMING-UP SPEECH ON THE TAX IN KIND
MAY 27

Comrades, although many comrades from the provinces have expressed dissatisfaction with the reports and the debate, it seems to me that we have, at any rate, achieved one object—we have ascertained how the new policy is understood and applied locally. The conference could hardly have set itself any other aim than that of securing an exchange of opinion for the purpose of thoroughly assimilating this new policy and of unanimously proceeding to its proper application. This we have achieved. True, there has been some perplexity and even wavering, which, unfortunately, in some cases, went far beyond perplexity over practical questions and conjectures about whether the new policy was meant "seriously" or "not seriously", and for how long. What Comrade Vareikis said, for example, was really not communist at all, and in content smacked of Menshevism. I must say this quite bluntly. How could he keep asking: "Tell us, is the peasantry a class, or not a class?" Of course, it is a class. In that case, he says, it must have political concessions, or, if not that, then certain measures should be taken in that direction, which will resemble Zubatovism[117] just the same.

Reference was made here to the fact that Martov had put the case squarely, whereas Vareikis was adding: "To a certain extent", "to some degree", "partly". This caused incredible, monstrous confusion. It is the same sort of confusion that was displayed when we were being accused of employing force. Again we have to explain that when we speak of dictatorship we mean the employment of coercion. Every state implies employment of coercion; but the whole

difference lies in whether it is employed against the exploited or against the exploiters. Is it employed against the toiling and exploited class? The same applies to the reference to Zubatovism. What was Zubatovism? It was support for the oppressor class by means of small economic concessions to the oppressed classes. That is why the response at that time was: economic concessions will not help you to induce the proletariat, the class that is fighting for the emancipation of all the oppressed, to abandon the idea of capturing political power and of destroying the system of oppression. At present the proletariat holds power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does that mean? It means, first, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. If we strayed from this bedrock course we should cease to be socialists and would find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the proletariat's most bitter enemies. Not long ago Comrade Bukharin quoted in *Pravda* some utterances of such a serious political thinker as Milyukov (Chernov and Martov come nowhere near him), who argued that only a socialist party could occupy the arena of political struggle in Russia today. And since the "socialist" parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, desire to take the trouble of fighting the Bolsheviks, they "are welcome to try". That is literally what Milyukov said, and it proves that he is cleverer than Martov and Chernov, simply because he is a representative of the big bourgeoisie (even if he personally had less brains than Chernov and Martov). Milyukov is right. He takes a very sober account of the stages of political development and says that Socialist-Revolutionism and Menshevism are the necessary stepping stones leading to a reversion to capitalism. The bourgeoisie needs such stepping stones, and whoever does not understand this is stupid.

From the standpoint of the interests of the bourgeoisie, Milyukov is absolutely right. Since we, being the party of the proletariat, are leading the peasantry, we must pursue a course towards strengthening large-scale industry, and must therefore be prepared to make economic concessions. The proletariat led the peasantry, and did it in such a way

that during the Civil War the peasantry obtained more economic benefits than the proletariat. In Martov's terms, this is Zubatovism. Economic concessions have been made to the peasantry. These concessions were made to a section of the working people constituting the majority of the population. Is this policy wrong? No, it is the only correct one! And no matter what you say about Martov's catchwords, about it being impossible to deceive a class, I ask you nevertheless: where is our deception? We say that there are two paths to choose: one following Martov and Chernov—and through them to Milyukov—and the other following the Communists. As for us, we are fighting for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of communism. Ours is a very hard road, and many are weary and lack faith. The peasants lack faith. But are we deceiving them? It is ridiculous to say that we are deceiving a class, and have lost our way amidst three pines, or even two, for the working class and the peasantry are only two classes. The proletariat leads the peasantry, which is a class that cannot be driven out as the landowners and capitalists were driven out and destroyed. We must remould it by prolonged and persistent effort, entailing great privation. It depends on us, the ruling party, how much of the suffering will fall to the lot of the proletariat and how much to that of the peasantry. How is this suffering to be shared? Is it to be on a basis of equality? Let Chernov and Martov say that. We say that we must be guided by the interests of the proletariat, that is, we must obtain safeguards against the restoration of capitalism and ensure the road to communism. Since the peasantry is now wearier and more exhausted, or rather it thinks that it is so, we make more concessions to it in order to obtain safeguards against the restoration of capitalism and to ensure the road to communism. That is the correct policy, and we are guided exclusively by class considerations. We tell the peasants frankly and honestly, without any deception: in order to hold the road to socialism, we are making a number of concessions to you, comrade peasants, but only within the stated limits and to the stated extent; and, of course, we ourselves shall be the judge of the limits and the extent. The concession itself is being made with an eye to distributing the burdens which, up to now, the

proletariat has borne to a larger extent than the peasantry. During the three and a half years of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it has voluntarily borne more hardships than the peasantry. This is an absolutely obvious and incontrovertible truth. This is how the question stands in regard to the relations between the proletariat, and the peasantry: either the peasantry comes to an agreement with us and we make economic concessions to it—or we fight. That is why all other arguments are but evidence of a terrible confusion. As a matter of fact, any other road leads to Milyukov, and the restoration of the landowners and capitalists. We say that we shall agree to make any concession within the limits of what will sustain and strengthen the power of the proletariat, which, in spite of all difficulties and obstacles, is unswervingly advancing towards the abolition of classes and towards communism.

The next point is that much of the criticism of Comrade Svidersky's speech was wrong. All the members of the opposition at once hurled themselves upon him with what might be called brilliant parliamentary speeches, Comrade Larin proving to be the most brilliant representative of the "parliamentary opposition". The Soviet system does not provide many opportunities for making parliamentary speeches; but nature asserts herself, and although we have no parliamentary institutions, the parliamentary manner survives. Concerning Comrade Svidersky they complained that he had proposed the introduction of a food supply inspectorate, and had even gone to the length of talking about a food dictatorship. Comrade Svidersky may have overstated his case, but he is right in substance. We distributed the reporters' roles in such a way that each played on a different instrument, as it were. The report on the question of exchange was made by the representative of Tsentrosoyuz, Comrade Khinchuk—the co-operator. As you are well aware, Tsentrosoyuz has concluded an agreement with the state. If some of the comrades have not read it, this only goes to show that they have not treated the material of the conference in a business-like way. Our state concludes an agreement with the representative of Tsentrosoyuz: the representative of the People's Commissariat for Food concludes an agreement with the representative of the co-operative

societies, and co-operators abroad must reckon with our agreement. Under the agreement all goods are delivered to the co-operative societies, so that the co-operators may trade on our behalf—on behalf of the centralised state, the big factories, and the proletariat—but not on their own behalf. This is a major and most important condition, because there can be no other arrangement. Petrograd and Moscow are starving, while the well-fed gubernias, as Comrade Bryukhanov's figures show, have eaten twice as much, and sent us half as much as they should have. What do you say: in the circumstances, do we or do we not need a food dictatorship? I think we do; we need it very much, indeed, because there is any amount of this laxity all over the country. You must realise that we cannot do without coercion, and Tsentrosoyuz must do the distributing under our control.

We say to Tsentrosoyuz: you have traded well and we will give you a bonus in the form of a definite percentage. This is stipulated in the agreement, and we will encourage this commission-basis trading by every sort of bonus system. We will give a bonus for profitable trade; but we will demand that this trade is carried on for our benefit, for the benefit of the state, which has centralised large-scale industry, and which is governed by the proletariat. Does large-scale industry stand to gain? Who stands to gain?

How can you ensure food supplies without a tax? You cannot. We do not know whether the tax or the exchange will yield most, but we do know—and it is a fact—that we lack an adequate fund for exchange. At the present time, you cannot get what you need without an instrument of coercion. Never! This is obvious. And in this, Svidersky, as a representative of his line, is absolutely right. We have approved of the establishment of a food supply inspectorate, and the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee will bring more pressure to bear on you because you know who ought to be appointed; that is your business; but once you make the appointment, see that the man does his job. Things being what they are, unless the state is assured of approximately 400 million poods of grain, it is no use talking about large-scale industry and socialist construction. Those who have not learned this in the course

of the past three years are not worth arguing with. But in spite of our numerous mistakes, we have increased this fund. True, while increasing the fund in 1920, we blundered over distribution, but enormous progress was made nonetheless. We must approach the subject soberly and say that to collect the tax in kind we need an expeditious apparatus, and it is no use making liberal speeches and hinting that a food supply inspectorate is such a nasty thing.

I am not aware of the existence of a "communist" system under which you could expect to collect—without coercion—a tax from the peasantry constituting a majority of the population in the period of transition from capitalism to communism. If you want to sustain large-scale industry—the basis of the proletarian dictatorship—then you must want this apparatus to function. And this, naturally, demands centralism. Look at the figures. Unfortunately, few of you are sufficiently familiar with them. See how much the localities have kept for themselves, in spite of the orders from the centre. The comrades from Moscow and Petrograd have quoted figures here showing that the orders from the centre are not being fully carried out. It turns out that three reminders were given, and an equal number of censures. What else is there to do? There remains nothing but dismissal, arrest and so forth. (*A voice*: "How many such cases were there?") There were many cases of infringements, but few dismissals. That is what I wanted to say in defence of this line of policy.

The harvest this year will evidently be a fair one in many parts, and will set in earlier than we expected. Hence, we must make preparations beforehand, the situation now being such that we must swiftly collect the main fund. Consequently, it is absolutely wrong to take the approach that many did here.

As for Comrade Larin, his talents lie more in the sphere of parliamentary opposition and journalism than business efficiency. He is tireless in the drawing-up of projects. He mentioned that he had proposed a good plan as early as January 1920, but if we were to collect all of his projects and pick out the good ones, we would probably find that they add up to one in ten thousand.

On May 10, he submitted a scheme to the Central Committee's Political Bureau for a general introduction of a collective supply system. Its main principle is alluring, but when was it proposed? On May 10, 1921, when there was an absolute shortage of food in centres like Moscow and Petrograd, when these important centres of the Russian Republic were temporarily doomed to semi-starvation and even worse. It is ridiculous to propose a reshuffle of the food supply organisations at a time when men are on their last legs, and are overworking the trunk-lines to Siberia, the Caucasus and the Ukraine, in an effort to track down every trainload, every car almost. What the devil is the use of introducing a collective supply system at a time like that? The Political Bureau adopted the following resolution: "That the scheme proposed by Larin and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions [the A.C.C.T.U., of course, hastened to put its signature to it] be rejected; that the author of the scheme be instructed to re-examine the question with greater care, in the light of the actual possibilities of obtaining supplies...." This principle was reiterated (in Chubar's and Holtzmann's theses, if you have read them) at the Trade Union Congress; Chubar had formulated the main parts of his theses in harmony with the policy of circumspection laid down by the Party's Central Committee. Holtzmann and Larin behaved according to the rule which Larin, half in jest, whispered in my ear at the end of the meeting of the Political Bureau. (I don't think I shall be committing an indiscretion if I relate this conversation.) When Larin saw that the resolution had been adopted he said to me: "You have given us your little finger, but we will take your hand." Then I said to myself—although I had known it before—now we know how to bargain with Larin. If he asks for a million rubles, offer him fifty kopeks. (*Laughter.*) During the debate, when Larin was asked for the facts, he quoted the example (which he said was "brilliant") of the construction of the Kizlyar-Staro-Terek railway. Although it has already been shown that there is nothing new in this example, that similar experiments have been made before, it is a sign of progress to hear definite examples and results of experience, instead of general arguments and countless theses, It would be

disastrous if everyone began reading and discussing these theses, nine-tenths of which you cannot read to the end without a splitting headache.

It is not theses, but a record of local experience, that we need. Let us study this experience, instead of piling system upon system and drawing up laws on collective supplies when we lack even the minimum of real supplies. Practical work is going on in the localities. We were told: it is not right to reproach the localities for not sharing their experiences. The Central Committee was reproached here for not giving publicity to local experience. But we have none of it: our time is taken up entirely with decrees. The majority of us are immersed in this unpleasant work, and that is why we cannot see local experience. It is your business to bring it to us. Larin was right in quoting the fine example of the Kizlyar-Terek railway, for it was a piece of local experience. But even here he allowed his imagination to run away with him, and Chubar and Osinsky had to put him right. This is not the only example. He said that a worker received 28 pounds under the old system and four poods under the new system. I was doubtful about the figures and so I asked him: Where did you get that from? He replied that they had been certified by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. But we know that Larin is not only a parliamentary man, but also a cartoonist. First, he drew a cartoon satirising the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. And now he says: four poods instead of 28 pounds—certified by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. First, he undermines confidence in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection by relating anecdotes of that kind, and then presents the certificate of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection as sole proof. Chubar and Osinsky say that this system has been repeatedly employed in the timber industry. The whole point is to compare the experience of one locality with that of another. The best part of Larin's statement was his description of the work on the Kizlyar-Terek railway. But what we need to know is whether things have not been done better in Tula or Tambov. The centre cannot tell you that, because we do not know. You should bring us this information from the localities, show us the facts, teach us, and we will all learn, and try to follow the best example.

The number of local centres, on the uyezd or district level, with such experience is two or three per thousand, possibly more, but surely two or three can be found. This experience must be thoroughly studied in a business-like fashion. We must carefully sift the evidence and verify the figures, and not rely merely on speeches by the opposition. If we do this, the centre will be able to learn.

I think the most important outcome of the debate has been the information we got on how the exchange of commodities was begun; the only thing lacking was the precise facts. Donbas comrades cabled to say: We have obtained 3,000 poods of wheat through exchange. This referred to a small district, but there were no details. I expected the comrades to come forward here and tell us what they gave in return, and through what organisation the exchange was made: the Commissariat for Food, a lessee, concessionaire or private entrepreneur? This we do not know; and yet it is far more important than our decrees. Decrees can be read, and it is hardly worth getting together to discuss them; but it is certainly worth while to come together to discuss how they obtained 3,000 poods of wheat in the Donbas, and whether the comrades in Volhynia or Tambov have not done better. Quite a good deal has been done locally. The comrades should come here and tell us the results of their practical experience over there. One will say: "I started doing so and so, but was hindered by the central organisation." Another will say: "I managed to bring the central organisation to heel." As for Tambov Gubernia, the comrade who delivered a parliamentary speech and thundered against the Commissariat for Food vaguely hinted that they had set up co-operative shops and agencies. The comrades had accepted this. Over there they have to put up with a number of additional difficulties; part of the area has not been sown, severe conditions generally, handicap upon handicap. Nevertheless, from what he said it is evident that exchange has begun and the co-operatives are functioning. Even pomade was mentioned. How much pomade did you take? And on what terms was it distributed? You must even trade in pomade; when you are trading you must reckon with the demand. If there is a demand for pomade, we must supply it. If we run things

properly we can restore large-scale industry even with the aid of pomade. What we must calculate, though, is how much of it we need to buy, or obtain, to be able to purchase 1,000 poods of grain. (*Voice*: What about icons; there's a demand for icons.) As for icons, someone has just given a reminder that the peasants are asking for icons. I think that we should not follow the example of the capitalist countries and put vodka and other intoxicants on the market, because, profitable though they are, they will lead us back to capitalism and not forward to communism; but there is no such danger in pomade. (*Laughter*.) As for church bells, we differ on that, and some comrades think that in some places the bells will soon be voluntarily recast into copper wire for electrification. Besides, there are so many of them in Russia at the moment that they can hardly be used by religious people for their original purpose, because the need is no longer there. As regards Volhynia, it was stated that there are places there where they give a pood of grain for ten pounds of salt. But how was this transacted? Did you have any agents? How did you trade? Who looked after the goods? Who locked up the warehouses? How much was stolen? That is the main thing but nothing was said about it at all. Instead, we were told that the Poles had given a pood of salt for a pood of grain. In conversation with the comrade I said that if the Poles offered a pood of salt for a pood of grain and the peasants offered you a pood of grain for ten pounds of salt, then you could have traded something for yourselves. What prevented you from doing that? The centre, it was said. I'm sorry but I simply cannot believe that the centre prevented you from obtaining four poods of grain for a pood of Polish salt. We could not have opposed a thing like that; I refuse to believe it. The comrades complained that before, when the army was there, everything had to be done through the military authorities; but now that the army is no longer there and there is no war, permission must be obtained from the centre. A comrade said that now they had the Southern Paper Trust and that they were fighting this Trust. But when I asked to whom they had complained about this organisation he answered that he did not know. But this is very important.

They were unable to name the body to whom they had sent their complaint about the Southern Paper Trust. I do not know what this Paper Trust is. In all probability it is a body that suffers from the same bureaucratic distortion that all our Soviet organisations are afflicted with. The capitalists are still fighting us. We have compelled many of them to seek protection under Milyukov's wing abroad; but many thousands are still here, waging war against us according to all the rules of the art of bureaucracy. But how are you combating this, comrades? Do you think you can take this Paper Trust and all the rest of them with your bare hands? We did not fight Denikin with bare hands, but armed ourselves strongly, and organised an army. But here we have excellent officials, who consider that it is in the interests of their class to play dirty tricks on us, to hamper our work; they think that they are saving civilisation by helping to bring about the downfall of the Bolsheviks, and they know how to run an office a hundred times better than we do. There was nowhere for us to learn this business. We must fight them according to all the rules of the art and take proceedings against Party comrades who go about lodging complaints, or telling anecdotes about the dirty tricks that are being played in some office or other. They go about Moscow telling anecdotes about the bureaucratic tricks that are being played. But you, comrades, who are intelligent Communists, what have you done to combat this?—"I lodged a complaint."—Where did you file your complaint? It turns out that no complaint had been filed, whereas it should have been sent to the Council of People's Commissars and to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; in other words, they should have exercised all their rights provided for by our Constitution. Of course, we may suffer a reverse here and there in this war. But has there ever been a war, even the most victorious, without any reverses? In this one reverses are also possible, but the fight must go on. Many of us, however, are not taking it seriously. Have you taken legal proceedings against those who are responsible for red tape? Has any people's court convicted anyone for making a worker or a peasant call at an office four or five times and finally sending him off with an answer which is formally correct, but is essen-

tially sheer mockery? You are Communists, aren't you? Then why don't you set a trap for these bureaucratic gentlemen and then haul them before a people's court, and into prison, for this red tape? How many people have you put into prison for red tape? Everyone will say, of course, that it is a troublesome business: Someone may be offended. Many take this view, but do not find it too much trouble to complain and tell anecdotes. Very often one cannot tell the difference between these anecdotes and the slander published by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in foreign journals. The Mensheviks write: "We have our own correspondents in all the Soviet offices in Moscow." (*Laughter.*) Quite often the anecdotes that are told here, and those with which the speeches of the parliamentary opposition are replete, appear in the Menshevik journals a few days later. But you should know where to draw the line; you must see the difference between a serious struggle and the telling of anecdotes. Of course, when people are tired, an anecdote told by a capable speaker may help to let off steam. Judging from my own observations this is so, and I have no objections from this point of view. But we need something more: we must study the methods used to catch the culprits, count up how many were caught and brought to trial, and sum up the results obtained. If we proceed on these lines we will win this war, although it takes far more skill than the Civil War.

I should like to say a word or two about Nikolayev-Gubernia. The comrade from Nikolayev Gubernia gave us a number of valuable facts, but in most cases he gave no details. He said: "There is a demand for textiles and iron, but not for pomade." Others said, however, that there was no demand for textiles. The comrade came up against the profiteers, and being obliged to pursue the free market policy, he wants to know how to combat them. We cannot fight them in the old way; and to fight them in the new way we have mounted guards in the transport system, and a number of new decrees have been passed; but, of course, no quick results can be expected. But where is your local experience in this matter? A number of decrees have now been passed for the protection of the transport system,

not against the profiteers, but against its "improper use". Special commissions, Extraordinary Three-Man Commissions have been set up by the Cheka and the Transport Cheka; the War Department and the People's Commissariat for Railways are also taking a hand. But what are the bodies functioning in your districts? How do they co-ordinate their work? What is being done about the complaints that the profiteers are getting the upper hand? How do they operate? This is what we ought to discuss. But comrades come here and complain: "The profiteers have got the upper hand." We have adopted the decrees. Perhaps they are no good, they must be put to the test, but how is this to be done? We test our decrees by publishing them. You know them; you come here to discuss them and tell us how they are applied. You must tell us: in such and such a place, such and such a Transport Three-Man Commission has done the following. In one place it was successful, in another it was not. Perhaps the speeches will not be as brilliant as those we heard about the food dictatorship; but unless we do this we shall never learn to make fewer mistakes in drafting decrees, and that is the main thing.

Let me deal in conclusion with the deductions which, I think, Comrade Osinsky has quite rightly drawn, and which sum up our activities. His deductions were three. First: "Seriously and for a long time". I think he is quite right. The policy is a long-term one and is being adopted in earnest. We must get this well into our heads and remember it, because, owing to the gossip habit, rumours are being spread that we are indulging in a policy of expedients, that is to say, political trickery, and that what is being done is only for the present day. That is not true. We are taking class relationships into account and have our eyes on what the proletariat must do to lead the peasantry in the direction of communism in spite of everything. Of course, we have to retreat; but we must take it very seriously and look at it from the standpoint of class forces. To regard it as a trick is to imitate the philistines, the petty bourgeoisie, who are alive and kicking not only outside the Communist Party. But I would not go along with Comrade Osinsky in his estimate of the period. He said "seriously and for a long

time" meant 25 years. I am not that pessimistic; I shall refrain from estimating the period, but I think his figure is a bit too pessimistic. We shall be lucky to project our policy for some 5 or 10 years, because we usually fail to do so even for 5 weeks.

We must promote enterprising non-Party workers. We must reiterate over and over again that, after all is said and done, meetings, congresses and conferences held by the Communist Party and other organisations in Soviet Russia must not be what they have been in the past, and still are, that is to say, assemblies with speeches in the spirit of parliamentary oppositions and the drawing up of resolutions. We have so many resolutions that nobody even takes the trouble to file them, let alone read them. We must devote our attention to business and not to resolutions. Under the bourgeois system, business matters were managed by private owners and not by state agencies; but now, business matters are our common concern. These are the politics that interest us most. Of course, we can denounce the Mensheviks for the 999th time, they deserve it; but after all is said and done, this is mere repetition, and many of us have now been doing it these thirty years. Most of us have had enough of it.

What is much more interesting is how, in this socialist state, we are to exchange textiles, pomade and other things for grain, and obtain an extra pood of flour in exchange for Polish salt. Although it is not our custom, Party meetings must take up the question of enterprise and initiative. The whole capitalist world is starving. They have an abundance of salt, pomades, and other things of that sort, and if we apply the slogan of local exchange properly and show initiative, we shall obtain extra poods of grain.

Comrade Gusev has handed me a draft of the rules and regulations for a Communist Producers' Co-operative Society. Its substance is contained in Point 5, in which the members of the society ask to be assured a "healthy, hygienic ration". (*Laughter.*) A "healthy, hygienic ration" is the goal of our whole food policy. We must collect 240 million poods of grain by means of the tax, and 160 million through commodity exchange, making a total of 400

million poods, so that the peasants may feel that this system is economically stable.

The surplus-grain appropriation system could not be continued any longer. The policy had to be changed. In this respect, we are facing what is, perhaps, the most difficult period of our construction effort. If we were to compare the whole work of the Communist Party to a four-year course in the higher sciences, we could say that our present position is as follows: we are taking our examination to pass from the third course to the fourth; we have not yet passed the examination, but there is every sign that we shall. We can say that the first course lasted from the 1870s to 1903; it was the initial introductory period, ranging from Narodnaya Volya, Social-Democracy and the Second International to Bolshevism. That was the first course.

The second course lasted from 1903 to 1917, with a serious preparatory course for revolution, and the first essay in revolution in 1905. The third course lasted from 1917 to 1921, a period of four years, which in content was more important than the first forty years. This was a very practical test, when the proletariat came to power, but it was not yet the crucial test. Although in our anthem we sing: "The last fight let us face", I must say that, unfortunately, it was not the last fight, but one of the fights just before the last, to be absolutely exact. At present we are taking our examination to pass from the third course to the fourth. Taking Osinsky's example of years, I think we should allow ten, because we shall have to take an exam to pass from the third course to the fourth. After that we must do well in the fourth course and then we shall really be invincible. We can win on the economic front. If we are victorious in relation to the peasantry and collect a "healthy, hygienic ration" this year, we shall pass to the fourth course. After that, all the work of construction that we are planning will be more serious.

This is the task confronting us. That is why I take the liberty, once again, in conclusion to express the hope that, in spite of the difficulties, and all the old traditions which frown on the idea of discussing local questions of minor economics at congresses, conferences and fine parliamentary

assemblies, we shall, nevertheless, say to ourselves: being Communists, we shall have to devote ourselves to these tasks. We must study the practical experience gained in economic work in the localities, where the decrees are being applied, where they are tested, where their defects should be rectified, where we must begin to do the things that are later summed up at our meetings. If we do that, our work of construction will make real and durable progress. (*Stormy applause.*)

4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON QUESTIONS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

1. The fundamental political task of the moment is for all Party and Soviet workers to gain a complete understanding of the New Economic Policy and to implement it to the letter.

The Party regards this policy as being established for a long period of years, and demands that everyone should carry it out unconditionally with thoroughness and diligence.

2. Commodity exchange is brought to the fore as the principal lever of the New Economic Policy. It is impossible to establish a correct relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry, or an altogether stable form of economic alliance between these two classes in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, without regular commodity exchange or the exchange of products between industry and agriculture.

The exchange of commodities, in particular, is required to stimulate the extension of the peasants' area under crop and improvement of peasant farming.

Local initiative and enterprise must be given all-round support and development at all costs.

Gubernias with the greatest grain surpluses must be placed on the priority list for commodity exchange.

3. Considering co-operatives to be the main apparatus for commodity exchange, the conference recognises as correct the policy of contracts between the agencies of the People's Commissariat for Food and the co-operative societies, and the transfer, under government control, by the former to the latter of commodity-exchange stocks to fulfil the assignments of the government;

the co-operatives to be given broad opportunities for procurement and all-round development of local industry and revival of economic life in general;

support for credit operations by the co-operatives;

anarchic commodity exchange (that is, exchange which eludes all control and state supervision) to be combated by concentration of exchange chiefly in the hands of the co-operatives, without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations;

market analysis.

4. Support for small and medium (private and co-operative) enterprises, chiefly those not requiring supplies from state raw material, fuel and food reserves.

Permission to lease government enterprises to private persons, co-operatives, artels and associations. The right of local economic agencies to conclude such contracts without authorisation from superior agencies. Obligatory notification of the Council of Labour and Defence in each such case.

5. Review of (certain sections of) production programmes for large-scale industry towards increasing the manufacture of consumer goods and peasant household articles.

Extension of enterprise and initiative by each large establishment in the disposal of financial and material resources. Submission of a precise decree to that effect for approval by the Council of People's Commissars.

6. Development of the system of bonuses in kind and the establishment by way of experiment of a collective supply system.

Establishment of a more correct distribution of foodstuffs with the aim of increasing labour productivity.

7. The need to maintain and enlarge the apparatus for the full and expeditious collection of the tax in kind everywhere. Investment of food agencies with the necessary Party authority for that purpose. Maintenance and enhancement of the centralisation of the food apparatus.

8. To concentrate all the enumerated measures on the current year's practical and urgent task: collection of at least 400 million poods of grain stocks as a basis for the rehabilitation of large-scale industry and the implementation of the electrification plan.

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9. To adopt in principle the draft Instructions of the C.L.D., authorising the All-Russia Central Executive Committee group to enact them into law.

To recognise the strict fulfilment of the Instructions in general and the recruitment and promotion of non-Party people for work, in particular, as the Party's unconditional and primary task.

10. To establish special responsibility on the part of central agencies for any hampering of local initiative and insufficient support of it. To authorise the All-Russia Central Executive Committee group to work out a corresponding decision and have it adopted at the very next session.

11. The conference authorises the Central Committee and all Party organisations to carry out a system of measures to intensify agitation and propaganda and effect the necessary transfer of Party cadres to ensure complete understanding and steady implementation of the enumerated tasks.

12. To set as the Party's most important task the careful and all-round publicising and study in the press and at trade union, Soviet, and Party meetings, conferences, congresses, etc., of the practical experience gained in economic development locally and at the centre.

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5
SPEECH IN CLOSING THE CONFERENCE
MAY 28

Comrades, I think that I can confine myself to a very short speech. As you are aware, we convened this special conference mainly for the purpose of achieving complete understanding on economic policy between the centre and the localities, among Party and all Soviet workers. I think that the conference has fully achieved its object. Some speakers noted that Comrade Osinsky gave the correct expression to the feelings of very many, probably, the majority of local Party workers when he said that we must remove all doubt about the fact that the policy adopted by the Tenth Party Congress and subsequently reinforced by decrees and orders has unquestionably been accepted by the Party in earnest and for a long time. This is what the conference most emphatically expressed and amplified by a number of points. When the comrades return to their localities, not the slightest possibility of wrong interpretation will remain. Of course, in adopting a policy to be pursued over a number of years we do not for a moment forget that everything may be altered by the international revolution, its rate of development and the circumstances accompanying it. The current international situation is such that some sort of a temporary, unstable equilibrium, but equilibrium for all that, has been established; it is the kind of equilibrium under which the imperialist powers have been compelled to abandon their desire to hurl themselves at Soviet Russia, despite their hatred for her, because the disintegration of the capitalist world is steadily progressing, unity is steadily diminishing, while the onslaught of the forces of the oppressed colonies, which have a population

of over a thousand million, is increasing from year to year, month to month, and even week to week. But we can make no conjectures on this score. We are now exercising our main influence on the international revolution through our economic policy. The working people of all countries without exception and without exaggeration are looking to the Soviet Russian Republic. This much has been achieved. The capitalists cannot hush up or conceal anything. That is why they so eagerly catch at our every economic mistake and weakness. The struggle in this field has now become global. Once we solve this problem, we shall have certainly and finally won on an international scale. That is why for us questions of economic development become of absolutely exceptional importance. On this front, we must achieve victory by a steady rise and progress which must be gradual and necessarily slow. I think that as a result of the work of our conference we shall certainly achieve this goal. (*Applause*.)

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SPEECH ON LOCAL ECONOMIC BODIES DELIVERED AT A SITTING OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MAY 30, 1921[118]

Comrades, I have very little to add to what Comrade Osinsky has said, for he has already explained the preliminary draft of the Instructions, copies of which you have, and the main idea underlying it. As there are details in this matter which virtually determine the whole issue, it was decided not to limit its examination to the Council of Labour and Defence and the Council of People's Commissars, but to bring it before the Party conference, where the Instructions were approved in principle, and before the supreme legislative body—the Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Local workers must make a careful verification of the methods by which this law is to be implemented, and it may be necessary at first to lay down a number of supplementary rules.

Care must be taken that this measure is not, in any circumstances, converted into just another source of increased red tape. This would not be unlikely if we were to receive too many reports, or if the methods of compiling them did not guarantee that they could be checked. Comrades, we must give thought to the methods of compiling the reports, and you may find it appropriate to elect a special commission which, guided by the suggestions that will be made here and the instructions and directives you give it, will put the matter of the reports into final shape. We already have a fair amount of material on this question. Naturally, if reports are to be submitted, they must come not only from the various economic bodies, but also from

the People's Commissariats, that is, including those which do not run branches of the economy but are nevertheless closely connected with economic work. One of the main objects of printing the reports is to bring them within reach of the non-Party masses, and of the population in general. We cannot use mass production methods and print these reports in large numbers, and so we must concentrate them in the libraries. That being the case, we must arrange for brief printed summaries of these reports, giving the gist of what is of most interest to the population. The technical facilities for this are available. Before coming here to speak I made inquiries of the representative of the Central Paper Board. He has sent me a precise report covering 339 uyezd centres, and showing that each of these has the printing facilities and the paper to print very brief reports. He has based his calculations on the assumption that the smallest of these uyezd centres would print 16 pages in octavo, once a month, of course. But once a month is too often. Whether you decide on once in two months, or in four, or perhaps even a longer period, will evidently be determined by the reports we get from the localities. He has assumed that there would be 1,000 copies, and has accordingly estimated that the required quantity of paper is now available. A thousand copies would enable us to supply these reports at least to every uyezd library and so bring them within the reach of all who are interested in them, particularly the masses of non-Party people. Of course, this will initially have to be an experiment; no one can guarantee that it will be successful at once, and that there will be no defects.

To conclude my brief supplementary remarks I should like to emphasise one other thing. One of the most important tasks confronting us at present is that of massive enlistment of non-Party people for this work, ensuring that apart from Party members and in any case officials of the department concerned, the largest possible number of non-Party people should have an interest in the work and be enlisted in it. It appeared to us that this could not be achieved in any way except by publishing the reports, at any rate, the more essential part of them. Some establishments send in extremely full reports. All the information that we have had on this question up to now shows that some local bodies

are excellently organised. At all events, the work in the localities is constantly providing us with a great deal of very encouraging material. What we really lack is the ability to publicise the best examples—which are not many—and set them up as models which all should be obliged to emulate. Our press does not publicise these really exemplary local organisations which have practical experience. Printing these reports and bringing them within the reach of the broad masses of the population, by supplying copies to every library, if only on the uyezd level, should help—provided conferences of non-Party people are properly convened—to enlist far greater numbers in the economic drive. Any number of resolutions have been passed on this subject. In some places, something has been done, but taking the country as a whole, certainly far too little is being done. By this method, however, we shall improve the work of the establishments and make it possible for every local worker in every responsible economic post to provide the centre with signed reports containing precise and definite information on his practical experience, which could be used as a model. This seems to be what we lack most at the present time.

Let us leave it to practice to decide how these reports are subsequently to be summarised and studied, and utilised at conferences, congresses and by establishments. Considering the available experience of local workers, the main thing now is to approve this decree and put it to the test and be sure to obtain results by the forthcoming All-Russia Congress (some time next December) which would show just how this measure could be developed, improved, modified and enlarged on the basis of experience.

These are the brief supplementary remarks that I should like to confine myself to for the time being.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIA FOOD CONFERENCE JUNE 16, 1921[119]

Comrades, first of all permit me to greet your conference on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.

Comrades, we all understand, of course, why such special attention should be paid to your conference, not only by those who are engaged in food supply work, but by all Soviet and Party workers, by the whole Party, and by all those who are at all seriously concerned about the fate of the Soviet Republic and its tasks. Your conference has met at a moment of exceptional importance, and for that reason it cannot possibly be regarded as an ordinary, or regular food conference, like any you have attended in the past, and will no doubt attend again in the future.

The exceptional importance of your present conference is due to two circumstances. The first is an unavoidable one—what we feared—the fact that for the second year our country is afflicted by a disaster that entails grave hardships. We do not know whether we are in for a long cycle of drought, as has been predicted these two years, but it is now clear that the grain and hay crop will fail in a large area of the country for the second year running, and the prospects are menacing. I will not say just now how large is the area which, according to the grain and hay crop reports, is affected by the drought; at all events, it is considerable. Whatever it is, the prospect is that in many gubernias there will be a large deficit in the tax in kind, and, moreover, the condition of the population in a number of gubernias will be desperate; so that, instead of collecting

a certain quantity of surplus produce from these gubernias for the maintenance of the army, the working class and industry, the food supply workers will have to assist the starving in these gubernias. The unanticipated tasks which thus devolve upon you, as food supply workers, will make your work much more arduous. This is the first circumstance.

The second circumstance, which is not as unexpected, is the moment of change, the turning point that has been reached, in our whole food policy. This is the first food campaign to be launched since the radical change in our food policy. This is the first time we have met to sum up the experience of local food supply workers and to prepare for our forthcoming tasks since the Soviet government was obliged to change, not only its food policy but, in many respects, the very principles of its economic policy; since the extremely severe hardships the peasants suffered last year, and the impossibility, as it turned out, of rapidly restoring large-scale industry, compelled us to switch all our state work to new lines

Reckoning with the gravity of the situation in the country and the impossibility of rapidly restoring large-scale industry, means making preparations to help small-peasant farming, at all costs, at any price, pull out of its critical position to a bearable one, and for this purpose to revive small, local industry, and adopt measures which, by at once placing small production on a sound basis, would open up opportunities for local trade, thereby enlarging the sphere for the investment of capital, and also switching to new lines the whole Soviet power—its very foundations, and its entire economic policy.

You are well aware of the effort it has cost us all, and you particularly, during the past three years to build up something like a stable food supply apparatus and to run it so that it might fulfil at least the most urgent and essential tasks. Hence, there is no need to tell you, who have been in the thick of all this, what it means quickly to reorganise all our work and switch it over to new lines; what it means to organise amidst so many unknowns, and, at the same time, to solve the problem of obtaining a larger quantity of food. You know all about it. Year after year, in spite of the terrible, unprecedented, sometimes super-

human difficulties created by the Civil War, our food policy has produced striking and tangible results, and the improvement has been far more rapid than in any other sphere of Soviet work. But you also know, of course, that although, as a result of the strenuous efforts of the food supply workers, we have succeeded in raising grain collections from 110 million poods in the first year to over 280 million poods, you know very well that this is not enough.

We are now, for the first time, entering on a big food supply campaign without any whiteguard troops or foreign armies on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. But to this must be added some reservations: except for the intervention started by the Japanese in the Far Eastern Republic. Which shows again that in the very first year when we can say that, on the whole, we have done with the Civil War, it becomes evident that we are surrounded by the international bourgeoisie, whom the Red Army taught a harsh lesson, but who has not by any means abandoned the idea of resuming the attack, in open or undercover, systematic or sporadic form, at the very first opportunity. So even here we have no sure guarantee. But in addition to all this you know that the very transition from war to economic development, the transition about which we talked so long, and to which we devoted several Party conferences and congresses, this transition in itself, is a transition, created fresh difficulties of vast proportions because, with a dislocated state apparatus and transport a shambles, enormous difficulties arose from the very transition from the old, large army, ranged on the frontier in battle formation, to a peace-time army. The signs are that we have overcome most of these difficulties; nevertheless, as anyone familiar with the situation will agree, quite a number of difficulties still confront us.

That is why I say that this food conference is exceptionally important, that it must settle other questions besides those specifically connected with the food supply, that your attention and efforts on behalf of the Republic are required not only in your capacity of food supply workers, and men on whom the Soviet government has placed the crucial task of supplying the population with food. I say that this is not enough. You as Party workers must

exert all your efforts to fulfil a number of tasks which so far exist only in the form of instructions and decisions adopted by the supreme organs of the Soviet power and by the Party. And you know perfectly well what a wide gap there is between general decisions, general instructions, and their practical application. You are aware that this entails enormous effort, which must be exerted in order to put these principles successfully into practice, to prevent them from remaining a dead letter, as, unfortunately, often happens in Soviet Russia.

I should like to remind you of the decision adopted by the last Party Conference, which dealt specifically with the question of the New Economic Policy.[120] The Party conference was called urgently for the purpose of convincing all comrades that this policy had been adopted, as was said at the conference, in earnest and for a long time and to prevent any wavering on that score in future, for there has been some wavering and uncertainty. The Party conference, as the supreme organ of the ruling, government Party, the leading authority of the working class, emphasised the importance of collecting the large food stock of 400 million poods. It laid emphasis on the point that the whole meaning of our food policy, permitting a large measure of unrestricted trade, boils down to building up a big food fund, as a large state reserve. Without it, neither the restoration of large-scale industry nor the restoration of the currency will be possible, and every socialist understands that unless large-scale industry—the only real basis—is restored, it is no use talking about socialist construction.

No country has been so devastated as ours. It had been more backward than other countries before the imperialist war, which brought it more ruin than it did to any other country, and in addition we had to endure the untold hardships of another three years of war against the bourgeoisie and the landowners. The vanquished countries with which Russia might be compared, countries like Serbia and Austria—where industry has been ruined to an extent equal to, and in some cases even greater than, that of Russia—are in desperate straits. Counting on the assistance of the bourgeoisie—for they did not rise against it—they are crushed

by a double burden: starvation, ruin and impoverishment (as in our case), plus the realisation that their position is hopeless, that they had put their stake on the bourgeoisie and are perishing without any prospects of assistance. But, in spite of all our incredible difficulties, we see and clearly realise, and the mass of workers and peasants clearly realise —in spite of our incredible difficulties fresh forces are arising. Every difficulty brought to life fresh forces, created new sources of energy and indicated new paths. The work these forces have performed proves to us that, terribly slow though it is, we are making progress, that frightfully hard though it may be to overcome difficulties at times, we are nevertheless overcoming them. There is a growing realisation that economic relationships are being built upon entirely new lines, that great as its sufferings may be, the working class is, step by step, day after day, finding solutions for all problems without the aid of the capitalists, and is fighting them, and dislodging them from one position after another.

This, comrades, seems to me to be the sum and substance of the decisions adopted by the Party conference. And with this I want particularly to emphasise that the present conference is not only a conference of specialists, but of Party and Soviet workers upon whom will devolve the practical task of building, under extremely difficult conditions, the new forms of economic policy and the foundation of the whole Soviet edifice.

We shall have to build in two ways: by collecting the tax and by reviving commodity exchange. The tax has been fixed, on the assumption of an average harvest, at 240 million poods, which is inadequate even for a short ration for the army which we need, and for the absolutely essential industrial enterprises. It will be difficult to collect this amount in full, not only in view of the threatening crop failure, but under any circumstances.

I have not got the exact figures before me showing the changes in the percentages of fulfilment of our food supply plans and assignments according to districts during the three years that we have been carrying on food supply operations. But everyone knows that the machinery we have created by our joint efforts is running far more smoothly

than that of a number of other People's Commissariats, and that our efficiency is steadily increasing. I also take it as an irrefutable fact that this year, when so much attention is being devoted to this work, we shall cope more fully with the tasks the Republic has set us. We must achieve, if not 100 per cent, then as near to that figure as possible; and we can achieve it, even amidst the difficulties created by the threatening failure of the harvest. The tax deficit may run to tens of millions of poods, but this may be balanced by the extra amount that is likely to be collected in areas where the harvest has been particularly good.

Comrades, the harvest absolutely refuses to reckon with the state of the food supply apparatus, and it has not given us the satisfaction of being particularly good where the food supply apparatus is particularly good. If we look at the chart indicating the harvest prospects we shall find that the areas of the R.S.F.S.R. and of neighbouring and fraternal republics where the harvest outlook is particularly good, or is above the average, are the very regions where the food supply apparatus is certainly not above the average, but even below it. Vigorous measures must be taken to transfer extra food supply workers to these areas, but we know too few people who are sufficiently trained and experienced to adapt themselves to the new areas quickly and get things moving at once. This is a matter that requires very close attention.

The main thing is commodity exchange, and it is this the Party conference put into the forefront and the last Party Congress decided. It is the question that is engaging most of the concern and attention of all those who are at the head of Soviet and Party work in Moscow. How well are we prepared for it? What has been actually done? What part of these plans has been carried out? You will be the first to have to answer these questions from first-hand experience. Your experience in this matter and its summing up will be of particular and vital importance.

This is a new field, and additional forces must be sent in. It demands that the food supply apparatus should be something more than it has been up to now—nothing but a more or less uniform and smoothly running machine for collecting a quantity of food Products. No, here

you will have to take account of the difference in the localities, in the goods demanded and the equivalents offered. You will not have to adjust yourselves to what the Soviet government wants, and to what the Soviet apparatus can carry out. No, you will have to adjust yourselves to the economic conditions of the small farmers, and will have to reckon with their satisfied and outstanding needs. You have fought the profiteers and have combated trade conducted in contravention of government orders. You will have to go on fighting them. But in order to engage in the exchange of commodities and avoid being beaten in the free market—which means being beaten by unrestricted trade—you must know it thoroughly, compete with it, fight it with its own weapons and beat it at its own game, but to be able to do that you must have a thorough knowledge of it.

The old bureaucratic methods are of no use; we need precise knowledge of commercial conditions and the ability to react quickly to every change. For this purpose, food products and articles for exchange must be rapidly transported from place to place over the vast territory of the R.S.F.S.R. The difficulties ahead of us are enormous. But this will be the basis of the whole of our New Economic Policy for the period until we fully restore large-scale industry. This may take at least ten years, during which time we must create such relations between the working class and the peasantry—the only classes that can serve as a base on which to build up our economy—and such an alliance between them as will economically satisfy both sides. It must be an alliance in which the small peasant will be reckoned with as a small peasant, until we are able to provide him with all the products of large-scale industry.

We must reckon with the small proprietor who sells his surplus products. We must also reckon with the need to improve the condition of the urban population—the workers. Unless we do this, we shall fail in our further work of construction that will so consolidate the transition to socialism that there will be no turning back. That is why commodity exchange is now the most important part of our economic policy. This is the task you, food supply workers, business managers and co-operators, will have to tackle.

This is what the Soviet government, the Party, and the whole Republic expect of you, for your attitude to this work and your successes will determine the success of what the Soviet Republic is now staking everything on in the work of socialist construction.

Comrades, I must say in conclusion that your conference has a special task before it: to consider a matter that was raised in the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in May, and settled, after discussion on the Central Committee, at the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions. It is to set to work, with due circumspection and very gradually, but immediately, to try out the system of collective supplies. The present system of food distribution has proved to be defective, and this cannot go on. The system of distributing food on the egalitarian principle has led to equalisation, which sometimes proves to be an obstacle to increasing output. The Republic must utilise the food surpluses it collects to maintain only what is needed for industry. We cannot maintain all our factories, nor is it necessary to do so: that would be wasteful management. We cannot restore the whole of large-scale industry, and so we must select and maintain only those factories which have the best equipment and promise a greater output.

Food supply workers cannot just go on thinking that their business boils down to collecting so many millions of poods and distributing them in certain fixed rations, on the present ration cards, say, and that there is the end of it. The immediate thing is to integrate the activity of all the economic People's Commissariats. The conscientious food supply worker must not only be interested in food supply work, but in all economic activity. More is expected of him now.

He cannot go on being only a food supply worker. He must be an economist appraising every step in the light of the work of all the economic People's Commissariats, and of all the results achieved by that work.

It is wrong to think that food distribution is only a matter of fairness. We must bear in mind that it is a method, an instrument, and a means of increasing output. State food supplies must be given only to those employees who are really needed, on the condition that productivity of labour

is increased to the utmost. And if the distribution of food is to be used as a political instrument, then it must be used to reduce the number of those who are not absolutely needed and to encourage those who actually are. If the distribution of food is a political instrument for restoring our industry, then we must maintain the industrial enterprises which are really needed now, and certainly stop maintaining those we do not need now, and thus economise fuel and food. For a number of years we have been managing these things very badly. This must now be rectified.

Thus, you see that the closer you look into the matter the wider you find the tasks confronting your food conference. I hope, however, that none of you will be intimidated by the complexity of these tasks, and that, on the contrary, the unusual nature of your tasks as Soviet and Party workers will stimulate you to fresh efforts to fulfil them. Our past experience of the work of other People's Commissariats clearly proves the necessity of combining Soviet and Party work. Food supply workers have carried out a number of urgent tasks under extremely difficult conditions; and they did it successfully because in these cases the Soviet and Party bodies resorted to unconventional methods, urgent measures and shock-work campaign operations. I repeat that it is the fundamental basis of our economic policy that is the main subject of your food conference. It must engage all your attention.

In conclusion, permit me to express the conviction that our united efforts in the direction we have taken will lay a firm foundation for a successful economic policy that will create an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the two main classes on which the Soviet power rests, the economic alliance which alone can guarantee the success of all our work of socialist construction. (*Stormy applause.*)

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THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[121]

JUNE 22-JULY 12, 1921

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The *Tezisy* are published according to the manuscript; the speech on the Italian question, the speech in defence of the tactics of the Communist International, and the report on the tactics of the R.C.P., according to the text of the book

THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[121]

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First published in full as a pamphlet, Treći kongres Komunističkog Internacionala (Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. at the Third Congress of the Communist International) in 1921; the speeches and the report in the book, Treći kongres Komunističkog Internacionala. Stenografičeski otchet (Third World Congress of the Communist International. Verbatim Report), Petrograd, 1922

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1

THESES FOR A REPORT ON THE TACTICS OF THE R.C.P.

1. THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

The international position of the R.S.F.S.R. at present is distinguished by a certain equilibrium, which, although extremely unstable, has nevertheless given rise to a peculiar state of affairs in world politics.

This peculiarity is the following. On the one hand, the international bourgeoisie is filled with furious hatred of, and hostility towards, Soviet Russia, and is prepared at any moment to fling itself upon her in order to strangle her. On the other hand, all attempts at military intervention, which have cost the international bourgeoisie hundreds of millions of francs, ended in complete failure, in spite of the fact that the Soviet power was then weaker than it is now and that the Russian landowners and capitalists had whole armies on the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. Opposition to the war against Soviet Russia has grown considerably in all capitalist countries, adding fuel to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and extending to very wide sections of the petty-bourgeois democrats. The conflict of interests between the various imperialist countries has become acute, and is growing more acute every day. The revolutionary movement among the hundreds of millions of oppressed peoples of the East is growing with remarkable vigour. The result of all these conditions is that international imperialism has proved unable to strangle Soviet Russia, although it is far stronger, and has been obliged for the time being to grant her recognition, or semi-recognition, and to conclude trade agreements with her.

The result is a state of equilibrium which, although highly unstable and precarious, enables the Socialist Republic to exist—not for long, of course—within the capitalist encirclement.

2. THE INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT OF CLASS FORCES

This state of affairs has given rise to the following international alignment of class forces.

The international bourgeoisie, deprived of the opportunity of waging open war against Soviet Russia, is waiting and watching for the moment when circumstances will permit it to resume the war.

The proletariat in all the advanced capitalist countries has already formed its vanguard, the Communist Parties, which are growing, making steady progress towards winning the majority of the proletariat in each country, and destroying the influence of the old trade union bureaucrats and of the upper stratum of the working class of America and Europe, which has been corrupted by imperialist privileges.

The petty-bourgeois democrats in the capitalist countries, whose foremost sections are represented by the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, serve today as the mainstay of capitalism, since they retain an influence over the majority, or a considerable section, of the industrial and commercial workers and office employees who are afraid that if revolution breaks out they will lose the relative petty-bourgeois prosperity created by the privileges of imperialism. But the growing economic crisis is worsening the condition of broad sections of the people everywhere, and this, with the looming inevitability of new imperialist wars if capitalism is preserved, is steadily weakening this mainstay.

The masses of the working people in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe, were roused to political life at the turn of the twentieth century, particularly by the revolutions in Russia, Turkey, Persia and China. The imperialist war of 1914-18 and the Soviet power in Russia are completing the process of converting these masses into an active factor in world politics and in the revolutionary

destruction of imperialism, although the educated philistines of Europe and America, including the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, stubbornly refuse to see this. British India is at the head of these countries, and there revolution is maturing in proportion, on the one hand, to the growth of the industrial and railway proletariat, and, on the other, to the increase in the brutal terrorism of the British, who with ever greater frequency resort to massacres (Amritsar),[122] public floggings, etc.

3. THE ALIGNMENT OF CLASS FORCES IN RUSSIA

The internal political situation in Soviet Russia is determined by the fact that here, for the first time in history, there have been, for a number of years, only two classes—the proletariat, trained for decades by a very young, but modern, large-scale machine industry, and the small peasantry, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

In Russia, the big landowners and capitalists have not vanished, but they have been subjected to total expropriation and crushed politically as a class, whose remnants are hiding out among Soviet government employees. They have preserved their class organisation abroad, as émigrés, numbering probably from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 people, with over 50 daily newspapers of all bourgeois and "socialist" (i.e., petty-bourgeois) parties, the remnants of an army, and numerous connections with the international bourgeoisie. These émigrés are striving, with might and main, to destroy the Soviet power and restore capitalism in Russia.

4. THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY IN RUSSIA

This being the internal situation in Russia, the main task now confronting her proletariat, as the ruling class, is properly to determine and carry out the measures that are necessary to lead the peasantry, establish a firm alliance with them and achieve the transition, in a series of gradual stages, to large-scale, socialised, mechanised agriculture. This is a particularly difficult task in Russia, both because of her backwardness, and her extreme state of ruin as a

result of seven years of imperialist and civil war. But apart from these specific circumstances, this is one of the most difficult tasks of socialist construction that will confront all capitalist countries, with, perhaps, the sole exception of Britain. However, even in regard to Britain it must not be forgotten that, while the small tenant farmers there constitute only a very small class, the percentage of workers and office employees who enjoy a petty-bourgeois standard of living is exceptionally high, due to the actual enslavement of hundreds of millions of people in Britain's colonial possessions.

Hence, from the standpoint of development of the world proletarian revolution as a single process, the epoch Russia is passing through is significant as a practical test and a verification of the policy of a proletariat in power towards the mass of the petty bourgeoisie.

5. THE MILITARY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY IN THE R.S.F.S.R.

The basis for proper relations between the proletariat and the peasantry in Soviet Russia was created in the period of 1917-21 when the invasion of the capitalists and landowners, supported by the whole world bourgeoisie and all the petty-bourgeois democratic parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks), caused the proletariat and the peasantry to form, sign and seal a military alliance to defend the Soviet power. Civil war is the most intense form of class struggle, but the more intense it is, the more rapidly its flames consume all petty-bourgeois illusions and prejudices, and the more clearly experience proves even to the most backward strata of the peasantry that only the dictatorship of the proletariat can save it, and that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are in fact merely the servants of the landowners and capitalists.

But while the military alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry was—and had perforce to be—the primary form of their firm alliance, it could not have been maintained even for a few weeks without an economic alliance between the two classes. The peasants received from the workers' state all the land and were given protection against

the landowners and the kulaks; the workers have been receiving from the peasants loans of food supplies until large-scale industry is restored.

6. THE TRANSITION TO PROPER ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

The alliance between the small peasants and the proletariat can become a correct and stable one from the socialist standpoint only when the complete restoration of transport and large-scale industry enables the proletariat to give the peasants, in exchange for food, all the goods they need for their own use and for the improvement of their farms. With the country in ruins, this could not possibly be achieved at once. The surplus appropriation system was the best measure available to the insufficiently organised state to maintain itself in the incredibly arduous war against the landowners. The crop failure and the fodder shortage in 1920 particularly increased the hardships of the peasantry, already severe enough, and made the immediate transition to the tax in kind imperative.

The moderate tax in kind will bring about a big improvement in the condition of the peasantry at once, and will at the same time stimulate them to enlarge crop areas and improve farming methods.

The tax in kind signifies a transition from the requisition of all the peasants' surplus grain to regular socialist exchange of products between industry and agriculture.

7. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CAN PERMIT CAPITALISM AND CONCESSIONS, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE THEREOF

Naturally, the tax in kind means freedom for the peasant to dispose of his after-tax surplus at his own discretion. Since the state cannot provide the peasant with goods from socialist factories in exchange for all his surplus, freedom to trade with this surplus necessarily means freedom for the development of capitalism.

Within the limits indicated, however, this is not at all dangerous for socialism as long as transport and large-scale industry remain in the hands of the proletariat. On the

contrary, the development of capitalism, controlled and regulated by the proletarian state (i.e., "state" capitalism in *this* sense of the term), is advantageous and necessary in an extremely devastated and backward small-peasant country (within certain limits, of course), inasmuch as it is capable of hastening the *immediate* revival of peasant farming. This applies still more to concessions: without denationalising anything, the workers' state leases certain mines, forest tracts, oilfields, and so forth, to foreign capitalists in order to obtain from them extra equipment and machinery that will enable us to accelerate the restoration of Soviet large-scale industry.

The payment made to the concessionaires in the form of a share of the highly valuable products obtained is undoubtedly tribute, which the workers' state pays to the world bourgeoisie; without in any way glossing this over, we must clearly realise that we stand to gain by paying this tribute, so long as it accelerates the restoration of our large-scale industry and substantially improves the condition of the workers and peasants.

8. THE SUCCESS OF OUR FOOD POLICY

The food policy pursued by Soviet Russia in 1917-21 was undoubtedly very crude and imperfect, and gave rise to many abuses. A number of mistakes were made in its implementation. But as a whole, it was the only possible policy under the conditions prevailing at the time. And it did fulfil its historic mission: it saved the proletarian dictatorship in a ruined and backward country. There can be no doubt that it has gradually improved. In the first year that we had full power (August 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919) the state collected 110 million poods of grain; in the second year it collected 220 million poods, and in the third year—over 285 million poods.

Now, having acquired practical experience, we have set out, and expect, to collect 400 million poods (the tax in kind is expected to bring in 240 million poods). Only when it is actually in possession of an adequate stock of food will the workers' state be able to stand firmly on its

own feet economically, secure the, steady, if slow, restoration of large-scale industry, and create a proper financial system.

9. THE MATERIAL BASIS OF SOCIALISM AND THE PLAN FOR THE ELECTRIFICATION OF RUSSIA

A large-scale machine industry capable of reorganising agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for socialism. But we cannot confine ourselves to this general thesis. It must be made more concrete. Large-scale industry based on the latest achievements of technology and capable of reorganising agriculture implies the electrification of the whole country. We had to undertake the scientific work of drawing up such a plan for the electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. and we have accomplished it. With the co-operation of over two hundred of the best scientists, engineers and agronomists in Russia, this work has now been completed; it was published in a large volume and, as a whole, endorsed by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920. Arrangements have now been made to convene an all-Russia congress of electrical engineers in August 1921 to examine this plan in detail, before it is given final government endorsement. The execution of the first part of the electrification scheme is estimated to take ten years, and will require about 370 million man-days.

In 1918, we had eight newly erected power stations (with a total capacity of 4,757 kw); in 1919, the figure rose to 36 (total capacity of 1,648 kw), and in 1920, it rose to 100 (total capacity of 8,699 kw).

Modest as this beginning is for our vast country, a start has been made, work has begun and is making steady progress. After the imperialist war, after a million prisoners of war in Germany had become familiar with modern up-to-date technique, after the stern but hardening experience of three years of civil war, the Russian peasant is a different man. With every passing month he sees more clearly and more vividly that only the guidance given by the proletariat is capable of leading the mass of small farmers out of capitalist slavery to socialism.

10. THE ROLE OF "PURE DEMOCRACY", THE SECOND AND TWO-AND-A-HALF INTERNATIONALS, THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE MENSHEVIKS AS THE ALLIES OF CAPITAL

The dictatorship of the proletariat does not signify a cessation of the class struggle, but its continuation in a new form and with new weapons. This dictatorship is essential as long as classes exist, as long as the bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, intensifies tenfold its attacks on socialism on an international scale. In the transition period, the small farmer class is bound to experience certain vacillations. The difficulties of transition, and the influence of the bourgeoisie, inevitably cause the mood of this mass to change from time to time. Upon the proletariat, enfeebled and to a certain extent declassed by the destruction of the large-scale machine industry, which is its vital foundation, devolves the very difficult but paramount historic task of holding out in spite of these vacillations, and of carrying to victory its cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital.

The policy pursued-by the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, i.e., the parties affiliated to the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, represented in Russia by the S.R. (Socialist-Revolutionary) and Menshevik parties, is the political expression of the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie. These parties now have their headquarters and newspapers abroad, and are actually in a bloc with the whole of the bourgeois counter-revolution and are serving it loyally.

The shrewd leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie headed by Milyukov, the leader of the Cadet (Constitutional-Democratic) Party, have quite clearly, definitely and openly appraised this role of the petty-bourgeois democrats, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In connection with the Kronstadt mutiny, in which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and whiteguards, joined forces, Milyukov declared in favour of the "Soviets without the Bolsheviks" slogan. Elaborating on the idea, he wrote that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks "are welcome to try" (*Pravda* No. 64, 1921, quoted from the Paris *Posledniye Novosti*[123]), because upon them devolves

the task of *first taking* power away from the Bolsheviks. Milyukov, the leader of the big bourgeoisie, has correctly appraised the lesson taught by all revolutions, namely, that the petty-bourgeois democrats are incapable of holding power, and always serve merely as a screen for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and a stepping stone to its undivided power.

The proletarian revolution in Russia again and again confirms this lesson of 1789-94 and 1848-49, and also what Frederick Engels said in his letter to Bebel of December 11, 1884.

...“Pure democracy ... when the moment of revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance ... as the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even feudal economy.... Thus between March and September 1848 the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass strengthened the liberals in order to hold down the revolutionary masses.... In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy, and this, I think, should not be lost sight of.” (Published in Russian in *Kommunistichesky Trud*[124] No. 360, June 9, 1921, in an article by Comrade V. Adoratsky: “Marx and Engels on Democracy”. In German, published in the book, Friedrich Engels, *Politisches Vermächtnis*, Internationale Jugend-Bibliothek, Nr. 12, Berlin, 1920, S. 19.)

N. Lenin

Moscow, Kremlin, June 13, 1921

2
SPEECH ON THE ITALIAN QUESTION
JUNE 28

Comrades, I should like to reply mainly to Comrade Lazzari. He said: "Quote concrete facts, not words." Excellent. But if we trace the development of the reformist-opportunist trend in Italy, what will that be, words or facts? In your speeches and in the whole of your policy you lose sight of the fact, which is so important for the socialist movement in Italy, that not only this trend, but an opportunist-reformist group has existed for quite a long time. I still very well remember the time when Bernstein started his opportunist propaganda, which ended in social-patriotism, in the treason and bankruptcy of the Second International. We have known Turati ever since, not only by name, but for his propaganda in the Italian party and in the Italian working-class movement, of which he has been a disrupter for the past twenty years. Lack of time prevents me from closely studying the material concerning the Italian party; but I think that one of the most important documents on this subject is a report, published in a bourgeois Italian newspaper—I don't remember which, *La Stampa*[125] or *Corriere della Sera*[126]—of the conference held by Turati and his friends in Reggio Emilia.[127] I compared that report with the one published in *Avanti!*[128] Is this not proof enough? After the Second Congress of the Communist International, we, in our controversy with Serrati and his friends, openly and definitely told them what, in our opinion, the situation was. We told them that the Italian party could not become a Communist Party as long as it tolerated people like Turati in its ranks.

What is this, political facts, or again just words? After the Second Congress of the Communist International we openly

said to the Italian proletariat: "Don't unite with the reformists, with Turati." Serrati launched a series of articles in the Italian press in opposition to the Communist International and convened a special conference of reformists.[129] Was all this mere words? It was something more than a split: it was the creation of a new party. One must have been blind not to have seen this. This document is of decisive importance for this question. All those who attended the Reggio Emilia conference must be expelled from the party; they are Mensheviks—not Russian, but Italian Mensheviks. Lazzari said: "We know the Italian people's mentality." For my part I would not dare to make such an assertion about the Russian people, but that is not important. "Italian Socialists understand the spirit of the Italian people very well," said Lazzari. Perhaps they do, I will not argue about that. But they do not know Italian Menshevism, if the concrete facts and the persistent refusal to eradicate Menshevism is anything to go by. We are obliged to say that—deplorable though it may be—the resolution of our Executive Committee must be confirmed. A party which tolerates opportunists and reformists like Turati in its ranks cannot be affiliated to the Communist International.

"Why should we change the name of the party?" asks Comrade Lazzari. "The present one is quite satisfactory." But we cannot share this view. We know the history of the Second International, its fall and bankruptcy. Do we not know the history of the German party? And do we not know that the great misfortune of the working-class movement in Germany is that the break was not brought about before the war? This cost the lives of twenty thousand workers, whom the Scheidemannists and the Centrists betrayed to the German Government by their polemics with and complaints against the German Communists.[130]

And do we not now see the same thing in Italy? The Italian party was never a truly revolutionary party. Its great misfortune is that it did not break with the Mensheviks and reformists before the war, and that the latter continued to remain in the party. Comrade Lazzari says: "We fully recognise the necessity of a break with the reformists; our only disagreement is that we did not think it necessary to bring it about at the Leghorn Congress." But

the facts tell a different story. This is not the first time that we are discussing Italian reformism. In arguing about this with Serrati last year, we said: "You won't mind us asking why the split in the Italian party cannot be brought about immediately, why it must be postponed?" What did Serrati say in reply to that? Nothing. And Comrade Lazzari, quoting an article by Frossard in which the latter said, "We must be adroit and clever", evidently thinks that this is an argument in his favour and against us. I think he is mistaken. On the contrary, it is an excellent argument in our favour and against Comrade Lazzari. What will the Italian workers say when you are obliged to explain your conduct and your resignation? What will you tell them if they declare our tactics to be clever and adroit compared with the zigzags of the pseudo-Communist Left—the Left which at times is not even simply Communist and more often looks like anarchism?

What is the meaning of the tales told by Serrati and his party about the Russians only wanting everyone to imitate them? We want the very opposite. It takes more than memorising communist resolutions and using revolutionary phrases on every possible occasion. That is not enough, and we are opposed beforehand to Communists who know this or that resolution by heart. The mark of true communism is a break with opportunism. We shall be quite frank and open with those Communists who subscribe to this and, boldly, in the conviction that we are right, will tell them: "Don't do anything stupid; be clever and skilful." But we shall speak in this way only with Communists who have broken with the opportunists, something that cannot yet be said about you. I repeat therefore: I hope the Congress will confirm the resolution of the Executive Committee. Comrade Lazzari said: "We are in the preparatory period." This is absolutely true. You are in the preparatory period. The first stage of this period is a break with the Mensheviks, similar to the one we brought about with our Mensheviks in 1903. The sufferings the whole of the German working class has had to endure during this long and weary post-war period in the history of the German revolution are due to the fact that the German party did not break with the Mensheviks.

Comrade Lazzari said that the Italian party is passing through the preparatory period. This I fully accept. And the first stage is a definite, final, unambiguous and determined break with reformism. When that is brought about the masses will side solidly with communism. The second stage is by no means a repetition of revolutionary slogans. It will be the adoption of our wise and skilful decisions, which will always be such, and which will always say: fundamental revolutionary principles must be adapted to the specific conditions in the various countries.

The revolution in Italy will run a different course from that in Russia. It will start in a different way. How? Neither you nor we know. The Italian Communists are not always Communists to a sufficient degree. Did a single Communist show his mettle when the workers seized the factories in Italy?[131] No. At that time, there was as yet no communism in Italy; there was a certain amount of anarchism, but no Marxian communism. The latter has still to be created and the masses of the workers must be imbued with it by means of the experience of the revolutionary struggle. And the first step along this road is a final break with the Mensheviks, who for more than twenty years have been collaborating and working with the bourgeois government. It is quite Probable that Modigliani, whom I was able to watch to some extent at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, is a sufficiently astute politician to keep out of the bourgeois government and to keep in the centre of the Socialist Party, where he can be far more useful to the bourgeoisie. But all the theories of Turati and his friends, all their propaganda and agitation, signify collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Is this not proved by the numerous quotations in Gennari's speech? Indeed, it is the united front which Turati has already prepared. That is why I must say to Comrade Lazzari: "Speeches like yours and like the one which Comrade Serrati made here do not help to prepare for the revolution, they disorganise it." (*Shouts*: "Bravo!" *Applause*.)

You had a considerable majority at Leghorn. You had 98,000 votes against 14,000 reformist and 58,000 communist votes. As the beginning of a purely communist movement in a country like Italy, with its well-known traditions, where

the ground has not been sufficiently prepared for a split, this vote is a considerable achievement for the Communists.

This is a great victory and tangible proof of the fact that the working-class movement in Italy will develop faster than our movement developed in Russia, because, if you are familiar with the figures concerning our movement, you must know that in February 1917, after the fall of tsarism and during the bourgeois republic, we were still a minority compared with the Mensheviks. Such was the position after fifteen years of fierce fighting and splits. Our Right wing did not grow—and it was not so easy to prevent it from growing, as you seem to think when you speak of Russia in such a disparaging tone. Undoubtedly, development in Italy will proceed quite differently. After fifteen years of struggle against the Mensheviks, and after the fall of tsarism, we started work with a much smaller number of adherents. You have 58,000 communistically minded workers against 98,000 united Centrists who occupy an indefinite position. This is proof, this is a fact, which should certainly convince all those who refuse to close their eyes to the mass movement of the Italian workers. Nothing comes all at once. But it certainly proves that the mass of workers—not the old leaders, the bureaucrats, the professors, the journalists, but the class that is actually exploited, the vanguard of the exploited—supports us. And it proves what a great mistake you made at Leghorn. This is a fact. You controlled 98,000 votes, but you preferred to go with 14,000 reformists against 58,000 Communists. You should have gone with them even if they were not genuine Communists, even if they were only adherents of Bordiga—which is not true, for after the Second Congress Bordiga quite honestly declared that he had abandoned all anarchism and anti-parliamentarism. But what did you do? You chose to unite with 14,000 reformists and to break with 58,000 Communists. And this is the best proof that Serrati's policy has been disastrous for Italy. We never wanted Serrati in Italy to copy the Russian revolution. That would have been stupid. We are intelligent and flexible enough to avoid such stupidity. But Serrati has proved that his policy in Italy was wrong. Perhaps he should have manoeuvred. This is the expression that he repeated

most often when he was here last year. He said: "We know how to manoeuvre, we do not want slavish imitation. That would be idiocy. We must manoeuvre, so as to bring about a separation from opportunism. You Russians do not know how to do that. We Italians are more skilful at that sort of thing. That remains to be seen." And what is it we saw? Serrati executed a brilliant manoeuvre. He broke away from 58,000 Communists. And now these comrades come here and say: "If you reject us the masses will be confused." No, comrades, you are mistaken. The masses of the workers in Italy are confused now, and it will do them good if we tell them: "Comrades, you must choose; Italian workers, you must choose between the Communist International, which will never call upon you slavishly to imitate the Russians, and the Mensheviks, whom we have known for twenty years, and whom we shall never tolerate as neighbours in a genuinely revolutionary Communist International." That is what we shall say to the Italian workers. There can be- no doubt about the result. The masses of workers will follow us. (*Loud approval.*)

3

SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF THE TACTICS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL JULY 1

Comrades! I deeply regret that I must confine myself to self-defence. (*Laughter*.) I say deeply regret, because after acquainting myself with Comrade Terracini's speech and the amendments introduced by three delegations, I should very much like to take the offensive, for, properly speaking, offensive operations are essential against the views defended by Terracini and these three delegations.[132] If the Congress is not going to wage a vigorous offensive against such errors, against such "Leftist" stupidities, the whole movement is doomed. That is my deep conviction. But we are organised and disciplined Marxists. We cannot be satisfied with speeches against individual comrades. We Russians are already sick and tired of these Leftist phrases. We are men of organisation. In drawing up our plans, we must proceed in an organised way and try to find the correct line. It is, of course, no secret that our theses are a compromise. And why not? Among Communists, who have already convened their Third Congress and have worked out definite fundamental principles, compromises under certain conditions are necessary. Our theses, put forward by the Russian delegation, were studied and prepared in the most careful way and were the result of long arguments and meetings with various delegations. They aim at establishing the basic line of the Communist International and are especially necessary now after we have not only formally condemned the real Centrists but have expelled them from the Party. Such are the facts. I have to stand up for these theses. Now, when Terracini comes forward and says that we must continue the fight against the Centrists, and goes on to tell

how it is intended to wage the fight, I say that if these amendments denote a definite trend, a relentless fight against this trend is essential, for otherwise there is no communism and no Communist International. I am surprised that the German Communist Workers' Party has not put its signature to these amendments. (*Laughter.*) Indeed, just listen to what Terracini is defending and what his amendments say. They begin in this way: "On page 1, column 1, line 19, the word 'majority' should be deleted." Majority! That is extremely dangerous! (*Laughter.*) Then further: instead of the words "'basic propositions', insert 'aims'". Basic propositions and aims are two different things; even the anarchists will agree with us about aims, because they too stand for the abolition of exploitation and class distinctions.

I have met and talked with few anarchists in my life, but all the same I have seen enough of them. I sometimes succeeded in reaching agreement with them about aims, but never as regards principles. Principles are not an aim, a programme, a tactic or a theory. Tactics and theory are not principles. How do we differ from the anarchists on principles? The principles of communism consist in the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and in the use of state coercion in the transition period. Such are the principles of communism, but they are not its aim. And the comrades who have tabled this proposal have made a mistake.

Secondly, it is stated there: "the word 'majority' should be deleted." Read the whole passage:

> "The Third Congress of the Communist International is setting out to review questions of tactics under conditions when in a whole number of countries the objective situation has become aggravated in a revolutionary sense, and when a whole number of communist mass parties have been organised, which, incidentally, in their actual revolutionary struggle have nowhere taken into their hands the virtual leadership of the majority of the working class."

And so, they want the word "majority" deleted. If we cannot agree on such simple things, then I do not understand how we can work together and lead the proletariat to victory. Then it is not at all surprising that we cannot each agreement on the question of principles either. Show

me a party which has already won the majority of the working class. Terracini did not even think of adducing any example. Indeed, there is no such example.

And so, the word "aims" is to be put instead of "principles", and the word "majority" is to be deleted. No, thank you! We shall not do it. Even the German party—one of the best—does not have the majority of the working class behind it. That is a fact. We, who face a most severe struggle, are not afraid to utter this truth, but here you have three delegations who wish to begin with an untruth, for if the Congress deletes the word "majority" it will show that it wants an untruth. That is quite clear.

Then comes the following amendment: "On page 4, column 1, line 10, the words 'Open Letter', etc., should be deleted."[133] I have already heard one speech today in which I found the same idea. But there it was quite natural. It was the speech of Comrade Hempel, a member of the German Communist Workers' Party. He said: "The 'Open Letter' was an act of opportunism." To my deep regret and shame, I have already heard such views privately. But when, at the Congress, after such prolonged debate, the "Open Letter" is declared opportunist—that is a shame and a disgrace! And now Comrade Terracini comes forward on behalf of the three delegations and wants to delete the words "Open Letter". What is the good then of the fight against the German Communist Workers' Party? The "Open Letter" is a model political step. This is stated in our theses and we must certainly stand by it. It is a model because it is the first act of a practical method of winning over the majority of the working class. In Europe, where almost all the proletarians are organised, we must win the majority of the working class and anyone who fails to understand this is lost to the communist movement; he will never learn anything if he has failed to learn that much during the three years of the great revolution.

Terracini says that we were victorious in Russia although the Party was very small. He is dissatisfied with what is said in the theses about Czechoslovakia. Here there are 27 amendments, and if I had a mind to criticise them I should, like some orators, have to speak for not less than three hours.... We have heard here that in Czechoslo-

vakia the Communist Party has 300,000-400,000 members, and that it is essential to win over the majority, to create an invincible force and continue enlisting fresh masses of workers. Terracini is already prepared to attack. He says: if there are already 400,000 workers in the party, why should we want more? Delete! (*Laughter.*) He is afraid of the word "masses" and wants to eradicate it. Comrade Terracini has understood very little of the Russian revolution. In Russia, we were a small party, but we had with us in addition the majority of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country. (*Cries*: "Quite true!") Do you have anything of the sort? We had with us almost half the army, which then numbered at least ten million men. Do you really have the majority of the army behind you? Show me such a country! If these views of Comrade Terracini are shared by three other delegations, then something is wrong in the International! Then we must say: "Stop! There must be a decisive fight! Otherwise the Communist International is lost." (*Animation.*)

On the basis of my experience I must say, although I am taking up a defensive position (*laughter*), that the aim and the principle of my speech consist in defence of the resolution and theses proposed by our delegation. It would, of course, be pedantic to say that not a letter in them must be altered. I have had to read many resolutions and I am well aware that very good amendments could he introduced in every line of them. But that would be pedantry. If, nevertheless, I declare now that in a political sense not a single letter can be altered, it is because the amendments, as I see them, are of a quite definite political nature and because they lead us along a path that is harmful and dangerous to the Communist International. Therefore, I and all of us and the Russian delegation must insist that not a single letter in the theses is altered. We have not only condemned our Right-wing elements—we have expelled them. But if, like Terracini, people turn the fight against the Rightists into a sport, then we must say: "Stop! Otherwise the danger will become too grave!"

Terracini has defended the theory of an offensive struggle.[134] In this connection the notorious amendments propose a formula two or three pages long. There is no need for us

to read them. We know what they say. Terracini has stated the issue quite clearly. He has defended the theory of an offensive, pointing out "dynamic tendencies" and the "transition from passivity to activity". We in Russia have already had adequate political experience in the struggle against the Centrists. As long as fifteen years ago, we were waging a struggle against our opportunists and Centrists, and also against the Mensheviks, and we were victorious not only over the Mensheviks, but also over the semi-anarchists.

If we had not done this, we would not have been able to retain power in our hands for three and a half years, or even for three and a half weeks, and we would not have been able to convene communist congresses here. "Dynamic tendencies", "transition from passivity to activity"—these are all phrases the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had used against us. Now they are in prison, defending there the "aims of communism" and thinking of the "transition from passivity to activity". (*Laughter.*) The line of reasoning followed in the proposed amendments is an impossible one, because they contain no Marxism, no political experience, and no reasoning. Have we in our theses elaborated a general theory of the revolutionary offensive? Has Radek or anyone of us committed such a stupidity? We have spoken of the theory of an offensive in relation to a quite definite country and at a quite definite period.

From our struggle against the Mensheviks we can quote instances showing that even before the first revolution there were some who doubted whether the revolutionary party aught to conduct an offensive. If such doubts assailed any Social-Democrat—as we all called ourselves at that time—we took up the struggle against him and said that he was an opportunist, that he did not understand anything of Marxism and the dialectics of the revolutionary party. Is it really possible for a party to dispute whether a revolutionary offensive is permissible in general? To find such examples in this country one would have to go back some fifteen years. If there are Centrists or disguised Centrists who dispute the theory of the offensive, they should be immediately expelled. That question cannot give rise to disputes. But the fact that-even now, after three years of the

Communist International, we are arguing about "dynamic tendencies", about the "transition from passivity to activity" —that is a shame and a disgrace.

We do not have any dispute about this with Comrade Radek, who drafted these theses jointly with us. Perhaps it was not quite correct to begin talking in Germany *about the theory* of the revolutionary offensive when an actual offensive had not been prepared. Nevertheless the March action was a great step forward in spite of the mistakes of its leaders. But this does not matter. Hundreds of thousands of workers fought heroically. However courageously the German Communist Workers' Party fought against the bourgeoisie, we must repeat what Comrade Radek said in a Russian article about Hölz. If anyone, even an anarchist, fights heroically against the bourgeoisie, that is, of course, a great thing; but it is a real step forward if hundreds of thousands fight against the vile provocation of the social-traitors and against the bourgeoisie.

It is very important to be critical of one's mistakes. We began with that. If anyone, after a struggle in which hundreds of thousands have taken part, comes out against this struggle and behaves like Levi, then he should be expelled. And that is what was done. But we must draw a lesson from this. Had we really prepared for an offensive? (*Radek*: "We had not even prepared for defence.") Indeed only newspaper articles talked of an offensive. This theory as applied to the March action in Germany in 1921 was incorrect—we have to admit that—but, in general, the theory of the revolutionary offensive is not at all false.

We were victorious in Russia, and with such ease, because we prepared for our revolution during the imperialist war. That was the first condition. Ten million workers and peasants in Russia were armed, and our slogan was: an immediate peace at all costs. We were victorious because the vast mass of the peasants were revolutionarily disposed against the big landowners. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, the adherents of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, were a big peasant party in November 1917. They demanded revolutionary methods but, like true heroes of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, lacked the courage to act in a revolutionary way. In August

and September 1917 we said: "Theoretically we are fighting the Socialist-Revolutionaries as we did before, but practically we are ready to accept their programme because only we are able to put it into effect." We did just what we said. The peasantry, ill-disposed towards us in November 1917, after our victory, who sent a majority of Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Constituent Assembly, were won over by us, if not in the course of a few days—as I mistakenly expected and predicted—at any rate in the course of a few weeks. The difference was not great. Can you point out any country in Europe where you could win over the majority of the peasantry in the course of a few weeks? Italy perhaps? (*Laughter.*) If it is said that we were victorious in Russia in spite of not having a big party, that only proves that those who say it have not understood the Russian revolution and that they have absolutely no understanding of how to prepare for a revolution.

Our first step was to create a real Communist Party so as to know whom we were talking to and whom we could fully trust. The slogan of the First and Second congresses was "Down with the Centrists!" We cannot hope to master even the ABC of communism, unless all along the line and throughout the world we make short shrift of the Centrists and semi-Centrists, whom in Russia we call Mensheviks. Our first task is to create a genuinely revolutionary party and to break with the Mensheviks. But that is only a preparatory school. We are already convening the Third Congress, and Comrade Terracini keeps saying that the task of the preparatory school consists in hunting out, pursuing and exposing Centrists and semi-Centrists. No, thank you! We have already done this long enough. At the Second Congress we said that the Centrists are our enemies. But, we must go forward really. The second stage, after organising into a party, consists in learning to prepare for revolution. In many countries we have not even learned how to assume the leadership. We were victorious in Russia not only because the undisputed majority of the working class was on our side (during the elections in 1917 the overwhelming majority of the workers were with us against the Mensheviks), but also because half the army, immediately after our seizure of power, and nine-tenths of the peasants,

in the course of some weeks, came over to our side; we were victorious because we adopted the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries instead of our own, and put it into effect. Our victory lay in the fact that we carried out the Socialist-Revolutionary programme; that is why this victory was so easy. Is it possible that you in the West can have such illusions? It is ridiculous! Just compare the concrete economic conditions, Comrade Terracini and all of you who have signed the proposed amendments! In spite of the fact that the majority so rapidly came to be on our side, the difficulties confronting us after our victory were very great. Nevertheless we won through because we kept in mind not only our aims but also our principles, and did not tolerate in our Party those who kept silent about principles but talked of aims, "dynamic tendencies" and the "transition from passivity to activity". Perhaps we shall be blamed for preferring to keep such gentlemen in prison. But dictatorship is impossible in any other way. We must prepare for dictatorship, and this consists in combating such phrases and such amendments. (*Laughter.*) Throughout, our theses speak of the masses. But, comrades, we need to understand what is meant by masses. The German Communist Workers' Party, the Left-wing comrades, misuse this word. But Comrade Terracini, too, and all those who have signed these amendments, do not know how the word "masses" should be read.

I have been speaking too long as it is; hence I wish to say only a few words about the concept of "masses". It is one that changes in accordance with the changes in the nature of the struggle. At the beginning of the struggle it took only a few thousand genuinely revolutionary workers to warrant talk of the masses. If the party succeeds in drawing into the struggle not only its own members, if it also succeeds in arousing non-party people, it is well on the way to winning the masses. During our revolutions there were instances when several thousand workers represented the masses. In the history of our movement, and of our struggle against the Mensheviks, you will find many examples where several thousand workers in a town were enough to give a clearly mass character to the movement. You have a mass when several thousand non-party workers, who

usually live a philistine life and drag out a miserable existence, and who have never heard anything about politics, begin to act in a revolutionary way. If the movement spreads and intensifies, it gradually develops into a real revolution. We saw this in 1905 and 1917 during three revolutions, and you too will have to go through all this. When the revolution has been sufficiently prepared, the concept "masses" becomes different: several thousand workers no longer constitute the masses. This word begins to denote something else. The concept of "masses" undergoes a change so that it implies the majority, and not simply a majority of the workers alone, but the majority of all the exploited. Any other kind of interpretation is impermissible for a revolutionary, and any other sense of the word becomes incomprehensible. It is possible that even a small party, the British or American party, for example, after it has thoroughly studied the course of political development and become acquainted with the life and customs of the non-party masses, will at a favourable moment evoke a revolutionary movement (Comrade Radek has pointed to the miners' strike as a good example[135]). You will have a mass movement if such a party comes forward with its slogans at such a moment and succeeds in getting millions of workers to follow it. I would not altogether deny that a revolution can be started by a very small party and brought to a victorious conclusion. But one must have a knowledge of the methods by which the masses can be won over. For this thoroughgoing preparation of revolution is essential. But here you have comrades coming forward with the assertion that we should immediately give up the demand for "big" masses. They must be challenged. Without thoroughgoing preparation you will not achieve victory in any country. Quite a small party is sufficient to lead the masses. At certain times there is no necessity for big organisations.

But to win, we must have the sympathy of the masses. An absolute majority is not always essential; but what is essential to win and retain power is not only the majority of the working class—I use the term "working class" in its West-European sense, i.e., in the sense of the industrial proletariat—but also the majority of the working and exploited rural population. Have you thought about this?

Do we find in Terracini's speech even a hint at this thought? He speaks only of "dynamic tendency" and the "transition from passivity to activity". Does he devote even a single word to the food question? And yet the workers demand their victuals, although they can put up with a great deal and go hungry, as we have seen to a certain extent in Russia. We must, therefore, win over to our side not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the working and exploited rural population. Have you prepared for this? Almost nowhere.

And so, I repeat: I must unreservedly defend our theses and I feel I am bound to do it. We not only condemned the Centrists but expelled them from the Party. Now we must deal with another aspect, which we also consider dangerous. We must tell the comrades the truth in the most polite form (and in our theses it is told in a kind and considerate way) so that no one feels insulted: we are confronted now by other, more important questions than that of attacks on the Centrists. We have had enough of this question. It has already become somewhat boring. Instead, the comrades ought to learn to wage a real revolutionary struggle. The German workers have already begun this. Hundreds of thousands of proletarians in that country have been fighting heroically. Anyone who opposes this struggle should be immediately expelled. But after that we must not engage in empty word-spinning but must immediately begin to learn, on the basis of the mistakes made, how to organise the struggle better. We must not conceal our mistakes from the enemy. Anyone who is afraid of this is no revolutionary. On the contrary, if we openly declare to the workers: "Yes, we have made mistakes", it will mean that they will not be repeated and we shall be able better to choose the moment. And if during the struggle itself the majority of the working people prove to be on our side—not only the majority of the workers, but the majority of all the exploited and oppressed—then we shall really be victorious. (*Prolonged*, *stormy applause*.)

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4
REPORT ON THE TACTICS OF THE R.C.P.
JULY 5

Comrades, strictly speaking I was unable to prepare properly for this report. All that I was able to prepare for you in the way of systematic material was a translation of my pamphlet on the tax in kind and the theses on the tactics of the Russian Communist Party. To this I merely want to add a few explanations and remarks.

I think that to explain our Party's tactics we must first of all examine the *international situation*. We have already had a detailed discussion of the economic position of capitalism internationally, and the Congress has adopted definite resolutions on this subject.[136] I deal with this subject in my theses very briefly, and only from the political standpoint. I leave aside the economic basis, but I think that in discussing the international position of our Republic we must, politically, take into account the fact that a certain equilibrium has now undoubtedly set in between the forces that have been waging an open, armed struggle against each other for the supremacy of this or that leading class. It is an equilibrium between bourgeois society, the international bourgeoisie as a whole, and Soviet Russia. It is, of course, an equilibrium only in a limited sense. It is only in respect to this military struggle, I say, that a certain equilibrium has been brought about in the international situation. It must be emphasised, of course, that this is only a relative equilibrium, and a very unstable one. Much inflammable material has accumulated in capitalist countries, as well as in those countries which up to now have been regarded merely as the objects and not as the subjects of history, i.e., the colonies and semi-colonies. It is quite possible, therefore, that insurrections, great battles and

revolutions may break out there sooner or later, and very suddenly too. During the past few years we have witnessed the direct struggle waged by the international bourgeoisie against the first proletarian republic. This struggle has been at the centre of the world political situation, and it is there that a change has taken place. Inasmuch as the attempt of the international bourgeoisie to strangle our Republic has failed, an equilibrium has set in, and a very unstable one it is, of course.

We know perfectly well, of course, that the international bourgeoisie is at present much stronger than our Republic, and that it is only the peculiar combination of circumstances that is preventing it from continuing the war against us. For several weeks now, we have witnessed fresh attempts in the Far East to renew the invasion,[137] and there is not the slightest doubt that similar attempts will continue. Our Party has no doubts whatever on that score. The important thing for us is to establish that an unstable equilibrium does exist, and that we must take advantage of this respite, taking into consideration the characteristic features of the present situation, adapting our tactics to the specific features of this situation, and never forgetting that the necessity for armed struggle may arise again quite suddenly. Our task is still to organise and build up the Red Army. In connection with the food problem, too, we must continue to think first of all of our Red Army. We can adopt no other line in the present international situation, when we must still be prepared for fresh attacks and fresh attempts at invasion on the part of the international bourgeoisie. In regard to our practical policy, however, the fact that a certain equilibrium has been reached in the international situation has some significance, but only in the sense that we must admit that, although the revolutionary movement has made-progress, the development of the international revolution this year has not proceeded along as straight a line as we had expected.

When we started the international revolution, we did so not because we were convinced that we could forestall its development, but because a number of circumstances compelled us to start it. We thought: either the international revolution comes to our assistance, and in that case our

victory will be fully assured, or we shall do our modest revolutionary work in the conviction that even in the event of defeat we shall have served the cause of the revolution and that our experience will benefit other revolutions. It was clear to us that without the support of the international world revolution the victory of the proletarian revolution was impossible. Before the revolution, and even after it, we thought: either revolution breaks out in the other countries, in the capitalistically more developed countries, immediately, or at least very quickly, or we must perish. In spite of this conviction, we did all we possibly could to preserve the Soviet system under all circumstances, come what may, because we knew that we were not only working for ourselves, but also for the international revolution. We knew this, we repeatedly expressed this conviction before the October Revolution, immediately after it, and at the time we signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. And, generally speaking, this was correct.

Actually, however, events did not proceed along as straight a line as we had expected. In the other big, capitalistically more developed countries the revolution has not broken out to this day. True, we can say with satisfaction that the revolution is developing all over the world; and it is only thanks to this that the international bourgeoisie is unable to strangle us, in spite of the fact that, militarily and economically, it is a hundred times stronger than we are. (*Applause.*)

In Paragraph 2 of the theses I examine the manner in which this situation arose, and the conclusions that must be drawn from it. Let me add that my final conclusion is the following: the development of the international revolution, which we predicted, is proceeding, but not along as straight a line as we had expected. It becomes clear at the first glance that after the conclusion of peace, bad as it was, it proved impossible to call forth revolution in other capitalist countries, although we know that the signs of revolution were very considerable and numerous, in fact, much more considerable and numerous than we thought at the time. Pamphlets are now beginning to appear which tell us that during the past few years and months these revolutionary symptoms in Europe have been much more serious

than we had suspected. What, in that case, must we do now? We must now thoroughly prepare for revolution and make a deep study of its concrete development in the advanced capitalist countries. This is the first lesson we must draw from the international situation. As for our Russian Republic, we must take advantage of this brief respite in order to adapt our tactics to this zigzag line of history. This equilibrium is very important politically, because we clearly see that in many West-European countries, where the broad mass of the working class, and possibly the overwhelming majority of the population, are organised, the main bulwark of the bourgeoisie consists of the hostile working-class organisations affiliated to the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. I speak of this in Paragraph 2 of the theses, and I think that in this connection I need deal with only two points, which were discussed during the debate on the question of tactics. First, winning over the majority of the proletariat. The more organised the proletariat is in a capitalistically developed country, the greater thoroughness does history demand of us in preparing for revolution, and the more thoroughly must we win over the majority of the working class. Second, the main bulwark of capitalism in the industrially developed capitalist countries is the part of the working class that is organised in the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. But for the support of this section of the workers, these counter-revolutionary elements within the working class, the international bourgeoisie would be altogether unable to retain its position. (*Applause.*)

Here I would also like to emphasise the significance of *the movement in the colonies*. In this respect we see in all the old parties, in all the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois labour parties affiliated to the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, survivals of the old sentimental views: they insist on their profound sympathy for oppressed colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The movement in the colonial countries is still regarded as an insignificant national and totally peaceful movement. But this is not so. It has undergone great change since the beginning of the twentieth century: millions and hundreds of millions, in fact the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe, are

now coming forward as independent, active and revolutionary factors. It is perfectly clear that in the impending decisive battles in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much more revolutionary part than we expect. It is important to emphasise the fact that, for the first time in our International, we have taken up the question of preparing for this struggle. Of course, there are many more difficulties in this enormous sphere than in any other, but at all events the movement is advancing. And in spite of the fact that the masses of toilers—the peasants in the colonial countries—are still backward, they will play a very important revolutionary part in the coming phases of the world revolution. (*Animated approval.*)

As regards the internal political position of our Republic I must start with a close examination of class relationships. During the past few months changes have taken place in this sphere, and we have witnessed the formation of new organisations of the exploiting class directed against us. The aim of socialism is to abolish classes. In the front ranks of the exploiting class we find the big landowners and the industrial capitalists. In regard to them, the work of destruction is fairly easy; it can be completed within a few months, and sometimes even a few weeks or days. We in Russia have expropriated our exploiters, the big landowners as well as the capitalists. They had no organisations of their own during the war and operated merely as the appendages of the military forces of the international bourgeoisie. Now, after we have repulsed the attacks of the international counter-revolution, organisations of the Russian bourgeoisie and of all the Russian counter-revolutionary parties have been formed abroad. The number of Russian émigrés scattered in all foreign countries may be estimated at one and a half to two millions. In nearly every country they publish daily newspapers, and all the parties, landowner and petty-bourgeois, not excluding the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, have numerous ties with foreign bourgeois elements, that is to say, they obtain enough money to run their own press. We find the collaboration abroad of

absolutely all the political parties that formerly existed in Russia, and we see how the "free" Russian press abroad, from the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press to the most reactionary monarchist press, is championing the great landed interests. This, to a certain extent, facilitates our task, because we can more easily observe the forces of the enemy, his state of organisation, and the political trends in his camp. On the other hand, of course, it hinders our work, because these Russian counter-revolutionary émigrés use every means at their disposal to prepare for a fight against us. This fight again shows that, taken as a whole, the class instinct and class-consciousness of the ruling classes are still superior to those of the oppressed classes, notwithstanding the fact that the Russian revolution has done more than any previous revolution in this respect. In Russia, there is hardly a village in which the people, the oppressed, have not been roused. Nevertheless, if we take a cool look at the state of organisation and political clarity of views of the Russian counter-revolutionary émigrés, we shall find that the class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie is still superior to that of the exploited and the oppressed. These people make every possible attempt and skilfully take advantage of every opportunity to attack Soviet Russia in one way or another, and to dismember it. It would be very instructive—and I think the foreign comrades will do that—systematically to watch the most important aspirations, the most important tactical moves, and the most important trends of this Russian counter-revolution. It operates chiefly abroad, and it will not be very difficult for the foreign comrades to watch it. In some respects, we ought to learn from this enemy. These counter-revolutionary émigrés are very well informed, they are excellently organised and are good strategists. And I think that a systematic comparison and study of the manner in which they are organised and take advantage of every opportunity may have a powerful propaganda effect upon the working class. This is not general theory, it is practical politics; here we can see what the enemy has learned. During the past few years, the Russian bourgeoisie has suffered a terrible defeat. There is an old saying that a beaten army learns a great deal. The beaten reactionary army has learned a

great deal, and has learned it thoroughly. It is learning with great avidity, and has really made much headway. When we took power at one swoop, the Russian bourgeoisie was unorganised and politically undeveloped. Now, I think, its development is on a par with modern, West-European development. We must take this into account, we must improve our own organisation and methods, and we shall do our utmost to achieve this. It was relatively easy for us, and I think that it will be equally easy for other revolutions, to cope with these two exploiting classes.

But, in addition to this class of exploiters, there is in nearly all capitalist countries, with the exception, perhaps, of Britain, a class of small producers and small farmers. The main problem of the revolution now is how to fight these two classes. In order to be rid of them, we must adopt methods other than those employed against the big landowners and capitalists. We could simply expropriate and expel both of these classes, and that is what we did. But we cannot do the same thing with the remaining capitalist classes, the small producers and the petty bourgeoisie, which are found in all countries. In most capitalist countries, these classes constitute a very considerable minority, approximately from thirty to forty-five per cent of the population. Add to them the petty-bourgeois elements of the working class, and you get even more than fifty per cent. These cannot be expropriated or expelled; other methods of struggle must be adopted in their case. From the international standpoint, if we regard the international revolution as one process, the significance of the period into which we are now entering in Russia is, in essence, that we must now find a practical solution for the problem of the relations the proletariat should establish with this last capitalist class in Russia. All Marxists have a correct and ready solution for this problem in theory. But theory and practice are two different things, and the practical solution of this problem is by no means the same as the theoretical solution. We know definitely that we have made serious mistakes. From the international standpoint, it is a sign of great progress that we are now trying to determine the attitude the proletariat in power should adopt towards the last capitalist class—the rock-bottom

of capitalism—small private property, the small producer. This problem now confronts us in a practical way. I think we shall solve it. At all events, the experiment we are making will be useful for future proletarian revolutions, and they will be able to make better technical preparations for solving it.

In my theses I tried to analyse *the problem of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry*. For the first time in history there is a state with only two classes, the proletariat and the peasantry. The latter constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population. It is, of course, very backward. How do the relations between the peasantry and the proletariat, which holds political power, find practical expression in the development of the revolution? The first form is alliance, close alliance. This is a very difficult task, but at any rate it is economically and politically feasible.

How did we approach this problem practically? We concluded an alliance with the peasantry. We interpret this alliance in the following way: the proletariat emancipates the peasantry from the exploitation of the bourgeoisie, from its leadership and influence, and wins it over to its own side in order jointly to defeat the exploiters.

The Menshevik argument runs like this: the peasantry constitutes a majority; we are pure democrats, therefore, the majority should decide. But as the peasantry cannot operate on its own, this, in practice, means nothing more nor less than the restoration of capitalism. The slogan is the same: Alliance with the peasantry. When we say that, we mean strengthening and consolidating the proletariat. We have tried to give effect to this alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, and the first stage was a military alliance. The three years of the Civil War created enormous difficulties, but in certain respects they facilitated our task. This may-sound odd, but it is true. The war was not something new for the peasants; a war against the exploiters, against the big landowners, was something they quite understood. The overwhelming majority of the peasants were on our side. In spite of the enormous distances, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of our peasants are unable to read or write, they assimilated our propaganda very easily. This proves that the broad masses—and

this applies also to the most advanced countries—learn faster from their own practical experience than from books. In Russia, moreover, learning from practical experience was facilitated for the peasantry by the fact that the country is so exceptionally large that in the same period different parts of it were passing through different stages of development.

In Siberia and in the Ukraine the counter-revolution was able to gain a temporary victory because there the bourgeoisie had the peasantry on its side, because the peasants were against us. The peasants frequently said, "We are Bolsheviks, but not Communists. We are for the Bolsheviks because they drove out the landowners; but we are not for the Communists because they are opposed to individual farming." And for a time, the counter-revolution managed to win out in Siberia and in the Ukraine because the bourgeoisie made headway in the struggle for influence over the peasantry. But it took only a very short time to open the peasants' eyes. They quickly acquired practical experience and soon said, "Yes, the Bolsheviks are rather unpleasant people, we don't like them, but still they are better than the whiteguards and the Constituent Assembly." "Constituent Assembly" is a term of abuse not only among the educated Communists, but also among the peasants. They know from practical experience that the Constituent Assembly and the whiteguards stand for the same thing, that the former is inevitably followed by the latter. The Mensheviks also resort to a military alliance with the peasantry, but they fail to understand that a military alliance alone is inadequate. There can be no military alliance without an economic alliance. It takes more than air to keep a man alive; our alliance with the peasantry could not possibly have lasted any length of time without the economic foundation, which was the basis of our victory in the war against our bourgeoisie. After all our bourgeoisie has united with the whole of the international bourgeoisie.

The basis of our economic alliance with the peasantry was, of course, very simple, and even crude. The peasant obtained from us all the land and support against the big

landowners. In return for this, we were to obtain food. This alliance was something entirely new and did not rest on the ordinary relations between commodity producers and consumers. Our peasants had a much better understanding of this than the heroes of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. They said to themselves, "These Bolsheviks are stern leaders, but after all they are our own people." Be that as it may, we created in this way the foundations of a new economic alliance. The peasants gave their produce to the Red Army and received from the latter assistance in protecting their possessions. This is always forgotten by the heroes of the Second International, who, like Otto Bauer, totally fail to understand the actual situation. We confess that the initial form of this alliance was very primitive and that we made very many mistakes. But we were obliged to act as quickly as possible, we had to organise supplies for the army at all costs. During the Civil War we were cut off from all the grain districts of Russia. We were in a terrible position, and it looks like a miracle that the Russian people and the working class were able to endure such suffering, want, and privation, sustained by nothing more than a deep urge for victory. (*Animated approval and applause.*)

When the Civil War came to an end, however, we faced a different problem. If the country had not been so laid waste after seven years of incessant war, it would, perhaps, have been possible to find an easier transition to the new form of alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. But bad as conditions in the country were, they were still further aggravated by the crop failure, the fodder shortage, etc. In consequence, the sufferings of the peasants became unbearable. We had to show the broad masses of the peasants immediately that we were prepared to change our policy, without in any way deviating from our revolutionary path, so that they could say, "The Bolsheviks want to improve our intolerable condition immediately, and at all costs."

And so, *our economic policy was changed*; the tax in kind superseded the requisitions. This was not invented at one stroke. You will find a number of proposals in the Bolshevik press over a period of months, but no plan that really promised success. But this is not important. The important

thing is that we changed our economic policy, yielding to exclusively practical considerations, and impelled by necessity. A bad harvest, fodder shortage and lack of fuel—all, of course, have a decisive influence on the economy as a whole, including the peasant economy. If the peasantry goes on strike, we get no firewood; and if we get no firewood, the factories will have to idle. Thus, in the spring of 1921, the economic crisis resulting from the terrible crop failure and the fodder shortage assumed gigantic proportions. All that was the aftermath of the three years of civil war. We had to show the peasantry that we could and would quickly change our policy in order immediately to alleviate their distress. We have always said—and it was also said at the Second Congress—that revolution demands sacrifices. Some comrades in their propaganda argue in the following way: we are prepared to stage a revolution, but it must not be too severe. Unless I am mistaken, this thesis was put forward by Comrade Smeral in his speech at the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I read about it in the report published in the Reichenberg *Vorwärts*[138] There is evidently a Leftist wing there; hence this source cannot be regarded as being quite impartial. At all events, I must say that if Smeral did say that, he was wrong. Some comrades who spoke after Smeral at this Congress said, "Yes, we shall go along with Smeral because in this way we shall avoid civil war." (*Laughter.*) If these reports are true, I must say that such agitation is neither communistic nor revolutionary. Naturally, every revolution entails enormous sacrifice on the part of the class making it. Revolution differs from ordinary struggle in that ten and even a hundred times more people take part in it. Hence every revolution entails sacrifices not only for individuals, but for a whole class. The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has entailed for the ruling class—the proletariat—sacrifices, want and privation unprecedented in history, and the case will, in all probability, be the same in every other country.

The question arises: How are we to distribute this burden of privation? We are the state power. We are able to distribute the burden of privation to a certain extent, and to impose it upon several classes, thereby relatively alleviating the condition of certain strata of the population.

But what is to be our principle? Is it to be that of fairness, or of majority? No. We must act in a practical manner. We must distribute the burdens in such a way as to preserve the power of the proletariat. This is our only principle. In the beginning of the revolution the working class was compelled to suffer incredible want. Let me state that from year to year our food policy has been achieving increasing success. And the situation as a whole has undoubtedly improved. But the peasantry in Russia has certainly gained more from the revolution than the working class. There is no doubt about that at all. From the standpoint of theory, this shows, of course, that our revolution was to some degree a bourgeois revolution. When Kautsky used this as an argument against us, we laughed. Naturally, a revolution which does not expropriate the big landed estates, expel the big landowners or divide the land is only a bourgeois revolution and not a socialist one. But we were the only party to carry the bourgeois revolution to its conclusion and to facilitate the struggle for the socialist revolution. The Soviet power and the Soviet system are institutions of the socialist state. We have already established these institutions, but we have not yet solved the problem of economic relations between the peasantry and the proletariat. Much remains to be done, and the outcome of this struggle depends upon whether we solve this problem or not. Thus, the distribution of the burden of privation is one of the most difficult practical problems. On the whole, the condition of the peasants has improved, but dire suffering has fallen to the lot of the working class, precisely because it is exercising its dictatorship.

I have already said that in the spring of 1921 the most appalling want caused by the fodder shortage and the crop failure prevailed among the peasantry, which constitutes the majority of our population. We cannot possibly exist unless we have good relations with the peasant masses. Hence, our task was to render them immediate assistance. The condition of the working class is extremely hard. It is suffering horribly. Those who have more political understanding, however, realise that in the interest of the dictatorship of the working class we must make tremendous efforts to help the peasants at any price. The vanguard of the

working class has realised this, but in that vanguard there are still people who cannot understand it, and who are too weary to understand it. They regarded it as a mistake and began to use the word "opportunism". They said, "The Bolsheviks are helping the peasants. The peasants, who are exploiting us, are getting everything they please, while the workers are starving." But is that opportunism? We are helping the peasants because without an alliance with them the political power of the proletariat is impossible, its preservation is inconceivable. It was this consideration of expediency and not that of fair distribution that was decisive for us. We are assisting the peasants because it is absolutely necessary to do so in order that we may retain political power. The supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and its political power.

The only means we found for this was the adoption of the tax in kind, which was the inevitable consequence of the struggle. This year, we shall introduce this tax for the first time. This principle has not yet been tried in practice. From the military alliance we must pass to an economic alliance, and, theoretically, the only basis for the latter is the introduction of the tax in kind. It provides the only theoretical possibility for laying a really solid economic foundation for socialist society. The socialised factory gives the peasant its manufactures and in return the peasant gives his grain. This is the only possible form of existence of socialist society, the only form of socialist development in a country in which the small peasants constitute the majority, or at all events a very considerable minority. The peasants will give one part of their produce in the form of tax and another either in exchange for the manufactures of socialist factories, or through the exchange of commodities.

This brings us to the most difficult problem. It goes without saying that the tax in kind means freedom to trade. After having paid the tax in kind, the peasant will have the right freely to exchange the remainder of his grain. This freedom of exchange implies freedom for capitalism. We say this openly and emphasise it. We do not conceal it in the least. Things would go very hard with us if we

attempted to conceal it. Freedom to trade means freedom for capitalism, but it also means a new form of capitalism. It means that, to a certain extent, we are re-creating capitalism. We are doing this quite openly. It is state capitalism. But state capitalism in a society where power belongs to capital, and state capitalism in a proletarian state, are two different concepts. In a capitalist state, state capitalism means that it is recognised by the state and controlled by it for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, and to the detriment of the proletariat. In the proletarian state, the same thing is done for the benefit of the working class, for the purpose of withstanding the as yet strong bourgeoisie, and of fighting it. It goes without saying that we must grant concessions to the foreign bourgeoisie, to foreign capital. Without the slightest denationalisation, we shall lease mines, forests and oilfields to foreign capitalists, and receive in exchange manufactured goods, machinery, etc., and thus restore our own industry.

Of course, we did not all agree on the question of state capitalism at once. But we are very pleased to note in this connection that our peasantry has been developing, that it has fully realised the historical significance of the struggle we are waging at the present time. Ordinary peasants from the most remote districts have come to us and said: "What! We have expelled our capitalists, the capitalists who speak Russian, and now foreign capitalists are coming!" Does not this show that our peasants have developed? There is no need to explain to a worker who is versed in economics why this is necessary. We have been so ruined by seven years of war that it will take many years to restore our industry. We must pay for our backwardness and weakness, and for the lessons we are now learning and must learn. Those who want to learn must pay for the tuition. We must explain this to one and all, and if we prove it in practice, the vast masses of the peasants and workers will agree with us, because in this way their condition will be immediately improved, and because it will ensure the possibility of restoring our industry. What compels us to do this? We are not alone in the world. We exist in a system of capitalist states.[139]... On one side, there are the colonial countries, but they cannot help us yet. On the other side, there are the

capitalist countries, but they are our enemies. The result is a certain equilibrium, a very poor one, it is true. Nevertheless, we must reckon with the fact. We must not shut our eyes to it if we want to exist. Either we score an immediate victory over the whole bourgeoisie, or we pay the tribute.

We admit quite openly, and do not conceal the fact, that concessions in the system of state capitalism mean paying tribute to capitalism. But we gain time, and gaining time means gaining everything, particularly in the period of equilibrium, when our foreign comrades are preparing thoroughly for their revolution. The more thorough their preparations, the more certain will the victory be. Meanwhile, however, we shall have to pay the tribute.

A few words about our food policy. Undoubtedly, it was a bad and primitive policy. But we can also point to some achievements. In this connection I must once again emphasise that the only possible economic foundation of socialism is large-scale machine industry. Whoever forgets this is no Communist. We must analyse this problem concretely. We cannot present problems in the way the theoreticians of the old school of socialism do. We must present them in a practical manner. What is modern large-scale industry? It is the electrification of the whole of Russia. Sweden, Germany and America have almost achieved this, although they are still bourgeois. A Swedish comrade told me that in Sweden a large part of industry and thirty per cent of agriculture are electrified. In Germany and America, which are even more developed capitalistically, we see the same thing on a larger scale. Large-scale machine industry is nothing more nor less than the electrification of the whole country. We have already appointed a special commission consisting of the country's best economists and engineers. It is true that nearly all of them are hostile to the Soviet power. All these specialists will come over to communism, but not our way, not by way of twenty years of underground work, during which we unceasingly studied and repeated over and over again the ABC of communism.

Nearly all the Soviet government bodies were in favour of inviting the specialists. The expert engineers will come to us when we give them practical proof that this will

increase the country's productive forces. It is not enough to prove it to them in theory; we must prove it to them in practice, and we shall win these people over to our side if we present the problem differently, not from the standpoint of the theoretical propaganda of communism. We say: large-scale industry is the only means of saving the peasantry from want and starvation. Everyone agrees with this. But how can it be done? The restoration of industry on the old basis will entail too much labour and time. We must give industry a more modern form, i.e., we must adopt electrification. This will take much less time. We have already drawn up the plans for electrification. More than two hundred specialists—almost to a man opposed to the Soviet power—worked on it with keen interest, although they are not Communists. From the standpoint of technical science, however, they had to admit that this was the only correct way. Of course, we have a long way to go before the plan is achieved. The cautious specialists say that the first series of works will take at least ten years. Professor Ballod has estimated that it would take three to four years to electrify Germany. But for us even ten years is not enough. In my theses I quote actual figures to show you how little we have been able to do in this sphere up to now. The figures I quote are so modest that it immediately becomes clear that they are more of propaganda than scientific value. But we must begin with propaganda. The Russian peasants who fought in the world war and lived in Germany for several years learned how modern farming should be carried on in order to conquer famine. We must carry on extensive propaganda in this direction. Taken by themselves, these plans are not yet of great practical value, but their propaganda value is very great.

The peasants realise that something new must be created. They realise that this cannot be done by everybody working separately, but by the state working as a whole. The peasants who were prisoners of war in Germany found out what real cultural life is based on. Twelve thousand kilowatts is a very modest beginning. This may sound funny to the foreigner who is familiar with electrification in America, Germany or Sweden. But he laughs best who laughs last. It is, indeed, a modest beginning. But the peasants are

beginning to understand that new work must be carried out on a grand scale, and that this work has already begun. Enormous difficulties will have to be overcome. We shall try to establish relations with the capitalist countries. We must not regret having to give the capitalists several hundred million kilogrammes of oil on condition that they help us to electrify our country.

And now, in conclusion, a few words about "*pure democracy*". I will read you a passage from Engels's letter to Bebel of December 11, 1884. He wrote:

"Pure democracy ... when the moment of revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance as the extreme bourgeois party, as which it already played itself off in Frankfort, and as the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even feudal economy.... Thus between March and September 1848 the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass strengthened the liberals in order to hold down the revolutionary masses.... In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the *whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy*, and this, I think, should not be lost sight of."

Our approach must differ from that of the theoreticians. The whole reactionary mass, not only bourgeois, but also feudal, groups itself around "pure democracy". The German comrades know better than anyone else what "pure democracy" means, for Kautsky and the other leaders of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals are defending this "pure democracy" from the wicked Bolsheviks. If we judge the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, not by what they say, but by what they do, we shall find that they are nothing but representatives of petty-bourgeois "pure democracy". In the course of our revolution they have given us a classic example of what "pure democracy" means, and again during the recent crisis, in the days of the Kronstadt mutiny. There was serious unrest among the peasantry, and discontent was also rife among the workers. They were weary and exhausted. After all, there is a limit to human endurance. They had starved for three years, but you cannot go on starving for four or five years. Naturally, hunger has a tremendous influence on political activity. How did the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks

behave? They wavered all the time, thereby strengthening the bourgeoisie. The organisation of all the Russian parties abroad has revealed the present state of affairs. The shrewdest of the leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie said to themselves: "We cannot achieve victory in Russia immediately. Hence our slogan must be: 'Soviets without the Bolsheviks.'" Milyukov, the leader of the Constitutional-Democrats, defended the Soviet power from the attacks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This sounds very strange; but such are the practical dialectics which we, in our revolution, have been studying in a peculiar way, from the practical experience of our struggle and of the struggle of our enemies. The Constitutional-Democrats defend "Soviets without the Bolsheviks" because they understand the position very well and hope that a section of the people will rise to the bait. That is what the clever Constitutional-Democrats say. Not all the Constitutional-Democrats are clever, of course, but some of them are, and these have learned something from the French Revolution. The present slogan is to fight the Bolsheviks, whatever the price, come what may. The whole of the bourgeoisie is now helping the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are now the vanguard of all reaction. In the spring we had a taste of the fruits of this counter-revolutionary co-operation.[140]

That is why we must continue our relentless struggle against these elements. Dictatorship is a state of intense war. That is just the state we are in. There is no military invasion at present; but we are isolated. On the other hand, however, we are not entirely isolated, since the whole international bourgeoisie is incapable of waging open war against us just now, because the whole working class, even though the majority is not yet communist, is sufficiently class-conscious to prevent intervention. The bourgeoisie is compelled to reckon with the temper of the masses even though they have not yet entirely sided with communism. That is why the bourgeoisie cannot now start an offensive against us, although one is never ruled out. Until the final issue is decided, this awful state of war will continue. And we say: "*A la guerre comme à la guerre*; we do not promise any freedom, or any democracy." We tell the peasants quite openly that they must choose between the rule of the

bourgeoisie, and the rule of the Bolsheviks—in which case we shall make every possible concession within the limits of retaining power, and later we shall lead them to socialism. Everything else is deception and pure demagogy. Ruthless war must be declared against this deception and demagogy. Our point of view is: for the time being—big concessions and the greatest caution, precisely because a certain equilibrium has set in, precisely because we are weaker than our combined enemies, and because our economic basis is too weak and we need a stronger one.

That, comrades, is what I wanted to tell you about our tactics, the tactics of the Russian Communist Party. (*Prolonged applause.*)

IDEAS ABOUT A STATE ECONOMIC "PLAN"

The principal mistake we have all been making up to now is too much optimism; as a result, we succumbed to bureaucratic utopias. Only a very small part of our plans has been realised. Life, everyone, in fact, has laughed at our plans.

This must be radically altered.

Anticipate the worst. We already have some experience; it is slight, but practical.

Food supplies? Frumkin says: The ideal is 150 million poods from the tax+50 million poods by means of exchange +40 million poods from the Ukraine = 240 million poods.

We must base our calculations on a *total of 200* million poods for the year.

What are we to do with this paltry, starvation figure? $200 : 12 = 16\frac{2}{3}$.

(α) Take a minimum for the army, i.e., calculate the rations for a minimum army.

(β) Include in the plan the economic work of the army on a modest, extremely modest scale.

1 *subbotnik**, 60 per cent of the army (participating).

1 out of 3 subbotniks 50 per cent participants (50 per cent of the army), etc.

(γ) For office employees—drastic reduction.

(δ) The workers.

Immediately draw up a list of the best *enterprises* (stress *enterprises*) by industries.

Close down $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{4}{5}$ of those now running.

The rest to run in two shifts. Only those which have enough *fuel* and *bread*, even if the minimum quantity of grain is collected (200 million poods) and fuel (?) *for the whole year*.

Do this in *rough outline*, as a first approximation, immediately, in a month, no later.

Fuel, we have.

A People's Commissariat for Communications, we have.

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* Voluntary work on week-ends without pay.—*Tr*.

There is no need to be exact about food; *take 200 million poods*.

Industry *according to branches* and *gubernias* (don't put it off until we get the figures for the "whole"), get this done with the utmost speed,

and, *the main thing*,

put 70 per cent of the members of the State Planning Commission to work *14 hours a day* (let science sweat a bit; we have given them good rations, now we must make them work).

Each one to be given the task of keeping "*general supervision*" (I think that is what it is called in the regulations of the State Planning Commission) over *definite* enterprises.

Take *700* as the number of large establishments, enterprises, depots (railway), state farms, etc., etc., that we must (and can, even at the worst: 200 million poods of grain in the course of the year) start and keep running from October 1, 1921 to October 1, 1922.

700 : 35 members of the Slate Planning Commission = *20*.

Say 30 (not all the members of the State Planning Commission will be continuously engaged on current work).

Take the trouble to supervise *these 30 unremittingly*. You are responsible for this.

Over and above these, keep an eye on another 30-70, less important; don't keep them under constant observation, but *make inquiries* in passing, from time to time.

To supervise unremittingly means *answering* with your head for the rational consumption of fuel and grain, for the maximum stocking of the one and the other, for the maximum deliveries, for economising fuel (in industry, on the railways, etc.), for economising food (feed *only* good workers), for increasing productivity of labour, *etc.*

All the rest—lease or give to anybody you please, or close, or "abandon", forget about, until *a sound improvement* is achieved, which will enable us to operate confidently, not with 200 million poods of grain $+X$ million poods of fuel, but with *300* million poods of grain +150 per cent of X fuel.

These are my ideas about the State Planning Commission.

Think it over. Let's discuss it.

July 4 *Lenin*

First published in 1924

Published according to the manuscript

GREETINGS TO THE DELEGATE CONGRESS OF TSENTROSOYUZ[141]

I send my greetings to the assembly of Tsentrosoyuz delegates on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. I deeply regret that I cannot be present to express my views on the most complicated problems confronting the co-operative societies.

I have no doubt that the pooling of experience of the work already done will help you to solve these problems in harmony with the plan for the country's overall economic development. Success in the practical work that now lies ahead will depend largely on the establishment, through the medium of commodity exchange, of proper relations between urban industry and agriculture. It will depend on the ability of the co-operative societies, by steady and persistent effort, to clear the way for the development of commodity exchange and to take the lead in this field. It will depend on their ability to collect the scattered stocks of commodities and to secure the production of new ones. In the long run, the practical solution of these problems is the best way to achieve our aims, namely, to restore agriculture and, on that basis, to strengthen and develop large-scale industry.

These problems have been complicated very much by the crop failure, which has become apparent in a number of gubernias. In your work, you will have to devote special attention to this fresh disaster and keep its consequences in mind when tackling all current questions.

I am sure that, short as the experience of work under the new conditions may be, Soviet co-operative societies will succeed in closely linking up their work with the general task of overcoming the chaos in the country's economy, and will display the utmost energy in this fight.

Written on July 16, 1921
Published in *Pravda* No. 156, July 19, 1921

Published according to the *Pravda* text

MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF REVOLUTIONARY TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL UNIONS[142]

July 18

Comrade Rykov,

Please be so kind as to convey to the delegates of the International Congress of Trade Unions the following:

I thank them from the bottom of my heart for the invitation to the Congress sent through you. I deeply regret that I am unable to accept it because of ill-health, for on doctor's orders I have had to leave Moscow for a month's holiday.

Please convey to the delegates my greetings and heartfelt wishes for the success of the Congress. It is hard to find words to express the full importance of the International Congress of Trade Unions. The winning of trade unionists to the ideas of communism is making irresistible headway everywhere, in all countries, throughout the world. The process is sporadic, overcoming a thousand obstacles, but it is making irresistible progress. The International Congress of Trade Unions will quicken this movement. Communism will triumph in the trade unions. No power on earth can avert the collapse of capitalism and the victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie.

Warm greetings and confidence in the inevitable victory of communism.

N. Lenin

Published in 1921

Published according to the manuscript

APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAT[143]

Several gubernias in Russia have been hit by a famine whose proportions are apparently only slightly less than those of the 1891 calamity.

It is the painful aftermath of Russia's backwardness and of seven years of war, first, the imperialist, and then, the Civil War, which was forced upon the workers and peasants by the landowners and capitalists of all countries.

We need help. The Soviet Republic of workers and peasants expects this help from the working people, the industrial workers and the small farmers.

The mass of both the former and the latter are themselves oppressed by capitalism and imperialism everywhere, but we are convinced that they will respond to our appeal, despite their own hard condition caused by unemployment and the rising cost of living.

Those who have suffered from capitalist oppression all their lives will understand the position of the workers and peasants of Russia, they will grasp or, guided by the instinct of working and exploited people, will sense the need of helping the Soviet Republic, whose lot it was to be the first to undertake the hard but gratifying task of overthrowing capitalism. That is why the capitalists of all countries are revenging themselves upon the Soviet Republic; that is why they are planning a fresh campaign, intervention, and counter-revolutionary conspiracies against it.

All the greater, we trust, will be the vigour and the self-sacrifice with which the workers and the small labouring farmers of all countries will help us.

N. Lenin

August 2, 1921

Pravda No. 172, August 6, 1921

Published according to the *Pravda* text collated with the manuscript

APPEAL TO THE PEASANTS OF THE UKRAINE

This year, the Ukraine, west of the Dnieper, has had an excellent harvest. The workers and peasants in the famine-stricken Volga area, who are now suffering hardships only a little less severe than the dreadful calamity of 1891, look to the Ukrainian farmers for help. Help must come quickly. Help must be abundant. No farmer must refrain from sharing his surplus with the starving Volga peasants who have no seed with which to sow their fields.

Let every uyezd that is well supplied with grain send, say, two or three peasant delegates to the Volga to deliver the grain, and to see for themselves the terrible suffering, want and starvation, and tell their fellow-countrymen upon their return how urgently help is needed.

Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars, *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)

August 2, 1921

Pravda No. 172, August 6, 1921

Published according to
the *Pravda* text collated
with the manuscript

A LETTER TO G. MYASNIKOV[144]

August 5, 1921

Comrade Myasnikov,

I have only just managed to read *both* your articles. I am unaware of the nature of the speeches you made in the Perm (I think it was Perm) organisation and of your conflict with it. I can say nothing about that; it will be dealt with by the Organisation Bureau, which, I hear, has appointed a special commission.

My object is a different one: it is to appraise your articles as literary and political documents.

They are interesting documents.

Your main mistake is, I think, most clearly revealed in the article "Vexed Questions". And I consider it my duty to do all I can to try to convince you.

At the beginning of the article you make a correct application of dialectics. Indeed, whoever fails to understand the substitution of the slogan of "civil peace" for the slogan of "civil war" lays himself open to ridicule, if nothing worse. In this, you are right.

But precisely because you are right on this point, I am surprised that in drawing your conclusions, you should have forgotten the dialectics which you yourself had properly applied.

"Freedom of the press, from the monarchists to the anarchists, inclusively".... Very good! But just a minute: every Marxist and every worker who ponders over the four years' experience of our revolution will say "Let's look into this—*what sort* of freedom of the press? What *for*? For *which class*?"

We do not believe in "absolutes". We laugh at "pure democracy".

The "freedom of the press" slogan became a great world slogan at the close of the Middle Ages and remained so up to the nineteenth century. Why? Because it expressed the ideas of the progressive bourgeoisie, i.e., its struggle against kings and priests, feudal lords and landowners.

No country in the world has done as much to liberate the masses from the influence of *priests* and *landowners* as the R.S.F.S.R has done, and is doing. We have been performing *this* function of "freedom of the press" *better than anyone else* in the world.

All over the world, wherever there are capitalists, freedom of the press means freedom to *buy up* newspapers, to *buy* writers, to *bribe*, buy and fake "public opinion" for the *benefit of the bourgeoisie*.

This is a fact.

No one will ever be able to refute it.

And what about us?

Can anyone deny that the bourgeoisie in this country has been defeated, *but not destroyed*? That it *has gone into hiding*? Nobody can deny it.

Freedom of the press in the R.S.F.S.R., which is surrounded by the bourgeois enemies of the whole world, means freedom of *political organisation* for the bourgeoisie and its most loyal servants, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

This is an irrefutable fact.

The bourgeoisie (all over the world) is still very much stronger than we are. To place in its hands yet *another* weapon like freedom of political organisation (= freedom of the press, for the press is the core and foundation of political organisation) means facilitating the enemy's task, means helping the class enemy.

We have no wish to commit suicide, and therefore, we will not do this.

We clearly see this *fact*: "freedom of the press" means *in practice* that the international bourgeoisie will immediately buy up hundreds and thousands of Cadet, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik writers, and will organise their propaganda and fight against us.

That is a fact. "They" are richer than we are and will buy a "force" ten times larger than we have, to fight us.

No, we will not do it; we will not help the international bourgeoisie.

How could you *descend* from a class appraisal—from the appraisal of the relations between *all* classes—to the sentimental, philistine appraisal? This is a mystery to me.

On the question: "civil peace or civil war", on the question of how *we* have won over, and *will continue* to "win over", the peasantry (to the side of the proletariat), on these two key world questions (=questions that affect the very *substance* of world politics), on these questions (which are dealt with in *both* your articles), you *were able* to take the Marxist standpoint, instead of the philistine, sentimental standpoint. You *did take account* of the relationships of *all* classes in a *practical*, sober way.

And suddenly you slide down into the abyss of sentimentalism!

"Outrage and abuses are rife in this country: freedom of the press will expose them."

That, as far as I can judge from your two articles, is where you slipped up. You have allowed yourself to *be depressed* by certain sad and deplorable *facts*, and lost the ability *soberly* to appraise the forces.

Freedom of the press will help *the force* of the world bourgeoisie. That is a fact. "Freedom of the press" *will not help to purge the Communist Party* in Russia of a number of its weaknesses, mistakes, misfortunes and maladies (it cannot be denied that there is a spate of these maladies), because this is *not* what the world bourgeoisie wants. But freedom of the press will be a weapon in the hands of *this world bourgeoisie*. It is not dead; it is alive. It is lurking nearby and watching. It has already *hired* Milyukov, to whom Chernov and Martov (partly because of their stupidity, and partly because of factional spleen against us; but mainly because of the objective logic of their petty-bourgeois-democratic position) are giving "faithful and loyal" service.

You took the wrong fork in the road.

You wanted to *cure* the Communist Party of its maladies and have snatched at *a drug* that will cause certain death—not at your hands, of course, but at the hands of the world bourgeoisie (+Milyukov+Chernov+Martov).

You forgot a minor point, a very tiny point, namely: the world bourgeoisie and its "freedom" to buy up *for itself* newspapers, and *centres of political organisation*.

No, we will not take this course. *Nine hundred* out of every thousand *politically* conscious workers will refuse to take this course.

We have many maladies. Mistakes (our *common* mistakes, all of us have made mistakes, the Council of Labour and Defence, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee) like those we made in distributing fuel and *food* in the autumn and winter of 1920 (those were enormous mistakes!) have greatly aggravated the maladies springing from our situation.

Want and calamity abound.

They have been terribly *intensified* by the famine of 1921.

It will cost us a supreme effort to extricate ourselves, but we will get out, and have already begun to do so.

We will extricate ourselves, for, in the main, our policy is a correct one, and takes into account *all* the class forces on an *international* scale. We will extricate ourselves because we do not try to make our position look better than it is. We realise all the difficulties. We see *all* the maladies, and are taking measures to cure them methodically, with perseverance, and without giving way to panic.

You have allowed panic to get the better of you; panic is a slope—once you stepped on it you slid down into a position that looks very much as if you are forming a new party, or are about to commit suicide.

You must not give way to panic.

Is there any isolation of the Communist Party cells from the Party? There is. It is an evil, a misfortune, a malaise.

It is there. It is a severe ailment.

We can see it.

It must be cured by proletarian and Party measures and not by means of "freedom" (*for the bourgeoisie*).

Much of what you say about reviving the country's economy, about mechanical ploughs, etc., about fighting for "influence" over the peasantry, etc., is true and useful.

Why not *bring this out* separately? We shall get together and work harmoniously in one party. The benefits will be great; *they will not come all at once*, but *very* slowly.

Revive the Soviets; secure the co-operation of non-Party people; let *non-Party* people verify the work of Party members: this is absolutely right. *No end* of work there, and it has hardly been started.

Why not amplify *this* in a *practical* way? In a pamphlet for the Congress?

Why not take that up?

Why be afraid of *spade* work (*denounce* abuses through the Central Control Commission, or the Party press, *Pravda*)? Misgivings about slow, difficult and arduous spade work cause people to give way to panic and to seek an "easy" way out: "freedom of the press" (*for the bourgeoisie*).

Why should you persist in your mistake—an obvious mistake—in your non-Party, *anti-proletarian* slogan of "freedom of the press"? Why not take up the less "brilliant" (scintillating with bourgeois brilliance) spade work of driving out abuses, combating them, and *helping* non-Party people in a practical and business-like way?

Have you ever brought up any *particular* abuse to the notice of the C.C., and suggested a definite *means* of eradicating it?

No, you have not.

Not a single time.

You saw a spate of misfortunes and maladies, gave way to despair and rushed into the arms of the enemy, the bourgeoisie ("freedom of the press" *for the bourgeoisie*). My advice is: do not give way to despair and panic.

We, and those who sympathise with us, the workers and peasants, still have an immense reservoir of strength. We still have plenty of health and vigour.

We are not doing enough to cure our ailments.

We are not doing a good job of practising the slogan: promote non-Party people, let non-Party people verify the work of Party members.

But we can, and will, do a hundred times more in this field than we are doing.

I hope that after thinking this over carefully you will not, out of false pride, persist in an obvious political mistake

("freedom of the press"), but, pulling yourself together and overcoming the panic, will get down to practical work: help to establish *ties* with non-Party people, and help non-Party people to *verify* the work of Party members.

There is no end of work in this field. Doing this work you can (and should) help to *cure* the disease, slowly but surely, instead of chasing after will-o'-the-wisps like "freedom of the press".

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Published in 1921

Published according to the manuscript

TO COMRADE THOMAS BELL

Dear comrade,

I thank you very much for your letter, of August 7. I have read nothing concerning the English movement last months because of my illness and overwork.

It is extremely interesting what you communicate. Perhaps it is the *beginning* of the real proletarian mass movement in Great Britain *in the communist sense*. I am afraid we have till now in England few very feeble propagandist societies for communism (inclusive the British Communist Party[145]) but no really *mass* communist movement.

If the South Wales Miners' Federation has decided on July 24 to affiliate to the Third International by a majority of 120 to 63—perhaps it is the beginning of a new era. (How many miners there are in England? More than 500,000? How much in South Wales? 25,000? How many miners were *really* represented in Cardiff July 24, 1921?)

If these miners are not too small minority, if they fraternise with soldiers and begin a *real* "class war"—we must do all our possible to *develop* this movement and strengthen it.

Economic measures (like communal kitchens) are good but they are not much important *now*, *before* the victory of the proletarian revolution in England. *Now* the *political* struggle is the most important.

English capitalists are shrewd, clever, astute. They *will support* (directly or indirectly) communal kitchens *in order* to divert the attention *from political aims*.

What is important is (if I am not mistaken):

1) To create a very good, really proletarian, really mass *Communist Party* in this part of England, that is, such party which will *really* be the *leading* force in *all* labour

movement in this part of the country. (Apply the resolution on organisation and work of the Party adopted by the Third Congress to this part of your country.)

2) To start a daily paper of the working class, for the working class in this part of the country.

To start it not as a business (as usually newspapers are started in capitalist countries), not with big sum of money, not in ordinary and usual manner—but as an *economic and political* tool of the *masses* in their struggle.

Either the miners of this district are capable to pay *halfpenny* daily (for the beginning *weekly*, if you like) for their *own* daily (or weekly) newspaper (be it very small, it is not important)—*or there is no beginning of really communist mass movement in this part of your country.*

If the Communist Party of this district cannot collect a few pounds in order to publish *small leaflets* daily as a beginning of the really *proletarian* communist newspaper—if it is so, if *every* miner will not pay a penny for it, then there is *not serious*, not genuine affiliation to the Third International.

English Government will apply the shrewdest means in order to suppress every beginning of this kind. Therefore we must be (in the beginning) very prudent. The paper must be *not too revolutionary* in the beginning. If you will have three editors, at least one must be *non-communist.* (At least two genuine workers.) If nine-tenths of the workers do not buy this paper, if two-thirds $\left(\frac{120}{120+63}\right)$ do not pay special contributions (f. 1 penny *weekly*) for *their* paper—it will be no workers' newspaper.

I should be very glad to have few lines from you concerning this theme and beg to apologise for my bad English.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on August 13, 1921

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A LETTER TO THE GERMAN COMMUNISTS

Dear comrades,

I had intended to state my view of the lessons of the Third Congress of the Communist International in a detailed article. Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to start on this work because of ill-health. The fact that a Congress of your Party, the United Communist Party of Germany (V.K.P.D.),[146] has been called for August 22, compels me to hasten with this letter, which I have to finish within a few hours, if I am not to be late in sending it to Germany.

So far as I can judge, the position of the Communist Party in Germany is a particularly difficult one. This is understandable.

Firstly, and mainly, from the end of 1918, the international position of Germany very quickly and sharply aggravated her internal revolutionary crisis and impelled the vanguard of the proletariat towards an immediate seizure of power. At the same time, the German and the entire international bourgeoisie, excellently armed and organised, and taught by the "Russian experience ", hurled itself upon the revolutionary proletariat of Germany in a frenzy of hate. Tens of thousands of the best people of Germany—her revolutionary workers—were killed or tortured to death by the bourgeoisie, its heroes, Noske and Co., its servants, the Scheidemanns, etc., and by its indirect and "subtle" (and therefore particularly valuable) accomplices, the knights of the "Two-and-a-Half International", with their despicable spinelessness, vacillations, pedantry and philistinism. The armed capitalists set traps for the unarmed workers; they killed them wholesale, murdered their

leaders, ambushing them one by one, and making excellent use to this end of the counter-revolutionary howling of both shades of Social-Democrats, the Scheidemannites and the Kautskyites. When the crisis broke out, however, the German workers lacked a genuine revolutionary party, owing to the fact that the split was brought about too late, and owing to the burden of the accursed tradition of "unity" with capital's corrupt (the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co.) and spineless (the Kautskys, Hilferdings and Co.) gang of lackeys. The heart of every honest and class-conscious worker who accepted the Basle Manifesto of 1912[147] at its face value and not as a "gesture" on the part of the scoundrels of the "Second" and the "Two-and-a-Half" grades, was filled with incredibly bitter hatred for the opportunism of the old German Social-Democrats, and this hatred—the greatest and most noble sentiment of the best people among the oppressed and exploited masses—blinded people and prevented them from keeping their heads and working out a correct strategy with which to reply to the excellent strategy of the Entente capitalists, who were armed, organised and schooled by the "Russian experience", and supported by France, Britain and America. This hatred pushed them into premature insurrections.

That is why the development of the revolutionary working-class movement in Germany has since the end of 1918 been treading a particularly hard and painful road. But it has marched and is marching steadily forward. There is the incontrovertible fact of the gradual swing to the left among the masses of workers, the real majority of the labouring and exploited people in Germany, both those organised in the old, Menshevik trade unions (i.e., the unions serving the bourgeoisie) and those entirely, or almost entirely, unorganised. What the German proletariat must and will do—and this is the guarantee of victory—is keep their heads; systematically rectify the mistakes of the past; steadily win over the mass of the workers both inside and outside the trade unions; patiently build up a strong and intelligent Communist Party capable of giving real leadership to the masses at every turn of events; and work out a strategy that is on a level with the best international strategy of the most advanced bourgeoisie, which

is "enlightened" by agelong experience in general, and the "Russian experience" in particular.

On the other hand, the difficult position of the Communist Party of Germany is aggravated at the present moment by the break-away of the not very good Communists on the left (the Communist Workers' Party of Germany, K.A.P.D.) and on the right (Paul Levi and his little magazine *Unser Weg* or *Sowjet*[148]).

Beginning with the Second Congress of the Communist International, the Leftists" or "K.A.P.-ists" have received sufficient warning from us in the international arena. Until sufficiently strong, experienced and influential Communist Parties have been built, at least in the principal countries, the participation of semi-anarchist elements in our international congresses has to be tolerated, and is to some extent even useful. It is useful insofar as these elements serve as a clear "warning" to inexperienced Communists, and also insofar as they themselves are still capable of learning. All over the world, anarchism has been splitting up—not since yesterday, but since the beginning of the imperialist war of 1914-18—into two trends: one pro-Soviet, and the other anti-Soviet; one in favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the other against it. We must allow this process of disintegration among the anarchists to go on and come to a head. Hardly anyone in Western Europe has experienced anything like a big revolution. There, the experience of great revolutions has been almost entirely forgotten, and the transition from the desire to be revolutionary and from talk (and resolutions) about revolution to real revolutionary work is very difficult, painful and slow.

It goes without saying, however, that the semi-anarchist elements can and should be tolerated only within certain limits. In Germany, we tolerated them for quite a long time. The Third Congress of the Communist International faced them with an ultimatum and fixed a definite time limit. If they have now voluntarily resigned from the Communist International, all the better. Firstly, they have saved us the trouble of expelling them. Secondly, it has now been demonstrated most conclusively and most graphically, and proved with precise facts to all vacillating work-

ers, and all those who have been inclined towards anarchism because of their hatred for the opportunism of the old Social-Democrats, that the Communist International has been patient, that it has not expelled anarchists immediately and unconditionally, and that it has given them an attentive hearing and helped them to learn.

We must now pay less attention to the K.A.P.-ists. By polemising with them we merely give them publicity. They are too unintelligent; it is wrong to take them seriously; and it is not worth being angry with them. They have no influence among the masses, and will acquire none, unless we make mistakes. Let us leave this tiny trend to die a natural death; the workers themselves will realise that it is worthless. Let us propagate and implement, with greater effect, the organisational and tactical decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International, instead of giving the K.A.P.-ists publicity by arguing with them. The infantile disorder of "Leftism" is passing and will pass away as the movement grows.

Similarly we are now needlessly helping Paul Levi, we are needlessly giving him publicity by polemising with him. That we should argue with him is exactly what he wants. Now, after the decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International, we must forget about him and devote all our attention, all our efforts, to peaceful, practical and constructive work (without any squabbling, polemics, or bringing up of the quarrels of yesterday), in the spirit of the decisions of the Third Congress. It is my conviction that Comrade K. Radek's article, "The Third World Congress on the March Action, and Future Tactics" (in *Die Rote Fahne*,[149] the Central Organ of the United Communist Party of Germany, issues of July 14 and 15, 1921), sins quite considerably against this general and unanimously adopted decision of the Third Congress. This article, a copy of which was sent me by one of the Polish Communists, is quite unnecessarily—and in a way that positively harms our work—directed not only against Paul Levi (that would be very unimportant), but also against Clara Zetkin. And yet Clara Zetkin herself concluded a "peace treaty" in Moscow, during the Third Congress, with the C.C. (the "Centrale") of the United Communist Party of Germany, providing

for joint, non-factional work! And we all approved of the treaty. In his misplaced polemical zeal, Comrade K. Radek has gone to the length of saying something positively untrue, attributing to Zetkin the idea of "putting off" (*verlegt*) "every general action by the Party" (*jede allgemeine Aktion der Partei*) "until the day when large masses rise" (*auf den Tag, wo die grossen Massen aufstehen werden*). It goes without saying that by such methods Comrade K. Radek is rendering Paul Levi the best service the latter could wish for. There is nothing Paul Levi wants so much as a controversy endlessly dragged out, with as many people involved in it as possible, and efforts to drive Zetkin away from the party by polemical breaches of the "peace treaty" which she herself concluded, and which was approved by the entire Communist International. Comrade K. Radek's article serves as an excellent example of how Paul Levi is assisted from the "Left".

Here I must explain to the German comrades why I defended Paul Levi so long at the Third Congress. Firstly, because I made Levi's acquaintance through Radek in Switzerland in 1915 or 1916. At that time Levi was already a Bolshevik. I cannot help entertaining a certain amount of distrust towards those who accepted Bolshevism *only after* its victory in Russia, and after it had scored a number of victories in the international arena. But, of course, this reason is relatively unimportant, for, after all, my personal knowledge of Paul Levi is very small. Incomparably more important was the second reason, namely, that *essentially* much of Levi's criticism of the March action in Germany in 1921 was *correct* (not, of course, when he said that the uprising was a "putsch"; that assertion of his was absurd).

It is true that Levi did all he possibly could, and much besides, to weaken and spoil his criticism, and make it difficult for himself and others to understand the essence of the matter, by bringing in a mass of details in which he was obviously wrong. Levi couched his criticism in an impermissible and harmful form. While urging others to pursue a cautious and well-considered strategy, Levi himself committed worse blunders than a schoolboy, by rushing into battle so prematurely, so unprepared, so absurdly

and wildly that he was certain to lose any "battle" (spoiling or hampering his work for many years), although the "battle" could and should have been won. Levi behaved like an "anarchist intellectual" (if I am not mistaken, the German term is *Edelanarchist*), instead of behaving like an organised member of the proletarian Communist International. Levi committed a breach of discipline.

By this series of incredibly stupid blunders Levi made it difficult to concentrate attention on the essence of the matter. And the essence of the matter, i.e., the appraisal *and correction* of the innumerable mistakes made by the United Communist Party of Germany during the March action of 1921, has been and continues to be of enormous importance. In order to explain and correct these mistakes (which some people enshrined as gems of Marxist tactics) *it was necessary* to have been on the *Right* wing during the Third Congress of the Communist International. Otherwise the *line* of the Communist International would have been a *wrong* one.

I defended and had to defend Levi, insofar as I saw before me opponents of his who merely shouted about "Menshevism" and "Centrism" and refused to see the mistakes of the March action and the need to explain and correct them. These people made a caricature of revolutionary Marxism, and a pastime of the struggle against "Centrism". They might have done the greatest harm to the whole cause, for "no one in the world can compromise the revolutionary Marxists, if they do not compromise themselves".

I said to these people: Granted that Levi has become a Menshevik. As I have scant knowledge of him personally, I will not insist, if the point is proved to me. But it has not yet been proved. All that has been proved till now is that he *has lost his head*. It is childishly stupid to declare a man a Menshevik merely on these grounds. The training of experienced and influential party leaders is a long and difficult job. And without it the dictatorship of the proletariat, and its "unity of will", remain a phrase. In Russia, it took us fifteen years (1903-17) to produce a group of leaders—fifteen years of fighting Menshevism, fifteen years of tsarist persecution, fifteen years, which included the years of the first revolution (1905), a great and mighty revolution.

Yet we have had our sad cases, when even fine comrades have "lost their heads". If the West-European comrades imagine that they are insured against such "sad cases" it is sheer childishness, and we cannot but combat it.

Levi had to be expelled for breach of discipline. Tactics had to be determined *on the basis* of a most detailed explanation and correction of the mistakes made during the March 1921 action. If, *after* this, Levi wants to behave in the old way, he will show that his expulsion was justified; and the wavering or hesitant workers will be given all the more forceful and convincing proof of the absolute correctness of the Third Congress decisions concerning Paul Levi.

Having made a cautious approach at the Congress to the appraisal of Levi's mistakes, I can now say with all the more assurance that Levi has hastened to confirm the worst expectations. I have before me No. 6 of his magazine *Unser Weg* (of July 15, 1921). It is evident from the editorial note printed at the head of the magazine that the decisions of the Third Congress are known to Paul Levi. What is his reply to them? Menshevik catchwords such as "a great excommunication" (*grosser Bann*), "canon law" (*kanonisches Recht*), and that he will "quite freely" (*in vollständiger Freiheit*) "discuss" these decisions. What greater freedom can a man have if he has been freed of the title of party member and member of the Communist International! And please note that he expects party members to write for him, for Levi, anonymously!

First—he plays a dirty trick on the party, hits it in the back, and sabotages its work.

Then—he discusses the essence of the Congress decisions.

That is magnificent.

But by doing this Levi puts paid to himself.

Paul Levi wants to continue the fight.

It will be a great strategic error to satisfy his desire. I would advise the German comrades to prohibit all controversy with Levi and his magazine in the columns of the daily party press. He must not be given publicity. He must not he allowed to divert the fighting party's attention from important matters to unimportant ones. In cases of extreme necessity, the controversy could be conducted

in weekly or monthly magazines, or in pamphlets, and as far as possible care must be taken not to afford the K.A.P.-ists and Paul Levi the pleasure they feel when they are mentioned by name; reference should simply be made to "certain not very clever critics who at all costs want to regard themselves as Communists".

I am informed that at the last meeting of the enlarged C.C. (*Ausschuss*), even the Left-winger Friesland was compelled to launch a sharp attack on Maslow, who is playing at Leftism and wishes to exercise himself in "hunting Centrists". The unreasonableness (to put it mildly) of this Maslow's conduct was also revealed over here, in Moscow. Really, this Maslow and two or three of his supporters and confederates, who obviously do not wish to observe the "peace treaty" and have more zeal than sense, should be sent by the German party to Soviet Russia for a year or two. We would find useful work for them. We would make men of them. And the international and German movement would certainly gain thereby.

The German Communists must at all costs end the internal dissension, get rid of the quarrelsome elements on both sides, forget about Paul Levi and the K.A.P.-ists and get down to real work.

There is plenty to be done.

In my opinion, the tactical and organisational resolutions of the Third Congress of the Communist International mark a great step forward. Every effort must be exerted to really put both resolutions into effect. This is a difficult matter, but it can and should be done.

First, the Communists had to proclaim their principles to the world. That was done at the First Congress. It was the first step.

The second step was to give the Communist International organisational form and to draw up conditions for affiliation to it—conditions making for real separation from the Centrists, from the direct and indirect agents of the bourgeoisie within the working-class movement. That was done at the Second Congress.

At the Third Congress it was necessary to start practical, constructive work, to determine concretely, taking account of the practical experience of the communist struggle already begun, *exactly what* the line of further activity should be in respect of tactics and of organisation. We have taken this third step. We have an army of Communists all over the world. It is still poorly trained and poorly organised. It would be extremely harmful to forget this truth or be afraid of admitting it. Submitting ourselves to a most careful and rigorous test, and studying the experience of our own movement, we must train this army efficiently; we must organise it properly, and test it in all sorts of manoeuvres, all sorts of battles, in attack and in retreat. We cannot win without this long and hard schooling.

The "crux" of the situation in the international communist movement in the summer of 1921 was that some of the best and most influential sections of the Communist International did not quite properly understand this task; *they exaggerated* the "struggle against Centrism" *ever so slightly*; they *went ever so slightly beyond* the border line at which this struggle turns into a pastime and revolutionary Marxism begins to be compromised.

That was the "crux" of the Third Congress.

The exaggeration was a slight one; but the danger arising out of it was enormous. It was difficult to combat it, because the exaggerating was done by really the best and most loyal elements, without whom the formation of the Communist International would, perhaps, have been impossible. In the tactical amendments published in the newspaper *Moskau*[150] in German, French and English and signed by the German, Austrian and Italian delegations, this exaggeration was definitely revealed—the more so because these amendments were proposed to a draft resolution that was already final (following long and all-round preparatory work): The rejection of these amendments was a *straightening out* of the line of the Communist International; it was a victory over the danger of exaggeration.

Exaggeration, if not corrected, was sure to kill the Communist International. For "no one in the world can compromise the revolutionary Marxists, if they do not compromise themselves". No one in the world will be able to prevent

the victory of the Communists over the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals (and under the conditions prevailing in twentieth-century Western Europe and America, after the first imperialist war, this means victory over the bourgeoisie) *unless* the Communists prevent it themselves.

Exaggeration, however slight, means preventing victory.

Exaggeration of the struggle against Centrism means *saving* Centrism, means *strengthening* its position, its influence over the workers.

In the period between the Second and the Third Congresses, we learned to wage a victorious struggle against Centrism on an international scale. This is proved by the facts. We will continue to wage this struggle (expulsion of Levi and of Serrati's party) to the end.

We have, however, *not yet* learned, on an international scale, to combat wrong exaggerations in the struggle against Centrism. But we have become conscious of this defect, as has been proved by the course and outcome of the Third Congress. And precisely because we have become conscious of our defect *we will rid ourselves of it*.

And then we shall be invincible, because without support inside the proletariat (through the medium of the bourgeois agents of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals) the bourgeoisie in Western Europe and America *cannot* retain power.

More careful, more thorough preparation for fresh and more decisive battles, both defensive and offensive—that is the fundamental and principal thing in the decisions of the Third Congress.

"...Communism will become a mass force in Italy if the Italian Communist Party unceasingly and steadily fights the opportunist policy of Serratism and at the same time is able to maintain close contact with the proletarian masses in the trade unions, during strikes, during clashes with the counter-revolutionary fascist organisations; if it is able to merge the movements of all the working-class organisations and to transform the spontaneous outbreaks of the working class into carefully prepared battles...."

"The United Communist Party of Germany will be the better able to carry out mass action, the better it adapts its fighting slogans to the actual situation in future, the more thoroughly it studies the situation, and the more co-ordinated and disciplined the action it conducts...."

Such are the most pertinent passages of the tactical resolution of the Third Congress.

To win over the majority of the proletariat to our side—such is the "principal task" (the heading of Point 3 of the resolution on tactics).

Of course, we do not give the winning of the majority a formal interpretation, as do the knights of philistine "democracy" of the Two-and-a-Half International. When in Rome, in July 1921, the entire proletariat—the reformist proletariat of the trade unions and the Centrists of Serrati's party—*followed* the Communists against the fascists, that was *winning over the majority* of the working class to our side.

This was far, very far, from winning them decisively; it was doing so only partially, only momentarily, only locally. But it was winning over the majority, and that is possible even if, formally, the majority of the proletariat follow bourgeois leaders, or leaders who pursue a bourgeois policy (as do all the leaders of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals), or if the majority of the proletariat are wavering. This winning over is gaining ground steadily in every way throughout the world. Let us make more thorough and careful preparations for it; let us not allow a single serious opportunity to slip by when the bourgeoisie compels the proletariat to undertake a struggle; let us learn to correctly determine the moment when the *masses* of the proletariat *cannot but* rise together with us.

Then victory will be assured, no matter how severe some of the defeats and transitions in our great campaign may be.

Our tactical and strategic methods (if we take them on an international scale) still lag behind the excellent strategy of the bourgeoisie, which has learned from the example of Russia and will not let itself be "taken by surprise". But our forces are greater, immeasurably greater; we are learning tactics and strategy; we have advanced this "science" on the basis of the mistakes of the March 1921 action. We shall completely master this "science".

In the overwhelming majority of countries, our parties are still very far from being what real Communist Parties should be; they are far from being real vanguards of the genuinely revolutionary and only revolutionary class,

with every single member taking part in the struggle, in the movement, in the everyday life of the masses. But we are aware of this defect, we brought it out most strikingly in the Third Congress resolution on the work of the Party. And we shall overcome this defect.

Comrades, German Communists, permit me to conclude by expressing the wish that your party congress on August 22 will with a firm hand put a stop once and for all to the trivial struggle against those who have broken away on the left and the right. Inner-party struggles must stop! Down with everyone who wants to drag them out, directly or indirectly. We know our tasks today much more clearly, concretely and thoroughly than we did yesterday; we are not afraid of pointing openly to our mistakes in order to rectify them. We shall now devote all the Party's efforts to improving its organisation, to enriching the quality and content of its work, to creating closer contact with the masses, and to working out increasingly correct and accurate working-class tactics and strategy.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

August 14, 1921

Published in 1921

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NOTES

[1] Lenin's first speech to Party activists in the discussion of the role and tasks of the trade unions in socialist construction was delivered at the Bolshoi Theatre on December 30, 1920.

Trotsky had started the discussion in the Communist group of the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference on November 3 with his call "to tighten the screws of War Communism" as opposed to the Party's line to stimulate democratic activity in the trade unions.

The disagreements turned "on the different approach to the mass, the way of winning it over, and keeping in touch with it" (*Lenin*). The disagreements in the group were brought before the Central Committee Plenary Meeting. But Trotsky's December 24 speech before the delegates of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and trade union activists carried the issue outside the Central Committee. On December 25, he published a pamphlet, which marked the formation of an anti-Party faction, and served as a signal for action by other anti-Party groups—"buffer", "Workers' Opposition", "Democratic Centralism", etc.

Lenin was against any discussion, realising that it distracted the Party's attention and forces from the immediate tasks of fighting the economic dislocation and the famine. But when the anti-Party groups came out, he attacked them, concentrating on the Trotskyites as the chief anti-Party force. In his speeches and articles—*The Party Crisis* and *Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin*—Lenin showed the essence of the internal Party struggle and exposed the factional activity of the opposition groups, which tended to disrupt the Party's unity, and the great harm of the discussion imposed on it. He put forward and developed a number of important principles underlying the trade unions' role in the dictatorship of the proletariat and their tasks in socialist construction.

The discussion lasted more than two months. The overwhelming majority of the Party organisations approved Lenin's platform and rejected the opposition's. The results of the discussion were summed up at the Tenth Congress of the Party on March 8-16, 1921. p. 19

[2] On its agenda were the current tasks of economic construction and the question of the trade union movement. It defined the short-term economic tasks and stressed the need for the trade

unions' active participation in socialist construction. It adopted the following resolutions: "The Current Tasks of Economic Construction" and "The Trade Unions and Their Organisation". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh i resheniakh syezdov, konferentsi i plenumov TsK* (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 477-90, 490-94). p. 22

[3] The reference is to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Red Army and Cossack Deputies held in Moscow on December 22-29, 1920. It was attended by 2,537 delegates, the greatest number ever. Of them 1,728 had voice and vote, and 809, voice only. Of the total number of delegates 91.7 per cent were Communists; 2.7, Communist sympathisers; 3.9, non-party people; 0.3, Mensheviks; 0.3, Bundists; 0.15, Left S.R.s; 0.15, anarchists, and 0.8, from other parties. It showed the growing authority of the Communist Party and the political bankruptcy of the petty-bourgeois parties, which had betrayed themselves as anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary.

The Congress met at a time when the war against the foreign intervention and internal counter-revolution was coming to a victorious end, and when the economic front stood out as "the main and most important one" (*Lenin*). On its agenda there were the following questions, the chief of which had been discussed beforehand by the Communist group: report on the activity of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, electrification of Russia; rehabilitation of industry and transport; development of agricultural production and promotion of farming; efficiency of Soviet establishments and the struggle against bureaucratic practices. These problems were thrashed out in three sections: industry, agriculture and Soviet administration.

Lenin guided the work of the Congress. At the plenary meeting on December 22, he gave a report on the activity of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, and on December 23, he summed up the debate. He spoke six times at the Communist group meetings on December 21, 22, 24 and 27 on the question of concessions and the draft law on measures to consolidate and develop peasant farming. By an overwhelming majority, the Congress adopted a resolution on Lenin's report, approving the government's activity, and rejected a draft resolution motioned by the petty-bourgeois delegates, who had delivered anti-Soviet speeches.

The Congress adopted a plan for the electrification of the country (GOELRO), worked out on Lenin's initiative and instructions. This was the first long-range economic plan of the Soviet state and Lenin called it "the second Party Programme". He also wrote the resolution on Krzhizhanovsky's report.

Another major question on the agenda was a draft law on measures to consolidate and develop peasant farming, which had been adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on December 14, 1920. Lenin stressed that the law was "a kind of a focus around

which hundreds of decrees and bills of the Soviet power were grouped". Lenin took part in the discussion of its principal clauses by the non-Party peasant delegates to the Congress at a special meeting on December 22, and by the Communist group on December 24 and 27. The draft law was adopted unanimously.

The Congress passed a comprehensive resolution to improve and reorganise the entire Soviet apparatus as required by the transition to peaceful economic construction. It regulated relations between central and local organs of power and administration. The Congress also discussed the reorganisation of the whole system of economic management in accordance with the new economic tasks, and approved a new statute of the Council of Labour and Defence.

It instituted the Order of the *Red Banner of Labour* as an award for dedication, initiative, efficiency and hard work in solving economic tasks. p. 24

[4] The reference is to the resolution of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), "The Current Tasks of Party Organisation". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 506-12). p. 27

[5] *Izvestia* of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party was an information organ dealing with Party problems. It was published under a resolution of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) as a weekly supplement to *Pravda* from May 28, 1919, and as an independent organ from October 1920.

In 1929, it was transformed into a fortnightly, *Partiinoye Stroitelstvo* (Party Construction), and in June 1946 renamed *Partiinaya Zhizn* (Party Life). p. 27

[6] The "*buffer group*" took shape during the trade union discussion in 1920-21, as one of the anti-Party groups. It was headed by N. I. Bukharin and included Y. Larin, Y. A. Preobrazhensky, L. P. Serebryakov, G. Y. Sokolnikov, V. N. Yakovleva and others. They tried to reconcile Leninism and Trotskyism, acting as a "buffer" in disagreements on the question of the role and tasks of the trade unions. In fact Bukharin attacked Lenin and defended Trotsky. They did much harm to the Party by supporting the worst kind of factional activity. Lenin said Bukharin's theses were a "low in ideological disintegration". Bukharin soon abandoned his platform and openly sided with Trotsky.

Lenin characterised the "buffer" group and its anti-Party views in his article, "The Party Crisis", in the pamphlet, *Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin*, and elsewhere. p. 27

[7] *The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence* was set up by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 30, 1918, to implement its September 2, 1918 decree which proclaimed the Soviet Republic a military camp. Lenin was appointed

its Chairman. It was vested with extraordinary powers in mobilising the resources of the Soviet state for defence in that exceptionally difficult period.

The Council was the Republic's chief military-economic and planning centre during the intervention and Civil War and also controlled the activity of the Revolutionary Military Council and other military organs. Its decrees were binding on all Soviet citizens, as well as on central and local agencies. Early in April 1920, it was reorganised into the Council of Labour and Defence (C.L.D.) (*Soviet Truda i Oborony*—STO), and under a decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920 it began to operate as a government commission responsible for co-ordinating the work of all economic departments. It was abolished in 1937. p. 28

8 *Glavpolitput*—the Chief Political Department of the People's Commissariat for Communications—was formed as a provisional organ under the direct leadership of the Party's Central Committee in February 1919, and in January 1920 it was renamed the Chief Political Administration. It took extraordinary measures to rehabilitate the railways that had been ruined in the imperialist war and the Civil War, to improve Party and political work among railway workers, and to strengthen and stimulate the activity of the railwaymen's trade union and make it an instrument for the further development of the railways. It introduced military discipline on the railways to gear them to the war effort. The measures effected by Glavpolitput saved the railways from utter ruin, but produced bureaucratic and undemocratic practices in the trade unions and a tendency to lose touch with the masses.

It was abolished by a Central Committee decision on December 7, 1920, at the end of the Civil War and the start of peaceful development. p. 34

9 *Tsektran*—the Central Committee of the Joint Trade Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers. In September 1920, the two unions were merged to set up a strong centralised administration capable of tackling the tasks of rapidly rehabilitating transport, whose stoppages tended to paralyse the national economy. Its extraordinary powers and military methods of work, which sprang from the enormity of the tasks before it, bred bureaucratic practices, the appointments system, administration by injunction, etc. It fell into the hands of the Trotskyites, who set the workers against the Party and split their unity. The plenary meetings of the C.C. on November 8 and December 7, 1920, condemned Tsektran's methods and adopted a decision to incorporate it into the general system of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on a par with other unions. Tsektran was advised to change its methods, develop trade union democracy, make all trade union bodies elective, reduce the appointments system, etc. The First All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers in March 1921 called by the Central Committee of the Party expelled the Trotskyites from the Tsektran leadership and outlined new methods of work. p. 34

[10] *Politvod*—the Chief Political Administration of Water Transport of the People's Commissariat for Communications—was set up in April 1920 as an agency of Glavpolitput to carry on political education among the workers and exercise political control over the technical and administrative personnel; to put water transport on its feet as soon as possible; to stimulate higher productivity and improve discipline. It was dissolved in December 1920. p. 35

[11] The Party wanted the trade unions' work reorganised in accordance with the tasks of peaceful socialist construction, democracy developed and military methods of administration abolished. This was opposed by Trotsky, who demanded, at the Communist group meeting on November 3, a "shake-up" of the trade unions. He wanted "the screws tightened" and the trade unions governmentalised immediately. He disagreed on the "approach to the mass, the way of winning it over, and keeping in touch with it". His speech started the Party discussion on the trade unions, but the Communist delegates rejected his demands, for their realisation would have abolished the trade unions and undermined the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is why his theses were discussed by the Party Central Committee. At the November 8 C.C. Plenary Meeting, Lenin came out with his own theses which, when put to the vote, won 8 votes, as against 7 for Trotsky's. p. 37

[12] *The Workers' Opposition*—an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist group under the leadership of A. G. Shlyapnikov, S. P. Medvedyev, A. M. Kollontai, I. I. Kutuzov, Y. K. Lutovinov, etc. It first came out under its demagogic name at the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) in September 1920.

In November the group launched a factional struggle undermining the unity of the Party and organised a special discussion at the Moscow Gubernia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). It took final shape as the Workers' Opposition in 1920-21 during the discussion on the trade unions. Its views constituted an anarcho-syndicalist deviation within the Party and were expounded in full in Kollontai's pamphlet, *The Workers' Opposition*, published on the eve of the Tenth Party Congress, proposing that the national economy should be run by an All-Russia Congress of Producers organised in industrial trade unions. It wanted all economic bodies to be elected by the trade unions, with Party and Soviet organs having no power to reject the candidates nominated by the trade unions. It denied that the Party had the leading role to play in socialist construction and that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the Party's chief instrument. It said it was not the Party but the trade unions that were the highest form of workers' organisation.

The Workers' Opposition had some temporary support among workers swayed by petty-bourgeois influence and tried to use their vacillation to promote its narrow interests. It also had some sympathisers in central and local Party organisations. Thus, its platform won 21 per cent of the vote at the Moscow Gubernia Party

Conference in November 1920; 30 per cent at the Communist group meeting of the Second All-Russia Congress of Miners in early 1921, but less than 6 per cent at the Tenth Party Congress. The Congress completely defeated the Workers' Opposition; this was the result of the Party's educational work exposing the Opposition's demagogic anti-Party views. It lost ground among the rank and file and was heavily defeated at the Tenth Congress. Lenin's resolution, "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in our Party", stressed that the views of the Workers' Opposition were wrong theoretically and "tended to weaken the Communist Party's consistent general line, actually helping the class enemy of the proletarian revolution". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 532). The Congress decided that the propaganda of the Workers' Opposition ideas was incompatible with membership in the Party. Its resolution on the Party's unity demanded the immediate dissolution of all anti-Party groups, whatever their platforms. Most rank-and-file members of the Opposition broke with the group and gave sincere support to the Party's line. But Shlyapnikov and Medvedyev headed the remnants in an illegal organisation which continued to conduct anti-Party propaganda behind a facade of ultra-revolutionary phrases. In February 1922, they sent to the Executive Committee of the Comintern their "Declaration of 22", a slanderous attack on the Party. The Executive Committee studied the "Declaration", condemned the group, and warned that any further activity on their part would put them outside the Third International. Their organisational defeat was completed by the Party's Eleventh Congress in 1922.

p. 46

[13] At a joint meeting of the Party groups of the Eighth Congress of Soviets, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions, an argument took place as to whether Y. E. Rudzutak was the author of the theses, *The Tasks of the Trade Unions in Production*. Lenin asked the Trade Union Central Council for documents on the origin of the theses. He was given an extract from record No. 44 of the minutes of November 1, and a covering note from S. A. Lozovsky. The extract proved that the Presidium had discussed and adopted Rudzutak's theses as a basis and had instructed M. P. Tomsky and Rudzutak to put finishing touches to the theses. The note said this was done by Rudzutak alone. The Fifth All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions heard Rudzutak's report, adopted his theses as a basis and elected a commission, consisting of G. V. Tsiperovich, A. A. Andreyev and Rudzutak, to edit them. They worked out several points and amplified the theses.

Lenin sent the documents and Rudzutak's theses to *Pravda* with his covering letter, which said: "I request the Editorial Board to publish Rudzutak's theses, which were adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference of November 2-6, 1920,

and are indispensable to the discussion. I enclose additional material on the disagreements in Party circles concerning the origin of these theses." The documents and Lenin's letter were published in *Pravda* No. 13 on January 21, 1921. p. 47

[14] The "Appeal to the Party" was adopted at a discussion meeting of the representatives of Petrograd district Party organisations on January 3, 1921. On January 6, it was approved by a city meeting in People's House which was attended by over 4,000 Party members and candidates. Only 20 votes were cast against it. When it was discussed in the district Party organisations it had the support of 95-98 per cent of the membership.

The Petrograd Bolsheviks supported Lenin and opposed Trotsky on the question of the trade unions' role and tasks. They called the other Party organisations to follow Lenin and stressed the danger of Trotsky's platform, for its realisation would have abolished the trade unions and undermined the dictatorship of the proletariat. *Pravda* No. 7 of January 13 published the Appeal and also the counter-statement of the Moscow Party Committee, which at that time took a "buffer" stand. In a resolution published in the same issue of *Pravda* the Moscow Committee said that it found "it absolutely impossible" to accept the Petrograd proposals; it said the Petrograd Party organisation's stand showed its "extremely dangerous" tendency to become a special centre for preparing the Party Congress; it did not condemn Trotsky's establishment of a faction, thereby giving support to his anti-Party struggle. p. 48

[15] *Draft Decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions* was Lenin's "Platform of 10" tabled before the Central Committee by a group of members of the C.C. and of the Central Committee's Trade Union Commission in opposition to the platforms of the anti-Party groups. It defined the role of the trade unions in the light of the new tasks connected with the end of the Civil War and transition to peaceful socialist construction: the trade unions, being a school of administration, a school of economic management, a school of communism, were chiefly to take part in government, train personnel for government bodies and economic agencies, and help tighten labour discipline. They were to base their work on education, persuasion and democratic practices. The Tenth Congress's resolution on the role and tasks of the trade unions was based on the "Platform of 10", which during the discussion had been supported by a majority of local Party organisations. p. 48

[16] An opportunist faction headed by M. S. Boguslavsky, A. Z. Kamensky, V. N. Maximovsky, N. Osinsky, Raphail (P. B. Farbman) and T. V. Sapronov. They first came out against Lenin's line in Party and Soviet organisation at the Eighth Party Congress. At the Ninth Congress, they had their own rapporteurs on economic construction and organisational problems, but failed

to find any support among the Bolsheviks. On many questions they had backing only from the Mensheviks.

They denied the Party's leading role in the Soviets and trade unions and demanded freedom of factions and groups, and a merger of the Council of People's Commissars and the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, they opposed the subordination of local to central organs and wanted the Organisation Bureau of the Central Committee deprived of all say in political leadership, which would have split up the C.C.'s political and organisational unity. They opposed one-man management and the personal responsibility of managers in industry. In the Ukraine, they were against the "Poor Peasants' Committees" which were instruments of the proletariat's dictatorship in the countryside.

The group published its platform during the trade union discussion in 1920-21, but at the pre-Congress meetings it won only a handful of votes. At the Tenth Congress they withdrew their platform and allowed their members to vote freely. They continued to fight the Party on questions of organisation, on which V. N. Maximovsky delivered a co-report. After the Tenth Congress, only the leaders continued their anti-Party activity. In 1923, they joined the Trotskyites, and in 1926, formed the "Group of 15" headed by Sapronov and Smirnov, which was expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth Party Congress. p. 49

[17] *Ignatovites*, or "a group of activists of Moscow city districts" was an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist group, headed by Y. N. Ignatov, during the trade union discussion of 1920-21. Its activity was limited to the Moscow Party organisation, because it had no influence among the city's workers and rank-and-file Party members. Before the Tenth Party Congress, it came out with two platforms: the current tasks of the trade unions, and Party organisation. The Ignatovites shared the anarcho-syndicalist views of the Workers' Opposition; they set the trade unions in opposition to the Soviet state; denied the Party's leadership in socialist construction: opposed democratic centralism; demanded freedom of discussions, and wanted the Party membership to consist of workers only. They also demanded the handover of the administration of the economy to an organ elected by the All-Russia Trade Union Congress, but in contrast to the Workers' Opposition, they wanted the organ confirmed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee as well. At the Tenth Congress, Ignatov was the official rapporteur of the Workers' Opposition on problems of Party organisation. After the Congress, the group broke up. p. 49

[18] The reference is to the merger of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group (which consisted of otzovists, ultimatumists, and god-builders) with Menshevik liquidators and Trotskyites. They united after the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the Russian Social-

Democratic Labour Party to fight its decisions. They led a malicious campaign against the Bolsheviks in an effort to split the workers' revolutionary movement and weaken the proletarian Party. They formed a bloc demanding the "transformation" of the Party, which, in fact, implied its liquidation. The bloc, which had no principles to hold it together, was unstable and soon fell apart. p. 51

[19] The reference is to the trade union discussion at an enlarged session of the Moscow Party Committee together with delegates from Party organisations of Moscow city districts and uyezds on January 17, 1921.

The session debated all the draft theses put forward by various groups during the discussion. In the preliminary voting, Lenin's theses got 76 votes; Trotsky's, 27; Bukharin's, 5; Shlyapnikov's, 4; Sapronov's, 11; Ignatov's, 25; Nogin's, none, and Ryazanov's, none. In the re-vote on the two main platforms, 84 votes were cast for Lenin's theses, and 27, for Trotsky's.

On January 18, the Moscow Party Committee adopted an appeal "To All Party Organisations" asking all Party members to give unanimous support to Lenin's platform. p. 51

[20] The Congress was held in Moscow's Trade Union House from January 25 to February 2, 1921. It was attended by 341 delegates, of whom 295 had voice and vote, and 46, voice only. They represented more than 332,000 members of the Miners' Trade

The items on its agenda were: report of the Miners' Trade Union Central Committee; reports of the Mining Council and its departments; fuel supply problems; tasks of the trade union; organisation of production; wage rates; organisation; cultural and educational work; labour safety measures; international ties; concessions, and election of a new Trade Union Central Committee. The Congress decided to issue an appeal for unity to the organised workers of all countries.

Prior to the Congress, on January 22-24, the R.C.P.(B.) group had four meetings to discuss the trade unions' role and tasks, which were addressed by Lenin, Trotsky and Shlyapnikov. The absolute majority of the group supported Lenin's platform, which won 137 votes; Shlyapnikov's received 61, and Trotsky's, 8.

The Congress helped to solve the fuel crisis and work out production programmes for the mining industry. p. 54

[21] The reference is to the resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist International, "On the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution". See *Vtoroi kongress Kominterna* (Second Congress of the Communist International, Moscow, 1934, pp. 640-46). p. 62

[22] The reference is to the Eighteenth Congress of the French Socialist Party in Tours, December 25-30, 1920. It was attended by

285 delegates with 4,575 mandates. The main question on the agenda was the Party's affiliation to the Communist International. The issue was a foregone conclusion because at the federation congresses held before the national Congress, an absolute majority had voted for immediate entry into the Third International on the basis of the 21 conditions. Still there was a bitter struggle at the Congress between supporters of affiliation (Paul Vaillant-Couturier, Marcel Cachin, Daniel Renoult) and its opponents (Léon Blum, Jean Longuet, Marcel Sembat and others). Clara Zetkin, who had come to the Congress in spite of the French Government's ban and police harassment, delivered a brilliant speech and conveyed greetings on behalf of the Communist International.

After a four-day debate, the delegates voted for affiliation by 3,208 mandates, or more than 70 per cent.

The majority set up the Communist Party of France, which was finally formed in May 1921. The minority, led by Léon Blum, aimed at splitting the workers' movement, and walked out of the Congress, forming their own reformist party, which retained the old name of the French Socialist Party. p. 62

[23] The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin) was set up in February 1920 on Lenin's initiative, on the basis of the reorganised People's Commissariat for State Control which had been formed in the early months of the Soviet power.

Lenin attached great importance to control and verification from top to bottom. He worked out in detail the principles of organising control in the Soviet state, kept an eye on Rabkrin's activity, criticised its shortcomings and did his best to make it more efficient. In his last articles, "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" and "Better Fewer but Better", Lenin outlined a plan for reorganising Rabkrin. To merge Party and state control and to enlist more workers and peasants in its activity were the basic principles of Lenin's plan, and this he regarded as the source of the Party's and the state's inexhaustible strength. On Lenin's instructions, the Party's Twelfth Congress set up a joint organ, the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, to exercise Party and state control.

During Stalin's personality cult, these principles were violated, and Lenin's system of control was substituted by a bureaucratic apparatus. In 1934, Stalin secured a decision to set up two control centres—the Central Committee's Party Control Commission, and the Government's Soviet Control Commission. The People's Commissariat for State Control of the U.S.S.R. was set up in 1940; it was reorganised into the Ministry for State Control in 1946, and later, into the Commission for State Control. Pursuant to a decision of the Twenty-Second Congress, which stressed the importance of Party, state and mass control, the November 1962 Central Committee Plenary Meeting deemed it necessary to reorganise the system of control on Leninist principles. The Party

and State Control Committee of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. was set up under a decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers on November 27, 1962. p. 68

[24] Lenin began writing the pamphlet on January 21 or 22, 1921, in Gorki where he was taking a rest. Upon his return to Moscow on January 22, he handed the greater part of the pamphlet to his secretary for typing. He finished the work on January 25 and had it sent to the printer's. Late on January 26, C.C. members who were going to attend local discussions of the trade unions' role and tasks were given copies of the printed pamphlet, while the rest of the copies were ready on January 27. p. 70

[25] *Petrogradskaya Pravda* (Petrograd Truth)—a daily published from April 2, 1918, as the organ of the Bolshevik Central and Petrograd Party Committees. Since January 1924, it has been appearing as *Leningradskaya Pravda*. p. 70

[26] V. I. Zoff's circular of May 3, 1920, was published in the *Bulleten Mariinskogo Oblastnogo Upravlenia Vodnogo Transporta* (Bulletin of the Mariinsky Regional Water Transport Administration) No. 5, 1920. It ran: "A great change is about to occur in the life of water transport: primitive methods, committee treadmill, haphazard work and anarchy are on the way out. Water transport is becoming a state enterprise, headed by political commissars with appropriate powers. Committees, trade unions and elected delegates will no longer have the power to interfere in technical and administrative matters."

The order was an example of administration by injunction and bureaucratic practices, which Tsektran's Trotskyite leadership was introducing, and was evidence of their misunderstanding of the trade unions' role in getting transport back on its feet. The trade unions were equated with outdated army committees, and barred by order from taking part in improving water transport operations. p. 79

[27] On December 24, 1920, in what used to be the Zimin theatre, Trotsky gave a report on the trade unions tasks in production at a joint meeting of trade union activists and delegates to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, called by the Central Committee of the Joint Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers. It started the open Party discussion on the trade unions. p. 106

[28] The Conference was held in Trade Union House on February 4, 1921, and was attended by about 1,000 delegates from Moscow and Moscow Gubernia. In view of the acute food crisis, the main reports dealt with the food situation and the working-class attitude to the peasantry. Wage rates and the trade unions' role in production were also discussed. A resolution adopted on the report about the relations between the workers and the peasants stressed

the need to substitute a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system. The Menshevik and S.R. delegates tried to use the country's difficulties to incite the delegates against the Soviet Government's economic policy and against the Communist Party but were rebuffed by the Conference. At the delegates' request, Lenin addressed the final sitting of the Conference. p. 108

[29] The Congress was held in Moscow on February 1-6, 1921, and was attended by 287 delegates. The items on the agenda were: activity of the trade union's Central Committee; economic tasks; output norms; international trade union federation, etc. The Congress sent a message of greetings to Lenin.

Lenin addressed the ninth plenary sitting on the morning of February 6, and mentioned a conflict which had arisen at a Communist group meeting to discuss nominations for the new trade union Central Committee. The disagreements were so acute that the Party's C.C. deemed it necessary to step in. p. 112

[30] The reference is to the newspaper *Volya Rossii* (The Will of Russia). It was the Central Organ of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, and was published in Prague from September 12, 1920, to October 9, 1921. p. 115

[31] The reference is to the monarchist Kapp putsch in Germany in March 1920, organised by a reactionary military clique headed by Kapp. The Kapp government fell after a few days under pressure from the workers. p. 117

[32] The Central Administration for the Distribution of Books under the State Publishing House was set up in December 1919 to work out a national plan for the stocktaking and distribution of literature. p. 128

[33] F. Dobler's article "Modern Library Network" was published in *Pravda* No. 24, February 4, 1921. p. 132

[34] Lenin wrote a rough draft of the theses on February 8, 1921, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's C.C., which dealt with the problems of the spring sowing campaign and the condition of the peasants. It was the first document defining the new economic foundation of the workers' and peasants' alliance, charting the transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy. It was taken as a basis for the draft resolution on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system, which was adopted by the Tenth Party Congress on March 15, 1921. p. 133

[35] *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life)—a daily published from November 1918 to November 1937. It was initially the organ of the Supreme Economic Council and the economic People's Commissariats, and later, the organ of the People's Commissariat

for Finance of the U.S.S.R., the State Bank, other financial agencies and the Central Committee of the Bank Employees' Union. p. 137

[36] *Bulleten Gosudarstvennoi Komissii po Elektrifikatsii Rossii* (Bulletin of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia) was published by the State Publishing House of Technical Literature under the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council in Moscow from April to August 1920. There were five issues in all. p. 138

[37] The reference is to *Der Zukunftsstaat. Produktion und Konsum im Sozialstaat* (*The State of the Future. Production and Consumption in the Socialist State*), a book by Karl Ballod, a professor of political economy, which was published in Germany in 1898. The second revised edition appeared in 1919, and a Russian translation, in Moscow, in 1920. p. 140

[38] The quotations are from the resolution on electrification adopted by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 29, 1920. The draft resolution was written by Lenin. p. 141

[39] This and subsequent quotations are from the Party Programme adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 423). p. 143

[40] *Tit Titych*—a rich tyrannical merchant in A. N. Ostrovsky's comedy, *Shouldering Another's Trouble.* p. 145

[41] The Congress was held in Kharkov from February 25 to March 3, 1921. On its agenda were: a report, by the Government of the Ukrainian Republic and reports on economic construction, electrification of the Ukraine, organisation of labour, rehabilitation of transport, food and land problems, and public education.

On February 25, the Presidium sent Lenin an invitation to attend the Congress. In reply, Lenin cabled a message of greetings, which was read out at the second sitting on February 26. Lenin was elected a member of the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee. p. 146

[42] The meeting was called by the Moscow Party Committee under a decision of an activists' meeting held on February 24, 1921. The plenary meeting heard a report on the food situation and Lenin's report on the international and domestic situation. It adopted a unanimous message to the workers, peasants and Red Army men of Moscow and Moscow Gubernia giving the reasons for the food crisis. It also called on them to fight the enemies, who tried to exploit these temporary food difficulties for their counter-

revolutionary aims. The message was published in *Pravda* No. 45, on March 1, 1921. p. 147

[43] Negotiations between the governments of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey opened in Moscow on February 26, 1921, and ended with the signing, on March 16, of a treaty of friendship and brotherhood between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey. A treaty of friendship between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, was signed in Kars on October 13. p. 147

[44] The talks on the conclusion of a final peace treaty opened in Riga, after the preliminary peace treaty between Poland, on the one hand, and Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine, on the other, was signed on October 12, 1920. The talks went on for five months. The Polish Government, instigated by France, continued its aggressive acts against the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia and hampered the peace conference in every way. Decisive diplomatic action by the Soviet Government and the defeat of Wrangel, who was an ally of bourgeois-landowner Poland, compelled the Polish Government to conclude peace. The final peace treaty was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921, under which Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were ceded to Poland.

The Riga Peace Treaty was abrogated by the Soviet Government on September 17, 1939, when Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia joined the Soviet Union in accordance with the will of their peoples. p. 148

[45] The followers of B. V. Savinkov (1879-1925), a leader of the counter-revolutionary revolts against the Soviet power in 1918-21. p. 153

[46] The reference is to the article *Surplus Appropriation or Tax* by P. Sorokin and M. Rogov, published by way of discussion in *Pravda* No. 35 and No. 43, on February 17 and 26, 1921. The discussion in the press was started under the February 16, 1920 decision of the C.C. Political Bureau. p. 156

[47] *The Tenth Party Congress* was held in Moscow on March 8-16, 1921. It was attended by 694 delegates with voice and vote and 296 with voice only. They represented 732,521 Party members. The items on the agenda were: 1) Report of the Central Committee; 2) Report of the Control Commission; 3) The trade unions' economic role; 4) The Socialist Republic in a capitalist encirclement, foreign trade, concessions, etc.; 5) Food supply, surplus-food appropriation, tax in kind and fuel crisis; 6) Problems of Party organisation; 7) The Party's current tasks in the nationalities question; 8) Reorganisation of the army and the militia question; 9) The Chief Administration for Political Education and the Party's propaganda and agitation work; 10) Report of the R.C.P.'s

representative in the Comintern, and its current tasks; 11) Report of the R.C.P.'s representatives in the International Trade Union Council; 12) Elections to the Central Committee, the Control Commission and the Auditing Commission. The Congress resolutions dealt with the key political and economic problems.

Lenin guided the entire work of the Congress: he delivered the opening and closing speeches and gave reports on the political activity of the C.C., the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system, the Party's unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, the trade unions and the fuel crisis. He drafted the main resolutions. He gave a profound theoretical and political substantiation of the necessity of transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP). The Congress adopted historic decisions on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system, and the transition to NEP, which was designed to draw millions of peasants into socialist construction.

The Congress paid special attention to the Party's unity. Lenin exposed and sharply criticised the anti-Marxist views of the opposition groups. The resolution "On Party Unity" adopted on Lenin's motion ordered the immediate dissolution of all factions and groups which tended to weaken the Party's unity. The Congress authorised the Central Committee to apply, as an extreme measure, expulsion from the Party to C.C. members who engaged in factional activity.

The Congress also adopted Lenin's draft resolution "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in our Party", which exposed the views of the Workers' Opposition as an expression of petty-bourgeois, anarchist vacillations. The propaganda of anarcho-syndicalist ideas was found to be incompatible with membership in the Party. With the country engaged in peaceful socialist construction, the Congress came down in favour of broader democracy within the Party.

The Congress summed up the discussion on the trade unions' role in economic development, condemned the ideas of the Trotskyites, the Workers' Opposition, the Democratic Centralism group and other opportunist trends, and approved Lenin's platform by an overwhelming majority, terming the trade unions as a school of communism, and suggesting measures to develop trade union democracy.

A commission headed by Lenin worked out the Congress's decisions on the Party's nationalities policy in the new conditions: to eliminate the actual inequality of peoples which had been oppressed in tsarist Russia, and draw them into socialist construction. The Congress condemned the anti-Party deviations on the nationalities question, great-power chauvinism and local nationalism, which were a grave danger to communism and proletarian internationalism.

On the newly elected 25-man Central Committee were Lenin, Artyom (F. A. Sergeyev), F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. I. Kalinin, G. K. Orjonikidze, M. V. Frunze, Y. E. Rudzutak, J. V. Stalin,

Y. M. Yaroslavsky; S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuibyshev, V. Y. Chubar were among the alternate members.

The historic decisions of the Tenth Congress charted the ways of transition from capitalism to socialism, and methods of construction of socialism in the new conditions; they stressed the importance of greater unity between the proletariat and the peasantry, and stronger Party leadership in the construction of socialism. p. 165

[48] The Second Congress, which laid the programme, tactical and organisational foundations of the Comintern, was held from July 19 to August 7, 1920. It opened in Petrograd, but was transferred to Moscow on July 23. More than 200 delegates represented Communist Parties and workers' organisations from 37 countries.

At the first sitting, Lenin gave a report on the international situation and the main tasks of the Comintern. Later he made speeches on the Communist Party, the nationalities and colonial questions, parliamentarism and other questions. He took part in the work of most of the commissions.

The Congress adopted Lenin's 21 conditions of affiliation to the Communist International, which was of great importance for creating and strengthening the new type of workers' parties in the capitalist countries. The ideas in Lenin's classic *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* served as the basis of the Congress's resolutions. Lenin also took part in drafting a resolution "On the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution", which stressed that the Communist Party was the principal instrument in the liberation of the working class. Lenin's theses on the nationalities and colonial question and on the agrarian question were also adopted as resolutions.

The Congress stimulated the international communist movement. Lenin said that after the Congress "communism has become central to the working-class movement as a whole". p. 167

[49] *The Ninth Congress* was held in Moscow from March 29 to April 5, 1920. It was attended by 715 delegates, the greatest number ever, who represented 611,978 Party members. Of them 553 had voice and vote, and 162, voice only. The delegates came from Central Russia, the Ukraine, the Urals, Siberia and other areas just liberated by the Red Army. Some delegates came straight from the front lines. The country was having a short respite after the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin.

Items on the agenda were: 1) Report of the Central Committee; 2) Current tasks of economic construction; 3) Trade union movement; 4) Organisational questions; 5) Tasks of the Communist International; 6) Attitude to co-operatives; 7) Transition to the militia system; 8) Election of the Central Committee; 9) Current business.

Lenin guided the work of the Congress. He made a report on the Central Committee's political activity and a summing-up speech;

he spoke on economic construction and the co-operatives; he proposed a list of candidates for election to the Central Committee. He also delivered the closing speech of the Congress.

In the resolution, "The Current Tasks of Economic Construction", the Congress stated that "the main condition of the country's economic rehabilitation is the undeviating implementation of an integrated economic plan projected for the immediate historical period ahead". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 478). Lenin considered its key item—electrification—to be a great programme for a period of 10 or 20 years. The Congress's directives served as the basis for GOELRO (the Plan of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia), which was completed and adopted by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920.

The Congress also dealt with industrial management. The resolution on this question stressed the need to develop competent, firm and vigorous administration on the basis of one-man management.

The anti-Party group of Democratic Centralism (T. V. Sapronov, N. Osinsky [V. V. Obolensky], V. M. Smirnov) came out against the Party's line in economic construction, but its proposals were condemned and rejected by the Congress.

The Congress discussed and approved the idea of labour emulation and communist *subbotniks*.

The Congress discussed the trade unions' activity in helping to fulfil the economic tasks. It defined their role, their relationship with the Party and the state, the forms and methods of the Party's leadership in the trade unions and their participation in economic construction.

At a closed session on April 4, the Congress elected 19 members and 12 alternate members of the new Central Committee. p. 168

[50] The reference is to the Party discussion of the trade unions' role and tasks in socialist construction. Lenin analysed these problems and criticised the anti-Party groups in his articles: *The Trade Unions*, *The Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes*; *The Party Crisis*; *Once Again on the Trade Unions*, *The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin*, and also in his speeches at the Second All-Russia Congress of Miners and at the Tenth Party Congress. p. 168

[51] The Soviet Government did its utmost to establish normal and good-neighbour relations with Poland. In 1919, it offered peace on many occasions, but received no answer from her bourgeois-landowner government, which continued in its hostile policy towards Soviet Russia.

On January 28, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. sent the Polish Government and people a message re-emphasising its recognition of Poland's independence and

sovereignty, and offering to make sizable territorial concessions to Poland.

On February 2, 1920, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee once again offered peace to the Polish people. Their reactionary government was dependent on the imperialists of the Entente and considered the Soviet concessions a sign of weakness. It was preparing for aggression against the Soviet Republic and the negotiations failed. p. 171

[52] *The 21 conditions for admission to the Comintern* were adopted by its Second Congress on August 6, 1920. Lenin worked out 19 of the conditions, which were published before the Congress. He submitted the 20th to the Congress commission on July 25, 1920, and it was adopted. The 21st condition ran: "Members of the Party who reject the obligations and theses of the Communist International in principle should be expelled from the Party. This also applies to delegates of extraordinary Party congresses." p. 180

[53] An international organisation set up at the Paris Peace Conference of victor powers in 1919. The League's working organs were its Assembly, Council and Permanent Secretariat headed by a secretary-general. Its Covenant, a part of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, was signed by 44 states. It was so couched as to create the impression that the League served the purposes of peace and security, worked for a reduction of armaments, and opposed aggression. Actually, however, it pandered to the aggressors, and encouraged the arms drive and preparations for the Second World War.

From 1920 to 1934, the League's activity was hostile to the Soviet state and in 1920 and 1921 the League was the organisational centre of armed intervention against it.

On September 15, 1934, on the initiative of French diplomats, 34 member-states sent the Soviet Union an invitation to join the League. In joining, the U.S.S.R. tried to create a peace front, but the reactionary circles of the Western powers resisted its efforts. When the war broke out, the League actually ceased to operate, although it was formally dissolved in April 1946, under a special Assembly decision. p. 180

[54] The trade agreement between Britain and Soviet Russia was signed on March 16, 1921. p. 181

[55] The counter-revolutionary mutiny in Kronstadt which began on February 28, 1921, was organised by the S.R.s, Mensheviks and whiteguards. It involved newly recruited sailors, most of whom came from the countryside and were politically ignorant and discontented with the surplus appropriation system. The mutiny was sparked off by the economic hardships and facilitated by the fact that the Kronstadt Bolshevik organisation was weakened.

The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie did not dare come out against the Soviet power openly and used a new tactic. In an

attempt to deceive the people the leaders of the mutiny put forward the slogan "Soviets without the Bolsheviks", hoping to drive out the Bolsheviks from the Soviets and re-establish capitalist rule in Russia.

On March 2, the mutineers arrested the fleet command and got in touch with foreign imperialists who promised them military and financial aid. The events in Kronstadt were a threat to Petrograd.

Red Army units under M. N. Tukhachevsky and over 300 delegates of the Tenth Party Congress who had military experience, led by K. Y. Voroshilov, were sent to storm Kronstadt. On March 18, the revolt was crushed. p. 183

[56] On June 8, 1918, Samara was occupied by the mutinous Czechoslovak corps which set up a whiteguard-S.R.-Menshevik government, the so-called Komuch (A Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly). By August 1918, Komuch had, with the aid of Czechoslovak units, occupied some gubernias on the Volga and in the Urals area, but that autumn it was defeated by the Red Army and ceased to exist. p. 185

[57] The substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system was discussed on February 8, 1921, at the C.C. Political Bureau, when N. Osinsky gave a report on "The Sowing Campaign and the Condition of the Peasants". A special commission was set up to work out proposals for improving the peasants' condition. For this commission Lenin wrote the *Rough Draft of Theses Concerning the Peasants* and defined the main principles on which the tax in kind was to be substituted for surplus appropriation.

Under a Political Bureau decision of February 16, a discussion on the question was started in *Pravda*, the first articles appearing on February 17 and 26.

On February 24, a C.C. Plenary Meeting approved a draft resolution on this question, which was then edited by a new commission. On March 3, Lenin tabled three amendments to it. On March 7, the C.C. Plenary Meeting discussed the draft once again and referred it for final editing to a commission headed by Lenin. It was adopted by the Tenth Congress on March 15, 1921. p. 187

[58] The Central Committee's circular letter, "To All Party Organisations and Party Members", published in *Izvestia of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* on September 4, 1920, exposed the causes of the bureaucratic practices and other shortcomings in the Party, and outlined changes in Party work to develop inner-Party democracy. The measures were approved in a resolution, "The Current Tasks of Party Organisation", of the Ninth All-Russia Party Conference. See *K.P.S.S v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 512). On December 28, the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets discussed the report, "Improvement

of the Work of Central and Local Soviet Bodies and the Struggle Against the Evils of Bureaucracy". p. 190

59 *A Moscow Gubernia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* took place in the Kremlin from November 20 to 22, 1920. It was attended by 289 delegates with voice and vote, and 89, with voice only. On its agenda were reports on the activity of the Moscow Party Committee, the international and domestic situation and the Party's tasks, the state of the country's economy, and production propaganda.

The atmosphere at the Conference was very tense, because the Bolsheviks had to fight against the anti-Party groups of Democratic Centralism, the Workers' Opposition and the Ignatovites, who made demagogic attacks on the Party's policy. The Workers' Opposition tried to get as many of their supporters on the Moscow Committee as possible and called a special meeting of worker delegates in the Mitrofanyevsky Hall of the Great Kremlin Palace, while the other delegates had a meeting in the Sverdlovsky Hall.

At the afternoon sitting on November 21, Lenin spoke on the international and domestic situation and the Party's tasks, and later, on the elections to the Moscow Committee.

Led by Lenin, the Conference beat back the anti-Party attacks. p. 195

60 *The Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* was held in Moscow from September 22 to 25, 1920. Its 241 delegates (116 with voice and vote, and 125, with voice only) represented 700,000 Party members. On its agenda were: 1) Report by a representative of the Polish Communists; 2) Political report of the C.C.; 3) Organisational report of the C.C.; 4) The current tasks of Party organisation; 5) Report of a commission on the study of the history of the Party; 6) Report on the Second Congress of the Comintern.

At the first sitting Lenin gave the political report of the Central Committee, dealing mainly with peace negotiations with Poland and preparations for defeating Wrangel. The Conference adopted a unanimous resolution on the terms of a peace treaty with Poland.

Having discussed the current tasks of Party organisation, the Conference rejected the views of the Democratic Centralism group, which tried to discredit the one-man management system in industry, and to oppose Party discipline and the Party's leading role in the Soviets and trade unions.

A resolution, "The Current Tasks of Party Organisation", motioned by Lenin, outlined some measures for strengthening the Party and its leading role in the Soviet state, and developing inner-Party democracy, and also measures against the excesses of bureaucracy in Soviet administrative bodies and economic agencies. The Conference deemed it necessary to set up a Control Commission alongside the Central Committee, and special Party commissions under gubernia committees, to combat various abuses and to inquire into complaints filed by Communists. p. 195

[61] *The Second Congress of Miners* was held in Moscow's Trade Union House from January 25 to February 2, 1921. Its 295 delegates with voice and vote, and 46 with voice only, represented over 332,000 members of the Miners' Trade Union. Lenin and Kalinin were elected Honorary Chairmen.

The Congress heard and discussed a report of the Minors' Trade Union Central Committee and reports of the Mining Council and its chief administrations; discussed fuel supply, organisation of production and other problems.

From January 22 to 24, the R.C.P.(B.) group had four meetings to discuss the trade unions' role and tasks. Lenin gave a report on January 23 and the absolute majority of the group voted for his platform.

The Congress helped to mobilise the people to combat the fuel crisis and to work out production programmes for the mining industry.

Lenin is quoting a speech by a Siberian delegate from Kollontai's pamphlet, *The Workers' Opposition* (Moscow, 1921). The text quoted by Kollontai is not in the report of the Siberian delegate as it is given in the Minutes of the Second Congress of Miners. p. 198

[62] The reference is to the speeches of Angel Pestana, of the Spanish National Confederation of Labour, and of Jack Tanner, of the British Shop Stewards Committee, at the sitting of the Second Congress of the Comintern of July 23, 1920. p. 199

[63] The reference is to the Kharkov non-Party City Conference on March 5-6, 1921, on the food problem. It was attended by about 2,000 delegates. Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks sharply criticised the activity of economic and food supply bodies, but the Conference did not support their resolution. On the report of the Chairman of the Kharkov Gubernia Executive Committee it adopted a resolution mapping out concrete measures to improve the workers' food supplies. p. 204

[64] The reference is to the anti-Soviet documents of the Kronstadt mutineers: a resolution of a general meeting of the battleships' 1st and 2nd brigades on March 1, and the provisional committee's appeal, "To the Population of the Fortress and the Town of Kronstadt", issued on March 2, 1921. p. 204

[65] The Conference was held in Moscow from November 2 to 6, 1920, and was attended by 202 delegates with voice and vote, and 59, with voice only. The tasks of peaceful socialist construction demanded a reorganisation of trade union activity on the basis of greater democratisation, and this was opposed by Trotsky. At the Communist group meeting on November 3, he demanded the immediate "governmentalisation" of the trade unions, and the introduction of military methods of command and administration. His speech started the Party discussion on the trade unions, but his demands were rejected by the Communist delegates.

Y. E. Rudzutak gave a report on the trade unions' tasks in industry. The Conference adopted his theses, which were based on Lenin's ideas that it was necessary to enhance the role of the trade unions in industry, develop democratic principles in their work, and strengthen the Party's leadership in the trade union movement. These ideas were later developed in the resolution, "The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions", adopted by the Tenth Party Congress. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 534-49). p. 210

[66] The reference is to Trotsky's speech at a joint meeting of Communist delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets and Communist members of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions on December 30, 1920. p. 211

[67] The resolution on railway and water transport and its further development was adopted by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 29, 1920. p. 211

[68] The "*Platform of Ten*" ("Draft Decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions") was worked out during the trade union discussion in November 1920 and signed by V. I. Lenin, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), G. Y. Zinoviev, M. I. Kalinin, L. B. Kamenev, S. A. Lozovsky, J. V. Stalin, M. P. Tomsky, Y. E. Rudzutak and G. I. Petrovsky. The Tenth Congress's resolution on the role and tasks of the trade unions was based on the "Platform of 10", which was supported by the majority of Party members. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 534-49). p. 212

[69] See Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 322). p. 212

[70] See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 422). p. 213

[71] Lenin's draft resolution on the co-operatives was adopted at the fourteenth sitting of the Tenth Party Congress, on March 15, 1921. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 564). p. 221

[72] The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) adopted a resolution "On the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus Appropriation System". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the

Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 563-64). p. 222

[73] Clare Sheridan, an English sculptor, who visited Soviet Russia in 1920. p. 222

[74] *The Fifth All-Ukraine Party Conference* was held in Kharkov in November 1920. Out of 316 delegates, only 23, or 7 per cent, voted for the Workers' Opposition platform. p. 241

[75] *Diskussionny Listok* (Discussion Bulletin)—a non-periodical publication of the Party Central Committee, issued under a decision of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) held in September 1920. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 509).

Two issues—in January and in February 1921—came out before the Tenth Congress, and it was subsequently issued during discussions and before Party congresses. p. 243

[76] The resolution "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 530-33). p. 243

[77] Under a decision of the Tenth Congress, Point 7 of the resolution, "On Party Unity", was not published at the time. The Thirteenth Party Conference in January 1924 condemned the factional activity of Trotsky and his supporters and decided to make public Point 7. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 785, item 14). It appeared in the *Bulletin* of the Thirteenth Party Conference. p. 244

[78] Lenin gave a report on Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation at the final, sixteenth, sitting of the Congress on March 16, 1921. The Workers' Opposition and the Democratic Centralism groups came out against Lenin's draft resolutions on these questions. But after Lenin's summing-up speech, his resolutions were carried by an overwhelming majority. p. 249

[79] See Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*; Marx's letter to J. Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852; and Engels, *Anti-Dühring*; *The Origin of the Family*, *Private Property and the State*. p. 250

[80] An anarchist "Leftist" group broke away from the German Communist Party and in April 1920 formed the so-called Communist Workers' Party of Germany. The "Leftists" held petty-bourgeois, anarcho-syndicalist views. Their representatives to the Second Congress of the Comintern, Otto Rühle and A. Merges, failed to

win any support, and walked out. The party had no support within the working class and later degenerated into an insignificant sectarian group. p. 252

[81] Its resolution on the agrarian question adopted on August 4, 1920. See *Vtoroi kongress* ... (The Second Congress of the Communist International, July-August 1920, Moscow, 1934, pp. 522-31). p. 253

[82] The reference is to A. Z. Kamensky's speech. p. 258

[83] On behalf of the Workers' Opposition, S. P. Medvedyev motioned a resolution to counter Lenin's draft resolution "On Party Unity". The former was rejected by a majority of the Tenth Party Congress. p. 260

[84] The resolution was adopted, with some slight changes, by the Tenth Party Congress. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 533). p. 260

[85] D. B. Ryazanov motioned an amendment to Lenin's draft resolution "On Party Unity". It said: "While condemning all factional activity, the Congress vigorously opposes any election to the Congress by platform." *Desyaty syezd* ... (The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.[B.], March 1921, Moscow, 1963, p. 539). On Lenin's motion, the amendment was rejected by the Congress. p. 261

[86] The draft instructions of the Presidium of the Tenth Congress to the delegates going to the localities are at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 267

[87] *Le Matin*—a French bourgeois daily, published in Paris from 1884. Its last issue appeared in August 1944. p. 268

[88] The Congress was held, under a decision of the Central Committee, in Moscow from March 22 to 31, 1921. Most of its 1,079 delegates were Communists. The items on the agenda were: report of Tsektran; report of the People's Commissar for Communications; report of the Central Board of the River Transport Workers section; wage rates; transport workers' food supplies, and international confederation of transport workers.

Lenin was elected Honorary Chairman of the Congress. On the eve of the Congress, on March 25, 1921, Lenin had a talk with V. V. Fomin, Deputy Commissar for Communications, about the work of the Congress and the composition of the next Tsektran. Lenin's speech at the March 27 afternoon sitting was published as a pamphlet in 1921.

The Congress drove out the Trotskyites from the Tsektran

leadership, and called on the transport workers to take an active part in the rehabilitation of the national economy. p. 272

[89] Lenin's reply to a letter from the Trade Union Committee of the First State Motor Works informing him about the production of motors and inviting him to attend a ceremony on April 7, 1921.

Lenin sent his congratulations. Wishing his message to be cabled to the workers at the right time, he wrote: "To be sent at 12 o'clock." p. 285

[90] The meeting was called by the Moscow Party Committee to explain the decisions of the Tenth Party Congress. It took place at Trade Union House, and was also attended by the Moscow Bolsheviks who had taken part in liquidating the Kronstadt counter-revolutionary mutiny, and the volost activists working among Moscow Gubernia peasant women. The report on the tax in kind was given by Lenin. p. 286

[91] *The Poor Peasants' Committees* were set up under the June 11, 1918 decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, "On the Organisation and Supply of Poor Peasants". They were to take stock of the food stored on peasant farms; to uncover surplus food on kulak farms, and to help the Soviet food supply bodies in requisitioning such surpluses and distributing them among the poor peasants. They were also to distribute farming machines, manufactured goods, etc. The committees actually became organs of the proletarian dictatorship in the villages. Their activity embraced all spheres of work and signified the further development of the socialist revolution in the countryside. At the end of 1918, after they had fulfilled their tasks, the committees were merged with volost and village Soviets.

In the Ukraine, they existed from 1920 to 1933, uniting land-starved and landless peasants. p. 295

[92] *The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk* between Soviet Russia and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) was signed in Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, and ratified by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on March 15. The terms of the treaty were extremely onerous for Soviet Russia: Germany and Austria-Hungary secured almost complete control over Poland, nearly the whole of the Baltic area, and a part of Byelorussia; the Ukraine seceded from Soviet Russia and became a German dependency; the cities of Kars, Batum and Ardagan were ceded to Turkey. In August 1918, Germany made Soviet Russia sign a supplementary treaty and a financial agreement whose terms were even more onerous.

The Brest Treaty was signed as a result of a great effort on Lenin's part, who had to fight Trotsky and the anti-Party "Left Communist" group. His wise and flexible tactics in extremely complicated conditions yielded the only correct policy: the Brest peace was a reasonable political compromise, which gave

the Soviet state a respite and an opportunity to demobilise the old disintegrating army and to create a new one—the Red Army. It allowed the country to get on with socialist construction and to build up resources for the coming struggle against internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention. This policy generated peaceful sentiments and promoted the growth of the revolutionary mood in the armies and the population of all the belligerent countries. After the November 1918 revolution in Germany overthrew the monarchy, the Brest Treaty was annulled by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 13. p. 295

[93] The conference was held in Moscow on April 5-7, 1921, as a preliminary to the All-Russia Congress of Women of the East. It was attended by 45 Communist delegates from Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Bashkiria, the Crimea, the Caucasus, Tataria, Siberia and some gubernias with a Turkic and mountaineer population.

It discussed the economic and juridical status of women in the East, their organisation, and agitation and propaganda among them.

The delegates sent Lenin an invitation to attend the conference, and in reply received the telegram in question. They sent him another message of greetings at the close of the conference. p. 299

[94] The meeting was held on April 11, 1921, to discuss the concessions question, because some leading trade unionists were hesitant, while A. G. Shlyapnikov and D. B. Ryazanov carried on demagogic propaganda against the idea of concessions.

Lenin gave a report on the issue, argued against Shlyapnikov's and Ryazanov's statements in the debate and made notes of all the arguments, which he used in his summing-up speech. He defined the essence of the concessions policy and its importance for the Soviet state. p. 300

[95] The reference is to the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress, "The Soviet Republic in Capitalist Encirclement". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 566-67). p. 300

[96] On February 1, 1921, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on oil concessions in Baku and Grozny, which made it necessary to work out the basic principles of concessions agreements. A. I. Rykov, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, was assigned to draft the project. As the work dragged out, Lenin studied the relevant material and in late March came out with a project, "The Basic Principles of Concessions Agreements". He made some additions and corrections (the document is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.C., C.P.S.U.) in the original (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 148), and his draft project was adopted as the basis of the March 29 resolution of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 302

[97] In March 1921, the workers of Mansfeld, led by Communists, went on strike against an order setting up police patrols at plants and factories in Central Germany. In some places there were armed clashes with the police. The workers of Berlin, Hamburg and several other towns expressed their solidarity with the heroic strikers, but the Communist Party of Germany failed to unite the working-class forces against the bourgeoisie because of the treacherous behaviour of Paul Levi and other opportunists in the party leadership.

The miners' strike in Britain lasted from April until June 1921, in protest of the mineowners' intention to cut wages. More than a million workers participated in the strike, with all the miners taking part. The miners' federation called on the executive committees of the transport and railway unions to strike in solidarity, but their reformist leaders were secretly negotiating with the government and the mineowners for a compromise to break up the strike. The miners had to return to work after a heroic three-month struggle. p. 307

[98] The conference (April 10-20, 1921) was attended by over 1,000 delegates from Petrograd factories and plants. It discussed the following questions: 1) The tasks of the working class and its participation in the economic construction of Soviet Russia; 2) Workers' living conditions in connection with the tasks of organising production; 3) Problems of food and workers' supply. The Mensheviks who got in as non-party workers did not succeed in disrupting the meeting because the mass of workers expressed a desire to work with the Communist Party.

The delegates sent their greetings to Lenin and invited him to the meeting. Lenin's reply was read out at the final sitting on April 20. p. 319

[99] The documents are preliminary material for Lenin's pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind* (*The Significance of the New Policy and Its Conditions*).

The first document is an initial plan of the pamphlet; on its basis, Lenin worked out a more detailed plan—Document Two—and also Documents Three and Four. The third document also includes a summary of the part of the pamphlet dealing with state capitalism; and the fourth is an outline of its final part: "Political Summary and Deductions". p. 320

[100] The reference is to paragraph 2 of the economic section of the Party Programme adopted by the Eighth Party Congress. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 21). p. 323

[101] Figures for 1920 showing the relative population of the imperialist countries and the colonies; out of the world's 1,750

million people, 250 million, or 1/7, lived in the imperialist countries, and 1,000 million, or 4/7, in the colonies. p. 323

[102] Lenin began to work on *The Tax in Kind* pamphlet at the end of March 1921, just after the Tenth Party Congress, and finished it on April 21. He attached great importance to its earliest publication and distribution, because it explained the necessity of transition to the New Economic Policy. In early May, it was published as a pamphlet, and was soon after carried by the magazine *Krasnaya Nov* No. 1; it later appeared in pamphlet form in many towns, and was reprinted in part and in full in central and local papers. In 1921, it was translated into German, English and French.

A special resolution of the Central Committee instructed all regional, gubernia and uyezd Party committees to use the pamphlet to explain the New Economic Policy to the working people. p. 329

[103] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—a daily published in Petrograd from April 18 (May 1), 1917, to July 1918 by a group of Menshevik internationalists and the writers who contributed to the magazine *Letopis* (Chronicle).

Lenin said their prevailing mood was one of intellectual scepticism, which is an expression of and a cover up for lack of principle.

The newspaper was hostile to the October Revolution and the Soviet power. From June 1, 1918, it appeared simultaneously in Moscow and Petrograd but both editions were closed down in July 1918.

Vperyod (Forward)—a daily published in Moscow from March 1917, first by the Moscow Menshevik organisation and then as the organ of the Moscow and Central Region Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks), and from April 2, 1918, as the organ of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks. L. Martov, F. I. Dan and A. S. Martynov were among its editors. On May 10, 1918, it was closed down by the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) for counter-revolutionary activity and its editors were committed for trial. On May 14, the paper resumed publication under the name *Vsegda Vperyod*! (Always Forward!) and was finally closed down in February 1919 under an All-Russia C.E.C. decision. p. 335

[104] See Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 24). p. 335

[105] See Engels, *The Peasant Question In France and Germany* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 438). p. 337

[106] A paraphrase of Pushkin's words from his poem *A Hero*, in which he says that he prefers the stimulating falsehood to a mass of sordid truths. p. 349

[107] *Oblomov*—a Russian landowner from I. A. Goncharov's eponymous novel, personifying sluggishness, stagnation and inertia. p. 350

[108] The reference is to the Plan for the Electrification of Russia worked out by a State Commission which consisted of the best scientists and specialists. It was the first long-range integrated state plan for laying the material foundation of socialism through electrification. The plan was published as a pamphlet for the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and was approved by it. p. 350

[109] *The Eighth Party Congress*, held in Moscow from March 18 to 23, 1919, was attended by 301 delegates with voice and vote, and 102 with voice only. They represented 313,766 Party members.

The items on the agenda were: 1) Report of the Central Committee; 2) Programme of the R.C.P.(B.); 3) Formation of the Communist International; 4) The military situation and military policy; 5) Work in the countryside; 6) Organisational questions; 7) Election to the Central Committee.

Lenin delivered the opening and closing speeches at the Congress, gave the report of the Central Committee, and the reports on the Party Programme, work in the countryside, and military policy.

The key problem before the Congress was the new Party Programme, worked out under Lenin's guidance and with his participation. The Congress approved Lenin's draft Programme, and rejected Bukharin's anti-Bolshevik proposals.

The Congress also supported Lenin's programme on the nationalities question and rejected Pyatakov's and Bukharin's proposals to exclude from the Programme the paragraph on the right of nations to self-determination.

After Lenin's summing-up speech on the Party Programme, the Congress decided to "adopt the draft Programme as a whole" and refer it to a programme commission for final editing. The latter asked Lenin to write "The draft Third Paragraph of the Political Section of the Programme (For the Programme Commission of the Eighth Party Congress)", which it later adopted. On March 22, the Congress approved the final text of the Programme.

Another key problem was the attitude to the middle peasants. In his speeches, specifically in his report on work in the countryside, Lenin substantiated the Party's new policy: transition from the policy of neutralisation to solid alliance between the working class and the middle peasantry, based on support from the poor peasants and struggle against the kulaks, with the proletariat retaining its leadership of the alliance. Lenin first put forward the slogan in late November 1918. The Congress adopted Lenin's "Resolution on the Attitude Towards the Middle Peasantry".

While discussing the military situation, the Party's military policy and Red Army organisation, the so-called Military Opposition came out against the Central Committee's theses (the Opposition included former "Left Communists"—V. M. Smirnov,

G. I. Safarov, and G. L. Pyatakov—and some independents). The Military Opposition favoured retention of some guerrilla methods, and opposed strict discipline in the army and enlistment of the services of old military specialists. At a closed plenary session on March 21, Lenin spoke in defence of the C.C. theses, and was supported by most of the speakers, who denounced the Military Opposition. The mistakes and shortcomings of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and its Chairman, Trotsky, were exposed and severely criticised in the military section and at plenary sessions.

The C.C. theses were assumed as a basis by a majority of 174 against 95, and a co-ordination commission worked out a resolution on the military question based on Lenin's directives, which was adopted by the Congress (with only one abstention).

Lenin's ideas on the military question were incorporated in the Party Programme and served as guidance in military organisation.

The resolution on the organisational question denounced the Sapronov-Osinsky opportunist group, which denied the Party's leadership within the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The decision on Party organisation stressed the need to raise the standards for admission of non-worker and non-peasant elements into the Party, to maintain its social composition. It was decided to carry out a general registration of all Party members by May 1, 1919. The Congress rejected the federal principle of Party organisation and approved the principle of an integrated centralised Communist Party working under the guidance of a single Central Committee.

The newly elected Central Committee was headed by Lenin. The Congress welcomed the establishment of the Third (Communist) International and adopted its platform. p. 351

[110] An international association of Centrist parties and groups (temporarily made to leave the Second International by revolutionary-minded workers' masses) called the "Two-and-a-Half International". It was set up in Vienna in 1921 and broke up in 1923, when it rejoined the Second International. p. 356

[111] The Menshevik émigré journal, *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* (Socialist Herald), was founded by L. Martov. It was published in Berlin from 1921, and later in Paris. It is now published in the United States. p. 359

[112] Sixteen of Lenin's speeches were recorded by the Central Periodicals Administration from 1919 to 1921. After the only record factory in Russia was restored, Lenin showed great interest in propaganda through records and in many ways helped to organise it. His first speeches were recorded in a specially equipped room at the Kremlin and the last, at the Central Periodicals Administration. Recording time was three minutes, and Lenin was always pleased when he managed to stay within limits. Sales ran to tens of thousands of records with special popularity enjoyed by his

speeches, "On the Middle Peasants", "What is the Soviet Power?" and "On the Tax in Kind". The speeches published in this volume were recorded on April 25, 1921. p. 366

[113] Under a resolution of the Tenth Party Congress (March 21, 1921) the All-Russia Central Executive Committee issued a decision (March 23) on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system. In pursuance of that decision, the Council of People's Commissars approved on March 28 and published on March 29 two decrees: "The Amount of the Tax in Kind for 1921-22" and "On Free Exchange, Purchase and Sale of Farm Produce in Gubernias Fulfilling Appropriations". On April 21 and later, the Council of People's Commissars adopted decisions on the tax rate for grain, potatoes, oil seeds and other farm produce. p. 366

[114] Lenin worked on the draft Instructions at the same time as he was preparing a draft decision of the C.L.D. (Council of Labour and Defence), entitled "On Local Economic Meetings, Records and Reports, and Guidance by the C.L.D.'s Instructions". Lenin made a thorough study of local documents on economic meetings and the first NEP measures. On May 20, 1921, the C.L.D. referred the draft Instructions and the draft decision to a special commission, which published the Instructions as a pamphlet because it was important to discuss them immediately. Members of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission and officials of departments and local bodies were invited to help edit the two drafts. On Lenin's proposal they were widely discussed by the working people. On May 24, they were discussed by the Fourth Congress of Economic Councils. On May 25, the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions instructed the newly elected All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions to consider the drafts and to insert the necessary amendments and addenda. The Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) approved the draft Instructions, authorising the All-Russia C.E.C. Communist Group to take steps to got them adopted as law. On May 30, both drafts were discussed at the Third Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, where Lenin delivered a speech. The session adopted them as a basis and referred them to a commission. Lenin introduced a number of editorial amendments to the C.E.C. decision, "On Local Economic Meetings", just before its final approval. On June 30, both drafts were adopted by the Presidium of the C.E.C. Because the Instructions defined the tasks of recording and reporting for all Commissariats and not only the economic ones, they were called "Instructions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence".

Lenin believed it was highly important to give the working people a thorough explanation of these Instructions and put them into practice as soon as possible. p. 375

[115] An extraordinary conference, held in Moscow from May 26 to 28, 1921, was attended by 239 delegates from Party and Soviet organisations. On its agenda were the following questions: 1) Economic policy: a) tax in kind; b) co-operatives; c) financial reform; d) small industry; 2) The current role of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks; 3) The Third Congress of the Comintern; 4) Information on the Fourth Trade Union Congress; 5) Organisational question.

The Conference centred on the question of the New Economic Policy (NEP) because it was not yet clear enough to the people in the localities.

Lenin guided the work of the Conference: he delivered the opening speech, spoke on the agenda, was elected to the Presidium, gave a report and a summing-up speech on the tax in kind, and the closing speech of the Conference. Substantiating the New Economic Policy, he exposed the false rumours about NEP and distortions of this policy, and stressed that it was a policy whose aim was the construction of a socialist society, that it was to be carried out "in earnest and for a long time". The Conference adopted Lenin's draft resolution, "On Economic Policy", which confirmed NEP's basic principles and gave concrete instructions for their implementation. It said: "The basic political task of the moment is for all Party and Soviet workers to master and implement to the letter the New Economic Policy. See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, p. 574).

After the Conference had heard information on the work of the Fourth Trade Union Congress, Lenin sharply criticised the factional activity of the trade union leadership, first and foremost M. P. Tomsky, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.

Another question of great importance was the organisational work of the Party, the report on which was given by V. M. Molotov. The Conference adopted a "Plan for the Work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)" which demanded the training and promotion of new Party workers and activisation of all Party and Soviet work. Lenin stressed that Party organisations had to establish closer ties with the non-Party masses and that it was necessary to collect and study the experience of local Party organisations. His remarks were taken into account in the resolution.

Representatives of the Communist Parties of Germany and the United States conveyed greetings to the Conference, and, on the motion of the Presidium, the Conference cabled a message of greetings to workers detained in prison. p. 399

[116] The reference is to the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions, held in Moscow from May 17 to 25, 1921, and the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils, held there from May 18 to 24, 1921.

The Fourth Congress of Trade Unions had the following items on its agenda: report of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade

Unions; report of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council; the role and tasks of the trade unions and economic development; organisational question; wage-rate policy and workers' supply; trade unions and co-operatives; labour protection, etc.

The Fourth Congress of Economic Councils had on its agenda: report of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, economic policy of the S.E.C. in connection with the decree on the tax in kind and the co-operatives, S.E.C. organisation, report of the State Planning Commission; report on foreign trade; electrification of Russia; material resources of the Republic and organisation of supply in industry.

The most important questions were discussed at joint sittings of the two congresses with the participation of specialists and public figures. p. 415

[117] Colonel of the gendarmerie Zubatov, Chief of the Secret Political Police, proposed the setting up of legal workers' organisations in 1901-03 to divert the workers from political struggle against the tsarist autocracy, and to switch their attention to narrow economic demands which the government, he asserted, was ready to meet. The Minister for the Interior, V. K. Plehve, approved Zubatov's activity and the first organisation, called "Workers' mutual aid in mechanical industries society", was set up in Moscow in May 1901, and later such societies made their appearance in Minsk, Odessa, Vilno, Kiev, and other towns.

The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., in its resolution "On the Trade Union Struggle", defined Zubatovism as a policy of "systematic betrayal of working class interests for the benefit of the capitalists", and in order to fight it, called on Party organisations to support and lead any strikes started by legal workers' organisations.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats made use of such organisations to draw the masses of working people into the struggle against the tsarist government, exposing the reactionary nature of Zubatov's policy. Lenin wrote in 1905: "And now the Zubatov movement is outgrowing its bounds. Initiated by the police in the interests of the police, in the interests of supporting the autocracy and demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, this movement is turning against the autocracy and is becoming an outbreak of the proletarian class struggle."

The tsarist government had to close down the Zubatov organisations in 1903 because of the mounting revolutionary movement. p. 417

[118] *The Third Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee* met on May 30-31, 1921, to discuss M. I. Kalinin's report on the activity of its Presidium, the sowing campaign, agencies co-ordinating the activity of economic Commissariats and local economic bodies; substitution of a tax in kind for appropriation, Petrograd industry, and reorganisation of tribunals. It heard reports by the Tver Gubernia Executive Committee and the Siberian Revolutionary Committee.

Lenin spoke on local economic agencies at the afternoon sitting, and made notes of the debate on the question (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 91). p. 438

[119] The Conference was held in Moscow from June 16 to 24, 1921, and was attended by 499 delegates: gubernia food commissars, members of gubernia food committee collegiums, and representatives of various food agencies and gubernia executive committees, co-operatives and trade unions.

The questions on the agenda were: 1) tax in kind; 2) commodity exchange; 3) relationship between the food agencies and co-operatives; 4) principles of the state supply, etc.

Lenin was elected an honorary member of the Presidium and spoke at the first sitting.

The Conference helped to improve the food situation in the country. p. 441

[120] The reference is to the resolution of the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) "On Economic Policy". See *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh* ... (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings, Part 1, 1954, pp. 574-76). p. 444

[121] The Third Congress was held in Moscow from June 22 to July 12, 1921. Its 605 delegates (291 with voice and vote, and 314 with voice only) represented 103 organisations from 52 countries, namely: 48 Communist Parties, 8 Socialist Parties, 28 Youth Leagues, 4 syndicalist organisations, 2 opposition Communist Parties (the Communist Workers' Party of Germany and the Workers' Communist Party of Spain) and 13 other organisations. The 72 delegates from the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks were headed by Lenin.

The Congress discussed the world economic crisis and the new tasks of the Communist International; the report on the activity of the Executive Committee of the Communist International; the Communist Workers' Party of Germany; the Italian question; the tactics of the Communist International; the attitude of the Red International Council of Trade Unions to the Communist International; the struggle against the Amsterdam International; the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.); the Communist International and the Communist youth movement; the women's movement; the United Communist Party of Germany, etc.

Lenin directed preparations for and the activities of the Congress; he was elected its Honorary Chairman; he took part in drafting all the key resolutions; he gave a report on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.); he spoke in defence of the Communist International's tactics, on the Italian question; in the commissions and at the enlarged sittings of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and at the delegates' meetings. Before and during the Congress, Lenin met and talked with delegates about the state of affairs in the Communist Parties.

The Third Congress had a great influence on the formation and development of young Communist Parties. It paid great attention to the Comintern's organisation and tactics in the new conditions of the world communist movement. Lenin had to combat the Centrist deviation and "Leftist" dogmatism, pseudo-revolutionary "Leftist" cant and sectarianism. As a result, revolutionary Marxism prevailed over the "Leftist" danger.

In the history of the world communist movement the Third Congress is known for the following achievements: it worked out the basic tactics of the Communist Parties; it defined the task of winning the masses over to the side of the proletariat, strengthening working-class unity and implementing united front tactics. The most important aspect of its resolutions, Lenin said, was "more careful, more thorough preparation for fresh and more decisive battles, both defensive and offensive". p. 451

[122] On April 13, 1919, in Amritsar, an industrial centre in Punjab, India, British troops fired on a mass meeting of working people who were protesting against the colonialist reign of terror. About 1,000 were killed and 2,000 wounded. The massacre led to popular uprisings in Punjab and other provinces, which were ruthlessly suppressed by the British colonialists. p. 455

[123] *Posledniye Novosti* (The Latest News)—an émigré daily, the organ of the counter-revolutionary party of Constitutional-Democrats, published in Paris from April 1920 to July 1940. Its editor was P. N. Milyukov. p. 460

[124] *Kommunistichesky Trud* (Communist Labour)—a daily published by the Moscow R.C.P.(B.) Committee and the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies from March 18, 1920. On February 7, 1922, it took the name of *Rabochaya Moskva* (Workers' Moscow); on March 1, 1939, *Moskovsky Bolshevik* (Moscow Bolshevik), and ever since February 19, 1950, has been appearing as *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow Truth). p. 461

[125] *La Stampa* (Press)—an Italian bourgeois newspaper published in Turin since 1867. p. 462

[126] *Corriere della Sera* (Evening Courier)—an influential Italian bourgeois newspaper published in Milan since 1876. p. 462

[127] The conference of the reformist wing of the Italian Socialist Party, the so-called "socialist concentration" group, took place in Reggio Emilia on October 10-11, 1920. Lenin gave a detailed characteristic of it in his article, "On the Struggle Within the Italian Socialist Party" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 31, pp. 377-96).

The report on the conference mentioned by Lenin was published in *Corriere della Sera* No. 244 and No. 245, of October 11 and 12, 1920, as well as in *Avanti!* No. 245 of October 13, 1920. p. 462

[128] *Avanti!* (Forward!)—a daily, the Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in Rome in December 1896. During the First World War, it took an inconsistently internationalist stand, and did not break with the reformists. In 1926, the paper was closed down by Mussolini's fascist government, but continued to appear abroad. It resumed publication in Italy in 1943. p. 462

[129] Lenin apparently refers to the conference of the "unitary" group (Serrati, Baratono and others) in Florence on November 20-21, 1920, which came out against the break with the reformists and, with this reservation, for the acceptance of the 21 conditions of affiliation to the Communist International. p. 463

[130] In January 1919, the Ebert-Scheidemann government dismissed the Berlin police chief, Eichhorn (a Left-wing Independent) who was very popular with the workers. This sparked off a workers' protest demonstration on January 4, the day following Eichhorn's retirement, and later a general strike and an armed uprising to overthrow the Ebert-Scheidemann government. The Revolutionary Committee of Action which headed the uprising included some Independents and Karl Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck of the Communist Party of Germany. The Communist Party considered the uprising premature, but decided to support the revolutionary mass movement in every way. Berlin events fired the proletariat's revolutionary struggle in the Rheinland, the Ruhr, Bremen and elsewhere.

Alarmed by the scope of the movement, the Central Committee of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany started negotiations with the government, who used them for preparing a counter-revolutionary offensive. On January 11, its forces, led by Noske, attacked the workers and drowned their uprising in blood. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the leaders of the German working class, were arrested and killed at the height of the counter-revolutionary reign of terror. Workers' action in other parts of the country was fiercely suppressed. p. 463

[131] In September 1920, Italian steelworkers occupied their mills on the initiative of their trade union, which was in conflict with the association of industrialists. The movement started in Turin and Milan, then spread through Piedmont and Northern Italy across the country, from the metallurgical industry to other industries and to agriculture. In Sicily and in other areas peasants occupied the land. The scope of the movement jeopardised the capitalist regime, but the reformist leaders of the Socialist Party and the trade unions, terrified by the political character of the movement, adopted a decision to confine it to within the trade unions and prevent it from developing into a revolution. They also decided to start negotiations with the industrialists.

This was a hard blow at the Italian workers' movement and showed the leaders' inability to lead the mass forces. Fascism used

the confusion within the working class to start its armed offensive in Italy. p. 465

[132] The amendments were proposed by the German, Austrian and Italian delegations to the draft theses on tactics, motioned by the Russian delegation at the Third Congress of the Comintern. They were published in German in *Moskau*, the organ of the Third Congress. p. 468

[133] The Open Letter (Offener Brief) of the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany to the Socialist Party of Germany, Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Communist Workers' Party of Germany and all trade unions, was published in *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Banner) on January 8, 1921. The U.C.P.G. called on all workers, trade unions and socialist organisations to unite their forces in combating reaction and the capitalists' offensive against the working people's vital rights. Their programme of joint action included demands for higher pensions for disabled war veterans; elimination of unemployment; improvement of the country's finances at the expense of the monopolies, introduction of factory and plant committee control over all stocks of food, raw materials and fuel restarting of all closed enterprises; control over sowing, harvesting and marketing of farm produce by the Peasants' Councils together with the agricultural labourers' organisations; immediate disarming and dissolution of all bourgeois militarised organisations; establishment of workers' self-defence; amnesty of all political prisoners; immediate re-establishment of trade and diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Lenin said these tactics were "*quite correct*" (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 221).

The Right-wing leaders of the organisations to whom the Open Letter was addressed rejected the proposal for joint action with the Communists, despite the fact that the workers came out for a united front of the proletariat. p. 470

[134] The *theory of an offensive struggle* or "theory of the offensive" was proclaimed at the Unity Congress of the Communist Party of Germany and the Left-wing Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany in December 1920. It envisaged that the party should conduct offensive tactics, regardless of whether there were any objective conditions for revolutionary activity or whether the working people supported the Communist Party. The theory found its followers among the "Leftists" in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Austria, and France, and was one of the causes of the defeat of the March 1921 uprising in Germany. But the "Leftists" tried to justify the mistakes of the Central Committee of the U.C.P.G. The theses on the March uprising adopted by the U.C.P.G. Central Committee on April 8, 1921, reiterated that the

U.C.P.G. was always to "follow the line of revolutionary offensive" and that offensive tactics, "even when unsuccessful, were a prerequisite of future victory and the only means for a revolutionary party to win over the masses". At the Third Congress of the Comintern the followers of this theory fought to make it the basis of the Communist International's resolutions on tactics. Lenin proved this theory to be wrong and adventurous, and the Congress approved his line of patient preparation and winning over of the majority of the working class to the side of the communist movement. p. 471

[135] See Note 97 on the British miners' strike in April-June 1921. p. 476

[136] The reference is to the resolution of the Third Congress of the Communist International, "The International Situation and Our Tasks". See *Kommunistichesky Internatsional v dokumentakh. Resheniya, tezisy i vozzvaniya kongressov Kominterna i plenumov IKKI. 1919-1932* (The Communist International in Documents. Resolutions, Theses and Appeals of Congresses of the Comintern and Plenary Meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. 1919-1932, Moscow, 1933, pp. 165-80). p. 478

[137] On May 26, 1921, in Vladivostok, the whiteguards, supported by the Japanese interventionists, overthrew the Maritime Regional Administration of the Far Eastern Republic and established a regime of bourgeois dictatorship and terror headed by industrialists, the Merkulov brothers. South Primorye became a springboard for continued imperialist intervention in the Far East.

The Revolutionary People's Army of the Far Eastern Republic, under V. K. Blyukher, and later I. P. Uborevich, defeated the whiteguards, liberating Khabarovsk on February 14, 1922, and Vladivostok on October 25, 1922. Japan had to withdraw her forces from the Far East. On November 14, 1922, the People's Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic set up the Far East Revolutionary Committee with plenipotentiary powers to implement the union of the Far East with Soviet Russia. On November 15, 1922, the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee issued a decree proclaiming the Far Eastern Republic an inseparable part of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 479

[138] *The Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party* (*Left*) *Congress* held in Prague from May 14 to 16, 1921, was the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It was attended by 569 delegates representing more than 350,000 Party members. The Congress adopted a resolution by acclamation on affiliation to the Third International. B. Smeral was the chief rapporteur at the Congress.

Lenin made a thorough study of the material of the Congress (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 288, 289, 311).

Vorwärts (Forward)—a newspaper published by the Austrian Left-wing Social-Democrats from May 1911 in Reichenberg. In

1921, it became the organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (German group). p. 488

[139] The verbatim report then goes on to say (Lenin spoke in German): "*als Glied der Weltwirtschaft*"; the French translation was: "*comme membre de l'économie mondiale*", and the English, "as a member of the world's economy". The text in this volume is taken from *Pravda*, July 9, 1921, which did not contain these words. p. 491

[140] See Note 55 on the counter-revolutionary Kronstadt mutiny in March 1921. p. 495

[141] The Congress, or the Third All-Russia Assembly of Tsentrosoyuz Delegates, was held in Moscow from July 16 to 23, 1921, and was attended by 384 delegates (250 with voice and vote, and 134 with voice only) from many parts of Russia. It discussed reports and adopted decisions on the activity of Tsentrosoyuz; prospects of the consumers' co-operative societies, trade and commodity exchange of Tsentrosoyuz; workers' co-operative societies; the state of and prospects for foreign trade and the role of co-operatives; co-operative societies' assistance to areas hit by the crop failure, and other questions. Lenin was elected honorary Chairman, and his message of greetings was read at the first plenary sitting on July 16. p. 499

[142] The Congress took place in Moscow from July 3 to 19, 1921, and was attended by 380 delegates from 41 countries of Europe, America and Asia, among them Russia, Britain, Italy, Spain, France, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, Finland, Korea, China and South Africa. The items on the agenda were: 1) Report of the Provisional International Council of Trade Unions, which was set up in July 1920; 2) The world economic crisis and trade union tasks and tactics; 3) Trade unions and parties. The Red International of Trade Unions and the Communist International; 4) Trade unions, factory committees and shop stewards; 5) Trade unions and workers' control over production; 6) Unemployment; 7) International trade and industrial unions; 8) Organisational question; 9) Women in production and trade unions.

It was the Inaugural Congress of the Red Trade Union International, which existed till late 1937 and had a great influence on the world trade union movement.

The Congress adopted the Rules of the Red Trade Union International, and elected its Central Council. It also adopted resolutions on other questions.

The Trade Union International fought for unity in the trade union movement on the basis of the revolutionary struggle for working-class demands; against the offensive of capital and

fascism, and the danger of an imperialist war. It worked for unity with the working class of Soviet Russia.

Lenin's message of greetings, sent in reply to an invitation from several delegations to attend, was read at the seventeenth sitting on July 19. p. 501

[143] Lenin's *Appeal to the International Proletariat* in connection with the famine which hit almost 33 million people in the Volga area and South Ukraine met with a broad response among the working people of all countries. An "*Ad hoc* Foreign Committee for Assistance to Russia" was set up on the initiative of the Comintern in August 1921. French revolutionary trade unions called on the workers to contribute a day's earnings for the famine stricken population of Russia. Henri Barbusse and Anatole France played an active part in organising assistance, and the latter contributed to the fund the Nobel Prize he was awarded in 1921. About one million francs were collected in France. Czechoslovakia contributed 7.5 million korunas in cash and 2 million korunas' worth of food; the German Communist Party collected 1.3 million marks in cash and 1 million marks' worth of food; Dutch Communists collected 100,000 guilders; the Italians, about 1 million liras; the Norwegians, 100,000 krones; the Austrians, 3 million krones; the Spaniards, 50,000 marks; the Poles, 9 million marks; the Danes, 500,000 marks, etc. By December 20, 1921, Communist organisations had bought 312,000 poods of food and collected 1 million gold rubles. The organisations of the Amsterdam International bought 85,625 poods of food and collected 485,000 gold rubles. p. 502

[144] Lenin wrote the letter in connection with Myasnikov's article "Vexed Questions", his memo to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and his speeches in the Petrograd and Perm Party organisations. Myasnikov had set up an anti-Party group in the Motovilikha District of Perm Gubernia which fought against Party policy. A Central Committee commission investigated his activity and proposed his expulsion from the Party for repeated breaches of discipline and organisation of an anti-Party group contrary to the resolution "On Party Unity" of the Party's Tenth Congress. His expulsion was approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on February 20, 1922. p. 504

[145] *The Communist Party of Britain* was founded at the Inaugural Congress held from July 31 to August 1, 1920. It united the Left wing of the British Socialist Party, the majority of the Scottish Socialist Workers' Party, the Irish Socialists, the Communist Unity Group of the Socialist Labour Party, the South Wales Communist Council and a number of small socialist groups. In January 1921, at the Unity Congress in Leeds, it was joined by the Communist Workers' Party (consisting mostly of members of the shop stewards movement in Scotland, headed by William

Gallacher) and the Workers' Socialist Federation. The formation of the British Communist Party was completed when the Left wing of the Independent Workers' Party, headed by Palme Dutt, joined it in the spring of 1921. p. 510

146 *Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (V.K.P.D.) (United Communist Party of Germany) was formed at the Unity Congress of the German Communist Party and the Left wing of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. It was held in Berlin from December 4 to 7, 1920. In October 1920, the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany split at the Congress in Halle when the majority demanded immediate affiliation to the Third International and complete adoption of the 21 conditions of affiliation worked out by the Second Congress of the Comintern. The Right wing of the party walked out of the Halle Congress and, under the old name, formed a separate party, which later, in September 1922, joined the Social-Democratic Party.

Lenin sent his letter to the Second Congress of the German Communist party, which was held in Jena from August 22 to 26, 1921. The items on the agenda were: the Third Congress of the Comintern; the party's immediate tasks; trade union activity; the famine in Soviet Russia and ways of helping her, etc. One of the chairmen as Wilhelm Pieck. A resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority approved the decisions of the Third Congress of the Comintern and acknowledged the correctness of the criticism in the theses of the Third Congress of the party's mistakes during the March 1921 uprising. The party resumed its old name of the Communist Party of Germany. p. 512

147 *The Basle Manifesto of 1912* on war was adopted by the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress in Basle held on November 24-25, 1912. It warned the peoples of the danger of a world-wide imperialist war, exposed its predatory aims and called on the workers to fight for peace, confronting "capitalist imperialism with the international solidarity of the proletariat". The Manifesto included Lenin's clause, taken from the Stuttgart Congress resolution (1907), that in the event of the outbreak of an imperialist war, the Socialists should utilise the economic and political crisis caused by the war to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule and fight for a socialist revolution. p. 513

148 *Sowjet* (Soviet)—a monthly published in Berlin from 1919 to July 1921. It was edited by Paul Levi, and among its contributors were Henriette Roland-Holst, Paul Frölich, Adolf Maslow, Fritz Geyer, and others. From July 1, 1921, when Paul Levi was expelled from the United Communist Party of Germany, the magazine changed its political complexion and adopted the name of *Unser Weg* (Our Way). It was closed down at the end of 1922. p. 514

[149] *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Banner)—a paper founded by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg as the Central Organ of the Spartacus League; it later became the Central Organ of the Communist Party of Germany. It was published in Berlin from November 9, 1918, but was continuously harassed and repeatedly closed down by the authorities.

The paper played an important role in turning the Communist Party into a truly mass proletarian and revolutionary party, free from all kinds of opportunists. It stood for united working-class action against the country's militarisation and the spread of nazism. Ernst Thälmann, Chairman of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Germany, was an active contributor. After the nazi dictatorship was set up, the paper was closed down but continued to appear illegally. From 1935 it was issued in Prague, and from October 1936 to late 1939, in Brussels. p. 515

[150] *Moskau* in German (Nos. 1-50), *Moscou* in French (Nos. 1-44) and *Moscow* in English (Nos. 1-41) was the organ of the Third Congress of the Communist International and was published in Moscow. p. 520

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*December 1920-August 1921*)

1920

December 30	Lenin addresses a joint meeting of Communist delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Communist members of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and Communist members of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions, and speaks on the trade unions, the present situation and Trotsky's mistakes.
December 31	The first sitting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, elected by the Eighth Congress of Soviets, unanimously confirms Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

1921

January, not later than 22	Lenin is on vacation and lives at Gorki near Moscow, travelling to the city to attend meetings of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Council of Labour and Defence.
January 4	Lenin presides at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
January 6	Lenin has a talk with a peasant delegate from the village of Modyonovo, Bogorodsk Volost, Moscow Gubernia, about a reduction of the food levies.
January 9	Lenin gives a report at a meeting of peasants in the village of Gorki, Moscow Gubernia, on the international and domestic position of the Soviet Republic.
January 11	Lenin cables instructions to gubernia executive committees, gubernia food committees and gubernia land departments concerning the establishment of local sowing committees and the conduct of the sowing campaign.
January 12	Lenin presides at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).

January 14	Lenin takes part in drafting the decision of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the role and tasks of the trade unions.
January 19	Lenin writes the article, "The Party Crisis".
January 20	Lenin writes a letter to the factory and office workers of Proletarskaya Station on the Vladikavkaz Railway, who sent a delegation with wheat, barley and flour for the working people of Moscow. He gives them advice on how to organise their farming commune and establish correct relations with neighbouring peasants.
January 23	Lenin gives a report at a meeting of the Communist group of the Second All-Russia Congress of Miners on the role and tasks of the trade unions.
January 24	Lenin delivers the closing speech at a meeting of the Communist group of the Second All-Russia Congress of Miners about the role and tasks of the trade unions.
	Lenin meets Gorky to discuss ways of improving the living conditions of Academician Ivan Pavlov.
	Lenin signs a decision of the Council of People's Commissars on the conditions ensuring the scientific work of Academician Pavlov and his associates.
January 25	Lenin completes the pamphlet, *Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin*.
January 26	Lenin presides at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), which approves a commission headed by Lenin to project the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Education.
January 27	Lenin receives Gorky and a delegation of the Joint Council of Scientific Institutions and Institutions of Higher Learning of Petrograd to discuss the creation of conditions for research in the Soviet Republic.
January 29-February 2	Lenin chairs the commission to reorganise the People's Commissariat for Education; writes the draft regulations of the Commissariat and the Central Committee's Instructions to Communists working in the Commissariat.

January 31 Lenin issues a directive to Baku leaders concerning the organisation of fisheries on the Caspian Sea.

Lenin is elected Chairman of the Grain Commission under the Council of Labour and Defence.

February 2 Lenin presides at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), which examines the following questions: the theses for the Party's Tenth Congress on the Chief Administration for Political Education and on propaganda and agitation work; aid to the peasantry hit by the crop failure; producers' co-operatives, etc.

Lenin writes a letter to the Marx and Engels Institute, asking what has been done about the collection of letters and all the published works of Marx and Engels.

February 4 Lenin addresses an enlarged conference of Moscow metalworkers.

Lenin presides at a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence to discuss the following questions: the progress of army demobilisation; measures to speed up the manufacture of electrical ploughing implements and motors, etc.

February 5 *Pravda* carries the Party Central Committee's Instructions, written by Lenin, to Communists working in the People's Commissariat for Education in connection with its reorganisation.

Lenin presides at a meeting of the Central Committee's Political Bureau to discuss the theses on "The Party's Immediate Tasks in the National Question" for the Party's Tenth Congress; various aspects of the sowing campaign; the work of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, etc.

Lenin heads a commission set up for the final editing of the theses.

February 6 Lenin speaks at the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Garment Workers on the international situation and the tasks of the trade union movement.

February 7 Lenin writes the article, "The Work of the People's Commissariat for Education".

Lenin and other members of the commission edit the theses on the nationalities question for the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

February 8 Lenin writes the "Rough Draft of Theses Concerning the Peasants".

Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the question of the losses caused by the foreign military intervention and blockade.

February 12 Lenin sends the members of the Political Bureau a memo and material on oil concessions and the state of the oil industry.

Lenin receives a Daghestan delegation and discusses the situation in the Daghestan Republic.

February 14 Lenin receives a peasant delegation from Tambov Gubernia and discusses the situation in the rural areas.

February 16 Lenin attends a meeting of the Moscow Committee with Party activists and gives a report on Party questions.

February 17 Lenin drafts a decision of the Council of Labour and Defence to set up a State Planning Commission and draws up a tentative list of its members.

February 19 Lenin presides at a discussion of questions for the forthcoming plenary session of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee at a session of the Central Committee's Political Bureau.

February 21 Lenin writes the article, "Integrated Economic Plan".

February 24-25 Lenin presides at a plenary meeting of the Party's Centra Committee to discuss the following questions: the situation in Moscow; substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system; oil concessions; fuel; operations of water transport; demobilisation of the army, etc.

February 25 Lenin visits the hostel of the All-Russia Art Studios and talks with students about art and literature.

February 26 Lenin addresses a Moscow Gubernia conference of working-class and peasant women.

Lenin receives a Turkish delegation and discusses the conclusion of a treaty with Turkey.

February 27 Lenin's message of greetings to the Fifth All-

Ukraine Congress of Soviets is carried in the newspaper Kommunist (Kharkov).

February 28 Lenin presides at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee to discuss the fuel question, the situation in Moscow and Petrograd, etc.

Lenin speaks at a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies on the international and domestic position of the Soviet Republic.

Lenin has a talk with peasants from Vladimir Gubernia on the situation in the countryside and the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system.

March 1 Lenin writes a letter to the People's Commissariat for Agriculture on recruiting non-Party peasants with practical experience to help organise farming.

March 2 Lenin writes a letter to the Georgian Communists.

March 4 Lenin writes the article, "International Working Women's Day".

March 7 Lenin presides at a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee to discuss the draft resolution on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system.

The Central Committee plenary meeting appoints Lenin chairman of a commission to draft the resolution for the Tenth Party Congress on the switch to the tax in kind.

March 8-16 Lenin presides at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 8 Lenin delivers the opening speech at the Party's Tenth Congress.

Lenin is elected to the Congress Presidium.

Lenin gives a report to the Congress on the political activity of the Party's Central Committee.

March 9 Lenin delivers the summing-up speech on the Central Committee's political activity.

March 12 and 13 Lenin attends closed sittings of the Congress to discuss the military question.

March 13 or 14	Lenin writes the Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Party Congress on Improving the Condition of Workers and Needy Peasants.
March 14	Lenin speaks at the Congress about the trade unions.
	A closed sitting of the Congress elects Lenin to the Party's Central Committee.
March 14 or 15	Lenin writes the preliminary draft resolutions of the Congress on Party unity, and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation in the Party.
March, not later than 15	Lenin writes the draft resolution of the Congress on co-operative societies.
March 15	Lenin gives a report and delivers the summing-up speech at the Congress on the introduction of the tax in kind.
March 16	Lenin gives a report and delivers the summing-up speech on Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, and motions the draft resolutions on these questions.
	Lenin delivers a speech and motions a proposal on the fuel question.
	Lenin delivers the summing-up speech at the Tenth Party Congress.
March 17	Lenin's directive to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army on the establishment of contacts with the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia is published.
March, not later than 21	Lenin instructs the Petrograd Soviet to lift the state of siege in Petrograd and institute martial law.
March 22	Lenin has a talk with peasants from Ufa Uyezd and orders that they should each be issued a certificate testifying that he summoned them to Moscow to "discuss and give advice on an important matter relating to the peasant economy".
March 24	Lenin cables all front and army district commanders, instructing them to take urgent measures to help the land agencies in the sowing campaign.
March 27	Lenin speaks at the All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers on the external and internal position of the Soviet Republic.

End of March-early April	Lenin works on the plan for his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind.*
April 7	Lenin sends a telephone message congratulating the Trade Union Committee and the workers of the First State Motor Works on their production of motors.
April 9	Lenin cables G. K. Orjonikidze about the steps taken to help Armenia and gives instructions on a number of measures to revive economic activity in the Transcaucasus.
	Lenin has a talk with a delegate from the workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk on the condition of the textile factories in the gubernia.
	Lenin gives a report on the tax in kind at a meeting of secretaries and responsible representatives of R.C.P.(B.) cells of Moscow City and Moscow Gubernia.
April 10	Lenin's message of greetings to the conference of representatives of women's departments of the Peoples of Soviet regions and republics in the East is published.
April 11	Lenin gives a report on concessions at a meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.
April 14	Lenin writes a letter to the Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic, instructing them on the consolidation and development of the Soviet power in the Caucasus.
	Lenin sends a message of greetings to a Petrograd city conference of non-Party workers.
April 18	Lenin gives instructions to G. K. Orjonikidze about the preservation of the Georgia State Bank, and the need to wage a most determined struggle against the counter-revolutionary activity of the Georgian Mensheviks.
April 21	Lenin completes his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind* (*The Significance of the New Policy and Its Conditions*).
April 25	Lenin writes three speeches for recording on the tax in kind; concessions and the development of capitalism; and consumers' and producers' co-operative societies.

April 26	Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the questions of relationships between the Uzbeks and the Turkmens; the Karelian Labour Commune, etc.
End of April-early May	Lenin drafts a circular letter to the Party's gubernia committees on their attitude to non-Party workers.
May 10	Lenin presides at a meeting of the Central Committee's Political Bureau to discuss the question of collective supplies.
	Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss the following questions: the state of workers' inspection in the localities, and appointment of a representative of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities to the "Narrow" Council of People's Commissars.
	Lenin writes his remarks on the theses for the Third Congress of the Communist International worked out by a commission.
May 14	In a letter "To Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, the Presidium of the State Planning Commission", Lenin outlines the principal questions for the drawing up of a nation-wide economic plan for the immediate period ahead.
May 18	On behalf of the Central Committee, Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Communist group of the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions against the draft resolution motioned by the anarcho-syndicalist group on the report of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions at the Congress.
May 21	Lenin completes his draft of the Instructions from the Council of Labour and Defence to local Soviet bodies.
May 22	Lenin drafts the Political Bureau's decision on the resolutions of the Communist group of the Fourth Congress of Trade Unions.
May 26-28	Lenin presides at the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.).
May 26	Lenin delivers the opening speech at the Conference.
	Lenin is elected to the Presidium of the Conference.
	Lenin gives a report on the tax in kind.

May 27	Lenin delivers the summing-up speech on the tax in kind.
	Lenin delivers a report on the R.C.P.(B.) group of the Fourth Congress of Trade Unions.
May, not later than 28	Lenin drafts a resolution on the questions of the New Economic Policy (NEP).
May 28	Lenin speaks in support of the draft resolution on NEP.
	Lenin delivers the summing-up speech at the Conference.
May 30	Lenin speaks on the tasks of local economic organs at a sitting of the third session of the Eighth All-Russia Central Executive Committee.
May	Lenin writes several letters to a Deputy People's Commissar for Education, requesting him to see what is being done to compile a dictionary of the Russian language (from Pushkin to Gorky).
June 5	Lenin instructs the Chairman of the State Commission for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. to prepare material to acquaint delegates to the Third Congress of the Communist International with the electrification plan.
June 13	Lenin writes the theses of a report on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Third Congress of the Communist International.
June 16	Lenin speaks on the New Economic Policy at the Third All-Russia Food Conference.
June 17	Lenin speaks at an enlarged meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the situation within the French Communist Party.
June 22-July 12	Lenin guides the work of the Third Congress of the Communist International.
June 22	Lenin is elected Honorary Chairman of the Third Congress of the Communist International.
June 28	Lenin speaks at the Third Congress of the Communist International on the Italian question.

June-July	Lenin issues instructions to provide manpower and all the necessary materials for the construction of the Kashira Electric Power Station.
July 1	Lenin speaks at the Third Congress of the Communist International in defence of the tactics of the Communist International.
July 4	Lenin writes a letter, "Ideas About a State Economic 'Plan'", containing instructions to the State Planning Commission under the Council of Labour and Defence in connection with the drawing up of the state plan.
July 5	Lenin gives a report at the Third Congress of the Communist International on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.)
July 6	Lenin cables the People's Commissar for Food of the Ukraine, instructing him to take resolute steps to satisfy the needs of the Donets Basin.
July 11	Lenin speaks at a meeting of delegates to the Third Congress of the Communist International on revolutionary tactics.
July 13	Lenin takes a month's holiday on the advice of his doctors and goes to Gorki.
July 16	Lenin writes a message of greetings to the Delegate Congress of Tsentrosoyuz.
July 18	Lenin writes a message of greetings to the First International Congress of Revolutionary Trade and Industrial Unions.
July 19	Lenin gives instructions to M. I. Kalinin on measures to help the starving people in the Volga area.
	Lenin presides at a government meeting to discuss assistance to gubernias hit by the crop failure and other questions.
July 20	Lenin writes a message of greetings to the peasants of Gorki on the occasion of the first use of electricity in their village.
August 2	Lenin writes to V. V. Adoratsky concerning the foreword to a collection of letters of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, and a book on the fundamentals of Marxism.

Lenin writes an appeal to the international proletariat for help to the population of the areas in Soviet Russia hit by the crop failure.

Lenin writes an appeal to the peasants of the Ukraine, asking them to help the workers and peasants of the Volga area hit by the crop failure.

August 5 Lenin writes a letter to G. Myasnikov, exposing the latter's anti-Party and anti-working-class views.

August 1 Lenin writes a letter to the representative of the British Communist Party on the Executive Committee of the Communist International about the tasks of the British Communist Party.

August 1 Lenin writes a letter to the German Communists in connection with the forthcoming Congress of the United Communist Party of Germany, advising them to take guidance from the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Communist International.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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

LENIN

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LENIN

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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V. I. LENIN
1921

PREFACE

Volume 33 contains articles, reports, speeches and letters written by Lenin in the period from August 16, 1921 to March 2, 1923.

In them he sums up the first results of economic rehabilitation under the New Economic Policy and substantiates the possibility of and outlines a plan for the building of socialism in Soviet Russia.

In the articles "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise", "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution", "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism", the reports "The Home and Foreign Policy of the Republic" at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 23, 1921, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)" on March 27, 1922 at the Eleventh Party Congress, "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution" at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International on November 13, 1922, "Speech at a Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet" on November 20, 1922, and in other works, Lenin traces the restoration and revival of large-scale socialist industry and the strengthening of the alliance between the workers and peasants on a new economic foundation. He outlines the ways of combating capitalist elements and expresses the firm conviction that "NEP Russia will become socialist Russia".

Some of the speeches, articles and documents in this volume deal with the building up of the Party, the purging of the Party and the improvement of its social composition, criticism and self-criticism, and the leadership of local government bodies, the trade unions and the co-operatives.

These include the article "Purging the Party", the letters "The Conditions for Admitting New Members to the Party", "Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)" at the Eleventh Party Congress, and the decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on "The Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy".

Considerable space is taken up in this volume by works showing Lenin's activity in strengthening and improving the state apparatus. These include "Tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and How They Are to Be Understood and Fulfilled", "Letter to J. V. Stalin on the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence", "Decree on the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence", "'Dual' Subordination and Legality" and "Speech at the Fourth Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Ninth Convocation" on October 31, 1922.

In many of the speeches, articles and documents in this volume Lenin sets forth the fundamental principles of the Soviet Government's foreign policy. On the premise that the Soviet Republic could coexist peacefully with capitalist states, Lenin considered that Soviet foreign policy should be founded on the struggle for peace and the defence of the independence and sovereignty of the Soviet state.

In the works dealing with the international working-class and communist movement, Lenin formulates the key objectives of the united front tactics and speaks of the prospects for the development of the world revolution. He emphasises that the mounting national liberation movement and revolutionary struggle in the East, in India and China, which together with Soviet Russia have the overwhelming majority of the world's population, are of tremendous importance for the final triumph of socialism on a world scale.

This volume contains Lenin's last articles: "Pages From a Diary", "On Co-operation", "Our Revolution", "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" and "Better Fewer, but Better". In these articles he sums up the results of the work that has been done, outlines a plan for building socialism in Soviet Russia by drawing the peasants into socialist construction, and puts forward

his co-operative plan for bringing the peasants into the work of building socialism. He defines the tasks in the cultural revolution and suggests concrete measures aimed at reorganising the state apparatus.

Included in this volume is Lenin's well-known article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism", in which he sets forth a programme of work in the sphere of Marxist philosophy.

The works and letters in this volume clearly show Lenin's struggle against the enemies of the Party—the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, against great-Russian chauvinism and local nationalism, and for strengthening friendship among nations.

Also in this volume are 20 works published in the *Collected Works* for the first time. "Letters to the Central Statistical Board", "Speech at a Meeting of Working Men and Women, Red Army Men and Young People of Khamovniki District, Moscow, Held to Mark the Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution" on November 7, 1921 and "Draft Directive of the Political Bureau on the New Economic Policy" (the latter two documents are published for the first time) deal with the implementation of the New Economic Policy.

In "Letter to P. A. Zalutsky, A. A. Solts and All Members of the Political Bureau Re the Party Purge and the Conditions of Admission into the Party" Lenin suggests instituting stricter conditions for admission into the Party.

In "Reply to Remarks Concerning the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars" Lenin sharply criticises Trotsky's hostile, anti-Party stand on the question of the role and functions of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the State Planning Commission.

For the first time the *Collected Works* include Lenin's letter to D. I. Kursky on the Soviet Civil Code; "Memo to the Political Bureau on Combating Dominant Nation Chauvinism"; "Letter to J. V. Stalin for Members of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Re the Foreign Trade Monopoly" on October 13, 1922 (published for the first time) in which Lenin upholds the immutability of the monopoly on foreign trade against the attempts of Bukharin, Sokolnikov and others to wreck

the foundations of that monopoly; "Letter to J. V. Stalin for Members of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)" on December 15, 1922, on the question of the report to the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets; two letters to the political Bureau on the promotion of radio engineering, and a letter for the Political Bureau on April 15, 1922 (published for the first time).

In the "Letter to the Political Bureau Re the Resolution of the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on the International Situation" Lenin emphasises the international role of the Soviet state as the first country to have actually implemented the policy of self-determination of nations.

The "Draft Decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Delegation to the Genoa Conference" defines the basic objectives of Soviet foreign policy; in the "Memo to G. Y. Zinoviev with the Draft of the Soviet Government's Reply to E. Vandervelde" Lenin exposes the treachery of the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals who came out in defence Or the counter-revolutionary Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties (both documents are published for the first time).

Published for the first time in the *Collected Works* are Lenin's greetings to various congresses and organisations: "Telegram to Narimanov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan" (published for the first time), "To the Working People of Daghestan", "Telegram to the Workers and Engineers of the Azneft Trust", "To the Workers of the Former Michelson Plant" and "To the Workers and Employees at the State Elektroperedacha Power Station".

NEW TIMES AND OLD MISTAKES IN A NEW GUISE

Every specific turn in history causes some change in the form of petty-bourgeois wavering, which always occurs alongside the proletariat, and which, in one degree or another, always penetrates its midst.

This wavering flows in two "streams": petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e., servility to the bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of sentimental democratic and "Social"-Democratic phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois revolutionism—menacing, blustering and boastful in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption and brainlessness in deeds. This wavering will inevitably occur until the taproot of capitalism is cut. Its form is now changing owing to the change taking place in the economic policy of the Soviet government.

The leitmotif of the Mensheviks[1] is: "The Bolsheviks have reverted to capitalism; that is where they will meet their end. The revolution, including the October Revolution, has turned out to be a bourgeois revolution after all! Long live democracy! Long live reformism!" Whether this is said in the purely Menshevik spirit or in the spirit of the Socialist-Revolutionaries,[2] in the spirit of the Second International or in the spirit of the Two-and-a-Half International,[3] it amounts to the same thing.

The leitmotif of semi-anarchists like the German "Communist Workers' Party",[4] or of that section of our former Workers' Opposition[5] which has left or is becoming estranged from the Party, is: "The Bolsheviks have lost faith in the working class." The slogans they deduce from this are more or less akin to the "Kronstadt" slogans of the spring of 1921.[6]

In contrast to the whining and panic of the philistines from among reformists and of the philistines from among revolutionaries, the Marxists must weigh the alignment of actual class forces and the incontrovertible facts as soberly and as accurately as possible.

Let us recall the main stages of our revolution. The first stage: the purely political stage, so to speak, from October 25 to January 5, when the Constituent Assembly[7] was dissolved. In a matter of ten weeks we did a hundred times more to actually and completely destroy the survivals of feudalism in Russia than the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries did during the eight months *they* were in power—from February to October 1917. At that time, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia, and all the heroes of the Two-and-a-Half International abroad, acted as miserable accomplices of reaction. As for the anarchists, some stood aloof in perplexity, while others helped us. Was the revolution a bourgeois revolution at that time? Of course it was, insofar as our function was to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution, insofar as there was as yet no class struggle among the "peasantry". But, at the same time, we accomplished a great deal *over and above* the bourgeois revolution *for* the socialist, proletarian revolution: 1) we developed the forces of the working class for *its* utilisation of state power to an extent never achieved before; 2) we struck a blow that was felt all over the world against the fetishes of petty-bourgeois democracy, the Constituent Assembly and bourgeois "liberties" such as freedom of the press for the rich; 3) we created the Soviet *type* of state, which was a gigantic step in advance of 1793 and 1871.

The second stage: the Brest-Litovsk peace.[8] There was a riot of revolutionary phrase-mongering against peace—the semi-jingoist phrase-mongering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the "Left" phrase-mongering of a certain section of the Bolsheviks. "Since you have made peace with imperialism you are doomed," argued the philistines, some in panic and some with malicious glee. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks made peace with imperialism as participants in the bourgeois robbery of the workers. We "made peace", surrendering to the robbers part of our property, only in order to save the workers'

rule, and in order to be able to strike heavier blows at the robbers later on. At that time we heard no end of talk about our having "lost faith in the forces of the working class"; but we did not allow ourselves to be deceived by this phrase-mongering.

The third stage: the Civil War, beginning with the Czechoslovaks[9] and the Constituent Assembly crowd and ending with Wrangel,[10] from 1918 to 1920. At the beginning of the war our Red Army was non-existent. Judged as a material force, this army is even now insignificant compared with the army of any of the Entente powers. Nevertheless, we emerged victorious from the struggle against the mighty Entente. The alliance between the peasants and the workers led by proletarian rule—this achievement of epoch-making importance—was raised to an unprecedented level. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries acted as the accomplices of the monarchy overtly (as Ministers, organisers and propagandists) and covertly (the more "subtle" and despicable method adopted by the Chernovs and Martovs, who pretended to wash their hands of the affair but actually used their pens against us). The anarchists too vacillated helplessly, one section of them helping us, while another hindering us by their clamour against military discipline or by their scepticism.

The fourth stage: the Entente is compelled to cease (for how long?) its intervention and blockade. Our unprecedentedly dislocated country is just barely beginning to recover, is only just realising the full depth of its ruin, is suffering the most terrible hardships—stoppage of industry, crop failures, famine, epidemics.

We have risen to the highest and at the same time the most difficult stage of our historic struggle. Our enemy at the present moment and in the present period is not the same one that faced us yesterday. He is not the hordes of whiteguards commanded by the landowners and supported by all the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, by the whole international bourgeoisie. He is everyday economics in a small-peasant country with a ruined large-scale industry. He is the petty-bourgeois element which surrounds us like the air, and penetrates deep into the ranks of the proletariat. And the proletariat is declassed, i.e., dislodged

from its class groove. The factories and mills are idle—the proletariat is weak, scattered, enfeebled. On the other hand, the petty-bourgeois element within the country is backed by the whole international bourgeoisie, which still retains its power throughout the world.

Is this not enough to make people quail, especially heroes like the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the knights of the Two-and-a-Half International, the helpless anarchists and the lovers of "Left" phrases? "The Bolsheviks are reverting to capitalism; the Bolsheviks are done for. Their revolution, too, has not gone beyond the confines of a bourgeois revolution." We hear plenty of wails of this sort.

But we have grown accustomed to them.

We do not belittle the danger. We look it straight in the face. We say to the workers and peasants: The danger is great; more solidarity, more staunchness, more coolness; turn the pro-Menshevik and pro-Socialist-Revolutionary panic-mongers and tub-thumpers out with contempt.

The danger is great. The enemy is far stronger than we are economically, just as yesterday he was far stronger than we were militarily. We know that; and in that knowledge lies our strength. We have already done so tremendously much to purge Russia of feudalism, to develop all the forces of the workers and peasants, to promote the world-wide struggle against imperialism and to advance the international proletarian movement, which is freed from the banalities and baseness of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, that panicky cries no longer affect us. We have more than fully "justified" our revolutionary activity, we have shown the whole world by our deeds what proletarian revolutionism is capable of in contrast to Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary "democracy" and cowardly reformism decked with pompous phrases.

Anyone who fears defeat on the eve of a great struggle can call himself a socialist only out of sheer mockery of the workers.

It is precisely because we are not afraid to look danger in the face that we make the best use of our forces for the struggle—we weigh the chances more dispassionately, cautiously and prudently—we make every concession that will strengthen us and break up the forces of the enemy (now

even the biggest fool can see that the "Brest peace" was a concession that strengthened us and dismembered the forces of international imperialism).

The Mensheviks are shouting that the tax in kind, the freedom to trade, the granting of concessions and state capitalism signify the collapse of communism. Abroad, the ex-Communist Levi has added his voice to that of the Mensheviks. This same Levi had to be defended as long as the mistakes he had made could be explained by his reaction to some of the mistakes of the "Left" Communists, particularly in March 1921 in Germany[11]; but this same Levi cannot be defended when, instead of admitting that he is wrong, he slips into Menshevism all along the line.

To the Menshevik shouters we shall simply point out that as early as the spring of 1918 the Communists proclaimed and advocated the idea of a bloc, an alliance with state capitalism against the petty-bourgeois element. That was three years ago! In the first months of the Bolshevik victory! Even then the Bolsheviks took a sober view of things. And since then nobody has been able to challenge the correctness of our sober calculation of the available forces.

Levi, who has slipped into Menshevism, advises the Bolsheviks (whose defeat by capitalism he "forecasts" in the same way as all the philistines, democrats, Social-Democrats and others had forecast our doom if we dissolved the Constituent Assembly!) to appeal for aid to the *whole* working class! Because, if you please, up to now only *part* of the working class has been helping us!

What Levi says here remarkably coincides with what is said by those semi-anarchists and tub-thumpers, and also by certain members of the former "Workers' Opposition", who are so fond of talking large about the Bolsheviks now having "lost faith in the forces of the working class". Both the Mensheviks and those with anarchist leanings make a fetish of the concept "forces of the working class"; they are incapable of grasping its actual, concrete meaning. Instead of studying and analysing its meaning, they declaim.

The gentlemen of the Two-and-a-Half International pose as revolutionaries; but in every serious situation they prove to be counter-revolutionaries because they shrink from the violent destruction of the old state machine; they have no

faith in the forces of the working class. It was not a mere catch-phrase we uttered when we said this about the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Co. Everybody knows that the October Revolution actually brought new forces, a new class, to the forefront, that the best representatives of the proletariat are now governing Russia, built up an army, led that army, set up local government, etc., are running industry, and so on. If there are some bureaucratic distortions in this administration, we do not conceal this evil; we expose it, combat it. Those who allow the struggle against the distortions of the new system to obscure its content and to cause them to forget that the working class has created and is guiding a state of the Soviet type are incapable of thinking, and are merely throwing words to the wind.

But the "forces of the working class" are not unlimited. If the flow of fresh forces from the working class is now feeble, sometimes very feeble, if, notwithstanding all our decrees, appeals and agitation, notwithstanding all our orders for "the promotion of non-Party people", the flow of forces is still feeble, then resorting to mere declamations about having "lost faith in the forces of the working class" means descending to vapid phrase-mongering.

Without a certain "respite" these new forces will not be forthcoming; they can only grow slowly; and they can grow only on the basis of restored large-scale industry (i.e., to be more precise and concrete, on the basis of electrification). They can be obtained from *no other* source.

After an enormous, unparalleled exertion of effort, the working class in a small-peasant, ruined country, the working class which has very largely become declassed, needs an interval of time in which to allow new forces to grow and be brought to the fore, and in which the old and worn-out forces can "recuperate". The creation of a military and state machine capable of successfully withstanding the trials of 1917-21 was a great effort, which engaged, absorbed and exhausted real "forces of the working class" (and not such as exist merely in the declamations of the tub-thumpers). One must understand this and reckon with the necessary, or rather, inevitable *slackening* of the rate of growth of *new* forces of the working class.

When the Mensheviks shout about the "Bonapartism" of

the Bolsheviks (who, they claim, rely on troops and on the machinery of state against the will of "democracy"), they magnificently express the tactics of the bourgeoisie; and Milyukov, from his own standpoint, is right when he supports them, supports the "Kronstadt" (spring of 1921) slogans. The bourgeoisie quite correctly takes into consideration the fact that the *real* "forces of the working class" now consist of the mighty vanguard of that class (the Russian Communist Party, which—not at one stroke, but in the course of twenty-five years—won for itself by deeds the role, the name and the power of the "vanguard" of the only revolutionary class) plus the elements which have been most weakened by being declassed, and which are most susceptible to Menshevik and anarchist vacillations.

The slogan "more faith in the forces of the working class" is now being used, *in fact*, to increase the influence of the Mensheviks and anarchists, as was vividly proved and demonstrated by Kronstadt in the spring of 1921. Every class-conscious worker should expose and send packing those who shout about our having "lost faith in the forces of the working class", because these tub-thumpers are actually the accomplices of the bourgeoisie and the landowners, who seek to weaken the proletariat for their benefit by helping to spread the influence of the Mensheviks and the anarchists.

That is the crux of the matter if we dispassionately examine what the concept "forces of the working class" really means.

Gentlemen, what are you really doing to promote non-Party people to what is the main "front" today, the economic front, for the work of economic development? That is the question that class-conscious workers should put to the tub-thumpers. That is how the tub-thumpers always can and should be exposed. That is how it can always be proved that, actually, they are not assisting but hindering economic development; that they are not assisting but hindering the proletarian revolution; that they are pursuing not proletarian, but petty-bourgeois aims; and that they are serving an alien class.

Our slogans are: Down with the tub-thumpers! Down with the unwitting accomplices of the whiteguards who are repeating the mistakes of the hapless Kronstadt mutineers of the spring of 1921! Get down to business-like, practical work

that will take into account the specific features of the present situation and its tasks. We need not phrases but deeds.

A sober estimation of these specific features and of the real, not imaginary, class forces tells us:

The period of unprecedented proletarian achievements in the military, administrative and political fields has given way to a period in which the growth of new forces will be much slower; and that period did not set in by accident, it was inevitable; it was due to the operation not of persons or parties, but of objective causes. In the economic field, development is inevitably more difficult, slower, and more gradual; that arises from the very nature of the activities in this field compared with military, administrative and political activities. It follows from the specific difficulties of this work, from its being more deep-rooted, if one may so express it.

That is why we shall strive to formulate our tasks in this new, higher stage of the struggle with the greatest, with treble caution. We shall formulate them as moderately as possible. We shall make as many concessions as possible within the limits, of course, of what the proletariat *can* concede and yet remain the ruling class. We shall collect the moderate tax in kind as quickly as possible and allow the greatest possible scope for the development, strengthening and revival of peasant farming. We shall lease the enterprises that are not absolutely essential for us to lessees, including private capitalists and foreign concessionaires. We need a bloc, or alliance, between the proletarian state and state capitalism against the petty-bourgeois element. We must achieve this alliance skilfully, following the rule: "Measure your cloth seven times before you cut." We shall leave ourselves a smaller field of work, only what is absolutely necessary. We shall concentrate the enfeebled forces of the working class on something *less*, but we shall consolidate ourselves all the more and put ourselves to the test of practical experience not once or twice, but over and over again. Step by step, inch by inch—for at present the "troops" we have at our command *cannot* advance any other way on tbe difficult road we have to travel, in thc stern conditions under which we are living, and amidst the dangers we have to face. Those who find this work "dull", "uninteresting" and

"unintelligible", those who turn up their noses or become panic-stricken, or who become intoxicated with their own declamations about the absence of the "previous elation", the "previous enthusiasm", etc., had better be "relieved of their jobs" and given a back seat, so as to prevent them from causing harm; for they will not or cannot understand the specific features of the present stage, the present phase of the struggle.

Amidst the colossal ruin of the country and the exhaustion of the forces of the proletariat, by a series of almost superhuman efforts, we are tackling the most difficult job: laying the foundation for a really socialist economy, for the regular exchange of commodities (or, more correctly, exchange of products) between industry and agriculture. The enemy is still far stronger than we are; anarchic, profiteering, individual commodity exchange is undermining our efforts at every step. We clearly see the difficulties and will systematically and perseveringly overcome thcm. More scope for independent local enterprise; more forces to the localities; more attention to their practical experience. The working class can heal its wounds, its proletarian "class forces" can recuperate, and the confidence of the peasantry in proletarian leadership can be strengthened *only* as real success is achieved in restoring industry and in bringing about a regular exchange of products through the medium of the state that benefits both the peasant and the worker. And as we achieve this we shall get an influx of new forces, not as quickly as every one of us would like, perhaps, but we shall get it nevertheless.

Let us get down to work, to slower, more cautious, more persevering and persistent work!

August 20, 1921

Pravda No. 190, August 28, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published1 according to
the *Pravda* text checked
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LETTERS TO THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD

1

TO THE MANAGER OF THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD

August 16

Comrade Popov,

The correspondence with the Central Statistical Board, particularly the data supplied to me on August 3 on current industrial statistics, has made it perfectly clear to me that my instructions (in the letter of June 4, 1921) are not being carried out at all and that the entire work, the entire organisation of the Central Statistical Board is wrong.

The data given to me on August 3 as current industrial statistics are obsolete and were supplied *multa non multum*—of considerable volume but small content! That is exactly like the "bureaucratic institutions", from which you said in your letter of June 11, 1921 you want to separate the Central Statistical Board.

Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn[12] has already *printed much* fuller data in the supplement to its No. 152 issue, i.e., in *July*!

From the same *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* I have *already had* data for the first quarter of 1921!

The Central Statistical Board, which *lags behind* an unofficial group of writers, is a model bureaucratic institution. In about two years' time it may provide a heap of data for research, but that is not what we want.

Nearly two and a half months have passed since my letter of June 4, 1921, but nothing has changed. The same shortcomings are in evidence. There is no sign of your promised "calendar programme" and so forth (letter of June 11).

Once more I draw your attention to the incorrectness of

all this and to the need to *accelerate* the *reorganisation* of the work of the Central Statistical Board.

In particular:

1) the chairman or manager of the Central Statistical Board must work in *closer* contact with the State Planning Commission and in accordance with the *direct instructions* of and tasks set by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission and its Presidium;

2) current statistics (both industrial and agricultural) must give summarised, practical key data (postponing academic analyses of "full" data) never later but necessarily *earlier* than our press.

You must learn to pick out what is *practically* important and urgent, and shelve data of academic value;

3) together with the State Planning Commission, a kind of index-number* must be prepared by which to appraise the state of our entire economy; it must be done at least once a month and must be given in comparison with pre-war figures and then with the figures for 1920 and, where possible, for 1917, 1918 and 1919.

Approximate, presumed, preliminary data (with a special reservation on each such or similar category) must be given where exact figures are unobtainable.

For our practical work we *must* have figures and the Central Statistical Board *must* have them *before anybody else*. Let the checking of the accuracy of the figures, the determining of the percentage of error and so forth be postponed for some time.

The figures to be used for the index-number must be determined by the Central Statistical Board and the State Planning Commission. (Roughly: main, key figures—population, territory, output of principal products, main results of the work of transport, and so forth—at least 10-15 figures conformably with the way these "index-numbers" have for a long time been compiled by statisticians abroad.)

4) Immediately, without any red tape (for it was absolutely impermissible to have done nothing about it for two and a half months) organise the prompt delivery of data on the eight questions I indicated on June 4 in my

* The words "index-number" are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

"approximate list" and also a summary report both general and in particular:

—without delay on Moscow (Moscow must be exemplary);

—then on Petrograd,

—and on each gubernia (singling out those gubernias where the people do their work quickly, without red tape, not in accordance with old academic customs).

Have nine-tenths of the available personnel at the Central Statistical Board and the Gubernia Statistical Bureaus put at once to the job of processing these eight questions correctly and rapidly, and put one-tenth on the academic work of studying complete and all-embracing data. If that cannot be done, ninety-nine per cent of the personnel must be put on processing data practically and urgently required for our economy, and the rest of the work should be postponed until better times, until the time when there will be surplus personnel.

5) Every month the Central Statistical Board must submit to the Council of Labour and Defence[13]—it must be done before it is in the press—*preliminary* data on *key* problems of the economy (with a compulsory comparison with the preceding year). These key problems, key figures, both those that go into the "index-number" and those that do not, must be worked on immediately.

Please send me the programme of these questions and the reply on other points without delay.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars

2

TO THE MANAGER OF THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD OR HIS DEPUTY

September 1, 1921

The undated "programme" of work sent to me boils down to a request for additional funds.

We cannot afford it at present.

The *entire* programme must, therefore, be *cut down in such a way* as to enable the necessary work to be continued (more regularly and completed faster) with the funds at *present* available.

I suggest that this cut be made at once; while the question of additional funds be postponed *to approximately November*.

I suggest that the programme be cut in such a way as to leave (until more funds are available) only the *most necessary* processes. They must include:

1. Monthly reports on the distribution of food by the state.

Forms for obtaining information must be established jointly with the People's Commissariat of Food roughly as follows:

a) the number of people receiving bread (I think that as a start it would be more prudent to limit the data to bread if no personnel is available to add data on all other issued products, both foodstuffs and non-foodstuffs)

1/4 lb each
1/2 " "
3/4 " "
1 " and so forth;

b) their grades by profession, occupation and so on;

c) summary: total number of recipients and total quantity of bread issued.

The data for Moscow and Petrograd are the most urgent; then for Moscow and Petrograd gubernias, the *key industrial gubernias* (Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Donbas, Baku, the Urals and so on) and, lastly, the other gubernias.

2. Monthly reports on enterprises transferred to collective supply.

While there are not many of them, all must be kept under observation (as you have suggested in your memo, p. 2, paragraph 1). Later, when there are very many, inspect *in detail* one-fifth or one-tenth selectively.

In short—all enterprises on collective supply.

The reports you require from these enterprises are far too sweeping (end of p. 2, paragraph 2). They can and must be shorter and show only what is most important.

3. Current industrial statistics for monthly reports must be reduced, with first place given, as absolutely essential, to data on the *quantity of articles produced*, specifically on the most important items.

These data are absolutely necessary every month.

The rest are not absolutely essential and may be compiled not so urgently, as the personnel and funds of the Central Statistical Board permit.

4. Production, distribution and consumption of fuel.

This must be in the report every month.

The programme must be drawn up jointly with the Central Fuel Board with as few changes as possible in the forms now in operation.

5. Monthly summaries of commodity exchanges (Commissariat of Food and the Central Council of Co-operative Societies) in the briefest possible form: such-and-such a quantity of such-and-suc.h products issued to uyezds in exchange for such-and-such a quantity of bread.

6. As you indicate in Supplement No. 1, paragraph IV, it is of course difficult to keep an account of the work of Soviet institutions. But difficulty is not impossibility. If not monthly reports, then reports once in two or three months are absolutely necessary at least, as a start, on "available personnel" as compared with the pre-war staff or that of other departments, other gubernias and so on,

with a rational subdivision of all employees into grades (responsible posts, purely office workers, service staff—an *approximate* list of certain grades).

A comparison of the largest and smallest staffs by gubernias and so on. First and foremost, for Moscow and Petrograd.

The decisions of the last Congress of Soviets make it obligatory for the Central Statistical Board to *tackle* the statistical study of the work of our Soviet offices, the number of employees, and so forth.[14]

7. Selection for study of a *small* number of typical enterprises (factories, state farms) and *institutions*—a) the best exemplary, b) middling and c) worst.

Cut down all the rest, except these seven paragraphs.

Inform me of your conclusion on the substance of the programme of work and the time limit for its compilation.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council
of Labour and Defence

First published in 1933

Published according to
the manuscript

LETTER TO THE EDITORS OF *EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN*

September 1

The conversion of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* into the official organ of the Council of Labour and Defence should not be a simple and empty formality.

The paper must become a militant organ that not only, first, provides regular and truthful information on our economy but, secondly, analyses the information, processes it scientifically to arrive at the right conclusions for the management of industry, etc., and, thirdly and lastly, *tightens up the discipline* of all workers on the economic front, ensures punctuality in reporting, approves good work and exposes inaccurate, backward and incompetent workers in a certain factory, office, branch of economy, etc., to the judgement of all.

The paper provides a mass of valuable, especially statistical, material on our economy. That material, however, suffers from two faults—it is casual, incomplete, unsystematic and, what is more, not processed, not analysed.

I will give you examples to explain this.

The article "The Moscow Basin in July" (No. 188) is one of the best because it analyses the data, compares them with the past and compares the enterprises one with another. The analysis, however, is incomplete. There is no explanation of why one enterprise (the Tovarkovo mines) has solved a problem others have not solved. No practical deduction is made. There is no comparison with annual data.

In issue No. 190, on page 2, there is an abundance of statistical details, usual for the paper, but they are not "digested" at all, they are casual, raw, without a suggestion

of analysis and are not compared (with the past or with other enterprises), etc.

The following changes must be made if the paper is to be the real organ of the Council of Labour and Defence, and not its organ in words alone.

(1) Keep a strict check on unpunctual and incomplete reports sent to relevant organisations and publicly list those that are inaccurate; at the same time *work to ensure* (through the People's Commissariat concerned or through the directorate of the Council of Labour and Defence) precise reporting.

(2) All statistical data must be much more strictly, that is, more carefully and thoroughly, systematised, and data must be obtained for comparison, always using the data for past years (past months, etc.); always select material for analysis that will explain the *reasons* for failure, and will *make prominent* some successfully operating enterprises or, at least, those that are ahead of the rest, etc.

(3) Organise a network of local correspondents, both Communists *and non-Party people*; allot greater space to local correspondence from factories, mines, state farms, railway depots and workshops, etc.

(4) Publish returns on the most important problems of our economy as special supplements. The returns absolutely must be processed, with an all-round analysis and practical conclusions.

Since we are short of newsprint, we must economise. And we probably can. For instance, reduce the number of copies from 44,000 to 30,000 (quite enough if correctly distributed, allowing two copies to each of 10,000 volosts, four to each of 1,000 uyezds, ten to each of 100 gubernias and 5,000 extra—all of them to go only to libraries, editorial offices and a few institutions). That will leave enough newsprint for eight supplements, each of two pages, a month.

That would be sufficient for monthly returns on a large number of important points (fuel; industry—two or three supplements; transport; food supplies; state farms, etc.).

These supplements should provide summarised statistics on the most important branches of the economy and they should be processed and analysed, and practical conclusions should be drawn from them.

The entire statistical material in the daily paper—there is a great deal of it but it is fragmentary—should be *adjusted* to the monthly reports and shorn of all details and trivialities, etc.

Since, in many cases, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* and the *Central Statistical Board* use the same sources, the supplements to the newspaper should (for the time being) replace the publications of the *Central Statistical Board*.

(5) All current statistical material should be divided between (a) employees of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, (b) members of the *State Planning Commission* and (c) members or employees of the *Central Statistical Board* in such a way that each should be in charge of *one* branch of the economy, and should be *responsible for*—

(aa) the timely receipt of reports and summaries; for a successful "struggle" to get them; for repeated demands for them, etc.;

(bb) for the summarising and analysis of data, and

(cc) for practical conclusions.

(6) *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* must keep track of enterprises granted as concessions and those leased, as far as their reporting is concerned and also by way of supervision and the drawing of conclusions, *in the same way* as it keeps track of all others.

Please arrange for a conference to include an editor of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, one member of the Central Statistical Board and one member of the State Planning Commission to discuss these questions and measures to be taken. Please inform me of the decisions of the conference.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence

P.S. Will that conference please discuss the question of elaborating an index-number* to determine the general state of our economy. This index should be published every month.

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on November 6, 1923 in
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the manuscript

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

PURGING THE PARTY[15]

The purging of the Party has obviously developed into a serious and vast]y important affair.

In some places the Party is being purged mainly with the aid of the experience and suggestions of non-Party workers; these suggestions and the representatives of the non-Party proletarian masses are being heeded with due consideration. That is the most valuable and most important thing. If we really succeed in purging our Party from top to bottom *in this way*, without exceptions, it will indeed be an enormous achievement for the revolution.

The achievements of the revolution cannot now be the same as they were previously. Their nature inevitably changes in conformity with the transition from the war front to the economic front, the transition to the New Economic Policy, the conditions that primarily demand higher productivity of labour, greater labour discipline. At such a time improvements at home are the major achievements of the revolution; a neither salient, striking, nor immediately perceptible improvement in labour, in its organisation and results; an improvement from the viewpoint of the fight against the influence of the petty-bourgeois and petty-bourgeois-anarchist element, which corrupts both the proletariat and the Party. To achieve such an improvement, the Party must be purged of those who have lost touch with the masses (let alone, of course, those who discredit the Party in the eyes of the masses). Naturally, we shall not submit to every thing the masses say, because the masses, too, sometimes—particularly in time of exceptional weariness and exhaustion resulting from excessive hardship and suffering—yield to sentiments that are in no way advanced. But in appraising

persons, in the negative attitude to those who have "attached" themselves to us for selfish motives, to those who have become "puffed-up commissars" and "bureaucrats", the suggestions of the non-Party proletarian masses and, in many cases, of the non-Party peasant masses, are extremely valuable. The working masses have a fine intuition, which enables them to distinguish honest and devoted Communists from those who arouse the disgust of people earning their bread by the sweat of their brow, enjoying no privileges and having no "pull".

To purge the Party it is very important to take the suggestions of the non-Party working people into consideration. It will produce big results. It will make the Party a much stronger vanguard of the class than it was before; it will make it a vanguard that is more strongly bound up with the class, more capable of leading it to victory amidst a mass of difficulties and dangers.

As one of the specific objects of the Party purge, I would point to the combing out of ex-Mensheviks. In my opinion, of the Mensheviks who joined the Party after the beginning of 1918, not more than a hundredth part should be allowed to remain; and even then, every one of those who are allowed to remain must be tested over and over again. Why? Because, as a trend, the Mensheviks have displayed in 1918-21 the two qualities that characterise them: first, the ability skilfully to adapt, to "attach" themselves to the prevailing trend among the workers; and second, the ability even more skilfully to serve the whiteguards heart and soul, to serve them in action, while dissociating themselves from them in words. Both these qualities are the logical outcome of the whole history of Menshevism. It is sufficient to recall Axelrod's proposal for a "labour congress",[16] the attitude of the Mensheviks towards the Cadets[17] (and to the monarchy) in words and action, etc., etc. The Mensheviks "attach" themselves to the Russian Communist Party not only and even not so much because they are Machiavellian (although ever since 1903 they have shown that they are past masters in the art of bourgeois diplomacy), but because they are so "adaptable". Every opportunist is distinguished for his adaptability (but not all adaptability is opportunism); and the Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt themselves "on principle"

PROPERTY OF IISG AMSTERDAM NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

so to speak, to the prevailing trend among the workers and assume a protective colouring, just as a hare's coat turns white in winter. This characteristic of the Mensheviks must be kept in mind and taken into account. And taking it into account means purging the Party of approximately ninety-nine out of every hundred Mensheviks who joined the Russian Communist Party after 1918, i.e., when the victory of the Bolsheviks first became probable and then certain.

The Party must be purged of rascals, of bureaucratic, dishonest or wavering Communists, and of Mensheviks who have repainted their "facade" but who have remained Mensheviks at heart.

September 20, 1921

Pravda No. 210, September 21, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the *Pravda* text

TASKS OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION AND HOW THEY ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AND FULFILLED[18]

It is more the duty of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to *be able to improve* things than to merely "detect" and "expose" (that is the function of the courts with which the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is in close contact but with which it is not to be identified).

Timely and skilful rectification—this is the prime function of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

To be able to correct it is necessary, first, to make a *complete* study of the methods by which the affairs of a given office, factory, department, and so forth, are conducted; second, to *introduce* in good time the necessary practical changes and to see that they are actually put into effect.

There is much that is similar, basically similar, in the methods by which the affairs of different and diverse factories, institutions, departments, etc., are conducted. The function of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is to train, on the basis of practical inspection work, a group of leading, experienced and well-informed persons, who would be capable of presenting problems (for the skilful and correct *presentation* of problems in itself predetermines the success of an investigation and makes it possible to rectify mistakes); to direct investigations or inspections to see that improvements are introduced, and so forth.

The proper organisation of accounting and reporting, for example, is a fundamental function of all departments and offices of the most diverse types. The Workers' and

Peasants' Inspection should study and make itself thoroughly familiar with this; it should be able to investigate at the shortest notice (by sending a man to a given office for half an hour or an hour) whether a system of accounting exists and, if so, whether it is properly organised, what defects there are in the system, how these defects may be eliminated, etc.

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should study, analyse and summarise the methods of accounting, the penalties for inefficiency, the methods of "detecting" fraud, and the methods of executive control. It should have a *list* of offices, departments and gubernias where the system of accounting is tolerably well *organised*. There will be nothing tragic if these constitute one in a hundred, or even one in a thousand, as long as *systematic*, undeviating, persistent and unflagging efforts are made to enlarge the sphere where proper methods are employed. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should have a chronological table showing what *progress* is being made in these efforts, the successes and reverses.

Acquaintance with the preliminary draft of the report on the work of the fuel supply organisations and on the growing crisis (fuel) in the autumn of 1921, makes me feel that *basically* the work of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is not organised on proper lines. This draft report contains *neither* evidence that the subject has been *studied*, *nor even a hint at suggestions for improvement.*

For example, a comparison is made between a three-week period in 1921 and a similar period in 1920. Bare totals are taken. It is wrong to make such a comparison, because allowances are not made for (1) the difference in the food supply (in the spring of 1921 and throughout the first half of that year *special* conditions prevailed as a consequence of the *transition* to the tax in kind), or for (2) the crop failure in 1921.

Danishevsky states that the gubernias that were unaffected by the crop failure fulfilled their three-week programme in 1921 *over one hundred per cent*; the affected gubernias fell very short of fulfilment.

There is no evidence in the report that the subject has been *studied*.

The defects in accounting employed at the Central Timber Board are, evidently, correctly pointed out in the preliminary report of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Danishevsky admits it. It has been proved. The methods of accounting are faulty.

But it is exactly on this *fundamental* question that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection cannot, in its preliminary report, *confine* itself to the "thesis" that "accounting is faulty, that there is no accounting". What have the comrades of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection done to *improve* those methods? In the winter and spring of 1921 many prominent officials of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection *personally* took part in a *vast number* of conferences and commissions on the fuel crisis. In the spring of 1921 (I think it was in *March* 1921) a *new* chief was appointed to the Central Timber Board. Consequently, *new methods of accounting* should have been introduced in it in March 1921.

Danishevsky did that; but he did it *unsatisfactorily*. His methods of accounting are faulty. He is to blame, undoubtedly.

But to find the guilty party in the person of the chief is only a very minor part of the task.

Has the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection carried out its task and done its duty? *Does it properly understand its task?* That is the main question. The reply to this must be negative.

Knowing the critical fuel situation, knowing that firewood is the most important, knowing that under the former Director of the Central Timber Board (Lomov) accounting was bad, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection,

in *March* 1921, should have *officially advised* them in writing: organise your accounting in *such-and-such a way*;

in *April* 1921, it should have investigated how the new Director (Danishevsky) had *organised* accounting and should have

again officially advised them in writing: introduce the following changes, otherwise things will not run smoothly;

in *May* 1921, it should have investigated again;

and so forth, *month after month*, until accounting had been tolerably well organised.

In the spring of 1921, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should have appointed a definite inspector (a *single* person is better than a "department", although in practice it is probable that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection has a whole "department" for auditing and inspecting matters concerning firewood and fuel in general) to keep his eye on accounting at the Central Timber Board, to *study* it and to report every month to a definite member of the Collegium, or else submit a monthly return (giving a list of gubernias in which accounting is tolerably well organised, in which there is no accounting, and so on. What measures have been taken? by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party? by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee? What results?).

Danishevsky is to blame for the bad organisation of accounting.

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, i.e., the *particular* responsible *auditor* or inspector, etc., whose name I do not know, is guilty of failing to perform his duty *as from March 1921*.

The practical, business-like, non-bureaucratic question is: How can accounting at the Central Timber Board be *improved*?

Failing to find an answer to this (extremely important) question in the preliminary report of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection—whose *duty* it was to provide the answer—I am seeking for an answer myself; but I may easily go wrong, for I have not studied the subject. My proposals are the following, and I will gladly amend them if better ones are suggested:

(1) introduce a system of accounting (once a fortnight) not by post, as hitherto, but by wire;

(2) draw up for this purpose a sort of "code" consisting of seven to nine figures and letters so as to be able in a

few lines to give total figures (of the amount of timber felled, in cubic sazhens[19]; the amount carted; the amount of grain, fodder, etc., received and issued);

(3) give Danishevsky legal authority to arrest any person who fails to send in reports punctually

or (if that is impossible, if it does not go through for some reason) apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for a warrant to *arrest* any person who fails to send in reports; the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to issue instructions accordingly; verify fulfilment;

(4) methods of personal and direct *inspection on the spot*: Is this being practised? How? What are the difficulties?

Danishevsky says that he has appointed *travelling* inspectors all over Russia, and that these have already visited *all* the gubernias; that they have delved down to the lowest units, are tightening things up, and in many gubernias have already succeeded in tightening things up.

Is that true? Is not Danishevsky being misled by his clerks?

Very probably he is.

But what about the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection? It should go into the matter and ascertain the facts. There is not a word about this in the preliminary report. When were the travelling inspectors appointed? How many? What is their standard of efficiency? What are the results of their activities? How can matters be improved if they are not satisfactory? These are the essentials; but it is just these essentials that the inspector of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is silent about.

I repeat: the organisation of a system of accounting is the fundamental problem. It has not been studied by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which has not fulfilled—and evidently does *not understand*—its task, which is to investigate the methods of accounting and to strive for and secure an improvement.

It must be able, through the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, through the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, through every possible channel, to

"bring the matter" before the highest bodies, Party and Soviet, and to secure an improvement in the system of accounting.

I have dealt at length with the most important (and simplest) question, viz., the system of accounting; but there are other important and more complicated questions, as, for example, contract work (executive control, accounting, etc.), and so forth.

One particularly interesting question is *broached* in the preliminary report, but only broached and not dealt with in a business-like fashion. Namely, the author of the preliminary report writes: "The responsible leaders are so overwhelmed with work that they are on the verge of exhaustion, while the technical staffs of the subordinate organisations" (organisations subordinated to the Central Fuel Board—the Central Coal Board, the Central Timber Board, etc.) "*are full of idle employees*."

I am sure that this is a valuable and absolutely correct observation, and that it applies not only to the Central Fuel Board, but to *all* or ninety-nine per cent of the offices and departments.

That evil is to be found everywhere.

In March, when the (new) organisation was being set up, or at the latest in April, when it had already been set up, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should have made the official proposal in writing:

improve matters in such-and-such a way.

That was not done.

How can the evil be eliminated?

I haven't the faintest idea. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should know, because it is its business to study the subject, compare different departments, make practical proposals, see how they work out in practice, etc.

When I say "Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" I mean primarily the author of this preliminary report; but I am perfectly well aware that it applies not only to this author.

Several absolutely conscientious, capable and experienced officials of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be chosen, if only two or three (I am sure that that number can be found), and instructed to draw up a rational plan of work for inspectors, beginning at least with the

system of accounting. It is better to start with a small job and finish it.

The author of the preliminary report touches upon a host of subjects, but not one of them has been studied; they have been hastily jumbled together and the whole thing is pointless. This is simply playing at "parliamentary reports". It is of no use to us. What we need is *actual improvement*.

How inadequately the subjects have been studied can be seen, for example, from question 52 (39): make a special list of exemplary mines only. That is exactly the conclusion the commission of the Council of Labour and Defence (Smilga and Ramzin) arrived at after visiting the Donets Basin in September 1921. It is exactly the conclusion that the State Planning Commission arrived at.

Why do I know about the work of the State Planning Commission and of Smilga's commission, while the *special inspector* who sat down to draw up a report on the Central Fuel Board does not know about it?

Because the work is not properly organised.

To sum up, I make the following practical proposals:

(1) make a special feature of at least the question of properly organising accounting and pursue it to the end;

(2) appoint definite persons for this job and send me their names;

(3) send me the name of the inspector in charge of Timber Board affairs.

Lenin

September 27, 1921

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Published according to the manuscript

К четырехлетней годовщине Октябрьской революции

Наступил четырехлетний годовщина 25-го октября (7 ноября).

Тем сравнительно короткий срок прошел великий день, тем ярче сыновьям рождение пролетарской революции в России, тем чудеснее мы вдумываемся в грозе в практический опыт нашей работы, будущий в целом.

Из самых кратких — и, конечно, далеко неполных — абзацев этот рождение и этот опыт можно за короткое следующим образом.

Непосредственной и бесспорной задачей революции в России была задача буржуазно-демократическая: сбросить остатки средневековья, сжать их до конца, очистить Россию от этого варварства, от этого позора, от этого величайшего тормоза, злой культуры и злого прогресса в нашей стране.

И мы вправе гордиться тем, что проделали эту чистку гораздо решительнее, острее, смелее,

First page of Lenin's manuscript
"Fourth Anniversary
of the October Revolution",
October 14, 1921

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS[20]

I regret very much that I am unable to greet your Congress in person.

I have on more than one occasion expressed my opinion on the importance of the book *A Plan for Electrification* and still more so of electrification itself. Large-scale machine industry and its extension to agriculture is the only possible economic basis for socialism, the only possible basis for a successful struggle to deliver mankind from the yoke of capital, to save mankind from the slaughter and mutilation of tens of millions of people in order to decide whether the British or German, the Japanese or American, etc., vultures are to have the advantage in dividing up the world.

The Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic has initiated the planned and systematic electrification of the country. However meagre and modest the beginning may be, however enormous the difficulties may be for the country which the landowners and capitalists have reduced to ruin in the course of four years of imperialist war and three years of civil war, and which the bourgeoisie of the whole world is watching, ready to pounce upon and convert into their colony, however slow, painfully slow, the progress in the electrification of our country may be, progress is nevertheless being made. With the assistance of your Congress, with the assistance of all the electrical engineers in Russia, and of a number of the best and progressive scientists in all parts of the world, by the heroic efforts of the vanguard

of the workers and working peasants, we shall cope with this task, and our country will be electrified.

I greet the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Electrical Engineers and wish you every success.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 8, 1921

Published according to the manuscript

Published on October 11, 1921 in the *Bulleten VIII Vserossiiskogo elektrotekhnicheskogo syezdu* (Bulletin of the 8th All-Russia Congress of Electrical Engineers) No. 3

FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The fourth anniversary of October 25 (November 7) is approaching.

The farther that great day recedes from us, the more clearly we see the significance of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and the more deeply we reflect upon the practical experience of our work as a whole.

Very briefly and, of course, in very incomplete and rough outline, this significance and experience may be summed up as follows.

The direct and immediate object of the revolution in Russia was a bourgeois-democratic one, namely, to destroy the survivals of medievalism and sweep them away completely, to purge Russia of this barbarism, of this shame, and to remove this immense obstacle to all culture and progress in our country.

And we can justifiably pride ourselves on having carried out that purge with greater determination and much more rapidly, boldly and successfully, and, from the point of view of its effect on the masses, much more widely and deeply, than the great French Revolution over one hundred and twenty-five years ago.

Both the anarchists and the petty-bourgeois democrats (i.e., the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are the Russian counterparts of that international social type) have talked and are still talking an incredible lot of nonsense about the relation between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist (*that is*, proletarian) revolution. The last four years have proved to the hilt that our interpretation of Marxism on this point, and our estimate of the experience of former revolutions were correct. We have *consummated* the bourgeois-democratic revolution as nobody had done before. We are

advancing towards the socialist revolution consciously, firmly and unswervingly, knowing that it is not separated from the bourgeois-democratic revolution by a Chinese Wall, and knowing too that (in the last analysis) *struggle alone* will determine how far we shall advance, what part of this immense and lofty task we shall accomplish, and to what extent we shall succeed in consolidating our victories. Time will show. But we see even now that a tremendous amount—tremendous for this ruined, exhausted and backward country—has already been done towards the socialist transformation of society.

Let us, however, finish what we have to say about the bourgeois-democratic content of our revolution. Marxists must understand what that means. To explain, let us take a few striking examples.

The bourgeois-democratic content of the revolution means that the social relations (system, institutions) of the country are purged of medievalism, serfdom, feudalism.

What were the chief manifestations, survivals, remnants of serfdom in Russia up to 1917? The monarchy, the system of social estates, landed proprietorship and land tenure, the status of women, religion, and national oppression. Take any one of these Augean stables, which, incidentally, were left largely uncleansed by all the more advanced states when they accomplished *their* bourgeois-democratic revolutions one hundred and twenty-five, two hundred and fifty and more years ago (1649 in England); take any of these Augean stables, and you will see that we have cleansed them thoroughly. In a matter of *ten weeks*, from October 25 (November 7), 1917 to January 5, 1918, when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, we accomplished a thousand times more in this respect than was accomplished by the bourgeois democrats and liberals (the Cadets) and by the petty-bourgeois democrats (the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries) *during the eight months* they were in power.

Those poltroons, gas-bags, vainglorious Narcissuses and petty Hamlets brandished their wooden swords—but did not even destroy the monarchy! We cleansed out all that monarchist muck as nobody had ever done before. We left not a stone, not a brick of that ancient edifice, the social-estate system even the most advanced countries,

such as Britain, France and Germany, have not completely eliminated the survivals of that system to this day!), standing. We tore out the deep-seated roots of the social-estate system, namely, the remnants of feudalism and serfdom in the system of landownership, to the last. "One may argue" (there are plenty of quill-drivers, Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries abroad to indulge in such arguments) as to what "in the long run" will be the outcome of the agrarian reform effected by the Great October Revolution. We have no desire at the moment to waste time on such controversies, for we are deciding this, as well as the mass of accompanying controversies, by struggle. But the fact cannot be denied that the petty-bourgeois democrats "compromised" with the landowners, the custodians of the traditions of serfdom, for eight months, while we completely swept the landowners and all their traditions from Russian soil in a few weeks.

Take religion, or the denial of rights to women, or the oppression and inequality of the non-Russian nationalities. These are all problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The vulgar petty-bourgeois democrats talked about them for eight months. In not a *single* one of the most advanced countries in the world have *these* questions been *completely* settled on *bourgeois-democratic* lines. In our country they have been settled completely by the legislation of the October Revolution. We have fought and are fighting religion in earnest. We have granted *all* the non-Russian nationalities *their own* republics or autonomous regions. We in Russia no longer have the base, mean and infamous denial of rights to women or inequality of the sexes, that disgusting survival of feudalism and medievalism, which is being renovated by the avaricious bourgeoisie and the dull-witted and frightened petty bourgeoisie in every other country in the world without exception.

All this goes to make up the content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. A hundred and fifty and two hundred and fifty years ago the progressive leaders of that revolution (or of those revolutions, if we consider each national variety of the one general type) promised to rid mankind of medieval privileges, of sex inequality, of state privileges for one religion or another (or "religious *ideas*",

"the church" in general), and of national inequality. They promised, but did not keep their promises. They could not keep them, for they were hindered by their "respect"—for the "sacred right of private property". Our proletarian revolution was not afflicted with this accursed "respect" for this thrice-accursed medievalism and for the "sacred right of private property".

But in order to consolidate the achievements of the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the peoples of Russia, we were obliged to go farther; and we did go farther. We solved the problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in passing, as a "by-product" of our main and genuinely *proletarian*-revolutionary, socialist activities. We have always said that reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle. We said—and proved it by deeds—that bourgeois-democratic reforms are a by-product of the proletarian, i.e., of the socialist revolution. Incidentally, the Kautskys, Hilferdings, Martovs, Chernovs, Hillquits, Longuets, MacDonalds, Turatis and other heroes of "Two-and-a-Half" Marxism were incapable of understanding *this* relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolutions. The first develops into the second. The second, in passing, solves the problems of the first. The second consolidates the work of the first. Struggle, and struggle alone, decides how far the second succeeds in outgrowing the first.

The Soviet system is one of the most vivid proofs, or manifestations, of how the one revolution develops into the other. The Soviet system provides the maximum of democracy for the workers and peasants; at the same time, it marks a break with *bourgeois* democracy and the rise of a *new*, epoch-making *type* of democracy, namely, proletarian democracy, or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Let the curs and swine of the moribund bourgeoisie and of the petty-bourgeois democrats who trail behind them heap imprecations, abuse and derision upon our heads for our reverses and mistakes in the work of building up *our* Soviet system. We do not forget for a moment that we have committed and are committing numerous mistakes and are suffering numerous reverses. How can reverses and mistakes be avoided in a matter so new in the history of the world

as the building of an unprecedented *type* of state edifice! We shall work steadfastly to set our reverses and mistakes right and to improve our practical application of Soviet principles, which is still very, very far from being perfect. But we have a right to be and are proud that to us has fallen the good fortune to *begin* the building of a Soviet state, and thereby to *usher in* a new era in world history, the era of the rule of a *new* class, a class which is oppressed in every capitalist country, but which everywhere is marching forward towards a new life, towards victory over the bourgeoisie, towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, towards the emancipation of mankind from the yoke of capital and from imperialist wars.

The question of imperialist wars, of the international policy of finance capital which now dominates the whole world, a policy that must *inevitably* engender new imperialist wars, that must inevitably cause an extreme intensification of national oppression, pillage, brigandry and the strangulation of weak, backward and small nationalities by a handful of "advanced" powers—that question has been the keystone of all policy in all the countries of the globe since 1914. It is a question of life and death for millions upon millions of people. It is a question of whether 20,000,000 people (as compared with the 10,000,000 who were killed in the war of 1914-18 and in the supplementary "minor" wars that are still going on) are to be slaughtered in the next imperialist war, which the bourgeoisie are preparing, and which is growing out of capitalism before our very eyes. It is a question of whether in that future war, which is inevitable (if capitalism continues to exist), 60,000,000 people are to be maimed (compared with the 30,000,000 maimed in 1914-18). In this question, too, our October Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in world history. The lackeys of the bourgeoisie and its yes-men—the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, and the petty-bourgeois, allegedly "socialist", democrats all over the world—derided our slogan "convert the imperialist war into a civil war". But that slogan proved to be the *truth*—it was the only truth, unpleasant, blunt, naked and brutal, but nevertheless the *truth*, as against the host of most refined jingoist and pacifist lies. Those

lies are being dispelled. The Brest peace has been exposed. And with every passing day the significance and consequences of a peace that is even worse than the Brest peace—the peace of Versailles—are being more relentlessly exposed. And the millions who are thinking about the causes of the recent war and of the approaching future war are more and more clearly realising the grim and inexorable truth that it is impossible to escape imperialist war, and imperialist peace (if the old orthography were still in use, I would have written the word *mir* in two ways, to give it both its meanings)* which inevitably engenders imperialist war, that it is impossible to escape that inferno, *except by a Bolshevik struggle and a Bolshevik revolution.*

Let the bourgeoisie and the pacifists, the generals and the petty bourgeoisie, the capitalists and the philistines, the pious Christians and the knights of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals vent their fury against that revolution. No torrents of abuse, calumnies and lies can enable them to conceal the historic fact that for the first time in time in hundreds and thousands of years the slaves have replied to a war between slave-owners by openly proclaiming the slogan: "Convert this war between slave-owners for the division of their loot into a war of the slaves of all nations against the slave-owners of all nations."

For the first time in hundreds and thousands of years that slogan has grown from a vague and helpless waiting into a clear and definite political programme, into an effective struggle waged by millions of oppressed people under the leadership of the proletariat; it has grown into the first victory of the proletariat, the first victory in the struggle to abolish war and to unite the workers of all countries against the united bourgeoisie of different nations, against the bourgeoisie that makes peace and war at the expense of the slaves of capital, the wage-workers, the peasants, the working people.

This first victory is *not yet the final victory*, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships, at the price of unprecedented suffering, accompanied by a series of serious reverses

* In Russian, the word *mir* has two meanings (*world* and *peace*) and had two different spellings in the old orthography.—*Tr.*

and mistakes on our part. How could a single backward people be expected to frustrate the imperialist wars of the most powerful and most developed countries of the world without sustaining reverses and without committing mistakes! We are not afraid to admit our mistakes and shall examine them dispassionately in order to learn how to correct them. But the fact remains that for the first time in hundreds and thousands of years the promise "to reply" to war between the slave-owners by a revolution of the slaves directed *against* all the slave-owners *has been completely fulfilled*—and is being fulfilled despite all difficulties.

We have made the start. When, at what date and time, and the proletarians of which nation will complete this process is not important. The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.

Gentlemen, capitalists of all countries, keep up your hypocritical pretence of "defending the fatherland"—the Japanese fatherland against the American, the American against the Japanese, the French against the British, and so forth! Gentlemen, knights of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, pacifist petty bourgeoisie and philistines of the entire world, go on "evading" the question of how to combat imperialist wars by issuing new "Basle Manifestos" (on the model of the Basle Manifesto of 1912[21]). *The first Bolshevik revolution* has wrested *the first hundred million people* of this earth from the clutches of imperialist war and the imperialist world. Subsequent revolutions will deliver the rest of mankind from such wars and from such a world.

Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice. It is in this most important and most difficult task that we have sustained the greatest number of reverses and have made most mistakes. How could anyone expect that a task so new to the world could be begun without reverses and without mistakes! But we have begun it. We shall continue it. At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correct-

ing a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country without committing such mistakes.

The difficulties are immense. But we are accustomed to grappling with immense difficulties. Not for nothing do our enemies call us "stone-hard" and exponents of a "firm-line policy". But we have also learned, at least to some extent, another art that is essential in revolution, namely, flexibility, the ability to effect swift and sudden changes of tactics if changes in objective conditions demand them, and to choose another path for the achievement of our goal if the former path proves to be inexpedient or impossible at the given moment.

Borne along on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm, rousing first the political enthusiasm and then the military enthusiasm of the people, we expected to accomplish economic tasks just as great as the political and military tasks we had accomplished by relying directly on this enthusiasm. We expected—or perhaps it would be truer to say that we presumed without having given it adequate consideration—to be able to organise the state production and the state distribution of products on communist lines in a small-peasant country directly as ordered by the proletarian state. Experience has proved that we were wrong. It appears that a number of transitional stages were necessary—state capitalism and socialism—in order to *prepare*—to prepare by many years of effort—for the transition to communism. Not directly relying on enthusiasm, but aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive and business principles, we must first set to work in this small-peasant country to build solid gangways to socialism by way of state capitalism. Otherwise we shall never get to communism, we shall never bring scores of millions of people to communism. That is what experience, the objective course of the development of the revolution, has taught us.

And we, who during these three or four years have learned a little to make abrupt changes of front (when abrupt changes of front are needed), have begun zealously, attentively and sedulously (although still not zealously,

attentively and sedulously enough) to learn to make a new change of front, namely, the New Economic Policy. The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd "businessman", a punctilious *wholesale merchant*—otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of "tuition" we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analysing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole "course", although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be—despite disaster, famine and ruin—we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.

October 14, 1921

Pravda No. 234,
October 18, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
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THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE TASKS OF THE POLITICAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS

REPORT TO THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF POLITICAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS OCTOBER 17, 1921[22]

Comrades, I intend to devote this report, or rather talk, to the New Economic Policy, and to the tasks of the Political Education Departments arising out of this policy, as I understand them. I think it would be quite wrong to limit reports on questions that do not come within the scope of a given congress to bare information about what is going on generally in the Party or in the Soviet Republic.

ABRUPT CHANGE OF POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE R.C.P.

While I do not in the least deny the value of such information and the usefulness of conferences on all questions, I nevertheless find that the main defect in the proceedings of most of our congresses is that they are not directly and immediately connected with the practical problems before them. These are the defects that I should like to speak about both in connection with and in respect of the New Economic Policy.

I shall speak about the Now Economic Policy briefly and in general terms. Comrades, the overwhelming majority of you are Communists, and although some of you are very young, you have worked magnificently to carry out our general policy in the first years of our revolution. Having done a large part of this work you cannot help seeing the abrupt change made by our Soviet government and our

Communist Party in adopting the economic policy which we call "new", new, that is, in respect of our previous economic policy.

In substance, however, this new policy contains more elements of the old than our previous economic policy did.

Why? Because our previous economic policy, if we cannot say counted on (in the situation then prevailing we did little counting in general), then to a certain degree assumed—we may say uncalculatingly assumed—that there would be a direct transition from the old Russian economy to state production and distribution on communist lines.

If we recall the economic literature that we ourselves issued in the past, if we recall what Communists wrote before and very soon after we took power in Russia—for example, in the beginning of 1918, when the first political assault upon old Russia ended in a smashing victory, when the Soviet Republic was created, when Russia emerged from the imperialist war, mutilated, it is true, but not so mutilated as she would have been had she continued to "defend the fatherland" as she was advised to do by the imperialists, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—if we recall all this we shall understand that in the initial period, when we had only just completed the first stage in the work of building up the Soviet government and had only just emerged from the imperialist war, what we said about our tasks in the field of economic development was much more cautious and circumspect than our actions in the latter half of 1918 and throughout 1919 and 1920.

THE 1918 DECISION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE ROLE OF THE PEASANTRY

Even if all of you were not yet active workers in the Party and the Soviets at that time, you have at all events been able to make, and of course have made, yourselves familiar with decisions such as that adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee at the end of April 1918.[23] That decision pointed to the necessity to take peasant farming into consideration, and it was based on a

report which made allowance for the role of state capitalism in building socialism in a peasant country; a report which emphasised the importance of personal, individual, one-man responsibility; which emphasised the significance of that factor in the administration of the country as distinct from the political tasks of organising state power and from military tasks.

OUR MISTAKE

At the beginning of 1918 we expected a period in which peaceful construction would be possible. When the Brest peace was signed it seemed that danger had subsided for a time and that it would be possible to start peaceful construction. But we were mistaken, because in 1918 a real military danger overtook us in the shape of the Czechoslovak mutiny and the outbreak of civil war, which dragged on until 1920. Partly owing to the war problems that overwhelmed us and partly owing to the desperate position in which the Republic found itself when the imperialist war ended—owing to these circumstances, and a number of others, we made the mistake of deciding to go over directly to communist production and distribution. We thought that under the surplus-food appropriation system the peasants would provide us with the required quantity of grain, which we could distribute among the factories and thus achieve communist production and distribution.

I cannot say that we pictured this plan as definitely and as clearly as that; but we acted approximately on those lines. That, unfortunately, is a fact. I say unfortunately, because brief experience convinced us that that line was wrong, that it ran counter to what we had previously written about the transition from capitalism to socialism, namely, that it would be impossible to bypass the period of socialist accounting and control in approaching even the lower stage of communism. Ever since 1917, when the problem of taking power arose and the Bolsheviks explained it to the whole people, our theoretical literature has been definitely stressing the necessity for a prolonged, complex transition through socialist account-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ing and control from capitalist society (and the less developed it is the longer the transition will take) to even one of the approaches to communist society.

A STRATEGICAL RETREAT

At that time, when in the heat of the Civil War we had to take the necessary steps in economic organisation, it seemed to have been forgotten. In substance, our New Economic Policy signifies that, having sustained severe defeat on this point, we have started a strategical retreat. We said in effect: "Before we are completely routed, let us retreat and reorganise everything, but on a firmer basis." If Communists deliberately examine the question of the New Economic Policy there cannot be the slightest doubt in their minds that we have sustained a very severe defeat on the economic front. In the circumstances it is inevitable, of course, for some people to become very despondent, almost panic-stricken, and because of the retreat, these people will begin to give way to panic. That is inevitable. When the Red Army retreated, was its flight from the enemy not the prelude to its victory? Every retreat on every front, however, caused some people to give way to panic for a time. But on each occasion—on the Kolchak front, on the Denikin front, on the Yudenich front, on the Polish front and on the Wrangel front—once we had been badly battered (and sometimes more than once) we proved the truth of the proverb: "A man who has been beaten is worth two who haven't." After being beaten we began to advance slowly, systematically and cautiously.

Of course, tasks on the economic front are much more difficult than tasks on the war front, although there is a general similarity between the two elementary outlines of strategy. In attempting to go over straight to communism we, in the spring of 1921, sustained a more serious defeat on the economic front than any defeat inflicted upon us by Kolchak, Denikin or Pilsudski. This defeat was much more serious, significant and dangerous. It was expressed in the isolation of the higher administrators of our economic policy from the lower and their failure to produce that

development of the productive forces which the Programme of our Party regards as vital and urgent.

The surplus-food appropriation system in the rural districts—this direct communist approach to the problem of urban development—hindered the growth of the productive forces and proved to be the main cause of the profound economic and political crisis that we experienced in the spring of 1921. That was why we had to take a step which from the point of view of our line, of our policy, cannot be called anything else than a very severe defeat and retreat. Moreover, it cannot be said that this retreat is—like retreats of the Red Army—a completely orderly retreat to previously prepared positions. True, the positions for our present retreat were prepared beforehand. That can be proved by comparing the decisions adopted by our Party in the spring of 1921 with the one adopted in April 1918, which I have mentioned. The positions were prepared beforehand; but the retreat to these positions took place (and is still taking place in many parts of the country) in disorder, and even in extreme disorder.

PURPORT OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

It is here that the task of the Political Education Departments to combat this comes to the forefront. The main problem in the light of the New Economic Policy is to take advantage of the situation that has arisen as speedily as possible.

The New Economic Policy means substituting a tax for the requisitioning of food; it means reverting to capitalism to a considerable extent—to what extent we do not know. Concessions to foreign capitalists (true, only very few have been accepted, especially when compared with the number we have offered) and leasing enterprises to private capitalists definitely mean restoring capitalism, and this is part and parcel of the New Economic Policy; for the abolition of the surplus-food appropriation system means allowing the peasants to trade freely in their surplus agricultural produce, in whatever is left over after the tax is collected—and the tax takes only a small share

of that produce. The peasants constitute a huge section of our population and of our entire economy, and that is why capitalism must grow out of this soil of free trading.

That is the very ABC of economics as taught by the rudiments of that science, and in Russia taught, furthermore, by the profiteer, the creature who needs no economic or political science to teach us economics with. From the point of view of strategy the root question is: who will take advantage of the new situation first? The whole question is—whom will the peasantry follow? The proletariat, which wants to build socialist society? Or the capitalist, who says, "Let us turn back; it is safer that way; we don't know anything about this socialism they have invented"?

WHO WILL WIN, THE CAPITALIST OR SOVIET POWER?

The issue in the present war is—who will win, who will first take advantage of the situation: the capitalist, whom we are allowing to come in by the door, and even by several doors (and by many doors we are not aware of, and which open without us, and in spite of us), or proletarian state power? What has the latter to rely on economically? On the one hand, the improved position of the people. In this connection we must remember the peasants. It is absolutely incontrovertible and obvious to all that in spite of the awful disaster of the famine—and leaving that disaster out of the reckoning for the moment—the improvement that has taken place in the position of the people has been due to the change in our economic policy.

On the other hand, if capitalism gains by it, industrial production will grow, and the proletariat will grow too. The capitalists will gain from our policy and will create an industrial proletariat, which in our country, owing to the war and to the desperate poverty and ruin, has become declassed, i.e., dislodged from its class groove, and has ceased to exist as a proletariat. The proletariat is the class which is engaged in the production of material values in large-scale capitalist industry. Since large-scale capitalist industry has been destroyed, since the factories are at a standstill, the proletariat has disappeared. It has

sometimes figured in statistics, but it has not been held together economically.

The restoration of capitalism would mean the restoration of a proletarian class engaged in the production of socially useful material values in big factories employing machinery, and not in profiteering, not in making cigarette-lighters for sale, and in other "work" which is not very useful, but which is inevitable when our industry is in a state of ruin.

The whole question is who will take the lead. We must face this issue squarely—who will come out on top? Either the capitalists succeed in organising first—in which case they will drive out the Communists and that will be the end of it. Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper rein on those gentlemen, the capitalists, so as to direct capitalism along state channels and to create a capitalism that will be subordinate to the state and serve the state. The question must be put soberly. All this ideology, all these arguments about political liberties that we hear so much of, especially among Russian émigrés, in Russia No. 2, where scores of daily newspapers published by all the political parties extol these liberties in every key and every manner—all these are mere talk, mere phrase-mongering. We must learn to ignore this phrase-mongering.

THE FIGHT WILL BE EVEN FIERCER

During the past four years we have fought many hard battles and we have learnt that it is one thing to fight hard battles and another to talk about them—something onlookers particularly indulge in. We must learn to ignore all this ideology, all this chatter, and see the substance of things. And the substance is that the fight will be even more desperate and fiercer than the fight we waged against Kolchak and Denikin. That fighting was war, something we were familiar with. There have been wars for hundreds, for thousands of years. In the art of human slaughter much progress has been made.

True, nearly every landowner had at his headquarters Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who talked loudly

about government by the people, the Constituent Assembly, and about the Bolsheviks having violated all liberties.

It was, of course, much easier to solve war problems than those that confront us now; war problems could be solved by assault, attack, enthusiasm, by the sheer physical force of the hosts of workers and peasants, who saw the landowners marching against them. Now there are no avowed landowners. Some of the Wrangels, Kolchaks and Denikins have gone the way of Nicholas Romanov, and some have sought refuge abroad. The people no longer see the open enemy as they formerly saw the landowners and capitalists. The people cannot clearly picture to themselves that the enemy is the same, that he is now in our very midst, that the revolution is on the brink of the precipice which all previous revolutions reached and recoiled from—they cannot picture this because of their profound ignorance and illiteracy. It is hard to say how long it will take all sorts of extraordinary commissions to eradicate this illiteracy by extraordinary means.

How can the people know that instead of Kolchak, Wrangel and Denikin we have in our midst the enemy who has crushed all previous revolutions? If the capitalists gain the upper hand there will be a return to the old regime. That has been demonstrated by the experience of all previous revolutions. Our Party must make the masses realise that the enemy in our midst is anarchic capitalism and anarchic commodity exchange. We ourselves must see clearly that the issue in this struggle is: Who will win? Who will gain the upper hand? and we must make the broadest masses of workers and peasants see it clearly. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the sternest and fiercest struggle that the proletariat must wage against the whole world, for the whole world was against us in supporting Kolchak and Denikin.

Now the bourgeoisie of the whole world are supporting the Russian bourgeoisie, and they are still ever so much stronger than we are. That, however, does not throw us into a panic. Their military forces were stronger than ours. Nevertheless, they failed to crush us in war, although, being immeasurably superior to us in artillery and

aircraft, it should have been very easy for them to do so. Perhaps they would have crushed us had any of the capitalist states that were fighting us mobilised a few army corps in time, and had they not grudged a loan of several millions in gold to Kolchak.

However, they failed because the rank-and-file British soldiers who came to Archangel, and the sailors who compelled the French fleet to leave Odessa, realised that their rulers were wrong and we were right. Now, too, we are being attacked by forces that are stronger than ours; and to win in this struggle we must rely upon our last source of strength. That last source of strength is the mass of workers and peasants, their class-consciousness and organisation.

Either organised proletarian power—and the advanced workers and a small section of the advanced peasants will understand this and succeed in organising a popular movement around themselves—in which case we shall be victorious; or we fail to do this—in which case the enemy, being technologically stronger, will inevitably defeat us.

IS THIS THE LAST FIGHT?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is fierce war. The proletariat has been victorious in one country, but it is still weak internationally. It must unite all the workers and peasants around itself in the knowledge that the war is not over. Although in our anthem we sing: "The last fight let us face", unfortunately it is not quite true; it is not our last fight. Either you succeed in uniting the workers and peasants in this fight, or you fail to achieve victory.

Never before in history has there been a struggle like the one we are now witnesses of; but there have been wars between peasants and landowners more than once in history, ever since the earliest times of slavery. Such wars have occurred more than once; but there has never been a war waged by a government against the bourgeoisie of its own country and against the united bourgeoisie of all countries.

The issue of the struggle depends upon whether we

succeed in organising the small peasants on the basis of the development of their productive forces with proletarian state assistance for this development, or whether the capitalists gain control over them. The same issue has arisen in scores of revolutions in the past; but the world has never witnessed a struggle like the one we are waging now. The people have had no way of acquiring experience in wars of this kind. We ourselves must create this experience and we can rely only on the class-consciousness of the workers and peasants. That is the keynote and the enormous difficulty of this task.

WE MUST NOT COUNT ON GOING STRAIGHT TO COMMUNISM

We must not count on going straight to communism. We must build on the basis of peasants' personal incentive. We are told that the personal incentive of the peasants means restoring private property. But we have never interfered with personally owned articles of consumption and implements of production as far as the peasants are concerned. We have abolished private ownership of land. Peasants farmed land that they did not own—rented land, for instance. That system exists in very many countries. There is nothing impossible about it from the standpoint of economics. The difficulty lies in creating personal incentive. We must also give every specialist an incentive to develop our industry.

Have we been able to do that? No, we have not! We thought that production and distribution would go on at communist bidding in a country with a declassed proletariat. We must change that now, or we shall be unable to make the proletariat understand this process of transition. No such problems have ever arisen in history before. We tried to solve this problem straight out, by a frontal attack, as it were, but we suffered defeat. Such mistakes occur in every war, and they are not even regarded as mistakes. Since the frontal attack failed, we shall make a flanking movement and also use the method of siege and undermining.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL INCENTIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY

We say that every important branch of the economy must be built up on the principle of personal incentive. There must be collective discussion, but individual responsibility. At every step we suffer from our inability to apply this principle. The. New Economic Policy demands this line of demarcation to be drawn with absolute sharpness and distinction. When the people found themselves under new economic conditions they immediately began to discuss what would come of it, and how things should be reorganised. We could not have started anything without this general discussion because for decades and centuries the people had been prohibited from discussing anything, and the revolution could not develop without a period in which people everywhere hold meetings to argue about all questions.

This has created much confusion. This is what happened—this was inevitable, but it must be said that it was not dangerous. If we learn in good time to separate what is appropriate for meetings from what is appropriate for administration we shall succeed in raising the position of the Soviet Republic to its proper level. Unfortunately, we have not yet learnt to do this, and most congresses are far from business-like.

In the number of our congresses we excel all other countries in the world. Not a single democratic republic holds as many congresses as we do; nor could they permit it.

We must remember that ours is a country that has suffered great loss and impoverishment, and that we must teach it to hold meetings in such a way as not to confuse, as I have said, what is appropriate for meetings with what is appropriate for administration. Hold meetings, but govern without the slightest hesitation; govern with a firmer hand than the capitalist governed before you. If you do not, you will not vanquish him. You must remember that government must be much stricter and much firmer than it was before.

After many months of meetings, the discipline of the Red Army was not inferior to the discipline of the old

army. Strict, stern measures were adopted, including capital punishment, measures that even the former government did not apply. Philistines wrote and howled, "The Bolsheviks have introduced capital punishment." Our reply is, "Yes, we have introduced it, and have done so deliberately."

We must say: either those who wanted to crush us—and who we think ought to be destroyed—must perish, in which case our Soviet Republic will live or the capitalists will live, and in that case the Republic will perish. In an impoverished country either those who cannot stand the pace will perish, or the workers' and peasants' republic will perish. There is not and cannot be any choice or any room for sentiment. Sentiment is no less a crime than cowardice in wartime. Whoever now departs from order and discipline is permitting the enemy to penetrate our midst.

That is why I say that the New Economic Policy also has its educational aspect. You here are discussing methods of education. You must go as far as saying that we have no room for the half-educated. When there is communism, the methods of education will be milder. Now, however, I say education must be harsh, otherwise we shall perish.

SHALL WE BE ABLE TO WORK FOR OUR OWN BENEFIT?

We had deserters from the army, and also from the labour front. We must say that in the past you worked for the benefit of the capitalists, of the exploiters, and of course you did not do your best. But now you are working for yourselves, for the workers' and peasants' state. Remember that the question at issue is whether we shall be able to work for ourselves, for if we cannot, I repeat, our Republic will perish. And we say, as we said in the army, that either those who want to cause our destruction must perish, or we must adopt the sternest disciplinary measures and thereby save our country—and our Republic will live.

That is what our line must be, that is why (among other things) we need the New Economic Policy.

Get down to business, all of you! You will have capitalists beside you, including foreign capitalists,

concessionaires and leaseholders. They will squeeze profits out of you amounting to hundreds per cent; they will enrich themselves, operating alongside of you. Let them. Meanwhile you will learn from them the business of running the economy, and only when you do that will you be able to build up a communist republic. Since we must necessarily learn quickly, any slackness in this respect is a serious crime. And we must undergo this training, this severe, stern and sometimes even cruel training, because we have no other way out.

You must remember that our Soviet land is impoverished after many years of trial and suffering, and has no socialist France or socialist England as neighbours which could help us with their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry. Bear that in mind! We must remember that at present all their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry belong to the capitalists, who are fighting us.

We must remember that we must either strain every nerve in everyday effort, or we shall inevitably go under.

Owing to the present circumstances the whole world is developing faster than we are. While developing, the capitalist world is directing all its forces against us. That is how the matter stands! That is why we must devote special attention to this struggle.

Owing to our cultural backwardness we cannot crush capitalism by a frontal attack. Had we been on a different cultural level we could have approached the problem more directly; perhaps other countries will do it in this way when their turn comes to build their communist republics. But we cannot do it in the direct way.

The state must learn to trade in such a way that industry satisfies the needs of the peasantry, so that the peasantry may satisfy their needs by means of trade. We must see to it that everyone who works devotes himself to strengthening the workers' and peasants' state. Only then shall we be able to create large-scale industry.

The masses must become conscious of this, and not only conscious of it, but put it into practice. This, I say, suggests what the functions of the Central Political Education Department should be. After every deep-going political

revolution the people require a great deal of time to assimilate the change. And it is a question of whether the people have assimilated the lessons they received. To my deep regret, the answer to this question must be in the negative. Had they assimilated the lessons we should have started creating large-scale industry much more quickly and much earlier.

After we had solved the problem of the greatest political revolution in history, other problems confronted us, cultural problems, which may be called "minor affairs". This political revolution must be assimilated; we must help the masses of the people to understand it. We must see to it that the political revolution remains something more than a mere declaration.

OBSOLETE METHODS

At one time we needed declarations, statements, manifestos and decrees. We have had enough of them. At one time we needed them to show the people how and what we wanted to build, what new and hitherto unseen things we were striving for. But can we go on showing the people what we want to build? No. Even an ordinary labourer will begin to sneer at us and say: "What use is it to keep on showing us what you want to build? Show us that you can build. If you can't build, we're not with you, and you can go to hell!" And he will be right.

Gone is the time when it was necessary to draw political pictures of great tasks; today these tasks must be carried out in practice. Today we are confronted with cultural tasks, those of assimilating that political experience, which can and must be put into practice. Either we lay an economic foundation for the political gains of the Soviet state, or we shall lose them all. This foundation has not yet been laid—that is what we must get down to.

The task of raising the cultural level is one of the most urgent confronting us. And that is the job the Political Education Departments must do, if they are capable of serving the cause of "political education", which is the title they have adopted for themselves. It is easy to adopt

a title; but how about acting up to it? Let us hope that after this Congress we shall have precise information about this. A Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy was set up on July 19, 1920. Before coming to this Congress I purposely read the decree establishing that commission. It says: All-Russia Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy.... More than that—Extraordinary Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy. Let us hope that after this Congress we shall receive information about what has been done in this field, and in how many gubernias, and that the report will be concrete. But the very need to set up an Extraordinary Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy shows that we are (what is the mildest term I can use for it?), well, something like semi-savages because in a country that was not semi-savage it would be considered a disgrace to have to set up an Extraordinary Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy. In such countries illiteracy is abolished in schools. There they have tolerably good schools where people are taught. What are they taught? First of all they are taught to read and write. If we have not yet solved this elementary problem it is ridiculous to talk about a New Economic Policy.

THE GREATEST MIRACLE OF ALL

What talk can there be of a new policy? God grant that we manage to stick to the old policy if we have to resort to extraordinary measures to abolish illiteracy. That is obvious. But it is still more obvious that in the military and other fields we performed miracles. The greatest miracle of all, in my opinion, would be if the Commission for the Abolition of Illiteracy were completely abolished, and if no proposals, such as I have heard here, were made for separating it from the People's Commissariat of Education. If that is true, and if you give it some thought, you will agree with me that an extraordinary commission should be set up to abolish certain bad proposals.

More than that—it is not enough to abolish illiteracy, it is necessary to build up Soviet economy, and for that literacy alone will not carry us very far. We must raise culture to a much higher level. A man must make use of

his ability to read and write; he must have something to read, he must have newspapers and propaganda pamphlets, which should be properly distributed and reach the people and not get lost in transit, as they do now, so that no more than half of them are read, and the rest are used in offices for some purpose or other. Perhaps not even one-fourth reach the people. We must learn to make full use of the scanty resources we do possess.

That is why we must, in connection with the New Economic Policy, ceaselessly propagate the idea that political education calls for raising the level of culture at all costs. The ability to read and write must be made to serve the purpose of raising the cultural level; the peasants must be able to use the ability to read and write for the improvement of their farms and their state.

Soviet laws are very good laws, because they give everyone an opportunity to combat bureaucracy and red tape, an opportunity the workers and peasants in any capitalist state do not have. But does anybody take advantage of this? Hardly anybody! Not only the peasants, but an enormous percentage of the Communists do not know how to utilise Soviet laws to combat red tape and bureaucracy, or such a truly Russian phenomenon as bribery. What hinders the fight against this? Our laws? Our propaganda? On the contrary! We have any number of laws! Why then have we achieved no success in this struggle? Because it cannot be waged by propaganda alone. It can be done if the masses of the people help. No less than half our Communists are incapable of fighting, to say nothing of those who are a hindrance in the fight. True, ninety-nine per cent of you are Communists, and you know that we are carrying out an operation on these latter Communists. The operation is being carried out by the Commission for Purging the Party, and we have hopes of removing a hundred thousand or so from our Party. Some say two hundred thousand, and I much prefer that figure.

I hope very much that we shall expel a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Communists who have attached themselves to the Party and who are not only incapable of fighting red tape and bribery, but are even a hindrance in this fight.

TASKS OF POLITICAL EDUCATIONALISTS

If we purge the Party of a couple of hundred thousand it will be useful, but that is only a tiny fraction of what we must do. The Political Education Departments must adapt all their activities to this purpose. Illiteracy must be combated; but literacy alone is likewise not enough. We also need the culture which teaches us to fight red tape and bribery. It is an ulcer which no military victories and no political reforms can heal. By the very nature of things, it cannot be healed by military victories and political reforms, but only by raising the cultural level. And that is the task that devolves upon the Political Education Departments.

Political educationalists must not understand their job as that of functionaries, as often seems to be the case when people discuss whether representatives of Gubernia Political Education Departments should or should not be appointed to gubernia economic conferences.[24] Excuse me for saying so, but I do not think you should be appointed to any office; you should do your job as ordinary citizens. When you are appointed to some office you become bureaucrats; but if you deal with the people, and if you enlighten them politically, experience will show you that there will be no bribery among a politically enlightened people. At present bribery surrounds us on all sides. You will be asked what must be done to abolish bribery, to prevent so-and-so on the Executive Committee from taking bribes. You will he asked to teach people how to put a stop to it. And if a political educationalist replies that it does not come within the functions of his department, or that pamphlets have been published and proclamations made on the subject, the people will say that he is a bad Party member. True, this does not come within the functions of your department, we have the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for that; but are you not members of the Party? You have adopted the title of political educationalists. When you were about to adopt that title you were warned not to choose such a pretentious one, to choose something more modest. But you wanted the title of political educationalists, and that title implies a great deal. You did not

take the title of general educationalists, but of political educationalists. You may be told, "It is a good thing that you are teaching the people to read and write and to carry on economic campaigns; that is all very well, but it is not political education, because political education is the sum total of everything."

We are carrying on propaganda against barbarism and against ulcers like bribery, and I hope you are doing the same, but political education is much more than this propaganda—it means practical results, it means teaching the people how to achieve these results, and setting an example to others, not as members of an Executive Committee, but as ordinary citizens who, being politically better educated, are able not only to hurl imprecations at red tape—that is that is very widely practised among us—but to show how this evil can really be overcome. This is a very difficult art, which cannot be practised until the general level of culture is raised, until the mass of workers and peasants is more cultured than now. It is to this function that I should like most of all to draw the attention of the Central Political Education Department.

I should now like to sum up all that I have said and to suggest practical solutions for the problems that confront the Gubernia Political Education Departments.

THE THREE CHIEF ENEMIES

In my opinion, three chief enemies now confront one, irrespective of one's departmental functions; these tasks confront the political educationalist, if he is a Communist—and most of the political educationalists are. The three chief enemies that confront him are the following: the first is communist conceit; the second—illiteracy, and the third—bribery.

THE FIRST ENEMY—COMMUNIST CONCEIT

A member of the Communist Party, who has not yet been combed out, and who imagines he can solve all his problems by issuing communist decrees, is guilty of

communist conceit. Because he is still a member of the ruling party and is employed in some government office, he imagines this entitles him to talk about the results of political education. Nothing of the sort! That is only communist conceit. The point is to learn to impart political knowledge; but that we have not yet learnt; we have not yet learnt how to approach the subject properly.

THE SECOND ENEMY—ILLITERACY

As regards the second enemy, illiteracy, I can say that so long as there is such a thing as illiteracy in our country it is too much to talk about political education. This is not a political problem; it is a condition without which it is useless talking about politics. An illiterate person stands outside politics, he must first learn his ABC. Without that there can be no politics; without that there are rumours, gossip, fairy-tales and prejudices, but not politics.

THE THIRD ENEMY—BRIBERY

Lastly, if such a thing as bribery is possible it is no use talking about politics. Here we have not even an approach to politics; here it is impossible to pursue politics, because all measures are left hanging in the air and produce absolutely no results. A law applied in conditions which permit of widespread bribery can only make things worse. Under such conditions no politics whatever can be pursued; the fundamental condition for engaging in politics is lacking. To be able to outline our political tasks to the people, to be able to say to the masses what things we must strive for (and this is what we should be doing!), we must understand that a higher cultural level of the masses is what is required. This higher level we must achieve, otherwise it will be impossible really to solve our problems.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS

A cultural problem cannot be solved as quickly as political and military problems. It must be understood that conditions for further progress are no longer what they

were. In a period of acute crisis it is possible to achieve a political victory within a few weeks. It is possible to obtain victory in war in a few months. But it is impossible to achieve a cultural victory in such a short time. By its very nature it requires a longer period; and we must adapt ourselves to this longer period, plan our work accordingly, and display the maximum of perseverance, persistence and method. Without these qualities it is impossible even to start on the work of political education. And the only criterion of the results of political education is the improvement achieved in industry and agriculture. We must not only abolish illiteracy and the bribery which persists on the soil of illiteracy, but we must get the people really to accept our propaganda, our guidance and our pamphlets, so that the result may be an improvement in the national economy.

Those are the functions of the Political Education Departments in connection with the New Economic Policy, and I hope this Congress will help us to achieve greater success in this field.

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REPORT ON THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
OCTOBER 29

Comrades, in reporting on the New Economic Policy, I must start with the reservation that I understand this subject differently from what many of you here, perhaps, expect; or rather, that I can deal with only one small part of this subject. Naturally, on this question interest centres mainly on the explanation and assessment of the recent laws and decisions of the Soviet government on the New Economic Policy. The larger the number of these decisions and the more urgent the need for their formulation, regulation and summation, the more legitimate the interest in such a subject, and as far as I can judge from my observations in the Council of People's Commissars, this need is now felt very, very acutely. No less legitimate is the desire to learn the facts and figures already available on the results of the New Economic Policy. The number of confirmed and tested facts is still very small, of course, but nonetheless such facts are available. Undoubtedly, to become familiar with the New Economic Policy it is absolutely necessary to keep up to date on those facts and to try to summarise them. But I cannot undertake to deal with either of these subjects, and if you are interested in them I am sure you will be able to find reporters on them. What interests me is another subject, namely, the tactics, or, if one may so express it, the revolutionary strategy we have adopted in connection with our change of policy; the extent, on the one hand, to which that policy corresponds to our general conception of our tasks, and, on the other hand, the extent to which the Party knows and appreciates the

necessity for the New Economic Policy. This is the special question to which I should like to devote my talk exclusively.

What interests me first of all is this. In appraising our New Economic Policy, in what sense can we regard our former economic policy as a mistake? Would it be correct to say that it was a mistake? And lastly, if it was a mistake, is it useful and necessary to admit it?

I think this question is important for an assessment of the extent to which agreement prevails in our Party on the most fundamental issues of our present economic policy.

Should the Party's attention be now concentrated exclusively on certain definite aspects of this economic policy, or should it be devoted, from time to time, at least, to appraising the general conditions of this policy, and to the question of whether Party political consciousness, Party interest and Party attention conform to these general conditions? I think the position today is that our New Economic Policy is not yet sufficiently clear to large numbers of our Party members; and unless the mistake of the previous economic policy is clearly understood we cannot successfully accomplish our task of laying the foundations and of finally determining the direction of our New Economic Policy.

To explain my views and to indicate in what sense we can, and in my opinion should, say that our previous economic policy was mistaken, I would like to take for the purpose of analogy an episode from the Russo-Japanese War, which, I think, will enable us to obtain a clearer picture of the relationship between the various systems and political methods adopted in a revolution of the kind that is taking place in our country. The episode I have in mind is the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese General Nogi. The main thing that interests me in this episode is that the capture of Port Arthur was accomplished in two entirely different stages. The first stage was that of furious assaults; which ended in failure and cost the celebrated Japanese commander extraordinarily heavy losses. The second stage was the extremely arduous, extremely difficult and slow method of siege, according to all the rules of the art. Eventually, it was by this method that the problem of captur-

ing the fortress was solved. When we examine these facts we naturally ask in what way was the Japanese general's first mode of operation against the fortress of Port Arthur mistaken? Were the direct assaults on the fortress a mistake? And if they were, under what circumstances should the Japanese army have admitted that it was mistaken so as to achieve its object; and to what extent should it have admitted that the assaults were mistaken?

At first sight, of course, the answer to this question would seem to be a simple one. If a series of assaults on Port Arthur proved to be ineffective—and that was the case—if the losses sustained by the assailants were extremely heavy —and that, too, was undeniably the case—it is evident that the tactics of immediate and direct assault upon the fortress of Port Arthur were mistaken, and this requires no further proof. On the other hand, however, it is easy to understand that in solving a problem in which there are very many unknown factors, it is difficult without the necessary practical experience to determine with absolute certainty the mode of operation to be adopted against the enemy fortress, or even to make a fair approximation of it. It was impossible to determine this without ascertaining in practice the strength of the fortress, the strength of its fortifications, the state of its garrison, etc. Without this it was impossible for even the best of commanders, such as General Nogi undoubtedly was, to decide what tactics to adopt to capture the fortress. On the other hand, the successful conclusion of the war called for the speediest possible solution of the problem. Furthermore, it was highly probable that even very heavy losses, if they were inevitable in the process of capturing the fortress by direct assault, would have been more than compensated for by the result; for it would have released the Japanese army for operations in other theatres of war, and would have achieved one of the major objects of the war before the enemy (the Russian army) could have dispatched large forces to this distant theatre of war, improved their training and perhaps gained immense superiority.

If we examine the course of the military operations as a whole and the conditions under which the Japanese army operated, we must come to the conclusion that these assaults

on Port Arthur were not only a display of supreme heroism on the part of the army which proved capable of enduring such huge losses, but that they were the only possible tactics that could have been adopted under the conditions then prevailing, i.e., at the opening of hostilities. Hence, these tactics were necessary and useful; for without a test of strength by the practical attempt to carry the fortress by assault, without testing the enemy's power of resistance, there would have been no grounds for adopting the more prolonged and arduous method of struggle, which, by the very fact that it was prolonged, harboured a number of other dangers. Taking the operations as a whole, we cannot but regard the first stage, consisting of direct assaults and attacks, as having been a necessary and useful stage, because, I repeat, without this experience the Japanese army could not have learnt sufficiently the concrete conditions of the struggle. What was the position of this army when the period of fighting against the enemy fortress by means of direct assault had drawn to a close? Thousands upon thousands of men had fallen, and thousands more would fall, but the fortress would not be taken in this way—such was the position when some, or the majority, began to realise that the tactics of direct assault had to be abandoned and siege tactics adopted. Since the previous tactics had proved mistaken, they had to be abandoned, and all that was connected with them had to be regarded as a hindrance to the operations and dropped. Direct assaults had to cease; siege tactics had to be adopted; the disposition of the troops had to be changed, stores and munitions redistributed, and, of course, certain methods and operations had to be changed. What had been done before had to be resolutely, definitely and clearly regarded as a mistake in order to remove all obstacles to the development of the new strategy and tactics, to the development of operations which were now to be conducted on entirely new lines. As we know, the new strategy and tactics ended in complete victory, although it took much longer to achieve than was anticipated.

I think this analogy can serve to illustrate the position in which our revolution finds itself in solving its socialist problems of economic development. Two periods stand out

very distinctly in this connection. The first, the period from approximately the beginning of 1918 to the spring of 1921; and the other, the period from the spring of 1921 to the present.

If you recall the declarations, official and unofficial, which our Party made in late 1917 and early 1918, you will see that even at that time we were aware that the revolution, the struggle, might proceed either by a relatively short road, or by a very long and difficult road. But in estimating the prospects of development we in most cases —I can scarcely recall an exception—started out with the assumption—perhaps not always openly expressed but always tacitly taken for granted—that we would be able to proceed straight away with socialist construction. I have purposely read over again all that was written, for example, in March and April 1918 about the tasks of our revolution in the sphere of socialist construction,[26] and I am convinced that that was really the assumption we made.

This was the period when we accomplished the essential, and from the political point of view necessarily the preliminary, task of seizing power, setting up the Soviet state system in place of the former bourgeois parliamentary system, and then the task of getting out of the imperialist war. And this withdrawal from the war was, as you know, accompanied by extremely heavy losses, by the signing of the unbelievably humiliating Treaty of Brest, which imposed almost impossible terms upon us. After the conclusion of that peace we had a period—from March to the summer of 1918—in which war problems appeared to have been solved. Subsequent events showed that this was not the case. In March 1918, after the problem of the imperialist war was solved, we were just approaching the beginning of the Civil War, which in the summer of 1918 was brought closer and closer by the Czechoslovak mutiny. At that time—March or April 1918—in discussing our tasks, we began to consider the prospect of passing from methods of gradual transition to such modes of operation as a struggle mainly for the expropriation of the expropriators, and this, in the main, characterised the first months of the revolution—the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. Even at that time we were obliged to say that our organisation of accounting

and control lagged considerably behind our work and activities in connection with the expropriation of the expropriators. That meant we had expropriated more than we could take account of, control, manage, etc., and thus the question was raised of transferring our activities from the task of expropriating, of smashing the power of the exploiters and expropriators, to that of organising accounting and control, to the, so to speak, prosaic tasks of actual economic development. Even at that time we had to retreat on a number of points. For example, in March and April 1918, the question was raised of remunerating specialists at rates that conformed, not to socialist, but to bourgeois relationships, i.e., at rates that corresponded, not to the difficulty or arduousness of the work performed, but to bourgeois customs and to the conditions of bourgeois society. Such exceptionally high—in the bourgeois manner—remuneration for specialists did not originally enter into the plans of the Soviet government, and even ran counter to a number of decrees issued at the end of 1917. But at the beginning of 1918 our Party gave direct instructions to the effect that we must step back a bit on this point and agree to a "compromise" (I employ the term then in use). On April 29, 1918, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a decision to the effect that it was necessary to make this change in the general system of payment.[27]

We regarded the organisational, economic work, which we put in the forefront at that time, from a single angle. We assumed that we could proceed straight to socialism without a preliminary period in which the old economy would be adapted to socialist economy. We assumed that by introducing state production and state distribution we had established an economic system of production and distribution that differed from the previous one. We assumed that the two systems—state production and distribution and private commodity production and distribution—would compete with each other, and meanwhile we would build up state production and distribution, and step by step win them away from the hostile system. We said that our task now was not so much to expropriate the expropriators as to introduce accounting and control, increase the productivity of labour and tighten up discipline. We said this

in March and April 1918; but we did not ask ourselves in what relation our economy would stand to the market, to trade. When in the spring of 1918, for example, in our polemics with a number of comrades, who were opposed to concluding the Brest peace, we raised the question of state capitalism, we did not argue that we were going back to state capitalism, but that our position would be alleviated and the solution of our socialist problems facilitated if state capitalism became the predominant economic system in Russia. I want to draw your particular attention to this, because I think it is necessary to bear it in mind in order to understand the present change in our economic policy and how this change should be interpreted.

I shall give you an example which may illustrate more concretely and vividly the conditions under which our struggle has evolved. In Moscow recently I saw a copy of the privately owned publication *Listok Obyavleni*.[28] After three years of our old economic policy this *Listok Obyavleni* seemed to me to be something very unusual, very new and strange. Looking at it from the point of view of the general methods of our economic policy, however, there was nothing queer about it. Taking this slight but rather typical example you must remember how the struggle was developing, and what were its aims and methods in our revolution in general. One of the first decrees at the end of 1917 was that which established a state monopoly of advertising. What did that decree imply? It implied that the proletariat, which had won political power, assumed that there would be a more gradual transition to the new social and economic relations—not the abolition of the private press, but the establishment of a certain amount of state control that would direct it into the channels of state capitalism. The decree which established a state monopoly of advertising thereby assumed that privately owned newspapers would continue to exist as a general rule, that an economic policy requiring private advertisements would continue, and that private property would remain—that a number of private establishments which needed advertising and advertisements would continue to exist. That is what the decree on the state monopoly of private advertising meant, and it could have meant nothing else. There was

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

something analogous to this in the decrees on banking, but I shall not go into that, for it would only complicate my example.

What was the fate of the decree establishing a state monopoly of private advertising issued in the first weeks of the Soviet government? It was soon swept away. When we now recall the course of the struggle and the conditions under which it has proceeded since then, it is amusing to think how naïve we were to talk then, at the close of 1917, about introducing a state monopoly of private advertising. What sort of private advertising could there have been in a period of desperate struggle? The enemy, i.e., the capitalist world, retaliated to that Soviet government decree by continuing the struggle and by stepping it up to the limit. The decree assumed that the Soviet government, the proletarian dictatorship, was so firmly established that no other system of economy was possible; that the necessity to submit to it would be so obvious to the mass of private entrepreneurs and individual owners that they would accept battle where we, as the state power, chose. We said in effect: "We will allow your private publications to continue; private enterprises will remain; the freedom to advertise, which is necessary for the service of these private enterprises, will remain, except that the state will impose a tax on advertisements; advertising will be concentrated in the hands of the state. The private advertising system, as such, will not be abolished; on the contrary, you will enjoy those benefits which always accrue from the proper concentration of publicity." What actually happened, however, was that we had to wage the struggle on totally different terrain. The enemy, i.e., the capitalist class, retaliated to this decree of the state power by completely repudiating that state power. Advertising ceased to be the issue, for all the remnants of what was bourgeois and capitalist in our system had already concentrated their forces on the struggle against the very foundations of state power. We, who had said to the capitalists, "Submit to state regulation, submit to state power, and instead of the complete abolition of the conditions that correspond to the old interests, habits and views of the population, changes will be gradually made by state regulation"—we

found our very existence in jeopardy. The capitalist class had adopted the tactics of forcing us into a desperate and relentless struggle, and that compelled us to destroy the old relations to a far larger extent than we had at first intended.

Nothing came of the decree establishing state monopoly of private advertising; it remained a dead letter, while actual events, i.e., the resistance of the capitalist class, compelled our state to shift the struggle to an altogether different plane; not to the petty, ridiculously petty, issues we were naïve enough to dabble in at the end of 1917, but to the issue of "To be or not to be?"—to smash the sabotage of the former salaried class; to repel the white-guard army, which was receiving assistance from the bourgeoisie of the whole world.

I think that this episode with the decree on advertising provides useful guidance on the fundamental question of whether the old tactics were right or wrong. Of course, when we appraise events in the light of subsequent historical development, we cannot but regard our decree as naïve and, to a certain extent, mistaken. Nevertheless, it did contain something that was right, in that the state power—the proletariat—made an attempt to pass, as gradually as possible, breaking up as little of the old as possible, to the new social relations while adapting itself, as much as possible, one may say, to the conditions then prevailing. But the enemy, i.e., the bourgeois class, went to all ends to provoke us into an extremely desperate struggle. Was this strategically correct from the enemy's point of view? Of course it was; for how could the bourgeoisie be expected to submit to an absolutely new, hitherto unprecedented proletarian power without first testing its strength by means of a direct assault? The bourgeoisie said to us, in effect, "Excuse us, gentlemen, we shall not talk to you about advertisements, but about whether we can find in our midst another Wrangel, Kolchak or Denikin, and whether they will obtain the aid of the international bourgeoisie in deciding, not whether you are going to have a State Bank or not, but an entirely different issue." Quite a lot was written about the State Bank at the end of 1917 but as in the case with advertisements it all remained largely a dead letter.

At that time the bourgeoisie retaliated with a strategy that was quite correct from its point of view. What it said was, "First of all we shall fight over the fundamental issue of whether you are really the state power or only think you are; and this question will not be decided by decrees, of course, but by war, by force; and in all probability this war will be waged not only by us, the capitalists who have been expelled from Russia, but by all those who want the capitalist system. And if it turns out that the rest of the world is sufficiently interested, we Russian capitalists will receive the assistance of the international bourgeoisie." From the standpoint of its own interests, the bourgeoisie acted quite rightly. If it had had oven a crumb of hope of settling the fundamental issue by the most effective means—war—it could not and should not have agreed to the partial concessions the Soviet government offered it while contemplating a more gradual transition to the new system. "We don't want your transition, we don't want your new system," was the reply of the bourgeoisie.

That is why events developed in the way they did. On the one hand, we had the victory of the proletarian state accompanied by a struggle of extraordinary magnitude amidst unprecedented popular enthusiasm, which characterised the whole period of 1917 and 1918. On the other hand, the Soviet government attempted to introduce an economic policy that was originally calculated to bring about a number of gradual changes, to bring about a more cautious transition to the new system. This policy was expressed, among other things, by the little example I have just given you. In retaliation, the enemy camp proclaimed its determination to wage a relentless struggle to decide whether Soviet power could, as a state, maintain its position in the international system of economic relations. That issue could be decided only by war, which, being civil war, was very fierce. The sterner the struggle became, the less chance there was of a cautious transition. As I have said, in the logic of the struggle the bourgeoisie was right from its own point of view. But what could we say? We said to the capitalists, "You will not frighten us, gentlemen. In addition to the thrashing we gave you and your Constituent Assembly in the political field, we shall give you a thrashing in this field too."

We could not act otherwise. Any other way would have meant the complete surrender of our positions.

If you recall the conditions under which our struggle developed you will understand what this seemingly wrong and fortuitous change meant; why—relying upon the general enthusiasm and on ensured political power—we were so easily able to disperse the Constituent Assembly; why we at the same time had to try a number of measures that meant the gradual and cautious introduction of economic reforms; and why, finally, the logic of the struggle and the resistance of the bourgeoisie compelled us to resort to the most extreme, most desperate and relentless civil war, which devastated Russia for three years.

By the spring of 1921 it became evident that we had suffered defeat in our attempt to introduce the socialist principles of production and distribution by "direct assault", i.e., in the shortest, quickest and most direct way. The political situation in the spring of 1921 revealed to us that on a number of economic issues a retreat to the position of state capitalism, the substitution of "siege" tactics for "direct assault", was inevitable.

If this transition calls forth complaints, lamentations, despondency and indignation among some people, we must say that defeat is not as dangerous as the fear to admit it, fear to draw all the logical conclusions from it. A military struggle is much simpler than the struggle between socialism and capitalism; and we defeated Kolchak and Co. because we were not afraid to admit our defeats, we were not afraid to learn the lessons that these defeats taught us and to do over and over again what had been left unfinished or done badly.

We must act in the same way in the much more complicated and difficult field of struggle between socialist and capitalist economy. Don't be afraid to admit defeat. Learn from defeat. Do over again more thoroughly, more carefully, and more systematically what you have done badly. If any of us were to say that admission of defeat—like the surrender of positions—must cause despondency and relaxation of effort in the struggle, we would reply that such revolutionaries are not worth a damn.

I hope that, except in isolated cases, nobody will be able to say that about the Bolsheviks, who have been steeled

by the experience of three years of civil war. Our strength lay and will lie in our ability to evaluate the severest defeats in the most dispassionate manner and to learn from them what must be changed in our activities. That is why we must speak plainly. This is interesting and important not only from the point of view of correct theory, but also from the practical point of view. We cannot learn to solve our problems by new methods today if yesterday's experience has not opened our eyes to the incorrectness of the old methods.

The New Economic Policy was adopted because, in the spring of 1921, after our experience of direct socialist construction carried on under unprecedentedly difficult conditions, under the conditions of civil war, in which the bourgeoisie compelled us to resort to extremely hard forms of struggle, it became perfectly clear that we could not proceed with our direct socialist construction and that in a number of economic spheres we must retreat to state capitalism. We could not continue with the tactics of direct assault, but had to undertake the very difficult, arduous and unpleasant task of a long siege accompanied by a number of retreats. This is necessary to pave the way for the solution of the economic problem, i.e., that of the economic transition to socialist principles.

I cannot today quote figures, data, or facts to show the results of this policy of reverting to state capitalism. I shall give only one small example. You know that one of our principal industrial centres is the Donets Basin. You know that there we have some of the largest of the former capitalist enterprises, which are in no way inferior to the capitalist enterprises in Western Europe. You know also that our first task then was to restore the big industrial enterprises; it was easier for us to start the restoration of the Donets industry because we had a relatively small number of workers there. But what do we see there now, after the change of policy last spring? We see the very opposite, viz., that the development of production is particularly successful in the small mines which we have leased to peasants. We see the development of state capitalist relations. The peasant mines are working well and are delivering to the state, by way of rent, about thirty

per cent of their coal output. The development of production in the Donets Basin shows a considerable general improvement over last summer's catastrophic position; and this is largely due to the improvement of production in small mines, to their being exploited along the lines of state capitalism. I cannot here go into all the data on the question, but this example should clearly illustrate to you some of the practical results that have been achieved by the change of policy. A revival of economic life—and that is what we must have at all costs—and increased productivity—which we must also have at all costs—are what we are beginning to obtain as a result of the partial reversion to the system of state capitalism. Our ability, the extent to which we shall be able to apply this policy correctly in the future, will determine to what extent we shall continue to get good results.

I shall now go back and develop my main idea. Is our transition to the New Economic Policy in the spring, our retreat to the ways, means and methods of state capitalism, sufficient to enable us to stop the retreat and prepare for the offensive? No, it is not yet sufficient. And for this reason. To go back to the analogy I gave at the beginning (of direct assault and siege in war), we have not yet completed the redeployment of our forces, the redistribution of our stores and munitions, etc.; in short, we are not yet fully prepared for the new operations, which must be conducted on different lines in conformity with the new strategy and tactics. Since we are now passing to state capitalism, the question arises of whether we should try to prevent the methods which were suitable for the previous economic policy from hindering us now. It goes without saying, and our experience has proved it, that that is what we must secure. In the spring we said that we would not be afraid to revert to state capitalism, and that our task was to organise commodity exchange. A number of decrees and decisions, a vast number of newspaper articles, all our propaganda and all the laws passed since the spring of 1921 have been directed to the purpose of stimulating commodity exchange. What was implied by that term? What plan of development, if one may so express it, did it imply? It implied a more or less socialist exchange throughout the country of the

products of industry for the products of agriculture, and by means of that commodity exchange the restoration of large-scale industry as the sole basis of socialist organisation. But what happened? You are all now well aware of it from your own practical experience, and it is also evident from our press, that this system of commodity exchange has broken down; it has broken down in the sense that it has assumed the form of buying and selling. And we must now admit this if we do not want to bury our heads in the sand, if we do not want to be like those who do not know when they are beaten, if we are not afraid of looking danger straight in the face. We must admit that we have not retreated far enough, that we must make a further retreat, a further retreat from state capitalism to the creation of state-regulated buying and selling, to the money system. Nothing came of commodity exchange; the private market proved too strong for us; and instead of the exchange of commodities we got ordinary buying and selling, trade.

Take the trouble to adapt yourselves to this; otherwise, you will be overwhelmed by the wave of spontaneous buying and selling, by the money system!

That is why we find ourselves in the position of having to retreat still further, in order, eventually, to go over to the offensive. That is why we must all admit now that the methods of our previous economic policy were wrong. We must admit this in order to be able to understand the nature of the present position, the specific features of the transition that now lies ahead of us. We are not now confronted with urgent problems of foreign affairs; nor are we confronted with urgent war problems. We are now confronted mainly with economic problems, and we must bear in mind that the next stage cannot be a transition straight to socialist construction.

We have not been able to set our (economic) affairs in order in the course of three years. The devastation, impoverishment and cultural backwardness of our country were so great that it proved impossible to solve the problem in so short a time. But, taken as a whole, the assault left its mark and was useful.

Now we find ourselves in the position of having to retreat even a little further, not only to state capitalism, but to

the state regulation of trade and the money system. Only in this way, a longer way than we expected, can we restore economic life. Unless we re-establish a regular system of economic relations, restore small-peasant farming, and restore and further expand large-scale industry by our own efforts, we shall fail to extricate ourselves from the crisis. We have no other way out; and yet there are many in our ranks who still do not understand clearly enough that this economic policy is necessary. When we say, for example, that the task that confronts us is to make the state a wholesale merchant, or that it must learn to carry on wholesale trade, that our task is commercial, some people think it is very queer and even very terrible. They say: "If Communists have gone to the length of saying that the immediate task is to engage in trade, in ordinary, common, vulgar, paltry trade, what can remain of communism? Is this not enough to make anyone throw up his hands in despair and say, 'All is lost'?" If we look round, I think we shall find people who express sentiments of this kind, and such sentiments are very dangerous, because if they become widespread they would give many people a distorted view of things and prevent them from appraising our immediate tasks soberly. If we concealed from ourselves, from the working class, from the masses the fact that we retreated in the economic field in the spring of 1921, and that we are continuing the retreat now, in the autumn and winter of 1921-22, we would be certifying to our own lack of political consciousness; it would prove that we lacked the courage to face the present situation. It would be impossible to work and fight under such conditions.

If an army which found that it was unable to capture a fortress by direct assault declared that it refused to leave the old positions and occupy new ones, refused to adopt new methods of achieving its object, one would say that that army had learnt to attack, but had not learnt to retreat when certain severe conditions made it necessary, and would, therefore, never win the war. There has never been a war in history that was an uninterrupted victorious advance from beginning to end—at any rate, such wars are very rare exceptions. This applies to ordinary wars but what about wars which decide the fate of a whole class, which decide

the issue of socialism or capitalism? Are there reasonable grounds for assuming that a nation which is attempting to solve this problem for the first time can immediately find the only correct and infallible method? What grounds are there for assuming that? None whatever! Experience teaches the very opposite. Of the problems we tackled, not one was solved at the first attempt; every one of them had to be taken up a second time. After suffering defeat we tried again, we did everything all over again; if we could not find an absolutely correct solution to a problem we tried to find one that was at least satisfactory. That is how we acted in the past, and that is how we must continue to act in the future. If, in view of the prospects before us, there were no unanimity in our ranks it would be a very sad sign that an extremely dangerous spirit of despondency had lodged itself in the Party. If, however, we are not afraid to speak the sad and bitter truth straight out, we shall learn, we shall unfailingly and certainly learn to overcome all our difficulties.

We must take our stand on the basis of existing capitalist relations. Will this task scare us? Shall we say that it is not communist? If so, then we have failed to understand the revolutionary struggle, we have failed to understand that the struggle is very intense and is accompanied by extremely abrupt changes, which we cannot brush aside under any circumstances.

I shall now sum up.

I shall touch upon the question that occupies many people's minds. If today, in the autumn and winter of 1921, we are making another retreat, when will the retreat stop? We often hear this question put directly, or not quite directly. This question recalls to my mind a similar question that was asked in the period of the Brest peace. When we concluded the Brest peace we were asked, "If you concede this, that and the other to German imperialism, when will the concessions stop? And what guarantee is there that they will stop? And in making these concessions, are you not making the position more dangerous?" Of course, we are making our position more dangerous; but you must not forget the fundamental laws of every war. War itself is always dangerous. There is not a moment in time of

war when you are not surrounded by danger. And what is the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is war, much more cruel, much more prolonged and much more stubborn than any other war has ever been. Here danger threatens us at every step.

The position which our New Economic Policy has created —the development of small commercial enterprises, the leasing of state enterprises, etc.—entails the development of capitalist relations; and anybody who fails to see this shows that he has lost his head entirely. It goes without saying that the consolidation of capitalist relations in itself increases the danger. But can you point to a single path in revolution, to any stage and method that would not have its dangers? The disappearance of danger would mean that the war had come to an end, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat had ceased. Of course, not a single one among us thinks that anything like that is possible at the present moment. Every step in this New Economic Policy entails a series of dangers. When we said in the spring that we would substitute the tax in kind for requisitioning, that we would pass a decree granting freedom to trade in the surplus grain left over after the tax in kind had been paid, we thereby gave capitalism freedom to develop. Failure to understand this means losing sight of the fundamental economic relations; and it means that you are depriving yourself of the opportunity to look round and act as the situation demands. Of course, the methods of struggle have changed; the dangers spring from other sources. When the question of establishing the power of the Soviets, of dissolving the Constituent Assembly was being decided, political danger threatened us. That danger proved to be insignificant. When the period of civil war set in—civil war backed by the capitalists of the whole world—the military danger, a far more formidable danger, arose. And when we changed our economic policy, the danger became still greater, because, consisting as it does of a vast number of economic, workaday trifles, which one usually becomes accustomed to and fails to notice, economics calls for special attention and effort and more peremptorily demands that we learn the proper methods of overcoming this danger. The restoration of capitalism, the

development of the bourgeoisie, the development of bourgeois relations in the sphere of trade, etc.—this constitutes the danger that is peculiar to our present period of economic development, to our present gradual approach to the solution of problems that are far more difficult than previous problems have been. There must not be the slightest misunderstanding about this.

We must understand that the present concrete conditions call for the state regulation of trade and the money system, and it is precisely in this field that we must show what we are capable of. There are more contradictions in our economic situation now than there were before the New Economic Policy was adopted; there is a partial, slight improvement in the economic position of some sections of the population, of the few; there is an extreme disproportion between economic resources and the essential needs of other sections, of the majority. Contradictions have increased. And it goes without saying that in making this very sharp change we cannot escape from these contradictions at one bound.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasise the three main points of my report. First, the general question—in what respect must we admit that our Party's economic line in the period preceding the New Economic Policy was wrong? By quoting the example of what had occurred during a certain war I tried to explain the necessity of passing from assault to siege tactics, the inevitability of assault tactics at first, and the need to realise the importance of new fighting methods after the assault tactics have failed.

Next, the first lesson, the first stage which we had reached by the spring of 1921—the development of state capitalism on new lines. Here certain successes can be recorded; but there are still unprecedented contradictions. We have not yet mastered this sphere of activity.

And third, after the retreat from socialist construction to state capitalism, which we were obliged to make in the spring of 1921, we see that the regulation of trade and the money system are on the order of the day. Remote from communism as the sphere of trade may seem to be, it is here that a specific problem confronts us. Only by solving that problem can we get down to the problem of meeting economic

needs that are extremely urgent; and only in that way shall we be able to restore large-scale industry—by a longer and surer way, the only way now open to us.

These are the main factors in the New Economic Policy that we must always bear in mind. In solving the problems of this policy we must clearly see the fundamental lines of development so as to be able to keep our bearings in the seeming chaos in economic relations we now observe, when, simultaneously with the break up of the old, we see the still feeble shoots of the new, and often employ methods that do not conform to the new conditions. Having set ourselves the task of increasing the productive forces and of restoring large-scale industry as the only basis for socialist society, we must operate in a way that will enable us to approach this task properly, and to solve it at all costs.

2
CLOSING SPEECH
OCTOBER 29

Comrades! Before replying to the observations submitted in writing I should like to say a few words in reply to the comrades who have spoken here. I should like to point to what I think is a misunderstanding in Comrade Larin's speech. Either I did not express myself clearly, or else he did not understand me properly; but he linked the question of regulation, which I dealt with in my speech, with the question of regulating industry. That is obviously wrong. I spoke about regulating trade and the money system and compared it with commodity exchange. To this I must add that if we want our policy, our decisions and our propaganda and agitation to be effective, and if we want to secure an improvement in our propaganda, agitation and decrees, we must not turn our backs on recent experience. Is it not true that we spoke about commodity exchange in the spring of 1921? Of course, it is; you all know it. Is it not true that commodity exchange, as a system, proved to be unsuited to the prevailing conditions, which have given rise to the money system, to buying and selling for money, instead of commodity exchange? There can be no doubt about this; the facts prove it. This answers both Comrade Stukov and Comrade Sorin, who spoke here about people imagining mistakes. Here is a striking example not of an imaginary, but of a real mistake.

The experience of our economic policy during the recent period, that commenced with the spring, has shown that in the spring of 1921 nobody challenged the New Economic Policy and that the whole Party, at congresses and con-

ferences and in the press, had accepted it absolutely unanimously. The controversies that had raged previously did not affect the new, unanimous decision in the least. This decision was based on the assumption that by means of commodity exchange we could achieve a more direct transition to socialist construction. But at present it is clear that we must go by a roundabout way—through trade.

Comrades Stukov and Sorin complained that there was a lot of talk about mistakes and begged us to refrain from inventing them. Of course, it is a very bad thing to invent mistakes; but it is utterly wrong to brush practical problems aside, as Comrade Gonikman does. He delivered quite an oration on the theme that "historical phenomena could not assume any other shape than they have done". That is absolutely incontrovertible, and, of course, we have all learnt this from the ABC of communism, the ABC of historical materialism, and the ABC of Marxism. Here is an argument based on these lines. Was Comrade Semkov's speech a historical phenomenon, or not? I maintain that it was. The very fact that this historical phenomenon could not assume any other shape than it did proves that nobody has invented mistakes and that nobody maliciously wanted members of the Party to give way—or maliciously wanted to permit them to give way—to despondency, dismay and dejection. Comrades Stukov and Sorin were very much afraid that the admission of mistakes would be harmful in one way or another, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, because it would spread despondency and dejection. The purpose I had in mind in giving these examples was to show that the crux of the matter is this—has the admission of mistakes any practical significance at the moment? Should anything be changed after what has happened, and had to happen? First we launched an assault; and only after that did we commence a siege. Everybody knows that; and now the application of our economic policy is being hindered by the erroneous adoption of methods that would, perhaps, be excellent under other conditions, but which are harmful today. Nearly all the comrades who spoke here entirely avoided this subject although this, and this alone, is the point at issue. My best ally here proved to be Comrade Semkov, because his speech was a vivid

example of this mistake. Had Comrade Semkov not been here, or had he not spoken here today, the impression might have remained that Lenin was inventing mistakes. But Comrade Semkov very definitely said: "What's the use of talking to us about state trade! They didn't teach us to trade in prison." Comrade Semkov, it is quite true that we were not taught to trade in prison! But were we taught to fight in prison? Were we taught how to administer a state in prison? Were we ever taught the very unpleasant business of reconciling the different People's Commissariats and of co-ordinating their activities? We were not taught that anywhere. We were not taught anything in prison. At best, we studied ourselves. We studied Marxism, the history of the revolutionary movement, and so forth. In that respect, for many of us the time we spent in prison was not lost. When we are told: "They did not teach us to trade in prison", it clearly shows that those who say it have a mistaken idea of the practical objects of the Party's struggle and activities today. And this is the mistake of employing methods suitable for an "assault" when we are in the period of "siege". Comrade Semkov revealed the mistake that is being made in the ranks of the Party. This mistake must be admitted and rectified.

If we could rely on military and political enthusiasm—which undoubtedly has been a gigantic historical force and has played a great role that will affect the international working-class movement as well for many years to come; if this enthusiasm—with a certain degree of culture, and with our factories in a better condition—could help us to pass straight on to socialist construction, we would not now engage in anything so unpleasant as business calculation and the art of commerce. It would not be necessary. As things are, however, we must engage in these matters. Why? Because we are directing, and must direct, economic development. Economic development has brought us to the position where we must resort not only to such unpleasant things as leasing, but also to this unpleasant business of trading. It was to be expected that this unpleasant situation would give rise to despondency and dejection. But who is to blame for that? Is it not those who have given way to dejection and despondency? If the economic situation in

which we find ourselves as a result of the sum total of conditions, economic and political, international and Russian, is such that the money system and not commodity exchange has become a fact, if it has become necessary to regulate the trade and defective money system that exist today, shall we Communists say that it has nothing to do with us? That would indeed be the most pernicious despondency, would express a mood of utter despair, and would make all further work impossible.

The situation in which we are carrying on our work has not been created by ourselves alone; it is bound up with the economic struggle and our relations with other countries. Things so turned out that last spring we had to discuss the question of leasing, and today we have to discuss the question of trade and the money system. To shirk this question by arguing "that they did not teach us to trade in prison" means to give way to inexcusable despondency, means shirking our economic task. It would be much more pleasant to capture capitalist trade by assault, and under certain circumstances (if our factories were not ruined and if we had a developed economy and culture) it would not be a mistake to launch an "assault", i.e., to pass straight on to commodity exchange. In the present circumstances, however, the mistake we make is that we refuse to understand that another method of approach is necessary and inevitable. Nobody is inventing this mistake; it is not a mistake taken from history—it is a lesson that will help us to understand what can and must be done at the present time. Can the Party successfully accomplish the task that confronts it if it approaches it on the principle that "they did not teach us to trade in prison" and that we don't want any commercial calculations? There are lots of things that we did not learn in prison, but which we had to learn after the revolution; and we learnt them very well.

I think it is our duty to learn to understand commercial relations and trade; and we shall begin to learn this, and finally master it, when we begin to talk about it without beating about the bush. We have had to retreat so far that the question of trade has become a practical question for the Party, a question of economic development. What dictates our transition to a commercial basis? Our environ-

ment, our present conditions. This transition is essential to enable us speedily to restore large-scale industry, link it up speedily with agriculture and organise a correct exchange of products. In a country with a better developed industry all this would take place much quicker; in our country this follows a longer, circuitous road, but in the end we shall attain our goal. And today we must be guided by the tasks that the present and immediate future pose before us, before our Party, which has to direct the whole state economy. We can no longer speak of commodity exchange today because we have lost it as a sphere of struggle. That is an incontrovertible fact, no matter how unpleasant it may be to us. Does that mean we must say there is nothing else for us to do? Nothing of the sort. We must learn. We must acquire the knowledge needed for the state to regulate commercial relations—it is a difficult task but not an impossible one. And we shall carry it out because we have carried out tasks that were just as new, necessary and difficult. The co-operative trade is something difficult but not impossible; we have to understand this thoroughly and get down to serious work. That is what our new policy boils down to. To date we have already put a small number of enterprises on a commercial footing; at these enterprises wages are paid according to the prices on the open market, and they have gone over to gold in their settlements. But the number of such economic units is insignificant; in most of the others there is chaos, a serious discrepancy between wages and living conditions; state supplies for some have ceased and for others have been reduced. What is the way out? The only way is to learn, adapt ourselves and resolve these problems properly, i.e., in conformity with the conditions obtaining.

That is my reply to the comrades who have spoken about today's talk, and now I shall reply briefly to some of the notes submitted.

One of them reads: "You refer to Port Arthur. But don't you see the possibility of our being Port Arthur besieged by the international bourgeoisie?"

Yes, comrades. I have already said that war itself is always dangerous; that we must never embark on war without bearing in mind the possibility of defeat. If we are defeated,

then, of course, we shall find ourselves in the deplorable position of Port Arthur. But in my speech I had in mind the Port Arthur of international capitalism, which is being besieged, and other armies besides our own are taking part in this siege. In every capitalist country there is a steadily growing army that is besieging this Port Arthur of international capitalism.

A comrade asks: "What will be our tactics on the morrow of the social revolution if it breaks out next year, or the year after?" If it were possible to answer such questions it would be quite easy to make revolutions, and we would make any number of them all over the place. But such questions cannot be answered, because we cannot say what will happen in six months' time, let alone next year, or the year after. It is as useless to put such questions as to attempt to decide which of the belligerents will find itself in the deplorable position of the fortress of Port Arthur. The only thing we know is that in the long run the fortress of the international Port Arthur must inevitably be captured, because the forces that will capture it are growing in all countries. The main problem that confronts us today is how to retain the possibility of restoring large-scale industry under the extremely difficult conditions in which we now find ourselves. We must not shun commercial accounting, but must understand that only on this basis can we create tolerable conditions that will satisfy the workers as regards wages, employment, etc. Only on this commercial basis will it be possible for us to build up our economy. This is being hindered by prejudice and by reminiscences of yesterday. Unless we take this into account we shall fail to carry out the New Economic Policy properly.

Questions like the following are also asked, "Where is the last line of retreat?" I have other questions of the same type, "How far can we retreat?" I anticipated this question and said a few words about it in my report. This question reflects a mood of despondency and dejection, and is absolutely groundless. We heard the same sort of question at the time we concluded the Brest-Litovsk peace. It is wrong to put such a question, because only when we have pursued our new policy for some time shall we have material on which to base our reply to it. We shall go on retreating

until we have completed our education; until we have made our preparations for a definite offensive. I cannot say more than that. It is very unpleasant to retreat. But when heavy blows are being struck, nobody stops to ask whether it is pleasant or unpleasant: the troops retreat, and nobody is surprised. Nothing useful will come of asking how long we shall go on retreating. Why anticipate hopeless situations? Instead of doing that, we must get down to definite work. We must closely examine the concrete conditions, the concrete situation, decide what position we can hold—a river, a hill, a bog, a railway station. Because only when we are able to hold our ground shall we be able to pass to the offensive. We must not give way to despondency; we must not shirk the problem by shouting propaganda slogans, which are all very well in their proper place, but which in the present case can do nothing but harm.

THE IMPORTANCE OF GOLD NOW AND AFTER THE COMPLETE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM

The best way to celebrate the anniversary of a great revolution is to concentrate attention on its unsolved problems. It is particularly appropriate and necessary to celebrate the revolution in this way at a time when we are faced with fundamental problems that the revolution has not yet solved, and when we must master something new (from the point of view of what the revolution has accomplished up to now) for the solution of these problems.

What is new for our revolution at the present time is the need for a "reformist", gradual, cautious and roundabout approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of economic development. This "novelty" gives rise to a number of questions, perplexities and doubts in both theory and practice.

A theoretical question. How can we explain the transition from a series of extremely revolutionary actions to extremely "reformist" actions in the same field at a time when the revolution as a whole is making victorious progress? Does it not imply a "surrender of positions", an "admission of defeat", or something of that sort? Of course, our enemies—from the semi-feudal type of reactionaries to the Mensheviks or other knights of the Two-and-a-Half International—say that it does. They would not be enemies if they did not shout something of the sort on every pretext, and even without any pretext. The touching unanimity that prevails on this question among all parties, from the feudal reactionaries to the Mensheviks, is only further proof that all these parties constitute "one reactionary mass" opposed to the proletarian revolution (as Engels

foresaw in his letters to Bebel of 1875 and 1884—be it said in parenthesis).[29]

But there is "perplexity", shall we say, among friends, too.

Restore large-scale industry, organise the direct exchange of its goods for the produce of small-peasant farming, and thus assist the socialisation of the latter. For the purpose of restoring large-scale industry, borrow from the peasants a certain quantity of foodstuffs and raw materials by requisitioning—this was the plan (or method, system) that we followed for more than three years, up to the spring of 1921. This was a revolutionary approach to the problem—to break up the old social-economic system completely at one stroke and to substitute a new one for it.

Since the spring of 1921, instead of this approach, plan, method, or mode of action, we have been adopting (we have not yet "adopted" but are still "adopting", and have not yet fully realised it) a totally different method, a reformist type of method: not to *break up* the old social-economic system—trade, petty production, petty proprietorship, capitalism—but to *revive* trade, petty proprietorship, capitalism, while cautiously and gradually getting the upper hand over them, or making it possible to subject them to state regulation *only to the extent* that they revive.

That is an entirely different approach to the problem.

Compared with the previous, revolutionary, approach, it is a reformist approach (revolution is a change which breaks the old order to its very foundations, and not one that cautiously, slowly and gradually remodels it, taking care to break as little as possible).

The question that arises is this. If, after trying revolutionary methods, you find they have failed and adopt reformist methods, does it not prove that you are declaring the revolution to have been a mistake in general? Does it not prove that you should not have started with the revolution but should have started with reforms and confined yourselves to them?

That is the conclusion which the Mensheviks and others like them have drawn. But this conclusion is either sophistry, a mere fraud perpetrated by case-hardened politicians, or it is the childishness of political tyros. The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary

is that of exaggerated revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate and can be successfully employed. True revolutionaries have mostly come a cropper when they began to write "revolution" with a capital R, to elevate "revolution" to something almost divine, to lose their heads, to lose the ability to reflect, weigh and ascertain in the coolest and most dispassionate manner at what moment, under what circumstances and in which sphere of action you must act in a revolutionary manner, and at what moment, under what circumstances and in which sphere you must turn to reformist action. True revolutionaries will perish (not that they will be defeated from outside, but that their work will suffer internal collapse) only if they abandon their sober outlook and take it into their heads that the "great, victorious, world" revolution can and must solve all problems in a revolutionary manner under all circumstances and in all spheres of action. If they do this, their doom is certain.

Whoever gets such ideas into his head is lost because he has foolish ideas about a fundamental problem; and in a fierce war (and revolution is the fiercest sort of war) the penalty for folly is defeat.

What grounds are there for assuming that the "great, victorious, world" revolution can and must employ only revolutionary methods? There are none at all. The assumption is a pure fallacy; this can be proved by purely theoretical propositions if we stick to Marxism. The experience of our revolution also shows that it is a fallacy. From the theoretical point of view—foolish things are done in time of revolution just as at any other time, said Engels,[30] and he was right. We must try to do as few foolish things as possible, and rectify those that are done as quickly as possible, and we must, as soberly as we can, estimate which problems can be solved by revolutionary methods at any given time and which cannot. From the point of view of our practical experience the Brest peace was an example of action that was not revolutionary at all; it was reformist, and even worse, because it was a retreat, whereas, as a general rule, reformist action advances slowly, cautiously, gradually, and does not move backward. The proof that our tactics in concluding the Brest peace were correct is

now so complete, so obvious to all and generally admitted, that there is no need to say any more about it.

Our revolution has completed only its bourgeois-democratic work; and we have every right to be proud of this. The proletarian or socialist part of its work may be summed up in three main points: (1) The revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist world war; the exposure and *halting* of the slaughter organised by the two world groups of capitalist predators—for our part we have done this in full; others could have done it only if there had been a revolution in a number of advanced countries. (2) The establishment of the Soviet system, as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. An epoch-making change has been made. The era of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has come to an end. A new chapter in world history—the era of proletarian dictatorship—has been opened. The Soviet system and all forms of proletarian dictatorship will have the finishing touches put to them and be completed only by the efforts of a number of countries. There is still a great deal we have not done in this field. It would be unpardonable to lose sight of this. Again and again we shall have to improve the work, redo it, start from the beginning. Every step onward and upward that we take in developing our productive forces and our culture must be accompanied by the work of improving and altering our Soviet system—we are still low in the scale of economics and culture. Much will have to be altered, and to be "embarrassed" by this would be absurd (if not worse). (3) The creation of the economic basis of the socialist system; the main features of what is most important, most fundamental, have not yet been completed. This, however, is our soundest basis, soundest from the point of view of principle and from the practical point of view, from the point of view of the R.S.F.S.R. today and from the international point of view.

Since the main features of this basis have not yet been completed we must concentrate all our attention upon it. The difficulty here lies in the form of the transition.

In April 1918, in my *Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*,[31] I wrote:

"It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a Communist in general. You must be able

at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which you must grasp with all your might in order to hold the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the next link; the order of the links, their form, the manner in which they are linked together, their difference from each other in the historical chain of events are not as simple and not as senseless as those in an ordinary chain made by a smith."

At the present time, in the sphere of activity with which we are dealing, this link is the revival of home *trade* under proper state regulation (direction). Trade is the "link" in the historical chain of events, in the transitional forms of our socialist construction in 1921-22, which we, the proletarian government, we, the ruling Communist Party, "*must grasp with all our might*". If we "grasp" this link firmly enough *now* we shall certainly control the *whole* chain in the very near future. If we do not, we shall not control the whole chain, we shall not create the foundation for socialist social and economic relations.

Communism and trade?! It sounds strange. The two seem to be unconnected, incongruous, poles apart. But if we study it from the point of view of *economics*, we shall find that the one is no more remote from the other than communism is from small-peasant, patriarchal farming.

When we are victorious on a world scale I think we shall use gold for the purpose of building public lavatories in the streets of some of the largest cities of the world. This would be the most "just" and most educational way of utilising gold for the benefit of those generations which have not forgotten how, for the sake of gold, ten million men were killed and thirty million maimed in the "great war for freedom", the war of 1914-18, the war that was waged to decide the great question of which peace was the worst, that of Brest or that of Versailles; and how, for the sake of this same gold, they certainly intend to kill twenty million men and to maim sixty million in a war, say, in 1925, or 1928, between, say, Japan and the U.S.A., or between Britain and the U.S.A., or something like that.

But however "just", useful, or humane it would be to utilise gold for this purpose, we nevertheless say that we must work for another decade or two with the same intensity

and with the same success as in the 1917-21 period, only in a much wider field, in order to reach this state. Meanwhile, we must save the gold in the R.S.F.S.R., sell it at the highest price, buy goods with it at the lowest price. When you live among wolves, you must howl like a wolf, while as for exterminating all the wolves, as should be done in a rational human society, we shall act up to the wise Russian proverb: "Boast not before but after the battle".

Trade is the only possible economic link between the scores of millions of small farmers and large-scale industry *if* ... *if* there is not alongside these farmers an excellently equipped large-scale machine industry with a network of power transmission lines, an industry whose technical equipment, organisational "superstructures" and other features are sufficient to enable it to supply the small farmers with the best goods in larger quantities, more quickly and more cheaply than before. On a world scale this "if" *has already been achieved*, this condition already exists. But the country, formerly one of the most backward capitalist countries, which tried alone directly and at one stroke to create, to put into use, to organise practically the *new* links between industry and agriculture, failed to achieve this task by "direct assault", and must now try to achieve it by a number of slow, gradual, and cautious "siege" operations.

The proletarian government can control trade, direct it into definite channels, keep it within certain limits. I shall give a small, a very small example. In the Donets Basin a slight, still very slight, but undoubted revival in the economy has commenced, partly due to a rise in the productivity of labour at the large state mines, and partly due to the leasing of small mines to peasants. As a result, the proletarian government is receiving a small additional quantity (a miserably small quantity compared with what is obtained in the advanced countries, but an appreciable quantity considering our poverty-stricken condition) of coal at a cost of, say, 100; and it is selling this coal to various government departments at a price of, say, 120, and to private individuals at a price of, say, 140. (I must say in parenthesis that my figures are quite arbitrary, first because I do not know the exact figures, and, secondly, I would not now make them public even if I did.) This looks

as if we are *beginning*, if only in very modest dimensions, to control *exchange* between industry and agriculture, to control wholesale trade, to cope with the task of taking in hand the available, small, backward industry, or large-scale but weakened and ruined industry; of reviving trade on the *present* economic basis; of making the ordinary middle peasant (and that is the typical peasant, the peasant in the mass, the true representative of the petty-bourgeois milieu) feel the benefit of the economic revival; of taking advantage of it for the purpose of more systematically and persistently, more widely and successfully restoring large-scale industry.

We shall not surrender to "sentimental socialism", or to the old Russian, semi-aristocratic, semi-muzhik and patriarchal mood, with their supreme contempt for trade. We can use, and, since it is necessary, we *must* learn to use, all transitional economic forms for the purpose of strengthening the link between the peasantry and the proletariat, for the purpose of immediately reviving the economy of our ruined and tormented country, of improving industry, and facilitating such future, more extensive and more deep-going, measures as electrification.

Marxism alone has precisely and correctly defined the relation of reforms to revolution, although Marx was able to see this relation only from one aspect—under the conditions preceding the first to any extent permanent and lasting victory of the proletariat, if only in one country. Under those conditions, the basis of the proper relation was that reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. Throughout the capitalist world this relation is the foundation of the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat—the ABC, which is being distorted and obscured by the corrupt leaders of the Second International and the half-pedantic and half-finicky knights of the Two-and-a-Half International. After the victory of the proletariat, if only in one country, something new enters into the relation between reforms and revolution. In principle, it is the same as before, but a change in form takes place, which Marx himself could not foresee, but which can be appreciated only on the basis of the philosophy and politics of Marxism. Why were we able to carry out the Brest

retreat successfully? Because we had advanced so far that we had room in which to retreat. At such dizzy speed, *in a few weeks*, from October 25, 1917, to the Brest peace, we built up the Soviet state, withdrew from the imperialist war in a revolutionary manner and completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution so that *even* the great backward movement (the Brest peace) left us sufficient room in which to take advantage of the "respite" and to march forward victoriously against Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Pilsudski and Wrangel.

Before the victory of the proletariat, reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle. After the victory (while still remaining a "by-product" on an international scale) they are, in addition, for the country in which victory has been achieved, a necessary and legitimate breathing space when, after the utmost exertion of effort, it becomes obvious that sufficient strength is lacking for the revolutionary accomplishment of some transition or another. Victory creates such a "reserve of strength" that it is possible to hold out even in a forced retreat, hold out both materially and morally. Holding out materially means preserving a sufficient superiority of forces to prevent the enemy from inflicting utter defeat. Holding out morally means not allowing oneself to become demoralised and disorganised, keeping a sober view of the situation, preserving vigour and firmness of spirit, even retreating a long way, but not too far, and in such a way as to stop the retreat in time and revert to the offensive.

We retreated to state capitalism, but we did not retreat too far. We are now retreating to the state regulation of trade, but we shall not retreat too far. There are visible signs that the retreat is coming to an end; there are signs that we shall be able to stop this retreat in the not too distant future. The more conscious, the more unanimous, the more free from prejudice we are in carrying out this necessary retreat, the sooner shall we be able to stop it, and the more lasting, speedy and extensive will be our subsequent victorious advance.

November 5, 1921

Pravda No. 251,
November 6-7, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE PROKHOROV TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS, HELD TO MARK THE FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 6, 1921[32]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

(*The entire audience rises. Prolonged applause.*) If we glance back over the past four years we see that in no country of the world but Russia have the proletariat won complete victory over the bourgeoisie. But if we have been successful it is only because the peasants and workers knew they were fighting for their land and their rule. The war against Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak was the first occasion in history when the working people fought successfully against their oppressors. The second cause of our victory is that the Entente could not fling sufficient numbers of loyal troops against Russia, as the soldiers of France and the sailors of Britain did not want to go and oppress their brothers.

Four years have enabled us to perform a miracle without parallel, in that a starving, weak and half-ruined country has defeated its enemies—the mighty capitalist countries.

We have won a strong position for ourselves in the world, one without parallel and totally unforeseen. What still remains is the tremendous task of setting our national economy going. All that we have achieved goes to show that we base ourselves on the most wonderful force in the world—that of the workers and peasants. This makes us confident that we shall meet our next anniversary with victory on the labour front.

Pravda No. 252,
November 9, 1921

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF WORKING MEN AND WOMEN, RED ARMY MEN AND YOUNG PEOPLE OF KHAMOVNIKI DISTRICT, MOSCOW, HELD TO MARK THE FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 7, 1921

(*The orchestra plays* "*The Internationale*". *General applause*.) Comrades, I cannot share with you reminiscences that would be as instructive and interesting as those of the comrades who were present in Moscow and personally engaged in this or that struggle. I was not in Moscow at the time, so I think I shall confine myself to a brief message of greetings.

One of the previous comrades finished his speech with an appeal for the workers themselves to work hard in trade union and Soviet bodies and to put all their energies into that work. I should like to support that appeal.

Comrades, during these four years we have experienced an unparalleled struggle. And had we been told four years ago that the foreign worker was not so near to world revolution, that we would have to wage bitter civil war for three years, nobody at that time would have believed that we would withstand it. However, even though we were attacked on all sides, we withstood the onslaught, and if we succeeded in doing so it was not because some miracle took place (for intelligent people don't believe in miracles), but because the troops that were sent against us were unreliable. Had the British not departed from Archangel and the French sailors not left Odessa, and had the foreign worker dressed in soldier's uniform and sent against us not become a sympathiser of Soviet rule, we would not be guaranteed even now against the possibility of an offensive against us . But we are not afraid of that, because we

know that we have many allies in every country . And the comrade who appealed to you here to work as a team was right, and I whole-heartedly support him, because you know that famine has attacked us at our most difficult hour, and the capitalists of the whole world are trying to use this situation to drive us into bondage. But there are masses of workers who are making it possible for us to carry on the fight against them.

Take, for example, the seed help being given to the peasants. You know that the surplus-food appropriation system has been replaced by a tax in kind, and you can now see how well that tax and the seed loan are coming in.

The other day we discussed how to help the peasants of the famine-stricken areas to sow the spring-crop fields, and we found that the quantity of seeds possessed by the state is far from enough to sow even as much as was sown this year. To do that the state needs 30 million poods of grain, whereas the tax in kind will only yield us 15 million poods, so that we shall have to buy the remaining 15 million poods abroad. Lately we have seen that the British bourgeoisie are campaigning for the cancellation of the trade agreement with Soviet Russia, but the British workers are opposed to that. We know that agreements are being concluded with other countries, and difficult as it may be to purchase 15 million poods of grain, we shall be able to do so.

In all foreign countries we see industrial crises and unemployment on a huge scale. Germany, crushed by the shameless Versailles Treaty, has been forced for long out of the international arena. She has been crushed to such an extent by the Versailles peace that she cannot trade. The Allies concluded the unprecedented Versailles peace, and in spite of it are perishing themselves.

Our economic position is improving with every passing day.

What I would ask is that you respond to the previous comrade's appeal and work harder inside our country. The necessity for doing so must be fully appreciated, for we are working to improve the peasants' husbandry, and that requires far greater effort than before. We are confident that we shall be able to do this. (*Applause. The orchestra plays "The Internationale".*)

Published for the first time
from the stenographic record

SPEECH AT A WORKERS' MEETING AT THE ELEKTROSILA PLANT No. 3 (FORMERLY DYNAMO PLANT) TO MARK THE FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION NOVEMBER 7, 1921

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin cited vivid examples showing that Soviet power was day by day gaining ever greater significance in the minds of the working people and was giving them ever greater proof that it is the power of the working people themselves.

The man with a gun—who was the terror of the working people in the past," said Comrade Lenin, "is no longer a terror for he is now a representative of the Red Army, and is their protector."

Pravda No. 254,
November 11, 1921

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET: *THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY* (*TWO OLD ARTICLES AND A STILL OLDER POSTSCRIPT*)[33]

In the spring of 1919 I spoke at a meeting of Petrograd workers. As usual, a verbatim report of the speech was taken, and, as usual, it was taken very badly—or perhaps the report was not so bad, but I, as usual, spoke badly. Be that as it may—reported badly or delivered badly—the speech was published, as usual.

Knowing and feeling all these "badlies" and "as usuals" only too well, I, soon after, sent the Petrograd comrades the following "postscript" to my speech (which, if I remember rightly, was published under the title of *Achievements and Difficulties of the Soviet Government*[34]):

"POSTSCRIPT

"After spending no little effort in correcting the verbatim report of my speech, I am compelled to make the following urgent request to all comrades who want to report my speeches for the press.

"My request is that they should never rely on the shorthand or any other verbatim reports of my speeches, never make any endeavour to obtain such reports, and never publish such reports of my speeches.

"Instead of publishing the verbatim reports of my speeches, let them, if necessary, publish summaries of them. I have seen such summaries of my speeches in the newspapers that were satisfactory; but I have never seen a single verbatim report of my speech that was at all satisfactory. Whether

this is due to the fact that I speak too fast, or that I do not construct my sentences properly, or to some other reason, I will not undertake to say; but the fact remains that I have never seen a single satisfactory shorthand or any other verbatim report of my speech.

"A good summary of a speech is better than a bad verbatim report. That is why I request that no verbatim reports of my speeches should ever be published. April 17, 1919. *N. Lenin*."

I sent this postscript to Petrograd with the following note: "I earnestly request the Petrograd comrades to publish the enclosed as a *preface*, or *postscript*, to my speech, at least in the smallest type. April 17. *Lenin*."

The reader will note the polite, almost pleading tone in which I begged the Petrograd comrades to publish these few lines "at least in the smallest type". As usual, the Petrograd comrades—headed by Comrade Zinoviev—"let me down", to use the mildest term I can think of. As usual, the Petrograd comrades are extremely fond of doing everything they can to display their self-reliance and independence—even going to the length of not granting an author's request, which is considered an obligatory duty by all people, comrades and citizens in all countries and in all republics, including even Soviet republics (with the exception of independent Petrograd). When I found that the Petrograd comrades had not fulfilled my request, I complained bitterly to Comrade Zinoviev; but the latter, as usual, answered, "It's done now and cannot be changed. Besides, how could we publish a postscript in which you *discredit* your own pamphlet." Thus ... "independence" was augmented by cunning, and I was made to feel foolish.

Recently I had other cases of badly delivered or (perhaps I should say "and") badly recorded speeches. These were the speeches I made at the Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Departments and at the Moscow Gubernia Party Conference. Taught by bitter experience I have now decided to act in a less "pleading" manner. Among my papers I have found my old preface of April 17, 1919, and am publishing it as a preface to my two articles. I am not publishing the two speeches mentioned for the reasons I have already stated.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Let truth prevail—better late than never. And it will prevail in many respects: in that the Petrograd comrades will be punished, even if to some slight degree, considering their offence, for their excessive "independence" and cunning; in that the reading public will at last realise most precisely, vividly and palpably how bad the verbatim reports of my speeches are; and in that those who are interested to learn my opinion about one of the most important tasks of the day in the sphere of our New Economic Policy will obtain an exact text of what I really wanted to say, and really did say.

N. Lenin

November 16, 1921

First published in 1930

Published according to proofs corrected by Lenin

TELEGRAM TO NARIMANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF AZERBAIJAN

Baku

My wish to the newly-opened Azerbaijan State Bank is that it should be a firm bulwark of the New Economic Policy in the hands of the workers and peasants of the fraternal Soviet republic. The donation of 40 millions to the famine victims on the Volga and in Kurdistan is the best proof of the preparedness to march under the banner of the Red International of working people.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R.

Written not earlier than
November 17, 1921

Published for the first time

Published according to
the manuscript signed by Lenin

A CAPABLY WRITTEN LITTLE BOOK

A Dozen Knives in the Back of the Revolution, Paris, 1921. This small volume of stories was written by the white-guard Arkady Averchenko, whose rage rises to the pitch of frenzy. It is interesting to note how his burning hatred brings out the remarkably strong and also the remarkably weak points of this extremely capably written book. When the author takes for his stories subjects he is unfamiliar with, they are inartistic. An example is the story showing the home life of Lenin and Trotsky. There is much malice, but little truth in it, my dear Citizen Averchenko! I assure you that Lenin and Trotsky have many faults in all respects, including their home life. But to describe them skilfully one must know what they are. This you do not know.

But most of the stories in the book deal with subjects Arkady Averchenko is very familiar with, has experienced, given thought to and felt. He depicts with amazing skill the impressions and moods of the representative of the old, rich, gorging and guzzling Russia of the landowners and capitalists. That is exactly what the revolution must look like to the representatives of the ruling classes. Averchenko's burning hatred makes some—in fact most—of his stories amazingly vivid. There are some really magnificent stories, as, for example, "Grass Trampled by Jackboots", which deals with the psychology of children who have lived and are living through the Civil War.

But the author shows real depth of feeling only when he talks about food; when he relates how the rich people fed in old Russia, how they had snacks in Petrograd—no, not in Petrograd, in St. Petersburg—costing fourteen and a half rubles, fifty rubles, etc. He describes all this in really

voluptuous terms. These things he knows well; these things he has experienced; here he makes no mistakes. His knowledge of the subject and his sincerity are most extraordinary.

In his last story, "Fragments of the Shattered", he describes an ex-Senator in the Crimea, in Sevastopol, who was "rich, generous and well-connected", but who is "now a day labourer at the artillery dumps, unloading and sorting shells", and an ex-director of a "vast steel plant which was considered to be the largest works in Vyborg District. Now he is a salesman at a shop which sells second-hand goods on commission, and has lately even acquired a certain amount of experience in fixing the price of ladies' second-hand robes and plush teddy-bears that people bring to be sold on commission."

The two old fogies recall the old days, the St. Petersburg sunsets, the streets, the theatres and, of course, the meals at the "Medved", "Vienna", "Maly Yaroslavets", and similar restaurants. And they interrupt their reminiscences to exclaim: "What have we done to deserve this? How did we get in anyone's way? Who did we interfere with?... Why did they treat Russia so?"...

Arkady Averchenko is not the one to understand why. The workers and peasants, however, seem to understand quite easily and need no explanations.

In my opinion some of these stories are worth reprinting. Talent should be encouraged.

Pravda No. 263,
November 2, 1921
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

MEMO TO J. V. STALIN WITH THE DRAFT DECISION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B) ON THE FORMATION OF A FEDERATION OF TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS

November 28

Comrade Stalin, in the main I agree with you, but I feel that the wording should be somewhat amended.

1) While a federation of Transcaucasian republics is absolutely correct in principle, and should be implemented without fail, its immediate practical realisation must be regarded as premature, i.e., a certain period of time will be required for its discussion, propagation and adoption by lower Soviet bodies;

2) the Central Committees of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan shall be instructed (through the Caucasian Bureau) to submit the federation question for broad discussion in the Party and by the *worker and peasant masses*, conduct vigorous propaganda *in favour* of a federation and secure *decisions* to that effect by the congresses of Soviets in each of these republics. Should serious opposition arise, the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P. must be informed accurately and in good time.

Lenin

Written on November 28, 1921

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Published in full for the first time, according to the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE FIRST MOSCOW GUBERNIA AGRICULTURAL CONGRESS NOVEMBER 29, 1921[35]

Comrades, permit me first of all to greet your Congress on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars. I very much regret that I am unable to deliver a comprehensive report to the Congress, as should be the case, and to stay behind to hear the reports and, in particular, the speeches that will be made here by representatives from the localities, by those who are directly engaged in farming, who are directly interested in promoting agriculture and are able to give essential practical pointers. I shall therefore have to limit myself, in addition to conveying general greetings, to a brief statement on the exceptional importance of the work of your Congress.

You all know, comrades, that the fundamental problem, the problem that all present circumstances have made one of the cardinal problems of the home and foreign policy of our Republic, is that of promoting the economy in general and agriculture in particular. All the signs indicate that now, after the bitter years of the imperialist war and after the victorious Civil War, a deep-going change is taking place among the peasant masses, and that deep down among them there is the realisation that it is no longer possible to carry on in the old way. The principal task now confronting us is to make known to the peasant masses what has been achieved by a small number of peasants and to make available to tens of millions knowledge that under our low level of scientific farming has been inadequately disseminated among them. There are a number of signs indicating the desire to reorganise their farms and improve farming methods which

the peasants feel more profoundly, widely and acutely than ever before; and we should see to it that agricultural congresses like the present one are held more frequently and that their results have a practical effect in the immediate future.

The greatest disaster that has befallen us this year is the famine in a number of gubernias and also the drought, which, evidently, may threaten us again, if not next year, then in the next few years. In this connection the key task, not only of agriculture but of the whole economy, is to secure a radical and immediate practical improvement of agriculture. That can be done only if the realisation that farming must be improved penetrates the mass of peasants engaged in farming. We shall be able to overcome and defeat the famine and secure an improvement of peasant farming only if the improvements that have been begun on a very large scale spread to all gubernias without exception. The work of a small number of specialists, a number that is insignificant compared with the masses of peasants, cannot be productive if it is not brought close to the practical tasks of agriculture. Congresses like yours must be held in all gubernias and must influence the peasant masses. The basic, I would even say political, necessity (because all political problems, inasmuch as our international position has improved, now run in a single channel) is now that of boosting farm productivity at all costs. An increase of its productivity must definitely result in an improvement in industry and in an improvement in the supplies of all necessary items to peasant farms—items of personal consumption and implements of production, machines, without which there can be no guaranteed living standard for the worker and peasant masses.

Comrades, you have heard here the report made by Comrade Osinsky on general economic policy and, as I have been told, the report of Comrade Mesyatsev on land tenure. I repeat that the practical suggestions that will be made by those directly engaged in farming, by the peasants themselves, are of the utmost value to us. The experience that you have brought with you and which will become available to the broadest masses is of extraordinary importance and value to us. Moscow Gubernia is, however, in an almost unique position because Moscow peasants can exchange

experiences with the central authorities and with farming specialists—this exchange has been possible and easier for them; the work and results of your Congress have an importance that goes far beyond the bounds of Moscow Gubernia. The most formidable danger will arise if the link with science is allowed to weaken; Moscow Gubernia peasants must, therefore, regard their experiments and the improvements in farming they have achieved as the first steps along that road and bring them to the knowledge of all the peasants. This is what I should like to draw your attention to: the experiments and the conclusions which you will draw here should not only enable you to make further progress on your own farms but should be transmitted to the peasants of the most remote gubernias.

All the questions that have been raised here: the questions of farmsteads, in short, all the questions connected with land tenure, are important for a much broader field; for us representatives of the centre, it is very important to know your opinion on these questions. We plan to approach them on the basis of practical experience. It is most important and basic for our peasant masses to realise the need to improve peasant farming, and for you yourselves to discuss thoroughly the practical steps that have been taken. We shall take note of everything you say here and will take your experience into account when we implement practical measures. I repeat, your experience must become known in the most remote gubernias. That is what we regard as particularly important in your work.

In conclusion let me once again convey greetings from the Council of People's Commissars, and wish you every success in your work. (*Applause.*)

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THE THESES ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE

Apropos of the *theses on the agrarian question* published over the signature of the Central Committee (*Le comité directeur*) of the Communist Party of France in *La Voix Paysanne* (Peasant Voice)[36] No. 95 of November 19, 1921, I may say the following:

It seems to me that the main ideas of the theses are quite correct, that they correspond to the decisions of the congresses of the Comintern, and that they are very well formulated. These ideas are: (1) that a revolution is necessary if new imperialist wars are to be averted; (2) that the pacifist and Wilson ideology has been defeated; (3) that it is absolutely necessary to draw up an agrarian "programme of transitional measures" (*un programme transitoire*) to communism, adapted to the peasants' *voluntary* transition to the socialisation of farming, that will, at the same time, ensure an *immediate* improvement in the condition of the vast majority of the rural population, the hired labourers and small peasants; (4) the immediate *confiscation*, i.e., expropriation without compensation (*sans indemnité*), both of lands lying fallow (*les terres arables en friche*) and of lands cultivated by the labour of *coloni*, tenant farmers or hired labourers (*les terres mises en valeur par les colons*, *fermiers ou salariés*); (5) the transfer of these lands to the whole body of workers who now cultivate them in order that these workers form "producers' co-operative societies" (*coopératives de production*) in conformity with the provisions of the new agrarian legislation; (6) the unconditional permanent (and hereditary) tenure of their lands by the "small proprietors who cultivate their lands themselves" (*les petits propriétaires*

exploitant eux-mêmes); (7) the need to ensure "continuous and increasing production" in agriculture ("*continuité et augmentation de la production*"); (8) the need for a number of measures for the systematic "communist education of the peasantry" ("*éducation communiste de la classe paysanne*") .

Being in complete agreement with these main ideas in the theses, I can only make the following few general observations about them.

1. The first part of the theses deals with the question: "war or revolution." Here it says among other things, and quite rightly, that "the events of the last few years have killed the pacifist and Wilson ideology" ("*les événements des dernières années ont tué l'idéologie pacifiste et wilsonienne*").

In order to dispel these pacifist illusions completely I think we should speak not only of war in general, but also of the specifically imperialist nature of the war of 1914-18, and of the war now in preparation between America and Japan with the probable participation of Great Britain and France.

There is no doubt that only the proletarian revolution can and certainly will put a stop to all war. But it would be a pacifist illusion to think that a victorious proletarian revolution in one country, say France, could put a stop to all war once and for all.

The experience of Russia has vividly dispelled this illusion. This experience has shown that only by means of a revolution were we able to extricate ourselves from the imperialist war, and that the Russian workers and peasants have gained immensely by their revolution *despite* the *Civil War* forced upon them by the capitalists of all countries. Just as reactionary wars, and imperialist wars in particular, are criminal and fatal (and among imperialist wars must be included the war France waged in 1914-18; the Treaty of Versailles has very vividly demonstrated this), so revolutionary wars are legitimate and just—i.e., wars waged against the capitalists in defence of the oppressed classes, wars against the oppressors in defence of the nations oppressed by the imperialists of a handful of countries, wars in defence of the socialist revolution against foreign invaders. The more

clearly the masses of workers and peasants of France understand this the less probable and less prolonged will be the inevitable attempts of the French, British and other capitalists to crush the revolution of the workers and peasants of France by means of war. In present-day Europe, after the victory Soviet Russia has achieved over *all* the capitalist countries which supported Denikin, Kolchak, Wrangel, Yudenich and Pilsudski—in present-day Europe, in view of the outrageous and shameless throttling of Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, a civil war waged by the French capitalists against a victorious socialist revolution in France can only be of very short duration and a thousand times less arduous for the French workers and peasants than the Civil War was for the Russian. Nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish clearly between imperialist wars—wars for the division of capitalist loot, wars to strangle small and weak nations—and revolutionary wars—wars of defence against the counter-revolutionary capitalists, wars to throw off the capitalist yoke.

In the light of the foregoing considerations I think that instead of what is said in the theses about "war or revolution", it would be more correct to say approximately the following.

The events of the last few years have revealed the utter falsity and fraud of the pacifist and Wilson ideology. This fraud must be thoroughly exposed. The war of 1914-18 was an imperialist, predatory and reactionary war not only on the part of Germany, but also on the part of France. This has been most vividly demonstrated by the Treaty of Versailles, which is even more brutal and revolting than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The new war now in preparation between America and Japan (or Great Britain), and which is unavoidable if capitalism continues to exist, will inevitably involve capitalist France, for she is implicated in all the imperialist crimes, atrocities and villainies of the present imperialist era. Either another war or a series of wars to "defend" French imperialism, or a socialist revolution—there is no other choice before the workers and peasants of France. They will not allow themselves to be intimidated by the tales of the counter-revolutionary capitalists about the hardships of the Civil War which they forced upon

Soviet Russia. The workers and peasants of France proved that they were capable of waging a legitimate, just and revolutionary war against their feudal aristocracy when the latter wanted to crush the great French Revolution of the eighteenth century. They will be able to wage a similarly legitimate, just and revolutionary war against the French capitalists when the latter become émigrés and organise foreign invasion against the French Socialist Republic. It will be easier for the French workers and peasants to crush their exploiters because the *whole* of Europe, exhausted, tormented and Balkanised by the atrocious Treaty of Versailles, will, directly or indirectly, be on their side.

2. I think that the statement in the next part of the theses that "the impending revolution in France (*cette révolution que nous devons faire*) will in a way be a premature revolution" (*sera en quelque sorte une révolution avant terme*) is wrong, as is also the following statement:

"The concentration of property proclaimed by Marxist theoreticians did not proceed according to rule in agriculture" (*La concentration de la propriété annoncée par les théoriciens du marxisme ne s'est pas produite avec régularité dans l'agriculture*).

That is wrong; and it is not the view of Marx or of Marxism, but the view of those "theoreticians" of quasi-"Marxism" who were responsible for the shameful breakdown of the Second International in 1914. It is the view of the pseudo-Marxists who in 1914 deserted to the side of "their" national bourgeoisie, and who were derided long ago by none other than Jules Guesde when he opposed Millerand in the press and said that the future Millerands would be on the side of "their" capitalists in the impending war for the division of the capitalist loot.

Marx did not regard concentration in agriculture as a simple and straightforward process. Proof of this will be found in Volume III of *Capital*, and in the article Engels wrote in the 1890s in opposition to the French agrarian programme[37] of that time. Marx did not consider that the proletarian revolution would be "opportune" only when the last peasant had been expropriated. Let us leave it to the Hyndmans, Renaudels, Vanderveldes and Südekums, to

Messieurs Turati and Serrati to interpret Marx's view in this way.

My advice would be to delete these statements for they are incorrect, unnecessary, and discredit the French Communists. They are not needed to prove the practically and theoretically important and correct main idea that the immediate application (*l'application immédiate*) of *integral* communism to *small-peasant farming* (by no means in France only, but in all countries where small-peasant husbandry exists) would be a *profound* error.

Instead of making these incorrect statements it would be better to explain in greater detail why the wealth the French peasants accumulated during the war cannot be lasting, why the money they accumulated during the war is depreciating, why the oppression of both the workers and the peasants of France by the big banks is increasing, what forms this increased oppression is taking, and so forth.

3. The theses go on to say that according to pre-war statistics there were in France 5,700,000 farms (*exploitations rurales*), of which 4,850,000 were small farms (up to 10 hectares) and 850,000 had over 10 hectares of land each. These figures show, state the theses, how unevenly the land is distributed in France. And they go on to say: "But these figures do not give us an exact idea ("*mais ils* [*ces chiffres*] *ne fournissent aucune précision*...") of the ratio between the area of the lands cultivated by their owners and the lands that serve as a source of capitalist profit" (..."*sur le rapport qui existe entre l'étendue des terres travaillées par leurs propriétaires et des terres source de profit capitaliste*").

Firstly, in France (as in every other capitalist country) the lands cultivated by their owners *also* serve as a "source of capitalist profit". Theoretically it would have been more correct, and practically more useful to have explained in the theses of the Communist Party of France the forms this profit takes rather than to have said that the concentration of property does not proceed "according to rule" ("*avec régularité*") in agriculture.

Secondly, it is true that French farming statistics are poor, inferior to the German, U.S., Swiss and Danish, and that they do not give an *exact* idea of the *area* of land cultivated on capitalist lines. It is also true, as is stated further on in the

theses, that farms with less than 10 hectares of land sometimes employ hired labour and that peasant owners sometimes cultivate by their own efforts "farms of 20, 30 and more hectares of land" ("*des fermes de 20, 30 hectares et au-dessus*").

Although from the French agrarian statistics one cannot get an idea of the exact area of land cultivated on capitalist lines, one can, nevertheless, obtain an *approximation*. I have neither Compère-Morel's book, nor any other sources at hand; but I remember that in the French statistics farms with 40 and more hectares of land are given separately. It would be very useful to quote these figures to show the small peasants of France more strikingly what a vast amount of land the French capitalists and landowners have grabbed (from the workers and from them). In the agrarian theses one can (and must, in my opinion) demonstrate more vividly with the aid of French agrarian statistics (and the statistics compiled by Compère-Morel—when he was still a socialist and not a champion of the capitalists and of their predatory war of 1914-18 and of their predatory Treaty of Versailles) that the vast majority of the rural population of France would gain at once, immediately and very considerably from a proletarian revolution.

4. My last observation concerns the points of the theses which speak of the need to increase the output of agricultural produce and the importance of modern machines (*des machines modernes*), particularly threshing machines (*les batteuses*), tractor ploughs (*les charrues à tracteur*), etc.

All these statements in the theses are undoubtedly correct and necessary from the practical point of view. I think, however, that we should not confine ourselves to the ordinary capitalist technique, but should take a step beyond that. A few words should have been said about the need for planned and complete electrification of the whole of France, and to show that it is absolutely impossible to do this *for the benefit of the workers and peasants* unless bourgeois rule is overthrown and power is seized by the proletariat. French literature contains no little data on the importance of electrification for France. I know that a small part of this data is quoted in the plan for the electrification of Russia that was drawn up by order of our government, and that since the

war considerable progress has been made in France towards the technical solution of the problem of electrification.

In my opinion it is extremely important both from the theoretical and from the practical propaganda point of view to say in the theses (and generally to enlarge on it in our communist literature) that modern advanced technology imperatively calls for *the electrification of the whole country—and of a number of neighbouring countries*—under a *single* plan; that this is quite feasible at the present time; that agriculture, and particularly the peasantry, stand to gain most from this; that as long as capitalism and private ownership of the means of production exist, the electrification of a whole country, or a series of countries, firstly, cannot be carried out speedily and according to plan, and secondly, *cannot benefit* the workers and peasants. Under capitalism, electrification will inevitably lead to increased *oppression* of the workers *and peasants* by the *big banks*. Even before the war, not a "narrow-minded Marxist", but none other than Lysis—who is now patriotically licking the boots of the capitalists—had proved that France was actually governed by a *financial oligarchy*.

France possesses splendid opportunities for electrification. After the victory of the proletariat in France, the small peasants particularly will benefit *enormously* from electrification carried out according to plan and unhindered by the private property of big landowners and capitalists. If the capitalists remain in power, however, electrification cannot possibly be planned and rapid, and in so far as it is carried out at all, it will be a means of imposing new fetters on the peasants, a new means of enslaving the peasants to the "financial oligarchy" which is robbing them today.

These are the few observations I am able to make on the French agrarian theses, which on the whole are, in my opinion, quite correct.

December 11, 1921

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Signed: *A Russian Communist*

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the manuscript

LETTER TO P. A. ZALUTSKY, A. A. SOLTS AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU RE THE PARTY PURGE AND THE CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION INTO THE PARTY[38]

To Zalutsky, Solts and All Members of the Political Bureau

I would say that the facts published on the Party purge fully bear out the immense success of that measure despite, the rather numerous individual mistakes. I think that the decision of the Party Conference should underline both these circumstances. I think no date should be set for a repeat purge, so as not to tie our hands in any way.

I would advise the Party Conference to adopt a decision on stricter conditions for admission into the Party: a term of probation of one and a half years for a worker (regarding a person a worker if he worked at least ten years in large-scale industry as an ordinary wage-worker and has now been working for not less than two or three years) and three years for everybody else.

These periods may be halved in special cases, when devotion to the Party and communist self-restraint have been proved beyond doubt and when 4/5ths of the membership in the Party bodies deciding the question are satisfied that such is the case.

The same probation period should be established for those who have been expelled from the Party under the present purge if they have not been expelled for a definite period and if they have not been expelled for shameful behaviour.

Show my letter to your immediate comrades, and if it won't be any trouble, send me, c/o Fotieva, your opinion in brief, even if it only underlines what you agree or disagree with in this letter.

Lenin

December 19, 1921

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Published according to
the stenographer's notes

LETTER TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU RE THE RESOLUTION OF THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION[39]

I ask that the question be discussed as to whether the Congress of Soviets ought to adopt a special resolution against the adventurist policy of Poland, Finland and Rumania (for a number of reasons it is better to say nothing about Japan). In the resolution it must be comprehensively explained that no government of Russia (except the Soviet Government) has ever recognised or could recognise the criminal nature of the imperialist policy in respect of the outlying regions of the former Russian Empire pursued both by tsarism and by the Provisional Government, which had the backing of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The resolution should state in detail how much we have shown by deeds that we value both the self-determination of nations and peaceful relations with the states that were once part of the Russian Empire. Say in detail that we fully anticipate a peaceful attitude, not only on the part of the workers and peasants of all the countries mentioned, but also on the part of a huge section of the reasonable bourgeoisie and the governments. In respect of the adventurist elements, end up with a sharp threat to the effect that if the adventurist fooling with gangs similar to the former Savinkov gangs does not stop, and if they continue to interfere with our peaceful work, we shall arise in a people's war, and those who take part in adventures and banditism will be completely crushed.

Instruct Trotsky and Chicherin to draw up a draft resolution.

A Congress resolution with such a content would be convenient for mass distribution in all languages.

December 22, 1921 *Lenin*

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NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

DECEMBER 23-28, 1921[40]

1

THE HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC

REPORT OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS DECEMBER 23

(*Stormy applause. Cries of* "Hurrah!", "Long live our leader, Comrade Lenin!", "Long live the leader of the world proletariat, Comrade Lenin!" *Prolonged applause.*) Comrades, I have to make a report on the foreign and home situation of the Republic. This is the first time I have been able to make such a report when a whole year has passed without one, at any rate large-scale, attack against our Soviet power by Russian or foreign capitalists. This is the first year that we have been able to enjoy a relative respite from attacks, even if for a limited period, and have been able in some measure to apply our energies to our chief and fundamental tasks, namely, the rehabilitation of our war-ravaged economy, healing the wounds inflicted on Russia by the exploiting classes that had been in power, and laying the foundations for socialist construction.

First and foremost, in dealing with the question of the international position of our Republic, I must repeat what I have already said, namely, that a certain equilibrium, though a highly unstable one, has been created in international relations. This is now evident. It is very strange for those of us who have lived through the revolution from its inception, who have experienced and observed our incredible difficulties in breaching the imperialist fronts, to see how things have now developed. At that time probably none

of us expected or could have expected that things would shape out like this.

We imagined (and it is perhaps well worth remembering this now because it will help us in our practical conclusions on the main economic problems) that future development would take a more simple, a more direct form than the one it took. We told ourselves and we told the working class and all working people both of Russia and of other countries that there was no way out of the accursed, criminal imperialist slaughter except through revolution, and that by breaking off the imperialist war by revolution we were opening up the only possible way out of this criminal slaughter for all peoples. It seemed to us then, as it was bound to, that this was the obvious, direct and easiest path to take. This direct path, which, in fact, alone had enabled us to break free of imperialist ties, of imperialist crimes and of the imperialist war continuing to threaten the rest of the world, proved to be one which other nations were unable to take—at any rate not as quickly as we had thought they would. When, nevertheless, we now see what has taken place, when we see that there is only one Socialist Soviet Republic and that it is surrounded by a whole array of frenziedly hostile imperialist powers, we ask ourselves—how was it possible for this to happen?

One may reply without any exaggeration that this happened because our understanding of events was basically correct, our appraisal of the imperialist slaughter and the confusion in the relations between the imperialist powers was also basically correct. It is only due to this that such a strange situation, the unstable, inexplicable, and yet to a certain extent indisputable equilibrium that we witness, has arisen. The fact of the matter is that although completely surrounded by countries economically and militarily much more powerful than ourselves, whose open hostility to us quite often borders on frenzy, we nevertheless see that they were unable to destroy Soviet Russia directly and instantly—something on which they had been spending so much of their resources and their strength for three years When we ask ourselves how this could have happened, how it could be that a state, undoubtedly one of the most backward and weakest, managed to repel the attacks of the openly

hostile, most powerful countries in the world, when we try to examine this question, we see clearly that it was because we proved to be correct on the most fundamental issues. Our forecasts and calculations proved to be correct. It turned out that although we did not receive the swift and direct support of the working people of the world that we had counted on, and which we had regarded as the basis of the whole of our policy, we did receive support of another kind, which was not direct or swift—the sympathy of the workers and peasants, the farm workers, throughout the world, even in the countries most hostile to us, the sympathy that was great enough to be the final and most decisive source, the decisive reason for the complete failure of all the attacks directed against us. This sympathy consolidated the alliance of the working people of all countries which we had proclaimed and which had been implemented within the borders of our Republic, and which had its effect on all countries. No matter how precarious this support may be, as long as capitalism exists in other countries (this we must of course see clearly and frankly acknowledge), we may say that it is something we can rely on. Because of this sympathy and support, the intervention, which we endured in the course of three years, which caused us incredible destruction and suffering, is, I will not say impossible—one has to be very cautious and circumspect here—but, at any rate, has been made far more difficult for our enemies to carry out. And this, in the final analysis, explains the situation now obtaining and which at first glance appears so strange and incomprehensible.

When we calmly weigh up the sympathy felt for Bolshevism and the socialist revolution, when we survey the international situation from the point of view of the balance of forces, irrespective of whether these forces favour a just or an unjust cause, whether they favour the exploiting class or the working people—we shall ignore this aspect and attempt an appraisal of the alignment of these forces on an international scale—then we shall see that they are grouped in a manner that basically confirms our predictions and calculations: that capitalism is disintegrating and that since the war, which ended first with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and subsequently with the Treaty of Versailles—and I don't

know which is worse—hatred and loathing for the war increase as time passes even in the countries which emerged as victors. And the farther we get from the war the clearer it becomes, not only to the working people, but to an extremely large extent also to the bourgeoisie of the victor countries, that capitalism is disintegrating, that the world economic crisis has created an intolerable situation from which there is no escape, despite all the victories. That is why, while being immeasurably weaker economically, politically and militarily than all the other powers, we are at the same time stronger, because we are aware of and correctly assess all that emerges and must emerge from this imperialist confusion, from this bloody tangle and from those contradictions (to take only the currency contradictions, I will not mention the others) in which they have become entangled and are becoming entangled still more deeply and from which they see no way out.

Today we see how the representatives of the most moderate bourgeoisie, who are definitely and without doubt far removed from socialist ideas, to say nothing of "that awful Bolshevism", change their tune; this concerns even people like the famous writer Keynes, whose book has been translated into all languages, who took part in the Versailles negotiations, and who devoted himself heart and soul to helping the governments—even he, subsequently, has had to change his tune, to give it up, although he continues to curse socialism. I repeat, he does not mention, nor does he wish even to think about Bolshevism—but he tells the capitalist world: "What you are doing will lead you into a hopeless situation", and he even proposes something like the annulment of all debts.

That is excellent, gentlemen! You should have followed our example long ago.

Only a few days ago we read a short report in the newspapers to the effect that one of the most experienced, exceedingly skilful and astute leaders of a capitalist government, Lloyd George, is, it appears, beginning to propose a similar step; and that seemingly the U.S.A. wishes to reply by saying: "Sorry, but we want to be repaid in full." That being so, we say to ourselves that things are not going too well in these advanced and mighty states since they are discussing

such a simple measure so many years after the war. This was one of the easiest things we did—it was nothing to some of the other difficulties we overcame. (*Applause.*) When we see the growing confusion on this question we say that we are not afraid of their propaganda; although we by no means forget either the dangers surrounding us or our economic and military weakness compared to any one of these states, who, jointly, quite openly and frequently express their hatred for us. Whenever we express somewhat different views as to whether the existence of landowners and capitalists is justified they do not like it, and these views are declared to be criminal propaganda. I simply cannot understand this, for the same sort of propaganda is conducted legally in all states that do not share our economic views and opinions. Propaganda which calls Bolshevism monstrous, criminal, usurpatory—this monster defies description—this propaganda is conducted openly in all these countries. Recently I had a meeting with Christensen, who was a candidate for the U.S. Presidency on behalf of the farmers' and workers' party there. Do not be misled by this name, comrades. It does not in the least resemble the workers' and peasants' party in Russia: It is a purely bourgeois party, openly and resolutely hostile to any kind of socialism, and is recognised as being perfectly respectable by all bourgeois parties. This Danish-born American, who received almost a million votes at the presidential elections (and this, after all, is something in the United States), told me how in Denmark, when he tried to say among people "dressed like I am", and he was well dressed, like a bourgeois, that the Bolsheviks were not criminals, "they nearly killed me". They told him that the Bolsheviks were monsters, usurpers, and that they were surprised that anyone could mention such people in decent society. This is the type of propaganda atmosphere surrounding us.

We see, nevertheless, that a certain equilibrium has been created. This is the objective political situation, quite independent of our victories, which proves that we have fathomed the depth of the contradictions connected with the imperialist war, and that we are gauging them more correctly than ever before and more correctly than other powers, who, despite all their victories, despite all their

strength, have not yet found a way out, nor see any. That is the substance of the international situation which accounts for what we now see. We have before us a highly unstable equilibrium but one that is, nevertheless, certain, obvious, indisputable. I do not know whether this is for long, and I do not think that anyone can know. That is why, for our part, we must display the utmost caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson that emerges from our governmental activities for the past year, the lesson which must be learned by all workers and peasants, is to be on the alert, to remember that we are surrounded by people, classes, governments who openly express the utmost hatred for us. We must remember that we are always a hair's breadth away from invasion. We shall do all in our power to prevent this misfortune. It is doubtful that any nation has experienced such a burden of the imperialist war as we have. Then we bore the burden of the Civil War forced on us by the ruling classes, who fought for the Russia of the émigrés, the Russia of the landowners, the Russia of the capitalists. We know, we know only too well, the incredible misfortunes that war brings to the workers and peasants. For that reason our attitude to this question must be most cautious and circumspect. We are ready to make the greatest concessions and sacrifices in order to preserve the peace for which we have paid such a high price. We are ready to make huge concessions and sacrifices, but not any kind and not for ever. Let those, fortunately not numerous, representatives of the war parties and aggressive cliques of Finland, Poland and Rumania who make great play of this—let them mark it well. (*Applause.*)

Anyone who has any political sense or acumen will say that there has not been—nor can there be—a government in Russia other than the Soviet Government prepared to make such concessions and sacrifices in relation to nationalities within our state, and also to those which had joined the Russian Empire. There is not, and cannot be, another government which would recognise as clearly as we do and declare so distinctly to one and all that the attitude of old Russia (tsarist Russia, Russia of the war parties) to the nationalities populating Russia was criminal, that this attitude was impermissible, that it aroused the rightful and

indignant protest and discontent of the oppressed nationalities. There is not, and cannot be, another government which would so openly admit this, which would conduct this anti-chauvinist propaganda, a propaganda that recognises the guilt of old Russia, tsarist Russia, Kerensky Russia—a government which would conduct propaganda against the forcible incorporation of other nationalities into Russia. This is not mere words—this is an obvious political fact, absolutely indisputable and plain for all to see. As long as no nationalities engage in intrigues against us which bind them to the imperialist oppression, as long as they do not help to crush us, we shall not be deterred by formalities. We shall not forget that we are revolutionaries. (*Applause.*) But there are facts incontrovertibly and indisputably showing that in Russia, that has defeated the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the smallest, completely unarmed nationality, however weak it may be, may and must absolutely rest assured that we have nothing but peaceful intentions towards it, that our propaganda about the criminality of the old policy of the old governments is not weakening, and that we are as firm as ever in our desire at all costs, and at the price of enormous sacrifices and concessions, to maintain peace with all nationalities that belonged to the former Russian Empire, but who did not wish to remain with us. We have proved this. And we shall prove this no matter how great the curses rained on us from all sides. It seems to us that we have given excellent proof of it, and we declare to the meeting of representatives of the workers and peasants of Russia, to the many millions of workers and peasants, that we shall do our utmost to preserve peace in the future, that we shall not shrink from great sacrifices and concessions in order to safeguard this peace.

There are, however, limits beyond which one cannot go. We shall not permit peace treaties to be flouted. We shall not permit attempts to interfere with our peaceful work. On no account shall we permit this, and we shall rise to a man to defend our existence. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, what I have just said is perfectly clear and comprehensible to you, and you could not expect anything else from anyone reporting to you on our policy. You know that such, and no other, is our policy. But, unfortunately,

there are now two worlds: the old world of capitalism that is in a state of confusion but which will never surrender voluntarily, and the rising new world, which is still very weak, but which will grow, for it is invincible. This old world has its old diplomacy, which cannot believe that it is possible to speak frankly and forthrightly. This old diplomacy thinks there must be a trap of some sort here. (Applause, laughter.) When this economically and militarily all-powerful old world sent us—that was some time ago—Bullitt, a representative of the United States Government, who came to us with the proposal that we should conclude peace with Kolchak and Denikin on terms that were most unfavourable to us—we said that we held so dear the blood of the workers and peasants shed for so long in Russia that although the terms were extremely unfavourable we were prepared to accept them, because we were convinced that the forces of Kolchak and Denikin would disintegrate from within. We said this quite frankly, with the minimum of diplomatic subtlety, and so they concluded that we must be trying to dupe them. And Bullitt, who had held these friendly, round-table conversations with us, was met with reproach and compelled to resign as soon as he got home. I am surprised that he has not yet been thrown into gaol, in keeping with the imperialist custom, for secretly sympathising with the Bolsheviks. (*Laughter*, *applause*.) But the upshot was that we, who at that time had proposed peace to our disadvantage, obtained peace on much more favourable terms. That was something of a lesson. I know that we can no more learn the old diplomacy than we can remould ourselves; but the lessons in diplomacy that we have given since then and that have been learned by the other powers must have had some effect, they must have remained in the memory of some people. (*Laughter*.) Hence, our straightforward statement that our workers and peasants prized above all the blessings of peace, but that there were limits to the concessions they were prepared to make to preserve it, was taken to mean that they had not for a moment, not for a second, forgotten the hardships they had suffered in the imperialist war and the Civil War. This reminder, which I am sure this Congress, and the whole mass of workers and peasants, all Russia, will endorse and express—

this reminder will surely have some effect and play a certain role, no matter how the powers take it, no matter what diplomatic ruse their old diplomatic habits make them suspect.

This, comrades, is what I think must be said about our international situation. A certain unstable equilibrium has been reached. Materially—economically and militarily—we are extremely weak; but morally—by which, of course, I mean not abstract morals, but the alignment of the real forces of all classes in all countries—we are the strongest of all. This has been proved in practice; it has been proved not merely by words but by deeds; it has been proved once and, if history takes a certain turn, it will, perhaps, be proved many times again. That is why we say that having started on our work of peaceful development we shall exert every effort to continue it without interruption. At the same time, comrades, be vigilant, safeguard the defence potential of our country, strengthen our Red Army to the utmost, and remember that we have no right to permit an instant's slackening where our workers and peasants and their gains are concerned. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, having thus briefly outlined the most essential features of our international position, I shall now deal with the manner in which economic relations are beginning to shape out in our country and in Western Europe, in the capitalist countries. The greatest difficulty here is that without definite relations between us and the capitalist countries we cannot have stable economic relations. Events very clearly show that neither can the capitalist countries have them. But today we are not in an altruistic mood. We are thinking more of how to continue in existence when other powers are hostile to us.

But is the existence of a socialist republic in a capitalist environment at all conceivable? It seemed inconceivable from the political and military aspects. That it is possible both politically and militarily has now been proved; it is a fact. But what about trade? What about economic relations? Contacts, assistance, the exchange of services between backward, ruined agricultural Russia and the advanced, industrially-developed group of capitalist countries—is all this possible? Did they not threaten

to surround us with a barbed wire fence so as to prevent any economic relations with us whatever? "War did not scare them, so we shall reduce them by means of a blockade."

Comrades, during the past four years we have heard so many threats, and such terrible ones, that none of them can frighten us any more. As for the blockade, experience has shown that it is an open question as to who suffers from it most, the blockaded or the blockaders. Experience has shown beyond doubt that during this first year, on which I am able to report as a period of a relatively elementary respite from direct brute force, we have not been recognised, we have been rejected, and relations with us have been declared non-existent (let them be recognised as non-existent by the bourgeois courts), but they nevertheless exist. I deem it my right to report to you that this is, without the slightest exaggeration, one of the main results achieved in 1921, the year under review.

I do not know whether the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Ninth Congress of Soviets has been, or will be, distributed to you today. In my opinion, the defect in this report is that it is too bulky and is difficult to read right through. But, perhaps, this is my own failing, and I have no doubt that the overwhelming majority of you, as well as all those who are interested in politics, will read it, even if not immediately. Even if you do not read it all, but only glance through its pages, you will see that Russia has sprouted, if one may so express it, a number of fairly regular and permanent commercial relations, missions, treaties, etc. True, we are not yet recognised *de jure*. This is still important, because the danger of the unstable equilibrium being upset, the danger of new attempts at invasion has, as I have said, increased; the relations, however, are a fact.

In 1921—the first year of trade with foreign countries—we made considerable progress. This was partly due to the improvement in our transport system, perhaps the most important, or one of the most important sectors of our economy. It is due also to our imports and exports. Permit me to quote very brief figures. All our difficulties, our most incredible difficulties—the burden of these diffi-

culties, the most crucial feature of them—lie in fuel and food, in the peasant economy, in the famine and calamities that have afflicted us. We know very well that all this is bound up with the transport problem. We must discuss this, and all comrades from the localities must know and repeat it over and over again to all their comrades there that we must strain every nerve to overcome the food and fuel crisis. It is from this that our transport system suffers, and transport is the material instrument of our relations with foreign countries.

The organisational improvements in our transport system over the past year are beyond doubt. In 1921 we transported by river much more than in 1920. The average run per vessel in 1921 was 1,000 pood-versts as compared with 800 pood-versts in 1920. We have definitely made some progress in organisation. I must say that for the first time we are beginning to obtain assistance from abroad. We have ordered thousands of locomotives, and we have already received the first thirteen from Sweden and thirty-seven from Germany. It is a very small beginning, but a beginning, nevertheless. We have ordered hundreds of tank cars, about 500 of which arrived here in the course of 1921. We are paying a high, an exorbitant price for these things, but still, it shows that we are receiving the assistance of the large-scale industry of the advanced countries; it shows that the large-scale industry of the capitalist countries is helping us to restore our economy, although all these countries are governed by capitalists who hate us heart and soul. All of these capitalists are united by governments which continue to make statements in their press about how matters stand with the *de jure* recognition of Soviet Russia, and about whether or not the Bolshevik Government is a legitimate one. Lengthy research revealed that it is a legitimate government, but it cannot be recognised. I have no right to conceal the sad truth that we are not yet recognised, but I must tell you that commercial relations are nevertheless developing.

All these capitalist countries are in a position to make us pay through the nose; we pay more for the goods than they are worth; but for all that, they are helping our economy. How did that happen? Why are they acting against

their own inclinations and in contradiction to what they are constantly asserting in their press? And this press is more than a match for ours in respect of circulation, and the force and venom with which it attacks us. They call us criminals, and all the same they help us. And so it turns out they are bound up with us economically. It turns out as I have already said, that our calculations, made on a grand scale, are more correct than theirs. This is not because they lack people capable of making correct calculations—they have far more than we have—but because it is impossible to calculate properly when one is heading for destruction. That is why I would like to supplement my remarks with a few figures to show how our foreign trade is developing. I shall quote only very brief figures that are easy to remember. In three years—1918, 1919 and 1920—our total imports amounted to a little over 17,000,000 poods; in 1921 they amounted to 50,000,000 poods, that is to say, three times the total amount imported in the three preceding years. Our exports in the first three years totalled 2,500,000 poods; in 1921 alone, they amounted to 11,500,000 poods. These figures are infinitesimally, miserably, ridiculously small; any well-informed person will at once say that they are indicative of poverty. And that is what they do indicate. But for all that, it is a beginning. And we, who have experienced direct attempts to crush us, who for years have been hearing threats that everything will be done to prevent any relations with us as long as we remain what we are, nevertheless see that something has proved more potent than these threats. We see that their forecast of economic development was wrong and ours was right. We have made a start, and we must now exert all our efforts to continue this development without interruption. We must make it our primary concern, giving it all our attention.

I shall give you another little illustration of the progress we made in 1921. In the first quarter of 1921 imports amounted to about 3,000,000 poods, in the second quarter to 8,000,000 poods, in the third quarter to 24,000,000 poods. So we are making progress. These figures are infinitesimally small, but they nevertheless show a gradual increase. We see how they grew in 1921, which was a year of unpre-

cedented difficulties. You know what that calamity, the famine, cost us, what incredible difficulties it is still causing on the farms, in industry and in our life generally. But although our country has been devastated by war, has suffered tremendous hardship as a result of all the wars and of the rule of tsars and capitalists, we are now on the road that offers us a prospect of improvement, in spite of the unceasing hostility towards us. That is the main factor. That is why, when we read recently about the Washington Conference,[41] when we heard the news that the countries hostile to us would be obliged to convene a second conference next summer and to invite Germany and Russia to discuss the terms of a genuine peace, we said that our terms are clear and definite; we have formulated them, we have published them. How much hostility shall we encounter? We have no illusions about that; but we know that the economic position of those who blockaded us has proved to be vulnerable. There is a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us. That force is world general economic relations, which compel them to make contact with us. The farther they proceed in this direction the more extensive and rapid will be the development of what in today's report for 1921. I have been able to indicate to you only by some scanty figures.

Now for our domestic economic situation; here, too, the important question that has priority is that of our economic policy. Our main task for 1921, the year under review, was to go over to the New Economic Policy, to take the first steps along this path, to learn how to make them, to adjust our legislation and administrative apparatus to it. The press has given you a lot of facts and information showing how this work has developed. You will not, of course, expect me to quote here additional facts or to give figures. It is only necessary to determine what the main thing was that united us most of all, that is more vital from the point of view of the most important and radical question of our entire revolution and of all future socialist revolutions (if viewed generally on a world scale).

The most basic, most vital question is that of the attitude of the working class to the peasants; this involves the alliance of the working class and the peasants; the ability of the advanced workers, who have passed through a lengthy, difficult but rewarding school of experience in a large factory, to do things in such a way that they attract to their side the mass of peasants, who were ground down by capitalism, by the landowners and by their old poverty-stricken, petty farms, to prove to them that only in alliance with the workers, no matter what the difficulties to be encountered on this path, and they are many, and we cannot close our eyes to this—only through this alliance can the peasants abolish the age-old oppression by the landowners and capitalists. Only by consolidating the alliance of the workers and peasants can mankind be saved from events such as the recent imperialist slaughter, from the barbarous contradictions to be seen in the capitalist world today, where a small number, a miserable handful of the richest powers are choking with wealth, while the huge population of the globe suffers privations, being unable to benefit from the culture and rich resources that lie before them but cannot be made use of because of insufficient commerce.

Unemployment is the chief calamity in the advanced countries. There is no way out of this situation other than through the firm alliance of the peasants with a working class that has passed through the difficult, but one reliable school of importance, the school of factory life, factory exploitation, factory solidarity—there is no other way out. We have tested this alliance in the political and military fields during our Republic's most difficult years. In 1921, for the first time, we tested this alliance in the economic field. So far we have handled things very, very badly in this field, as we must frankly admit. We must recognise this shortcoming and not gloss over it; we must do everything possible to eliminate it and understand that the foundation of our New Economic Policy lies in this alliance. There are only two ways in which proper relations between the working class and the peasants can be established. If large-scale industry is flourishing, if it can immediately supply the small peasants with a sufficient amount of goods, or more than previously, and in this way establish

proper relations between manufactured goods and the supply of surplus agricultural goods coming from the peasants, then the peasants will be fully satisfied, then the mass of peasants, the non-Party peasants, will acknowledge, by virtue of experience, that this new system is better than the capitalist system. We speak of a flourishing large-scale industry, which is able to supply all the goods the peasants are in urgent need of, and this possibility exists; if we consider the problem on a world scale, we see that a flourishing large-scale industry capable of supplying the world with all kinds of goods exists, only its owners do not know how to use it for anything but the manufacture of guns, shells and other armaments, employed with such success from 1914 to 1918. Then industry was geared to war and supplied mankind with its products so abundantly that no fewer than 10 million people were killed and no fewer than 20 million maimed. This is something we have all seen, and, besides, war in the twentieth century is not like previous wars.

After this war, even among the victor countries, among those most hostile and alien to any kind of socialism, who ruthlessly oppose the slightest socialist idea, a large number of people have been heard to say quite definitely that even if there were no wicked Bolsheviks in the world, it is hardly likely that another war of this kind could be permitted. This is said by the representatives of the most wealthy countries. This is what this rich, advanced, large-scale industry was used for. It served to maim people, and it had no time to supply the peasants with its goods. All the same we have a right to say that such an industry exists on a world scale. There are countries whose large-scale industry is so advanced that it could instantly satisfy the needs of hundreds of millions of backward peasants. We make this the basis of our calculations. From your daily observations you know better than anyone else what has been left of our large-scale industry, which was weak anyway. In the Donets Basin, the main centre of our large-scale industry, for instance, the Civil War caused so much destruction, and so many imperialist governments established their rule there (how many of them did the Ukraine see!), that it was inevitable that next to nothing should

remain of our large-scale industry. When, added to this, there is the misfortune of the 1921 crop failure, it becomes clear that the attempt to supply the peasants with goods from large-scale industry, which had been placed under state control, was unsuccessful. Once this attempt has failed, the only economic relation possible between the peasants and the workers, that is, between agriculture and industry, is exchange, trade. That is the crux of the matter. The substitution of the tax in kind for requisitioning—that, very simply, is the substance of our economic policy. When there is no flourishing large-scale industry which can be organised in such a way as to supply the peasants with goods immediately, then the gradual development of a powerful alliance of the workers and peasants is possible only through trade and the gradual advance of agriculture and industry above their present level, under the guidance and control of the workers' state. Sheer necessity has driven us to this path. And this is the sole basis and substance of our New Economic Policy.

At a time when the main attention and the main forces were diverted to political and military problems, we simply had to press forward with great speed along with the vanguard, knowing that it would have support. The alliance of the peasants and workers in the fight for great political changes, for our great achievements of the past three years, which put us at war with the dominant world powers, was made possible by a simple burst of political and military enthusiasm because every peasant realised, felt and sensed that he was confronted by his age-old enemy, the landowner, who in one way or another was being aided by representatives of other parties. That is why this alliance was so solid and invincible.

In the economic field the basis of this alliance has to be different. A change in the substance and form of the alliance is essential. If anyone from the Communist Party, from the trade unions, or merely anyone sympathetic to Soviet power has overlooked the need to change the form and substance of this alliance, then so much the worse for him. Such oversights in a revolution are impermissible. The change in the form of the alliance has become necessary because the political and military alliance could not

continue intact in the realm of economics, when we have as yet no large-scale industry, when what we had has been ruined by a war such as no other country has ever experienced. Even in countries infinitely more wealthy than ours, in countries that had gained, not lost from the war, the level of industry has not yet risen. A change in the form and substance of the alliance of the workers and peasants has become essential. We went much further forward in the political and military period than the purely economic aspect of the alliance of the workers and peasants permitted us to do. We had to do this in order to defeat the enemy, and we had the right to do this. We were successful because we defeated our enemies in the field that existed at that time, in the political and military field, but we suffered a series of defeats in the economic field. There is no need to be afraid to admit this; on the contrary, we shall only learn how to win when we do not fear to acknowledge our defeats and shortcomings, when we look truth, even the saddest truth, straight in the face. We have a right to be proud of our achievements in the first field, that is, in the political and military field. They have gone down in history as an epoch-making victory, whose overall influence is yet to be felt. But economically, in the year under review, we only started the New Economic Policy and we are taking a step forward in this regard. At the same time, we are only just beginning to learn and are making very many more mistakes, looking back, being carried away by our past experience—splendid, lofty, magnificent, of world-wide significance, but which could not solve the economic problems now imposed on us in a country where large-scale industry has been devastated; in conditions which demand that we learn, in the first place, to establish the economic link now necessary and inevitable. That link is trade. This is a very unpleasant discovery for Communists. It is quite likely that this discovery is extremely unpleasant, in fact it is certain that it is unpleasant, but if we are swayed by ideas of pleasantness or unpleasantness we shall fall to the level of those would-be socialists of whom we saw plenty at the time of the Kerensky Provisional Government. It is hardly likely that "socialists" of this type still have any authority in our Republic. And our

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strength has always been our ability to take the actual balance of forces into consideration and not to be afraid of it no matter how unpleasant it might be for us.

Since large-scale industry exists on a world scale, there can be no doubt that a direct transition to socialism is possible—and nobody will deny this fact, just as nobody will deny that this large-scale industry either comes to a standstill and creates unemployment in the most flourishing and wealthy victor countries, or only manufactures shells for the extermination of people. And if, owing to the backwardness with which we came to the revolution, we have not reached the industrial development we need, are we going to give up, are we going to despair? No. We shall get on with the hard work because the path that we have taken is the right one. There is no doubt that the path of the alliance of the mass of the people is the sole path which will ensure that the workers and peasants work for themselves and not for the exploiters. In order to bring this about in our conditions we must have the only possible economic link, the link through the economy.

That is why we have retreated, that is why we have had to retreat to state capitalism, retreat to concessions, retreat to trade. Without this, proper relations with the peasants cannot be restored in the conditions of devastation, in which we now find ourselves. Without this, we are threatened with the danger of the revolution's vanguard getting swiftly so far ahead that it would lose touch with the peasants. There would be no contact-between the vanguard and the peasants and that would mean the collapse of the revolution. Our approach to this must be particularly careful, first and foremost, because what we call our New Economic Policy follows from it. That is why we have unanimously declared that we shall carry out this policy in earnest and for a long time, but, of course, as has already been correctly noted, not for ever; it has been made necessary by our poverty and devastation and by the tremendous weakening of our large-scale industry.

I shall permit myself to quote a few figures in order to prove that despite the difficulties and the many mistakes we have made (and we have made a great number) we are nevertheless moving ahead. Comrades, I have not got the

overall figures on the development of internal trade; I only wish to deal with information on the turnover of the Central Council of Co-operative Societies for three months. For September the turnover of these co-operatives amounted to one million gold rubles, for October three million and for November six million. Again, if taken as absolute, the figures are miserable, small; this must be frankly recognised, because it will be more harmful to harbour any illusions on this score. They are paltry figures, but in these conditions of devastation they undoubtedly show that there is an advance, and that we can fasten on to this economic basis. No matter how numerous the mistakes we make—the trade unions, the Communist Party and the administrative bodies—we are becoming convinced that we can rid ourselves of them, and are gradually doing so, and that we are taking the path that is sure to lead to the restoration of relations between agriculture and industry. The growth of the productive forces can and must be achieved even on the level of petty-peasant economy and, for the time being, on the basis of small-scale industry, since it is so difficult to rehabilitate large-scale industry. We must make headway, and we are beginning to, but we need to remember that in this field a different rate and different conditions of work obtain, that here victory will be more difficult. Here we cannot achieve our aims as quickly as we were able to in the political and military fields. Here we cannot proceed by leaps and bounds, and the periods involved are different—they are reckoned in decades. These are the periods in which we shall have to achieve successes in the economic war, in conditions of hostility instead of assistance from our neighbours.

This path of ours is the right one, for it is the path which, sooner or later, all other countries must inevitably take. We have begun to follow this right path; we must assess even the smallest step, take into account our slightest mistakes, and then we shall reach our goal by following this path.

I ought now, comrades, to say a few words about our main preoccupation, farming, but I believe that you are to hear a far more detailed and fuller report on this question than I could make, and also on the famine, to be made by Comrade Kalinin.

You are fully aware, comrades, of the incredible hardships of the 1921 famine. It was inevitable that the misfortunes of old Russia should have been carried over to our times, because the only way to avoid them is to restore the economy, but not on the old, paltry, petty basis. It must be rehabilitated on a new basis, the basis of large-scale industry and electrification. Only in that way shall we be rid of our poverty and of interminable famines. It can be seen at once that the periods by which we were able to measure our political and military victories do not apply here. Surrounded by hostile countries, we have, nevertheless, pierced the blockade: no matter how meagre the help, we did get something. In all, it amounts to 2,500,000 poods. That is all the help that we have received from abroad, that the foreign countries graciously presented to starving Russia. We were able to collect about 600,000 gold rubles in donations. It is a far too pitiful sum, and shows the mercenary attitude of the European bourgeoisie toward our famine. No doubt you have all read how, at the news of the famine, influential statesmen grandiloquently and solemnly declared that to take advantage of the famine in order to raise the question of old debts would be a devilish thing to do. I am not so sure that the devil is worse than modern imperialism. What I do know is that in actual fact, despite the famine, they did try to recover their old debts on particularly harsh conditions. We do not refuse to pay, and solemnly declare that we are prepared to discuss things in a business-like fashion. But you all understand, and there can be no doubt about this, that we shall never under any circumstances allow ourselves to be tied hand and foot in this matter without considering all its aspects, without taking into account reciprocal claims, without a business-like discussion.

I have to inform you that during recent days we have had considerable success in the struggle against the famine. You have no doubt read in the newspapers that the U.S.A. has allocated 20 million dollars for the relief of the starving in Russia, probably on the same conditions as A.R.A.—the American Relief Administration. Krasin sent us a telegram a few days ago saying that the U.S. Government

is formally proposing to guarantee the dispatch to us over a period of three months of foodstuffs and seeds worth 20 million dollars, provided we, on our part, can agree to the expenditure of 10 million dollars (20 million gold rubles) for the same purpose. We immediately agreed to this and have telegraphed accordingly. And I think we may say that, during the first three months, we shall be able to supply the starving with seed and food worth 30 million dollars, that is, 60 million gold rubles. This is, of course, very little; it by no means covers the terrible losses we have suffered. You all understand this perfectly well. But at any rate this is aid which will undoubtedly help to relieve our desperate need and desperate famine. And since in autumn we were able to achieve certain successes in providing the starving areas with seed and in extending the sown areas in general, we now have hopes for far greater success in the spring.

In the autumn, approximately 75 per cent of the usual area was sown to winter crops in the famine-stricken gubernias, 102 per cent in the gubernias partially hit by the crop failure, 123 per cent in the producing gubernias and 126 per cent in the consuming gubernias. This, at any rate, proves that no matter how fantastically difficult our conditions, we were still able to give the peasants some help in enlarging the area sown to crops and in fighting the famine. Under present conditions we have every right to expect, without any exaggeration or fear of error, that we shall be able to help the peasants substantially with seed for the spring-crop area. This aid, I repeat, is by no means adequate. Under no circumstances shall we have enough for all our needs. This must be stated quite frankly. All the more reason, therefore, to do everything possible to extend this aid.

In this connection I must give you the final figures on our work to solve the food problem. Generally speaking, the tax in kind made things much easier for the peasants as a whole. This needs no proof. It is not simply a question of how much grain has been taken from the peasants, but that the peasant feels better provided for under the tax in kind, and has a greater interest in improving his farm. With increased productive forces the tax in kind has opened

up wider horizons for an industrious peasant. On the whole, the results of the collection of the tax in kind for the year under review are such that we have to say that we must make every effort to avert failure.

Here, in brief, are the general results that I can give you based on the latest returns supplied by the People's Commissariat of Food. We need at least 230 million poods. Of these, 12 million are needed for the famine-stricken, 37 million for seed, and 15 million for the reserve fund. We can obtain 109 million through the tax in kind, 15 million from the milling tax, 12,500,000 from the repayment of the seed loan, 13,500,000 from trade, 27 million from the Ukraine and 38 million poods from abroad—38 million, reckoning the 30 million from the source I have already mentioned to you, and in addition the eight million poods we plan to buy. This makes a total of 215 million poods. So we still have a deficit, with not a single pood in reserve, nor is it certain that we shall be able to buy more abroad. Our food plan has been calculated to the narrowest margin so that the least possible burden falls on the peasants who have been victims of the famine. In the central Soviet organisations we have for a long time been making every effort to have the plan for food deliveries fulfilled to the maximum. In 1920 we estimated that the state maintained 38 million people; now we have reduced this figure to eight million. Such is the reduction we have made in this respect. This can lead to only one conclusion: there must be 100 per cent collection of the tax in kind, i.e., it must at all costs be collected in full. For the peasants that have suffered so much, this represents a great burden and we do not forget this. I am perfectly well aware that the comrades in the localities, who have themselves experienced all the difficulties of solving the food campaign problem, know better than I do what it means to collect the tax in full at this moment. But, as a result of our work during 1921, I must say on behalf of the government that this task; comrades, has to be carried out; this difficulty will have to be faced, this problem will have to be overcome. Otherwise we cannot meet the most basic, most elementary requirements of our transport and industry, we cannot ensure the very minimum, absolutely essential budget, without

which we cannot exist in our present condition of hostile encirclement and the highly unstable international balance of forces.

Without the most tremendous efforts, there is and can be no way out of the situation in which we find ourselves after being tortured by the imperialist and civil wars and after being persecuted by the ruling classes of all countries. Therefore, not shunning the bitter truth, we must state quite definitely, and bring this home to the workers in the localities on behalf of the Congress: "Comrades, the entire existence of the Soviet Republic and our very modest plan for rehabilitating transport and industry are based on the assumption that we shall fulfil our general food procurement programme. It is vitally necessary, therefore, to collect the tax in full."

Speaking of the plan I shall now deal with the present position of the state plan. I shall begin with fuel, which is the food of industry and the basis of all our industrial work. Probably you have already received today, or will do so in a few days, a report on the work of our Gosplan, the State Planning Commission. You will receive a report on the Congress of Electrical Engineers, which made a valuable and important contribution and an examination by Russia's best technical and scientific personnel of the plan providing the only scientific short-cut to the rehabilitation of our large-scale industry, a plan that will take at least ten to fifteen years to fulfil. I have already said, and I shall not tire of repeating, that the periods we have to reckon with in our practical work today are different from those that we saw in the political and military sphere. Very many leading workers of the Communist Party and trade unions have understood this, but it is vital that everyone should do so. Incidentally, in Comrade Krzhizhanovsky's pamphlet—the report on the work of the State Planning Commission—which will be distributed to you tomorrow, you will see how the engineers and farming experts together regard the question of the state plan in general. You will see that their approach is not our usual one of viewing things from a general political or economic point of view, but of regarding matters in the light of their joint experience as engineers and farming experts and, incidentally,

showing the limit to our retreat. In the pamphlet you will find an answer to this question from the point of view of the engineers and farming experts; its contents are all the more valuable because you will find there how our general state planning organisation tackles the question of transport and industry as a result of its work during the year under review. Naturally, I cannot outline the contents of this report here.

I should like to say a few words on the state of the fuel plan, as in this sphere we suffered the gravest setback at the beginning of 1921, the year under review. It was precisely here, basing ourselves on the improved situation at the end of 1920, that we made the serious miscalculation which led to the colossal crisis in transport in the spring of 1921, a crisis caused not only by a shortage of material resources, but by a miscalculation of the rate of development. The mistake of transferring the experience we had gained during the political and war periods to economic problems was already having its effect; it was an important, a fundamental mistake which, comrades, we still repeat at every step. Many mistakes are being made right now, and it must be said that if we do not realise this and rectify them at all costs, there can be no stable economic improvement. After the lesson we have had we have worked out the fuel plan for the second half of 1921 with far greater care, regarding as impermissible the slightest exaggeration, and doing all we can to prevent it. The figures given me by Comrade Smilga, who is in charge of all our fuel collection institutions, for the end of December, although still incomplete, show that there is a deficit, which is now insignificant and indicates an improvement in the internal structure of our fuel budget, or its mineralisation, as the technical experts put it, that is, considerable success in supplying Russia with mineral fuel; after all, a firm foundation for large-scale industry capable of serving as the basis for socialist society can only be built on mineral fuel.

This is how our fuel plan was calculated at the beginning of the second half of 1921. We hoped to obtain 297 million poods of fuel in firewood, i.e., 2,700,000 cubic sazhens converted into 7,000-calory conventional fuel in the way we usually do and in the way it is done on p. 40 of Krzhi-

zhanovsky's pamphlet, which will be distributed to you. Our figures show that to date we have received nearly 234 million poods. This is an enormous deficiency to which I must draw your attention. During the year under review we have paid very careful attention to the work of our fuel institutions in the matter of firewood. This is the work, however, that is mainly connected with the state of the peasant farms. It is the peasant and his horse that have to bear the burden. The fuel and fodder shortage, etc., greatly affect their work. Hence the shortage. That is why now, when we stand on the threshold of the winter fuel campaign, I must say once again—comrades, you must take to the localities the slogan that the greatest concentration of effort is needed in this work. Our fuel budget has been based on the absolute minimum required to raise the level of industrial production, but it is vitally necessary that this absolute minimum be achieved, no matter how difficult the conditions.

Further. We estimated that we would receive 143 million poods of coal; we received 184 million poods. That is progress, progress in increasing the amount of mineral fuel, progress made by the Donets coalfield and other enterprises, where many comrades have worked selflessly and achieved practical results in improving large-scale industry. I shall give you a couple of figures concerning the Donets Basin, because it is the basis, the main centre of all our industry. Oil—we reckoned on receiving 80 million poods, which if converted into conventional fuel would be 120 million poods. Peat—we calculated at 40 million (19 million poods of conventional fuel) and we received 50 million. So we had reckoned on obtaining a total of 579 million poods, but apparently we shall not succeed in getting more than 562 million poods. In general, there is a fuel shortage. True, it is not very great, possibly 3-4 per cent short of requirements, but nevertheless it is a shortage. In any case, it has to be admitted that all this constitutes a direct threat to large-scale industry, because some part of the minimum requirements will not be met. I think I have proved to you by this example, firstly, that our planning bodies have not wasted their time, that the moment is approaching when we shall be fulfilling our plans, and, at the same

time, that we are beginning to make just a little progress, and that the hardships and difficulties of our economic situation are still extremely great. Therefore, the main slogan, the main battle-cry, the main appeal with which this Congress must proceed in its work and with which it must conclude its work, which the delegates must carry to the localities is this: an all-out effort is still needed, no matter how difficult it may be, both in the industrial and in the agricultural field. An all-out effort is the only hope for the Republic, the only way in which the rule of the workers and peasants can be maintained, preserved and stabilised. That we have achieved notable successes has been shown particularly in the Donets Basin, where comrades such as Pyatakov in large-scale industry and Rukhimovich in small-scale industry have worked with great devotion and great success, with the result that for the first time the small-scale industry is in a position to produce something. In large-scale industry, output per coal-hewer reached the pre-war level, which had not been the case earlier. The total output of the Donets Basin for 1920 was 272 million poods, and in 1921 it is estimated at 350 million poods. This is a very, very small figure compared to the maximum pre-war figure—1,700 million. But still it is something. It proves that there is an important advance. It is, after all, a step forward in the rehabilitation of large-scale industry, and we cannot afford to grudge any sacrifice to this end.

Now a few words about the iron and steel industry. Here our situation is particularly difficult. We are producing possibly something like six per cent of the pre-war figure. That is the extent of the ruin and poverty to which the imperialist and civil wars have reduced Russia. But we are, of course, making headway. We are building centres like Yugostal,[42] where Comrade Mezhlauk is working with the utmost devotion. Difficult as our position is, we nevertheless can see tremendous successes in this sphere. In the first half of 1921, 70,000 poods of iron were smelted monthly; in October, 130,000; in November, 270,000 or almost four times as much. We can see that there are no grounds for panic. We by no means close our eyes to the fact that the figures I have given represent a miserable, paltry level, but all the same they prove that no matter

how exceptionally grave things were in 1921, no matter what extraordinary burdens have fallen to the lot of the working class and peasants, we are, nonetheless, progressing, we are on the right path, and by straining every nerve we can hope that there will be even greater improvement.

I should also like to give some figures on our progress in electrification. Unfortunately, so far, we have not been very successful. I counted on being able to congratulate the Ninth Congress on the opening of the second big electric power station built by the Soviet government; the first was Shatura, and the second the Kashira Station, which we had hoped to open in December.[43] It would have generated, and can generate, 6,000 kw at first, which, with the 18,000 kw we have in Moscow, would have been substantial help. But a number of obstacles prevented us from opening the station in December 1921; it will be opened very soon, in a few weeks at the latest. You have probably seen the report published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* a few days ago and signed by engineer Levi, one of the leading participants at the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Electrical Engineers and, in general, one of our most important workers. I shall give you a few figures from this report. Taking 1918 and 1919 together, 51 stations with a 3,500 kw capacity were commissioned. If we take 1920 and 1921 together, 221 stations with a 12,000 kw capacity were commissioned. Of course, when these figures are compared with Western Europe they seem extremely small and paltry. But they show that progress can be made even in face of difficulties such as no country has ever experienced. The building of small power stations throughout the countryside played an important role. It must be frankly admitted that they were very often too far apart, although there was some good in that, too. Thanks to these small stations new centres of modern large-scale industry were set up in the countryside. Although they may be of trilling significance, they show the peasants that Russia will not remain a country of manual labour, or of the primitive wooden plough, but will go forward to different times. And the peasant masses-are gradually coming to understand that we must and can put Russia on a different footing. The periods involved, as I have already pointed out, are measured in decades, but the work has already

commenced, and the realisation of this is spreading among the mass of the peasants, partly because the small stations grow faster than the larger ones. But if in 1921 there was a delay in the opening of one large electric power station, at the beginning of 1922 there will be two stations—at Kashira near Moscow, and at Utkina Zavod near Petrograd.[44] In this respect, at any rate, we have taken the path that ensures progress, provided we approach the fulfilment of our tasks with unrelaxed zeal.

A few words about yet another achievement—our success in peat production. Our peat output reached 93 million poods in 1920 and 139 million poods in 1921; this is, possibly, the only sphere in which we have far surpassed the pre-war level. Our peat resources are inexhaustible, greater than those of any other country. But there have always been gigantic difficulties, and to some extent they still remain, in the sense that this work, which is arduous in general, was especially arduous in Russia. The hydraulic method of peat-cutting, recommended by Comrades Radchenko, Menshikov and Morozov of the Central Peat Board, has made the work easier. There have been great achievements in this field. In 1921, we had in operation only two peat pumps, machines for the hydraulic extraction of peat, which relieve the workers of the back-breaking toil still involved in peat-cutting. Twenty of these machines have been ordered from Germany and will be received in 1922. Co-operation with an advanced European country has begun. We cannot ignore the possibilities for the development of peat-cutting which now open out before us. There are more bogs and peat deposits in Russia than anywhere else, and it is now possible to transform the back-breaking labour, which only a few workers were prepared to undertake, into more normal work. Practical co-operation with a modern, advanced state—Germany—has been achieved because her factories are already working on machines designed to lighten this labour, machines which will most certainly start to operate in 1922. We must take this fact into account. We can do a great deal in this sphere if we all understand and all spread the idea that, given intensified efforts and mechanised labour, we in Russia have a better opportunity to emerge from the economic crisis than any other country.

I want to emphasise another aspect of our economic policy. In assessing our New Economic Policy it is not enough to pay attention to what may be of particular importance. Of course, the essence of this policy is the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, the union of the vanguard of the proletariat with the broad mass of the peasants. Thanks to the New Economic Policy, the development of the productive forces—at all costs, and without delay—has begun. There is another aspect of the New Economic Policy, that of the possibility of learning. The New Economic Policy is a form that will enable us to begin learning how to manage our economy in real earnest; up to now we have been doing this very badly. Of course, it is difficult for a Communist leader, for a trade union leader of the working people to realise that at the moment trade is the touchstone of our economic life, the only possible basis for the alliance of the vanguard of the proletariat with the peasants, the only possible link which will permit us to begin economic development all along the line. If we take any merchant trading under state and legal control (our court is a proletarian one, and it can watch each private businessman in order to see that the laws are not interpreted for them as in bourgeois states; recently there was an example of this in Moscow,[45] and you all know that we shall multiply these examples, severely punishing any attempts by these private businessmen to contravene our laws), we shall see that all the same, this merchant, this private businessman, eager for his 100 per cent profit, will do business—for example, he will acquire raw material for industry in a way that most Communists or trade union workers would never be able to do. That is the significance of the New Economic Policy. Here is something you can learn. It is a very serious lesson, and we must all learn it. It is an extremely harsh one, not like listening to lectures or passing examinations. We are up against a difficult problem, a stern economic struggle, in circumstances of poverty, in circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, a bread shortage, famine and cold; this is the real school and we must graduate from it. Every attempt to brush this task aside, every attempt to turn a blind eye to it, to disregard it, would be the most criminal and most dangerous

arrogance on the part of Communists and trade unionists. All of us, comrades, who are governing Soviet Russia, are apt to commit this sin, and we must admit it quite frankly in order to rid ourselves of this shortcoming.

We are undertaking economic development on the basis of yesterday's experience, and it is here that we make our main mistake. I shall quote a French proverb which says that people's faults are usually connected with their merits. A man's faults are, as it were, a continuation of his merits. But if the merits persist longer than they are needed, are displayed when and where they are no longer needed, they become faults. Very likely, almost all of you have observed this in private and public life, and we now note it in the development of our revolution, of our Party and of our trade unions, which are the mainstay of our Party; in the entire government machinery ruling Soviet Russia, we see this fault, which, as it were, is the continuation of our merits. Our great merit was that in the political and military fields we took a step of historic importance, that has gone down in world history as a change of epochs. What we have done cannot be taken from us, no matter what sufferings lie ahead. It was due to the proletarian revolution and to the fact that the Soviet system replaced the old system that we emerged from the imperialist war and got out of our misfortunes. This cannot be taken away from us—this is the undoubted, unalterable, inalienable merit, which no efforts or onslaughts of our enemies can take away from us, but which if it persists where it is no longer needed becomes a most dangerous fault.

A burst of enthusiasm on the part of the workers and peasants at their present level of class-consciousness was sufficient to solve political and military problems. They all understood that the imperialist war was crushing them—to understand this there was no need of a higher level of consciousness, of a new level of organisation. The enthusiasm, drive and heroism, which still remain and which will remain for ever as a monument to what a revolution can do and has done, helped to solve these problems. That is how we achieved our political and military successes, and this merit now becomes our most dangerous fault. We look back and we think that economic problems can be solved in

the same manner. That, however, is the mistake; when the situation has changed and different problems have to be solved, we cannot look back and attempt to solve them by yesterday's methods. Don't try—you won't succeed! We must realise that this is a mistaken attitude. There are Communist Party and trade union workers who very often turn their backs on and wave aside the humble, many years' difficult work in economic management, which demands forbearance, bitter experiences, long effort, punctuality and perseverance, whether as government workers, or as yesterday's fighters; they excuse themselves with recollections of the great things they did yesterday. These people remind me of the fable of the geese[46] who boasted that they had "saved Rome", but to whom the peasant replied using a long switch, "Leave your ancestors in peace, and what good have you done, geese?" No one will deny that in 1917-18-19-20 we solved our political and military problems with the heroism and success that opened a new epoch in world history. That belongs to us, and there is no one, either in the Party or in the trade unions, who is attempting to take this away from us—but an entirely different task now faces government and trade union workers.

At the present moment you are surrounded by capitalist powers who will not help you, but will hamper you; at the present moment you work in conditions of poverty, ruin, famine and calamity. You must either learn to work at a different rate, calculating the work to be done in decades and not months, relying on the worn-out mass of the people who cannot keep pace with the revolutionary-heroic momentum in their daily work; either you learn to do this, or you will deserve to be called geese. When a trade union or a political worker makes the general statement that the trade unions, the Communist Party run things—that is good. In the political and military sphere we did this splendidly, but in the economic field we do it very badly. We have to admit this and do better. "Stop wagging your tongue" is what I will say to any trade union worker who puts the general question of whether the trade unions should take part in production. (*Applause.*) It would be better to give me a practical reply to the question and tell me (if you hold a responsible position, are a man in authority,

a Communist Party or a trade union worker) where you have organised production well, how many years it took you to do it, how many people you have under you—a thousand or ten thousand. Give me a list of those whom you have assigned to the work of economic management which you have completed, instead of starting twenty different jobs without completing a single one because you had no time. It happens that we in Soviet Russia have not made a habit of completing economic tasks so as to be able to talk about our success for years to come, and of not fearing to learn from the merchant who makes one hundred per cent profit and a bit more; instead we write a wonderful resolution about raw materials and say that we are representatives of the Communist Party, the trade union, the proletariat. Forgive me, but what is the proletariat? It is the class which is working in large-scale industry. Where is your large-scale industry? What kind of proletariat is it? Where is your industry? Why is it at a standstill? Because there is no raw material? But did you succeed in collecting it? No. Write a resolution that it should be collected, and you will find yourself in a mess. And people will say, how stupid, and, consequently, you resemble the geese whose ancestors saved Rome.

History has allotted us the task of completing the great political revolution by slow, hard and laborious economic work, covering a very long period. Great political changes in history have always demanded a long period of assimilation. All great political changes have come about through the enthusiasm of the vanguard, whom the masses followed spontaneously, not quite consciously. There could be no other development in a society that was oppressed by tsars, landowners and capitalists. And we carried out this part of the work, the political revolution, in a manner that makes its epoch-making significance indisputable. Subsequently, following the great political revolution, however, another task arises which must be understood: this revolution has to be assimilated, has to be put into effect, and we must not plead that the Soviet system is bad, and that it must be rebuilt. We have a tremendous number of enthusiasts who want to rebuild in any kind of way, and these reconstructions lead to calamities of a kind which I

have never known in all my life. I am very well aware of the faults of our government machinery in mass organisational work, and for every ten faults that any of you can point out to me, I can immediately point out a hundred more. The thing, however, is not that it should be improved by rapid reorganisation, but that this political transformation has to be assimilated to arrive at a different level of economic efficiency. That is the whole point. It is not necessary to rebuild, but, on the contrary, it is necessary to help correct the many faults present in the Soviet system and in the whole system of management, so as to help tens of millions of people. We need the aid of all the peasants to assimilate our great political victory. We need to look at things soberly and realise that victory has been won, but it has not yet become part and parcel of the economy of everyday life and of the living conditions of the people. This work will take many decades and will require colossal efforts. It cannot be carried out at the same rate, speed, and under the same conditions which existed during the war.

Before concluding, I want to apply this lesson—that faults are sometimes the continuation of our merits—to one of our institutions, namely, to the Cheka. You all know, comrades, the violent hatred towards this institution displayed by Russian émigrés and those numerous members of the ruling classes of the imperialist countries who live alongside these Russian émigrés. And no wonder! It was our effective weapon against the numerous plots and numerous attacks on Soviet power made by people who were infinitely stronger than us. The capitalists and landowners retained all their international ties and all the international support; they were supported by states incomparably more powerful than our state. You know from the history of these conspiracies how these people acted. You know that the only way in which we could reply to them was by merciless, swift and instant repression, with the sympathy and support of the workers and peasants. That is the merit of our Cheka. We shall always emphasise this whenever we hear, directly or indirectly, as we often do from abroad, the howls of those Russians who can say the word "Cheka" in all languages, and regard it as an example of Russian barbarism.

Gentlemen, Russian and foreign capitalists! We know

that you will never come to love this institution. No wonder! It was able to repulse your intrigues and plots better than anyone else, at a time when you throttled us, invaded us from all sides, when you organised internal plots and committed every possible crime in order to frustrate our peaceful work. Our only response is through an institution aware of the plotters' every move and able to retaliate immediately instead of engaging in persuasion. As long as there are exploiters in the world, who have no desire to hand over their landowner and capitalist rights to the workers on a platter, the power of the working people cannot survive without such an institution. We are keenly aware of this, but we also know that a man's merits may become his faults, and we know that prevailing conditions insistently demand that the work of this organisation be limited to the purely political sphere, that it concentrate its efforts on tasks in which it is aided by the situation and the circumstances. If the attempts of the counter-revolution resemble their previous attempts—and we have no proof that the mentality of our adversaries has altered in this respect, we have no grounds for believing this—we shall be able to reply in such a way that will make it clear that we are in earnest. The Soviet government grants admission to foreign representatives, who come here under the pretext of giving aid, but these same representatives turn round and help overthrow Soviet rule; there have been cases of this. Our government will not find itself in this position, because we shall value and make use of an institution like the Cheka. This we can guarantee to one and all. But, at the same time, we say categorically that it is essential to reform the Cheka, define its functions and powers, and limit its work to political problems. The task now confronting us is to develop trade, which is required by the New Economic Policy, and this demands greater revolutionary legality. Naturally, if we had made this the all-important task when we were attacked and Soviet power was taken by the throat, we would have been pedants; we would have been playing at revolution, but would not be making the revolution. The closer we approach conditions of unshakable and lasting power and the more trade develops, the more imperative it is to put forward the firm slogan of greater revolutionary legality,

and the narrower becomes the sphere of activity of the institution which matches the plotters blow for blow. This conclusion results from the experience, observation and reflection of the government for the past year.

I must say in conclusion, comrades, that we have placed on a correct footing the problem we have been handling this year and which up to now we have handled so badly—that of forming a sound economic alliance of the workers and peasants, even under conditions of extreme poverty and devastation; we have taken the correct line, and there can be no doubt about this. And this is not merely a task for Russia alone, it is a world task. (*Stormy*, *prolonged applause*.)

This task which we are working on now, for the time being on our own, seems to be a purely Russian one, but in reality it is a task which all socialists will face. Capitalism is dying; in its death throes it can still condemn tens and hundreds of millions of people to unparalleled torment, but there is no power that can prevent its collapse. The new society, which will be based on the alliance of the workers and peasants, is inevitable. Sooner or later it will come—twenty years earlier or twenty years later—and when we work on the implementation of our New Economic Policy, we are helping to work out for this society the forms of alliance between the workers and peasants. We shall get this done and we shall create an alliance of the workers and peasants that is so sound that no power on earth will break it. (*Stormy*, *prolonged applause*.)

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INSTRUCTIONS BY THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES DECEMBER 28

The Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, having examined the reports of the People's Commissariats on their economic activities during the year under review, supplements and summarises the decisions of the Congress of Soviets on individual economic questions with the following guiding points, which must be strictly adhered to by all Soviet bodies at the centre and in the localities.

1. The Congress of Soviets orders that the main and immediate task of all the economic bodies must be to effect, speedily and at all costs, stable practical improvements in supplying the peasantry with large quantities of the goods that are needed to raise the level of agriculture and improve the living conditions of the working peasantry.

2. This being the main object, it must be kept in mind by all industrial administrative bodies, allowing of course no relaxation in the supply of the Red Army with everything it needs, a task which must remain primary in order to maintain the Soviet Republic's defence potential.

3. The improvement of the conditions of the workers should also depend on the achievement of this object, which means that it is the duty of all workers' organisations (primarily the trade unions) to see to it that industry is so organised as to be able speedily and fully to satisfy the requirements of the peasantry; wage increases and improvement in the conditions of industrial workers should be directly determined by the degree to which success is achieved in this field.

4. This object must also be pursued by the People's Commissariat of Finance; and the Ninth Congress of Soviets instructs it to make every effort to secure the speediest reduction of the issue of paper money, eventually put a stop to it and establish a sound currency backed by gold. The substitution of taxes for the issue of paper money must be pursued undeviatingly without any red tape.

5. The same object must be given priority by all bodies and organisations engaged in home and foreign trade, i.e., the Central Council of Co-operative Societies, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, etc. The Congress of Soviets will judge—and instructs the leading bodies of the Soviet government to judge—the success of these organisations only by the rapid and practical results they achieve in developing exchange between agriculture and industry. In particular, the Congress instructs the various organisations to use private enterprises more widely for supplying raw materials, transporting these materials and for promoting trade in every way, while the function of state bodies is to control and direct this exchange, and sternly punish all deadening red tape and bureaucracy.

6. The Ninth Congress of Soviets calls upon all organisations and departments engaged in economic activities to devote infinitely more attention and energy than hitherto to the task of enlisting the services of all capable non-Party workers and peasants in this field of state activity.

The Congress declares that in this respect we are a long way behind requirements, that not enough method and perseverance are being displayed in this matter, that it is absolutely and urgently necessary to recruit business and government officials from a wider circle than hitherto; and, in particular, that every success achieved in rebuilding industry and agriculture should be more regularly encouraged by awards of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour, as well as by cash bonuses.

The Congress of Soviets draws the attention of all economic bodies and all mass organisations of a non-governmental, class character to the fact that it is absolutely essential still more perseveringly to enlist the services of specialists in economic organisation, to employ scientists and technicians, and men who by their practical activities have acquired

experience and knowledge of trade, of organising large enterprises, of supervising business transactions, etc. The improvement of the material position of specialists and the training under their direction of a large number of workers and peasants must receive unflagging attention from the central and local government bodies of the R.S.F.S.R.

7. The Ninth Congress of Soviets calls upon the People's Commissariat of Justice to display far more energy than hitherto in two matters:

first, that the People's Courts of the Republic should keep close watch over the activities of private traders and manufacturers, and, while prohibiting the slightest restriction of their activities, should sternly punish the slightest attempt on their part to evade rigid compliance with the laws of the Republic. The People's Courts should encourage the masses of workers and peasants to take an independent, speedy and practical part in ensuring enforcement of the laws;

second, that the People's Courts should take more vigorous action against bureaucracy, red tape and mismanagement. Trials of such cases should be held not only for the purpose of increasing responsibility for the evil which it is so difficult to combat under present circumstances, but also for the purpose of focussing the attention of the masses of workers and peasants on this extremely important matter, and of securing a practical object, viz., greater success in the economic field.

The Ninth Congress is of the opinion that the task of the People's Commissariat of Education in this new period is to train, in the shortest possible period, specialists in all fields from among the peasants and workers; and it orders that school and extra-mural education should be more closely connected with the current economic tasks of the Republic as a whole, as well as of the given region and locality. In particular, the Ninth Congress of Soviets declares that far from enough has been done to fulfil the decision of the Eighth Congress of Soviets on the popularisation of the plan for the electrification of Russia, and requires that every electric power station mobilise all competent forces and arrange regular talks, lectures and practical studies to acquaint the workers and peasants with the importance of electricity

and with the plan for electrification. In those uyezds where no power stations yet exist, at least small power stations should be built as speedily as possible and used as local centres for propaganda, education and the encouragement of every initiative in this field.

Written on December 25-27, 1921

Published in *Izvestia* No. 295, December 30, 1921

Published according to the manuscript

BRITISH LABOUR PARTY POLICY

(TO COMRADE CHICHERIN, A COPY TO COMRADE RADEK AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU)

The telegram about the British Labour Party shows how extraordinarily naïve Krasin is. As I see it, measures of two kinds should now be taken: 1) a series of articles signed by various people and ridiculing the views of so-called European democracy on the Georgian problem should be published in the press; 2) some caustic journalist should be immediately commissioned to draft for Chicherin a super-polite Note in reply to the British Labour Party. In this Note he should make it perfectly plain that the proposal that we withdraw our troops from Georgia and hold a referendum there would be quite reasonable and might be recognised as coming from people who have not gone out of their minds, and have not been bribed by the Entente, if it extended to all nations of the globe; specifically, in order to set the British Labour Party leaders thinking about the meaning of present-day imperialist relations in international politics, we suggest, in particular, that that party give favourable consideration to the following: first, that British troops be withdrawn from Ireland and that a referendum be held there; second, the same with regard to India; third, the same with regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea, fourth, the same with regard to all countries in which there are troops of any of the big imperialist states. The Note should express, in superbly polite terms, the idea that people desirous of giving thought to these proposals of ours and to the system of imperialist relations in international politics may prove capable of understanding the "interesting" nature of the proposals made by us to the

British Labour Party. On the whole, the draft Note, couched in super-polite and extremely popular terms (to suit the intelligence of ten-year-olds), should deride the idiotic leaders of the British Labour Party.

I propose that the Political Bureau consider whether it ought to send a copy of this letter to Krasin. I personally am in favour.

Lenin

December 27, 1921

First published in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1930

Dictated by telephone
Published according to a typewritten copy

THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE UNIONS UNDER THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

DECISION OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.), JANUARY 12, 1922[47]

1. THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The New Economic Policy introduces a number of important changes in the position of the proletariat and, consequently, in that of the trade unions. The great bulk of the means of production in industry and the transport system remains in the hands of the proletarian state. This, together with the nationalisation of the land, shows that the New Economic Policy does not change the nature of the workers' state, although it does substantially alter the methods and forms of socialist development for it permits of economic rivalry between socialism, which is now being built, and capitalism, which is trying to revive by supplying the needs of the vast masses of the peasantry through the medium of the market.

Changes in the forms of socialist development are necessary because the Communist Party and the Soviet government are now adopting special methods to implement the general policy of transition from capitalism to socialism and in many respects are operating differently from the way they operated before: they are capturing a number of positions by a "new flanking movement", so to speak; they are retreating in order to make better preparations for a new offensive against capitalism. In particular, a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control, are now being permitted and are developing; on the other hand, the socialised state enterprises are being put on what is called a profit basis, i.e., they are being reorganised on commercial

lines, which, in view of the general cultural backwardness and exhaustion of the country, will, to a greater or lesser degree, inevitably give rise to the impression among the masses that there is an antagonism of interest between the management of the different enterprises and the workers employed in them.

2. STATE CAPITALISM IN THE PROLETARIAN STATE AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The proletarian state may, without changing its own nature, permit freedom to trade and the development of capitalism only within certain bounds, and only on the condition that the state regulates (supervises, controls, determines the forms and methods of, etc.) private trade and private capitalism. The success of such regulation will depend not only on the state authorities but also, and to a larger extent, on the degree of maturity of the proletariat and of the masses of the working people generally, on their cultural level, etc. But even if this regulation is completely successful, the antagonism of class interests between labour and capital will certainly remain. Consequently, one of the main tasks that will henceforth confront the trade unions is to protect in every way the class interests of the proletariat in its struggle against capital. This task should be openly put in the forefront, and the machinery of the trade unions must be reorganised, changed or supplemented accordingly (conflict commissions, strike funds, mutual aid funds, etc., should be formed, or rather, built up).

3. THE STATE ENTERPRISES THAT ARE BEING PUT ON A PROFIT BASIS AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The transfer of state enterprises to the so-called profit basis is inevitably and inseparably connected with the New Economic Policy; in the near future this is bound to become the predominant, if not the sole, form of state enterprise. In actual fact, this means that with the free market now permitted and developing the state enterprises will to a large extent be put on a commercial basis. In view of the

urgent need to increase the productivity of labour and make every state enterprise pay its way and show a profit, and in view of the inevitable rise of narrow departmental interests and excessive departmental zeal, this circumstance is bound to create a certain conflict of interests in matters concerning labour conditions between the masses of workers and the directors and managers of the state enterprises, or the government departments in charge of them. Therefore, as regards the socialised enterprises, it is undoubtedly the duty of the trade unions to protect the interests of the working people, to facilitate as far as possible the improvement of their standard of living, and constantly to correct the blunders and excesses of business organisations resulting from bureaucratic distortions of the state apparatus.

4. THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A STATE WHICH RECOGNISES PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND, FACTORIES, ETC., AND WHERE POLITICAL POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS, AND THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A STATE WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNISE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND AND THE MAJORITY OF THE LARGE ENTERPRISES AND WHERE POLITICAL. POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE PROLETARIAT

As long as classes exist, the class struggle is inevitable. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the existence of classes is inevitable; and the Programme of the Russian Communist Party definitely states that we are taking only the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must frankly admit the existence of an economic struggle and its inevitability until the electrification of industry and agriculture is completed—at least in the main—and until small production and the supremacy of the market are thereby cut off at the roots.

On the other hand, it is obvious that under capitalism the ultimate object of the strike struggle is to break up the state machine and to overthrow the given class state power.

Under the transitional type of proletarian state such as ours, however, the ultimate object of every action taken by the working class can only be to fortify the proletarian state and the state power of the proletarian class by combating the bureaucratic distortions, mistakes and flaws in this state, and by curbing the class appetites of the capitalists who try to evade its control, etc. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must never forget and must never conceal from the workers and the mass of the working people that the strike struggle in a state where the proletariat holds political power can be explained and justified only by the bureaucratic distortions of the proletarian state and by all sorts of survivals of the old capitalist system in the government offices on the one hand, and by the political immaturity and cultural backwardness of the mass of the working people on the other.

Hence, when friction and disputes arise between individual contingents of the working class and individual departments and organs of the workers' state, the task of the trade unions is to facilitate the speediest and smoothest settlement of these disputes to the maximum advantage of the groups of workers they represent, taking care, however, not to prejudice the interests of other groups of workers and the development of the workers' state and its economy as a whole; for only this development can lay the foundations for the material and cultural welfare of the working class. The only correct, sound and expedient method of removing friction and of settling disputes between individual contingents of the working class and the organs of the workers' state is for the trade unions to act as mediators, and through their competent bodies either to enter into negotiations with the competent business organisations on the basis of precise demands and proposals formulated by both sides, or appeal to higher state bodies.

In cases where wrong actions of business organisations, the backwardness of certain sections of workers, the provocations of counter-revolutionary elements or, lastly, lack of foresight on the part of the trade union organisations themselves lead to open disputes in the form of strikes in state enterprises, and so forth, the task of the trade unions is to bring about the speediest settlement of a dispute by taking

measures in conformity with the general nature of trade union activities, that is, by taking steps to remove the real injustices and irregularities and to satisfy the lawful and practicable demands of the masses, by exercising political influence on the masses, and so forth.

One of the most important and infallible tests of the correctness and success of the activities of the trade unions is the degree to which they succeed in averting mass disputes in state enterprises by pursuing a far-sighted policy with a view to effectively protecting the interests of the masses of the workers in all respects and to removing in time all causes of dispute.

5. REVERSION TO VOLUNTARY TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

The formal attitude of the trade unions to the automatic enrolment of all wage-workers as union members has introduced a certain degree of bureaucratic distortion in the trade unions and has caused the latter to lose touch with the broad mass of their membership. Hence, it is necessary most resolutely to implement voluntary enrolment both of individuals and of groups into trade unions. Under no circumstances must trade union members be required to subscribe to any specific political views; in this respect, as well as in respect of religion, the trade unions must be non-partisan. All that must be required of trade union members in the proletarian state is that they should understand comradely discipline and the necessity of uniting the workers' forces for the purpose of protecting the interests of the working people and of assisting the working people's government, i.e., the Soviet government. The proletarian state must encourage the workers to organise in trade unions both by juridical and material means; but the trade unions can have no rights without duties.

6. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY

Following its seizure of political power, the principal and fundamental interest of the proletariat lies in securing an enormous increase in the productive forces of society and

in the output of manufactured goods. This task, which is clearly formulated in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party, is particularly urgent in our country today owing to post-war ruin, famine and dislocation. Hence, the speediest and most enduring success in restoring large-scale industry is a condition without which no success can be achieved in the general cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital and securing the victory of socialism. To achieve this success in Russia, in her present state, it is absolutely essential that all authority in the factories should be concentrated in the hands of the management. The factory management, usually built up on the principle of one-man responsibility, must have authority independently to fix and pay out wages, and also distribute rations, working clothes, and all other supplies on the basis and within the limits of collective agreements concluded with the trade unions; it must enjoy the utmost freedom to manoeuvre, exercise strict control of the actual successes achieved in increasing production, in making the factory pay its way and in increasing profits, and carefully select the most talented and capable administrative personnel, etc.

Under these circumstances, all direct interference by the trade unions in the management of factories must be regarded as positively harmful and impermissible.

It would be absolutely wrong, however, to interpret this indisputable axiom to mean that the trade unions must play no part in the socialist organisation of industry and in the management of state industry. Their participation in this is necessary in the following strictly defined forms.

7. THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE BUSINESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATIONS OF THE PROLETARIAN STATE

The proletariat is the class foundation of the state accomplishing the transition from capitalism to socialism. In a country where the small peasantry is overwhelmingly predominant the proletariat can successfully fulfil this function only if it very skilfully, cautiously and gradually estab-

lishes an alliance with the vast majority of the peasantry. The trade unions must collaborate closely and constantly with the government, all the political and economic activities of which are guided by the class-conscious vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party. Being a school of communism in general, the trade unions must, in particular, be a school for training the whole mass of workers, and eventually all working people, in the art of managing socialist industry (and gradually also agriculture).

Proceeding from these principles, the trade unions' part in the activities of the business and administrative organisations of the proletarian state should, in the immediate period, take the following main forms:

1. The trade unions should help to staff all the state business and administrative bodies connected with economies: nominate their candidates for them, stating their length of service, experience, and so forth. Right of decision lies solely with the business organisations, which also bear full responsibility for the activities of the respective organisations. The business organisations, however, must give careful consideration to the views on all candidates expressed by the trade unions concerned.

2. One of the most important functions of the trade unions is to promote and train factory managers from among the workers and the masses of the working people generally. At the present time we have scores of such factory managers who are quite satisfactory, and hundreds who are more or less satisfactory, but very soon, however, we must have hundreds of the former and thousands of the latter. The trade unions must much more carefully and regularly than hitherto keep a systematic register of all workers and peasants capable of holding posts of this kind, and thoroughly, efficiently and from every aspect verify the progress they make in learning the art of management.

3. The trade unions must take a far greater part in the activities of all the planning bodies of the proletarian state, in drawing up economic plans and also programmes of production and expenditure of stocks of material supplies for the workers, in selecting the factories that are to continue to receive state supplies, to be leased, or to be given out as concessions, etc. The trade unions should undertake no

direct functions of controlling production in private and leased enterprises, but participate in the regulation of private capitalist production exclusively by sharing in the activities of the competent state bodies. In addition to participating in all cultural and educational activities and in production propaganda, the trade unions must also, on an increasing scale, enlist the working class and the masses of the working people generally for all branches of the work of building up the state economy; they must make them familiar with all aspects of economic life and with all details of industrial operations—from the procurement of raw materials to the marketing of the product; give them a more and more concrete understanding of the single state plan of socialist economy and the worker's and peasant's practical interest in its implementation.

4. The drawing up of scales of wages and supplies, etc., is one of the essential functions of the trade unions in the building of socialism and in their participation in the management of industry. In particular, disciplinary courts should steadily improve labour discipline and proper ways of promoting it and achieving increased productivity; but they must not interfere with the functions of the People's Courts in general or with the functions of factory managements.

This list of the major functions of the trade unions in the work of building up socialist economy should, of course, be drawn up in greater detail by the competent trade union and government bodies. Taking into account the experience of the enormous work accomplished by the unions in organising the economy and its management, and also the mistakes which have caused no little harm and which resulted from direct, unqualified, incompetent and irresponsible interference in administrative matters, it is most important, in order to restore the economy and strengthen the Soviet system, deliberately and resolutely to start persevering practical activities calculated to extend over a long period of years and designed to give the workers and all working people generally practical training in the art of managing the economy of the whole country.

8. CONTACT WITH THE MASSES—THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITION FOR ALL TRADE UNION ACTIVITY

Contact with the masses, i.e., with the overwhelming majority of the workers (and eventually of all the working people), is the most important and most fundamental condition for the success of all trade union activity. In all the trade union organisations and their machinery, from bottom up, there should be instituted, and tested in practice over a period of many years, a system of responsible comrades—who must not all be Communists—who should live right among the workers, study their lives in every detail, and be able unerringly, on any question, and at any time, to judge the mood, the real aspirations, needs and thoughts of the masses. They must be able without a shadow of false idealisation to define the degree of their class-consciousness and the extent to which they are influenced by various prejudices and survivals of the past; and they must be able to win the boundless confidence of the masses by comradeship and concern for their needs. One of the greatest and most serious dangers that confront the numerically small Communist Party which, as the vanguard of the working class, is guiding a vast country in the process of transition to socialism (for the time being without the direct support of the more advanced countries), is isolation from the masses, the danger that the vanguard may run too far ahead and fail to "straighten out the line", fail to maintain firm contact with the whole army of labour, i.e., with the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants. Just as the very best factory, with the very best motors and first-class machines, will be forced to remain idle if the transmission belts from the motors to the machines are damaged, so our work of socialist construction must meet with inevitable disaster if the trade unions—the transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses—are badly fitted or function badly. It is not sufficient to explain, to reiterate and corroborate this truth; it must be backed up organisationally by the whole structure of the trade unions and by their everyday activities.

9. THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE STATUS OF THE TRADE UNIONS UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

From all the foregoing it is evident that there are a number of contradictions in the various functions of the trade unions. On the one hand, their principal method of operation is that of persuasion and education; on the other hand, as participants in the exercise of state power they cannot refuse to share in coercion. On the one hand, their main function is to protect the interests of the masses of the working people in the most direct and immediate sense of the term; on the other hand, as participants in the exercise of state power and builders of the economy as a whole they cannot refuse to resort to pressure. On the one hand, they must operate in military fashion, for the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fiercest, most dogged and most desperate class war; on the other hand, specifically military methods of operation are least of all applicable to the trade unions. On the one hand, they must be able to adapt themselves to the masses, to their level; on the other hand, they must never pander to the prejudices and backwardness of the masses, but steadily raise them to a higher and higher level, etc., etc. These contradictions are no accident, and they will persist for several decades; for as long as survivals of capitalism and small production remain, contradictions between them and the young shoots of socialism are inevitable throughout the social system.

Two practical conclusions must be drawn from this. First, for the successful conduct of trade union activities it is not enough to understand their functions correctly, it is not enough to organise them properly. In addition, special tact is required, ability to approach the masses in a special way in each individual case for the purpose of raising these masses to a higher cultural, economic and political stage with the minimum of friction.

Second, the afore-mentioned contradictions will inevitably give rise to disputes, disagreements, friction, etc. A higher body is required with sufficient authority to settle these at once. This higher body is the Communist Party and the international federation of the Communist Parties of all countries—the Communist International.

10. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE SPECIALISTS

The main principles of this question are set forth in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party; but these will remain paper principles if constant attention is not paid to the facts which indicate the degree to which they are put into practice. Recent facts of this kind are: first, cases of the murder of engineers by workers in socialised mines not only in the Urals, but also in the Donets Basin; second the suicide of V. V. Oldenborger, Chief Engineer of the Moscow Waterworks, because of the intolerable working conditions due to the incompetent and impermissible conduct of the members of the Communist group, as well as of organs of the Soviet government, which prompted the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to turn the whole matter over to the judicial authorities.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government as a whole bear a far greater share of the blame for cases of this kind than the trade unions. But the present issue is not one of establishing the degree of political guilt, but of drawing certain political conclusions. Unless our leading bodies, i.e., the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions, guard as the apple of their eye every specialist who does his work conscientiously and knows and loves it—even though the ideas of communism are totally alien to him—it will be useless to expect any serious progress in socialist construction. We may not be able to achieve it soon, but we must at all costs achieve a situation in which specialists—as a separate social stratum, which will persist until we have reached the highest stage of development of communist society—can enjoy better conditions of life under socialism than they enjoyed under capitalism insofar as concerns their material and legal status, comradely collaboration with the workers and peasants, and in the mental plane, i.e., finding satisfaction in their work, realising that it is socially useful and independent of the sordid interests of the capitalist class. Nobody will regard a government department as being tolerably well organised if it does not take systematic measures to provide for all the needs of the specialists, to reward the best of them, to safeguard and protect their interests, etc., and does not secure practical results in this.

FROM MARX TO MAO
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The trade unions must conduct all the activities of the type indicated (or systematically collaborate in the activities of all the government departments concerned) not from the point of view of the interests of the given department, but from the point of view of the interests of labour and of the economy as a whole. With regard to the specialists, on the trade unions devolves the very arduous duty of daily exercising influence on the broad masses of the working people in order to create proper relations between them and the specialists. Only such activities can produce really important practical results.

11. THE TRADE UNIONS AND PETTY-BOURGEOIS INFLUENCE ON THE WORKING CLASS

Trade unions are really effective only when they unite very broad strata of the non-Party workers. This must give rise—particularly in a country in which the peasantry greatly predominates—to relative stability, specifically among the trade unions, of those political influences that serve as the superstructure over the remnants of capitalism and over small production. These influences are petty-bourgeois, i.e., Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik (the Russian variety of the parties of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals) on the one hand, and anarchist on the other. Only among these trends has any considerable number of people remained who defend capitalism ideologically and not from selfish class motives, and continue to believe in the non-class nature of the "democracy", "equality", and "liberty" in general that they preach.

It is to this socio-economic cause and not to the role of individual groups, still less of individual persons, that we must attribute the survivals (sometimes even the revival) in our country of such petty-bourgeois ideas among the trade unions. The Communist Party, the Soviet bodies that conduct cultural and educational activities and all Communist members of trade unions must therefore devote far more attention to the ideological struggle against petty-bourgeois influences, trends and deviations among the trade unions, especially because the New Economic Policy

is bound to lead to a certain strengthening of capitalism. It is urgently necessary to counteract this by intensifying the struggle against petty-bourgeois influences upon the working class.

Central Committee,
Russian Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*)

Written December 30, 1921-January 4, 1922
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DRAFT DIRECTIVE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY[48]

Draft

The Political Bureau brings to the notice of all economic bodies that now, after the Party Conference in December 1921 and the Ninth Congress of Soviets, the New Economic Policy has been quite firmly and clearly established.

The maximum effort must therefore be made to test it in practice as quickly and as widely as possible. All general arguments, theoretical arguments and debates on the subject of the New Economic Policy must be relegated to debating clubs, partly to the press. They must be rooted out relentlessly from the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labour and Defence and all economic bodies. All sorts of commissions must be reduced to the absolute minimum and commission conferences replaced by the demand for written amendments or counter-drafts from all interested departments within the shortest period (one or two days). The Higher Economic Commission should be turned into a body engaged solely in classifying and pooling the economic acts promulgated by the state, and all sorts of so-called commission discussion should, if possible, be ruled out. The Higher Economic Commission must accelerate and not slow down the general course of the work.

The Political Bureau requires the People's Commissariat of Finance to concentrate all its efforts on achieving the speediest possible increase of the number of taxes and increasing the revenues from them, and also on business-like amendments to the general budget. All arguments about the money policy, the replacement of the tax in kind by cash taxes, etc., should be taken partly to debating clubs and partly to the press.

The Political Bureau requires all People's Commissars to display the utmost speed and energy in eliminating bureaucracy and red tape in the testing of the New Economic Policy in practice; the Political Bureau requires that bonuses be instituted for the largest possible number of persons holding responsible positions for speedily increasing output and expanding both home and foreign trade. This requirement concerns, first and foremost, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, then the State Bank (particularly its trade department), the Central Council of Co-operative Societies and the Supreme Economic Council.

After this draft has been endorsed in the Political Bureau, have it read to and signed by all members of the collegiums of all People's Commissariats and all members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Written between January 9 and 12, 1922

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TO THE WORKING PEOPLE OF DAGHESTAN[49]

I gratefully accept your gift, which is the result of the creative initiative of the working people of Daghestan.

I wish you success in the difficult work of reviving the economy of Daghestan.

Lenin,

Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars
of the R.S.F.S.R.

January 12, 1922

Izvestia No. 10,
January 14, 1922

Dictated by telephone
Published according to
a typewritten copy

LETTER TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE GEORGIAN RED ARMY[50]

Comrade Sergo,

It is absolutely essential that the Congress of Soviets of Georgia should adopt a decision to strengthen the *Georgian* Red Army without fail, and that the decision is *really* carried out.

In the last resort, if the peasants are opposed to this, a decision, couched in the most general terms, should be adopted, such as it is deemed essential "without fail to strengthen the Georgian Red Army and to call upon all government bodies and all the working people to work to secure this", etc.

Actually, however, it is necessary, at all costs, and *immediately*, to develop and strengthen the Georgian Red Army. As a beginning let it consist only of one brigade or even less; two or three thousand Red cadets—of whom 1,500 should be Communists—who (as cadres) could serve as the nucleus of an army *when the contingency arises*. This is absolutely essential.

Perhaps Stalin will enlarge on the military and technical methods of carrying this out.

I am confining myself to the political aspect of the matter: those who fail to carry this out will be expelled from the Party *without compunction*. This is not a matter to be trifled with. It is absolutely essential politically; and you personally, and the entire Georgian Central Committee, will be held responsible to the whole Party for this.

I await your reply.

Yours,

Lenin

February 13

This is for Comrade Sergo and for all the members of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party.

Written on February 13, 1922

First published in 1925 in M. D. Orakhelashvili, *Lenin i Z.S.F.S.R.* (*Materially*) (Lenin and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [Dokuments]), Tiflis, Sovetsky Kavkaz Publishing House

Published according to a typewritten copy supplemented and signed by Lenin

LETTER TO D. I. KURSKY WITH NOTES ON THE DRAFT CIVIL CODE

February 28, 1922

Comrade Kursky,

Re your letter of February 23 (No. 255) in reply to my letter.

I shall try to see you personally, but I cannot promise it because I am not feeling well.

I hope that after the meeting of executives in connection with my letter, you will write to me about its practical results. It is particularly important to organise a real check of what is actually being done, what is actually being accomplished, what the People's Courts and the Revolutionary Tribunals have achieved and how this can be assessed and verified.

How many cases of abuses of the *New Economic Policy* have been tried?

How many sentenced, and what punishments (as a whole and not in individual cases)?

etc.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Especially urgent and important:

P.S. *Re the Civil Codes*[51]: I am unable to go into the wording of individual articles. My health does not permit me to do so.

I must confine myself to the following points:

1) The People's Commissar of Justice must find out and *personally* check who precisely is responsible for each major section of the Civil Code.

2) Everything that the literature and experience of the West-European countries contain on the *protection* of the working people must be used.

3) Do not limit yourself to that (this is most important). Do not follow the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs blindly. *We must not play up to "Europe"* but MOVE FARTHER *in intensifying state interference in "private legal relations", in civil affairs*. I cannot say exactly how that ought to be done because I am in no condition either to study the question or to go into even an individual code. But that that must be done is clear to me. The danger threatening us in this field is that of *underdoing* it (and not that of overdoing it); that, too, is perfectly clear to me. On the eve of Genoa[52] we must not make a false move, show a lack of spirit, let slip out of our hands the slightest possibility of *extending* state interference in "civil" relations.

Lenin

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Published according to
the manuscript

NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

ON ASCENDING A HIGH MOUNTAIN; THE HARM OF DESPONDENCY; THE UTILITY OF TRADE; ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MENSHEVIKS, ETC.[53]

I

BY WAY OF EXAMPLE

Let us picture to ourselves a man ascending a very high, steep and hitherto unexplored mountain. Let us assume that he has overcome unprecedented difficulties and dangers and has succeeded in reaching a much higher point than any of his predecessors, but still has not reached the summit. He finds himself in a position where it is not only difficult and dangerous to proceed in the direction and along the path he has chosen, but positively impossible. He is forced to turn back, descend, seek another path, longer, perhaps, but one that will enable him to reach the summit. The descent from the height that no one before him has reached proves, perhaps, to be more dangerous and difficult for our imaginary traveller than the ascent—it is easier to slip; it is not so easy to choose a foothold; there is not that exhilaration that one feels in going upwards, straight to the goal, etc. One has to tie a rope round oneself, spend hours with an alpenstock to cut footholds or a projection to which the rope could be tied firmly; one has to move at a snail's pace, and move downwards, descend, away from the goal; and one does not know where this extremely dangerous and painful descent will end, or whether there is a fairly safe detour by which one can ascend more boldly, more quickly and more directly to the summit.

It would hardly be natural to suppose that a man who had climbed to such an unprecedented height but found himself in such a position did not have his moments of despondency. In all probability these moments would be more

numerous, more frequent and harder to bear if he heard the voices of those below, who, through a telescope and from a safe distance, are watching his dangerous descent, which cannot even be described as what the *Smena Vekh*[54] people call "ascending with the brakes on"; brakes presuppose a well-designed and tested vehicle, a well-prepared road and previously tested appliances. In this case, however, there is no vehicle, no road, absolutely nothing that had been tested beforehand.

The voices from below ring with malicious joy. They do not conceal it; they chuckle gleefully and shout: "He'll fall in a minute! Serve him right, the lunatic!" Others try to conceal their malicious glee and behave mostly like Judas Golovlyov.[55] They moan and raise their eyes to heaven in sorrow, as if to say: "It grieves us sorely to see our fears justified! But did not we, who have spent all our lives working out a judicious plan for scaling this mountain, demand that the ascent be postponed until our plan was complete? And if we so vehemently protested against taking this path, which this lunatic is now abandoning (look, look, he has turned back! He is descending! A single step is taking him hours of preparation! And yet we were roundly abused when time and again we demanded moderation and caution!), if we so fervently censured this lunatic and warned everybody against imitating and helping him, we did so entirely because of our devotion to the great plan to scale this mountain, and in order to prevent this great plan from being generally discredited!"

Happily, in the circumstances we have described, our imaginary traveller cannot hear the voices of these people who are "true friends" of the idea of ascent; if he did, they would probably nauseate him. And nausea, it is said, does not help one to keep a clear head and a firm step, particularly at high altitudes.

II

WITHOUT METAPHORS

An analogy is not proof. Every analogy is lame. These are incontrovertible and common truths; but it would do no harm to recall them in order to see the limits of every analogy more clearly.

Russia's proletariat rose to a gigantic height in its revolution, not only when it is compared with 1789 and 1793, but also when compared with 1871. We must take stock of what we have done and what we have not as dispassionately, as clearly and as concretely as possible. If we do that we shall be able to keep clear heads. We shall not suffer from nausea, illusions, or despondency.

We wound up the bourgeois-democratic revolution more thoroughly than had ever been done before anywhere in the world. That is a great gain, and no power on earth can deprive us of it.

We accomplished the task of getting out of the most reactionary imperialist war in a revolutionary way. That, too, is a gain no power on earth can deprive us of; it is a gain which is all the more valuable for the reason that reactionary imperialist massacres are inevitable in the not distant future if capitalism continues to exist; and the people of the twentieth century will not be so easily satisfied with a second edition of the "Basle Manifesto", with which the renegades, the heroes of the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals, fooled themselves and the workers in 1912 and 1914-18.

We have created a Soviet type of state and by that we have ushered in a new era in world history, the era of the political rule of the proletariat, which is to supersede the era of bourgeois rule. Nobody can deprive us of this, either, although the Soviet type of state will have the finishing touches put to it only with the aid of the practical experience of the working class of several countries.

But we have not finished building even the foundations of socialist economy and the hostile powers of moribund capitalism can still deprive us of that. We must clearly appreciate this and frankly admit it; for there is nothing more dangerous than illusions (and vertigo, particularly at high altitudes). And there is absolutely nothing terrible, nothing that should give legitimate grounds for the slightest despondency, in admitting this bitter truth; for we have always urged and reiterated the elementary truth of Marxism—that the joint efforts of the workers of several advanced countries are needed for the victory of socialism. We are still alone and in a backward country, a country that was ruined more than others, but we have accomplished a great

deal. More than that—we have preserved intact the army of the revolutionary proletarian forces; we have preserved its manoeuvring ability; we have kept clear heads and can soberly calculate where, when and how far to retreat (in order to leap further forward); where, when and how to set to work to alter what has remained unfinished. Those Communists are doomed who imagine that it is possible to finish such an epoch-making undertaking as completing the foundations of socialist economy (particularly in a small-peasant country) without making mistakes, without retreats, without numerous alterations to what is unfinished or wrongly done. Communists who have no illusions, who do not give way to despondency, and who preserve their strength and flexibility "to begin from the beginning" over and over again in approaching an extremely difficult task, are not doomed (and in all probability will not perish).

And still less permissible is it for us to give way to the slightest degree of despondency; we have still less grounds for doing so because, notwithstanding the ruin, poverty, backwardness and starvation prevailing in our country, in the *economics* that prepare the way for socialism we have *begun to make progress*, while side by side with us, all over the world, countries which are more advanced, and a thousand times wealthier and militarily stronger than we are, *are still retrogressing* in *their* own vaunted, familiar, capitalist economic field, in which they have worked for centuries.

III

CATCHING FOXES; LEVI AND SERRATI

The following is said to be the most reliable method of catching foxes. The fox that is being tracked is surrounded at a certain distance with a rope which is set at a little height from the snow-covered ground and to which are attached little red flags. Fearing this obviously artificial human device, the fox will emerge only if and where an opening is allowed in this fence of flags; and the hunter waits for it at this opening. One would think that caution would be the most marked trait of an animal that is hunted by everybody.

But it turns out that in this case, too, "virtue unduly prolonged" is a fault. The fox is caught precisely because it is over-cautious.

I must confess to a mistake I made at the Third Congress of the Communist International also as a result of over-caution. At that Congress I was on the extreme Right flank. I am convinced that it was the only correct stand to take, for a very large (and influential) group of delegates, headed by many German, Hungarian and Italian comrades, occupied an inordinately "Left" and incorrectly Left position, and far too often, instead of soberly weighing up the situation that was not very favourable for immediate and direct revolutionary action, they vigorously indulged in the waving of little red flags. Out of caution and a desire to prevent this undoubtedly wrong deviation towards Leftism from giving a false direction to the whole tactics of the Communist International, I did all I could to defend Levi. I suggested that perhaps he had lost his head (I did not deny that he had lost his head) because he had been very frightened by the mistakes of the Lefts; and I argued that there had been cases of Communists who had lost their heads "finding" them again afterwards. Even while admitting, under pressure of the Lefts, that Levi was a Menshevik, I said that such an admission did not settle the question. For example, the whole history of the fifteen years of struggle between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Russia (1903-17) proves, as the three Russian revolutions also prove, that, in general, the Mensheviks were absolutely wrong and that they were, in fact, agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement. This fact is incontrovertible. But this incontrovertible fact does not eliminate the other fact that in *individual* cases the Mensheviks were right and the Bolsheviks wrong, as, for example, on the question of boycotting the Stolypin Duma in 1907.

Eight months have elapsed since the Third Congress of the Communist International. Obviously, our controversy with the Lefts is now outdated; events have settled it. It has been proved that I was wrong about Levi, because he has definitely shown that he took the Menshevik path not accidentally, not temporarily, not by "going too far" in combating the very dangerous mistakes of the Lefts, but deliberately and permanently, because of his very nature.

Instead of honestly admitting that it was necessary for him to appeal for readmission to the party after the Third Congress of the Communist International, as every person who had temporarily lost his head when irritated by some mistakes committed by the Lefts should have done, Levi began to play sly tricks on the party, to try to put a spoke in its wheel, i.e., actually he began to serve those agents of the bourgeoisie, the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals. Of course, the German Communists were quite right when they retaliated to this recently by expelling several more gentlemen from their party, those who were found to be secretly helping Paul Levi in this noble occupation.

The development of the German and Italian Communist Parties since the Third Congress of the Comintern has shown that the mistakes committed by the Lefts at that Congress have been noted and are being rectified—little by little, slowly, but steadily; the decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International are being loyally carried out. The process of transforming the old type of European parliamentary party—which in fact is reformist and only slightly tinted with revolutionary colours—into a *new type* of party, into a genuinely revolutionary, genuinely Communist Party, is an extremely arduous one. This is demonstrated most clearly, perhaps, by the example of France. The process of changing the *type* of Party work in everyday life, of getting it out of the humdrum channel; the process of converting the Party into the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat without permitting it to become divorced from the masses, but, on the contrary, by linking it more and more closely with them, imbuing them with revolutionary consciousness and rousing them for the revolutionary struggle, is a very difficult, but most important one. If the European Communists do not take advantage of the intervals (probably very short) between the periods of particularly acute revolutionary battles—such as took place in many capitalist countries of Europe and America in 1921 and the beginning of 1922—for the purpose of bringing about this fundamental, internal, profound reorganisation of the whole structure of their Parties and of their work, they will be committing the gravest of crimes. Fortunately, there is no reason to fear this. The quiet, steady, calm, not very rapid, but profound work

of creating genuine Communist Parties, genuine revolutionary vanguards of the proletariat, has begun and is proceeding in Europe and America.

Political lessons taken even from the observation of such a trivial thing as catching foxes prove to be useful. On the one hand, excessive caution leads to mistakes. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that if we give way to mere "sentiment" or indulge in the waving of little red flags instead of soberly weighing up the situation, we may commit irreparable mistakes; we may perish where there is absolutely no need to, although the difficulties are great.

Paul Levi now wants to get into the good graces of the bourgeoisie—and, *consequently*, of its agents, the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals—by republishing precisely those writings of Rosa Luxemburg in which she was wrong. We shall reply to this by quoting two lines from a good old Russian fable[56]: "Eagles may at times fly lower than hens, but hens can never rise to the height of eagles." Rosa Luxemburg was mistaken on the question of the independence of Poland; she was mistaken in 1903 in her appraisal of Menshevism; she was mistaken on the theory of the accumulation of capital; she was mistaken in July 1914, when, together with Plekhanov, Vandervelde, Kautsky and others, she advocated unity between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks; she was mistaken in what she wrote in prison in 1918 (she corrected most of these mistakes at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 after she was released). But in spite of her mistakes she was—and remains for us—an eagle. And not only will Communists all over the world cherish her memory, but her biography and her *complete* works (the publication of which the German Communists are inordinately delaying, which can only be partly excused by the tremendous losses they are suffering in their severe struggle) will serve as useful manuals for training many generations of Communists all over the world. "Since August 4, 1914,[57] German Social-Democracy has been a stinking corpse"—this statement will make Rosa Luxemburg's name famous in the history of the international working-class movement. And, of course, in the backyard of the working-class movement, among the dung heaps, hens like Paul Levi, Scheidemann, Kautsky and all that fraternity will

cackle over the mistakes committed by the great Communist. To every man his own.

As for Serrati, he is like a bad egg, which bursts with a loud noise and with an exceptionally—pungent smell. Is it not too rich to get carried at "his" congress a resolution that declares readiness to submit to the decision of the Congress of the Communist International, then to send old Lazzari to the Congress, and finally, to cheat the workers as brazenly as a horse-coper? The Italian Communists who are training a real party of the revolutionary proletariat in Italy will now be able to give the working masses an object lesson in political chicanery and Menshevism. The useful, *repelling* effect of this will not be felt immediately, not without many repeated object lessons, but it will be felt. The victory of the Italian Communists is assured if they do not isolate themselves from the masses, if they do not lose patience in the hard work of exposing all of Serrati's chicanery to rank-and-file workers in a practical way, if they do not yield to the very easy and very dangerous temptation to say "minus *a*" whenever Serrati says "a", if they steadily train the masses to adopt a revolutionary world outlook and prepare them for revolutionary action, if they also take practical advantage of the practical and magnificent (although costly) object lessons of fascism.

Levi and Serrati are not characteristic in themselves; they are characteristic of the modern type of the extreme Left wing of petty-bourgeois democracy, of the camp of the "other side", the camp of the international capitalists, the camp that is against us. The whole of "their" camp, from Gompers to Serrati, are gloating, exulting, or else shedding crocodile tears over our retreat, our "descent", our New Economic Policy. Let them gloat, let them perform their clownish antics. To every man his own. But we shall not harbour any illusions or give way to despondency. If we are not afraid of admitting our mistakes, not afraid of making repeated efforts to rectify them—we shall reach the very summit. The cause of the international bloc from Gompers to Serrati is doomed.

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THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SITUATION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

SPEECH DELIVERED TO A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF METALWORKERS, MARCH 6, 1922[58]

(*Stormy applause.*) Comrades, permit me to depart somewhat from your usual procedure and speak today not of the subjects on the agenda of your meeting and Congress, but of my conclusions and opinions on the principal political problems. It has now become the custom to address those who, while not being official representatives of state departments, actually perform an enormous part of the work of the state. You all know that really business-like work is being done in most of our state departments by representatives of the working class, and this, of course, includes the metalworkers, who are in the front ranks.

That is why I think in this case it will not be out of place to depart from the usual procedure and to speak not so much on trade union and Party issues as on political issues, on our international and domestic situation. In my opinion there is something in our international and domestic situation that resembles some change of policy to which every Party member, and, of course, every class-conscious worker, should pay special attention in order that he may fully understand the significance of this change of policy, and be able properly to assimilate it and apply it in his Soviet, Party, trade union or other work.

Of course, comrades, you all know that Genoa remains in the forefront of the problems of our international politics. I am not very sure that it does so legitimately, for when we say "Genoa" we mean the Conference that everybody long ago heard about, the Conference that was to have taken

place in Genoa, Italy. The preparations for it had been almost completed; but now, unfortunately, the situation is so indefinite that nobody knows (and I am afraid that even the initiators and organisers themselves do not know) whether there is much chance of its taking place or not. At all events, we must say to ourselves, and to all those who have any interest in the destiny of the workers' and peasants' republic, that our position on this question, that is, on the question of the Genoa Conference, has been absolutely firm from the very beginning, and remains so. It is not our fault if certain people lack not only firmness but even the most elementary determination, the most elementary ability to carry out their own plans. From the very beginning we declared that *we welcomed Genoa and would attend it*. We understood perfectly well and did not in the least conceal the fact that we were going there as merchants, because trade with capitalist countries (as long as they have not entirely collapsed) is absolutely essential to us; we realised that we were going to Genoa to bargain for the most proper and most advantageous and politically suitable terms for this trade, and nothing more. This is by no means a secret to those capitalist countries whose governments drew up the first plan for the Genoa Conference and got it going. Those countries know perfectly well that the list of commercial agreements linking us with different capitalist states is growing longer and longer, that the number of practical transactions is increasing, and that we are now discussing in the greatest detail a huge number of joint Russian and foreign commercial projects between the most diverse combinations of foreign countries and various branches of our industry. Thus, the capitalist states are well aware of the practical basis of what is mainly to be discussed at Genoa. And this basis has a superstructure consisting of all sorts of political talk, assumptions and projects, but we must realise that it is only a little one, largely artificial, designed and erected by those who are interested in it.

It goes without saying that during the more than four years' existence of Soviet power we have acquired sufficient practical experience (apart from the fact that we are already quite familiar with it in theory) to enable us to appraise correctly the diplomatic game the gentlemen who

represent the bourgeois countries are today playing according to all the rules of the obsolete art of bourgeois diplomacy. We know perfectly well what lies at the bottom of this game, we know that it is trade. *The bourgeois countries must trade with Russia*; they know that unless they establish some form of economic relations their disintegration will continue in the way it has done up to now. Notwithstanding all their magnificent victories, notwithstanding the endless boasting with which they fill the newspapers and telegraph services of the whole world, their economy is falling to pieces. And after more than three years of effort, after their great victories, they cannot cope with the very simple task of restoring the old, let alone building anything new, and are still racking their brains over the problem of how to get together and form some combination of three, four, or five (the number is so large, you see, that it is frightfully difficult to reach an agreement) so as to be able to trade.

I can understand that Communists need time to learn to trade, and I know that those who are learning will be making the crudest of mistakes for several years; but history will forgive them because they are entirely new to the business. For this purpose we must make our thinking more flexible, and must discard all communist, or rather Russian, Oblomovism,[59] and much more besides. But it is strange for representatives of bourgeois countries to have to learn the trading business all over again, after they have been engaged in it for hundreds of years, and when the whole of their social life is based upon it. Incidentally, it should not seem so strange to us. For a long time we have been saying, and we always knew, that their appraisal of the imperialist war was less correct than ours. They appraised it from what they could see directly in front of them, and three years after their tremendous victories they still cannot find a way out of the situation.

We Communists said that our appraisal of the war was more profound and correct; that its contradictions and its disasters would have a far broader impact than the capitalist countries imagined. And, looking at the bourgeois victor countries from outside, we said: they will recall our forecast and our appraisal of the war and its consequences more than once. The fact that they do not understand the simplest

things does not surprise us. But we nevertheless say, "We must trade with the capitalist countries as long as they exist." We shall negotiate with them as merchants; and the fact we can do so is proved by the increasing number of trade agreements we are signing and negotiating with them. But we cannot publish them until they are signed. From the commercial point of view we, of course, have to agree when a capitalist merchant comes to us and says, "This deal must remain between ourselves until the negotiations are completed." We, however, know how many agreements are in course of preparation—the list alone fills several pages, and it includes scores of practical proposals that have been discussed in detail with important financial groups. Of course, the gentlemen representing the bourgeois countries gathering at Genoa are as well aware of this as we are; whatever the position may be as regards other matters, contacts between these governments and their capitalist firms have, of course, been maintained. Even they are not so terribly lax as not to know of this.

Since in foreign telegrams we are continually reading statements which create the impression that they do not know exactly what will take place at Genoa, that they have something new up their sleeve, that they want to astonish the world by submitting new terms to Russia, permit me to say to them (and I hope I shall have the opportunity of saying it to Lloyd George personally, at Genoa): "You will not surprise anyone by this, gentlemen. You are businessmen and you know your job well. We are only just learning to trade and are still clumsy at it. But we have tens and hundreds of agreements and draft agreements, which show how we trade and what transactions we conduct or shall conduct, and on what terms." And we smile quietly to ourselves when we read in the newspapers all sorts of reports—published for the purpose of scaring someone—to the effect that they intend to put us to some sort of test. We have been threatened often enough, and with much more serious threats than those uttered by the merchant who intends to slam the door after making his last offer. We have been threatened with the guns of the Allied powers that rule almost the whole world. *We were not frightened by those threats. Please, gentlemen, European diplomats, do not forget that.*

We are not in the least concerned about maintaining our diplomatic prestige, the good name to which the bourgeois states attach so much importance. Officially, we shall not even talk about it. But we have not forgotten it. Not one of our workers, not one of our peasants has forgotten, can forget, or ever will forget that he fought in defence of the workers' and peasants' government against the alliance of all those very powerful states that supported the intervention. We have a whole collection of treaties which those countries concluded with Kolchak and Denikin over a number of years. They have been published; we are familiar with them and the whole world is familiar with them. What is the use of playing hide-and-seek and pretending that we have all become Simple Simons? Every peasant and every worker knows that he fought against those countries, and that they failed to vanquish him. And if you gentlemen, who represent the bourgeois governments, care to amuse yourselves, to waste your paper (of which you have ever so much more than you need) and your ink, and to overload your cables and radio stations with messages announcing to the whole world: "We shall put Russia to the test", we shall see who comes off best. We have already been put to the test, not the test of words, not the test of trade, not the test of money, but the test of the bludgeon. And in view of the severe, bleeding and painful wounds inflicted on us, we have earned that it be said of us—not by ourselves, but by our enemies—"A man who has been beaten is worth two who have not."

We have earned this on the field of battle. As far as trade is concerned, it is a pity that we Communists are not being thrashed enough, but I trust that this defect will be made good in the near future with equal success.

I said that I hope to discuss these subjects with Lloyd George personally, in Genoa, and to tell him that *it is no use trying to frighten us with such trivialities* because it will only damage the prestige of those who try it. I hope that I shall not be prevented from doing this by ill health, which during the past few months has prevented me from taking a direct part in political affairs, and which totally incapacitates me for the Soviet duties which I have been appointed to perform. I have reason to believe that I shall be able to

return to my duties within a few weeks. *But will three or four of them succeed within the next few weeks in reaching an agreement on what they have informed the world they are already agreed upon? I am not sure about that.* I even dare assert that nobody in the world is sure about it, and what is more, that they themselves are not sure, because when these victorious powers, which rule the whole world, gathered at Cannes after numerous preliminary conferences—the number of these conferences is infinite, and even the European bourgeois press is jeering—they could not say definitely what they wanted.

From the point of view of practical tasks and not that of a game of diplomatic leap-frog, therefore, Comrade Trotsky has defined the position more correctly than anybody else. The day after the news was received that all the arrangements for Genoa had been made, that everything had been settled, that complete agreement had been reached about Genoa and that it was only the instability of one of the bourgeois governments (they seem to have become suspiciously unstable these days) that necessitated the temporary postponement of the Conference, he issued the following order: "Let every man of the Red Army get a clear understanding of the international situation. We know definitely that there is a permanent group over there who want to try their hand at intervention. We shall be on the alert. Let every man of the Red Army know all about the diplomatic game and what is meant by force of arms, which, up to now, has decided all class conflicts."

Let every man of the Red Army know all about this game and what is meant by force of arms, and then we shall see what happens. No matter how shaky capitalism may have become in all capitalist countries, many quite influential parties may still try their hand at this game. And if the governments are so unstable that they cannot convene a conference at the date set for it, who knows whose hands they will fall into? We know that in those countries there are influential parties and influential persons and business magnates who want war. We are perfectly well aware of this, and we are well informed of what really lies at the bottom of economic treaties. We have endured exceptional hardship, and we know what misfortune and suffering a fresh

attempt at war must entail for us. But we say we *shall be able to stand it again—just try and do it!* When Comrade Trotsky issued his definite order instead of publishing opinions about the game of diplomatic leap-frog, he had drawn the conclusion that we must again explain the international situation to every man of the Red Army, and tell him that the postponement of the Genoa Conference, owing to the instability of the Italian Cabinet, is a danger signal of war. *We shall see to it that every man of the Red Army understands this*. It will be easy for us to do this because there is hardly a family, hardly a man of the Red Army in Russia who does not know this, not only from newspapers, circulars and orders, but from his own village, where he has seen cripples, and knows families that have gone through this war, where he sees crop failures, appalling hunger and ruin, hellish poverty, and knows what causes them—even though he does not read the Paris publications of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries which attribute all this to the malignant nature of the Bolsheviks. There can scarcely be a desire so deeply ingrained in him as the desire to repel (to say the least) those who forced upon us the war waged by Kolchak and Denikin and supported it. There is no need for us to appoint new agitation and propaganda commissions for this purpose.

In respect of the Genoa Conference we must distinguish exactly between its real nature and the newspaper canards circulated by the bourgeoisie. They think that these canards are frightful bombs, but they do not frighten us, because we have seen so many of them- and sometimes they do not deserve answering even with a smile. Every attempt to impose terms upon us as if we were vanquished is so very foolish that it is not worthy of a reply. *We are establishing relations as merchants*; *we know what you owe us and what we owe you*; *and we know what your legitimate profit and even your super-profit may be*. We get many proposals, and the number of agreements we are concluding is growing and will continue to grow, no matter how three or four of the victor powers combine. You will lose by this postponement of the Conference, because you will show your own people that you do not know what you want, and that the disease you are suffering from is lack of will power, and a failure to under-

stand economics and politics, which we have appraised more profoundly than you. It will soon be ten years since we made this appraisal, and all the ruin and disorder that has occurred since then is still not understood by the bourgeois countries.

We already see clearly the position that has taken shape in our country, and we can say with full conviction that *we can now stop the retreat we began, we are already stopping it. Enough!* We clearly realise that the New Economic Policy is a retreat, and we do not conceal it. We grasped more than we could hold, but such is the logic of the struggle. Those of you who remember what the position was in October 1917, or those of you who were politically immature at the time and have learned since what the position was in 1917, know what a large number of compromise proposals we Bolsheviks made to the bourgeoisie at that time. "Gentlemen, your affairs are in a bad way," we said, "we shall be in power, however, and will remain in power. Wouldn't you like to consider how you could settle things without a rumpus, as the muzhik would say?" We know that there was not only a rumpus, but attempts at rebellion, which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries instigated and supported. Formerly they said: "We are prepared to surrender power to the Soviets right now." A few days ago I read an article by Kerensky, who opposed Chernov in a Paris journal (there's lots of that stuff there). "Did we cling to power?" asked Kerensky. "Even at the time of the Democratic Conference[60] I said that if anyone could be found to form a homogeneous government, power would be transferred to the new government without the slightest upheaval."

We have never refused to take power alone. We said that as early as June 1917,[61] and took power at the Congress of Soviets in October 1917. We Bolsheviks obtained a majority at that Congress of Soviets. Then Kerensky appealed to the officer cadets,[62] rushed off to Krasnov and wanted to muster an army to march on Petrograd. We knocked them about a bit, and now they say in an offended tone, "You are insolent, you are usurpers, butchers!" And we say in reply, "You have only yourselves to blame, friends! Do not imagine that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten what you did. In October you challenged us to the most desperate fight, and we retaliated with terror and redoubled terror;

and we shall adopt terror again if necessary, if you try it again." Not a single worker, not a single peasant doubts the need for it. No one doubts it but whimpering intellectuals.

Under conditions of unheard-of economic hardship we were compelled to wage war against an enemy whose forces were a hundred times superior to ours. It goes without saying that under these circumstances we were obliged to go to greater lengths in our urgent communist measures than would otherwise have been the case; we were forced to do it. Our enemies thought they could finish us off; they thought they could bring us to our knees, not in words, but in deeds. They said they would not make any concessions. We replied that if they thought we dared not resort to the most extreme communist measures they were mistaken. And we did dare; we did it, and we won. Now we say we cannot hold these positions, we are retreating, because we have won enough to be able to hold essential positions. All the whiteguards headed by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries wax jubilant and say, "Aha, you are retreating!" We say "Rejoice, since it puts you in good humour." We stand to gain if our enemy pats himself on the back instead of engaging in practical work. Rejoice, you are only putting us in a more favourable position by deceiving yourselves with illusions. We have captured vast positions, and had we not captured them in the period from 1917 to 1921 we would have had no room to retreat, geographically, economically or politically. We are maintaining power in alliance with the peasantry, and if you reject terms offered you before a war, you get worse terms after the war. This is definitely recorded in the diplomatic, economic and political history of the period 1917-21, so that we are not boasting at all. It is a plain statement of fact, a simple reminder. Had the capitalist gentlemen accepted the proposals we made to them in October 1917, they would have had five times as much as they have now. You fought for three years. What have you gained by it? Do you want to fight again? We know perfectly well that by no means all of you want to fight. On the other hand we know that in view of the desperate famine and the present state of industry, we cannot hold all the positions we won in the period 1917-21. We have surrendered a number of them. But we can now say that, *so far as making con-*

cessions to the capitalists is concerned, the retreat is at an end. We have weighed up our own forces and those of the capitalists. We have done some reconnoitring by way of concluding agreements with Russian and foreign capitalists, and we say—and I hope, I am sure, that the Party Congress will say the same, officially, on behalf of the ruling party of Russia—"*We can now stop our economic retreat. Enough! We shall not retreat any further*; we shall set about deploying and regrouping our forces properly."

When I say that we are halting our economic retreat I do not want to suggest that I have for a moment forgotten the hellishly difficult conditions in which we find ourselves; nor do I want to soothe or console you on that score. The question of the limits of the retreat, and of whether we are stopping the retreat or not, is not one of the difficulties that confront us. We are aware of these difficulties. We know what famine in a peasant country like Russia means. We know that we have not yet succeeded in alleviating the sufferings caused by the famine. We know what a financial crisis means in a country which is compelled to trade and where paper currency has been issued on a scale such as the world has never seen before. We are well aware of these difficulties and fully appreciate their immensity. I am not afraid to say that they are tremendous. This does not frighten us in the least. On the contrary, we gain strength from saying openly to the workers and peasants that these are the difficulties that confront us; this is the danger with which the Western powers threaten us. Let us work and weigh up our tasks soberly. The fact that we are stopping our retreat does not mean that we are not aware of the dangers. We look them straight in the face. "This," we say, "is where the main danger lies; we must alleviate the sufferings caused by the famine. We have not done so yet. We have not yet overcome the financial crisis." Hence, you must not interpret what I say about halting the retreat to mean that we think that we have already laid the foundation (of our new economy) and that we can now calmly advance. No, the foundation has not yet been laid. We still cannot look calmly to the future. We are surrounded by threats of war, about which I have said enough, and by still greater internal dangers, economic dangers within the country; these are the

frightful state of ruin of the peasantry, the famine, and our disrupted finances. These dangers are very great. They call for tremendous effort on our part. But if we are forced to go to war, we shall be able to fight. It will not be easy for them to fight, either. It was easy for them to start war in 1918 and as easy to continue it in 1919. But much water, and blood, and many other things have flowed under the bridge since then. The Western workers and peasants have changed since 1919. And it is impossible to fool them by saying, "We are fighting the Germans; the Bolsheviks are nothing more than German agents." We do not become panic-stricken over our economic situation. Today we have scores of agreements concluded with Russian and foreign capitalists. We know what difficulties lay and still lie before us. We know why the Russian capitalists consented to conclude these agreements. We know on what terms these agreements were concluded. The majority of the capitalists concluded the agreements as practical men, as merchants. We, too, are acting as merchants. But every merchant takes some account of politics. If he is a merchant from a not altogether barbarous country, he will not enter into transactions with a government unless it shows considerable signs of stability, unless it is very reliable. The merchant who did such a thing would not be a merchant, but a fool. Most merchants are not fools, for the logic of the commercial struggle eliminates the fools. If, formerly, the test was, "Denikin has beaten you, now show that you can beat Denikin", today the test is, "If the merchant has beaten you, prove that you can compel him to do business". We have proved it. We have already concluded a number of agreements with very big capitalist firms, both Russian and West-European. We know what they are after, they know what we are after.

Today the object of our activities has changed somewhat. That is exactly what I want to say a few words about, to supplement my already somewhat lengthy report.

In view of the fact that the Genoa situation is precarious and the end of the wavering is not in sight, and because we have made so many concessions in our domestic policy, we must now say: "*Enough! No more concessions!*" The capitalist gentlemen think that they can dally, and the longer they dally the more concessions they will get, but we must say,

"*Enough! Tomorrow you will get nothing.*" If they have not learned anything from the history of Soviet power and its victories, they can do as they please. For our part we have done all we could and have informed the whole world about it. I hope the Congress will confirm the fact that we shall not retreat any further. *The retreat has come to an end*, and, in consequence of that, the nature of our work is changing.

It must be stated that considerable nervousness, almost morbidness, is still observed in our ranks when this question is discussed. All sorts of plans are drawn up, and all sorts of decisions are adopted. In this connection I want to mention the following. Yesterday I happened to read in *Izvestia* a political poem by Mayakovsky.[63] I am not an admirer of his poetical talent, although I admit that I am not a competent judge. But I have not for a long time read anything on politics and administration with so much pleasure as I read this. In his poem he derides this meeting habit, and taunts the Communists with incessantly sitting at meetings. I am not sure about the poetry; but as for the politics, I vouch for their absolute correctness. We are indeed in the position, and it must be said that it is a very absurd position, of people sitting endlessly at meetings, setting up commissions and drawing up plans without end. There was a character who typified Russian life—Oblomov. He was always lolling on his bed and mentally drawing up schemes. That was a long time ago. Russia has experienced three revolutions, but the Oblomovs have survived, for there were Oblomovs not only among the landowners but also among the peasants; not only among the peasants, but among the intellectuals too; and not only among the intellectuals, but also among the workers and Communists. It is enough to watch us at our meetings, at our work on commissions, to be able to say that *old Oblomov still lives*; *and it will be necessary to give him a good washing and cleaning*, *a good rubbing and scouring to make a man of him*. In this respect we must have no illusions about our position. We have not imitated any of those who write the word "revolution" with a capital R, as the Socialist-Revolutionaries do. But we can quote the words of Marx that many foolish things are done during a revolution, perhaps more than at any other time.[64] We revolutionaries

must learn to regard these foolish acts dispassionately and fearlessly.

In this revolution we have done so much that is ineradicable, that we have finally won; the whole world knows about it and we have no reason whatever to be embarrassed or nervous. On the basis of our reconnaissance we are now checking up on what we have done. This check is very important and should serve as the starting point for our further progress. And since we have to hold out in the struggle against the capitalists, we must pursue our new line with determination. *We must build up our whole organisation in such a way that our commercial enterprises are not headed by people who lack experience in that field.* Very often we find a Communist at the head of a government office who is admittedly a conscientious comrade, tried and tested in the struggle for communism, who suffered imprisonment for the cause, and for that reason has been put at the head of a state trust. But he does not know how to trade. He has all the undoubted qualities of a Communist, but the merchant cheats him, and is quite right in doing so; it is a mistake to put a very worthy, excellent Communist, whose loyalty no one but a madman would doubt, in a place that should be occupied by a shrewd, conscientious salesman who could cope with his work ever so much better than the most devoted Communist. This is just where our Oblomovism makes itself felt.

We have given Communists, with all their splendid qualities, practical executive jobs for which they are totally unfitted. How many Communists are there in government offices? We have huge quantities of material, bulky works, that would cause the heart of the most methodical German scientist to rejoice, we have mountains of paper, and it would take Istpart[65] fifty times fifty years to go through it all; but if you tried to find anything practical in a state trust, you would fail; and you would never know who was responsible for what. The practical fulfilment of decrees—of which we have more than enough, and which we bake as fast as Mayakovsky describes—is never checked. Are the orders of the responsible Communist officials carried out? Can they get this done? No. They cannot, and that is why we are changing our domestic policy to the very core. Of what value are our meetings and commissions? Very often they are just make-

believe. After we began to purge our Party and said to ourselves: "Out with the self-seekers who have crept into the Party, out with the thieves!" things improved . We have expelled about a hundred thousand, that is splendid, but it is only a beginning. We shall discuss this question thoroughly at the Party Congress. And then, I think, the tens of thousands who now only organise commissions, and do not, and cannot, carry on practical work, will meet with the same fate. And after we have completed the purge in this way, our Party will get down to real work and learn to understand it as it learnt to understand war work. This, of course, is not a matter of several months, or even a year. We must display rock-like firmness in this question. We are not afraid to say that the nature of our work has changed. Our worst internal enemy is the bureaucrat—the Communist who occupies a responsible (or not responsible) Soviet post and enjoys universal respect as a conscientious man. As the Russian saying goes, "Although he never touches a drop, he sings false". He is very conscientious, but he has not learnt to combat red tape, he is unable to combat it, he condones it. *We must rid ourselves of this enemy, and with the aid of all class-conscious workers and peasants we shall get at him . The whole mass of non-Party workers and peasants will follow the lead of the vanguard of the Communist Party in the fight against this enemy and this inefficiency and Oblomovism. There must be no hesitation whatever in this matter.*

In conclusion, I will sum up briefly. The Genoa game the game of leap-frog that is going on around it, will not compel us to waver in the least. They cannot catch us now. *We shall go to the merchants and agree to do business, continuing our policy of concessions; but the limits of these concessions are already defined.* What we have given the merchants in our agreements up to now has been a step backward in our legislation; but we shall not retreat any further.

In connection with this, our main tasks in our internal and, particularly, our economic policy are undergoing a change. We do not need new decrees, new institutions or new methods of struggle. *What we need is the testing of the fitness of our officials; we need executive control.* The next purge will affect the Communists who imagine that they are administrators. All those who run all these

commissions and conferences and talk but do no practical work would do better to go into the field of propaganda, agitation and other useful work of that kind. All sorts of extraordinary and intricate things are invented on the plea that the New Economic Policy requires something new, but they do not do the work they are instructed to do. They make no effort to look after the kopeks entrusted to them; they make no effort to make one kopek grow into two; but they draw up plans affecting billions and even trillions of Soviet rubles. It is this evil that we shall combat. *To test men and verify what has actually been done*—this, this again, this alone is now the main feature of all our activities, of our whole policy. This is not a matter of a few months or of a year, but of several years. We must say officially, on behalf of the Party, what the main feature of our activities is at the present time, and reorganise our ranks accordingly. If we do that we shall be as victorious in this new field as we have been up to now in all the fields of activity engaged in by Bolshevik, proletarian power, supported by the peasant masses. (*Applause*.)

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ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITANT MATERIALISM

Comrade Trotsky has already said everything necessary, and said it very well, about the general purposes of *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*[66] in issue No. 1-2 of that journal. I should like to deal with certain questions that more closely define the content and programme of the work which its editors have set forth in the introductory statement in this issue.

This statement says that not all those gathered round the journal *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* are Communists but that they are all consistent materialists. I think that this alliance of Communists and non-Communists is absolutely essential and correctly defines the purposes of the journal. One of the biggest and most dangerous mistakes made by Communists (as generally by revolutionaries who have successfully accomplished the beginning of a great revolution) is the idea that a revolution can be made by revolutionaries alone. On the contrary, to be successful, all serious revolutionary work requires that the idea that revolutionaries are capable of playing the part only of the vanguard of the truly virile and advanced class must be understood and translated into action. A vanguard performs its task as vanguard only when it is able to avoid being isolated from the mass of the people it leads and is able really to lead the whole mass forward. Without an alliance with non-Communists in the most diverse spheres of activity there can be no question of any successful communist construction.

This also applies to the defence of materialism and Marxism, which has been undertaken by *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*. Fortunately, the main trends of advanced

social thinking in Russia have a solid materialist tradition. Apart from G. V. Plekhanov, it will be enough to mention Chernyshevsky,[67] from whom the modern Narodniks (the Popular Socialists,[68] Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.) have frequently retreated in quest of fashionable reactionary philosophical doctrines, captivated by the tinsel of the so-called last word in European science, and unable to discern beneath this tinsel some variety of servility to the bourgeoisie, to bourgeois prejudice and bourgeois reaction.

At any rate, in Russia we still have—and shall undoubtedly have for a fairly long time to come—materialists from the non-communist camp, and it is our absolute duty to enlist all adherents of consistent and militant materialism in the joint work of combating philosophical reaction and the philosophical prejudices of so-called educated society. Dietzgen senior[69]—not to be confused with his writer son, who was as pretentious as he was unsuccessful—correctly, aptly and clearly expressed the fundamental Marxist view of the philosophical trends which prevail in bourgeois countries and enjoy the regard of their scientists and publicists, when he said that in effect the professors of philosophy in modern society are in the majority of cases nothing but "graduated flunkeys of clericalism".

Our Russian intellectuals, who, like their brethren in all other countries, are fond of thinking themselves advanced, are very much averse to shifting the question to the level of the opinion expressed in Dietzgen's words. But they are averse to it because they cannot look the truth in the face. One has only to give a little thought to the governmental and also the general economic, social and every other kind of dependence of modern educated people on the ruling bourgeoisie to realise that Dietzgen's scathing description was absolutely true. One has only to recall the vast majority of the fashionable philosophical trends that arise so frequently in European countries, beginning for example with those connected with the discovery of radium and ending with those which are now seeking to clutch at the skirts of Einstein, to gain an idea of the connection between the class interests and the class position

of the bourgeoisie and its support of all forms of religion on the one hand, and the ideological content of the fashionable philosophical trends on the other.

It will be seen from the above that a journal that sets out to be a militant materialist organ must be primarily a militant organ, in the sense of unflinchingly exposing and indicting all modern "graduated flunkeys of clericalism", irrespective of whether they act as representatives of official science or as free lances calling themselves "democratic Left or ideologically socialist" publicists.

In the second place, such a journal must be a militant atheist organ. We have departments, or at least state institutions, which are in charge of this work. But the work is being carried on with extreme apathy and very unsatisfactorily, and is apparently suffering from the general conditions of our truly Russian (even though Soviet) bureaucratic ways. It is therefore highly essential that in addition to the work of these state institutions, and in order to improve and infuse life into that work, a journal which sets out to propagandise militant materialism must carry on untiring atheist propaganda and an untiring atheist fight. The literature on the subject in all languages should be carefully followed and everything at all valuable in this sphere should be translated, or at least reviewed.

Engels long ago advised the contemporary leaders of the proletariat to translate the militant atheist literature of the late eighteenth century[70] for mass distribution among the people. We have not done this up to the present, to our shame be it said (this is one of the numerous proofs that it is much easier to seize power in a revolutionary epoch than to know how to use this power properly). Our apathy, inactivity and incompetence are sometimes excused on all sorts of "lofty" grounds, as, for example, that the old atheist literature of the eighteenth century is antiquated, unscientific, naïve, etc. There is nothing worse than such pseudo-scientific sophistry, which serves as a screen either for pedantry or for a complete misunderstanding of Marxism. There is, of course, much that is unscientific and naïve in the atheist writings of the eighteenth-century revolutionaries. But nobody prevents the publishers of these writings from abridging them and providing

them with brief postscripts pointing out the progress made by mankind in the scientific criticism of religions since the end of the eighteenth century, mentioning the latest writings on the subject, and so forth. It would be the biggest and most grievous mistake a Marxist could make to think that the millions of the people (especially the peasants and artisans), who have been condemned by all modern society to darkness, ignorance and superstition, can extricate themselves from this darkness only along the straight line of a purely Marxist education. These masses should be supplied with the most varied atheist propaganda material, they should be made familiar with facts from the most diverse spheres of life, they should be approached in every possible way, so as to interest them, rouse them from their religious torpor, stir them from the most varied angles and by the most varied methods, and so forth.

The keen, vivacious and talented writings of the old eighteenth-century atheists wittily and openly attacked the prevailing clericalism and will very often prove a thousand times more suitable for arousing people from their religious torpor than the dull and dry paraphrases of Marxism, almost completely unillustrated by skilfully selected facts, which predominate in our literature and which (it is no use hiding the fact) frequently distort Marxism. We have translations of all the major works of Marx and Engels. There are absolutely no grounds for fearing that the old atheism and old materialism will remain unsupplemented by the corrections introduced by Marx and Engels. The most important thing—and it is this that is most frequently overlooked by those of our Communists who are supposedly Marxists, but who in fact mutilate Marxism—is to know how to awaken in the still undeveloped masses an intelligent attitude towards religious questions and an intelligent criticism of religions.

On the other hand, take a glance at modern scientific critics of religion. These educated bourgeois writers almost invariably "supplement" their own refutations of religious superstitions with arguments which immediately expose them as ideological slaves of the bourgeoisie, as "graduated flunkeys of clericalism".

Two examples. Professor R. Y. Wipper published in 1918 a little book entitled *Vozniknovenie Khristianstva* (The Origin of Christianity—Pharos Publishing House, Moscow). In his account of the principal results of modern science, the author not only refrains from combating the superstitions and deception which are the weapons of the church as a political organisation, not only evades these questions, but makes the simply ridiculous and most reactionary claim that he is above both "extremes"—the idealist and the materialist. This is toadying to the ruling bourgeoisie, which all over the world devotes to the support of religion hundreds of millions of rubles from the profits squeezed out of the working people.

The well-known German scientist, Arthur Drews, while refuting religious superstitions and fables in his book, *Die Christusmythe* (The Christ Myth), and while showing that Christ never existed, at the end of the book declares in favour of religion, albeit a renovated, purified and more subtle religion, one that would be capable of withstanding "the daily growing naturalist torrent" (fourth German edition, 1910, p. 238). Here we have an outspoken and deliberate reactionary, who is openly helping the exploiters to replace the old, decayed religious superstitions by new, more odious and vile superstitions.

This does not mean that Drews should not be translated. It means that while in a certain measure effecting an alliance with the progressive section of the bourgeoisie, Communists and all consistent materialists should unflinchingly expose that section when it is guilty of reaction. It means that to shun an alliance with the representatives of the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century, i.e., the period when it was revolutionary, would be to betray Marxism and materialism; for an "alliance" with the Drewses, in one form or another and in one degree or another, is essential for our struggle against the predominating religious obscurantists.

Pod Znamenem Marksizma, which sets out to be an organ of militant materialism, should devote much of its space to atheist propaganda, to reviews of the literature on the subject and to correcting the immense shortcomings of our governmental work in this field. It is particularly

important to utilise books and pamphlets which contain many concrete facts and comparisons showing how the class interests and class organisations of the modern bourgeoisie are connected with the organisations of religious institutions and religious propaganda.

All material relating to the United States of America, where the official, state connection between religion and capital is less manifest, is extremely important. But, on the other hand, it becomes all the clearer to us that so-called modern democracy (which the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, partly also the anarchists, etc., so unreasonably worship) is nothing but the freedom to preach whatever is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, to preach, namely, the most reactionary ideas, religion, obscurantism, defence of the exploiters, etc.

One would like to hope that a journal which sets out to be a militant materialist organ will provide our reading public with reviews of atheist literature, showing for which circle of readers any particular writing might be suitable and in what respect, and mentioning what literature has been published in our country (only decent translations should be given notice, and they are not so many), and what is still to be published.

In addition to the alliance with consistent materialists who do not belong to the Communist Party, of no less and perhaps even of more importance for the work which militant materialism should perform is an alliance with those modern natural scientists who incline towards materialism and are not afraid to defend and preach it as against the modish philosophical wanderings into idealism and scepticism which are prevalent in so-called educated society.

The article by A. Timiryazev on Einstein's theory of relativity published in *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* No. 1-2 permits us to hope that the journal will succeed in effecting this second alliance too. Greater attention should be paid to it. It should be remembered that the sharp upheaval which modern natural science is undergoing very often gives rise to reactionary philosophical schools and minor schools, trends and minor trends. Unless, there-

fore, the problems raised by the recent revolution in natural science are followed, and unless natural scientists are enlisted in the work of a philosophical journal, militant materialism can be neither militant nor materialism. Timiryazev was obliged to observe in the first issue of the journal that the theory of Einstein, who, according to Timiryazev, is himself not making any active attack on the foundations of materialism, has already been seized upon by a vast number of bourgeois intellectuals of all countries; it should be noted that this applies not only to Einstein, but to a number, if not to the majority, of the great reformers of natural science since the end of the nineteenth century.

For our attitude towards this phenomenon to be a politically conscious one, it must be realised that no natural science and no materialism can hold its own in the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois world outlook unless it stands on solid philosophical ground. In order to hold his own in this struggle and carry it to a victorious finish, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious adherent of the materialism represented by Marx, i.e., he must be a dialectical materialist. In order to attain this aim, the contributors to *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* must arrange for the systematic study of Hegelian dialectics from a materialist standpoint, i.e., the dialectics which Marx applied practically in his *Capital* and in his historical and political works, and applied so successfully that now every day of the awakening to life and struggle of new classes in the East (Japan, India, and China)—i.e., the hundreds of millions of human beings who form the greater part of the world population and whose historical passivity and historical torpor have hitherto conditioned the stagnation and decay of many advanced European countries—every day of the awakening to life of new peoples and new classes serves as a fresh confirmation of Marxism.

Of course, this study, this interpretation, this propaganda of Hegelian dialectics is extremely difficult, and the first experiments in this direction will undoubtedly be accompanied by errors. But only he who never does anything never makes mistakes. Taking as our basis Marx's

method of applying materialistically conceived Hegelian dialectics, we can and should elaborate this dialectics from all aspects, print in the journal excerpts from Hegel's principal works, interpret them materialistically and comment on them with the help of examples of the way Marx applied dialectics, as well as of examples of dialectics in the sphere of economic and political relations, which recent history, especially modern imperialist war and revolution, provides in unusual abundance. In my opinion, the editors and contributors of *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* should be a kind of "Society of Materialist Friends of Hegelian Dialectics". Modern natural scientists (if they know how to seek, and if we learn to help them) will find in the Hegelian dialectics, materialistically interpreted, a series of answers to the philosophical problems which are being raised by the revolution in natural science and which make the intellectual admirers of bourgeois fashion "stumble" into reaction.

Unless it sets itself such a task and systematically fulfils it, materialism cannot be militant materialism. It will be not so much the fighter as the fought,[71] to use an expression of Shchedrin's. Without this, eminent natural scientists will as often as hitherto be helpless in making their philosophical deductions and generalisations. For natural science is progressing so fast and is undergoing such a profound revolutionary upheaval in all spheres that it cannot possibly dispense with philosophical deductions.

In conclusion, I will cite an example which has nothing to do with philosophy, but does at any rate concern social questions, to which *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* also desires to devote attention.

It is an example of the way in which modern pseudoscience actually serves as a vehicle for the grossest and most infamous reactionary views.

I was recently sent a copy of *Ekonomist* No. 1 (1922), published by the Eleventh Department of the Russian Technical Society.[72] The young Communist who sent me this journal (he probably had no time to read it) rashly expressed considerable agreement with it. In reality the journal is—I do not know to what extent deliberately—

an organ of the modern feudalists, disguised of course under a cloak of science, democracy and so forth.

A certain Mr. P. A. Sorokin publishes in this journal an extensive, so-called "sociological", inquiry on "The Influence of the War". This learned article abounds in learned references to the "sociological" works of the author and his numerous teachers and colleagues abroad. Here is an example of his learning.

On page 83, I read:

> "For every 10,000 marriages in Petrograd there are now 92.2 divorces—a fantastic figure. Of every 100 annulled marriages, 51.1 had lasted less than one year, 11 per cent less than one month, 22 per cent less than two months, 41 per cent less than three to six months and only 26 per cent over six months. These figures show that modern legal marriage is a form which conceals what is in effect extra-marital sexual intercourse, enabling lovers of 'strawberries' to satisfy their appetites in a 'legal' way" (*Ekonomist* No. 1, p. 83).

Both this gentleman and the Russian Technical Society, which publishes this journal and gives space to this kind of talk, no doubt regard themselves as adherents of democracy and would consider it a great insult to be called what they are in fact, namely, feudalists, reactionaries, "graduated flunkeys of clericalism".

Even the slightest acquaintance with the legislation of bourgeois countries on marriage, divorce and illegitimate children, and with the actual state of affairs in this field, is enough to show anyone interested in the subject that modern bourgeois democracy, even in all the most democratic bourgeois republics, exhibits a truly feudal attitude in this respect towards women and towards children born out of wedlock.

This, of course, does not prevent the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, a part of the anarchists and all the corresponding parties in the West from shouting about democracy and how it is being violated by the Bolsheviks. But as a matter of fact the Bolshevik revolution is the only consistently democratic revolution in respect to such questions as marriage, divorce and the position of children born out of wedlock. And this is a question which most directly affects the interests of more than half the population of any country. Although a large number of

bourgeois revolutions preceded it and called themselves democratic, the Bolshevik revolution was the first and only revolution to wage a resolute struggle in this respect both against reaction and feudalism and against the usual hypocrisy of the ruling and propertied classes.

If 92 divorces for every 10,000 marriages seem to Mr. Sorokin a fantastic figure, one can only suppose that either the author lived and was brought up in a monastery so entirely walled off from life that hardly anyone will believe such a monastery ever existed, or that he is distorting the truth in the interest of reaction and the bourgeoisie. Anybody in the least acquainted with social conditions in bourgeois countries knows that the real number of actual divorces (of course, not sanctioned by church and law) is everywhere immeasurably greater. The only difference between Russia and other countries in this respect is that our laws do not sanctify hypocrisy and the debasement of the woman and her child, but openly and in the name of the government declare systematic war on all hypocrisy and all debasement.

The Marxist journal will have to wage war also on these modern "educated" feudalists. Not a few of them, very likely, are in receipt of government money and are employed by our government to educate our youth, although they are no more fitted for this than notorious perverts are fitted for the post of superintendents of educational establishments for the young.

The working class of Russia proved able to win power; but it has not yet learned to utilise it, for otherwise it would have long ago very politely dispatched such teachers and members of learned societies to countries with a bourgeois "democracy". That is the proper place for such feudalists.

But it will learn, given the will to learn.

March 12, 1922

Pod Znamenem Marksizma No. 3,
March 1922
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pod Znamenem*
Marksizma text

TO COMRADE MOLOTOV
FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU

RE COMRADE PREOBRAZHENSKY'S THESES[73]

1. The heading will not do. These are not "fundamental principles", which have already been laid down by our Programme, but theses on "The Organisation of the Russian Communist Party's Work in the Rural Districts Under Present Conditions".

I propose that the author be instructed to *shorten* and partly alter the theses in conformity with this new subject. In particular, he should shorten the recapitulation of general principles (these should be given in a leaflet explaining and commenting on the decision to be adopted by the Congress) and enlarge in greater detail on the *practical* and, particularly, the *organisational* conclusions.

2. In the heading of §I: "social relations" instead of the singular.

(The typing is careless: "obyedineniya" instead of "*obedneniya*", "besploshchadnykh" instead of "bezloshadnykh"....)*

3. In §I, particularly, many of the passages are far too long; much of this should be transferred to a pamphlet.

4. Statements about "co-operation" in §I, and in other places, are bare and abstract. Too much has been said about this, and we are sick of it. It must be formulated quite differently, without repeating the bare slogan: "Co-operate!" but *showing concretely* what *practical experience*

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* i.e., "amalgamation" instead of "impoverishment"; "plotless" instead of horseless.—*Ed.*

has already been acquired in the field of co-operation, and *how* it can be promoted. If the author lacks this material, then the decision of the Congress must contain a *demand* that it be collected and analysed not academically, but practically. (All Comrade Preobrazhensky's theses are ultra- and super-academic; they smack of the intelligentsia, the study circle and the littérateur, and not of practical state and economic activity.)

5. "With the exception of collective farms" we have no development, but a "tendency to decline" (among the poor peasants). This will not do. In the first place, there is no proof that the "collectives" are, in general, better. We must not irritate the peasants with false communist self-adulation. In the second place, not "tendency to decline" but retarded development *everywhere*; decline—*often*.

6. The "good husbandmen" are "*carried away*" by "the task of improving farming methods". This is a clumsy expression and, unfortunately, is also a piece of "communist self-adulation". It should read: "are beginning, although slowly" (§ I).

7. "Peasant (?) equality is dissolving" (?). You cannot say a thing like that.

The end of § I is no good at all; it is an article, not a thesis; an assumption unsupported by facts.

8. The beginning of § II is far too abstruse. Properly speaking, it has no business to be in these theses. It is quite out of context.

9. The second sentence in § II (levelled against the "methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees"[74]) is pernicious and wrong, because war, for example, may compel us to resort to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees.

This must be said quite differently; in this way, for example: in view of the supreme importance of reviving agriculture and increasing the output of farm produce, the proletariat's policy towards the kulaks and well-to-do peasantry must, at present, mainly pursue the object of *curbing* their exploiting appetites, etc.

The whole point is: How can and should our state curb these appetites and protect the poor peasants? This must be studied, and we must compel people to study it practically; general phrases are *useless*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

10. The last words in § II are correct, but they are abstruse and insufficiently enlarged upon. This must be explained in greater detail.

11. In § III the sentence starting with "The divorcement" is badly distorted.

12. Strictly speaking, the whole of § III teems with commonplaces. This is no use. To repeat them so emptily is harmful; it causes nausea, ennui and irritation at the useless chewing over of phrases.

Instead of irritating the peasants by this *foolish communistic playing at co-operation* it would be far better to take at least one *uyezd* and show by a *practical* analysis how "co-operation" can be promoted; to show how we have *actually* helped to improve farming methods, etc., how we ought to help, etc.

This is not the right approach to the subject. It is a harmful approach. The general phrases are nauseating. They *breed* bureaucracy and encourage it.

13. The beginning of § IV is particularly unhappy. It is an abstruse article and not a thesis for a congress.

Further. "Instructions in the form of decrees" is what the author proposes. It is radically wrong. Bureaucracy is throttling us precisely because we are still playing with "instructions in the form of decrees". The author could not have invented anything worse or more pernicious than this.

Further. To say at a congress of the Russian Communist Party that "we must put into effect the decisions of the Ninth Congress of Soviets" is positively scandalous. To write theses for that!

This whole section is bad. Commonplaces. Phrases. Pious wishes that everybody is sick of. It is typical of *contemporary* "communist bureaucracy".

Instead of that it would be far better to take the practical experience even of one uyezd—even of one volost—and examine the facts not academically, but in a *practical* way and say: Learn, dear communist bureaucrats, *not to do things like this* (give concrete examples, the names of places and definite facts) but *like that* (also giving the concrete facts).

As regards "co-operation", this defect in the theses is particularly striking and particularly harmful in § IV.

14. In § V the "workers employed on the state farms" are declared to be the "cadres of the agricultural proletariat". That is wrong. It is an example of "communist conceit". Far more often they are *not* proletarians but "paupers", petty bourgeois, or what you will. We must not delude ourselves with lies. That is harmful. It is the main source of our bureaucracy. And it *quite unnecessarily* irritates and offends the peasants. It would be far wiser for the time being to keep silent about the "cadres of the agricultural proletariat" employed on our state farms.

Further on it is quite rightly stated that it is "very difficult" to organise this "proletariat" ("which is of a very heterogeneous composition": quite right! And therefore more like ... something indecent, but not "cadres").

Quite true! And therefore one should not say such things as "the staffs of the state farms must be purged of the petty proprietor elements", for this will only excite *ridicule* and legitimately so (it sounds like: purging the peasants' huts of bad air).

Far better say nothing about it.

15. § VI begins (at last!) to approach practical tasks. But this approach is so feeble and backed by so little practical experience that one is inevitably driven to the conclusion that (in place of the proposal made above, in § I):

the theses are unsuitable;

the author plus Osinsky plus Teodorovich plus Yakovenko should be instructed to make arrangements at the Congress for a conference of delegates who are working in the rural districts;

the object of this conference should not be to discuss "principles", etc., but solely to *study and appraise practical experience of*:

how to organise co-operatives?

how to combat the bad organisation of state farms? the bad organisation of co-operatives and collective farms?

how to strengthen the All-Russia Trade

Union of Land and Forestry Workers? (send the author to work there for a *long* period).

The Central Committee should instruct this conference not to repeat generalities, but solely to study in detail local (uyezd, volost, village) *practical* experience. If there is not enough information about this experience (as is probably the case, because nobody has taken the trouble to collect it; but there is a lot of uncollected information), then it would be better for the Congress:

(a) to elect a commission to study this practical experience;

(b) the commission to be subordinate to the Central Committee;

(c) to include Comrade Preobrazhensky in this commission;

(d) to include him also in the All-Russia Trade Union of Land and Forestry Workers....

(e) to instruct the commission to collect information on the experience acquired, to study it and draft (after publishing a series of articles)

a *letter on behalf of the* (new) *Central Committee* on the organisation of work in the rural districts in which the most concrete directions must be given on *how* to organise co-operatives, *how* to "curb" the kulaks, while not checking the growth of the productive forces, *how* to run the All-Russia Trade Union of Land and Forestry Workers, *how* to strengthen it, etc., etc.

The Central Committee's resolution for the Congress should be drafted on the following lines (approximately):

The facts show, and the special commission of the Congress confirms it, that the main defect in the Party's work in the rural districts is the failure to study practical experience. This is the root of all evil, and the root of bureaucracy. The Congress instructs the Central Committee, first and foremost, to combat this—among other things, with the aid of such-and-such a commission, one (or two, or three)

of the members of which should be sent for *permanent* work in the All-Russia Trade Union of Land and Forestry Workers.

The commission should publish leaflets and pamphlets, and systematically study experience so as to be able to advise and to order how the work should and should not be done.

Lenin

March 16, 1922

First published in 1925

Published according to the manuscript

MEMO TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV WITH THE DRAFT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO E. VANDERVELDE[75]

To Comrade Zinoviev
Copy to Comrade Kamenev
to Comrade Molotov

I have just spoken to Kamenev and we have arranged that late tonight you will reply to Vandervelde that you have delivered his telegram to the Soviet Government. Comrade Kursky, the People's Commissar of Justice, will send him a reply tomorrow on behalf of the Soviet Government.

I propose that the text of the reply be discussed in the Political Bureau and, for my part, suggest the following text:

"No member of the Soviet Government in Russia has ever doubted that representatives of the Second International always steadfastly pursued the policy likewise followed with some vacillation by representatives of the Viennese Socialist Association.[76] They were the ones who pursued the policy of forming a direct and indirect alliance with those exploiter classes that have in all countries persecuted and killed Communists, examples of which are particularly numerous and striking in the democratic republic of Germany. The confidence in the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that certain political circles in Western Europe are showing may be explained only by this alliance and political closeness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who, in effect, supported the invasion of Russia by Kolchak, Denikin and

others. As a matter of fact, far from a sentence having been passed in the case of the Socialist-Revolutionaries you write about, there has not even been a trial and they have not yet been indicted. In any case, I consider it my duty to add that the Soviet Government did not turn down practical proposals like the proposal to exchange prisoners of war or to free various categories of war prisoners, when proposals of that kind came from Denikin's government during his direct invasion of Soviet Russia with the objective of restoring the rule of the landowners.

"Kursky,
"People's Commissar of Justice."
V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars

Dictated by telephone
on March 17, 1922

Published in full for the first
time according to the steno-
grapher's notes (typewritten copy)

PREFACE TO I. I. STEPANOV'S *THE ELECTRIFICATION OF THE R.S.F.S.R. AND THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE OF WORLD ECONOMY*

I heartily recommend this book by Comrade Stepanov to all Communists.

The author has succeeded in giving a very able exposition of exceedingly difficult and important problems. He did very well in not writing a book for intellectuals (as is the practice among many of us who copy the worst manners of bourgeois writers), but for the working people, for the masses, for rank-and-file workers and peasants. To his book the author has appended a list of references for supplementary reading for the benefit of those who may find it difficult to understand some parts of it without further explanation, as well as for the benefit of those who would like to consult the principal works on this subject published in Russia and abroad. Special reference must be made to the beginning of Chapter VI, where the author splendidly outlines the significance of the New Economic Policy, and magnificently answers the "airy" scepticism that is displayed in some quarters about the possibility of electrification. This scepticism is usually a cloak to conceal the absence of serious thought on the subject (that is, if it is not a cloak to conceal whiteguard, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik hostility to all Soviet construction, which, in fact, is sometimes the case).

What we lack most for genuine (and not idle-bureaucratic) popular education is precisely "school manuals" (for absolutely all schools) like this one. If all our Marxist writers sat down to write such manuals, or textbooks, on all social questions without exception, instead of wasting their efforts on newspaper and magazine political

fireworks, which everybody is sick and tired of, we should not have the present disgraceful situation where, nearly five years after the proletariat captured political power, the young people in the *proletariat's* state schools and universities are taught (or rather, corrupted) by the old bourgeois scientists using the old bourgeois junk.

The Eighth Congress of Soviets decreed that instruction on the Plan for Electrification should be compulsory in all educational establishments in the R.S.F.S.R.[77] without exception. This decree, like many others, has remained a dead letter because of our (Bolsheviks') lack of culture. Now that Comrade Stepanov's "manual for schools" has been published we must see to it—and we shall see to it!—that every uyezd library (and later every volost library) obtains several copies of it and that every electric power station in Russia (there are over 800 of them) not only has copies of this book but also arranges popular lectures on electricity, on the electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. and on engineering in general. We must see to it that every village schoolteacher reads and assimilates this manual (to help him in this a circle or group of engineers and teachers of physics should be organised in every uyezd), and not only reads, understands and assimilates it himself but is able to relate what is in it in a plain and intelligible way to his pupils, and to young peasants in general.

It will require no little effort to do this. We are poor and uneducated. But that does not matter so long as our people realise that they must learn, and so long as they are willing to learn; so long as the workers and peasants clearly understand that they must now learn not to "benefit" and produce profits for the landowners and capitalists, but to improve *their own* conditions of life.

This knowledge and desire exist. And so we definitely shall start learning, and shall certainly learn something.

N. Lenin

March 18, 1922

Pravda No. 64,
March 21, 1922

Published according to the text in I. Stepanov's *The Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Transitional Phase of World Economy*, Moscow, 1922, checked with the manuscript

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE

March 21, 1922

I have had a talk with Tsyurupa and Rykov. I hope the work will proceed smoothly. Incidentally, one of the questions concerns your Commissariat.[78] Tsyurupa's and Rykov's main job is (must be now) to verify fulfilment and select personnel.

Assistants are needed. The Executive Secretary's staff at the Council of People's Commissars is much too small to handle the work, but it would be irrational to enlarge it. I expressed the idea that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be used for the purpose (of directly helping Tsyurupa and Rykov verify fulfilment and supervise the *lower echelons* of the People's Commissariats). I should like to know if you approve of this; if you do, a written agreement is necessary between you and the deputies, and I should like to participate in drawing up that agreement.

The purpose is to train (by having them tested by you and the two deputies on *practical* assignments) specially and unquestionably reliable people, from among the best workers of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, whom Tsyurupa and Rykov select by agreement with you, who would be able quickly and unconditionally a) to *secure* fulfilment; b) to verify fulfilment; c) to check the correctness of the *apparatus* in the various People's Commissariats departments, the Moscow Soviet or the Petrograd Soviet, etc.; d) to issue instructions on *how* the work should be organised.

These people are to carry on their work in such a way as to *personally* report on the course and results of it to the deputies and you. They must be selected *very* gradually so that only after repeated tests they are made, so to say, inspectors and instructors "with special authority"; their number must be *gradually* brought up to several dozen. In their turn, they will (*actually*) enlist non-Party workers and peasants into the work of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

If you approve of the above, send a copy of this to Tsyurupa and Rykov with your postscript. If you have objections, write me a note (and telephone) immediately. I should like to speak of this in the report to the Congress.

Lenin

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FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF *BEDNOTA*[79]

My congratulations to the Editorial Board of *Bednota* on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of their newspaper.

For four years the paper has worked honourably and successfully to serve the interests of the working peasantry. The war that was forced upon the people by the capitalists and landowners ruined Russia to such an extent that our working peasantry still remain poor. The working people of Russia have still a lot of real hard work to do to overcome the starvation and poverty, the want and ruin that prevail as a consequence of the war.

But the peasants and workers of Russia will get down to this hard work and finish it, come what may. In this effort the workers and peasants will be inspired by the knowledge that they will be working for their own benefit, to improve their own conditions of life, and not for the enrichment of landowners and capitalists.

Soviet power has given us the alliance of workers and peasants. Therein lies its strength. Therein lies the guarantee of our successes and of our ultimate victory.

This alliance gave us victory over Kolchak and Denikin, who, with the aid of foreign troops sent here by the capitalists, had tried to restore the rule of the landowners in Russia.

Now the foreign capitalists are compelled to conclude trade agreements with Soviet Russia. These agreements will help us to get the agricultural implements, machines and other goods that we need for the restoration of our ruined peasant farms.

We are now experiencing a most difficult spring following a year of famine. But we shall not be downhearted.

Great as the hardships of the workers and peasants may be, we have now won the right and the opportunity to work for our own benefit and not for the benefit of the landowners. And we shall restore and improve our ruined economy.

N. Lenin

March 23, 1922

Bednota No. 1183,
March 26, 1922

Published according to
the manuscript

LETTER TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH THE PLAN OF THE POLITICAL REPORT FOR THE ELEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS[80]

March 23, 1922

Comrade Molotov,

Please will you convey to the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee:

1. My request to be excused from attending the Plenary Meeting on account of ill health (I shall not be able to manage both the sittings of the Plenary Meeting and the report at the Congress).

2. If my presence at the Plenary Meeting is necessary to explain the following plan of the report, I shall certainly come, and could arrive within two or three hours of being summoned.

3. Plan of the Political Report of the Central Committee that I propose to deliver at the Congress:

> In the main repeat and in several points enlarge on what I said in my speech at the Metalworkers' Congress on March 6, 1922. Very briefly about Genoa. At somewhat greater length about *NEP* and the concept of "state capitalism".
>
> Checking the (economic) retreat and the task of regrouping our forces. The warning given us by the bourgeoisie as expressed by the *Smena Vekh* writer Ustryalov, who said that *NEP* was not the "tactics" but the "evolution" of Bolshevism.

What we lack most is culture, administrative ability. Illustrate this by a few examples. Economically and politically *NEP* makes it fully possible for us to lay the foundations of socialist economy. It is "only" a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard.

What our revolution has won irrevocably and what still remains undone.

The possibility of intervention. The danger of a financial crisis. Take advantage of the "respite": concentrate on choosing men and on executive control.

The gulf between the magnitude of the tasks already undertaken and our material and cultural poverty.

Supplementary to the report, deal with the functions of the two Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence; refer to my correspondence on this subject with A. D. Tsyurupa beginning from the end of January 1922; to the regulations we three (plus Rykov) are now drafting on the reorganisation of this work and the need for the maximum verification of fulfilment.

Relieve the Council of People's Commissars of minor matters; demarcate its functions more precisely from those of the Council of Labour and Defence and of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.[81] Enhance the prestige of the Council of People's Commissars by enlisting the co-operation of leading comrades, the People's Commissars, and not only the Deputy Commissars.

In this connection and in conformity with Comrade Kalinin's repeated verbal statements and Comrade Yenukidze's written communication enclosed herewith, the Central Committee should recommend that the Congress approve the plan outlined above and the convocation of

the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for longer sessions than usual for the purpose of discussing the main questions of legislation and for a systematic review of the work of the People's Commissariats and of the Council of People's Commissars.

Lastly, it is necessary to delimit much more precisely the functions of the Party (and of its Central Committee) from those of the Soviet government; to increase the responsibility and independence of Soviet officials and of Soviet government institutions, leaving to the Party the general guidance of the activities of all state bodies, without the present, too frequent, irregular and often petty interference.

Draw up an appropriate resolution for endorsement by the Party Congress.

4. I request that the Central Committee Plenary Meeting appoint a supplementary rapporteur on behalf of the C.C., for my report will be too general. Moreover, I am not quite certain that I shall be able to deliver it. But the main thing is that I am months behind the current work of the Political Bureau.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

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Published according to the manuscript

THE CONDITIONS FOR ADMITTING NEW MEMBERS TO THE PARTY

LETTERS TO V. M. MOLOTOV

1

Comrade Molotov,

I request that the following proposal be submitted to the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee.

I consider it extremely important to lengthen the probation period for new members of the Party. Zinoviev proposes that the probation period should be six months for workers and twelve months for other categories. I propose a period of six months only for those workers who have actually been employed in large industrial enterprises for not less than ten years. A probation period of eighteen months should be established for all other workers, two years for peasants and Red Army men, and three years for other categories. Exceptions are to be permitted in special cases with the joint consent of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.

I think it will be extremely dangerous to accept the short periods of probation proposed by Zinoviev. There is no doubt that we constantly regard as workers people who have not had the slightest real experience of large-scale industry. There has been case after case of petty bourgeois, who have become workers by chance and only for a very short time, being classed as workers. All shrewd white-guards are very definitely banking on the fact that the alleged proletarian character of our Party does not in the least safeguard it against the small-proprietor elements gaining predominance in it, and very rapidly, too. In view

of the lackadaisical and unsystematic methods that prevail in our ranks, short probation periods will actually mean that no real test will be made to ascertain whether the applicants are really more or less tried Communists. If we have 300,000 to 400,000 members in the Party, even that number is excessive, for literally everything goes to show that the level of training of the present Party membership is inadequate. That is why I strongly insist on longer probation periods, and on instructing the Organising Bureau to draw up and strictly apply rules that will really make the period of probation a serious test and not an empty formality.

I think that this question should be discussed at the Congress with special care.

Lenin

March 24, 1922

2

Comrade Molotov,

Please give this to be read to all the members of the Central Committee before the question of the conditions for admitting new members to the Party is brought up at the Congress.

Having read the decision of the Plenary Meeting of March 25 on the question of the probation periods for new Party members, I should like to challenge this decision at the Congress. I am afraid, however, that I shall not be able to speak at the Congress, and so I request that my opinion be read.

There is no doubt that judged by the bulk of its present membership our Party is not proletarian enough. I do not think anybody can challenge this, and a mere glance at the statistics will bear it out. Since the war, the industrial workers of Russia have become much less proletarian than they were before, because during the war all those who desired to evade military service went into the factories. This is common knowledge. On the other hand, it is equally undoubted that, taken as a whole (if we take the level of the overwhelming majority of Party members), our Party is less politically trained than is necessary for real proletarian leadership in the present difficult situation, especially in view of the tremendous preponderance of the peasantry, which is rapidly awakening to independent class politics. Further, it must be borne in mind that the temptation to join the ruling party at the present time is very great. It is sufficient to recall all the literary productions of the *Smena Vekh* writers to see that the types who have been carried away by the political successes of the Bolsheviks are very remote from everything proletarian.

If the Genoa Conference results in further political successes for us, there will be a big increase in the efforts of petty-bourgeois elements, and of elements positively hostile to all that is proletarian, to penetrate into the Party. Six months' probation for workers will not diminish this pressure in the least, for it is the easiest thing in the world for anyone to qualify for this short probation period by fraudulent means, the more so that it is not in the least difficult under present conditions for very many intellectual and semi-intellectual elements to join the ranks of the workers. From all this I draw the conclusion that we must establish much longer probation periods and this opinion is strengthened by the fact that the whiteguards are definitely banking on the non-proletarian composition of our Party membership. If we agree to a six months' period for workers, we must without fail, in order not to deceive ourselves and others, define the term "worker" in such a way as to include only those who have acquired a proletarian mentality from their very conditions of life. But this is impossible unless the persons concerned have worked in a factory for many years—not from ulterior motives, but because of the general conditions of their economic and social life.

If we do not close our eyes to reality we must admit that at the present time the proletarian policy of the Party is not determined by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party. A slight conflict within this group will be enough, if not to destroy this prestige, at all events to weaken the group to such a degree as to rob it of its power to determine policy.

Hence, it is necessary: 1) to lengthen the probation period for all categories; 2) to define in great detail how the applicant is to pass the probation period; what concrete and practical tests should be applied to determine whether the probation period is really a period of probation and not a mere formality; 3) to create a qualified majority on the bodies which decide on the applications of new members; 4) to make it a rule that the decision to admit new members be endorsed, not only by the Gubernia Party Committees, but also by the Control Commissions; 5) to

devise other measures for the purpose of helping the Party to rid itself of those members who are by no means Communists consciously implementing a proletarian policy. I do not propose that a new general purging of the Party be undertaken, because I think at the moment it is impracticable; but I do think it is necessary to find some means of actually purging the Party, i.e., of reducing its membership. I am sure that if the necessary thought is given to the matter a number of suitable measures can be devised.

I would ask the members of the Central Committee who will read this to reply to me if possible, if only in a brief telephone message to one of the secretaries of the Council of People's Commissars.

Lenin

March 26, 1922

Dictated by telephone

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ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[82]

MARCH 27-APRIL 2, 1922

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Published according to the text in the book checked with the verbatim report; speech at the closing session published according to the manuscript

ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B.)[82]

MARCH 27-APRIL 2, 1922

Published in 1922 in Odinnadtsatyy syezd R.K.P.(B.), Stenograficheskiy otchet (Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik], Verbatim Report), Moscow, Publishing Department of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.

Published according to the text in the book checked with the verbatim report; speech at the closing session published according to the manuscript

1

SPEECH IN OPENING THE CONGRESS
MARCH 27

Comrades, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party I declare the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P. open.

Comrades, you have gathered in congress after a whole year, in the course of which we have, for the first time, been free from the intervention and invasion of capitalist countries, at all events, in their most direct form. This is the first year that we have had the opportunity of devoting our efforts to the real, main and fundamental tasks of socialist construction.

In this field we have undoubtedly taken only the first steps. But I am sure that if we soberly appraise what we have achieved and are not afraid to look facts—which are not always pleasant, and sometimes very unpleasant—straight in the face, we shall certainly overcome all the difficulties that only now are looming ahead of us in all their magnitude.

The disasters that befell us in the past year were, if anything, even more severe than those of the preceding years.

It seemed as if all the consequences of the imperialist war and of the war which the capitalists forced upon us had combined and hurled themselves upon us in the shape of famine and the most desperate ruin. These disasters have as yet been far from overcome; and none of us expects that they can be overcome soon.

But if we maintain and strengthen the unity of our Party, if we emerge from international difficulties as successfully as we have done up to now, if we concentrate all

our efforts on the tasks that now necessarily arise from present conditions, there can be no doubt that we shall overcome these difficulties.

All over the world the communist movement is growing, if not as fast as those of us who measured it by wartime and immediate post-war standards expected, at all events it is growing and is becoming sound, solid, broad and deep. And if we, in co-operation with the Communist Parties that now exist in all, or nearly all, countries, soberly assess our position and are not afraid to admit our mistakes, we shall victoriously emerge from all these difficulties.

2
POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) MARCH 27

(*Applause.*) Comrades, permit me to start the political report of the Central Committee from the end and not from the beginning of the year. The political question most discussed today is Genoa. But since a great deal has already been said on the subject in our press, and since I have already said what is most essential to it in my speech on March 6, which has been published, I would ask you to permit me to refrain from going into details unless you particularly wish me to do so.

On the whole you know everything about Genoa, because much has been written about it in the newspapers—in my opinion too much, to the detriment of the real, practical and urgent requirements of our work of construction in general, and of our economic development in particular. In Europe, in all bourgeois countries, of course, they like to occupy people's minds, or stuff their heads, with all sorts of trash about Genoa. On this occasion (I would say not only on this occasion) we are copying them, and copying them far too much.

I must say that in the Central Committee we have taken very great pains to appoint a delegation of our best diplomats (we now have a fair number of Soviet diplomats, which was not the case in the early period of the Soviet Republic). The Central Committee has drawn up sufficiently detailed instructions for our diplomats at the Genoa Conference; we spent a long time discussing these instruc-

tions and considered and reconsidered them several times. It goes without saying that the question here is, I shall not say of war, because that term is likely to be misunderstood, but at all events one of rivalry. In the bourgeois camp there is a very strong trend, much stronger than any other, that wants to wreck the Genoa Conference. There are trends which greatly favour the Genoa Conference and want it to meet at all costs. The latter have now gained the upper hand. Lastly, in all bourgeois countries there are trends which might be called pacifist trends, among which should be included the entire Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals. It is this section of the bourgeoisie which is advocating a number of pacifist proposals and is trying to concoct something in the nature of a pacifist policy. As Communists we have definite views about this pacifism which it would be superfluous to expound here. Needless to say, we are going to Genoa not as Communists, but as merchants. We must trade, and they must trade. We want the trade to benefit us; they want it to benefit them. The course of the issue will be determined, if only to a small degree, by the skill of our diplomats.

Insofar as we are going to Genoa as merchants it is obviously by no means a matter of indifference to us whether we shall deal with those people from the bourgeois camp who are inclined to settle the problem by war, or with those who are inclined towards pacifism, even the worst kind of pacifism, which from the communist viewpoint will not stand the slightest criticism. It would be a bad merchant, indeed, if he were unable to appreciate this distinction, and, by shaping his tactics accordingly, achieve practical aims.

We are going to Genoa for the practical purpose of expanding trade and of creating the most favourable conditions for its successful development on the widest scale. But we cannot guarantee the success of the Genoa Conference. It would be ridiculous and absurd to give any guarantees on that score. I must say, however, that, weighing up the present possibilities of Genoa in the most sober and cautious manner, I think that it will not be an exaggeration to say that we shall achieve our object.

Through Genoa, if the other parties in the negotiations

are sufficiently shrewd and not too stubborn; bypassing Genoa if they take it into their heads to be stubborn. But we shall achieve our goal!

The fact of the matter is that the most urgent, pressing and practical interests that have been sharply revealed in all the capitalist countries during the past few years call for the development, regulation and expansion of trade with Russia. Since such interests exist, we may argue, we may quarrel, we may disagree on specific combinations—it is highly probable that we shall have to disagree—this fundamental economic necessity will, nevertheless, after all is said and done, make a way for itself. I think we can rest assured of that I cannot vouch for the date; I cannot vouch for success; but at this gathering we can say with a fair amount of certainty that regular trade relations between the Soviet Republic and all the capitalist countries in the world are certain to continue developing. When I come to it in another part of my report I shall mention the hitches that may possibly occur; but I think that this is all that need be said on the question of Genoa.

Needless to say, the comrades who desire to study the question in greater detail and who are not content with the list of delegates published in the newspapers may set up a commission, or a section, and acquaint themselves with all the material of the Central Committee, and all the correspondence and instructions. Of course, the details we have outlined are provisional, for no one up to now knows exactly who will sit round the table at Genoa, and what terms, or preliminary terms or provisions will be announced. It would be highly inexpedient, and I think practically impossible, to discuss all this here. I repeat, this Congress, through the medium of a section, or a commission, has every opportunity to collect all the documents on this question—both the published documents and those in the possession of the Central Committee.

I shall not say any more, for I am sure that it is not here that our greatest difficulties lie. This is not the question on which the attention of the whole Party should be focussed. The European bourgeois press is artificially and deliberately inflating and exaggerating the importance of this Conference in order to deceive the masses of the

working people (as nine-tenths of the bourgeois press in all these free democratic countries and republics always does). We have succumbed to the influence of this press to some extent. As usual, our press still yields to the old bourgeois habits; it refuses to adopt new, socialist methods, and we have made a greater fuss about this subject than it deserves. In fact, for Communists, especially for those who have lived through such stern years as we have lived through since 1917, and witnessed the formidable political combinations that have appeared in that period, Genoa does not present any great difficulties. I cannot recall any disagreement or controversy on this question either in the Central Committee or in the ranks of the Party. This is natural, for there is nothing controversial here from the point of view of Communists, even bearing in mind the various shades of opinion among them. I repeat: we are going to Genoa as merchants for the purpose of securing the most favourable terms for promoting the trade which has started, which is being carried on, and which, even if someone succeeded in forcibly interrupting it for a time, would inevitably continue to develop after the interruption.

Hence, confining myself to these brief remarks about Genoa, I shall now proceed to deal with the issues which, in my opinion, have been the major political questions of the past year and which will be such in the ensuing year. It seems to me that the political report of the Central Committee should not merely deal with the events of the year under review, but also point out (that, at any rate, is what I usually do) the main, fundamental political lessons of the events of that year, so that we may learn something for the ensuing year and be in a position to correctly determine our policy for that year.

The New Economic Policy is, of course, the major question. This has been the dominant question throughout the year under review. If we have any important, serious and irrevocable gain to record for this year (and I am not so very sure that we have), it is that we have learnt something from the launching of this New Economic Policy. If we have learnt even a little, then, during the past year, we have learnt a great deal in this field. And the test of whether

we have really learnt anything, and to what extent, will probably be made by subsequent events of a kind which we ourselves can do little to determine, as for example the impending financial crisis. It seems to me that in connection with the New Economic Policy, the most important things to keep in mind as a basis for all our arguments, as a means of testing our experience during the past year, and of learning practical lessons for the ensuing year are contained in the following three points.

First, the New Economic Policy is important for us primarily as a means of testing whether we are really establishing a link with the peasant economy. In the preceding period of development of our revolution, when all our attention and all our efforts were concentrated mainly on, or almost entirely absorbed by, the task of repelling invasion, we could not devote the necessary attention to this link; we had other things to think about. To some extent we could and had to ignore this bond when we were confronted by the absolutely urgent and overshadowing task of warding off the danger of being immediately crushed by the gigantic forces of world imperialism.

The turn towards the New Economic Policy was decided on at the last Congress with exceptional unanimity, with even greater unanimity than other questions have been decided by our Party (which, it must be admitted, is generally distinguished for its unanimity). This unanimity showed that the need for a new approach to socialist economy had fully matured. People who differed on many questions, and who assessed the situation from different angles, unanimously and very quickly and unhesitantly agreed that we lacked a real approach to socialist economy, to the task of building its foundation; that the only means of finding this approach was the New Economic Policy. Owing to the course taken by the development of war events, by the development of political events, by the development of capitalism in the old, civilised West, and owing also to the social and political conditions that developed in the colonies, we were the first to make a breach in the old bourgeois world at a time when our country was economically, if not the most backward, at any rate one of the most backward countries in the world. The vast

majority of the peasants in our country are engaged in small individual farming. The items of our programme of building a communist society, that we could apply immediately, were to some extent outside the sphere of activity of the broad mass of the peasantry, upon whom we imposed very heavy obligations, which we justified on the grounds that war permitted no wavering in this matter. Taken as a whole, this was accepted as justification by the peasantry, notwithstanding the mistakes we could not avoid. On the whole, the mass of the peasantry realised and understood that the enormous burdens imposed upon them were necessary in order to save the workers' and peasants' rule from the landowners and prevent it from being strangled by capitalist invasion, which threatened to wrest away all the gains of the revolution. But there was no link between the peasant economy and the economy that was being built up in the nationalised, socialised factories and on state farms.

We saw this clearly at the last Party Congress. We saw it so clearly that there was no hesitation whatever in the Party on the question as to whether the New Economic Policy was inevitable or not.

It is amusing to read what is said about our decision in the numerous publications of the various Russian parties abroad. There are only trifling differences in the opinions they express. Living with memories of the past, they still continue to reiterate that to this day the Left Communists are opposed to the New Economic Policy. In 1921 they remembered what had occurred in 1918 and what our Left Communists themselves have forgotten; and they go on chewing this over and over again, assuring the world that these Bolsheviks are a sly and false lot, and that they are concealing from Europe that they have disagreements in their ranks. Reading this, one says to oneself, "Let them go on fooling themselves." If this is what they imagine is going on in this country, we can judge the degree of intelligence of these allegedly highly educated old fogies who have fled abroad. We know that there have been no disagreements in our ranks, and the reason for this is that the practical necessity of a different approach to the task of building the foundation of socialist economy was clear to all.

There was no link between the peasant economy and the new economy we tried to create. Does it exist now? Not yet. We are only approaching it. The whole significance of the New Economic Policy—which our press still often searches for everywhere except where it should search—the whole purpose of this policy is to find a way of establishing a link between the new economy, which we are creating with such enormous effort, and the peasant economy. That is what stands to our credit; without it we would not be communist revolutionaries.

We began to develop the new economy in an entirely new way, brushing aside everything old. Had we not begun to develop it we would have been utterly defeated in the very first months, in the very first years. But the fact that we began to develop this new economy with such splendid audacity does not mean that we must necessarily continue in the same way. Why should we? There is no reason.

From the very beginning we said that we had to undertake an entirely new task, and that unless we received speedy assistance from our comrades, the workers in the capitalistically more developed countries, we should encounter incredible difficulties and certainly make a number of mistakes. The main thing is to be able dispassionately to examine where such mistakes have been made and to start again from the beginning. If we begin from the beginning, not twice, but many times, it will show that we are not bound by prejudice, and that we are approaching our task, which is the greatest the world has ever seen, with a sober outlook.

Today, as far as the New Economic Policy is concerned the main thing is to assimilate the experience of the past year correctly. That must be done, and we want to do it. And if we want to do it, come what may (and we do want to do it, and shall do it!), we must know that the problem of the New Economic Policy, the fundamental, decisive and overriding problem, is to establish a link between the new economy that we have begun to create (very badly, very clumsily, but have nevertheless begun to create, on the basis of an entirely new, socialist economy, of a new system of production and distribution) and the peasant

economy, by which millions and millions of peasants obtain their livelihood.

This link has been lacking, and we must create it before anything else. Everything else must be subordinated to this. We have still to ascertain the extent to which the New Economic Policy has succeeded in creating this link without destroying what we have begun so clumsily to build.

We are developing our economy together with the peasantry. We shall have to alter it many times and organise it in such a way that it will provide a link between our socialist work on large-scale industry and agriculture and the work every peasant is doing as best he can, struggling out of poverty, without philosophising (for how can philosophising help him to extricate himself from his position and save him from the very real danger of a painful death from starvation?).

We must reveal this link so that we may see it clearly, so that all the people may see it, and so that the whole mass of the peasantry may see that there is a connection between their present severe, incredibly ruined, incredibly impoverished and painful existence and the work which is being done for the sake of remote socialist ideals. We must bring about a situation where the ordinary, rank-and-file working man realises that he has obtained some improvement, and that he has obtained it not in the way a few peasants obtained improvements under the rule of landowners and capitalists, when every improvement (undoubtedly there were improvements and very big ones) was accompanied by insult, derision and humiliation for the muzhik, by violence against the masses, which not a single peasant has forgotten, and which will not be forgotten in Russia for decades. Our aim is to restore the link, to prove to the peasant by deeds that we are beginning with what is intelligible, familiar and immediately accessible to him, in spite of his poverty, and not with something remote and fantastic from the peasant's point of view. We must prove that we can help him and that in this period, when the small peasant is in a state of appalling ruin, impoverishment and starvation, the Communists are really helping him. Either we prove that, or he will send us to the devil. That is absolutely inevitable.

Such is the significance of the New Economic Policy; it is the basis of our entire policy; it is the major lesson taught by the whole of the past year's experience in applying the New Economic Policy, and, so to speak, our main political rule for the coming year. The peasant is allowing us credit, and, of course, after what he has lived through, he cannot do otherwise. Taken in the mass, the peasants go on saying: "Well, if you are not able to do it yet, we shall wait; perhaps you will learn." But this credit cannot go on for ever.

This we must know; and having obtained credit we must hurry. We must know that the time is approaching when this peasant country will no longer give us credit, when it will demand cash, to use a commercial term. It will say: "You have postponed payment for so many months, so many years. But by this time, dear rulers, you must have learnt the most sound and reliable method of helping us free ourselves from poverty, want, starvation and ruin. You can do it, you have proved it." This is the test that we shall inevitably have to face; and, in the last analysis, this test will decide everything: the fate of NEP and the fate of communist rule in Russia.

Shall we accomplish our immediate task or not? Is this NEP fit for anything or not? If the retreat turns out to be correct tactics, we must link up with the peasant masses while we are in retreat, and subsequently march forward with them a hundred times more slowly, but firmly and unswervingly, in a way that will always make it apparent to them that we are really marching forward. Then our cause will be absolutely invincible, and no power on earth can vanquish us. We did not accomplish this in the first year. We must say this frankly. And I am profoundly convinced (and our New Economic Policy enables us to draw this conclusion quite definitely and firmly) that if we appreciate the enormous danger harboured by NEP and concentrate all our forces on its weak points, we shall solve this problem.

Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file working peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely more slowly than we expected, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually move forward

FROM MARX TO MAO
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with us. If we do that we shall in time progress much more quickly than we even dream of today. This, in my opinion, is the first fundamental political lesson of the New Economic Policy.

The second, more specific lesson is the test through competition between state and capitalist enterprises. We are now forming mixed companies—I shall have something to say about these later on—which, like our state trade and our New Economic Policy as a whole, mean that we Communists are resorting to commercial, capitalist methods. These mixed companies are also important because through them practical competition is created between capitalist methods and our methods. Consider it practically. Up to now we have been writing a programme and making promises. In its time this was absolutely necessary. It is impossible to launch on a world revolution without a programme and without promises. If the whiteguards, including the Mensheviks, jeer at us for this, it only shows that the Mensheviks and the socialists of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals have no idea, in general, of the way a revolution develops. We could proceed in no other way.

Now, however, the position is that we must put our work to a serious test, and not the sort of test that is made by control institutions set up by the Communists themselves, even though these control institutions are magnificent, even though they are almost the ideal control institutions in the Soviet system and the Party; such a test may be mockery from the point of view of the actual requirements of the peasant economy, but it is certainly no mockery from the standpoint of our construction. We are now setting up these control institutions but I am referring not to this test but to the test from the point of view of the entire economy.

The capitalist was able to supply things. He did it inefficiently, charged exorbitant prices, insulted and robbed us. The ordinary workers and peasants, who do not argue about communism because they do not know what it is, are well aware of this.

"But the capitalists were, after all, able to supply things—are you? You are not able to do it." That is what we heard last spring; though not always clearly audible, it was the

undertone of the whole of last spring's crisis. "As people you are splendid, but you cannot cope with the economic task you have undertaken." This is the simple and withering criticism which the peasantry—and through the peasantry, some sections of workers—levelled at the Communist Party last year. That is why in the NEP question, this old point acquires such significance.

We need a real test. The capitalists are operating alongside us. They are operating like robbers; they make profit; but they know how to do things. But you—you are trying to do it in a new way: you make no profit, your principles are communist, your ideals are splendid; they are written out so beautifully that you seem to be saints, that you should go to heaven while you are still alive. But can you get things done? We need a test, a real test, not the kind the Central Control Commission makes when it censures somebody and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee imposes some penalty. Yes, we want a real test from the viewpoint of the national economy.

We Communists have received numerous deferments, and more credit has been allowed us than any other government has ever been given. Of course, we Communists helped to get rid of the capitalists and landowners. The peasants appreciate this and have given us an extension of time, longer credit, but only for a certain period. After that comes the test: can you run the economy as well as the others? The old capitalist can; you cannot.

That is the first lesson, the first main part of the political report of the Central Committee. We cannot run the economy. This has been proved in the past year. I would like very much to quote the example of several Gos-trests (if I may express myself in the beautiful Russian language that Turgenev praised so highly)* to show how we run the economy.

Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, and largely owing to ill health, I have been unable to elaborate this part of my report and so I must confine myself to express-

* An ironical reference to the habit, then emerging, of abbreviating the names of various institutions. Here the abbreviation stands for *state trusts*.—*Ed*.

ing my conviction, which is based on my observations of what is going on. During the past year we showed quite clearly that we cannot run the economy. That is the fundamental lesson. Either we prove the opposite in the coming year, or Soviet power will not be able to exist. And the greatest danger is that not everybody realises this. If all of us Communists, the responsible officials, clearly realise that we lack the ability to run the economy, that we must learn from the very beginning, then we shall win—that, in my opinion, is the fundamental conclusion that should be drawn. But many of us do not appreciate this and believe that if there are people who do think that way, it can only be the ignorant, who have not studied communism; perhaps they will some day learn and understand. No, excuse me, the point is not that the peasant or the non-Party worker has not studied communism, but that the time has passed when the job was to draft a programme and call upon the people to carry out this great programme. That time has passed. Today you must prove that you can give practical economic assistance to the workers and to the peasants under the present difficult conditions, and thus demonstrate to them that you have stood the test of competition.

The mixed companies that we have begun to form, in which private capitalists, Russian and foreign, and Communists participate, provide one of the means by which we can learn to organise competition properly and show that we are no less able to establish a link with the peasant economy than the capitalists; that we can meet its requirements; that we can help the peasant make progress even at his present level, in spite of his backwardness; for it is impossible to change him in a brief span of time.

That is the sort of competition confronting us as an absolutely urgent task. It is the pivot of the New Economic Policy and, in my opinion, the quintessence of the Party's policy. We are faced with any number of purely political problems and difficulties. You know what they are: Genoa, the danger of intervention. The difficulties are enormous but they are nothing compared with this economic difficulty. We know how things are done in the political field; we have gained considerable experience; we have learned

a lot about bourgeois diplomacy. It is the sort of thing the Mensheviks taught us for fifteen years, and we got something useful out of it. This is not new.

But here is something we must do now in the economic field. We must win the competition against the ordinary shop assistant, the ordinary capitalist, the merchant, who will go to the peasant without arguing about communism. Just imagine, he will not begin to argue about communism, but will argue in this way—if you want to obtain something, or carry on trade properly, or if you want to build, I will do the building at a high price; the Communists will, perhaps, build at a higher price, perhaps even ten times higher. It is this kind of agitation that is now the crux of the matter; herein lies the root of economics.

I repeat, thanks to our correct policy, the people allowed us a deferment of payment and credit, and this, to put it in terms of NEP, is a promissory note. But this promissory note is undated, and you cannot learn from the wording when it will be presented for redemption. Therein lies the danger; this is the specific feature that distinguishes these political promissory notes from ordinary, commercial promissory notes. We must concentrate all our attention on this, and not rest content with the fact that there are responsible and good Communists in all the state trusts and mixed companies. That is of no use, because these Communists do not know how to run the economy and, in that respect, are inferior to the ordinary capitalist salesmen, who have received their training in big factories and big firms. But we refuse to admit this; in this field communist conceit—komchvanstvo,* to use the great Russian language again—still persists. The whole point is that the responsible Communists, even the best of them, who are unquestionably honest and loyal, who in the old days suffered penal servitude and did not fear death, do not know how to trade, because they are not businessmen, they have not learnt to trade, do not want to learn and do not understand that they must start learning from the beginning. Communists, revolutionaries who have accomplished the greatest revolution in the world, on whom the

* Literally, "comconceit".—*Ed.*

eyes of, if not forty pyramids, then, at all events, forty European countries are turned in the hope of emancipation from capitalism, must learn from ordinary salesmen. But these ordinary salesmen have had ten years' warehouse experience and know the business, whereas the responsible Communists and devoted revolutionaries do not know the business, and do not even realise that they do not know it.

And so, comrades, if we do away with at least this elementary ignorance we shall achieve a tremendous victory. We must leave this Congress with the conviction that we are ignorant of this business and with the resolve to start learning it from the bottom. After all, we have not ceased to be revolutionaries (although many say, and not altogether without foundation, that we have become bureaucrats) and can understand this simple thing, that in a new and unusually difficult undertaking we must be prepared to start from the beginning over and over again. If after starting you find yourselves at a dead end, start again, and go on doing it ten times if necessary, until you attain your object. Do not put on airs, do not be conceited because you are a Communist while there is some non-Party salesman, perhaps a whiteguard—and very likely he is a whiteguard—who can do things which economically must be done at all costs, but which you cannot do. If you, responsible Communists, who have hundreds of ranks and titles and wear communist and Soviet Orders, realise this, you will attain your object, because this is something that can be learned.

We have some successes, even if only very tiny ones, to record for the past year, but they are insignificant. The main thing is that there is no realisation nor widespread conviction among all Communists that at the present time the responsible and most devoted Russian Communist is less able to perform these functions than any salesman of the old school. I repeat, we must start learning from the very beginning. If we realise this, we shall pass our test; and the test is a serious one which the impending financial crisis will set—the test set by the Russian and international market to which we are subordinated, with which we are connected, and from which we cannot isolate

ourselves. The test is a crucial one, for here we may be beaten economically and politically.

That is how the question stands and it cannot be otherwise, for the competition will be very severe, and it will be decisive. We had many outlets and loopholes that enabled us to escape from our political and economic difficulties. We can proudly say that up to now we have been able to utilise these outlets and loopholes in various combinations corresponding to the varying circumstances. But how we have no other outlets. Permit me to say this to you without exaggeration, because in this respect it is really "the last and decisive battle", not against international capitalism—against that we shall yet have many "last and decisive battles"—but against Russian capitalism, against the capitalism that is growing out of the small peasant economy, the capitalism that is fostered by the latter. Here we shall have a fight on our hands in the immediate future, and the date of it cannot be fixed exactly. Here the "last and decisive battle" is impending; here there are no political or any other flanking movements that we can undertake, because this is a test in competition with private capital. Either we pass this test in competition with private capital, or we fail completely. To help us pass it we have political power and a host of economic and other resources; we have everything you want except ability. We lack ability. And if we learn this simple lesson from the experience of last year and take it as our guiding line for the whole of 1922, we shall conquer this difficulty, too, in spite of the fact that it is much greater than the previous difficulty, for it rests upon ourselves. It is not like some external enemy. The difficulty is that we ourselves refuse to admit the unpleasant truth forced upon us; we refuse to undertake the unpleasant duty that the situation demands of us, namely, to start learning from the beginning. That, in my opinion, is the second lesson that we must learn from the New Economic Policy.

The third, supplementary lesson is on the question of state capitalism. It is a pity Comrade Bukharin is not present at the Congress. I should have liked to argue with him a little, but that had better be postponed to the next Congress. On the question of state capitalism, I think that

generally our press and our Party make the mistake of dropping into intellectualism, into liberalism; we philosophise about how state capitalism is to be interpreted, and look into old books. But in those old books you will not find what we are discussing; they deal with the state capitalism that exists under capitalism. Not a single book has been written about state capitalism under communism. It did not occur even to Marx to write a word on this subject; and he died without leaving a single precise statement or definite instruction on it. That is why we must overcome the difficulty entirely by ourselves. And if we make a general mental survey of our press and see what has been written about state capitalism, as I tried to do when I was preparing this report, we shall be convinced that it is missing the target, that it is looking in an entirely wrong direction.

The state capitalism discussed in all books on economics is that which exists under the capitalist system, where the state brings under its direct control certain capitalist enterprises. But ours is a proletarian state; it rests on the proletariat; it gives the proletariat all political privileges; and through the medium of the proletariat it attracts to itself the lower ranks of the peasantry (you remember that we began this work through the Poor Peasants Committees). That is why very many people are misled by the term state capitalism. To avoid this we must remember the fundamental thing that state capitalism in the form we have here is not dealt with in any theory, or in any books, for the simple reason that all the usual concepts connected with this term are associated with bourgeois rule in capitalist society. Our society is one which has left the rails of capitalism, but has not yet got on to new rails. The state in this society is not ruled by the bourgeoisie, but by the proletariat. We refuse to understand that when we say "state" we mean ourselves, the proletariat, the vanguard of the working class. State capitalism is capitalism which we shall be able to restrain, and the limits of which we shall be able to fix. This state capitalism is connected with the state, and the state is the workers, the advanced section of the workers, the vanguard. We are the state.

State capitalism is capitalism that we must confine within certain bounds; but we have not yet learned to confine it within those bounds. That is the whole point. And it rests with us to determine what this state capitalism is to be. We have sufficient, quite sufficient political power; we also have sufficient economic resources at our command, but the vanguard of the working class which has been brought to the forefront to directly supervise, to determine the boundaries, to demarcate, to subordinate and not be subordinated itself, lacks sufficient ability for it. All that is needed here is ability, and that is what we do not have.

Never before in history has there been a situation in which the proletariat, the revolutionary vanguard, possessed sufficient political power and had state capitalism existing alongside it. The whole question turns on our understanding that this is the capitalism that we can and must permit, that we can and must confine within certain bounds; for this capitalism is essential for the broad masses of the peasantry and for private capital, which must trade in such a way as to satisfy the needs of the peasantry. We must organise things in such a way as to make possible the customary operation of capitalist economy and capitalist exchange, because this is essential for the people. Without it, existence is impossible. All the rest is not an absolutely vital matter to this camp. They can resign themselves to all that. You Communists, you workers, you, the politically enlightened section of the proletariat, which under took to administer the state, must be able to arrange it so that the state, which you have taken into your hands, shall function the way you want it to. Well, we have lived through a year, the state is in our hands; but has it operated the New Economic Policy in the way we wanted in this past year? No. But we refuse to admit that it did not operate in the way we wanted. How did it operate? The machine refused to obey the hand that guided it. It was like a car that was going not in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired; as if it were being driven by some mysterious, lawless hand, God knows whose, perhaps of a profiteer, or of a private capitalist, or of both. Be that as it may, the car is not going quite in the direction the man at the wheel imagines, and often it goes in an altogether different direction.

This is the main thing that must be remembered in regard to state capitalism. In this main field we must start learning from the very beginning, and only when we have thoroughly understood and appreciated this can we be sure that we shall learn.

Now I come to the question of halting the retreat, a question I dealt with in my speech at the Congress of Metalworkers. Since then I have not heard any objection, either in the Party press, or in private letters from comrades, or in the Central Committee. The Central Committee approved my plan, which was, that in the report of the Central Committee to the present Congress strong emphasis should be laid on calling a halt to this retreat and that the Congress should give binding instructions on behalf of the whole Party accordingly. For a year we have been retreating. On behalf of the Party we must now call a halt. The purpose pursued by the retreat has been achieved. This period is drawing, or has drawn, to a close. We now have a different objective, that of regrouping our forces. We have reached a new line; on the whole, we have conducted the retreat in fairly good order. True, not a few voices were heard from various sides which tried to convert this retreat into a stampede. Some—for example, several members of the group which bore the name of Workers' Opposition (I don't think they had any right to that name)—argued that we were not retreating properly in some sector or other. Owing to their excessive zeal they found themselves at the wrong door, and now they realise it. At that time they did not see that their activities did not help us to correct our movement, but merely had the effect of spreading panic and hindering our effort to beat a disciplined retreat.

Retreat is a difficult matter, especially for revolutionaries who are accustomed to advance; especially when they have been accustomed to advance with enormous success for several years; especially if they are surrounded by revolutionaries in other countries who are longing for the time when they can launch an offensive. Seeing that we were retreating, several of them burst into tears in a disgraceful and childish manner, as was the case at the last extended Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Moved by the best communist sentiments

and communist aspirations, several of the comrades burst into tears because—oh horror!—the good Russian Communists were retreating. Perhaps it is now difficult for me to understand this West-European mentality, although I lived for quite a number of years in those marvellous democratic countries as an exile. Perhaps from their point of view this is such a difficult matter to understand that it is enough to make one weep. We, at any rate, have no time for sentiment. It was clear to us that because we had advanced so successfully for many years and had achieved so many extraordinary victories (and all this in a country that was in an appalling state of ruin and lacked the material resources!), to consolidate that advance, since we had gained so much, it was absolutely essential for us to retreat. We could not hold all the positions we had captured in the first onslaught. On the other hand, it was because we had captured so much in the first onslaught, on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm displayed by the workers and peasants, that we had room enough to retreat a long distance, and can retreat still further now, without losing our main and fundamental positions. On the whole, the retreat was fairly orderly, although certain panic-stricken voices, among them that of the Workers' Opposition (this was the tremendous harm it did!), caused losses in our ranks, caused a relaxation of discipline, and disturbed the proper order of retreat. The most dangerous thing during a retreat is panic. When a whole army (I speak in the figurative sense) is in retreat, it cannot have the same morale as when it is advancing. At every step you find a certain mood of depression. We even had poets who wrote that people were cold and starving in Moscow, that "everything before was bright and beautiful, but now trade and profiteering abound". We have had quite a number of poetic effusions of this sort.

Of course, retreat breeds all this. That is where the serious danger lies; it is terribly difficult to retreat after a great victorious advance, for the relations are entirely different. During a victorious advance, even if discipline is relaxed, everybody presses forward on his own accord. During a retreat, however, discipline must be more conscious and is a hundred times more necessary, because, when the entire army is in retreat, it does not know or see where it should halt.

It sees only retreat; under such circumstances a few panic-stricken voices are, at times, enough to cause a stampede. The danger here is enormous. When a real army is in retreat, machine-guns are kept ready, and when an orderly retreat degenerates into a disorderly one, the command to fire is given, and quite rightly, too.

If, during an incredibly difficult retreat, when everything depends on preserving proper order, anyone spreads panic—even from the best of motives—the slightest breach of discipline must be punished severely, sternly, ruthlessly; and this applies not only to certain of our internal Party affairs, but also, and to a greater extent, to such gentry as the Mensheviks, and to all the gentry of the Two-and-a-Half International.

The other day I read an article by Comrade Rakosi in No. 20 of *The Communist International* on a new book by Otto Bauer, from whom at one time we all learned, but who, like Kautsky, became a miserable petty bourgeois after the war.[83] Bauer now writes: "There, they are now retreating to capitalism! We have always said that it was a bourgeois revolution."

And the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, all of whom preach this sort of thing, are astonished when we declare that we shall shoot people for such things. They are amazed; but surely it is clear. When an army is in retreat a hundred times more discipline is required than when it is advancing, because during an advance everybody presses forward. If everybody started rushing back now, it would spell immediate and inevitable disaster.

The most important thing at such a moment is to retreat in good order, to fix the precise limits of the retreat, and not to give way to panic. And when a Menshevik says, "You are now retreating; I have been advocating retreat all the time, I agree with you, I am your man, let us retreat together," we say in reply, "For the public manifestations of Menshevism our revolutionary courts must pass the death sentence, otherwise they are not our courts, but God knows what."

They cannot understand this and exclaim: "What dictatorial manners these people have!" They still think we are persecuting the Mensheviks because they fought us in Geneva.[84] But had we done that we should have been unable

to hold power even for two months. Indeed, the sermons which Otto Bauer, the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries preach express their true nature—"The revolution has gone too far. What you are saying now we have been saying all the time, permit us to say it again." But we say in reply: "Permit us to put you before a firing squad for saying that. Either you refrain from expressing your views, or, if you insist on expressing your political views publicly in the present circumstances, when our position is far more difficult than it was when the whiteguards were directly attacking us, then you will have only yourselves to blame if we treat you as the worst and most pernicious whiteguard elements." We must never forget this.

When I speak about halting the retreat I do not mean that we have learned to trade. On the contrary, I am of the opposite opinion; and if my speech were to create that impression it would show that I had been misunderstood and that I am unable to express my thoughts properly.

The point, however, is that we must put a stop to the nervousness and fuss that have arisen with the introduction of NEP—the desire to do everything in a new way and to adapt everything. We now have a number of mixed companies. True, we have only very few. There are nine companies formed in conjunction with foreign capitalists and sanctioned by the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. The Sokolnikov Commission[85] has sanctioned six and the Northern Timber Trust[86] has sanctioned two. Thus we now have seventeen companies with an aggregate capital amounting to many millions, sanctioned by several government departments (of course, there is plenty of confusion with all these departments, so that some slip here is also possible). At any rate we have formed companies jointly with Russian and foreign capitalists. There are only a few of them. But this small but practical start shows that the Communists have been judged by what they do. They have not been judged by such high institutions as the Central Control Commission and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The Central Control Commission is a splendid institution, of course, and we shall now give it more power. For all that, the judgement these institutions pass on Communists is not—just

imagine—recognised on the international market. (*Laughter.*) But now that ordinary Russian and foreign capitalists are joining the Communists in forming mixed companies, we say, "We can do things after all; bad as it is, meagre as it is, we have got something for a start." True, it is not very much. Just think of it: a year has passed since we declared that we would devote all our energy (and it is said that we have a great deal of energy) to this matter, and in this year we have managed to form only seventeen companies.

This shows how devilishly clumsy and inept we are; how much Oblomovism still remains, for which we shall inevitably get a good thrashing. For all that, I repeat, a start, a reconnaissance has been made. The capitalists would not agree to have dealings with us if the elementary conditions for their operations did not exist. Even if only a very small section of them has agreed to this, it shows that we have scored a partial victory.

Of course, they will cheat us in these companies, cheat us so that it will take several years before matters are straightened out. But that does not matter. I do not say that that is a victory; it is a reconnaissance, which shows that we have an arena, we have a terrain, and can now stop the retreat.

The reconnaissance has revealed that we have concluded an insignificant number of agreements with capitalists; but we have concluded them for all that. We must learn from that and continue our operations. In this sense we must put a stop to nervousness, screaming and fuss. We received notes and telephone messages, one after another asking, "Now that we have NEP, may we be reorganised too?" Everybody is bustling, and we get utter confusion, nobody is doing any practical work; everybody is continuously arguing about how to adapt oneself to NEP, but no practical results are forthcoming.

The merchants are laughing at us Communists, and in all probability are saying, "Formerly there were Persuaders-in-Chief,[87] now we have Talkers-in-Chief." That the capitalists gloated over the fact that we started late, that we were not sharp enough—of that there need not be the slightest doubt. In this sense, I say, these instructions must be endorsed in the name of the Congress.

The retreat is at an end. The principal methods of operation, of how we are to work with the capitalists, are outlined. We have examples, even if an insignificant number.

Stop philosophising and arguing about NEP. Let the poets write verses, that is what they are poets for. But you economists, you stop arguing about NEP and get more companies formed; check up on how many Communists we have who can organise successful competition with the capitalists.

The retreat has come to an end; it is now a matter of regrouping our forces. These are the instructions that the Congress must pass so as to put an end to fuss and bustle. Calm down, do not philosophise; if you do, it will be counted as a black mark against you. Show by your practical efforts that you can work no less efficiently than the capitalists. The capitalists create an economic link with the peasants in order to amass wealth; you must create a link with peasant economy in order to strengthen the economic power of our proletarian state. You have the advantage over the capitalists in that political power is in your hands; you have a number of economic weapons at your command; the only trouble is that you cannot make proper use of them. Look at things more soberly. Cast off the tinsel, the festive communist garments, learn a simple thing simply, and we shall beat the private capitalist. We possess political power; we possess a host of economic weapons. If we beat capitalism and create a link with peasant farming we shall become an absolutely invincible power. Then the building of socialism will not be the task of that drop in the ocean, called the Communist Party, but the task of the entire mass of the working people. Then the rank-and-file peasants will see that we are helping them and they will follow our lead. Consequently, even if the pace is a hundred times slower, it will be a million times more certain and more sure.

It is in this sense that we must speak of halting the retreat; and the proper thing to do is, in one way or another, to make this slogan a Congress decision.

In this connection, I should like to deal with the question: what is the Bolsheviks' New Economic Policy—evolution or tactics? This question has been raised by the *Smena Vekh* people, who, as you know, are a trend which has arisen among Russian émigrés it is a socio-political trend led by some

of the most prominent Constitutional-Democrats, several Ministers of the former Kolchak government, people who have come to the conclusion that the Soviet government is building up the Russian state and therefore should be supported. They argue as follows: "What sort of state is the Soviet government building? The Communists say they are building a communist state and assure us that the new policy is a matter of tactics: the Bolsheviks are making use of the private capitalists in a difficult situation, but later they will get the upper hand. The Bolsheviks can say what they like; as a matter of fact it is not tactics but evolution, internal regeneration; they will arrive at the ordinary bourgeois state, and we must support them. History proceeds in devious ways."

Some of them pretend to be Communists; but there are others who are more straightforward, one of these is Ustryalov. I think he was a Minister in Kolchak's government. He does not agree with his colleagues and says: "You can think what you like about communism, but I maintain that it is not a matter of tactics, but of evolution." I think that by being straightforward like this, Ustryalov is rendering us a great service. We, and I particularly, because of my position, hear a lot of sentimental communist lies; "communist fibbing", every day, and sometimes we get sick to death of them. But now instead of these "communist fibs" I get a copy of *Smena Vekh*, which says quite plainly: "Things are by no means what you imagine them to be. As a matter of fact, you are slipping into the ordinary bourgeois morass with communist flags inscribed with catchwords stuck all over the place." This is very useful. It is not a repetition of what we are constantly hearing around us, but the plain class truth uttered by the class enemy. It is very useful to read this sort of thing; and it was written not because the communist state allows you to write some things and not others, but because it really is the class truth, bluntly and frankly uttered by the class enemy. "I am in favour of supporting the Soviet government," says Ustryalov, although he was a Constitutional-Democrat, a bourgeois, and supported intervention. "I am in favour of supporting Soviet power because it has taken the road that will lead it to the ordinary bourgeois state."

This is very useful, and I think that we must keep it in mind. It is much better for us if the *Smena Vekh* people write in that strain than if some of them pretend to be almost Communists, so that from a distance one cannot tell whether they believe in God or in the communist revolution. We must say frankly that such candid enemies are useful. We must say frankly that the things Ustryalov speaks about are possible. History knows all sorts of metamorphoses. Relying on firmness of convictions, loyalty, and other splendid moral qualities is anything but a serious attitude in politics. A few people may be endowed with splendid moral qualities, but historical issues are decided by vast masses, which, if the few do not suit them, may at times treat them none too politely.

There have been many cases of this kind; that is why we must welcome this frank utterance of the *Smena Vekh* people. The enemy is speaking the class truth and is pointing to the danger that confronts us, and which the enemy is striving to make inevitable. *Smena Vekh* adherents express the sentiments of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois, or of Soviet employees whose function it is to operate our New Economic Policy. This is the real and main danger. And that is why attention must be concentrated mainly on the question: "Who will win?" I have spoken about competition. No direct onslaught is being made on us now; nobody is clutching us by the throat. True, we have yet to see what will happen tomorrow; but today we are not being subjected to armed attack. Nevertheless, the fight against capitalist society has become a hundred times more fierce and perilous, because we are not always able to tell enemies from friends.

When I spoke about communist competition, what I had in mind were not communist sympathies but the development of economic forms and social systems. This is not competition but, if not the last, then nearly the last, desperate, furious, life-and-death struggle between capitalism and communism.

And here we must squarely put the question: Wherein lies our strength and what do we lack? We have quite enough political power. I hardly think there is anyone here who will assert that on such-and-such a practical question, in such-and-such a business institution, the Communists, the

Communist Party, lack sufficient power. There are people who think only of this, but these people are hopelessly looking backward and cannot understand that one must look ahead. The main economic power is in our hands. All the vital large enterprises, the railways, etc., are in our hands. The number of leased enterprises, although considerable in places, is on the whole insignificant; altogether it is infinitesimal compared with the rest. The economic power in the hands of the proletarian state of Russia is quite adequate to ensure the transition to communism. What then is lacking? Obviously, what is lacking is culture among the stratum of the Communists who perform administrative functions. If we take Moscow with its 4,700 Communists in responsible positions, and if we take that huge bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap, we must ask: who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can truthfully be said that the Communists are directing that heap. To tell the truth they are not directing, they are being directed. Something analogous happened here to what we were told in our history lessons when we were children: sometimes one nation conquers another, the nation that conquers is the conqueror and the nation that is vanquished is the conquered nation. This is simple and intelligible to all. But what happens to the culture of these nations? Here things are not so simple. If the conquering nation is more cultured than the vanquished nation, the former imposes its culture upon the latter; but if the opposite is the case, the vanquished nation imposes its culture upon the conqueror. Has not something like this happened in the capital of the R.S.F.S.R.? Have the 4,700 Communists (nearly a whole army division, and all of them the very best) come under the influence of an alien culture? True, there may be the impression that the vanquished have a high level of culture. But that is not the case at all. Their culture is miserable, insignificant, but it is still at a higher level than ours. Miserable and low as it is, it is higher than that of our responsible Communist administrators, for the latter lack administrative ability. Communists who are put at the head of departments—and sometimes artful saboteurs deliberately put them in these positions in order to use them as a shield—are often fooled. This is a very unpleasant admission to make, or, at any rate, not a

very pleasant one; but I think we must admit it, for at present this is the salient problem. I think that this is the political lesson of the past year; and it is around this that the struggle will rage in 1922.

Will the responsible Communists of the R.S.F.S.R. and of the Russian Communist Party realise that they cannot administer; that they only imagine they are directing, but are, actually, being directed? If they realise this they will learn, of course; for this business can be learnt. But one must study hard to learn it, and our people are not doing this. They scatter orders and decrees right and left, but the result is quite different from what they want.

The competition and rivalry that we have placed on the order of the day by proclaiming NEP is a serious business. It appears to be going on in all government offices; but as a matter of fact it is one more form of the struggle between two irreconcilably hostile classes. It is another form of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It is a struggle that has not yet been brought to a head, and culturally it has not yet been resolved even in the central government departments in Moscow. Very often the bourgeois officials know the business better than our best Communists, who are invested with authority and have every opportunity, but who cannot make the slightest use of their rights and authority.

I should like to quote a passage from a pamphlet by Alexander Todorsky.[88] It was published in Vesyegonsk (there is an uyezd town of that name in Tver Gubernia) on the first anniversary of the Soviet revolution in Russia, on November 7, 1918, a long, long time ago. Evidently this Vesyegonsk comrade is a member of the Party—I read the pamphlet a long time ago and cannot say for certain. He describes how he set to work to equip two Soviet factories, and for this purpose enlisted the services of two bourgeois. He did this in the way these things were done at that time—threatened to imprison them and to confiscate all their property. They were enlisted for the task of restoring the factories. We know how the services of the bourgeoisie were enlisted in 1918 (*laughter*); so there is no need for me to go into details. The methods we are now using to enlist the bourgeoisie are different. But here is the conclusion he arrived at: "This is only half the job. It is not enough to defeat the bourgeoi-

sie, to overpower them; they must be compelled to work for us."

Now these are remarkable words. They are remarkable for they show that even in the town of Vesyegonsk, even in 1918, there were people who had a correct understanding of the relationship between the victorious proletariat and the vanquished bourgeoisie.

When we rap the exploiters' knuckles, render them innocuous, overpower them, it is only half the job. In Moscow, however, ninety out of a hundred responsible officials imagine that all we have to do is to overpower, render innocuous and rap knuckles. What I have said about the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and whiteguards is very often interpreted solely as rendering innocuous, rapping knuckles (and, perhaps, not only the knuckles, but some other place) and overpowering. But that is only half the job. It was only half the job even in 1918, when this was written by the Vesyegonsk comrade; now it is even less than one-fourth. We must make these hands work for us, and not have responsible Communists at the head of departments, enjoying rank and title, but actually swimming with the stream together with the bourgeoisie. That is the whole point.

The idea of building communist society exclusively with the hands of the Communists is childish, absolutely childish. We Communists are but a drop in the ocean, a drop in the ocean of the people. We shall be able to lead the people along the road we have chosen only if we correctly determine it not only from the standpoint of its direction in world history. From that point of view we have determined the road quite correctly, and this is corroborated by the situation in every country. We must also determine it correctly for our own native land, for our country. But the direction in world history is not the only factor. Other factors are whether there will be intervention or not, and whether we shall be able to supply the peasants with goods in exchange for their grain. The peasants will say: "You are splendid fellows; you defended our country. That is why we obeyed you. But if you cannot run the show, get out!" Yes, that is what the peasants will say.

We Communists shall be able to direct our economy if we succeed in utilising the hands of the bourgeoisie in build-

ing up this economy of ours and in the meantime learn from these bourgeoisie and guide them along the road we want them to travel. But when a Communist imagines that he knows everything, when he says: "I am a responsible Communist, I have beaten enemies far more formidable than any salesman. We have fought at the front and have beaten far more formidable enemies"—it is this prevailing mood that is doing us great harm.

Rendering the exploiters innocuous, rapping them over the knuckles, clipping their wings is the least important part of the job. That must be done; and our State Political Administration and our courts must do it more vigorously than they have up to now. They must remember that they are proletarian courts surrounded by enemies the world over. This is not difficult; and in the main we have learned to do it. Here a certain amount of pressure must be exercised; but that is easy.

To win the second part of the victory, i.e., to build communism with the hands of non-Communists, to acquire the practical ability to do what is economically necessary, we must establish a link with peasant farming; we must satisfy the peasant, so that he will say: "Hard, bitter and painful as starvation is, I see a government that is an unusual one, is no ordinary one, but is doing something practically useful, something tangible." We must see to it that the numerous elements with whom we are co-operating, and who far exceed us in number, work in such a way as to enable us to supervise them; we must learn to understand this work, and direct their hands so that they do something useful for communism. This is the key point of the present situation; for although individual Communists have understood and realised that it is necessary to enlist the non-Party people for this work, the rank-and-file of our Party have not. Many circulars have been written, much has been said about this, but has anything been accomplished during the past year? Nothing. Not five Party committees out of a hundred can show practical results. This shows how much we lag behind the requirements of the present time; how much we are still living in the traditions of 1918 and 1919. Those were great years; a great historical task was then accomplished. But if we only look back on those years and do not

see the task that now confronts us, we shall be doomed, certainly and absolutely. And the whole point is that we refuse to admit it.

I should now like to give two practical examples to illustrate how we administer. I have said already that it would be more correct to take one of the state trusts as an example, but I must ask you to excuse me for not being able to apply this proper method, for to do so it would have been necessary to study the concrete material concerning at least one state trust. Unfortunately, I have been unable to do that, and so I will take two small examples. One example is the accusation of bureaucracy levelled at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade by the Moscow Consumers' Co-operative Society. The other example I will take from the Donets Basin.

The first example is not quite relevant—I am unable to find a better—but it will serve to illustrate my main point. As you know from the newspapers, I have been unable to deal with affairs directly during these past few months. I have not been attending the Council of People's Commissars, or the Central Committee. During the short and rare visits I made to Moscow I was struck by the desperate and terrible complaints levelled at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. I have never doubted for a moment that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade functions badly and that it is tied up with red tape. But when the complaints became particularly bitter I tried to investigate the matter, to take a concrete example and for once get to the bottom of it; to ascertain the cause, to ascertain why the machine was not working properly.

The M.C.C.S. wanted to purchase a quantity of canned goods. A French citizen appeared and offered some. I do not know whether he did it in the interests of the international policy and with the knowledge of the leadership of the Entente countries, or with the approval of Poincaré and the other enemies of the Soviet government (I think our historians will investigate and make this clear after the Genoa Conference), but the fact is that the French bourgeoisie took not only a theoretical, but also a practical interest in this business, as a French bourgeois turned up in Moscow with an offer of canned goods. Moscow is starving; in the summer

the situation will be worse; no meat has been delivered, and knowing the merits of our People's Commissariat of Railways, probably none will be delivered.

An offer is made to sell canned meat for Soviet currency (whether the meat is entirely bad or not will be established by a future investigation). What could be simpler? But if the matter is approached in the Soviet way, it turns out to be not so simple after all. I was unable to go into the matter personally, but I ordered an investigation and I have before me the report which shows how this celebrated case developed. It started with the decision adopted on February 11 by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on the report of Comrade Kamenev concerning the desirability of purchasing food abroad. Of course, how could a Russian citizen decide such a question without the consent of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party! Think of it! How could 4,700 responsible officials (and this is only according to the census) decide a matter like purchasing food abroad without the consent of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? This would be something supernatural, of course. Evidently, Comrade Kamenev understands our policy and the realities of our position perfectly well, and therefore, he did not place too much reliance on the numerous responsible officials. He started by taking the bull by the horns—if not the bull, at all events the Political Bureau —and without any difficulty (I did not hear that there was any discussion over the matter) obtained a resolution stating: "To call the attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to the desirability of importing food from abroad; the import duties...", etc. The attention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was drawn to this. Things started moving. This was on February 11. I remember that I had occasion to be in Moscow at the very end of February, or about that time, and what did I find? The complaints, the despairing complaints of the Moscow comrades. "What's the matter?" I ask. "There is no way we can buy these provisions." "Why?" "Because of the red tape of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade." I had not been taking part in affairs for a long time and I did not know that the Political Bureau had adopted a decision on the

matter. I merely ordered the Executive Secretary of our Council to investigate, procure the relevant documents and show them to me. The matter was settled when Krasin arrived. Kamenev discussed the matter with him; the transaction was arranged, and the canned meat was purchased. All's well that ends well.

I have not the least doubt that Kamenev and Krasin can come to an understanding and correctly determine the political line desired by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. If the political line on commercial matters were decided by Kamenev and Krasin, ours would be the best Soviet Republic in the world. But Kamenev, a member of the Political Bureau, and Krasin—the latter is busy with diplomatic affairs connected with Genoa, affairs which have entailed an enormous, an excessive amount of labour—cannot be dragged into every transaction, dragged into the business of buying canned goods from a French citizen. That is not the way to work. This is not new, not economic, and not a policy, but sheer mockery. Now I have the report of the investigation into this matter. In fact, I have two reports: one, the report of the investigation made by Gorbunov, the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, and his assistant, Miroshnikov; and the other, the report of the investigation made by the State Political Administration. I do not know why the latter interested itself in the matter, and I am not quite sure whether it was proper for it to do so; but I will not go into that now, because I am afraid this might entail another investigation. The important thing is that material on the matter has been collected and I now have it before me.

On arriving in Moscow at the end of February I heard bitter complaints, "We cannot buy the canned goods", although in Libau there was a ship with a cargo of canned goods, and the owners were prepared to take Soviet currency for real canned goods! (*Laughter.*) If these canned goods are not entirely bad (and I now emphasise the "if", because I am not sure that I shall not call for another investigation, the results of which, however, we shall have to report at the next Congress), if, I say, these goods are not entirely bad and they have been purchased, I ask: why could not

this matter have been settled without Kamenev and Krasin? From the report I have before me I gather that one responsible Communist sent another responsible Communist to the devil. I also gather from this report that one responsible Communist said to another responsible Communist: "From now on I shall not talk to you except in the presence of a lawyer." Reading this report I recalled the time when I was in exile in Siberia, twenty-five years ago, and had occasion to act in the capacity of a lawyer. I was not a certified lawyer, because, being summarily exiled, I was not allowed to practise; but as there was no other lawyer in the region, people came and confided their troubles to me. But sometimes I had the greatest difficulty in understanding what the trouble was. A woman would come and, of course, start telling me a long story about her relatives, and it was incredibly difficult to get from her what she really wanted. I said to her: "Bring me a copy." She went on with her endless and pointless story. When I repeated, "Bring me a copy", she left, complaining: "He won't hear what I have to say unless I bring a copy." In our colony we had a hearty laugh over this copy. I was able, however, to make some progress. People came to me, brought copies of the necessary documents, and I was able to gather what their trouble was, what they complained of, what ailed them. This was twenty-five years ago, in Siberia, in a place many hundreds of versts from the nearest railway station.

But why was it necessary, three years after the revolution, in the capital of the Soviet Republic, to have two investigations, the intervention of Kamenev and Krasin and the instructions of the Political Bureau to purchase canned goods? What was lacking? Political power? No. The money was forthcoming, so they had economic as well as political power. All the necessary institutions were available. What was lacking, then? Culture. Ninety-nine out of every hundred officials of the M.C.C.S.—against whom I have no complaint to make whatever, and whom I regard as excellent Communists—and of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade lack culture. They were unable to approach the matter in a cultured manner.

When I first heard of the matter I sent the following written proposal to the Central Committee: "All the officials

concerned of the Moscow government departments—except the members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, who, as you know, enjoy immunity—should be put in the worst prison in Moscow for six hours, and those of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade for thirty-six hours." And then it turned out that no one could say who the culprits were (*laughter*), and from what I have told you it is evident that the culprits will never be discovered. It is simply the usual inability of the Russian intellectuals to get things done—inefficiency and slovenliness. First they rush at a job, do a little bit, and then think about it, and when nothing comes of it, they run to complain to Kamenev and want the matter to be brought before the Political Bureau. Of course, all difficult state problems should be brought before the Political Bureau—I shall have to say something about that later on—but one should think first and then act. If you want to bring up a case, submit the appropriate documents. First send a telegram, and in Moscow we also have telephones; send a telephone message to the competent department and a copy to Tsyurupa saying: I regard the transaction as urgent and will take proceedings against anyone guilty of red tape." One must think of this elementary culture, one must approach things in a thoughtful manner. If the business is not settled in the course of a few minutes, by telephone, collect the documents and say: "If you start any of your red tape I shall have you clapped in gaol." But not a moment's thought is given to the matter, there is no preparation, the usual bustle, several commissions, everybody is tired out, exhausted, run down, and things begin to move only when Kamenev is put in touch with Krasin. All this is typical of what goes on not only in the capital, Moscow, but also in the other capitals, in the capitals of all independent republics and regions. And the same thing, even a hundred times worse, constantly goes on in the provincial towns.

In our struggle we must remember that Communists must be able to reason. They may be perfectly familiar with the revolutionary struggle and with the state of the revolutionary movement all over the world; but if we are to extricate ourselves from desperate poverty and want we need culture, integrity and an ability to reason. Many lack these quali-

ties. It would be unfair to say that the responsible Communists do not fulfil their functions conscientiously. The overwhelming majority of them, ninety-nine out of a hundred, are not only conscientious—they proved their devotion to the revolution under the most difficult conditions before the fall of tsarism and after the revolution; they were ready to lay down their lives. Therefore, it would be radically wrong to attribute the trouble to lack of conscientiousness. We need a cultured approach to the simplest affairs of state. We must all understand that this is a matter of state, a business matter; and if obstacles arise we must be able to overcome them and take proceedings against those who are guilty of red tape. We have proletarian courts in Moscow; they must bring to account the persons who are to blame for the failure to effect the purchase of several tens of thousands of poods of canned food. I think the proletarian courts will be able to punish the guilty; but in order to punish, the culprits must be found. I assure you that in this case no culprits will be found. I want you all to look into this business: no one is guilty; all we see is a lot of fuss and bustle and nonsense. Nobody has the ability to approach the business properly; nobody understands that affairs of state must not be tackled in this way. And all the whiteguards and saboteurs take advantage of this. At one time we waged a fierce struggle against the saboteurs ; that struggle confronts us even now. There are saboteurs today, of course, and they must be fought. But can we fight them when the position is as I have just described it? This is worse than any sabotage. The saboteur could wish for nothing better than that two Communists should argue over the question of when to appeal to the Political Bureau for instructions on principles in buying food; and of course he would soon slip in between them and egg them on. If any intelligent saboteur were to stand behind these Communists, or behind each of them in turn, and encourage them, that would be the end. The matter would be doomed for ever. Who is to blame? Nobody, because two responsible Communists, devoted revolutionaries, are arguing over last year's snow; are arguing over the question of when to appeal to the Political Bureau for instructions on principles in buying food.

That is how the matter stands and that is the difficulty

that confronts us. Any salesman trained in a large capitalist enterprise knows how to settle a matter like that; but ninety-nine responsible Communists out of a hundred do not. And they refuse to understand that they do not know how and that they must learn the ABC of this business. Unless we realise this, unless we sit down in the preparatory class again, we shall never be able to solve the economic problem that now lies at the basis of our entire policy.

The other example I wanted to give you is that of the Donets Basin. You know that this is the centre, the real basis of our entire economy. It will be utterly impossible to restore large-scale industry in Russia, to really build socialism—for it can only be built on the basis of large-scale industry—unless we restore the Donets Basin and bring it up to the proper level. The Central Committee is closely watching developments there.

As regards this region there was no unjustified, ridiculous or absurd raising of minor questions in the Political Bureau; real, absolutely urgent business was discussed.

The Central Committee ought to see to it that in such real centres, bases and foundations of our entire economy, work is carried on in a real business-like manner. At the head of the Central Coal Industry Board we had not only undoubtedly devoted, but really educated and very capable people. I should not be wrong even if I said talented people. That is why the Central Committee has concentrated its attention on it. The Ukraine is an independent republic. That is quite all right. But in Party matters it sometimes—what is the politest way of saying it?—takes a roundabout course, and we shall have to get at them. For the people in charge there are sly, and their Central Committee I shall not say deceives us, but somehow edges away from us. To obtain a general view of the whole business, we discussed it in the Central Committee here and discovered that friction and disagreement exist. There is a Commission for the Utilisation of Small Mines there and, of course, severe friction between it and the Central Coal Industry Board. Still we, the Central Committee, have a certain amount of experience and we unanimously decided not to remove the leading people, but if there was any friction it was to be reported to us, down to the smallest detail. For since we have not only devoted but

capable people in the region, we must back them up, and enable them to complete their training, assuming that they have not done so. In the end, a Party Congress was held in the Ukraine—I do not know what happened there; all sorts of things happened. I asked for information from the Ukrainian comrades, and I asked Comrade Orjonikidze particularly—and the Central Committee did the same—to go down there and ascertain what had happened. Evidently, there was some intrigue and an awful mess, which the Commission on Party History would not be able to clear up in ten years should it undertake to do so. But the upshot of it all was that contrary to the unanimous instructions of the Central Committee, this group was superseded by another group. What was the matter? In the main, notwithstanding all its good qualities, a section of the group made a mistake. They were overzealous in their methods of administration. There we have to deal with workers. Very often the word "workers" is taken to mean the factory proletariat. But it does not mean that at all. During the war people who were by no means proletarians went into the factories; they went into the factories to dodge the war. Are the social and economic conditions in our country today such as to induce real proletarians to go into the factories? No. It would be true according to Marx; but Marx did not write about Russia; he wrote about capitalism as a whole, beginning with the fifteenth century. It held true over a period of six hundred years, but it is not true for present-day Russia. Very often those who go into the factories are not proletarians; they are casual elements of every description.

The task is to learn to organise the work properly, not to lag behind, to remove friction in time, not to separate administration from politics. For our administration and our politics rest on the ability of the entire vanguard to maintain contact with the entire mass of the proletariat and with the entire mass of the peasantry. If anybody forgets these cogs and becomes wholly absorbed in administration, the result will be a disastrous one. The mistake the Donets Basin officials made is insignificant compared with other mistakes of ours, but this example is a typical one. The Central Committee unanimously ordered: "Allow this group to remain; bring all conflicts, even minor ones, before the

Central Committee, for the Donets Basin is not an ordinary district, but a vital one, without which socialist construction would simply remain a pious wish." But all our political power, all the authority of the Central Committee proved of no avail.

This time there was a mistake in administration, of course; in addition, a host of other mistakes were made.

This instance shows that it is not a matter of possessing political power, but of administrative ability, the ability to put the right man in the right place, the ability to avoid petty conflicts, so that state economic work may be carried on without interruption. This is what we lack; this is the root of the mistake.

I think that in discussing our revolution and weighing up its prospects, we must carefully single out the problems which the revolution has solved completely and which have irrevocably gone down in history as an epoch-making departure from capitalism. Our revolution has such solutions to its credit. Let the Mensheviks and Otto Bauer of the Two-and-a-Half International shout: "Theirs is a bourgeois revolution." We say that our task was to consummate the bourgeois revolution. As a certain whiteguard newspaper expressed it: Dung had accumulated in our state institutions for four hundred years; but we cleaned it all out in four years. This is the great service we rendered. What have the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries done? Nothing. The dung of medievalism has not been cleared out either in our country, or even in advanced, enlightened Germany. Yet they reproach us for doing what stands very much to our credit. The fact that we have consummated the revolution is an achievement that can never be expunged from our record.

War is now in the air. The trade unions, for example, the reformist trade unions, are passing resolutions against war and are threatening to call strikes in opposition to war. Recently, if I am not mistaken, I read a report in the newspapers to the effect that a certain very good Communist delivered an anti-war speech in the French Chamber of Deputies in the course of which he stated that the workers would prefer to rise in revolt rather than go to war. This question cannot be formulated in the way we formulated it in 1912, when the Basle Manifesto was issued. The Russian

revolution alone has shown how it is possible to emerge from war, and what effort this entails. It showed what emerging from a reactionary war by revolutionary methods means. Reactionary imperialist wars are inevitable in all parts of the world; and in solving problems of this sort mankind cannot and will not forget that tens of millions were slaughtered then, and will be slaughtered again if war breaks out. We are living in the twentieth century, and the only nation that emerged from a reactionary war by revolutionary methods not for the benefit of a particular government, but by overthrowing it, was the Russian nation, and it was the Russian revolution that extricated it. What has been won by the Russian revolution is irrevocable. No power on earth can erase that; nor can any power on earth erase the fact that the Soviet state has been created. This is a historic victory. For hundreds of years states have been built according to the bourgeois model, and for the first time a non-bourgeois form of state has been discovered. Our machinery of government may be faulty, but it is said that the first steam engine that was invented was also faulty. No one even knows whether it worked or not, but that is not the important point; the important point is that it was invented. Even assuming that the first steam engine was of no use, the fact is that we now have steam engines. Even if our machinery of government is very faulty, the fact remains that it has been created; the greatest invention in history has been made; a proletarian type of state has been created. Therefore, let all Europe, let thousands of bourgeois newspapers broadcast news about the horrors and poverty that prevail in our country, about suffering being the sole lot of the working people in our country; the workers all over the world are still drawn towards the Soviet state. These are the great and irrevocable gains that we have achieved. But for us, members of the Communist Party, this meant only opening the door. We are now confronted with the task of laying the foundations of socialist economy. Has this been done? No, it has not. We still lack the socialist foundation. Those Communists who imagine that we have it are greatly mistaken. The whole point is to distinguish firmly, clearly and dispassionately what constitutes the historic service rendered by the Russian revolution from what we do very badly, from what

has not yet been created, and what we shall have to redo many times yet.

Political events are always very confused and complicated. They can be compared with a chain. To hold the whole chain you must grasp the main link. Not a link chosen at random. What was the central event in 1917? Withdrawal from the war. The entire nation demanded this, and it overshadowed everything. Revolutionary Russia accomplished this withdrawal from the war. It cost tremendous effort; but the major demand of the people was satisfied, and that brought us victory for many years. The people realised, the peasants saw, every soldier returning from the front understood perfectly well that the Soviet government was a more democratic government, one that stood closer to the working people. No matter how many outrageous and absurd things we may have done in other spheres, the fact that we realised what the main task was proved that everything was right.

What was the key feature of 1919 and 1920? Military resistance. The all-powerful Entente was marching against us, was at our throats. No propaganda was required there. Every non-Party peasant understood what was going on. The landowners were coming back. The Communists knew how to fight them. That is why, taken in the mass, the peasants followed the lead of the Communists; that is why we were victorious.

In 1921, the key feature was an orderly retreat. This required stern discipline. The Workers' Opposition said: "You are underrating the workers; the workers should display greater initiative." But initiative had to be displayed then by retreating in good order and by maintaining strict discipline. Anyone who introduced an undertone of panic or insubordination would have doomed the revolution to defeat; for there is nothing more difficult than retreating with people who have been accustomed to victory, who are imbued with revolutionary views and ideals, and who, in their hearts, regard every retreat as a disgraceful matter. The greatest danger was the violation of good order, and the greatest task was to maintain good order.

And what is the key feature now? The key feature now—and I would like to sum up my report with this—is not that

we have changed our line of policy. An incredible lot of nonsense is being talked about this in connection with NEP. It is all hot air, pernicious twaddle. In connection with NEP some people are beginning to fuss around, proposing to reorganise our government departments and to form new ones. All this is pernicious twaddle. In the present situation the key feature is people, the proper choice of people. A revolutionary who is accustomed to struggle against petty reformists and uplift educators finds it hard to understand this. Soberly weighed up, the political conclusion to be drawn from the present situation is that we have advanced so far that we cannot hold all the positions; and we need not hold them all.

Internationally our position has improved vastly these last few years. The Soviet type of state is our achievement; it is a step forward in human progress; and the information the Communist International receives from every country every day corroborates this. Nobody has the slightest doubt about that. From the point of view of practical work, however, the position is that unless the Communists render the masses of the peasants practical assistance they will lose their support. Passing laws, passing better decrees, etc., is not now the main object of our attention. There was a time when the passing of decrees was a form of propaganda. People used to laugh at us and say that the Bolsheviks do not realise that their decrees are not being carried out; the entire whiteguard press was full of jeers on that score. But at that period this passing of decrees was quite justified. We Bolsheviks had just taken power, and we said to the peasant, to the worker: "Here is a decree; this is how we would like to have the state administered. Try it!" From the very outset we gave the ordinary workers and peasants an idea of our policy in the form of decrees. The result was the enormous confidence we enjoyed and now enjoy among the masses of the people. This was an essential period at the beginning of the revolution; without it we should not have risen on the crest of the revolutionary wave; we should have wallowed in its trough. Without it we should not have won the confidence of all the workers and peasants who wanted to build their lives on new lines. But this period has passed,

and we refuse to understand this. Now the peasants and workers will laugh at us if we order this or that government department to be formed or reorganised. The ordinary workers and peasants will display no interest in this now, and they will be right, because this is not the central task today. This is not the sort of thing with which we Communists should now go to the people. Although we who are engaged in government departments are always overwhelmed with so many petty affairs, this is not the link that we must grasp, this is not the key feature. The key feature is that we have not got the right men in the right places; that responsible Communists who acquitted themselves magnificently during the revolution have been given commercial and industrial functions about which they know nothing; and they prevent us from seeing the truth, for rogues and rascals hide magnificently behind their backs. The trouble is that we have no such thing as practical control of how things have been done. This is a prosaic job, a small job; these are petty affairs. But after the greatest political change in history, bearing in mind that for a time we shall have to live in the midst of the capitalist system, the key feature now is not politics in the narrow sense of the word (what we read in the newspapers is just political fireworks; there is nothing socialist in it at all), the key feature is not resolutions, not departments and not reorganisation. As long as these things are necessary we shall do them, but don't go to the people with them. Choose the proper men and introduce practical control. That is what the people will appreciate.

In the sea of people we are after all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we express correctly what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse. The chief thing the people, all the working people, want today is nothing but help in their desperate hunger and need; they want to be shown that the improvement needed by the peasants is really taking place in the form they are accustomed to. The peasant knows and is accustomed to the market and trade. We were unable to introduce direct communist distribution. We lacked the

factories and their equipment for this. That being the case, we must provide the peasants with what they need through the medium of trade, and provide it as well as the capitalist did, otherwise the people will not tolerate such an administration. This is the key to the situation; and unless something unexpected arises, this, given three conditions, should be the central feature of our activities in 1922.

The first condition is that there shall be no intervention. We are doing all we can in the diplomatic field to avoid it; nevertheless, it may occur any day. We must really be on the alert, and we must agree to make certain big sacrifices for the sake of the Red Army, within definite limits, of course. We are confronted by the entire bourgeois world, which is only seeking a way in which to strangle us. Our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are nothing more nor less than the agents of this bourgeoisie. Such is their political status.

The second condition is that the financial crisis shall not be too severe. The crisis is approaching. You will hear about that when we discuss financial policy. If it is too severe and rigorous we shall have to revise many things again and concentrate all efforts on one thing. If it is not too severe it may even be useful; it will give the Communists in all the state trusts a good shaking; only we must not forget to do it. The financial crisis will shake up government departments and industrial enterprises, and those that are not equal to their task will be the first to burst; only we must take care that all the blame for this is not thrown on the specialists while the responsible Communists are praised for being very good fellows who have fought at the fronts and have always worked well. Thus, if the financial crisis is not too severe we can derive some benefit from it and comb the ranks of the responsible Communists engaged in the business departments not in the way the Central Control Commission and the Central Verification Commission[89] comb them, but very thoroughly.

The third condition is that we shall make no political mistakes in this period. Of course, if we do make political mistakes all our work of economic construction will be disrupted and we shall land ourselves in controversies

about how to rectify them and what direction to pursue. But if we make no sad mistakes, the key feature in the near future will be not decrees and politics in the narrow sense of the word, not departments and their organisation—the responsible Communists and the Soviet institutions will deal with these things whenever necessary—the main thing in all our activities will be choosing the right people and making sure that decisions are carried out. If, in this respect, we learn something practical, if we do something practically useful, we shall again overcome all difficulties.

In conclusion I must mention the practical side of the question of our Soviet institutions, the higher government bodies and the Party's relation to them. The relations between the Party and the Soviet government bodies are not what they ought to be. On this point we are quite unanimous. I have given one example of how minor matters are dragged before the Political Bureau. It is extremely difficult to get out of this by formal means, for there is only one governing party in our country; and a member of the Party cannot be prohibited from lodging complaints. That is why everything that comes up on the Council of People's Commissars is dragged before the Political Bureau. I, too, am greatly to blame for this, for to a large extent contact between the Council of People's Commissars and the Political Bureau was maintained through me. When I was obliged to retire from work it was found that the two wheels were not working in unison and Kamenev had to bear a treble load to maintain this contact. Inasmuch as it is barely probable that I shall return to work in the near future, all hope devolves on the fact that there are two other deputies—Comrade Tsyurupa, who has been cleansed by the Germans, and Comrade Rykov, whom they have splendidly cleansed. It seems that even Wilhelm, the German Emperor, has stood us in good stead—I never expected it. He had a surgeon, who happened to be the doctor treating Comrade Rykov, and he removed his worst part, keeping it in Germany, and left the best part intact, sending that part of Comrade Rykov thoroughly cleansed to us. If that method continues to be used it will be a really good thing.

Joking aside, a word or two about the main instructions. On this point there is complete unanimity on the Central Committee, and I hope that the Congress will pay the closest attention to it and endorse the instructions that the Political Bureau and the Central Committee be relieved of minor matters, and that more should be shifted to the responsible officials. The People's Commissars must be responsible for their work and should not bring these matters up first on the Council of People's Commissars and then on the Political Bureau. Formally, we cannot abolish the right to lodge complaints with the Central Committee, for our Party is the only governing party in the country. But we must put a stop to the habit of bringing every petty matter before the Central Committee; we must raise the prestige of the Council of People's Commissars. The Commissars and not the Deputy Commissars must mainly attend the meetings of the Council. The functions of the Council must be changed in the direction in which I have not succeeded in changing them during the past year, that is, it must pay much more attention to executive control. We shall have two more deputies—Rykov and Tsyurupa. When Rykov was in the Extraordinary Authorised Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence for the Supply of the Red Army and Navy he tightened things up and the work went well. Tsyurupa organised one of the most efficient People's Commissariats. If together they make the maximum effort to improve the People's Commissariats in the sense of efficiency and responsibility, we shall make some, even if a little, progress here. We have eighteen People's Commissariats of which not less than fifteen are of no use at all—efficient People's Commissars cannot be found everywhere, and I certainly hope that people give this more of their attention. Comrade Rykov must be a member, of the Central Committee Bureau and of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee because there must be a tie-up between these two bodies, for without this tie-up the main wheels sometimes spin in the air.

In this connection, we must see to it that the number of commissions of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence is reduced. These bodies

must know and settle their own affairs and not split up into an infinite number of commissions. A few days ago the commissions were overhauled. It was found that there were one hundred and twenty of them. How many were necessary? Sixteen. And this is not the first cut. Instead of accepting responsibility for their work, preparing a decision for the Council of People's Commissars and knowing that they bear responsibility for this decision, there is a tendency to take shelter behind commissions. The devil himself would lose his way in this maze of commissions. Nobody knows what is going on, who is responsible; everything is mixed up, and finally a decision is passed for which everybody is held responsible.

In this connection, reference must be made to the need for extending and developing the autonomy and activities of the regional economic conferences. The administrative division of Russia has now been drawn up on scientific lines; the economic and climatic conditions, the way of life, the conditions of obtaining fuel, of local industry, etc., have all been taken into account. On the basis of this division, district and regional economic conferences have been instituted. Changes may be made here and there, of course, but the prestige of these economic conferences must be enhanced.

Then we must see to it that the All-Russia Central Executive Committee works more energetically, meets in session more regularly, and for longer periods. The sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee should discuss bills which sometimes are hastily brought before the Council of People's Commissars when there is no need to do so. It would be better to postpone such bills and give the local workers an opportunity to study them carefully. Stricter demands should be made upon those who draft the bills. This is not done.

If the sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee last longer, they can split up into sections and subcommissions, and thus will be able to verify the work more strictly and strive to achieve what in my opinion is the key, the quintessence of the present political situation: to concentrate attention on choosing the right people and on verifying how decisions are carried out.

It must be admitted, and we must not be afraid to admit, that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the responsible Communists are not in the jobs they are now fit for; that they are unable to perform their duties, and that they must sit down to learn. If this is admitted, and since we have the opportunity to learn—judging by the general international situation we shall have time to do so—we must do it, come what may. (*Stormy applause.*)

3

CLOSING SPEECH ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) MARCH 28

(*Applause.*) First of all I shall have to devote a little time to criticising the remarks made here by Comrades Preobrazhensky and Osinsky. I think that on the most important and fundamental question Comrades Preobrazhensky and Osinsky were wide of the mark, and their own statements have proved their line of policy to be wrong.

Comrade Preobrazhensky spoke about capitalism and said that we ought to open a general discussion on our Programme. I think that this would be the most unproductive and unjustified waste of time.

First of all about state capitalism.

"State capitalism is capitalism," said Preobrazhensky, "and that is the only way it can and should be interpreted." I say that that is pure scholasticism. Up to now nobody could have written a book about this sort of capitalism, because this is the first time in human history that we see anything like it. All the more or less intelligible books about state capitalism that have appeared up to now were written under conditions and in a situation where state capitalism was capitalism. Now things are different; and neither Marx nor the Marxists could foresee this. We must not look to the past. When you write history, you will write it magnificently; but when you write a textbook, you will say: State capitalism is the most unexpected and absolutely unforeseen form of capitalism—for nobody could foresee that the proletariat would achieve power in one of the least developed countries, and would first try

to organise large-scale production and distribution for the peasantry and then, finding that it could not cope with the task owing to the low standard of culture, would enlist the services of capitalism. Nobody ever foresaw this; but it is an incontrovertible fact.

Comrade Larin, in his speech, revealed that he has a very vague conception of the New Economic Policy and of how it should be handled.

Not a single serious objection has been raised to our adoption of the New Economic Policy. The proletariat is not afraid to admit that certain things in the revolution went off magnificently, and that others went awry. All the revolutionary parties that have perished so far, perished because they became conceited, because they failed to see the source of their strength and feared to discuss their weaknesses. We, however, shall not perish, because we are not afraid to discuss our weaknesses and will learn to overcome them. (*Applause.*) The capitalism that we have permitted is essential. If it is ugly and bad, we shall be able to rectify it, because power is in our hands and we have nothing to fear. Everybody admits this, and so it is ridiculous to confuse this with panic-mongering. If we were afraid to admit this our doom would be sealed. But the fact that we will learn and want to learn this is proved by the experience of the past three, four, five years, during which we learnt more complicated matters in a shorter period. True, then we were driven by necessity. During the war we were driven very hard; I think there was neither a front nor a campaign in which we were not hard pressed. The enemy came within a hundred versts of Moscow; was approaching Orel; was within five versts of Petrograd. That was the time we really woke up and began to learn and to put the lessons we had learnt into practice, and we drove out the enemy.

The position now is that we have to deal with an enemy in mundane economics, and this is a thousand times more difficult. The controversies over state capitalism that have been raging in our literature up to now could at best be included in textbooks on history. I do not in the least deny that textbooks are useful, and recently I wrote that it would be far better if our authors devoted less attention

to newspapers and political twaddle and wrote textbooks, as many of them, including Comrade Larin, could do splendidly. His talent would prove most useful on work of this kind and we would solve the problem that Comrade Trotsky emphasised so well when he said that the main task at the present time is to train the younger generation, but we have nothing to train them with. Indeed, from what can the younger generation learn the social sciences? From the old bourgeois junk. This is disgraceful! And this is at a time when we have hundreds of Marxist authors who could write textbooks on all social problems, but do not do so because their minds are taken up with other things.

As regards state capitalism, we ought to know what should be the slogan for agitation and propaganda, what must be explained, what we must get everyone to understand practically. And that is that the state capitalism that we have now is not the state capitalism that the Germans wrote about. It is capitalism that we ourselves have permitted. Is that true or not? Everybody knows that it is true!

At a congress of Communists we passed a decision that state capitalism would be permitted by the proletarian state, and we are the state. If we did wrong we are to blame and it is no use shifting the blame to somebody else! We must learn, we must see to it that in a proletarian country state capitalism cannot and does not go beyond the framework and conditions delineated for it by the proletariat, beyond conditions that benefit the proletariat. It was quite rightly pointed out here that we had to give consideration to the peasants as a mass, and enable them to trade freely. Every intelligent worker appreciates that this is necessary for the proletarian dictatorship, and only Comrade Shlyapnikov can joke about and mock it. This is appreciated by everybody and has been chewed over a thousand times, but you simply refuse to understand it. If under present conditions the peasant must have freedom to trade within certain limits, we must give it to him, but this does not mean that we are permitting trade in raw brandy. We shall punish people for that sort of trade. It does not mean that we are permitting the sale of political literature called Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary and financed by the capitalists of the whole world.

That is what I meant when I mentioned machine-guns, and Comrade Shlyapnikov should have understood it. What he says is nonsensical!

You will not frighten anybody and you will not win any sympathy! (*Applause. Laughter.*)

Poor Shlyapnikov! Lenin had planned to use machine-guns against him!

What I had in mind was Party disciplinary measures, and not machine-guns as such. When we talk about machine-guns we have in mind the people in this country whom we call Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and who argue as follows: "You say you are retreating towards capitalism, and we say the same thing; we agree with you!" We are constantly hearing this sort of thing; and abroad a gigantic propaganda campaign is being conducted to prove that while we Bolsheviks are keeping the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in prison, we ourselves are permitting capitalism. True, we are permitting capitalism, but within the limits that the peasants need. This is essential! Without it the peasants could not exist and continue with their husbandry. But we maintain that the Russian peasants can do very well without Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik propaganda. To those who assert the contrary we say: We would rather perish to the last man than yield to you! And our courts must understand all this. Now that we are passing from the Cheka to state-political courts we must say at this Congress that there is no such thing as above-class courts. Our courts must be elected, proletarian courts; and they must know what it is that we are permitting. They must clearly understand what state capitalism is.

This is the political slogan of the day and not a controversy about what the German professors meant by state capitalism and what we mean by it. We have gone through a great deal since then, and it is altogether unseemly for us to look back.

The degree to which Comrade Preobrazhensky goes off the political track is shown by what he said about an Economic Bureau and about the Programme.[90] What a magnificent thing our Programme is, but how frightfully we garble it! How is that possible? Because some people read

it word for word and line by line, and beyond that they will not look. They pick out a passage and say: "There was a controversy over this." Some say that the line of the Workers' Faculties and of the Communist local cells was correct, but the line of those who said: "Go easy, treat those specialists more carefully", was wrong. True, the Communist cells are splendid and so are the Workers' Faculties, but they are not infallible; they are not saints....

Yes, the Communist cells are the representatives of our Party, and the Workers' Faculties are the representatives of our class; but the fact that they make mistakes and that we must correct them is an elementary truism. How they are to be corrected I do not know, because I did not attend the meetings of the Central Committee at which this question was discussed. But I do know that the Workers' Faculties and the Communist cells overdo things in the line they have taken against the professors. After our Central Committee has examined this question in all its aspects and has decided that things have been overdone and that a more cautious line must be adopted towards these professors, who are the representatives of an alien class, Comrade Preobrazhensky comes along, takes out the Programme and says: "No political concessions to this stratum; that would be an infringement of the Programme."

If we start guiding the Party in this way we shall inevitably go under. And this is not because Comrade Preobrazhensky has wrong ideas about politics in general, a but because he approaches everything from the angle of what is his strongest point; he is a theoretician whose mind is restricted by what is customary and usual; he is a propagandist whose mind is taken up with measures directed to the purpose of propaganda. Everybody is aware of and appreciates this strong point of his, but when he approaches things from the political and administrative angle the result is simply monstrous. Set up an Economic Bureau?! But everybody has just said, everybody has agreed, and we have complete unanimity on the point (and this is very important, for action depends upon this unity) that the Party machinery must be separated from the Soviet government machinery.

It is terribly difficult to do this; we lack the men! But Preobrazhensky comes along and airily says that Stalin has jobs in two Commissariats.[91] Who among us has not sinned in this way? Who has not undertaken several duties at once? And how can we do otherwise? What can we do to preserve the present situation in the People's Commissariat of Nationalities; to handle all the Turkestan, Caucasian, and other questions? These are all political questions! They have to be settled. These are questions that have engaged the attention of European states for hundreds of years, and only an infinitesimal number of them have been settled in democratic republics. We are settling them; and we need a man to whom the representatives of any of these nations can go and discuss their difficulties in all detail. Where can we find such a man? I don't think Comrade Preobrazhensky could suggest any better candidate than Comrade Stalin.

The same thing applies to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. This is a vast business; but to be able to handle investigations we must have at the head of it a man who enjoys high prestige, otherwise we shall become submerged in and overwhelmed by petty intrigue.

Comrade Preobrazhensky proposes that an Economic Bureau should be set up; but if we do that all our talk about separating Party activities from Soviet government activities will be just hot air. Comrade Preobrazhensky proposes what appears to be a splendid scheme: on the one hand the Political Bureau, then the Economic Bureau, and then the Organising Bureau. But all this is very fine only on paper; in actual practice it is ridiculous! I positively cannot understand how, after Soviet power has been in existence for five years, a man who has an intuition for vital politics can make and insist upon such a proposal.

What is the difference between the Organising Bureau and the Political Bureau? You cannot draw a hard and fast line between a political question and an organisation question. Any political question may be an organisation question, and vice versa. Only after established practice had shown that questions could be transferred from the Organising Bureau to the Political Bureau was it possible to organise the work of the Central Committee properly.

Has anybody ever proposed anything different? No, because no other rational solution can be proposed. Political questions cannot be mechanically separated from organisation questions. Politics are conducted by definite people; but if other people are going to draft documents, nothing will come of it.

You know perfectly well that there have been revolutions in which parliamentary assemblies drafted documents which were put into effect by people from another class. This led to friction, and they were kicked out. Organisation questions cannot be separated from politics. Politics are concentrated economics.

Comrade Kosior complained about the Central Committee and mentioned names (I have written them all down). I am not personally familiar with the subject, and so I cannot answer; but if you, as the Party Congress, are interested, it is your duty to elect a commission to investigate every case and subject Kosior and the persons concerned to examination by third degree. The whole point here is that if the Central Committee is deprived of the right to distribute forces, it will be unable to direct policy. Although we make mistakes when we transfer people from one place to another, nevertheless, I take the liberty of asserting that all the time it has been functioning, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee has made the minimum of mistakes. This is not self-praise. The activities of the Political Bureau are tested not by commissions, not by people appointed by our Party, but by the whiteguards, by our enemies; and the proof is the results of its policy, in which no serious mistakes have been committed.

Comrade Osinsky's strong point is that if he undertakes anything he pursues it with energy and vigour. We must do all we can to cultivate this strong point of his and to curb his weak points (even if Osinsky raises a howl—he is such a vigorous fellow—this must be done; otherwise, as a worker, he will be done for). We on the Central Committee have taken measures which, I think, will combine his weak points with his strong ones.

If I wanted to polemise with Comrade Osinsky—which I do not want to do—I would say that the weightiest evidence that could be brought against him is the speech he

delivered here today. I would have it printed and posted up on a board.... There was once a man....

A Deputy People's Commissar and a leading figure in one of the most important People's Commissariats, and foremost among those who can draw up a platform on any question, this man proposes that we should adopt the Cabinet system.[92] I assert that this man is absolutely done for.... I will not go into this in detail, or polemise; what interests me most is that Comrade Osinsky's vast energy should be directed into proper channels. If Comrade Osinsky does not, in a comradely way, heed the advice that has been often given to him by the Central Committee, and for which I have been largely responsible, and if he does not moderate his zeal in this matter, he will inevitably find himself in the mire, as he found himself today.

This is very unpleasant for a man who is fond of displaying his character; and it is quite legitimate for a man gifted with a strong character to want to display it. Would to God that everybody had such a character to display. But the Central Committee must see to it that this character is displayed for a useful purpose. The Central Committee must see to it that this talk about a Cabinet is cut short, even if the man who undergoes this circumcision, so to speak, complains about it. This will be beneficial. He must put a curb on his talents to prevent himself from landing in the mire; and he must consult comrades in the other People's Commissariats and adhere to the general line. Has any one of our Commissariats done anything without controversy? No.

"Improvement of the system of administration and the psychological mobilisation of the masses." This is sheer murder! If the Congress were to adopt this politically reactionary point of view it would be the surest and best method of committing suicide.

"Improvement of the system of administration"?! Pray God that we succeed, at least, in getting out of the muddle that we are in today.

We have no system?! For five years we have been spending our best efforts in the endeavour to create this system! This system is a tremendous step forward.

The machinery of state is faulty! Do we know what the

trouble is? We do not! But Comrade Osinsky talks as if he does. Why, he can sit down and in ten minutes devise a whole system of administration. It will be harmful and a political mistake if his zeal is not curbed. In other channels, however, the zeal he is displaying now will be very useful.

Well, that's one illustration. And then Comrades Preobrazhensky and Osinsky bore out in their comments what I said about the most important thing, and Comrade Larin proved it still more thoroughly. Look what he did. He hurled accusations at me and laughed and jested very merrily.

He does this magnificently; this is his strong point. If Comrade Larin could display this strong point of his in some field other than that of state activities he would be a thousand times more useful for our Republic; for he is a very capable man and has a vivid imagination. This quality is extremely valuable; it is wrong to think that only poets need imagination. That is a silly prejudice! It is needed even in mathematics; it would have been impossible to discover the differential and integral calculus without imagination. Imagination is a very valuable asset; but Comrade Larin has a little too much of it. I would say, for example, that if Comrade Larin's stock of imagination were divided equally among all the members of the R.C.P., there would be very good results. (*Laughter. Applause.*) But until we can perform this operation, Comrade Larin must be kept away from state, administrative, planning, and economic affairs. Otherwise, we shall have the same thing occurring as did in the old Supreme Economic Council, when Comrade Rykov had not yet recovered, and affairs were directed and documents signed by "Y. Larin" on behalf of the entire Supreme Economic Council. Things were run badly not because Comrade Larin displayed his worst qualities, but on the contrary; it was because he displayed his best qualities—and nobody can have even a shadow of doubt about his devotion and knowledge of affairs. Nevertheless, things were run badly.

This is exactly what I said. True, all these are copybook maxims. As for copybook maxims, even Kamkov poked fun at me for this at the Congress of the Socialist-

Revolutionaries. He said: "Today, Lenin is preaching: 'Thou shalt not steal'; and tomorrow he will add: 'Thou shalt not commit adultery.' This is all that Lenin's wisdom amounts to." I heard this from Kamkov, the Socialist-Revolutionary, as far back as 1918. And if Kamkov, who backed these arguments with artillery, made no impression on anyone, what impression can Comrade Larin's jokes make? Now we must concentrate all our attention on the major problems of our New Economic Policy. Here Comrade Larin tried to divert the Party on to the wrong road. If he were engaged with matters on which he could usefully display his numerous talents, where he could be of great benefit to the younger generation, and where he would not play such a trick as he played in the State Planning Commission, it would be entirely different. If he were engaged in such work he would make an impression on the younger generation—I think I am speaking plainly enough—and we should not have the confusion that he has caused here.[93]

I said that Comrade Kamenev proposed on the Political Bureau that a resolution be adopted to the effect that it would be useful to import food and that canned goods be purchased with Soviet currency. Larin sat here, heard this perfectly well, and remembering it perfectly well, said as soon as he got on to the platform: "Lenin forgot, owing to ill health—we shall forgive him this time—that the permission of the Political Bureau has to be obtained for disbursements from the gold reserve." Had Comrade Kamenev proposed that we should take money out of the gold reserve and give it to French profiteers in exchange for canned goods we would not have listened to him. We did not offer a single gold kopek for the canned goods, we offered Soviet paper currency and—just imagine—it was accepted. Wolfson even assured me yesterday that these canned goods were of good quality (although they have not arrived yet); but I shall not believe him until we have tasted them, because here they may try to cheat us. The point is, however, that Comrade Larin garbled the facts; we did not spend a single gold kopek; we spent 160,000 million Soviet paper rubles.

Of course, it would be ridiculous and absurd to think that Comrade Larin did this with malicious intent. No,

that is not the point. The point is that his imagination soars a trillion kilometres high and, as a consequence, he mixes everything up.

Then he went on to say that the State Planning Commission had proposed to lease out three-fourths of our railways. It is a good thing that he said this at the Party Congress, where Krzhizhanovsky immediately refuted him. It does not often happen like that. You think that talk of this sort is heard only at Party congresses? Inquire at the Central Control Commission and they will tell you how they examined the case of the Moscow Debating Club,[94] and what brought up the case of the Moscow Debating Club, where Comrades Larin and Ryazanov ... (*Ryazanov from his seat*: "I said nothing about the gold reserve there; worse things were said.") I was not in Moscow and took no part in the investigation of this case, I merely had a brief report.... (*Ryazanov*: "Don't believe every rumour.") I learned this from a conversation I had with Comrade Solts; it is not a rumour, but a conversation I had with a man whom our supreme body, the Party Congress, had appointed to the Central Control Commission. It was he who told me; and what he told me cannot rouse the slightest doubt. One must be very thoughtless to call this a rumour. The Central Control Commission investigated the affair of the Debating Club and was obliged to state unanimously that it was not being run properly. What is wrong is quite clear to me. Today, Larin, in passing, carried away by his own eloquence, went to the length of saying that a proposal had been made to lease out three-fourths of our railways, but that the Central Committee had put the matter right. Krzhizhanovsky said that nothing of the kind had happened; the Central Committee had put nothing right; Larin had simply muddled up his facts. This is constantly happening.

For four years we have been unable to put a useful worker like Larin to really useful work and to relieve him of work where he causes harm, in spite of himself.

The situation is rather unnatural, I think. We have the dictatorship of the proletariat, a reign of terror, victory over all the armies in the world, but no victory over Larin's army! Here we have suffered utter defeat! He is always

doing what he has no business to do. His vast knowledge and his ability to enthuse people would be of real benefit to the younger generation, which is groping in the dark. We are unable to utilise his knowledge, and this gives rise to friction and resistance. Here the Political Bureau, the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee and the Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, which are accused of enjoying too much authority, turn out to have insufficient authority, or prestige, to distribute all the comrades properly.

We must think this question over and discuss it seriously. This is the pivot of our work, and we must set things right here. If we do, we shall emerge from our difficulties. We shall achieve this by rectifying things, but not by talking about the new tasks of the Agrarian Programme as Osinsky and Larin did. I wrote a review of this programme for the Central Committee.[95] I shall not discuss it now; every member of the Party interested in the subject has a right to go to the Secretariat and read it there. Please do so. If we divert the efforts of Larin and Osinsky into the proper channels and curb their misguided zeal, enormous benefit will accrue.

In conclusion I shall say a few words about Shlyapnikov. I intended to speak about him at greater length, but ninety-nine per cent of this subject has been covered by Trotsky and Zinoviev, who on instructions of the Central Committee replied to the Statement of the Twenty-Two[96] at the meeting of the Communist International.

Firstly, Comrade Shlyapnikov pretended not to understand why I referred to machine-guns and panic-mongers; and he jokingly said that he had been tried lots of times. Of course, comrades, it is not a bad thing to make a joke. One cannot speak at a big meeting without cracking a joke or two, because one's audience gets weary. One must be human. But there are certain things that one must not joke about; there is such a thing as Party unity.

At a time when we are completely surrounded by enemies; when the international bourgeoisie is sufficiently astute to shift Milyukov to the left, to supply the Socialist-Revolutionaries with money for the publication of all sorts of newspapers and to incite Vandervelde and Otto

Bauer to launch a campaign against the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and to howl that the Bolsheviks are brutes; when all these people, who have studied politics for ages and have thousands of millions of gold rubles, francs, etc., at their disposal, are arrayed against us, for Comrade Shlyapnikov to crack jokes and to say: "I have been tried by the Central Committee", and so forth, is a deplorable thing, comrades. The Party Congress must draw definite conclusions. We do not arrange trials at the Central Committee for nothing! Comrade Shlyapnikov was tried by the Central Committee, and we were short of three votes to expel him from the Party.[97] The members of the Party gathered at this Congress should interest themselves in the matter and read the minutes of that meeting of the Central Committee. This is no laughing matter!

You have a legitimate right to appeal to the Communist International. But a long time before that appeal was lodged a large majority of the Central Committee was in favour of expelling Comrade Shlyapnikov; only the necessary two-third vote was lacking. You cannot trifle with a thing like that! It will do you no harm to know that at the meeting of the Communist group at the Metalworkers' Congress Comrade Shlyapnikov openly advocated a split.

Comrade Trotsky has already dealt with the significance of Comrade Kollontai's pamphlet.

If we trifle with things like this it will be utterly hopeless to expect that we shall hold on in the difficult situation in which we now find ourselves. I have indicated the three conditions under which it will be possible for us to hold on: first, that there shall be no intervention; second, that the financial crisis shall not be too severe; and third, that we shall make no political mistakes.

One of the speakers stated that I said political complications. No, I said political mistakes. If we make no political mistakes, I say, 99 per cent of the Party membership will be with us, and so also will the non-Party workers and peasants, who will understand that this is the time to learn.

I remember that in the article he wrote on the anniversary of the Red Army Comrade Trotsky said: "A year of tuition." This slogan applies equally to the Party and to the working

class. During this period we have rallied around us a vast number of heroic people who have undoubtedly made the turn in world history permanent. But this does not justify our failure to understand that we now have ahead of us a "year of tuition".

We are standing much more firmly on our feet today than we stood a year ago. Of course, even today the bourgeoisie may attempt another armed intervention, but they will find it much more difficult than before; it is much more difficult today than it was yesterday.

To ensure ourselves the opportunity to learn we must make no political mistakes. We must waste no time playing with the unity of the Party, as Comrade Shlyapnikov is doing. We cannot afford games of that kind! We know that the conflict within the Party is costing us a great deal. Comrades, we must not forget this lesson! Concerning the past year, the Central Committee has every right to say that at the opening of this Congress there was less factional strife in the Party, it was more united than last year. I do not want to boast that all factionalism in the Party has vanished. But it is an incontrovertible fact that there is less factionalism in the Party today. This has been proved.

You know that the present Workers' Opposition is only a wreck of the former Workers' Opposition. Compare the signatures appended to the Statement of the Twenty-Two with those appended to the platform that was issued before the Tenth Congress. You will find that many of those signatures are missing. We must tell those people who legitimately used their right to appeal to the Communist International that they had no right to appeal on behalf of Myasnikov. The Myasnikov case came up last summer,[98] I was not in Moscow at the time, but I wrote Myasnikov a long letter,[99] which he inserted in his pamphlet. I saw that he was a capable man and that it was worth while having a talk with him; but this man must be told that if he comes out with criticism of this sort it will not be tolerated.

He writes a letter saying: "Collect all the discontented in the district." Yes, it is not a very difficult matter to collect all the discontented in a district. Take the speeches that Shlyapnikov delivers here, and which Comrade Med-

vedyev delivers elsewhere. (*Medvedyev from his seat*: "Where did you obtain your information?") I obtained my information from the bodies appointed by the Congress of the R.C.P.: the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Central Control Commission. Make inquiries there, if you like, and you will learn what sort of speeches Comrade Medvedyev delivers. If we do not put a stop to this sort of thing we shall be unable to maintain unity which, perhaps, is our greatest asset. We must ruthlessly expose our mistakes and discuss them. If we clearly understand this—and we are beginning to understand it at this Congress—there is not the slightest doubt that we shall be able to overcome them. (*Stormy applause*.)

4
SPEECH IN CLOSING THE CONGRESS
APRIL 2

Comrades, we have reached the end of our Congress.

The first difference that strikes one in comparing this Congress with the preceding one is the greater solidarity, the greater unanimity and greater organisational unity that have been displayed.

Only a small part of one of the sections of the opposition that existed at the last Congress has placed itself outside the Party.

On the trade union question and on the New Economic Policy no disagreements, or hardly any disagreements, have been revealed in our Party.

The radically and fundamentally "new" achievement of this Congress is that it has provided vivid proof that our enemies are wrong in constantly reiterating that our Party is becoming senile and is losing its flexibility of mind and body.

No. We have not lost this flexibility.

When the objective state of affairs in Russia, and all over the world, called for an advance, for a supremely bold, swift and determined onslaught on the enemy, we made that onslaught. If necessary, we shall do it again and again.

By that we raised our revolution to a height hitherto unparalleled in the world. No power on earth, no matter how much evil, hardship and suffering it may yet cause millions and hundreds of millions of people, can annul the major gains of our revolution, for these are no longer our but historic gains.

But when in the spring of 1921 it turned out that the vanguard of the revolution was in danger of becoming

isolated from the masses of the people, from the masses of the peasants, whom it must skilfully lead forward, we unanimously and firmly decided to retreat. And on the whole, during the past year we retreated in good revolutionary order.

The proletarian revolutions maturing in all advanced countries of the world will be unable to solve their problems unless they combine the ability to fight heroically and to attack with the ability to retreat in good revolutionary order. The experience of the second period of our struggle, i.e., the experience of retreat, will in the future probably be just as useful to the workers of at least some countries, as the experience of the first period of our revolution, i.e., the experience of bold attack, will undoubtedly prove useful to the workers of all countries.

Now we have decided to halt the retreat.

This means that the entire object of our policy must be formulated in a new way.

The central feature of the situation now is that the vanguard must not shirk the work of educating itself, of remoulding itself, must not be afraid of frankly admitting that it is not sufficiently trained and lacks the necessary skill. The main thing now is to advance as an immeasurably wider and larger mass, and only together with the peasantry, proving to them by deeds, in practice, by experience, that we are learning, and that we shall learn to assist them, to lead them forward. In the present international situation, in the present state of the productive forces of Russia, this problem can be solved only very slowly, cautiously, in a business-like way, and by testing a thousand times in a practical way every step that is taken.

If voices are raised in our Party against this extremely slow and extremely cautious progress, these voices will be isolated ones.

The Party as a whole has understood—and will now prove by deeds that it has understood—that at the present time its work must be organised exactly along these lines, and since we have understood it, we shall achieve our goal!

I declare the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party closed.

ON THE DRAFT OF THE ELEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS RESOLUTION ON WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE[100]

LETTER TO COMRADE OSINSKY

April 1, 1922

Comrade Osinsky,

After thinking over the conversation I had with you about the work of the Agricultural Section of the Party Congress, I have arrived at the conclusion that the most urgent thing at the present time is:

> not to tie our (neither the Party's nor the Soviet government's) hands by any orders, directives or rules until we have collected sufficient facts about economic life in the localities and until we have sufficiently studied the actual conditions and requirements of present-day peasant farming;
>
> under no circumstances to permit what would be most dangerous and harmful at the present time, and what the local authorities may easily slip into—superfluous, clumsy and hasty regulation that has not been tested by experience.

The recent Congress of Soviets laid down the line. The task of the Party Congress, in my opinion, is to discuss in the Agricultural Section the application of this line in the light of *practical experience in the localities*; to instruct the Central Committee of the R.C.P. and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (the Soviet government bodies in general) more thoroughly to collect detailed facts that can be used as verification material; to order, or rather, to give directions to the Communist group at the next session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to the effect that in working out the details of the decision

of the Congress of Soviets, i.e., in converting this decision into new and more detailed laws, to be as cautious as possible so as not to hinder the successful development of agricultural production by clumsy interference.

What we must fear most of all, I think, is clumsy interference; for we have not yet made a thorough study of the actual requirements of *local* agricultural life and the actual abilities of the machinery of local administration (the ability not to do evil in the name of doing good).

Hence, it seems to me that it is desirable that something *approximating* the following be included in the resolution of the Party Congress based on the proceedings of the Agricultural Section:

> 1) The Party Congress, having heard the report of the proceedings of the Agricultural Section, accepts it as information; it finds that the material so far collected on the experience of the localities is inadequate and that the primary task of the Party and of Communist groups in all Soviet bodies is to collect carefully and make a close study of local practical experience.
>
> 2) The Congress regards the dissolution (or hasty reorganisation?) of the agricultural co-operative organisations as a mistake, and recommends the greatest caution in this matter.
>
> 3) On the question of the conditions on which hired labour may be employed on the farms, and of the terms on which land may be rented, the Party Congress recommends all officials engaged in this field of work not to restrict either of these transactions by unnecessary formalities, but to confine themselves to putting into effect the decisions of the recent Congress of Soviets and to studying the practical measures it would be expedient to adopt to curb all tendencies to go to extremes and harmful excesses in these matters.
>
> 4) The Congress considers that the primary and main object of all Party activities among the peasantry is to render practical assistance in immediately extending the area planted to crops, bringing fresh lands under the plough, increasing the output of farm produce and in alleviating the hardships of

the peasantry. All efforts and resources must be devoted to assisting and encouraging the poor section of the peasantry, and every effort must be made to devise measures that in practice will prove suitable for this purpose even under the present difficult conditions.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

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WE HAVE PAID TOO MUCH

Imagine that a Communist has to enter premises in which agents of the bourgeoisie are carrying on their propaganda at a fairly large meeting of workers. Imagine also that the bourgeoisie demands from us a high price for admission to these premises. If the price has not been agreed to beforehand we must bargain, of course, in order not to impose too heavy a burden upon our Party funds. If we pay too much for admission to these premises we shall undoubtedly commit an error. But it is better to pay a high price—at all events until we have learned to bargain properly—than to reject an opportunity of speaking to workers who hitherto have been in the exclusive "possession", so to speak, of the reformists, i.e., of the most loyal friends of the bourgeoisie.

This analogy came to my mind when in today's *Pravda* I read a telegram from Berlin stating the terms on which agreement has been reached between the representatives of the three Internationals.

In my opinion our representatives were wrong in agreeing to the following two conditions: first, that the Soviet government should not apply the death penalty in the case of the forty-seven Socialist-Revolutionaries, second that the Soviet government should permit representatives of the three Internationals to be present at the trial.

These two conditions are nothing more nor less than a political concession on the part of the revolutionary proletariat to the reactionary bourgeoisie. If anyone has any doubt about the correctness of this definition, then, to reveal the political naïveté of such a person, it is sufficient to ask him the following questions. Would the

British or any other contemporary government permit representatives of the three Internationals to attend the trial of Irish workers charged with rebellion? Or the trial of the workers implicated in the recent rebellion in South Africa?[101] Would the British or any other government, in such, or similar circumstances, agree to promise that it would not impose the death penalty on its political opponents? A little reflection over these questions will be sufficient to enable one to understand the following simple truth. All over the world a struggle is going on between the reactionary bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat. In the present case the Communist International which represents one side in this struggle, makes a political concession to the other side, i.e., the reactionary bourgeoisie; for everybody in the world knows (except those who want to conceal the obvious truth) that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have shot at Communists and have organised revolts against them, and that they have done this actually, and sometimes officially, in a united front with the whole of the international reactionary bourgeoisie.

The question is—what concession has the international bourgeoisie made to us in return? There can only be one reply to this question, and it is that no concession has been made to us whatever.

Only arguments which becloud this simple and clear truth of the class struggle, only arguments which throw dust in the eyes of the masses of working people, can obscure this obvious fact. Under the agreement signed in Berlin by the representatives of the Third International we have made two political concessions to the international bourgeoisie. We have obtained no concession in return.

The representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals acted as blackmailers to extort a political concession from the proletariat for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, while emphatically refusing, or at any rate making no attempt, to induce the international bourgeoisie to make some political concession to the revolutionary proletariat. Of course, this incontrovertible political fact was obscured by shrewd bourgeois diplomats (the bourgeoisie has been training members of its class to become good diplomats for many centuries); but the attempt to

obscure the fact does not change it in the least. Whether the various representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals are in direct or indirect collusion with the bourgeoisie is a matter of tenth-rate importance in the present case. We do not accuse them of being in direct collusion. The question of whether there has been direct collusion or fairly intricate, indirect connection has nothing to do with the case. The only point that has anything to do with it is that as a result of the pressure of the representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, the Communist International has made a political concession to the international bourgeoisie and has obtained no concession in return.

What conclusion should be drawn from this?

First, that Comrades Radek, Bukharin and the others who represented the Communist International acted wrongly.

Further. Does it follow from this that we must tear up the agreement that they signed? No. I think it would be wrong to draw such a conclusion. We ought not to tear up the agreement. All we have to do is to realise that on this occasion the bourgeois diplomats proved to be more skilful than ours, and that next time, if the price of admission is not fixed beforehand, we must bargain and manoeuvre more skilfully. We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie (no matter how skilfully these concessions may be concealed by intermediaries, no matter of what sort) unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to the other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism.

Perhaps the Italian Communists and a section of the French Communists and Syndicalists, who were opposed to united front tactics, will infer from the above argument that united front tactics are wrong. But such an inference will obviously be wrong. If the communist representatives have paid too much for admission to premises in which they have some, even if small, opportunity of addressing workers up to now in the exclusive "possession" of reformists, such a mistake must be rectified next time. But it would be an

incomparably greater mistake to reject all terms, or all payment for admission to these fairly well-guarded and barred premises. The mistake that Comrades Radek, Bukharin and the others made is not a grave one, especially as our only risk is that the enemies of Soviet Russia may be encouraged by the result of the Berlin Conference to make two or three perhaps successful attempts on the lives of certain persons; for they know beforehand that they can shoot at Communists in the expectation that conferences like the Berlin Conference will hinder the Communists from shooting at them.

At all events, we have made some breach in the premises that were closed to us. At all events, Comrade Radek has succeeded in exposing, at least to a section of the workers, the fact that the Second International refused to include among the slogans of the demonstration a demand to annul the Treaty of Versailles. The great mistake the Italian Communists and a section of the French Communists and Syndicalists make is in being content with the knowledge they already possess. They are content with knowing well enough that the representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, and also Paul Levi, Serrati and others, are very shrewd agents of the bourgeoisie and vehicles of their influence. But people, workers, who really know this, and who really understand its significance, are undoubtedly in the minority in Italy, Britain, the U.S.A. and France. Communists must not stew in their own juice, but must learn to penetrate into prohibited premises where the representatives of the bourgeoisie are influencing the workers; and in this they must not shrink from making certain sacrifices and not be afraid of making mistakes, which, at first, are inevitable in every new and difficult undertaking. The Communists who refuse to understand this and who do not want to learn how to do it cannot hope to win over the majority of the workers; at all events, they are hindering and retarding the work of winning this majority. For Communists, and all genuine adherents of the workers' revolution, this is absolutely unpardonable.

Once again, the bourgeoisie, in the persons of their diplomats, have outwitted the representatives of the Communist International. Such is the lesson of the Berlin

Conference. We shall not forget this lesson. We shall draw all the necessary conclusions from it. The representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals need a united front, for they hope to weaken us by inducing us to make exorbitant concessions; they hope to penetrate into our communist premises without any payment, they hope to utilise united front tactics for the purpose of convincing the workers that reformist tactics are correct and that revolutionary tactics are wrong. We need a united front because we hope to convince the workers of the opposite. We shall put the blame for the mistakes on our communist representatives who committed them, and on those parties which commit them, while we shall try to learn from these mistakes and to prevent a repetition of them in the future. But under no circumstances shall we thrust the blame for the mistakes of our Communists upon the proletarian masses, who all over the world are facing the onslaught of advancing capital. We adopted united front tactics in order to help these masses to fight capitalism, to help them understand the "cunning mechanism" of the two fronts in international economics and in international politics; and we shall pursue these tactics to the end.

April 9, 1922

Pravda No. 81, April 11, 1922
Signed: Lenin

Dictated by telephone
Published according to
the *Pravda* text

DECREE ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE[102]

1. THE GENERAL AND MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN

1. The main functions of the Deputy Chairmen, for which they are particularly responsible and to which all their other functions must be subordinated, are to exercise executive control over the fulfilment of decrees, laws and decisions; to reduce the staffs of Soviet government offices and supervise the reorganisation of their business on proper and rational lines, and to combat bureaucratic methods and red tape.

The ensuing gives these main functions in detail or supplements them in minor particulars.

It is the duty of the Deputy Chairmen:

2. To ensure that no question concerning Soviet affairs is discussed by other bodies, government or Party (Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee Political Bureau and Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P., and so forth, without exception), without the knowledge and participation of the Deputy Chairmen.

3. To relieve the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence as far as possible of minor matters, part (and most) of which should be settled by the departmental administrations and part (in urgent

and exceptionally important cases) by the Deputy Chairmen themselves.

4. To ensure by strict supervision that the executive sessions of the Council of Labour and Defence and particularly of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars shall not assume more functions than are absolutely necessary, shall not complicate their duties and functions, nor permit their functions to become bureaucratically inflated and hypertrophied; they must demand more self-reliance and more responsibility from every People's Commissar and every government department.

5. To compel the People's Commissars and independent government departments to administer their affairs on their own responsibility in accordance with their prescribed rights and duties.

6. To see to it that the degree of responsibility, primarily of members of Collegiums and of the most important Soviet officials, and then of all Soviet officials, shall be precisely and individually defined; to combat relentlessly the prevailing haziness and vagueness concerning each individual's duties and the complete lack of responsibility resulting from this.

7. To become personally acquainted with a certain number of Soviet officials not only of the highest rank, but primarily the medium and lower officials, by summoning them to the centre and, wherever possible, by visiting government offices in Moscow and the provinces, so as to test and choose men, and also to really improve the machinery of Soviet government.

8. To give priority to those People's Commissariats, their departments and offices which for a specific period acquire exceptional importance, and to render them the maximum of assistance in the way of personnel, resources, the personal direction of the Deputy Chairmen, etc.

II. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN

9. The Deputy Chairmen should devote about nine-tenths of their efforts to the People's Commissariats concerned with economic affairs and one-tenth to the rest.

10. Financial questions are in the forefront for the immediate future and the Deputy Chairmen should devote most attention to them.

11. A particularly vital matter is the introduction of a system of bonuses to be paid to Soviet employees in proportion to the turnover and profits of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the co-operative societies and other trading organisations.

Systematic efforts must be made to study the bonus system of payment to all Soviet employees in general and devise measures for applying it.

12. All work now proceeding for the purpose of forming a separate People's Commissariat of Internal Trade, or of turning these functions over to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade or the Supreme Economic Council, should be stopped. The *Council of Labour and Defence* should set up a special *Internal Trade Commission* which shall be furnished with the smallest possible secretarial staff, and the only local organs of which shall be the gubernia economic conferences.

13. It is extremely important to supervise the activities of the state trusts with a view to seeking those that are tolerably well organised among the bulk of badly organised ones, and steadily closing down the latter; to investigate the role played (actually) by the Communists on the management boards of the state trusts; to ascertain who is really responsible for the conduct of affairs and for efficiency in conducting affairs.

14. Each Deputy Chairman should undertake to organise one or two exemplary departments, or offices, of any given People's Commissariat to enable him to arrive at a standard size of staffs, verify the correctness of this standard and establish the best methods of conducting and supervising affairs.

The methods of work, methods of improving efficiency, and the methods of supervision employed in these few really exemplary offices should later be gradually introduced into all Soviet offices.

In view of the exceptional importance of this question, and in view of the stubborn resistance of the Soviet bureaucrats, who want to cling to the old bureaucratic methods,

there will have to be a persistent struggle to create a few exemplary offices as a means of tightening up and testing the rest. By agreement with the bodies concerned (the Central Committee of the Soviet Office Employees' Union, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the Labour Institute, etc., etc.) and under the supervision of the Deputy Chairmen the best of the latest literature on the organisation of labour and on management, especially the American and German, should be translated and published.

15. It is necessary—if at first only in a very few government offices—to supervise the redistribution of Communists in Soviet offices and to see to it that Communists occupy only such posts (at the very top as well as the very bottom of the hierarchy) as enable them really to watch the progress of work, really to combat bureaucracy and red tape, really to secure an immediate amelioration of the conditions and improvement in the lot of those unfortunate citizens who are compelled to have dealings with our utterly inefficient Soviet machinery of administration.

Special attention must be paid to the Communists who occupy posts at the lower levels of the hierarchy, for often they are actually more important than those at the top.

16. The reports of the gubernia economic conferences must be read regularly, firstly, by the members of the State Planning Commission, the officials of the Central Statistical Board and the staff of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*; and every one of these should write a very brief review for the press or for his respective department, and be responsible for giving the necessary timely directions and conclusions. Secondly, they must be read by a group of several dozen Communists (not less), as far as possible not Soviet officials, who can read reports from the *purely* Communist and not from the departmental point of view.

The group headed by Comrade Milyutin in Petrograd should have charge of the distribution of the reports of the gubernia economic conferences for reading, and as material for newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, etc.

Constant efforts must be made gradually to extend the obligatory printing of reports to an ever increasing number of business organisations (uyezd economic conferences, state trusts, "mixed companies", etc., etc.), for unless an increas-

ing number of the population grow accustomed to reading these reports in the libraries, it is useless talking about transforming this semi-barbarous country into a cultured and socialistic one.

17. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* must actually become the organ of the *Council of Labour and Defence*, *an organ of business administration*. Both Deputy Chairmen should read it regularly and relentlessly combat the prevailing efforts of all writers and of all Soviet officials to reduce this newspaper to the level of an ordinary "semi-independent", intellectualist bourgeois organ of "opinion", views and wrangling and to keep out of its columns summaries of reports, control of regular receipt of these reports, serious analysis of the business operations of *particular organisations*, serious criticism of efficient and inefficient offices, persons, methods of work, etc.

It will take years to convert *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* into a real *business management* paper, into a real organ of socialist construction, all the more necessary is it, therefore, to strive steadily and systematically to achieve this.

18. The same applies to the Central Statistical Board. It must not be an "academic" and "independent" organisation—as it mostly is today, owing to old bourgeois habits—but an organ of socialist construction, verification, control and of registration of what the socialist state must primarily know now, immediately. Here, too, the tenacity of old habits will inevitably be very great, and all the more strenuous, therefore, must be the efforts to combat them. (I request that the Deputy Chairmen read my correspondence on this subject in the summer of 1921* with the editor of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* and with the Central Statistical Board.)

III. THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN'S METHODS OF WORK. THEIR STAFFS

19. The Deputy Chairmen must free themselves as much as possible from minor details and from unnecessary interviews with People's Commissars and members of Collegiums, which usually take up a great deal of their time and prevent them from exercising executive control.

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* See pp. 36-38, 30-35 of this volume.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

20. The Deputy Chairmen must free themselves as much as possible from the need to attend all sorts of commissions.

21. The Deputy Chairmen must make every effort to dissolve existing commissions (nine-tenths of which are superfluous and show a tendency to revive in a slightly different guise very soon after they have been dissolved) and to prevent the formation of new ones.

22. In those cases where commission work is unavoidable, the Deputy Chairmen must do all they can to avoid taking part in it themselves, and should, as far as possible, confine themselves to finally endorsing the decisions of such commissions, or to expediting their proceedings and sending their decisions for endorsement in the prescribed order.

23. The staff of the Deputy Chairmen shall consist of, firstly, the staffs of the Executive Secretary of the *Council of People's Commissars* and of the *Council of Labour and Defence*, their assistants and secretaries. This absolutely necessary minimum staff, whose size (not too large) is such that the Deputy Chairmen can exercise personal supervision, must under no circumstances be enlarged. Secondly, the Deputy Chairmen are to entrust individual members of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars with various commissions. Thirdly, the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must serve as the main staff of the Deputy Chairmen.

The Deputy Chairmen should personally select assistants and executives from the staff of this People's Commissariat, train them and supervise their work, and make special efforts to enlist non-Party workers and peasants for this work (this is an exceptionally difficult matter, but if it is not steadily developed Soviet power will be doomed).

24. The Deputy Chairmen must to a greater extent than hitherto exercise their powers to impose penalties (expedite the drafting of the law on this subject undertaken by Comrade Tsyurupa) for bureaucratic methods, red tape, inefficiency, neglect, etc. The penalties for the worst offences must be dismissal, legal prosecution, and the People's Commissariat of Justice must organise trials of such cases, to which great publicity must be given.

IV. CO-ORDINATING THE WORK OF THE TWO DEPUTY CHAIRMEN

25. To co-ordinate their work, the two Deputy Chairmen should send each other copies of their most important instructions, and make a practice of keeping a verbatim record of the oral instructions, directions and so forth given by them during personal interviews (in the briefest terms and the most important points, of course). The number of stenographers on the Executive Secretary's staff of the Council of People's Commissars should therefore be increased sufficiently to enable the Deputy Chairmen to have two stenographers constantly at their service during business hours. If necessary, a couple of dictaphones of the best type should be ordered from abroad.

26. The same applies to the most important reports, written and oral.

27. In necessary and important cases the Deputy Chairmen should confer in order to reach a common understanding regarding objects and activities and to avoid duplication and running at cross purposes in the course of their work.

In the event of disagreement arising between the Deputy Chairmen the issue should be settled by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, or, if he is absent, by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, or by a comrade especially appointed by it for the purpose.

V. DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN

28. During the next few months, until further notice, the functions of the Deputy Chairmen shall be distributed as follows.

29. Comrade Tsyurupa shall preside at the meetings of the Full Council of People's Commissars (after he has presided for two hours he should be relieved by Comrade Rykov). The presence of the non-presiding Deputy Chairman is obligatory at sessions of the Full Council of People's Commissars and at (plenary) sessions of the Council of Labour and Defence.

Comrade Tsyurupa shall sign for publication in the press the decisions of the Full Council of People's Commissars and its telegraphic orders, and also supervise the work of the commissions of the Full and Narrow Councils of People's Commissars and the work of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars. He shall closely supervise the work of the Executive Secretary and Secretariat of the Full Council of People's Commissars and at the same time be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of this staff with those of the staff of the Council of Labour and Defence and see that there is complete contact and harmony between them.

30. Comrade Rykov shall preside at the plenary sessions of the Council of Labour and Defence, sign its decisions for publication in the press and also its telegraphic orders, and closely supervise the work of the Executive Secretary and Secretariat of the Council of Labour and Defence (with the aforementioned proviso that there is complete co-ordination between the work of this staff and that of the staff of the Full Council of People's Commissars).

31. For the purpose of executive control, supervising the reduction of staffs and improving the machinery of administration, and also for the settlement of minor current questions that do not need the decision of the Full Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, the People's Commissariats are to be divided between the two Deputy Chairmen as follows:

Under Comrade Tsyurupa's supervision:
People's Commissariat of Agriculture
People's Commissariat of Railways
Supreme Economic Council
People's Commissariat of Post and Telegraph
People's Commissariat of Justice
People's Commissariat of the Interior
People's Commissariat of Nationalities
People's Commissariat of Education.

Under Comrade Rykov's supervision:
People's Commissariat of Finance
People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade
Internal Trade Commission
Central Council of Co-operative Societies

People's Commissariat of Labour (and in part the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions)
People's Commissariat of Public Maintenance
People's Commissariat of Food
People's Commissariat of the Army and Navy
People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs
People's Commissariat of Public Health
Central Statistical Board
Regional Economic Conferences
Concessions Committee
State Planning Commission.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

April 11, 1922

First published in 1928

Published according to the manuscript

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN

To Comrade Stalin (for the Political Bureau)

April 15

I have just received the book *Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnosheni za 1910-1914 gody*.[103]

This massive tome of 733 pages has been published with that disgraceful, truly Soviet slovenliness which ought to be punished by imprisonment. The price is not indicated. The responsible person or persons are not named. There is no index!! The simple *list* of names has been compiled *carelessly*. And so on.

I suggest that:

(1) Hanecki and Karakhan be given two days in which to find all the persons responsible for this publication,

(2) hold up the sale of the book,

(3) write a notice to be inserted in the book to indicate what is missing,

(4) and draw up an intelligible index; in short, that by Thursday they should submit a *brief* report to the Central Committee on all these monstrosities—the defects in the publication, and on the ways of correcting them.

Lenin

P.S. M. N. Pokrovsky is named in the "Preface"—which is *unsigned*!! He has worked on *compiling* the material but it is obvious that he is not responsible for the *publication*, for the *way* the book has been put out.

Published for the first time, according to the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET *OLD ARTICLES ON ALMOST NEW SUBJECTS*

PREFACE TO THE 1922 EDITION[104]

This pamphlet has been published on the recommendation of the Communists of Moscow, not on mine. I was, at first, opposed to the republication of this old stuff, as I considered it to be out of date.

After reading the material prepared by the Moscow comrades for publication I found that it was not as obsolete as might have been expected. In fact, most of it is not obsolete at all, in spite of the extremely turbulent and rapid revolutionary development of the past four years.

The situation in the spring of 1922 duplicates on a broad scale the main features of the situation in the spring of 1918. At that time we had a "respite" between two wars—between the imperialist war, which we brought to an end (it would be more correct to say almost brought to an end) in February 1918, and the Civil War, which did not come to an end with our first victory over counter-revolutionaries of the Bogayevsky type, but for which preparations were being made by the Czechoslovaks, Kornilov, Denikin and Co.

Today Genoa represents another "respite" on a very much larger, on a world scale. It is a respite between the war against Soviet Russia, that was fought and lost by the world bourgeoisie, and the new war which this bourgeoisie is preparing, but is not yet ready for (I am writing these lines on April 28, 1922, when the latest news indicates the danger of a rupture).

Now, as then, the "pivot" of Soviet policy is organisation, accounting and control, a slow, cautious and business-like approach to practical tasks, to executive control and

the study of our practical experience. I spoke about this at the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P. a few weeks ago. The Congress accepted this "line", as is evident from the resolution it passed on the report of the Central Committee, and from other resolutions. And I tried to sum up that line in my speech in closing the Eleventh Congress.

The republication of this old pamphlet of 1918 will be useful because the controversies that raged at that time will go a long way to explain the problems that face our Party today. Speeches like those delivered by Comrades Preobrazhensky, Osinsky and Larin during the debate on the report of the Central Committee at the Eleventh Party Congress clearly revealed that very many prominent and leading Party officials are not concentrating their attention on what they should. In their speeches they wrongly defined the "pivot" of the problems that now confront the Party. I hope to be able to discuss this matter with the reader in greater detail in the near future. For the time being, I must limit myself to the remark that the object of the present pamphlet is to explain why the task that was in the forefront when this pamphlet was first published was (*and at the present time still is*) "to learn to work efficiently", to learn how to put the right men in the right place, to establish individual responsibility for a definite job, carefully to study and test practical experience instead of hankering after "new" plans of new government departments, or after new methods of organisation, reorganisation, and so forth.

Just one more absolutely necessary remark in conclusion. I have deleted from this pamphlet the speech I delivered in closing the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in the spring of 1918.[105] This speech was recorded in such a way as to render it absolutely useless. I must repeat what I once wrote to the Petrograd comrades in 1919, or 1920, in a letter intended for publication in the press, but which, unfortunately, they did not publish,* viz., that I cannot accept responsibility for the reports of my speeches in the way they are usually printed in the press, and I earnestly request that they should not be reprinted—except

* See pp. 121-23 of this volume.—*Ed.*

in case of extreme necessity, and, in any case, together with my present definite statement. Whether it is due to the fact that I often speak too fast; whether in many cases my style of delivery is faulty, or whether the ordinary records of speeches are made too hurriedly and are very unsatisfactory—for all these reasons, and for certain others all taken together, the fact remains that I cannot accept responsibility for the text of my speeches as recorded, and request that they should not be reproduced. Let those who make these records be responsible. If it is necessary to reprint anything, there are plenty of pamphlets and articles that can be reprinted, and for the text of which I take full and complete responsibility.

April 28, 1922

N. Lenin

Published in the pamphlet *Old Articles on Almost New Subjects*, Moscow, 1922

Published according to the manuscript

TELEGRAM TO THE WORKERS AND ENGINEERS OF THE AZNEFT TRUST

Baku

On the night of April 9 enemies of the working class tried to destroy the Surakhan oilfields at Baku by fire. I have learned of instances of extraordinary heroism and courage displayed by the workers and engineers of the oilfields, who localised the fire at tremendous risk to their own lives, and consider it my duty to thank the workers and engineers of the Surakhan oilfields on behalf of Soviet Russia. These examples of heroism show better than anything else that despite all the difficulties, despite the uninterrupted conspiracies of the whiteguard Socialist-Revolutionary enemies of the workers' republic, the Soviet Republic will emerge triumphantly from all difficulties.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 28, 1922
First published in 1942

Published according to the original signed by Lenin

ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF *PRAVDA*

It is ten years since *Pravda*, the legal—legal even under tsarist law—Bolshevik daily paper, was founded. This decade was preceded by, approximately, another decade: nine years (1903-12) since the emergence of Bolshevism, or thirteen years (1900-12), if we count from the founding in 1900 of the "Bolshevik-oriented" old *Iskra*.[106]

The tenth anniversary of a Bolshevik daily published in Russia.... Only ten years have elapsed! But measured in terms of our struggle and movement they are equal to a hundred years. For the pace of social development in the past five years has been positively staggering if we apply the old yardstick of European philistines like the heroes of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals. These civilised philistines are accustomed to regard as "natural" a situation in which hundreds of millions of people (over a thousand million, to be exact) in the colonies and in semi-dependent and poor countries tolerate the treatment meted out to Indians or Chinese, tolerate incredible exploitation, and outright depredation, and hunger, and violence, and humiliation, all in order that "civilised" men might "freely", "democratically", according to "parliamentary procedure", decide whether the booty should be divided up peacefully, or whether ten million or so must be done to death in this division of the imperialist booty, yesterday between Germany and Britain, tomorrow between Japan and the U.S.A. (with France and Britain participating in one form or another).

The basic reason for this tremendous acceleration of world development is that new hundreds of millions of people have been drawn into it. The old bourgeois and

imperialist Europe, which was accustomed to look upon itself as the centre of the universe, rotted and burst like a putrid ulcer in the first imperialist holocaust. No matter how the Spenglers and all the enlightened philistines, who are capable of admiring (or even studying) Spengler, may lament it, this decline of the old Europe is but an episode in the history of the downfall of the world bourgeoisie, oversatiated by imperialist rapine and the oppression of the majority of the world's population.

That majority has now awakened and has begun a movement which even the "mightiest" powers cannot stem. They stand no chance. For the present "victors" in the first imperialist slaughter have not the strength to defeat small—tiny, I might say—Ireland, nor can they emerge victorious from the confusion in currency and finance issues that reigns in their own midst. Meanwhile, India and China are seething. They represent over 700 million people, and together with the neighbouring Asian countries, that are in all ways similar to them, over half of the world's inhabitants. Inexorably and with mounting momentum they are approaching their 1905, with the essential and important difference that in 1905 the revolution in Russia could still proceed (at any rate at the beginning) in isolation, that is, without other countries being immediately drawn in. But the revolutions that are maturing in India and China are being drawn into—have already been drawn into—the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary movement, the world revolution.

The tenth anniversary of *Pravda*, the legal Bolshevik daily, is a clearly defined marker of this great acceleration of the greatest world revolution. In 1906-07, it seemed that the tsarist government had completely crushed the revolution. A few years later the Bolshevik Party was able—*in a different form*, *by a different method*—to penetrate into the very citadel of the enemy and daily, "legally", proceed with its work of undermining the accursed tsarist and landowner autocracy from within. A few more years passed, and the proletarian revolution, organised by Bolshevism, triumphed.

Some ten or so revolutionaries shared in the founding of the old *Iskra* in 1900, and only about forty attended the

birth of Bolshevism at the illegal congresses in Brussels and London in 1903.[107]

In 1912-13, when the legal Bolshevik *Pravda* came into being it had the support of hundreds of thousands of workers, who by their modest contributions[108] were able to overcome both the oppression of tsarism and the competition of the Mensheviks, those petty-bourgeois traitors to socialism.

In November 1917, nine million electors out of a total of thirty-six million voted for the Bolsheviks in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. But if we take the actual struggle, and not merely the elections, at the close of October and in November 1917, the Bolsheviks had the support of the *majority* of the proletariat and class-conscious peasantry, as represented by the majority of the delegates at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and by the majority of the most active and politically conscious section of the working people, namely, the twelve-million-strong army of that day.

These few figures illustrating the "acceleration" of the world revolutionary movement in the past twenty years give a very small and very incomplete picture. They afford only a very approximate idea of the history of no more than 150 million people, whereas in these twenty years the revolution has developed into an invincible force in countries with a total population of over a thousand million (the whole of Asia, not to forget South Africa, which recently reminded the world of its claim to *human* and not slavish existence, and by methods which were not altogether "parliamentary").

Some infant Spenglers—I apologise for the expression—may conclude (every variety of nonsense can be expected from the "clever" leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals) that this estimate of the revolutionary forces fails to take into account the European and American proletariat. These "clever" leaders always argue as if the fact that birth comes nine months after conception necessarily means that the exact hour and minute of birth can be defined beforehand, also the position of the infant during delivery, the condition of the mother and the exact degree of pain and danger both will suffer. Very "clever"! These

gentry cannot for the life of them understand that from the point of view of the development of the international revolution the transition from Chartism to Henderson's servility to the bourgeoisie, or the transition from Varlin to Renaudel, from Wilhelm Liebknecht and Bebel to Südekum, Scheidemann and Noske, can only be likened to an automobile passing *from* a smooth highway stretching for hundreds of miles *to* a dirty stinking puddle of a few yards in length on that highway.

Men are the makers of history. But the Chartists, the Varlins and the Liebknechts applied their minds and hearts to it. The leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals apply other parts of the anatomy: they fertilise the ground for the appearance of new Chartists, new Varlins and new Liebknechts.

At this *most difficult* moment it would be most harmful for revolutionaries to indulge in self-deception. Though Bolshevism *has become* an international force, though in *all* the civilised and advanced countries new Chartists, new Varlins, new Liebknechts have been born, and are growing up as legal (just as legal as our *Pravda* was under the tsars ten years ago) Communist Parties, nonetheless, for the time being, the international bourgeoisie still remains incomparably stronger than its class enemy. This bourgeoisie, which has done everything in its power to hamper the birth of proletarian power in Russia and to multiply tenfold the dangers and suffering attending its birth, is still in a position to condemn millions and tens of millions to torment and death through its whiteguard and imperialist wars, etc. That is something we must not forget. And we must skilfully adapt our tactics to this specific situation. The bourgeoisie is still able freely to torment, torture and kill. But it cannot halt the inevitable and—from the standpoint of world history—not far distant triumph of the revolutionary proletariat.

May 2, 1922

Pravda No. 98,
May 5, 1922
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

REPLY TO REMARKS CONCERNING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

To Comrade Stalin with the request to pass it on (do not duplicate it—to do so would give publicity to polemics) to members of the Political Bureau and Comrade Tsyurupa (asking them to sign it and give the date when they have read it)

I am sorry for replying belatedly, but the delay was caused by the removal of the bullet.[109]

Comrade Rykov's remarks are "critical", but not concrete and do not require an answer.

I consider Comrade Tomsky's remarks on the bonus system incorrect. The collapse of the trade union bonus system, which, according to Comrade Tomsky, has degenerated into "robbery of the state", must force us to be more persevering in studying and improving the methods of applying the bonus system, but we must not reject it.

Some of Comrade Trotsky's remarks are likewise vague (for example, the "apprehensions" in paragraph 4) and do not require an answer; other remarks made by him renew old disagreements, that we have repeatedly observed in the Political Bureau. I shall reply to these on two main points: a) the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and b) the State Planning Commission.

a) As regards the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Comrade Trotsky is fundamentally wrong. In view of the hidebound "departmentalism" that prevails even among the best Communists, the low standard of efficiency of the employees and the internal intrigues in the departments (worse than any Workers' and Peasants' Inspection intrigues), we cannot at the moment dispense with the Workers'

and Peasants' Inspection. A lot of hard and systematic work has to be put in to convert it into an apparatus for investigating and improving all government work. We have no other practical means of investigating, improving and giving instruction in this work. If the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection now has an inefficient and underpaid staff of 12,000, that staff should be reduced and improved; for example, reduce it to one-sixth and the payroll by half, i.e., raise salaries threefold; at first select a few dozen and later hundreds of the best, absolutely honest and most efficient employees, who are now available but not registered, not selected, not put in any group and not organised. This can and must be done; if not, it will be impossible to combat departmentalism and red tape, it will be impossible to teach non-Party workers and peasants the art of administration, which is a task that at the present time we cannot shirk either in principle or in practice.

b) As regards the State Planning Commission, Comrade Trotsky is not only absolutely wrong but is judging something on which he is amazingly ill-informed. The State Planning Commission does not suffer from academic methods. On the contrary, it suffers from an overload of much too much petty, routine "vermicelli". Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, because he is soft-hearted, gives way much too easily to those who ask him for urgent assistance. Pyatakov, the new Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission, will, I hope, be "stricter" and help to rid the State Planning Commission of its shortcoming, which is quite the opposite of "academic methods".

Since I know full well the real shortcomings of the State Planning Commission, and in order to provide the members of the Political Bureau with factual, objective material and not with figments of the imagination, I asked Comrade Krzhizhanovsky if his work suffered from "abstractness" and what the exact facts about it were. Comrade Krzhizhanovsky sent me a list of the questions that have piled up before the Presidium of the State Planning Commission in the course of two months: February and March 1922. Result: aa) questions concerning planning—17 per cent; bb) questions of an important economic nature—37 per cent; cc) "vermicelli"—46 per cent. I can send this mate-

rial to any member of the Political Bureau who would like to see it.

The second paper from Comrade Trotsky, dated April 23, 1922, and addressed to the Deputy Chairmen with a copy to the Secretariat of the Political Bureau (the copy was evidently posted to me by mistake), contains, first, an extremely excited but profoundly erroneous "criticism" of the Political Bureau decree on setting up a financial triumvirate (Sokolnikov and two deputies) as a brake between the Narrow and Full Councils of People's Commissars. The sending of this criticism to the Deputy Chairmen is not in conformity either with planned or, in general, with any organised state activity.

Secondly, this paper flings the same fundamentally wrong and intrinsically untrue accusations of academic method at the State Planning Commission, accusations which lead up to the next incredibly uninformed statement by Comrade Trotsky. "At present," he writes, "there neither is nor can be an economic plan without establishing the quantity of money issued and without distributing cash funds between the departments. Yet, *as far as I can judge*, the State Planning Commission *has nothing whatever to do* with these basic questions."

The underscored words only make me want to ask the question: Why "judge" something about which you are uninformed? Any member of the C.C. or the Council of Labour and Defence could easily get the information he needs, and if he tried he would learn that the State Planning Commission has a financial and economic section, which deals precisely with the above questions. There are shortcomings in this work, of course, but they must not be sought in academic methods but in exactly the opposite direction.

Lenin

Written on May 5, 1922

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Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF THE DELEGATION TO THE GENOA CONFERENCE

The All-Russia Central Executive Committee's draft resolution on Joffe's report should be drawn up approximately as follows:

1. The delegation of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee has carried out its task correctly in upholding the full sovereignty of the R.S.F.S.R., opposing attempts to force the country into bondage and restore private property, and in concluding a treaty with Germany.

2. The international political and economic situation is characterised by the following features.

Political: the absence of peace and the danger of fresh imperialist wars [Ireland, India, China and others; worsening of relations between Britain and France, between Japan and the United States, *etc.*, *etc.* ((in greater detail))].

3. Economic: the "victor" countries, exceedingly powerful and enriched by the war (= by plunder), have not been able to re-establish even the former capitalist relations three and a half years after the war [currency chaos; non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Versailles and the impossibility of its fulfilment; non-payment of debts to the United States, *etc.*, *etc.* (*in greater detail*)].

4. Therefore, Article One of the Cannes resolutions, by recognising the *equality* of the two *property systems* (capitalist or private property, and communist property, *so far* accepted only in the R.S.F.S.R.), is thus compelled

to recognise, even if only indirectly, the collapse, the bankruptcy of the first property system and the inevitability of its coming to an *agreement* with the second, on terms of equality.

5. The other articles of the Cannes terms, as well as the memoranda, etc., of the powers at Genoa, are in contradiction to this and are, therefore, still-born.

6. True equality of the two property systems—*if only as a temporary state*, *until such time as the entire world abandons* private property and the *economic chaos* and wars engendered by it for the higher property system—is found only in the Treaty of Rapallo.[110]

The All-Russia Central Executive Committee, therefore:

welcomes the Treaty of Rapallo as the only correct way out of the difficulties, chaos and danger of wars (as long as there remain two property systems, one of them as obsolete as capitalist property);

recognises *only* this type of treaty as normal for relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and capitalist countries;

instructs the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to pursue a policy along these lines;

instructs the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to confirm it by agreement with all republics that are in federal relations with the R.S.F.S.R.;

instructs the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Council of People's Commissars to permit deviations from the Rapallo-type treaty only in exceptional circumstances that gain very special advantages for the working people of the R.S.F.S.R., etc.

Written on May 15 or 16, 1922
Published for the first time

Published according to the manuscript

LETTER TO D. I. KURSKY

May 17, 1922

Comrade Kursky,

Further to our conversation, I herewith enclose the draft of an article supplementary to the Criminal Code.[111] It is a rough draft and, of course, needs altering and polishing up. The main idea will be clear, I hope, in spite of the faulty drafting—to put forward publicly a thesis that is correct in principle and politically (not only strictly juridical), which explains the *substance* of terror, its necessity and limits, and provides *justification* for it.

The courts must not ban terror—to promise that would be deception or self-deception—but must formulate the motives underlying it, legalise it as a principle, plainly, without any make-believe or embellishment. It must be formulated in the broadest possible manner, for only revolutionary law and revolutionary conscience can more or less widely determine the limits within which it should be applied.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

VARIANT 1.

Propaganda or agitation, or membership of, or assistance given to organisations the object of which (propaganda and agitation) is to assist that section of the international bourgeoisie which refuses to recognise the rights of the communist system of ownership that is superseding capitalism, and is striving to overthrow that system by violence, either by means of foreign intervention or blockade, or by espionage, financing the press, and similar means,

is an offence punishable by death, which, if mitigating circumstances are proved, may be commuted to deprivation of liberty, or deportation.

VARIANT 2.

a) Propaganda or agitation that objectively serves (variant 2b) the interests of that section of the international bourgeoisie which, etc., to the end.

b) Persons convicted of belonging to, or assisting, such organisations, or persons who conduct activities of the aforesaid character (whose activities bear the aforesaid character), shall be liable to the same penalty.

Variant 2b: serves or is likely to serve.

First published in 1924

Published according to the manuscript

LETTERS TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE PROMOTION OF RADIO ENGlNEERING

1

To Comrade Stalin with the request to pass this round to all members of the Political Bureau

Comrade StaIin,

Appended are two reports. The first from Professor Osadchy, an expert on electricity, about radio-telegraph and telephone communication; the second is from Bonch-Bruyevich (who is not related to the well-known Bonch-Bruyevich brothers, one of whom was the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, and the other an outstanding tsarist general). This Bonch-Bruyevich, whose report I append, is a prominent specialist and inventor in radio engineering and one of the principal figures at the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory.

These reports show that it is technically quite feasible to broadcast human speech over any distance by wireless; furthermore, it is also possible to use many hundreds of stations that could broadcast speeches, reports and lectures delivered in Moscow to many hundreds of places throughout the Republic, situated hundreds and, under certain conditions, thousands of versts away from Moscow.

I think that from the standpoint of propaganda and agitation, especially for those masses of the population who are illiterate, and also for broadcasting lectures, it is absolutely necessary for us to carry out this plan. Con-

sidering the unfitness of most of the bourgeois professors of social sciences whom we are using and even the harm caused by them, we have no other way out than to enable our few communist professors, who are capable of delivering lectures on social sciences, to deliver these lectures for hundreds of localities in all parts of the Federation.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that under no circumstances should we stint funds to complete the organisation of wireless communication and produce efficiently working loudspeakers.

I propose that we pass a decision to allocate, as an extraordinary measure, a sum of up to 100,000 rubles from the gold fund over and above the estimate to organise the work at the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory in order to accelerate to the maximum the completion of the work it has begun to instal efficient loudspeakers and many hundreds of stations throughout the Republic, which can repeat for the broad masses the speeches, reports and lectures delivered in Moscow or some other centre.

The Council of Labour and Defence must be instructed to organise special supervision over the expenditure of this fund and, perhaps, if it proves to be expedient, to institute bonuses from the above fund for specially rapid and successful work.

Let me add that today's *Izvestia* carries a report about an English invention in radio-telegraphy that transmits radio-telegrams secretly. If we managed to buy this invention, radio-telephone and radio-telegraph communication would be of further tremendous significance for military purposes.

May 19, 1922 *Lenin*

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Pravda No. 21,
January 21, 1919

Dictated by telephone
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a typewritten copy

2

Comrade Stalin,

Re today's paper from Bonch-Bruyevich I think that we cannot finance the Radio Laboratory from the gold fund without special assignments.

I therefore propose instructing the Council of Labour and Defence to find out what expenditures are necessary to enable the Radio Laboratory to accelerate to the maximum the improvement and production of loudspeaking telephones and receivers. This is the only thing for which we should, in my opinion, allocate a definite sum of gold over and above the estimate.

May 19, 1922 *Lenin*

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"DUAL" SUBORDINATION AND LEGALITY[112]

To Comrade Stalin for the Political Bureau

The question of the procuratorship has given rise to disagreement on the commission appointed by the Central Committee to direct the proceedings of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee session. If these disagreements do not cause this question to be brought before the Political Bureau automatically, I propose, in view of its extreme importance, that it be brought up in any case.

In substance, the point at issue is the following: On the question of the procuratorship, the majority of the commission elected by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee expressed opposition to the proposal that local procurators should be appointed solely by the central authority and be subordinate solely to the latter. The majority demands what is called "dual" subordination, the system that applies to all local officials, i.e., subordination to the central authority in the shape of the respective People's Commissariat, and also to the Gubernia Executive Committee.

The same majority of the commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee denies the right of local procurators to challenge the legality of decisions passed by gubernia executive committees, and by local authorities generally.

I cannot imagine on what grounds this obviously fallacious decision of the majority of the commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee can be justified. The only argument I have heard in support of it is that defence of "dual" subordination in this case means legitimate opposition to bureaucratic centralism, defending the

necessary independence of the local authorities, and protecting the officials of the gubernia executive committees from high-handed conduct by the central authorities. Is there anything high-handed in the view that law cannot be Kaluga law or Kazan law, but that it must be uniform all-Russia law, and even uniform for the entire federation of Soviet Republics? The underlying fallacy of the view which has prevailed among the majority of the commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee is that they wrongly apply the principle of "dual" subordination. "Dual" subordination is needed where it is necessary to allow for a really inevitable difference. Agriculture in Kaluga Gubernia differs from that in Kazan Gubernia. The same thing can be said about industry; and it can be said about administration, or management, as a whole. Failure to make allowances for local differences in all these matters would mean slipping into bureaucratic centralism, and so forth. It would mean preventing the local authorities from giving proper consideration to specific local features, which is the basis of all rational administration. Nevertheless, the law must be uniform, and the root evil of our social life, and of our lack of culture, is our pandering to the ancient Russian view and semi-savage habit of mind, which wishes to preserve Kaluga law as distinct from Kazan law. It must be borne in mind that, unlike the administration authorities, the procurator has no administrative powers, and has no power to decide any question of administration. His rights and duties are reduced to one function, viz., to see that the law is really uniformly interpreted throughout the Republic, notwithstanding differences in local conditions, and in spite of all local influences. The only right and duty of the procurator is to take the matter before the court. What sort of court? Our courts are local courts. Our judges are elected by the local Soviets. Hence, the authority to which the procurator submits a case of infringement of the law is a local authority which, on the one hand, must strictly abide by the laws uniformly established for the whole Federation and, on the other hand, in determining the penalty, must take all local circumstances into consideration. And it has the right to say that although there has been a definite infringement of the law in a given case,

nevertheless, certain circumstances, with which local people are closely familiar, and which come to light in the local court, compel the court to mitigate the penalty to which the culprit is liable, or even acquit him. Unless we strictly adhere to this most elementary condition for maintaining the uniformity of the law for the whole Federation, it will be utterly impossible to protect the law, or to develop any kind of culture.

Similarly, it is wrong in principle to argue that procurators should not have the right to challenge the decisions of gubernia executive committees, or of other local authorities; that legally the latter come under the jurisdiction of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection judges not only from the viewpoint of the law, but also from the viewpoint of expediency. The procurator must see to it that not a single decision passed by any local authority runs counter to the law, and only from this aspect is it his duty to challenge every illegal decision. He has no right to suspend such a decision; he must only take measures to secure that the interpretation of the law is absolutely uniform throughout the Republic. Hence, the decision of the majority of the commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee is not only utterly wrong in principle, it not only applies the principle of "dual" subordination in an utterly fallacious manner, but it also hinders all efforts to establish uniformity of the law and develop at least the minimum of culture.

Further, in deciding this question, it is necessary to take into account the weight of local influence. Undoubtedly, we are living amidst an ocean of illegality, and local influence is one of the greatest, if not the greatest obstacle to the establishment of law and culture. There is scarcely anyone who has not heard that the purging of the Party revealed the prevalence, in the majority of local purging committees, of personal spite and local strife in the process of purging the Party. This fact is incontrovertible, and significant. Scarcely anyone will dare deny that it is easier for the Party to find half a score of reliable Communists who possess an adequate legal education and are capable of resisting all purely local influences than to find hundreds

of them. And this is precisely what the question boils down to in discussing whether procurators should be subject to "dual" subordination, or to subordination solely to the central authorities. At the centre we must find about half a score of men to exercise the functions of the central procurator authority represented by the Procurator General, the Supreme Tribunal, and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Justice (I leave aside the question as to whether the Procurator General should be the sole authority, or whether he should share his authority with the Supreme Tribunal and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Justice, for this is purely a secondary question, and can be settled, one way or another, in accordance with whether the Party will delegate vast authority to one person, or divide that authority among the three aforesaid bodies). These ten should work at the centre, under the closest supervision of and in closest contact with the three Party bodies which provide the most reliable barrier against local and personal influences, viz., the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and the Central Control Commission. The latter body, i.e., the Central Control Commission, is responsible only to the Party Congress, and is constructed in such a way that no member of it can hold a position in any People's Commissariat, government department, or any organ of the Soviet government. It is clear that under these circumstances we have the greatest guarantee so far devised that the Party will set up a small central collegium that will be really capable of resisting local influences and local, and all other, bureaucracy, and which will establish real uniformity in the application of the laws throughout the Republic, and throughout the Federation. Hence, any mistake that this central legal collegium may make can be at once rectified on the spot by the Party bodies, which determine all the fundamental concepts and lay down all the fundamental rules for all our Party and Soviet activities throughout the Republic.

To depart from this would mean dragging in on the sly a view which nobody can defend openly and frankly, viz., that culture and law, which is its necessary concomitant, are so highly developed in our country that we can guarantee

to find hundreds of absolutely irreproachable procurators capable of resisting all local influences, and of establishing uniformity of the law throughout the Republic by their own efforts.

To sum up, I draw the conclusion that to defend the "dual" subordination of procurators, and to deprive them of the right to challenge any decision passed by the local authorities, is not only wrong in principle, not only hinders our fundamental task of constantly introducing respect for the law, but is also an expression of the interests and prejudices of local bureaucrats and local influences, i.e., the most pernicious wall that stands between the working people and the local and central Soviet authorities, as well as the central authority of the Russian Communist Party.

I therefore propose that the Central Committee should reject "dual" subordination in this matter, establish the subordination of local procurators solely to the *central authority*, and allow the procurator to retain the right and duty to challenge the legality of any decision or order passed by the local authorities with the proviso, however, that he shall have no right to suspend such decisions; he shall only have the right to bring them before the courts.

Lenin

Dictated by telephone
on May 20, 1922

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in *Pravda* No. 91,
April 23, 1925

Published according to
the stenographer's notes
(typewritten copy)

A FLY IN THE OINTMENT

Citizen O. A. Yermansky has written a very good, useful book: *The Taylor System and the Scientific Organisation of Labour* (Gosizdat, 1922). It is a revised edition of his book, *The Taylor System*, which first appeared in 1918. The book has been substantially enlarged; very important supplements have been added: I. "Productive Labour and Culture"; II. "The Problem of Fatigue". One of the most important sections, earlier entitled "Labour and Leisure", only 16 pages long, has now been enlarged to 70 pages (Chapter III: "Human Labour").

The book gives a detailed exposition of the Taylor system and, this is especially important, both its positive and *negative aspects*, and also the principal scientific data on the physiological intake and output in the human machine. On the whole the book is quite suitable, I think, as a standard textbook for all trade union schools and for all secondary schools in general. To learn how to work is now the main, the truly national task of the Soviet Republic. Our primary and most important task is to attain universal literacy, but we should in no circumstances limit ourselves to this target. We must at all costs go beyond it and adopt everything that is truly valuable in European and American science.

Citizen Yermansky's book has one serious flaw which may make it unacceptable as a textbook. It is the author's verbosity. He repeats the same thing again and again without any conceivable need. I suppose the author may be vindicated to some extent by the fact that he was not trying to write a textbook. However, he says on p. VIII that he regards the popular exposition of scientific questions as

one of the merits of his book. He is right. But popular exposition should also shun repetition. The people have no time to waste on bulky volumes. Without good reason, Citizen Yermansky's book is much too bulky. That is what prevents it from being a popular book....*

Written after
September 10, 1922
First published in 1928

Published according to
the manuscript

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* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

LETTER TO THE FIFTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS[113]

September 17, 1922

Dear Comrades,

This is the first time since my long illness that I am able to address a Congress, even though in writing. Permit me, therefore, to confine myself to expressing to you my cordial greetings, and to a few brief remarks on the position and tasks of our industry and of our Republic. Our position is particularly difficult because we lack the means to restore our fixed assets, i.e., machinery, tools, buildings, etc.; and it is precisely that part of industry known as heavy industry which is the main basis of socialism. In capitalist countries these fixed assets are usually restored by means of loans. We are refused loans until we restore the property of the capitalists and landowners; but this we cannot and will not do. The only road open to us is the long and extremely arduous road of slowly accumulating our savings, of raising taxes in order to be able gradually to repair our destroyed railways, machinery, buildings, etc. So far, we are the only country in the world in which the working peasants, under the leadership of the workers, are building socialism, flatly rejecting the leadership of the bourgeoisie who, under cover of florid phrases about democracy, liberty, etc., are actually consolidating the private ownership of the capitalists and landowners and establishing the rule of a handful of rich men who have divided the entire globe among themselves and are fighting one another for its redivision, for the enslavement of hundreds of millions of people in the weaker and more backward nations.

As long as we remain in the field alone the task of restoring our economy will be an extremely heavy burden on our shoulders. All the peasants and all the workers will have to exert themselves to the very utmost; our machinery of state, which is still working very inefficiently, must be improved and made less costly so that we may improve the conditions of the working people, and, to some extent at least, restore our economy, which was destroyed by the imperialist and civil wars.

Let every politically conscious peasant and worker who may become despondent over our hard conditions of life, or over the extremely slow progress of our work of state construction, remember the recent past, when the capitalists and landowners were in power. This will give him new zest in his work. The only way to save the workers' and peasants' rule is to make every effort to intensify and improve our work in all fields.

With comradely greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Published in *Trud* on September 18, 1922 and in *Pravda* No. 210 on September 19, 1922

Published according to the manuscript

MEMO TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON COMBATING DOMINANT NATION CHAUVINISM

I declare war to the death on dominant nation chauvinism. I shall eat it with all my healthy teeth as soon as I get rid of this accused bad tooth.

It must be *absolutely* insisted that the Union Central Executive Committee should be *presided over* in turn by a
Russian
Ukrainian,
Georgian, etc.
Absolutely!

Yours,
Lenin

Written on October 6, 1922
First published in *Pravda* No. 21 on January 21, 1937

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE WORKERS OF BAKU

Moscow, October 6, 1922

Dear Comrades,

I have just heard Comrade Serebrovsky's brief report on the situation in the Azerbaijan oilfields. The difficulties of the situation are by no means small. I send you my cordial greetings and urge you to do all you can to hold on for the immediate future. Things are always particularly difficult at first. Later on it will be easier. We must win, and we shall do so at all costs.

Once more, my most cordial communist greetings.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Published in *Bakinsky Rabochy* No. 251, November 7, 1922

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF RUSSIA[114]

Dear Friends,

I regret very much that I am unable to greet you in person. I wish your Fifth Congress every success in its work. I am convinced that the youth will make such good progress that when the next stage of the world revolution approaches they will be fully capable of coping with their tasks.

With cordial communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

October 11, 1922

Pravda No. 230,
October 12, 1922

Published according to
the manuscript

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) RE THE FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY[115]

To Comrade Stalin, Secretary of the C.C.

October 13, 1922

The decision of the Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of October 6 (Minutes No. 7, Point 3) institutes what seems to be an unimportant, partial reform: "implement a number of separate decisions of the Council of Labour and Defence on temporary permission for the import and export of individual categories of goods or on granting the permission for specific frontiers".

In actual fact, however, this wrecks the foreign trade monopoly. Small wonder that Comrade Sokolnikov has been trying to get this done and has succeeded. He has always been for it; he likes paradoxes and has always undertaken to prove that monopoly is not to our advantage. But it is surprising that people, who in principle favour the monopoly, have voted for this without asking for detailed information from any of the business executives.

What does the decision that has been adopted signify?

Purchasing offices are being opened for the import and export trade. The owner of such an office has the right to buy and sell *only* specially listed goods.

Where is the control over this? Where are the means of control?

In Russia flax costs 4 rubles 50 kopeks, in Britain it costs 14 rubles. All of us have read in *Capital* how capitalism changes internally and grows more daring when interest rates and profits rise quickly. All of us recall that

capitalism is capable of taking deadly risks and that Marx recognised this long before the war and before capitalism began its "leaps".

What is the situation now? What force is capable of holding the peasants and the traders from extremely profitable deals? Cover Russia with a network of overseers? Catch the neighbour in a purchasing office and prove that his lax has been sold to be smuggled out of the country?

Comrade Sokolnikov's paradoxes are always clever, but one must distinguish between paradoxes and the grim truth.

No "legality" on such a question is at all possible in the Russian countryside. No comparison with smuggling in general ("All the same," they say, "smuggling is also flourishing in spite of the monopoly") is in any way correct; it is one thing to deal with the professional smuggler on the frontier and another with *all* the peasantry, who will *all* defend themselves and fight the authorities when they try to deprive them of the profit "belonging to them".

Before we have had an opportunity to test the monopoly system, which is only just beginning to bring us millions (and will give us tens of millions and more), we are introducing complete chaos; we are shaking loose the very supports that we have only just begun to strengthen.

We have begun to build up a system; the foreign trade monopoly and the co-operatives are both only in the process of being built up. Some results will be forthcoming in a year or two. The profit from foreign trade runs into hundreds per cent, and we are *beginning* to receive millions and tens of millions. We have *begun* to build up mixed companies; we have begun to learn to receive *half* of their (monstrous) profits. We can already see signs of very substantial state profits. We are giving this up in the hope of duties which cannot yield any comparable profit; we are giving everything up and chasing a spectre!

The question was brought up at the Plenary Meeting hastily. There was no serious discussion worth mentioning. We have no reason for haste. Our business executives are only just beginning to go into things. Is there anything like a correct approach to the matter when major questions of trade policy are decided in a slapdash manner, without collecting the pertinent material, without weighing the

pros and *cons* with documents and figures? Tired people vote in a few minutes and that's the end of it. We have weighed less complicated political questions over and over again and frequently it took us several months to reach a decision.

I regret it very much that illness prevented me from attending the meeting on that day and that I am now compelled to seek an exception to the rule.

But I think that the question must be weighed and studied, that haste is harmful.

I propose that the decision on this question be deferred for two months, i.e., until the next Plenary Meeting; in the interim information and verified *documents* on the experience of our trade policy should be collected.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

P.S. In the conversation I had with Comrade Stalin yesterday (I did not attend the Plenary Meeting and tried to get my information from the comrades who were there), we spoke, incidentally, of the proposal temporarily to open the Petrograd and Novorossiisk ports. It seems to me that both examples show the extreme danger of such experiments even for a most restricted list of goods. The opening of the Petrograd port would intensify the smuggling of flax across the Finnish frontier to prodigious proportions. Instead of combating professional smugglers we shall have to combat *all the peasantry* of the flax-growing region. In this fight we shall almost assuredly be beaten, and beaten irreparably. The opening of the Novorossiisk port would quickly drain us of surplus grain. Is this a cautious policy at a time when our reserves for war are small? When a series of systematic measures to increase them have not yet had time to show results?

Then the following should be given consideration. The foreign trade monopoly has started a stream of gold into Russia. It is only just becoming possible to calculate; the first trip of such-and-such a merchant to Russia for six months has given him, say, hundreds per cent of profit; he increases his price for this right from 25 to 50 per cent in favour of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Further-

more, it has become possible for us to learn and to *increase* this profit. Everything will at once collapse, the whole work will stop, because if here and there various ports are opened for a time, *not a single merchant will pay a penny for this kind of* "*monopoly*" . That is obvious. Before taking such a risk things have to be thought over and weighed several times. Besides there is the political risk of letting through not foreign merchants by name, which we check, but the entire petty bourgeoisie in general.

With the start of foreign trade we have begun to reckon on an influx of gold. I see no other settlement except for a liquor monopoly, but here there are very serious moral considerations, and also some business-like objections from Sokolnikov.

Lenin

P.P.S. I have just been informed (1.30 hours) that some business executives have applied for a postponement. I have not yet read this application, but I whole-heartedly support it. It is only a matter of two months.

Lenin

Published for the first time
according to the manuscript

TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF FINANCIAL WORKERS[116]

Dear Comrades,

The strengthening of Soviet finances is one of the most difficult problems before us; but at present it stands in the forefront, and unless it is solved it will be impossible to make any considerable progress either in safeguarding the independence of Soviet Russia from international capital or in developing our industry and culture. Our financial organisations must do their utmost to collect the taxes as quickly as possible and thereby ensure the resources that the workers' and peasants' state needs to enable all the organs of state power to function properly.

I greet the All-Russia Congress of Financial Workers and express the firm conviction that in the building up of our finances you will justify the hopes placed in you by the masses of the working people of Soviet Russia.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

October 20, 1922

Pravda No. 240,
October 24, 1922

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TO THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS OF SOVIET RUSSIA (IN THE UNITED STATES)[117]

October 20, 1922

Dear Comrades,

I have just verified by special inquiry to the Perm Gubernia Executive Committee the extremely favourable information that was published in our newspapers about the work of the members of your Society, headed by Harold Ware, with the tractor team at the Toikino State Farm, Perm Gubernia.

In spite of the immense difficulties, particularly in view of the extreme remoteness of that locality from the centre, and also the devastation caused by Kolchak during the Civil War, you have achieved successes that must be regarded as truly outstanding.

I hasten to express to you my profound gratitude and to ask you to publish this in your Society's journal, and, if possible, in the general press of the United States.

I am sending a recommendation to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee that it should recognise this state farm as a model farm, and render it special and extraordinary assistance in building and also in supplying petrol, metal, and other materials necessary for a repair shop.

Once again on behalf of our Republic I express to you our profound gratitude, and ask you to bear in mind that no form of assistance is as timely and as important for us as that which you are rendering.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Pravda No. 240,
October 24, 1922

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

TO THE SOCIETY FOR TECHNICAL AID FOR SOVIET RUSSIA[118]

October 20, 1922

Dear Comrades,

Extremely favourable information has appeared in our press about the work of members of your Society at the state farms in Kirsanov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, and at Mitino Station, Odessa Gubernia, and also about the work of the group of miners in the Donets Basin.

In spite of the enormous difficulties, and particularly in view of the devastation caused by the Civil War, you have achieved successes that must be regarded as outstanding.

I hasten to express to you my profound gratitude and to ask you to publish this in your Society's journal, and, if possible, in the general press in the United States.

I am sending a recommendation to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee that it should recognise the most successful farms as model farms, and render them the special and extraordinary assistance necessary for the successful promotion of their work.

Once again on behalf of our Republic I express to you our profound gratitude, and ask you to bear in mind that the work you are doing to cultivate land with the aid of tractors is particularly timely and important for us.

It gives me particular satisfaction to be able to congratulate you on your proposal to organise 200 agricultural communes.

Lenin,
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Pravda No. 240,
October 24, 1922

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

GREETINGS TO THE LIBERATED PRIMORYE TERRITORY[119]

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Far Eastern Republic, Chita[120]

On the fifth anniversary of the victorious October Revolution the Red Army has taken another decisive step towards completely clearing the territory of the R.S.F.S.R. and of its allied republics of foreign troops of occupation. The capture of Vladivostok by the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic unites with the masses of the working people of Russia the Russian citizens who have borne the heavy yoke of Japanese imperialism. I congratulate all the working people of Russia and our valiant Red Army on this new victory, and I request the Government of the Far Eastern Republic to convey to all the workers and peasants in the liberated regions, and in Vladivostok, the greetings of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R.

Moscow, October 26, 1922

Pravda No. 243,
October 27, 1922

Published according to the *Pravda* text

INTERVIEW GIVEN TO MICHAEL FARBMAN, *OBSERVER* AND *MANCHESTER GUARDIAN* CORRESPONDENT

1. *Question*. The anti-Russian press describes Herriot's reception in Moscow and the Franco-Russian negotiations as a definite change in Soviet Russia's foreign policy.

Is that true? Is it true that Russia regards British policy in the Middle East as a challenge and is ready to conclude an agreement with France directed against Britain?

Answer. I consider it absolutely incorrect to describe Herriot's reception in Moscow and the Franco-Russian negotiations as a change, even a slight one, in Soviet Russia's policy in general, or as being anti-British in particular.[121] We certainly value very highly both Herriot's reception in Moscow and the step taken towards a rapprochement with France or towards negotiations with her, which have now become possible, probable and, I should like to believe, essential. Any rapprochement with France is something we very much desire, especially in view of the fact that Russia's commercial interests imperatively demand closer relations with this strong continental power. But we are convinced that this rapprochement does not in the least imply that some change must necessarily take place in our policy towards Britain. We believe fully friendly relations with both powers to be quite possible, and that is our aim. We believe that the development of commercial relations will inevitably go a very long way towards achieving this aim. We believe that the interests of Britain and France, rightly understood, will likewise operate in that direction. We believe that the mutual interests of both Britain and France, insofar as they have points of contact

with Russia, do not under any circumstances contain elements of inevitable hostility between Britain and France. On the contrary, we even think that peaceful and friendly relations between these powers and Russia are a guarantee (I am almost prepared to say—the strongest guarantee) that peace and friendship between Britain and France will last a long time, and that all possible, and under present circumstances probable, differences between France and Britain will most speedily and truly find a happy solution.

2. *Question*. Is not the virtual termination of the Greco-Turkish War, a war supported by Britain, an opportune moment for the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian agreement?

Answer. Of course, the termination of the Greco-Turkish War, which had Britain's support, is a factor that, to a certain extent, improves the chances of an Anglo-Russian agreement being concluded. We looked for such an agreement even before that war ended and shall now continue to seek it with the utmost energy. True, some of the problems connected with the termination of that war are objects of our disagreement with Britain. But, first of all, the peace which has followed the Greco-Turkish War is in our opinion such an advantage to international politics as a whole that we hope for an improvement in the general conditions under which they are conducted, thanks to the Greco-Turkish peace. Secondly, we do not consider the differences between Britain and ourselves to be in any way insurmountable. On the contrary, we expect that, with the Middle East problem entering various stages, the near future will show us to what extent we are right in hoping that the end of the Greco-Turkish War will also be the end of the conflicts and differences which placed that war in the forefront of international politics. We are doing everything in our power to make the end of that war also the end of all friction and disagreement with Britain, and we hope that the interests of the British Government will rise on this occasion, too, above any promptings and the frequently insincere utterances of the anti-Russian press.

3. *Question*. Do you consider Russia's participation in the eastern question a matter of prestige alone, or do you proceed exclusively from Russia's real interests? Does the Russian Government agree

to the French proposal to permit Russia's participation in only that part of the Conference that will decide the question of the Straits?

Answer. I consider Russia's participation in the settlement of the Middle East question[122] to have nothing to do with prestige. I hope that our international politics as a whole over a period of five years have shown completely that we are quite indifferent to questions of prestige and that we are incapable of putting forward any demand whatsoever or of worsening the real chances of peace between states solely on account of prestige. I am confident that in no other country are the masses so indifferent to prestige and even so prepared to treat the question of prestige as such with happy ridicule. We are of the opinion that modern diplomacy will rapidly come to regard questions of prestige precisely in this way.

Our Middle East policy is a matter of Russia's most real, immediate and vital interest and of the interest of a number of states federated with her. If all these states did not succeed in getting their demand to participate in the Middle East Conference satisfied, there would remain a huge mass of elements of hostility, conflict and discontent; their non-participation would involve such difficulties in purely commercial affairs between Eastern Europe on the one hand, and all other states on the other, that either there would remain no grounds whatever for peaceful coexistence or that such existence would be extraordinarily difficult.

The Russian Government, therefore, is not satisfied with the proposal from Paris to allow Russia to participate only in that part of the Conference which will settle the problem of the Straits. We are of the opinion that such a limitation would inevitably lead to a number of very practical, immediate inconveniences, in particular economic inconveniences, from which France and Britain would themselves suffer, most probably in the near future.

4. *Question*. What is the Russian programme for the solution of the Straits problem?

Answer. Our Straits programme (still only approximate, of course) contains, among other things, the following:

First, the satisfaction of Turkey's national aspirations.

We consider this essential, and not only in the interests of national independence. Our five years' experience in settling the national question in a country that contains a tremendous number of nationalities such as could hardly be found in any other country, gives us the full conviction that under such circumstances the only correct attitude to the interests of nations is to meet those interests in full and provide conditions that exclude any possibility of conflicts on that score. Our experience has left us with the firm conviction that only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual mistrust, can remove the fear of any intrigues and create that confidence, especially on the part of workers and peasants speaking different languages, without which there absolutely cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful development of everything that is of value in present-day civilisation.

Secondly, our programme includes the closing of the Straits to all warships in times of peace and of war. This is in the direct commercial interests of all powers, not only of those whose territory is in the immediate vicinity of the Straits, but of all others, too. It must be remembered that all over the world there has been an inordinate amount of pacifist talk, an unusual number of pacifist phrases and assurances, and even vows against war and against peace,[123] although there is usually little preparedness on the part of the majority of states, especially on the part of the modern civilised states, to take any realistic steps, even the most simple, to ensure peace. On this, and on similar questions, we should like to see a minimum of general assurances, solemn promises and grandiloquent formulas, and the greatest possible number of the simplest and most obvious decisions and measures that would certainly lead to peace, if not to the complete elimination of the war danger.

Thirdly, our programme on the Straits includes complete freedom of commerce by sea. After what I have said above I do not think it at all necessary to explain this point or make it more concrete.

5. *Question*. Would the Russian Government agree to the League of Nations controlling the Straits if the League were to include in

its composition Russia, Turkey, Germany and the United States?

Or would Russia insist on the establishment of a special commission to control the Straits?

Answer. We are, of course, opposed to the League of Nations, and I do not think that it is only our economic and political system with its specific features that accounts for our negative attitude towards the League; the interests of peace, regarded from the point of view of the concrete conditions of modern international politics in general, also fully justify that negative attitude. The League of Nations bears so many marks of its world war origin, it is so intimately bound up with the Versailles Treaty and is so marked by the absence of anything resembling the establishment of the real equality of rights between nations, anything resembling a real chance of their peaceful coexistence, that I think our negative attitude to the League can be appreciated and does not stand in need of further comment.

6. *Question*. Does the refusal to ratify the agreement with Urquhart mean a victory of the "Left Communists"? What are the objective conditions which would make possible a resumption of negotiations and the ratification of the agreement with Urquhart?

Answer. The question of concluding an agreement with Urquhart[124] was raised by our government when I was ill and was unable to take part in affairs of state. Therefore I am not yet fully informed of all the details of this matter. Nevertheless I can assert quite definitely that there is not, nor can there now be, any question of a victory for the Left Communists. I know this from my direct observation of the course of government affairs.

The fact of the matter is that Britain's act of injustice, expressed in her unwillingness to admit us to the Conference, was so unexpected, aroused such indignation in Russia and so firmly united not only the Right with the Left Communists but also united the huge mass of the non-Party population of Russia, the workers and peasants, that things did not and could not reach the point of disagreement between the Left and Right Communists.

The reason given for our rejection of the Urquhart agreement

was a direct expression, one may say, not only of the general Party sentiment but of that of the entire people, i.e., the sentiment of the entire mass of the workers and peasants.

The resumption of negotiations and the subsequent ratification of an agreement with Urquhart depend primarily on the elimination of the flagrant injustices committed against Russia by Britain in curtailing her right to participate in the Middle East Conference. As far as the concrete terms submitted to us by Urquhart are concerned, I have not yet had time to look into this matter in sufficient detail, and can only say that the government has decided to let the supporters and opponents of this agreement have their say in our press as soon as possible, in order to obtain, from the most objective and motivated discussion, material for the overall verification of all the pros and cons and for a decision on the issue in a manner that best accords with Russia's interests.

7. *Question*. To what extent are the accusations of the anti-Russian press in Britain justified when they assert that the recent arrests of industrialists in Moscow signify the end of the New Economic Policy and a reversion to the policy or nationalisation and confiscation?

Answer. As to your question concerning the accusations made against us in the British anti-Russian press that "Moscow industrialists" were being arrested, I must say that I have today just read in our newspaper (*Izvestia*) an item headed "Arrests of Black Marketeers". None other than Comrade Z. B. Katsnelson, chief of the Economic Division of the State Political Administration, tells us in this article that there was no question of arrests of industrialists, and that "rumours circulated by enemies of Soviet power, both within the R.S.F.S.R. and abroad, that the arrests are infringements on the freedom to trade are actually nothing but *nonsensical* inventions that have the definite counter-revolutionary intent of disrupting the economic relations that are being established with Western Europe".

Indeed, those arrested were exclusively profiteers on the so-called black market and our authorities are in possession of evidence establishing connection between these black-market currency profiteers and certain employees

of foreign missions in Moscow. This evidence shows not only the sale of platinum and of gold bars but also the *organisation of contraband shipments of these valuables abroad.*

From this you can see how absolutely unfounded are the rumours that we are putting an end to the New Economic Policy and how utterly false are the accusations made by the anti-Russian press in Britain, which is trying by the most unheard-of distortion and deception to present our policy in a false light. Actually, there has never been any mention in any government circles whatsoever of discontinuing the New Economic Policy and returning to the old. Incidentally, the whole work of the government during the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee now in progress is aimed at obtaining the widest possible legislative sanction for what is known as the New Economic Policy, so as to eliminate all possibility of any deviation from it.

October 27, 1922

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SPEECH AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, NINTH CONVOCATION OCTOBER 31, 1922[125]

(*Stormy, prolonged applause. All rise.*) Comrades, permit me to confine myself to a few words of greeting. We should first of all, of course, send our greetings to the Red Army, which has recently given further proof of its valour by capturing Vladivostok and clearing the entire territory of the last of the republics linked with Soviet Russia. I am sure that I am expressing the general opinion when I say that we all welcome this new feat of the Red Army, and also the fact that apparently a very important step has been taken towards bringing the war to a close; the last of the whiteguard forces have been driven into the sea. (*Applause.*) I think that our Red Army has rid us for a long time of the possibility of another whiteguard attack on Russia or on any of the republics that are directly or indirectly, closely or more or less remotely, connected with us.

At the same time, however, in order to avoid adopting a tone of inordinate self-adulation, we must say that the strength of the Red Army and its recent victory were not the only factors in this; other factors were the international situation and our diplomacy.

There was a time when Japan and the U.S.A. signed pacts to support Kolchak. But that was so long ago that many people have probably forgotten it completely. But that was the case. We have made such pacts impossible now, and, due to our efforts, the Japanese, in spite of their military

strength, declared that they would withdraw, and have kept their promise; our diplomacy must also be given credit for this. I shall not drag out my brief greeting by saying what brought us that success. I shall only say that in the near future our diplomats will once again have to display their skill in a matter of immense importance, and one in which we are vitally interested. I have in mind the Middle East Conference that Great Britain is convening in Lausanne on November 13. I am sure that there, too, our diplomats will prove their mettle, and that we shall be able to vindicate the interests of all our federated republics, and of the R.S.F.S.R. At all events, we shall succeed in revealing to the masses where and what the obstacle is, and to what extent it is an obstacle to the legitimate desires and aspirations not only of ourselves, but of all countries interested in the question of the Straits.

I shall limit my utterances on foreign politics to these brief remarks and shall now deal with the proceedings of this session.

I think that here we have achieved no small success in spite of the fact that to some people the questions dealt with may at first sight appear to be not so very important. Take the first code of laws that you have already passed—the Code of Labour Laws. Our adoption of a code of laws which firmly lays down the principles of labour legislation such as the eight-hour day at a time when in all other countries the working class is being heavily attacked is a tremendous achievement for Soviet rule. True, there are people who, perhaps, would desire something more from this code; but I think that such a desire would be totally unjustified.

We must bear in mind that compared with all the countries where fierce capitalist competition is raging, where there are millions and tens of millions of unemployed, and where the capitalists are forming vast combinations and are launching an offensive against the working class—if we compare ourselves with those countries, we are the least cultured, our productive forces are the lowest, and we are the least efficient. This is, I would say, a very unpleasant thing to have to admit. I think, however, that precisely because we do not disguise such things with platitudes

and stereotyped catchwords, but candidly admit them, precisely because we all admit, and are not afraid to proclaim from this rostrum, that we are exerting more efforts than any other country to rectify all this, we shall succeed in catching up with these countries faster than they ever dreamed possible.

This will not be done at a fantastic speed, of course, it will naturally take us several years of laborious effort to achieve it. It goes without saying that nothing can be done overnight. We have been in existence for five years, we have seen at what speed social relations change, and have learned to appreciate what time means; and we must go on learning what it means. Nobody believes that any important change can be achieved at a fantastic speed; but we do believe in real speed, speed compared with the rate of development in any period in history you like to take—especially if progress is guided by a genuinely revolutionary party; and this speed we shall achieve at all costs.

I will now touch upon the Land Code that you have passed. You are aware that in the very first days after the famous 25th of October, 1917, our laws, unlike any other laws, propounded a land principle[126] which, though very imperfect from the technical and perhaps also from the juridical point of view, nevertheless, provided the peasants with all that was vital and essential for them, and ensured their alliance with the workers. From that time onwards, difficult as it has been for us to pull through these five years of continuous war, we have never relaxed our efforts to satisfy to the utmost the peasants' desire for land. And if it turns out that the law which you have just passed also needs amending in some way or other, we shall adopt such amendments and improvements as readily as you have just adopted amendments and improvements to our Criminal Code. We regard the land question, the question of improving the living conditions of the peasants, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, as one of fundamental importance. In this respect we have already succeeded in convincing the Russian peasants that in our supreme legislative body every proposal to change the old laws will always meet, not with opposition, but with the most favourable consideration and support.

You have also had before you for your consideration the Civil Code and the Law on the Judicial System. You know that in the light of the policy which we have firmly adopted, and concerning which there can be no wavering in our ranks, this is a most important question for the vast masses of the population. You know also that here, too, we have tried to maintain the dividing line between what can satisfy the ordinary citizen's legitimate needs in present-day economic conditions, and what is abuse of the New Economic Policy—the things that are legal in all other countries, but which we do not want to legalise. The future will show to what extent the amendments you have approved of and adopted specifically for this purpose are effective. We shall leave ourselves a perfectly free hand in this matter. If everyday experience reveals abuses which we have not foreseen, we shall forthwith introduce the necessary amendments. As far as this is concerned, you are all well aware, of course, that, unfortunately, no other country can as yet vie with us in the speed with which we legislate. We shall see whether events in the near future will not compel them to try to catch up with Soviet Russia a little in this matter.

Further, I must speak about another important matter that you have finally settled here, and that is the question of the local congresses of Soviets and of the gubernia executive committees. This is a question that was always kept in the background under all previous legislative systems and in all constitutions. It was regarded as a matter of no importance- the opinion was that the local government bodies could continue to follow the old rut. We are of a contrary opinion. We are convinced that the successes our revolution has achieved are due to our having always devoted most of our attention to the local government bodies and to local experiences. The revolution of October 1917 at one stroke achieved such successes that it seemed to us in the spring of 1918 that the war had drawn to a close—actually, it had only just started in its worst form, the form of civil war; actually, peace with the Germans meant that they assisted the worst elements in the Civil War; actually, the peace treaty we then signed with the Germans and which collapsed in the autumn, in many cases meant

that assistance was given to these worst elements by the Allied Powers who blamed us for concluding peace with the Germans—and, I say, our revolution accomplished its task so quickly in a few months, a few weeks even, because we relied entirely on the forces in the localities, we gave them full scope for their activities, and we looked to the localities for the enthusiasm that made our revolution swift and invincible. I am aware that since then our localities have undergone many different perturbations, so to say. The problem of the relations between the localities and the centre has been one of no little difficulty, and I do not want to suggest that we have always found the ideal solution for it. Considering our general level of culture, it was useless dreaming of an ideal solution. But we may confidently say that we have solved it more sincerely, justly and durably than it has been solved in any other country.

In conclusion I shall touch only upon one other question that particularly interests me, and which, I think, should interest you, although officially it does not appear either on your agenda or in the list of questions. This is the question of our machinery of state; an old and eternally new question.

In August 1918 we took a census of public officials in Moscow. We obtained a total of 231,000 state and Soviet employees; this figure covered the number employed both in central government offices and in the local, Moscow municipal offices. Recently, in October 1922, we took another census in the belief that we had cut down these innated staffs and that they would certainly be smaller. The figure obtained, however, was 243,000. This, then, was the result of all the reductions of staffs that we carried through. A great deal of effort will still have to be spent on investigating and comparing these figures. When we took the first census in 1918, in the first flush of reforms, we, to put it bluntly, could make next to nothing of the returns. We had no time for that sort of thing. The Civil War did not leave us a minute to spare. Now, however, we hope that this work will be done. We are convinced that our machinery of state, which suffers from many defects, is inflated to far more than twice the size we need, and often works not for us, but against

us—we need not be afraid to admit this truth even from the rostrum of the supreme legislative body of our Republic —we are convinced that this machinery of state will be improved. Much effort and skill will be required to improve it. We have made a beginning in the serious study of the problem of how to improve it, but this is only a beginning—a few essays and material from local research. If we all leave this session determined to devote more attention to this problem than we have done up to now, determined to spend less time on bustle and fuss—and all too often we spend a vast amount of time on this—if we really make a thorough study of our machinery of state and work for a number of years to improve it, that will be a great asset and a guarantee of success. We must have the courage to say that up to now we have built up our machinery of state spontaneously. Our best workers undertook the most arduous duties in both the civil and military fields, and very often they went about them in the wrong way, but they learned to rectify their mistakes and get things done. The proportion of these, perhaps, scores of courageous men and women, relative to the hundreds of those who sabotaged—or half-sabotaged, floundering among their voluminous papers—this proportion was very often such that our vital affairs became submerged in a deluge of paper. We have not been able to study this question up to now, but henceforth we must study it in the most comprehensive manner. This will take years and years; we shall have to study hard for years, for the cultural standard of our workers is low, they find it difficult to undertake the new tasks of production, but it is only on their sincerity and enthusiasm that we can rely. It will take us years and years to secure an improvement in our machinery of state, to raise it—not merely individuals, but as a whole—to a higher cultural level. I am sure that if we continue to devote our efforts to such work, we shall certainly and inevitably achieve better and better results. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Pravda No. 247,
November 1, 1922

Published according to
the *Pravda* text
checked with the verbatim report

TO *PETROGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*[127]

November 1, 1922

Dear Comrades,

I greet you from the bottom of my heart on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution and wish that during the next five years our fight on the peace front will be as successful as it has been hitherto on the war front.

With best greetings and wishes,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 251, November 5, 1922

Published according to the manuscript

TO *PRAVDA*

Dear Comrades,

I cordially greet you on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution. My desire is that we should in the next five years gain by peaceful efforts no less than we have gained up to now by force of arms.

November 2, 1922

Yours,
Lenin

Pravda No. 252,
November 7, 1922

Published according to
the manuscript

TO THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST CO-OPERATORS[128]

I welcome the very timely convocation of the International Conference of Communist Co-operators and wish you every success in your work.

Like the delegates at the conference, I fully appreciate the complexity and difficulty of the task you have undertaken, that of capturing the machinery of the co-operative movement in order to further the world revolution.

I shall be very glad if the experience we have gained in our work in Russia can be of use to the common cause.

Written on November 2, 1922
Published in *Pravda* No. 249, November 3, 1922

Published according to the newspaper text

TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF STATISTICIANS[129]

November 4, 1922

From the bottom of my heart I thank you for your message of greetings and ask you to accept my gratitude and best wishes for success in your work.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Published in *Pravda* No. 251, November 5, 1922

Published according to the original signed by Lenin

INTERVIEW WITH ARTHUR RANSOME, *MANCHESTER GUARDIAN* CORRESPONDENT[130]

FIRST VERSION

1. *Question*. I find considerable economic activity; everybody is buying and selling, and evidently, a new trading class is arising. My question is—*how is it that the Nepman is not, and shows no signs of aspiring to become, a political force?*

Answer. Your first question reminded me of a conversation I had long, long ago, in London. It was on a Saturday night. I was taking a stroll with a friend; that was some twenty years ago.[131] The streets were thronged. Traders were lined all along the curbs, and their stalls were lit up by small metal tubes, filled with naphtha, or something of that sort. The lights were very pretty. The traffic in the streets was really extraordinary. Everybody was buying or selling.

In Russia at that time there was a trend that we called Economism. By this rather slangy term we meant the childish vulgarisation of Marx's views on historical materialism. My friend was an Economist, and he at once began to show off his knowledge. This extraordinary economic activity, he argued, should create a desire for political power. I laughed at this interpretation of Marx. The abundance of small traders and their extremely lively activities, I said, do not prove in the least that this class is a great economic force, from which one could infer a desire for "political power". London, probably, became the world's commercial centre, both economic and political, in a somewhat more complicated way than my friend imagined,

and the London street traders, their remarkable activity notwithstanding, were rather far from being a "political" force, and even from the desire to become one.

I am afraid that your question as to why our Nepmen (i.e., street traders? petty hucksters?) "show no signs of aspiring to become a political force" will raise a smile here; and our answer will be—for the very same reason that the Saturday night crowd buying and selling in the streets of London did not, in Britain, "show signs of aspiring to become a political force".

2. *Question*. I get the impression that in Russia, today, buying and selling and barter are highly profitable, whereas production is possible only in very rare cases. Buying and selling and barter are in the hands of the Nepmen. In most cases profitable production is conducted on a small scale, and is in the hands of private individuals. *Unprofitable* production is in the hands of the state. My question is—*does this not presage a continuous increase in the economic power of the Nepmen and a continuous diminution of the power of the state?*

Answer. I am afraid that you formulate your second question also from an almost Economist angle in the sense indicated above. It was Bastiat, I think, who seriously held the opinion that "the ancient Greeks and Romans lived by plunder". The "economic" question as to where the loot obtained by the people who lived by plunder came from did not trouble him very much.

You "get the impression that in Russia, today, buying and selling and barter are highly profitable, whereas production is possible only in very rare cases".

I was very surprised to read such a conclusion drawn from observation of what goes on in the streets of Moscow. I thought to myself—what about the millions and millions of Russian peasants? The fact that they sow crops is not a rare, or very rare case, but the commonest case in Russia, is it not? Is it not "even" commoner than the "buying and selling" of the Nepmen? And, probably, peasant production is not only "possible" in Russia, but extremely "profitable", is it not? If it were not so, how could our peasants have obtained the means to pay the tax in kind, amounting to hundreds of millions of poods of grain, which they have already delivered to the government so very quickly and easily? How is one to explain the universal acceleration

of building activity observed by everybody, both in town and country, throughout boundless Russia?

Does not the questioner take for "highly profitable selling and barter" the petty trade in which a small trader sometimes makes millions and millions of profits in depreciated Russian currency, when on the free market a million rubles is worth less than a ruble was before? It is scarcely possible to slip into such an error, for our government is now—has been for the last few months already—striking out the "superfluous" noughts of our paper currency.[132] One day the figure is a million million; four noughts are struck out and it becomes a hundred million. The state does not become richer as a result of this operation, but it is very strange to assume that it "becomes weaker", for this operation is an obvious step towards stabilising the currency, and the Nepmen are beginning to see that the ruble is becoming stabilised; this was to be seen in the summer, for example. The Nepmen are beginning to understand that the "striking out" of noughts will continue, and I doubt whether their "aspiration to become a political force" will hinder it.

To return to the question of production. In this country the land belongs to the state. The small peasants who occupy the land are paying the tax splendidly. Industrial production—in so-called light industry—is obviously reviving; and this production is partly in the hands of the state and managed by its employees, and partly in the hands of lessees.

Thus, there are no grounds for anticipating "a continuous diminution of the power of the state".

You must draw a distinction not between production and trade, but between production in light industry and that in heavy industry. The latter is really unprofitable, and this is actually creating serious difficulties for the country. Of this, more below.

3. *Question*. It is being hinted that an attempt is to be made (by means of taxation) to compel the Nepmen to subsidise industry. My question is—*will not this merely result in a rise in prices and increased profits for the Nepmen, which will indirectly create the necessity of raising wages—thus causing a return to the former situation?*

Answer. The government has at its command hundreds of millions of poods of grain. That being the case, it is wrong to anticipate that taxes will "*merely*" result in a rise in prices. The taxes will also provide us with revenues, obtained from the Nepmen and manufacturers, which will be used for industry, particularly heavy industry.

4. *Question*. Judging by usual capitalist standards, the economic situation should be worse. Judging by communist standards, the situation should also be worse (decline of heavy industry). And yet, everybody I meet admits that his conditions are better than they were a year ago. Evidently, something is taking place that neither capitalist nor communist ideology allows for. Both presuppose progress. But what if, instead of progressing, we are receding? My question is—*is it not possible that we are not marching forward to new prosperity, but are reverting to the old conditions?* Is it not possible that Russia is going back to the period of agricultural production approximately commensurate with her needs, and to a brisk home trade only slightly affected by foreign imports? Is not such a period conceivable under the proletarian dictatorship as it was formerly under the feudal dictatorship?

Answer. Let us first "judge" by "usual capitalist standards". Throughout the summer our ruble remained stable. This is an obvious sign of improvement. Furthermore, the revival of peasant production and of light industry is beyond doubt. This, too, is an improvement. Lastly, the State Bank has obtained a net revenue of no less than 20,000,000 gold rubles (this is at the lowest estimate; actually, it obtained a larger sum). A small sum, but the improvement is beyond doubt. A small sum, but it undoubtedly marks the beginning of an increase in the funds available for heavy industry.

To proceed. Let us now judge by communist standards. All the three circumstances enumerated above are assets also from the communist viewpoint, for in this country political power is in the hands of the workers. The *step* towards the stabilisation of the ruble, the revival of peasant production and light industry and the *first* profits obtained by the State Bank (i.e., the state) are all assets from the communist viewpoint *too*.

How is it that although capitalism is the antithesis of communism, certain circumstances are *assets* from *the two opposite viewpoints*? It is because one possible way to

proceed to communism is through state capitalism, provided the state is controlled by the working class. This is exactly the position in the "present case".

The decline of heavy industry is a loss to us. The first profits obtained by the State Bank and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade mark the beginning of an improvement in this field, too. The difficulties here are enormous; but the situation is by no means hopeless.

Let us proceed further. Is it possible that we are receding to something in the nature of a "feudal dictatorship"? It is utterly impossible, for although slowly, with interruptions, taking steps backward from time to time, we are still making progress along the path of state capitalism, a path that leads us forward to socialism and communism (which is the highest stage of socialism), and certainly not back to feudalism.

Foreign trade is growing; the ruble is becoming more stable, although the progress is not altogether without interruptions; there is an obvious revival of industry in Petrograd and Moscow; a small, a very small beginning has been made in accumulating state funds for the purpose of assisting heavy industry, and so on, and so forth. All this shows that Russia is not receding, but advancing, although, I repeat, very slowly, and not without interruption.

5. *Question*. Or are we witnessing a deplorable *squandering of capital that should be utilised in production*?

Answer. This question has already been answered in the foregoing.

6. *Question*. In addition to these questions *The Manchester Guardian* would be interested to obtain direct from you a refutation of the rumours now freely circulating in Moscow that the ration system will be reintroduced this winter and that all Nepman stocks are to be requisitioned.

Answer. I readily affirm that the rumours to the effect that we intend to revert to the ration system or that we intend to "requisition all Nepman stocks" are groundless.

They are fairy-tales, nothing more. We are not contemplating anything of the sort.

Nothing of the sort is conceivable in present-day Russia.

These rumours are being maliciously circulated by people who are very angry with us, but are not very clever.

7. *Question*. Lastly, am I right in assuming that the agreement with Urquhart has not been finally rejected, but has only been shelved until normal, friendly relations have been established with the British Government?

Answer. You are absolutely right about Urquhart. I shall repeat what I recently told Farbman.* We have not finally rejected the proposal for a concession to Urquhart. We have rejected it only for the political reasons we have publicly announced. In our press we have started a discussion of all the *pros* and *cons*. And we hope that after this discussion we shall arrive at a definite opinion on both the political and economic aspects.

Yours,

Lenin

November 5, 1922

Published in *The Manchester Guardian* No. 23797, November 22, 1922

First published in Russian in 1930

Translated from the manuscript

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See pp. 383-89 of this volume.—*Ed*.

SECOND VERSION (UNFINISHED)

In reply to your questions:

1. I think that the "Nepman", i.e., the representative of the trading system developing under the "New Economic Policy", would like to become a political force, but shows no signs of this, or shows them in such a way as to conceal his aspirations. He is compelled to conceal his aspirations, for otherwise he would run the risk of meeting with the stern opposition of our state authorities, or perhaps even worse than opposition, i.e., downright hostility.

I am of the opinion that with the concentration of the bulk of the means of production in the hands of our state what the petty bourgeoisie actually needs, economically is freedom to buy and sell consumer goods. Our laws grant the petty bourgeoisie this freedom.

The term "Nepman" that you use leads to some misunderstanding. This word is made up of the abbreviation NEP, which stands for "New Economic Policy", and the word "man". Together it means "a man, or representative, of this New Economic Policy". This term first arose as a journalese nickname for the small huckster, or individual who took advantage of the free market for all sorts of abuses.

Outwardly, what strikes the eye most in the New Economic Policy is that people like the "Nepmen", that is, people of all sorts who "buy and sell", as you say, come to the fore.

But the actual economic activities of the actual majority of the population by no means consist in this. For example, it is sufficient to point to the activities of the vast masses of the peasantry who, precisely at the present time, are

displaying tremendous energy and self-sacrifice in restoring their tillage, their agricultural implements, their houses, farm buildings, etc. On the other hand, at this very moment the industrial workers are displaying equal energy in improving their tools, in replacing worn out tools by new ones, in restoring wrecked, dilapidated or damaged buildings, etc.

The "Nepmen", if we are to employ this term, which belongs rather to the realm of journalese than to the realm of serious political economy, make more noise than their economic power warrants. I am therefore afraid that anybody who in a vulgarised way applied to our "Nepmen" the proposition of historical materialism that economic power must be followed by political power, is in danger of falling into serious error, and even of becoming the victim of a series of ridiculous misunderstandings.

The real nature of the New Economic Policy is this—firstly, the proletarian state *has given small producers freedom to trade*; and secondly, in respect of the *means of production in large-scale industry*, *the proletarian state is applying a number of the principles of what in capitalist economics is called "state capitalism"*.

I think that the "Nepmen" who draw from this the conclusion that they should aspire to become a political force are in danger not only of falling into error, but also of becoming a butt for newspaper quips about their vulgar conception of Marxism.

2. It seems to me that your impression that in Russia today buying and selling are highly profitable, "whereas production is possible only in very rare cases" is likely to call forth well-deserved ridicule over Mister Nepman's political economy.

If I am not mistaken, the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia are small peasants, who have now thrown themselves into production with extraordinary zeal, and have achieved (partly due to the assistance the government has given them by way of seed, etc.) enormous, almost incredible success, particularly if we bear in mind the unprecedented devastation caused by the Civil War, the famine, and so forth. The small peasants have been so successful that they delivered the state tax amounting to

hundreds of millions of poods of grain with extraordinary ease, and almost without any coercion.

I therefore think that it would be more true to say that the overwhelming majority of the population, whose production is conducted on a very small scale and is concentrated in private hands, obtains very large profits. This applies to peasant farming as a whole. The same, or slightly smaller, profits are obtained from industrial production—part of which is in private hands and part in the hands of lessees from the state or state factories producing consumer goods for the rural population.

The only really unprofitable production in the hands of the state is that part which, to employ the scientific terminology of political economy, should be called the production of means of production (ores, metals, etc.), or the production of fixed capital. Under capitalist economy the renewal of this form of capital usually requires government loans, which at one stroke provide extremely large sums (hundreds of millions of rubles, or even dollars) for the reorganisation of a number of enterprises capable of restoring damaged means of production.

In our case, the restoration of the damaged means of production promises no profit whatever for a long time to come, and is "unprofitable", as you express it. For a long time we shall have to resort to revenues obtained from concessions, or state subsidies, for the purpose of restoring our fixed capital.

Such is the actual economic situation at present. As you see, my view of this situation is quite different from yours. I am afraid that your opinion that in this country there is a "continuous increase in the economic power of the Nepmen" and a "continuous diminution of the power of the state" would probably have prompted Marx to make some caustic remarks about vulgar political economy.

I still stick to my old idea that after Marx you can drag in non-Marxian political economy only for the purpose of fooling philistines, even if they are "highly civilised" philistines.

I am rounding off on the question of "political power". The basis of political power in Russia is the workers and peasants. In all capitalist countries the peasants are robbed

by the landowners and capitalists. As the peasants become more politically educated they understand this better. That is why the bulk of the population will not follow the lead of the "buying and selling" Nepmen.

3. Will not the tax on the "Nepmen" merely result in increased wages and prices, instead of providing funds for production?

No, because prices will be based on grain. A certain part of this grain is in the hands of the state, collected in the form of a tax. The Nepmen cannot directly influence prices because they are not producers. The foreign trade monopoly, I must say in passing, will help us to keep the Nepmen in hand, for, without consulting them, prices will be determined by the price of production abroad plus the extra charge imposed by the state for the purpose of subsidising production.

I am afraid that you sometimes imagine that the Nepmen are forcing up prices although the rise in prices is actually due to the depreciation of our paper currency, caused by increased issues. That would be a mistake.

Written between October 27 and November 5, 1922

First published in *Pravda* No. 17, January 21, 1926

Published according to a typewritten copy with corrections and additions by Lenin

TO THE NON-PARTY CONFERENCE OF WOMEN WORKERS AND PEASANTS OF MOSCOW CITY AND MOSCOW GUBERNIA[133]

Dear Comrades,

I thank you cordially for your kind wishes and greetings. I am very sorry that I am unable to attend in person.

Congratulations on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the revolution and all best wishes for the success of your Conference.

Yours,
Lenin

November 6, 1922

Rabochaya Moskva No. 227,
November 9, 1922

Published according to
the *Rabochaya Moskva* text

TO THE WORKERS OF THE FORMER MICHELSON PLANT[134]

Dear Comrades,

I regret very much that precisely today a slight indisposition has forced me to stay indoors. I send you my warmest greetings and wishes on the occasion of the fifth anniversary. I wish you success in your work for the next five years.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

November 7, 1922

First published in 1942

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES AT THE STATE ELEKTROPEREDACHA POWER STATION[135]

Dear Comrades,

Today, on the fifth anniversary of the revolution, it gives me particular pleasure to welcome the opening of your club. I express the hope that by joint efforts you, workers and employees at the State Elektroperedacha Power Station, will turn that club into one of the most important centres of education for workers.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

November 7, 1922

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Published according to
the original corrected
and signed by Lenin

TO THE WORKERS AT THE STODOL CLOTH MILL IN KLINTSI[136]

November 8, 1922

Dear Comrades,

I thank you most heartily for your greetings and your gift. I will tell you as a secret that you ought not to send me any gifts. I earnestly request you to spread this secret among the workers as widely as possible.

Please accept my best thanks, greetings and wishes.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1924

Published according to the manuscript

FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[137]

NOVEMBER 5-DECEMBER 5, 1922

1

TO THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND TO THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES

I regret very much that I cannot be present at the first session of the Congress and that I must confine myself to greetings in writing.

Notwithstanding the enormous obstacles confronting the Communist Parties, the Communist International is growing and becoming strong. The main goal is still to win over the majority of the workers. We shall attain this goal in spite of everything.

The amalgamation of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals will benefit the proletarian revolutionary movement: less fiction and less fraud is always to the benefit of the working class.

To the Petrograd workers and their newly-elected Soviet who are hosts to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, I send my best wishes and cordial greetings.

The Petrograd workers must be in the foremost ranks on the economic front, too. We rejoice to hear about the beginning of the economic revival of Petrograd. I hope to be able to accept your invitation to visit Petrograd in the near future.

Soviet rule in Russia is celebrating its fifth anniversary. It is now sounder than ever. The Civil War is over. The first successes in the economic field have been achieved. Soviet Russia considers it a matter of the greatest pride to help the workers of the whole world in their difficult struggle to overthrow capitalism. Victory will be ours.

Long live the Communist International!

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Moscow, November 4, 1922

Pravda No. 253,
November 9, 1922

Published according to
the *Pravda* text

2

FIVE YEARS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

REPORT TO THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, NOVEMBER 13, 1922

(*Comrade Lenin is met with stormy, prolonged applause and a general ovation. All rise and join in singing "The Internationale"*.) Comrades, I am down in the list as the main speaker, but you will understand that after my lengthy illness I am not able to make a long report. I can only make a few introductory remarks on the key questions. My subject will be a very limited one. The subject, "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution", is in general too broad and too large for one speaker to exhaust in a single speech. That is why I shall take only a small part of this subject, namely, the question of the New Economic Policy. I have deliberately taken only this small part in order to make you familiar with what is now the most important question—at all events, it is the most important to me, because I am now working on it.

And so, I shall tell you how we launched the New Economic Policy, and what results we have achieved with the aid of this policy. If I confine myself to this question, I shall, perhaps, succeed in giving you a general survey and a general idea of it.

To begin with how we arrived at the New Economic Policy, I must quote from an article I wrote in 1918.[138] At the beginning of 1918, in a brief polemic, I touched on the question of the attitude we should adopt towards state capitalism. I then wrote:

"State capitalism would be a *step forward* as compared with the present state of affairs (i.e., the state of affairs

at that time) in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months' time state capitalism became established in our Republic, this would be a great success and a sure guarantee that within a year socialism will have gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible in our country."

Of course, this was said at a time when we were more foolish than we are now, but not so foolish as to be unable to deal with such matters.

Thus, in 1918, I was of the opinion that with regard to the economic situation then obtaining in the Soviet Republic, state capitalism would be a step forward. This sounds very strange, and perhaps even absurd, for already at that time our Republic was a socialist republic and we were every day hastily—perhaps too hastily—adopting various new economic measures which could not be described as anything but socialist measures. Nevertheless, I then held the view that in relation to the economic situation then obtaining in the Soviet Republic state capitalism would be a step forward, and I explained my idea simply by enumerating the elements of the economic system of Russia. In my opinion these elements were the following: "(1) patriarchal, i.e., the most primitive form of agriculture; (2) small commodity production (this includes the majority of the peasants who trade in grain); (3) private capitalism; (4) state capitalism, and (5) socialism." All these economic elements were present in Russia at that time. I set myself the task of explaining the relationship of these elements to each other, and whether one of the non-socialist elements, namely, state capitalism, should not be rated higher than socialism. I repeat: it seems very strange to everyone that a non-socialist element should be rated higher than, regarded as superior to, socialism in a republic which declares itself a socialist republic But the fact will become intelligible if you recall that we definitely did not regard the economic system of Russia as something homogeneous and highly developed; we were fully aware that in Russia we had patriarchal agriculture, i.e., the most primitive form of agriculture, alongside the socialist form. What role could state capitalism play in these circumstances?

I then asked myself which of these elements predominated? Clearly, in a petty-bourgeois environment the petty-

bourgeois element predominates. I recognised then that the petty-bourgeois element predominated; it was impossible to take a different view. The question I then put to myself—this was in a specific controversy which had nothing to do with the present question—was: what is our attitude towards state capitalism? And I replied: although it is not a socialist form, state capitalism would be for us, and for Russia, a more favourable form than the existing one. What does that show? It shows that we did not overrate either the rudiments or the principles of socialist economy, although we had already accomplished the social revolution. On the contrary, at that time we already realised to a certain extent that it would be better if we first arrived at state capitalism and only after that at socialism.

I must lay special emphasis on this, because I assume that it is the only point of departure we can take, firstly, to explain what the present economic policy is; and, secondly, to draw very important practical conclusions for the Communist International. I do not want to suggest that we had then a ready-made plan of retreat. This was not the case. Those brief lines set forth in a polemic were not by any means a plan of retreat. For example, they made no mention whatever of that very important point, freedom to trade, which is of fundamental significance to state capitalism. Yet they did contain a general, even if indefinite, idea of retreat. I think that we should take note of that not only from the viewpoint of a country whose economic system was, and is to this day, very backward, but also from the viewpoint of the Communist International and the advanced West-European countries. For example, just now we are engaged in drawing up a programme. I personally think that it would be best to hold simply a general discussion on all the programmes, to make the first reading, so to speak, and to get them printed, but not to take a final decision now, this year. Why? First of all, of course, because I do not think we have considered all of them in sufficient detail, and also because we have given scarcely any thought to possible retreat, and to preparations for it. Yet that is a question which, in view of such fundamental changes in the world as the overthrow of capitalism and the building of socialism with all its enormous difficulties, absolutely

requires our attention. We must not only know how to act when we pass directly to the offensive and are victorious. In revolutionary times this is not so difficult, nor so very important; at least, it is not the most decisive thing. There are always times in a revolution when the opponent loses his head; and if we attack him at such a time we may win an easy victory. But that is nothing, because our enemy, if he has enough endurance, can rally his forces beforehand, and so forth. He can easily provoke us to attack him and then throw us back for many years. For this reason, I think, the idea that we must prepare for ourselves the possibility of retreat is very important, and not only from the theoretical point of view. From the practical point of view, too, all the parties which are preparing to take the direct offensive against capitalism in the near future must now give thought to the problem of preparing for a possible retreat. I think it will do us no harm to learn this lesson together with all the other lessons which the experience of our revolution offers. On the contrary, it may prove beneficial in many cases.

Now that I have emphasised the fact that as early as 1918 we regarded state capitalism as a possible line of retreat, I shall deal with the results of our New Economic Policy. I repeat: at that time it was still a very vague idea, but in 1921, after we had passed through the most important stage of the Civil War—and passed through it victoriously—we felt the impact of a grave—I think it was the gravest—internal political crisis in Soviet Russia. This internal crisis brought to light discontent not only among a considerable section of the peasantry but also among the workers. This was the first and, I hope, the last time in the history of Soviet Russia that feeling ran against us among large masses of peasants, not consciously but instinctively. What gave rise to this peculiar, and for us, of course, very unpleasant, situation? The reason for it was that in our economic offensive we had run too far ahead, that we had not provided ourselves with adequate resources, that the masses sensed what we ourselves were not then able to formulate consciously but what we admitted soon after, a few weeks later, namely, that the direct transition to purely socialist forms, to purely socialist distribution,

was beyond our available strength, and that if we were unable to effect a retreat so as to confine ourselves to easier tasks, we would face disaster. The crisis began, I think, in February 1921. In the spring of that year we decided unanimously—I did not observe any considerable disagreement among us on this question—to adopt the New Economic Policy. Now, after eighteen months have elapsed, at the close of 1922, we are able to make certain comparisons. What has happened? How have we fared during this period of over eighteen months? What is the result? Has this retreat been of any benefit to us? Has it really saved us, or is the result still indefinite? This is the main question that I put to myself, and I think that this main question is also of first-rate importance to all the Communist Parties; for if the reply is in the negative, we are all doomed. I think that all of us can, with a clear conscience, reply to this question in the affirmative, namely, that the past eighteen months provide positive and absolute proof that we have passed the test.

I shall now try to prove this. To do that I must briefly enumerate all the constituent parts of our economy.

First of all I shall deal with our financial system and our famous Russian ruble. I think we can say that Russian rubles are famous, if only for the reason that their number now in circulation exceeds a quadrillion. (*Laughter.*) That is something! It is an astronomical figure. I am sure that not everyone here knows what this figure signifies. (*General laughter.*) But we do not think that the figure is so very important even from the point of view of economic science, for the noughts can always be crossed out. (*Laughter.*) We have achieved a thing or two in this art, which is likewise of no importance from the economic point of view, and I am sure that in the further course of events we shall achieve much more. But what is really important is the problem of stabilising the ruble. We are now grappling with this problem, our best forces are working on it, and we attach decisive importance to it. If we succeed in stabilising the ruble for a long period, and then for all time, it will prove that we have won. In that case all these astronomical figures, these trillions and quadrillions, will not have mattered in the least. We shall then be able to place our economy

on a firm basis, and develop it further on a firm basis. On this question I think I can cite some fairly important and decisive data. In 1921 the rate of exchange of the paper ruble remained stable for a period of less than three months. This year, 1922, which has not yet drawn to a close, the rate remained stable for a period of over five months. I think that this proof is sufficient. Of course, if you demand scientific proof that we shall definitely solve this problem, then it is not sufficient; but in general, I do not think it is possible to prove this entirely and conclusively. The data I have cited show that between last year, when we started on the New Economic Policy, and the present day, we have already learned to make progress. Since we have learned to do this, I am sure we shall learn to achieve further successes along this road, provided we avoid doing anything very foolish. The most important thing, however, is trade, namely, the circulation of commodities, which is essential for us. And since we have successfully coped with this problem for two years, in spite of having been in a state of war (for, as you know, Vladivostok was recaptured only a few weeks ago), and in spite of the fact that only now we are able to proceed with our economic activities in a really systematic way—since we have succeeded in keeping the rate of the paper ruble stable for five months instead of only three months, I think I can say that we have grounds to be pleased. After all, we stand alone. We have not received any loans, and are not receiving any now. We have been given no assistance by any of the powerful capitalist countries, which organise their capitalist economy so "brilliantly" that they do not know to this day which way they are going. By the Treaty of Versailles they have created a financial system that they themselves cannot make head or tail of. If these great capitalist countries are managing things in this way, I think that we, backward and uneducated as we are, may be pleased with the fact that we have grasped the most important thing—the conditions for the stabilisation of the ruble. This is proved not by theoretical analysis but by practical experience, which in my opinion is more important than all the theoretical discussions in the world. Practice shows that we have achieved decisive results in that field, namely,

we are beginning to push our economy towards the stabilisation of the ruble, which is of supreme importance for trade, for the free circulation of commodities, for the peasants, and for the vast masses of small producers.

Now I come to our social objectives. The most important factor, of course, is the peasantry. In 1921 discontent undoubtedly prevailed among a vast section of the peasantry. Then there was the famine. This was the severest trial for the peasants. Naturally, all our enemies abroad shouted: "There, that's the result of socialist economy!" Quite naturally, of course, they said nothing about the famine actually being the terrible result of the Civil War. All the landowners and capitalists who had begun their offensive against us in 1918 tried to make out that the famine was the result of socialist economy. The famine was indeed a great and grave disaster which threatened to nullify the results of all our organisational and revolutionary efforts.

And so, I ask now, after this unprecedented and unexpected disaster, what is the position today, after we have introduced the New Economic Policy, after we have granted the peasants freedom to trade? The answer is clear and obvious to everyone; in one year the peasants have not only got over the famine, but have paid so much tax in kind that we have already received hundreds of millions of poods of grain, and that almost without employing any measures of coercion. Peasant uprisings, which previously, before 1921, were, so to speak, a common occurrence in Russia, have almost completely ceased. The peasants are satisfied with their present position. We can confidently assert that. We think that this evidence is more important than any amount of statistical proof. Nobody questions the fact that the peasants are a decisive factor in our country. And the position of the peasantry is now such that we have no reason to fear any movement against us from that quarter. We say that quite consciously, without exaggeration. This we have already achieved. The peasantry may be dissatisfied with one aspect or another of the work of our authorities. They may complain about this. That is possible, of course, and inevitable, because our machinery of state and our state-operated economy are still too inefficient to avert it; but any serious dissatisfaction with us on the part of

the peasantry as a whole is quite out of the question. This has been achieved in the course of one year. I think that is already quite a lot.

Now I come to our light industry. In industry we have to make a distinction between heavy and light industry because the situation in them is different. As regards light industry, I can safely say that there is a general revival. I shall not go into details. I did not set out to quote a lot of statistics. But this general impression is based on facts, and I can assure you that it is not based on anything untrue or inaccurate. We can speak of a general revival in light industry, and, as a result, of a definite improvement in the conditions of the workers in Petrograd and Moscow. In other districts this is observed to a lesser degree, because heavy industry predominates in them. So this does not apply generally. Nevertheless, I repeat, light industry is undoubtedly on the upgrade, and the conditions of the workers in Petrograd and Moscow have unquestionably improved. In the spring of 1921 there was discontent among the workers in both these cities. That is definitely not the case now. We, who watch the conditions and mood of the workers from day to day, make no mistake on that score.

The third question is that of heavy industry. I must say that the situation here is still grave. Some turn for the better occurred in 1921-22, so that we may hope that the situation will improve in the near future. We have already gathered some of the resources necessary for this. In a capitalist country a loan of hundreds of millions would be required to improve the situation in heavy industry. No improvement would be possible without it. The economic history of the capitalist countries shows that heavy industry in backward countries can only be developed with the aid of long-term loans of hundreds of millions of dollars or gold rubles. We did not get such loans, and so far have received nothing. All that is now being written about concessions and so forth is not worth much more than the paper it is written on. We have written a great deal about this lately and in particular about the Urquhart concession. Yet I think our concessions policy is a very good one. However, we have not concluded a single profitable concession agreement so far. I ask you to bear that in mind.

Thus, the situation in heavy industry is really a very grave problem for our backward country, because we cannot count on loans from the wealthy countries. In spite of that, we see a tangible improvement, and we also see that our trading has brought us some capital. True, it is only a very modest sum as yet—a little over twenty million gold rubles. At any rate, a beginning has been made; our trade is providing us with funds which we can employ for improving the situation in heavy industry. At the present moment, however, our heavy industry is still in great difficulties. But I think that the decisive circumstance is that we are already in a position to save a little. And we shall go on saving. We must economise now though it is often at the expense of the population. We are trying to reduce the state budget, to reduce staffs in our government offices. Later on, I shall have a few words to say about our state apparatus. At all events, we must reduce it. We must economise as much as possible. We are economising in all things, even in schools. We must do this, because we know that unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up an industry at all; and without an industry we shall go under as an independent, country. We realise this very well.

The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—this, too, is not enough; we also need heavy industry. And to put it in a good condition will require several years of work.

Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we are not able to provide them, we shall be doomed as a civilised state, let alone as a socialist state. In this respect, we have taken a determined step. We have begun to accumulate the funds that we need to put heavy industry on its feet. True, the sum we have obtained so far barely exceeds twenty million gold rubles; but at any rate this sum is available, and it is earmarked exclusively for the purpose of reviving our heavy industry.

I think that, on the whole, I have, as I have promised, briefly outlined the principal elements of our economy, and feel that we may draw the conclusion from all this that the

New Economic Policy has already yielded dividends. We already have proof that, as a state, we are able to trade, to maintain our strong positions in agriculture and industry, and to make progress. Practical activity has proved it. I think this is sufficient for us for the time being. We shall have to learn much, and we have realised that we still have much to learn. We have been in power for five years, and during these five years we have been in a state of war. Hence, we have been successful.

This is understandable, because the peasantry were on our side. Probably no one could have supported us more than they did. They were aware that the whiteguards had the landowners behind them, and they hate the landowners more than anything in the world. That is why the peasantry supported us with all their enthusiasm and loyalty. It was not difficult to get the peasantry to defend us against the whiteguards. The peasants, who had always hated war, did all they possibly could in the war against the whiteguards, in the Civil War against the landowners. But this was not all, because in substance it was only a matter of whether power would remain in the hands of the landowners or of the peasants. This was not enough for us. The peasants know that we have seized power for the workers and that our aim is to use this power to establish the socialist system. Therefore, the most important thing for us was to lay the economic foundation for socialist economy. We could not do it directly. We had to do it in a roundabout way. The state capitalism that we have introduced in our country is of a special kind. It does not agree with the usual conception of state capitalism. We hold all the key positions. We hold the land; it belongs to the state. This is very important, although our opponents try to make out that it is of no importance at all. That is untrue. The fact that the land belongs to the state is extremely important, and economically it is also of great practical purport. This we have achieved, and I must say that all our future activities should develop only within that framework. We have already succeeded in making the peasantry content and in reviving both industry and trade. I have already said that our state capitalism differs from state capitalism

in the literal sense of the term in that our proletarian state not only owns the land, but also all the vital branches of industry. To begin with, we have leased only a certain number of the small and medium plants, but all the rest remain in our hands. As regards trade, I want to re-emphasise that we are trying to found mixed companies, that we are already forming them, i.e., companies in which part of the capital belongs to private capitalists—and foreign capitalists at that—and the other part belongs to the state. Firstly, in this way we are learning how to trade, and that is what we need. Secondly, we are always in a position to dissolve these companies if we deem it necessary, and do not, therefore, run any risks, so to speak. We are learning from the private capitalist and looking round to see how we can progress, and what mistakes we make. It seems to me that I need say no more.

I should still like to deal with several minor points. Undoubtedly, we have done, and will still do, a host of foolish things. No one can judge and see this better than I. (*Laughter.*) Why do we do these foolish things? The reason is clear: firstly, because we are a backward country; secondly, because education in our country is at a low level; and thirdly, because we are getting no outside assistance. Not a single civilised country is helping us. On the contrary, they are all working against us. Fourthly, our machinery of state is to blame. We took over the old machinery of state, and that was our misfortune. Very often this machinery operates against us. In 1917, after we seized power, the government officials sabotaged us. This frightened us very much and we pleaded: "Please come back." They all came back, but that was our misfortune. We now have a vast army of government employees, but lack sufficiently educated forces to exercise real control over them. In practice it often happens that here at the top, where we exercise political power, the machine functions somehow; but down below government employees have arbitrary control and they often exercise it in such a way as to counteract our measures. At the top, we have, I don't know how many, but at all events, I think, no more than a few thousand, at the outside several tens of thousands of our own people. Down below, however, there are hundreds

of thousands of old officials whom we got from the tsar and from bourgeois society and who, partly deliberately and partly unwittingly, work against us. It is clear that nothing can be done in that respect overnight. It will take many years of hard work to improve the machinery, to remodel it, and to enlist new forces. We are doing this fairly quickly, perhaps too quickly. Soviet schools and Workers' Faculties have been formed; a few hundred thousand young people are studying; they are studying too fast perhaps, but at all events, a start has been made, and I think this work will bear fruit. If we do not work too hurriedly we shall, in a few years' time, have a large body of young people capable of thoroughly overhauling our state apparatus.

I have said that we have done a host of foolish things, but I must also say a word or two in this respect about our enemies. If our enemies blame us and say that Lenin himself admits that the Bolsheviks have done a host of foolish things, I want to reply to this: yes, but you know, the foolish things we have done are nonetheless very different from yours. We have only just begun to learn, but are learning so methodically that we are certain to achieve good results. But since our enemies, i.e., the capitalists and the heroes of the Second International, lay stress on the foolish things we have done, I take the liberty, for the sake of comparison, to cite the words of a celebrated Russian author, which I shall amend to read as follows: if the Bolsheviks do foolish things the Bolshevik says, "Twice two are five", but when their enemies, i.e., the capitalists and the heroes of the Second International, do foolish things, they get, "Twice two make a tallow candle".[139] That is easily proved. Take, for example, the agreement concluded by the U.S.A., Great Britain, France and Japan with Kolchak. I ask you, are there any more enlightened and more powerful countries in the world? But what has happened? They promised to help Kolchak without calculation, without reflection, and without circumspection. It ended in a fiasco, which, it seems to me, is difficult for the human intellect to grasp.

Or take another example, a closer and more important one: the Treaty of Versailles. I ask you, what have the

"great" powers which have "covered themselves with glory" done? How will they find a way out of this chaos and confusion? I don't think it will be an exaggeration to repeat that the foolish things we have done are nothing compared with those done in concert by the capitalist countries, the capitalist world and the Second International. That is why I think that the outlook for the world revolution—a subject which I must touch on briefly—is favourable. And given a certain definite condition, I think it will be even better. I should like to say a few words about this.

At the Third Congress, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the organisational structure of the Communist Parties and on the methods and content of their activities. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost entirely Russian, that is to say, everything in it is based on Russian conditions. This is its good point, but it is also its failing. It is its failing because I am sure that no foreigner can read it. I have read it again before saying this. In the first place, it is too long, containing fifty or more points. Foreigners are not usually able to read such things. Secondly, even if they read it, they will not understand it because it is too Russian. Not because it is written in Russian—it has been excellently translated into all languages—but because it is thoroughly imbued with the Russian spirit. And thirdly, if by way of exception some foreigner does understand it, he cannot carry it out. This is its third defect. I have talked with a few of the foreign delegates and hope to discuss matters in detail with a large number of delegates from different countries during the Congress, although I shall not take part in its proceedings, for unfortunately it is impossible for me to do that. I have the impression that we made a big mistake with this resolution, namely, that we blocked our own road to further success. As I have said already, the resolution is excellently drafted; I am prepared to subscribe to every one of its fifty or more points. But we have not learnt how to present our Russian experience to foreigners. All that was said in the resolution has remained a dead letter. If we do not realise this, we shall be unable to move ahead. I think that after five years of the Russian revolution the

most important thing for all of us, Russian and foreign comrades alike, is to sit down and study. We have only now obtained the opportunity to do so. I do not know how long this opportunity will last. I do not know for how long the capitalist powers will give us the opportunity to study in peace. But we must take advantage of every moment of respite from fighting, from war, to study, and to study from scratch.

The whole Party and all strata of the population of Russia prove this by their thirst for knowledge. This striving to learn shows that our most important task today is to study and to study hard. Our foreign comrades, too, must study. I do not mean that they have to learn to read and write and to understand what they read, as we still have to do. There is a dispute as to whether this concerns proletarian or bourgeois culture. I shall leave that question open. But one thing is certain: we have to begin by learning to read and write and to understand what we read. Foreigners do not need that. They need something more advanced: first of all, among other things they must learn to understand what we have written about the organisational structure of the Communist Parties, and what the foreign comrades have signed without reading and understanding. This must be their first task. That resolution must be carried out. It cannot be carried out overnight; that is absolutely impossible. The resolution is too Russian, it reflects Russian experience. That is why it is quite unintelligible to foreigners, and they cannot be content with hanging it in a corner like an icon and praying to it. Nothing will be achieved that way. They must assimilate part of the Russian experience. Just how that will be done, I do not know. The fascists in Italy may, for example, render us a great service by showing the Italians that they are not yet sufficiently enlightened and that their country is not yet ensured against the Black Hundreds.[140] Perhaps this will be very useful. We Russians must also find ways and means of explaining the principles of this resolution to the foreigners. Unless we do that, it will be absolutely impossible for them to carry it out. I am sure that in this connection we must tell not only the Russians, but the foreign comrades as well, that the most important thing

in the period we are now entering is to study. We are studying in the general sense. They, however, must study in the special sense, in order that they may really understand the organisation, structure, method and content of revolutionary work. If they do that, I am sure the prospects of the world revolution will be not only good, but excellent. (*Stormy, prolonged applause. Shouts of* "Long live our Comrade Lenin!" *evoke a fresh stormy ovation.*)

Pravda No. 258,
November 15, 1922

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GREETINGS TO THE ALL-RUSSIA AGRICULTURAL EXHIBITION[141]

I attach great importance to this Exhibition; I am sure that all organisations will co-operate with it in every way. With all my heart I wish you the best success.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

November 14, 1922

Published in 1922

Published according to the manuscript

TO THE *CLARTÉ* GROUP[142]

November 15, 1922

Dear Friends,

I take this opportunity to send you best greetings. I have been seriously ill, and for over a year I have not been able to see a single one of the productions of your group. I hope that your organisation "*des anciens combattants*"* still exists and is growing stronger not only numerically, but also spiritually, in the sense of intensifying and spreading the struggle against imperialist war. It is worth devoting one's whole life to the struggle against this kind of war; it is a struggle in which one must be ruthless and chase to the furthermost corners of the earth all the sophistry that is uttered in its defence.

Best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

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First published in Russian in 1930

Published according to the manuscript

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* Ex-servicemen.—*Ed.*

SPEECH AT A PLENARY SESSION OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET NOVEMBER 20, 1922[143]

(*Stormy applause. "The Internationale" is sung.*) Comrades, I regret very much and apologise that I have been unable to come to your session earlier. As far as I know you intended a few weeks ago to give me an opportunity of attending the Moscow Soviet. I could not come because after my illness, from December onwards, I was incapacitated, to use the professional term, for quite a long time, and because of this reduced ability to work had to postpone my present address from week to week. A very considerable portion of my work which, as you will remember, I had first piled on Comrade Tsyurupa, and then on Comrade Rykov, I also had to pile additionally on Comrade Kamenev. And I must say that, to employ a simile I have already used, he was suddenly burdened with two loads. Though, to continue the simile, it should be said that the horse has proved to be an exceptionally capable and zealous one. (*Applause.*) All the same, however, nobody is supposed to drag two loads, and I am now waiting impatiently for Comrades Tsyurupa and Rykov to return, and we shall divide up the work at least a little more fairly. As for myself, in view of my reduced ability to work it takes me much more time to look into matters than I should like.

In December 1921, when I had to stop working altogether, it was the year's end. We were effecting the transition to the New Economic Policy, and it turned out already then that, although we had embarked upon this transition in the beginning of 1921, it was quite a difficult, I would

say a very difficult, transition. We have now been effecting this transition for more than eighteen months, and one would think that it was time the majority took up new places and disposed themselves according to the new conditions, particularly those of the New Economic Policy.

As to foreign policy, we had the fewest changes in that field. We pursued the line that we had adopted earlier, and I think I can say with a clear conscience that we pursued it quite consistently and with enormous success. There is no need, I think, to deal with that in detail; the capture of Vladivostok, the ensuing demonstration and the declaration of federation which you read in the press[144] the other day have proved and shown with the utmost clarity that no changes are necessary in this respect. The road we are on is absolutely clearly and well defined, and has ensured us success in face of all the countries of the world, although some of them are still prepared to declare that they refuse to sit at one table with us. Nevertheless, economic relations, followed by diplomatic relations, are improving, must improve, and certainly will improve. Every country which resists this risks being late, and, perhaps in some quite substantial things, it risks being at a disadvantage. All of us see this now, and not only from the press, from the newspapers. I think that in their trips abroad comrades are also finding the changes very great. In that respect, to use an old simile, we have not changed to other trains, or to other conveyances.

But as regards our home policy, the change we made in the spring of 1921, which was necessitated by such extremely powerful and convincing circumstances that no debates or disagreements arose among us about it—that change continues to cause us some difficulties, great difficulties, I would say. Not because we have any doubts about the need for the turn—no doubts exist in that respect—not because we have any doubts as to whether the test of our New Economic Policy has yielded the successes we expected. No doubts exist on that score—I can say this quite definitely—either in the ranks of our Party or in the ranks of the huge mass of non-Party workers and peasants.

In this sense the problem presents no difficulties. The difficulties we have stem from our being faced with a task whose solution very often requires the services of new people, extraordinary measures and extraordinary methods. Doubts still exist among us as to whether this or that is correct. There are changes in one direction or another. And it should be said that both will continue for quite a long time. "The New Economic Policy!" A strange title. It was called a New Economic Policy because it turned things back. We are now retreating, going back, as it were; but we are doing so in order, after first retreating, to take a running start and make a bigger leap forward. It was on this condition alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy. Where and how we must now regroup, adapt and reorganise in order to start a most stubborn offensive after our retreat, we do not yet know. To carry out all these operations properly we need, as the proverb says, to look not ten but a hundred times before we leap. We must do so in order to cope with the incredible difficulties we encounter in dealing with all our tasks and problems. You know perfectly well what sacrifices have been made to achieve what has been achieved; you know how long the Civil War has dragged on and what effort it has cost. Well now, the capture of Vladivostok has shown all of us (though Vladivostok is a long way off, it is after all one of our own towns) (*prolonged applause*) everybody's desire to join us, to join in our achievements. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic now stretches from here to there. This desire has rid us both of our civil enemies and of the foreign enemies who attacked us. I am referring to Japan.

We have won quite a definite diplomatic position, recognised by the whole world. All of you see it. You see its results, but how much time we needed to get it! We have now won the recognition of our rights by our enemies both in economic and in commercial policy. This is proved by the conclusion of trade agreements.

We can see why we, who eighteen months ago took the path of the so-called New Economic Policy, are finding it so incredibly difficult to advance along that path. We live in a country devastated so severely by war, knocked

out of anything like the normal course of life, in a country that has suffered and endured so much, that willy-nilly we are beginning all our calculations with a very, very small percentage—the pre-war percentage. We apply this yardstick to the conditions of our life, we sometimes do so very impatiently, heatedly, and always end up with the conviction that the difficulties are vast. The task we have set ourselves in this field seems all the more vast because we are comparing it with the state of affairs in any ordinary bourgeois country. We have set ourselves this task because we understood that it was no use expecting the wealthy powers to give us the assistance usually forthcoming under such circumstances.* After the Civil War we have been subjected to very nearly a boycott, that is, we have been told that the economic ties that are customary and normal in the capitalist world will not be maintained in our case.

Over eighteen months have passed since we undertook the New Economic Policy, and even a longer period has passed since we concluded our first international treaty. Nonetheless, this boycott of us by all the bourgeoisie and all governments continues to be felt. We could not count on anything else when we adopted the new economic conditions; yet we had no doubt that we had to make the change and achieve success single-handed. The further we go, the clearer it becomes that any aid that may be rendered to us, that will be rendered to us by the capitalist powers, will, far from eliminating this condition, in all likelihood and in the overwhelming majority of cases intensify it, accentuate it still further. "Single-handed"—we told ourselves. "Single-handed"—we are told by almost every capitalist country with which we have concluded any deals, with which we have undertaken any engagements,

* In the verbatim report the text reads further: "and that even if we took into consideration the extremely high, say such-and-such a rate of interest, that is imposed in these circumstances on a country that, to use the accepted term, is rendered aid. Properly speaking, these rates of interest are very far from being aid. To put it bluntly, they would deserve a far less polite term than the word aid, but even these usual conditions would have been onerous for us."—*Ed.*

with which we have begun any negotiations. And that is where the special difficulty lies. We must realise this difficulty. We have built up our own political system in more than three years of work, incredibly hard work that was incredibly full of heroism. In the position in which we were till now we had no time to see whether we would smash something needlessly, no time to see whether there would be many sacrifices, because there were sacrifices enough, because the struggle which we then began (you know this perfectly well and there is no need to dwell on it) was a life-and-death struggle against the old social system, against which we fought to forge for ourselves a right to existence, to peaceful development. And we have won it. It is not we who say this, it is not the testimony of witnesses who may be accused of being partial to us. It is the testimony of witnesses who are in the camp of our enemies and who are naturally partial—not in our favour, however, but against us. These witnesses were in Denikin's camp. They directed the occupation. And we know that their partiality cost us very dear, cost us colossal destruction. We suffered all sorts of losses on their account, and lost values of all kinds, including the greatest of all values—human lives—on an incredibly large scale. Now we must scrutinise our tasks most carefully and understand that the main task will be not to give up our previous gains. We shall not give up a single one of our old gains. (*Applause.*) Yet we are also faced with an entirely new task; the old may prove a downright obstacle. To understand this task is most difficult. Yet it must be understood, so that we may learn how to work when, so to speak, it is necessary to turn ourselves inside out. I think, comrades, that these words and slogans are understandable, because for nearly a year, during my enforced absence, you have had in practice, handling the jobs on hand, to speak and think of this in various ways and on hundreds of occasions, and I am confident that your reflections on that score can only lead to one conclusion, namely, that today we must display still more of the flexibility which we employed till now in the Civil War.

We must not abandon the old. The series of concessions that adapt us to the capitalist powers is a series of

concessions that enables them to make contact with us, ensures them a profit which is sometimes bigger, perhaps, than it should be. At the same time, we are conceding but a little part of the means of production, which are held almost entirely by our state. The other day the papers discussed the concession proposed by the Englishman Urquhart, who has hitherto been against us almost throughout the Civil War. He used to say: "We shall achieve our aim in the Civil War against Russia, against the Russia that has dared to deprive us of this and of that." And after all that we had to enter into negotiations with him. We did not refuse them, we undertook them with the greatest joy, but we said: "Beg your pardon, but we shall not give up what we have won. Our Russia is so big, our economic potentialities are so numerous, and we feel justified in not rejecting your kind proposal, but we shall discuss it soberly, like businessmen." True, nothing came of our first talk, because we could not agree to his proposal for political reasons. We had to reject it. So long as the British did not entertain the possibility of our participating in the negotiations on the Straits, the Dardanelles, we had to reject it, but right after doing so we had to start examining the matter in substance. We discussed whether or not it was of advantage to us, whether we would profit from concluding this concession agreement, and if so, under what circumstances it would be profitable. We had to talk about the price. That, comrades, is what shows you clearly how much our present approach to problems should differ from our former approach. Formerly the Communist said: "I give my life", and it seemed very simple to him, although it was not always so simple. Now, however, we Communists face quite another task. We must now take all things into account, and each of you must learn to be prudent. We must calculate how, in the capitalist environment, we can ensure our existence, how we can profit by our enemies, who, of course, will bargain, who have never forgotten how to bargain and will bargain at our expense. We are not forgetting that either, and do not in the least imagine commercial people anywhere turning into lambs and, having turned into lambs, offering us blessings of all sorts for nothing. That does not happen, and we do not expect

FROM MARX TO MAO
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it, but count on the fact that we, who are accustomed to putting up a fight, will find a way out and prove capable of trading, and profiting, and emerging safely from difficult economic situations. That is a very difficult task. That is the task we are working on now. I should like us to realise clearly how great is the abyss between the old and the new tasks. However great the abyss may be, we learned to manoeuvre during the war, and we must understand that the manoeuvre we now have to perform, in the midst of which we now are, is the most difficult one. But then it seems to be our last manoeuvre. We must test our strength in this field and prove that we have learned more than just the lessons of yesterday and do not just keep repeating the fundamentals. Nothing of the kind. We have begun to relearn, and shall relearn in such a way that we shall achieve definite and obvious success. And it is for the sake of this relearning, I think, that we must again firmly promise one another that under the name of the New Economic Policy we have turned back, but turned back in such a way as to surrender nothing of the new, and yet to give the capitalists such advantages as will compel any state, however hostile to us, to establish contacts and to deal with us. Comrade Krasin, who has had many talks with Urquhart, the head and backbone of the whole intervention, said that Urquhart, after all his attempts to foist the old system on us at all costs, throughout Russia, seated himself at the same table with him, with Krasin, and began asking: "What's the price? How much? For how many years?" (*Applause.*) This is still quite far from our concluding concession deals and thus entering into treaty relations that are perfectly precise and binding—from the viewpoint of bourgeois society—but we can already see that we are coming to it, have nearly come to it, but have not quite arrived. We must admit that, comrades, and not be swell-headed. We are still far from having fully achieved the things that will make us strong, self-reliant and calmly confident that no capitalist deals can frighten us, calmly confident that however difficult a deal may be we shall conclude it, we shall get to the bottom of it and settle it. That is why the work—both political and Party—that we have begun in this sphere must be

continued, and that is why we must change from the old methods to entirely new ones.

We still have the old machinery, and our task now is to remould it along new lines. We cannot do so at once, but we must see to it that the Communists we have are properly placed. What we need is that they, the Communists, should control the machinery they are assigned to, and not, as so often happens with us, that the machinery should control them. We should make no secret of it, and speak of it frankly. Such are the tasks and the difficulties that confront us—and that at a moment when we have set out on our practical path, when we must not approach socialism as if it were an icon painted in festive colours. We need to take the right direction, we need to see that everything is checked, that the masses, the entire population, check the path we follow and say: "Yes, this is better than the old system." That is the task we have set ourselves. Our Party, a little group of people in comparison with the country's total population, has tackled this job. This tiny nucleus has set itself the task of remaking everything, and it will do so. We have proved that this is no utopia but a cause which people live by. We have all seen this. This has already been done. We must remake things in such a way that the great majority of the masses, the peasants and workers, will say: "It is not you who praise yourselves, but we. We say that you have achieved splendid results, after which no intelligent person will ever dream of returning to the old." We have not reached that point yet. *That is why NEP remains the main, current, and all-embracing slogan of today.* We shall not forget a single one of the slogans we learned yesterday. We can say that quite calmly, without the slightest hesitation, say it to anybody, and every step we take demonstrates it. But we still have to adapt ourselves to the New Economic Policy. We must know how to overcome, to reduce to a definite minimum all its negative features, which there is no need to enumerate and which you know perfectly well. We must know how to arrange everything shrewdly. Our legislation gives us every opportunity to do so. Shall we be able to get things going properly? That is still far from being settled. We are making a study of things. Every issue of

our Party newspaper offers you a dozen articles which tell you that at such-and-such a factory, owned by so-and-so, the rental terms are such-and-such, whereas at another, where our Communist comrade is the manager, the terms are such-and-such. Does it yield a profit or not, does it pay its way or not? We have approached the very core of the everyday problems, and that is a tremendous achievement. Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract picture, or an icon. Our opinion of icons is the same—a very bad one. We have brought socialism into everyday life and must here see how matters stand. That is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to conclude by expressing confidence that difficult as this task may be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and numerous as the difficulties may be that it entails, we shall all—not in a day, but in a few years—all of us together fulfil it whatever the cost, so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Pravda No. 263,
November 21, 1922

Published according to
the *Pravda* text
checked with
the verbatim report

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE FIFTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET EMPLOYEES' UNION[145]

November 22, 1922

Dear Comrades,

The primary, immediate task of the present day, and of the next few years, is systematically to reduce the size and the cost of the Soviet machinery of state by cutting down staffs, improving organisation, eliminating red tape and bureaucracy, and by reducing unproductive expenditure. In this field your union has a great deal of work before it.

Wishing the Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Soviet Employees' Union success and fruitful work, I hope that it will especially deal with the question of the Soviet machinery of state.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*),
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Izvestia No. 267,
November 25, 1922

Published according to
a typewritten copy checked
and signed by Lenin

TO THE EDUCATIONAL WORKERS' CONGRESS[146]

Thank you for your greetings, comrades. I wish you success in grappling with the great and responsible task before you of training the rising generation for the work of building up our new society.

Lenin

Written on November 26, 1922
Published in *Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya* No. 10, December 1922

Published according to the *Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya* text

TO THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, MOSCOW[147]

December 4, 1922

Dear Comrades,

I regret that I cannot greet you in person. I send you my best wishes for success in your work. I hope that notwithstanding your lofty title you will not forget the main thing, namely, that it is necessary to promote in a practical manner the training and education of young people.

With best communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Pravda No. 275,
December 5, 1922

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and signed by Lenin

NOTES ON THE TASKS OF OUR DELEGATION AT THE HAGUE[148]

On the question of combating the danger of war, in connection with the Conference at The Hague, I think that the greatest difficulty lies in overcoming the prejudice that this is a simple, clear and comparatively easy question.

"We shall retaliate to war by a strike or a revolution"—that is what all the prominent reformist leaders usually say to the working class. And very often the seeming radicalness of the measures proposed satisfies and appeases the workers, co-operators and peasants.

Perhaps the most correct method would be to start with the sharpest refutation of this opinion; to declare that particularly now, after the recent war, only the most foolish or utterly dishonest people can assert that such an answer to the question of combating war is of any use; to declare that it is impossible to "retaliate" to war by a strike, just as it is impossible to "retaliate" to war by revolution in the simple and literal sense of these terms.

We must explain the real situation to the people, show them that war is hatched in the greatest secrecy, and that the ordinary workers' organisations, even if they call themselves revolutionary organisations, are utterly helpless in face of a really impending war.

We must explain to the people again and again in the most concrete manner possible how matters stood in the last war, and why they could not have been otherwise.

We must take special pains to explain that the question of "defence of the fatherland" will inevitably arise, and that the overwhelming majority of the working people will inevitably decide it in favour of their bourgeoisie.

Therefore, first, it is necessary to explain what "defence of the fatherland" means. Second, in connection with this, it is necessary to explain what "defeatism" means. Lastly, we must explain that the only possible method of combating war is to preserve existing, and to form new, illegal organisations in which all revolutionaries taking part in a war carry on *prolonged* anti-war activities—all this must be brought into the forefront.

Boycott war—that is a silly catch-phrase. Communists must take part in every war, even the most reactionary.

Examples from, say, pre-war German literature, and in particular, the example of the Basle Congress of 1912, should be used as especially concrete proof that the theoretical admission that war is criminal, that socialists cannot condone war, etc., turn out to be empty phrases, because there is nothing concrete in them. The masses are not given a really vivid idea of how war may and will creep up on them. On the contrary, every day the dominant press, in an infinite number of copies, obscures this question and weaves such lies around it that the feeble socialist press is absolutely impotent against it, the more so that even in time of peace it propounds fundamentally erroneous views on this point. In all probability, the communist press in most countries will also disgrace itself.

I think that our delegates at the International Congress of Co-operators and Trade Unionists should distribute their functions among themselves and expose all the sophistries that are being advanced at the present time in justification of war.

These sophistries are, perhaps, the principal means by which the bourgeois press rallies the masses in support of war; and the main reason why we are so impotent in face of war is either that we do not expose these sophistries beforehand, or still more that we, in the spirit of the Basle Manifesto of 1912, waive them aside with the cheap, boastful and utterly empty phrase that we shall not allow war to break out, that we fully understand that war is a crime, etc.

I think that if we have several people at The Hague Conference who are capable of delivering speeches against

war in various languages, the most important thing would be to refute the opinion that the delegates at the Conference are opponents of war, that they understand how war may and will come upon them at the most unexpected moment, that they to any extent understand what methods should be adopted to combat war, that they are to any extent in a position to adopt reasonable and effective measures to combat war.

Using the experience of the recent war to illustrate the point, we must explain what a host of both theoretical and practical questions will arise on the morrow of the declaration of war, and that the vast majority of the men called up for military service will have no opportunity to examine these questions with anything like clear heads, or in a conscientious and unprejudiced manner.

I think that this question must be explained in extraordinary detail, and in two ways:

First, by relating and analysing what happened during the last war and telling all those present that they are ignorant of this, or pretend that they know about it, but actually shut their eyes to what is the very pivot of the question which must be understood if any real efforts are to be made to combat war. On this point I think it is necessary to examine all the opinions and shades of opinion that arose among Russian socialists concerning the last war. We must show that those shades of opinion did not emerge accidentally, but out of the very nature of modern wars in general. We must prove that without an analysis of these opinions, without ascertaining why they inevitably arise and why they are of decisive significance in the matter of combating war—without such an analysis it is utterly impossible to make any preparations for war, or even to take an intelligent stand on it.

Secondly, we must take the present conflicts, even the most insignificant, to illustrate the fact that war may break out any day as a consequence of a dispute between Great Britain and France over some point of their treaty with Turkey, or between the U.S.A. and Japan over some trivial disagreement on any Pacific question, or between any of the big powers over colonies, tariffs, or general

commercial policy, etc., etc. It seems to me that if there is the slightest doubt about being able at The Hague to say all we want to say against war with the utmost freedom, we should consider various stratagems that will enable us to say at least what is most important and to publish in pamphlet form what could not be said. We must take the risk of our speaker being stopped by the chairman.

I think that for the same purpose the delegation should consist not only of speakers who are able, and whose duty it shall be, to make speeches against war as a whole, i.e., to enlarge on all the main arguments and all the conditions for combating war, but also of people who know all the three principal foreign languages, whose business it shall be to enter into conversation with the delegates and to ascertain how far they understand the main arguments, what need there is to advance certain arguments and to quote certain examples.

Perhaps on a number of questions the mere quoting of fact of the last war will be sufficient to produce serious effect. Perhaps on a number of other questions serious effect can be produced only by explaining the conflicts that exist today between the various countries and how likely they are to develop into armed collisions.

Apropos of the question of combating war, I remember that a number of declarations have been made by our Communist deputies, in parliament and outside parliament, which contain monstrously incorrect and monstrously thoughtless statements on this subject. I think these declarations, particularly if they have been made since the war, must be subjected to determined and ruthless criticism, and the name of each person who made them should be mentioned. Opinion concerning these speakers may be expressed in the mildest terms, particularly if circumstances require it, but not a single case of this kind should be passed over in silence, for thoughtlessness on this question is an evil that outweighs all others and cannot be treated lightly.

A number of decisions have been adopted by workers' congresses which are unpardonably foolish and thoughtless.

All material should be immediately collected, and all the separate parts and particles of the subject, and the whole "strategy" to be pursued should be thoroughly discussed at a congress.

On such a question, not only a mistake, but even lack of thoroughness on our part will be unpardonable.

December 4, 1922

First published in *Pravda* No. 96, April 26, 1924
Signed: *Lenin*

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A FEW WORDS ABOUT N. Y. FEDOSEYEV[149]

My recollections of Nikolai Yevgrafovich Fedoseyev go back to the beginning of the nineties. I cannot vouch for their accuracy.

At that time I was living in the provinces—namely in Kazan and in Samara. I heard about Fedoseyev while I was in Kazan, but I never met him. In the spring of 1889 I went to live in Samara Gubernia, where, at the end of the summer, I heard of the arrest of Fedoseyev and of other members of study circles in Kazan—including the one to which I belonged. I think that I, too, might easily have been arrested had I remained in Kazan that summer. Soon after this, Marxism, as a trend, began to spread, merging with the Social-Democratic trend initiated in Western Europe very much earlier by the Emancipation of Labour group.[150]

Fedoseyev was one of the first to proclaim his adherence to the Marxist trend. I remember that this was the grounds of his polemics with N. K. Mikhailovsky, who in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[151] replied to one of his secretly circulated letters. This, too, prompted me to start corresponding with Fedoseyev. I remember that the go-between in our correspondence was Hopfenhaus, whom I met once, and through whom I made an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a meeting with Fedoseyev in Vladimir. I went to that town in the hope that he would succeed in getting out of the prison, but I was disappointed.[152]

Later, Fedoseyev was exiled to Eastern Siberia. This was at the time I was in exile there; and it was in Siberia that he committed suicide, because, I think, of certain tragic incidents in his private life connected with the exceptionally unhappy conditions under which he lived.

As far as I remember, my correspondence with Fedoseyev was concerned with the problems that then arose about the Marxist or Social-Democratic world outlook. I particularly remember that Fedoseyev enjoyed the affection of all those who knew him, and was regarded as a typical old-time revolutionary, entirely devoted to his cause, who, perhaps, had made his conditions worse by certain statements, or unguarded actions towards the gendarmes.

Probably I have some fragments of Fedoseyev's letters or manuscripts somewhere, but I cannot say definitely whether they have been preserved or may be found.

At all events, Fedoseyev played a very important role in the Volga area and in certain parts of Central Russia during that period; and the turn towards Marxism at that time was, undoubtedly, very largely due to the influence of this exceptionally talented and exceptionally devoted revolutionary.

December 6, 1922

Published in *N. Y. Fedoseyev, a Pioneer of Revolutionary Marxism in Russia* (*A Collection of Reminiscences*), Moscow-Petrograd, 1923
Signed: *Lenin*

Published according to the text in the collection

TO THE ALL-UKRAINE CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[153]

I welcome the opening of the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets.

One of the most important problems which the Congress has to solve is that of uniting the republics. The proper solution of this problem will determine the future organisation of our machinery of state, the glaring defects of which were so vividly and strikingly revealed by the recent census of Soviet employees in Moscow, Petrograd and Kharkov.

The second problem to which the Congress must devote special attention is that of our heavy industry. To raise the output of the Donbas and of the oil and iron and steel industries to pre-war level is the fundamental problem of our entire economy; and we must concentrate all our efforts on solving this problem.

I am firmly convinced that the Congress will find the correct solutions for these problems, and with all my heart I wish you success in your work.

Lenin

December 10, 1922

Kommunist (Kharkov) No. 285, December 12, 1922

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RE THE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE[154]

TO COMRADE STALIN FOR THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

I think it is most important to discuss Comrade Bukharin's letter. His first point says that "neither Lenin nor Krasin says a word about the incalculable losses that are borne by the economy of the country as a consequence of the inefficiency of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, due to the 'principles' on which it is organised; they do not say a word about the losses incurred because we ourselves are unable (and will not be able for a long time for quite understandable reasons) to mobilise the peasants' stocks of goods and use them for international trade".

This statement is positively untrue, for in his § 2 Krasin clearly discusses the formation of mixed companies as a means, firstly, of mobilising the peasants' stocks of goods, and secondly, of obtaining for our Exchequer no less than half the profits accruing from this mobilisation. Thus it is Bukharin who is trying to evade the issue, for he refuses to see that the profits accruing from the "mobilisation of the peasants' stocks of goods" will go wholly and entirely into the pockets of the Nepmen. The question is: will our People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade operate for the benefit of the Nepmen or of our proletarian state? This is a fundamental question over which a fight can and should be put up at a Party Congress.

Compared with this primary, fundamental question of principle, the question of the inefficiency of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade is only a minor one, for

this inefficiency is only part and parcel of the inefficiency of all our People's Commissariats, and is due to their general social structure; to remedy this we shall require many years of persistent effort to improve education and to raise the general standard.

The second point in Bukharin's theses says that "points like § 5 of Krasin's theses, for example, are fully applicable to concessions in general". This, too, is glaringly untrue, for Krasin's 5th thesis states that "the most pernicious exploiter, the merchant, profiteer, the agent of foreign capital, operating with dollars, pounds and Swedish crowns, will be artificially introduced into the rural districts". Nothing of the kind will happen in the case of concessions, which not only stipulate territory, but also envisage special permission to trade-in specified articles; and what is most important, we control the trade in the articles specified in the concession. Without saying a single word in opposition to Krasin's argument that we shall be unable to keep free trade within the limits laid down by the decision of the Plenary Meeting of October 6, that trade will be torn out of our hands by pressure brought to bear not only by smugglers, but also by the entire peasantry—without saying a word in answer to this fundamental economic and class argument, Bukharin hurls accusations against Krasin that are amazingly groundless.

In the third point of his letter Bukharin writes "§ 3 of Krasin's theses". (By mistake he mentions § 3 instead of § 4.) "We are maintaining our frontiers", and he asks: "What does this mean? In reality, this means that we are doing nothing. It is exactly like a shop with a splendid window, but with nothing on its shelves (the 'shut the shops system')." Krasin very definitely says that we are maintaining our frontiers not so much by tariffs, or frontier guards, as by means of our monopoly of foreign trade. Bukharin does not say a word to refute this obvious, positive and indisputable fact, nor can he do so. His sneering reference to the "shut the shops system" belongs to the category of expressions to which Marx, in his day, retorted with the expression "free-trader *vulgaris*", for it is nothing more than a vulgar free-trader catch-phrase.

Further, in his fourth point, Bukharin accuses Krasin

of failing to realise that we must improve our tariff system, and at the same time he says that I am wrong in talking about having inspectors all over the country, because export and import bases are the only point under discussion. Here, too, Bukharin's objections are amazingly thoughtless and quite beside the point; for Krasin not only realises that we must improve our tariff system and not only fully admits it, but says so with a definiteness that leaves no room for the slightest doubt. This improvement consists, firstly, in our adopting the monopoly of foreign trade, and secondly, in the formation of mixed companies.

Bukharin does not see—this is his most amazing mistake, and a purely theoretical one at that—that no tariff system can be effective in the epoch of imperialism when there are monstrous contrasts between pauper countries and immensely rich countries. Several times Bukharin mentions tariff barriers, failing to realise that under the circumstances indicated any of the wealthy industrial countries can completely break down such tariff barriers. To do this it will be sufficient for it to introduce an export bounty to encourage the export to Russia of goods upon which we have imposed high import duties. All of the industrial countries have more than enough money for this purpose, and by means of such a measure any of them could easily ruin our home industry.

Consequently, all Bukharin's arguments about the tariff system would in practice only leave Russian industry entirely unprotected and lead to the adoption of free trading under a very flimsy veil. We must oppose this with all our might and carry our opposition right to a Party Congress, for in the present epoch of imperialism the only system of protection worthy of consideration is the monopoly of foreign trade.

Bukharin's accusation (in his fifth point) that Krasin fails to appreciate the importance of increasing circulation is utterly refuted by what Krasin says about mixed companies, for these mixed companies have no other purpose than to increase circulation and to provide real protection for our Russian industry and not the fictitious protection of tariff barriers.

Further, in point six, in answer to me, Bukharin writes that he attaches no importance to the fact that the peasants will enter into profitable transactions, and that the struggle will proceed between the Soviet government and the exporters and not between the peasants and the Soviet government. Here, too, he is absolutely wrong, for with the difference in prices that I have indicated (for example, in Russia the price of flax is 4 rubles 50 kopeks, while in Britain it is 14 rubles), the exporter will be able to mobilise all the peasants around himself in the swiftest and most certain manner. In practice, Bukharin is acting as an advocate of the profiteer, of the petty bourgeois and of the upper stratum of the peasantry in opposition to the industrial proletariat, which will be totally unable to build up its own industry and make Russia an industrial country unless it has the protection, not of tariffs, but of the monopoly of foreign trade. In view of the conditions at present prevailing in Russia, any other form of protection would be absolutely fictitious; it would be merely paper protection, from which the proletariat would derive no benefit whatever. Hence, from the viewpoint of the proletariat and of its industry, the present fight rages around fundamental principles. The mixed company system is the only system that can be really effective in improving the defective machinery of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade; for under this system foreign and Russian merchants will be operating side by side. If we fail to learn the business thoroughly even under such circumstances, it will prove that ours is a nation of hopeless fools.

By talking about "tariff barriers" we shall only be concealing from ourselves the dangers which Krasin points out quite clearly, and which Bukharin has failed to refute in the slightest degree.

I will add that the partial opening of the frontiers would be fraught with grave currency dangers, for in practice we should be reduced to the position of Germany; there would be the grave danger that the petty-bourgeoisie and all sorts of agents of émigré Russia would penetrate into Russia, without our having the slightest possibility of exercising control over them.

The utilisation of mixed companies as a means of obtaining serious and long tuition is the only road to the restoration of our industry.

Lenin

Dictated by telephone
on December 13, 1922

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LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

I have now finished winding up my affairs and can leave with my mind at peace.[155] I have also come to an agreement with Trotsky on the defence of my views on the monopoly of foreign trade. Only one circumstance still worries me very much; it is that it will be impossible for me to speak at the Congress of Soviets.[156] My doctors are coming on Tuesday and we shall see if there is even a small chance of my speaking. I would consider it a great inconvenience to miss the opportunity of speaking, to say the least. I finished preparing the summary a few days ago. I therefore propose that the writing of a report which somebody will deliver should go ahead and that the possibility be left open until Wednesday that I will perhaps personally make a speech, a much shorter one than usual, for example, one that will take three-quarters of an hour. Such a speech would in no way hinder the speech of my deputy (whoever you may appoint for this purpose), but would be useful politically and from the personal angle as it would eliminate cause for great anxiety. Please have this in mind, and if the opening of the Congress is delayed, inform me in good time through my secretary.[157]

Lenin

December 15, 1922

I am emphatically against any procrastination of the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. If any circumstance (including the circumstance that my participation is desirable in the debate over this question) gives rise to

the idea to postpone it to the next Plenary Meeting, I would most emphatically be against it because, firstly, I am sure Trotsky will uphold my views as well as I; secondly, the statements that you, Zinoviev and, according to rumours, Kamenev have made prove that some members of the C.C. have already changed their minds; thirdly, and most important, any further vacillation over this extremely important question is absolutely impermissible and will wreck all our work.

Lenin

December 15, 1922

Dictated by telephone

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PAGES FROM A DIARY

The recent publication of the report on literacy among the population of Russia, based on the census of 1920 (*Literacy in Russia*, issued by the Central Statistical Board, Public Education Section, Moscow, 1922), is a very important event.

Below I quote a table from this report on the state of literacy among the population of Russia in 1897 and 1920.

	Literates per thousand males		Literates per thousand females		Literates per thousand population	
	1897	1920	1897	1920	1897	1920
1. European Russia	326	422	136	255	229	330
2. North Caucasus	241	357	56	215	150	281
3. Siberia (Western)	170	307	46	134	108	218
Overall average	318	409	131	244	223	319

At a time when we hold forth on proletarian culture and the relation in which it stands to bourgeois culture, facts and figures reveal that we are in a very bad way even as far as bourgeois culture is concerned. As might have been expected, it appears that we are still a very long way from attaining universal literacy, and that even compared with tsarist times (1897) our progress has been far too slow. This should serve as a stern warning and reproach to those who have been soaring in the empyreal heights of "proletarian culture". It shows what a vast amount of urgent spade-work we still have to do to reach the standard of an ordinary West-European civilised country.

It also shows what a vast amount of work we have to do today to achieve, on the basis of our proletarian gains, anything like a real cultural standard.

We must not confine ourselves to this incontrovertible but too theoretical proposition. The very next time we revise our quarterly budget we must take this matter up in a practical way as well. In the first place, of course, we shall have to cut down the expenditure of government departments other than the People's Commissariat of Education, and the sums thus released should be assigned for the latter's needs. In a year like the present, when we are relatively well supplied, we must not be chary in increasing the bread ration for schoolteachers.

Generally speaking, it cannot be said that the work now being done in public education is too narrow. Quite a lot is being done to get the old teachers out of their rut, to attract them to the new problems, to rouse their interest in new methods of education, and in such problems as religion.

But we are not doing the main thing. We are not doing anything—or doing far from enough—to raise the schoolteacher to the level that is absolutely essential if we want any culture at all, proletarian or even bourgeois. We must bear in mind the semi-Asiatic ignorance from which we have not yet extricated ourselves, and from which we cannot extricate ourselves without strenuous effort—although we have every opportunity to do so, because nowhere are the masses of the people so interested in real culture as they are in our country; nowhere are the problems of this culture tackled so thoroughly and consistently as they are in our country; in no other country is state power in the hands of the working class which, in its mass, is fully aware of the deficiencies, I shall not say of its culture, but of its literacy; nowhere is the working class so ready to make, and nowhere is it actually making, such sacrifices to improve its position in this respect as in our country.

Too little, far too little, is still being done by us to adjust our state budget to satisfy, as a first measure, the requirements of elementary public education. Even in our People's Commissariat of Education we all too often find disgracefully inflated staffs in some state publishing establish-

ment, which is contrary to the concept that the state's first concern should not be publishing houses but that there should be people to read, that the number of people able to read is greater, so that book publishing should have a wider political field in future Russia. Owing to the old (and bad) habit, we are still devoting much more time and effort to technical questions, such as the question of book publishing, than to the general political question of literacy among the people.

If we take the Central Vocational Education Board, we are sure that there, too, we shall find far too much that is superfluous and inflated by departmental interests, much that is ill-adjusted to the requirements of broad public education. Far from everything that we find in the Central Vocational Education Board can be justified by the legitimate desire first of all to improve and give a practical slant to the education of our young factory workers. If we examine the staff of the Central Vocational Education Board carefully we shall find very much that is inflated and is in that respect fictitious and should be done away with. There is still very much in the proletarian and peasant state that can and must be economised for the purpose of promoting literacy among the people; this can be done by closing institutions which are playthings of a semi-aristocratic type, or institutions we can still do without and will be able to do without, and shall have to do without, for a long time to come, considering the state of literacy among the people as revealed by the statistics.

Our schoolteacher should be raised to a standard he has never achieved, and cannot achieve, in bourgeois society. This is a truism and requires no proof. We must strive for this state of affairs by working steadily, methodically and persistently to raise the teacher to a higher cultural level, to train him thoroughly for his really high calling and—mainly, mainly and mainly—to improve his position materially.

We must systematically step up our efforts to organise the schoolteachers so as to transform them from the bulwark of the bourgeois system that they still are in all capitalist countries without exception, into the bulwark of

the Soviet system, in order, through their agency, to divert the peasantry from alliance with the bourgeoisie and to bring them into alliance with the proletariat.

I want briefly to emphasise the special importance in this respect of regular visits to the villages; such visits, it is true, are already being practised and should be regularly promoted. We should not stint money—which we all too often waste on the machinery of state that is almost entirely a product of the past historical epoch—on measures like these visits to the villages.

For the speech I was to have delivered at the Congress of Soviets in December 1922 I collected data on the patronage undertaken by urban workers over villagers. Part of these data was obtained for me by Comrade Khodorovsky, and since I have been unable to deal with this problem and give it publicity through the Congress, I submit the matter to the comrades for discussion now.

Here we have a fundamental political question—the relations between town and country—which is of decisive importance for the whole of our revolution. While the bourgeois state methodically concentrates all its efforts on doping the urban workers, adapting all the literature published at state expense and at the expense of the tsarist and bourgeois parties for this purpose, we can and must utilise our political power to make the urban worker an effective vehicle of communist ideas among the rural proletariat.

I said "communist", but I hasten to make a reservation for fear of causing a misunderstanding, or of being taken too literally. Under no circumstances must this be understood to mean that we should immediately propagate purely and strictly communist ideas in the countryside. As long as our countryside lacks the material basis for communism, it will be, I should say, harmful, in fact, I should say, fatal, for communism to do so.

That is a fact. We must start by establishing contacts between town and country without the preconceived aim of implanting communism in the rural districts. It is an aim which cannot be achieved at the present time. It is inopportune, and to set an aim like that at the present time would be harmful, instead of useful, to the cause.

But it is our duty to establish contacts between the urban workers and the rural working people, to establish between them a form of comradeship which can easily be created. This is one of the fundamental tasks of the working class which holds power. To achieve this we must form a number of associations (Party, trade union and private) of factory workers, which would devote themselves regularly to assisting the villages in their cultural development.

Is it possible to "attach" all the urban groups to all the village groups, so that every working-class group may take advantage regularly of every opportunity, of every occasion to serve the cultural needs of the village group it is "attached" to? Or will it be possible to find other forms of contact? I here confine myself solely to formulating the question in order to draw the comrades' attention to it, to point out the available experience of Western Siberia (to which Comrade Khodorovsky drew my attention) and to present this gigantic, historic cultural task in all its magnitude.

We are doing almost nothing for the rural districts outside our official budget or outside official channels. True, in our in our country the nature of the cultural relations between town and village is automatically and inevitably changing. Under capitalism the town introduced political, economic, moral, physical, etc., corruption into the countryside. In our case, towns are automatically beginning to introduce the very opposite of this into the countryside. But, I repeat, all this is going on automatically, spontaneously, and can be improved (and later increased a hundredfold) by doing it consciously, methodically and systematically.

We shall begin to advance (and shall then surely advance a hundred times more quickly) only after we have studied the question, after we have formed all sorts of workers' organisations—doing everything to prevent them from becoming bureaucratic—to take up the matter, discuss it and get things done.

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ON CO-OPERATION

I

It seems to me that not enough attention is being paid to the co-operative movement in our country. Not everyone understands that now, since the time of the October Revolution and quite apart from NEP (on the contrary, in this connection we must say—because of NEP), our co-operative movement has become one of great significance. There is a lot of fantasy in the dreams of the old co-operators. Often they are ridiculously fantastic. But why are they fantastic? Because people do not understand the fundamental, the rock-bottom significance of the working-class political struggle for the overthrow of the rule of the exploiters. We have overthrown the rule of the exploiters, and much that was fantastic, even romantic, even banal in the dreams of the old co-operators is now becoming unvarnished reality.

Indeed, since political power is in the hands of the working class, since this political power owns all the means of production, the only task, indeed, that remains for us is to organise the population in co-operative societies. With most of the population organised in co-operatives, the socialism which in the past was legitimately treated with ridicule, scorn and contempt by those who were rightly convinced that it was necessary to wage the class struggle, the struggle for political power, etc., will achieve its aim automatically. But not all comrades realise how vastly, how infinitely important it is now to organise the population of Russia in co-operative societies. By adopting NEP we made a concession to the peasant as a trader, to the

principle of private trade; it is precisely for this reason (contrary to what some people think) that the co-operative movement is of such immense importance. All we actually need under NEP is to organise the population of Russia in co-operative societies on a sufficiently large scale, for we have now found that degree of combination of private interest, of private commercial interest, with state supervision and control of this interest, that degree of its subordination to the common interests which was formerly the stumbling-block for very many socialists. Indeed, the power of the state over all large-scale means of production, political power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured proletarian leadership of the peasantry, etc.—is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society out of co-operatives, out of co-operatives alone, which we formerly ridiculed as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to treat as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society? It is still not the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for it.

It is this very circumstance that is underestimated by many of our practical workers. They look down upon our co-operative societies, failing to appreciate their exceptional importance, first, from the standpoint of principle (the means of production are owned by the state), and, second, from the standpoint of transition to the new system by means that are the *simplest*, *easiest and most acceptable to the peasant*.

But this again is of fundamental importance. It is one thing to draw up fantastic plans for building socialism through all sorts of workers' associations, and quite another to learn to build socialism in practice in such a way that *every* small peasant could take part in it. That is the very stage we have now reached. And there is no doubt that, having reached it, we are taking too little advantage of it.

We went too far when we introduced NEP, but not because we attached too much importance to the principle of free enterprise and trade—we went too far because we lost sight of the co-operatives, because we now under-

rate the co-operatives, because we are already beginning to forget the vast importance of the co-operatives from the above two points of view.

I now propose to discuss with the reader what can and must at once be done practically on the basis of this "co-operative" principle. By what means can we, and must we, start at once to develop this "co-operative" principle so that its socialist meaning may be clear to all?

Co-operation must be politically so organised that it will not only generally and always enjoy certain privileges, but that these privileges should be of a purely material nature (a favourable bank-rate, etc.). The co-operatives must be granted state loans that are greater, if only by a little, than the loans we grant to private enterprises, even to heavy industry, etc.

A social system emerges only if it has the financial backing of a definite class. There is no need to mention the hundreds of millions of rubles that the birth of "free" capitalism cost. At present we have to realise that the co-operative system is the social system we must now give more than ordinary assistance, and we must actually give that assistance. But it must be assistance in the real sense of the word, i.e., it will not be enough to interpret it to mean assistance for any kind of co-operative trade; by assistance we must mean aid to co-operative trade in which *really large classes of the population actually take part*. It is certainly a correct form of assistance to give a bonus to peasants who take part in co-operative trade; but the whole point is to verify the nature of this participation, to verify the awareness behind it, and to verify its quality. Strictly speaking, when a co-operator goes to a village and opens a co-operative store, the people take no part in this whatever; but at the same time guided by their own interests they will hasten to try to take part in it.

There is another aspect to this question. From the point of view of the "enlightened" (primarily, literate) European there is not much left for us to do to induce absolutely everyone to take not a passive, but an active part in co-operative operations. Strictly speaking, there is "*only*" one thing we have left to do and that is to make our people

so "enlightened" that they understand all the advantages of everybody participating in the work of the co-operatives, and organise this participation. "*Only*" that. There are now no other devices needed to advance to socialism. But to achieve this "only", there must be a veritable revolution—the entire people must go through a period of cultural development. Therefore, our rule must be: as little philosophising and as few acrobatics as possible. In this respect NEP is an advance, because it is adjustable to the level of the most ordinary peasant and does not demand anything higher of him. But it will take a whole historical epoch to get the entire population into the work of the co-operatives through NEP. At best we can achieve this in one or two decades. Nevertheless, it will be a distinct historical epoch, and without this historical epoch, without universal literacy, without a proper degree of efficiency, without training the population sufficiently to acquire the habit of book-reading, and without the material basis for this, without a certain sufficiency to safeguard against, say, bad harvests, famine, etc.—without this we shall not achieve our object. The thing now is to learn to combine the wide revolutionary range of action, the revolutionary enthusiasm which we have displayed, and displayed abundantly, and crowned with complete success—to learn to combine this with (I am almost inclined to say) the ability to be an efficient and capable trader, which is quite enough to be a good co-operator. By ability to be a trader I mean the ability to be a cultured trader. Let those Russians, or peasants, who imagine that since they trade they are good traders, get that well into their heads. This does not follow at all. They do trade, but that is far from being cultured traders. They now trade in an Asiatic manner, but to be a good trader one must trade in the European manner. They are a whole epoch behind in that.

In conclusion: a number of economic, financial and banking privileges must be granted to the co-operatives—this is the way our socialist state must promote the new principle on which the population must be organised. But this is only the general outline of the task; it does not define and depict in detail the entire content of the practi-

cal task, i.e., we must find what form of "bonus" to give for joining the co-operatives (and the terms on which we should give it), the form of bonus by which we shall assist the co-operatives sufficiently, the form of bonus that will produce the civilised co-operator. And given social ownership of the means of production, given the class victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the system of civilised co-operators is the system of socialism.

January 4, 1923

II

Whenever I wrote about the New Economic Policy I always quoted the article on state capitalism[158] which I wrote in 1918. This has more than once aroused doubts in the minds of certain young comrades. But their doubts were mainly on abstract political points.

It seemed to them that the term "state capitalism" could not be applied to a system under which the means of production were owned by the working class, a working class that held political power. They did not notice, however, that I used the term "state capitalism", *firstly*, to connect historically our present position with the position adopted in my controversy with the so-called Left Communists; also, I argued at the time that state capitalism would be superior to our existing economy. It was important for me to show the continuity between ordinary state capitalism and the unusual, even very unusual, state capitalism to which I referred in introducing the reader to the New Economic Policy. *Secondly*, the practical purpose was always important to me. And the practical purpose of our New Economic Policy was to lease out concessions. In the prevailing circumstances, concessions in our country would unquestionably have been a pure type of state capitalism. That is how I argued about state capitalism.

But there is another aspect of the matter for which we may need state capitalism, or at least a comparison with it. It is the question of co-operatives.

In the capitalist state, co-operatives are no doubt collective capitalist institutions. Nor is there any doubt that under our present economic conditions, when we

combine private capitalist enterprises—but in no other way than on nationalised land and in no other way than under the control of the working-class state—with enterprises of a consistently socialist type (the means of production, the land on which the enterprises are situated, and the enterprises as a whole belonging to the state), the question arises about a third type of enterprise, the co-operatives, which were not formerly regarded as an independent type differing fundamentally from the others. Under private capitalism, co-operative enterprises differ from capitalist enterprises as collective enterprises differ from private enterprises. Under state capitalism, co-operative enterprises differ from state capitalist enterprises, firstly, because they are private enterprises, and, secondly, because they are collective enterprises. Under our present system, co-operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but do not differ from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class.

This circumstance is not considered sufficiently when co-operatives are discussed. It is forgotten that owing to the special features of our political system, our co-operatives acquire an altogether exceptional significance. If we exclude concessions, which, incidentally, have not developed on any considerable scale, co-operation under our conditions nearly always coincides fully with socialism.

Let me explain what I mean. Why were the plans of the old co-operators, from Robert Owen onwards, fantastic? Because they dreamed of peacefully remodelling contemporary society into socialism without taking account of such fundamental questions as the class struggle, the capture of political power by the working class, the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting class. That is why we are right in regarding as entirely fantastic this "co-operative" socialism, and as romantic, and even banal, the dream of transforming class enemies into class collaborators and class war into class peace (so-called class truce) by merely organising the population in co-operative societies.

Undoubtedly we were right from the point of view of the fundamental task of the present day, for socialism

cannot be established without a class struggle for political power in the state.

But see how things have changed now that political power is in the hands of the working class, now that the political power of the exploiters is overthrown and all the means of production (except those which the workers' state voluntarily abandons on specified terms and for a certain time to the exploiters in the form of concessions) are owned by the working class.

Now we are entitled to say that for us the mere growth of co-operation (with the "slight" exception mentioned above) is identical with the growth of socialism, and at the same time we have to admit that there has been a radical modification in our whole outlook on socialism. The radical modification is this; formerly we placed, and had to place, the main emphasis on the political struggle, on revolution, on winning political power, etc. Now the emphasis is changing and shifting to peaceful, organisational, "cultural" work. I should say that emphasis is shifting to educational work, were it not for our international relations, were it not for the fact that we have to fight for our position on a world scale. If we leave that aside, however, and confine ourselves to internal economic relations, the emphasis in our work is certainly shifting to education.

Two main tasks confront us, which constitute the epoch—to reorganise our machinery of state, which is utterly useless, and which we took over in its entirety from the preceding epoch; during the past five years of struggle we did not, and could not, drastically reorganise it. Our second task is educational work among the peasants. And the economic object of this educational work among the peasants is to organise the latter in co-operative societies. If the whole of the peasantry had been organised in co-operatives, we would by now have been standing with both feet on the soil of socialism. But the organisation of the entire peasantry in co-operative societies presupposes a standard of culture among the peasants (precisely among the peasants as the overwhelming mass) that cannot, in fact, be achieved without a cultural revolution.

Our opponents told us repeatedly that we were rash in undertaking to implant socialism in an insufficiently

cultured country. But they were misled by our having started from the opposite end to that prescribed by theory (the theory of pedants of all kinds), because in our country the political and social revolution preceded the cultural revolution, that very cultural revolution which nevertheless now confronts us.

This cultural revolution would now suffice to make our country a completely socialist country; but it presents immense difficulties of a purely cultural (for we are illiterate) and material character (for to be cultured we must achieve a certain development of the material means of production, must have a certain material base).

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OUR REVOLUTION

(APROPOS OF N. SUKHANOV'S NOTES)

I

I have lately been glancing through Sukhanov's notes on the revolution. What strikes one most is the pedantry of all our petty-bourgeois democrats and of all the heroes of the Second International. Apart from the fact that they are all extremely faint-hearted, that when it comes to the minutest deviation from the German model even the best of them fortify themselves with reservations—apart from this characteristic, which is common to all petty-bourgeois democrats and has been abundantly manifested by them throughout the revolution, what strikes one is their slavish imitation of the past.

They all call themselves Marxists, but their conception of Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics. They have even absolutely failed to understand Marx's plain statements that in times of revolution the utmost flexibility[159] is demanded, and have even failed to notice, for instance, the statements Marx made in his letters—I think it was in 1856—expressing the hope of combining a peasant war in Germany, which might create a revolutionary situation, with the working-class movement[160]—they avoid even this plain statement and walk round and about it like a cat around a bowl of hot porridge.

Their conduct betrays them as cowardly reformists who are afraid to deviate from the bourgeoisie, let alone break with it, and at the same time they disguise their coward-

ice with the wildest rhetoric and braggartry. But what strikes one in all of them even from the purely theoretical point of view is their utter inability to grasp the following Marxist considerations: up to now they have seen capitalism and bourgeois democracy in Western Europe follow a definite path of development, and cannot conceive that this path can be taken as a model only *mutatis mutandis*, only with certain amendments (quite insignificant from the standpoint of the general development of world history).

First—the revolution connected with the first imperialist world war. Such a revolution was bound to reveal new features, or variations, resulting from the war itself, for the world has never seen such a war in such a situation. We find that since the war the bourgeoisie of the wealthiest countries have to this day been unable to restore "normal" bourgeois relations. Yet our reformists—petty bourgeois who make a show of being revolutionaries—believed, and still believe, that normal bourgeois relations are the limit (thus far shalt thou go and no farther). And even their conception of "normal" is extremely stereotyped and narrow.

Secondly, they are complete strangers to the idea that while the development of world history as a whole follows general laws it is by no means precluded, but, on the contrary, presumed, that certain periods of development may display peculiarities in either the form or the sequence of this development. For instance, it does not even occur to them that because Russia stands on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries which this war has for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation—all the Oriental, non-European countries—she could and was, indeed, bound to reveal certain distinguishing features; although these, of course, are in keeping with the general line of world development, they distinguish her revolution from those which took place in the West-European countries and introduce certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East.

Infinitely stereotyped, for instance, is the argument they learned by rote during the development of West-

European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen among them put it, the objective economic premises for socialism do not exist in our country. It does not occur to any of them to ask: but what about a people that found itself in a revolutionary situation such as that created during the first imperialist war? Might it not, influenced by the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that would offer it at least some chance of securing conditions for the further development of civilisation that were somewhat unusual?

"The development of the productive forces of Russia has not attained the level that makes socialism possible." All the heroes of the Second International, including, of course, Sukhanov, beat the drums about this proposition. They keep harping on this incontrovertible proposition in a thousand different keys, and think that it is the decisive criterion of our revolution.

But what if the situation, which drew Russia into the imperialist world war that involved every more or less influential West-European country and made her a witness of the eve of the revolutions maturing or partly already begun in the East, gave rise to circumstances that put Russia and her development in a position which enabled us to achieve precisely that combination of a "peasant war" with the working-class movement suggested in 1856 by no less a Marxist than Marx himself as a possible prospect for Prussia?

What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold, offered us the opportunity to create the fundamental requisites of civilisation in a different way from that of the West-European countries? Has that altered the general line of development of world history? Has that altered the basic relations between the basic classes of all the countries that are being, or have been, drawn into the general course of world history?

If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite "level of culture" is, for it differs in every West-European country), why cannot we begin by first achieving the

prerequisites for that definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and then, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?

January 16, 1923

II

You say that civilisation is necessary for the building of socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of civilisation in our country as the expulsion of the landowners and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards socialism? Where, in what books, have you read that such variations of the customary historical sequence of events are impermissible or impossible?

Napoleon, I think, wrote: "*On s'engage et puis ... on voit*." Rendered freely this means: "First engage in a serious battle and then see what happens." Well, we did first engage in a serious battle in October 1917, and then saw such details of development (from the standpoint of world history they were certainly details) as the Brest peace, the New Economic Policy, and so forth. And now there can be no doubt that in the main we have been victorious.

Our Sukhanovs, not to mention Social-Democrats still farther to the right, never even dream that revolutions could be made otherwise. Our European philistines never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater distinctions than the Russian revolution.

It need hardly be said that a textbook written on Kautskian lines was a very useful thing in its day. But it is time, for all that, to abandon the idea that it foresaw all the forms of development of subsequent world history. It would be timely to say that those who think so are simply fools.

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HOW WE SHOULD REORGANISE THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION

(RECOMMENDATION TO THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS)[161]

It is beyond question that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is an enormous difficulty for us, and that so far this difficulty has not been overcome. I think that the comrades who try to overcome the difficulty by denying that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is useful and necessary are wrong. But I do not deny that the problem presented by our state apparatus and the task of improving it is very difficult, that it is far from being solved, and is an extremely urgent one.

With the exception of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, our state apparatus is to a considerable extent a survival of the past and has undergone hardly any serious change. It has only been slightly touched up on the surface, but in all other respects it is a most typical relic of our old state machine. And so, to find a method of really renovating it, I think we ought to turn for experience to our Civil War.

How did we act in the more critical moments of the Civil War?

We concentrated our best Party forces in the Red Army; we mobilised the best of our workers; we looked for new forces at the deepest roots of our dictatorship.

I am convinced that we must go to the same source to find the means of reorganising the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. I recommend that our Twelfth Party Congress adopt the following plan of reorganisation, based on some enlargement of our Central Control Commission.

The Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of our Party are already revealing a tendency to develop into a

kind of supreme Party conference. They take place, on the average, not more than once in two months, while the routine work is conducted, as we know, on behalf of the Central Committee by our Political Bureau, our Organising Bureau, our Secretariat, and so forth. I think we ought to follow the road we have thus taken to the end and definitely transform the Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee into supreme Party conferences convened once in two months jointly with the Central Control Commission. The Central Control Commission should be amalgamated with the main body of the reorganised Workers' and Peasants' Inspection on the following lines.

I propose that the Congress should elect 75 to 100 new members to the Central Control Commission. They should be workers and peasants, and should go through the same Party screening as ordinary members of the Central Committee, because they are to enjoy the same rights as the members of the Central Committee.

On the other hand, the staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be reduced to three or four hundred persons, specially screened for conscientiousness and knowledge of our state apparatus. They must also undergo a special test as regards their knowledge of the principles of scientific organisation of labour in general, and of administrative work, office work, and so forth, in particular.

In my opinion, such an amalgamation of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection with the Central Control Commission will be beneficial to both these institutions. On the one hand, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection will thus obtain such high authority that it will certainly not be inferior to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, our Central Committee, together with the Central Control Commission, will definitely take the road of becoming a supreme Party conference, which in fact it has already taken, and along which it should proceed to the end so as to be able to fulfil its functions properly in two respects: in respect to *its own* methodical, expedient and systematic organisation and work, and in respect to maintaining contacts with the broad masses through the medium of the best of our workers and peasants.

I foresee an objection that, directly or indirectly, may come from those spheres which make our state apparatus antiquated, i.e., from those who urge that its present utterly impossible, indecently pre-revolutionary form be preserved (incidentally, we now have an opportunity which rarely occurs in history of ascertaining the period necessary for bringing about radical social changes; we now see clearly *what* can be done in five years, and what requires much more time).

The objection I foresee is that the change I propose will lead to nothing but chaos. The members of the Central Control Commission will wander around all the institutions, not knowing where, why or to whom to apply, causing disorganisation everywhere and distracting employees from their routine work, etc., etc.

I think that the malicious source of this objection is so obvious that it does not warrant a reply. It goes without saying that the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and his collegium (and also, in the proper cases, the Secretariat of our Central Committee) will have to put in years of persistent effort to get the Commissariat properly organised, and to get it to function smoothly in conjunction with the Central Control Commission. In my opinion, the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, as well as the whole collegium, can (and should) remain and guide the work of the entire Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, including the work of all the members of the Central Control Commission who will be "placed under his command". The three or four hundred employees of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection that are to remain, according to my plan, should, on the one hand, perform purely secretarial functions for the other members of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and for the supplementary members of the Central Control Commission; and, on the other hand, they should be highly skilled, specially screened, particularly reliable, and highly paid, so that they may be relieved of their present truly unhappy (to say the least) position of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection officials.

I am sure that the reduction of the staff to the number

I have indicated will greatly enhance the efficiency of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection personnel and the quality of all its work, enabling the People's Commissar and the members of the collegium to concentrate their efforts entirely on organising work and on systematically and steadily improving its efficiency, which is so absolutely essential for our workers' and peasants' government, and for our Soviet system.

On the other hand, I also think that the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should work on partly amalgamating and partly co-ordinating those higher institutions for the organisation of labour (the Central Institute of Labour, the Institute for the Scientific Organisation of Labour, etc.), of which there are now no fewer than twelve in our Republic. Excessive uniformity and a consequent desire to amalgamate will be harmful. On the contrary, what is needed here is a reasonable and expedient mean between amalgamating all these institutions and properly delimiting them, allowing for a certain independence for each of them.

Our own Central Committee will undoubtedly gain no less from this reorganisation than the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. It will gain because its contacts with the masses will be greater and because the regularity and effectiveness of its work will improve. It will then be possible (and necessary) to institute a stricter and more responsible procedure of preparing for the meetings of the Political Bureau, which should be attended by a definite number of members of the Central Control Commission determined either for a definite period or by some organisational plan.

In distributing work to the members of the Central Control Commission, the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, in conjunction with the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, should impose on them the duty either of attending the meetings of the Political Bureau for the purpose of examining all the documents appertaining to matters that come before it in one way or another; or of devoting their working time to theoretical study, to the study of scientific methods of organising labour; or of taking a practical part in the work of super-

vising and improving our machinery of state, from the higher state institutions to the lower local bodies, etc.

I also think that in addition to the political advantages accruing from the fact that the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission will, as a consequence of this reform, be much better informed and better prepared for the meetings of the Political Bureau (all the documents relevant to the business to be discussed at these meetings should be sent to all the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission not later than the day before the meeting of the Political Bureau, except in absolutely urgent cases, for which special methods of informing the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and of settling these matters must be devised), there will also be the advantage that the influence of purely personal and incidental factors in our Central Committee will diminish, and this will reduce the danger of a split.

Our Central Committee has grown into a strictly centralised and highly authoritative group, but the conditions under which this group is working are not commensurate with its authority. The reform I recommend should help to remove this defect, and the members of the Central Control Commission, whose duty it will be to attend all meetings of the Political Bureau in a definite number, will have to form a compact group which should not allow anybody's authority without exception, neither that of the General Secretary nor of any other member of the Central Committee, to prevent them from putting questions, verifying documents, and, in general, from keeping themselves fully informed of all things and from exercising the strictest control over the proper conduct of affairs.

Of course, in our Soviet Republic, the social order is based on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in which the "Nepmen", i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to participate on certain terms. If serious class disagreements arise between these classes, a split will be inevitable. But the grounds for such a split are not inevitable in our social system, and it is the principal task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as well as of our Party as a whole, to watch very

closely over such circumstances as may cause a split, and to forestall them, for in the final analysis the fate of our Republic will depend on whether the peasant masses will stand by the working class, loyal to their alliance, or whether they will permit the "Nepmen", i.e., the new bourgeoisie, to drive a wedge between them and the working class, to split them off from the working class. The more clearly we see this alternative, the more clearly all our workers and peasants understand it, the greater are the chances that we shall avoid a split, which would be fatal for the Soviet Republic.

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BETTER FEWER, BUT BETTER

In the matter of improving our state apparatus, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should not, in my opinion, either strive after quantity or hurry. We have so far been able to devote so little thought and attention to the efficiency of our state apparatus that it would now be quite legitimate if we took special care to secure its thorough organisation, and concentrated in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection a staff of workers really abreast of the times, i.e., not inferior to the best West-European standards. For a socialist republic this condition is, of course, too modest. But our experience of the first five years has fairly crammed our heads with mistrust and scepticism. These qualities assert themselves involuntarily when, for example, we hear people dilating at too great length and too flippantly on "proletarian" culture. For a start, we should be satisfied with real bourgeois culture; for a start, we should be glad to dispense with the cruder types of pre-bourgeois culture, i.e., bureaucratic culture or serf culture, etc. In matters of culture, haste and sweeping measures are most harmful. Many of our young writers and Communists should get this well into their heads.

Thus, in the matter of our state apparatus we should now draw the conclusion from our past experience that it would be better to proceed more slowly.

Our state apparatus is so deplorable, not to say wretched, that we must first think very carefully how to combat its defects, bearing in mind that these defects are rooted in the past, which, although it has been overthrown, has not yet been overcome, has not yet reached the stage of a culture that has receded into the distant past. I say culture deliberately, because in these matters we can only regard

as achieved what has become part and parcel of our culture, of our social life, our habits. We might say that the good in our social system has not been properly studied, understood, and taken to heart; it has been hastily grasped at; it has not been verified or tested, corroborated by experience, and not made durable, etc. Of course, it could not be otherwise in a revolutionary epoch, when development proceeded at such breakneck speed that in a matter of five years we passed from tsarism to the Soviet system.

It is time we did something about it. We must show sound scepticism for too rapid progress, for boastfulness, etc. We must give thought to testing the steps forward we proclaim every hour, take every minute and then prove every second that they are flimsy, superficial and misunderstood. The most harmful thing here would be haste. The most harmful thing would be to rely on the assumption that we know at least something, or that we have any considerable number of elements necessary for the building of a really new state apparatus, one really worthy to be called socialist, Soviet, etc.

No, we are ridiculously deficient of such an apparatus, and even of the elements of it, and we must remember that we should not stint time on building it, and that it will take many, many years.

What elements have we for building this apparatus? Only two. First, the workers who are absorbed in the struggle for socialism. These elements are not sufficiently educated. They would like to build a better apparatus for us, but they do not know how. They cannot build one. They have not yet developed the culture required for this; and it is culture that is required. Nothing will be achieved in this by doing things in a rush, by assault, by vim or vigour, or in general, by any of the best human qualities. Secondly, we have elements of knowledge, education and training, but they are ridiculously inadequate compared with all other countries.

Here we must not forget that we are too prone to compensate (or imagine that we can compensate) our lack of knowledge by zeal, haste, etc.

In order in renovate our state apparatus we must at all costs set out, first, to learn, secondly, to learn, and thirdly,

to learn, and then see to it that learning shall not remain a dead letter, or a fashionable catch-phrase (and we should admit in all frankness that this happens very often with us), that learning shall really become part of our very being, that it shall actually and fully become a constituent element of our social life. In short, we must not make the demands that are made by bourgeois Western Europe, but demands that are fit and proper for a country which has set out to develop into a socialist country.

The conclusions to be drawn from the above are the following: we must make the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection a really exemplary institution, an instrument to improve our state apparatus.

In order that it may attain the desired high level, we must follow the rule: Measure your cloth seven times before you cut."

For this purpose, we must utilise the very best of what there is in our social system, and utilise it with the greatest caution, thoughtfulness and knowledge, to build up the new People's Commissariat.

For this purpose, the best elements that we have in our social system—such as, first, the advanced workers, and, second, the really enlightened elements for whom we can vouch that they will not take the word for the deed, and will not utter a single word that goes against their conscience—should not shrink from admitting any difficulty and should not shrink from any struggle in order to achieve the object they have seriously set themselves.

We have been bustling for five years trying to improve our state apparatus, but it has been mere bustle, which has proved useless in these five years, or even futile, or even harmful. This bustle created the impression that we were doing something, but in effect it was only clogging up our institutions and our brains.

It is high time things were changed.

We must follow the rule: Better fewer, but better. We must follow the rule: Better get good human material in two or even three years than work in haste without hope of getting any at all.

I know that it will be hard to keep to this rule and apply it under our conditions. I know that the opposite rule will

force its way through a thousand loopholes. I know that enormous resistance will have to be put up, that devilish persistence will be required, that in the first few years at least work in this field will be hellishly hard. Nevertheless, I am convinced that only by such effort shall we be able to achieve our aim; and that only by achieving this aim shall we create a republic that is really worthy of the name of Soviet, socialist, and so on, and so forth.

Many readers probably thought that the figures I quoted by way of illustration in my first article* were too small. I am sure that many calculations may be made to prove that they are. But I think that we must put one thing above all such and other calculations, i.e., our desire to obtain really exemplary quality.

I think that the time has at last come when we must work in real earnest to improve our state apparatus and in this there can scarcely be anything more harmful than haste. That is why I would sound a strong warning against inflating the figures. In my opinion, we should, on the contrary, be especially sparing with figures in this matter. Let us say frankly that the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not at present enjoy the slightest authority. Everybody knows that no other institutions are worse organised than those of our Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and that under present conditions nothing can be expected from this People's Commissariat. We must have this firmly fixed in our minds if we really want to create within a few years an institution that will, first, be an exemplary institution, secondly, win everybody's absolute confidence, and, thirdly, prove to all and sundry that we have really justified the work of such a highly placed institution as the Central Control Commission. In my opinion, we must immediately and irrevocably reject all general figures for the size of office staffs. We must select employees for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection with particular care and only on the basis of the strictest test. Indeed, what is the use of establishing a People's Commissariat which carries on anyhow, which does not enjoy the slightest confidence, and whose

* See pp. 481-86 of this volume.—*Ed.*

word carries scarcely any weight? I think that our main object in launching the work of reconstruction that we now have in mind is to avoid all this.

The workers whom we are enlisting as members of the Central Control Commission must be irreproachable Communists, and I think that a great deal has yet to be done to teach them the methods and objects of their work. Furthermore, there must be a definite number of secretaries to assist in this work, who must be put to a triple test before they are appointed to their posts. Lastly, the officials whom in exceptional cases we shall accept directly as employees of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must conform to the following requirements:

First, they must be recommended by several Communists.

Second, they must pass a test for knowledge of our state apparatus.

Third, they must pass a test in the fundamentals of the theory of our state apparatus, in the fundamentals of management, office routine, etc.

Fourth, they must work in such close harmony with the members of the Central Control Commission and with their own secretariat that we could vouch for the work of the whole apparatus.

I know that these requirements are extraordinarily strict, and I am very much afraid that the majority of the "practical" workers in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection will say that these requirements are impracticable, or will scoff at them. But I ask any of the present chiefs of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, or anyone associated with that body, whether they can honestly tell me the practical purpose of a People's Commissariat like the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. I think this question will help them recover their sense of proportion. Either it is not worth while having another of the numerous reorganisations that we have had of this hopeless affair, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, or we must really set to work, by slow, difficult and unusual methods, and by testing these methods over and over again, to create something really exemplary, something that will win the respect of all and sundry for its merits, and not only because of its rank and title.

If we do not arm ourselves with patience, if we do not devote several years to this task, we had better not tackle it at all.

In my opinion we ought to select a minimum number of the higher labour research institutes, etc., which we have baked so hastily, see whether they are organised properly, and allow them to continue working, but only in a way that conforms to the high standards of modern science and gives us all its benefits. If we do that it will not be utopian to hope that within a few years we shall have an institution that will be able to perform its functions, to work systematically and steadily on improving our state apparatus, an institution backed by the trust of the working class, of the Russian Communist Party, and the whole population of our Republic.

The spade-work for this could be begun at once. If the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection accepted the present plan of reorganisation, it could now take preparatory steps and work methodically until the task is completed, without haste, and not hesitating to alter what has already been done.

Any half-hearted solution would be extremely harmful in this matter. A measure for the size of the staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection based on any other consideration would, in fact, be based on the old bureaucratic considerations, on old prejudices, on what has already been condemned, universally ridiculed, etc.

In substance, the matter is as follows:

Either we prove now that we have really learned something about state organisation (we ought to have learned something in five years), or we prove that we are not sufficiently mature for it. If the latter is the case, we had better not tackle the task.

I think that with the available human material it will not be immodest to assume that we have learned enough to be able systematically to rebuild at least one People's Commissariat. True, this one People's Commissariat will have to be the model for our entire state apparatus.

We ought at once to announce contest in the compilation of two or more textbooks on the organisation of labour in general, and on management in particular. We can

take as a basis the book already published by Yermansky, although it should be said in parentheses that he obviously sympathises with Menshevism and is unfit to compile textbooks for the Soviet system. We can also take as a basis the recent book by Kerzhentsev, and some of the other partial textbooks available may be useful too.

We ought to send several qualified and conscientious people to Germany, or to Britain, to collect literature and to study this question. I mention Britain in case it is found impossible to send people to the U.S.A. or Canada.

We ought to appoint a commission to draw up the preliminary programme of examinations for prospective employees of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; ditto for candidates to the Central Control Commission.

These and similar measures will not, of course, cause any difficulties for the People's Commissar or the collegium of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, or for the Presidium of the Central Control Commission.

Simultaneously, a preparatory commission should be appointed to select candidates for membership of the Central Control Commission. I hope that we shall now be able to find more than enough candidates for this post among the experienced workers in all departments, as well as among the students of our Soviet higher schools. It would hardly be right to exclude one or another category beforehand. Probably preference will have to be given to a mixed composition for this institution, which should combine many qualities, and dissimilar merits. Consequently, the task of drawing up the list of candidates will entail a considerable amount of work. For example, it would be least desirable for the staff of the new People's Commissariat to consist of people of one type, only of officials, say, or for it to exclude people of the propagandist type, or people whose principal quality is sociability or the ability to penetrate into circles that are not altogether customary for officials in this field, etc.

* * *

I think I shall be able to express my idea best if I compare my plan with that of academic institutions. Under the guidance of their Presidium, the members of the Central

Control Commission should systematically examine all the papers and documents of the Political Bureau. Moreover, they should divide their time correctly between various jobs in investigating the routine in our institutions, from the very small and privately-owned offices to the highest state institutions. And lastly, their functions should include the study of theory, i.e., the theory of organisation of the work they intend to devote themselves to, and practical work under the guidance either of older comrades or of teachers in the higher institutes for the organisation of labour.

I do not think, however, that they will be able to confine themselves to this sort of academic work. In addition, they will have to prepare themselves for work which I would not hesitate to call training to catch, I will not say rogues, but something like that, and working out special ruses to screen their movements, their approach, etc.

If such proposals were made in West-European government institutions they would rouse frightful resentment, a feeling of moral indignation, etc.; but I trust that we have not become so bureaucratic as to be capable of that. NEP has not yet succeeded in gaining such respect as to cause any of us to be shocked at the idea that somebody may be caught. Our Soviet Republic is of such recent construction, and there are such heaps of the old lumber still lying around that it would hardly occur to anyone to be shocked at the idea that we should delve into them by means of ruses, by means of investigations sometimes directed to rather remote sources or in a roundabout way. And even if it did occur to anyone to be shocked by this, we may be sure that such a person would make himself a laughing-stock.

Let us hope that our new Workers' and Peasants' Inspection will abandon what the French call *pruderie*, which we may call ridiculous primness, or ridiculous swank, and which plays entirely into the hands of our Soviet and Party bureaucracy. Let it be said in parentheses that we have bureaucrats in our Party offices as well as in Soviet offices.

When I said above that we must study and study hard in institutes for the higher organisation of labour, etc., I

did not by any means imply "studying" in the schoolroom way, nor did I confine myself to the idea of studying only in the schoolroom way. I hope that not a single genuine revolutionary will suspect me of refusing, in this case, to understand "studies" to include resorting to some semi-humorous trick, cunning device, piece of trickery or something of that sort. I know that in the staid and earnest states of Western Europe such an idea would horrify people and that not a single decent official would even entertain it. I hope, however, that we have not yet become as bureaucratic as all that and that in our midst the discussion of this idea will give rise to nothing more than amusement.

Indeed, why not combine pleasure with utility? Why not resort to some humorous or semi-humorous trick to expose something ridiculous, something harmful, something semi-ridiculous, semi-harmful, etc.?

It seems to me that our Workers' and Peasants' Inspection will gain a great deal if it undertakes to examine these ideas, and that the list of cases in which our Central Control Commission and its colleagues in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection achieved a few of their most brilliant victories will be enriched by not a few exploits of our future Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and Central Control Commission members in places not quite mentionable in prim and staid textbooks.

* * *

How can a Party institution be amalgamated with a Soviet institution? Is there not something improper in this suggestion?

I do not ask these questions on my own behalf, but on behalf of those I hinted at above when I said that we have bureaucrats in our Party institutions as well as in the Soviet institutions.

But why, indeed, should we not amalgamate the two if this is in the interests of our work? Do we not all see that such an amalgamation has been very beneficial in the case of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where it was brought about at the very beginning? Does not the Political Bureau discuss from the Party point of view many

questions, both minor and important, concerning the "moves" we should make in reply to the "moves" of foreign powers in order to forestall their, say, cunning, if we are not to use a less respectable term? Is not this flexible amalgamation of a Soviet institution with a Party institution a source of great strength in our politics? I think that what has proved its usefulness, what has been definitely adopted in our foreign politics and has become so customary that it no longer calls forth any doubt in this field, will be at least as appropriate (in fact, I think it will be much more appropriate) for our state apparatus as a whole. The functions of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection cover our state apparatus as a whole, and its activities should affect all and every state institution without exception: local, central, commercial, purely administrative, educational, archive, theatrical, etc.—in short, all without any exception.

Why then should not an institution, whose activities have such wide scope, and which moreover requires such extraordinary flexibility of forms, be permitted to adopt this peculiar amalgamation of a Party control institution with a Soviet control institution?

I see no obstacles to this. What is more, I think that such an amalgamation is the only guarantee of success in our work. I think that all doubts on this score arise in the dustiest corners of our government offices, and that they deserve to be treated with nothing but ridicule.

* * *

Another doubt: is it expedient to combine educational activities with official activities? I think that it is not only expedient, but necessary. Generally speaking, in spite of our revolutionary attitude towards the West-European form of state, we have allowed ourselves to become infected with a number of its most harmful and ridiculous prejudices; to some extent we have been deliberately infected with them by our dear bureaucrats, who counted on being able again and again to fish in the muddy waters of these prejudices. And they did fish in these muddy waters to so great an extent that only the blind among us failed to see how extensively this fishing was practised.

In all spheres of social, economic and political relationships we are "frightfully" revolutionary. But as regards precedence, the observance of the forms and rites of office management, our "revolutionariness" often gives way to the mustiest routine. On more than one occasion, we have witnessed the very interesting phenomenon of a great leap forward in social life being accompanied by amazing timidity whenever the slightest changes are proposed.

This is natural, for the boldest steps forward were taken in a field which was long reserved for theoretical study, which was promoted mainly, and even almost exclusively, in theory. The Russian, when away from work, found solace from bleak bureaucratic realities in unusually bold theoretical constructions, and that is why in our country these unusually bold theoretical constructions assumed an unusually lopsided character. Theoretical audacity in general constructions went hand in hand with amazing timidity as regards certain very minor reforms in office routine. Some great universal agrarian revolution was worked out with an audacity unexampled in any other country, and at the same time the imagination failed when it came to working out a tenth-rate reform in office routine; the imagination, or patience, was lacking to apply to this reform the general propositions that produced such brilliant results when applied to general problems.

That is why in our present life reckless audacity goes hand in hand, to an astonishing degree, with timidity of thought even when it comes to very minor changes.

I think that this has happened in all really great revolutions, for really great revolutions grow out of the contradictions between the old, between what is directed towards developing the old, and the very abstract striving for the new, which must be so new as not to contain the tiniest particle of the old.

And the more abrupt the revolution, the longer will many of these contradictions last.

* * *

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The general feature of our present life is the following: we have destroyed capitalist industry and have done our best to raze to the ground the medieval institutions and landed proprietorship, and thus created a small and very small peasantry, which is following the lead of the proletariat because it believes in the results of its revolutionary work. It is not easy for us, however, to keep going until the socialist revolution is victorious in more developed countries merely with the aid of this confidence, because economic necessity, especially under NEP, keeps the productivity of labour of the small and very small peasants at an extremely low level. Moreover, the international situation, too, threw Russia back and, by and large, reduced the labour productivity of the people to a level considerably below pre-war. The West-European capitalist powers, partly deliberately and partly unconsciously, did everything they could to throw us back, to utilise the elements of the Civil War in Russia in order to spread as much ruin in the country as possible. It was precisely this way out of the imperialist war that seemed to have many advantages. They argued somewhat as follows: "If we fail to overthrow the revolutionary system in Russia, we shall, at all events, hinder its progress towards socialism." And from their point of view they could argue in no other way. In the end, their problem was half-solved. They failed to overthrow the new system created by the revolution, but they did prevent it from at once taking the step forward that would have justified the forecasts of the socialists, that would have enabled the latter to develop the productive forces with enormous speed, to develop all the potentialities which, taken together, would have produced socialism; socialists would thus have proved to all and sundry that socialism contains within itself gigantic forces and that mankind had now entered into a new stage of development of extraordinarily brilliant prospects.

The system of international relationships which has now taken shape is one in which a European state, Germany, is enslaved by the victor countries. Furthermore, owing to their victory, a number of states, the oldest states in the West, are in a position to make some insignificant concessions to their oppressed classes—concessions which,

insignificant though they are, nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries and create some semblance of "class truce".

At the same time, as a result of the last imperialist war, a number of countries of the East, India, China, etc., have been completely jolted out of the rut. Their development has definitely shifted to general European capitalist lines. The general European ferment has begun to affect them, and it is now clear to the whole world that they have been drawn into a process of development that must lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism.

Thus, at the present time we are confronted with the question—shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism? But they are consummating it not as we formerly expected. They are not consummating it through the gradual "maturing" of socialism, but through the exploitation of some countries by others, through the exploitation of the first of the countries vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has been definitely drawn into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement.

What tactics does this situation prescribe for our country? Obviously the following. We must display extreme caution so as to preserve our workers' government and to retain our small and very small peasantry under its leadership and authority. We have the advantage that the whole world is now passing to a movement that must give rise to a world socialist revolution. But we are labouring under the disadvantage that the imperialists have succeeded in splitting the world into two camps; and this split is made more complicated by the fact that it is extremely difficult for Germany, which is really a land of advanced, cultured, capitalist development, to rise to her feet. All the capitalist powers of what is called the West are pecking at her and preventing her from rising. On the other hand, the entire East, with its hundreds of millions of exploited

working people, reduced to the last degree of human suffering, has been forced into a position where its physical and material strength cannot possibly be compared with the physical, material and military strength of any of the much smaller West-European states.

Can we save ourselves from the impending conflict with these imperialist countries? May we hope that the internal antagonisms and conflicts between the thriving imperialist countries of the West and the thriving imperialist countries of the East will give us a second respite as they did the first time, when the campaign of the West-European counter-revolution in support of the Russian counter-revolution broke down owing to the antagonisms in the camp of the counter-revolutionaries of the West and the East, in the camp of the Eastern and Western exploiters, in the camp of Japan and the U.S.A.?

I think the reply to this question should be that the issue depends upon too many factors, and that the outcome of the struggle as a whole can be forecast only because in the long run capitalism itself is educating and training the vast majority of the population of the globe for the struggle.

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And during the past few years it is this majority that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.

But what interests us is not the inevitability of this complete victory of socialism, but the tactics which we, the Russian Communist Party, we, the Russian Soviet Government, should pursue to prevent the West-European counter-revolutionary states from crushing us. To ensure our existence until the next military conflict between the counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East, between the most civilised countries of the world and the Orientally backward countries which, however, comprise the majority, this majority

must become civilised. We, too, lack enough civilisation to enable us to pass straight on to socialism, although we do have the political requisites for it. We should adopt the following tactics, or pursue the following policy, to save ourselves.

We must strive to build up a state in which the workers retain the leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and by exercising the greatest economy remove every trace of extravagance from our social relations.

We must reduce our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. We must banish from it all traces of extravagance, of which so much has been left over from tsarist Russia, from its bureaucratic capitalist state machine.

Will not this be a reign of peasant limitations?

No. If we see to it that the working class retains its leadership over the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible thrift in the economic life of our state, to use every saving we make to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to complete the Volkhov Power Project,[162] etc.

In this, and in this alone, lies our hope. Only when we have done this shall we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik horse of poverty, from the horse of an economy designed for a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and must seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of the Volkhov Power Station, etc.

That is how I link up in my mind the general plan of our work, of our policy, of our tactics, of our strategy, with the functions of the reorganised Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. This is what, in my opinion, justifies the exceptional care, the exceptional attention that we must devote to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in raising it to an exceptionally high level, in giving it a leadership with Central Committee rights, etc., etc.

And this justification is that only by thoroughly purging our government machine, by reducing to the utmost everything that is not absolutely essential in it, shall we be

certain of being able to keep going. Moreover, we shall be able to keep going not on the level of a small-peasant country, not on the level of universal limitation, but on a level steadily advancing to large-scale machine industry.

These are the lofty tasks that I dream of for our Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. That is why I am planning for it the amalgamation of the most authoritative Party body with an "ordinary" People's Commissariat.

March 2, 1923

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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NOTES

[1] The *Mensheviks* were adherents of the petty-bourgeois opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement and instruments of bourgeois influence over the working class. They received their name at the close of the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in August 1903, when at the elections to the Party's central organs they found themselves in the minority (*menshinstvo*), and the revolutionary Social-Democrats headed by Lenin won the majority (*bolshinstvo*); hence the names Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Mensheviks sought to secure agreement between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and pursued an opportunist line in the working-class movement. In the period of dual power after the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, when the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as represented by the Provisional Government intertwined with the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasants as represented by the Soviets, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries accepted-posts in the Provisional Government, supported its imperialist policy and opposed the mounting proletarian revolution. In the Soviets the Mensheviks pursued the same policy of supporting the Provisional Government and diverting the masses from the revolutionary movement.

After the October Revolution, they became an openly counter-revolutionary party, organising and participating in conspiracies and revolts against Soviet power. p. 21

[2] The *Socialist-Revolutionaries* were members of a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which emerged at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902.

After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 they were, together with the Mensheviks, the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and landowners, while their leaders held posts in that government. Far from supporting the peasants' demand for the abolition of landlordism, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party pressed for its preservation. The Socialist-Revolutionary Ministers of the Provisional Government sent punitive detachments against peasants who seized landed estates.

At the close of November 1917, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries formed an independent party.

During the years of foreign military intervention and the Civil War the Socialist-Revolutionaries, carried on counter-revolutionary

subversive activities, vigorously supported the interventionists and white guards, took part in counter-revolutionary plots and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. After the Civil War they continued their hostile activities within the country and among whiteguard émigrés. p. 21

[3] The *Two-and-a-Half International* (whose official name was the International Association of Socialist Parties) was an international organisation of Centrist socialist parties and groups that had been forced out of the Second International by the revolutionary masses. It was formed at a conference in Vienna in February 1921. While criticising the Second International, the leaders of the Two-and-a-Half International pursued an opportunist, splitting policy on all key issues of the proletarian movement and sought to utilise their association to offset the growing influence of the Communists among the working-class masses.

In May 1923, the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals merged into the so-called Socialist Labour International. p. 21

[4] The *Communist Workers Party of Germany* was formed in April 1920 by "Left" Communists, who had been expelled from the Communist Party of Germany at the Heidelberg Congress in 1919. In November 1920, in order to facilitate the unification of all communist forces in Germany and satisfy the wishes of the best proletarian elements within it, the C.W.P.G. was temporarily admitted to the Comintern with the rights of a sympathising member on the condition that it merged with the United Communist Party of Germany and supported its actions. The C.W.P.G. leadership did not fulfil the instructions of the Comintern Executive Committee. For the sake of the workers still supporting the C.W.P.G., the Third Comintern Congress decided to give it two or three months in which to convene a congress and settle the question of unification. The C.W.P.G. leadership failed to fulfil the decision of the Third Congress and continued their splitting tactics with the result that the Comintern Executive Committee was compelled to break off relations with the party. The C.W.P.G. found itself outside the Comintern and subsequently degenerated into an insignificant sectarian group that had no proletarian support whatever and was hostile to the working class of Germany. p. 21

[5] The *Workers' Opposition* was an anti-Party faction formed in the Russian Communist Party in 1920 by Shlyapnikov, Medvedyev, Kollontai and others. It took final shape during the debates on the role of the trade unions in 1920-21. Actually there was nothing of the working class about this opposition, which expressed the mood and aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. It counterposed the trade unions to the Soviet Government and the Communist

Party, considering them the highest form of working-class organisation.

After the Tenth Party Congress, which found the propagation of the ideas of the Workers' Opposition incompatible with membership in the Communist Party, a large number of rank-and-file members of that opposition broke away from it. p. 21

[6] This is a reference to the counter-revolutionary mutiny, which broke out in Kronstadt on February 28, 1921. Organised by Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and whiteguards, it involved a considerable number of sailors, most of whom were raw recruits from the villages, who had little or no knowledge of politics and voiced the peasants' dissatisfaction with the requisitioning of surplus food. The economic difficulties in the country and the weakening of the Bolshevik organisation at Kronstadt facilitated the mutiny.

Hesitating to oppose the Soviet system openly, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie adopted new tactics. With the purpose of deceiving the masses, the leaders of the revolt put forward the slogan "Soviets without Communists", hoping to remove the Communists from the leadership of the Soviets, destroy the Soviet system and restore the capitalist regime in Russia.

On March 2, the mutineers arrested the fleet command. They contacted foreign imperialists, who promised them financial and military aid. The seizure of Kronstadt by the mutineers created a direct threat to Petrograd.

Regular Red Army units commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevsky were sent by the Soviet Government to crush the mutiny. The Communist Party reinforced these units with more than 300 delegates of the Tenth Party Congress; all these men, with Kliment Voroshilov at their head, had had fighting experience. The mutiny was snuffed out on March 18. p. 21

[7] The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on November 12 (25), 1917 according to lists drawn up before the October Revolution. Most of the seats were held by Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and other counter-revolutionary elements. Though it did not mirror the new alignment of forces that took shape in the country as a result of the revolution, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government felt the necessity of convening it because backward sections of the working population still believed in bourgeois parliamentarism. The Assembly opened in Petrograd on January 5 (18), 1918, but was dissolved on the next day by a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee when the counter-revolutionary majority in it rejected the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People submitted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and refused to endorse the decrees of the Second Congress of Soviets on peace, land and the transfer of power to the Soviets. The decision to dissolve the

Assembly was whole-heartedly approved by broad masses of workers, soldiers and peasants. p. 22

8 This peace treaty was signed between Soviet Russia and the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) on March 3, 1918. It was ratified on March 15 by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The terms were extremely onerous for Soviet Russia. They gave Germany and Austria-Hungary control over Poland, almost the whole Baltic area and part of Byelorussia; the Ukraine was separated from Soviet Russia and became dependent upon Germany. Turkey received the towns of Kars, Batum and Ardagan.

The signing of the Brest Treaty was preceded by a vehement struggle against Trotsky and the anti-Party group of "Left Communists". The treaty was signed thanks to a huge effort on Lenin's part. It was a wise political compromise, for it gave Soviet Russia a peaceful respite and enabled her to demobilise the old disintegrating army and create the new, Red Army, start socialist construction and muster her forces for the coming struggle against internal counter-revolution and foreign intervention. This policy promoted the further intensification of the struggle for peace and the growth of revolutionary sentiments among the troops and the masses of all belligerent countries. After the monarchy in Germany was overthrown by the revolution of November 1918, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee abrogated the predatory Brest Treaty. p. 22

9 Lenin refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny of the Czechoslovak Corps inspired by the Entente with the connivance of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Corps, consisting of Czech and Slovak war prisoners, was formed in Russia before the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the summer of 1918 it had more than 60,000 men (altogether in Russia there were about 200,000 Czech and Slovak prisoners of war). After Soviet rule was established, the financing of the Corps was undertaken by the Entente powers, who decided to use it against the Soviet Republic. Tomas Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak National Council, proclaimed the Corps part of the French Army, and Entente representatives raised the question of evacuating it to France. The Soviet Government agreed to its evacuation on condition that the Russian soldiers in France were allowed to return home. Under an agreement signed on March 26, 1918, the Corps was given the possibility of leaving Russia via Vladivostok, provided it surrendered its weapons and removed the counter-revolutionary Russian officers from its command. But the counter-revolutionary command of the Corps perfidiously violated the agreement with the Soviet Government on the surrender of weapons and, acting on orders from the Entente imperialists, provoked an armed mutiny at the close of May. Operating in close contact with the whiteguards and kulaks, the White Czechs occupied

considerable territory in the Urals, the Volga country and Siberia, everywhere restoring bourgeois rule.

On June 11, soon after the mutiny broke out, the Central Executive Committee of the Czechoslovak communist groups in Russia appealed to the soldiers of the Corps, exposing the counter-revolutionary objectives of the mutiny and calling upon the Czech and Slovak workers and peasants to end the mutiny and join the Czechoslovak units of the Red Army. Most of the Czech and Slovak war prisoners were favourably disposed to Soviet power and did not succumb to the anti-Soviet propaganda of the Corps' reactionary command. Many of the soldiers refused to fight Soviet Russia after they realised that they were being deceived. Nearly 12,000 Czechs and Slovaks joined the Red Army.

The Volga country was liberated by the Red Army in the autumn of 1918. The White Czechs were finally routed early in 1920. p. 23

[10] *Wrangel*—baron, tsarist general and rabid monarchist. During the foreign military intervention and Civil War he was a puppet of the British, French and U.S. imperialists. In April-November 1920 he was commander-in-chief of the whiteguard armed forces in South Russia. He fled abroad after his forces were defeated by the Red Army. p. 23

[11] The *mistakes of the "Lefts" in the Communist Party of Germany* were that they incited the working class to premature actions. The German bourgeoisie utilised these mistakes to provoke the workers into armed action at an unpropitious time. A workers' revolt broke out in Central Germany in March 1921. That revolt was not supported by the workers of other industrial regions with the result that despite a heroic struggle it was quickly crushed. For Lenin's assessment of this revolt and criticism of the mistakes of the "Lefts" see his "Speech in Defence of the Tactics of the Communist International" at the Third Comintern Congress and his "A Letter to the German Communists" (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 468-77 and 512-23). p. 23

[12] *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*—a daily newspaper published in Moscow from November 1918 to November 1919. p. 30

[13] From December 1920 the *Council of Labour and Defence* was a permanent organ of the Council of People's Commissars. It existed until 1937. It emerged in April 1920 on the basis of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence, set up by decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of November 30, 1918, with the purpose of mobilising manpower and means for the country's defence. The Council of Labour and Defence was also headed by Lenin. p. 32

[14] Lenin has in mind the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (December 22-29, 1920) decision "On Soviet Construction". p. 35

[15] The purge was undertaken in the second half of 1921 on the basis of the Tenth R.C.P.(B.) Congress resolution "On Problems of Party Development". It was preceded by long and careful preparation.

Under the purge nearly 170,000 people, i.e., almost 25 per cent of the membership, were expelled from the Party. This improved the Party's social composition, strengthened discipline, gave the Party greater prestige among the non-Party worker and peasant masses and freed the Party from elements who discredited it. The Party's ideological and organisational unity was enhanced.

p. 39

[16] The idea of convening a so-called *labour congress*, proposed by P. B. Axelrod and supported by other Mensheviks, was aimed at getting representatives of various workers' organisations together and founding a legal "broad labour party", which would include Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists. Actually, it would have meant the dissolution of the R.S.D.L.P. and its replacement by a non-Party organisation.

p. 40

[17] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief political organisation of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. It was founded in October 1905, its membership including representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders from among the landowners, and bourgeois intellectuals. In order to deceive the working people the Cadets falsely called themselves the "Party of People's Freedom", but in reality they never went beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. They considered their main task to be the fight against the revolutionary movement and aspired to share power with the tsar and the feudal landowners. During the First World War they actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest, and in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried to save the monarchy. After the Great October Socialist Revolution they became irreconcilable enemies of Soviet rule and actively participated in all the armed counter-revolutionary actions and campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards were defeated, the Cadets fled abroad, where they continued their anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary activity.

p. 40

[18] Lenin wrote this letter to J. V. Stalin, who was at that time People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, after receiving a preliminary report from Loginov, head of the fuel section at the industrial department of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, on the fuel situation and on the work of fuel enterprises.

The ideas in this letter were further developed by Lenin in a series of articles, including "How We Should Reorganise the

Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" and "Better Fewer, But Better" (see present volume, pp. 481-86, 487-502). p. 42

[19] *Sazhen*—a Russian linear measure equal to 2.13 metres, used in the U.S.S.R. before the introduction of the metric system. p. 46

[20] This Congress, convened on Lenin's initiative, was held in Moscow on October 1-9, 1921. It was attended by nearly 900 scientists, engineers and technicians as well as workers from various industrial enterprises.

Lenin was elected honorary chairman of the Congress, and his letter of greetings was read at the morning sitting on October 9, 1921. p. 49

[21] The Extraordinary International Socialist Congress that sat in Basle on November 24-25, 1912, adopted a manifesto on war, which warned the peoples that an imperialist world war was imminent, showed the predatory objectives of that war and called upon the workers of all countries to make a determined stand for peace. It included a point, contributed by Lenin to the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress of 1907, that if an imperialist war broke out the socialists should utilise the economic and political crisis stemming from it to accelerate the downfall of capitalist class domination and to work for a socialist revolution. p. 57

[22] Held in Moscow on October 17-22, 1921, this Congress was attended by 307 delegates.

Its main object was to endorse a plan of work for 1922 and work out the forms and methods of agitation and propaganda in the situation called forth by the New Economic Policy.

Lenin, who was given an ovation by the delegates, spoke at the evening session on October 17.

The *Political Education Departments* were formed by local (volost, uyezd and gubernia) public education bodies in conformity with a decree issued on February 23, 1920. Their work was guided by the Central Political Education Committee at the People's Commissariat of Education. p. 60

[23] The All-Russia Central Executive Committee passed its decision of April 29, 1918 on the basis of Lenin's report "On the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government". The propositions in that report and in the article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" were summed up by Lenin in six theses, which, with some additions, were unanimously endorsed by the Party Central Committee on May 3, 1918. See "Six Theses on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 314-17). p. 61

[24] *Gubernia economic conferences* were local organs of the Council of Labour and Defence. They were set up by the Executive

Committees of the gubernia Soviets in conformity with the decision passed by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920. p. 76

[25] This Conference was held on October 29-31, 1921, and was attended by 637 delegates.

It debated 1) the international and domestic situation, 2) the report of the gubernia economic conference, 3) the report on the work of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), 4) the report of the Auditing Commission, and 5) the report of the Control Commission. Moreover, it heard a report on the purging of the Party in Moscow and Moscow Gubernia, and on other questions.

Lenin delivered his report on the New Economic Policy at the first sitting on October 29. p. 81

[26] Lenin has in mind his articles: "The Chief Task of Our Day", "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government", "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" and others (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 159-63, 235-77, 323-54). p. 87

[27] See Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 314-17. p. 88

[28] *Listok Obyavleni* (*Moskovsky Listok Obyavleni* [Moscow Advertising Sheet]) was published privately in Moscow from October 1921 to February 1922. p. 89

[29] See Engels's letters to A. Bebel of March 18-28, 1875 and December 11, 1884 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 291, 381). p. 110

[30] Engels, *Emigré Literature* (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, S. 534. Dietz Verlag, Berlin). p. 111

[31] See Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 274. p. 112

[32] This meeting, attended by 2,000 workers, was organised as an evening of reminiscences.

Lenin spoke in his capacity of Deputy to the Moscow Soviet elected by the workers of the Prokhorov Textile Mills. p. 117

[33] This pamphlet was not published. Lenin's pamphlet *The Problem of the New Economic Policy*, which included the articles "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution" and "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism", was published in 1921 (see present volume, pp. 51-59, 109-116). p. 121

[34] See Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 55-88. p. 121

[35] The *First Moscow Gubernia Agricultural Congress*, held on November 28-30, 1921, was attended by more than 300 delegates

from peasants and land offices. Lenin spoke on November 29, 1921. p. 128

[36] *La Voix Paysanne*—weekly organ of the Central Association of Working Peasants, was published in Paris by the Communist Party of France in 1920-37. p. 131

[37] Lenin refers to Engels's article "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* in Two Volumes, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 420-40). p. 134

[38] This letter was written in connection with the drawing up of a resolution on Party purge for the Eleventh All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). Illness prevented Lenin from attending the Conference. His recommendations on stricter conditions for admission into the Party were incorporated in the resolution adopted by the Party Conference (see *KPSS v resolyutsiakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsi i plenumov Ts.K.* [C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings], Part I, 1954, p. 597). p. 138

[39] Lenin's recommendation that the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets adopt a special resolution against the adventurist policy of the bourgeois governments of Poland, Finland and Rumania was approved by the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), at a meeting on December 22, 1921. p. 139

[40] The *Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets* sat in Moscow on December 23-28, 1921. It was attended by 1,993 delegates, of whom 1,631 had a casting vote and 362 a consultative voice.

This Congress summed up the first results of activities under the New Economic Policy, fully approving the home and foreign policy of the workers' and peasants' government. In its "Declaration on the International Position of the R.S.F.S.R.", the Congress made the proposal to the governments of neighbouring and all other states to found their foreign policy on the principle of peaceful coexistence, on "peaceful and friendly coexistence with the Soviet republics".

The Congress devoted its main attention to finding ways of rapidly restoring agriculture as a key condition for the development of the country's entire economy. It also gave much of its attention to famine relief, calling upon workers and peasants to bend every effort to help the people, particularly children, stricken by famine along the Volga. The Congress expressed its "warm appreciation to the workers of all countries who came to the assistance of the famine-stricken gubernias of Soviet Russia".

The Congress decisions stated that the restoration and development of large-scale industry "is, in addition to the restoration of agriculture, the cardinal task of the Republic".

Lenin was very active in preparing for the Congress and directed its work.

He wrote the "Instructions on Questions of Economic Management", which were adopted by the Congress, and also a number of documents on which the Congress decisions were based.

The Congress elected a new All-Russia Central Executive Committee consisting of 386 members and 127 alternate members. p. 141

[41] This Conference on restricting naval armaments and on Pacific and Far Eastern problems was convened on the initiative of the U.S.A. It sat in Washington from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922 and was attended by representatives of the U.S.A. Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands. Soviet Russia was not invited, nor was the Far Eastern Republic, which was in existence at the time. Without the Soviet Republic's participation, the Conference examined a number of problems concerning Soviet Russia. In this connection, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs lodged two protests—on July 19 and November 2, 1921—with the governments concerned, stating it would not recognise decisions taken by the Conference without the participation of one of the principal interested parties. On December 8, 1921, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs protested against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the problem of the Chinese-Easter Railway, which solely concerned Russia and China.

The decisions of the Conference were a supplement to the Versailles Treaty; under pressure brought to bear by the U.S.A. and Britain, Japan was compelled to relinquish some of the positions she had captured in China, but at the same time she consolidated her rule in South Manchuria. p. 155

[42] *Yugostal*—a mining metallurgical trust founded in September 1921. It embraced some large iron and steel plants in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Crimea and played an important part in rehabilitating the country's iron and steel industry. It existed until 1919. p. 168

[43] The first section (capacity—5,000 kw) of the State Shatura District Power Station, a project started in 1918, was commissioned on July 25, 1920. The station was completed in 1925 and was named after Lenin.

The building of the Kashira Power Station was started in February 1919, and it was expected that it would be completed by the end of 1921, when the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets was due to open. Lenin attached great importance to this station as a power source for some of the largest factories and mills in Moscow and as the first project under the electrification plan. He kept a close watch on the course of the project, directly participating in the solution of many of its problems and checking how it was being supplied with the necessary materials, manpower, fuel and equipment.

The first section (12,000 kw) of this power station became operational on June 4, 1922. p. 169

[44] The Krasny Oktyabr (formerly Utkina Zavod) Power Station was completed in 1922, its first section (10,000 kw) becoming operational on October 8, 1922. p. 170

[45] This is a reference to the trial of 35 private businessmen—owners of tea-and-dining rooms, bakeries, shoemaking establishments, etc.—in Moscow on December 15-18, 1921. They were charged with violating the Labour Code, namely, exploiting the labour of children, juveniles and women, lengthening the working day, and so on. Workers of large enterprises, both members and non-members of the Party, acted as prosecutors. The court sentenced ten of the accused to large fines or to forced labour without imprisonment. p. 171

[46] Lenin has in mind the fable *Geese* by the well-known Russian writer Ivan Krylov. p. 173

[47] The role and tasks of the trade unions under the conditions created by the New Economic Policy were examined at a Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on December 28, 1921. The draft of the decision on the trade unions adopted by the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) was written by Lenin.

The theses of January 12, 1922 were examined by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee which unanimously approved them and submitted them without amendments to the Eleventh Party Congress. They were unanimously passed at that Congress (see *KPSS v rezolyutsiakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsi i plenumov Ts.K.* [C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings], Part I, 1954, pp. 603-12). p. 184

[48] The *Draft Directive of the Political Bureau on the New Economic Policy* was debated at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on January 12, 1922 and accepted as a basis; it was endorsed on January 16, 1922. p. 197

[49] Lenin's greeting to the working people of Daghestan was written in reply to a letter from Comrade Karkmasov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Daghestan Soviet Socialist Republic, in which he reported that a start had been made in tapping mineral resources. Two poods of mercury extracted in Daghestan were sent to Lenin as a production gift. p. 199

[50] This letter was written on the eve of the First Congress of Soviets of Georgia, which was held on February 25-March 3, 1922.

Lenin's suggestion to strengthen the Georgian Red Army was called forth by the aggressive stand of the British imperialists

and by the campaign of slander started against the Soviet Republic by the reactionary imperialist press together with the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals and the Georgian Mensheviks. They demanded the withdrawal of the Red Army from Georgia with the objective of wresting that territory away from Soviet Russia.

The First Congress of Soviets of Georgia adopted statement "On the Red Army", which declared that the strengthening of the existing nucleus of the Georgian Red Army was the cardinal task and requested the Government of the fraternal Russian Soviet Republic not to withdraw the Red Army from Georgian territory.

Lenin's suggestion on strengthening the Georgian Red Army was accepted by the Political Bureau on February 25, 1922.

p. 200

[51] The Civil Code was revised on the basis of Lenin's directives in the letter to D. I. Kursky. It was examined at the Third and Fourth Sessions of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee (in May and October 1922). The Fourth Session passed a decision to give effect to the Civil Code as of January 1, 1923 (see Lenin's speech at the Fourth Session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee in the present volume, pp. 390-95).

p. 202

[52] The *International Economic and Financial Conference* was held in Genoa on the initiative of the Soviet Government expressed in Notes to Britain, Italy, the U.S.A., France and Japan on October 28, 1921. The Soviet Notes stated that the Conference should examine the establishment of peace and economic co-operation in Europe and also the question of Russian debts. The decision to convene the Conference was taken by the Supreme Entente Council at a conference in Cannes on January 6, 1922.

The Allied countries invited Soviet Russia to the Conference in the hope of compelling her to make a number of political and economic concessions and, at the same time, establishing economic relations with her.

The Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference was named by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee at an extraordinary meeting on January 27. Lenin was appointed to lead the delegation, and G. V. Chicherin was named as his deputy. The question of Lenin going to Genoa was widely discussed by the people of the Soviet republics. Many of them expressed apprehension for his life and safety and opposed his going to the Conference. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) passed a special decision on this question, under which Lenin's plenary powers as head of the delegation were passed to Chicherin.

Lenin directed the work of the delegation, drew up the Central Committee's directives to it and also other important documents connected with Soviet Russia's participation in the Genoa Conference.

The Conference sat from April 10 to May 19, 1922. It was attended by representatives of 29 countries. At the Conference the Soviet delegation reiterated the need for peaceful coexistence between states with different social and economic systems. Its statement, approved by Lenin and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars, declared. "While remaining true to the principles of communism, the Russian delegation recognises that in the present epoch, which makes the parallel existence of the old and the emergent social system possible, economic co-operation between states representing the two systems of ownership is imperatively necessary for universal economic reconstruction (see *Materialy Genuezskoi konferentsii. Polny stenograficheskiy otchot* [Materials of the Genoa Conference. Complete Verbatim Report], Moscow, 1922, p. 78).

The Genoa Conference failed to settle the problems that confronted it. The Soviet delegation emphatically rejected the attempts of the imperialist powers to impose a colonial status upon Soviet Russia (the establishment of control over Soviet finances and so forth). By proposing talks on a general reduction of armaments and the banning of the most barbarous means of warfare (poison gases, military aircraft), the Soviet delegation demonstrated the peace-loving nature of Soviet Russia's Leninist foreign policy to the whole world. p. 203

[53] This article was not completed. p. 204

[54] *Smena Vekh*—the title of a collection of articles published in Prague in 1921, and then the name of a journal published in Paris from October 1921 to March 1922. It was the mouthpiece of advocates of a socio-political trend that emerged among White émigré intellectuals in 1921 and was supported by part of the old, bourgeois intelligentsia that did not emigrate for various reasons.

A certain revival of capitalist elements in Soviet Russia following the implementation of the New Economic Policy served as the social foundation for this trend. When its adherents saw that foreign military intervention could not overthrow Soviet rule they began advocating co-operation with the Soviet government, hoping for a bourgeois regeneration of the Soviet state. They regarded the New Economic Policy as an evolution of Soviet rule towards the restoration of capitalism. Some of them were prepared loyally to co-operate with the Soviet government and promote the country's economic rejuvenation. Subsequently, most of them openly sided with the counter-revolution.

A characteristic of this trend is given by Lenin in this volume (see pp. 285-86). p. 205

[55] *Judas Golovlyov*—a landowner and main personage of M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*. He was called Judas for his bigotry, hypocrisy and callousness. The name Judas Golovlyov has become a synonym for these negative traits. p. 205

[56] This is a reference to the fable *The Eagle and the Hens* by Ivan Krylov. p. 210

[57] In the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, the Social-Democratic faction voted with the bourgeois representatives in favour of granting the imperial government war credits amounting to 5,000 million marks, thereby approving Wilhelm II's imperialist policy. p. 210

[58] This Congress, held in Moscow on March 3-7, 1922, was attended by 318 delegates representing more than half a million members of the metalworkers' union. Lenin spoke at a meeting of the Communist group at the Congress on the morning of March 6. p. 212

[59] *Oblomov*—the main personage in the novel of the same name by I. A. Goncharov. The name Oblomov has become a synonym of narrow-mindedness, stagnation and immobility. p. 214

[60] The *All-Russia Democratic Conference* was convened in September 1917 in Petrograd by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee of Soviets to decide the question of power. Actually, the conference was called with the purpose of distracting the people's attention from the mounting revolution. More than 1,500 persons attended the conference. The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders did their utmost to reduce representation from the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies and increase the number of delegates from various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois organisations and thereby ensure a majority. The Bolsheviks went to the conference to use its rostrum for exposing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The conference passed a resolution on the formation of a Pre-Parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic). This was an attempt to create the illusion that a parliamentary system had been instituted in Russia. However, the rules endorsed by the Provisional Government reduced the Pre-Parliament to the status of a consultative body. Lenin categorically insisted on a boycott of the Pre-Parliament, because to remain in it would give the impression that that body could resolve the tasks of the revolution. The Central Committee debated Lenin's suggestion and, despite the opposition of Kamenev and other capitulators, adopted a decision to recall Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament. On October 7 (20), the day the Pre-Parliament opened, the Bolsheviks made the Central Committee Declaration public and walked out. p. 219

[61] Lenin refers to the "Speech on the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government" at a sitting of the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on June 4 (17), 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 25, p. 20). p. 219

[62] *Officer cadets*—students of military academies in tsarist Russia. p. 219

[63] This is a reference to Vladimir Mayakovsky's *Incessant Meeting Sitters*. p. 223

[64] Lenin refers to words used by Engels in *Emigré Literature* (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, S. 534. Dietz Verlag. Berlin). p. 223

[65] *Istpart* (Commission for Collecting and Studying Materials on the History of the October Revolution and the History of the Russian Communist Party) was set up at the People's Commissariat of Education by a decree passed by the Council of People's Commissars on September 21, 1920. On December 1, 1921, by a decision passed by the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), Istpart became a department of the Party Central Committee. In 1928 it was merged with the Lenin Institute at the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 224

[66] *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*—a philosophical and socio-economic journal published in Moscow from January 1922 to June 1944 with the purpose of popularising materialism and atheism. p. 227

[67] *N. G. Chernyshevsky* (1828-1889)—a Russian revolutionary democrat, an outstanding predecessor of Russian Social-Democracy, economist, philosopher and writer. p. 228

[68] *Popular Socialists* were members of the petty-bourgeois Popular Socialist Labour Party, which stemmed from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1906. The Popular Socialists advocated a bloc with the Constitutional-Democrats. During the First World War they preached social-chauvinistic views.

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 the Popular Socialists actively supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, accepting portfolios in it. After the October Socialist Revolution they took part in counter-revolutionary conspiracies and in armed action against the Soviet Government. They ceased to exist as a party during the period of the foreign military intervention and the Civil War. p. 228

[69] *Josef Dietzgen* (1828-1888)—a German tannery worker, who independently arrived at dialectical materialism. p. 228

[70] See Engels, *Emigré Literature* (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, S. 532. Dietz Verlag. Berlin). p. 229

[71] Lenin borrowed this expression from *A Story of a Town* by M. Y . Saltykov-Shchedrin, the well-known Russian satirist. p. 234

[72] *Ekonomist*—a journal published in Petrograd in 1921-22 by the Department of Industry and Economy of the Russian Technical Society.

The *Russian Technical Society* was a scientific body founded in St. Petersburg in 1866. It had branches in other towns and its

purpose was to help promote industry and popularise technical knowledge.

After the October Revolution most of the Society's members who, in addition to engineers and technicians, included office employees, lawyers, merchants and former owners of industrial enterprises, were hostile to Soviet rule. The Society was closed in 1929. p. 234

[73] On March 10, 1922, E. A. Preobrazhensky's theses "Fundamental Principles of the Policy of the R.C.P. in the Present-Day Countryside", prepared by him for the Eleventh Party Congress, were circulated to all members of the Organising Bureau and the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). Lenin wrote the letter published in this volume after reading these theses. The Political Bureau discussed Preobrazhensky's theses on March 18 and endorsed the proposals formulated by Lenin in Paragraph 15 of his letter. p. 237

[74] *Poor Peasants' Committees* were instituted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in conformity with its decree "On Organising and Supplying the Village Poor" of June 11, 1918. The functions of these committees were to register the food reserves of the peasant farms, bring to light food surpluses at the kulak farms, help Soviet food organs to requisition these surpluses, supply the poor peasants with food at the expense of the kulak farms, distribute farm implements and manufactured goods, and so forth. However, their practical activities embraced all aspects of the work in the countryside and they became centres and organs of the proletarian dictatorship in the countryside. The organisation of these committees ushered in the further development of the socialist revolution in the countryside. At the end of 1918, having fulfilled their tasks, the Poor Peasants' Committees were merged with volost and village Soviets. p. 238

[75] The decree of the State Political Administration committing members of the C.C. and active members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party for trial before the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal for counter-revolutionary, terrorist acts against Soviet rule, was published on February 28, 1922. In reply to this decree, a group of Socialist-Revolutionaries living abroad and calling themselves "Delegation of Socialist-Revolutionaries Living Abroad", published an appeal "To Socialist Parties Throughout the World" in issue No. 913 of their newspaper *Golos Rossii* (Voice of Russia) (published in Berlin) on March 11, 1922. In this appeal they protested against what they alleged was a predetermined death sentence for the accused. The appeal was supported by the parties of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, and also by reformist trade unions and bourgeois intellectuals.

The document published in this volume was written in connection with telegrams sent to Lenin and Chicherin by the National Council of the Independent Labour Party of Britain, T. Stauning,

Chairman of the Danish Social-Democratic Party, E. Vandervelde, a leader of the Second International, and by the Presidium of the General German Workers' Union, who demanded that the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries be postponed until the Berlin Conference of the three Internationals.

The *trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries* was held in Moscow on June 8-August 7, 1922. Thirty-four persons were tried: members of the Central Committee and of the Moscow Bureau of the Central Committee, and individual members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party who acted on the strength of directives from that party's Central Committee. The trial fully bore out the indictment and revealed the counter-revolutionary activity of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party: conspiracies and the organisation of uprisings against Soviet rule, the murder of workers' leaders, support for the foreign intervention. The Supreme Tribunal sentenced twelve of the main accused to death. The Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorsed this sentence and ordered it to be executed if the Socialist-Revolutionary Party did not relinquish its armed struggle against Soviet rule and continued its terrorist acts and organising uprisings. Some of the accused were sentenced to imprisonment of from two to ten years. A number of the accused, who repented and exposed the criminal activities of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, were released from custody.

p. 243

[76] See Note No. 3 p. 243

[77] The reference is to the resolution on electrification adopted by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which sat on December 22-29, 1920 (see present edition, Vol. 31, p. 532). p. 246

[78] Lenin refers to the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

The *Workers' and Peasants' Inspection* was set up in February 1920 on Lenin's initiative through the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat of State Control, which began functioning in the first months after the establishment of Soviet rule. p. 247

[79] Lenin wrote this greeting at the request of *Bednota*'s editor V. A. Karpinsky.

Lenin took a keen interest in the work of this newspaper and required Karpinsky to send him regular reports on the number of letters received by the newspaper from peasants and Red Army men, on the general mood expressed in these letters and the main questions raised in them.

Bednota, whose publication was started in Moscow on March 27, 1918, was a newspaper for peasants. On February 1, 1931 it was merged with the newspaper *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye*.

p. 249

[80] This letter was discussed on March 25, 1922 at a Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), which endorsed the plan of the report proposed by Lenin. p. 251

[81] The *Narrow Council of People's Commissars* was organised in December 1917. It had the rights of a commission of the Council of People's Commissars and its task was to relieve the Council of People's Commissars of minor affairs. Its decisions had to be endorsed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 252

[82] The *Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)* was held in Moscow on March 27-April 2, 1922.

It was convened a year after the Civil War ended and the country went over to peaceful economic development. Its purpose was to sum up the results of the first year of the New Economic Policy and map out the further plan of socialist construction.

This was the last Party Congress in which Lenin participated. It was attended by 522 delegates with a casting vote and 165 delegates with a consultative voice. It discussed 1) the political report of the Central Committee, 2) the organisation report of the Central Committee, 3) the report of the Auditing Commission, 5) the report of the Central Control Commission, 5) the report of the Communist International, 6) the trade unions, 7) the Red Army, 8) the financial policy, 9) the results of the Party purge and the accompanying strengthening of the Party ranks, and the co-reports on work with young people and on the press and propaganda, and 10) elections to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.

Lenin opened the Congress, delivered the political report of the R.C.P.(B.), a closing speech on the report and a speech closing the Congress. p. 259

[83] Here Lenin refers to Mátyás Rakosi's article "The New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia, which analyses Otto Bauer's pamphlet "*Der neue Kurs*" *in Sowjetrussland* ("The New Policy" in Soviet Russia), published in Vienna in 1921. Rakosi's article appeared in March 22 in the magazine *Communist International*, No. 20.

Communist International, organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, was published in Russian, German, French, English, Spanish and Chinese. The first issue was put out on May 1, 1919. Publication was stopped in June 1943 following the decision of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee of May 15, 1943 to dissolve the Communist International. p. 282

[84] Lenin has in mind the struggle waged abroad between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. p. 282

[85] The Commission for Mixed Companies under the Council of Labour and Defence. This Commission was set up by a decision of the

Council of Labour and Defence on February 15, 1922. Its Chairman was Sokolnikov. p. 283

[86] The *Northern Timber Trust* was a special administrative body of the timber industry of the North White Sea area. It was established in 1921. p. 283

[87] *Persuader-in-Chief* was the nickname given by the soldiers to A. F. Kerensky, then the War and Navy Minister of the Provisional Government, for trying to persuade the soldiers to start an offensive when he toured the front in the summer of 1917. This attempt was made on orders from the Anglo-French imperialists and the Russian bourgeoisie. p. 284

[88] Alexander Todorsky's book *A Year With a Rifle and a Plough* was published in 1918 by the Vesyegonsk Uyezd Executive Committee of Soviets, Tver Gubernia. Lenin speaks of this book in his article "A Little Picture in Illustration of Big Problems" (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 386-89). p. 289

[89] The *Central Verification Commission* was set up on June 25, 1921 by the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) to direct the work of local verification commissions during the period of the Party purge. It consisted of five men. p. 305

[90] At the Congress E. A. Preobrazhensky suggested that another organ of the Central Committee, an Economic Bureau, should be set up in addition to the Political Bureau and the Organising Bureau.

He accused the Central Committee of violating that part of the Party Programme dealing with bourgeois specialists, which stated that while creating a comradely atmosphere for the work of these people and showing concern for their material welfare no political concessions should be made to them and their counter-revolutionary impulses should be curbed. He alleged that the C.C. had made a political concession to the professors who had taken part in the strikes at institutions of higher learning in Moscow, Kazan, Petrograd and other cities in 1921-22. One of their basic demands was that the new Rules of Institutions of Higher Learning, drawn up by the Central Administration of Vocational and Political Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning and endorsed in the autumn of 1921 by the Council of People's Commissars, should be revised. They objected to the Workers Faculties at institutions of higher learning and to the procedure, laid down in the new Rules, of forming the boards of these institutions with the participation of representatives of the students, trade unions and the Central Administration of Vocational and Political Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning. They demanded that the latter right be transferred to the teachers' boards, and also made a number of economic demands. The Central Administration of Vocational and Political Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning, which was at that time

headed by Preobrazhensky, made the mistake of insisting on stern measures, including detention, against the striking instructors. The same stand was taken by the Communist cells and Workers' Faculties of some institutions of higher learning.

The Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) took this question up several times. In view of the need for a flexible approach to specialists, it rectified the mistake of the Central Administration of Vocational and Political Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning, instructing A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Pokrovsky and other leading officials of the People's Commissariat of Public Education to examine the teachers' demands and, without making any fundamental, political concessions, to reach agreement with them. In February 1922 the Political Bureau set up a commission consisting of representatives of the People's Commissariat of Public Education, the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Public Education Workers and teachers to examine the economic position of institutions of higher learning and recognise the need or new Rules of Institutions of Higher Learning. After repeated conferences between the teachers and the commission, and a number of other measures that were taken by the People's Commissariat of Public Education on instructions from the Party C.C., the strikes were stopped. p. 313

[91] J. V. Stalin was People's Commissar of Nationalities from the time the People's Commissariat of Nationalities was set up on October 26 (November 8), 1917 to its dissolution in July 1923. As from March 1919, he was also People's Commissar of State Control, and after the reorganisation of this Commissariat in February 1920, he was People's Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection until April 25, 1922. p. 315

[92] N. Osinsky (V. V. Obolensky), speaking at the Congress, proposed that a "Cabinet" of Commissars be set up. His suggestion was that it should be formed not by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee but unilaterally by its Chairman, who would be responsible to A.R.C.E.C.

While Osinsky spoke Lenin made the following entry in his notebook: "(*Set up a cabinet!*) one member should form the Cabinet" (*Lenin Miscellany XIII*, 1930, p. 22). p. 317

[93] At the Congress Y. Larin alleged that an authorised body of the State Planning Commission had proposed that at the Genoa Conference the Soviet delegation should offer to lease (as a concession) three-quarters of the country's railways, the Petrograd-Rybinsk waterway, the iron and steel plants in the Urals with a railway network of 3,000 versts, and the power engineering industry.

This allegation was refuted by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky. p. 319

[94] The *Debating Club* at the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) was organised in August 1921. Similar clubs were opened in various parts of Moscow. They debated Party and Soviet development, the

Soviet Republic's economic policy and other problems. However, the Debating Club soon began to be used by opposition groups as a forum for propagandising their views.

On February 20,1922, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) examined the question of the Debating Club on the basis of a report from the Central Control Commission and instructed the Moscow Committee to reconsider the composition of the Club's board and to organise its work in conformity with the Party's tasks. p. 320

[95] See present volume, pp. 237-42. p. 321

[96] This anti-Party statement was sent on February 26, 1922 to the Presidium of the Extended Plenary Meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee by a group of members of the former Workers' Opposition (A. G. Shlyapnikov, S. P. Medvedyev, A. M. Kollontai, G. I. Myasnikov and others, which continued to exist as a faction despite the resolution "On Party Unity" passed by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). The statement claimed that "matters were unsatisfactory with regard to a united front in our country", that the leading Party bodies were ignoring the requirements and interests of the workers and that a split was impending in the Party.

The Comintern Executive Committee appointed a commission consisting of Clara Zetkin, Marcel Cachin, Jacob Friis, Vasil Kolarov, Karl Krejbich, Umberto Terracini and Arthur McManus to look into the Statement of the Twenty-Two. On March 4, on the basis of the report of this commission, a Plenary Meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee, with four abstentions, passed a resolution rejecting the accusations in the statement and censured the stand of the twenty-two as running counter to the decisions of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) appointed a commission of 19 persons to examine the Statement of the Twenty-Two. On April 2, on the basis of the report of this commission, a closed session of the Congress adopted a special resolution "On Certain Members of the Former Workers' Opposition", in which it stigmatised the anti-Party behaviour of members of the Workers' Opposition group, and warned the leaders of the group that they would be expelled from the Party if they renewed their factional activity. p. 321

[97] On a motion proposed by Lenin, the joint sitting of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on August 9, 1921, examined the question of expelling A. Shlyapnikov from the Central Committee and from the Party for anti-Party activity. p. 322

[98] In Motovilikha District, Perm Gubernia, G. I. Myasnikov organised an anti-Party group which opposed the Party's policy. On July 29, 1921, the Organising Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

examined Myasnikov's statements in the Perm organisation, found that they were directed against the Party and set up a commission to investigate Myasnikov's activities. On August 22, acting on the basis of the report of this commission, the Organising Bureau found Myasnikov's theses incompatible with Party interests, prohibited him from speaking of his theses at official Party meetings, recalled him from the Perm organisation and placed him at the disposal of the Central Committee. Myasnikov disobeyed the Central Committee, returned to Motovilikha and continued his anti-Party activities. At the same time, he tried to organise an anti-Party group in Petrograd. After investigating his activities, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) commission proposed that he should be expelled from the Party for repeated violations of Party discipline and for organising a special anti-Party group in defiance of the Tenth Party Congress decision on Party unity. On February 20, 1922, the Political Bureau approved the commission's decision on Myasnikov's expulsion from the Party, with the provision that he should have the right to apply for Party membership in a year (see *Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). Verbatim Report*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 748-49). p. 323

[99] See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 504-09. p. 323

[100] The suggestions made in Lenin's letter were used as the basis for the Eleventh Party Congress resolution "On Work in the Countryside". The Congress instructed the Central Committee to set up a permanent commission at the C.C. to direct work in the countryside. p. 327

[101] Workers' uprisings broke out in March 1922 in Johannesburg, Benoni and Brakpan in South Africa.

In order to preserve their profits following the drop of the price of gold in the world market, the owners of the goldfields began lowering the wages of European workers and discharging them en masse. On January 9, 1922, this provoked a strike in the goldfields. In March the strike developed into an uprising. The workers seized the towns of Benoni and Brakpan, and two workers' suburbs (Fordsburg and Geppestown) of Johannesburg. The then young Communist Party of South Africa was active in the uprising. Many Communists heroically sacrificed their lives during the armed struggle. On March 10, the reactionary government of General Smuts declared the above towns in a state of siege, and brought in troops, artillery and aircraft. On March 14, the uprising was suppressed and more than 10,000 persons were arrested. Thousands of workers were tried by military tribunals. p. 331

[102] This decree was the result of extensive work by Lenin, who drew up new rules covering the functions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence.

A. D. Tsyurupa and A. I. Rykov, Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, helped to draft the decree. p. 335

[103] This book (*Documents on the History of Franco-Russian Relations for 1910-14*) was published by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1922. Changes were made in it on the basis of suggestions from Lenin. p. 344

[104] Lenin's pamphlet *Old Articles on Almost New Subjects. On the Question of the New Economic Policy* (*Two Articles and a Speech, 1918*) was published in 1922 by the Moscow branch of the State Publishing House. The pamphlet included the Preface to the 1922 Edition, the article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government", report on the immediate tasks of the Soviet Government at the session of the All-Russia C.E.C. on April 29, 1918, and the article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 235-77, 281-305, 323-54). p. 345

[105] See present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 306-13. p. 346

[106] *Iskra* (old) was the first Russian illegal Marxist newspaper. Founded by Lenin in 1900, it played the decisive role in the formation of a revolutionary Marxist party of the working class of Russia.

Soon after the Second Party Congress (1903), control of the newspaper was seized by Menshevik opportunists. With the publication of its 52nd issue *Iskra* ceased to be an organ of revolutionary Marxism. p. 349

[107] Lenin refers to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held on July 17-August 10 (July 30-August 23), 1903. The first thirteen sessions took place in Brussels. Owing to police persecution, the Congress was moved to London. p. 351

[108] Here Lenin means the cash collections that were undertaken by workers for their newspaper *Pravda*. p. 351

[109] One of the bullets that struck Lenin during the assassination attempt on August 30, 1918, was removed on April 23, 1922 at the Soldatenkovskaya Hospital (now the Botkin Hospital). p. 353

[110] The treaty signed by Soviet Russia and Germany on April 16, 1922 at Rapallo (near Genoa) at the time of the Genoa Conference.

Under this treaty the signatories renounced all claims arising from the First World War. On the condition that the Soviet Government would not meet similar claims of other states, the German Government renounced its demand for the return to former German owners of enterprises nationalised by the Soviet Government. At the same time the two countries established diplomatic relations and most favoured nation treatment in economic questions.

The signing of the Rapallo Treaty was a major achievement of Soviet diplomacy. It strengthened the Soviet state's international position and wrecked the attempts to form a united anti-Soviet front. This treaty showed the Soviet Government's desire to normalise relations with bourgeois states solely on the basis of recognition of the equality of the two systems of ownership. p. 357

[111] The revised draft Criminal Code, in which Lenin's recommendations were used for Articles 57, 58, 61 and 70, was examined and endorsed by the Third Session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee (May 12-26, 1922). p. 358

[112] Lenin wrote this letter in connection with the drawing up of the Rules of the Procurator's office. On May 24, 1922 the Political Bureau discussed Lenin's letter and accepted the recommendations in it. On May 26, acting on the report of the special commission, the Third Session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee approved the Rules in accordance with Lenin's recommendations. p. 363

[113] The *Fifth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions* was held in Moscow on September 17-22, 1922. It was attended by 970 delegates representing 5,100,000 trade union members . The Congress elected Lenin an honorary member of its presidium. Lenin's letter was read at the first sitting on September 17, 1922. The Congress sent Lenin greetings in reply. p. 370

[114] This Congress was held in Moscow on October 11-17, 1922. It elected Lenin its honorary chairman. Lenin's greetings were read at the first (ceremonial) sitting on October 11. In their greetings in reply, the Y.C.L.ers pledged themselves to surmount all the difficulties standing in the way of the working class and its youth, and asked for help in the communist education of young people. p. 374

[115] This letter was written after the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), at its October 6, 1922 sitting, which Lenin did not attend, acted on a report by G. Y. Sokolnikov and passed a decision to relax the monopoly of foreign trade.

Lenin disagreed with this decision, holding that it would wreck that monopoly.

In his letter to the C.C., R.C.P. (B.), the first part of which was written on October 12 and the postscript on October 13, he showed that the decision on foreign trade was wrong and proposed postponing a decision on this question for two months, until the next Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee.

On October 13, the Central Committee Secretariat sent the members of the C.C. the letter from Lenin and also the Theses of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade on the Foreign Trade System drawn up by L. B. Krasin. The members of the C.C.,

with few exceptions, supported Lenin's recommendations. N. I. Bukharin, for example, wrote to Stalin on October 15, trying to give grounds for the demand to annul the foreign trade monopoly. Stalin wrote to members of the Central Committee: "Comrade Lenin's letter has not persuaded me that the decision of the C.C. Plenary Meeting of October 6 on foreign trade was wrong.... Nonetheless, in view of Comrade Lenin's insistence that fulfilment of the C.C. Plenary Meeting decision be delayed, I shall vote *for* a postponement so that the question may be again raised for discussion at the next Plenary Meeting which Comrade Lenin will attend." On October 16, on the basis of a questionnaire proposed by Lenin, the members of the Central Committee, by fourteen votes against one, decided to postpone a decision on this question until the next Plenary Meeting. p. 375

[116] The *All-Russia Congress of Financial Workers* was held in Moscow on October 22-28, 1922. Lenin was elected honorary chairman. His letter was read on October 22. p. 379

[117] The *Friends of Soviet Russia* (*in the United States*) was founded in June 1921. It had over 200 local organisations, each of which had an Executive Committee or Committee of Action, which was directly linked up with the Society's National Executive. The National Executive and the Consultative Committee directed all organisational and propaganda work and also concentrated all cash donations into a single fund. The aim of the Society was to help the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia, tell the people of the U.S.A. the truth about Soviet Russia and secure the lifting of the U.S. economic blockade of Russia.

In May 1922, the Society sent to Russia a tractor team, which began working at the Toikino State Farm, Sarapul Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, on July 17. The team did much to raise production at the state farm and to show the peasants the advantages of large-scale farming with machines.

On Lenin's recommendation, Toikino was recognised as a model farm by the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 9, 1922.

Lenin's letter was translated into English and printed on November 15, 1922 in the magazine Soviet Russia, which was published in New York by Russian workers' organisations in the U.S.A. p. 380

[118] The *Society for Technical Aid for Soviet Russia* was organised by Russian émigrés in New York in May 1919. Similar societies sprang up elsewhere in the U.S.A. and also in Canada. These societies were founded with the active participation of Americans and Canadians. Their purpose was to help Soviet Russia restore her economy by sending skilled workers and technicians from the U.S.A. and Canada.

The work of the societies for Technical Aid for Soviet Russia and of Friends of Soviet Russia (in the United States) was

evaluated by Lenin as a striking manifestation of proletarian internationalism and fraternal solidarity among working people.

Lenin's letter was translated into English and printed in December 1922 in the magazine *Soviet Russia*, which was published in New York by Russian workers' organisations in the U.S.A. p. 381

[119] Lenin sent his telegram of greetings to the liberated Primorye Territory on the occasion of the liberation of Vladivostok on October 25, 1922, by troops of the Far Eastern Republic, who acted jointly with guerillas in clearing out the whiteguards and Japanese interventionists. In their reply, the working people of Primorye Territory sent greetings to the Soviet Government and thanked it for its assistance. p. 382

[120] The *Far Eastern Republic* was established in April 1920. It embraced the Trans-Baikal Area, Amur, Primorye and Kamchatka regions, and the northern part of the Sakhalin Island. The formation of this "buffer" state as a bourgeois-democratic republic that pursued an essentially Soviet policy suited the interests of Soviet Russia, which sought to secure a prolonged respite on the Eastern Front and avoid war with Japan.

On November 14, 1922, after the interventionists and the whiteguards were driven out of the Far East (with the exception of the northern part of the Sakhalin Island), the People's Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic passed a decision to unite with the R.S.F.S.R. p. 382

[121] Edouard Herriot, leader of the Radical Socialist Party, member of Parliament and Mayor of Lyons, visited Russia unofficially on September 20-October 10, 1922. He toured the country with the aim of elucidating economic and political possibilities for establishing relations between France and the R.S.F.S.R. p. 383

[122] The Lausanne Conference, which took place on November 20, 1922-July 24, 1923. p. 385

[123] The Versailles Peace Treaty. p. 386

[124] Talks on the leasing of a mining concession in the Urals and Siberia were held with John Leslie Urquhart, a leading British industrialist. During the discussion of the draft agreement, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev insisted on the acceptance of the fettering terms proposed by Urquhart. On October 6, 1922, the Council of People s Commissars rejected the draft agreement with Urquhart because of the hostile policy of the British Government towards Soviet Russia and the shackling terms of the agreement. p. 387

[125] The *Fourth Session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee* was held on October 23-31, 1922. Lenin spoke at the closing sitting. p. 390

[126] The Decree on Land adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 258-60). p. 392

[127] *Petrogradskaya Pravda*—a daily newspaper which started publication on April 2, 1918 as the organ of the Central and Petrograd Committees of the R.C.P.(B.). In January 1924 the newspaper's name was changed to *Leningradskaya Pravda*. p. 396

[128] The *First International Conference of Communist Co-operators* took place in Moscow on November 1-6, 1922. It was attended by representatives from Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, the Far Eastern Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, the R.S.F.S.R., Sweden, Switzerland and the Ukraine.

The cardinal question before the conference was that of the tactics of Communists in the co-operative movement. The resolution adopted by the conference rejected the principle that co-operatives should be neutral in politics and underlined the need for establishing a close bond between co-operative work and the political and economic tasks of the proletariat, and for carrying on this work in closer co-operation with Communist Parties and revolutionary trade unions. The conference elected Lenin its honorary chairman and sent him greetings. Lenin's greetings in reply were read on November 2, 1922. p. 398

[129] The *Fourth All-Russia Congress of Statisticians* was held in Moscow on November 3-12, 1922. Lenin was elected honorary chairman of the Congress and sent a telegram of greetings. His reply was read at the second sitting on November 5. p. 399

[130] Arthur Ransome, *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, came to Soviet Russia in October 1922 with the express purpose of interviewing Lenin. On October 26 he was asked to write down the questions that he wanted answered. On the next day Ransome wrote seven questions which he sent to Lenin.

Lenin received Ransome in the evening of November 3. They spoke of the parliamentary elections in Britain and the fascist coup in Italy, but mostly the talk was around the questions submitted by Ransome. Lenin said that he had not yet answered all the questions, but promised to do so before Ransome left the country. On Sunday, November 5, Lenin wrote his answers to all of Ransome's seven questions. p. 400

[131] Lenin and his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya lived in London from April 1902 to April 1903. The friend that Lenin mentions is K. M. Takhtarev, a Social-Democrat, member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and one of the leaders of Economism.

The *Economists* were representatives of an opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement of the close of the

19th and beginning of the 20th century. The Economists incorrectly assessed the relation between economics and politics and belittled the role of the political revolutionary struggle. They said that the working class should confine itself to an economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions and so forth, maintaining that the political struggle was a matter for the liberal bourgeoisie. They rejected the idea that the party of the working class plays the leading role, that socialist political consciousness must be brought into the working-class movement. They thereby cleared the road for bourgeois ideology. Economism held out the threat of steering the proletariat away from the road of revolution and making it politically dependent on the bourgeoisie. This trend was completely routed ideologically by Lenin. p. 400

[132] On October 24, 1922, the Council of People's Commissars passed a decision to put into circulation banknotes dated 1923. Under the new decision, signed by Lenin, one 1923 ruble was equal to a million rubles of the banknotes that had been removed from circulation or one hundred 1922 rubles. p. 402

[133] This conference was held on November 6, 1922. It was attended by over 2,000 delegates.

Lenin handed his letter of greetings to the delegates who were sent to him to ask him to speak at the conference. p. 410

[134] In August 1922 the workers of this factory requested the Moscow Soviet to name their factory after Lenin. This request was granted on September 9, 1922. In connection with the renaming of the factory and the approaching fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, a general meeting of workers decided to hold a rally on November 7. The workers invited Lenin to attend the rally.

Unable to do so because of his illness, Lenin wrote this letter. p. 411

[135] Lenin's letter of greetings to the workers and employees of the Elektroperedacha Power Station (now the Klasson Station, named after the engineer who built it) was written in reply to an invitation to speak at the opening of the club on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution. p. 412

[136] This letter was written in reply to greetings from the Stodol Mill workers of November 3, 1922, when the mill was named after Lenin. Together with greetings, the workers sent Lenin a gift—a suit-length made at the mill. p. 413

[137] The *Fourth Congress of the Communist International* took place on November 5-December 5, 1922. It opened in Petrograd and then, from November 9 onwards, the sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by 408 delegates, 343 of whom had a casting vote, representing 58 Communist organisations in various countries. Also present were representatives of the Italian Socialist Party,

the Iceland Workers' Party, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the Young Communist International, the Profintern, the International Women's Secretariat, the International Workers' Aid and U.S. Negro Organisation. The Congress endorsed the theses on a united workers' front, drawn up by the R.C.P.(B.), approved the theses on the tactics of the Communist International, on the tasks of Communists in the trade union movement, and on the Eastern question, and adopted a resolution on the socialist revolution in Russia, on the Young Communist International and other questions.

Lenin read his report "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution" in German at the morning sitting on November 13. p. 415

[138] Lenin refers to the article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 323-54). p. 418

[139] This expression was used in Ivan Turgenev's *Rudin* by Pigasov, who was a woman-hater. Refusing to credit women with the ability to think logically, Pigasov maintained: A man may, for example, say that twice two make not four but five or three and a half; but a woman will say that twice two make a tallow candle." p. 429

[140] *Black Hundreds* were monarchist gangs that were formed by the tsarist police to combat the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and organised Jewish pogroms. p. 431

[141] The *All-Russia Agricultural Exhibition* was, according to a decision of the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, scheduled to open in the autumn of 1922. However, on account of the large volume of work that went into organising the exhibition and into surmounting the consequences of a crop failure, the opening was postponed until 1923. Great importance was attached to the foreign section at the exhibition, and many foreign businessmen were eager to take part in it. In the press it was emphasised that the exhibition "must be not only Russian but also, to some extent, international".

The First Agricultural and Crafts Exhibition in the Soviet Union was opened in Moscow on August 19, 1923. Lenin took a keen interest in the exhibition. On October 19, during his last stay in Moscow, Lenin drove across the territory of the exhibition despite being gravely ill. p. 433

[142] The *Clarté* group of progressive writers and cultural workers was organized by Henri Barbusse in 1919 on the basis of *l'Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants*. Similar groups were set up in other countries, and together they formed the War Veterans International, whose main motto was: War on war. The *Clarté*

group included supporters of the Third International—Henri Barbusse, Anatole France, Paul Vaillant-Couturier—and pacifist writers—Romain Rolland, Stefan Zweig, H. G. Wells, Themas Hardy, Upton Sinclair, Jules Romain, and others. The group published a monthly magazine of the same name (in Paris from October 1919 to January 1928), which in its first years was quite popular in France and abroad. However, the ideological disagreements within the group and its organisational weakness did not permit it to become a large and influential organization. Soon after Barbusse resigned as editor (in April 1924), the magazine lost its progressive significance. It ceased publication in 1928 and the group disintegrated. p. 434

[143] Lenin spoke at the Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet, which held a joint sitting with all the district Soviets in Moscow, in the evening of November 20,1922. This was his last public speech. p. 435

[144] The decision adopted by the People's Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic on November 14, 1922, to join the R.S.F.S.R. This decision was published on November 15, 1922. The full text of the decision was published in the newspapers on November 21, 1922, after Lenin had made his speech. p. 436

[145] The *Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Soviet Employees' Union* was held in Moscow on November 16-21, 1922. Lenin was elected an honorary delegate to the congress by the Sixth Tver Gubernia Congress of the Soviet Employees' Union. Electing Lenin its honorary chairman, the Fifth All-Russia Congress sent him a message of greetings. p. 444

[146] The *Fourth All-Russia Educational Workers' Congress* took place in Moscow on November 21-26, 1922. It elected Lenin its honorary chairman and sent him a message of greetings. Lenin's reply was read at the morning sitting on November 26. p. 445

[147] The *Third Congress of the Young Communist International* took place in Moscow on December 4-16, 1922. It was attended by 121 delegates from 38 youth organisations in different countries. Lenin's letter of greetings was read at the opening session. The congress sent him a message in reply. p. 446

[148] The *Hague International Peace Congress*, December 10-15, 1922, was convened by the Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions as a result of pressure brought to bear by the working class with the purpose of combating the threat of another world war. The Soviet delegation, invited to the congress on the demand of revolutionary trade unions and co-operatives in face of the resistance of the opportunist majority at the congress, set forth the tasks of the proletariat with regard to war. It spoke in the spirit of the instructions given to it by Lenin. The congress

rejected the programme of action proposed by the Soviet delegation. p. 447

[149] This article was written at the request of the Party History Commission for a special volume dedicated to the revolutionary activity of N. Y. Fedoseyev. Fedoseyev wrote a number of Marxist works directed against the Narodniks, primarily against N. K. Mikhailovsky. The correspondence with Fedoseyev mentioned by Lenin has not been found. p. 452

[150] *Emancipation of Labour* was the first Russian Marxist group. It was formed in Switzerland in 1883 by G. V. Plekhanov. The group did much to popularise Marxism in Russia. p. 452

[151] *Russkoye Bogatstvo*—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to mid-1918. Early in the 1890s it became the organ of liberal Narodniks. It preached conciliation with the tsarist government and was savagely opposed to Marxism and the Russian Marxists. p. 452

[152] Lenin went to Vladimir at the beginning of October 1893 with the intention of meeting N. Y. Fedoseyev. p. 452

[153] The *Seventh All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets* was held in Kharkov on December 10-14, 1922. One of its principal decisions, adopted on the basis of a report delivered by M. V. Frunze, was on the union federation of the Soviet republics. Lenin's telegram was read at the opening session on December 10. The congress elected Lenin an honorary member of the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee and sent him a telegram of greetings in reply. p. 454

[154] On October 16, 1922 (see Note No. 115), the Central Committee decided that the question of the monopoly on Foreign trade would be re-examined at a Plenary Meeting of December 15 (then the date of the meeting was postponed to December 18). Lenin had prepared carefully for the meeting.

However, on December 13, Lenin's illness took a turn for the worse and he was not permitted to work by his doctors. Unable to take part in the C.C. Plenary Meeting, he wrote this letter of December 13, in which he analysed and rejected Bukharin's arguments against the monopoly of foreign trade in a letter to the Central Committee of October 15, 1922.

The December Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee unanimously passed a decision revoking the decision of the preceding Plenary Meeting held in October, and confirmed that it was "unquestionably necessary to preserve and organisationally strengthen the foreign trade monopoly". Nonetheless Lenin attached such great importance to the question of the monopoly of foreign trade that he intended to speak about it to the Communist group at the forthcoming Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and to bring it up for discussion at the Twelfth Party Congress.

Acting on Lenin's instructions, the Twelfth Party Congress which was held on April 17-25, 1923, examined the question of the foreign trade monopoly. Its resolution, passed on the report of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), stated: "The Congress categorically affirms that the monopoly of foreign trade is immutable and that no one is permitted to bypass it or to waver in implementing it. The new Central Committee is instructed to take systematic measures to strengthen and promote the monopoly of foreign trade" (*KPSS v resolyutsiakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsi i plenumov Ts.K.* [C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings], Part I, 1954, p. 682). p. 455

[155] When Lenin's health deteriorated his doctors ordered him to move to Gorki, a suburb of Moscow. p. 460

[156] The *Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets*, which opened in Moscow on December 23, 1922. It was attended by 2,215 delegates, of whom 488 were representatives from the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lenin was elected honorary chairman. A message of greetings to Lenin was adopted amidst stormy applause and the singing of *The Internationale*.

The Congress discussed the report of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the home and foreign policy of the Soviet Republic, and also the reports of the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Education, the People's Commissariat of Finance and the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. Fully endorsing the work of the Soviet Government, the Congress passed decisions mapping out a series of measures aimed at further promoting industry, agriculture and finances. On December 26 the Congress heard a report on the unification of the Soviet republics, and on the next day, at its last sitting, it passed a decision on this question, finding it necessary to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Moreover, the Congress adopted an address to all the peoples of the world, in which on behalf of the workers and peasants of Russia it solemnly reaffirmed its desire for peace and called upon the working people of all countries to combine their efforts with those of the peoples of the Soviet Union in order to secure peace and save mankind from monstrous wars of extermination. p. 460

[157] Due to a further deterioration of his health, Lenin was unable to attend the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 460

[158] Lenin refers to his article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 323-54). p. 472

[159] This, evidently, is a reference to the Paris Commune as a supremely flexible political system in Marx's *The Civil War in France*

(see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in 2 Volumes*, Vol. I, pp. 473-90) and the high appraisal of the "flexibility of the Parisians" given by Marx in a letter to L. Kugelmann on April 12, 1871 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works in 2 Volumes*, Vol. II, pp. 463-64) p. 476

[160] Lenin has in mind the following excerpt from a letter from Marx to Engels on April 16, 1856: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War. Then the affair will be splendid" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, p. 92) p. 476

[161] This article and its continuation, *Better Fewer, But Better*, were written by Lenin for the Twelfth Party Congress.

The decisions adopted by that Congress, April 17-25, 1923, took into account all of the instructions in Lenin's last articles and letters. It passed a special resolution "On the Tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Central Control Commission" and also a decision on amalgamating these two bodies. p. 481

[162] The power project on the Volkhov River was the first of the large hydropower stations in the Soviet Union. Construction on this project was started in 1918, but the work really got under way only in 1921, after the Civil War. The station became operational in 1926. p. 501

THE LIFE AND WORK
OF
V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*August 1921-January 1924*)

1921

August 16 and September 1	Lenin writes to the Central Statistical Board, instructing it on the organisation of current industrial and agricultural statistics.
August 20	Lenin writes the article "New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise".
August 31	Lenin instructs the Commission for the Hydraulic Extraction of Peat to check up on the invention of an industrial method of dehydrating peat.
August-September	Lenin directs the preparations for the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Electrical Engineers.
August-December	Lenin instructs the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Railways, the People's Commissariat of Finance, the People's Commissariat of Food and other People's Commissariats to provide the Kashira and Volkhov power projects with labour and all the necessary materials.
September 1	Lenin writes a letter to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* on the newspaper's basic tasks in dealing with economic problems.
September 3	In a letter to the People's Commissariat of Justice Lenin instructs it on measures to combat bureaucracy.
September 6	Lenin writes a letter to the Statistical Department of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), instructing it how to keep an account of the distribution of leading Party cadres working in the Soviet apparatus.
September 15	Lenin submits to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) a draft circular on the procedure of giving recommendations in connection with the Party purge.
September 19	Lenin talks with representatives of U.S. workers, who came to Russia with the purpose of rendering production and technical aid; he writes a letter

to V. V. Kuibyshev, Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), instructing him to organise a production colony for them in the Kuznetsk Basin.

September 20 Lenin writes the article "Purging the Party".

September 27 Lenin writes the letter "Tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and How They Are to Be Understood and Fulfilled".

September 30 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence commission on the supply of fuel to the railways.

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: the plan of distributing grain reserves for 1921-22; the measures to rehabilitate and develop the Donbas coal industry and the Baku and Grozny oil industries; land improvement at the state farms in Moscow Gubernia, and other questions.

October 4 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: measures to be taken to collect the tax in kind; the procedure and time-limit for putting the new ruble in circulation; the institution of the State Bank of the R.S.F.S.R., and other questions.

October 8 Lenin writes a greeting "To the Presidium of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Electrical Engineers".

Lenin directs the work of the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), which discusses: the financial policy; commodity exchange and co-operatives; the Party purge; the registration of responsible workers and the procedure for their distribution (Lenin submits a draft proposal); the People's Commissariat of Public Education; the Comintern; and the international situation.

Lenin writes directives of the Political Bureau on giving factories in the Ukraine land for sowing sugar-beet.

October 14 Lenin writes the article "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution".

October 17 Lenin delivers a report on "The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments" to the Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Departments.

Lenin instructs the People's Commissariat of Finance to prepare for a monetary reform.

October 21 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: Lenin's draft "Atlas of Diagrams for the Council of Labour and Defence" with statistics on industry, agriculture, transport and so forth; a loan to the Azerbaijanian Soviet Republic for land improvement in Mugan; the Murmansk and Petrograd ports, and other questions.

October 22 Lenin witnesses the testing of an electric plough at the experiment farm of the Moscow Zootechnical Institute at Butyrsky Khutor.

October 24 Lenin sends N. A. Semashko, People's Commissar of Public Health, directives on the procedure of holding a household sanitary week and demands exemplary cleanliness in Moscow.

October 29 Lenin reports on the New Economic Policy to the Seventh Moscow Gubernia Party Conference and delivers the closing speech.

November 3 Lenin instructs the Narrow Council of People's Commissars urgently to examine the draft agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic.

November 4 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: the work of the State Planning Commission departments on dividing Russia up into districts; the order for turbines for the Volkhov Power Station; the Kara Sea Expedition, and other questions.

November 5 Lenin writes the article "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism".

Lenin receives a delegation from the Mongolian People's Republic.

November 6 Lenin speaks at a meeting of the Prokhorov Textile Mills workers held to mark the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution.

November 7 Lenin speaks at a meeting of working men and women, Red Army men an young people of Khamovniki District, Moscow, held to mark the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution.

Lenin speaks at a workers' meeting at the Elektrosila Plant No. 3 (formerly Dynamo Plant) held to mark the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution.

November 10 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: an improvement of the living conditions of scientists; the tariff policy, and other questions.

Lenin receives Wilhelm Pieck and Fritz Heckert and discusses with them the situation in the German Communist Party.

November 16 Lenin writes the preface to the pamphlet "The Problem of the New Economic Policy".

Not earlier than November 17 Lenin sends greetings to the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijanian Soviet Republic on the occasion of the opening of the Azerbaijanian State Bank.

November 18 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: the financial plan and the emission plan for 1922 (Lenin submits additions to the draft decision); the composition of the commission for the systematisation of legislation in the sphere of the New Economic Policy, and other questions.

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: the commissioning of the Kashira Power Station; the reserve food stocks, and other questions.

November 23 Lenin instructs the State Planning Commission to take steps to accelerate the building and commissioning of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Power Station.

November 25 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: the mining, and gold and platinum industries; the switchover of the oil industry to a self-supporting basis; stepping up the work at the Urals and Siberian mines; supplies to miners in the Moscow Basin, and other questions.

November 28 Lenin writes a letter to A. D. Tsyurupa, setting forth a plan of work for the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence.

November 29 Lenin speaks at the First Moscow Gubernia Agricultural Congress.

November 30 Lenin signs a decision of the Council of Labour and Defence on organising a tree seed fund to ensure the planting of forests, fixing sands and ravines and setting up snow-retention zones.

December 5 Lenin writes a letter (in English) to American comrades, requesting them to inform him of their opinion of his book *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One, Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America* and asking them to send him the official publication of the U.S. census for 1920.

December 6 Lenin writes a letter to Maxim Gorky, asking him to request Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells to take part in organising aid for the famine-stricken in Russia.

Lenin writes notes for the Comintern theses on a united front.

Lenin is given sick leave and moves to Gorki, a suburb of Moscow.

December 11 Lenin writes the article "The Theses on the Agrarian Question Adopted by the Communist Party of France".

December 16 Lenin instructs the People's Commissar of Public Education to set up a commission to examine the question of organising a film industry in Russia.

December 17 Lenin begins writing a report on the work of the government to the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and asks the People's Commissariats for the necessary reference materials.

December 19 Lenin writes a letter to members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on purging the Party and on the conditions of admission into the Party.

December 22 Lenin suggests that the Political Bureau draw up a special resolution for the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on the international situation.

December 23 Lenin delivers the report of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of

	People's Commissars on "The Home and Foreign Policy of the Republic" at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
December 25	Lenin writes his "Instructions on Questions of Economic Activities", which are adopted by the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 28, 1921.
December 26	Lenin attends the conference of non-Party delegates to the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, makes notes of the speeches and replies to questions by the delegates.
December 27	Lenin writes a letter to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on "British Labour Party Policy".
December 28	Lenin attends a Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
December 30-January 4, 1922	Lenin writes a draft decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on "The Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy". The draft was endorsed by the Central Committee on January 12, 1922.
December 31	Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
	The Political Bureau passes a decision to grant Lenin six weeks' leave as from January 1, 1922.

1922

January 3	Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to establish the procedure for accounting and the drawing up of balance-sheets by enterprises and offices to whom state supplies had been stopped, and for making all trade enterprises accountable to the State Bank.
Between January 9 and 12	Lenin writes the "Draft Directive of the Political Bureau on the New Economic Policy".
January 17	Lenin writes a letter to D. I. Kursky on the fundamental principles of the Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R. and on the struggle against abuses of the New Economic Policy.
January 17-March 1	Lenin lives on a state farm near the village of Kostino (near Moscow).

January 20	Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars urgently to send all the People's Commissariats the Political Bureau directive on the New Economic Policy.
January 24, February 15, 20, 21 and 27	In letters to A. D. Tsyurupa Lenin issues directives on the reorganisation of the work of the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labour and Defence and the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.
January 27	Lenin writes a letter for members of the Political Bureau, suggesting that M. I. Kalinin be sent to the Ukraine to collect food for the famine-stricken areas.
	An extraordinary session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee appoints Lenin head of the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference.
January-March	Lenin draws up the basic directives for the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference.
February 2	The Political Bureau passes a decision to prolong Lenin's leave until the Eleventh Party Congress.
February 13	Lenin writes his "Letter to G. K. Orjonikidze on the Strengthening of the Georgian Red Army".
February 15, 18, 22 and 28	Lenin writes letters to the People's Commissariat of Finance, A. D. Tsyurupa and the State Bank with instructions on the tasks of the State Bank under the New Economic Policy.
February 20 and 28	Lenin writes to D. I. Kursky, instructing him on the work of the People's Commissariat of Justice and on the drafting of the Civil Code.
February 22	Lenin writes a letter for members of the Political Bureau on the Civil Code of the R.S.F.S.R.
End of February	Lenin writes the article "Notes of a Publicist. On Ascending a High Mountain; the Harm of Despondency; the Utility of Trade; Attitude Towards the Mensheviks, etc."
March 1	In a letter to the Central Council of Co-operative Societies Lenin outlines the functions of the co-operatives under the New Economic Policy.
March 3	In a letter to members of the Political Bureau Lenin suggests rejecting Sokolnikov's proposal for

permitting the free import of food and demands decisive measures to strengthen the monopoly of foreign trade and an investigation into the delay over the purchase of tinned food abroad.

Lenin writes letters to V. M. Molotov for members of the Political Bureau in which he criticises Sokolnikov's theses for the Ninth Party Congress on the basic principles of the financial programme and proposes adopting the theses that the monopoly of foreign trade has to be strengthened.

March 6 Lenin speaks on "The International and Domestic Situation of the Soviet Republic" at a meeting of the Communist group at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Metalworkers.

March 10 Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to take steps to create normal conditions of work for the Public Library in Moscow (now the Lenin State Library).

March 12 Lenin writes the article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism" for the magazine *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*.

March 16 In a letter to the Political Bureau Lenin criticises Preobrazhensky's theses on work in the countryside and proposes to reject them; he also proposes convening a conference of delegates to the Eleventh Party Congress to study the experience of work in the countryside.

Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to request the Central Statistical Board to submit statistical reports to the Council of People's Commissars under the established time-table.

March 17 Lenin writes a draft letter to E. Vandervelde in reply to the attempt of the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals to intervene in the trial of Right Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to ensure the implementation of his directives on the promotion of the film industry and the building of a radio and telephone network.

March 18 Lenin writes a preface to I. I. Stepanov's *The Electrification of the R.S.F.S.P. and the Transitional Phase of World Economy*.

March 21

Lenin writes his "Letter to J. V. Stalin on the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence".

March 23

In a letter to the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Lenin sets forth a plan for the political report for the Eleventh Party Congress.

Lenin writes greetings to the newspaper *Bednota* on the occasion of its fourth anniversary.

March 24

Lenin submits to the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) suggestions on conditions for admitting new members to the Party.

March 26

Lenin writes a letter for members of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the C.C. Plenary Meeting decision on the conditions for admitting new members to the Party.

March 31

Lenin writes a letter to D. I. Kursky, People's Commissar of Justice, on bureaucratic practices in the Committee for Inventions.

March 27-April 2

Lenin directs the work of the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

March 27

Lenin opens the Congress and delivers the political report of the Central Committee.

March 28

Lenin delivers the closing speech on the Central Committee political report at the Congress.

April 1

Lenin writes to the Agricultural Section of the Eleventh Congress, giving directives on the draft resolution of the Congress on work in the countryside.

April 2

The Congress elects Lenin a member of the C.C., R.C.P.(B). Lenin speaks at the closing session of the Congress.

April 3

Lenin takes part in the work of the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).

Lenin submits a draft decision on the work of the C.C. Secretariat.

April 6

Lenin instructs G. M. Krzhizhanovsky to take energetic measures to promote the development of the Kursk iron-ore deposits.

April 6, 10 — In letters to V. V. Adoratsky, Lenin instructs the Marx and Engels Institute to publish selected correspondence by Marx and Engels.

April 9 — Lenin writes the article "We Have Paid Too Much".

April 11 — Lenin writes the draft "Decree on the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence".

April 12 — Lenin writes a letter to the editorial boards of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* with instructions to organise the study of local experience and popularise the achievements of the localities and local workers.

April 15 — In a letter to the Political Bureau Lenin draws attention to the slipshod publication of the book *Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnosheni za 1910-1914 gody* ("Documents on the History of Franco-Russian Relations for 1910-14").

April 23 — Lenin undergoes an operation for the removal of a bullet at the Botkin Hospital.

April 28 — Lenin writes "Preface to the pamphlet *Old Articles on Almost New Subjects*. Preface to the 1922 Edition".

Lenin sends a telegram to the workers and engineers of the Azneft Trust in Baku thanking them for their courage in localising a fire at the Surakhan oilfields.

May 2 — Lenin writes the article "On the Tenth Anniversary of *Pravda*".

Lenin writes a letter to G. Y. Sokolnikov on the proposed internal grain loan, demanding "really revolutionary measures" to strengthen the country's financial position.

May 5 — Lenin writes his "Reply to Remarks Concerning the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars" for members of the Political Bureau.

May 15 — Lenin studies the draft Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. and suggests a wider use of the death penalty for Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries engaged in counter-revolutionary activities.

May 15 or 16	Lenin draws up the "Draft Decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Delegation to the Genoa Conference"
May 16	Lenin takes part in the work of a Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).
May 17	Lenin sends D. I. Kursky, People's Commissar of Justice, a draft of an additional paragraph for the Criminal Code on the use of terror with regard to counter-revolutionary parties.
	Lenin writes a letter to the People's Commissar of Public Education, saying that the price of books had to be reduced so that they could be bought by the broad masses.
May 19	Lenin writes two letters on the promotion of radio engineering for members of the Political Bureau.
May 23-October 1	Lenin resides at Gorki near Moscow.
May 20	Lenin writes a letter to the Political Bureau on "Dual" Subordination and Legality".
May 26	Lenin has his first attack of illness.
Mid-June	There is some improvement in Lenin's health.
July 13	In a note to L. A. Fotieva, Lenin says his health is better and instructs her to send him books.
After September 10	Lenin writes the article "A Fly in the Ointment".
September 13	Lenin writes a draft letter to the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions and sends it to members of the Political Bureau.
September 12, 18	In letters for members of the Political Bureau Lenin opposes an endorsement of an agreement to lease a concession to Urquhart.
September 17	Lenin writes to the Council of People's Commissars on financial aid to the Donbas and Baku.
	Lenin sends a letter of greetings to the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Congress.

September 25 Lenin requests the People's Commissariat of Justice to inform him of the progress in preparing the Soviet Code of Laws for publication.

October 2 Lenin returns to Moscow and resumes work.

October 3 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: the wages fund for October; a one-day census of employees in Moscow; the organisation of a fish economy administration, and other questions.

October 5 Lenin attends a Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).

October 6 Lenin writes a memo to the Political Bureau on combating dominant-nation chauvinism in connection with the discussion in the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) of the question of forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Lenin signs a decision of the Council of People's Commissars rejecting the agreement to lease a concession to Urquhart.

Lenin writes a letter of greetings "To the Workers of Baku".

Lenin sends greetings to the editorial staff of *Put Molodezhi*, a newspaper published by the Bauman District Committee of the Young Communist League of Russia.

October 10 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: the code of land laws; the code of labour laws; the law on local budgets; the civil code; the rules of the judicial systems, and other questions.

Lenin sends greetings to the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Textile Workers.

October 11 Lenin sends greetings to the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist League of Russia.

October 13 Lenin writes a letter on the foreign trade monopoly.

October 17 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: the draft rules of gubernia congresses of Soviets and gubernia executive committees, the budget of the People's Commissariat of Railways, and other questions.

October 19 Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.

October 20 Lenin sends greetings to the All-Russia Congress of Financial Workers.

Lenin writes letters to the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia (in the United States) and to the Society for Technical Aid for Soviet Russia.

October 21 Lenin sends a telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia categorically demanding the adoption of measures to stop the anti-Party struggle of the Mdivani group of national-deviators.

October 24 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: the trade agreement with Finland; the civil code, and other questions.

October 26 Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.

Lenin writes greetings to the liberated Primorye Territory.

October 27 Lenin writes answers to questions from Michael Farbman, *Observer* and *Manchester Guardian* correspondent.

October 28 Lenin writes a letter on measures to be taken to help and promote the economic revival of Soviet Armenia.

October 31 Lenin speaks at the Fourth Session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, which discusses: the issue of a state lottery-loan; a subsidy for the promotion of cotton-growing in Armenia, and other questions.

November 1 Lenin sends greetings to *Petrogradskaya Pravda* on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution.

November 2 Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.

Lenin sends greetings to *Pravda* on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution.

Lenin sends greetings to the First International Conference of Communist Co-operators.

November 3 Lenin presides over a meeting of the bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International. The meeting discusses questions connected with preparations for the Congress. Lenin proposes an amendment in the draft letter of greetings "To the Fourth Congress of the Communist International and to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies".

Lenin writes greetings to textile workers in Petrograd.

Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: the report of the authorised representative of the Council of Labour and Defence on the sale of new-harvested grain; electric ploughing; the minimum wages for November 1922; the provision of funds for the Donbas; the supply of firewood to the iron and steel plants in the Urals, and other questions.

Lenin receives Arthur Ransome, *Manchester Guardian* correspondent.

November 4 Lenin sends greetings to the All-Russia Congress of Statisticians.

November 5 Lenin finishes writing his answers to questions put by Arthur Ransome.

November 6 Lenin sends greetings to the Non-Party Conference of Women Workers and Peasants of Moscow City and Moscow Gubernia.

November 6, 8 Lenin requests information on the situation in the Donbas and on the implementation of the decision on the State Seed Board.

November 7 Lenin sends greetings to the workers of the former Michelson Plant on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution.

Lenin sends greetings to the workers and employees at the State Elektroperedacha Power Station on the opening of a club on the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution.

November 8 Lenin writes greetings to the workers at the Stodol Cloth Mill in Klintsi.

November 9 Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.

November 13 Lenin delivers a report on "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution" at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International.

November 14 Lenin writes greetings to the All-Russia Agricultural Exhibition.

November 15 Lenin writes greetings to foreign writer war-veterans, who had formed the *Clarté* group in France.

Lenin writes a letter to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov on Party policy with regard to bourgeois specialists under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

November 16 Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.

November 17 Lenin presides over a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence, which discusses: the preparation of materials for the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets; measures for the sale of new-harvested grain; the financing of the coal and oil industries, and other questions.

November 18 Lenin requests information on the work and experiments of I. V. Michurin; proposes to submit to the Council of Labour and Defence the question of the irrigation system in Turkestan.

November 20 Lenin speaks on foreign and home policy at a Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet.

November 22 Lenin writes a letter to the Presidium of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Soviet Employees' Union.

November 23 Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.

November 25 Lenin asks that a letter of greetings be sent on his behalf to the Fourth All-Russia Educational Workers' Congress.

November Lenin has a series of talks with delegates to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International on the organisational pattern of Communist Parties and on the methods and content of their work.

December 1 Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to request for summary data on the state of industry for the year and on the budget of industry in connection with

	the preparations for the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
December 2	In a letter to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the International Workers' Aid Lenin appeals to the workers and working people of the whole world to launch a campaign for economic aid to Soviet Russia.
December 4	Lenin sends greetings to the Third Congress of the Young Communist International in Moscow.
	Lenin writes his "Notes on the Tasks of Our Delegation at The Hague".
December 5	Lenin writes directives on the distribution of functions between the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence.
	Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to ask the People's Commissariat of Agriculture what measures had been taken to help I. V. Michurin.
December 6	Lenin writes the article "A Few Words About N. Y. Fedoseyev".
December 7	Lenin attends a meeting of the Political Bureau.
December 7-12	Lenin lives at Gorki; he prepares for his report to the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
December 9	Lenin draws up instructions on the functions of the Deputy Chairmen and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
December 10	Lenin sends greetings to the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets.
December 12	Lenin works in his study in the Kremlin for the last time.
December 13	Lenin dictates a letter to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the foreign trade monopoly.
First half of December	Lenin prepares to speak at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, drawing up an outline of his speech.

December 15	Lenin dictates a letter to J. V. Stalin for members of the Central Committee, on the speech for the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets.
December 16	Lenin suffers the second attack of illness.
December 23	Lenin summons his secretary, dictates letters and demands books.
December 29	Lenin's doctors allow him to read.

1923

January 1, 2	Lenin dictates the article "Pages From a Diary".
January 4, 6	Lenin dictates the article "On Co-operation".
January 9, 13	Lenin dictates the first variant of the article "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection".
January 10	Lenin instructs the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars to request the Central Statistical Board to send him the figures of the census of Soviet employees.
January 16, 17	Lenin dictates the article "Our Revolution (Apropos of N. Sukhanov's Notes)".
January 19, 20 22, 23	Lenin dictates the second variant of the article "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Recommendation to the Twelfth Party Congress)" and has it sent to press.
February 2, 4 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Lenin dictates the article "Better Fewer, But Better".
March 2	Lenin looks through his article "Better Fewer, But Better" and has it sent to press.
March 9	Lenin has another attack.
May 15	Lenin is moved to Gorki.
Second half of July	Lenin's health improves.
October 19	Lenin comes to Moscow for a few hours, goes to his study. On the way back to Gorki he visits the Agricultural Exhibition.

1924

January 21, 6.50 p.m., Gorki	Lenin dies.
Night of January 21	The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) holds a Plenary Meeting in connection with Lenin's death.
January 22	M. I. Kalinin informs the Eleventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Lenin's death.
January 22-23	Members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), members of the Council of People's Commissars, delegations from the Congress of Soviets and Moscow organisations, as well as peasants from the surrounding villages come to Gorki to take their leave of Lenin.
January 23, 10-11 a.m.	The coffin with Lenin's body is carried from Gorki to the Gerasimovo (now Leninskaya) Station.
January 23, 1 p.m., Moscow	The funeral train with Lenin's body arrives in Moscow. Lenin's immediate associates carry the coffin to the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions.
January 26	The Second Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. meets in memorial session. It adopts an address "To Working Mankind" and passes decisions to rename Petrograd into Leningrad, to erect monuments to Lenin, and to publish his works.
January 23-27	Hundreds of thousands of workers, peasants, Red Army men and employees of Moscow, and delegations from the working people of all parts of the Soviet Union file in endless day and night procession through the Hall of Columns to take their leave of Lenin.
January 27, 9.20	The coffin with Lenin's body is carried from Hall of Columns to Red Square.
January 27, 4. p.m.	The coffin with Lenin's body is installed in mausoleum in Red Square.

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 33

На английскот языке

LENIN

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

34

THE RUSSIAN EDITION WAS PRINTED
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ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

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МОСКВА

V. I. LENIN

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34

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PREFACE

The thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth volumes contain Lenin's correspondence with organisations and persons—letters, telegrams and notes—during the period from 1895 to 1922.

The documents in these volumes comprise a considerable part of Lenin's correspondence and form a valuable supplement to his writings published in the preceding volumes of the *Collected Works*. These documents reflect the immense and varied activity of Lenin in building up the Bolshevik Party, a party of a new type, his irreconcilable struggle against opportunists of all shades, his struggle for the proletarian revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, his leadership of the world's first Soviet socialist state.

Volume 34 includes letters of Lenin written in the period from November 1895 to November 1911.

The letters of 1895-1901 reflect Lenin's activities in building up the Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia, his struggle against Narodism, "legal Marxism" and Economism. The letters addressed to G. V. Plekhanov, Lydia Knipovich, N. E. Bauman and others show how Lenin's plan for the creation of the first all-Russia newspaper of the revolutionary Marxists—*Iskra*—was carried out; they reveal Lenin's leading role in *Iskra*, and his struggle within the editorial board of the newspaper.

A considerable part of the volume consists of the letters of 1901-04. A group of letters of this period, addressed to G. V. Plekhanov, deal with questions concerning the drafting of the revolutionary programme of the proletarian party. In his correspondence with local committees—those of Kharkov and Nizhni-Novgorod, the St. Petersburg organisation (letters to I. V. Babushkin and others), and the

Organising Committee for convening the Second Party Congress—Lenin calls on the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia to unite on the basis of the programmatic and organisational principles of *Iskra*, and gives precise directives for developing Party work and preparing for the Party Congress. In a number of letters written after the Second Congress Lenin exposes the splitting activities of the Mensheviks, wages a relentless struggle against certain demoralised Bolsheviks (Krasin, Noskov, Galperin) who had gone over to the Mensheviks and helped them gain a majority in the Central Committee. These are his letters to the Central Committee, to the Siberian Committee, to N. Y. Vilonov, A. M. Stopani, Rozalia Zemlyachka and others.

The letters to the Caucasian Union Committee reflect Lenin's leadership of the Bolshevik organisations in the Caucasus.

The letters of the period of the first Russian revolution (1905-07) reflect Lenin's struggle for the convocation of the Third Party Congress, for the implementation of its decisions, and for the tactical principles of Bolshevism. Included here are letters to the Central Committee, S. I. Gusev, Rozalia Zemlyachka and others.

The letters of the period of Stolypin reaction reveal Lenin's struggle against liquidationism, Trotskyism, otzovism and ultimatumism, conciliation, and distortions of the theoretical principles of the revolutionary Marxist Party. This volume includes a letter to G. Y. Zinoviev in which Lenin brands Trotsky as a despicable careerist and factionalist. A number of letters published in this volume expose the international revisionists who supported the Russian Menshevik opportunists.

An important place in Lenin's correspondence of 1908-11 is occupied by his letters to Maxim Gorky.

The letters in this volume depict Lenin's struggle to create a Marxist revolutionary party, to rally the Party's forces and make the Bolsheviks an independent party, a party of a new type, a party of Leninism, a Bolshevik party.

The following letters, which have previously appeared in various publications, are included in Lenin's *Collected*

Works for the first time: to the Editorial Board of *Iskra*, February 26, 1904; to M. K. Vladimirov, August 15, 1904; to the Caucasian Union Committee, December 20, 1904; to the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., October-December 1904; Letter to a Comrade in Russia, January 6, 1905; five letters to A. V. Lunacharsky, 1905, 1907 and 1908; to Maxim Gorky, February 7, 1908; to P. Yushkevich, November 10, 1908; two letters to A. I. Lyubimov, August and September 1909; a letter to G. Y. Zinoviev, August 24, 1909; draft of a letter to the "Trustees", February-March 1910; to N. G. Poletayev, December 7, 1910; to A. Rykov, February 25, 1911.

Published for the first time is the letter in this volume to G. D. Leiteisen, July 24, 1902, in which Lenin notes the union of Russian Social-Democratic organisations around *Iskra*.

* * *

The letters in volumes 34 and 35 are arranged in chronological order; those sent from Russia are dated according to the old style, those sent from abroad are dated according to the new style. Where Lenin's manuscript is undated, the editors have given the date at the end of the letter. Each letter has a serial number and it is stated to whom and where it was sent, the date of writing and the address of the sender.

Besides brief notes, each volume of the letters is provided with an index of deciphered pseudonyms, nicknames and initials.

1895

1
TO P. B. AXELROD[1]

You are probably cursing me for this delay. There were some good reasons for it.

I will recount them in order. First of all, I was in Vilna.* I had talks with our people about the Miscellany.[3] Most of them are agreed on the need for such a publication and promise support and supply of material. Their mood is in general sceptical (I recalled your expression about the pal.** provinces), as much as to say—we shall see whether it will correspond to agitational tactics, to the tactics of the economic struggle. I stressed that this would largely depend on us.

Further, I was in Moscow. I saw no one, for there was no trace of the "Teacher of Life". Is he all right? If you know anything about him and have an address, write to him to send it to us, otherwise we cannot find any contacts there. Great havoc has been played there,[4] but it seems that some people have survived and the work did not cease. We have material from there—a description of some strikes. If you have not had it, write and we shall send it to you.

After that I was in Orekhovo-Zuyevo. Places like this, frequently to be met with in the central industrial area, are extremely peculiar: a purely manufacturing town with tens of thousands of inhabitants, whose only means of livelihood is the mills. The mill management is the sole authority. The mill office "runs" the town. There is the sharpest division of the people into workers and bourgeois. Hence

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* The key is the same as the one we have been using.[2]

** The word "pal." has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

the workers' frame of mind is rather oppositional, but, after the recent smash-up there, so few of our people are left and all of them so closely watched that contacts are very difficult. However, we shall be able to deliver the literature.

Further, the delay has been due to local trouble. This also accounts for the meagreness of the material sent.

I don't like the address in Zurich. Can't you find another—not in Switzerland, but in Germany? That would be much better and safer.

Further, in sending your reply—*a book on technology*, address: Mr. Luchinsky, Alexandrovsky Iron Works, Chemical Laboratory, St. Petersburg—add, if there is room, other material: pamphlets issued in Geneva, interesting cuttings from *Vorwärts*,[5] etc. Write in detail about the Miscellany: what material there is already, what is planned, when the first issue will appear, and what exactly is lacking for the second. We shall probably send money, but later on. Reply *as quickly as possible* so that we may know whether this method is suitable.

Send the Pole a rendezvous address as quickly as possible, since we need delivery facilities. The address is: student Mikhail Leontievich Zakladny, Technological Institute, the same town, ask for Ivanov. The money for the publication in Russian of his *Geschichte*, *etc.*, has been promised.*

Another request: we are badly in need of ink; as to what kind, you can find out from Mögli, who has it. Could you send it somehow? Is there no opportunity? Please think it over or ask your "practical men" to do so. By the way, you asked us to approach them directly. In that case, tell us: 1) do they know our method and key? 2) do they know who these letters come from?

You are now being sent: 1) information about the expulsion of the Dukhobors; 2) an account about rural workers in the south; and 3) a description of the Thornton mills—for the time being, only the beginning, about a quarter, of this is being sent.

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* The publication and its author have not been ascertained.—*Ed.*

It is necessary to write with *Chinese ink*. Better still, add a small crystal of *potassium dïchromate* ($K_2Cr_2O_7$): then it won't wash off. Use the *thinnest paper possible*. All the best. Yours....

Regards to the comrade.

Written at the beginning of November 1895
Sent from St. Petersburg to Zurich

First published in part in 1923
First published in full 1924

Printed from the original

2
TO P. B. AXELROD

We have received the Breslau report.[6] We unstuck it with great difficulty, in the course of which a large part was torn (the letter, thanks to the good paper, remained intact). Evidently you have not yet received the second letter. You must use very thin paste—not more than a teaspoonful of starch (and it must be potato starch, not wheat starch, which is too strong) to a glass of water. Ordinary (good) paste is needed only for the top sheet and coloured paper, and the paper holds well, under the action of a press, even with the thinnest paste. At any rate, the method is suitable and it should be used.

I am sending you the end of Thornton. We have material on the strike 1) at Thornton's, 2) at Laferm's, 3) on the Ivanovo-Voznesensk strike, 4) on the Yaroslavl strike (a worker's letter, very interesting), and on the St. Petersburg Boot Manufacturing Factory. I am not sending it, as we have had no time yet to copy it and because I do not count on being in time for the first issue of the Miscellany. We have established contacts with the Narodnaya Volya printing-press,[7] which has already put out three things (not ours) and has taken one of ours.* We are planning to publish a newspaper,[8] in which this material will be printed. This will be definitely settled in about 1½ to 2 months' time. If you think the material will arrive in time for the first issue, let us know at once.

Yours,
Ilyin

Have you any difficulty in handling our parcels? We must jointly improve the method.

Written mid-November 1895
Sent from St. Petersburg to Zurich
First published in 1923 — Printed from the original

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* Send us material, if you have any, for workers' pamphlets. They will gladly print it.

1897

3

TO P. B. AXELROD

Dear Pavel Borisovich,

I am very, very glad to have succeeded after all in getting a letter from you (I received it yesterday, i.e., August 15) and news of you and of G. V. Your and his opinions on my literary efforts* (for the workers) have been extremely encouraging. There is nothing I have wanted so much, or dreamed of so much, as an opportunity of writing for workers. But how to do this from here? It is very, very difficult, but not impossible, I think. How is the health of V. Iv.?

I know only one method—the one by which I am writing these lines.[9] The question is whether it is possible to find a copyist, who will have no easy task. You, apparently, consider it impossible and this method, in general, unsuitable. But I do not know any other.... It is a pity, but I do not despair: if one does not succeed now—one can succeed later on. Meanwhile, it would be good if you were to write occasionally by the method which you use with your "old friend".[10] That will enable us to keep in touch, which is the most important thing.

You, of course, have been told enough about me, so there is nothing to add. I live here all alone. I am quite well and occupy myself both with the journal[11] and with my big job.**

All the very best. Kind regards to V. Iv. and G. V. I have not seen Raichin for over a month. I hope to go to Minusinsk soon to see him.

August 16 Yours,

V. U.

Written August 16, 1897
Sent from the village
of Shushenskoye to Zurich

First published in 1924

Printed from the copy written
by A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova

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* See "Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers" (present edition, Vol. 2).—*Ed.*

** Lenin was working at that time on his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see present edition, Vol. 3).—*Ed.*

1898

4
TO A. N. POTRESOV[12]

September 2, 1898

Yesterday I received your letter of August 11 with the list of books and the printed matter—the *Archiv*.[13] The article of the "eminent political economist" is highly interesting and excellently composed. The author evidently disposed of very rich material, which had luckily fallen into his hands. Generally speaking, in the journalistic field, he appears to be even a better writer than in the purely economic field. *Archiv*, in general, is an interesting journal and I shall certainly subscribe to it for next year. I should like also to subscribe to some English periodical or newspaper (weekly); can you advise me which to select? I have no idea what there is in the English publicistic field that is most interesting and is available in Russia.

As regards Struve's article,[14] on which we hold different opinions, it has to be said, of course, that it is impossible to judge accurately of the author's views from it alone. It seemed to me, for instance, and still seems to me, that he definitely set himself "general classificatory tasks" (the title itself indicates this), whereas you consider that he set himself "no such tasks".... That "it is necessary to win our handicraft workers away from so-called people's industry" is something with which, of course, I am wholly and definitely in agreement, and I think that this still confronts our "disciples"[15] as an unsolved problem. It was in Struve's article that I saw a *plan* for solving this problem.

Have you paid attention to *N. G.*'s articles in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[16] (in the two last issues) against "materialism and dialectical logic". They are highly interesting—from the negative aspect. I must admit that I am not competent

to deal with the questions raised by the author, and I am extremely surprised that the author of *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus** has not expressed his opinion in the Russian literature and does not vigorously oppose neo-Kantianism, letting Struve and Bulgakov[17] polemise on specific questions of this philosophy, as if it had already become part of the views of Russian disciples.[18] Space would surely be found for philosophical articles in more than one of our periodicals; moreover, a book could get through easily. His polemic with Bernstein and Conrad Schmidt interests me greatly, and I very much regret that I am quite unable to obtain *Zeit*.[19] I should be greatly obliged to you if you could help me in this. It would be quite sufficient, of course, to receive this journal even for a short period. Do you have the issue of *Die Neue Zeit* (of a few years ago) which carried an article by the same author on Hegel (the 30th Anniversary of his death—something of that kind)?[20] Neither I nor any of the comrades here get *Die Neue Zeit*, although they promised to send it from St. Petersburg! The devil take all those people who make promises and do not keep them!

Another interesting article is that of Ratner's on *Capital* in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (for July). I cannot stand such lovers of the golden mean, who do not dare to come out openly against doctrines with which they have no sympathy, but wriggle, make "amendments", evade the main issues (such as the theory of the class struggle) and beat about the bush of particulars.

The articles by another author in *Die Neue Zeit* on social trends in Russia also sound very interesting[21]: your mentioning them is extremely tantalising. If I have understood you rightly, this author expresses an idea already expounded by him elsewhere (on the danger of *einer politischen Isolierung des russischen Proletariats***). It seems to me that "alienation from society" does not necessarily signify "isolation",*** for there is society and society: in fighting Na-

* The author of this book was G. V. Plekhanov.—*Ed.*

** Political isolation of the Russian proletariat.—*Ed.*

*** That we must by no means allow such "isolation"—in this I believe the author to be wholly and a thousands times right, especially against narrow adherents of "economics"[22].—*Ed.*

rodism[23] and all its offshoots, the disciples thereby come closer to those *gauches** who tend to break *decisively* with Narodism and adhere *consistently* to their views. From *such* people the disciples would hardly begin dissociating themselves unreservedly. Rather the contrary. A "conciliatory" (or, rather, alliancist) attitude towards such people is wholly compatible, in my opinion, with the fight against Narodism and all its manifestations.

Please write. All the best.

V. Ulyanov

Well, well, you have already come to blows—and how!—with sticks and what not! Fortunately, Eastern Siberia seems to be lagging somewhat behind the Vyatka Gubernia in bellicosity.[24]

Sent from Shushenskoye village
to Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

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* Lefts.—*Ed.*

1899

5

TO A. N. POTRESOV

January 26, 1899

I have received your letter of December 24. I am very glad that you have at last got rid of your illness, of which rumours had even reached us. I heard of it during the holidays while I was in Minusinsk, and kept thinking where and how I could obtain news of you. (I thought it inconvenient to write to you directly, as you were said to be seriously ill.) Well, you have now revived just in time for a literary undertaking which is also being revived. Of course, you know already about *Nachalo*,[25] which is to be started in the middle of February. I hope you have now fully recovered—it is already a month since you wrote the last letter—and that you will be able to work. You are probably fairly well provided for in the matter of books and order the chief new ones? If you are not too short of funds for ordering books, I think you can work even in the backwoods—at least I judge by myself, comparing my life in Samara seven years ago, when I was reading almost exclusively other people's books, and now, when I have begun to acquire the habit of ordering books.

In regard to the *Heritage* I have had to agree with your opinion that to consider it as something of an integral nature is a bad tradition of the bad years (the eighties). Perhaps I really ought not to tackle historico-literary themes.... My justification is that nowhere do I propose acceptance of Skaldin's heritage.[26] That one must take over the heritage from other people is indisputable. It seems to me that my defence (from possible attacks of opponents) will be the note on p. 237, where it was precisely Chernyshevsky[27] I had in mind and where I gave reasons why it was inconvenient to take him as a parallel.* It is admitted there that Skaldin is a *Liberalkonservativ*, that he is "not typical"

* "The Heritage We Renounce" (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 491-534, footnote on p. 505).—*Ed.*

of the sixties, that it is "inconvenient" to take "typical" writers; I did not have Chernyshevsky's articles and do not have them, moreover the chief ones have still not been republished, and I should hardly be able to avoid snags here. Furthermore, I would begin defending myself by pointing to the fact that I gave an exact definition of what I understand by the "heritage" of which I am speaking. Of course, if the article nevertheless gives the impression that the author proposes to accept precisely Skaldin's heritage, this is a fault that cannot be remedied. I forgot what is perhaps my chief "defence", namely, that if Skaldin is a "rarity", then bourgeois liberalism, more or less consistent and free from Narodism, is by no means a rarity, but a very broad trend of the sixties and seventies. You retort: "Coincidence and continuity are poles apart". But the crux of the matter is that the article says it is necessary to purge bourgeois liberalism of Narodism. If this is true and *if it is feasible* (a particularly important condition!), then the result of the purge, the residue after it, will be bourgeois liberalism that not only coincides with Skaldin's but is its successor. Thus, if I am accused of accepting Skaldin's heritage, I shall be entitled to answer that I am merely undertaking to *purge* it of admixtures, but that I myself have nothing to do with it and, in addition to cleaning various Augean stables, have more congenial and more positive occupations.... Well, I'm afraid I have let myself be carried away and really imagine myself a "defendant"!

We have not corresponded for such a long time that to tell you the truth I have forgotten when I last wrote you about the articles "*Die historische Berechtigung*". I believe I wrote before I received them?* Now I have read them and have found that the author's main idea is fully acceptable (especially at the end concerning the two extremes or snags that have to be avoided). In giving the reasons, however, one should really bring out more sharply the *Klassencharakter* of the *Bewegung*** of which the author speaks (he mentioned it, but only in passing and very briefly), and furthermore not to regard the Fronde-like

* See p. 26 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** Movement.—*Ed.*

agrarians with such favour; in their liberalism there is more of the Fronde and of a sense of grievance on account of *einundsechzig** than of a desire for "the most rapid industrialisation" of the country. It is worth while recalling their attitudes towards seasonal work, migration, etc. The author should have formulated the task more accurately: to free all *fortschrittliche Strömungen*** from the rubbish of Narodism and agrarianism and to utilise all of them in this purified form. In my opinion, "utilise" is a much more exact and suitable word than *Unterstützung und Bundesgenossenschaft*.*** The latter indicates the equality of these *Bundesgenossen*,**** yet they must (in this I fully agree with you) follow in the wake, sometimes even "with clenched teeth"; they have absolutely not grown so far as to reach equality and will never grow to reach it, owing to their cowardice, disunity, etc. *Unterstützung*, however, will come by no means from the *Intelligenz und fortschrittliche Grundbesitzer*[5] alone, but also from many others, both from Semites and from *fortschrittliche Kaufleute und Industrielle*[6] (the author has quite wrongly passed them over: it is still a question whether they constitute a smaller percentage in their milieu than in that of the *Grundbesitzer*[7]) and those *Bauern*[8] who tend to represent *Urteil* and not *Torurteil*, *Kukunft and not Vergangenheit*[9] of their class, and very many others. In two respects the author has tipped the scales in the other direction: firstly, in combating the Economists he has left aside *praktische*, immediate *Forderungen*,[10] which are important not only for *industriellen Arbeiter*, but also for *Hausindustrielle* and *Landarbeiter*,[11] etc. Secondly, he has fought against an abstract,

* Sixty-one (1861).—*Ed.*

*** Progressive trends.—*Ed.*

*** Support and alliance.—*Ed.*

**** Allies.—*Ed.*

[5] Intelligentsia and progressive landowners.—*Ed.*

[6] Progressive tradesmen and industrialists.—*Ed.*

[7] Landowners.—*Ed.*

[8] Peasants.—*Ed.*

[9] Reason and not prejudice, the future and not the past.—*Ed.*

[10] Demands.—*Ed.*

[11] Not only for industrial workers, but also for handicraftsmen and agricultural workers.—*Ed.*

neglectful attitude to *gemässigten fortschrittlichen** elements (it is fair to say that they should by no means be entirely neglected, they should be utilised) and thereby, as it were, obscured the independent and more resolute position adopted by the *Bewegung* he represents. In the historico-philosophical sense the proposition which he advances (and which was earlier advanced by Inorodzew in *Soziale Praxis*[28]) is indisputable, viz., that among our present *Genossen*** there are no few *verkleideten Liberalen*.*** To a certain extent this can also be said of *Deutschland versus England*. That is, so to speak, our good fortune; it enables us to count on an easier and swifter beginning; it compels us to utilise all these *verkleideten*. But the author's formulation can, perhaps, give rise to some misinterpretation (one Old-Believer told me: but this is belittling and depersonalising...), on the, one hand, and a certain feeling of distrust and embarrassment among *Genossen*. In this respect Inorodzew's formulation, too, in my opinion, was unfortunate.

As regards the heart of the matter, however, I think there are no differences of opinion with the author.

About Parvus, I haven't the slightest notion of his personal character and do not at all deny his great talent. Unfortunately, I have read very few of his works.

Do you expect to obtain Kautsky's *Die Agrarfrage*,**** which has recently come out?

Regarding Wert, Yevg, Solovyov and M. Filippov, I must say that the first-named I do not know at all, and I have read very little of the other two. That there is and will be "weathering", I have not an iota of doubt. Hence it is especially necessary to have not only *verkleidete Literatur*.*****

All the best.

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye village
to Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

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* Moderately progressive.—*Ed.*

** Comrades.—*Ed.*

*** Disguised liberals.—*Ed.*

**** *The Agrarian Question*.—*Ed.*

***** Disguised literature.—*Ed.*

6
TO A. N. POTRESOV

April 27, 1899

I was very glad, A. N., to receive your letter of March 27, which at last broke your long and persistent silence. A heap of questions to be discussed has indeed accumulated but there is no opportunity of having any detailed conversation here on subjects that are mainly of a literary nature. And now there is the journal[29]: without talks with one's colleagues one feels too cut off for writing. There is only Julius, who takes all this quite closely and *actively* to heart, but the accursed "long distances" prevent sufficiently detailed conversation with him.

I shall begin with what interests and agitates me now most of all—Bulgakov's article in issues 1-2 and 3 of *Nachalo*. On reading your opinion of him, I was exceedingly pleased to meet with sympathy on the most essential point—the more so because, apparently, one cannot count very much on sympathy from the editorial board.... If Bulgakov's article made a "repellent" and "pitiful" impression on you, it absolutely infuriated me. Up till now, though I have read and re-read Bulgakov, I simply cannot understand how he could write an article so completely nonsensical and in such an extremely unbecoming tone, and how the editors found it possible not to dissociate themselves by at least a single comment from such a slashing attack on Kautsky. Like you, I am "convinced that our people are utterly [just so!] confused and puzzled". And who wouldn't be puzzled when told—in the name of "modern science" (No. 3, p. 34)—that Kautsky is all wrong, arbitrary, socially incredible, "with equally little of both real agronomics and real economics" (No. 1-2) and so forth? Moreover, Kaut-

sky is not expounded, *but simply distorted*, while Bulgakov's own views as part of any coherent system are entirely lacking. No man with any sense of party spirit or sense of responsibility to all the *Genossen* and their whole programme and practical activity would dare to take such "side kicks" (to use your apt expression) at Kautsky, without giving anything himself, but merely promising ... a learned work on "Ost-Elbe"! Apparently, he feels himself free from all comradely obligations and responsibility, a "free" and individual spokesman of professorial science. I do not forget, of course, that under Russian conditions it is impossible to demand of a journal that it admit some *Genossen* and exclude others—but a journal like *Nachalo* is not an almanac, allowing Marxism just because it is the mode (*à la Mir Bozhy*,[30] *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*,[31] etc.), but an organ of a definite trend. It is incumbent on such a journal, therefore, to put a certain restraint on learned "kickers" and on all "outsiders" in general. It is to the fact that its editors have run it as an organ of a definite trend and not as an almanac that *Novoye Slovo*[32] owes its great success.

I read through Kautsky's book before Bulgakov's article appeared and I did not find in the latter a single at all intelligent argument against Kautsky. What I did find was a heap of *distortions* of Kautsky's ideas and theses. What sheer nonsense Bulgakov talks when he asserts, for example, that Kautsky confuses technics and economics, that he tries to prove the "ruin of agriculture" (No. 3, p. 31. Kautsky says *just* the opposite: S. 289), that he denies agriculture any tendency to develop (No. 3, p. 34), and so on!

I have already written, and sent to the editorial board a fortnight ago, a first article on "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" and am now starting on a second dealing with the end of Bulgakov's article.* I greatly fear that P. B. will reject it, either on account of its considerable length (it turns out to be larger than Bulgakov's article, firstly, because I have to give reasons for refuting such unsupported and carelessly pronounced verdicts as, for example, that Marx was wrong in teaching that the ratio $\frac{v}{c}$ decreases in agriculture; secondly, because

* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 105-59.—*Ed.*

it is essential to expound Kautsky), or because a polemic is considered undesirable (of course, I have not used in the article a single abusive expression, like those above, and in general I have tried to avoid anything personal against Bulgakov. The tone in general is in no way sharper than in my article against Tugan-Baranovsky[33] on the theory of the market*). I should be very glad to hear your opinion, when you have read Kautsky's book and finished reading Bulgakov: what exactly do you find "true" in Bulgakov? And do you think it possible to let Bulgakov's article in the journal go unanswered?

In general, all this "new critical trend" in Marxism, espoused by Struve and Bulgakov (P. B. is apparently *in favour of* Bulgakov), looks highly suspicious to me: resounding phrases about "criticism" against "dogma" and so forth—and absolutely no positive results of the criticism. Moreover, compiling an article *à la* Bulgakov required, besides "criticism" and sympathy for professorial "modern science", tactlessness *nec plus ultra*.

I sent Struve a reply to his article on the market.** My sister[34] writes to me that this reply will be published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* and that P. B. intends to answer it in the same journal. I cannot agree with you that "the crux of the question lies in the concrete impossibility of an abstractly conceivable proposition" and my main argument against P. B. is precisely that he mixes up abstract-theoretical and concrete-historical questions. "Concretely impossible" is not only realisation as put forward by Marx, but also land rent as put forward by him, and average profit, and the equality between wages and the value of labour-power, and much more besides. But the impossibility of something being realised in a *pure* form is not a refutation. I am quite unable to see any contradiction between my assertions in the *Studies*[35] and in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, nor do I see the "bourgeois apologetics" with which Struve has been trying to frighten readers. What I find most objec-

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* "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory (Apropos of the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)" (see present edition, Vol. 4).—*Ed.*

** "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" (see present edition, Vol. 4).—*Ed.*

tionable in his article is the fact that he drags in critical philosophy and that he makes remarks such as that Marx's theory of value and profit "*indisputably* suffers from a contradiction". P. B. is perfectly well aware that this is *disputable*—why then sow confusion in the minds of our people, who so far *have received no* systematic proof of this contradiction and its correction from any single spokesman of the "new critical trend"?

And Bulgakov's sally (No. 3, p. 34, note) against the theory of *Zusammenbruch**!—without any mention of Bernstein and with the irrevocable authority of a "learned" decree! I know about the publication of Bernstein's new book and I have ordered it but it is hardly likely to be sent. The article about it in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*[36] and in *Zhizn*[37] (not a bad journal! Its literary section is really good, even better than any others!) has quite convinced me that I did not rightly understand Bernstein's disjointed articles and that he has got himself so tangled up in lies that he really deserves to be *begraben*,** as the author of *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus**** expressed it in an open letter to Kautsky. Bernstein's arguments, which are new to me, against the materialist conception of history,***** etc., are (according to *Zhizn*) astonishingly feeble. If P. B. is such an ardent defender of Bernstein that he is all but prepared to "quarrel" over him, it is very, very sad, because his "theory" against *Zusammenbruch*—excessively narrow for Western Europe—is altogether unsuitable and *dangerous* for Russia. Do you know that it is already being made use of by our "young" people (ultra-Economists), who in one publication gave an account of the Stuttgart debates *in such a way* that for them Bernstein, Peus, and others were defenders of "economics, not politics"? What does P. B.

* Collapse (of capitalism).—*Ed.*

** Buried.—Ed.

*** *Contributions to the History of Materialism.—Ed.*

**** Incidentally, do you remember how one of our common friends[38] in the "beautiful faraway" maliciously ridiculed and soundly scolded me for having called the materialist conception of history a "method"? And behold, it turns out that Kautsky, too, in using the same word: "method", is guilty of the same grievous sin. (*Zhizn*, January, Book II, p. 53.) Have you any news of this friend? Is his health better? Is there any hope that he will write?

think of such "allies"? If by the successes of the ultra-Economists you mean the resignation of Volgin and his closest comrades, I know about it[39]; it was a great shock to me and I am now puzzled as to how matters stand and what the future has in store. I think it terribly harmful that this dispute with the ultra-Economists was not *fully and completely* ventilated in the press: it would have been the only serious way of clearing things up and establishing certain precise theoretical propositions. Instead, there is now complete chaos!

My book has come out* and I have asked that it should be sent to you (I have not yet received it myself). I have heard that the P. S. to the preface was late, came under the preliminary censorship and, it seems, "got into trouble". I shall await your comments with interest.

I ordered Karelin's book and read it before I received it from you. I liked it very much; it is devilishly annoying that it was pared down! Aren't you going to write a review of it?

An acquaintance of mine has sent me *A. P.*'s "Magazine Notes" (on the "heritage" and the "inheritors"). I wonder whether the continuation intended to carry on a further polemic with me or not? I liked A. P.'s article very much; the issue was much the worse for the cuts in the article. Truth to tell, I see no differences of opinion between us: you deal with a *different* question—not what the attitude of the disciples is to Russian democracy in general and whether they reject it (I wrote *exclusively* about this),** but what the relations were between democrats of various types in the good old days. I was concerned only with Mikhailovsky's[40] mistake in supposing that we reject democracy altogether—whereas you fasten on *his other mistake*, the "slurring over" of substantially important distinctions in the "heritage". I saw Maslov's note in No. 3 of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* directed against me, but to tell you the truth I was not interested in it. By the way, the cuts in A. P.'s article confirmed my opinion that it is "inconvenient" to

* *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see present edition, Vol. 3).—*Ed.*

** "The Heritage We Renounce" (see present edition, Vol. 2).—*Ed.*

take a more striking testator than Skaldin (a sad confirmation!). In general, I find the tone of the journal that of a dying body. If that is so, the end and death is only a question of time. It is simply speculation on *Ratlosigkeit** and bureaucracy in the department which, etc. One could hold one's tongue without any harm and not without advantage to the cause. As a matter of fact, compared with the modern tone, our *Materials* could be a model of "moderation" and "solidity"....[41]

All the best.
V. U.

Write more often, if it's not too much bother, otherwise I am quite unable to get press news from anyone.

I am sending the *Historische Berechtigung*** by registered post. Please don't think me careless about returning books: you did not mention any time limit and so I did not refuse comrades who asked to be allowed to read it. I shall be very grateful for the end of Karelin.

Do you have any German reviews of Kautsky? I have read only that in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*—irate and empty *à la* Bulgakov.

I am very pleased on the whole with the issues of the journal.[42] It is splendidly edited. Have you read Gvozdyov's book[43] and what do you think of it?

Sent from Shushenskoye village
to Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

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* Perplexity.—*Ed.*
** *Historical Justification.—Ed.*

7
TO A. N. POTRESOV

June 27, 1899

Last Friday, the 18th, I received your letter of June 2, but *I have not received* either Mehring or Karelin, about which you write. I waited a little at first, thinking there was a delay in the post, but now I am forced to believe that either the parcel has been lost or you put off sending it. If the former is the case, lodge a complaint at once.

Your comments on my book* gave me great joy. All the same, I think you are exaggerating in speaking about a translation of it: I doubt whether the Germans would want to read a thing so crammed with facts of purely local and minor significance. True, they translated N.—on[44] (but then he already had a great reputation and the recommendation, probably, of Engels, although the latter had intended to make hay of it, according to Monist). Have you come across reviews of it in the German literature? If I am not mistaken, they have translated him into French too. I was somewhat surprised at your statement that you "at last succeeded in obtaining" my book.... Didn't you receive it from Moscow or St. Petersburg? I asked that it should be sent to you, as to all the rest of my friends, and they all got it. If you have not received it, let me know and I shall write again to Moscow. So far I have not seen any reviews of it in the press, but I don't expect to find any before the autumn—but then the only newspaper I read is *Russkiye Vedomosti*,[45] which continues to maintain a "tactful silence"....

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* *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see present edition, Vol. 3).—*Ed.*

I have read Bulgakov's article in *Archiv*. I do not intend to write a reply to him for the German public too: for one thing, I couldn't do it in German; secondly—and this is the chief thing, for it would be possible, perhaps, to find a translator from Russian—an article of the kind that I wrote for the Russian public, i.e., with a detailed exposition of Kautsky's book, would be quite unsuitable for the German public. I cannot answer Bulgakov's special references (from German statistical data) for I have no material. Nor would I undertake to write *for the Germans* about his general standpoint (Kantian and ... Bernsteinian, if one can use the term). I think it really is necessary to correct the Germans' idea of the Russian disciples, but for this (unless someone would undertake to write a special article) a simple paragraph about my article against Bulgakov, when this article is published in a Russian journal, would suffice.* But if it is not published at all—owing to the demise of *Nachalo* and the refusal of *Zhizn*, or the censorship—then the matter will take quite a different turn.

Regarding the "sensational discoveries" of the Russian disciples and their neo-Kantianism, I am becoming more and more indignant. I have read Tugan-Baranovsky's article in No. 5 of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*.... What utterly stupid and pretentious nonsense! Without any historical study of Marx's doctrine, without any new researches, on the basis of schematic errors (arbitrary alteration of the norm of surplus-value), on the basis of elevating to a general rule an exceptional case (raising the productivity of labour *without* decreasing the value of the product: an absurdity if this is taken as a general phenomenon)—on the basis of this to talk about a "new theory", about Marx's mistake, about reconstruction.... No, I cannot believe your statement that Tugan-Baranovsky is becoming more and more a *Genosse*. Mikhailovsky was right in calling him an "echo man": his article in *Mir Bozhy* ("according to Beltov", you remember? in 1895) and

* Lenin refers to the article "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" (see present edition, Vol. 4) The article was published in the journal *Zhizn* in Jan.-Feb. 1900.—*Ed.*

this article confirm the severe judgement of the prejudiced critic. It is confirmed also by what I have heard about his personal qualities from you and from Nadya. Of course, all this is not enough to draw a final conclusion and I am quite likely to be mistaken. It would be interesting to know your opinion of his article.

And then there's this idea of distinguishing between "sociological" and "economic" categories, set going by Struve (in No. 1 of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*) and repeated both by P. Berlin (in *Zhizn*) and by Tugan-Baranovsky. In my view it promises nothing but an utterly meaningless and scholastic play at definitions, to which the Kantians give the resounding name of "critique of concepts" or even "gnosiology". I simply cannot understand what *sense* there is in such a distinction. How can there be something economic apart from social?

Incidentally, concerning neo-Kantianism. What stand do you take? I have read and re-read with great pleasure *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus*, I have read the articles of the same author in *Neue Zeit* against Bernstein and Conrad Schmidt (*Neue Zeit*, No. 5, 1898-99; the later issues I have not seen),[46] I have read Stammler ("*Wirtschaft und Rech*")* whom our Kantians (P. Struve and Bulgakov) have so highly praised, and I definitely side with Monist. Stammler especially rouses my indignation; I fail to see in him even a hint of anything fresh and significant.... Sheer *erkenntnistheoretische Scholastik***! Stupid "definitions" of a mediocre lawyer, in the worst sense of this last word, and no less stupid "conclusions" drawn from them After Stammler, I re-read the articles of Struve and Bulgakov in *Novoye Slovo* and found that neo-Kantianism was a thing to be seriously reckoned with. I could no longer restrain myself and stuck in my comments and attacks against it, both in reply to Struve (on his article in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*.*** Why and by whom the publication of this reply is being held up—I fail to understand. It was to have ap-

* Economy and Law".—*Ed.*

** Epistemological scholasticism.—*Ed.*

*** "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" (see present edition, Vol. 4).—*Ed.*

peared in No. 6 of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*. But it is not there. Meanwhile, my silence is beginning to make things awkward for me: for example, Nezhdanov's article in *Zhizn* No. 4[47]) and in reply to Bulgakov. I say, "I could no longer restrain myself" for I am only too well aware of my lack of philosophical education and I do not intend to write on these subjects until I have learned more. That is just what I am now doing—I have started with Holbach and Helvètius, and am now taking up Kant. I have got hold of the chief works of the chief classical philosophers, but I do not have the neo-Kantian books (I have only ordered Lange). Tell me, please, whether you or your comrades have them and whether you could not share them with me.

On the same subject I have been greatly interested by the review in No. 5 of *Nachalo* (May issue, which is in the last stages of consumption) on Bogdanov's book. I don't understand how I could have missed the notice of this book's publication. I have only now ordered it. Already from Bogdanov's first book I suspected Monist, and the title and contents of the second book strengthen my suspicions. And how disgustingly pointless and disgustingly supercilious this review is! Not a word on the real issue and ... a reprimand for ignoring Kantianism, although it is evident from the reviewer's own words that Bogdanov does not *ignore* Kantianism, but *refutes* it, having a different standpoint in philosophy.... I think (if I am not mistaken about Bogdanov) it is impossible to let this review go unanswered.[48] The only thing I can't understand is how Kamensky could have left unanswered the articles of Struve and Bulgakov in *Novoye Slovo* against Engels. Could you explain this for me?

Your information about the reaction against Marxism which has begun in St. Petersburg was news to me. I am puzzled. "Reaction"—does that mean among the Marxists? And which ones? P. B. again? Is it he and his Co. who are developing a tendency to unite with the liberals? I am looking forward to your explanations with great impatience. I fully agree that the "critics" are only confusing our people, *while giving absolutely nothing*, and that a serious fight with them (especially over Bernstein) will be necessary (only will there be somewhere to fight...?). If P. B. "absolutely

ceases to be a *Genosse*"—so much the worse for him. It will be a great loss, of course, for all *Genossen*, for he is very talented and knowledgeable, but, of course, "friendship is friendship, but service is service", and this does not do away with the need to fight. I fully understand and share your "fury" (caused by the epithet "loathsome" [sic!] in regard to Monist—because of what? because of the article in *Neue Zeit*? because of the open letter to Kautsky about who will *begraben* whom?) and I am eager to know about his answer to your letter giving vent to this fury. (I have not yet seen Bernstein's book). *Gründliche Auseinandersetzung* is necessary, of course, but it will not and cannot appear in *Nachalo* or *Zhizn*: only specific articles against the "critics" of Marxism will be published. What is required for it is a third kind of literature* and *Platform* (if I have understood you rightly). Only then, at last, the *Genossen* will be dissociated from "outsiders" and "kickers", and only then will no kind of personal whimsies or theoretical "sensational discoveries" be able to produce confusion and anarchy. The accursed Russian disorganisation is wholly to blame here!

It is not clear to me in what way your article on the heritage (I have read only the first one) was aimed at the St. Petersburgers. I have not seen the article "Out of Turn". Send it to me.

I should very much like to have a more detailed and circumstantial talk about the *Blitzableiter*.** But this, evidently, will have to be left for another time. My term of exile ends on January 29, 1900. I hope they don't extend it—a calamity that not infrequently strikes exiles in Eastern Siberia. I am dreaming of Pskov. And you?

Nadya sends her regards.

All the very best.

V. U.

P.S. I have just re-read the end of my article against Bulgakov in the rough copy ... and I have noticed that my

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* Illegal Marxist literature.—*Ed.*

** Lightning conductor.—*Ed.*

tone there is conciliatory; implying, as it were: I am an "orthodox" and vigorous opponent of the "critics" (that I said plainly), *but* we must not exaggerate these disagreements [as Mr. Bulgakov does] in the face of common enemies. It is quite possible that this "conciliatory" tone [I have tried my hardest to be mild and polemise as a *Genosse*] will prove inappropriate or even ridiculous if expressions like "loathsome" are employed, and if the "critics" cause a definitive cleavage. In that case I should find myself "guilty though guiltless"; not having seen Bernstein's book, not knowing *all* the views of the "critics", and being at a "respectable distance", my view [when I wrote that article] was quite an "old one", simply that of a contributor to *Nachalo*.... It looks as if my statement about the theory of the class struggle not having been touched on by the "critics" is incorrect?[49]

Sent from Shushenskoye village
to Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia

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1900

8
TO NADEZHDA KRUPSKAYA[50]

I have long been intending to write to you about affairs, but various circumstances have always interfered. My life here is all bustle, even painfully so—and this (N. B.) despite the extraordinary precautions taken against it! I live almost, one might say, in solitude—and yet there is this bustle But then I suppose it's unavoidable in every new situation, and it would be a sin to complain, seeing that I am not half as nervy as our dear bookseller[51] who succumbs to black melancholy and momentary prostration under the influence of this bustle. But there is much that is good besides the bustle. Well, I shall now tell you something about the affairs of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, and I shall do so on the basis of facts and accounts of the *other* side....

In the first place, a completely wrong idea of *Vademecum* prevails in Russia as a result of the cock-and-bull stories of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* supporters. To hear them—it is nothing but indulgence in personalities, and so forth, nothing but acting general and making mountains out of molehills for the sake of denigrating individuals, nothing but the use of "impermissible" methods, etc. Actually, this thing is a *major issue of principle*, and the attacks on individuals are merely an appendage, an appendage that is inevitable in view of the confused relations which the "young" have tried to create and aggravate to the utmost *Vademecum* is an outcry, a forthright outcry against banal Economism, against the "shame and disgrace" of Social-Democracy. "I never thought I would have to experience such shame," exclaims Plekhanov at the end of the preface to the documents he has published. "We

must get out of this chaotic and disgraceful situation at all costs. Woe to the party that patiently tolerates such confusion!" And against all the various accusations levelled at Plekhanov we must first of all categorically establish that the *whole essence* of his pamphlet is precisely declaration of war against the "disgraceful" principles of "Credoism" and "Kuskova-ism", precisely a split over principles, and the split and "fracas" in the Union are merely a *side* effect of this dissension over principles.

If the split over principles has been combined with this "fracas" (at the Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad in April 1900, things *literally* came to the pitch of brawling, hysteria, and so on and so forth, which led to Plekhanov's resignation), if things took this turn, the blame for it rests with the *young*. It was from the standpoint of Economism that the young waged a systematic, stubborn and dishonest struggle against the Emancipation of Labour group during 1898—"dishonest" because they did not show their colours *openly*, because they baselessly put all the blame on "Russia" (keeping silent about the anti-"Economist" Social-Democrats of Russia), and because they have used their connections and practical resources to push aside the Emancipation of Labour group in order to declare the latter's unwillingness to let in "disgraceful" ideas and disgraceful stupidity to be an unwillingness to let in all "young forces" in general. This struggle against the Emancipation of Labour group, this pushing it aside, was carried out on the sly, in a "private" fashion, by means of "private" correspondence and "private" conversations—plainly and bluntly speaking, by means of *intrigue*, because the role of the Emancipation of Labour group in the Russian Social-Democratic movement never was, never will be and never can be a *private* matter. The *young* proclaimed "new" views against the old, but concealed those views so artfully and diplomatically (thereby showing that for them the very question of views was a *private* matter) that it was left for the *old to set forth* the gist of the disputes. "We sent to St. Petersburg an account of our disputes with the young ones" writes Plekhanov (p. XLVII of *Vademecum*). Thus, as early as 1898 the Emancipation of Labour group *proved* that for it the whole question lay in the vacillation

over principles on the part of the young, who were capable of sinking as low as complete denial of socialism. As early as 1898 the Emancipation of Labour group came out with an *appeal* to Russian Social-Democrats against ideological waverings,[52] but this appeal proved to be the voice in the wilderness, since after the arrests in the summer of 1898 all outstanding leaders of the Party were swept from the battlefield and only the voice of the *Economists* responded to the appeal.

It is not surprising that after this the Emancipation of Labour group resigned from the editorial board, it is not surprising that open war against Economism became more and more urgent and inevitable. But here, to the aid of the Economic trend, came people who were united to these Economists by long-standing hostility towards the Emancipation of Labour group and these people did not shrink from the attempt to abet Economism, without washing dirty linen in public, and to enable the Economists to continue, with greater convenience than ever before, the tactics of "private" propaganda of their views under the flag of Social-Democracy and under cover of ambiguous statements by the new editorial board, which wanted to imitate that dear little calf who sucked two mothers at once.

In the very first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* the new editors declared that they "do not know what young comrades P. B. Axelrod is talking about" in attacking the Economists. They declared this despite the fact that the whole history of the Union in recent years was a history of its struggle with the "young"; they declared this despite the fact that one of the members of the editorial board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was *himself an adherent* of the Economic trend (Mr. V. I—n).[53] To an outsider, to one who has not pondered over the history of Russian Social-Democracy and the Social-Democratic Union Abroad during the last few years, it may seem quite incomprehensible and strange that such a slight and (*apparently*) casual remark dropped by the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo* ("we do not know what young comrades P. B. Axelrod is talking about") could spark off the most passionate polemics, ending in the split of the Union and its disintegration. Yet there is nothing strange about this seemingly strange phenomenon. The

slight remark of *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s editors in connection with their publication of Mr. V. I—n's articles fully and clearly revealed *the cardinal distinction between two conceptions of the immediate tasks and most urgent demands of Russian Social-Democracy*. The first conception can be expressed in the words *laissez faire*, *laissez passer* in relation to Economism. These are tactics of a conciliatory attitude to Economism, the tactics of concealing the "extremes" of Economism, of defending Economism against open struggle against it, the tactics of "free criticism", i.e., free criticism of Marxism on the part of all overt and covert ideologists of the bourgeoisie. The other conception required a resolute struggle against Economism, an open protest against the threatening vulgarisation and narrowing of Marxism, an irrevocable break with bourgeois "criticism".

Written in August
prior to 24th, 1900
Sent from Switzerland to Ufa

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

9
ADDRESSEE UNIDENTIFIED

September 5, 1900
Nuremberg

Comrade,

It looks as if we shall not be able to meet—we are not going to either Mainz or Paris and leave here tomorrow.[54] It is a great pity, but we must accept the situation and confine ourselves to conversing by post.

Firstly, I hasten to correct a remark in your first letter, a correction I would ask you to convey *also to the person* who told you of my "promise to meet". *That is not true.* I did not promise to meet, but said that we would *officially* (i.e., on behalf of our group[55]) get in touch with the Union[56] when we were abroad, *if this appeared to be necessary*. It was wrong of G.[57] to forget about this condition, and to forget besides to tell you that I spoke with him in a personal capacity and, consequently, *could not* have promised anything definite in anticipation of our group's decision. When we heard out the other side here[58] and learned about the congress and the split, we saw that there was now no need for an official contact. That's all. Consequently, the Union has *no right whatever* to "lay claim" to me, whereas I claim that G. told certain other persons of our conversation, although he had *formally* promised me that, prior to our group making contact with the Union, he would inform *no one except the arrested person*. Since you have informed me of his claim, I hope you will not refuse, being in Paris, to inform him likewise of this claim of mine. If "the rumour is heavy on the ground",[59] it is G. who is to blame for it.*

* Secondly, yet another little departure: I heard out both G., *whom I met in the course of several days*, and the other side. You, on the other hand, heard out only the Unionists; but no more or less influential and authoritative representatives of the other side. Hence, it seems to me that it is you, if anybody, who has violated the rule of "*audiatur et altera pars*" ("hear the other side as well".—*Ed.*)

Now passing to the heart of the matter. Amalgamation is *impossible*. So is federation, if the word is understood in its real sense, i.e., a certain agreement, a treaty, mutual obligations, etc. "The endeavour to afford each other as much help as possible"—is, I think, not bound up with federation, but is possible also without it, and is possible in general, although I do not know whether it is easily practicable. If the Union sincerely desired this, it would hardly have started with ultimatums and the threat of a boycott (that was precisely the meaning of the words used by the person who delivered your letter); that cannot serve to improve relations.

We are an independent literary group. We want to remain independent. We do not consider it possible to carry on without such forces as Plekhanov and the Emancipation of Labour group, but *no one is entitled to conclude* from this that *we shall forego even a particle of our independence*. That is *all* we can say *at the moment* to people who want to know above all what our attitude is to the Emancipation of Labour group. To anyone who is not satisfied with this, we have nothing to say except: judge us by our deeds if you do not believe our words. If, however, it is a question not of the *present moment*, but of the more or less near *future*, then, of course, we shall not refuse to impart to people with whom we shall have close relations more detailed information on the *form* of the relations between us and the Emancipation of Labour group.

You will ask: what kind of relations will you have with the Union? *For the time being none*, because it is our *unalterable* decision to remain an independent group and enjoy the closest co-operation of the Emancipation of Labour group. This decision, however, is distrusted by the Union, which fears that we will not be capable of sustaining our complete independence, that we will fall into an "impossible" (your expression) polemical tone. If our activity dispels this distrust on the part of the Union, good relations can be established between us, otherwise they cannot. *Voilà tout*. You write: "The Union is looking to you"; but obviously we can only help the Union with writings, and it is no less obvious that at the present time, when all our vital juices must go to nourish our coming offspring,[60] we cannot afford to feed other people's children.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

You write that 1) there are no disagreements in principle, and that 2) the Union is ready to prove in practice its determination to fight the "Economic trend". We are *certain* that on both these points *you are mistaken*. Our conviction is based on such *writings* as, the *postscript* to the Anti-Credo,[61] the *reply* to *Vademecum*.[62] *No. 6* of *Rabocheye Dyelo*,[63] the *preface* to the pamphlet *A Turning Point in the Jewish Labour Movement*, and others. We intend *to come out in writing* with a refutation of the opinion that there are no disagreements in principle (so that we shall have *some* relations with the Union: relations between parties engaged in a polemic).

Now for the last *and main* point: are we right or not in regarding you as having had "a very, very sharp change of views"? Let us recall how things stood in Russia: you *knew* that we wanted to found an *independent* literary enterprise, you *knew* that we were for Plekhanov. Consequently, you knew *everything*, and not only did not refuse to participate, but, on the contrary, yourself used such an expression as "*our*" enterprise (do you remember our last talk in your flat *en trois*?), thus giving us grounds for expecting the *closest* participation from you. Now, however, it turns out that you are *silent* on the question of your participation, that you set us the "task" of "settling the conflict abroad at all costs", that is to say, a task which we have not undertaken and *are not undertaking*—without, of course, giving up the hope that our foundation of an *independent* enterprise with the co-operation of the Emancipation of Labour group may create a basis for settling the conflict. Now, apparently, you doubt the expediency of our group establishing an *independent enterprise*, for you write that the existence of two organisations with "each leaving the other to act as the spirit moves it" will be bad for the cause. It seems indubitable to us that your views have undergone a sharp change. We have now set before you with complete frankness how matters stand with us, and we should be very glad if our exchange of views on the question of "impending tasks" were not limited to this.

Address: Nürnberg, Ph. Roegner.

First published in 1924 Printed from the original

10
TO APOLLINARIA YAKUBOVA[64]

October 26

I received your letter of October 24 yesterday and am replying at once as requested.

I cannot forward the letter just now, as I am not sending any pasted-in things to the address I have, and only use the chemical method. I have no time to copy the letter by this means. I wrote to the addressee[65] yesterday giving the substance of the letter, and I hope in the near future to communicate the whole letter to him. But if you can copy it into an unbound book by the chemical method, then I will send it at once.

I will give my sister the address: she was not in Paris in September, so you could hardly have been there at the same time. I hope you dropped her a few lines at the address I gave you.

Now, to business.

Your letter to me creates a strange impression. Apart from information concerning addresses and forwarding, it contains nothing but reproaches—bare reproaches without any explanations. You even go to the extent of attempting caustic remarks ("are you sure that you have done this for the benefit of the Russian workers' movement and not for the benefit of Plekhanov?")—but, of course, I am not going to exchange caustic remarks with you.

You reproach me for having "advised against".[66] You quote me very inaccurately. I remember very well that I did not express myself categorically, absolutely. I wrote: "We find it hard at the moment to advise anything"; that is to say, I made our decision depend directly on a preliminary elucidation of the matter. What this elucidation

should have been is clear from my letter: it was essential for us to be perfectly sure whether there had really been a "turn" in *Rabochaya Mysl*[67] (as we had been told and as we were entitled to conclude from the fact that you proposed to Plekhanov that he should participate) and what kind of turn.

On this basic and main question you do not say a word.

That we regard *Rabochaya Mysl* as an organ of a special trend with which we differ in the most serious way is something of which you have long been aware. Some months ago both the addressee of your long letter and I flatly refused to take part in an organ of that trend, and obviously, in doing so ourselves, we could not but advise others to do the same.

The news of a "turn" in *Rabochaya Mysl*, however, put us in a "difficulty". A *real* turn could substantially alter the situation. It is natural therefore that in my letter I expressed *above all* the desire to learn all the details of the *turn*—but you have not said a word in reply to this.

Perhaps, however, you consider that the answer to my question about the turn is contained in your letter to my friend[68]? Perhaps, if you approached Plekhanov on behalf of the editorial board of *Rabochaya Mysl*, your letter to my friend could be regarded as an authentic expression of the board's views? If *so*, then I am inclined to draw the conclusion that there has been no turn. If I am mistaken, please explain my mistake to me. The other day, another close supporter of Plekhanov wrote to me about the turn in *Rabochaya Mysl*. But, being in correspondence with you, I cannot, of course, believe these "rumours" of a turn which are not in any way confirmed by you.

Again, I had better say openly and straightaway (even at the risk of incurring further reproaches) that, being in complete solidarity with my friend (to whom you write), I subscribe to his words: "We shall have to fight you"—if there is no turn. But if there is—you must explain in full detail exactly what this turn is.

You write to my friend: "fight us, if you are not ashamed to do so". He will answer you himself, of course, but I for my part beg leave to reply to this. I am not in the least ashamed to fight—seeing that things have gone so far that

the disagreements have concerned fundamental issues, that an atmosphere has been created of mutual non-comprehension, mutual distrust and complete discordance of views (I am not speaking of *Rabochaya Mysl alone*; I am speaking about everything I have seen and heard, and *not so much* here as at home), inasmuch as a number of "splits" *has already arisen* on this basis. To get rid of this oppressive atmosphere, even a furious thunderstorm, and not merely a literary polemic, can (and should) be welcomed.

And there is no reason to be so much afraid of a struggle: a struggle may cause annoyance to some *individuals*, but it will clear the air, define attitudes in a precise and straightforward manner, define which differences are important and which unimportant, define where people stand—those who are taking a completely different path and those Party comrades who differ only on minor points.

You write that there have been mistakes in *Rabochaya Mysl*. Of course, we all make mistakes. Without a struggle, however, how is one to distinguish these minor mistakes from the *trend* which stands clearly revealed in *Rabochaya Mysl* and attains its culmination in the "Credo".* Without struggle there cannot be a sorting out, and without a sorting out there cannot be any successful advance, nor can there be any *lasting unity*. And those who are beginning the struggle at the present time are by no means *destroying*

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* *Note*. In your letter to my friend, for example, there is both misunderstanding and the Economic trend. You are right in stressing that an economic struggle is necessary, that one must know how to make use of legal societies, that all kinds of responses and so forth are necessary, that one should not turn one's back on society. All that is legitimate and true. And if you think that revolutionaries have a different view, that is a misunderstanding. Revolutionaries say merely that every effort must be made to ensure that legal societies and so forth do not *separate* the workers' movement from Social-Democracy and the revolutionary political struggle but, on the contrary, unite them as closely and indissolubly as possible. In your letter, however, there is no effort to combine, but there is an effort to separate, that is, there is Economism or "Bernsteinism",[69] for example, in the statement: "The labour question in Russia, as it stands in reality, was first raised by *Rabochaya Mysl*"—in its arguments about the judicial struggle and so forth.

I apologise if my reference to your letter to my friend offends you; I wanted only to illustrate my thought.

unity. There is no longer any unity, it has already been destroyed all along the line. Russian Marxism and Russian Social-Democracy are already a house divided against itself, and an open, frank struggle is one of the essential conditions for *restoring* unity.

Yes, *restoring*! The kind of "unity" that makes us conceal "Economic" documents from our comrades like a secret disease, that makes us resent the publication of statements revealing what views are being propagated under the guise of Social-Democratic views—such "unity" is not worth a brass farthing, such "unity" is sheer cant, it only aggravates the disease and makes it assume a chronic, malignant form. That an open, frank and honest struggle will cure this disease and create a really united, vigorous and strong Social-Democratic movement—I do not for a moment doubt.

Perhaps it is very inappropriate that in a letter *to you* of all people I have to speak so often of a struggle (literary struggle). But I think that our old friendship most of all makes *complete frankness* obligatory.

All the best.

Petroff

P.S. In a week or two I shall have another address: Herr Philipp Roegner, Cigarrenhandlung, Neue Gasse, Nürnberg (only for letters and in two envelopes). [Please do not write any initials in the letters—heaven knows whether the post here is quite reliable.]

Written October 26, 1900
Sent from Munich to London

First published in 1930 Printed from the original

1901

11
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV[70]

January 30, 1901

I have received your letter just now, dear G. V., immediately on my return from a "final" talk with Judas.[71] The matter has been settled and I am terribly displeased with the way in which it has been settled. I hasten to write to you while my impressions are still fresh.

Judas did not argue about the "democratic opposition"; he is no romantic and not one to be frightened with words. But, as far as "item 7" is concerned (the utilisation of material for *Iskra*, material reaching *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*), he outsmarted our people, all of whom, P. B. *y compris*, stood up for him, against me. He, Judas—you see—expected that *Iskra* would be more popular, more "working-class"; he finds that our free use of material received by *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* could create competition.... He demands that material for *Iskra* should be used only *by agreement* with the representative of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*—agreement ceases to be necessary only if it is impossible to communicate with this representative, a condition that, obviously, will rarely operate, for Judas says frankly that he proposes either the existence of a representative *im Auslande** ("not more than 12 hours from Munich") or very punctual correspondence. He would like to publish *each month five* sheets—that is to say, about 200,000 characters—just as much as in two sheets of *Iskra*. That he will be able to *supply* so much material is hardly to be doubted, for he is well-to-do, writes a great deal and has good connections. The thing is clear: the competition is

* Abroad.—*Ed.*

aimed not so much against *Zarya*[72] as against *Iskra*; the same preponderance of political material, the same newspaper character—*review* of current events, short articles (Judas with very true intuition attaches very great importance to the frequent publication of booklets with smallish articles). We shall be swamped with material of this kind, we shall be running around carrying out errands for Judas, who by his control of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* (it is obvious that he will be master and complete master there for he has the money and 99 per cent of the materials—it is rarely, if ever, that we shall be in a position to give them even a very little) will make a magnificent liberal career and try to shoulder aside not only the heavyish *Zarya*, but *Iskra* as well. We shall be running around, keeping ourselves busy with proof-reading and transportation, while His Highness Mr. Judas will be *rédacteur-en-chef* of the most influential (in broad circles of *so genannten** public opinion) little journal. But "romantic" comfort can be offered these *rechtgläubigen*: let it be called "Supplement to the Social-Democratic journal *Zarya*", let them console themselves with catchwords, but meanwhile I shall take the whole affair into my hands. One is entitled to ask—will not the famous "hegemony" of Social-Democracy prove under the circumstances to be mere cant? In what will it find expression other than in the catchword "Supplement to the Social-Democratic journal"? That he will overwhelm us with material is indubitable, for we can't manage as it is to write enough both for *Zarya* and *Iskra*.

Either the one or the other: either *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* is a supplement to the journal *Zarya* (as arranged) and then it should appear not more frequently than *Zarya*, with *complete* freedom to use material for *Iskra*. Or we sell our birthright for a mess of pottage and prove *genasführt*** by Judas, who feeds us with catchwords.

If it is our destiny and if it is possible for us to achieve real hegemony, it will be exclusively by means of a political newspaper (reinforced by a scientific organ), and when we are told with infuriating insolence that the political

* So-called.—*Ed.*
** Led by the nose.—*Ed.*

section of our newspaper must not compete with the political enterprise of the liberal gentlemen, our pitiful role becomes as clear as daylight.

I have made a copy of this letter, and am appending it to the Minutes of today's meeting as a statement of my protest and of my "dissenting opinion", and I invite you too to raise the banner of revolt. Better a break than this factual subordination to the Credo programme alongside loud phrases against Credo-ism.

If the majority expresses itself in favour—I shall, of course, submit, but only after having washed my hands of it beforehand.

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1925

Printed from the typewritten copy with insertions in Lenin's handwriting

12
TO P. B. AXELROD

March 20, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I have received all your letters and have given Auntie news of her old friend.[73] There was no need for you to worry about addresses and to think that there had been any change. I am still living at the same place and you should write to me at the old address:

Herrn Georg Rittmeyer, *Kaiserstrasse 53/0*, *München*. Inside: *für Meyer*.

I am not expecting my wife for some time yet: her term of exile only ends on Sunday, and she has to make some calls on the way, so she can hardly be here before the second half of April. Even when she does come you can still write to Rittmeyer,[74] for he will always forward everything to me, and I in turn will let you know in good time of any change of address.

We are having trouble with *Zarya*. That capricious gentleman Dietz[75] definitely rejected your editorial article; he was frightened by the references to *Iskra*, scented a whiff of "groups", etc., and referred to the fact that both Bebel and Singer (shareholders in his *G.m.b.H.*) are rather afraid,[76] and so on. To our very great regret, we had to give up your article, replacing it by a few words "to the readers". This new censorship is horribly unpleasant! The cover, too, has suffered: they deleted even "several Russian Social-Democrats". When shall we get rid of the "tutelage" of these *Dreck-Genossen*?!

We are having unpleasantness with that Calf (Judas) too. A very angry letter has come from his friend (=the proposed source of money=*goldene Wanze*[77]), saying: I am

sending 200 (two hundred!) rubles *for Sovremennoye Obozreniye*, and bear in mind, he says, that it is for this enterprise and *not* for yours. We are all indignant, and it has been decided: 1) not to publish the statement about the coalition, 2) to send the Calf and his "friend" an *ultimatum*: either firm financing of *our* enterprise or we refuse, 3) to finish the Witte memorandum.[78]

Well, haven't we been fooled again by Judas?

There is one consolation: No. 2 of *Iskra* has reached Russia safely. It is a success and letters are pouring in. The devil knows what is happening in Russia: demonstrations in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kazan; martial law in Moscow (by the way, they arrested my youngest sister there and even my brother-in-law,[79] who had never taken part in anything!); bloody battles; prisons crammed full, and so on.

In a few days we are expecting Brother[80] and our common friend—Feld[81]—who have already left (at last!); the latter (*so far*) has safely fulfilled everything required of him.

We are publishing a May-Day leaflet,[82] and then we shall start on No. 3 of *Iskra*, and perhaps also No. 4 at the same time—there is a lot of material.

Zarya will come out on Saturday, they say, and will be sent to you directly from Stuttgart.

Our finances are in a *very* bad way. Hence *for the time being* we must definitely refrain from all expenditure on inviting a man out (proposed by you as a carrier).

All the very best.

Yours,

Meyer

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

13
TO P. B. AXELROD

March 25, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I haven't had a talk with you for a long time, I could not get down to it and, besides, Alexei has written to you about all business matters,* but the need of a talk has become too great for me to put it off any longer. I should like to consult you about both the Parisians and Zurichers,[83] as well as about matters in general.

Do you know that the Parisians (long ago, about two or three weeks) have "dissolved the *Iskra* promotion group" and have refused (for the second time) to co-operate, on the grounds of our having "violated organisational neutrality" (sic! that we were unfair to the Union[84] and wrongly attacked it in *Zarya*). This was written by the author of "Comments on the Programme of *Rabocheye Dyelo*",[85] who hinted most unambiguously that *Rabocheye Dyelo* was on the mend (in *Listok* No. 6[86] it has even over-mended itself, in our opinion!) and consequently ... consequently ... *Vivrons verrons***—this "dear comrade" concluded. Obviously (like certain "young forces" about whom G. V. wrote), he is aiming at a better position in *Rabocheye Dyelo*. The sheer scoundrelism of it made us so indignant that we did not even answer them. In *Iskra* No. 4 (we have been promised that No. 3 will be ready by May 1 and intend to start on No. 4 immediately) we are going to flay *Rabocheye Dyelo* for its shilly-shallying.

I really don't know whether to give these intrigants up

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* I have been ill here for a week with influenza.

** We shall wait and see.—*Ed.*

as a bad job or to make yet another attempt. They are, undoubtedly, capable people, they have written, they have (both of them) supplied material (Danevich as well), they have collected money skilfully (as much as 350 frs—nowhere yet has so much been collected abroad for *Iskra*). As a matter of fact, we are not blameless either in regard to them: we have not paid them sufficient attention, we have not sent a single article for examination and "comradely advice", we have not offered any "section" (if only a foreign review in *Iskra* or comments in a social chronicle on certain issues). Apparently, under the conditions obtaining abroad, it is impossible, quite *impossible*, not to have something of the sort. Now take the Berliners[87] (Arsenyev was there recently)—they too want a definite position; simply to help *Iskra*, they say, can satisfy a student, but *we* or *Dvinskaya* (she and her husband are withdrawing from the Union, in which, when the members were questioned, only three—*Grishin*[88] *y compris*!—expressed themselves in favour of the conference. *Vive camarade G.*!) require, they say, something of the sort, you know....

I just don't know what to do! It is necessary to "invent" an organisation—without that *es geht nicht*.*

It has occurred to me that the following plan of organisation could be tried: the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation,[89] the editorial board of *Zarya* and various groups (the Berliners, for example, the Parisians, *perhaps*, etc.), or various persons, unite in a *League*,[90] let us say. Literary activity to be handled in three ways: the Emancipation of Labour group has its print-shop, *Zarya* has its own, with an *elected* Literary Committee as closest collaborator, taking part in periodic joint editorial sessions and publishing (over the signature of the Literary Committee) pamphlets, etc., in the print-shops of *Sotsial-Democrat* and *Zarya—eventuell* also in a third print-shop should the *League* set one up (there is such a prospect). The *supreme decision* on literary questions in the League will belong to a *conference of three members*: from the Emancipation of Labour group, from *Zarya*, and from the Literary Committee. There will be a joint, elected management.

* There is nothing doing.—*Ed*.

Such, in substance, is my plan (of course, *Iskra*, being a Russian publication, *does not* formally *come into* the League). In principle this plan is approved here—by Elder Sister too. I believe that such a "constitution" ("Austrian" Alexei jokingly calls it) holds no dangers for us, and something of the kind is absolutely necessary, otherwise there will be general dissatisfaction and we may lose all our people. In this way we shall be fully guaranteed against dissensions and squabbles, keeping full control of our print-shops and editorial boards, while giving people the requisite scope without which they will not agree to co-operate.

Please write what you think of this idea, and talk it over with G. V. (to whom I am not writing, for he should soon be here and will, of course, call on you on the way). I am not going into details; they can be easily settled. If we all (i.e., the whole *Sotsial-Demokrat*) agree on this, the chances are that the Berliners (who have a print-shop and are eager to "work" from a definite "position") will join us, and then we shall be able to counterpose to the Union a united "League" developing extensive activities.

There is no need to fear an elected management, for it will only control transport and the collection of money abroad, divided in a definite proportion between *Sotsial-Demokrat*, *Zarya*, etc., but it will not have anything to do with *Iskra*, which informally will be behind *Zarya* and together with *Zarya*. Formally the League can be declared the ally abroad of the *Iskra organisation in Russia*, which we are already establishing.

Nor is there any need to fear literary stupidities, for (1) the Literary Committee can be bound by its Rules as far as independent publishing is concerned; (2) it will publish over its own signature: the Emancipation of Labour group and *Zarya* will not be confused with it; (3) our people as well can be in it; (4) it will be subordinated to the conference, in which we have a majority.

I don't know, of course, whether this will satisfy the Parisians—they are so proud. We feel awkward about approaching them. If you approve of the plan, would you care to write to them and throw out a feeler, seeing that they spoke to you earlier in Paris about their sad situation; you could now suggest this way out to them. If you ap-

prove of the idea, we shall get in touch with Koltsov and ask him to draft Rules for the League.*

Now about the Lettish Zurichers. I don't know whether you have heard that the transport arranged with their help *came to grief*: 3,000 copies of *Iskra* (No. 1) were *seized* by the police, who got hold of the smuggler as well. Later one of them wrote to us, asking for more fare money. We replied that we could not give any more for this route—we would not dare to put it before our organisation—but if he would undertake specially to get one pood across (as he undertook to do when he talked with me), then let him come and pick it up.

There was not a word in reply. Do you know whether, perhaps, they have taken offence? What are they doing and planning? If you see any of them, please have a talk to find out how matters stand.

We are beginning to think about No. 2 of *Zarya*—it is time to do so. The Witte memorandum will soon be finished,** in about 2-3 weeks (for some reason Dietz is incredibly slow with it; so far only 9 sheets are ready). So far we have *no* material apart from Nevzorov's article on the historical preparation of Russian Social-Democracy which you already know about. We are hoping for a leading article by G. V. on recent events, his article *contra* Struve, your article (from editorial comments)—that's true, isn't it?; an article by Luxemburg is promised (a new introduction to her articles "Die sozialistische Krise in Frankreich",*** which articles we intend to translate), and Kautsky has promised an article on academicians and proletarians.

We have no foreign reviews. How do matters stand with the "Austrian" article? Isn't anything coming from America?—and from Switzerland? It is said that Danevich is ill. There is no one we can ask to write about Germany—apart from Parvus, who promised (?) a foreign review but that is not quite the thing.

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* It would be good to come before our people with a joint draft of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and *Zarya*.

** "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed*.

*** "The Socialist Crisis in France."—*Ed*.

In the fourth issue of *Iskra* it is proposed to have an article on terrorism (by Alexei); there is: "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo" (continuation), "The Autocracy and Finance" (by Parvus), something for the social chronicle (there is a supplement on demonstrations) and the working-class movement. We are thinking of issuing No. 4 in a single sheet (No. 3 has expanded so much, to two sheets, 8 pages (seven pages are now ready), like No. 1—and part had to be left out.)! We must exert every effort to expedite the publication of *Iskra*—to make it a monthly.

Good-bye! All the best. Regards to all your family. From my wife too.

Yours,
Petrov

P.S. Write to me at Rittmeyer's.

Before I forget: on the instructions of Elder Sister I inform you that 250 frs. has been received. The report on this is published in *Iskra* No. 3 ("From America through Axelrod"). I am sending you via Stuttgart 10 copies of *Zarya*—send them to Ingerman, Mokriyevich, etc. Elder Sister is writing an article for the Germans on the demonstrations.

Sent from Munich to Zurich
First published in 1925 Printed from the original

14
TO N. E. BAUMAN[91]

May 24, 1901

We received your letter with the report for January, February, March and April. Thanks for the detailed and clear list of income and expenditure. But as regards your activity in general, we are still unclear what exactly this activity is and what its results are. You wrote that you have your hands full and there is no one to replace you, but you have still not kept your promise to describe this activity. Is your work confined to forwarding literature to the points named in the report? Or are you engaged in forming a group or groups? If so, where and what kind, what has been done already, and what are these groups for—for local work, for sending to us for literature, or for something else?

We ask about this because the question is very important. Things with us are going none too well. We are bad off financially, Russia gives almost nothing. Shipping is still unorganised and haphazard. Under these conditions, our "tactics" must aim *wholly* at 1) sending here the fullest possible amount of the money collected in Russia for *Iskra*, and reducing local expenditure to a minimum; 2) spending money almost exclusively on *shipment*, as we already have receiving agents functioning in Pskov and Poltava who are comparatively very cheap and no burden on our exchequer.

Please think this over carefully. Our daily bread, by which we barely manage to keep alive, consists as before solely of suitcases. For a couple of them we pay about a hundred rubles, and the chance nature of the persons sent entails a vast amount of delay, carelessness, loss, etc. Nothing is being done to organise the sending of "suitcasers" from Riga (which, according to both Raznotsvetov and

Ernst, is possible). There is no news from Leopold.[92] Nothing is being arranged in Finland, although this is also possible, as we are assured from various quarters. Is it reasonable, in such a state of affairs, to spend 400 rubles in four months on local reception and intermediaries for forwarding literature?

We think you should move into the immediate vicinity of the frontier for the sake of shipping at least 2-4 suitcases and 10-20 pounds per month by personal handling. What do you say to this?

Sent from Munich to Moscow

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

15
TO P. B. AXELROD

May 25, 1901

Dear P. B.,

You have already heard, of course, from G. V. of the plan for our organisation and of the new "conciliatory" enterprise of Nevzorov, Danevich and Ryazanov (who have taken the title of the *Borba* group[93]). We answered their inquiry (whether we agreed to a preliminary conference between *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Union, and *Zarya*, i.e., their representatives) *by consenting*. G. V. said here that, of course, it was necessary to agree and that he had already written to you about it. Today Ryazanov (who has already spent about two days here) told me that he had received a letter from Gurevich, who informed him that official agreement had been received only from us, that so far there was still nothing from the Emancipation of Labour group, that he had seen Krichevsky and Ivanshin and was almost sure of their agreement to the conference, that the place suggested is Brussels and the date about June 4, and that the Bund organisation abroad[94] also wished to attend the conference.

Please write to them *as soon as possible* about the *official* agreement to the conference on the part of the Emancipation of Labour group (as the representative of *Sotsial-Demokrat*), and about your attitude to the question of place and time.* On the first point we wrote that we are in favour of Zurich or some place closest to it (and that Switzerland, of course, is the most convenient place also for the Emancipation of Labour group) and that we should

* I am repeating Gurevich's address, just in case: Mr. E. Gourevitsch, 38 bis Rue Gassendi, 38 bis Paris.

like the conference to be held quickly, if possible in May, for in June we have not so much free time at our disposal. (Our desire to hasten the conference is really to be explained by the fact that it is more advantageous to us to get it over quickly so as to begin our own organisation sooner and have time for preparing for a decisive fight against the Union in the event of a break. The fight, probably, will be shifted to Russia, too, in the summer.)

Please support our desire to hasten the conference* (putting forward any sort of grounds) and to hold it in Switzerland. I think they can hardly object to Switzerland, firstly, because two of the four (*Zarya* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* against the Union and *Borba*) are in favour of Switzerland; secondly, Switzerland is bound to be the natural place for a congress of representatives of the Swiss, German and French groups. Perhaps it would be possible to agree not on Zurich but on Basle, for instance? Let me know, please, when you send your official agreement.

I shall now tell you about Ryazanov. On the question of our organisation (the *Iskra* organisation abroad) he at first got into a huff when he learnt that we had no intention of enlarging the editorial board and were proposing only a deliberative role for them. He spoke with feeling about Nevzorov being a man who had a great past and services to his credit (exactly the way Nevzorov last summer spoke about Ryazanov!)—he expressed indignation, resorted to irony, and so on and so forth. But a little later, seeing that all this hadn't the slightest effect on us, he became disposed to make concessions. He declared that he, perhaps, would agree to our plan ("Nevzorov would never agree"), but the best thing would be a federation between *Sotsial-Demokrat*, *Zarya* and *Borba*, that *Borba* was ready to give up the idea of publishing its own organ (we never believed they could set one up) and confine itself to a series of pamphlets.

On the whole, it looks as if it will be possible to work with them; they may jib a little, but will nevertheless join in.

As far as a rapprochement with the Union is concerned, Ryazanov at first stated that he did not put any hopes at

* They are said to want it round about June 10. We don't mind.

all on the conference, that it was only Gurevich who entertained such an idea, and so forth. But when he learnt that we were not making the abolition of the Union a *conditio sine qua non*, and that we were ready to allow the existence of a scientific organ (*Zarya*) and a political newspaper (*Iskra*) side by side with a popular miscellany or workers' journal (*Rabocheye Dyelo*), he made a decisive change of front and declared that he had long ago spoken about this to Krichevsky, that he regarded it as the natural way of ending discord and that he himself was now ready to work for the realisation of such a plan. Let him do some work! Perhaps amalgamation *or federation* on such a basis will really occur—it would be a big step forward.

Another reason why we are in favour of Zurich, I would add, is that Alexei is anxious to have more time to talk over all kinds of matters with you.

If the questioning of all members of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (for an official answer to the *Borba* group) requires much time, please try, if possible, to shorten this time somehow. Delay in calling the conference is extremely undesirable.

Regarding participation of the Bund organisation abroad, we think it should be refused (without making a *casus belli* out of it in the last resort) on the grounds of paragraph 1 of the decisions of the Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1898. (On the strength of this paragraph the Bund is autonomous only in questions specifically concerning the Jewish proletariat and, consequently, cannot act as an independent party to negotiations.)

How about your article for *Iskra*? Do you intend to provide something for the second booklet of *Zarya*, about which G. V., of course, has told you?

With warmest greetings and best regards from all of us.

Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich
First published in 1925

Printed from the original

16
TO LYDIA KNIPOVICH[95]

How do you propose printing *Iskra* in Russia? At a secret printing-press or a legal one? If the latter, write immediately whether you have anything definite in view; we are ready to snatch at this plan with both hands (it is possible, we have been assured, in the Caucasus), and it would not require much money.* If the former, bear in mind that in our printed sheet (4 pages) there are about 100,000 characters [and that each month!]; would a secret printing-press be able to cope with that? Will it not waste a vast amount of money and people with excessively great risk? Would it not be better to use this money and energy on shipments, which Russia, in any case, cannot do without.

Written May 28, 1901
Sent from Munich to Astrakhan
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

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* If you have any more or less reliable contacts with legal printing-plants, talk the matter over with them without fail and write: to us; we have our own, very practical (and tested) plan on this score.[96]

17
TO THE *ISKRA*[97] PROMOTION GROUP

Doctor* should take up residence at the frontier, in Polangen for example (we have connections with the non-Russian side in those places, and we have also our own depot), study the local conditions (he would have to know Lettish and German there, but perhaps one could manage without that), try to find a plausible occupation (we are assured that it is possible to live there by private practice), establish good relations with the local petty officials and accustom them to frequent crossings of the frontier. The frontier there is crossed not with a passport, but with a *Grenzkarte*** (valid for 28 days). With such frequent crossings it will be possible to carry across (on one's person or in a suitcase by our method, which requires a small case for medical instruments) a little at a time, some pounds of literature on each occasion. It is very important for us that the crossings should be regular and frequent, even if with very little at a time. If the person will undertake to arrange this and do the work *himself*, we will give him the fare money and a couple of months' living expenses, until he settles down.

Written June 5, 1901
Sent from Munich to Berlin
First published in 1928 — Printed from the original

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* The identity of this person has not been established.—*Ed.*
** Frontier card, enabling people living in the frontier zone to cross the frontier.—*Ed.*

18
TO L. Y. GALPERIN[98]

в/з

A further shipment to Persia via Vienna was made only recently, so it is premature to talk of failure. It may be successful. Inform the addressee in Tabriz that he will be receiving books from Berlin and write us when they are received.

As regards arrangements for printing *Iskra* in the Caucasus, we have already sent X a *detailed* inquiry but have not yet had an answer.* We must know exactly what the plan is (whether a legal or an illegal printing-press), how feasible it is, what amount of printed matter it reckons on (can *Iskra* be printed monthly?), how much money is needed initially and per month. Our funds just now are very low, and we cannot make any promises until we have detailed information, which please send immediately.

Make every effort to obtain money. We have already written about this through X to one of your acquaintances and advise you to ask ZZ also to take up the matter; one of the members of the *Iskra* group already spoke to him about money at the beginning of last year (remind him of the conversation in a theatre in one of the capitals).[99]

As regards the Eastern shore of the Black Sea, you must look for routes without fail. Devote your efforts especially to the French steamships—we hope to find a means of contact with them from here.

Written between June 18 or 22, 1901
Sent from Munich to Baku
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

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* See p. 70 of this volume.—*Ed.*

19
TO N. E. BAUMAN

To Rook

We have just received news from Nikolai (=Ernst) of the shipment to him of 4½ poods, which he has in a safe place; that is the first thing. The second is that he *always* has an opportunity of getting our man together with the smuggler across the frontier and that such people are needed. So we make the following proposal to you: take a trip to the spot at once, travel with one of your passports to Nikolai in Memel, find out about everything from him, then cross the frontier by *Grenzkarte* or with a smuggler, pick up the literature lying on this side (i.e., in Russia) and deliver it everywhere. It is obvious that for success in this matter it is *essential* to have one more person from the Russian side to help Nikolai and exercise control over him, someone always ready to cross the frontier secretly, but chiefly occupied with receiving literature on the Russian side and forwarding it to Pskov, Smolensk, Vilna, Poltava. [We have lost faith altogether in Nikolai and his Co.; *we have decided not to give them another farthing* and we can hope to use this route only on condition that a wholly reliable man of ours takes a direct part in the shipments.] You would be a suitable man for this, for (1) you have already visited Nikolai once, and (2) you have two passports. It is a difficult and serious matter, requiring changes of residence, but it is also most important for us. Think it over carefully and reply immediately, without putting it off for a single day. If you are not prepared to undertake this job, we must find someone else for it immediately. Hence we once again earnestly request you to reply at once.

Written June 25 or 26, 1901
Sent from Munich to Moscow

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

20
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

July 7, 1901

Dear G. V.,

How is your work going? All this time I have been wanting to write you about the ending to Orthodox's article, i.e., the later addendum concerning Berdayev's article[100] in No. 6 of *Mir Bozhy*. Our *Struvefreundliche Partei*[101] rejected this ending by a majority of 2¾ votes against 1¼ (Alexei "divided himself" into ¾ and ¼)—I was left in the minority with my "*in favour*". They didn't like the note on romantic love either, nor the general character of the addendum. In my opinion, however, it gave a brief, sharp, clear and business-like rebuff to the gentleman in question; the concluding verses are especially good!

We are again told in letters from Russia that there is to be a congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—in one town even an invitation has been received. It is extremely important to make haste with the programme. Write, please, whether you are thinking of undertaking and can undertake this work. Apart from you and P. B. there is really no one: the formulation requires intensive thinking out, but with the bustle existing here, for example, it is quite impossible to concentrate and give proper thought to it. Those old drafts of the programme and the article (that is, one draft and one article) which Alexei brought you—and which he quite wrongly took back—are hardly likely to be of much use, are they? What do you think? If, however, you need them, we shall immediately send them to you.

I have ordered Shakhovskoi and Tezyakov.[102] Why do you need them for the programme? You are not thinking of drawing up demands for the agricultural workers on the basis of them, are you? And what is your attitude to demands

for the peasantry? Do you in general accept the possibility of such demands in the Russian Social-Democratic programme?

The proofs of your article have not yet come. *Zarya* No. 2 contains: Old Believer on *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, V. I. on Berdayev, I have written on the Witte memorandum and trounced the Preface[103] (I am thinking of sending it to you for your advice, but I don't know whether there will be enough time), Alexei has an essay on "The Tasks of the Socialist Intelligentsia"—you have seen it, what do you think of it? I shall write, too, against Chernov.* And will you do the review of the miscellany *At the Post of Honour*?

For *Iskra* (No. 6 is being set up and will appear in July, No. 7 should appear in August) we are expecting from you articles concerning the letter of a worker and on the "Rebirth of Revolutionism in Russia".

Parvus is still standing by his "organisation"!

Kautsky passed through here. He is going on holiday and does not promise to write anything just now;

Nevzorov has sent *Iskra* a "disgusting" (the comment of V. I. and Puttman) article against the article "Where To Begin"[104]—a hymn to the committees, a defence (evasive) of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, etc. We shall return it to the author (we shall make a copy and send it to you, if you like).

Yes, regarding the plan of federation or amalgamation with the Union, I hope you have seen our counter-plan? If not, ask Koltsov to get it from Dvinskaya. I doubt whether anything will come of this.

All the very best.

Yours....

Oh, yes, about the money from the Belgians for our movement. I think one-third should be given to *Rabocheye Dyelo*: for the sake of 50-100 francs it is not worth while to give cause even for talk.

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

* "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" see present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

21
TO S. O. TSEDERBAUM[105]

We have just received a letter with the plan of Pakhomy's Brother, Yablochkov and Bruskov. We cannot conceal that not only are we unable to agree with any part of this plan (though the first part is perhaps debatable), but we were simply astonished by it, especially by the second part, namely: 1) that everyone move to St. Petersburg, 2) that a regional organ of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia be established. So astonished that we apologise beforehand for any too sharp word that may slip into our comments.

It is unbelievable! After a whole year of desperate efforts we have barely succeeded in starting to form a staff of leaders and organisers in Russia for this vast and most urgent task (this staff is still terribly small, for we have only 2-3 persons in addition to the three mentioned above, whereas an all-Russia organ requires more than one dozen such energetic collaborators, taking this word *not merely* in a literary sense), and suddenly the edifice is to be dismantled again and we are to return to the old primitive methods! I cannot imagine more suicidal tactics for *Iskra*! A regional organ like the existing *Yuzhny Rabochy*[106] means a mass of money and personnel expended all over again on editorial offices, technical facilities, delivery arrangements, etc., and for the sake of what? For the sake of five issues in eighteen months! Even this it will not be able to do now in eighteen months, for *Yuzhny Rabochy* had the advantage of being founded by a full-formed Committee, i.e., by a whole organisation at the apogee of its development. At present there are only three of you. If, instead of combating the narrowness which makes the St. Petersburger forget about Moscow, the Muscovite about St. Petersburg, the Kiev

man about everything except Kiev, if instead of training people to handle all-Russia affairs (it takes years to train them for this, if we want to build a political party worthy of the name), if, instead of this, we shall again encourage primitive methods, local narrowness and the development of a Gothamite instead of an all-Russia Social-Democracy, it will be nothing but Gothamite foolishness, it cannot be anything else. It has been found out by experience how unequipped we are for creating a really political organ, how few contributors and reporters we have, how few people with political connections, how few practical workers to handle technical jobs and distribution.

Russia has *few* of them, as it is, without our splintering them still further and dropping an all-Russia undertaking that has already been launched and which needs all-round support, for the sake of founding a new local enterprise. At best, in the event of this new plan being a shining success, it will lower the standard of Russian Social-Democracy, lower its political significance, because there cannot be a "local" political newspaper, since in a local organ the general-political section is always bound to suffer. You write: a "mass" organ. We totally fail to understand what kind of animal this is. Do you mean to say that Pakhomy's Brother, too, has begun to think that we must descend to a lower level; from the advanced workers to the mass, that we must write more simply and closer to life? Do you mean to say our aim is to descend closer to the "mass" instead of raising this already stirring mass to the level of an organised political movement? Is it letters from factories and workshops that we lack, and not political exposures, political knowledge and political *generalisations*? And in order to extend and deepen our political *generalisations* we are invited to fragment our work as a whole into regional undertakings! And besides depreciating the cause politically they will inevitably depreciate it technically by the plan for a regional organ. By *combining* all forces on *Iskra*, we can set up a monthly newspaper (this has now been *proved* after a year's experience) with really political material, but in the case of a regional organ it is impossible just now to think even of four issues per annum. If we don't skip impatiently from one plan to another, and are not put

out by temporary setbacks and the slow growth of an all-Russia undertaking, it would be quite possible after six months or a year to achieve a fortnightly organ (which is persistently in our thoughts). We assume, of course, that Pakhomy's Brother, Yablochkov and Bruskov stand by the previous line, approving both the political trend and the organisational plan of *Iskra*, but if they have altered their views on these matters, that is quite a different question, of course. We are quite at a loss to understand why these people have lost confidence in this plan, and so quickly too (because they cannot fail to see that the new plan destroys the old one). Is it because of shipments? So far we have attempted only *once* to arrange a route and this attempt has not yet led to a complete failure—and even after two or three *failures* we ought not to throw up the sponge. Have not these people begun to sympathise with publication in Russia, rather than abroad? Surely they know that *everything* was done for the former and about 1,000 rubles spent, but so far without result. We must say that in general we consider that any plan for publishing any sort of regional or local organ of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia is decidedly incorrect and harmful. The *Iskra* organisation exists to support and develop the paper, and to *unite* the Party through it, and not for a *dispersion* of our forces, of which there is more than enough without this organisation. As for everyone going to St. Petersburg, we can only say that we have very few Party workers like P., B. and Pakhomy's Brother and we need to preserve them. Living in one place, the danger of a general roundup is a hundred times greater. If they find that one person there is not enough (it's for them to decide), let them add to him the one who is being released in the autumn (Pakhomy's Brother), but not both. And then, for the sake of both security and united work, let them not forget that it is extremely desirable to change their place of residence from time to time. If, finally, success were achieved in winning over the Committee in St. Petersburg, it should, of course, be made to devote itself heart and soul to *Iskra* and its more frequent publication, and to oppose all new primitive undertakings. Primitivism is a much more dangerous enemy than Economism, for *vital* roots of Economism, we are profoundly convinced,

are deeply buried in primitivism. And there will never be any political movement (political not in words only, but in fact, i.e., one directly influencing the government and preparing a general assault) until we overcome this primitivism and eradicate all belief in it. If St. Petersburg has bought 400 copies of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, the *Sotsialist*[107] group has set about distributing 1,000 copies of *Iskra* Let them organise the distribution of this number of copies; let them arrange for it to contain a detailed St. Petersburg section (if necessary, it will be a special supplement), and then there will have been accomplished the very task that has overshadowed for you all other tasks of winning over St. Petersburg. Let us remind you that all "practical workers" are agreed that *Yuzhny Rabochy* has no advantages over *Iskra* as regards accessibility to workers, so that this argument, too, falls to the ground. It is absurd and criminal to disperse forces and funds—*Iskra* has no money, not a single Russian agent is obtaining a farthing for it, and yet everyone is thinking up some new undertaking requiring new funds. All this shows a lack of self-discipline We must be more patient; by means of our plan we shall achieve our ends, albeit not so soon, whereas what can be reckoned on by implementing the proposed plan is clear from the lamentable experience of *Rabocheye Znamya*.[108] Our friends began to carry out their plan in such haste that Yablochkov travelled to St. Petersburg in defiance of the condition laid down, abandoning Odessa, in which the presence of our agent was essential. We demand that the new plan be discarded. If our arguments are thought unconvincing, let all new plans be put off until our congress, which we shall convene, if necessary, when the thing has been got going. As far as popular literature is concerned, the idea is to extend the publication of popular pamphlets. This letter expresses the opinion not only of our group but also of the Emancipation of Labour group.

Written in the second half of July 1901
Sent from Munich to Vilna
First published in 1925

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

22
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

July 25, 1901

Dear G. V.,

Yesterday I received the books on the agrarian question, Thank you for them. I am pretty deeply immersed in my "agrarian" article against Chernov (and partly Hertz and Bulgakov). I think this Chernov needs to be trounced *unmercifully*.*

Velika was here just now and read extracts from your letter to her. As regards the proofs, we have already done "everything in our power", i.e., we have sent Dietz corrections to be inserted in the text if it is not too late; if it is, we shall specify them *without fail* at the end of the book so that there will be no great harm done really. My wife read the proofs and compared them with the manuscript (the phrase on which you have made the marginal note, "I didn't have that!" proved to be a slip of the pen on your part. As I have just seen from the manuscript, you actually did write "the May uprising". We have corrected this too). Since proof-reader mistakes are unavoidable, we shall from now on apply the "tactics" proposed by you: we shall send the author the *first* proofs (the second will be too late), for him to correct not individual letters and characters, since that will be done by the proof-reader and is indeed not important, but *only places where the sense is distorted* by the omission of words and phrases or by the replacement of one word by another.

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* See "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

I received my article* from P. B. with his letter. P. B. is also in favour of toning it down. Needless to say, I have already *introduced* all the mitigations concretely indicated by you and P. B. As regards changing the whole tone of the article, or replacing all attacks by tongue-in-cheek edification, although I like this plan of yours, I doubt whether I *could* do it. If I didn't feel any "irritation" against the author I would not have written like that. But since there is "irritation" (understandable not only to us but to every Social-Democratic reader of the preface), I am no longer able to conceal it, and cannot exercise cunning here. I shall try to tone it down still more and make still further reservations; perhaps something will come of it.

I shall pass on to Alexei your comments on his essay (he has long been looking forward to them). He probably forgot to tell you that *he himself* passed his subject about Mikhailovsky on to Ryazanov (the latter is now writing it). I understood that you were writing a review of *At the Post of Honour*, which we sent you.

All the very best.

Yours....

If you see Koltsov, give him many thanks from me for *Volnoye Slovo*.[109]

O yes, I almost forgot. I should like to ask your advice on the following question. This same swine Chernov quotes F. Engels's article "The German Peasant" in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1900, No. 1, where *at the end* Engels says that it is necessary to "restore the Mark". I found this article. It turned out to be a translation of the *Anhang* to the *Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*—"Die Mark"; *moreover in "Russkoye Bogatstvo" at the end two paragraphs* (18 lines) *have been inserted which are absent in the original*. I compared all the rest of the translation paragraph by paragraph, but the devil knows where these two paragraphs have come from. This outrage ought to be exposed, only—isn't there a misunderstanding here

* "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

perhaps? Isn't there *another text* of this article by Engels? In a note to the Russian translation, the editors of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* say:

"This article of his (Engels) appeared in the eighties [in 1882? the preface to *Entwicklung* is marked September 21, 1882] in a German magazine [? *Neue Zeit*? or *Zuricher Sozialdemokrat*?[110] Do you know?] without his signature [?]. But in a copy of it, which Engels sent to one of his friends [sic! Danielson? Did you hear anything about this from Engels?] he signed it with his initials." In addition, it is said, the historical part of the article is identical with the preface to "Schlesische Milliarde" and with an article in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[111] (*April-March 1849*).

Could you help me to get to the bottom of this? Wasn't there *another text* of the article "Die Mark" in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* or elsewhere? Could Engels *later* have thrown out the end about "the restoration of the Mark"?

Sent from Munich to Geneva
First published in 1925 Printed from the original

23
TO P. B. AXELROD

July 26, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I have received and carefully read your letter (so has Alexei). I was very glad that you set out your remarks in such detail.[112] Only you are wrong in thinking that I am too ("pretty") "stubborn" . I have accepted *all* your suggestions about toning down definite passages (as well as all suggestions of G. V.), that is, I have toned it down everywhere. "A kopek on the ruble" will unite all the workers: I have added "in the opinion of the Economists" in brackets. Instead of "restriction of the autocracy" I have put "destruction", as you suggested. On pp. 82-83 I have *deleted* altogether what was incautious in the sense of our views on utilising the liberals (i.e., incautiously expressed ideas), as you advised. I have also inserted a note with a reference to your pamphlet *The Historical Situation*, pointing out that the question only slightly touched upon by me has been analysed in detail by you. I have inserted a couple of words to the effect that one can be glad of the greater understanding of the workers' movement shown by the liberals (in the person of R.N.S.). I have deleted altogether "regret" at the publication of the Witte memorandum with such a preface. I have also deleted some sharp remarks in the first and the second half of the article. In general, I am not at all so stubborn about toning down specific remarks, but as a matter of principle I cannot give up the idea that it is our right (and our duty) to trounce R.N.S. for his political juggling. He is precisely a political juggler—reading and re-reading the preface has definitely convinced me of this, and in my criticism I brought in everything that the last few months have shown us (i.e., *Verhand-*

*lungen** with "Calf", attempts at an agreement, etc.** I got a weight off my chest, so to speak, in settling accounts with this individual. I regarded elucidation of the constitutional nature of the Zemstvo as the crux of the whole article. Zemstvo liberalism is, in the sphere of its influence on society, the same thing as Economism in the sphere of the latter's influence on the workers. We must attack the narrowness of both the one and the other.

Tomorrow, probably, the question of the article will be *decided* here. If it goes to press now, I shall try to send you a copy of the first proof; you may have further suggestions, and we can still manage to touch it up (while the first and second proofs are being corrected).

I send you warm greetings and wishes for a good rest and recuperation. For this it would be best, perhaps, not to send you anything for the time being? So as not to spoil your holiday and treatment?

Yours,
Petrov

Write to Herrn Dr. Med. Carl Lehmann, Gabelsbergerstrasse 20 a/II, München (*für Meyer* inside).

Sent from Munich to Geneva
First published in 1925 Printed from the original

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* Negotiations.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 55-57 of this volume.—*Ed.*

24
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

July 30, 1901

Dear G. V.,

I received your letter from the country and the new books (*Final Report*, *Blondel et Vandervelde et Destrée*), for which many thanks.

I did not get Tezyakov[113]; *probably it won't come at all*, as it was ordered from Kalmykova's store[114] and *she is being exiled* from St. Petersburg *for three years* and *is closing down the store* (the latest and quite accurate news!).

I am sending you Kuleman[115] today.

As regards the forgery in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* concerning Engels,* I shall take all possible steps.

As regards reviews, we have little definite information. All are busy with their own articles (Velika—against Berdayev, Puttman with magazine notes=against *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, I with my agrarian article,** etc.). Moreover, there is still time for reviews.

I have sent my article against R.N.S. to the press after toning down a number of sharp passages.*** I have also written a postscript to it, in which I draw a parallel between an article of Dragomanov's[116] ("Knock, and it shall be opened unto you") and that of R.N.S., to the advantage of the former. There, too, I am toning down a few expressions (on Velika's insistence). But the general tone of my strictures can no longer be subject to radical revision.

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* See pp. 81-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Lenin was engaged on his article "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

*** "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5 and p. 81 of this volume).—*Ed.*

Letters from Russia say that our people are terribly taken with *Berdayev*. There you have someone who asks to be trounced, and *not only* in the specifically philosophical sphere! True, Velika is writing an article in connection with Berdayev's last article in *Mir Bozhy*.

I was very glad to learn that you and P. B. will be seeing each other and will start on the programme. It will be a tremendous step forward if we can come before our people with a draft like yours and P. B.'s. This is a matter that is most urgent.

All the very best.

Yours,

Petrov

Sent from Munich to the Canton of Vaux (Switzerland)

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

25
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

October 21, 1901

Dear G. V.,

A few days ago I sent you *Neue Zeit* No. 1, with Engels's article on the programme.[117] I think you will find it of some interest for your work, i.e., for drawing up the draft programme. Then today we sent you proofs; when you have read them, please send them directly to Dietz marked "*Druckfertig*"* as soon as possible.

I have selected a little material for a review of home affairs** and in a few days' time I shall tackle it in real earnest (at the moment I am indisposed—a touch of the flu after my trip[118]. Since after this work I shall have to get busy with *Iskra*, and then with the pamphlet, which I have been putting off for a long time,*** I have no time whatever left for the programme, and you are our only hope.

Could you recommend some Frenchman for letters from France? (Danevich will probably refuse.)

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

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* "Ready for the press."—*Ed.*

** "Review of Home Affairs" (see present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

*** The reference is to *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

26
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 2, 1901

Dear G. V.,

We have received your letter. We are planning to print your article in *Iskra* No. 10. No. 9 will come out in a few days; the delay is due to its having swelled to eight pages.

Did you receive Nos. 1 and 3 of *Neue Zeit* (when you have finished with them, please *return* them)? I sent them to you because they contain articles by Engels and Kautsky on the programme,[119] which may, perhaps, be of use to you. When do you expect to finish the programme?

You do not write anything about the review of the collected writings of Marx.[120] We take it that you will send it all the same—it is absolutely necessary for *Zarya* No. 2-3. Volume 4 will be published on November 4, containing letters of Lassalle to Marx, but it is not worth while writing a review of it now, so as not to delay publication.

I am finishing my review of home affairs.* Alexei has written about Lübeck. We have reviews: yours on Frank, three by Alexei + yours on the collected writings of Marx + perhaps Velika Dmitrievna's on *Svoboda*.[121] This will be enough.

Also,** *Zarya* No. 2-3 is ready and it is only a matter of the printing, which could be completed by the middle of November.

All the best.

Yours....

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* See p. 87 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** And so.—*Ed.*

P.S. I ask about the programme so insistently because we have to know whether, immediately after *Zarya* No. 2-3 has come out, there will be material for No. 4 to be given to the compositors. Dietz is pressing me about this.

If Ryazanov's article has not yet been sent—send it *immediately*, otherwise he will positively tear Alexei to pieces. Ryazanov (and Parvus with him) has been mortally offended by the postponement of his article and wants, it seems, to take leave of us. "You don't know your job as editors!", Parvus said to us.

How do you like that?

Written November 2, 1901
Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

27
TO THE *ISKRA* ORGANISATIONS IN RUSSIA

1) Yakov
2) The Moscow Committee
3) St. Petersburg + Nizhni
4) Bakunin?
5) "A Letter to the Russian Social-Democratic Press".[122]

We have just learnt that the Unionists are arranging a conference of the leading committees to decide the question of the conflict abroad.[123]

Every effort must be made to secure the adoption of the following measures by the largest possible number of committees and groups:

1) The conference must unfailingly be postponed at least until the spring (until Easter or thereabouts). Reasons: a) It is essential to have delegates *both* from *Iskra and* from the League abroad, and this requires time and money. A conference without delegates from *Iskra* and the League is invalid and senseless. b) It is essential to wait for the publication of the pamphlets of both sides giving the gist of the disagreements. Until these pamphlets come out the conference cannot have the knowledge needed for judgement and so its deliberations would be hanging in the air. *Iskra* No. 12 (appearing December 5, 1901) definitely promises that this pamphlet will be issued very shortly (in about a month and a half). All the disagreements will be analysed there in great detail. We shall show there how *pernicious* the *Rabocheye Dyelo* trend is, and reveal all their disgraceful vacillation and impotence in the face of Bernsteinism and Economism. This pamphlet is nearly ready and is rapidly approaching completion. Further, at the present time (mid-December, new style) reports on the

disagreements are being delivered abroad: one by a representative of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, another by a representative of the League. These reports too will very soon appear in print, and to call a conference before they appear is just a waste of money and a needless sacrifice.

2) We shall send a *special* representative to the conference, if it does take place. Hence it is *imperative* that we should be informed immediately (1) whether the conference has been fixed; (2) where; (3) when; and (4) the pass-word and rendezvous for the conference. The committees and groups must be *formally* requested to communicate this information on pain of the conference being declared invalid and of immediate publication of the fact that there is a desire to decide matters without having heard both sides.

3) If the committees or groups elect to the conference representatives with a bias in favour of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, it is essential to protest against this immediately and *formally*, and to demand representatives from *both Rabocheye Dyelo and Iskra* supporters (from the Majority and the Minority respectively).

4) In the event of the conference declaring against *Iskra*, it will be necessary to *withdraw* from committees and groups which do not agree to protest publicly against this—to withdraw and at once publish the fact in *Iskra* and give the reasons for it. Our people must begin right now to make arrangements for such a step.

5) We must be informed at once of the result, and kept informed immediately of *all* steps taken. *Every effort* should be made to ensure that *Iskra* supporters everywhere reach agreement and act in unison.

Written prior to December 18, 1901
in Munich

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

28
TO INNA SMIDOVICH[124]

We have received information that Akim is printing *Vperyod*.[125] We refuse to believe it and request you to ascertain whether this is not a misunderstanding. That people who have been collecting hundreds and thousands of rubles on behalf of *Iskra*, for the *Iskra* print-shop—people who represent the *Iskra* organisation in Russia—should go over secretly to another undertaking and that at a critical moment for us, when shipments have come to a stand, when the entire North and Centre (and the South tool) have flooded us with complaints at the absence of *Iskra*, and when the only hope was to have it reproduced in Russia, that people should have done this in such an underhand way, for Akim wrote us that he was printing No. 10 and we were so sure of it, while Handsome did not tell us a word about his magnificent plans—such behaviour, which violates not only all rules of the organisation, but also certain simpler rules, is simply unbelievable.

If this incredible news is true, we *demand* an immediate meeting to deal with this unprecedented depravity and, for our part, we earnestly request Yakov and Orsha to scrape together whatever money they can and immediately carry out their plan of coming here.

Written December 18, 1901
Sent from Munich to Kiev

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

1902

29
TO L. I. GOLDMAN[126]

Do you consider it essential that the existence of an *Iskra* print-shop in Russia be kept secret? That is to say: are you against our widely showing the Russian copy abroad?[127]

As regards the general maladjustment of our affairs, of which, according to the person who has recently seen you,[128] you so bitterly complain, we can be of little assistance. The Russian members of the *Iskra* organisation should form a solid core and achieve a proper distribution of *Iskra throughout* Russia. That is wholly a matter for the Russian organisation. If we achieve it, success is assured. But without it, maladjustment is inevitable.* For the sake of proper distribution and *prestige* it would be extremely important to print *Iskra* in Russia, every third or fourth issue, choosing one of more permanent interest. Perhaps No. 13,[129] for example, should be chosen.

But once you do print, print a *much* larger number of copies; we should try at least once to *satiate* the whole of Russia. Do you remember how you yourself complained of the small circulation?

Once again, best regards and congratulations on your success!

Written January 3, 1902
Sent from Munich to Kishinev
First published in 1928 — Printed from the original

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* Do you think Dementiev could act as distributor?

30
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

February 7, 1902

Dear G. V.,

I am sending you the draft programme with Berg's amendments. Please write whether you will insert the amendments or present a complete counterdraft. I should like to know also which passages you have found unsatisfactory.

Regarding religion, in a letter of Karl Marx on the Gotha Programme I read a sharp criticism of the demand for *Gewissensfreiheit** and a statement that Social-Democrats ought to speak out plainly about their fight against *religiösem Spuk*.**[130] Do you consider such a thing possible and in what form? In the matter of religion we are less concerned about cautiousness than the Germans, as is the case, too, in regard to the "republic".

Will you please let Koltsov copy from your copy; it will not take much time.

How is your work going (if you are writing an article for *Zarya*, as we assume)? When do you think you will finish it?

You have still not sent me *Neue Zeit* (Nos. *1* and *3*) and the *letter on the agrarian programme*! Please send them or write why there has been this delay.

I have ordered *Conrad's Jahrbücher*[131] for 1902 for you. *Wirtschaftliche Chronik* for 1901 will come out in February—it will be sent to you then. Have you subscribed to *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta*[132] and have you already begun to receive it?

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* Freedom of conscience.—*Ed.*

** Religious spookery.—*Ed.*

Have you heard anything more about the *Rabocheye Dyelo* people? We haven't heard a thing.

My pamphlet is being set up.*

Vorwärts has refused to publish even a condensed reply and the matter has gone to the *Vorstand*.** It is said that Bebel is on our side. We shall see.

All the very best.

Yours,

Frey

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1928

Printed from the original

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* *What Is To Be Done?* (See present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

** Executive Committee (of the German Social-Democratic Party).—*Ed.*

31
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

April 4, 1902

Dear G. V.,

I am sending you my article on the cut-off lands.* When you have read it, please send it to P. B. together with this letter, for *if* you keep to the plan which I originally supported (viz., that this article should be, so to speak, a general defence of our general draft), we must agree jointly on any necessary corrections. If, however, you reject this plan, then we shall have to make other arrangements.

In some places I have quoted the general part of the programme (the statement of principle) according to my draft; this will be altered, of course, if my draft is rejected. (I could then make some quotations from the Erfurt Programme,[133] if you had no objections.)

Velika Dmitrievna made some marginal comments without, however, suggesting definite changes in each particular case. Please write and give me your opinion on these points. On one of them, I should like to say a few words in my own defence. Velika Dmitrievna suggests deleting pages 79-82**; I, of course, would not go out of my way to defend them. But she has also discovered in them the programme's "encouragement of unfairness" in proposing not to give preference to small leaseholders (of nationalised land) but leasing to big and small alike *on condition* of fulfilment of the agrarian laws and (N.B.) proper cultivation of the land and livestock management.

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* "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed.*

** This refers to the MS. of "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 140-42).—*Ed.*

She argues: this will be a "crime", for "the rich will grab everything", while improved cultivation will deprive of work nine-tenths of the workers whom no agrarian laws will help.

I think this argument is incorrect, for (1) it presumes a very highly developed bourgeois society in which it is a rare peasant who can manage without wage-labour; (2) the "rich" can then obtain land only if large-scale farming is technically and economically "well organised", but this cannot be done all at once, hence the sudden transition that frightens Velika Dmitrievna cannot happen; (3) the ousting of workers by machines is, of course, the inevitable result of large-scale production, but we are pinning our hopes not on retarding the development of capitalist contradictions, but on their full development; moreover, improved cultivation of the soil presupposes a gigantic growth of industry and intensified efflux of population from the land; (4) the proposed measure will not only not help any "criminals" but, on the contrary, is the *sole conceivable* measure in bourgeois society for counteracting "crime", for it directly restricts *not only exploitation of the worker*, *but also plunder of the land* and deterioration of livestock. It is precisely the petty producer in bourgeois society who *especially squanders* the forces not only of people, but of the land and livestock.

If you, too, are in favour of deleting pp. 79-82, please give your advice on how to alter the note on p. 92.*

What is your opinion as to whether it is possible in general to publish the agrarian part of the programme (and the commentaries on it) separately from the programme as a whole, prior to the publication of the whole programme?

I received yesterday the proofs of V. I .'s article and sent them to Dietz. Yesterday I sent to your address the continuation of the proofs of her article. (To speed things up she could send the corrected proofs directly to Dietz.)

It is now three weeks since we last heard of poor Tsvetov. He has probably gone under. It will be a great loss to us!

All the very best.

Yours,

Frey

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 145.—*Ed.*

April 5. P.S. I have just received your letter. I have passed it on to our people. We shall answer in a few days.

Please send Berg's draft (which you call commissional)[134] *immediately* to this address: *Frau Kiroff*, *Schraudolfstrasse*, 29, III, 1. bei *Taurer*. *This is very urgent*, for they *have no copy* and do not understand your comments. (Personally, I would have preferred publication of both drafts, in the form of the "third way" proposed by everyone, but the majority, apparently, is now of a different mind.) I shall send you the agrarian books. Velika Dmitrievna, it seems, is ready to soften her "detraction" of the legal Marxists.

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

32
TO P. B. AXELROD

May 3, 1902

Dear P. B.,

The other day I sent you a "letter for K.",* without adding a single line from me as I was extremely busy. I hope you will forgive me?

I should like to have a few words with you now about the article on the cut-off lands.** I corrected it, taking into account *all* the suggestions and demands of the high collegium. Now it is being sent to G. V. *to be forwarded on to you*: don't forget to ask him for it should he delay it (Dietz's printing-press is standing idle!). Berg is satisfied with my corrections, but he has informed me that the strongest objections to the article came from you. If it does not disturb your work too much—please write and tell me the cause of your dissatisfaction. I am very interested in this. (If you are writing an article, please don't drop it for my sake, as this conversation is not a "business" one, but largely *post festum*.)

I find it difficult, for instance, to understand your insertion "...the heavy oppression to which the peasantry is subjected..." (of the survivals of serfdom). Firstly, it is superfluous, as it adds nothing to the *thought*. Secondly, it is inaccurate (it is not only the peasantry that they heavily oppress; moreover their harmfulness does not lie only in the "oppression" of one or other social stratum).

The programme has already been sent for copying and will appear as the leading article in *Iskra* No. 21. The

* Unidentified.—*Ed*.

** "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed*.

question whether or not I should write a criticism (permitted by the high collegium) I have not yet decided, for I want to read the programme in print over and over again "at leisure", and at present I have not yet fully recovered from the stunning effect of London.[135]

How are L. Gr. and Boris Nikolayevich? How is the former's work progressing? And how is the health of the latter? *We are counting on him very shortly* (*most probably*), and may he, therefore, recover fully and quickly.

With warm greetings and best wishes for your health,

Yours...

P.S. Inform B. N. that in Voronezh about 40 people have been arrested (it is said), and a letter received today gives the names: "Karpov, Lyubimov, Korostenev, Kardashev, Butkovsky, Makhnovets and Gubareva, the last four were released without being interrogated. In Ufa there have been eight raids and two arrests: Boikov and Sazonov, students." The Voronezh people were arrested (April 1) apparently "on orders from St. Petersburg—Kiev" (sic!). That is the *entire* content of one *direct* letter to us.

In general, there have been arrests galore! It is *almost certain* that those arrested include our Nadezha, whom you saw and recognised both in Zurich and among us—yes, yes, the very same! It's a very bad business!

N.B. Get L. Gr. to send immediately the issue you received of *Pridneprovsky Krai*[136] containing blank spaces.

Sent from London to Zurich

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

33
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY[137]

May 6

We received the letter. Wood, apparently, has been taken. It is essential that Claire should save himself and therefore should go underground without delay. The meeting with Sasha[138] (Wood managed to write to us about it) led to the appointment of a committee for convening a congress in five months' time.

Our *main* task now is to prepare for it, i.e., to ensure that our own *reliable* people penetrate into the largest possible number of committees and try to undermine the Southern Central Committee of the southern committees (=whirligig). This "whirligig", which is manipulated by a *Genosse* (someone has even accused him of being an *agent provocateur*, but that has not been verified yet), is the main obstacle (besides St. Petersburg). Hence the immediate task—that both Kurtz and Embryon join the committees at once. Next, that their example in one form or another is followed by Claire and Brodyagin. This is the main task, for otherwise we shall inevitably be ousted; subordinate everything else to this task, bear in mind the major significance of the Second Congress! Adapt ...* to this end and think about an attack on the centre, Ivanovo and others, the Urals and the South. The formal aspect is now acquiring special significance.

Brodyagin suspects provocation. There cannot be any here, we are already in London. It is very likely that many threads have been picked up from some of our arrested

* A word crossed out in the manuscript has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

people—that explains everything. Look after yourself as you would the apple of your eye—for the sake of the "main task".[139] If we (i.e., *you*) do not cope with it—it will be a great calamity.

Forward this letter to Brodyagin immediately and tell him to write to us without fail and more frequently; all his letters have arrived safely.

If it is confirmed that Wood has gone under, we must meet Claire or Brodyagin as soon as possible or correspond in great detail, if there are good addresses (?) for sending you *all* the details about Sasha (send an address for the bookbinding as quickly as possible).

Arrange the passport yourself, do not rely on us. Shouldn't Claire and Brodyagin change passports, since the former is already known to everyone?

Who will be the delegate from Moscow? Is he absolutely reliable? Has he a good successor? And so: again and again: join the committees. Is Nizhni reliable?

Written May 6, 1902
Sent from London to Samara
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

34
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

I have received the article with your comments.* You have fine ideas of tact towards editorial colleagues! You do not even shrink from choosing the most contemptuous expressions, not to mention "voting" proposals which you have not taken the trouble to formulate, and even "voting" on style. I should like to know what you would say, if I were to answer your article on the programme in a similar manner? If you have set yourself the aim of making our common work impossible, you can very quickly attain this aim by the path you have chosen. As far as personal and not business relations are concerned, you have already definitely spoilt them or, rather, you have succeeded in putting an end to them completely.

N. Lenin

Written May 14, 1902
Sent from London to Geneva
First published in 1925

Printed from the original

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* The reference is to "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed.*

35
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

June 23, 1902

Dear G. V.,

A great weight fell from my shoulders when I received your letter, which put an end to thoughts of "internecine war". The more this last seemed inevitable the greater the gloom such thoughts aroused, since the consequences for the Party would be most unfortunate....

I shall be very glad, when we meet, to have a talk with you about the beginning of the "affair" in Munich,[140] not, of course, to rehash the past, but to discover for myself what it was that offended you at the time. That I had no intention of offending you, you are of course aware.

V. I. has shown me also your letter about the article, i.e., your proposal to be given an opportunity of expressing your opinion in your programmatic article. Personally, I am inclined to consider such a decision the best and I think that the possibility of registering a 25 per cent difference (if it has to be registered at all) has always existed for each of the co-editors (just as you have already mentioned a somewhat different formulation of the question of nationalisation in the same article—or of the liberals in the review in *Zarya* No. 2-3). I am ready now, of course, to discuss with you once again desirable alterations in my article* and I shall send you the proofs for this purpose. Select anything you like. We ought to finish *Zarya as quickly as possible*; as it is the negotiations are dragging out terribly. In any case, I shall at once inform both A. N. and Julius of your proposal.

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* "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed.*

I have not yet received the proofs of your article and so cannot answer your question about the passage on Marx.

The letter of a Socialist-Revolutionary,[141] in my opinion, is hardly worth publishing; they have their own press—let them polemise there (for that's what it is with them—sheer polemics). About Belgium, it would be good to publish Rosa Luxemburg's article, if this could be done quickly.

All the very best.

N. Lenin

P.S. In a day or two I am going to Germany to see my mother and take a holiday.[142] My nerves are worn to shreds and I am feeling quite ill. I hope we shall soon meet in London?

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

36
TO G. D. LEITEISEN[143]

July 24, 1902

Dear L.,

My sister's address is: Mme Elizaroff. *Loguivy* (par Ploubazlanec), Côtes du Nord. Anya and Mother really do not like it here very much and they may go to some other place—they don't know where yet (you can address your letter *Expédition*). I am going home tomorrow. I liked it here very much on the whole and have had a good rest, only unfortunately I was a bit premature in imagining myself well again, forgot about dieting and now am again having trouble with catarrh. Well, all that is of no consequence.

Are you going to stay long in that country of yours? It would be a good thing if you were to combine the pleasant with the useful (your job) and take a good long holiday. Drop me a line about yourself when you return.

How do you like the result of the negotiations with L. Gr. and Yuriev? Did you reach full agreement and do you now hope for better results?

There is good news from Russia of the committees making a turn towards *Iskra*, even that of *St. Petersburg* (sic!). Here is a curious little example. They sent a pamphlet to *Rabocheye Dyelo*. There is a note there (on p. 9—we have been told exactly!) reading: "See Lenin's excellent book."* The Unionists here raised the alarm, and wrote to St. Petersburg: be so good as to delete it, you are hitting both yourself and us by it. Reply: don't hinder us from putting matters on a new footing, but give the pamphlet to *Iskra*.

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* *What Is To Be Done?* (See present edition, Vol. 5).—*Ed.*

This is *entre nous*, of course, for the time being. But it is characteristic!

I don't know whether St. Petersburg will maintain its new position.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Write to me in London.

P.S. I almost forgot. *Socialiste* notified me that my subscription expired in December 1901. Is that so? Haven't they made a mistake? I remember your going there once with Yurdanov's card. Didn't you keep some document, or do you remember without it?

Sent from Loguivy
(Northern coast of France)
to Paris

Printed from the original

37
TO P. G. SMIDOVICH[144]

August 2, 1902

Dear Ch.,

I received your letter, and I reply, to start with, in a couple of words: I don't feel at all well, I am all done up.

On the point you have raised, I have *not* seen a *single* letter. I think you are under a misapprehension. Who could think of "unorganising" the workers' circles, groups and organisations instead of increasing and strengthening them? You write that I have not indicated how a strictly secret organisation can have contact with the mass of workers. That is hardly the case, for (although that is *vient sans dire*) you yourself quote the passage on p. 96 concerning the need "*in as large a number as possible* (Lenin's italics) and with the widest variety of functions" for "a large number (N.B.!) [*a large number!!*] of other organisations" (i.e., besides the central organisation of professional revolutionaries).* But you are wrong in finding an *absolute* antithesis where I have merely established a gradation and marked the limits of the extreme links of this gradation. For a whole chain of links occurs, *beginning* from the handful making up the highly secret and close-knit core of professional revolutionaries (the centre) and *ending with the mass* "organisation without members". I point out merely the trend in the changing character of the links: *the greater the "mass" character of the organisation, the less definitely organised and the less secret should it be*—that is my thesis. And you want to understand this as meaning that there is no need for intermediaries between the mass and the revolutionaries! Why, the whole essence lies in these intermediaries! And since I point out the characteristics of the extreme links and stress (*and I do stress*) the need for intermediate links, it is obvious that the latter will have their place *between* the "organisation of revolutionaries"

* *What Is To Be Done?* (See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 466).—*Ed.*

and the "mass organisation"—*between* as regards the type of their structure, i.e., they will be less narrow and less secret than the centre, but more so than a "weavers' union", and so forth. In a "factory circle" (*needless to say*, we must aim at having a circle of intermediaries in each factory), for example, it is essential to find a "middle" course: on the one hand, the whole, or almost the whole, factory must inevitably *know* such and such a leading worker, trust him and obey him; on the other hand, the "circle" should arrange things so that *all* its members *cannot be* identified, so that the one in closest contact with the mass *cannot be* caught red-handed, cannot be exposed at all. Doesn't that follow logically from what is said in Lenin's book?

The ideal of a "factory circle" is quite clear: four or five (I am speaking by way of example) revolutionary workers—they must not *all* be known to the mass. One member, probably, must be known, and he needs to be protected from exposure; let it be said of him: he is one of us, a clever chap, *although he does not take part in the revolution* (not visibly). One member maintains contact with the centre. Each of them has an alternate member. They conduct *several* circles (trade-union, educational, distribution, spy-catching, arming, etc., etc.), the degree of secrecy, naturally, of a circle for catching spies, for example, or for procuring arms, being quite different from that of one devoted to the reading of *Iskra* or the reading of legal literature, and so on and so forth. The degree of secrecy will be inversely proportional to the number of members of the circle and directly proportional to the remoteness of the circle's aims from the *immediate struggle*.

I do not know whether it is worth while writing specially about this: if you think it is, return this letter to me together with yours, as material, and I shall think it over. I hope to meet the St. Petersburg comrade here and talk things over with him in detail.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from London to Marseilles

First published in 1928

Printed from the original

38
TO V. A. NOSKOV[145]

August 4, 1902

Dear B. N.,

I received both your letters and was very glad to see from them that the imaginary "misunderstandings" are really just *smoke*, as I already said in writing to Cook (I wrote that I was convinced of this).

You complain of our "agents". I want to talk this over with you—it is such a painful subject with me too. "Agents have been recruited too lightly." I know it, I know it only too well, I never forget it, but that is just the tragedy of our situation (believe me, tragedy is none too strong a word!)—that we *are obliged* to act in this way, that we are *powerless* to overcome the lack of management prevailing in our affairs. I am well aware that your words contained no reproach to us. But try to put yourself in our place and *adopt such an attitude* as to make you say not "your agents" but "*our* agents". You could, and in my opinion should, adopt such an attitude—and only then will *all* possibility of misunderstandings have been removed once for all. Substitute the first person for the second, keep an eye yourself on "our" agents, help to search for, change and replace them, and then you will speak not of our agents being "unpleasant" (such language is bound to be misunderstood: it is regarded as an expression of estrangement, it is regarded as such in general and by the members of our editorial collegium who have not had an opportunity of clearing up the question with you), but of the shortcomings of *our common* cause. The mass of these shortcomings weighs more and more heavily upon my mind as time goes on. The time is now fast approaching (I feel it) when the question will face us squarely: either Russia will appoint its

people, put forward people who will come to our aid and set matters right, or.... And although I know and see that such people are being put forward and that their number is growing, this is taking place so slowly and with such interruptions, and the "creaking" of the machinery is so nerve-racking, that ... sometimes it becomes extremely painful.

"Agents have been recruited too lightly." Yes, but after all we don't make the "human material", we take and have to take *what we are given*. We couldn't live without it. A man is going to Russia—"I want to work for *Iskra*," he says. He is an honest man, devoted to the cause. Well, he goes, of course, and passes for an "agent", although *none* of us had ever handed out such a title. And what means have we for checking "agents", guiding them or appointing them to other places? More often than not we can't even get letters, and *in nine cases out of ten* (I speak from experience) all our plans in regard to the future activity of the "agent" end in smoke *as soon as the frontier is crossed*, and the agent muddles along just anyhow. Believe me, I am literally losing all faith in routes, plans, etc., made here, because I know beforehand that nothing will come of it all. We "have to" make frantic efforts *doing* (*for lack of suitable people*) other people's jobs. In order to appoint agents, to look after them, to *answer* for them, to unite and guide them *in practice*—it is necessary to be everywhere, to rush about, to see all of them on the job, at work. This requires a team of *practical organisers and leaders*, but we haven't got any; at least, very, very few to speak of.... That's the whole trouble. Looking at our practical mismanagement is often so infuriating that it robs one of the capacity for work; the only consolation is that it must be a vital cause if it is *growing*—and obviously it is—*despite* all this chaos. That means when the ferment is over we shall have good wine.

Now do you understand why the mere remark by an Iskrist: "those agents of 'yours' are rather lightweight" can almost drive us to distraction? Try taking the place of these "lightweights" yourselves instead, we feel like saying. We keep repeating and even writing in our booklets that the whole trouble is that "there are plenty of people

and *there are no people*", yet we have this lack of people thrust under our nose. There is only one way out, only one solution that is *most imperatively* necessary, urgent in the most literal, unexaggerated sense of the word—for time will not wait and our enemies are growing too, including *Osvobozhdeniye*[146] and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and all the various new Social-Democratic groups, beginning with the lightheads of *Zhizn* and ending with the Borbist[147] intriguers. The solution is for the Iskrists in Russia to get together at last, *find the people and take the management of "Iskra" into their own hands*, for truly it is said: our land is great and abundant, but disorder reigns in it. People *must* be found, for *there are* people, but they must be guarded more carefully than the apple of one's eye, not merely in the direct sense of guarding from the police, but guarded for this urgent matter, without allowing them to be diverted by other, generally useful but *untimely tasks*. When, owing to a complete lack of people, we are *compelled* to seize on the most "lightweight", it is not surprising that we cannot stand by calmly watching others postponing our work "for later on".

If all the *present*, available supporters of *Iskra* were *at once*, without delaying, to take up the *management* of *Iskra*, its *independent* equipment with the means for sending across the frontier, its distribution, and supply of material, etc., we *would have already an actual Central Committee*, a C.C. disposing *de facto* of "agents" (for the C.C. and not the editorial board should dispose of the agents) and *managing* all practical matters.

It is being said: if there are no people, where is the C.C. to get them? But we do find the people, even if only lightweights. One heavyweight among ten lightweights does not take the lead, but the experience will not have been wasted. People learn in the course of the work: some drop out, others replace them, and *once things have been set going* it is ten times easier for the others to *take up* this work which has been running smoothly. If we were to set up a C.C. today (not formally), tomorrow it would be formal and would already be *drawing* capable people from every local organisation ten times more energetically than now. And it is only this "drawing from the local organisations"

that can create a state of affairs under which these local organisations would be properly *served*.

That is why I am so *jealous*, so devilishly jealous about Semyon Semyonich[148] and why the glance (the mere glance) at an "outsider" worries me. I can't adopt any other attitude, for unless the Iskrists say: this is *my* business, unless they say it out loud, unless they come to grips with the job, tackle it tooth and nail, unless they begin to upbraid the others for lack of tenacity [you once said to me: upbraid the Iskrists! And I replied: it is not I but *you* should do so, for only one who takes part practically in the work *itself* and who knows it thoroughly has the right to do so]—unless the Iskrists do this, it means that they *want* to leave us "only with lightweights", and that would be the beginning of the end.

It is time to conclude. I am extremely desirous that you and Cook should have as concrete an idea as possible of our position, understand it and say not you, but *we*. In any case, it is essential that Cook should write to us frequently, and *directly*, and keep us in *closer* touch with Semyon Semyonich and the latter with us.

As to your visit here, if you still have to be in Zurich, that is a different matter. Why are you feeling bad? Is your health quite all right? Should you not take a little rest?

I am still unwell, so it is no use even thinking of a journey.

Write me your opinion of Zernova and Sanin. I have heard something about the latter from various persons and got the impression that he is no worker, that he is much too "wild".* Is it true that Zernova is a bad person, that is, not merely in the sense of being fond of "adventure" (that, in itself, is not so bad) but as being unreliable?

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from London to Zurich

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

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* This word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

39
TO E. Y. LEVIN[149]

Dear comrades,

We were extremely glad to receive your letter informing us of the views and plans of the remaining editors of *Yuzhny Rabochy*.[150] We whole-heartedly welcome your proposal for the closest contact and co-operation between *Yuzhny Rabochy* and *Iskra*. The most vigorous steps should immediately be taken to consolidate these close relations and pass to *united activities* resulting from the unity of our views. In the first place, we shall avail ourselves for this purpose of your proposal to negotiate with Chernyshev.[151] Let us have his address. Is he going to be abroad (as we have heard) and will he not visit us?* Secondly, let us know also who your official representative is. Give us at once a direct address for letters to you from abroad *and from Russia*, as well as a rendezvous address to you. We have already taken steps for members of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia to meet you and confer about everything in detail. Not to waste time, we ask you, too, to write to us about matters in greater detail. What are the immediate practical plans of the editorial board of *Yuzhny Rabochy*? Is it in contact with the southern committees and does it have formal relations with them? From your statement that you intend to conduct affairs as they were conducted *prior to the formation* of the League of Southern Committees and Organisations[152] we infer that both the composition and *trend* of the present editorial board of *Yuzhny Rabochy* differ from the composition and trend which existed in the spring, at the

* From abroad, write to Dietz in *two envelopes*, asking him to forward immediately to the editorial board of *Iskra*.

time of the conference. What exactly is the difference between these trends, and what is the position adopted here by the southern committees, i.e., which of them support the trend of the League of Southern Committees and Organisations and which of them are in favour of your trend? What is your opinion of the extent of this divergence, does it prevent Party unity, and what measures are desirable for speedy achievement of solidarity? In what relation do the six provincial groups you have written about stand to the southern committees (and to the two trends which you have mentioned)? We should very much like you to help us to clear up fully all these questions, for that would be of great assistance in bringing closer together your friends and the members of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia working in the south.

Written August 22, 1902
Sent from London to Kharkov
First published in 1924 Printed from the original

40

TO V. P. KRASNUKHA AND YELENA STASOVA[153]

A *personal* letter to Vanya and Varvara Ivanovna. Please hand it immediately to them alone.

The news of Bouncer's "victory" has astounded us.[154] Was the departure of Kasyan and Hairpin really sufficient to deprive the Iskrists of the ability to act? Bouncer's protest could lead only to your proposing to him *to put it to the vote* and at once declaring by a majority, firstly, that on the substance of the question he is in an insignificant minority; and, secondly, that his complaint of violation of the Rules is ridiculous and petty-fogging (for, according to the Rules, the opinion should be asked of all who were present in St. Petersburg and the matter not deferred pending an inquiry of those who were absent).

If Bouncer raised (dared to raise) the question of dissociation, it was imperative at once to adopt a majority decision for his expulsion from the Union.

Obviously, Bouncer is brazenly heading "for war" and the Iskrists will be eternally disgraced if they do not reply to this by the most resolute and desperate war. Do not be afraid of any threats on the part of Bouncer, you have nothing to fear from publicity, treat the matter immediately as a war issue, as we have written above, and adopt the decisions proposed above as speedily as possible. Even if Bouncer carries still others along with him (even if only half or *less than* half of you are left) you should all the same go the whole hog and demand Bouncer's expulsion unconditionally, without being the least afraid of a "split" in the Union.

You should also put an ultimatum to the workers too: either a split in the Union and war, or a decisive condemnation of Bouncer by the workers and his expulsion.

We, for our part, are writing at once to 2a3b. We are *putting off* the publication of the St. Petersburg statement in *Iskra*.[155]

We repeat: the question has now become a *point of honour* with the *Iskra* people of St. Petersburg.... Of course, everything you do now must be done at a general meeting, to which Bouncer must be invited and minutes of the decisions taken. Send us the minutes at once.

Written September 24, 1902
Sent from London to St. Petersburg

First published in 1924 Printed from the original

41
TO P. A. KRASIKOV[156]

Dear friend,

I cannot find my notes on our meeting here.[157] In any case they are not needed. The meeting was of a consultative nature and you two[158] of course, remember what happened better than I do. I cannot reconstruct officially what took place, and I could not do so even if I had the jottings made exclusively for myself, sometimes not in words but by signs. If there is anything important that needs to be settled, write a definite proposal, send in an official inquiry to us (to the editorial board) and we shall answer at once. But if there is no occasion for it yet—well, we have reached full agreement on general tactics.

I was very, very glad to learn that you have rapidly gone forward in the matter of the O.C.[159] and set it up with six members. I am surprised only that you have co-opted others *before* the formal constitution, *before* the invitation of the Bund? Just the opposite was planned, wasn't it? Incidentally, this is not so important if you are sure that it will cause no inconvenience.

Be stricter with the Bund! Be stricter, too, in writing to the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo* abroad, reducing their function to such a minimum that in any case it cannot be of importance. You can entrust technical arrangements of the Congress to special delegates from you or to your special *agents*; don't hand over this matter to *anyone* and don't forget that the people abroad are weak in secrecy techniques.

Outline the congress *ordre du jour* only in general terms. Send us an enquiry asking to be informed of our (editorial) *ordre du jour*, who are our reporters and how many delegates

there may be from us (from the editorial board). Speed things up with the Congress as much as you can.

Try to provide mandates for those who have fled from Russia; that will economise expenses.

Be sure to inform us exactly of each and every official step taken by the Organising Committee. And one thing more: *Rabocheye Dyelo* is dying and it would be very valuable if you (on behalf of the Organising Committee) were to send them an exhortation, in serious but not abusive terms, on the importance of uniting, on the value of conciliation, and so forth.

And so, make haste! In case of need, we shall raise a little money.

Written November 11, 1902
Sent from London to
St. Petersburg

First published in part in 1920
First published in full in 1928

Printed from the original

42
TO E. Y. LEVIN

Lenin writing. We are very glad to note the successes and energy of the O.C. It is most important to exert every effort immediately to carry matters to a conclusion and as quickly as possible. Try to replace speedily the member from St. Petersburg (Ignat would be good) and write to us in detail about the attitude adopted towards the Organising Committee in various places (committees). Will Ignat see Fyokla[160] soon? We need to know precisely and speedily.

We have drawn up the list of questions approximately as follows (in the order for their discussion): 1) attitude towards Boris[161]? (If only a federation, then we should part at once and sit separately. We need to prepare everyone for this.) 2) The programme. 3) The Party Organ (the newspaper. A new one or one of those already existing. Insist on the importance of this preliminary question). 4) Organisation of the Party (basic principle: two central institutions, unsubordinated to each other. a) The Central Organ—ideological leadership. Abroad? b) The Central Committee—in Russia. All practical direction. Regular and frequent meetings between them and certain reciprocal membership rights or sometimes reciprocal co-optation. It is extremely important to prepare the ground in advance for securing the adoption of this basic principle and for making it fully clear to everyone. Next, the greatest possible centralisation. Autonomy of the local committees in local affairs—with the Central Committee having the right of veto in exceptional cases. District organisations only with the consent and endorsement of the Central Committee). 5) Various questions of tactics: terror, trade unions, legalisation of the workers' movement, strikes, demonstrations,

uprising, agrarian policy and work among the peasantry and in the army, agitation in general; leaflets and pamphlets and so on *and so forth*; here no special order has been adhered to. 6) Attitude to other parties (*Osvobozhdeniye*, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Poles, Letts, etc.). 7) Delegates' reports (*it is very important* that there should be reports from every committee, and as full as possible (they should be prepared *immediately* and for safety's sake copies should be given to the Organising Committee to be sent to us). Try always to characterise the local *Socialist-Revolutionaries* and give an estimate of their strength and connections in the reports). 8) Groups and organisations abroad (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, *Borba*, *Zhizn*, *Svoboda*.[162] A committee or the Central Committee to be charged with working out a plan for their unification). 9) May Day. 10) The 1903 Congress in Amsterdam.[163] 11) Internal organisational questions: finance, the type of organisation of the committees, the C.C. to take charge of shipment and distribution of literature, etc. Some of these, probably, will have to be discussed in committees.

I repeat, this is merely a preliminary draft and only the order of items 1-5 has been discussed here jointly. In this connection, among the members of the editorial board I was in favour of item 3 being put in one of the first places (i.e., in fact, third), but another member (Pakhomy) was for putting it after item 5. I consider it important to settle item 3 at the outset so as at once to give battle to all opponents on a fundamental and broad issue and to ascertain the entire picture of the Congress (alternatively: to separate on an important issue).

Find out whether you will have reporters and on what questions (*ad* 5—in detail).

What pamphlet does Ignat want published? Is it not the letter to Yeryoma*?

Be sure to obtain from *each* committee (and group) an official and *written* reply as to whether they recognise the Organising Committee. It is essential to have this at once.

I advise that the announcement about the Organising Committee should be issued in Russia as well (i.e., not

* The reference is to Lenin's "A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks" (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed*.

only printed in *Iskra*); issue it even if only in hectographed form.

We shall send the general editorial draft of the questions and the list of our reporters when we have made contact about this with all the members of the editorial board who are living in various countries at present.

Appoint immediately members of the Organising Committee in the chief centres (Kiev, Moscow, St. Petersburg), and give secret addresses for rendezvous with them so that we can be sure that all those whom we send are under the full disposal of the Organising Committee. This is very, very important.

Finally, one thing more: Ignat's meeting with Fyokla must be arranged to take place *after* 1) he has seen all and everyone he possibly can; 2) you have received from everyone official recognition of the Organising Committee; 3) you have *officially informed* "*Rabocheye Dyelo*" *as well* that they will have a plenipotentiary member of the Organising Committee. Only under these conditions can the meeting of Ignat and Fyokla lead to further important practical steps. Ignat should therefore make haste with these preliminary measures and not forget that he should come to Fyokla's equipped with formally acknowledged and *the widest* (N.B.!) plenary powers.

Written not earlier than
December 11, 1902
Sent from London to Kharkov

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

43
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

December 14, 1902

Dear G. V.,

There has been no news from you for quite a time and a lot of business and questions have accumulated.

First of all, about articles for *Iskra*. For No. 30 (No. 29 will come out tomorrow or the day after) we have Julius's article "Autumnal Summing-up". One more article is *essential*. How about you? Please let us know whether you are writing anything and when you are thinking of sending it, and also about a *feuilleton*; it would be very good to have in No. 30 the *feuilleton* you proposed against Tarasov's "little page".[164] I shall await your reply.

Next, about a pamphlet against the Socialist-Revolutionaries. L. Gr. told me and wrote to you that it would be best if you undertook it, for you could give, in addition to "dogmatic" criticism, the *historical parallel* with the seventies. I fully agree with L. Gr. that such a parallel is very, very important; but there is no use, of course, in my even thinking about it. And in general I should be very glad if you would undertake this pamphlet. I have little heart for it myself; besides, in addition to current business, I am now faced with the task of preparing for lectures in Paris (Julius tells me that they want to invite me there for three or four lectures on the agrarian question). And so, absolutely everything points to the pamphlet being your job—it is most definitely needed against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who must be picked to pieces in the most detailed and thoroughgoing manner. They are awfully harmful to us and our cause. Do write and tell us your decision.

L. Gr.'s answer to *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[165] was published in No. 29: you will receive it towards the end of the week—and you have already seen the proofs.

I learnt today that you will be at the international conference in Brussels (probably at the end of December or beginning of January[166]) and will read a lecture there. I hope you will not fail to drop in on us. We are right next door and the fare will be quite cheap during the holidays. And here, firstly, your lecture is very badly needed, as there are many *workers* here who are infected with anarchism (I discovered this when I delivered my lecture on the Socialist-Revolutionaries, which did not interest our people here[167]). You would certainly be able to influence them. Furthermore, and this is the chief thing, we have a heap of important subjects to discuss, especially as regards Russian affairs: the Organising Committee, after long preparation, has at last been formed there and it can play a *tremendous* role. It is of the highest importance that we should jointly reply to a *whole series* of questions which it has *already addressed to us* (questions concerning measures for uniting the Party, the agenda, *Tagesordnung*, at the general congress, what reports there will be *from us*, etc.—extremely important questions in general, and now of particular significance). Write, please, as to when exactly the conference in Brussels will be held, how long it will last and whether you will be able to come here. Further, it may, perhaps, not be out of place if at this conference you already make use in one way or another of the fact that the Organising Committee has been set up. Write soon and we shall get in touch with Russia: we may succeed even in getting some sort of statement or letter from them addressed to you, if needed.

Do you see the Zhiznites[168]? How is the "rapprochement" with them progressing and what are the chances? And what about the *Rabocheye Dyelo* people? You know, I believe it would be a good thing if they too took part in your "Marxist circle" and if we began (informally) to come closer to them. It is not worth while these days quarrelling with them, and there is no reason to, as a matter of fact: by replacing *Rabocheye Dyelo* by *Krasnoye Znamya*[169] they have in effect adopted our plan for "division of literary functions", and

(apart from the *silly* "clairvoyant") there is nothing *harmful* in Martynov's pamphlet *Workers and Revolution*.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

As for the Bulgarian,* I am to blame. I'm sorry. I did not write because there were no assignments to give, and it did not occur to me that you would worry.

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

* Unidentified.—*Ed*.

44
TO V. I. LAVROV AND YELENA STASOVA[170]

December 27

We have received Vlas's letter. We shall give you what help we can. We have long been aware of your plight and have been thinking of assistance.

But you must immediately and without fail write us an accurate account of the split in St. Petersburg. Answer the following points: l) Was the Organisation Committee (the summer one) elected by the League of Struggle[171] alone (=committee of intellectuals?) or by the Workers' Organisation[172] as well? 2) When exactly was it elected? 3) Is there a precise record of its powers (i.e., what it was charged with doing)? 4) Wherein lay the irregularity of its election, according to Bouncer and Co.? 5) Were there delegates from the Workers' Organisation (two?) in the Organisation Committee and by whom were they elected? 6) From what has Bouncer been chucked out—from the Organisation Committee or the Intellectuals' Committee or the Workers' Organisation? 7) What Workers' Organisation is it that now writes its declarations? A new one? A reorganised one? when? how? 8) Why have you not sent us the September leaflet of the Committee of the Workers' Organisation? 9) Why have you not issued even a handwritten leaflet against them?—or sent us a counter-declaration? Not one of their moves should be left unanswered. 10) What is this C.C. like now? Is there still an Organisation Committee? Are there workers on your side? Why haven't they formed a counter-organisation? Why don't your workers protest against Bouncer workers and their committee?

Send us immediately new, absolutely unused places of rendezvous for visitors. Do not give these (our) rendezvous to anyone else. Seek out beforehand a flat to shelter one person. Take special care to cover up traces of his contacts with the old members (Heron and others), who are probably being shadowed.

Written December 27, 1902
Sent from London
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

45
TO F. V. LENGNIK[173]

December 27

We have received the letter about the coup d'état* and are replying at once. We are astounded that Zarin could allow such a scandal! There you have the fruits of his mistake in not joining the Committee!—a step we were insisting on long ago. We shall not publish anything about the statement for the time being, for we have received neither the statement nor the letter against it. Commence hostilities by all means, make Zarin join, drew up a minute of the break (or the number of votes *pro* and *contra*), and issue a local leaflet on the causes of the split (or divergence). There is no sense in publishing the statement without such official documents about each of your steps. Be sure to put on record each step of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* supporters and of yours against them, and do not yield one iota. They must be shown up as being against the Organising Committee, whilst you are for it. It is on the basis of recognition (or non-recognition) of the Organising Committee that decisive battle should promptly be given *everywhere*; convey this most insistently to Zarin and his immediate *Genossen*.

And so, let Zarin display redoubled energy and fight for Kiev—that is his prime duty.

The literature is in Russia and should soon be in your hands. You *must* send not less than two poods to our people in St. Petersburg, *without fail*.

Written December 27, 1902
Sent from London to Kiev
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

* This refers to the capture of the Kiev Committee by the Economists, supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.—*Ed*.

1903

46
TO I. V. BABUSHKIN[174]

For Novitskaya from Lenin

Dear friend,

As regards the "examination",[175] I must say that it is impossible to propose an examination programme from here. Let all the propagandists write about the programme on which they are lecturing or wish to lecture, and I shall answer in detail. You ask for more questions to be put to you. Very well, only mind you answer them all: 1) What are the present Rules of the St. Petersburg Committee? 2) Is there "discussion"? 3) What is its position in relation to the Central Committee and the Workers' Organisation? 4) The attitude of the C.C. to the district organisation and to the workers' groups? 5) Why did the Iskrist workers tacitly permit Bouncer workers to call themselves a "Workers' Organisation Committee"? 6) Have measures been taken to keep track of every step of the St. Petersburg Zubatov organisation[176]? 7) Are regular lectures read (or talks arranged) in the workers' circles on the subject of organisation, on the significance of an "organisation of revolutionaries"? 8) Is propaganda widely conducted among the *workers* to the effect that it is they who should pass to an illegal position as frequently and extensively as possible? 9) Have measures been taken to ensure ten times as many letters from St. Petersburg, the flow of which has been held up for a disgracefully long time? 10) Is the idea being inculcated among all workers that *it is they* who ought to organise a printing-press for leaflets and the proper distribution of the latter?

There are ten questions for you. I send you warm greetings and await your reply. Mind you disappear at the first sign that you are being spied on.

Written January 6, 1903
Sent from London
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

47
TO YELENA STASOVA

We have received (from somewhere abroad) a new Bouncer document, dated October 1902, a programme and principles of organisation—muddled and pernicious. We are devilishly vexed and offended at your failure to send us immediately and directly (in two copies to different addresses all the St. Petersburg productions. It is simply outrageous that up to now we have not had the first leaflet of the Bouncer people (the July "protest" against the recognition of *Iskra*) and only learnt about it from *Otkliki*[177]! Surely it is not difficult to send leaflets when all letters arrive quite all right! More outrageous still is the fact that you hold up your replies so long. Ignat has told us that his leaflet replying to the Bouncer drivel was written a long time ago, but that you held it up and substituted another one, longer, feebler and more watered-down, only in the end to publish none at all! If it couldn't be published, surely it could have been sent here in a letter!

For Christ's sake, explain what is the matter; is it due to sheer bungling oversight on the part of someone in the Committee (or of the whole Committee?) or to deliberate opposition and intrigue within the Committee?

We cannot rid ourselves of the impression inevitably created by all this: namely, that the Bouncers are steadily ousting you, deceiving you and before long will kick you out altogether.

We would strongly advise electing Bogdan in place of the missing member of the Organising Committee from

St. Petersburg[178]; he fully deserves it. And in general, apparently, things will never advance an inch without professional revolutionaries.

Written January 15, 1903
Sent from London
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

48

TO THE KHARKOV COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

January 15

(From Lenin.) Dear comrades, many thanks for your detailed letter on the state of affairs; such letters are rarely written to us although we are in very great need of them and ten times as many are essential if we really want to establish a living connection between the editorial board abroad and the local Party workers, and make *Iskra* a full reflection of our working-class movement, both as a whole and as regards particular features of it. We therefore beg you to continue on the same lines, and at least sometimes to give us straight pictures of talks with workers (what do they talk about in the circles? What are their complaints? perplexities? requirements? the subjects of the talks? and so on and so forth).

The plan of your organisation, apparently, is suitable for a rational organisation of revolutionaries, insofar as it is possible to say "rational" when there is such a lack of people, and insofar as we can judge of the plan from a brief account of it.

Give us more details about the independents. Further questions: Are there no workers of the "Ivanovo-Voznesensk" school and tradition left in Kharkov? Are there any persons who once directly belonged to this Economist and "anti-intellectualist" company or only their successors? Why don't you write anything about the "leaflet of workers' mutual aid societies", and why don't you send it to us? We here have seen only a handwritten copy of No. 2 of this leaflet. What sort of group is issuing it? Are they out-and-out Economists or merely green youths? Is it a purely working-class organisation or is it under the influence of Economist intellectuals?

Are any traces left of the *Kharkovsky Proletary*[179] group?

Is *Iskra* read in the workers' circles? With explanations of the articles? Which articles are more eagerly read and what kind of explanations are required?

Is propaganda of secrecy methods and transition to an illegal position conducted among the workers on a large scale?

Try to make more use of the St. Petersburg Zubatov organisation and go on sending workers' letters.

Yours,
Lenin

Written January 15, 1903
Sent from London
First published in 1924

Printed from the original

49
TO YELENA STASOVA

January 16, 1903

We have just received No. 16 of *Rabochaya Mysl*[180] (from. Geneva) and No. 2 and 3 of *Rabochaya Mysl Listki* from St. Petersburg. It is now as clear as daylight that the Bouncers are fooling you and leading you by the nose when they assure you of their agreement with *Zarya* and *Iskra*. Come out with a militant protest immediately (if you are not able to publish it, send it here at once, in any case a copy), wage war vigorously and carry it widely into the midst of the workers. Any delay and any conciliation with the Bouncers would now be not only arch-stupidity but absolutely disgraceful. And so long as you have Bogdan, you can't complain of being shorthanded (help has been sent). Reply at once what steps you are taking.

Sent from London to
St. Petersburg

First published in 1928

Printed from the original

50
TO I. V. BABUSHKIN

January 16

We have received from Geneva *Rabochaya Mysl* No. 16 (evidently published and even written by *Svoboda*, i.e., by Nadezhdin) already labelled as the organ of the St. Petersburg Committee. It has a letter of the Bouncers making a correction, a trivial correction, strictly speaking not a correction at all but a *compliment* to *Svoboda*. If the Bouncers assure you of their solidarity with *Zarya* and *Iskra*, that is obvious deception, the sheer humbug of people who are playing for time in order to gain strength. We earnestly and insistently advise you therefore to issue immediately (and if you cannot issue it, send it here) a leaflet protesting in the name of the Committee and in general to refute all conciliatory manoeuvres and approaches, and to launch a vigorous war, a ruthless war, against the Bouncers, with an exposure of their defection from Social-Democracy to the "Revolutionary-Socialist" *Svoboda*. We approve the energetic behaviour of Novitskaya and once again ask you to continue in the same militant spirit, without allowing the slightest vacillations. War on the Bouncers and to hell with all conciliators, people of "elusive views" and shilly-shallyers! Better a small fish than a big beetle. Better two or three energetic and wholly devoted people than a dozen dawdlers. Write as often as possible and, *without delay*, give us access to your workers (and a characterisation of them) so that in case of arrests we shall not be stranded.

Written January 16, 1903
Sent from London
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928

Printed from the original

51
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

January 27

Old Man writing. I have read your angry letter of January 3 and am replying at once. Regarding correspondence, dogs,[181] etc., the secretary[182] will reply below: I can no longer make out who is to blame but we absolutely must be in constant touch, not less frequently than twice a month, but so far this has not been the case and we have heard nothing about you for long periods at a time. Don't forget that when we have no letters, we can't do anything, we do not know whether people are alive or not; we are compelled, simply compelled, to consider them almost non-existent. You did not answer my question about Brutus's transference; apparently, there is little hope of any good arrangement until this transference takes place. Now to business. In criticising us, you overestimate our strength and influence; we reached agreement here about the Organising Committee, we insisted on its meeting, on your being invited, and we wrote to you. We could do nothing more than that, absolutely nothing, and we do not answer for anything. The trouble is that Brutus was not in the Organising Committee, and all subsequent action was taken without him (as also without us) We have not accepted an unknown member (he is of the dawdler type, unintelligent; I knew him personally in Pskov, tied down by family and place, backward, no good at all, Pankrat had already been criticised because of him), we have not transferred the bureau, we have given absolutely no "power" to Pankrat. But when it turned out that Pankrat was the sole (N.B., N.B.) mobile person of the Organising Committee, the result could not but be power as well. You write: there are people, but we do not have them, do not know them, do not see them. We have worked ourselves up to neurasthenia over the total lack of persons for the Organising Committee, which requires mobile, flying, free and illegal people. Pankrat alone went over to illegality, travelled,

began to fly, began to know everything—and assumed the rank of corporal as a matter of course. We did not interfere, naturally, because we neither could interfere nor wanted to interfere; there was no other! Try to understand this. Pankrat is indolent and careless, but he is clever, sensible, knows the job, knows how to fight and is a man you can get on with. Now he is stranded [in Paris] indefinitely, and we are going for him baldheaded, driving him to Russia, as otherwise the Organising Committee is nothing but a cipher. "She" (Akim's brother) will go shortly, we shall try to get "her" into the O.C.; "she", I believe, is energetic. Pen does not want to go away. There are no passports, and no copies. If Brutus moves to a nearby, lively place, we shall help him to get the bureau back,[183] and everything will be straightened out, perhaps. Otherwise everything will proceed (if it does proceed) by the will of Allah, the will of Pankrat, and "her" will, and we are powerless in the matter.

The literature has been sent off. Over 40 poods have been shipped. We are publishing the statement of the Organising Committee in No. 32, which will come out the day after tomorrow.

Uncle, too, is still standing aside (like Brutus) and has not even gone anywhere; if only he and Brutus would settle in *Poltava* at least, they would take over the bureau.

I am very annoyed with Zarin; his letters convey nothing, he is inert, knows nothing about Kiev, and has allowed a split to take place under his very nose. To keep aloof from local affairs to such an extent is simply outrageous! Is it our fault that, of the two "equal members" of the Organising Committee, Zarin "sits and says nothing", while Pankrat at least is stirring a little? I think (I don't know for certain) that Zarin is a person with little initiative and one who is tied down by legality and place. And now such people, alas, remain aloof, and through no fault or will of ours.

Written January 27, 1903
Sent from London to Samara

First published in 1928 Printed from the original

52

TO THE UNION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ABROAD[184]

To the Union of Russian Social-Democrats

In reply to the letter of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats to the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy, received by us on February 4, 1903, we hasten to inform the Union of Russian Social-Democrats that we entirely share its opinion as to the need to form a foreign section of the Organising Committee in Russia. It is true that we cannot at all agree with the opinion of the Union of the R.S.D. that the Organising Committee "wrongly or inaccurately ascribes its origin to private initiative", for the O.C. refers directly to the decision of the conference (the O.C. was in fact set up in fulfilment of such a decision). Moreover, the O.C. was formed by organisations which took part in the conference. The fact that the O.C. has not straight away and without inquiring the opinion of the remaining Party organisations declared itself an official Party body is, in our view, evidence of the Organising Committee's correct understanding of its tasks, and of its tact and caution, which are so important in a serious Party matter.

It should be said at once, though, that we do not attach any great importance to our above-mentioned disagreement with the Union of the R.S.D.; on the contrary, we have every hope that this disagreement will be easily dispelled with the development of the Organising Committee's activity.

Further, we would consider it inexpedient, even not quite lawful on our part, "to proceed *immediately* to constitute a foreign section of the O.C.", unless there was a direct invitation from the O.C. in Russia. We have been informed

that the O.C. has already written to the Bund in Russia and to the Union of the R.S.D. Abroad. We do not have the text of either letter. In any case, it follows from the above that the O.C. in Russia is already taking steps in this direction. It would hardly be wise on our part to begin to act without waiting for the result of these steps of the Organising Committee.

We consider it our duty to bring the letter of the Union of the R.S.D. immediately to the notice of the O.C. in Russia and at the same time we shall communicate to the O.C. our opinion of the desirability of the O.C. in Russia immediately setting up its foreign section. We would suggest waiting for a reply from the O.C. in Russia. If, however, the comrades of the Bund Committee Abroad and of the Union of the R.S.D. consider that, before receiving this reply, it would be useful to arrange a *private meeting* of representatives of the Bund Committee Abroad, the Union of the R.S.D., and the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy, we would not, of course, refuse to take part.

The League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy

Written February 4 or 5, 1903
Sent from London to Paris
First published in 1930 Printed from the original

53
TO Y. O. MARTOV[185]

February 5, 1903

I am sending you a copy of the Union's letter and the draft of our reply.* The reply was sent to Plekhanov who was to await your letter from Paris. Arrange a meeting with P. Andr. and Boris immediately and answer Plekhanov *as quickly as possible* whether you are satisfied with the reply or whether changes are required. It would be desirable, of course, not to delay the reply to the Unionists, but if changes are voted it will entail a pretty long delay; perhaps unimportant changes can be disregarded. But, of course, if there is disagreement on the substance of the question, it will be necessary to hold up the reply (I am writing to Plekhanov about this) and have everyone vote.

In my opinion (with which V. I. and L. Gr. agree) the most important thing here is that 1) the foreign section of the O.C.[186] should be precisely a section of the Organising Committee in *Russia*. The Unionists' idea, I believe, is to have *two* sections with equal rights: one in Russia, the other abroad. By no means can we accept or allow such an interpretation. The O.C. in Russia must act cautiously (in this respect its announcement is admirably drawn up), but in *all* matters and in *all* approaches made to it, must *behave* with the utmost formality and rigour, that is to say, in such a way that it, the O.C. in Russia, controls everything and *no one* in the Party can do *anything* of a general Party character or in the way of general obligations, *unless authorised to do so by the Organising Committee in Russia.*

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* See pp. 139-40 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Yet the Unionists, by their letter, recognise (or almost three-quarters recognise) the O.C. and the more they recognise it, the more formally and firmly must the Organising Committee behave. It is of the highest importance to adopt the right tone from the very beginning and to take such a stand that the Party position is made quite clear: *either* recognition of the *present* O.C. and *subordination* to it, *or* war. *Tertium non datur.** Even now there is every chance of obtaining *general* recognition, without offending or irritating anyone, but without giving way *in the slightest degree.*

2) The O.C. should reduce the functions of *its* foreign section to a minimum. The foreign section only "deals with" affairs *abroad* (in the sense of preparing for unity) and *assists* the Russian section. On every other question that goes the least beyond those limits, the foreign section of the O.C. *must request the opinion and decision of the Organising Committee in Russia.* I strongly urge, therefore, that the O.C. in Russia should *as soon as possible* write a letter to the Union, the League and the Bund proposing that they should form *a section of their own for exercising such-and-such functions.* It is essential that the O.C. in Russia should indicate the "limits of authority" to its foreign section, and I propose below an outline of these functions with *three* and only three strictly limited items. I earnestly request you to discuss this draft as quickly as possible with P. A. and Boris and confirm it (alternatively, put changes to the vote). (We shall send all these data to Yuri[187] as well, asking him to await the arrival of P. A. and Boris, who should do everything to hasten their arrival.)

(Of course, P. A. could write a letter to the League, the Union and the Bund Committee Abroad from here, but I think this is in the highest degree undesirable, for people will suspect a put-up job and a fiction. Better to wait a week or two, and have the letter sent without fail from Russia.)

I also believe we must think of electing a member of ours to the O.C. (the foreign section) and vote on it in advance, for owing to the members being in different places

* There is no third way.—*Ed.*

this can take much time and it will be unpleasant if things have to wait on this account. For my part, I vote for L. Gr.

I positively do not have time to write to Plekhanov as well. You will simply forward to him *at once both this letter and the reply to the Union*, and meanwhile I will drop him a line.

All the best.

Lenin

Sent from London to Paris

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

54

TO THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To Nizhni

As regards the appeal, I (Lenin) find your decision reasonable[188]—I have not had time yet (nor a chance) to consult my associates.* The courage of the Nizhni-Novgorod workers, who asked that their personal well-being should not be taken into account, ought to be mentioned in *Iskra*; it would be desirable for you to write a letter about this to the editors.

We received via Berlin the "Letter to the *Iskra* Editorial Board from the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee", a long letter, about terrorism, with a defence (partial and conditional) of terrorism; the end is missing (apparently). Write *immediately*:

1) Did the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee send this letter officially?

2) Repeat the end of it (the letter has seven paragraphs and ends with the words: "They clear the atmosphere, which is often too heavy, they teach the government to handle the revolutionaries more carefully").

3) Let us know whether you allow stylistic corrections (in some places the style is very bad, due perhaps to incorrect, hasty and unclear copying).

We shall probably publish the letter together with our reply.

We earnestly and *insistently* beg you to inform us in your letters without delay of every official step taken by the Committee (dispatch of a document for travelling war-

* I may yet be able to return to this question.

rants..., list of leaflets, answer to another committee or to a group abroad, and so on and so forth). Otherwise there are bound to be misunderstandings,* mistakes and bureaucratic delays. Iskrists should pull together and inform *Iskra* speedily and comprehensively.

All the very best.

Written prior to February 23, 1903
Sent from London
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

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* For example, we have heard a lot of tittle-tattle and abuse about the Committee's leaflet *against* a demonstration on the day of the trial.[189] The leaflet itself we received not long ago *by chance* from Berlin, and with delay. Good heavens! This is simply outrageous! Surely it wasn't difficult for the Committee to write to us about the *leaflet* and send us a copy of it *as soon as it came out*. For heaven's sake, take all the necessary steps to correct these shortcomings.

55

TO THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE WITH THE TEXT OF NADEZHDA KRUPSKAYA'S LETTER

I have received the letter of the O.C. I suggest answering like this:

"In our opinion, the question of the '*ordre du jour*' stands as follows. This question of the agenda will be definitely *settled* by the *Congress itself*, and only by the Congress. Consequently, it is quite useless to dispute about the right to vote on this point. Further, the *bulk* of the committees have already recognised the '*exclusive* initiative' of the O.C. in convening the Congress. Hence it follows that the *preliminary* preparation for the Congress, including *preliminary preparation* (or propaganda) of the *ordre du jour*, is *exclusively* a matter for the Organising Committee. It is, therefore, altogether superfluous to propose that anyone should *vote* as well on a '*preliminary*' *ordre du jour*; it cannot have any *decisive* significance. Furthermore, it will merely *cause* both delay and dissatisfaction, for there will be people who will be *offended* (committees that were not consulted), and people who will *inevitably* be dissatisfied and complaining. Consequently, from the standpoint of both formal loyalty and tact *no formal* decision should be taken about collecting the votes of the committees or of anyone at all. It would only undermine the authority of the Organising Committee if it renounces the *exclusive* initiative entrusted to it.

"If it is very inconvenient now to alter an adopted (and formally unexceptionable) decision, there may be, perhaps, the following way out: turn the voting (of the committees) into a *consultation* with them, that is to say, adopt a decision that as far as possible the O.C. will try to make use of meetings and talks for *consultation*.

"Finally, we advise making haste with the Congress. The sooner you convene it, the better. And set to work immediately and more actively *preparing the committees*, nominating delegates, winning over *Nikolayev* and Odessa. The important thing is to make perfectly sure of a safe majority of firm Iskrists."

Nevzorov disgraced himself yesterday, and Charles Rappoport and Krichevsky gave him a dressing down. There were no Iskrists.[190]

I shall be leaving probably on Sunday. The trains arrive not at 6 but at 3.45 and 10.45. With one of them, probably.

Yours....

Written March 5 or 6, 1903
Sent from Paris to Kharkov
First published in 1928

Printed from the original

56
TO THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE

Letter to the O.C.

We have just received the rules of the Congress. It appears that we did not understand you and replied about the *ordre du jour* when you were asking about the *rules* of the Congress. We hasten to say that on the whole we are very satisfied with your draft, which is carefully and sensibly drawn up. Clause 19, which has evoked dispute, seems reasonable to us; to exclude certain organisations from the Congress (and, in the final analysis, the rules are precisely regulations for the exclusion of some and the granting of rights to others) is in fact inconvenient and impossible without the agreement of the majority of the committees. Our only advice would be to fix a formally binding period as short as possible (for example, not more than a week) in the course of which the committees and organisations are *obliged* to draw up and send in their amendments to the draft rules. This is essential in order to avoid delay, which is most of all to be feared. (It is probably through fear of delay that Ignat, too, protested. We understand his fears, but if you are able to complete the interrogation quickly, the matter can be put right.)

For our part, we shall write to the *Iskra* organisations about our advice that your draft should be accepted immediately and completely. We earnestly request you to make use of every facility to ensure that the dispatch and communication of the draft (on the basis of § 19), the "session" of the arbitration courts, and determination of the composition of the deputies will be completed within a month at the latest.

In this connection we advise you informally to recommend all qualified organisations to appoint *as far as possible* one (or two) delegates from among comrades living abroad who are known for their past work—in order to avoid extra expenses and difficulties involved in sending delegates abroad.

We formally propose 1) to supplement your draft only by a note to § 19: "Organisations which have not presented their comments within a week from the date of receipt of the draft will be regarded as having accepted the draft rules of the Congress"; 2) to make provision for alternate delegates in the event of delegates being arrested before the Congress.

Written between March 6 and 9, 1903
Sent from Paris to Kharkov
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

57
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

March 15, 1903

Dear G. V.,

I have received your letter. You are writing "The Ides of March", that is excellent. The *dead-line* is March 25, 1903—the article must be here. *We expect it without fail.*

Maslov's book is being sent to me in a few days from Paris (I shall ask them to make haste) and I shall send it on to you *at once*.[191] It contains interesting data on the harm of the village commune, which I quoted in Paris.[192]

I had already ordered David's book and am now reading it. Terribly watery, poor and trite. I am trying to finish it quickly so as to send it on to you. Have you seen Kautsky's articles on this "neo-Proudhonist"[193]?

I have now set to work on a popular pamphlet for the peasants on our agrarian programme.* I should very much like to demonstrate our idea of the class struggle in the countryside on the basis of *concrete* data on the four sections of the village population (landowners, peasant bourgeoisie, middle peasantry, and semi-proletarians together with proletarians). What do you think of such a plan?

From Paris I came away with the conviction that only such a pamphlet could dispel the perplexities about the cut-off lands, etc.

About the Manifesto of February 26 I have written an article which will appear in No. 34.** I have categorically insisted that it should be the leading article in view of the *tremendous* importance of the Manifesto. It seems, how-

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* *To the Rural Poor* (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed.*

** "The Autocracy Is Wavering" (see present edition, Vol. 6).—*Ed.*

ever, that V. I. is *wavering* (!) and together with Y. O. is deciding the other way round: first about Marx.

In my opinion, this is even preposterous.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

58
TO THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE

We advise that steps be taken immediately to have the O.C. together with the Polish Social-Democrats issue a formal declaration (as detailed and precise as possible) on their full solidarity with the Russian S.D.L.P. and their desire to join the Party. On the basis of such a formally published statement the O.C. could invite the Polish Social-Democrats to the Congress. Then, surely, no one will protest.[194]

Next (privately), we earnestly request you everywhere and among everyone to prepare the ground for a struggle against the Bund at the Congress. Without a stubborn struggle the Bund will not surrender its position. And we can never accept its position. Only firm determination on our part to go through to the end, to the expulsion of the Bund from the Party, will undoubtedly compel it to give way.

Make haste with the list; it is very important and must be done quickly, without waiting for a reply from the committees. By the way, were the committees given a short time within which to reply? Are you keeping a list of the delegates already appointed? (Send it to us as an additional precaution.)

Written March 31, 1903
Sent from London to Kharkov
First published in full in 1928 Printed from the original

59
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

(The Old Man.)

There is little I can tell you this time. The main thing now, in my opinion, is to make every effort to expedite the Congress and ensure a majority of intelligent (and "our") delegates. Almost all our hope is on Brutus. As far as possible, he should himself keep an eye *on everything*, especially the delegates, and try to get the maximum number of our people appointed. The system of two votes from each committee is very favourable for this. Next, the question of the Bund is very important. We have stopped the polemic with it over the O.C., but not, of course, the polemic over principles. That is out of the question. We must make everyone understand, simply "ram it into every head", that it is necessary to prepare for war against the Bund if we want peace with it. War at the Congress, war even to the extent of a split—whatever the cost. Only then will the Bund be sure to surrender. We absolutely cannot accept, and never will accept, the stupid idea of federation. At the very most—autonomy according to the old Rules of 1898 with a delegate appointed by the C.C. taking part in the C.C. of the Bund. We must prepare our people, we must explain the stupidity and demonstrate the absurdity of the attack on Ekaterinoslav,[195] and so on. Please write speedily and let us know what the feeling is in this respect, how your propaganda is going and whether there is any hope of the majority taking the right stand. We should like to issue a pamphlet to the Jewish workers on the necessity of a close union and the stupidity of federation and "national" policy.

Written April 3, 1903
Sent from London to Samara
First published in full in 1928 Printed from the original

60
TO THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE

April 6, 1903

In transmitting to the O.C. the inquiry of the foreign section of the O.C.,[196] we for our part earnestly advise you not to widen the functions of the foreign section in any way and not to allow it to extend its bounds by a single inch, as it is making every effort to do. In the interests of the work, the functions of the foreign section of the O.C. should in no way go beyond preparing the secret part of the Congress, collecting money and, at most, discussion of the conditions for uniting the Social-Democratic organisations abroad in the form of a *preliminary* preparation of this question. Regarding point 1 a), we are strongly against giving the address of the O.C.'s foreign section to the committees. The functions of the foreign section being what they are, this is quite pointless. It is not without its dangers in the sense of causing delay and confusion. As regards publicity, it should be frankly stated that everything will be published in *Iskra* (the formal basis for this is its recognition by the majority of the committees). Other organisations should be formally recommended to reprint all the statements of the O.C. from *Iskra*. As regards contact between the O.C. and its foreign section, we advise the following arrangement: the O.C. will communicate *with Deutsch* through the usual channels (*Deutsch* is the secretary of the O.C.'s foreign section, which also includes *Alexander and Lokhov*). And you will communicate with Deutsch through us, as before. This is quite natural; the foreign section of the O.C. elected a secretary and you have endorsed his election.

To the second question we advise that you reply by agreeing, and to the third by an explanation that the agenda will be presented and is already being prepared.

Sent from London to Kharkov
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

61
TO YEKATERINA ALEXANDROVA[197]

Private, from Lenin

I have road your long letter, for which many thanks. Better late than never. You ask me not to be very cross. As a matter of fact, I was hardly cross at all, and was more inclined to smile at the recollection of my last conversation at the door of the "den"[198] with a certain Jacques, who considered at that time (at that time!) that we did too little bossing. That things take a long time adjusting themselves within the O.C., that there is still a huge amount of disorder and anarchy, I was quite aware and have not expected anything else. The only cure for that is persistent treatment (time and experience) and a single potent remedy (a general Party congress). I wrote long ago and I repeat it: hurry up, for heaven's sake, with this remedy as much as you can, otherwise there is a risk of your experience being *lost* altogether.

I am not going to write about the questions of 1) Yuri,[199] 2) the Bureau, and 3) Ignat's dispute with Bundist. In part, they have become obsolete; in part, they require to be settled on the spot, and as regards this last part my advice at best would be to no purpose (despite the opinion of my friend Jacques). This part you (all of you) have to decide for yourselves, "have to" not in the sense of *sollen** but of *müssen.***

I will say something about the Bund, the P.P.S.[200] and "heresy".

Formally, I think, our attitude to the Bund should be studiously correct (no hitting straight in the teeth), but

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* Should.—*Ed.*
** Must.—*Ed.*

at the same time icily cold, buttoned up to the neck, and on legitimate ground we should press hard against the Bund relentlessly and all the time, going right to the end without being afraid. Let them get out, if they want to, but we should not give them the slightest occasion, the shadow of an excuse, for a break. We must, of course, observe the formalities prior to the Congress, but there is no point in showing our cards. You write: Bundist knows we are working for *Iskra* but keeps silent, although we have no right to do so in the name of the O.C. In my opinion, this should not be done from the O.C. but from each member *personally*, referring not to the O.C., but to *the committees which have recognised Iskra*. The result is the same and even much stronger (there are no "agents"), and the formal aspect is irreproachable. Preparing the committees against the Bund is one of the *most important* tasks of the present moment, and it, too, is fully possible without any violation of form.

Similarly, it was wrong to speak to the P.P.S. about the "convictions of *members* of the Organising Committee". It should have been said of the O.C.: we are preparing the congress, and the *congress* will decide; and on the question of "convictions" one should not remain silent but refer, not to the O.C., but to *Iskra* and *still more* to the committees that have recognised *Iskra*. Furthermore, we should obtain from the P.P.S. a formal if only short document (a letter), and not say to them "we are anti-nationalists" (why frighten people needlessly?), but gently persuade them that our programme (recognition of the right of national self-determination) is adequate for them too, drawing from them definite counter-declarations and a *formal approach* to the O.C. and the Congress. Our trump card against the P.P.S. is that we recognise national self-determination in principle, but within reasonable limits determined by the unity of the proletarian class struggle.

Before I forget: I really do not know the representatives of the Russian organisation of *Iskra* in the O.C. Nor do I know why I should know this, and why there should be "representatives". The Organising Committee has long ago *co-opted* all sorts of good people, but they were not "representatives", were they? Or is this untrue?

It is important, I think, to make use of the distinction between the Russian organisation of *Iskra* and the O.C. precisely for the sake of formal irreproachability.

Now about "heresy". Either I misunderstand you, or this is a great mistake. In view of the extreme brevity of your letter on this (highly important) point, I can only take your words *à la lettre*. Four delegates "organise" both the C.C. and the Central Organ! Frankly, this is simply ridiculous, for you ought to know that the only people competent (i.e., *having the knowledge* and necessary experience) to "organise" the Central Organ are the members of the editorial board + *individuals* from outside for consultation, while the only people competent to organise the C.C. are experienced practical workers + individuals for consultation (if you know of such persons). Or do you, perhaps, know of a "foursome" who have *experience* and knowledge of all these things? If you do, then name them—seriously. I am not joking, for this letter of mine is a personal one and it is important for me to be clear about your idea.

You are out for a single centre of power and a "strong hand", if I am not mistaken. It would be a good thing and you are absolutely right that that is what we need. But no one can achieve it in such a forthright way as you are thinking of. For nine-tenths of current affairs, two central bodies are absolutely essential; they would immediately arise of themselves, even if we did not want this. For form's sake, however, we should try to achieve 1) a formal way of uniting these two central bodies (for example, a committee with delegates from both of them), 2) a reduction in the number of members of the two central bodies, or the selection of an executive committee within each central body, and—most important—3) a strict, *formal* distribution of functions among individual members of the central bodies, so that their whole membership should *know* precisely which member is charged with managing what, which member (in each centre) has the right to *decide* (and even to speak) in each sphere of problems, and in what way matters can be transferred to a plenary meeting of one or both of the central bodies.

I am confident that you will considerably moderate your demands and will agree that this is the maximum immedi-

ately desirable. Even that is very, very difficult and *I do not see* any people who are fully suitable, informed, and experienced enough for such a distribution of functions. There is a great deal, a vast amount of mismanagement *both* among you and *us* (you, members of the O.C., should not think only of yourselves, you "organise" the *whole* Party), and we must think out not *pia desideria*, but practical, *firm*, "first steps".

I have expressed my views to you *frankly* and I should be very glad of a further exchange of letters with you. Really and truly, you *ought* to write more often and in more detail on such questions. I have nothing against this letter being communicated to the whole O.C., I should even welcome it, but I leave the decision to you. You did well to mention *to whom* your letter was addressed.

All the best. Moderate your demands and hurry, hurry, hurry with the "potent remedy". Best regards.

Yours,
Lenin

Written later than May 22, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev
First published in 1928

Printed from the original

62
TO ALEXANDRA KALMYKOVA[201]

September 7, 1903

I have just received your letter and hasten to reply. Yes, I see that you are already well informed and that the sum of the information that makes you so is tinctured—as well it would be—a definite colour. I understand also that what has happened is bound to worry you.

But it is one thing to know and another to understand, as you justly write, and I am deeply convinced that it is impossible to understand what has happened from the standpoint of "the effect of a nervous breakdown". A nervous breakdown could only give rise to sharp animosity, fury and a reckless attitude to results, but the results themselves are utterly inescapable and their advent has long been merely a question of time.

"Riffraff" and "praetorians"—you say. That is not the case. The political alignment was *im Grossen und Ganzen* as follows: five Bundists, three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, four *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists, six from the "Marsh" or indecisives, nine Iskrists of the soft line (or *Zickzackkurs*) and twenty-four Iskrists of the firm line; these are voting members, and, of course, approximate. There have been cases when everything was mixed up differently, but *à vol d'oiseau* this, on the whole, was how the groups worked out. The biggest shuffle (over equality of languages), when many Iskrists vacillated, left us with not less than 23 (out of a total of 33 Iskrists) and even among these 23 the "Martovites" were in a minority. And do you know the result of the vote at the meeting of the 16? Sixteen *members of the Iskra organisation*, and not "riffraff" nor "praetorians"? Do you know that here, too, Martov *was in the minority* both on the question of the person who had been the apple of discord *and on the question of lists*?

The minority of Iskrists of the soft or zigzag line defeated the majority (on the question of the Rules, and more than once) by a coalition of the Bund + the Marsh + the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists. And when the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo* withdrew, the majority of the Iskrists had their own back. *Voilà tout*. And not a single person has any doubt that, if the Bund had not withdrawn, Martov would have beaten us over the central bodies. And to make such a finale a reason for resentment, offence, a split in the Party! It is madness. The story goes that the "praetorians" ousted people because of a slanderous accusation of opportunism, that they cast slurs on and removed active people, etc. That is mere idle talk, the fruit of an imaginary grievance, *rien de plus*. No one, absolutely no one had "slurs" cast upon him or was removed, prevented from taking part in the work. Some one or other was merely removed from the *central body*—is that a matter for offence? Should the Party be torn apart for that? Should a theory of hypercentralism be constructed on that account? Should there be talk of rule by a rod of iron, etc., on that account? Never for a moment have I doubted or been capable of doubting that a trio of editors is the *sole* genuinely business-like trio, which does not break up anything, but adapts the old "family" collegium to the role of someone in an *official* capacity. It is precisely the family character of the Six that has been tormenting us all these three years, *as you know only too well*, and from the moment *Iskra* became the Party and the Party became *Iskra*, we *had to*, were *obliged to*, break with the Six and its family character. It was for this reason that already prior to the Congress I declared that I was going to demand freedom of election of the editorial board—or the trio—which is the sole basis also for sensible co-optation.

The break with the "family character" was absolutely essential and I am confident the Six would have peacefully accepted this trio but for the accompanying squabbles over §1 and over the C.C. *It is only* these squabbles that in their eyes painted the trio in this "horrible", absolutely false hue. There is nothing "horrible" in it at all, and it was essential to impose a restraint on the *Zickzackkurs*, and the majority of the Iskrists (both at the Congress and within the *Iskra* organisation) understood this perfectly well.

No, I repeat, the finale is not an "unforeseen calamity", it is not a "division of the whole". That is untrue. It is untrue that one can curse the day of "promotion"—or all our old work would remain for ever a torment of Tantalus. And in the Party, on its formal basis, with subordination of *everything* to the Rules* (over which we quarrelled desperately not without reason, quarrelled over every trifle with Martov, who *beat* us on this point), in such a Party the old family editorial board (*not once* in three years—this is a fact—did it meet with the full number of six members) was *impossible*, the more so because the non-Iskrists entered the Party in a bunch by right, on formal grounds. And this called for a firm and consistent line, and not a zigzag policy. There is no returning to the old, and only a disordered imagination can picture Martov being led to the slaughter instead of to joint work with comrades, of whom each has his shade of the political line. *Actually*, I would add, this trio, *throughout these three years*, *in 99 cases out of a hundred*, *had always been* the decisive, politically decisive (and not literary) central body.

Now, after Martov *beat* the majority of the Iskrists by alliance with the Bund and *made every preparation* for beating them by this alliance on the question of the central bodies as well, I find "their" complaints about riffraff and praetorians, their laments about the "crystal" of *Iskra*'s editorial board ludicrous. He beat them by an alliance, I say, and not by a deal; I would not think of accusing them of a *deal* with the Marsh and the Bund, nothing of the sort. When "they" talk about "defamatory rumours" (of being allies of the Bundists) being spread against them, "they" are repeating their usual mistake of confusing the personal and the political. A deal would be personally ugly. The alliance did *not* depend *on their will*, their alliance was caused by their mistake; it was not they who went with the Bund + the Marsh, but the Bund + the Marsh + *Yuzhny Rabochy*, etc., who followed them, having grasped at once which of the Iskrists had to be supported from the anti-Iskrist standpoint. The Bund + the Marsh, etc., only

* That is why "arrangements among ourselves" are *impossible* now, absolutely impossible, both judicially and morally.

revealed politically Martov's organisational and tactical mistake.

For one who knows all the facts of the Congress and especially the distribution of Iskrist votes (both at the Congress and in the underground organisation of *Iskra*) there cannot be any doubt that there is no going back. The *Iskrists* have parted company, but *Iskra* could not exist apart from the Iskrists. And, I repeat, *among the Iskrists* Martov was definitely in a minority, and a *split* in the Party (towards which Martov is *fatally* heading, more and more each day) will be a revolt of the minority, a minority that is in the wrong both juridically and *still more in all essentials*.

We "cast slurs" neither on Martov nor on anyone else for their mistake, but call *all* of them to the work.

As regards the "material means" of which you speak, we are hard up just now, it goes without saying, and the Californian[202] sources have gone up in smoke. But, if it came to that, we could endure even extreme need, so long as all the work of many years is not allowed to be wrecked *through dissatisfaction with the composition of the central bodies* (for objectively "their" dissatisfaction amounts *only* to this).

"Must the bucket too be shared?"[203] you ask. I could hardly answer this question, for I make no claim to impartiality in "sharing", and you do not need an answer that is not impartial. I am convinced that there are no "fractional parts", but there is a senseless *attempt* to break to pieces, smash and scatter the whole (to build a new hearth, as you put it) owing to defeat on a *single* question where the defeated Iskrists were utterly wrong.

All the best.

Sent from Geneva to Dresden
First published in 1927

Printed from a copy
written out by N. K. Krupskaya

63
TO A. N. POTRESOV

To Alex. Nikolayevich

September 13, 1903

I tried to have a talk with Y. O. recently, when the atmosphere of the impending split; was already in full evidence, and I want to try to have a talk with you too, in the hope that you, like Y. O., would not be averse to making an attempt at explanation. If this hope is unfounded, you will, of course, let me know, but meanwhile I shall do what I consider necessary.

The refusal of Martov to serve on the editorial board, his refusal and that of other Party writers to collaborate, the refusal of a number of persons to work for the Central Committee, and the propaganda of a boycott or passive resistance are bound to lead, even if against the wishes of Martov and his friends, to a split in the Party. Even if Martov adheres to a loyal stand (which he took up so resolutely at the Congress), others will not, and the outcome I have mentioned will be inevitable. (Not for nothing, by the way, does Auntie, too, write about "building a new hearth".)

And so I ask myself: over what, in point of fact, would we be parting company as enemies for life? I go over all the events and impressions of the Congress,[204] I realise that I often behaved and acted in a state of frightful irritation, "frenziedly"; I am quite willing to admit *this fault of mine to anyone*, if that can be called a fault which was a natural product of the atmosphere, the reactions, the interjections, the struggle, etc. But examining now, quite unfrenziedly, the results attained, the outcome achieved by frenzied struggle, I can detect nothing, absolutely noth-

ing in these results that is injurious to the Party, and absolutely nothing that is an affront or insult to the Minority.

Of course, the very fact of finding oneself in the minority could not but be vexatious, but I categorically protest against the idea that we "cast slurs" on anybody, that we *wanted* to insult or humiliate anybody. Nothing of the kind. And one should not allow political differences to lead to an interpretation of events based on accusing the other side of unscrupulousness, chicanery, intrigue and other pleasantries we are hearing mentioned more and more often in this atmosphere of an impending split. This should not be allowed, for it is, to say the least, the *nec plus ultra* of irrationality.

Martov and I have had a political (and organisational) difference, as we had dozens of times before. Defeated over §1 of the Rules, I could not but strive with all my might for *revanche* in what remained to me (and to the Congress). I could not but strive, on the one hand, for a strictly Iskrist Central Committee, and, on the other, for a trio on the editorial board that would remove the very cause of our old, hopeless quarrels, that would unite persons of whom each has his own political line, of whom each makes decisions and will always make decisions "without regard for persons" and in keeping with his own extreme conviction.

I said (during our conversation with you and Y. O. about the trio before the Congress) that I regarded the inclusion in the Six of an absentee member[205] as most harmful of all for the work; I also took exception at the time, very strong exception, to Zasulich's highly personal attitude (although Y. O. has forgotten it); I said quite definitely (when you named the *most probable* elected trio) that I too considered it the most probable and that even if it *remained alone*, without going in for any co-optation (although at the time we mentioned one of the possible co-optations), I saw nothing bad in that. Yuli Osipovich has forgotten this last statement of mine too, but I remember it very well. But it is, of course, useless to argue about this. That is not important; what is important is that with such a trio not one of those painful, long-drawn-out, hopeless quarrels with which we began the work of *Iskra* in 1900 and which were often repeated, making it impossible for

us to work for *months* on end—*not a single one of such* quarrels would be possible. That is why I consider this trio the *only* business-like arrangement, the *only* one capable of being an official institution, instead of a body based on indulgence and slackness, the *only* one to be a real centre, each member of which, I repeat, would always state and defend his Party viewpoint, *not one grain more*, and irrespective of all personal motives, *all* considerations concerning grievances, resignations, and so on.

This trio, after what had occurred at the Congress, undoubtedly meant legitimising a political and organisational line *in one respect* directed against Martov. Undoubtedly. Cause a rupture on that account? Break up the Party because of it? Did not Martov and Plekhanov oppose me over the question of demonstrations? And did not Martov and I oppose Plekhanov over the question of the programme? Is not one side of *every* trio *always* up against the other two?

If the majority of the Iskrists, both in the *Iskra* organisation and at the Congress, found this particular shade of Martov's line organisationally and politically mistaken, is it not really senseless to attempt to attribute this to "intrigue", "incitement", and so forth? Would it not be senseless to try to talk away this fact by *abusing* the Majority and calling them "riffraff"?

I repeat that, like the majority of the Iskrists at the Congress, I am profoundly convinced that the line Martov adopted was wrong, and that he had to be corrected. To take offence at this correction, to regard it as an insult, etc., is unreasonable. We have not cast, and are not casting, any "slurs" on anyone, nor are we excluding anyone *from work*. And to cause a split because someone has been excluded *from a central body* seems to me a piece of inconceivable folly.

Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Montreux
(Switzerland)

First published in a shortened version in 1904 in the pamphlet: V. I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, and in full in 1927

Printed from the original

64
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Thanks to Smith for his long letter. Let him write to Yegor, making a last appeal to reason. Let Zarin go and see Yegor immediately, after obtaining authority (full authority) to decide matters in Yegor's countries. Arrange all this with strict precision. You must act formally and, as regards the Yegors,[206] you must prepare for a decisive war, and see to it at all costs that any attempt of theirs to get into the committees meets with a prompt and vigorous rebuff. You must be on your guard about this and prepare all the committees. All the Yegors are carrying out and *extending* the boycott; they are devilishly embittered, they have dreamed up a heap of imaginary grievances and insults, they imagine that they are rescuing the Party from tyrants, they are shouting about this left and right, they are stirring people up. Their dissension has already deprived us (I don't know for how long, *possibly* even *forever*) of two of our largest sources of money. Please make the most desperate efforts to obtain money—that is the chief thing.

And so, don't let Smith look on Yegor in the old way. Friendship is at an end here. Down with all softness! Prepare for the most vigorous resistance, send Zarin at once, nominate candidates (in the event of Smith's death*), and in the same event prepare Smith, too, for a trip "to Yegor",** appoint *members to the Council*,[207] put everything on a very formal footing and exert yourself to the utmost. We shall cope with the matter of literature. We are putting strong hopes on Vadim.

Written between September 10
and 14, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev
First published in 1927

Printed from the original

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* Meaning here arrest.—*Ed.*
** Meaning to leave the country.—*Ed.*

65
TO ALEXANDRA KALMYKOVA

September 30

You write: "I have lived too long in the world not to know that in such cases truth is not on one side alone, but on both sides." I fully admit it. The trouble is that the other "side" does not realise the new situation, the new basis, and demands what used to be easily arrived at (if only after months of quarrelling), but is now unachievable. The basis has become *different*, that is a *fait accompli*; but they are still guided chiefly by the offensive turn this or that thing took at the Congress, by the frenzied way Lenin behaved, etc. I did act frenziedly, there is no denying it, and I frankly admitted as much in a letter to Old Believer.* But the thing is that the results achieved by "frenzied" struggle are *not frenzied at all*, yet the other side in its fight against frenzy goes on fighting against the results themselves, against the inevitable and necessary results. But you have long been aware of the direction in which things were going. You know how you expressed your firm conviction of an obstacle due to certain "old men", and you, of course, will not doubt that the ill-fated "trio" is not a dirty trick, not a Jacobin coup, but a straightforward, natural and the *best*, really and truly the best, way out from three years of "wrangling". The trio is a triangular construction and there is no room whatever for wrangling in it. You know what the sensitivity and "personal" (instead of political) attitude of Martov + Old Believer + Zasulich led to when, for example, they all but

* See pp. 164-66 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"condemned" a man *politically* for an incident of a purely personal character. At that time, without a moment's hesitation, you sided with the "flayers and monsters". Yet this is quite a typical case. Now, too, the root is the same, the same mixing of the personal and the political, the same suspicion that we want to *cast a slur on* people personally, although we only set them aside (or shift them) politically. And when you remind me: blame *must* also fall on you, I reply: I would not think of denying the personal aspect, but that is no reason for demanding a *political* correction. The hopelessness, the complete hopelessness, of the situation lies precisely in the fact that a political correction is being demanded on account of the sum total of personal grievances, of personal dissatisfactions with the composition of the central bodies. *Tout ce que vous voulez, mais pas de ça**! And if *political* divergence (as some desire) should be considered the cause, is it not ridiculous to *demand* for the sake of "peace" the co-optation of a larger number, or at least an equal number, of *political* opponents? It is ridiculous *nec plus ultra*!

The little example quoted by me above out of a large number of cases of wrangling is typical not only in substance but also in the form of the outcome. Do you know how we won the upper hand at that time? *We were in the minority*, but we won by sheer persistence, by threatening to bring everything into the open. They think they can do the same now. The trouble is that *now* is not *then*. Now the formal basis is *unremovable*. If it were not for this formal basis—why shouldn't there be six, once people have been roused to fury? We've stood three years of it, we can stand another three; we decided not by votes, but by persistence, so let us decide by persistence now too. But the thing is—it can't be done *now*. Yet people doggedly refuse to see or understand this change. And this is what makes the situation so hopeless. Now the dilemma is inexorable: *either* the divergence is over the question of persons, in which case it is ridiculous to make a political scandal and throw up work on account of it. *Or* the diver-

* Anything but that!—*Ed.*

gence is political—and then it is still more ridiculous to "correct" this by imposing definite persons of a different, shall we say, nuance.

They are taking (seem to be taking) the second course. In that case, join the trio, Martov, and *prove* before the Party the mistakes of the *two* in *your* collegium; unless you participate in the collegium you cannot obtain data for exposing these mistakes and putting the Party on its guard against them. Otherwise your accusations are empty *Parteiklatsch** over some future contingency.

If you take the first course, then don't stretch your resentment to the extent of throwing up the work, and the work will speedily cause "frenzy" to be forgotten. There is no more hopeless blind alley than that of throwing up one's work.

Written September 30, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Dresden
First published in 1927

Printed from a copy written out by N. K. Krupskaya

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* Party tittle-tattle.—*Ed.*

66

TO THE ODESSA COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the Odessa Committee

October 1, 1903

Dear comrades,

We too sincerely regret that a difference of opinion has arisen between the Odessa Committee and *Iskra* on the subject of factory stewards.[208] Our delay in replying to the letter of the Odessa Committee was due mainly to the fact that the editors were absent at the time. Generally speaking, the obstacle in this case (strange as it may seem) was the Second Congress of the Party.

As regards the essence of the matter, incidentally, a resolution was adopted at the Congress *recommending* participation in the election of factory stewards.

[Quote the text: resolution *No. 28*.]

This resolution was passed by a huge majority, and we think that matters can be put right, although it will take time. The Odessa Committee should *immediately* disseminate (without publishing) the text of this resolution among all *organised* workers and explain it to them. Later, when the resolution is published, it would be desirable for a leaflet to be issued over the signature of the Odessa Committee setting out the *Party* view on the question and calling on the workers to follow the tactics approved by the whole Party.

As regards the substance of the matter, we find that *constant* agitation in connection with the election of stewards would have a much greater educational and organising significance than agitation carried out *once only*—in connection with refusal to elect. And your own reports about patriarchal methods confirm this, pointing to the

need for a *constant struggle* against espionage laws and methods of spying.

We fully concur with your desire for a more frequent exchange of opinions so as to avoid differences of opinion and contradictory statements in agitation. Write more often, not only for the press, and see to it that addresses (for letters to you) are effective regularly.

We shall try to write a leaflet on the connection between the economic and the political struggle, if only other work does not interfere.

We are publishing the manifesto of *Rabochaya Volya*[209] in full, as you desired.

Lenin

Sent from Geneva
First published in 1928

Printed from the original

67
TO Y. O. MARTOV

To Comrade Martov from the Editors of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

Comrade,

The editorial board of the Central Organ Considers it its duty officially to express its regret at your refusal to participate in *Iskra* and *Zarya* (at present *Zarya* No. 5 is being prepared for the press). In spite of the numerous invitations to co-operate which we made immediately after the Second Party Congress, before *Iskra* No. 46, and which we repeated several times after that, we have not received a single literary item from you.

What is more, even the publication of the second edition of your pamphlet *The Red Flag* has been held up for many weeks owing to non-delivery of the end of the manuscript.

The editorial board of the Central Organ states that it considers that your refusal to co-operate has not been caused by any action on its part.

No element of personal irritation, of course, should be allowed to hinder work in the Central Organ of the Party.

If, however, your withdrawal is due to any divergence between your views and ours, we would consider a detailed exposition of such differences extremely useful in the interests of the Party. Moreover, we would consider it highly desirable that the nature and extent of these differences should be made clear to the whole Party as soon as possible through the pages of the publications edited by us.

Finally, for the sake of the cause, we once again bring to your notice that at the present time we are ready to co-opt you as a member of the editorial board of the Central

Organ so as to give you every opportunity to officially state and defend all your views in the highest Party institution.

Geneva, October 6, 1903[210]

Lenin. Plekhanov

Sent to Geneva
First published in full in 1927

Printed from a copy written out by N. K. Krupskaya

68
TO G. D. LEITEISEN

October 10, 1903

Dear Leiteisen,

I received your letter and, in accordance with your request, I am replying at once. Whether there will be a congress and when, I do not know. I have heard that a majority of the three members of the League's board of management here pronounced against a congress and that it was decided to invite the opinion of the two absent members: you and Vecheslov; thus a settlement of the question has been postponed.

As far as I am concerned, I am personally against a congress. You think that the League ought to express itself and that a split in it is inevitable in any case; that two active militant sections would be better than a united inactive League. The point is, however, that a split in the League is not only inevitable, but is *already an almost accomplished fact*; two active militant sections *have already been formed* and until a split in the *Party* occurs these militant sections will *inevitably* remain in the united League. On the other hand, the Party Congress has completely upset the whole organisational basis of the League: its old Rules, which are well known to you, will, of course, in effect cease to exist after the Party Congress. The League must be renovated and it will, of course, be rebuilt on new lines by the Central Committee of the Party, which is charged with organising the Party committees and, in general, all Party institutions.

Consequently, one may say, it is left for the congress *to come together in order to part company*. To part company

in two senses: in the sense of the mutual recrimination between us and the Martovites, and in the sense of the liquidation of the old League. Is it worth while coming together for this purpose? You will not cure the "split" (or, rather, the sulky withdrawal) in this way, but only still further embitter the two sides. What is the use of that? What is the use of a pageant of speeches when it is already almost certain that about thirty-five of the total forty members of the League have already *taken up their positions*?

Is the idea—to stage a "*dress rehearsal*"? i.e., to see approximately how we shall fight if it comes to a split in the Party? I cannot deny *this* significance of a congress, but *such* a game is not worth the candle.

The alignment of the remaining five (or about five) members of the League can be ascertained in a much easier way.

The League's work abroad will in any case proceed on new lines worked out by the Party's Central Committee. A League Congress *now* will generate more heat than light, i.e., it will contribute nothing to the work abroad.

I was very glad to learn that you are coming here and that we shall meet. Let me know in good time because I am still intending to go away on holiday for three or four days. I am swamped with work.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Beaumont (France)

First published in part in 1928
Published in full in 1929

Printed from the original

69
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

To Claire

Dear friend,

I was very pleased to receive your latest news about the plan to take the skin off* Deer—it is high time! On the other hand, it is evident from letters that Deer and Vadim do not have a correct idea of the situation, and that there is no mutual understanding between us. This is very regrettable (even if Vadim's last letter giving advice in the form of an ultimatum is not to be taken seriously—Stake himself will reply to this, for, I repeat, I find it difficult to take *such* a thing seriously). Co-optation of Demon, Falcon, etc., is an erroneous step, in my opinion, for these people lack experience and self-dependence. The division of functions, too, is very dangerous, for it threatens to produce fragmentation. Meanwhile the committees continue to be neglected: in Kiev people are behaving foolishly and, strange to relate, neither Andreyevsky, nor Dyadin, nor Lebedev, have gone into the committees to fight. Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Don, and Gornozavodsky, too, are in the hands of the mutineers.** Positions must be occupied everywhere by our people at all costs. We must get at least one of our people, one who is wholly ours, on every committee without fail. The Caucasus is beginning to be stirred up[211]—there, too, they need our people's help. More important than a division of functions is for seats in each committee to be occupied by our agents, and then for all efforts to be devoted to transport and delivery.

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* Meaning to place him in an illegal position.—*Ed.*

** Meaning the Mensheviks.—*Ed.*

When all is said and done, the most important thing, and our whole strength, lies in transport. We should not be content with one route alone, but have two or three, so as to put a stop to the continual interruptions.

It is extremely important to issue the announcement[212] as soon as possible, to issue it in Russia and distribute it everywhere. For heaven's sake, hurry up with this and write to us about it quickly and precisely. Brutus should be formally elected to the Council and his vote formally transferred to Stake. This is a matter that brooks no delay.

In my view, it is extremely important that Deer should be sent here if only for a couple of weeks, or even a week. This would be very, very useful, giving a view of everything *à vol d'oiseau*, enabling him to see the source of ferment and to achieve full mutual understanding. Surely, no one can grudge a mere 200 rubles and two or three weeks for the sake of this! Surely a legal foreign passport could be found for Deer! Think this over carefully. I strongly recommend this step, which is especially convenient in connection with Deer's plans. Truly, without having reached full agreement it is difficult to keep in step. And Deer's talk of "moral influence on the Old Man" shows (please don't take offence!) the utmost lack of mutual understanding. Why doesn't Deer write anything *about this*? The plan of co-opting Martov is simply ridiculous; it shows such a lack of understanding that there are certain to be instances when you will get into a mess, and with a scandal at that. No really, I can't even speak seriously about your co-opting Martov; if you have been thinking of it seriously, then we speak different tongues! We have all (including Stake) laughed until we cried over this "plan"!!

Lenin

Written October 20, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

70

TO THE CAUCASIAN UNION COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the Caucasus

Dear comrades,

We have had news of your affairs both from Ruben in person and from Rashid-Bek by letter. We can only welcome your decision to remove Isari[213] temporarily, until the matter is examined *by the Central Committee*. The sum total of information concerning his behaviour at the Congress certainly points against him. The Congress showed his utter instability; after some waverings, Isari, nevertheless, at the decisive moment voted with the Majority and helped to secure adoption of the present composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ and of the Central Committee. But afterwards Isari suddenly went over to the other side, and is now fighting against the decisions of the Majority by methods that are hardly loyal! It's simply disgusting! Such a leader is not worthy of political trust. In any case, he should be treated with caution, to say the least, and should not be given any responsible posts—such is our deep conviction, both mine (Lenin's) and Plekhanov's.

Let the Caucasian comrades hold firmly to the course they have adopted. Let them turn a deaf ear to the slander against the Majority. The full minutes of the Congress will soon see the light of day and then things will be clear to all. Let them carry on their good teamwork with comradely faith in the Central Committee, and we are sure that the present "dissension" in the Party will be rapidly dispelled.

We are giving much thought now to the idea of organising here the publication of Georgian and Armenian litera-

ture. Competent comrades have taken this in hand, and we hope to raise the money. We need both literary and financial help.

We send greetings to the Caucasian comrades and ardent wishes for success in their work.

Lenin. Plekhanov

Written October 20, 1903
Sent from Geneva
First published in 1928

Printed from the original

71

TO THE DON COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Comrades,

We have received your letter with the resolution.[214] We earnestly request you to write to us on the following: 1) Have you heard reports from both the Minority and the Majority (one of your delegates, as you probably know, was on the side of the Majority), or only from the Minority? 2) What do you mean by the word "departure"? Departure —where to? Do you mean by this that someone has been removed from work, or has removed himself, for some reason or other, and for what reasons precisely? 3) What is it you call "abnormal conditions at elections"? 4) Who exactly, in your opinion, should be co-opted on to the Central Committee? and 5) who exactly on to the editorial board of the Central Organ?

Written in October 1903
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1904 in the book: L. Martov, *The Struggle Against the "State of Siege" Within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, Geneva

Printed from the text of the book

72

TO THE MINING AND METALLURGICAL WORKERS' UNION

Comrades,

We have received your resolution[215] and ask you to reply to the following questions. Please discuss them at a general meeting of all the members of the Committee (or send them to all the members, if they are not together) as an enquiry from the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ.

1) Has the Committee heard a report from the representative of the Majority at the Party Congress?

2) Does the Committee consider it normal to pass a resolution appraising the activities and decisions of the Congress before the minutes have been issued, and even before the Committee has enquired of the Central Committee or members of the Majority about matters which are not clear to it?

3) How could these disagreements on organisational questions *destroy* everything previously done by *Iskra* and the Organising Committee? How did the *destruction* manifest itself? *What exactly* was destroyed? We are not at all clear on this, and if you want to safeguard the Central Organ from any kind of error, it is your duty to explain to us what you regard as our error. Set the matter out in full detail and we shall carefully discuss your opinion.

4) What exactly are the "*sharp* disagreements on organisational questions"? We do not know. (We asked Martov and the former members of *Iskra*'s editorial board to expound these disagreements *in the pages of the publications edited by us*, but so far our request has not been complied with.*

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* See pp. 173-74 of this volume.—*Ed.*

5) In what do you see the atmosphere of political intrigue and distrust? On the part of whom? Be more explicit. (If *we* distrusted Martov we would not have invited him to work in *Iskra*.)

6) If there really are "sharp disagreements on organisational questions" between us and the former editors, how can the two of us co-opt the four of them? That surely would mean making *their* tendency the dominant one? But the Congress pronounced in *our favour*, didn't it? What you want, therefore, is that the decision of the Congress should be revised on the basis of a private agreement.

7) Do you consider it normal that by threats of a split, boycott, etc., people should want to make Party officials (editors of the Central Organ, and the Central Committee) do something that these central bodies do not consider useful in the interests of the Party?

8) Do you consider it normal and permissible that Party members who have been left in a minority should abstain from work in the Central Organ, from supporting the Central Committee and obeying it, from helping the Party financially, and so forth?

Written in October 1903
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1904 in the book: L. Martov, *The Struggle Against the "State of Siege" Within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, Geneva

Printed from the text of the book

73
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 1, 1903

Dear Georgi Valentinovich,

I am quite unable to calm down on account of the questions that are worrying us. This delay, this postponement of a decision, is simply dreadful, a torture....

No, really, I can quite understand your motives and considerations in favour of a concession to the Martovites. But I am deeply convinced that a concession at the present time is the most desperate step, leading to a storm and a shindy *far more certainly* than would war against the Martovites. This is no paradox. I not only did not persuade Kurtz to leave but, on the contrary, tried to persuade him to stay, but he (and Ru) flatly refuses now to work with the Martovite editorial board. What's going to happen? In Russia, dozens of delegates have been travelling all over; even from Nizhni-Novgorod they write that much has been done by the C.C., transport has been arranged, agents have been appointed, the announcement *is being published*, Sokolovsky in the west, Berg in the centre, and Zemlyachka and lots of others, have all settled down to work. And now comes the refusal of Kurtz. It means a long *break* (in the session and meeting of the *whole* C.C., now, it seems, already considerably enlarged). Afterwards, either a struggle of the C.C. against the Martovite editorial board or the resignation of the *whole* C.C. Then you + two Martovites in the Council must *co-opt a new C.C.*, and this without election by the Congress, with total disapproval on the part of the *great bulk* in Russia, and bewilderment, discontent and refusal on the part of these agents who have already gone out. Why, this will utterly discredit the Con-

gress and sow complete discord and cause a scandal *in Russia* a hundred thousand times more terrible and dangerous than a scurrilous foreign pamphlet.

We are fed up with discord! That is what they write and *scream* about in letters from Russia. And to give way to the Martovites now would mean *legitimising* discord in Russia, for *in Russia* there has not yet been even a trace of disobedience and revolt. No statements of yours or mine will now restrain the delegates of the Majority at the Party Congress. These delegates will create a frightful rumpus.

For the sake of unity, for the sake of the stability of the Party—do not take this responsibility upon yourself, do not withdraw and do not give everything away to the Martovites.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in Geneva (local mail)
First published in 1926 Printed from the original

74
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Dear friend,

You cannot imagine what is going on here—it's simply disgusting—and I beg you to do everything possible and impossible *to come here together with Boris*, *after obtaining the votes of the others*. You know that I am now fairly experienced in Party matters, and I categorically declare that any postponement, the slightest delay or vacillation, will spell ruin to the Party. You will probably be told about everything in detail. The gist of it is that Plekhanov has suddenly changed front, after the rows at the League Congress,[216] and has thereby cruelly and shamefully let down me, Kurtz and all of us. Now he has gone, without us, to haggle with the Martovites who, seeing that he was frightened of a split, double and quadruple their demands. They demand not only the Six, but also the entry of their people into the C.C. (they do not say as yet how many and whom) and of two of them into the Council, and a disavowal of the activities of the C.C. in the League (activities carried out with the full agreement of Plekhanov). Plekhanov was pitifully scared of a split and a struggle! The situation is desperate, our enemies are rejoicing and have grown insolent, all our people are furious. Plekhanov is threatening to throw the whole thing up immediately and is capable of doing so. I repeat, your *coming is essential* at all costs.

Written November 4, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev

First published in 1928 — Printed from the original

75

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Their conditions are: 1) co-optation of *four* on to the editorial board; 2) co-optation? on to the C.C.; 3) recognition of the lawfulness of the League; 4) *two* votes in the Council. I would propose that the C.C. put the following conditions to them: 1) co-optation of *three* on to the editorial board; 2) *status quo ante bellum* in the League; 3) *one* vote in the Council. Next I would propose endorsing at once (but for the time being without communicating it to the contending side) the following *ultimatum*: 1) co-optation of four on to the editorial board; 2) co-optation of two on to the C.C. at the discretion of the C.C.; 3) *status quo ante bellum* in the League; 4) *one vote* in the Council. If the ultimatum is not accepted—war to the bitter end. An additional condition: 5) cessation of all gossip, wrangling and talk concerning the strife at the Second Party Congress and after it.

For my part, I may add that I am resigning from the editorial board and can remain only in the Central Committee. I shall go *the whole hog* and publish a booklet about the struggle of the hysterical scandalmongers or discarded ministers.*

Written November 4, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

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* Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* was published in May 1904 (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

76

TO V. A. NOSKOV AND G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

November 5

1) Yesterday Lalayants set out to visit you.

2) I already wrote yesterday about the row here and that Plekhanov has taken fright and entered into negotiations with them.* They put forward the conditions: 1) restoration of the old editorial board, 2) co-optation of several persons on to the Central Committee, 3) two votes in the Council, 4) recognition of the League Congress as lawful. In other words, they agree to peace only on condition of complete surrender of the position, disavowal of Wolf and rendering the present Central Committee "harmless". My personal opinion is that any concessions on the part of the C.C. would be degrading and would completely discredit the present Central Committee. It is necessary that Deer and Nil come here as soon as possible, everything is at stake—and if the C.C. is not prepared for a determined struggle, a fight to the bitter end, it would be best to give up everything to them at once. To permit such demoralisation, to enter into such deals, means to ruin everything. I repeat, that is my personal opinion. In any case, come here at once so that we may jointly decide what to do.

Written November 5, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev

First published in 1928

Printed from a copy written out by N. K. Krupskaya

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* See p. 186 of this volume.—*Ed.*

77
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 6, 1903

Georgi Valentinovich,

I have given much thought to your statement of yesterday that you will reserve for yourself "full freedom of action" if I do not agree to advise Konyagin to resign from the Party Council. I am quite unable to agree to this. Nor do I consider it possible to remain any longer in the unofficial position of *de facto* editor in spite of my resignation, since you say that full freedom of action as understood by you does not exclude your handing over the editorial board to the Martovites. I am compelled, therefore, to hand over to you all the official contacts of the editorial board of the Central Organ and all documents, which I am sending you under special cover. If any explanations are required in regard to the documents, I shall, of course, willingly give them. Some of the material has been given to contributors (Lebedev, Schwarz, Ruben), who will have to be told of everything being transferred to you.

N. Lenin

P.S. Please do not interpret the turnover of the editorial board in the sense of the notorious boycott. That would contradict what I said plainly in my statement to you of November 1 of this year.[217] I shall now, of course, bring my resignation from the editorial board to the knowledge of the comrades.

P.P.S. I am sending (tomorrow morning by messenger) three packets—aa, bb, cc—according to the importance of the material.

Issue No. 52 was to have been put out on November 16 with the announcement of the Central Committee.[218] For this the printing should begin on Monday; it will be all right even beginning it on Tuesday.

Written in Geneva (local mail)
First published in 1926 Printed from the original

78
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

November 8, 1903. To Smith

Dear friend,

Once more I earnestly beg you to come here, you in particular, and another one or two persons from the Central Committee. This is absolutely and immediately necessary. Plekhanov has betrayed us, there is terrible bitterness in our camp; all are indignant that, because of the rows in the League, Plekhanov has allowed the decisions of the Party Congress to be revised. I have definitely resigned from the editorial board. *Iskra* may come to a stop. The crisis is complete and terrible. Bear in mind that I am not fighting now for the editorial board of the Central Organ, I am quite reconciled to Plekhanov setting up a five-man board without me. But I am fighting for the C.C. which the Martovites, who have grown insolent after Plekhanov's cowardly betrayal, also want to seize; they are demanding the co-optation on to it of their own people without even saying how many! The fight for the editorial board of the Central Organ has been irretrievably lost owing to Plekhanov's treachery. The sole chance of peace lies in trying to give them the editorial board of the C.O. while holding on to the C.C. ourselves.

This is not at all easy (even this may be too late already), but we must try. We need Smith here, and best of all *two* more Russians from the C.C., the most imposing (no ladies) (e.g., Boris and Doctor). Plekhanov threatens to resign if the C.C. does not yield. For heaven's sake, don't believe in his threats; we must use more pressure on him, scare him. Russia must stand up firmly for the C.C. and content itself with handing over the editorial board of the C.O.

New people from the C.C. are needed here, otherwise there is absolutely no one to conduct negotiations with the Martovites. Smith is triply needed. I repeat the Martovites' "conditions": 1) negotiations on behalf of the editorial board of the C.O., and the C.C., 2) six on the editorial board of the C.O., 3) ? on the C.C. Cessation of co-optation on to the C.C., 4) two seats in the Council, 5) disavowal of the C.C. as regards the League, recognition of the latter's Congress as lawful. These are indeed peace terms put by victors to the vanquished!

Sent from Geneva to Kiev
First published in 1928 Printed from the original

79
TO M. N. LYADOV[219]

November 10, 1903*

Dear Lidin,

I should like to give you our "political news".

To begin with, here is a chronology of recent events. Wednesday (October 27 or 28?) was the third day of the League Congress. Martov yelled hysterically about "the blood of the old editorial board" (Plekhanov's expression) being upon us, and that on the part of Lenin there was something in the nature of intrigue at the Congress, etc. I calmly challenged him in writing (by a statement to the bureau of the Congress**) to make his accusations against me *openly* before the whole Party; I would undertake to publish *everything*. Otherwise, I said, it was mere *Skandalsucht*.*** Martov, of course, "nobly withdrew", demanding (as he still does) a court of arbitration; I continued to demand that he should have the courage to make his accusations openly, otherwise I would *ignore* it all as pitiful tittle-tattle.

Plekhanov refused to speak in view of Martov's discreditable behaviour. Some dozen of our people submitted a statement to the Congress bureau, branding Martov's "discreditable behaviour" in reducing the dispute to the level of squabbling, suspicions, etc. I would remark in parenthesis that my two hours' speech about "Comrade Martov's histor-

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* The letter bears Lenin's note: "unmailed".—*Ed.*

** "Statement Concerning Martov's Report" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

*** Mania for provoking a row.—*Ed.*

ical turn"* at the Party Congress towards *Versumpfung*** did *not* evoke even from the Martovites a *single* protest about the issue being reduced to the level of squabbling.

Friday. We decided to introduce eleven new members into the League. In the evening at a private meeting with these "grenadiers" (as we jokingly called them), *Plekhanov rehearsed* all the steps by which we should utterly rout the Martovites. A stage scene. Thunderous applause.

Saturday. The C.C. read its statement about not endorsing the League's Rules and about the meeting being unlawful (a statement previously discussed with Plekhanov in all details, word by word). All our people walked out amid the Martovites' cries of "gendarmes" and so forth.

Saturday evening. Plekhanov "surrendered". He did not want a split. He demanded the opening of peace negotiations.

Sunday (November 1). I tendered my resignation in writing to Plekhanov (not wishing to be a party to such depravity as the revision of the Party Congress under the influence of a row abroad; to say nothing of the fact that from the purely strategical aspect a more stupid moment for concessions could not have been chosen).***

November 3. Old Believer gave Plekhanov, who began the negotiations, a written statement of the conditions of peace with the opposition: 1) Negotiations to be conducted by the editorial board of the C.O. and by the C.C. 2) Restoration of the old editorial board of *Iskra*. 3) Co-optation on to the C.C., the number to be decided during the negotiations. Cessation of co-optation on to the C.C. from the moment negotiations begin. 4) *Two seats* (sic!) on the Party Council and 5) recognition of the lawfulness of the League Congress.

Plekhanov was not put out. He demanded that the C.C. give way (!). The C.C. refused and wrote to Russia. Plekhanov declared that he would resign if the C.C. did not give way. I turned over to Plekhanov (November 6) *all* editorial matters, convinced that Plekhanov was capable

* "Report on the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 73-83).—*Ed.*

** Sinking into the Marsh.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 91.—*Ed.*

of surrendering to the Martovites not merely the newspaper but the *entire C.C.* for nothing.*

The state of affairs: *Iskra* would hardly come out on time. The Martovites were rejoicing over their "victory". All our people (except the two Axelrod maids,[220] who are faithful to Plekhanov even in his *Treulosigkeit***) dissociated themselves from Plekhanov and at a meeting (November 6 or 7) told him some home truths (on the subject of the "second Isari").

A pretty picture, is it not? I shall not join the editorial board, but I shall write. Our people want to defend the C.C., insofar as that is possible, and to continue an intensified agitation against the Martovites—the right plan, in my opinion.

Let Plekhanov leave us; the Party Council will then turn over *Iskra* to a committee and convene an Extraordinary Party Congress. Do you mean to say the League Abroad will be allowed by a majority of three or four votes to *revise* the Party Congress? Do you mean to say it is proper, after carrying the fight to the lengths of the greatest publicity and almost a rupture, to sound the retreat and accept peace terms dictated by the Martovites?

I should like to know your opinion.

I think that to act *à la* Plekhanov means subverting the Party Congress and betraying its majority. I think that we must agitate with all our strength here and in Russia for subordination to the Party Congress and not to the League Congress.

A boycott of *Iskra* (even a Martovite *Iskra*) is, of course, stupid. Moreover it would be a boycott not of a Martovite but, possibly, of a Plekhanovite *Iskra*, for Zasulich and Axelrod will soon give Plekhanov three votes in the Five. And that's called an editorial board! As an illustration to your witty remark about the saintly relics of Sarovsky, I will quote the following statistical item: in the 45 issues of *Iskra* under six editors, there were 39 articles and *feuilletons* written by Martov, 32 by me, 24 by Plekhanov, 8 by Old Believer, 6 by Zasulich, and 4 by P. B. Axelrod. This

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* See pp. 189-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Treachery.—*Ed.*

in the course of three years! *Not a single* issue was made up (in the sense of technical editorial work) by anyone other than Martov or myself. And now—as a reward for the row, as a reward for Old Believer cutting off an important source of finance—they are to be taken on to the editorial board! They fought over "differences of principle", which, in Old Believer's letter of November 3 to Plekhanov were so expressively converted into figuring out how many seats they needed. And we have to legitimise this fight for seats, to make a deal with this party of discarded generals or ministers (*grève générale des généraux*,* as Plekhanov said) or with the party of hysterical brawlers! What's the use of Party congresses if things are done by nepotism abroad, by hysteria and brawling?

Further about the notorious "trio", which the hysterical Martov sees as the pivot of my "intriguing". You probably remember from as far back as the time of the Congress my programme for the Congress and my commentary on this programme. I should very much like *all Party members to know this document*, and so once again I quote it for you precisely. "Item 23 (*Tagesordnung***). *Election of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ of the Party*.

My commentary: "The Congress shall elect *three* persons to the editorial board of the Central Organ and *three* to the Central Committee. These six persons *in conjunction* shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority vote additional members to the editorial board of the C.O. and to the C.C., and report to this effect to the Congress. After the report has been endorsed by the Congress, subsequent co-optation shall be effected by the editorial board of the C.O. and by the C.C. separately."

Is it not clear that this means *renewal* of the editorial board, a thing which *cannot* be done without the consent of the C.C. (*four* out of six are necessary for co-optation), while the question of enlarging the original trio or leaving it as it was *is left open* (co-optation "*if necessary*")? I showed this draft to *everyone* (including Plekhanov, of course)

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* A general strike of generals.—*Ed.*

** Agenda.—*Ed.*

prior to the Congress. Of course, renewal was necessary owing to dissatisfaction with the Six (and especially with Plekhanov, who in fact had the votes of P. B. Axelrod, who almost never took part, and of the pliable V. I. Zasulich), and, of course, in a private conversation with Martov, I *sharply* expressed this dissatisfaction, "scolded" all three—Plekhanov (especially) and Axelrod and Zasulich—for their caprices, and proposed even enlarging the Six to Seven, etc. Is it not hysteria to give a twist now to these private conversations and raise a howl that "the trio was aimed against Plekhanov" and that I had laid a "trap" for Martov, and so forth? Of course, when we agreed with Martov, the trio would be against Plekhanov, and when Plekhanov agreed with Martov (on the subject of demonstrations, for example) then the trio would be against me, and so on. The hysterical howling merely covers up a pitiful incapacity to understand that the editorial board must have real, and not fictitious, editors, that it must be a business-like and not a philistine collegium, and that *each* of its members should have his *own* opinion on *each* question (which was never the case with the unelected trio).

Martov *approved* my plan of two trios, but when it turned out to be against him in *one* question, he went into a fit of hysteria and began to howl about intrigue! It was not for nothing that in the corridors of the League Congress Plekhanov called him a "pitiful person"!

Yes ... the dirty squabble abroad—that is what overruled the decision of the majority of Russian Party workers. Plekhanov's betrayal, too, was partly due to fear of a row abroad, and partly to a feeling (*perhaps*) that in the Five he was sure to have three votes....

A fight for the C.C., for a new congress to be held soon (in the summer)—that is what is left to us.

Get hold of my notebook.* It was sent by Poletayev (Bauman) to Vecheslov *alone* and personally. Shergov could have taken it only by trickery, *only by a breach of trust*.

* The reference is to the "Report on the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed*.

Read it to anyone you like, but don't let anyone have it, and return it to me.

You must oust Vecheslov from all positions. Take a letter for yourself from the C.C., tell the *Parteivorstand** that you are the agent of the C.C., and take *all* German contacts *wholly* into your hands.

I owe you an apology about your pamphlet. I have only managed to read it through once. It needs revising, but I have not had time to map out the revision.

Yours,
Lenin

Written in Geneva
First published in 1928

Printed from the original

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* The Executive Committee (of the German Social-Democratic Party).—*Ed.*

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TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 18, 1903

Georgi Valentinovich,

I am sorry that I am a day late with my article*; I was, not well yesterday and in general the work is going terribly hard these last few days.

The article turned out longer than I thought and had to be divided into two parts; in the second part I shall make a detailed analysis of Novobrantsev and draw conclusions.

I consider that my article should have a signature and so I am taking a pseudonym, otherwise, pending the announcement, it will probably be inconvenient for you.

Will you please also insert my statement** appended herewith in the issue of *Iskra* containing the announcement about the Congress. Of course, in the event of complete peace being established in the Party (which I am hoping for) and if you were to and it necessary, I could, among other peace terms, discuss also the non-publication of this statement.

Yours sincerely,

N. Lenin

Written in Geneva (local mail)
First published in full in 1928

Printed from the original

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* The reference is to "The Narodnik-like Bourgeois and Distraught Narodism" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

** "To the Editorial Board of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

81

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear friends,

The new political situation was fully clarified after the publication of *Iskra* No. 53. It is clear that the Five in the Central Organ are out to hound both Lenin (even going so far as slander about his having expelled the *Yuzhny Rabochy* people from the Party and vile hints about Schweitzer[221]) and the C.C., and the Majority as a whole. Plekhanov says bluntly that the Five on the C.O. are not afraid of any Central Committee. The C.C. is being attacked both here and in Russia (letter from St. Petersburg about Martyn's journey). The issue squarely faces us. If time is lost and we fail to give the watchword for the struggle, *complete* defeat is inevitable owing, firstly, to the desperate struggle of the *Iskra* Five and, secondly, to the arrests of our people in Russia. *The only salvation is—a congress. Its watchword*: *the fight against disrupters*. Only by this watchword can we catch out the Martovites, win over the broad masses and save the situation. In my opinion, the only possible plan is this: *for the time being* not a word about the *congress*, complete secrecy. *All*, *absolutely all*, forces to be sent *into the committees and on tours*. A fight to be waged for peace, for putting a stop to disruption, for subordination to the Central Committee. Every effort to be made to strengthen the committees with our people. Every effort to be made to catch out the Martovites and *Yuzhny-Rabochy* people in disruption, pin them down by documents and resolutions against the disrupters; resolutions of the committees should pour into the Central Organ. Further, our people should be got into the wavering committees. Winning over the committees with the watchword: against

disruption—this is the *most important* task. *The congress must be held not later than January*, therefore set to work energetically; we, too, shall put all forces into operation. *The object of the congress is to strengthen* the C.C. and the Council, and perhaps the C.O. as well, either by a trio (in the event of our being able to tear Plekhanov away, which is not very likely), or by a Six, *which I would join* in the event of a peace that is honourable for us. At the worst: their *C.O.*, *our C.C. and Council*.

I repeat: either *complete* defeat (the C.O. will hound us) or *immediate preparation for a congress. It must be prepared secretly at first* during a maximum of one month, *after which during three weeks the demands of half the committees to be collected and the congress convened*. Again and yet again—this is the only salvation.

Written December 10, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1929 Printed from the original

82
TO THE *ISKRA* EDITORIAL BOARD[222]

To the Editorial Board of the Central Organ

December 12, 1903

I, as representative of the C.C., received today from Comrade Martov an inquiry as to whether a report on the negotiations of the C.C. with the Geneva opposition could be published or not.[223] I believe it could, and I earnestly request the comrades on the editorial board of the C.O. to consider once again the question of peace and good will in the Party.

It is not too late yet to secure such a peace, it is not too late yet to keep from our people and our enemies the details of the split and the speeches about dishonourable conduct and falsified lists, speeches which will probably be utilised even by *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*.[224] I can guarantee that the Majority will readily agree to consign all this dirt to oblivion, provided peace and good will in the Party are secured.

Everything now depends on the editorial board of the C.O., which includes representatives of the former opposition that rejected the C.C.'s peace proposal of November 25, 1903.[225] I ask you, comrades, to take into consideration that since then the C.C. has already made two further voluntary concessions, by advising Comrade Ru to hand in his resignation and by trying to settle the League affair "amicably".

Meanwhile the boycott of the C.C., the agitation against it and the disruption of practical work in Russia continue. People write to us from Russia that the opposition are making a "hell" there. We have the most definite information that the agents of the Minority are systematically

continuing their disruptive work, making a round of the committees. People in St. Petersburg write about Martyn's visit there with the same aim. Things have reached a point when the opposition are making their own transport arrangements and, through Dan, are offering the C.C. to share them on a fifty-fifty basis!

I consider it my duty to the Party to ask the editorial board of the C.O. for the last time that it persuade the opposition to subscribe to peace and good will on the basis of a sincere recognition of the two central bodies by both sides and cessation of the intestine war which renders any joint work impossible.

Written in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1929 Printed from the original

83
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Dear friend,

It is essential that we clear up in all details a question on which we apparently differ, and I beg you to forward this letter of mine for discussion by all members of the C.C. (or its Executive Committee[226]). The difference is this: 1) you think that peace with the Martovites is possible (Boris even congratulates us on peace! It is both comic and tragic!); 2) you think that an immediate congress is an acknowledgement of our impotence. I am convinced that on both points you are cruelly mistaken. 1) The Martovites are heading for war. At the meeting in Geneva, Martov bluntly shouted: "We are a force." They vilify us in their newspaper and basely sidetrack the issue, covering up their trickery by yelling about bureaucracy on your part. On every hand Martov continues to clamour about the C.C. being absolutely ineffective. In short, it is naïve and quite impermissible to doubt that the Martovites are out to seize the C.C. as well by the same methods of trickery, boycott and brawling. A fight with them on this level is beyond our strength, for the C.O. is a powerful weapon and our defeat is inevitable, especially in view of the arrests. By letting the time slip by you are heading for the certain and complete defeat of the entire Majority, you are silently swallowing the insults which the C.C. is suffering abroad (at the hands of the League) and asking for more. 2) A congress will demonstrate our strength, will prove that not merely in words but in fact we shall not permit a clique of brawlers abroad to boss the whole movement. It is now that a congress is needed, when the watchword is: the fight against disruption. Only this watchword jus-

tifies a congress, and justifies it completely in the eyes of Russia as a whole. By losing this opportunity, you lose this watchword and prove your impotent, passive subordination to the Martovites. To dream of strengthening our positions by positive work in face of the attacks on the part of the C.O. and the Martovites' boycott and agitation is simply ludicrous. It means slowly perishing in an inglorious struggle against the intriguers, who will say afterwards (and are already saying): see how ineffective this Central Committee is! I repeat, don't harbour any illusions. Either you dictate peace to the Martovites at a congress, or they will kick you out ingloriously or replace you at the first setback caused by arrests. The congress now has an aim, namely: to put an end to the intolerable disruption, to sweep away the League, which flaunts every and any C.C., to take the Council firmly into its hands and put the Central Organ in order. How to put it in order? At *worst* by leaving even the Five (or by restoring the Six); but this worst event is improbable if we get a big majority. Then we shall either rout the Martovites completely (Plekhanov *is beginning to talk* of a new *Vademecum*, seeing that there is no peace, and is threatening to attack both contending sides. That's just what we want!), or we shall say frankly that we have no guiding C.O. and we shall convert it into an organ for discussion, with freedom for signed articles of the Majority and the Minority (or even better: relegate the polemic with the Martovites to pamphlets, and in *Iskra* fight only against the government and the enemies of Social-Democracy).

And so, abandon the naïve hope of working peacefully in such an impossible atmosphere. Send all the *main* forces out on tours, let Deer travel, *secure* immediately the absolute support of your own committees, then launch an attack on those of the others, and—a congress, a congress. not later than January!

P.S. If Martov asks Deer concerning publication[227]—let Deer without fail transfer his vote to Stake; without fail, otherwise there will be an arch-scandal! When Martov and Dan speak to Stake at rendezvous they treat him with intolerable insolence!

P.P.S. Today, 18th, another dirty trick of the Martovites: their refusal to publish in No. 54 my letter on why

I resigned from the editorial board,* on the pretext that Hans was against publication of documents (they have become inveterate liars! Hans was against it provided there was *peace*!). The refusal is accompanied by a heap of disgusting statements, such as that the C.C. has been trying to lay hands on the C.O., that negotiations have gone on for restoring confidence in the C.C., and so on. The tactic is clear: hypocritically to disguise the opposition of the Dans, Martyns, etc., to the C.C. and on the sly to {ling mud at the C.C. in the newspaper. On no account shall I leave the vile No. 53 unanswered. Wire immediately: 1) do you agree to the publication of my letter *outside Iskra*? 203 shares; 2) do you agree to devote all efforts immediately to the congress? 204 shares. If the answer to both questions is "yes", then wire: 407 shares. If it is "no" to both, then 45 shares.

The day after tomorrow I shall send you my letter of resignation from the editorial board. If you do not agree to an immediate congress and intend to suffer Martov's insults without saying anything, then I shall probably have to resign from the Central Committee as well.

Written December 18, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev
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* See present edition, Vol. 7.—*Ed.*

84
TO N. Y. VILONOV[228]

Dear comrade,

I was very glad to have your letter because here abroad we have too little opportunity of hearing the frank and independent voices of those engaged in local activities. For a Social-Democratic writer living abroad it is extremely important to have a frequent exchange of opinions with advanced workers who are active in Russia, and your account of the impact our dissensions have upon the committees interested me very much. I shall, perhaps, even publish your letter if the occasion offers.[229]

It is impossible to answer your questions in a single letter, since a detailed account of the Majority and the Minority would take up a whole book. I have now published in leaflet form my "Letter to the Editors of *Iskra* (Why I Resigned From the *Iskra* Editorial Board),"* where I give a brief account of the reasons why we parted company and try to show how the matter is misrepresented in *Iskra* No. 53 (beginning with No. 53, the editorial board consists of four representatives of the Minority in addition to Plekhanov). I hope that this letter (a small printed sheet of eight pages) will soon be in your hands, because it has already been taken to Russia and it will probably not be difficult to distribute it.

I repeat: in this letter the matter is set out very briefly. It cannot at present be set out in greater detail until the minutes of the Party Congress and of the League Congress have been issued (it is announced in *Iskra* No. 53 that the minutes of both these congresses will be published in full

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* See present edition, Vol. 7.—*Ed.*

very soon. I have information that the minutes of the Party Congress will be issued as a book of over three hundred pages; nearly 300 pages are now ready and the book will probably come out in a week or two at the latest). Most probably a pamphlet* will have to be written when these two sets of minutes are published.

My personal view of the matter is that the split is primarily and mainly due to dissatisfaction with the composition of the central bodies (the Central Organ and the Central Committee). The Minority wanted to keep the old six-man board of the C.O., but the Congress selected three of the six, apparently finding them better suited for political leadership. The Minority was similarly defeated over the composition of the Central Committee, that is to say, the Congress did not elect those whom the Minority wanted.

In consequence of this the dissatisfied Minority began exaggerating minor differences of opinion, boycotting the central bodies, mustering its supporters and even preparing to split the Party (very persistent and, probably, trustworthy rumours are current here that they have already decided to found, and have begun to set up, their own newspaper to be called *Kramola*.** No wonder the *feuilleton* in *Iskra* No. 53 has been set up in a type which does not exist at all in the Party print-shop!).

Plekhanov decided to co-opt them on to the editorial board to avoid a split, and wrote the article "What Should Not Be Done" in *Iskra* No. 52. After No. 51, I resigned from the editorial board, for I considered this modification of the congress under the influence of the rows taking place abroad to be incorrect. But personally, of course, I did not want to prevent peace if peace were possible, and therefore (since *now* I do not consider it possible for me to work in the Six) I withdrew from the editorial board, without, however, refusing to contribute.

The Minority (or opposition) wants to force its people into the Central Committee too. For the sake of peace, the C.C. agreed to take two of them, but the Minority is still not satisfied and continues to spread vile rumours about

* Lenin has in view his pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* which appeared in May 1904 (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

** Meaning "Sedition".—*Ed.*

the C.C. being ineffectual. In my opinion, that is the most outrageous violation of discipline and Party duty. Moreover, it is sheer slander, for the C.C. was elected by the Congress from persons for whom the *majority* of the *Iskra* organisation had expressed support. And the *Iskra* organisation, of course, knew better than anyone else who was fitted for this important role. A Central Committee of three persons[230] was elected at the Congress—all three long-standing members of the *Iskra* organisation; two of them were members of the Organising Committee; the third had been invited to serve on the O.C. but did not do so because he was personally unwilling, yet for a long time he worked for the O.C. on general Party matters. It follows that the most reliable and experienced persons were elected to the C.C. and I consider it a shabby trick to shout about their "ineffectiveness", when it is the Minority itself that *hinders* the C.C. from working. All the charges against the C.C. (about formalism, bureaucracy, and so forth) are nothing but malicious inventions devoid of any foundation.

It goes without saying that I fully share your opinion as to the unseemliness of an outcry against centralism and against the congress on the part of people who previously spoke in a different tone and who are dissatisfied because on one particular issue the congress did not do what they wanted. Instead of admitting their mistake, these people are now disrupting the Party! I believe, the comrades in Russia should vigorously oppose all disruption and insist that the congress decisions be implemented and prevent the squabble about who should be on the C.O. and the C.C. from hindering the work. The squabbles abroad among the writers and all the other generals (whom you too harshly and bluntly call intriguers) will cease to be dangerous to the Party only when the leaders of committees in Russia become more independent and capable of firmly demanding the fulfilment of what their delegates decide at the Party congress.

Concerning the relations between the Central Organ and the Central Committee, you are quite right that neither the one nor the other should be given the upper hand once for all. The congress itself, I think, should make a separate

decision on each occasion. At present, too, according to the Rules, the Party Council stands above both the C.O. and the C.C. And the Council has two members from the C.O. and two from the C.C., the fifth member having been elected by the congress. Hence the congress itself has decided who should be given the upper hand on this occasion. Stories about us wanting the C.O. abroad to overrule the C.C. in Russia are sheer gossip in which there is not a word of truth. When Plekhanov and I were on the editorial board we had even in the Council *three* Social-Democrats from Russia and *only two* from abroad. Now, under the Martovites, the reverse is the case! Now judge for yourself what their talk is worth!

I send you warm greetings and earnestly request you to let me know whether you received this letter, whether you have read my letter to the editorial board and Nos. 52, 53 of *Iskra*, and how in general things are now in the Committee.

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

Written between December 17
and December 22, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Ekaterinoslav

First published in 1929

Printed from the original

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

December 22, 1903

To the Central Committee from Lenin, member of the C.C.

I have read the C.C.'s announcement circulated to the committees,[231] and can only shrug my shoulders. A more ridiculous misunderstanding I cannot imagine. Hans has been cruelly punished by this for his credulity and impressionability. Let him explain to me, in the name of all that's holy, where he gets the temerity to speak in such an unctuous tone about peace when the opposition (Martov included) *has formally rejected peace* in the reply to the Central Committee's ultimatum? Is it not childishness, after this formal rejection of peace, to believe the chatter of Martov who, firstly, does not remember today what he said yesterday and, secondly, cannot answer for the whole opposition? Is it not naïve to speak and write about peace when the opposition is on the war-path again, is clamouring at meetings in Geneva that it is a force, and is beginning a mean persecution in *Iskra* No. 53? And to tell a downright lie to the committees!—for example, that the conflict with the League is "completely at an end"? To keep silent about the first Council (with Ru)?

Finally, this silly advice that I should go away from here! I could understand if it has been given by members of the family or relatives, but for such piffle to be written by the Central Committee! Yes, it is now that the literary war begins. No. 53 and my letter, published in leaflet form,* will demonstrate that for you.

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* The reference is to the letter "Why I Resigned From the *Iskra* Editorial Board" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

that for the moment I cannot think how you are to be extricated from a ludicrous situation, unless it is by declaring that the contents of *Iskra* No. 53, and especially the article "Our Congress", have destroyed all your faith in the possibility of peace. Personally, I see no other way out.

Reply to the committees (and to Martov himself) that the disgracefully false article "Our Congress" has provoked a polemic in the press, but that you (the C.C.) will try to carry out positive work. Plekhanov was against the article "Our Congress" and against Martov delivering a public lecture.

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1929 Printed from the original

86
TO THE EDITORS OF *ISKRA*[232]

To the Editorial Board of the Central Organ

Comrades,

In connection with the resolution adopted on December 22 by the editorial board of the Central Organ, the representative of the C.C. abroad considers it necessary to point out to the editors the extreme unseemliness of this resolution, which can only be put down to excessive irritation.[233]

If Lenin, acting not as a C.C. member but as a former editor, expounded something which you thought incorrect, you can thresh this out in the press.

Comrade Hans did not conclude on behalf of the C.C. any agreement about non-publication of the negotiations and he could not do so without our knowledge. The editorial board cannot fail to be aware of this. Probably Comrade Hans made a suggestion about non-publication of the negotiations *in the event of a formal peace being concluded*.

Not evasively, but quite categorically, the C.C. representative abroad twice informed the editorial board of the C.O. that he permitted Lenin's letter to be published.*

If the editorial board had not been moved by a spirit of excessive irritation, it would easily have seen how extremely out of place were its remarks about the number of C.C. members living abroad. To this and other unseemly attacks of the editorial board (like the ludicrous charge of some kind of alleged "secret" printing), the C.C. represen-

* The reference is to the letter "Why I Resigned From the *Iskra* Editorial Board" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed*.

tative abroad replies merely by a call to remember Party duty and put a stop to *acts* capable of making literary polemics the occasion for a split.

The Central Committee Representative Abroad

Written December 24-27, 1903
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1929

Printed from the original

87

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

December 30, 1903

We have received your letter of December 10 (old style). We are surprised and angered by your silence on burning issues and your unpunctuality in correspondence. It is really impossible for matters to be conducted in this fashion! Get another secretary if Bear and Doe are unable to write every week. Just think, so far nothing substantial has been received from Deer! So far (after 20 days) there has been no reply to our letter of December 10 (new style).* At all costs this scandalous state of affairs must be put an end to!

Further, we categorically insist on the need to know where we stand in the struggle against the Martovites, on the need to reach agreement among ourselves and to adopt an absolutely definite line.

Why haven't you sent Boris over here, as Hans here wanted? If Boris were here, he would not be writing us ridiculous speeches about peace. Why hasn't Hans fulfilled his promise to write to the Old Man an exact account of Boris's mood? If you can't send Boris, send Mitrofan or Beast in order to clear up the matter.

I repeat over and over again: Hans's main mistake lies in having trusted to his latest impression. No. 53 ought to have sobered him. The Martovites have taken possession of the C.O. for the purpose of war, and now war is being waged all along the line: attacks in *Iskra*, brawling at public lectures (recently in Paris Martov read a lecture about the split to an audience of 100 and engaged in a

* See pp. 200-01 of this volume.—*Ed.*

fight against Lebedev), the most shameless agitation against the Central Committee. It would be unpardonable short-sightedness to think that this could not spread to Russia. Things here have reached a stage when the C.O. has broken off relations with the C.C. (the C.O. resolution of December 22, sent to you), and when the C.O. has published *a false statement* (*Iskra* No. 55) alleging an *agreement* about non-publication of the negotiations).

It is high time you gave serious thought to the political situation as a whole, took a broader view, got away from the petty, everyday concern with pence and passports, and, without burying your head in the sand, got clear on where you are going and *for the sake of what* you are dilly-dallying.

There are two tendencies among us in the C.C., if I am not mistaken (or, perhaps, three? What are they?). In my opinion they are: 1) to procrastinate, without convening a congress and turning a deaf ear, as far as possible, to attacks and grossest insults, and to strengthen the position in Russia; 2) to raise a storm of resolutions against the C.O., to devote *all* efforts to winning over the shaky committees and to prepare a congress in two, or at most three, months' time. And so, I ask: what does your strengthening of the positions consist in? Only in your losing time, while the adversary is mustering his forces here (and the groups abroad matter a lot!), and in your putting off a decision until you suffer defeat. Defeat is inevitable and will be fairly rapid—it would be sheer childishness to ignore that.

What will you leave us after the defeat? Among the Martovites—fresh and increased forces. Among us—broken ranks. For them—a strengthened Central Organ. For us—a bunch of persons badly handling the transportation of a Central Organ that abuses them. That is a sure path to defeat, a shameful and stupid postponement of *inevitable* defeat. You are merely closing your eyes to this, taking advantage of the fact that the war abroad is slow in reaching you. Your tactics literally amount to saying: after us (after the present composition of the C.C.), the deluge (a deluge for the Majority).

I think that even if defeat is inevitable, we must make our exit straightforwardly, honestly and openly, and that

is possible only at a congress. But defeat is by no means inevitable, for the Five are *not* solid, Plekhanov is not with them, but *in favour of peace*, and a congress could *show up* both Plekhanov and them, with their supposed differences of opinion. The only serious objection to a congress is that it will necessarily legitimise a split. To this I reply: 1) even that is better than the present position, for then we can make our exit honestly instead of prolonging the disgraceful position of being spat upon; 2) the Martovites have missed the moment for a split, and their withdrawal from the Third Congress is improbable, for the present struggle and full publicity remove the possibility of a split; 3) a deal with them, if that were possible, is best of all done at the congress.

Discuss this matter seriously and send your reply at long last, giving the opinion of each (absolutely each) member of the Central Committee.

Don't bother me about leaflets; I am not a machine and in the present scandalous situation I can't work.

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1929 Printed from the original

1904

88

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

P.S.[234] January 2, 1904. I have just received the proofs of Axelrod's article in *Iskra* No. 55[235] (No. 55 will be out in a couple of days). It is much more disgusting even than Martov's article ("Our Congress") in No. 53. We have here "ambitious fantasies" "inspired by the legends about Schweitzer's dictatorship"; we have here again accusations about "the all-controlling centre" "disposing at its personal (sic!) discretion" of "Party members who are converted (!) into cogs and wheels". "The establishment of a vast multitude of government departments, divisions, offices and workshops of all kinds." The conversion of revolutionaries (really and truly, sic!) "into head clerks, scribes, sergeants, non-commissioned officers, privates, warders, foremen" (sic!). The C.C., it says (according to the Majority's idea), "must be merely the collective agent of this authority (the authority of the *Iskra* editorial board), and be under its strict tutelage and vigilant control". Such, it says, is "the organisational utopia of a theocratic nature" (sic!). "The triumph of bureaucratic centralism in the Party organisation—that is the result" ... (really and truly, sic!). In connection with this article I again and again ask all C.C. members: is it really possible to leave this without a protest or fight? Don't you feel that by tolerating this silently you are turning yourselves into nothing more nor less than gossip-mongers (gossip about Schweitzer and his pawns) and spreaders of slander (about bureaucrats, i.e., yourselves and the Majority as a whole)? And do you consider it possible to conduct "positive work" under such "ideological leadership"? Or do you know of any other means of honest struggle apart from a congress?

((The Martovites, apparently, have Kiev, Kharkov Gornozavodsky, Rostov and the Crimea. This makes ten votes + the League + the editorial board of the C.O. + two in the Council = 16 votes out of 49. If all efforts are at once directed towards Nikolayev, Siberia and the Caucasus, it is *fully* possible to leave them with one-third.))

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1929 Printed from the original

89
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

January 4, 1904

Old Man writing. I have just received Deer's letter with a reply to mine of December 10* and I am answering immediately. You don't have to ask me for a criticism of Deer's views! I will say straight out that I am furious with Deer's timidity and naïveté.

1) To write to the C.O. from the C.C. in Russia is the height of tactlessness. Everything must go *through* the C.C.'s representative abroad, and no other way. I assure you, this is essential if you want to avoid a terrific row. The C.O. must be told once and for all that there is the C.C.'s plenipotentiary representative abroad and that's flat.

2) It is not true that there was some sort of agreement about the League minutes. You said plainly that you were leaving the question of publishing or shortening them to us. (As a matter of fact there was no "agreement" for *you* to make on this. Not even for the *entire* C.C.). You are hopelessly muddled up on this, and if you were to write a single incautious word, it will all appear in the press with an immense hullabaloo.

3) If in your letter to the C.O. about No. 53 you did not use a single word of protest against the obscenities about Schweitzer, bureaucratic formalism, etc., then I am bound to say that we have ceased to understand each-other. In that case I shall say no more and come out as a private writer against these obscenities. In print, I shall call these gentlemen hysterical tricksters.

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* See pp. 200-01 of this volume.—*Ed.*

4) While the C.C. is muttering about positive work, Yeryoma and Martyn are stealing Nikolayev from it. This is a downright disgrace and another warning to you, the hundredth, if not thousandth. *Either* we win over the committees and convene a congress, *or* ignominiously retire from the scene under the hail of obscene attacks by the C.O., which denies me access to *Iskra*.

5) To speak of a conference of the committees and of an "ultimatum" (after they have *ridiculed* our ultimatum!) is simply ridiculous. Why, the Martovites will simply burst out laughing in reply to this "threat"! What do they care about ultimatums when they brazenly hold back money, attack the C.C. and *openly* say: "We await the first break-down."

Can Deer have forgotten already that Martov is a pawn in the hands of cunning persons? And after this to still talk about the attitude of Martov and George towards Deer and Nil! It is offensive to read this naïveté. In the first place, both Martov and George don't care a hang about all your Deer and Nils. Secondly, George is pushed right into the background by the Martovites and he says plainly that they don't listen to him (which is clearly evident from *Iskra*). Thirdly, I repeat for the hundredth time that Martov is a cipher. Why didn't that good soul Hans make friends here with Trotsky, Dan and Natalya Ivanovna? What a pity the dear fellow missed such a chance (the last chance) to make a "sincere", "happy peace".... Would it not be wiser to write letters directly to these "masters" than to weep on the neck of that rag doll, Martov? Just try and write, it will sober you up! And until you have written to them and personally received a spit in the face from them, don't bother us (or them) about "peace". We here can clearly see who is doing the *chattering* and who the *bossing* among the Martovites.

6) I gave my arguments in favour of a congress already last time. For heaven's sake, don't pussyfoot to yourself; postponing the congress would only be a proof of our impotence. And if you continue harping on peace, it will not only be Nikolayev that the enemies will take from you.

It's either war or peace. If peace—then it means that you are giving way to the Martovites, who are waging a

vigorous and clever war. In that case you will suffer in silence while mud is being flung at you in the C.O. (=the ideological leadership of the Party!). In that case we have nothing to talk about. I have already said in the press *everything* there was to be said, and will go on saying everything in the full sense of the word.

It is clear to me that the hounding we feared if I were to take *Iskra* on my own, has started all the same, only now my mouth is stopped. And it is childishness to rely on Andreyevsky's talk about the influence of Lenin's name.

If it's war, I would ask you in that case to explain to me by what means, other than a congress, a *real* and honest war can be carried on.

I repeat that a congress now is not pointless, for Plekhanov is no longer with the Martovites. Publication (which I shall secure at all costs)[236] will finally separate him from them. And he is already at loggerheads with them.

The Martovites will not even mention the Six at the Third Congress. A split would be better than what we have at present, when they have dirtied *Iskra* with tittle-tattle. But they will hardly seek a split at the Third Congress, and we shall be able to hand over *Iskra* to a neutral committee, taking it away from both sides.

7) Against the League, I shall do my utmost to achieve a decisive war.

8) If Nil is still for peace, let him come and talk a couple of times with Dan. That will be enough, I'm sure!

9) We need money. There is enough for two months, and after that not a farthing. Don't forget we are now "keeping" a bunch of scoundrels, who spit on us in the C.O. That is called "positive work". *Ich gratuliere*!*

Sent from Geneva to Kiev
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* My congratulations!—*Ed.*

90

TO THE *ISKRA* EDITORIAL BOARD[237]

As the representative of the C.C., I consider it necessary to point out to the editors that there are absolutely no grounds for raising the question of lawfulness, etc., on the basis of heated speeches at lectures or on the basis of literary polemics. The Central Committee as such has never had, and does not have, the slightest doubt of the lawfulness of the editorial board co-opted, as *Iskra* No. 53 quite justly stated, in complete accord with Clause 12 of the Party Rules. The Central Committee would be ready to state that publicly as well, if necessary. If the editorial board sees these polemics as attacks upon itself, it has every opportunity of replying. It is hardly reasonable to resent what the editorial board regards as sharply worded statements in the polemic, when no mention is made anywhere of boycott or any other disloyal (from the viewpoint of the C.C.) form of activity. We would remind the editorial board that the C.C. has *repeatedly* expressed its full readiness to publish, and made a *direct proposal to publish*, immediately both Dan's letter and Martov's "Once Again in the Minority", without being at all put out by the very sharp attacks to be found in these documents. In the view of the C.C., it is essential to give all Party members the widest possible freedom to criticise the central bodies and to attack them; the C.C. sees nothing terrible in such attacks, provided they are not accompanied by a boycott, by standing aloof from positive work or by cutting off financial resources. The Central Committee states even now that it would publish criticism against itself, seeing in a free exchange...*

Written January 8, 1904
in Geneva (local mail)

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* The sentence was completed by F. V. Lengnik as follows: "of opinions a guarantee against possible mistakes of the part of the central bodies".—*Ed.*

91

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY COUNCIL[238]

Comrade,

We would propose getting together for a meeting of the Council on Monday, January 25, at 4 p. m., in the Landolt restaurant. If you appoint a different place and time, please let us know not later than Sunday, for one of us lives far away from Geneva.

As regards secretarial duties, we think it should be possible to restrict ourselves to the services of Comrade Martov, who was already appointed secretary of the Council at its first meeting.

We would emphatically protest against Comrade Blumenfeld as secretary for, in the first place, he does not observe the rules of secrecy (he informed Druyan of Lenin's membership of the Central Committee); secondly, he is too expansive, so that there is no guarantee of calm and business-like qualities, and there is even the danger of a row and of having the door locked. Thirdly, we may have to discuss him personally on the Council, as purchaser of Party literature.

If you consider a special person necessary as secretary, we propose for this Comrade Bychkov, who is one of the old members of the *Iskra* organisation and a prominent Party activist (a member of the Organising Committee); moreover he is the most impartial and capable of recording everything calmly.

Council members....

P.S. I shall have to come to Geneva specially for the Council meeting, and the mail takes rather a long time reaching Mornex. I would ask you therefore to send me a

letter not later than Sunday (*during the day*), if the meeting is fixed for Monday, otherwise the notice will not reach me in time.

Alternatively, I would ask you to postpone the meeting until Wednesday.

My address is: Mornex....

Written January 23, 1904
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1929 Printed from the original

92

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY COUNCIL

Comrade,

We are unfortunately compelled to enter our emphatic protest against the editorial board's proposal of Comrade Gurvich as secretary.

Firstly, there were a number of conflicts with him in the C.C.

Secondly, he has expressed in writing (we can send you a copy) such an attitude to the Council, the highest Party institution, that his participation in the Council meeting is quite impossible.

Thirdly—and chiefly—we shall probably have to raise in the Council the question of *Comrade Gurvich personally*, as a representative of the League's board of management, who, in our opinion, has shown a wrong attitude to the Central Committee. It is inconvenient to have as secretary a person whose activities are being questioned.

We draw attention also to the fact that, appreciating the importance of the Council as an instrument for unity and agreement (and not for disunity and discord) we *immediately* proposed as secretary someone who has taken no part in the dissensions and against whom there has been no protest by the other side.

We are sure that the other side, too, the editorial board of the Central Organ, could easily propose a candidate who has not taken part in the dissensions and who could not be the subject of discussion on the Council.

Yours sincerely, *L.*

Written January 27, 1904
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1929

Printed from the original

93

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

For the C.C. (to be handed to N. N.*)

The meetings (three sittings) of the Party Council ended yesterday. These meetings brought into sharp focus the whole political situation within the Party. Plekhanov sided with the Martovites, outvoting us on every question of any importance. Our resolution condemning boycott, etc. (boycott *by either side*), was not put to the vote; a line was merely drawn in principle between impermissible and permissible forms of struggle. On the other hand, a resolution of Plekhanov's was adopted saying it was desirable that the C.C. co-opt an *appropriate* (sic!) number from the Minority. After this we withdrew our resolution and submitted a protest against this policy of place-hunting on the part of the Council. Three Council members (Martov, Axelrod and Plekhanov) replied that it was "beneath their dignity" to examine this protest. We stated that the only *honest* way out was a congress. The Council rejected it. The three members passed resolutions legitimising (!) the editorial board's sending out its representatives separately from the C.C., and instructing the C.C. to give the editorial board literature in the amount required for distribution (!). That means giving it them for their own transportation and delivery, for they now send out one "agent" after another, who *refuse* to execute commissions for the Central Committee. In addition, they also have transport ready (they proposed sharing the cost of carriage fifty-fifty).

Iskra (No. 57) has an article by Plekhanov calling our C.C. *eccentric* (there being no Minority on it) and inviting it to co-opt the Minority. How many is unknown; according to private information, not less than *three* out of a very

* N. N.—unidentified.—*Ed.*

short list (of 5-6, apparently), perhaps with a demand also for the resignation of someone from the Central Committee.

One must be blind not to see now what is afoot. The Council will bring pressure to bear on the C.C. *in every possible way*, demanding complete surrender to the Martovites. Either—an immediate congress, the immediate collection of resolutions on a congress from 11-12 committees, and the immediate concentration of all efforts on agitating for a congress. Or—the resignation of the whole C.C., for no C.C. member will consent to the ignominious and ludicrous role of accepting people who *foist themselves* on the C.C., people who will not rest content until they have taken everything into their hands, and who will drag every trifle before the Council so as to get their own way.

Kurtz and I insistently demand that the C.C. *be convened immediately at all costs* to decide the matter, taking into account, of course, our votes as well. We repeat emphatically and for the hundredth time: either a congress at once, or resignation. We invite our dissentients to come here, so as to judge the situation on the spot. Let them try *in practice* to get along with the Martovites and not write us hollow phrases about the value of peace!

We have no money. The C.O. is overloading us with expenses, obviously pushing us towards bankruptcy, and obviously counting on a financial crash in order to take extraordinary measures which would reduce the C.C. to a cipher.

We need two or three thousand rubles immediately at all costs. Without fail and immediately, otherwise we shall face *complete* ruin within a month!

We repeat: think it over carefully, *send delegates here* and take a straightforward view of the matter. Our last word is: either a congress or the resignation of the whole Central Committee. Reply at once as to whether you give us your votes. If not, let us know *what is to be done if Kurtz and I resign*, let us know without fail.

Written January 31, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1929 Printed from the original

94
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

To Hans from Old Man

Dear friend.

I have seen *Beast* and only learnt about your affairs from him. In my opinion, you must make Deer go away at once and change his skin. It is stupid and ridiculous of him to await the blow. The only way out is to go underground and travel about. It only seems to him that such a step is difficult and hard to take. Deer should try it and he will quickly find that his new position will become a normal one for him. (I utterly fail to understand or share Konyaga's arguments against it.)

Next, about the whole political situation. Things are in a terrible tangle. Plekhanov has gone over to the Martovites and is overpowering us in the Council. The Council has expressed a desire that the C.C. should have additional members (this is published in *Iskra* No. 58). The Council has given the editorial board the right to send out agents and receive literature for distribution.

The Martovites evidently have their own war fund and are only waiting for a suitable moment for a coup d'état (such a moment as a financial crash—we are without money—or a break-down in Russia, etc.). I have no doubt about this and Kurtz and I are demanding that C.C. members who do doubt it should, come here to convince themselves, for it is ridiculous and undignified to have people pulling different ways.

I believe we should now 1) kick up a row in the committees against the C.O. by means of the most militant resolutions; 2) carry on a polemic against the C.O. in leaflets of the committees; 3) adopt resolutions on a congress in

the committees and publish them locally; 4) set Schwarz, Vakar and others to work on leaflets for the Central Committee.

Hans should be warned that he will definitely be used to give false evidence against me, that is certain. If Hans does not want this to happen, let him immediately send a written categorical statement: 1) that there was no agreement about non-publication of the negotiations; 2) that in the Council on November 29, 1903, Hans did not promise to co-opt on to the C.C.; 3) that Hans understood that the Martovites would take over the C.C. for the purpose of peace and that they balked his expectations by launching war, beginning with No. 53. We shall publish this statement *only if* they provoke us.

Written between February 2 and 7, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Kiev
First published in 1929

Printed from the original

95

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE P.P.S.

Comrades,

Please send us more detailed information as to what kind of conference you are planning, which organisations will be represented, and when and where it will be held. Further, be so good as to inform us what would be your attitude to the participation of Polish-Democrats in the conference.

On receipt of all supplementary information from you, we shall submit your proposal, in accordance with our Party Rules, to the Party Council.

With comradely greetings,
On behalf of the C.C....

Written February 7, 1904
Sent from Geneva
First published in 1925

Printed from the original

96

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Old Man writing. I have read the letters of Zemlyachka and Konyagin. Where he got the idea that I have now realised the uselessness of a congress, God only knows. On the contrary, I insist as before that this is the only honest way out, that only short-sighted people and cowards can dodge this conclusion. I insist as before that Boris, Mitrofan and Horse should be sent here without fail, for people need to see the situation (especially that which arose after the Council meetings) for themselves, and not waste their time preaching to the winds from afar, hiding their heads under their wings and taking advantage of the fact that the C.C. is a long way off and it would take a year and a day to reach it.

There is nothing more absurd than the opinion that working for a congress, agitating in the committees, and getting them to pass well-thought-out and forceful (and not sloppy) resolutions *precludes* "positive" work or contradicts it. Such an opinion merely betrays an inability to understand the political situation which has now arisen in the Party.

The Party is virtually torn apart, the Rules have been turned into scraps of paper and the organisation is spat upon—only complaisant Gothamites can still fail to see this. To anyone who has grasped this, it should be clear that the Martovites' attack must be met with an equal attack (and not with fatuous vapourings about peace, etc.). And for an attack, all forces must be set in motion. All technical facilities, transport and receiving arrangements should be handled *exclusively* by auxiliary personnel, assistants and agents. It is supremely unwise to use C.C.

members for this. The C.C. members must *occupy* all the committees, mobilise the Majority, tour Russia, unite their people, launch an onslaught (in reply to the Martovites' attacks), an onslaught on the C.O., an onslaught by means of resolutions 1) demanding a congress; 2) *challenging* the editors of the C.O. to say whether they will submit to the congress on the question of the composition of the editorial board; 3) branding the new *Iskra* without "philistine delicacy", as was done recently by Astrakhan, Tver and the Urals. These resolutions should be published in Russia, as we have said a hundred times already.

I believe that we really do have in the C.C. bureaucrats and formalists, instead of revolutionaries. The Martovites spit in their faces and they wipe it off and lecture me: "it is useless to fight!" ... Only bureaucrats can fail to see now that the C.C. is not a C.C. and its efforts to be one are ludicrous. Either the C.C. becomes an organisation of *war against the C.O.*, war in deeds and not in words, of war waged in the committees, or the C.C. is a useless rag, which deserves to be thrown away.

For heaven's sake, can't you see that centralism has been irretrievably shattered by the Martovites! Forget all idiotic formalities, take possession of the committees, teach *them* to fight for the Party against the circle spirit abroad, write leaflets for them (this will not hinder agitation for a congress, but assist it!), use auxiliary forces for technical jobs. Take the lead in the war against the C.O. or renounce altogether ludicrous pretensions to "leadership" ... by wiping off the spittle.

Claire's behaviour is shameful, but Konyaga's encouragement of him is still worse. Nothing makes me so angry now as our "so-called" C.C. *Addio*.

Old Man

Written in February 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1929

Printed from the original

97

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ISKRA*

The C.C. informs the editorial board of the C.O. that it regards the instruction that letters *intended for the C.C.* are to be handed to the C.O. as an illegitimate and unscrupulous confiscation and a violation of trust.

The C.C. states also that it has already fully taken the measure of Comrade Blumenfeld, who has now been entrusted with the sorting out of letters, on account of his unreliability in matters of secrecy and his proneness to make rows.

The C.C. will therefore bring to the knowledge of all Party members such confiscation and its inevitably harmful consequences for our work.

The C.C.

Written February 26, 1904
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

98

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Comrades,

Having received notification of your collective decision of the C.C. majority against a congress and the desirability of putting an end to "squabbling", and having discussed this notification among the three of us (Kurtz, Beast and Lenin), we unanimously adopted the following decision:

1) Kurtz and Lenin will *temporarily* resign membership of the Council (while remaining members of the C.C.) until the true nature of our differences with the majority of the Central Committee has been cleared up. (We stated in the Council that we see no other honest way out of the squabbling except a congress, and we voted for a congress.) We stress that we are withdrawing temporarily and conditionally, by no means resigning altogether, and greatly desiring a comradely clarification of our differences and misunderstandings.

2) In view of (a) the need for C.C. members on the Council to live abroad; (b) the need for personal consultation with the C.C. members in Russia; c) the need for a C.C. member abroad after the departure of Kurtz, Beast and Lenin (Kurtz and Beast are leaving for Russia, Lenin is taking his official and full holiday for not less than two months); (d) the need to arrange that the conduct of affairs here that give rise to "squabbling" should be in the hands of *those* C.C. members who *disagree* with us, for we are *powerless to combat* the squabbling otherwise than as we are doing,

—in view of all this, we most earnestly request the C.C. to send here *immediately* and without fail at least one of its members from Russia.

We ask you to inform us at once of the receipt of this letter and of your reply.

P.S. To avoid gossip and false rumours, we have informed the Council of our resignation in the following form (copy in full):

"*To the Chairman of the Party Council*

"Comrade, in view of the departure of one of us, and the holiday being taken by the other, we are regretfully compelled to relinquish temporarily the post of C.C. members on the Council. We have informed the Central Committee of this.

"With Social-Democratic greetings,

Kurtz,

Lenin"

Written March 13, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1929

Printed from the original

99
TO F. V. LENGNIK

I add my personal request to Stake that he should on no account resign.[239] If Valentin is unwilling to consult on everything and to hand all, absolutely all, information to Stake, then let Valentin resign. Let Stake bear in mind that the whole course of events is now in our favour; a little more patience and persistence, and we shall win. Make sure to acquaint everyone with the pamphlet,* especially Brutus. After the pamphlet we must make a further attack on Brutus. Brutus will be ours; for the time being I shall not accept his withdrawal; you should not accept it either; put his resignation in your pocket for the time being. There is no question of Zemlyachka's resignation, remember that; Nil does not even claim that she has resigned. Inform Zemlyachka about this and stand firm. I repeat: our side will gain the upper hand within the Central Committee.

Written May 26, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Moscow
First published in 1930 — Printed from the original

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* The reference is to *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

100
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Dear friend,

You will, of course, grasp the gist of the matter from our agreement with Nil.[240] For heaven's sake, don't be in a hurry to make decisions and don't despair. Be sure first to read my pamphlet* and the Council minutes. Do not let your temporary withdrawal from affairs worry you; better abstain from some of the voting, but do not withdraw altogether. Believe me, you will still be very, very much needed and all your friends are counting on your early "resurrection". Many people in the Party are still in a state of bewilderment and confusion, at a loss to grasp the new situation and faint-heartedly losing confidence in themselves and in the right cause. On the other hand, it is becoming more and more evident to us here that we are gaining from delays, that the squabbling is dying out of itself and the essential issue, that of principles, is irrevocably coming into the forefront. And in this respect the new *Iskra* is pitiably feeble. Don't believe the stupid tales that we are out for a split, arm yourself with a certain amount of patience and you will soon see that our campaign is a splendid one and that we shall win by the force of conviction. Be sure you reply to me. It would be best if you could wangle things so as to come out here for a week or so—not on business, but just for a holiday, and to meet me somewhere in the mountains. I assure you that you will still be very much needed, and although Konyaga

* *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

mistakenly dissuaded you from one plan of yours—a thing put off is not a thing lost! Gird up your loins, we are still full of fight.

Yours,
Lenin

Written not earlier than
May 26, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

101
TO L. B. KRASIN[241]

From Old Man to Horse, private

In connection with the documents sent you (the agreement with Nil and my official letter to the C.C.*), I should like to have a talk with you, but I do not know whether we shall succeed in meeting. Your "friend"[242] was here recently and he spoke of your possible arrival, but Nil contradicted this news. It will be a great pity if you do not come; your coming would be absolutely essential in all respects, as there are misunderstandings galore and they will increase more and more, hindering all work, unless we succeed in meeting and having a detailed talk. Write to me without fail whether you are coming and what you think of my pamphlet. In general, you are unpardonably inactive where letters are concerned.

In my opinion, Boris (and *Konyaga*, too, apparently) have got stuck in an obviously obsolete point of view. They are still "living in November", when squabbling overrode everything else in our Party struggle, when it was permissible to hope that everything would "come right of itself" given a certain personal tractibility, etc. This point of view is now antiquated and to persist in it means either being a parrot senselessly repeating one and the same thing, or a political weathercock, or renouncing any leading role whatsoever and becoming a deaf-and-dumb cabman or factotum. Events have irrevocably shattered this old point of view. Even the Martovites refuse to have anything to do with "co-optation"; the theoretical

* "Letter to the Members of the Central Committee" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

drivel that fills the new *Iskra* has already *de facto* pushed all squabbling far into the background (so that now only the parrots can call for a cessation of squabbling); by the force of events the issue has *boiled down*—for heaven's sake grasp this—it has boiled down to whether the Party is satisfied with the new *Iskra*. If we don't want to be pawns, we absolutely must understand the present situation and work out a plan for a sustained and inexorable struggle on behalf of the Party principle against the circle spirit, on behalf of revolutionary principles of organisation against opportunism. It is time to get rid of old bugbears which make out that every such struggle is a split, it is time to stop hiding our heads under our wings, evading one's Party duties by references to the "positive work" ... of cabmen and factotums; it is time to abandon the opinion, at which even children will soon be laughing, that agitation for a congress is Lenin's intrigue.

I repeat: the C.C. members are in very serious danger of becoming extremely backward eccentrics. Anyone who possesses a particle of political honour and political honesty must stop shifting and shuffling (*even* Plekhanov has not succeeded in that, leave alone our good Boris!), and must adopt a definite position and stand by his convictions.

All the very best. Awaiting your reply,

Yours,

Lenin

Written not earlier than May 26, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Baku
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

102
TO YELENA STASOVA AND F. V. LENGNIK

We have just received Absolute's letter about the meeting and do not understand it at all. On whose initiative is the meeting being arranged? Who will attend it? Will Nikitich, Deer and Valentin be there? It is essential to know everything in the greatest possible detail. For what may happen is this: Deer, Nikitich and Mitrofan may transfer their votes to Nil or Valentin, which will give them a majority, and they may carry out a coup d'état; it is easier to do this abroad, where the Council is at hand to sanction their decisions. In general a meeting here of the soft members[243] may turn out to be very dangerous at the present time. Judging by the way Nil behaves, one could expect anything from him. He says, for example, in connection with Plekhanov's letter: "We must reply that we do not agree with Lenin's policy, but we don't want to give him up." What he understands by Lenin's policy, God alone knows. He refused to discuss matters with Falcon: "You will learn my opinion from Valentin." He talks to the Minority in a very friendly way, quite different from the way he talks to the Majority. Falcon wanted to go away today, but just now we are in some perplexity. The "soft" ones alone may decide, if it is to their advantage, that transfer of votes is not allowed, in which case Falcon ought not go away—it will be an extra vote and, besides, support for Lenin is needed. If, however, there are no grounds for thinking that the meeting will end in a coup, then there is no need for Falcon to hang about. In the first event, wire: "*Geld folgt*"* (meaning: Falcon to travel immedi-

* "Money follows".—*Ed.*

ately); in the second event, wire: "*Brief folgt*"* (meaning-Falcon to remain abroad). The address for the telegram is....**

Reply also by letter without delay and in as much detail as possible. Settle the time more exactly. What do you mean by: prepare lodgings? Do you too think that all the "stone-hards" can go away without everything falling into the hands of the hard-soft "Matryona-ites"? If, for example, Valentin remains while the others go away, he can break a lot of china. In that case, perhaps, Falcon's presence will be needed in Russia. Think all this over very carefully. At present we do not share your optimism concerning the C.C., but we are optimists as regards our victory.

If the meeting is a general one, let Stake once more make desperate efforts to drag Deer out here and explain to him that the transfer of his (Deer's) vote to Konyaga or Boris could mean a coup d'état and Lenin's withdrawal for a desperate struggle.

Written June 19, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Moscow
First published in 1930

Printed from a copy
written out by N. K.
Krupskaya with corrections
and an addition
by V. I. Lenin

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* "Letter follows".—*Ed.*
** Space was left in the manuscript for the address.—*Ed.*

103

TO Y. O. MARTOV, SECRETARY OF THE PARTY COUNCIL

Reply to Comrade Martov

Comrade,

I received your undated letter while travelling, and without having the Council minutes at hand. At all events I consider it in principle absolutely impermissible and unlawful that outside a Council meeting members of the Council should give their votes or make arrangements on any matters that come within the competence of the Council. I cannot therefore comply with your request about voting for candidates. If I am not mistaken, the Council decided that all Council members should represent our Party at the Congress.[244] Consequently, the question has been settled. If any Council member is unable to go, then, in my opinion, he can appoint someone else in his place; I do not know, of course, whether it is customary for international congresses to permit such substitution, but I do not know of any obstacle to it in our Party Rules or in the Party's usual regulations. Personally I am also unable to go and would like as a substitute for myself Comrade Lyadov, who has plenipotentiary powers from the C.C., and Comrade Sergei Petrovich, member of the Moscow Committee.

With Social-Democratic greetings,
N. Lenin, council member

P.S. *Re* the communication to the C.C., I shall write to the Geneva agents, who are in charge of all matters during my absence.

Written August 10, 1904
in the Swiss mountains
Sent to Geneva

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

104
TO M. K. VLADIMIROV[245]

For Fred

Dear Comrade,

I have received your last letter. I am writing to the old address, although I am afraid that letters are not reaching you; the previous letter was answered in considerable detail. The comradely trust which is evident in all your letters induces me to write to you personally. This letter is not written from the collegium and is not intended for the Committee.

The state of things in your Committee, which is suffering from a lack of people, lack of literature and complete lack of information, is similar to the state of things in Russia as a whole. Everywhere there is a terrible lack of people, even more so in the Minority committees than in those of the Majority, complete isolation, a general mood of depression and bitterness, stagnation as regards positive work. Ever since the Second Congress, the Party is being torn to pieces, and today things have gone very, very far in this respect; the tactics of the Minority have terribly weakened the Party. The Minority has done all it could to discredit the C.C. as well, beginning its persecution already at the congress, and carrying it on intensively both in the press and orally. In even greater measure it has discredited the C.O., which it has turned from a Party organ into an organ for settling personal accounts with the Majority. If you have been reading *Iskra* there is no need to say anything to you about this. In their attempts to dig up fresh disagreements they have now trotted forth as their slogan "liquidation of the fourth, *Iskra*,

period", and are burning everything that they worshipped yesterday, totally distorting the perspective and interpret it. The Party functionaries, who remember what they stood for yesterday, do not follow the lead of the C.O. The vast majority of the committees adhere to the standpoint of the Congress majority and are breaking their spiritual ties with the Party organ more and more.

The present state of affairs, however, is having such an effect on positive work, and hindering it to such an extent, that among a whole number of Party functionaries a mood has developed that makes them immerse themselves in positive work and stand completely aloof from the embittered internecine struggle which is taking place in the Party. They want to close their eyes, stop up their ears and hide their heads under the wing of positive work; they are running away to escape from things which no one, being in the Party, can now escape from. Some of the C.C. members have adopted such a "conciliatory" attitude in an attempt to blanket the growing disagreements, to blanket the fact that the Party is disintegrating. The Majority (the non-conciliatory Majority) says: we must quickly find some way out, we must come to some arrangement, we must try to find the framework within which the ideological struggle can proceed more or less normally; a new congress is needed. The Minority is against a congress; they say: the vast majority of the Party is against us and a congress is not to our advantage; the "conciliatory" Majority is also against a congress, it is afraid of everyone's growing animosity against the C.O. and the C.C. To think that a congress could lead only to a split would mean to admit that we haven't got a Party at all, that Party feeling is so poorly developed among all of us that it cannot overcome the old circle spirit. In this respect we have a better opinion of our opponents than they have of themselves. Of course, it is impossible to guarantee anything, but an attempt to settle the conflict in a Party manner, and to find a way out, must be made. The Majority, at any rate, does not want a split, but to go on working under the conditions which have now been created is becoming more and more impossible. Already more than ten committees have expressed themselves in favour of a congress (St.

Petersburg, Tver, Moscow, Tula, Siberia, Caucasus, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Odessa, Riga, Astrakhan), but even if the great majority of the committees pronounce for a congress it will not take place so very soon, for both the C.O. and the C.C., and probably the Council as well, will oppose the wishes of the majority of the comrades in Russia.

With regard to literature, the C.C. comrade with whom we talked about this replied that it was being punctually supplied to your Committee. Obviously, there has been some confusion. Persons were sent to you twice, but in Russia they were directed to other places. We shall try to send you new things as opportunity arises.

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

Written August 15, 1904
in the Swiss mountains,
sent to Gomel

First published in 1934

Printed from a
copy written out
by N. K. Krupskaya

105
TO THE *ISKRA* EDITORIAL BOARD

To the C.O. of the R.S.D.L.P.

August 24, 1904

Comrades,

Being rather far from Geneva, I learnt only today that the editors of the Central Organ intend to publish a "declaration" said to have been adopted by the Central Committee.[246]

I consider it my duty to warn the editors of the C.O. that already on August 18, 1904, I made a statement contesting the lawfulness of this declaration,* i.e., the lawfulness of the decision on this question allegedly adopted by a majority of the C.C.

There are at present six members of the C.C. (owing to Comrade Mitrofan's resignation and, if the rumour is to be believed, the recent arrest of Zverev and Vasiliev).

According to my information, it is even probable that only three members out of the six had the audacity to speak for the whole C.C. and to do so not even through the two representatives abroad, who are formally bound by the agreement of May 26, 1904 (this agreement was signed by Glebov, Zverev and myself).

I enclose herewith a copy of my statement of August 18, 1904, and I must state that the editorial board of the C.O. will be responsible for giving press publicity to the *whole incident and conflict* in the event of the "declaration" being

* "To Five Members of the Central Committee" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

published before the matter of my protest against the validity of the decision has been settled within the C.C.

N. Lenin,
C.C. member and representative abroad

P.S. In any case I consider it absolutely obligatory that publication of the "declaration" should be withheld until I have thrashed out the matter with Comrade Glebov who, according to my information, is today leaving Berlin for Geneva. Not even I, a member of the C.C., have any knowledge of the latter's decision concerning the publication of this declaration.

If, nevertheless, the editorial board decides to publish the declaration, then I consider it is morally bound to publish also my protest against its lawfulness.

Written in the Swiss mountains,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930

Printed from a
copy written out
by N. K. Krupskaya

106

TO MEMBERS OF THE MAJORITY COMMITTEES AND ALL ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE MAJORITY IN RUSSIA WITH THE TEXT OF A LETTER TO LYDIA FOTIYEVA

Dear Lydia Alexandrovna,

Please send the following letter to all *our friends* in Russia as soon as possible (desirably today):

"Please begin immediately collecting and dispatching all correspondence to our addresses with the inscription: 'For Lenin'. Money, too, is badly needed. Events are taking a sharper turn. The Minority is obviously preparing a coup through a deal with part of the Central Committee. The worst is to be expected. Details in a few days."

Send this letter immediately

(1) to *St. Petersburg*, to the address of Mouse, (2) to *Tver*, (3) to *Odessa* (to both addresses), (4) to *Ekaterinoslav*, (5) to Siberia, (6) to the Urals, (7) to *Riga* (to both addresses), (8) to Rosa, (9) to Nizhni-Novgorod (the address for letters: Library of the Vsesoslovny Club in a brochure), (10) to Saratov (to Golubev's address), and generally to all the addresses of friends on whom we can fully depend.

Best regards.

Leon* should not leave so soon, her document will be sent out, but not before a day or two.**

Written about August 28, 1904,
in Switzerland
Sent to Geneva

First published in 1930 — Printed from the original

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* Unidentified.—*Ed.*

** The lines printed in small type are Krupskaya's text.—*Ed.*

107
TO V. A. NOSKOV

To Comrade Glebov, Member of the C.C.

August 30, 1904

Comrade,

I cannot take part in the voting on co-optation[247] proposed by you until I receive your written reply to my protest of August 18, 1904, and detailed information on the decisions allegedly adopted by the Central Committee. I cannot come to Geneva at the present time.

Lenin, C.C. member

Written in the Swiss mountains,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

108
TO V. A. NOSKOV

To Com. Glebov. In reply to your note of August 30, 1904, we inform you that the lawfulness and validity of the C.C. decisions to which you refer have been contested by C.C. member, Comrade Lenin. In the capacity of C.C. agents who have been kept informed of the whole course of the conflict within the C.C. we, in turn, also contest the lawfulness of this decision and state that the decision of the C.C. cannot be recognised as lawful, for it begins by stating as a fact what is known to be untrue: here abroad we ourselves have seen *two* C.C. members who were not informed of the meeting of the Central Committee. Since you have once told us a direct untruth (about an alleged ban imposed by the Central Committee on Comrade Lenin's book*) we are the more inclined to doubt statements emanating from you. We therefore request you to furnish us immediately with exact data for checking the lawfulness of the C.C. decision (composition of the meeting** and written statements of each participant). While having no intention whatever to oppose lawful decisions of an actual majority of the C.C. we shall pay no attention to any statement of yours until this lawfulness has been proved to us.

Written August 30 or 31, 1904
in the Swiss mountains,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930 — Printed from the original

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* *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back* (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed*.

** To avoid misinterpretation, we state that after publication of the untrue statement (in the declaration) concerning the composition of the meeting, we have absolutely no possibility of arriving at the truth except by getting to know the composition of the meeting.

109
TO V. A. NOSKOV

To Comrade Glebov

September 2, 1904

Comrade,

Please let me know whether you intend to reply to my protest in connection with the decision allegedly adopted by a majority of the Central Committee.

At what "preceding regular meeting of the C.C." did Comrade Osipov announce his resignation?

When exactly and by whom were the C.C. members who were absent when Osipov made this statement informed about this?

Did Comrade Valentin report to the Central Committee about his (Valentin's) dispute with Comrade Vasiliev in connection with the supposed resignation of Comrade Osipov?

When and to whom did Comrade Travinsky formally announce his resignation? Please let me have a copy of this announcement and all the details. Perhaps someone has already written to me about this, but the letter has gone astray?

Until the lawfulness (of the composition of the C.C. and its decision of ... July) has been "verified" by *all* members of the C.C., I do not regard either Comrade Glebov or myself entitled to represent the C.C. in the Party Council.

N. Lenin,
C.C. member

Written in the Swiss mountains,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

110

TO Y. O. MARTOV, SECRETARY OF THE PARTY COUNCIL

To Comrade Martov

September 2, 1904

Comrade,

In reply to your invitation of August 31, 1904, to a sitting of the Council, I must state that until the lawfulness of the composition of the C.C. and of its last, allegedly regular, meeting has been verified by all C.C. members, I do not consider either Comrade Glebov or myself entitled to represent the C.C. in the Party Council. Until such a check is made I regard all official steps undertaken by Comrade Glebov (and participation in the Council is also an official step) as *unlawful*.

I shall confine myself to pointing out one *obvious untruth* and one *inaccuracy* in the "verification" of the C.C.'s composition carried out by three C.C. members at their "meeting" of ... July. 1) Regarding the resignation of Mitrofanov, I have the written statement of Comrade Osipov. About the resignation of Travinsky, I have had no definite written statement from anyone. Three C.C. members at least prematurely accepted the resignation, without consulting the other members. 2) Regarding the notorious resignation of Comrade Osipov I have a written communication of C.C. member Vasiliev about his dispute with Comrade Valentin and the decision to examine the dispute at a general meeting of the Central Committee. About Osipov's resignation, too, I have not had a single communication. The statement of the three C.C. members that Osipov formally announced his withdrawal at the preceding regular meeting of the C.C. is an *obvious lie*,

documentarily refuted by the agreement of May 26, 1904, signed by Zverev and *Glebov*. This agreement, which was concluded *months after* the "preceding regular meeting of the C.C." and after Osipov is alleged to have joined the St. Petersburg Committee, records the C.C. as consisting of nine members, i.e., *including Osipov*.

N. Lenin,
C.C. member

Written in the Swiss mountains,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930

Printed from a
copy written out
by N. K. Krupskaya

111

TO Y. O. MARTOV, SECRETARY OF THE PARTY COUNCIL

To Comrade Martov

Duplicate

September 7, 1904

Comrade,

In connection with the copies you have sent me, I have to state that the Council need not have troubled to repeat its invitation, seeing that I have already replied to it by a refusal. Never have I expressed a desire that investigation of the "conflict" in the C.C. should be submitted to the Council. On the contrary, I have plainly stated in letters to Comrade Glebov and to Comrade Martov that only the C.C. members as a whole are competent to verify the lawfulness of its composition. The Council is not authorised even by the Rules to examine conflicts within the Central Committee.*

Since the Bureau of the International Congress has accepted the transference by me of *my* mandate,[248] I am no longer accountable in any way to any Council. I shall willingly give explanations (in writing or in print) concerning *definite* issues to anyone who wants them.

N. Lenin,
C.C. member

Written in the neighbourhood of Geneva, sent to Geneva

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

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* See pp. 253-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

112

TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE OF THE SOUTHERN COMMITTEES[249] AND TO THE SOUTHERN BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.

Comrades,

In reply to your resolution on the desirability of an Organising Committee of the Majority being set up, we hasten to inform you that we entirely agree with your idea. We should prefer only to call the group not an Organising Committee, but a Bureau of the Majority Committees. We do not consider it possible for us to appoint the B.M.C. ourselves, and are restricting ourselves to recommending comrades Martyn, Demon and K., Baron, Sergei Petrovich, Felix and Lebedev, who (as you know) have actually begun the work of uniting the Majority committees. We think that, given the direct support of several committees, these comrades could act as a special group uniting the activities of supporters of the Majority.

(Participants of the Meeting of the 22[250])

Written later than October 5, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Odessa
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

113
TO THE MAJORITY COMMITTEES

1) To be written to *all* our committees:
"Immediately and without fail write *officially* to the C.C. in Russia (sending us a copy of your letter) requesting that the Committee be supplied with all publications of the new publishing house of Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin,[251] and that they be supplied regularly. Get a reply from the C.C. and send it to us. Make use of a personal meeting with C.C. members and ask them about their reply in the presence of witnesses. Have you received the supplement to Nos. 73-74—the decisions of the Council[252]? You must protest against this scandalous affair, it is a downright falsification of the congress, a downright incitement of the periphery against the committees and a shifting of the squabble to the Council. If you have not received these decisions, enquire about them also from the C.C. and keep us informed. We shall issue shortly a detailed examination of these Council decisions."

2) The *full* reply of the 22 concerning the Organising Committee to be sent to *Odessa*, *stipulating* that the place they received it from is to be kept secret. The letter to be inscribed "for Baron, Osip and Leonsha *exclusively*". Let Odessa send us, Felix and Mouse, immediately their reply, their amendments, or their agreement, etc. Let Odessa send immediately Nikolayev's decision concerning the congress.

Written later than October 5, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1930

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TO THE SIBERIAN COMMITTEE

Geneva, October 30, 1904

To the Siberian Committee from N. Lenin

Comrades,

I should like through you to answer Comrade Simonov, who was here as a representative of the Siberian Union and who, before departing, left me a letter (I was not in Geneva at the time) setting out his conciliatory point of view. It is this letter, the contents of which are probably known to you from Comrade Simonov, that I should like to talk to you about. Comrade Simonov's point of view amounts to this: they (the Minority) are, of course, anarchists and disrupters, but there is nothing to be done with them; a "truce" is necessary (Simonov stresses that, in contrast to other conciliators, he does not speak of peace but of a truce) in order to find some way out of an intolerable situation, and to gather strength for a further struggle against the Minority.

I found Simonov's letter extremely instructive as coming from such a rarity as a *sincere* supporter of conciliation. There is so much hypocrisy among the conciliators that one finds it refreshing to meet the views (even if incorrect) of a man who says what he thinks. And his views are certainly incorrect. He himself realises that it is impossible to be *reconciled* with falsehood, confusion and squabbling, but what is the sense of talking about a *truce*? For the Minority will use such a truce merely for strengthening their positions. Factional polemics (cessation of which was hypocritically promised by the hypocritical C.C. in its recent letter to the committees, a letter that you too have prob-

ably already received) have not ceased but have assumed the especially vile forms that were condemned even by Kautsky, who sides with the Minority. Even K. Kautsky said in his letter to *Iskra* that a "hidden" polemic is worse than any other, for the issue becomes confused, hints remain obscure, straightforward answers are impossible. And take *Iskra*; the leading article in No. 75, the subject of which is very remote from our differences, will be found interspersed, without rhyme or reason, with senilely embittered abuse against the Ivanovs on the Council, the sheer ignoramuses, etc., etc. From the standpoint of our deserters from the C.C., this, probably, is not factional polemics! I say nothing, in substance, of the arguments used by the author of the leading article (apparently Plekhanov): that Marx was *mild* towards the Proudhonists. Can you imagine a falser use of historical facts and great names of history? What would Marx have said if the slogan of mildness was used to cover up *muddling* the distinction between Marxism and Proudhonism? (And is not the new *Iskra* wholly occupied in muddling the distinction between *Rabocheye Dyelo*ism and Iskrism?) What would Marx have said if mildness had been made a cover for asserting in print the correctness of Proudhonism against Marxism? (And is not Plekhanov now playing the fox in print by pretending to recognise that the Minority is correct in principle?) By this comparison alone Plekhanov gives himself away, betrays the fact that the relation of the Majority to the Minority is equivalent to the relation of Marxism to Proudhonism, to that very relation of the revolutionary to the opportunist wing which figures also in that memorable article "What Should Not Be Done". Take the decisions of the Party Council (No. 73 and the supplement to Nos. 73-74) and you will see that the cessation of the Minority's secret organisation, proclaimed in the above-mentioned letter of the C.C. to the committees, signifies nothing but the passing of three C.C. members into the secret organisation of the Minority. In *this* sense the secret organisation has really disappeared, for all three of our so-called central institutions—not only the C.O. and the Council, but also the Central Committee—have now become a secret organisation (for struggle against the Party). In the name of a struggle ("on prin-

ciple") against formalism and bureaucracy, they are now declaring war on the "headings", declaring that the publishing house of the Majority is not a Party one. They falsify the congress, counting the votes falsely ($16 \times 4 = 61$, for five members of the Council figure in the total 61, but in half the organisations the Council figures as an organisation with two votes!), concealing the resolutions of the committees from the Party (it is concealed that Nizhni-Novgorod, Saratov, Nikolayev and the Caucasus were in favour of a congress: see the last resolutions in our pamphlet *To the Party*, and *The Fight for a Congress*[253]). They bring squabbling into the Council, interminably distorting the question of representation at the Amsterdam Congress[254] and having the audacity to publish charges of "deceit" against the Northern Committee, when this incident had not only not been investigated (although the C.C. had decided to investigate it as far back as *July*), but the comrade accused by some slanderer has so far *not even been questioned* (during three months, August, September and October, this comrade was abroad and saw Central Committee member Glebov, who had taken the decision for an investigation but did not take the trouble to present the charges to the accused person himself!). They encourage disruption in the name of the Council, inciting the "periphery" to attack the Majority committees, and uttering a deliberate lie about St. Petersburg and Odessa. They condemn as an "abuse" the voting of one and the same comrades in different committees, when at the same time three Council members—Plekhanov, Martov and Axelrod—vote *three* times *against* a congress: once on the editorial board, once in the Council and once in the League! They assume the powers of a congress by declaring credentials invalid. Isn't that falsifying the congress? And can it be that Comrade Simonov would advise a truce in relation to *these* tactics as well?

Take the report to the Amsterdam Congress[255] which has recently been issued in Russian. Deliberately flouting the will of the Party, the Minority speak in the name of the Party, repeating in a covert form the same lie about the old *Iskra* which was always being propagated by Martynov and Co., and which is now being served up by Balalaikin-

Trotsky. Or maybe Comrade Simonov wants a truce with this Balalaikin too (whose pamphlet is published *under the editorship of Iskra* as plainly stated in *Iskra*)? Maybe here, too, he believes in the cessation of factional polemics promised by the C.C.?

No, the belief that a truce with hypocrisy and disruption is permissible is one that is unworthy of a Social-Democrat and profoundly erroneous at bottom. It is faint-heartedness to think that "there is nothing to be done" with writers, even notable ones, and that the only tactic left in relation to them is that formulated by Galyorka ("Down with Bonapartism") in the words "You curse but bow down". To the conversion of all the Party's central institutions into a secret organisation for struggle against the Party, to the Council's falsification of the congress, the Majority replies by a further and inevitable strengthening of its unity. Disdaining hypocrisy, it openly puts forward a programme of struggle (see the resolution of the 22 endorsed by the Caucasian Union,[256] and the Committees of St. Petersburg, Riga, Moscow, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav and Nikolayev. The C.O., of course, concealed this resolution from the Party although it received it two months ago). The southern committees have already taken a decision to unite the committees of the Majority and to set up an Organising Committee to combat the flouting of the Party. There is not the slightest doubt that such an organisation of the Majority will be set up in the near future and will act openly. Despite the lying stories of deserters from the C.C., the adherents of the Majority are growing in number in Russia, and the young literary forces, repelled by the muddled and hypocritical *Iskra*, are beginning to rally from all sides to the newly-started publishing house of the Majority (the publishing house abroad of Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin) with the aim of giving it every possible support by transforming, enlarging and developing it.

Comrade Simonov had no reason to be down-hearted. He was wrong to jump to the conclusion that however nasty it was, there was nothing to be done about it. There is something to be done! The more grossly they flout the idea of a congress (Balalaikin-Trotsky, writing under the editorship of *Iskra*, has already declared a congress to be

a *reactionary attempt* to reinforce the plans of the Iskrists. Ryazanov was more sincere and honest when he called the congress a packed affair) and the more grossly they flout the Party and its functionaries in Russia, the more merciless becomes the rebuff they encounter and the more closely does the Majority rally its ranks, uniting all persons of principle and recoiling from the unnatural and intrinsically rotten political alliance of Plekhanov, Martynov and Trotsky. It is precisely such an alliance that we see now in the new *Iskra* and in *Zarya* No. 5 (a reprint of Martynov's article has appeared). Anyone who sees a little further than his nose, whose policy is not determined by interests of the minute and coalitions of the hour, will understand that this alliance, which breeds only confusion and squabbles, is doomed, and that the adherents of the *trend* of the old *Iskra*, people who are able to distinguish this trend from a circle even of notable "foreigners", must and will be the grave-diggers of this alliance.

I should be very glad, comrades, if you would inform me of the receipt of this letter and whether you have succeeded in forwarding it to Comrade Simonov.

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

First published in 1930 Printed from the original

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TO A. M. STOPANI[257]

To Tu—ra from Lenin, private

Dear Comrade,

I was extremely glad to have your letter. Please write punctually every week, even if only a few lines, and make sure that all addresses are usable and that you have reserve addresses for letters and rendezvous. It's a downright scandal that the adherents of the Majority are so scattered! No common work is possible without regular contact and we have had nothing from you for over six months.

I absolutely and fully agree with everything you write concerning the need to unite the Majority, to rally its committees and prepare for a united congress capable of enforcing the will of the Party workers in Russia. Very close contact is essential for all this, otherwise we shall drift apart and you will know absolutely nothing of our common affairs.

The C.C. has now wholly fused with the Minority and has *virtually* become part of its secret organisation, the aim of which is to fight against a congress at all costs. The new decisions of the Council plainly falsify both the counting of votes and the will of the committees (supplement to *Iskra* Nos. 73-74. Have you seen it?). Now we must be prepared for the fact that they will not convene a congress on any account, will not shrink from any violation of the Rules, nor from any further flouting of the Party. They openly jeer at us, saying "where is your strength?" We should indeed be behaving like children if we confined ourselves to *faith* in a congress, without preparing straightaway to counter force by force. For this purpose we must: 1) immediately unite all the Majority committees and set up a Bureau of the Majority Committees (the initiative has already been taken by Odessa + Nikolayev + Ekaterinoslav) to combat the Bonapartism of the central bodies;

2) exert every effort to support and extend in every way the Majority's publishing house (started here by Bonch-Bruyevich and myself; Bonch-Bruyevich is only the publisher). A group of writers in Russia has already set to work on this and you should immediately begin collecting and sending all kinds of material, correspondence, leaflets, comments, and so on and so forth, especially from workers and about the workers' movement. Do this without fail and immediately. (If from now on you do not begin to send us an item every week, we shall break off relations with you.)

In the matter of the Bureau, what has been done already is this. The Odessa + Nikolayev + Ekaterinoslav committees took the following decision (quote in full) ... = = The 22 answered them as follows ... = =[258]

You must try to go to Tiflis as soon as possible and hand over both the one and the other. Let them speedily join. It will, of course, be possible to add members from the Caucasus to the Bureau. And so, let all the committees of the Caucasus immediately give their opinion about the idea of a Bureau, that is to say, write to us and to St. Petersburg (or Riga?) (address..., key ...), whether they agree to a Bureau and whether they want changes or additional candidates. For heaven's sake see to it that this matter of prime importance is dealt with properly, sensibly and quickly.

Some comrades are demanding a conference of the Majority committees in Russia. We here think this is not only expensive but bureaucratic and ineffectual. But we must press on with might and main. It is not worth while coming together to elect a Bureau; it is much better to reach agreement on this by letter or by a tour made by one or two comrades When the Bureau speaks out and is joined by Ekaterinoslav + Odessa + Nikolayev + St. Petersburg + Moscow + Riga + the Caucasus, then this Bureau will at once be speaking as the representative of the organised Majority.

And so, for heaven's sake, make haste and answer speedily.

All the very best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Written November 10, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Baku

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

116
TO A. A. BOGDANOV

Dear friend,

Please tell Rakhmetov immediately that he is acting like a real pig towards us. He cannot imagine how eagerly everyone here is expecting from him definite and precise, encouraging reports, and not the telegrams he sends us. This eternal suspense and uncertainty is real torture. It is absolutely impossible that Rakhmetov should have nothing to write about: he has seen and is seeing many people, he has spoken with Zemlyachka, he has been in touch with Beard, the Moscow lawyers and writers, etc., etc. He must keep us *au courant*, pass on contacts, inform us of new addresses, forward local correspondence, tell us about business meetings and interesting encounters. Rakhmetov has not sent us a single new contact! It's monstrous. *Not a single* item of correspondence, not a single report about the group of writers in Moscow. If Rakhmetov were to be arrested tomorrow, we'd find ourselves empty-handed, as if he had never lived! It's a crying shame; he could have written everything and about everything without the slightest danger, and all he has done is to hint at some young forces and so on. (What is known about Bazarov, Frich, Suvorov and the others?) Not less than once a week (that's not much, surely), two or three hours should be spent on a letter of 10-15 pages, otherwise, I give you my word, all contact is virtually broken. Rakhmetov and his boundless plans become a boundless fiction, and our people here are simply running away, drawing the horrified conclusion that there is no sort of majority and that nothing will come of the majority. In their new form, the tactics of the Minority have become quite clear, namely, to ignore and keep silent about the Majority's writings and the Majority's existence, to keep polemics out of the C.O. and talk importantly about positive work (recently the editors of the C.O. issued in print, "for Party members only", a

letter to Party organisations concerning a plan for the participation of Social-Democrats in the Zemstvo campaign—staggering pomposity about staggering banalities. An analysis and scathing criticism of this letter has been issued here by Lenin*). It is essential that the Majority should come forward with an organ of its own[259]; the necessary money and workers' letters for this are lacking. We must work hard to get both the one and the other; unless we have the most detailed and exhaustive letters nothing will come of it. Contacts are not being transmitted, there is no possibility of attacking one and the same personage from different angles, there is no co-ordination in the work of the bulk of the Bolsheviks who travel about Russia arranging things each on his own. This dispersal of efforts is felt everywhere; the committees are again lagging behind the situation, some of them unaware of the Council's new decisions (the supplement to *Iskra* Nos. 73-74, a special ten-page leaflet), others not giving serious thought to them and not realising that these decisions are tantamount to the most complete and brazen falsification of the congress. Only children could fail to see now that the Council and C.C. will stop at nothing to *sabotage* a congress. We must counterpose this by a *force* = a press organ + the organisation of the Majority in Russia, otherwise we are bound to die. Lenin has not yet seen Lightmind; it is strange that the latter has moved to the side lines and maintains a waiting attitude!

And so, give Rakhmetov a triple dressing-down and make him write a diary as a punishment. Why hasn't Mme Rakhmetova gone where she promised? We repeat: all and sundry will run away (even Galyorka is groaning and moaning), for there is no sign of any contact with Russia, no sign that Rakhmetov is alive, working for the common cause, that he is worried and concerned about it. Without letters there is nothing but complete isolation!

Written November 21, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1930 Printed from the original

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* The reference is to the pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra"'s Plan* (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

117
TO NADEZHDA KRUPSKAYA

December 3, 1904

Today I sent a business letter to Bonch. I forgot to add an important thing—that *3,000* copies (of Leiteisen's dictionary) be printed; this is essential for price calculation. Tell Bonch about this at once.

I am sending you the statement of the Union Committee and of the Caucasian representative of the C.C.,[260] received today by Raisa.* *In my opinion*, it is *absolutely necessary* to re-issue this immediately *in leaflet form* in our publishing house. Do this at once without fail; the Nikolayev and other resolutions can be added to the leaflet, but it should be kept quite small, 2-4 (maximum) pages (without any headings, merely with a mention below of the publishers).

I have just received your letter. I don't understand what the matter is with the "plan" of Lyadov and Rakhmetov, but there is something wrong here. *I shall try to come as quickly as possible* and hasten Destroyer's arrival.

I warmed the attached sheets but without success. Perhaps you'll try some other reagents.

A free evening has occurred unexpectedly. I am sending you on the other side a letter which I advise you to forward *immediately* to all three from me personally,** without a powwow. It will give them a good shake up; afterwards we could find out whether the news was exaggerated or not. The fact remains that disunity is beginning, and a warning

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* Unidentified.—*Ed.*

** See pp. 271-73 of this volume.—*Ed.*

must be issued and the culprits denounced most forcefully at the very start. I strongly advise you to send this letter off *at once* to all three from me personally. Tomorrow I shall talk to Destroyer and, I'm sure, he'll be for me, so will Vasily Vasilyevich and Schwarz, but it will be best if the text is mine personally. I wanted to write to Martyn Nikolayevich and give him a piece of my mind, but I don't think it's any good; I shall come and talk it over, as he is harmless here for the time being. As to the damage that has started in Russia, my letter will go some way in paralysing it. A pity you did not make Martyn Nikolayevich write to me at once in Paris about everything—a great pity, it was so important.

I have re-read the letter to Rakhmetov; a hard word here and there could, perhaps, have been omitted, but I *earnestly advise* you to send the letter off at once from me personally in this sharply worded form.

I called on Leiteisen. He read me Plekhanov's letter to him. Plekhanov, of course, swears at Lenin for all he is worth. He writes that "Trotsky's pamphlet is trashy, like himself". He asks Leiteisen "not to side with the Minority, but with him" (Plekhanov). He complains of "the tragedy of his life, when, after twenty years, there isn't a comrade who believes him". He says that he asks for "comradely confidence but not subordination to authority", and that he is "seriously thinking of resigning" ... for the time being this is *entre nous*.

Deutsch wrote to Leiteisen the other day, *asking for financial assistance*—he says they have no money. Zasulich wrote the same thing (earlier) to Yefron, swearing at Galyorka and considering Sergei Petrovich to be Galyorka(!). I hope to leave on Monday, the day after tomorrow, to read on Tuesday and Wednesday in Zurich, to be in Berne on Thursday, and home on Friday. It may take a few days longer though.[261]

Write to me in Zurich through Argunin (in two envelopes, but see that the inner one is fairly strong, and be cautious). Have they written from Lausanne, have they asked me to go there? Have they given an address?

Yours,

N. Lenin

Be sure to write immediately to *all* our committees to send us a *formal order* to reprint *openly* for everyone the editorial board's letter on the Zemstvo. Do this, just to be on the safe side. *No excuses*, please. Get hold of the letter itself (or republish it) and circulate it in envelopes to the Majority committees.

Sent from Paris to Geneva
First published in 1930 Printed from the original

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TO A. A. BOGDANOV, ROZALIA ZEMLYACHKA AND M. M. LITVINOV[262]

From Lenin to Rakhmetov, Zemlyachka and Papasha, private

December 3, 1904

Dear friend,

I received news of Martyn Nikolayevich's arrival (I have not seen him myself) from which I infer that things are in a bad way with us. The Bolsheviks in Russia and those abroad are at sixes and sevens again. From three years' experience I know that such disunity can do enormous damage to our cause. I see evidence of this disunity in the fact: 1) that Rakhmetov's arrival is being held up; 2) that the weight of emphasis is being shifted from the press organ here to something else, to a congress, a Russian O.C., etc.; 3) that deals of some kind between the C.C. and the writers' group of the Majority, and almost idiotic enterprises of the Russian organ, are being connived at or even supported. If my information about this disunity is correct, I must say that the bitterest enemy of the Majority could not have invented anything worse. Holding up Rakhmetov's departure is sheer unpardonable stupidity, verging on treachery, for gossip is increasing terribly and we risk losing impact here because of the childishly foolish plans for devising something immediately in Russia. To delay the Majority's organ abroad (for which only the money is lacking) is still more unpardonable. The whole crux now lies in this organ, without it we shall be heading for certain, inglorious death. We must get some money at all costs, come what may, if only a couple of thousand, and start immediately, otherwise we are cutting our own

throats. Only hopeless fools can put *all* hopes on a congress, for it is clear that the Council will torpedo any congress, wreck it even before it is convened. Understand me properly, for heaven's sake; I am not suggesting that we abandon all agitation for a congress and renounce this slogan, but only children could now confine themselves to this, and fail to see that the essence lies in *strength*. Let there be a spate of resolutions about the congress as before (for some reason Martyn Nikolayevich's tour did not yield a single repeat resolution, which is a pity, a great pity), but *this is not the crux of the matter*—how can anyone fail to see this? An Organising Committee or a Bureau of the Majority is necessary, but without a press organ this will be a pitiful cipher, a sheer farce, a soap bubble which will burst at the first setback caused by police raids. At all costs an organ and money, money to us here, get it by any means short of murder. An Organising Committee or a Bureau of the Majority should authorise us to start an organ (as quickly as possible) and make a round of the committees, but should the O.C. take it into its head to *first* get "positive work" going, and *put off* the organ *for the time being*, then such an idiotic Organising Committee would ruin the whole thing for us. Finally, to publish anything in Russia, to make any sort of deal with the dirty scum of the C.C. means committing an outright betrayal. That the C.C. wants to divide and split up the Bolsheviks in Russia and those abroad is obvious; this has long been its plan and none but foolish greenhorns could be taken in by it. To start an organ in Russia with the help of the C.C. is madness, sheer madness or treachery; this is what follows and will inevitably follow from the objective logic of events, because the organisers of an organ or a popular newspaper are bound to be fooled by every mangy tyke of a Central Committee. I plainly prophesy this and I give such people up in advance as a hopeless case.

I repeat: first and foremost comes an organ, and again an organ, and money for an organ; to spend money on anything else now is the height of folly. Rakhmetov must be dragged out here at once, without delay. Making a round of the committees should have the primary aim of securing local correspondence (it is inexcusable and disgraceful that

we have no correspondent items all this time! It's a downright shame and a spoke in our wheel!); all agitation for a congress should be merely an *incidental* matter. All the Majority committees should immediately and *in actual practice* break with the C.C. and transfer all relations to the O.C. or the Bureau of the Majority; this O.C. *must immediately* issue a printed announcement of its formation, and make it public at once without fail.

Unless we nip this disunity among the Majority in the bud, unless we come to an agreement on this both by letter *and* (*most important*) by a meeting with Rakhmetov, we here will all *give the whole thing up as a hopeless job*. If you want to work together, you must all pull together and act in concert, by agreement (and not in defiance of and without agreement). Damn it all, it's a downright disgrace and scandal that people go out to get money for an organ and engage instead in all kinds of piddling lousy affairs.

In a few days I shall come out in print against the C.C. still more vigorously. If we don't break with the C.C. and the Council we shall deserve only to be spat on by everyone.

I await a reply and Rakhmetov's arrival.[263]

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Russia
First published in 1930 Printed from the original

119
TO M. M. LITVINOV

To Papasha from Lenin

Dear friend,

I hasten to reply to your letter, which pleased me very, very much. You are a thousand times right that we must act vigorously, in a revolutionary way, and strike the iron while it's hot. I agree, too, that it is the Majority committees that must be united. The need for a centre in Russia and an organ here is now clear to all of us. As far as the latter is concerned, we have already done all we could. Private is working with might and main, he has enlisted participants, has thrown himself whole-heartedly into the job and is trying his hardest to find a millionaire, with considerable chance of success. Finally, you are a thousand times right in that we must act openly. The question at issue between us touches only on a minor point and should be discussed calmly, viz.: whether to have a conference of committees or direct formation of a Bureau of the Majority Committees (we prefer this title to Organising Committee, although of course it is not a matter of the title) which would be recognised at first by some, and afterwards by all, of the Majority committees. You are for the former, we are for the latter. If a conference abroad were possible, I would be wholly in favour of it. In Russia, however, it would be devilishly dangerous, bureaucratic and ineffectual. Meanwhile Odessa + Nikolayev + Ekaterinoslav have already come to terms and authorised the "22" to "appoint an Organising Committee". We replied by recommending the title "Bureau of the Majority Committees" and seven candidates (Mermaid, Felix, Zemlyachka, Pavlovich, Gusev, Alexeyev, Baron). We are writing to Odessa and St. Petersburg about

this. Alexeyev is already on his way to you. Will it not be best to carry out the election of candidates through Riga, St. Petersburg + Moscow, and immediately afterwards make a *public* statement about this (we are sending you a draft of the announcement*), and then rush off to the Northern Committee, the Caucasus, Saratov, Nizhni-Novgorod, etc., asking them to subscribe and supplementing the Bureau as liberally as possible by a couple or so of *their* candidates (although it is not very likely that the subscribing committees will demand large additions to the members of the Bureau). I definitely cannot imagine our meeting with difficulties over the composition of the Bureau.

The advantages of this method are: speed, cheapness, safety. These advantages are very important, for speed counts above all now. The Bureau will be the official body for uniting the committees and will in fact completely replace the C.C. in the event of a split. The membership of the literary group for our future central organ is already fully designated (a five- or six-man board: Private, Galyorka, myself, Schwarz + *Lunacharsky* + perhaps *Bazarov*). Tackle the transportation job yourself and do so energetically. We have got hold here of a former Bundist who has done a lot of work on two frontiers; he promises to arrange things for 200-300 rubles monthly. We are only waiting for the money before putting him in touch with you.

The disadvantage of your method is the red tape. I consider it quite useless to present ultimatums to the C.C. and Council. The C.C. is playing the hypocrite and I don't doubt now for a moment that they have sold themselves completely to the Minority and are out to falsify the congress. We should not harbour any illusions. Now, when they control all the central bodies, they have a thousand means for falsifying the congress and *have already begun to do so*. We shall prove this in print by analysing the Council's decisions (*Iskra* Nos. 73-74, supplement). We, of course, stand and will continue to stand for a congress, but we must cry from the house-tops that they are already falsifying the congress and that we shall expose their falsification. As a matter of fact, I now put the congress in the ninth

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 503-05.—*Ed.*

place, allotting the first to the organ and the Russian centre. It's absurd to speak of disloyalty when they have pushed us into it themselves by making a deal with the Minority. It is a lie to say that the secret organisation of the Minority has been dissolved; it has not; three members of the C.C. have entered this secret organisation, that is all. All three central bodies now constitute a secret organisation against the Party. Only simpletons can fail to see that. We must reply by an open organisation and expose their conspiracy.

Please strengthen everyone's faith in our organisation and in the future organ. We need only to be patient a little longer, while Private finishes his job. Collect and send us local correspondence (*always* inscribed: for Lenin) and material, *especially* from workers. You and I differ on a minor point, as I would be only too glad to have a conference. But really, the game is not worth the candle; it will be much better to come out at once with an announcement from the Bureau, for we shall easily reach agreement on its membership and conflicts on this score are improbable. And once the Bureau proclaims itself it will quickly gain recognition and will begin to speak on behalf of all the committees. Think this over carefully once more and reply speedily.

Written December 8, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

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TO ROZALIA ZEMLYACHKA

To Zemlyachka from Old Man

December 10, 1904

I have just returned from my lecture tour and received your letter No. 1. I spoke with Mermaid. Did you get my abusive letter (sent also to Papasha and Sysoika)?* As regards the composition of the O.C., I, of course, accept the general decision. I don't think Private should be drawn into this—he should be sent out here immediately. Further, it is essential to organise a special group (or to supplement the O.C.) for making regular rounds of the committees and maintaining all contacts between them. Our contacts with the committees and with Russia in general are extremely inadequate and we must exert every effort to get more local correspondents' reports and ordinary letters from comrades. Why don't you put us in touch with the Northern Committee? With the Moscow printing workers (this is very important!)? With Ryakhovsky? With Tula? With Nizhni-Novgorod? Do this immediately. Further, why don't the committees send *us* their repeat resolutions concerning the congress? This is essential. I am very much afraid that you are too optimistic about the congress and about the C.C.; you will see from the pamphlet *The Council Versus the Party* (it is already out) that they go to any lengths, perform the devil knows what tricks, in their desire to sabotage the congress. In my opinion, it is a definite mistake on the part of the O.C. not to issue a printed announcement. In the first place, an announcement is necessary in order to offset our open way of acting to the Minority's

* See pp. 271-73 of this volume.—*Ed.*

secret organisation. Otherwise the C.C. is bound to catch you out, to take advantage of Sysoika's ultimatums and talk of your "secret" organisation; this will be a disgrace for the Majority, a disgrace for which you will be wholly to blame. Secondly, a printed announcement is necessary in order to inform the mass of Party workers about the new centre. You will never be able to do this even approximately by any letters. Thirdly, a statement about the unity of the Majority committees will be of tremendous moral significance as a means of reassuring and encouraging despondent members of the Majority (especially here abroad). To neglect this would be a great political mistake. I therefore insist, again and again, that immediately after the Northern Conference the Bureau of the Majority (or the O.C. of the Majority committees) should issue a printed statement mentioning the consent and *direct authorisation* of the Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, four Caucasian, Riga, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, and Northern committees, etc. (perhaps the Tula and Nizhni-Novgorod committees), i.e., 12-14 committees. This will not only not harm the struggle for a congress but will be of tremendous assistance to it. Answer at once whether you agree or not. Regarding the Zemstvo campaign, I strongly recommend that both my pamphlet* and the letter of the *Iskra* editorial board should be published in Russia immediately and openly (without the stupid heading "for Party members"). I may write another pamphlet, but the polemic with *Iskra* must be republished without fail. Finally, and this is particularly important and urgent: may I sign the local manifesto about a new organ** on behalf of the Organising Committee of the Majority committees (or better the Bureau of the Majority Committees)? May I speak here in the name of the Bureau? May I call the *Bureau* the publisher of the new organ and organiser of the editorial group? This is extremely necessary and urgent. Reply immediately, after seeing Private; tell him, and repeat it, that he must come here

* *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra"'s Plan* (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

** "A Letter to the Comrades (With Reference to the Forthcoming Publication of the Organ of the Party Majority)" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

immediately, without delay, if he doesn't want to run the risk of being arrested and doing great harm to our cause. People everywhere abroad chatter an awful lot; I have heard them myself when on a lecture tour in Paris, Zurich, etc. A last warning: either he clears out and comes here at once or ruins himself and throws all our work back a year. I do not undertake to present any ultimatums about a congress to anyone here, as that would only evoke ridicule and jeers; there is no point in play-acting. Our position will be ten times cleaner and better if we come forward openly with the Bureau of the Majority and openly declare for a congress, instead of carrying on silly backdoor negotiations, which at best will serve only to delay matters and allow new intrigues on the part of people like Glebov, Konyagin, Nikitich and other rotters. The entire Majority here is fretting and worrying, longing for an organ, demanding it everywhere. We cannot publish it without direct authorisation from the Bureau, but publish it we must. We are doing everything we can to raise money and hope to succeed; you too must try to raise some. For heaven's sake, hurry up with the authorisation to publish in the name of the Bureau, and print a leaflet about it in Russia.

Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1930 Printed from the original

121

TO THE CAUCASIAN UNION COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the Caucasian Union from Lenin

Dear Comrades,

We have just received the resolutions of your conference.[264] Send us without fail a more carefully made copy—there is a lot that is undecipherable. Without fail, too, carry out as soon as possible your splendid plan—to send your special delegate here. Otherwise it will really be extremely difficult, almost impossible, to reach agreement and remove mutual misunderstandings. This is an urgent necessity at the present time.

You still have little knowledge of all the documents and all the dirty tricks of the Council and the Central Committee. There is not the slightest doubt that they have already side-tracked the Third Congress and will now split all the committees. It is essential immediately 1) to set up a Bureau of the Majority Committees, 2) to entrust it with all matters concerning the congress and all leadership of the committees, 3) to support our organ *Vperyod*,[265] 4) to publish your resolutions (do you authorise us to do this?) and an announcement about the Bureau.

Please reply quickly.

Yours,

Lenin

We do not understand what relationship your (Caucasian) Bureau bears to the All-Russia Bureau of the Majority Committees. Write speedily, and best of all send a delegate.

Written later than December 12 1904
Sent from Geneva
First published in 1926

Printed from the original

122

TO THE CAUCASIAN UNION COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrades,

I have received your letter concerning *Borba Proletariata*.[266] I shall do my best to write and shall tell my editorial comrades about it too. I am heavily occupied at present with work for the new organ. A detailed letter on this matter has already been sent to you.* Let us have your reply as soon as possible and please send more, more and still more, workers' letters. The success of the organ depends now on you in particular, for the beginning is especially difficult.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written December 20, 1904
Sent from Geneva
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

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* "A Letter to the Comrades (With Reference to the Forthcoming Publication of the Organ of the Party Majority)" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—*Ed.*

123
TO MARIA ESSEN[267]

From Lenin to Nina Lvovna, private

December 24, 1904

Dear Beastie,

I have long been intending to write to you, but have been hard pressed for time. We are now all in high spirits and terribly busy; yesterday the announcement concerning publication of our newspaper *Vperyod* came out. The entire Majority rejoices and is heartened as never before. At last we have stopped this sordid squabbling and shall get down to real team-work with those who want to work and not to make rows! A good group of writers has formed, we have fresh forces. Money is scarce, but we should be getting some soon. The Central Committee, by betraying us, has lost all credit; it has co-opted (in an underhand way) the Mensheviks and is raising a hue and cry against the congress. The Majority committees are uniting, they have already elected a Bureau and now the organ will cement this unity. Hurrah! Cheer up, we're all coming to life again. Sooner or later, one way or another we certainly hope to see you too. Drop me a line how you are getting on, and, above all, keep cheerful; remember, you and I are not so old yet—we have everything before us.

Affectionately yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1926

Printed from the original

124
TO ROZALIA ZEMLYACHKA

To Zemlyachka from Lenin, private

December 26, 1904

Dear friend,

I have received your authorisation. In a day or two I shall be writing for the press on your business.* I recently received also the minutes of the Northern Conference.[268] Hurrah! You have done a splendid job and you (together with Papasha, Mouse and others) are to be congratulated on a huge success. A conference like that is a very difficult thing under Russian conditions; apparently, it has been a great success. Its significance is tremendous; it fits in most appropriately with our announcement of our newspaper (*Vperyod*). The announcement has already been issued. The first number will come out at the beginning of January, new style. The task now is: 1) To issue in Russia as quickly as possible a printed leaflet about the Bureau of the Majority Committees. For heaven's sake, don't put this off even for a week. It is devilishly important.

2) Once again to make a round of the committees of the south (*and Volga*), stressing the importance of giving *every* support to *Vperyod*.

Transportation will be taken care of, so long as we have Papasha. Let him take energetic steps for passing on his heritage in case of arrest.

Get Rakhmetov away quickly from dangerous areas and send him to destination. Be quick!

When we have money, we shall send a lot of people.

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* "Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party" (see present edition, Vol. 7).—Ed.

We are publishing an article in *Vperyod* No. 1, about the St. Petersburg disgrace (the Minority's disruption of the demonstration.)*

Hurry up with the public announcement about the Bureau, and be sure to list all the thirteen committees.[269] Hurry, hurry and again hurry! We shall then have the money.

Yours,
Lenin

My best regards to all friends.

Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1926 Printed from the original

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* The article referred to is: "Time to Call a Halt!", published in *Vperyod* No. 1 (see present edition, Vol. 8).—*Ed.*

125
TO A. I. YERAMASOV[270]

To Monk from Lenin, private

Dear Comrade,

I was very glad to learn that it is now possible to establish more regular contact with you. It would be good if you were to take advantage of this to write me a few lines about how you feel and what the immediate prospects are. Up till now all news of you has come through intermediaries, which always makes mutual understanding rather difficult.

Throughout the year our Party affairs have been in a scandalous state, as you have probably heard. The Minority has wrecked the Second Congress, created the new *Iskra* (Have you seen it? What do you think of it?) and now, when the vast majority of the committees that have expressed themselves at all have vigorously rebelled against this new *Iskra*, the Minority has wrecked the Third Congress as well. It has become all too obvious to the Minority that the Party will not tolerate their organ of tittle-tattle and squabbling in the struggle, of reversion to *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism in matters of principle, to the famous organisation-as-process theory.

The situation now has been made clear. The Majority committees have united (four Caucasian and the Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Tver, Northern and Nizhni-Novgorod committees). I have begun here (with new literary forces) to publish the newspaper *Vperyod* (and announcement has been issued, No. 1 will appear at the beginning of January, new style). Let us know what you think of it and whether we can count on your support, which would be extremely important for us.

Written between December 23, 1904
and January 4, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

126

TO THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The Moscow Zubatovist Workers' Society has a branch in St. Petersburg with the same Rules (workers of machine industry) and partly even with the same membership, that is, with those who previously worked in the St. Petersburg Zubatovist Society (Ushakov, Starozhilov and Gorshkov, Pikunov and Mokhnatkin, Nikiforov, and others). This Society is sponsored by Litvinov-Fallinsky, Chizhov and Langovoi. It is strongly recommended that *extreme* caution be exercised in contacts with this Society owing to the *huge* risk of *agent provocateurs*. The Society has now gone a bit left, but is completely at the service of the bourgeoisie and the police.

(This information comes from a well-informed person.)

Written in October-December 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

1905

127
TO A COMRADE IN RUSSIA

January 6, 1905

Dear friend,

Thank you for your detailed letter. It will be very welcome if you tackle local affairs more energetically.

As for my view of the arguments of the editorial board in its second "secret" leaflet[271] quoted by you, I can only say the following so far. First of all one is struck by the glaring absurdity of "secret" when 1) there is nothing secret about it, and 2) the same ideas were repeated in No. 79 (the Ekaterinodar demonstration, the article of a correspondent, and the editors' comment). No. 79 is analysed in *Vperyod* No. 1.* You will receive it before Monday and will see how we present the issue. Secrecy technique by means of a leaflet nowadays is simply absurd, and I would attack it particularly sharply.

In essence, the "ideas" of the editors in this new production of theirs offer, as it were, two points of vantage: 1) Old Believer's position, to which the editors refer and which is clarified in *Iskra*, and 2) playing at parliamentarism, "parades and manoeuvres", lack of faith in the proletariat, a bashful attempt to *retract* on the question of panic (as much as to say, those words about panic were perhaps "superfluous" (!)).

This should be strongly emphasised

Ad 1. Old Believer's position, which clearly emerged also in No. 77 (*the leading article*)—N.B., N.B., in my

* See Lenin's article "Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals" (present edition, Vol. 8).—*Ed.*

opinion, is sheer muddle. I shall analyse it in the press.[272] To justify his muddled resolution he is obliged to "invent" a *good* bourgeoisie. A "bourgeois democracy" is invented distinct from the Zemstvo people and liberals (as if the Zemstvo people were not bourgeois democrats!), which, practically speaking, includes the *intelligentsia* (by attentively reading No. 77 and No. 79 you will clearly see that bourgeois democracy is identified with the "radical intelligentsia", "democratic intelligentsia" and "intellectualist democracy"—e.g., No. 78, p. 3, column 3, 9th line up, and passim).

To class the intelligentsia, in contrast to the Zemstvo people, etc., as bourgeois democrats is sheer nonsense. To call on them to become "an independent force" (No. 77, *Iskra*'s italics) is claptrap. The real basis of broad democracy (the peasants, handicraftsmen, etc.) is ignored here, as are also the *Socialist-Revolutionaries*, who are the natural and inevitable *left* elements of the radical intelligentsia. I can only outline these propositions here, as it is necessary to deal with them in greater detail in the press.

Old Believer is chockful of pretentious drivel about the "democratic intelligentsia" being the "motor nerve" (!) of liberalism, and so on. His attempt to represent as a "new word" the term "third element", used to describe the uplift intelligentsia, the intellectuals among the Zemstvo employees, etc., is amusing. See my review of home affairs in *Zarya* No. 2-3, where there is a *whole chapter* entitled "The Third Element".* Only the new *Iskra* could find a "new word" here.

It is not true that the Social-Democrats, as a vanguard, can influence only the democratic intelligentsia. They can influence and *are influencing* the Zemstvo people too. Our influence on them and on Mr. Struve is a fact overlooked only by people enamoured of the "evident, tangible results" of gala performances.

It is untrue that, apart from the Zemstvo people and democratic intelligentsia, there is no one to influence (peasants, handicraftsmen, etc.).

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 281-89.—*Ed.*

It is untrue that it is the intelligentsia, in contrast to the liberals, that constitutes "bourgeois democracy".

It is untrue that the French Radicals and Italian Republicans have not obscured the class-consciousness of the proletariat.

It is untrue that the "agreement" (of which the editors wrote in the first leaflet) *could* have referred to Old Believer's "conditions". That is absurd. The editors are hedging, clearly aware that *in fact* the conditions have gone by the board.

Ad 2. In my opinion, the second point stands out particularly clearly in a sentence of the second leaflet:

"We should, in our view, follow our class enemy and temporary political ally in that very sphere in which they are fulfilling the role of political leader entrusted them by history, that of emancipating the nation; *in this sphere the proletariat should measure its strength against the bourgeoisie*".*

This is playing *at* parliamentarism with a vengeance! "Measure its strength"—to what depths our despicable intellectualist gasbags degrade this great concept by reducing it to the demonstration of a handful of workers at a Zemstvo meeting! What a hysterical fuss, trying to snatch an advantage from a momentary situation (just now the Zemstvo people are "in the limelight"—fire away about the sphere in which they fulfil the role entrusted them by history! For pity's sake, gentlemen! Don't talk so pretty!). "*Full* contact of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie that is politically in the limelight." What can be "fuller" than that! "Argufying" with the Mayor, of Ekaterinodar himself!

The defence of the idea about the "highest type of mobilisation" is not quite clear, for here you are paraphrasing and not quoting. But this idea contains the *key* to their confusion. The distinction between an "ordinary", and a "political demonstration" (does the second leaflet really say that in so many words? Is it a printed leaflet? Can you get a copy? a specimen?) is a real *gem*. This, I think, is where the opponent should be brought to bay, for it is

* The italics are Lenin's.—*Ed.*

here that he comes to grief. It is not demonstrations in the Zemstvos that are bad, but high-faulting judgements about the highest type that are *fatuous*.

I shall leave it at that for the time being. I am preparing for my lecture today.[273] It is said that the Mensheviks have decided not to come.

No. 1 of *Vperyod* comes out today.[274]

Write in some detail about your impression of *Vperyod*, *obtain* letters for it, especially for the workers' section.

[I advise you to compare the second leaflet of the editorial board with No. 77 and No. 78. Old Believer, and No. 79.]

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in Geneva
First published in 1934

Printed from the original

128
TO ROZALIA ZEMLYACHKA

To Zemlyachka from Lenin, private

I have received your huffy letter and hasten to reply. You have taken offence for nothing. If I did say hard things, I meant them lovingly, really, and with the reservation: provided Lyadov's information was correct. The tremendous work you have done to win over fifteen committees and organise three conferences[275] is highly appreciated by us, as you could have seen from the preceding letter concerning the Northern Conference.* We have not taken and are not taking a single step without you. The young lady who went to St. Petersburg promised to use her personal connections to obtain money, and we wrote to N. I.[276] for you, and not at all through any desire to ignore you (the inscription "private" was intended solely as a safeguard against our enemies). The misunderstanding about our letters to N. I. we shall explain to her immediately. To the devil with N. I., of course.

Many thanks to the committees for sending addresses. Please send some more. Gusev has gone, Lyadov will be going when we have money.

Lyadov set out the matter of the organ in Russia somewhat incorrectly, and I beg your pardon if I lost my temper a bit and offended you.

As regards the open action of the Bureau I shall not argue this point any more. A fortnight, of course, is a trifle. Believe me, I fully and positively intend to reckon with the opinion in Russia on all points, and I only ask you seriously: for heaven's sake, inform me more frequently about this

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* See p. 283 of this volume.—*Ed.*

opinion. If I am guilty of succumbing to the mood of the Bolsheviks abroad, I can hardly be blamed, since Russia writes rarely and exasperatingly little. I fully accept the choice of the Northern Conference,[277] and, believe me, I do so right willingly. Try to raise money and write telling me that you are not angry.

Wholly yours,
Lenin

Written at the beginning
of January 1905
Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

129

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE MAJORITY COMMITTEES' BUREAU

January 29, 1905

Dear friend,

I have a great favour to ask you: please give Rakhmetov a scolding, yes, a good sound scolding. Really, he acts towards us like the *Osvobozhdeniye* people[278] or priest Gapon[279] towards the Social-Democrats. I have just been looking at the table of our correspondence with Russia.[280] Gusev sent us six letters in ten days, but Rakhmetov two in thirty days. What do you think of that? Not a sign of him. Not a line for *Vperyod*. Not a word about the work, plans and connections. It's simply impossible, incredible, a disgrace. No. 4 of *Vperyod* will come out in a day or two, and immediately after it (a few days later) No. 5, but without any support from Rakhmetov. Today letters arrived from St. Petersburg dated January 10, very brief ones. And no one arranged for good and full letters about the Ninth of January![281]

I have had no reply whatever to my letter to Rakhmetov about literary contributions!*

Neither is there anything about the Bureau and the congress.[282] Yet it is so important to hurry up with the announcement concerning the Bureau and with the convening of the congress. For heaven's sake, don't trust the Mensheviks and the C.C., and go ahead everywhere and in the most vigorous manner with the split, a split and again a split. We here, carried away by enthusiasm for the revolution, were on the point of joining with the Mensheviks

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* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 43-46.—*Ed.*

at a public meeting, but they cheated us again, and shamefully at that. We earnestly warn anyone who does not want to be made a fool of: a split, and an absolute split.

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

130
TO AUGUST BEBEL

Geneva, February 8, 1905

Comrade,

On the very day you wrote to me[283] we were preparing a letter to Comrade Hermann Greulich,* in which we explained how and why the split in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has now become an accomplished fact. We shall send a copy of this letter to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party.

The Third Congress of our Party will be convened by the Russian Bureau of the Majority Committees. The *Vperyod* editorial board and the Bureau are only provisional central bodies. At the present time, neither I nor any of the editors, contributors or supporters of *Vperyod* known to me can assume the responsibility of taking any new, important steps binding on the whole Party without a Party Congress decision.[284] Thus, your proposal can be submitted only to this Party Congress.

Please excuse my poor German.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin

Sent to Berlin

First published in German and Russian in 1905

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

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* "A Brief Outline of the Split in the R.S.D.L.P.," (see present edition, Vol. 8).—*Ed.*

131
TO S. I. GUSEV[285]

To Khariton

February 15, 1905

Dear friend,

Many thanks for the letters. Be sure to keep this up, but bear in mind this: 1) never restrict yourself to making a precis of letters or reports handed over to you but be sure to send them on (apart from your own letters) *in full*; 2) be sure to put us in *direct* touch with new forces, with the youth, with newly-formed circles. Don't forget that the strength of a revolutionary organisation lies in the number of its connections. We should measure the efficiency and results of our friends' work by the number of *new* Russian connections passed on to us. So far *not one* of the St. Petersburgers (shame on them) has given us a *single* new Russian connection (neither Serafima, nor Sysoika, nor Zemlyachka, nor Nik. Iv.). It's a scandal, our undoing, our ruin! Take a lesson from the Mensheviks, for Christ's sake. Issue No. 85 of *Iskra* is chockful of correspondence. You have been reading *Vperyod* to the youth, haven't you? Then why don't you put us in touch with one of them? Remember, in the event of your being arrested we shall be in low water unless you have obtained for us a *dozen* or so new, young, loyal friends of *Vperyod*, who are able to work, able to keep in contact, and able to carry on correspondence even without you. Remember that! A professional revolutionary must build up dozens of new connections in each locality, put all the work into their hands while he is with them, teach them and bring them up to the mark not by lecturing them but by work. Then he should go to another place and after a month or two return to check up

on the young people who have replaced him. I assure you that there is a sort of idiotic, philistine, Oblomov-like fear of the youth among us. I implore you: fight this fear with all your might.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

132
TO S. I. GUSEV

February 25, 1905

We have just this moment learnt from Lyadov's letter that the C.C. has agreed to a congress.[286] I adjure the Bureau by all that is holy not to believe the C.C. and not on any account to relinquish a single jot of their complete independence in convening the congress. The Bureau has no right to yield an inch to the C.C. If it does we here will raise a revolt and all the rock-firm committees will be with us. The C.C. has been invited to the congress, and let it come with the Mensheviks, but we and we alone are convening the congress. *Vperyod* No. 8, with the Bureau's announcement and our energetic addendum,* will come out on Tuesday (February 28, 1905). For heaven's sake, do everything to ensure that this letter is forwarded quickly to Lyadov, Sysoika and Zemlyachka.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

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* See present edition, Vol. 8.—*Ed.*

133
TO S. I. GUSEV

To Nation

Dear friend,

Thanks tremendously for the letters. You are simply rescuing us from the effects of our foreign environment. Be sure to keep it up. For heaven's sake, obtain correspondence from the workers themselves. Why don't they write? It's a downright disgrace! Your detailed account of the Committee's agitation at the elections to the Shidlovsky Commission[287] is magnificent. We shall print it.

One more question: did you accept on the Committee the six workers mentioned? Reply without fail. We advise you by all means to accept workers on the Committee, to the extent of one-half at least. Unless you do this you will not be fortified against the Mensheviks, who will send strong reinforcements from here.

No one from the Bureau writes about the congress. This worries us, for Mermaid's optimism (and partly yours) that the C.C.'s consent to the congress is a gain, inspires grave misgivings. To us it is as clear as daylight that the C.C. wanted to fool you. You should be a pessimist as far as the C.C. is concerned. Don't believe it, for Christ's sake! Make the most of the moment to induce the Minority committees, especially those of the "Marsh", to turn up. It's tremendously important to give special attention to Kiev, Rostov and Kharkov; *we know* that there are *Vperyod* supporters, *workers* and intellectuals, in all these three centres. *At all costs* delegates from these committees should be brought to the congress with a *consultative* voice.* The

* Write all this to Mermaid and Demon.

same applies to the Moscow print-workers. Altogether it is most deplorable that the Bureau did not publish our decision to have the workers' organisations invited to the congress: *this is a tremendous mistake*. Rectify it quickly and without fail.

I strongly advise carrying out agitation among all the *300* organised workers in St. Petersburg for sending one or two delegates to the congress with a *consultative* voice *at their own expense*. The idea will no doubt appeal to the workers, and they will set to work with a will. Don't forget that the Mensheviks will try their damnedest to discredit the congress in the eyes of the workers by saying: there were no workers present. This has to be taken into consideration and special attention must be paid to workers' representation. The workers of St. Petersburg will certainly collect three hundred rubles for two workers' delegates (or some Maecenas will make a special donation for it)—agitation among the workers for sending the cap round will have a tremendous effect, everyone will know of it. This would be of enormous importance. Be sure to read this in the Committee and at meetings of organisers and agitators. Do all our organisers and agitators speak to the workers about direct connections with *Vperyod*?

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Both Bureau leaflets (No. 1 on an uprising and No. 2 on the attitude towards the liberals) are excellent and we are reprinting them in full in *Vperyod*.[288] If only they were to keep this up! By the way: why has the writers' group declared that it belongs to the organisation of the St. Petersburg Committee? The reason this is not advisable is this. A writers' group attached to the Committee would have no mandate to the congress. If it was a *special* group, not belonging to any committee, but an *all-Russia* "writers' group belonging to the Russian S.D.L.P.", it would have the right (*with the Bureau's permission*) to send a delegate with a *consultative* voice. Arrange this, please! We shall not publish the fact that it is a group attached to the St. Petersburg Committee. Let

1) the S.P.C. part with it; 2) let it become a separate and special group at least for a time; 3) let it "submit a request" (there's bureaucracy for you!) for its delegate to be admitted to the congress with a consultative voice; 4) let the Bureau give permission. I can't believe that a dozen writers will be unable to raise 200 rubles for a delegate! I'm sure it would be useful to have their delegate at the congress (for example, Rumyantsev or someone else). Inform the Bureau of this or, better still, *do all this yourself without any reports at all.*

Written at the beginning
of March 1905
Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

134
TO S. I. GUSEV

To Nation from Lenin

March 11, 1905

Dear friend,

I have just received Nos. 10 and 11.* Many thanks, particularly for the scolding in No. 10. I love to hear people scold—it means they know what they are doing and have a line to follow. You've given the "old wolf" a proper trimming; the mere perusal of it made him scratch himself. No. 11, though, showed that you are far too optimistic if you hope so easily to come to terms with the St. Petersburg Mensheviks. Oh, I fear the Danaans[289] and advise you to do the same! Have you noticed that everything that is not to their advantage remains a matter of words, undocumented—for example, the C.C.'s agreeing to a congress. Issue No. 89 of *Iskra* appeared today with the Council's decision of March 8, 1905, against a congress—a lying, raging decision ("by acting the way they do, the participants in a congress place themselves outside the Party"), which gives the number of "qualified Party organisations, apart from the central bodies", as of January 1, 1905, as thirty-three (a shameless lie, non-existent committees, like that of the Kuban and the unendorsed Kazan Committee, have been invented, while in the case of two others, those of Polesye and the North-West, the date has been mixed up, January 1, 1905, being stated instead of April 1, 1905). Clearly there can be no question of the Council's participation in the congress, nor, consequently, of the League and the Central Organ. I'm very glad of this, *and I don't believe* that the

* Gusev's letters to Lenin.—*Ed.*

Mensheviks in Russia will go; I don't believe it. So far not one of you has sent us a single written statement of a single Menshevik committee agreeing to a congress. Be under no illusion! If the St. Petersburg Mensheviks agree to make concessions, demand from them, as a *conditio sine qua non*, *recognition of the congress* to be convened by the Bureau, and recognition of the St. Petersburg Committee as the only *legal committee connected with the working-class movement* —to be given in writing, and copies to be sent to *Vperyod* without fail (over their own signatures) and on behalf of all the members, specified by name, of the St. Petersburg Minority group. Even then do not allow them *any contacts at all*—otherwise you will win yourselves internal enemies, mark my words!

Inform Rakhmetov immediately by express telegram that around March 20, 1905, there will be a most important conference here with the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and a *host* of other parties about an agreement for an uprising[290] —Rakhmetov's presence is *essential*, let him come posthaste and lose no time.

In conclusion I tell you once again: you do not know the Minority forces throughout Russia and are under an illusion. This is a mistake. The Mensheviks at present are stronger than we are; it's going to be a long and hard fight. The icons abroad[291] raise a heap of money. I consider it simply *indecent* for us to raise the question of an agreement with the Bund, etc., *after* their (and the Lettish) conference with the C.C.[292] (minutes in *Posledniye Izvestia*[293] and in *Iskra* No. 89). It would be idiocy; it would look as if we were thrusting ourselves upon them. We shall be told: we don't know you, we have already reached agreement with the C.C. It will end in disgrace, believe me!

All the very best. *Lenin*

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

135
TO S. I. GUSEV

To Gusev from Lenin

March 16, 1905

Dear friend,

I have just learnt that, at the request of the Bund, the conference here of *eighteen* Social-Democratic and other *revolutionary* parties (including the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the P.P.S.) has been postponed to the beginning of April. It is extremely important for us to settle jointly with Rakhmetov a number of fundamental questions concerning our participation in this conference (its aim is to reach agreement on an uprising). *Iskra* is carrying on a most vile intrigue. If Rakhmetov has not left yet, make every effort to see that he goes immediately, and let me know at once without fail exactly what you know about the time of his departure.

We are pretty worried here about the congress. It's all very well for you, Igor and Lyadov to write about the Old Man being nervy. Who wouldn't be nervy when we are surrounded here by enemies who take advantage of every item of news and who get their news more quickly than we do. Really, this is unpardonable on the part of the Bureau. As regards the East, for example, all we know is that Zemlyachka is touring the Urals and that Lyadov visited Saratov. The reply from the latter place is vague, nothing definite. We do not know what arrangements have been made for publishing leaflets over the signature of the "Committees of the Eastern District". It is a disgrace and a scandal! Recently the Socialist-Revolutionaries showed us one such leaflet, a stupid one, against Gapon! Obviously, this is a C.C. intrigue, but surely two members of the Bureau who

visited the East could have learnt something and written us about it in good time, so as not to put us in an idiotic position in face of the enemy! Don't they feel ashamed at putting *Vperyod* in such an extremely awkward position? And more than awkward, because *Iskra* brazenly takes advantage of everything. In *Iskra* No. 89 the Council excommunicates everyone who goes to the congress. The votes are again falsified there. They count 75 votes as of January 1, 1905 ($33 \times 2 = 66 + 9$ from the C.C., Central Organ and Council). They have invented the Kazan and Kuban committees, which were never endorsed, and lie about the Polesye and North-Western committees having been endorsed as of January 1, 1905. Actually, they were not endorsed until April 1, 1905. We exposed this lie in *Vperyod* No. 10.*

Here is something that should be borne in mind: for the congress to be lawful from *Iskra*'s point of view, there must be *nineteen* committees attending it. By our reckoning, this is wrong. But if there were 28 (apart from the League) fully qualified organisations in *Russia* as of January 1, 1905, then the participation of *14-15* at the congress is extremely desirable, *almost essential*. Meanwhile, we have $13 - 1$ (Ekaterinoslav) $+ 2$ (Voronezh and Tula) $= 14$, and that only by counting Tiflis, a doubtful. Of course, the congress is necessary all the same, if only of a dozen committees, and the sooner the better. Any kind of congress, so long as it is a congress. But why is there no news of the Bureau having visited a *single* neutral or Menshevik committee? Was it not decided that the Bureau would invite and visit all of them? Why hasn't Lyadov visited the Kuban Committee? Why, in travelling through, did he not invite to the congress the Don, Kharkov, Gornozavodsky and Kiev committees? And the various groups in these towns? An excellent means of stirring the workers is to invite them to the congress *themselves*. Why isn't this being done? It would really have enormous significance! Why isn't there a scrap of news about Kursk, the Polesye Committee and others? We shall do everything we can from here, but not

* See "Whom Are They Trying to Fool?" (present edition, Vol. 8).—*Ed.*

much can be done from here. There are slight chances of making contact with Kazan, Siberia, Kursk, Polesye, and Saratov, but all this is problematical. And yet, if all these five, plus the Urals, were at the congress, then its full lawfulness, even according to *Iskra*'s reckoning, would be beyond doubt. Do write.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

136
TO THE ODESSA COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the Odessa Committee from Lenin

Dear friends,

I should like to say a few words to you about congress delegates. If you are sending them from Russia, then my letter does not apply. But I heard that you are thinking of giving a mandate to one of the people here. If this rumour is true, then I would advise giving mandates to *both* of your candidates here, i.e., to Josephine and Danila—one with a vote and the other with a consultative voice (i.e., write a letter to the congress that the Odessa Committee *requests the congress* to let Josephine attend with a *consultative* voice, as a member of the Southern Bureau and a very useful worker in a consultative capacity, or, for example, Danila, as having an excellent knowledge of the local areas and having worked with remarkable energy among the Odessa proletariat). You may rest assured that the congress will grant such a request from the Committee. Please read this letter to *all* the Committee members and send me a reply.[294]

P.S. Are you taking workers into the Committee? This is essential, absolutely essential! Why don't you put us in direct contact with workers? Not a single worker writes to *Vperyod. This is a scandal.* We need at all costs *dozens* of worker correspondents. I would ask you to read this part of the letter, too, not only to all Committee members, but also to all Majority organisers and agitators.

Regards to everyone!

Yours,
Lenin

Written March 25, 1905, in Geneva

First published in 1925

Printed from the original

137
TO S. I. GUSEV

To be handed to Gusev from Lenin, private

April 4, 1905

Dear friend,

You wrote yourself that you were now being shadowed. What's more, I have gathered information fully confirming this fact from St. Petersburgers who have recently arrived from the scene of activities. There can be no doubt at all about it. I know from my own experience and from that of lots of comrades that one of the most difficult things for a revolutionary is to leave a danger spot *in good time*. Whenever the time comes to drop work in a given locality, that work becomes particularly interesting and *particularly needed*; so it seems always to the person concerned. I consider it my duty, therefore, to *demand* of you most insistently that you abandon St. Petersburg for a time. This is absolutely essential. No excuses *of any kind*, no considerations for the work, should put off this step. The harm caused by an inevitable arrest will be enormous. The harm caused by going away will be insignificant, and merely apparent. Advance young assistants *for a time*, for a month or two, to fill the top posts, and rest assured that, with an extremely brief and temporary setback, the cause, on the whole, will gain by it tremendously. The young people will acquire more experience in key posts, and any mistakes they may make will be speedily corrected by us. An arrest, however, would ruin all our major opportunities for organising central work. Once more, I insistently advise going out *immediately* to the provinces for a month. There's heaps of work to be done everywhere, and everywhere general guid-

ance is needed. If there is a *will* to go (and a will there must be) the thing can always be arranged.

I'm not writing anything about the agreement of March 12, 1905.[295] Cursing will do no good. I suppose they could not act otherwise. The thing now is to prepare energetically for the congress and to increase the number of delegates. Don't be too free with money, take care of it; it will be needed more than ever after the congress.

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1925 Printed from the original

138
TO OLGA VINOGRADOVA[296]

To Beggar from Lenin

Dear Comrade,

I have read with interest your letter[297] (No. 6) about the primary nucleus of the organisation among handicraft workers. At the factories this nucleus should be represented by the factory committee, but what about the handicraft industries? You stand for trade union circles, but what about your opponents—? I didn't quite grasp what they stand for. Neither do I know, unfortunately, what these old trade union "councils" were. When did they exist? How were they formed? How did they combine Social-Democratic and trade union work?

Not being familiar with the practical aspect of this practical question, I hesitate to express an opinion *as yet*. Further letters may tell me more—then we shall see. One must study experience and be careful in changing things, that is true. But it's not quite clear to me what Economism has to do with it. Don't the factory committees, too, mainly discuss factory interests (which are also trade union interests)? Yet no one has objected to the factory committee being the primary nucleus of the *Social-Democratic* organisation. The important thing is living conditions, conditions of assembly, conditions under which people meet, conditions of joint work, because the primary nucleus should meet frequently and regularly and function in a particularly lively fashion. Finally, is a single type of organisation obligatory here? Would not a variety of types be better for adaptation to various conditions and for acquiring richer experience?

Thanks for the letters. Keep on writing, for it is not often we have news about the *day-to-day* (the most interesting) aspect of the work.

Lenin

Written April 8, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Odessa
First published in 1925 Printed from the original

139
TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

To the Secretariat of the International Socialist Bureau

Geneva, July 8, 1905

Dear Comrades,

Your letter of July 6 somewhat surprised us. You should already have known that Citizen Plekhanov is no longer the representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Party in the International Socialist Bureau.

In *Iskra* No. 101, Citizen Plekhanov published the following letter, which we translate literally, and which, one would think, he should have brought to the notice of the Bureau:

"Comrades, the decisions of the conference [of the breakaway section of the Party],[298] which have dealt a mortal blow to the central institutions of our Party, compel me to divest myself of the title of editor of the Central Organ and fifth member of the Council (elected by the Second, *lawful* Congress).

"G. Plekhanov.

"P.S. I take this opportunity publicly to ask that section of the Party which recognises the decisions of the 'Third' Congress[299] as binding, whether it wishes me to continue to represent this, now—alas!—dissevered Party in the International Socialist Bureau. I can remain the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. *only* if this is the wish of *both* sections.

"Montreux, May 29, 1905."

The editorial board of *Proletary*,[300] the Central Organ of the Party, replied to this statement of Citizen Plekhanov's with the following paragraph, published in No. 5, for June 13, 1905:

"In regard to Comrade Plekhanov's postscript we can state that the question of the Party's representation in the

International Bureau by Comrade Plekhanov has now been submitted to the C.C. of the Party for its decision."

The question has not yet been settled and, consequently, at the present time Citizen Plekhanov cannot, in the capacity of representative of the Party,[301] sign any document emanating from the International Bureau.

In view of this we draw your attention, dear comrades, to the fact that it is very inconvenient for us to communicate with the Bureau through a comrade who himself declares *publicly* that he cannot represent the Party so long as it does not definitely authorise him to do so. We again repeat our request to the International Secretariat that, pending settlement of the question of representation in the International Socialist Bureau, everything that concerns us (letters, manifestoes, documents, funds, etc.) should be sent to the address of the Party's Central Committee (V. Oulianoff, Rue de la Colline, 3, Genève).

Accept, dear comrades, the assurance of our fraternal sentiments.

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1931

Printed from the handwritten copy
Translated from the French

140

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

From Lenin to the members of the C.C., private

July 11, 1905

Dear friends,

A number of letters from all over Russia, Alexandrov's news, a talk with Tick and several other new arrivals—all this strengthens my conviction that there is some internal defect in the work of the C.C., a defect of organisation, in the way the work is arranged. The general opinion is that there is no Central Committee, that it does not make itself felt, that no one notices it. And the facts confirm this There is no evidence of the C.C.'s political guidance of the Party. Yet all the C.C. members are working themselves to death! What's the matter?

In my opinion, one of the principal causes of it is that there are no regular C.C. leaflets. Leadership by means of talks and personal contacts at a time of revolution is sheer utopianism. Leadership must be public. *All other* forms of work must be wholly and unconditionally subordinated to this form. A responsible C.C. litterateur should concern himself first of all with writing (or obtaining from contributors—though the editor himself should always be prepared to write) a leaflet twice a week on Party and political topics (the liberals, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Minority, the split, the Zemstvo delegation, the trade unions, etc., etc.) and republishing it in every way, immediately mimeographing in 50 copies (if there is no printing-press) and circulating it to the committees for republication Articles in *Proletary* could, perhaps, sometimes be used l for such leaflets—after a certain amount of revision. I cannot understand why this is not being done! Can Schmidt

and Werner have forgotten our talks on this? Surely it is possible to write and circulate at least one leaflet a week? The Report on the Third Congress* has not been reprinted[302] in full anywhere in Russia all this time. It is so outrageous, such a fiasco for all the C.C.'s famous "techniques" that I simply cannot understand what Winter was thinking about, what Sommer and the others are thinking about! After all, are there not committee print-shops in existence?

Apparently, the C.C. members completely fail to understand the tasks of "keeping in the public eye". Yet without that there is no centre, there is no Party! They are working themselves to the bone, but they are working like moles, at secret rendezvous, at meetings, with agents, etc., etc. It is a sheer waste of strength! If you are short-handed, then put third-rate forces on the job, even tenth-rate ones, but attend to the political leadership yourselves, issue leaflets first and foremost. And then—personal appearances and speeches at district meetings (in Polesye no one attended the meeting. A scandal. They all but broke away!), at conferences, etc. Something like a C.C. diary should be published, a C.C. bulletin, and every important question should be dealt with in a leaflet issued twice a week. It is not difficult to publish one: 50 copies can be run off on a hectograph and circulated, one of the committees can print it and have copies sent to us. The thing is to *act*, to act *all the time* openly, to stop being dumb. Otherwise we here, too, are completely cut off.

Perhaps the C.C. should be enlarged? Half a dozen more agents taken on? People could be found for this, I'm sure. In fact, I want to suggest a practical step right now: in view of the almost total absence of correspondence between the C.C. members (we have had only two letters from Werner and Winter, and from Alexandrov only news from the road, "travel impressions", nothing more), it is absolutely essential to *carry out* our joint decision of May 10, 1905, concerning the holding of a meeting by September 1, 1905.[303] For heaven's sake, don't put this off, don't be stingy about spending 200-300 rubles. Without this, there is a great

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 433-39.—*Ed.*

danger that we shall not be able to set things going properly. At the moment they are not moving at all. This is evident from all reports.

There are still six weeks to go to September 1. It is possible to wind up affairs and make arrangements for a trip in good time, after corresponding among others with Alexandrov as to who should go. I await a reply.

Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1926 Printed from the original

141
TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

From Lenin to the C.C.

Dear friends,

In regard to your recent letters I should say that I agree with all the decisions except two. 1) I emphatically protest against the appointment of Matryona as an agent and earnestly request you to revise it. He is a muddle-headed fellow, who can cause us great harm, desert us a dozen times, put us to shame by his stupidity, etc. Let him work in the Committee—as an agent he is no good at all, unless you put him on a "technique" job. As regards Stanislav, please let me know who he is, tell me more about him. For my part I would strongly recommend Lalayants as an agent. In Odessa and the Southern Bureau he displayed outstanding ability as an organiser; according to the general opinion he has got real live work going there. He was the guiding spirit of all the local work—so a number of Odessites reported, some of whom were anything but favourably disposed towards the "rockfirm". Last but not least he is a man of exceptionally high principle. 2) Regarding Plekhanov, I am extremely surprised at your silence on a question that had been raised here in Winter's time. Have we the right to appoint as the representative of the Party someone who does not want to come into the Party and refuses to recognise the Third Congress? He has now declared in print that he does not consider the Third Congress lawful and will act as representative *only* of both sections. A number of comrades here had pointed out, when Winter was still here, that, in appointing Plekhanov, we would only pamper him and spoil him altogether. I was in favour of Plekhanov at first, but I now see that he can only be appointed on certain

conditions. Just imagine concretely what it will mean to have as our representative on the Bureau someone to whom no one speaks, and who *cannot* be made to "represent" the *C.C.* and not himself! We have now at last secured direct contact between the Bureau (the I.S.B.) and us, and we see that there are quite a number of small business matters, financial and others (requests on behalf of Russia and concerning Russia, about which I wrote to them recently; the method of representation, about which they asked me a few days ago, etc.). The Bureau wrote about another "proposal of Bebel's"[304] (which has not yet reached us); evidently, the old fellow is out to "make peace" again (Kautsky has published a mean article in connection with the German edition of the "Report"[305]). Think what our position will be if Plekhanov is the representative and Plekhanov has to deal with Bebel on the question of "peace"! I understand very well what strong reasons there are to make us all, and especially you, desire "peace", desire the appointment of Plekhanov, but I have become convinced that such a step, without a *real* guarantee of peace, will be only a false step, will confuse the issue still more, will cause new splits, violations of agreements, altercations and *fresh* resentment, and will only make unity *more remote*. In my opinion, all the talk about unity will be so much empty phrase-making so long as a *realisable* plan for it has not been worked out from experience; things are going in this direction, we must wait a few months, let everyone assess the absurdity of the decisions of the conference, let *experience* destroy their idiotic "organisational statute", let *experience* cut down their claims (for, in general, things are going better with us, and we are obviously going forward to victory)—and then direct negotiations will be started between the central bodies without intermediaries, then we shall work out (whether at once or after two or three attempts, I do not undertake to say, of course) a *modus vivendi*. But now it is necessary to fight.

My proposal is to make a "proposal" to Plekhanov on your lines, *but on condition* that he is willing to recognise the Third Congress, come into the Party and submit to its decisions. By such a step we shall observe the conventions and eliminate any possible confusion.

Pending your reply I shall not propose anything to Plekhanov. I earnestly beg you to postpone a decision until we meet in September.

I am extremely surprised that you write nothing about the "Open Letter"[306] written by Reinert that was sent to me. I don't understand the why and wherefor. Why is there not a word about this in the *decisions*? Write quickly whether it is to be published in the Central Organ. If it is, then I should like very much to ask for a slight alteration concerning tactical differences so that it may not come into contradiction with my pamphlet, which Lyubich will tell you about.[307] I hope we shall see eye to eye on this and, if possible, I would ask to be allowed to make this alteration myself.

I am extremely surprised that the "Report" is not being issued in Russia in full. It's scandalous! Make all the technical staff hurry up with this, for heaven's sake!

We are extremely grateful for the detailed decisions, letters from committees and leaflets you have sent us. At long last something like regular contacts between us are being established! Please, don't drop this custom and find a good St. Petersburg secretary. We are badly in need of information from St. Petersburg about Party affairs, the liberals, questions of Party life that are being discussed in the circles, etc., etc. Do not forget that the Bund and the Mensheviks are better informed than we are here!

All the very best.

N. Lenin

Written July 12, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Russia
First published in 1926

Printed from the original

142

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

No. 1

July 28, 1905

Dear friends,

The two following important questions must be decided as quickly as possible: 1) The question of Plekhanov. We have instructed a special agent (Lyadov) to tell you how the matter stands. I shall repeat it briefly. Plekhanov acted with incredible impudence by writing to the International Socialist Bureau that both sections of the Party had recognised (!) him, and in every way denouncing and denigrating our Third Congress. I have a copy of his letter sent to me from the Bureau. It will be sent on to you. With great difficulty I established direct contact with the International Socialist Bureau and refuted Plekhanov. Plekhanov then refused to be the representative. You know that I was by no means unconditionally opposed to Plekhanov's appointment, but now it would be quite unthinkable. It would be such a disavowal of me that my position would become impossible. It would discredit us altogether in the eyes of the International Socialist Bureau. Do not forget that almost all the Social-Democrats abroad are on the side of the "icons" and think nothing of us, look down on us. An incautious step on your part will spoil everything. Therefore I earnestly request Werner and Schmidt to confirm, as quickly as possible, if only provisionally, the steps I have taken. That is one thing. Secondly, Plekhanov should be offered a scientific organ in the name of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., but on condition that he recognise the Third Congress and all its decisions as binding on him. If he turns this down, the blame will fall on him, while we shall have demonstrated our conciliatory spirit. If he accepts, we shall take a further step to meet him. And so: I earnestly advise you to rescind the decision about representation,

and, as regards the scientific organ, to draft the proposal with the above condition.[308] 2) About the proposal for mediation on the part of the International Socialist Bureau. The full text will be sent to you, although Lyadov has already taken it for you. For the purpose of reconciliation, the International Socialist Bureau proposes a conference between us and the Minority, under the chairmanship of members of the I. S. Bureau. The foreign Social-Democrats (Bebel and others) are strongly urging the I.S.B. to bring pressure to bear on us. Letters of this kind have come even from the British (the Social-Democratic Federation; I have a copy of the letter, in the usual conciliatory vein, about it being a crime to quarrel at such a time, etc.[309]). I wrote to the I. S. Bureau that it was not within my competence to settle this question, and that the decision had to come from the whole C.C., to which, I said, I was writing immediately. Then I enquired whether they had in mind mediation only, or a court of arbitration that was binding on both sides; it was important for me, I said, to write on this point to the C.C. So far there is no reply from them.

My opinion is as follows. The conference should certainly be agreed to. It should be fixed for round about September 1. We should send to it without fail one or two C.C. members from Russia (do not forget that our meeting is fixed for September 1, and that it is extremely necessary in all respects). Mediation should be accepted with thanks. A binding decision by arbitration should be refused on the strength of the Third Congress resolution,[310] which has bound us unconditionally and which states that the conditions for complete amalgamation with the Minority should be submitted to the Fourth Congress for confirmation. The Third Congress instructed us to prepare and work out these conditions, but not to endorse them finally. In fulfilment of the instruction of the Third Congress, we accept mediation and will try to work out a fully detailed modus for agreement now and for gradual amalgamation. If we can manage it, we shall implement the agreement at once, and submit the plan for amalgamation to the Fourth Congress, which will then have to be convened at the same time and in the same place with the obligatory attendance of all Minority organisations. It is extremely important to bear in mind

that the Mensheviks have no central body whose decisions are binding on them. *Iskra* is not subordinated to the Organisation Committee. We should not play the role of fools entering into an agreement with people who have neither the right nor the power to speak for the whole Minority. It is essential therefore to make it clear at once that the delegates from the Minority at the meeting with the I. S. Bureau should be both from the Organisation Committee and from *Iskra*, and in addition should promise to invite the opinions of all Minority organisations as soon as possible, giving a list of them to us. Incidentally, if from the point of view of Russia it is of more importance to you that the Mensheviks of Russia should preponderate, then you will discuss whether special *Iskra* delegates are necessary. You will know best. But do not forget that without the consent of *Iskra* all agreements will be a fiction. One more question: should we inform the I. S. Bureau of the secret resolution of the Third Congress? Have we the right to do so? I am in doubt about this. Of course, informing the European socialist comrades is not "publishing", and they can be made to undertake not to publish. But is this advisable? Decide for yourselves. It is easy to give a satisfactory explanation even without informing them about the Third Congress resolution which binds us.

I shall publish the open letter to the Organisation Committee in *Proletary* No. 11 (No. 10 is already coming out). I did not publish it earlier because I was waiting for an explanation from you, which only arrived yesterday. We earnestly request you to make a note on each document whether it is to be published and published immediately.

And so, reply as soon as possible on behalf of Werner and Schmidt at any rate: 1) Will you write the reply to the I. S. Bureau yourselves or do you instruct me to do so? 2) Do you approve my reply or not? 3) If not, I would ask you to hurry up with a reply, so that we can reach full agreement; any misunderstanding in such a matter, lack of clarity or lack of information, is fraught with the greatest danger.

P.S. Please send my letters on to Dubois, I haven't got his address.

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

143
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY[311]

August 2, 1905

Dear An. Vas.,

Yesterday I sent you a "business" letter and asked for *Iskra* No. 105* and Plekhanov's L. Feuerbach** to be sent to you. Today I'd like to talk to you on things other than current petty business.

Our people in Geneva are down in the dumps. It's surprising how little is needed for people who are not quite self-dependent and not used to independent political work, to lose heart and start moping. And our Geneva Bolsheviks are terrible mopers. A serious struggle is on, which the Third Congress, of course, did not put an end to and merely opened a new phase of it; the Iskrists are lively busybodies, brazen as hucksters, well skilled by long experience in demagogy—whereas among our people a kind of "conscientious stupidity" or "stupid conscientiousness" prevails. They can't put up a fight, they're awkward, inactive, clumsy, timid.... They're good fellows, but no damn'd good whatever as politicians. They lack tenacity, fighting spirit, nimbleness and speed. Vas. Vas. is extremely typical in this respect: a charming fellow, an utterly devoted worker and honest man, but he'll never make a *politician*, I'm afraid. He's much too kind—one can hardly believe that the "Galyorka" pamphlets were written by him. He brings

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* The leading article is said to be utter piffle! Will you write something against it as quickly as possible? If you agree, *send a telegram*.

** Meaning Plekhanov's preface to the second Russian edition of Engels's pamphlet *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*.—*Ed*.

no fighting spirit either to the newspaper (he is always regretting that I do not allow him to write kind articles about the Bund!) or to the colony. A spirit of despondency reigns and I am for ever being reproached (I have only been three weeks in the country, and travel to town for four to five hours *three* and sometimes *four* times a week!) because things are not going well with them, because the Mensheviks are smarter, etc., etc.!

And our C.C., for one thing, is not much of a "politician" either, it's much too kind, it, too, suffers from a lack of tenacity, resourcefulness and sensitivity, from inability to take political advantage of every trifle in the Party struggle. Secondly, it has a lofty contempt for us "foreigners" and keeps all the best people away from us or takes them from here. And we here abroad, find ourselves behindhand. There is not enough ferment, stimulus or impulse. People are incapable of acting and fighting by themselves. We are short of speakers at our meetings. There is no one to pour cheer into people, to raise key issues, no one capable of lifting them above the Geneva marsh into the sphere of more serious interests and problems. And the whole work suffers. In political struggle a halt is fatal. There are thousands of demands and they are continually increasing. The new-Iskrists are not dozing (they have now "intercepted" the sailors[312] who arrived in Geneva, have enticed them, probably by their usual political showmanship and overloud *marktschreien**, "utilising" post facto the Odessa events for the benefit of their coterie). We are *impossibly* short of people. I don't know when Vas. Vas. intends to write, but as a speaker and political centre he is beneath criticism. He is more likely to spread despondency among people than to rouse them and call them to order. Schwarz is absent; he writes from over there zealously and well, even better than he did here, I should say, but that's all he does. As for personally exercising an influence on people and being able to direct them and meetings, he is rarely capable of doing that even when in Geneva. It is a large, important centre here. There are lots of Russians. Crowds of travellers. Summer is an especially busy time, for among

* Mountebank crying of wares.—*Ed.*

the multitude of Russian tourists coming to Geneva there is a certain percentage of people who should and could be made use of, aroused, drawn in and guided.

Think it over and write to me in greater detail (preferably to my private address: 3. Rue David Dufour). Do you remember writing me that your absence from Geneva would be no loss, because you wrote a lot even from afar. You do write a lot, and we keep the newspaper going *somehow* (just somehow and no more, though we desperately need a lot more). But not only is there a loss, but a tremendous loss, which is felt more and more sharply every day. Personal influence and speaking at meetings make all the difference in politics. Without them there is no political activity and even writing itself becomes less political. Faced by an enemy who has powerful forces abroad, we are losing more ground each week than we can probably make up in a month. The fight for the Party is not over, and it will not be brought to real victory without straining every nerve....

All the best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Italy

First published in 1934

Printed from the original

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

From Lenin to the Members of the C.C.

August 14, 1905

Dear friends,

I have just read in *Iskra* No. 107 the minutes of the meeting of July 12, 1905, between the C.C. and the Organisation Committee.[313] It is most regrettable that so far the promised minutes have *not* been received from you. There have been no letters either. Really, it is impossible to work in this way. I knew nothing about the plan to issue the "Open Letter" or the plan of negotiations, or the plan for some sort of concessions. Is such an attitude to a member of the collegium permissible? Think of the position you put me in! The position is absolutely impossible, for it is precisely here, abroad, that I have to answer everybody frankly—you will admit this yourself on calm reflection.

Your reply to the Organisation Committee gives rise to a number of perplexities. I can't make out whether you are trying to be cunning or what? Can you have forgotten that there is the straightforward resolution of the Third Congress that the terms of unification must be endorsed by a new congress? How could one talk seriously of co-opting to the C.C. when there are two rival organs? How could one leave unanswered the toleration of two central organs, i.e., a complete violation both of the Rules and of the decisions of the Third Congress? How was it possible not to present the Mensheviks with a principled ultimatum on the organisational question: (1) congresses instead of plebiscites as the supreme organ of the Party; (2) unconditional subordination of Party literature to the Party; (3) direct elections to the C.C.; (4) subordination of the minority to the majority, etc.?

Haven't you taken warning from the unfortunate example of the transportation "agreement", which was immediately wrecked by Frockcoat, causing so much fresh bitterness?[314] Nothing can do such harm to the cause of future unity as a fictitious agreement which satisfies no one and leaves grounds for a struggle; such an "agreement" will *inevitably* lead to a new rupture and redoubled bitterness!

Or are you being cunning? Are you hoping to "take in" the Organisation Committee, or to set the Mensheviks in Russia at loggerheads with those abroad? Has there not been sufficient experience on this score, proving the futility of such attempts?

I repeat in all seriousness: you are putting me in an *impossible* position. I am not exaggerating. I earnestly request you to answer these questions: 1) shall we have the meeting on September 1, as we decided, or have you rescinded this decision? 2) if you have rescinded it, then how, when and where will your meeting (of C.C. members) be held and what measures do you intend to take to enable me to cast my vote and (what is *much more* important) discover your *real* intentions. A meeting is devilishly necessary on a thousand matters. We have no money. The Germans, for some reason, are not giving any. If you do not send 3,000 rubles, we shall go under. Practically all the minutes have been set up,[315] 1,500 rubles are needed for the publication. The treasury is empty as *never* before.

What is this resolution of the Orel-Bryansk Committee? (*Iskra* No. 106.)[316] There is some muddle here. For heaven's sake, tell us what you know. Couldn't someone be sent there—Lyubich from Voronezh, for example?

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

145
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Dear An. Vas.,

I have received your letter. You had better write to my private address: 3. Rue David Dufour.

I don't know what to do about Kostrov's pamphlet. I have not yet read it in the press, but from the old manuscript I know what kind of stuff it is. You are quite right about its being plain "Black-Hundred literature".[317] You ask—how to reply?

Vas. Vas. has written a paragraph for *Proletary*—an uninteresting one, I don't feel like publishing it. Olin has delivered a lecture, he is writing, too, but I don't think he'll manage it. Two things are required here, in my opinion: firstly, "a brief outline of the history of the split". A popular one. Starting from the beginning, from Economism. Properly documented. Divided into periods: 1901-03; 1903 (Second Congress); August 26, 1903-November 26, 1903; November 26, 1903-January 1904; January-August 1904; August 1904-May 1905; May 1905 (Third Congress).

I think it could be written so clearly, exactly, and concisely that even those to whom Kostrov addresses himself would read it.

Secondly, we need a lively, sharp, *subtle* and detailed characterisation (literary-critical) of these Black Hundreds. As a matter of fact, this falsity is at the bottom of things both with L. M. (did you read the disgraceful stuff in No. 107? Schwarz is replying with an article. I don't know whether it is worth while?) and with Old Believer. A number of such articles and pamphlets should be collected, the gross lie should be shown up, *nailed down*, so that it would be impossible to wriggle out of it, and branded as definitely "Black-Hundred literature". The new-Iskrists have now provided plenty of material and if it is carefully gone over and these dirty methods of *tittle-tattle*, talebearing, etc., are exposed in all their beauty, a powerful effect

could be produced. L. M.'s obscure "personal hints" alone—what undiluted filth it is!

I may perhaps tackle the first subject myself, but not just now, not soon; I have no time for it* (afterwards, I daresay, it will be too late!).

I would not tackle the second subject and I think that *only* you could do it. A nasty job, a stinking one, there's no denying it, but, after all, we are not fine gentlemen, but newspapermen, and it is impermissible for Social-Democratic publicists to allow "foulness and poison" to go unbranded.

Think this over and drop me a line.

A pamphlet on the mass political strike has to be produced—that should not be difficult for you.

You should certainly continue writing popular pamphlets as well, selecting something topical. What precisely, I do not know. Perhaps about the Bulygin Duma? It will be necessary to await the publication.[320]

It would be good to write about workers' organisation. Compare our Rules (Third Congress) and the Conference Statute, analyse the two, explain the idea, importance and methods of *revolutionary* organisation of the proletariat (particularly for an uprising), the difference between Party organisations and those aligned with the Party, etc. In part, this would be an answer to Kostrov, a popular one, for the masses, on a burning topic of the day. Have a try!

All the very best,

Yours,

N. Lenin

Written between August 15 and 19, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Italy
First published in 1934

Printed from the original

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* I am now going to answer Plekhanov (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 2).[318] He has to be pulled to pieces thoroughly, for he, too, has a heap of abominations and miserable arguments. I hope that I shall succeed.

Further, I am turning over in my mind a plan for a popular pamphlet: *The Working Class and Revolution*[319]—a description of democratic and socialist tasks, and then conclusions about an uprising and a provisional revolutionary government, etc. I think such a pamphlet is essential.

146
TO P. N. LEPESHINSKY[321]

To Comrade Olin, who signed as secretary of the *Geneva group* of the R.S.D.L.P. organisation abroad

Decision of the C.C. representative abroad, which must *be read out in full* at the next meeting of the group (i.e., today, August 29, if this decision arrives during the meeting).[322]

Today, August 29, 1905, at 8 p.m., copies of the letter from the Geneva group to the forwarding office and of the reply of the latter to the former reached the C.C. representative abroad.

In connection with these documents, the representative abroad of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. points out to the Geneva group that it has displayed lack of understanding of Party discipline and has violated the Party Rules. The forwarders are agents of the Central Committee. Any dissatisfaction with C.C. agents is a matter for examination primarily by the Central Committee itself. According to the Rules, the C.C. deals with all conflicts arising within the Party, and particularly so in the case of conflicts between members of the Party's various organisations and C.C. agents. Therefore, by inviting C.C. agents to a meeting of the group, the latter took a step that was, formally speaking, incorrect in general and tactless in particular.

If, however, this invitation was not supposed to be a formal act, then it should not have been made in writing and officially.

The "personal behaviour" of "officers" is either merely personal (unconnected with and independent of the office they hold), in which case its investigation by the group amounts to *squabbling*; or else, the personal behaviour

has to do with the office, in which case every Party member, who is dissatisfied with this behaviour, and who insists on a *formal*, *official* investigation, is *obliged* first and foremost to address himself formally to the C.C. The Geneva group of the R.S.D.L.P., by allowing questions concerning dissatisfaction with C.C. agents to "come up" before the group as a matter of *formal* examination prior to this being *formally* reported to the C.C., has thereby again showed failure to understand the discipline and Rules of the Party.

The difference I have just mentioned between *squabbling* and *criticism of an officer* (criticism which is *obligatory* for every Party member, and which should be made in an open way and addressed directly to the central institutions or the Congress, and not underhand, private, parochial criticism), this difference is evidently not clearly grasped by the group.

The C.C. representative abroad therefore considers it his duty to warn all young comrades of the group. In the "colonial" conditions of life abroad people can always be found who are liable to contract the disease of squabbling, gossip and tittle-tattle, people who very badly fulfil the functions which the C.C. or the Congress entrusts to them, but who are eager to gossip about the unsatisfactory fulfilment of other functions by other Party members. Some comrades, through inexperience, curiosity or spinelessness, may often listen seriously to these people. Such people, however, should not be listened to, but should be sharply called to order and *not allowed* to raise formal questions concerning the "personal behaviour of officers" *until* these questions have been formally submitted for consideration to the appropriate Party institutions and examined and *decided by them.*

Party members abroad easily succumb to the disease I have indicated, but all young comrades with healthy nerves should keep a strict eye on themselves and others, for the *only* way of combating this disease is to see to it that any inclination towards squabbling and tittle-tattle is *immediately and relentlessly nipped in the bud.*

That is why the C.C. representative abroad has decided:

I. To *request* the Geneva group to *withdraw* its letter of August 28 to the forwarding office.

This would be the best and speediest way of ending a bad business which, by the very force of events, threatens to lead to the most unpleasant quarrels and rifts.

The group is not obliged, of course, to meet the *request* which I am making *in the name of the C.C.* I venture to make this *request* because I am dealing with *comrades*, with whom so far I have never had any formal conflict.

II. Should the group reject my request then point I of the decision falls away. In that case, I propose that the group:

1) Inform me whether it intends to comply with the Party Rules as explained above, i.e., to comply with the *decision made by me in the name of the C.C.* (an appeal against this decision can be made (a) at a full meeting of the C.C. or (b) at a Congress, but it is binding until annulled by a higher body).

2) Send me, in accordance with Clause 11 of the Party Rules, all information concerning the make-up of the group and "all its activities" (votings, etc.) in connection with the present unfortunate business.

N. Lenin
the Representative Abroad
of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.

Written August 29, 1905
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1931

Printed from the original

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TO P. N. LEPESHINSKY

At the request of Comrade Vas. Vas. I am explaining the passage he indicated in my decision (that people can be found who do their work badly, but who are eager to gossip about the shortcomings of others). The suggestion that I meant to accuse someone, etc., is without grounds. *Every* Party worker has his shortcomings and drawbacks in the work, but we must be *careful* that criticism of shortcomings or their examination at the central Party bodies does not overstep the boundary where tittle-tattle begins. The whole point and substance of my decision are meant to serve as a *warning* and a *request* that an immediate stop be put to a matter that has been wrongly and badly begun.

N. Lenin

Written August 29, 1905
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1931

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148
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Dear An. Vas.,

Your plan for a pamphlet on *Three Revolutions* pleased me immensely. I'd drop the reply to Plekhanov for the time being if I were you—let that enraged doctrinaire bark away to his heart's content. To delve specially into philosophy at such a time! You must work as hard as you can for Social-Democracy—don't forget that you are committed *for your entire working time*.

As for the Three Revolutions, tackle this straight away. This subject has to be dealt with in a *thorough* manner. I am sure you could make a success of it. Describe, in a popular way, the tasks of socialism, its essence and the conditions for its realisation. Then—victory in the present revolution, the significance of the peasant movement (a separate chapter), what could *now* be regarded as complete victory; a provisional government, revolutionary army, uprising—the *significance and conditions* of new forms of struggle. Revolution *à la* 1789 and *à la* 1848. Finally (better to make this the second part and the preceding one—the third), about the bourgeois character of the revolution, more fully about the *economic* aspect, then thoroughly expose the *Osvobozhdeniye* people in all their *interests*, tactics and political intrigue.

This is a rich theme indeed, and a militant one, against the *Iskra* vulgarisers. Please tackle it at once and take your time over it. It is extremely important to produce a popular thing on this subject, something forceful and pointed.

Now about the split. You misunderstood me. It's no use your waiting for me, for these are different subjects: one is

the history (we shall try to manage that); the other—an outline of their polemical methods. A literary-critical outline on the subject, let us say, of "cheap and shoddy literature". Here an analysis is to be given in a whole pamphlet of several chapters, with quotations, showing up all this disgusting claptrap of Old Believer, Martov and the rest in their polemic with *Proletary*, as well as the rehash of this theme in "Majority or Minority", etc. Pillory them for their *paltry method* of warfare. Make them into a *type*. Draw a full-length portrait of them by quotations from their own writings! I am sure you'd pull it off, if only you collect a few quotations.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I have received the article about Kuzmin-Karavayev. Also the 1848 *feuilleton*.

Written at the end of August 1905
Sent from Geneva to Italy
First published in 1934

Printed from the original

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

From Lenin to Members of the C.C.

September 7, 1905

Dear friends,

Today I received news of your agreement to a conference on the Duma with the Bund, the Letts, etc.[323] Only today, although the thing happened a month ago! It is left for me to write you another "protest" (an occupation which, it seems, is becoming my profession)....

Definitely, I shall accuse you formally before the Fourth Congress of the crime called "restoration of duocentrism in defiance of the Rules and will of the Party". Really, I shall. Just think—is it not duocentrism that you have introduced! I am *obliged ex officio* to run the organ of the Central Committee. Is that not so? But how can I do that when I *do not get a scrap* of writing on any question of tactics, and a for-r-r-rmal enquiry about the "pre-arranged" meeting on September 1 (new style) is left without reply! Just think what the outcome will be if there is disharmony between us! Is it so difficult to get someone to write in good time, if only on matters of "state importance"?

I have written about the Duma in Nos. 12, 14 and 15 of *Proletary*. I am also writing in No. 16, which will come out on September 12 (new style)*. In *Posledniye Izvestia* (September 1, new style, No. 247) the Bund talked itself popeyed. We'll give them a whipping they won't forget till

* See "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and Insurrection", "'Oneness of the Tsar and the People, and of the People and the Tsar'", "In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie, or in the Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry?" and "The Theory of Spontaneous Generation" (present edition, Vol. 9).—*Ed.*

they're able to sit up again. These Bundists are such dolts and trumpeters, such nitwits and idiots, they are the limit! *Iskra* has got tangled up in lies, especially Martov in the Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (August 24, new style—translation in *Proletary* No. 15). For heaven's sake, don't rush in with an official resolution and do not give way an inch to this Bundist-new-Iskrist conference. Is it true that there will be no minutes? How can one possibly confer with these prostitutes without minutes?

I strongly warn you against the Armenian Social-Democratic Federation.[324] If you have agreed to its participation in the conference, you have made a *fatal* mistake, which must be rectified *at all costs*. It is represented in Geneva by a couple of disrupters who publish sheer trivia here and have no *serious* connections with the Caucasus. It is a *Bund creatura*, nothing more, specially invented to cultivate Caucasian Bundism. If you allow these people to attend a *Russian* conference, that is, a conference of organisations working in Russia, you will get yourself into a terrible mess. All the Caucasian comrades are against this gang of disruptive writers (I know this from many people); and we shall soon trounce them in *Proletary*. You will only evoke protests from the Caucasus and a *fresh* squabble instead of "peace" and "unity". For pity's sake! How can one ignore the Caucasian Union, which is working so hard in Russia, and hobnob with the dregs of the Geneva marsh! I beg you most earnestly, don't do it.

I have received the decision about dividing the money equally with the Organisation Committee. It will be carried out to the letter.

All the best.

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926

Printed from the original

150
TO P. A. KRASIKOV

September 14, 1905

Dear friend,

I hasten to reply to your pessimistic letter. I cannot verify the facts, but it seems to me that you are exaggerating; that's the first point. The C.C.'s leaflets are good, and *Rabochy* No. 1 is very good.[325] This is a big thing. At the moment financial affairs are bad, but connections exist and the prospects are very good. One big enterprise, very solid and profitable, has been set up, so the "financier"[326] is *certainly* not asleep. The second point: you take a wrong view of things. To wait until there is complete solidarity within the C.C. or among its agents is utopian. "Not a circle, but a party", dear friend! Focus attention on the local committees; they are *autonomous*, they give full scope, they free one's hands for financial and other connections, for statements in the press, and so on and so forth. Mind you don't make the same mistake you are blaming others for; don't moan and groan, and if you don't like working as an agent, push on with committee work and urge those who think like you to do the same. Assuming that you do have differences of opinion with the "agents". It is far more advisable for you to get your views accepted in the committee, especially if it is a united, principled committee, and to conduct an open, straightforward, vigorous policy in it than to argue with the "agents". If you are right about the anaemia of the committees and a plethora of "agents", the remedy for this malady is in your own hands: flock into the committees. The committee is autonomous. The committees *decide* everything at congresses. The committees can pass resolutions. The committees have the

right to go into print. Don't sit idle, looking up at the "heads", but get down to business on your own. You now have a broad, free field and independent, rewarding work in a most important committee. Throw yourself into it, pick a willing team, approach the workers boldly and widely, run off leaflets, *order them from us*, *Schwarz*, *me*, *Galyorka*, loudly voice your Party opinion in the name of the committee. In this way, I assure you, you will do a thousand times more to influence the whole Party and the C.C. in the direction you desire than by bringing personal influence to bear on the agents and members of the C.C. It strikes me that you are looking at things in the old parochial way, and not from the Party standpoint. The C.C. is elective, the congress is not far off, you have your rights, make use of them and bring all energetic, resolute supporters on to the same road: into the committees! Pressure must be brought to bear formally, through the committees, and not personally through talks with the agents. No one is obliged to be an agent if he wants to work in the committees!

You write that the agent Myamlin stated that *Iskra*'s Khlestakovian report is fair.[327] Very well. That is his right. But in *Letuchy Listok* No. 1, the C.C. stated that two-thirds of the Party is on our side. That means that Myamlin has hit out at himself! Your job is to curb the Myamlins and expose and discredit them through *your own* committee, and not through talks with them. The committees will elect people who appoint the Myamlins, but it is not the Myamlins who decide the fate of the Party. Let energetic people capture the committees: there you have a slogan for all, which I advise you to spread, to drum into people's heads and to implement.

The agent Myamlin stands for two central organs. Again: who will decide? The committees and their delegates to the fourth congress. Prepare one, two or more committees—there you have a rewarding and *practical* task. Suppose the Myamlins are victorious. The *committees* have the right to start their own organ of the press, even a single committee! That is why you err and drift into the old, pre-party point of view when you write: "They are printing Trotsky's leaflets" (there is nothing wrong in that if the leaflets are fairly

good and vetted. I advise the St. Petersburg Committee, too, to print his leaflets vetted, say, by you), or when you write: "A fall from grace *à la* Boris is imminent." I don't understand it. Suppose there are Borises. This junk is always plentiful. Suppose the Borises and Myamlins prove to have the majority (of the *committees*, don't forget that, of the *committees*). Then "all the preceding work is undone", you conclude. Why? How can *Proletary* become undone, what can cause its undoing? Even the absurdity of "two central organs" will not cause the undoing of *Proletary*, it will only introduce absurdity into the Rules. Life will only preserve *Proletary* and sweep away the absurdity. Even the Myamlins will not dare to close down *Proletary*. And finally, let us assume the worst of possible endings, in the vein of your pessimism: suppose the closing down does take place. I shall then ask: what is the St. Petersburg Committee for? Is it likely that *Proletary* will be weaker as the organ of the St. Petersburg Committee than as one of "two" central organs? Take immediate energetic measures to have the St. Petersburg Committee establish not formal, but business-like, close, permanent ties with *Proletary*, and you will strengthen your position and the impact of your ideas so much that you will defy a hundred Myamlins. The St. Petersburg Committee is a force three times as great as all the "agents" put together. Make *Proletary* the organ of the St. Petersburg Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee the thorough-going executor of the *ideas* and tactics of *Proletary*; there you have a *real* struggle against Myamlinism, and not a struggle by complaints and groaning. Hundreds of addresses can be found in St. Petersburg, and a host of opportunities for organising workers' correspondence, revitalising contacts, placing orders for leaflets, republishing articles from *Proletary* in leaflet form, retelling them in leaflets, re-writing them in the form of leaflets, etc., etc. Leaflets can and should deal also with general Party problems (the other day the Kostroma Committee sent us a resolution against Plekhanov being appointed to the International Bureau: a downright smack in the eye, and no mistake!). Myamlinism must be combated by *exemplary* organisation of committee agitation, by *militant leaflets to the Party* and not by wry complaints to the C.C.!

What article of mine in No. 5 (?) of *Zarya* (on Prokopovich) are you referring to?[328] I am puzzled. Why are you dissatisfied with Ruben? Put me in direct touch with him and Lalayants without fail.

All the very best. Write oftener and cheer up! The Myamlins be damned!

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

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151
TO S. I. GUSEV

To Nation from Lenin

September 20, 1905

Dear friend,

Thanks for letter No. 3. We may publish part of it.[329] You have made a start with the talks with the editorial board not merely on formal questions (on the Rules, contacts, addresses, and so on), not only on subjects for reportage (such and such events occurred), but on the subject of the *gist* of your views, your *understanding* of our tactics, and *how precisely you* put these tactics into effect in lectures, at meetings, etc. Such talks between practical workers in Russia and ourselves are *extremely valuable* to us, and I request you most earnestly to advocate, remind and insist everywhere that anyone who wants to consider the Central Organ *his own* C.O. (and every Party member should want that), should not restrict himself to formal answers or reports, but should *talk* with the editorial board about the views he is advocating, *talk not for publication*, but to create an ideological connection. To regard such talks as a mere pastime is to lapse into narrow-minded practicalism and leave to chance the entire principled, ideological aspect of all our practical work, all agitation, for without a clear, well-thought-out ideological content agitation degenerates into phrase-mongering. And to work out a clear ideological content it is not enough to be merely a contributor to the C.O., it requires also joint discussions about how the practical workers *understand* one or other proposition, how *they are putting into actual practice* particular views. Without this, the editorial board of the C.O. is left in the air, it will not know whether its advocacy is accepted, whether there is any response to it, how practical life modifies it, what amendments and additions are needed.

Without it, Social-Democrats will sink to a level where the writer scribbles and the reader reads from time to time. Consciousness of connection with the Party is still weak among us, it has to be strengthened by word and deed.

I shall try to make use of your example by publishing part of your letter. On the whole we are in agreement and see eye to eye with you (your ideas coincide with mine in *Two Tactics*). In particular, it seems to me that you are wrong in attacking the Mensheviks for the words "preparation of the *masses* for an uprising". If there is a mistake here, it is not a cardinal one.

All the very best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Odessa

First published in 1926

Printed from the original

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

I received your *Letuchy Listok* No. 2 for June 24, 1905, only today, October 3, 1905, new style. (It takes the "United Centre" *three* months to inform its members....)

The article: "Fundamentals of Party Organisation" is very good. I can imagine what it's like to have to chew over the ABC to the Mensheviks! But you have to. The writer of the article has made an excellent job of it. I am thinking of publishing it in *Proletary*.[330] It is late, of course, but better late than never.

This article has set me thinking that you can and should see to it that the C.C. is not mute but always articulate. The time is past for ideological leadership through "whisperings" in secret meeting places and rendezvous with agents! Leadership should be through political literature. *Rabochy* is not suitable for that, it has a different role to perform. You *must decidedly* issue a C.C. bulletin in a format not exceeding *two printed pages*, but you should issue it *twice a week*. It would contain a short article on a political, tactical or organisational subject, then brief, minor items of three lines each. Only (1) it must be printed, for the hectograph is now very bad (is there not some small equipment that operates *rapidly*?) and (2) it must be done punctually and frequently.

Your plan of converting *Rabochy* into a smaller weekly newspaper is not clear to me. In my opinion, a popular organ is one thing (I am not in favour of it, but the Congress decided on it, so that's that), and a *bulletin* of really guiding political articles of a general kind is another. You have three or four good contributors, so it would be as easy as anything to get two small articles every week, and the significance would be tremendous!

Written October 3, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

153

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

October 3, 1905

Dear friends,

I have received a pile of documents and listened to Delta's detailed story. I hasten to reply on all the points.

1) I shall not be able to come at the scheduled time, as there can be no question of my leaving the newspaper now.[331] Voinov is stuck in Italy. Orlovsky had to be sent away on business. There is no one to replace me. Therefore the thing is being postponed until Russian October, as arranged by you.

2) I repeat my most urgent request that you send a formal reply to the International Bureau. As to whether you are sending someone to the conference abroad. Exactly whom and when. As to whether you are appointing someone—also precisely. Otherwise you will discredit yourselves incredibly in the eyes of the International Bureau.

3) About Plekhanov, also formally and conclusively—yes or no. Who should be appointed? Postponement of this question is extremely dangerous.[332]

4) About legal publishing, make a formal decision quickly. My draft agreement with Malykh,[333] has done you no harm whatever, as it is only a draft. I merely repeat that Malykh provided a livelihood for lots of people here, whom the Party is unable to maintain. Do not forget that. I would advise both concluding an agreement with Malykh and continuing to do business with the others after the manner of Schmidt.

5) As regards opposition to the C.C. on the part of almost all the agents, I have the following to say. Firstly, co-opting Insarov and Lyubich, which I fully welcome, will probably

improve matters very much. Secondly, some of the agents are evidently exaggerating somewhat. Thirdly, would it not be advisable to put some of the agents on the committees with instructions to concern themselves with the whole area of two or three neighbouring committees? Unity of tactics should not be overestimated: a certain variety in the actions and plans of the committees will do no harm.

6) I consider it extremely important to start preparing for the fourth congress.[334] It is high time. It will probably be six months late at least, if not more. All the same, it is high time. I think we are a little to blame for the laxity among some of the committees and for allowing them to waive the decisions of the Third Congress concerning the conditions of admission for the Mensheviks. If these committees, which at one and the same time recognise and do not recognise the Third Congress, do not define their attitude to the fourth congress, there will be chaos Some of them will not attend the fourth congress. Another scandal. Some of them will attend it and desert to the other side at the congress. We should not confuse the policy of uniting the *two* parts with the *mixing-up* of both parts. We agree to uniting the two parts, but we shall never agree to mixing them up. We must demand of the committees a distinct division, then two congresses and amalgamation. Two congresses at the same time, in one place, and they will discuss and accept the drafts for amalgamation prepared beforehand.

But just now we must vigorously *oppose* any *mixing-up* of the two sections of the Party. I would advise giving the agents a watchword of this kind in the most definite form and instructing them to put it into effect.

If this is not done there will be an unholy mess. The Mensheviks have everything to gain by confusion and they will go out of their way to breed it. They won't be "any the worse for it" (since nothing can be worse than their disorganisation), whereas we value our organisation, embryonic though it is, and will defend it tooth and nail. It pays the Mensheviks to mix things up and make another scandal out of the fourth congress, for they are not even contemplating a congress *of their own*. We must direct all our efforts and all our thoughts towards cementing and

better organising *our* section of the Party. These tactics may seem "egoistic", but they are the only reasonable ones. If we are well united and organised, if we get rid of all the whiners and turncoats, then our hard core, even if not very large, will carry with it the whole mass of "organisational nebulosity". But if we have no such core, the Mensheviks, having disorganised themselves, will disorganise us as well. If we have a hard core, we shall soon force them into amalgamation with us. If we have no core, then it will not be the other core (it is non-existent) that will win the day, but the *muddleheads*, and then, I assure you, there will be fresh squabbles, a fresh, inevitable split and resentment a hundred times worse than before.

So let us prepare for real unification by increasing *our own* strength and working out *clear* drafts for standards of rules and tactics. And the people who chatter idly about unification, who *mix up* the relations between the sections of the Party, should, in my opinion, be ruthlessly removed from our midst.

All the best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926

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154

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

October 5, 1905

Dear friends,

I have just received Reinert's new letter. I have gone carefully into his proposal, talked it over with Delta and revised my negative reply in the letter of October 3, 1905.

I can return Orlovsky in a week's time. They could then, perhaps, manage without me somehow for a week or two. I would write a few articles in advance and do some writing during the journey. But your plan, nevertheless, seems to me highly irrational. According to the news now filling the foreign press, feeling in Finland is running very high. It is openly reported that a number of outbreaks are imminent and that an uprising is being prepared. Troops are being sent there in force. The coastal and naval police have been reinforced fourfold. After the *John Grafton* incident,[335] special attention is being paid to ships approaching the coasts. Arms have been discovered in many places and the search for them has been stepped up. It is considered within the bounds of possibility that clashes will be deliberately provoked to provide a pretext for using armed force.

To arrange a general meeting there under such circumstances means taking a quite unnecessary risk. It would be an absolutely desperate undertaking. A trifling accident (the likelihood of which in Finland now is particularly great) would be enough to wreck everything, both the C.C. and the C.O., for then everything here would go to pieces. We must face the facts: it would mean handing over the Party wholly to the Menshevik leaders to be torn to pieces. I am sure that when you have thought the matter over you will agree that we are not entitled to do that.

Please discuss whether the plan could not be altered in the following way. All of us to meet in Stockholm. Compared to the present plan this would mean for you some slight inconveniences and tremendous advantages. The inconveniences lie in the half-a-day's delay (counting from Abo, near which it is proposed to meet) or a maximum of one day each way. Two days in all, possibly even 4 days. That is a mere trifle. The advantages are greater safety. A total break-down would then be ruled out completely. That means we shall not in the slightest jeopardise the C.O. and the whole C.C.; we shall not be doing anything stupid or desperate. Some of you can travel quite legally; they cannot be arrested. The rest will obtain passports of other people or will travel without passports (Delta says it is easy for the Finns to arrange for crossing the frontier). In the event of an arrest being made, it would be, firstly, an isolated case and not wholesale break-down and, secondly, there would be absolutely no evidence, so that in the event of legal proceedings it would be impossible for the police to dig up anything serious. We are then guaranteed meeting for two to three days in complete safety, with all the documents available (I shall bring them with me and you will send yours by post, etc.), and with the possibility of drawing up any minutes, manifestos, etc., that we like. Finally, we would then try out whether I could travel to Stockholm more frequently, in order to work for you and for the leaflets, etc., from there (the Mensheviks, I believe, did something of the kind in the South).

Please discuss this plan carefully. If you approve, send me a telegram addressed: Kroupsky, 3, Rue David Dufour, Genève, signed Boleslav with just a number indicating the date when I ought to be in Stockholm (30=I should be there by September 30; 2 or 3=I should be there by October 2 or 3, and so on).

All the best.

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Russia

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TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

October 8, 1905

Dear friends,

I hasten to inform you of an important change that has taken place in regard to representation on the International Bureau. The South-Russian Conference of Mensheviks[336] adopted a resolution on this question in which (1) there is a gross lie about me personally. I am replying in No. 20 of *Proletary*,* which will come out the day after tomorrow; (2) they ask Plekhanov to represent *their section of the Party*.

This is exactly what we need! Plekhanov, of course, will accede to their request. His quasi-neutrality, which is so disastrous to us, will be shown up, and that is just what we wanted to prove. Let there be two representatives on the International Bureau: one from the Majority and one from the Minority. That will be the best thing. Moreover, if Plekhanov represents the Minority *that will be better still*. It is an excellent precedent for future unity. I earnestly request you: abandon now all thought of Plekhanov and appoint your own delegate from the Majority. Only then will our interests be fully taken care of. It would be good to appoint Orlovsky. He knows languages, he is a good speaker, and an impressive personality. Most contacts are by writing, almost all of them, and we, of course, would begin consultations. As a matter of fact, there would be nothing to consult about: I assure you from experience that this representation is *a mere formality*. At one time

* See "Representation of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau" (present edition, Vol. 9).—*Ed.*

Plekhanov often entrusted this representation to Koltsov, and no harm ever came of it, although Koltsov was no good at all as a "parliamentarian" and an impossible, clumsy lout in general.

All the best.

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1926

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156
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

October 11

Dear An. Vas.,

Your article deals with a subject that is extremely interesting and very timely.[337] Recently, in a leading article, *Leipziger Volkszeitung*[338] ridiculed the Zemstvo members for their September Congress, for "playing at a Constitution", for *already* posing as parliamentarians, etc., etc. The mistake of Parvus and Martov needs analysing from this aspect. But your article gives no analysis. I believe the article should be revised along one of two lines: either the weight of emphasis should be shifted to our new-Iskrists, who are "playing at parliamentarism", and you should demonstrate in detail the relative, temporary importance of parliamentarism, the futility of "parliamentary illusions" in an era of revolutionary struggle, etc., by explaining the whole thing from the beginning (for Russians this is very useful!) and introducing a bit of Hilferding,[339] just by way of illustration; or else you should take Hilferding as a basis—the article will then need less revision—give it a different heading, but describe more clearly Hilferding's method of presenting the question. Of course, you may find another plan of revision, but please set to work on it at once, without fail. You have time for it, since the article could not go into this issue (the Moscow events[340] + the old material have taken up all the space). So, the deadline is Tuesday, October 17. Please make it a comprehensive article and send it by October 17. It would be better to revise it along the first lines, it may then turn out to be an editorial!

If we already had a parliament, we would certainly support the Cadets,[341] Milyukov and Co. contra *Moskov-*

skiye Vedomosti. For example, when balloting, etc. Such action there would not in the slightest degree violate the independence of the class party of Social-Democracy. But in an era not of parliament, but of revolution (you make the distinction in the very heading), support for people *who are incapable of fighting in a revolutionary way* is 1) violation of the independence of our Party. The deal cannot be clear and above-board. It is precisely the "sale" of our right to revolution, as you say, and not the *use* of our right for the purpose of support. In a parliament we give support without in any way disappearing. Now we are disappearing by *obliging* the Milyukovs to speak *for us* on definite terms. Further, what is most important 2) such support is betrayal of the revolution. There is no parliament as yet, it is only an *illusion* of the Milyukovs. We must fight in a revolutionary way *for* a parliament, but not in a parliamentary way for a revolution; we must fight in a revolutionary way for a *strong* parliament, and not in an *impotent* "parliament" for a revolution. In Russia now, *without* the victory of the revolution, *all victories* in "parliament" (the Duma or the like) are *nothing*, worse than nothing, for they blind the eyes by a *fiction*. Parvus has not understood this.

The Cadets have already become *regierungsfähig** (the Trubetskois and Manuilovs in the role of rectors, etc.), they have already climbed to the second storey of freedom of assembly (at the price of debasing assemblies), the storey of quasi-parliamentarism. All they need is that the proletariat, while remaining *actually in the basement*, should imagine itself on the second storey, should fancy itself a parliamentary force and agree to "conditions" about "support" and so on. That is a rich theme! We now are strong owing to the revolutionary struggle of the people and weak in a quasi-parliamentary respect. *With the Cadets it is just the reverse.* They calculate on dragging us into quasi-parliamentarism. *Iskra* has allowed itself to be fooled. It is on this point that a *detailed* analysis of the relation of "'parliamentarism' to revolution" would be appropriate (cf. Marx on the class struggles in France in 1848).[342]

* Fit to govern.—*Ed.*

These ideas outlined by you (I am stating them, of course, in a very general and inexact way) must be amplified, mulled over, and served up. People in Russia are now badly in need of having the relation between parliamentarism and revolution explained to them from the very beginning. But Martov and Co. go into hysterics and scream: if only we would become legal! If only we would act openly! It doesn't matter how, so long as it's legal! It is now of all times that we need steadfastness, the continuation of the revolution, struggle against a wretched semi-legality. *Iskra* has failed to understand this. Like all opportunists, they do not believe in the energy and stubbornness of the workers' revolutionary struggle. Moscow is a lesson to them. And here we have that vulgarian Parvus applying to Russia the tactics of petty deals!

Did you receive my letter? All the very best to you and to An. Al.

Yours,
Lenin

Written October 11, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Florence
First published in 1931

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157
TO S. I. GUSEV

To Nation from Lenin

October 13, 1905

Dear friend,

The resolution of the Odessa Committee on the trade union struggle ("decisions" No. 6 or 5—it is not clear; in letter No. 24. It is dated September 1905) seems to me highly erroneous. The excitement of the struggle against the Mensheviks naturally explains this, but one must not fall into the other extreme. And that is just what this resolution does. I venture, therefore, to make a critical analysis of the Odessa Committee's resolution, and would ask the comrades to discuss my remarks, which are in no way due to a desire to find fault.

The resolution is in three (unnumbered) parts in the preamble, and five (numbered) parts in the resolution proper. The first part (the opening paragraph of the preamble) is quite good: to undertake "leadership of *all* manifestations of the class struggle of the proletariat" and "never to forget the task" of leading the trade union struggle. Splendid. Further, the second point, that the task of preparing for an armed uprising comes "into the forefront", and (the third or final point of the preamble) "in consequence of this the task of leading the trade union struggle of the proletariat inevitably recedes into the background". This, in my opinion, is wrong theoretically and incorrect from the point of view of tactics.

It is wrong theoretically to equate the *two tasks* as if they were on the same level: "the task of preparing for an armed uprising" and "the task of leading the trade union struggle". The one task is said to be in the forefront, the

other in the background. To speak like that means comparing and contrasting things of a different order. The armed uprising is a method of political struggle at a given moment. The trade union struggle is one of the constant forms of the whole workers' movement, one always needed under capitalism and essential at all times. In a passage quoted by me in *What Is To Be Done?*[343] Engels distinguishes three basic forms of the proletarian struggle: economic, political, and theoretical—that is to say, trade union, political, and theoretical (scientific, ideological, and philosophical). How can one of these basic forms of struggle (the trade union form) be put on a level with a *method* of another basic form of struggle at a given moment? How can the whole trade union struggle, as a "task", be put on a level with the present *and by far not the only* method of political struggle? These are incommensurable things, something like adding tenths to hundredths without reducing them to a common denominator. In my opinion, both these points (the second and third) of the preamble should be deleted. Alongside "the task of leading the trade union struggle" can be put only the task of leading the general political struggle as a whole, the task of waging the general ideological struggle as a whole, and not some particular, given, modern tasks of the political or ideological struggle. In place of these two points mention should be made of the necessity of never for a moment forgetting the political struggle, the education of the working class in all the fullness of Social-Democratic ideas, and the need to achieve a close, indissoluble connection between all manifestations of the workers' movement for creating an integral, truly Social-Democratic movement. This indication could be the second point of the preamble. The third could mention the necessity of warning against the narrow conception and narrow formulation of the trade union struggle, which are zealously disseminated by the bourgeoisie. I am not, of course, putting forward a draft for the resolution, I am not touching on the question whether it is worth while making special mention of this; for the time being I am merely examining what expression of your thought would be theoretically correct.

Tactically, the resolution in its present form puts the case

for an armed uprising rather lamely. An armed uprising is the highest method of *political* struggle. Its success from the point of view of the proletariat, i.e., the success of a proletarian uprising under Social-Democratic leadership, and not of any other kind of uprising, requires extensive development of all aspects of the workers' movement. Hence the idea of contraposing the task of an uprising to the task of leading the trade union struggle is supremely incorrect. In this way the task of the uprising is played down, belittled. Instead of summing up and crowning the *entire* workers' movement as a whole, the result is that the task of the uprising is dealt with as a thing apart. Two things are, as it were, mixed up: a resolution on the trade union struggle in general (this is the *subject* of the Odessa Committee's resolution), and a resolution on the disposition of forces in the present work of the Odessa Committee (your resolution goes off on this tack, but that's quite another pair of shoes).

I pass on to the numbered points of the part comprising the resolution proper.

Ad I. "To expose the illusions" "which are bound up with the trade unions" ... this is more or less passable, although it were best deleted. Firstly, it belongs to the preamble, where the inseparable connection of all aspects of the movement should be pointed out. Secondly, the nature of the illusions is not stated. If this is to be inserted at all, there should be added: bourgeois illusions as to the possibility of meeting the economic and other needs of the working class in capitalist society.

..."strongly emphasising their [the unions's] narrowness compared with the ultimate aims of the workers' movement". It follows that all trade unions are "narrow". What about *Social-Democratic* trade unions which are linked with the political organisation of the proletariat? The crux of the matter is not that trade unions are "narrow", but that this one aspect (and narrow just because it is one aspect) should be bound up with others. Consequently, these words should either be thrown out or further mention should be made of the need to establish and strengthen the *connection* between one aspect and all the others, the need to imbue the trade unions with *Social-Democratic*

content, *Social-Democratic* propaganda, and to draw them into *all* Social-Democratic work, etc.

Ad II. All right.

Ad III. For the reasons stated, it is incorrect to compare the task of the trade unions with the "most urgent and primary task" of an armed uprising. There is no need to speak of the armed uprising in a resolution on the trade union struggle, for the former is a means for the "overthrow of the tsarist autocracy" which is mentioned in point II. The trade unions could broaden the basis from which we shall draw strength for an uprising, so that, I say once again, it is erroneous to contrapose one to the other.

Ad IV. "To wage a vigorous ideological struggle against the so-called Minority", which is reverting to "Economism" "in problems of the trade unions". Isn't this too general for a resolution of the Odessa Committee? Doesn't it seem an exaggeration? After all, there has been no criticism in the press of any resolution of the Mensheviks on the "trade unions". It has merely been pointed out that the liberals praise them for a tendency to fall over backwards in their zeal on this question. The only [inference] to be drawn from this is that we too must show zeal, without however "falling over backwards" in the attempt. I think this point should either be deleted altogether, leaving only a warning against narrowness and mentioning the struggle against the tendencies of the bourgeoisie and liberals to distort the tasks of the trade unions, or it should be formulated specially in connection with some particular resolution of the Mensheviks (I do not know of such resolutions at the present time, unless some kind of Akim resolutions appeared among you in the South).

Ad V. Now this is the real thing. The words "and, if possible, leadership" I would replace by "and leadership". We do everything "if possible". The insertion of these words here of all places may be misinterpreted in the sense that we strive less for leadership, etc.

Generally speaking I think we should be careful not to exaggerate the struggle against the Mensheviks on this issue. This is probably just the time when trade unions will soon begin to spring up. We must not stand aloof, and above all not give any occasion for thinking that we

ought to stand aloof, but endeavour to take part, to influence, etc. For there is a special section of workers, elderly family men, who will make very little contribution to the political struggle at present, but very much to the trade union struggle. We must make use of this section, merely guiding their steps in this field. It is important that at the very outset Russian Social-Democrats should strike the right note in regard to the trade unions, and at once create a tradition of Social-Democratic initiative in this matter, of Social-Democratic participation, of Social-Democratic leadership. In practice, of course, there may not be enough forces, but that is quite another question; even so, given an ability to make use of all the available forces, some will always be found for the trade unions as well. Forces have been found for writing a resolution on the trade unions, i.e., for ideological guidance, and that's the crux of the matter!

I wish you all the best and ask you to drop me a line about receipt of this letter and about your thoughts in connection with it.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Odessa
First published in 1926

Printed from the original

158
TO MARIA ESSEN

October 26, 1905

Dear Beastie,

I received your long letter a few days ago. Many thanks We get very little news from St. Petersburg, and few leaflets of any kind. Please do not abandon your intention to send us absolutely all news of every kind as well as correspondence.

As regards Party affairs, it seems to me that your pessimism is a bit exaggerated. I judge by things over here. I continually hear from the "periphery" that *Proletary* is obviously on the decline, that things are going from bad to worse, that the newspaper is running to seed and so on and so forth. But things are not as bad as they seem. With the gigantic movement that there is now, no single C.C. in the world, under conditions where the Party is illegal could satisfy a thousandth part of the demands made on it. That our slogans, the slogans of *Proletary*, are not just a voice crying in the wilderness, can be clearly seen even from the legal newspapers, which report meetings of 10,000-15,000 in the University, etc. My word, our revolution in Russia is a fine one! We hope to return there soon—things are heading that way with remarkable speed.

We shall certainly arrange a meeting with the C.C. This question is already settled and everything has been arranged.

As regards differences of opinion, you seem to be exaggerating too. I see no disagreements here between *Proletary* and the C.C. Timing the uprising? Who would undertake to fix it? Personally, I would willingly postpone it until the spring, and until the Manchurian army comes home; I am inclined to think that in general it will be to our advantage to postpone it. But, then, nobody asks us, anyway. Take the present tremendous strike.

That the C.C. is focussing its attention on leadership through the press is, in my opinion, the right tactics. I only wish that in addition to *Rabochy*, which is very useful at the present time, we had *agitational* bulletins, small ones of two, or a maximum of four, pages, lively, frequent, issued at least once a week, and sometimes twice. With the present gigantic, incredible growth of the movement, the Party can be led only through the press. And we must produce lively, mobile, speedy, brief leaflet-bulletins, giving the main slogans and the results of the main events.

Concerning stoppage of the Central Organ, there is a misunderstanding here. They were afraid of the whole business going bankrupt, but had no intention of suppressing the C.O. Generally speaking the importance of the foreign-based section of the Party is now diminishing *hour by hour*, and this is unavoidable. We shall not abandon *Proletary*, of course, under any circumstances, until we can get it published in Nevsky Prospekt in St. Petersburg. But we must now pay a great deal of attention to a legal newspaper as well. We here abroad already have to put the shutters up (propagandist literature), and we shall soon close down altogether and open up in St. Petersburg.

In preparing for the uprising, I would advise at once carrying out extensive propaganda everywhere for the organisation of a *large number*, hundreds and thousands, of *autonomous* combat squads, very small ones (from *three* persons upwards), which would arm themselves as best they can and prepare themselves in every way. The time of the uprising, I repeat, I would *willingly postpone* until the spring, but it is difficult, of course, for me to judge from a distance.

All the very best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1926

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159

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the C. C.

Please write to me immediately whether you authorise me to invite Plekhanov on to our broad Editorial Committee (the 7-man one) and the editorial board of *Novaya Zhizn*.[344] Wire (signature—Boleslav. Address—Krupskaya): yes or no. I shall make another attempt at a rapproachement with him, although there is not much hope.

Written October 27, 1905
Sent from Geneva to
St. Petersburg

First published in 1926 Printed from the original

160
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

Dear Georgi Valentinovich,

I am writing this letter to you because I am convinced that the need for Social-Democratic unity is a question that can no longer be put off, and the possibility for it is now greater than ever. Two reasons prevent me from further postponing a direct approach to you: 1) the founding of a legal Social-Democratic newspaper, *Novaya Zhizn*, in St. Petersburg, and 2) the events of the last few days.[345] Even if these events do not lead to our returning to Russia very soon, at any rate this return is now very, very near, and the Social-Democratic newspaper provides an immediate basis for the most serious joint work.

That we Bolsheviks earnestly desire to work together with you is something I need hardly repeat to you. I have written to St. Petersburg asking all the editors of the new newspaper (at present there are seven of them: Bogdanov, Rumyantsev, Bazarov, Lunacharsky, Orlovsky, Olminsky and myself) to send you a joint and official request to join the editorial board. But events will not wait, postal communication is interrupted, and I do not think I am justified in postponing an essential step for what is really a mere formality. In fact, I am absolutely sure of general agreement and joy on account of this proposal. I am very well aware that all Bolsheviks have always regarded disagreement with you as something temporary, due to exceptional circumstances. It goes without saying, the struggle often involved us in steps, statements and actions which were bound to make future unity more difficult, but there has always been a *readiness* on our part to unite, a consciousness of he *extreme abnormality* of the best force among Russian

Social-Democrats standing aloof from the work, a consciousness of the entire movement's *extreme need* of your guiding, close and immediate participation. And we all firmly believe that if not today, then tomorrow, and if not tomorrow, then the day after, our union with you will come about despite all difficulties and obstacles.

But it would be better if it were today rather than tomorrow. Things have now taken such a turn that *we may be too late*, and we intend to exert every effort not to be late.

Would you care to work together with us? I should be extremely glad if you would agree to meet me and talk this over. I am confident that a personal meeting would remove many misunderstandings, and many seeming difficulties in the way of unity would vanish at once. But should you not agree in general, or not agree just now, I venture to take the liberty of touching on some of these difficulties in advance.

These difficulties are: 1) Your disagreements with many members of the new editorial board. 2) Your disinclination to join either of the two halves of the Social-Democratic Party.—The first difficulty, I think, is wholly removable. We are in agreement with you on approximately nine-tenths of the questions of theory and tactics, and to quarrel over one-tenth is not worth while. You wanted, and still want, to correct some assertions, which you regard as erroneous, in my writings. But nowhere at any time have I gone out of my way specially to impose my views on any Social-Democrat, and none, positively none, of the new editors has entered into an engagement to be "Leninist". Barsov's speech at the Third Congress was an expression of the general view in this respect. You consider that the philosophical views of three of the seven persons mentioned are erroneous.[346] But these three, too, have not attempted, and are not attempting, to link these views of theirs with any official Party matter. And these three—I am not speaking at random but on the basis of precise knowledge of the facts—would be extremely glad to work jointly with you. For you and us to part company politically now, at a time when your general sympathy with the views of the Majority is known, among other things, from your lecture, is evi-

dent from your latest writings, and is evident indirectly from the position adopted by Parvus, who is perhaps most in agreement with you—to part company politically now would be extremely undesirable, extremely inopportune, and extremely harmful for the Social-Democratic movement.

And a new legal newspaper, which will have an audience of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of workers—indeed, all the coming work in Russia at a time when your immense knowledge and vast political experience are terribly needed by the Russian proletariat—all this will provide *new ground*, on which it will be so much easier to forget the past and work together on a real live job. To pass from work in Geneva to work in St. Petersburg is a transition that is exceptionally favourable, psychologically and from the Party standpoint, for going over from disunity to unity, and I very much hope that we shall not miss such an opportunity, which has not occurred since the Second Congress and which, probably, will not occur again so soon.

Here, however, is the second difficulty. Perhaps you do not want unity with one half of the Party. You will demand unity of the whole Party as a *conditio sine qua non* for your participation in the work. You are quite right in holding that such unity is desirable and necessary. But is it possible *at present*? You yourself are inclined to answer this in the negative, for not long ago you were proposing a federation. *Today* the broadest tribune for our influence on the proletariat is a *daily* newspaper in St. Petersburg (we shall be in a position to issue it in an edition of 100,000 copies and bring the price down to one kopek). Is a joint editorial board with the Mensheviks conceivable *at present*? We think it is not. And so do the Mensheviks. And so do you, judging from your proposal for a federation. Are three newspapers really necessary? Cannot we get together for a *political* organ of revolutionary Social-Democracy when there are really no organisational disagreements between us, and the Party's coming out into the open tomorrow will dispel all lingering fears about conspiracy. And the revolution itself will sweep away our tactical differences with astonishing speed; besides, you have not expressed any disagreement with the *resolutions* of the Third Congress;

and these *resolutions*, after all, are the sole Party directive that unites all of us Bolsheviks.

It seems to me that under such circumstances your coming over to us is fully possible, and it will not make future unity more difficult, but will rather facilitate and accelerate it. Instead of the present struggle, which is being protracted owing to your standing aloof, the revolutionary Social-Democratic movement as a whole will be in a stronger position. The struggle, too, will gain by it by becoming steadier, more disciplined. The general body of Social-Democrats will at once feel confident, hopeful—a different atmosphere will immediately be created, and the new newspaper, hour by hour, will win for itself a leading position in the Social-Democratic movement, without looking backwards, without going into details of the past, but only firmly and steadfastly leading the working class in the present arena of struggle.

I conclude by once again asking you to agree to meet me and by expressing the general confidence of us Bolsheviks in the usefulness, importance and necessity of working jointly with you.

Sincerely yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written at the end of October 1905
in Geneva (local mail)

First published in 1926

Printed from the original

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TO MOTYA AND KOSTYA,* MEMBERS OF THE ODESSA ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (MAJORITY)

To Motya and Kostya, Members of the Majority of the Odessa organisation

Dear Comrades,

I have received your "Letter to the Comrades". I shall not publish it—indeed you do not ask me to do so. But I consider it my duty to reply to you. I have more than once stated in print what I am repeating to you now. It is useless to complain and mourn over the split. We must *work hard* to do away with it, we must think *how* to unite, and not indulge in platitudes and lamentation. Complaining about the struggle of *two* parties and creating a *third*, and a *secret* one at that, as you have done, hiding yourselves from both organisations—means *intensifying* the split. If you have been expelled for violating the rules of the organisation, it serves you right, and it's no use trying to muddle things by making out that you were expelled for your opinions, for your conciliatory attitude, and not because of your disruptive activities.

An "inaugural congress" is an empty *phrase*. Just think a *bit*, the tiniest *little bit*, what groups precisely should send their delegates, and how many from each? Just think a tiny bit how you would react to the idea of an inaugural meeting *without* a basis of voting rights. Would you not call it charlatanry?

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* The bearers of these pseudonyms have not been identified.—*Ed.*

Why do you say nothing about the idea of *two* congresses, that of the Majority and the Minority, held at the same time and in the same place? This idea was put forward by the C.C. and by *Proletary*.[347] Would it not be easier to hold two congresses from the *existing* two parties than to start by creating a *third* (on which you will waste *months*, if not years) and then to convene *three* congresses? What idiot is going to submit to an "inaugural congress" without knowing beforehand whether the Social-Democrats will really be represented there, which of them exactly, and in what proportions?

The slogan of "two congresses" has in its favour 1) the assent of one party of the two; 2) full readiness for a congress on the part of the Majority and the fact that *its* standards for convocation and the *rights* of its congress were made known; 3) the possibility of achieving the same thing very rapidly in the groups and organisations of the *other* party: by publicly listing all groups, getting their opinions, and publishing draft rules of the congress.

But all that your slogan of an "inaugural congress" has in its favour is the whining of certain whimperers, for *not a single section* of the Party knows the *basis* of this congress in any respect whatever. You are simply people of little faith and weak nerves. The sight of an unclean disease and ugly pimples has made you turn away. This is understandable, humanly speaking, but irrational. We think that one must not turn away, that a third party will not get us anywhere, whereas the two existing ones will unite after all, albeit not at once and not without painful treatment.

Written at the end of October-
beginning of November 1905
Sent from Geneva to Odessa

First published in 1931 Printed from the original

1907

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TO MAXIM GORKY

Wednesday, August 14, 1907

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

We arrived here today with Meshkovsky and tomorrow we are going to Stuttgart.[348] It is very, very important that you, too, should be there.[349] For one thing, you were appointed officially by the C.C. (with a consultative voice). Secondly, it would be very good to see you, as it may be a long time before we meet. Thirdly, it is only a matter of a day's journey from where you are and it will last *not more than* a week (it is not London!). It will not be at all late if you leave on Sunday or even Monday.

In short, everything is in favour of your coming. I wish you would, health permitting. Don't miss this opportunity of seeing the international socialists *at work*—it is something quite, quite different from a general acquaintance and mere chatting. The next congress will not be held for another three years. Besides, we shall never be able to discuss all our business by mail unless we meet. In short, come without fail. *Au revoir!*

My best regards to Maria Fyodorovna.[350]

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent to the Isle of Capri (Italy)
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

163
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Dear An. Vas.,

I have received your pamphlet at last—the first part arrived quite a long time ago.[351] I kept waiting for the end so as to read it as a whole, but I waited in vain. So far the third supplement is still missing ("How Marx Regarded", etc.). This is most unfortunate for, not having the complete manuscript, one is afraid of giving it to the press to be set up. If this third supplement has not been sent yet, please try to send it as quickly as possible. The money (200 rubles) has been sent to you; did you receive it?

As regards the content of your pamphlet, I liked it very much, as did all our people here. A most interesting pamphlet and excellently written. The only thing is, there are many unguarded statements, so to speak—I mean the kind of things which various S.R.s, Mensheviks, syndicalists, etc., will *pick on*. We discussed collectively whether we should touch it up or give an explanation in the preface. We decided on the latter course, as it would be a pity to touch it up; it would impair the integral character of the exposition.

The conscientious and attentive reader will be able to understand you correctly, of course; nevertheless, you should *specially guard yourself* against false interpreters, whose name is legion. For example, we must of course criticise Bebel, and I do not approve of Trotsky, who recently sent us a hymn of praise to Essen and German Social-Democracy in general. You are right in pointing out that in Essen Bebel was wrong both on the question of militarism and on the question of colonial policy (or rather on

the character of the radicals' fight at Stuttgart on this subject).[352] But it should be mentioned in this connection that these are the mistakes of a person with whom we are going the same way, and which can only be rectified in this, Marxist, Social-Democratic way. For there are many people among us (you probably do not see their press) who maliciously chuckle over Bebel *for the sake of glorifying* Socialist-Revolutionarism, syndicalism (*à la* Yezersky, Kozlovsky, Krichevsky—see *Obrazovaniye*, etc.) and anarchism.

In my opinion, *all* your ideas can and should always be set forth in such a way that criticism will be aimed not at orthodoxy, not at the Germans in general, but at *opportunism*. Then it will be *impossible* to misinterpret you. Then the conclusion will be clear, namely, that Bolshevism, taking a lesson from the Germans and profiting by their experience (this demand of yours is a thousand times correct!), will take *all that is vital* from syndicalism *in order to kill Russian syndicalism and opportunism*. To do this is easier and more natural for us Bolsheviks than for anyone else, for in the revolution we have always fought against parliamentary cretinism and Plekhanovite opportunism. And it is we alone who, from the revolutionary and not from the pedantic Cadet standpoint of Plekhanov and Co., can refute syndicalism, which produces no end of confusion (particularly dangerous confusion in the case of Russia).

Proletary No. 17 has come out and has been sent to you, and so has *Zarnitsy*.[353] Have you received them? Do you read *Tovarishch*? How do you like it now? What about your remembering old times and poking fun at them in verse? Write please.

All the very best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Written between November 2 and 11, 1907
Sent from Kuokkala (Finland) to Italy

First published in 1934

Printed from the original

1908

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TO MAXIM GORKY

January 9, 1908, Geneva

Dear Al. M.,

My wife and I arrived here a few days ago. We both caught cold on the way. We are settling down here just anyhow, for the time being temporarily, so everything is bad. I was very glad to have your letter: it would really be fine to make a trip to Capri! I shall definitely find time one of these days to visit you. At present, unfortunately, it is impossible. We have come here with the commission to establish a newspaper: to transfer *Proletary* here from Finland. We haven't decided yet finally whether we shall choose Geneva or some other city. In any case we must hurry and we have our hands full with the new arrangements. It would be nice to pay you a visit in the spring or summer, when things here are well under way! What is the best time for Capri?

How is your health? How do you feel? Does your work go well? I heard while passing through Berlin that you and Lunacharsky have been touring Italy and, in particular, have been in Rome.[354] Do you like Italy? Do you meet many Russians?

It would be best for me to visit you when you are not engaged on anything big, so that we can wander about at leisure and chat together.

Have you received my book (the first volume of collected articles for twelve years)[355]? I asked for it to be sent to you from St. Petersburg.

My very best regards to Maria Fyodorovna. *Au revoir!*

Yours,

N. Lenin

My address is: Mr. Wl. Oulianoff,
17, Rue des deux Ponts, 17, (chez Küpfer), Genève.

Sent to the Isle of Capri (Italy)
First published in 1924 Printed from the original

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TO MAXIM GORKY AND MARIA ANDREYEVA

January 15, 1908

Dear A. M. and M. F.,

I received your express letter today. The idea of dropping in on you on Capri is delightfully tempting, dash it! You have painted such an attractive picture that I have definitely made up my mind to come out, and I shall try to bring my wife with me. Only I am still uncertain about the date; at present I must give all my attention to *Proletary*, it must be *established* and work got going smoothly at all costs. That will take a month or two at least. But it must be done. By the spring we shall find ourselves drinking the white wine of Capri, looking at Naples and chatting with you. Incidentally, I have begun to study Italian and, as a learner, I pounced at once on the address written by Maria Fyodorovna: *expresso* instead of *espresso*! Let's have that dictionary!

As for the shipment of *Proletary*, you have brought it on your own head by writing. You won't be able to wriggle away from us now so easily! A heap of commissions have to be given straight away to M. F.:

1) To find the secretary of the union of steamship employees (there must be such a union!) serving on steamers that maintain communications with Russia.

2) To find out from him where the ships *come from* and *go to*, and *how often*. He must arrange *weekly shipments* for us without fail. How much will that cost? He must find someone for us who is *punctual* (are there punctual men among the Italians?). Will they want an address in Russia (in Odessa, say, for delivering the newspapers) or could small quantities be kept *temporarily* with some Italian innkeeper in Odessa? This is *extremely important* for us.

3) If M. F. cannot take care of this herself—making all the arrangements, finding the necessary people, instructing them, checking, etc., let her be sure to put us in touch with this secretary—we shall then write to him directly.

This thing is urgent. In two or three weeks' time we hope to publish *Proletary* here and it will have to be dispatched at once.[356]

Well—until we meet on Capri! Now, A. M., take care of yourself.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to
the Isle of Capri (Italy)

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Printed from the original

166
TO THEODORE ROTHSTEIN[357]

January 29, 1908

Dear Comrade,

About two-and-a-half to three months ago in Finland I received your letter with the reminder about the debt, which I handed over to the C.C.[358] Now the "Finnish smash-up" has compelled me to move to Geneva, involving considerable time and trouble. Today one of the comrades here has told me that you are insistently reminding about the debt and that the Englishman is even threatening publication in the press (!), etc.

I shall immediately write again to Russia to say that the debt must be repaid. But, you know, it is *extremely* difficult to do this now! The Finnish smash-up, the arrests of many comrades, the seizure of papers, the need to remove printing-presses and to send many comrades abroad all this has entailed *heavy* and unforeseen expenditure. The Party's financial plight is all the more unfortunate because during two years everyone has grown out of the habit of working illegally and has been "spoilt" by legal or semi-legal activities. Secret organisations have had to be organised almost afresh. This is costing a mint of money. And all the intellectualist, philistine elements are abandoning the Party; the exodus of the intelligentsia is enormous. Those remaining are pure proletarians who have no opportunity of making open collections.

It should be explained to the Englishman and brought home to him that the conditions at the time of the Second Duma when the loan was made were quite different, that the Party will, of course, pay its debts, but it is impossible, inconceivable to demand this just *now*, that it would be usury, and so on.

We must convince the Englishman. It is hardly likely he will be able to get the money. And making a row will lead him nowhere.

If I am not mistaken, the members of the *factions* signed separately and the responsibility is by *factions* too.

All the best.

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. Not knowing your address, I have written to Quelch, asking him to obtain some literature. *I am extremely grateful to him*; I'm afraid he can't always make out my terrible English!

My address is: Vl. Oulianoff, 17, Rue des deux Ponts, Genève.

Sent from Geneva to London

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

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TO MAXIM GORKY

February 2, 1908

Dear A. M.,

I am writing to you about two matters.

Firstly, about the Semashko affair. If you do *not* know him personally, it is not worth while your intervening in the matter described below. If you do know him, it is worth while.

L. Martov made a "statement" in the Berne Social-Democratic newspaper to the effect that Semashko was not a delegate at the Stuttgart Congress but merely a *journalist*. Not a word about his being a member of the Social-Democratic Party. This is a vile attack by a Menshevik on a Bolshevik who is in prison. I have already sent my official statement as the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Bureau.[359] If you know Semashko personally, or knew him in Nizhni-Novgorod, you should write *without fail* to the same newspaper saying that you are shocked at Martov's statement, that you are personally acquainted with Semashko as a Social-Democrat, and that you are sure that he is not implicated in the affairs inflated by the international police. I am quoting below the newspaper's address and the full text of Martov's statement, which M. F. will translate for you. Write to the editors yourself in Russian, and ask M. F. to append a German translation.

The second matter. All three of us have come together here now, having been sent from Russia to establish *Proletary* (Bogdanov, I and one "Praktik"). Everything is in running order, in a day or two we shall publish an announcement.[360] You are on our list of contributors. Drop us a line

as to whether you could give us something for the first issues (something after the manner of your "*notes on philistinism*" in *Novaya Zhizn*, or fragments from a story you are writing[361], etc.).

All the very best. Best regards to M. F.!

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

The following was published in *Berner Tagwacht*[362] (address of the editorial office: Kapellenstrasse 6, Bern. Social-Democratic organ) No. 24, January 30, 1908.

"*Erklärung*. In einigen Zeitungen stand zu lesen, dass der unlängst in Genf verhaftete D-r Simaschko ein Delegierter der Genfer Gruppe der russischen Sozialdemokratie in Stuttgart gewesen sei. Dem gegenüber erkläre ich, dass D-r Simaschko nicht Mitglied der russischen Section auf dem genannten Kongresse war und kein Delegiertenmandat besessen hat. Er war dort nur als Journalist tätig.

"L. Martoff, Delegierter der russischen Sozialdemokratie auf dem Stuttgarter Kongress."*

That's all. The disgusting thing about it is that Social-Democracy indirectly, as it were, shakes the dust off its feet, and repudiates Semashko!

Sent from Geneva to the
Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924 Printed from the original

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* *Statement*. Some newspapers reported that Dr. Semashko, recently arrested in Geneva, was a delegate in Stuttgart of the Russian Social-Democratic group in Geneva. In contradiction to this, I declare that Dr. Semashko was not a member of the Russian section at the said Congress and had no delegate's mandate. He was there only in the capacity of journalist.

"*L. Martoff*, delegate of Russian Social-Democracy at the Stuttgart Congress."—*Ed*.

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TO MAXIM GORKY

February 7, 1908

Dear A. M.,

I shall consult A. A. about your statement; since you did not know him personally I think it is not worth while publishing it.[363]

To what Bolshevik symposium have you sent the article on cynicism? I am puzzled, because people write to me a good deal about Bolshevik symposia, but I have never heard of this one. I hope it is to the St. Petersburg one.[364] Send me a copy of your letter to Sienkiewicz, if you have one (indicating *when* it was sent)—but Sienkiewicz will no doubt publish it since it is an opinion poll.[365]

Your plans are very interesting and I should like to come. But, you will agree, I cannot very well throw up the Party job, which needs organising immediately.[366] It is difficult to get a new job going. I can't throw it up. We shall have it going in about a couple of months or so, and then I shall be free to tear myself away for a week or two.

I agree with you a thousand times about the need for *systematically* combating political decadence, renegadism, whining, and so forth. I do not think that there would be any disagreement between us about "society" and the "youth". The significance of the intellectuals in our Party is declining; news comes from all sides that the intelligentsia is *fleeing* the Party. And a good riddance to these scoundrels. The Party is purging itself from petty-bourgeois dross. The workers are having a bigger say in things. The role of the worker-professionals is increasing. All this is wonderful, and I am sure that your "kicks" must be understood in the same sense.

Now—how are we to exert influence, what exactly should our literature be? Symposia *or Proletary*? Of course, the easier thing is to reply: not *or*, but *and*—the reply will be irreproachable but of little practical value. We must have legal symposia, of course; our comrades in St. Petersburg are working on them by the sweat of the brow, and I, too, have been working on them after London, while sitting in Kwakalla.[367] If possible, *all* efforts should be made to support them and continue these symposia.[368]

But my experience from London up to November 1907 (half a year!) has convinced me that no *systematic* legal literature can now be produced. I am convinced that what the *Party* now needs is a regular political organ, consistently and vigorously pursuing a policy of struggle against disintegration and despondency—a *Party* organ, a political newspaper. Many people in Russia do not believe in a foreign-based organ. But this is an error, and our collegium knew what it was doing when it decided to transfer *Proletary* here. That it is difficult to organise, set it up and run it—goes without saying. But it *has* to be done and it will be done.

Why shouldn't literary criticism be included in it? Too little space? I don't know, of course, your system of working. Unfortunately, when we have met, we spent more time chattering than talking business. If you don't like writing small, short, periodical (weekly or fortnightly) articles, if you prefer to work on *big* things—then, of course, I would not advise you to interrupt it. It will be of greater benefit!

If, however, you are inclined towards joint work in a political newspaper—why not continue and make a regular feature of the genre which you began with "Notes on Philistinism " in *Novaya Zhizn*, and began very well, in my opinion? I wrote to you about this "with an ulterior motive" in one of the first letters, thinking: if it appeals to him, he will seize on the idea. And it seems to me that in your last letter you are seizing on it after a fashion. Or am I mistaken? How great would be the gain, both for Party work through the newspaper, which would not be so one-sided as it previously was, and for literary work, which would be more closely linked with Party work,

with systematic, continuous influence on the Party! There should be not "forays", but a solid onslaught all along the line, without stops or gaps; Bolshevik Social-Democrats should not only attack all kinds of duffers piecemeal, but should conquer all and everything as the Japanese conquered Manchuria from the Russians.

Of the three subjects that you mention for the symposia (philosophy, literary criticism, and current tactics) one-and-a-half would go into the political newspaper, into *Proletary*, viz.: current tactics and a good half of the literary criticism. Ah, there is nothing good about all those special, long articles of literary criticism scattered through various semi-Party and non-Party periodicals! We should try to take a step away from this old, intellectualist, stuffed-shirt manner, that is, we should link literary criticism, too, *more closely* with Party work, with Party leadership. That is what the adult Social-Democratic Parties in Europe are doing. That is what we should do, too, without being afraid of the difficulties of the first steps of collective newspaper activity in this field.

Large works of literary criticism—in books, partially in periodicals.

Systematic, periodic articles, in the concert of a political newspaper, linked with Party work, in the spirit of what was begun by *Novaya Zhizn*—tell me, have you any inclination towards this, or not?

The third subject is philosophy. I am fully aware of my unpreparedness in this sphere, which prevents me from speaking about it in public. But, as a rank-and-file Marxist, I read attentively our Party philosophers, I read attentively the empirio-monist Bogdanov and the empirio-critics Bazarov, Lunacharsky, etc.—and *they* drive me to give *all* my sympathy *to Plekhanov*! It takes physical strength to keep oneself from being carried away by the mood, as Plekhanov does! His tactics are the height of ineptitude and baseness. In philosophy, however, he upholds the right cause. I am for materialism against "empirio-" etc.

Can, and should, philosophy be linked with the trend of Party work? With Bolshevism? I think this should not be done at the present time. Let our Party philosophers put in some more work on theory for a while, let them dis-

pute and ... *seek a meeting of minds*. For the time being, I would stand for *such* philosophical disputes as those between materialists and "empirios" being separated from integral Party work.

I look forward to your reply, meanwhile I must conclude.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1934

Printed from the original

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TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

To Anat. Vas.

February 13, 1908

Dear An. Vas.,

Yesterday I sent you a short note about Bringmann. I hasten to reply to your letter of February 11.

I don't quite understand why you should feel hurt by my letter. Not on account of philosophy, surely!

Your plan for a section of *belles-lettres* in *Proletary* and for having A. M. run it is an excellent one, and pleases me exceedingly. I have in fact been dreaming of making the *literature and criticism* section a permanent feature in *Proletary* and having A. M. to run it. But I was *afraid*, terribly afraid of making the proposal outright, as I *do not know* the nature of A. M.'s work (and his work-bent). If a man is busy with an important work, and if this work would suffer from him being torn away for minor things, such as a newspaper, and journalism, then it would be foolish and criminal to disturb and interrupt him! That is something I very well understand and feel.

Being on the spot, you will know best, dear An. Vas. *If you consider* that A. M.'s work *will not suffer* by his being harnessed to regular Party work (and the Party work will gain a great deal from this!), then try to arrange it.

Proletary No. 21 will come out on February 13 (26). So there is still time. It is desirable to have the manuscripts by *Friday*, which will give us plenty of time to put them in the issue which comes out on Wednesday. If it's something urgent we could manage it even if the copy arrives on Sunday (to avoid delay, write and send it directly to my address), or even (in an extreme case!) on Monday.

You, too, must write without fail. Won't you send us for No. 21 either a political article on Russian affairs (10,000-16,000 characters) or an article on Ferri's resignation[369] (8,000-10,000 characters)? Better still, not "either ... or", but "both ... and".

I send you my best regards and ask you to reply whether A. M.'s contribution to *Proletary* is being arranged. If it is, let him begin at once, *without waiting* for the "meeting" and an agreement.[370]

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924 Printed from the original

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TO MAXIM GORKY

February 13, 1908

Dear Al. M.,

I think that some of the questions you raise about our differences of opinion are a sheer misunderstanding. Never, of course, have I thought of "chasing away the intelligentsia", as the silly syndicalists do, or of denying its necessity for the workers' movement. There can be no divergence between us on any of *these* questions; of that I am quite sure, and since we cannot get together at the moment, we must start work together at once. At work we shall best of all find a common language.

I am very, very pleased with your plan of writing short paragraphs for *Proletary* (the announcement has been sent to you). Naturally, if you are working on something big, *do not break it off*.

Regarding Trotsky, I wanted to reply last time, but I forgot. We (i.e., the editorial board of *Proletary*, Al. Al., myself and "Inok"—a very good colleague from the home Bolsheviks) decided straight away to invite him on to *Proletary*. We wrote him a letter, proposing and outlining a theme. *By general agreement* we signed it the "Editorial Board of *Proletary*", so as to put the matter on a more collegial footing (I personally, for example, had had a big fight with Trotsky, a regular fierce battle in 1903-05 when he was a Menshevik). Whether there was something in the form of our letter that offended Trotsky, I do not know, but he sent us a letter, not written by him: "On Comrade Trotsky's instructions" the editorial board of *Proletary* was informed that he refused to write, he was too busy.

In my opinion, this is mere posturing. At the London Congress,[371] too, he acted the *poseur*. I don't know really whether he will go with the Bolsheviks....

The Mensheviks here have issued an announcement about the monthly *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*[372] over the signatures of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov. I shall get it and send it to you. The struggle may become sharper. But Trotsky wants to stand "above the contending factions"....

It is in regard to materialism as a world outlook that I think I disagree with you in substance. Not the "materialist conception of history" (our "empirios"[373] do not deny that), but philosophical materialism. That the Anglo-Saxons and Germans owed their philistinism to "materialism", and the Romance peoples their anarchism, is something I emphatically dispute. Materialism, as a philosophy, was *everywhere pushed into the background* by them. *Neue Zeit*, that most sober and well-informed organ, is indifferent to philosophy, was never a zealous supporter of philosophical materialism, and of late has been publishing the empirio-critics without a single reservation. It is wrong, absolutely wrong to think that dead philistinism could be deduced from the materialism which Marx and Engels taught! All the philistine trends in Social-Democracy are most of all at war with philosophical materialism, they lean towards Kant, neo-Kantianism, the critical philosophy. No, the philosophy which Engels substantiated in *Anti-Dühring* keeps philistinism at arm's length. Plekhanov does harm to this philosophy by linking the struggle *here* with the factional struggle, but after all no Russian Social-Democrat ought to confuse the present Plekhanov with the old Plekhanov.

Al. Al. has just now left me. I shall communicate with him again about the "meeting". If you insist—it could be arranged for a couple of days and very soon at that.

All the best.

Lenin

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

171
TO MAXIM GORKY

March 16, 1908

Dear A. M.,

It's a pity I can't manage to go and see you. A reply has come from Brussels[374] and here there is no delay. But there is no money and no time, and I cannot abandon the newspaper.

Judging from the fact that you own a nanny-goat, I see that you are in a good humour, the right frame of mind, and life is normal with you. With us things are going none too well. We are pretty much at loggerheads with Al. Al. over this philosophy. I am neglecting the newspaper because of my hard bout of philosophy: one day I read one of the empirio-critics and swear like a fishwife, next day I read another and swear still worse. And Innokenty scolds me—and quite right too—for neglecting *Proletary*. Things are not running smoothly.

Ah, well, it's only natural. Things will come right.

It would be fine if you could manage to write for *Proletary* without your major works suffering.

With warm greetings and best regards to A. Vas. and Maria Fyodorovna.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

172
TO MAXIM GORKY

To A. M., private

March 24, 1908

Dear A. M.,

I have received your letter concerning my fight with the Machists. I quite understand and respect your feelings and I ought to say that I get something similar from my St. Petersburg friends, but I am very deeply convinced that you are mistaken.

You must understand—and you will, of course—that once a Party man has become convinced that a certain doctrine is grossly fallacious and *harmful*, he is obliged to come out against it. I would not be kicking up a row if I were not absolutely convinced (and I am becoming more and more convinced of this every day as I study the original sources of wisdom of Bazarov, Bogdanov and Co.) that their book is ridiculous, harmful, philistine, fideist—the whole of it, from beginning to end, from branch to root, to Mach and Avenarius. Plekhanov, at bottom, is *entirely* right in being against them, only he is unable or unwilling or too lazy to say so *concretely*, in detail, simply, without unnecessarily frightening his readers with philosophical nuances. And at all costs I shall say it *in my own way*.

What kind of "reconciliation" can there be here, dear A. M.? Why, it is ludicrous even to mention it. A fight is *absolutely* inevitable. And Party people should devote their efforts not to slurring it over, putting it off or dodging it, but to ensuring that essential Party work *does not suffer* in practice. That is what *you* should be concerned about, and nine-tenths of the Bolsheviks in Russia will help you in this and heartily thank you for it.

How is this to be done? By "neutrality"? No. There cannot and *will not be* any neutrality on such an issue. If it is possible to speak of neutrality, it can only be in a *relative* sense: we must *separate* all this fight from the faction. So far, you have been writing "from the outside", keeping away from the factional publications; go on writing in this way. Only so will the faction not be committed, not be *involved*, not be compelled tomorrow or the day after to *decide*, to *vote*, i.e., to turn the *fight* into a chronic, protracted, hopeless affair.

That is why I am *against* allowing any kind of philosophy in the journal.[375] I know I am being abused for this: he wants to stop other people's mouths, while he has not yet opened his own! But just think it over coolly.

A journal with philosophy. No. 1—three articles of Bazarov, Bogdanov and Lunacharsky against Plekhanov. One article of mine saying that *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*=Berdayevism and reactionary clericalism.

No. 2—three times three keyed up articles of Bogdanov, Bazarov and Lunacharsky against Plekhanov and Lenin. One article of mine, proving from another angle that *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*=reactionary clericalism.

No. 3—howling and cursing.

I could write six or a dozen articles against *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*, one article against each author and each aspect of his views. Can this drag on in this way? How long? Will *this* not make a split *inevitable* through endless exacerbation and embitterment? Will *this* not bind the faction to make a decision: decide, analyse, and end the "discussion" by a vote....

Think this over carefully, if you fear a split. Will the practical workers undertake to distribute books with such a "fight"? Isn't another way better: go on writing as before, *outside* the factional publications. Do your scrapping on the side, *for the time being* the faction can wait. If there is a chance of *weakening* the inevitable animosity, it can only be in this way, I think.

You write: the Mensheviks will gain from a fight. You are mistaken, deeply mistaken, A. M.! They will gain if the Bolshevik faction does not dissociate itself from the philosophy of the three Bolsheviks. *In that case*, they will

definitely win. But if the philosophical fight goes on outside the faction, the Mensheviks will be definitely reduced to a political line and that will be the death of them.

I say: *separate* the fight from the faction. Of course, such a separation, on living persons, is rather difficult and painful. It needs time. It needs solicitous comrades. Here the practical workers will help, here you should help, here it is a question of "psychology", and you know best. I think you could help a lot here—provided that, on reading my book against the *Studies*,* you don't become as furious against me as I became against them.

As regards the journal, think it over carefully and answer me soon. I am a little doubtful whether it is worth while for us to make the journey to you together *at present*. Why jangle nerves unnecessarily? Why draw out the torture ... there is no avoiding a fight. Would it not be better to settle this business of the journal simply, without long negotiations and ceremonial and futile meetings. I am merely putting questions to you in order to consult you.

Best regards to M. F. I shall most certainly come to Capri and try to bring my wife along, only I should like to do this independently of the philosophical fight.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I enclose *important* information about a spy among you.

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

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* The reference is to *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* which Lenin was engaged on at the time (see present edition, Vol. 14).—*Ed.*

173
TO MAXIM GORKY

How is it there is no news from you, dear A. M.? You wrote that you had long finished your big work and were going to help us in *Proletary*. But when? What about your doing a small article on Tolstoy or something of that sort? Send us a line whether you intend to do so.[376]

Al. Al. is on his way to you. I can neither abandon the paper nor get away from my work. But this is only a delay, I shall come all the same.

What do you think of *Proletary*? It is an uncared-for waif. Never before have I so neglected my paper: I spend whole days reading the accursed Machists, and dash off articles for the newspaper in incredible haste.

Well, all the best.

Yours,

Lenin

To M. F. thousand greetings! I shall bicycle down to see her!

Get Anat. Vas. to write for *Proletary* too! Let me do some philosophic barking by helping *Proletary* in the meantime!

Written in the first half of April 1908
Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

175
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

To Anat. Vas.

April 16, 1908

Dear A. V.,

I have received your letter. I am *very* glad that you are undertaking work for *Proletary*. This is absolutely *necessary*, *particularly* in regard to the subjects you mention + Italian letters. Mind you don't forget that you are a contributor to a Party newspaper and don't let those round you forget it.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. *Privately*, about philosophy: I cannot return your compliments and I think you will soon take yours back. As for me, I have parted company (and probably for a long time) with the preachers of "the union of scientific socialism and religion" and with all Machists as well.

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1934

Printed from the original

175
TO MAXIM GORKY

April 16, 1908

Dear Al. M.,

Today I received your letter and hasten to reply. It is useless and harmful for me to come: I *cannot* and will not talk to people who are preaching the union of scientific socialism and religion. The time for notebooks[377] is past. It's no use arguing, and it's stupid to jangle one's nerves for nothing. Philosophy must be *separated* from Party (factional) affairs: the decision of the Bolshevik Centre[378] makes this obligatory.

I have already *sent to be printed* the most formal declaration of war.[379] There is no longer any room for diplomacy here—of course, I am speaking of diplomacy not in the bad sense, but in the good sense of the word.

"Good" diplomacy on your part, dear A. M. (if you, too, have not come to believe in God), should consist in separating our joint (i.e., including myself) *affairs* from philosophy.

A talk on other matter than philosophy won't come off now: it would be unnatural. Incidentally, if these *other* matters, *not* philosophical, but *Proletary* matters, for example, really demand talks just *now*, and at your place, I could come (I don't know whether I shall find the money: there are difficulties at present), but I repeat: only on condition that I do not speak about philosophy or religion.

And I definitely intend coming to have a talk with you when I am free and through with my work.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Best regards to M. F.: she is not for God, by any chance, is she?

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

176
TO MAXIM GORKY

April 19, 1908

Dear A. M.,

I have received the telegram from you and M. F. and am sending my refusal today or tomorrow morning. I repeat, *on no account* is it permissible to mix the disputes of writers about philosophy with a *Party* (i.e., *factional*) matter. I have already written about this to An. Vas.[380] and to avoid any misinterpretations or incorrect conclusions from my refusal to come *I repeat it for all the comrades*. We should continue to conduct our factional work harmoniously: none of us has regretted the policy which we pursued and implemented at the time of the revolution. Hence, it is our duty to *defend* it before the Party. We can only do this all together, and we should do it in *Proletary* and in all Party work.

If, in the course of it, A should inveigh against B, or B inveigh against A, on account of philosophy, we *must* do this as a thing apart, that is, without interfering with the work.

I shouldn't like you and the comrades to put a bad construction on my refusal to come. I am very sorry, but the whole situation and the state of the editorial board prevent my coming.

All the very best.

Yours, *Lenin*

We are expecting to receive the promised article about the Rome strike from An. Vas. as soon as possible. We are expecting help for *Proletary* from all writers: we are all answerable to our comrades in Russia, who are dissatisfied with it. Let Al. Al. *concern himself* seriously about money! They are crying out in Russia for lack of money.

Sent from Geneva to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

177
TO V. V. VOROVSKY[381]

Dear friend,

Thanks for your letter. Both your "suspicions" are wrong. I was not suffering from nerves, but our position is difficult. A split with Bogdanov is imminent. The true cause is offence at the sharp criticism of his philosophical views at lectures (not at all in the newspaper). Now Bogdanov is hunting out every kind of difference of opinion. Together with Alexinsky, who is kicking up a terrible row and with whom I have been compelled to break off all relations, he has dragged the boycott out into the light of day.

They are trying to bring about a split on empirio-monistic and boycott grounds. The storm will burst very soon. A fight at the coming conference is inevitable. A split is highly probable. I shall leave the faction as soon as the policy of the "Left" and of true "boycottism" gets the upper hand. I invited you, thinking that your speedy arrival would help to pacify. In August (new style) we are nevertheless counting on you without fail as a participant in the conference. Be sure to arrange things so as to be able to travel abroad. We shall send money for the journey to all the Bolsheviks. Issue the slogan locally: mandates to be given only to local, and only to active Party workers. We earnestly request you to write for our newspaper. We can now pay for articles and will pay regularly.

All the best.

Do you know of any publisher who would handle the work on philosophy I am writing?[382]

Written July 1, 1908
Sent from Geneva to Odessa

First published in 1924

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police record

178
TO P. YUSHKEVICH[383]

Sir,

I do not agree to diluting Marxism nor to a free tribune in publications I know nothing of.

N. Lenin

Written November 10, 1908
Sent from Geneva
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933

Printed from the original

1909

179
TO ROSA LUXEMBURG[384]

May 18, 1909

Werte Genossin,

I sent you yesterday by registered book-post a copy of my book on philosophy—in memory of our conversation about Mach when we last met.[385]

If possible, I should like to ask you to write a note about this book for *Neue Zeit*[386] for the "*Verzeichnis der in der Redaktion eingelaufenen Druck-Schriften*"*. If this necessitates any formality, such as sending the book direct to the editors (who do not understand Russian), please drop me a line about it and I shall try to send a special copy to the editors of *Neue Zeit*.

You, of course, have heard from Comrade Tyszka about our internal struggle among the Bolsheviks. Your article against the otzovists and ultimatumists[387] has pleased everyone very much[388]; it is a pity that you write *so rarely* in Russian; you prefer the rich Social-Democratic Party of the Germans to the poor Social-Democratic Party of the Russians.

All the best! Regards to Tyszka. With greetings.

N. Lenin

P.S. The note of *Die Neue Zeit* editors to Rothstein's (excellent) article in No. 33 leads me to think that Kautsky himself is none too pleased now with his defence of the I.L.P. in Brussels[389].... Am I right?

Sent from Paris to Berlin
First published in 1925 — Printed from the original

* "List of printed matter received by the editorial board."—*Ed.*

180
TO A. I. LYUBIMOV[390]

Dear Mark,

I am sending you for Lyova my reply to the Capriotes.[391] If he considers it necessary, let him make a copy for Inok, and then send the letter to Capri—I don't know the address. I think it could be sent in two envelopes: the outer one inscribed "Signor Massimo *Gorki*, Villa Blaesus, *Capri*, Italie", and the inner one: "For the Executive Committee of the School".

I don't know any other address.

As regards Trotsky, I must say that I shall be most vigorously opposed to *helping* him if he rejects (and he has already rejected it!) *equality* on the editorial board, proposed to him by a member of the C.C. Without a settlement of this question by the Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Centre, *no* steps to help Trotsky are *permissible*. Consequently, the Economic Committee is entitled to agree to the printing of *Pravda*[392] at the *Proletary* printing-press only if this will not be help for a *new faction* (for Trotsky is founding a new faction, whereas the Bolshevik C.C. member proposed to him *instead* that he should come into the Party) but a *strictly* commercial deal, for payment, as with any other person, provided the compositors are disengaged, etc. I insist most categorically that the question of the attitude to *Pravda* shall still be decided by the *Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Centre* and that pending this decision not a single step in the way of *help* shall be taken, nor shall we bind ourselves *in any way*.

All the best.

N. Lenin

P.S. Please make a copy of my letter to the Capriotes *in any case*. It may prove necessary for the B.C.

Written August 18, 1909
Sent from Bombon (France)
to Paris
First published in 1933

Printed from the original

181
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV[393]

Dear Gr.,

I have received No. 7-8 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.[394] I object to Trotsky's *signature*; signatures must be omitted. (I have not yet read the articles.)

As regards *Proletary*, I think we should insert in it 1) an article on the elections in St. Petersburg (in connection with the claptrap of *Rech*[395] and Vodovozov, if *Rech* has not misreported him); 2) on the Swedish strike—a summing-up article is essential; 3) ditto on the Spanish events[396]; 4) on the Mensheviks, in connection with their (very vile) polemic with the Geneva (Georgien[397]) anti-liquidator; 5) in the supplement as a special sheet, an answer to the "Open Letter" of Maximov and Co.[398] A proper answer must be given to them so that these scoundrels do not mislead people by their lies.

After three weeks' holiday, I am beginning to come round. I think I could take No. 4 and 5, upon myself, if need be No. 1 as well, but I am still afraid to promise. Write me your opinion and the exact *deadlines*. What else is there for *Proletary*?

Nos. 2 and 3 can be made up from *Vorwärts*; I shall send it to you, if you will undertake to write.

As regards *Pravda*, have you read Trotsky's letter to Inok? If you have, I hope it has convinced you that Trotsky behaves like a despicable careerist and factionalist of the Ryazanov-and-Co. *type*? Either equality on the editorial board, *subordination* to the C.C. and no one's transfer to Paris except Trotsky's (the scoundrel, he wants to "fix up" the *whole* rascally crew of *Pravda* at our expense!)—

or a break with this swindler and an exposure of him in the C.O. He pays lip-service to the Party and behaves worse than any other of the factionalists.

All the best.

N. Lenin

P.S. I'm afraid we'll have to give Kamenev up as a bad job. An article on *The Social Movement*[399] has been promised six weeks (or six months) ago?

My address is: Mr. Wl. Oulianoff (Chez Madame Lecreux), Bombon (Seine-et-Marne).

Written August 24, 1909
Sent from Bombon (France)
to Paris

First published in 1933

Printed from the original

182
TO A. I. LYUBIMOV

Dear Mark,

I entirely agree, of course, to your making free use of my letter for a report or for publication.* Bear in mind, though, that I am writing an article** for *Proletary* in which I bluntly describe the gang of scoundrels, Maximov and Co., *as canaille*, and call their school nothing but a "Yerogin's hostel".*** And so, *to avoid misunderstanding*: I agree to speak "mildly" only *to workers* who address me *personally* over *their own* signatures.

Maximov and Co., however, are a band of adventurers who have enticed some workers into their Yerogin hostel. To avoid contradictions, *do not circulate* my letter among our people, but *send it exclusively* to organisations with this *reservation* (the reservation had better be published too):

"The appropriate reply to the company of offended writers, unrecognised philosophers and ridiculed god-builders[400] who have hidden away their so-called "*school*" from the Party, will be given in *Proletary*. The present letter, however, is Lenin's personal reply to those workers who have addressed him personally."

I should advise *everyone* either not to go to Bogdanov's lecture—or to answer him in such a way as once and for all to kill the desire to butt in. It is base cowardice to go

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* The reference is to a letter to students at the Capri Party School (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 472-78).—*Ed.*

** If I manage to finish it, I shall send it to you tomorrow express—perhaps it will be in time for the report.

*** See "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" (present edition, Vol. 16).—*Ed.*

gate-crashing on a faction from which he has already been ejected. There is nothing more harmful now than sentimentalising. A *complete break* and war, *more determined than that against the Mensheviks*. This war will quickly teach the fools who have still "not made things out".

All the best.

N. Lenin

P.S. And *Plekhanov*'s "Dnevnik"![401] *Don't forget I am waiting.*

Written at the beginning
of September 1909
Sent from Bombon (France)
to Paris

First published in 1933

Printed from the original

183
TO MAXIM GORKY

November 16, 1909

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

I have been fully convinced all the time that you and Comrade Mikhail were the most hardened factionalists of the new faction, with whom it would be silly of me to try and talk in a friendly way. Today for the first time I met Comrade Mikhail, and had a heart-to-heart chat with him both about affairs and about you, and I perceived that I had been cruelly mistaken. Believe me, the philosopher Hegel was right: life proceeds by contradictions, and living contradictions are so much richer, more varied and deeper in content than they may seem at first sight to a man's mind. I regarded the school as *merely* the centre of a new faction. This has turned out to be wrong—not in the sense that it was not the centre of a new faction (the school was this centre and is so at the present time), but in the sense that this was incomplete, not the whole truth. Subjectively, certain people made such a centre out of the school, objectively, it was such, but in addition the school drew to it real front-rank workers from real working-class life. What happened was that, besides the contradiction between the old and the new faction, a contradiction developed on Capri, between some of the Social-Democratic intellectuals and the workers from Russia, who will bring Social-Democracy on to the true path *at all costs* and whatever happens, and who will do so despite all the squabbling and dissension abroad, despite the "incidents", and so on and so forth. People like Mikhail are a guarantee of it. Moreover, it turned out that a contradiction developed in the school between elements of the Capri Social-Democratic intelligentsia.

I gathered from Mikhail that you are taking things hard, dear A. M. You have seen the working class and Social-Democratic movement from an aspect and in forms and manifestations which already more than once in the history of Russia and Western Europe have led intellectuals of little faith to despair of the workers' movement and Social-Democracy. I am confident that this will not happen in your case, and after my talk with Mikhail I want to shake your hand heartily. With your gifts as an artist you have rendered such a tremendous service to the working-class movement of Russia—and indeed not only of Russia—and will render a still greater service yet, that it is on no account permissible for you to fall a prey to moods of depression evoked by episodes of the struggle abroad. Conditions occur when the course of the working-class movement inevitably gives rise to this struggle abroad, and to splits, dissension and the quarrelling among the circles—but this is not because of the workers' movement being intrinsically weak or Social-Democracy intrinsically erroneous, but because the elements out of which the working class has to forge its Party are too heterogeneous and diverse in calibre. The working class will forge it in any case, it will forge an excellent revolutionary Social-Democratic Party in Russia, and it will do so more speedily than sometimes seems likely from the standpoint of the thrice-accursed emigrant position; it will forge it more surely than might be imagined if one were to judge by some external manifestations and individual episodes. People like Mikhail are a guarantee of that.

All the very best to you and to Maria Fyodorovna. I am now hopeful that we shall meet again and not as enemies.

Yours,
Lenin

Wl. Oulianoff,
4, Rue Marie Rose, 4
Paris, XIV

Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

184
TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

You are wrong in asking me to come over. Why should I be slanging Maximov, Lunacharsky, etc.? You yourself write about keeping at loggerheads strictly among ourselves and yet you invite us to do the same in public. It's no model. And about repelling the workers, you are wrong there too. If they accept our invitation and call on us, we shall have a chat with them and fight for the views of a certain newspaper,[402] which certain factionalists are abusing (I heard this long ago from Lyadov and others) as being a deadly bore, a semi-literate and useless paper which does not believe in the proletariat or socialism.

As regards a new split, your arguments don't hang together. On the one hand, both are nihilists (and "Slav anarchists"—why, my dear man, the non-Slav Europeans at times like ours fought, cursed and split a hundred times worse than we do!)—and, on the other hand, the split will be not less deep than that between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. If it is a question of the "nihilism" of the "loggerheads", of the semi-literacy, etc., of someone who does not believe in what he writes, etc.—then, the split is not deep or it is not a split at all. And if the split is deeper than that between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—then it is not a question of nihilism, not a question of writers who do not believe in what they write. It doesn't hold water, really! You are wrong about the present split and justly* say: "I understand people but not their deeds."

What strikes you and Maximov in *Proletary* as insincerity and futility, etc., is due to a totally different viewpoint on the entire present moment (and, of course, on Marxism). We have been marking time for almost two years now, torturing questions which still seem "disput-

* An addition "justly": I make a reservation. Without understanding their deeds one cannot understand people either, unless it be ... outwardly. That is to say, it is possible to understand the psychology of one or other participant of a struggle, but not the *meaning* of the struggle, not its party and political *significance*.

able" to Maximov, but which events decided long ago. And if we were to continue "disputing" about them, we would still be vainly marking time. But by parting company, we shall show the workers clearly, directly and definitely, two ways out. The Social-Democratic workers will make their choice easily and swiftly, for the tactics of preserving (in storage cans) the revolutionary *words* of 1905-06 instead of applying the revolutionary *method* to a new, different situation, to a changed epoch, which demands different methods and different forms of organisation—these tactics are dead. The proletariat is moving towards revolution and will come to it, but *not in the way* it did prior to 1905. To one who "believes" that the proletariat will make it, but who *does not understand* this "not in the way"—to him our position is *bound to* seem insincere, futile, tedious, based on lack of faith in the proletariat and socialism, etc., etc. The divergence resulting from this is, undoubtedly, deep enough to make a split—at least abroad—inevitable. But it does not come anywhere near the split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, if one is to speak of the depth of the split in the Party, in Social-Democracy, among Marxists.

You are surprised that I fail to see Mikhail's hysteria, lack of discipline (it is not for you to say, nor for Mikhail to listen) and other bad qualities. Well, I have had a little opportunity of testing him: I thought that nothing would come of a conversation between you and me, that there was no sense in writing. Under the impression of my talk with Mikhail, I wrote at once, in the heat of the moment, without even reading through the letter, without putting it off until the next day. The next day I thought: I have been foolish enough to believe Mikhail. But it turned out that for all his enthusiasm Mikhail was right *to some extent*, for we *did* have our talk, you and I—not without hitches, of course, and not without *Proletary* being annihilated, but that can't be helped!

All the very best.

N. Lenin

Written not earlier than November 20, 1909
Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924 Printed from the original

185
TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV[403]

Dear friend,

I have received your letter of September 20, 1909, and was extremely glad to hear from you. It is a pity there was no news from you earlier—we are now terribly isolated here; we tried to get in touch with you and Vyach., but failed. These are indeed hellishly difficult years and a possibility of contacts with old friends is ten times more valuable for that reason. I shall answer your letter point by point. You have seen the newspaper up to December 1908. Since then much water has flowed under the bridge.

With the so-called "Lefts" we have a complete split, which was made good in the spring of 1909. If you come across my book on philosophy (I sent it to you immediately it came out, i.e., in the beginning of the summer of 1909) and the newspaper for 1909, you will hardly say that we are making concessions to the silly Lefts. There is a complete and formal split with Maximov and the Maximovites. An out-and-out fight. They may set up their own organ, or they may not. They are stirring things up in St. Petersburg and Odessa, but they cannot become a force; it is the death agony of "otzovism-ultimatumism", in my opinion. The split with Maximov and Co. cost us no little energy and time, but I think it was inevitable and will be useful in the long run. Knowing your views, I think, I am even confident, that we are in agreement here.

As to what you say about it being time to "liquidate the belief in a second coming of the general-democratic onset", I definitely do not agree with you there. You would only be playing into the hands of the otzovists (who are very prone to such "maximalism": the bourgeois revolu-

tion is behind us—ahead is the "purely proletarian" one) and the extreme Right-wing Menshevik liquidators. (Incidentally: have you heard about the split among the Mensheviks? Plekhanov has left the editorial board of their newspaper, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, and the editorial board of their collective work: *The Social Movement in Russia in the Twentieth Century*. In August 1909 he published *Dnevnik* No. 9, where he called the Mensheviks the accomplices of the liquidators,[404] and said about Potresov "he is no comrade of mine", and that Potresov had ceased to be a revolutionary, and so on. Things with us are moving towards an alignment with the Plekhanovite Mensheviks with the aim of strengthening the Party.) But the main thing, in my opinion, is that such a view is theoretically wrong. The "German line" is *possible*—without doubt. And we frankly recognised that as early as the beginning of 1908. But this possibility can become a reality only through a number of "general-democratic" onsets (or upsurges, or crises, etc.) just as France came to the end of the "general-democratic" onsets not after 1789-93, but after 1871 (i.e., after 1830, 1848, and 1871), and Germany not in 1849-50, but also after 1871, i.e., after the *Verfassungsstreit** of the sixties. Struve, Guchkov and Stolypin are trying their hardest to "copulate" and produce a Bismarckian Russia—but nothing comes of it. Nothing. They're impotent. All the signs show, and they themselves admit, that nothing comes of it. Stolypin's agrarian policy[405] is correct from the point of view of Bismarckianism. But Stolypin himself "asks" for 20 years to make something "come of it". But twenty years, and even a shorter time, is impossible in Russia without 1830-1848-1871 (if in the French style) and 1863-1865 (if in the German style). It is impossible. And all these dates (both 1830-1848-1871 and 1863-1865) are a "general-democratic onset".

No, we cannot "liquidate" the idea of "a general-democratic onset"—that would be a cardinal mistake. We should recognise the possibility of a "German line", but we should not forget that so far it does *not* exist. It simply does not.

* Constitutional conflict.—*Ed.*

We should not link the destinies of the proletarian party with the success or failure of the bourgeois revolution—that is indisputable. We should organise the work so that, whatever the turn events take, it will be a stable, unalienable achievement—that is true. But we are obliged to do our duty as leaders of a democratic, "general-democratic", movement right to the end, until the Russian 1871, until the complete turn of the peasantry to the side of an *Ordnungspartei*.* And such a turn, as far as Russia is concerned, is still a long way off! We cannot deny the possibility of a "German", that is to say, a "rotten", solution of "general-democratic" problems, but we are obliged to do *everything*, we are obliged to work long and hard in order that this solution will be not "rotten", not German, but French, i.e., that of the 1830-1848-1871 type, and not of the 1863-65 type (merely a "constitutional" crisis). There is no guarantee that our 1863-65 will turn out to be "rotten" or successful, but it is our business, the business of the working-class party, to do everything to make the "rotten" develop into the *successful*, to make the German *Verfassungsstreit* develop into a real French scrimmage. There are no historical laws to prevent a rotten crisis from turning into a real scrimmage. There are no such laws. Everything depends on the circumstances, on the mass of poor peasants (whom Stolypin has suppressed but not satisfied), on the strength of the workers' party, on the conditions, friction and conflicts between Guchkov and the "spheres", etc., etc. We should see to it that we are stronger (and by the time of our 1863-1865 we shall be stronger than the Germans were then), and that the peasants then do what we tell them, and not what the liberals tell them. Only the struggle will decide how far this will be achieved. We shall demand everything in the sense of a "general-democratic onset": if successful we shall gain *everything*, if unsuccessful—a part; but, in going into battle, we must not confine ourselves to demanding a part. To build in a new way, to organise in a new way, to enter the crisis in a new way—such is the *crucial feature* of the moment, but *all* the old

* Party of order.—*Ed.*

slogans, the demand for "*everything*", must be maintained, developed and strengthened.

All the very, very best. I wish you health and good cheer.

Yours whole-heartedly,
Old Man

Written December 2, 1909
Sent from Paris
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1922

Printed from
the typewritten
copy found in
police record

1910

186
DRAFT OF A LETTER TO THE "TRUSTEES"[406]

Letter to the German Trio

To explain the at first glance strange proposal and request which we and the C.C. are addressing to you, we must clarify the situation in our Party.

To understand this situation, one must have a clear idea, firstly, of the violent nature of the counter-revolution and the appalling chaos in the Social-Democratic organisation and Social-Democratic work; and, secondly, of the basic ideological and political trends in our Party.

On the first question, it is sufficient to note the tremendous decline among the organisations everywhere, almost their cessation in many localities. The wholesale flight of the intelligentsia. All that is left are workers' circles and isolated individuals. The young, inexperienced worker is making his way forward with difficulty.

On the second question. There were *two* trends among the Social-Democrats in the revolution (and two factions, *tatsächlich Spaltung**): the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. Stockholm 1906 and London 1907.[407] An opportunist and a revolutionary wing.

The 1907-08 break-down gave rise (α) among the Mensheviks—to *liquidationism* (definition), (β) among the Bolsheviks—to *otzovism* (and ultimatumism). Definition.

(α) Beginning with March 1908, the Mensheviks took *absolutely* no part in the central work of the Party and even tried to disrupt it (August 1908). Abroad they predominate (students, immature bourgeois intellectuals, etc.). A wide-open split abroad (thanks to the Mensheviks) and

* An actual split.—*Ed.*

their *complete* non-participation in Party work, plus a struggle against the Party.

The conference of December 1908 brands this.[408]

(β) Otzovism-ultimatumism among the Bolsheviks in 1908-09. The Bolsheviks' resolute struggle against it and *Kaltstellung** of the otzovists and ultimatumists. Removal.

Chaos in Russia increasing.

Plekhanov's statement, August 1909 ("What Can We Do for You?"[409], the liquidationism of *Golos*; liquidationism declared to be petty-bourgeois opportunism; acknowledgement of the crisis in the Party [frightful disease]; resignation from the editorial board of the *Social Movement* which had taken refuge in a *bürgerlich-liberalen Verlag***).

The significance of Plekhanov's statement = a feeble echo, the confirmation *by a factional enemy of the Bolsheviks* of all their accusations.

The gravitation of the Mensheviks *in Russia* towards the Party (particularly in the case of workers: St. Petersburg, Moscow).

Experience of *Party* unity on this basis, on the recognition of the struggle on two fronts; against liquidationism and against otzovism-ultimatumism.

Conditions for unity on our part: unconditional recognition of the struggle against liquidationism (half-measure of the C.C.: a personal concession); cessation of factional struggle (= of the split abroad in particular) and *loyal subordination to the majority* of the Party (Bolsheviks + Poles in particular), which extricated the Party from the 1907-09 crisis and set it on the path of a resolute struggle on two fronts.

Conditions of the Mensheviks: concealment of a clear definition of liquidationism (half-measure in the *unanimous* resolution) and *equality* on the editorial board of the Central Organ (virtually the leading Party body in view of the extreme weakness and instability of the C.C. in Russia).

In the C.C. an *extremely unstable compromise* is effected: 1) a unanimous resolution *deleting* the name liquidation-

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* Removal.—*Ed.*

** Bourgeois-liberal publishing house.—*Ed.*

ism[410]; 2) three and two in the C.O., in circumstances of the Menshevik declaration about "mechanical suppression", "a state of siege", etc.; 3) refusal of the Mensheviks resolutely, clearly and irrevocably to renounce their factional newspaper and factional organisation, and to recognise *loyal* subordination to the Majority.

Hence our fears. Having dissolved the Bolshevik faction and handed over the money to the C.C. (actually 5 powers in circumstances of an accidental and wavering majority, marred by otzovism-ultimatumism), we fear (have every ground for fearing) a split of the Mensheviks abroad and their dragging in of liquidationism (in the shape of equality on the editorial board).

We are convinced that in view of attempts at a split, organised from abroad by the Mensheviks, the C.C. (i.e., the Bolsheviks + the nationals) will not be strong enough to combat liquidationism, and we will have to *resume* the factional struggle, reply to the split by a split.

The experience of the "truce": the Bolsheviks have disarmed. The experience of the "Party way of life".

The conditions to be put to the Mensheviks: (α) complete disarmament—cessation of the factional newspaper, the factional funds, the factional split abroad; (β) *loyal* implementation of the resolution on the struggle against liquidationism; (γ) *loyal* subordination to the majority in the C.O.; (δ) *loyal* assistance to the C.C. in Russia.

Si non—non!

The flirting of the Mensheviks with the otzovists-ultimatumists. Trotsky's impotence and connivance in regard to the liquidators.

Written in February-early March
1910 in Paris

First published in 1933

Printed from the original

187
TO N. Y. VILONOV

March 27, 1910

Dear Comrade Mikhail,

How is your health? Are you getting better? Write about this, tell us whether you are putting on weight and how much.

The fog of conciliatory unity among us is beginning to disperse. I am sending you a reprint from No. 12 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.[411] You will see from it that there has been an all-out fight with the *Golos* group. The question now boils down to whether there are any Plekhanovites in existence, whether there are any *pro-Party* Mensheviks in existence, or whether all the Mensheviks are *Golos* supporters, and Plekhanov is simply an isolated individual.

Intensified agitation has to be carried on for the withdrawal of the Plekhanovites from the *Golos* groups, for the replacement of the *Golos* supporter in the Bureau of the C.C. Abroad by a Plekhanovite and so on—and by means of such agitation to verify *in practice* whether Party unity will result at least in our unity with the Plekhanovites or whether nothing at all will come of it.

The group of Bolsheviks here is about to start such agitation; when it does, you will receive news of it.

The Vperyodists[412] are holding a sort of meeting here; it is said that Bogdanov and Stanislav have arrived. What they intend to do is not known. They are behaving stupidly and the Central Organ will, probably, have to fight them as well, after their first press statement. There was a letter from Russia saying that Alexinsky wrote to the Moscow *Vperyod* group about their plan to organise a school of *their own* for 50 people (they have raised money, then?)

but that the *Vperyod* people in Moscow are said to be inclined towards a general party school.

There is no correspondence with Gorky. It is rumoured that he has become disillusioned with Bogdanov and has realised the falsity of the latter's behaviour. Have you any news from Capri?

There are few forces in Russia. Ah, if only we could send from here a good Party worker to the C.C. or for convening a conference! But here everyone is a "has-been".

Keep well and write,

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to Davos
(Switzerland)

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

188
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

March 29, 1910

My dear comrade,

Fully sharing your idea, stated in *Dnevnik* No. 11, about the need for a close and sincere alignment of all genuinely Social-Democratic elements in the struggle against liquidationism and otzovism, I should very much like to have a talk with you personally about the present state of affairs in the Party. If you, too, find this useful and if your health permits, be so kind as to write me (or wire) a few words as to when you could meet me in San Remo. I am ready to make the journey for that purpose.[413]

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

Vl. Oulianoff, 4, Rue Marie Rose, Paris, XIV.

Sent from Paris to San Remo (Italy)

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

189
TO N. Y. VILONOV

April 7, 1910

Dear Comrade M.,

I am sending you the resolution of our local Plekhanovites, or, rather, the pro-Party Mensheviks.[414] If it is true that with you in Davos the pro-Party elements preponderate among the Mensheviks, it is extremely important that they should respond immediately, rally together one way or another and come out openly. Obviously, *Bolsheviks* should be very cautious in giving such advice to Mensheviks, for even among the Plekhanovites there is no accusation more terrible, horrible and intolerable than that of "aiding the Bolsheviks" or of working "for the Bolsheviks", etc.

In the present confused situation there are, in my opinion, only two ways out: either back to our own Bolshevik faction, or a *determined fight* together with the Plekhanovites for the Party and against the *Golos* people. The second alternative is the more desirable, but it does not depend on us. So long as it is possible, we shall do all we can for the second way out. Only after trying out *all* possibilities, all means for the second way out, shall we return to the first one.

I am very glad that your acquaintance with pragmatism has begun to turn you away from Machism. In Russia now they are intensively translating all this "latest" philosophical muck: Petzoldt and Co., the pragmatists, etc. This is good: when our people in Russia, especially the Russian workers, see the teachers of our Bogdanov and Co., *au naturel*—they will quickly turn away from both teachers and pupils.

To regard truth as an instrument of cognition means, in effect, to go over to agnosticism, i.e., to abandon materialism. In this and in everything fundamental, the pragmatists, Machists, empirio-monists are birds of a feather.

With warm greetings and wishing you a speedy and lasting recovery.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Paris to Davos
(Switzerland)

First published in 1930

Printed from the original

190
TO MAXIM GORKY

To Al. Max.

April 11, 1910

Dear A. M.,

I did not receive the letter from you and M. F. sent through M. S. Botkina until today. Before I forget: you can write to me at my *private* address (Oulianoff, 4, Rue Marie Rose, 4, Paris, XIV) and at the address of the Party—in which case it is safer to use two envelopes, the inner one marked: for Lenin, private (110, Avenue d'Orléans, Mr. Kotliarenko, Paris, XIV).

I shall try and send you tomorrow the publications you ask for.

Did I criticise you, and where? It must have been in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 1* (published as a supplement to the C.O.).[415] I am sending you a copy. If this is not what your informants had in mind, then I don't remember anything else at the moment. I wrote nothing else during that period.

Now about unity. You ask: is this a fact or an anecdote? I shall have to go back a long way to tell you about this, for there is something both "anecdotal" (rather trivial) about this fact, and something serious, in my view.

There have been deep and serious factors leading to Party unity: in the ideological field—the need to purge Social-Democracy from liquidationism and otzovism; in the practical field—the terribly difficult plight of the Party and of all Social-Democratic work, and the coming to maturity of a new type of Social-Democratic worker.

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* See "Notes of a Publicist", Section One, The "Platform" of the Adherents and Defenders of Otzovism (present edition, Vol. 16).—*Ed.*

At the C.C. plenum (the "long plenum"—three weeks of agony, all nerves were on edge, the devil to pay!) to these serious and deep-lying factors, which were by no means generally recognised, were added minor, petty factors—a mood of "conciliation in general" (without any clear idea with whom, for what, and how); hatred of the Bolshevik Centre for its implacable ideological struggle; squabbling on the part of the Mensheviks, who were spoiling for a fight, and as a result—an infant covered with blisters.

And so we have to suffer. Either—at best—we cut open the blisters, let out the pus, and cure and rear the infant.

Or, at worst—the infant dies. Then we shall be childless for a while (that is, we shall re-establish the Bolshevik faction) and then give birth to a more healthy infant.

Among the Mensheviks, those working for serious unity are the Plekhanovites (not quite consciously, rather slowly and waveringly, but they are nevertheless working for it, and, what is most important, they cannot help working for it), the *pro-Party*-ists and the workers. The *Golos* people, however, are fencing, causing confusion and making mischief. They are building up a strong, legal, opportunist centre in Russia (Potresov & Co. in the press: see *Nasha Zarya*[416] No. 2—what a scoundrel this Potresov is!—and Mikhail, Roman, Yury + the sixteen authors of the "Open Letter"[417] in No. 19/20 of *Golos*—in practical, organisational work).

The C.C. plenum wanted to unite *everyone*. Now the *Golos* people *drop out*. This abscess *must* be removed. It cannot be done without squabbling, rows, nervous strain, mud and "scum".

We are just now in the thick of this squabbling. Either the C.C. in Russia lops off the *Golos* supporters by removing them from important bodies (such as the Central Organ, etc.)—or our faction will have to be re-established.

In No. 11 of *Dnevnik*, Plekhanov has given an appraisal of the plenum which clearly shows that the sincere and serious desire to fight opportunism *now* prevails with him over the minor, petty desire to *utilise* the *Golos* opportunists *against* the Bolsheviks. Here, too, things take a complex and protracted course, but the Mensheviks' legalistic, liquidationist centre that has been built up in Russia will,

inevitably lead to serious Social-Democrats turning away from them.

Now about the Vperyodists. At one time it seemed to me that within this group, too, there were two trends: towards the Party and Marxism, towards renouncing Machism and otzovism, and the opposite. As far as the first trend is concerned, Party unity would enable the patent absurdities of otzovism, etc., to be corrected in a convenient and unembarrassing Party way. But, apparently, the second trend is getting the upper hand among them. Alexinsky (a mere babe-in-arms in politics, but one who has turned angry and is committing one stupidity after another) kicked up a row and resigned from both the editorial board of *Diskussionny Listok* and from the Party's School Committee.[418] They will probably organise a school of *their own*, again a factional one, again on the side. If they do, we shall fight again and win the workers away from them.

And so it works out, that in the matter of unity the "anecdotic" predominates at the present time, is brought into high focus, gives occasion for sniggering and sneering, etc. It is said that the Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov has even written a farce about unity among the Social-Democrats entitled "A Storm in a Tea-cup", and that this farce will be performed here in a day or two before one of the groups of the emigrant colony, who are addicted to sensationalism.

It is sickening to be stuck in the midst of this "anecdotic" situation, this squabbling and row-making, nervous strain and "scum"; to observe all this is also sickening. But one should not allow oneself to succumb to the mood. Life in exile is now a hundred times harder than it was before the revolution. Life in exile and squabbling are inseparable.

But the squabbling will pass away; nine-tenths of it remains abroad; it is an accessory feature. The development of the Party, the development of the Social-Democratic movement goes forward despite all the devilish difficulties of the present situation. The purging of the Social-Democratic Party from *its* dangerous "deviations", from liquidationism and otzovism *goes forward* steadfastly; within the framework of unity it has *progressed considerably farther*

than before. As a matter of fact, we had finished with otzovism ideologically before the plenum. We had not finished with liquidationism at that time; the Mensheviks succeeded temporarily in *hiding the snake*, but now it has been dragged out into broad daylight, now everyone sees it, now we shall kill it!

And this purging is by no means only an "ideological" task, a labour of armchair workers as that fool (or rogue) Potresov thinks, who *stands up* for the Machists the way the Mensheviks at the plenum stood up for the Vperyodists. No, this purge is inseparably bound up with the mass working-class movement, which learns how to organise Social-Democratic work in the present difficult period, learns precisely by rejection, finds the right path by rejecting liquidationism and otzovism. Only that windbag Trotsky imagines that this rejection can be avoided, that it is superfluous, that it does not concern the workers, that the issues of liquidationism and otzovism have been posed *not* by life itself, *but* by the wicked polemicists.

I can imagine how distressing the sight of this painful growth of the new Social-Democratic movement must be to those who have not seen and lived through its painful growth in the late eighties and early nineties. At that time such Social-Democrats were to be counted by the score, if not in individuals. Now there are hundreds and thousands of them. Hence the crisis and crises. And the Social-Democratic movement *as a whole* is coping with them openly and will overcome them honestly.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

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191
TO N. A. SEMASHKO[419]

October 4, 1910

Dear N. A.,

We must meet as soon as possible to talk about the *speediest* convocation of a meeting of Bolsheviks (anti-Vperyodists). Yesterday Mark + Lozovsky + Lyova departed with a protest against a factional newspaper.[420] The funny fellows! I am glad that the muddlers are out of it, but we must *speedily* ascertain the attitude of the remaining people. If possible come out as quickly as you can and take steps for an early meeting.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Paris to Chatillon (France)
First published in 1930

Printed from the original

192
TO JULIAN MARCHLEWSKI[421]

October, 7, 1910

Dear Comrade,

I received the letter from you and Wurm and your article late yesterday evening. In accordance with your and Kautsky's request, *lasse ich es bei Ihrem Artikel bewenden*.*

I have already written about half of a long article against both Martov and Trotsky.** I shall have to leave it and start on an article against Trotsky. Since you meet Kautsky, please tell him that I am taking care of the reply to Trotsky. If the Germans are so afraid of a polemic, I don't think it matters much whether the reply comes a week earlier or a week later?

What a pity that even Kautsky and Wurm do not see how disgusting and mean such articles as those of Martov and Trotsky are. I shall try to write at least a private letter to Kautsky to clarify the matter. It is really a downright scandal that Martov and Trotsky lie with impunity and write scurrilous lampoons in the guise of "scientific" articles!

By the way, could you help me to clear up two practical questions. First: could a translator from Russian into German be found in Berlin (for articles for *Neue Zeit*)? Or is this unreliable and expensive, so that it would be better to look for someone here? I shall look out for someone here in any case, but I should like to know your opinion, as you have considerable experience in this respect.

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* I shall confine myself to your article.—*Ed.*

** Reference is to "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (see present edition, Vol. 16).—*Ed.*

Second: what if I were to write a pamphlet (of a size *à la* Cherevanin: *Das Proletariat in der russischen Revolution*) on the subject of the Russian revolution, its lessons, class struggle, etc. Could a German party publisher be found or not? Do the Germans pay for such things, or must payment be looked for only from the Russians, while the Germans are served *nebenbei*?

In connection with the reply to Martov, I have dug into some very interesting strike statistics of 1905-08 and should very much like to analyse them. It is a subject more suitable for a book or pamphlet than for an article.* But the Germans are disgracefully "unconscious" in questions concerning the appraisal of the Russian revolution!

I enclose a brief enumeration of what it is desirable to add against Martov. If you include even a part of it in your article, it would be very good.[422]

Beste Grüsse.

Yours,

Lenin

Here, in my opinion, are the chief (not all, by far) points of Martov's lies and falsehood which it is desirable to point out (if not in full, at least in part):

In saying that Comrade Radek is misquoting, Comrade Martov casts suspicion without giving proof. We, however, have *full* proof that Martov quotes falsely. "So far we have been speaking French" (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1910), Martov quotes Lenin. *The quotation is distorted*. Lenin said: "During the revolution we learned to 'speak French'" (*Proletary* No. 46)**. By distorting the quotation, Martov contrives to conceal the fact that he (like all opportunists) calls on the workers to *unlearn* the methods of revolutionary struggle.

"To speak French"—"*richtiger gesagt*: blanquistisch",*** is Martov's emendation. We thank him for his frankness. To call the participation of the French proletariat in the French revolutions "Blanquism" is precisely the "essence" of the views of Martov and Quessel.[423]

* See "Strike Statistics in Russia" (present edition, Vol. 16).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 15, p. 458.—*Ed.*

*** "Or rather: in the Blanqui manner".—*Ed.*

"*In ganz Westeuropa*," writes Martov, "*betrachtet man die Bauernmassen in dem Masse für bündnisfähig, als sie die schweren Folgen der kapitalistischen Umwälzung der Landwirtschaft zu spüren bekommen...; für Russland malte man sich ein Bild aus, wie mit dem Proletariat sich die 100 Millionen Bauern vereinigen..., die noch nicht von der kapitalistischen Bourgeoisie in die Schule genommen worden sind*" (*Neue Zeit*, Seite 909). *Das ist eben russisches Quesseltum!**

The Russian Quessel *forgot* to mention that in the *agrarian programme* of the Russian Social-Democrats (adopted in Stockholm, 1906, when the Mensheviks had a majority!) it is stated "support for the revolutionary actions of the peasantry to the extent of *confiscation* of the landed estates". Is there anything like this in "Europe", O Russian Quessel? There is not, for in Europe the questions of a bourgeois revolution are no longer *revolutionary* issues. The "school of the capitalist bourgeoisie" as far as the Russian peasants are concerned is a school of betrayals and treachery on the part of the liberal bourgeoisie (which has been *betraying* the peasants to the landowners and absolutism), and only extreme opportunists are capable of defending such a *school*.

In scoffing at the "union with the proletariat of 100 million peasants", Martov is scoffing at the whole revolution, which has demonstrated such a union *in practice* both in the arena of the uprising (October, November-December, 1905) and in the arena of *both* Dumas (1906-1907).

Martov vacillates helplessly between the liberals (they are *against* "confiscation of the landed estates", *against* "revolutionary actions of the peasantry") and the Social-Democrats, who so far have by no means withdrawn their support of the peasant *uprising* or their *statement* to this effect contained in their *programme*.

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* "In the whole of Western Europe the peasant masses are considered suitable for alliance to tho extent that they come to experience the painful results of the capitalist revolution in agriculture...; for Russia a picture has been drawn of the union with the proletariat of 100 million peasants ... who have not yet been through the school of the capitalist bourgeoisie" (*Neue Zeit*, p. 909). That precisely is Russian Quesselism!—*Ed*.

Martov believes that during the years of revolution (1905-07) it was *not* the question of a republic, *but* "*die Frage der Unabhängigkeit* der Volksvertretung" (S. 918)* that was on the order of the day. Independence *from* whom? From the monarchy which *had carried out Staatsstreiche*?** The Russian opportunists forget at least the connection between the agrarian and the political revolution (is it possible to fight for the confiscation of the landed estates without fighting for a republic?); they forget that the era of *Staatsstreiche*, *der Aufstände*, *der Niederwerfungsstreiks*,*** by virtue of its *objective* conditions and not of our will, *puts* the question of a republic on the order of the day. The "republic" as a slogan of the day in 1905="romanticism"; "independence" (from the monarchy which carries out *Staatsstreiche* and wages *den Bürgerkrieg*)****=*Realpolitik*, is not that so, O Russian Quessel?

Apropos. Rosa Luxemburg argued with Kautsky as to whether in Germany the moment *had arrived* for *Niederwerfungsstrategie*,***** and Kautsky *plainly and bluntly* stated that he considered this moment was unavoidable and imminent but had not yet arrived. But Martov, "deepening (*verballhornend*[1]) Kautsky, denies the applicability of the *Niederwerfungsstrategie* to the year 1905 in Russia! Martov finds that the uprising in December 1905 was evoked "*künstlich*"[2] (*Neue Zeit*, S. 913). *Die Leute*, *welche so glauben*, *können nur* künstlich *zur Sozialdemokratie gerechnet werden*. Natürlich *sind sie Nationalliberale*.[3]

Martov ridicules the view that the proletariat is "*die ausschlaggebende Macht*" (S. 909)[4] in the revolution. So far only the liberals have dared (and not always, at that)

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* "The question of the independence of the people's representative assembly".—*Ed.*

** Coups d'état.—*Ed.*

*** Coups d'état, uprisings, strikes for political overthrow.—*Ed.*

**** Civil war.—*Ed.*

***** Strategy of overthrow.—*Ed.*

[1] Botching.—*Ed.*

[2] Artificially.—*Ed.*

[3] People who think like that can only *artificially* be reckoned as Social-Democrats. *In effect*, they are National-Liberals.—*Ed.*

[4] "The decisive force" (p. 909).—*Ed.*

to deny the indisputable historical fact that in 1905 the Russian proletariat actually played the part of "*der ausschlaggebenden Macht*". And when a theory which denies the "hegemony of the proletariat in the Russian revolution" gained the upper hand in the five-volume *Social Movement* (edited by Martov and Potresov), Plekhanov *resigned* from the editorial board and declared the *Social Movement* a work of liquidators. Martov now represents not Menshevism as a whole but only that kind of Menshevism which Plekhanov, who has remained a Menshevik, has repudiated and which he has called opportunism.

Martov contraposes the Russian boycott of 1906 to the anarchists' defence of boycott ("political abstention") "*in ganz Westeuropa*". We have already spoken about the boycott of 1906 (you have already dealt with this). But speaking of boycott in general, why did Martov *forget* the chief application of a boycott in the Russian revolution, the boycott of the Bulygin Duma (the law of August 6, 1905)? Against this boycott were all the liberals, even those of the *Left* (Osvobozhdeniye League), in favour of it were the Bolshevik Social-Democrats. Is it because *this* boycott was victorious that Martov is silent about it? Is it because *this* boycott was the slogan of a *victorious Niederwerfungsstrategie*?

All the Mensheviks (especially in *Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Zhizn*[424]) seized on Rosa Luxemburg's dispute with Kautsky in order to declare K. Kautsky a "Menshevik". Martov is trying his hardest, by means of *kleinliche und miserable Diplomatie*, to *deepen* the gulf between Rosa Luxemburg and K. Kautsky. These *elende** devices cannot succeed. Revolutionary Social-Democrats may argue about the *timing* of *Niederwerfungsstrategie* in Germany, but not of its *appropriateness* in Russia *in 1905*. It has never occurred to Kautsky to deny *its* appropriateness for Russia in 1905. Only liberals and German and Russian Quessels can deny that!

Well then, will not the upshot of the question of the mass strike in Magdeburg (the acceptance of Rosa's resolution and her withdrawal of the second part) make for *peace* be-

* Pitiful.—*Ed.*

tween her and Kautsky? and the *Vorstand*? Or will it not be soon?[425] ((I wrote to Rosa Luxemburg a couple of weeks ago from Stockholm.))

My address is: VI. Oulianoff, 4, Rue Marie Rose, 4, Paris, XIV.

Sent to Leipzig
First published in 1925 Printed from the original

193
TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY[426]

Dear Comrade,

Many thanks for the letter and news of the Plekhanovite agitation. All such information, which gives us an accurate idea of the moods prevailing among the Social-Democrats abroad, is now extremely valuable to us. I too am thinking of going on a lecture tour in Switzerland (Geneva, Lausanne, Berne, Zurich[427]). I don't know whether the journey will be worth it.

Regarding a bloc with Plekhanov, I think you are quite right that we should be in favour of it. Since 1909 I have been *wholly* in favour of a *rapprochement* with the Plekhanovites. And even more so now. We can and should build the Party only with the Plekhanovites—the *Vperyod* and *Golos* people should have been given up as hopeless long ago. It is a mistake to think that the Plekhanovites are weak, mere "ciphers" (as is sometimes said), etc. That is an impression existing abroad. I am deeply convinced that nine-tenths of the Menshevik *workers* in Russia are Plekhanovites. The whole history of Menshevism in the revolution vouches for the fact that Plekhanovism is the best (and therefore the most viable) product of the proletarian stream of Mensheviks.

In Copenhagen, Plekhanov and I talked about publishing a popular newspaper. It is essential. (Trotsky has clearly turned to the liquidators, to support of the *Golos* group, to *disruption* of the Party bloc between the Bolsheviks and Plekhanovites.) Plekhanov and I fully agree that nothing can be done with Trotsky. We shall either establish a popular newspaper under the C.O., *or separately* by the group of Bolsheviks. Plekhanov has promised to contribute. Money will be needed—we have exceedingly little. I am hoping

for every assistance from you. We are struggling hard to establish a periodical in Russia (*à la Vozrozhdeniye* or *Zhizn*). We can't get the thing going, there is no secretary, no one through whom to arrange things—our people are continually being arrested, worse luck! Yet a periodical is essential.[428]

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

Written October 14, 1910
Sent from Paris to Berne

First published (abridged) in 1927
Published in full in 1930

Printed from the original

194
TO MAXIM GORKY

November 14, 1910

Dear A. M.,

There has been no news from you and M. F. for a very long time. I have been looking forward eagerly to news from Capri. What's wrong? Surely you don't keep count of letters as some people are said to keep count of visits.

Everything here is as of old. A host of trivial affairs and all kinds of trouble connected with the struggle of the various "dominions" inside the Party. Brrr!... It must be nice on Capri....

By way of relaxation from the squabbling we have taken up the old plan of publishing *Rabochaya Gazeta*. With difficulty we raised 400 francs. Yesterday No. 1 came out at last. I am sending you a copy together with a leaflet and a subscription list.[429] Members of the Capri-Neapolitan colony who sympathise with such an enterprise (and with the "rapprochement" between the Bolsheviks and Plekhanov) are invited to afford every assistance. *Rabochaya Gazeta* is necessary, but we can't make a go of it with Trotsky, who is intriguing in favour of the liquidators and the otzovists and *Vperyod* supporters. Already in Copenhagen Plekhanov and I protested vigorously against Trotsky's despicable article in *Vorwärts*. And what a disgusting article he has published in *Neue Zeit*, too, on the historical significance of the struggle among the Russian Social-Democrats[430]! And Lunacharsky's in the Belgian *Le Peuple*—have you seen it?

We are setting up a small legal periodical to combat *Nasha Zarya* and *Zhizn*—this, too, with Plekhanov's participation. We hope to issue No. 1 soon.[431]

And so we jog along. Little by little, hard and slowly we are making headway, extricating ourselves from the squabbles.

What is the news with you? Did you write to Stroyev and what reply did you receive? We wrote a first letter to him to "make contact"; he received it and replied that he did not understand who was writing. We wrote again. Not a word. There's a terrible shortage of the right people, and the old ones have dispersed.

Arrangements were on the point of completion in St. Petersburg for putting out a weekly newspaper together with the Duma group (the Mensheviks there fortunately incline not towards the liquidators, but towards Plekhanov), but the matter has been held up again, the devil knows why.[432]

Write how you are getting on. Is your work going well? Has anything come of the journal we talked about in the summer? How are things with Znaniye?[433]

I have the right to be cross with M. F. She promised to write. Nothing has come. She promised to find out about the Paris library on the history of the Russian revolution. Nothing has come. That's bad.

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

Tria's report will, probably, be published *after all*. The editorial board of the C.O.[434] decided this. But the squabbling on that editorial board—ye gods!...

Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1930

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195
TO MAXIM GORKY

November 22, 1910

Dear A. M.,

I wrote you a few days ago when sending *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and asked what had come of the journal we talked about in the summer and about which you promised to write to me.

I see in *Rech* today a notice about *Sovremennik*, published "with the closest and *exclusive* [that is what is printed! illiterately, but so much the more pretentiously and significantly] participation of Amfiteatrov" and with you as a regular contributor.[435]

What is this? How does it happen? A "large monthly" journal, with sections on "politics, science, history, social life"—why, this is something quite different from symposia aiming at a concentration of the best forces of *belles-lettres*. Such a journal should either have a perfectly definite, serious and consistent *trend*, or it will inevitably disgrace itself and those taking part in it. *Vestnik Yevropy*[436] has a trend—a poor, watery, worthless trend—but one which serves a definite element, certain sections of the bourgeoisie, and which also unites definite circles of the professorate and officialdom, and the so-called intelligentsia from among the "respectable" (or rather, would-be respectable) liberals. *Russkaya Mysl*[437] has a trend, an odious trend, but one which performs a very good service for the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. *Russkoye Bogatsvo*[438] has a trend—a Narodnik, Narodnik-Cadet trend—but one which has kept its line for scores of years, and which serves definite sections of the population. *Sovremenny Mir*[439] has a trend—often Menshevik-Cadet trend (at present with a leaning towards pro-Party Menshevism)—but a trend. A journal without a trend is an absurdity, a ridiculous, scandalous and harmful thing. And what sort of trend can there be with

the "exclusive participation" of Amfiteatrov? One cannot expect G. Lopatin to provide a trend, and if the talk (said also to have got into the newspapers) is true about Kachorovsky's participation, than that is a "trend", but a trend of the blockheads, a S.R. trend.

During our talk in the summer when I told you that I had all but written you a disappointed letter about *Confessions* but did not send it because of the split with the Machists which had begun at that time, you replied: "*it's a pity* you did not send it". Then you went on to reproach me for not going to the Capri school,[440] and you said that, if matters had taken a different course, the breakaway of the Machists and otzovists might have cost you less nervous strain, less waste of energy. Recalling these talks, I have now decided to write to you without putting it off and without waiting for any verification, while the impression the news has made is still fresh.

I think that a political and economic monthly with the exclusive participation of Amfiteatrov is something many times worse than a special Machist-otzovist faction. What was and still is bad about this faction is that the *ideological* trend deviated and still deviates from Marxism, from Social-Democracy, without, however, going so far as a break with Marxism, and only creating confusion.

Amfiteatrov's journal (his *Krasnoye Znamya*[441] did well to die when it did!) is a political act, a political enterprise in which there is not even a realisation that a general "leftism" is not enough for a policy, that after 1905 to talk seriously about politics without making clear one's attitude towards Marxism and Social-Democracy is out of the question, impossible, inconceivable.

Things are turning out bad. It's saddening.

Yours,
Lenin

To M. F.—*salut et fraternité*.

Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

196

TO N. G. POLETAYEV[442]

I have received your two letters, which surprised me. What could be easier, it would seem, than to write and tell us simply and clearly what is the matter? We are still in the dark. It should not be difficult to find a person to write sensibly, clearly and frankly at least once a week.

Your attempt to detach the liquidators from liquidationism is unfortunate to a degree. We have never approved this distinction. Only sophists draw it. We earnestly request you not to believe the sophists and not to make this distinction. One can reconcile oneself to anything but the liquidators, and if you do not want the work to be ruined, keep them out of it.

With great difficulty we obtained from a publisher here a further thousand rubles and will send them to you tomorrow. If this publisher approaches you again with questions, advice, conditions, and so on—don't answer at all, or answer as we once advised.

Concerning the little magazine, we have had nothing from anyone.

So we repeat once more our insistent request: we have obtained for you what you require, see that you do not let us down, keep out the liquidators (there is no such thing as liquidationism without liquidators. And who could have played such a cruel joke on you by assuring you of a distinction between liquidationism and the liquidators?) and, further, see to it that we get a sensible, clear, frank and detailed letter every week. Surely these two requests are not difficult, not too much; we cannot manage without it.

Yours....

Written December 7, 1910
Sent from Paris to
St. Petersburg

First published in 1933

Printed from
the typewritten
copy found in
police record

1911

197
TO MAXIM GORKY

January 3, 1911

Dear A. M.,

I have long been intending to reply to your letter but intensification of the squabbling* here (a hundred thousand devils take it!) distracted me.

But I should like to have a chat with you.

First of all, before I forget: Tria has been arrested together with Jordania and Ramishvili. It is reported as being true. A pity, for he is a good chap. A revolutionary.

Regarding *Sovremennik*. In *Rech* today I read the contents of the first issue and I am cursing and swearing. Vodovozov on Muromtsev ... Kolosov on Mikhailovsky, Lopatin "Not ours", etc. You can't help swearing. And here are you, teasing as it were: "realism, democracy, activity".

Do you think these are good words? They are *bad* words, used by all the bourgeois tricksters in the world, from the Cadets and S.R.s in our country to Briand or Millerand here, Lloyd George in Britain, etc. The words are bad, turgid, and they carry a S.R.-Cadet message. It's not good.

As regards Tolstoy, I fully share your opinion that hypocrites and rogues will make a saint of him. Plekhanov, too, was infuriated by all the lying and sycophancy around Tolstoy, and in here we see eye to eye. He criticises *Nasha Zarya* for it in the C.O. (the next issue),[443] and I am doing so in *Mysl*** (No. 1 arrived today. Congratulate us on *our own* little journal in Moscow, a Marxist one. This has been a happy day for us). *Zvezda* No. 1 (it appeared on December

* That rascal Trotsky is uniting the Golosists and Vperyodists against us. It is war!

** See "Hero's of 'Reservation'" (present edition, Vol. 16).—Ed.

16 in St. Petersburg) also contains a good article by Plekhanov with a *trivial* comment, for which we have already scolded the *editors*. It was probably concocted by that ninny Yordansky, together with Bonch! But how come *Sovremennik* to combat the "legend about Tolstoy and his religion". Is it Vodovozov with Lopatin? You must be joking

That they have started hitting out at the students is; in my opinion, comforting, but Tolstoy must not be allowed to get away with either "passivism" or anarchism or Narodism or religion.

As regards quixotism in the international policy of Social-Democracy, I think, you are wrong. It is the revisionists who have long been asserting that colonial policy is progressive, that it implants capitalism and that therefore it is senseless to "accuse it of greed and cruelty", for "without these qualities" capitalism is "hamstrung".

It would be quixotism and whining if Social-Democrats were to tell the workers that there could be salvation somewhere apart from the development of capitalism, not through the development of capitalism. But we do not say this. We say: capital devours you, will devour the Persians, will devour everyone and go on devouring until you overthrow it. That is the truth. And we do not forget to add: except through the growth of capitalism there is no guarantee of victory over it.

Marxists do not defend a single reactionary *measure* such as banning trusts, restricting trade, etc. But to *each his own*. Let Khomyakov and Co. build railways across Persia, let them send Lyakhovs,[444] but the job of the Marxists is to *expose* them to the workers. If it devours, say the Marxists, if it strangles, fight back.

Resistance to colonial policy and international plunder *by means* of organising the proletariat, *by means* of defending freedom for the proletarian struggle, *does not retard* the development of capitalism but *accelerates* it, forcing it to resort to more civilised, technically higher methods of capitalism. There is capitalism and capitalism. There is Black-Hundred-Octobrist[445] capitalism and *Narodnik* ("realistic, democratic", full of "activity") capitalism. The more we *expose* capitalism before the workers for its "greed and cruelty" the more difficult is it for capitalism

of the first order to persist, the more surely is it bound to pass into capitalism of the second order. And this just suits us, this just suits the proletariat.

You think I have fallen into a contradiction? In the beginning of the letter I considered the words "realism, democracy, activity" bad words, and now I find them good? There is no contradiction here; what is bad for the proletariat is good for the bourgeois.

The Germans have an exemplary journal of the opportunists: *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. There gentlemen like Schippel and Bernstein have long been attacking the international policy of the revolutionary Social-Democrats by raising an outcry that this policy resembles the "lamentations of compassionate" people. That, brother, is a trick of opportunist swindlers. Ask for this journal to be sent to you from Naples and have their articles translated if you are interested in international politics. You probably have such opportunists in Italy too, only there are no Marxists in Italy, that's what makes her so nasty.

The international proletariat is pressing capitalism in two ways: by converting Octobrist capitalism into democratic capitalism and, because it drives Octobrist capitalism away *from itself*, by *transplanting* this capitalism to the savages. This, however, enlarges the basis of capitalism and brings its death nearer. There is practically no Octobrist capitalism left in Western Europe; practically all capitalism is democratic. Octobrist capitalism has gone from Britain and France to Russia and Asia. The Russian revolution and the revolutions in Asia = the struggle for ousting Octobrist capitalism and replacing it by democratic capitalism. And democratic capitalism = the last of its kind. It has no next stage to go on to. The next stage is its death. What do you think of *Zvezda* and *Mysl*? The former is dull, in my opinion. But the latter is *all* ours and I am delighted with it. I'm afraid they'll soon close it down, though.

I was wondering whether you could arrange for my book on the agrarian question to go to Znaniye. Talk it over with Pyatnitsky, I just can't find a publisher, not for love or money.[446]

Reading your postscript: "my hands are shaking and freezing" makes me indignant. What wretched houses you

have on Capri! It's a disgrace, really! Even we here have central heating; and your "hands are freezing". You must revolt.

All the very best.

Yours,

Lenin

I have received from Bologna an invitation to come to the school there (20 workers). I have turned it down.[447] I don't want to have anything to do with the Vperyodists. We're trying again to get the workers to come here.

Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924

Printed from the original

198
TO A. RYKOV

Saturday, February 25, 1911

Dear Vlasov,

I have just received your letter and I hasten to reply at once without waiting for Grigory, who forwarded Samovarov's letter on to you today.

Nadya is writing today to Lyubich. What a pity you didn't think of it before. Now you must write to him not about preparing to leave, but about immediate departure. Write to him again, insisting emphatically on immediate departure, otherwise the enemy will have four (the Bundist+the Lett+two Mensheviks) and we'll have no more than that (three, of whom one is doubtful,+one Pole).

Your letter concerning the declaration grieves me very much, for I see from it how inadequate our agreement still is and hence (to my *extreme regret*) how "precarious" it is.

Among the changes proposed by you, there are some to which no objections can be made. These include: dealing with the question of affairs abroad in a special resolution; adding to the declaration a special paragraph on the significance of the Duma and on the fact that those not assisting in the elections to the Fourth Duma are traitors; *separating* the question of renewing the primary Party cells (although I do not understand why it should be separated and where it should be put. It must be dealt with, however! But where?).

But you propose many more changes that are unacceptable and harmful.

("To recognise that the conference is urgent"? Why try to be cunning? You don't believe in it yourself! To breed hypocrisy and self-deception—there is nothing more harmful than that just now!)

"To express satisfaction that otzovism-ultimatumism has in effect disappeared from the political horizon"....

That is *untrue*. I have seen workers who support *Vperyod*, and *even* Yevgeny in his speeches refutes this untruth.

"To welcome the decision of the *Vperyod* group to take part in the elections"....

There has been *no* such decision so far. And if it does appear tomorrow, it is scandalous "to welcome" the splitters for doing their *duty* and to keep silent about the expro funds.[448]

You write: "I know of no otzovist or ultimatumist statements of *Vperyod after* the plenum"....

You ought to know better. Just look: (1) The leaflet of the *Vperyod* group after the plenum: sheer abuse of the central bodies—not a word about renouncing the otzovist-ultimatumist platform. (2) The symposium No. 1[449]—ditto. *Not a single* guiding article on the *Duma* and Duma activities. (3) Lunacharsky in *Le Peuple* (it is quoted in the C.O.—Lunacharsky was officially delegated by the *Vperyod group* to the Copenhagen Congress). (4) The leaflet of the Geneva *Vperyod* group (it is quoted in part in *Golos S.-D.*), which lines up with Lunacharsky.

Vperyod, after the plenum, was in duty *bound* to issue a new platform, since the *old one* (it came out on December 27, 1909, i.e., *on the eve* of the plenum) is an *otzovist-ultimatumist* platform. *Vperyod* has *not* done this!

Your basic mistake is that you believe *words* and close your eyes to *deeds*. A lot of "good words" have been told you by various people like Domov or Alexinsky and I don't know who else, and you believe them. You write: *Vperyod* "is on the eve of dissolution or is a possible ally of ours", it "is freeing itself from the otzovist-ultimatumist platform".

This is *untrue*. They are the lying words of swindlers who are ready to promise anything so long as they can *disguise* the facts, namely, their own special school, their 85,000 rubles of expro money.

What if Domov does move away from *Vperyod*—Domov is a high school teacher, a philistine, an ignorant old woman, and not a politician. What if Alexinsky has "quarrelled" with Bogdanov and Co,—now, *after returning* from

Bologna, he has quite made it up again and yesterday delivered a lecture *on behalf of* the *Vperyod* group!

You put your trust in *words* and leave *yourself* helpless *in deeds*—which means repeating the *fatal* error of the plenum, an error which has weakened the Party *for a year* at least. If you now, a year after the idiotic conciliatory errors of the plenum, *repeat* these errors, you will completely ruin all prospects of "unity". I say this with the fullest conviction, for I know it thoroughly from experience. Leave it to Samovarov to shout about my having wrecked "unity" (this is the catch-phrase of Trotsky and Yonov!). Samovarov *has* to shout this nonsense (which he *dares not* utter in print and which I have *publicly* dealt with and refuted in No. 2 of *Diskussionny Listok**), for he is *ashamed* to admit the mistake the conciliators made at the plenum. Their mistake was that they almost ruined the prospect of unity with the *pro-Party* Mensheviks, by believing the *words* of the anti-Party Golosists and allowing them *to consolidate themselves in deeds.*

Mind you don't repeat this mistake!

The Vperyodists are very strong. They have a school = a conference = agents. We (and the C.C.) have *not*. They have money—some 80,000 rubles. You think they will give it to you? Are you really so naïve?

And if not, *how* can you regard as "allies" *factionalists* who are keeping a factional fund *against* you!

It is the height of naïveté to write: "I do not want to make it difficult for the *Vperyod* splinter elements to achieve a rapprochement."

They have achieved a rapprochement with the liquidators, they have organised a school against you, they are pulling the wool over your eyes, saying: we are all right, we are not otzovists, and you believe their words *and do not combat their deeds*. It's the limit, really!

You write: "I should not like to have the Vperyodists expelled from the general Party (not factional) organisation abroad."

Either the one or the other: either you *encourage* a special

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* The reference is to "Notes of a Publicist" (see present edition, Vol. 16).—*Ed.*

faction and let it *keep* its money, in which case we shall publish our statement to the C.C. (demanding a committee of enquiry) and say: let the Vperyodists help *such* a C.C., *we shall not do so.*

Or you *condemn* the factionalism of the Vperyodists, in which case you have to be consistent. *By condemning* in words only, you make yourself *ridiculous.*

In that case it must be said: *so long as* the Vperyodists (1) do not publish a *new* platform, (2) do not make pro-Party statements, (3) do not dissolve their *factional* school, (4) do not hand over their *factional* funds to the Party—they remain an anti-Party faction.

If you do not say *this*, you will lose our co-operation *without* gaining that of the Vperyodists. Is that good policy?

As for the splinter elements (*future ones*!), do not worry about that. If we are *strong*, they will all come to us. If we are weak, if we believe in words, we shall be laughed at, that's all. To find the right form is not so difficult: for example, after condemning the *Vperyod faction*, to say that part of the Vperyodist *workers* stand for elections, for legal opportunities, for the Party principle, and that you call on such workers, such Vperyodists, to come *away from* the faction and *to* the Party, etc., etc.

In the resolution on unity abroad it should be clearly specified *who* the disrupters are: the *Golosists* and *Vperyodists must* be named, and it must be explained wherein lies *their* "disruption and anti-Partyism": *not* in ideas (argue and write about this in *Diskussionny Listok*, etc.) *but* in the special school, in the special school funds, in the special organ (*Golos*), in the special collections for *Golos*, and in the special factional groups (which maintain contacts with Russia *against* the C.C.).

If the Golosists and Vperyodists are not precisely and clearly named, the whole resolution = 0. In that case you will *compel* us to come out against this *playing* at unity.

If you name them precisely and say *clearly* what their factionalism is, you will immediately and definitely *win over the majority* of our people abroad (the Bolsheviks + the Plekhanovites + pro-Party workers + the bulk of the *groups* in the "provinces" and in America, where there are no *leaders* of Golosism).

If the C.C.'s "struggle" against *factions* consists in its *paying court* to the *anti-Party* factions of *Golos* and *Vperyod*, in hampering *our* work (in a Party spirit) by multi-storey formalities (the Pole, a committee, a collegium of people who are not acquainted with the matter, "invitation" of Vperyodists, quarrel with Alexinsky, etc., etc.), then you can *count us out*.

We have just received a letter from St. Petersburg. Samovarov has proposed to the Social-Democratic Duma group that it issue an electoral platform!

This—to a majority of Mensheviks! (and not a word to us). If Samovarov wants to carry on *in this fashion*, I promise you that I shall begin a series of leaflets *directly* against Samovarov.

If an agreement among us is possible, the *Bolsheviks* must rally into a *trend* and work *harmoniously* (on the basis of the agreement), and not carry on intrigues, nor go over to the Mensheviks.

Write and let me know your opinion as soon as possible.

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Have you seen Nikitich? Has he tried to sell the story of *Vperyod*'s peace-loving nature? He's a great hand at making promises and throwing dust in people's eyes.

Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1931 Printed from the original

199
TO MAXIM GORKY

May 27, 1911

Dear A. M.,

A few days ago I received a letter from Poletayev. He writes, inter alia: "We have received a letter from Gorky. He is proposing that N. I. should come abroad to work out a plan for unity around some organ, and adds that he has spoken to you about this and to the Menshevik M" (Martov, I assume).

Poletayev adds that N. I. is hardly suitable for this plan and that if somebody must come, it should be somebody else. It is hardly likely that Pokrovsky will make the journey.

Reading this in Poletayev's letter frightened me—no, really.

Our uniting with Mensheviks like Martov is *absolutely* hopeless, as I told you here. If we start arranging a meeting for such a hopeless plan—the result will be nothing but a disgrace (personally I would not go even to a meeting with Martov).

Judging from Poletayev's letter, the participation of the Duma group is planned. Is this necessary? If it is a question of a journal, then the Duma group has nothing to do with it. If it is a question of a newspaper, it should be borne in mind that we have had *plenty* of discord as it is with *Zvezda*: they have no line, they are afraid of going with us, afraid of going with the liquidators, they play hot and cold, they give themselves airs, they vacillate.

Besides, a union of the Plekhanovites + our people + the Duma group threatens to give Plekhanov a *preponderance*, for Mensheviks predominate in the Duma group. Is it desirable and reasonable to give Plekhanov a preponderance?

I *very much* fear that Yordansky is unsuitable for such plans (for he has "*his*" own journal and he will either raise

obstacles or try to impose "his" journal, leaving it as *his*, that is, a semi-liberal organ).

To avoid disappointments and hopeless squabbles, I think we should be very careful as regards "unity". Upon my word, we should be not uniting now, but dissociating! If a publisher can be found for a journal or a newspaper, *you* should conclude an agreement with him *off your own bat* (or take money from him without an agreement, if possible), but the arrangement of a meeting will only make a mess. Truly, the result will be a mess.

I am writing to you because I do not want to see *you* of all people wasting your time, nervous energy, etc., on a mess. I *know* from my own bitter experience of 1908-11 that it is impossible to "unite" *now*. In our *Mysl*, for example, Plekhanov more than once behaved temperamentally—he was dissatisfied, for example, with my article on strikes and on Potresov,* saying that I was abusing "him"! We managed to smooth things over and *for the time being* we can and must work with Plekhanov, but *formal* unions and meetings are premature and could spoil everything.

Don't hurry with the meeting!

It is said positively among us that there exists a government circular of Stolypin's for closing down *all* Social-Democratic publications. It sounds like the truth. Before the Fourth Duma they will probably put the screw on ten times tighter.

Legal opportunities will evidently diminish in the immediate future. We must push on with illegal work.

M. F. wrote that you have completely withdrawn from Znaniye. That means a complete break with Pyatnitsky and my last letter came too late?

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. *Sovremennaya Zhizn*[450] in Baku has also been raided and suppressed!

Sent from Paris to the Isle of Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924 Printed from the original

* "Strike Statistics in Russia", "Those Who Would Liquidate Us" (see present edition, Vol. 16, and Vol. 17).—*Ed.*

200
TO ANTONIN NĚMEC[451]

Paris, November 1, 1911

Dear Comrade,

You will be doing me a great service if you can help me with advice and action in the following matter. A number of organisations of our Party intend to call a conference (abroad—of course). The number of members of the conference will be about 20-25. Is there a possibility of organising this conference in Prague (to last about a week)?[452]

The most important thing for us is the possibility of organising it *in extreme secrecy*. No person, no organisation, should know about it. (It is a *Social-Democratic* conference, hence legal according to European laws, but the majority of the delegates *do not have passports* and cannot use their own names.)

I earnestly beg you, dear comrade, if it is at all possible, to help us and tell me as quickly as possible the address of a comrade in Prague who (in the event of an affirmative reply) could make all the practical arrangements. It would be best if this comrade understood Russian—if this is impossible we can also reach agreement with him in German.

I hope, dear comrade, that you will pardon me for troubling you with this request. I send you my thanks in anticipation.

With Party greetings. *N. Lenin*

My address is:
VI. Oulianoff
4, Rue Marie Rose, 4,
Paris, XIV.

Sent to Prague

First published in 1930 in a Russian translation

Printed from the original German text

NOTES

[1] *Axelrod*, *Pavel Borisovich* (1850-1928)—in the seventies a Narodnik, later a Marxist. In 1883 took part in founding the Emancipation of Labour group. From 1900 a member of the editorial board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Menshevik leader.

During the period of reaction (1907-10) one of the leading liquidators. Adopted a hostile attitude towards the October Socialist Revolution. p. 20

[2] This footnote was given by Lenin in view of the fact that the names of towns were ciphered in the letter for purposes of secrecy. p. 20

[3] This refers to the preparations for publishing abroad a non-periodical Miscellany entitled *Rabotnik*. It was published in 1896-99 by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and edited by the Emancipation of Labour group. The publication was sponsored by Lenin. In May 1895, during his stay in Switzerland, Lenin made arrangements for its publication with G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and other members of the Emancipation of Labour group. On his return to Russia in September 1895 Lenin developed extensive activities aimed at supplying articles and correspondence from Russia for the Miscellany and organising financial support for the publication. During his trips to Vilna, Moscow and Orekhovo-Zuyevo Lenin made arrangements with the local Social-Democrats for assistance to be rendered this publication.

Altogether 6 issues of *Rabotnik* in three volumes and 10 issues of *Listok Rabotnika* were published. p. 20

[4] This refers to the arrests made among the Social-Democrats in Moscow and Moscow Gubernia. p. 20

[5] *Vorwärts*—a daily, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Berlin from 1891. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels, the paper was controlled by the Party's Right wing and systematically published articles of the opportunists. *Vorwärts* tendentiously reported the struggle against opportunism and revisionism within the R.S.D.L.P. and supported the Economists, and later, after the split in the Party, the Mensheviks. p. 21

[6] This refers to the report of the Breslau Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held in 1895. The correspondence from abroad was sent in the binding of a book. p. 23

[7] This refers to the illegal printing-press of the young Narodnaya Volya group, organised in January 1895. Lenin negotiated with this group for the purpose of using the press for the publication of literature for the workers. In November 1895 Lenin's pamphlet *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers* (see present edition, Vol. 2) was handed over to this group for printing. This is the fourth thing ("one of ours") which Lenin refers to. p. 23

[8] This refers to *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause), which was being prepared by the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. The first number of this newspaper was compiled and edited by Lenin, who also wrote all the main articles: the editorial "To the Russian Workers", "What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?", "Frederick Engels" (see present edition, Vol. 2). In addition the newspaper contained articles by other members of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, such as G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, L. Martov (Y. O. Tsederbaum) and M. A. Silvin.

In his book *What Is To be Done?* Lenin wrote: "This issue was ready to go to press when it was seized by the gendarmes, on the night of December 8, 1895, in a raid on the house of one of the members of the group, Anatoly Alexeyevich Vaneyev, so that the first edition of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was not destined to see the light of day" (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 376). p. 23

[9] While in exile Lenin sent most of his letters to P. B. Axelrod concealed in the inside of book-covers. Passing through several hands, these letters eventually found their way abroad to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin's sister, who lived in Berlin at the time, and she forwarded them on to Axelrod. This particular letter was copied out by her and inserted in the middle of the text of her own letter to Axelrod. p. 24

[10] Meaning Anna Ilyinichna Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin's sister. p. 24

[11] This refers to the journal *Novoye Slovo* in which two articles of Lenin's were published in 1897: "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" and "About a Certain Newspaper Article" (see Vol. 2 of this edition).

Novoye Slovo (New Word)—a scientific, literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1894 by the liberal Narodniks, and from the spring of 1897 by the "legal Marxists". The journal was closed down by the government in December 1897. p. 24

[12] *Potresov, Alexander Nikolayevich* (1869-1934)—joined the Marxists in the nineties of the 19th century. For participating in the St.

Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, was exiled. In 1900 went abroad, where he took part in founding *Iskra* and *Zarya*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Mensheviks. During the years of reaction (1907-10) was an ideologist of liquidationism; played a leading role in the Menshevik publications *Vozrozhdeniye*, *Nasha Zarya*, and others.

After the October Revolution he emigrated. p. 25

[13] *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* (Archive of Social Legislation and Statistics)—a journal, published from 1888 to 1933 in Berlin—Thüringen—Leipzig.

Lenin here refers to Vol. XII of this journal published in 1898 and containing an article by an anonymous author (probably P. B. Struve) entitled "New Factory Legislation in Russia". p. 25

[14] *Struve, Pyotr Bernhardovich* (1870-1944)—a bourgeois economist and publicist. In the nineties a leading spokesman of "legal Marxism", "supplemented" and criticised the economic and philosophical theories of Marx, and tried to adapt Marxism and the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie; contributor to and editor of the journals *Novoye Slovo*, *Nachalo* and *Zhizn*. Struve was one of the theoreticians and organisers of the liberal-monarchist Osvobozhdeniye League (1903-05). With the formation of the Cadet Party in 1905—a member of its Central Committee. After the October Revolution—a white émigré. p. 25

[15] *Disciples*—followers of Marx and Engels. This term was used in the nineties as a legal designation for Marxists. p. 25

[16] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth)—a monthly journal published from 1876 to 1918 in St. Petersburg. In the early nineties it passed into the hands of the liberal Narodniks beaded by N. K. Mikhailovsky. The journal advocated a conciliatory attitude towards the tsarist government and conducted a bitter fight against Marxism and the Russian Marxists. In 1906 it became the organ of the semi-Cadet Trudovik Popular Socialist Party. p. 25

[17] *Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolayevich* (1871-1944)—bourgeois economist and idealist philosopher. In the nineties a "legal Marxist". Advocated a revision of Marx's doctrine on the agrarian question. After the Revolution of 1905-07 joined the Cadets, preached philosophical mysticism, participated in the counter-revolutionary miscellany *Vekhi*.

In 1922 he was deported for counter-revolutionary activities. p. 26

[18] Lenin refers to the polemic between Bulgakov and Struve over the book *Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung* by the German Kantian Stammler. p. 26

[19] Lenin refers to Plekhanov's articles "Bernstein and Materialism" in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 44 (1897-98. Band II) and "Conrad Schmidt against Marx and Engels" in the same journal, issue No. 5 (1898-99. Band I).

Die Neue Zeit—a theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to October 1917 it was edited by K. Kautsky, and after him by Heinrich Cunow. p. 26

[20] The reference is to Plekhanov's article "The Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel's Death" in the journal *Die Neue Zeit* Nos. 7, 8, 9 (1891-92. Band I).

Lenin's reference to "the 30th anniversary" is obviously a slip of the pen. p. 26

[21] The reference is to Axelrod's articles "Die historische Berechtigung der russischen Sozialdemokratie" (later issued in Russia as a separate pamphlet under the title *The Historical Position and the Mutual Relations between the Liberal and Socialist Democracy in Russia*), published in the journal *Die Neue Zeit* No. 30 and No. 31 (1897-98. Band II).

Lenin's comments on Axelrod's articles will be found on pp. 29-31 of this volume. p. 26

[22] The reference is to *Economism*, an opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The Economists held that the political struggle against tsarism was mainly the business of the liberal bourgeoisie, while the workers were to confine themselves to an economic struggle for better working conditions, higher wages, etc. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class and the significance of revolutionary theory in the labour movement, and maintained that that movement could only develop spontaneously. Lenin gave a devastating criticism of Economism in his book *What Is To Be Done?* p. 26

[23] *Narodism*—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement, which arose between the 1860s and 1870s. The Narodniks were out to abolish the autocracy and hand over the landowners' land to the peasantry. At the same time they denied the development of capitalist relations in Russia to be a natural tendency, and accordingly regarded the peasantry, and not the proletariat, as the main revolutionary force, and the village commune as the embryo of socialism. With the object of rousing the peasants to the struggle against the autocracy the Narodniks went into the country, "among the people", but gained no support there.

In the eighties and nineties the Narodniks took a conciliatory stand towards tsarism, expressed the interests of the kulaks, and waged a bitter fight against Marxism. p. 27

[24] Lenin refers to the heated disputes between the Marxists and the Narodniks that raged among the exiles. It was of one such clash in Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia, that Potresov wrote to Lenin about. p. 27

[25] *Nachalo* (The Beginning)—a scientific literary and political monthly, organ of the "legal Marxists", published in St. Petersburg in the early months of 1899 under the editorship of P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky and others. G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich and others contributed to it. Lenin wrote a number of book reviews for the journal (see present edition Vol. 4, pp. 65-73 and 94-103) which also published the first six paragraphs of Chapter III of his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see Vol. 3 of this edition). p. 28

[26] The reference is to Lenin's article "The Heritage We Renounce" (see Vol. 2, pp. 491-534, of this edition).

Skaldin (*Yelenev*, *Fyodor Pavlovich*) (1828-1902)—a Russian publicist and author; in the sixties of the 19th century a spokesman of bourgeois liberalism, contributed to the journal *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*. Subsequently Slaldin sided with the extreme reactionaries. p. 28

[27] *Chernyshevsky*, *Nikolai Gavrilovich* (1828-1889)—great Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, author and literary critic, leader of the revolutionary-democratic movement of the sixties in Russia. p. 28

[28] *Soziale Praxis*—a German monthly, published from 1895 to 1910, after which it came out under another name. p. 31

[29] Meaning the journal *Nachalo* (see Note 25). p. 32

[30] *Mir Bozhy* (God's World)—a monthly literary and popular science journal of a liberal trend published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1906. From 1906 to 1918 it was issued under the name of *Sovremenny Mir* (The Contemporary World). p. 33

[31] *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (Scientific Review)—a journal, published in St. Petersburg from 1894 to 1903, accepted contributions from publicists and scientists of all schools and trends; widely used by liberals and "legal Marxists". The journal published occasional articles by Marxists. p. 33

[32] See Note 11. p. 33

[33] *Tugan-Baranovsky*, *Mikhail Ivanovich* (1865-1919)—Russian bourgeois economist, in the nineties a prominent spokesman of "legal Marxism", contributed to the journals *Novoye Slovo*, *Nachalo*, and others. p. 34

[34] This refers to Anna Ilyinichna Ulyanova-Yelizarova. p. 34

[35] This refers to a miscellany of Lenin's, *Economic Studies and Essays*, published in October 1898 (the cover and title-page bore the date 1899). p. 34

[36] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a daily newspaper, mouthpiece of the German merchants of Change. Published in Frankfurt am Main from 1856 to 1943. p. 35

[37] *Zhizn* (Life)—a literary, scientific and political journal published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901.

Publication was resumed abroad in April 1902 by the *Zhizn* Social-Democratic group (V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, V. A. Posse, V. M. Velichkina and others); six issues of the journal, twelve of *Listok Zhizni* and several volumes of the *Zhizn Library* series were published.

The group ceased to exist in December 1902 and the publishing-house was liquidated. p. 35

[38] Apparently this refers to Plekhanov, with whom Lenin had talks in 1895 during his visit to Switzerland. p. 35

[39] This refers to the split that took place at the First Conference of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad held in Zurich (Switzerland) in November 1898.

The *Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was founded in Geneva in 1894 on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group (see Note 58). It had its own press where it printed revolutionary literature and published the non-periodic miscellany *Rabotnik*. At first the Emancipation of Labour group controlled the Union and edited its publications. Eventually control passed to the opportunist elements—the Economists or the so-called "young" group. At the First Conference of the Union held in November 1898 the Emancipation of Labour group announced their refusal to edit the Union publications. The Group finally broke with the Union and left its ranks in April 1900 at the Second Conference of the Union, when the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters walked out and established their own *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in 1903 the Union's representatives took an extremely opportunist stand and walked out after the Congress declared the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad to be the only organisation of the Party abroad. The Second Congress declared the Union dissolved. p. 36

[40] *Mikhailovsky*, *Nikolai Konstantinovich* (1842-1904)—a prominent theoretician of liberal Narodism, publicist and literary critic; a representative of the subjective school in sociology; editor of the journals *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* and *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. Lenin cri-

ticised Mikhailovsky's views in his book *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (see Vol. 1 of this edition) and other writings. p. 36

[41] Lenin refers to the miscellany *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development* containing his article (over the pen-name K. Tulin) "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book. (The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature)" directed against legal Marxism (see Vol. 1 of this edition). p. 37

[42] This refers to *Die Neue Zeit* (see Note 19). p. 37

[43] *Gvozdyov* (*Zimmerman*, *Roman Emilievich*) (1866-1900)—author, whose short stories and economic articles were published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, *Zhizn* and *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*. p. 37

[44] *(N.—on)—Danielson*, *Nikolai Frantsevich* (1844-1918)—Russian writer and economist, an ideologue of liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties; in his political activities he reflected the evolution of the Narodniks away from revolutionary action against tsarism towards a conciliatory attitude to it. Completed the translation of Marx's *Capital* into Russian, which was begun by G. A. Lopatin. While working on this translation he carried on a correspondence with Marx and Engels in which he touched on the problems of Russia's economic development. Danielson, however, failed to grasp the essence of Marxism and subsequently came out against it.

Lenin here refers to Danielson's book *Sketches of Our Post Reform Social Economy* in which its author elaborates Narodnik views on the development of post-reform national economy in Russia. The German edition appeared in 1899 in Munich. The French edition was published in 1902. p. 38

[45] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Recorder)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 onwards; it expressed the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia. In 1905 it became the organ of the Right-wing of the bourgeois Cadet Party. It was closed down in 1918 together with other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 38

[46] Lenin refers to Plekhanov's article "Konrad Schmidt gegen Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels" published in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 5 for 1898-99. p. 40

[47] Nezhdanov's article mentioned here is entitled "Markets under Capitalist Production (Apropos of Ratner's, Ilyin's and Struve's Articles)". Lenin replied to this in his article "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov" (see Vol. 4 of this edition). p. 41

[48] This refers to the review of A. Bogdanov's book *Fundamentals of the Historic View on Nature*, which came out in St. Petersburg in 1899. The first book by the same author *A Short Course of Economic*

Science was reviewed by Lenin in *Mir Bozhy* No. 4 for April 1898 (see Vol. 4 of this edition, pp. 46-54).

Bogdanov, *A.* (*Malinovsky*, *Alexander Alexandrovich*) (1873-1928)—philosopher, sociologist and economist, by education a physician. During the nineties took part in the work of the Social-Democratic circles. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. During the years of reaction (1907-10) he became the leader of the otzovists and of the *Vperyod* group, which came out against Lenin and the Party. In questions of philosophy he attempted to set up a system of his own, known as "empirio-monism", a species of subjective-idealist Machian philosophy, which was sharply criticised by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1909) (see Vol. 14 of this edition). p. 41

[49] The remarks referring to the end of Lenin's article "Capitalism in Agriculture" were taken into consideration by Lenin when publishing the article (see Vol. 4 of this edition). p. 43

[50] *Krupskaya*, *Nadezhda Konstantinovna* (1869-1939)—a professional revolutionary and outstanding member of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; the wife of V. I. Lenin. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1890. In 1895 was one of the organisers of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1901 emigrated and worked as secretary of the *Iskra* editorial board . Took an active part in preparing the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which she attended as a non-voting delegate. After the Congress she was secretary of the editorial boards of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. During the first Russian revolution (1905-07) worked as secretary to the Central Committee of the Party in Russia. Took an active part in preparing and carrying out the October Socialist Revolution. p. 44

[51] Apparently this refers to A. N. Potresov. p. 44

[52] This refers to the announcement concerning the resumption of publications by the Emancipation of Labour group issued at the end of 1899. The date given by Lenin is a slip of the pen. p. 46

[53] (*V. I—n*) *Ivanshin*, *Vladimir Pavlovich* (1869-1904)—one of the editors of the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo*, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad; maintained close contact also with *Rabochaya Mysl*, the newspaper of the St. Petersburg Economists. In his articles he drew a line between the immediate economic interests of the workers and the political tasks of Social-Democracy.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) he joined the Mensheviks. p. 46

[54] On September 6 Lenin left Nuremberg for Munich, which was chosen as the residence for the members of the editorial board of the all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper *Iskra*. p. 48

[55] This refers to the group consisting of V. I. Lenin, Y. O. Martov and A. N. Potresov formed on Lenin's initiative upon his return from exile at the beginning of 1900 with the object of setting up abroad an all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper. p. 48

[56] This refers to the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (see Note 39). p. 48

[57] Here and elsewhere the reference is to Lenin's talks with Ts. Kopelson ("Grishin"), a member of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 48

[58] This refers to the Emancipation of Labour group, the first Russian Marxist group, founded by Plekhanov in Geneva in 1883. Other members of the group were P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. I. Zasulich and V. N. Ignatov. The E. L. group did a great deal to disseminate Marxism in Russia. It translated into Russian, published abroad and distributed in Russia the works of the founders of Marxism: *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Marx and Engels; *Wage-Labour and Capital* by Marx; *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* by Engels and other works. Plekhanov and his group dealt a severe blow to Narodism. The two drafts of a programme for Russian Social-Democrats written by Plekhanov in 1883 and 1885 and published by the E. L. group were an important step towards preparing the ground for and establishing a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. An important part in spreading Marxist views in Russia was played by Plekhanov's essays: *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), *Our Differences* (1885) and *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895). The E. L. group, however, committed serious errors; they clung to remnants of the Narodnik views, underestimated the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry and overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie. These errors were the embryo of the future Menshevik views held by Plekhanov and other members of the group.

Lenin pointed out that the E. L. group "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement" (see Vol. 20, p. 278 of this edition).

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1903 the E. L. group announced that it had ceased its activities as a group. p. 48

[59] The rumour refers to the forthcoming publication of the newspaper *Iskra*.

Iskra (The Spark) was the first all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper, it was founded by Lenin in 1900 and played an important role in building the Marxist revolutionary party of the working class in Russia.

As it was impossible to publish a revolutionary newspaper in Russia on account of police persecution, Lenin, while still in exile in Siberia, evolved a detailed plan for its publication aboard.

When his exile ended (in January 1900) Lenin immediately set about putting his plan into effect.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900, later issues were published in Munich; from July 1902 the paper was published in London, and from the spring of 1903 in Geneva. Considerable help in getting the newspaper going (the organisation of secret printing-presses, the acquisition of Russian type, etc.) was rendered by the German Social-Democrats Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun and others, as well as by Julian Marchlewski, a Polish revolutionary residing at Munich at the time, and by Harry Quelch, one of the leaders of the English Social-Democratic Federation.

The editorial board of *Iskra* consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, Y. O. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich. The first secretary of the board was I. G. Smidovich-Leman; in the spring of 1901 this post was taken over by N. K. Krupskaya, who also conducted the correspondence between *Iskra* and the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia. Lenin was virtually Editor-in-Chief and the leading figure in *Iskra*, in which he published his articles on all fundamental issues of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia, and dealt with the most important international events.

Iskra became the centre for the unification of Party forces, for the gathering and training of Party cadres. R.S.D.L.P. groups and committees of a Leninist *Iskra* trend were set up in a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara and others). Iskrist organisations sprang up and worked under the direct leadership of Lenin's disciples and associates N. E. Bauman, I. V. Babushkin S. I. Gusev, M. I. Kalinin, P. A. Krasikov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky, I. I. Radchenko, and others.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin the *Iskra* editorial board drew up a draft programme of the Party (published in *Iskra* No. 21), and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in July-August 1903. By the time the Congress was convened most of the local Social-Democratic organisations in Russia had adopted the *Iskra* position, approved its tactics, programme and plan of organisation, and recognised the newspaper as their leading organ. A special resolution of the Congress noted *Iskra*'s exceptional role in the struggle to build the Party and adopted the newspaper as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. The Second Congress approved an editorial board consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov and Martov. Despite the Congress decision Martov refused to participate, and issues Nos. 46-51 of *Iskra* were edited by Lenin and Plekhanov. Later Plekhanov adopted a Menshevik stand and demanded that all the old Menshevik editors be included in the editorial board of *Iskra*, although they had been rejected by the Congress. Lenin could not agree to this, and on October 19 (November 1), 1903, he resigned from the *Iskra* editorial board. He was co-opted to the Central Committee from where he conducted a struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. Issue 52 was edited by Plekhanov alone. On November

13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, on his own initiative and in defiance of the will of the Congress, co-opted all the old Menshevik editors to the editorial board. Beginning with issue 52 the Mensheviks turned *Iskra* into their own organ. p. 48

[60] Meaning the newspaper *Iskra*. p. 49

[61] In August 1899, upon receiving from A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova in St. Petersburg the manifesto of the Economists which she called "the Credo of the 'young' group", Lenin wrote his Anti-Credo—"A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (see Vol. 4, pp. 167-82 of this edition). The author of the *Credo* was Y. D. Kuskova, then a member of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. The manifesto of the Economists was not intended for the press, and, as Lenin pointed out, was published "without the consent and perhaps even against the will of its authors", because the Economists feared public criticism of their opportunist views (see Vol. 5, p. 364 of this edition). p. 50

[62] *Vademecum for the Editors of Rabocheye Dyelo. A Collection of Material Published by the Emancipation of Labour Group, with a Preface by G. V. Plekhanov* (Geneva, February 1900) was directed against opportunism in the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P., chiefly against Economism of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and of its organ, the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo*. p. 50

[63] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause)—a journal, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, published in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902. Twelve numbers (nine books) were issued in all. The editorial board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was the centre of the Economists abroad. *Rabocheye Dyelo* supported Bernstein's slogan of "freedom of criticism" of Marxism, and took an opportunist stand on questions of the tactics and organisational tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats. Its supporters propagated opportunist ideas making the proletariat's political struggle subservient to the economic struggle; they exalted spontaneity in the working-class movement and denied the leading role of the Party. V. P. Ivanshin, one of the journal's editors, also took part in editing *Rabochaya Mysl*, organ of the outspoken Economists, which *Rabocheye Dyelo* supported. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group represented the extreme Right, opportunist wing of the Party. p. 50

[64] *Yakubova, Apollinaria Alexandrovna* (1870-1917)—a participant in the Social-Democratic movement from 1893, prominent exponent of Economism. A member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class; in 1897-98 was one of the organisers of the St. Petersburg publication of the Economists' newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*. In 1898 was exiled to Siberia for a term of four years and emigrated in the summer of 1899. Assisted in the organisation of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

which she attended as a non-voting delegate. After the split in the Party, she sympathised with the Mensheviks. Retired from political activities after 1905. p. 51

[65] The reference is to Plekhanov. p. 51

[66] The reference is to Lenin's reply to Plekhanov, who asked Lenin's advice concerning the Economists' invitation to contribute to their newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*. p. 51

[67] *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought)—a newspaper, organ of the Economists, published from October 1897 to December 1902. Sixteen issues were published (St. Petersburg—Berlin—Warsaw—Geneva). Edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others. A criticism of *Rabochaya Mysl* views, described as the Russian variety of international opportunism, was given by Lenin in his article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy" (see Vol. 4 of this edition) and in articles published in *Iskra* and in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see Vol. 5 of this edition). p. 52

[68] This apparently refers to Y. O. Martov. p. 52

[69] *Bernsteinism*—an opportunist anti-Marxist trend in the international Social-Democratic movement, which originated in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century and was named after Eduard Bernstein, the German Social-Democrat. Bernstein tried to revise Marx's revolutionary doctrine in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism and to turn the Social-Democratic Party into a petty-bourgeois party of social reform. In Russia this trend found support among the "legal Marxists" and the Economists. p. 53

[70] *Plekhanov*, *Georgi Valentinovich* (1856-1918)—an outstanding leader of the Russian and international labour movement, the first propagandist of Marxism in Russia, founder of the first Russian Marxist group, the Emancipation of Labour group (Geneva 1883). At the beginning of the twentieth century Plekhanov, together with Lenin, edited the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya*, took part in drafting the Party Programme and preparing the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. After this Congress he stood for a conciliatory attitude towards opportunism and eventually joined the Mensheviks. In 1908-12 Plekhanov came out against the liquidators and headed the pro-Party Mensheviks. During the First World War (1914-18) he adopted a social-chauvinist stand. His attitude to the October Socialist Revolution was hostile, but he took no part in anti-Soviet activities.

Lenin thought highly of Plekhanov's philosophical works and his role in disseminating Marxism in Russia; at the same time he sharply criticised Plekhanov for his deviations from Marxism and the serious mistakes in his political activities. p. 55

[71] This refers to the negotiations between the editorial board of *Iskra* and the liberals concerning the publication of a supplement *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* to the journal *Zarya*. The talks, in which Lenin, Zasulich, Potresov, and Struve took part, started on December 29, 1900, and continued through January 1901. Struve rejected Point 7 of the draft agreement proposed by the *Iskra* and *Zarya* group concerning full freedom for the editors of *Iskra* to use all the political material received by *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*. Statements concerning the issue of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* were written by Plekhanov on behalf of *Iskra* and *Zarya* and by Struve on behalf of the "democratic opposition" group. The publication, however, did not materialise in view of Dietz's refusal to publish the statements, which did not fulfil censorship requirements. The talks between *Iskra* representatives and Struve were broken off and not resumed. p. 55

[72] *Zarya* (Dawn)—a Marxist scientific and political journal, published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* editorial board. Only four numbers (three books) were issued. *Zarya* criticised international and Russian revisionism, came out in defence of the theoretical premises of Marxism; it published the following writings of Lenin dealing with this question: "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see Vol. 5, pp. 31-80, of this edition), the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see Vol. 5 of this edition) and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 105-48), as well as Plekhanov's "Criticism of Our Critics. Part 1. Mr. Struve as Critic of Marx's Theory of Social Development", "Cant versus Kant, or Herr Bernstein's Spiritual Testament" and others. p. 56

[73] The reference is to Dobrogeanu-Gherea (Kats, K. A.) (1855-1920) —leader of the opportunist wing of the Rumanian Social-Democrats. p. 58

[74] *Rittmeyer*, *G.*—a Munich Social-Democrat at whose place Lenin lived in 1900-01 under the name of Meyer. Letters to Lenin were sent to his address from December 1900 to the end of July 1901. p. 58

[75] *Dietz*—owner of a Stuttgart printing-house at which *Zarya*, the Marxist scientific and political journal, was printed. *G.m.b.H.*—*Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung*. p. 58

[76] This refers to an article of Axelrod's intended as an editorial for the first issue of *Zarya*. In the phrase that was to appear on the cover of the journal "Published in close co-operation with G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, P. B. Axelrod and several Russian Social-Democrats", Dietz crossed out the last five words. p. 58

[77] This refers to D. Zhukovsky, a publisher of books on philosophy. p. 58

[78] The secret memorandum of tsarist minister S. Y. Witte under the heading "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo", with a preface by P. B. Struve (using the pseudonym R.N.S.), was published illegally by *Zarya* in 1901. Both the memorandum and the preface were sharply criticised by Lenin in his article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see Vol. 5 of this edition). p. 59

[79] Referring to Maria Ulyanova and M. T. Yelizarov. p. 59

[80] This refers to Y. O. Martov. p. 59

[81] The pseudonym of *Blumenfeld*, *Yosif Solomonovich* (born 1865)—a Social-Democrat, active member of the Emancipation of Labour group, later a member of the *Iskra* organisation, by trade a compositor. In the E. L. group and *Iskra* was in charge of printing and shipping arrangements. In March 1902 was arrested with a parcel of *Iskra* publications and imprisoned in a Kiev jail, whence he escaped abroad in August 1902. After the split at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. he joined the Mensheviks. In December 1903 became secretary of the editorial board of the Menshevik *Iskra* and subsequently worked in the Menshevik organisations in Russia and abroad. p. 59

[82] This refers to the *Iskra* leaflet "First of May" issued in April 1901. p. 59

[83] *Parisians*—the *Borba* (Struggle) literary group abroad who considered themselves affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P. The group was dissolved by decision of the Second Congress of the Party (see Note 93).

Zurichers—Lettish Social-Democrat students living in Zurich who handled the shipment of illegal publications to Russia. p. 60

[84] This refers to the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (see Note 39). p. 60

[85] The author of "Comments" was D. Ryazanov.

Ryazanov, *David Borisovich* (1870-1938)—participant in the Social-Democratic movement of the nineties. In 1900 went abroad and was one of the organisers of the *Borba* literary group, which opposed the Party programme worked out by *Iskra* and Lenin's principles of Party organisation. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. declared against the participation of the *Borba* group in the Congress proceedings and rejected a motion inviting Ryazanov to the Congress in the capacity of its representative.

In 1909 he was lecturer at the Capri school of the *Vperyod* faction. p. 60

[86] *Listok Rabochevo Dyela* (*Rabocheye Dyelo* Supplement)—a non-periodic publication of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad; appeared in Geneva in 1900-01. p. 60

[87] This refers to members of the *Iskra* promotion group in Berlin. p. 61

[88] See Note 57. p. 61

[89] The revolutionary organisation *Sotsial-Demokrat* was formed by members of the Emancipation of Labour group and their followers in May 1900 after the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad which took place at its Second Conference. In October 1901 *Sotsial-Demokrat*, on Lenin's proposal, united with the foreign section of the *Iskra* organisation into the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 61

[90] Lenin's plan was carried out in October 1901, when the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad was founded. Affiliated to the League were the foreign section of the *Iskra* organisation, and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation. The task of the League was to disseminate the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy and promote the building up of a militant Social-Democratic organisation. The League was the representative abroad of the *Iskra* organisation. It issued several bulletins and pamphlets including Lenin's *To the Rural Poor* (see Vol. 6 of this edition).

The R.S.D.L.P.'s Second Congress endorsed the League as the only Party organisation abroad having the status of a committee and working under the guidance and control of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. After the Second Congress the Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the League and launched a struggle against the Bolsheviks. At the League's second congress in October 1903 the Mensheviks slandered the Bolsheviks, upon which Lenin and his followers walked out. The Mensheviks got new Rules adopted, directed against the Party Rules approved by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. From then on the League became a stronghold of Menshevism. It existed until 1905. p. 61

[91] *Bauman, Nikolai Ernestovich* (1873-1905)—a professional revolutionary, prominent leader of the Bolshevik Party. Began his revolutionary activities in the early nineties. In 1900 was one of the founders of the *Iskra* organisation and worked in Moscow as its agent in 1901-02. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the Bolsheviks. p. 65

[92] The pseudonym "Leopold" has not been deciphered. Apparently it was the code name given to the shipping group associated with N. E. Bauman. p. 66

[93] The *Borba* group was formed in Paris in the summer of 1900 and consisted of D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov and E. L. Gurevich.

The name *Borba* (Struggle) was adopted by the group in May 1901. In an attempt to reconcile the revolutionary and opportunist trends in Russian Social-Democracy, the *Borba* group took the initiative in convening (in June 1901) the Geneva conference of representatives of the Social-Democratic organisations abroad—the *Iskra* and *Zarya* editorial board, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, the Foreign Committee of the Bund and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—and took part in the "unity" conference of the R.S.D.L.P.'s organisations abroad at Zurich (September 21-22 [October 4-5], 1901). In November 1901 the group issued a programmatic "Advertisement of the Publications of the Social-Democratic *Borba* Group". In its publications the group distorted the revolutionary theory of Marxism, interpreted it in a doctrinaire scholastic spirit and was hostile to Lenin's organisational principles for building up the Party. Owing to its deviations from Social-Democratic views and tactics, its disruptive activities and lack of contact with the Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the group was refused admission to the Second Congress, by whose decision it was dissolved. p. 67

[94] *The Bund*—the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia—was organised at an inaugural congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilna in 1897; it united mostly semi-proletarian elements of the Jewish artisans in the Western regions of Russia. At the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1898) the Bund joined the Party "as an autonomous organisation, independent only as far as questions affecting the Jewish proletariat are concerned" (*K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*], Part I, 1954, p. 14).

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the Russian working-class movement and took an opportunist stand on the most important issues of the Social-Democratic movement. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected the Bund's demand that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party, rejoining it in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists constantly supported its opportunist wing (the Economists, Mensheviks and liquidators) and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. To the Bolshevik programme's demand for the right of nations to self-determination the Bund opposed the demand for autonomy of the national culture. During the years of reaction (1907-10) the Bund adopted a liquidators' stand and took an active part in forming the anti-Party August bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) the Bundists took a social-chauvinist stand. In 1917 the Bund supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution, its leaders joining forces with the counter-revolution during the years of foreign military intervention and civil war. At the same

time a swing towards co-operation with the Soviet government was to be observed among the Bund's rank and file. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself. p. 67

[95] This letter is a postscript to N. K. Krupskaya's letter.

Knipovich, *Lydia Mikhailovna* (1856-1920)—a professional revolutionary, started her revolutionary activities in the seventies, carried on extensive cultural and educational work among the workers and played a prominent part in establishing *Iskra*'s contacts with the local organisations in Russia. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the Bolsheviks. p. 70

[96] Lenin proposed setting up *Iskra* abroad, having a matrix made from the type-setting and the matrix sent to Russia to be stereotyped and printed. p. 70

[97] This letter is a postscript to that of N. K. Krupskaya. p. 71

[98] *Calperin*, *L. Y.* (1872-1951)—a Social-Democrat, joined the revolutionary movement in 1898. While in exile, in Astrakhan Gubernia, he established contact with the *Iskra* organisation and was sent to Baku as its agent in the spring of 1901, where he worked at setting up the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., and an illegal printing-press, and at organising the transportation of illegal literature from abroad and its distribution in Russia.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. he joined the Bolsheviks and for a time represented the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ on the Party Council and was afterwards co-optated to the Central Committee. Adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Menshevism and was against convening the Third Congress of the Party. Retired from active political work in 1906. p. 72

[99] Lenin refers to his visit to the Moscow Art Theatre with I. Lalayants, of which he wrote to his mother M. A. Ulyanova in his letter dated February 20, 1901. p. 72

[100] *Berdayev*, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1874-1948)—a reactionary idealist philosopher and publicist.

The reference here is to his article "The Fight for Idealism", published in the journal *Mir Bozhy* No. 6, for 1901. p. 74

[101] *Struvefreundliche Partei*—the name by which Potresov and Zasulich were jokingly called among the editorial staff of *Iskra*. p. 74

[102] The reference is to the books: N. Shakhovskoi, *Agricultural Outside Employments*, Moscow, 1896; N. I. Tezyakov, *Agricultural Workers and the Organisation of Sanitary Supervision Over Them in Kherson Gubernia*, Kherson, 1896. p. 74

[103] The preface to Witte's "memorandum" was written by P. B. Struve. Lenin "trounced" Struve's preface in Chapter V of his article "The

Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see Vol. 5 of this edition). p. 75

[104] This refers to Nevzorov's (Y. M. Steklov's) article "And So, Where Do We Begin?" directed against Lenin's article "Where To Begin" (see Vol. 5 of this edition). p. 75

[105] *Tsederbaum, Sergei Osipovich* (1879-1939)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1898. Worked on the organisation of transport facilities for *Iskra* publications. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became an active Menshevik. After the October Socialist Revolution retired from political activities. p. 76

[106] *Yuzhny Rabochy* (Southern Worker)—a Social-Democratic illegal newspaper, published from January 1900 to April 1903 by a group of this name. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the group's delegates adopted a "Centre" position (that of "middling opportunists", as Lenin called the representatives of the Centre). The Second Congress decided to dissolve the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group as well as all separate Social-Democratic groups and organisations. p. 76

[107] The *Sotsialist* group was organised in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1900. It was one of the groups that were dissatisfied with the Economist tendency of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, and gave prominence to the political struggle. In January 1901 it amalgamated with the *Rabocheye Znamya* group. The group broke up after the arrests in the spring of 1901. p. 79

[108] The *Rabocheye Znamya* group (Workers' Banner) came into being during the second half of 1897. It disapproved of Economism and set itself the aim of conducting political propaganda among the workers. It published the newspaper *Rabocheye Znamya* (three issues were put out) and several pamphlets and leaflets. In January 1901 the St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Znamya* group amalgamated with the *Sotsialist* group, but in the course of January-April the members of the united group who were in Russia were arrested. Most of the members of the St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Znamya* group joined the *Iskra* organisation. p. 79

[109] *Volnoye Slovo* (Free Word)—a weekly, and from issue No. 37 a fortnightly publication which appeared in Geneva from 1881 to 1883; altogether 62 issues were put out. Founded for provocative purposes with the knowledge of the Russian secret political police by members of the Svyashchennaya Druzhina (Holy Squad)—a secret organisation of the landed gentry and tsarist dignitaries headed by Prince P. Shuvalov. Edited by the police agent A. P. Malshinsky. p. 81

[110] The reference is to *Der Sozialdemokrat*, Central Organ of the German Social-Democrats, published illegally in Zurich and London from 1879 to 1890. p. 82

[111] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*—a daily, published in Cologne from July 1, 1848, to May 19, 1849, edited by K. Marx. "No German newspaper, before or since," wrote Engels, "has ever had the same power and influence or been able to electrify the proletarian masses as effectively as the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 336-37). In his article "Karl Marx" Lenin called this newspaper "the finest and unsurpassed organ of the revolutionary proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 81). p. 82

[112] This is a reply to Axelrod's remarks on Lenin's article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see Vol. 5 of this edition). p. 83

[113] See Note 102. p. 85

[114] This refers to Kalmykova's bookstore in St. Petersburg, which was used as a secret rendezvous by Social-Democrats. p. 85

[115] This refers to V. Kuleman's book *The Trade Union Movement, an Essay on the Trade Union Organisation of the Workers and Associations of Employers in All Countries*, St. P., 1901. p. 85

[116] *Dragomanov, Mikhail Petrovich* (1841-1895)—Ukrainian historian, ethnographer and publicist, a bourgeois liberal. He was assistant professor at Kiev University; contributed to liberal journals. p. 85

[117] The reference is to Engels's article "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891". p. 87

[118] Lenin refers to his trip to Zurich to attend the "unity" conference of the R.S.D.L.P.'s organisations abroad: *Iskra-Zarya*, *Sotsial-Demokrat* (including the Emancipation of Labour group), the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, the Bund and the Borba group. The conference was held on September 21-22 (October 4-5), 1901. p. 87

[119] The articles referred to were: F. Engels "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 1 for October 2, 1901); K. Kautsky "Die Revision des Programms der Sozialdemocratie in Oesterreich" (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 3 for October 16, 1901). p. 88

[120] This refers to the review of the book *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle. Herausgegeben von Franz Mehring. I. Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels. Von März 1841 bis März 1844.* Stuttgart, Verlag von I.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger 1902. p. 88

[121] See Note 162. p. 88

[122] The five points indicate where this letter was to be sent. Point 4 refers to the Tver Social-Democratic organisation, the letter for which was forwarded to the address of A. Bakunin. Point 5, given

in quotes, is the title of a letter received from an *Iskra* representative in Russia. This letter was published by Lenin in full in his article "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see Vol. 5 of this edition). Under this point Lenin meant the *Iskra* representative from whom the letter had been received. p. 90

[123] By the "conflict abroad" Lenin meant the incident at the "unity" conference of R.S.D.L.P.'s organisations abroad, which the members of *Iskra*, *Zarya* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* walked out. p. 90

[124] *Smidovich*, *Inna Germogenovna*—a Social-Democrat. From the first day of *Iskra*'s organisation until the arrival of N. K. Krupskaya in Geneva in April 1901 she discharged the duties of secretary of the Editorial board, and afterwards handled literature shipments across the frontier. p. 92

[125] *Vperyod*—a newspaper of an Economist trend, published in Kiev in 1896-1900. p. 92

[126] *Goldman*, *L. I.* (1877-1939)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1893. In 1900 went abroad, where he joined the *Iskra* organisation. In May 1901 organised an illegal printing-press in Kishinev, where *Iskra* and other Social-Democratic publications were printed. Was arrested in 1902 and escaped from exile in 1905; was secretary of the Menshevik *Iskra* editorial board.

After the October Socialist Revolution he worked as business executive and engaged in publishing activities. p. 93

[127] An *Iskra* illegal printing-press, organised at Kishinev, printed various issues of the newspaper for distribution in Russia. Lenin's letter refers to the report about the Kishinev press having printed issue No. 10 of *Iskra*. p. 93

[128] This apparently refers to I. B. Basovsky, who organised a dispatch office in Kiev in August 1901 to handle *Iskra* literature arriving from abroad; this office also distributed all the literature printed in Kishinev. p. 93

[129] *Iskra* No. 13 for December 20, 1901, featured Lenin's article "Demonstrations Have Begun" (see Vol. 5 of this edition). p. 93

[130] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 35. p. 94

[131] *Conrad's Jahrbücher—Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*—a periodical published in Jena from 1863 by the bourgeois economist J. Conrad. p. 94

[132] *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta* (Commercial Industrial Gazette)—a daily supplement to *Vestnik Finansov*, *Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* (Finance, Industry and Trade Herald); published in St. Petersburg

from 1893 to 1918. From 1894 onward was issued as an independent publication. p. 94

[133] *Erfurt programme*—the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party adopted at the Congress in Erfurt in October 1891. See Engels's article, Note 117. p. 96

[134] The text of the commission's draft programme was the result of the work of the co-ordinating commission appointed by the *Iskra* editorial board to draft up a unified draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of Lenin's and Plekhanov's previous drafts. The members of the *Iskra* editorial board were to give their comments on the commission's draft, and the co-ordinating commission was to draw up a final draft programme. The commission's draft was endorsed by the members of the *Iskra* editorial board in Zurich on April 14, 1902, in Lenin's absence. p. 98

[135] Lenin here refers to *Iskra*'s removal from Munich to London. p. 100

[136] *Pridneprovsky Krai* (Dnieper Region)—a scientific, literary, political and economic daily, published in Ekaterinoslav from 1901. p. 100

[137] *Krzhizhanovsky*, *Gleb Maximilianovich* (1872-1959)—veteran leading member of the Communist Party, well-known Soviet scientist, power engineer, joined the revolutionary movement in 1893. In December 1895 he was arrested and exiled to Siberia for three years. Upon his return in 1901 he settled in Samara, where he helped to organise an *Iskra* centre. In the autumn of 1902 he was elected to the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. At the Congress, in his absence, he was elected to the Central Committee. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. p. 101

[138] *Sasha*—name used to denote the Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Committees held at Byelostok on March 23-28 (April 5-10), 1902. The Conference set up an Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the Party. p. 101

[139] Lenin refers to the preparations for the Second Congress of the Party. p. 102

[140] Lenin refers to the beginning of the disagreements in connection with the drafting of the Party programme, the first discussion of which took place at a meeting of the *Iskra* editorial board in Munich on January 21, 1902. At this meeting Lenin sharply criticised the first draft of the programme drawn up by Plekhanov and submitted his own amendments and proposals. p. 104

[141] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, formed at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 through the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles. The S.R.s

saw no class distinctions between the proletariat and the peasantry, glossed over the class differentiation and antagonism within the peasantry and denied the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The tactics of individual terrorism which the S.R.s advocated as the principal method of fighting the autocracy caused great harm to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the S.R.s envisaged the abolition of private ownership of the land and its transfer to the village communes on the basis of equalised tenure, as well as the development of all forms of co-operation. There was nothing socialistic in this programme, which the S.R.s sought to present as a programme for "socialising the land", since abolition of private ownership of the land alone, as Lenin pointed out, cannot abolish the domination of capital and the poverty of the masses.

The Bolsheviks exposed the S.R.s' attempts to pose as socialists, fought hard with them for influence over the peasantry and showed how harmful their tactics of individual terrorism were to the working-class movement. At the same time, they were prepared, on certain conditions, to make temporary agreements with the S.R.s in the struggle against tsarism.

The absence of class homogeneousness among the peasantry was responsible for the political and ideological instability and the organisational confusion in the S.R. party, and for its constant vacillation between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat .There had been a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party during the first Russian revolution, its Right wing forming the legal Trudovik Popular Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Cadets, and the Left wing taking shape as the semi-anarchist league of Maximalists. During the years of reaction (1907-10) the S.R. party suffered a complete ideological and organisational break-down, and the First World War found most of the S.R.s taking a social-chauvinist stand.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 the S.R.s, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government of the bourgeoisie and landowners (the party's leaders Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov were members of that government). The Left wing of the S.R.s founded an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries at the end of November 1917. In an effort to maintain their influence among the peasant masses, the Left S.R.s formally recognised the Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but shortly afterwards turned against the Soviet power.

During the foreign military intervention and civil war the S.R.s carried on subversive counter-revolutionary activities, strongly supported the interventionists and whiteguards, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the civil war, the S.R.s continued their hostile activity against the Soviet state. p. 105

[142] Lenin met his mother in France, and not in Germany. From the second half of June to July 25, 1902, Lenin lived at Loguivy (Northern coast of France) with his mother and his sister A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova. p. 105

[143] *Leiteisen*, *Gavriil Davidovich* (1874-1919)--a Social-Democrat contributor to *Iskra* and *Zarya*. Started revolutionary activities in the nineties, at the beginning of the twentieth century emigrated abroad, where he joined the Emancipation of Labour group and then became a member of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the Bolsheviks, and contributed to the newspapers *Vperyod*, *Proletary* and other Bolshevik organs. p. 106

[144] *Smidovich*, *Pyotr Germogenovich* (1874-1935)—Social-Democrat, Iskrist; after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—a Bolshevik. By profession an electrical engineer. Started his revolutionary activities in St. Petersburg in the late nineties; at first was inclined towards Economism, and then joined *Iskra*. At the end of 1900 was arrested and in 1901 deported abroad; was a member of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. In 1905 worked in the Moscow District Committee of the Party. After the October Socialist Revolution occupied important administrative and business posts. p. 108

[145] *Noskov*, *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1878-1913)—a Social-Democrat. In the late nineties joined the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In April 1902 attended the Zurich meeting of the *Iskra* editorial board where the Party's draft programme was discussed. In 1902-03 organised the transportation of illegal Social-Democratic literature to Russia and took part in organising the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. At the Second Congress joined the Bolsheviks and was elected to the Central Committee; after the Congress adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mensheviks, came out against the convocation of the Third Congress. p. 110

[146] *Osvobozhdeniye* (Emancipation)—a fortnightly, published abroad from June 18 (July 1), 1902 to October 5 (18), 1905, edited by P. B. Struve. The journal was the organ of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and expounded the ideas of moderate-monarchist liberalism. In 1903 the *Osvobozhdeniye* League formed around the journal (officially it came into existence in January 1904). The League existed up till October 1905. p. 112

[147] Lenin here refers to the members of the *Borba* group (see Note 93). p. 112

[148] *Semyon Semyonovich*—a code name for the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P. (or the Northern Labour League), which arose in 1900-01. The League united the Social-Democratic organisations

of the Vladimir, Yaroslavl and Kostroma gubernias. From the outset the Northern League was linked with *Iskra* and supported the latter's political line and plan of organisation.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Northern Labour League was reconstituted as the Northern Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the local committees becoming groups of the Northern Committee. At the conference of Northern organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Kostroma in July 1905 the Northern Committee was liquidated and separate committees were formed in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Yaroslavl and Kostroma. p. 113

[149] *Levin, E. Y.* (born 1873)—a Social-Democrat, one of the leaders of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, a member of *Yuzhny Rabochy* editorial board. At the Pskov meeting of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (November 1902) was elected a member of the O.C. At the Second Congress adopted a centrist stand; after the Congress joined the Mensheviks. In September 1903 he was arrested and subsequently retired from political activity. p. 114

[150] This refers to the members of the group and editorial board of the newspaper *Yuzhny Rabochy* who remained at large after the mass arrests in the spring of 1902. In August 1902 they entered into negotiations with the editorial board of *Iskra* for joint work to restore the unity of Russian Social-Democracy. The declaration of solidarity with *Iskra* by members of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group (published in *Iskra* No. 27, for November 1, 1902 and in *Yuzhny Rabochy* No. 10, for December 1902) was of great importance in consolidating the ranks of Social-Democracy in Russia. In November 1902 the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, together with the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P., took part in setting up the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and participated in its activities. p. 114

[151] *Chernyshev, I. V.*—a Social-Democrat, wavering between the Economists and Iskrists, member of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group. In August 1902 he went abroad, where he negotiated with the *Iskra* editorial board for joint work in uniting the Party. In April 1903 joined the Economists and declared himself an adherent of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 114

[152] *The League of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.* was formed in December 1901 at a conference of representatives of the Social-Democratic committees and organisations in the South of Russia (Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Odessa, Kharkov and Kishinev) on the initiative of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group. The conference elected a Central Committee of the League and declared the newspaper *Yuzhny Rabochy* to be its central organ. The group's attempt (in opposition to the *Iskra* plan of creating in Russia a centralised Marxist party with the aid of an all-Russia

political newspaper) to restore the R.S.D.L.P. by setting up regional Social-Democratic associations proved impracticable, and after the mass police raids in the spring of 1902 the League disintegrated. p. 114

[153] *Krasnukha*, *V. P.* (1868-1913)—a Social-Democrat, an Iskrist; since 1899 worked in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation; at the beginning of April 1902 represented the St. Petersburg League of Struggle at the Byelostok Conference. In November 1902 attended the Pskov meeting of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. at which he was elected a member.

Stasova, *Yelena Dmitrievna* (born 1873)—veteran of the revolutionary movement, member of the Bolshevik Party since 1898. In 1902-03 a member of the St. Petersburg Committee. From August 1905 to January 1906 carried out Party assignments in Geneva. p. 116

[154] Bouncer (*Vyshibalo*)—pseudonym of Tokarev, leader of the St. Petersburg Economists. As a member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, Tokarev protested against the July declaration of the St. Petersburg Committee recognising *Iskra* and *Zarya* as the leading organs of Russian Social-Democracy. He also demanded that the representative of the *Iskra* organisation be expelled from the committee of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle. p. 116

[155] This refers to the July declaration of the R.S.D.L.P.'s St. Petersburg Committee announcing solidarity with the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya* and recognising them as the leading organs of Russian Social-Democracy. This declaration was issued in July 1902 in the form of a separate leaflet and subsequently printed in *Iskra* No. 26 for October 15, 1902. p. 117

[156] *Krasikov*, *Pyotr Ananievich* (1870-1939)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. Started his revolutionary activities in 1892 and joined the *Iskra* organisation in 1900. At the Pskov meeting of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (November 1902) he was elected a member of the O.C. At the Second Congress (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. After the Congress took an active part in the fight against the Mensheviks. In August 1904 attended the meeting of the 22 Bolsheviks in Geneva. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. p. 118

[157] This refers to the meeting of the *Iskra* editorial board with representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the *Iskra* organisation in Russia and the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P. held on August 15, 1902. At this meeting an Iskrist nucleus of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the Party was set up. p. 118

[158] Meaning Krasnukha and Krasikov. p. 118

[159] The *Organising Committee* (O.C.) for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was set up on Lenin's initiative at a meeting of S.D. committees in Pskov on November 2-3, 1902. The Iskrists formed a preponderant majority on the new committee. P. A. Krasikov, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky and G. M. Krzhizhanovsky were co-opted to the O.C. on behalf of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, and A. M. Stopani on behalf of the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 118

[160] *Fyokla*—secret code name for the *Iskra* editorial board. p. 120

[161] Meaning the Bund (see Note 94). p. 120

[162] The *Svoboda* group, calling themselves the "revolutionary-socialist" group, was founded by E. O. Zelensky (Nadezhdin) in May 1901. Lenin described this group as one of those "small and rootless groups" which "had no stable or serious principles, programme, tactics organisation, and no roots among the masses" (see Vol. 20, pp. 356 and 357, of this edition). The group published a journal *Svoboda* (Freedom) in Switzerland (two numbers were issued: No. 1 in 1901 and No. 2 in 1902). The *Svoboda* group advocated the ideas of terrorism and Economism, and in a bloc with the St. Petersburg Economists came out against *Iskra* and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The group ceased to exist in 1903. p. 121

[163] This refers to the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International planned to be held in 1903. It was held in August 1904. p. 121

[164] This refers to Plekhanov's article against the article by K. Tarasov (pseudonym of N. S. Rusanov, a Narodnik publicist) published in the Socialist-Revolutionary journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* p. 123

[165] *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia)—an illegal newspaper of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, published in Russia from the end of 1900. From January 1902 to December 1905 it came out abroad (Geneva) as the official organ of the S.R. party. p. 124

[166] This refers to the forthcoming meeting of the International Socialist Bureau, which was held in Brussels on December 29, 1902. Plekhanov did not attend the meeting. p. 124

[167] Lenin probably refers to his London lecture of November 29, 1902, on the subject of S.R. programme and tactics. p. 124

[168] *Zhiznites* members of the *Zhizn* Social-Democratic group (see Note 37). p. 124

[169] *Krasnoye Znamya* (Red Banner)—a journal, organ of the Economists published in Geneva by the Union of Russian Social-Demo-

crats Abroad from November 1902 to January 1903 in place of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. Three numbers of the journal were published. p. 124

[170] *Lavrov, V. I.*—a Social-Democrat, Iskrist; from November 1902 was stand-in to Y. D. Stasova on the St. Petersburg Committee in case of her arrest. In 1903 was in charge of technical arrangements for the St. Petersburg Committee; conducted correspondence with *Iskra*.
Re: Stasova, see Note 153. p. 126

[171] This refers to the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class organised by Lenin in the autumn of 1895. In December 1895 the tsarist government dealt the League a severe blow by arresting a considerable number of its leading members, Lenin included. The long absence of the League's founders, who were exiled to Siberia, facilitated the prosecution of an opportunist policy on the part of the "young" members and the Economists, who, from 1897, through the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*, implanted on Russian soil the ideas of trade-unionism and Bernsteinism. In the second half of 1898 control of the League passed to the most outspoken of the Economists—the *Rabochaya Mysl* adherents. The old surviving members of the League took part in preparing and holding the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In the autumn of 1900 the League of Struggle amalgamated with the St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation, and was recognised as the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The struggle between the Iskrists and Economists in the St. Petersburg Organisation ended in the summer of 1902 with the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. adopting an *Iskra* stand. p. 126

[172] *Workers' Organisation*—an organisation of supporters of Economism which arose in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1900. In the autumn of the same year it amalgamated with the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was formed, consisting of two parts: the Committee proper, and the Committee of the Workers' Organisation. With the *Iskra* trend gaining the ascendancy in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation (1902) the group of Economist-minded Social-Democrats broke away from the St. Petersburg Committee and again set up an independent Workers' Organisation, which existed until the beginning of 1904. p. 126

[173] *Lengnik, Friedrich Wilhelmovich* (1873-1936)—a professional revolutionary Bolshevik, joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1893. In 1896 was arrested in connection with the activities of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and exiled to Eastern Siberia. On his return from exile joined the *Iskra* organisation; at the Pskov meeting of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (November 1902) was elected a member of the O.C.

At the Congress was elected, in his absence, to the Central Committee and Council of the Party. In 1903-04 took an active part in the fight against the Mensheviks abroad. p. 128

[174] *Babushkin*, *Ivan Vasilyevich* (1873-1906)—a professional revolutionary, started revolutionary activities in 1893. An active member of the St. Petersburg and Ekaterinoslav Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Took an active part in organising the Leninist newspaper *Iskra* (1900). An active participant in the revolution of 1905-07. p. 129

[175] Lenin received a letter from Babushkin asking him to make out a question paper for "examining" members of the propagandist group, that is, to ascertain their position in regard to *Iskra* principles. p. 129

[176] *Zubatov organisation* pursued a policy of "police socialism" initiated by S. V. Zubatov, a Colonel of the Gendarmes and Chief of the Moscow Secret Political Police, under which legal workers' organisations were set up during 1901-03 for the purpose of diverting the workers from the political struggle against the autocracy. p. 129

[177] Lenin refers to the two leaflets (that of September and October) of the Workers' Organisation Committee quoted in the article "The St. Petersburg Split" published in *Iskra* No. 30, for December 15, 1902.

The September leaflet was previously published in the "Supplement" to *Otkliki* (Comments) No. 1, December 1902, issued by the *Svoboda* group in Geneva. p. 131

[178] *Krasnukha*, *V. P.*, the St. Petersburg member of the O.C., was arrested in November 1902. p. 132

[179] The reference is to the pamphlet *Listok Rabochikh Kass* (Issue 2 published by the organised workers of Kharkov) and the hectographed journal *Kharkovsky Proletary* published in October 1901. p. 134

[180] Issue No. 16 of *Rabochaya Mysl* for November-December 1902 contained "A Protest of the Workers' Organisation Committee" against the statement of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. recognising the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya* as the leading organs of the Party. The same issue published a letter of the Workers' Organisation Committee to the *Svoboda* group and the *Otkliki* editorial board expressing gratitude for their sympathy and readiness to give support. The *Rabochaya Mysl Listki* were issued by the Iskrist St. Petersburg Committee in December 1902 and January 1903 in place of the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*. *Listok* No. 1 was destroyed by decision of the Committee in view of its unhappy wording. p. 135

[181] The secret code name for *Iskra*'s Baku group. p. 137

[182] Meaning N. K. Krupskaya. p. 137

[183] This refers to the Bureau of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the Party. p. 138

[184] Simultaneously with this letter Lenin wrote the "Draft Appeal of the Russian Organising Committee to the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the Foreign Committee of the Bund" (see Vol. 6 of this edition) and sent it on February 5 to Martov in Paris to be discussed with the members of the Russian Organising Committee P. A. Krasikov and V. A. Noskov, who had arrived there (see p. 141 of this volume). p. 139

[185] *Martov, L.* —pseudonym of Tsederbaum, Y. O. (1873-1923)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in the nineties. In 1895 took part in organising the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1900 helped to prepare the publication of *Iskra* as a member of its editorial board. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) became minority (Menshevik) leader, and from then on was one of the leaders of the Mensheviks' central bodies and an editor of their publications. After the October Socialist Revolution opposed the Soviet power. Emigrated to Germany in 1920. p. 141

[186] The *Foreign Section of the Organising Committee* consisted of L. G. Deutsch, representing the *Iskra* editorial board, A. I. Kremer representing the Bund, and N. N. Lokhov (Olkhin) representing the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 141

[187] Meaning the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group. (See Note 106.) p. 142

[188] The Nizhni-Novgorod Committee decided not to appeal against the sentence passed on the workers of Sormovo and Nizhni-Novgorod in connection with the May Day demonstration of 1902. p. 144

[189] The leaflet "To All Nizhni-Novgorodians issued by the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was disseminated in the city two days before the trial of the workers, which was held on October 29-31, 1902. p. 145

[190] Lenin refers to the dispute following his lecture in Paris on March 3-6, 1903, on the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Russian Social-Democrats. Nevzorov (Y. M. Steklov) was one of Lenin's opponents in this dispute. p. 147

[191] This refers to P. Maslov's book *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, Vol. I, the first edition of which appeared in 1903. p. 150

[192] Lenin is referring to his lectures at the Russian School of Social Sciences and at the meeting of Russian political emigrants, which he read in Paris in February 1903. p. 150

[193] This refers to the book *Sozialismus und Landwirtschaft* by E. David. The reference to Kautsky concerns his article "Sozialismus und Landwirtschaft" (*Die Neue Zeit* Nos. 22-26 for February and March 1903) in which he examines this book. p. 150

[194] The Polish Social-Democrats' statement of solidarity with the R.S.D.L.P. did not appear in *Iskra*. Representatives of the Polish Social-Democratic Party attended the Second Congress as non-voting delegates. p. 152

[195] The Bund's attack on the Ekaterinoslav Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. is fully dealt with in Lenin's article "Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an 'Independent Political Party'?" (see Vol. 6 of this edition). p. 153

[196] See Note 186. p. 154

[197] *Alexandrova, Yekaterina Mikhailovna* (1864-1943)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1890. In 1902, during her residence abroad, joined the *Iskra* organisation, then worked as its agent in Russia. At the Orel meeting of the O.C. for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (February 1903) was elected to the O.C.; at the Congress she joined the Mensheviks; after the Congress became an active Menshevik. After the October Socialist Revolution worked in cultural and educational institutions. p. 156

[198] The "den" was the common room in the London flat shared by V. I. Zasulich, Y. O. Martov and I. S. Blumenfeld, so called on account of its constantly disorderly state. p. 156

[199] Meaning the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group. (See Note 106.) p. 156

[200] *P.P.S.* (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*)—the Polish Socialist Party, a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. p. 156

[201] *Kalmykova, Alexandra Mikhailovna* (1849-1926)—a progressive public worker; ran a bookstore in 1889-1902, which served as a rendezvous for Social-Democrats; rendered financial aid to *Iskra* and *Zarya*. In 1902 she was deported abroad for three years; after the split in the Party she gave financial aid to the Bolsheviks. p. 160

[202] By "Californian" sources Lenin is apparently referring to the financial aid which *Iskra* had been regularly receiving. These sources have not been ascertained. p. 163

[203] This refers to the financial aid for *Iskra*. p. 163

[204] Meaning the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held on July 17 (30)-August 10 (23), 1903, first in Brussels, then in London. p. 164

[205] This refers to P. B. Axelrod. p. 165

[206] *Yegors*, *Yegor's countries*—Martov's followers, Mensheviks living in Geneva. p. 167

[207] This refers to the appointment of two representatives of the Central Committee to the Party Council, in accordance with the Rules adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 167

[208] The law on factory stewards was passed on June 10, 1903. Lenin dealt in detail with this law in his article "An Era of Reforms" (see Vol. 6 of this edition). p. 171

[209] *Manifesto of Rabochaya Volya*—a declaration by the Odessa Social-Democratic Union *Rabochaya Volya* recognising the correctness of *Iskra* views and tactics, announcing adherence to the Odessa Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and closing the Union as a result of it. The Manifesto was published in *Iskra* No. 50 for October 15, 1903. p. 172

[210] This letter was sent also to P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Zasulich, A. N. Potresov (Old Believer) and L. D. Trotsky with the omission of the second and sixth (last) paragraphs.

Lenin wrote on the envelope "Very important. Copy of my and Plekhanov's letter to Martov & Co. dated October 6, 1903 and Martov's reply". p. 174

[211] The state of affairs in the Caucasus in connection with the behaviour of the Tiflis delegate Topuridze (Isari), who deserted to the Mensheviks after the Second Congress, is fully dealt with in Lenin's letter to the Caucasian Union Committee (see pp. 179-80 of this volume). p. 177

[212] This refers to the Central Committee's announcement (report) concerning the Party's Second Congress which had been held; the draft announcement had been sent to Russia. p. 178

[213] The three persons mentioned here by their pseudonyms were delegates of the Caucasian union committees at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.: B. M. Knunyants, representing the Baku Committee, A. G. Zurabov, representing the Batum Committee and Topuridze, representing the Tiflis Committee. The first two adhered to the Majority (Bolsheviks) at the Congress and after it, while the latter wavered at the Congress and afterwards supported the Minority (Mensheviks). p. 179

[214] This refers to the resolution adopted by the Don Committee on the results of the Party's Second Congress. p. 181

[215] This refers to the resolution adopted by the Committee of the Mining and Metallurgical Workers' Union on the results of Party's Second Congress. p. 182

[216] See Note 90. p. 186

[217] This refers to Lenin's statement of resignation from the Party Council and from the editorial board of the Central Organ (see Vol. 7 of this edition, p. 91). p. 189

[218] This refers to the report concerning the Second Congress of the Party. See Note 212. p. 190

[219] *Lyadov*, *Martyn Nikolayevich* (1872-1947)—professional revolutionary. Began revolutionary activities in 1891. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—a Bolshevik, afterwards carried on an active struggle against the Mensheviks in Russia and abroad. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. p. 193

[220] This refers to I. I. and L. I. Axelrod. p. 195

[221] *Schweitzer*, *J. B.* (1833-1875)—leader of the Lassalleans in the German labour movement in the sixties; dictatorially ruled the General German Workers' Union and strongly opposed the Eisenachers, headed by Bebel and Liebknecht. p. 200

[222] Lenin wrote this letter for F. V. Lengnik, the representative of the Central Committee abroad. p. 202

[223] This refers to the C.C.'s negotiations with the Mensheviks concerning the situation which arose within the Party after the Second Congress. p. 202

[224] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (Moscow Recorder)—one of the oldest Russian newspapers, originally issued (in 1756) as a small sheet by Moscow University. In 1863 it became a monarcho-nationalist mouthpiece reflecting the views of the most reactionary sections of the landowners and the clergy. From 1905 onwards was one of the leading organs of the Black Hundreds. Continued to appear until the October Socialist Revolution in 1917. p. 202

[225] The reference is to the Central Committee's ultimatum presented to the Mensheviks on November 25, 1903, the chief points of which were set forth by Lenin in his letter to the C.C. dated November 4, 1903 (see p. 187 of this volume). With strong support from Plekhanov, who, the very next day after the ultimatum, co-opted all the old editors to the editorial board of the Central Organ, the Mensheviks rejected the C.C.'s ultimatum and declared open war against the Majority of the Party.

An appraisal of the C.C.'s ultimatum was given by Lenin in his book *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back* (see Vol. 7 of this edition). p. 202

[226] The C.C.'s Executive Committee was set up in the second half of October 1903 and consisted of three C.C. members—G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, L. B. Krasin and F. V. Gusarov. p. 204

[227] This refers to the publication of material concerning the C.C.'s negotiations with the Menshevik (Geneva) opposition abroad. p. 205

[228] *Vilonov*, *Nikifor Yefremovich* (1883-1910)—professional revolutionary. Began his revolutionary activities in 1901. In 1902 joined the Kiev Social-Democratic organisation, became a supporter of *Iskra*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903)—a Bolshevik. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. p. 207

[229] Vilonov's letter, slightly abridged, was published by Lenin in his "Postscript to the Pamphlet *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*" (see Vol. 7 of this edition). p. 207

[230] The three persons were G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, F. V. Lengnik and V. A. Noskov. p. 209

[231] On Krzhizhanovsky's return from abroad and on the basis of his report concerning the results of the negotiations with the Mensheviks, the C.C. circulated a letter to the local committees which played down the acute Party struggle and advocated a conciliatory policy towards the Mensheviks. p. 211

[232] Lenin wrote this letter for Lengnik, the C.C.'s representative abroad. p. 213

[233] This refers to the resolution passed by the editorial board of the new, Menshevik, *Iskra* concerning the publication as a separate sheet of Lenin's letter "Why I Resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board" (see Vol. 7 of this edition). p. 213

[234] This letter is a postscript to the previous letter of December 30, 1903, both being dispatched on January 5, 1904. p. 218

[235] This refers to Axelrod's article "The Unity of Russian Social-Democracy and Its Tasks", published in *Iskra* Nos. 55 and 57. Lenin here refers to the first part of this article published in issue No. 55 under the sub-heading "Liquidation of Primitivism Summed Up". p. 218

[236] Meaning the publication of material concerning the C.C.'s negotiations with the Menshevik (Geneva) opposition. p. 222

[237] This letter was an insertion to the rough copy of Lengnik's letter sent in reply to that of Y. O. Martov. p. 223

[238] This and the next letter were written for Lengnik, the C.C.'s representative abroad. p. 224

[239] This letter is an addition to the letter of N. K. Krupskaya on the subject of Stake's (Lengnik's) non-withdrawal from the C.C. p. 237

[240] This refers to Lenin's agreement with Noskov, who had arrived in the capacity of the C.C.'s representative abroad and its second member on the Party Council to replace Lengnik, who had returned to Russia; the agreement covered joint action by Noskov and Lenin abroad on behalf of the C.C. and was signed on May 13 (26) in the presence of a third member of the C.C., M. M. Essen, who was abroad at the time (see Vol. 7, pp. 430-31, of this edition). p. 238

[241] *Krasin*, *Leonid Borisovich* (1870-1926)—prominent Soviet statesman, joined the Social-Democratic movement in the nineties. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903)—a Bolshevik; co-opted to the C.C. of the Party, where he adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mensheviks and helped to co-optate three of their representatives on the C.C. Shortly afterwards, however, he broke with the Mensheviks. An active participant in the first Russian revolution. p. 240

[242] The reference is to D. S. Postolovsky, Russian Social-Democrat, agent of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. from the spring of 1904. A conciliator. p. 240

[243] *Soft members*—C.C. members, conciliators: V. A. Noskov, L. Y. Galperin and L. B. Krasin. p. 242

[244] This refers to the Party Council's decision of May 31 (June 13), 1904, concerning representation at the forthcoming Amsterdam Congress of the Second International. p. 244

[245] *Vladimirov*, *Miron Konstantinovich* (1879-1925)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. Carried on Party work in St. Petersburg, Gomel, Odessa, Lugansk and Ekaterinoslav. Delegate to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Participant in the revolution of 1905-07. After the October Socialist Revolution occupied various important posts. p. 245

[246] This refers to the decision adopted in July 1904 on behalf of the C.C. by C.C. conciliator members Krasin, Noskov and Galperin. In this decision the conciliators recognised the validity of the *Iskra* Menshevik editorial board co-opted by Plekhanov. They co-opted three more conciliators on to the C.C. The conciliators were against convening the Third Congress of the Party and adopted a decision dissolving the Southern Bureau of the C.C. which agitated for the convocation of this Congress. They deprived Lenin of the right to represent the C.C. abroad and attempted to ban publication of his writings which did not have the permission of the C.C.'s collegium.

The adoption of the "July Declaration" was a complete betrayal of the decisions of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the

part of the conciliator members of the C.C. who openly sided with the Mensheviks. p. 248

[247] V. A. Noskov informed Lenin of the C.C.'s decision to co-optate three new members on to the C.C., namely, L. Y. Karpov, A. I. Lyubimov, and I. F. Dubrovinsky, and asked Lenin to give his vote for or against the nominated candidates within a week. p. 251

[248] Lenin did not attend the Amsterdam Congress and transferred his mandate to M. N. Lyadov and P. A. Krasikov, who were included in the delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Congress. p. 256

[249] Three conferences of local Bolshevik committees—the Southern, Caucasian and Northern conferences—were held in September-December 1904. (1) The Southern Regional Conference (three committees: those of Odessa, Ekaterinoslav and Nikolayev) was held in September 1904. The conference declared in favour of convening the Third Congress of the Party and proposed that an Organising Committee for convening the congress be set up, consisting of R. S. Zemlyachka, M. N. Lyadov and A. Bogdanov. The conference instructed Lenin to constitute the full Organising Committee.

(2) The Regional Conference of the Caucasian Union Committee (four committees: those of Baku, Batum, Tiflis and Imeretia and Mingrelia) was held in November 1904 in Tiflis. The conference declared in favour of immediately convening the Third Congress of the Party and elected a bureau to make preparations for the congress.

(3) The Northern Regional Conference (six committees: those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, Northern and Nizhni-Novgorod) was held in December 1904. The conference passed a vote of non-confidence in the Party's central bodies seized by the Mensheviks, declared strongly in favour of convening the Third Congress of the Party, and set up a special bureau for organising the congress. p. 257

[250] This refers to the meeting held in the neighbourhood of Geneva on Lenin's initiative during the early part of August 1904. The meeting was attended by 19 members of the R.S.D.L.P., including Lenin, Krupskaya, Olminsky, Lyadov, and Lepeshinsky. The initial variant of the appeal "To the Party", written by Lenin, was adopted (see Vol. 7 of this edition). Shortly afterwards three more Bolsheviks added their votes to the decisions of this meeting, and the appeal "To the Party" was issued on behalf of 22 Bolsheviks.

The appeal became the Bolsheviks' programme of struggle for convening the Third Congress of the Party. p. 257

[251] *The Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin publishing house of Social-Democratic party literature* was set up by the Bolsheviks after the Menshevik editorial board of *Iskra* refused to publish the statements of

organisations and Party members supporting the decisions of the Second Congress and demanding the convocation of the Third Congress of the Party. p. 258

[252] The decisions of the Council of the R.S.D.L.P. were published in a separate supplements to Nos. 73 and 74 of *Iskra*. The first of these decisions dealing with the procedure for convening the Third Congress listed a number of measures aimed at obstructing agitation in favour of the congress and preventing its being convened in the immediate future. p. 258

[253] This refers to the pamphlet *To the Party*, in which the appeal under the same heading written by Lenin was published (see Vol. 7 of this edition), and N. Shakhov's pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress*, to which Lenin wrote a preface (see Vol. 7, p. 488, of this edition). p. 261

[254] *The question of representation at the Amsterdam Congress* was this: The Party Council, in its September decision, accused Lenin Lyadov and Krasikov of a breach of Party discipline, expressed in their applying directly to the International Socialist Bureau on the question of Lenin transferring his mandate to the Congress. The Council further maintained that Lenin demanded for himself, as a representative of the C.C., the right to attend the Congress "at a time when he was already in antagonism with the Central Committee". Actually, Lenin sent representatives to the Congress early in August, that is, before his conflict with the conciliator section of the C.C., which took place towards the end of August. p. 261

[255] This refers to the *Report of the Delegation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress* (*August 14-20, 1904*), Geneva, 1904. p. 261

[256] *The Caucasian S.D. Union* united the working-class organisations of the Caucasus (Tiflis, Baku, Batum, Kutais, Guria, etc.). At the first Congress of the Caucasian Union held in March 1903 a leading Party organ was set up—the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin and the Caucasian Union Committee were in constant and close contact. In September 1904 the C.U.C. supported the resolution of the meeting of the "22" and started agitation in favour of the immediate convocation of the Party's Third Congress. p. 262

[257] *Stopani, Alexander Mitrofanovich* (1871-1932)—professional revolutionary, joined the revolutionary movement in 1892. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) and after it—a Bolshevik. After the Congress, on the instructions of the C.C., he worked in Yaroslavl, where he organised an illegal printing-plant; left for Baku in the summer of 1904 after the plant was raided by the police; was one of the organisers of the Baku Bolshevik Committee. After the October Socialist Revolution occupied leading Party posts. p. 264

[258] The manuscript contains Lenin's note: "(quote in full)" followed by dots and special marks indicating that the text of the corresponding resolution of the Conference of the Southern Committees was to be quoted here. The text of the resolution was not quoted in the letter, nor was the reply of the "22" (see p. 257 of this volume). p. 265

[259] Lenin speaks of the need for creating the illegal Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*, the first issue of which came out on January 4, 1905 (December 22, 1904). p. 267

[260] Meaning the statement of the Caucasian Union Committee and the Caucasian representative of the C.C. protesting against the decisions of the Party Council published in a supplement to Nos. 73 and 74 of *Iskra*. p. 268

[261] Lenin was on a lecture tour (on the subject of the situation within the Party) in Paris (up to December 5), Zurich (December 6-7) and Berne (December 8). p. 269

[262] *Zemlyachka*, *Rozalia Samoilovna* (1876-1947)—a leading member of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1893; upon her return from abroad in 1896 became a member of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. From 1901 an agent of *Iskra*, carried on work in Odessa and Ekaterinoslav. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) an Iskrist of the Majority. After the Congress she was co-opted on to the Central Committee from the Bolsheviks, took an active part in the fight against the Mensheviks. In August 1904 participated in the meeting of the 22 Bolsheviks in Geneva, was elected to the Bureau of the Majority Committees. Worked as secretary of the St. Petersburg Party organisation and was its delegate to the Third Congress of the Party.

Litvinov, *Maxim Maximovich* (1876-1951)—prominent Party member and statesman, distinguished Soviet diplomat. Started revolutionary work in 1898 as a propagandist in workers' circles. In 1900 worked in the Kiev Committee; in 1901 was arrested, in prison joined the Iskrists. In August 1902 escaped from prison with ten other Iskrists and emigrated. Took an active part in disseminating *Iskra*, was a delegate at the Second Congress of the League. p. 271

[263] Lenin intended to enlist the services of A. Bogdanov (Rakhmetov) for work on the newspaper *Vperyod*, the mouthpiece of the Bolsheviks, which was being organised (see Note 265). p. 273

[264] This refers to the resolutions of the Regional Conference of the Caucasian Union Committee held in Tiflis in November 1904. On the basis of the previous resolutions of the Caucasian committees giving support to the resolution of the "22" and to the idea of convening an emergency congress of the Party the Conference adopted a resolution calling for the organisation of broad agitation

and struggle for the Third Congress, for which purpose it elected a special bureau with instructions to contact the Bolshevik group of 22". In the postscript to this letter Lenin wishes to be informed as to what organisational forms of relationship existed between the Bureau of the Majority Committees and the bureau set up by the Conference of the Caucasian committees, and asks them to send a delegate. p. 280

[265] *Vperyod* (Forward)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen issues were put out. Lenin was the newspaper's organiser, manager and ideological guide. Other members of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky, and A. V. Lunacharsky. The outstanding role which the newspaper played in combating Menshevism and highlighting the tactical issues posed by the revolutionary movement was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress (1905), which recorded a vote of thanks to the editorial board. p. 280

[266] *Borba Proletariata* (Struggle of the Proletariat)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, organ of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P., founded by decision of the First Congress of the Caucasian Union of the R.S.D.L.P. Published from April-May 1903 to October 1905; 12 numbers were issued. The newspaper was published in three languages—Georgian, Armenian and Russian. The editors maintained close contact with Lenin and the Bolshevik centre abroad. p. 281

[267] *Essen*, *Maria Moiseyevna* (1872-1956)—a Social-Democrat. Joined the revolutionary movement in the early nineties. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. a Bolshevik; was co-opted on to the Central Committee at the end of 1903. In 1906 a member of the Moscow Committee. During the period of reaction (1907-10) retired from active political life. p. 282

[268] *The Northern Regional Conference* (six committees: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, Northern and Nizhni-Novgorod) was held in December 1904 (see Note 249). p. 283

[269] This refers to the committees, at the conferences of which the Bureau of the Majority Committees was elected. p. 284

[270] *Yeramasov*, A. I. (died 1927)—a Social-Democrat, Iskrist. From the time of *Iskra* up to the October Socialist Revolution gave financial assistance to the Bolshevik Party. p. 285

[271] This refers to the second Mensheviks' "Letter to Party Organisations" published in leaflet form in December 1904 over the signature of the *Iskra* editorial board. A critical analysis of *Iskra*'s first letter mentioned by Lenin lower down was given by him in

the pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and Iskra's Plan* (see. Vol. 7 of this edition). Lenin also deals with these letters in his article "Two Tactics" (see Vol. 8 of this edition). p. 287

[272] The editorial "Democrats at the Parting of the Ways" in No. 77 of the Menshevik *Iskra* was criticised by Lenin in his article "Working-Class and Bourgeois Democracy" published in *Vperyod* No. 3, for January 24 (11), 1905 (see Vol. 8 of this edition). p. 288

[273] On January 6, 1905 (December 24, 1904), Lenin read a lecture on working-class and bourgeois democracy to an audience of political emigrants in Geneva. p. 290

[274] Issue No. 1 of *Vperyod* was dated January 4, 1905 (December 22, 1904). p. 290

[275] This refers to the three conferences of the Bolshevik local committees (the Southern the Caucasian and the Northern) held in September-December 1904, which went on record for the immediate convocation of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see Note 249). p. 291

[276] This refers to *Fyodorova-Shtremer*, *N. I.*—secretary of the St. Petersburg Committee. In December 1904 she adopted a conciliatory stand in regard to the Mensheviks. p. 291

[277] This refers to the election of the Bureau of the Majority Committees for convening the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 292

[278] See Note 146. p. 293

[279] *Gapon*, *Georgi Apollonovich* (1870-1906)—a priest, *agent provocateur* in the service of the tsarist secret political police. On the eve of the revolution of 1905-07, acting on the instructions of the Department of the Police, he organised the Association of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, which was subsidised by the Department of the Police and the St. Petersburg secret political police. Provoked the procession of St. Petersburg workers to present a petition to the tsar on the Ninth of January, 1905 (see Note 281). Escaped abroad, where he had close ties with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. He returned to Russia and resumed contact with the secret political police. Exposed as an *agent provocateur*, Gapon was killed in accordance with a sentence passed on him by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 293

[280] The tables of correspondence with Russia were compiled by N. K. Krupskaya, who kept a record of all the correspondence. p. 293

[281] *The Ninth of January 1905*—"Bloody Sunday", the day on which, by order of the tsar, a peaceful procession of St. Petersburg work-

ers was shot down. The workers, led by the priest Gapon, were marching to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. This cold-blooded massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan of "Down with the autocracy!". The events of January 9th precipitated the revolution of 1905-07. p. 293

[282] The reference is to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., preparations for which were in hand. p. 293

[283] In his letter of February 3, 1905, August Bebel notified Lenin that in order to liquidate the split in the R.S.D.L.P. the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party had instructed him to preside at a court of arbitration in which representatives of the Bolsheviks (*Vperyod*) and the Mensheviks (*Iskra*) were to be included. Bebel asked the Bolsheviks to confirm their readiness, in the event of their agreeing to a court of arbitration and election of their representatives to such a court, to accept the court's award. It was stipulated that the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks were to cease all polemics from the moment they submitted to the court. p. 295

[284] Bebel's proposal was reported in *Vperyod* No. 8 for February 28 (15), 1905, in a note to the editors comment following the text of the announcement of the Bureau of the Majority Committees concerning the convocation of the Third Congress of the Party (see Vol. 8, p. 178, of this edition). p. 295

[285] *Gusev, Sergei Ivanovich* (1874-1933)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. From December 1904 to May 1905 secretary of the Bureau of the Majority Committees and the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party, then a leader of the Bolshevik organisation in Odessa. From January 1906 a member of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. During the years of reaction (1907-10), came out against liquidationism and otzovism.

After the October Socialist Revolution, held positions of trust. p. 296

[286] A paragraph from Moscow reporting that a representative of the Central Committee had made a statement at a meeting to the effect that all the members of the C.C. agreed to the convening of the Third Congress was published in *Vperyod* No. 8, for February 28 (15), 1905. It was accompanied by an afterword "From the Editors" written by M. S. Olminsky. The afterword stated that the C.C. for some months had resisted a congress and dismissed the committees that had declared for it, and that now that its tactics had failed it was declaring its agreement to have a congress convened immediately, obviously with the intention of wrecking it. Lenin added to Olminsky's text the following words: "We hope that neither the Bureau nor the local committees will let themselves be deceived by the subterfuges of the Party's 'Shidlovsky Commission'." p. 298

[287] *The Shidlovsky Commission*—a special government commission set up by royal Ukase of January 29 (February 11), 1905, "to enquire into the causes of the discontent among the workers of the city of St. Petersburg and its environs" in connection with the mounting strike movement following the events of Bloody Sunday (January 9). The Commission, headed by Senator Shidlovsky was made up of government officials, managers of state factories and manufacturers. The Commission was to include representatives of the workers elected by two-stage elections. The Bolsheviks launched a campaign in connection with these elections, exposing the true designs of tsarism, which had organised this Commission in order to draw the workers away from the revolutionary struggle. When the electors presented their demands to the government, namely, freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, etc. Shidlovsky stated on February 18 (March 3), 1905 that these demands could not be granted. After this the majority of the electors withdrew from the elections and appealed to the workers of St. Petersburg, who supported them by going on strike. The Commission was dismissed on February 20 (March 5), 1905, without having started work. p. 299

[288] The leaflets of the Bureau of the Majority Committees: the first, "Vital Issues" (concerning the uprising), was published in the newspaper *Vperyod* No. 9, for March 8 (February 23), 1905; the second, "The Attitude of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to the Liberals", in Issue No. 10 for March 15 (2), 1905. p. 300

[289] A quotation from Virgil's *Aeneid*: "I fear the Danaans, though their hands proffer gifts". p. 302

[290] In regard to the conference of socialist organisations of Russia see Lenin's article "A Militant Agreement for the Uprising" (Vol. 8, pp. 158-66, of this edition) and "Speech on an Agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionaries" delivered on April 23 (May 6), 1905, at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Vol. 8, pp. 416-21). p. 303

[291] *Icons abroad*—an ironical name for the Menshevik leaders. p. 303

[292] This refers to a conference of representatives of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., the Bund, the Lettish S.D.L.P., and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party held abroad in January 1905. It was convened on the initiative of the Bund with the object of uniting all the Social-Democratic organisations. The conference adopted a resolution on agreements with the liberal and democratic parties and on a "bloc" of the revolutionary and opposition organisations in Russia. p. 303

[293] *Posledniye Izvestia*—the bulletin of the Bund Committee Abroad, published in London and Geneva in 1901-06. p. 303

[294] In reply to this letter, Lydia Knipovich, a member of the Odessa Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., informed Lenin that the mandate to the congress previously issued to V. V. Vorovsky in the name of the Odessa Committee was being transferred to Lenin and that Vorovsky would receive his mandate from the Nikolaev Committee. p. 307

[295] This refers to the agreement between the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Bureau of the Majority Committees concluded on March 12 (25), 1905, on the question of setting up an Organising Committee for convening the Third Congress of the Party. p. 309

[296] *Vinogradova*, *Olga* (1881-1913)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1901. In 1903 carried on propaganda and agitation in Nizhni-Novgorod. In 1903-04—a member of the Bolshevik group in Berlin. In the spring of 1905 worked in the Odessa organisation. Was a correspondent of the newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. In 1905-07 worked in St. Petersburg, was a member of the agitators' collegium under the St. Petersburg Committee. Afterwards worked in Saratov. p. 310

[297] This letter was a reply to that of Olga Vinogradova dated February 18, 1905, from Odessa, in which she wrote to Lenin: "In your letter to Comrade T. you mention my promise to write about Nizhni-Novgorod." p. 310

[298] This refers to the *Geneva Conference of the Mensheviks* held simultaneously with the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in April 1905. p. 312

[299] *The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London from April 12 to 27 (April 25-May 10), 1905, and was attended by 24 voting delegates and 14 delegates with a consultative voice. It was the first Bolshevik congress.

All the Congress proceedings were guided by Lenin. He wrote the drafts of all the basic resolutions adopted by the Congress and spoke on the question of the armed uprising, on the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government, on the attitude towards the peasant movement, on the Party Rules and on a number of other questions. The Minutes of the Congress record over a hundred speeches and motions made by Lenin.

The Congress condemned the actions of the Mensheviks, their opportunism in organisational and tactical questions; it laid down the tactical line of the Bolsheviks aimed at the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and its development into a socialist revolution. The resolutions of the Congress outlined the tasks of the proletariat as the leader of the revolution and the strategic plan of the Party in the bourgeois-democratic revolution namely, the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry, and with the liberal bourgeoisie isolated, was to fight for the victory of the revolution.

The Congress amended the Party Rules: a) it adopted Lenin's wording of Clause One; b) it defined precisely the rights of the Central Committee and its relations with the local committees; c) it modified the organisational structure of the Party's central bodies: in place of the two centres (the Central Committee, the Central Organ) the Congress established a single competent Party centre—the Central Committee. p. 312

[300] *Proletary* (The Proletarian)—underground Bolshevik weekly, Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., founded in accordance with a resolution of the Third Party Congress. By a decision of the plenary meeting of the Party C.C. of April 27 (May 10), 1905, Lenin was appointed Editor-in-Chief.

Proletary was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25), 1905. Twenty-six numbers were put out. The newspaper carried on the line of the old, Leninist, *Iskra*, and maintained complete continuity with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*. Lenin wrote over sixty articles and paragraphs for the newspaper. His articles were reprinted in the local Bolshevik periodicals and published in leaflet form. p. 312

[301] The question of the R.S.D.L.P.'s representation in the International Socialist Bureau was discussed in the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. on May 7 (20), 1905. Plekhanov's appointment as representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the I.S.B. was signed by Krasin, Lenin and Postolovsky with a reservation to the effect that Lenin was instructed to implement this decision in the event of a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations started with Plekhanov. Lenin considered recognition of the validity of the Third Congress, membership of the Party and acceptance of its decisions to be obligatory on the part of Plekhanov.

The Mensheviks nominated Plekhanov to the I.S.B. at their conference. On June 16, 1905, Plekhanov notified the I.S.B. that he had been authorised to represent the Party by both splinter groups and gave a tendentious account of the split in which he denied the necessity and validity of the Party's Third Congress. p. 313

[302] The Report on the Third Congress and the major resolutions were published in *Proletary* No. 1, for May 14 (27), 1905. p. 315

[303] Lenin is here referring to the decision of the plenary meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (the first plenum after the Third Congress), held on April 27 (May 10), 1905, concerning the next plenary meeting to be held in Geneva on September 1 (14). This decision was not carried out. p. 315

[304] Bebel's offer to mediate in uniting the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was addressed to the International Socialist Bureau after he had received a negative reply to a similar proposal addressed directly to Lenin on January 21 (February 3), 1905. (See Lenin's reply, p. 295 of this volume.) p. 318

[305] The Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the resolutions of the Congress were published in the pamphlet *Bericht über den III Parteitag der S.D.A.P.R.*, München. K. Kautsky wrote an article "Die Spaltung der russischen Sozialdemokratie" ("The Split in Russian Social-Democracy") in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, the mouthpiece of the German Left Social-Democrats (No. 135 for June 15, 1905), against the circulation of this pamphlet. In reply to Kautsky's article Lenin wrote his "Open Letter to the Editorial Board of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*" (see Vol. 8 of this edition), which the editors did not publish. p. 318

[306] *The Open Letter* of the C.C. to the Organisation Committee of the Mensheviks, written by A. A. Bogdanov, was published in *Proletary* on August 9 (July 27), 1905, issue No. 11.

The C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. proposed to the Menshevik centre —the Organisation Committee—to enter into negotiations for unity on the following terms, with the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks preserving ideological independence:

(1) the local committees unite on the basis outlined by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

(2) the central bodies come to an arrangement for joint activities aimed at re-establishing unity;

(3) the parallel existence of the Party organs to be preserved.

This plan was criticised by Lenin in his letter to the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. dated August 14, 1905 (see pp. 326-27 of this volume). p. 319

[307] In the "Open Letter" the tactical differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks were recognised as "insignificant". The pamphlet here referred to by Lenin is *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, on which he worked in the course of June-July 1905 (see Vol. 9 of this edition). p. 319

[308] The decision appointing Plekhanov Editor-in-Chief of the Party's scientific organ was adopted by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. on May 7 (20), 1905; Lenin was instructed to implement this decision in the event of the negotiations with Plekhanov being satisfactorily concluded. p. 321

[309] The Social-Democratic Federation, founded in 1884, included within its ranks representatives of reformism (Hyndman and others), anarchists, and Marxists representing the Left wing of the British socialist movement. In 1907 it was renamed the Social-Democratic Party; in 1911 this Party and the Left elements of the Independent Labour Party formed the British Socialist Party, which, in 1920, together with the Socialist Unity group, played the chief role in establishing the Communist Party of Great Britain. p. 321

[310] A secret resolution of the Third Congress on the question of "preparing the terms of unification with the Mensheviks" stated that

the Congress "instructs the C.C. to take steps towards preparing and working out the terms of unification with the breakaway section of the R.S.D.L.P., which terms are to be submitted for final endorsement to a new Party congress" (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses*, *Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 90). p. 321

[311] *Lunacharsky*, *Anatoly Vasilievich* (1875-1933)—joined the revolutionary movement in the early nineties. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. Member of the editorial boards of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod*, *Proletary* and later *Novaya Zhizn*. During the reaction deviated from Marxism and participated in the anti-Party *Vperyod* group. Advocated the combination of Marxism with religion. Lenin sharply criticised Lunacharsky's views in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1909). In 1917 Lunacharsky was enrolled in the Party at the Sixth Congress.

After the October Socialist Revolution a prominent Soviet statesman. p. 323

[312] Meaning the participants in the mutiny aboard the armoured cruiser *Potemkin*. p. 324

[313] The Menshevik *Iskra* published the minutes of the meeting between the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Mensheviks' centre—the Organisation Committee—held on July 12, 1905, to discuss unification of the Party. The Mensheviks proposed a plan, which, considering the impossibility of convening a congress, called for unification of the Party "by means of sufficient mutual concessions by both sections of the Party". The plan set forth in the minutes provided for the organisation of a Central Committee consisting of representatives of both sections of the Party, and for retaining *Iskra* and *Proletary* as the official organs of the Party. The representatives of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. found the point concerning the formation of a Central Committee consisting of representatives of both sections of the Party acceptable, the question of the functioning of two organs was postponed pending clarification of the attitude towards this on the part of the editorial boards concerned; as to the terms in general, the representatives of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. considered that, although they did not conflict with the basic principles of the Party Rules, not all of them were practicable. p. 326

[314] This refers to the agreement concluded by member of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Leonid Krasin and the Social-Democrat V. L. Kopp (Frockcoat) arranging for illegal transportation to and from Russia. On the basis of this agreement V. L. Kopp attempted not only to monopolise the business of illegal communication with Russia, but to seize some of the property and literature belonging to the Bolsheviks. p. 327

[315] This refers to the publication of the minutes of the Third Congress. of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 327

[316] The Orel-Bryansk Committee, having heard the report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., did not "consider it possible to take one or another stand" and recommended the Minority, not represented at the Third Congress, "to amalgamate with the Party", declaring that "in the area of its revolutionary work it would make no distinction between the comrades of the Minority and those of the Majority, both of which it considered members. of a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party". p. 327

[317] "Black-Hundred Literature"—articles of Kostrov (N. Jordania) published first in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (organ of the Georgian Mensheviks), Nos. 1-3, and subsequently in pamphlet form under the title *Majority or Minority*? p. 328

[318] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat) No. 2 for August 1905 published Plekhanov's article "Selected Passages From Correspondence With Friends (A Letter to the Editors of *Proletary*)" in which the author answered Lenin's article "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Article One. Plekhanov's Reference to History" (see Vol. 8 of this edition), and accused Lenin and the Bolsheviks of Blanquism. p. 329

[319] A plan of the pamphlet *The Working Class and Revolution* was drawn up by Lenin (see Vol. 9 of this edition), but the pamphlet on this subject was not written. p. 329

[320] The manifesto concerning the Bulygin Duma was published on August 6 (19), 1905. On August 29 (16) *Proletary* published an article of Lenin's on this subject entitled "Oneness of the Tsar and the People, and of the People and the Tsar" (Vol. 9, pp. 191-99, of this edition). p. 329

[321] *Lepeshinsky*, *Panteleimon Nikolayevich* (1868-1944)—a prominent member of the Communist Party. Joined the Social-Democratic movement in the early nineties. In 1900 he took an active part in organising the promulgation of *Iskra*. In 1903 he emigrated to Switzerland; took part in preparing the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. During the revolution of 1905-07 carried on revolutionary work in Ekaterinoslav and St. Petersburg. p. 330

[322] This letter of Lenin's (*Decision* of the C.C. representative abroad) was written in connection with the conflict that had arisen between various members of the Bolshevik Geneva group. p. 330

[323] The Conference of Social-Democratic Organisations in Russia was held in Riga on September 7-9 (20-22), 1905. It was attended by representatives of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., of the Orga-

nisation Committee of the Mensheviks, of the Bund, of the Lettish Social-Democrats, of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. The Conference approved the Bolshevik tactics of active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. The Conference decisions were assessed by Lenin in his articles "The First Results of the Political Alignment" and "The Hysterics of the Defeated" (see Vol. 9 of this edition). The Mensheviks refused to sign the resolutions of the Conference. p. 336

[324] *The Armenian Social-Democratic Federation*—a nationalist organisation formed in 1903, shortly after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which proclaimed itself the sole representative of the Armenian proletariat; like the Bundists, it recognised only the federative principle of party organisation. p. 337

[325] *Letuchie Listki* (Leaflets) of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.—a non-periodical publication dealing with current tactical and organisational questions in keeping with the decisions of the Third Congress of the Party. Altogether four numbers were put out. *Listok* No. 1 was printed in June 1905 at the printshop of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party and reprinted in abridged form in July by the Moscow Committee of the Party.

Rabochy (The Worker)—an illegal popular Social-Democratic newspaper, published in pursuance of the decision of the Third Congress of the Party by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Moscow in August-October 1905. The de facto editor of the paper was A. A. Bogdanov. p. 338

[326] "Financier"—L. B Krasin (see Note 241). p. 338

[327] The report of the Menshevik *Iskra* published in the French socialist newspaper *Le Socialiste* No. 11, dealt with the attitude of the local Party organisations to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. *Iskra* declared that the Congress was recognised as lawful by only eight organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. (Tver, Tula, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Orel, Kursk and Minsk) uniting 2,000,000-2,500,000 workers; 25 organisations according to *Iskra*, did not recognise the Congress; in four organisations the Congress was recognised by a minority, and the attitude to the Congress on the part of nine organisations was unascertained. Since this false information was not given by *Iskra* to the press in Russia, Lenin published in *Proletary* No. 9, for July 26 (13), 1905, under the heading "Our Khlestakovs" a full translation of the article printed in *Le Socialiste* with his introductory and concluding comments. The statistics concerning the committees of the R.S.D.L.P. which allegedly "refused to recognise" the Third Congress of the Party were also dealt with by Lenin in his article "Keeping International Social-Democracy Informed of Our Party Affairs" published in *Proletary* No. 15, for September 5 (August 23), 1905 (see Vol. 9 of this edition). p. 339

[328] Issue No. 5 of the Marxist journal *Zarya* was being prepared for the press but did not appear. p. 341

[329] S. I. Gusev, who worked as secretary of the Odessa Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. during the latter half of 1905, wrote to Lenin about the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the revolution of 1905, reported what educative work the Odessa Committee was doing among the masses, and criticised the resolutions of the Geneva Conference of the Mensheviks. Excerpts from Gusev's letter were published in *Proletary* No. 20, for October 10 (September 27), 1905, with an editor's preface written by Lenin (see Vol. 9, p. 335 of this edition). p. 342

[330] A. A. Bogdanov's article "Fundamentals of Party Organisation" was not published in *Proletary*. p. 344

[331] This refers to Lenin's trip to Finland to attend a meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. In a letter dated October 17 (30) he was given the address for a rendezvous in Stockholm. p. 345

[332] This refers to representation in the I.S.B. By a decision of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin was appointed representative. p. 345

[333] *Malykh*, *Maria*—publisher of legal Social-Democratic literature in 1905. p. 345

[334] *The Fourth* (*Unity*) *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Stockholm on April 10-25 (April 23-May 8), 1906.

It was attended by 112 voting delegates representing 57 local organisations and 22 delegates with a consultative voice. There were, in addition, three representatives each from the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund, and the Lettish S.D.L.P. and one each from the Ukrainian S.D.L.P. and the Labour Party of Finland, and a representative of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Bolshevik delegates included, among others, V. I. Lenin, F. A. Artyom (Sergeyev), M. V. Frunze, M. I. Kalinin, S. G. Shahumyan, and V. V. Vorovsky. The principal items on the agenda were the agrarian question, the current situation, the class tasks of the proletariat, the attitude to the Duma, and organisational questions. On all issues a sharp struggle was waged between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Lenin made reports and speeches on the agrarian question, the current situation, on the question of tactics in regard to the Duma elections, on the armed uprising and other questions.

The Mensheviks' numerical preponderance at the Congress though slight, determined the character of the Congress decisions. On a number of questions the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions (the agrarian programme, the attitude towards the Duma, etc.). The Congress adopted Lenin's formulation of Clause One of the Party Rules concerning membership of the Party. The Congress admitted into the R.S.D.L.P. the non-Russian Social-Demo-

cratic organisations of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, and made arrangements for the Bund to join the R.S.D.L.P.

The Central Committee elected at the Congress consisted of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks. Only Mensheviks were elected to the editorial board of the Central Organ.

An analysis of the Congress is given in Lenin's pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* (see Vol. 10 of this edition). p. 346

[335] The steamship *John Grafton* carrying weapons for revolutionary purposes ran aground off the coast of Finland on August 26 (September 8), 1905. Some of the weapons were put ashore, after which the vessel was blown up by its crew. p. 348

[336] *The South-Russian Inaugural Conference of the Mensheviks* was held in Kiev in August 1905. It was attended by twelve delegates from Menshevik groups and committees. The Conference adopted resolutions on the following questions: amalgamation of both sections of the Party; the Duma; the composition of *Iskra* editorial board; representation of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau; the Articles of Association, and others.

Lenin sharply criticised the decisions of the Conference in his articles "A New Menshevik Conference" and "The Latest in *Iskra* Tactics, or Mock Elections as a New Incentive to an Uprising" (see Vol. 9 of this edition). p. 350

[337] The reference is to Lunacharsky's article published, apparently, after Lenin's suggested revision, under the heading "Parliament and Its Significance" in *Proletary* No. 25, for November 16 (3), 1905. p. 352

[338] *Leipziger Volkszeitung*—organ of the Left wing of German Social-Democracy. The newspaper was published daily from 1894 to 1933; for a number of years it was edited by Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg. From 1917 to 1922 the paper was the mouthpiece of the German "Independents". After 1922 it was the organ of the Right Social-Democrats. p. 352

[339] Lenin is referring to Rudolph Hilferding's article "Parlamentarismus und Massenstreik" published in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 51, for September 13, 1905. p. 352

[340] *The Moscow events*—the strikes and demonstrations started by the Moscow workers, which Lenin dealt with in his articles "The Political Strike and the Street Fighting in Moscow" and "The Lessons of the Moscow Events" (see Vol. 9 of this edition). The strike movement spread to St. Petersburg and was followed by a general political strike all over the country (see Lenin's article "The All-Russia Political Strike", Vol. 9 of this edition). p. 352

[341] *Cadets*—abbreviated name for members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in October 1905, its membership was made up of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders of the landowning class and bourgeois intellectuals. The Cadets called themselves the "party of people's freedom". Actually they strove towards a deal with the autocracy in order to preserve tsarism in the form of a constitutional monarchy. Their watchword from the beginning of the imperialist war was "war to a victorious finish. After the February revolution of 1917, as a result of a deal with the S.R. and Menshevik leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, they occupied key positions in the bourgeois Provisional Government and pursued a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people.

After the victory of the October Revolution the Cadets came out as implacable enemies of the Soviet power. They took part in all the counter-revolutionary armed actions and campaigns of the interventionists. Living abroad as émigrés after the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards, the Cadets did not cease their anti-Soviet activities. p. 352

[342] Karl Marx, "The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow 1962, pp. 139-242). p. 353

[343] Lenin refers to his translation of the preface to the pamphlet *The Peasant War in Germany* quoted in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see Vol. 5, pp. 371-72, of this edition). p. 356

[344] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—the first legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. Lenin took over the editorship upon his return to Russia early in November 1905. *Novaya Zhizn* was, in effect, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Closely associated with the paper were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky. Maxim Gorky contributed articles and gave the paper financial aid. The paper's circulation reached 80,000.

Novaya Zhizn was constantly persecuted. Fifteen of its twenty-seven issues were confiscated and destroyed. It was banned after the publication of No. 27. The last issue No. 28 came out illegally. p. 362

[345] *The events of the last few days* apply to the general political strike in Russia in October 1905. p. 363

[346] The three persons were A. Bogdanov, V. Bazarov and A. Lunacharsky. p. 364

[347] In a note from the editorial board published in *Proletary* No. 20 for October 10 (September 27), 1905, Lenin wrote about the necessity of convening "two congresses", that of the Majority and the

Minority, "at the same time and in the same place" (see "On the Question of Party Unity", Vol. 9, pp. 327-28, of this edition). p. 368

[348] Lenin and Meshkovsky (I. P. Goldenberg) were delegates to the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart (August 18-24, 1907). This letter was apparently written in Berlin. p. 369

[349] Gorky did not attend the Stuttgart Congress. p. 369

[350] Maria Fyodorovna Andreyeva, the well-known Russian actress and public figure, was the wife and assistant of A. M. Gorky. p. 369

[351] This refers to the pamphlet by A. V. Lunacharsky (Voinov) on the attitude of the Party towards the trade unions, which was written in connection with the discussion of this question at the Seventh, Stuttgart, Congress of the Second International. Lunacharsky attended the Congress as a member of the Russian delegation and a representative of the Bolsheviks. He was elected to the committee that drafted a resolution on the question of "the relations between political parties and the trade unions".

Lunacharsky's pamphlet was not published owing to the tightening of the censorship in 1908. See Lenin's preface to the pamphlet in Vol. 13 of this edition. p. 370

[352] This refers to the Essen Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party, held on September 21-23, 1907, at which Bebel came out against Karl Liebknecht, who had criticised Noske's chauvinist stand and the whole behaviour of the German delegation at the Stuttgart Congress. Bebel also came out against Rosa Luxemburg and all the German Left wingers for the "methods" (i.e., for their bloc with the Bolsheviks) which they adopted at the Congress in their struggle against the social-chauvinists and social-imperialists. p. 371

[353] *Proletary*—a Bolshevik illegal newspaper, edited by Lenin, published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909. Altogether 50 issues were put out. *Proletary*, in effect, was the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. The paper devoted a good deal of space to tactical and general political questions, and published reports on the activities of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., the decisions of conferences and C.C. plenary meetings, C.C. letters on various questions of Party activity, and a number of other documents. The paper was in close touch with the local Party organisations.

During the years of the Stolypin reaction *Proletary* played an important role in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations and combating the liquidators, otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders.

By a decision of the plenary meeting of the Party's C.C. of January 1910 the paper was closed down.

Zarnitsy (Summer Lightning)—a Bolshevik legal symposium, published in St. Petersburg in 1907. p. 371

[354] Gorky toured Italy in October-December 1907 and met Lunacharsky in Florence. p. 372

[355] This refers to the first volume of Lenin's writings entitled *Twelve Years* published in St. Petersburg in November 1907 (the cover bore the date 1908). See Lenin's "Preface to the *Collection Twelve Years*", Vol. 13 of this edition. p. 372

[356] Arrangements for delivering *Proletary* to Russia through Gorky and Andreyeva were made in the early months of 1908, but hitches occurred owing to police interference. In a letter to Morgari, socialist M.P., editor of *Avanti!*, Gorky wrote at the beginning of May 1908 that two parcels containing the newspaper *Proletary* had been sequestered in Genoa and asked for an explanation of this "strange misunderstanding". Gorky's letter was published in *Avanti!* on May 5 (18), and on May 25 the newspaper reported that the ban on *Proletary* had been lifted. p. 374

[357] *Rothstein, Theodore Aronovich* (1871-1953)—a Social-Democrat. In 1890 he was compelled to emigrate from Russia. Settled in England, joined the English Social-Democratic Federation where he adhered to its Left wing. Joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. Contributed to the Russian and foreign socialist press. Took part in founding the Communist Party of Great Britain. Returned home in 1920. From 1921 to 1930 engaged in diplomatic work, afterwards Director of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics. From 1939 an Academician. p. 375

[358] During the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (April 30-May 19 [May 13-June 1], 1907), owing to the Party's extremely difficult financial position, a loan was raised with the help of Maxim Gorky and George Lansbury, the money being advanced by an English soap manufacturer and was to be repaid by January 1, 1908. The loan not being repaid in time, the lender wrote to Theodore Rothstein, reminding him about it, and the latter, then a member of the English Social-Democratic Party, wrote to Lenin about it.

After the October Revolution the Soviet Government, through L. B. Krasin, repaid the debt to the lender's heirs who returned the letter acknowledging the debt signed by all the participants of the Congress. p. 375

[359] N. A. Semashko was arrested in Geneva at the end of January 1908. Lenin's statement was published in the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht* No. 29, for February 5, 1908. p. 377

[360] The announcement concerning the resumption of *Proletary* abroad was issued as a separate leaflet, stating that the publication had been transferred from Russia to Geneva and giving publication dates, the names of contributors and subscription rates. p. 377

[361] Gorky's *Notes on Philistinism* were published in the legal Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* in October-November 1905. p. 378

[362] *Berner Tagwacht*—a daily, organ of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, founded in Berne in 1893. At the beginning of World War I the paper published articles by Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and other Left Social-Democrats. From 1917 the paper openly supported the social-chauvinists. p. 378

[363] This refers to Gorky's statement for the press in connection with the arrest of Semashko. p. 379

[364] The article "On Cynicism" was written by Gorky for the French magazine *Les Documents du Progrès* and was first published in the symposium *Literaturny Raspad* (Zerno Publishers, St. Petersburg, which appeared in 1908) and afterwards in the March issue of the French magazine. The article contained erroneous ideas of a god-building nature. p. 379

[365] Gorky's letter of January 30, 1908, to Henryk Sienkiewicz was an answer to the opinion poll organised by the latter on the attitude to the seizure of the Poznan landowners' estates by the Prussian government.

Gorky's letter was an accusatory document directed against Sienkiewicz's defence of big private landownership in Poznan. Gorky wrote to Sienkiewicz that, while he appreciated his gift as an artist, he protested against Sienkiewicz appealing to Wilhelm II with such arguments as the "peaceful" behaviour of the Poles, who were "not kindling the fire of revolution", were punctually paying their taxes and providing soldiers for the Prussian army. These words give me reason to doubt the strength of your love for the Polish people," Gorky wrote in conclusion.

The 252 replies to Sienkiewicz's questionnaire were published by him in book form in Paris, but Gorky's reply was left out. p. 379

[366] Lenin was engaged in the work of issuing the newspaper *Proletary*, publication of which had been transferred from Finland to Geneva at the end of 1907. p. 379

[367] *Kwakalla*—a jocular name for the village Kuokkala, in Finland, where Lenin lived during May-November 1907. p. 380

[368] The Bolshevik symposia were published after the coup of June 3rd when the legal newspapers and periodicals were obliged to close down owing to censorship persecution. The year 1907 and beginning of 1908 saw the publication of the symposia *Golos Zhizni* (The Voice of Life), *Zarnitsy* (Summer Lightning), *Kalendar dlya vsekh* (Popular Calendar) *for 1908*, *Tyemi Dnya* (Topics of the Day), *Tekushchaya Zhizn* (Current Life), *O Veyaniakh Vremeni* (Spirit of the Times). p. 380

[369] This refers to the refusal of E. Ferri, leader of the centrist majority of the Italian Socialist Party, to edit the Party's Central Organ *Avanti!*. Lunacharsky's article "The Crisis in the Italian Workers Party" was published in *Proletary* No. 23, for March 11 (February 27), 1908. p. 384

[370] The reference is to a meeting on Capri, sponsored by Gorky, which was to have been attended by Lenin, Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunacharsky and Skvortsov-Stepanov to discuss questions of publishing activities and theoretical questions. The meeting took place in April 1908 (Skvortsov-Stepanov did not attend; he came to Geneva for a week to meet Lenin). Lenin mentions it in his "A Letter to Students at the Capri Party School" dated August 30, 1909 (see Vol. 15 of this edition). p. 384

[371] *The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London on April 30-May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907. It was attended by 336 delegates, of whom 105 were Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 57 Bundists, 44 Polish Social-Democrats, 29 Lettish Social-Democrats and 4 non-factionalists. The Poles and Letts supported the Bolsheviks, who had a solid majority at the Congress. One of the main questions discussed was that of the attitude to the bourgeois parties. Lenin delivered the report on this question. On all fundamental issues the Congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions. A Central Committee was elected consisting of 5 Bolsheviks, 4 Mensheviks, 2 Polish and 1 Lettish Social-Democrats. Among the alternate members elected to the C.C. were 10 Bolsheviks, 7 Mensheviks, 3 Polish and 2 Lettish Social-Democrats.

The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. marked the victory of Bolshevism in the Russian working-class movement. The decisions of the Congress summed up the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the opportunist, Menshevik wing of the Party in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks' tactics were approved by the Congress and accepted as the tactics of the whole Party. p. 386

[372] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of a Social-Democrat)—a newspaper, the organ of the Mensheviks, published from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva, then in Paris. The newspaper coming out in open support of the liquidators, Plekhanov resigned from the editorial board in May 1909, after which the paper took definite shape as the ideological centre of the liquidators. p. 386

[373] Lenin is referring to the group of empirio-critics and empiriomonists, adherents of the reactionary idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius, namely, Bogdanov, Bazarov and Lunacharsky. p. 386

[374] This refers to an invitation to Lenin to attend the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau. p. 387

[375] A journal which was to have been published by Gorky. The plan for its publication did not materialise. p. 389

[376] Gorky's article on Tolstoy did not appear in *Proletary*. Asked in 1927 whether he had written such an article, Gorky answered: "I wrote something about Tolstoy for *Proletary*. I don't remember what the title was. Possibly, 'A Great Man'." p. 391

[377] "*Notebooks*"—"Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy"—was written by Lenin in 1906 in connection with Bogdanov's book *Empirio-monism* (Issue III). Lenin deals with these "Notes" in greater detail in his letter to Gorky dated February 25, 1908 (see Vol. 13 of this edition). p. 393

[378] *The Bolshevik Centre* was elected by the Bolshevik group of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. p. 393

[379] Lenin is referring to his article "Marxism and Revisionism" published in the symposium *Karl Marx—1818-1883*, in which he stated for the first time in print that he would shortly write a number of articles or a separate book against the neo-Humist and neo-Berkeleyian revisionists—Bogdanov, Bazarov and others (see Vol. 15, pp. 29-39, of this edition). p. 393

[380] This letter has not been found. p. 394

[381] *Vorovsky*, *Vatslav Vatslavovich* (1871-1923)—a prominent member of the Bolshevik Party, journalist and literary critic. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1890. In 1902 he emigrated abroad and became a contributor to Lenin's *Iskra*. In 1905 co-editor with Lenin on the newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, delegate to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. From the end of 1905 worked in the St. Petersburg organisation of the Bolsheviks and on the Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*. In 1906 a delegate to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1907 headed the Bolshevik organisation in Odessa. Was arrested and exiled for his revolutionary activities.

After the October Revolution held leading diplomatic posts. p. 395

[382] Lenin is referring to his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* (see Vol. 14 of this edition). p. 395

[383] This letter was written in reply to that of the Menshevik Machist Yushkovich offering Lenin to contribute to literary-philosophical symposia. p. 396

[384] *Luxemburg*, *Rosa* (1871-1919)—a prominent member of the international labour movement, one of the leaders of the Left wing of the Second International. Started revolutionary activities in the late eighties, was one of the founders and leaders of the Social-

Democratic Party of Poland. From 1897 took an active part in the German Social-Democratic movement.

After the revolution of November 1918 in Germany took a leading part in the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Germany. In January 1919 she was arrested and killed by order of the Scheidemann government.

Lenin, who thought highly of Rosa Luxemburg, often criticised her mistakes, thus helping her to adopt a correct stand. p. 397

[385] Lenin and Krupskaya visited Rosa Luxemburg early in January 1908 when they stopped over in Berlin on their way to Geneva from Stockholm. p. 397

[386] The notice (note) concerning the appearance of Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* was published in the journal *Die Neue Zeit*, I. Band, No. 2, October 8, 1909. p. 397

[387] *Otzovists* (from the Russian word *otozvat*—recall)—the name given to some of the Bolsheviks (Bogdanov, Pokrovsky, Lunacharsky, Bubnov and others) who demanded that the Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma should be recalled and that work in the legal organisations should be stopped. In 1908 the otzovists formed a group of their own and waged a struggle against Lenin. They emphatically refused to sit in the Duma or work in the trade unions, co-operative societies and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations of the workers. They strove to shut themselves up within the framework of the illegal organisation: to tear the Party away from the non-party masses and expose it to the attacks of reaction. Lenin called the otzovists "liquidators of a new type" and "Mensheviks inside out".

A variety of otzovism was ultimatumism. The ultimatumists differed from the otzovists only in form. They proposed that an ultimatum should first be presented to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and if it was not complied with, the Social-Democratic deputies should be recalled from the Duma.

Ultimatumism was virtually otzovism in disguise. Lenin called the ultimatumists "bashful otzovists".

In the spring of 1909 the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders formed a promotion group to organise an anti-Party school on the Isle of Capri (Bogdanov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky and others). This group, in effect, was the centre of the anti-Party faction of otzovists, ultimatumists, and god-builders.

A meeting of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* held in June 1909 adopted a decision that "Bolshevism, as a definite tendency in the R.S.D.L.P. has nothing in common with otzovism or ultimatumism" and called upon the Bolsheviks to resolutely combat this defection from revolutionary Marxism. Bogdanov (Maximov), the guiding spirit of otzovism, was expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks.

Later, in his book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, Lenin wrote that the Bolsheviks were able to make an

orderly retreat and preserve their forces after the failure of the revolution because "they ruthlessly exposed and expelled the revolutionary phrase-mongers, those who did not wish to understand that one had to retreat, that one had to know how to retreat, and that one had absolutely to learn how to work legally in the most reactionary of parliaments, in the most reactionary of trade unions, co-operative and insurance societies and similar organisations" (see Vol. 31, p. 28, of this edition). p. 397

[388] The article referred to was "Revolutionary Hangover" published in *Proletary* No. 44, April 8 (21), 1909. p. 397

[389] The reference is to Kautsky's stand at the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau on October 11, 1908 on the question of the British Labour Party's membership of the Second International. This is dealt with in Lenin's article "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau" (see Vol. 15 of this edition). p. 397

[390] *Lyubimov, A. I.* (1879-1919)—a Social-Democrat, joined the revolutionary movement in 1898. Repeatedly persecuted by the tsarist government. In 1904 was co-opted on to the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Delegate of the Party's Council to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Adopted a conciliatory stand towards the Mensheviks both after the Second Congress of the Party and during the years of reaction. p. 398

[391] See Lenin's "A Letter to the Organisers of the Party School on Capri" (Vol. 15 of this edition).

The *Capri school* was organised in 1909 on Capri (Italy) by the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders. The meeting of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* exposed the factional anti-Bolshevik nature of the school, which was condemned and qualified as "a new centre being formed for a faction breaking away from the Bolsheviks" (see Vol. 15, p. 450, of this edition).

The school began to function in August, lectures being read by Bogdanov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky, Gorky, Lyadov, Pokrovsky and Desnitsky. Lenin declined the organisers' invitation that he come to Capri as a lecturer. In his letter to the school's students, who insisted on his reading a cycle of lectures to them, Lenin explained that he could not do it inasmuch as it was "a school *deliberately hidden away from the Party*" in "a remote foreign spot" and bearing a factional character. Lenin proposed to the students that they should come to Paris where they would learn real Social-Democracy instead of the "*separatist* factional '*science*'" of the otzovists and god-builders (see Vol. 15, pp. 472-78, of this edition). p. 398

[392] This refers to the Mensheviks' liquidator newspaper *Pravda*, Trotsky's factional mouthpiece, published in 1908-12. The first issues appeared in Lvov, and from No. 4 onward the paper came out in Vienna. p. 398

[393] *Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich* (1883-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. From 1908 to April 1917 was an emigrant abroad, member of the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat* and of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*. During the years of reaction (1907-10) and the new revolutionary upsurge he adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators, otzovists and Trotskyists. In the period of preparation and conduct of the October Revolution he wavered and was opposed to an armed uprising.

In November 1927 he was expelled from the Party for factional activities, was twice reinstated and expelled again for anti-Party activities. p. 399

[394] *Sotsial-Demokrat*—Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., an illegal newspaper published from February 1908 to January 1917. The editorial board, by decision of the C.C. elected at the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., was composed of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats. The paper was virtually run by Lenin. p. 399

[395] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily newspaper, Central Organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. Closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 399

[396] The reference is to the general strike in Sweden, which broke out on August 4, 1909, following the lockout of 83,000 workers in various branches of industry, and to the revolt in Catalonia. Articles on these subjects were published in *Proletary* No. 47-48 under the headings: "Lessons of the Class Struggle (the General Strike in Sweden)", a leading article and "Colonial Robbery and Revolution". p. 399

[397] The polemic Lenin intended writing about was carried on in June and August-September 1909 in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Nos. 15 and 16-17, in connection with an article by a Geneva anti-liquidator Menshevik, apparently Victor Tevzaya (Georgien), entitled A Word on a Topical Subject", in which he defended the idea of an illegal party and urged that the Menshevik organisations clear their ranks of the liquidator legalists. In leading articles headed "Concerning the Article of a Geneva Comrade" and "On the Organisational Discussion" the *Golos* people denied that they "winked at" liquidationism and accused the author of sectarianism. In his reply ("On the Same Subject") Georgien quoted a number of documents reflecting the activities of the liquidators in the organisations in Russia. No special article on this polemic appeared in *Proletary*. Reference to a promised analysis and evaluation of liquidator ideas "piled up" in issue No. 15 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is contained in a footnote to Lenin's article "The Liquidation of Liquidationism" (see Vol. 15, p. 460, of this edition). p. 399

[398] This refers to the contents of the current issue, No. 47-48, of *Pro-*

letary, which published the following articles by Lenin: "The Liquidators Exposed", "On the Open Letter of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Regional Committee", and "The Elections in St. Petersburg", and to the supplement to this issue containing the article "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" (see Vol. 16 of this edition). p. 399

[399] L. B. Kamenev's article on the Menshevik five-volume publication *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* edited by L. Martov, P. Maslov and A. Potresov was published in *Proletary*, Nos. 47-48 and 49, September 5 (18) and October 3 (16), 1909. p. 400

[400] *God-builders*—adherents of a religious-philosophical trend, hostile to Marxism, which in the period of reaction (1907-10) arose among a section of the Party intellectuals who had moved away from Marxism after the defeat of the revolution of 1905-07. The god-builders advocated the creation of a new "socialist" religion and tried to reconcile Marxism with religion. An extended meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* held on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909 condemned god-building and declared in a special resolution that the Bolshevik section of the Party had nothing in common with "such a distortion of scientific socialism". (See *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 222.)

The reactionary nature of god-building was exposed by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see Vol. 14 of this edition). p. 401

[401] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat)—a non-periodical organ published by Plekhanov in Geneva from 1905 to 1912. The last issue appeared in Petrograd in 1916. p. 402

[402] The newspaper referred to was *Proletary* (see Note 353). p. 405

[403] *Skvortsov-Stepanov*, *Ivan Ivanovich* (1870-1928)—one of the oldest participants in the Russian revolutionary movement, a Marxist writer. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1892; from the close of 1904 a Bolshevik. In 1906 a delegate to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., at which he adopted a Leninist stand. In the period of reaction (1907-10) adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the *Vperyod* faction, but under the influence of Lenin he rectified these errors. He was repeatedly arrested and exiled for his revolutionary activities.

After the October Socialist Revolution he occupied important government and Party posts. p. 407

[404] *Liquidators*—adherents of an opportunist trend dominant among the Mensheviks during the period of reaction following the defeat of the first Russian revolution of 1905-07. They demanded the liquidation of the revolutionary illegal party of the proletariat and the creation in its stead of an opportunist party operating

legally within the framework of the tsarist regime. Lenin and other Bolsheviks untiringly denounced the liquidators, who were betraying the cause of the revolution. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) expelled the liquidators from the Party. p. 408

[405] Meaning Stolypin's agrarian reform aimed at using the kulaks as a bulwark of the regime in the countryside. The tsarist government issued a Ukase on November 9 (22), 1906, regulating the peasants' withdrawal from the communes and the establishment of their proprietary rights on the allotment lands. Under this Stolypin law (which got its name from P. A. Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers) the peasant was free to withdraw from the village commune, take possession of his allotment on a proprietorship basis, and sell it. The rural community was obliged to give the peasants who withdrew from the commune an allotment of land in one place (an *otrub*, homestead) The Stolypin reform speeded up the development of capitalism in the countryside and the process of differentiation among the peasantry, and sharpened the class struggle in the village. The Stolypin reform is characterised and evaluated in a number of works by Lenin, notably in his *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* (see Vol. 13 of this edition). p. 408

[406] This document is the draft of a letter of Lenin's to Karl Kautsky, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin, the "trustees", to whom the funds of the Bolshevik section of the Party were handed over in accordance with the decision of the January 1910 Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Details of this will be found in Lenin's article "The Results of the Arbitration of the 'Trustees'" (see Vol. 17, pp. 365-67, of this edition). p. 411

[407] Lenin is referring to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Stockholm on April 10-25 (April 23-May 8), 1906, and the Fifth (London) Congress held on April 30-May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907. p. 411

[408] Lenin refers to the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. which condemned liquidationism. p. 412

[409] A phrase used by Plekhanov and addressed to the newspaper of the Menshevik liquidators *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of a Social-Democrat). p. 412

[410] Lenin here refers to the resolution "The State of Affairs in the Party" adopted by the Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910. A critical analysis of this resolution is given by Lenin in his article "Notes of a Publicist" (see Vol. 16 of this edition). p. 413

[411] The reprint from No. 12 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* for March 23 (April 5), 1910, contained Lenin's article "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liqui-

dators Against the Party (Reply to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*) (see Vol. 16 of this edition). p. 414

[412] *Vperyodists*—adherents of the *Vperyod* anti-Party group, consisting of otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders and empirio-monists; organised in December 1909 on the initiative of Bogdanov and Alexinsky; the group had its press organ of the same name. In 1912 together with the Menshevik liquidators they joined the general anti-Party bloc (the August bloc) against the Bolsheviks, which was organised by Trotsky. Lacking support among the workers, the group virtually fell to pieces in 1913. It disintegrated completely in 1917, after the February revolution. p. 414

[413] In answer to this letter Plekhanov wrote on April 2, 1910: "I, too, think, that the only way of coping with the crisis our Party is now living through is by a close alignment among the Menshevik Marxists and the Bolshevik Marxists, and I believe that you and I should talk this over." Plekhanov, however, wrote that this meeting should be held later. During the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International, at which Plekhanov and Lenin wrote to the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany protesting against the publication in *Vorwärts* of an anonymous and libellous article by Trotsky, an agreement was reached between Lenin and Plekhanov for a joint struggle for the Party and the Party principle against liquidationism and the liquidators, and for Plekhanov's contribution to *Rabochaya Gazeta*. p. 416

[414] *Pro-Party Mensheviks*—a small group of Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov, who broke away from the Menshevik liquidators and came out against liquidationism in 1908-12. The resolution here referred to was adopted by the pro-Party Mensheviks (in Paris) on April 4, 1910, concerning the necessity of closing down the liquidator newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in accordance with the decision of the January 1910 Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 417

[415] *Diskussionny Listok* (Discussion Bulletin) was started by decision of the January 1910 ("Unity") Plenum of the C.C. Its editorial board was composed of representatives of all the existing trends and national organisations in the Party. It appeared as a supplement to the Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat* in Paris from March 6 (19), 1911, to April 29 (May 12), 1911. Three issues were put out. p. 419

[416] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a monthly legal journal of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. It became the centre of the liquidators in Russia. p. 420

[417] The "Open Letter" was written by a group of prominent Mensheviks, who proposed liquidating the Party. p. 420

[418] The Party's School Committee was organised in accordance with a decision of the January 1910 ("Unity") Plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and was made up of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks Vperyodists (2 representatives each) and one representative each from the Bund, the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish Social-Democrats. The C.C.'s Bureau Abroad was instructed "to take all steps to induce Comrade Maximov (Bogdanov) and others to give up the idea of organising a separate school and to join the organisation of the school under the C.C., in which they should be guaranteed full opportunity of applying their teaching and lecturing talents" (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 240). p. 421

[419] *Semashko, Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1874-1949)—prominent Soviet statesman. Member of the Bolshevik Party since 1893. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. Was arrested in 1907 by the Swiss authorities; on his release from prison he moved to Paris, where he was secretary of the Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. p. 423

[420] Here and lower down (see pp. 430-31 and 432) the reference is to arrangements for publishing abroad the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochaya Gazeta*. p. 423

[421] *Marchlewski, Julian* (1866-1925)—prominent member of the revolutionary movement in Poland, Germany and Russia. Was one of the organisers and leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. At the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was elected alternate member of the Central Committee. From 1909 worked chiefly in the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 424

[422] The article against Martov by Marchlewski (Karsky) was published in the journal *Die Neue Zeit* (I. Band, No. 4, October 28 1910) under the heading: "Ein Mißverständnis" (A Misunderstanding). This article dealt with Martov's distortion of the quotation from Lenin's article and his application to the Russian revolution of 1905-07 of Kautsky's idea to the effect that "the strategy of overthrow" was inapplicable to Germany. p. 425

[423] *Quessel, L.*—German Social-Democrat, ultra-opportunist who gave an opportunist appraisal of the revolution of 1905. p. 425

[424] *Nasha Zarya*, see Note 416.

Vozrozhdeniye (Renaissance)—a legal journal of the Menshevik liquidators, published in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910.

Zhizn (Life)—a legal socio-political journal, organ of the Men-

shevik liquidators, published in Moscow; two issues were put out (in August and September 1910). p. 428

[425] This refers to the controversy between Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky in the German Social-Democratic press on the question of the general political strike. The Magdeburg Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held on September 18-24, 1910, adopted the first part of a resolution proposed by Rosa Luxemburg recognising the general political strike as a method of struggle for an electoral reform in Prussia; the part of the resolution Lenin refers to deals with the question of propaganda of the idea of a general strike. p. 429

[426] *Shklovsky, G. L.* (1875-1937)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. since 1898, carried on Party work in the towns of Byelorussia and abroad. From 1909 a political emigrant. Returned to Russia after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917; worked in Nizhni-Novgorod and Moscow.

After the October Socialist Revolution worked in Party and government institutions. p. 430

[427] Lenin's lecture tour in Switzerland evidently did not take place. p. 430

[428] In this and his next letter Lenin writes about arrangements for publishing the Bolshevik legal journal *Mysl*. p. 431

[429] Lenin's "Announcement on the Publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*" (see Vol. 16 of this edition). *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette)—an illegal popular organ of the Bolsheviks, published in Paris in 1910-12. p. 432

[430] During the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen (August 28-September 3, 1910) Lenin and Plekhanov submitted a joint protest to the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party against the publication in *Vorwärts*, the Central Organ of the German Social-Democrats, of an anonymous and slanderous article penned by Trotsky concerning the state of affairs in the Russian Social-Democratic Party.

Lenin came out against this slander of Trotsky's in his article "How Certain Social-Democrats Inform the International About the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P." published in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 17, for September 25 (October 8), 1910, and in his article "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" published in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 3, for April 29 (May 12), 1911 (see Vol. 16 of this edition). p. 432

[431] Lenin has in mind preparations for the publication of the Bolshevik legal monthly *Mysl* (Thought), the first issue of which appeared in Moscow in December 1910. The journal was published up till April 1911, altogether five numbers being issued.

The journal was founded on Lenin's initiative to step up the

fight against the liquidators' legal organs and to educate the advanced workers and intellectuals in the spirit of Marxism. Lenin directed the journal from abroad and carried on a regular correspondence with the editors. p. 432

[432] This refers to the publication of the Bolshevik legal newspaper *Zvezda* (Star). It appeared from December 16 (29), 1910 to April 22 (May 5), 1912. Up till the autumn of 1911 the pro-Party Mensheviks (the Plekhanovites) contributed to *Zvezda*. Ideological guidance of the newspaper was effected by Lenin from abroad. p. 433

[433] *Znaniye* (Knowledge)—a book-publishing house, founded in St. Petersburg in 1898 by a group of writers; later Maxim Gorky was closely associated with it. p. 433

[434] *The Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.*, the illegal newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, was published from February 1908 to January 1917 (see Note 394). p. 433

[435] *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary)—a monthly literary and political journal, published in St. Petersburg in 1911-15. Grouped around it were Menshevik liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, "Popular Socialists" and Left liberals. The journal had no ties whatever with the working-class masses. A leading role in the journal at the beginning of its existence was played by A. V. Amfiteatrov.

As a result of Lenin's letter, Gorky demanded that the words in the announcement describing him as "a regular contributor" should be deleted (see V. I. Lenin and A. M. Gorky, *Letters*, *Reminiscences*, *Documents*, Second Russ. ed., Moscow, 1961, p. 59). Gorky broke with *Sovremennik* in August 1911, but resumed his contributions in 1912 when Amfiteatrov resigned from the editorial staff. p. 434

[436] *Vestnik Yevropy* (European Messenger)—a monthly magazine devoted to politics, history and literature, bourgeois-liberal in trend, published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. p. 434

[437] *Russkaya Mysl* (Russian Thought)—a monthly literary and political journal published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918. Up to 1905 it was of a liberal-Narodnik trend. In the nineties it sometimes published articles of the Marxists. After the revolution of 1905 it became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. The editor was P. B. Struve. p. 434

[438] *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. See Note 16. p. 434

[439] *Sovremenny Mir* (The Modern World)—a monthly literary, scientific and political journal, appeared in St. Petersburg from 1906 to 1918. p. 434

[440] See Note 391. p. 435

[441] *Krasnoye Znamya* (Red Banner)—a bourgeois political and literary journal founded by A. V. Amfiteatrov. Published in Paris from 1906. p. 435

[442] *Poletayev*, *Nikolai Gurievich* (1872-1930)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik, a turner by trade. Took part in the workers' circles in the 1890s. Repeatedly sentenced to imprisonment. Deputy to the Third Duma from St. Petersburg Gubernia, member of the parliamentary Social-Democratic Party. Closely associated with the publication of the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. After the October Socialist Revolution—a business executive. p. 436

[443] This refers to Plekhanov's article "Karl Marx and Leo Tolstoy" published in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 19-20, for January 13 (26), 1911. p. 437

[444] *Lyakhov*, *V.* —a tsarist army colonel, commanded the Russian troops who suppressed the revolutionary movement in Persia in 1908. p. 438

[445] The *Black-Hundreds* were monarchist gangs of pogromists organised by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement.

Octobrists—members of the Octobrist party (or Union of October Seventeenth), a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and landowners who engaged in capitalist farming. It was founded in November 1905. While paying lip service to the Manifesto of October 17, in which the tsar, frightened by the revolution, promised the people "civil liberties" and a constitution the Octobrists unreservedly supported the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. The leaders of the Octobrists were the well-known industrialist A. Guchkov and the owner of vast estates M. Rodzyanko. p. 438

[446] Lenin is apparently referring to his book *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* written in 1908 for the Granat Bros. Encyclopaedia. It was not published there for censorship reasons, and Lenin intended, as his letter indicates to have it published by the Znaniye book publishers. However, it was first published in Moscow in 1918 as a separate booklet by the Zhizn i Znaniye Publishing House (see Vol. 15 of this edition). p. 439

[447] The anti-Party school in Bologna (November 1910-March 1911) was a continuation of the Capri school. Lecturers at this school were Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Trotsky, Lyadov, Maslov, Sokolov and others. An invitation to read lectures there was turned down by Lenin in view of the anti-Party tendency and splitting activities of the school's organisers. Lenin invited the students to Paris, where he promised to read them a number of lectures on the questions of tactics, the situation within the Party and the agrarian question. The lectures in Paris did not take place. p. 440

[448] Meaning the funds on which the second Vperyodist school existed; these funds were received mainly from the Ural Party people, who carried out the Miass expropriation. p. 442

[449] This refers to the symposium *Vperyod*, organ of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group, published in Geneva in 1910-11. p. 442

[450] *Sovremennaya Zhizn* (Modern Life)—a Bolshevik legal journal, appeared in Baku in March-April 1911. p. 447

[451] *Němec*, *Antonin* (1858-1926)—a Right Social-Democrat. From 1897 virtual leader of the Czech Social-Democrats, whom he represented in the Second International. In 1906-18 Social-Democratic deputy to the Vienna Imperial Council; in 1918-25 deputy to the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic. p. 448

[452] his refers to arrangements for the Sixth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in Prague on January 5-17 (18-30), 1912.

The Czech Social-Democrats rendered great help in organising this Conference. They not only gave the premises for the Conference, but provided accommodation for the delegates in the homes of Czech workers and generally took care of the delegates. The building in which the Prague Conference was held (7, Gibern St.) is now a Lenin Museum. p. 448

IDENTIFICATION OF PSEUDONYMS, NICKNAMES AND INITIALS USED IN THE TEXT

A. A., Al. Al.—Bogdanov A. A.
Absolute—Stasova Yelena
Akim—Goldman L. I.
Akim's Brother—Gorev-Goldman B. I.
Alexander—Kremer A. I.
Alexandrov—Postolovsky D. S.
Alexei—Martov Y. O.
A. M., Al. M.—Gorky A. M.
A. N.—Potrosov A. N.
An. Al.—Lunacharskaya Anna
Andreyevsky—Ulyanov D. I.
A. P.—Potresov A. N.
Arseniev—Potresov A. N.
Auntie (*Tyotka*)—Zasulich Vera
Auntie—Kalmykova Alexandra
A. Vas., An. Vas., Anat. Vas.—Lunacharsky A. V.

B.—Andropov S. V.
Balalaikin—Trotsky L. D.
Baron—Essen E. E.
Barsov—Tskhakaya M. G.
Bear (*Medved*)—Ulyanova Maria
Beard (*Boroda*)—Desnitsky V. A.
Beast, Beastie (*Zver*, *Zverev*, *Zverushka*)—Essen Maria
Beggar (*Nishchy*)—Vinogradova Olga
Beltov—Plekhanov G. V.
Berg—Martov Y. O.
B. N.—Noskov V. A.
Bogdan—Babushkin I. V.
Bonch—Bonch-Bruyevich V. D.
Bookseller (*Knigoprodavets*)—Potresov A. N.
Boris, Boris Nikolayevich—Noskov V. A.
Bouncer (*Vyshibalo*)—Tokarev A. S.
Brodyagin—Silvin M. A.
Bruskov—Andropov S. V.
Brutus—Krzhizhanovsky G. M.
Bundist—Portnoi K.
Bychkov—Lepeshinsky P. N.

Calf (*Telyonok*)—Struve P. B.
Ch.—Smidovich P. G.
Claire—Krzhizhanovsky G. M.
Cook (*Povar*)—Shchekoldin F. I.

Danevich—Gurevich E. L.
Danila—Novomirsky D. I.
Deer (*Lan*)—Krzhizhanovsky G. M.
Delta—Stasova Yelena
Dementiev—Basovsky I. B.
Demon—Zemlyachka Rozalia
Destroyer (*Minonosets*)—Lunacharsky A. V.
Doe (*Lanikha*)—Krzhizhanovskaya Zinaida
Doctor—Gusarov F. V.
Domov—Pokrovsky M. N.
Dubois—Postolovsky D. S.
Dvinskaya—Ettinger-Davidson E. S.
Dyadin—Knipovich Lydia

Elder Sister (*Starshaya Sestra*)—Zasulich Vera
Embryon—Baramzin Y. V.
Ernest—Rollau E.

Falcon (*Sokol*)—Essen Maria
Feld—Blumenfeld I. S.
Felix—Litvinov M. M.
Fred—Vladimirov M. K.
Frey—Lenin V. I.
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В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ
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СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 35

На английском языке

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PREFACE

Volume 35 consists of letters, telegrams and notes written by Lenin between February 1912 and December 1922 inclusive.

The documents in this volume reflect Lenin's activities during the revival of the working-class movement that began in 1910, during the imperialist world war, during the period when the Great October Socialist Revolution was prepared and carried out, and during the first five ears of Soviet power.

The letters written in the years of revolutionary revival—to the editorial board of *Pravda*, to Y. M. Sverdlov and others—show Lenin's activity in guiding the Bolshevik legal daily newspaper *Pravda* and the Bolshevik group in the Fourth State Duma, and contain authoritative observations on the problem of nationalities.

A number of letters, to Maxim Gorky, G. K. Orjonikidze and others, throw light on Lenin's efforts to unite the Party on the basis of the decisions of the Prague Conference, and his fight against the anti-Party August bloc, organised by Trotsky.

A large number of letters in this volume reflect Lenin's struggle against the imperialist war and the treacherous policy of the open social-chauvinists, Kautskians and Trotskyists, and expose the anti-Party activity of hidden enemies of the Party—Pyatakov, Bukharin, Zinoviev and their supporters. These letters also show what Lenin did to guide the revolutionary work of the Bolshevik organisations in Russia and unite the Left-wing elements of international Social-Democracy on the principles of proletarian internationalism for the fight against social-chauvinism and for transformation of the imperialist war into civil war.

The volume includes a considerable number of letters from Lenin to Inessa Armand, containing most important propositions on Bolshevik theory and tactics in regard to problems of war, peace and revolution. The Bolshevik attitude to the slogan "defence of the fatherland" receives particular attention.

The letters and telegrams of the years 1918-20 contain directives issued by Lenin on questions of the country's defence, the Red Army's military operations and consolidation of the Soviet rear.

A number of letters sharply criticise the work of the Revolutionary Military Council. These letters, and also the telegrams to the Military Councils of various fronts and armies, expose the suspicious activities of the Trotskyists who had found their way into high military posts and were attempting to frustrate the successes of the Red Army and make more difficult the struggle of the Soviet people against the foreign invaders and the whiteguards.

In the letters covering the years 1921-22 much space is devoted to the strengthening of the Soviet state, economic planning and the electrification of the country. Many documents of this period deal with the problems of improving the work of the machinery of state—the drive against bureaucracy, the proper selection of personnel, systematic checking of the fulfilment of decisions and drawing the mass of working people into state administration.

Lenin's correspondence in these years demonstrates his special concern for scholars and writers, for the development of Soviet culture, science and technology. This can be seen in his letters about the plan for electrification of the country, the importance of radio inventions, the compilation of a dictionary of contemporary Russian, the work of libraries and schools, and in those which point to the necessity for gathering materials on the history of the Civil War and the Soviet Republic.

The volume contains 172 documents that had not been included in previous editions of the *Collected Works* (they are marked with an asterisk in the contents list). Of these 23 appeared in print for the first time in the Fourth Russian Edition.

The letters and telegrams are in chronological order, those sent abroad from Russia being dated in old style, those sent from abroad in new style. Where there is no date in Lenin's original, the editors have added it at the end of the document.

Apart from the reference notes, there is an alphabetical list for identifying the pseudonyms, nicknames and initials used in the text.

1912

1

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

We shall shortly send you the resolutions of the Conference.[1] We have finally succeeded—in spite of the liquidationist[2] scoundrels—in reviving the Party and its Central Committee. I hope you will be as glad of this as we are.

Won't you write a May Day leaflet for us? Or a little leaflet in a similar May Day spirit? Quite a short one, a "heart-warmer", what do you say? Think of old times, remember 1905, and put down a couple of words, if you have the mind to write. There are two or three illegal printing-presses in Russia, and the Central Committee will republish it, probably, in several tens of thousands of copies. It would be a good thing to get a *revolutionary* manifesto like the *Tales* in *Zvezda*.[3] I am very, very glad that you are helping *Zvezda*. We are having a devilish hard job with it—internal and external and financial difficulties are immense—but still we are managing so far.

All the best,
Lenin

P.S. And *Sovremennik*[4] has had the sense to die, after all! That was a good deed on its part.

Written in February 1912
Sent from Paris to Capri (Italy)
First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

2

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

I am very glad you have agreed to try and write a May Day leaflet.

I enclose the Conference resolutions.

I have seen *Zhivoye Dyelo*.[5] A rotten little liquidationist rag with an "approach". Liberal propaganda. They are glad that the police prevent the question of the Party being openly discussed.

Zvezda will continue, either as a weekly *or as a kopek daily*.[6] You helped *Zvezda* very, very much with your splendid *Tales*, and that made me extremely joyful, so that the joy—if I am to talk straight—outweighed my sadness at your "affair" with the Chernovs and Amfiteatrovs[7].... Brr! I am glad, I must confess, that they are "going up the spout".

But as for your having nothing to live on and not being able to get printed anywhere, that's bad. You ought to have got rid of that leech Pyatnitsky long ago and appointed an honest agent, an agent pure and simple, to deal with Znaniye[8] (perhaps it's already too late, I don't know)!!! If only.... It would have been a gold mine....

I see Rozhkov's *Irkutskoye Slovo*[9] very rarely. The man's become a liquidator. And Chuzhak is an old ass, hardened and pretentious.

Yours,

Lenin

Thank M. F.[10] for her letter to Moscow, and a thousand greetings!

Written in February-March 1912
Sent from Paris to Capri

First published
in *Bakinsky Rabochy* No. 17,
January 21, 1927

Printed from the original

3

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Comrade,

I hasten to reply to some of your questions. A report on the Conference is a necessary and most important thing. I hope that, once you have taken it on, you will go round all Switzerland, and not only the two cities.[11]

"From the Announcement I cannot make out what steps the Conference took to draw in various trends abroad and national organisations." These are your words.

But the *Announcement* stated clearly and precisely that the *Vperyod* group[12] + *Trotsky* + *Plekhanov*[13] were invited, and the nationals three times. What more was needed?

Lunacharsky at Zinoviev's lecture in Paris had the brass face to say that it was a "*Gaunerkniff*",* because, he said, the invitations were sent out not by the Conference but by delegates *who had arrived*. Well, isn't this Lunacharsky a scoundrel? 23 sessions = 12 days: if the invitations hadn't been sent out *beforehand*, the people who were invited would have missed half (letter has to be sent off, secret addresses given, then they have to arrive—just add it all up!). And from Trotsky's letter you can see that the invitation was from *7 people* = ½ of the total of 14.

I was *against* the invitation, but the delegates *invited* the *Vperyod* group and Trotsky and Plekhanov.

The chairman of the credentials committee was the *delegate from Kiev* (a Menshevik). Even Trotsky has admitted (under pressure!) that this is a *bona fide* organisation.

Whom will the worker believe, then? The Kiev *organisation* or ranters abroad?

Don't believe rumours. Neither the Plekhanovites nor the *Vperyod* people, *no one* left the Conference. There were

* "Swindler's trick".—*Ed.*

in all *two* pro-Party Mensheviks. The one from Kiev behaved with extreme correctness and on the whole went *with us*. The one from *Ekaterinoslav*, behaved with extreme obstructiveness, *but even he did not leave the Conference*, and only moved "protests" in the spirit of Plekhanov.

The Ekaterinoslav delegate moved his *own* draft resolution on the constitution of the Conference, in which he *fully admitted* that *everyone* had been notified, protested that some had not come, but wanted the Conference to constitute itself as representing *Russian* organisations. He remained on this in a minority of *one*.

Now 12 delegates are in Russia, making reports everywhere. *There are already letters* about this from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Samara, Nikolayev and Tiflis. The work has begun and will continue.

The Bund[14]+the Letts are trying to fix up a conference with the liquidators. Let them try! It's deeds that are needed, gentlemen, and not words!! You have been impotent (+Trotsky+Vperyodists) since November 26, 1910[15] —when Trotsky proclaimed the calling of a conference— and you will remain impotent.

We have broken with the liquidators, the *Party* has broken with them. Let someone try to set up a different R.S.D.L.P. *with* the liquidators! It would be laughable.

The Duma Social-Democratic group is *directly* neither for us nor for them. But (1) there were *two* deputies at our Conference[16]; (2) *Zvezda* has *nine* Social-Democratic deputies on its list of contributors, while the liquidationist *Zhivoye Dyelo* has *four*. There are facts for you!

Among the Letts the Bolsheviks have declared war on their Central Committee.

Well, I wish you every success! Greetings to all our friends.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Written on March 12, 1912
Sent from Paris to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

4

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Comrade,

Nadya sent you my little note today.* I hasten to let you know—so that there should be no misunderstanding and you should not make any mistake in your report—that *yesterday* there was a meeting in Paris of "Social-Democrats" who were enemies of the Conference. They *all* (the Plekhanovites and the *Golos* group,[17] the *Vperyod* group and the conciliators, and *tutti quanti***) adopted a resolution of protest against the Conference, and also something about excluding me from the International Socialist Bureau[18] (this is from hearsay, because, of course, the Bolsheviks and the supporters of the Conference[19] *did not* attend the meeting).

Naturally, all this is laughable. If these gentry proved unable to retain their grip even on the C.C. Bureau Abroad (make fun of it in your report, using Plekhanov's funeral oration in No. 15 of his *Dnevnik*, Supplement 2![20]), now they will be even less able to set up anything. Well, kind friends, not words but deeds: you boast that you have united. Do please unite in *Nasha Zarya* and *Zhivoye Dyelo*, and above all in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*.[21]

Comedians!

All the best, and best wishes for success.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on March 12, 1912
Sent from Paris to Berne
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* See the previous letter.—*Ed.*
** The like.—*Ed.*

5

TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE, S. S. SPANDAYAN AND YELENA STASOVA[22]

March 28, 1912

Dear Friends,

I am *terribly* upset and disturbed by the *complete* disorganisation of our (and your) relations and contacts. Truly, it is enough to make one despair! Instead of letters, you send various telegraphically brief exclamations which are quite incomprehensible.

(1) Nothing from Ivanovich. What is he doing? Where is he? How is he getting on? It's devilishly necessary to have someone legal in Petersburg or near Petersburg, because things are bad there. This is a furious and difficult war. We have neither information nor guidance, nor supervision of the paper.

(2) Not one of the Conference delegates gives us any contacts. Not one, and not a single contact. Why, that's complete collapse!

(3) No resolutions from anywhere which are sensible, clear, stating what organisations adopted them, supporting the decisions, confirming that their delegate attended, came back, reported!! Is it really not clear how different such formal resolutions are from letters of an intimate character: "decent", "jolly good", "we won", etc.? There are no resolutions from Kiev or from Savka's town.[23] Nikolai has sent in a letter full of joyful exclamations but absolutely senseless. It is quite unsuitable either for the press or for official use. Were all the resolutions read out? Were they approved? What is the text of resolutions on the

Conference? Are they joining forces with the local liquidators? Not one (not one!) of these fundamental elementary questions is answered. Not a single word of communication with that town (most important!) has been transmitted to us. Is not that collapse? Isn't that a parody of work?

(4) No resolutions from anywhere, not a single one, demanding the money! Simply a disgrace.

(5) Neither from Tiflis nor from Baku (terribly important centres) is there any word of sense about reports having been delivered. Where are the resolutions? Shame and disgrace!

(6) Not a single reprinting from anywhere of the Announcement or even *part* of it, either in print or hectographed! A disgrace.

(7) No precise reply in writing about the platform either. Will it be published? When? Has it been approved completely? We have to print it in the Central Organ, but have no precise information.

(8) They will have to go round all the organisations again and everywhere get resolutions adopted which are precise, formal, detailed, sensible, clear (a) on representation at the Conference and on its substance, (b) on support for the Central Committee, (c) and against the liquidators, specifically against the local ones, and in general, and (d) demanding return of the money.

(9) About the money, things are bad, send us a resolution which gives us the right to bring an action. The Germans have sent a refusal. Unless it is taken to court, we shall have a complete breakdown in three or four months.

(10) If you have *no* financial resources, the budget must immediately be radically reviewed: we have gone beyond all limits, kind are approaching bankruptcy.

(11) In *Vorwärts*[24] of March 26, there was a furious and malicious article against the Conference, from the editorial board. Clearly this is Trotsky. There is a great battle over the Conference—but Russia is silent. It is no use putting on a bold show and boasting; everyone knows about *Vorwärts* and the protests, but nothing comes from Russia.

Summing up: this is collapse and disorganisation. A round of visits and contacts. Precise correspondence. Reprinting of the Announcement, even by hectograph. Otherwise it's all boasting.

Lenin

Pass on the letter to S. for further transmission. Greetings.

Sent from Paris to Tiflis

First published in the magazine *Krasny Arkhiv* No. 1, 1934

Printed from a copy written by Yelena Stasova

6

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS[25]

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I thank you for sending me the Paris "resolution".[26]

As I have already written to you, the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. condemned the liquidators and various groups abroad[27] which are introducing disorganisation into our Party and represent nothing in Russia. On the one hand, in Paris at the present time it is groups of this kind that have voted for the above-mentioned resolution. An old custom has it that all condemned persons have the right to inveigh against their judges for 24 hours. The persons who have signed the resolution have made excessive use of this right, and perhaps even abused it.

On the other hand, there are groups who *were invited* to the Conference but refused to take part in it. Now they are "protesting" and attempting to call another conference, appealing to the gods to witness that they stand for unity. A very original way to get unity! We shall see whether they will make any headway in Russia. It is just as difficult to carry out anything real in Russia as it is easy to vote for abusive resolutions in Paris. And, of course, Paris, Vienna, etc., do not possess the right to speak in the name of Russia.

In any case, the persons who signed the Paris resolution are in too much of a hurry when they begin to talk about a "split". In order to establish that a split exists, it must be established that there exist at least two Central Committees *in Russia*. So far this is not so.

As for Citizen Plekhanov, the C.C. informed him more than a month ago of the Conference resolutions. He has not

vouchsafed a reply. Consequently, at the present time I am quite ignorant of whether Citizen Plekhanov has (and from *which* C.C.) any powers as a member of the International Socialist Bureau.

If you, dear comrade, are luckier than I, i.e., if you get any reply from Citizen Plekhanov, I hope you will be good enough to inform me.

With fraternal greetings,

Yours to command,

N. Lenin

Written in French earlier than March 28, 1912

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

7

TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE, S. S. SPANDAYAN AND YELENA STASOVA*

Don't be light-hearted about the campaign of the liquidators abroad. It is a great mistake when people simply dismiss what goes on abroad with a wave of the hand and "send it to hell". The liquidators will cause a lot of confusion if they call their conference with the Bund+the Caucasian Regional Committee[28]+the Letts+liquidationist intellectuals. And they will call it! We must fight stubbornly, seriously and systematically. There must be a round tour and explanation everywhere of the liquidators' deception. Reprint the long article in the last issue of *Rabochaya Gazeta*[29] as a leaflet. I advise you to print a number of leaflets immediately (all the important resolutions of the Conference are a must). With leaflets you will win everything. Be exceptionally careful in setting about *Izvestia*.[30] The paper will be a great pretext for the police. And it is more important than anything else to hold on until the elections. Remember that there are *no* replacements.

Written early in April 1912
Sent from Paris to Tiflis
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from a copy written by Yelena Stasova

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* This letter is a postscript to a letter written by N. K. Krupskaya.—*Ed*.

8

TO THE BUREAU OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P. IN RUSSIA*

April 16, 1912

Dear Friends,

For God's sake give us more contacts. Contacts, contacts, contacts, that's what we haven't got. Without this everything is unstable. Remember that two have already left the scene, there are no replacements for them. Without contacts everything will fall to pieces after one or two further arrests. You must without fail set up regional committees (or simply groups of trusted *agents*), *linked up* with us, for every region. Without this everything is shaky. As regards publication, you should press on with reprinting the *entire* resolution about the elections,[31] to make it *everywhere* available *in full* and among the masses.

As regards the money, it is time to stop being naïve about the Germans. Trotsky is now in full command there, and carrying on a *furious* struggle. You must send us a mandate to take the matter to the courts, otherwise we shall get nothing. We have already sent the May Day leaflet everywhere I advise you to publish the appeal to the peasants about the elections as a leaflet (from *Rabochaya Gazeta*: the peasantry and the elections).** Make sure of

* This letter was sent via the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. —*Ed*.

** See "The Peasantry and the Elections to the Fourth Duma" (present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 529-31).—*Ed*.

republishing the long article from *Rabochaya Gazeta*. This is an essential supplement to the platform, in which a very important paragraph about socialism has been omitted. Write! Contacts, contacts. Greetings.

P.S. *Vorwärts* is printing the most brazen lies, as, for example, that all Russia has already declared in favour of the Bundist-Lettish conference. It's Trotsky and Co. who are writing, and the Germans believe them. Altogether, Trotsky is boss in *Vorwärts*. The foreign department is controlled by Hilferding, Trotsky's friend.

Sent from Paris

Published for the first time
in the Fourth (Russian) Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from a copy
written by Nadezhda Krupskaya

9

TO THE EDITOR OF *ZVEZDA*

Dear Colleague,

I am sending new material today for the *Voter's Handbook*. This is nearly all, there will he another article or two from here in two days' time, and then you will get an article on the budget from Tver.

(1) I very much advise you also to reprint from *Zvezda* No. 34 (December 17, 1911) the article by Frey: "The Role of Worker Electors in the Election Campaign" (it would also be a good thing to reprint his article in No. 36, December 31, 1911, about the role of peasant electors,* as well). Don't go out of your way to cut them down. It is better to publish in full a substantial article which will be of value in giving intelligible guidance for the elections. Don't go out of your way for cheapness and brevity—better publish something solid.

If, after all, it is absolutely impossible to publish all the articles, be certain to return those you don't.

(2) Here it is most essential to make arrangements for regular correspondence. Let your secretary write to me direct here, and not through Arcachon, to avoid any delay. Give us a better address for letters to you.

(3) You are wrong not to reply to the liquidators. This is a great mistake. You can and should reply, without saying a word about the Conference. You should print a brief reply to every lie of *Zhivoye Dyelo*: *Zhivoye Dyelo* in such-and-such a number is lying, as all the liquidators do. It is essential to reply, otherwise you lose.

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 372-84.—*Ed.*

(4) If Plekhanov writes, you should send his articles here in proofs. Otherwise it becomes a "privilege" for him, which we cannot tolerate. Be careful. You will force us to leave if Plekhanov is given the privilege of writing against the Conference when we cannot write in favour of it. It would be a mean trick to allow him to abuse it when we cannot praise it.

(5) Be sure to send us in a separate packet, wrapped up in *Novoye Vremya*,[32] these numbers of *Zvezda*: Nos. 24 and 25 of the summer of 1911, No. 18 (54), No. 19 (55), No. 22 (58), No. 23 (59)—we haven't got them—and *Zhivoye Dyelo* No. 11 and No. 12. Please send us confiscated issues separately, wrapping them up in newspapers of the Right.

(6) Let us know as soon as possible about the daily paper.[33] What will be the size? What length of article can be sent?

(7) Try and buy as cheaply as possible the Verbatim Reports of the Third Duma, especially the sessions of 1911-12. Write.

Written on April 22, 1912
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1923
in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-14)*, Part III

Printed from the
typewritten copy found
in police records

10

TO B. N. KNIPOVICH[34]

June 6, 1912

Dear Colleague,

It is terribly annoying that my first letter to you about the book (thank you very much for sending it) has been lost. It is an incredible-but with us, it turns out, a possible—fact that a letter of a purely scientific nature can be lost. I will try and repeat it from memory, because I did not take a copy.

I read your book* with great pleasure, and was very glad to see that you had taken up a serious and large-scale work. This work will certainly enable you to test, deepen and consolidate your Marxist convictions.

I will note some ideas which came into my mind when reading it. It seemed to me that here and there, when studying the results of "differentiation", departures from the countryside are overlooked. I will make clear what I mean by this example, (a) first aspect: out of 100 households 25 have no horse = 25 per cent, or have no sowings; (b) second aspect: of 150 households 36 have no sowings = 24 per cent. Diminished differentiation, it would seem? But if 30 households or families have left the village for the town, or migrated, etc., then *in fact* proletarisation has increased. I think this is a typical example. The statistics always consider the households in existence, remaining "narrowly statistical" and omitting what is sometimes most important.

Then, the author definitely and more than once confines the subject of his research to the *tillage* aspect. But in

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* Reference is to B. N. *Knipovich's book K voprosu o differentsiatsii russkogo krestyanstva. Differentsiatsia v sfere zemledelcheskogo khozyaistva* (*A Contribution to the Problem of Differentiation of the Russian Peasantry. Differentiation in the Sphere of Farming*), St. Petersburg, 1912.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

his conclusions he imperceptibly extends the theme, speaking of the whole of *agriculture* and sometimes even of the whole economy. This leads to error, because some aspects of "differentiation", i.e., of the proletarisation of the peasants and the genesis of capital, are, as a consequence, lost (for example, commercial stock-breeding in Yaroslavl Gubernia and other forms of penetration of exchange into agriculture, as it becomes specialised).

Furthermore. Do not the rows of figures sometimes obscure the *types*, socio-economic *types* of farmers (substantial bourgeois farmer; middle farmer; semi-proletarian; proletarian)? This danger is *very* great because of the *qualities* of statistical material. The "rows of figures" carry one away. I would advise the author to take this danger into account: our "socialists of the chair" unquestionably in this way *throttle* the living Marxist content of data. They drown the class struggle in rows and rows of figures. This does *not* occur with the author, but in the big work he has undertaken he ought particularly to take account of this danger, this "line" of the socialists of the chair, the liberals and the Narodniks. He should take it into account and *trim it down*, of course.

Lastly, Maslov[35] has appeared as something like a *deus ex machina*. *Cur*? *Quomodo*? *Quibus auxiliis*?* After all, his theory is very remote from Marxism. The Narodniks rightly called him a "critic" (=opportunist). Perhaps the author took him on trust more by chance?

Such were my thoughts when reading your interesting and serious book. I shake you by the hand, and wish you success in your work. I take this opportunity to send warm greetings to the whole family, and particularly to the "water-carrying nags"[36]—do you remember?

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written in Paris
First published in 1928
in the magazine *Bolshevik* No. 7

Printed from the original

* Why? How? By what means?—*Ed.*

11

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*[37]

Dear Colleague,

I send you one more article by I. Gylka. The author reminds you that he is *expecting an advance*.

It is urgently necessary to reply to him immediately (you can do it through me, but *without fail* on a *separate* sheet). The author lives in Lemberg, makes a special *study* of his subject, and such a contributor should be drawn in. Once again I advise you to pay him an advance, *and in any* case to reply to him *at once*.

N.B. If Gylka's articles are not accepted, return them at once without fail!

We have received the parcel, and cannot help complaining.

Of the books, only *one*! Write and say why. Did other members of the staff take the rest of the books received? Have they taken them for long, or for good? If so, you ought to arrange to send them to us *for a time*. We repeat that without books we *cannot* work.

The office should be more careful about this.
We received the *Voter's Handbook two and a half weeks after publication*! Yet to send it *at once* would have cost *5 kopeks*....

There has been a delay with the papers, after all. We are stuck here without newspapers, and we shall be without them for another two or three days.

I would very much advise you to send a reporter to the City Council, find out *how many* applications* they are

* From what districts? streets? etc., as detailed as possible.

getting from tenants and set about publishing this *systematically* (encouraging successful districts and appealing to the unsuccessful). Very little time is left, and the paper should make itself responsible for the *whole* business.

You should get from the City Council, through any statisticians among your acquaintances (or officially from the editors and the members of the State Duma), *all* the statistical material (if they don't exist, then buy *Rech*[38] for those years and months, or some other paper) about the elections to the *First*, *Second* and Third State Duma+ Petersburg statistics (housing, population, etc.). With such material in your hands, and with an intelligent reporter visiting the City Council daily or 2-3 times a week, you can run a *good* section in the paper about the course of the elections.

Do you send *Pravda* to the Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung*[39] in Vienna? Send it, and *send it to us as well by wrapper*.

I advise you to reply to Trotsky through the post: "To Trotsky (Vienna). We shall not reply to disruptive and slanderous letters." Trotsky's dirty campaign against *Pravda* is one mass of lies and slander. The well-known Marxist and follower of Plekhanov, Rothstein (London), has written to us that he received Trotsky's slanders and replied to him: I cannot complain of the Petersburg *Pravda* in any way. But this intriguer and liquidator goes on lying, right and left.

Yours faithfully,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. It would be still better to reply in this way to Trotsky through the post: "*To Trotsky* (Vienna). You are wasting your time sending us disruptive and slanderous letters. They will not be replied to."

Written on July 19, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

12

TO THE EDITOR OF *NEVSKAYA ZVEZDA*[40]

Dear Colleague,

I have received your long letter, and I see that you and I must most certainly have it out.

First of all, a detail. You won't find correspondents at two kopeks a line. So long as you have no money, you will have to make do with our articles about affairs abroad.

Now for the main thing. You complain of monotony. But this will always be the case if you don't print *polemics*—if, in particular, you cut down *Kamenev* (he writes in a *different* tone)—if you reduce everything to "positive liquidationism". And in addition you will lose all your contributors if you don't print them, and don't even reply and don't send back articles (for example, mine: the reply to Blank—*important*! "Unquenchable Hopes"[41] and *a number of others*!!).

Just look at *Nevsky Golos*: it's more lively. It is not afraid of polemics. It attacks. It boldly makes its point to the bitter end.

By avoiding "painful questions", *Zvezda* and *Pravda make themselves* dry and monotonous, uninteresting, uncombative organs. A socialist paper *must* carry on polemics: our times are times of desperate confusion, and we can't do without polemics. The question is whether they are to be carried on in a lively way, attacking, putting forward questions independently, or only on the defensive, in dry and boring fashion.

For example, the "Supporter of *Zvezda*" in No. 16 gave a good reply. Clearly he is a man of principle. But all the same he did not dissipate the *terrible* fears aroused *everywhere* (I have a *series* of letters) by No. 6 of *Nevsky Golos*.[42] What did happen, after all? *Was* there a conference? Called by whom? What for? None of this is clear! And until this is cleared up *no one* wants to work. Everyone is saying: haven't I the right to know *who* I am working *for*, *whom* I am helping to get elected to the Duma? Maybe it's a liquidator? Maybe it's some muddled Trotskyist conciliator? Perhaps I am taking part (indirectly) in drawing up a "common platform"??

Such questions paralyse energy and introduce demoralisation.

Meanwhile *Nevsky Golos* is attacking briskly and takes a more challenging line. You can't hide differences from the workers (as *Pravda* is doing): it's harmful, fatal, ridiculous. You can't leave it to the *adversary*, to *Nevsky Golos*, to open up discussion of differences. *Pravda* will *perish* if it is *only* a "popular", "positive" organ, that is certain.

It would certainly be victorious if it were not afraid of polemics, talked straight about the liquidators, became lively through argument, by an article against Axelrod,[43] etc. Such articles as Axelrod's attract: *all* the workers hear about the differences and are *attracted* to Axelrod's open explanations, because he *says* things *straight out* a hundred times more boldly than we do. *All* the workers hear the talk about a united platform, all the leading workers know Axelrod's article[44]—and if you are silent, you have fallen behind! And the paper which falls behind is *lost*. A paper must be a step *ahead of everyone*, and that goes for both *Nevskaya Zvezda* and for *Pravda*. Side by side with the two "positive" little articles, *Pravda* must provide *polemics*—Kamenev's literary note—a feature article ridiculing the liquidators—and so forth. Monotony and lateness are incompatible with the newspaper business. And *Pravda* has in addition a special and exceptionally important duty: "whom is it going to *lead*"—this is what *everyone* is asking, what *everyone* is trying to read between the lines. It would be important to have a meeting (once in four years, before

the elections)—you can't carry on the paper without even infrequent meetings with your constant contributors. *Think* over this well and quickly, for time won't bear delay.

Best wishes,
Ulyanov

Written on July 24, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1923
in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy"* (*1911-14*), Part III

Printed from the original

13

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

I have received your letter about the "pressing matter" and, I confess, read it with a sorrowful feeling. It shows quite clearly that there is between us not enough of the mutual understanding that in a "pressing matter", as in any serious matter, is most essential.

And the matter is really serious and—I agree with you—pressing (not in the sense of a few days, of course). In order to get mutual understanding on this, we ought to meet: this would cost four or five days and 11+11+15+10=47 rubles all in all....

All that I can do at present to meet your request, I am doing. I am sending you an article "On the Election Platform".[45] You will see clearly, I hope, what my views are from this article.

As regards altering it, I must lay down *special* conditions (usually I don't make any, as you know, relying entirely on a comradely, collective and not pettifogging attitude). But on this occasion these special conditions are essential for me, because the question is one of vast importance, a radical question of principle.

I can agree *only* to (1) eliminating the subhead and (2) minimum corrections for the *censorship* (only!!) in three or four places, correction of *individual* words, *and nothing more at all*. If *even then* you can't print it either in *Pravda* or in *Nevskaya Zvezda*, *return* the article, I need it. To eliminating mention of the liquidators I *cannot* agree.

The essence of the whole question is that the liquidators are setting a trap: "let's have an open platform" (while privately the liquidator thinks: I will sign *anything* in

an open platform). And that is true, the liquidator will sign *anything* in an open platform!! And it will be not a platform, not a serious affair, but philistine chatter, a list of "reforms", a competition with the liberals on *their* own ground, because every liberal (up to and including Trubetskoi) will at present, six or eight weeks before the elections, put his name to *anything*!! The liberals and the liquidators will sign anything, if only they can get elected to the Fourth Duma.

One must grasp the essence of the question, the principle involved, and not be afraid of somewhat "unusual", "unsuitable" (for *Pravda*) expressions, polemics, etc. The workers in their mass will understand very well the *spirit* of the thing ("no cutting up")—and that is the whole point. *All* will understand why inventing open platforms in Third-of-June Russia, six or eight weeks before the elections, is ridiculous, stupid, philistine, even scoundrelly. And that is the essence.

Such an article printed as a feature in *Pravda*, even in small type, will at once take up a position, and kill the adventurism of the inventors of open platforms. It will kill the demagogy of their "say openly what you believe in". Used not Katkov in just the same way to ask: "Say openly that you recognise the autocracy"?

Much has devolved on *Pravda* in the elections, and much will be required of it. It would be a scandal if *Pravda* were ridiculed *from the left* for drawing up open platforms. *Pravda* has *in practice* the position of leader. That position must be defended honourably. It should say clearly, calmly and firmly: against the liquidators. And at once the whole gang of these petty liberals will be killed. Let them put forward their *own* list: they won't dare, because they will be completely disgraced!! I await a *speedy* reply.

With greetings,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Written earlier than August 1, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

14

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

I have your letter, and the letter from Vitimsky. I was very glad to get a word from him. But the contents of his letter gave me great concern.

You write, and as secretary,* evidently, on behalf of the editorial board, that "the editorial board in principle considers my article fully acceptable *including the attitude to the liquidators*". If that is so, why then does *Pravda* stubbornly and sytematically cut out any mention of the liquidators, both in my articles and in the articles of other colleagues?? Don't you really know that they already *have* their candidates? We know this *for certain*. We have had official communications about this from a city in the south,** where there is a deputy from the worker curia. Undoubtedly the same applies to other places.

The silence of *Pravda* is more than strange. You write: "The editorial board considers it an *obvious* misunderstanding" that it is being "suspected of striving to legalise the demands contained in the platform". But surely you will agree that this is a fundamental question, one which determines the whole spirit of the publication, and moreover one which is inseparably bound up with the question of the liquidators. I have not the slightest inclination for "suspecting"; you know *from experience* that I show tremendous patience with your corrections for reasons of censorship as

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* Reference is to V. M. Molotov.—*Ed.*

** The city referred to is Kharkov.—*Ed.*

well. But a fundamental question requires a *straight answer*. One must not leave a contributor uninformed as to whether the editorial board intends to direct the section of the paper dealing with the elections *against* the liquidators, naming them clearly and precisely, or *not against* them. There is not and cannot be any middle course.

If the article "must be printed anyway" (as the secretary to the editorial board writes), then how am I to understand Vitimsky's "the *angry* tone is harmful"? Since when has an angry tone against what is bad, harmful, untrue (and the editorial board is "in principle" in agreement!) harmed a daily newspaper?? On the contrary, colleagues, really and truly on the contrary. To write without "anger" of what is harmful means to write boringly. And you yourselves refer, and justly so, to monotony!

Furthermore, I have not had any reply for a long time concerning the article about November 9 (the reply of a correspondent).[46] I repeat my request: return what cannot pass the censorship or what you unquestionably reject.

We receive *Pravda irregularly* (yesterday we *didn't* get it *at all*!!). We have not seen *Zvezda*, either No. 14 or No. 17, *at all*. A scandal! Can't you send us the *page proofs* by wrapper, rather than throw them away? That costs two kopeks. It would save time. To send proofs to a contributor is perfectly legitimate. When leaving at night, the night editor would put the wrapper into a post-box—that would be all. (But the wrappers often tear, they should be made larger, the same size as the newspapers. It would be best of all to use long narrow envelopes: in such envelopes—*un*sealed—press material is more likely to arrive, and the envelopes don't cost much.) It is particularly essential to have *Zvezda* No. 17. Today is Thursday: *two days*' delay!!

Finally, please let me know whether it would not be possible to publish in one form or another (like *Nevsky Golos*, which has more than once printed information about the Social-Democrats abroad) the following news. The German *Vorstand** has made an appeal to the 11 (*sic*!) Social-Democratic groups, factions and centres, suggesting a joint conference on the subject of "unity". The so-called "Lenin

* Party Executive.—*Ed.*

trend" has replied with the most categorical refusal: what can be more ridiculous and unworthy than this playing at an agreement abroad with "centres and factions" which have demonstrated their absolute impotence in Russia? No negotiations with them, no agreements with the liquidators—such was the reply of the so-called "Lenin trend". Whether anything has come of this arch-stupid idea of Trotsky's, and whether anything will come of it, is not known.

And so I ask you to reply: can a report describing these "Paris novelties", and giving an assessment of them, be published, in one form or another, in the newspaper you edit? Do censorship conditions make this possible, or is it quite impossible?[47] (I ask only about the censorship aspect of the case, since in principle—I venture to think on the basis of the previous letter—the editorial board is *not* in favour of unity with the liquidators, isn't that so?)

With comradely greetings,

V. Ulyanov

Written on August 1, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1930
in the second and third editions
of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XVI

Printed from the original

15

TO MAXIM GORKY

Cracow, August 1, 1912

Krakau, Oesterreich.
Zwierzyniec. 218.
Wl. Ulijanow

Dear A. M.,

I have received your letter and a letter from the Siberians. My address now is not Paris, but Cracow—see above.

I haven't quite understood what party you have decided to expel me from. From the Socialist-Revolutionary perhaps?

No, joking apart, it's a bad, philistine, bourgeois style you have adopted, to wave us away with a "you're all squabblers". Just have a look at the latest S.R. literature —*Pochin*, *Izvestia zagranichnoi oblastnoi organizatsii*— compare it with *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* and with *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[48]—and then again with Ropshin,[49] etc. Remember *Vekhi*[50] and the polemics (quasi-polemics) conducted against it by Milyukov, Gredeskul[51] (who has now discovered that a second revolution in Russia is not necessary), etc., etc.

Compare *all* this as a whole, the sum *total* of ideological trends from 1908 to 1912 among the S.R.s,[52] Trudoviks,[53] Bezzaglavtsi[54] and Cadets,[55] with what existed and exists among the Social-Democrats (somebody, some day—probably a historian—will certainly do this work). You will see that *everyone*, literally everyone outside the Social-Democrats was discussing *the same* questions, literally the very same, on account of which little groups have broken away from our Party in the direction of liquidationism and otzovism.

The bourgeois, the liberals, the S.R.s like to shout about "squabbles" among the Social-Democrats, because they themselves do not take "painful questions" *seriously*, tag along behind others, play the diplomat, and make do with eclecticism. The difference between the Social-Democrats and all of them is that among the Social-Democrats squabbles are the externals of a struggle of groups with *profound* and clear ideological roots, while *among them* squabbles are externally smoothed over, internally empty, petty, trivial. Never and not for anything would I exchange the sharp struggle of currents of opinion among the Social-Democrats for the nicely smoothed emptiness and intellectual poverty of the S.R.s and Co.

All the very best.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Greetings to M. F.!

P.S. And in Russia there is a *revolutionary* revival, not just a revival, but a revolutionary one. And we have managed at last to set up a daily *Pravda*—incidentally, thanks precisely to that (January) Conference* which the fools are yapping at.

Sent to Capri

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

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* The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.—*Ed.*

16

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

Kamenev writes to us today that you have informed him that peaceful relations have once again been restored between Plekhanov and yourselves by the elimination of "misunderstandings".

I would very much ask you to let me know the meaning of this dream. We had every reason to believe that the rejection of the articles by Dnevnitsky[56] and Plekhanov regarding a concession to the liquidators (for it was *precisely* about this that they were writing, under the screen of "unity") took place quite deliberately and resolutely. So what "misunderstandings" could there be in this case?

Are there not new misunderstandings in this latest communication?

The last, or more precisely yesterday's, editorial in *Rech* (July 19) is of tremendous importance. It cannot be doubted that the Cadets have done everything in their power (and beyond it) to "*hush up*" *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. And now they have come out with it! It is *clear* that they themselves have thereby admitted the *danger*. They have shown themselves unable to pass it by and hush it up. They have been driven out of their position of silence. And Prokopovich and Blank in *Zaprosy Zhizni*[57] echo them still more crudely, stupidly, tearfully.

Now of all times it is essential, in my opinion, to bring intense pressure to bear on *Rech*, to publish a *number* of articles against it and inflame the struggle still further. This is necessary both from the point of view of principle

(since *only Zvezda* and *Pravda* are carrying on a campaign on behalf of working-class democracy, while both *Rech* and the Prokopoviches approvingly pat the liquidators on the back), and for practical reasons (since it is just this more lively struggle that must liven up both arguments and talks with the electors and their enrolment in the electoral registers).

Could you not find out how many people are registering, by polling districts, streets and professions? It would be extremely important to *encourage* them by concrete examples, in order to arouse competition between districts, streets and professions.

I hope you'll be kind enough also to inform *Nevskaya Zvezda* that I insist on the return of my article replying to Blank ("Petty Artifices") if it is not printed in No. 18. I will in that case certainly print it in the journal. Now that *all* the liberals+liquidators+non-Party and Co. have turned against us, it would be criminal for us to keep silent.

The election campaign in Petersburg has begun successfully—the leadership has been won by *Zvezda* and *Pravda*—what is necessary is not to lose one's grip on it, and to carry through the fight to a finish. This is in the interests of *the paper itself*, quite apart from everything else, which, of course, I do not mention.

I await news of the "positively decided" question.

With greetings,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. I still *await* a reply about the articles: "The Results of Six Months' Work".*

P.P.S. Couldn't you at least send me a cutting from No. 17 of *Nevskaya Zvezda*—the little article "Unity or Split"?

Written on August 2, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 187-202.—*Ed.*

17

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

If you recognise that "our squabbles are produced by an irreconcilable difference of ideological roots"—that the same applies to the S.R.s (that it is the same with the Cadets—*Vekhi*—this you did not add, but there can be no doubt about it)—that there is being created a *reformist* (apt word!) party—then you *cannot* say both to the liquidator and to his enemy: "Both of you are squabblers."

In that case the business of those who have understood the ideological roots of the "squabble", without taking part in it, is to help the masses to *discover the roots*, and not to justify the masses for regarding the disputes as "a private matter between the generals".

We "leaders have not written a single clear book, not a single sensible pamphlet".... Untrue. We wrote as best we could. No less clearly, no less sensibly, than before. And we have written a lot. There have been cases when we wrote against people without any "squabbling" (against *Vekhi*,* against Chernov,[58] against Rozhkov,** etc.). [Do you see all the issues of *Nevskaya Zvezda*?]

... "The result of this: among the workers in Russia there are a great number of good ... young people, but they are so furiously irritated with those abroad".... This is a fact; but it is not the fault of the "leaders", it is the

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* See "Concerning *Vekhi*" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 123-31). —*Ed*.

** See "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto" (present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 313-24).—*Ed*.

result of the detachment, or, more truly, the *tearing asunder*, of Russia and the emigrant centres. What has been *torn asunder* must be tied together again, and to abuse the leaders is cheap and popular, but of little use ... "that they dissuade the workers from taking part in the conference"....

....What conference? The one the liquidators are now calling? Why, we ourselves are dissuading them too! Isn't there some misunderstanding on your part about this?[59]

I have read that Amfiteatrov has written, in some Warsaw paper,[60] if I am not mistaken, in favour of boycotting the Fourth Duma? Do you happen to have this article? Send it me, I will return it.

Things are warming up in the Baltic Fleet! I had a visit in Paris (this is between ourselves) by a special delegate sent by a meeting of the sailors and Social-Democrats. What's lacking is organisation—it's enough to make one weep!! If you have any officer contacts, you should make every effort to arrange something. The sailors are in a fighting mood, but they may all perish again in vain.

Your articles in *Zaprosy Zhizni* were not too good. It's a strange journal, by the way—liquidationist-Trudovik-*Vekhi*. A "classless reformist" party just about sums it up....

You ask why I am in Austria. The C.C. has organised a Bureau here (between ourselves): the frontier is close by, we make use of it, it's nearer to Petersburg, we get the papers from there on the third day, it's become far easier to write to the papers there, co-operation with them goes better. There is less squabbling here, which is an advantage. There isn't a good library, which is a disadvantage. It's hard without books.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Greetings to M. F.

Written earlier than August 25, 1912

Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

18

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

You remind me again about the address of a friend. You have already asked me once for this address, and I sent it to you. It was added by me—I well remember—at the very end of a long letter. Look this up if you can. But perhaps it is simpler to repeat the address: Herrn Kurt Lauschner, Beuthen (Ober-Schlesien). Piekarerstr. 19/III, Germany. Inside it is essential to add: for Herr Hörsing: Für Herrn Hörsing (there are two Beuthens in Germany, therefore it is necessary to specify "Ober-Schlesien")...* has arrived. Many thanks. Dansky's manuscript has also arrived. I am extremely surprised that today, when I had from you both *Pravda* and a packet of reactionary papers, I did not receive Thursday's *Nevsky Golos*. But I, for a number of important reasons, very much need to have *Nevsky Golos* directly it appears. If it does not appear, please don't be too lazy to send me two words about it at once. It is extremely important for me to know as soon as possible whether it appeared on Thursday, August 23 (as *Nevsky Golos* promised on August 17), and, if it did appear, to get a copy. By the way, I sent you a long time ago a list of issues of *Zvezda*, *Nevskaya Zvezda*, *Pravda* and *Zhivoye Dyelo* missing from my files. You still don't reply whether you can send them. Yet one mutual friend told me the other day that you have files of *Zvezda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*. Let me know, please, whether you have

* Some words are missing in the original.—*Ed.*

kept the list I sent, and whether you can send me the missing issues. I take advantage of this opportunity to congratulate Comrade Vitimsky (I hope it will not be difficult for you to pass this letter on to him) on the remarkably fine article in *Pravda* (No. 98)[61] which I received today. The subject chosen was extremely topical, and was splendidly worked out in a brief but clear form. In general it would be useful from time to time to recall, quote and explain in *Pravda* Shchedrin and other writers of the "old" Narodnik democratic movement. For the readers of *Pravda*—for the 25,000—this would be appropriate and interesting, and also it would throw light on present-day questions of working-class democracy from another point of view, and in other words.

What is the circulation of *Pravda*? Don't you think it might be useful to publish monthly statistics, even briefly (circulation, name of town and district)? What could be the arguments against publishing them? If there are no special considerations, it seems to me that you should publish.

I almost forgot. We have had a number of complaints from various places abroad that neither when subscriptions are sent, nor when money is sent for particular issues, does *Pravda* arrive. I don't get it regularly now myself. This means undoubtedly that something is wrong in the dispatch department. Please take the most energetic steps you can. Look yourselves at the letters from abroad about subscriptions, and get the matter cleared up. Send one copy of *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda* to the following address: Frl. Slutzky: Katherinenstr. 8 g. H.II (bei Worte), Halensee, Berlin.

Written on September 8, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1923
in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy"* (*1911-14*), Part III

Printed from the typewritten
copy found in police records

19

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

How is your health? Last time the news you sent me was not good—temperature rising, etc. Are you quite well again? Write a couple of words: I shall be very grateful.

Still nothing from you in *Pravda*. A pity. You ought to support the paper.

We are now "up to the ears" in the elections. Absenteeism is damnably great. In the worker curia likewise. But still everywhere Social-Democrats have been elected. Very much depends on the outcome of the elections for the building up of the Party.[62]

Have you heard anything about the liquidators' conference?

In what journal will you be printed? What's happening about Znaniye?

All the best, and I wish you a speedy and sound recovery.

Regards to M. F.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. My address is not Paris, but Cracow, Ulica Lubomirskiego. 47. Krakau.

P.S. Have you seen *Luch*[63]? Have you heard what sort of an undertaking *Dyen*[64] is? There are rumours that it is the organ of *Witte*[65]....

Written at the beginning of October 1912

Sent to Capri

First published in *Bakinsky Rabochy* No. 17, January 21, 1927

Printed from the original

20

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

The other day I had a letter from the editorial board of *Pravda* in Petersburg, in which they ask me to write to you that they would be extremely glad of your regular contributions. "We would like to offer Gorky 25 kopeks a line, but we are afraid of offending him." That's what they write to me.

To my mind, there is nothing at all to be offended at. Nobody could even dream of your contributions depending on considerations of payment. In the same way, everybody knows that the workers' *Pravda*, which usually pays 2 kopeks a line, and still more frequently pays nothing, cannot attract anyone by its fees.

But there is nothing bad about contributors' to a workers' paper receiving regular payment, however small it may be. In fact, it's all to the good. The circulation is now 20-25 thousand. It's time it began thinking of a proper arrangement about payment for contributions. What is bad about *everybody* working on a workers' paper beginning to earn a little? And how can there be anything offensive in this proposal?

I am sure that the fears of the Petersburg editors of *Pravda* are quite without foundation, and that you will not treat their proposal otherwise than in comradely fashion. Write a couple of words, either to them direct at the office, or to me.

Tomorrow is the election of electors in Petersburg (for the worker curia). The struggle with the liquidators has

developed. In Moscow and Kharkov the Party people have won.

Have you seen *Luch*, and do you get it at all? There are people who have fiddled the cards and pretend to be "kind-hearted"!

I have seen an advertisement for *Krugozor*.[66] Is this your undertaking, or are you there by invitation?

Every good wish, and above all for your health. Greetings to M. F.

Yours,
Lenin

47. Ulica Lubomirskiego. Krakau.

Written on October 17, 1912
Sent to Capri
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

21

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

I read today in *Pravda* and in *Luch* about the result of the elections for the worker curia in Petersburg. I cannot but express to you my congratulations on the leading article in No. 146. At a moment of defeat, inflicted not by the Social-Democrats (analysis of the figures clearly shows that it was not Social-Democrats who got the liquidators in), the editorial board at once took the appropriate, firm and dignified tone in pointing out the significance of a protest in principle against "belittling". Don't misunderstand these lines. Don't think that they are produced by anything except the desire to share my thoughts, so natural for a constant contributor. It was a difficult time. The struggle was hard. Almost everything possible was done, but demoralisation had its effect, and the non-Party workers gave their votes to the opportunists. All the more essential, then, is the strictly principled, insistent and stubborn work of the united whole (the united editorial board, for example, or the general body of contributors, and so forth) to counteract the demoralisation.

It is extremely important not to break off the study of the election results which *Pravda* began, but to continue it. To collect and print the votes of all the candidates (you have only 9 out of 13). To collect and print an enquiry into how the non-Party workers voted, how the Putilov workers voted (7 and 2 liquidators), the Semyannikov workers voted (2 and 1 liquidator), and so on, factory by factory.

Only *Pravda* can do this important job with success.

Greetings and best wishes.

Yours,

Lenin

Written on November 2, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-14)*, Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

22

TO THE EDITOR OF *SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT*

WRITTEN ON A COPY OF "MANDATE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS TO THEIR WORKERS' DEPUTY"[67]

N.B. *Return* without fail!! Don't dirty. *Extremely important* to preserve this document! *To be set up*.

Written earlier than November 18, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris
First published in *Pravda* No. 123, May 5, 1932

Printed from the original

23

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

I send you the St. Petersburg Mandate which by chance, thanks to an opportunity of very speedy delivery, reached us from Petersburg. Publish this Mandate to the St. Petersburg deputy without fail, in a prominent position and in large type. It is quite intolerable that *Luch*, distorting the Mandate, is already mentioning it and printing reports about it, while *Pravda*, whose supporters drew up the Mandate and got it adopted and put it into action, is silent about it.... What does this mean? Can a workers' newspaper exist if it behaves with such contempt for what interests the workers? (Naturally, if certain expressions and phrases are undesirable from the censorship point of view, partial changes are possible, as usually happens in such cases) But not to print such a thing means not only to give ground for hundreds of disputes, in which *Pravda* will be the guilty party, but also to inflict the greatest possible damage on it as a newspaper, on the circulation and organisation of the paper as an undertaking. A newspaper, after all, is not just something for the reader to do a bit of reading in and the writer to do a bit of writing in. A newspaper must itself seek out, itself discover in good time and, at the appropriate moment, print certain material. A paper must look for and find the contacts it needs. Yet here suddenly is a Mandate to the St. Petersburg deputy, coming from the supporters of *Pravda*, but not printed in *Pravda*.... Please reply immediately on receiving this letter.

Written on November 24, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-14)*, Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

24

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

We were extremely sad to see two blunders in Sunday's *Pravda*. First, there was no article about the Basic Congress, and secondly, you did not print the greetings to the Congress from Badayev and the others.[68] As regards the first point, we are partly to blame as well, because we did not send an article. We were busy with extremely urgent and important affairs. It would not have been at all difficult to write such an article, and the editorial board of *Pravda* knew that the Congress was opening on Sunday. But the second omission is entirely the responsibility of Badayev. It is quite unforgivable that he is not concerned about his paper, that he signs anything that may turn up without at once taking it to his paper. A workers' paper in Petersburg without the co-operation of the workers' deputy for Petersburg (particularly as he is a *Pravda* supporter) is a stupid situation. It is most essential to pay as much attention as possible to this important omission, both on the part of the whole editorial board and on the part of Baturin[69] (to whom, by the way, please pass on this letter, and from whom it would be very pleasant to have a couple of lines), and on the part of the deputy himself.

You asked for the address of Gorky. Here it is: Signor Massimo Gorki. Villa Spinola. *Capri* (Napoli). Italie.

Here is the address of a correspondent in Rome; write to him, he will contribute to *Pravda*: B. Antonoff, Via le Giulio Cesare, 47. Roma. Italy.

Why don't you send the money you owe? This delay is causing us great difficulties. Please don't be late. Why haven't you replied to the request to print a notice in the paper that the editorial board is looking for Nos. 5-10 of *Pravda*?

I wish you all the best.

Yours,
V.

Written on November 26, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy"* (*1911-14*), Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

25

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear Al. M.,

It seems a long time since we have had any word from you. How are you getting on? Are you well?

I received today No. 187 of *Pravda* with the subscriptions for 1913. The paper is having a hard passage: since the summer decline in circulation, the rise has been *very* slow, and a deficit remains. They have even temporarily stopped payment to two permanent contributors, which has made our position exceptionally difficult.

We propose to develop intensive agitation among the workers for *subscriptions*, and to use the money collected to strengthen the paper and expand it, because since the opening of the Duma there has been no room at all for articles.

I hope you too will take part in the agitation for subscriptions, in order to help in "rescuing" the paper. In what form? If you have a tale or something suitable, the announcement of it will make very good agitation. If not, send them a promise to provide one in the near future, and particularly in 1913. Finally, a few simple lines, in a *letter to the workers* from you, about the importance of supporting the workers' paper *actively* (by subscriptions, sales, collections), would also be splendid agitation.

Please drop a line about one or the other—direct to the editor of *Pravda* (2 Yamskaya, St. Petersburg) or to me here (Ulijanow, 47, Lubomirskiego, Krakau).

Probably there will be no war, and we shall remain here for the time being, "taking advantage" of the desperate hatred of the Poles towards tsarism.

The liquidators are now carrying on an attack *against* revolutionary strikes! They've sunk to that. There is talk of a strike and demonstration for January 9.

Among the workers' deputies, for the first time in the three Dumas (2nd, 3rd, 4th), all six deputies from the chief gubernias are on the side of the Party. Things are difficult, but still the cause is going ahead.

Have you seen the "defence" of Ropshin in *Zavety*,[70] in the name of "freedom of thought and criticism" (in reply to the letter to the editor from Natanson and Co.)? That is worse than any liquidationism—renegacy which is muddled, cowardly, evasive and nonetheless systematic!

We are swimming "against the stream".... One has now to fight *for* revolutionary agitation among the masses against very many "would-be revolutionaries".... Among the mass of the workers there is unquestionably a revolutionary mood, but the new democratic intelligentsia (including the workers' intelligentsia) with a revolutionary ideology is growing up slowly, lagging behind, can't yet catch up.

Very warm greetings!

Write me a couple of words.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Greetings to M. F.! She has somehow fallen quite, quite silent....

Written on December 22 or 23, 1912
Sent to Capri
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

1913

26

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

New Year's greetings to you, too! I wish you all the very best, and above all health! We have Malinovsky,[71] Petrovsky and Badayev staying with us just now. Yesterday I received your letter and read it out to them. They were all extraordinarily pleased. Malinovsky wanted to visit you, but probably the distance will be a barrier. Ah, if only you could be nearer to us.... If your health permitted, you could transfer to the local Galician health resorts like Zakopane, find a healthy place in the mountains, two days nearer to Russia; we could get more frequent visits from the workers, once again organise a workers' school[72]: crossing the frontier is not difficult, the price of the journey from Petersburg is 12 rubles, contacts with the workers of Moscow and the South are also possible.... I've been really day-dreaming in connection with M. F.'s journey.... That was a wonderful idea of hers, really wonderful. Make sure to drop me a line, when you have a chance, whether she has succeeded in getting her legal papers (probably she will succeed). Also let me know how Malinovsky can find her in Petersburg or in Moscow. Through Tikhonov? If we can't find some cash to expand and strengthen *Pravda*, it will perish. The deficit is now 50-60 rubles a day. We have to increase the circulation, reduce costs, expand the paper. We have held out for 200 issues—a record. After all, we are influencing twenty to thirty thousand worker-readers systematically in a Marxist spirit: it is something really big, and we should be dam-

nably sorry if the paper went under. We are discussing with the deputies, from every point of view and in every possible way, how to get *Pravda* out of its difficulties, but fear that without financial help from outside we won't succeed.

Malinovsky, Petrovsky and Badayev send you warm greetings and best wishes. They are good fellows, especially the first. Really, it is possible to build a workers' party with such people, though the difficulties are incredibly great. The base at Cracow has proved to be useful: our move to Cracow has fully "paid for itself" (from the point of view of the cause). The deputies confirm that a revolutionary mood is unquestionably growing among the mass of the workers. If we now create a good proletarian organisation, without obstacles from the treacherous liquidators—the devil knows what victories we can then win when the movement from below develops....

What you write about letters from Russia is remarkably interesting and characteristic. Menshevik workers say that Russia has outlived Marx!! And this is not the only case. The liquidators introduce such corruption, such a spirit of treachery, such desertion, as it is difficult to imagine. And in addition, thousands of intrigues for "uniting" with them: the only way to make a mess of the *whole* cause, to spoil the building of the Party, which has had a difficult start, is once again to begin the intrigues="unity" with the liquidators. Well, the battle isn't over yet....

I am ready to share with all my heart in your joy at the return of the *Vperyod* group, *if* ... *if* your supposition is justified that "Machism, god-building[73] and all that nonsense has been dumped for ever", as you write. If that is so, if the *Vperyod* people have understood this or will understand it now, then I warmly join in your delight at their return. But I underline "*if*" because this, so far, is still a hope rather than a fact. Do you remember, at Capri in the spring of 1908, our "last meeting" with Bogdanov, Bazarov and Lunacharsky[74]? Do you remember how I said that we should have to part company for two or three years, and how then M. F., in the chair, furiously protested, calling me to order, etc.![75]

It has turned out to be four and a half, nearly five years. And this is not very long, for such a period of the most profound collapse as occurred in 1908-11. I don't know whether Bogdanov, Bazarov, Volsky (a semi-anarchist), Lunacharsky, Alexinsky[76] are *capable of learning* from the painful experience of 1908-11. Have they understood that *Marxism* is a more serious and more profound thing than it seemed to them, that one cannot scoff at it, as Alexinsky used to do, or dismiss it as something dead, as the others did? *If* they have understood this—a thousand greetings to them, and everything personal (inevitably brought in by the sharpness of the struggle) will in one moment be thrown on the scrap-heap. But if they haven't understood it, if they haven't learned anything, then don't hold it against me: friendship is friendship, but duty is duty. Against attempts to abuse Marxism or to confuse the policy of the workers' party we shall fight without sparing our lives.

I am *very* glad it is through *Pravda*, which did not directly attack them, that the *way* has been found for the gradual return of the *Vperyod* people. Very glad. But for the sake of a *lasting* rapprochement, we must now move towards it slowly and *cautiously*. That is what I have written to *Pravda* too. And friends of the reunion of the Vperyodists with us must bend their efforts to this also: a careful, tested *return* of the Vperyodists *from* Machism, otzovism,[77] god-building can yield great results. The least carelessness, any "recurrence of the Machist, otzovist, etc., disease", and the struggle will burst out still more violently.... I have not read the new "Philosophy of Living Experience" by Bogdanov, probably the same old Machism in a new dress....

We have excellent connections with Sergei Moiseyev in Paris. We have known him a long time, and are working together. He is a real Party man and Bolshevik. It is with such people that we are building the Party, but there are damnably few of them left.

Once again I wish you the best: I must finish this letter, which has become indecently long. Good health!

Yours,
Lenin

N. K. sends her warm greetings!

(Some more good workers from Russia have gathered here. We are organising a conference.[78] Alas, we haven't the money, or we could get a devil of a lot done from this base!)

I am writing to *Pravda* today that they, after asking Tikhonov, should print a notice that Tikhonov and you are in charge of the literary department of *Pravda*. Isn't that so? Write to them yourself, if they don't print it.

Written earlier than January 8, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri
First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

27

TO N. A. RUBAKIN

January 25, 1913

Dear Comrade,

In answer to your request, I am sending you as brief an "*exposé*" as possible.[79] If you had not added that "the *history of the polemics*" would not be barred from your book, it would have been *quite* impossible to give an account of Bolshevism.

Moreover, doubt has been aroused in my mind by your sentence: "*I shall try* to make no changes in your account." I must lay down as a condition for it being printed that there are *to be no changes whatsoever*. (As to purely censorship changes we could, of course, come to a special arrangement.)

If it doesn't suit, please return the sheet.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

My address is: Wl. Uljanow. 47. Lubomirskiego. *Krakau*. Autriche.

Sent to Clarens (Switzerland)

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

28

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

Of course, I have nothing against your sending my letter to Tikhonov.

After your account I have become interested in Lunacharsky's article "Between Fear and Hope". Couldn't you send it to me, if you have a copy? If you want it I shall return it without fail.

The collections for the Moscow paper rejoiced us greatly. *Our* trio of deputies from Moscow Region—Malinovsky, Shagov and Samoilov—will set about this. That has already been agreed. But care is needed: before consolidating *Pravda*, we cannot set about a Moscow paper. We have a plan for organising a *Moskovskaya Pravda*.[80]

Please write to Tikhonov that he should talk *only* to Badayev and *Malinovsky*—but he must talk with them.

I was particularly glad of the following words in your letter: "From all the plans and suppositions of the Russian intelligentsia, it is clear beyond any doubt that socialist thought is interlarded with various currents *radically* hostile to it. They include mysticism, and metaphysics, and opportunism, and reformism, and relapses into Narodism. All these currents are *all the more* hostile because they are *extremely indefinite* and, not having their own platforms, cannot determine themselves with sufficient clarity."

I underline the words which have particularly delighted me. That's just it: "radically hostile", and all the more so because they are indefinite. You ask, for example, about

Stepanov (I. I.).[81] What did he turn out to be in the era of collapse and vacillation, 1908-11 (yet he was a good fellow, a hard worker, well-read, etc.)? He wanted to make peace with the Vperyodists. But then that means that he was wobbling himself.

He wrote letters to me about giving up the democratic revolution in Russia as a bad job, that in our country things would proceed without revolution, on Austrian lines. I branded him as a liquidator for these philistine ideas. He was offended. And then *Larin*[82] blurted out his ideas in print.

Now Stepanov is *demonstratively* writing not for us but for Rozhkov's paper *Novaya Sibir* at Irkutsk.[83] And do you know what "trend" Rozhkov has discovered? Did you read his article in *Nasha Zarya* of 1911 and my reply in *Zvezda*?* And Rozhkov has *dug himself in* as an arch-opportunist. And Stepanov? Allah knows. That's just it: an "extremely indefinite" and muddled position. I should *never* entrust any at all independent department to Stepanov now: he himself doesn't know where he will jump next. But probably he could be a useful contributor. He is one of those who haven't "seen clearly". To commission him to "organise" a department means to kill *both him* and the department for certain.

You write: "It's time we had our journal, but we haven't a sufficient number of people who have come properly to terms with each other for this."

I don't accept the second part of this sentence. The journal would *oblige* a sufficient number of people to *come to terms* with each other, provided there was a journal, provided there was a *nucleus*.

A nucleus does exist, but there is no full-size journal for external reasons—no money. If we had money, I am sure we could manage a full-size journal even now, because in addition to the *nucleus* of contributors we could, for payment, draw in *a lot of people* by giving out subjects and allocating jobs.

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* See "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto" (present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 313-24).—*Ed.*

So long as we have no money, we must in my opinion not only dream but build upon what we've got, in other words, on *Prosveshcheniye*.[84] Of course, it's a little fish, but in the first place a big fish, like everything else, grows from a little one. Secondly, better a little fish than a big cockroach.

It's time, high time, to *begin* coming to terms, if we want to have "people who have come to terms" in large numbers.

"It's time we had our journal." The literary nucleus is there. The correctness of the line has been confirmed by the experience of 12 years (or even 20), and particularly by the experience of the last six years. We should gather around this nucleus, thereby defining it in greater detail, training it up and expanding. We *had* to begin with the illegal one and with *Pravda*. But we don't want to *stop* at that. And therefore, once you have said that "it's time we had our journal", allow me to call you to account for these words: *either* to draft out at once a plan of enquiries for money for a full-size journal with such-and-such a programme, such-and-such an editorial board and such-and-such a body of contributors, or to begin on the same plan expanding *Prosveshcheniye*.

Or more truly, not *either—or*, but *both*.

I await your reply. You probably have already had a letter from Vienna about *Prosveshcheniye*. There is a reliable hope of consolidating it for 1913 in a smaller form. You want us to "have our journal", then let's push it ahead together.

I haven't heard anything about the Dashnaks. But I think it's a nonsensical rumour. It's been started by the government, which wants to swallow up Turkish Armenia.[85]

The P.P.S.* are undoubtedly *for* Austria and will fight for her. A war between Austria and Russia would be a very useful thing for the revolution (throughout Eastern Europe), but it's not very probable that Franz-Josef and Nicky will give us this pleasure.

You ask me to keep you better informed. With pleasure—only you must reply. I send you (for the time being confi-

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* P.P.S. (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna)—Polish Socialist Party. —*Ed*.

dentially) the resolutions of our recent conference (which in my view was very successful and will play its part).[86]

Resolutions, they say, are of all forms of literature the most boring. I am a man who has consumed too many resolutions. Drop me a line about how readable they are for you (especially about revolutionary strikes and about the liquidators).

What bad effect has the rumour about an amnesty had in Russia? I don't know. Drop me a line.

N. K. sends her regards.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after January 25, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

29

TO Y. M. SVERDLOV[87]

To Comrade Andrei, and if he is not in Petersburg, then to Nos. 3, 6 and others.[88]

Dear Friend,

I was extremely sorry to hear that you consider that Vasily exaggerates the importance of *Dyen*.[89] In reality the *key* to the situation at present is precisely *Dyen* and the way it is run. Unless we secure a reform and proper management in this field, we shall reach bankruptcy, both material and political. *Dyen* is the necessary means of organisation for uniting and lifting up the movement. Only *through* this means can now come the necessary influx of people and resources for what you indicate. Things are bad in Petersburg primarily because *Dyen* is bad, and we are unable to make, or the board of "editors" there prevents us making, use of *Dyen*.

At one kopek a month 25,000 will provide 250 rubles. Remember without fail that there are no other sources at all. The whole situation in general will now depend on the outcome of the struggle with the liquidators in Petersburg. That is clear. And this struggle can be decided only by the proper management of *Dyen*. If it is true that Nos. 1 and 3, or 3 and 6, are for caution in reforming *Dyen*, i.e., for delay in expelling the present editors and office staff, this is very sad. We repeat: this smells of bankruptcy. We must seriously come to agreement and set about reforming *Dyen*. (1) We need accounts made up to the last kopek. (2) Has No. 1 had a letter about this? (3) Have you read this letter?

(4) You must take the cash (revenue and subscriptions) into your own hands. (5) Will this be done, and when will it be done? (6) It is essential to put in our own editorial board of *Dyen* and throw out the present one. Work is thoroughly bad at present, the boosting of the Bundist liquidators (*Zeit*) and the non-Social-Democrat Jagiello is an absolute disgrace. The absence of a campaign for unity from below is stupid and base. They keep silent about unity on Vasilyevsky Island, about the liquidators' refusal, they don't know how to reply to No. 101 of *Luch*[90] or to their reply: are such people editors? They are not people, but wretched wet-rags and wreckers of the cause.

The use made of *Dyen* for keeping the class-conscious workers informed and reporting their work (the Petersburg Committee particularly) is beneath all criticism. You must put an end to the so-called autonomy of these editorial failures. You must set about it before all else. You should install yourself in "sanctuary" with No. 1. Put in a telephone. Take the editorial board into your own hands. Draw in assistants. You on your own—with some of these people as pure executives—given our work from here, can fully cope with the job. If this is well organised, there will also be a revival in the work of the Petersburg Committee, which is ridiculously inept, incapable of saying a word, lets every occasion for a statement go by. And it ought to be making a statement almost daily in legal form (in the name of "influential workers", etc.) and at least once or twice a month illegally. Once again, the key to the *whole* situation is *Dyen*. Here it is possible to conquer, and then (only then) organise the local work as well. Otherwise everything will collapse.

You should wait, so far as a Moscow paper is concerned. But No. 3 and his two colleagues should publish a letter immediately. Their delay is unforgivable. They should come out immediately, take up their position, declare that this is *our* affair—the affair of those three—that they are in charge (otherwise the liquidators will elbow them out). Much has already been lost, hurry.

So a statement must be made. Why shouldn't No. 3, too, be a publisher? What in general is the distribution of duties between Nos. 1, 3, 6 and their immediate friends? Has there been a report? Is there complete agreement?

Written on February 9, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy"* (*1911-14*), Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

30

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleagues,

I cannot but express my indignation at the printing by the editorial board of Mr. Bogdanov's stupid and impudent letter in No. 24, and the senseless note from the editors.[91] It had been precisely and clearly laid down as a condition that such things should not be printed without consultation.

The editorial board is mocking us by infringing the conditions. It is not surprising that for *the same* reasons no confidence *whatever* is aroused by the letter of Mikhalchi, who contradicts himself a hundred times in it.

The enquiry from the Riga workers (No. 24) is dated January *19*.[92] There was every possibility both of linking it up with the article on Narodism in No. 17 (January 22) and of sending it here in good time. I repeat that the editorial board is making a mockery of the conditions laid down. I insistently ask you, after those whom it concerns have read this letter, *immediately* to pass it on to the publisher of the newspaper, Deputy Badayev.

Yours faithfully,
V. Ilyin

Written on February 14, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

Published for the first time
in the Fourth (Russian) Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

31

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Today we have learned of the beginning of reform in *Dyen*.[93] A thousand greetings, congratulations and wishes for success. At long last you have managed to begin the reform. You cannot imagine to what extent we have been exhausted by working with a sullenly hostile editorial board. Additional for Nos. 1 and 3[94]: we are surprised that you could take offence or be displeased at the sharp letter with the three-ruble note enclosed. All the sharpness was directed precisely against those editors whom you happily have begun to throw out. Sharpness against those who should be thrown out, what is bad about that? Once again we congratulate you on the beginning of the reform. The letter by No. 3 in *Dyen* is magnificent, and the other letters too. Reply whether you have received the draft of the Budget speech. Send us as much material as possible. One cannot work without it. The speech on the Budget could be expanded to twice the size, if there were material. The statements of the numbers[95] are excellent. I congratulate them with all my heart. Please repeat the second address for letters to the students: we have some doubt about the name. Please send us addresses for literature as soon as possible.

How about No. 10[96]? Surely, as a pupil of A., he may become a number. What is the circulation of *Vechernaya Pochta*[97]? Did Jan's comrades receive what he sent? Ask No. 3. Warm greetings.

Written on February 19, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-14)*, Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

32

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

Now, sir, what's the meaning of this bad behaviour of yours? You're overworked, tired, your nerves are out of order. This is all wrong. In Capri of all places, and in the winter when there are probably less "visitors", you ought to have a regular way of life. You have no one to look after you, is that why you have let yourself slide like this? Honestly, it's no good. Pull yourself together and give yourself a stricter régime, really! Falling ill in times like these just isn't allowed. Have you begun working at night? Why, when I was in Capri, I was told that it was only with my coming that things had got out of hand, while before me everyone went to bed at the right time. You must rest and establish a régime, without fail.

I will write to Troyanovsky and his wife about your wish to meet them. This would be a really good thing. They are good people. We haven't seen much of them at work yet, but everything we have heard up to now speaks in their favour. They also have money. They might get into their stride and do a great deal for the journal. Troyanovskaya is going to Russia soon.

It is a great joy to me, and to all of us, that you are *taking up Prosveshcheniye*. I confess that I did have the thought: now as soon as I write about our little journal, A. M. will lose his enthusiasm. I repent, I repent of such thoughts.

Now it really will be splendid if little by little we draw in fiction writers and set *Prosveshcheniye* going! Excellent! The reader is new, proletarian; we shall make the journal cheap; you will let in only democratic fiction, without

moaning, without renegade stuff. We shall consolidate the workers. And the workers now are fine. Our six deputies in the Duma from the worker curia have now begun to work *outside the Duma* so energetically that it is a joy to see. This is where people will build up a real workers' party! We were never able to bring this off in the Third Duma. Have you seen the letter in *Luch* (No. 24) from the four deputies about their resignation?[98] A good letter, wasn't it?

And have you seen in *Pravda* how mildly Alexinsky is writing, and so far not making a row? Wonderful! He sent one "Manifesto" (why he entered *Pravda*). They didn't print it. And still, *so far*, he is not making a row. Wonder-ful! But Bogdanov is making a row: a piece of exceptional stupidity in *Pravda* No. 24. No, we shall never get anywhere with him! I have read his *Engineer Mannie*. It's the same old Machism = idealism, so concealed that neither the workers nor the stupid editors of *Pravda* understood it. No, this Machist is as hopeless as Lunacharsky (thanks for his article). If only Lunacharsky could be separated from Bogdanov in aesthetics, as Alexinsky has begun to draw apart from him in politics ... if only....

As regards the theory of matter and its structure, I am fully in agreement with you that one should write about it, and that it is a good remedy against "the poison which the shapeless Russian soul is sucking". Only you are wrong to call this poison "metaphysics". It ought to be called *idealism* and agnosticism.

For the Machists call materialism metaphysics! And it so happens that a *host* of the most prominent present-day physicists, *on the occasion* of the "wonders" of radium, electrons, etc., are smuggling in the *God business*—both the crudest and the most subtle—in the shape of philosophical idealism.

As regards nationalism I am fully in agreement with you that we ought to take this up more seriously. We have a marvellous Georgian who has sat down to write a big article for *Prosveshcheniye*, for which he has collected *all* the Austrian and other materials.[99] We shall go at this hard. But that our resolutions (I am sending them in printed form) "are formalities, bureaucracy", there your abuse is off target. No. It's not a formality. In Russia and in the Cau-

casus the Georgian + Armenian + Tartar + Russian Social-Democrats have worked *together*, in a *single* Social-Democratic organisation *for more than ten years*. This is not a phrase, but the proletarian solution of the problem of nationalities. The only solution. So it was in Riga too: Russians + Letts + Lithuanians. *Only the separatists*—the Bund—used to stand aloof. The same at Vilna.

There are two good Social-Democratic pamphlets on the nationalities problem: Strasser and Pannekoek. Would you like me to send them to you? Will you find anyone to translate them from the German for you?

No, the disgusting situation that exists in Austria *won't happen* here. We won't allow it! And there are more of our Great Russians here. With the workers on our side we won't let in any of the "Austrian spirit".

As regards Pyatnitsky,[100] I am *for* prosecution. There is no need to stand on ceremony. Sentimentalism would be unforgivable. Socialists are not at all against use of the state court. We are *for* making use of legality. Marx and Bebel made use of the state court *even* against their socialist opponents. One must know *how* to do it, but it must be done.

Pyatnitsky must be prosecuted, *and no nonsense*. If you hear reproaches against you for this—spit in the mugs of those who make them. It is the hypocrites who will reproach you. To give way to Pyatnitsky, to let him off for fear of going to court, would be *unforgivable*.

Well, I have chattered more than enough. Write and tell me about your health.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. We know *Foma*-Piterets. He is now at Narym. Foma from the Urals? We don't seem to remember him. At the Congress of 1907 there was a Foma-Piterets.

Written between February 15 and 25, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri
First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*
Printed from the original

33

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleagues,

Let me first of all congratulate you on the vast improvement in the whole conduct of the paper which has become apparent during the last few days. I want to congratulate you and to wish you further successes in the same direction. The day before yesterday I sent the first two short articles entitled "An Increasing Discrepancy".* From No. 234 of *Pravda* I see clearly that these articles will not be suitable. Therefore please pass them over without delay to *Prosveshcheniye*, to which I am sending the final section. Please pass over to them also the other articles which have not been printed (the reply to Mayevsky; on morality; Bulgakov on the peasants[101]—Bulgakov's articles from *Russkaya Mysl*, etc.). Please be sure to reply as soon as possible whether you have done this. Send me Nos. 7, 8, 21 and 24 of *Luch* and No. 25 of *Pravda*. I had always been getting *Pravda* until lately in the mornings, as I do *Rech* and *Novoye Vremya*. But for the last week *Pravda* has begun to come late, and arrives only in the evenings. Clearly the dispatch department is working carelessly. I earnestly request you to take steps to see that they display greater care with the daily post.

I receive no new books at all. Steps must be taken (a) to get them from the publishers on a deposit account, (b) to get the Puma and official publications through the deputies. It is absolutely impossible to work without books.... I don't receive either *Zavety* or *Russkaya Molva*.[102] I can't get on

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 562-79.—*Ed.*

without them. I particularly need the issue of *Russkaya Molva* where they wrote about *Luch* and explained that the Mensheviks are against underground work.

March 1 (14) will be the 30th anniversary of the death of Marx. You ought to publish a supplement for two or three kopeks, four pages in *Pravda* format with a big portrait of Marx and a number of small articles.[103] There should also he detailed advertisements both for *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*. Probably it would pay for itself with a circulation of 25-30 thousand, and make a profit. If you agree, cable me: "Draw up" (we shall then sit down to write), then, in addition, send a more detailed reply. Reply please, two or three times a week in a few lines, about what articles you have received and which will be printed.

In my opinion you were quite right to publish Dnevnitsky in full, as a first step. But for the future it would be better to hold up such long (and bad) articles, and to begin correspondence about passing them over to *Prosveshcheniye*.

Yours,
I.

Written on February 21, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-14)*, Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

34

TO M. A. SAVELYEV

For Vetrov
Urgent

Dear Colleague,

It is extremely sad that our correspondence is still not properly organised, that I still have no special address for you personally, that you don't reply to my questions for so long. (1) I wrote to you a very, very long time ago that *Zvezda* still had, in addition to the article "Debates in Britain on Liberal Labour Policy", the articles "Two Utopias"* and a criticism of the boycott policy (against Amfiteatrov, I don't remember the title[104]). I repeat what I asked: get hold of them and send them to me. I hope to make use of them. (2) At *Pravda* there are also a number of articles which have not been used there. I very much want you to find them and make them into notes of a publicist signed, say, T.... The approximate arrangement would be: I. Reply to Mayevsky (in *Luch*, about liquidationism). (This subject is the more necessary because Dnevnitsky and Plekhanov, in No. 234 of *Pravda*, have struck false notes.) II. Bulgakov in *Russkaya Mysl* on the peasants (I don't remember the title). III. On morality (two short articles). IV. "An Increasing Discrepancy" (on the February 1913 conference of the Cadets. We must react to this. Two short articles were sent to *Pravda* the day before yesterday; the remaining four are small, I am sending them today). The titles for these paragraphs should

* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 360-65, 355-59.—*Ed.*

not be in large type (as was done in the article "Results of the Elections"* in No. 1 of *Prosveshcheniye*) but in small point.

There are an awful lot of misprints in No. 1 of *Prosveshcheniye*.... I enclose the corrected proofs of the article "Debates in Britain on Liberal Labour Policy". It should be printed. Have you really not managed to get rid yet of Mikhalchi.... This is essential, I assure you, essential. I have seen a misprint on page 26 of *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1. A correction in print is absolutely necessary. I enclose the correction.

V. Il.

Misprint

Many misprints occurred in the January number of *Prosveshcheniye* (1913, No. 1). We correct one which distorts the sense. On page 26, line 23 from the top, it reads: "25 per cent in the workers' party", but should read "52 per cent".

Written on February 22, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy"* (*1911-14*), Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

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* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 493-518.—*Ed.*

35

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you Poletayev's letter (*return it immediately*) and a short article (also to be returned)....*

I have read *Current Topics*. What scoundrels! But we don't know whether to attack or *keep silent* about these young pigs. Is it really worth pitching into them now? What is your opinion?

My view is that they ought to be hammered a little, but not too much, in the next issue of the C.O.[105]

Your report seems to have turned out wonderfully well....

A thousand greetings!

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. *Good* news from Petersburg, Moscow Region and the South. The *workers*' illegal organisation is growing and taking shape. A reform of *Pravda* has *begun*.

Troyanovsky is starting something like an intrigue on account of Koba's article for *Prosveshcheniye*: "The Problem of Nationalities and Social-Democracy". He wants it to be stated that the article is for discussion, because Galina is for cultural-national autonomy!!

Of course we are absolutely against. The article is a *very good one*. It's a burning question, and we shall not give up one iota of our attitude in principle against the Bundist, rabble.

It may "blow over", but ... *tenez vous pour averti*!**

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* The manuscript is damaged in places. Several words here and below are illegible.—*Ed.*

** Bear it in mind.—*Ed.*

We have decided to attack the Vperyodists. Get Miron to write whether there is enough money for four pages of the C.O.

Have you read "The Meteor" in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*? What is it? A lampoon?

Written on February 25, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

36

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

I have read the "Manifesto"[106] today....

It seems there is a complete amnesty for writers. You should try to get back—*having first found out, of course, whether they won't play you a dirty trick on account of the "school"*,[107] etc. Probably they won't be able to prosecute you for this.

I hope you don't take the view that one mustn't "accept" an amnesty? This would he wrong. A revolutionary, as things are today, will do *more* from inside Russia, and our deputies even sign "the solemn oath".

But you don't have to sign anything, only to make use of the amnesty. Drop me a line about your opinion and your *plans*. Perhaps you will call here if you do move—after all, it's on your way!

And for a revolutionary writer to have the possibility of roaming around Russia (the new Russia) means that he is afterwards able to hit a hundred times harder at the Romanovs and Co....

Did you get my last letter? Somehow we haven't had news from you for a long time. Are you well?

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Did you got the letter from N. K. with the *material*?

Written after March 6, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri
First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

37

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I received your letter today and ...* from the report on the Third Duma group. Thanks. I passed it on today to Malinovsky, who is here; ... is leaving today....

It's strange, very strange indeed, about Dan! He lives quite freely, goes to the group, is the editor of *Luch*, etc.!! The secret police are playing some *big* game here!

There are heavy arrests at home. Koba has been arrested. We have discussed with Malinovsky what measures to take. The circulation of *Pravda* is 30-32 thousand on week-days and 40-42 thousand on holidays. There is a general cry that we haven't the people. The liquidators have a mass of intellectuals, while all ours get arrested.

It's been decided "in principle" to abolish the extra sheets and to publish weekly supplements to *Pravda*, for an extra payment, of 4-8-12 pages (in place of *Zvezda*); it would be a good thing if successful—but the lack of people is a hindrance.

The Six got on very well together, but complain that it's hard going....

All the "intelligentsia" are with the liquidators. The mass of the workers are with us (40,000 *Pravda*, against 12,000 *Luch*) but the workers are producing their *own* intelligentsia with the greatest difficulty. Slowly and with difficulty.

Party affairs in Russia in general are obviously improving. Workers' circles, groups and organisations are obviously developing everywhere and growing stronger. Expanding. And the Urals and the South and Moscow

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* The manuscript is damaged in places. Several words here and below are illegible.—*Ed*.

Region (particularly). In the Caucasus there is an improvement (latest information is that there are arrests again)....

There is an undoubted revival in the Social-Democratic movement. Once again people have begun to give (a little) money. News! There are signs of a revival of revolutionary organisations in the forces. But the tempo of the movement is different somehow, new in some way.

You have, of course, noticed Plekhanov in *Pravda*? Had his fling and ... returned. What a wobbler he is! Helped Mayevsky[108] (after January 1912)—then abandoned him (August 1912)—was mercilessly attacked by him—now attacks him in turn!! Kiselyov has sent me a long letter, reproaching me for keeping down the pro-Party Mensheviks, of whom I am supposed to be unwarrantedly demanding that they should be "Leninists". The man's a crank! But Gr—y thinks this is a "move" by Plekhanov....

Something new in the history of intrigue: K. Radek has put out a pamphlet *Meine Abrechnung*, against Tyszka, gave him a terrific lambasting. They have promised to send you a copy too.

I have read Rosa's new book *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals*. She has got into a shocking muddle. She has distorted Marx. I am very glad that Pannekoek and Eckstein and O. Bauer have all with one accord condemned her, and said against her what I said in 1890 against the Narodniks. I intend to write about Rosa for No. 4 of *Prosveshcheniye*.[109]

Koba had time to write a big article on the nationalities problem (for three issues of *Prosveshcheniye*). Good! We must fight for the truth against the separatists and opportunists of the Bund and among the liquidators.

There is a certain moving of the waters towards Russia: there are more leaving foreign parts to work at home than before.

Trotsky, they say, is offended with *Luch*.

But I must close. Warm regards from Malinovsky and us all. All the best.

Yours, *Lenin*

Written before March 29, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

38

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

For Iv. Iv.

Dear Comrades,

Many thanks for your detailed letter and very valuable information. Write more often, and give us contacts with the districts.

It is very important that the liquidators are giving a "hostile" reception to the rapprochement of the pro-Party Mensheviks with the Party. A resolution about this ought to be adopted in the districts. This fact proves for the 1,000th time that the liquidators have finally become a non-Party and anti-Party element, that unity is possible only against them (against *Luch*) and by no means with them. You are quite right, in my belief, in attributing great importance to this fact. One can't in any way talk about unity with the liquidators: one cannot unite the Party with the destroyers of the Party. The resolution of the February Conference of 1913 about unity from below, it seems to me, should be hectographed (if there are not enough copies), adding the resolution against *Luch* with the precise list of the five points.[110]

Furthermore, I fully share your opinion about the importance of a campaign against the Seven,[111] and of the workers displaying initiative in this respect. The Seven are wavering and near-Party, but to a very little extent Party people. One can enter into agreements with them within the Duma, in order to direct them and drag them after oneself, but it would be a crime to gloss over their liquidationism, their

lack of character and principle. We must support and develop the campaign against the Seven. Now that the liquidators' *Luch* is expanding (obviously on liberals' money, because its deficit is 1,000 rubles a month, and its circulation is only 12,000) we must strengthen tenfold the campaign to support the six workers' deputies, to increase *Pravda*'s readership, to extend *Pravda*. We must take the struggle for *Pravda* direct into the factories, pressing them to subscribe for more copies, winning away every factory from *Luch*, so that there is a competition between the factories for the largest number of subscribers to *Pravda*. A victory of Party principles is a victory for *Pravda* and vice versa. We should start this kind of campaign: to increase the circulation of *Pravda* from 30,000 to 50,000-60,000, and the number of subscribers from 5,000 to 20,000, and proceed unfalteringly in this direction. Then we shall extend and improve *Pravda*.

Your remarks about the lack of intellectuals are very true. And we won't have them. *Pravda* and the illegal publications will replace them. You should publish at least hectographed resolutions and leaflets until more is technically possible. There should be a weekly publication of 30-60 copies of hectographed resolutions of the Petersburg Committee by way of directives. We could always come to an agreement by correspondence about these resolutions. Think this over. It will strengthen the illegal work, reduce the number of victims, make the propaganda more general, etc.

The resolution of the Petersburg Committee for the Six against the Seven is excellent.[112] Haven't you even hectographed it? This is absolutely essential. Now this is just the kind of campaign that is necessary. We shall try to send you articles for *Izvestia*.[113] Let us know the dates. Tell us what the size will be, and what the length of the articles should be.

L.

Written on April 5, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-14)*, Part III

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

39

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

How do you stand about a little article or a story for the *May* issue of *Prosveshcheniye*? They write to me from there that they could publish *10-15 thousand* (that's how we are marching ahead!), if there were something from you. Drop me a line whether there will be.[114] Then *Pravda* reprints it, and we get 40,000 readers. Yes ... the affairs of *Prosveshcheniye* could begin to prosper; otherwise there *does not exist*, devil take it, a single consistent journal for the workers, for the *Social-Democrats*, for revolutionary democracy; nothing but rotten sour-pusses of one kind or another.

How is your health? Have you rested, and will you be taking a rest in the summer? It is essential, my word on it, that you should have a *good* rest!

Things are not too well with me. The wife is down with goitre. Nerves! My nerves are also playing me up a little. We are spending the summer in the village of Poronin, near Zakopane. (My address is: Herrn Wl. Ulianow, *Poronin*, *Galizien*, Austria.) It's a good place, and healthy. Height about. 700 metres. Suppose you took it into your head to pay us a visit? There will be interesting workers from Russia. Zakopane (seven versts from us) is a well-known health resort.

Have you seen Demyan Bedny's *Fables*?[115] I will send them if you haven't. If you have, write and say what you think of them.

Do you get *Pravda* and *Luch* regularly? Our cause is going ahead—in spite of everything—and the workers' party is being built up as a *revolutionary* Social-Democratic party, against the liberal renegades, the liquidators. We shall have cause to celebrate one day. We are rejoicing just now at the victory of the workers in Petersburg over the liquidators when the Board of the new Metalworkers' Union[116] was elected.

And "your" Lunacharsky is a fine one!! Oh, what a fine fellow! Maeterlinck, he says, has "scientific mysticism".... Or Lunacharsky and Bogdanov are perhaps no longer yours?

Joking apart. *Keep well*. Send me a couple of words. *Rest* as well as you can.

Yours,
Lenin

Ulianow, Austria. *Poronin* (Galizien).

How did you find the jubilee number of *Pravda*?[117]

Written not earlier than May 9-10, 1913
Sent to Capri

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

40

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleagues,

Today at last I have received the file of *Pravda* for the last few days or, more precisely, for the last week. My best thanks and best congratulations on your success: in my opinion the paper has now undoubtedly *found* its feet. The improvement is a tremendous one and a serious one, and, let us hope, firm and for good. The length of Plekhanov's articles and the abundance of anti-liquidationism (about which one of the workers' deputies writes to me) are now questions of detail; it won't be difficult to correct matters in this respect, now that the paper has taken a firm stand, and I think that the workers on the spot will see at once how to make the necessary correction. We have also received the detailed letter of a member of the staff (who unfortunately has not the pleasant "deputy" quality), and we were very glad of it, congratulating him on every kind of success. It seems as though now (and only now, after the St—v* adventure) the period of wavering has ended ... touch wood! ...

I don't advise you to present Plekhanov with ultimatums: it is too early, it may do harm!! If you do write to him, write as kindly and mildly as possible. He is valuable now because he is fighting the enemies of the working-class movement.

As regards Dernyan Bedny, I continue *to be for*. Don't find fault, friends, with human failings! Talent is rare. It should he systematically and carefully supported. It will be a sin on your conscience, a great sin (a hundred

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* Who this refers to has not been established.—*Ed.*

times bigger than various personal "sins", if such occur...) against the democratic working-class movement, if you don't draw in this talented contributor and *don't help* him. The disputes were petty, the cause is a serious one. Think over this!

As regards expansion, I have recently written in detail to one of the *Prosveshcheniye* people; I hope you also *have* seen the letter. I, too, am in favour of financial caution: to provide the same six pages (the present extra sheets) *in another form*, with a different sauce and title and content: 4 pages of Sunday supplement for the advanced workers + 2 pages of a "workers' kopek" for 1 kopek, for the *masses*, to win a hundred thousand readers, with an especially popular content. You shouldn't imitate *Luch* but go your *own* road, the proletarian road: 4 pages for the advanced *workers* and 2 pages (and *later* even 4) for the *masses*, for a long and stubborn battle for 100,000 readers. We must go wide and deep, into the masses, and not follow intellectual patterns like *Luch*.

Once again greetings, congratulations and best wishes.

Yours,
V. I.

Another special greeting to Vitimsky: his article about the workers' press and workers' democracy against the liberals[118] was *very successful*!! And the Bogdanov "Ideology" is *certain* to be heresy: I promise you that I will prove this exactly!![119]

Marxists are glad of an increase in circulation when it is increased by *Marxist* articles, and not by articles *against Marxism*. We want a principled paper—all the contributors and readers of *Pravda* want it—a Marxist, not Machist paper? Isn't that so?

P.S. The address is not Paronen, but *Poronin* (Galizien), and be sure to *add* on the wrapper: *via Warsaw-Frontier-Zakopane*.

Written not earlier than May 25, 1913
Sent to St. Petersburg
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*
Printed from the original

41

TO THE BOLSHEVIK DEPUTIES IN THE FOURTH STATE DUMA

Dear Friends,

In our opinion you made a mistake in tying yourselves up with Fyodor.[120] Probably nothing but squabbles will come of it. You should have published your own report.[121] But now we have to start from what has already been done. In the present situation it is essential to insist above all *on complete equality*, and at the very outset to move a formal resolution, approximately in this form: "The co-operative[122] resolves that in drawing up the report no majority decision of one wing over another is allowed, and both wings (the Six and the Seven) enjoy complete equality in all respects, i.e., the commission is set up on a parity basis, and disputed passages are edited by agreement, and not by a majority decision. If speeches of the deputies are printed at the end of the report, the selection of the speeches also is to be by agreement." This resolution is essential. Otherwise they will set up a commission on the basis of equality, and then the co-operative, by a majority of one, will endorse what the liquidator proposes. If Feodora rejects such a resolution, we recommend you officially to declare that, in view of their unwillingness to agree to equality, you reserve complete freedom of action. Even so, you can still put forward your own candidate.

We append the first rough draft of the theses:

1) The election campaign. The circumstances in which it takes place. Its results for the Social-Democrats. The platform of the Social-Democrats: the 8-hour day, confiscation of the land, complete democratisation.

2) The composition of the Social-Democratic group. How it was set up. The Jagiello case.[123] (Exposition of the points of view of the Six and the Seven. Indication of protests made.)

3) The political platform of the group and its first speeches. The declaration. Indicate that the Six reject cultural-national autonomy. Indicate that wide sections of the workers have approved precisely ... the watchwords in the declaration. An outline of the political position of the Social-Democrats.

The main watchwords are still: the 8-hour day, transfer of the land, complete democratisation.

4) Questions put down by the group.

5) The group and the Budget.

6) The bourgeois groups in the Duma and sharp criticism of them and of the liberals (the speeches by Maklakov, the Octobrists,[124] the Black Hundreds[125]).

7) The workers and the group. Their instructions, appeals, reactions, material for questions, mutual aid in cash, etc.

8) Immunity of the deputies (the case of Petrovsky[126]).

Internal differences: each side puts forward its own point of view, with an equal number of pages to each. Statements made by each side to the press are reprinted. A list of workers' resolutions, as many as there are. The supplement. Most important tasks.

We await your news. Apartments have been taken.[127]

Written on June 17, 1913
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 1

Printed from the typewritten copy found in police records

42

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

Dear Georgy Valentinovich,

At the request of the six Social-Democratic deputies I invite you to come for a few weeks to Zakopane in the summer to deliver lectures on such questions of Marxism and the Social-Democratic movement as you may select. We have heard today from Petersburg that it is also possible that four deputies may come who support the liquidators or who are wavering (Buryanov, Tulyakov, Khaustov and *maybe* even Mankov). As Mensheviks they naturally attribute particular importance to the question of your participation.

On our part, we should think it very useful that Party people of various views should take part in an enterprise which seems to us extremely important for strengthening connections with the workers and reinforcing Party work.

In view of the conspirative nature of the case, we have decided not to tell a single group abroad about the plan to organise these lectures—all the more so because the deputies would probably be in peril of particularly severe penalties.

Poronin, where it is proposed to hold the lectures, is seven kilometres by rail from Zakopane—one of the best mountain health resorts in Galicia. As to the financial

side (travelling expenses), we can come to a special arrangement by correspondence, if required.

Please write whether you agree to this proposition.

Yours faithfully,
N. Lenin

My address is: Herrn WI. Ulianow.
Poronin (Galizien). Autriche.

Written not later than June 22, 1913
Sent to Geneva
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

43

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

We have had a letter today from Petersburg that our plan for a visit of the Social-Democratic deputies here is close to fulfilment (*extra-conspiratively*: it has been decided not to say a word to anyone except you). In addition to the six supporters of *Pravda* it is possible, they write, that Tulyakov, Buryanov, Khaustov and even, maybe, Mankov may come. Probably they will manage to draw in some of the workers as well (non-deputies). Write, please, whether you could come (for a number of lectures, or talks, or classes, just as you please). It would be a fine thing! Seven kilometres from here by rail is Zakopane, a very good health resort. As regards money for the journey, we shall raise it, in all probability (so they write). We can collect and send you all the information about Zakopane as a health resort.

If your health permits, do come for a short time! You would meet more workers, after the ones at London[128] and the Capri school.

Malinovsky wanted to visit you but didn't manage it, he was short of time. He and all the deputies send you warm greetings.

I await your reply.

Yours,

Lenin

The newspapers are full of reports about the "conflict".[129] I think they are going to stifle *Pravda* for us. Maklakov

will bring this off one way or another—by-passing the Duma, against the Duma or in some other way, but bring it off he will![130]

In that case we shall turn again to illegal literature—but we have no money.

Hasn't the "merchant" begun to contribute yet? It is time, just the right time.

Address: Herrn Wl. Ulianow. *Poronin* (Galizien). Autriche.

Written not later than June 22, 1913
Sent to Capri
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

44

TO MAXIM GORKY

July 25, 1913

Dear A. M.,

I have kept on intending to write to you, and then putting it off on account of my wife's operation. The other day at last the operation took place, and things are now on the mend. The operation proved a rather difficult one: I am very glad indeed that we managed to get Kochor to operate.

Now to business. You wrote that you would be in Berlin in August. When in August? At the beginning or at the end? We intend to leave here on August 4. Our tickets take us through Zurich, Munich and Vienna, and we shall break the journey in each of these cities. (Possibly the doctor will not let us leave so soon as the 4th: in that case we shall postpone it again.)

Couldn't we see each other somewhere? In all probability it would suit you to travel through Berne, or through Zurich, or through Munich, wouldn't it?

There is *great* need for us to meet. The closing down of *Pravda* creates a devilishly difficult situation. Perhaps we could think of something. Then in Berlin you could do a very great deal for us, i.e., for *Pravda*.

Therefore I beg you to write *immediately*, be it only two words, whether our meeting is possible, either here or in the places mentioned, at the beginning of August? If it is *im*possible, I will write to you about everything in greater detail, particularly about the school (the arrest of the

organiser* has spoilt things for us damnably; we are looking for another).

I shake your hand warmly and wish you the best of luck, and most of all health for the journey. So reply *at once*!

Yours,
Lenin

Address: Herrn Ulianoff. 4. Gesellschaftsstraße, 4. (Svizzera). *Bern*.

Sent to Capri
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

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* E. F. Rozmirovich.—*Ed*.

45

TO THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY ON THE DEATH OF AUGUST BEBEL

We share your grief at the loss of one of the most prominent leaders of international revolutionary Social-Democracy.

By instruction of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,

Lenin

Written in German
between August 13 and 17, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Berlin
Published in *Vorwärts* No. 211,
August 17, 1913

Printed from the
newspaper text

46

TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN[131]

Dear Comrade,

I found your letter on my return home. Be sure and send as much material as you can about the nationalities problem in the Caucasus (since you, *unfortunately*, cannot write yourself), send us both the article by *Kostrov* and his booklets, reports by the delegates translated into Russian (I hope you will find someone to do this), *statistics of nationalities* in the Caucasus and material on the relations between the nationalities in the Caucasus, in Persia, Turkey and Russia. In a word, send everything there is and that you can collect. Don't forget also to *look for* comrades in the Caucasus who could write articles about the problem of nationalities there.

Greetings and wishes for success.[132]

Yours,

V. Ilyich

Written on August 24, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Astrakhan

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the handwritten
copy found in police records

47

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA TRUDA*[133]

P.S. I have not received No. *5* of *Pravda Truda*. Thank you very much for sending me *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*: only No. *7* is missing, and also Nos. *7* and *9* of *Nash Put*.[134] Please send them.

It seems to me that you are making a gigantic mistake in drifting unconsciously with the stream *and not changing* the tone of the paper. Everything suggests that both the tone *and the content* of the news section must be *changed*. It is essential to *achieve* legality, ability to pass the censor. This can and must be achieved. Otherwise you are destroying, for no reason at all, the work you have undertaken. Think this over more seriously.

Written not earlier than September 30, 1913
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

48

TO MAXIM GORKY

September 30, 1913

Dear A. M.,

This reply has been delayed a little. Sorry. How devilishly furious I was in Berne, and later!! I thought: if you were in Verona (the telegram from you about Bebel was from Verona)—or in some Rom...[135]?? Why, *I could* have come to Verona from Berne!! But from you at that time there was not a sound for *months*....

What you write about your illness worries me terribly. Are you doing the right thing in living without treatment at Capri? The Germans have excellent sanatoria (for example, at St. Blasien, near Switzerland) where they treat and *completely* cure lung diseases, achieve *complete* healing, feed you up, then systematically accustom you to cold, harden you against catching cold, and turn out fit people, able to work.

While you, after Capri, and in winter, want to go to Russia???? I am terribly afraid that this will injure your health and undermine your working capacity. Are there *first-class* doctors in that Italy of yours??

Really, go and visit some first-class doctor in Switzerland* or Germany, and set about a couple of months of *serious* treatment in a *good* sanatorium. Because to squander official property, i.e., to go on being ill and undermining your working capacity, is something quite intolerable in every respect.

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*I can find out names and addresses.

I have heard (from the editor of *Prosveshcheniye*, who saw Ladyzhnikov) that you are dissatisfied with *Pravda*. Because it's dry? That is true. But it's not easy to correct this defect all at once. We haven't the people. With *great* difficulty, one year after it started, we secured a merely *tolerable* editorial board in Petersburg.

(I have forwarded your letter to *Prosveshcheniye*.)

Write what your plans are, and what your *health* is like. I earnestly ask you to *set about your treatment seriously*—really, it is *quite possible* to be cured, and to let it go on is simply outrageous and criminal.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Some of the people we have had here, and some we shall have, are good. *And have you seen "Nash Put"*? What a success, eh? Our second paper. We shall start a third, too, in the South.

Address: Ulianow. *Poronin* (Galizien). *Austria*. (During the winter I shall be in Cracow: Lubomirskiego. 51.)

Sent to Capri

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

49

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*[136]

Dear Colleagues,

Thank you very much for *twice* sending the newspaper *in time*, i.e., *simultaneously* with all the bourgeois papers. But apart from these two occasions, *Za Pravdu* always comes *half a day* later than the bourgeois papers. Can't this be altered, and the paper *always* be sent at the proper time, so that it comes *at the same time* as the bourgeois press?

Best greetings!

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. What is the circulation now? Will there ever be (at last!!) a financial report? As regards legality, your secretary is wrong in his last letter: *much* can and should still be done in the sense of increasing the paper's legality.

How many subscribers are there *now*?

Written earlier than October 26, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in *Pravda*
No. 99, May 5, 1927

Printed from the original

50

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*

To the Editor

For the Editorial Board

Dear Colleagues,

Welcoming the excellent beginning of the struggle by the six deputies for proper respect of the will of the majority of the workers, and the excellent campaign of your paper,[137] I would ask you also to take notice of the following:

If the Seven begin impudently proclaiming *themselves* time Social-Democratic group (as they have done at the end of their article in No. 60[138]), then the Six must without fail declare calmly, briefly and firmly: "We are the Social-Democratic Labour group, since we act in keeping with the Will of the majority of the class-conscious workers, put it into effect, and represent the majority. The seven non-Party deputies have not refuted a single fact, a single figure, out of the mass quoted in our paper and demonstrating this truth. Here is our address; write to us, worker comrades, and do not imagine that we shall insult you by thinking you capable of believing the theory that 'seven deputies are higher than the Party, higher than the will of the majority of the workers'. Even 77 deputies could not be higher than that will. We are strictly fulfilling it."

Such a brief declaration is essential. Then you should send a formal statement to Senior Conventus (i.e., to the State Duma). *Then* the Seven will very rapidly, at once lose their arrogance: very, very rapidly they will *agree*

to equality (which *all* of them have recognised in writing). *Neither* they *nor* anyone else will have any other way out.

Once you have begun a job, you can't back out. The Six have made a *splendid* beginning, and their victory is *assured*, *if* they carry on *correctly*—in a week or two their victory is inevitable.

Best greetings and wishes,

V. I.

Written between November 2 and 7, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in *Pravda* No. 123, May 5, 1932

Printed from the original

51

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*

Dear Colleagues,

I congratulate you on the excellent beginning of your campaign for the rights of the worker deputies.

After reading the dirty intrigue in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, I earnestly advise you to think matters over and accept my plan of yesterday.* Such things *must not* be left without an *organisational* solution.

It is not enough for the workers to send resolutions: it is essential that the workers should organise *deputations* to the Duma group.

Greetings and best wishes!

Yours,
V. I.

Written not earlier than
November 3, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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* See the previous letter.—*Ed.*

52

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*

In view of the importance of the campaign against the Seven, it is extremely important for us, as contributors, to have daily information. But *Za Pravda* is late every day. We earnestly ask you to take steps to see that the paper is sent daily in good time, and without delay.

That the majority is for the Six is clear. But the conduct of the Six is inconsistent. Victory is within their grasp, if they take the logically (and politically) inevitable step and proclaim themselves a separate group.

Once this is done, and a statement handed in to the Duma, the Seven will he obliged (by the very technique of work in the Duma) to enter into an agreement with the Six.

It would be ridiculous to let victory slip from their hands when it is completely assured. The more resolutely they separate, the more speedily will federation be restored.

The campaign against the Seven began excellently, but is now being carried on with insufficient determination. In reply to the most shameless insolence of the liquidators, the newspaper needs not to complain but to attack, stressing the *infringement of the will* of the proletariat by the Seven, and their *anti-Party character*. The watchword should be: "Resign your seats, gentlemen of the Seven, if you don't want to reckon with the will of the majority of the workers, if you want to go against the Party." This watchword should be made quite clear and precise, repeating it daily.

Written on November 7, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1924
in *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 1

Printed from the typewritten
copy found in police records

53

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*

Dear Colleagues,

It is essential to insert a loose sheet on Sunday, devoted *entirely* to the campaign for the Six.

One big article, with *subheads*.

We send you the text.* Put in the resolution of the *Conference*[139] (was it *on account of that resolution* that that issue of *Za Pravdu* was confiscated?).

You should demand that the Seven resign their seats.

Add the results of the Petersburg resolutions, if they are clearly in our favour.[140]

Drop us a line, or telegraph: "Supplement in hand."

Best greetings,

Yours,

V. I.

Written not later than
November 7, 1913

Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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* See "Material on the Conflict Within the Social-Democratic Duma Group" (present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 458-74).—*Ed*.

54

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*

Dear Colleagues,

I hasten to congratulate with all my heart all Marxist workers on the victory of the cause of the majority against the disorganisers, on the setting up of a group which does not wish to thwart the will of the majority.[141] I have just received the Sunday issue of *Za Pravdu*. The calculations are particularly good—they should be continued.

Once again, greetings to all from all.

Yours,

Lenin

Written not earlier than
November 13, 1913

Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

55

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

Whatever are you doing? This is simply terrible, it really is!

Yesterday I read your reply in *Rech* to the "howling" over Dostoyevsky,[142] and was preparing to rejoice, but today the liquidators' paper arrives, and *in it there is a paragraph of your article* which was not in *Rech*.

This paragraph runs as follows:

"And 'god-seeking' should be *for the time being*" (only for the time being?) "put aside—it is a useless occupation: it's no use seeking where there is nothing to be found. Unless you sow, you cannot reap. You have no God, you have not *yet*" (yet!) "created him. Gods are not sought—*they are created*; people do not invent life, they create it."

So it turns out that you are against "god-seeking" only "for the time being"!! It turns out that you are against god-seeking *only* in order to replace it by god-building!!

Well, isn't it horrible that such a thing should *appear* in your article?

God-seeking differs from god-building or god-creating or god-making, etc., no more than a yellow devil differs from a blue devil. To talk about god-seeking, not in order to declare against *all* devils and gods, against every ideological necrophily (all worship of a divinity is necrophily—be it the cleanest, most ideal, not sought-out but built-up divinity, it's all the same), but to prefer a blue devil to a yellow one is a hundred times worse than not saying anything about it at all.

In the freest countries, in countries where it is *quite* out of place to appeal "to democracy, to the people, to public opinion and science", in such countries (America, Switzerland and so forth) particular zeal is applied to render the people and the workers obtuse with just this very idea of a clean, spiritual, built-up god. Just because any religious idea, any idea of any god at all, any flirtation even with a god, is the most inexpressible foulness, particularly tolerantly (and often even favourably) accepted by the *democratic* bourgeoisie—for that very reason it is the most dangerous foulness, the most shameful "infection". A million *physical* sins, dirty tricks, acts of violence and infections are much more easily discovered by the crowd, and therefore are much less dangerous, than the *subtle*, spiritual idea of god, dressed up in the most attractive "ideological" costumes. The Catholic priest corrupting young girls (about whom I have just read by chance in a German newspaper) is *much less* dangerous, precisely to "democracy", than a priest without his robes, a priest without crude religion, an ideologically equipped and democratic priest preaching the creation and the invention of a god. For it is *easy* to expose, condemn and expel the first priest, while the second *cannot* be expelled so simply; to expose the latter is 1,000 times more difficult, and not a single "frail and pitifully wavering" philistine will agree to "condemn" him.

And you, knowing' the "frailty and pitiful wavering" of the (Russian: why Russian? Is the Italian an better??) *philistine* soul, confuse that soul with the sweetest of poisons, most effectively disguised in lollipops and all kinds of gaily-coloured wrappings!!

Really, it is terrible.

"Enough of self-humiliation, which is our substitute for self-criticism."

And isn't god-building the *worst* form of self-humiliation?? Everyone who sets about building up a *God*, or who even merely tolerates such activity, *humiliates* himself in the worst possible way, because instead of "deeds" he is *actually* engaged in self-contemplation, self-admiration and, moreover, such a man "contemplates" the dirtiest, most stupid, most slavish features or traits of his "ego", deified by god-building.

From the point of view, not of the individual, but of society, *all* god-building is precisely the *fond self-contemplation* of the thick-witted philistine, the frail man in the street, the dreamy "self-humiliation" of the vulgar petty bourgeois, "exhausted and in despair" (as you condescended to say very truly about the *soul*: only you should have said, not "the Russian", but the *petty-bourgeois*, for the Jewish, the Italian, the English varieties are all *one and the same devil*; stinking philistinism everywhere is equally disgusting—but "democratic philistinism", occupied in ideological necrophily, is particularly disgusting).

Reading your article over and over again, and *trying to discover* where this *slip* of your tongue could come from, I am at a loss. What does it mean? A relic of the "Confession", which *you yourself* did not approve?? Or its echo??

Or something different: for example, an unsuccessful attempt to *bend back* to the viewpoint of *democracy in general*, instead of the viewpoint of the *proletariat*? Perhaps it was in order to talk with "democracy in general" that you decided (excuse the expression) to indulge in baby-talk? Perhaps it was "for a popular exposition" to the *philistines* that you decided to accept for a moment *their*, the philistines', prejudices??

But then that is a *wrong* approach, in all senses and in all respects!

I wrote above that in *democratic* countries it would be *quite* out of place for a proletarian writer to appeal "to democracy, to the people, to public opinion and science". Well, but what about us in Russia?? Such an appeal is *not quite* appropriate, because it also in some ways flatters the prejudices of the philistines. A kind of general appeal, general to the point of vagueness—even Izgoyev of *Russkaya Mysl*[143] will sign it with *both hands*. Why then select watchwords which *you* distinguish perfectly well from those of Izgoyev, but which the *reader* will not be able to distinguish?? Why throw a democratic veil over the question for the reader, instead of *clearly* distinguishing the *petty bourgeois* (frail, pitifully wavering, exhausted, despairing, self-contemplating, god-contemplating, god-building, god-indulging, self-humiliating, *uncomprehendingly-anarchistic*—wonderful word!!—et cetera, et cetera)

— from the *proletarians* (who know how to be of good cheer not only in words, and who are able to distinguish the "science and public opinion" of the *bourgeoisie* from their own, bourgeois democracy from proletarian democracy)?

Why do you do this?

It's damnably disappointing.

Yours,

V. I.

P.S. We sent you the novel by registered book post. Did you receive it?

P.P.S. Get as good *medical* treatment as you can, please, so that you can travel in the winter, *without colds* (it's dangerous in the winter).

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Written on November 13 or 14, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published in *Pravda* No. 51
March 2, 1924

Printed from the original

56

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU*

To the Editor:

It is essential to reprint the "Material",[144] even if in parts, since the issue was confiscated *not* on that account. Legality, legality without fail!!

If you can't reprint it at once, announce immediately in print, for those who didn't see the issue of October 29 that it *will be* reprinted.

Written not earlier than
November 14, 1913

Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

57

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *ZA PRAVDU**

To the Editor: The article by "Friend" in No. *25* is bad. Sharp, and nothing more. For God's sake, less sharpness. Analyse the arguments more calmly, repeat the *truth* as circumstantially and simply as possible. That, and only that, is the way to ensure definite victory.

Written not earlier than November 16, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

* This letter was attached to an unidentified article.—*Ed.*

58

TO MAXIM GORKY

...* On the question of god, the god-like and everything connected with it, there is a contradiction in your position—the same, I think, which I used to point out in our talks when we last met in Capri. You broke (or appeared to break) with the *Vperyod* people, without having noticed the ideological basis of "Vperyodism".

The same has happened now. You are "most vexed", you "cannot understand how the words 'for the time being' crept in"—that is how you write—and yet at the same time you defend the idea of God and god-building.

"God is the complex of those ideas, worked out by the tribe, the nation, mankind, which awaken and organise social feelings, having as their object to link the individual with society and to bridle zoological individualism."

This theory is obviously connected with the theory or theories of Bogdanov and Lunacharsky.

And it is clearly wrong and clearly reactionary. Like the Christian socialists (the worst variety of "socialism", and its worst distortion), you make use of a method which (despite your best intentions) repeats the hocus-pocus of the priests: you eliminate from the idea of God everything about it that is *historical and drawn from real life* (filth, prejudices, sanctified ignorance and degradation, on the one hand, serfdom and monarchy, on the other), and instead of the reality of history and life there is substituted in the idea of God a gentle petty-bourgeois phrase (God = "ideas which awaken and organise social feelings").

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* The beginning of the letter has never been found.—*Ed.*

Your wish in so doing is to say something "good and kind", to point out "truth and justice" and the like. But your good wish remains your personal affair, a subjective "innocent desire". Once you have written it down, it goes out among the *masses*, and its *significance* is determined not by your good wishes, but by the *relationship of social forces*, the objective relationship of classes. By virtue of that relationship *it turns out* (irrespective of your will and independently of your consciousness) that you have put a good colour and a sugary coating on the idea of the clericals, the Purishkeviches, Nicholas II and the Struves,[145] since *in practice* the idea of God helps *them* keep the people in slavery. By beautifying the idea of god, you have beautified the chains with which they fetter ignorant workers and peasants. There—the priests and, Co. will say—what a good and profound idea this is (the idea of God), as even "*your*" leaders recognise, Messrs. democrats: and we (the priests and Co.) serve that idea.

It is untrue that god is the complex of ideas which awaken and organise social feelings. That is Bogdanov *idealism*, which suppresses the material origin of ideas. God is (in history and in real life) first of all the complex of ideas generated by the brutish subjection of man both by external nature and by the class yoke—ideas which *consolidate* that subjection, *lull to sleep* the class struggle. There was a time in history when, in spite of such an origin and such a real meaning of the idea of God, the struggle .of democracy and of the proletariat went on in the form of a struggle of *one religious* idea against another.

But that time, too, is long past.

Nowadays both in Europe and in Russia *any*, even the most refined and best-intentioned defence or justification of the idea of God is a justification of reaction.

Your entire definition is reactionary and bourgeois, through and through. God = the complex of ideas which awaken and organise social feelings, having as their object to link the individual with society and to bridle zoological individualism

Why is this reactionary? Because it falsely colours the idea of "bridling" zoology preached by priests and feudals. In reality, "zoological individualism" was bridled not by

the idea of God, it was bridled both by the primitive herd and the primitive community. The idea of God *always* put to sleep and blunted the "social feelings", replacing the living by the dead, being *always* the idea of slavery (the worst, hopeless slavery). Never has the idea of God "linked the individual with society": it has always *tied* the oppressed *classes hand and foot* with faith in the *divinity* of the oppressors.

Your definition is bourgeois (and not scientific, not historical) because it operates with sweeping, general, "Robinson Crusoe" conceptions in general, not with definite *classes* in a definite historical epoch.

The idea of God among the Zyrian savages, etc. (including semi-savages) is one thing. With Struve and Co. it is something quite different. In both cases class domination supports this idea (and this idea supports it). The "popular" conception of God and the divine is "popular" ignorance, degradation, darkness, just like the "popular conception" of the tsar, the devil and dragging wives by the hair. I completely fail to understand how you can call the "popular conception" of God "democratic".

It is untrue that philosophical idealism "always has in view only the interests of the individual". Did Descartes have the interests of the individual more in mind than Gassendi? Or Fichte and Hegel as compared with Feuerbach?

That "god-building is the process of the further development and accumulation of social elements in the individual and society" is simply terrible!! If there were freedom in Russia, the entire bourgeoisie would praise you to the skies for such things, for such sociology and theology of a purely bourgeois type and character.

Well, that's enough for the time being: this letter is too long as it is. Once again, I shake your hand and wish you good health.

Yours,

V. I.

Written in the second half of November 1913

Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

59

TO INESSA ARMAND[146]

I have just had the telegram, and changed the envelope, which had been marked for A....

What's happening to the Central Organ?? This is a disgrace and a scandal!! No sign of it yet, and not even the proofs. Enquire and get an explanation, please.

The issue of *Vorwärts* where Kautsky used the rotten phrase that there is no Party (*die alte Partei sei verschwunden* literally) is No. 333 of December 18, 1913. You should get hold of it (rue de Bretagne. 49 or somewhere else) and organise a protest campaign. We are for an exchange of opinion, *for* the resolution of the I.S.B.—*this N.B.*—but are absolutely against Kautsky's *scoundrelly* phrase.[147] He should be beaten unmercifully for this, with the reservation that we are *for* Aussprache (exchange of opinion), etc.

Written after December 18, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

60

TO INESSA ARMAND

...* Idiotically stupid are the people who have "taken fright" at trusted agents,[148] as something allegedly "insulting" to the Party cells. That means, the argument runs, that, there are no Party cells if *they want* trusted agents!

Comedians! They chase *words*, without thinking about how devilishly complicated and subtle life is, producing *entirely new* forms, which we only partly "catch on" to.

People for the most part (99 per cent of the bourgeoisie, 98 per cent of the liquidators, about 60-70 per cent of the Bolsheviks) don't know how to *think*, they only *learn words by heart*. They've learnt the word "underground". Firmly. They can repeat it. They know it by heart.

But *how* to change *its forms* in a new situation, how to learn and think *anew* for this purpose, this we do not understand.

The summer conference of 1913 (abroad) decided to overcome the Seven. The campaign of the working *masses* in the autumn of 1913 in Russia—the *majority* are for us!! A "circle" of "trusted agents" (without election by the Party cells!! Alarm!!—shout Antonov, Isaac and Co.) decided—and the *masses* carried it out.

How can that be done? Well, that, is where one must learn to understand such a "cunning" mechanism. It *could not* have been done, were there no underground and no Party cells. *And it could not have been done*, if there were no new and *cunning* forms of the underground and the Party cells.

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* The beginning of the letter has never been found.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

I am very interested in whether you will succeed in making our people understand this. Write in as much detail as you can.

We have received *one* copy of *Sputnik Rabochego*.[149] 5,000 copies have *already* been sold!! Hurrah!! *Set about* the women's journal[150] super-energetically!

Written at the end of December 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

1914

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TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Cracow, January 12, 1914

Dear Comrade Wijnkoop,

Thank you most cordially for your kind letter. I hope you have read in the German Social-Democratic papers (*Vorwärts* and *Leipziger Volkszeitung*) the articles of our opponents (for example, *J. K.* of the Rosa Luxemburg group, and *Z. L.*, who represents *no* group in Russia, in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*). The German Social-Democratic press is boycotting us, particularly *Vorwärts*, and only *Leipziger Volkszeitung* has printed one article from us (signed by the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*).

In *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*[151] Radek writes about Russian affairs. Yet Radek also represents *no* group whatever in Russia! It is ridiculous to print articles by emigrants who represent nothing, and not accept articles from the representatives of organisations which exist in Russia!

And the attitude of Kautsky—can anything be more idiotic? In relation to all other countries he studies the history of the movement, criticises documents, tries to understand the *true sense* of the differences, the political significance of splits. In relation to Russia, history does not exist for him. Today he repeats what he has heard from

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* See "The Split in the Russian Social-Democratic Duma Group" (present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 480-84).—*Ed.*

Rosa Luxemburg, yesterday he repeated what he had heard from Trotsky, Ryazanov and other writers who only represent their own "pious wishes", tomorrow he will begin to repeat what other Russian students or emigrants are kind enough to tell him, and so on. While in *Neue Zeit* (!!) only commonplaces, declamations, no facts, no understanding of the essence of the questions on which we differ!! Pure childishness!!

We are being lectured on unity with the liquidators of our Party—an absurdity. It is we who are bringing unity into being, by rallying the workers of Russia *against* the liquidators of our Party. I attach a document which we circulated to members of the International Socialist Bureau. You will find there *facts* and *figures* which prove that we are the ones who represent the unity of the Party (and the vast majority of the workers) in Russia *against* groups of liquidators who are without workers.

Unfortunately even Pannekoek in *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* refuses to understand that you have to print the articles of the two wings of Social-Democracy in Russia, and not the articles of Radek who represents only his own personal ignorance and fantasy, and who *does not wish* to provide *precise facts*.

Once again I thank you, dear Comrade Wijnkoop, you personally and the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party, for your kind letter, and please pass on my greetings to Comrade Gorter.

I hope you will forgive my bad French.

Yours,

Vl. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

Wl. Uljanow. 51. Ulica Lubomirskiego, Krakau (Cracovie).

Written in French
Sent to Amsterdam

First published in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1934

Printed from the original

62

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I send you the draft Ukrainian appeal for *Shakhtyorsky Listok*,[152] and particularly ask you to be tactful in getting it adopted (not on my behalf, of course, and better not in your name either) *through* Lola[153] and two or three Ukrainians (of course, *against* Yurkevich and, *if possible*, without the knowledge of this disgusting, rotten nationalist philistine, who under the flag of Marxism is preaching the *division* of the workers by nationalities, a *special* national organisation of the Ukrainian workers).

You will understand why it is inconvenient for *me* to send such a draft in my own name. Lola wrote to me that he agrees with me *against* Yurkevich, but Lola is naïve. The matter, however, must not drag on. It is terribly important that a voice should be heard from *amongst the Ukrainian Social-Democrats* for unity *against* dividing up the workers by nations. And now *Shakhtyorsky Listok* (received by me only today, Wednesday, April 1, as a supplement to the Sunday *Put Pravdy*) should *immediately* be made use of for this purpose.

Rewrite my draft (I agree to *all* changes, of course, if only there remains the direct protest against the division by nations); let Lola *alone* or with someone else, etc., *accept and translate it into Ukrainian*, and then send it *through me* to *Put Pravdy* in his name or (better) on behalf of a group (though it be of two or three people) of Ukrainian Marxists (still better, Ukrainian workers).

This should be done tactfully, quickly, against Yurkevich and *without his knowledge*, because this twister will make trouble.

(I have received your story of Stepanyuk's report and the speech by Yurkevich; frankly speaking, I was angry with you—you didn't understand what the *essence* of Yurkevich's position was. And I again—I'm sorry—called you the Holy Virgin. Please don't be angry, it was because I'm fond of you, because we're friends, but I can't help being angry when I see "something that recalls the Holy Virgin".)

Reply as quickly as possible and say whether you can carry out this assignment properly, and how soon.

On Monday I sent you the collection and a note attached to Nadya's letter. Have you received them?

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

If my draft could be retold by a Ukrainian voice, and with a couple of vivid Ukrainian examples, that would be best of all!! I will bring pressure to bear on *Put Pravdy*.

Written on April 1, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Paris

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Printed from the original

63

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I enclose Lola's letter.[154] Return it *at once* after reading it. (He is obviously twisting, but all the same we shall make a small *step* forward through him. I beg you very much, if you go to Zurich, do your utmost to see the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, ascertain their attitude on the question of a separate national-Ukrainian Social-Democratic organisation, and try and organise even a little group of anti-separatists.)

If Nik. Vas. has not yet been at our printing-press, let him ask them:

1) to stick *both* leaflets on paper with the printed heading of the press;

2) to write out *in German* (or, if they don't know the language, then in French) an exact estimate of the cost of (α) setting, (β) the *same* paper 5,000+1,000, (γ) printing and *everything else*.

As regards an intensive effort to discover contacts (in order to prepare for "the important affair"[155])—and especially for correspondence—both in Paris and in Switzerland, I hope you will do your best.

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. Would it not be possible before your departure to concentrate all our books (and those which Kamsky has from Orlovsky's library) with *Nik. Vas.*, and make him *swear an oath not to allow them to be plundered*. If brother*

* This word was written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

has written about his books, do the same with them. From this library (Orlovsky's, Kamsky has it) please get, or have procured, the *Minutes of the Second Congress* of the R.S.D.L.P., and send them to me as quickly as possible.

One more thing *s. v. pl.*:

It is essential to republish the Party Programme and Rules (with the changes of January 1912).[156] Please let the Committee of Organisations Abroad have them set up (*after ascertaining the exact cost*) and send us the *page* proof: we shall say *then* how many should be printed.

["Programme and Rules of the R.S.D.L.P."]

Is there in Paris No. *11* of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (February or March 1910)? If there is, send us *all* the copies.

Written on April 24, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Paris
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TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *DZVIN*[157]

P.S. I have not spoken with Yurkevich, but I must say that I am profoundly indignant at the preaching of *separation* of the Ukrainian workers into a special Social-Democratic organisation.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

Lenin

Written on April 26, 1914 in Cracow

First published in 1937 in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

Printed from the original

65

TO N. N. NAKORYAKOV[158]

May 18, 1914

Dear Comrade Nazar,

Many thanks to you for the bulletins of the 13th Census and for the fifth volume of the 12th (1900) Census.

I have been expecting any day the *same* volume (Agriculture) of the 13th Census (Census of 1910), but for some reason it does not arrive. Probably the Statistical Bureau has sent it to you, because Hourwich wrote to me that this volume had been published. Please drop me a line whether you have this volume (Agriculture. Census of 1910), whether you can get it and send it me. I will immediately send you the cost of postage.

Please note my new address: Poronin (Galizien).

Congratulations on the splendid May Day in Russia: 250,000 in Petersburg alone!! *Put Pravdy* for May 1 has been confiscated, but I have learned from *Novy Mir*[159] that you often get confiscated issues as well. Altogether the news from Russia is evidence that revolutionary feelings are developing not only among the working class.

On May 15 Sima is leaving Cracow (Zakład Kąpielowy D-ra Kadena w *Rabce*. Galizien) for the summer to take a post in a village between Cracow and Poronin; she is very glad to have got this post.

N. K. sends her greetings. With all my heart I hope you will get better and have a good rest in the summer.

Yours,
V. I.

P.S. We have lately had news from the Organisation in the Urals: things are not at all bad there. They're alive and growing!

Sent to New York

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

66

TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

May 19, 1914[160]

Dear Suren,

I have received your letter of April 17. I hope you will reply when you have read the end of the article on self-determination of nations (I am writing it just now) in *Prosveshcheniye*.*

Regarding your pamphlet against An, *be sure* to send a *Selbstanzeige*, or exposition, to *Prosveshcheniye*.[161]

I propose the following plan to you in addition. In order to combat the stupidity of the "cultural-national autonomists", it is necessary for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group to bring in a Bill in the Duma for the equality of nations and the defence of the rights of national minorities.

Let's draft such a Bill.[162] The general principles of equality—the division of the country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according to, among other things, nationality (the local population indicates the boundaries, the State Parliament endorses them)—the limits of powers of autonomous regions and areas, as well as of self-governing local units—illegality of any departure from the equality of nations in the decisions of the autonomous regions, Zemstvos, etc.; common school councils, democratically elected, etc., freedom and equality of language—choice of languages by municipal institutions, etc.—defence of minorities: the right to a proportional share of

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* See "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 393-454).—*Ed.*

expenditure, to school premises (free) for pupils of "alien" nationalities, to have "alien" teachers, "alien" departments in museums and libraries, theatres, etc.—the right of every citizen to seek cancellation (by the courts) of every departure from equality in respect of any "infringement" of the rights of national minorities (five-year censuses of the population in mixed regions, ten-year censuses in the state as a whole), etc.

I have a feeling that by this means we could give a popular explanation of the stupidity of cultural-national autonomy and *kill* the supporters of this stupidity for good.

The Bill might be drafted by the Marxists of *all*, or of very many, nations of Russia.

Write immediately whether you agree to help in this. In general, write *more frequently*, not less than once a week. It is unforgivable to put off replying for a long time: have this in mind, especially now!!

All the best,

Yours,

V. I.

Sent from Poronin to Baku

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

67

TO INESSA ARMAND

I have just read, my dear friend,* Vinnichenko's new novel which you sent me.[163] There's balderdash and stupidity! To combine together as much as possible of every kind of "horror", to collect in one story "vice" and "syphilis" and romantic crime, with extortion of money by means of blackmail (with the sister of the blackmailed person turned into a mistress), and the trial of the doctor! All this with hysterical outbursts, eccentricities, claims of having one's "own" theory of organising prostitutes. This organisation represents nothing bad in itself; but it is the *author*, Vinnichenko himself, who makes nonsense of it, *smacks his lips* over it, makes it his "hobby horse".

The review in *Rech* says that it is an imitation of Dostoyevsky and that there are good parts in it. There is an imitation, in my opinion, and a supremely bad imitation of the supremely bad in Dostoyevsky. Of course, in real life there are individual cases of all the "horrors" which Vinnichenko describes. But to lump them all together, and in such a way, means laying on the horrors *with a trowel*, frightening both one's own imagination and the reader's, "stunning" both oneself and the reader.

Once I had to spend a night with a sick comrade (delirium tremens), and once I had to "talk round" a comrade who had attempted suicide (after the attempt), and who some years later did commit suicide. Both recollections *à la* Vinnichen-

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* The words "my dear friend" were written by Lenin in English.—*Ed*.

V. I. Lenin in Zakopane
1914

ko. But in both cases these were small fragments of the lives of both comrades. But this pretentious, crass idiot Vinnichenko, in self-admiration, has from such things compiled a collection that is nothing but horrors—a kind of "twopenny dreadful". Brrr.... Muck, nonsense, pity I spent so much time reading it.

P.S. How are things going with your arrangements for the summer?

Yours,

V. I.

*Franchement, continuez vous à vous fâcher ou non?**

Written earlier than June 5, 1914

Sent from Poronin to Lovran (Austria-Hungary, now Yugoslavia)

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* Tell me frankly, are you still angry, or not?—*Ed.*

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TO INESSA ARMAND

* My dear friend!

The precedent letter I've sent in too much hurry. Now I can more quietly speak about our "business".*

I hope you've grasped what is in the report?[164] The most important part is the *conditions 1-13* (and then 14—slanderous, less important). They should be presented as vividly as possible.

N.B.: The addendum about the demonstration on April 4, 1914 goes *into the report*, under the question of *closing* the liquidationist paper. The addendum about the Plekhanov *Yedinstvo*[165] goes into the report under the question of the *groups abroad*.

I am sure that you are one of those people who develop, grow stronger, become more vigorous and bold when they are alone in a responsible position—and therefore I obstinately *do not believe* the pessimists, i.e., those who say that you ... can hardly.... Stuff and nonsense! I don't believe it! You will manage splendidly! With your excellent French you'll lay them all flat, and you won't allow Vandervelde to interrupt and shout. (In the event of anything like that, a formal protest to the *whole* Executive Committee and a threat to leave the meeting+the written protest of the whole delegation.)

They must give you the right to make a report. You will say that you ask for the opportunity, and that you *have*

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* The passage between the asterisks was written by Lenin in English.—*Ed*.

precise and practical *proposals*. What could be more business-like and practical? We put ours forward, you put yours, and then we shall see. Either we adopt common decisions, or let us each report to our congresses, *to the Congress of our Party*. (But in practice, clearly, we shall adopt *absolutely nothing*.)

The essential thing, in my opinion, is to prove that only we are the Party (the other side are a fictitious bloc or tiny groups), only we are a workers' party (on the other side are the bourgeoisie, who provide money and approval), only we are the *majority*, four-fifths.

This is the first thing. And the second is to explain in *as popular language as possible* (I should absolutely fail in this, not knowing the language, while you will succeed) that the Organising Committee = a fiction. The reality which it conceals is *merely* a group of liquidationist writers in St. Petersburg. Proof? The literature....

Collapse of the August bloc. (Cf. *Prosveshcheniye* No. 5, I am sending my article* to Popov.)
(N.B. Departure of the Letts.)

The argument may be: your (i.e., Bolshevik) advantage among the Letts is small, your majority is a small one. Reply: "Yes, it is small. If you like to wait, it will soon be *écrasante*."

We excluded the liquidators' group from the Party in January 1912. The result? Have they set up a *better* party?? *None at all*. What they have is the complete break-up of the August bloc—aid to them by the bourgeoisie, desertion of them by the workers. Either accept our conditions, or no *rapprochement*, not to speak of *unité*!!

Arguments against Jagiello: an *alien* party. We don't trust it. Let the Poles unite.

Argument against Rosa Luxemburg: *what is real is not her* party, but the "opposition". Proof: there were *three electors* from Warsaw for the worker curia: *Zalewski*, *Bronowski* and Jagiello. *The first two* belong to the opposition. (If Rosa evades this, make her talk. If she denies it, demand that it be entered in the minutes, promising that we shall

* See "Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 325-47).—*Ed*.

expose Rosa L.'s *untruth*.) And so *all the Social-Democratic* electors from Warsaw = opposition (the elections to the Fourth Duma). And in the rest of Poland? *Unknown*!! Give us the *names* of the electors!!

Kautsky's letter against Rosa and for the opposition was in *Pravda*.[166]

I am sending this No. to Popov. It can be *quoted*.

In general, I think I have sent you rather *too* many of the "most detailed" kind (as you asked), than too few.

In any case, the three of you will always find arguments and reasons and facts, and you always have the right to have a separate consultation—as to appointing a speaker from the delegation, etc.

The O.C. and the Bund will *lie* impudently:

... "They too, they will say, have an underground. It was recognised by the August Conference...."

Untrue! Literature published abroad. Newspapers?

The departure of the Letts? Their verdict?

Quotations from "Nasha Zarya" and "Luch" against the underground!! (These were "slips of the tongue"?? Untrue! This is being said *below* by a bunch, a *handful* of liquidationist workers, and it is a crying act of disorganisation.)

Or: you haven't an underground either.

But is *Pravda* with 40,000 copies ranting about the underground? Or are the workers letting themselves be deceived??

And what about the conference of the summer of 1913 and its *decision*: that the 6 deputies should make a statement? And then 6,722 votes for us, 2,985 against. A majority of 70 per cent!!

Lay as much *stress* as possible on the trade unions and the insurance committees: this has exceptional influence with the Europeans. We shall not allow the liquidators to disorganise our firm majority in the trade unions and insurance committees!!

* I've forgotten the money question. We will pay for letters, *telegrams* (please wire oftener) & railway expenses, hotel expenses & so on. Mind it!

If possible try to be on Wednesday evening already in Brussels in order to arrange, *prepare* the delegation, come to agreement & so on.

If you succeed to receive the first report, for 1-2 hours,—it is almost all.* Afterwards it will only be a matter of "hitting back", worming out "their" counter-propositions (on all 14 questions) and declaring that we are *not in agreement*, and will report to the Congress of our Party. (We shall not accept a single one of their propositions.)

Very truly. Yours,**

V. I.

If there is talk of the money held by the former trustee, refer to the resolution of January 1912,[167] and refuse to say any more. We, that is, don't renounce our right!!

I am sending Popov Plekhanov's articles (from *Pravda*) about the *liquidators*.[168] Quote them, and say that *Pravda* remains of *the same* opinion.

Written between July 10 and 16, 1914
at Poronin

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* The whole of this passage between asterisks, except for the words "come to agreement" (in Russian, "spetsya"), was written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

** This line was written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

69

TO I. E. HERMAN

Dear Comrade Herman,

It seems to me that an *important* moment is approaching in the attitude of the Lettish Social-Democrats to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (in the person of the Central Committee—to our *part* of the R.S.D.L.P.—if that suits your legitimists, who want to "consider" the liquidators a little).

Here clarity and honesty are necessary.

In 1911-14 the Letts (their C.C.) were liquidators.

At the Congress of 1914[169] they became opponents of liquidationism, but *neutral* as between the O.C. and the C.C.

Now, after Brussels, after the resolution in No. 32 of *Trudovaya Pravda*,[170] the Letts want to enter our Party and conclude an agreement with the C.C.

Is this a good thing?

It is good, if what is being done is clearly understood and there is an honest attitude towards it.

It is bad, if it is being done without clear understanding, without firm resolution and reckoning with the consequences.

Those who want legitimacy in the sense of restoring the Stockholm-London (1906-07) R.S.D.L.P., had better not join our Party: there will be no result except squabbles, disappointments, offence taken and mutual hindrance. That was "a federation of the worst type" (as was stated in the resolution of the January 1912 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.[171] It was *rottenness*. Away with that rottenness!

If it is a question of defending the relics of federalism (for example, the Stockholm agreement and *delegation* from the Lettish C.C. to the Russian C.C.[172]), then it's a waste of time! In my belief we shall not accept it. It is play-acting, diplomacy *à la* Tyszka (which is now being imitated by the scoundrels in the Polish opposition, who went over at Brussels to the liquidators), not team work. Are we agreed in *principle*? Yes or no? If the answer is yes, then we must march together *against* (1) liquidationism, (2) "nationalism" (= (a) "cultural-national autonomy" and (b) the separatism of the Bund), (3) against federalism.

We have clearly, openly, before all the workers of Russia, unfurled these banners *since January 1912*. That is not a short time. You could and should have realised what was involved.

So let's come to an agreement—if we are to agree—clearly and honestly. To play at hide-and-seek, in my opinion, is out of place and unworthy. We are waging a *serious war*: against us are all the bourgeois intellectuals, the liquidators, the nationalists and the separatists of the Bund, the federalists overt and covert. Either we conclude an agreement *against* all these enemies, or *it would be better put off*.

It is better to confine ourselves to engagement than to tie ourselves up with marriage, if there is no complete certainty that the union will endure!!

All this is my personal opinion.

But I should very much like to come to an understanding with you and to reach clarity. If we came to an agreement on fundamentals at Brussels, we can and must ask ourselves *without diplomacy* whether we can agree on a stable treaty.

I am *very* worried that part of the Letts are

for cultural-national autonomy, or wavering,

for Bundist federalism, or wavering,

hesitating to attack the nationalism and separatism of the Bund,

hesitating to support our demand that the liquidationist paper of a group of disorganisers in Petersburg[173] should be closed, etc.

Is it a great part? in general and among members of the Central Committee? among the workers and among the intellectuals?

Is it influential?

After all, it is *we* who are waging the battle against the liquidators in Petersburg and throughout Russia. What is to be done if you *cannot conscientiously* help us fight the liquidators and the Bundists?? To conclude a *lasting* agreement in that case would be dishonest, and simply unrealistic!

And now, in addition, there is this disgusting manoeuvre of the Polish opposition *in favour* of the liquidators (voting *for* the Brussels resolution),[174] *for* nationalism (recognition of cultural-national autonomy as "an arguable proposition"), *for* federalism (the demand for the *old*, Tyszka, agreement of 1906 with the P.S.D.*).

Clarity, clarity before everything else! Anyone who has not realised the state and the circumstances of the war of proletarian democracy against bourgeois democracy (= the liquidators and the nationalists) *had better wait*.

I would like to know your opinion!

Yours,

Lenin

I should be very glad to hear the opinion of "Paragraph" on these questions. Show him this letter!

(Please give the "14 points" of our C.C.[175] to Rude for a day to read through.)

Written later than July 18, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berlin
First published in 1935 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

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* Polish Social-Democracy.—*Ed.*

70

TO THE SECRETARY, EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GRANAT BROS. ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY

July 21, 1914

Dear Colleague,

To my greatest regret, a number of quite exceptional and unforeseen circumstances (beginning with the resignation of Malinovsky) obliged me at the very beginning to interrupt the article on Marx[176] which I had begun, and after several unsuccessful attempts to find time to continue it, I have been forced to the conclusion that I shall not be able to do this work before the autumn.

I offer you my profound apologies, and express the hope that the editorial board of your so valuable publication will have time to find another Marxist and get the article from him by the time appointed.

Yours to command,

V. Ilyin

Sent from Poronin to Moscow

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

71

TO THE SECRETARY, EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GRANAT BROS. ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY

Dear Colleague,

Some days ago, despairing of any opportunity to finish the work, I sent you a letter giving it up, with my apologies.* But now the political circumstances on which I am so extremely dependent are suddenly changing again in radical fashion. First of all, the exceptional security measures in St. Petersburg, about which I read today in the Russian papers, are to remain in force until September 4, 1914, evidently meaning that the paper for which I was writing is stopped until then. Secondly, the war will, it seems, interrupt a number of *urgent* political affairs with which I was burdened. Therefore I could now set about continuing the article on Marx which I have begun, and could probably finish it soon. If you have not yet placed the order with someone else, and commissioned another author, please reply by cable to me (at my expense): Uljanow. Poronin. Rabotaite.**

If you have already commissioned someone else, please reply by postcard.

With assurances of my deep respect,

V. Ilyin

Absender: Wl. Uljanow, Poronin (Galizien), Austria.

Written on July 28, 1914
Sent to Moscow

Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

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* See the previous letter.—*Ed.*
** Work.—*Ed.*

72

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear K.,

I have had your postcard, and hasten to reply. Wait a little: we shall let you know about what can and should be done regarding what you (and we) desire.[177] Don't forget, by the way, that legality here is now of a special kind: have you spoken about this with the friends at Lausanne? Be sure to have a talk with them.

We remain at Berne. The address is Donnerbühlweg 11*a*. Uljanow.

As regards a lecture, I don't know yet. I shall have to think it over, and consult in greater detail. How many people could be counted on where you are?[178]

All the best. Greetings from all.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. It might, perhaps, be better to give a talk about the critique and my anti-critique. Two words nevertheless: one cannot on formal grounds defend the scoundrelly chauvinism of the Germans. There were bad resolutions, there were some that were not bad; there were declarations of both types. But there is a limit to everything! *And it has been overstepped*. We cannot be patient, we cannot be diplomatic, we must revolt against shameful chauvinism with all our strength!!

Written later than September 27, 1914

Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

73

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Karpinsky,

I am taking advantage of this messenger to speak openly.

There is *every* ground for expecting that the Swiss police and military authorities (at the *first signal* from the Russian or French Ambassador, etc.) will bring us before a military tribunal or expel us for breach of neutrality, etc. Therefore don't write anything openly in your letters. If you have to communicate anything, write in chemicals (the sign of chemicals is the date on the letter underlined).

We have decided to publish the *attached* manifesto, instead of the not very readable theses.[179] Let us know when you get it, calling the manifesto "The Development of Capitalism".

It ought to be published. But we advise you to do this only on condition that you take (are *able* to take) the maximum precautions!!

No one should know *where* and by whom it was published. All rough copies should be burned!! The copies printed should be kept *only* by some influential Swiss citizen, deputy and so forth.

If this is impossible, *don't* print it.

If it cannot be printed, do it on a mimeograph (also with the greatest precautions). Reply: I have received the development of capitalism (*in so many*) copies=I shall reprint it in so many copies.

If it cannot be published, either in print or mimeographed, write immediately. We shall think of something else. Reply in as much detail as possible.

(If you succeed in publishing it, send us here *by hand* 3/4 of the copies; we shall find somewhere to keep them.)

I await a reply!

Yours,

Lenin

N.B. P.S. We shall find the money for the publication. Only write beforehand, *how much* will be needed, because there is *very* little money. Could not the 170 francs from the Committee of Organisations Abroad[180] be used for this purpose?

Written earlier than October 11, 1914

Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

74

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Friend,

I spoke here today at Plekhanov's lecture, against his chauvinism.[181] I intend to deliver a lecture here on Tuesday. I should like to lecture at Geneva (the European war and European socialism) on Wednesday.[182] Arrange it, after proper discussion—as conspiratively as possible, i.e., so that no permission will be required (of course, it is also desirable that there should be a maximum audience). You are the best judge of how to do this. It should combine the maximum audience with the minimum of police publicity and police interference (or police threats). At Berne I lectured to members of the groups and guests whom they recommended (about 120-130 persons), without notices, etc. Would not this method be best?

Reply immediately to Mr. Ryvline. Villa Rougemont. Chailly sur Lausanne. For me. On Tuesday I am lecturing here at Lausanne, and your reply should be here by Tuesday afternoon. When we meet, we can have a more detailed talk about our affairs. And so, if permission is required at Geneva, then think it over ten times, whether a closed meeting would not be best. In general, of course, you decide. If it is all right for Wednesday (to arrange the lecture for Wednesday evening), I will arrive on Wednesday morning.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on October 11, 1914
Sent from Lausanne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear K.,

Just while I was staying in Geneva *joyful* news arrived from Russia. There also arrived the text of the reply of the Russian Social-Democrats to Vandervelde.[183] We therefore decided to publish, instead of a separate manifesto, the next issue of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*.[184] Today this decision will be finally shaped, so to speak.

And so, please take all the necessary steps as soon as possible to find a Frenchman, i.e., a Swiss citizen, as a responsible editor, and to determine the costs. We think of two pages as the size, with a format something like that of the Paris *Golos*.[185] The dates of publication will be *in*-definite—hardly more often than two or three times *a month* at first. The printing will be small, because with our orientation we cannot reckon on the man in the street (500 copies?). The price is to be about 10 centimes. All this is still *assumption*, but you need to know it for the discussion with the compositor.

And so, the price?

How long is needed for the publication (setting, etc.) of an issue of that size?

Then the type? Is there only one large size, or is there also a small size, brevier? How many thousand letters and spaces will go into two pages of *Golos* format of (1) large type and (2) small type, brevier?

You should not distribute the type of the manifesto which has already been set: we shall fit it into the paper. By Monday we shall send you some small amendments

to the manifesto, and a *different* signature (because after contact with Russia we are now acting *more officially*).

A thousand greetings!

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Please check up whether my letters to you arrive absolutely to time (without any delay).

Written on October 17, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva
First published, but not in full, in *Pravda* No. 92, April 22, 1926
Published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

76

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV[186]

October 17, 1914

Dear Friend,

I arrived home last night after my lecture tour and found your letters. Heartiest greetings to you, and, through you, to all Russian friends. The reply to Vandervelde was given to a translator yesterday, and I have not yet seen the text. I will write about it as soon as I see it.

In my view the most important thing now is a consistent and organised struggle against the chauvinism which has seized upon the whole bourgeoisie and the majority of the opportunist socialists (and those making their peace with opportunism—like Mr. Kautsky!). And to perform the tasks imposed by this struggle it is first of all necessary to combat the chauvinism of one's *own* country—specifically, in Russia the gentry *à la* Maslov and Smirnov (see *Russkiye Vedomosti* and *Russkoye Slovo*) whose "works" I have read,[187] or Messrs. Sokolov, Meshkovsky, Nikitin and others whom you have seen or heard. Plekhanov, as I think you have already been told, has become a French chauvinist. Among the liquidators there is evidently confusion.* Alexinsky, *they say*, is a Francophil. Kosovsky (the Bundist, a Right-winger, I heard his lecture) is a Germanophil.** It seems

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* Our intellectuals in Paris (outvoted in the section by the workers) have gone as volunteers (Nik. Vas., Antonov and others) and have issued a stupid non-Party appeal[188] jointly with the S.R.s. It has been sent to you.

** Martov is behaving most decently of all in *Golos*. But will Martov hold out? *I don't believe it*.

as though the middle course of the whole "Brussels bloc"[189] of the liquidator gentry with Alexinsky and Plekhanov will be adapting themselves to Kautsky, who now is *more harmful than anyone else*. How dangerous and scoundrelly his sophistry is, covering up the dirty tricks of the opportunists with the most smooth and facile phrases (in *Neue Zeit*[190]). The opportunists are an obvious evil. The German "Centre" headed by Kautsky is a concealed evil, diplomatically coloured over, contaminating the eyes, the mind and the conscience of the workers, and more dangerous than anything else. Our task now is the unconditional and open struggle against international opportunism and those who screen it (Kautsky). And this is what we shall do in the Central Organ, which we shall shortly issue (probably two little pages). We must with all our strength now support the legitimate hatred of the class-conscious workers for the rotten behaviour of the Germans, and draw from this hatred a political conclusion *against* opportunism and any concession to it. This is an international task. It devolves on us, there is no one else. We must not retreat from it. It is wrong to put forward the watchword of the "simple" restoration of the International (for the danger of a rotten conciliatory resolution on the Kautsky-Vandervelde line is very, very great!). The watchword of "peace" is wrong: the watchword should be transformation of the national war into a civil war. (This transformation may be a long job, it may require and will require a number of preliminary conditions, but all the work should be carried on *in the direction* of precisely *such* a transformation, in that spirit and on that line.) Not sabotage of the war, not separate, individual actions in that spirit, but mass propaganda (not only among "civilians") leading to the transformation of the war into a civil war.

In Russia chauvinism hides behind phrases about "*la belle* France" and unfortunate Belgium (and what about the Ukraine, etc.?) or behind "popular" hatred of the Germans (and of "Kaiserism"). Therefore our unquestionable duty is to combat these sophistries. And in order that the struggle should proceed along precise and clear lines we need a watchword which generalises it. That watchword is: for us *Russians*, from the point of view of the interests of

PROMETEA ROMANA NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the working masses and the working class of *Russia*, there cannot be the smallest doubt, absolutely any doubt, that the *lesser* evil would be now, at once the *defeat* of tsarism in this war. For tsarism is a hundred times worse than Kaiserism. Not sabotage of the war, but the struggle against chauvinism and the concentration of all propaganda and agitation on the international rallying (rapprochement, solidarity, agreement, *selon les circonstances**) of the proletariat for the purpose of civil war. It would be a mistake both to call for *individual* acts of shooting officers, etc., and to tolerate arguments like the one that "we don't want to help Kaiserism". The first is a deviation towards anarchism, the second towards opportunism. We, on the contrary, must prepare mass (or at the very least collective) action among the troops—not only of one nation—and carry on *all* propaganda and agitation work in that direction. The direction of our work (stubborn, systematic, maybe protracted) in the spirit of turning the national war into a civil war—there is the crux of the matter. The time for this transformation is a different question, at present still unclear. We must allow this moment to mature, and systematically "make it mature".

This is all for the time being. I will write frequently. You write more often too.

Set forth in greater detail the leaflet of the Petersburg Committee.

More details about the views and reactions of the workers.

The balance of *forces* among the "groups" in St. Petersburg? That is, have the liquidators grown stronger as regards ourselves? To what extent?

Is Dan at liberty? His position? And that of Chirkin, Bulkin and Co.?

More details.

To whom precisely, and in whose name, did you send a hundred rubles?

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

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* According to circumstances.—*Ed.*

The watchword of peace, in my opinion, is incorrect at the present moment. It is a philistine, parson's watchword. The proletarian watchword must be civil war.

Objectively, from the radical change in the situation in Europe, such a watchword follows for the epoch of a mass war. The same watchword follows from the Basle resolution.[191]

We can neither "promise" civil war nor "decree" it, but to go on working—if necessary for a very long time—in *that direction*, we are in duty bound. You will see the details in the Central Organ article.* Meanwhile I am only indicating the main points of our position, so that we can reach a really good understanding.

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

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* See "The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 35-41).—*Ed.*

77

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

October 17, 1914

Dear Friend,

I have read the reply to Vandervelde, and attach my ideas on the subject of that reply.

It would be extremely desirable that in the event of the Duma being convened (*is it true* that it is being summoned in a month's time?)[192] our group should make a statement independent of the bloc, and should set forth a *consistent* point of view. Reply at once (1) whether there will be a session of the Duma, (2) whether you have good contacts with the Duma group,[193] and how many days this will require.

October 21, 1914

I continue my interrupted letter. My criticism of the reply, of course, is a private affair, intended *only for friends* with the object of reaching complete mutual understanding. The Central Organ will appear in a day or two, and we shall send it to you.

About the International, don't be an optimist, and beware of the intrigues of the liquidators and opportunists. Although Martov is going left today, this is because he is alone. But what will happen tomorrow? Tomorrow he will descend to their common plan: to stop the mouths (and the mind and the conscience) of the workers with an indiarubber resolution in the spirit of Kautsky, who justifies all and sundry. Kautsky is the most hypocritical, most revolting and most harmful of all! It is internationalism, if you please, for

the workers of every country to shoot at the workers of another country under the guise of "defence of the fatherland"!!!

Let them intrigue—it is after all no more than a petty intrigue today, at such a moment in world history, to think of playing diplomacy with opportunism and setting up a "German" International Socialist Bureau![194] We must today maintain our principles. The workers of Petersburg are imbued with the best feelings of enmity to the traitors among the German Social-Democrats. With all our strength we must support and consolidate that feeling and consciousness into firm resolution to fight international opportunism. Up till now German Social-Democracy was the main authority—today *it is a model of what not to do*!

You are needed in Stockholm. Organise the correspondence with Russia as well as you can. Send my letters (is that possible?) to the one who gave you a note in pencil: we must reach an understanding with him in as much detail as possible.[195] This is extremely important. We are beginning publication of the Central Organ.

Write more often!

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

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TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

October 27, 1914

Dear Friend,

I have just received your second letter, and sit down to have a talk with you.

Many thanks for the letter about events in St. Petersburg.[196] It will make an excellent report for the Central Organ. An issue of the Central Organ will be published in a few days, and we shall send it to you. Wait for it. Wait also for the next issue. You must stay for the time being in Stockholm until transport *through* Stockholm (1) of letters, (2) of people and (3) of literature has been completely organised. For this you should systematically train and *test* a good transmitting agent in Stockholm. Is Comrade Skovno suitable for this? What's good about her is that she is a Bolshevik. She won't go over to the other side. But is she business-like, is she alert, does she attend to details?

I am delighted if Comrade Kollontai[197] has taken up our position, and I am also glad at the excellent (on the whole) management of *Golos* by Martov in Paris. But I am in deadly fear that Martov (and others akin to him) will go over ... to the position taken up by Kautsky and Troelstra. I hate and despise Kautsky now more than anyone, with his vile, dirty self-satisfied hypocrisy. Nothing has happened; so he says, principles have not been abandoned, everyone was entitled to defend his fatherland. It is internationalism, if you please, for the workers of all countries to shoot one another "in order to defend their fatherland".

Rosa Luxemburg was right when she wrote, long ago, that Kautsky has the "subservience, of a theoretician"—

servility, in plainer language, servility to the majority of the Party, to opportunism. Just now there is *nothing* in the world more harmful and dangerous for the *ideological* independence of the proletariat than this rotten self-satisfaction and disgusting hypocrisy of Kautsky, who wants to smother and cover up everything, to tranquillise the awakened conscience of the workers by sophistries and pseudo-scientific chatter. If Kautsky succeeds in this, he will become the main representative of bourgeois corruption in the working-class movement. And Troelstra will be for him —oh, that Troelstra is a more skilful opportunist than the "kind" little old man Kautsky! How that Troelstra manoeuvred in order to drive honest men and Marxists out of the Dutch Party (Gorter, Pannekoek, Wijnkoop)!! I shall never forget how Roland-Hoist, when she once visited me in Paris, said about Troelstra: "*ein hundsgemeiner Kerl*" (*gredin*, in French)*.... I am sorry that you cast pearls before him....[198] Troelstra + the opportunist scoundrels in the *Vorstand*** of the German Social-Democrats are carrying on a dirty little intrigue in order to cover everything up. Be on your guard, don't become the unwilling victim of that intrigue!! Don't accidentally give any help to these worst enemies of the working-class movement, who in an epoch of crisis are defending chauvinism "theoretically", and carrying on a petty and revolting diplomacy. The only one who has told the workers the truth—although not loudly enough, and sometimes not quite skilfully—is Pannekoek, whose article we have sent to you (pass on a translation to the Russians).[199] His words, that if now the "leaders" of the International that was murdered by the opportunists and Kautsky come together and begin "papering over" the cracks, this "will be of no significance whatever"—these are the *only* socialist words. They are the *truth*. Bitter, but the truth. And now the workers need the truth, the whole truth, more than at any other time, not rotten diplomacy, not playing at "papering over", not smearing over the evil with indiarubber resolutions.

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* "A scoundrelly son of a bitch.—*Ed.*
** Executive or C.C.—*Ed.*

It is clear to me that Kautsky, Troelstra plus Vandervelde (it may be plus X+Y+Z or minus X, Y, Z—this is not important) are now busy with an intrigue for that purpose. The transfer of the International Bureau to Holland is a similar intrigue by the same scoundrels.

I shall keep away from them and from it—and will give the same advice to our representative in the International Socialist Bureau (Litvinoff, 76. High Street. Hampstead, London, N. W.)—and I advise you to do the same.

"Don't attend the counsels of the impious",[200] don't put any faith in Troelstra, and the like, etc., etc., just present them with a brief ultimatum: here is the manifesto (a revision of the theses; we shall send it to you in print in a few days) of our C.C. on the war: do you want to publish it in your language?? No? Well, then *adieu*, our roads diverge!

If Kollontai is on our side, let her help to "push" this manifesto in the other languages. Make the acquaintance of *Höglund*, a young Swedish Social-Democrat, leader of the "opposition", read him our manifesto (refer to me: we became acquainted at Copenhagen). Sound out whether he is *ideologically* close to us (he is only a naïve, sentimental anti-militarist: these are the very people who should be told—either the watchword of civil war, or remain with the opportunists and the chauvinists).

The essence of the whole problem in Russia now is to organise an ideological rebuff to the opportunists of the International and to Kautsky. This is the key question. Won't Martov go over at this point??... I fear so!...

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Für Alexander

Dear Friend,

In two or three days you will receive our Central Organ, and then I hope there will be complete "harmony" of our views. Frankly speaking, I am a little afraid whether some of the steps you have taken may not be interpreted in the sense that you are ignoring our legitimate representative in the International Socialist Bureau—Mr. Litvinoff, 76. High Street. Hampstead. London, N. W. Of course, such an interpretation will be a malicious distortion, but all the same be more careful.

Troelstra has deceived you, or led you into error. He is an arch-opportunist, and an agent of the intrigues of the most scoundrelly centre of the most scoundrelly opportunists—the German Social-Democrats (headed by Kautsky, who basely defends the opportunists), with their most foul Vorstand. We shall not attend any conferences or join in any steps, taken on the initiative of scoundrels like them. We will stand aside: let them disgrace themselves! For they, having disgraced themselves once, will disgrace themselves again. The French have already rejected their intrigues, and without the French there can be only a dirty comedy acted by dirty blackguards.

Larin, to all appearances, is swindling you without scruple. If he expresses his "confidence" in the German *Vorstand*, I can well understand that Troelstra has "taken note of it". Of course he would!! Confidence in the rottenest opportunists!! For God's sake correct what can

be corrected, and don't express the least confidence, direct or indirect, in any of the opportunists, either German or French. Pannekoek is right: the Second International is dead for ever. It was killed by the opportunists (and not by "parliamentarism", as the slow-witted Pannekoek put it). "Papering over" the differences is only a petty intrigue, and we must take *no* part in it, either direct or indirect.

We shall try to send you a couple of leaflets shortly. Don't go away, have patience. Arrange everything I wrote to you about, wait until the Central Organ has reached Russia, wait until we reach a *complete* understanding with the Russian colleagues too (both with Kamenev and with others), after they have received the Central Organ. Before all this has been done there can be no thought of your departure. It would be premature for us as yet to leave.[201] Find out, by the way, whether Social-Democratic things can he printed in Sweden (as for example, our Central Organ).

Poor Gorky! What a pity that he has disgraced himself by putting his signature under that rotten little paper of the Russian liberal gentry.[202] Both Meshkovsky and Plekhanov and others (including Maslov and Smirnov) have sunk to the same level.

Make sure of getting and rereading (or get someone to translate to you) Kautsky's *Weg zur Macht**—what he wrote there about the revolution of our times!!

And what a scoundrel he has become now, renouncing all this!

Our job now is a merciless war on chauvinism, covered up by chatter about defence of the "fatherland", etc., especially on the "socialist chauvinism" of Plekhanov, Guesde, Kautsky (the worst of the lot, the hypocrite!) and Co. Defending the revolution (bourgeois in Russia and socialist in the West), we preach it in wartime too. Our watchword is civil war. It is all purest sophistry that this watchword is unsuitable, etc., and so forth. We cannot "make" it, but we preach it and we work in that direction. In every country preference should be given to the struggle against the chauvinism of the *particular* country, to awakening of hatred of one's *own* government, to appeals (repeated,

* *Path to Power.—Ed.*

insistent, numerous, tireless) to the solidarity of the workers of the warring countries, to their *joint* civil war against the bourgeoisie.

No one will venture to *guarantee* when and to what extent this preaching will be "justified" in practice: *that is not the point* (only base sophists renounce revolutionary agitation because they don't know when the revolution will take place). The point is to work on those *lines*. Only that work is socialist, not chauvinist. And it *alone* will bear socialist fruit, revolutionary fruit.

The watchword of peace now is absurd and mistaken (*especially* after the *betrayal* by almost all the leaders up to and including Guesde, Plekhanov, Vandervelde, Kautsky). In practice it would mean petty-bourgeois moaning. But we must remain revolutionaries *in war conditions too*. And must preach the *class struggle* among the troops also.

All the best. Write more often.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on October 31, 1914
Sent from Berne to Stockholm
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

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TO THE SECRETARY, EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GRANAT PUBLISHING HOUSE

Berne, November 17, 1914

Dear Colleague,

I have sent you today by registered post the article on Marx and Marxism[203] for the dictionary. It is not for me to judge how far I have succeeded in solving the difficult problem of squeezing the exposition into a framework of about 75,000 letters and spaces. I will observe that I had to compress the literature very intensively (15,000 was the ultimatum), and I had to select the *essence* of various tendencies (of course, with the majority *for* Marx). It was difficult to make up my mind to renounce many *quotations* from Marx. In my view, quotations are very important for a dictionary (especially on the most controversial questions of Marxism, which include philosophy and the agrarian problem first and foremost). Readers of the dictionary should have available *all* the most important statements by Marx, otherwise the purpose of the dictionary would not be achieved. That is how it seemed to me. I don't know either whether you will be satisfied from the point of view of censorship: if not, perhaps we could manage to agree on the *rewording* of some passages, having in mind passing the censor. For my part, without ultimative demands from the editorial board, I could not make up my mind to "correct" a number of quotations and propositions of Marxism for reasons of censorship.

I hope you will be kind enough to let me know immediately (a postcard will do) that you have received the article.

I would ask you particularly to send the fee due to me as soon as possible to Gospodin Mark Timofeyevich *Yelizaroy*, 17 Grechesky Prosp., Flat 18, *Petrograd* (sending it to me here in wartime would involve the expense of an exchange operation and would be most inconvenient for me).

With assurances that I am at your service,

V. Ilyin

P.S. On account of the war, my library has been held up in Galicia,[204] and I could not find some quotations from Marx's works in the Russian translations. If you think it *necessary*, perhaps you could request someone in Moscow to do it? (In my view, it is not.) Incidentally, I should be very glad if you found it possible to send me a proof of the article, and to let me know whether *partial* corrections of the proof are possible or not. If you cannot send the proof, I hope you will be kind enough to send me an off-print.

My address: Wl. Uljanow. 11. Distelweg. 11. Bern.

Sent to Moscow

First published in 1923 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 6-7

Printed from the original

81

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

November 28, 1914

Dear Friend,

I have had a telegram from Branting[205] today that "the newspapers *confirm* the arrest of five deputies".[206] I fear that now we cannot doubt the fact of the arrest.

This is terrible. The government has evidently decided to have its revenge on the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group, and will stick at nothing. We must be ready for the very worst: falsification of documents, forgeries, planting of "evidence", false witness, trial behind closed doors, etc., etc.

I think that without such methods the government would not succeed in getting a sentence.

Could you not try to find out the names of the six who have been arrested?

Is K. all right?

At all events, the work of our Party has now become 100 times more difficult. And still we shall carry it on! *Pravda* has trained up thousands of class-conscious workers out of whom, in spite of all difficulties, a new collective of leaders—the Russian C.C. of the Party—will be formed. It is now particularly important that you should remain in Stockholm (or *near* Stockholm), and put all your energy into establishing contacts with Petersburg. (Write whether you have received any money as a loan: in my last letter I put in a little note for you about this. If you have not had any and cannot get any, we shall probably be able to send you something; write in as much detail a possible.)

In Zurich a newspaper *Otkliki* is promised (probably the 1iquidators+Trotsky) in December. In Paris a daily S.R. *Mysl* (*arch-philistine* phrase-making, playing at "Left-ism")[207] has begun to appear. An abundance of papers, phrases from the intelligentsia, today r-r-revolutionary, tomorrow...? (tomorrow they will *make peace* with Kautsky, Plekhanov, the liquidationist "patriotic-chauvinist-opportunist intelligentsia" in Russia)....

Among the *working* class in Russia they never had anything, and have nothing. You cannot trust them in the slightest.

I shake you warmly by the hand, and wish you *courage*. Times are difficult, but ... we shall get through!

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

82

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear Comrade,

I have received your letter and the English enclosure.[208] Many thanks!

I send you both the things you wrote about. Let us know—if you translate them and send them off—what happens to them.

It is said that in *Hamburger Echo* there was a leading article "Über unseren Verrat an der Internationale",* which stated that the Germans (i.e., the German opportunist scoundrels) are all in it, and that Plekhanov, Maslov and Chkheidze are *for them*.[209]

Is it true? And what do you think about it?

Greetings and best wishes,

V. Ilyin

P.S. Ask Alexander to make the acquaintance of Kobetsky (Kobezky. Kapelwej. 51[4]. Kjobenhavn VI) and to take from him my letter to himself (Alexander).

It is useless to advocate a well-meaning programme of noble wishes for peace, if we do not at the same time and in the first place advocate the preaching of illegal organisation and civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

N. Lenin

The European war has brought this great benefit to international socialism, that it has exposed for all to see

* "On Our Betrayal of the International."—*Ed.*

the utter rottenness, baseness and meanness of opportunism, thereby giving a splendid impetus to the cleansing of the working-class movement from the dung accumulated during decades of peace.

N. Lenin

Written earlier than
December 16, 1914
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

1915

83

TO BASOK[210]

Copy of a reply handed to Tria on January 12, 1915

Dear Citizen,

Tria has passed on to me your letter of December 28, 1914.

You are obviously mistaken. We take the stand of international revolutionary Social-Democracy, and you of the national bourgeoisie. We are working to bring together the *workers* of various (and particularly the *warring*) countries, while you evidently are moving nearer to the bourgeoisie and the government of "your" nation. We are on different roads.

N. Lenin

Berne, January 12, 1915
Bern. Uljanow. Distelweg. 11.

Sent to Constantinople
First published in 1924 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

84

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear friend!

I very much advise you to write the plan of the pamphlet in as much detail as possible.[211] Otherwise too much is unclear.

One opinion I must express here and now:

I advise you to throw out altogether § 3—the "demand (women's) for freedom of love".

That is not really a proletarian but a bourgeois demand.

After all, what do you understand by that phrase? What *can* be understood by it?

1. Freedom *from* material (financial) calculations in affairs of love?
2. The same, *from* material worries?
3. From religious prejudices?
4. From prohibitions by Papa, etc.?
5. From the prejudices of "society"?
6. From the narrow circumstances of one's environment (peasant or petty-bourgeois or bourgeois intellectual)?
7. From the fetters of the law, the courts and the police?
8. From the serious element in love?
9. From child-birth?
10. Freedom of adultery? Etc.

I have enumerated many shades (not all, of course). You have in mind, of course, not nos. 8-10, but either nos. 1-7 or something *similar* to nos. 1-7.

But then for nos. 1-7 you must choose a different wording, because freedom of love does not express this idea exactly.

And the public, the readers of the pamphlet, will *inevitably* understand by "freedom of love", in general, something like nos. 8-10, even *without your wishing it*.

Just because in modern society the most talkative, noisy and "top-prominent" classes understand by "freedom of love" nos. 8-10, just for that very reason this is not a proletarian but a bourgeois demand.

For the proletariat nos. 1-2 are the most important, and then nos. 1-7, and those, in fact, are not "freedom of love".

The thing is not what you *subjectively* "mean" by this. The thing is the *objective logic* of class relations in affairs of love.

Friendly shake hands!*

W. I.

Written on January 17, 1915
Sent from Berne

First published in 1939
in the magazine *Bolshevik* No. 13

Printed from the original

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* These words, like "Dear Friend" at the beginning, were written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

85

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear friend!

I apologise for my delay in replying: I wanted to do it yesterday, but was prevented, and I had no time to sit down and write.

As regards your plan for the pamphlet, my opinion was that "the demand for freedom of love" was unclear and—independently of your will and your wish (I emphasised this when I said that what mattered was the objective, class relations, and not your subjective wishes)—would, in present social conditions, turn out to be a bourgeois, not a proletarian demand.

You do not agree.

Very well. Let us look at the thing again.

In order to make the unclear clear, I enumerated approximately ten *possible* (and, in conditions of class discord, inevitable) different interpretations, and in doing so remarked that interpretations 1-7, in my opinion, would be typical or characteristic of proletarian women, and 8-10 of bourgeois women.

If you are to refute this, you have to show (1) that these interpretations are wrong (and then replace them by others, or indicate which are wrong), or (2) incomplete (then you should add those which are missing), or (3) are not divided into proletarian and bourgeois in that way.

You don't do either one, or the other, or the third.

You don't touch on points 1-7 at all. Does this mean that you admit them, to be true (on the whole)? (What you write about the prostitution of proletarian women and their

dependence: "impossibility of saying no" fully comes under points 1-7. No difference at all can he detected between us here.)

Nor do you deny that this is a *proletarian* interpretation.

There remain points 8-10.

These you "don't quite understand" and "object" to: "I don't understand how it is *possible*" (that is what you have written!) "to *identify*" (!!??) "freedom of love with" point 10 ....

So it appears that *I* am "identifying", while you have undertaken to refute and demolish *me*?

How so?

Bourgeois women understand by freedom of love points 8-10—that is my thesis.

Do you deny this? Will you say what *bourgeois* ladies understand by freedom of love?

You don't say that. Do not literature and life really *prove* that that is just how bourgeois women understand it? They prove it completely! You tacitly admit this.

And if that is so, the point is their class position, and it is hardly possible and almost naïve to "refute" *them*.

What you must do is *separate* from them clearly, *contrast* with them, the proletarian point of view. One must take into account the objective fact that otherwise *they* will snatch the appropriate passages from your pamphlet, interpret them in their own way, make your pamphlet into water pouring on their mill, distort your ideas in the workers' eyes, "*confuse*" the workers (sowing in their minds the fear that *you* may be bringing them *alien* ideas). And in their hands are a host of newspapers, etc.

While you, completely forgetting the objective and class point of view, go over to the "offensive" against *me*, as though I am "identifying" freedom of love with points 8-10.... Marvellous, really marvellous ....

"Even a fleeting passion and intimacy" are "more poetic and cleaner" than "kisses without love" of a (vulgar, and shallow) married couple. That is what you write. And that is what you intend to write in your pamphlet. Very good.

Is the contrast logical? Kisses without love between a vulgar couple are *dirty*. I agree. To them one should contrast ... what?... One would think: kisses *with* love? While

you contrast them with "fleeting" (why fleeting?) "passion" (why not love?)—so, logically, it turns out that kisses without love (fleeting) are contrasted with kisses without love by married people.... Strange. For a popular pamphlet, would it not he better to contrast philistine-intellectual-peasant (I think they're in my point *6* or point 5) vulgar and dirty marriage without love to proletarian civil marriage with love (adding, *if you absolutely insist*, that fleeting intimacy and passion, too, may be dirty and may be clean). What you have arrived at is, not the contrast of class *types*, but something like an "incident", which of course is possible. But is it a question of particular incidents? If you take the theme of an incident, an individual case of dirty kisses in marriage and pure ones in a fleeting intimacy, that is a theme to be worked out in a novel (because there the whole *essence* is in the *individual* circumstances, the analysis of the *characters* and psychology of *particular* types). But in a pamphlet?

You understood my idea very well about the unsuitable quotation from Key,[212] when you said it is "stupid" to appear in the role of "professors of love". Quite so. Well, and what about the role of professors of fleeting, etc.?

Really, I don't want to engage in polemics at all. I would willingly throw aside this letter and postpone matters until we can talk about it. But I want the pamphlet to be a good one, so that *no* one *could* tear out of it phrases which would cause you unpleasantness (sometimes *one single* phrase is enough to be the spoonful of tar in a barrel of honey), *could mis*interpret you. I am sure that here, too, you wrote "without wishing it", and the only reason why I am sending you this letter is that you may examine the plan in greater detail as a result of the letters than you would after a talk—and the plan, you know, is a very important thing.

Have you not some French socialist friend? Translate my points 1-10 to her (as though it were from English), together with your remarks about "fleeting", etc., and watch her, listen to her as attentively as possible: a little experiment as to what *outside* people will say, what their impressions will be, what they will expect of the pamphlet.

I shake you by the hand, and wish you fewer headaches and to get better soon.

V. U.

P.S. About Baugy[213] I don't know.... Possibly my friend* promised too much.... But what? I don't know. The thing has been postponed, i.e., the conflict has been postponed, *not* eliminated. We shall have to fight and fight!! Shall we succeed in dissuading them? What is your opinion?

Written on January 24, 1915
Sent from Berne
First published in 1939
in *Bolshevik* No. 13

Printed from the original

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* These two words were written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

86

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

February 11

Dear Friend,

I have received your two letters, of February 4 and 5. Many thanks. As regards sending *Sotsial-Demokrat*, we have given your letter to the secretary of the dispatch committee to read. Tomorrow I shall remind him personally, and I hope that they will do everything.

The Parisians promised to send you Plekhanov's little pamphlet, and we are very surprised that you have not received it. We shall order it once more, and get one ourselves to send you.[214]

The two Plekhanovites of whom you wrote were here. We chatted with them. Take notice of the little fair one (they are going back the same way): apparently Plekhanov repelled him even more than the little dark one. The latter, I think, is a hopeless chatterbox. But the former keeps very quiet, and you can't find out what is going on in his head.

From *Nashe Slovo* (which is appearing in Paris in place of *Golos*) we have had a letter today with a plan for a common protest against "official social-patriotism" (on the subject of the scheme for a London conference of socialists *de la* Triple Entente[215]). Whether the conference will take place, we don't know; we had the other day from Litvinov a letter he transmitted from Huysmans, who is planning something strange, calling together the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau on February 20 at The Hague, and on February 20-25 organising in the same

place personal negotiations (!!) with the delegates from Britain, France and Russia!! Astonishing!! It looks like preparations of some kind for something Francophil and patriotic (by the way, you are absolutely right that there are now many "phils" and few socialists. For us both Francophils and Germanophils are one and the same=patriots, bourgeois or their lackeys, and not socialists. The Bundists, for example, are for the most part Germanophils and glad of the defeat of Russia. But in what way are they any better than Plekhanov? Both are opportunists, social-chauvinists, only of different colours. And Axelrod too).

We have replied to *Nashe Slovo* that we are glad of their proposal, and have sent them our draft declaration.* Hopes of an agreement with them are not great, because Axelrod, it is said, is in Paris—and Axelrod (see Nos. 86 and 87 of *Golos* and No. 37 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*) is a social-chauvinist, who wants to reconcile Francophils and Germanophils on the basis of social-chauvinism. Let us see what is dearer to *Nashe Slovo*—anti-chauvinism or the good will of Axelrod.

I think that both in Russia and throughout the world a new basic grouping is coming into existence within Social-Democracy: the chauvinists ("social-patriots") and their friends, their defenders—and the anti-chauvinists. In the main, this division corresponds to the division between the opportunists and the revolutionary Social-Democrats. But it *plus précis* represents, so to speak, a higher stage of development, nearer to the socialist revolution. And among us the old grouping (liquidators and Pravdists) is becoming out of date, and being replaced by a new, more sensible division: social-patriots and anti-patriots. By the way. They say that Dan[216]=a *German* "social-patriot", i.e., a Germanophil, i.e., *for Kautsky*. Is this true? It looks very much like the truth. It's an odd thing that in the Organising Committee[217] the split is along *bourgeois* lines: Francophils (Plekhanov + Alexinsky + Maslov + *Nasha Zarya*) and Germanophils (Bund+Axelrod+Dan?? etc.).

If you don't get any money from the Swedes, let us know:

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* See "To the Editors of *Nashe Slovo*" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 125-28).—*Ed*.

we shall send you 100 francs. Think over very thoroughly where it is best (i.e., most useful for the cause and safest for you: this is very important: you must protect yourself!!) to lie low, in London or in Norway, etc. It is of the greatest importance to organise transport, even little by little. You ought to have an interview with the Plekhanovites who in two or three weeks will be in your place, and come to an arrangement about all this.

All the best; I wish you courage and all good things.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

87

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear Comrade,

Many thanks for all your trouble and assistance, about which you write in your last letter.

Your articles in *Nashe Slovo* and for *Kommunist*[218] on Scandinavian affairs have raised the following question in my mind:

Can one praise and find correct the position of the Left Scandinavian Social-Democrats who reject the arming of the people? I argued about this with Höglund in 1910 and tried to prove to him that this was not Leftism, nor revolutionism, but simply the philistinism of petty-bourgeois provincials.[219] These Scandinavian petty-bourgeois have tucked themselves away in their little countries, almost at the North Pole, and are proud of the fact that you can't get to them in a month of Sundays! How can one allow that a revolutionary class on the eve of the social revolution should be *against* the arming of the people? This is not struggle against militarism, but a cowardly attempt to retire from the great questions of the capitalist world. How can one "recognise" the class struggle, without understanding its inevitable transformation at certain moments into civil war?

It seems to me that you ought to collect material on this, and come out resolutely *against* in *Kommunist*, and then, for the instruction of the Scandinavians, print it afterwards in Swedish, etc.

I should like to know your opinion about this in more detail.

Bruce Glasier, in my belief, is an unsuitable contributor: although he has a proletarian strain in him, still he is an unbearable opportunist. You will hardly be able to go along with him: he will start crying after two days, and saying that he was "trapped", that he doesn't want and doesn't recognise anything of the kind.

Have you seen the book by David, and his opinion about our manifesto?[220]

Is there not in the Scandinavian countries any material on the struggle of *the two currents of opinion* concerning the attitude to the war? Could not one gather precise material (reactions, assessments, resolutions) with a precise contrasting of *facts* regarding the tendencies of the two currents? Do facts confirm (in my opinion, they do) that the opportunists-taken as a *current of opinion*—are, on the whole,>chauvinists than the revolutionary Social-Democrats? What do you think, would it not be possible to gather and work up such material for *Kommunist*?

I shake your hand, and wish you all the best,

N. Lenin

P.S. Who is this Shaw Desmond who has been giving a lecture in the Scandinavian countries? Is the text of his lecture available in English? Is he a conscious revolutionary, or *à la* Hervé?

Written later than May 22, 1915
Sent from Berne to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

88

TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Dear Comrade,

The weathercock (*Drehscheibe*) Kautsky and Co. want now, with the help of Left phrases and a purely verbal departure from the policy of August 4",[221] to "stifle" the revolutionary ferment which is beginning. We are now for peace, these gentlemen will be saying together with Renaudel and Co., striving thereby to satisfy the revolutionary masses.

There is talk of a conference of the Lefts—and it is *more than likely* that dirty little souls of the Bernstein-Kautsky type will make use of such a conference in order, once again, to deceive the masses with the help of "passive radicalism".

It is quite possible that sensible statesmen of *both belligerent groups* now have *nothing* against the incipient revolutionary ferment being stifled by an idiotic "peace programme".

I don't know whether the German Lefts are already strong enough to upset the manoeuvre of these passive (and hypocritical) "radicals". But you and we are *independent parties*. We must do something: work out a programme of revolution, expose the idiotic and hypocritical watchword of peace, denounce and refute it, talk with utter frankness to the workers—in order to tell the *truth* (without the base diplomacy of the leaders of the Second International). And the truth is this: either one supports the revolutionary ferment which is beginning, and assists it (for this one needs the watchword of revolution, of civil war, of illegal organisation, etc.), or one stifles it (for this one needs the watchword of peace, the "condemnation" of "annexations", maybe disarmament, etc., etc.).

History will show that it is we who were right, i.e., the revolutionaries in general, not necessarily *A* or *B*.

I should like to know whether you (your Party) are able to send your representative (knowing *one* of the three main languages). And do you think it possible that both our *parties* officially (in writing or verbally, better: *and verbally*) should propose a joint declaration (or resolution)?

If there are *only* money difficulties, let us know exactly how much is needed. Perhaps we will be able to help.

Best greetings.

Yours,
N. Lenin

My address:
WI. Uljanow,
Hotel Marienthal in *Sörenberg*
(Kanton Luzern). Schweiz.

Written in German
between June 19 and July 13, 1915
Sent to Zwolle (Holland)
First published in *Pravda* No. 21,
January 21, 1949

Printed from the original

89

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear Comrade,

The question of a conference of the "Left" is going ahead. There has already been a first *Vorkonferenz*,[222] and a second, decisive one, will be held *shortly*. It is extremely important to draw in the Left Swedes (*Höglund*) and the Norwegians.

Be kind enough to write (1) whether we are in agreement with you (or you with the C.C.), if not, wherein we differ, and (2) whether you will undertake to draw in the "Left" Scandinavians.

Ad I. You know our position from *Sotsial-Demokrat*. In Russian affairs we shall *not* be for unity with the Chkheidze group[223] (which Trotsky, and the O.C., and Plekhanov, and Co. want: see *The War*), because this is a cover-up and defence of *Nashe Dyelo*. In international affairs we shall not be for rapprochement with Haase-Bernstein-Kautsky (for *in practice* they want unity with the Südekums and to shield them, they want to get away with Left phrases and to change nothing in the old rotten party). We cannot stand for the *watchword* of peace, because we consider it supremely muddled, pacifist, petty-bourgeois, helping the governments (they now want to be with one hand "for peace", in order to climb out of their difficulties) and obstructing the revolutionary struggle.

In our opinion, the Left should make a common declaration *of principle* (1) unquestionably condemning the social-chauvinists and opportunists, (2) giving a programme of revolutionary action (whether to say civil war or revolu-

tionary mass action, is not so important), (3) against the watchword of "defence of the fatherland", etc. A declaration of principle by the "Left", in the name of several countries, would have a *gigantic* significance (of course, not in the spirit of the Zetkin philistinism which she got adopted at the Women's Conference[224] at Berne; Zetkin *evaded* the question of condemning social-chauvinism!! out of a desire for "peace" with the Südekums+Kautsky??).

If you are not in agreement with these tactics, drop us a line straightaway.

If you are in agreement, do take on the translation of (1) the manifesto of the Central Committee (No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*)* and (2) the Berne resolutions (No. 40 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*)** into Swedish and Norwegian, and get in touch with Höglund—do they agree to prepare a *common* declaration (or resolution) on such a basis (naturally we shall not quarrel over details)? *Particular* speed with this is necessary.

And so I await your reply.

Every good wish,

Yours,

Lenin

Written later than July 11, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland) to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 158-64.—*Ed.*

90

TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Dear Comrade Wijnkoop,

The scheme with which we are now occupied, the plan for an international declaration of principle by the Marxist Left, is so important that we have no right to delay, and must carry it through successfully to its conclusion, moreover as quickly as possible. The fact that we are late with it presents a great danger!

The article by A. P. in *Berner Tagwacht* (July 24) on the Congress of the S.D.P. of Holland is extremely important for our mutual understanding.[225] I welcome with the greatest joy the position taken up by you, Gorter and Ravesteyn on the question of a people's militia (we have that in our programme too). An exploited class which did not *strive* to possess arms, to know how to use them and to master the military art would be a class of lackeys. The defenders of disarmament as against a people's militia (there are "Lefts" of this kind in Scandinavia too: I argued about this with Höglund in 1910) are taking up the position of petty bourgeois, pacifists, opportunists in the small states. But for us it is the point of view of the *great states* and the *revolutionary struggle* (i.e., *also of civil war*) which must be decisive. Anarchists may be against a people's militia, from the point of view of the social revolution (conceived of without relation to time and space). But our *most important* task now is to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the Marxist Left on the one hand and the opportunists (and Kautskians) and anarchists on the other.

One passage in the article by A. P. really revolted me, namely the one where he says that the declaration of principle by Mme. Roland-Hoist "completely corresponds to the point of view of the S.D.P."!!

From that declaration of principle, in the form in which it was printed in *Berner Tagwacht* and in *Internationale Korrespondenz*,[226] I see that we cannot *in any circumstances* accept solidarity with Mme. Roland-Hoist. Mme. Roland-Holst, in my opinion, is a Dutch Kautsky or a Dutch Trotsky. These people *in principle* "firmly disagree" with the opportunists, but *in practice*, on all important questions, they agree!! Mme. Roland-Holst rejects the principle of defence of the fatherland, i.e., she rejects social-chauvinism. That is good. *But she does not reject opportunism!!* In a most lengthy declaration there is not one word against opportunism! There is not one clear, unambiguous word about *revolutionary* means of struggle (but in return, all the more phrases about "idealism", self-sacrifice, etc., which every scoundrel, including Troelstra and Kautsky, can very willingly accept)! Not one word about a *rupture* with the opportunists! The watchword of "peace" is quite *à la* Kautsky! Instead of this (and quite consistently, from the point of view of the unprincipled "declaration of principle" of Mme. Roland-Holst) the advice to co-operate *both* with the S.D.P. and the S.D.L.P.!! This means unity with the opportunists.

Quite like our Mr. Trotsky: "in principle *firmly* against defence of the fatherland", in practice *for* unity with the Chkheidze group in the Russian Duma (i.e., with the opponents of our group which has been exiled to Siberia, with the *best friends* of the Russian social-chauvinists).

No. No. Never and in no circumstances shall we agree in principle with the declaration of Mme. Roland-Holst. It is a quite thoughtless, purely platonic and hypocritical internationalism. Just one long compromise. It is suited (speaking politically) only to the task of forming a "Left wing" (i.e., a "harmless minority", a "decorative Marxist signboard") in the old, rotten and scoundrelly lackey parties (the Liberal Labour parties).

Of course, we do not demand an *immediate* split in this or that party, for example, in Sweden, Germany or France. It is very possible that the time for this will be more favour-

able (for example, in Germany) somewhat later. But *in principle* we must unquestionably demand a complete break with opportunism. The *whole* struggle of our Party (and of the working-class movement in Europe generally) must be directed against opportunism. The latter is not a current of opinion, not a tendency; it (opportunism) has now become the organised tool of the bourgeoisie within the working-class movement. And furthermore: questions of the revolutionary struggle (tactics, means, propaganda in the army, fraternisation in the trenches, *etc.*) must undoubtedly be analysed *in detail*, discussed, thought out, tested, explained to the masses in the illegal press. Without this any "recognition" of revolution remains only an empty phrase. We have no common road with phrase-mongering (in Dutch: "passive") radicals.

I hope, dear Comrade Wijnkoop, that you will not take offence at these remarks of mine. After all, we must come to a proper agreement, in order to carry on jointly this *difficult* struggle.

Please show this letter to Comrade Pannekoek and other Dutch friends.

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. I will shortly send you the official resolution of our Party (of 19*13*) on the question of the right of all nations to self-determination.[227] We are *for this*. Now, in the struggle against the social-chauvinists, we must be more for this than ever before.

Written in German
later than July 24, 1915

Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Zwolle (Holland)

First published in *Pravda* No. 21,
January 21, 1949

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91

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

We are sending you the money tomorrow. Many thanks for the news from Russia. In principle we have nothing against an agreement; we hope that you will be extra careful.

As regards armament of the people versus disarmament, it seems to me all the same that we cannot alter the programme.[228] If the words about the class struggle are not an empty phrase in the liberal sense (as they have become with the opportunists, Kautsky and Plekhanov), how can one object to a fact of history—the transformation of this struggle, under certain conditions, into civil war? How moreover can an oppressed class in general be against the armament of the people?

To reject this means to fall into a semi-anarchist attitude to imperialism—in my belief, this can be seen in certain Left-wingers even among ourselves. Once there is imperialism, they say, then we don't need either self-determination of nations or the armament of the people! That is a crying error. It is precisely for the socialist revolution against imperialism that we need both one and the other.

Is it "realisable"? Such a criterion is incorrect. Without revolution almost the entire minimum programme is unrealisable. Put in that way, realisability declines into philistinism.

It seems to me that this question (like *all* questions of Social-Democratic tactics today) can be put *only* in connection with the evaluation of (and reckoning with) opportunism. And it is clear that "disarmament", as a tactical watchword,

is opportunism. Moreover it is a provincial one, it stinks of a little state, detachment from the struggle, poverty of ideas: "it's no business of mine"....

We are sending you the draft (individual) of a declaration of the international Left.* We urge you to translate it and to pass it on to the Left in Sweden and Norway, in order to make a *business-like* advance to a *Verständigung*** with them. Send us your observations, *resp.* your counterdraft, if you wish, and *secure* the same from the Left in Scandinavia.

*Beste Grüsse.****

Yours,
Lenin

Written on July 26, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* Reference is to "The Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Wing at Zimmerwald" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 345-48).—*Ed.*

** Understanding.—*Ed.*

*** Best greetings.—*Ed.*

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TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

We were very glad about the statement by the Norwegians and your efforts with the Swedes.[229] It would be devilishly important to have a joint international statement by the *Left* Marxists! (A statement of principle is the main thing, and so far the only thing possible.)

Roland-Hoist, like Rakovsky (have you seen his French pamphlet?), like Trotsky, in my opinion, are *all* the most harmful "Kautskians", in the sense that all of them in various forms are for unity with the opportunists, all in various forms *embellish* opportunism, all of them (in various ways) preach eclecticism instead of revolutionary Marxism.

I think your criticism of the draft declaration does not show (unless I am mistaken) any serious differences between us. I think it mistaken in theory and harmful in practice not to distinguish types of wars. We cannot be against wars of national liberation. You quote the example of Serbia. But if the Serbs were *alone* against Austria, would we not be *for* the Serbs?

The essence of the thing today is the struggle *between* the Great Powers for the redivision of the colonies and the subjugation of the smaller powers.

A war of India, Persia, China and so forth with Britain or Russia? Would we not be *for* India against Britain, etc.? To call *that* "a civil war" is inexact, an obvious exaggeration. It is extremely harmful to stretch the conception of civil war beyond measure, because that *blurs* the essence of the question: a war of hired workers against the capitalists of a *particular* state.

It is the Scandinavians, apparently, who are falling into a petty-bourgeois (and provincial, *kleinstaatisch*) pacifism, repudiating "war" in general. That is not Marxist. One has to combat this, like their rejection of the militia.

Once again greetings, and congratulations on the Norwegian declaration!

Yours,
Lenin

Written not earlier than
August 4, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Christiania (Oslo)
First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

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TO K. B. RADEK

Dear Comrade Radek,

I return your draft.[230] Not a word about social-chauvinism and (=) opportunism and the struggle against them!! Why such an embellishing of the evil and concealment from the working masses of their main enemy in the Social-Democratic parties?

Will you make an ultimatum of insisting that not a word should be said openly about a ruthless struggle against opportunism?

I hope to *arrive two days earlier* (i.e., September 2-3) if you inform me that the Germans will also come earlier (otherwise Zinoviev will come alone).

(Your draft is too "academic", not a militant appeal, not a fighting manifesto.)

Will you be sending your draft to Wijnkoop? *Are you insisting* that they (the Dutch) should come?

Please send me at once the (German) translation of *my draft* (about which you wrote to Wijnkoop) and the translation of our resolution of 1913 (the nationalities question). That makes *two things*.

We must make *every* effort to publish our pamphlet (in German) before September 5. I am writing today to Kasparov that he should help you and find another translator (in Berne—Comrade Kinkel). Can you (with Kasparov) work at "extra speed" and translate this pamphlet in the course of a week? And what about the printing? Can it be

printed in three or four days? We must make *every* effort and do this!

I beg you to reply immediately.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in German
on August 19, 1915

Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

94

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

August 23, 1915

Dear Alexander,

As regards the plan of your journey, it is very hard for me to give you definite advice from so far off.[231] Our financial affairs are known to you. Nadezhda Konstantinovna has written to you in detail (in addition to what was sent, 600 francs were promised before October 10+400 francs one month later. In all, 1,000 francs. *For the time being* there is no hope of more).

On the one hand, extreme care is essential. Have you completely reliable papers? And all the rest?

On the other hand, it would be unquestionably useful for the cause just now, if a fully-informed and independent person travelled round two or three centres, made contacts, established relations and *immediately* returned to Sweden, to pass on all the contacts to us and to discuss the further situation. This would be most important.

Kommunist No. 1 will appear in 8-10 days; then, after as many more, No. 2 (or Nos. 1-2 together). No. 44 of the Central Organ will appear in a day or two. A pamphlet about the war *with all documents* will come out in a fortnight. It is already being set.

Events in Russia have completely endorsed our position, which the social-patriot donkeys (from Alexinsky to Chkheidze) have christened defeatism. The facts have proved that we are right!! The military reverses are helping to shake the foundations of tsarism, and facilitating an alliance of the revolutionary workers of Russia and other countries. Peo-

ple say: what will "you" do, if "you", the revolutionaries, defeat tsarism? I reply: (1) our victory will fan the flames of the "Left" movement in Germany a hundredfold; (2) if "we" defeated tsarism completely, we would propose peace to all the belligerent powers on democratic terms and, if this were rejected, we would conduct a *revolutionary* war.

It is clear that the advanced section of Pravdist workers, that bulwark of our Party, has survived, in spite of terrible devastations in its ranks. It would be extremely important for leading groups to come together in two or three centres (*most conspiratively*), establish contact with us, restore a Bureau of the Central Committee (one exists, I think, in Petersburg already) and the C.C. itself in Russia. They should establish firm ties with us (*if necessary*, one or two persons should be brought to Sweden for this purpose). We would send news-sheets, leaflets, etc. The most important thing is firm and constant relations.

Chkheidze and Co. are obviously shuffling: they are true friends of *Nashe Dyelo*, Alexinsky is pleased with them (I hope you have seen *The War* by Plekhanov+Alexinsky+Co. There's a disgrace!!) and yet they "play" at Leftism with the help of Trotsky!! I don't think they will succeed in deceiving the class-conscious Pravdists.

Write what you decide. Greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Will A. Kollontai agree to help us arrange in the U.S.A. for an edition of our pamphlet in English*?

Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* Reference is to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards the War*) (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338).—*Ed.*

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TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Für Alexander

Dear Friend,

Try and see Belenin and tell him, please, that he has been co-opted a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. You understand, of course, that the maximum secrecy must be observed in this matter, and that you must "forget" about it after passing on the information to Belenin (I am not writing to him direct for obvious reasons). His function during the journey is very important: Trotsky and the company of lackeys of opportunism abroad are straining every effort to "gloss over" the differences, and "save" the opportunism of *Nasha Zarya*, by whitewashing and lauding the Chkheidze group (=the most faithful friends of *Nasha Zarya*). It is necessary to set up groups in Russia (of old, experienced, sensible Pravdist workers who have *fully* mastered the question of the war) and take the best of them (2-3) into the C.C. If there are difficulties, or if doubts arise, then he could limit himself to setting up *analogous* bodies (for example, "the leading All-Russia Workers' Group" or "Committee", etc.; it's not the name that counts, of course).

Your connections and your knowledge of old and experienced workers will help you to give advice to Belenin, who, of course, will treat this work with exceptional seriousness and caution. And the most important thing is that he should now be extremely careful, making *a short trip* and bringing back *all the contacts*.

Best greetings! Drop me a line directly you receive this letter.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. The pamphlet will appear earlier than I thought. I have already received part of the proofs. Probably in a week or ten days we shall have both the pamphlet and No. 1-2 of *Kommunist*.

There *will* now *be* three members of the C.C. abroad In Russia there are a number of candidate members (workers) and arrested members of the C.C. (also workers, leading Pravdists).

P.P.S. Tomorrow you will get a more detailed letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna. Treat it with the utmost attention.

Written earlier than
September 13, 1915

Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

96

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

October 10, 1915

Dear Friend,

Tomorrow we are publishing two issues of the Central Organ at the same time—No. 45-46 (devoted to the Zimmerwald Conference) and No. 47, containing news from Russia and the "theses" on tactics.* These theses consist partly of replies to the questions which we touched on in our correspondence, and you in your talks with N. I., etc. I shall await your comments.

Have you received the *Russian* text of the pamphlet *Socialism and War*?

(In parenthesis: A. M. has sent in a criticism of the German text, and I replied to her in a detailed letter to America. If you are interested, ask her to send it to you. About her leaflet I wrote to her at Bergen, asking permission to make corrections. There is no reply. I am afraid I shall have to write to America, and that means a big delay.)

News from Russia testifies to the growing revolutionary mood and movement, though to all appearances this is not yet the beginning of revolution.

The most important thing for us now is to establish contacts and make them regular (this is quite possible by correspondence; consider whether one copy of the paper and manifestos cannot be sent in a thin binding). Let us hope that Belenin will succeed in organising this. Otherwise one cannot dream of any systematic, connected work.

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* Reference is to Lenin's article "Several Theses" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04).—*Ed.*

Pay special attention to the thesis about the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. One must be careful with this thing: 200 or 300 leaders might be arrested!! Except in connection with an insurrection, the "strength" of a Soviet of Workers' Deputies is an *illusion*. One should not give way to it.

All the best.

Yours,
Lenin

Could not one organise the transcribing of such articles in the Central Organ as "Eleven Theses" in chemical ink, for rapid delivery to Petersburg? Think it over well.

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

November 9, 1915

Dear A. M.,

Only yesterday did we get your letter of October 18 from Milwaukee. Letters take a terribly long time! You have not yet received my letter (and Nos. 45-46 and 47 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*) about Zimmerwald, and containing all the replies to your questions; yet that letter was written more than a month ago. Try at any rate to calculate where you will be (approximately, in six weeks' time) and give us addresses (for letters to you), so that they arrive nearer.

As regards the New York *Volkszeitung*, Grimm assured me today that they are quite Kautskian! Is that the case? I think our *German* pamphlet* might help you to determine the "strength" of their internationalism. Have you had it? (500 copies were sent to you.)

In a few days we are publishing here (in German, and then *we hope* to put it out in French and, if we can manage the money, in Italian) a little pamphlet on behalf of the *Zimmerwald Left*. Under this name we should like to launch into international circulation, as widely as possible, our Left group at Zimmerwald (the C.C.+the Polish Social-Democrats+the Letts+the Swedes+the Norwegians+1 German+1 Swiss) with its *draft resolution* and *manifesto* (printed in No. 45-46 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*). The little pamphlet (20-30-35 thousand letters and spaces) will contain these two documents and a small introduction.[232] We rely on you to publish it in America *in English too* (for it is hopeless to do this

* Reference is to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards the War*) (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338).—*Ed.*

in England: it has to be brought there *from* America) and, if possible, in other languages. This is to be the first publication by the *nucleus of Left* Social-Democrats of *all* countries, who have a clear, exact and full *reply* to the question of what is to be done and in which direction to go. It would be most important if you could succeed in publishing this in America, circulating it as widely as possible and *establishing firm publishing links* (*Charles Kerr* (N.B.) at Chicago;- the *Appeal to Reason** at *Kansas*, *etc.*), for it is generally most important for us to come out in various languages (you could do *a great deal* in this respect).

As regards money, I see with distress from your letter that so far you have not managed to collect anything for the Central Committee. Perhaps this "Manifesto of the Left" will help....

I never doubted that Hillquit would be for Kautsky and even *to the right* of him, because I saw him at Stuttgart (1907) and *heard* how *afterwards* he defended the prohibition against bringing yellow people into America (an "internationalist")....

The Zimmerwald Manifesto itself is *inadequate*; Kautsky and Co. are ready to put up with it, on *condition* that there is "not a step further". We *don't* accept this, because it is *complete hypocrisy*. So that if there are people in America who are afraid *even* of the Zimmerwald Manifesto, you can brush them aside, and bring in only those who are *more Left than the Zimmerwald Manifesto*.

I shake you by the hand and wish you every success!

Yours,
Lenin

(Ulianow. Seidenweg. 4a. III. *Bern*)

Sent from Berne to New York

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* Try establishing contact with them—if only in writing, should you not get to Kansas. Their little paper is sometimes *not bad*. Be sure to sound them out with our resolution of the "Zimmerwald Left". And what is Eugene *Debs*? He sometimes writes in a revolutionary way. Or is he also a wet-rag *à la* Kautsky?

Write *when* you will *again* be in New York, and for *how many* days. Try *everywhere* to see (if only for 5 minutes) the local *Bolsheviks*, to "refresh" them and *get them in touch with us*.

1916

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TO MAXIM GORKY

January 11, 1916

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

I am sending you at the *Letopis* address, not for *Letopis* but for the publishing house, the manuscript of a pamphlet and request you to publish it.[233]

I have tried in as popular a form as possible to set forth new data about America which, I am convinced, are particularly suitable for popularising Marxism and substantiating it by means of facts. I hope I have succeeded in setting out these important data clearly and comprehensibly for the new sections of the reading public which are multiplying in Russia and need an explanation of the world's economic evolution.

I should like to continue, and subsequently also to publish, a second part—about Germany.

I am setting to work on a pamphlet about imperialism.*

Owing to war-time conditions I am in extreme need of earnings, and would therefore ask, if it is possible and will not embarrass you too much, to speed up publication of the pamphlet.

Yours with respect,

V. Ilyin

The address is Mr. Wl. Oulianoff, Seidenweg, *4-a*, *Berne*, (Suisse).

Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* Reference is to *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304).—*Ed.*

99

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

As regards your letter and its mention of the current reproach that I am "uncompromising", I should like to discuss the subject with you in greater detail.

As regards James, he never understood politics and was always against the split. James is a wonderful person, but *on these subjects* his judgements are profoundly wrong.

In Russia (and now in the new International too) the question of a split is the *basic* one. Any compromise *here* would be a crime. I know well how many good people (James, Galyorka, the Petrograd "friends" among the intellectuals) were *against* the split in the Duma group. All of them were 1,000 times wrong. The split was essential. And the split with *Chkheidze and Co*. now, too, is *absolutely* essential. All who waver on this subject are *enemies* of the proletariat, and we must be *un*compromising with them.

But who is wavering? Not only Trotsky and Co. but also *Yuri*+Eug. B. (as late as last summer they were "creating scenes" on account of Chkheidze!!). Then the *Poles* (the opposition). In their *Gazeta Robotnicza* No. 25, there is their resolution: once again *for manoeuvring*, as in Brussels on July 3 (16), 1914.

With them an *un*compromising attitude is obligatory.

Radek is the best of them; it was useful to work *with* him (for the Zimmerwald Left as well, by the way), and we did work. But *Radek* is also *wavering*. And our tactics here are *two-sided* (this Yuri+Nik. Iv. *absolutely* could not or would not understand): on the one hand, to *help* Radek to move

left, to *unite* all who could be united for the Zimmerwald Left. On the other hand, not to allow *one iota* of wavering on *the basic issue*.

The basic issue is the break with the O.C., with Chkheidze and Co.

The Poles are *wavering*, and published a most blackguardly resolution *after* No. 1 of *Kommunist*.

The conclusion?

Either to hang on to the title of *Kommunist*, and *open the door to squabbling and wavering*, to letters to the editor (from Radek, Bronski, perhaps Pannekoek and others), complaints, whining, gossip, etc.

Not on any account.

This would be harmful to the cause.

It means helping the scoundrels of the O.C., Chkheidze and Co.

Not on any account.

Kommunist was a temporary bloc to achieve a definite object. The object has been achieved: the journal was published, the rapprochement attained (*then* it was possible, *before* Zimmerwald). Now we have to go by *another* road, to go further.

Kommunist has become *harmful*. It has to be *stopped*, and replaced by a *different* title: *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (edited by the *editorial board of* "*Sotsial-Demokrat*").[234]

Only in this way will we avoid squabbling, avoid wavering.

In Russia, is there also discord? Oh, of course! *But it is not our business to increase it*. Let Chkheidze and Co., Trotsky and Co. busy themselves with increasing the discord (that is their "profession"). Our job is to pursue *our own* line. The fruits of *such* work are manifest: the Petrograd workers are 100 times better than the Petrograd intellectuals (even the "sympathisers"...).

We had to make *temporary* concessions to the "trio" (Yuri + Eug. Bosh + Nik. Iv.), because *at that time* it was impossible to bring out the journal otherwise (now it is possible); and the main thing was that we had not yet seen Eug. Bosh + Yuri *at work*, and could hope that the *work* would lead them *upwards*.

But they went downwards.

And the temporary alliance *must* be dissolved. Only in that way will *the cause* not suffer. Only in that way will *they too* learn.

For we are not against *discussion*. We are against *editorial* rights for those who displayed unforgivable vacillation (perhaps owing to their youth? then we shall wait: perhaps in five years' time they will straighten themselves out).

Nik. Iv. is an economist who studies seriously, and *in this* we have always supported him. But he is (1) credulous where gossip is concerned and (2) devilishly *unstable* in politics.

The war pushed him towards semi-anarchist ideas. At the conference which adopted the Berne resolutions (the spring of 1915)[235] he produced *theses* (I have them!) which were the height of stupidity, a disgrace, semi-anarchism.

I attacked sharply. Yuri and Eug. Bosh listened and remained satisfied that I did not allow any falling away to the left (they declared at the time their complete disagreement with N. Iv.).

Six months passed. Nik. Iv. studies economics. He *doesn't* occupy himself with politics.

And lo and behold, on the question of self-determination, *he* serves us up *the same* nonsense. Eug. Bosh+Yuri sign it!! (Take their "theses" from N. Iv., and my reply to him.[236])

Yet the question is an important one. It is an essential question. It is inextricably bound up with the question of *annexations*—a most topical question.

They didn't think it out. They didn't read. They didn't study. They listened two or three times to Radek (he has the old "Polish" disease: he is confused on this)—and *signed*.

That is a scandal. It is a disgrace. These are not editors. We must refute such people, expose them, give them time to study and think, and be in no hurry to humour them: "Here are editorial rights for you, distribute your nonsense among the workers!!"

If that is allowed, they will *bring* matters to polemics in the press—and then I will be *obliged* to call them "imperialist Economists", and demonstrate their complete emptiness, the *completely* unserious and unthought-out character of their ideas. Polemics in the press will drive them away *for years*.

But if we stop *Kommunist* now, they will think it over and drop their nonsense: they will read and become convinced. Come on, dear friends, write a serious *pamphlet*, if you proclaim that you have "differences" on policy (which you have never studied or worked on), let's have it! They will think it over, and *not* produce it. And in a few months they will be "cured".

That's how it has been in the past. So t will be in the future.

On the question of annexations (and of self-determination) our position (the resolution of 1913)* has been *completely* confirmed by the war. And this question has become a topical one. While Radek + the Dutchmen (Gorter and Pannekoek) have obviously got muddled on this. In *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* we shall explain this affair again and again.

We must conduct matters so as to:

(1) stop *Kommunist*;

(2) in publishing the miscellany about the Jews,[237] give Yuri + Eug. Bosh as *much* humouring, rights and privileges as possible (it won't harm *the cause* in *this case*). Detailed conditions in a written agreement;

(3) the same as regards their transport group (take their regulations and our amendments to them);

(4) publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* under the editorship of the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

We shall invite them to contribute. We shall say to them: you have differences? Prepare a serious pamphlet! *We shall undertake to print it*. (They won't write it, because they haven't even begun to think seriously about the question; they haven't even studied it!!)

Now that will be a *business-like* policy.

Eug. Bosh has long been intending to go to Russia. There she could be useful. Here *she has nothing to do*, and she will *invent* something to do.

Do you know that *affliction* of life abroad: "inventing" things to do for people stranded abroad? A terrible affliction.

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* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 427-29.—*Ed.*

Well, that's all for the time being. Gather all the documents and put yourself abreast of the facts. We shall talk about it again and again.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I attach a copy of my reply to N. I. Bukharin on the subject of what the new "differences" mean.

Written later than March 11, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm
First published in 1929
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 7

Printed from the original

100

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

May 21, 1916

Dear Grigory,

I don't want to turn our correspondence into an altercation. The question is a serious one and, although I have discussed it more than once, I will repeat my views since it is a necessity.

After more than six mouths' work with the "publishers" (from Kiev) and several months of thinking over this experience from every point of view, the editorial hoard of the Central Organ sent them in the winter of 1915 a letter which you also signed. In this letter the editorial board stated that it was giving up participation in *Kommunist*, on account of a number of considerations which were set forth in exceptional detail, took up a great deal of space in our letter, and amounted to this: that we could not assume Party responsibility for such co-editors, that their attitude to the cause was a non-Party one, and that we must regard the temporary attempt to reach understanding as unsuccessful.

We decided to publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.

Then you began to have hesitations, which led to our last talk at Kienthal. I made a concession to you by agreeing to an attempt to restore relations, on the condition that (1) there should be an agreement between the *editorial board* of the Central Organ and the publishers for each issue; (2) they should give up their group position of an "imperialist Economic" character, their "playing" on the differences with Radek, etc.

These conditions were not written down, and you now dispute them. But that dispute has become unimpor-

tant, since you *yourself* have set forth in writing, in your draft letter to A., *your* conditions, and the publishers have *not* accepted *even these*! (and you had been assuring me that the question was settled, that they would not insist on equal rights!).

The fact is, consequently, that if, even after our meeting at Kienthal, one were to accept your "interpretation", i.e., that I had laid down more extensive conditions than you, even so, *your* lesser conditions have also been rejected by the publishers.

It is obvious that your direct and unquestionable duty after this was to attack the publishers with all your strength, to break with them for good, and to use every effort to prove to Alexander that it was impossible to have any dealings with these gentry as editors of a leading journal.

Instead of this you propose to surrender to them, to renounce all conditions and to withdraw the letter written by the editorial board of the Central Organ which you yourself signed! And this on the pretext that "they should not be taken seriously". In reality, what you are proposing is that *your* policy should *not* be taken seriously. You reduce the letter from the editorial board to devil knows what, abjure your own point of view and give the *right* to the publishers to draw the conclusion that the editorial board of the Central Organ was merely throwing its weight about!

These are no longer hesitations, these are hesitations cubed, which are turning into something much worse.

It remains for me only to repeat for the last time why I don't enter *Kommunist*, why I consider it anti-Party and harmful, why I maintain the position of the letter from the editorial board of the Central Organ breaking with the publishers.

We concluded a temporary "federation" with the publishers, and called it a "federation" in so many words, quite definitely making a reservation about its temporary character, "as an experiment". When we concluded this temporary alliance, the publishers were *opposing* the wobblings of Bukharin (at the Conference in Berne in March 1915), and there *was not* a single fact pointing to any rapprochement of this group of three (the publishers + Bukharin) with special views of their own.

But after the very first number of the journal they did come together in this way, and when, after a long preliminary correspondence, I called their trend "imperialist Economism", you wrote to me that you agreed. This was in March 1916. It confirmed once more the most detailed letter from the editorial board of the Central Organ written during the winter.

The Party—and international—situation now is such that the Central Committee must continue to go ahead independently, *not tying its hands* either in Russian or in international affairs. The "publishers", good for nothing as writers and as politicians (which the editorial board of the Central Organ was obliged to recognise in its winter letter), want to *tie us down* with an agreement about *equal rights*, i.e., we must agree to grant equal rights to a lady who hasn't written a single line and doesn't understand a single thing, and to a "young man" who is entirely under her influence. And they will make use of this equality to *play* on our differences with Radek, with Bukharin and others!

It is simply madness to agree to equal rights on such conditions, it means ruining all the work.

It is not true that they want "only a discussion". They have every opportunity for a discussion. They have money. Nearly a year has gone by. Why don't they write, why don't they publish discussion pamphlets? Because they don't want to take responsibility *themselves*! That is clear. And it is this that constitutes their mockery of Party principles, because anyone who proclaims that he has differences must think out his case, come forward openly, face his responsibility, and not "play" and not aspire to "equality" when the Party does not even know the position they take up (and when *they* have no position).

It is a fact that Bukharin stumbles at every step into the views which he set forth in writing in March 1915 (at the Conference), and which you *also* rejected. You admitted this fact by agreeing in March 1916 (a year later) with my assessment of "imperialist Economism".

By granting "equality", you grant equality in face of the Party to the wobblings of Bukharin! You tie our hands and encourage these wobblings. That is an insane policy.

You know that Radek, in the first place, was so "offend-

ed" (at our insistence on the printing of our theses in Pannekoek's journal[238]) that—as you yourself wrote to me in March 1916—he carries on "no team work" with you! And the differences with him have not disappeared; on the contrary, you yourself agreed with me that his estimate of the Irish insurrection was a philistine one. And you propose to give "equality" to publishers who hide behind Radek, playing (for 2,000 francs!) on our differences with him!! This is an insane policy.

Secondly, Radek is one thing and the editorial board of his paper (*Gazeta Robotnicza*) is another. That this paper has also started a game (using the Chkheidze group, Trotsky, etc.) you yourself have admitted. Remember that this paper appeared in February 1916, and that the letter of the Committee of Organisations Abroad* *against* it was worked out with your participation. Well then, is it serious politics if we now in our leading journal grant "equality" to people who want to make their career by "utilising" our struggle with the Poles, who betrayed us to Vandervelde and Kautsky on July 3 (16), 1914??

Thirdly, you know that at Kienthal Radek wanted to build up a majority against us among the Left, at the meeting of the Left, making use of Fröhlich, the Robmann woman, etc., and that an *ultimatum* was required to force him to recognise the *independence* of our Central Committee. What *new* "game" will these people make of this when the question arises of the attitude to Junius (the question has already arisen), or of a "mechanical separation" from the Kautskians and others! Do you *guarantee* that there will be none?? If you do, this would amount on your part to renouncing all our policy. If you don't, then it is insane to tie our hands after this in the editorial board of our leading journal.

In no circumstances do I accept this insane policy. This is my final decision. I continue to think that only the publication of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* disentangles the affair (which you want to put in a hopeless tangle). *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* groups around us a number of most useful workers (Varin, Safarov, the Letts, etc.), detaches Bukharin

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 157-60.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

from the publishers to us, enables us to *lead* the Party (and the international Left) and not to march at the tall of Madam Publisher.

Write to me precisely what your decision is. Formally the matters now stand in this way, that the editorial board of the Central Organ has broken with *Kommunist*, and its final attempt (even your *lesser* conditions) has been rejected. That means that we must announce in print that *Kommunist* has stopped, and that *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* is going to appear.

I shake your hand and send you *salut*.

V. U.

Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 4

Printed from the original

101

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear A.,

Evidently there has been an interruption in our correspondence, and *quite a number* of misunderstandings have been caused by your not receiving our second letter sent to Stockholm. Otherwise I cannot understand *how* you can write that we don't answer your questions. We replied to *everything* in the greatest detail; it was *you* who *didn't* reply to us. N. K. is writing very often; we will have to be patient and repeat some things in order to achieve results. It is essential to maintain regular correspondence.

About *Kommunist* you write to me that the split with Chkheidze arouses no doubts. In whom? In Bukharin and Co.!

But what I wrote was that this relates not to Bukharin and Co. but to *Radek and Co.*

Kommunist was our temporary bloc with two groups or elements—(1) Bukharin and Co., (2) Radek and Co. While it was possible to march together with them, this *was* the right thing *to do*. Now it *is not*—and we must *temporarily* part or, more correctly, move away.

The Poles adopted in the *summer* of 1915 (*after* No. 1-2 of *Kommunist*) and printed *only in 1916* a resolation which once again showed their wobblings on the question of Chkheidze. Is it reasonable *now* to afford them the *possibility* and *right* (they are, after all, staff members of *Kommunist*!!) to muscle in and spoil the journal with their squabbling??

In my belief, it is not reasonable. It is much more useful for the cause to take another title (*Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*) and *wait a while*, until the Poles have learned better (or until they come under Germany) or until the situation changes.

Further. About Bukharin and Co. I will certainly send you (though not very soon, because it depends on a journey to Berne) Bukharin's "theses" of the *spring* of 1915. Then you will see what it is all about:

1) In the spring of 1915 Bukharin (at the Conference!) writes theses in which he is visibly rolling down into the *swamp*. The Japanese[239] are *against* him. (Therefore we temporarily accept the maximum of concessions in *Kommunist*, in order to create a form convenient for *clearing up* the affair: shall we succeed in overcoming Bukharin's waverings "in comradely fashion"? will E. B., who calls herself a Bolshevik, help in this or not?)

2) In the summer of 1915 (or approaching the autumn) Bukharin + *the Japanese*, now as a group of three, sign the theses about self-determination. *Utterly wrong*, in our opinion, and a *repetition* of Bukharin's mistakes.

3) At the beginning of 1916 Bukharin on the question of the "Dutch Programme" (from No. 3 of the *Bulletin* of the I.S.C) *again* returns to the ideas of his spring theses of 1915!!!

The conclusion? A bloc is impossible in this case *also*. We must *wait* until Bukharin's waverings have ceased. A journal which would be an organ of Polish-Bukharin waverings would be *harmful*. It would be harmful in such a situation to cling to the old title, and not to be capable of selecting another (*Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*).

The non-Party and dishonest behaviour of the Japanese lies in this, that they want to throw the responsibility for *their* wobblings *on us*. Excuse us, kind friends, we shall not allow you to do this! If you want to be Party people, you will help us partly in money to publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, where we (after all, we are not wobbling) will analyse your mistakes in comradely fashion *without* naming you, *not giving* the enemy the chance to rejoice and gloat.

Moreover, if the Japanese took seriously the most serious question of differences (abroad *il n'y a qu'un pas** to a separate faction!! You can believe me, I've been seeing this happen for about 20 years!!), they would force themselves to study the difference, think it over, work at it (they did

* There is but one step.—*Ed.*

not think and did *not* study, but simply *blurted out the first thing that came into their heads*). They would have given a full statement of *their* differences, either in a manuscript for an intimate circle of leading comrades (who could have helped in *not* giving publicity to the question in the press), or in a pamphlet if *they* wanted to "go into print" (they've got the money).

Then *they themselves* would be answering for their "ideas". That is essential. If you want to teach the workers new truths —*answer for them*, and don't throw responsibility on us, don't hide behind us (we are nobodies, let Lenin and Co. answer to the Party for the "discussion", i.e., for the gloating of our enemies).

No, kind friends!! That won't wash!! *I* am not going to answer for *your* wobblings. We shall publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* even without your help, Messrs. Japanese. We shall grant you a *postponement*: think it over, clear up your ideas, *decide* finally whether you want to assume responsibility for a new muddle or not. If all you want is to "match" *us* against the Poles and the Dutch in the Russian press, that we *won't* allow you to do.

This is the situation, these are my views; and I repeat that I will certainly send you Bukharin's spring theses, so that you can judge the whole situation *according to the documents*.

N. K. is writing today about self-determination. We are *not* for fragmentation. But what about the question of *annexations*? Bukharin and Co. (just like Radek with Rosa Luxemburg and Pannekoek) have not thought over what it means to be "against old and new annexations" (the formula *in the press* drawn up by Radek)?? Why, that *is* "self-determination of nations", only expressed in *other* words!

Well, so long until next time.

Yours,
Lenin

Written earlier than June 17, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1929
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

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102

TO M. N. POKPOVSKY[240]

July 2, 1916

Dear M. N.,

I am sending you the manuscript* today by registered post. All the material, the plan and the greater part of the work were already completed on the plan as ordered, 5 signatures (200 manuscript pages), so that to cut it down once more to 3 signatures was absolutely impossible. It will be terribly disappointing if they don't publish it! Wouldn't it be possible at least to get it printed in the journal of the same publisher?[241]" Unfortunately, for some reason my correspondence with him has lapsed.... As regards the name of the author, I would, of course, prefer my usual pseudonym. If that is inconvenient, I suggest another: N. Lenivtsyn. Or if you want to, take any other. As regards the notes, I would earnestly ask you to retain them; you will see from No. 101 that they are exceptionally important for me. And then in Russia the students, etc., are also readers: they need to have the literature indicated to them. I deliberately selected a most economical system (in the sense of space and *paper*). Using small type, 7 manuscript pages mean something like two pages of print. I particularly ask you to leave in the notes, or to appeal to the publisher to leave them. As regards the title: if the one given is inconvenient, if it is desirable to avoid the word imperialism, then put in: "The Basic Peculiarities of Contemporary Capitalism." (The

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* This was the MS. of Lenin's book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304).—*Ed.*

subheading, "A Popular Outline", is unquestionably necessary, because a number of important matters are set forth in that style.) The first sheet with a list of chapters, some of which have headings that are perhaps not quite convenient from the point of view of the restrictions, I am sending for you. If you find it more convenient and safer, retain it and don't send it further. Altogether it would be very pleasant if both could be printed in the journal of the same publisher. If you see nothing inconvenient in this, drop them a line about it. I shall be very grateful to you. I shake your hand and send my best greetings.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. I strove with all my might to adapt myself to the "restrictions". It's terribly difficult for me and I feel there is a great deal of unevenness on account of this. But it can't be helped!

Sent from Zurich to Sceaux (Seine), France

First published in full in 1932 in the second edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIX

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103

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Bukharin's article is beyond question unsuitable.[242] There is not any shadow of a "theory of the imperialist state". There is a summary of data about the growth of state capitalism, and nothing else. To fill an illegal journal with this most legal material would be absurd. It must be rejected (with supreme politeness, promising every assistance in getting it published legally).*

But perhaps we had better wait for Yuri's article, and not write to Bukharin for the time being.

We should wait, too, with the letter to Bukharin about their "faction", otherwise he will think that we have rejected it out of "factionalism".

To pose the question of the "epoch" and the "*present war*", as though they were "extremes", is just what is meant by falling into eclecticism. Just as though our aim were to strike the "happy mean" between "extremes"!!!

The problem is to give a *correct* definition of the relationship of the *epoch* to the *present* war. This has been done both in the resolutions and in my articles: "the *present* imperialist war is *not an exception*, but a typical phenomenon in the imperialist *epoch*." [The typical is not the unique.]

One cannot understand the present war without understanding the epoch.

When people say this about the epoch, this is not just a phrase. It is correct. And your quotations from my old articles say *only* that. *They are correct*.

* Privately, in my own name, I will advise Bukharin to change the title and retain *only* the economic part. For the political part is quite incomplete, not thought out, useless.

But when people draw from this the conclusion, *as they have begun to do*, that "in the epoch of imperialism there *cannot* be national wars", that is nonsense. It is an obvious error—historical and political and *logical* (for an epoch is a sum of varied phenomena, in which in addition to the typical there is *always* something else).

And you *repeat this error*, when you write in your remarks:

"Small countries cannot in the present epoch defend their fatherland."

[=the vulgarisers]

Untrue!! This is just the error of Junius, Radek, the "disarmers" and the Japanese!!

One should say: "Small countries, *too*, cannot *in imperialist wars*, which are most typical of the current imperialist epoch, defend their fatherland."

That is quite different.

In this difference lies the *whole essence* of the case against the *vulgarisers*. And it's just the *essence* which you haven't noticed.

Grimm repeats the error of the vulgarisers, and you *indulge* him by providing a wrong formulation. On the contrary, it is just now that we must (both in talks and in articles) refute the vulgarisers for Grimm's benefit.

We are not at all against "defence of the fatherland" *in general*, not against "defensive wars" *in general*. You will *never* find that nonsense in a single resolution (or in any of my articles). We are against defence of the fatherland and a defensive position in the *imperialist war* of 1914-16 and in other *imperialist* wars, typical of the imperialist *epoch*. But in the imperialist *epoch* there *may* be also "just", "defensive", revolutionary wars [namely (1) national, (2) civil, (3) socialist *and suchlike*].

N.B.

Written in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein (Switzerland)

First published in 1932 in *Bolshevik* No. 22

Printed from the original

104

TO N. I. BUKHARIN

Dear Com.,

Unfortunately we cannot print the article "On the Theory of the Imperialist State". As it turns out, so much space is occupied with material from Russia that all other subjects are restricted, and there is not enough money. Things are difficult.

But the main thing is not that. The main thing is some defects in the article.

The title does not correspond to the contents. The article consists of two parts, the combination of which has been insufficiently thought out: (1) about the state in general, and (2) about state capitalism and its growth (especially in Germany). The second part is good and useful, but nine-tenths legal. We would advise you to print it in one of the legal reviews (if not in *Letopis*), after *very* little alteration, and would be ready to do everything we can to help such publication.

The first part touches on a subject of tremendous importance in principle, but that's just it—it only *touches* on it. We cannot, when publishing a review once a year, print on such a basic question of theory an article which has been insufficiently thought out. Leaving aside the polemic against Gumplowicz, etc. (that would also be better worked over and *developed* into a legal article), we must point out a number of extremely inexact formulations by the author.

Marxism is a "sociological" (???) "theory of the state"; the state=the "general"(?) organisation of the ruling classes; the quotations from Engels are *broken off* just at those

points which are *particularly* important, if you are discussing this subject. The distinction between the Marxists and the anarchists on the question of the state (pp. 15-16) has been defined *absolutely incorrectly*: if you are to deal with this subject, you must speak *not* in that way; you *must not* speak in that way. The conclusion (the author gives it in italics): "Social-Democracy must intensively underline its hostility in principle to the state power" (p. 53)—[compare: the proletariat creates "its provisional state organisation of power" (p. 54) ("state organisation of power"!?)]—is also either supremely inexact, or incorrect.

Our advice is to work up into legal articles (α) the section about state capitalism and (β) the polemic with Gumplowicz and Co. Leave the rest *to mature*. That is our conviction.

Written at the end of August
and beginning of September 1916

Sent from Flums (Switzerland)
to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1932
in *Bolshevik* No, 22

Printed from the original

105

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

Evidently Belenin's decision about his "trip" has already been taken, judging by the letter which Grigory has sent me today. And the time is quite short! Yet we have particular reason to exchange letters and come to an understanding with him: this is now incredibly important. Therefore I most earnestly request you to take all possible steps to see Belenin *personally*, to pass on to him all that follows, and *frankly* and also in detail write to me (without fail!) how matters stand, i.e., whether or not there are differences, divergencies, etc., between us and Belenin, and what they are (and how to eliminate them, if they exist).

The elimination of James[243] (I earnestly ask you *not* to say one word about this elimination to a *single* person abroad: you cannot imagine how dangerous in *all* respects is chatter abroad on these subjects, and *in connection* with such events)—the elimination of James makes the position critical and once again raises the question of the general plan of work.

In my convinced opinion, this plan is composed, first, of the *theoretical* line, secondly, of the most immediate *tactical* tasks and, thirdly, of direct organisational tasks.

(1) On the first point, the order of the day now is not only the *continuation* of the line we have endorsed (against tsarism, etc.) in our resolutions and pamphlet* (this line has

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* The resolutions of the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad and the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64, 295-338).—*Ed.*

been remarkably confirmed by events, by the split in Britain,[244] etc.), but also cleansing it of the stupidities which have accumulated, and the muddle about rejecting democracy (this includes disarmament, repudiation of self-determination, the theoretically wrong rejection "in general" of defence of the fatherland, the wobblings on the question of the role and significance of the state in general, etc.).

It will be an extreme pity if Belenin does not receive my article in reply to Kievsky (just yesterday it was sent to be transcribed, and will he ready only in a few days). What are we to do? Don't neglect the necessity of coming to an understanding on theoretical questions: really and truly, it is essential for work in such difficult times. Think over whether we could not put into effect the following plan (or something similar); I am beginning to realise that Belenin's wife is not in America, as I thought, but in Spain, through which Belenin will of course travel now. Could we not organise the copying and passing on of manuscripts to his wife in Spain? In that case perhaps my article, too, even if sent in a week from now, would reach Belenin in time, because he will certainly spend a few days in Spain.

Think it over; apart from this special case, regular correspondence with Belenin's wife, and with Spain in general, is extremely important. Spain is a supremely important point just now, because it is still more convenient to work there than in Britain and elsewhere.

I cannot dwell more fully on theoretical agreement. The enemy has already seized on the stupid repudiation of the significance of democracy (Potresov[245] in No. 1 of *Dyelo*). Bazarov has made a fool of himself in *Letopis*. Bogdanov is talking *another kind* of balderdash, but *also* balderdash in *Letopis*. An exceptionally suspicious bloc of the Machists and the O.C.-ists has come into being there. A shameful bloc! It's hardly likely that we can break it up.... Should we perhaps try a bloc with the Machists against the O.C.-ists? Hardly likely to succeed!! Gorky is always supremely spineless in politics, a prey to emotion and passing moods.

The legal press in Russia is acquiring exceptional importance, and therefore the question of the correct line, too, becomes still more and more important, because it is easier for the enemy to "bombard" us in this field.

The best thing would be, probably, if Belenin could have a "base" in Spain and receive our letters and manuscripts there: we could continue our discussion, exchange letters, Belenin could return there soon after his short trip further on (for the danger is very great, and it would be much more useful for our cause if Belenin made *brief* trips round a few cities and then returned to Spain, or to where he is now, or to a neighbouring country to *consolidate* contacts, etc.).

On the second point. The main thing now, I think, is to publish popular leaflets and manifestos against tsarism. Consider whether this could be organised in Spain? If not, we shall prepare them here and send them on. For this *the most efficient* transport contacts are essential. You were quite right: the Japanese have proved *absolutely* useless. Best of all would be foreigners, with whom we could correspond in English or some other foreign language. I will not dwell on the question of transport, because you yourself realise and know this. The trouble is that there is no money, but they should collect some in Petersburg.

The main Party question in Russia has been *and remains* the question of "unity". Trotsky in the 500 or 600 issues of his paper has not managed to speak out, or to think out, fully whether there is to be unity with Chkheidze, Skobelev and Co., or not. I think there are still some "unifiers" in Petersburg as well, though very weak (was it not they who published *Rabochiye Vedomosti* in Petersburg?).[246] "Makar", they say, is in Moscow and also playing the conciliator. Conciliationism and unificationism is the most harmful thing for the workers' party in Russia—not just idiocy, but the *destruction* of the Party. For *in practice* "unification" (or conciliation and the like) with Chkheidze and Skobelev (they are the key point, because they give themselves out to be "internationalists") is "unity" with the O.C., and through it with Potresov and Co., i.e., in practice it is *playing the lackey* to the social-chauvinists. If Trotsky and Co. have not understood this, so much the worse for them. *Dyelo* No. 1 and—especially—the participation of the workers in the war industries committees, *prove* that this is so.

Not only in elections to the Duma the day after peace is signed, but in general on *all* questions of Party practice, "unity" with Chkheidze and Co. is the *essential question*

today. We can rely only on those who have understood just how deceptive the idea of unity is and how necessary it is to break with that fraternity (Chkheidze and Co.) in Russia. Belenin ought to rally *only* such people as leaders.

By the way, a split on the international scale is also due. I consider it quite timely now that *all* class-conscious leading workers in Russia should understand this, and should adopt resolutions in favour of an organisational break with the Second International, with the International Bureau of Huysmans, Vandervelde and Co., in favour of building a Third International *only* against the Kautskians of all countries (Chkheidze and Co., also Martov and Axelrod= the Russian Kautskians), *only* in rapprochement with people who take the stand of the Zimmerwald Left.

On the third point. The most pressing question now is the weakness of contacts between us and leading workers in Russia!! No correspondence!! No one but James, and now he has gone!! We can't go on like that. We *cannot* organise either the publication of leaflets or transport, either agreement about manifestos or sending over their drafts, etc., etc., without *regular* secret correspondence. That is the key question!

This Belenin did not do on his first visit (probably he couldn't at the time). Convince him, for Christ's sake, that this must be done on the second visit! It must be done!! The immediate success of the visit, really and truly, must be measured by the number of contacts!! (Of course the personal influence of Belenin is still more important, but he *will not be able* to stop anywhere for long without destroying himself and harming the cause.) The number of contacts in each city will be the measure of the success of his visit!! Two-thirds of the contacts, as a minimum, in each city, should be with leading *workers*, i.e., they should *write* themselves, *themselves* master secret correspondence (artists are made, not born), should themselves each train up 1-2 "heirs" in case of arrest. This should not be entrusted to the intelligentsia alone. Certainly not. It can and must be done by the leading workers. Without this it is *impossible* to establish continuity and purpose in our work—and that is the main thing.

That's all, I think.

As regards legal literature, I will also add:

it is important to ascertain whether they will accept my articles in *Letopis* (if the O.C.-ists cannot be thrown out by means of a bloc with the Machists). With restrictions? Which?

We must find out in greater detail about Volna.[247]

As regards myself personally, I will say that I need to earn. Otherwise we shall simply die of hunger, really and truly!! The cost of living is devilishly high, and there is nothing to live on. The cash must be dragged *by force** out of the publisher of *Letopis*, to whom my two pamphlets** have been sent (let him pay *at once* and as much as possible!). The same with Bonch. The same as regards *translations*. If this is not organised I really will not be able to hold out, this is absolutely serious, absolutely, absolutely.

I shake you firmly by the hand and send a thousand best wishes to Belenin. Drop me a line that you have received this *immediately*, just two words.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Write *frankly*, in what state of mind Bukharin is leaving? Will he write to us or not? Will he carry out our requests or not? Correspondence (with America) is possible only through Norway. Tell him this and arrange it.

Written later than October 3, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm
First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* About cash Belenin will have a talk with Katin, and with Gorky himself, of course *if it is not* inconvenient.

** Reference is to *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture* and *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102, 185-304).—*Ed.*

106

TO FRANZ KORITSCHONER[248]

October 25, 1916

Dear Friend,

We regret very much that you haven't written a single line to us so far. One must hope that the big events in Vienna will stimulate you at long last to write to us in detail.

Berner Tagwacht (and then other papers) printed a report that at a war factory in Speyer (Austria) there was a strike of 24,000 workers, that Czech soldiers opened fire, and that 700 (seven hundred!) workers were killed! How much truth is there in this? Please let us know about it in as much detail as you can.

As regards the act of Friedrich Adler,[249] I would beg you to let us know the details.

The papers here (*Berner Tagwacht* and *Volksrecht*—do you get them both, or neither?) extol this act. *Avanti!* (does *Avanti!* reach you?) states that Friedrich Adler was the author of the famous manifesto of the Austrian internationalists. Is that true? And is it now convenient to speak about this openly?

(1) Did Friedrich Adler tell anyone about his plan? (2) Did he give any friend any documents, letters, statements to be published later? (3) Is it true, as the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* writes, that *everywhere* (both in the railway club and in other places) he was in a minority (and how big was that minority?), (4)——that his position in the organisation had become "unbearable" (?)—(5)—that at the last party conference he received only *seven* votes?—(6) that at the last two meetings of trusted agents he attacked the

party extremely sharply and demanded "demonstrations"? (What kind precisely?)

Please write us in as much detail as possible about all these questions, and in general give us more information and details about Friedrich Adler. Unless you give us special instructions to the contrary, *we shall print* in our papers everything that we get from you (and will also publish them—as material from our editorial office—in the local German-language press).

As regards the political assessment of the act, we maintain, of course, our old conviction, confirmed by decades of experience, that individual terrorist acts are *inexpedient* methods of political struggle.

"Killing is no murder,"* wrote our old *Iskra* about terrorist acts; we are *not at all opposed* to political killing (in this sense the servile writings of the opportunists in *Vorwärts* and the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* are simply revolting), but as revolutionary tactics individual attacks are inexpedient and harmful. Only the mass movement can be considered genuine political struggle. Only in direct, immediate connection with the mass movement can and must individual terrorist acts be of value. In Russia the terrorists (against whom we always struggled) carried out a number of individual attacks; but in December 1905, when matters at last reached the stage of a mass movement, insurrection—when it was necessary to help the *masses* to use violence—then just at that moment the "terrorists" were *missing*. That is where the terrorists make their mistake.

Adler would have been of much greater help to the revolutionary movement if, without being afraid of a split, he had systematically gone over to illegal propaganda and agitation. It would be very good if some Left group were found to publish a leaflet in Vienna which would inform the workers of its view; if it branded in the sharpest possible way the servile behaviour of the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* and *Vorwärts*, morally justified Adler's act ("killing is no murder"), but as a *lesson* for the workers declared: not terrorism but systematic, prolonged, self-sacrificing activity in revolutionary propaganda and agitation, demon-

* These words were written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

strations, etc., etc., *against* the lackey-like opportunist party, *against* the imperialists, *against* one's own governments, *against* the war—that is what is needed.

Tell us also, please, how right it would be to regard Adler's act as a gesture of *despair*? I think that politically it is so. He had lost his faith in the party, he could not bear the fact that it was impossible to work with this party, that it was impossible to work with Victor Adler, he could not accept the idea of a split and take upon himself the burdensome task of a struggle against the party. And as a result of his despair came this attempt.

An act of despair of a Kautskian (*Volksrecht* writes that Adler was not a supporter of the Zimmerwald Left, but rather a Kautskian).

But we revolutionaries cannot fall into despair. We are not afraid of a split. On the contrary, we recognise the necessity of a split, we explain to the masses why a split is inevitable and necessary, we call for work against the old party and for revolutionary mass struggle.

What trends (*resp*. what individual shades of opinion) exist in Vienna and in Austria in assessing Adler's act?

I am afraid that the Vienna Government will declare Friedrich Adler insane, and not let matters come to a trial. But if they do, it will certainly be essential to organise the distribution of leaflets.

Write more and in greater detail, and observe exactly all technical precautions.

Best greetings!

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in German
Sent from Zurich to Vienna
First published in *Pravda* No. 60, March 1, 1932

Printed from the original

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TO N. D. KIKNADZE[250]

Dear Comrade,

Thank you very much for your story of the Geneva arguments.[251] It is very important for us to have reactions from our readers. It's a pity that we rarely get to know them.

Lunacharsky, Bezrabotny and Co. are people without heads.

I advise you to put the question to them squarely: let them produce *written* theses (and afterwards in the press), brief and clear (like our resolutions)—(1) about self-determination (§ 9 of our Party Programme). Do they agree or not with the resolution of 1913?

If they don't, why have they kept silent? Why haven't they produced their own?

(2) *Why* do they reject defence of the fatherland in the present war?

(3) *How* do they pose the question of "defence of the fatherland"?

(4) What is their attitude to national wars, and (5)—to national insurrections?

Let them reply!

They will muddle themselves up like children, I'll take a bet. They haven't understood *anything whatever* on the question of the historical character of the "nation" and of "defence of the fatherland".

Since you want to argue with them, I send you my article from No. 3 (or 4) of *Sbornik* on this subject.[252] *This is private*, *i.e.*, *only for you*: after reading it, return it to me

or give it to the Karpinskys, *to return to me with their next packet*. I cannot as yet show it to everyone.

I thought that you had left, and therefore sent my letter about Swiss affairs only to Noah. But the letter is *intended* for you *too. Read it.* Noah does not send *a word* in reply. Strange! Very strange!

Best greetings. Get better!

Yours,
Lenin

Written at the end of October
and beginning of November 1916

Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

108

TO N. D. KIKNADZE

Dear Comrade,

You question my remark as to the *possibility* of transforming the present imperialist war, *too*, into a national war.

Your argument? "We shall have to defend an imperialist fatherland"....

Is that logical? If the fatherland remains "imperialist", how can the war then be national??

The talk about "possibilities", in my opinion, has been theoretically wrongly introduced by Radek, and by § 5 of the theses of the *Internationale*.[253]

Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities.

A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put *only* precisely and unquestionably demonstrated *facts*.

That is what our (Party) resolution does.*

When *instead* of it we are presented with "impossibility", I reply: untrue, un-Marxist, a cliché. All kinds of transformation are *possible*.

And I quote a historical fact (the wars of 1792-1815). I take this example to illustrate the possibility of something like that nowadays (if there is a development *backwards*).

In my opinion, *you* are confusing the possible (about which it was *not* I who began talking!!) with the real, when you think that the recognition of a possibility allows us to alter our tactics. That is the height of illogicality.

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64.—*Ed*.

I recognise the possibility that a Social-Democrat way be transformed into a bourgeois, *and the reverse*.

An indubitable truth. Does it follow from this that I will now recognise a *particular* bourgeois, Plekhanov, as a Social-Democrat? No, it does not follow. But what about the possibility? Let's wait for it to be transformed into reality.

That's all. It is precisely in "methodology" (about which you write) that one must distinguish the possible from the real.

All kinds of transformation are possible, even of a fool into a wise man, but such a transformation rarely becomes *actual*. And merely because of the "possibility" of such a transformation I shall not cease to consider the fool to be a fool.

Your perplexities about "dualistic" training are not clear to me. For I *concretely* gave the example (Norway) both in *Prosveshcheniye** and in my article against Kievsky.**

You *don't* reply to that!! You choose the quite unclear example of Poland.

This is not "dualistic" training, but *reducing* different things to a common denominator, bringing Nizhni and Smolensk to a *common* Moscow.

A Swedish Social-Democrat who does not stand for the *freedom* of secession for Norway is a scoundrel. This you do not challenge. A Norwegian Social-Democrat may be either *for* secession or *against* it. Is unity on such a question obligatory for all Social-Democrats of all countries? No. That would be a cliché, a ridiculous cliché, a ridiculous pretension.

We never blamed the Polish Social-Democrats (I wrote this in *Prosveshcheniye*) because *they* were against the independence of Poland.

Instead of a simple, clear, theoretically unchallengeable argument: we cannot now be for the *kind* of democratic

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* See "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 425-30).—*Ed.*

** See "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (ibid., Vol. 23, pp. 48-55).—*Ed.*

demand (for an independent Poland) that *in practice* subordinates us *completely* to one of the imperialist powers or coalitions

(this is unquestionable, this is enough; it is essential and sufficient)

—instead of this they talked themselves into an absurdity: "It is unrealisable."

We laughed this out of court in 1903 and in April 1916.

The good Polish Social-Democrats almost, almost proved the unrealisability of a new Polish state, only ... only the imperialist Hindenburg interfered: he went and realised it.[254]

To what ridiculous pedantry people descend when they desire (from the Cracow point of view[255]) to make more profound (or more foolish?) the "economic" aspect!!

The P.S.D. have got themselves into the position of repudiating "*Staatenbau*"*!! But is not all democracy *Staatenbau*? And the independence for the Dutch Indies which Gorter demands, is *not* that the *Staatenbau*?

We are for freedom of secession for the Dutch Indies. But is a Social-Democrat of the Dutch Indies *bound* to be for secession? There is another example for you of what you call "dualistic" training!!

War is the continuation of politics. Belgium is a colonialist country, you argue. Nevertheless, shall we really be unable to determine *which* politics the *present* war continues, the politics of Belgian slave-owning or of Belgian liberation??

I think we shall be able to.

And if anyone loses his way, that will be a question of *fact*.

One cannot, after all, "prohibit" national wars (as Radek wants) out of fear that brainless people or swindlers *again* pretend that the imperialist war is a national one!! That is ridiculous, yet that is the conclusion from what Radek is saying.

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* "Building of a state."—*Ed*.

We are not against a *national* insurrection, we are *for* it. That is clear. And we cannot go further than that: we shall consider each case concretely, and I don't think we shall take the rebellion of the South in the United States in 1863 as a "national insurrection"....

I had Engels's article from the Grünberg Archives,[256] but sent it away to Grigory. I shall get it back from him and *send it to you*.

Very best greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

N. K. asks me very much to send her greetings too.

Written later than November 5, 1916

Sent from Zurich to Geneva

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Of course, I also want to correspond. Let's continue our correspondence.

How I laughed over your postcard, I really had to hold my sides, as they say. "In France there is no such measure as the ha, but there is the acre, and you don't know how big an acre is...."

That really is funny!

It was *France—imaginez-vous*?—that introduced the metric system. According to the metric system, adopted in most countries of the world, a ha = hectare = 100 ares. An acre is *not* a French measure but an English one, about 4/10 of a hectare.

You mustn't be offended over my laughing. I didn't mean any harm. After all, is it so surprising that you do not often come across the words hectare, ha, etc.? They are dull, technical words.

Many thanks for translating the theses.[257] I will send them to Abramovich and Guilbeaux.

Alter them for France? It's hardly worth the while, much is different there.

Today there was a meeting of the Lefts here: *not* everyone came, only 2 Swiss + 2 foreigners (Germans) + 3 Russ. Jew. Polish* ... *Schwach*! I think it will be almost a failure: the second meeting will be in ten days' time.... It's difficult for them, because what it *actually* amounts to is a war

* And the lecture did not come off, only a talk.

with Grimm, and their forces are too small. Well, we'll see.

As regards women, I agree with your addendum.

You are being captious about the thesis that Social-Democrats (1) in *Switzerland* (2) now should not vote in any circumstances for war credits. After all, the beginning goes on *all the time* about the *present*, imperialist war. Nothing else but that.

"The working men have no country"—this means that (α) his economic position (*le salariat**) is not national but international, (β) his class enemy is international, (γ) the conditions of his emancipation also, (δ) the international unity of the workers is *more important* than the national.

Does this mean, does it follow from this, that we *should not* fight *when it is a question* of throwing off a foreign yoke?? Yes or no?

A war of colonies for emancipation?

—of Ireland against England?

And an insurrection (national), is not that defence of the fatherland?

I will send you my article against Kievsky about this.**

If you need more books, *write*. One can get a lot here, and all the same I am often in the libraries.

All the best.

Lenin

Written on November 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg
(Switzerland)
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* Wages system.—*Ed.*

** See "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 28-76).—*Ed.*

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

As regards rewording for the French, I would not undertake it.* Perhaps you will try?

They were written for the Swiss: the "military part" here is a special one (for a small state), the inner-party situation is different, etc., etc. Besides, I would not be able to find *concrete* material about France.

I should be heartily glad to do something for the French Left, but somehow contacts don't get established. Grisha writes long but exceptionally meaningless letters, full of water, chews old stuff, nothing business-like, tells us nothing precise about the French *Left*, and establishes no, absolutely no contact with them.

As regards the fatherland, you evidently want to establish a contradiction between my writings previously (when? 1913? where precisely? what precisely?) and now. I don't think there are any contradictions. Find the exact texts, then we shall look at it again.

Of course, there were always differences between the orthodox and the opportunists as to the conception of fatherland (cf. Plekhanov 1907 or 1910, Kautsky 1905 and 1907, and Jaurès: *L'armée nouvelle*). I entirely agree with this: here the divergence was a radical one. I don't think I have ever said anything against that.

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* Lenin refers to his theses "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 137-48).—*Ed*.

That the defence of the fatherland is admissible (when it is admissible) only as the defence of democracy (in the appropriate epoch), is my opinion too.

Of course, proletarians should never "merge" with the general democratic movement. Marx and Engels did not "merge" with the bourgeois-democratic movement in Germany in 1848. We Bolsheviks did not "merge" with the bourgeois-democratic movement in 1905.

We Social-Democrats always stand for democracy, not "in the name of capitalism", but in the name of clearing the path for *our* movement, which clearing is impossible without the development of capitalism.

Best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. If you need books, write.

Written on November 25, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg
(Switzerland)

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in *Bolshevik* No. 1

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

As regards "defence of the fatherland" I don't know whether we differ or not. You find a contradiction between my article in the collection of articles *To the Memory of Marx** and my present statements, *without quoting* either precisely. I cannot reply to this. I haven't got the collection *To the Memory of Marx*. Of course, I cannot remember word for word what I wrote in it. Without *precise* quotations, then and now, I am not able to reply to *such* an argument on your part.

But *generally* speaking, it seems to me that you argue somehow in a somewhat one-sided and formalist manner. You have taken *one* quotation from the *Communist Manifesto* (the working men have no country) and you seem to want to apply it without any reservations, *up to and including the repudiation of national wars*.

The whole spirit of Marxism, its whole system, demands that each proposition should be considered (α) only historically, (β) only in connection with others, (γ) only in connection with the concrete experience of history.

The fatherland is an historical concept. The fatherland in an epoch or, more precisely, at the *moment* of struggle for the overthrow of national oppression, is one thing. At the moment when national movements have been left far behind, it is another thing. For the "three types of countries" (§ 6 of our theses on self-determination**) there *cannot*

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* See "Marxism and Revisionism" (present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 29-39).—*Ed*.

** See "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 150-52).—*Ed*.

be a proposition about the fatherland, and its defence, identically applicable in all conditions.

In the *Communist Manifesto* it is said that the working men have no country.

Correct. But *not only* this is stated there. It is stated there also that when national states are being formed the role of the proletariat is somewhat special. To take the first proposition (the working men have no country) and *forget* its *connection* with the second (the workers are constituted as a class nationally, though not in the same sense as the bourgeoisie) will be exceptionally incorrect.

Where, then, does the connection lie? In my opinion, precisely in the fact that in the *democratic* movement (at such a moment, in such concrete circumstances) the proletariat cannot refuse to support it (and, consequently, support defence of the fatherland in a national war).

Marx and Engels said in the *Communist Manifesto* that the working men have no country. But the same Marx *called* for a *national* war more than once: Marx in 1848, Engels in 1859 (the end of his pamphlet *Po and Rhine*, where the *national* feeling of the Germans is directly inflamed, where they are directly called upon to wage a national *war*). Engels in *1891*, in view of the then threatening and advancing war of France (Boulanger) + Alexander III against Germany, *directly* recognised "defence of the fatherland".[258]

Were Marx and Engels muddlers who said one thing today and another thing tomorrow? No. In my view, admission of "defence of the fatherland" in a national war *fully* answers the requirements of Marxism. In 1891 the German *Social-Democrats* really *should have* defended their fatherland in a war against Boulanger + Alexander III. This would have been a peculiar variety of *national* war.

Incidentally, in saying this, I am *repeating* what I said in my article against Yuri.* For some reason you don't mention it. It seems to me that on the question raised here there are *precisely* in that article a number of propositions which make clear completely (or nearly so) my understanding of Marxism.

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* See "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 28-76).—*Ed.*

As to Radek—my "quarrel" (???!!!) with Radek. I had an argument last spring with Grigory, who had no understanding at all of the political situation at that time, and reproached me for breaking with the Zimmerwald Left. That is nonsense.

The connection with the Zimmerwald Left is also a conditional thing. First of all, Radek is not=the Zimmerwald Left. Secondly, there was no "break" with Radek in general, but only in a particular *sphere*. Thirdly, it is stupid to conceive of the connection with Radek in such a way that *our* hands should be tied in the *necessary* theoretical and practical struggle.

Ad 1 (to point 1). I never, anywhere, took a single step, not a suspicion of it, not merely towards a break, but even towards weakening the ties with the "Zimmerwald Left". Nobody has ever pointed one out to me, or will be able to point it out. Neither with Borchardt, nor with the Swedes, nor with Knief, etc., etc.

(Radek very meanly threw us out of the editorial board of *Vorbote*. Radek behaves in politics like a Tyszka huckster, impudent, insolent, stupid. *Grigory* wrote to me in the spring of 1916, when I was already in Zurich, that *he* had *no* "team work" with Radek. Radek has *moved away*—that is the *fact*. He moved away *on account* of *Vorbote*, both from me *and from Grigory*. On account of the impudence and huckster-like meanness of one person, the Zimmerwald Left does not cease to be Left, and there is no purpose in dragging *it* into the affair: it's not sensible, not correct,

Gazeta Robotnicza, in the number for February 1916, is a pattern of such a Tyszka-like rotten servile "game" (Radek follows in his footsteps). Anyone who *forgives* such things in politics I consider a donkey or a scoundrel. *I shall never forgive them*. For such things you punch men's faces or turn away.

Of course I did the second. And I don't repent. We did not lose a *single hair* of our ties with the *Left* Germans. When the problem arose of marching together with Radek *in practice* (the Zurich Congress of November 4-5, 1916[259]), *we went ahead* together. All Grigory's silly phrases about my break with the Zimmerwald Left proved to be a stupidity, which they always were.)

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Ad 2—the "sphere" of the break with Radek, therefore, were (α) Russian and Polish affairs. The resolution of the Committee of Organisations Abroad confirmed this. (β) The affair with Yuri and Co. Radek even now is writing (I can send you them if you wish) the most impudent letters to me (and Grigory) on the theme that, "we" (he + Bukharin + Yuri and Co.) "see things" in such-and-such a way!! Only a donkey and a scoundrel, who wants to invent an "*intrigue*", *squeezing through the crack* of differences between us and Yuri and Co., can write in this way. If Radek did *not* understand *what* he was doing, then he is a donkey. If he did understand, then he is a scoundrel.

The political task of our Party was clear: *we could not tie* our hands by equality in the editorial board with N. I.+ Yuri+E. B. (Grigory did not understand this, and drove me to a direct ultimatum: I declared that I would *resign* from *Kommunist* if we did not break with it. *Kommunist* was a good thing, *so long as* there was *no* separate programme of the trio who composed 1/2 the editorial board). To grant *equality* to a group consisting of Bukharin+Yuri+ E. B. would be idiocy and the ruin of all the work. Neither Yuri, quite a little pig, nor E. B. has a drop of brains, and if they had allowed themselves to descend to *group* stupidity with Bukharin, then we had to break with them, more precisely with *Kommunist*. And that was done.

The polemics over self-determination are only beginning as yet. Here they are in complete confusion—as *in the whole question* about the attitude to democracy. To grant "equality" to little pigs and fools—never! They didn't want to learn peaceably and in comradely fashion, so let them blame themselves. (I *pestered* them, provoking conversations about it in Berne: they turned up their noses! I wrote them letters, tens of pages long, to Stockholm—they turned up their noses! Well, if that's how it is, let them go to the devil. I did everything possible for a *peaceable* outcome. If you don't want it, I will punch your faces and expose you as idiots before the whole world. That, and only that, is the way to treat them.) But where does Radek come in, you may ask.

Because he was the "heavy artillery" of this "group", artillery hidden in the bushes on one side. Yuri and Co.

were quite skilful in their calculations (E. B. is capable as an intriguer, it turned out that she was not *leading Yuri to us*, but setting up a group against us). Their calculation was: we shall start the war, but it's Radek who will fight for us!! Radek will fight *for us*, while Lenin will have his hands *tied*.

But it didn't come off, my dear little pigs! I will not let my hands be tied in politics. If you want to fight, come out openly. But the role of Radek—secretly inciting young pigs, but himself hiding behind the "Zimmerwald Left"—is the height of scoundrelism. The most lousy ... of the Tyszka swamp could not have been playing the huckster, the lackey and the intriguer behind one's back in dirtier fashion.

Ad 3—I have already stated clearly. The question of the relationship of imperialism to democracy and the minimum programme is arising on an *ever wider* scale (see the Dutch programme in No. 3 of the *Bulletin*[260]; the American S.L.P. have thrown out the *whole* minimum programme. *Entwaffnungsfrag*e*). On this Radek has *absolute confusion* in his head (this is clear from his theses; it was also shown by the question of indirect and direct taxes raised in my theses). I will never let my hands be tied in explaining this most important and fundamental question. I cannot. The question has to be cleared up. There will be *dozens* of "falls" over it yet (they will stumble for certain).

Anyone who understands the "connection" with the Zimmerwald Left in such a way that we should let *our* hands be tied in the theoretical struggle against "imperialist Economism" (that *international* disease; Dutch-American-Russian, etc.), understands nothing. To learn by heart the words "Zimmerwald Left" and to kowtow before the utter theoretical confusion in Radek's head, that I don't accept.

The results: after Zimmerwald *manoeuvres* were *more difficult*. It was necessary to *take the essential* from Radek, E. B. and *Co.*, *without allowing one's hands to be tied*. I consider that I was successful in this. After Bukharin's departure to America and, *above all*, after Yuri had sent us his article and after *he had accepted* (he accepted! *he had*

* The question of disarmament.—*Ed.*

to accept) my reply, their affairs, as a "group", were *finished*. (Yet Grigory wanted to *perpetuate* that group, granting it *equality*: *we* would give it equality!!)

With Radek we *parted company* on the Russo-Polish arena, and *did not invite* him into our *Sbornik*.[261] *It had to be that way*.

And now he can do nothing which could *spoil* the work. He was obliged at the Zurich Congress (November 5, 1916) to go *together* with me, as now, *against Grimm*.

What does this mean? It means that I succeeded in *dividing** the questions: *not in one iota* is the internationalist pressure on the Kautskians (Grimm *y compris***) weakened, and at the same time I am not subjected to "equality" with Radek's stupidity!

Strategically I now consider the cause to have been won. It is possible that Yuri + *Co*. + Radek + Co. will *abuse me*. *Allez-y*, *mes amis!**** *Now* the *odium* will fall on *you*, not on us. But you will *now* not injure the cause, and for us the road has been cleared. We have disentangled ourselves from the *dirty* (in all senses) muddle with Yuri and Radek, *without in one iota weakening* the "Zimmerwald Left", and possessing the *requisites* for the struggle against stupidity on the question of the attitude to democracy.

Voilà. I apologise for this long letter and for the abundance of sharp words: I can't write otherwise when I am speaking frankly. Well, after all, this is all *entre nous*, and perhaps the unnecessary bad language will pass.

Best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

In general, both Radek and Pannekoek are *incorrect* in the way they approach the question of the struggle against Kautskianism. This *N.B.!!*

Written on November 30, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Clarens (Switzerland)
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* This was very difficult!!
** Included.—*Ed*.
*** Go ahead, my friends!—*Ed*.

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TO ARTHUR SCHMID[262]

Dear Comrade,

Will you allow me to suggest an amicable agreement?

I must admit that yesterday I paid insufficient attention to one very important point in your arguments.[263] Namely, the idea that the peculiarity of Switzerland lies, among other things, in her greater degree of democracy (the referendum), and that this peculiarity should be made use of also for propaganda purposes. This idea is very important and, in my opinion, completely correct.

Could we not apply this idea in such a way that our differences (which are probably very insignificant) should disappear? For example:

If we put the question for the referendum *only* in this way—for complete elimination or against?—we shall get a mixture of pacifist (bourgeois-pacifist, etc.) and socialist votes for it, i.e., we shall get not a clarification of a socialist consciousness but a darkening of it, not the application of the idea and the policy of *class struggle* to this particular question (namely, the question of militarism) but the renunciation of the point of view of the class struggle on the question of militarism.

But if we put the question for the referendum in this way-for the expropriation of large capitalist enterprises in industry and agriculture, *as the only way* of completely eliminating militarism, or against expropriation?

If we put it like that, we shall be saying in our practical policy the same thing that we all recognise theoretically,

namely, that the complete elimination of militarism is thinkable and realisable only in connection with the elimination of capitalism.

Consequently there should be approximately the following formulation: (1) we demand the *immediate* expropriation of large enterprises, perhaps in the form of a direct Federal property and income tax, with such high, revolutionarily-high, rates for large properties that the capitalists will, in fact, be expropriated.

(2) We declare that such a socialist transformation of Switzerland is economically possible already today, directly, and, in consequence of the unbearably high cost of living, is urgently necessary as well, and that for the political effecting of such a transformation Switzerland needs not a bourgeois but a proletarian government, which would rely not on the bourgeoisie but on the broad masses of hired workers and small people, and that the revolutionary mass struggle which we see beginning, for example, in the mass strikes and street demonstrations in Zurich, and which is recognised by the Aarau decision,[264] pursues *exactly* that purpose—to put a *real* end in that way to the intolerable position of the masses.

(3) We declare that such a transformation of Switzerland *will quite inevitably arouse* imitation and the most resolute enthusiastic support on the part of the working class and the mass of the exploited in *all* civilised countries, and that *only* in connection with such a transformation will *the complete elimination of militarism* for which we strive, and for which at present particularly wide masses in Europe are instinctively thirsting, become not an empty phrase, not an amiable wish, but a genuine, practically achievable and politically self-explanatory measure.

What do you think of this?

Do you not consider that, if the question is put in this way (both in practical agitation and in parliamentary speeches and proposals for a legislative initiative and for a referendum), we shall avoid *the* danger that bourgeois and "socialist" pacifists will falsely understand and misinterpret our anti-militarist slogan in the sense that we suppose it possible to completely abolish militarism in

bourgeois Switzerland, in her *imperialist* environment, *without* a socialist revolution (which, of course, is nonsense that we all unanimously repudiate).

With Party greetings,

N. Lenin

Wl. Uljanow.
Spiegelgasse 14[II] (bei Kammerer). Zürich I.

Written in German
on December 1, 1916

Sent to Winterthur (Switzerland)

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Another letter has arrived today from St. Petersburg—they have been attentive in their writing lately.

Apart from the letter from Guchkov,[265] which is going into No. 57 of the Central Organ (being set), and which probably Grigory showed you in Berne, letters from Lvov and Chelnokov[266] have been received, all on the same subject, the country's bitter indignation (against the traitors carrying on negotiations for a separate peace), etc.

The mood, they write, is supremely revolutionary.

My manuscript about imperialism has reached Petersburg, and now they write today that the publisher (and this is Gorky! oh the calf!) is dissatisfied with the sharp passages against ... who do you think? ... Kautsky! He wants to get in touch with me about it!!! Both laughable and disappointing.

There it is, my fate. One fighting campaign after another-against political stupidities, philistinism, opportunism and so forth.

It has been going on since 1893. And so has the hatred of the philistines on account of it. But still, I would not exchange this fate for "peace" with the philistines.

Now there is Radek as well. No. 6 of *Jugend-Internationale* (have you seen it?) contains the article by Nota Bone. We (Grigory and I) at once recognised Bukharin. I replied to his exceptional stupidities in No. 2 of *Sbornik*.* (You haven't seen it? It was ready a few days ago.)

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* The reply was in the article "The Youth International" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 163-66).—*Ed.*

Today Grigory sends me No. 25 of *Arbeiterpolitik*. There is the *same* article in it (with cuts, obviously made by the censors), signed by Bukharin. (We have received one more number of *Novy Mir*, from New York, containing a criticism—alas, alas! *A correct one*: that is the tragedy, that a Menshevik is *right* against Bukharin!!— a criticism *evidently of the same* article (in a number which we haven't got) by Bukharin in *Novy Mir*.)

And Radek—"Tyszka's methods", Grigory writes to me today-publishes in No. 25 of *Arbeiterpolitik* praise of Bukharin ("a young force") and a little note, in passing, about the "three editors of *Kommunist*"!

He squeezes into the crack of the differences between us: the time-honoured policy of riffraff and scoundrels, incapable of arguing with *us* straightforwardly and resorting to intrigues, double-dealing, baseness.

There is a picture for you of *what is*, and of *what* Radek *does* (a man is judged not by what he says or thinks about himself, but by what he does—do you remember that Marxist truth?).

Voilà.

This is the kind of "*environment*" one has to fight with!!

And what theoretical disgrace and nonsense in Radek's "theses"....

I have been reading the *Plaidoirie*[267] by Humbert-Droz. My God, what a philistine of Tolstoyism!! I have written again to Abramovich. Is he really hopeless after all? I am wondering whether there are not in Switzerland bacilli of petty-bourgeois (and petty-state) thick-wittedness, Tolstoyism, and pacifism, which destroy the best people? I am sure there must be!

I have read the *second* pamphlet by P. Golay (*L'Antimilitarisme*)—what a gigantic step back in comparison with the first (*Le Socialisme qui meurt*), and into *the same* swamp....

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Do you ski? You really should! Learn the trick, get yourself skis and go off to the mountains—you must. It's good in the mountains in winter! It's delightful, and smells of Russia.

Written on December 18, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
(Switzerland)

First published in 1949
in *Bolshevik* No. 1

Printed from the original

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TO M. N. POKROVSKY

December 21, 1916

Dear M. N.,

I have received your postcard of December 14, 1916. If they write to you that the publisher owes me "in addition to the 500 rubles another 300 rubles", I must say that I consider he owes me *more*, because he accepted (1) my work on the agrarian question, Part 1* and (2) my wife's booklet on an educational subject.[268] And I consider that there is an obligation to pay for what has been accepted, once the manuscript has been delivered.

I wrote about this to Petersburg, but my contacts with Petersburg are exceptionally weak and intolerably slow.

You "thought it possible" to throw out the criticism of Kautsky in my pamphlet[269].... Sad! Really, really sad. Why? Would it not be better to ask the publishers: print outright, gentlemen, that *we*—the publishers—have eliminated criticism of Kautsky. Really, that is how it should have been done.... Of course, I am obliged to submit to the publisher, but let the publisher not be afraid to say what he wants and what he doesn't want; let the publisher answer for the cuts, not I.

You write: "You won't thrash me, will you?", i.e., for agreeing to throw out this criticism?? Alas, alas, we live in too civilised an age to settle questions so simply....

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* The work was *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. Part I (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102).—*Ed*.

Joking aside, it is sad, devil take it.... Well, I shall settle accounts with Kautsky in another place.

I shake your hand and send my best greetings.

V. Ulyanov

Sent from Zurich to Sceaux (Seine) (France)

First published in full in 1932 in the second edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIX

Printed from the original

115

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

About Radek. You write: "I told him at Kienthal that he had behaved badly."

Is that all? Only that! What about the political conclusion?? Or was his action only an accident?? Only his personal affair?? Nothing of the kind! There is the source of your political mistake. You do not assess what is going on politically. Yet really this is a question of politics, however strange it might seem at first sight.

As regards defence of the fatherland. It would be most unpleasant for me if we differed on this. Let us try once more to come to agreement.

Here is some "material for reflection":

War is the continuation of politics.

Everything depends on the *system* of political relations before the war and during the war.

The main types of these systems are (a) the relation of the oppressed nation to the oppressing, (b) the relation between two oppressing nations on account of the loot, its division, etc., (c) the relation of a national state which does not oppress others to one which oppresses, to a particularly reactionary state.

Think over this.

Caesarism in France + tsarism in Russia against *non-imperialist* Germany in 1891—that was the historical situation in 1891.

Think over that! And I was writing of *1891* in No. 1 of *Sbornik* as well.*

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* See "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 320-60).—*Ed.*

How glad I am that you have had a talk with Guilbeaux and Levi! It would be a good thing to do this more frequently, or at any rate from time to time. As for the Italian, he is lying! Turati's speech is a model of *rotten* Kautskianism (he has dragged "*droits nationaux*" into the *imperialist* war!!). And the article by *bb* about this speech in *Volksrecht* is rotten too.

Oh, how I would like to write about this, or to have a talk with the Italian!!

How stupid that Levi is attacking parliamentarism!! Stupid!! And a "Left", too!! God, how much muddle there is in people's heads.

Yours,
Lenin

Written later than December 23, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
First published in 1949
in *Bolshevik* No. 1

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

About Radek you, following Grigory, seem to have got confused between personal impressions and sadness over the "dark" political picture in general and politics. You are sorry, you regret, you sigh-and nothing more. *No* other policy than that which was followed *could* have been pursued. We could not renounce correct views and surrender to "Tyszka's methods". The picture is "dark" not because of this, and the Lefts are weak not because of this, and *Vorbote* is not appearing not because of this—but because the revolutionary movement grows extremely slowly and with difficulty. This has to be put up with; rotten blocs with a certain person (or with E. B. + *Kii*) would only interfere with performing the difficult task of standing fast in difficult times.

As regards "imperialist Economism", it somehow turns out that we are "talking past each other". You *evade* the definition I gave, *pass it by* and put the question again. The "Economists" did not "renounce" political struggle (as you write)—that is inaccurate. They defined it *wrongly*. The "imperialist Economists" do the same.

You write: "Would even the complete rejection of democratic demands mean rejecting the political struggle? Is not the *direct struggle* for the conquest of power political struggle?"

The whole point is that with Bukharin (and partly with Radek as well) this is just the kind of thing you get, and it is wrong. "The direct struggle for

the conquest of power" while "completely rejecting democratic demands" is something unclear, unthought-out, confused. This is just what Bukharin is confused about.

More precisely, you approach the question from rather a different point of view, when you see a contradiction between §§ 2 and 8.

In § 2 there is a *general* statement: the socialist revolution is *impossible* without the struggle for democracy. This is unquestionable, and this is just the weakness of Radek + Bukharin that they, *while disagreeing* (like you), don't venture to challenge it!!

But further, in a certain sense for a certain period, *all* democratic aims (not only self-determination! Note that! You have forgotten that!) are capable of hindering the socialist revolution. In what sense? At what moment? When? How? For example, if the movement has already developed, *the revolution has already begun*, we have to *seize the banks*, and we are being appealed to: wait, *first* consolidate, legitimise the republic, etc.!

An example: in August 1905, the boycott of the Duma was correct, and was not rejection of political struggle.

((§ 2 = *in general*, refusal to participate in representative institutions is an absurdity; § 8 = there are cases when we *have* to refuse; there is a visual comparison for you which makes clear that there is *no* contradiction between § 2 and § 8.))

Against Junius. The situation is the imperialist war. The remedy for it? Only a socialist revolution in Germany. Junius did not draw this conclusion, and took democracy *without* the socialist revolution.

One should know how to *combine* the struggle for democracy and the struggle for the socialist revolution, *subordinating* the first, to the second. In this lies the whole difficulty; in this is the whole essence.

The Tolstoyans and the anarchists throw out the first. Bukharin and Radek have become confused, failing to combine the first with the second.

But I say: don't lose sight of the *main* thing (the socialist revolution); put it first (Junius has not done this); put *all* the democratic demands, but subordinating them to it, co-ordinating them with it (Radek + Bukharin unwisely

eliminate *one* of them), and bear in mind that the struggle for the main thing may blaze up even though it has begun with the struggle for something partial. In my opinion, only this conception of the matter is the right one.

A war of France + Russia against Germany in 1891. You take "my criterion", and apply it *only* to France and Russia!!!! For pity's sake, where is the logic here? That's just what I say, that *on the part of France and Russia* it would have been a reactionary war (a war in order to turn back the development of Germany, to return her from national unity to dismemberment). *But on the part of Germany*? You are silent. Yet that is the chief thing. For Germany in 1891, the war did not, and could not, have an imperialist character.

You have forgotten the main thing—that in 1891 no imperialism existed at all (I have tried to show in my pamphlet that it was born in 1898-1900, not earlier), and there was no imperialist war, there could not be, on the part of Germany. (By the way, there was no revolutionary Russia then either; that is very important.)

Furthermore, you write: "The 'possibility' of the dismemberment of Germany is not excluded in the 1914-17 war either", simply sliding away from the assessment of what exists to what is *possible*.

That is not historical. It is not political.

What *exists* today is an *imperialist* war on *both* sides. This we have said 1,000 times. This is the essence.

And the "possible"!!?? All kinds of things are "possible"!

It is ridiculous to deny the "*possibility*" of transforming the imperialist war into a national war (though Usiyovich was horrified at the idea!). What is not "possible" on this earth! But *so far* it has not been transformed. Marxism buttresses its policy on the *actual*, not on the "possible". It is possible that one phenomenon will change into another-and our tactics are not fossilised. *Parlez-moi de la réalité et non pas des possibilités!**

Engels was right. In my day I have seen an awful lot of hasty charges that Engels was an opportunist, and my attitude to them is supremely distrustful. Try, I say,

* Talk to me of reality and not of possibilities!—*Ed.*

and prove first that Engels was wrong!! You won't prove it!

Engels's foreword to *The Class Struggles in France*[270]? Don't you know that it was distorted in Berlin *against* his will? Is that serious criticism?

His statement about the Belgian strike[271]? When? Where? What? I don't know it.

No. No. Engels was *not* infallible. Marx was *not* infallible. But if you want to point out their "fallibility" you have to set about it differently, really, quite differently. Otherwise you are 1,000 times wrong.

Very, very best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on December 25, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
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1917

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TO INESSA ARMAND

A meeting of the C.C. of the Swiss party was held here on Sunday (January 7).

The scoundrel Grimm *at the head of all the Rights* got carried (against Nobs, Platten, Münzenberg *and Naine*) a decision to *postpone*, for an indefinite period, the party congress which had been fixed for February 11, 1917 specially on the question of the war. The reasons were false. In reality it was his desire for a bloc with the Rights, with the social-patriots, who threatened to resign if defence of the fatherland were rejected!! They don't want to allow the Swiss workers to decide the question of defence of the fatherland!!!

Naine, they say, told Grimm excellently that he was cutting his own throat as international secretary.

Chairman of Zimmerwald, etc.—yet such a scoundrel in politics!

I have a mind to write an open letter to Charles Naine,* a member of the International Socialist Commission, to publish it, to call Grimm a blackguard in it, and to say that I don't want to be in the Zimmerwald organisation with such a type, and am sending a reasoned statement on this to my Central Committee.

It's important to "catch" Grimm immediately, *en flagrant délit***—to expose him (since "they" will not let anything get into the press), to tear off his mask.

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 220-28.—*Ed.*

** Red-handed.—*Ed.*

I think this will make Radek + Roland-Hoist also say *something* to Grimm.

Of course, *such* a leaflet is not suitable for publishing under our imprint, it must be published separately, outside our firm.

Very, very best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on January 8, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

About Engels. If you have run across the issue of *Neue Zeit* with Kautsky's story (and Engels's letters) about how they distorted Engels's preface to *Klassenkämpfe*, it would be a good thing if you copied it out in full detail in a special notebook. If you can't, then send me the exact number of *Neue Zeit*, the year, volume and page.[272]

Your attacks on Engels, I am convinced, are totally groundless. Excuse my frankness. One must prepare much more seriously before writing like that! Otherwise it's easy to disgrace oneself—I warn you *entre nous*, as a friend, between ourselves, in case you begin talking *in this way* some day in the press or at a meeting.

The Belgian strike? First of all it is possible that on this question of fact, an individual question, Engels was mistaken. Of course, that is possible. One must collect everything he wrote on this question. Secondly, events in *recent* times *in general*, 1905 definitely, have provided something *new* about general strikes, which Engels did not know. Engels had been accustomed for decades to hear about the "general strike" *only* the empty phrases of the anarchists, whom he *legitimately* hated and despised. But later events have *demonstrated* a *new* type of "mass strike", a *political* one, i.e., a particularly non-anarchist one. This new feature Engels did not know *yet*, and could not know.

This must not be forgotten.

Was not the Belgian strike a *transition* from the old to the new? Could Engels *at that time* (1891-92?? He was already 71-72; dying) see that this was not the old Belgian

belch (the Belgians for a long time were Proudhonists), but the transition to something new? This must be thought over.

As regards "defence of the fatherland", in my opinion, you are falling into abstraction and unhistoricalness. I repeat what I said in the article against Yuri*: defence of the fatherland=justification for taking part in the *war*. Nothing more. To generalise this, to make it a "general principle", is *ridiculous*, supremely unscientific. (I will send you the American programme of the S.L.P., with this ridiculous generalisation.) Wars are a supremely varied, diverse, complex thing. One cannot approach them with a general pattern.

(I) Three main types: the relation of an oppressed nation to the oppressor (every war is the continuation of politics; politics is the *relationship* between nations, classes, etc.). As a general rule, war is legitimate on the part of the oppressed (irrespective of whether it is defensive or offensive in the military sense).

(II) The relation between two oppressor nations. The struggle for colonies, for markets, etc. (Rome and Carthage; Britain and Germany 1914-17). As a general rule, a war of that kind is robbery on *both* sides; and the attitude of democracy (and socialism) to it comes under the rule: "Two thieves are fighting, may they both perish"....

(III) The third type. A *system* of nations with equal rights. This question is *much more complex*!!!! Especially if side by side with civilised, comparatively democratic nations there stands tsarism. That's how it was (approximately) in Europe from 1815 to 1905.

1891. The colonial policy of France and Germany was *insignificant*. Italy, Japan, the United States *had no* colonies *at all* (now they have). In Western Europe a *system* had come into being (N.B. this!! Think over this!! Don't forget this!! We live not only in separate states, but also in a certain *system* of states; it is permissible for the anarchists to ignore this; we are not anarchists), a *system* of states, on the whole constitutional and national. *Side by side* with them was powerful, unshaken, pre-revolutionary tsarism, which had plundered and oppressed everyone for hundreds of years which crushed the revolutions of 1849 and 1863.

* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 28-76.—*Ed.*

Germany (in 1891) was the country of *advanced* socialism. And this country was menaced by tsarism in alliance with Boulangism!

The situation was quite, quite different from what it is in 1914-17, when tsarism has been undermined by 1905, while Germany is waging a war to dominate the world. A *different* pair of shoes!!

To identify, even to compare the international situations of 1891 and 1914, is the *height* of unhistoricalness.

Stupid Radek wrote recently in the Polish manifesto ("*Befreiang Polens*") that "*Staatenbau*" is not the aim of the Social-Democratic struggle. This is arch-stupidity! It is half-anarchism, half-idiocy! No, no, we are not at all indifferent to the *Staatenbau*, to the *system* of states, to their *mutual relations*.

Engels was the father of "passive radicalism"?? Untrue! Nothing of the kind. You will never be able to prove this. (Bogdanov and Co. tried, but only disgraced themselves.)

In the *imperialist* war of 1914-17, between *two* imperialist coalitions, we must be against "defence of the fatherland", since (1) imperialism is the eve of socialism, (2) imperialist war is a war of thieves over their booty, (3) in *both* coalitions there is an *advanced* proletariat, (4) in both a socialist revolution is *ripe*. *Only* for these reasons are we against "defence of the fatherland", *only* for these reasons!!

Best greetings and wishes.

Yours,

Lenin

I have sent for the addresses of the youth organisations. They have been promised me.

And so, as regards the plan of publication: *push ahead* with the affair. And your lecture *on pacifism*?[273]

P.S. I got both your last two letters at once, but it must have been my own fault.

Written on January 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1949 in *Bolshevik* No. 1

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Your lecture was yesterday, and I am impatiently waiting for news of how it went off. When I got your express letter on Thursday, I hurried to Radek at the other end of the town and collected some cuttings from him. I wanted very much to write you a long letter on pacifism (an extremely important subject in general, a basic one from the point of view of the whole international situation today, about which I wrote in the article*—I have received it, *merci*!—and lastly a particularly important subject *for Switzerland*). But I did not manage it: both on Thursday and on Friday we had meetings of the Lefts.

Things have gone badly for the Lefts here, because Nobs and Platten have become frightened of a war against Grimm, who *furiously attacked* the referendum[274] and frightened, our young friends!! Sad!! In Berne, judging from Grigory's letters, things are better. Radek, at my insistence, has written a little pamphlet against the "Centre" here and Grimm, but yesterday the "Lefts" defeated (!!) the plan that it should be published by the Lefts: they have been frightened by the fright of Nobs and Platten. What warriors! What Lefts!

I think you should consider your lecture last night a *rehearsal*, and make ready to repeat it in Geneva and La Chaux-de-Fonds. It is worth working up this subject,

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* Reference is apparently to the article "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 175-94).—*Ed.*

and lecturing on it *more* than once. It will do the Swiss a tremendous lot of good. Write in as much *detail* as possible *how* you put the question, *what* arguments you advanced, what objections you met, etc.

Have the draft resolutions for the Swiss Congress on defence of the fatherland and the question of the war been translated into French? I mean translation in the *press*: *Grütlianer*, *Sentinelle*, etc. Or not?

It would be well to arrange for their translation, if it has not been done, and to think about agitation and propaganda.

Probably this question will go ahead in connection with your visit to Chaux-de-Fonds. I shall await news from you.

Abramovich is working wonderfully, and he should be supported in every possible way.

All possible greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Trotsky has sent in a silly letter. We shall neither print it nor reply to him.

Has any campaign begun in the press of French Switzerland about (1) the referendum and (2) the resolutions on the war question for the Congress? Or is there *no* campaign? Do you see, and regularly, *Volksrecht* and *Berner Tagwacht*? This is essential now; we have to help the Swiss Lefts.

Did I write to you that Guilbeaux refused to sign the resolution against Grimm? (Or maybe you have heard this already from Grigory?) He's not up to much, our Guilbeaux; he's afraid of a war with Grimm, he's *afraid* of Sokolnikov, who is *afraid* of a split; he's afraid of Merrheim, who is afraid of "Monsieur" Jouhaux!! Well, what warriors!! I want to write about this to Olga.

Written on January 22, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I send you the cuttings I have taken from Radek (only up to Saturday: return them (to me) *immediately* after the lecture).

Note the paragraph in the resolution of the *Internationale* which declares against pacifism (against "persuasion").

The conference at The Hague and similar pacifist declarations and measures undertaken by the governments and the bourgeoisie are produced

(1) by hypocrisy

(2) by deception of the people

(3) by the *trend* of bourgeois pacifism, possessing "big" names and dreaming of *peace* without a social revolution. This trend has a *vast* literature (aristocratic, not for the people)

(4) by calculation: it is convenient sometimes for one, sometimes for another power to "show itself" peaceful, to gain time, etc.

This is in general. Concretely, one must study each particular case, and each power.

I *haven't* got the figures you ask for.

(The addresses have been sent: Abramovich and his friends are the best people to give a recommendation, *if required*.)

The key to the question of pacifism (a question most important for Switzerland): the idea that war is *not* con-

nected with capitalism, is *not the continuation* of the politics of *peace*time. In this lies the theoretical falsity; the practical one is evasion of the social *revolution*.

In great haste. Greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

Written between January 22 and 30, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
First published in 1949
in *Bolshevik* No. 1

Printed from the original

121

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I have received the cuttings. *Merci*!

We were recently visited by two escaped prisoners of war. It was interesting to see "live" people, not corroded by emigrant life. As types: one is a Jew from Bessarabia, who has seen life, a Social-Democrat or nearly a Social-Democrat, has a brother who is a Bundist, etc. He has knocked about, but is uninteresting as an individual because commonplace. The second is a Voronezh peasant, a man of the soil, from an Old Believers' family. A breath from the Black Earth. It was extremely interesting to watch him and listen. He spent a year in a German prison camp (a mass of horrors) with 27,000 *Ukrainians*. The Germans build up camps according to nations, and do their utmost to break them away from Russia; for the Ukrainians they sent in skilful lecturers from Galicia. The results? Only 2,000, according to him, were for "self-rule" (independence in the sense more of autonomy than of separation) after months of effort by the agitators!! The remainder, he says, were furious at the thought of separation from Russia and going over to the Germans or Austrians.

A notable fact! One cannot but believe him. 27,000 is a big number. A year is ample time. The conditions for the Galician propaganda were exceptionally favourable. And yet closeness to the Great Russians got the upper hand! This does *not* imply, of course, that "freedom of separation" is in any way wrong. On the contrary. But it follows from

this that, maybe, fate will free Russia from the "Austrian type" of development.

As regards defence of the fatherland our Voronezh man is like Troyanovsky and Plekhanov. He sympathises with socialism, but "if the Germans are pushing on, why shouldn't we defend ourselves? "He doesn't understand. He is deeply hurt (both he *and the Jew*!!) that the Germans are so mercilessly beating "our people". As regards the tsar and God, all the 27,000, he says, have finished with them completely, as regards the big landowners too. They will return to Russia embittered and enlightened.

All the yearning of the Voronezh man is to get back home, to the land, to his farm. He traipsed around the German villages working, kept his eyes open and learned a lot.

They praise the French (in the prison camps) as good comrades. "The Germans also curse their Kaiser." They hate the English: "Swelled heads; won't give you a piece of bread if you won't wash the floor for them" (that's the kind of swine you got, perverted by imperialism!).

To change the subject, what a splendid row has arisen over the referendum, especially its preamble! Delightful! You should have seen the articles by Grimm and Co. in *Berner Tagwacht* and the "provincial" Social-Democratic press! One continuous howl and groan! We've hit the scoundrels just where it hurt. I did my utmost to incite Radek he is still here, and we are maintaining—you didn't expect it?—the *utmost* friendship, as always against the "Centre", when there is *no* ground for Radekite twisting, diplomacy about "rights", etc.) to write a little pamphlet: we walked about Zurich for hours with me "nagging" him. He sat down and wrote it. Our "Lefts", frightened by Nobs and Platten (those heroes were *frightened* by Grimm, who himself was frightened by Greulich and Co.!!), heard it read and *turned* it *down* (!!): it must not be printed, or they would be expelled from the Party (!!). We shall print it separately.

The situation is such that interest has been heightened, and that all who are *internationalists* not merely in words *must* help the Swiss workers and the Left. And we shall help them!

And yet another subject. I have been rereading Engels's *Zur Wohnungsfrage*[275] with his preface of 1887. Do you know it? Wonderful! I am still "in love" with Marx and Engels, and cannot calmly stand any abuse of them. No, these were real people! We must learn from them. We must not leave that basis.. It was from *that* basis that both the social-chauvinists and the Kautskians departed. (By the way, have you seen the Loriot-Rappoport, Saumoneau resolution?[276] Also ¾ Kautskian. I want to write something for the French, to demolish it and pacifism as a whole. I will ask Grisha whether he will publish it. He did *not* reply about my answer to Souvarine!*). Well, each and every good wish, I've chattered three bags full.

All the best.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I hope that the referendum will bring much benefit in French Switzerland as well. I await news from Abramovich, Olga, etc.

Written on January 30, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
First published in 1949 in *Bolshevik* No. 1

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* See "An Open Letter to Boris Souvarine" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 195-204).—*Ed.*

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I was very glad to have your letter. I like the plan of your lecture* very much. I advise you to be sure to repeat it, to challenge H. Droz to battle, to supplement the lecture with a section on the revolution (only perhaps the size of the lecture will not permit it?), i.e., *how* can the revolution take place, what is the dictatorship of the proletariat, why is it necessary, why is it *impossible* without arming the proletariat, why is it fully compatible with complete, all-round democracy (in spite of the vulgar opinion)?

Droz and the other Swiss social-pacifists do *not* understand it; they have *not* thought it out; and the Swiss conditions *d'un petit État et de la petite bourgeoisie d'un petit État*** *generate* in every possible way precisely pbs (=petty-bourgeois) pacifism.

If you receive *Volksrecht* and *Berner Tagwacht* (it is *essential* to read these two papers), that is, in my opinion, enough for judging the position of the *Centre*, which is exactly the position of Grimm (the scoundrel! How fraudulently he "fights" the social-patriot Huber-Rohrschach!!), and to which both Nobs and Platten have (¾) descended. You are terribly mistaken if you are not joking, when you write of my "influence" on Platten. This is how matters

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* A lecture on pacifism.—*Ed.*

** of a little state and of the petty bourgeoisie of a little state.—*Ed.*

stand: he and Nobs "put themselves down" as Lefts at Zimmerwald and Kienthal. I made dozens of attempts to draw them into discussions, a study circle, talks. All in vain!! They are *afraid* of Grimm and of a struggle against him. They are ¾ in the "Centre". They are *almost* hopeless. Perhaps a strong movement of the Left will straighten them out, but even that is hardly likely!

Today we have not yet received the corrected resolution. We hope for it tomorrow.

Münzenberg told me yesterday that on Tuesday they are having a conference of the Young from German- and French-speaking Switzerland. By that time we must have *our* resolution on the question of the war. (Radek undertook to draft one, but so far has *not* produced it.) My opinion is that you should set to work as hard as you can, so as *before* Tuesday to be able (I) to write to Geneva and Ch.-de-F.* that for the time being they should take *my* theses (the paragraphs on the question of the war, section I) as a basis; (2) to discover who will he a the meeting of the Young from French Switzerland; (3) to "work them over", "instruct" them, so that they understand what really distinguishes us from (α) social-pacifism and (β) the "Centre" (= Grimm and Co.). (Platten has understood absolutely nothing, and doesn't want to learn.) Our position, in general, = Karl Liebknecht, the struggle against social-patriotism and the Centre of *one's own* country; the inseparable connection between the struggle against the war and the struggle against opportunism, and *all-round* and *immediate revolutionary* work *for* the socialist revolution.

The preamble to the referendum, by the way, = the first step to a platform of the *Left* in Switzerland. *N.B.* this.

On Tuesday the Young from French Switzerland will definitely put forward a draft Left resolution and fight for it. I have not yet seen the corrections, but I am sure that he is *injuring* the cause (reconciling and muddling the differences between the Left and the Swiss social-patriots, not opening them up. In this lies the whole essence and the whole foulness of Grimm's articles in *Berner Tagwacht* and *Neues Leben* about the majority and the minority).

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* La Chaux-de-Fonds.—*Ed.*

Try to make friends with the French internees, start corresponding with them, make contacts, *found* (a secret and informal) group of *Lefts* among them. *Most* important!

The slogan of "a mass movement" is not bad, but it is *not* completely correct. Because it forgets the *revolution*, the *conquest of power*, the *dictatorship of the proletariat*. N.B. this!! Or more correctly: the support and development (at once) of every kind of *revolutionary* mass actions, *with the object* of bringing nearer the *revolution*, *etc*.

Platten=a muddlehead. With Scheidemann or with Liebknecht? he asks, not understanding that the very thing Grimm is doing is "reconciling", uniting, *confusing* the Swiss social-patriots (Greulich and Co.) and the Swiss "Left", who are *quite politically unconscious*!!!

You are right: revolutionary struggle against the high cost of living, strikes, demonstrations, etc., *at once*. At once "go to the people", i.e., to the *masses*, to the *majority* of the oppressed, preaching the *socialist revolution* (i.e., taking over the banks and *all* large-scale enterprises).

Very best wishes.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on February 3, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

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TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

February 17, 1917

Dear A. M.,

We had your letter today, and were very glad to get it. For a long time we did not know that you were in America, and had no letters from you except one, telling us that you were leaving America.

I wrote to you on January 7-8 (the day the letter was forwarded from Stockholm—all the letters direct from here to America are intercepted by the French!), but evidently this letter (with an article for *Novy Mir*) did not reach you while you were still in New York.

Pleasant as it was to learn from you of the victory of N. Iv. and Pavlov in *Novy Mir* (I get this newspaper devilishly irregularly; it must be the fault of the post and not the dispatch department of the paper itself), it was just as sad to read about the bloc between Trotsky and the Right for the struggle against N. Iv. What a swine this Trotsky is—Left phrases, and a bloc with the Right against the Zimmerwald Left!! He ought to be exposed (by you) if only in a brief letter to *Sotsial-Demokrat*!

I have already received No. 1 of *The Internationalist*, and am very glad of it. I have inadequate information about the conference of the S.L.P. and the S.P. on January 6-7, 1917. It appears that the S.L.P. is throwing out all its minimum programme (there is a temptation and a danger for Bukharin, who has been stumbling "at that there spot" since 1915!!). It is a great pity that I cannot collect all the

documents about the S.L.P. (I asked Bukharin about it, but letters clearly get lost). Have you any material? I could return it after reading.

I am preparing (have almost got the material ready) an article on the question of the attitude of Marxism to the state.[277] I have come to conclusions which are even sharper against Kautsky than against Bukharin (have you seen his "Nota Bene" in No. 6 of *Jugend-Internationale*? and *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2*?). The question is exceptionally important. Bukharin is far better than Kautsky, but Bukharin's mistakes may *destroy* this "just cause" in the struggle with Kautskianism.

I will send you my article about self-determination against P. Kievsky.** What a pity we have no money! We would publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 3 (all the material is *ready and waiting*) and No. 4 (Bukharin's article about the state, which we rejected at first, and my article on the state)!

The Zimmerwald Right, in my opinion, has ideologically buried Zimmerwald: Bourderon + Merrheim in Paris voted for *pacifism*, Kautsky also on January 7, 1917 in Berlin, Turati (December 17, 1916!!) and the whole Italian party also. This is the death of Zimmerwald!! In words they *condemned* "social-pacifism" (see the Kienthal resolution), while in practice they have turned towards it!!

Grimm has basely turned towards the social-patriots within the Swiss party (our friend in Stockholm will send you material about it), entering into a bloc with them on January 7, 1917 (*Parteivorstandssitzung****) *against the Left* for postponement of the Congress!! And now he has even more basely attacked the Left for the *Begründung des Referendums******* (we shall send it to you) and drawn up a "mid-way", "Centrist" resolution. Have you got the Zurich *Volksrecht*, or can you get it?? If not, we shall, send you something, or try to.

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* See "The Youth international" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 163-66).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 28-76.—*Ed.*

*** The session of the Party Executive.—*Ed.*

**** The preamble to the referendum.—*Ed.*

Tomorrow (February 18) is the Congress of the Swedish party. Probably a split? It seems as though there are *devillsh* dissension and confusion among the Young.[278] Do you know Swedish? Could you arrange contributions (by me and other Lefts) to the newspaper of the Swedish Young?

Please reply, if only briefly, but *quickly* and regularly, because it's terribly important for us to organise *good* correspondence with you.

Best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Zurich to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

The other day we had a gratifying letter from Moscow (we shall soon send you a copy, although the text is uninteresting). They write that the mood of the masses is a good one, that chauvinism is clearly declining and that probably our day will come. The organisation, they say, is suffering from the fact that the adults are at the front, while in the factories there are young people and women. But the fighting spirit, they say, is not any the less. They send us the copy of a leaflet (a good one) issued by the Moscow Bureau of the Central Committee.[279] We shall print it in the next issue of the Central Organ.

Richard is himself again! It's difficult for people to live, and for our Party in particular. But still they do live.

There is also a letter from Kollontai, who (let this be *entre nous* for the time being) has returned to Norway from America. N. Iv. and Pavlov (the Lett who was in Brussels: Pavel Vasilyevich) had *won Novy Mir*, she says (I get this paper very irregularly), but ... Trotsky arrived, and this scoundrel at once ganged up with the *Right* wing of *Novy Mir* against the Left Zimmerwaldists!! That's it!! That's Trotsky for you!! Always true to himself = twists, swindles, poses as a Left, *helps* the Right, so long as he can....

Among the Left in America, she says, things are not going badly, though Kollontai is afraid of anarcho-syndicalist tendencies in the S.L.P. (N. Iv., she says, is not afraid of this). I have read in the S.L.P. organ (*The Weekly People*)[280] that they are throwing overboard their minimum

programme.... N. Iv. has been stumbling "at that there spot" since 1915. I fear for him! But the post to America is *not* working.

I have been putting in a lot of study recently on the question of the attitude of Marxism to the *state*; I have collected a lot of material and arrived, it seems to me, at very interesting and important conclusions, *much more* against Kautsky than against N. Iv. Bukharin (who, however, is not right all the same, though *nearer* to the truth than Kautsky). I would terribly much like to write about this: perhaps publish No. *4* of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* with Bukharin's article, and with my discussion of his little mistakes and Kautsky's big lying and vulgarisation of Marxism.

Nadya is ill: she has caught bronchitis and has a temperature. It looks as though she will be in bed for some time. I called in the doctor today.

Well, and what about your visit to La Chaux-de-Fonds? Have you given up this idea altogether, and all your plans about work in French Switzerland? You should not let that drop. Things here, as I wrote, are not very good, yet today we have finished *leaflet No. 1*[281] ("the Swiss group of Zimmerwald Lefts"). We shall see what happens!

If not now, then in general (i.e., a little later) we shall succeed (I am sure)—if not we, then our successors—in building up a Left *trend* in Switzerland. The *ground* for this exists!

Have you read the propositions of the Left at the Congress of the Zurich cantonal party at Töss,[282] February 11, 1917? in *Volksrecht*? Not bad all the same, eh?

All the very best greetings and handshakes. Excuse the scribble on the last page: I am being hurried.

Yours,

Lenin

Written between February 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

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TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

March 5, 1917

Dear A. M.,

Newspaper reports speak of a congress of the Young being called in Sweden on May 12 to found a new party "on Zimmerwald principles".

I must admit that this news particularly disturbs and angers me. For "Zimmerwald" is clearly bankrupt, and a good word is once again serving to cover up decay! The Zimmerwald majority—Turati and Co., Kautsky and Ledebour, Merrheim—have *all* gone over to the position of social-pacifism, condemned so solemnly (and so fruitlessly!) at Kienthal. The manifesto of Kautsky and Co. of January 7, 1917, a number of resolutions of the Italian Socialist Party, the resolutions of Merrheim-Jouhaux and Longuet-Bourderon (+Raffin-Dugens in *unity* with Renaudel), is not this the bankruptcy of Zimmerwald? And the Zimmerwald "Centre"—R. Grimm, who on January 7, 1917 entered into an *alliance* with the social-patriots of Switzerland to fight the Left!! Grimm, who abuses the social-patriots of *all* countries *except* the Swiss, whom he *covers up*! *C'est dégoûtant*!* I am beside myself with fury at these scoundrels; it is revolting to listen to them and to hear about them; it is even more revolting to think of working with them. Buffoonery!

We intend to collect material for you about this bankruptcy of R. Grimm. Write whether you can get the Zurich *Volksrecht*. You will find the *principal* material there in

* It is disgusting!—*Ed.*

the *preamble* to the referendum, in the resolution of the *Left* at Töss (February 11, 1917), etc., etc.

But the majority of the Swedish Left, *I am sure*, are sincere. This is clear. And it is necessary at all costs to help them before May 12 to understand *beforehand* the utter banality of social-pacifism and Kautskianism, all the vileness of the Zimmerwald majority, to help them work out a good programme and tactics for themselves, for the new party.

Really, we must (all of its, the Left in Sweden and those who can get into touch with them) unite, bend every effort, help—for the moment in the life of the Swedish party, the Swedish *and Scandinavian* labour movement, is a *decisive* one.

Since you read Swedish (and speak it too), a considerable share of responsibility falls on you, if we understand "internationalism" not in the sense of "it's no concern of mine".

I am sure you are doing a great deal. One would like to rally and unite the Lefts to help the Swedes at such a difficult moment in their life. Could not one organise in Christiania, Copenhagen and Stockholm for this purpose a group of Russian Bolsheviks and Lefts who know Swedish and can help? The work could be divided: to collect the main documents and articles (I was sent the polemic between Norman and Mauritz Västberg in *Politiken* of November 28, 1916 on the theme, "first a programme, then a new party"—but I could not understand it); to work out one's own theses to help them; to print a number of articles to aid them. Swedes able to *write* in German, French or English could also enter such a group.*

What is your opinion, is this possible or not? Is it worth while worrying with it?

My opinion is that it is worth while, but of course I am not in a position to judge from far away, outside. I only see and *know* in the firmest way possible that the question of the programme and tactics of a *new* socialism, genuinely revolutionary Marxism and not rotten Kautskianism, *is*

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* What sort of a figure is Lindhagen? "S.R."? "Narodnik"? "Radical-socialist"? Hervé?

on the agenda *everywhere*. This is clear both from the S.L.P. and *The Internationalist* in America, and from the data about Germany (the resolutions of the Lefts, January 7, 1917) and about France (the pamphlet of the Lefts in Paris, *Les socialistes de Zimmerwald et la guerre**), *and so on*.

In Denmark *Trier* and others would, I am sure, join in the cause of setting up a new, *Marxist*, party in Scandinavia; part of the Norwegian Lefts also. The struggle with Branting and Co. is a serious business: necessity *must* force them to take a more serious attitude to questions of the theory and tactics of revolutionary Marxism.

In my opinion, the work of preparing for May 12 should be pushed *intensively*, and from *three* sides simultaneously: (1) the assistance group mentioned earlier; (2) groups of the Scandinavian Lefts: write an article (in the Swedish papers) about the necessity of founding *at once* such groups to prepare a programme and tactics for May 12.

(3)—the third interests me particularly, *not* because it is the most important (initiative from within is more important), but because *we* can help here. If, for example, you were *immediately*, after looking through the main literature of the Left and Right in Sweden, to rough out *on the basis of it* theses on these lines:

theoretical (programme) and practical (tactical) differences

defence of the fatherland;
conception of imperialism;
character of the war;
disarmament;
social-pacifism;
+ dictatorship of the proletariat { the nationalities question;
revolution;
"mass actions";
civil war;
attitude to trade unions;
opportunism and struggle against it,
etc.

Every thesis should include (a) what has been said about it ("the *essence*") by the Left in Sweden; (b) by the Right there.

* *The Socialists of Zimmerwald and the War.—Ed.*

On this basis, taking account of the position of the Left in Russia, Germany and America (the main countries in this respect), we could work out our own theses and, by publishing them in Swedish, *help* the Swedes to make preparations for May 12.

Some of the *main* points from the *most important* resolutions and articles of the Right and the Left wing in Sweden ought for this purpose to be translated into Russian or German or French or English.

In essence, morally and politically, we are all responsible for the Swedish Young and must help them.

You are in an exceptionally favourable position to give such aid. Write at once what you think about it.

It would be useful, probably, to send this letter on to Lyudmila also, together with your views.

All the very best. I wish you every success.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Zurich to Christiania (Oslo)

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126

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I enclose the leaflet and my best congratulations on it.

Don't give it to anyone as yet: it would be a good thing if no one knew that it comes *partly* from the Russians. May not Usiyevich or someone *near* him have blabbed?

Let the distribution be made by the *Swiss* groups.

We here in Zurich are in a state of agitation today: there is a telegram in *Zürcher Post* and in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of March 15 that in Russia the revolution *was victorious* in Petrograd on March 14 after three days of struggle, that 12 members of the Duma are in power and the ministers *have all been arrested*.

If the Germans are not lying, then it's true.

That Russia has for the last few days been *on the eve* of revolution is beyond doubt.

I am *beside* myself that I cannot go to Scandinavia!! I will not forgive myself for not risking the journey in 1915!

Best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on March 15, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
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TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

March 16, 1917

Dear A. M.,

We have just received the second set of government telegrams about the revolution of March 1 (14) in Petrograd. A week of bloody battles by the workers—and Milyukov + Guchkov + Kerensky[283] in power!! On the "old" European pattern....

Well, what of it! This "first stage of the first revolution (among those engendered by the war)" will not be the last, nor will it be only Russian. Of course, we shall continue to be against defence of the fatherland, against the imperialist slaughter controlled by Shingaryov[284] + Kerensky and Co.

All our watchwords remain the same. In the last issue of *Sotsial-Demokrat* we actually spoke of the possibility of a government "of Milyukov and Guchkov, if not of Milyukov and Kerensky".* It turned out that it was *both* ... *and*: all three together. Lovely! We shall see how the party of people's freedom (after all, it's in a majority in the new ministry, since Konovalov[285] is even just a little "more Left", while Kerensky is certainly more Left!) will give the people freedom, bread and peace.... We shall see!

The main thing now is the press and the organisation of the workers in a *revolutionary* Social-Democratic party. Chkhenkeli[286] must now (he promised!) provide funds for "defence of the fatherland". While Mr. Chkheidze, although he did utter ultra-Left speeches *during* the revolution or on its eve (when Yefremov, too, spoke in no less

* See "A Turn in World Politics" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 262-70).—*Ed.*

rrrevolutionary fashion), of course, does not deserve *one atom* of confidence after all his "politics" with Potresov and Co., with Chkhenkeli, etc. It would be the greatest misfortune if the Cadets were now to promise a legal workers' party, and if our people accepted "unity" with Chkheidze and Co.!!

But this will not happen. First, the Cadets will not allow' anyone a legal workers' party except the Potresovs and Co. Secondly, if they do allow it, we shall set up as before our *own* separate party and *without fail* combine legal work with illegal.

On no account a repetition of something like the Second International! *On no account* with Kautsky! Definitely a *more revolutionary* programme and tactics (there are elements of it in K. Liebknecht, the S.L.P. in America, the Dutch Marxists, etc.) and definitely the combination of legal and illegal work. Republican propaganda, the struggle against imperialism, *as before* revolutionary propaganda, agitation and struggle with the aim of an *international* proletarian revolution and the conquest of power by the "Soviets of Workers' Deputies" (and not the Cadet swindlers).

... After the "great rebellion" of 1905—the "glorious revolution"* of 1917!...

Be so kind as to forward this letter to Lyudmila, and drop me a line as to how far we are in agreement, or how far we differ, and also as to the plans of A. M., etc. If our deputies[287] are allowed to return, one must definitely be brought for a couple of weeks to Scandinavia. All the best.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Zurich to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in *Pravda* No. 169, July 27, 1924

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* "great rebellion" and "glorious revolution" were written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

128

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

March 17, 1917

Dear A. M.,

I have just had your telegram, worded so that it sounds almost ironical (just imagine thinking about "directives" from here, when news is exceptionally meagre, while in Petersburg there are probably not only effectively leading comrades of our Party, but also formally commissioned representatives of the Central Committee!).

Only just this minute I have read the telegram of the Petersburg Telegraph Agency of the 17th giving the programme of the new government, and the news about Bonar Law's statement that the tsar has not yet abdicated and that no one knows where he is.

Yesterday it seemed that the Guchkov-Milyukov government was already completely victorious and had already come to an agreement with the dynasty. Today the situation is that the dynasty does not exist and the tsar has fled, clearly preparing for a counter-revolution!...

We have begun working out theses which we shall perhaps finish this evening and then, naturally, will immediately forward to you. If possible, wait for these theses, which correct (*resp*. cancel) what I am writing now in my own name only, so far.

—Zinoviev and I have just managed to draw up a first draft of the theses, *a rough one*, very unsatisfactory in the editorial sense (of course, we shall not print it *in this form*) but giving, I hope, an idea of the main point.

We earnestly ask you to acquaint Yuri and Eug. B. with it, and also Lyudmila, and likewise to drop us at least a

line or two before you leave*—and also *make certain* to arrange with someone who is *staying* in Norway to forward *our* material to Russia and *Russian* material to us. Please do this, and ask this comrade remaining behind (or a Norwegian comrade who knows German, French or English) to be *exceptionally* efficient. We shall send money for the expenses.

In my opinion, the main thing now is not to let oneself get entangled in stupid "unification" attempts with the social-patriots (or, what is still more dangerous, with the wobblers like the Organising Committee, Trotsky and Co.) and to continue the work of *our* Party in a consistently *internationalist* spirit.

What is now on the agenda is expansion of the work, organisation of the masses, awakening of new sections—the backward, the rural, domestic servants—Party cells in the forces for systematic and detailed *Entlarvung*** of the new government, and preparation for the conquest of power by the *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*. Only such a power *can* give bread, *peace* and liberty.

What is needed today is to finish off the reactionaries, *not a shadow* of confidence or support for the new government (not a shadow of confidence in Kerensky, Gvozdyov,[288] Chkhenkeli, Chkheidze[289] and Co.) and *armed temporising*, *armed preparation* of a *wider* base for a *higher* stage.

If there is freedom of the press, republish (as material for the history of the recent past) our writings here, and inform us by cable whether we can help by writing from here through Scandinavia. We are afraid that it will be some time before we succeed in leaving accursed Switzerland.

All the best.

Yours,
Lenin

I wish you every kind of success!

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* Alexandra Kollontai and other Bolsheviks were leaving for Russia.—*Ed.*

** Exposure.—*Ed.*

P.S. I am afraid that there will now be an *epidemic* in Petersburg "simply" of excitement, without systematic work on a party of a *new* type. It *must not* be *à la* "Second International". Wider! Raise up new elements! Awaken a new initiative, new organisations in all sections, and *prove* to them that *peace* will be brought only by an armed Soviet of Workers Deputies, if it takes power.

Sent from Zurich to Christiania (Oslo)

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TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Vyach. Al.,

I am considering every possible way of travelling.* The following is an absolute secret. Please reply to me immediately and, perhaps, best by express (I think we won't ruin the Party by a dozen extra express letters), so that I can be sure no one has read the letter.

Take out papers in your own name for travelling to France and England, and I will *use them* to travel through England (and *Holland*) to Russia.

I can put on a wig.

The photograph will be taken of *me* with the wig on, and *I* shall go to the Consulate in Berne with your papers and wearing the wig.

You must then disappear from Geneva for a minimum of a few weeks (until my telegram arrives from Scandinavia): for this period you must hide yourself well away in the mountains, where, *we shall*, *of course*, *pay* for your board and lodging.

If you agree, begin *preparations immediately* in the most energetic (and most secret) fashion, and drop me a line at once in any case.

Yours,
Lenin

Think over all the practical steps *involved* and write to me in detail. I am writing to you because I am convinced that between us everything will remain *absolutely* secret.

Written on March 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in *Pravda* No. 92, April 22, 1926

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* Of returning to Russia.—*Ed.*

130

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I have sent you (through Inessa) copies of two of my articles for *Pravda*—for information, to co-ordinate our views.

I need them back on *Monday*: if necessary, send them express and take them to the station.

Be careful about blocs with the *Nachalo*[290] people: we are against rapprochement with other parties, are *for* warning the workers *against* Chkheidze. Essential! Chkheidze is clearly wobbling: cf. how he is being praised in the *Temps* of March 22 and in many other papers. We are *for* the C.C. in Russia, *for Pravda*, *for* our Party, *for* a proletarian militia preparing the way for peace and socialism.

Greetings!

Yours,
Lenin

Written on March 24, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

131

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY[291]

Dear Comrade Anatoly Vasilyevich,

As regards a conference, my *personal* opinion (I am sending on your letter to Zinoviev) is that it is expedient now only between people who are ready to warn the proletariat not only against the Gvozdyov supporters,[292] but also against the *waverings of Chkheidze*.

In this, I believe, is the essence of our inner-Party and, if one may use the term, near-Party situation.

It is just for this reason that I am *not* wasting time on a single conference with Martov and Co.

Independence and separateness of our Party, *no rapprochement with other parties*, are indispensable conditions for me. Without this one cannot help the proletariat to move through the *democratic* revolution to the *commune*, and I would not serve any other ends.

I personally would be *for* a conference with people and groups who agree on this basic point.

I should be very glad to have a talk with you, without any formal conferences, and should consider it *valuable* for myself personally (and for the cause).

With all my heart I congratulate you, too, and shake your hand, and send greetings as well from N. K. to you both.

With fraternal greetings,

Lenin

My address:
Wl. Uljanow. Spiegelgasse. 14II (bei Kammerer). Zürich. I.

Written earlier than March 29, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva
First published in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*
Printed from the original

132

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I have sent you through Inessa copies of my two letters to *Pravda*. I hope you have done what I asked, and today (Sunday) or tomorrow have sent them back to me *by express*.

After Tuesday (I am lecturing here oil Tuesday evening) I will send you a copy of letter No. 3.* Then I think, it will be easy for us to *come to an agreement* about tactics.

Lunacharsky has written to me proposing a "conference". I have replied: I am agreeable to having a talk with you (Lunacharsky) personally.** (He will be coming to Zurich.) I am agreeable to a conference, however, *only* on condition that the workers are warned *against* the waverings of Chkheidze. He (Lunacharsky) *has said nothing*.

So it means that we shall confine ourselves to a personal talk.

Chkheidze is obviously *wobbling*: cf. *Le Temps* of March 22 *praises* Chkheidze, while on March 24 it *abuses* him.

The picture is clear!!

Therefore I am a little afraid that you have been in too much of a hurry to draw up a general resolution[293] (I have sent it to *Pravda* today, together with my article, addressed to Herrn Fürstenberg, Boulevard Hotel, *Kristiania*. You can send articles there, with a note that the articles are for *Pravda*, and that I supplied the address; as to articles on questions of *principle*, it would he useful for us to reacts preliminary agreement).

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 320-32.—*Ed.*

** See the previous letter.—*Ed.*

Pravda, probably, *needs* articles. At any rate I am writing, and *I am advising all friends to write*.

I fear that you are too much in a hurry also to unite with the *Vperyod* group.

In your resolution the ending is good (I had time only to look through it *rapidly*: it had to go off), but the beginning (about democracy in general) seemed to me very bad.

As regards unity with *Vperyod*. I sent a telegram to Scandinavia to the members of our Party who are leaving:

"Notre tactique: méfiance absolue, aucun soutien nouveau gouvernement, Kerensky surtout soupçonnons, armement prolétariat seule garantie, élection immédiate douma de Petrograd *aucun rapprochement autres partis*."*

The last is *conditio sine qua non*.

We don't trust Chkheidze.

Our deputies and Kamenev are *already* in Petersburg, *or* will be there in a few days. There is a *Central Committee* in Petersburg (*Frankfurter Zeitung* printed extracts from its manifesto, *lovely*!), *Pravda* exists. We are for preservation of *this* party *absolutely*, against all fusions with the Organising Committee.

(Probably there is no O.C. in Petersburg, since *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Vossische Zeitung* gave a detailed account of the *manifesto* of Chkheidze and Co. of March 16,[294] and there is *not a word* about the O.C. there.)

It is precisely for the elections to the Constituent Assembly (or for the overthrow of the government of Guchkov and Milyukov) that we *must have* a separate party, ours, which has in my opinion *completely* justified itself during the years 1914-17.

That means? Do the Vperyodists want *honestly* to join this party?

Bon!

They don't want to? I won't agree to "concessions" and "bargaining".

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* "Our tactics: absolute distrust, no support for the new government, suspect Kerensky above all, arming of the proletariat the only guarantee, immediate elections to the Petrograd Duma, *no rapprochement with other parties*."—*Ed.*

Have a talk with them, *as man to man* and *more than once*, and drop me a line, so that I have your reply by Tuesday (or at latest Wednesday morning).

Will you undertake to type in two copies (or in one copy) my manuscript* of 500 pages (written on octavo), *for payment not less than last time*? I would then publish it, at once in Petersburg.

You will oblige me greatly!

Reply.

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Lyudmila has *left* Stockholm. Don't use Stockholm as an address!

P.P.S. Will you and Olga go to Russia, if there is an opportunity, and when? Who else would go from Geneva?

Written on March 25, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* Reference is to Lenin's *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431).—*Ed.*

133

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

You must be in an excessively nervous state. This is my explanation for a number of theoretical "oddities" in your letters.

We should not distinguish the first and the second revolution, or the first and the second stage??

That's just what we have to do. Marxism requires that we should distinguish the *classes* which are in action. In Russia *it is not the same* class as before that is in power. Consequently, the revolution which lies ahead is quite, quite *different*.

My phrase about support of the workers by the Milyukovs has (it seemed to me) a clear sense; *if* the Milyukovs really wanted to finish off the monarchy, they *should have* supported the workers. Only that!

One must not make a "fetish" out of revolution. Kerensky is a revolutionary, but a chatterbox, a petty liar, a deceiver of the workers. It is almost certain that *even* in the Petrograd "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' the *majority* has been fooled by him (with the help of the wobbling and muddling Chkheidze). And what will happen to the countryside?

It is *quite* possible that *for a time* the majority both of the workers and of the peasants will really be *for* the imperialist war (which the Guchkovs+Milyukovs are representing as "defence of the Republic").

It would be a good thing if someone with free time (better still a group, but if one doesn't exist, then at least an

individual) undertook to *collect all* the telegrams (and articles if possible) in *all* the foreign newspapers about the Russian revolution.

There are mountains of material. It is impossible to follow it all.

Probably we *won't* manage to get to Russia!! Britain *will not let us through*. It can't be done through Germany.

Greetings!

Lenin

Written between March 25 and 31, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens
Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

134

TO J. S. HANECKI[295]

March 30, 1917

Dear Comrade,

I thank you with all my heart for the trouble you are taking and for your help. I cannot, of course, make use of the services of people who are connected with the publisher of *Die Glocke*.[296] I cabled you today that the only hope of breaking out of here is by an exchange of emigrants in Switzerland for German internees. Britain will on no account let me through, or any internationalists at all, neither Martov and his friends nor Natanson and his friends. The British sent Chernov back to France, although he had all his papers for transit!! It is clear that the Russian *proletarian* revolution has no more malignant enemy than the British imperialists. It is clear that Milyukov (and Co.), agents of Anglo-French imperialist capital, and Russian imperialists themselves, are capable of *everything*—deception, treachery, and everything else—in order to prevent the internationalists returning to Russia. The least confidence in this respect either in Milyukov or in Kerensky (an empty chatterer, an agent of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie in his objective role) would be simply ruinous for the working-class movement and for our Party, and would border on betrayal of internationalism. The only—without exaggeration, the only—hope for us to get to Russia is to send as soon as possible a reliable person to Russia, to *secure* from the government, by pressure from the "Soviet of Workers' Deputies", an *exchange* of all the emigrants in Switzerland for interned Germans. It is necessary to act with the maxi-

mum energy, making a record of every step, not sparing expense on telegrams, and collecting documents against Milyukov and Co., who are capable of dragging matters out, feeding us with promises, swindling, etc. You can imagine what torture it is for all of us to be sitting here at such a time.

Furthermore, the dispatch of a reliable person to Russia is *still more necessary* for reasons of principle. The latest information in the foreign press gives clearer and clearer indications that the government, with the direct help of Kerensky and thanks to the (putting it mildly) unforgivable wobblings of Chkheidze, is swindling—and swindling *not without success*—the working class, representing the imperialist war as a "defensive" one. Judging from the telegram of the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency of March 30, 1917. Chkheidze has allowed himself to be completely deceived by this slogan, adopted also by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies —if this source, generally unreliable of course, is to be believed. At all events, even if the report is untrue, the *danger* of such a deception is all the same undoubtedly *vast*. All the efforts of our Party must be concentrated on fighting it. Our Party would disgrace itself for ever, commit political suicide, if it tolerated such a deception. To judge from one report, Muranov returned from Kronstadt *together with Skobelev*. If Muranov went there *on behalf* of the Provisional Government of the Guchkovs and Milyukovs, I very much ask you to pass on (through someone reliable), *and to print*, that I *absolutely condemn this*, that any rapprochement with those who are wobbling in the direction of social-patriotism and have taken up the profoundly mistaken, profoundly harmful social-pacifist, Kautskian, position of Chkheidze and Co. is, I am deeply convinced, *harmful* for the working class, *dangerous*, *inadmissible*.

I hope you have received my "Letters from Afar" Nos. 1-4,* in which I developed the theoretical and political foundation for these views. If these letters have been lost, or did not reach Petrograd, please cable me, and I will send you copies.

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 295-342.—*Ed.*

There is no doubt that in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies there are numerous, even, it seems, a majority of, (1) supporters of Kerensky, a most dangerous agent of the imperialist bourgeoisie, pursuing imperialism, i.e., the defence and justification of a plundering war of conquest *on Russia's part*, under cover of an ocean of sounding phrases and empty promises, (2) supporters of Chkheidze, who is wobbling hopelessly in the direction of social-patriotism and sharing all the philistinism and stupidity of Kautskianism. Our Party is obliged to carry on the most stubborn, the most highly principled, the most pressing and most merciless struggle against *both* currents. And I personally will not hesitate for a second to declare, and to declare in print, that I shall prefer even an immediate split with anyone in our Party, whoever it may be, to making concessions to the social-patriotism of Kerensky and Co. or the social-pacifism and Kautskianism of Chkheidze and Co.

I must at all costs demand the republication in Petrograd —if only tinder the title: *From the History of the Last Years of Tsarism*—of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* published here, of the pamphlet by Lenin and Zinoviev on the war and socialism,[297] of *Kommunist* and *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. But most of all, and first of all, the theses in No. 47 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (of October 13, 1915).* These theses are now exceptionally important.

These theses say directly, clearly, precisely how we should act in a revolution in Russia, and they do it 1½, years before the revolution.

These theses have been remarkably, literally confirmed by the revolution.

The war has *not* ceased, *and cannot cease*, to be imperialist on the part of Russia, so long as (1) the landowners and capitalists, representatives of the bourgeois *class*, are in power; (2) so long as such direct agents and servants of that bourgeoisie as Kerensky and the other social-patriots are in power; (3) so long as the treaties between tsarism and the Anglo-French imperialists remain in force (the Guchkov-Milyukov government has *openly* declared *abroad*—I don't

* Reference is to Lenin's article "Several Theses" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04).—*Ed.*

FOR MARXIST ED TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

know whether it has done so in Russia—that it is *loyal* to these treaties). They are robber treaties, for the seizure of Galicia, Armenia, Constantinople, etc., etc.; (4) so long as these treaties have *not* been published and *not* annulled; (5) so long as the whole alliance between Russia and the Anglo-French bourgeois, imperialist governments has *not* been broken off altogether; (6) so long as state power in Russia has *not* passed *from* the imperialist bourgeoisie (mere promises and "pacifist" declarations, however much the stupid Kautsky, Chkheidze and Co. believe in them, do *not* transform the bourgeoisie into a *non*-bourgeoisie) *into the hands* of the proletariat, which *alone* is capable, on condition that it is supported by the poorer section of the peasantry, of breaking *not merely in words* but in deeds with the interests of capital, with imperialist policy, with the plundering of other countries, of emancipating the peoples oppressed by the Great Russians *completely*, withdrawing the troops from Armenia and Galicia *at once*, etc.; (7) only the proletariat is capable, if it rids itself of the influence of its national bourgeoisie, of winning the *genuine* confidence of the proletarians of *all* the belligerent countries, and entering into peace negotiations *with them*; (8) these proletarian peace terms are set forth precisely and clearly both in No. 47 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and in my letter *No. 4*.

Hence it is clear that the watchword: "We are *now* defending the Republic in Russia, we are *now* carrying on a 'defensive war', we shall fight *Wilhelm*, we are fighting for the overthrow of Wilhelm" is the greatest deception, the greatest swindling of the workers!! For Guchkov-Lvov-Milyukov and Co. are landowners and capitalists, representatives of the *class* of landowners and capitalists, *imperialists* who are fighting for the *same* robber ends, on the basis of the same robber treaties concluded by tsarism, in alliance with the *same* imperialist robber bourgeoisie of Britain, France and Italy.

The appeal to the Germans by the bourgeois and *imperialist* republic in Russia—"Overthrow Wilhelm"—is a repetition of the lying slogan of the French social-chauvinists, traitors to socialism, Jules Guesde, Sembat and Co.

In a very popular way, very clearly, without learned words, it must he explained to the workers and soldiers that it is

not only Wilhelm who has to he overthrown, but also the kings of Great Britain and Italy. That is first of all. And secondly, and *most important*, the *bourgeois* governments must be overthrown, *beginning with Russia*—for otherwise peace cannot be won. It may be that *we cannot* immediately "overthrow" the government of Guchkov-Milyukov. That may be so. But that is not an argument for *telling an untruth!!* The workers must be told the *truth*. We have to say that the government of Guchkov-Milyukov and Co. is an imperialist government, that the workers and peasants must *first of all* (now or after elections to the Constituent Assembly, if it is not used to deceive the people, if the elections are not postponed until after the war—the question of choice of moment cannot be decided from here), first of all must transfer *all* state power into the hands of the working class, the enemy of capital, the enemy of imperialist war, and only then will they have the *right* to appeal for the overthrow of *all* kings and *all* bourgeois governments.

For God's sake try and deliver all this to Petrograd and to *Pravda*, to Muranov and Kamenev and the others. For God's sake make every effort to send this with a most reliable person. It would be best of all if a reliable sensible chap like Kuba went (he would perform a great service to the whole world working-class movement) and helped our friends in Petrograd!! I hope you will do this!! Do everything in your power.

Conditions in Petrograd are exceptionally difficult. The republican patriots are straining *every* effort. They are trying to drown our Party in slander and dirt (the Chernomazov "affair": I am sending a document about it*), etc., etc.

There *cannot* be any confidence in Chkheidze and Co., or Sukhanov or Steklov and the like No rapprochement with other parties, any of them! Not a shadow of confidence in or support for the government of Guchkov-Milyukov and Co.!! The most irreconcilable propaganda of internationalism and of struggle with republican chauvinism and social-chauvinism everywhere, both in the press and within the Soviet of Workers' Deputies; the organisation of *our* Party: this is

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* Reference is to Lenin's article "Tricks of the Republican Chauvinists" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 362-64).—*Ed.*

the essential. Kamenev must realise that he bears a *world*-historic responsibility.[298]

Don't grudge money on communications between Stockholm and Petrograd!!

I beg you very much, dear comrade, to cable me on receipt of this letter, and generally to keep me *au courant* in every respect. I hope the Swedish friends will also help in this.

All the best.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Zurich to Stockholm
First published in 1921
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 2

Printed from the original

135

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Friends,

And so we are leaving through Germany *on Wednesday*. Tomorrow this will be finally decided.

We shall send you a mass of packages containing our books, *papers* and things, requesting you to forward them in turn to Stockholm for transhipment to us in Petrograd.

We shall also send you money and credentials from the Central Committee authorising you to carry on all correspondence and manage affairs.

We are thinking of publishing a leaflet, "Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers" in German, *in French* and in Italian.

Inessa will not have time to do the French translation: I hope you will do it and publish it (with Guilbeaux).

A comrade here (who knows German and Italian), Julius *Mimiola*, has promised me he will do the Italian translation and publish it.

(Krummgasse. 2.)

Zürich. 4.

I have given him *your* address. When you have the German pamphlet, send it to him (and a letter in *German*) and money for publication.

((Here is another address for you of a *Left-wing* German here, who published leaflet No. I of the Zimmerwald Left, and may be useful again for publications: Herrn Karl *Schnepf*. Thurwiesenstrasse. 8. *Zürich. I will give hint your address*.))

Very best greetings and thousands of wishes.

All the best.

Yours,

Lenin

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 367-73.—*Ed*.

P.S. We hope to collect the journey money *for about 12 persons*, because the comrades in Stockholm have helped us *very much*.

P.S. Please take 2-3 copies, on the thinnest possible paper, of my letters No. 1 and No. 2 to *Pravda* ("Letters from Afar"), to send (for the information of comrades) to Paris and elsewhere in Switzerland.

We shall hand over correspondence with Paris to you. You will have to find a bookbinder (a most reliable one) for sending letters to Paris in bindings (and to learn chemical writing).

P.P.S. Come to a *detailed* agreement about correspondence with Chaux-de-Fonds, and about publishing my speech,[299] with Abramovich (notify him that he should hurry up with his preparations for travelling: we are going on Wednesday).

Written on April 2, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO V. A. KARPINSKY

April 12, 1917

Dear Friend,

I hope that this letter will all the same reach you, and also the newspapers which are being sent to you. I say "all the same" because the difficulties of communication with foreign countries are incredibly great. We were allowed in, and received here with furious attacks, but up till now we have received no books, manuscripts or letters. Evidently the military censorship is working wonderfully—even with excessive zeal, since you know, of course, that we had not even the slightest mention of the war, and could not have.

Please stop typing the agrarian manuscript, because I *have found* one copy here, already set. What is missing in it is the end, the end of the "Conclusion",[300] beginning with the words:

"The whole of the peasantry and the proletariat are opposed to the private ownership of the land. The reformative path of creating a Junker-bourgeois Russia necessarily presupposes the preservation of the foundations of the old system of landownership and the slow...."

Now, from these words the end of the Conclusion is missing.

You will oblige me very much if *from these words*, and to the end of the Conclusion, you take 4-5 copies and send them (1) to me personally; (2) to *Pravda*, 32 Moika; (3) to Stockholm, to the address given to you. I ought to receive at least one of these copies.

Drop me a postcard, addressed to *Pravda*, or better still to M. T. Yelizarov (for V. I.), 48/9 Shirokaya, Flat 24,

Petrograd, whether you have received this letter, and when you sent the copies of the end of the Conclusion.

Our journey was wonderful. Platten was not admitted by Milyukov.

The atmosphere here is a furious campaign of the bourgeoisie against us. Among the workers and *soldiers*—sympathy.

Among the Social-Democrats, victory of "revolutionary defencism" (now, they say, there is something to defend—the Republic, against Wilhelm). Chkheidze and Co., Steklov (leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd) have completely descended into revolutionary defencism. Chkheidze is in a bloc with Potresov. All are howling and screaming for "unity" of the whole Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. We, of course, are against.

On April 22, 1917 there will be an All-Russia Conference of the Bolsheviks (of our Party) in Petrograd.[301]

Write me whether our "Farewell Letter" has been published, in what languages and how sales are going.

Write whether you have received the papers (I am sending you a file of *Pravda* and cuttings from various papers). Keep Paris and all Switzerland as well informed as possible. All the best.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Written on April 12 (25), 1917
Sent from Petrograd to Geneva
First published in 1923
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 9

Printed from the typewritten
copy found in police records

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TO THE BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ABROAD

August 17 (30), 1917

Dear Friends,

With great difficulty, after long weeks of forced interruption, it seems as though we are successfully resuming our correspondence. Of course, to make this completely successful you will have to go to a lot of pains and effort to organise it at your end.

The shameful campaign of slander launched by the bourgeoisie about the alleged espionage, or connection therewith, of Hanecki, Kollontai and many others is, of course, a scoundrelly cover for the crusade against the internationalists on the part of our bold "republicans", who want to "compare favourably" with tsarism in their slander-mongering.

(1) I have read somewhere in the Russian papers that Hanecki and Radek have been publishing a denial.[302] I don't know whether this is true. But it is essential. The first thing to do is for Radek to write to Paris and get the minutes of the last Paris trial of himself (by various factions of the R.S.D.L.P.). Lunacharsky, denouncing these base slanderers, long ago described this trial in *Novaya Zhizn*.[303] But that is not enough. Someone should try to get the minutes or at least the full sentence of the court, and, if it cannot be printed, take several typed copies and send them here. If it is impossible to get the minutes or the sentence, it would he desirable to procure at least a written account of the trial by one of the Parisians who took part in it, and to publish

at least a small pamphlet in Russian (there is a Russian printing-press in Christiania), in order to give a documentary refutation of these disgusting slanders. It will be possible to send us at least some copies of the pamphlet, and extracts from it should appear in *Arbeiterpolitik*, *Politiken*, *Demain*, etc.

(2) It is equally essential that Hanecki should give a documentary refutation of the slanderers, by publishing as rapidly as possible the financial accounts of his trading and his "business deals" with Sumenson (who is this lady? It's the first time I have heard of her!) and with Kozlovsky (it is desirable that the accounts should be audited and signed by a Swedish notary or Swedish socialists, several of them, members of Parliament). It is also necessary to publish the text of the telegrams (there has already been something in the Russian papers, in *Russkaya Volya*, *Bez Lishnikh Slov*[304] and others, but probably not in full), and to analyse and explain each.

We must fight against this shameful Dreyfus campaign, against this slandering, by publishing the pamphlet, and as quickly as possible, not sparing toil, trouble or money, in order to brand the slanderers and, as far as possible, to help those who have been arrested on this base and slanderous charge.

(3) How are the financial affairs of the Bureau Abroad, which was appointed by our Central Committee? After the July persecutions it is clear that our C.C. cannot help (I think so at any rate). Write whether you have succeeded in collecting anything through the Swedish Left, and will the Bureau manage to exist? What about the *Bulletin*? How many issues have been published, and in what languages?[305] Has Guilbeaux had all the issues? Have you a file of *Demain*? Was the *Bulletin* sent to America, North and South? Write about all this in as much detail as you can.

(4) By the way. I don't remember who informed us, but it seems that after Grimm, and independently of him, Moor appeared in Stockholm. That the scoundrel Grimm, as a Kautskian "Centrist", proved capable of a scoundrelly understanding with "his" minister does not surprise me: anyone who does not break resolutely with the social-chauvinists always risks falling into this scoundrelly situation.

But what kind of man is Moor? Has it been fully and absolutely proved that he is an honest man? That he never had, and has not now, any direct or indirect dealings with the German social-imperialists? If it is true that Moor is in Stockholm, and if you know him, I would very, very much ask you, earnestly ask you, insistently ask you to take every step to check this up in the most strict and the most documented fashion. There is not, or rather, should not be, any room even for a shadow of suspicion, reproach, rumour, etc. I very much regret that the "Zimmerwald Commission" did not condemn Grimm more severely![306] It should have been done more severely!

(5) I have been, and remain, unquestionably against participation in the Stockholm Conference.[307] I must observe that I am writing all this letter personally, as from myself, since I have had no chance either to ask the C.C. or even communicate with it. Therefore, in replying to me with particular detail, append to your letter your official, detailed, business-like, documentary report (of the whole Bureau) to the Central Committee, and I will send it on.

So, I am absolutely against participating in the Stockholm Conference. I consider Kamenev's statement[308] (have you seen *Novaya Zhizn*? you ought to subscribe to it) the height of stupidity, if not of baseness, and have already written about this to the Central Committee and for the press. Luckily Kamenev was speaking only for himself, and was disavowed by another Bolshevik.

I consider participation in the Stockholm Conference, or in any other, with the Ministers (and scoundrels) Chernov, Tsereteli, Skobelev and their parties, to be direct betrayal, and will state this opinion in the press against all and sundry. If in the "Zimmerwald Commission" (judging by the report of the social-chauvinist Rozanov) it proved possible almost to reject Stockholm, or to half-reject it, this is very good. But "almost" and "half" are of no use at all, and all this "half"-social-chauvinist Zimmerwald Commission, which depends on the Italians and the Ledebourites, who desire "unity" with the social-chauvinists, is a most harmful institution.

(6) We are making the very greatest and unforgivable mistake in delaying or postponing the convening of a con-

ference of the Left to found a Third International. It is just now, when Zimmerwald is so shamefully wavering or obliged to be inactive, just now *while* there *still* is in Russia a legal (almost legal) internationalist party with more than 200,000 (240,000) members* (which does not exist anywhere else in the world in wartime), it is just now that we are in duty bound to call a conference of the Left, and we shall really be criminals if we are *late* in doing so (the Bolshevik Party in Russia is being driven more and more underground day by day).

Money for the conference will be found. It is possible to issue several numbers of its *Bulletin*. There is a centre for it in Stockholm. There is a French "foothold" (*Demain*) and an English one (the "Socialist *Labour* Party" of America; its delegate Reinstein** was recently in Petrograd and will probably be in Stockholm)—though by the way *in addition* to the S.L.P. (the "Socialist *Labour* Party" of America) there is also an English foothold, Tom Mann in Britain, the minorities within the British Socialist Party, the Scottish socialists and *The International* in America.

It would be simply criminal to postpone now the calling of a conference of the Left.

It would be immeasurably stupid to "wait" for a "large" number of participants, and to be "embarrassed" by the fact that at present there are "few". For just now such a conference will be a *moral* force, independently of the number of participants, while later it may be *hushed up*.

The Bolsheviks, the P.S.D., the Dutch, *Arbeiterpolitik*, *Demain*—there is already a sufficient *nucleus*. They will certainly be joined, if energetic action is taken, by part of the Danes (Trier and others, who have left the party of the scoundrel Stauning), part of the Swedish Young (against whom *we* are sinning, in not *leading* them, because they *must be led*), some of the Bulgarians, the Lefts in Austria ("Franz"[309]), some of the friends of Loriot in France, part of the Lefts in Switzerland (*Youth International*) and in

* Seventeen daily papers; 1,415,000 copies weekly altogether; 320,000 daily.

** I have no idea what sort of a bird this is. According to the press, he greeted the "Unity Congress" of the Mensheviks!! That means he's a suspect bird.

Italy, and then the elements in the Anglo-American movement which I have already mentioned.

The resolutions of the conference of the Bolsheviks (April 24-29, 1917) and of their congress (July 1917; see the resolutions in *Novaya Zhizn*),[310] the draft new programme of the same Party—there is a sufficient *ideological basis* (adding *Vorbote*, *Tribune*, *Arbeiterpolitik* and others) to be able to present the whole world with clear answers to the questions raised by imperialism, and to accuse the social-chauvinists and the Kautskians.

Such a conference must be called *at once*, *its* provisional *Bureau* must be set up, and its manifesto and draft resolutions printed in three languages for passing on to the parties. I repeat once again: I am profoundly convinced that, if we do not do this *now*, we shall make this work terribly difficult for ourselves in the future, and will terribly facilitate an "amnesty" for the traitors to socialism.

(7) The ministerialism of the Russian Menshevik-"Zimmerwaldists" must be specially utilised to put an ultimatum to Zimmerwald in general: either a break with the Brantings, Huysmans and Co., or we walk out immediately. By the way: is *Arbeiterpolitik* making a campaign against Zetkin and against the Braunschweiger *Volksfreund* for the way these scoundrels, pursuing their intrigues, have been whitewashing and supporting the Russian Mensheviks, Chkheidze and Co., who have proved ministerial swine, just like Sembat, Renaudel, Thomas and Co.?

Has Mehring, too, still not understood to this day the utter baseness of Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Skobelev and Co.?

(8) You must get your letters sent on here—I hope to receive immediately *just* as detailed a letter as mine (otherwise I do not agree to correspond)—and literature as well: files from the middle of June, at the very least, of *Arbeiterpolitik*, *Demain*, *Kampf* (Duisburg), *Weekly People* (S.L.P.), *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, *Neue Zeit*, *The Call* and others. *Spartacus*, the publications of Loriot and his friends, *Avanti!*, etc., etc. As a beginning, you might at least send cuttings.

(9) You should send here, if possible every week, first, articles for the provincial and Petrograd Party press (reviews of the Left-wing movement abroad, facts, facts, facts);

secondly, leaflets (4-8-16 small pages) for publication as booklets. Summaries of *facts* about the collapse of the International, the disgrace of the social-chauvinists, the disgrace of the Kautskians, the growth of the movement of the Left: at least 4 booklets on each of these subjects, 16-32 small pages each. *Facts* and *facts*. There is a hope of publishing this. Reply at once whether you can take it on. When sending it on by our method (there can be no question now of sending it legally) I think it is *all the same* which language it is written in.

(10) I hope you have the file of *Pravda*, and are subscribing to *Novaya Zhizn*. If you have not received *Rabochy i Soldat* (closed down), *Proletarskoye Dyelo* (Kronstadt) and *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Moscow), write at once, and I will send them as soon as the new method, being tested for the first time by this letter, is organised satisfactorily.

P.S. August 18. I have just received Nos. 1, 2, 4 of the new paper *Proletary*, the Central Organ[311]—of course, they will soon close it down. I will try and send it to you. I am sending Nos. *1-7*.

August 20. I have still not succeeded in sending off my letter, and probably won't succeed for some time. So this is becoming something like a diary instead of a letter! It can't be helped. You must have a lot of patience and determination, if you want to communicate at all with internationalists in the "most free" imperialist republic. Today I have learned from *Izvestia* that *News of the Stockholm Information Bureau of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* is being published weekly in Stockholm. Try to send *files* of all Stockholm publications. *We see nothing*.

August 25 (September 7). It looks as though tomorrow it will be possible to send this letter. Make *every* effort to organise delivery from your end. Reply without fail *at once*, if only briefly, to the address (within *your* country) which the comrade delivering this letter (or his friend) communicates to you. He will also pass on a cipher; as an experiment I am writing a few words in this cipher, and please reply to thorn in the same cipher.*

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* A few lines are in cipher here.—*Ed*.

P.S. Write one more pamphlet, 16-32 small pages, about the secret diplomatic treaties of Russia: brief, precise, facts, facts. Such-and-such a treaty of such-and-such a date, month, year, content so-and-so. A list of the treaties. A summary. As brief and factual as possible. Reply whether you undertake to do it, and when you will send it.

I conclude: for God's sake, a conference of the Left immediately, a bureau of the Left, a bulletin of the bureau, and decide on a *second* conference in 2 (1½) months.

Greetings!

Lenin

Sent from Helsingfors to Stockholm

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

138

TO THE FINNISH COMRADES[312]

Manner, Sirola, Kuusinen, Valpas and Viiku

Dear Comrades,

With the greatest happiness I have heard from my Finnish friends that you are at the head of the revolutionary wing of the Finnish Social-Democratic Labour Party and are carrying on a struggle for the cause of the proletarian socialist revolution. I can state with confidence on behalf of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia that the great organising talent of the Finnish workers, their high level of development and their prolonged political schooling in democratic institutions will help them successfully to effect the socialist reorganisation of Finland. We count on the fraternal aid of the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Finland.

Long live the international socialist revolution!

With best greetings,

November 11, 1917 *N. Lenin*

Written in German

First published in Russian in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1931

Printed from the original

139

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES[313]

All power is in the hands of the Soviets. Confirmations are unnecessary. Your dismissal of the one and appointment of the other is law.

Written on November 19 (December 2), 1917

First published in *Rabochaya Moskva* No. 255, November 7, 1927

Printed from the original

140

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OSTROGOZHSK SOVIET[314]

Draw up a precise inventory of the valuables, put them away in a secure place, you are responsible for their safekeeping. The estates are the property of the people. Prosecute for looting. Inform us of the sentences of the court.

Lenin

Written on December 6 (19), 1917

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

1918

141

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

People's Secretariat
For Commissar Orjonikidze
Kharkov

I have received your telegram of January 20, 1918. Hearty thanks for your energetic measures regarding food. Go on trying for God's sake as hard as you can to secure foodstuffs, press on with collection and delivery of grain, so as to arrange supply before the spring floods. All hopes are on you, otherwise famine by the spring is inevitable.

I have talked, and will talk, with Pyatakov about sending money. A hundred millions have been sent, fifty will be sent to Kharkov. Take measures for triple defence of the railway line from Petrograd to Kharkov. I am sure that your relations with the Central Executive Committee in Kharkov will as before be entirely friendly. Greetings and best wishes.

Lenin

Written on January 22
(February 4), 1918

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

142

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DRISSA TOWN SOVIET[315]

To Urban, Chairman of the Drissa Soviet of Deputies

Offer resistance where it is possible. Evacuate all valuables and foodstuffs. Destroy all the rest. Leave nothing to the enemy. Take up the railway lines—two versts out of every ten. Blow up the bridges.

Lenin

Written on February 19, 1918

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the text
of N. P. Gorbunov's notes

143

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR WAR

April 22, 1918

On April 22 at 11 p.m. the Council of People's Commissars resolved that the War Commissariat be requested to take immediately all steps within its power to defend the eastern boundary of Kharkov Gubernia, especially Chertkovo station, which the Germans and haidamaks are trying to occupy in order to interrupt railway communication with Rostov.

Details to be discussed with Stalin.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the typewritten
original signed by V. I. Lenin

144

TO D. I. KURSKY[316]

It is essential *immediately*, with demonstrative speed, to introduce a Bill stating that the penalty for bribery (extortion, graft, acting as an agent for bribery, *and the like*) shall be

not less than

ten years' imprisonment and, in addition, ten years of compulsory labour.[317]

Written on May 4, 1918

First published in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 260, November 7, 1928

Printed from the original

145

TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

Dear Comrade Shahumyan,

Many thanks for your letter. We are delighted with your firm and resolute policy. Be capable of combining with it the most cautious diplomacy, unquestionably required by the present most difficult situation—and we shall be victorious.

The difficulties are immeasurable. *So far* we are being saved *only* by the contradictions and conflicts and struggles among the imperialists. Be capable of making use of these conflicts: *for the time being* we have to learn diplomacy.[318]

Best greetings and wishes, and greetings to all friends.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on May 14, 1918
Sent to Baku
Published in *Bulletins of the Dictatorship of the Tsentrokaspy and the Presidium of the Provisional Executive Committee* No. 33, September 8, 1918

Printed from the *Bulletins* text

146

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

May 23, 1918

Vladimir Dmitriyevich Bonch-Bruyevich,
Office Manager, Council of People's Commissars

In view of your failure to fulfil my insistent request to point out to me the justification for raising my salary as from March 1, 1918, from 500 to 800 rubles a month, and in view of the obvious illegality of this increase, carried out by you arbitrarily by agreement with the secretary of the Council, Nikolai Petrovich Gorbunov, and in direct infringement of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 23, 1917, I give you a severe reprimand.[319]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the typewritten
original signed by V. I. Lenin

147

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

To be telephoned to the Smolny, Petrograd*:

In view of the cutting of the Siberian Railway by the Czechoslovaks and the tremendous threat to transport, in view of interrupted communications the very greatest peril menaces the food supply.

Comrade Vladimirov insists, and I support him, that Petrograd should urgently send its best food supply personnel to Moscow. These personnel, together with strong detachments of selected workers, may save the situation.

Don't delay. Don't wait for help from outside. Strain every effort for extraordinary measures by the Petrograd workers.

Lenin

Written on June 2, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

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* At the top of this document Lenin wrote: "If this cannot be telephoned immediately to Petrograd, it should be sent by direct line."—*Ed.*

148

TELEGRAM TO NIZHNI-RIVERSIDE

Urgent. Nizhni-Riverside.
Copies to Saratov, Tsaritsyn

You are instructed to carry out immediately and without question all orders and instructions of People's Commissar Stalin, extraordinary plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars.

Transmit to Stalin: copies of all his orders and instructions must be sent immediately to Nizhni-Riverside, Volga Regional Authority.

Contents of this telegram to be passed on at once to all districts.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 8, 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from a text
written in an unknown hand
corrected and signed
by V. I. Lenin

149

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

June 26, 1918

Also to Lashevich and other members of the C.C.

Comrade Zinoviev,

Only today we have heard at the C.C. that in Petrograd the *workers* wanted to reply to the murder of Volodarsky by mass terror and that you (not you personally, but the Petrograd Central Committee members, or Petrograd Committee members) restrained them.[320]

I protest most emphatically!

We are discrediting ourselves: we threaten mass terror, even in resolutions of the Soviet of Deputies, yet when it comes to action we *obstruct* the revolutionary initiative of the masses, a *quite* correct one.

This is im-poss-ible!

The terrorists will consider us old women. This is wartime above all. We must encourage the energy and mass character of the terror against the counter-revolutionaries, and particularly in Petrograd, the example of which is *decisive*.

Greetings!

Lenin

P.S. Detachments and still more detachments: make use of your victory at the elections. If the Petrograders move 10-20 thousand into *Tambov* Gubernia, the Urals, etc., they will save both themselves and the whole revolution, *completely and for certain*. The harvest is a giant one, we have to hang on only a few weeks more.

First published in part
in *Pravda* No. 17, January 21, 1923

Published in full in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

150

TELEGRAM TO A. M. YURIEV

If you are still disinclined to understand Soviet policy, which is equally hostile both to the British and to the Germans, you will have only yourself to blame, Natsarenus is on his way.

We shall fight the British if they continue their policy of plunder.[321]

Lenin

Written on June 26, 1918
Sent to Murmansk
First published in *Pravda*
No. 51, February 21, 1935

Printed from the original

151

TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

June 29, 1918

Dear Comrade Shahumyan,

I send my best greetings and wishes.

Stalin is in Tsaritsyn. Better send your letters through Stalin.

Greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Baku

First published in 1938

Printed from the original

152

TELEGRAM TO CHIEFS OF REQUISITIONING DETACHMENTS ON ALL RAILWAYS[322]

The Council of People's Commissars has been informed of quite intolerable behaviour, damaging to Soviet power, by some requisitioning detachments. The detachments have been sent for responsible service on the railways, for the struggle against actual profiteering. Chiefs of detachments are instructed to maintain the most stringent discipline in their detachments, for the absence of which, as for all offences by the detachments, the chiefs will be held to strict account before the merciless judgement of the Revolutionary Tribunal. Detachments should be informed that the Council of People's Commissars is convinced that class-conscious workers will not tolerate any breach of the strictest proletarian discipline, and will treat with the greatest severity those who by their behaviour are disgracing Soviet power. But if obvious hooligans have found their way into the detachments, and refuse to obey the instructions of the central authorities and their chiefs, or disgrace the Soviet Republic by taking bribes from grain speculators, they must be immediately arrested by their chiefs and the local Soviets of Deputies, and delivered under guard to Moscow for committal to most severe judgement by the Revolutionary Tribunal.

Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 1, 1918

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the typewritten
original corrected, amended
and signed by V. I. Lenin

153

TO ALL DISTRICT COMMITTEES OF THE R.C.P., ALL DISTRICT SOVIETS OF DEPUTIES, ALL STAFFS OF THE RED ARMY

Two bombs were thrown in the German Embassy about 3 p.m. today, severely wounding Mirbach. This is an obvious act of the monarchists or of those provocateurs who want to drag Russia into war in the interests of the Anglo-French capitalists, who have also bribed the Czechoslovaks. Mobilise all forces, put everyone on guard immediately to catch the criminals. *All* cars are to be detained and held for a triple check.[323]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 6, 1918
Published on July 7 (June 24), 1918 in *Pravda* No. 138 and *Izvestia* No. 140

Printed from the original

154

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE MOSCOW SOVIET

To be transmitted to all volost, village and uyezd Soviets of Moscow Gubernia.*

The defeated bands of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who revolted against Soviet power are scattering through the surrounding districts. The leaders of this whole adventure are fleeing. Take all steps to capture and detain those who had the insolence to rise against Soviet power. Detain all cars. Lower barriers over the highways everywhere. Concentrate near them armed detachments of the local workers and peasants. There is information that one armoured car, which the rebels possessed, has got out of the city. Take all steps to detain this armoured car.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 7, 1918
Published on July 8 (June 25), 1918 in *Pravda* No. 139 and *Izvestia* No. 141

Printed from the text written in an unknown hand and signed by V. I. Lenin

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* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system continued under Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

155

RADIO MESSAGE TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

July 22, 1918

Shahumyan
Soviet of Deputies
Baku

I can only support in full Stalin's telegram against the Narodnik faction of the Baku Soviet and concerning the will of the Fifth Congress of Soviets.[324]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published
in *Bakinsky Rabochy* No. 221,
September 24, 1933

Printed from the original

156

TO CLARA ZETKIN

July 26, 1918

Esteemed Comrade Zetkin,

Many warm thanks for your letter of June 27, which was brought me by Comrade Hertha Hordon. I will do all I can to help Comrade Hordon.

We are all extremely glad that you, Comrade Mehring and the other "Spartacus comrades" in Germany are with us, "head and heart".[325] This gives us confidence that the best elements of the West-European working class—in spite of all difficulties—will nevertheless come to our assistance.

We here are now living through perhaps the most difficult weeks of the whole revolution. The class struggle and the civil war have penetrated deep among the population: everywhere there is a split in the villages—the poor are for us, the kulaks are furiously against us. The Entente has bought the Czechoslovaks, a counter-revolutionary revolt is raging, the bourgeoisie is making every effort to overthrow us. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that we shall escape this "usual" (as in 1794 and 1849) course of the revolution, and will conquer the bourgeoisie.

With great gratitude, very best greetings and sincere respect,

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. My wife asks me to give you her special greetings. To Comrade Hoschka (we have translated his speech, as we

have your article) and to all, all friends the very best greetings.

P.S. I have just been brought our new State Seal. Here is the impression. The inscription reads: Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Workers of all countries, unite![326]

Written in German

First published in Russian in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1933

Printed from the original

157

TELEGRAM TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN[327]

July 29

Astrakhan
For Shahumyan in Baku

Any actions by the Dashnaks against the decision of the Fifth Congress of Soviets and the central Soviet power will be considered insurrection and treason. As regards sending troops we shall take steps, but cannot promise for certain.

Lenin

Written on July 29, 1918
First published in 1938
in the magazine *Krasny Arkhiv*
No. 4-5

Printed from the original

158

TO A. D. TSYURUPA[328]

In view of the critical food situation, we must not scatter our forces. We must concentrate them in one place, where it is *possible* to secure *a lot* of grain.

I suggest that forces be concentrated in Yelets Uyezd where, according to a number of reports and on the evidence of the People's Commissar for the Interior Pravdin, who inspected this area, the state of affairs, in the sense of the throttling of the kulaks and the organisation of the poor peasants, is a model one.

Send immediately, with the maximum speed, *all* the food, harvesting and harvest-requisitioning detachments to Yelets Uyezd, with the maximum number of threshers and attachments (if possible) for rapid drying of the grain, etc.

Give them the task of *clearing* the uyezd of grain *surpluses completely*.

Probably this will yield several million poods of grain (in my opinion, more than 6 million poods).

First send the maximum forces to those 12 (out of 21) volosts of the uyezd where, according to the local people, the organisation of the poor peasants is best, and particularly to the former landed estates which have been registered.

Don't be *niggardly* with bonuses for rapid harvesting and delivery of grain, assign for this purpose *up to 30 million* rubles immediately (grant bonuses to volosts and villages in the shape of machinery, grants for schools and hospitals and, in general, mainly for such purposes). The maximum

bonuses must be given for delivery of *all* surpluses of grain, medium bonuses for big deliveries in general, and so forth.

Among the workers of the famine-stricken gubernias (and among the famine-stricken peasants there also) develop mass agitation: crusade for grain to Yelets Uyezd!

Written on August 5, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

159

TELEGRAM TO N. A. ANISIMOV

Anisimov
Astrakhan

The situation in Baku is still not clear to me.
Who is in power?
Where is Shahumyan?
Inquire of Stalin, and act in the light of all the circumstances; you know that I have complete confidence in Shahumyan. The situation cannot be understood from here, and there is no possibility of giving speedy help.[329]

Lenin

Written on August 9, 1918
First published in 1938
in *Krasny Arkhiv* No. 4-5

Printed from the original

160

TO G. F. FYODOROV

August 9, 1918

Comrade Fyodorov,

It is obvious that a whiteguard insurrection is being prepared in Nizhni. You must strain every effort, appoint three men with dictatorial powers (yourself, Markin and one other), organise *immediately* mass terror, *shoot and deport the hundreds* of prostitutes who are making drunkards of the soldiers, former officers and the like.

Not a minute of delay.

I can't understand how Romanov could leave at a time like this!

I do not know the bearer. His name is Alexei Nikolayevich Bobrov. He says he worked in Vyborgskaya Storona District in Petrograd (from 1916).... Previously worked in Nizhni in 1905.

Judging by his credentials, he can be trusted. Check up on this and set him to work.

Peters, Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission, says that they also have *reliable* people in Nizhni.

You must act with all energy. Mass searches. Execution for concealing arms. Mass deportation of Mensheviks and unreliables. Change the guards at warehouses, put in reliable people.

They say Raskolnikov and Danishevsky are on their way to see you from Kazan.

Read this letter to the friends and reply by telegraph or telephone.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Nizhni-Novgorod

First published, but not in full, in 1938 in *Bolshevik* No. 2

Printed in full from a photo-copy of the original

161

TELEGRAM TO V. V. KURAYEV

August 10, 1918

Kurayev
Gubernia Executive Committee
Penza

Have received your telegram, passed it on to Sverdlov and reached agreement with him.

All measures will be taken.

Essential to crush the kulak rising with the greatest energy, speed and ruthlessness, drawing part of the troops from Penza, confiscating all the property of the rebel kulaks and all their grain. Telegraph more frequently how this is going.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

162

TELEGRAM TO V. V. KURAYEV

Kurayev
Gubernia Executive Committee
Penza

Extremely important to gather and publish facts of participation of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the kulak rising. Inform us in as much detail as possible what steps you are proposing to take against the Left S.R.s. I have cabled the rest to Minkin and Bosh.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 12, 1918

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

163

TELEGRAM TO A. Y. MINKIN

August 14, 1918

Minkin
Gubernia Executive Committee
Penza

I have received two complaints against you: the first, that you are showing softness in crushing the kulaks. If this is true, you are committing a great crime against the revolution. The second complaint is that you are cutting down agitation, reducing the circulation of leaflets, complaining of lack of money. We shall not grudge hundreds of thousands for agitation. Demand money urgently from the Central Executive Committee, there will be no lack of money. We shall not accept such excuses.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

164

TELEGRAM TO M. F. BOLDYREV

August 17, 1918

Boldyrev
Executive Committee
Zadonsk

Act in the most resolute way against the kulaks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary scoundrels who have made common cause with them. Issue appeals to the poor peasants. Organise them. Ask for help from Yelets. Essential to suppress the kulak extortioners mercilessly. Telegraph.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1927
in the magazine
Revolutsia i Kultura No. 2

Printed from the original

165

TELEGRAM TO THE ZDOROVETS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, OREL GUBERNIA

Burov, Pereyaslavtsev
Zdorovets, Orel Gubernia

Copy to the Orel Gubernia Soviet of Deputies

Essential to combine ruthless suppression of the kulak Left Socialist-Revolutionary rising with confiscation of all the grain from the kulaks and exemplary clearing out in full of grain surpluses, distributing part of the grain free to the poor peasants. Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 19, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

166

TELEGRAM
TO THE LIVNY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

August 20, 1918

Executive Committee
Livny

Copy to Military Commissar Semashko and Communist Organisation

Congratulations on energetic suppression of the kulaks and whiteguards in the uyezd. Essential to strike while the iron is hot and, without losing a minute, organise the poor peasants in the uyezd, confiscate all the grain and all the property of the rebel kulaks, hang the kulak ring-leaders, mobilise and arm the poor peasants under reliable leaders drawn from our detachment, arrest hostages from among the rich peasants and hold them so long as all surpluses of grain have not been gathered and delivered in their volosts. Telegraph fulfilment. Send part of the model Iron Regiment at once to Penza.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

167

TELEGRAM TO THE ASTRAKHAN GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

August 21, 1918

Gubernia Executive Committee
Astrakhan
Copy to Gubernia Communist Organisation

Can it really be true that in Astrakhan there is already talk about evacuation?

If it is true, it is essential to take ruthless measures against the cowards, and immediately appoint the most reliable and resolute people to organise the defence of Astrakhan and to pursue the most firm policy of struggle to the bitter end in the event of an offensive by the British.

Telegraph detailed reply.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1938 in *Bolshevik* No. 2

Printed from the original

168

TO PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

August 29, 1918

I allow myself to express the following wishes on the question of fulfilment of the Council of People's Commissars' resolution of August 29, on the submission of *reports* within *one week*:

In the reports, which must be *as popular as possible*, it is particularly necessary to note

(a) improvement in the position of the masses (raising of wages for the *workers*, school-teachers, etc.),

(b) participation of the workers in administration (personally outstanding workers, workers' organisations likewise, etc.),

(c) participation of the poor peasants and their help to Soviet power in the struggle against the kulaks,

(d) expropriation of the landowners, capitalists, traders, financiers, etc.

The main task is to demonstrate *concretely*, with facts, *exactly how* Soviet power has made definite steps (*the first*) towards socialism.

Lenin

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

169

TO M. S. KEDROV[330]

August 29, 1918

Comrade Kedrov,

You are giving us too little factual information. Send reports *with every messenger*.

How much fortification work has been done?

Along what line?

At what points on the railway have sappers been *provided*, so that in the event of an advance in force by the Anglo-French we can blow up and *seriously* damage *such-and-such a number* (how many, there must be a full report, and where precisely) of bridges, versts of the railway, passages through the marshes, etc., etc.

Have you taken sufficient measures to safeguard Vologda against the whiteguard peril? It will be unforgivable if you display weakness or carelessness in this regard.

Greetings!

Lenin

Sent to Vologda

First published in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 17, January 21, 1927

Printed from the original

170

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Trotsky, Sviyazhsk
Copy to Kayurov and Chugurin
Staff of 5th Army

Thanks. Recovery proceeding excellently.[331] Am sure that the crushing of the Kazan Czechs and whiteguards, as well as of the kulak extortioners supporting them, will be exemplarily ruthless.

Best greetings.

Lenin

Written on September 7, 1918
First published in *Pravda* No. 201, August 30, 1928

Printed from the original

171

TELEGRAM TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

September 18, 1918

People's Commissar Lunacharsky
Petrograd

Copy to Pokrovsky, 53 Ostozhenka, Moscow

I have heard today Vinogradov's report on the busts and monuments, and am utterly outraged; nothing has been done for months; to this day there is not a single bust, the disappearance of the bust of Radishchev is a farce. There is no bust of Marx on public display, nothing has been done in the way of propaganda by putting up inscriptions in the streets. I reprimand you for this criminal and lackadaisical attitude, and demand that the names of all responsible persons should be sent me for prosecution. Shame on the saboteurs and thoughtless loafers.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

172

TO RAILWAYMEN COMRADES ON THE MOSCOW-KIEV-VORONEZH RAILWAY

I thank you with all my, heart for your greetings and good wishes and, for my part, wish you every success in the cause of building socialism. The proletarian mass of railwaymen and clerks must overcome not only sabotage but also syndicalist strivings and inclinations, and I am sure it will overcome them.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Moscow, September 20, 1918

Published on October 15, 1918 in the magazine *Vestnik Glavnogo Voyenno-Revolutsionnogo Komiteta Moskovsko-Kievo-Voronezhskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi* (Kursk) No. 33

Printed from the original

173

TO Y. A. BERZIN, V. V. VOROVSKY AND A. A. JOFFE

September 20, 1918

Dear Comrades,

Today's *Pravda* has quoted extracts from Kautsky's article against Bolshevism (from *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik*).[332]

Kautsky's disgraceful rubbish, childish babble and shallowest opportunism impel me to ask: why do we do nothing to fight the *theoretical* vulgarisation of Marxism by Kautsky?

Can we tolerate that even such people as Mehring and Zetkin keep away from Kautsky more "morally" (if one may put it so) than *theoretically*.... Kautsky has found nothing better to do now than to write against the Bolsheviks, they say.

Is that an argument? Can one really so weaken one's own position? Why, that is only putting a weapon into Kautsky's hands!!

And this instead of writing:

Kautsky has *absolutely* failed to understand and has distorted in a purely opportunist way

the	teaching	of	Marx	on the state
"	"	"	"	*on the dictatorship* of the proletariat
"	"	"	"	on bourgeois democracy,
"	"	"	"	on parliamentarism
"	"	"	"	on the role and significance of the Commune, etc.

We ought to take these measures:

(1) have a detailed talk with the Left (Spartacists and others), stimulating them to make a statement *of principle*,

of *theory*, in the press, that on the question of dictatorship Kautsky is producing philistine Bernsteinism, not Marxism;

(2) publish as soon as possible in German my *The State and Revolution*;

(3) provide it with at least a *publisher's* foreword, as for example:

"The publisher considers the appearance of this booklet particularly essential at the present moment, in view of the complete distortion of Marxism, precisely on these questions, in the latest works of Kautsky, who is replacing the viewpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat by philistine social-liberalism in the spirit of Bernstein and other opportunists."

(4) If it is impossible to publish the booklet quickly, then get a note similar to the "publisher's foreword" in the *newspapers* (of the Left).

I would very much ask you to send (especially addressed to me) Kautsky's pamphlet (about the Bolsheviks, dictatorship, etc.) as soon as it appears—[333]

—and then to collect for me *all* Kautsky's articles about the Bolsheviks ("Democracy and Dictatorship", the end of 1917 or the beginning of 1918; then the article from *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik*, August 1918) *and other articles, if there were any.*

Very best greetings!

Lenin

Sent to Berne, Stockholm and Berlin

First published, but not in full, in *Pravda* No. 17, January 21, 1925

Published in full in 1932 in the second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIX

Printed from the original

174

TO Y. M. SVERDLOV AND L. D. TROTSKY

October 1, 1918

Comrades *Sverdlov and Trotsky*

Things have so "accelerated" in Germany that we must not fall behind either. But today we are already behind.

We should call *tomorrow* a joint session of the

Central Executive Committee
Moscow Soviet
District Soviets
Trade unions, etc., etc.

A *number* of reports must be made on *the beginning of the revolution in Germany*.

(Victory of *our* tactics of struggle against German imperialism. And so forth.)

A resolution to be adopted.

The international revolution has come so close in *one week* that it has to be reckoned with as an event of the *next few days*.

No alliances either with the government of Wilhelm, or with the government of Wilhelm II+Ebert and the other scoundrels.

But for the German worker masses, the German working people in their millions, once they have begun with their spirit of revolt (so far *only* a spirit), we

are beginning to prepare

a fraternal alliance, *bread*, military aid.

||| We are all ready to die to help the German workers advance the revolution which has begun in Germany

The conclusion: (1) ten times more effort to secure grain (clean out *all* stocks both for ourselves *and for the German* workers).
(2) Ten times more *enrolments* for the army. We must have *by the spring* an army of three millions to help the international workers' revolution.

This resolution should go out to the whole world by cable on Wednesday night.

Appoint the meeting for 2 p.m. on Wednesday. We shall begin at *4*, give me the platform for 1/4 hour of introduction, I shall drive up and leave immediately afterwards. Send the car for me tomorrow morning (but by telephone say only: *agreed*).[334]

Greetings!

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

175

TELEGRAM ON THE OCCASION OF THE CAPTURE OF SAMARA

Samara has been captured. The Volga is free. It would be criminal not to make use of the few days remaining before navigation closes. It is essential to strain every effort to deliver the maximum quantity of oil and food cargoes to the upper reaches of the Volga. This task cannot be performed without the strictest centralisation of all measures, and the precise fulfilment in the localities of orders from the centre. Taking this into account, the Council of People's Commissars resolves, and orders the fulfilment without fail:

(1) All vessels, rafts, etc., commandeered by various organisations shall be returned immediately to the *Central Inland Waterways Board* and the *Central Oil Board* respectively. (This does not apply to the vessels and floating transport already included in the Volga Military Flotilla.)

(2) The right of requisitioning vessels, rafts, etc., on the Volga, previously granted to various organisations, institutions and individuals, is annulled. The requisitioning of floating means of transport required for military purposes shall henceforth take place on each occasion only by special permission of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

(3) All Commanders of Fronts, Extraordinary Commissions and Soviets shall immediately take the most stringent measures to ensure the unhindered movement of vessels and the protection of cargoes against any seizures and delays whatsoever.

(4) The control of the entire Volga tanker fleet and all oil cargoes on the Volga is vested exclusively in the Central Oil Board. (Telegraphic address: *Glavkoneft*, Moscow.) All authorities, including the military and Front Commanders, are instructed to carry out without question all decisions of the *Central Oil Board* concerning the movement of oil cargoes, and decisions of the *Central Inland Waterways Board* concerning vessels.

(5) The direct control of oil cargoes along the Whole Volga is vested in Comrade *Tarvid*, *member of the Collegium of the Central Oil Board*. All his instructions, and likewise those of his agents, regarding oil are absolutely binding on all authorities.

(6) All decisions as to requisitioning or prohibition of dispatch of oil, etc., published up to this day, remain in force only insofar as they do not contradict the instructions of the *Central Oil Board*.

(7) Most strictly confirming the aforesaid, the *Council of People's Commissars* has decided to prosecute before military-revolutionary courts all who infringe the present decision, without regard to their posts or their Party membership. Agents of the *Central Oil Board*, *the Central Inland Waterways Board and the Commissariat of Food* in the localities are instructed to report to Moscow urgently all actions by local authorities which interfere with the planned work of these centres. Extraordinary Commissions will be dispatched immediately to try the guilty and carry out the sentences.

(8) The content of the present decision of the *Council of People's Commissars* is to be made known to all local executive bodies and persons in official positions.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Kremlin, Moscow
October 9, 1918

Published in *Izvestia* No. 223, October 13, 1918

Printed from the typewritten original signed by V. I. Lenin, collated with the newspaper text

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

176

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES[335]

Dear Comrades,

I have received your paper numbered 24962 with an extract from the resolution of the Presidium of October 7.

In all conscience I must say that this resolution is so *politically* illiterate and so stupid that it makes one sick. "...The Presidium is obliged to disclaim responsibility...." That is how capricious young ladies behave, not grown-up politicians. You will not free yourselves of responsibility, but increase it threefold.

If the Commissariat of Public Education does not reply to you and does not fulfil its duty towards you, then you are obliged to *complain*, and with documents. You are not children, are you, that you can't understand this?

When did you complain? Where is the copy? Where are the documents and the proofs?

Both the whole Presidium and Vinogradov, in my opinion, ought to be sent to prison for a week for inactivity.

If the Commissariat of Public Education "does not produce the busts" (when did you demand them? From whom? The copy and the document? When did you complain?), you should have *fought for your rights*. But "to disclaim responsibility" is the way of capricious young ladies and stupid Russian intellectuals.

Forgive this frank expression of my opinion, and accept communist greetings from one who hopes that you will get your lesson in prison for inaction in authority, and from one who is profoundly indignant at your behaviour.

October 12, 1918 *Lenin*

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

V. I. Lenin in the Kremlin courtyard during convalescence after the attempt on his life. *October 1918*

177

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPARTACUS GROUP[336]

October 18, 1918

Dear Comrades,

We have had news today that the Spartacus group, together with the Bremen Left Radicals,[337] has taken the most energetic steps to promote the setting up of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils throughout Germany. I take this opportunity to send our best wishes to the German revolutionary internationalist Social-Democrats. The work of the German Spartacus group, which has carried on systematic revolutionary propaganda in the most difficult conditions, has really saved the honour of German socialism and the German proletariat. Now the decisive hour is at hand: the rapidly maturing German revolution calls on the Spartacus group to play the most important role, and we all firmly hope that before long the German socialist proletarian republic will inflict a decisive blow on world imperialism.

I hope that the book by the renegade Kautsky against the dictatorship of the proletariat will also bring certain benefits. It will prove the correctness of what the Spartacus group always said against the Kautskians, and the masses will the more quickly be freed from the corrupting influence of Mr. Kautsky and Co.

With best greetings and firm hopes that in the very near future it will be possible to hail the victory of the proletarian revolution in Germany.

Yours,

N. Lenin

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1929 in German in *Illustrierte Geschichte der Deutschen Revolution* No. 6, Berlin

First published in Russian in *Pravda* No. 308, November 7, 1930

Printed from a photo-copy of the original
Translated from the German

178

TELEGRAM TO I. I. VATSETIS

October 20, 1918

Vatsetis
Arzamas

Extremely surprised and concerned at the delay in taking the Izhevsk and Votkinsk Works. Please adopt the most energetic measures to hasten this. Telegraph what precisely you have undertaken.[338]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

First published in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

* The telegram is also signed by Y. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russia C.E.C.—*Ed.*

179

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO A. A. JOFFE

Russian Ambassador Joffe
Berlin

Immediately transmit our very warmest greetings to Karl Liebknecht. The liberation from prison of the representative of the revolutionary workers of Germany is the portent of a new era, the era of victorious socialism, which is now opening up both for Germany and for the whole world.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks),

*Lenin**

Written on October 23, 1918

Published in *Pravda* No. 231 and *Izvestia* No. 233, October 25, 1918

Printed from the original

* The names of Sverdlov and Stalin are also appended, in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

180

TELEGRAM TO THE OREL AND KURSK GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AND GUBERNIA PARTY COMMITTEES

Secret
Urgent, top priority
November 9, 1918

2 addresses:
Orel, Gubernia E. C. and Gubernia Communist Party Committee
Kursk, Gubernia E. C. and Gubernia Communist Party Committee

A radio message has just been received from Kiel, addressed to the international proletariat and stating that power in Germany has passed into the hands of the workers and soldiers.

This radio message is signed by the Council of Sailors' Deputies of Kiel.

In addition, German soldiers at the front have arrested a peace delegation from Wilhelm, and have themselves begun negotiations for peace direct with the French soldiers. Wilhelm has abdicated.

It is essential to make every effort to communicate this as soon as possible to the German soldiers in the Ukraine, and to advise them to attack the troops of Krasnov, because then we shall together win tens of millions of poods of grain for the German workers, and beat off an invasion by the British, whose squadron is now approaching Novorossiisk.

Telegraph receipt and fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

181

TELEGRAM TO IVANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE UNECHA R.C.P.(B.) ORGANISATION[339]

November 13, 1918

Ivanov, Chairman of the Unecha R.C.P
Unecha

I thank everyone for the greetings. Am particularly touched by the greetings from the revolutionary soldiers of Germany. It is now extremely important that the revolutionary soldiers of Germany should take an immediate and active part in liberating the Ukraine. First of all, the whiteguards and the Ukrainian authorities must be arrested and, secondly, delegates from the revolutionary troops of Germany must be sent to all German military units in the Ukraine, so that they may take rapid and common action to liberate the Ukraine. There is no time to lose. Not an hour must be wasted. Telegraph immediately whether the revolutionary soldiers of Germany are accepting this proposal.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

N.B. *Urgent*.
Top priority.
Report to me at what time Unecha *received* this.

First published, but not in full, in 1937 in the book: Y. Gerasimov and M. Erlikh, *Nikolai Alexandrovich Shchors*. *Boyevoi Put*, Moscow

Published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

182

TELEGRAM TO THE OREL GUBERNIA COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

November 13, 1918

Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P. of Bolsheviks
For the Ukrainians
Orel

I have just received from Unecha greetings from the revolutionary soldiers of Germany. I consider it extremely important that you should inform all posts on the Ukrainian border of this by telegraph and, replying on my behalf with gratitude for the greetings of the revolutionary soldiers of Germany, you should appeal to them to help by rapid and resolute action in the liberation of the Ukraine. Let the revolutionary soldiers of Germany complete the glorious German revolution they have begun by arresting the whiteguards in the Ukraine and liberating it.

Long live the revolutionary soldiers of Germany in the Ukraine!

Long live the fraternal alliance between the German Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic!

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

183

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO I. I. VATSETIS

Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis
Serpukhov

The Defence Council inquires:

(1) Is it true that during the battles in the Balashov area about two weeks ago our units in the course of two or three days surrendered 25-30 guns to the enemy and, if this is true, what have you done to bring those guilty to trial and to avert similar happenings?

(2) Is it true that a fortnight ago you gave an order for the capture of Orenburg and, if it is true, why is the order not being carried out?

(3) What has been done to stabilise the position of our units in the Perm area who are demanding urgent help from the Centre?

The Defence Council awaits a reply from you to these questions.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Defence Council

Written on December 23, 1918

First published in *Pravda* No. 44, February 23, 1927

Printed from the typewritten text amended by J. V. Stalin and signed by V. I. Lenin

184

TELEGRAM TO THE SOVIET OF COMMUNES OF THE NORTHERN REGION

Zinoviev, Smolny, Petrograd
Northern Region Food Committee, Economic Council, Petrokomprod
Gubernia Food Committee, Optosoyuz
Copies to Trudosoyuz, Gubernia Food Committees
Olonets, Cherepovets, Novgorod, Pskov Economic Councils

According to information received, notwithstanding the decree of November 21, local co-operatives are being nationalised and closed, their goods requisitioned and no help is being given in restoring their legitimate activity.[340] All this causes dislocation of supply and upsets the organisation of the Soviet Republic's rear. The present is an instruction immediately to cease attempts to infringe and evade the decree of November 21, to restore the closed and nationalised co-operatives, to return their goods, and without fail to include the co-operatives in the distributive system, on an equal footing with state shops. The co-operative machinery should be made use of in all possible ways in the business of purchasing supplies and distribution, and representatives of the co-operative movement should be drawn into co-operative commissions of the food supply organisations. Infringement and evasion of the decree will be punished. This telegram is to be communicated for information and action to all Executive Committees and food supply organisations of the Northern Region. To be published in the local newspapers.

Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Defence Council

Written on December 25, 1918

Published in *Petrogradskaya Pravda* No. 285, December 27, 1918

Printed from a typewritten copy

1919

185

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Urgent

Trotsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic
Kursk (or present whereabouts)

The operations report of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasus Front No. 4873 shows that the Krasnov troops have occupied Raigorod, on the banks of the Volga south of Sarepta, threatening in the first place our military freight moving from Vladimirovka to Tsaritsyn, and secondly the safety of the line from Astrakhan to Saratov. Please take steps. The same operations report shows that a British fleet of four vessels bombarded Staroterechnaya, south of Astrakhan, set fire to two of our barges and withdrew to sea unscathed, seizing our hospital ship *Alesker* with medical staff on board. Where is our fleet and what is it doing?

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 2 or 3, 1919
First published in *Pravda* No. 21. January 21, 1937

Printed from the text written by J. V. Stalin and signed by V. I. Lenin

186

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

In code

Sokolnikov

I am extremely worried by the slowing down of operations against the Donets coalfields and Rostov. There must be a speed-up but, of course, only with substantial forces. Work out practical directives for this purpose, and we shall get them adopted by the Central Committee for the Ukrainians, and equally for our own people. It is a crying scandal that the suppression of the Cossack rising is dragging on.[341] Reply in as much detail as you can.

Lenin

Written on April 20, 1919

First published in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3, 1934

Printed from the original

187

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

In code

Antonov, *Kiev*
Copies to *Podvoisky and Rakovsky*

Sokolnikov cables me that Denikin has magnificently taken advantage of the interlude in the Donets coalfields, fortified himself and gathered fresher forces than ours. The peril is a tremendous one. The Ukraine is bound to recognise the Donets Basin Front as unquestionably the most important Ukrainian front, and at all costs to begin immediately carrying out the directive of the Commander-in-Chief to provide solid reinforcements for the sector Donets-Mariupol. From Podvoisky's information I see that there is a mass of war materiel in the Ukraine, even without counting Odessa. It should not be hoarded, and both Donets workers and new units should be formed to take Taganrog and Rostov. Have you mobilised all the officers in the Ukraine? At all costs the forces against Denikin must be rapidly and considerably increased. Cable in as much detail as possible, and make your cipher clerks do their ciphering more carefully, so that everything can be understood.

Lenin

April 22, 1919

First published
in *Krasnaya Zvezda* No. 17,
January 20, 1929

Printed from the original

188

TELEGRAM TO K. A. MEKHONOSHIN

Military
Top priority
In code
April 24, 1919

Mekhonoshin
Astrakhan

Extremely strange that you are sending only boastful telegrams about future victories. Discuss immediately:

first—is it not possible to accelerate the capture of Petrovsk in order to get oil out of Grozny?

secondly—cannot the mouth of the Ural and Guriev be captured, in order to take oil from there? The need for oil is desperate.

Bend all your efforts to the most rapid securing of oil, and telegraph in detail.

Lenin

First published, but not in full, in 1930 in the book *Grazhdanskaya voina, 1918-21*, Vol. III

Published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

189

TELEGRAM TO K. G. RAKOYSKY, V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO, N. I. PODVOISKY, L. B. KAMENEV

Rakovsky, Antonov, Podvoisky, Kamenev
Kiev

At all costs, using all your strength and as rapidly as possible, help us to finish off the Cossacks and take Rostov, even at the price of a temporary weakening in the west of the Ukraine, since otherwise we are threatened with destruction.

Lenin

Written on April 24, 1919
First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

190

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT

In code

Commander-in-Chief, Serpukhov
Revolutionary Military Council, Western Front

With the loss of Vilna the Entente has become still more insolent. It is essential to develop the maximum speed in regaining Vilna in the shortest possible time, so as not to give the Whites the opportunity of bringing up their forces and consolidating. Speed up the reinforcements which are on the way and act as energetically as you can. The Field Staff is to increase its supervision of the operation in this direction in every possible way.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 24, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
written by E. M. Sklyansky
and signed by V. I. Lenin

191

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

In code

Antonov, Kiev
Copy to Rakovsky, Podvoisky, Kamenev

I have received your code message, and also your scheme for dividing the Southern Front and the Ukrainian Front. For the first I thank you, for the second I rebuke you for playing at independence.[342] Send the Ukrainian units to capture Taganrog without fail, immediately and at all costs. Telegraph.

Lenin

Written on April 25, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

192

TO N. I. BUKHARIN

Comrade Bukharin,

Print this with a *circumstantial* and calm analysis, demonstrating *in detail* that *such* waverings of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the direction of the kulak and of separation from Russia, i.e., of *fragmentation* of our forces in face of Kolchak and Denikin, *objectively* lead to *helping* the bourgeoisie and Kolchak.[343]

Lenin

April 25

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

193

TO THE STAFF OF THE 2nd UKRAINIAN SOVIET ARMY AND ALL COMRADES OF THAT ARMY

May 2, 1919

I express my very deepest gratitude and appreciation to the comrades of the 2nd Ukrainian Soviet Army for the tank sent as a present.[344]

This gift is dear to all of us, dear to the workers and peasants of Russia, as evidence of the heroism of their Ukrainian brothers, and is dear also because it bears witness to the complete collapse of the Entente which seemed so strong.

Best greetings and the warmest good wishes for success to the workers and peasants of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Red Army.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in 1926
in *Voyenny Vestnik* No. 3

Printed from the original

194

TELEGRAM TO K. G. RAKOYSKY, V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO, N. I. PODVOISKY

In code

May 5, 1919

Rakovsky, Antonov, Podvoisky
Kiev

Up till now there has not been a single precise factual reply from you as to what units have been moved into the Donets Basin, how many rifles, sabres, guns, at what station the advanced trains are. The capture of Lugansk proves that those who accuse you of leaning to independence and turning your eyes to Rumania are right. Understand that you will be responsible for a disaster if you are late with serious help to the Donets Basin.

Lenin

Please return to me with a note: sent in code—hours—minutes.

Urgent

Lenin

May 5

First published in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3, 1934

Printed from the original

195

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV AND A. L. KOLEGAYEV

In code

May 6, 1919

Sokolnikov and Kolegayev
Revolutionary Military Council, Southern Front
Kozlov

The delay in suppressing the revolt is simply outrageous. I have seen a report today that the suppression is getting no further. It is essential to take the most energetic steps and root out this tardiness. Should we not send you reinforcements of Cheka men?[345] Telegraph in detail. The delay over this revolt is intolerable.

Lenin

First published, but not in full, in 1938 in *Bolshevik* No. 2

Published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

196

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

May 12, 1919

Ivan Nikitich Smirnov,
Member of the Revolutionary Military Council
Revolutionary Military Council 5

Do you guarantee that the reports attributed to you, concerning the demoralisation of Koichak's forces and their mass desertion to our side, are not exaggerated? If you do, what steps have you taken, first, to accelerate the offensive and consolidate the victory and, secondly, to dispatch to all units of both the Eastern and Southern Fronts deserters from Koichak who have experienced his atrocities and are capable of raising the spirit of our army?

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

197

TELEGRAM TO THE PETROGRAD DEFENCE COMMITFEE[346]

Zinoviev, Defence Committee, Petrograd

With the object of ascertaining the situation in Petrograd, the Defence Council requests you to give an exhaustive reply: on what considerations was it decided to evacuate several factories from Petrograd and the neighbourhood, by whom and why was an instruction given to sink ships, the total numbers of workers mobilised and remaining in the factories, are all those who have been mobilised really being used for defence requirements, for what reasons were Commissars appointed to the state factories, was there an indiscriminate call-up of citizens or was the decision of the central authority observed. The Defence Council, while leaving in force for the time being the state of siege in Petrograd, notifies you that measures taken by the Petrograd Defence Committee must be applied with the knowledge of, and in appropriate cases by agreement with, the central authority.[347]

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

Written on May 13, 1919

First published, but not in full, in *Pravda* No. 165, June 16, 1939

Published in full in 1941 in the book *Dokumenty o geroicheskoi oborone Petrograda v 1919*, Moscow

Printed from the typewritten text signed by V. I. Lenin

198

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

Urgent

In code

Sokolnikov,
Member, Revolutionary Military Council, Southern Front
Boguchar

The offensive against Petrograd multiplies tenfold the peril, and the extreme necessity of suppressing the revolt immediately, at all costs. Telegraph how things are going—has the division which was landed got to work at last, are the Voronezh and Tambov Communists who were sent you arriving, do you need more reinforcements, and of what sort?—in as much detail and as frequently as possible. Delays are extraordinarily dangerous.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 19, 1919
First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

199

TELEGRAM TO A. L. KOLEGAYEV

In code

May 21, 1919

Kolegayev
Revolutionary Military Council, Southern Front
Kozlov

Copy to Sokolnikov, Member, Revolutionary Military Council
Boguchar

Copy to Khvesin and Beloborodov,
Staff of the Commander of the Expeditionary Forces

From Beloborodov's telegram of the 20th I learn monstrous news, that orders reach units several days late, while armoured cars have no fuel. I am putting pressure on here, pull things together in your own area. The Military Commissar at Tambov telegraphs that he has sent you 669 Communists to Boguchar and Ust-Medveditskaya. I am surprised that, having them, plus 2,000 Red Army cadets, plus a division, you are slow to take resolute action to crush the revolt, which must be done immediately. Telegraph in as much detail as possible.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

200

TELEGRAM TO K. G. RAKOYSKY AND V. I. MEZHLAUK

In code

May 26, 1919

Rakovsky, Council of People's Commissars
Kiev

Mezhlauk, Deputy People's Commissar for War
Kharkov

I repeat my request that you telegraph me twice a week about your actual help to the Donets Basin. I insist on the fulfilment of this request. Don't lose a moment of your victory over Grigoryev, don't release a single soldier who has been fighting Grigoryev.[348] Decree and put into effect the complete disarmament of the population, shoot on the spot without mercy for every concealed rifle. The whole problem of the moment is a rapid victory in the Donets Basin, the collection of all rifles from the villages, the creation of a stable army. Concentrate all forces on this task, don't relax your energies, mobilise the workers en masse. Read this telegram to all prominent Bolsheviks.

Lenin

Sent to Kiev

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

201

TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV, M. M. LASHEVICH, K. K. YURENEV

In code
May 29, 1919

Gusev, Lashevich, Yurenev
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

On your insistence Kamenev* has been appointed again. If we don't win the Urals before the winter, I consider that the revolution will inevitably perish. Strain all your energies. Telegraph me in code and in good time about every friction between Kamenev and the Staff. Watch over reinforcements more attentively; mobilise the front-line population en masse; keep your eye on political work. Telegraph me results weekly in code. Read this telegram to Muralov, Smirnov, Rozengolts and all prominent Communists and Petrograd workers. Notify receipt. Pay particular attention to mobilisation of the Orenburg Cossacks. You are responsible for seeing that units do not get demoralised or depressed. Don't get carried away by the operations side.

Lenin

First published, but not in full, in 1930 in *Grazhdanskaya voina, 1918-21*, Vol. III

Published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

* Reference is to S. S. Kamenev, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front.—*Ed.*

202

TELEGRAM TO D. I. YEFREMOV

May 30, 1919

Yefremov
Revolutionary Military Council 10

Immediately select a group of the most responsible and energetic Tsaritsyn workers who took part in carrying out the measures ordered by Stalin in the defence of Tsaritsyn, and instruct them to begin carrying out all these measures with the same energy. Telegraph the names of those responsible.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

Sent to Tsaritsyn
First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

203

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE EASTERN FRONT

The same directive
to be issued through
the Central Committee

Lashevich, Yurenev, Gusev, Rozengolts,
Smirnov, Muralov

Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front

Serious worsening of the situation near Petrograd and the break-through in the South oblige us again and again to take troops from your front. We cannot do otherwise. You must go over to more revolutionary forms of military work, cutting through the usual methods. Mobilise in the front-line area everyone between 18 and 45 en masse, give them the task of capturing the nearest big works like Motovilikha, Minyar, promising to let them go when they have captured these places, assigning two or three men per rifle, calling on them to drive Kolchak out of the Urals. Mobilise 75 per cent of members of the Party and the trade unions. There is no other way out, you must go over to revolutionary methods. Discuss in part with Kamenev how to carry this out, and reply what you are undertaking.

Lenin

Written on June 9, 1919
First published in *Pravda* No. 21,
January 21, 1937

Printed from the original

204

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Comrade Sklyansky,

(1) Without fail at once appoint (and carry through to the end) an investigation into *who* misinformed you, *minimising* the disaster.* After all, this is *treachery*.

(2) *All* measures must he taken and *special attention given* to the rapid movement of the 6 regiments from the Eastern Front.

For really it is *you*, *Comrade Sklyansky*, *who have proved to be responsible for the delay*!![349]

Reply to me *what exactly you have done* on both points.

Lenin

Written on June 10, 1919

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

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* Reference is to the critical situation in Petrograd.—*Ed*.

205

TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV AND M. M. LASHEVICH

Gusev, Lashevich

We have to take the division in view of the bad and almost catastrophic situation near Petrograd and in the South. No help for it. We shall hope that, in view of the capture of Ufa, the 5th Army will be able to give up the division without yielding the Belaya River, and that by doubling and redoubling our Party energy we shall together cope with the problem of not letting things go as far as defeat on the Eastern Front.

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1919

First published in *Pravda* No. 53, February 23, 1938

Printed from the original

206

TELEGRAM TO O. I. SOMOV AND D. I. YEFREMOV

In code
June 14, 1919

Somov, Yefremov
Revolutionary Military Council 10
Tsaritsyn
Copy to Raskolnikov

It is essential to retain Tsaritsyn, it has withstood a siege more than once. Strain every effort, inform us in more detail, more often, we are taking steps. Hasten the evacuation of anything not absolutely essential, and valuables. Mobilise en masse. Don't weaken the political work. Mind you keep in touch with us.

Lenin

First published in *Pravda* No. 53, February 23, 1938

Printed from the original

207

TELEGRAM
TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

In code
June 14, 1919

Revolutionary Military Council, Southern Front
Kozlov

Are you taking all steps to support Tsaritsyn? They are asking for 15,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. It is essential to retain Tsaritsyn. Report what has been done and what is being done.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

208

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE AND S. Z. ELIAVA

Top priority
June 16, 1919

Frunze-Mikhailov, Commander of the Southern Group
Samara (or the present whereabouts of the Staff of the Southern Group)
Eliava, Member of the Revolutionary Military Council

Please convey to the Uralsk comrades my warm greetings for the heroes of the fifty days' defence of besieged Uralsk, and my request not to get down-hearted, and to hold out just a few more weeks. The heroic defence of Uralsk will be crowned with success.[350]

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published (facsimile) in 1927 in *Krasnoarmeyets* No. 2 (95)

Printed from the original

209

TELEGRAM TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF SOVIETS OF THE FRONT-LINE DISTRICTS

June 16, 1919

Gubernia Executive, Voronezh
Uyezd Executive, Novokhopyorsk, Voronezh Gubernia
Uyezd Executive, Borisoglebsk, Tambov Gubernia
Uyezd Executive, Balashov, Saratov Gubernia
Uyezd Executive, Atkarsk, Saratov Gubernia
Uyezd Executive, Kamyshin, Saratov Gubernia
Gubernia Executive, Tambov
Gubernia Executive, Saratov

Immediately take all steps for compulsory conscription of all the able-bodied population and requisitioning of carts for the work of strengthening the positions which is being carried on by military field engineering units. Appoint a member of the Executive Committee, personally responsible for fulfilment of work, to each sector. Urgently telegraph fulfilment, on your responsibility under war-time law. Name all the responsible members of the Executive Committees. The Gubernia Executive Committees answer for immediate fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in 1940
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

210

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 10th ARMY AND THE TSARITSYN GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

June 18, 1919

Revolutionary Military Council 10
Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee
Tsaritsyn

Copy to Revolutionary Military Council, Southern Front
Kozlov

I have been watching with joy the heroism of the 10th Army and the Tsaritsyn proletariat in the defence of Tsaritsyn. I am sure that Red Tsaritsyn, which has withstood winter sieges lasting many months, will withstand all trials now as well. Greetings to the defenders of Red Tsaritsyn! The promised reinforcements are on the way.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Published in *Kommunist* (Astrakhan) No. 136, June 25, 1919

Printed from the original

211

TELEGRAM
TO M. M. LASHEVICH AND K. K. YURENEV

In code
June 20, 1919

Lashevich, Yurenev
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

There are reports, first, of a considerable decrease in the number of political workers in the armies of the Eastern Front, because they are leaving for local administrative work in the areas liberated from the enemy; and, secondly, of the fatigue of some divisions. The most serious attention must be given to this. Political workers and all others, whoever they may be, should be absolutely forbidden to leave the army before the Urals have been occupied, and before they have been replaced by double the number of Urals workers; and then at all costs you should *secure* mobilisation en masse in the front-line area and replace the tired units by fresh forces, if only for a temporary rest, because the *offensive* against the Urals must not be weakened, it must definitely be intensified, speeded up, strengthened with reinforcements. *Telegraph what measures you are taking*. *Pay attention* to the rising near Samara and on the Irgiz.[351] Your silence about this is suspicious.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

212

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE EASTERN FRONT

July 1, 1919

Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk
Copy to Staff of Army 3

I congratulate the heroic Red troops who have captured Perm and Kungur. Warm greetings to the liberators of the Urals. At all costs complete victory must be rapidly achieved. It is extremely necessary to mobilise, immediately and to a man, the workers of the Urals factories that are being liberated. New revolutionary methods must be found for at once incorporating these workers in the army, in order to provide a rest for those who are tired and to transfer troops for the South. Inform the regiments of the first part of this telegram.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in *Pravda* No. 17 and *Izvestia* No. 17, January 21, 1927

Printed from the original

213

TELEGRAM TO V. V. KURAYEV, V. A. RADUS-ZENKOVICH, K. I. PLAKSIN

July 2, 1919

Kurayev, Member of the Revolutionary Military Council 4
Zenkovich, Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee
Plaksin, Chairman of the Gubernia Party Committee
Saratov

All attention to cleansing the garrison and strengthening the rear. Mercilessly root out the whiteguards in town and country. Personally check up on the political work and organisation in the garrison. Everyone to switch to war work! Make everyone pull himself together and be disciplined. Telegraph results. Fortify Rtishchevo particularly.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

214

TELEGRAM TO V. A. RADUS-ZENKOVICH

July 8, 1919

Zenkovich, Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee
Saratov
Copy to Kurayev,
Member of the Revolutionary Military Council 4
Copy to Plaksin, Chairman of the Gubernia Party Committee
Copy to Krylenko
Copy to Yaroslavsky

Telegraph as precisely as possible, if necessary in code, what practical successes you have achieved, and whether there is a change of mood in the garrison. It is essential that special detachments should go round all the volosts of the front-line area and work them over—organising the poor peasants, removing the kulaks, taking hostages from among them, suppressing the "Greens",[352] returning deserters to duty. Particular attention to Atkarsk Uyezd and Rtishchevo. I await a detailed factual reply.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

First published (facsimile) in 1930 in *Grazhdanskaya voina, 1918-21*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

215

TELEGRAM TO THE TULA METALWORKERS' CONGRESS

Presidium of the *Metalworkers' Congress*, Tula
(Copy to be sent to Melnichansky)

I welcome with all my heart the decision of the Tula Metalworkers' Congress to increase tenfold the output of arms, etc.[353] Please inform me monthly, by post or by messenger, exactly what actual successes are being achieved on all your decisions.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1919
First published in *Pravda* No. 53, February 23, 1933

Printed from the original

216

TELEGRAM TO M. M. LASHEVICH AND K. K. YURENEV

July 17, 1919

Lashevich, Yurenev
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

Congratulations on your victories.[354]

Special measures should be taken: first, to prevent the Urals workers from pilfering arms, so that they don't get involved in harmful guerrilla warfare and, secondly, to prevent the Siberian partisan spirit from demoralising our troops.

Telegraph your opinion, also inform me *whether you are working well with the new Commander of the Front*, and in more detail about Bashkir affairs.[355]

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

217

TO MAXIM GORKY

July 18, 1919

Dear A. M.,

Come here for a rest—I often go away for two days to the country, where I can put you up splendidly for either a short or a longer time.

Do come!

Telegraph *when*; we shall arrange a compartment for you, so that you can travel in comfort. Really, you need a little change of air. I await your reply.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Moscow to Petrograd

First published in *Pravda* No. 75 and *Izvestia* No. 75, March 29, 1928

Printed from the original

218

TO MAXIM GORKY

July 31, 1919

Dear Alexei Maximych,

The more I read over your letter, and the more I think of the connection between its conclusions and what it sets forth (and what you described at our meetings), the more I arrive at the conviction that the letter, and your conclusions, and all your impressions, are quite sick.

Petrograd has been one of the sickest places in recent times. This is quite understandable, since its population has suffered most of all, the workers have given up more of their best forces than anyone else, the food shortage is grave, and the military danger too. Obviously your nerves can't stand it. That is not surprising. Yet you won't listen when you are told that you ought to change your abode, because to let oneself flog the nerves to a state of sickness is very unwise, unwise even from the plain common-sense point of view, not to speak of other points of view.

Just as in your conversations, there is in your letter a sum of sick impressions, leading you to sick conclusions.

You begin with dysentery and cholera, and immediately a kind of sick resentment comes over you: "fraternity, equality". Unconscious, but the result is something like communism being responsible for the privations, poverty and diseases of a besieged city!!

Then follow some bitter witticisms, which I don't understand, against "hoarding" literature (which? why connected with Kalinin?). And the conclusion that a "wretched

remainder of the intelligent workers" say that they have been "betrayed" into "captivity to the muzhik".

That, now, has no sense in it at all. Is it Kalinin who is being accused of betraying the workers to the muzhik? That is what it amounts to.

This might be invented by workers who are either quite green, stupid, with a "Left" phrase instead of a brain, or else by those who are overwrought, exhausted, hungry, sick, or else by the "remainder of the aristocracy" who have a splendid ability to distort everything, a splendid gift for picking on every trifle to vent their frenzied hatred of Soviet power. You yourself mention this remainder at the same point in your letter. Their state of mind is having an unhealthy influence on you.

You write that you see "people of the most varied sections of society". It's one thing to see them, another thing to feel daily contact with them, in all aspects of one's life. What you mainly experience is from the "remainder"—if only by virtue of your profession, which obliges you to "receive" dozens of embittered bourgeois intellectuals, and also by virtue of your general circumstances.

As though the "remainder" cherish "something bordering on sympathy for Soviet power", while "the majority of the workers" produce thieves, "Communists" who have jumped on the band-waggon, etc.! And you talk yourself into the "conclusion" that a revolution cannot he made with the help of thieves, cannot be made without the intelligentsia.

This is a completely sick psychology, acutely aggravated in the environment of embittered bourgeois intellectuals.

Everything is being done to draw the intelligentsia (the non-whiteguard intelligentsia) into the struggle against the thieves. And *month by month* the Soviet Republic acquires a *growing* percentage of bourgeois intellectuals who are *sincerely* helping the workers and peasants, not merely grumbling and spitting fury. This cannot be "seen" in Petrograd, because Petrograd is a city with an exceptionally large number of bourgeois people (and "intelligentsia") who have lost their place in life (and their heads), but for all Russia this is an unquestionable fact.

In Petrograd, or from Petrograd, one can only become convinced of this if one is exceptionally well informed

politically and has a specially wide political experience. This you haven't got. And you are engaged, not in politics and not in observing the *work* of political construction, but in a particular profession, which surrounds you with embittered bourgeois intellectuals, who have understood nothing, forgotten nothing, learned nothing and *at best*—a very rare best—have lost their bearings, are in despair, moaning, repeating old prejudices, have been frightened to death or are frightening themselves to death.

If you want to *observe*, you must observe from below, where it is possible to *survey* the work of building a new life, in a workers' settlement in the provinces or in the countryside. There one does not have to make a political summing-up of extremely complex data, there one need only observe. Instead of this, you have put yourself in the position of a professional editor of translations, etc., a position in which it is impossible to observe the new building of a new life, a position in which all your strength is frittered away on the sick grumbling of a sick intelligentsia, on observing the "former" capital* in conditions of desperate military peril and fierce privations.

You have put yourself in a position in which you *cannot* directly observe the new features in the life of the workers and peasants, i.e., nine-tenths of the population of Russia; in which you are compelled to observe the fragments of life of a former capital, from where the flower of the workers has gone to the fronts and to the countryside, and where there remain a disproportionately large number of intellectuals without a place in life and without jobs, who *specially* "*besiege*" you. Counsels to go away you stubbornly reject.

Quite understandably, you have reduced yourself to a condition of sickness: you write that you find life not only hard, but also "extremely revolting"!!! I should say so! At such a time to chain oneself to the sickest of places as an editor of translated literature (the most suitable occupation for observing people, for an artist!). As an artist, you *cannot* see and study anything there that is new—in the army, in the countryside, in the factory. You have

* Petrograd. In March 1918 the capital was transferred to Moscow.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

deprived yourself of any opportunity of doing what would satisfy the artist: in Petrograd a politician can work, but you are not a politician. Today it's windows being broken for no reason at all, tomorrow it's shots and screams from prison, then snatches of oratory by the most weary of the non-workers who have remained in Petrograd, then millions of impressions from the intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of a capital which is no longer a capital, then hundreds of complaints from those who have been wronged, *inability* to see any building of the new life in the time you have left after editing (the building goes on in a particular way, and least of all in Petrograd)—how could you fail to reduce yourself to a point when it is extremely revolting to go on living?

The country is living in a feverish struggle against the bourgeoisie of the whole world, which is taking a frenzied revenge for its overthrow. Naturally. For the first Soviet Republic, the first blows *from everywhere*. Naturally. Here one must live either as an active politician or (if one's heart does not draw one to politics), as an artist, observe how people are building life anew somewhere that is not, as the capital is, the centre of furious attack, of a furious struggle against conspiracies, of the furious anger of the capital's intelligentsia—somewhere in the countryside, or in a provincial factory (or at the front). There it is easy, merely by observing, to distinguish the decomposition of the old from the first shoots of the new.

Life has become revolting, the "divergence" from communism "is deepening". Where the divergence lies, it is impossible to tell. Not a shadow of an indication of a divergence in politics or in ideas. There is a divergence of *mood*—between people who are engaged in politics or are absorbed in a struggle of the most furious kind, and the mood of a man who has artificially driven himself into a situation where he can't observe the new life, while his impressions of the decay of a vast bourgeois capital are getting the better of him.

I have expressed my thoughts to you frankly on the subject of your letter. From my conversations (with you) I have long been approaching the same ideas, but your letter gave shape and conclusion, it rounded off the sum

total of the impressions I have gained from these conversations. I don't want to thrust my advice on you, but I cannot help saying: change your circumstances radically, your environment, your abode, your occupation—otherwise life may disgust you for good.

All the best.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1925
in *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 1

Printed from the original

219

TELEGRAM TO A. P. ROZENGOLTS

Address:

Rozengolts
Revolutionary Military Council 7

All in code

Has every measure been taken to hold Petrograd at all costs? We are pushing ahead with the promised reinforcements, but it will take time for them to arrive. Make an exceptional effort.

Lenin

Written on August 1, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
written by E. M. Sklyansky
and amended and signed
by V. I. Lenin

220

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code

Trotsky
Copy to Rakovsky

The Political Bureau of the Central Committee requests that the Central Committee's directive be communicated to all responsible workers: to hold out to the last, defending Odessa and Kiev, the communications between them and their communications with us to the last drop of blood. This is a question of the fate of the whole revolution. Remember that our help is not far off.

For the Political Bureau of the Central Committee,
Lenin

Written on August 9, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

221

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Comrade Sklyansky,

I am not well, I have had to go to bed.

Therefore *reply by messenger*.

The delaying of the offensive in the Voronezh direction (*from August 1* to *10*!!!) is monstrous. The successes of Denikin are enormous.

What's wrong? Sokolnikov said that there (on the approaches to Voronezh) our forces were *four* to one.

So what is wrong? How could we miss the boat in this way?

Tell the Commander-in-Chief *that this won't do. Serious* attention is required.

Should I not send the following telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front (copy to Smilga):

In code

To be late with the offensive is quite intolerable, because this delay will yield the whole Ukraine to Denikin and will ruin us. You answer for every day and even hour that the offensive is held up unnecessarily. Inform us at once of your explanations, and the date when at last you will begin a resolute offensive.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

Written on August 10, 1919

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

222

INSTRUCTION TO A SECRETARY AND NOTE TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Secret. Take *2 copies*, and send one to Comrade *Sklyansky* with this note:

Comrade Sklyansky,

It is clear from this that they are trying to shift responsibility. Probably *there isn't a single battle-worthy* unit against Mamontov: this is an absolute disgrace, and complete negligence on the part of the Revolutionary Military Council, or *complete failure to use an opportunity*.

As energetic measures as possible must be taken!

Lenin

To Sklyansky. See to it yourself that all this is kept *secret*.

Addition: The railway people say that our units that have been sent against Mamontov *are afraid to leave their trucks*.

By sending such units, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic *disgraces itself*.

Written at the end of August 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

223

TELEGRAM
TO THE BASHKIR REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

Bashkir Revolutionary Committee
Ufa

Copy to Comrade *Validov*

Now that the decisive victories of the Red Army in the East have assured the free development of the Bashkir people, the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to transfer some Bashkir units to Petrograd acquires exceptional political importance. The predatory imperialists will see that the awakened peoples of the East have risen to defend the centres of the proletarian revolution. At the same time close contact between the armed Bashkirs and the workers of Petrograd will ensure close ties and mutual respect in the spirit of communism. I express my profound conviction that the Revolutionary Committee of the Bashkir Republic, and all advanced Bashkir comrades, will make every effort to ensure that the transfer of the Bashkir units takes place in the shortest possible time and with the least possible burdening of the railways. Please transmit fraternal greetings to the Bashkir Red Army men.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 5, 1919

First published in 1932
in *Grazhdanskaya voina v Bashkirii. Vospominania uchastnikov*. Ufa

Printed from the typewritten text
signed by V. I. Lenin

224

TO S. I. GUSEV[356]

Comrade Gusev,

Thinking over the letter from Sklyansky (about the situation on September 15) and the sum total of the operations reports, I am becoming convinced that our Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic is working badly.

To keep on with reassuring reports is bad tactics. It becomes "a game of reassurance".

But in reality, we have stagnation, almost collapse.

At the Siberian Front they have put some blackguard Olderogge and the old woman Pozern in charge, and "reassured themselves". An absolute disgrace! And now we are beginning to get beaten! We shall make the R.M.C.R. responsible for this, if *energetic* steps are not taken! To let victory slip out of our hands is a disgrace.

Inaction against Mamontov. Evidently, there has been one delay after another. The troops marching on Voronezh from the North were late. We were late in transferring the 21st Division to the South. We were late with the armoured cars. Late with communications. Whether it was the Commander-in-Chief alone who visited Orel, or whether he went with you, is all one: the job was not done. Communications with Selivachov were not established, supervision of him was not established, in spite of the *long-standing* and *direct* demand of the Central Committee.

As a result, inaction against Mamontov and inaction with Selivachov (instead of the "victories" promised from day to day in childish little drawings—do you remember how you showed me these little drawings, and how I said: they've forgotten the enemy?!).

If Selivachov deserts, or his divisional commanders betray us, the guilty party will be the R.M.C.R., because it slept, and sent us soothing messages, but didn't do its job. We must send the best, *most energetic* commissars to the South, not sleepy owls.

We are late, too, with new formations. We are letting the autumn go by-and Denikin will triple his forces, get tanks, etc., etc. This can't go on. The *sleepy* tempo of work must be made into a *lively* one.

Reply (through Lydia Alexandrovna Fotiyeva).

Lenin

September 16

Apparently our R.M.C.R. "gives orders", without being interested in or able to follow up *fulfilment*. This may be our common vice, but in military affairs it simply means destruction.

Written on September 16, 1919

First published in *Pravda* No. 63, March 5, 1933

Printed from the original

225

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

October 15, 1919

Comrade Sklyansky,

Cavalry radio stations, and also light mobile field stations, of which there are large quantities in the stores of the Central Military Engineers' Board, are absolutely essential for the Southern Front. Give immediate instructions for the urgent transfer to the Southern Front of 50 of each type. This is demanded by Stalin, who complains very much of lack of communications.

Write me what exactly you have done, and incidentally order for me from the C.M.E.B. a brief summary of the total number of radio stations they possess, and their distribution among the forces.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Defence Council

First published in *Pravda* No. 53, February 23, 1933

Printed from the original

226

NOTE ON A LETTER FROM G. K. ORJONIKIDZE[357]

In the opinion both of Unshlikht and of Stalin, Sergo is a most reliable *military* worker. That he is a most loyal and *most practical* revolutionary, I know from my own experience of over 10 years.

Written not earlier than October 15, 1919

First published in *Pravda* No. 298, October 28, 1936

Printed from the original

227

TO G. N. KAMINSKY, D. P. OSKIN, V. I. MEZHLAUK

October 20, 1919

Comrades Kaminsky, Oskin and Mezhlauk
Tula

Comrades,

Tula is just now of exceptional importance—and generally speaking, even independently of the enemy being close at hand, Tula is of vast importance to the Republic.

Therefore you must exert *all* your energy to achieve *co-ordinated* work, concentrating *everything* on military affairs and military supplies.

I regret very much the friction between yourselves and Zelikman on one side and Peters (he is an important and extremely dedicated person) on the other, and I think that this is Zelikman's fault because, if some unevenness was noticeable, it should have been immediately put right (and this was not difficult to do), without letting matters reach a conflict. The slightest *unevenness* must in future be settled, reporting to the centre *in time*, not allowing it to develop into a conflict.

Every effort must be made to improve the work in Tula; it must be placed *entirely* on a *war footing*. A decree reducing the civil administration will be published in a few days. Not only must it be observed; it must be applied with supreme conscientiousness and zeal.[358] In Tula *the masses* are far from being on our side. Hence the necessity

for *particularly* intensive work among the troops, among the reservists, among the working men and women.

If you are short of personnel, write: we shall send you help from Moscow.

Check up on the defence work unremittingly. Are strong points being put up? Is the work weakening? Are there enough materials, and workers? Are the Red Army men being trained? Are supplies for them in order? All these and similar questions must be *assigned* for special *supervision* to practical people and comrades devoted to the Party. You bear full responsibility for the *success* of this work and for any negligence (if you do not complain in time and do not appeal to the centre). The formation of army units is of *exceptional* importance.

If we take Orel,[359] the effort should not be reduced, but, multiplied *tenfold*, since without this we shall not conquer, and an interruption in the offensive means death for us.

Read this letter to *all* responsible workers and Party members and *regularly*, *very briefly*, keep me informed of what *in fact* is being done.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in 1931 in the book D. Oskin, *Zapiski Voyenkoma*, Moscow

Printed from the original

228

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR WAR

October 24, 1919

From *Stalin*
(*To be settled urgently*)

(1) The mobilised Letts to be sent to the reserve battalions of the Lettish Division
(hurry up Peterson; repeat the order to him).
(2) The Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, promised by the Commander-in-Chief, to be moved to Kozlov.
To be checked up. Hurry him up.
(3) Eight battalions for the 8th Army, promised by the Commander-in-Chief. Hurry him up.
Appoint a responsible person.
(4) The Commander-in-Chief promised reinforcements from Kaluga for the 45th Division.
Check this. Hurry him up.
Appoint a responsible person.

Lenin

First published in *Pravda* No. 53, February 23, 1938

Printed from the original

229

TO V. V. VOROVSKY[360]

October 24, 1919

Comrade V. V. Vorovsky
State Publishing House

Having looked through the pamphlet *Third International, March 6-7, 1919*, brought out by the State Publishing House, Moscow, 1919 (price 8 rubles), 99 pages, I impose a *severe reprimand* for such a publication, and demand that all members of the collegium of the State Publishing House should read my present letter, and should work out serious measures to guarantee that such an outrage is not repeated.

The pamphlet is a horrible piece of work. A slovenly mess. No table of contents. Some idiot or sloven, evidently an illiterate, has lumped together, as though he were drunk, all the "material", little articles, speeches, and printed them *out of sequence*.

No preface, no minutes, no exact text of the decisions, no separation of decisions from speeches, articles, notes, nothing at all! An unheard-of disgrace!

A great historic event has been disgraced by such a pamphlet.

I demand:

(1) Correction by *pasting in*. (The guilty persons to be sent to prison and obliged to *paste in* the additions in every copy.)

That I should be informed:

(2a) How many copies were printed?

(2b) How many have been sold?

(3) Reprinting in a *decent* form. *Proofs to be shown to me.*

(4) Establishment of a rule that *one definite person* should be responsible for *each* publication (a register of responsible persons to be started).

(5) Other measures for introducing order; they are to be worked out and sent to me.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

230

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev,

(1) It is said that the combustible slate near Veimarn is not deep down. If two or three sazhens of earth are removed, an excavator can be used to break up the slate and extract it.

We must make an effort; mobilise the bourgeoisie for this (they can live in dug-outs for the time being); work three shifts of eight hours; rouse the Petrograd workers for this job;

mobilise the peasants (four hours a day for two weeks, *as a beginning and so on*).

(2) It is said that Zhuk (the one who was killed) was making sugar out of sawdust?

Is that true? If it is true, you absolutely must *find his assistants*, in order to continue the job. *The importance is tremendous*.

Greetings!

Lenin

Written later than October 25, 1919

First published in 1925
in the book *K godovshchine smerti V. I. Lenina 1924 g.—21 yanvarya 1925 g.*
Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the original

231

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Gleb Maximilianych,

I was very interested in your report on peat.

Wouldn't you write an article about it in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (and then republish as a pamphlet, or in some journal)?[361]

The question must be discussed in the press.

Here, you should say, are reserves of peat—milliards.

Its heat efficiency.

Its location—near Moscow; *Moscow Region*.

Near Petrograd—as exactly as possible.

Easy to secure (in comparison with coal, combustible slate, etc.).

Use of the labour of the *local* workers and peasants (*even if only four hours a day for a start*).

Here, you say, is the basis for electrification, increasing output *so many times* by using *existing* power stations.

Here is the *most rapid* and *most certain* basis for the restoration of industry—

—organisation of labour in socialist fashion (agriculture+ industry);

—a way out of the fuel crisis (we shall release *so many* millions of cubic metres of timber for transport).

Put in the *conclusions* of your report; add a peat map; brief and general calculations. The possibility of building peat machines quickly, etc., etc. Briefly, the essence of the economic programme.

The question must be brought up *immediately* in the press.

Yours,

Lenin

December 26

P.S. In case of necessity, get Winter on the job, but provide the article as soon as you can.

First published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 18, January 22, 1925

Printed from the original

232

TELEGRAM TO M. M. LITVINOV

To Litvinov from Lenin

It is extremely important for us to have all the documents, resolutions, pamphlets, newspaper articles and speeches dealing with the ideological trends in Left-wing socialism and communism, especially anarcho-syndicalist distortions of communism or attacks on communism. Collect all this carefully in all languages, make clippings, send, or bring, them in three or four copies, especially the German "Independents", their congress and after their congress,[362] and the German Communists.

Lenin

Written on December 28, 1919
Sent to Copenhagen
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original



V. I. Lenin
1920

1920

233

TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS[363]

January 16, 1920

To Comrade Tomsky, with a request to bring this before the All-Russia C.C.T.U.
and the Communist group in the All-Russia C.C.T.U.

Dear Comrades,

I send you herewith a report on the astonishing *red tape*, carelessness, bureaucracy and helplessness displayed in a most important *practical* matter.

I have never doubted that there is still very much bureaucracy in our Commissariats, in all of them.

But I did not expect that there would be *no less* bureaucracy in the trade unions.

This is the greatest disgrace. I very much ask you to read all these documents in the Communist group of the All-Russia C.C.T.U., and to work out *practical* measures for combating bureaucracy, red tape, idleness and helplessness.

Please be good enough to let me know the results.

Melnichausky *himself* rang me up about these 10,000 metalworkers. I made a fuss at the People's Commissariat of Railways, and now Comrade Melnichansky has let me down ....

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in *Trud* No. 18, January 22, 1925

Printed from the original

234

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

January 18, 1920

Comrade Lunacharsky,

Recently I had occasion—to my regret and shame, for the first time—to look through the famous Dahl dictionary.[364]

It's a magnificent thing, but then it's a dictionary of *regional* terms, and out of date. Is it not time to produce a dictionary of the *real* Russian language, a dictionary, say, of words used *nowadays* and by the *classics*, from Pushkin to Gorky?

What if 30 scholars were set to work at this, and provided with Red Army rations?

What would be your attitude to this idea?

A dictionary of the classical Russian language?

Without making a noise about it, have a talk with people who know the subject, if it's not too much trouble, and let me know your opinion.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1940

Printed from the original

235

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Gleb Maximilianovich,

I have received and read the article.[365]

Magnificent.

We need *several* such articles. Then we shall publish them as a pamphlet.[366] What we lack is specialists with a wide horizon and "an eye for the future".

It is necessary (1) *for the time being* to cut out the footnotes or reduce them. There are too many of them for a newspaper (I will have a talk with the editor tomorrow).

(2) Would it not be possible to add a *plan*, not a technical one (this, of course, is a job for *many* people, and not to be done in a hurry), but a political or state plan, i.e., a task for the proletariat?

Approximately as follows: in 10 (5?) years let us build *20-30* (30-50?) power stations, in order to cover the whole country with a network of centres of 400 (or 200, if we can't manage more) versts radius; using peat, water, combustible slate, coal, oil (*for example*, make a survey of the whole of Russia, giving *rough* approximations). Let's begin at once buying the necessary machines and models, you say. In 10 (20?) years we'll make Russia "electrical".

I think you could produce such a "plan"—I repeat, not a technical one but a state one—a draft plan.

It must be provided right away, in a visual, popular form, for the masses, so as to carry them forward with a clear and vivid perspective (entirely *scientific* at its foundations): let's set to work, and in 10-20 years we shall make all Russia, both industrial and agricultural, *electrical*. We

shall set ourselves the target of having *so many* (thousands or millions of horse-power or kilowatts?? devil knows what) mechanical slaves and so on.

Could there also be a *tentative* map of Russia with centres and their areas? Or is that not yet possible?

I repeat, we must carry away the *mass* of workers and politically-conscious peasants with a *great* programme for the next 10-20 years.

Let's have a talk on the telephone.

Yours,

Lenin

January 23

P.S. Krasin says that electrification of the railways is impossible for us. I that true? And if it is, perhaps it will be possible in 5-10 years? Maybe it is possible in the Urals?

Could not a special article be written about a "state plan" for a network of power stations, with a map or with the approximate list (number) of them, with the prospects of centralising the power of the whole country?

Ring me up on the telephone, please, when you get this letter, and we shall have a talk.

Written on January 23, 1920

First published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 18, January 22, 1925

Printed from the original

236

TO M. A. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

February 5, 1920

Mikhail Alexandrovich,

Comrade Nikolayev has given me your letter and told me the essence of the thing. I made inquiries of Dzerzhinsky, and immediately sent off both the telegrams for which you asked.

I take this opportunity of expressing to you my deep gratitude and sympathy for the great work of radio inventions which you are carrying on. The newspaper without paper and "without distances" which you are bringing into being will be a great achievement. I promise to assist you in any and every possible way in this and similar work.

With best wishes,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Telegrafiya i telefoniya bez provodov* (Nizhni-Novgorod) No. 23

Printed from the original

237

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

All in code
February 27, 1920

Trotsky

Of course, the Defence Council will not object to the disbanding of the army clerical stall.[367] All the symptoms are that Poland will present us with absolutely unreasonable, even arrogant terms. All attention must be directed to preparing, strengthening the Western Front. I should think extraordinary measures essential for rapid transportation of everything possible to the Western Front from Siberia and from the Urals. I am afraid we have been in a little too much of a hurry with the labour armies,[368] if we don't use them entirely to accelerate deliveries to the Western Front. We have to give out the watchword of being ready for war with Poland.

Lenin

First published in full in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

238

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA AND G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

All in code
March 11, 1920

Smilga and Orjonikidze
R.M.C., Caucasus Front

Copy to Stalin
R.M.C., South-Western Front

I am very glad of your report that you expect the complete defeat of Denikin soon, but I am afraid of your excessive optimism. The Poles evidently are going to make war with them inevitable. Therefore the main problem now is not the Caucasus Labour Army, but preparations for the speediest possible transfer of the maximum troops to the Western Front. Concentrate all your efforts on this problem. Make use of prisoners most energetically for the same purpose:

Lenin

First published in 1934 in the magazine *Voina i revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

239

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

March 14

Gleb Maximilianovich,

After looking through the statement by the *GOELRO*[369] and thinking over yesterday's talk, I have come to the conclusion that it is *dry*.

It is not enough.

Can't you write, or commission an article from Krug (or someone else) of such a kind as to

prove

or, at any rate, illustrate

a) the tremendous advantage,

b) the *necessity* of electrification.

For example:

I. Transport. To restore in the old way—

we need α millions (at pre-war price)

or α fuel $+ \beta$ working days.

But to restore it on the basis of electrification

α minus x million rubles

α minus y fuel $+$ (β minus z) working days.

Or *also* $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}$, but with an effect so many times greater than the previous one.

II. Steam power. If industry is restored in the old way, we must spend *more* than for restoring it on the basis of electrification.

III. Agriculture.

To restore, say, $+$ 5 million ploughs and teams of horses.

The cost of doing this in the old way, and with electrification?

This is a *rough idea*. I think an intelligent specialist will do this work in a couple of days (if he wants to do it conscientiously), taking either the figures of pre-war statistics (a few, really a few, summary figures), or a *rough and approximate* calculation ("as a first approximation"[370] *towards a first approximation*).

Commission this. Perhaps you will commission somebody to collect the *material* for you and write the article yourself or *give an interview*. I will send an interviewer. Then we shall have the *warp* for propaganda. And that is important.

After reading this, ring me up on the telephone.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on March 14, 1920

First published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 18, January 22, 1925

Printed from the original

240

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

March 15, 1920

Comrade Sklyansky,

A decision of the R.M.C. is required:

to turn particular attention to the *mistake* that has obviously been *made* with the Crimea (sufficient forces were not moved in time)[371];

—all efforts should be exerted to correct the mistake (events in Germany[372] render *extremely* acute the question of *hastening* Denikin's final defeat);

—in particular, prepare naval equipment (mines, submarines, etc.) and a possible advance from Taman into the Crimea (I seem to remember that Mikhail Dmitriyevich Bonch-Bruyevich told me this would be easy).

A number of most precise and most energetic decisions by the R.M.C. on this are *essential immediately*.

Send me a copy.

Lenin

First published (facsimile) in 1930 in *Grazhdanskaya voina, 1918-21*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

241

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA AND G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

In code
March 17, 1920

Smilga and Orjonikidze
R.M.C., Caucasus Front

It is extremely, extremely necessary for us to take Baku. Devote all your efforts to this, and in your statements you must be particularly diplomatic and make maximum sure that a firm local Soviet authority is ready. The same applies to Georgia, though I advise you to be even more careful there. Come to an understanding with the Commander-in-Chief about transfer of troops.

Lenin

First published in full in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

242

TO V. V. ADORATSKY[373]

April 6, 1920

Comrade Adoratsky,

I have passed on to Comrade Khodorovsky a request to help you as regards rations, wood fuel, etc.

He has promised to do this.

Write to me when someone is coming this way (better through the military)

(1) has anything been done to help you? in rations? in fuel?

(2) do you need anything more?

(3) can you collect material for the *history of the Civil War*

and the *history of the Soviet Republic*?

Can you collect any of this material in Kazan? Can I be of assistance?

Files of *Izvestia* and *Pravda*? Is a lot missing?

Can I help in getting what is missing?

Please write to me, and *give your address*.

Best greetings.

Yours,

Lenin

Sent to Kazan

First published in 1924 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

243

TO K. A. TIMIRYAZEV[374]

April 27, 1920

Dear Klimenty Arkadyevich,

Many thanks to you for your book and kind words.[375] I was simply delighted to read your remarks against the bourgeoisie and for Soviet power. I shake your hand very warmly and with all my heart wish you health, health and health again!

Yours,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in 1923 in *Ogonyok* No. 35

Printed from the original

244

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Orjonikidze,
Member of the R.M.C., Caucasus Front
Baku via Rostov

To be delivered through responsible persons, and on delivery inform Sklyansky, Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

The Central Committee instructs you to withdraw your units from the territory of Georgia to the frontier, and to refrain from an advance into Georgia.

After the conversations with Tiflis it is clear that peace with Georgia is not ruled out.

Let us know immediately all most precise details about the insurgents.

By instruction of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee,

*Lenin**

Written on May 4, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* The telegram was also signed by J. V. Stalin.—*Ed.*

245

TO M. N. POKROVSKY[376]

May 5, 1920

Comrade Pokrovsky,

Some time ago it happened that I talked with Comrade Lunacharsky about the necessity of publishing a good dictionary of the Russian language.* Not like Dahl, but a dictionary for use (and study) by all, a dictionary, so to speak, of the classical, contemporary Russian language (for example, from Pushkin to Gorky, perhaps). Provide about 30 scholars, or as many as are needed, with rations, taking, of course, those who are not suitable for any other work—and let them do the job.

Lunacharsky said that he had been thinking about this already, and that it was either being done or would be done.

Be so kind as to find out whether it is being done, and drop me a line.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* See Letter 234.—*Ed.*

246

TO A. S. SERAFIMOVICH[377]

May 21, 1920

To Comrade Serafimovich

Dear Comrade,

My sister has just told me of the terrible misfortune which has overtaken you. Allow me to give you the very warmest handshake, and to wish you courage and firmness of spirit. I very much regret that I have not been able to fulfil my desire to see you more often and to become better acquainted. But your books, and what my sister has often told me, have aroused a profound affection for you in me, and I very much want to say to you how *necessary* your work is for the workers and for all of us, and how essential it is now for you to be firm, in order to overcome your grief and *force* yourself to return to work. Forgive me for writing in a hurry. Once again, I shake you very warmly by the hand.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1924
in the book: V. Veshnev,
A. Serafimovich kak khudozhnik slova

Printed from the original

247

TO D. I. KURSKY[378]

Have measures been taken for the *immediate* (1) setting up of *Soviet power* in the liberated areas; (2) holding of *congresses* of Soviets; (3) expulsion of the *landowners*, distribution of *part* of their lands among the poor peasants and the remainder among *Soviets* of agricultural labourers?

Written early in July 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

248

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Theses should also be written for the Second Congress of the Third International on the international economic and political situation.

Could not Radek, or *Lapinsky*, who has more time, or *someone else*, whom they would advise, be given the job of making a *preliminary draft of these theses*, *approximately* on the following *lines*[379]:

(1) The division of the whole world (both in the sense of the spheres of influence of banking and finance capital, and in the sense of international syndicates and cartels, and equally in the sense of the seizure of colonies and semi-colonies) is the basic fact of imperialism, of the economy of the twentieth century.

(2) Hence imperialist wars are inevitable in general, and particularly the first imperialist war of 1914-18.

(3) Results of this war:

(a) *reduction* in the number of states that are world powers, *increase* in the number of weak, dependent states which are being plundered and divided;

(b) the tremendous sharpening of *all* capitalist contradictions, both within all the capitalist countries and among the countries themselves;

(c) in particular, the sharpening, on a world scale, of both poles of capitalism:

increase of luxury among a tiny number of capitalist magnates;

increase of need, poverty, ruin, famine, unemployment, extreme insecurity of existence;

(d) intensification of militarism, more intense and accelerated preparation for new imperialist wars, economically inevitable; a growth in the number of wars throughout the world, particularly of revolutionary wars;

(e) complete bankruptcy of the League of Nations, exposure of its falseness; the collapse of "Wilsonism". The bankruptcy of bourgeois *democracy*.

(4) Explanation, in the briefest way, by characterising (cf. the report by P. Levi, April 14, 1920[380]):

Britain and America
France
Japan
the other, neutral countries of Europe and America
the defeated countries (principally Russia and Germany)
the colonies
the semi-colonies (Persia, Turkey, China).

(5) Raw material—its exhaustion
industry—its weakening (fuel, etc.)
currencies—their collapse. Debts. Devaluation.
"Dislocation", *break-up* of the whole system of world economy.

(6) The result = a world revolutionary crisis. The communist movement and Soviet power.

Written earlier than July 19, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

249

TO C. V. CHICHERIN[381]

July 22, 1920

To Comrade Chicherin

My proposal:

1) Directives to be given to Kopp through the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the spirit of Comrade Chicherin's proposal (only trade negotiations).

2) Gukovsky to be answered.

3) Curzon to be replied to *in two days* (not earlier; why spoil them), after asking Kamenev and the Consul once again: why haven't we received the original in English?

The reply to be extra polite on the following lines if *Britain* (+ France + ? + ?) wants a general, i.e., a *real* peace, *we* have long been *for it*. In that case *remove Wrangel*, since he is *your man*, kept by you, and then we begin negotiations at once.

If Poland wants peace, we are *for*; we've said it clearly and we repeat it, let her make an offer.

If you interrupt *trade* negotiations, we are very sorry, but you expose *yourselves* as departing from the truth, because you began these negotiations *during* Poland's war and *promised an armistice*. Calmly and precisely expose their contradictions.

The draft reply to be approved by telephone through the members of the Political Bureau on Friday or Saturday, July 23 or 24.

Lenin

Comrade Chicherin,

If you agree, inform Comrade Krestinsky (he agrees in principle), then draft the reply.

Yours,
Lenin

Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

250

TO THE LIBRARY OF THE RUMYANTSEV MUSEUM

If, according to the rules, reference publications are not issued for home use, could not one get them for an evening, for the night, when the Library is closed. *I will return them by the morning*.

For reference for *one* day:

I. The two *best*, fullest, dictionaries of the *Greek* language, Greek-*German*, -French, -Russian or -English.

II. The best *philosophical* dictionaries, dictionaries of philosophical terms: the German, I think, is Eisler; the English, I think, is Baldwin; the French, I think, is Frank (if there is nothing newer); the Russian, the latest you have.

III. A history of Greek philosophy

1) *Zeller*, the complete and latest edition.

2) *Gomperz* (the Vienna philosopher): *Griechische Denker*.

Written on September 1, 1920

First published in 1929 in *Ogonyok* No. 3

Printed from the original

251

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

In code
September 9, 1920

Orjonikidze
R.M.C., Caucasus Front

The most rapid and complete elimination of all bands and remnants of the whiteguards in the Caucasus and the Kuban area is a matter of absolute importance to the whole state. Inform me more frequently and more precisely on how matters stand.

Lenin

First published in *Pravda* No. 298, October 28, 1936

Printed from the original

252

TO THE CHEREMKHOVO COAL MINERS

September 15, 1920

To the Chief Board of Management of the Coal Mines
of Eastern Siberia
For the workers in the mines and also
for their technical personnel

Dear Comrades,

I thank you with all my heart for your greetings of August 2, 1920, transmitted through Comrade Ivan Yakovlevich Ilyin. My talk with Comrade Ilyin about the energetic work being done in the Siberian mines and his report of the gradual growth of conscious discipline among the workers (who are now working not for the capitalists but for themselves) gave me tremendous pleasure.

Particularly precious in your greetings, comrades, was the feeling of the deepest conviction in the final and complete victory of Soviet power over the landowners, capitalists and all kinds of exploiters, and also your unswerving firmness and determination to overcome all obstacles and difficulties. It is from this firmness of the working class and toiling masses that, like every other Communist, I draw my confidence in the inevitable world victory of the workers and the workers' cause.

With communist greetings, and wishes for your speediest success,

Devotedly yours,
V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 253,
November 11, 1920

Printed from the original

253

TELEGRAM
TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 1st CAVALRY ARMY[382]

By direct line (in code)

R.M.C., 1st Cavalry Army

It is extremely important to accelerate to the utmost the transfer of your Army to the Southern Front. Please take all steps for this purpose, not hesitating at the heroic. Telegraph what precisely you are doing.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

October 4

First published in *Pravda* No. 53, February 23, 1933

Printed from a typewritten copy

254

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

In code
Secret

Frunze, R.M.C., Southern Front[383]

Having received the exultant telegrams from Gusev and yourself, I am afraid of excessive optimism. Remember that at all costs you must enter the Crimea on the heels of the enemy. Prepare as carefully as possible, and check whether all the fords for taking the Crimea[384] have been studied.

Lenin

October 16, 1920

First published in 1935
in *Krasny Arkhiv*, No. 5

Printed from a typewritten copy

255

TO THE TULA COMRADES

Dear Comrades,

As *you* have set it forth, I am in agreement with you, but if you want to make use of my opinion against your "opposition", *give* them both your letter to me and my reply.[385] Then they will be informed, and will be in a position to give me *their* version: and then I will *not* be informed one-sidedly.

On the substance of the matter, this briefly is my view. Until we have *completely* beaten Wrangel, until we have captured the entire Crimea, military tasks come *first*. That is absolutely unquestionable.

Furthermore, *for* Tula, in view of its armaments and ammunition works, *it may very well be* that for a certain time *even after victory* over Wrangel it will still be a task of first priority to go through with producing rifles and ammunition, *because the Army must be made ready* by the spring.

Excuse my brevity, and please inform me whether you have shown the "opposition" this letter of mine and your letter to me.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 20, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

256

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET[386]

Dear Comrades,

In my opinion, to provide scientists with an extra room for a study, and for a laboratory, in Petrograd (a city exceptionally well off as regards apartments) is really and truly no sin. You should even have taken the initiative yourselves.

I strongly request you to get this thing moving and, if you disagree with me, to be kind enough to drop me a few words immediately, so that I see where the obstacle is.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

October 21

First published in *Leningradskaya Pravda* No. 209, September 13, 1924

Printed from the original

257

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 1st CAVALRY ARMY

R.M.C., 1st Cavalry Army
Copy to the Southern Front
Copy to L. B. Kamenev

Wrangel is obviously withdrawing his forces. Possibly he is already trying to take refuge in the Crimea. To let him give you the slip would be the greatest crime. The success of the impending blow depends to a considerable degree on the 1st Cavalry Army. We request the R.M.C. of the 1st Cavalry Army to adopt the most heroic measures to accelerate the concentration of this Army.

*Lenin**
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

October 24, 1920

First published in 1940
in *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal*
No. 10

Printed from a typewritten copy

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* The telegram is also signed by L. D. Trotsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.—*Ed.*

258

TO R. E. KLASSON[387]

November 2, 1920

Comrade Klasson,

I fear that you—excuse my frankness—will not be up to making use of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on Hydropeat.[388] I fear this because you, evidently, have spent too much time on "senseless dreams" about the restoration of capitalism, and have not been sufficiently attentive to the extremely specific features of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. But I say this not in order to reproach you, and not only because I remembered the theoretical arguments I had with you in 1894-95, but with a narrowly practical object.

In order to make proper use of the decision of the C.P.C. you must

1) complain with ruthless strictness and in good time of any breaches of this decision, checking up very closely on its fulfilment and, of course, selecting for complaint only those cases which come under the rule, "few but to the point";

2) from time to time—again following the same rule—write to me (N.B. *mark the envelope*: *PERSONAL*, from *so-and-so*, on such-and-such a question):

> please send a reminder or inquiry
> such-and-such (draft text on a separate sheet)
> to such-and-such a person or institution, on such-and-such a question, in view of the recognition of the works undertaken by Hydropeat as being of state importance.

If you don't let me down, i.e., if your reminders and inquiries are strictly business-like (without departmental squabbles or polemics), I will sign such reminders and inquiries in two minutes, and they will sometimes be of practical value.

Wishing you rapid and great success with your invention.

Greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1929
in the magazine *Izobretatel* No. 2

Printed from the original

259

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

November 6

G. M.,

This is a very important thing. Our Commission[389] (to which surely you have been invited? by the previous decision?) will meet *tomorrow* (or November 8 in the morning).

The (attached) draft of the subcommission must be attentively discussed beforehand.

GOELRO* has not been included at all!

In my opinion this is not right: what is any "plan" worth (or any "planning commission" or "planning programme") *without a plan of electrification*? It is worth nothing.

Strictly speaking, it is GOELRO which should be the single planning organ of the Council of People's Commissars; but so simply and brutally this will not be accepted, and it would be wrong. We must think over (urgently, before tomorrow) how the question should be put.

Perhaps (1) the chairman of GOELRO should be given a consultative vote in the *economic department* of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars[390]?

(2) GOELRO should be made a *standing* commission of the *C.P.C.*, since it prepares *and carries out*, or should carry out, electrification for the Supreme Economic Council, for the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, for the People's Commissariat of Railways, *etc.*

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* See Note 369.—*Ed.*

(3) *All* planning commissions of all People's Commissariats should he linked and co-ordinated with GOELRO. But how?

By setting up yet one more commission *attached* to GOELRO, composed of the chairmen of *all* the separate planning commissions? Or how otherwise?

Ring me up when you have read this.

And *return me the minutes* (*of the subcommission of November 5*) *today*, *not later than 10 p.m.*

Yours,
Lenin

Written on November 6, 1920

First published in 1924 in the book: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, *Tovaroobmen i planovaya rabota*, Moscow

Printed from the original

260

TO THE STATE PUBLISHING HOUSE

Please inform me (1) whether there exists in the State Publishing House a general practice under which, when any book or pamphlet without exception is published, there is recorded in writing:

(a) the signature of the member of the Board of the Publishing House who is responsible for editorial supervision of the publication in question;

(b) the signature of the actual editor of the text;

(c) the signature of the responsible proof-reader or publisher or printer.

(2) If not, what objections are there to such a system? What are the present means of supervision?

(3) Information under §1 about the pamphlet:

{ *On Concessions*. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars, November 23, 1920. Text of the Decree. Units for Concession. Maps. State Publishing House. 1920.[391]

State Printing Works (former Sytin), 71 Pyatnitskaya, Moscow, 1920.

Written on December 11, 1920

First published in 1921 in the magazine *Zhizn* No. 1

Printed from the original

261

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.,

The following idea has come into my head.

There must he propaganda for electricity. How? Not only in words but by example.

What does this mean? The most important thing is to make it popular. For this we have, here and now, to work out a *plan* for lighting up *every house* in the R.S.F.S.R. by electricity.

This is a long-term affair, because neither 20,000,000 (-40,000,000?) bulbs, nor wire, etc., shall we have *for a long time*.

But all the same a plan is needed *now*, if only to cover a number of years.

That comes first.

And secondly, we must work out right away a *shorter* plan, and then thirdly—and this is most important—we must be able to arouse both *competition* and *initiative among the masses*, so that they set about the job *straightaway*.

Would it not be possible for this purpose immediately to work out such a plan (for example):

(1) All volosts (10-15 thousand) to be supplied with electric lighting in *one* year.

(2) All settlements (½-1 million, probably not more than ¾ million) in *two* years.

(3) Priority for the reading-room and the Soviet (two light bulbs).

(4) Get the poles ready *at once* in such-and-such a way.

(5) Prepare the insulators *at once yourselves* (ceramics

works, I believe, are local and small affairs?). Make them *in such-and-such a way*.

(6) *Copper* for the wires? *Collect it yourselves* in your uyezd and volosts (a gentle hint at church bells, etc.).

(7) Organise training in electricity in such-and-such a way.

Could not something *of this kind* be considered, worked out and *decreed*?

Yours,
Lenin

Written in December 1920
First published
in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 18,
January 22, 1925

Printed from the original

262

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky

Would it not be possible to develop (not at once, but *straightaway* after the Congress,[392] for the Council of Labour and Defence) a practical plan for an electrification campaign:

*Etwas**:

(1) in *each* uyezd *urgently* to set up at least one power station;

(2) make it obligatory for this centre to become a *training*, lecture, demonstration, etc., centre, and *take the entire* population through these courses (beginning with the young people, or by volosts, etc.);

(3) immediately assign tasks among the population as to what they can now make a start on (we need 2½ million poods of copper—so let us at once assign tasks for bringing in *25* million poods, let people *voluntarily* begin to collect church bells, door handles, etc.; then *poles*, etc.);

(4) begin preparatory *navvying* work *at once*, assigning tasks among the uyezds;

(5) mobilise *all* engineers, electricians, all who have done courses at physico-mathematical faculties, etc., without exception. Their obligation will be to deliver not less than two (four?) lectures a week, to teach *not less than* (10-*50*?) people about electricity. If they fulfil this-a bonus. If they don't—gaol.

(6) Write *urgently* a few popular pamphlets (some to

* Something like this.—*Ed.*

be translated from *German*) and adapt the "book" (yours) into a number of more popular articles, for teaching in the schools and reading to the peasants.

And then a number of detailed measures on the following two groups:

aa) propaganda and training

bb) first steps towards putting this into practice at once, and from all angles.

Lenin

Written late in December 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

1921

263

TO THE BAKURY VOLOST ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

Bakury Volost Organisation of the R.C.P.,
Bakury Volost, Serdobsk Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia

Copy to the Saratov Gubernia Party Committee
and the Gubernia Executive Committee

Dear Comrades,

The secretary of your organisation, Comrade *Turunen*, has informed me in writing that, at the request of the peasants, you have passed a decision to bring to my knowledge through him the counter-revolutionary activities of certain food-supply workers in your volost who are ill-treating poor peasants, robbing them for personal gain, encouraging illicit distilling, getting drunk, raping women, provoking attacks on Soviet power, etc. You ask me to take steps from here in Moscow to put an end to these counter-revolutionary actions. But to fight on the spot, with all your strength against counter-revolution is one of the most important tasks of local Party organisations, including yours. Your bounden duty is, by getting into touch with the Uyezd Party Committee, and—if that does not help—with the Gubernia Party Committee, to secure the arrest and prosecution before the Revolutionary Tribunal of counter-revolutionaries and scoundrels like those about whom you are reporting.

What have you done in this direction?

In the second part of his letter, Comrade *Turunen* sets out your view that Soviet power, in order to overcome economic break-down, must for some time lean on the

peasantry as it would on a crutch. This is quite true. This has been said in our Party Programme, and in the resolutions of Party Congresses. At the last, Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the question of reviving agriculture was considered in detail and very carefully, and the Congress adopted important practical decisions, which you will have to apply on the spot, as directed by the Gubernia authorities.

These decisions have been published in the newspapers. In addition, Comrade *Turunen* will bring you some supplementary material which he will have received at the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, where he was sent on my recommendation.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 21, 1921

First published in *Izvestia* No. 31, February 8, 1927

Printed from the typewritten text signed by V. I. Lenin

262

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov,

This Bonch-Bruyevich (no relation, only has the same surname as V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich) is by all accounts a *very outstanding* inventor. The matter is *of immense importance* (a newspaper without paper and without wires, for with a loudspeaker and with the receiver which Bonch-Bruyevich has developed in such a way that it will be easy for us to produce *hundreds* of receivers, all Russia will be able to hear a newspaper read in Moscow).

I particularly ask you:

(1) to follow up this matter specially, *calling in Ostryakov* and *telephoning Nizhni*,

(2) to get the attached draft decree *speedily* through the Narrow Council. If unanimity cannot be reached quickly, be sure to prepare it for the Full Council of People's Commissars for Tuesday,

(3) to inform me twice a month on the *progress* of the work.[393]

Lenin

January 26

First published in *Pravda* No. 92, April 22, 1926

Printed from the original

240

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

February 6, 1921

Comrade Sklyansky,

I attach one more "warning".

Our military command has failed disgracefully by allowing Makhno to get away (in spite of an immense superiority of forces and strict orders to catch him), and is now failing still more disgracefully by proving unable to crush a handful of bandits.

Order a *brief* report for me from the Commander-in-Chief (with a brief sketch showing the disposition of bands and troops) about what is being done.

How is the wholly reliable cavalry being used?

— the armoured trains? (Are they rationally distributed? Are they not moving *wastefully*, requisitioning grain?)

— armoured cars?

— aeroplanes?

How, and how many are in use?

Both grain and wood fuel, everything is being lost because of the bands, while we have a million-strong army. You must do all you can to brace up the Commander-in-Chief.

Lenin

First published, but not in full, in 1938 in *Bolshevik* No. 2

Published in full in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

266

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Secret

G. M.,

Look at this and note it. Return it at once secretly.

Milyutin is writing nonsense about the plan.[394] The greatest danger is that the work of planning the state economy may be bureaucratised.

This danger is a great one. Milyutin does not see it.

I am very much afraid that with your different approach to the question *you do not see it either*.

We are beggars. Hungry, ruined beggars.

A complete, integrated, real plan for us at present= "a bureaucratic utopia".

Don't chase it.

At once, without delaying a day or an hour, bit by bit single out *the most important*, the minimum number of enterprises, and *put them on their feet*.

Let's talk about this personally before your report. *Think it over*.

Lenin

Written on February 19, 1921

First published, but not in full, in 1924 in the book: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, *Tovaroobmen i planovaya rabota*, Moscow

Published in full in 1928 in *Zapiski-Instituta Lenina*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

267

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

February 25

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky,

On the question of the General Planning Commission.[395]

(1) On its composition in general we shall come to an agreement after your arrival. This will not be difficult.

(2) The Central Committee has decided to leave in Larin for the time being. The danger from him is a very great one, because it is in his character to disorganise any work, *seize power*, overthrow all chairmen, *drive specialists away*, speak (*without a shadow of right to do so*) in the name "of the Party", etc.

On you falls the *heavy* task of subordinating, disciplining, moderating Larin. Remember: directly he "begins" to go beyond limits, rush to me (or send me a letter). Otherwise Larin will upset the *whole* General Planning Commission.

(3) You have to set up within the *General Planning* Commission a *super-firm* presidium (it must be *without* Larin), so that organisers and strong people (capable of giving a complete rebuff to Larin, and *steadily* going ahead with this difficult work) should *help* you and *relieve you* of *administrative* work (it was pointed out at the Central Committee that you are, strictly speaking, not an administrator). The Presidium, perhaps, could consist of two of your assistants, one secretary, and so forth. You must be the "leading spirit" of the work and the *ideological* guide (in particular, kick out, get rid of *tactless* Communists

who may drive out the specialists).... Your task is to catch, select, *put on the job* capable organisers, administrators (like Osadchy, etc.)—to *provide the Central Committee of the R.C.P. with the opportunity*, *the data*, *the material*, *for evaluating them*. |||| N.B.

(4) The "GOELRO" *as a* GOELRO, you must restore as a *subcommission* of the General Planning Commission. You will be chairman of this subcommission too.

(5) You will have to set up quite a number of subcommissions: we must have a talk about this, when you have a plan for them.

(6) What will be exceptionally important is the subcommission on

study,
checking
and
"tying up", co-ordination,
making proposals
for altering

current economic plans (for 1921 at the present moment).

Larin must without fail be made a member of this subcommission but (1) not as chairman and not as vice-chairman and not as secretary; (2) counterbalancing *him*, say, with Sereda, as a model of balanced mind, non-fantasy, non-harrassment.

(7) I suggest that you think over the following plan (I consider it most important): to oblige *a few persons*, members of the *General Planning Commission*, systematically to present either to the Commission or to the *subcommission under* §*6 reports* and *articles* on the fulfilment by various departments (and by various gubernias, uyezds, groups of factories, individual factories, etc.) of current economic plans and on the comparison of this fulfilment with various years and for printing in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*. (I consider it most important that *Larin* without fail, and also Sereda, Popov, Strumilin, should be *formally* obliged to follow with the greatest attention the facts and figures of the *real* fulfilment of our economic plans, and should *print* regular notes in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for public criticism and checking. *Two* or *three* specialists could also be set to work on this. It is essential that each should answer

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

individually for the study and the checking; and that on each part of this work there should be *two* persons, independent of one another, for mutual checking and for testing various methods of analysis, summarising, etc.).

Think about all this and let's have a talk *more than once* after your arrival.

Greetings!

Lenin

Written on February 25, 1921

First published, but not in full, in 1924 in the book: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, *Tovaroobmen i planovaya rabota*, Moscow

Published in full in 1928 in *Zapiski-Instituta Lenina*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

268

TELEGRAM
TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 11th CAVALRY ARMY

Copy to R.M.C., Caucasus Front
Copy to the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia
Copy to Comrade Orjonikidze

In view of the fact that units of the 11th Army are on the territory of Georgia, you are instructed to establish complete contact with the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia and to abide strictly by the directives of the Revolutionary Committee, undertaking no measures which might affect the interests of the local population, without co-ordinating them with the Georgian Revolutionary Committee; to observe particular respect for the sovereign bodies of Georgia; to display particular attention and caution in regard to the Georgian population. Issue the appropriate directive at once to all army institutions, including the Special Department. Hold to account all who infringe this directive. Inform us of every case of such infringement, or of even the least friction and misunderstanding with the local population.

Lenin
Chairman, Defence Council

Written on March 10, 1921

Pravda Gruzii No. 13, March 17, 1921

Printed from the newspaper text collated with a typewritten copy

269

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.,

I return your speech.[396]

Its main defect: too much about electrification, too little about *current* economic plans.

The main emphasis is not laid where it should be.

When I had before me the communist "wiseheads" who had not read the book *The Electrification Plan*[397] and had not understood its importance and were chattering and writing nonsense about the plan in general, I had to push their noses into this book, because there is no other serious plan and there cannot be.*

If I had before me the people who *wrote* that book, I should push their *noses* not into the book but *away from it*—into the problems of *current* economic plans.

Get down to those problems now, Messrs. Professors! Your electrification is *in allen Ehren*.** Honour to it indeed. You've written the first edition. We'll make improvements and publish a second. The specialists in such-and-such a subcommission will write a dozen decrees and resolutions on teaching electricity and the electrification plan, and so forth. We shall endorse them.

But the general state planning commission should now busy itself *not* with this, but immediately, with all its strength, set about the *current* economic plans.

Fuel *today*. For 1921. Now, this spring.

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* See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 137-41.—*Ed.*

** In great esteem.—*Ed.*

V. I. Lenin
1921

The gathering of refuse, of scrap, of dead materials. Making use of them *for the purpose of* exchange for grain.

And the like.

This is what "*their*" noses have to be pushed into. This is what they should be set to work at. Now. Today.

1-2 subcommissions on electrification.

9-8 subcommissions on current economic plans.

That is how the forces should be allocated for the year 1921.

Yours,

Lenin

Written later than April 5, 1921

First published in *Trud* No. 120, May 29, 1924

Printed from the original

270

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY, M. N. POKROVSKY AND Y. A. LITKENS[398]

April 8, 1921

Comrades *Lunacharsky*, *Pokrovsky and Litkens*

Signs are increasing that, as regards systematic and planned work, affairs in the People's Commissariat of Education are not improving, in spite of the directives of the Central Committee and the special instructions of the Central Committee when the People's Commissariat of Education was being reorganised.

When will the main plan of work be drawn up? What questions will be included in this plan? Such questions as the writing of textbooks—the library network and its use—model schools—accountability of the teachers—programmes for training courses, lectures, classes in schools—supervision over the degree of effective fulfilment of programmes and the progress of class studies?

Or other questions? Which?

What questions have been recognised as most important and urgent?

Are there decisions on this subject? What measures are being taken for systematic supervision of their fulfilment?

I request a brief reply.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the typewritten
text signed by V. I. Lenin

271

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Cipher what is marked in blue pencil*

Orjonikidze

I have received your cipher message about the desperate food situation in Transcaucasia. We have taken a number of steps, given a little gold to Armenia, confirmed all kinds of instructions to the Commissariat of Food. But I must warn you that we are in great need here, and will not be able to help. I urgently require that you should set up a regional economic body for the whole of Transcaucasia, make the utmost effort with concessions, especially in Georgia; try and buy seed, even if it be abroad, and push forward irrigation in Azerbaijan with the help of the resources of Baku, in order to expand agriculture and cattle-breeding, and also try and develop commodity exchange with the North Caucasus. Have you and the Georgian comrades grasped the significance of our new policy in connection with the tax in kind[399]? Read this to them and keep me more frequently informed; read my letter to Serebrovsky in Baku.

Lenin

Written on April 9, 1921

First published in 1925 in the book: M. D. Orakhelashvili, *Lenin i Z.S.F.S.R.* (Documents), Tiflis

Printed from the original

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* Lenin marked the following passages: "about the desperate food situation ... will not be able to help" and "with concessions, especially in Georgia".—*Ed.*

272

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Anatoly Vasilyevich *Lunacharsky*
Copy to the Central Peat Board

In order to expand the output of peat, there must be a large-scale development of propaganda—leaflets, pamphlets, mobile exhibitions, films, publication of textbooks; teaching about the peat industry to be introduced as a compulsory subject in schools and higher technical colleges; textbooks must be written; study groups must be sent abroad annually.

Specifically it is necessary (1) to instruct the State Publishing House to print by April 15, 100,000 copies of *Peat*, a pamphlet of 1½ signatures, delivered by the Central Peat Board on February 8 this year to Comrade Mordvinkin at the Agitation Department, and to accept from the Central Peat Board another three pamphlets and leaflets, for publication by May 1; 15,000 copies of the pamphlets to be issued to the Central Peat Board for distribution.

(2) To instruct the Film Department to make 12 films in the course of May—under the direction of the Central Peat Board—showing how peat is secured (for Russia, the Ukraine, the Urals, Byelorussia and Siberia).

(3) To instruct the Central Board for Vocational Training to draw up by June 1, together with the Central Peat Board, a draft course of compulsory lessons in schools and higher educational establishments on the peat industry.

Please send me copies of your instructions, and the replies of the institutions and persons concerned, with an indication of the dates.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 9, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the typewritten
text signed and signed
by V. I. Lenin

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TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

April 12

G. M.,

Yesterday I talked with Smilga. He should be having a talk with you today.

The question of the main features of the state plan, not as an institution but as a *plan*, cannot be put off.

You now know the tax in kind and other decrees. There is the policy for you. And you make as careful a calculation as possible (taking into account harvests of various sizes) how much this can produce.

Immeasurably still more urgent is fuel. Timber-floating has broken down. The bad harvest resulting from such a spring will thwart deliveries.

Let Ramzin and Co within two days provide me with *brief* summaries: *three* figures (wood fuel, coal, oil)

by half-years 1918???
1919
1920
particularly *1921*
and the plan for 1922
the fuel plan for 1920
four figures: laid down?
secured?
how was the quantity laid down to be distributed (only the main headings)?
how was the quantity secured distributed?

By Thursday morning. On this will depend my decision regarding foreign trade. Order it today. We shall have a talk tomorrow.

Greetings!

Lenin

Written on April 12, 1921

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TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.,

Is the instruction clear?

We must presume that we shall have in 1921-22
the same, or even worse,
harvest failure
fuel shortage (on account of lack of food and fodder for the horses).

From this point of view there should be calculated what purchases are needed abroad in order *at all costs* to overcome our most dire shortages, i.e., to procure without fail the foodstuffs that are lacking (by direct purchase of provisions abroad, and by exchange of goods for grain in the outlying regions of Russia) and to secure the necessary additional minimum of fuel.

Only those requirements can and must be justified which are essential *from this point of view*.

Not all electrical requirements come under this heading. It is not enough to demonstrate that electricity economises fuel.

It must be demonstrated in addition that this expenditure *is essential for 1921-22*, *given* maximum shortage of grain and fuel.

Lenin

Written on April 13, 1921

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TO Y. A. LITKENS

Comrade Litkens,

I forgot when we met to ask you to check how matters stand with the committee of scholars who are drawing up a dictionary (brief) of the *contemporary* (from Pushkin to Gorky) Russian language.

I long ago, and many times, made arrangements for this with Pokrovsky and Lunacharsky.

Is it being done? What precisely? Find out and send me exact details.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

May 6

First published in 1932 to *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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TO THE EDITORIAL BOARDS OF *PRAVDA* AND *IZVESTIA*

May 9, 1921

I request you to pay particular attention to the article in *Posledniye Novosti*[400] (Paris) No. 309:

"Milyukov and Avksentyev among the Americans".

It is essential *systematically* to record *such* articles and paragraphs; there is a mass of them; they should be *summarised*, impressing on our departments and on the reading public among the workers and peasants

that the more intelligent whiteguard bourgeoisie understands perfectly well the importance of concessions and foreign trade to Soviet power

and therefore makes it its *main* task now to thwart trade agreements between the R.S.F.S.R. and foreign states, to frustrate the policy of concessions.

Please drop me a line on this question.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1924 in *Zhizn* No. 1

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TO M. F. SOKOLOV

May 16

Comrade *M. Sokolov*, Secretary of the Department
for Management of Property Evacuated from Poland

Dear Comrade,

I have received and read your draft report for May 18.[401] You write that I have "slipped up". On the one hand, you say, by leasing forests, land, etc., we are introducing *state capitalism*, and on the other hand, he (Lenin) "talks" about "expropriating the landowners".

This seems to you a contradiction.

You are mistaken. Expropriation means *deprivation of property*. A lessee is *not* a property-owner. That means there is no contradiction.

The introduction of capitalism (*in moderation* and skilfully, as I say more than once in my pamphlet*) is possible without restoring the landowners' property. A lease is a contract *for a period*. Both ownership and control remain *with us*, the workers' state.

"What fool of a lessee will spend money on model organisation," you write, "if he *is pursued by the thought of possible expropriation*...."

Expropriation is a *fact*, not a *possibility*. That makes a big difference. *Before* actual expropriation not a single capitalist would have entered our service as a lessee. Whereas now "they", the capitalists, have fought three years,

* See "The Tax in Kind" (present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 329-65).—*Ed*.

and wasted *hundreds of millions of rubles in gold* of their own (and those of the Anglo-French, the biggest *money-bags* in the world) on war with us. Now they are having a bad time abroad. What choice have they? Why should they not accept an agreement? For 10 years you get not a had income, otherwise ... you die of hunger abroad. Many will hesitate. Even if only five out of 100 try the experiment, it won't be too bad.

You write:

"Independent mass activity is *possible* only when we *wipe off* the face of the earth that ulcer which is called the bureaucratic chief administrations and central boards."

Although I have not been out in the provinces, I know this bureaucracy and all the harm it does. Your mistake is to think that it can be destroyed all at once, like an ulcer, that it can be "wiped off the face of the earth".

This is a mistake. You can throw out the tsar, throw out the landowners, throw out the capitalists. We have done this. But you cannot "throw out" bureaucracy in a peasant country, you cannot "wipe it off the face of the earth". You can only *reduce* it by slow and stubborn effort.

To "throw off" the "bureaucratic ulcer", as you put it in another place, is wrong in its very formulation. It means you don't understand the question. To "throw off" an ulcer of this kind is *impossible*. It can only be *healed*. Surgery in *this* case is an absurdity, an *impossibility*; only a *slow cure*—all the rest is charlatanry or naïveté.

You are naïve, that's just what it is, excuse my frankness. But you yourself write about your youth.

It's naïve to wave aside a healing process by referring to the fact that you have 2-3 times tried to fight the bureaucrats and suffered defeat. First of all, I reply to this, your unsuccessful experiment, you have to try, not 2-3 times, but 20-30 times—repeat your attempts, start over again.

Secondly, where is the evidence that you fought correctly, skilfully? Bureaucrats are smart fellows, many scoundrels among them are extremely cunning. You won't catch them with your bare hands. Did you fight correctly? Did you *encircle* the "enemy" according to all the rules of the art of war? I don't know.

It's no use your quoting Engels.[402] Was it not some

"intellectual" who suggested that quotation to you? A futile quotation, if not something worse. It smells of the doctrinaire. It resembles despair. But for us to despair is either ridiculous or disgraceful.

The struggle against bureaucracy in a peasant and absolutely exhausted country is a long job, and this struggle must be carried on persistently, without losing heart at the first reverse.

"*Throw off*" the "chief administrations"? Nonsense. What will you set up *instead*? You don't know. You must not *throw them off*, but cleanse them, heal them, heal and cleanse them ten times and a hundred times. And not lose heart.

If you give your lecture (I have absolutely no objection to this), read out my letter to you as well, please.

I shake your hand, and beg you not to tolerate the "spirit of dejection" in yourself.

Lenin

Written on May 16, 1921

First published in *Pravda* No. 1, January 1, 1924

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TO Y. A. LITKENS

May 19

Take advantage of Pokrovsky's holiday to begin work on the compiling of a dictionary of the Russian language without burdening him with administrative functions.

(1) Appoint a committee of 3-5 of the best philologists. They should within two weeks draw up a plan and the composition of the final committee (to [define]* the work, its nature, time limits, etc.).

(2) The task is a brief dictionary of the Russian language, from Pushkin to Gorky (the *small* "Larousse" as a model). Model, and contemporary. With the new orthography.

(3) On the basis of their report (of the 3-5), some *scientific academic* centre must *endorse* the plan. Then we shall begin by the autumn.

Written on May 19, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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* This word is not clear in the original.—*Ed.*

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TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

May 25

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky,

You should have been sent the *draft* "Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence".*

Think it over yourself (and the Presidium too—and all members of the State Planning Commission should be informed) from two points of view:

(a) it includes problems concerning your "department": electrification and the local bodies of the State Planning Commission. What is needed in this case is a detailed analysis and study by all of you, in order to *verify* and *supplement* (*resp.* alter) the list of detailed *problems*;

(b) the remainder does not come under the jurisdiction of the State Planning Commission, but *much of it* in essence affects the Commission. The opinion of the latter is desirable (not obligatory).

Lenin

P.S. Do you not think that it will be necessary to appoint a group of members of the State Planning Commission to study the uyezd reports, and all economic reports in general? Or should all members of the Commission be given several reports each, with the *obligation* to read *and study* them?

By the way: the study of current economic plans (for 1921) must definitely be *individualised*. Each member of

* See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 375-98.—*Ed.*

the State Planning Commission answers for *such-and-such* a side or part of this work. And vice versa: for *every* side or part of economic activities in 1921, from the point of view of the current plan, so-and-so answers, in the sense of studying the results. Send this to me without fail.

Written on May 25, 1921

First published, but not in full, in full, in 1924 in the book: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, *Tovaroobmen i planovaya rabota*, Moscow

Published in full in 1928 in *Zapiski Institute Lenina*, Vol. III

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TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

May 26, 1921

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky,

I think it is necessary for the State Planning Commission to work out two things:

(1) through the statistical subcommission, to draw up a kind of index-number.

A monthly summary of the chief data of our economic life (figures and a curve). Approximately:

Output of fuel
" ore
" iron.

The main data about other branches of industry:
% of workers engaged in production;
% of under-fulfilment of sowing plan;
state of agricultural production;
% of locomotives out of action;
absolute number of pood-versts;
timber, wood fuel, etc.;
supplies of foodstuffs, etc.;
electrification likewise

(in each case a comparison with the previous year and with pre-war).

Without this we shall not have a survey of economic life.

This is one of the fundamentals for the work of the State Planning Commission.

(2) A subcommission of *economic* statistics.

The Central Statistical Board should be made into an organisation that does analysis for us, *current*, not "scientific" analysis. For example:

How many superfluous people fed?

How many superfluous factories?

How should raw materials be redistributed? And labour-power?

The economic work of the army?

Statisticians must be our *practical assistants*, not engage in scholastics.

Think over this, and drop me a line about the results.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1924
in the book: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky,
Tovaroobmen i planovaya rabota,
Moscow

Printed from the original

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TELEGRAM TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY[403]

Urgent

Dzerzhinsky, Chairman, All-Russia Extraordinary Commission
Southern Area (or present whereabouts)

Copy to *Voinov*, trio for combating the break-up of transport, Moscow

All the Ukrainian comrades most pressingly insist on intensification of the struggle against profiteering in the Ukraine, which threatens to disorganise the purchases of grain for the famine-stricken centres of the Republic, purchases which have begun and are already showing good results. Please devote particular attention, and inform me whether emergency measures are being taken, what measures in particular and what their results are.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on May 27, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

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TO I. T. SMILGA

Comrade Smilga
Copy to the Central Oil Board
Copy to Comrade *Gubkin*

Both the press and reports from people on the spot show more and more frequently that things are getting worse in Baku.

Care for and attention to Baku must be increased. Please bring before the *Council of Labour and Defence* a programme of systematic measures to aid Baku, making use of purchases abroad.

Constant "observation" must be established of what is happening at Baku and *how we are helping*.

Brief summaries should be drawn up on both items, (a) *what they have*, (b) *what we have provided*, and supervise continuously.

Lenin

Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on May 27, 1921

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TO M. P. PAVLOVICH[404]

Comrade Pavlovich
People's Commissariat of Nationalities

May 31, 1921

Comrade Pavlovich,

I have arranged for publication of a school atlas (in Petrograd).[405]

It would be extremely important to include maps of imperialism.

Would you not undertake this?

For example:

(1) colonial possessions 1876-1914-1921, adding or specially shading off semi-colonial countries (Turkey, Persia, China, and so forth).

(2) Brief statistics of colonies and semi-colonies.

(3) Map of financial dependencies. For example, for each country ± with a figure (millions or milliards of francs) of how much this country owes, and how much it is owed;

also comparatively for 1876-1914-1921

(if 1876 be taken as the culminating point of pre-monopoly capitalism).

(4) Railways of the world, with a note, in each country, showing to whom most of them belong (British, French, North America, etc.).

Will this prove too much of a mixture? Convenient forms can be found, with what matters, what predominates noted very briefly.

(5) The main sources of those raw materials over which there is a struggle (oil, ores, etc.)—also with notes (% or millions of francs belong to such-and-such a country).

We must without fail include maps of this kind *in the textbooks*, of course with a brief explanatory text.

A statistical assistant can be given you for the auxiliary work.

Please reply whether you undertake this, how and when.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1923 in the magazine *Prozhektor* No. 21

Printed from the original

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TO Y. A. LITKENS

Comrade Litkens,

So let us agree on the question of the dictionary as follows:

(1) Approximately within a month (in the absence of Pokrovsky) adopt a *formal* decision and appoint a *responsible person* or *persons*.

(2) On the basis of this decision draw up a *plan* of work, indicating not only the persons responsible but also the expenditure and rations required.

The plan should provide for the work to begin in August or September.

Lenin

Written late in May 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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TO V. A. AVANESOV[406]

June 1

Comrade Avanesov,

You should draw up a circular to all local bodies of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection[407] on the subject of local economic conferences.

(1) You should require a *personal* list of all representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in all economic conferences.

(2) You should be immediately informed of every change in the list.

(3) You should demand that, whether they are Communists or non-Party people, they should be *specially and personally* recommended for their reliability and honesty.

(4) You should demand that they be strictly accountable, *particularly* as regards drawing non-Party people into the work and as regards reports to *them*, the non-Party people, on the work of the economic councils.

All this should be brought before the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and adopted, so that the local bodies conform to it.

Lenin

Written on June 1, 1921
First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

286

TO I. M. GUBKIN

June 3, 1921

Comrade Gubkin
Central Oil Board

Looking through the journal *Neftyanoye i Slantsevoye Khozyaistvo*, I came across a note (p. 199), in No. 1-4 (1921), "On the Replacement of Metal Tubes by Cement Solution in the Drilling of Oil Wells".

It turns out that this can be applied in rotary drilling, which we have in Baku, as I have read in the report of the Baku comrades.

We are ruining ourselves and ruining Baku because of insufficient drilling.

It is *possible* to replace iron tubes with cement, etc., which after all is easier to come by than iron tubes, and which costs, as your own journal points out, a "quite insignificant" sum!

And this kind of information you bury in a tiny note in a super-learned journal, which perhaps one person in 1,000,000 in the R.S.F.S.R. is capable of understanding.

Why didn't you sound the big bells? Why didn't you publish it in the general press? Or appoint a committee of practical experts? Or get the Council of Labour and Defence to adopt incentives?

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

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TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky,

I don't know whether everything has been done to acquaint members of the Third Congress of the Communist International with the electrification plan.

If not, it must be done *without fail* in one-two weeks.

There should be set out (in the lobbies of the Congress)

(1) a map of electrification, with a brief text in *three* languages

(2) similarly, regional maps

(3) the electrification balance-sheet

370 million working days,
bricks,
copper, etc.

(4) a map of the most important local, small, new stations.

There must be a *brief* (16-24 pp.) pamphlet in *three languages*, a summary of the *Electrification Plan*.

I shall not be able to attend the Council of People's Commissars on Tuesday, June 7.

If the question of the Committee for Utilisation arises, be prepared *yourself* for a serious battle and make *precise* proposals, so that, if the circumstances require, you can complain to the Central Committee and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.[408]

Yours,

Lenin

In confidence:

A new plot has been discovered in Petrograd. Intellectuals were participating. Some are professors not very remote from Osadchy. This has led to a lot of his friends having their houses searched, *and quite right too*.

Caution!!!

Written on June 5, 1921

First published, but not in full, in *Pravda* No. 21, January 21, 1931

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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288

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Orjonikidze

I am surprised that you are interfering with Stalin's holiday. Stalin ought still to rest for not less than four or six weeks. Get a written opinion from good doctors.

Let me know what you are doing for Baku and for the development of foreign trade. Your silence about this makes me suspicious.

Lenin

Written on July 4, 1921
Sent to Tiflis
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

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289

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

July 10

Comrade Bryukhanov,

I have received a letter from Lobachov dated July 9, indicating a sharp deterioration in the supply situation in Petrograd and Moscow. He asks for instructions.

In my opinion, you should draw up measures to intensify the work. I propose

(1) that you should press *immediately*, in particularly urgent, accelerated, *revolutionary* fashion for *collection of the tax* in Moscow Gubernia (the rye has already been harvested). Moscow workers, in particular, should be mobilised for this, *to assist* the food supply organisations.

(2) In general, mobilise more workers for food supply, *plundering* the People's Commissariats, in accordance with *yesterday's* decision of the Political Bureau[409] (take a copy of it).

(3) Once more send precise orders to the Ukrainian and Siberian People's Commissariats of Food.

(4) Delegate *an emergency* expedition (together with the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operative Societies) to *Podolsk* Gubernia where, they say, there are masses of grain and it costs *6,000* rubles a pood in Soviet currency.

(In general, my impression is that, as regards purchases and barter, the People's Commissariat of Food is *asleep*, and *lagging behind* disgracefully. No initiative. No bold work.)

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Please reply to me on July 11.

Written on July 10, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

In code

First: please inform me of the state of Stalin's health, and the doctors' opinion on this. Secondly, it would be extremely important for us to get a concession from the Turks for the copper mines, south of Batum, which were ceded to them. Inform me whether any steps have been taken, and which. Thirdly, Krasin is in Moscow, and this should be taken advantage of in order to clear up the position of the Transcaucasian Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Fourthly, inform me of the state of Reske's health, and when his treatment will be completed.

Lenin

Dictated by telephone
on July 17, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the typewritten text

291

TO A. A. KOROSTELEV

Comrade Korostelev,

The work of your commission[410] is exceptionally important, responsible and difficult.

You must strain all your energies to see that you have fewer reverses; and not lose heart because of the reverses, but insistently and patiently resume the work, again and again. In Moscow it is much more difficult to work than in the provinces—there is more bureaucracy, there are more corrupted and spoiled "top" people, etc.

But, in return, the work in Moscow will have tremendous demonstrative and *political* importance.

In my belief, your commission should try and adapt its work to the "Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence".

The main thing is not to scatter your forces. It is better to take *a few establishments*, not very big tasks, set yourselves, at first, modest aims—but pursue them stubbornly, not forgetting what you have begun, not dropping the work half-way, but going on with it to the end.

Gradually, but without fail, draw in *non-Party* people from amongst *workers* well known for their honesty, and respected in every district. Time and effort should not be spared in discovering them and getting to know them.

They should little by little, and carefully, be *introduced* to the work, and you must try to find an occupation *entirely suited* to each one, and appropriate to his capacities.

The main thing is to get the workers and the population used to the commission, in the sense that they should *see*

help coming from it; the main thing is to *win the confidence* of the masses, the non-Party people, the rank-and-file workers, the ordinary men in the street.

For you of all people, as chairman of the commission and as a man from the centre, a member of the collegium of the *unpopular* Workers' and Peasants' *Inspection*, this will not be easy. But this is the whole essence of the thing.

You must in every possible way, and in all possible respects, show that you are able to give, and actually give, *help*, real help, even if on a small scale. Only on this basis can you go on further.

Please write to me or, if you don't like writing, ring me up on the telephone—I can talk to you from my study, where it is quieter, so that we can exchange ideas on the work of your commission.

Show this letter to the other members of the commission, if you think it timely.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

July 26

P.S. The main task of the commission is to improve our economy, improve management, secure *real personal responsibility*. For this purpose a few more institutions should be selected: a canteen, baths, a laundry, a hostel, etc.

Written on July 26, 1921

First published in 1924 in *Bolshevik* No. 1

Printed from the original

292

TO L. M. KHINCHUK

July 29

Comrade Khinchuk,

They say you are leaving? For how many months? Before your departure it is essential that you should both officially get your "*deputy*" appointed and, unofficially, should let me know to which of the Communists who are *fully* experienced people (2-3 of them) in the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operative Societies I can address myself.

Then before your departure you must tell me, *very briefly*, when the machinery of the co-operative movement will begin working at last.

What I mean is this:

(1) In how many *volosts* (of *such-and-such* gubernias) are there shops (co-operatives) and, consequently, your trading agents, and in how many are there none? How many per volost?

(2) How many of the shops (agents) reply promptly to all the questions of the centre, and render reports? Once a week? Once a fortnight?

(3) How many volost shops have received goods, and which (even the briefest replies)? Salt? Kerosene? Textiles? *etc*.

(4) How many replies are there about the amount of surpluses and raw materials held by the peasants (which can be acquired in exchange for *this or that*)?

grain?

other foodstuffs?

industrial raw materials? etc.

(5) How much have you exchanged during the period under review? Of what, for what?

In my opinion, so long as there are no such reports, *there is nothing*. Only talk.

I await your reply.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 29, 1921

First published in *Soyuz Potrebitelei* No. 5, May 1924

Printed from the original

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TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MOSCOW GUBERNIA COMMUNE

Copy to the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet
" to the People's Commissariat of Education

Comrade Smolyaninov has informed me that a workers' and peasants' delegation from Stavropol Gubernia has delivered to Moscow, addressed to me, a railway wagon of food for the hungry workers, as a gift. Please, in the first place, take over this wagon as rapidly as possible, without any red tape; secondly, dispatch it to the most needy Moscow workers, notifying them without fail that this is a present from the Stavropol workers and peasants; thirdly, see to it that the delegation is looked after, both in the sense of its being put up properly and of its receiving thanks from the Moscow Soviet, and, finally, that they are supplied with literature and given the opportunity of seeing the institutions in Moscow which interest them.

Please report fulfilment to me, immediately and precisely.

Lenin

Dictated by telephone
on July 30, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the typewritten text

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TO V. V. ADORATSKY

August 2

Comrade Adoratsky,

I have looked through the introduction. It's difficult to judge, because it's unfinished. It looks as though it should be cut down, and expressed much more clearly, with closer attention to the formulations.[411]

The *really* outstanding quotations from the letters should be combined with *other* works of Marx and with *Capital* (for example, on the question of "equality" *what matters most* is in *Capital*[412]). If you take question *x*, then on *this* question there is so-and-so in the letters, so-and-so in other works of Marx, so-and-so in *Capital*.

I could only glance at the letters. Of course, you will still have to cut them down considerably, link them up, arrange them properly; think over each one two or three times, and then *briefly* comment. Evidently there is more work involved than it seemed at first.

The chronological order (very likely you are right) is probably more convenient.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. I am on holiday. Unwell. Can't make appointments.

If you have finished the "textbook", you should start pushing it.[413] Probably the quickest way is through M. N. Pokrovsky.

Written on August 2, 1921

First published, but not in full, in 1924 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Published in full in 1932 in the second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIX

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TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE PUBLISHING HOUSE

Comrade Teodorovich (P.C.A.) and
the State Publishing House

August 7

Among the new books I have received from the State Publishing House is

Semyon Maslov: "The Peasant Economy". 1921. *5th* ed.! (or *4th* ed.).

Looking it through, I see that it is a dirty bourgeois little book from beginning to end, stuffing up the mind of the muzhik with sham bourgeois "scientific" lies.

Nearly 400 pages, and nothing about the Soviet system and its policy, about our laws and measures for transition to socialism, etc.

Only a fool or a malicious saboteur could have passed this book.

Please investigate and send me the names of *all* those responsible for editing and publishing it.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 7, 1921
First published in 1924
in *Zhizn* No. 1

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TO G. I. SAFAROV

August 7

Comrade Safarov,

Thank you very much for the pamphlet[414] and other material.

We are sending Joffe to make an attempt to *combine* your line and Tomsky's.

That *must* be done.

Unquestionably grain and meat to Moscow, *first and foremost*.

For this purpose, both the "New Economic Policy" in general and a *number* of concessions and bonuses to the merchants.

At the same time, systematic and maximum concern for the Moslem poor, for their organisation and education.

Such a policy can and must be worked out and *fixed* (in a number of the *most precise* directives).

It must be a model for the *whole* East.

Best greetings.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. After the line has been worked out, you, too, will probably be granted leave.

Written on August 7, 1921
Sent to Tashkent

First published, but not in full, in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

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297

LETTER TO V. S. DOVGALEVSKY AND INSTRUCTION TO A SECRETARY

To the People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs

Typed copies to { (1) addressee
(2) me
(3) N. P. Gorbunov

Comrade Dovgalevsky,

Please let me have information about the state of wireless telephony in our country.

1) Is the Central Moscow Station working? If so, how many hours a day, and over what distance in versts? If not, what is lacking?

2) Are we manufacturing (and how many?) receivers, installations capable of voice reception from Moscow?

3) How do matters stand with loudspeakers, installations which enable a whole hail (or square) to hear Moscow?

Etc.

I am very much afraid that this business has once again "gone to sleep" (in the damnable manner of the Russian Oblomovs,[415] putting everyone and everything to *sleep*).

It has been "promised" many times, and all time limits have long ago expired!

The importance of this affair for us (for propaganda in the East especially) is *exceptional*. Delay and negligence here are criminal.

All this already exists abroad; what is lacking can and

must be bought. In all probability, there is criminal negligence somewhere.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

September 2, 1921

First published, but not in full, in 1932 in *Radiofront* No. 3

Published in full in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

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298

LETTER TO D. I. KURSKY AND INSTRUCTION TO A SECRETARY

September 3

Comrade Kursky, *People's Commissar for Justice*,
and his deputy, and also all the members of the Collegium

Typed on *headed notepaper* to (1) the addressee
copies to (2) me
(3) Avanesov
(4) Gorbunov and Smolyaninov

I have sent you through the Office Manager of the Council of People's Commissars a statement from Professor Graftio with astonishing documents about red tape.[416]

This red tape is just what is to be expected, especially in the Moscow and central institutions. But all the more attention should be given to fighting it.

My impression is that the People's Commissariat of Justice is purely formal, i.e., radically wrong, in its attitude to this question.

What is needed is:

(1) to bring this matter before the courts;

(2) to secure the disgrace of those guilty, both in the press and by strict punishment;

(3) to stiffen up the judges through the Central Committee, so that they punish red tape more severely;

(4) to arrange a conference of the Moscow People's Judges, members of tribunals, etc., to work out *effective* measures for fighting red tape;

(5) without fail, this autumn and winter of 1921-22, to bring up for trial in Moscow 4-6 cases of Moscow red tape, selecting the more "vivid" cases, and making each trial a *political* affair;

(6) to find some, if only 2-3, sensible "experts" on questions of red tape, among the more fierce and militant Communists (get hold of Sosnovsky), so as to train people to *hound out* red tape;

(7) to publish a *good*, intelligent, non-bureaucratic *letter* (a circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice) on the struggle against red tape.

I impose this most important task on the People's Commissar and his deputy, on their *personal* responsibility, and request that I be given *regular* information as to its fulfilment.

Lenin

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 3, 1921

First published in *Pravda* No. 30, February 6, 1927

Printed from the original

299

TO I. K. YEZHOV

September 27, 1921

Comrade *Yezhov*, Head of Central Stores Board,
Supreme Economic Council

Comrade Yezhov,

I have received and looked through the papers about the store.

Transfer to the Supreme Economic Council has now been decided.[417]

I will expect you to let me have *brief* but precise reports on whether *in practice* any improvement in the stores business is being achieved, how the struggle against pilfering is going, as regards this store and other stores.

I am obliged to charge you, too, with red tape: "We've been shouting for three years", "I took the matter through to the end nearly ten times, *it seemed*", you write. But the whole trouble is that *not once* did you take the matter through to the end, without any "it seemed".

You know the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Rules of the R.C.P. "To the end" means up to the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (if there is no Congress of Soviets). In the Party line, it means the plenary meeting of the Central Committee.

You have not once taken the matter through to the end.

(1) A brief, "telegraphic", but clear and precise statement to members of the C.C. and members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee;

(2) an article in the press;

(3) an initiative by the local or neighbouring unit of the R.C.P., its opinion, its question asked at the Moscow Soviet

—these are *three* measures which are obligatory in the struggle against red tape.

This is a difficult struggle, that goes without saying. But the difficult is not the impossible.

You gave up in despair, you did not fight, you did not exhaust all the means of fighting.

The stores business requires much more insistence in the struggle against red tape-checking "from below" and "by those below"—publicity in the press—checking again and again—etc.

I should like to hope that, having now had a painful and melancholy but useful experience, you will set about this battle with red tape in such a way as to really take the matter through "to the end".

From time to time one must know the results of this struggle.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. Will you not send on some occasion, together with *brief*, quite brief information about the course of the struggle (with red tape), *brief* data about your staff (the number of people, how many of them are Communists, their qualifications; responsible, purely executive, office workers, etc.) and a *brief* plan of your work?

Write briefly, in cablese, separating out special points, if necessary. I won't read a long document at all, that's certain.

If there are *practical* proposals, put them down on a separate sheet, extremely brief, *like a telegram*, with a copy to my secretary.

Lenin

First published, but not in full, in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 95, January 25, 1924

Published in full in *Pravda* No. 30, February 6, 1927

Printed from the original

300

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

October 13, 1921

Comrade Gorbunov,

Please get a decision, after the necessary agreement with the Chairman of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars (and clearing the matter with the secretaries), that the system for summoning rapporteurs (both to the Full and the Narrow Council of People's Commissars) should be altered.

At present those who have to report get a general summons to the meeting and wait for hours.

This is outrageous and barbarous.

You must see to it that they are told to come at *one particular time*.

Provided there is a *double* check by telephone, whether rapporteurs are needed, and which; provided there is a *correct* distribution of the agenda of the given meeting (business requiring rapporteurs, business not requiring them), we can and must see to it that rapporteurs *do not wait more than 15 minutes*.

Please, work out such a system without delay, considering it carefully, and let me have a decision on the subject, adopted by the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in *Pravda* No. 17, February 21, 1925

Printed from the original

301

TO SIDNEY HILLMAN

October 13, 1921

Comrade Hillman,

I thank you with all my heart for your help. Thanks to you an agreement was rapidly achieved on organisation of help for Soviet Russia by the American workers. Particularly important is the fact that the organisation of this aid has now been arranged in respect also of those workers who are *not* Communists. Throughout the world, and particularly in the most advanced capitalist countries, millions of workers do not at the present time share the views of the Communists, but nonetheless are ready to help Soviet Russia, to help and feed the starving, if only some of them, and to help the cause of restoring the economy of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Such workers repeat with complete conviction the words—and what is more important not only repeat the words but give them practical expression in life—of the leaders of the Amsterdam Trade Union International (unquestionably hostile to communism), namely, that any victory of the international bourgeoisie over Soviet Russia would mean the greatest possible victory of world reaction over the working class in general.

Soviet Russia is exerting all her strength to overcome starvation, ruin and dislocation. The financial aid of the workers of the whole world is infinitely important for us in this respect, side by side with moral help and political help. America, naturally, is at the head of the states where

the workers can help us, are already helping us and will help—I am profoundly convinced—on a far greater scale.

Devoted to the cause, the energetic advanced workers of America will be taking the lead of all the workers of a number of industrial countries who are bringing Soviet Russia their technical knowledge, and their determination to make sacrifices in order to help the Workers' and Peasants' Republic to restore its economy. Among the peaceful means of struggle against the yoke of international finance capital, against international reaction, there is no other means with such rapid and certain promise of victory as aid in the restoration of the economy of Soviet Russia.

With best greetings to all workers who are bringing aid, in one form or another, to Soviet Russia.

N. Lenin

First published in 1930
in the second and third editions
of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII

Printed from the original

302

TO N. A. SEMASHKO

October 24, 1921

Comrade Semashko,

After signing today the decision of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars on the 2,000 millions (I think that is the figure?[418] I don't remember it exactly) for cleaning up Moscow, and after reading the "Regulations" of the People's Commissariat of Health for the week of housing sanitation (*Izvestia* of *July 12*), I have come to the conclusion that my suspicions (about the complete inadequacy of the organisation of the whole business) are increasing.

The thousand millions will be taken, stolen and pilfered but the job won't be done.

We must secure model (or at least, as a beginning, *tolerable*) cleanliness in Moscow, for one cannot even imagine a greater scandal than "Soviet" dirt in the "first" Soviet houses. What then is to he expected in houses which are *not* first?

Please send me the most brief but precise, business-like, factual report on what has been achieved by the week of sanitation, and where? Is there any gubernia where something has been done without muddle?

Further. What is being done (and what has been done?) in Moscow? Who answers for this work? Is it only "officials" with a pompous Soviet title, who don't understand a thing, who don't know the business and only sign papers? Or are there *business-like* people in charge? Who in particular?

V. I. Lenin watches the trials of the first Soviet electric plough at the training and experimental farm of the Moscow Zootechnics Institute. *October 22, 1921*

The most important thing is to secure personal responsibility.

What has been done to secure personal responsibility?

Checking is done by whom?

By inspectors? How many are there? Who are they?

By youth detachments (Young Communist League)? Do such exist? How many? Where and how have they given examples of their work?

What other methods for *real* checking are there?

Is money being spent on buying valuable articles (carbolic? cleaning equipment? how much has been bought?) or is it being spent on maintaining new "official" loafers?

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published, but not in full, in *Izvestia* No. 18, January 22, 1927

Published in full in 1933 of *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

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303

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.,

I have read it, and approve *very*, *very much*.[419] Get it ready *as soon as possible*, dictate it.

One addition, in my opinion, is essential: about the New Economic Policy. I think it would be better to insert it (*throwing light* from different points of view on the place, the significance, the *role in the general framework* of the New Economic Policy) in the separate chapters. Almost in every chapter you can (and should, in my belief) add a page or two about the fact that the New Economic Policy *does not change* the single state economic plan, and *does not go beyond* its framework, but alters the *approach* to its realisation.

Your opinion?

Greetings,

Lenin

Written on November 16, 1921

First published in 1924
in the book: G. M. Krzhizhanovsky,
Tovaroobmen i planovaya rabota,
Moscow

Printed from the original

304

TO A. S. YENUKIDZE

Comrade Yenukidze,

Cannot the vacating of the apartment, promised to Stalin, be speeded up?

I ask you particularly to do this and *to ring me up* (the telephone is a good one; through the upper switchboard) whether you are being successful, or whether there are obstacles.

Yours,
Lenin

Written in November 1921
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

305

TO LYDIA FOTIYEVA

Remind me tomorrow that I must see Stalin, and before this put me through on the telephone to *Obukh* (the doctor) about Stalin.

Written on December 28, 1921

Published in full in 1933 of *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

1922

306

TO D. I. KURSKY

Comrade *Kursky*
People's Commissariat of Justice

I have received two communications from the People's Commissariat of Justice—of November 14 and December 20—on the "fulfilment" of my instruction to organise a systematic campaign against red tape.

In the first communication you write:

> "It involves a great deal of labour to single out the processes in which this organisational defect (viz., the ponderousness and bureaucratic complexity of our apparatus, inter-departmental relations, friction, etc.) does not have such a decisive effect, and red tape is the result of the activity of persons, and not an objective consequence of the insufficiently smooth working of our apparatus."

With such an approach, of course, nothing will come of the struggle against red tape. It is the responsible persons who are to blame for these "organisational defects"; these, and no others, are the ones we must learn to prosecute and punish with exemplary severity. You will never catch a saboteur engaged in red tape.

The second communication from the People's Commissariat of Justice, signed by Krasikov, and the attached reports of the investigators of "exceptionally important cases"—Vyukov, Roizman and Kedrov, a member of the staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection—truly discover America. These reports, in a pretty illiterate form,

set forth standard platitudes about bureaucracy, complexity of apparatus, etc., etc.

In a word, it is obvious that the struggle against red tape has not moved ahead one iota.

In essence, I have not received in exhaustive reply to a single one of the five tasks which I laid down.

I suggest that you once again examine the question and organise the struggle against red tape in business-like fashion, according to all the rules of war.

I ask you by the 20th of each month, without any preliminary reminders, to send me a report on the course of the campaign.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 17, 1922

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the typewritten
text signed by V. I. Lenin

307

TO A. D. TSYURUPA[420]

1

NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE

January 24, 1922

Comrade Tsyurupa,

In connection with our telephone conversation yesterday, and your promise to observe a strict regime, we need to have a detailed talk on the whole system of work, and to think it over thoroughly.

The most radical defect of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. is the absence of any checking-up on fulfilment. *We are being sucked down* by the rotten bureaucratic swamp into writing papers, jawing about decrees, drawing up decrees—and in this sea of paper live work is being drowned.

Clever saboteurs are deliberately luring us into this paper swamp. Most of the People's Commissars and other grandees are, quite unconsciously, "sticking their heads into the noose".

The strict medical regime laid down for you must be used *at all costs* to break away from turmoil and commotion, commissions, talking and writing of papers—to break away, to *think over* the system of work and *radically reform it*.

The centre of gravity of your activities must be just this refashioning of our disgustingly bureaucratic way of work, the struggle against bureaucracy and red tape, the *checking-up on fulfilment*.

The checking-up on fulfilment, the checking-up on what

happens in practice—this is your main and principal task. You should set up for this a little staff (four-six persons) of particularly tried and tested assistants (an office manager, his assistants, a secretary and such like).

For this purpose, in my opinion, it is essential:

(1) to relieve the *C.P.C.* and the *C.L.D.* of unnecessary burdens, transferring all petty questions to the Narrow Council of People's Commissars and the procedural meetings of the *C.L.D.*

This has begun. But it will "come apart" in two weeks, given our damned Oblomov ways, if it is not followed up, chased up, checked up, flogged along with three knouts.

The office manager must be taught (just as the Secretariat of the *C.P.C.* and the *C.L.D.* should be) to watch very closely to see that petty questions are not brought before the C.P.C. and the C.L.D., and that all questions in general first go through a triple filter (an inquiry to the appropriate People's Commissariats; their urgent reply; the same from the Codification Department, etc., etc.).

You and Gorbunov* must together work out written *regulations* for the bringing forward and consideration of questions, and check *not less than* once a month, *you personally*, whether the regulations are being observed and whether they are achieving their object, i.e., reduction of paper work, red tape, more forethought, more sense of responsibility on the part of the People's Commissars, *replacement of half-baked decrees by careful*, *prolonged*, *business-like checking-up on fulfilment* and by *checking of experience*, establishment of personal responsibility (in effect, we have complete irresponsibility at the top, in the People's Commissariats and in their departments, and the saboteurs make magnificent use of this: as a result we have an Oblomov situation which wrecks all business).

I know that this is *extraordinarily* difficult. But just because it is difficult, you must devote yourself *entirely* to this matter.

Hence

(2) a minimum of sessions. The standard should he once a week for the Council of People's Commissars + once a week for the Council of Labour and Defence, two hours each.

* + a codifier + 1 from the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

(3) The Supreme Economic Commission. Close down all its subcommissions as rapidly as possible, and replace them by demanding of the People's Commissars that each of them should have *responsible* people to write drafts, that the People's Commissar should endorse them, and that he himself should get them co-ordinated in the *briefest* possible time with all "interested" People's Commissars and at the C.L.D. or the C.P.C.

The Supreme Economic Commission should exist *only* for co-ordination (*codification*) and the most rapid checking (*stamping*) by yourself plus Kamenev.

Only for this.

Not for talk.

Not for discussion.

(4) You are not to become a member of a single commission, not one, except the Supreme Economic Commission.

(5) To fight the outrageous abundance of commissions, replacing them by a formal demand for *a written opinion* in the shortest possible time.

(6) You must in this way set yourself free from commotion and turmoil, which are *killing all of us*, and make it possible for you to think calmly about the work *as a whole*—

—and particularly to concentrate on checking-up on fulfilment, on fighting bureaucracy and red tape.

I beg you to think over this whole question, and to write to me.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

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308

2

A PROGRAMME FOR WORK ON NEW LINES

February 20

Comrade Tsyurupa,

More on the subject of work on new lines.

I will try to formulate its programme in this way:

(1) the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. to be made ten times more compact, in the sense that the People's Commissars should not dare to bring trivial matters before them, but should decide them themselves and *answer* for them themselves;

(2) the staff of the Managing Department of the C.P.C. (at present three-quarters idle) should be made responsible for this, for putting this into effect;

(3) the same applies to the Narrow Council of People's Commissars, plus its *especial* reduction in size;

(4) some of the members of the Narrow Council and its staff, and also the staff of the Managing Department of the C.P.C., to be taken by you under your personal command in order to *check up on effective fulfilment* (you instruct so-and-so: take a journey down there, look, read, check up, you will answer for any bungling through gullibility).

(5) You (and Rykov) must devote *first and foremost* one hour, or if your health permits, two, every day, to personal checking-up on the work: you summon to your office (or visit) not grandees, but members of Collegiums *and lower*, practical workers of the People's Commissariat of X, Y, Z—and check up on their work, get down to rock-bottom, school them, teach them, give them a proper trouncing. Study people, search for *able* workers. This is now the essence;

all orders and decisions without this are dirty bits of paper.

Reply to me. We shall think it over, consult with members of the Central Committee, and as rapidly as possible *fix* such a (or some other) programme.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. A. Bryukhanov is not suitable. Someone else must be found. For the time being you had better set up a "trio" there, something pretty strong.

Written on February 20, 1922

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

309

3

PROPOSAL FOR THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

Comrade Tsyurupa,

I send you my addition. My advice is to get *brief* comments from *all* People's Commissars and *all* members of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.

Yours,
Lenin

A special supplementary decision should lay down:

The principal task of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars must be strict watchfulness that the People's Commissariats (1) observe the laws, (2) do not evade responsibility by needlessly transferring a mass of unnecessary questions to the Narrow Council for decision, but should decide the questions themselves, on their own responsibility or by agreement between two or more People's Commissariats under ordinary procedure; (3) checking the legality, expediency and rapidity of individual instructions and acts of the People's Commissariats; the struggle against bureaucracy and red tape by such checking, and by persistent reduction of the number of officials.

Written on February 20-21, 1922

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

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310

4

DRAFT DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE, THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND ALSO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

The chief defect of these institutions is that they are overburdened with trivial matters. As a result, they are floundering in bureaucracy instead of fighting it,:

The causes of this evil are (1) the weakness of the Managing Department, (2) the inability of the People's Commissars to climb out of the mire of trivialities and bureaucratic details, (3) the desire of the People's Commissars (and still more that of their departmental bureaucrats who egg them on) to shift responsibility on to the C.P.C., (4) last and most important—the fact that responsible workers do not realise that the order of the day now is to fight the sea of paper and show distrust of it and of the eternal "reorganisations", that the first task of the moment is not decrees not reorganisations but *selection of people*; establishment of *individual responsibility for what is being done*; *checking-up on work actually performed*. Otherwise we shall not climb out of the bureaucracy and red tape which are throttling us.

The Narrow Council of Peoples Commissars, the C.L.D. and the C.P.C. must go all out to get rid of trivialities, teaching the People's Commissariats to settle minor matters themselves and to answer for them more strictly.

The staff of the Managing Department of the C.P.C. must regard as its main task the practical realisation of the following: to reduce the number of matters coming before the

Narrow C.P.C., the C.L.D. and the C.P.C., and to ensure that the People's Commissars (severally and jointly) should decide more themselves and answer for it; to shift the centre of gravity to checking up on effective fulfilment.

For the same purpose, the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C., Comrades Rykov and Tsyurupa, must go all out to free themselves of trivial matters and commissions, fight against attempts to drag them (the deputies) into matters which should be settled by the People's Commissars; devote two or three hours a day, as a minimum, to making the personal acquaintance of the responsible workers (not the grandees) of the most important (and later, all) People's Commissariats, in order to check up and select people; make use of the staff of the Managing Department of the C.P.C. and some of the members of the Narrow Council, and also the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, to checkup on the work actually done and what success it has had; in short, they should become practical instructors in administrative work, such as we lack most of all.

Distrust of decrees, of institutions, of "reorganisations" and of grandees, especially among Communists; struggle against the mire of bureaucracy and red tape by checking up on people and on the actual work done; merciless expulsion of unnecessary officials, reduction of staff, replacement of Communists who don't study the art of management seriously—such must be the line of the People's Commissars and the C.P.C., of its Chairman and his Deputy Chairmen.

Lenin

February 27

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

311

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

January 26, 1922

Comrade Karpinsky,

Would you not write to me briefly (two-three pages maximum)

how many letters come from the peasants to *Bednota*[421]?

what is important (particularly important) and new in these letters?

Their moods?

The topical subjects?

Could I not *once in two months* receive such letters (the next by March 15, 1922)?

α) average number of letters
β) moods
γ) most important topical subjects.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in *Pravda* No. 19, January 24, 1924

Printed from the facsimile

312

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

January 28, 1922

G. M.,

I have read Gorev's work[422] and return it.

I expected more. A former Bolshevik, who captivated you so, and who in your opinion had once again become a real Bolshevik, should have produced impressive, vivid, powerful, popular propaganda, a defence of communism for France, starting from her electrification.

But Gorev's work has turned out "professorial".

I offer the following plan for your consideration:

(1) send it to be set *at once*, in order to publish it soon in *any* case;

(2) suggest to Gorev—*if you agree*—that he should write in addition a preface or an afterword, in which he should in very clear and popular form and a little more freely (prescribe for him to this end three grammes of extract of Larinism they say it has appeared on sale in Moscow) attack French capitalism, and say to the French workers and peasants: you could become in three-five years three times as rich, and work not more than six hours a day (approximately), if there were a Soviet government in France putting electrification into effect;

(3) if in your (or Gorev's) opinion, Gorev will do this badly or unwillingly, then think over whether someone should not be asked to do this work separately (*a brief* "Ballod"[423] for France);

(4) send me Gorev's article, as soon as you can, once it is set up (to be published as a pamphlet or in some journal, whichever you choose). *Perhaps* I will write an introduction.[424]

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

313

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

Top secret

Comrade Sokolnikov
Copy to Comrade Tsyurupa and Comrade Krzhizhanovsky

You said to me that some of our trusts may, in the immediate future, find themselves without any money and ask us in an ultimatum to nationalise them. I think that trusts and factories have been founded on a self-supporting basis precisely in order that they themselves should be responsible and, moreover, fully responsible, for their enterprises working without a deficit. If it turns out that they have not achieved this, then in my opinion they must be prosecuted and punished, as regards all the members of their boards of management, by prolonged terms of imprisonment (perhaps applying conditional release after a certain time), confiscation of all their property, etc.

If, after setting up trusts and enterprises on a self-supporting basis, we do not prove able by business-like, mercantile methods fully to protect our interests, we shall turn out to be complete idiots.

The Supreme Economic Council must watch over this, but still more the People's Commissariat of Finance through the State Bank and through special inspectors, since it is precisely the People's Commissariat of Finance which, not being directly interested, is obliged to establish effective and real control and supervision.

Lenin

Dictated by telephone on
February 1, 1922

First published in *Pravda* No. 79,
March 21, 1931

Printed from a typewritten copy

314

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

February 15, 1922

Copy to Comrade Tsyurupa and Comrade Kamenev

Comrade Sokolnikov,

Should not the main attention be directed to the development of trade, and to supervision of it through the Trade Department of the State Bank?

Should we not organise this matter so as to find two or three dozen (or even less, if our damned bureaucratic machine cannot cope with such a "difficult" task) representatives of the Trade Department of the State Bank, and so that these representatives should receive bonuses in proportion to the growth of commercial turnover in those enterprises or territorial regions which have been "entrusted" to them?

It would seem to me that this would be more realistic than setting up special commissions or institutions which, given our rotten customs (with pretensions to "true communism"), will *inevitably* degenerate into bureaucratic stupidity. Meanwhile the Trade Department of the State Bank must be given a clear *practical* task—to develop internal trade and take it under its own control. And for the development of operations let both the representatives and the members of the board (if there are members of the board in the Trade Department of the State Bank) receive their bonuses—but only for the development of operations.

Judging by what Gorbunov has told me about the results of his "troubles" over the Belov and GUM[425] affair, it is clear that the Trade Department of the State Bank is *at fault* here. They slept in, they missed the bus, they waited, like

real jack-in-office scoundrels, for an *order* "from above". I think the Trade Department should be punished at once for this, where it hurts most, with the warning: one more such yawn, one more such display of sleepiness—and it means *prison*.

Another practical means, it would seem to me, is the registration of private commercial deals and a tax on them, by means of a stamp duty or something similar. How does this question stand? *Cannot* private trade be placed in *such* a way (or begin to be placed) under the control of the People's Commissariat of Finance and the State Bank?

I think that the success of the work of the entire People's Commissariat of Finance should be measured 99 per cent by *the development of state trade* and of the *Trade Department of the State Bank* (in the granting of credit to private trade). Everything else counts only 1 per cent.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1949 in *Bolshevik* No. 1

Printed from the original

315

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

February 22, 1922

Comrade Sokolnikov,

The question is not just of GUM alone. All the work of all our economic bodies suffers most of all from bureaucracy. Communists have become bureaucrats. If anything will destroy us, it is this. And for the State Bank it is most dangerous of all to be bureaucratic. We are still thinking in terms of decrees, of institutions. This is the mistake. The whole essence now is practical men and practice. To find people who are *men of business* (1 out of 100; 1 out of 1,000 Communists, and that only with God's help); to transform our decrees out of dirty paper (it's all the same whether they are bad or good decrees) into living practice—that is the *essence*.

Whether the State Bank itself should trade, or through subordinate firms, through its agents, or through its client debtors, etc.—I don't know. I don't take it upon myself to judge, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the technique of currency circulation and banking business. But what I do know firmly is that the whole problem now is the rapid development of state trade (in all its varieties: co-operation, clients of the State Bank, mixed companies, factors, agents, etc., etc.).

February 28

On account of my illness I did not finish and send away this letter. You speak (in your interview) about replacing state trusts by mixed companies. There will be no practical results. The clever capitalists will draw stupid (most honest

and most virtuous) Communists into the mixed companies, and swindle us as they are swindling us now. The problem now is not one of institutions but of people, and of checking up on practical experience. *One by one* we must discover people who know how to trade, and step by step use their experience, their labour, to *clean out* the..., expelling the virtuous Communists from boards of management, shutting down sleepy (and strictly communist) enterprises, shutting them down, separating out the one per cent which are worth while. Either the People's Commissariat of Finance will prove *able* to go over to *such* work, or the entire People's Commissariat of Finance=0.

Yours,

Lenin

Written on February 22 and 28, 1922

First published in 1949 in *Bolshevik* No. 1

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316

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

April 6, 1922

G. M.,

Yesterday Martens[426] told me that the existence of an unheard-of wealth of iron deposits in Kursk Gubernia has been "proved" (you said "nearly").

If that is so, should we not *already this spring*—

(1) put down the necessary narrow-gauge lines there?

(2) Prepare the nearest peatbog (or bogs?) for exploitation, so that an electric power station can be put up there?

If this does not seem to you unnecessary, write to Martens about it (and two words to me).

Martens wants to go there in three weeks' time. I have written to Rykov and Tsyurupa that he should also be given an engineer from the State Planning Commission.

This business must be pushed ahead with *particular* energy. I am very much afraid that without triple checks it will go to sleep. When I leave, don't forget that Rykov and Tsyurupa have my letter about it.

Yours,

Lenin

First published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 17, January 21, 1925

Printed from the original

317

TO CHARLES P. STEINMETZ

Moscow. April 10, 1922

Dear Mr. Steinmetz,

I, thank you cordially for your friendly letter of February 16, 1922. I must admit to my shame that I heard your name for the first time only a few months ago from Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, who was the Chairman of our State Commission for Working out a Plan for the Electrification of Russia and is now Chairman of the State General Planning Commission. He told me of the outstanding position which you have gained among the electrical engineers of the whole world.

Comrade Martens has now made me better acquainted by his accounts of you. I have seen from these accounts that your sympathies with Soviet Russia have been aroused, on the one hand, by your social and political views. On the other hand, as a representative of electrical engineering and particularly in one of the technically advanced countries, you have become convinced of the necessity and inevitability of the replacement of capitalism by a new social order, which will establish the planned regulation of economy and ensure the welfare of the entire mass of the people on the basis of the electrification of entire countries. In all the countries of the world there is growing—more slowly than one would like, but irresistibly and unswervingly—the number of representatives of science, technology, art, who are becoming convinced of the necessity of replacing capitalism by a different socio-economic system, and whom the "terrible difficulties"* of the struggle of Soviet Russia against the

* These words were written by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

entire capitalist world do not repel, do not frighten away but, on the contrary, lead to an understanding of the inevitability of the struggle and the necessity of taking what part in it they can, helping the new to overcome the old.

In particular, I want to thank you for your offer to help Russia with your advice, suggestions, etc. As the absence of official and legally recognised relations between Soviet Russia and the United States makes the practical realisation of your offer extremely difficult both for us and for you, I will allow myself to publish both your letter and my reply, in the hope that many persons who live in America, or in countries connected by commercial treaties both with the United States and with Russia, will then help you (by information, by translations from Russian into English, etc.) to give effect to your intention of helping the Soviet Republic.

With very best greetings,

Yours fraternally,

Lenin

Sent to New York

Published in *Pravda* No. 85, April 19, 1922

Printed from the typewritten text corrected by V. I. Lenin

318

TO N. I. BUKHARIN

Comrade Bukharin,

I send you today's *Pravda*. Now, why print stupidities in the guise of the article by Pletnyov,[427] who puts on pompous airs with all the learned and fashionable words he can? I have marked two stupidities and put a number of question marks. The author has to learn not "proletarian" science, but simply to learn. Can it be that the editorial board of *Pravda* is not going to explain the author's mistakes to him? Why, this is *falsification* of historical materialism! Playing at historical materialism!

Yours,
Lenin

Written on September 27, 1922

Published for the first time in the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

319

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Comrade Bogdanov,

Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council

Copies:

to *Comrades Krzhizhanovsky and Pyatakov*, State Planning Commission
" *Comrade Vladimirov*, People's Commissariat of Finance
" Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee
" *Comrade Kamenev*, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and
" Comrade *L. B. Krasin*

Comrade Krasin has sent me a letter in which he tells me of the very great successes of a group of engineers, headed by Comrade Gubkin, who, with stubbornness bordering on the heroic, and with insignificant support by state organisations, have not only developed from zero the detailed scientific investigation of combustible slates and sapropelite, but have also learned in practice to produce out of these minerals various useful products, such as ichthyol, black varnish, various soaps, paraffins, ammonium sulphate, etc.

In view of the fact that this work, as Comrade Krasin testifies, represents a firm foundation for an industry which in ten or twenty years will produce hundreds of millions for Russia, I propose that:

(1) the further development of this work be immediately guaranteed in the financial sense;

(2) all obstacles retarding it be eliminated, now and henceforth;

(3) this group of engineers be awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour and a large sum of money.

Please inform me of further developments in writing through Comrade Gorbunov, Office Manager of the C.P.C. In the event of any obstacles arising, inform me immediately through the same channel.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars
and Council of Labour and Defence

Written on October 16, 1922

First published in *Izvestia* No. 20, January 20, 1930

Printed from the typewritten copy signed by V. I. Lenin

320

TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

Dear Ivan Ivanovich,

I have read your article about specialists.[428]

I don't agree. Two points.

The first is at the beginning (the third column from the beginning): "The proletarian dictatorship will collapse if, in the first place...*" (this is correct) "and secondly, if these specialists are not our own specialists, *such as see their aim to be the consolidation and development of the dictatorship of the proletariat*."

What I have underlined is incorrect. We shall not have such specialists for a long time, until the *bourgeois* specialists, the *petty-bourgeois* specialists have disappeared, until *all* the specialists have become *Communists*. Yet the proletarian dictatorship must certainly not "*collapse*" in the meantime. A *lesser* condition will be enough—namely, the *first*. The second does not imperil our existence. It is sufficient to "have at our disposal".

For a long time yet there will be doubts, uncertainty, intrigues, betrayals, etc. The second condition will last until the *end* of the dictatorship, and therefore *is not a condition of the dictatorship*.

Now the second point, at the end of the article, the third and second paragraphs *from the end*.

"The class struggle ... no more abnormal than the relations which it expresses".[429]

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* Lenin refers to the following passage: "...in the first place, it does not have at its disposal well-qualified specialists of the most diverse categories".—*Ed*.

Untrue. It is *untrue*, and not merely abnormal. It is worse than abnormal: it is *scientifically untrue*. This is *not* the class struggle.

Further. "The scientific laboratory is a united collective, acting co-ordinately, concertedly *and consciously in all* its elements."

Untrue. This cannot be the case before the *abolition of classes*.

This is not scientific but sentimental: *before* classes have been abolished, "*share and share alike*" in everything. Wrong. It will degenerate into the practices of 1918: medical assistants demand that doctors should "share and share alike" in everything (*scientific*).

This is both wrong and practically harmful.

An example: the Political Bureau and its *girl secretaries*. "Share and share alike" in everything (*scientific*)? You yourself will not insist on that. You have been carried away.

Best greetings!

Yours,
Lenin

Written on November 15, 1922

First published in 1929
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 10

Printed from the original

321

TO COMRADE MÜNZENBERG, SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS' AID[430]

Supplementing your report at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, I should like in a few words to point out the significance of the organisation of aid.

The assistance given to the starving by the international working class helped Soviet Russia in considerable measure to endure the painful days of last year's famine and to overcome it. At the present time we have to heal the wounds inflicted by the famine, provide in the first place for many thousands of orphaned children, and restore our agriculture and industry which have suffered heavily as a result of the famine.

In this sphere, too, the fraternal aid of the international working class has already begun to operate. The American tractor column near Perm, the agricultural groups of the American Technical Aid, the agricultural and industrial undertakings of the International Workers' Aid, the allocation of and subscriptions to the first proletarian loan, through the Workers' Aid to Soviet Russia—all these are very promising beginnings in the cause of workers' fraternal aid to promote the economic restoration of Soviet Russia.

The work of economic assistance, so happily begun by the International Workers' Aid to Soviet Russia, should be supported in every possible way by the workers and toilers of the whole world. Side by side with the continuing strong political pressure on the governments of the bourgeois countries over the demand for recognition of the Soviet government,

widespread economic aid by the world proletariat is at present the best and most practical support of Soviet Russia in her difficult economic war against the imperialist concerns, and the best support for her work of building a socialist economy.

Vl. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Moscow, December 2, 1922

First published in 1924
in the book *Tri goda mezhdunarodnoi rabochei pomoshchi. 1921-24*,
Moscow, Mezhrahpom Publishers

Printed from the Russian translation
of the German original
signed by Lenin

NOTES

[1] Reference is to the resolutions passed by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1912. The resolutions and "Announcement" concerning the Conference were published in booklet form in Paris in February 1912 by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 23

[2] *Liquidationism*—an opportunist trend in the R.S.D.L.P. that emerged in the period of reaction following the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution. The liquidators demanded liquidation of the illegal revolutionary party of the working class and tried to subordinate the working-class movement to bourgeois interests. The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. expelled the liquidators from the Party. p. 23

[3] *Zvezda* (The Star)—legal Bolshevik newspaper (December 1910-May 5, 1912). In 1911 and 1912 it published seven stories by Gorky from his *Tales of Italy* series. p. 23

[4] *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary)—literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1911 to 1915. It was a rallying point for Menshevik liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Left-wing liberals. p. 23

[5] *Zhivoye Dyelo* (Vital Cause)—Menshevik liquidationist legal weekly, published in St. Petersburg from January to April 1912. Sixteen issues appeared. Its contributors included L. Martov, F. Dan and P. Axelrod. p. 24

[6] The daily newspaper for the workers that succeeded *Zvezda* was *Pravda* (Truth), the first issue of which appeared on May 5, 1912. p. 24

[7] Reference is to Gorky's work for the magazine *Zavety* (Behests), to which V. Chernov, a Socialist-Revolutionary leader, contributed, and for the magazine *Sovremennik*, which in 1911 was run by A. Amfiteatrov. p. 24

[8] Znaniye (Knowledge)—a book-publishing firm founded in Petersburg in 1898 by a group of writers. Gorky joined the firm

later and virtually became its leading spirit. The managing director was K. P. Pyatnitsky. p. 24

[9] *Irkutskoye Slovo* (Irkutsk Word)—weekly newspaper with a Menshevik-liquidationist orientation (1911-12). Its publisher, *Rozhkov*, a member of the R.S.D.L.P. since 1905, had in the years of reaction become one of the ideologists of liquidationism; *N. Chuzhak* (N. F. Nasimovich) was a literary critic. p. 24

[10] *M. F.*—Maria Fyodorovna Andreyeva—Gorky's wife. p. 24

[11] Lenin refers to reports on the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912). G. L. Shklovsky made reports on the Conference in Berne and Lausanne, but his tour of all Switzerland did not take place. p. 25

[12] *Vperyod* group—an anti-Party group of otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders (see Notes 73 and 77); was organised in December 1909 on the initiative of A. Bogdanov and G. Alexinsky. It had its own organ called *Vperyod* (Forward). Lacking the support of the workers, the group had virtually collapsed by 1913. Its complete and formal dissolution occurred in 1917, after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution. p. 25

[13] *Trotsky* (*Bronstein*), *L. D.* (1879-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897, became a Menshevik. During the years of reaction (1907-10) and the subsequent revolutionary revival, though ostensibly an advocate of "non-factionalism", he in fact adopted the position of the liquidators. In 1912, he was the organiser of the anti-Party August bloc. During the first world war he took up a Centrist stand. Returning from emigration after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917, he joined the Inter-District Organisation and together with its other members was admitted to the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the October Socialist Revolution Trotsky held a number of government posts. In 1918 he was opposed to the Brest Peace Treaty, in 1920-21 he led the opposition in the discussion on the trade unions, and from 1923 conducted a bitter factional struggle against the Party's general line, against Lenin's programme of building socialism, and preached the impossibility of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. In 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Party. For anti-Soviet activities he was deported from the U.S.S.R. in 1929, and in 1932 deprived of Soviet citizenship.

Plekhanov, *G. V.* (1856-1918)—outstanding figure in the Russian and international working-class movement, the first propagandist of Marxism in Russia. In 1883 he set up in Geneva the first Russian Marxist organisation, the Emancipation of Labour group. An opponent of Narodism, Plekhanov also opposed revisionism in the international working-class movement. He wrote a number of works that played a big part in defending and propagating materialist philosophy. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

(1903) Plekhanov took up a position of reconciliation with opportunism and later joined the Mensheviks. In the years of reaction (1907-10) and during the subsequent revolutionary revival Plekhanov came out against the Machist revision of Marxism and against liquidationism. During the first world war he became a social-chauvinist. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution he returned to Russia from emigration, and opposed the Bolsheviks and the socialist revolution on the grounds that Russia was not ripe for socialism. When the October Socialist Revolution occurred, his attitude to it was negative, but he took no part in the struggle against Soviet power. p. 25

[14] *Bund* (General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia) was organised in 1897; it spread nationalism and separatism in the working-class movement in Russia. It disbanded in March 1921. p. 26

[15] Lenin has in mind the resolution of November 28, 1910, passed at a meeting of the so-called Party Social-Democratic Club in Vienna (mainly composed of Trotskyists) and aimed against *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette) (see Note 29). p. 26

[16] The delegates which the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma sent to the Prague Party Conference were N. G. Poletayev and V. Y. Shurkanov (the latter was subsequently exposed as an *agent provocateur*). They arrived late at the Conference. Lenin met them in Leipzig. p. 26

[17] *Golos* group—Mensheviks associated with the liquidators' paper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social-Democrat) published first in Geneva and then in Paris. p. 27

[18] *International Socialist Bureau* (I.S.B.)—permanent executive and information body of the Second International. The decision to set up the Bureau was taken at the Paris Congress of the Second International in 1900. From 1905 to 1912 Lenin represented the R.S.D.L.P. in the Bureau. With the outbreak of the world war the I.S.B. became an obedient tool in the hands of the social-chauvinists. p. 27

[19] In Paris, on March 12, 1912, a meeting of representatives of the Bund Committee Abroad, the *Vperyod* group, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda*, the pro-Party Mensheviks and the conciliators passed a slanderous anti-Party resolution aimed against the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. and its decisions. As representative of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau, Lenin wrote two letters concerning this resolution to the Bureau Secretary Camille Huysmans (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 547-50, and this volume, pp. 31-32). p. 27

[20] Reference is to Plekhanov's article "Vechnaya Pamyat" (Eternal Memory) published in Supplement 2 to No. 15 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat), which Plekhanov brought out, at intervals between March 1905 and April 1912 in Geneva. Sixteen numbers were issued. Publication was resumed in 1916 in Petrograd, but only one issue appeared. p. 27

[21] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn), *Zhivoye Dyelo* (Vital Cause) and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social-Democrat) were organs of the Menshevik liquidators. p. 27

[22] At the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., G. K. Orjonikidze and S. S. Spandaryan were elected to the Central Committee and the Bureau of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in Russia. Yelena Stasova was elected a candidate for membership of the Central Committee. p. 28

[23] *Savka's town*—Ekaterinoslav, where Y. D. Zevin, who used the pseudonym "Savka", was working. p. 28

[24] *Vorwärts* (Forward)—daily newspaper, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, started in Berlin in 1891. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels, the editorship of the paper fell into the hands of the Party's Right wing and regularly published articles by opportunists.

In the issue for March 26, 1912, *Vorwärts* carried an anonymous slanderous article written by Trotsky against the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. and its decisions. The German opportunists on *Vorwärts* refused to publish Lenin's reply to Trotsky. In order to give the German workers a true picture of the Prague Conference, *Sotsial-Demokrat* printed Lenin's reply in German and published it as a separate pamphlet *Der Anonymus aus dem "Vorwärts" und die Sachlage in der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Russlands* (The Anonymous Writer in *Vorwärts* and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P.).

The pamphlet was sent out to 600 German addresses—editorial boards of Social-Democratic publications, local committees, and libraries. p. 29

[25] *Huysmans*, *Camille* (b. 1871)—veteran of the Belgian working-class movement; professor of philology and journalist. From 1904 to 1919 he was Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. During the world imperialist war of 1914-18 he adopted a Centrist position. p. 31

[26] Lenin refers to the slanderous resolution passed by the meeting of anti-Party groups in Paris on March 12, 1912 (see Note 19). p. 31

[27] Reference is to the resolutions of the Prague Party Conference of 1912 on "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators" and "The Party Organisation Abroad" (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 480-81, 484). p. 31

[28] *Caucasian Regional Committee*—factional centre of the Caucasian Menshevik liquidators. It joined the anti-Party August bloc organised by Trotsky. p. 33

[29] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette)—illegal popular organ of the Bolsheviks, published irregularly in Paris between 1910 and 1912.

Reference is to the article "What Should the People Be Taught about the Election Campaign?" published in *Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 8, March 17 (30), 1912. p. 33

[30] *Izvestia* (News)—the projected publication did not take place. p. 33

[31] Reference is to the resolution "Elections to the Fourth Duma", adopted by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1912. p. 34

[32] *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917. At first moderate-liberal in tone, it became an organ of reactionary aristocratic circles and officialdom after it was taken over by A. S. Suvorin in 1876. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Black Hundreds. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 37

[33] Lenin refers to the Bolshevik legal daily paper *Pravda* that was being prepared for publication. p. 37

[34] *Knipovich, B. N.* (1880-1924)—economist and statistician, participated in the Social-Democratic movement, arrested in 1911 and deported. His first scientific work *A Contribution to the Problem of Differentiation of the Russian Peasantry* appeared in 1912. p. 38

[35] *Maslov, P. P.* (1867-1946)—economist, Social-Democrat, wrote a number of books on the agrarian problem in which he attempted to revise Marxism. p. 39

[36] The expression recalls the summer of 1907, when Lenin for conspiratorial purposes and to restore his health was living at Knipovich's country house in Stjernsund (Finland). To get water for their flowers the Knipovich family had to pull a water-cart from a well that was situated a long way from the garden. When he saw members of the family setting out for water, Lenin came out of the house and helped them pull the cart. p. 39

[37] *Pravda* (Truth)—the first legal mass workers' daily in Russia. The first issue appeared in St. Petersburg on May 5, 1912.

Pravda played a key role in the history of the Bolshevik Party and the revolution. It was a collective propagandist, agitator and organiser in the struggle to put the Party's policy into practice.

As a centre of the campaign for Party principles, it fought resolutely against the Menshevik liquidators, otzovists and Trotskyists and opposed international opportunism. *Pravda* helped to build a firm foundation for a mass Bolshevik party.

Lenin guided the policy of *Pravda*, which published 270 of his articles. The paper was closed down eight times by the tsarist government but continued to appear under fresh names: *Rabochaya Pravda* (Workers' Truth), *Severnaya Pravda* (Northern Truth), *Pravda Truda* (Truth of Labour), *Za Pravdu* (For Truth), *Proletarskaya Pravda* (Proletarian Truth), *Put Pravdy* (Path of Truth), *Rabochy* (The Worker), and *Trudovaya Pravda* (Labour Truth). Before the outbreak of the first world war, on July 21, 1914, the paper was banned and did not recommence publication until after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917.

On March 18, 1917, *Pravda* began appearing as the organ of the Central and Petrograd Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. On April 18, upon his return from abroad, Lenin joined the editorial board and became its leading spirit. Between July and October 1917, the paper was persecuted by the bourgeois Provisional Government and had frequently to change its name, appearing as *Listok Pravdy* (*Pravda*'s News Sheet), *Proletary* (The Proletarian), *Rabochy* (The Worker) and *Rabochy Put* (Workers' Path). After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, on November 9, 1917, the Party's Central Organ began appearing under its original name *Pravda*.

p. 40

[38] *Rech* (Speech)—daily newspaper, central organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party; appeared in St. Petersburg from February 1906 to October 1917. p. 41

[39] *Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung* (Vienna Workers' Newspaper)—daily newspaper, central organ of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, founded by Victor Adler in Vienna in 1889. Banned in 1934, it resumed publication in 1945 as the-central organ of the Socialist Party of Austria. p. 41

[40] *Nevskaya Zvezda* (Neva Star)—legal Bolshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from February to October 1912. Lenin directed the paper's policy from abroad. It was constantly persecuted by the government. Of the 27 numbers that appeared 9 were confiscated, and for 2 the editors were fined. The editors were frequently prosecuted. p. 42

[41] The articles Lenin mentions here, "Petty Artifices (A Reply to Blank)" and "Unquenchable Hopes", have not been discovered to this day. p. 42

[42] The liquidators' paper *Nevsky Golos* (Neva Voice) No. 6, for July 5, 1912, carried a report on meetings held in St. Petersburg by representatives of various Social-Democratic trends (allegedly including supporters of *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*) to discuss the Fourth Duma election campaign. The editors of *Nevskaya Zvezda*

and *Pravda* denied any participation by their representatives in these meetings. p. 43

[43] *Axelrod, P. B.* (1850-1928)—a Menshevik leader. During the years of reaction and the subsequent revolutionary revival, he was one of the leaders of the liquidators and a member of the editorial board of the Menshevik liquidators' newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. During the first world war he maintained a position of social-chauvinism under cover of Centrist phrases. He was hostile to the October Socialist Revolution. p. 43

[44] The article Lenin refers to was "On Current Themes (From P. B. Axelrod's Letters to Friends)", published in *Nevsky Golos* No. 6 on July 5, 1912, and in *Nasha Zarya* No. 6 for 1912. Lenin criticises the article in his work *How P. B. Axelrod Exposes the Liquidators* (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 175-86). p. 43

[45] This article, which Lenin sent to *Pravda* in July 1912, was not published and has never been discovered. p. 45

[46] Lenin's article about November 9 (the reply of a correspondent) has never been found. p. 48

[47] No report on the subject suggested by Lenin was published in *Pravda*. p. 49

[48] The publications mentioned here—*Pochin* (Beginning), *Izvestia zagranichnoi oblastnoi organizatsii* (Journal of the Regional Organisation Abroad), *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (Revolutionary Thought) and *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia)—were run by various groups and trends in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 50

[49] Reference is to the novels by V. Ropshin (B. Savinkov), one of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party: *Kon bledny* (The Pale Horse), published in the magazine *Russkaya Mysl* No. 1 for 1909, and *To chego ne bylo* (What Never Happened), published in the magazine *Zavety* Nos. 1-8, April-November 1912, and in No. 1 for January 1913. p. 50

[50] *Vekhi* (Landmarks)—a symposium published by the Constitutional-Democrats in Moscow in the spring of 1909. Its articles devoted to the Russian intelligentsia cast a slur on the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the liberation movement in Russia, and the views and activities of the outstanding revolutionary democrats of the nineteenth century V. G. Belinsky, N. A. Dobrolyubov, N. G. Chernyshevsky and D. I. Pisarev. The contributors to the symposium vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905 and thanked the tsarist government for protecting the privileged classes "with its bayonets and jails" from "the fury of the people". p. 50

[51] *Milyukov, P. N.* (1859-1943)—leader of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party, prominent ideologist of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie. One of the men who in October 1905 founded the Cadet Party, he became chairman of its Central Committee and editor of its central organ, the newspaper *Rech* (Speech). He was a member of the Third and Fourth Dumas. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 he became Minister for Foreign Affairs in the bourgeois Provisional Government, and after the October Socialist Revolution helped to organise the foreign military intervention against Soviet Russia. Later he was active among the White émigrés.

Gredeskul, N. A. (b. 1864)—professor of law, publicist, Constitutional-Democrat; deputy to the First Duma. Worked on Cadet *Rech* and a number of other bourgeois-liberal papers. In 1916 he left the Constitutional-Democratic Party. After the October Socialist Revolution taught as a professor in Leningrad.

p. 50

[52] *Socialist-Revolutionary Party* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia; emerged at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the union of various Narodnik groups and circles. The S.R.s did not recognise the class differences between the proletariat and the small owners. They glossed over the class differentiation and contradictions within the peasantry and denied the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. The tactics of individual terrorism which the S.R.s advocated as the main form of struggle against the autocracy did great harm to the revolutionary movement and made it more difficult to organise the masses for revolutionary struggle.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the S.R.s' attempts to masquerade as socialists, waged a determined struggle against them for influence over the peasantry, and exposed the harm caused to the working-class movement by their tactics of individual terrorism. At the same time the Bolsheviks, under certain conditions, made temporary agreements with the S.R.s in the struggle against tsarism.

The heterogeneity of the peasantry as a class determined the political and ideological instability and organisational disunity of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and their constant wavering between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the period of reaction (1907-10) the S.R.s suffered complete ideological and organisational collapse. During the first world war the majority of them became social-chauvinists.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917, the S.R.s together with the Mensheviks and the Cadets were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landowner Provisional Government, and their leaders (Kerensky, Avksentyev, Chernov) were members of it. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasant demand for abolition of the landed estates and came out in favour of landed proprietorship. The S. R.

ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against peasants who had seized the landowners' estates.

At the end of November 1917, the Left wing of the party formed the independent party of Left S.R.s. In an attempt to preserve their influence over the mass of the peasants, the Left S.R.s formally recognised Soviet power and came to an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon joined the struggle against Soviet power.

During the years of foreign intervention and civil war, the S.R.s engaged in counter-revolutionary subversion, actively supported the interventionists and whiteguards, participated in counter-revolutionary conspiracies, and organised terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the Civil War the S.R.s continued their hostile activities against the Soviet state. p. 50

[53] *Trudovik group* (Trudoviks)—group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Duma, consisting of peasants and intellectuals with a Narodnik orientation.

Their politics were the class politics of the small peasant farmer and the Trudoviks in the Duma wavered between the Cadets and Social-Democrats. Since the Trudoviks did to some extent represent the peasant masses, the Bolsheviks in the Duma adopted tactics of co-operating with them, in certain fields, for the sake of the common struggle against tsarist autocracy and the Cadets. p. 50

[54] *Bezzaglavtsi*—semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik group of the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia, formed when the revolution of 1905-07 was on the wane. It took its name from the political weekly *Bez Zaglaviya* (Without a Title) published in St. Petersburg between January and May 1906. Under cover of their formal non-attachment to any party, the Bezzaglavtsi advocated bourgeois-liberal and opportunist ideas, and supported the revisionists in the Russian and international Social-Democratic movement. p. 50

[55] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in October 1905, it represented the bourgeoisie, landowners and bourgeois intellectuals. The Cadets wanted to make a deal with tsarism. They advocated a constitutional monarchy, opposed the slogan of a republic and insisted on preservation of the landed estates. During the world war of 1914-18 they became ideologists of imperialism and supported the expansionist policy of tsarism.

After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets took an active part in all armed counter-revolutionary actions and in the interventionist campaigns against Soviet Russia. p. 50

[56] *Dnevnitsky* (*Tsederbaum*, *F. O.*) (b. 1883)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, publicist. From 1909 onwards he lived abroad, became associated with the pro-Party Mensheviks, worked for

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat) and the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. p. 52

[57] *Zaprosy Zhizni* (Demands of Life)—magazine run by Cadets, Popular Socialists and Menshevik liquidators. Appeared in St. Petersburg 1909-12.

Prokopovich, *S. N.* (1871-1955)—bourgeois economist and publicist. One of the first advocates of Bernsteinism in Russia. In 1906 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, and in 1917 was Minister for Food in the bourgeois Provisional Government.

Blank, *R. M.* (b. 1866)—bourgeois publicist. At one time editor of *Zaprosy Zhizni*. p. 52

[58] Reference seems to be to L. B. Kamenev's article "Ob obyazannostyakh demokrata (otvet V. Chernovu)" ("On the Duties of a Democrat [A Reply to V. Chernov]"), published in No. 8-9 of *Prosveshcheniye* in July-August 1912. p. 54

[59] Reference is to the liquidators' so-called August Conference, which was held in Vienna in August 1912. This conference was responsible for the forming of the anti-Party August bloc, organised by Trotsky. p. 55

[60] Lenin has in mind the newspaper *Warsaw Latest News*, published from July 13 to August 19, 1912 under the editorship of V. N. Chudovskaya. A. Amfiteatrov was a contributor. p. 55

[61] Reference is to the article "Kulturniye lyudi i nechistaya sovest" ("Cultured People and a Sullied Conscience") by M. S. Olminsky (A. Vitimsky), published in *Pravda* No. 98, August 23, 1912. p. 57

[62] Lenin refers to the elections to the Fourth State Duma, which ended on November 7 (20), 1912. p. 58

[63] *Luch* (Ray)—legal daily newspaper put out by Menshevik liquidators in St. Petersburg from September 1912 to July 1913. In all, 237 issues appeared. The newspaper existed mainly on the liberals' donations. Its policy was controlled by P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov and A. S. Martynov. p. 58

[64] *Dyen* (The Day)—liberal-bourgeois daily paper, published in St. Petersburg from 1912 until it was closed down on October 26 (November 8), 1917. Its contributors were Menshevik liquidators, who took over the paper completely after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917. p. 58

[65] *Witte*, *S. Y.* (1849-1915)—statesman of tsarist Russia, a convinced supporter of the autocracy, who sought to preserve the

monarchy by means of small concessions and promises to the liberal bourgeoisie and harsh repressive measures against the people. He was Prime Minister (1905-06). p. 58

[66] *Krugozor* (Horizon)—literary-political monthly with a bourgeois-liberal orientation. Two numbers were published in St. Petersburg in January and February 1913. Maxim Gorky was listed among the contributors but actually did not take part. p. 60

[67] This mandate was adopted at meetings of workers of the larger enterprises in St. Petersburg and at a congress of workers' representatives on October 17 (30), 1912. p. 63

[68] Lenin refers to No. 166 of *Pravda*, which appeared on November 11 (24), 1912, the day the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress of the Second International opened in Basle.

The telegram from A. Y. Badayev and other deputies, greeting the Basle Congress and protesting against war, was published in *Pravda* No. 167, on November 13 (26), 1912. p. 65

[69] *Baturin* (*Zamyatin*, *N. I.*) (1877-1927)—one of the editors of *Pravda*. p. 65

[70] *Zavety* (Behests)—legal literary-political monthly with a Socialist-Revolutionary orientation; appeared in St. Petersburg, April 1912 to July 1914. p. 68

[71] *Malinovsky* was subsequently exposed as an *agent provocateur*. p. 69

[72] Reference is to the Party school at Poronin, which the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. planned to organise in 1913, during the Duma's summer recess, for members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, workers and Party activists. Lenin intended giving an important series of lectures on political economy, the theory and practice of socialism in Russia, and on the agrarian and nationalities problems. Difficulties, such as lack of funds, etc., prevented the school from being organised. p. 69

[73] *Machism, or empirio-criticism*—a reactionary subjective-idealist philosophical trend which became widespread in Western Europe at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Its founders were the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach and the German philosopher Richard Avenarius. In Russia, during the years of reaction, the influence of Machism made itself felt among some intellectuals of the R.S.D.L.P., particularly Menshevik intellectuals (N. Valentinov, P. Yushkevich and others). Some literary men among the Bolsheviks also adopted Machist positions (V. Bazarov, A. Bogdanov and others). Though they claimed to advocate Marxism, the Russian Machists

were trying to revise the fundamental principles of Marxist philosophy. In his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* Lenin revealed the reactionary essence of Machism, defended Marxist philosophy from revisionist attacks and in the new historical conditions obtaining at the time pushed forward the development of dialectical and historical materialism in all respects. The defeat of Machism was a crippling blow to the ideology of Menshevism, otzovism and god-building.

God-building—a religious-philosophical trend hostile to Marxism. It arose during the period of reaction among certain Party intellectuals who departed from Marxism after the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution. The god-builders (A. V. Lunacharsky, V. Bazarov and others) advocated a new "socialist" religion and tried to reconcile Marxism with religion. Maxim Gorky was at one time associated with them. p. 70

[74] *Bogdanov, A.* (*Malinovsky, A. A.*; *Maximov, N.*) (1873-1928)—Social-Democrat, philosopher, sociologist, economist; by training, a doctor. After the Second Congress, of the R.S.D.L.P. he joined the Bolsheviks and was elected a member of the Central Committee. He was on the editorial boards of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, and worked as an editor of the Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*. In the years of reaction (1907-10) and the subsequent revolutionary revival he headed the otzovists, and the *Vperyod* anti-Party group. In philosophy he tried to create his own system of "empirio-monism" (a variety of subjective-idealist philosophy), which Lenin criticised sharply in his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. At a meeting of the enlarged editorial board of the newspaper *Proletary* in June 1909 Bogdanov was expelled from the Bolshevik Party. After the October Socialist Revolution he became one of the organisers and leaders of the Proletcult (Proletarian Culture Organisation). From 1926 onwards he was director of the Blood-Transfusion Institute which he had founded.

Bazarov, V. (real name Rudnev, V. A.) (1874-1939)—philosopher and economist, joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1896.

Between 1905 and 1907 he contributed to a number of Bolshevik publications, gave up Bolshevism in the years of reaction, and became one of the main representatives of the Machist revision of Marxism.

Lunacharsky, A. V. (1875-1933)—professional revolutionary, prominent Soviet statesman.

Having entered the revolutionary movement in the early nineties, he became a Bolshevik after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. During the years of reaction he turned away from Marxism, took part in the anti-Party *Vperyod* group, and called for the merging of religion and Marxism. p. 70

[75] Lenin visited Capri for a few days at Gorky's request in April 1908. During his stay he told A. Bogdanov. V. Bazarov and

A. V. Lunacharsky that he definitely disagreed with them in matters of philosophy. p. 70

[76] *Alexinsky*, *G. A.* (b. 1879)—started his political career as a Social-Democrat. An otzovist and one of the organisers of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group in the years of reaction, he became a social-chauvinist during the world war and worked for a number of bourgeois papers. In July 1917 he made slanderous allegations against Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In April 1918 he fled the country. p. 71

[77] *Otzovism* (from the Russian "otozvat"—to recall)—opportunist trend among the Bolsheviks, which was led by A. Bogdanov. Under cover of revolutionary phrases the otzovists (besides Bogdanov the group included G. A. Alexinsky, S. Volsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. N. Lyadov) demanded the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Third Duma. They also refused to work in legal organisations. Declaring that under conditions of reaction the Party should conduct only illegal work, the otzovists refused to participate in the Duma, the trade unions, the co-operatives or any mass legal and semi-legal organisations.

A variety of otzovism was ultimatumism. The ultimatumists proposed that the Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma should be presented with an ultimatum demanding implicit obedience to the decisions of the Party Central Committee and, if they rejected it, that they should be recalled. Ultimatumism was actually a masked form of otzovism. Lenin called the ultimatumists "bashful otzovists".

The otzovists caused great harm to the Party. Their policy would have isolated the Party from the masses and converted it into a sectarian organisation. p. 71

[78] Reference is to the Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers, known for conspiratorial purposes as the "February Conference". It took place in Cracow on December 26, 1912, lasting till January 1, 1913 (January 8-14, 1913). p. 72

[79] Lenin refers to his article "On Bolshevism", which was written for the second volume of N. A. Rubakin's book *Sredi Knig* (Among Books) (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 485-86).

On January 10 (N.S.), 1913, Rubakin wrote Lenin a letter asking him for a "brief *exposé* (not more than one sheet of note-paper) ... of the very *essence* of Bolshevism and to indicate the books where this essence is expounded". Lenin's article in the second volume of *Sredi Knig* was published without alterations. p. 73

[80] Reference is to the newspaper *Nash Put* (Our Path). Lenin had pointed out the necessity for a legal workers' newspaper in Moscow in the summer of 1912. But the fund-collecting campaign for the

Moscow newspaper did not begin until November 1912. *Pravda* No. 176 for November 24 (O.S.), 1912 published a "Letter from a Group of Moscow Workers", which indicated that it would be possible and opportune to start a workers' newspaper in Moscow. The call to make collections for the paper was enthusiastically supported by the workers, but its appearance was delayed by the arrest, in February 1913, of the group of Bolsheviks who were starting it.

The first number of *Nash Put* appeared on August 25 (September 7), 1913. Lenin was active on the paper. Its contributors included Maxim Gorky, Demyan Bedny, M. S. Olminsky, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, and also the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma. *Nash Put* was very popular among the workers and received donations from 395 workers' groups. When the paper was banned on September 12 (25), 1913, after only 16 issues had appeared, the Moscow workers staged a protest strike but did not succeed in getting the ban lifted. p. 74

[81] *Skvortsov-Stepanov, I. I.* (1870-1928)—one of the oldest participants in the Russian revolutionary movement. He joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1896, becoming a Bolshevik and Marxist writer towards the end of 1904. On several occasions between 1907 and 1911 he was nominated by the Bolsheviks as a candidate for the Duma. In the period of reaction he held incorrect views on the agrarian problem and adopted a conciliatory attitude to the anti-Party *Vperyod* group, but under Lenin's influence overcame his mistakes. p. 75

[82] *Larin, Y.* (*Lurye, M. A.*) (1882-1932)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. After the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution he became an active supporter of liquidationism, but in August 1917 was admitted to the Bolshevik Party. After the October Socialist Revolution he held various administrative and managerial posts. p. 75

[83] *Novaya Sibir* (New Siberia)—socio-political and literary daily newspaper with a liberal orientation. It was published in Irkutsk from December 1912 to February 1913. The liquidator N. Rozhkov was, in practice, its editor. p. 75

[84] *Proveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—legal Bolshevik socio-political and literary monthly; began publication in St. Petersburg in December 1911. Maxim Gorky was editor of the fiction section. The magazine was banned by the tsarist government on the eve of the first world war, in June 1914. One further issue (a double one) appeared in the autumn of 1917. p. 76

[85] Reference is probably to rumours of the possibility of a rising in Turkish Armenia under the leadership of the Armenian bourgeois-nationalist Dashnaktsutyun Party. This was suggested in

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an article "Turkish Armenians and Russia" in the newspaper *Russkoye Slovo* (Russian Word) No. 7, January 9, 1913. p. 76

[86] Reference is to the resolutions of the Cracow Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party workers (January 8-14, 1913). p. 77

[87] This letter deals with the state of affairs in the *Pravda* editorial office at the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913. The "February" Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party workers in Cracow in 1913 prescribed measures for improving the editors' work. p. 78

[88] Members of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma were referred to by their "numbers" for purposes of secrecy. No. 1 was A. Y. Badayev, No. 3—R. Malinovsky, and No. 6—G. I. Petrovsky. p. 78

[89] *Dyen* (The Day)—cover name for *Pravda*. p. 78

[90] Lenin refers to a leading article "The Working Masses and the Underground" published in the Menshevik liquidators' paper *Luch* No. 15 (101), January 19, 1913. It was aimed against the Party's illegal work. This liquidationist sally was exposed by Lenin in his article "To the Social-Democrats", published as a hectographed leaflet in Cracow (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 529-31). p. 79

[91] Lenin refers to Bogdanov's letter to *Pravda* protesting at the refusal of *Pravda* supporters to co-operate with the liquidators in the nomination of a workers' deputy to the Fourth Duma. In a note to the letter the editors confined themselves to stating that agreement had not been reached through the fault of the liquidators. p. 81

[92] *The enquiry from the Riga workers* of January 19, 1913 was printed in No. 24 of *Pravda*, January 30, 1913. The authors of the enquiry, who signed themselves "A group of Narodnik workers and Social-Democrat Readers of *Pravda*" asked the editors to state their opinion on the question of "uniting with the Left Narodniks". Lenin's article "On Narodism", with which he wanted to link up this enquiry, had been published in Nos. 16 and 17 of *Pravda* on January 20 and 22, 1913 (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 524-28). p. 81

[93] See Note 89. p. 82

[94] See Note 88. p. 82

[95] Reference is to the letters from the Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma that were published in *Pravda* in January-

February 1913 under the heading "Local Impressions of the Deputies of the Social-Democratic Group". p. 82

[96] Lenin refers to *V. I. Khaustov* (b. 1884)—a Social-Democrat, Menshevik, and one of the deputies to the Fourth Duma who belonged to the Social-Democratic group. p. 82

[97] *Vechernaya Pochta* (Evening Post)—cover name for the Menshevik liquidators' paper *Luch*. p. 82

[98] Lenin refers to the following letter from the Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma—A. Y. Badayev, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov and N. R. Shagov—on their resignation from the liquidators' newspaper *Luch*: "On December 18, 1912, we, in accordance with the wishes of the Social-Democratic group of December 15, accepted the proposal of the newspaper *Luch* that we should be included among its contributors.

"Since then more than a month has passed. In all this time *Luch* has acted in constant and rabid opposition to anti-liquidationism. We consider its advocacy of an 'open' workers' party and its attacks on the underground, in the present conditions of Russian life, impermissible and harmful.

"Since we find it impossible to allow our names to be used as a cover for the liquidationist views advocated by *Luch* we request the editors to remove us from the list of its contributors" (*Luch* No. 24, January 30, 1913). p. 84

[99] Lenin refers to J. V. Stalin's writing of the article "The Nationalities Problem and Social-Democracy". p. 84

[100] Gorky suspected dishonesty on the part of K. P. Pyatnitsky, the managing director of the St. Petersburg publishing firm Znaniye (knowledge). The matter was never actually taken to court. p. 85

[101] Lenin's articles "A Reply to Mayevsky", "Bulgakov on the Peasants" and two other articles on morality, mentioned in this letter, have never been found. p. 86

[102] *Russkaya Molva* (Russian Tidings)—daily newspaper of the Progressist Party; appeared in St. Petersburg from December 1912 to August 1913. p. 86

[103] On March 1 (14), 1913, the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Karl Marx, *Pravda* published Lenin's article "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 582-85). The issue of *Pravda* dedicated to the anniversary appeared on March 3 (16), 1913. p. 87

[104] Lenin's article criticising boycottism, which he mentions in this letter, has not been found. p. 88

[105] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Social-Democrat)—Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., an illegal paper published abroad from February 1908 to January 1917. Lenin was virtually in charge of the paper, which printed more than 80 of his articles and short items. During the period of reaction (1907-10) and the subsequent revolutionary revival *Sotsial-Demokrat* was of enormous significance in the Bolsheviks' campaign against the liquidators, Trotskyists and otzovists, for the preservation of the illegal Marxist party and strengthening of its ties with the masses. p. 90

[106] The "Manifesto" referred to is the amnesty decree promulgated in connection with the 300th anniversary of the House of the Romanovs. p. 92

[107] Reference is to a school on Capri organised by the *Vperyod* group in 1909 with Gorky's participation. p. 92

[108] *Mayevsky*, *Y.* (*Gutovsky*, *V. A.*) (1875-1918)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. He contributed to the magazine *Nasha Zarya*, the newspaper *Luch* and other Menshevik liquidators' organs. p. 94

[109] In March and April 1913 Lenin was working on an article to be called "Rosa Luxemburg's Unsuccessful Addition to Marxist Theory". He drew up a plan of the article, compiled statistical tables and copied quotations from Marx's *Capital*, but the article was never published. p. 94

[110] Lenin refers to the resolution "The Attitude to Liquidationism, and Unity" passed at the "February" Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party workers held in Cracow from December 26, 1912 to January 1, 1913 (January 8-14, 1913) (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 463-65). p. 95

[111] *The Seven* were the seven Menshevik liquidator deputies who belonged to the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 95

[112] Reference is to the resolution of the Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. passed in February 1913. The resolution noted the correctness of the political line maintained by the Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Dams and condemned the conduct of the Menshevik deputies supporting the liquidators' paper *Luch*. p. 96

[113] At a meeting in February 1913 the Petersburg Committee took a decision to publish *Izvestia P.K. R.S.D.R.P.* (News of the P.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.) and planned the first Issue. The project did not materialise. p. 96

[114] In the May 1913 issue of *Prosveshcheniye* there are no works by Gorky, but the June issue contains his story *Krazha* (The Theft). p. 97

[115] *Bedny*, *Demyan* (*Pridvorov*, *Y. A.*) (1883-1945)—outstanding Soviet poet, joined the Bolshevik Party in 1912. In 1911 he had begun contributing to the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. His poems and fables were fired with the spirit of the class struggle against the capitalist system and its defenders. During the period of foreign intervention and civil war Bedny went to the front as a poet-agitator. p. 97

[116] The elections of the Board of the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union took place on April 21 (May 4), 1913. The meeting was attended by nearly 800 people and another 400 were unable to get in because there was no room. The Bolsheviks submitted a list of candidates for the Board that had been published in *Pravda* No. 91 and was distributed among those present. Despite the liquidators' demand that candidates should be elected "irrespective of trend", the majority of the meeting voted for the *Pravda* list; 10 out of the 14 successful candidates for the Board were *Pravda* nominees. p. 98

[117] Reference is to *Pravda* No. 92, April 23, 1913, which contained Lenin's articles "Anniversary of *Pravda*" and "A Few Words on Results and Facts". p. 98

[118] Lenin refers to the article by M. S. Olminsky (A. Vitimsky) "Kto s kern?" ("Who Is on Whose Side?"), published in *Pravda* No. 106, May 10, 1913. The article was part, of the polemic with *Luch* concerning the conference between the editors of bourgeois publications and representatives of the workers' press. The conference was called for the purpose of protesting at the introduction of harsher laws against the press. The chairman of the conference did not allow a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the *Pravda* representatives. They and representatives of a number of trade union papers refused to sign the liberal editors' resolution. Besides the representatives of *Rech*, *Russkaya Molva*, *Sovremennoye Slovo* and *Dyen*, etc., only the representatives of *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya* signed the resolution, thus acting against the workers' papers represented at the conference. p. 100

[119] On Lenin's insistence A. A. Bogdanov's article "Ideology" (from the "Dictionary of Foreign Words" series) was rejected by *Pravda* as anti-Marxist. Concerning the statement which Bogdanov then sent to *Pravda* announcing his resignation from the paper, Lenin wrote a "Letter to the Editor" which was published in the newspaper *Put Pravdy* No. 9, January 31, 1914 (see present, edition, Vol. 20, pp. 93-94). p. 100

[120] *Fyodor* (Feodora)—cover name for the Menshevik section of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 101

[121] Lenin means a report on the activity of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. No such report had been published. p. 101

[122] "The co-operative" was the cover name for the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 101

[123] Lenin refers to the controversy over the right of J. I. Jagiello, the deputy to the Fourth Duma for Warsaw, to belong to the Social-Democratic group. p. 102

[124] *Octobrists* or *Union of October Seventeen*—counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and big landowners who ran their estates on capitalist lines. It was founded after publication of the tsar's manifesto of October 17, 1905, in which the tsar, frightened by the revolution, promised the people "civil rights" and a constitution. The Octobrists unreservedly supported the home and foreign policy of the tsarist government. Their leaders were A. Guchkov, the powerful industrialist, and M. Rodzyanko, who owned huge estates. p. 102

[125] *The Black Hundreds*—bands of monarchists organised by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. These bands murdered revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and staged pogroms against the Jews. p. 102

[126] Reference is to the arrest of Y. M. Sverdlov and K. T. Novgorodtseva (Sverdlova) at the apartment of G. I. Petrovsky, a member of the Fourth Duma, on February 10 (23), 1913. They were given away to the police by the *agent provocateur* R. V. Malinovsky. p. 102

[127] Lenin refers to accommodation for the Party school which the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. was planning to organise at Poronin. p. 102

[128] Gorky had been a delegate to the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which took place from April 30 to May 19 (May 13 to June 1), 1907. p. 105

[129] The conflict was between the Fourth Duma and the government, in connection with a speech by the Black Hundred deputy Markov II, who had said with reference to a representative of the Ministry of Finance "there must be no stealing". The Duma had not reacted in any way to the statement. The Cabinet, considering this an insult to the whole government, insisted that Markov II should be prosecuted for slander and demanded that Rodzyanko, Chairman of the Fourth Duma, should make a public statement condemning Markov's speech. p. 105

[130] *Pravda* was banned on July 5 (18), 1913 by decree of the St. Petersburg Chamber of Justice on the proposal of N. A. Maklakov, Minister of the Interior. On July 13 (26) of the same year it resumed publication under the new name of *Rabochaya Pravda* (Workers' Truth). p. 106

[131] *Shahumyan, S. C.* (1878-1918)—outstanding figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. From 1904 to 1910 he was one of the leaders of Party work in the Transcaucasus and one of the organisers and editors of Bolshevik legal and illegal publications. An active opponent of the Mensheviks. He was co-opted as an alternative member for the Central Committee by the Central Committee which had been elected by the Sixth (Prague) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. While exiled to Astrakhan (1911-14), he wrote, on Lenin's instructions the work *National-Cultural Autonomy*, in which he upheld the principles of proletarian internationalism. On his return from exile in 1914 he became leader of the Baku Bolshevik organisation. p. 110

[132] In reply to this letter Lenin received a letter from S. G. Shahumyan written on September 7, 1913 in Astrakhan. Shahumyan wrote that later he would send statistics of nationalities in the Caucasus, and gave the following provisional figures—5 million Moslems, 2 million Armenians and 2 million Georgians. Concerning the distribution of nationalities in uyezds, gubernias and the cities—Tiflis, Baku, Batum, Elisavetpol, etc., he suggested using the *Caucasian Calendar*. He also sent the pamphlet he had promised and a translation of two reports on Armenian affairs. p. 110

[133] *Pravda Truda* (Truth of Labour)—Bolshevik daily which appeared in St. Petersburg from September 11 (24) to October 9 (22), 1913 instead of *Severnaya Pravda* (Northern Truth) that had been banned on September 7 (20). Only 20 numbers of *Pravda Truda* appeared. p. 111

[134] *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (New Workers' Newspaper)—Menshevik liquidators' daily published in St. Petersburg from August 1913 to January 1914.

Nash Put (Our Path) was a Moscow Bolshevik paper published in September 1913 (see Note 80). p. 111

[135] Lenin refers to a telegram sent by Maxim Gorky from Rimini to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. about the death of August Bebel. It was published in *Severnaya Pravda* No. 4, August 4, 1913. p. 112

[136] *Za Pravdu* (For Truth)—one of the names under which the Bolshevik paper *Pravda* appeared from October 1 (14) to December 5 (18), 1913. Altogether 52 issues appeared; 21 were confiscated and for 2 the editors were fined.

The financial report referred to in the letter was printed in No. 9 of *Za Pravdu*, October 13. p. 114

[137] In October 1913 *Za Pravdu* published a statement by the Bolshevik deputies (the Six) demanding that the Menshevik section of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma (the Seven)

should recognise the equality of the Six and the Seven to decide all questions in the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. In the same month the Bolshevik deputies announced in *Za Pravdu* the refusal of the Menshevik liquidators to acknowledge the equality of the Six and the Seven in the group and stated that it was necessary to form an independent Bolshevik workers' group in the Duma. p. 115

[138] Lenin refers to the article "A Threat to the Unity of the Social-Democratic Group", which was published in the liquidators' *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 60, October 18, 1913. p. 115

[139] Reference is to the resolution "The Social-Democratic Group in the Duma", passed at the Poronin Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party workers. It was published in *Za Pravdu* No. 12, October 17, 1913 (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 425-26). p. 119

[140] The resolutions passed by St. Petersburg workers and published in *Za Pravdu* beginning from October 22 (November 4). They are summed up in Lenin's "How the Workers Responded to the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group In the Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 536-43). p. 119

[141] The Bolshevik deputies' statement ("Reply to the Seven Deputies") on the setting up of an independent Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Fourth Duma was published in No. 22 of *Za Pravdu*, October 29, 1913. p. 120

[142] Lenin's letter was prompted by the appearance in *Russkoye Slovo* (Russian Word) No. 219, September 22, 1913, of an article by Gorky "On the Karamazov Attitude", protesting against the Moscow Art Theatre's staging of Dostoyevsky's reactionary novel *The Possessed*. The bourgeois press came to the defence of the play and Gorky replied with another article "Once Again on the Karamazov Attitude", which was published in No. 248 of *Russkoye Slovo*, October 27, 1913.

Large sections of the article, but without the concluding paragraph, were reprinted on October 28 (November 10) in *Rech* No. 295. The next day Gorky's article, including the final paragraph, which Lenin quotes in full in his letter, was reprinted in the liquidators' *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 69. p. 121

[143] *Russkaya Mysl* (Russian Thought)—literary-political magazine that was published in Moscow 1880-1918. After the 1905 revolution it became the organ of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party. *Izgoyev*, *A. S.*, a bourgeois journalist, was one of the ideologists of this party. p. 123

[144] Lenin's article "Material on the Conflict Within the Social-Democratic Duma Group", first published in *Za Pravdu* No. 22,

October 29, 1913 (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 458-74), was nut reprinted in the newspaper. In 1914 it was reprinted in the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* under the title "Material on the History of the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Duma".

Issue No. 22 of *Za Pravdu* was confiscated because of its leading article "Beilis Acquitted". p. 125

[145] *Purishkevich, V. M.* (1870-1920)—big landowner, monarchist, leader of the Black Hundreds, notorious for his anti-semitic speeches in the Duma.

Struve, P. B. (1870-1944)—bourgeois economist and publicist, a leader of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party. In the nineties he was a prominent representative of "legal Marxism" and tried to adapt Marxism and the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. p. 128

[146] *Armand, Inessa* (1875-1920)—outstanding figure in the international women's working-class and communist movement. She became a member of the Bolshevik Party in 1904 and took an active part in the 1905-07 revolution and in the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. p. 130

[147] Reference is to Kautsky's speech at the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau on December 14, 1913. It was criticised severely by Lenin in his articles "A Good Resolution and a Bad Speech" and "Kautsky's Unpardonable Error" (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 528-31, and 546-48). p. 130

[148] *Trusted agents*—workers chosen to maintain constant contact between the Central Committee and the local Social-Democratic groups, and to evolve flexible forms of leadership for local activities in the big working-class centres. The system of trusted agents was initiated by the Cracow Conference of the CC. of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1913 and the need for it was confirmed by the Poronin Conference. p. 131

[149] *Sputnik Rabochego* (Worker's Handbook) *for 1914*—a pocket calendar put out by the Party Priboi publishers in December 1913. The whole edition was sold in one day. In February 1914 a second, revised edition was produced.

The calendar included Lenin's article "Strikes in Russia" (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 534-38). p. 132

[150] Lenin refers to the preparation for the publication of the magazine *Rabotnitsa* (Working Woman), the first issue of which appeared in St. Petersburg on February 23 (March 8), 1914. p. 132

[151] *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*—Social-Democratic daily published 1890-1919. Until 1916 it was under the influence of the Bremen Left

Social-Democrats, but later fell into the hands of the social-chauvinists. p. 133

[152] *Shakhtyorsky Listok* (Miners' Leaflet)—appeared on March 16, 1914 as a supplement to No. 38 of *Put Pravdy*. It was published on the initiative of the miners themselves and on funds which they collected. The second *Shakhtyorsky Listok* came out in No. 77 of *Put Pravdy*, May 4, 1914.

The *Appeal to the Ukrainian Workers* was printed in Ukrainian in No. 28 of *Trudovaya Pravda* on June 29, 1914 over the signature of Ocksen Lola. The MS. of Lenin's draft appeal has not been preserved. The contents of the document published in *Trudovaya Pravda* justify the assumption that it was Lenin's work.

The "Editorial Comment on Ocksen Lola's 'Appeal to the Ukrainian Workers'" was written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 494). p. 135

[153] *Lola, O. N.* (Stepanyuk) (1884-1919)—Ukrainian worker and Bolshevik. Persecuted for his revolutionary activities, he emigrated after the 1905-07 revolution to Galicia, then to Paris. p. 135

[154] Lenin sent Inessa Armand O. Lola's (Stepanyuk's) letter of April 22 (N.S.), 1914, in which Lola wrote that he was entirely in agreement with the "Appeal to the Ukrainian Workers", but that it should be printed on behalf of the *Pravda* editorial board and not over his signature. p. 137

[155] The "important affair" was the preparation for the next Party Congress, which was to be held in accordance with the decision of the "August" (sometimes called "Summer") 1913 Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party workers. The outbreak of the first world war prevented this. p. 137

[156] *The Programme and Rules of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, with amendments to the Rules made by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. of 1912, were published by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris in 1914. p. 138

[157] Lenin's letter is an addendum to a letter from G. Y. Zinoviev to the editorial board of the magazine *Dzvin*, in which Zinoviev reported on his talks with a member of the editorial board, L. Yurkevich, on the conditions under which the Bolsheviks might work for the magazine.

The statements in favour of splitting off the Ukrainian workers into a separate Social-Democratic organisation which roused Lenin's indignation had been made in Yurkevich's preface to a book by Levinsky *Ocherk razvitiya ukrainskogo rabochego dvizheniya v Galitsii* (Outline of the Development of the Ukrainian Working-Class Movement in Galicia) (Kiev, 1914). Lenin sharply criticised the views of the bourgeois nationalist Yurkevich on the problem of nationalities in his article "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 448-49).

Dzvin (The Bell)—legal nationalist monthly with a Menshevik orientation; published in Ukrainian in Kiev from January 1913 to the middle of 1914. p. 139

[158] *Nakoryakov*, *N. N.* (b. 1881)—began his revolutionary activity in 1901, worked in the R.S.D.L.P. committees in Kazan and Samara and was a delegate to the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1911 he emigrated to America, where he edited the Menshevik-orientated newspaper *Novy Mir*, published by Russian émigrés. In 1917 he returned to Russia and in 1925 joined the R.C.P.(B.). p. 140

[159] *Novy Mir* (New World)—Menshevik-orientated newspaper published by a group of Russian émigrés in New York in 1911-17. From 1912 to 1916 the paper was edited by J. Ellert (whose real name was N. N. Nakoryakov. See Note 158.). p. 140

[160] The date "May 19" was crossed out by N. K. Krupskaya and replaced by the date when the letter was sent "June 4". In the margin is written: "For ... [one word heavily deleted.—*Ed.*] *urgent*". The letter has an addendum by N. K. Krupskaya: "Because of the Bill the letter remained unposted for two weeks. Have you received the previous letter sent to the same address? Why don't you reply? Warmest greetings!" p. 142

[161] Reference is to Shahumyan's pamphlet *National-Cultural Autonomy*, which he wrote in Armenian in 1913. The pamphlet was a reply to articles by the Armenian bourgeois nationalist D. Ananun (An) "The Problem of Nationalities and Democracy".

No communication from the author about the contents of the pamphlet was published in *Prosveshcheniye*. p. 142

[162] The outlines of the Bill given in this letter formed the basis of Lenin's "Bill on the Equality of Nations and the Safeguarding of the Rights of National Minorities" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 281-83). The Bill was to be brought into the Fourth Duma by the Bolshevik group, but this was not achieved. p. 142

[163] Lenin refers to the novel *Paternal Testaments* by the Ukrainian writer V. Vinnichenko, a bourgeois nationalist. p. 144

[164] Reference is to the report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P, drawn up by Lenin for the Brussels "Unity" Conference. On Lenin's instructions the report was delivered at the conference by Inessa Armand (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 495-535). p. 146

[165] *Yedinstvo* (Unity)—newspaper uniting the extreme Right-wing group of the Menshevik defencists led by Plekhanov. It was published in Petrograd. Four issues came out in May-June 1914. It appeared daily from March to November 1917. From December

1917 to January 1918, it was published under the title *Nashe Yedinstvo* (Our Unity). p. 146

[166] Kautsky's letter against Rosa Luxemburg concerning the report on the meeting of the I.S.B. was published in *Vorwärts*, central organ of the German Social-Democrats, No. 339, December 24, 1913 and reprinted in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 12, December 20 (O.S.), 1913 with a postscript by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 63-64). Kautsky's letter was a reply to Rosa Luxemburg's letter to the editorial board of *Vorwärts*. p. 148

[167] Lenin has in mind the resolution "Property in the Hands of the Former Trustee, and Financial Reports", passed by the Prague Party Conference of 1912. The Conference declared that in view of the liquidators' infringement of agreement and in view of the trustees' refusal to arbitrate, the Bolsheviks' representatives had every formal right to use the Party property in the hands of the former trustee C. Zetkin. p. 149

[168] This refers to G. V. Plekhanov's articles "Under a Hail of Bullets (Passing Notes)", published in *Pravda*, April-June 1913. p. 149

[169] Reference is to the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region, which was held from January 26 to February 8 (N.S.), 1914 in Brussels. p. 150

[170] *Trudovaya Pravda* No. 32, July 4, 1914, published a resolution "On the Current Situation and Unity" over the signature of the "Loading Institution of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region" (C.C. of the S.D.L.R.). Stressing the "need for unity of forces and activity of the working class", the resolution stipulated the following as the basis of unity: (1) "uncurtailed demands"; (2) recognition of the underground; (3) unity from below; (4) "recognition of the democratic majority and not the federation"; (5) struggle "against the liquidators both on the right and on the left". p. 150

[171] The resolution was on "The Absence of Delegates from the Non-Russian National Centres at the General Party Conference" passed by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 150

[172] Reference is to the "Draft Terms of the Amalgamation of the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party with the R.S.D.L.P.", passed at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., April-May 1906, in Stockholm. p. 151

[173] The paper was the Menshevik liquidators' *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, which came out in St. Petersburg from May to July 1914. p.151

[174] The Polish opposition, which at the earlier sessions of the Brussels Conference had been unanimous with the Bolsheviks and the Lettish Social-Democrats, voted at the last session in favour of the resolution of the International Socialist Bureau drawn up by Kautsky. p. 152

[175] Reference is to the conditions of "unity" proposed by the Bolsheviks at the Brussels "Unity" Conference (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 515-27). p. 152

[176] Lenin managed to finish his article on Marx in November 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 43-91).

In its reply to Lenin's letter the Granat Bros. Publishing House wrote on July 12 (O.S.), 1914: "Since with this particular article we connect a whole series of factors of great importance to the entire character of the Dictionary, we are unable to resign ourselves to having an indifferent, average interpretation of this subject. We have all along wanted to get a scientifically serious and forceful interpretation.... Though we have considered foreign as well as Russian names, we cannot find an author. We request you most earnestly, therefore, to go ahead with the article.... We are prepared ... to grant a considerable postponement—till August 15.... We request you most insistently, again and again, not to give it up and to share with us the view that this article would be a valuable and necessary undertaking." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.) p. 153

[177] Lenin refers to the plans for publishing the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., *Sotsial-Demokrat* (see Note 105), and illegal Bolshevik literature. p. 155

[178] Lenin was to lecture on "The European War and Socialism". He did so in Geneva on October 15, 1914. p. 155

[179] Reference is to the theses "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War", known as "The Theses on War", and to the Manifesto of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 15-19, 25-34). p. 156

[180] The *Committee of Organisations Abroad* was elected at a conference of the groups of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad in Paris in December 1911. Its composition changed several times. At the conference of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad held in Berne, February 27 to March 4, 1915, N. K. Krupskaya, I. F. Armand, G. L. Shklovsky and V. M. Kasparov were elected to the Committee. During the war the Committee was based in Switzerland and worked under Lenin's immediate guidance. It did much to co-ordinate the activities of the R.S.D.L.P. sections abroad, campaigned against the social-chauvinists, and worked for unity of the Left-wing internationalists among the Social-Democrats of various countries. p. 157

[181] Plekhanov's lecture "On the Socialists' Attitude to the War" was organised by the local group of Mensheviks in Lausanne, October 11, 1914.

Only Lenin spoke in the discussion of the lecture. Some brief notes by Lenin on Plekhanov's lecture and reply to the discussion, and also the rough plan of Lenin's speech on the lecture, have been preserved. A newspaper report of Lenin's speech was printed in *Golos* No. 33, October 21, 1914. A report on the meeting, containing the text of Plekhanov's lecture, was published in the same paper. p. 158

[182] Lenin lectured on "The Proletariat and the War" in Lausanne on October 14, 1914, and on "The European War and Socialism" in Geneva on October 15. p. 158

[183] This refers to the Bolsheviks' reply to Emile Vandervelde's telegram, which he sent to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, appealing for support of the Russian Government in the war against Germany. The reply, which was published over the joint signature of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, November 1, 1914, stated that in the interests of democracy and socialism the Bolsheviks considered it an urgent task of the revolutionary proletarian party in the period of the imperialist war to extend and consolidate the class organisations of the proletariat and to develop the class struggle against the imperialist bourgeoisie and its governments. p. 159

[184] The Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. *Sotsial-Demokrat* was revived by Lenin after it had been silent for almost a year. No. 33 appeared in Geneva on November 1 (14), 1914. p. 159

[185] *Golos* (Voice)—a Menshevik daily; came out in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915. p. 159

[186] During the imperialist world war Shlyapnikov was sent to Stockholm by the Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Bolshevik group in the Duma and was for a time the connecting link between Lenin and the Russian section of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Petersburg Committee. p. 161

[187] Lenin refers to P. Maslov's letter to the editors of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, which was published under the heading "War and Commercial Agreements" in No. 207 of the paper for September 10 (23), 1914, to the article by Y. Smirnov (Gurevich) "The War and European Democracy", published in No. 202 of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, September 3 (16), 1914, and to the appeal by writers, artists and actors "Concerning the War", published in *Russkoye Slovo* No. 223, September 28 (October 11), 1914. p. 161

[188] At the beginning of the war part of the Committee of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad, which was in Paris, and some members

of the Paris section of the Bolsheviks—N. I. Sapozhkov (Kuznetsov), A. V. Britman (Antonov) and others—together with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries approved a declaration on behalf of the "Russian Socialists", published it in the French press, and then went to the front. p. 161

[189] Lenin refers to the Brussels "Unity" Conference of July 16-18, 1914, convened by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau "for an exchange of opinion" about the possibility of restoring the unity of the R.S.D.L.P. Represented at the conference were the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), the Organising Committee (Mensheviks), the Plekhanov *Yedinstvo* group, the Vperyod group, the Bund, the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region, the Social-Democrats of Lithuania, the Polish Social-Democrats, the Polish Social-Democratic opposition and the P.P.S. (Left wing). The Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau was represented by Emile Vandervelde, Camille Huysmans, Karl Kautsky, A. Nemets and others. Well in advance of the Conference, the leaders of the I.S.B. reached a secret agreement with the liquidators for joint action against the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, refused to submit to the decisions of the Brussels Conference and exposed before the international proletariat the true aims of the "unifiers". p. 162

[190] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party. It was published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky, and afterwards by Heinrich Cunow. During the first world war the journal took up a Centrist position and virtually supported the social-chauvinists. p. 162

[191] Reference is to the manifesto on the war passed by the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress held in Basle, November 24-25, 1912. The manifesto recommended that in the event of an imperialist war socialists should use the economic and political crisis evoked by the war to fight for a socialist revolution. p. 164

[192] Lenin refers to the third session of the Fourth State Duma, which opened on January 27 (O.S.), 1915. p. 165

[193] Reference is to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Fourth Duma, consisting of the Bolshevik deputies A. Y. Badayev, G. I. Petrovsky, M. K. Muranov, F. N. Samoilov, N. R. Shagov and R. V. Malinovsky (Malinovsky was subsequently exposed as an *agent provocateur*). Working under the direct supervision and control of the Central Committee, the Bolshevik group in the Duma acted on behalf of the Party and the majority of class-conscious workers. p. 165

[194] When he speaks of the creation of a "German" International Socialist Bureau, Lenin has in mind the German social-chauvin-

ists' proposal to move the headquarters of the I.S.B. Executive Committee from Brussels to Amsterdam. p. 166

[195] This apparently refers to L. B. Kamenev's note to Lenin. The note was passed on to Lenin by A. G. Shlyapnikov, who called on Kamenev at Mustamäki on his way abroad. p. 166

[196] Shlyapnikov's letter to Lenin contained news of the workers' strikes and demonstrations in protest against the imperialist war. They had occurred in Nevskaya Zastava District, Vyborgskaya Storona District and other working-class districts of Petrograd on August 1 (July 19), 1914 when general mobilisation began. p. 167

[197] *Kollontai*, *Alexandra* (1872-1952)—member of the Social-Democratic movement from the 1890s, took part in the revolution of 1905-07. Between 1906 and 1915 she was associated with the Mensheviks. In 1915 she became a member of the Bolshevik Party, having adopted a revolutionary-internationalist stand at the outbreak of war. After the October Socialist Revolution she held responsible posts. p. 167

[198] At the end of October 1914 Shlyapnikov talked with Pieter Troelstra, leader of the Dutch Social-Democratic movement, who had come to Stockholm on behalf of the opportunist leaders of German Social-Democracy to get an agreement on the transfer of the International Socialist Bureau (I.S.B.) to Amsterdam for the duration of the war, and to influence the Scandinavian Social-Democrats towards justifying the treacherous position taken up by the leaders of German Social-Democracy. During his meeting with Troelstra, which took place in the presence of a representative of the Organising Committee, Y. Larin, the Menshevik Dalin, Alexandra Kollontai and others, Shlyapnikov handed him the manifesto of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., and the reply of the Bolshevik group in the Duma to Emile Vandervelde, and later, at his request, sent him letters explaining the Bolsheviks' attitude to the war. p. 168

[199] Reference is to Anton Pannekoek's article "Der Zusammenbruch der Internationale" ("The Collapse of the International"), printed in *Berner Tagwacht*, the organ of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, Nos. 245, 246 and 247, for October 20, 21 and 22, 1914. p. 168

[200] Lenin refers to the conference of socialists of the neutral countries proposed by Pieter Troelstra and Thorvald Stauning. The conference took place in Copenhagen on January 17-18, 1915. It was attended by representatives of the socialist parties of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Holland. The conference approved a resolution calling on the Social-Democratic parties of the neutral countries to urge their governments to mediate between the belligerent countries and thereby help to restore peace. Some of the

Social-Democratic parties placed before the conference declarations on their attitude to the war. From the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. the conference received No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* containing the manifesto "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", an an official report of the arrest of the Bolshevik deputies to the Duma. p. 169

[201] To improve connections with Party organisations in Russia Lenin tried to find out through some of the comrades whether it would be possible for him to move from Switzerland to Sweden or Norway. The move did not take place. p. 171

[202] The proclamation "From Writers, Artists and Actors" was written in a spirit of bourgeois patriotism and justification of tsarist Russia's participation in the war. It appeared over the signatures of several prominent figures in the world of letters and the arts, including Maxim Gorky. p. 171

[203] Reference is to Lenin's article "Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)", which he wrote for the Granat Bros. Publishing House. It appeared in abridged form in Vol. 28 of the Encyclopaedic Dictionary, over the signature of V. Ilyin. The full text of the article was printed in 1925 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 43-91). p. 173

[204] This was Lenin's personal library, which he left in Cracow during the imperialist world war (1914-18). Much of it was lost. p. 174

[205] *Branting*, *Karl Hjalmar* (1860-1925)—leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden, and one of the leaders of the Second international. He adopted opportunist positions. p. 175

[206] Five Bolshevik deputies in the R.S.D.L.P. group in the Fourth Duma were denounced by an informer and arrested on November 5 (18), 1914, the day after the Bolsheviks' conference on the war. The tsarist government accused the Bolshevik deputies of "high treason", and all the deputies were sentenced to deprivation of their rights and exile to Eastern Siberia. p. 175

[207] The Mensheviks' Organising Committee declared its intention of publishing its own paper *Otkliki* (Echoes), but the project was never realised.

Mysl (Thought)—daily paper of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Edited by M. Natanson and V. Chernov, it appeared in Paris from November 1914 to March 1915, when it was closed down by the French Government. p. 176

[208] The enclosure was a letter from Shaw Desmond, correspondent of the British Social-Democratic paper *The Labour Leader*, which he wrote on November 29, 1914 asking for information on the

attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. to the questions of war and peace. Lenin wrote his reply on Shaw Desmond's letter and in this letter. p. 177

[209] *Hamburger Echo*—daily newspaper, organ of the Hamburg organisation of the German Social-Democratic Party.

Lenin refers to the article by Haenisch "Der deutsche 'Verrat' an der Internationale" ("The German 'Betrayal' of the International"), published in *Hamburger Echo* No. 286, December 8, 1914. p. 177

[210] This letter was written in reply to a letter from Basok (M. I. Melenevsky), one of the leaders of the bourgeois-nationalist Alliance for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, proposing co-operation (see Lenin's article "Slanderers", present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 287-88). p. 179

[211] Reference is to the plan of a pamphlet for working-class women that Inessa Armand intended to write. The pamphlet did not appear in print. p. 180

[212] *Key, Ellen* (1849-1926)—Swedish writer, author of a much talked of pedagogical book *The Century of the Child* (1900). Her views on pedagogics were considerably influenced by mysticism and individualism. p. 184

[213] An attempt was being made by the Baugy group (N. I. Bukharin, E. F. Rozmirovich, N. V. Krylenko) to publish a newspaper independently of the Central Organ. The group took its name from the town of Baugy in Switzerland, where it had its headquarters. Lenin learned of the project by chance, from a letter which the group sent to Inessa Armand suggesting that she should contribute to the paper. Lenin was against the publication of such small papers and the question "The C.O. and a new newspaper" was placed before the conference of R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad, held in Berne, February 27 to March 4, 1915. The conference adopted a resolution confirming the correctness of Lenin's line. p. 185

[214] Reference is to Plekhanov's pamphlet *The War. A Reply to Comrade Z. P.*, Paris, 1914. p. 186

[215] *The Conference of the Socialists of the Triple Entente* was held in London on February 14, 1915. See Lenin's articles "The London Conference" and "On the London Conference" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 132-34, 178-80). p. 186

[216] *Dan* (*Gurevich*), *F. I.* (1871-1947)—a Menshevik leader. During the years of reaction and the subsequent revolutionary revival he headed a group of liquidators abroad. His position during the world war was that of a social-chauvinist. After the October Socialist Revolution he fought against Soviet power. p. 187

[217] *Organising Committee*—the Mensheviks' leading centre, was formed in 1912 at the August Conference of Menshevik liquidators, Trotskyists and other anti-Party groups and trends. p. 187

[218] The magazine *Kommunist* was organised by Lenin and published by the editorial board of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* in co-operation with G. L. Pyatakov and E. B. Bosh, who both financed the publication. N. I. Bukharin was also on the editorial board. Only one (double) issue appeared, in 1915.

Lenin had intended making *Kommunist* the organ of the Left Social-Democrats but serious difficulties soon arose between the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh. These difficulties became more acute after the double issue had appeared.

This issue contained Alexandra Kollontai's article "Why Was the German Proletariat Silent in the July Days?"

Nashe Slovo (Our Word) printed a number of articles by Kollontai. p. 189

[219] Lenin criticises the incorrect position of Carl Zeth Höglund and the Swedish, Norwegian and Swiss Left Social-Democrats, in his articles "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" and "The 'Disarmament' Slogan" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 77-87, 94-104). p. 189

[220] Reference is to Eduard David's book *Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkrieg* (Social-Democracy in the World War) published in Berlin in 1917. For a criticism of this book see Lenin's article "The Main German Opportunist Work on the War" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 270-74). p. 190

[221] n August 4, 1914 the Social-Democratic group in the German Reichstag voted for war credits. p. 191

[222] *Vorkonferenz*—preparatory conference for the first International Socialist Conference (Zimmerwald) held in Berne July 11, 1915. p. 193

[223] The Menshevik group in the Fourth Duma. p. 193

[224] *The International Women's Socialist Conference* concerning the attitude to be adopted towards the war was held March 26-28, 1915 in Berne. See Lenin's article "On the Struggle Against Social-Chauvinism" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 199-203). p. 194

[225] Reference is to Anton Pannekoek's article "Der Jahreskongress der S.D.P. in Holland" ("The S.D.P. Congress in Holland"), published in the supplement to *Berner Tagwacht* No. 170, July 24, 1915. p. 195

[226] *Internationale Korrespondenz* (International Bulletin)—German social-chauvinist weekly, appeared in Berlin from the end of September 1914 to October 1, 1918. p. 196

[227] Lenin refers to the resolution on the nationalities problem passed by the "August" ("Summer") Conference of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers, held in Poronin, September 23 to October 1 (October 6-14), 1913 (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 427-29). p. 197

[228] Reference is to the twelfth point in the Programme of the R.S.D.L.P. approved by the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress. It was stated in the Programme that the Party set itself the immediate aim of overthrowing the tsarist autocracy and replacing it with a democratic republic, whose constitution would as the twelfth point stipulated, ensure "replacement of the regular army by the general arming of the people". p. 198

[229] This refers to the statement by the Norwegian Left Social-Democrats that, in principle, they agreed with the resolution Lenin had drafted for the Left Social-Democrats to present at the first International Socialist Conference. The Norwegian Lefts were later supported by the Swedish Lefts. p. 200

[230] This was the resolution Radek drafted for the Left Social-Democrats to present at the forthcoming first International Socialist Conference. p. 202

[231] Shlyapnikov was to make a journey to Russia. p. 204

[232] In November 1915 the Zimmerwald Left published a pamphlet In German entitled *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 (*Die Zimmerwalder Linke über die Aufgaben der Arbeiterklasse*) (International Leaflets No. 1 [The Zimmerwald Left on the Tasks of the Working Class]). p. 210

[233] The Parus (Sail) Publishing House was organised under the auspices of the magazine *Letopis* (Chronicle). Pares was to publish Lenin's *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the Untied States of America* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102). p. 212

[234] *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Social-Democratic Review) was published by the editorial board of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, under Lenin's direct supervision. Two issues appeared: No. 1 in October, and No. 2 in December 1916. p. 214

[235] Reference is to the conference of the R.S.D.L.P. sections abroad, which was held February 27 to March 4, 1915 in Berne (Switzerland).

In his report to the conference on "The War and the Tasks of the Party" Lenin dealt with the most vital questions of Bolshevik strategy and tactics during the imperialist war.

Bukharin put forward theses in defence of anti-Marxist views, which Lenin characterised as a trend of "imperialist Economism".

The conference passed the resolutions written by Lenin on the character of the war, on the slogan "defence of the fatherland", on the slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, on the attitude to other parties and groups, etc. (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64). p. 215

[236] Reference is to Lenin's reply to Bukharin, which criticised the theses "On the Self-Determination Slogan" that had been sent to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* over the signatures of Bukharin, Pyatakov and Eugène Bosh in November 1915. Lenin also criticised these "theses" in his articles "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism", "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)" and "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 215

[237] Reference is to the proposed publication of material on the position of Jews in Russia collected by Shlyapnikov during his trip. The project was never realised. p. 216

[238] Lenin is referring to the magazine *Vorbote* (Herald), the theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left. It appeared in German in Berne. Two issues were published: No. 1 in January and No. 2 in April 1916. Its official publishers were Henriette Roland-Holst and Anton Pannekoek. Lenin took an active part in the foundation of the magazine and, after the publication of No. 1, in organising its translation into French, so that it could be more widely distributed. p. 221

[239] The "Japanese" was a name for G. L. Pyatakov and Eugène Bosh, who emigrated from Russia to Switzerland through Japan. p. 224

[240] *Pokrovsky*, *M. N.* (1868-1932)—member of the Bolshevik Party from 1905, prominent Soviet statesman and historian.

From 1908 to 1917 he lived abroad. During the years of reaction he became associated with the otzovists and ultimatumists, and then with the anti-Party *Vperyod* group, with which he broke in 1911. During the imperialist world war he worked for the Centrist newspapers *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*, returning to Russia in 1917. From November 1917 to March 1918, he was Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, from 1919, Deputy Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R., and from 1929 onwards, a member of the Academy of Sciences. p. 226

[241] Reference is to *Letopis* (Chronicle), published by Maxim Gorky. p. 226

[242] For *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* Bukharin wrote an article called "On the Theory of the Imperialist State", but because of its mistaken anti-Marxist propositions concerning the question of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat the article was rejected by the editors. p. 228

[243] *Elimination of James* meant the arrest of Anna Yelizarova in Petrograd. p. 232

[244] Reference is to the split in the British Socialist Party at the Manchester Conference in April 1916, at which the Right, opportunist wing of the party, Hyndman and his supporters, were outvoted and left the party. The leadership of the British Socialist Party was then taken over by internationalist elements, which actively opposed the imperialist war. The British Socialist Party laid the foundation for the Communist Party of Great Britain, which was formed in 1920. p. 233

[245] *Potresov, A. N.* (1869-1934)—Menshevik leader. In the years of reaction and subsequent revolutionary revival he was an ideologist of liquidationism. During the first world war he became a social-chauvinist. p. 233

[246] "*Unifiers*"—members of the Inter-District Organisation of the united Social-Democrats, set up in St. Petersburg in 1913. It consisted of Trotskyists and some former Bolsheviks who had left the Party. During the first world war the "unifiers" took up a Centrist position and opposed the Bolsheviks. From August to November 1916 they published a legal magazine, *Rabochiye Vedomosti* (Workers' News), in Petrograd. In 1917 they declared themselves to be in agreement with the Bolshevik Party line and at the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) were admitted to the Party. p. 234

[247] Reference is to the Volna (Wave) Publishing House, set up in Petrograd in 1916, whose organisers asked Lenin to contribute to its publications and send them articles. When he heard that one of the organisers of the publishing house was Chernomazov, who was suspected of being an *agent provocateur*, Lenin turned down the proposal. p. 236

[248] *Koritschoner, Franz* (*Nadin*) (1891-1942)—one of the men who founded the Austrian Communist Party in 1918, and a member of its Central Committee until 1927. He edited the party's Central Organ, *Die Rote Fahne* (The Bed Banner). p. 237

[249] *Friedrich Adler*, one of the leaders of the Austrian Social-Democrats, had murdered the Austrian Prime Minister Karl Stürgkh. p. 237

[250] *Kiknadze, N. D.* (1885-1951)—member of the Bolshevik Party from 1903. Professional revolutionary; lived in emigration in Switzerland, 1906-17. p. 240

[251] In the discussion on the nationalities problem that developed after the publication of the first number of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* A. V. Lunacharsky and Bezrabotny (D. Z. Manuilsky) attacked Lenin's propositions on the defence of the fatherland and the right of nations to self-determination. Kiknadze opposed Lunacharsky and Manuilsky. p. 240

[252] The article was "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", which Lenin had intended to publish in No. 3 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. This number never appeared and the article was first published in 1924 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 28-76). p. 240

[253] These theses of the *Internationale* group were published on February 29, 1916 in the *Bulletin of the International Socialist Commission in Berne* ("Bulletin" Internationale sozialistische Kommission zu Bern) No. 3. The fifth paragraph contains the assertion that national wars are impossible in the epoch of imperialism. p. 242

[254] In the Declaration of the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments published on November 5, 1916, Poland was proclaimed a constitutional monarchy under the protection of Germany and Austria-Hungary. p. 244

[255] The views on the nationalities problem developed by Rosa Luxemburg in the magazine of the Polish Social-Democrats *Przeglad Socjaldemokratyczny* (Social-Democratic Review), published in Cracow. (See Lenin's article "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 393-454). p. 244

[256] This refers to a series of articles by Engels entitled "What Have the Working Classes to Do With Poland?" which was reprinted in 1916 in the *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, published by Grünberg. p. 245

[257] Inessa Armand had translated into French the theses known as "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 137-48). p. 246

[258] See Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 13, S. 267-68, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1964, and *Werke*, Bd. 22, S. 252-56. p. 251

[259] The Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland was held in Zurich, November 4-5, 1916. p. 252

[260] The *Bulletin of the International Socialist Commission* No. 3, for February 29, 1916, published the draft programme of the Dutch Social-Democrats, which contained, among other points, the following specific demands: democratisation of all representative institutions, the setting up of a republic, an eight-hour working day, abolition of militarism. p. 254

[261] Reference is to *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (see Note 234). p. 255

[262] *Schmid*, *Arthur* (b. 1889)—Swiss bourgeois economist. p. 256

[263] The arguments Schmid advanced in his speech of November 30, 1916, at a meeting of Swiss Social-Democrats who supported the Zimmerwald Left. The meeting discussed the question of preparing a draft resolution for the forthcoming Extraordinary Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party on the socialists' attitude to militarism and the war. p. 256

[264] A decision taken by the Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party (held in Aarau, November 20-21, 1915) on recognition of the mass revolutionary, struggle against the war. p. 257

[265] On August 15 (28), 1916 Guchkov wrote a letter to General Alexeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The letter expressed the Russian bourgeoisie's fear of the mounting revolution and its dissatisfaction with the tsarist government, which was proving incapable of checking it. Guchkov's letter was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 57 for December 30, 1916. p. 259

[266] *Lvov*, *G. Y.* (1861-1925)—prince, owner of large estates, Constitutional-Democrat, Chairman of the All-Russia Zemstvo Association during the first world war, subsequently one of the chairmen of the United Association of Zemstvos and Towns; both organisations represented the imperialist bourgeoisie and landowners.

Chelnokov, *M. V.* (b. 1863)—big industrialist and householder, one of the founders of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets). Deputy to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas. Mayor of Moscow, 1914-17. p. 259

[267] Reference is to Humbert-Droz's pamphlet *Guerre à la Guerre. A bas L'Armée. Plaidoirie complète devant le Tribunal Militaire à Neuchâtel le 26 août 1916* (War on War. Down with the Army. Full text of Counsel's Speech before the Military Tribunal at Neuchâtel on August 26, 1916). Humbert-Droz bad been arrested for refusing to answer the call-up. p. 260

[268] Lenin refers to Krupskaya's booklet *Public Education and Democracy*. It was published in 1917 by the Zhizn i Znaniye (Life and Knowledge) Publishing House. p. 262

[269] The MS. of the book *Imperialism*, *the Highest Stage of Capitalism* was at this time in the Parus (Sail) Publishing House. p. 262

[270] Reference is to Engels's Introduction to Marx's *The Class Struggles in France*, *1848 to 1850* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 118-38). p. 269

[271] This apparently refers to what Engels said in a letter to F. A. Sorge dated April 8, 1891. p. 269

[272] Lenin has in mind Kautsky's article "Einige Feststellungen über Marx und Engels" ("Some Facts about Marx and Engels") printed in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1908, No. 1, October 2, pp. 5-7. p. 272

[273] Inessa Armand gave her lecture on pacifism on January 21, 1917 (see Letter 119). p. 274

[274] The referendum was on the question of holding an extraordinary congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party to discuss the attitude to be adopted to militarism and war. The referendum was declared by the Swiss Left Social-Democrats in connection with the decision of the Executive of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party to postpone the congress indefinitely. p. 275

[275] See F. Engels, "The Housing Question" Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1982, pp. 546-635). p. 281

[276] This refers to the resolution on peace proposed on behalf of Loriot, Rappoport and Saumoneau in December 1916, at the congress of the Seine Federation of the French Socialist Party. The resolution was voted down. p. 281

[277] Lenin intended publishing an article on the attitude of Marxism to the state in No. 3 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, but did not write it. The material he collected formed the basis of his book *The State and Revolution*. p. 286

[278] Lenin means the Lefts in the Swedish Social-Democratic movement, who looked for support in their struggle against the Right opportunists to the Social-Democratic Youth League. During the world war the Young joined the Zimmerwald Left. p. 287

[279] The Moscow Bureau's leaflet which Lenin mentions was not published in the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*, because in January 1917, after the publication of No. 58, the paper closed down.

The Moscow Bureau of the Central Committee was at the time the leading body of the Moscow Regional Bolshevik Party organisation. Among the Bureau's members were Rozalia Zemlyachka, M. S. Olminsky and I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov. p. 288

[280] The *Weekly People*—organ of the Socialist Labour Party of America, founded in New York in 1891. p. 288

[281] Reference is to Leaflet No. 1, "Gegen die Lüge der Vaterlandsverteidigung" ("Against the Lie about Defence of the Fatherland"), which was later published over the signature of the "Group of Zimmerwald Lefts in Switzerland". Lenin was closely concerned with the writing and editing of this leaflet. It included the

"Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue" and a number of other writings by Lenin. p. 289

[282] The Congress of the Zurich Social-Democratic organisation in Töss was held February 11-12, 1917. It discussed the Social-Democratic attitude to militarism and war. Two draft resolutions were moved: (1) a resolution drafted by the Rights in a spirit of social-chauvinism and (2) a Centrist draft approved by the majority of the leaders of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. The majority resolution was passed by 93 votes to 65. To prevent the social-chauvinist resolution being adopted, the Lefts voted for the majority resolution, but moved amendments drafted by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 282). The Lefts' motion containing these amendments received 32 votes. The materials of the Congress were published in the newspaper *Volksrecht*. p. 289

[283] *Milyukov*, *P. N.* (1859-1943). See Note 51.

Guchkov, *A. I.* (1862-1936)—big capitalist, organiser and leader of the Octobrists' party. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 he became Minister of Military and Naval Affairs in the first cabinet of the bourgeois Provisional Government.

Kerensky, *A. F.* (b. 1881)—Socialist-Revolutionary. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 he became first a minister, then Prime Minister of the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 295

[284] *Shingaryov*, *A. I.* (1869-1918)—Constitutional-Democrat, deputy to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas. After the February 1917 revolution, Minister of Agriculture in the first cabinet and Minister of Finance in the second cabinet of the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 295

[285] *Konovalov*, *A. I.* (b. 1875)—big textile manufacturer; Minister of Trade and Industry in the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 295

[286] *Chkhenkeli*, *A. I.* (1874-1959)—Menshevik, deputy to the Third and Fourth Dumas. During the first world war, a social-chauvinist. After the February revolution of 1917, representative of the bourgeois Provisional Government in the Transcaucasus. p. 295

[287] Reference is to the Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma A. Y. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov and N. B. Shagov. (See Note 206.) p. 296

[288] *Gvozdyov*, *K. A.* (b. 1883)—Menshevik liquidator. Social-chauvinist during the imperialist world war. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 he became successively a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, Deputy

Minister, and Minister of Labour in the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 298

[289] *Chkheidze, N. S.* (1864-1926)—one of the Menshevik leaders. During the imperialist world war, a Centrist. After the October Socialist Revolution he became Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, a counter-revolutionary, Menshevik government. When Soviet power was established in Georgia in 1921, he emigrated to Paris. p. 298

[290] *Nachalo* (The Beginning)—a Menshevik-Trotskyist paper, published in Paris from September 1916 to March 1917. p. 301

[291] This letter was written in reply to a letter from A. V. Lunacharsky, who was to visit Zurich in March 1917 and had suggested to Lenin that there should be a joint conference of Bolsheviks and *Vperyod* supporters. Lenin turned down the proposal. p. 302

[292] *Gvozdyov* (see also Note 288) was leader of the so-called "Workers' Group" under the Central War Industries Committee, set up by the Russian bourgeoisie in 1915. p. 302

[293] This refers to the resolution adopted at a meeting of Russian and Swiss internationalists on March 22, 1917. p. 303

[294] *Manifesto of Chkheidze*—an appeal by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which was dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. It called for support of the Provisional Government. p. 304

[295] *Hanecki, J. S.* (1879-1937)—prominent figure in the Polish and Russian revolutionary movements; in 1917, a member of the Bureau Abroad of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 he took up residence in Stockholm. p. 308

[296] *Die Glocke* (The Bell)—a fortnightly magazine published in Munich, and from 1915 to 1925 in Berlin, by Parvus (Helfand), a member of the German Social-Democratic Party, social-chauvinist, and agent of the German imperialists. p. 308

[297] The pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. Towards the War*) was published on the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference and distributed to the delegates.

In 1918 It was republished by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338). p. 310

[298] Lenin stresses the responsibility borne by Kamenev because Kamenev, who had returned to Petrograd from exile on March 12, 1917, had become one of the editors of *Pravda* and a representative of the Bolshevik Party in the Petrograd Soviet.

Kamenev, however, adopted a semi-Menshevik position on certain vital aspects of Party policy. In articles published in *Pravda* he argued that the Bolsheviks should give the Provisional Government conditional support, while exerting pressure to make it open peace negotiations at once. In his assessment of the war Kamenev leaned towards defencism. Kamenev's position was sharply criticised by Lenin in his pamphlet *Letters on Tactics* (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 42-54). p. 313

[299] Lenin refers to his speech of greeting on behalf of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. at the Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party in Zurich, November 4, 1916. p. 315

[300] What is meant here is the "Conclusion" to Lenin's book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*. The book was written in November-December 1907 and printed in 1908, but while it was still at the print-shop it was confiscated by the police and destroyed.

While he was abroad, Lenin decided that when he returned to Russia he would get the book reprinted. This was done in 1917, but only part of the Conclusion appeared. The Conclusion was not published in full until 1924, in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* (No. 5, pp. 166-72), after the discovery in the Geneva Party archives of Lenin's manuscript entitled "The Agrarian Problem during the First Russian Revolution (Towards a Revision of the Social-Democrats' Agrarian Programme)", which contained the full text of the Conclusion. p. 316

[301] Reference is to the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), held in Petrograd, April 24-29 (May 7-12), 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 225-313). p. 317

[302] *Pravda* No. 88 for June 22 (July 5), 1917 published Hanecki's cable from Stockholm denying the slanderous statements made about him in the newspaper *Dyen* (Day). The same issue of *Pravda* also contained a telegram signed by Bronaki, Orlovsky and Radek affirming Hanecki's innocence. p. 318

[303] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life) (Petrograd, 1917-18)—Menshevik-orientated daily, organ of a group of Social-Democrats known as the "Internationalists", which included Menshevik supporters of Martov and various semi-Menshevik intellectuals.

Reference is to Lunacharsky's letter to the editor published in *Novaya Zhizn* No. 60, June 28 (July 11), 1917. p. 318

[304] *Bez Lishnikh Slov* (Without Wasting Words)—scurrilous weekly paper published by the Black-Hundred leader Alexinsky in Petrograd in July 1917. p. 319

[305] Reference is to *Russische Korrespondenz "Pravda"* ("Pravda" Russian Bulletin), published by the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee

Bureau Abroad in Stockholm in 1917. It was published in German; a French edition also appeared. p. 319

[306] While Robert Grimm, Chairman of the International Socialist Commission (I.S.C.), was in Russia in the spring of 1917, he exchanged secret dispatches with the Swiss statesman Hoffmann concerning the German terms for conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Germany and Russia. When this became known, he was expelled from Russia. The investigation of the case was entrusted to a special commission nominated by the I.S.C., which declared Grimm's actions contradictory to the principles of the Zimmerwald movement. Grimm was removed from his post of Chairman of the I.S.C. and the commission's decision on the case was ratified by the third Zimmerwald Conference, held in Stockholm in September 1917. p. 320

[307] Reference is to the International Socialist Conference, which was to take place in Stockholm in the summer of 1917. The Conference had been proposed by social-chauvinists of the neutral countries. p. 320

[308] On August 6 (19), 1917, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, held to discuss preparations for the Stockholm Conference, Kamenev spoke in favour of participation in the conference and revision of the Bolsheviks' decision on this question. The Bolshevik group in the C.E.C. dissociated itself from Kamenev's speech.

Lenin sent the editor of the newspaper *Proletary* an open letter called "Kamenev's Speech in the C.E.C. on the Stockholm Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 240-42). p. 320

[309] Reference is to Franz Koritschoner. See Note 248. p. 321

[310] Reference is to the resolutions passed at the Seventh (April) Conference and the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (see *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Tseka*, 7th ed., Part 1, 1954, pp. 335-53, and 372-89). p. 322

[311] *Proletary* (The Proletarian)—daily paper, Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party; it appeared from August 13 (26) to August 24 (September 6), 1917 in place of *Pravda*, which had been banned by the Provisional Government. Ten issues were published. p. 323

[312] This letter was written in connection with the upswing of the revolutionary working-class movement in Finland sparked off by the October Socialist Revolution in Russia. p. 325

[313] Lenin's telegram was sent in reply to a request from the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that the Council of People's Commissars should confirm the appointment of

the newly elected Gubernia Commissar and the dismissal of the previous one. p. 326

[314] This telegram was sent in reply to an inquiry from Y. Kryukov, Chairman of the Ostrogozhsk Soviet (Voronezh Gubernia), on what to do with the valuables collected during confiscation of the landed estates. p. 327

[315] This telegram replies to an inquiry from Urban, Chairman of the Drissa Town Soviet, on what to do if German forces advanced on the town. p. 329

[316] *Kursky, D. I.* (1874-1932)—member of the Bolshevik Party from 1904, People's Commissar for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R., 1918-28. p. 331

[317] Lenin was prompted to write this letter by an incorrect decision taken by the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal, which on May 2, 1918 heard the case against four members of the Moscow Commission of Investigation charged with bribery and blackmail and passed a sentence of only six months' imprisonment. On May 4 Lenin proposed to the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) that the judges who had passed such a lenient sentence should be expelled from the Party. Acting on the instructions given by Lenin in this letter, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decision obliging the People's Commissariat of Justice "immediately" to draw up a Bill stipulating a "heavy minimum sentence for bribery and any connivance in bribery". The Commissariat of Justice's Bill was discussed by the C.P.C. on May 8 and amended by Lenin before it finally became law. p. 331

[318] The defeat of the anti-Soviet revolt of the Mussavatists at the end of March 1918 consolidated Soviet power in Baku. A meeting of the Baku Soviet on April 25 set up the Baku Council of People's Commissars, which besides Bolsheviks included some Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Shahumyan was made Chairman of the Baku Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Council launched a number of socialist projects. In April and May 1918 Soviet power was established over a considerable part of Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan workers' and peasants' struggle for the victory of socialist revolution was waged in an extremely complex situation. The German-Turkish intervention had begun in the Transcaucasus and Turkish troops had invaded Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the British Command in Iran had made contact with the Baku Dashnaks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, in the hope of using them to take over Baku and overthrow Soviet power in the city. Lenin therefore instructed the leaders of the Baku Council of People's Commissars to be extremely flexible in taking advantage of the contradictions within the imperialist camp and within the nationalist parties. p. 332

[319] Lenin refers to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, passed on November 18 (December 1), 1917, "On the Remuneration of People's Commissars, Senior Government Employees and Officials", which he had drafted. It set the maximum monthly salary for Commissars at 500 rubies with an allowance of 100 rubles for each member of the family unable to work.

Lenin also imposed a severe reprimand on N. P. Gorbunov, Secretary of the C.P.C. p. 333

[320] *Volodarsky, V.*— a leader of the Petrograd Bolsheviks, editor of the Petrograd newspaper *Krasnaya Gazeta* (Red Gazette) and member of the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet. He was murdered on June 20, 1918 by Socialist-Revolutionaries, who in direct collusion with whiteguards and foreign Interventionists adopted terroristic tactics against the Bolsheviks.

On August 30, M. S. Uritsky, Chairman of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission, was murdered by a Socialist-Revolutionary. The same day a villainous attempt to assassinate Lenin was made by the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist Kaplan. Lenin was gravely wounded by two poisoned bullets. p. 336

[321] This telegram was the last warning to A. M. Yuriev (Alexeyev), Chairman of the Murmansk Territory Soviet, where the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had a majority. On March 2, 1918 Yuriev had violated the instructions of the Soviet Government by entering into negotiations with representatives of the Entente and concluding a so-called "verbal agreement" with them, which virtually placed the Territory's military forces and economy in the hands of the "Allies" and enabled the imperialists of Britain, France and the United States to land troops in Murmansk. Despite several warnings from the Soviet Government Yuriev persisted in his criminal policy. On June 26 he sent Lenin a radio message demanding further concessions to the interventionists. Lenin's reply was the telegram published here.

Natsarenus, S. P. (1883-1938)—Military Commissar Extraordinary for the Murmansk-White Sea Territory in 1918; later Military Commissar for the Petrograd Military District. He was also at various times member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 7th, 14th and 15th armies. p. 337

[322] This telegram followed a discussion by the Council of People's Commissars on July 1, 1918 concerning a report from V. I. Nevsky, People's Commissar for Railways, about protests received from railwaymen over the illegal activities of certain requisitioning detachments. Lenin drafted the telegram and submitted it to the meeting. A typewritten copy with corrections and amendments in Lenin's hand has been preserved. p. 339

[323] The German Ambassador Mirbach was assassinated in the afternoon on July 6 by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries Blyumkin and Andreyev, who got into the German Embassy with a forged

document for the alleged purpose of negotiating with the Ambassador and threw a bomb at him. The Left S.R.s hoped by this act to provoke a war with Germany and be able to overthrow Soviet power through the combined efforts of all the enemies of the revolution. The assassination of Mirbach marked the beginning of the Left S.R. counter-revolutionary revolt in Moscow, July 6-7, 1918, which was part of a general onslaught by internal counter-revolutionaries and the imperialists of the Entente against Soviet Russia; the rebels were secretly supported by foreign diplomatic missions.

The revolt occurred during the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which instructed the Government to suppress the revolt at once. The group of Left S.R. delegates to the Congress was arrested. Thanks to the vigorous measures taken by the Soviet Government and the concerted action of Moscow workers and garrison, the revolt was put down. p. 340

[324] Reference is to the telegram that J. V. Stalin sent from Tsaritsyn to Shahumyan on July 20, 1918. In this telegram Stalin condemned the policy of the Mensheviks, Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Baku Soviet, who, on the pretext of defending the city from the advancing Turkish army, advocated inviting the "assistance" of British troops. On behalf of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, Stalin demanded that the Baku Council of People's Commissars should unconditionally implement the decisions of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on an independent foreign policy and resolute opposition to the agents of foreign capital. p. 342

[325] *Spartacists*—members of the Spartacus group, a revolutionary organisation of the German Left Social-Democrats, formed at the beginning of the first world war by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Leon Jogiches (Tyszka) and Wilhelm Pieck. The group carried on revolutionary propaganda among the masses, organised anti-war demonstrations, led strikes, and exposed the imperialist nature of the war and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. In April 1917, the group joined the centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, while maintaining its organisational independence. In November 1918, during the revolution in Germany, the group renamed itself the Spartacus League; on December 14, 1918 it published its own programme and broke with the "Independents". At the Inaugural Congress held December 30, 1918 to January 1, 1919 the Spartacists founded the Communist Party of Germany. p. 343

[326] Lenin stamped the end of the letter with the State Seal of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 344

[327] This telegram was Lenin's reply to a telegram from Baku reporting the advance of the Turkish troops and the treacherous activities of

the Dashnaks, wad also the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who at an extraordinary meeting of the Baku Soviet on July 25, 1918, in spite of energetic protests by Bolshevik leaders of Soviet power in the city, had managed to gain an insignificant majority for a resolution inviting the British to give Baku military "assistance".

After the passing of this resolution, the Bolsheviks declared that they would resign their posts as People's Commissars. They continued, however, to fight for Soviet power. At an emergency meeting of the Executive Committee of the Baku Soviet on July 26, 1918 it was decided that until the question of power was finally settled all People's Commissars should remain at their posts. The All-Baku Conference of Bolsheviks held on July 27 resolved that emergency measures should be taken to defend Bake under the leadership of the C.P.C.; it also resolved to announce general mobilisation and call upon the workers to defend the city and Soviet power. The Baku C.P.C. undertook various measures to fulfil this decision. p. 345

[328] *Tsyurupa, A. D.* (1870-1928)—professional revolutionary, prominent as a member of the Communist Party and government administrator. His posts included Deputy People's Commissar for Food (from November 1917), Commissar for Food (from 1918), Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and of the Council of Labour and Defence (from 1921), People's Commissar for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (1922-23), Chairman of the State Planning Commission (1923-25) and People's Commissar for Home and Foreign Trade (1925); was elected member of the Party Central Committee at the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th congresses of the Party. p. 346

[329] On July 31, 1918 external pressure and various internal factors brought about the temporary collapse of Soviet power in Baku. On August 1, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Dashnaks Organised a counter-revolutionary government known as the Dictatorship of the Central Caspian Area. Agents of the Entente, they immediately sent their representatives to Iran to fetch the British, and on August 4 a British force landed in Baku.

In these critical days the Baku Communists were with the masses, explaining the situation and exposing the treacherous policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Dashnaks; but the Baku Communists lacked the strength and opportunity to bring about any fundamental change in the political situation. On August 12, a Communist conference took the decision to withdraw temporarily to Astrakhan, taking as many arms and as much equipment as possible. A group of Communists was appointed to carry on Party work in Baku.

The plan of evacuation to Astrakhan did not succeed and the leaders of Soviet power in Baku were arrested.

In the middle of September 1918 the Turkish command launched an offensive on Baku. The troops of the Dictatorship of the

Central Caspian Area and the British force withdrew, and on the morning of September 15 Turkish troops and Mussavatists entered the city. The previous day a group of Communists had managed to get the Commissars and other Bolsheviks out of prison. They escaped from the city aboard the steamer *Turkmen*, but on September 17 the crew, which had counter-revolutionary leanings, brought the ship into Krasnovodsk port, where the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and British interventionists were in command. All the members of the Baku Council of People's Commissars and other Party workers were immediately arrested. On the night of September 19, 1918, twenty-six leaders of the Baku Commune, who have since become known in history as the twenty-six Baku Commissars (S. G. Shahumyan, P. A. Japaridze, M. A, Azizbekov, I. T. Fioletov, Y. D. Zevin, G. N. Korganov, M. G. Vezirov and others), were brutally murdered in the Transcaspian desert by the British interventionists with the direct participation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. p. 348

[330] *Kedrov, M. S.* (1878-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the October Socialist Revolution, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for War, and Military Commissar for Demobilisation. In May 1918 he was sent to the North to organise defence. In March 1919 he became a member of the Collegium of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission. p. 358

[331] Lenin refers to his recovery from wounds received when an attempt was made on his life by the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist Fanny Kaplan on August 30, 1918.

His telegram was a reply to a telegram from the leaders of the Political Department of the 5th Army, wishing him a speedy recovery. p. 359

[332] Reference is to the article "Karl Kautsky and Henriette Roland-Holst on the Bolsheviks", published an September 20, 1918 in *Pravda*. The extracts mentioned by Lenin were taken from Kautsky's article "Democracy or Dictatorship" in No. 34 of the magazine *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik* (Socialist Foreign Policy) for August 1918. The magazine was the organ of the Kautskians. It was published in Berlin from 1915 to 1922 (after November 1918, under the title of *Der Sozialist*). p. 362

[333] Kautsky's pamphlet *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat* was published in Vienna in the autumn of 1918. It distorted the Marxist theory of the proletarian revolution and slandered the Soviet state. Lenin in his book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* and other works of this period castigated the leaders of the Second International, particularly Kautsky, for their distortion of Marxist teaching on the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and further developed Marxist theory on these vital questions. p. 363

[334] The joint meeting of the All-Russia C.E.C., the Moscow Soviet, the factory committees and the trade unions, proposed by Lenin, was held on Thursday, October 3, 1918. Lenin, who was convalescing at Gorki after being wounded, could not attend the meeting, but sent a letter that was read out. His main proposals were included in the resolution passed by the meeting, which on the same day was officially announced to the world by telegraph. p. 365

[335] Lenin was prompted to write this letter by the decision of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet of October 7, 1918, in which the leaders of the Soviet attempted to avoid responsibility for not carrying out the decree of the Council of People's Commissars on setting up in Moscow monuments to outstanding figures in the revolutionary movement and the world of culture. p. 368

[336] See Note 325. p. 369

[337] Reference is to the Bremen group of German Left Social-Democrats; in 1919 the group joined the Communist Party of Germany. p. 369

[338] Reference is to the suppression of the whiteguard and S.R. revolt at the Izhevsk and Votkinsk Works (Vyatka Gubernia). The rebels took over Izhevsk and Votkinsk in August 1918. The two towns were liberated by Soviet troops on November 7 and 12, 1918. p. 370

[339] This telegram was Lenin's reply to the following telegram, which he received on November 13, 1918 from Unecha Station (Chernigov Gubernia): "The representatives of the revolutionary soldiers of Germany, delegates of the Lyshchichi Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, together with the Unecha organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), welcome in your person the world revolution. Representatives of the revolutionary German troops of the village of Lyshchichi (signatures). Chairman of the Unecha organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) *Ivanov*. Revolutionary Commissar *Lind*. Commander of the Bogun Regiment *Shchors*." p. 373

[340] The decree "On Organisation of Supply", passed by the Council of People's Commissars on November 21, 1918, provided for development of the co-operative movement and the revival of nationalised and municipalised co-operative shops and stores. The decree made it incumbent on the Poor Peasants' Committees and the local Soviets to establish systematic supervision of the work of the co-operatives in order to prevent any attempts that might be made by kulaks and other counter-revolutionary elements to dominate them. p. 376

[341] Lenin refers to the whiteguard Cossack rising on the Don, in the Veshenskaya area, in the rear of the Southern Front. In a number of directives to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Command of the Southern Front Lenin drew attention to the danger of the rebels' linking up with Denikin's

advancing troops, and the need to crash the rebellion with all speed (see this volume, pp. 381, 387, 390 and 391). p. 378

[342] Realising the tremendous significance of the struggle for the Donets coalfields, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and Lenin repeatedly instructed the commanders of the Ukrainian Front and the Ukrainian Soviet Government to assist the Southern Front. But some of the military leaders of the Ukraine (N. I. Podvoisky, V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko and others), prompted by narrow, local interests, held up the transfer of troops to the Donets sector. Antonov-Ovseyenko, Commander of the Ukrainian Front, demanded that the lines of demarcation between the Ukrainian Front and the Southern Front in the Donets Basin should be revised, and that the bulk of the forces operating in this area should be placed under his command, and refused to recognise the major importance of the Donets sector, claiming that the Ukrainian Front was confronted by more important tasks in the western and southern Ukraine. Lenin rejected his proposal. p. 383

[343] Reference is to the highly nationalistic resolution passed by the Ekaterinoslav organisation of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, who opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat, the policy of the Soviet Government, and the political, economic and military alliance between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia. p. 384

[344] The war trophies captured by the Red Army on the Southern Front included several French tanks. The Command of the 2nd Ukrainian Soviet Army sent one of them to Lenin as a gift, accompanying it with a letter of welcome. p. 385

[345] *Cheka* (All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage)—a security organ set up by the Council of People's Commissars on December 7, 1917. In 1922 it was reorganised as the State Political Administration (G.P.U.). p. 387

[346] At time beginning of May 1919, the threat of an offensive by White Finnish troops made it necessary to mobilise the working people of Petrograd in defence of the city. Some of the Petrograd leaders, however, including G. Y. Zinoviev, Chairman of time city's Defence Committee, underestimated the strength and ability of the defenders. In a mood of panic they decided, without informing the Defence Council, to evacuate several factories, and were preparing to scuttle the Baltic Fleet. Workers were mobilised haphazardly with the result that many factories of great defence importance had to slow down. The telegram sent by Lenin was on behalf of the Defence Council. The draft of it was signed by L. B. Krasin and A. I. Rykov. p. 389

[347] The Defence Council took direct control over, the organisation of the defence of Petrograd. On May 17, 1919 it decided not to announce and not to carry out any general evacuation of Petrograd

or the Petrograd area, but to set up a special commission with powers to state what should be moved out of the city, and how this should be done. p. 389

[348] Reference is to the counter-revolutionary "ataman" Grigoryev, who in May 1919 had started an insurrection in the rear of the Red Army in the southern Ukraine (Elizavetgrad, Ekaterinoslav, Krivoi Rog and Kherson area). The insurrection was crushed at the end of May 1919. p. 392

[349] Lenin refers to the criminal delay in fulfilling his instructions on the urgent dispatch of reinforcements to the Petrograd Front. p. 396

[350] Besieged Uralsk was relieved by the Red Army on July 11, 1919. p. 400

[351] During the decisive offensive actions of the Southern Group of the Forces of the Eastern Front against Kolchak, White Cossack and kulak risings occurred in a number of front-line areas (Samara and Orenburg gubernias, and the Urals Region). p. 403

[352] Lenin refers to the counter-revolutionary bands marauding in the rear of the Soviet forces. p. 406

[353] In its telegram to Lenin of July 11, 1919, the Presidium of the Tula Gubernia Metalworkers' Congress declared that the Congress had voted for a tenfold increase in arms output (underlined twice by Lenin), the military training of all workers and the forming of reserve workers' regiments that would be ready at any minute to go into action against the whiteguards. The Presidium asked Lenin to convey to the Council of People's Commissars "the metalworkers' socialist pledge to die or conquer all imperialists of this country and from abroad". p. 407

[354] Lenin refers to the following decisive victories over the whiteguard forces in the struggle for the liberation of the Urals: the capture of the town of Zlatoust by the 5th Army (July 13, 1919), and the capture of the town of Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk) by the 2nd Army on July 14, 1919.

The new Commander of the Forces of the Eastern Front appointed on July 13, 1919 was Mikhail Frunze. p. 408

[355] Reference is evidently to the enlisting of the Bashkirs in the struggle against Kolchak, particularly the formation of Bashkir military units. p. 408

[356] *Gusev, S. I.* (1874-1933)—joined the Party in 1896. On political work in the Red Army, 1918-20. Member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 5th and 2nd Armies of the Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern fronts. p. 420

[357] This was written on a letter from G. K. Orjonikidze (Sergo) of October 15, 1919, reporting disorder and criminal lack of discipline in the armies of the Southern Front.

Orjonikidze had written: "Something unbelievable, something bordering on treachery. A light-minded attitude to the work, an absolute failure to understand the seriousness of the situation. Not a sign of order at any of the headquarters. Front H.Q. is a riot.... Where is this order and discipline, where is Comrade Trotsky's regular army?! How could he have allowed such a collapse. This is beyond all bounds." p. 423

[358] On October 15, 1919, the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) discussed the situation on the various fronts. In view of the grave military danger, the Bureau passed a decision that Soviet Russia should be turned into a veritable armed camp and that the maximum number of Communists and Communist sympathisers should be taken off general administrative work (except in the People's Commissariats of Railways and Food, and the Cheka). A commission consisting of Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev and Krestinsky was instructed to draft a decree simplifying civil administration so as to release as many personnel as possible who were fit for military service. The draft decree "On Simplification of the Civil Apparatus of Soviet Power" was discussed by the C.P.C. on October 21 and 28, November 4, 21 and 25, and December 15. The decree was published in *Izvestia* No. 293, on December 28, 1919. p. 424

[359] Orel was liberated by Soviet troops on October 20, 1919, the day Lenin wrote this letter. p. 425

[360] *Vorovsky, V. V.* (1871-1923)—joined the Party in 1894. After the October Socialist Revolution he was the Soviet Republic's plenipotentiary in Scandinavia (1917-19), in charge of the State Publishing House (1919-20), then returned to diplomatic work, in Italy (1921-23). p. 427

[361] Krzhizhanovsky's article was published in *Pravda* No. 5, on January 10, 1920, under the title "Torf i krizis topliva" ("Peat and the Fuel Crisis"). p. 430

[362] Lenin refers to the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, a Centrist party founded in April 1917. The party held an emergency congress in Leipzig from November 30 to December 6, 1919, at which under pressure from Left-wing members of the party a programme of action recognising the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the system of Soviets was adopted. The party's proletarian wing also proposed "immediate and unconditional joining of the Third International". In October 1920 at the Independent Social-Democratic Party's congress in Halle a split occurred, and in December 1920 a large section of the party joined the Communist Party of Germany. The Right-wing elements formed a separate

party, retaining the old title Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany; this party existed until 1922. p. 432

[363] At the end of 1919, Lenin gave instructions that 10,000 qualified metalworkers should be sent to repair the railways. The leaders of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions were slow in arranging the transfer of metalworkers to the Moscow railway system, and the delay prompted Lenin to write this letter. p. 433

[364] Reference is to *Tolkovy slovar zhivogo velikorusskogo yazyka* (Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Russian Language) by V. I. Dahl, published in four volumes, 1863-66.

In accordance with Lenin's instructions, the People's Commissariat of Education began work on compiling a new dictionary, but the project was not realised at that time. A new *Tolkovy slovar russkogo yazyka* (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language) came out in 1935-40 in four volumes under the editorship of D. N. Ushakov. p. 434

[365] Lenin refers to Krzhizhanovsky's article "Zadachi elektrifikatsii promyshlennosti" ("Tasks of the Electrification of Industry"), a condensed version of which was published in *Pravda* No. 20 on January 30, 1920. p. 435

[366] Krzhizhanovsky had written a pamphlet *Osnovniye zadachi elektrifikatsii Rossii* (The Basic Tasks of the Electrification of Russia). It was published in February 1920. p. 435

[367] In his telegram of February 26, 1920 Trotsky wrote that it would be inexpedient to maintain the whole clerical staff of the 3rd Army, which had been transferred to labour service. The army had only one infantry and one cavalry division. The telegram further stated that the Field H.Q. had given its assent to the disbanding of the army clerical staffs and requested the opinion of the Defence Council. Lenin marked the telegram "Report to the Defence Council". p. 438

[368] Lenin refers to the transfer of certain Red Army units to labour service at the beginning of 1920, so that they could be used for purposes of reconstruction. The war with bourgeois-landowner Poland and Wrangel forced the Government to return the labour armies to the fighting line. p. 438

[369] Reference is to the programme of work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) and the explanatory note to it, passed at a session of GOELRO on March 13, 1920. p. 440

[370] Krzhizhanovsky subsequently wrote that when Lenin used the words "as a first approximation" he was teasing him for his habit of prefacing any calculations or plans with this cautious formula. p. 441

[371] The task of taking the Crimea, where the remnants of Denikin's defeated army under the command of General Y. A. Slashchov had taken refuge, was given to the 13th Army of the South-Western Front. In January 1920, only the 46th Division of this army engaged Slashchov's forces, but it was unable to break through into the Crimea. Fresh attempts to take the Crimea in February and the first half of March 1920 were also unsuccessful. p. 442

[372] Reference is to the events in Germany following the so-called "Kapp putsch". On March 13, 1920 Berlin was seized by counter-revolutionary officers of the Reichswehr, who aimed at restoring the monarchy and establishing a terroristic military dictatorship. The German working class replied to this attempted counter-revolutionary coup with a general strike, which spread all over the country. The putsch was defeated. p. 442

[373] *Adoratsky, V. V.* (1878-1945)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. In 1920, he became assistant manager of the Central Archives Board, and in 1932 a member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. He wrote a number of works on the Marxist theory of the state and law, and on the philosophy and history of Marxism. p. 444

[374] *Timiryazev, K. A.* (1843-1920)—Russian Darwinist, outstanding botanist and physiologist, gifted populariser and propagandist of scientific knowledge, Corresponding Member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. He was the first eminent scientist to welcome the October Socialist Revolution. p. 445

[375] Reference is to Timiryazev's book *Nauka i Demokratiya. Sbornik statei 1904-1919* (Science and Democracy. Collected articles 1904-1919), Moscow, 1920.

On page IX of the book there is a gift inscription from the author that reads: "To deeply respected Vladimir Ilyich Lenin from K. Timiryazev, who counts it his good fortune to be Lenin's contemporary and a witness of his glorious work." p. 445

[376] See Note 240. p. 447

[377] The proletarian writer Serafimovich had lost his son during the Civil War. p. 448

[378] This note was in response to information from Kursky that a communiqué had been received by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic from the Western Front, stating that the 15th Army's offensive was going well. p. 449

[379] The plan of theses expounded in this letter formed the basis of Lenin's report on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International which he made at the Second

Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow from July 19 to August 7, 1920 (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 215-34). p. 450

[380] Reference is to Levi's report "The Political Situation and the Elections to Parliament" at the Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, which took place in Berlin, April 14-15, 1920. p. 451

[381] *Chicherin, G. V.* (1872-1936)—prominent Soviet statesman, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-30. p. 452

[382] This was written in connection with telegrams from Mikhail Frunze, who had asked Lenin to hasten the transfer of the 1st Cavalry Array to the Southern Front. p. 457

[383] *Frunze* was made Commander of the Forces of the Southern Front in September 1920. p. 458

[384] The Crimea was liberated by the Red Army in November 1920. p. 458

[385] In a letter addressed to Lenin certain members of the Presidium of the Tula Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) asked for his advice on "which of the two positions in the situation at present experienced by Soviet Russia is correct—the position giving priority to peaceful construction, or the other position giving priority to the necessity of straining every effort to solve our military problems". The authors of the letter expressed misgivings that showing priority to economic and educational tasks, as certain members of the Tula Party organisation were trying to do, would weaken effort and discipline at the Tula munitions factories. p. 459

[386] This letter was written in response to Maxim Gorky's appeal to the All-Russia Commission for Improving Scientists' Living Conditions, in which he mentioned certain cases when scientific workers had been obliged to share too large a part of their flats with new tenants. Gorky was then chairman of the Petrograd branch of the Commission. p. 460

[387] *Klasson, R. E.* (1868-1926)—Soviet power engineer. He designed and directed the construction of a number of power stations in Moscow, Petrograd and in the Baku oilfields, and also the world's first peat-fuelled power station. He was one of the inventors of the hydraulic method of extracting peat. p. 462

[388] Lenin refers to the decision "On the Hydraulic Method of Extracting Peat", passed by the Council of People's Commissars on October 30, 1920. p. 462

[389] Reference is to the meeting of the preliminary conference on organisation of contact between all People's Commissariats concerned with the economy. The preliminary conference was set up by the

Council of People's Commissars on October 26, 1920; its chairman was Lenin. p. 464

[390] The *Narrow Council of People's Commissars* was organised in December 1917. It had the rights of a commission of the Council of People's Commissars and its task was to relieve the Council of minor affairs. Its decisions, which had to be unanimous, were signed by V. I. Lenin and acquired the force of decisions of the Council of People's Commissars. If a difference of opinion arose the matter was placed before the Council of People's Commissars. p. 464

[391] This letter, a copy of which was sent to Y. A. Preobrazhensky, was written apparently because Lenin had noticed omissions in the proofs of the pamphlet *On Concessions. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 23, 1920. Text of the Decree. Units for Concession. Maps*, which had been sent to him for inspection. p. 466

[392] Lenin refers to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, held December 22-29, 1920, at which Krzhizhanovsky delivered a report on the plan for the electrification of Russia. The resolution on the electrification report was drafted by Lenin. p. 469

[393] The letter was written on a memorandum which P. A. Ostryakov, the construction chief of the first radio-telephone station in Moscow, sent to Lenin on January 26, 1921. Ostryakov reported that he was encountering difficulties and asked Lenin to help remove them and endorse the decree Ostryakov had drafted.

On January 27, 1921 the C.P.C. passed a decree on organising full-scale radio-telephone construction. It instructed the People's Commissar iat of Posts and Telegraphs to build stations for two-way radio-telephone communication in Moscow and other centres.

Bonch-Bruyevich, M. A. (1888-1940)—outstanding Soviet radio engineer. In 1916-19 he did research on electronic valves. In 1918 he took charge of the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory. p. 473

[394] Reference is to V. P. Milyutin's report "On Methods of Drawing up an Integrated Economic Plan", which he delivered at the Socialist Academy on February 17, 1921. An account of the report and its theses were published in the newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 37, on February 19, 1921. Lenin criticised Milyutin's theses in his article "An Integrated Economic Plan" (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 137-45). p. 475

[395] Reference is to the State Planning Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence of the R.S.F.S.R. It was organised on February 21, 1921. p. 476

[396] The speech delivered by Krzhizhanovsky at the first session of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) on April 5, 1921. p. 480

[397] This refers to the book *Plan elektrifikatsii R.S.F.S.R. Doklad vosmomu syezdu Sovetov Gosudarstvennoi Komissii po elektrifikatsil Rossii* (Plan for the Electrification of the R.S.F.S.H. Report of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia to the Eighth Congress of Soviets) published in December 1920.

Lenin spoke of the importance of this book in his report on the work of the Council of People's Commissars at the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 513-18) and in the article "An Integrated Economic Plan" (ibid., Vol. 32, pp. 137-41). p. 480

[398] *Litkens, Y. A.* (1888-1922)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1904. In 1917 he was a member of the internationalist Mensheviks' Central Committee; in 1919 entered the R.C.P.(B.). Deputy Manager of the Chief Committee for Political Education, 1920; Deputy Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R., from 1921 on. p. 482

[399] Reference is to *NEP* (New Economic Policy)—the policy of the proletarian state during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. This policy was "new" in contrast to the economic policy which had been conducted in Soviet Russia in the period of foreign military intervention and the Civil War, known in history as the policy of War Communism (1918-20). The latter was made necessary by war-time conditions, and its characteristic features were extreme centralisation of production and distribution of goods, prohibition of free trading, and food requisitioning which compelled the peasants to turn in all surplus produce to the state.

When the New Economic Policy was adopted, commodity-money relations became the basic form of relations between socialist industry and the small-peasant economy. When food requisitioning was abolished and replaced by the tax in kind, the peasants were able to dispose of their surplus produce as they chose, i.e., sell them at the market, and through the market obtain the industrial goods they required.

The New Economic Policy was calculated to achieve a firm economic and political alliance between the working class and the peasantry for the building of socialism, for the development of the productive forces along socialist lines. It provided for a certain measure of capitalism while the basic economic positions remained in the hands of the proletarian state. It assumed the struggle of the socialist elements against the capitalist elements, the victory of the socialist elements, the elimination of the exploiting classes, and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. p. 483

[400] *Posledniye Novosti* (Latest News)—whiteguard émigré daily paper, organ of the counter-revolutionary Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets); published in Paris from April 1920 to July 1940. Its editor was P. N. Milyukov. p. 490

[401] Reference is to the co-report by Sokolov "On the Tax in Kind and

the Change in the Policy of Soviet Power" at the general meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) group at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, May 18, 1921. Sokolov sent it to Lenin requesting him to read it and reply to a number of questions which it raised. p. 491

[402] In the draft of his co-report Sokolov quoted the following passage from Engels: "The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government at a time when society is not yet ripe for the domination of the class he represents and for the measures which that domination implies" (Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*, Moscow, 1965, p. 112). p. 492

[403] *Dzerzhinsky*, *F. E.* (1877-1926)—Party member from 1895. After the October Socialist Revolution he became Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (known as the Cheka). In 1921 he was appointed People's Commissar for Railways, while remaining Chairman of the Cheka and People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Member of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 499

[404] *Pavlovich*, *M. P.* (*Veltman*, *M. L.*) (1871-1929)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. He became a Communist after 1917, and from 1921 was a member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Affairs of Nationalities. p. 501

[405] Reference is to the preparations for the publication of the *Vsemirny geografichesky atlas* (Geographical Atlas of the World), launched on Lenin's initiative. The project was not realised. p. 501

[406] *Avanesov*, *V. A.* (1884-1930)—joined the Party in 1903. In 1917 he became a member of the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C.; in 1920-24, Deputy People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, member of the Collegium of the Cheka, and later Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade. p. 504

[407] *Workers' and Peasants' Inspection* (*Rabkrin*) was set up in February 1920 on Lenin's initiative, on the basis of the reorganised People's Commissariat of State Control, which had been formed in the early months of Soviet power. Lenin attached great importance to control and verification at all levels. He worked out in detail the principles of organising control in the Soviet state, kept an eye on Rabkrin's activity, criticised its shortcomings and did his best to make it more efficient. In his last articles, "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection" and "Better Fewer, but Better", Lenin outlined a plan for reorganising Rabkrin. The basic principles of Lenin's plan were to merge Party and state control and to enlist more workers and peasants in its activities. p. 504

[408] When the Regulations on the Council of Labour and Defence's Commission for Utilising the Material Resources of the R.S.F.S.R. were being drawn up, differences of opinion concerning the functions of the commission arose between A. B. Khalatov (People's Commissar for Food), G. M. Krzhizhanovsky (State Planning Commission), P. A. Bogdanov (Supreme Economic Council) and L. N. Kritsman (Commission for Utilising Material Resources).

On June 14, 1921, the Council of People's Commissars endorsed the amended draft Regulations drawn up by the State Planning Commission. On June 29, the Regulations, which on the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars had been edited by a commission composed of Bogdanov, Krzhizhanovsky, Kritsman and Khalatov, were signed by Lenin. p. 506

[409] On July 9, 1921, the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) passed a decision "On Intensifying Food Work". It stated: "The Organising Bureau should confirm the need to take the maximum number of Communists and, in exceptional cases, other particularly valuable comrades, from their present work and transfer them to food work, even at the cost of causing a temporary dosing-down of nine-tenths of departments in some institutions and even whole People's Commissariats that are not absolutely essential." p. 509

[410] Reference is to the commission for assisting economic bodies. p. 511

[411] Reference is to the introduction Adoratsky wrote for the book which Lenin had asked him to prepare, *K. Marks i F. Engels. Pisma. Teoriya i politika v perepiske Marksa i Engelsa* (Letters. Theory and Policy in the Correspondence of Marx and Engels). The book appeared in 1922. p. 516

[412] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, pp. 59-60, 126-27. p. 516

[413] Adoratsky was preparing for the press the book *Programma po osnovnym voprosam Marksizma* (Programme on the Basic Problems of Marxism), published in 1922. p. 516

[414] Reference is to Safarov's pamphlet *Ocheredniye voprosy naisionalnoi politiki* (Current Questions of the Nationalities Policy), published in 1921. p. 518

[415] *Oblomov*—landowner in Goncharov's novel of the same name, personifying sluggishness, stagnation and inertia. p. 519

[416] Professor G. O. Graftio, Chief Engineer at the Construction of the Volkhov Hydro-Power Station, had stated that some institutions were taking a bureaucratic attitude to the project. p. 521

[417] Reference is apparently to the transfer of Store No. 11 from the People's Commissariat of Railways to the Supreme Economic Council. p. 523

[418] This refers to the decision of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars on the allocation of 2,000 million rubles for repairing houses in Moscow, passed on October 21, 1921. p. 528

[419] Reference is to Krzhizhanovsky's book *Khozyaistvenniye problemy R.S.F.S.R. i raboty Gosudarstvennoi obshcheplanovoi komissii* (*Gosplana*) (The Economic Problems of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Work of the State General Planning Commission [Gosplan]), Part I. The book appeared in December 1921 with the addition, of which Lenin writes in this letter. p. 530

[420] On December 1, 1921, the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.), having heard Lenin's report on the work of Tsyurupa, endorsed his appointment as Second Deputy Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence. On December 5, by decision of the Political Bureau Tsyurupa was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 535

[421] *Bednota* (The Poor)—daily peasant newspaper published in Moscow from March 27, 1918, to February 1, 1931, when it was merged with *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (Socialist Agriculture). p. 543

[422] Reference is to Gorev's pamphlet *Elektrifikatsia Frantsii* (The Electrification of France). It was published in 1922. p. 544

[423] Lenin refers to the book by Karl Ballod *Der Zukunftsstaat* (The State of the Future), a Russian translation of which appeared in 1920. Lenin writes of Ballod's book in his article "An Integrated Economic Plan" (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 140). p. 544

[424] The introduction to A. Gorev's pamphlet *Elektrifikatsia Frantsii* (The Electrification of France) was not written by Lenin. p. 545

[425] *GUM*—a state department store in Moscow, of which Belov was director at the time. p. 547

[426] *Martens, L. K.* (1875-1948)—Communist, technological engineer. In 1921 he was member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council. p. 551

[427] *Pletnyov, V. F.* (1886-1942)—one of the leaders of the Proletcult. He and A. Bogdanov spread anti-Marxist reactionary ideas on culture and art claiming that such ideas represented "proletarian culture". For a criticism of the views of the Proletcult supporters see present edition, Vol. 29, p. 336 and Vol. 31, pp. 316-17. p. 554

FROM MARX TO MAO
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[428] Lenin refers to the article by I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov "Chto takoye spets i kak yego delayut" ("What a Specialist Is and How He Is Made"), published in *Pravda* No. 244, October 28, 1922. p. 557

[429] Reference is to the following passage from the article by Skvortsov-Stepanov: "Here, too, the *class struggle* must develop, the struggle between socialism and 'capitalist craftsmanship' or 'craftsmen's capitalism', more likely the latter. After what has been said the reader will not be surprised by the abnormality of this phrase. It is no more abnormal than the real relations which it expresses." p. 557

[430] *International Workers' Aid*—an international proletarian organisation, set up in 1921 to help the population of the parts of Soviet Russia which in 1921 were struck by famine because of the bad harvest. Its chairman was Clara Zetkin, and its General Secretary, Willi Münzenberg. International Workers' Aid was active in collecting money, provisions and medical supplies, organising children's homes, etc. In 1922 the I.W.A. launched a number of industrial and agricultural projects in Soviet Russia to promote her economic rehabilitation. The I.W.A. later grew into a powerful organisation, which rendered great assistance to the international working-class movement. p. 559

IDENTIFICATION OF PSEUDONYMS, NICKNAMES AND INITIALS USED IN THE TEXT

A. Alexander—Shlyapnikov, A. G.
A. M., Al. M., Al. Max.—Gorky, A. M.
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An—Ananun, D.
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E. B., Eug. B.—Bosh, Eugène

Foma-Piterests—Smirnov, A. P.
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LENIN

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36

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PREFACE

Volume 36 contains some of Lenin's writings from 1900 to 1923. A large part of the volume consists of his letters directly connected with the letters, telegrams and notes printed in volumes 34 and 35. The letters for 1900-03 to P. B. Axelrod, G. V. Plekhanov, V. P. Nogin, S. I. Radchenko, P. N. Lepeshinsky and P. A. Krasikov, Yelena Stasova and others show Lenin's varied activity in creating the first all-Russia illegal Marxist paper, *Iskra*, and the journal *Zarya*, and throw light on his struggle against "Legal Marxism" and Economism. The letters for 1903-04 to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. A. Noskov, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, G. D. Leiteisen and others relate to Lenin's struggle against the disrupting and disorganising activities of the Mensheviks after the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The correspondence for 1905-07 sheds light on Lenin's activity in connection with the calling of the Third Party Congress and the fulfilment of its decisions.

The documents for the years of reaction show the measures taken by Lenin to resume publication of the newspaper *Proletary* in Geneva and improve the work of the Central Organ, and his struggle against open and undercover liquidationism and the attempts to distort the theoretical foundations of the revolutionary Marxist party.

A number of documents reflect Lenin's activity in the International Socialist Bureau.

A large number of letters during the years of the First World War addressed to V. A. Karpinsky, A. G. Shlyapnikov, Alexandra Kollontai and others deal with the resump-

tion of publication of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (the Central Organ of the Party), the rallying of internationalist elements, and the exposure of social-chauvinism and Centrism in Russian and international Social-Democracy. The question of calling the internationalists' conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal is a prominent one in these letters.

A considerable part of the documents in the volume represent spadework done by Lenin—plans, summaries, outlines, theses. Among them are the "Preliminary Draft of the April Theses", "Plan for a Report on the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)", "Draft Decree on Consumers' Communes. Preliminary Theses", "Material for the Fourth (Extraordinary) All-Russia Congress of Soviets", "Notes on the Question of Reorganising State Control", "On Polytechnical Education. Notes on Theses by Nadezhda Konstantinovna*", "Notes for a Speech at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Substitution of Food Requisitioning by a Tax", "Notes for a Report at the Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Workers", "Notes on the History of the R.C.P.", "Notes for a Speech on March 27, 1922", "Notes for a Report 'Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution'", and "Outline of Speech at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets".

The volume includes 59 works (marked with an asterisk in the contents) which were first published in the *Collected Works* in the Fourth Russian Edition. Three letters to G. V. Plekhanov—November 9, 1900, July 13, 1901 and December 1, 1902—relate to the period when Plekhanov was a member of *Iskra*'s editorial board. They draw attention to the need to repel the efforts of some members of the board to weaken *Iskra*'s fight against opportunism and revisionism, and give details on the preparation of material for the various issues of the paper.

In a letter to Karl H. Branting on April 19, 1901, Lenin invites the Swedish and Finnish Social-Democrats to establish closer relations through contributions to the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya*. Lenin points out how important it would be for the Russian people, the Russian workers

* N. K. Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

in particular, to be informed about the political state of the people of Finland and their struggle against tsarism.

The volume includes the "Preface to the Speeches of Nizhni-Novgorod-Workers in Court", written before December 1 (14), 1902. In his letters to the secretary of the British Labour Representation Committee, dated March 23 and May 20, 1905, Lenin gives an account of the disbursement of the money sent in aid of the families who had suffered of "Bloody Sunday" (January 9, [22], 1905).

In a letter to Lydia Fotieva on June 1 or 2, 1905, Lenin tells of his intention to give a lecture in Paris on "The Third Congress and Its Decisions". The article, "The State of Affairs in the Party", written in July 1911 during the preparations for the Party Conference at Prague, deals with the struggle against the conciliators and their Menshevik and Trotskyite allies, who were trying to prevent the calling of the Conference.

Eight letters addressed to the editorial board of the Bolshevik paper *Pravda* (five in October and November 1912, and three between February and April 1914) show Lenin's guidance of *Pravda*, which brought up a whole generation of revolutionary Russian workers known as "Pravdists"- the letters deal at length with the work of the editorial board in connection with the Fourth Duma election campaign.

The volume includes nine articles written for *Pravda* in 1912 and 1913 but not printed at the time, and 16 articles published in *Pravda* in 1913 and 1914, part of them unsigned, part over various pen-names, and which were only established as belonging to Lenin on the strength of fresh archive documents.

His articles "After the Elections in America", "More Zeal than Sense" and "In America" expose the deception of the masses by the bourgeois parties, and the cynical and dirty trading in "party principles" during the elections to secure the fat jobs in the Administration. Lenin showed how the American multimillionaires, under the pretext of providing external defence for the state, were in reality defending the interests of the capitalist monopolies; he explained that the workers of all countries stood for peace, and that imperialist wars waged in the interests of the capitalists involved tremendous sacrifices.

In a number of articles, Lenin analyses the working-class movement in Germany. The proletariat's growing indignation against the imperialists and the plunder of the masses by a handful of capitalist arms manufacturers is described in "The German Social-Democrats and Armaments". In "Lessons of the Belgian Strike", he examines the general strike by the Belgian proletariat in April 1913 to back up their demand for universal suffrage. "The High Cost of Living and the 'Hard' Life of the Capitalists" and "Capitalism and Female Labour" deal with the plight of the workers in tsarist Russia and give a vivid description of the enrichment of a handful of capitalists and the impoverishment and ruin of the masses of working people in capitalist conditions.

Included for the first time in the Fourth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works* are the plan for a lecture on "The Russian Revolution, Its Significance and Its Tasks", delivered at Zurich not later than March 27, 1917; a letter to Giacinto M. Serrati of December 4, 1918; "Draft Third Clause of the General Political Section of the Programme (for the Programme Commission of the Eighth Party Congress)", showing the essence of proletarian socialist democracy and its basic distinction from bourgeois democracy; a telegram to Bela Kun of May 13, 1919, with greetings for the Red Army of the Hungarian workers and peasants, and a letter to Bela Kun of June 18, 1919, warning him not to trust the Entente,* which was only trying to gain time to crush the revolution.

A group of documents (December 31, 1920-August 5, 1921) deal with the manufacture of electric ploughs.

In a letter to the chairman of the State Bank, A. L. Sheinman, on February 28, 1922, Lenin points to the defects in the work of the State Bank and the need for a more careful selection of personnel. In a letter to N. Osinsky on April 12, 1922, Lenin underlines the importance of studying and broadly popularising advanced local experience.

The volume includes documents dictated by Lenin in December 1922-January 1923: "Letter to the Congress", known as the "Testament", and letters "Granting Legis-

* See Note 260.—*Ed.*

lative Functions to the State Planning Commission" and "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'".

These works lead up to Lenin's last writings, which are of programme significance: "Pages from a Diary", "On Co-operation", "Our Revolution (Apropos of N. Sukhanov's Notes)", "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Recommendation for the Twelfth Party Congress)" and "Better Fewer, But Better" dictated in January and February 1923 and published at the time in *Pravda* (see present edition, Vol. 33).

In his "Letter to the Congress" Lenin emphasises the need to preserve the Communist Party's unity, and proposes practical steps to ensure it, enhance the Central Committee's prestige and improve the Party machinery. Lenin proposes that the number of members of the Party's C.C. should be increased to between 50 and 100. He describes the personality of some Central Committee members, and points out Stalin's defects and suggests a discussion of the question of replacing him by another comrade as Secretary-General.

In his letter "Granting Legislative Functions to the State Planning Commission" Lenin points out the need to extend its terms of reference and tells of the political and business qualities its leaders should possess.

Of great importance is Lenin's letter, "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", written before and during the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It vividly brings out Lenin's role as the true inspirer and creator of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and his concern for a correct national policy and the strengthening of the U.S.S.R. He demands the application of the principles of proletarian internationalism and the strengthening of the friendship of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, great and small.

He condemns the Great-Power deviation in the national question as the principal danger at the time, points out the harmfulness of Great-Power and chauvinist distortion of the idea of unifying the Soviet republics, and denounces the excessive centralism and bureaucratic practices in this sphere. He stresses the need to ensure full and effective equality of nations, to exercise skill in conducting the

national policy and take account of the particular features and interests of the various nations, and to strengthen the sovereignty of each republic as a necessary condition for the people's unity and fraternal friendship.

* *
*

The works of Lenin included in Volume 36 are given in chronological order, with the documents sent from abroad dated in the New Style.

The volume contains an index of names identifying the assumed names used in the text.

1900

TO Y. M. STEKLOV[1]

Letter to Nakhamkis

1. We shall carry it.

2. The pluses of the article. [Remarks about the mass and Social-Democratic mass movement—the impossibility for Social-Democrats to renounce their strict Social-Democratic principles even for a moment—about propaganda and agitation, and the relationship between political rights and political freedom. About not narrowing down the significance of May Day, etc.]

3. The minus. Some minor alterations in the article are desirable, and we suggest what they might be, hoping that joint discussions of them will bring us to complete agreement.

Firstly, there is need for a summing-up of what has been said, a résumé, a conclusion, as you yourself have already pointed out. Secondly, in connection with this, a rewording of some passages and a shortening of the rest of the article (whose total length *must not exceed 1 printed sheet*) are desirable (for example, the following passages might be cut down: p. 3 [N.B. 2]; p. 39 [N.B. 16] and some others). It seems to us that the rewording should consist in the following: the whole form of the article has become something of a challenge ("open letter", the official form of address, etc.), and this is hardly desirable. You yourself pointed out some of the extremes in the present polemics ("Mr. G.'s stalwarts",[2] and similar things) and *you were quite right*; but since these extremes were there, we should now be more careful—not in the sense of conceding one iota of principle, but in the sense of refraining from *needlessly* embittering those who are working for Social-Democracy within the limits of their understanding. Perhaps a

criticism of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* programme in the third person would be better in this respect?

For the same reasons it would be appropriate to make some "allowance" for the formal side of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* programme. After all, it is not the programme of a party, nor even the draft programme of a party, so that it is incorrect to compare it with the programmes of the French and German Social-Democrats (at any rate, when such a comparison is made without reservations, as it is on your p. 42 [N.B. 17]).The criticism of the *formal* side of the programme could be abbreviated (you yourself expressed the desire, on p. 2, to "leave aside" the formal defects), reducing the formal shortcomings, as *particular* cases, to the *general* defect of the programme in principle. We think that such an alteration is desirable with respect to the critical remarks on pp. 45 (N.B. 20), 39 (N.B.16), 20 (N.B. 9) and 6 (N.B. 6). The brusque formulation of these remarks here and there might give the people occasion to speak (and not entirely without foundation) of faultfinding. The superfluous (from the strictly theoretical standpoint) reminder of the need to reckon with local conditions, etc., could be the result, not of the editorial board having failed to master scientific socialism, but of its wishing to emphasise this quite obvious point just at this moment, when it saw the need to do so. And is there not sometimes a need to stress even self-evident things? We *do not deny at all* that, in the present case, *75 per cent*—only 75 per cent—of the "need" boiled down to the "need" of bowing and scraping before *Rabochaya Mysl*. If we forget about the remaining 25 per cent, we shall give the people a chance to accuse us of faultfinding, whereas if we reduce these formal defects, *as particular instances*, to the general defect of principle, we shall take the faultfinding edge off our remarks and reinforce our line of argument.

Now a few more detailed remarks:

P. 17 (N.B. 8), footnote 1. The remark "What does this dream augur?" is obscure.

P. 24 (N.B. 11). You cannot say that Social-Democracy "is little concerned about whether its demands are attainable". We understand your idea and accept it, but it should be expressed with greater care and precision; "cannot make

the immediate possibility of attainment the supreme test" would indicate the road that *needs to be* taken, not the possibility of early practical success, or something of that sort.

P. 32 (N.B. 13)—"to use its own expression": isn't that too strong?

P. 33 (N.B. 14)—"to seize, etc.": an awkward, incautious expression, because of the word "seize".

P. 35 (footnote *in fine**). (N.B. 15.)

"Gendarmes" and so forth. Would it not be better to strike out or change this?

P. 43 (N.B. 18). Too strong. "Peasantry" is a term we cannot *eschew*.

P. 44 (N.B. 19). Too strong and blunt. The question of what the peasantry can provide is still far from settled by the Russian Social-Democrats (compare the footnote to the 1885 Programme of the Emancipation of Labour group[3]), and is hardly likely to be decided in the sense that the political role of the peasants is equal to *zero* (cf. *Der 18. Brumaire*[4]).

I hope to have a letter from you in reply to this, and not a letter alone, but the article as well (preferably not later than in 2 weeks' time, 3 weeks at the outside).

G. V. has looked through the article and has also decided *in favour* of it, noting only the passage on p. 24 (about the possibility of attainment).

P.S. The "we" in this letter are those with whom you had a talk at Bellerive.[5] *We do not undertake as yet to speak for the whole editorial board with complete certainty*, but hope this will not produce any unpleasant consequences either for you or for us.

Written not later than September 4, 1900
Sent from Nuremberg to Paris

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* At the end.—*Ed.*

TO ***[6]

Dear Comrade,

We have received your letter, and hasten to reply.

If you consider the passing on of my words to G. as "retribution", as an unpleasant duty, then of course I must withdraw my request. If you do not find it unpleasant, please pass on my words on some suitable occasion, in a conversation, not as a complaint but as a correction. At all events, please bear in mind that I *do not insist*.

We *are not displaying* the "revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation"[7] signboard: when we wrote to you we emphasised that we were an independent literary undertaking.[8]

Whether we shall have an "impossible" polemic is a question we dealt with in our previous letter.

We have no intention whatever of forgoing personal acquaintance with this or that ally, but see no useful purpose in having special relations between the Literary Group[9] and the Union[10] at the present time, because the Union's distrust of us can be dissipated, I repeat, only by our publications, and any preliminary conversations would be futile.

There has not been, and cannot be any question of "considering the Literary Group's attitude to the Union binding upon you".

If your refusal to participate is quite out of the question we are very glad not to have understood you quite correctly, and hasten to send you an address to which all material from Russia could be sent (the Rögner address given you can be used only from abroad, and please don't pass it on to anyone else). Please inform us what you might con-

tribute to the journal and the newspaper, whether or not you have anything ready and, if not, when you think you could write.

Written in Munich
between September 6 and 15, 1900

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

October 10, 1900

Dear P. B.,

I have received your letter with the enclosures. Thanks for these.

About the English journal (there were two messages in it) my sister[11] says that she doesn't remember the title exactly —something like *Family Pictures*[12]—a yellow cover with red drawings, an illustrated journal, somewhat larger than *Neue Zeit*,[13] about 10 sheets; she says she gave it to you, in the presence of your wife, to pass on to me.

Alexei is well, writing, busy organising contacts. He will be free in six or eight weeks, hardly earlier. My brother[14] is still here, keeps putting it off.

The statement will be ready in a few days, and I shall of course send it on to you.[15] There is already plenty of copy for the paper; only a pity that it's mostly highly specific workers' stuff, strikes and strikes, and descriptions of the workers' condition. Nothing at all on internal questions.

Dietz has undertaken to publish the journal for us. The type has been bought, but there is still no responsible editor[16]: one arrangement has fallen through, but there are others in view. If we fail to find a responsible editor, we shall move the printing press elsewhere.

How is your health? Do you manage to do any work? I suppose Paris has completely worn you out? Let us know about the article on Liebknecht[17] for the journal and *for the paper*—how do matters stand, and when can we expect to have it?

I shake you warmly by the hand, and wish you the best of health and more free time.

Yours,
Petroff

Here is the best address:

Herrn Dr. Med. *Carl Lehmann*,
Gabelsbergerstrasse 20a, *München*.

Inside, on the second envelope: for Petrov.
(Excuse the scribble!)

P.S. We have just had a letter from Nakhamkis, from which it appears that there has been a misunderstanding about the subject of the Paris congresses.[18] You asked Gurevich to write, and of course this was very good. Koltsov wrote to tell us that he intended to deal with the same subject, and even informed Nakhamkis that we had "commissioned" him to write about it, which was not actually the case. Would you write to Koltsov suggesting that he should rather take up some other subject? Will you do this, please, since we don't know exactly where he is at present. We are writing to tell Nakhamkis that he and Gurevich should divide this work between them.

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

October 18, 1900

Dear P. B.,

I received your long and kind letter of Oct. 15 yesterday. Many thanks for it. We were very glad to learn that you are better, and that you can get on with your work. Your article for the paper is being copied already! You are outstripping us: we are still unable to get organised to have someone copy out all the things that have to be sent off. Zagorskaya[19] has still not arrived, while the stuff to be copied keeps piling up. Sometimes I feel quite exhausted and out of touch with my real work.

I did not quite understand your hint about the impending "trouble" with the Parisians.[20] Of course it would be terribly difficult for you to write about everything; but perhaps you will pass on the substance of it to Vera Ivanovna, who, we hope, will soon be coming here?

We still have no responsible editor.... The statement has been prepared and sent to Russia (I will soon send you a copy), and before long it will be possible to begin setting up the paper. We intend to publish a long report, "May Day Demonstrations in Kharkov" (about 50,000 letters and spaces), as a separate pamphlet,[21] and to print only a very brief extract in the newspaper; after all, we cannot take up three-quarters of a sheet with a single article! (The newspaper will have 3 columns a page, approximately 6,000 letters each, or, to be more precise, "letters and spaces".) (We intend the first issue to have 2 sheets, 8 pages.) What do you think?

Thanks for the advice on correspondents' reports. We shall certainly try to make use of it, because that would, of course, only improve the make-up of the paper.[22]

I quite agree with your view of my brother's journey. What can one do with him? We are constantly receiving warnings from every side—both from Paris (that people arriving from Russia mention us all three by name), and from Russia (that I was traced on my way here,[23] and that in one provincial town they arrested a perfectly innocent man, a distant relative, *who had never seen one in his life*, and asked him what instructions I had given him!)—and I am doing my utmost to persuade my brother either not to go, or to go for a fortnight all told; I keep arguing with him, ridiculing him, abusing him (I have never abused him so violently)—but nothing seems to have any effect: he keeps saying he wants to go home! And now he has brought matters to the point of the statement being sent to Russia, which means (if the statement arrives, and that is certain) a direct indication of the new literary undertaking. After all, there's not much longer to wait before Alexei arrives, surely? My "opponent" is about to arrive, and I will give him this to read—let him "refute" it, if he can do so without a twinge of conscience!

We are both quite well, but very edgy: the main thing is this agonising uncertainty[24]; these German rascals keep putting us off daily with "tomorrows". What I could do to them!

Yes, I quite forgot (please be so kind as to forgive the hasty tone of this letter!)—we have already had negotiations with Buchholtz but he refused, refused flatly. He is pressing upon us a *Vermittlerrolle*,* and won't budge!

My very best wishes, and greetings to all your family.

Yours,
Petrov

Zagorskaya has just arrived. I will be seeing her tomorrow.

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

* The role of intermediary.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

October 19

Dear P. B.,

A short P.S. to yesterday's letter, so as not to make you answer questions which have turned out to be *erledigt*.*

We have just received the Parisians' letters, and at once understood what I wrote to you yesterday that I had not quite understood**: namely, your warning to be "wise as serpents" (easier said than done!) and to keep away from the "émigrés". The tone of the letters is such that it serves as an excellent commentary on your remark, which is now quite clear to me.

Yours,
Petrov

Written on October 19, 1900
Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* Settled.—*Ed.*

** See p. 36 this volume.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

October 21, 1900

Dear P. B.,

I saw Zagorskaya only yesterday; she passed on to me something from you.

Please send us the article (on Liebknecht) as soon as it is copied out. From what Zagorskaya said I could not get an idea of the exact size of the article, but size is, after all, not the main consideration: we can always make room, and it will always be a pleasure to do so, for your article.

As regards the lady from Paris who is going to South Russia in a month's time, and wants recommendations. I think the best thing to do is to introduce her to my sister, who is now in Paris and will be staying there another three weeks, if not more. If you agree with this plan, let us know this lady's name and address, and also write some little note to present to her on your behalf (if that should be necessary). Send it either to me, or to my sister (103 Rue de la Glacière. M-lle Loukachevitsch, *Paris*. For Blank).

I hear that you have sent a cushion and an English journal over here. To what address, and for whom, if it was marked *postlagernd**? Zagorskaya could tell me nothing about this.

All the very best,

Yours,

Petrov

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* Poste restante.—*Ed.*

P.S. I enclose a copy of our statement for America.[25] We *don't* want to *circulate it here*—at any rate, certainly not until it has appeared in Russia in sufficient quantities (and we have had no news yet from Russia about this). We have thought, therefore, of sending the statement at present only to you and to G. V., but if you think it *essential* to send it to America without waiting for news from Russia, then of course do so.

Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO V. P. NOGIN

November 2, 1900

Please forgive me, dear Novosyolov, that I am so disgracefully late with my reply to your letter of October 17. I was constantly distracted by "petty" matters and chores here, and was also waiting for a reply from Alexei. It was essential to wait for a reply, in order to clear up the question of our editorial statement. Alexei has decided not to circulate it at present. Therefore, in sending you a copy, I *beg* you to keep it secret for the time being, and *not* to show it to *anyone* (apart perhaps from that close friend of yours who has authority from the St. Petersburg group, and about whom you write[26]) and, in any case, not let it pass into anyone else's hands. In general, we have decided not to circulate this thing abroad until it has been distributed in Russia, and since Alexei is holding it back over there, it is particularly important for us to see that it does not spread out here. Counting on your close participation in our undertaking, I decided to make an exception and to acquaint you with the statement. When reading it please bear in mind that the intention is to publish both a paper and a *journal* (or a *miscellany*); but the statement says nothing about the latter for certain special reasons connected with the plan for publishing the journal.[27] Therefore, some passages of the statement should be read as applying *not only* to the paper.

Please write and tell me what impression the statement has made on you and your friend.

What type of "agitation journal" do the members of the *Rabocheye Znamya* group propose to publish (it was about them you wrote, wasn't it?)? What kind of journal is it to be, and who is to work on it?

As regards shipment across the frontier into Russia, I think this will always be easily done: we have connections with several groups who carry on such transport, and in addition a member of our group was recently given a promise (a solid one, judging by everything) that they would be able to take anyone across the frontier into Russia without a passport. This, I think, is easily arranged.

The Russian passport business is much worse. So far there is nothing, and the "prospects" are still very indefinite. Perhaps this too will be arranged by the spring.

I shall probably be staying on here for a fairly long time, and our correspondence can therefore continue without inconvenience.

You ask what work we should like to request you to take on. I think that (by the spring or by the autumn, whenever you intend to move) the following work will be of especial importance for us: (1) transport of literature across the frontier; (2) delivery throughout Russia; (3) organisation of workers' groups to circulate the paper and collect information, etc., i.e., in general, organisation of the circulation of the paper and of close and proper connections between it and individual committees and groups. We pin great hopes on your co-operation, particularly in the business of direct contacts with the workers in various places. Does such work appeal to you? Have you anything against travelling? It would probably require constant travels.

Is the St. Petersburg group, from which your friend has authority, still in existence? If so, could he provide addresses for contacts in St. Petersburg and a password, in order to transmit our statement to them? Have they any connections with the workers in general, and the St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation in particular[28]?

All the best, and I wish you the speediest and easiest emergence from quarantine abroad.

Yours,
Petroff

P.S. Have I written the address correctly?
Please confirm receipt of this letter.

Sent from Munich to London

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

November 3

I received your letter yesterday, dear P. B., and have today already sent off the note to my sister. I have not passed on the letter to V. I.

Before I forget: please, let me know *to whom* the cushion and the English book you sent here were addressed. *I have not yet received them*. If you sent them *postlagernd*, was it the ordinary *postlagernd* or *Bahnhofpostlagernd*,* or some other way? V. I. could not tell me, and I have been waiting for your letter all this time, but there is no mention of this in it. Since I don't know the name in the address, I cannot make inquiries. Please, ask Vera Pavlovna to drop me a line about this, and kindly forgive me for worrying you again and again with these trifles.

As regards the article on Liebknecht, truly we don't know what to do. Your article turned out to be long enough *for the journal*: 8 pages (according to V. I., similar to those in *Nakanune*[29] in small type, i.e., about 8,000 letters per page)—this makes 64,000 letters, and even if we take *Nakanune*'s larger type, it will come to *about 50,000 letters*! Our paper will have the *Vorwärts* format, also in three columns. Each column of about 6,000 letters, which means that *half* your article will take up an entire page of the newspaper, plus another column! This is extremely inconvenient for the paper, apart from the inconvenience of dividing up such an article as yours about Liebknecht.

I will calculate all this more precisely when your article arrives. We shall do our best to carry it, but if this proves to be impossible because of the size, will you be

* Railway poste restante.—*Ed.*

so good as to allow us to publish it as a pamphlet supplement to the paper (if you are writing about Liebknecht separately for the journal)? We are now setting up the *May Day Demonstrations in Kharkov* pamphlet (50,000 letters); then will come the turn of the paper, and then of your pamphlet about Liebknecht; if it proves necessary, an obituary could be written for the paper, with a reference to the pamphlet. What do you think of that?

I repeat that all this is mere supposition; it is essential to make an exact calculation, and when I do this, on receipt of your article, I will write to you at once.

I wish you all the best, and particularly that you should get well again as soon as possible. Kindest regards to your family.

Yours,
Petrov

Written on November 3, 1900
Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

November 8

Dear P. B.,

I have received your letter of the 5th and the article.[30] Many thanks. The alterations probably involved a great deal of work and must have caused even more annoyance, because condensing such a subject must be extremely uninteresting work. It is all the more valuable to us that you undertook to do it. Please excuse us for not sending you the articles: our "secretary" is, unfortunately, burdened with serious family duties, and therefore the copying proceeds very slowly. I enclose an article, "New Friends of the Russian Proletariat", which we want to publish in No. 1 as a feature.[31] Please let us know your opinion (you can pencil it on the article) and then be kind enough to send it onto G. V.

As regards the Parisians, we decided on the very tactics you advised: on the one hand, "not to arm", and on the other, "to abstain". Of course, they are dissatisfied with our abstention and we were recently obliged (of necessity) to give such a rebuff to their expression of dissatisfaction that we feared a "cooling-off" (feared is not quite the right word, because we decided to give this rebuff even if it should inevitably lead to a rupture). Yesterday, we received a reply from the "secretary" of the group they have formed in Paris[32]; judging by the reply, our rebuff has had no harmful consequences, and "all is well". Let's hope that this will continue to be so in the future. It is quite true that later on we shall probably have to think of the "rules" and the other pleasant and interesting things you mention:

but it was a master-stroke on your part to have set approximately six months for this. It would be premature so long as the undertaking is not "in full working order"; we are completely in agreement with you in this respect.

But I cannot agree with you about beginning to appear here openly. I cannot as yet think that "legality has already been lost". To my mind, it has not *yet* been lost, and this "yet" may last another few months, during which time much will be clarified. (My brother is already in Russia, and so far all is well. The traveller[33] is also wandering successfully, so far.) And even if there were a complete and final loss of legality, there might be weighty considerations against coming out openly (for example, considerations about journeys home). Therefore, until the first issues have appeared, and until all of us (including Alexei and my brother) get together, I shall, in any case, remain in hiding. If the undertaking is destined to be a success, this decision may soon change, but my earlier "optimism" about this condition has been thoroughly shaken by "the humdrum of life".[34]

As regards the journal, it will soon be clear, I suppose, whether we shall organise it here or seek refuge in other countries. As soon as this is cleared up, I shall let you know.

I find it very inconvenient to write to America, for after all I know no one there, and no one there knows me, and all the same it will be necessary to use you as an intermediary. Would it not, therefore, be better for you to write direct, and to send the statement, informing them that it comes from a Russian group, stating your attitude to this group and saying that a pamphlet, *May Day Demonstrations in Kharkov*, is now being set at the same printing press, and that when it is finished the paper will be set; that the statement says nothing about a journal (or a miscellany) for technical reasons of secrecy, but that for No. 1 there are being written (or are ready) such-and-such articles by G. V., yourself and Kautsky (*Erinnerungen**, an interesting piece which V. I. is already translating), and others. It seems to me that all the aims you mention will be attained much better and much more directly by your letter,

* Reminiscences.—*Ed.*

while your dispatch of the statement to America no longer entails (I think) any undesirable publicity, particularly the sending of one copy for the secretary of the society there to read out at its meeting.[35]

All best wishes,
Yours,
Petroff

P.S. I have received the cushion and the book.

Written on November 8, 1900
Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 9

I received your letter today, dear Georgi Valentinovich, and at once sent you by registered book-post (1) the article "What Has Happened?" by Puttman; (2) the article by Byvaly, and (3) the article by D. Koltsov about the Paris Congress.[36]

Vera Ivanovna found this last article quite unacceptable and I entirely agree with her. The article is uninteresting, quite unsuitable for the journal (especially since you will be writing about Millerand[37]) and much too long for the paper. It contains 22,000-27,000 letters, whereas for the paper we need an item of 6,000-9,000 letters or only a little more. We would therefore like to ask Rakovsky to write an article of that size for the paper, and to reject Koltsov's article. We decided to send it on to you, all the more since you were going to reply to Rakovsky. So do as you find most appropriate—either reject Koltsov's article and order one from Rakovsky, or request Koltsov to rewrite and shorten the article, under your guidance. It seems to us more probable that you will choose the first alternative, and in that case you can of course refer to us when informing Koltsov, and we can write to him ourselves as soon as we get your reply.

I am sending the article by Byvaly for polishing up and insertion of some corrections which you indicated. Of course you may make corrections: please do so with all the articles, either making them in pencil right in the manuscript or on separate sheets. I can, if you like, write to Byvaly afterwards about these corrections—he is not likely

to take a rigid stand, but if he does, we shall have to discuss the matter and make a choice: whether or not to take the whole as it is. The only thing I cannot agree with you on at all is the suggestion to cut out the mention of Bakharev's pamphlet,[38] and this not so much because it would be extremely unpleasant for the author, as because I, too, consider Bakharev's pamphlet useful (in spite of its defects), for it raises a really important point and, on the whole, deals with it correctly. Byvaly writes not only about the old but also about the new; if serious revolutionaries had no need of such pamphlets in the 1870s, we nowadays certainly have need of them, and we had the firm intention to print a critical but approving note about it (possibly in the paper, but not in No. 1). The fact that quite young workers and intellectuals are being drawn into the mass movement, who have almost completely forgotten, or rather have no knowledge of what used to happen in the old days and how, and the absence of organisation of "experienced" revolutionaries—all this makes it necessary to publish pamphlets about rules of behaviour for socialists. The Poles have such a pamphlet,[39] which seems to give a great deal more than Bakharev's does. Vera Ivanovna agrees that the mention of Bakharev should not be cut out. In certain conditions, if you think it useful, a discussion in the journal on the question of the possible importance of such pamphlets might perhaps not be altogether irrelevant.

We intend Byvaly's article for the journal and not the paper. Vera Ivanovna says that our paper turns out to be at a lower level, in terms of the readers for whom it is intended, than you probably imagine. Vera Ivanovna is on the whole rather dissatisfied with the paper: she says it is of the *Rabocheye Dyelo type*, only somewhat more literary, more brushed up. I have sent one article to Pavel Borisovich, asking him to send it on to you. It would be quite inconvenient to have the question of Kautsky's resolution shortened and abridged to the size of a newspaper article and that is why we should like the journal to carry an article or item on this question by you. Or perhaps you intend to confine yourself to something very small? Probably even an item on this subject will require about 10 printed pages, i.e., about 20,000 letters, if not more?

I must say that I thought you would be willing to write an item about Solovyov. Puttman is hardly likely to take it on. I shall write to him, but I am not very hopeful.

Vera Ivanovna is prepared to write about the Decembrists,[40] but what about the material? We shall write immediately to have them send us what they can. Perhaps you too will suggest what it would be particularly important to have for this work. I think the most important thing is the historical journals, which are not available here.

Gurevich is writing a big article for the journal on French affairs, and for the newspaper on the national congress. Goldendakh or Nakhamkis was going to write about the International Congress, but did not.

Please send us your article, "Socialism and the Political Struggle " (it can be sent by registered book-post *to the same address of Lehmann*); I doubt that Alexei would not like the article because of the comradely criticism, for I remember him telling me that he found the objections of Pavel Borisovich to be justified.

We shall number the separate sheets (unless they have been numbered already) and I don't think the compositors will lose anything; after all, they always have to deal with separate sheets, and the same applies to our paper, and so far they have never lost anything. The question of "responsible editor" will evidently be settled favourably, I think, tomorrow or the day after (today I received news that two have agreed, and am expecting vital information tomorrow). We think that all the same we shall not manage (initially, at least) without the help of Blumenfeld, whom Dietz has agreed to take on as a compositor, and who would *put the thing on its feet* for us, train the Germans, etc. As soon as all this is finally cleared up, I shall write or telegraph to him at once. But I should very much like to have your article, "Once More", etc.,[41] as soon as possible, because we might have to send it for setting immediately.

Against *Rabochaya Mysl*—more precisely, only against the article "Our Reality" in the *Separate Supplement*—I had an article, "The Retrograde Movement in Russian Social-Democracy",[42] written as far back as a year ago. It has now been sent here to me, and I am thinking of rewriting

it for the journal, with additional material directed against *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

I don't quite understand to which "latest No." of *Rabochaya Mysl* you refer. No. 8 was the last issue of the paper (a new editorial board "from page 5"), which, incidentally, carries a *repudiation* of the famous *parallels* at the end of the article on Chernyshevsky in the *Separate Supplement*. Is that what you have in mind?

I would think the item, "To What Lengths They Have Gone",[43] a useful one, though *now* I doubt the "belligerency" of *Rabochaya Mysl*: they nevertheless want to take a few steps "towards us" (*passez moi le mot**), and we ought to try to consider them *verbesserungsfähig*.** But of course there *should* be an attack in any case: they won't change unless attacked. I have been corresponding lately with Vetrinskaya, an old comrade of mine in the League,[44] and told her that I supported Alexei's words: "We shall have to wrestle with you." Go aheid, if you are not ashamed, she told Alexei. I wrote to say that I was not in the least ashamed.

I should also like to have a talk with you about the economic trend and Alexei's views, but it is already very late, and I will confine myself to a few words. The economic *trend*, of course, was always a mistake, but then it is very young, while there has been *overemphasis* of "economic" agitation (*and there still is here and there*) even without the trend, and it was the legitimate and inevitable companion of *any step forward* in the conditions of our movement which *existed in Russia* at the end of the 1880s or the beginning of the 1890s. The situation then was so murderous that you cannot probably even imagine it, and one should not censure people who stumbled as they clambered up out of that situation. For the purposes of this clambering out, some narrowness was essential and legitimate: *was*, I say, for with this tendency to blow it up into a theory and tie it in with Bernsteinism, the whole thing of course changed radically. But that the overemphasis of "economic" agitation and catering to the "mass" movement

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* Excuse the expression.—*Ed.*

** Capable of improvement, not entirely hopeless.—*Ed.*

were natural, you too, unless I'm mistaken, recognised in "The New Campaign" written in 1896, when Vilna Economism[45] was already *à l'ordre du jour*,* while St. Petersburg economism was emerging and taking shape.

Every good wish, and please excuse the disorderly writing.

Yours,
Petroff

Written on November 9, 1900
Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1956
in *Kommunist* No. 18

Printed from the original

* On the agenda.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

November 16

I have just received, dear P. B., your remarks on the article "The Urgent Tasks".[46] Many thanks. What do you think about the unpopularity of this article? It won't sound discordant, will it?

I enclose the preface to the pamphlet *May Day Demonstrations in Kharkov* (some, but very small, corrections were made in the manuscript you have). Please, let's hear what you think of it, and do not hesitate to make your remarks on it, in ink or in pencil.

I am also sending you a document received from Russia about the amalgamation of the St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation and the League of Struggle.[47] They say the St. Petersburg people are terribly proud of it, and Kiev is said to have adopted the programme already. It must be written about. Would you like to do so? (After reading this "document"—this "specimen", as my brother calls it—please send it on to G. V., if you don't need it.)

We have at last found a responsible editor. Ettinger has undertaken to sign two numbers in any case, giving up all claims about the "tone", etc., and reserving the right after these two issues to make a statement in the press about her disagreement with the content, and so forth. Let us hope that she will keep to this condition (she only asks very earnestly that we should say nothing about it to anyone until publication), and in the meantime we shall either find someone elge, or make other arrangements.[48] I personally negotiated with Ettinger with the aid of Buchholtz, who *resigned from the Union* for the purpose of taking

some steps in the spirit of conciliation. I shall write in more detail about these steps later, considering that there is little of interest in them.

We now hope to begin setting in a few days.

With all good wishes,

Yours,

Petroff

Written on November 16, 1900
Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

November 19, 1900

Dear P. B.,

I have just received your letter of November 17, and read your remarks with great interest. Of course we shall try without fail to send you as many articles as possible, as this is valuable for the publications in all respects, quite apart from your natural interest in them. One thing we are sorry about is that our secretary is *überarbeitet**; but this will change soon all the same, because serious reforms are afoot in the matter of *Kinderpflege*.**[49]

Danevich has sent in an item of about 12,000 letters for the paper, on the French national congress; I hesitate to say whether it is entirely suitable. Very possibly we shall manage without it if we have your chronicle of events, which we are awaiting impatiently. Danevich is writing a big article on French affairs for the journal.[50]

The enclosed letter is for Rolau: my colleague is writing to him about our "tea" business, because we think that my correspondent Skubiks is not in town.[51] Please be good enough to pass this letter on to Rolau, and ask him to reply to us at once (forgive me for troubling you with such a request: I hope you can entrust, say, Gurevich with this). But if Rolau is not in town, would you be so kind as to read the letter addressed to him, and have a talk about its matter, if only with Skubiks's wife. The thing is that

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* Overworked.—*Ed.*

** Child care.—*Ed.*

we must have a definite reply as soon as possible, and if neither Rolau nor Skubiks is available, this can't be done otherwise than by a personal talk between you and someone of their company.

As regards the article by L. Axelrod,[52] I quite agree with you that it should first of all be sent to G. V.

Every good wish, and excuse this too hasty letter.

Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

November 26, 1900

Dear P. B.,

I have just received a letter from our mutual friend, who tells us that everything has been arranged. At last the business will go forward "steadily"! He begs you to send (me), as quickly as possible, the Nusperli passport* (or Husperli? It is not clear, but you must know what is meant).[53]

Tomorrow, November 27, he begins the setting, and consequently we may hope that in two weeks' time (or a little more) everything will be quite ready. It is therefore very important to have all the material available within a week, including your foreign chronicle. I hope that this date will not cause you to break off anything, for I suppose most of it has been done. V. I. is writing to G. V. today, asking him to hurry up the person who is writing about the Paris congress.[54] It is, of course, quite possible to make references to his article (if you do make any) even before the article arrives.

Wishes of all the best and of good health.

Yours,
Petrov

P.S. I am this very day sending Dietz the manuscript (by G. V.).[55] I hope there, too, things will go ahead decisively. High time!

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* He writes: I will send it back as soon as I arrive here."

TO P. B. AXELROD

December 11

Dear P. B.,

Thank you very much for letting us have your remarks so speedily on the item about the split.[56] I have made the corrections you want, except that I could not cut out altogether the mention of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s services: it seems to me that this would be unfair to an opponent with a record not only of offences against Social-Democracy.

Poletayev told me a piece of news that has made me very glad, that you have to some extent got free of the yoghurt, and could pay us a short visit. Now this would be splendid! I think there will be no difficulty in finding accommodation, one can take a room by the week. After all you do have a Swiss citizen's passport. I am still waiting (still, because I have been waiting a long time already, and to no purpose) the early arrival of both friends. Alexei writes that he is "eager to come", but is being somewhat delayed by various circumstances. The other friend has not written for a long time, but I don't think this means that anything very bad has happened. By the time they arrive, both *Iskra* (in 1 or 2 weeks) and *Zarya* will probably have appeared (Dietz has hired another compositor and is driving ahead quickly, hurrying us up. By the way, will you have anythiog for this issue of the journal*?). By that time, something will also have been cleared up about the transport (what a difficult problem!) and about the

* Perhaps you could put together something of what you wrote about Liebknecht and which did not go into the paper.

material, and then it would be extremely desirable to have a general meeting. I look forward to this very much.

What about young Adler's article[57]? Is he writing it? When will it be ready? Please hurry him up in a letter and —if you find the correspondence too burdensome, or if the *Umweg** via Munich—Zurich—Vienna entails long delay, then give him Lehmann's address (Herrn Dr. Med. Carl Lehmann, Gabelsbergerstrasse *20a*. München. On the second envelope: für Meyer)—and give us his address, and we shall squeeze a reply out of him.

We want to print 1,000 copies of *Zarya* for Russia and 500 for abroad.

I am eagerly awaiting your chronicle, and then a meeting.

Yours,
Petroff

For Gurevich:

Please try and arrange the following: we need to have a good address in Zurich through which Yefimov (Dietz's compositor) could carry on correspondence with Geneva, i.e., an intermediary, transmitting address. If you can, please send it to me as soon as possible, and in any case drop me a line at least right away in reply.

My best wishes, and regards to Vera Pavlovna.

Yours,
Petroff

Written on December 11, 1900
Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* Roundabout way.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

Midnight, December 14, 1900

Dear P. B.,

Forgive me for having disturbed you unnecessarily with my telegram. Not having received the article in the morning, I inferred (after your telegram of yesterday) that something had happened, and decided to inquire by telegram, in particular under the influence of a desperate letter from the printers. And then your article arrived a few hours later! I hasten to inform you without delay of its arrival, as you asked, and, once again, please excuse the telegram.

I am very, very glad that we shall soon see each other; my "brother" will, I think, also arrive in a few days, and Alexei too, possibly, in 2 or 3 weeks' time.

There is still no article from Paris on the International Congress—I have sent a telegram today.

I may have to go away for a short time before the paper appears, in order to sort out various small items (we are badly out in thousands of letters, and are now throwing out a good deal!), but this will take 3 or 4 days, no more.

Let me know whether I should take a room for you, or just have a preliminary look for one. I will ask V. I. about your requirements, and will begin my search.

Forgive the brevity—I am very tired and in a hurry.

Very best regards,

Yours,

Petroff

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

December 24, 1900

Dear P. B.,

I returned from my business trip only yesterday,[58] and found your letter. The paper should be ready today; as soon as I receive it I shall send it to you, unless you start out yourself.

My brother arrives this evening.

Alexei will not get rid of his obstacles and leave before Dec. 20 (O.S.).

I was *quite* unable to send the proofs—I myself could not get them, and had to make the journey to sort things out on p. 8. However unpleasant it was, I had to divide your article, and hold up the second half for the next issue,[59] otherwise what was essential could not have gone in, on account of the setting (for technical reasons) in bourgeois, instead of brevier.

And so, from Vasilyev—? And from Adler—nothing? You say nothing of Adler in your letter.

The journal is going forward: G. V. has sent in an article on Struve[60]—6 articles have been sent in all.

All the best, and I heartily wish you speedy recovery from the influenza which is raging so everywhere this year.

Yours,
Petroff

P.S. I have just learned from Gurevich's letter that you have received the article on Austria. That's fine. Have

you a really good translator? If not, send us the article, we shall translate it over here.

To Gurevich

Thanks for your information. Of course it would be desirable to have details about the Riga comrade: what kind of work would and could he take on? How free and financially well off is he, etc.?

Please tell Skubiks that I got his letter, but did not reply because I was away—and now can only say that *our man is already "there"* and has an address, so that the matter I was corresponding with Skubiks about is settled.

With best wishes,

Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

1901

TO V. P. NOGIN

January 3, 1901

Dear Comrade,

I have received *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*,[61] and am very grateful to you for sending this booklet. As regards transport we cannot at this moment undertake any definite obligations. Our routes are just now being arranged and will evidently be arranged satisfactorily; but it remains to be seen how they will function. In all probability we shall be able to give you quite a definite reply in 2 or 3 weeks at the outside, and will be happy to undertake the shipment of your booklet, if we can. We know nothing of Max Menkus, and are not doing our business through him. Your letters and reports have been received. We have already used some of them for the paper. Incidentally, the first issue should be ready in a few days, and I shall then send you a copy.[62] We expect our Poltava friend to arrive here in the very near future. All the best. Oh yes, there is also this. Having learned that we have completed a translation of Kautsky's book, *Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme*, a member of the *Rabocheye Znamya* group approached a member of our group in Russia offering to publish the translation.[63] But we should like to publish it ourselves, in our own name. Therefore would the persons who made the offer agree to give us the money for its publication, if only

some of it? Please write to tell us whether you are able and willing to write to them about it.

Yours,
*Petrov**

We propose to publish Hyndman's article in the near future with a footnote that "it has been sent to us in the author's MS. *through the good offices of a member of the Rabocheye Znamya group in St. Petersburg*".[64] If you have anything to say about the underlined words, please inform us *immediately*.

All the best,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to London

First Published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the typescript
text with corrections
and postscript by Lenin

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* Here is added, in an unknown hand: "Address: Herrn Philipp Rögner Cigarrenhandlung Neue Gasse Nürnberg."—*Ed.*

TO V. P. NOGIN

January 24, 1901

Dear Comrade,

I have received your letter about the passports, have written to my friend here who might be expected to help me in this respect, and am now awaiting a reply. I think it will be possible to get a foreign (Bulgarian or German) passport (for entering Russia), but I'm not hopeful about a Russian passport, or at least a blank passport, not filled in. This may, of course, come off, but I should advise you to take steps right away to secure a foreign passport, at the risk of being left without any at all. But as regards a Russian passport, if we succeed in getting one, it will be more likely in Russia.

If there is to be no mention of *Rabocheye Znamya* in the footnote, would you suggest another way of putting it? For example, from (through) a member of the *Rabocheye Znamya* group who worked in St. Petersburg in 1897, or something like that. I think it would be better to say somehow through whom the article was received, but if you think otherwise, naturally we shall publish it without any indication of how we received it.

I have been told the name of tbe St. Petersburg man who made the proposal (in one of the provinces, and a fairly remote one) about publishing the translation of Kautsky. I am afraid to entrust the name to the post; however, I will let you have it in this form. Write down Alexei's name, patronymic (in Russian style) and surname, and number all the 23 letters in their order. Then the surname of this St. Petersburg man will consist of the following letters: 6, 22, 11, 22 (for this substitute the next letter of the alphabet), 5, 10 and 13.[65]

As to the sale of *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, we shall inquire from those organisations abrsad with whom we have contacts.

Over here everything now depends on transport, which is eating up a lot of money because this is a new undertaking. I cannot therefore give you any definite reply as regards financial aid for fabricating passports, until it has become clear just how much money is needed for this, and what the chances are that all the other essentials (money apart) are available. Alexei paid out money to one influential organisation as long ago as last spring (sic!) for the purchase of blank passports (which they had promised), but so far has had nothing.

Would you agree to take on yourself in the immediate future a permanent function in transportation—i.e., to live near the frontier, travel around, communicate with the contrabandists, etc.? Do you know German, or any language other than Russian?*

Every good wish,

Yours,

Petrov

I enclose the paper[66]; please show it to *no one* except your friend, and let me know your opinion. No. 2 is at the press.

Write to me at the following address:

Herrn Georg Rittmeyer,
Kaiserstrasse 53 I.
München.

(Without any enclosure, if the letter is in Russian.)

Sent from Munich to London

First Published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

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* Do you know of any comrade suitable for this work and who knows Yiddish? And also do you happen to know an absolutely reliable comrade who is a compositor?

TO THE *BORBA* GROUP[67]

February 3, 1901

Dear Comrades,

We are deeply distressed over your letter of refusal to co-operate. Our letter to Nevzorov (a letter with a special enclosure for you of the "statement," the No. 1 of *Iskra*, and a proof of Ryazanov's article) and your refusal letter must have crossed, having been sent off at the same time.

This alone will show you how far it was from us to keep you from taking part in our affairs. We ask you to excuse the delay—that is indeed our fault, but you must bear in mind that we suffer as much as you do from the "indefinite state of relations". We have strictly abided by our group's decision not to circulate the newspaper abroad before it is circulated in Russia, making an exception only for our closest associates, including your good selves. Until quite recently, we had been altogether uncertain as to whether the paper would circulate in Russia (even today we cannot *vouch* for it); we had our hands full in this matter in connection with some fresh negotiations (with the liberal democrats—so far a *big secret*!),[68] and this delayed fulfilment of the decision adopted a fortnight or so ago to send you the issue of *Iskra*.

Our statement has not yet been circulated in Russia but has only been *shown* to several persons.

We repeat that what has happened is the result not of any lack of concern but of the indefiniteness and bustle from which we ourselves have not yet emerged. We should

be very happy to see the misunderstandings produced by this cleared up and find you taking your old attitude to our common cause.

Comradely greetings,

Petrov

Sent from Munich to Paris

First Published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO THE *BORBA* GROUP

February 21, 1901

Dear Comrades,

Your insistence on "defining relations" has surprised us but, to our deep regret, we cannot satisfy you in this respect. Our business is just being started, the wheels have only just been set in motion, and whether it will really get going depends on everyone vigorously co-operating —when suddenly, instead of doing the urgent work, we are asked to set about "defining relations" with some kind of particular exactness! We think that close and constant collaboration (which has already been expressed by your sending us two articles, and on which we were relying for the future) is a sufficiently definite relation, and that from it there clearly follows also the right of contributors to speak on behalf of the publication, enlist supporters, establish contacts, collect funds, order articles, etc. That this enlistment will naturally lead also to more intimate contacts between those enlisted and the editorial board, and that the establishment of final agreements (about any undertaking, or about the management of this or that section, or this or that function) will require direct contacts between the editorial board and those who have been enlisted, all this likewise follows, as a matter of course, from the very nature of relations between close contributors and the editorial board.

We hope that our relations could in the course of time develop from the form of simple collaboration to the kind of co-operation under which some departments would be allocated, and general editorial conferences would be held from time to time.

Furthermore, we do not deny of course that the business of organising things abroad will require (in 3 or 6 months' time) the creation of new forms, organs and functions, and were relying on you in this respect, but we are unable to set about all this immediately, when *Zarya* and *Iskra* have still to be consolidated.

We hope that you, too, will realise our position and will agree that any further "definition of relations" at the present time is impossible.

All the best.

Sent from Munich to Paris

First Published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

February 27, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I have received both your letters, and have passed on the letter from Italy to V. I. I don't yet know the contents of that letter, because I transmitted it through Blumenfeld. He and I are setting out tomorrow: he is going on through Vienna, I am going via Vienna to Prague on my own business.[69] Please excuse me for writing briefly, because of appointments and packing.

A letter has come from Dietz to the effect that he *is not printing* the statement (about an alliance with the liberals), that this is dangerous ("amalgamation", groups, etc.) and that, altogether, would it not be better for us to have a secret printing press?! We are very much astounded by this piece of news from the erratic idiot Dietz. We have decided (*provisorisch**) *for the time being* to leave *Zarya* here (for the time being!) and print the rest in Geneva.

I *think* that diplomatic relations with the Parisians have been resumed.

Molotov has *already* written his article on finance (for No. 3 of *Iskra*).[70] He has promised a review of foreign affairs.

There is still not quite enough material for No. 3 of *Iskra*.

Judas (the calf) has not yet left. He is clearing out at last in a few days, I think—thank God. "All is well" with him.

From home there is letter after letter about the student disorders. My brother writes that he will soon be coming.

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* Provisionally.—*Ed*.

No. 2[71] has not yet reached Russia.

All the best. I will make certain to write a more sensible letter when I return (I shall be away for 4 or 7 days) and take up my usual routine.

Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO F. I. DAN

March 22, 1901

Many thanks for your letter of March 2 addressed to Rittmeyer. We are very glad that we have at last established correspondence with you (of which I wrote you as far back as *July* 15!). Please observe the rules so that we should always know in any important affair that the letter will reach us. The address you used last time is one of the best: make use of it.

Collect cash. We have now been reduced almost to beggary, and it is a question of life or death for us to obtain a large sum. We shall send you *Zarya* in a few days. So do everything you can about finance.*

How do matters stand with the doctor's group?[72] Last summer, their representative behaved in a way that was equivalent to a rupture (he made some idiotic demands on us)—but later a member of his group renewed contact with our representative in Berlin.[73] Get some sense out of them: are they willing to help us or not?

Send us an address for delivering a suitcase,[74] and a more reliable one for letters and books.

Yours,
Starik

What about the Finnish routes[75]? We know nothing, and have not had a single letter from you about this. Please, repeat.

* The money can be sent through a bank by cheque, in a registered letter addressed to Carl Lehmann (the third letter is a German *h*), M.D., Gabelsbergerstrasse 20a. Keep this address in mind: it is good for cash, and for letters and books.

If the bearers of a suitcase have no letter from the organisation, then you should not talk freely with them about *anything at all.*

Sent from Munich to Berlin

First Published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO V. P. NOGIN

April 6, 1901

Alexei and I have just received your letter about *Zarya*. Many thanks for your detailed and frank opinion; we find such comments all the more valuable because they are so rare. What you say about the inadequacy of the political reviews and articles in *Zarya* is perfectly justified. We fully realise this inadequacy, and will do everything to put it right.

With best wishes,

Yours ....

Sent from Munich to London

First Published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO KARL H. BRANTING[76]

April 19, 1901

Dear Comrade,

Our comrade in Berlin has already written you on our behalf that we should like to establish closer contacts with the Swedish and Finnish comrades.

Allow me, at this time, to make the following request on behalf of the editorial board of the Russian Social-Democratic journal *Zarya* (J. H. W. Dietz Verlag. Stuttgart).

We attach very great importance to informing the Russians in general, and the Russian workers in particular, of the political situation in Finland and the oppression of Finland, and also of the stubborn struggle waged by the Finns against despotism. We should therefore be most grateful to you if you transmitted to all the Finnish comrades you know our urgent request to support us in this undertaking.

It would of course be particularly helpful for us if we could find a permanent Finnish contributor who would send us, firstly, monthly notes (4,000-8,000 letters), and, secondly, longer articles and reviews from time to time. We need the latter for *Zarya* and the former for the illegal Russian paper *Iskra*, whose editorial board has made this request of us.

If you think it useful, I will send you *Zarya* and two issues of *Iskra*.

The articles may be written also in Swedish or in Finnish; we shall find a translator ourselves.

I beg you to inform me whether you can comply with our request.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

I. Petrov

P.S. Please excuse my extremely bad German.
My address is as follows:
Herrn J. H. W. Dietz Verlag.
Furthbachstr. 12.
Stuttgart.
On the inner envelope:
An die Redaktion der Morgenröte—für Herrn Petroff.

Sent from Munich to Stockholm

First published in Swedish
on March 8, 1955
in the newspaper *Morgon-Tidningen*
No. 65

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

April 21, 1901

Dear G. V.,

We are very glad that your adventure ended satisfactorily.[77] We are expecting you: we need to have a talk about a great deal, both on literary and on organisational subjects, and about *Iskra* (the third issue should be ready by May 1. Then we want straightaway to print No. 4), and about *Zarya*. You have the address for calling—Velika Dmitrievna's. Here is another (Alexei's) just in case: Occamstr. (in Schwabing) 1a, III, rechts bei Frau Kraft, and ask for Herrn Vernet; only it would be better, when using this address, to write beforehand about your call, as otherwise you may easily not find anyone at home.

I send you *Promyshlenny Mir* Nos. 1-11. We have Frank—I will send it to you, if you need it before you come.[78]

We have only one copy of *Na Slavnom Postu*[79]: we shall order another, because there is a big demand for it.

We are in complete agreement with you about the priority of organisation over agitation at the present time. *Listok* "*Iskry*" is fairly cautious about any direct appeal—or do you consider even this dangerous[80]?

Hoping to see you soon.

Yours,
Petrov

Please bring or send *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo*.[81]

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First Published in 1928
in the miscellany *Gruppa*
"*Osvobozhdeniye Truda*" No. 6

Printed from the original

TO M. G. VECHESLOV

For Yuriev

April 25

I have received your letter.

Please send us as soon as you can an exact account of how many suitcases you have received and of what kind, how many have gone and how many remain. We need this to draw up our report and financial accounts. As regards the literature, I have also long been asking you to write how much you received, and what in particular, where you sent it and how it was used.

We have *not* got the May Day leaflet (N.B.).

The money (100 marks) has already been sent; I repeat my request that you make an extra effort to obtain money in Berlin and elsewhere for the suitcases; you will thereby be giving us the most serious and essential help. How much money of your own have you in hand? What is the average (and actual) monthly turnover?

It would be very important to send *Kharkov Days* as soon as possible to the South, where they are pressing for it.

I have not quite understood you about the bulletin. (1) Is it the *Iskra* Promotion Group or the Neutral Group that wants to publish it?[82] (2) Are the bulletins to be the same as before or different? We think that it would be extremely unwise to spend money on bulletins of the old type and, for our part, find it difficult to promise raw material, for the reason that we are working intensively at present on turning *Iskra* into a monthly paper,[83] and we have neither the time nor the money for copying and sending

out material. What we have to think of is not dividing up the available material into bulletins, and weakening both its importance and impression by circulating it in a raw state abroad, but, on the contrary, concentrating all the material in *Iskra* and accelerating its publication with well-edited and illuminated material. Any other tactics would mean not a struggle against, but a promotion of, the present ideological vacillation and confusion.

It is not surprising that such bulletins were published by the Neutral Group, with its absurd composition and programme, but we should expect more co-operation and rational work from the *Iskra* Promotion Group. Try and pass on these views to your group (but do not read my letter in full, because I am writing to you personally) and persuade it. Let us know its decision.

Bulletins reviewing the foreign press on Russia are a different matter. They are of course useful. Send us cuttings from the Russian papers. Would it also be possible to supply the *Iskra* editorial board with Russian journals, after they have been read in Berlin? If it would, let us know what journals we could count on (we have some, but not enough).

Written on April 25, 1901
Sent from Munich to Berlin

First Published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO S. I. RADCHENKO

We have received your letter. We fully approve of your method of distributing the literature, and advise you to keep strictly to it, without listening to anyone's advice or calumny.

One thing that is desirable is that you should show some consideration for the *Sotsialist group*,[84] and, in case of need, give them some privileges (for example, credit), because they are seeking to come closer to us, and promise to agitate for us. They have offered us a share of their income instead of payment for literature; *we authorise you* to accept this, at *your* discretion, if you find it *not unprofitable* financially. (Why do the *Sotsialist* group complain that *you don't give them* any literature?)

In general, don't give away anything free, but distribute everything as quickly *as possible* for cash.

Don't give any money to Grigoryev, send it all to us. Grigoryev should make money on his own literature, of which he has a lot.

Number 3 is being printed, and the fourth is to follow immediately. A May Day leaflet and a special *Iskra* leaflet have appeared.[85]

Do everything you can to have people sent *to Berlin* to collect the suitcases (the *address is*).* The password is: *from Petrov*.

If you still have some 100-200 of *Kharkov Days*, send them immediately *by hand* to....

Contact Pskov. We shall be sending the suitcases to Lepeshinsky, and you can collect them from him.

Written at the end of April 1901
Sent from Munich to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

* A blank space in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

TO P. N. LEPESHINSKY AND P. A. KRASIKOV

2a 3b—r——[86]

June 1, 1901

We should be very glad to work together with —r——. He would be particularly useful at this time of wobbling among the public in general, and of all kinds of intrigues abroad in particular. Unfortunately, our financial position is very bad, and we are absolutely unable to allocate any money for his journey and his living expenses. It is also extremely difficult to find paid employment here (we say nothing of France and French Switzerland, because we don't know them. —r—— himself is better informed about this than we are). Only in one case could we give some financial support: if —r—— were to undertake to go abroad, get a French passport here and use it to cross the frontier two or three times in various places, taking across a couple of suitcases each time. We have to pay for such transport anyway, and should of course pay him more willingly than some outsider. With his knowledge of the language and his resourcefulness, he would certainly be able to do it, and might find someone else on the way for the same purpose. If he is agreeable, let him write at once—you will read him the whole of this letter—and tell us his distinguishing features in as great detail as possible. On the strength of these features we shall then immediately apply for a French passport, and on receipt of it will let him know, so that he can start out. In general, our cause now hinges on transport, transport and transport. Whoever wants to help us should *entirely* concentrate on this.

Now about the 125 rubles. We have been repeatedly caught out over advances to other organisations: we have given away a pile of money, and the result has been insignificant, *almost nil*. Therefore we are very much afraid of paying in advance. Furthermore, it is more important for us to have swift delivery of a small quantity (if only half a pood *a month*) than of 10-20 poods over 3-4 months, because our first priority is *Iskra*'s monthly publication and delivery. Up to now suitcases virtually alone have kept us going. So have as detailed a discussion as possible to find out whether the offer is reliable, which organisation is making it, the type of transport, and whether we could have our own man in there for supervision and participation, and then let us know. If they agree to have a trial run without payment in advance, take the decision yourselves. But if we are to hand over a sizable sum immediately, we shall have to consider and discuss *all* the particulars very thoroughly.

Sent from Munich to Pskov

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

June 1, 1901

Dear P. B.,

We have just received your letter with the materials and letters of Deb.*[87] enclosed. Many thanks; we shall have to sort out the material.

As regards Deb.'s proposal, we agree of course to let him have 300 offprints, and we hope that his reservations will not present the slightest obstacle to our printing his reminiscences. The deadline for No. 2 of *Zarya* is one month, i.e., July 1. The maximum length is 2 sheets, or 2½ at the outside. We hope that he will divide up his 4-5 sheets into chapters, so that they will fit into No. 2 and No. 3 of *Zarya*.

We know nothing as yet about the conference.[88] Please persuade Koltsov and someone else from *Sotsial-Demokrat* to agree. After all, this does not commit anyone to anything, but it removes from us the odium of being unwilling to stop the dissension. We really are not inclined to make any substantial concessions either to *Borba* or to *Rabocheye Dyelo* (how feeble No. 7 of its *Listok* is[89]! We have already left it behind even technically, in speed of coverage).

No. 5 of *Iskra* is at the press. The leading article is "About Vacuous Dreams" (by Starover). A feature article by G. V., "New Wine in Old Bottles", is about the manifesto of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and their turn towards the Social-Democrats. Then one (or even two) short articles on the massacre of May 4-7 in St. Petersburg (in Vyborgskaya Storona and at the Obukhov Works). There is also some pretty good material for the social chronicle and the labour

* We shall, of course, preserve his letter.

movement section, and also for the "May Day in Russia" section—for instance, a vivid letter from a St. Petersburg working woman about the killing on May 4 of a workman (her relative) in the crowd marching to Nevsky Prospekt.[90] There is a letter from our close friend, a worker at Ivanovo-Voznesensk.[91] about the feeling there, the attempts to celebrate May Day and the success of *Iskra*.

Only the financial side is in a bad way; all the rest is going well, with promise for the future.

How is your health? Is it easier for you now in your *Erwerbsarbeit**? Do you get enough rest? How do you intend to spend the summer?

Very best wishes to you and all your family.

Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* Work for a living.—*Ed.*

TO M. G. VECHESLOV

June 17, 1901

We have received your letter asking us to send you 100 marks. Unfortunately, I cannot fulfil this request until I have received from you the "latest information" which you promised. I simply cannot take it on myself to decide to pay out this sum (both for formal reasons, because it depends on the board, and for the reasons I explained to you when we met), and I cannot get the board together at present because some people are absent. I ask you once again not to be sparing of reports to us of the latest and most detailed facts, otherwise our relations will *never* settle down to normal. Information of the kind that "so far everything is satisfactory" may produce, if anything, a negative impression on our board, which decides such matters. I understand very well that the most energetic efforts often prove fruitless for reasons beyond our control, and that it would be stupid to blame you for any failures. But you, too, must understand that unless we have the most circumstantial and exact information of what those efforts were, what exactly was successful (*respective** unsuccessful), why precisely and what the state of affairs and the plans at the present moment are, we *cannot* take any further steps and impose on our principals further sacrifices, for which *we* bear the responsibility.

Sent from Munich to Berlin

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from a copy
written by N. K. Krupskaya

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* Or.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

June 9, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I enclose Nevzorov's article, which we have rejected.[92] Just have a look at this thing (I heard you were interested in it), and when you have read it, please send it on at once to G. V., who is also interested in the Parisians. We think it is essential to keep a copy, as a document.

We are having No. 6 of *Iskra* set up—it will probably be 6 pages, because there is a good deal of material in the social chronicle and on the labour movement. For the second number of *Zarya* we have sent (1) G. V.'s leading article, "What Next?", and (2) L. I.'s article, "Why We Don't Want to Go Backwards", signed Orthodox. Then Arsenyev and Velika Dmitrievna are writing articles, and there's a paper by Alexei (what did you think of it? Velika D. was dissatisfied). I have written a little article on Witte's minute and the preface to it, and have of course damned Mr. R. N. S.[93]—Velika Dmitrievna is very much displeased, and I shall have to send the article to G. V., etc.: this Mr. R. N. S. is a sore point!

How is your work going, and how is your health? Will you have a long holiday this year, and where do you intend to spend it? I should very, very much like you to look in here and have a talk about various things—but I am afraid of inviting you lest, instead of relating, you put more strain on your nerves. If this does not frighten you, do come.

They have written to us from Russia that there is increasing talk of a congress. This once again impels us to think of a programme. The publication of a draft programme is *extremely* necessary, and would be of tremendous impor-

tance.[94] But apart from you and G. V. there is no one to take it on: it's a job that requires calm concentration and careful consideration. Please come to our help, provided your affairs and your health permit. Or perhaps you will see G. V. and spend some time with him—you could then take advantage of such a stay?

Kautsky passed through here (on his way for a holiday in Tyrol), but we forgot to talk with him about the Erfurter Programm (which Alexei is now looking through). Has he promised a special introduction?

What were the books about which you told Alexei's sister that they had been sent?

We can't be too sure about the foreign affairs review for *Zarya*: Parvus wants to write only about organisation, Luxemburg and Danevich will (perhaps) give us something on France, and *nothing* else, neither on Germany nor Austria. That's bad!

Well, until later. Forgive me for writing so rarely; I have very little time left in the local hurly-burly. The Londoners[95] are here at the moment; I like them. What do you think of them?

Very best wishes to you and all your family. Yours....

Leiteisen's address is: 52, Faubourg du Temple. *Mr. Gouman. Paris*; on the inner envelope: pour Mr. Basile.

[We shall have to wait a little with reprinting the first issue of *Iskra*: the matter of the one *thousand* copies that have been preserved, as it turns out, and of the attempt now being made to transport them will soon be cleared up.]

The note on Adler will still be in time for *Iskra* No. 6,[96] if it arrives not later than in a week.

I write nothing about the draft agreement with the Union: there is nothing new, and you must know the old situation from Alexei's sister.

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

July 13, 1901

I have received your letter of the 11th. As regards Orthodox's P. Scriptum,[97] the majority opinion is being set forth to you today by Alexei. I disagree with this opinion, and I (personally) would like to know your view, both of this P.S. in particular, and of the opinion likewise that it could supposedly be rejected after the adoption of the whole article, owing to the "literary defects" in the P. Scriptum. The "rescue" of the P.S., about which you write, may be possible if there is a resolute vote by Pavel Borisovich *for*, and even then not for certain: the votes will be equally divided, for Alexei, is now almost entirely against.

Generally speaking, I think that on any matter in any way relating to "controversial" points, you ought to make a direct inquiry about the reasons for the opinions expressed by our *Struvefreundliche*[98] this could be done by letters addressed to Lehmann as before (altogether, letters should now be addressed through to *Lehmann*) with an addition "für Meyer" *and* "for Puttman" I'm afraid I simply cannot undertake to give an account of their views. This applies also, for instance, to my article against R. N. S.[99]

Many thanks for the offer to send material against Chernov. I have just got on to him, and could probably find use for what bears on France and Belgium (Vandervelde et Destrée, *Le socialisme en Belgique*,* quoted by Chernov, and also Vandervelde's latest work[100]). But send it only if you don't need it, and if you can do without it for a few weeks. I very much need to have Liebknecht's *Zur Grund-*

* *Socialism in Belgium.—Ed.*

und Bodenfrage,* which I have failed to find here, either among Parvus's books or at the library. If you do have it, please send it along for a short time.

Chernov quotes someone called Gerolamo Gatti, who is a downright opponent of the Marxists: *Le nuove correnti dell'economia agricola* (Milano-Palermo, 1900).** Do you know what sort of bird this is? Is he worth reading? Is there a French translation? (I don't know Italian, though perhaps my sister could help.)

Very best wishes. Write about my article.

Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1956 in *Kommunist* No. 16

Printed from the original

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* *On the Agrarian Question.—Ed.*

** Gerolamo Gatti, *Agricoltura e socialismo. Le nuove correnti dell'cconomia agricola* (The Agrarian Question and Socialism. New Trends in Agriculture).—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

July 21, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I was intending to reply to your letter, but kept putting it off until I received the article. Don't be in any particular hurry with it, if it is hard work, or even give up reading it altogether, to give yourself a rest and have some proper treatment. G. V. has already written to me in considerable detail where he sees changes desirable, and I shall of course try to make *all* these changes[101] (but as to changing the *tone* ... I really don't know whether I can do that. It is hardly likely that I can write in diplomatic tones about a gentleman who arouses such violent feelings in me. And I don't think G. V. is quite right when he says that my "hatred" will be incomprehensible for the reader: I will quote the example of Parvus, who, without any knowledge of the author, after reading the introduction felt the same hostility to this "dolt", as he called him—but that is in parenthesis). I very much disapproved of our having imposed two jobs on you (reading my article and Orthodox's) just when you had gone away for treatment and a rest. Try rather to make really good use of the period of your treatment, and do not by any means burden yourself with a close reading of the manuscripts.

Please, write (and send manuscripts and everything else) *only* to the following address:

Herrn Dr. Med. Carl Lehmann.
Gabelsbergerstrasse 20 a/II.
München (inside: *für Meyer*).

The Rittmeyer address is *no longer good* (but if you have

sent something to Rittmeyer before receiving this letter, we shall still get it).

Do you happen to have Liebknecht's book *Zur Grund- und Bodenfrage* (Leipzig 1876)? Or perhaps one of the Zurich comrades has it? I *need* it *very much* for an article against Chernov, and it is not available at the library here, nor has Parvus or Lehmann got it.

Well, so long. I wish you the very best, and hope you have a good rest and are *thoroughly* fit again.

Yours,
Petrov

P.S. Here's another request: do you (or Greulich) happen to have the *minutes of the congresses of the International* —or *Vorbote*[102] (which, I believe, carried the full reports)? This Chernov fellow keeps worrying me: I do believe the scoundrel has *distorted* things in referring to the minutes of the congresses of the International, and putting down as "dogmatic Marxism" even the "solidarised communities" (of Rittinghausen).[103] If you could help me with this material, I should be very grateful.

[But if you have to go to a lot of trouble to find these references, *don't do it*, *please*: I shall manage somehow.]

Here's yet another request (I feel that I'm making a hog of myself—piling up request upon request—but it's hard to stop once you've started. But *really*, if you have to go to a lot of trouble, like travelling about in search of the books, etc., let it go, and "shelve" my applications. I'll manage somehow. I shall make mincemeat of Chernov in any case). The fact is that the swine Chernov quotes Engels's article, "The German Peasant" (in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1900, No. 1). When I found the article I discovered that it was a translation of Engels's article "*Die Mark*" (*Anhang** to the pamphlet, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*)[104] (I've only got the 4th edition of the pamphlet, 1891), but at the end of the translated text there is an addition of *two tirades in Russian which the original does not have* and which contain highly dubious statements: "restore (sic!) the mark", etc.

* Addendum.—*Ed.*

I wonder what that is: a distortion by *Russkoye Bogatstvo*? In which case they ought to be pilloried good and proper. But first we must look at this from every side: a footnote to the Russian article says that Engels's article "appeared in one of the German magazines in the 1880s, without his signature. But the offprint which Engels sent to one of his friends was signed with his initials". (1) Have you any idea which "German magazine" it is? Could it be *Neue Zeit*? (2) Do you happen to have an early edition of the pamphlet *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie*, *etc.*, with the "*Die Mark*" *Anhang*? It is necessary to make a collation to find out whether the early editions contained the tirades the 4th edition does not have (although this is very unlikely).

Then I need for the purposes of comparison the pamphlet: W. Wolff, *Die schlesische Milliarde*,[105] which I was unable to find at the local library and which is not available at the *Vorwärts Buchhandlung** either—it's been sold out.

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

First published in full in the Firth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

* Bookshop.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

August 24, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I enclose Nevzorov's article which he has rewritten. It has confronted us with this dilemma: either to publish it in *Zarya*, or to reject it altogether. The votes are divided equally (Alexei and Arsenyev, *for*; Velika Dmitrievna and I, against). Please cast your vote. I must say that I am particularly exasperated by the fact that everyone (even Arsenyev!) says the article is "vile", "treacherous" (as G. V. has also called it), but they keep talking of printing it! To my mind, this is the worst tactics of indulgence and connivance. They say in defence of the article: "It's a contributor's letter to the editorial board. It's *awkward* to reject it." In my opinion, once a contributor adopts that *kind* of attitude, we are in duty bound to put an end to it. Let him go to *Rabocheye Dyelo* and Godspeed (Nevzorov even wrote to ask us if we had any objections to it!? Sic!)—that will help us to "document" his figure much better, and take him to pieces much more freely than in our *Zarya*. (One of the arguments *for* was that it should be printed to provide the occasion for replying to the widespread arguments.)

And so, it's up to you to decide the issue!

And how about Finn's article? If it's a good one (as you wrote), shouldn't we publish it in *Zarya*? Will you send it to us?

How is your health? I heard that you were not far from Thun, but I hope the letter will be readdressed.

When do you expect to visit G. V.? We rely on you very much as regards the programme.

Well, so long. Hope you will be fit soon, and all the best.

Yours,
Petrov

Number seven of *Iskra* will appear in a day or two. G. V.'s article (the second against Struve) has been sent to *Zarya*. Then there will be articles by Nevzorov, Alexei, Velika Dmitrievna and Arsenyev; one on the agrarian question (which I am writing)[106] and one by G. V. against Bernstein (a review of the Russian translation of his book). There is no review of foreign affairs. Perhaps Danevich will write one? He has already sent in a second letter for *Iskra* (it will go into No. 8).

Sent from Munich
to Heiligenschwende
(near Thun, Switzerland)

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

August 30, 1901

Dear P. B.,

I received your letter today, and today also sent off the proofs of my article[107] to Dietz. I have made the change you suggested—at the end, separating the liberals from the revolutionaries who had been designated together as "we". But as regards the "providential slip", I could do nothing about it: alteration of this passage would have required much too extensive changes; besides, the spirit of the whole article makes it impossible to alter it in the sense of eliminating the "one-sidedness" (you are right, of course, that the presentation is "one-sided": how could one observe a judicious balance in a polemical article devoted to an attack on one of the flanks of our opponents! What I mean is that it's not that I don't see the *defect* here but that it lies too deep to be eliminated by one particular alteration).

We have been receiving all your letters. As regards my sister, I don't know how matters stand, because I haven't heard from her for quite a long time.

You have, of course, received Alexei's letter describing the obstacle to the congress[108]? We shall wait and see how you and Danevich decide this matter.

The seventh issue[109] has appeared, and has of course been sent to you. In the eighth, there will be Ryazanov's article, "The Imperial Drink Shop" (on the vodka monopoly); then we anticipate an article on the new law (of June 8) on land grants to nobles in Siberia.[110] In the social chronicle, there are reports on the liberals' congress, the disgraceful treatment of exiles in Siberia, the deep unrest in

out-of-the-way places like Kursk, and about the revolt of seminary and gymnasium students. We also have a very interesting article by a worker—a reply to Dadonov, who abused the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*.[111] It's a very good article, they say (I haven't read it yet), so that we don't know where it should be best printed, in *Iskra* or in *Zarya*. In No. 8 of *Iskra*, there is a letter by Danevich from France.

We still have no foreign review for *Zarya*! Nor are we likely to have one on home affairs either.[112] It's a misfortune! Meanwhile, *Zarya* is getting fatter and fatter. We already have 6 sheets+4 (Plekhanov's "Critique")+2 (him again, against Bernstein)+2 (Nevzorov+Alexei)+2 or 3 (Velika Dmitrievna and Starover).... As for me, I'm bogged down in the agrarian question.

Well, I hope we shall soon meet.

All the best,
Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich
to Heiligenschwende

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO E. L. GUREVICH

November 3, 1901

Dear Comrade,

You told us, in our talk here before the departure, that however our relations developed—and even if we went our several ways—you would in any case remain a contributor to our publications. After that we repeated to each other, even after the sad outcome of our negotiations on organisation,[113] that we did not in any way "declare war on each other", and remained political allies albeit temporarily treading our different ways.

We hope, therefore, that you will continue to send your letters from France to *Iskra*. To our regret, we have not been able to get a definite reply to this question from the member of your group here. Please, let us know whether or not you intend to co-operate with us in the future.

You know, of course, how much we value your literary co-operation, and if today, after the formation of the League, the organisational relations between ourselves and your group have become more complicated, there are no obstacles to closer literary collaboration on our part, in any case. We should welcome it.

With comradely greetings....

P.S. From what Ryazanov said I have drawn the conclusion that my words about the possible effect of our differences on the literary agreement were misunderstood. All I had in mind was the pamphlets agreement (the League has set up a special board of pamphlet editors); but the

foundation of the League has not affected the purely literary relations between the editorial board of *Zarya* and *Iskra* and their contributors.

Sent from Munich to Paris
First Published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from a copy
written
by N. K. Krupskaya

TO LYUBOV AXELROD

November 27, 1901

Dear L. I.,

Thank you for your book which V. Iv. has shown me. I very much regret that I have not yet been able to start reading it: first, I have lately been very busy with a pamphlet (against *Rabocheye Dyelo*),[114] and, secondly, I am once again going down with some "undetermined" illness. The work is at a standstill, and I don't know how soon I shall be able to get down to it again! And it's urgent work.

As regards a recommendation to Popova, to my deep regret I am quite unsuitable for this. I don't know and never have known Popova personally. I dealt with her *only through Struve* (and, you will understand, it's quite out of the question to ask him to recommend your book. Yet he is editorial manager of Popova's publications!). If I were to apply to Popova, therefore, the result would be sooner negative than otherwise.

But even that is not all. I recently wrote (a month or six weeks ago) to Popova *for the first time*, asking her to send me a copy of the second volume of the Webbs, the translation of which I edited and which has only just been published.[115] Up to this day I have neither reply nor book!

I once had what you might call a "friendly" correspondence with Vodovozova. But she *has not replied at all* to my last letter to her (a *business one*, written last spring!). As you see, there again I am no use at all.

You will have either to look for someone with better connections in literary and publishing circles, or to apply directly to several publishers enclosing your book. [Per-

haps Filippov could help you? After all, he has printed something of yours! My relations with him have been broken off.]

Berg will write to you or have a personal talk with you: he wants to go soon.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Frey

Sent from Munich to Berne

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

December 1, 1901

I have read, dear G. V., your letter about Finn's article. You have proved much stricter. It seemed to me that the article was not a bad one. But your arguments have fully convinced me, and I agree to the amputation. I have *already spoken* to the author about the need for some changes and cuts. He did not resist absolutely, but expressed the "wish" that the cuts should not be too heavy, as otherwise, he said, he would find someone else to publish the article.

We shall try to write to the author: we have the address, but it's not very convenient to write.

However, I *will not undertake* to correct the article. That will have to be your job, if the decision is to carry it.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Frey

Your criticism of Finn's article has made me think again of how poor *Iskra*'s economic section is, a fact you spoke of at Zurich. Why don't you send us anything for this section? It would be so important to have anything from notes of half a column (4,000 letters, 4-6 of your pages) about current events like the co-operative congress, new data about syndicates, economic reviews in *The Economist*, major strikes, fresh statistical data, etc., etc., to articles of 1½-2 columns, or feature articles up to 20-25 thousand letters (up to 30 of your pages)! You seem to be more in touch with economic literature than anyone else, so it would

be easiest for you to draw up such notes, even occasionally! Do try and help us, or *Iskra* will become monotonous. Of course I would not even dream of distracting you from your work on the programme, which is *urgently* needed and has first priority; but it would be possible to write small notes and little articles in between, about the new issues of economic journals, etc.

Iskra's historical section is also weak: feature articles telling about the European revolutions, and so forth. I think that here we could even translate. Please send us suitable material; you once said you had something in view.

Yours,
Frey

I am still unwell, and "struggling" with the pamphlet against *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which is advancing almost in crab-like fashion.

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

December 19, 1901

Dear G. V.,

I have just received your letter of the 17th, and am replying at once. I replied to you *over a week* ago about the trip to Brussels,[116] sending the long letter to P. B. (since it also included the plan for No. 4 of *Zarya*) with a request to send it on to you *immediately*. If the letter has not been lost, it is a scandal that he has delayed it! I am writing to him immediately.

I support Alexei's opinion that you *must* go. Krichevsky can do us harm—and now that the *decisive* struggle is beginning, we should keep an eye on him. We won't be able to get along with them.

I am sending you 230 marks: 80 marks=100 francs for the International Bureau, and 150 marks for the trip. Will that be enough?

Take a *circular ticket* (the period is 2 months) with a break at Munich (if it's imprudent to do so from Geneva, order it in Zurich). At Zurich persuade P. B. to come too. Then we shall all be together at the beginning of January, and shall *have done* both with the programme (this is important) and with No. 4 of *Zarya*, etc.

I am expecting *Zarya* any day now. I already sent P. B. its contents in that letter.

Write a little report or a note for *Iskra* on the sessions of the International Secretariat.

Every good wish,

Yours,

Frey

Reply whether you will be here.

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO L. I. GOLDMAN

... I have always said that the distribution of functions tends to resolve of itself: over here, the literature is published, articles are written for the paper, etc. In Russia, the literature is distributed and contacts are established. Transport is handled by special persons, appointed by mutual agreement of those here and there, and connected with both sides. Such is the ideal....

... We have long been concerned over the fact that organisation in Russia (a matter of first-rate importance) has been making such slow headway, and, you will recall, we even sent you a "plan" last summer[117] (unfortunately we have not kept a copy of the letter elaborating the "plan"). But you replied: "We have no men." You now seem to have found it possible to get down to this, and we are all ready, of course, to help all of you, if it depends on us. But our role here is quite a subordinate one. You are connected with X. Y. Z.[118]; consequently, all the "sources" of literature are within your reach. Establish contacts with one another, and turn these sources to use; if you find people who are suitable and have earned your complete confidence, make up a management committee from among them by joint agreement and we shall of course write to everyone we can to have them abide by the committee's instructions. What is essential though is that the management committee should *without fail* have in view the whole of Russia, and not by any means one district only, because *Iskra*'s whole future depends on whether it will be able to overcome local rule-of-thumb work and district separateness, and become an all-Russia paper *in practice*....

Written in December 1901
Sent from Munich to Kishinev

First published in 1928
in "Doklad organizatsii 'Iskry' vtoromu syezdu R.S.D.R.P."
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original
of the "Doklad..."
in N. K. Krupskaya's
handwriting

1902

TO LYUBOV AXELROD

February 18, 1902

Dear L. I.,

In reply to your letter, I hasten to tell you that the articles by Struve and Bulgakov appeared in the *May 1897* issue of *Novoye Slovo* (No. 8, according to their special numbering).[119]

We are very glad that you will be finishing the article soon—please send the articles of Struve and Bulgakov along with it.

Have you made any use of the articles by Vl. Chernov in the latest issues of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* on the subjective method, Berdayev, etc.? What a good thing it would be to devote even a few lines to giving this chatterbox a dressing down! In No. 2 (February) of *Sozialistische Monatshefte*[120] someone called Lozinsky also tries to bury materialism and extols Berdayev.

We hear from Vologda (where Berdayev and Bogdanov are doing time) that the exiles there engage in earnest discussions of philosophy, and that Berdayev, as the one who knows most about it, appears to be "winning".

Every good wish,

Yours....

Sent from Munich to Berne

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO P. B. AXELROD

March 22, 1902

Dear P. B.,

How is your health after your journey? Have you recovered from the life of a wanderer, and from the "reaction" you expected when you were going away?

Velika Dmitrievna sent you G. V.'s programme and our scheme for a "settlement in committee",[121] through a committee of arbitration *sui generis*. This scheme *seems* to be falling through because of G. V.'s unwillingness, but I don't yet know this for certain. I should like to know your impression of G. V.'s new draft and which of the two drafts you now favour.

The copying of your pamphlet[122] has *only just* been started: up to now the copyist was busy with copying for *Iskra* (with Tsvetov away, *Iskra* has been making very slow headway: only one issue will appear in March). Evidently delay is inevitable if your pamphlet is to be published here; but if you are very much opposed to this, let me know, and we may then send it on to Geneva. If speed is not so important for you, then as soon as the copying is finished and Tsvetov returns, the pamphlet will be sent to the printers.

A few more words about the programme. We consider it very undesirable to put it up for a vote by the *whole* League (instead of the editorial board alone), *respective** have a discussion in the press among ourselves (although this will not be easy to avoid if the attempt to reach agreement fails). What is your opinion?

All the very best wishes for your health.

Yours....

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

* Or.—*Ed.*

TO P. B. AXELROD

March 27, 1902

Dear P. B.,

I have just received your letter, and hasten to reply. I very much like your idea of printing the article in *Zarya*, instead of as a pamphlet (a supplement to *Iskra*), both in general and in particular, on account of our plans for moving to London (Yevgeny is writing to you about it).[123] About half of your article is already copied, and I shall send it to you directly it is finished: the work of copying is going ahead quickly now. It will be a fine thing to have a magazine-type article in *Zarya*. As for the changes that may be required on account of the letter being addressed "to *Iskra*", they will be insignificant.

No one, so far as I am aware, has begun or intends to write any review on *Kanun revolutsii*.[124] Therefore please do write it: what we are short of in *Zarya* is reviews.

As for the programme, I will send you my comments on G. V.'s draft in a few days (my sick friend now has them)[125]; I showed them to my friends here, and they persuaded me not to send them to G. V., in view of the proposals which had been made for an "arbitration or conciliation" committee. But I would be very happy to send them to you personally to show you my *Bedenken** set forth therein systematically. As regards our meeting,[126] however, I don't think it could bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion just *at present*. I don't know what the whole board will decide (we shall be acquainting it with your plan this very day), but I personally very much fear that in the absence

* Considerations.—*Ed.*

of an already prepared third draft, *in the absence of a new make-up of those voting*, in the absence of any *firm* agreement on how to vote, who is to vote and *what significance is to be attached to the voting*, our Zurich meeting would once again be inconclusive. And you are a thousand times right about the importance of issuing a programme.

Have you seen *Borba*'s *Kalendar*[127]? How did you like it?

No. *4* of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*[128] has appeared. That's hard work!

Forgive me for the brevity and hastiness of this letter. I am in a great hurry.

Yours....

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO A. A. BOGDANOV

Dear Comrades,

We are very glad about your proposal for the publication of pamphlets. There is, in fact, a certain lack of pamphlets, and we could easily publish them in any quantity. (As regards transport, we cannot at the moment *guarantee* regular delivery *en masse*, but we hope that this too will be constantly improving.) However we beg you not to insist on the stipulation that pamphlets should be accepted or rejected *en bloc*, without any partial changes at all. This stipulation is extremely inconvenient, and will hold up everything terribly. Take the very first article sent to us, about organisation (the technical problems of organisation). In the general opinion of the editorial board, this article (interesting and valuable though it is) *cannot appear in this shape*, because it contains quite inappropriate and tactless remarks (like "one-man rule" and "dictatorship by one member of the committee", etc.); and there are also minor defects requiring correction. Yet an agreement about such changes, not particularly essential from the author's standpoint (but unquestionably necessary), could be reached without any difficulty at all. Think this over well, and don't hold up an important undertaking out of a desire to impose particularly restrictive conditions on us.

We repeat that the article is, on the whole, practical and valuable; in general, we are even *prepared* to agree to the stipulation that articles should be accepted or rejected as a whole, without partial corrections. But, then, under this, stipulation, we should be *obliged* to reject your very first article, and that would be harmful to the cause. After all, it would surely be possible to come to an agreement

with the author about any *partial* corrections. Why don't you try and let us make these corrections by way of experiment? If you like we shall write to you in greater detail about what precisely should be changed.

Written between March 28
and April 19, 1902
Sent from London to Vologda

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO F. V. LENGNIK

And so your task now is to turn *yourself* into a committee for preparing the congress,[129] to accept the Bundist into this committee (after assessing him *from every angle*—this N.B.!), and to push your own people through into the largest number of committees possible, safeguarding yourself and your people more than the apple of your eye, until the congress. Remember: all this is of the utmost importance! Be bolder, more pushy and more inventive in this respect, and in all others, as discreet and as careful as possible.

Wise as serpents—and (with the committees: the Bund[130] and St. Petersburg) harmless as doves.

Yours ever,
Starik

Written on May 23, 1902
Sent from London to Samara

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO I. I. RADCHENKO

We have just given the *Bundist* contact with you. This concerns the congress. You and he (+a bureau or someone else) must form a Russian Committee for preparing the congress. Behave *as impressively as you can* and act with *caution*. Take on yourself the greatest possible number of districts in which you undertake to prepare for the congress, refer to the bureau (giving it some other name), in a word, make sure that the whole thing is *entirely in your hands*, leaving the Bund, for the time being, confined to the Bund. We shall begin negotiations here about a rapprochement over here, and will inform you immediately.

And so, for the time being, *have in mind* the composition of a Russian Committee for Preparing the Congress which is most advantageous for us (you may find it convenient to say that you have already formed this committee, and are very glad to have the Bund *participate* or something like this). Take on yourself, *without fail*, to be secretary in this committee. These are the first steps. And then we shall see.

I say have the composition "in mind" to have as free a hand as possible: don't commit yourself to the Bund right away (you can say, for example, that connections have been established with the Volga, the Caucasus, the centre—we have a man from over there—and the South—we're sending two down there), and make yourself master of the undertaking. But do all this most carefully, without rousing objections.

Write whether your role is clear to you. Perhaps we shall yet have time to exchange letters.

Make certain to send the weekly paper *regularly* to Rögner's address: we need the most regular correspondence.

And we should like to send a special weekly: let us have as quickly as possible the address of a doctor, a technician, a cyclist, an artiste, and so on, and so forth.

Yours ever....

Written on June 22, 1902
Sent from London to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

July 2, 1902

Dear G. V.,

Excuse my writing in such a hurry. I have come here to Brittany for a rest (I am awaiting my family here as well),[131] but in Paris Berg gave me his item, and I have received the article over the signature of Veteran which you sent.

I am completely in agreement with Veteran. On account of the note about Lekkert in *Iskra* I had a little battle with Berg and Velika Dmitrievna, who both, as usual, had an attack of nerves, and began to talk about the inevitability of terror, and the need for us to express this (in one way or another). The item in *Iskra* was thus a compromise: that was all I managed to *secure*.[132]

Now Berg himself has become more resolutely opposed to terror, even that of the Lekkerts.

But the question is whether it is all right to insert your article with the Veteran signature. *Of course*, *if you wish*, *it will certainly go in* (and there is time for it to go into the next issue)—but wouldn't it be better for you to turn it into a leading article for No. 22, combining it, so to speak, with Berg's article "How to Fight"? I enclose this article which, in my opinion, contains passages requiring corrections, passages which are undesirably evasive on the question of Lekkert.

I also enclose an item about the priest's letter. What is your opinion?

And so please reply as soon as possible, dear G. V., and send all three articles straight back to London (J. Richter, 30. Holford Sq. 30. Pentonville: London W. C.). Write to me at the same address.

I think *a leader* would be the best place to say what you do say: the substance of the matter will be brought out (the "*objection*" *to Iskra* will be smoothed out) and the integral impression will be made stronger. You will find it easy and natural to develop your article into a leader, thereby *substituting* it for the article "How to Fight". Such a substitution would, in my opinion, be the best result.

All good wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Loguivy
(Northern France) to Geneva

First published in 1928
in the miscellany *Gruppa*
"*Osvobozhdeniye Truda*" No. 6

Printed from the original

TO NADEZHDA KRUPSKAYA

July 16, 1902

I enclose a letter to Arkady.

I received today your letter, the proofs and the money. *Merci*.

There is some damned muddle altogether about this "congress" in Switzerland.[133] Who was it (first of all) who thought of a "congress"? *Not we*. It was probably invented by B. N., who ought really to be given a good head-washing for irresponsible behaviour (his tour of Europe, his idle talk with Korenevsky about the congress, etc.); if you haven't done it already, please *give him a thorough talking to*. I was thinking of doing it myself, but I suppose you will do it better, because I am very angry.

No one is arranging a "congress": a congress requires that *everyone should be there* (whereas we know nothing for sure about Arkady and Sonya[134]). A "congress" requires some of those abroad (like Dimka, the old fellows, maybe Alexandrova and others), and *that has not even been mentioned*. No one has even been preparing a programme for a congress, and no one knows what to talk about at one: About the *Iskra* organisation in Russia? Without any delegates from that organisation itself? All of this is amazingly hasty and ill-considered!

L. Gr. himself is now postponing it "until the autumn". Will you, too, help to "blast" this "congress" nonsense? It is *essential* right away to see Lapot: he will both see the Swiss and will *himself* come and see us. What else is there? Then there's Povar, who evidently still needs some training—so let him study at Zurich: that will be excellent. Maybe he, like B. N., will remain abroad for *months*?! Why hurry

to see him, then? When he wants to go, he *himself* will have to come and see us, so there is no need to drag him over now. And what is this nonsense that B. N. and V. V. have been writing to Berg? "We can't talk except in the presence of P. B." Talk with whom? Povar? He is at P. B.'s. With the three persons? They are at P. B.'s. With Lapot? He will be visiting P. B. Advise Berg to give V. V. and B. N. a thorough bawling-out for this nonsense, and write to me what Berg thinks about it, and whether there is any hope that he himself will reply to them in a way that will discourage them from talking nonsense. Besides, P. B. himself went to Munich, and will come to London as well. No one doubts that a visit from G. V. is (*will be*) necessary.

I wrote to G. V. that I know nothing about a "congress", but that it is *essential* to have a *business-like meeting* (with Lapot and others) in London, where, of course, he also will be. If necessary, I will write to him again.

Try pressing L. Gr. *in every way* in order to dissuade him: he has no clear idea of *who* is to attend this "congress", *for what purpose* it is to be held, and *how* it is to proceed.

Yours ....

I suppose it is not necessary to return the proofs, *n'est-ce pas*?*

And what about V. I.'s article, hasn't it been set?

Please don't forget: there is a quotation from Bulgakov in my agrarian article: Vol.? p.? It should not be left in this form, and if I don't return earlier, and don't see the proofs again, cross out not the whole footnote, but only the words: "Vol.—p.—".[135]

Sent from Loguivy to London

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

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* Isn't that so?—*Ed.*

TO I. I. RADCHENKO

A Letter to Arkady

Dear Friend,

I have read your long letter of June 6* over again, and want to add something to my previous letter.[136] I was very glad indeed to have your report of a talk with the workers. Such letters are a great rarity for us, and they really invigorate us. Be sure to pass this on to your workers, with our request that they themselves should write to us *not only for publication*, but simply to exchange ideas and not to lose contact and mutual understanding. I personally am particularly interested, in this connection, in what the workers will think of *What Is To Be Done?*, because I have not yet had any views from workers.

And so give us a direct contact with your group of workers, and also with Manya[137]: this is very important, and will very much consolidate both their closer approach to *Iskra* and your own position among them. And then, if there are really capable people among Manya's leaders, it would be a good thing for one of them to come and see us: suggest this to them and find out what they think of it.

Then there are three more points.

(1) If Vanya[138] is with us, how are you to determine your relations with him? What is your opinion? Perhaps, if Vanya and Manya are *entirely* on our side (and if they issue the statement I wrote of—this is extremely important), they could include you in their Central Committee[139] and *in addition* formally confirm you in your function for the special work of unification on an all-Russia scale (i.e., "The Central Committee authorises N. N., who is one of its members and a member of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, an organisation with which the C.C. is in complete

* June 19, N.S.—*Ed.*

solidarity, to be in charge of work in preparation for Party unity, in the *Iskra* spirit").

Perhaps it might be varied in this way (of course I am suggesting all this only tentatively, no more): "The C.C. of the St. Petersburg Committee, expressing its complete solidarity with the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, is happy to co-opt to the Committee, with its full consent, a group of persons belonging to that organisation and specially engaged in transporting *Iskra* and distributing it *throughout Russia*. The C.C. assigns such-and-such members to assist this group and allocates such-and-such funds, and one of the members of this group (Arkady) enters the C.C. of the St. Petersburg Committee, while remaining a member of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia, and takes special charge of preparations for all-Party unity in the *Iskra* spirit." By the group I mean the persons you sent for fish,[140] etc. I repeat that I am only suggesting various acceptable and possible propositions, in fulfilment of your request to suggest a "concrete draft of a plan", and leaving it to your discretion to make use of my suggestions in one form or another. Be sure to write how things stand at present, and in what direction you are moving them. Strike the iron while it is hot, and remember that we have to come to a mutual agreement in as detailed a form as possible about the plan for finally and irrevocably winning over the "tuning fork" (=the St. Petersburg Committee=Vanya). And you must be as wise as a serpent with your young friends!

If this is possible, it would be best of all. Then you would be a delegate from Vanya in the Organising Committee (preparing for Sasha[141], and one more of our people could be in it from Sonya. Write as soon as you can what you think of all this, and whether you have *talked* about it with Vanya and with *Manya*.

(2) It is you who must without fail set up an Organising Committee in Russia, and take it into your own hands: you on behalf of Vanya, Claire on behalf of Sonya+one more of our people from the South—that is the ideal. Be extremely careful and restrained with the Bund, without showing your hand, and letting it deal with Bundist affairs but *not allowing* it to *stick its nose* into Russian affairs: remember that there you have an unreliable friend (*and maybe even an enemy*).

(3) Explain to everyone everywhere that it is pure gossip that *Iskra*'s editorial board itself wants to become the Russian Party's C.C. It is nonsense. The C.C. can exist only in the field of operations, and our hope is that it will develop out of the Organising Committee and revolutionary workers. The relationship between *Iskra*'s editorial board and the C.C. would be determined by the division of functions principle (ideological leadership and *practical direction*), with regular congresses serving to ensure unity, or possibly the attachment of one of the five (as an assumption) members of the C.C. here as a permanent delegate. The gossip is being spread by *Borba*, and it must be exposed. We don't want to reply in print to these rogues: the best way to punish them is for *Iskra* to be silent.

Perhaps Vanya's doubts (about which you wrote) are also due to his vague idea of all this? Make sure that both Vanya and still more *Manya* are quite clear about it.

All the very best, and hopes above all that you will manage to hold out.

Yours,
Lenin

[P.S. If it should come into Vanya's head to demand a precise definition of relations between Manya and himself, between his members and the members of Manya who are in the St. Petersburg C.C., I think this would be best *postponed* until we meet here, and that Vanya should be told *straight*: "One of two things—either we really see eye to eye; and then a month of work together will see us working so smoothly that there will not remain the slightest shadow of misunderstanding between us, because we shall all be Iskrists. Or else we shall find ourselves in disagreement—in which case we shall part ways in a proper manner. But we don't want to look silly once again by drawing up agreements, etc.!" From your letter of June 6 I see that you replied to them at the outset in this sense, and of course it was an excellent thing to do.]

Written on July 16, 1902
Sent from Loguivy to St. Petersburg

First published in 1924
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KALMYKOVA

September 27, 1902

I have received your letter. Many thanks for your detailed reply. Until Viscount arrives I will not, as you wish, either raise the general question of finance or *give any information* about your letter, except in general terms, i.e., neither about how you define the body of "holders", nor about what amount you specify, nor about how soon you can provide it (the whole immediately, or in instalments). We shall, in any case, have *vertrauliche** talks with Viscount about all the most important questions; so it will be best for me first of all to show him your letter, and to decide jointly with him on the limits, so to speak, of any further information about its contents.

I personally incline to the view that for the time being it would be best not to tell anyone about the whole amount (to keep it secret), nor to tell absolutely anyone about the possibility of obtaining it all at once, because at the present moment there's an *infinity* of "possible" expenditure on "possible" undertakings. The abundance of escapes is putting a mass of people at *Iskra*'s "disposal", *provided all of them are given maintenance*, but if we start this on a grand scale, frivolously and in haste, we shall find ourselves "on the rocks" within six months or a year. On the other hand, if we are more "tight-fisted", a fairly large number of peripheral undertakings manage "to make do with their own resources". In view of this, it is best to *arrange matters in the old way* (i.e., to speak to all those who participate in this way): *you* can provide a *good* deal

* Confidential.—*Ed.*

yet, let us say, "*over* 10 thousand", but, first, not all at once, and second, you *wish* to provide only in extreme necessity, advising them to seek regular sources to cover current expenses themselves. I repeat that so far this is my personal opinion, and I don't yet know Viscount's opinion. We wanted to raise the question with him here about some "amicable", "friendly" division of functions, starting from the principle that after all it is better to take advantage of peace to bring about a stable *modus vivendi* than to postpone matters once more until some "accidental" conflict. But whether this will succeed, whether we shall decide in this way, whether it will be convenient to raise the question—all this is still unknown.

At present, we are very hard up for money, and there are some *urgent* expenses. Therefore, please send *2,000 marks* immediately, if possible: what you can, of this amount, at once, and what you have to draw, as soon as possible (and let us know when it will arrive). But in my opinion you should already draw a larger amount: draw some *3,000 rubles* and keep it at home, so that we could get it from you at short notice. Otherwise we literally don't know how to get out of it: we already owe 150 rubles, and are putting off a payment of 50 rubles next week. We need about 300 rubles for departures (quite essential), about 200 for the people here soon, etc. Write as soon as you can what arrangements you have made, when and how much you will be receiving.

I shall pass on what you say to Brock. There is a crowd of people here, and altogether too much commotion. Yet many more are arriving in the next few days!

You write nothing about your plans for coming here, and very vaguely about your health: only that you don't feel well, but what is the matter? I am also worried about the lack of news from home.

Well, my best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from London to Dresden

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

PREFACE TO THE SPEECHES OF NIZHNI-NOVGOROD WORKERS IN COURT[142]

NIZHNI-NOVGOROD WORKERS IN COURT

We reprint the speeches of the Nizhni-Novgorod workers from the lithographed leaflet issued by the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. To add anything to these speeches would only mean weakening the impression created by this ingenuous account of the workers' misery, of the growing indignation among them and of their readiness to fight. It is now our duty to make every effort to have these speeches read by tens of thousands of Russian workers. The example of Zalomov, Bykov, Samylin, Mikhailov and their comrades, who courageously stood up in court for their fighting call: "Down with the autocracy!", will inspire the whole working class of Russia to equally heroic and resolute struggle for the freedom of the whole people, and the freedom of steady working-class advance to the bright socialist future.

Written before December 1 (14), 1902

Published in *Iskra* No. 29, December 1, 1902

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

December 1, 1902

Dear Georgi Valentinovich,

I was already going to inquire why you were silent, when I received your letter. Your requests will be fulfilled.

Why do you say nothing either (1) about a topic for *Iskra* or (2) about a feature article on Tarasov[143]? Did you not get my letter from Berne? Please reply as soon as possible whether you intend to write a leading article for *Iskra* on this or some similar theme. [As soon as possible, because No. 28 is ready and the setting of No. 29 has begun. In No. 28, there is a leading article by Vera Ivanovna against the S.R.s to show that they are distorting history by their inventions that no politicians were insulted in the period of Narodnaya Volya,[144] etc. The heading is: "*Le mort saisit le vif*".*]

How are your polemics with "Vladimirov" going? What about your lecture? How are Lalayants's and the other study groups? What are the *Zhizn* people[145] up to?

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Yes, I almost forgot to say that Lev**

Please forward the enclosed letter by local post.

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1956 in *Kommunist* No. 16

Printed from the original

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* "The Dead Seizes the Living."—*Ed.*

** The phrase is incomplete.—*Ed.*

1903

TO F. V. LENGNIK

To Kurtz

January 17, 1903

Yesterday we received *Kievski S.-D. Listok* No. 1, dated *November* 30 (sic!) through an outsider. It is simply a scandal that our Iskrists always lag behind! Why didn't Zarin send us this leaflet in time? Why hasn't he written a single word about this undertaking? We implore Zarin to link us up directly with some member of the Committee, someone who is conscientious and mobile and who knows everything that is going on. Every leaflet (whoever issues it) must be sent immediately to two different addresses in two copies, one in an envelope, another wrapped up in a Russian newspaper. Then we must immediately be given contact with *Vakar*. We are very much afraid that the Kiev Iskrists, owing to their inactivity and onlooker attitude, will suffer the same fate as that of the St. Petersburg Iskrists. Not a word either about receipt and *distribution* (N.B.) of the literature! This is a desperate situation!

Sent from London to Kiev

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO YELENA STASOVA

Why don't you reply to No. 16 of *Rabochaya Mysl*, published in Geneva, apparently by Nadezhdin? Are you really going to let this pass too without a protest? What a scandal that leaflet No. 1 of *Rabochaya Mysl* was burned[146]: of course, there were some things in it that needed correcting, and drastically at that. But then why wasn't it done? It's quite incomprehensible what is going on at your end! Why has the printed leaflet on the 200th anniversary of the press been delayed[147]? Send us immediately every leaflet, your own and other people's, workers' and students', all without exception, with a note saying whether they may be quoted and whether they were distributed—two copies of each to two addresses, either simply in envelopes or wrapped up inside a legal newspaper sent by book-post, only with a strong wrapper crosswise.

Why don't you send to *Iskra* the St. Petersburg Committee reports of the money you collect? Be sure to do this. There is great need of workers' letters from St. Petersburg; please do your best to get some, especially about unemployment, and then about the impression created by our literature.

Correct leaflet No. 1 of *Rabochaya Mysl*, rewriting it in a more restrained and more business-like tone, and be sure to publish the story of the split within the Committee. Nadezhdin's *Rabochaya Mysl cannot*, I emphasise, *cannot* be let off without a public protest.

Written on January 28, 1903
Sent from London to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY AND V. A. NOSKOV

To Claire and Boris from Starik

Dear Friends,

Kurtz is writing to you about yesterday's meeting.[148] There is no longer any hope, absolutely no hope of peace. You can't imagine even a tenth of the outrages to which the Martovites have sunk here, poisoning the whole atmosphere abroad with their spiteful gossip, encroaching on our contacts, *money*, literary material, etc. War has been declared, and they (Lyuba, Kostya, Yeryoma) are already on their way to fight in Russia. Get ready for the most legal but desperate struggle. We must by all means fill the places on *all* committees without exception with our own people. Special attention should be paid to Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav and Rostov. Is it true that the Kiev Committee has adopted a resolution backing the Minority? Is that possible? Why weren't we told earlier?

I would very strongly advise you to co-opt Konyaga and Ignat. You will soon see and get to know the former. About the latter I will say this: in wartime he is, truly, useful and essential; he will be quite loyal; he can be kept away from functions for which he is not fit; there is much idle gossip about him; there is no need to fear that he will co-opt God knows whom, because Kurtz will be staying here, and we shall take care of him. I repeat that I strongly advise you to take in Ignat, but, of course, it is entirely up to you; I have made Ignat give me a solemn promise that he would obey his chiefs in all things (and admitted to him that he should be prepared for not being co-opted).

Please be sure to get the Bureau to function properly,

so that we should get weekly letters from you. I would ask you even more earnestly to have Brutus go underground: it's not worth while perishing cheaply. Let him travel all over the place in the next two or three months, and then come here to replace Kurtz. This step is really essential. We have seen Lebedev. Ruben is here also.

Gurvich and Khinchuk are Martovites.

Hurry up with your reply about the Council. You should at once make a formal appointment of one more member representing you, and he should transfer his vote to Kurtz. Please don't delay.

Written on October 5, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Kiev

First published in 1927
in *Lenin Miscellany VI*

Printed from the original

TO F. I. DAN

Copy of a Reply

Addressed to Potresov (for Dan)

December 2, 1903

"Dear Comrade,

"The elimination of the personal conflict between Martov and myself could be confirmed in an annex to the minutes of the League's Congress.[149] For my part, I should only welcome it. But no one has either the formal or the moral right to abbreviate anything in the minutes of the Congress, or to delete anything from the description of what took place."

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

Written in Geneva (mailed locally)

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the original

1904

TO THE SOUTHERN BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To Odessa

From Lenin, C.C. member abroad and member of the Council

Comrades,

We have been informed privately that the majority of the Nikolayev Committee is accused of incorrect action.[150] I should very much like to be clear on what happened. Be so kind as to reply to me *immediately* yourselves (and ask for an immediate reply to me also from the comrades who are at present members of the Nikolayev Committee, passing this letter on to them) on the following questions:

(1) Who were the members of the Nikolayev Committee before the raid of March 8-9? A full list of conspirative names is essential. How many members were there in all? How many supported the Minority and how many the Majority?

(2) Were all the members of the Nikolayev Committee arrested on March 8-9? If not, how many remain? How many belong to the Majority, and how many to the Minority?

(3) Was or was there not a formal resolution of the Nikolayev Committee (before the raid of March 8-9) on the nomination of candidates? If there was, when was it adopted, how many candidates were nominated and who precisely were they?

(4) Have there been arrests in the Nikolayev Committee since March 8-9? What changes in its composition did each of these arrests bring about?

(5) Were or were not Comrades S. and O. (members of the Minority with whom there was a dispute) members of the Nikolayev Committee before the raid? Did they or did they not work in Nikolayev earlier? If they did, when, how long, in what capacity, in which group, in which line, etc.? When precisely did S. and O. come to Nikolayev?

(6) How many days after the wholesale arrests (March 8-9) did Comrade N. come to Nikolayev?

(7) What right had Comrade N. to declare Comrades S. and O. members of the Nikolayev Committee, without consulting Comrades V. and A., members of the Nikolayev Committee, and without obtaining their consent?

(8) Did Comrades S. and O. make any complaint about being members of the Nikolayev Committee without any appointment and without co-optation? If they did, please state in detail on what grounds.

(9) What connections were Comrades S. and O. supposed to hand over to Comrades V., N. and A.? Where did Comrades S. and O. get these connections? Who gave these connections to them, and when?

(10) Why did S. and O. not recognise Comrades V. and A. as the Committee?

(11) What official organisations of the Nikolayev Committee existed at the time of the raid of March 8-9, i.e., what groups of agitators, of organisers, of propagandists, etc., and how many such groups? Please list all without fail, and state how many members there were in each, how many of the Minority and how many of the Majority?

(12) When was the group of agitators whose meeting of 10 on April 20 adopted a resolution in favour of the Majority formed? Was it before the raid or after the raid? Was its composition changed after the raid, and how precisely? Did or did not this group (or some other groups) have a formal or tacit right to nominate candidates for membership of the local Committee?

(13) Do you happen to know from where, and with whose help (in cash, etc.), S. and O. were sent?

Written in Geneva
at the end of May 1904

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

July 26, 1904

Dear Vladimir Dmitrievich,

Thank you for your letter of 23.7.04 about our affairs.[151] I reply point by point.

As regards general policy, I am still for an armed peace, for retreats with protests (as we said in our talk with Nina Lvovna in the presence of yourself and Martyn Nikolayevich), in short, for our old tactics. Protest against every infringement, publish, agitate, without giving them any pretexts for the coup d'état which they desire. As to the details of particular measures, you can judge better on the spot.

That C.C. agents were not given any papers is the direct *fault* of Boris, who was the last to leave.[152] I have already written to Martyn Nikolayevich that I advise him to *explain* to the C.O. editorial board the *absurdity* of demanding the papers: tell them Boris has been written to twice, *there is a report about his arrest*, so must we really wait six months for a reply from Russia? Keep protesting—but *de facto* you will still be carrying on everything.

As regards finance, I have the feeling that we were rash in taking on the library: it's not luxuries we need, it's sustenance. Do you remember my telling you this? And the 300 francs have been spent! Please, do be careful, don't let yourself be carried away by the library,[153] keep your mind on the cause *as a whole*.

My best greetings to Ignat. How does he feel?

I am terribly worried about Nina Lvovna. Write at once if you hear anything.

To my mind, we must issue a reply to Plekhanov (in *pamphlet* form, not as a leaflet, and with a short preface) if the C.O. fails to publish it despite all our protests. And *don't be late* with this, or it will lose its interest.[154]

Every good wish, and greetings to Vera Mikhailovna and all our friends.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Write to me (and send newspapers) to *Meiringen*, *postlagernd*.*

Written in Switzerland,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

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* Poste restante.—*Ed.*

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Dear Vladimir Dmitrievich,

I have received your letter and hasten to reply. I simply cannot understand why you fell out, and what the point is.[155] I don't see why not sell 20-30 copies of *Zarya* and why this should be "running ahead of things". I should think this was the kind of routine matter in forwarding that could be left entirely to the manager of the forwarding section, i.e., to you. I am writing this very day to Martyn Nikolayevich asking him to try and clear up the misunderstanding. You shouldn't be too much upset about individual expressions, even sharp ones, even unfair ones. You see, surely, that we are all very edgy—the cause of it all is the rotten situation created by the new traitors in the C.C. Maybe we shall now soon put an end to all this, once and for all, and make a fresh start—then the basis for petty conflicts will disappear. In the meantime, we must try and see it through patiently, and I would reply to caustic remarks by jokes about "the deadly destroyer".[156] I quite understand your irritation, but joking seems to be the only answer. If a dispute arises, drag out its solution, write to us here, that's all you should do. Please take *all possible steps* to accelerate the appearance of

(1) the pamphlet by Ryadovoi and Galyorka,
(2) your statement with the documents,
(3) Galyorka's pamphlet which was sent today.[157]

How is Ilya? He visited me yesterday, I told him what was in hand,[158] but he still can't make up his mind. Has he been given my (1) letter on the subject of the agreement of 26.5.04[159]; (2) protest against the C.C. declaration,[160] and (3) letter about the protest[161]? *It is absolutely essential*

that he and all the compositors read this; *don't delay with this*.

Have matters been arranged about the co-operative printing press[162]? Hurry.

Ilya says there is a rumour that Glebov has a letter of resignation from Travinsky. We shall look into it *and check*.

They're a nice lot, aren't they? Five and four are arguing; *two* of the five resign; two of the four are taken—then the three, instead of resigning, stage a coup d'état[163]!

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in Switzerland,
between
August 18 and 31, 1904,
sent to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

September 13, 1904

Dear Vladimir Dmitrievich,

I think you *should not send* any application, as we decided previously.[164]

Stick a leaflet on the pamphlet,[165] printing on it (1) an advertisement about your publishing agency (and on the back); (2) Boris's statement on its prohibition (as already set); (3) the letter from Boris dated Sept. 12 (this one),[166] without the postscript; (4) a short additional remark, something to this effect:

"Such is the policy of people who so magnificently carried on a war 'of principle' against formalism and bureaucracy! It would, however, be interesting to learn which clause of the Rules prohibits Party members from publishing Party literature?

"V. Bonch-Bruyevich"

Greetings to everybody. I shall be back on Thursday, the day after tomorrow.

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. Inform Sergei Petrovich: (1) that on Thursday we shall evict him from his quarters and shall be spending the night there ourselves; (2) that Pan wrote about Samsonov four days ago. He should have been sent direct!

Written in the neighbourhood of Geneva
Sent to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

TO G. D. LEITEISEN

September 29, 1904

Dear Comrade,

I was very pleasantly surprised by reports from Sergei Petrovich and Martyn Nikolayevich about your political stand at the present time. I need not tell you how painful it has been for me, over the last twelve months, to see a break in the good relations which had previously always existed between us. In view of these reports, I think it would not be worth our while to look back to the past: we could probably resume our old relations exclusively on the basis of our common positive tasks of the present and the future. If I am mistaken in this, you will, of course, correct my error; but I feel it to be my duty, after my talk with Martyn Nikolayevich, to make a first attempt to clarify frankly and directly how we stand.

Respectfully yours,

N. Lenin

My address is: ...*

Sent from Geneva to Paris

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from a copy written by P. N. Lepeshinsky

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* No address is given in the MS.—*Ed.*

TO MARIA GOLUBEVA

Coded

Personal from Lenin to *Maria Petrovna*

Dear Comrade,

I was extremely glad to learn from our mutual friends (particularly from *Zver*—I don't know whether you knew her by the same nickname) that you are alive and have taken up a political stand in solidarity with us. We were acquainted and saw each other so long ago (at Samara in 1892-93) that it would be difficult for us to renew our friendship without the help of new friends. And I should very much like to renew it. For this purpose I am sending you, taking advantage of the address I have, a detailed letter about our affairs, and earnestly ask you to reply personally and as soon as you can. It is quite impossible to work together unless there is regular correspondence, but up to now Saratov has been in the habit of keeping a stubborn silence for months at a time. Please see that all this is changed now, and begin to write us yourself as circumstantially as possible. Without detailed letters from you personally it will be impossible to get a clear picture either of your personal activity in the cause or of Saratov conditions in general. Please make yourself spend 2 or 3 hours a week on this.

I send you very best greetings and good wishes.

Lenin

Written after October 5, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Saratov

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

TO E. E. ESSEN

To Baron from Lenin

November 4, 1904

Dear Comrade,

The many reports I have had about you oblige me to beg you to leave your work temporarily and come here for a month. I understand perfectly how carried away you are by your work, and how hard it is for you to tear yourself away from it, but, after all, we must think of deploying our forces from the standpoint of the general plan of the campaign. We need experienced workers, and you must find some young people to substitute for you temporarily, and come over here without fail to settle some common problems, to tell us about all your conclusions from your journeys, and to confer about the new steps we are taking. This is quite necessary, otherwise we shall be left without reserves in any serious contingency in the future. Please reply to me personally as soon as possible, and I entreat you not to postpone your journey even for as long as a week. You've been intending to come for a long time; but keep putting it off. It may end badly: I've seen it happen before. My best wishes, and hope to see you soon.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Odessa

First published in 1924
in the magazine *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 1

Printed from the original

TO A. I. YERAMASOV

Dear Friend,

Your help was extremely valuable to us in general and to me in particular. If I have not yet made any special request of you, it was because there has been no extremity, but I have been confident of the utmost possible support on your part. At the present time, a moment of extremity is approaching, a situation so serious that I could not even imagine anything of the kind before. Our undertaking is threatened with complete collapse, unless we manage to hold out for at least six months *with the help of extraordinary resources*. And to do that without folding up our activities we need a minimum of two thousand rubles a month: for editing, publishing, transport, and equipment of the most essential agents. That is why I now address this most urgent request to you to help us out and procure this support for us. Please let me know as soon as possible whether you are able to fulfil this request of ours.

Written in December 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

1905

TO ***[167]

March 9, 1905

Dear Friend,

I am unable to answer most of your questions, because I myself know no more than you do. It looks as if Voinov is not in favour of a single centre. The Russians are. Whether or not it will go through, I don't know. I am more in favour of the old system,[168] but do not attach any particular importance to it. The crux of the problem is consultations between the Central Committee and the editorial board—and that *in effect* brings us back again to some sort of Council.

"Then we shall see."

I can't write about you to Moscow, because I have no personal friends there, and one has to be careful with such things. It is better to wait and see how they decide themselves.

I will send you the outline of my report ("The Tasks of the Third Congress") if I find it*: it is *very* brief, almost what was said in "From the Editors", in *Vperyod*.[169]

I have not so far been able to find out what sort of consent there was on the part of the Central Committee to a congress. I myself was very much afraid of a skilful C.C. intrigue—you saw our attitude in *Vperyod*.[170] Now the Minority C.C. have nearly all been arrested, only Fisher,

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* I have found it. I can't send it, because it is hieroglyphics on a scrap of paper. My advice is to concentrate on the experience of the Second Congress.

Nikitich and Karp remain. Stein and Povar[171] have also been arrested. This will probably weaken the Mensheviks for a long time. Over here, dear old Martov has a real fit at his club at any mention of the congress. Judging by this, they won't come. But who can know for certain? I am ready even for the worst: for a split on our part, but consider this improbable.

Don't tell me you have not even managed to get a *minute* of Deutsch's most disgusting boasts. Why, that is unheard of! One couldn't even expect such impudence. You should have forced him up against the *minutes*, published a *list* of "their" groups or at least passed the minutes on for the congress, so as to show the Russians the boundless impudence of these gentlemen.

All the best,

N. Lenin

Written in Geneva

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR REPRESENTATION COMMITTEE[172]

March 23, 1905

Dear Sir,

Thank you very much for your donation. I have received a cheque for £80 (francs 2,008) and directed £60 (frs 1,506) according to your prescriptions in St. Petersburg to our St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. I have received also the second cheque for £90 (the sum not yet received here in francs). £50 will be also sent to aid the widows and orphans of the St. Petersburg (labourers) working men, killed on 9 (22) January.

With kind regards.

Yours very sincerely,

Vl. Oulianoff
(Editor of the *Vperiod*)

VI. Oulianoff, Editor of the "*Vperiod*",
3. Rue de la Colline. 3. Genève.
Switzerland.

Sent to London

First published on August 18, 1946
in the journal *British Ally* No. 33

Printed from the original
in English

TO P. A. KRASIKOV

April 5, 1905

Dear Friend,

So far I can say nothing definite about the date.[173] I think you will have time enough to go to Liege, if you can return on Sunday, or if you *don't take a return ticket* and don't go back to Paris (probably the best thing will be to take a 45-day circular ticket, Paris—Liège, etc.—Paris, right away). It's *hardly* possible before Monday, although, I repeat, I'm not sure. Today, April 5, was fixed as the latest date for departure from St. Petersburg—*ergo* it is hardly likely before Monday. So far no one has arrived. On Friday, two will be setting off from here—they may call at your town, but strictly incognito.

Have you seen Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*[174]? What a melancholy tone of utter resignation! I am sorry for the old man, he's angry for no good reason, but what a lovely brain....

Our line with the *delegates* must be strictly peaceable: we "have nothing to lose, but stand to win everything (if there's a victory)"; for our opponents it's the other way round. You will, of course, see this yourself from the B.M.C. and C.C. leaflet,[175] and also from No. 13 (Question of Organisation).[176]

Hurry, hurry, hurry with the report of the Committee of the Organisation Abroad,[177] *the list of members* and all the documents.

Au revoir,

Yours,

N. Lenin

Greetings to Kiska! How is she getting on?

Sent from Geneva to Paris

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

TO ***[178]

I hasten to remind you about one thing which it is *essential* to translate and publish as soon as possible, and which I forgot to mention in my talk with you (although I have had this thing in mind for a very long time!). It is Friedrich Engels's *Die Reichsverfassungskampagne*, from the collection of the works of Marx and Engels published by Mehring (Marx, *Nachlass*, etc., Vol. III). This is quite a separate thing, which really must appear as a pamphlet. It is now of *particularly* great interest.[179]

Written in Geneva in April-May 1905

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR REPRESENTATION COMMITTEE

May 20, 1905

Dear Sir,

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of £25, of which £5 will be subscribed, according Your condition, for relief work. Your subscriptions are all mentioned in our paper *Vperiod* (Forward), which we send to You. Now I send You again the issues of this paper, where the subscriptions are mentioned and I notice these mentions with blue pencil.

We have written already to St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party that it is necessary to make a report before some working men meetings about the subscriptions from the L.R.C. All communications with the organisations of our party being secret it must take some time before an answer can be received. This week some Russian comrades go to St. Petersburg and I repeated to them my request. They promised to me to take all measures to accelerate this report in St. Petersburg and to send a notice to You. Your letter from 22.4.05 will also be sent to the St. Petersburg Committee.

I hope, dear Sir, that you will soon receive a letter from our Petersburg comrades stating the report before working men meeting in the Russian capital.

I beg to apologise for my bad English.

With kindest thanks.

Yours very sincerely,

Vl. Oulianoff
(Editor of the *Vperiod*)

VI. Oulianoff,
3. Rue de la Colline. 3.
Genève. Switzerland.

Sent to London

First published on August 18, 1946
in the journal *British Ally* No. 33

Printed from the original
in English

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA

My dear Kiska,

I have just sent you a telegram. To be on the safe side, I will explain what it is about. I have been summoned to Paris on business. I want on no account to waste my time in travelling merely for this reason, but to give a lecture. The subject: "The Third Congress and Its Decisions". The contents: a parallel analysis of our decisions and those of the Mensheviks. They have just issued an announcement about their conference, and I will analyse it. I can speak only on *Tuesday* (I will be arriving on Monday, but my evening will be taken up) and must finish in one day. If you can, hire the biggest hall (where I spoke against Struve—Filatov and the others will know) and inform the maximum number of people. If you have not yet telegraphed a clear reply, do so tomorrow, so that I should know *exactly* whether a hall has been hired. Perhaps you will even have time to write to me by *express* (so that I should get it not later than Sunday morning), but if you have something important to report, be sure to cable.

I am giving the same lecture here today.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

*Tournez s'il vous plaît!**

If by any chance it turned out that I couldn't deliver the lecture, I might not come at all. Therefore be sure to reply.[180]

Written on June 1 or 2, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Paris

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

* P.T.O.—*Ed.*

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

September 15, 1905

Dear Comrades,

I have received the money, 1,000 rubles—2,640 francs—and the first issue of *Rabochy*. It makes an excellent impression. Let us hope that it will largely solve the difficult problem of providing a popular exposition which is not boring. There is something fresh in the tone and character of the exposition. A splendid fighting spirit. In short, let me congratulate you on this success with all my heart, and wish for more. So far, I have the following minor remarks: (1) a little more should be said about *socialism*, in view of the "explanatory" nature of the organ, and (2) the fighting political slogans should be more closely and directly tied in with the *resolutions* of the Third Congress, and with the general spirit of our revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics.

Now for your letter of Aug. 24, 1905,[181] which simply amazed us all by its tone. I. About information. You "can do nothing more". That is not true, since we find that the Bund, and the Mensheviks, and a number of Bolsheviks can do more, and are doing it. It is a fact that the C.C. member abroad is not as well informed as the Bundists and *Iskra*. This should be put right, and maintained steadily through tireless effort. Here is the most recent example. We received your active boycott resolution *just the other day*.[182] People arriving from Russia have known about it *since June*! And you tell us that you "can do nothing more"? Its late arrival caused discordance between us, through no fault of mine, for, not knowing how you were interpret-

ing it, I gave a different interpretation of "active boycott" in *Proletary*.

There you have another fact of the two-centre situation which you have restored . In substance, the discordance turned out not to be great, but still it is undesirable on a question concerning the course of action of the whole Party. I believe it to be (1) extremely important and the only correct approach, from the point of view of the decisions of the Third Congress, to put forward directly, as the central point in the agitation campaign, the slogan of insurrection and a provisional revolutionary government. (2) I think it is quite wrong to advise that meetings of the electors should be "dispersed by force". Such tactics would be fatal. One of the two things: either there are no conditions for using force on a sizable scale—in which case, we should confine ourselves to agitation, speeches, strikes and demonstrations, making an effort at persuading the electors and on no account "dispersing them". Or conditions do exist for the use of force on any considerable scale—in which case the force must be directed, not against the electors, but against the police and the government. In that case, undertake an insurrection. Otherwise you risk landing in a most absurd situation: the workers "use force to break up" meetings of electors; the government uses force to defend them! This in practice shows the harmfulness of not advancing the straightforward and resolute slogan of insurrection, as a centre of agitation against the Duma: prepare for an insurrection, try to persuade everybody (including the electors as well) to prepare for an insurrection, explain its objectives, forms, methods, conditions, organs and preliminaries. But don't use *force* to no purpose, before it has been accumulated, for if you haven't convinced the electors, it is plain madness and suicide for the Social-Democrats to scatter them by force.

Furthermore. II. You write that you were not tricking the Organising Committee, but were doing the will of the Third Congress. I think that you are clearly wrong in this. I wrote to you as long ago as...* about the need to prepare

* A space was left in the MS. after "as long ago as" for the date of the letter to the Central Committee—July 28 (see present edition, Vol.

the *conditions* for unification, and *two congresses* to give it effect (in the same place and at the same time, with an obligation on the part of each organisation to accept the decisions of *its own* congress). So there is no difference of opinion there. But it is a fact that you have forgotten about the secret resolution (I append it below) concerning the *obligatory* endorsement of the conditions of fusion by the Fourth Congress. That is what I have been insisting on. Two clauses of the Organising Committee's statement—Clauses 2 and 3—(*Letuchy Listok TsK*[183] No. 3, p. 5) speak out *directly against* unification through a congress. This cannot be denied. But you, *in your reply*, say *nothing at all* of your disagreement! So the result is that you have set aside the resolution. That this is a mistake, and that it must be corrected, is beyond doubt.

Then there is another unquestionable mistake: the absence of any direct reply to the Organising Committee. You write that "*it was a question of fusion on the basis of the Third Congress*". Have a heart, gentlemen! Why deceive yourselves? Why weaken your correct position by obvious hypocrisy?

Fusion on the basis of the Third Congress was rejected. It was offered here both by Vinter and by Vadim directly both to Plekhanov and to the Organising Committee. Given such a unification, there would have been a *single* C.O. (through his agents, Plekhanov even suggested a "trio" for it). Given *such* a unification, there would have been a single C.C., formed out of both halves *as an essential condition*, i.e., the "co-optation" would not have been co-optation but a real fusion.

But this was rejected. Consequently, there remains *agreement* up to the Fourth Congress, and *fusion* "on the basis of the *Fourth* Congress". Instead of giving such a direct and clear reply and statement for all to hear, you evade the substance of the question by withholding your opinion *from our people* (for while the O.C. is patently proposing fusion *not* on the basis of the Third Congress, you reply: this is on the whole acceptable, good, let's have another

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34, pp. 320-22). N. K. Krupskaya crossed out "as long ago as" and wrote "earlier" over it.—*Ed.*

talk about it!). Meanwhile you write to me: "*Our ultimatum was the Rules of the Third Congress*." And you don't call that self-deception? Why, if you say it in public, in the first place, all the Bolsheviks will laugh you out of court, and, in the second place, the Mensheviks will reply to you in *such fashion* that all your good intentions about fusion will go to the devil!

In my opinion, it is better to tell the Party frankly: to our regret, *they* have rejected unification on the basis of the Third Congress. Let's set about preparing for the Fourth Congress in such a way as to have two congresses assemble at the same time and in the same place. Let's work out a plan of unification. Let's say, in all parallel organisations *everywhere* there are equal numbers of both groups (*à la* Nikolayev[184]). If so, draw up a list of parallel organisations, a complete list, and poll all of them. Then there is a Central Committee, shall we say, also half-and-half, i.e., in equal numbers. With complete *unification*, there can be no objection in principle to "co-optation" of that kind (though in practice the question is more complicated and one must know how many parallel organisations there are, etc). (In parenthesis: it's a great pity that in No. 1 of *Letuchy Listok* you boasted that 2/3 of the Party are on our side. Thereby you prejudiced any future acceptance of the "half-and-half" principle on your part. And were you really telling the truth about the 2/3?) Furthermore, the C.O. With *fusion* it would be absurd, in my opinion, to have two Central Organs and I believe it possible that the Bolsheviks will prefer, rather than have this absurd situation, to have their own organ issued by several committees, in accordance with the Party Rules. If there are two *rival* Central Organs, unification will be a dead letter. In that event, it is better to have "agreement", on a basis similar to that at Nikolayev, i.e., everywhere unification or conciliation commissions, with equal numbers from both sides.

III. About money. We were all thunderstruck by your statement that the C.O. must be published "on resources from abroad", and that the bankruptcy of the C.C. must *begin with the C.O*. You write that this is not irritation and not a rebuke. Give me leave not to believe you. To say this

calmly, coolly and in all seriousness is to proclaim a *rupture* between the C.O. and the Party, and this is something you could not wish. It is something unheard of to have the Party's C.O. published not with the Party's resources, but on funds abroad, and to decide that the bankruptcy of the Party must *begin* (rather than end) with the C.O. If we were to take this seriously, instead of regarding it merely as a sign of nervousness on account of temporary difficulties (for in general your turnover is a "fat" one, and your prospects both of the 60,000 and the "undertaking" are three times "fatter"), we should have to take immediate steps to start publication "on resources from abroad" of an organ of the Committee of the Organisation Abroad. But, I repeat, I regard this monstrous outburst on your part only as a state of nerves, and will await our personal meeting, since, in my opinion, it is not the beginning of a break, but a misunderstanding.

Best wishes,

N. Lenin

Written in Geneva

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

TO M. A. REISNER

October 4, 1905

Dear Mikhail Andreyevich,

I am very grateful to you for your letter, which gives me even more information than Felix Alexandrovich did in his report of a talk with you, as to the plans and tactics of our so-called Cadets.[185] It was extremely valuable to have your communication that the liberals, Witte, etc., are in deadly fear of an active boycott. I have just received news from Russia that an inter-Party conference of Social-Democrats (both sections of the R.S.D.L.P., the Bund, probably the Letts, etc.)[186] has been held. The active boycott tactics have been finally adopted.

Your plan is not clear to me: (1) Do you really think there is the slightest hope that the Cadets will refuse to participate in an election to the Duma? I think there is none. (2) Don't you think it better for us, if we are to conclude an agreement with the radicals, to demand a million or so from them for the purpose of arming the Petersburg workers, than to have an election to a Constituent Assembly right now? What point will there be in holding an election before or without a fight against Trepov?

Of course, this needs to be discussed in greater detail. I pin my hopes, first, on the meeting you will be having in Berlin over the next few days with one of my friends,[187] and, second, on our meeting here with you about which Felix wrote to us. Wishing you success in the struggle for an active boycott.

Yours faithfully....

Sent from Geneva to Berlin

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

October 25, 1905

Dear Friends,

I have just received your letter about my appointment to the International Bureau[188] (it is a pity that you did not appoint Orlovsky, but we can discuss that when we meet) and about a meeting at Odessa (Berlin). It is essential to have a meeting as soon as possible. Instead of Odessa, I can suggest Warsaw (Königsberg)[189]—all the conditions are the same, but it's nearer and more unexpected for the police. In the latter place all could be ready for you in *four days*, given the best possible conditions (a legal passport), on which I advise you to begin working energetically at once. Given worse conditions, the period is still very short, and it would be a good thing, if possible, to increase the number of participants. If you decide on an unfamiliar city (Königsberg is 22 hours from St. Petersburg) the meeting could be appointed in a café, hotel, or tavern, with the aid of a guide-book.

I am writing this very day to the I. Bureau for information about the conference and its date; directly I receive the reply, I will forward it to you. Please hurry with our meeting, regardless even of the conference with the I. Bureau.

Were minutes taken at the inter-Party conference? If they were, send them to us without fail.

Written in Geneva

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

1907

TO M. S. KEDROV

Dear Comrade,

According to our agreement, the material for Vol. II should have been delivered by Oct. 1, and for Vol. III, by Oct. 10.[190] The first volume has been delayed. I have already handed in 12 sheets for Volume II, another 7 are ready, and I can hand in the remainder (about 5 or 7) very soon. But I should like to know whether you really require all this material so quickly. Will you be setting it at once? Have you already sent the 12 sheets of Volume II for setting? Will publication be delayed if I send you the end of Volume II later? If it will, I can let you have the end of Volume II immediately, if you want it. But I have a plan to write, for the end of Volume II, a large work about the distribution of land in Russia (using the new statistical data of 1905) and about municipalisation (taking into account Volume IV of *Capital*, or *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, which also appeared in 1905). I think it would be of great interest for the public, and would be very timely. I have already collected nearly all the material for the work and processed part of it. I need a few weeks to finish it; I hope to be able to write the work in a few weeks.

Please, let me know, therefore, whether you want Vol. II to be delivered immediately without this new article, or to have it handed in with the new article in about a month or six weeks.

Written at the end of November and
the beginning of December 1907
Sent from Finland to
St. Petersburg

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from a copy
written by N. K. Krupskaya

1908

TO G. A. ALEXINSKY

January 7, 1908

Dear Pyotr,

Nadezhda Konstantinovna and I arrived at Geneva today.[191] We haven't decided finally where to stay: Alexander Alexandrovich is very much against Geneva, and we are reconnoitring in other places.

But we have to find out just what the situation here is as well. Please write immediately (1) whether you know of a *suitable* person to manage the printing press and the forwarding section[192]; (2) what you think of the doc[tor]* as such; (3) what particularly should be borne in mind about the printing press; [does it need] an owner in view of the fact that it [belongs] to the C.O. of the Bolshevik [group] of the Stockholm Congress? Why do you consider only the *Menshevik* printing press to be the property of the C.C.? (4) Do you think that a weekly paper is possible, and what approximate sale could it count on? 300-500-1,000?

We received your letter in Berlin amidst the panic caused by the arrest of the 17,[193] and therefore destroyed it without a sufficiently attentive reading.

Reply to the address....

How is your health? When [app]roximately will [you] be able to come back here? Has your health [at all] improved during this period?

All the best....

Sent from Geneva to Vienna

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* Part of the sheet on which the letter was written was torn off and is missing. The words and phrases restored from the remaining letters and from the context are bracketed.—*Ed.*

TO G. A. ALEXINSKY

Dear Pyotr,

I have the following request. I have written a big work on the subject of the agrarian programme, in which, among other things, I deal in detail with the debate in the Second Duma.[194] I lack some of the *documents* introduced in the Second Duma.

More precisely: *Mushenko* introduced a draft of the 104 or 105, not the "well-known" Trudovik[195] draft of the First Duma, which was repeated in the Second as well, but the *new*, *S.R. draft*.[196] It was reprinted in French in *Rapport du parti S.R. au congrès de Stuttgart*. Do you happen to have the Russian text? Can you get it? I will be very much obliged if you can help.

Has it appeared in a separate edition? Where and when?

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written between January 7 and February 2, 1908
Sent from Geneva to Vienna

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO G. A. ALEXINSKY

February 3, 1908

Well, that's what I call a "good" turn! Giving the address and connections to the Menshevik Mandelberg. That was really naïve. *On no account* let Mandelberg come anywhere near us; but now that you have committed this piece of stupidity, get the address back from him and cheat him.

We wrote to you yesterday about *Proletary*. There is a tremendous and inevitable sharpening of the factional struggle *everywhere*. Details when we meet.

V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Vienna

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

It's a long time since I wrote to you. Our trip is being constantly put off: the main obstacle at present is the lack of news from Brussels. My friends wrote to me from there that I am expected at a meeting of the Bureau (International Socialist). I asked the secretary when I should come (because, I said, I had to go to Italy). *There's still no reply*. But I mustn't miss Brussels.

Have you received *Proletary*? What are your intentions about it, then? And what about An. Vas.? It was with regret that I got his refusal to write about the Commune. *Innokenty* is our third editor.

Drop me a line about what plans you and An. Vas. have for *Proletary*.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written in the first half of March 1908
Sent from Geneva to Capri

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

TO MARIA ANDREYEVA

Dear Maria Fyodorovna,

I enclose a letter from our librarian to A. M.

The thing is this. I want very much A. M. to write a *legal* open letter to the *Russian* papers, asking *assistance for the* Kuklin *Library* in Geneva by the dispatch to it of newspapers of the period of the revolution and material on its history.

A very short letter *explaining* to the general public why assistance to the library is also important *for the work* both of Gorky himself and of many other literary men he knows.[197]

I would ask you to arrange to have the letter hectographed (I hope Zinovy Alexeyevich will not refuse to help in this) and sent *to all Russian* newspapers and journals of a more or less decent trend.

Please organise all this!

I would ask Zinovy Alexeyevich to send me by *slow* delivery the books which Victor did not take, *unless* Natalia Bogdanovna takes *them*.

All good wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

May Day greetings!

Written in the end of April 1908
Sent from Geneva to Capri

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO Th. A. ROTHSTEIN

July 8, 1908

Dear Comrade,

As regards the creditor, I have decided to postpone the letter until a *plenary* meeting of the Central Committee, which is to take place in the *very* near future.[198] I find it inconvenient to butt in with the meeting of the authorised Party collegium about to take place.

I shall be very glad to see you here. I can say little that is definite about the neighbourhood of Geneva: I have been ill all the time since my return from London, and am sitting at home, without seeing anyone who lives in the country. I know that *in France*, but quite close to Geneva, there are many good and hardly expensive places. For example, there is Mornex on the slopes of the Salève, which means that it is fairly high up. A friend of mine lived there in 1904, and I believe one can stay there on one's own quite cheaply, and at slightly higher cost at the pensions, but for 4-4½ francs for sure, because that is the usual price. One can also find a place a little farther away from Geneva (Mornex is about 7 versts away, I should think, and there is an electric tram up to Salève)—within 10 versts and more, on the slopes of the Jura, but I don't know what the place is like over there. I will try and find out something more definite, and will write to you directly I discover anything.

Every good wish,

Yours,

Lenin

VI. Oulianoff. 61, III. Rue des Maraîchers. 61. Genève. This is a new address. It's not far from the École de médecine.

Sent from Geneva to London

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

NOTE TO A. A. BOGDANOV

Dear A. A.,

Here is Steklov's letter. Reply to him yourself. I replied that I was agreeable, provided the subjects were changed round—philosophy for me, the peasant question for Bazarov.[199]

All the best,

Lenin

P.S. Return the letter.

Written in Geneva
October 27 or 28, 1908
(mailed locally)

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

1909

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

The last two-thirds of Kamenev's article are quite bad, and can hardly be edited. I straightened out the first third (p. 1 to end of p. 5) but am not able to make any further alteration, because I see that what it needs is not *editing* but *complete rewriting*.

In this part of the article, Kamenev gives an incredibly woolly and confused expression, with thousands of frills, to his idea (that the Octobrists[200] and the Rightists are fighting over minor matters, that their struggles, dissensions, fights are inevitable in bourgeoisifying the monarchy and that from this fighting the revolution *follows* only *indirectly*, i.e., provided the proletariat enters the arena, and not directly, not by the bourgeoisie itself "going left").

To my mind, we *cannot* publish it in this form.

Either persuade the author to *rewrite* the last two-thirds—and we shall then "edit" the article, or have a hand yourself at rewriting the last two-thirds almost completely.

I enclose (pp. 1-3 in ink) an approximate plan for its rewriting.

Written at Bombon (Seine-et-Marne, France) in August 1909

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Tuesday

Dear Grigory,

I have received the article about the Swedish strike.[201] It's a very good one. I have sent it to Paris together with the end of my article on Bogdanov[202] (which came to 100 lines —2 pages of *Proletary* in the supplement). I don't know now whether you will approve it all. I leave it *entirely* to your judgement: I am so sick of writing this article that now I don't know whether it wouldn't be better to scrap the *whole*, and reply to Bogdanov literally in a couple of words about his scandal-mongering regarding the "property of the whole group". It's up to you!

I shall write about Plekhanov. The Swedish strike article should go in as the leader.

Best wishes,
Lenin

Written at Bombon (Seine-et-Marne, France) in August September 7 or 14, 1909

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

1910

TO LEON TYSZKA

For T.

March 28, 1910

Dear Comrade,

Thank you for sending me Rosa Luxemburg's articles.[203]

I must protest in the strongest possible terms on the main question—regarding the replacement of Warski by Leder.[204] Why, you put us in the most impossible situation! I will not say anything of Leder's personal qualities (as they caught the eye in work together at congresses and conferences: these impressions of him did *not* at all testify to any knowledge, capacities, literary taste, understanding of the business, and often bore witness to petty faultfinding, etc., etc.—you will appreciate that I am writing to you, too, *privatissime**). I won't enlarge on the fact that it is not right to substitute an inexperienced and scarcely suitable person for an experienced writer, a sensible Marxist and an excellent comrade.

But I will speak about the position of the C.O. editorial board and *about the crisis* in the Party. You surely cannot have failed to notice the critical situation. Warski and I write to the Central Committee about a change in the composition of the C.O. (Dan is clearly disrupting it). The liquidators[205] are disrupting the C.C. And in these circumstances, just when there is *unquestionable* need of

* Strictly confidentially.—*Ed.*

a man who was at the plenum, who has been tested in the work, who is working nicely with the board, who has begun a serious war with a serious enemy—just at that moment he is being replaced by a new man! Where's your fear of God? Don't you see it means paralysing the C.O.? After all, the C.O. is now the *only* organ of leadership for the *whole* Party (until the C.C. gets together again after its disruption by the liquidators). It is terribly important to have the C.O. in working trim—and this is surely no time "to begin all over again", to "initiate" a newcomer, to *argue* instead of getting on with the job. Please do try to understand that, in order to find *loopholes*, the Mensheviks, relying on the plenum (and formally they have an unquestionable right to rely on it), *argue* about every single word in the resolution, its every omission, every incident at the plenum (even the tiniest). Now, is it conceivable, in the situation, to have a man play the part of pendulum when he *was not* present at the plenum and has not worked with us in the central bodies of the R.S.D.L.P. for *years and years*? Why, this is absolutely impossible! It means blocking the whole business—and that at a time when *highly important* questions come up for *decision* at every meeting. Why, Leder will be obliged to say "I don't know" to the *thousands* of arguments and the cavilling of the Mensheviks (who, as you know very well, are devilishly skilful at making use of every *fraktioneller Dreck**). Now, I ask you, can we have such a man at such a time?

No. No. We are not demanding anything excessive of the P.S.D.** We know their forces, and their needs, and the conditions of work in Poland. We are not overburdening Warski, and are not preventing him from doing Polish *literary* work. But you must let us have him in the C.O., as we agreed during the plenum. Without Warski, we are *absolutely* not in a position to "tide over" the period of crisis, i.e., to secure a change in the composition of the C.O. Now, when the crisis is over, when the composition of the C.O. is altered, then ... but even then, let's *not* have Leder,

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* Factional piece of dirt.—*Ed.*

** Polish Social-Democrats.—*Ed.*

for the love of God. In that case, let's have Karski, if we can't have Warski even then. But at present Warski is absolutely, absolutely essential.

All good wishes. Greetings to Rosa.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO MARIA ZOLINA

For *M. M.*

April 30, 1910

Dear Comrade,

Thank you for letting me know about Mikhail's condition. I took steps at once to get a grant for him. As matters stand, it is hopeless to try and get it through the Central Committee's Bureau Abroad, because there we are now in a minority. There was an opportunity to write to Russia, and I asked the Russian Central Committee to take a decision on a grant for Mikhail. I hope to have a favourable reply in two weeks' time. *In any case*, it would be essential to ensure that Mikhail should continue the treatment and stay at Davos for the time being, until a complete cure.

All the best,

Yours,

N. Lenin

My address is:
Mr. Vl. Oulianoff.
4. Rue Marie Rose. 4.
Paris. XIV,

Sent from Paris to Davos
(Switzerland)

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO LEON TYSZKA

July 20

Werter Genosse,*

I have just learned from Warski that two of the *Golos* people (who *were* at the plenum) are *already* in Russia. The situation is critical. Since the plenum, we have lost *three* Bolsheviks.[206] We can't afford any more. It's all up, unless the Poles come to our rescue. It's all over, unless you get a second Polish C.C. man, and send him along with Hanecki for 2-3 weeks, in order to convoke the collegium *at all costs only* to carry through the "measures" and for co-opting purposes.[207] It depends on you. We have done everything possible, lost three, can't afford any more. Write to me as follows: Mr. Oulianoff. Rue Mon Désir. Villa les Roses. *Pornic* (Loire-Inférieure). France. I shall be there until August 23—then at Copenhagen.[208]

Warm greetings to Rosa.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written on July 20, 1910
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* Dear Comrade.—*Ed.*

TO KARL RADEK

September 30, 1910

Werter Genosse,

Excuse me for this delay in replying to your two letters. I returned to Paris only the other day,[209] and was unable to reply earlier.

As regards an article for the C.O. on the disarmament resolution of the Copenhagen Congress, it was ordered (back in Copenhagen) and written by another contributor. Unfortunately, your proposal came too late.

As to inserting your article in the next issue, I must have a talk with Warski and another member of the editorial board. I shall do this.

Concerning your leading articles in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, I must say that the question is very interesting, but I have not studied it at length, and it seems to me that theoretically you are not quite right. The criterion of what is "impracticable within the framework of capitalism" should not be taken in the sense that the bourgeoisie will not allow it, that it cannot be achieved, etc. In that sense, very many demands in our minimum programme are "impracticable", but are none the less obligatory.

Then, when mentioning the Inaugural Address of the International, you omit from your quotation Marx's words about the principles of relations between states.[210] Is not that a "minimum programme" in foreign policy? And finally, why do you say nothing about Engels's "*Kann Europa abrüsten*?"*?

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* "Can Europe Disarm?"—*Ed.*

You are quite right, in my opinion (all this is my personal opinion, of course), that it is impossible to leave out the demand to arm the people. Wouldn't it be more correct to concentrate your fire not on the fact that *Abrüstung** is written into the resolution, but that *Volkswehr*** is not?

I want to reply to Martov and Trotsky in *Neue Zeit*. I have already written to Kautsky and asked him whether they would carry it and how long it could be. It is also necessary of course to reply in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to Leipzig

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* Disarmament.—*Ed.*

** Arming the people.—*Ed.*

TO KARL RADEK

To Comrade *Karl Radek*

October 9, 1910

Dear Comrade,

I intended to reply to the articles by Martov and Trotsky in a long article on the substance of the matter in *Neue Zeit*. But things turned out otherwise. You published a very good statement, while Comrade Karski, even before I had written to Kautsky and Wurm of my intention, had sent *Neue Zeit* an article against Martov.[211] Wurm sent me Karski's article, and I agreed that that was enough.

But I cannot, however, leave unanswered Martov and Trotsky's most incredible absurdities and distortions. About a third or a half of my article is now ready. Its subject is: "*The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia*".[212] Please give me your advice: is it possible and will it be useful to publish this article in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*?

If the answer depends on whether or not the editorial board likes my article, I am of course prepared to send it to you without laying down any conditions.

I should be very grateful to you if you could tell me anything about this right away. For instance, I should like to ~now whether you could publish a few feature articles on the subject in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. What is the *maximum* length of an article to be? And one other thing: I do not write German, but Russian. Can you have a translation made in Leipzig—or do you find this inconvenient or difficult, and prefer that I should find a translator over here (which of

course, in all probability, I can do)? Or, finally, should I write in my *very* bad German (of which this letter is a specimen), and you can then have my bad German translated into good German in Leipzig? (A friend once told me that it was *easier* to translate into German from good Russian than from bad German.)

With best wishes,

Yours,

N. Lenin

My address is:
Mr. Vl. Oulianoff.
4. Rue Marie Rose. 4.
Paris. XIV.

Sent from Paris to Leipzig

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original
in German

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 22, 1910

Dear G. V.,

Comrade Grigory has just given me your letter. I have had only one paper from the International Socialist Bureau, *exclusively* about money, i.e., about our Party's contribution for the maintenance of the International Socialist Bureau. I passed it on to the treasurer of the C.C.'s Bureau Abroad, and replied to Huysmans that I had informed the C.C. about the contribution. I shall, of course, send on to you every "non-financial" paper from the International Socialist Bureau.

What did you think of *Rabochaya Gazeta*?

People are saying here that Martov and Co., when resuming the publication of *Golos*, invited the pro-Party Mensheviks "to clear out" of "*their*" group.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

1911

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

February 3, 1911

Dear Comrade,

I received your letter about Singer today, and passed it on to a comrade who promised to send a telegram (I myself have a touch of the flu). By the way, on December 18, I sent you a letter from Huysmans and my draft reply.[213] Your reply seems to be such a long time in arriving! Send me back Huysmans's letter, at least.

The Duma group informs us that the liquidators made a new attack after Jordansky's note in No. 4 of *Zvezda*. The liquidators were backed by Smirnov, Martov's brother, Cherevanin and others.

Veselovsky, Chernyshov, Lositsky were against.

Poletayev (who wrote to me about it) says that there is no doubt that they have won, i.e., that the liquidators' attack has been beaten off.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to San Remo (Italy)

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

How is your health? M. F. wrote that you had returned with a cough, etc. I hope you are better.

We've had some bad luck with *Mysl*.[214] You probably know what has happened from *Rech* and other papers. We have to transfer the whole business to St. Petersburg, and begin all over again. But we have no legal and reliable people.

Could you help us, if you sympathise with *Mysl*? Or perhaps Pyatnitsky could help? As things are, we still have enough money to publish such a small journal (provided, of course, that we all work for nothing and pay outsiders 20 rubles a sheet! Not so generous, you see). So *at present* it is only *technical* help that is needed: to find a publisher who, *without spending a kopek of his own*, would bring out the journal (and we so strongly recognise the *strictest* legality, that we give the right both to the publisher and to the secretary of the editorial board+a lawyer to *hold up* anything in the least dangerous; we brought out four issues without the slightest faultfinding from the court. No. 5 was confiscated on account of Kautsky[215]! That was obviously a mere pretext. There was nothing illegal in Kautsky).

Why should not Pyatnitsky or someone else help us in such a safe business? If it is impossible to find a publisher, what about a *secretary*, a *legal* person whom we would pay 50 rubles a month for worrying about the printing press and forwarding. All we want is an honest and thoughtful person. The trouble is that we have *no* legal people, except workmen (and they won't do).

The second question. We have a translation of Kautsky's latest articles against Maslov, which has already been *paid* for.[216] It's quite legal. It's an essential thing, because Maslov has written a lot of nonsense and has also lied to his Russian readers. It's 3-5 printed sheets. Could it be published—without author's fees (for our translation has already been paid for) at cost price? Is Pyatnitsky (or someone else) suitable for anything like this or not?

The third question. Y. M. Nakhamkis, deported here from St. Petersburg for his connections with the Social-Democratic Duma group (he is *Nevzorov* or *Steklov*, author of a good book about Chernyshevsky[217]), is badly in need of work and asks me to inquire whether it would be possible to publish Peary: *A Journey to the North Pole*. He thinks it will have a good sale.

What news is there of the "plans"? Please write.

And do reply to the workers at our school. They are good fellows. One of them is a poet, and keeps writing verses, but the poor chap has no guide, helper, instructor or adviser.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Robert E. Peary:

La découverte du pôle nord. Paris—magnificent illustrations. The blocks can be bought here cheaply. About 15 printed sheets, each of 40,000 letters and spaces. (I have just seen Steklov, who gave me these details.)

Written at the end of April 1911
Sent from Paris to Capri

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY

Our Party has undoubtedly arrived at one of the critical points of its development. All Bolsheviks must do their utmost to fully clarify their principles, to unite, and once again lead the Party out on to the high road.

The events that have just taken place abroad (June and July 1911) are a sign of crisis in the Party centres. These events, described and commented upon in a number of leaflets of nearly all groups and trends, amount to this, that the liquidators (through the Central Committee Bureau Abroad[218]—C.C.B.A.) have finally prevented the convocation of a plenum. The Bolsheviks have broken with this C.C.B.A., which has outlawed itself, and jointly with the "conciliators" and the Poles have set up a Technical Commission and an Organising Commission[219] for the convocation of a conference.

What are the principles involved in these events?

The break with the liquidators, who had broken with the R.S.D.L.P., but continued to obstruct all its work from inside the centres (like the C.C.B.A.), means the elimination of this obstruction and the possibility of unanimously setting about the restoration of the illegal and really revolutionary Social-Democratic Party. That is the first and main thing. The second is that the break with the C.C.B.A., which had violated all Party laws (and the consequent resignation from the C.O. editorial board of Martov and Dan, who since February 1910 had taken *no* part in the C.O.), means putting right the mistake of the plenum (in January 1910) owing to which it was not the pro-Party Mensheviks but the Golosists[220] (i.e., liquidators) who turned out to be in the central bodies. The principle laid down by the plenum

(cleansing the workers' party of the *bourgeois* trends of liquidationism and otzovism[221]) has now been divested of the liquidationist centres concealing it.

Fortunately, a court of arbitration has now assessed the hypocritical outcries of the *Golos* people and Trotsky in defence of the C.C.B.A. Three German Social-Democrats (Mehring, Kautsky and Clara Zetkin) were to decide the question of the Bolshevik funds *conditionally* handed over to the C.C., and they decided *provisionally*, pending the conference, to give the money to the Technical Commission and not to the C.C.B.A. This decision is tantamount to the court of arbitration's recognition that the C.C.B.A. was in the *wrong*.

What is the attitude of the other factions abroad? Trotsky, of course, is solidly behind the liquidators, the Vperyodists[222] *also* (they have not yet said as much in the press, but it is known from their official negotiations with the Organising Commission). Plekhanov is "on the fence", while preaching agreement with the C.C.B.A. (see Plekhanovites' resolution).

The C.C.B.A. is itself trying to set about the calling of a conference, with the help of Trotsky, *Vperyod* and Co. Whether anything will come of such an "alliance", no one knows. A collapse of principle is there inevitable. Nothing even resembling Party work *can* result from this bloc. The "bloc" which is being organised by the former C.C.B.A. means nothing but intrigue to *cover up* the anti-Party and anti-Social-Democratic activity of the group of Messrs. Potresov, Mikhail, Yuri, Roman and Co.

The Bolsheviks' task now is to unite, beat off the attack of all the enemies of Social-Democracy, give a lead to all who are wavering, and help the illegal R.S.D.L.P. to get on its feet.

Some say this is a split. The hypocrisy of these outcries from the gentry in the C.C.B.A. has been recognised even by the Germans, who are not familiar with Russian affairs. Martov's pamphlet in German, delivered to the holders of the funds, caused Clara Zetkin to make this comment: "A disgusting production."

In Russia, there is no split among the illegal organisations, there are no parallel Social-Democratic organisations.

There are Party people, and liquidators who have broken away and set up a separate group. Groups abroad, like those of *Golos*, Trotsky, the Bund, and *Vperyod*, want to cover up the break-away of the liquidators, help them to hide under the banner of the R.S.D.L.P., and help them to thwart the rebuilding of the R.S.D.L.P. It is our task at all costs to rebuff the liquidators and, *despite their opposition*, recreate the R.S.D.L.P. To say that rebuilding and reinforcing the illegal party, despite the opposition of the break-away legalists, is "a split" means to make a mockery of the truth and (unconsciously or hypocritically) stretch out a hand to the liquidators. There are some who say that the Bolsheviks want a faction of their own. On this point the "conciliators" (in Paris) have now separated into a *faction* of their own. Without desiring "factionalism", they have set up a new faction (with representatives of its own in the Technical Commission and the Organising Commission—and that is the basic symptom of a faction, the "conciliators'" internal discipline among themselves).

How does the question of factionalism stand? In January 1910 the Bolsheviks dissolved their group *on condition* that all the other factions would also be dissolved. This condition has not been carried out, as everyone knows. *Golos*, *Vperyod*, and Trotsky and Co. have *intensified* their factional activity. And on December 5, 1910, we Bolsheviks publicly declared that the stipulation had been *violated* and that our agreement on the dissolution of all factions had been *broken*, and demanded a return of our group's funds.

Not only the anti-Party trends, but also the Plekhanovites have remained a separate faction: they have their own organ (*Dnevnik*), their *own* platform, their factional nominees to the central bodies, their internal faction discipline.

In these circumstances, the shouts against "factionalism" are so empty, especially when coming from those who have just formed their own faction. Surely it is time to understand that shouts against factionalism are meant to *distract attention* from the really important question, that of the *Party* or *anti-Party content* of the activity of the various factions. We Bolsheviks set up the T.C. and the O.C. in a bloc with the factions of the "conciliators" and the Poles.

The Poles are *for* the "conciliators"; we are in the minority, we are not responsible *for* the conciliatory errors of the T.C. and the O.C. The whole history of "conciliationism" (which we shall recount in the press, directly the conciliators *force* us to do it) is *crying evidence* of its erroneous nature. The Bolsheviks must understand this, so as not to repeat these errors.

The "conciliators" have *not understood* the ideological roots of what keeps us apart from the liquidators, and have therefore left them a number of *loopholes* and have frequently been (involuntarily) a plaything in the hands of the liquidators. At the January 1910 plenum, the "conciliators" (together with the Poles) got through an idiotic clause in the resolution: "For the first time", etc. (see Lenin's article in *Diskussionny Listok* No . 2,[223] or Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*, which admitted that the clause was blown up, integralist, i.e., nonsensical). The conciliators put their trust in the *Golos* people; in return, *Golos publicly* disgraced the conciliators with its greasy kisses.

The conciliators put their trust in Trotsky, who has clearly executed a full turn towards the liquidators. The conciliators in Russia (having had control of the C.C. Bureau, i.e., *all* the authority and *all* the money, for more than a year) haggled with the liquidators, invited them, "awaited" them and, *for that reason*, have done *nothing*.

Now, by entering the T.C. and the O.C., the conciliators have reached the parting of the ways. On the one hand, the *fact* of the break with the C.C.B.A. is recognition and correction of conciliationist errors. On the other, the formation of a separate faction against the Bolsheviks, and the alliance with the least steady Poles, is a step in continuation of their old errors.

It is our duty to warn all Bolsheviks of this peril, and to call on them to unite all their forces and to *fight* for the conference. One and all must be mobilised for this struggle. The Bolsheviks must win, in order to take the Party on to the high road.

Since the revolution, the Bolsheviks, as a trend, have lived through two errors—(1) otzovism-Vperyodism and (2) conciliationism (wobbling in the direction of the liquidators). It is time to get rid of both.

We Bolsheviks have resolved *on no account* to repeat (and *not to allow* a repetition of) the error of conciliationism *today*. This would mean slowing down the rebuilding of the R.S.D.L.P., and entangling it in a new game with the *Golos* people (or their lackeys, like Trotsky), the Vperyodists and so forth. But this is a critical time, and there can be no delay.

All Bolsheviks must unite, organise the conference speedily and *at all costs*, win a victory at it or go over to open and straightforward opposition based on principle. Only Bolshevism, which is alien to waverings either to the left or to the right, can bring the Party out on to the high road.

Written in July 1911

First published in 1956 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from a typescript copy

TO MAXIM GORKY

September 15, 1911

Dear A. M.,

It must have been two months ago that I wrote to you last—at the beginning of the school[224] (it is now over, and the students have gone away). There was no reply, and I was wondering whether the "negotiations" had become protracted or whether anything had radically changed. Leshchenko was here the other day and told me about Capri, and I was very glad to learn that the whole trouble was the postponement of the meetings you had had in mind until "after the fair".[225] But the plans at Capri, Leshchenko said, were unchanged: a literary monthly, a full-sized paper and also, I understand, a tabloid.

Yes, all this would be very welcome indeed just now. The liquidators are buying *Kievskaya Kopeika* (so they say in St. Petersburg, whence we had a letter today), and are transferring it to St. Petersburg. It would be extremely important to organise a counter-attack.

So far we have been able only to collect our last cash for reviving *Zvezda*. I very much count on your help: send us an article. Help is particularly important at the beginning, because it won't be easy to resume an interrupted publication.

Have you received the pamphlet by Kamenev, and have you read it? I cherish the hope that it must dissipate some of the prejudices you seem to have against its author.

Our Party affairs are in a pretty mess, but still things are coming to a head. Plekhanov is hedging, he always acts that way—it's like a disease—before things break. Martov sent Kautsky and Zetkin the translation (in typescript)

of his pamphlet, and this was a *great* help to us: both Kautsky and Clara Zetkin said some pretty harsh things about the pamphlet: the former called it "disgusting", the latter "dirty".

Well, all the best. Do write for *Zvezda*.

Drop me a line, if you feel equal to the effort. Warm greetings to Maria Fyodorovna.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Paris to Capri
First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Comrade,

On the way from here to Geneva (I am giving a lecture here tomorrow on the subject of "Stolypin and the Revolution") I shall be in Berne and would like to see the Bolsheviks there. Drop me a line immediately (to the address on the back*—*for* N.N.), to say whether I can find you on Wednesday or Thursday, and whether there are any other Bolsheviks in town.

All the best,
Lenin

P.S. There may be letters for me at your address. If you have moved, notify the Post Office.

Written on September 25, 1911
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* The reference is to the address of Safarov, which was given on the hack of the postcard as the address of the sender.—*Ed*.

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Comrade,

I have received your letter and replied by telegram. To avoid any misunderstandings, here are a few more details. What I meant was a *public* lecture ("Stolypin and the Revolution"), with the admission fees to go for the benefit of *Rabochaya Gazeta* (of course there is no need, or at any rate it's not obligatory, to say in the advertisement for whose benefit it is).[226] The presiding committee (or the chairman) at the meeting must be from among local *Bolsheviks*, and by no means "elected" (to avoid intrigues and scandals, to which the liquidators are very prone).

I am willing to have a talk with pro-Party people (Plekhanovites), *but not with Golosists*. It would be best of all to confine the audience to Bolsheviks.

I hope to arrive on Thursday; I will send you a telegram about the time of arrival, if I can manage it.

Please be kind enough to send this letter *at once* to Gorin [M. Gorine. Rue du Pont Neuf. 2. (Chez M-me Vire) Genève], to enable him to take steps to organise a *similar* lecture at Geneva on *Saturday*, and to reply to me through you by Thursday.

All the best,

Lenin

As regards literature for the lecture, please get together for me (α) a *file* of the C.O., (β) *Two Parties*, (γ) *Dnevnik*, (δ) Arkomed.[227]

Written between September 26 and 28, 1911
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

1902

WHAT IS THE CADET ELECTION PLATFORM?

Saturday's editorial in *Rech*, September 15, is a virtual exposition of the basic political principles of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. What do these principles of the main party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie amount to now?

They amount to three points: (1) "extension of the franchise"; (2) "radical reform of the Council of State"[228]; and, (3) "responsibility of the Ministry to the people's representatives". It goes without saying that to this are added freedom of association (coalitions) and all the other freedoms, equality of nationalities, "restraint and slowing down" of differentiation in the countryside, and so on and so forth.

Readers should compare these "three points" of the liberals with the "three points" of working-class democrats, who have given an effective reply to the political question, the labour question and the peasant question alike. The actual source of all the evils and misfortunes, their real "focus", and the way out are indicated clearly and explicitly by the "three points" of the working-class democrats.

But the liberal platform—for, not nominally but in substance, it is an election platform—of the Cadets is only a *wish* for modest constitutional reforms. It differs very little from the wishes of the Octobrists.

The main thing has been obscured; on the main thing the liberal-monarchist bourgeois party has nothing to say. The Cadets want "to win by modesty", but then let us re-

call that Messrs. Guchkovs have already tried modesty in practice. And what was the result? The result was nil!

We want very little, the Cadets boast. But, gentlemen, that "trump" has already been played by the Octobrists. In all three Dumas, the Cadets and the Octobrists vied with each other in assuring the "government" and the "public" that they want very little, a modest minimum on the European standard. The result is nil!

No, gentlemen, whether you list constitutional reforms in three points or in twenty, your platform will be a dead one. You can talk about constitutional reforms, without appearing ridiculous, only where and when the foundations and pillars of political liberty already exist, where and when they are established, assured and stable.

You yourselves know that that is not yet the case in Russia, and therefore your pious wishes do not show the people a way out but mislead them with illusory hopes!

Written between September 15 and 20
(September 28 and October 3), 1912

First published in 1954
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 6

Printed from the original

WORKERS' UNITY AND THE ELECTIONS

The issue of *Luch*, the liquidators' newspaper, put out (as a *Pravda* correspondent rightly points out) *on polling day* to disrupt unity, is filled to overflowing with talk of "unity".

The decisive moment in the elections to the workers' curia[229] in St. Petersburg Gubernia will arrive in a few days, on Friday, October 5. On that day, the representatives of the workers will elect 6 electors.[230] It is *these* elections that are of decisive importance, because *unless all* the electors are steadfast, consistent working-class democrats and opponents of liquidationism, there will be no serious guarantee that the deputy elected to the Duma will be one the majority of class-conscious workers want.

In order not to fail at the crucial moment, one must have a clear understanding of the tasks of working-class democrats and the situation in which the representatives are acting.

The essence of the problem *today* is that under cover of shouts about unity, the liquidators are *flouting* the will of the majority of class-conscious workers in St. Petersburg, and are foisting on the majority of the workers the *splinter* candidates of the *minority* intelligentsia, namely, the liquidationist intelligentsia.

All elections in a bourgeois country are accompanied by rampant phrase-mongering and licentious promises. The main principle of Social-Democrats is not to trust words but go to the heart of the matter.

The liquidators' phrases about unity in their newspaper *Luch* are a pack of lies. *In reality*, unity has already been brought about in St. Petersburg by the majority of class-conscious workers *against the liquidators*; it was established

by the May Day demonstration, and by the support given to *Pravda* by 550 groups of workers against the 16 groups of liquidators.

Now that is action, not talk. When 550 groups unite against 16, it is *unity*. When 16 *foist* "their" candidate on 550, it is a split.

The liquidators are carrying out a split, while shouting about unity on the "Stop thief!" principle.

Class-conscious workers should not let themselves be deceived by empty shouts and phrases.

Don't trust words, take a sober look at the state of affairs. The vast majority of Marxist workers are opponents of liquidationism. An insignificant minority of workers favour the liquidators, and the "strength" of the liquidators lies in the bourgeois intelligentsia, which is in a position to put out a journal, found a newspaper on polling day, get hold of "contacts", people for intellectuals' election committees, and so forth.

Every Social-Democrat in St. Petersburg knows these facts.

This clarifies the significance of the liquidators' shouts about unity. Under cover of these shouts, the bourgeois intelligentsia, which sympathises with the liquidators, wants to *destroy* the unity of the *workers* by foisting on them the liquidators' candidate.

That is the heart of the matter. That is the "crafty design" of the liquidator *Luch*.

Whoever wants the *genuine* unity of Marxist workers must help to elect all the anti-liquidator electors.

Whoever wants genuine unity will help to give effect to the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers.

Whoever helps the minority to flout their will is a most malicious disruptor, however loud his shouts of unity!

Written not later than September 18
(October 1), 1912

First published in 1954
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 6

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear K.,

I have not been following the recent peace congresses. I know about the participation of the socialists—and about its opportunist character—but only from *hearsay*.[231]

I will not undertake to express myself definitely on this question before I have read the reports of at least one congress. The question is a complicated one. The general growth of opportunism, and the "balancing" of its forces with those of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the big countries of the labour movement (Germany), must surely tell in this sphere too. Let Bebel play the diplomatist with the opportunists—*if* this is essential (?)—but it does not befit us to do so. That's all I can say just now.

Greetings to Comrade Olga and all our friends, including Gorin. How is he getting on? What news have you? What are your relations with Plekhanov? Do you have any talks?

Kamenev, on his way to Paris, will go to Switzerland to lecture in the autumn (he is now here). Perhaps I, too, shall manage to come in the winter.

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

Written on October 8, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Letter to the Editors

The undersigned, now in the capacity of a permanent political contributor to *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*, considers it his duty to express his protest against the behaviour of the colleagues in charge of these newspapers at a critical time.

The elections in St. Petersburg, both in the workers' curia and in the 2nd urban curia, are a critical moment, a moment for realising the results of five years of work, a moment for determining, in many respects, the direction of work for the next five years.

At such a moment, the leading organ of working-class democrats must follow a clear, firm, and precisely defined policy. But *Pravda*, which is in many respects effectively the leading organ, is *not* conducting such a policy.

Luch and *Metallist*,[232] with their desperate shouts about "unity", are carrying on under that "popular" flag the worst policy of the liquidators, namely, insubordination of an insignificant minority to the vast majority of Marxist workers in St. Petersburg, imposition of the candidate of some three, five or ten tiny groups of intellectuals and a handful of workers on *hundreds* of consistent working-class democratic groups.

During the few days remaining before the election of workers' electors, during the few weeks remaining before elections in St. Petersburg in the 2nd curia, it is *Pravda*'s undoubted duty to carry on a *merciless* fight against this *deception* of the mass of workers, behind the barrage of pious and popular phrases. Its bounden duty is in the

most detailed fashion to explain, demonstrate, chew up for all and sundry, 1st, that liquidationism is a non-Marxist, liberal trend;

2nd, that unity requires the subordination of the minority to the majority, whereas the liquidators are beyond doubt, as the experience of eight months' work shows, an insignificant minority;

3rd, that those who want to support the *working-class* democracy must know *where* the mass of workers stand, and *where* the philistine intelligentsia, which is playing at Marxism;

4th, that the conference which the liquidators and *Luch* are fussing about has been denounced and exposed *both* by the neutral Plekhanov (he said straight out that "*non-Party* and *anti-Party* elements" took part in their conference) *and* even by Alexinsky, who is hostile to the anti-liquidators.

And so on, and so forth.

Unless *Pravda* explains all this in good time, *it* will be responsible for the confusion and the disruption, since, having the vast majority of the workers behind it and having explained matters in good time, *Pravda* would *most certainly* have ensured unity, because the liquidators are past masters at boasting and threats, but would never dare act against *Pravda*.

Pravda itself has admitted that there are two clearly formalised lines, platforms, collective wills (the August, or liquidators', line and the January line). Yet *Pravda* creates the opinion that it is carrying on some third line "of its own", invented only yesterday by someone and amounting (as we have learned from St. Petersburg through other channels, since *Pravda*'s editorial board has stubbornly refused to favour us with a reply) either to letting the liquidators have one of the three candidates, or handing over to them the whole of the 2nd curia "in exchange for the workers' curia". If these rumours are untrue, *Pravda* bears the entire *responsibility* for them, because you cannot sow such uncertainty among Marxists that unquestionable *friends*, Marxists, believe these rumours. and pass them on.

At this hot time, *Nevskaya Zvezda* is closed down, with-

out a single letter or explanation, collective exchange of opinion is *completely* interrupted, and political contributors are left *in the dark*, not knowing *whom* they are helping after all to get elected; may it not be a liquidator? I am obliged hotly to protest against this, and to decline any responsibility for this abnormal situation, which is pregnant with drawn-out conflicts.

Please communicate this letter to the "boss" of *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*, to the whole editorial board of both papers and all contributors who are consistent working-class democrats.

Greetings,
V. Ilyin

Written in the first half
of October 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Friend,

Don't you find it strange that we have had an active and extremely lively correspondence on one particular theoretical question, one particular book, one particular theory, and that we have never had any correspondence on the vitally urgent questions of that sphere of Russian journalism in which both of us have had to take some considerable part in recent times?

I personally find it strange. I think there can absolutely be no circumstances—and there are none—which could serve as any kind of justification for the absence of such correspondence, since you yourself once pointed out, and quite rightly, that we all feel the harmfulness of detachment, isolation, a certain solitude, etc.

I hope, therefore, that I will meet with your support if I start right out with correspondence No. 2 (for No. 1, about the book and the theory, is proceeding on its own and will continue to do so).

You were acquainted, I think, though distantly, with Pokrovsky 2nd? What do you think of the latest explanation by the Senate? I mean the one under which the tenant qualification requires actual occupation of the premises? After all, it looks as though this explanation, made just before the elections in the 2nd curia, is specifically aimed at Pokrovsky 2nd, Predkaln, etc.! Can they have any other qualification in their own localities except that of tenant? And how could they, being members of the Duma, "actually occupy" their apartments in their localities-for, say, a-year? And if they are being "explained", should not Pokrovsky 2nd be invited to stand in St. Petersburg, where

he probably has a qualification that is much more reliable, i.e., one less subject to "explanation"? I personally would very much sympathise with such a candidature in St. Petersburg (alongside the two evidently indisputable candidates who caused the stupid and brazen *Luch* to come out with its stupid and brazenly cowardly repudiation). I shall be most grateful if you summon the effort to drop me a line or two (in reply to my 200) on your views of this matter.

Furthermore, I should like to discuss the two workers' papers at St. Petersburg. *Luch* is base and unprincipled: it's not a paper, but a "leaflet for subverting" the Social-Democratic candidate. But they know how to fight, they are lively and glib. Meanwhile *Pravda* is carrying on now, at election time, like a sleepy old maid. *Pravda* doesn't know how to fight. It does not attack, it does not persecute either the Cadet or the liquidator. But can an organ of forward-looking democrats *not* be a fighting organ at a hot time like this? Let's give it the benefit of the doubt: let's assume that *Pravda* is sure that the anti-liquidators will win. *All the same* it should fight to let the *country* know what is involved, *who* is disrupting the election campaign, and *what ideas* are at stake in the struggle. *Luch* is fighting furiously, hysterically, abandoning its principles in the most shameless fashion. *Pravda*—to spite it—puts on a "serious mien", affects various airs and graces, and fails to fight at all! Does that look like Marxism? After all, didn't Marx know how to combine war, the most passionate, whole-hearted and merciless war, with complete loyalty to principle?

Not to fight at election time is suicide. Look at what *Luch*'s "Cadet-eating" has come to! And the *Pravda* people were afraid that we might be overdoing the Cadet-eating!

Best wishes,

Yours,

V. Ilyin

Written after October 3, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Friend,

We learned only today of the liquidators' victory in St. Petersburg. An analysis of the figures makes it clear that they were got through by *non-Social-Democrats*, namely, the 11 "non-Party" men who voted for the non-Party Stepanov. But the figures are incomplete. It is extremely, extremely important to have the complete figures, i.e., (1) the number of votes for and *against all* 13 candidates; the newspapers give only the figures for 9 candidates (3 liquidators and 6 of ours); those for 3 liquidators and 1 non-Party candidate are missing. Make *every* effort to collect these data. Let several representatives write to the editors of the papers to establish this fact, if the minutes cannot be found. The importance of these figures is extremely great. Spare no effort to discover them. (2) There should be a poll of the representatives on who voted how. This is of particular importance with respect to "our" 7 Putilov workers+2 of ours from the Semyannikov Works. Collect the information as speedily, as fully and as precisely as possible. It is extremely important to learn from the representatives *how* the 11 non-Party men voted (apparently they all voted steadily for the liquidators, but it is desirable to collect direct evidence).

Written on November 2, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITOR OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

I wrote to Gorky as you requested, and received a reply from him today. He writes:

"Send the enclosed note to *Pravda*. There is no question of fee, that is nonsense. I will work for the paper, and will soon begin sending it manuscripts. I couldn't do it up to now only because I have been desperately busy, putting in about 12 hours a day; it's back-breaking work."

As you see, Gorky's attitude is very friendly.* I hope you will reciprocate, and *see* that *Pravda* is sent to him *regularly*. The forwarding department sometimes slips up, so that from time to time you must check and check again.

If you want to retain his friendly interest, send him (through me) any new publication which might be of interest to him, and also any particular manuscripts.

I would very much ask you to send me *Pravda* Nos. 146, 147, 148 and *Nevskaya Zvezda* Nos. 26 and 27, at least two copies of each.

Are you thinking of replying to *Luch*'s maliciously vicious attacks? These rascals first broke away, and are now shouting about a split! Their *list* did get *less* {the total vote for the whole list, all 6 candidates} both on Oct. 17 and on Oct. 18! Get hold *without fail* of the exact figures of the polling for *all* the liquidator candidates, from Zaitsev or some other of the electors. This is *terribly* important! And buy the *printed* list of representatives at the office

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* I enclose Gorky's letter to *Sovremenny Mir*[233] requesting them to hand his *Tale* over to you. *Get it as soon as possible.*

of the St. Petersburg city authorities, as I asked! Make sure to *do* this without fail!

All the best,
Yours....

Congratulations and good wishes to all the staff, editors and friends of *Pravda* on the occasion of the victory of its supporters in St. Petersburg, Kharkov and elsewhere!

P.S. Be sure to write now about the circulation of *Pravda* and *Luch*! Have you enough material?

Written on November 2, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

November 17, 1912

Dear Comrade,

I have just sent you a telegram about our agreement to the combination which you decided upon with Rubanovich.

We ask you to lay before the commission,[234] by way of information, our *shade of opinion*, too, if we happen to differ with you on the following point.

Kautsky's article in No. 6 of *Neue Zeit*, after the October session of the I.S.B.,[235] is obviously the official opinion of the Germans, the Austrians and others. We do not accept the main point of the article (S. 191-92, from the words "*Dabei müssen*"* to "*heischenden Massen*"** *in particular*).[236]

With Kautsky it turns out to be a *pledge* against a *revolutionary* mass strike. This is inadmissible bath from the Russian standpoint (there are 100,000 political strikers *now* in St. Petersburg, with revolutionary meetings and sympathies for the sailors' *mutiny*!) and from the general European standpoint. However, you know our point of view from our writings, and I hope you will not object to having a talk with Comrade Kamenev.

Comrade Kamenev is our delegate to the I.S.B. (M. Rosenfeld, 11. Rue Roli. 11. Paris XIV).

Please cable him if you are not going, and if you are,

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* In this connection, must.—*Ed.*

** Clamouring masses.—*Ed.*

please see him *before* the commission at Basle (M. Rosenfeld. Poste Restante, *Bâle*).

If you don't go for some reason, please send your vote in writing for the election (of Rubanovich or Kamenev) to the commission.

Respectfully yours,
N. Lenin

Wl. Uljanow. 47. Lubomirskiego. Autriche. Krakau.

Sent from Cracow to San Remo

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN AMERICA

We have already pointed out in *Pravda*[237] the great importance of the Republican Party split in America and the formation of Roosevelt's Progressive Party.[238]

Now the elections are over. The Democrats have won, and at once the consequences predicted by the socialists are beginning to tell. Roosevelt's Progressive Party, with its 4.5 million votes, is a specimen of the broad bourgeois-reformist trend which has come on the scene in sweeping American fashion.

What happens to this trend is of general interest because, in one form or another, it exists *in all* capitalist countries.

In any bourgeois-reformist trend there are two main streams: the bourgeois bigwigs and politicians, who deceive the masses with promises of reform, and the cheated masses, who feel that they cannot go on living in the old way, and follow the quack with the loudest promises. And so we find the brand-new Progressive Party in America splitting at the seams right after the elections.

The bourgeois politicians who made use of Roosevelt's quackery to dupe the masses are already yelling about a *merger* with the Republican Party. What's the idea? It is simply this: the politicians want the cushy jobs which the victorious party in America hands out to its supporters with especial brazenness. The Republican split gave the victory to the Democrats. These are now ecstatically sharing out the luscious public pie. Is it surprising that their rivals are prepared to renounce the Progressive Party and return to the *consolidated* Republican Party, which has every chance of defeating the Democrats?

Indeed, this looks very much like a cynical cheap sale

of "party loyalties". But we see exactly the same thing in *all* capitalist countries; and the *less* freedom there is in a country, the dirtier and fouler is this sale of party loyalties among the bourgeois sharks, and the greater is the importance of backstairs intrigues and private connections in procuring concessions, subsidies, bonanza legal cases (for the lawyers), etc.

The other wing of any bourgeois-reformist trend—the cheated masses—has now also revealed itself in the highly original, free and lucid American style. "Scores who had voted for the Progressive Party," writes *Appeal to Reason*,[239] the New York workers' paper, "now come to socialist editorial offices and bureaux for all kinds of information. They are mostly young people, trusting, inexperienced. They are the sheep shorn by Roosevelt, without any knowledge of politics or economics. They instinctively feel that the Socialist Party, with its one million votes, is a more serious proposition than Roosevelt's 4.5 million, and what they want to know most is whether the minimum reforms promised by Roosevelt can be implemented."

"Needless to say," the paper adds, "we are glad to give every one of these 'progressives' *any* information, and never let any of them leave without socialist literature."

The lot of capitalism is such that its sharpest operators cannot help "working"—for socialism!

Written before November 25 (December 8), 1912

First published in 1954 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 6

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleagues,

I am in urgent need of No. 8 of *Pravda*. You wrote that you hadn't got it. Please insert the following advertisement in *Pravda*—I write Nos. 5-10, instead of No. 8, to be on the safe side.

This is often done. I particularly ask you to do this.

Yours,
V. Ilyin

What's the matter with Olminsky? Is it true that he is ill?

Pravda

To complete our file, we are in need of 1 copy each of Nos. 5-10. Readers are earnestly requested to send in their spare copies.

Editorial Board and Management

Written on November 26, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

MORE ZEAL THAN SENSE

Each has his own preoccupations: the proletariat sees the need for peace, and the capitalists look to the "patriotic" examples provided by the Balkan War. To each his own. The workers insist that in terms of human life a Balkan revolution would have cost a hundred times less than the Balkan War, and would have produced democratic results a thousand times broader and more stable.

The capitalists—both the "Right" and the liberals, all the way up to our Progressists and Cadets—are straining to prove that whereas the banded capitalists in the Balkans have pocketed so much, the banded capitalists of Britain, France and Russia, as an "entente", could have made off with ever so much more.

One American "patriot", a patriot of the money-bag, managed to find out that some ships in the Greek navy had been built by Greek millionaire magnates at their own expense.

This American Guchkov or Maklakov hastened to advertise and play up the grand patriotic example in every way. He wrote: "Now if only our country's shores and all our overseas trade were protected by giant dreadnoughts called *Morgan*, *Astor*, *Vanderbilt* and *Rockefeller*! With such an example before them, the people would grumble less about the concentration of capital in the hands of billionaires and about the unequal distribution of wealth!"

Patriotic, but impractical, say the American workers laughing. Gentlemen, go ahead with your splendid scheme, we're all *for* it. Until now, the Rockefellers, Morgans, etc., over here in America have been hiring private detachments of armed men to protect their property and fight

strikers. Let the billionaires now give the people a clear picture showing that the "external" defence of the "state" is *defence of the monopolies and the profits* of the owners of our trusts! Let's see what lesson the American workers will learn as they contemplate these super-dreadnoughts named *Morgan*, *Rockefeller*, etc.: will it be patriotic emotion or socialist convictions? Will they become more servile to the capitalists, or will they demand with greater firmness that all trusts (manufacturers' associations), all the property of the trusts, should be handed over to the workers, to society as a whole?

...The American "patriot" has overdone it....

Written before November 26
(December 9), 1912

First published in 1954
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 6

Printed from the original

THE QUESTION OF PARTY AFFILIATION AMONG DEMOCRATIC-MINDED STUDENTS

We noted in *Pravda* the other day (see No.)[240] the article by the student M. which provides remarkably valuable material about "student moods". On students' party affiliation, the writer says:

"Of course, a comparatively limited section of the students are members of Left-wing organisations. In existing conditions, it could not be otherwise, and in general the strength of organisations is determined not by the number of their members, but by their influence on the masses. It is hard to make a guess about the future, but it should be pointed out that today the Left-wing organisations are marching in step with the mass of the students" (*Zaprosy Zhizni*[241] No. 47).

The author is quite right when he says that *with us* in Russia, *particularly* in the current political conditions, "the strength of organisations is determined *not* by the number of their members, *but* by their influence on the masses". This would not hold true for Europe; nor would it hold true for Russia in the autumn of 1905; but for present-day Russia it is so true that one might even venture what looks like a paradox: the number of members of an organisation should not exceed a definite minimum, *if* its influence on the masses is to be broad *and stable*!

But what is the party attitude of these "Left-wing" organisations among the students? Student M. writes:

"It should be particularly noted that one does not feel any dissension among the individual Left-wing organisations. Such dissension was particularly strong three or so years ago, during the period of lull and inaction. There were cases when elections to canteen commissions and the like were held according to party lists. Now these divisions have almost disappeared, partly because everyone has realised the need to join forces for common action, partly because the old party

positions have been unsettled and the new ones have yet to be consolidated."

There can be no doubt that in this respect, as well, the students provide a reflection of an all-Russia phenomenon. Everywhere, throughout the democratic movement, and also among the workers, "the old party positions have been unsettled and the new ones have yet to be consolidated". What is liquidationism? It is either a pusillanimous concession to the spirit of the times, to the atmosphere of "unsettlement" of the old party positions, or the malicious utilisation of this unsettlement by the liberals.

The task of the *whole* democratic movement is to fight with all its strength against this "unsettlement", and to achieve a precise, clear, definite, thoughtful "consolidation" of the "new positions". It would be a great mistake to confuse the arguments and discussions on party (and inner-party) platforms with "dissensions".

It is absolutely necessary "to join forces for common action", including, for instance, those of Marxists and Narodniks. This does not obviate a definite party stand, but, on the contrary, *demands* it. It is possible to combine action only when there is *real* unity of conviction as to whether the particular action is necessary. That is as clear as daylight. Russian democracy has been the worse for trying to "join forces" for *democratic* action with *non*-democrats, with the liberals!

Try and "join the forces" of the supporters, shall we say, of political strikes with the "forces" of their adversaries: there will obviously be *harm* for the "action". Hence, the first thing to do is to achieve a clear, definite, precise, well-thought-out delimitation of "positions", platforms and programmes—and then to *combine* the forces that *can* march together by conviction and social nature; combine them *only* for the action on which unanimity can be expected. Then, and only then, will any good come of the undertaking.

V. I.

Written between November 24 and 29 (December 7 and 12), 1912

First published in 1954 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 6

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TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Your letter is the first, I believe, to offer a "report" on Basle![242] It's rather late.... Evidently something was lacking (or in excess?) at Basle.... I believe that what the delegates lacked was organisation. And that is extremely sad. Kamenev, of course, was run off his feet, but what about the other five? Was it really not clear that it was necessary to write to *Pravda daily*? Was it really so difficult to assign the various duties? We've not had a single letter in *Pravda* from the spot, while the liquidators had *several* in *Luch*.

Isn't it a shame? Of course, so long as we sleep and the liquidators work, they will make more headway. Is anything being done to collect money for *Pravda*? It doesn't look like it, while the liquidators have reports in *Luch* of *collections* abroad. Yet *Pravda* is very, very, very much in *need*.

Not a single one of the delegates (except Kamenev) has written here about Basle. It was essential to get organised and write twice a day. But all kept silent. Evidently there is some dissatisfaction. What with? God only knows! I am *tremendously* satisfied with the *results* of Basle, because the liquidator idiots let themselves be caught out on the question of the initiating group![243] You couldn't have pinned down the riffraff better. But I'm worried by the inactivity of our delegates, and a sort of "in-the-pouts" behaviour on their part, for no apparent reason. Did they talk with the German delegates? (After all, 4 or 5 did *know* German!) Who? With whom? How? What about? There's not a word, except from Kamenev. Agitation among the Germans is *very* important.

You write that "with us things are not too good in the press and in the Duma group". They are not too good with *Prosveshcheniye*.[244] There is no money. It's a serious crisis. It should be given help to enable it to pull through.

Pravda's circulation is about 23,000. *Luch* has 8,000-9,000. It would be sinful to complain thus far. But in April and May *Pravda* had 60,000, and in the summer dropped to 20,000. It's rising *very* slowly. *Without help it won't pull through*. In the Duma group things are better than ever before. All the six seats in the workers' curia are *ours*.[245] That's something we've *never* had. For the first time, we have taken the South. Six and six out of 12. Mankov is a Menshevik. Rusanov is a question mark. We can fight. Here are precise data on our progress. Deputies in the workers' curia:

II	Duma—	12	Mensheviks,	11	Bolsheviks	(=47%) ("Minutes of
III	Duma—	4	"	4	"	(=50%) London Congress",
IV	Duma—	3	"	6	"	(=67%) p. 451).[246]

If you have anyone anywhere who is losing heart, let him think over these figures and be ashamed of his faint-heartedness. *For the first time* we have among our people in the Duma an *outstanding* workers' *leader* (Malinovsky). He will read the declaration. There's no comparing him with Alexinsky. And the results—maybe not at once—will be *great*. In the III Duma we started out with 0!

In the sphere of illegal work, thanks to the Bureau's moving here, more has been done than before. We are moving ahead, even if slowly. We are publishing illegally more than others. But we have no money. If we get help, we shall also publish *Rabochaya Gazeta*, etc.

Illegal work can be helped from abroad only by visits. Then help is *very* important in the form of new connections (1) letters; (2) chance visits; (3) *passports*; (4) etc., etc. *What is being done in this respect is not enough*. Only one per cent is being done in the localities abroad of what could be done. The most important thing right now is to help *Pravda* to *pull through*. And it is getting poor help. One man in Vienna (Bukharin) is making an effort. But *nothing* is being done in the other cities! No one writes regular reports. No one makes *collections*. No one collects interest-

ing local books and pamphlets for dispatch here ...* material for interesting articles. Comrades, we must give more thought to these things! For example, who among the Social-Democrats at Neuenburg in Switzerland ... has done anything? What has been done about it?

All the best....

P.S. Please send this letter to Yuri, for him to pass on to Antonov in Paris, and from there on to Vienna. To this day, we have not yet found out whether Plekhanov had spoken at the October meeting of the Bureau on unity with the S.R.s (cf. Martov in No. 37 of *Luch*.[247]) Didn't anyone make inquiries about this with Rubanovich, or Němec, or Huysmans, or anyone else?

Written before December 20, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Berne

First published in 1930
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of the original

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* An illegible word in the copy at this point looks like "as".—*Ed.*

IN AMERICA

The 32nd Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labour, as the association of trade unions is called, has come to a close in Rochester. Alongside the rapidly growing Socialist Party, this association is a living relic of the past: of the old craft-union, liberal-bourgeois traditions that hang full weight over America's working-class *aristocracy*.

On August 31, 1911, the Federation had 1,841,268 members. Samuel Gompers, a strong opponent of socialism, was re-elected President. But Max Hayes, the socialist workers' candidate, received 5,074 votes against Gompers's 11,974, whereas previously Gompers used to be elected unanimously. The struggle of the socialists against the "trade unionists" in the American trade union movement is slowly but surely leading to the victory of the former over the latter.

Gompers not only fully accepts the bourgeois myth of "harmony between labour and capital", but carries on a downright bourgeois policy in the Federation against the socialist one, although he professes to stand for the complete political "neutrality" of the trade unions! During the recent presidential elections in America, Gompers reprinted in the Federation's official publication the programmes and platforms of all three bourgeois parties (Democrats, Republicans and Progressists) but did *not* reprint the programme of the *Socialist* Party!

Protests against this mode of action were voiced at the Rochester Convention even by Gompers's own followers.

The state of affairs in the American labour movement shows us, as it does in Britain, the remarkably clear-cut

division between purely trade unionist and socialist strivings, the split between *bourgeois labour policy* and socialist labour policy. For, strange as it may seem, in capitalist society even the working class can carry on a bourgeois policy, if it forgets about its emancipatory aims, puts up with wage-slavery and confines itself to seeking alliances now with one bourgeois party, now with another, for the sake of imaginary "improvements" in its indentured condition.

The principal historical cause of the particular prominence and (temporary) strength of bourgeois labour policy in Britain and America is the long-standing political liberty and the exceptionally favourable conditions, in comparison with other countries, for the deep-going and widespread development of capitalism. These conditions have tended to produce within the working class an aristocracy that has trailed behind the bourgeoisie, *betraying* its own class.

In the twentieth century, this peculiar situation in Britain and America is rapidly disappearing. Other countries are catching up with Anglo-Saxon capitalism, and the *mass* of workers are learning about socialism at first hand. The faster the growth of world capitalism, the sooner will socialism triumph in America and Britain.

Written before December 7 and 20)
1912

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THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS "PARLIAMENTARY" REPRESENTATIVES

ARTICLE THREE[248]

The Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma was the first Social-Democratic parliamentary group in Russia to manage to exist for several years and to stand a long "test" of working jointly with the party of the working class. For obvious reasons we cannot here tell the story of this work. We can and must point out only the most important feature: what was the *impact* of the Party's development on the Duma group, and how did *relations* between the group and the Party change.

First of all, we have to establish the fact that the early steps in the activity of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma aroused the strong dissatisfaction and sharp disapproval of the Majority of the Party. The group was largely dominated by the Mensheviks, who were in opposition to the Party's 1907 decisions,[249] and the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma continued or took over this "opposition".

A kind of struggle began between the Party and the group. The group's declaration was attacked—and quite rightly—for its opportunism. The periodicals which represented the opinion of the Majority of the Party, or of the Party as a whole, repeatedly criticised the group's opportunist steps, and noted that on a number of questions the group had either failed to set forth the Party's views in full, or had expressed them wrongly.

A long list of the mistakes and erroneous actions of the Third Duma group subject to correction was officially

recognised in December 1908.[250] Naturally, it was clearly stated at the time that the responsibility fell not only on the group, but also on the *whole* Party, which ought to pay more attention to its Duma group and work *more closely* with it.

The results of that work are there for all to see. Between 1908 and 1912, the Right wing of Menshevism in the Party developed into *liquidationism*. The four-year struggle of both Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks[251] against liquidationism cannot be excised from history, however much *Luch* would like to do so.

During these four years, the Social-Democratic Duma group, from being in opposition *to* the Party, from being a group criticised by the Party and defended (and sometimes directly encouraged in its opportunism) by the Mensheviks, became an *anti-liquidationist* group.

The group's connections with the various newspapers by 1912 have provided documentary evidence of this. Astrakhantsev and Kuznetsov contributed to the liquidationist *Zhivoye Dyelo*. Belousov did too, but he soon *left the group altogether*, sending it an *extremely liquidationist* message with sympathetic references to Martov and *Nasha Zarya*[252] (Mr. Belousov's historic message will probably soon appear in the press).

Furthermore, Shurkanov wrote both for the liquidationist and for the anti-liquidationist newspapers. Gegechkori and Chkheidze wrote for neither. The other *8 members of the group* (Voronin, Voiloshnikov, Yegorov, Zakharov, Pokrovsky, Predkaln, Poletayev and Surkov) contributed to the *anti-liquidationist* publications.

In 1911-12 *Nasha Zarya* repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with the Social-Democratic Duma group: the liquidators could not be pleased at the Menshevik group's siding with the anti-liquidators.

The experience of work in the Black-Hundred Duma, and the experience of struggle against the Right wing of Menshevism, which has sunk into the swamp of liquidationism, all tended to push the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma to the left, towards the Party, and away from opportunism.

Very many, especially those who find it unpleasant,

are wont to forget this remarkable story of the four-year *struggle of the Party for a Party attitude* in the group (which only means, of course, its ideological orientation, its line). But the story is a fact. It should be remembered. It should be the point of departure in assessing the work of the group in the Fourth Duma. Of this, more in the next article.

V. I.

Written in the first half of December 1912

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THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS "PARLIAMENTARY" REPRESENTATIVES

ARTICLE FIVE

The resolution on the Jagiello issue[253] was the first step of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma which gave an idea of its composition and direction of activity. We learn from the newspapers that it was adopted by 7 Menshevik votes against 6 Bolsheviks. Consequently, it is clear that we have here a decision adopted contrary to the opinion of the majority of the Party, since the 6 worker deputies from the six chief industrial gubernias represent, as we have seen, the vast majority of the working-class party.

But, perhaps, the *content* of the resolution shows it to be correct?

Let us turn to the content.

Clause 1 refers to "the lack of precise data for establishing whether the larger or the smaller part of the Warsaw proletariat gave their votes" for Jagiello as an "*elector*".

So, in the opinion of 7 Social-Democratic deputies, the question is not clear. Yet they speak quite definitely of the *Warsaw*, and not of the Polish, proletariat, as the liquidators and the Bund do (see *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya*). But we know *for sure* that the "Warsaw proletariat" "*has chosen as electors*" two Social-Democrats and one P.S.P.[254] man (Jagiello).

Two are a majority as against one. So that there are very *precise* data to the effect that Jagiello was voted in by a *minority*. What is more, the *majority* of the worker electors (both Social-Democrats) were *against* the election of Jagiello,

and made a *formal* declaration to that effect. The liquidators referred to Jagiello's larger vote, but this does not eliminate the *fact* that *two* Social-Democrats and *one* P.S.P. member were chosen as electors.

In any case, by ignoring in its resolution the *protest* of the two Social-Democratic electors, who represented *all* the Polish Social-Democrats in Warsaw, the Seven acted in an *anti-Party way*, because until now *only* the Polish Social-Democrats have been affiliated to the Russian Social-Democratic Party.

But the 2nd clause of the resolution is even worse. The election of Jagiello "by Jewish bourgeois electors", we are told, "marks the growth of awareness even in bourgeois circles" (!? in *Jewish* bourgeois circles?) "of the fact that only socialists can be real fighters for the just (?!) interests of oppressed nationalities".

Everyone knows that the Jewish bourgeois have not shown the least sign of any such "awareness". They *preferred* a Polish bourgeois, but were *obliged* to elect a socialist for lack of any other supporter of equality. It was not "the growth of awareness", but the growth of *difficulties* caused by the national struggle among the bourgeois, that has given deputy Jagiello his seat!

A worker elector can (and should) *utilise* the "difficulties" of two thieves who have fallen out to get an honest man into the Duma. That is unquestionable. The opposite view held by a section of the Polish Social-Democrats (the so-called chief executive which has lost the *chief* city, Warsaw) does not hold good.

But when an honest man has entered the Duma because two thieves fell out, it is ridiculous and absurd to say that *one of the thieves* displayed a "growth of awareness". It is this lauding of Jewish bourgeois electors—not at all necessary even to *justify* Jagiello's mandate—that proves the *opportunism* of the seven members of the group, and shows their *non-proletarian* attitude on the national question.

The Seven *in their resolution* should have condemned and branded national animosity in general, and the Polish bourgeois for their anti-Semitism *in particular*—that would have been something. But to attribute a "growth of aware-

ness" to Jewish bourgeois is merely to display one's own *lack* of awareness.

Clause 3 undertakes to prove that Jagiello is a Social-Democrat. How is this proved? (1) "By his statement." That is no proof. *Party* people reckon with the *organisation* of which X is a member, and not with any "statement" by X. Only the liquidators can forget this ABC.* (2) "The support of Jagiello's candidature by the Bund and P.S.P. bloc."

But where, in that case, are the Polish Social-Democrats? A bloc *without them* and *against them* (the withdrawal of Warsaw's two Social-Democratic electors) is proof of the *anti-Party attitude* of the Bund, as was recognised even by the conciliation-minded Plekhanov!

In Clause 4 we read: "The P.S.P. is not yet united with the Russian Social-Democratic Party." That is a half-truth! Why have the Seven *said nothing* of the fact that a Party resolution (December 1908) had *rejected* unity with the P.S.P.? Was it only to please those who would liquidate the Party?

The conclusion from the whole of this lame and miserable resolution is *separation* of "questions of the internal life of the Russian Social-Democratic Party" from "questions of political activity in the Duma". This is a thoroughly bad separation. *Party* people cannot separate these questions. To separate them is to separate the Duma group from the Party. It is the worst kind of opportunism and the introduction of great confusion. Tactics are determined by the Party's "internal" decisions. Is it *these* tactics or some other, "non-Party", tactics that should be applied in "political activity in the Duma"?

A candidate of the Bund, which wants to be considered a section of the Social-Democratic Party, is *deprived* of a decisive vote on "questions of the internal life of the Social-Democratic Party". This is the only positive point in the muddled resolution of the seven deputies, who have been confused by the liquidators.

Class-conscious workers should do their utmost to help them sort things out, to explain to them the mistake they

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* The sentence is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

have made, and to work hard (in the Fourth Duma as they did in the Third) to *straighten out* the Duma group. A mistake at the outset is not so terrible in itself—this was rightly pointed out by K. Stalin[255]; what alone is important is that the working-class democrats should openly and frankly *recognise* the mistake and secure its recognition. Then the continuation will be better than the beginning.

V. I.

Be sure to notify me of the receipt of this article, and should you, by any chance, decide not to carry it, return it without delay, for I shall then have it published elsewhere.

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of December 1912

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1913

EUGÈNE POTTIER

THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH

In November of last year—1912—it was twenty-five years since the death of the French worker-poet, Eugène Pottier, author of the famous proletarian song, the *Internationale* ("Arise ye starvelings from your slumbers", etc.).

This song has been translated into all European and other languages. In whatever country a class-conscious worker finds himself, wherever fate may cast him, however much he may feel himself a stranger, without language, without friends, far from his native country—he can find himself comrades and friends by the familiar refrain of the *Internationale*.

The workers of all countries have adopted the song of their foremost fighter, the proletarian poet, and have made it the world-wide song of the proletariat.

And so the workers of all countries now honour the memory of Eugène Pottier. His wife and daughter are still alive and living in poverty, as the author of the *Internationale* lived all his life. He was born in Paris on October 4, 1816. He was 14 when he composed his first song, and it was called: *Long Live Liberty*! In 1848 he was a fighter on the barricades in the workers' great battle against the bourgeoisie.

Pottier was born into a poor family, and all his life remained a poor man, a proletarian, earning his bread as a packer and later by tracing patterns on fabrics.

From 1840 onwards, he responded to all great events in the life of France with militant songs, awakening the consciousness of the backward, calling on the workers to

unite, castigating the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois governments of France.

In the days of the great Paris Commune (1871), Pottier was elected a member. Of the 3,600 votes cast, he received 3,352. He took part in all the activities of the Commune, that first proletarian government.

The fall of the Commune forced Pottier to flee to England, and then to America. His famous song, the *Internationale*, was written in *July 1871*—you might say, the day after the bloody defeat in May.

The Commune was crushed—but Pottier's *Internationale* spread its ideas throughout the world, and it is now more alive than ever before.

In 1876, in exile, Pottier wrote a poem, *The Workingmen of America to the Workingmen of France*. In it he described the life of workers under the yoke of capitalism, their poverty, their back-breaking toil, their exploitation, and their firm confidence in the coming victory of their cause.

It was only nine years after the Commune that Pottier returned to France, where he at once joined the Workers' Party. The first volume of his verse was published in 1884, the second volume, entitled *Revolutionary Songs*, came out in 1887.

A number of other songs by the worker-poet were published after his death.

On November 8, 1887, the workers of Paris carried the remains of Eugène Pottier to the Père Lachaise cemetery, where the executed Communards are buried. The police savagely attacked the crowd in an effort to snatch the red banner. A vast crowd took part in the civic funeral. On all sides there were shouts of "Long live Pottier!"

Pottier died in poverty. But he left a memorial which is truly more enduring than the handiwork of man. He was one of the greatest *propagandists by song*. When he was composing his first song, the number of worker socialists ran to tens, at most. Eugène Pottier's historic song is now known to tens of millions of proletarians.

Pravda No. 2, January 3, 1913
Signed: *N. L.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKERS' CHOIRS IN GERMANY

The workers' choral societies of Germany recently celebrated a kind of jubilee: the number of worker-singers reached 100,000, with a total membership of 165,000 in these societies. The number of women workers in them is 11,000.

The workers' choirs have their own periodical, *Arbeiter-Sänger Zeitung*, which began to appear regularly only in 1907.

The beginnings of the workers' choral societies date back to the 1860s. A choral section was founded in the Leipzig Artisans' Educational Society, and one of its members was August Bebel.

Ferdinand Lassalle attached great importance to the organising of workers' choirs. At his insistence, members of the General Association of German Workers[256] founded, at Frankfurt am Main in 1863, a workers' society called the Choral Union. This Union held its meetings in the dark and smoky back room of a Frankfurt tavern. The room was lit with tallow candles.

There were 12 members of the Union. Once, when Lassalle, on one of his speaking tours, stayed overnight at Frankfurt, these 12 worker-singers sang him a song by the well-known poet Herwegh, whom Lassalle had long been urging to write the words for a workers' chorus.

In 1892, after the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law,[257] there were 180 workers' choral societies in Germany with 4,300 members. In 1901, the membership reached 39,717, in 1907, 93,000, and by 1912, 165,000. Berlin is said to have 5,352 members of workers' choral societies; Hamburg, 1,628; Leipzig, 4,051; Dresden, 4,700, etc.

We recently reported how the workers of France and other Romance countries had marked the 25th anniversary of the death of Eugène Pottier (1816-1887), the author of the famous *Internationale*.* In Germany, the propaganda of socialism by workers' songs is much more recent, and the "Junker" (landowners', Black-Hundred) government of Germany has been throwing up many more foul police obstacles to such propaganda.

But no amount of police harassment can prevent the singing of the hearty proletarian song about mankind's coming emancipation from wage-slavery in all the great cities of the world, in all the factory neighbourhoods, and more and more frequently in the huts of village labourers.

Written after January 3 (16), 1913

First published in 1954 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 6

Signed: *T.*

Printed from the original

* See pp. 223-24 of this volume.—*Ed.*

TO N. A. RUBAKIN

February 13, 1913

Dear Comrade,

I cannot agree to your alterations. The book *Twelve Years*[258] has been confiscated, and it is hardly likely that a copy can be found. However, I shall try and make some inquiries, and if I have any luck I shall send you one.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna sends her greetings.

Absender: Wl. Uljanow. 47. Lubomirskiego. Krakau.

With all respect,

Lenin

Sent from Cracow to Clarens (Switzerland)

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF THE BOURGEOISIE

Government newspapers and liberal newspapers are full of news, rumours, speculations and calculations about "Balkan" policy. What a mess! Sensation follows upon sensation, each report is more spectacular than the last. Yesterday, it was said that war was about to break out between Austria and Montenegro, between Bulgaria and Serbia. Today there is a spate of denials of yesterday's news, and assurances that "peace has been secured".

Yesterday there were piquant stories about Essad pasha, his secret treaty with the King of Montenegro, and his insidious plans for seizing power in Albania. Today comes denial of these stories, and more piquant reports about agreements between Austria and Essad.

The man in the street, swallowing everything he is told, listens to these fables, taking them at their face value, and blindly following the swindlers who try to divert "public" attention with exactly the kind of thing that serves their interest. The man in the street does not suspect that he is being led by the nose, and that the ringing phrases about "patriotism", "the country's honour and prestige" and "the Concert of Great Powers" are a deliberate attempt to cover up the machinations of financial swindlers and all sorts of capitalist adventurers. The sensational reports cooked up daily by the big bourgeois newspapers, whose occupation it is to sell the "latest" and the "most exciting" news at a profit, are designed specifically to distract the attention of the crowd from the really important questions and the real background of "high" politics.

The conservative newspapers in Europe, the Black-

Hundred[259] and Octobrist, and also non-party, papers in our own country, are playing this game crudely and in primitive fashion. In Russia, for example, they carry daily incitements against Austria, and depict Russia as the "protector" of the Slavs. The liberal press, like *Rech* and similar other papers, is carrying on *the very same game*, only in more subtle fashion, concealing it more skilfully, making its "digs" at Austria with greater caution, assuming the air of statesmen discussing the issues confronting the Concert of Europe.

In reality, all this quarrelling between Austria and Russia, between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente,[260] all these subtle approaches, are nothing but disputes between capitalist profiteers and capitalist governments over the division of the spoils. They are trying to drag the man in the street into the issue of how "we" can tear off a bigger slice, and how to let "them" have a smaller one; they are trying to get the man in the street to take an interest and show concern in the squabbling.

Nothing is being written or said about the number of skins to be taken off the backs of the peasant and the worker in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece to cover the expenses of war, or in Austria to cover the expenses of mobilisation, or in Russia for the same purpose and for her imperialist policy; or whether, and how, democratic institutions are to be ensured in the "new" states of the Balkans, or in Armenia, or in Mongolia. That is not news. The profits of the international sharks do not depend on that. Democratic institutions even tend to hamper "steady" profit-making. Instead of *exposing* the policy of the Great Powers, the newspapers—both conservative and liberal—are engaged in discussing how *best* to help the sharks have their fill through this policy.

Written on April 26 (May 9), 1913

Published on May 4, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 101

Printed from the *Pravda* text

CAPITALISM AND FEMALE LABOUR

Present-day capitalist society conceals within itself numerous cases of poverty and oppression which do not immediately strike the eye. At the *best* of times, the scattered families of poor townspeople, artisans, workers, employees and petty officials live in incredible difficulties, barely managing to make both ends meet. Millions upon millions of women in such families live (or, rather, exist) as "domestic slaves", striving to feed and clothe their family on pennies, at the cost of desperate daily effort and "saving" on everything—except their own labour.

It is these women that the capitalists most willingly employ as home-workers, who are prepared for a monstrously low wage to "earn a little extra" for themselves and their family, for the sake of a crust of bread. It is from among these women, too, that the capitalists of all countries recruit for themselves (like the ancient slave-owners and the medieval feudal lords) any number of concubines at a most "reasonable" price. And no amount of "moral indignation" (hypocritical in 99 cases out of 100) about prostitution can do anything against this trade in female flesh; so long as wage-slavery exists, inevitably prostitution too will exist. All the oppressed and exploited classes throughout the history of human societies have always been forced (and it is in this that their exploitation consists) to give up to their oppressors, first, their unpaid labour and, second, their women as concubines for the "masters".

Slavery, feudalism and capitalism are identical in this respect. It is only the *form* of exploitation that changes; the exploitation itself remains.

An *exhibition* of the work of "women exploited at home" has opened in Paris, the "capital of the world", and the centre of civilisation.

Each exhibit has a little tag showing how much the woman working at home *receives* for making it, and how much she can make per day and per hour on this basis.

And what do we find? *Not on a single* article can a woman working at home earn more than 1.25 francs, i.e., 50 kopeks, whereas the earnings on the vast majority of jobs are very much smaller. Take lampshades. The pay is 4 kopeks per dozen. Or paper bags: 15 kopeks per thousand, with earnings at *six* kopeks an hour. Here are little toys with ribbons, etc.: 2.5 kopeks an hour. Artificial flowers: *two* or *three* kopeks an hour. Ladies' and gentlemen's underwear: from *two* to six kopeks an hour. And so on, without end.

Our workers' associations and trade unions, too, ought to organise an "exhibition" of this kind. It will not yield the colossal profits brought in by the exhibitions of the bourgeoisie. A display of proletarian women's poverty and indigence will bring a different benefit: it will help wage-slaves, both men and women, to understand their condition, look back over their "life", ponder the conditions for emancipation from this perpetual yoke of want, poverty, prostitution and every kind of outrage against the have-nots.

Written on April 27 (May 10), 1913

Published on May 5, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 102

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LANDOWNERS' CALL FOR "PACIFYING" THE COUNTRYSIDE

If the newspaper *Novoye Vremya* is quite deservedly "famed" for being one of the most dishonest newspapers, which adapts itself to profitable business interests, to the government, and to the ruling class of landowners, its correspondent Menshikov is doubly famed, and with even better reason.

Menshikov's articles frequently allow readers to make a sure guess as to which "circles" in official, capitalist, or aristocratic St. Petersburg had *ordered* this or that statement by him. Not very long ago, this Menshikov was ordered an article in defence of the "aristocratic" Council of State against the plans for its supposedly democratic reform. The article had clearly been ordered by high-ranking official landowner circles. All the more instructive is it then to hear what the landowners have to say about the notorious "pacification" of the countryside.

"I have fairly frequent calls from provincials visiting St. Petersburg, landowners and public men," says Menshikov. Whether the landowners call on him, or whether he calls at the front halls of distinguished landowners, is another matter. In any case he sings to the landowners' tune, and his article has value only in that it gives one an idea of what the landowners frankly say.

"If they are to be believed—and why shouldn't they be believed," the landowners' mouthpiece goes on, "the Pugachov movement[261] of 1905-06 has not at all ended. It has subsided, it has assumed other, less boisterous forms, but it continues its work of destruction. True, the peasants no longer march, as they used to do, in great crowds, with caravans of horse-drawn carts, to plunder and burn the country estates of the landowners. But arson continues all the

same without cease: now it's a house they set on fire, now a threshing shed, now a hayloft, now a barn, now a stack of corn or straw. The most outrageous, the most stupid illegal cattle-grazing continues.... During the seven years of our parliamentary era, no headway at all has been made in the fight against village anarchy."

Thus writes Menshikov in *Novoye Vremya*. The order evidently was to prepare "public opinion" for fresh measures of persecution and punishment of "hooligans", to use the expression current in the Black-Hundred and Octobrist camp. But, in carrying out his orders, the landowners' lackey blurts out the landowners' true state of mind and the true causes of their alarm.

Let us note and remember that the landowning gentry intend to have new punitive laws and regulations to fight the "*Pugachov movement*" of 1905-06, *which has not at all ended*, *but has assumed new forms*.

Only one thing is somewhat strange. In 1905 and 1906, the government and the Council of the United Nobility[262] assured themselves and others that the "Pugachov movement" was the result of communal landownership and the embryonic state of the institution of private property in land among the peasantry. Now all the agents of the government, all the government parties and newspapers are dinning into our ears that the village commune has collapsed and has been destroyed, and that the new system of land tenure and the establishment of private property in land among the peasantry have been a "tremendous" success. If that were so, the "Pugachov movement" allegedly caused by the village commune should surely have stopped! And if it "has not at all ended", as the landowners assure us through Menshikov, their mouthpiece, it follows that the village commune has nothing to do with it. Consequently, the famous successes of the "new system of land tenure" are a myth.

At any rate, the policy of which the landowners have been boasting is a patent flop.

Written on April 28 (May 11), 1913

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in *Pravda* No. 101
Signed: *M. P.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

LESSONS OF THE BELGIAN STRIKE

The general strike of the Belgian workers has ended, as readers will know, in a half-victory.[263] *So far* the workers have secured only a *promise* by the clerical government to appoint a commission to examine the question, not only of the local but also of the national franchise. The other day, the Belgian Prime Minister promised in the Chamber of Deputies that the commission would be appointed in May.

Of course, a ministerial promise (like any other promise "from above") is something that can by no means be taken seriously. One could not even speak of a partial victory, if the general political situation did not bear witness to a certain breach made by the general strike in the old, die-hard, unyielding and stubborn clerical (i.e., reactionary and obscurantist) "order".

The achievement of the strike is not so much this fragment of a victory over the government as the success of the organisation, discipline, fighting spirit and enthusiasm for the struggle displayed by the mass of the Belgian working class. The working class of Belgium has proved that it is capable of steadfast struggle at the call of its Socialist Party. "We shall repeat the strike once again, if necessary!" This was said by a workers' leader during the strike and is an expression of the fact that the masses are aware of holding their weapons firmly in their hands, and of being ready to make use of them once again. The strike proved to the Belgian capitalists that it inflicts vast losses on them, and that concessions are essential, if Belgian capital is not to fall hopelessly behind German capital, etc.

In Belgium, stable constitutional practices have long since been established, and political liberty is an old achievement of the people. Given political liberty, the workers have a broad and open road before them.

Why, in that case, has the strike had such *little* success? There are two main reasons.

The first is the domination of opportunism and reformism in a section of the Belgian Socialists, especially those in parliament. Being accustomed to move in alliance with the Liberals, these members of parliament feel themselves dependent on the Liberals in all their activity. As a result, there was hesitation in calling the strike, and hesitation could not but limit the success, strength and scope of the whole proletarian struggle.

The first lesson of the Belgian strike is: look less to the Liberals, trust them less, and have more confidence in the independent and whole-hearted struggle of the proletariat.

The second cause of its partial failure is the weakness of the workers' organisations and the weakness of the *party* in Belgium. The Workers' Party in Belgium is an alliance of politically organised workers with politically unorganised workers, "pure and simple" co-operators, trade unionists, etc. This is a big drawback of Belgium's labour movement, which Mr. Yegorov in *Kievskaya Mysl* and the liquidators in *Luch* have done wrong to ignore.

The second lesson of the Belgian strike is: pay more attention to socialist propaganda, work more to build up a strong, highly principled and strictly party organisation which is true to socialism.

Written on May 2 (15), 1913

Published on May 8, 1913
in *Pravda* No. 104
Signed: *K. O.*

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THE BUILDING INDUSTRY AND BUILDING WORKERS

Russia's industrial boom over the last few years has been accompanied by the usual rapid development of the building industry. *Vestnik Finansov*[264] recently carried out a poll among the municipal authorities in 158 towns of Russia on this question. Mr. Veselovsky in *Russkoye Slovo* gives the following data from the poll: annual construction and remodelling of houses:

in 1907	11,961
" 1908	13,709
" 1909	15,093
" 1910	16,674

In some three years, the building industry has expanded nearly 50 per cent! That the capitalists are making vast profits on this industrial boom can be seen from the prices of bricks. The prices reach 33 rubles per thousand in St. Petersburg, and 36 rubles in the more industrialised Moscow.

Municipal brickworks exist in only 50 or 60 towns, so that the possibility of combating the insatiable appetites of the building capitalists is insignificant. And, for that matter, our towns, as a result of the property franchise, the complete absence of free elections, etc., have been completely handed over to a handful of money-bags, who take municipal interests to be those of their own pockets.

The series of notorious collapses of houses under construction shows the incredibly scandalous practices in building, the carelessness and the total disregard for human life. Intensified building activity, with thousands and thousands of rubles passing into the pockets of con-

tractors, engineers, capitalists, and the mass of sacrifices offered up by the workers on the altar of capital—that is what the industrial "boom" means.

And what of the position of the hundreds of thousands of building workers?

We learn the following about their wages from the poll. The day's wage of a building worker varies with the size of the town as follows:

Population	Day's wage of a building worker			
Under 5,000	1	ruble	33	kopeks
5,000-10,000	1	"	36	"
10,000-25,000	1	"	41	"
25,000-50,000	1	"	53	"
50,000-75,000	1	"	56	"
75,000-100,000	1	"	87	"
100,000 and over	1	"	80	"

Even in the biggest cities, the worker's wage does not reach 2 rubles a day! One can imagine what these workers suffer with the present high cost of living, when very often they have to maintain a family in another town or in the country. Moreover, building work is seasonal, it does not continue the year round. During the few months of employment, the worker must earn enough to maintain himself and his family throughout the year.

These figures are evidence of the workers' poverty and utter insecurity.

It is more difficult for building workers to unite and get organised than for workers in factories. All the more insistently should workers in the van campaign for the education and organisation of building workers, who can seek help nowhere but from their own workers' paper, their own workers' trade union, and their own more developed proletarian comrades.

Written on May 4 (17), 1913

Published on May 9, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 105 Signed: *F.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FOURTH DUMA

What the Social-Democrats, representing the working class, think of the Fourth Duma is well known. Their assessment is based on the class character of the landowner and landowner-bourgeois Duma, and also on the character of the government which is trying to make some kind of deal with the ruling classes in this Duma.

But it is instructive also to look at how this Duma is assessed by the *Right itself*, and particularly by the *landowners*.

In this respect, it is interesting to read an interview carried by southern papers with Mr. Sinadino, mayor of Kishinev, and a landowner who was a Nationalist in the Third Duma, and in the Fourth is considered a member of the "Centre" party, that is, to the *right* of the Octobrists. There seems to be no point in looking around for a more reliable pillar of the Establishment! And here is his assessment:

> "The Fourth Duma is a mere fiction. The men on the Council of State have no consideration at all for the representatives of the people, and act, we should say, against their will. I repeat, the Duma is a mere fiction, and in such conditions can give the country nothing. I can find no expression in Russian to describe the activities of the Council of State. It is what the French call 'sabotage'...."

This offended landowner is telling such truths about the Duma and about our government that the workers ought to look at them closely. In general, as readers know, the democrats have a chance to hear a truthful opinion about the system and "order" of dominant reaction from the reactionary gentlemen only when these reactionaries fall out.

One landowner (or several landowners) feels offended—

and you get such a description of the landowners' "system" of state administration and state structure that you might think the description had been taken from a Social-Democratic leaflet!

Both the Fourth and the Third Duma, Mr. Offended Right-wing Landowner, are not fictions, because they provide the government, for example, with approval for its budget. But the point is that in spite of the whole landowning class and all the top bourgeoisie helping the government, it is not able to make any headway!

The possibility for an alliance between the government and the landowners and the bourgeoisie has been created. The Duma is doing *all* it can to bring about *such* an alliance. And yet nothing even remotely resembling a constitution has been produced. The old state system is still there. The Ministers likewise are people who "tremble" (to use Sinadino's words) "for their own future", evidently not knowing what will happen to them tomorrow, what their orders will be tomorrow.

All the "activity" of the Duma with the Council of State, all the liberal wailing about the hopelessness of reforms, even the most modest, the most Octobrist, the most insignificant—and, finally, the frank admissions of the offended landowner-"legislator"—all show that constitutional illusions and reformist aspirations in present-day Russia are quite groundless.

Written on May 5 (18), 1913

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THE HIGH COST OF LIVING AND THE "HARD" LIFE OF THE CAPITALISTS

The cost of living is rising higher and higher. Associations of capitalists are steadily raising prices, raking in millions and tens of millions, while the mass of the peasantry fall into greater and greater ruin and workers' families find it ever more difficult to make both ends meet, and have to go hungry and deny themselves the barest necessities.

The organ of our industrial millionaires, *Promyshlennost i Torgovlya*,[265] gives the following data about the rising cost of living. The so-called *price index*, which is obtained by combining the prices of a specified number of major foodstuffs, has been rising steadily over the past few years. Here are the figures for *April*:

Year	Price Index
1908	2,195
1909	2,197
1910	2,416
1911	2,554
1912	2,693
1913	2,729

In the last six years, prices have risen from 2,195 to 2,729, i.e., by fully 24 per cent! There is remarkable "progress" in the fleecing of the mass of the working people, and particularly of the workers, by the capitalist combines.

But the capitalists—both in the journal quoted and in their innumerable societies and associations, graciously authorised by the government—continue to complain of the "*unfair*" taxation of trade and industry!

This would be funny, only the workers are not inclined to laugh.

The poor and unfortunate industrial millionaires publish the following data given in a ministerial document on the taxation of *urban real estate*.

In 1910, the income from such property was assessed at 239 million rubles (of course, it was assessed bureaucratically, by officials, and one can imagine how many tens of millions were concealed by the oh-so-poor merchant class). In 1912, i.e., only two years later, the income on urban real estate was assessed at 500 million rubles (counting only Russia, without the Kingdom of Poland).

And so, *in two years*, the net income on urban real estate rose by more than 250 million rubles! This gives an idea of the stream of gold pouring into the pockets of the capitalists, coming in millions of trickles from incredible want, poverty and hunger among the peasants and workers.

"The high cost of living today" is nothing but the present-day (capitalist) form of impoverishment, ruin and plunder of the working people alongside the unprecedented enrichment of a handful of capitalists.

Pity the poor capitalists who complain of patently "unfair" taxation. Just think: they have to give up 6 per cent of their *net* income. In 1910, they had to give up (in Russia without Poland) 14 million rubles, and in 1912, 29.8 million rubles.

And so in two years the increase in tax on the robbed millionaires amounted to nearly 16 million rubles.

What do you think, worker comrades: when *net* income goes up from 240 to 500 millions, i.e., *by 260 million rubles in two years*, should not a tax of a hundred or two hundred million rubles have been collected? Should they not have taken from the *additional* profit of 260 million rubles, made on the workers and poor peasants, two hundred millions, at a modest valuation, for schools and hospitals, to aid the hungry and provide for workers' insurance?

Written on May 17 (30), 1913

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Printed from the *Pravda* text

THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND ARMAMENTS

The Budget Commission of the German Reichstag has passed the first reading of the Arms Bill. There is no doubt that its adoption is assured. The government of the Junkers—those brothers of our Purishkevich and Markov—is "working" hand in hand with the German bourgeoisie on new methods of oppressing the people, while increasing the profits of the capitalist manufacturers of the weapons of destruction. The manufacturers of war supplies and equipment are doing good business. The young hopefuls of the Prussian nobility are anticipating the pleasure of getting "additional" appointments as officers. All the ruling classes are satisfied—and what are modern parliaments but instruments for doing the will of the ruling classes.

In order to justify the new armaments, there are the usual efforts to paint a picture of the perils threatening the "fatherland". To scare the German philistine, the German Chancellor has raised, among other things, the bogey of the *Slav peril*. The Balkan victories, you see, have strengthened "Slavdom", which is hostile to the whole "German world"! Pan-Slavism, the idea of uniting all the Slavs against the Germans there lies the peril, the Junkers' Chancellor assures them.

The German Social-Democrats have exposed, and continue steadfastly to expose in their press, their parliamentary speeches and at meetings, these hypocritical, chauvinist outbursts. There is a state, the Social-Democrats have said, the majority of whose population is Slav and which has long enjoyed political liberty and constitutional order. It is Austria. It is quite absurd to fear military designs on the part of that state.

Pinned down by the Social-Democrats, the German Chancellor referred to the noisy Pan-Slavist manifestations in St. Petersburg. That's a wonderful argument! The manufacturers of guns, armour, gunpowder and other "cultural" requirements wish to enrich themselves both in Germany and in Russia, and in order to fool the public each refers to the other. Russian chauvinists are being used to scare the Germans, and German chauvinists, the Russians! Both play a miserable role in the hands of the capitalists, who know perfectly well that the very idea of a war by Russia against Germany is ridiculous.

We repeat that the German chauvinists are assured of a majority vote in the Reichstag. But among the German workers there is growing indignation and demand for more than purely parliamentary means of struggle against the shameless plundering of the people's money by the chauvinists. It is interesting to note that a general meeting of the Social-Democrats of the 1st Württemberg constituency (Stuttgart) adopted the following resolution:

"This general meeting expresses its regret at the fact that the struggle against the Arms Bill in parliament is not being waged with sufficient vigour. The meeting considers that the furious drive into the people's pocket by the arms manufacturers should be resisted by all possible means. This meeting, therefore, expects the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag to take up the struggle when the Bill comes out of committee for discussion by the Reichstag as a whole, in the most energetic fashion, without hesitating to adopt even obstructionist tactics. The meeting considers insufficient the extraparliamentary struggle the Party has carried on until now. This meeting demands that the Party executive should begin organising action to involve the whole working population, including mass strikes."

There is slow but steady growth of awareness among German Social-Democrats that more resolute, active, mass struggle by the workers is necessary. If the opportunists, of whom there are many in the parliamentary group and among the officials of the labour movement, are opposed to such a struggle, the masses of workers accept it with greater and greater sympathy.

Written on May 17 (30), 1913

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ORGANISATION OF THE MASSES BY THE GERMAN CATHOLICS

In backward states, where the mass of the people have no rights, where there is no political liberty, where the authorities have arbitrary powers, political organisations on any broad scale are non-existent. Only tiny groups of landowners or millionaire industrialists enjoy "the right of association"; but they turn all their attention to high quarters, to "the spheres", to the authorities, and not only shun but dread any massive organisation of the people.

In states with assured constitutional foundations and the people's right to take part in government, it is not only the socialists who strive to organise the masses (their only strength lies in educating and organising the masses), but also the *reactionary parties*. If the state system has been made democratic, the capitalists *must* seek support among the masses, and for this the latter must be organised around the watchwords of clericalism (Black-Hundredism and religion), of nationalism and chauvinism, etc.

Political liberty does not eliminate the class struggle but, on the contrary, makes it broader and more conscious, drawing into it the most backward sections of the people, and teaching them politics and defence of their views and interests.

It is instructive to see how, for example, the German reactionary party of the "Centre", i.e., the Catholics, organises masses of the people. They strive to get the masses to defend capitalism around the watchwords of religion and "patriotism". And the Catholics in Germany have succeeded in playing up the people's prejudices and igno-

rance, partly owing to the fact that the Catholics in Germany are a minority of the population, which at one time was subjected to persecution by the state. And the masses of toilers and exploited always instinctively tend to sympathise with those who are persecuted. The Catholic reactionaries have made skilful use of this sentiment.

The Catholics have created a mass organisation, the so-called People's Union for Catholic Germany. The Union has three-quarters of a *million members*. The organisation is strictly centralised. Its aim is to safeguard the "christian" (in practice, *capitalist*) system, and fight "destructive" (i.e., socialist) tendencies.

The Union is headed by a 24-man board. Of them, 9 handle the board's business correspondence, and the rest are representatives of different regions, large cities, etc. There is one "agent" for every 20-40 Catholic families. All the agents act on instructions from the board.

The Catholics, when attacking the Social-Democrats, usually accuse the Social-Democratic agitators of living on the workers' coppers. But in *their own* organisation the Catholics themselves act in precisely the same way: in every place of any importance they have *paid agitators*.

Work at the party executive is organised on strictly factory lines. Twenty special officials are in charge of "literature": one handles theology, another, the agrarian question, a third, the Social-Democratic movement, a fourth, the artisans, etc. They make cuttings and extracts from newspapers and journals, and keep a card index. They have a staff of stenographers. A special library has 40,000 volumes. They draw up letters to the press—"reports"—which are published by dozens of Catholic papers. Special branches of this correspondence deal with "social and political questions" and "apologetics" (i.e., defence of religion and Christianity). Series of booklets are published on all questions. As many as 5,000 sets of speakers' notes on various subjects are sent out every year. A special department deals with propaganda by films. An information bureau answers queries of every kind free of charge: in 1912 it answered over 18,000,000.

Catholic students are regularly recruited for propaganda and agitation, particularly during vacations. The

agents (of whom there are several *tens of thousands*) attend special "social courses". There are special two-month courses at the party executive for "training" to fight the Social-Democrats. There are special fortnightly courses for peasants, teachers, shop assistants, etc.

The reactionary German Catholics are rather well organised. But all their work is a feeble imitation of the work of the German Social-Democrats.

Written on May 20 (June 2), 1913

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HOLIDAYS FOR WORKERS

The metalworkers in Germany, as in other countries, are in the van of class-conscious and organised proletarians. They have raised the question, among other things, of regular *annual holidays* for workers.

The manufacturers resist this measure with all their strength, pleading the "heavy burden" of the cost involved. But the German metalworkers, in a special pamphlet published by their union, have given exact figures to refute these selfish and hypocritical evasions. The workers have proved that between 1905 and 1910 the net profit in 93 joint-stock companies in the German metallurgical industry averaged 13.4 per cent!

It would be sufficient to reduce this profit by no more than 2 per cent to give all workers regular holidays.

But at the present time the system of holidays is still quite inadequately developed, and for the most part is being applied by the capitalists to further indenture the workers. The German metalworkers have taken two polls on the question of holidays, in 1908 and 1912.

In 1908, workers had holidays at 138 factories. Of the 75,591 workers engaged in these factories, 13,579, i.e., 17.9 per cent, had holidays.

In 1912, workers had holidays at 389 factories. Of the 233,927 workers employed there, 34,257, i.e., 14 per cent, had holidays.

In all, only *three* factories in a thousand in the metallurgical industry had a system of holidays! Of the total number of metalworkers only 1.8 per cent, i.e., less than *one-fiftieth*, had holidays.

Most factories allowing holidays—namely, more than nine-tenths of them—grant holidays only to workers who have been employed a fairly long time at the works. Of the 389 factories (with 233,927 workers), 84 factories employing 140,209 workers require a length of service from *five to ten* years (!) before a worker gets the right to a holiday.

Such holidays are obviously a ridiculously small improvement for the workers, and are *mainly* a bait to keep the workers in the factory and a means of combating strikes!

In most cases (for 72 per cent of the workers in the factories mentioned) the length of the holiday does not exceed *one week*. For 10 per cent, the period is *less than a week*, and only for 16 per cent is it *more than a week* (up to two weeks).

In most factories allowing holidays (97 per cent), workers going on holiday are paid their previous wages, or an average weekly wage.

We find, therefore, that even in the leading industry of an advanced country the system of holidays for workers is disgracefully inadequate. But the workers are coming to realise the need for regular and adequate rest and by their insistence the organised workers will be able to achieve success in this sphere too.

Written on May 20 (June 2), 1913

Published on May 31, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 124 Signed: *N. N.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

THE MEANING OF AN "HISTORIC" FORMULA

The press is still exercised over the adoption of the so-called lack-of-confidence-in-the-government formula by the Fourth Duma (on the Ministry of the Interior estimates), by the votes of the Octobrists and the Cadets. Indeed, the formula, like the comments on it in the liberal press, deserves serious consideration. This has really raised questions of principle: it is essential to return to them again and again.

The leader-writer in *Rech* solemnly declared (No. 137) that May 21, the day this formula was adopted, "will go down as a date of historic significance". Our liberals are past masters at uttering loud and ringing phrases of this kind; but the very first attempt at a serious analysis of the *meaning* of the Duma's decision betrays their astounding shallowness and helplessness.

The liberals ignore the most fundamental and indubitable *facts* which reveal the meaning of the Duma formula.

Firstly, of the parties which adopted the formula, neither the Octobrists *nor the Progressists*[266] (with whom the Cadets are *in practice* indissolubly tied up!) proposed rejection of the estimates. The rejection of the estimates on the part of the Cadets was only a theatrical gesture to catch the democrats, since all knew perfectly well that the Cadets would *in practice* support the Octobrists.

The "historic" formula is a phrase, since the *majority* of the bourgeois parties did not even venture to use their unquestionable "parliamentary" right to reject the budget. And without the support of both the Octobrists and the Progressists the Cadets are *nil* in the Duma and in the country.

Secondly, what does the ideological and political *content* of the formula amount to? "We insist on the earliest

implementation of *extensive reforms*," says the formula adopted by the Octobrists. That is what the Progressists also said. The same was demanded, in even stronger terms—"*radical reforms*"!—by the "Centre" (i.e., the semi-Octobrists and semi-nationalists). The same reformist attitude is fully adopted by the Cadet formula: their wording is somewhat sharper, but the ideas are exclusively reformist.

Thirdly, all the formulas, from that of the Cadets to that of the Octobrists, give a clear expression of the *reactionary* standpoint.

In this respect, contrary to the lying assurances of *Rech*, the Octobrist formula is not to the right but to the left of the Progressist, and even of the Cadet, formulas. See and judge for yourselves:

(1) The Progressists: (the Ministry) "is sowing in the country the seeds of trouble threatening the security of the state";

(2) The Cadets: "such a situation is a serious threat to state and *public* security";

(3) The Octobrists: "the Ministry is destroying respect for the law and the authorities among the people, thereby strengthening the mood of opposition."

Translated from the language of "official policy" into ordinary human terms, this means one thing: the Cadets, the Octobrists and the Progressists all *promise* to provide better protection for the *landowners*, not as individuals but as a class, of course, than the present system does.

Fourthly, all these three parties start from nationalism and chauvinism. The Ministry, they allege, "weakens the power of Russia" (say the Octobrists and the Progressists) or "the external might of the state" (say the Cadets, even more clearly!).

Such are the facts hushed up and distorted by the liberals. The "historic" formula of the Fourth Duma is a *compact* between the Cadets and the Octobrists, with the help of the Progressists, on censuring the government and expressing the wish for "radical reforms", *provided* the budget is voted and the standpoint of reactionary nationalism and chauvinism is clearly expressed.

Written on May 27 (June 9), 1913

Published on June 2, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 126

Printed from the *Pravda* text

FROM WHOM DOES SUPPORT COME?

Our liberal press has taken the notorious Fourth Duma formula on the Ministry of the Interior estimates to mean that "the government is acting in something of a vacuum.... The government has no friends in the country with the exception of the subsidised newspapers, and the handfuls of politicians who are also subsidised and are loyal only so long as the subsidy lasts."

That is the opinion of the "serious", professorial *Russkiye Vedomosti*, and that's no joke!

"The government is completely isolated, and finds no support even in the political groups it set up itself." That is the opinion of *Rech*.

It would probably be hard to match the puerility displayed in these observations by the professors, lawyers, writers and deputies of the liberal camp. Theirs is a truly incurable parliamentary cretinism, in a country where "there is, thank God, no parliament"![267]

In a vacuum, you say?

But haven't you heard, Messrs. professors and deputies, of the Council of the United Nobility, and of *its* support of the government's policy; of the hundred million or so of dessiatines of the best land in the best parts of Russia belonging to the landowning class; of all the key civil and military posts held by the same class; of the sugar and other finance barons among the same class?

You haven't heard of all that? Oh, ye wise statesmen of liberalism!

The government, you say, is completely isolated, it has no friends in the country?

But what are you there for, gentlemen? Wasn't it you, together with the Progressists and the Octobrists, who voted the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior?

Imagine the existence of millionaire acquaintances who easily give you as much money as you want, while expressing "wishes" which are not binding on anybody. Don't you think, gentlemen, that we should be entitled to call these millionaires our friends, and that we should not feel ourselves "isolated" (among the millionaires)?

But by your formula you have extended to the government not only material but also great *ideological* support. This is very important, and you must not think that we shall allow you to dodge this ticklish question before the public.

What was the argument about in the Duma? To vote the funds, but to express a wish for—the reform of the police and for "normal limits of the legal system", said the nationalists. To vote the funds, but to express a desire for radical or broad reforms, said the Octobrists, *adding* that their unequivocal stand is *counter-revolutionary* nationalism and chauvinism.

And now all the liberals perform this trick: they keep silent about the addition, but express delight over the demand for "radical reforms"! All that is lacking is an addendum to their list, on the suggestion of some clever liquidator, on "freedom of association and review of agrarian legislation"....

The feudal landowners are backing the old system. The bourgeoisie is in favour of reform. By its "formula" it inflicted a moral blow on the government. But *at the same time* that bourgeoisie gave moral *support* to the government by emphasising its counter-revolutionary attitude! And *such* support is a hundred times more effective and weighty than dozens of "moral" blows.

The "historic" Duma formula provides fresh confirmation that the June Third system[268] has entered a blind alley. And the bourgeoisie, maintaining the position described, cannot get out of that blind alley. The experience of history teaches us that the bourgeoisie may daydream about reforms, stagnate in a blind alley and bear the yoke of the Purishkeviches for decades, unless the crisis is resolved the way the liberals dread and hope to exorcise.

Written on May 27 (June 9), 1913

Published on June 5, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 127

Printed from the *Pravda* text

FROM FRANCE

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

This paper has already reported the remarkable act of spinelessness on the part of Gustave Hervé. This smart journalist and agitator, a man without socialist training or socialist education, went over (from the ranks of the professors) to the workers' party, with all the habits and practices of a bourgeois intellectual. He began as an opportunist. Then he swung over to the "extreme Left", and for a long time preached semi-anarchist ideas, "terrifying" the bourgeoisie with noisy outcries in an anti-militarist spirit.

Lately he has tended to turn away from the anarchists and to make his way back to the party, and towards recognition of the parliamentary struggle and of educational and organisational work. But there again, this intellectual smarty wobbled, and swung back to the opportunists. Being an impressionist, too much swayed by the last impression and prone to spineless vacillation, he has been so "scared" by the present reactionary wave of chauvinism, nationalism and imperialism in France that he has begun preaching a return to the "bloc" policy, i.e., an alliance with the bourgeois Radicals. In order to save the Republic in France it is essential, he asserts, to have a bloc with the Radicals; otherwise the reactionaries in France will once again restore the monarchy or the Empire!

It is hardly necessary to say that, apart from extreme opportunists, the French Socialists ridicule the spineless Hervé, and energetically protest against the bloc. Recently one of the organs of the workers' party published in the

South of France carried a number of statements by leading Socialists *against the bloc*.

It is the Socialists who began and are carrying on the campaign against reaction, these leading workers rightly say; it is the Socialists who campaigned among the masses with their protest against the law for a return to three years' military service (i.e., a return to the reactionary, barrack-room and absolutely undemocratic army). It is the Socialists who are working for a *proletarian bloc*, i.e., the alliance of socialist workers and syndicalist workers. Among the Radicals and "Radical-Socialists" (a petty-bourgeois party resembling our Narodniks) only a tiny section supports this truly democratic campaign of the Socialists, and then with many waverings.

Why then have a bloc? Alliance with those who waver will weaken the pressure of the masses and increase the vacillation! Meanwhile, the Socialists have never refused to support the Radicals *to the extent* that they oppose the reactionaries.

Here, for example, are Messrs. Charles Dumont and Alfred Masse, true-blue "Radical-Socialists", writes one Socialist, who *are backing* the three-year service law in the expectation of securing a ministerial post. Here is Clemenceau "himself", the leader of the Radicals, carrying on a campaign *for* this law. Here is another prominent leader of the Radicals, Léon Bourgeois, who has also declared in favour of the law. Lastly, in the Military Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, the law was adopted by 17 votes to 4, the latter *exclusively* socialist.

How can there be a bloc, then, with this shameless bourgeois party of Radicals and "Radical-Socialists"? Only by agitating *against* it among the masses can the French Socialists *detach* all democratic elements from that party, thereby *obliging* some part of it to go left, towards democracy. Being completely dependent on the masses at the elections (since France, of course, has universal suffrage and parliamentary government), many Radicals will think again and again before finally voting *for* a reactionary law well known to be unpopular among the masses.

The only serious support for democracy and the Republic in France (as everywhere else) is the masses, the masses

of workers and with them also the small peasants, and not the parliamentary politicians, buffoons, careerists and adventurers of the bourgeois parties, who declare themselves "Radical-Socialists" one day, only to sell out democracy and country the next day (for the sake of some ministerial job or profitable deal, in the form of some concession or post in a millionaire syndicate, etc.)—(as the French bourgeois sold France to Bismarck in 1871, out of fear of the Paris workers' uprising against wage-slavery).

The French Socialists, who are fighting the idea of a bloc and are extending their socialist work and agitation among the masses, deserve the warmest greetings.

Written on May 30 (June 12), 1913

Published on June 5, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 127
Signed: *F.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

DEPUTY FRANK FAVOURS THE MASS STRIKE

The speech of the well-known Baden Social-Democrat Frank, a most prominent representative of the opportunist wing, in favour of the mass strike as a means of struggle for electoral reform in Prussia, is something of an event in the German Socialist Party.

The Social-Democratic Party organisation in Wilmersdorf, a suburb of Berlin, invited Frank to give a lecture on the subject. The bourgeois press, expecting peaceable and tranquillising words to come "out of Baden", loudly advertised the meeting. The free publicity was magnificent. The meeting turned out to be a huge and most impressive one.

But whether because he was addressing the militant Berlin workers or because as a southerner, accustomed to the freer atmosphere of Southern Germany, he was outraged at the shameless domination of the "Junkers" (the German Black-Hundred gentry) whom he saw at closer quarters in Berlin, Frank made a fiery speech in favour of the mass strike.

The speaker began by outlining internal politics in Prussia. Frank castigated the domination of the Junkers, the reactionary electoral law for the Prussian Landtag (a law rather like our own Third Duma law) and the absence of elementary democratic guarantees. When he noted that under the Prussian electoral law the keeper of a brothel had first-class electoral rights, and the Prime Minister, only third-class rights, and that this was characteristic of the Prussian "way of life", the audience roared with laughter in approval of his assessment.

The Berlin workers—Frank said with a smile—have proved by their struggle against Jagow (the, mayor who

vainly tried to prohibit demonstrations in 1910) that they have talents in the sphere of street manoeuvres.

The speaker recalled the examples of mass strikes in history: by the Chartists in England; the Belgians in 1893, 1902 and 1912; the Swedes in 1903; the Italians in 1904, and the Russians in 1905; he dwelt in greater detail on the last example, stressing the help which the Russian workers then gave their neighbours and brothers, the Austrian workers. The mere threat of a political strike *then* proved sufficient to win adult suffrage for the Austrians.

In Prussia and in Germany, exclaimed Frank, we have the best labour movement in the world and the most extensive working-class press. Let us then learn mass struggle from the proletariat of the whole world! (Enthusiastic approval and applause of the audience.)

Naturally, this new form of struggle involves sacrifice and danger, Frank continued; but when have political battles not entailed danger and sacrifice? Once we have realised the necessity of struggle, we must carry it on to the end, we must pilot our ship forward despite the possible reefs ahead. Those who fear them and remain in port will certainly be safe, but they will never get to the other shore—the objective for which we are striving.

Enthusiastically received by the meeting, Frank's speech showed once again the great indignation the reactionaries have aroused in the German workers. A mighty protest is maturing in the German proletariat slowly but surely.

Written on June 5 (18), 1913
Published on June 11, 1913
in *Pravda* No. 132
Signed: *Karich*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

AN INTERESTING CONGRESS

An interesting congress opened at Kharkov yesterday, June 12. It is interesting in two respects. For one thing, it is the first general Zemstvo congress on the statistics of public education. And then it has been honoured by particular attention on the part of the authorities. The chairman of the congress has been *appointed* by the authorities, and the specialists have been "screened", as B. Veselovsky puts it in *Russkoye Slovo*, also by the authorities. No representatives of the press have been allowed to attend the congress.

These measures—which even from the "Russian" point of view seem to be unduly, let us say, prudent—can hardly be explained by the fact that the congress meets in one of the Ukrainian centres. This Zemstvo congress will be attended not only by Ukrainian statisticians and Zemstvo officials,[269] but also by men in this field who come from all the nationalities of Russia.

The subject of the congress is apparently not to the liking of the authorities, although the only item on the agenda will be the organisation of statistics, what has been done, why too little has been done, while more should be done, and better.

Public education lags more in Russia than anywhere else in the world. Duma deputy Badayev pointed out in his speech that even among the American Negroes there are only 44 per cent illiterates—in Europe it is 1 or 2 per cent—whereas in Russia 79 per cent are illiterate!

However, despite a thousand obstacles, public education has lately been growing and developing faster than before. To know the truth about the state of education is the direct

and most vital interest of the masses of the people in general, and the workers in particular.

It would not be at all difficult to organise the public education statistics on European lines. Every teacher could easily report every year the required information about every pupil (age, nationality, family conditions, economic condition of parents, etc.) and about every teacher (education, salary, working day, nationality and so forth). A small number of statisticians, annually processing such data, could provide the state with most abundant and valuable material, both on the conditions in which the young generation is being brought up and educated, and on a number of aspects of popular life, ... if ... if .... But representatives of the press have not been admitted to the Kharkov congress, its chairman has been appointed, its specialists, as B . Veselovsky tells us in *Russkoye Slovo*, have been screened by the authorities.

I'm afraid we've been a trifle silly with this talk of European-style statistics of education. Europe is something we can only dream of! We would do well to keep silent.

Written on June 8 (21), 1913
Published on June 13, 1913
in *Pravda* No. 134
Signed: *N.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Comrade,

I have received and read your article. I think the subject was well chosen and has been correctly elaborated, but the article will need some polishing up. There is far too much—how shall I put it?—"agitation", which is out of place in an article on a *theoretical* subject. Either you yourself, I think, ought to work it over, or we could do it.

Many thanks for your news of Kostrov. Please ask Avel to write and inform us more frequently. This is important, because we know *nothing*.

Could you obtain and translate Kostrov's Georgian articles (a) against the liquidators, (b) on the national question, *for* cultural-national autonomy, (c) *the most important*, against Plekhanov's preface to Arkomed,[270] against Plekhanov's defence of hegemony?

I am going away to Berne for a few weeks. On my return, I hope, we shall discuss things again in our letters.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Thanks for the issue of *Pravda*.[271]

Written between June 18 and 22, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO G. I. SAFAROV

Dear Georgi,

I don't know anything about the conference.[272] *Decide for yourselves.*

N. K.'s treatment is dragging out, and I shall be staying here *another fortnight*, or maybe longer. I don't know exactly.

The Ukrainian's article is very good.[273] The main thing is that he is a centralist. This is so rare and so valuable in our rotten times that you and Yuri[274] must *without fail* get to know him *closer*, get to know the man.

The article requires not so much corrections of style (that's nothing) as *explanations by the author*. He must write one more article. I am writing about this on the next page*; you and Yuri read it, *and decide for yourselves* whether to let the Ukrainian read it, or whether it is better for you to tell him what it says.

*Beste Grüsse,***

N. Lenin

Written on July 20, 1913
Sent from Berne to Zurich

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* See p. 262 of this volume.—*Ed*

** Best greetings.—*Ed.*

TO O. N. LOLA

Dear Comrade,

I very much enjoyed your article, as the article of a *centralist* fighting the Dontsovs and Co. It is extremely important to fight nationalists of *this* brand (and the Ukrainian Social-Democrats), who are more subtle!

I will insist that the editorial board of *Pravda* insert your article. But in my view the readers—40,000 Russian (and for the most part Great-Russian) workers—will not understand it.

My advice, if you don't mind my giving it, is that you should write one *more* article, which is to go in *first*. An introduction, a *brief* general sketch of the question of "centralism" and "separatism" (you have chosen the terms *very well* and correctly) among Social-Democrats of the Ukraine. Give the reader an introduction to the question. Describe the general trends, what they are and what their history is (briefly).

Then there is one more question: Basok, it is said, has turned towards nationalism and separatism. That's what I have heard; is it true? Could you get me his "famous" article (1910 or 1911 or 1912) with the turn in question?[275]

Then recently, they say, someone or other "united" at a conference in Lvov: the Spilka[276] group with the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, or with the Dontsovs? I was promised the joint resolutions from Lvov, but haven't had them yet. What do you know about this?[277] Should not a couple of lines be added to say that even among the Spilka group there are some who are, unfortunately, sliding down to nationalism and separatism?

Greetings and best wishes,

N. Lenin

Written on July 20, 1913
Sent from Berne to Zurich

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO J. S. HANECKI

Dear Comrade,

If you happen to be in Jena, be sure to make the acquaintance of our representative (send him a letter *postlagernd* Herrn Bekzadian, *Jena*—if you do not manage to meet him otherwise).[278] Have a talk with him about all our affairs. He should be given the facts against Tyszka.[279]

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

Acquaint him with Pannekoek, Mehring and others of the Left, if he does not get to know them himself. Drop me a line whether you are going to Jena (when you have quite decided on this).

Absender: Ulianow. Poronin.

Written on September 12, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Cracow

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO V. L. LEDER[280]

October 28, 1913

Cracow, Ul. Lubomirskiego. 51

Dear Comrade,

I quite understand your indignation against the scoundrels in the so-called Chief Executive, but would advise the commission[281] first of all, nevertheless, to secure a *formal* refusal from the Chief Executive. You can after all secure this (the address of Rosa Luxemburg, as a member of the International Socialist Bureau, etc.), for without it the I.S.B. will probably not interfere, and *inclusion* of the question will be rejected on formal grounds. You should not *improve* the position of Tyszka and Co. by any step on your part which may call forth an I.S.B. *refusal* of your request.

I advise you to write a careful information letter *on behalf of the commission* to Huysmans (*mainly* pressing the point that the Zarzad Glówny* refuses to have its "judgement" reviewed by a panel of I.S.B. affiliated parties active in Russia) asking him to help you to bring moral pressure to bear on the Chief Executive. This would be better than a premature formal appeal, entailing the risk of failure.

I hope you will inform me, if Plekhanov replies to you.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin

Ulianow. Ul. Lubomirskiego. 51. Kraków.

Sent to Paris

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

* Chief Executive.—*Ed.*

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear Alexei Maximych,

I am sending you today by registered book-post the beginning of a novel which is to go into *Prosveshcheniye*. We think that you will not object. But if, by any chance, you should, *cable* to *Prosveshcheniye*: "Postpone Voitinsky" or *"Don't carry* Voitinsky's novel".[282]

The news that you are being given a *new* kind of treatment by "a Bolshevik", even if a former one, has really worried me. The saints preserve us from comrade-doctors in general, and Bolshevik-doctors in particular! Really and truly, in 99 cases out of 100 the comrade-doctors are "asses", as a *good* doctor once said to me. I assure you that you should consult (except on minor complaints) *only* first-class men. It is terrible to try out on yourself the inventions of a Bolshevik! The only reassuring thing is the supervision of professors in Naples, if these professors really know their business.... You know, if you do go in winter, *in any case* call on some first-class doctors in *Switzerland* and in *Vienna*—there will be no excuse for not doing so! How do you feel now?

Yours,
N. Lenin

P.S. Over here things are not at all bad; in St. Petersburg, the workers are organising on *party* lines in *all* the legal societies, including the sick benefit societies. There were some interesting and practical lads here, too.

My address: Wl. Ulianow. Ulica Lubomirskiego. 51. *Kraków. Krakau* (*Galizien*).

Written at the beginning
of November 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

I have received the novel[283] and your letter. My opinion is that the novel should be shelved, since you are *not in favour*. I enclose a letter from Kamenev, who read the novel (I have not read it yet).

We shall write to St. Petersburg to have them hold it up.

I enclose my letter of yesterday[284]: don't be angry that I lost my temper. Perhaps I did not understand you *aright*? Perhaps it was *as a joke* that you wrote "for a time"? Perhaps you weren't serious about God-building, either?

I entreat you to get the best possible treatment.

Yours,
Lenin

Written at the middle
of November 1913
Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

TO N. I. BUKHARIN

Dear Comrade,

We were very willingly preparing to publish your article on Struve's book.[285] But in a second reading we realised that the passage about the serf economy would inevitably be understood in Party circles as advice to delete the *confiscation* of landed estates in the Programme. This needs discussing. Why not throw out the passage for the time being? We thought you *did not want* to start a discussion *just at present*.

If we are wrong, and you *did want* to start a discussion, drop us a line: if you insist, we shall carry the article....*

Written in December 1913
Sent from Cracow to Vienna

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

1914

TO THE EDITORS OF *PUT PRAVDY*

February 9, 1914

Dear Colleagues,

I have received a letter from the secretary about the unfortunate article which has put the newspaper in peril.[286] It's a great pity that publicity was given (was it a board decision?) to this unfortunate article in which they contrived to find evidence of ties between the papers....

Having only just come home after a journey "on matters of business",[287] I looked through all the published issues and have *failed to find two* articles which I sent (about a month ago!) in reply to F. D. on the subject of unity ("The Liquidators' Leader on the Liquidators' Terms of Unity" is the title of the first of these articles).[288] The articles are absolutely essential, especially in view of the new journal *Borba*,[289] and it is necessary to publish them *before* it comes out. Yet the articles have not been published, and (as though making a mockery of any collective work) you haven't written me a single line for a whole month about their fate! ((If they are too long, which however is improbable, I would have sent them to *Prosveshcheniye*.))

Really, I quite fail to understand this way of doing business! How can you treat contributors—and colleagues—in this manner?

Please, reply!

With greetings,

V. I.

P.S. Please send me
Proletarskaya Pravda No. 11 (29)
Put Pravdy No. 2[290]
Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta No. 8 (126).

P.S. Do you happen to have a file of the journal *Mysl*,[291] or any separate issues? Please, send them over.

Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO A. A. TROYANOVSKY

Dear Alexander Antonovich,

Many thanks for your news from Vienna: it's very interesting. Trotsky's venture is of great importance[292]; the break-up of the *August bloc*[293] is complete (the Letts have *withdrawn* from the Organising Committee!).[294]

Grigory says that you have continued

(1) the statistics of collections (by workers' groups) after October 1, 1913 (up to January 1, 1914)[295]

(2) the statistics of voting for the *Seven* and for the *Six* (also at least up to January 1, 1914, or February 1, 1914).[296]

Please complete this work as soon as you can, and send it over immediately: *it will go into the pamphlet* we are sending out shortly.[297]

Hurry!

I have received No. 1 of *Prosveshcheniye*. Not bad. There was no point only in having the review of Levitsky with the silly word "factionalism".[298]

And what is your opinion of the issue?

Greetings to Yelena Fyodorovna.

Also to Bukharin.

Yours,
Lenin

Written not earlier
than February 11, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Vienna

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO ISAAC A. HOURWICH

Cracow, February 27, 1914

Dear Colleague,

I have long since received your book, *Immigration and Labour*,[299] and have been looking for your address to send you my thanks. But it proved far from easy to find your address. I got it only today, and hasten to express my gratitude to you for sending me the book. I have already written an article[300] about it, and on the basis of it, in our St. Petersburg Social-Democratic newspaper *Pravda*, and intend to write again. I believe that this work provides a mass of valuable material for the study of capitalism, being at the same time something of an application of the best methods of our Zemstvo statisticians on *Western* soil.

The comrade who sent me your address (Mr. John Ellert) has written to tell me that you could use your influence to help obtain all kinds of material from the Bureau of the Census in Washington. May I, therefore, ask you to do me a favour, provided of course that this will not give you too much trouble or interfere with your work.

When I made a study of American agricultural statistics (Vol. V. *Agriculture—Census of 1900*) in Paris, I found a great deal of interesting matter. Now, in Cracow, I am unable to obtain these publications. Cahan, editor of the Jewish socialist paper in New York,[301] who was over here a year ago, promised to have them sent, but has apparently forgotten to do so.

They say that when requested by the right people the American Bureau of the Census will send its publications free of charge even to foreign countries. If that is so, could

you put in a word? (I could send the Bureau of the Census library my books, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and the *Agrarian Question*.[302]) What I need *most* is *Agriculture*, Vol. V, Census of 1900, and *the same volume of the Census of 1910* (if that is not yet out, then the bulletins).

If that is impossible, would you be so kind as to send a postcard to Mr. John *Ellert* (c/o *Novy Mir*.[303] 140. East 4th Street, New York)—I shall send him the money to buy the things I need most.

I thank you once again for the book, and hope you will pardon the trouble.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin (*V. Ulyanov*)

Address: Wl. Uljanow. 51. Ulica Lubomirskiego. *Krakau* (Galizien). Austria.

Sent to New York

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITORS OF *PUT PRAVDY*

Dear Colleagues,

I welcome your paper in every way, and particularly its obvious improvement. At last the literary side is beginning to be well organised! The next job is the *business* side. You must not leave the question of subscribers "unpublished" either: you should announce their number, otherwise you cannot rise from the small circle level to full-scale organisation, from a private enterprise to a collective one.

Nor can I pass over an obvious mistake in No. 22, where side by side with the correct resolution from the Vyborg workers (on Buryanov) you have, without comment from the editors, a longer and disgustingly double-faced resolution from the Zurich group.[304] *Pravda*'s word is law; its silence tends to confuse the workers; its abstention sows bewilderment.

With Buryanov one must be "as wise as a serpent", but the editorial board has departed from such wisdom. We praise him *only* for leaving the liquidators, and not at all for lone-wolf "independence". In this the liquidators are *right*, and there is no greater danger for a politician in the struggle than to take up the *wrong* position.

Yet the Zurich group *support* Buryanov in his erroneous, false, double-faced position! And we give them a platform—what for? Knowing that the Zurich group are a *minority* abroad! Knowing that we cannot make *all* the groups abroad express their stand in *Pravda*!

Buryanov should be made to understand and feel the falseness of his attitude. You have left the liquidators? Good.

You have proposed equality? Good.

What then? It is time to make a choice. *We will not support you* in double-dealing (the pendulum game). The liquidators are attacking you as an "independent Social-Democrat": *they are right*, and we shall not defend you. Here is a reasonable period for you, here is assistance during that period (tacit, with speeches, etc.), *but no more than that*. Either you make your choice (within 2 or 4 weeks)—or you get no more help.

That is the only way to act. Otherwise in the *immediate future* (both at the Vienna Congress *and earlier*[305]) Buryanov's stand will do us harm, *and people will be justified in telling us* that we are supporting an "independent".

The editorial board must find an occasion to say (1) that the Vyborg workers are right, not the Zurich group; (2) that, apart from a section of those abroad (Zurich), *no one* in Russia has approved or will approve "independence".

This must be done.

All the best, and wishing the paper every kind of improvement and success!

V. I.

P.S. Within a month, Buryanov will say: the Zurich group supported me, and *only* the workers of Vyborg condemned me! And we shall not have had general mass support *for* the Vyborg group. But that is just what we need most now.

If you "give Buryanov a free hand" and your support, he will consolidate his position *against* us, and that would be a crime against the will of the majority of the workers and against the "Marxist whole".

P.S. Could you please send No. 2 of *Nasha Zarya* as quickly as possible, when it comes out, for a reply to L. Martov in *Prosveshcheniye*?

P.P.S. Please show this letter to the paper's contributors who are in the R.S.D.L. Duma group.

Can you send me Milyukov's article in *Russkiye Vedomosti* where he speaks about the tactics of refusing to believe in a peaceable outcome?

The lost book has been found. *Insist on non-abridgement.*

About the paper, I repeat that the improvement is tremendous. (The same comments from everywhere.) All the best. Laissez-nous écrire plus souvent l'opinion *et les directives* (les commandes même) du rédacteur!*

Written before March 23, 1914
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

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* Have them inform us more frequently of the editor's opinion *and directives* (nay, his orders)!—*Ed.*

TO Y. B. STANKEVICH

Cracow, March 24, 1914

Dear V. B.,

Since I do not in the main agree with the programme of your journal as you have set it forth, I must decline to be a contributor.[306]

Yours faithfully,
V. Ilyin

Wl. Uljanow. 51. Ulica Lubomirskiego. Kraków.

Sent to St. Petersburg
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITORS OF *PUT PRAVDY*

ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARTICLES ABOUT IRELAND

I would ask the editorial board to let me know whether my second article[307] is being published. It ought to be. If there is no room, drop me a line. Otherwise I cannot write the continuation.

I ask you particularly not to be late (as you were with No. 2 of *Borba*) in sending me *Yedinstvo*: the "pro-Party Bolsheviks"[308] on it should, in my opinion, be held up as a laughing-stock, with the straightforward statement that they are zeros, who have never had a single coherent thought on a single question. And Plekhanov should be told: it is a pity that he is now nullifying his great services in the struggle against the liquidators during the period of disorganisation, in the struggle against the Machists at the height of Machism, by preaching what he himself cannot explain. Unity with *whom*, then? with *Nasha Zarya*? with *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*?—and on *what* terms?

We stand for unity, on precisely specified terms, which have *long since been approved by the majority of the workers*: start from below, enter the underground organisation, prove by deeds your refusal to join in liquidating the Party.

Not all who "cry" unity understand what unity is, or help to bring it about. Those who destroy the will of the *majority* of the workers are not unifiers but disrupters.

(A struggle against Plekhanov is unavoidable, now that he has become involved in this idiotic affair, but he should be set apart from Lyova and Mark, with the emphasis that he had done service, but it is a pity that he is *once again* on the roundabout.)

Write me more frequently, even if briefly. Otherwise it is hard to get the co-operation going.

A thousand greetings to the paper, which has become 1,000 times better! Best wishes of every success!

Send me Nos. 8 and 36-38 of *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*
No. 43 of *Put Pravdy*.

I haven't received Deborin or any other books from *Prosveshcheniye* although I have asked for them more than once. Write about the plan for the next issue.

Written between April 7 and 23, 1914
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1956 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Friend,

Yesterday I received a worrying letter from Samoilov.[309] He is worse. He can't sleep. *He is bored.*

Chlenov advised cold (!?) baths. After four baths Samoilov felt *even worse.*

This is terribly unpleasant, because we undertook, so to speak, to get him cured. I am sending him today a letter of recommendation from Landau, the local nerve specialist, to Dr. *De Montet* at the "Mon Repos" sanatorium in *Vevey*.

Evidently Samoilov should be taken to the best nerve specialist and transferred to a sanatorium, with regular treatment and care.

Do this, please. Feel free to spend on telephones and travelling: we shall cover all this if need be, because we must get Samoilov on his feet again by the autumn at all costs.

If necessary, go and see Sali once more. But evidently this calls for a *nerve* specialist. I hope you will find the *best* one in Switzerland, and take Samoilov to him. I am writing about the same matter to Rivlin: please come to an arrangement with him to act together and share the burden.

They say boredom is very harmful for neurasthenics. But what is to be done? Should we take Samoilov along with us to *Poronin* (we are going there on May 1) or to *Zakopane*? We could do that, but *it rains there all the summer.*

Write to me about the result of your visit to the doctor and about your decisions. We might now try the "Mon Repos" sanatorium.

Regards to your family. Nadezhda Konstantinovna sends hers too.

Yours,
Lenin

Written at the end of April 1914
Sent from Cracow to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

OUR TASKS

We have given a brief review of the history of the working-class press in Russia and of the origin of *Pravda*. We have tried to show how the age-long history of democratic movements in Russia led to the formation of an independent working-class democratic movement under the ideological banner of Marxism—and how the twenty years' history of Marxism and the working-class movement in Russia, as a result of the long struggle of the workers' vanguard against petty-bourgeois opportunist trends, led to the rallying of the vast majority of class-conscious workers around *Pravda*, which was created by the famous upsurge of the working-class movement in the spring of 1912.

We have seen how, during the paper's two years, class-conscious Pravdist workers united ideologically, and to a certain extent also organisationally, by their efforts creating and supporting, strengthening and developing a consistently Marxist workers' press. Strictly insisting on their continuity with the organised Marxists of the preceding historical epoch, not breaking any of their decisions, building the new on the foundations of the old, and going systematically, unswervingly ahead to the firmly and precisely stated aim of consistent Marxism, the Pravdist workers have begun the solution of an unusually difficult historic task.

A whole host of enemies, a whole mass of difficulties, both external and internal, arose in the way of the labour movement in the 1908-11 epoch. In no country in the world has the working-class movement hitherto succeeded in emerging from *such* crises while maintaining its continuity, its organised character, its loyalty to the old decisions, programme and tactics.

But the Russian workers—or more exactly the workers of Russia—*succeeded* in this; they succeeded in emerging with flying colours from an incredibly painful crisis, remaining loyal to the past and maintaining continuity of organisation, while mastering *new* forms of training for their forces, *new* methods of education and mobilisation of fresh generations of the proletariat for the solution by old methods of old but still outstanding historic problems.

Of all the classes of Russian society, the working class of Russia alone succeeded in this—not, of course, because it stood higher than the workers of other countries: on the contrary, it is still far behind them in organisation and class-consciousness. It succeeded in this because it *relied* at once on the *experience* of the workers of the whole world, both on their theoretical experience, on the achievements of their class-consciousness, their science and experience summed up by *Marxism* and on the practical experience of the proletarians of neighbouring countries, with their magnificent workers' press and their mass organisations.

The Pravdist workers, having safeguarded *their own* line in the most difficult and painful of periods against persecution from without and against despondency, scepticism, timidity and betrayal within, can now say to themselves, with full awareness and resolution: we know that we are on the right path, but we are taking only the first steps along that path, and the principal difficulties still lie ahead of us, we still have to do a great deal to consolidate our own position completely, and to raise to conscious activity millions of backward, dormant and downtrodden proletarians.

Let the petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" of the proletariat, slavishly following the liberals, hold forth contemptuously against "the underground", against "advertising the illegal press"; let them cherish illusions about the June Third "legality". We know the fragile nature of that "legality", we shall not forget the historic lessons of the importance of an illegal press.

Developing further our "Pravdist" work, we shall push ahead with the purely newspaper side hand in hand with *all* sides of the workers' cause.

Put Pravdy must be circulated in three, four and five times as many copies as today. We must put out a trade union supplement, and have representatives of all trade unions and groups on the editorial board. Our paper must have regional (Moscow, Urals, Caucasian, Baltic, Ukrainian) supplements. We must consolidate—despite all the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalists of all nations without exception—the unity of the workers of *all* the nationalities of Russia, and for this purpose, incidentally, start supplements in our paper devoted to the workers' movement of the various nationalities of Russia.

Both the foreign department of *Put Pravdy* and the chronicle of the *organisational*, ideological and political life of the class-conscious workers should be expanded many times over.

We must create a kopek *Vechernaya Pravda*. *Put Pravdy* in its present shape is essential for the class-conscious worker and should be still further enlarged, but it is too dear, too difficult, too big for the worker in the street, for the rank-and-filer, for any of the millions not yet drawn into the movement. The advanced worker will never forget about them, for he knows that craft isolation, the emergence of a labour aristocracy and its separation from the masses mean degradation and brutalisation of the proletarian and his transformation into a miserable philistine, a pitiful flunkey; it means loss of all hope of his emancipation.

There is need to start a kopek *Vechernaya Pravda*, with a circulation of 200,000 or 300,000 copies in the very thick of the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses, showing them the light of the world-wide working-class movement, inspiring them with faith in their strength, impelling them towards unity and helping them to rise to full class-consciousness.

We must secure a much greater degree of organisation on the part of the readers of *Put Pravdy* than there is now, in their various factories, districts, etc., and more active participation in correspondence and running and circulating the paper. We must get the workers to take a regular part in editorial work.

We must have—there is in fact a great deal more that

we must have! We cannot list here everything that we need; we would even be ridiculous (and worse) if we attempted here to enumerate all spheres, or even the principal fields of our work!

We know that we are on the right path. We know that we are marching hand in hand with the forward-looking workers of all countries. We know that this field of our work is only a small part of the whole, and that we are still at the beginning of our great road to emancipation. But we also know that nothing on earth can stop us on that road.

Rabochy No. 1, April 22, 1914

Printed from the *Rabochy* text

TO A. A. TROYANOVSKY

May 20, 1914

Dear Alexander Antonovich,

Your draft constitution is being discussed.[310] It's a long business: a discussion with Russia and with the Central Committee.

The discussion article has nothing to do with the constitution. Send it over as soon as possible. The end of the article on self-determination should appear in May, and has already been sent off.[311]

Yours,
*N. Lenin**

P.S. It would be a good thing if you sent us Pokrovsky's letters to read. Your proposal to have an exchange of letters with him, so as to get him out of the indecent *Borba*, is very interesting.

Sent from Poronin to Vienna

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* The letter also bears the signature of G. Y. Zinoviev.—*Ed.*

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Friend,

Many thanks for Volume I of Rubakin. I will return it soon. If it is urgent, drop me a line. I am *very* glad that you don't sympathise with *Sovremennik*: it is a rotten undertaking by a bloc of two lots of scoundrels, the liquidators and the Narodniks. We shall attack it violently. (Mr. Stankevich invited me; I replied: "Because I do not agree in the main, I must decline to be a contributor."*)

Of course, to earn a living all of us sometimes have to work in bourgeois publications! But Messrs. Martov and Dan have made a "demonstration" of it! Plekhanov, too, is in that disgraceful place![312]

I shall be glad to send you the credential of a delegate: do you want it to be legal (how?) or illegal?[313]

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after May 23, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Vienna

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* See p. 276 of this volume.—*Ed.*

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Hanecki has put an "ultimatum": give us 250 kronen, otherwise we don't go to Brussels. We are not sending them!

I am absolutely against it. It will be even better if *they*[314] don't go. Let Tyszka "make peace" with the P.S.P.—but we are *waiting* for a reply from the opposition.

Lovely!

Take Hanecki a *negative* reply!

Written at Poronin
before July 16, 1914

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Grigory Lvovich,

I have just learned that the International Congress has been transferred to Paris for August 9 (N. S.).[315] I hope you are going—and *well ahead of time*, in order to make preparations in Paris (Kamsky was in the delegation at Brussels,[316] and will give you all the information). Reply at once. Even more important is the question of Samoilov's going. Will he be able to go? It is quite probable that none of the members of the Duma will be able to arrive in time from Russia. Therefore it is essential that Samoilov should go. It would be best for you to arrange to travel with him. He could be fixed up (if his treatment so requires) in a pension near Paris (provided there is a telephone) (or even in a clinic) in the country, half an hour or so away by rail. He will have to come to Paris two or three times at most, for 3 or 4 hours each time (possibly even less), so that from the standpoint of his treatment this can probably be arranged. It is only necessary to think it all out beforehand and arrange it by correspondence. (We are not going; Litvinov or Kamsky will attend the I.S.B.)—write to Dr. Wladimirsky (rue Baillon. 10. Paris); he will give advice.

I ask you particularly to make every effort to prepare and arrange this as carefully as possible. If it turns out that Samoilov's journey is *absolutely* impossible, telegraph me immediately (the address is: Uljanow. Poronin): "nievozmozno".* Otherwise, if he can go and you undertake to organise everything, telegraph: "jedet" (= Samoilov is going) or "jedem" (= both you and Samoilov are going).

* Impossible.—*Ed.*

I *need* a cabled reply (you will easily guess why[317]). In addition, write at once.

Regards to Fyodor Nikitich and your family.

Yours,
V. I.

P.S. It is possible—in the event of war—that you will be receiving letters and money for me. I hope we shall then arrange for regular transmission. If I have to leave, I shall cable you.

Absender: Wl. Uljanow. Poronin (Galizien).

Written on July 31, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO M. V. KOBETSKY

Dear Comrade,

Our trip did not come off.[318] I don't know whether you have got the letters. If you have, send me a reply to check whether the post is working. You may now find yourself, as an exception and an extremely rare one at that, an inhabitant of a non-belligerent country; so that if only the post from you to us functions, you must be sure to keep us informed, and send us information from the papers to which we have no access. Of course, only the most important information (particularly about Russia).

Let me know whether you will have (or whether you already have) any good contacts with Stockholm, and whether you can transmit letters, provide an address for money from Russia, etc.

Regards,
Yours,
*V. I.**

Written on August 2, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Copenhagen

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* At the top of the letter Lenin wrote, evidently addressing himself to the landlord: "*Geehrter Herr! Bitte diesen Brief an Herrn Kobezky gefälligst zu übergeben!*" ("Dear Sir, please pass this letter on to Mr. Kobetsky!")—*Ed.*

TO VIKTOR ADLER

September 5, 1914

Dear Comrade,

I have safely arrived with all my family at Zurich.[319] *Legitimationen** were asked for only at Innsbruck and Feldkirche: your help was therefore extremely useful to me. Passports are required for entry into Switzerland, but I was allowed in without a passport when I mentioned Greulich. Very best regards and deepest gratitude.

With Party greetings,

Lenin (*V. Ulyanov*)

Absender: Uljanow bei Bekzadian. Bollegstrasse. 40. Zürich.

Sent from Zurich to Vienna

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original in German

* Papers.—*Ed.*

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

September 6

Dear Comrade,

I arrived here safely yesterday with my whole family, after a brief captivity in Austria. Zinoviev will also be coming. We thought of settling in Geneva, where all our old sympathies attract us. But then we began to hesitate in favour of Berne. They say that there's a rush to Geneva of new French émigrés from Paris, Brussels, etc. We wonder if there is an excessive rise in prices, particularly of rents. Also we shall have to make our arrangements on a temporary basis: is it possible to take furnished rooms (two small ones), with use of kitchen, by the month?

One other question: if it is not too much trouble, please call at the Société de lecture (Grand' Rue. 11) and take their rules; I must see whether they have been changed in any way. It is this Société[320] that particularly attracts me to Geneva, although here too?... It's expensive.... What about a printing press? Is there a Russian one? Can one now publish a leaflet, etc.? In Russian? With special precautions, or as before (against the war, of course, and against the new type of nationalists, from Haase to Vandervelde and Guesde—they've all played false!). You will oblige me very much by replying to all these questions as soon as possible. Are there any other Bolshevik comrades in Geneva? Including those going to Russia? Best regards from all of us to you, to Comrade Olga and all our friends.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written on September 6, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published on April 22, 1926
in *Pravda* No. 92

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Friend,

I have your letter telling me of the talk with Sigg about the publication.[321] That's excellent! Take as much as you require of the 160 francs (as little as possible, of course, because we are hoping to publish a little miscellany) and publish the *manifesto*[322] (*not the theses*[323] *but the manifesto*) with the *maximum precautions*; don't print many (200 or 300) and *hide* the stock *without fail* at the Swiss deputy's.

If you do not have the text of the manifesto, but only the theses, get the manifesto at Lausanne.

I am awaiting your reply.

Yours,
Lenin

We shall send what is published to Paris and to Russia: a hundred for abroad, two hundred for Russia. We shall write again about how to send them and to what addresses.

Written before October 15, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

SPEECH AT G. V. PLEKHANOV'S LECTURE "ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIALISTS TO THE WAR", SEPTEMBER 28 (OCTOBER 11), 1914[324]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

"Our theses, worked out by the Central Committee of the Party," Comrade Lenin began, "were sent to the Italians, and many of them, unfortunately not all, were incorporated in the Lugano resolution.[325]

The opponent very much liked the first part of Plekhanov's report, dealing with the betrayal of the German Social-Democrats,[326] but the same could not be said about the second part, in which Plekhanov tried to justify completely the stand of the French socialists.

How was it possible to defend French socialism, which had called on the Italians to enter the war? It was difficult to find any passages to justify this appeal even in the extremely elastic resolutions of the International.

The present war had shown the enormous wave of opportunism that had risen out of the depths of European socialism. The European opportunists, in order to rehabilitate themselves, had tried to fall back on the old and hackneyed argument about "keeping the organisation intact". The orthodox Germans had gone back on their stand to preserve the formal unity of the party. He, Comrade Lenin, had always pointed out the opportunism lurking in such an approach, he had always fought against conciliatory attitudes which sacrifice principles. All the resolutions of Vandervelde and Kautsky suffered from this opportunist tendency of smoothing over obvious contradictions. Kautsky, in his article "About the War",[327] had even talked him-

self into justifying everybody, asserting that all were right from their point of view, since *subjectively* they considered themselves to be in danger and *subjectively* considered their right to exist to have been violated. Of course, from the standpoint of the psychology of the moment and humanitarian considerations, such a mood was more comprehensible among the French and could therefore be viewed with greater sympathy; still socialism could not argue from fear of attack alone, and it had to be frankly said that there was more chauvinism than socialism in the behaviour of the French.

Plekhanov, Lenin said further, criticised those comrades who asserted that it was impossible to find out who attacked first. In the opponent's opinion, the present war was not at all *accidental*, and had not depended on this or that attack, but had been prepared by all the conditions of development of bourgeois society. It had been predicted long ago, and precisely in such a combination and precisely along such lines. The Basle Congress spoke about it quite clearly, and even foresaw that Serbia would be the pretext for a conflict.

Comrade Lenin then analysed the duty of socialists in wartime. *Social-Democrats did their duty only when they fought chauvinist passions at home.* And the Serbian Social-Democrats[328] offered the best example of such fulfilment of duty.

Not forgetting the words of Marx that "the workingmen have no country", the proletariat should take part, not in defending the old framework of the bourgeois states, but in creating a new framework for socialist republics. And the great mass of the proletariat would realise this through its sure instinct. What was going on in Europe was nothing but speculation on the worst—and the most deep-rooted—of prejudices. "Our task," said Lenin, "is not to swim with the tide, but to transform the national, the pseudo-national war into a resolute encounter of the proletariat with the ruling classes."

Lenin then went on to criticise the entry of socialists into governments, and pointed out the responsibility falling on socialists who back their government's every step.

"*It is better to go to a neutral country and from there to tell the truth, it is better to make a free and independent appeal to the proletariat, than to become a Minister*"—with those words the opponent ended his short speech.

Golos No. 33, October 2, 1914

Printed from the *Golos* text

LECTURE ON "THE PROLETARIAT AND THE WAR" OCTOBER 1 (14), 1914[329]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The speaker divided his lecture into two parts: clarifying the nature of the present war, and the attitude of socialists to the war.

For a Marxist clarifying the nature of the war is a necessary preliminary for deciding the question of his attitude to it. But for such a clarification it is essential, first and foremost, to establish the objective conditions and concrete circumstances of the war in question. It is necessary to consider the war in the historical environment in which it is taking place, only then can one determine one's attitude to it. Otherwise, the resulting interpretation will be not materialist but eclectic.

Depending on the historical circumstances, the relationship of classes, etc., the attitude to war must be different at different times. It is absurd once and for all to renounce participation in war in principle. On the other hand, it is also absurd to divide wars into defensive and aggressive. In 1848, Marx hated Russia, because at that time democracy in Germany could not win out and develop, or unite the country into a single national whole, so long as the reactionary hand of backward Russia hung heavy over her.

In order to clarify one's attitude to the present war, one must understand how it differs from previous wars, and what its peculiar features are.

Has the bourgeoisie given such an explanation? No. Far from having given one, it will not manage to give one in any circumstances. Judging by what is going on among

the socialists, one might think that they, too, have no idea of the distinctive features of the present war.

Yet, the socialists have given an excellent explanation of it, and have predicted it. More than that, there is not a single speech by a socialist deputy, not a single article by a socialist publicist, that does not contain that explanation. It is so simple that people somehow do not take notice of it, and yet it provides the key to the correct attitude to the present war.

The present war is an imperialist one, and that is its basic feature.

In order to clarify this, it is necessary to examine the nature of previous wars, and that of the imperialist war.

Lenin dwelt in considerable detail on the characteristics of wars at the end of the 18th and during the whole of the 19th centuries. They were all *national wars*, which accompanied and promoted the creation of national states.

These wars marked the destruction of feudalism, and were an expression of the struggle of the new, bourgeois society against feudal society. The national state was a necessary phase in the development of capitalism. The struggle for the self-determination of a nation, for its independence, for freedom to use its language, for popular representation, served this end—the creation of national states, that ground necessary at a certain stage of capitalism for the development of the productive forces.

Such was the character of wars from the time of the great French Revolution up to and including the Italian and Prussian wars.

This task of the national wars was performed either by democracy itself or with the help of Bismarck, quite independently of the will and the consciousness of those who took part in them. The triumph of present-day civilisation, the full flowering of capitalism, the drawing of the whole people and of all nations into capitalism—that was the outcome of national wars, the wars at the beginning of capitalism.

An imperialist war is quite a different matter. On this point, there was no disagreement among the socialists of all countries and all trends. At all congresses, in discussing resolutions on the attitude to a possible war, everyone

was always agreed that this war would be an *imperialist one*. All European countries have already reached an equal stage in the development of capitalism, all of them have already yielded everything that capitalism can yield. Capitalism has already attained its highest form, and is no longer exporting commodities, but capital. It is beginning to find its national framework too small for it, and now the struggle is on for the last free scraps of the earth. If national wars in the 18th and 19th centuries marked the beginning of capitalism, imperialist wars point to its end.

The whole end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century were filled with imperialist policy.

Imperialism is what impresses a quite specific stamp on the present war, distinguishing it from all its predecessors.

Only by examining this war in its distinctive historical environment, as a Marxist must do, can we clarify our attitude to it. Otherwise we shall be operating with old conceptions and arguments, applied to a different, an old situation. Among such obsolete conceptions are the fatherland idea and the division, mentioned earlier, of wars into defensive and aggressive.

Of course, even now there are blotches of the old colour in the living picture of reality. Thus, of all the warring countries, the Serbs alone are still fighting for national existence. In India and China, too, class-conscious proletarians could not take any other path but the national one, because their countries have not yet been formed into national states. If China had to carry on an offensive war for this purpose, we could only sympathise with her, because objectively it would be a progressive war. In exactly the same way, Marx in 1848 could call for an offensive war against Russia.

And so the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th are characterised by imperialist policy.

Imperialism is that state of capitalism when, having done all that it could, it turns towards decline. It is a special epoch, not in the minds of socialists, but in actual relationships. A struggle is on for a division of the remaining portions. It is the last historical task of capitalism. We cannot say how long this epoch will last. There may

well be several such wars, but there must be a clear understanding that these are quite different wars from those waged earlier, and that, accordingly, the tasks facing socialists have changed.

To tackle these new tasks the proletarian party may need organisations of a very different type.

Kautsky, in his pamphlet *Weg zur Macht*,* pointed out, in making a careful and detailed examination of economic phenomena and drawing very cautious conclusions from them, that we were entering a phase quite unlike the old peaceful and gradual development.

It is hard to say just now what the new form of organisation, corresponding to this phase, should be. But it is clear that in view of the new tasks, the proletariat will have to create new organisations or modify the old. All the more absurd is the fear of disarray in one's organisation, so vividly manifest among the German Social-Democrats; all the more absurd is this legalism at all costs. We know that the St. Petersburg Committee has issued an illegal leaflet against the war. The same has been done by the Caucasian and certain other organisations in Russia. There is no doubt that this could also be done abroad, without any rupture of ties.

Legality, of course, is a most valuable thing, and Engels had good reason to say: "Messrs. bourgeois, you will have to be the first to break your legality!"[330] What is now going on might teach the German Social-Democrats a lesson, because a government which has always boasted of its legality is not put out by now having violated it all along the line. In this respect, the brutal order of the Berlin Commandant, which he forced *Vorwärts*[331] to run on its front page, may prove useful. But *Vorwärts* itself, once it renounced the class struggle on pain of being closed down, and promised not to refer to it until the end of the war, has committed suicide. It is dead, as the Paris *Golos*,[332] now the best socialist paper in Europe, has rightly said. The more frequently and the more violently I differed with Martov before, the more definitely I must say now that that writer is now doing precisely what a Social-Democrat

* *The Way to Power.—Ed.*

should do. He is criticising his own government, he is unmasking his own bourgeoisie, he is accusing his own Ministers. Meanwhile, those socialists who have disarmed in relation to their own government, and devote themselves to exposing and shaming the Ministers and ruling classes of another country, play the part of bourgeois writers. Südekum himself is objectively playing the part of agent of the German Government, as others play it in relation to the French and Russian allies.

Socialists who fail to realise that the present war is imperialist, who fail to take a historical view of it, will understand nothing about the war. They are capable of taking a childishly naïve view of it, in this sense, that at night one seized the other by the throat, and the neighbours have to save the victim of attack, or in cowardly fashion to shut themselves away from the light "behind locked doors" (in Plekhanov's words).

We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived, and let the bourgeois advisers explain the war as simply as that: people were living at peace, then one attacked, and the other is defending himself.

Comrade Lenin read an extract from an article by Luzzatti, carried by an Italian newspaper. In that article, the Italian politician rejoices that the great victor in the war turned out to be ... the fatherland, the idea of fatherland, and repeats that we should remember the words of Cicero who said that "civil war is the greatest evil".

This is what the bourgeoisie have managed to achieve, this is what excites and delights them most, this is what they have spent vast sums and efforts on. They are trying to convince us that it is the same old, conventional, national war.

No, indeed. The era of national wars is past. This is an imperialist war, and the task of socialists is to turn the "national" war into a civil war.

We all expected this imperialist war, and prepared for it. And if this is so, it is not at all important who attacked first; all were preparing for the war, and the attacker was the one who thought it most advantageous to do so at the particular moment.

Comrade Lenin then went on to define the conception of "fatherland" from the socialist point of view.

This conception was clearly and precisely defined by the *Communist Manifesto*, in the brilliant pages whose truth has been fully tested and justified by experience. Lenin read an extract from the *Communist Manifesto*, where the conception of fatherland is regarded as a historical category, which corresponds to the development of society at a definite stage and which later becomes unnecessary. The proletariat cannot love what it has not got. The proletariat has no country.

What are the tasks of the socialists in the present war?

Comrade Lenin read the Stuttgart resolution, later confirmed and supplemented at Copenhagen and Basle.[333] This resolution clearly states the socialists' methods of combating the trends leading to war and their duties in respect of a war that has broken out. These duties are defined by the examples of the Russian revolution and the Paris Commune. The Stuttgart resolution was carefully worded, in consideration of all kinds of criminal laws, but it indicated the task clearly. The Paris Commune is civil war. The form, the time and the place are a different matter, but the direction of our work is clearly defined.

From this angle, Comrade Lenin then examined the actual stand taken by socialists in the various countries. Apart from the Serbs, the Russians have done their duty, as the Italian *Avanti!* notes, and Keir Hardie is doing it by exposing the policy of Edward Grey.

Once the war is on, it is impossible to escape it. One must go and do one's duty as a socialist. In a war, people think and ponder probably even more than "at home". One must go out and organise the proletariat there for the final aim, because it is utopian to imagine that the proletariat will tread a peaceful path to it. It is impossible to go over from capitalism to socialism without breaking up the national framework, just as it was impossible to pass from feudalism to capitalism without national ideas.

Golos Nos. 37 and 38,
October 25 and 27, 1914

Printed from the *Golos* text

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending you the manifesto on account of *five* amendments. Please make them in the proofs as carefully as possible.[334]

I am also sending "A Reply to Vandervelde"[335]—*for setting*.

As many articles as possible should be set in *brevier*. We must get the maximum of material into the two pages. It's a pity that we hadn't thought of this when sending the manifesto for setting.

The whole question now is, how many thousands of letters can be got into the two pages? The C.O.'s *old* format *should be taken* (there is no masthead in Geneva it is desirable to make up the new masthead as economically as possible, so as to lose the least space: say, have the masthead fit in a corner, instead of "covering" all three columns).

We are waiting for an exact calculation of the size: how many letters in brevier can be got in.

Best of all, send us both the proof of the manifesto (the second proof) and samples of all types, including the very smallest.

The masthead for the issue (this should be the *next* No. of the C.O.) should also specify the price: 10 cts., I think. In any case, it is *essential* to send us a proof of the issue *made up* into pages.

If the *whole thing* could be set up in brevier, with the C.O. format, we should have about 40,000 letters in the two pages. We could then insert another couple of articles which we are preparing. (If the manifesto has *already* been

set, and in an unsuitable type, etc., we shall publish it separately.)

You will have considerable correspondence expenses: everything must be sent in envelopes, not in wrappers. Keep a record of your postal expenses and draw upon the "fund" (160 frs.), otherwise you will be ruined!

Ask Syoma to get us *Sozialistische Monatshefte* [all the issues since the war] from the Bundists: if necessary, we shall pay, and will *guarantee* to return them at the time fixed (even with a deposit, if required).

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Let me know when the two-page issue of the C.O. *can* be ready. I shall be lecturing at Montreux shortly (I don't know exactly when) and can call on you, *should* it be necessary.[336]

Written on October 18, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

The compositor has dragged things out terribly! He promised the manifesto for Monday, and today is Friday. Terrible!

Will it always be like this?

As regards the address to be put on the paper: is it worth while taking a *case**? After all (1) this will make you go to the Post Office 100 times for nothing, (2) the authorities will eventually know *who* has taken the box. Think it over, whether it would not be better to indicate, as the address, Bibliothèque russe—*for the editorial board of the C.O.*?

Let's think about it.

Nicolet, they say, is *incapable* of keeping and transmitting money, and so forth.

I have written about the order of the articles: send us the proofs as they come in. Then it will not be necessary to waste *two* days (that's terribly long) on sending what has been made up (if it is sent by *express*, one day is more than enough).

We are waiting impatiently for the proofs.

On Monday, I am lecturing at Montreux, on Tuesday, at Zurich. I won't go to Geneva.

Regards and best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

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* Post office box.—*Ed.*

I have just received your letter. As regards Jaurès and Frank, we shall postpone it for a while. We have to wait. No point in just censuring them. And there is nothing to praise them for. We have decided to keep quiet for a while.

What about the proofs? Will it always take that long? The last No. of the C.O. was in December 1913—No. *32*. So this one must be No. *33*.

Written on October 23, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

November 14, 1914

Dear Friend,

I am very glad to hear from you that the C.O. has been received, and is to go where it should.

As regards your speech at the congress of the Swedish Social-Democrats, I can advise only this: either no speech at all, or a statement that you greet the fraternal party of the Swedish workers and wish it every success *in the spirit of revolutionary international Social-Democracy*.[337] If you cannot say *this*, then it is not worth while speaking at all. But if possible, of course, it would be best to add (1) that the Russian workers have expressed their view through the Social-Democratic Duma group, which did *not* vote for the budget, (2) that they are issuing *illegal* leaflets in St. Petersburg, Riga, Moscow and the Caucasus, (3) that the organs of their Party, the C.C. and the C.O., have declared against international opportunism.

Is this "done"?—H'm.... Of course, Branting won't like it, but it's not our business to "please" the opportunists. If you are given 10-12 minutes and *freedom* of speech, then you should speak *against German* (and other) opportunism, without, of course, in any way touching either the Swedish Social-Democrats or their "Young", and so forth. As regards restoring the International, I would advise you *not* to say anything, either directly or indirectly. I am sending you an article (a very good one!) on this theme (translate it and send it to Russia).[338] We shall keep silent on the question of restoring the International, and stay on the side lines. We must bide our time. The *Leftists*[339]

are beginning to stir among the Germans: *if* they have a split, *then*, maybe, the International will be saved from rotting.

As regards the watchword of "peace", you are mistaken if you think the bourgeoisie doesn't even want to hear of it. Today I have been reading the English *Economist*. The *wise* bourgeois of an advanced country are *for* peace (of course, in order to *strengthen* capitalism).[340] But we must not let ourselves be confused with the petty-bourgeois, sentimental liberals, etc. The epoch of the *bayonet* has begun. This is a fact; consequently, we have to fight *with such a weapon too*.

One of these days, the slogan of peace will be taken up by the *German* bourgeoisie, and particularly by the *opportunists*. We must stand for the watchword of *the revolutionary proletariat*, capable of *fighting* for *its own* aims—and that is civil war. This too is a *very* concrete watchword, and *it alone* unerringly reveals the main trends: either for the proletarian, or for the bourgeois cause.

As regards the debt to the Swedes,[341] neither I nor Nadezhda Konstantinovna can remember anything at all. But it is *quite* possible that either I did not know, or have forgotten. It would be a very good thing, therefore, to send them a friendly letter of thanks, suggesting that the debt should be "donated". I think you yourself could do this, on behalf of the Petrograd Committee, for example, plus *some* Social-Democratic deputies, authorising you in Petrograd. I believe this would be the best form. I think you should act in the same way on the loan. I would not advise pushing a letter from me (it could start "*factional*" squabbles!). I will send a letter if you insist, but my advice is: don't. *Without* me they will be *better* inclined to give, really! Refer to Petrovsky, get a letter from him (if need be), this is better, really!

All the very best,

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. If Kollontai translates the Central Committee manifesto (from No. 33 of the C.O.) into German, perhaps you will send us a copy?

P.S. About the "peace" watchword. An interesting article by Bernstein in the last issue of *Neue Zeit* shows that in Britain, where the bourgeoisie is cleverest and freest of all, etc., there is a trend *for peace* from the standpoint of ultra-opportunism. That is, peace is the best guarantee of "social peace", i.e., the *submission* of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie, the pacification of the proletariat, the *continuation* of the existence of capitalism. Bernstein's article does not elaborate this. But it is obvious that there are many *such* peacemakers among the liberal and radical *bourgeois* of all countries. Add to this (1) that *all* chauvinists are also for peace (only on *what* terms)—and in the legal press, we shall *not be allowed* to speak of our terms! (2) that the German and Russian *Courts* are also for a particular kind of peace with each other (in secret today, half-open tomorrow), (3) that all the sentimental bourgeois and philistines are "for peace" from the "anti-revolutionary", philistine, slavish, etc., standpoint.

The question is, who *objectively* now benefits from the watchword of peace? In any case, not the propaganda of the ideas of the *revolutionary* proletariat! Not the idea of *utilising* the war to *hasten* the collapse of capitalism!

Add to this the victory of the opportunist chauvinists in nearly all countries: the slogan of peace will only *help* them to *extricate themselves*.

Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

November 25

Dear Friend,

Last night we read of the arrest of 11 people (including 5 members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group[342]) near Petrograd, and we sent a telegram to Branting today to help you ascertain (through the Finns *le cas échéant**) whether the 5 members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group have been arrested.

It will be a bad blow if it is true!

But all the more impermissible in that case will be your departure for Denmark. In any case, I protest energetically against such a departure. This is the time for you to be in Stockholm personally, in order to establish better, more frequent and more extensive contacts. This is a difficult job, it requires an experienced person, with a knowledge of at least one foreign language. It *cannot* be left just to "anyone" to look after.

If you are pressed (by the police) in Stockholm, you should hide in some village *near* Stockholm (this is easily done, they have telephones everywhere). I think Kollontai, too, could soon easily come to Stockholm or to some suburban place, incognito.

We shall soon be issuing No. 34 of the C.O., and then No. 35 as well.

Reply as quickly as possible. We have been getting all your letters. We have also received the document[343] of the liquidators (*their* reply to Vandervelde). Thanks.

All good wishes, and we are awaiting your news.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on November 25, 1914
Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

* If there is a chance.—*Ed.*

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear and esteemed Comrade,

I am very grateful to you for sending me the leaflet[344] (for the time being, I can only pass it on to the *Rabotnitsa* editorial board members here—they have already sent a letter to Clara Zetkin, with a content similar to yours, evidently), and also for the offer to send information about Britain for the C.O. I am in correspondence with a comrade in London (Mr. Litvinoff), who represents our Party's C.C. in the I.S.B.; but of course the more connections we have with representatives of the Left wing of the International, the better. I quite agree with you that these representatives ought to keep closer together, and take common counsel. And it is with this end in view that I take advantage of your kind letter to continue the conversation you began.

You don't seem to agree with the slogan of civil war quite fully, but assign to it, one might say, a subordinate (and, I think, even conditional) place, behind the slogan of peace. And you emphasise that "we need to put forward a slogan that would *unite* everyone".

Let me say frankly that what I fear most at present is just this kind of blanket unification which, I am convinced, is the most dangerous and the most harmful thing for the proletariat. After all, Kautsky has already invented, in *Neue Zeit*, an ultra-"unifying" theory,[345] which....*

Written between November 28
and December 8, 1914
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

* The letter breaks off at this point.—*Ed.*

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I have received the C.O. You are doing an excellent job; best regards and thanks!

I also enclose a little note for No. 35. It will squeeze in, I hope?

Perhaps something else can be squeezed in as well?

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I believe Syoma reads *Vorwärts*? Would he be so kind as to send us *extracts* (brief ones) of the most interesting items? For example, about the conflict between the *Vorwärts* editorial board and the Central Committee of the trade unions?[346] About my lecture at Zurich?[347] About the victory of the opportunists in Sweden, etc.? Only the *most* important news in *a couple of words*, so that we can keep track of the *Vorwärts* line.

Likewise with the German Social-Democratic papers *in America*.

Does he read them?

Written between December 5 and 12, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I enclose the proofs.

We shall have to wait with No. 36.[348] It's not yet written, and we ought to wait a little while.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I read with interest the remarks about "national pride", but—could not agree. Chauvinism should be "spotlighted" *from different angles*.[349]

Be sure to insert the following about the *postponement*. #Insertion*:

For lack of space, part of the material, a statement by Liebknecht, etc., has been held over.

Excuse the extreme haste!

We have shortened the manuscripts, i.e., the articles.

Written on December 9, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* The text of the insertion is given on a separate sheet.—*Ed.*

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

I (and Nadezhda Konstantinovna) have had a letter from Kollontai. We are going to reply to her.

My letters to you, I am sure, are being lost or delayed: I have written more than once through Kobetsky. Inquire once again.

We have received your manuscript, and intend to publish it in the C.O. (or as a pamphlet).[350]

Do you read *Golos*? It already shows signs of Martov's turnabout[351]—Axelrod's efforts to "reconcile" (Martov with Südekum, i.e., Plekhanov)—and next to that Trotsky "*against*" an "amnesty"!

What a mess! And they dare abuse us for "factionalism" (while making peace with social-chauvinism for the sake of factionalism!). An unpleasant and tiresome picture.

If you attend the conference,[352] be on your guard. If you do speak, I advise you to *repeat* your Stockholm speech, *adding* that the entry of the Belgians and the French into the government is also betrayal (even if with *extenuating* circumstances). Otherwise they will think that out of *Russian* chauvinism we are abusing *only* the Germans.

In my opinion it is *not worth while* sending a *report*, *it should not be done*.

What should be done, for information (only)—and on behalf of *Litvinov* (Litvinoff. 76. High Street. 76. Hampstead. London. N.W.)—is to send a full translation of the manifesto and of the report of the arrest of the 5 (and the 11). I hope you have already had an exchange of letters with Litvinov?

All good wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. What did Kollontai think of the "document"[353] and the latest issues (80-86 and the following) of *Golos*?

P.S. I have just read that the conference is to take place on January 17, and that the Swiss Party has *refused*. I think that, if that is the case, it is better not to participate *at all*.

P.P.S. Kautsky, in the *Labour Leader*, is *for the slogan of peace*.[354] There is my reply to Comrade Kollontai! I wonder if she will still be in favour of this watchword now.

Written after December 28, 1914
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

1915

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

January 3, 1915

Dear Friends,

Many thanks for your greetings, and from all of us also (from Nadezhda Konstantinovna and me in particular) best wishes for the new year!

A Paris compositor has offered to come to Geneva and set the C.O. for *35 francs* an issue, if we find a printing press which will provide him with the type.[355]

Discuss this *from all points of view* (reduction of expenses is desirable, because we have decided to publish the C.O. weekly) and reply as soon as you can.

Furthermore, consider also when the material should be sent in, by what day everything should be ready and for what day publication should be timed in the interests of circulation. It would seem that the most convenient day for circulation is Saturday. If so, should it be published on Wednesday or Thursday? So that we should have it here on Friday, and the whole of Switzerland by Saturday.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO THE EDITORIAL SECRETARY OF GRANAT PUBLICATIONS

January 4, 1915

Dear Colleague,

I received your letter yesterday and sent a telegram "*consens*"—agreed. However sad it is that the editors struck out everything about socialism and tactics (without which Marx is not Marx), I had to agree all the same, because your argument ("absolutely impossible") could not be gainsaid.[356]

I shall be very grateful if you send me a proof, or drop me a postcard about *when* it could be expected. By the way, is there still time for some corrections to the section on dialectics? Perhaps you will be so kind as to let me know when it is being sent for setting, and what the deadline is for corrections. It is a question I have been working on these last six weeks, and I think I could add something if there is still time.

Then I would like to offer my services to the editors of the dictionary, if there are still any unallotted articles in the volumes to be published. I am now in exceptionally good conditions as regards German and French libraries, to which I have access in Berne—and in exceptionally bad conditions as regards literary work in general. Therefore I would be very glad to take on articles on questions of political economy, politics, the labour movement, philosophy, etc. My wife has written on education, as N. Krupskaya, in *Russkaya Shkola* and *Svobodnoye Vospitaniye*,[357] and has made a particular study of the question of the "*Labour School*" and the old pedagogical classics. She would be glad to undertake articles on these questions.

At your service,

V. Ulyanov

Wl. Uljanow. Distelweg. 11. *Bern*.

Sent from Berne to Moscow

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

We have once more decided (after having a talk yesterday with Grimm, by the way) to advise you not to attend the council of the heathen: let the liquidators attend the Copenhagen conference, if they like. We should do *better* not to take part at all.

Even the Swiss are not going.

This appears to be an intrigue of the Germans. I even think that it involves an intrigue of the German General Staff, who want to probe for "peace" through others.

We shall learn nothing there. Nothing much can be done there. All we need is to send in the manifesto.

I am in a great hurry, so excuse the abruptness.

Yours,
Lenin

Written before January 17, 1915
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

We are sending you notepaper with our stamp. But if you must have it *en tête*,* drop us a line, and we shall order it at once at the printer's.

I made inquiries about the deputies' photographs yesterday. They have already been ordered here, and will be ready this week. We shall then send them on to you.[358]

No. 36 is long since out, and has been sent you.

No. 37 is being printed.

The instructions about the number of copies to be sent have been passed on.

I fully approve your plans on stamps for contributions, etc., etc. Altogether, as regards your position, you will already see in No. 36 that you are the official, fully authorised representative of the C.C.; you were one before, and you remain one still. I think this position is quite definite. We see neither reason for, nor possibility of, changing it now (until we have ascertained what's going on in Russia). I am absolutely convinced that you were writing sincerely, *en dehors de toute*,** etc., and therefore hope that you will write me just as sincerely, if there are nevertheless any inconveniences, and what they are. Write frankly (to me privately if you find it more convenient).

Golos has been closed down. The O.C. people[359] are clearly breaking up. In Zurich Martov was turned (by Axelrod + Martynov + Semkovsky + the Bundists) *to the right*, towards "peace" with the Plekhanovs and the Südekums. The

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* At the head.—*Ed.*

** Apart from everything else.—*Ed.*

Bundists have issued No. 7 of their *Information Bulletin*; it is colourless, totally for peace with the Südekums (including Kautsky; in what way is he better than the Südekums?).

With all my heart I wish you success in your difficult work, and am very thankful for your news. We have received the Copenhagen resolutions.

Yours,
Lenin

Written between January 20
and February 1, 1915
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

Your plan for a trip in April and preparations for it seems to be *completely* correct.[360] You are right: that is the plan to adopt and prepare as systematically and in as much detail as possible.

Thank you for your letters. We have written to you several times. We have also sent notepaper with our stamp, I hope you have received all this.

Today we received an issue of *Nashe Slovo*, which has begun to appear in Paris instead of *Golos*, which was closed down. The issue of *Nashe Slovo* contains a statement by Martov (and Dan) on their differences with *Nasha Zarya*.

Evidently, there is a big cleavage among them (the liquidators), and no one can say what will happen. Axelrod is clearly trying to "reconcile" the German (and Bundist) chauvinists with the Francophiles (and Plekhanov). After Zurich, Martov sang to Axelrod's tune, but whether he is now "gone left" for long, we don't know.

In a few days we shall be issuing No. 37 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

All the best, and I wish you every success

Yours,
Lenin

Before April, we shall try (together with you) to organise correspondence, and establish some contacts. You, too, should make arrangements *in good time*.

Written on January 30 or 31, 1915
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

MAY DAY AND THE WAR[361]

INTRODUCTION

1. This year, the demonstration of the international proletarian movement takes place during the greatest European war.

2. Perhaps nothing can be done in 1915 for "a review of forces"? for comparing "successes and defeats"? for contrasting the bourgeois world and the proletarian world?—since the appearance=*all* has collapsed.

3. But this is not so. War=the greatest possible crisis. *Every* crisis means (with the possibility of *temporary* retardation and regress)

(α) acceleration of development
(γ) (β) sharpening of contradictions
(β) (γ) their exposure
(δ) collapse of all that is *rotten*, etc.

That is the standpoint from which to consider the crisis (on May Day): does it have any of the progressive, useful features of *any* crisis?

COLLAPSE OF BOURGEOIS-NATIONAL FATHERLANDS

4. "Defence of fatherlands" and the actual nature of the war. What is the essence? Nationalism versus imperialism.

5. 1789-1871 (about 100 years)...
and 1905-?

6. "Defence of fatherlands" (Belgium? Galicia? Over the division of the slaveowners' spoils)
versus "away with frontiers". Collapse of national fatherlands? Good riddance!

7. Imperialism old and new—*Rome* and *Britain versus Germany*.

{ Seizure of territories
Colonies
Division of the world
Export of capital }

8. Maturity of the objective conditions for socialism.
9. How to defend the *status quo*?
How to carry on the revolutionary struggle for socialism?
10. National freedom *versus* imperialism. The proletariat of oppressor and oppressed nations.
11. "Internationalism" in the attitude to wars. ((“Which bourgeoisie is better”? or independent action by the proletariat?))

12. Back (to the national fatherland) or forward (to the socialist revolution)?

Σ=
the collapse
of national
narrowness.

COLLAPSE OF OFFICIAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

13. Everyone feels (if he does not realise) the turning-point in the history of the working-class movement The crisis and the collapse of the International. What is the cause? Was the International united, or were there two trends?
14. A review of attitudes to the war within the working-class movement of the major countries:

{ Germany: August 4 versus Borchardt and *Die Internationale*[362]
Britain:
France: (Guesde+Sembat versus Merrheim)
Russia:

{ Italy
Switzerland
Sweden } [In practice, two parties everywhere]

15. What is the point? Compare the British and the German labour movement =

Bourgeois tendencies and influence in the labour movement.

16. Fifteen years of struggle against opportunism, and its growth in Western Europe. The collapse of opportunism benefits the working-class movement.

((Guesde-Hyndman-Kautsky-Plekhanov.))

17. The crisis of official Marxism (1895-1915). Not to resurrect the corpse, but to develop revolutionary Marxism against opportunist "would-be Marxism".

18. Marxism versus Struvism....

Dialectics versus eclecticism....

19. Torn banner? Stuttgart 1907
Chemnitz* 1910
(disillusionment) Basle 1912

20. "All possibilities" *except* revolutionary action.

21. Anarchism = opportunism (petty-bourgeois). *La Bataille Syndicaliste* { Cornelissen
Grave
Kropotkine }

22. *Abdankung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*.**

Ineffectual organisations have broken up or, rather, perished—to clear the ground for better ones. "Over-ripening" (not that the proletariat has not matured): compare 1907.

COLLAPSE OF PETTY-BOURGEOIS ILLUSIONS ABOUT CAPITALISM

23. The war is seen, on the one hand, as a single national cause, and on the other, as an abnormality, a disruption of "peaceful" capitalism, etc.

---

* Evidently meaning the Copenhagen Congress.—*Ed.*

** The recantation of German Social-Democrats.—*Ed.*

Both illusions are harmful. And the war tends to destroy both illusions.

24. "*Burgfrieden*",* the "national bloc", "*l'union sacrée*"** during the war?

25. War is a "terrible" thing? Yes. But it is a terribly *profitable* thing.

160,000 millions>60,000 million rubles.

*Mehrwert****=*10,000-20,000 million* rubles.

26. "Adaptation" of industry to war conditions. (Ruin. Rapid concentration.)

27. War and the pillars of capitalism.

"Peaceful democracy", "culture", "the rule of law", etc., versus the horrors of war?

Untrue.

Private property and exchange. The guarantee of ruin for some, the guarantee and basis of violence.

28. Colonies and concessions.

"Honest concessionaire"?

"Humane" colonialist?

29. War=a terribly profitable thing=the direct and inevitable product of capitalism.

30. Harmful illusions can only hinder the struggle against capitalism.

COLLAPSE OF PACIFIST DREAMS

31. Capitalism without imperialism? (Shall we look back?)

32. Theoretically (in the abstract) it is possible even without colonies, etc.

33. Just as with a 4-hour working day, 3,000 workers minimum....

Ad 33: "Capitalism *can* develop *without* imperialism, without wars, without colonies, with full freedom of trade."

Is that true?

Capitalism *can* provide thousands of millions not for war, but in aid of the paupers and the workers, thereby perpetuating the domination of the capitalist class!

---

* Civil peace.—*Ed.*

** Holy Alliance.—*Ed.*

*** Surplus value.—*Ed.*

Theoretically identical propositions. "Compelling pressure of the working class and humanitarian measures of the bourgeoisie." The whole point is that such things can be compelled not by pressure *in general*; what is needed is *pressure* with the force of a real revolution. And the revolution and counter-revolution will sharpen the struggle to something more essential.

The question boils down to a struggle for reforms. This struggle is legitimate and necessary within definite limits, viz.:

(1) absence of a revolutionary situation; (2) partial character of the reforms, not to sharpen the struggle of classes to the point of revolution.

34. On account of what? On account of the horrors of war? (And what about the terrible profits?)

On account of pressure from the proletariat? (And what about the opportunists' betrayal?)

35. Peace without annexations, disarmament, etc., etc.

Objective meaning: *clerical consolations* ((Feuerbach: religion consoles. Is it useful?))

"Abolition of secret diplomacy"?

"Utopia or Hell"?

N.B. [The review of *Forel* in *Das Volksrecht*]

36. The struggle for reforms?
    Yes.—Its limits.
    Particulars.

An epoch of reforms, *the absence of a revolutionary situation*.

This is the crux.

RESULTS OF THE COLLAPSE OF ILLUSIONS

37. Revolutionary situations
    (α) the lower orders won't, the upper classes can't
    (β) growth of misery
    (γ) extraordinary activity.
38. Slow and tortuous development.

Compare 1900 versus 1905.

39. Plunder by the capitalists "*Kriegssklaverei*"* and deception by the governments?
40. The war and the marvels of technique?
41. The war and regrouping (workers versus peasants)
42. Three mental attitudes
(α) despair and religion
(β) hatred of the enemy
(γ) hatred of capitalism, not only in general, but of *one's own* government and bourgeoisie.
43. The "Gaponade".[363]
44. Letter: "*Mundspitzen*"** ("*Kamarades*")
45. Every crisis breaks some and *hardens* others.
46. Hardens—*for* the socialist revolution (ΣΣ).

ΣΣ= Collapse of what is harmful, rotten in the labour movement= elimination of the obstacles to revolutionary battles.

PROFITS OF THE CAPITALISTS

By the way. The 10,000 million loan in Germany. The loan will yield 5 per cent. The government has so arranged things that the *savings* banks (for subscription to the loan) receive funds from the *loan* offices (*Darlehenskassen*), paying them 5.25 per cent. The loan offices get the money from the government! A swindle. *Das Volksrecht* (Zurich), of April 27, 1915.[364]

The absurdity of "amiable" utopias: without secret diplomacy—we proclaim the aims of the war—peace without annexations, etc., etc. Sentimental and reactionary rubbish.

The old nations (*respective*,*** the bourgeois states) *versus* "away with frontiers"!

---

* War slavery.—*Ed*.
** Get ready to whistle.—*Ed*.
*** Correspondingly.—*Ed*.

The experience of Russia: 1900 versus 1905.
Down with the autocracy (1900) and the "people"....
Revolutionary slogans and the growth of the revolutionary movement....

Written in the last days of April 1915

First published in January 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

TO KARL RADEK

Werter Genosse,*

Our letters evidently crossed. At the same time that you were writing to me, I was writing (a postcard) to you and sending you the *Miscellany*.[365] I hope you have received it.

About a conference of the Left:

I have not been a member of the International Socialist Bureau *since 1912* (since 1912 Maximovich, in London, has been the C.C.'s member of the I.S.B.). But, of course, Grigory and I here will do everything necessary on behalf of the C.C.

You write that "*Grimm macht das* [behind the backs of the C.C.?] *ohne Absicht*"**[366]....

I wonder! *Es scheint mir wenig glaubhaft zu sein. Ist Grimm wirklich ein Kind*? *Nach zwei Konferenzen in Bern*?***[367]

But you in Berne, of course, can see it more clearly, and I should be glad if it turned out that I was wrong and you were right.

And so, *if* Grimm *macht das ohne Absicht*, then the thing is simple: Grimm *must write* to the C.C. (the official address is printed in our C.O.—Bibliothèque russe. 7. Rue Hugo de Senger. 7. *Genève*. Für das Kom. Central****).

(Of course, it is also possible to write to my address; this will be more direct.)

---

* Dear Comrade.—*Ed.*

** Grimm is not doing this deliberately.—*Ed.*

*** I think this is highly unlikely. Is Grimm really a child? *After* two conferences in Berne?—*Ed.*

**** For the Central Committee.—*Ed.*

Unless he does this, Grimm will be acting *dishonestly* (for to write to Maximovich in *London* means losing time and risking the letter falling into the wrong hands: the police will intercept it!).

It is unbecoming for us to ask for an invitation: we don't want to force ourselves on them. We *cannot* do this!

Now on the substance of the question. You write: "*Da wird Grimm und vielleicht* [*?? sicher meines Erachtens!*] *auch andere die Sache so abwechseln* [*nur? richtiger: zertreten und verraten!*] *wollen*, *dass nur ein Aktionsprogramm* [*soll heissen: Ermattungsprogramm*, a programme of abandoning the struggle, a programme of discouraging the workers *from* revolution, a programme of *pacifying* the workers with Leftist phrases] *für die Stunde kommt*."*

My opinion is that the "swing" by Kautsky+Bernstein +Co. (+500+1,000+??) is a swing of shit (=*Dreck*), who have sensed that the masses won't stand for it any longer, that it's "necessary" to make a turn to the left, in order to continue *swindling* the masses.[368]

This is clear.

Renaudel in *l'Humanité* is also "going left"!

These shit-heads will get together and say that they are "against the August 4 policy", that they are "for peace", "against annexations" and ... and ... thereby *will help* the bourgeoisie to damp down the incipient revolutionary mood.

I conclude from your letter that you share my views.

*Ergo***, our programme should be:

(1) to go if invited;

(2) to bring together *beforehand* the "Left", i.e., the supporters of *revolutionary action* against *their own* governments;

(3) to put before the Kautskian shit-heads *our* draft resolution (the Dutch[369]+ourselves+the Left Germans +0, and that won't be too bad, for *later* it will be not zero, but everyone!);

---

* In that case, Grimm and possibly (I think, surely) others as well will want to try and turn things in such a way (only? more likely: to suppress and betray!) that now only one programme of action (rather: a programme of exhaustion...) will be put forward.—*Ed.*

** Hence.—*Ed.*

(4) to put forward 2 or 3 speakers at the conference (if you *manage* to get there, this will be possible).

Would it be possible to get together *a few* German Left-wingers *against* Kautsky and Co., for a programme *of this kind*?

Write what you think of this programme. Its essence = against the stupid and treacherous slogan of peace.

Come and see us!

Yours,
Lenin

Is it not *clear* that the O.C. will side with Drehscheibe* Kautsky and Co.? *Eh*?

And are you sure that Grey + Bethmann-Hollweg have not "tipped the wink" to Südekum + Vandervelde: time to speak up *for* peace, chaps, or else there will be a revolution?

P.S. In our hotel (Hotel Marienthal) we have a *telephone* (No. 111). If you have anything urgent, ring up—at 8.30 a.m. we are *always* at home.

P.P.S. Please read the enclosed and send it on.

Written after June 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

* Turntable.—*Ed.*

TO KARL RADEK

Werter Genosse,

I enclose a letter about the *Vorkonferenz*.*[370]

Take a copy for *Lichtstrahlen*[371]—or get Wijnkoop (*if you are sure* that he is punctual) to send it on to them.

N.B. All this is *vertraulich*.** Promise not to speak about it, either to Grimm or to Balabanova or to Trotsky or to anyone else!

Read my letter to Wijnkoop and send it off.[372] I hope you have sent off the previous one! Let me know about this.

Either the German Left will now unite (if only for a statement of *principles* on behalf of an *anonymous Stern*[373] group, or whatever you like: the workers will later *join* this group), or we shall have to dismiss them from our minds.

(I understand that *Lichtstrahlen* cannot act directly. But why should not a *Stern* group, *consisting* of X+Y+Z, come forward with *resolutions* or a *manifesto*? And then privately and secretly distribute them?)

I don't understand how you *missed* the *Vorkonferenz* in Berne!? And you were the one who was exhorting me!?

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Do you find reading Russian difficult? Do you understand *everything*?

---

* Preliminary conference.—*Ed.*
** Confidentially.—*Ed.*

P.S. Either send the Berne resolutions (the translation) direct to Wijnkoop (if you have a copy), or send them here: we shall make a copy.[374]

It would be extremely important for us to have a private consultation with some of the German Left. Could you organise this? By the way, why not come over here?

Written on July 15, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO KARL RADEK

Dear Comrade Radek,

I have received your letter to Wijnkoop, and am sending it off by the first post. I am adding that work should be started right away, if the idea is to prepare a declaration (to say nothing of another *Communist Manifesto*).

We have provided (1) a manifesto; (2) resolutions; (3) a draft declaration.[375] So let us have your amendments or counterdrafts as soon as possible. Hurry! Or we shall be late!

I personally am against *Nashe Slovo* participating, but would not make this an ultimatum. Why am I against? (1) It is corruption, because *Nashe Slovo* has not *itself* declared that it is an *independent* or third (apart from the C.C. and O.C.) party or group for work in Russia; (2) There are *O.C. supporters* in *Nashe Slovo* in numbers unknown to the public. This is dual representation! (O.C.+ *Nashe Slovo*). (3) *Nashe Slovo* is for the Chkheidze faction in the Duma (*and the O.C.* and Plekhanov+Alexinsky are also for it). Isn't that corruption?

Taking *Lichtstrahlen* as a *group*, and considering it more important than Zetkin's, is *not* funny.

This group includes Borchardt+Radek+contributors to *Lichtstrahlen*. That is enough.

This group has a little journal (while Zetkin and Co. haven't got one).

Borchardt was the first to say publicly: *Die Sozialdemokratie abgedankt*.*[376] That was not propaganda but a most important political act. *It was action*, and not promise.

---

* The Social-Democrats *recanted*.—*Ed*.

The most important thing for us (i.e., all the Left) is a clear, complete, precise *Prinzipienerklärung*.* Without this all the so-called programmes of action are nothing but talk and deception. What did the Zetkin "resolution of action" in Berne come to? *Nothing* in terms of action! Nothing in terms of principle![377]

The Borchardt group, if it comes forward (together with us or separately) as an anonymous group (*Stern*, or *Pfeil*, or whatever) with a clear-cut *Prinzipienerklärung*+a call to *revolutionary* action, will play an outstanding part in world history.

Meanwhile, Zetkin and Co., having *everything* in their hands (newspapers, journals, connections with *Berner Tagwacht*, the opportunity of visiting Switzerland, etc.), have done *nothing* in 10 months to unite the international Left. This is a disgrace.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I advise you not to enlist. It's stupid to help the enemy. You will be doing a service to the Scheidemanns. Better emigrate. Really, that will be better. There is now a desperate need of Left-wing workers.

"The opposition in Germany is the product of ferment among the masses, *whereas* the Bolsheviks represent the orientation of a little group of revolutionaries."

That is not the Marxist approach.

It is Kautskianism—or a dodge.

What was the 1847 *Communist Manifesto* and its group? The product of ferment among the masses? Or the orientation of a little group of revolutionaries? Or *both* the one *and* the other?

And what are we, the Central Committee? Or hasn't the R.S.D.L. Duma group proved that there are links with the masses? And what about the *Petrograd Proletarsky Golos*? Or is there *no* "ferment among the masses" in Russia?

The Left in Germany will make a historic mistake if, on the pretext that they (they=Zetkin, Laufenberg,

* Statement of principles.—*Ed.*

Borchardt; Thalheimer, Duncker! Ha, ha!) are "the product of ferment among the masses", they refuse to come forward with a *Prinzipienerklärung* (anonymously, on behalf of a *Stern* group, etc. Later the workers will *support* it and *think* about it).

There is need for a Left statement and programme *so as* to develop the "ferment among the masses". It is necessary *because* of such ferment. It is necessary *so as* to transform the "ferment" into a "movement". *It is necessary so as* to develop "ferment" in the rotten International.

And immediately!

You are quite, quite *wrong*!

P.S. You didn't say clearly in your letter to Wijnkoop whether it was set or proposed for August 20. Drop me *and Grigory* a line about this (if it is urgent).

Rakovsky (see his pamphlet)[378] is *for* defence of the fatherland. To my mind, we should part company with such people.

Written before August 4, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I enclose the sheets of the pamphlet which were accidentally overlooked. Please check whether you have everything now. I wrote to you yesterday about the *reprints* coming up for the pamphlet.

What about No. 44?

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. The attached footnote to the manifesto should go into the pamphlet. Insert it, please.

> *Footnote*. The demand for a United States of Europe, as put forward in the manifesto of the C.C., which supplemented it with a call for the overthrow of the monarchies of Russia, Austria and Germany, differs from the pacifist reading of this slogan by Kautsky and others. [To the paragraph in the manifesto of the C.C. (No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*) containing a reference to the United States of Europe.]

There is an editorial in No. 44 of our Party's Central organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which shows that the "United States of Europe" slogan is economically wrong. Either this is an impossible slogan under capitalism, one signifying not only the giving up of colonies, but also the establishment of a balanced world economy, with the colonies, spheres of influence, etc., divided among the several countries. Or else it is a reactionary slogan, signifying a temporary alliance between the Great Powers of Europe to plunder the more rapidly developing Japan and America. (Note by the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.)

Return the material as soon as possible!

Written before August 11, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

I am afraid to write to V. K., because "hurry-up" letters make his nervous illness even worse. But what is happening to No. 44? Or has the Kuzmikha woman turned definitely against us? I was in a terrible hurry to get No. 44 finished, had no time to correct the articles, didn't see the proofs—and there it is—stuck. And Kuzma was demanding the pamphlet by the *week before last*![379]

Drop me a line, please, whether there is any hope of issuing both 44 and the pamphlet. When will the one and the other be ready? There's need to add to and amend a few things in the pamphlet. It's essential to have proofs.

Greetings to V. K.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. How do you like *Peuple*? Solid *for* Vandervelde!

Written on August 16, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

Hurrah! You've beaten Kuzmikha herself! Well, you're really a heroine!

I enclose the proofs and *two* insertions for the pamphlet. Please make sure that they *are inserted in the right place*. (If there is any delay, don't send me the proofs of *these* insertions, but handle them yourself.)

I am writing to Grigory that I am publishing the pamphlet (he can phone me if there are any differences).

There should be *three* supplements at the end of the pamphlet:

I. The manifesto of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. on the war (from No. *33*. I am enclosing it).

Insert footnote (on the United States slogan) which I *sent* you (and did you send a copy to Lyalin?).

II. The resolution from No. *40* which I am sending.[380]

III. The 19*13* resolution (the conference of the C.C. with Party workers) *on the national question*.[381] I haven't got it. I am asking them to send it to you from Berne. (But there *must* be one at your library.)

Print the pamphlet in 2,000 copies on the cheapest paper (if you have thin paper, then 1,000 copies on that), in the cheapest possible format, convenient for envelopes.

Salut,*

Yours,

Lenin

---

* Regards.—*Ed*.

P.S. If you can do this without delay, send me a *second* copy of *all* proofs of the pamphlet (to send to a comrade who is leaving for Russia).

Written after August 16, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

The *Vorkonferenz* (II) has been postponed until Sept. 5.[382]

Höglund and the Left Norwegians (and what about the Danes?) *must* procure an invitation themselves. They *should send* their statements, requests and declarations *to us* (*for the C.C.*) in writing, signed and stamped, in one of the three international languages.

Very warm regards to Alexander (why is he *only* criticising my draft?[383] Let's have your amendments, *s'il vous plaît*!)—and to you for your successful work among the Left in Scandinavia.

Yours,
Lenin

I think it is hardly likely that the conference will materialise soon, if at all. However, let Höglund *prepare*, seriously and *urgently*.

But are they willing to have a joint manifesto with us on behalf of the Left in the various countries (independently of the conference)?

Written before August 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg
to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Kasparov,

There is to be a conference of the Left in Berne on Sept. 5.[384]

It would be *extremely* important to have our pamphlet in German appear *before* that date.[385]

Can you help in this?

—first, by calling on Radek, helping him to read the manuscript and inciting him to sit down and do the translation (unfortunately, we shall *not manage* to have the Russian proofs before then);

—second, by seeing to the contract with the German printing house (Radek knows what this is about);

—third, by calling on Kinkel, showing him this letter and *asking him to help with the translation* (to take on part of it).

I know that Kinkel almost hates me for my translation requests. But this is an emergency, the matter is important, we need urgent help, and maybe he won't be too angry.

Drop me a reply by postcard as quickly as you can.

All kinds of regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO J. A. BERZIN

Dear Berzin,

Many thanks for the credential received.[386] Please, if you don't mind, send me *immediately* the same in French or in German, with a stamp on it, etc., in due form, and particularly with an addition in the text of the credential to the effect that not only has your party always been (and is) affiliated to the International Socialist Bureau (but has a delegate on it with a consultative vote). This is very urgent.

Best regards,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. If you have received from us a manuscript draft of a brief declaration in Russian,[387] please pass it on to Litvinov as soon as you can, with a request to translate it into English and send it to me as soon as possible. Please send me a reply by postcard, so that I should know you have received this letter.

Written on August 20, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

It turns out that it is not the *Vorkonferenz* but the conference itself that is to take place on Sept. 5. So there is no time to lose.

You should strain every effort to try and send Höglund here, or the most Leftist and most reliable Norwegian, so that they should be here for certain not later than Sept. 3. (They should telephone me from Berne at Sörenberg, Hotel Marienthal (*Kanton Lüzern*), telephone *1.11*—(1.11)).

If it is *absolutely* impossible for any of them to come, let them at once (so that I should have it *for certain* on Sept. 2 or 3) send by registered letter either a transfer of credential to our C.C. (a formal credential, in German or French)—or (if they are not agreeable to handing over their credential) their statement that they are in solidarity with the C.C. + their *Prinzipienerklärung* + (without fail) a letter to the conference authorising our C.C. to read it out (*respective** put it to the vote, if possible).

The crux of the struggle will be, whether to proclaim, in the *Prinzipienerklärung*, a ruthless struggle (up to and including a split) against *opportunism* = social-chauvinism. Secure the *maximum possible* clarity and firmness of formulation on this very point.

Write me a postcard at once whether you have received this letter, and whether you hope (or are sure?) that such-and-such will be done.

(Regards to Alexander!)

Salut,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after August 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg
to Christiania

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

* Or.—*Ed.*

TO YELIZAVETA RIVLINA[388]

Dear Comrade,

I wrote to you the other day about Golay. Things are now going forward from the other side, so to speak. It is *not* a preliminary conference, but an international conference of the Left that has been set for Sept. 5. *Merrheim* will be there from Paris (all this is *entre nous*, of course). The *Nashe Slovo* people will attend. Why should not Golay and Maine be there as representatives of Left-wing socialism in French Switzerland (since Grimm, who is much more half-and-half than Naine and Golay, will be attending)?[389] Please, try and see both as soon as possible, have a good heart-to-heart talk with them, and drop me a line in reply, as soon as you can, about the frame of mind of both these Leftist Frenchmen. You realise, of course, that it is *anti-chauvinist Frenchmen* who would just *now*—especially in the presence of Merrheim—be of particular importance at the conference.

So, hurry with your reply!

Regards to Rivlin.

Yours,

Lenin

Written after August 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Lausanne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear Alexandra Mikhailovna,

It will be a great pity if your trip to America finally falls through. We pinned many hopes on this visit: for the publication in the U.S.A. of our booklet (*Socialism and War*, which you will receive in a few days), for connections with the publisher Charles H. Kerr[390] in Chicago in general, for mobilising the internationalists and lastly for the financial help which we so badly need for all those vital affairs *in Russia* of which you write (and justly emphasise their urgency, in view of the desirability of our coming closer to Russia. The obstacles there are *chiefly* financial, and also of a police nature; can one get there safely?).

If the question of a trip has been finally decided in the negative sense, try and think over whether you could (through connections with Charles H.. Kerr, etc.) help us to publish our booklet in English? This can be done *only* in America. We are *sending* you the German edition of our booklet. Do everything you can for its sale in the Scandinavian countries (it is terribly important for us to cover some of the expenses at least, otherwise we *cannot* publish it in French!).

Write *in greater detail*, more concretely and more frequently (if you are not going to America) about the practical questions arising in Russia, who is raising them, how, on what occasions and in what circumstances. All this is of extreme importance for the publication of leaflets—a *vital* question, as you rightly say. About the conference of the Left (where we rallied well as an opposition, although we did sign the manifesto) you will be partly informed by the

delegate *you* sent,[391] and partly we shall later tell you in writing.

(We are very short of cash! That is the *main* trouble!)

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written between September 8 and 13, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Christiania

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I enclose Radek's letter. (I have sent him a sympathetic reply.) Let me have it back.

I shall be writing a report on the conference: please send me *all* your materials.[392]

Was it at your place that I left my *C.O. file*?

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

It would be a good thing to have Inessa get down to translating the booklet into French.[393]

Written between September 11 and 15, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein (Switzerland)

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear G. L.,

Please send me as soon as you can three copies each of the German booklet[394] and the French resolutions.[395] (What is the bill? And is there any hope of cutting it down? Are you concluding a contract for the sale of the German booklet in Switzerland? Drop me a line.)

Please, send 10 copies of the German booklet and 2 sets of the French resolutions to the following address: Fru A. Kollontay. Turisthotel. Holmenkollen. *Kristiania*. Norwegen. (Let me know *when* they have been sent.)

Please hurry up Radek to send me a copy of the officially adopted manifesto.[396] It is very urgent. Call on Radek once or twice and get it done, please. You should also have a talk with him (and not only have a talk, but go about it in a *business-like* way, worry him, have it done, check it up) about the sale of the German booklet in Switzerland. You should get hold of the addresses of *German* workers' societies and clubs in various towns (including Geneva), find contacts, write and make sure something has been done. *All that is your job*. Please, go about it as vigorously as you can.

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on September 13, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. A.,

I was away on business for a few days (and only for that period did I ask that everything should be sent to Geneva; now please send *everything* again—including the booklet—to Sörenberg).

On my arrival I found your letter about Rolland's articles.[397] I am terribly worried about your not having received them. I sent them to you *by letter post* two weeks ago, if not more. I have not had any cases before this of unregistered letters being lost in Switzerland. Could there be some mistake? Perhaps someone has received these articles in your *absence*? Write about this, please. If the answer is that there was, not, and could not have been any mistake, and if you do not have the articles, I will naturally do everything possible to get them for you (if I have lost them). I shall either buy this issue, or (if it has been sold out) get it from the library and *make a complete copy for you*. I am very sorry, and please write to me as soon as possible how matters stand. If you require a copy, *how soon*? Write *frankly*.

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

For some reason I have stopped receiving *Zhizn*. Is there no exchange? Would you make an inquiry? And what about *Vperyod*[398]? What news is there of the O.C. miscellany[399] and the Bund publications? *Kommunist No. 1-2 has appeared.*[400] *This is a fact.*

Written on September 13, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO KARL RADEK

Dear Radek,

The letter to Wijnkoop has been sent.

Also the report with *your* letter to Grigory.

You probably have no *copy of our statement* (that we are dissatisfied with the manifesto, that it does not go far enough, etc.)? We handed it in to the Bureau, and Grimm read it out. We *must absolutely have a copy of this statement*. Would Grimm let you make a copy? If not, we're stuck!

P.S. And Grimm's "conspirative methods" too! The whole world already knows everything! And these stupid Italians in *Avanti!*. What a shame![401]

Yours,
Lenin

Written before September 18, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne
First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO KARL RADEK

Dear Radek,

Many thanks for the manifesto and report.[402]

(1) Could we have *gratis* 20 copies of this issue of *Berner Tagwacht*, to send to our Party groups?

(2) In the manifesto, the words "*revolutionary* proletarian class struggle" have been replaced by the word "*irreconcilable*". Is that *loyal* on Grimm's part?

(3) The report does *not* say that a part (one-tenth) of the *German* delegation (and one-third of the Swiss) signed our draft resolution.

Is that loyal on Grimm's part?

Your opinion, please: ought we not *officially* to write to Grimm about this?

(4) Does Grimm guarantee that in the *detailed* report (the minutes of the sessions) our draft and our statement will be included in full?

Yes or no?

(5) There are many inaccuracies in the report, and *not a word* about the voting (on our draft)!

The question of a split and of the dissolution of *this* Bureau (Grimm and Co.) was *not* voted on.[403]

We must do something.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Please, send me our draft and our statement.[404]

Grimm *does not say a word* about our booklet[405] (=report)! What a rogue!

Written before September 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original
in German

TO M. M. KHARITONOV

September 19, 1915

Dear Comrade,

I should like to give a lecture in Zurich about the middle of October on "The International Conference of September 5-8, 1915".[406] If the subject is suitable, and can yield even a small return, let me know. (I am also writing to Geneva about this; we must agree beforehand about the *dates*. I am asking them in Geneva to have posters printed for both occasions, leaving out the town and the date.) Let me know your opinion as soon as you can.

By the way. Will you send me Axelrod's German pamphlet on the tasks of international Social-Democracy,[407] which appeared in Zurich recently? I am curious to have a look at it.

(We shall publish a report on the conference in the C.O.—and then *Nashe Slovo* and the *Socialist-Revolutionaries*, etc., etc., will follow. But I shall deal with it in greater detail than in the press, and shall make an assessment and draw the conclusions.)

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Sörenberg to Zurich

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

September 19

Dear Alexander,

We have received your letters telling us about the good working of the transport arrangements, and were extremely glad of them. As regards the literature at Vardö, try to get hold of and save *everything*: send us the files of *Proletary* and *Vperyod*; we can also make use of the pamphlets (the old ones, of 1905); it will be worth while sending them to Russia, now that there is a possibility of transport in general.[408]

Yesterday I read in the foreign press the news of the "dispersal" of the Duma. It is clear that the reactionaries are either frightened by the bloc of the Left, or are banking on some "military" chances (perhaps a separate peace?). Our attitude to the chauvinist revolutionaries (like Kerensky and part of the Social-Democrat liquidators or patriots) cannot, in my opinion, be expressed by the formula of "support". The gulf between the chauvinist revolutionaries (revolution for victory over Germany) and the proletarian internationalist revolutionaries (revolution to awaken the proletariat of other countries, to unite it in a general proletarian revolution) is too wide for there to be any question of support. We must *utilise* every protest (even a timid and muddled one, *à la* Gorky), we shall *utilise* the revolutionary work of the chauvinists too, and depending on the circumstances shall not reject "joint action" (in keeping with our Party's resolutions adopted in 1907, at the London Congress, and in 1913, at our conference),[409] but nothing beyond that. At the moment, in practice: we shall not issue joint appeals and manifestos with the revolutionary

patriots, we shall *avoid* Duma "blocs" with them, avoid "unity" with them when speaking at congresses, during demonstrations and the like. But *technical* mutual services, if the patriots go along, will probably be possible (as with the liberals before 1905), and we shall not reject them. Our relations must be *straightforward and clear-cut*: you want to overthrow tsarism for victory over Germany, we want to do so for the international revolution of the proletariat.

We have incredibly little information from Russia. It is simply a shame that such a comparatively simple business as conspirative correspondence with Russia (*fully* possible even in wartime) turns out to be so very badly organised. This is one of the most essential things. (I hope you have had a *detailed discussion* of this with *Nadezhda Konstantinovna* in your letters, and will do so yet as circumstantially as possible.) The most vital thing is to establish regular contact, to bring over from Russia at least two or three leading workers, if only to Sweden, for the most detailed talks and correspondence, in order to reach complete "harmony". I hope Belenin's visit will bring a marked improvement in this sphere. To do the round trip fast, to establish new connections, to collect the news—that is now the key to the whole of our work, and without it it's no use even looking to the future.[410]

We are thinking over a plan to publish manifestos and leaflets for transportation to Russia. We have not yet decided where they are to be published, here or in the Scandinavian countries. We should select the cheapest alternative, because the distance does not matter.*

With all my best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on September 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* The last two sentences in the MS. have been struck out.—*Ed.*

TO KARL RADEK

Dear Radek,

Thanks for the bulletin.[411]

We shall discuss the money question with Grigory. We're hard up just now!

But the most important thing is: why are you silent about our (*your* final) *draft resolution*[412]? I *must* have it *at once* (and our statement on the voting for the manifesto)!

You should have a copy! Why don't you send it to me?

Or Grimm? Can he really be refusing to let you make a copy? *Please reply*.

Grimm's "*loyalty*" is only so much talk. He has deliberately failed to mention Borchardt—it's a disgrace.[413]

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after September 21, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original in German

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Alexander,

It is a very good thing that you are undertaking to handle the leaflets.[414] We are drawing up a detailed plan for them, and will soon be sending it to you and to N. I. But you know it is still most desirable that N. I. should write the leaflets in two copies simultaneously (with a copying-pencil over carbon paper), and that you (or he himself) should send us the second copy at once. For leaflets are a *very* responsible thing, and the *most* difficult of all forms of literature. It is essential therefore to give them most careful thought, and to have collective consultations. In view of the slowness of setting up, printing and transport, the time lost on dispatch here will be relatively small, and, in any case, does not matter in comparison with the importance of well-thought-out appeals.

How do you plan to sign the leaflets? You have forgotten to write about this.

Kollontai's pamphlet has a good underlying idea. But the subject is exceptionally difficult; it is extremely hard to present it on this popular level. I think it needs correcting. I have already written to her about this, asking her to agree to these corrections.[415] If she does, things will go ahead very quickly, for I have already prepared a draft of the corrections.

As regards a visit to your country,[416] there is a hitch, first, because of lack of finance (the fare is high, and the cost of living there) and, second, because of the dubious police situation. We shall rather await Belenin's return and his news of home.

Every good wish,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after September 26, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Stockholm

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear G. L.,

I simply cannot understand what's happening to Radek. I have asked him *repeatedly* for:

(1) a copy of our (i.e., the C.C.+Letts+P.S.D.+Swedes+Norwegians+Borchardt+Platten) *draft* resolution (in German)[417];

(2) a copy of our (the same groups') statement at the conference on the voting (why we, though not in agreement with the manifesto, vote *for*);

(3) a copy of our (the same groups+Roland-Holst) statement of protest against Ledebour's ultimatum.[418]

Radek does not reply!

And I *must* have them for the Central Organ.

Please, do call on him and find out what's wrong. (If Radek hasn't got them, can Grimm really *be refusing* to have *a copy made*? That would be the height of impudence!)

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written at the end of September
or the beginning of October 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Berne

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I received the proofs today (the last ones, I think), and we are sending them off this very day. The instruction on the order of the articles has already been sent, so that I hope the double issue (price 20 centimes) will soon be out. Let me know when exactly.

I am sending this express for the following urgent reason: very important (and favourable) news has been received from Russia. We want to publish another (two-page) issue of the C.O. right away, to appear *really* at once. If, contrary to all expectations, it is *possible* to guarantee this time that Kuzma and Kuzmikha will honour their promise (i.e., will set about it at once, and bring it out without the *least* delay), telegraph: "*garanti*". If not (which is of course much more probable, because we know how unreliable Kuzma is in spite of your efforts), then telegraph (Seidenweg. 4a) "*non*".[419]

I shall write tomorrow about the lecture.

Salut,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on October 6, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

November 22, 1915

Dear Alexandra Mikhailovna,

I failed to finish the letter I sent you today out of sheer absent-mindedness. This is the address: Mr. C. W. Fitzgerald, Secretary of the Socialist Propaganda League* 20. Baker Street. *Beverly. Mass.*

I was mistaken, therefore, when I said that he lives in Boston. But his sheet contains the addresses of all 18 members of the League, and among them some living in Boston. I hope you will make every effort to find out everything you can about them, and will try to build up out of them (either *including* them, or out of some of them) one of the rallying-points for the Zimmerwald Left in America.

Every good wish,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Berne to New York

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

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* See Note 435.—*Ed.*

TO V. A. KARPINSKY AND SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Friends,

I am sending you leaflet No. 1.[420]

Help us to distribute it.

The address of the publisher is on the leaflet (rub it off after making a copy). Tell the Frenchmen, Guilbeaux and others, about it.

How is the Swiss referendum going? Is there any response (in Geneva) to the struggle between the opponents and supporters of "defence of the fatherland"?[421]

Best regards and wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Written at the end of November
or the beginning of December 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

Forgive me for writing on this scrap of paper.

It seems to me that you acted correctly. Indeed, unless there is a break with *Nashe Dyelo*, all the rest is deception. This is clearer than ever, now that the O.C. informers, in alliance with the reactionaries, have "won" in Petrograd (by rigging the election).[422]

Add to the resolution condemnation of the rigged *second* election.[423] And to the preamble, the impermissibility of taking part in "*defence*", once the war is of an imperialist, i.e., annexationist, i.e., plundering, i.e., oppressive, nature (in general, I advise drawing up the preamble as carefully as possible, *on the basis of Sotsial-Demokrat*, selecting the arguments from the relevant articles and resolutions of the Petrograd workers).

We shall pass on the letter to Inessa.

All the best, and regards to everyone.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. One request: Inessa tells us that there is a girl in Geneva who used to live in *Arras*.* You know her. We are told that she has a good command of French. Will she undertake to translate from German into French (for Roland-Holst's magazine, published here with our participation[424])? Free of charge or for a fee? How much? Find out, please.

Written before December 16, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

* The person referred to is not identified.—*Ed.*

1916

TO HENRIETTE ROLAND-HOLST

Dear Comrade,

Comrade Radek has just shown us Comrade Pannekoek's letter and the "Introduction".

This letter and the "Introduction" substantially *change* the previously adopted constitution of *Vorbote*.[425] It had been agreed that *Vorbote* would appear as the organ of *two* groups, namely, (1) the Roland-Holst and Trotsky group (or Roland-Holst and her friends without Trotsky, if Trotsky is unwilling to join); (2) the Zimmerwald Left group (whose bureau consists of three comrades: Radek, Lenin and Zinoviev). Comrade Pannekoek was appointed representative of the latter group.

Now the above-mentioned documents (the letter and the "Introduction") change the constitution: *Vorbote* appears as the organ of *two comrades*, Pannekoek and Roland-Holst.

If Comrades Pannekoek and Roland-Holst have decided to make this change, we take note of it. The owner of *Vorbote* had the full right to do so.

We do not refuse to co-operate in these new conditions, but must require certain guarantees. *Vorbote* appears for the first time as the organ of the Zimmerwald Left or "on the platform of the Zimmerwald Left". We were *elected* representatives of that Left by all the members of the Zimmerwald Left attending at Zimmerwald (except Platten). We think therefore—and in *this* respect we have all three come to a unanimous decision—that this guarantee is self-evident, and will undoubtedly be given by you.

The guarantee consists in this, that if there are any differences of principle among us, the article which ... by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (representative ...), the editorial board....*

Written after January 21, 1916
Sent from Berne
to Laren (Holland)

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original
in German

* The manuscript breaks off at this point.—*Ed.*

TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Dear Comrade,

I should very much like to go to Zurich for two or three weeks to work in the libraries on a piece of research.[426] My wife also. So far we have no papers, but hope soon to get them. The question is whether we shall be able to overcome the financial difficulties. I would very much ask you to reply frankly and *without exaggeration* to the following questions:

(1) What *net* income can there be (i.e., for me) from a lecture? Minimum and maximum? The subject: "Two Internationals": the growing division and rupture with the social-chauvinists throughout the world. Is it possible to increase the income by giving two lectures, and by how much?[427] (2) Will the local comrades help the two of us to get cheap accommodation? (3) How much will it cost to have a room (for two, even if with a single bed) *per week*? The cheapest, preferably in a worker's family? (4) Dinner in a canteen, if there is one (here we pay 65 centimes in a students' canteen)? (5) *Morgenkafee* and coffee in the evening, because, of course, we cannot do our own housekeeping in Zurich?

The cost of the journey will be $7 \times 4 = 28$ francs; extra expenditure on living in another town? That is the question. The room situation here is bad. Do you happen to know a worker's family which could reliably promise to put us up cheap?

I shall be very grateful for a frank reply, but without any wild promises.

Beste Grüsse,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Are there any cheap self-service food counters or the like, and what are the prices?

Written on January 27, 1916
Sent from Berne to Zurich

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Dear Comrade,

I am very grateful for your speedy and detailed reply. We shall be there on February *4*. If you can, find us a room *for two*, *by the week*, not dearer than 1 franc a day; preferably in an *ordinary* working-class family (with a stove; it may still be cold).

If this is impossible, perhaps you will recommend a *cheap* hotel (1 franc a day, or even cheaper), where we could stay until we found a room ourselves. We shall agree on the date of the lecture, etc.

I hope to have a money order from you on Monday morning (keep a special account of the expenses: the *express* and the like, and postal expenses generally, etc., because we shall cover them ourselves).

Beste Grüsse,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on January 29, 1916
Sent from Berne to Zurich

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO MAXIM GORKY

For A. M. Gorky

Dear Alexei Maximovich,

I am sending you under registered cover my wife's booklet, *Public Education and Democracy*.[428]

The author has long been studying educational questions, over twenty years. The booklet is based both on her personal observations and on material about new educational developments in Europe and America. From the contents you will see that the first half also contains a sketch of the history of democratic views. This is also very important, because the views of the great democrats of the past are usually set forth wrongly, or from the wrong standpoint. I don't know whether you are able yourself to take time off to read it, or whether you are interested; §§ 2 and 12 could serve as an example. Changes in education in the latest, imperialist, epoch are sketched out on the basis of material of recent years, and shed some very interesting light on the question for the democrats in Russia.

You will do me a great favour by helping—directly or indirectly—to publish this booklet. The demand in Russia for literature in this sphere has now probably greatly increased.

Best regards and wishes,

V. Ulyanov

Wl. Uljanow. Seidenweg. 4a. *Bern*.

Written before February 8, 1916
Sent from Berne to Petrograd

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade,

Here is our new address.[429] Send *everything* to it, please. We have taken the premises for a month. On Thursday (Feb. 17) I am giving the first lecture here ("Two Internationals"), and after a while, the second ("Conditions of Peace and the National Question", or something of that kind).

Please write and tell me when it will be possible to give a lecture (the first, or both?) in Geneva, and whether the cost can be covered. How much will it yield net, as a minimum? I have to know this, because I am very short of money, and I must calculate as carefully as possible whether I should travel from here (at greater expense) or later on from Berne (I can stay more than a month here, if I like it). I shall await detailed and authoritative instructions from you. Perhaps you would drop a line to Lausanne, too, to find out whether it is worth while going there for an evening?

Best wishes, and regards to V. K. and all our friends.

Yours,
V. U.

Nadya sends warm greetings.

Written on February 13, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade,

Many thanks for the detailed information.

I am busy here on February 25 and 26.

So will you please fix the day for the lecture *yourself*, either before the 25th or after the 26th, and let me know beforehand?[430] I would also ask you very much to write to Lausanne, so that I could have done with the lot *in 2 days*, i.e., lecture in Lausanne either on the evening before Geneva, or on the day after Geneva.

I accept the subject: "'Conditions of Peace' (in quotation marks) and the National Question". So this is the agreed subject. All the best. Regards to V. K. and all our friends.

Yours,
Lenin

There is a convenient train: it arrives in Geneva at 9.*15 p.m.* Is it all right if I come by this train? If not, then can I lecture in Lausanne *the evening before*? Please!

Written on February 17, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

May I trouble you with the following request? I should like to have for my lecture the issue of the Paris *Golos* (*Nashe Slovo*'s predecessor) in which *Semkovsky* replied to me on the question of the self-determination of nations, and in one *footnote* (I remember that it was a footnote) dealt particularly with the *comparison* between the right of nations to secede and the *right of divorce*. I would return the issue as soon as you required it. If it is impossible to send it, could the footnote be copied out (it is not very long)? Perhaps you have in your library, or someone else in Geneva has, a file of *Golos*? I am lecturing here the day after tomorrow, Saturday. Consequently, if it cannot be sent so as to reach me on Saturday morning, it is not worth while sending it at all.

Regards and *au revoir*,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on February 24, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade,

It is *impossible* to lecture at the club about the conference which took place, because this will mean publicity, something the organisers of the conference fear more than anything, and specially asked to avoid in every possible way.[431] Consequently, the subject must be changed. I haven't a clear idea of *who* will be present at the internationalist club,[432] and therefore find it difficult to choose a subject. I suggest the following: if it is essential to name the subject beforehand, choose some vague title ("Current Affairs" or "Urgent Problems of the Working-Class Movement", etc.), so that *everything* could be brought under it. Meanwhile I shall take advice in Geneva, and will prepare for the morning of the 2nd a *small* report or opening to a discussion.

Au revoir,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on February 27, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO Y. LARIN

For Y. Larin

Dear Comrade,

To my regret, the list of contributors, the indefinite nature of the miscellany, the restrictions imposed on the contributors, and the lack of information about some of them—all of this obliges me to decline to participate.[433]

With Social-Democratic greetings,

Lenin

Written on March 13, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

March 19, 1916

Dear A. M.,

We have received your letter, and once again congratulate you on your success.

I was terribly irritated by the fact that "noble" France had (actually!) *confiscated* some of my registered letters to you in America. Well, we can't help that, can we? Now you must do *your very best* about contacts with America.

You did write me that while in America you received *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 in German, and that you would try to publish it in English![434] And now there's *not a word* about it?

What does it mean?!

Is that to say that no sympathisers are to be found in America and that *Internationale Flugblätter cannot* be published in English?

This is incredible!

But if that is so, it should be published in Norway (in English). Would you undertake to translate it, and how much will it cost to publish it?

I also wrote to you in America that I had received a Socialist Propaganda League[435] leaflet from Boston, Mass. (signed by 20 Socialists *with addresses*, mostly in Massachusetts). This league is internationalist, with a programme clearly tending to the left.

I sent them *the longest* letter[436] in English (and *Internationale Flugblätter* in German). There has been no reply. I wonder if "noble" France has confiscated the lot.

If you received *nothing* and know *nothing* about them, I shall send you their address and a copy of my letter. Will you undertake to send it on to America?

And what of the Socialist *Labour* Party? After all, they are internationalists (even if there is something narrowly sectarian about them). Have they got their copy of *Internationale Flugblätter*? Have you any contacts with *them*?

Furthermore, you also wrote that you had *started* negotiations with *Charles* H. Kerr. What's the result? He did promise to publish a *part* of our pamphlet (by Lenin and Zinoviev).

Now you say nothing more about it.... How are we to understand this?[437]

Internationale Korrespondenz[438] reported that the *New Review* in America had undertaken to publish articles by the Zimmerwald Left. Is that true? Do you know the *New Review*?

Reply as soon and as circumstantially as you can. You will, of course, find out *everything* in great detail about *direct* mail steamers from Norway to America.

As for Höglund and the Norwegians, *I am still* unable to find out whether or not they have received *Internationale Flugblätter*, whether or not they have published it in Swedish and Norwegian, whether or not they have *officially* affiliated to the Zimmerwald Left (like the Rev. Soc. *Verband* of Roland-Holst) Please take the trouble to find out, get things done, give them a piece of your mind, make them do it, follow it through! Let Bukharin inform you of the contents of our special letter to him about the Zimmerwald people, and please see that this is done.

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

My address is: Herrn Uljanow (Schuhladen Kammerer). Spiegelgasse. 12. *Zürich*. I.

P.S. What interesting books and pamphlets have you brought along? Schlüter's history of Chartism? What else?

P.S. Am sending you our "theses" (from *Vorbote* No. 2). Drive this home to the Scandinavians.

Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

Thank you very much for your letter. I shall send you the address of the Socialist Propaganda League, unless I have left it behind in Berne: in that case I shall send it over from Berne (i.e., in 2 or 3 weeks' time).

Do you think *Appeal to Reason* would refuse to reprint *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1? Is it worth trying?

Will the Socialist *Labour* Party agree to publish, if *we pay* the costs? Are these people hopeless sectarians or not? Have you any connections with them? Why *don't they send us* copies of their papers in the *Internationale Sozialistische Kommission*? (I saw some quite by chance.) Or are they maniacs with an *idée fixe* about a special "economic" organisation of workers?

You ask how desirable it is that the Norwegian party should send its official representative to the conference. Of course, it is 1,000 times better to have a class-conscious and intelligent *Left-winger* from among the youth, than a Right-winger or a ½-Kautskyite from the party.

That is clear. Use your influence on these lines, if you can.

I am very much distressed that we do not see eye to eye on self-determination. Let's try to argue this out in detail *without a squabble* (which someone is trying very hard to stir up for us on this score)[439].... *Entre nous*, perhaps Alexander will show you my reply to N. I. Bukharin's remarks (for the time being this discord must remain strictly confidential, but I trust to your discretion).

This question ("self-determination") is of the utmost importance. Besides, it is *organically* bound up with the question of *annexations*.

The best of everything,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I sent Alexander a great big letter a few days ago. Has he got it?

Written after March 19, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

INITIAL VARIANT OF R.S.D.L.P. C.C. PROPOSALS TO THE SECOND SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

PROPOSALS BY THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P. TO THE SECOND SOCIALIST CONFERENCE CALLED BY THE I.S.C. (BERNE)[440]

THESES ON ITEMS 5, 6, 7a, 7b AND 8 OF THE AGENDA

In announcing the convocation of the Second International Socialist Conference, the I.S.C. published the following major items of the agenda:

5. "The struggle to end the war"
6. "Problems of peace"
7a. Parliamentary "action" } "agitation and propaganda" }
7b. Mass " } "agitation and propaganda" }
8. International Socialist Bureau.

The I.S.C. has invited organisations to discuss these questions and send in their propositions. Here is the response of our Party's C.C. to the invitation:

1. In the same way as any war is only the continuation by means of force of the policy which the belligerent powers and the ruling classes in them carried on for long years or decades before the war, so peace ending any war can be nothing but an account and a record of the actual changes in strength achieved as a result of that war.

2. Hence, any talk of assessing a given war on the strength of the "simple" concepts of defence and attack, and of assessing the coming peace on the strength of "simple" high-minded wishes for a stable, democratic, honourable, etc., peace, is most absurd and thick-witted, from the standpoint of theory, from the standpoint of socialist doctrine, and is the greatest deception of the working class in practice.

3. The present war is an imperialist war, i.e., a war born of contradictions on the basis of highly developed, monopoly capitalism, which is ripe for transition to socialism. This war is being waged for world hegemony, i.e., for fresh oppression of the weak nations, for another division of the world, the division of colonies, spheres of influence, etc.—a division in which the old robber powers, Britain, France and Russia, would give up a share of their booty to Germany, a younger and stronger robber power.

4. Consequently, unless a revolution of the proletariat overthrows the present governments and present ruling classes of the belligerent "Great" Powers, *there is absolutely no possibility of any other kind* of peace, except a more or less brief armistice between the imperialist powers, a peace accompanied by a *strengthening* of reactionary forces within the states, an *intensification* of the national oppression and greater enslavement of the weak nations, a *growth* in the inflammable material preparing the way for new wars, etc., etc. For from the objective content of the policy engendered by the whole epoch of imperialism, the policy carried on by the bourgeoisie of *all* the warring "Great" Powers both before *this* war and *during it*, inevitably flows a peace based on a fresh and worse oppression of nations, etc.

5. To spread among the masses of the people ideas or hopes of the possibility of a stable or democratic, etc., peace between the present governments and the present ruling classes (i.e., the bourgeoisie in alliance with the landowners), as most of the official socialist parties are doing, is not only shamelessly to deceive the people, but also to blunt their vigilance and to distract them from the revolutionary struggle, which is already in effect beginning as a movement of strikes and demonstrations.

6. That is just the kind of deception of the people and distraction of the proletariat from the revolutionary struggle that is inherent in the "peace programme" now being "unanimously" put forward both by Huysmans, the Second International's official representative at the congress of the *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei* of Holland in Arnhem,[441] and by Kautsky, the most influential theoretician of the Second International and the most influential

defender of the social-patriots and social-chauvinists of all countries. Their programme is nothing but verbal and hypocritical recognition of a few democratic pious hopes: rejection of annexations and indemnities, self-determination of nations, democratisation of foreign policy, courts of arbitration to examine disputes between states, disarmament, United States of Europe, etc., etc.

7. The most obvious confirmation of the fact that this "peace programme" is sheer hypocrisy is, on the one hand, its verbal acceptance by a number of bourgeois pacifists and ministerial demagogues of the warring countries, and on the other, its repetition by notorious (*notorisch*) chauvinists at the conferences of the "socialists", first of one group of warring powers in London (February 1915) and then of the other in Vienna (April 1915).[442] It is the "socialists" who join bourgeois governments engaged in the predatory war, who voted the war credits and assisted the war by taking part in various organisations and institutions, etc., who *in practice* pursue a policy of defending old and new annexations, colonial oppression, etc., that now proclaim before the whole world their "peace programme", consisting of rejection of annexations and so forth.

8. The highest authority in the Second International, Kautsky, proclaimed to the whole world on May 21, 1915 (*Neue Zeit*) that the agreement and "unanimity" of "socialists" in London* and in Vienna, on the principle of the "independence" or self-determination of nations, proves the Second International's "unanimity" on, and "viability" in, its "peace programme".[443] This defence and sanction of the most crying and most brazen hypocrisy and deception of the workers is by no means an accident, but a systematic policy pursued in a number of countries by men who pretend to be "internationalists", but actually whitewash the imperialist war by applying to it the idea of "defence of the fatherland", and strengthen the domination of the labour movement by social-chauvinists, who have betrayed socialism, by preaching "unity" with them. This policy, which is most harmful and dangerous for the

* The MS. says erroneously "in Copenhagen".—*Ed.*

working class, is being carried on by Kautsky, Haase and others in Germany, Longuet, Pressemane and others in France, most of the leaders in Britain, Axelrod, Martov and Chkheidze and Co. in Russia, Trèves and others in Italy (see the threat of *Avanti!*, the Central Organ of the Italian Party, issued on March 5, 1916, to expose Trèves and other "reformist-possibilists" as having "set in motion every possible means to obstruct the action of the party leadership and Oddino Morgari towards the Zimmerwald organisation and the new International itself"[444]). This world-wide policy, which is most dangerous for the working class, may be called a *Kautskian* policy, after its most authoritative representative.

9. Socialists cannot renounce the struggle for reforms. They must vote, incidentally in parliaments as well, for any, even minor, improvements in the condition of the masses, such as higher aids to the inhabitants of devastated areas, relaxation of national oppression, etc. But on the basis of the *present* war and the peace which follows *from it*, such reformist activity for the improvement of the people's condition is obviously possible only in miniature proportions. It would be a crying deception of the masses to suggest to them, directly or indirectly, that a reformist solution of the problems raised by the *present* war is possible. For *this* war has brought about a revolutionary situation in Europe by making an issue of the *most fundamental* problems of imperialism, which must needs be solved the imperialist way unless the present governments and ruling classes of Europe happen to be overthrown the revolutionary way. Therefore, the main and basic task in the struggle for a stable and democratic peace on the part of socialists should be: first, explanation to the masses of the need of *revolutionary mass struggle*, systematic propaganda of such struggle and the creation of an appropriate organisation; second, exposure of the *lies* and *hypocrisy* both of bourgeois-pacifist and socialist, particularly Kautskian, talk about peace and the "unanimity" of the Second International on the "peace programme". Such phrases are doubly hypocritical when coming from "socialists" who echo the bourgeoisie in denying any possibility of transforming the present imperialist war

into a civil war for socialism, and who oppose any revolutionary activity in this direction.

10. The central point of the prevailing hypocrisy about a "peace programme" is the allegedly unanimous acceptance of struggle against *old* and *new annexations*. But those who talk about annexations and the struggle against them are unable, or for the most part unwilling, to think about *the meaning of annexation*. It is clear that not every attachment of "foreign" territory can be called annexation, since socialists, generally speaking, are in favour of eliminating frontiers between nations, the coming together and integration of nations, and the formation of larger states. It is clear that not every infringement of the *status quo* can be considered annexation: this would be a most reactionary attitude, and a mockery of the fundamental conceptions of historical science. It is clear that not every attachment by force, that is, war, can be considered annexation, since socialists cannot object to force if it is applied in the interests of the mass of the population and the interests of mankind's progress. It is clear that only the attachment of territory *against the will* of its population can and must be deemed annexation. In other words, the concept of annexation is organically bound up with the concept of *self-determination of nations*.

11. It is precisely on the basis of the *present* war, because of the fact that it is imperialist on the part of *both* groups of warring "Great" Powers, that there was bound to develop, and actually did develop, the phenomenon of the bourgeoisie and social-chauvinists intensively "*fighting*" against "annexations", *if* they have been carried out, or are being carried out, by an *enemy* state. Südekum and his Austro-German friends and defenders, including Haase and Kautsky, are silent about the annexations carried out by Germany in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, Denmark, Poland, etc., but very often "fight against annexations" carried out by Russia in respect of Finland, Poland, Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc., by Britain in respect of India, and so forth. On the other side, the British, French, Italian and Russian Südekums, i.e., Hyndman, Guesde, Vandervelde, Renaudel, Trèves, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Chkheidze and Co., are silent about Britain's annexations in respect of India, France's

in respect of Nice or Morocco, Italy's in respect of Tripoli or Albania, Russia's in respect of Poland, Ukraine, etc., but then *largely* "fight against annexations" carried out by Germany.

It is clear that such "struggle against annexations" on the part of the social-chauvinists and Kautskyites is hypocritical through and through, and the bourgeoisie is assisting such struggle directly, by allocating millions upon millions for chauvinist propaganda, and indirectly, by granting a monopoly of legality only to the social-chauvinists and the Kautskyites.

It is clear that both the French "socialists" who justify a war for Alsace-Lorraine, and the German "socialists" who refuse to demand freedom for Alsace-Lorraine to secede from Germany, are equally annexationists, for all their swearing to the contrary. It is clear that Russian "socialists" who speak or write against the "break-up of Russia", or, behind the "peace without annexations" slogan, justify, directly or indirectly, the present war over who is to enslave Poland, are just as much annexationists, and so on and so forth.

12. If socialists are not to transform "the struggle against annexations" into an empty phrase or into revolting hypocrisy, they should, *first*, explain to the masses the need for revolutionary struggle for the conquest of political power by the proletariat and a socialist revolution which springs from all the conditions of the imperialist epoch and the present imperialist war, and which alone can firmly and everywhere ensure the self-determination of nations, i.e., liberate oppressed nations and effect the, coming together and integration of nations, not on the basis of force but on the basis of the equal rights and consent of the proletariat and working people of all nations; *secondly*, immediately mount the widest propaganda and agitation against the veiled chauvinism and annexationism of the official socialist parties, especially in the "Great" Powers. Socialists should explain to the masses that the English socialist who does not struggle now for freedom of secession for Ireland, India, etc., is a socialist and internationalist only in words, and a chauvinist and annexationist in practice. The same applies to the French socialist who does not fight for the freedom of the French colonies, against

the war to annex Alsace-Lorraine, etc.; the German socialist who does not fight for freedom of secession for Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes, the Poles, the Belgians, the Serbs and others; the Russian socialist who does not fight for freedom of secession for the Ukraine, Finland, etc., and against war over Poland; the Italian socialist who does not fight for freedom of secession for Tripoli, Albania, etc.; the Dutch socialist who does not fight for freedom of secession and independence for the Dutch East Indies; the Polish socialist who does not fight for full freedom and equality for the Jews and the Ukrainians oppressed by the Poles, and so on.

13. It inevitably follows from the Zimmerwald manifesto and the I.S.C. circular of Feb. 10, 1916 (Bulletin No. 3)[445] that all "war on war" and "struggle for peace" are *hypocrisy* unless they are indissolubly bound up with immediate *revolutionary mass struggle*, and with its propaganda and preparation. But this conclusion must be set forth straightforwardly and definitely. There is need, first, to explain to the masses what the development of the revolutionary mass struggle in the conditions of a European war can and *must* (*muss*) lead to. It leads inevitably to the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism. This is *hinted at* by all the speeches about it being better for the workers to die for their own cause, rather than for someone else's. But a hint is insufficient. The masses should have clearly put before them the great, even though maybe not very immediate, aim. They should know what direction to take and why. Second, if we call on the masses to fight their governments "regardless of the military position of a given country", we thereby not only reject in principle the admissibility of "defence of the fatherland" in the *present* war, but recognise the *desirability* of defeat of any *bourgeois* government, in order to transform the defeat into a revolution. And this must be said straightforwardly: revolutionary mass struggle cannot become international unless its class-conscious representatives openly unite for the purpose of defeating and overthrowing *all* bourgeois governments. Third—and this is most important—it is *impossible* to carry on a revolutionary mass struggle without creating everywhere, not

only at the top but also in the midst of the masses, an illegal organisation for its propaganda, preparation and discussion of its course and conditions. If there have been street demonstrations in Germany, if there have been many letters from the front calling on the people *not* to subscribe to the war loan in France, if there have been mass strikes in Britain, to say nothing of Russia, then in order to aid this struggle, to unify it on an international scale, it is unquestionably necessary to report *every* step along this road in a *free*, *i.e.*, *illegal*, press, analysing the successes, assessing their conditions, and building up and developing the struggle. Without an illegal organisation and an illegal press the acceptance of "mass action" will remain an empty phrase (as is the case in Switzerland).*

14. On the question of the socialists' parliamentary struggle (*Aktion*), it should be borne in mind that the Zimmerwald resolution not only expresses its sympathy with the five Social-Democratic deputies of the Duma, who belong to our Party, and who have been sentenced to exile in Siberia, but also proclaims its *solidarity* with their tactics. It is impossible to recognise the revolutionary struggle of the masses and put up with the *purely* legal, *purely* reformist activity of socialists in parliaments; this leads only to legitimate dissatisfaction among the workers, and their leaving the S.D. ranks for anti-parliamentary anarchism or syndicalism. It is essential to say clearly and publicly that Social-Democrats in parliaments must use their position *not only* to make parliamentary speeches, but also to give all-round *extra-parliamentary* assistance to the illegal organisation and revolutionary struggle of the workers, and that the *masses* themselves must, through their illegal organisation, *check up* on such activity by their leaders.

15. The question of convening the International Socialist Bureau, included in the agenda of the coming Second International Socialist Conference, unavoidably raises the more fundamental question of principle, namely, whether the unity of the old parties and of the Second International is possible. The wider the sympathy among the masses

* Paragraphs 12 and 13 are crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

for the Zimmerwald organisation, the less understandable for the masses and the more harmful for the development of their struggle is the inconsistency and timidity of the attitude which in essence identifies the old parties and the Second International with bourgeois policy in the working-class movement (see the Zimmerwald manifesto and I.S.C. circular of Feb. 10, 1916), while fearing a split with them, and promising to dissolve the I.S.C. directly the old International Socialist Bureau reassembles.

This promise *was not* voted upon, and was not even discussed at Zimmerwald.

During the six months since Zimmerwald, it has become even clearer that a split is inevitable, that the work recommended by the Zimmerwald manifesto cannot be carried on in unity with the old parties, and that the fear of a split hampers every step on that way. In Germany it is not only the *Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands* group that has condemned the fear of a split, and has openly come out against the hypocrisy of those who preach unity; Otto Rühle, a *member* of the *Reichstagsfraktion* and a close associate of Karl Liebknecht, has openly declared for a split. And *Vorwärts* has failed to find a single serious or honest argument against Rühle. In France, Bourderon, a member of the Socialist Party, is against a split in words, but has actually tabled in the Congress a resolution which directly "*désapprouve* [disapproves] of the C.A.P. [*Comité Administratif Permanent*=Party Executive] and the G.P." (*Groupe Parlementaire*=parliamentary group). The adoption of such a resolution would clearly mean an immediate and unquestionable split in the party. In Britain, T. Russel Williams, even writing in the moderate *Labour Leader*, has openly and repeatedly declared the inevitability of a split, and has met with support from some members of his party. In America, with formal unity in the Socialist Party, some of its members declare for militarism and war (so-called preparedness), and others, among them Eugene Debs, the one-time Socialist candidate for the Presidency, openly preach civil war for socialism *in connection* with the looming war.

There *is* already an actual split throughout the world, and closing their eyes to this only tends to harm the

Zimmerwaldists, making them ridiculous in the eyes of the masses, who know perfectly well that each step in *their work* in the spirit of Zimmerwald means a continuation and widening of the split.

It takes courage openly to recognise what is inevitable and what has taken place, to abandon the harmful illusions about unity being possible with the "defenders of the fatherland" in the present war, to help the masses to be rid of the influence of those leaders who are "misleading them" (see the I.S.C. circular of Feb. 10, 1916) or paving the way for a plot (*Pakt*) *against* socialism via an "amnesty".

That is our proposal on the item of the agenda for the calling of the International Socialist Bureau at The Hague.

* * *

Reformist talk is the main means for deceiving the people at a time when the objective situation has placed on the agenda of history the greatest world crisis, which, regardless of the will of the several parties, can be either evaded or put off until the next imperialist war, or resolved through a socialist revolution. It is neither an accident nor the ill will of the several governments or capitalists of some country but the whole evolution of bourgeois relations that has led to imperialism and the present imperialist war. Nor is it an accident or the result of some demagogy or agitation but the objective conditions of the wartime crisis and the aggravation of class contradictions that are now giving rise to the strikes, demonstrations and similar other manifestations of mass revolutionary struggle in a number of belligerent countries.

Objectively the question appears in this way—and in no other: either to help this still weak but internally powerful and deep ferment and movement of the masses, which is potentially capable of developing into a socialist revolution; *or* to conduct a policy of assisting the bourgeois governments (*Durchhaltspolitik*, *politique jusquauboutiste**). The real meaning of the sugary talk about a democratic peace is nothing but *assistance* to the governments through the hypocritical dulling and duping of the masses.

* Carrying on the war to a victorious end.—*Ed.*

* * *

This war has raised the fundamental questions of imperialism, that is, the questions of the very existence of capitalist society, and it would be quackery to suggest to the people—directly or indirectly—that any reformist solution of these problems is possible. What is involved here is a fresh division of the world in accordance with the new balance of forces between the capitalist states, which over the last few decades have been developing not only at exceptional speed but—and this is especially important—extremely unevenly. On the basis of capitalist social relations this redivision of the world is inconceivable except through force and war. The objective state of things rules out any reformist solution for the mature contradictions; it rules out any other way out except a series of imperialist wars or a socialist revolution of the proletariat, for whose success the imperialist epoch itself has already created the conditions. Real political activity in these conditions is possible only as one of two things: assistance to "one's own" national bourgeoisie in plundering other countries, or assistance to the incipient....*

Written in late February
and March 1916

First published in *Pravda* No. 255,
November 6-7, 1927

Printed from the original

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* Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

I have only just learned from Alexander's letter to Grigory of the sad fate of our friends in the town from which Alexander has come.[446]

I hope you will make use of all your connections, and do everything possible and impossible to extricate them and help them in every way.

I have decided not to write to Branting, because my recommendation at present in *all* respects—you will appreciate—may do harm. Probably it will be best of all for you to get things moving through your Norwegian friends. Cable, if you need anything else.

(In case of necessity, perhaps the appeal could go through Denmark? It would also be valid through the German Social-Democratic deputies but for the fact that the Right-wingers are very angry with you. Now if you could try through the *non*-Rightist German Social-Democrats....)

I am surprised that Alexander has received only one letter from me. I sent three: the second to the town from which Alexander has come (addressed to the "Secretary of the Party" at the People's House—telephone there, if possible); the third went to his present address. I hope he's got the third letter by now. I am expecting him to write, for he has been somewhat niggardly about writing. Best regards to him from me and N. K. To you too.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on April 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

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TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

You know, of course, that Huysmans is calling the neutrals together for June 26.[447] We must try to have one of "our men" attend from the Scandinavian countries, and we ought to think out his line thoroughly. Please, write as soon as you can whether there is any hope of this (so that we should have time to exchange letters).

Do you read the German Social-Democratic papers? The Braunschweig *Volksfreund* gave a good answer to Huysmans,[448] while the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, which is an organ of the Right, said it was *in complete agreement* with Huysmans's criticism of the Zimmerwaldists.[449]

Is there any hope of the sentence on Höglund being quashed? This is unheard-of, incredible ferocity![450]

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Best regards to Nik. Ivanovich, from whom there was a telegram but no letter. I wish him with all my heart an early rest and quick recovery. How are his finances?

P.S. Isn't 75 kronen too much for the pamphlet in English?[451] Perhaps we should wait?

Written between April 19 and May 7, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Alexander,

The conference is over, its manifesto has been published (May 1).[452] I hope you receive *Berner Tagwacht*—or some other Swiss paper? If not, drop us a line, and we shall send you the French text.

Grigory is preparing a circumstantial letter about the conference, and this will be sent to you.

After all, a manifesto was adopted: that is a step forward, *because* it was accepted by the French deputies (three, one of them the semi-chauvinist Brizon).[453] A resolution criticising pacifism, and a resolution on the International Socialist Bureau, sharply criticising it, were adopted. On the whole, this is *none the less*, despite the mass of defects, a step towards a break with the social-patriots.

This time the Left was stronger: a Serb, three Swiss and a Frenchman (not a deputy; *not* from any group, but on his own) reinforced our Left. Then there were two Germans (from the *Internationale* group)[454] who supported us on the main questions.

Have you seen the Huysmans manifesto? It contains an unmistakable malicious "hint" about us! The Braunschweig *Volksfreund* gave him a good answer.

As regards the Japanese,[455] we have decided to make another, and, I hope, final, attempt to reach agreement: (1) all the old agreements (verbal) are cancelled; (2) an agreement between the Central Organ's editorial board, which edits the issue, and the *publishers* to be concluded from issue to issue, i.e., for each issue separately; (3) No. 3 to be published at Berne (clearly it is impossible at Stockholm).

Try and see whether it will come off or not. If not, we shall publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. We can't wait.[456]

Here is the plan for No. 3:

1) Material from Russia (up to 3 sheets).
2) Theses of the Central Organ's editorial board on self-determination.
3) Lenin's article on the same subject.
4) The 2nd Zimmerwald Conference. Grigory Zinoviev or Lenin.
5) Bukharin: an economic subject.
6) Lyalin on the high cost of living.
7) Alexander—from Russia.
8) A Serb and an Italian have promised articles.
9) Russian themes—Grigory Zinoviev.
10) Radek—continuation (? hardly worth while. In my opinion, no).*
10) Kollontai—from America.
11) A Lett.
12) Varin.
13) The women's labour movement.
14) Book reviews.
15) About Trotsky, Martov and the Chkheidze group....

Think it over, *probe the ground*, get the facts, as tactfully as possible, and reply as soon as you can.[457]

All the best, and wishes for every success.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. As Nadya has already written, I agree with you on the Jewish miscellany.[458] Nadya has repeatedly written to Berne for the material. Regards to Alexandra Mikhailovna!

Yours,
Lenin

Written between May 6 and 13, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

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* This point is crossed out in the MS. Lenin had in view a continuation of the Radek article, "A Quarter of a Century of Development of Imperialism", carried in No. 1-2 of *Kommunist*.—*Ed*.

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

As we agreed, I intend to visit Geneva and Lausanne for a lecture, "Two Streams in the International Labour Movement" (you said that this title was better than "Two Internationals", which I used here).

If conditions have not changed, and my trip will pay for itself, please fig the date for a fortnight ahead (*at Lausanne the day after*).[459]

I shall be awaiting your reply.

I need to work a day or so at the Geneva Public Library. Could you find out whether by any chance it will be closed on any day, apart from the holidays?

Salutations,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on May 17, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

For Alexander

May 23, 1916

Dear Friend,

I have only just received from Grigory your letter to him of May 19.

You write that "the correspondence and negotiations with *Kommunist* have become a terrible bore". I quite understand you, but do have patience! You can't, after all, once you have set about negotiating, have attacks of nerves and fall into despair. That's not the proletarian way, really and truly.

You put two questions: (1) to co-opt two more (C.O. supporters) to the editorial board; (2) to start a Discussion Section in *Kommunist*.

On the first point you write: "From conversations with them I realise that they have nothing against it, though of course it grieves them."

I began thinking about your plan. I think that to take on non-writers (particularly after all our sad experiments) would be an absolute iniquity, something we could not justify before the Party. We could, perhaps, find one writer (I have one in my mind; I must find out more about him, and think it over again and again, before saying yes or no). It's much harder getting another one.

Could you modify your plan, to make it workable, in this way: either the C.O. editorial board co-opts two *Party writers*, if they are available (then there will be seven); or, if it manages to find only one, the publishers (the Kievskys, he and she) delegate one of their number to the

editorial board (then there will be five: Bukharin+a publisher+three here)?

(I personally would find the latter particularly suitable, because (a) it would obviate the need to *invent* editors; (b) it would not reduce the "rights" of the publishers, because it is all the same to have one to one or two to two; (c) it would create an editorial board of writers, which is extremely important in a Party sense, to combat the striving abroad for editorial positions.)

Think it over and reply (if not inconvenient, probe the ground among the publishers).

As regards the Discussion Section, your plan is debatable, if it is implemented in a practical way and if one little thing, which you could not have known of, is eliminated.

In a practical way means laying down precisely who has the *right* to have a discussion article inserted. All members of the editorial board. That is unquestionable. Is it sufficient? I think it is. The editorial board will consist of five or seven persons.

The "one little thing" is this. A discussion within the Party. Undoubtedly. Well, but what about inflaming differences or opening doors for *groups abroad* which are not in the Party? This is the point. The publishers made *Kommunist* impossible, because they did not want any discussion, they did not write or prepare anything at all for discussion—but played on Radek's striving to crawl through the cracks of our Party from outside. Radek and the *Nashe Slovo* people, and many others among the groups abroad, are simply straining, *in the guise* of discussion, to bring about divisions amongst us, to blow up discontents, and hamper our work (an old game of exiles abroad!).

You may not know that Radek pushed us out of the *Vorbote* editorial board. It was initially agreed that there would be a joint editorial board composed of two groups: (1) the Dutch (maybe+Trotsky) and (2) us (i.e., Radek, *Grigory and me*). This condition gave us equal rights on the editorial board.

Radek intrigued for months, and got the "missus" (Roland-Holst) to *cancel* this plan. We were demoted to the position of contributors. It's a fact!

Is it proper to reward Radek for this feat by giving him the *right* to "discuss", and the publishers, the *right* to hide behind Radek? That will be not discussion, but dissension and intrigue. (1) *Gazeta Robotnicza* (February 1916), in which Radek participates, carried some purely factional attacks on us, and a resolution on *Nashe Slovo* lines. (2) Now on the question of assessing the Irish insurrection (a most important question, is it not? Not abstract "theory"!) *both* Radek[460] *and* Kulisher (the Cadet in *Rech*)[461] are in *full agreement*, stupidly calling it a "putsch".

This is incredible, but it's a fact!

If, in the guise of "discussion", the publishers want to provide a platform for all the groups abroad wishing to fight our Party without joining it, that is *not* discussion, it is a game.

If they don't want this, why not lay down precisely, for example, that the *right* to open discussions is restricted (1) to members of the editorial board; (2) to the Party organisations in Russia; (3) to the C.O.A.,[462] being the organisation of the Party outside Russia?

Kommunist was an *alliance* with the Dutch and Radek. This alliance has been *changed* by the fact that we were downgraded in the Dutch-Radek journal from editors to contributors. So don't cherish any harmful illusions about the alliance remaining the same! These are harmful illusions! We have to go forward ourselves, *not allowing* our hands to be tied. *Not in any way*.

The practical conclusion: think over (and I will think it over and write to Grigory about it) the following §§:

1) the composition of the editorial board is changed: 5 or 7 (see above);

2) another title is chosen (*Sbornik* or the like);

3) explicit rules of discussion (e.g., in the spirit of);

4) Switzerland to be the place of publication (for some reason you don't mention this point. Why?);

5) the income is divided in *such-and-such a way*. Will the publishers agree to provide ½ for the cost of transport

and of maintenance for the organiser of contacts, etc., i.e., yourself?

Reply!

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Thousands of best wishes, and *don't let your nerves go*. Chiefs have no right to have fits of nerves!

Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 7

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

Dear A. M.,

I was very glad to have your news and information.[463] We shall have to be patient about America: it's worth while publishing *only* over there.

I hope you will do everything possible to consolidate matters as regards the Left Swedes and Norwegians. So far nothing has yet been fixed. Not a thing! There is only talk. There is neither formal affiliation with the Left, nor proper relations with us, not a single thing. And this after the Höglund affair! I can't understand these people!

As regards the meeting of the neutrals at The Hague on June 26, I have this plan: it is clear that the phlegmatic Norwegians will be *unable* to do a thing without a knowledge of foreign languages. Why don't you go *as well*?[464]

Why could not the C.C. of the Norwegian Party appoint X *plus* you? X is essential, as a local man, while you are a *plus*. Even if as an interpreter. You would be exceptionally useful, because then you would get to know *everything*. I am certain that, otherwise, we *won't* even get a full, precise, clear and accurate *report* of what has taken place (and the workers of the whole world will *not* get one either). Think about this. And do everything possible for it.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I haven't read the Rybalka pamphlet[465]: too busy. Tell me: did the stupid S.R. pamphlets *weaken* the significance of the revolutionary struggle of the S.R. peasants?

Did the provocateur Gapon *weaken* the significance of the revolutionary struggle of the Gapon workers? They call the Irish insurrection a "putsch" (have you seen K. Radek in *Berner Tagwacht*?)—and you *put up* with this!? I don't understand you. I absolutely do not understand. If anything, this in particular has proved the indecent pedantry and stupid doctrinaire approach of K. Radek in *Berner Tagwacht* and those "of like mind with him".

If your journey is *impossible*, could you, at any rate, get the C.C. of the Norwegian Party to pass a decision to the effect that the delegate should *carefully* and *on the spot* make a note of *everything* that takes place?

Written after May 28, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

For Comrade Alexander

Dear Alexander,

Of course we shall give Belenin 300 kronen, if he has already so firmly decided on his plan for a trip. It will be a pity if he goes. In any case, you must do *everything* to ensure his return in a few months.

As regards the "Japanese", you shouldn't think that they have made "considerable concessions" in the draft you have sent on. They haven't made any at all! On the contrary, the demand that the *two* should have the right to haul in dissenting contributors is an *innovation*, an addition, a *surenchère*. And this innovation clearly exposes their "policy" in the worst sense of the word. If the founders, the publishers, the young contributors want freedom of opinion *for themselves*—freedom of discussion—that is legitimate. But if people, *behind* this legitimate desire, try to smuggle in "discussion" which is *not their own*, but that of "contributors", isn't it clear that this is a game?

Never has there been anything like this anywhere. If the *two* want publicity for all kinds of intrigues abroad—let them go ahead, *and let them be responsible for it*. I *cannot participate* in this either directly or indirectly.

You will ask, perhaps, where is the proof that it is a question of intrigues abroad? I wrote to you about this *long ago*, and you have not replied a single time. The proof is the issue of *Gazeta Robotnicza* (February 19*16*), from which we have Radek and Bronski as "contributors".

That is a fact.

These gentlemen were the first in the Zimmerwald Left to start an *intrigue*—and at what a time! They want to "play off" Chkheidze and Trotsky.

At such a moment the *two* publishers do not blush to propose to *us* that *we* should give them "freedom and a guarantee" of discussion for such contributors! This is either madness, or the height of impudence.

And equal representation with them (6=3+3), is that not the same thing? Why, they once gave you to understand (and you wrote this *yourself*) that they would accept the co-opting of *two*, *supporters* of the C.O. But when it came to having a written agreement, they beat a retreat. Isn't that the game of petty hucksters?

If people are in agreement, sincerely and in principle, to have a journal or a miscellany *support* the Programme of the Party, then the majority must be for it. Otherwise there is no sincerity, no principle, only "the purse strings".

My view is, explain all this to them clearly, in popular language, if necessary in writing, and give them an ultimatum: either this way (7=4+3), or you send in your conclusion about their "game" to the Bureau.[466] That will be the correct Party reply.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written late in May 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 7

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Alexander,

I wrote to you briefly yesterday. Today I want to have a further talk.

I am revolted by the "conditions" laid down by the Japanese. That two editors should have the right to decide on inserting an article written for discussion purposes by a contributor! Not even three, but only two: in other words, the publishers "depend" on no one but themselves.[467]

The meaning of this clause is clear: they want to hide behind Radek and *inflame* our differences with him and with the P.S.D.[468] This is not discussion, but the height of intrigue, the utmost cravenness. It's just as it was in Paris in 1911, when we were "dragged" into a discussion with Rappoport, or Lyova, or Viktoryonok, or Bogdanov! I have written to you that the Polish *Gazeta Robotnicza* (*February 1916*) is attacking us just like those Parisians did then.

In no circumstances will I join an editorial board which is intriguing in this way, under the guise of discussion. If you, Japanese, want to help to disorganise our Party, do it on *your own* responsibility. Your purse is full. Go ahead and publish the "discussion" by Radek or *Gazeta Robotnicza*: then the *Russian* workers will see at once that you are intriguers, and will kick you out. But you want to *play* this mean trick *under cover* of a "collective board". Sorry, but I won't accept this and will expose you. That is my reply to the Japanese on this question.

The same goes for "equal rights" (the elimination of the seventh member, or voting on him).[469] This is a continuation of the old "game". What has Party membership got to do with it? The point is that we are to give "equal rights"

to people who have shown themselves in the *negative*! Why should we? Equal rights = the right to spoil the work! In the name of what? For what purpose? To make dissension *permanent*?

No. If they want to make a *new* experiment, we shall take a *new* journal, or more precisely *miscellany*, and *try* (the old confidence has been undermined) to issue one with an editorial board of seven. We shall make the *experiment*: this is the maximum concession which I can conscientiously allow. If the experiment fails, the intriguers and the capitalists lose nothing, because the "purse" can always be withdrawn. And we shall then issue our own miscellany. One that is simple, clear and without intrigue.

I wish you all the best, and ask you to be patient.

Yours,
Lenin

Written after June 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

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in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 7

Printed from the original

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

June 17, 1916

Dear Friend,

Nadezhda Konstantinovna is writing to you about other matters, but I will reply to your P.S. to me.

You write that "our people have no evil intentions", and you add that for the Kievskys "it's a matter of the national question alone, and that they write the articles themselves".

If that were the case, why then have a paragraph in the Rules about the right of discussion for *contributors* on the demand of two (note: not even three, but two, i.e., distrust of Bukharin on the part of the Japanese)? In that event, this paragraph would have no meaning. And it is a thing without precedent for two editors out of six or seven to demand "freedom" of discussion (alleged discussion) not for themselves, but for contributors.

No. The Japanese woman *cannot* insert meaningless paragraphs into the Rules. The meaning of this paragraph is just this, and only this, that *our* hands are being tied, and we find ourselves helpless against the striving of the Poles to start an intrigue.

You write that you have not seen *Gazeta Robotnicza* (*you should have been sent it*, and also the *C.O.A. resolution* adopted with the participation of Grigory: I am writing to him and Zina at once, to have them send it to you immediately). You say, moreover, that for this reason "you don't know what it's all about".

But you add there and then, for some reason: "I know, I feel, that you have cooled off towards Radek and Co."

You will agree that this is somewhat strange. After all,

my apprehension about intrigue on the part of Radek and Co., my *conviction* that this is so, springs directly from the *facts* concerning *Vorbote* (I wrote to you about it).[470] That is the first point. And the second, and most important, is that it springs from *Gazeta Robotnicza*.

It is in that paper that Radek and Co. *began* an intrigue against us, when we had nowhere written a single line against them![471] After all, this is a fact. You can't brush facts aside. The old "game" (the word used in the C.O.A. resolution) of playing up our split with Chkheidze and Co. began in *Gazeta Robotnicza*, and is *Tyszka*'s old, long familiar game.[472]

So what are we to do? Either we allow this game not only to grow unhindered, but to *seep through to our journal*. This is what the paragraph in the Japanese woman's draft Rules leads to! And it would mean a hopeless and final war against Radek and Co.

You write, *as though* against me, that "it is not to our advantage to quarrel with the Zimmerwald Left".

I reply: if we are *not* to have a final quarrel with *Radek and Co*. (and through them with others as well, should things go badly), we *must*, for that very purpose, make this kind of "game" and intrigue impossible in our journal.

That is just why I refuse to go along with the discussing "contributors", and refuse to join *Kommunist*.

It's one of two things: if we agree to restore *Kommunist*, it would mean opening the door to the *development* of that intrigue; it would mean us opening the door to it. This would be a mad policy, I am sure. Does the Japanese woman understand all its implications? I don't know, but that isn't very important: the "mechanics" of relations abroad would itself lead to such a result, regardless of the malice or angelic goodness and purity of the Japanese woman's intentions.

The other prospect: *not* to revive *Kommunist*. To issue *another* miscellany. Give the editors the right of discussion. Analyse the national question. *Beat off Gazeta Robotnicza's game and intrigue*.

Radek or his friends attacked us in *Gazeta Robotnicza*. We replied in *our* miscellany,[473] only in ours, please note, *not in one published in common with the Zimmerwald Left of other countries*.

That's where it ends.

The Zimmerwald Left, whom *Radek tried without success* to drag into a quarrel with us at Kienthal (in talks with Platten and others, he wanted to deprive us of equality in the main commission of the Left *but the Left wouldn't let him do* it)—these Zimmerwald Left have *nothing to do* with the struggle between *Gazeta Robotnicza* and *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.

The Zimmerwald Left cannot intervene in *this* struggle, they cannot take offence and complain: Radek and Co. were the *first* to attack in *Gazeta Robotnicza*, and they have had their reply in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (or in some other miscellany). *In such a situation*, no efforts by Radek and Co. can conceivably bring about a quarrel between ourselves and the Zimmerwald Left (just as at Kienthal Radek *failed* to set us at loggerheads, either with Platten or with the German Left, though he did try to).

While Radek and Co. reply to us in the next issue of *Gazeta Robotnicza*, and we to them in *another* miscellany (I insist absolutely on agreements from miscellany to miscellany), quite a lot of time will go by.

And during all that time, if *that* is the approach, Radek and Co.'s dirty trick in *Gazeta Robotnicza will not be able* to set us at loggerheads with the Left.

That is why I have said, and still say, that I will not on any account now either join *Kommunist*, or accept equal rights with the Japanese woman, or membership at all *jointly* with Radek in our own miscellany, because I am convinced that *this* will make inevitable a quarrel with the Left.

If we issue *Kommunist* No. 3, then Radek *and* Bronski *and* Pannekoek (and the general public) will have the right to expect, and will expect, *a continuation of the same thing*; they will have the right to expect, and will expect, all possible guarantees for contributors; they will have the right, finally (and this is particularly important), to take offence and intervene if we reply *there* to *Gazeta Robotnicza*'s dirty tricks. This throws the gates wide open to intrigue.

In that event, Radek and Co. will *surely* bring about a quarrel between us and the Left, because even Pannekoek will have the most sacred right to say: it *wasn't* that kind of *Kommunist* that I agreed to join, I *don't* want

"attacks" on *Gazeta Robotnicza* (he will depict defence as attack: you know how that's done).

In that case, Radek and Co. will have the right to issue any letter to the general public, both in Russian *and in German*; they will have the right to say: *Kommunist* was in practice (this is a fact) the common organ of yourselves+Pannekoek+Radek+Bronski, while you *use* it to "offend" *Gazeta Robotnicza*, *you are beginning* to split the Left, and so on and so forth (as he had *already* been saying at Kienthal, note that: he had *already* used this strategy at Kienthal).

And in the eyes of the whole Left, the blame falls on us! We allowed ourselves to be drawn into a quarrel with the Left, we fell into the Tyszka trap. That is where continuing the *Kommunist* leads to; that is why I refuse to go in.

Whereas on the contrary, I repeat, if—in a separate, *new* miscellany, *without* Pannekoek, Radek, Bronski—we *reply* to *Gazeta Robotnicza*, reply to Bukharin and anyone else, *this is absolutely no concern of the Zimmerwald Left*, and they *cannot* either interfere or take offence. Radek *cannot* "complain" either to Pannekoek or to the Germans that *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* has *replied* to *Gazeta Robotnicza*.

And then, in addition, there is also the question of defeatism. *The same applies*.

And then there is also the question of the Chkheidze group. *The same applies*. For *that* is what *Gazeta Robotnicza* was playing on.

If the Japanese woman has no "evil intentions", she *cannot* reject an agreement on one miscellany (*without* Radek and the others), when we provide for a discussion *with the Japanese and Bukharin*. We are agreeable likewise to have it in a separate pamphlet (if Bukharin wants it, for he will then be able *in advance* to look at my "tone", about which he has expressed fears). It will then be possible to separate the arguments with Bukharin from the joint work with Bukharin.

My articles and Grigory's about defeatism, self-determination, *Gazeta Robotnicza*'s dirty tricks, Chkheidze, "self-defence", etc., your articles about the "War Industries Committees", etc., Varin's and Safarov's (*we mustn't* have foreigners in this miscellany), etc., and *whatever they please* from Bukharin and the Japanese.

There is the plan for an agreement on one miscellany.

The Japanese woman cannot refuse, unless she has evil intentions.

One cannot insist on *Kommunist*, if it has fallen to pieces; it is absurd and ridiculous to drag me by force into *Kommunist*; they won't succeed.

But if the Japanese woman won't have an agreement on a separate miscellany, *that means* she has evil intentions or (which is all the same for the cause) her policy *leads* to an evil intrigue.

And then we publish *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata alone*.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 7

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

Inessa very badly needs a passport.[474] We beg you to take the enclosed letter to Guilbeaux (directeur de *Demain*, 28 rue du Marché, visitors on Fridays 2-4; perhaps it would be better to ask him for an interview by postcard).

Of course don't tell either him, *or anyone else*, *who* the passport is for.

It is better to see Guilbeaux personally: we have thought it over from every angle, and have decided that it would be better than writing to him. I hope this request will not give you or V. K. too much trouble.

Have you at your library the book by *Yu. Delevsky* (I think that's his name?): *Class Contradictions within the Modern Proletariat*, or *something like that*?[475]

If it's not at your library, perhaps you know someone who has it (and, by the way, do you happen to know the exact title of the book?).

Best greetings to you both,

Yours,

Lenin

Nadya sends her regards.

Written on June 27, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TO ALEXANDRA KOLLONTAI

July 25, 1916

Dear A. M.,

I was long in answering your letter because, owing to Nadya's illness, we'd had to move into the mountains. I quite agree with you that the role of Left-winger at the conference with Huysmans will, in the main, be one of collecting information.[476] This is more important than anything else. The most important thing is to make notes *on the spot*, and about everything. Collect each and every kind of document; and do not forget for a single minute the need for *full* information. The only way is to write down everything (even if briefly) at once, on the spot, in a special notebook. Grimm is not going: they didn't give him a passport. That means there is to be only one Left-winger. This makes his responsibility all the greater. It will take great resolution and full political clarity to carry on the line alone: you are the best judge of whether these qualities are there. If they are, it would be a good thing to "put" a couple of questions to the vote: approve Zimmerwald; ditto Kienthal; condemn the social-patriots, Hyndman and Co., Sembat and Co., Legien and Co., Plekhanov and Co. The same thing can also be done in the form of questions. It'll be up to you to decide whether this can be done.

Please drop me a couple of words about the receipt of this postcard.

Alexander must have taken all the addresses with him, and will try and find out whether anything has been printed in America about the Zimmerwald Left and get it, and contact the Socialist Propaganda League, the Socialist Labour Party, *International Socialist Review* and *Appeal to*

Reason. If you get this postcard and reply, we may perhaps have time to write each other about what precisely it is convenient to ask him to do there.

One personal request: have you any publishing connections? I have none. By way of earnings, I should like to have either a *translation*, or an article on *education* for Nadya (her illness requires a *prolonged* stay in the mountains, and that is expensive).

Best greetings and good wishes. Nadya sends her regards.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Flums (Switzerland)
to Christiania

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

TO ZINAIDA LILINA

Dear Zina,

I read in *Berner Tagwacht* and heard that your lecture at Olten was a *great* success. *Ich gratuliere!** Perhaps you could write a *brief* summary of the main points for our *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, if you were going to write on the same subject? We are in a terribly difficult situation: we failed to calculate beforehand the exact size of the articles, we have "swollen up" out of all proportion, we have not been able to "unload", and are now faced with the prospect of a great big volume, which is least convenient for propaganda from abroad.

Drop me a few words about your subject, and about whether you could, *without detriment to the subject*, confine yourself to 4-5 pages of our large size (you have it in the proofs, and you will probably not find it too hard to calculate precisely).

Write.

Beste Grüsse, especially to Styopka, who must have grown so that I won't be able to toss him up to the ceiling!

Written after July 27, 1916
Sent from Zurich
to Hertenstein (Switzerland)

First published in 1929
in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 4

Printed from the original

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* Congratulations.—*Ed.*

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear G. L.,

I don't know whether you are in Berne. Please let me know directly you get this letter.

1) I have a request to you: I need to dispatch a manuscript in bindings: 100 *sheets* (not pages but sheets) *just like* this one (destination, same as Grigory's).[477]

Please order *two* books of *suitable* format: you will get the manuscript in 5-6 days. *I am in a terrible hurry with the dispatch* (I have lost my own copy!) and therefore would very much ask you to hurry, and if you can't do it, to reply as soon as possible, so that I could look for someone else through whom to arrange it.

2) Why do you say nothing about my papers? If you can't manage anything (or if it's inconvenient), do not hesitate to let me know. It isn't worth while going to a lot of trouble over it!

3) Did you get a printed copy of the "paper" on the Ts. case[478] from Moor? *This is essential. Don't forget!* We must get hold of it at all costs, or he may lose it, the scoundrel!

4) Why has there not been a money report for a long time? Or has there been such a windfall that you can't add it up?

Greetings to all, from Lyuda on.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Please send us the POW letters,[479] *after you are through*: we must keep track of their state of mind, demands, opinions, etc.

Written on August 5, 1916
Sent from Flums to Berne

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear G. L.,

I was very glad to have news from you. And thank you for the POW letters. Your work *is a success*, congratulations!

Please send the cash to *Tribune*, and *ask* them not to send the paper any more! It's of no use! Besides, I never ordered it.

Regards to the whole family,

Yours,

Lenin

Written late in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Berne

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO G. Y. BELENKY

Dear Grisha,

And so the misunderstanding has been cleared up. It's not worth talking about it any more. It *isn't* worth while publishing in Paris under the censorship. If the possibility of publishing without censorship definitely arises, then write, in as much detail as you can.

We agree to a (provisional) editorial board for publishing leaflets in Paris: Varin+Domov+1 from the Paris group.[480]

The papers say that there is to be a conference of the Entente socialists at the Palais Bourbon on Dec. 24, 1916. Find out whether this is so. We shall send a leaflet from the Central Committee, and you make as thorough preparations as possible for publishing and distributing it in that event.

Many thanks for all you are sending us. Send and write as much as you can.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on October 26, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Paris

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

ON THE AMENDMENT TO BEBEL'S RESOLUTION AT THE STUTTGART CONGRESS[481]

I remember very well that the final drafting of this amendment was preceded by prolonged negotiations directly between ourselves and Bebel. The first draft made a much more straightforward statement about revolutionary agitation and revolutionary action. We showed it to Bebel; he replied: I don't accept it, because then the Public Prosecutor will dissolve our party organisations, and we can't have that, as there are no serious developments as yet. After consultation with legal specialists and numerous redraftings of the text in order to give legal expression to the same idea, a final formula was found which Bebel agreed to accept.

N. Lenin

Written in December 1916

Published in December 1916
in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrades,

I have to give a lecture here on the Ninth of January, 1905, but I have no material.[482] Please help me to find:

1) *Mysl* for 1910 (?)-1911
   V. Ilyin's articles on strikes in Russia.[483]
2) *Diskussionny Listok* of the C.O. of the R.S.D.L.P. for 1910-1911 (?), my article on revolution and counter-revolution in Russia, with a summary of strike statistics.[484]
3) Trotzky: *Russland in der Revolution.*
4) Gorn, Mech, Cherevanin and others,
   collections (legal) for 1906-07 (?). The social movement in Russia, or something like that. One issue about *the peasantry.*[485]
   (Agrarian question)
5) Maslov, Vol. II. The peasant movement in 1905-06.[486]
6) *The Social Movement in Russia.* The five-volume collection of Potresov and Co.
7) *Moscow in 1905*[487]
   and other 1905-06 pamphlets. *Anything you have.*

Please send what you have, or mark off on this note what there is and what can be sent over.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I sent Guilbeaux my theses on work among the Left in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, and asked him to send them on to you.[488] Pass them on also to Noah and Stepko.

Written on December 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

1917

UNIDENTIFIED ADDRESSEE

Today, Nobs and Münzenberg told me the following facts which are not without significance.

On Jan. 7, Münzenberg proposed that the congress should be postponed *to March* (clearly wishing by this proposition to expose the hypocrisy of the arguments used by Grimm+ the social-patriots). It was defeated.[489]

Greulich proposed postponement *until May*. Nobs stated that he was in favour (once again choosing the lesser evil and exposing the same crowd). When Nobs said that he was *for*, Greulich (what a character!) immediately *withdrew* his proposition (having seen his mistake). Then Naine declared that *he* was moving Greulich's proposal. *It was defeated*.

Münzenberg proposed that the cantonal committees (to whom the matter has now been referred) should be allowed time until July. It was defeated!

These facts show up Grimm's unprecedented impudence, when he says in his article (*Berner Tagwacht* of Jan. 8 or 9, *Parteibeschlüsse*)[490] that the Left wing, too, were "in principle" *not* against postponement!

Münzenberg has written an article for *Volksrecht* (Nobs has promised to insert it tomorrow or the day after) against the decision of the *Partei-Vorstand*.*[491]

After reading this, send it on to Olga, for her to send to Abramovich.

Written at Zurich
on January 11 or 12, 1917

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* Party executive.—*Ed.*

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Friend,

I enclose a resolution. Please read it and pass it on to Guilbeaux and to the German group.

This resolution (it was voted *here* by a meeting of the Left)[492] must be got through all possible organisations; and, if it is adopted even by a *small party* organisation, it should be sent *officially* both to the local party committee and to the Central Executive (*Geschäftsleitung der sozialistischen Partei. Zürich. Volkshaus*), with a demand that it be published.

I am terribly angry with Guilbeaux—tell him this—for *failing to return* to me the draft statement against Grimm[493] (has he shown it to you? He must!).

If he doesn't want to sign it, let him send it back *at once*.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on January 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

Many thanks for your letter on affairs in your local party. You are not alone, to tell the truth, in having bouts of "pessimism".[494] The party here is opportunist through and through, a benevolent society for petty-bourgeois officials.

Even the alleged Left leaders (like Nobs and Platten) are no use *at all*: the said two in particular.[495] You can't do anything without access to the masses. But while taking care not to entertain excessive hopes, we should not fall into pessimism either: this is an important moment, and if we helped *ever so little* (a couple of leaflets or the' like), that would also be *something*. Even that *will not be lost* quite without trace.

I am very glad that you have the intention to help in every possible way in the distribution of the leaflet.[496] Please, don't forget to destroy *all* our correspondence.

When is your cantonal congress of the Socialist Party? I sent a draft resolution to Abramovich. Has he sent it on to you? Do you know anything (apart from what was in *Volksrecht*) about the congress of the Zurich party at Töss?[497]

Who reported on the Olten meeting on Feb. 1?[498] Only Guilbeaux and Co.? They got the jitters, you know! They failed to understand the task, and got scared!

I cannot lecture in French.

Every good wish of success. Regards to Vyacheslav Alexeyevich.

Yours,
Lenin

And how are things with the referendum? How many signatures? Are they still collecting them?[499]

Written on February 12, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Martov's plan is a good one[500]: it's *necessary* to work for it, but *we* (and you) cannot do this directly. *We* shall be open to suspicion. It's necessary that, in addition to Martov, non-Party Russians and patriotic Russians should approach Swiss Ministers (and influential people, lawyers, etc., something that can be done in Geneva as well) requesting them to *have a talk* about it with the German Government's Ambassador at Berne. We cannot take part, either directly or indirectly; our participation will *spoil* it all. But the plan, in itself, is a *very* good one and is *very* right.

Written after March 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO J. S. HANECKI

Fürstenberg, Boulevard-Hotel, Christiania

Cable to *Pravda*, appending return address. Have just read extracts from the Central Committee manifesto[501] Very best wishes! Long live the proletarian militia paving the way for peace and socialism!

Ulyanov

Written after March 23, 1917
Sent from Zurich
to Christiania

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original
in German

PLAN FOR A LECTURE, "THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS TASKS", DELIVERED AT ZURICH[502]

1. Die erste Etappe der ersten Revolution.
2. Nicht die letzte Revolution, nicht die letzte Etappe.
3. In drei Tagen Sturz der monarchischen Regierung, die Jahrhunderte gedauert und schwere Kämpfe 1905-07 erlebt hat?
4. Wunder.*

PART I

1. "The world has changed in three days."
2. "A miracle."
3. How could it be overthrown in 8 days?
   Four main conditions:
4. —(I)——The revolution of 1905-07.

(((Ploughed up the soil; showed up *all* classes and parties; stripped and isolated *Nicholas II* and *Co*. (Rasputin).

5. — —(II)——Collaboration of *three* forces in this revolution:
   — —(α) Anglo-French finance capital.
6. — —(β) the whole bourgeoisie and the capitalist landowning class of Russia (and the top sections of the army).
7. — — —(γ) the revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary section of the army, of the soldiers.

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* 1. The first stage of the first revolution.
2. Not the last revolution, not the last stage.
3. The overthrow, in three days, of the monarchist government, which had been in power for centuries, and had survived the fierce battles of 1905-07.
4. A miracle.—*Ed*.

8. Three forces now:
   —(αα) the tsarist monarchy; relics of the dynasty (counter-revolution in the South).
9. —(ββ) the new government and the bourgeoisie.
10. —(γγ) *The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Peace, bread, liberty*=
11. =The three main demands
12. ||
13. ||The new government cannot meet them....
14. *Three lines* in the Soviet of Workers' Deputies:
15. The resolution on *Kerensky*,[503] etc.
16. Chkheidze's waverings.
17. The R.S.D.L.P. C.C. line. *The C.C. manifesto*

PART II

18. What is to be done? Which way do we go, and how? Towards the Commune? Demonstrate this.
19. Analysis of the situation. Rapid change of situations (*the day before yesterday*—the greatest *illegality*. The call to revolutionary struggle. The struggle against *social-chauvinism*;
    (*yesterday*—the maximum of revolutionary heroism in combat;
    (*today—transition, organisation*....
    (*tomorrow*—combat again.
20. *Organisation*—the main issue of the day
    Which? The Party? The trade unions? etc.
21. *The Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Quid est** Thesis No. 4[504]
22. Our "*state*".
23. The Paris Commune.... Its essence.
24. The teachings of Marx and Engels on the transitional type of state[505]:
25. Proletarian *militia*. What kind....
26. —*They* need it
27. — —and *we* do

"Don't let them revive the police"

* What is.—*Ed.*

28. Revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry....
29. Peace? *How* (Gorky?)
30. —Our conditions of peace (Thesis No. 11 in No. 47).[506]
31. A step (transition) to socialism.
32. Long live the Russian, long live the incipient world-wide proletarian revolution!

Written not later than March 27, 1917

First published in 1955 in the journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO J. S. HANECKI

Berlin variant is unacceptable to me. Either the Swiss Government obtains a carriage up to Copenhagen,* or the Russian Government reaches agreement on the exchange of all émigrés for interned Germans.

Written on March 28, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original
in German

* "Up to Copenhagen" inserted by N. K. Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

TELEGRAM TO J. S. HANECKI

Your plan is unacceptable. Britain will never let me through, more likely to intern me. Milyukov will swindle us. The only hope—send someone to Petrograd and secure through the Soviet of Workers' Deputies exchange for interned Germans. Cable.

Ulyanov

Written on March 30, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original
in German

TELEGRAM TO ROBERT GRIMM

National Councillor Grimm[507]

Our Party has decided to accept without reservations the proposal that the Russian émigrés should travel through Germany, and to organise this journey at once.[508] We already expect to have more than ten participants in the journey.

We absolutely decline responsibility for any further delay, resolutely protest against it and are going alone. We earnestly request you to make the arrangements immediately and, if possible, let us know the decision tomorrow.

With gratitude,

Lenin, *Zinoviev*, *Ulyanova*

Written on March 31, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from a copy
in an unknown hand
Translated from the German

TO THE ZURICH GROUP OF BOLSHEVIKS

Dear Friends,

I attach the decision of our Party's Central Committee[509] (the Karpinskys, after taking 2 copies, must *immediately* return this decision to me). *Immediately* take a copy (*for yourselves*) and send it to the Karpinskys *express* by the *first train* (*take it to the station*), *enclosing also this letter of mine*.

Inform Lausanne (Goberman)[510] specially.

I will add for myself that I consider the Mensheviks who have wrecked the common enterprise *scoundrels* of the first water who are "afraid" of what "public opinion", i.e., the social-patriots, will say![511] I am going (and Zinoviev) *in any case*.

Find out exactly (1) who is going and (2) how much money they have.

Write about this at once to Radomyslsky, Neufeldstr. 27. Bern.

We *already* have a fund of over 1,000 francs for the journey. We are thinking of fixing Wednesday, April 4, as the day of departure.

All should *immediately* take passports from the Russian Consul at their place of residence.

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Send copies at once to Abram and his wife.

P.S. I enclose the 100 francs which you asked Grigory to lend you.

Written on April 2 or 3, 1917

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO J. S. HANECKI

We have an unaccountable delay. The Mensheviks demand the sanction of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Send someone to Finland or Petrograd at once to settle the matter with Chkheidze as far as possible. Belenin's opinion is desirable. Cable Volkshaus, Berne.

Ulyanov

Written on April 5, 1917
Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in the journal
Proletarskaya Revolutsia
No. 1 (24)

Printed from the text
on the telegraph form
Translated from the German

TELEGRAM TO HENRI GUILBEAUX

Leaving tomorrow midday for Germany.[512] Platten accompanying train, please come immediately, shall cover expenses. Bring Romain Rolland, if he agrees in principle Do everything possible to bring Naine or Graber with you Cable Ulyanov, Volkshaus.

Ulyanov

Written on April 6, 1917
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1923 in French in the book by Henri Guilbeaux, *Waldimir Iljitsch Lenin*, Berlin

Printed from the book text
Translated from the French

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE APRIL THESES[513]

THESES:

1) Attitude to the war.
   No concessions to "revolutionary defencism".
2) "The demand that the Provisional Government" should "renounce conquests ".
   (α) Attitude to the Provisional Government.
   (β) Attitude to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

2 bis) Criticism of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

3) Not a parliamentary republic, but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.

(α) Abolition of the army, the bureaucracy and the police. (β) Salaries to officials.

4) Specifics of propaganda, agitation and organisation in the period of transition from the first stage of the revolution to the second. Maximum of legally recognised rights.
   Supporters, honest, but duped by the bourgeoisie, of *only* "war through necessity", "war not for conquest", and their deception by the bourgeoisie.
5) The agrarian programme.
   (α) Nationalisation. (Confiscation of all landed estates.)
   (β) Each large-scale estate to be turned into a "model farm" under the control of a Soviet of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.
   +(γ) Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies to be pivotal.

6) A single bank under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

6 bis) *Not* introduction of socialism *at once*, but the immediate, systematic and gradual transition of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies to *control* over social production and distribution of products.

7) Congress.
Change of programme and name.
A new International. Creation of a revolutionary international....*

Written on April 8 (16), 1917
First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VII*

Printed from the original

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* The MS. breaks off at this point.—*Ed.*

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON APRIL 4 (17), 1917 ON THE QUESTION OF THE PASSAGE ACROSS GERMANY

MINUTES

In order to put an end to the lies being spread by the bourgeois press, it is essential to adopt the resolution proposed by Comrade Zinoviev. He proposes a statement that émigrés of all trends should be allowed through. We undertook no obligations at all. We only promised that on our return we would appeal to the workers to help the exchange. If you recognise that exchange is right, you will thereby refute all the lies. Otherwise you will give food for insinuation and slander....

First published in 1925 in the book: *Petrogradsky Sovet rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov. Protokoly* (The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Minutes), State Publishing House

Printed from the text in the book

REPORT AT A MEETING OF BOLSHEVIK DELEGATES TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES APRIL 4 (17), 1917[514]

I have put down a few theses on which I will make some comments. For lack of time I was unable to present a circumstantial and systematic report.

The basic question is the attitude to the war. The main thing that comes to the fore, when you read about Russia and see what goes on here, is the victory of defencism, the victory of the traitors to socialism, the deception of the masses by the bourgeoisie. What strikes one is that here in Russia the socialist movement is in the same state as in other countries: defencism, "defence of the fatherland". The difference is that nowhere is there such freedom as here, and therefore we have a special responsibility to the whole international proletariat. The new government is as imperialist as the previous one; it is imperialist through and through, despite its promise of a republic.

"I. In our attitude towards the war, which under the new government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia's part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession to 'revolutionary defencism' is permissible.

"The class-conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: a) that power passes to the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants aligned with the proletariat; b) that all annexations are renounced in deed and not in word; c) that a complete break is effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests.

"In view of the undoubted honesty of those broad sections of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity, and not as a means of conquest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with particular thoroughness, persistence and patience to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection existing between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that without overthrowing capital *it is impossible* to end the war by a truly democratic peace, a peace not imposed by violence.

"The most widespread campaign for this view must be organised in the army at the front.

"Fraternisation."

We cannot allow the slightest concession to defencism in our attitude to the war even under the new government, which remains imperialist. The masses take a practical and not a theoretical view of things. They say: "I want to defend the fatherland, not to seize other peoples' lands." When can a war be considered your own? When annexations are completely renounced.

The masses take a practical and not a theoretical approach to the question. We make the mistake of taking the theoretical approach. A class-conscious proletarian can agree to a revolutionary war, which really does justify revolutionary defencism. The practical approach is the only possible one with representatives of the mass of the soldiers. We are not pacifists in any sense. But the main question is: which class is carrying on the war? The class of capitalists, linked with the banks, cannot wage any kind of war except an imperialist one. The working class can. Steklov and Chkheidze have forgotten everything. When you read the resolution of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, you are amazed that people calling themselves socialists could adopt such a resolution.[515]

What is specific in Russia is the extremely rapid transition from savage violence to the most subtle deception. The main condition is *renunciation of annexations not in words*, but in deeds. *Rech* howls at *Sotsial-Demokrat*'s statement that the integration of Courland with Russia is annexation. But annexation is the integration of any country with distinct national peculiarities; it is any integration of a nation against its will, irrespective of whether it differs in language,

if it feels itself to be another people. This is a prejudice of the Great Russians which has been fostered for centuries.

The war can be ended only by a clean break with international capital. The war was engendered not by individuals but by international finance capital. It is no easy thing to break with international capital, but neither is it an easy thing to end the war. It is childishness and naïveté to expect one side alone to end the war.... Zimmerwald, Kienthal[516].... We have a greater obligation than anyone else to safeguard the honour of international socialism. The difficulty of approach....

In view of the undoubted existence of a defencist mood among the masses, who recognise the war *only of necessity* and not for the sake of conquest, we must explain to them most circumstantially, persistently and patiently that the war cannot be ended in a non-rapacious peace unless capital is overthrown. This idea must be spread far and wide. The soldiers want a concrete answer: how to end the war. But it is political fraud to promise the people that we can end the war only by the goodwill of individual persons. The masses must be forewarned. A revolution is a difficult thing. It is impossible to avoid mistakes. Our mistake is that we (have not exposed?) revolutionary defencism to the full. Revolutionary defencism is betrayal of socialism. We cannot confine ourselves.... We must admit our mistake. What is to be done? To explain. How to present ... who doesn't know what socialism is.... We are not charlatans. We must base ourselves only on the political consciousness of the masses. Even if we have to remain in a minority let it be so. It is worth while giving up our leading position for a time; we should not be afraid of remaining in a minority. When the masses say they don't want conquest, I believe them. When Guchkov and Lvov say they don't want conquest, they are swindlers. When the worker says that he wants to defend the country, he voices the oppressed man's instinct.

"II. The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is *passing* from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the *second* stage, which

must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants.

"This transition is characterised, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognised rights (Russia is *now* the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence towards the masses, and, finally, by their unreasoning trust in the government of capitalists, those worst enemies of peace and socialism.

"This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the *special* conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life."

Why didn't they take power? Steklov says: for this reason and that. This is nonsense. The fact is that the proletariat is not organised and class-conscious enough. This must be admitted; material strength is in the hands of the proletariat, but the bourgeoisie turned out to be prepared and class-conscious. This is a monstrous fact, but it should be frankly and openly admitted, and the people should be told that they didn't take power because they were unorganised and not conscious enough.... The ruin of millions, the death of millions. The most advanced countries are on the brink of disaster, and they will therefore be faced with the question....

The transition from the first stags to the second—the transfer of power to the proletariat and the peasantry—is characterised, on the one hand, by the maximum of legality (Russia today is the freest and most progressive country in the world) and, on the other, by an attitude of blind trust on the part of the masses in the government. Even our Bolsheviks show some trust in the government. This can be explained only by the intoxication of the revolution. It is the death of socialism. You comrades have a trusting attitude to the government. If that is so, our paths diverge. I prefer to remain in a minority. One Liebknecht is worth more than 110 defencists of the Steklov and Chkheidze type. If you sympathise with Liebknecht and stretch out even a finger (to the defencists), it will be betrayal of international socialism. If we break away from those people ... everyone who is oppressed will come to us, because the war will lead him to us; he has no other way out.

The people should be spoken to without Latin words, in clear and simple terms. They have the right ...—we must adapt ourselves ... make the change, but it is essential. Our line will prove to be the correct one.

"III. No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion-breeding 'demand' that *this* government, a government of capitalists, should *cease* to be an imperialist government."

Pravda demands of the *government* that it should renounce annexations. To demand of a government of capitalists that it should renounce annexations is nonsense, a crying mockery of....

From the scientific standpoint this is such gross deception which all the international proletariat, all.... It is time to admit our mistake. We've had enough of greetings and resolutions, it is time to act. We must get down to a sober, business-like....

"IV. Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our Party is in a minority, so far a small minority, as against *a bloc of all* the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists[517] and the Socialist-Revolutionaries down to the Organising Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence among the proletariat.

"The masses must be made to see that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the *only possible* form of revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is, as long as *this* government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic, and persistent *explanation* of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.

"As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticising and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the people may overcome their mistakes by experience."

We Bolsheviks are in the habit of taking the line of maxi-

mum revolutionism. But that is not enough. We must sort things out.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the real government. To think otherwise is to fall into anarchism. It is a recognised fact that in the Soviet of Workers' Deputies our Party is in a minority. We must explain to the masses that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the only possible government, a government without parallel in the world, except for the Commune. What if a majority of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies takes the defencist stand? That cannot be helped. It remains for us to explain, patiently, persistently, systematically, the erroneous nature of their tactics.

So long as we are in a minority, we carry on the work of criticism, in order to open the people's eyes to the deception. We don't want the masses to take our word for it. We are not charlatans. We want the masses to overcome their mistakes through *experience*.

The manifesto of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies contains not a word imbued with class-consciousness. It's all talk! Talk, flattery of the revolutionary people, is the only thing that has ruined all revolutions. The whole of Marxism teaches us not to succumb to revolutionary phrases, particularly at a time when they have the greatest currency.

"V. Not a parliamentary republic—to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step—but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.

"Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy.*

"The salaries of all officials, all of whom are elective and displaceable at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker."

This is the lesson of the French Commune, which Kautsky forgot and which the workers teach us in 1905 and 1917. The experience of these years teaches us that we must not allow the police and the old army to be restored.

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* i.e., the standing army to be replaced by the arming of the whole people.

The programme should be changed, it is out of date. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is a step to socialism. There must be no police, no army, no officialdom. The convocation of the Constituent Assembly—but by whom? Resolutions are written only to be shelved or sat on. I should be glad to have the Constituent Assembly convened tomorrow, but it is naïve to believe that Guchkov will call it. All the chatter about forcing the Provisional Government to call the Constituent Assembly is empty talk, a pack of lies. Revolutions were made, but the police stayed on, revolutions were made, but all the officials, etc., stayed on. That was why the revolutions foundered. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the only government which can call that assembly. We all seized upon the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, but have failed to understand them. From this form we are dragging back to the International, which is trailing behind the bourgeoisie.

A bourgeois republic cannot solve the problem (of the war), because it can be solved only on an international scale. We don't promise liberation ... but we say that it is possible only in this form (Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). No government except the Soviet of Workers' and Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. If you talk about the Commune, they won't understand. But if you say, there is the Soviet of Workers' and Agricultural Labourers' Deputies instead of the police, learn to govern—no one can interfere with us—(that they will understand).

No books will ever teach you the art of government. Learning to govern is a matter of trial and error.

"VI. The weight of emphasis in the agrarian programme to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

"Confiscation of all landed estates.

"Nationalisation of *all* lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organisation of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and for the public account."

What is the peasantry? We don't know, there are no statistics, but we do know that it is a force.

If they take the land, you can be sure that they won't give it back to you, they won't ask us. The pivot, the centre of gravity of the programme has shifted, and is the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies. If the Russian peasant doesn't settle the revolution, the German worker will.

The Tambov muzhik....

The first dessiatine cost free, the second, for 1 ruble, the third, for 2 rubles. We shall take over the land, and the landowner will never be able to take it back.

Communal farming.

It is necessary to organise separate Soviets of Deputies from the poor peasants. There is the rich muzhik, and there is the labourer. Even if you give him land, he won't set up a farm. The large estates should be turned into model farms run on social lines, with management by the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

There are large estates.

"VII. The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."

The bank is "a form of social book-keeping" (Marx). War teaches economy; everyone knows that the banks sap the strength of the people. The banks are the nerve, the focus of the national economy. We cannot take hold of the banks, but we advocate their amalgamation under the control of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

"VIII. It is not our *immediate* task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the *control* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies."

Practice and the revolution tend to push the Constituent Assembly into the background. The important thing about laws is not that they are put down on paper, but who carries them out. The dictatorship of the proletariat is there, but people don't know haw to work it. Capitalism has developed into state capitalism.... Marx ... only that which has matured in practice....

"IX. Party tasks:

(a) Immediate convocation of a Party congress.

(b) Amendment of the Party Programme, mainly:

1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war;

2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state"*;

3) Amendment of our out-of-date minimum programme.

(c) Change of the Party's name.**

"X. A new International.

"We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International against the *social-chauvinists* and against the '*Centre*'.***"

General conclusion.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies has been created, it enjoys vast influence. All instinctively sympathise with it. This institution combines far more revolutionary thought than all the *revolutionary phrases*. If the Soviet of Workers' Deputies succeeds in taking government into its own hands, the cause of liberty is assured. You may write the most ideal laws, but who will put them into effect? The same officials, but they are tied up with the bourgeoisie.

It is not "introduce socialism" that we ought to tell the masses, but put it into effect (?). Capitalism has gone ahead, war capitalism is different from that which existed before the war.

On the basis of our tactical conclusions we must go on to practical steps. A Party congress must be called at once and the Programme revised. A great deal in it is out of date. The minimum programme must be changed.

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* That is, a state of which the Paris Commune was the prototype.

** We must call ourselves the *Communist Party*, instead of "Social-Democratic", for the official Social-Democrat leaders *throughout* the world have betrayed socialism and have gone over to the bourgeoise (the "defencists" and wavering "Kautskians").

*** "Centre" is the name given among international Social-Democrats to the trend which wavers between the chauvinists (=the "defencists") and the internationalists, namely, Kautsky and Co. in Germany; Longuet and Co. in France; Chkheidze and Co. in Russia; Turati and Co. in Italy; MacDonald and Co. in Britain, etc.

I personally propose that we change the name of our Party and call it the *Communist Party*. The people will understand the name of "Communist". Most of the official Social-Democrats have committed treason, they have betrayed socialism.... Liebknecht is the one Social-Democrat.... You are afraid of betraying old recollections. But if you want to change your underwear you must take off your dirty shirt and put on a clean one. Why throw out the experience of world-wide struggle? Most of the Social-Democrats throughout the world have betrayed socialism, and have sided with their governments (Scheidemann, Plekhanov, Guesde). What is to be done to make Scheidemann agree?... This point of view spells ruin for socialism. It would be deception to send a radio telegram to Scheidemann about ending the war....

The term "Social-Democracy" is inexact. Don't cling to an old word which has become rotten through and through. If you want to build a new party ... and all the oppressed will come to you.

The Centre prevailed at Zimmerwald and Kienthal.... *Rabochaya Gazeta*. We shall prove to you that the whole of experience has shown.... We declare that we have formed a Left wing and have broken with the Centre. Either you speak about the International, then carry out..., or you....

The Left Zimmerwald trend exists in all the countries of the world. The masses must realise that socialism has split throughout the world. The defencists have renounced socialism. Liebknecht alone.... The future is with him.

I have heard that there is a tendency in Russia towards unification, towards unity with the defencists. This is betrayal of socialism. I think it is better to remain alone, like Liebknecht: one against 110.

First published
on November 7, 1924
in *Pravda* No. 255

Printed from the *Pravda* text

TO J. S. HANECKI AND KARL RADEK

Comrades Hanecki and Radek: Herrn Fürstenberg
8. Birgerjarlsgatan. 8. Stockholm

April 12, 1917

Dear Friends,

Up to now we have received nothing, absolutely nothing from you—no letters, no packets, no money.[518] Only two telegrams from Hanecki. We are sending you two files of *Pravda*: one for you, the other for Karpinsky (Mr. Karpinsky. Bibliothèque russe. 7. rue Hugo de Senger. 7. Genève. (Genf) Suisse), and two sets of cuttings: one for you, the other for Karpinsky.

Notify us by postcard (M. T. Yelizarov for V. I. Shirokaya Ul., 48, kv. 24. Petrograd) or by telegram that you have received this letter and the papers.

Steinberg[519] has arrived, and promises to get hold of the packets which were sent. We shall see whether he succeeds.

If you get the newspapers, they will give you an idea of the whole situation.

In case the papers don't reach you, let me describe it in brief.

The bourgeoisie (+Plekhanov) are furiously attacking us for travelling through Germany. They are trying to incite the soldiers against us. So far it isn't coming off: there are supporters, and loyal ones, among them. Among the S.R.s and the Social-Democrats there is the most desperate chauvinist excitement, which has taken the form of "revolutionary defencism" (now, they allege, there is something to defend, namely, the republic against Wilhelm).

We are being furiously attacked for opposing "unity", while the masses are for the unity of all Social-Democrats. We are against.

Chkheidze has sunk *completely* into "revolutionary defencism". In a bloc with Potresov. *All* are for the Liberty Loan.[520] It is opposed only by us+the *Nashe Slovo* group+Larin and a handful of Martov's friends.

We are calling an all-Russia conference of Bolsheviks on April 22, 1917.[521]

We hope completely to straighten out the line of *Pravda*, which has wobbled towards "Kautskyism".[522]

Write articles for *Pravda* on foreign affairs—very short and in the *Pravda* spirit (it's so small! There is so little space! We are working to enlarge it). Also, most briefly, about the German revolutionary movement and the Leftist press.

Write us a letter about the doings among the Swedish Left.[523] We have heard that the chauvinist Branting is attacking Radek.

At the beginning of the revolution, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies concluded an *agreement* with the Provisional Government for *support* of the latter.[524] There is a "Contact Commission": the Soviet "supervises" the Provisional Government.

The position is extremely complex and exceptionally interesting. We are publishing pamphlets on tactics.[525] The Soviet wants a *general*, international socialist congress. We want *only* a congress of the Left, against the social-chauvinists and against the "Centre".

I shake your hands, and wish you all the best. Write as often as you can and be very regular and careful in your contacts.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Petrograd to Stockholm

First published in 1923 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 9 (21)

Printed from the original

THESES ON THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT DECLARATION

Theses

1) Peace without annexations =	a world revolution against capital.
2) Revision of the treaty = "Steps for an agreement with the Allies."	either a farce, or a world revolution against capital.
2 *bis*) Puffing the capitalists: "Allied democracies": glossing over the class struggle.	
3) All land to the *peasants* —	this can be realised even without a revolution against capital, by means of a *bloc*, an *alliance* of the capitalists and the *rich* peasants.
4) All land to the *working people* —	this cannot be realised without a revolution against capital.
5) Organisation of production —	either a fraud (and more enrichment for the capitalists) or a utopia without a revolution against capital.
6) "An offensive" —	a utopia without the greatest revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses,

which can flow only from the greatest revolution, a revolution against capital.

7) Departure from the Soviets,
betrayal of them,
transition to *bureaucracy*:
"state control", we are *for*. But *by whom*?
Who is to exercise control?
Officials?
Or the Soviets?

8) Constituent Assembly on land:

already out of date

9) No confidence and no support!

10) Even more strongly: explanation of the *proletarian* line, drawing a distinction between it and the *petty-boureois* line

ΣΣ = *a Ministry of petty-bourgeois illusions and petty-bourgeois compromise.*

Written not before May 4, (17) 1917

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A REPORT ON THE SEVENTH (APRIL) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) AT A MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANISATION MAY 8 (21), 1917

I

"Victory"! Hence ... chaos of phrases, moods, "exaltations" ... "revolutionary democracy"=*reactionary* democracy....

(α) Ministry (support of the capitalists)....

(β) for the offensive....

(γ) against taking the land....

(δ) against fraternisation....

Separation of the proletarian class line=formation of a mass proletarian party ....

Reorganisation of all parties....

|| Capitalists ....

|| (Trudoviks) Narodniks and Mensheviks

||| Proletarian party

"all like children"
(*Zemlya i Volya* No. 36)
(May 6, 1917)

Verses "From Springtime Moods" by *Ilya Ilyin*

"All like children! The day is so rosy!
No night! There'll be no slumber!
As though there were no frosts,
As though spring reigns eternal!"

No. 47 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, October 13, 1915. Theses Nos. *8-11*.[526]

Wavering of the petty bourgeoisie = the essence. But the petty bourgeoisie = tens and tens of millions, "a host of hosts", a multitude of groups and strata, subgroups and substrata, etc., etc. A *supremely protracted* process....

II

The main points in *all* resolutions:

(1) The war: capitalists
revolutionary defencists (Narodniks and Mensheviks)....
internationalist proletarians

(2) Attitude to the Provisional Government:
capitalists
Contact Commission (Narodniks and Mensheviks)
internationalist proletarians.

(3) *Agrarian*:
landowners and capitalists
{ "*not to take the land*" (*Narodniks and Mensheviks*) (in § 4)
not to separate out agricultural wage-workers
not to advance to socialism.... (§§ 8 and 9)[527]
internationalist proletarians.

(4) Borgbjerg and the *International*.[528]

+(5) three trends: (α) for the capitalists
(β) waverers (Narodniks and Mensheviks)
(γ) internationalist proletarians

+(6) Coalition Ministry
capitalists in the majority
Narodniks and Mensheviks
proletarians.

(7) National question: Finland
capitalists
Mensheviks
proletarians.

(8) Alliance with the internationalists against the petty-bourgeois defencist bloc....

(9) The present moment: attitude to socialism
(α) capitalists
(β) Mensheviks and Narodniks (not socialism)
(γ) proletarians.
(10) Party Programme. ΣΣ about *imperialism*
about the *state*
about the *International*.
N.B. (11) Advance to socialism.
(12) The Soviets { development in the localities, a brake in the centre }
ΣΣ=*new elections*....
((V.O.!))[529]

III

New conditions:
{{ (α) Unprecedented legality
(β) Tens of millions before us...
(γ) Eve of unprecedented collapse
(war—and famine) (main thing).
*Inde**: Be as firm as a rock in maintaining the proletarian line
{ against petty-bourgeois waverings — —
— —influence the masses by *persuasion*, "*explanation*"—
— —prepare for a collapse and a revolution *1,000 times more powerful than the February one*.
Waverings of the petty bourgeoisie: { Trotsky.... Larin and Binshtok Martov *Novaya Zhizn* }
The masses: (Peasant Congress[530])
The old personnel of agitators+propagandists+*organisers* +etc.?
New forces (*shortage of people*).
(α) Big meetings of Party members (like this one).
(β) *Tenfold multiplication of groups* of agitators+ propagandists+*organisers*.

* Hence.—*Ed.*

How? *I don't know*. But I know for certain that without this it's *no use even talking* about a revolution by the proletariat.

(γ) Group agitation—on a massive scale (versus meetings)

(γ) ditto *organisation*.

(δ) The maximum of Marxism = the maximum of popular style and simplicity (*Umschlag**)

(δ) The party of the proletariat and semi-proletariat = the party of the workers and poor peasants....

(δ) The maximum of Marxism = (*Umschlag*) the maximum of popular style.

The poor peasants.

Demagogy? Everyone was accused of this in all revolutions.

Marxism is the guarantee....

Written between May 6 and 8 (19 and 21), 1917

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

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* Transition of one into the other.—*Ed*.

FOR THE CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[531]

Phrase-mongering about revolution and halting (=throttling) of the revolution by the Narodniks and Mensheviks.

The "new" government[532]:

(1) Lockout experts....

...(2) Draggers-out of the slaughter....

...(3) Saviours of the landowner....

||The offensive (for peace without annexations).

||Secret treaties (and peace without annexations).

||Finland (and peace without annexations—and *democracy*).

Delay on the land (cf. the peasant Soviet and Conference of State Duma members[533] versus the Chief Land Committee).[534]

Lockout experts (and persecution of workmen).

Schlisselburg and Kronstadt—the post and telegraph employees (Ministers for pacification, or Ministers for throttling revolution? Ministers for dispatches to pacify?)

Tereshchenko+Shingaryov+Lvov and Co.=practical men....

Kerensky=Minister of Revolutionary Histrionics....

Economic ruin and catastrophe (and promises).

Bloc of Mensheviks+Narodniks (S.R.)+*Yedinstvo*....

Bloc of the petty and big bourgeoisie *against* the workers....

Written in the first half of June 1917

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

NOTE TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev

Entre nous: if they do me in, I ask you to publish my notebook: "Marxism on the State" (it got left behind in Stockholm).[535] It's bound in a blue cover. It contains a collection of all the quotations from Marx and Engels, likewise from Kautsky against Pannekoek. There are a number of remarks and notes, and formulations. I think it could be published after a week's work. I believe it to be important, because not only Plekhanov but also Kautsky have bungled things. The condition: all this is absolutely *entre nous*!

Written between July 5 (18) and 7 (20), 1917

First published in 1924 in the publisher's preface to N. Lenin *The State and Revolution, The Marxist Theory of the State, and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*. Moscow, Krasnaya Nov Publishers

Printed from the book text

TO N. I. PODVOISKY OR V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

November 26, 1917

To the Staff (for Podvoisky or Antonov)

The bearers are railwaymen comrades from Orenburg. *Urgent* military aid against Dutov is required. Please discuss and decide on *practical* steps as soon as possible. Write to me what you have decided.

Lenin

First published on February 23, 1927 in *Pravda* No. 44

Printed from the *Pravda* text

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) NOVEMBER 29 (DECEMBER 12), 1917

MINUTES[536]

1

The question of the composition of *Pravda*'s editorial board[537] is under discussion. N. I. Bukharin suggests that he be released from work in the Economic Conference, to enable him to devote himself entirely to work in *Pravda*.

Comrade Lenin points out that up to now the Economic Conference has not received sufficient attention, yet it is one of the most important factors in current state construction,[538] and therefore needs expert men, like Comrade Bukharin. Therefore he insists that Comrade Bukharin should not be on *Pravda*'s editorial board.

2

Yelena Stasova proposes an editorial board for *Pravda* composed of the following three: J. V. Stalin, G. Y. Sokolnikov and N. I. Bukharin.

Comrade Lenin proposes a different three: Sokolnikov, Stalin and Trotsky.

3

An application from A. I. Rykov, L. B. Kamenev, V. P. Milyutin and V. P. Nogin for readmission to the C.C. of the Party is under discussion.

Comrade Lenin reads a rough draft of his reply to this application,[539] pointing out that the statement of the four

shows clearly their complete disagreement with us, since they consider that the C.C. has made concessions. He makes the concrete proposal that the four should be required to state in writing where they want their letter to go, i.e., whether they want it printed in the press. For our part we do not intend to send it to the press, but reply to them in writing that we are not taking them back.

First published in 1929 in the book: *Protokoly TsK R.S.D.R.P. August 1917-fevral 1918* (Minutes of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. August 1917-February 1918)

Printed from the manuscript minutes

SESSION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DECEMBER 1 (14), 1917

1

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF SETTING UP A SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL[540]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin speaks in defence of the Soviet draft, pointing out that the Supreme Economic Council cannot be reduced to a parliament, but must be the same kind of fighting organ for combating the capitalists and landowners in the economy as the Council of People's Commissars is in politics.

Published on December 3 (16) 1917 in the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* No. 192

Printed from the newspaper text

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV AND F. E. DZERZHINSKY

Comrade Shlyapnikov and Comrade Dzerzhinsky

The bearer, Comrade Vorobyov, a delegate from the Urals, has excellent references from his local organisation. In the Urals, there is a most acute problem. The boards of the Urals works *here* (with offices in Petrograd) should be *arrested* immediately, threatened with (revolutionary) court proceedings for bringing about a crisis in the Urals, while all the works in the Urals should be *confiscated*. Draw up a draft decree as soon as possible.[541]

Lenin

Written at the beginning of December 1917

First published on April 22, 1920 in the newspaper *Uralsky Rabochy* No. 95

Printed from the original

FROM A PUBLICIST'S DIARY

Themes for Elaboration[542]

1. "The man with the gun need no longer be feared."
*1 bis**: Living quarters and food for the poor.
*1 ter***: The weak spots of the Soviet power, which is just starting out.
2. "Propaganda by deed."
3. Agitator or prosecutor?
4. Practicalism and "positive work".
5. Organisational work and organisers from among the people.
5 bis: cf. *Pravda* until April 4 on miracles of organisation.[543]
6. Our attitude to the anarchists.
6 bis: Anarchists by mistake—through impatience—in mood—by instinct.
7. Discontented among the workers.
8. The intelligentsia's red tape and slovenliness.
9. Has the resistance of the capitalists been broken down? (Historic phrase of the good Peshekhonov.[544])
9 bis: Civil war, its significance, its burdens (deserters), its inevitability in 1917-18.
10. National chauvinism in the oppressor and in the oppressed nations.
10 bis: The parasitism of the petty bourgeoisie and the Finnish Social-Democrats' betrayal.
11. How to "win over" to the side of the Russian Socialist Republic of Soviets other nations, in general, and

* Second.—*Ed.*
** Third.—*Ed.*

the nations formerly oppressed by the Great Russians, in particular?

12. Suppression of the exploiters.

13. How to organise emulation?

14. Accounting and control, as the essence of socialism.

14 bis: Mobile groups of controllers.

14 ter: Rogues in revolutions.

15. To manage factories or to argue about socialism?

16. Workers' discipline and the habits of tramps.

16a. The death sentence and shootings of thieves by the Red Guards.

17. What do tramps and intellectuals have in common?

17 bis: "Right-wing Bolshevism"; is there room for it in our Party?

18. The Constituent Assembly and the Socialist Republic of Soviets.

The waves of revolution follow one upon the other not smoothly, not evenly, not all in the same way.

18 *bis*: The formal democracy of the bourgeoisie and (versus) the machinery of the proletariat for drawing the people into the war against the bourgeoisie.

18 ter: Democracy and (versus) the dictatorship of the proletariat.

19. Quotation from Plekhanov's 1903 speech.[545] In what does "their" complete ideological collapse lie (of the petty-bourgeois, opportunist socialists, Mensheviks, Right-wing and Chernov S.R.s, the *Novaya Zhizn* group and Co.)?



20. A "separate peace", its dangers and its possible significance. Is a separate peace an "understanding" ("compromise") with the imperialists?

20 *bis*: A separate peace and our duty to the international proletariat. "*Die Deutschen brauchen eine Niederlage*."*[546]

21. Steps or stages in the revolution. Taking account of class forces and allies. Peace and land—in Russia.

* "The Germans need a defeat."—*Ed*.

22. Imperialists' provocation: Republic of Soviets, give us a convenient pretext for throttling you as soon as possible!

22 bis: *Pravda* of Dec. 24; "Their plan." Lloyd George's historic words. "About Russia."[547]

23. Revolutionary internationalists going over to "defencism".

24. The foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Soviets.

25. Revolutionary phrases and revolutionary duty in the matter of revolutionary war.

26. How to "prepare" a revolutionary war?

27. The revolutionary war of a proletariat in power can only be a war for consolidated socialism.

28. First defeat the bourgeoisie in Russia, then fight the foreign, alien bourgeoisie.

29. The difficulties of revolution in the West-European "parasitic" countries.

31.* Revolutions—locomotives of history.
Put the locomotive into top gear and keep it on the rails.

32. To raise the very lowest strata to making history: *Mit dem Umfang der geschichtlichen Action wird auch der Umfang der Masse zunehmen*, *deren Action sie ist*. "With the thoroughness of the historical action the size of the mass whose action it is will therefore increase."[548]

33. Κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί.** { Already gained:
(α) Maximum democracy
(β) Concretisation of the first steps to socialism
(γ) Peace and land }

34. Finances and food.
Centre and localities.

35. "Harassment" of profiteers and saboteurs.

36. Money. Its role. Its attraction into the "Treasury".

37. Nationalisation of industry and the workers' "duty" at work.

38. State monopoly of foreign trade.

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* No. 30 is not in the MS.—*Ed*.

** Acquisition for good.—*Ed*.

39. The fisc ("Treasury") and the transformation of this concept in a socialist revolution.
40. Banks as a form of accounting.
(Pyatakov's article in *Pravda*.[549])
41. "Gaining time"=a separate peace (*until* a Europe-wide revolution).
42. Three "dates". The "defeats" of Apr. 20 and July 3 versus the victory of Oct. 25.
43. Comparison of this "defeat" with a separate peace.
44. Distribution of labour and distribution of products =ΣΣ.

Economic questions:
The national question:
Political questions:
Questions of organisation:
Foreign policy:

Written on December 24-27, 1917
(January 6-9, 1918)

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

DRAFT DECREE ON CONSUMERS' COMMUNES[550]

1

PRELIMINARY THESES

The drafts put forward by the Commissariat for Food for "supply boards", "delegate committees", etc., and similarly the draft of the Supreme Economic Council for "district economic councils"[551] suggest the need to amalgamate such bodies.

Preliminary theses:

(*Etwa**): supply and marketing committees?

The basic unit should be consumer and producer (better than purchasing and trading, etc.) volost societies, playing the part both of supply committees and marketing agencies. In case of need, volost boundaries could be made alterable.

In the towns a similar place could perhaps be taken by block committees or committees for sections of blocks.

If we manage to set up such committees, basic units, in the localities, the amalgamation of these committees would provide a network capable of properly organising the supply of the whole population with all essentials, and of organising production on a national scale.

Possibly instead of "societies" these could be Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, with the participation of commercial employees, etc., etc.

Every such society or committee or Soviet (or supply and marketing committee) would be divided up into sections or departments, according to *goods* marketed and *types of products* supplied, for the general regulation of production and consumption (a department for finance, or for cash

* Roughly.—*Ed.*

receipts and disbursements, should be attached to every supply and marketing committee). With the right of levying income tax and granting interest-free credits to the poor, and also universal labour service, this might be the basic unit of socialist society. The volost banks would then have to be amalgamated with the state savings banks, being transformed into a state-wide accounting department, aggregate of the state's receipts and disbursements accounts.

The transportation of products, and likewise their purchase and sale, would then be permitted *only* from one supply and marketing committee to another, all individual marketing being prohibited. On certificates issued by volost (or generally the "basic", lowest) supply and marketing committees, products could be sold also to individuals from central stores, provided that these transactions are recorded in the books of the volost or other supply and marketing committees (except within small units, or for trifles). No transportation of products would be permitted without certificates from the supply and marketing committee.

This would be the unification of the Commissariats for Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Labour, and Food, and the Supreme Economic Council, and the Commissariats for Finance and Communications.

N.B.: "Supply and marketing committees": volost, uyezd, gubernia and district. (ΣΣ = the S.E.C.) Their departments: Central Textile Board, Central Sugar Board, Central Coal Board, etc. (ΣΣ = the S.E.C), Central Bank, etc.

N.B.: Representatives of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies should superintend the well-to-do quarters in towns (or well-to-do country-house settlements, etc.), i.e., those quarters, etc., where the percentage of workers and peasants is lower than, say, 60 per cent.

Written on December 24-27, 1917
(January 6-9, 1918)

First published on January 22, 1929
in *Izvestia* No. 18

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Antonov, at His Staff. Kharkov

I welcome whole-heartedly your energetic activity and ruthless struggle against the Kaledinites. I entirely approve of your refusal to make concessions to the local conciliators, who, it seems, have led astray a section of the Bolsheviks. I particularly approve of and welcome the arrest of the millionaire saboteurs in the first- and second-class railway carriage.[552] I advise you to send them for six months to do forced labour in the mines. Once again I greet you for your resolution, and condemn the waverers.

Lenin

Written between December 21 and 28, 1917 (January 3 and 10, 1918)

Published on January 12, 1918 (December 30, 1917) in *Pravda* No. 226

Printed from the telegraph form text

1918

SPEECHES ON WAR AND PEACE AT A MEETING OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) JANUARY 11 (24), 1918

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin speaks first and points out that at the meeting on January 8 (21) three standpoints were brought out on this question, and asks whether the question should be discussed point by point on the theses he put forward, or whether a general discussion should be opened. The second alternative is adopted, and Comrade Lenin has the floor.

He begins by setting forth the three standpoints brought out at the previous meeting (1) signing a separate annexationist peace, (2) waging a revolutionary war, and (3) proclaiming the war ended, demobilising the army, but not signing a peace treaty. At the previous meeting, the first standpoint received 15 votes, the second 32 and the third 16.

Comrade Lenin points out that the Bolsheviks have never renounced defence, but this defence and protection of the fatherland must have a definite, concrete context, which exists at the present time, namely, defence of the Socialist Republic against an extremely strong international imperialism. The question is only one of how we should defend our fatherland, the Socialist Republic. The army is excessively fatigued by the war; the horses are in such a state that in the event of an offensive we shall not be able to move the artillery; the Germans are holding such favourable positions on the islands in the Baltic that if they start an offensive they could take Reval and Petrograd

with their bare hands. By continuing the war in such conditions, we shall greatly strengthen German imperialism, peace will have to be concluded just the same, but then the peace will be still worse because it is not we who will be concluding it. The peace we are now forced to conclude is undoubtedly an ignominious one, but if war begins, our government will be swept away and peace will be concluded by a different government. At present, we are relying not only on the proletariat but also on the poor peasantry, which will abandon us if the war continues. Drawing out the war is in the interest of French, British and American imperialism, and proof of this, for example, is the offer made at Krylenko's headquarters by the Americans to pay 100 rubles for every Russian soldier. Those who take the standpoint of revolutionary war stress that we shall then be engaged in a civil war with German imperialism, and shall thereby awaken revolution in Germany. But Germany, after all, is still only pregnant with revolution, whereas we have already given birth to a quite healthy infant, the Socialist Republic, which we may kill if we start the war. We are in possession of a circular letter of the German Social-Democrats, there is information about the attitude to us of two trends in the Centre, of which one considers that we have been bought, and that the current events in Brest are a farce, with the actors playing out their parts. This section is attacking us for the armistice. The other section of the Kautskyites says that the personal honesty of the leaders of the Bolsheviks is beyond all doubt, but that the Bolsheviks' behaviour is a psychological riddle.[553] We don't know the opinion of the Left-wing Social-Democrats. The British workers are supporting our efforts for peace. Of course, the peace we conclude will be an ignominious one, but we need a breathing space in order to carry out social reforms (take transport alone); we need to consolidate ourselves, and this takes time. We need to complete the crushing of the bourgeoisie, but for this we need to have both our hands free. Once we have done this, we shall free both our hands, and then we should be able to carry on a revolutionary war against international imperialism. The echelons of the revolutionary volunteer army which have now been formed are the officers of our future army.

What Comrade Trotsky is proposing—an end to the war, refusal to sign a peace treaty and demobilisation of the army—is an international political demonstration. The only thing we achieve by withdrawing our troops is handing over the Estonian Socialist Republic to the Germans. It is said that by concluding peace we are giving a free hand to the Japanese and Americans, who will immediately occupy Vladivostok. By the time they have even reached Irkutsk, we shall have been able to strengthen our Socialist Republic. By signing a peace treaty we of course betray self-determined Poland, but we retain the Estonian Socialist Republic and win a chance to consolidate our gains. Of course, we make a turn to the right, which leads through a very dirty stable, but we must do it. If the Germans start an offensive, we shall be forced to sign any peace treaty, and then, of course, it will be worse. An indemnity of three thousand million is not too high a price for saving the Socialist Republic. By signing peace now, we give the broad masses a visual demonstration that the imperialists (of Germany, Britain and France), having taken Riga and Baghdad, are continuing to fight, whereas we are developing, the Socialist Republic is developing.

2

Comrade Lenin points out that he is not in agreement on some points with his supporters Stalin and Zinoviev.[554] Of course, there is a mass movement in the West, but the revolution there has not yet begun. But if we were to alter our tactics because of that, we should be traitors to international socialism. He does not agree with Zinoviev that the conclusion of peace will for a time weaken the movement in the West. If we believe that the German movement can develop immediately, in the event of an interruption of the peace negotiations, then we must sacrifice ourselves, for the German revolution will have a force much greater than ours. But the whole point is that the movement there has not yet begun, but over here it already has a newborn and loudly shouting infant, and unless we now say clearly that we agree to peace, we shall perish. It is important for

us to hold out until the general socialist revolution gets under way, but this we can only achieve by concluding peace.

3

Comrade Lenin motions a vote on the proposition that we drag out the signing of a peace treaty in every possible way.

First published in 1922
in N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov),
Sobraniye Sochinenii
(Collected Works), Vol. XV

Printed from
the manuscript minutes

TO THE NAVAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

January 15, 1918

Please take urgent measures to provide Comrade Ter-Arutyunyants immediately with 2,000 sailors for operations against the bourgeois Rada.[555]

Lenin

First published in 1924
in the book *Lenin i Krasny Flot*
(Lenin and the Red Navy)

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

People's Commissar Antonov, Kharkov

Your telegram received. I welcome the adherence of the Cossacks,[556] whose delegates are already here and have joined the Congress of Soviets. As regards Mogilev, I have just informed Podvoisky and shall also inform Krylenko; as for the land question on the Don, I advise you to bear in mind the text of the resolution adopted the day before yesterday at the Congress of Soviets on the federation of the Soviet Republics.[557] This resolution should fully reassure the Cossacks. Please inform the Secretariat that Zatonsky has left for Kharkov; and that, when leaving, he asked Comrade Artyom to be appointed his deputy. Reply immediately.

Lenin

Written on January 17 (30), 1918
Sent from Petrograd to Kharkov

First published in part in 1924 in the book by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanshoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vol. I, Moscow

Published in full in 1932 in V. I. Lenin *Sobraniye Sochinenii* (Collected Works), Second and Third editions, Vol. XIX

Printed from the telegraph form text

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

People's Commissar Antonov, Kharkov

In view of complaints by the People's Secretariat of friction which has arisen between you and the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine,[558] I request you to inform me of your side of the matter. Naturally our interference in the internal affairs of the Ukraine, unless required by military necessity, is undesirable. It is more proper to have the various measures adopted through the local authorities, and in general it is best to settle all misunderstandings on the spot.

Lenin

Written before January 21, 1918
Sent from Petrograd to Kharkov

First published in 1924 in the book by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanshoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vol. I

Printed from the telegraph form text

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

January 21, 1918

Comrade Antonov,

I have received a complaint against you from the Central Executive Committee (at Kharkov). I very much regret that my request to you to come to an understanding did not reach you. Please, contact me as soon as you can (by direct line, single or double, through Kharkov) so that we can talk the thing out and get a really good understanding between ourselves. It is my earnest request that you make *every* effort to *eliminate all* friction with the (Kharkov) C.E.C. This is *of the utmost importance* to the *state*. I beg you to make peace with them, and recognise their sovereignty *in every possible form*. I earnestly ask you to recall the commissars you have appointed.

I very much hope that you will fulfil this request, and reach *absolute* peace with the Kharkov C.E.C. This calls for *super-tact* on a *national* plane.

As regards the victories over Kaledin and Co., I send you warmest greetings, good wishes and congratulations. Hurrah and hurrah! I warmly shake your hand.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1924 in the book by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanshoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vol. I

Printed from the original

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) JANUARY 24 (FEBRUARY 6), 1918[559]

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin believes that the agenda of the Congress should consist of the Party Programme, the question of peace, and tactical questions.

2

N. I. Bukharin, Y. M. Sverdlov and J. V. Stalin table concrete proposals for the agenda of the Party's Seventh Congress.

Comrade Lenin agrees with all the previous speakers, but he is worried by the vast number of October Bolsheviks in the Party, a fact which may hinder the Congress in working out a consistent programme.

3

Comrade Lenin considers it essential that in admitting members a mandatory inscription be made concerning the date of joining the Party: before Oct. 25 or after; and that it is essential that new members recognise the mandatory nature of the tactics which the Party found correct in relation to the October Revolution.

First published in 1929 in the book: *Protokoly TsK R.S.D.R.P. August 1917-fevral 1918* (Minutes of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. August 1917-February 1918)

Printed from the manuscript minutes

TELEGRAM TO M. A. MURAVYOV

Commander-in-Chief Muravyov, Kiev

February 14, 1918

In the absence of orders from Antonov to the contrary, act as energetically as possible on the Rumanian front, by agreement with Rakovsky and his commission.

Lenin

Sent from Petrograd to Kiev

First published in 1924 in the book by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanshoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vol. I

Printed from the original

TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF M. A. MURAVYOV, TO THE SUPREME RUMANIAN BOARD, TO THE PEOPLE'S SECRETARIAT OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC, FOR V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

To Yudovsky, Rumcherod,[560] for transmission to Commander-in-Chief Muravyov, Odessa, for Commander-in-Chief Muravyov, to the Supreme Rumanian Board, to the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic for Antonov

In view of the serious situation on the Russo-Rumanian front and the need for urgent support of the revolutionary detachments in Bessarabia, Commander-in-Chief Muravyov and his northern army are seconded to the Supreme Rumanian Board. We do not doubt for a moment that the valiant heroes of the liberation of Kiev will do their revolutionary duty without delay.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 17, 1918

First published in 1924 in the book by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanshoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vol. I

Printed from the telegraph form text

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) FEBRUARY 18, 1918[561]

MINUTES

1

We cannot postpone discussion of the question, because if the Germans do not accept our offers of peace, we carry on a revolutionary war.

2

There is one point for achieving united tactics. If the offensive becomes a fact, then we sign peace. It is possible that the Germans have done a deal with the French, and this is a question not of Poland but of overthrowing the Soviet Government.

Indefinite tactics now are out of place. We have to act. If the Germans carry on a war by agreement with the French, then we carry on a revolutionary war. We have to demonstrate this clearly to the people. That is why we need either an armistice or a peace. We may muddle people's understanding. We shall be unable to hold the masses. There is no reply to the radio message. Everyone will have to fight. It will be a different grouping. To drag on means to obscure the understanding of the masses. They are losing their land. We shall have concluded peace with the people, not with imperialism.

3

We must send out information all over Russia to prepare.

First published in 1929 in the book: *Protokoly TsK R.S.D.R.P. August 1917-fevral 1918* (Minutes of the C.C. of the R.S.D.R.P. August 1917-February 1918)

Printed from the manuscript minutes

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) FEBRUARY 23, 1918[562]

MINUTES

1

Comrade Lenin believes that the policy of revolutionary phrases is at an end. If this policy is continued, he will resign both from the government and from the Central Committee. An army is needed for a revolutionary war, and it does not exist. That means the terms must be accepted.

2

Comrade Lenin. Some have reproached me for coming out with an ultimatum. I put it as a last resort. It is a mockery for our Central Committee members to talk of an international civil war. There is a civil war in Russia, but not in Germany. Our agitation remains. We are agitating not by words, but by the revolution. That too remains. Stalin is wrong when he says that we need not sign. These terms must be signed. If you don't sign them, you will sign the Soviet power's death warrant within three weeks. These terms do not infringe on the Soviet power. I have not the slightest hesitation. I put the ultimatum not in order to withdraw it. I don't want revolutionary phrases. The German revolution has not yet matured. This will take months. The terms must be accepted. If there is another ultimatum later, it will be in a new situation.

3

Comrade Lenin. I also consider it essential to prepare for a revolutionary war. The treaty can be interpreted, and we shall interpret it. The demobilisation there is in a purely military sense. Before the war, we also had an army. A revolutionary war needs serious preparation. I do not doubt for a second that the masses stand for peace.

4

Lenin proposes the following for voting: (1) Are the German proposals to be accepted immediately? (2) Is a revolutionary war to be prepared for immediately? (3) Is a poll of Soviet electors in Petrograd and Moscow to be taken immediately?

5

Comrade Lomov asks whether Vladimir Ilyich allows of silent or open agitation against signing the peace.

Comrade Lenin replies in the affirmative.

6

In view of the statement by several members of the C.C. that they are resigning all their responsible Soviet and Party posts, Y. M. Sverdlov proposes that members of the C.C. remain at their posts until the Congress, and carry on their agitation within the Party.

Comrade Lenin is in favour of discussing the question raised by Sverdlov as, first, there are three days to go before the signing and, second, twelve days for ratification. Consequently, it will be possible to canvass the Party and, if it comes out against signing, ratification will not follow; but as time is short today, he suggests postponing the question until tomorrow.

7

Comrade Stalin asks whether resignation from their posts does not in effect mean withdrawal from the Party.

Comrade Lenin points out that resignation from the C.C. does not mean withdrawal from the Party.

8

Comrade Lenin suggests that the comrades should leave the sessions during the voting and should not sign any documents, so as not to bear any responsibility, but should not give up their work in the Council.

First published in 1922
in N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov),
Sobraniye Sochinenii
(Collected Works), Vol. XV

Printed from
the manuscript minutes

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Urgent. To People's Commissar Antonov,
wherever he may be

Take Rostov today at all costs.

Lenin

Written on February 23, 1918

First published in 1924 in the book by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanshoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vol. I

Printed from the telegraph form text

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Antonov, Rostov-on-Don, wherever he may be

Our warmest greetings to all the dedicated fighters for socialism, and greetings to the revolutionary Cossacks. In reply to your telegram from Novocherkassk[563] we inform you: let a plenipotentiary congress of urban and rural Soviets of the whole Don Region work out its own draft land law, and submit it to the Council of People's Commissars for endorsement. That will be better. I have nothing against the autonomy of the Don Region. The geographical boundaries of this autonomous region must be fixed by agreement with the population of the neighbouring zone and the autonomous republic of the Donets Basin. We cannot send you a delegate, everyone here has his hands full. We ask you to represent the Council of People's Commissars, or to appoint someone at your discretion.

Lenin, *Stalin*

Written on February 28, 1918
Published on March 20 (7), 1918 in the newspaper *Donskiye Izvestia* No. 1

Printed from the telegraph form text

MATERIAL FOR THE FOURTH (EXTRAORDINARY) ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[564]

1

NOTES FOR A SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE CONGRESS

1. The turning-point: Oct. 25, 1917-Feb. 17, 1918 and later
2. Peace at Brest-Litovsk and now ... (Trotsky versus the supporters of revolutionary war"....
3. "Breathing space."
4. Economic burdens ... but what about Belgium?
5. "Betrayal."
   A phrase.
   2 versus 10 and 200,000 versus 1,000,000.[565]
6. The Ukraine and Finland.
7. The standpoint of the peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie, the declassed soldier....
8. Class forces and the "obnoxious peace". What about the Russian bourgeoisie?
9. The "leftism" of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.
10. Even "despair"?
11. Using the "crack", "contradictions", the strategic deployment of forces: Germany—Britain—Japan—America....

N.B.: *11 bis*: *Tilsit*. Peace and war, their interconnection.

12. Biding time, retreating and waiting.

What for? Who for? The international revolution.

13. Building up forces. *For* "defence of the fatherland". Discipline and discipline (up to and including draconic measures).

Written on March 12-18, 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

2

NOTES FOR A REPORT ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE PEACE TREATY

1. Understand the turning-point in history, the shift in the balance of classes and social forces.
2. The "independence" of the Russian revolution, Feb. 23 (1917)-Feb. 11 (1918). (The causes.)
3. Triumphal advance: Oct. 25 (1917)-Feb. 11 (1918)
4. Imperialism: an epoch of heavy defeats, retreats Not the same enemy. No army.
5. An "extra-historical" statement of the question. The bourgeoisie and its yes-men.
6. Who disorganised the army?
7. The Vinnichenkos = the Kerenskys + the Tseretelis + the Chernovs.
8. Provocation and trap. "Glad of the Germans" ....
9. Despair and phrase-mongering. Phrase-mongering and bragging: among the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries [in our ranks < 1/10th (453 and 36 and 8 = 497)][566].... (The demoralised army....)
10. Compare 1907 and 1918.
11. The peasantry and phrase-mongering.
12. "Breathing space." *Defence of the fatherland.*
13. 2 and 10; 200,000 and 1,000,000.
14. The Tilsit peace and a weak German people (*only* weak and backward). Peace and war in their interconnection.
15. We are waiting, while retreating, for a *different* ally: the international socialist proletariat.

Written on March 13 or 14, 1918

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

TO THE TASHKENT CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE TURKESTAN TERRITORY, TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE TURKESTAN TERRITORY, FOR IBRAHIMOV AND KLEVLEYEV[567]

You can rest assured, comrades, that the Council of People's Commissars will support autonomy for your territory on Soviet principles; we welcome your initiatives, and are deeply convinced that you will cover the whole territory with a network of Soviets, and will act in close contact with the Soviets already in existence.

We ask you to send the commission for the calling of a Constituent Congress of Soviets, which you have undertaken to organise, to us here in Moscow, in order to work out together the question of defining the relations between the plenipotentiary organ of your territory and the Council of People's Commissars.

In greeting your Congress, we hope that you will be equal to the tasks imposed on it by history.

Moscow, April 22, 1918

Lenin and Stalin

Published on May 5 (April 22), 1918 in the newspaper *Shchit Naroda* No. 85

Printed from a typescript copy

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

June 14, 1918

Comrade Zinoviev,

Every effort must be made to send *hundreds* of agitators to the countryside from Petrograd immediately. This is particularly important now, on the eve of the Congress of Soviets,[568] and the *whole* military and food situation demands it even more insistently. We shall find the money, don't spare the cost. We have talked about this in detail with Svidersky (and Tsyurupa). Concentrate on this.

Greetings,
Lenin

Sent from Moscow to Petrograd

First published in part on January 21, 1925 in *Pravda* No. 17

Published in full in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO COMMISSAR IVANOV

Commissar Ivanov, Voronezh

The Left S.R. revolt and Muravyov's betrayal have been completely liquidated. Strong aid to the Czechoslovak front is needed.[569] All efforts on the Kuban front should be concentrated on full and reliable protection of the line from Tikhoretskaya to Tsaritsyn and from Tsaritsyn to the north, not on further advance.[570] Mekhonoshin, Kobozev and Blagonravov are temporarily in command on the Czechoslovak front.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 11, 1918
Sent from Moscow to Voronezh

First published in 1927
in the journal *Krasnoarmeyets*
No. 21 (114)

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO YEVGENIA BOSCH

To the Gubernia Executive Committee, Penza
A copy for Yevgenia Bogdanovna Bosch

Your telegram received.[571] Essential to organise a reinforced guard of selected and reliable people, to carry out a campaign of ruthless mass terror against the kulaks, priests and whiteguards; suspects to be shut up in a detention camp outside the city. Get the office working.[572] Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 9, 1918
Sent from Moscow to Penza

First published in 1924
in the journal
Proletarskaya Revolutsia
No. 3 (26)

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO THE PENZA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

August 12, 1918

Bosch, Gubernia Executive Committee, Penza

Your telegram received. Extremely surprised at the absence of information on the course and outcome of the suppression of the kulak rising in the five volosts. I do not want to think that you have displayed tardiness or weakness in crushing it, and in the model confiscation of all property, particularly grain, of the rebel kulaks.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Sent from Moscow to Penza

First published in 1924 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3 (26)

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO M. S. KEDROV

Secret

Kedrov, Gubernia Executive Committee, Vologda

The harmfulness of your departure has been shown by the absence of any leader when the British began their advance up the Dvina.

Now you must intensively make up for lost ground, contact Kotlas, send aviators there immediately and organise the defence of Kotlas at all costs.[573]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 12, 1918
Sent from Moscow to Vologda

First published in 1926
in the journal
Bolshevistskaya Mysl
No. 11 (13)

Printed from the original

TO N. I. MURALOV

August 29, 1918

Comrade Muralov,

Please give your assistance to the bearer, Comrade Malyshev, who is organising supplies of explosives for the group going to Kotlas. *The matter is supremely urgent.*

It is necessary that explosives should be got *without loss of time* from Vyazma (Malyshev will leave for Vyazma *this very day*, with a warrant from you).

You must also send a telegram to Kursk summoning Comrade *Sobolev*, a demolition instructor.

The demolition group require one carriage (fast) to Kotlas.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1926
in the journal
Sputnik Politrabotnika
No. 15 (45)

Printed from the original

DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON REPORTS BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATE[574]

That all Commissariats be instructed to draw up within one week a brief report, from two to five printed pages, on their work from Oct. 25, 1917.

That these reports be drawn up in the most popular language, with special attention to facts on the role of workers' organisations and representatives of the proletariat in government, to large-scale measures of a socialist nature and the struggle to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie.

That the same instruction be given to the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission.

That the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee be requested to take the same decision as regards its activity (with special emphasis on the Constitution and the results of the congresses of Soviets).

Written on August 29, 1918

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO M. F. VLADIMIRSKY

October 27, 1918

Comrade Vladimirsky (or any other member of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet)

The bearers are comrades from Vyborg. Please receive them *immediately*. Moreover, they point out the *excessively formalistic procedures* for admission to the Soviet building, the incredible captiousness of the guard, and the writing of absolutely unnecessary special passes. Can't this business be simplified?

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1924 in the book: *Ob Ilyiche. Sbornik statei, vospominany, dokumentov i nekotorykh materialov* (About Ilyich, A Collection of Articles, Reminiscences, Documents, and Some Material), Priboi Publishers

Printed from the original

RADIOGRAM FROM MOSCOW TO ONE AND ALL

To all frontier Soviets

According to the latest information, German soldiers have arrested a delegation of German generals on their way to negotiate an armistice. German soldiers have entered into direct negotiations with French soldiers. Kaiser Wilhelm has abdicated. Chancellor Prince of Baden has resigned. The new Chancellor is to be the government Social-Democrat Ebert. General strike has swept all major cities of Southern Germany. The whole German navy is on the side of the revolution. All German ports in the North Sea and the Baltic are in the hands of the revolutionary navy. We have received from the Kiel Council of Soldiers' Deputies a radio message, addressed to the international proletariat, to the effect that the German navy is flying the red flag and that funeral services for those who fell for liberty are to be held today. All this will very probably be concealed from the German soldiers on the Eastern Front and in the Ukraine. By all the means at your disposal bring these facts to the knowledge of the German soldiers.

Chicherin
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Moscow
By radio

Written on November 10, 1918

First published in *Izvestia* No. 256, November 6-7, 1927

Printed from the *Izvestia* text, collated with a typescript copy

TO GIACINTO M. SERRATI

December 4, 1918

Dear Comrade Serrati,

My best wishes to you and to Comrade Lazzari. We all hope that a proletarian revolution will soon begin in Italy, and other Entente countries.

Most cordial greetings.

Regards to Italian comrades.

Yours ever,

Lenin

First published in 1920
in *Almanacco socialista italiano*,
Milan

Printed from the miscellany text,
Translated from the Italian

IN MEMORY OF COMRADE PROSHYAN

I became acquainted with Comrade Proshyan and learned to value his co-operation during our work together in the Council of People's Commissars, at the end of last year and the beginning of the present year, when the Left S.R.s. were in alliance with us. Proshyan stood out for his deep devotion to the revolution and to *socialism*. It could not be said of all the Left S.R.s that they were socialists, and this could even hardly be said of most of them. But this had to be said about Proshyan, because, in spite of his loyalty to the ideology of the Russian Narodniks, a non-socialist ideology, you saw in Proshyan a deeply convinced socialist. In his own way, not through Marxism, not starting with the idea of the class struggle of the proletariat, did this man become a socialist; and I was able to observe more than once, when working together with him in the Council of People's Commissars, how Comrade Proshyan would resolutely side with the Bolsheviks, the Communists, against his fellow Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, when they expressed the standpoint of the petty proprietors and took a negative attitude to communist measures in the sphere of agriculture.

I particularly recall a conversation with Comrade Proshyan not long before the Brest peace. It seemed then that there no longer remained any substantial differences between us. Proshyan began speaking to me about the need for our parties to amalgamate, saying that the Left S.R.s most remote from communism (at that time, the word was not yet commonly used) had noticeably, and very strongly, drawn closer to it during the period of our work together in the Council of People's Commissars. I was reserved

as regards Proshyan's proposal, and called it premature, but did not at all deny that we had come closer in our practical work.

The Brest peace brought about a complete divergence, and from divergence, given Proshyan's revolutionary consistency and convictions, there could not but develop direct, even armed struggle. I must admit I did not in any way expect matters to go as far as an insurrection, or such facts as the betrayal of Commander-in-Chief Muravyov, a Left S.R. But the example of Proshyan revealed how deep the roots of *patriotism* were even in the most sincere and convinced socialists from among the Left S.R.s, how differences in the general principles underlying men's world views had inevitably shown themselves at a difficult turning-point in history. The subjectivism of the Narodniks led to a fatal error on the part of even the best of them, who let themselves be blinded by the spectre of monstrous strength, that of German imperialism. Any other struggle against that imperialism except an insurrectionary one, and moreover immediately, that very minute, without any consideration of the objective conditions of the international situation and our own, seemed in the light of a revolutionary's duty absolutely intolerable. It was the effect of the very same mistake which in 1907 made the Socialist-Revolutionaries unconditionally "boycott" the Stolypin Duma. But in the circumstances of hot revolutionary battles the error took a more cruel revenge, and pushed Proshyan on to the path of armed struggle against the Soviet power.

Nevertheless up to July 1918 Proshyan succeeded in doing more to strengthen the Soviet power than he did after July 1918 to undermine it. And in the international situation created after the German revolution, a new approach by Proshyan to communism—a firmer one than before—would have been inevitable but for his untimely death.

N. Lenin

Pravda No. 277,
December 20, 1918

Printed from the *Pravda* text

1919

TELEGRAM TO THE KURSK EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

January 6, 1919

Kursk
Cheka

Copy to the Gubernia Executive Committee

Immediately arrest Kogan, a member of the Kursk Central Purchasing Board, for refusing to help 120 starving workers from Moscow and sending them away empty-handed. This to be published in the newspapers and by leaflet, so that all employees of the central purchasing boards and food organisations should know that formal and bureaucratic attitudes to work and incapacity to help starving workers will earn severe reprisals, up to and including shooting.

Lenin

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Sent from Moscow to Kursk
Published on January 11, 1919
in the newspaper *Volna*
(Kursk) No. 5

Printed from the original

REPLY TO A PEASANT'S QUESTION[575]

Izvestia of February 2 carried a letter from a peasant, G. Gulov, who asks a question about the attitude of our Workers' and Peasants' Government to the middle peasantry, and tells of rumours that Lenin and Trotsky are not getting on together, and that there are big differences between them on this very question of the middle peasant.

Comrade Trotsky has already replied to that in his "Letter to the Middle Peasants", which appeared in *Izvestia* of February 7. In this letter Comrade Trotsky says that the rumours of differences between him and myself are the most monstrous and shameless lie, spread by the landowners and capitalists, or by their witting and unwitting accomplices. For my part, I entirely confirm Comrade Trotsky's statement. There are no differences between us, and as regards the middle peasants there are no differences either between Trotsky and myself, or in general in the Communist Party, of which we are both members.

In his letter Comrade Trotsky has explained clearly and in detail why the Communist Party and present Workers' and Peasants' Government, elected by the Soviets and belonging to that Party, do not consider the middle peasants to be their enemies. I fully subscribe to what Comrade Trotsky has said.[576]

There is not a single decree (law) or decision of the Soviet government which fails to draw a distinction between the three main groups of peasants. The first group is the poor peasants (proletarians and semi-proletarians, as they are usually called in economic science). They are very numerous. When the landowners and capitalists were in power, the brunt of their yoke fell on the poor peasants. In all the countries of the world, the workers and the rural poor supporting them are the firmest basis for the true

socialist movement. The second group is the kulaks, that is, the rich peasants who exploit the labour of others, either hiring them for work, or lending money at interest, and so forth. This group supports the landowners and capitalists, the enemies of the Soviet power. The third group is the middle peasants. They are not enemies of the Soviet power. They can be its friends; we are working for this, and will bring it about. All the teachers of socialism have always recognised that the workers will have to overthrow the landowners and the capitalists in order to build socialism, but that with the middle peasants an agreement is possible and essential.

Under the landowners and capitalists, only very few of the middle peasants, perhaps one in a hundred, managed to secure a stable welfare, and then only by becoming kulaks, and saddling the poor peasants, whereas the vast majority of the middle peasants inevitably must suffer from poverty and ill-treatment by the rich. That is the case in all capitalist countries.

Under socialism, all workers and all middle peasants to a man can have full and stable welfare, without robbing someone else's labour. No Bolshevik, no Communist, no intelligent socialist has ever entertained the idea of violence against the middle peasants. All socialists have always spoken of agreement with them and of their gradual and voluntary transition to socialism.

Our country has been ruined more than other countries by the criminal four-year war of the capitalists. Everywhere there is ruin and dislocation, lack of goods for sale, and a terrible and tormenting famine in the towns and non-agricultural gubernias. We have to strain every effort to overcome the breakdown, to overcome the famine, to overcome the troops of the landowners and capitalists, who are trying to restore to power the tsar and the rich, the exploiters. In the South, on the Don and in the Ukraine, the white-guards have been beaten, and the road to fuel (coal) and grain is being opened up. A few final efforts, and we shall be saved from the famine. But the destruction left behind by the war is great, and only long and self-sacrificing work by all toiling people can bring our country out on to the road to sustained prosperity.

Two kinds of complaints must be noted among those being voiced by middle peasants. First, there are complaints at the excessively "bossy", undemocratic, and sometimes absolutely disgraceful behaviour of the local authorities, especially in the backwoods. Surely it is more difficult to organise proper control and supervision of the local authorities' work in the countryside, and the worst elements and dishonest people-sometimes worm their way into the ranks of the Communists. Those who, contrary to the laws of the Soviet power, treat the peasants unjustly must be ruthlessly fought, immediately removed and most severely prosecuted. All the efforts of honest workers and peasants are being directed to purging Russia of these "relics" of the landowners' and capitalists' system who allow themselves to behave like "bosses" when, under the laws of our Workers' and Peasants' Republic, they should behave like men elected by the Soviets and set an example of conscientiousness and strict observance of the laws. The Soviet power has already shot quite a few such officials caught, for example, taking bribes, and the struggle against such scoundrels will be carried on to the end.

Another kind of complaint is made against the requisitioning of grain and the strict prohibition of free sale of grain. Our government is fighting inexorably against arbitrary action and breaches of the law. But can we allow free sale of grain? In our ruined country, there is not enough, or barely enough, grain, and in addition the railways have been so spoiled by the war that supplies are going very badly.

When there is not enough grain, the free sale of it means terrific profiteering and inflation of prices up to hundreds of rubles per pood, because a hungry man will give anything for a piece of bread. The free sale of grain in a hungry country means frenzied profiteering by the kulaks, the shameless rich peasants who fill their money-bags out of the people's need and the hunger. The free sale of grain in a hungry country means a victory of the rich over the poor, because the rich will buy grain even at a mad, fantastic price, while the poor will have nothing. The free sale of grain is freedom for the rich to make profits, and freedom for the poor to die. The free sale of grain means a return

to the domination and unbridled power of the capitalists.

No. We don't want to go back, and will not go back, to the restoration of the rule of the capitalists, the rule of money, and freedom to profiteer. We want to go forward to socialism, to the proper distribution of grain among all the working people. All grain surpluses must be handed over to the Soviet state at a fair price; and the state must distribute them equally among the working people. This cannot be achieved all at once, it is not easy to establish such a fair socialist system. It will take a great deal of work and effort, and strict comradely discipline among the workers and peasants, to root out the old, capitalist, freedom to trade, freedom to make profits, freedom to fight, freedom to oppress—a freedom that has covered the whole world with blood.

But this difficult work has now been taken up by millions and millions of workers and peasants. Every honest peasant and worker has realised the importance of socialism, and is persistently fighting for it.

The socialist revolution is growing throughout the world. The power of the capitalists, "freedom to trade", will not return. Socialism will win.

N. Lenin

February 14, 1919

Pravda No. 35,
February 15, 1919

Printed from the original

NOTES ON THE QUESTION OF REORGANISING STATE CONTROL[577]

1) A workers' organ, or an organ enlisting workers' participation, at the centre and in the localities.

2) Voluntary inspectors as a system.

2 *bis*: Two-thirds women mandatory.

3) Immediate practical tasks:

(α) inspection raids, on citizens' complaints

(β) fight against red tape

(γ) revolutionary measures of struggle against abuses and red tape

(δ) transport

(ε) raising labour productivity

(ζ) increasing food output.

Written on March 8, 1919

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

DRAFT THIRD CLAUSE OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL SECTION OF THE PROGRAMME (FOR THE PROGRAMME COMMISSION OF THE EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS)

Bourgeois democracy confined itself to proclaiming formal rights equally applicable to all citizens, e.g., the right of assembly, of association, of the press. At best all legislative restrictions on these points were abolished in the most democratic bourgeois republics. But, in reality, both administrative practices and particularly the economic bondage of the working people always made it impossible for them, under bourgeois democracy, to make any wide use of these rights and liberties.

By contrast, proletarian or Soviet democracy, instead of the formal proclamation of rights and liberties, guarantees them in practice first and foremost to those classes of the population who were oppressed by capitalism, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry. For this purpose, the Soviet power expropriates from the bourgeoisie premises, printing presses and stocks of paper, and places them at the entire disposal of the working people and their organisations.

The task of the Russian Communist Party is to draw ever wider masses of working people into the exercise of their democratic rights and liberties, and to extend the material possibilities for this.

Written not later than
March 20, 1919

First published on April 22,
1956
in *Pravda* No. 113

Printed from the original

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

A *fierce* telegram must be sent off *today*, over your signature and mine, both to the General Staff and to the *Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front binding them* to develop the *maximum* energy and *speed* in capturing Vilna.

Written on April 24, 1919
First published on September 23, 1925
in *Pravda* No. 217

Printed from the original

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

April 30, 1919

Comrade Zinoviev,

Talking with Comrade Yemelyanov, I was particularly struck by the fact that such best and most reliable Petrograd workers are *wasting* themselves on technical work like road transport.

This is unforgivable! For technical work we can hire and take ninth-rate men and strangers, i.e., those whose honesty is not known. But men like Yemelyanov should be sent *into the countryside*, *into the administration*, into management, into the uyezd executive committees, where honest men are few and far between, where the need for honest men is desperate.

Could we form a *sponsoring group* of workers in Petrograd, consisting of Comrade Yemelyanov and 5 or 10 of his friends, to select 300-600 Petrograd workers, with the most solid references from the Party and the trade unions, for dispatch, singly or in pairs, to uyezd executive committees throughout Russia?

I should support this plan in every possible way. All such men (too old to go to the front) should be taken off technical work and posts *where they can be replaced*, and transferred to *administrative* work in the countryside. Without a group of such absolutely reliable and experienced Petrograd workers we shall not be able to bring about any big improvement in the villages.

Greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1924 in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 2 (11)

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KAMENEV[578]

Rakovsky, Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Kiev, for Kamenev

Absolutely essential that you personally, taking along Joffe, if necessary, to help you, should not only verify and expedite but personally bring up the reinforcements to Lugansk and the Donets Basin generally, as otherwise the disaster will undoubtedly be tremendous and scarcely remediable. If you need one, take a mandate from the Kiev Council of Defence. We shall undoubtedly perish *unless we clear the Donets Basin completely in a short time*. Provisionally, until Rostov has been taken, we must be diplomatic with Makhno's troops, sending Antonov there in person, and making him personally responsible for Makhno's troops. Telegraph detailed reply.

Lenin

Written on May 7, 1919

First published in 1925 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 6 (41)

Printed from the decoded text on the telegraph tape

TELEGRAM TO BELA KUN

Bela Kun, Budapest

Received your letter of April 22 only on May 13. I am sure that in spite of the vast difficulties the proletarians of Hungary will retain power and consolidate it. Greetings to the growing Red Army of the Hungarian workers and peasants. The Entente's ferocious peace will everywhere strengthen sympathy with the Soviet power. Yesterday the Ukrainian forces defeated the Rumanians and crossed the Dniester. I send best greetings to you and to all Hungarian comrades.

Lenin

Written on May 13, 1919

Published in part on May 16, 1919 in Hungarian in the newspaper *Vörös Ujság* No. 83, Budapest

Published in full in Hungarian in 1954 in the book Lenin, "*Magyarországrol. Szemelvények Lenin Müvelböl*", Budapest

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO S. A. GETSOV, KHARKOV CHIEF COAL BOARD

To Getsov, Chief Coal Board, Kharkov; copy to Bazhanov; copy to Bogdatyan, Chairman of the Extraordinary Committee for Supplies or Serebrovsky, Kharkov; copy to Bogdatyan, Chairman of the Extraordinary Committee for Supplies, Kiev; copy to Podvoisky, People's Commissar for the Army; copy to Trotsky, Kiev; to Kamenev wherever he may be

General cancellation of mobilisation of workers of the Donets Basin, with the present situation at the front, is absolutely impermissible.[579] The Council of Defence realises the exceptional importance of the Donets Basin, and has therefore decided to defer mobilisation for hewers only, even in those enterprises which for one reason or another are not producing coal at the present time. Retaining the hewers, at any rate, safeguards the coal industry against disaster, and will permit the resumption of coal-getting directly the emergency is over. No other deferments are permissible.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written on May 16, 1919
First published in 1925 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 6 (41)

Printed from the telegraph form text

TO V. A. AVANESOV[580]

Avanesov, at the State Control Commission, to *arrest* the official who replied in this way.

Lenin

May 20

Written on May 20, 1919
First published in 1956
in the journal
Istorichesky Arkhiv No. 2

Printed from the original

TO BELA KUN

Coded

Bela Kun, Budapest

We have had a special discussion at the Central Committee of the Party, as a separate item on the agenda, of the question you raised about sending you the comrade you named. We found it impossible to send him, and have sent another who has already left, and is being delayed only for technical reasons; he should soon reach you.

By the way, let me add for myself that you are, of course, right in beginning negotiations with the Entente. They should be begun and carried on; it is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us.

Try and organise postal communications with us by air.

Best regards,

Lenin

Comrade Chicherin, please have this translated and sent to Bela Kun.

Lenin

June 18

Written on June 18, 1919

First published in English in 1946 in the book *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. 7, Washington

Printed from the original

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

September 4, 1919

(*Cavalry* is helpless against low-flying planes.)

Comrade Sklyansky,

Could you get some *learned* military X.Y.Z ... to reply (fast) to the following question: aeroplanes against cavalry? *Examples*. Flying *quite low*. *Examples*. So as to issue instructions on the basis of "science" (I read something about this once, but one "practitioner", *I. N. Smirnov*, ridicules it, and says it's nonsense).

?

Lenin

First published on February 23, 1927 in *Pravda* No. 44

Printed from the original

FOREWORD TO G. ZINOVIEV'S ARTICLE "ON THE NUMERICAL COMPOSITION OF OUR PARTY"

Comrade Zinoviev has sent me this article, with the request that I send it on to the Moscow press. I fulfil his request with great pleasure. The article, in my opinion, deserves to be reprinted in all the newspapers. All Party comrades ought to read it, and should everywhere, following the example of Petrograd, start simultaneously both purging the Party of "hangers-on" and intensively recruiting to the Party all the best elements among the mass of workers and peasants.

N. Lenin

Pravda No. 210,
September 21, 1919

Printed from the *Pravda* text

TELEGRAM TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET ON YUDENICH'S OFFENSIVE OCTOBER 14, 1919

The whiteguard offensive is clearly a manoeuvre to reduce our pressure in the South. Beat off the enemy, strike at Yamburg and Gdov. Mobilise office staff for the front. Close down nine-tenths of the departments. Mobilisation of all our forces for the front has never yet been carried out anywhere, although much has been written about it, and there are circular letters and a resolution of the Central Committee.[581] You must drive them off in time so as to resume your help to the South.

Published on October 21, 1924 in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 241

Printed from the newspaper text

TO A. S. YENUKIDZE, L. B. KAMENEV AND YELENA STASOVA

Comrades Yenukidze, L. B. Kamenev and Yelena Stasova

I beg you to provide assistance, clothing, *accommodation and food* for the bearer

Comrade *Pyotr Okhrimenko*.[582]

If there are any difficulties involved, please ring me up.

November 12, 1919

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in 1956 in the journal *Smena* No. 7

Printed from the original

NOTE TO D. I. KURSKY

Kursky[583]

In my opinion, this should be added:

1) drawing up a protocol is *not* as yet a "complaint", but only an exact *record of the beginning* of the dispute. The best way to avoid a complaint is to secure an exact reply or immediate performance;

2) by this means we can and should secure rapid decisions *in substance*, without red tape, namely: by proposing a short method of solution on the spot, proposing it officially ("collect the material in such-and-such a place, I suggest that an order be placed at such-and-such an office, I request that such-and-such be done to avoid bureaucratic delay"); such a statement or request will *greatly* assist the centre in combating red tape;

3) against the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence[584] to go to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee;

4) after endorsement by the C.P.C., publish an *article* (with examples; chew it up) in *Bednota*.

Lenin

Written between December 17 and 23, 1919

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

NOTE TO D. I. KURSKY[585]

Kursky:

(the evil of red tape)

1) Should be written in more popular language.
2) The text of the law to be reproduced in its entirety.
3) Give *3-4* concrete examples { why? how? this *facilitates* the struggle against red tape }
4) Require *every* gubernia Executive Committee to reprint.
5) Explain that we shall punish *both for ignorance* of and for *failure to apply* this law.

Written between December 17 and 23, 1919

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK BY JOHN REED: *TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD*

INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

With the greatest interest and with never slackening attention I read John Reed's book, *Ten Days That Shook the World*. Unreservedly do I recommend it to the workers of the world. Here is a book which I should like to see published in millions of copies and translated into all languages. It gives a truthful and most vivid exposition of the events so significant to the comprehension of what really is the Proletarian Revolution and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. These problems are widely discussed, but before one can accept or reject these ideas, he must understand the full significance of his decision. John Reed's book will undoubtedly help to clear this question, which is the fundamental problem of the international labor movement.

Nikolai Lenin

Written at the end of 1919

First published in Russian in 1923 in the book: Dzhon Rid, *10 dnei kotoriye potryasli mir*, Moscow

Printed from the book text

1920

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP IN THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS MARCH 15, 1920[586]

MINUTES

Comrades,

Comrade Lozovsky said that Comrade Bukharin and I will be partly in agreement with him. That is true. You have written the theses, but what are you defending? Then you must strike out your theses, because they say: "as a basic principle", but we do not take practice as our point of departure. So write that down, then. What in that case remains of your theses? Today I had occasion to be at a meeting of the water transport workers, and to argue there, and Comrade Ishchenko said: "In any case, there is a guarantee that we shall put the question as practical men." All right then, put that down; but what you have written is something different. You have written: "as a basic principle". Where is your justification, who is defending it? No one. They edge away. Write that down, and then half our differences will disappear. And after all, what you have written is untrue: where do you answer the argument which is put forward against collective management; where is the participation of the broad masses, with three, five or seven workers taking part in the collegiums? Do you want participation by the broad masses or don't you? Of course, those who don't want it are to be thrown out, but that is no argument. You say, the "broad non-Party masses of workers". There are no such masses in a single col-

legium: it's not true, and that's no way to reason. That is not the system you need to draw in the broad non-Party masses: you have to train, to promote, to enliven. How many workers have the Central Committee of the textile workers and others put forward? How many of them have been promoted and how many demoted during the last three months? Give me figures, and then I will say: there are the people. It's childish to write "principles": after studying it for two years, all you have written are princi-ples—people will laugh. Here your argument does not correspond to your conclusion: participation of the broad masses is assured by a collegium of seven, or of three, persons. People will laugh at it. That is my first objection.

Secondly, I refer you to the bourgeoisie. Whom shall we learn from, if not the bourgeoisie? How did they manage? They managed as a class when it was the ruler, but didn't it appoint managers? We haven't yet caught up with them in their degree of development. They knew how to rule as a class, and to manage through anyone you please individually, entirely in their own interests; at the top they had a small collegium and they didn't discuss basic principles and didn't write such resolutions. They had all power in their hands, and regarded as competent the one who knew his job. The workers have not yet reached that point, and in order to win we must give up our old prejudices. The rule of the working class is reflected in the constitution, the ownership and in the fact that it is we who are running things, while management is quite another matter, it is a question of skill, a question of experience. The bourgeoisie understood this perfectly, but we have not yet realised it. Let's get down to learning. We have already said here that we must hold power firmly in our hands, but we haven't yet learned how to manage; we have to do a great deal to learn the business of management.

My third argument: competence. How can you show that it is possible to manage without being competent, to manage without full knowledge, without knowledge of the science of management? It is ridiculous! What sort of system is it? Why all the words that you have spoken here? In order to manage, one must know the job and be a

splendid administrator. Where does it say that for this reason we need collective management? The fact that we have few experienced workers proves the contrary; what follows is that collective management is intolerable. In that case, adopt theses in which you say: keep a commissar or a commission, etc., attached to every expert. So long as we lack the principle of competence and respect for the expert, we remain at the primitive level. In that way we shall never create any industrial front. Unity of will! Without this there is no dictatorship at the front, but dawdling. You know it is a typical result, that there is friction there, not management. Appoint an expert with experience; but we know by now that when we combine a competent person with an incompetent one in a collegium, we create a multitude of wills and complete confusion. That is my fifth argument.* Everyone is writing resolutions about each person being answerable for his own job. But where is this being carried out? Let them say: where did we divide responsibility according to that principle? We have been learning for two years how to run the state, and still write: "the basic principle." This is ridiculous, this is on the second-form level; but let's have your experience, and we shall see from it to what extent you are competent people and where the lack of competence tells. They say that under the artillery department the works managements were poor. That is the example Lozovsky and Tomsky have quoted. When was this? Comrade Lozovsky, we have to reckon with the condition of the Soviet Republic. What did we begin with, who was at the head? Krylenko, Dybenko and Podvoisky, before we had Trotsky—and that was our collective management. And if Kolchak and Denikin lambasted us, why did they? Because while we had seven men in charge, we had to learn for two years, and after that we went over to one-man management. Do we have to reckon with this, or not? Of course, it's only a trifle, you've just taken the two years' history of the Republic and crossed it out. Why? You don't like it, do you? Do it all over again. And what about Rykov: he was appointed Extraordinary Plenipoten-

* Evidently there was a fourth argument against collective management, but it did not find reflection in the minutes.—*Ed.*

tiary for Soviet Defence, and Rykov began dragging things out of the mess by himself. You don't know your own history, the history of your Supreme Economic Council and of the Soviet Republic. History tells us that from collective management by the workers we went over to management by tens, we broke our necks, and Kolchak lambasted us, and it was a good thing he did, because we learned something thereby, we learned that collective management must be held in a tight grip. We have described four systems: accept these four systems,[587] accept the C.C. theses. Then you will be taking your stand on the groundwork of the two years' history of the Soviet power, of its experience, and not on arguments which are primitive, which will muddle you ...* for an adult worker, who is not afraid of any expert and says, "if you put experienced people in charge, our machinery will run". That is how an adult workman reasons, while the timid ones say: "I'm afraid that I shall be left without an expert." That is a sign of weakness. Stop whining, and be your age.

First published in 1924 in the book: N. Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov), *Statyi i rechi po voprosam professionalnogo dvizheniya* (Articles and Speeches on Questions of the Trade Union Movement), issued by the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions

Printed from the book text, collated with the stenographic report

* Passage not clear.—*Ed.*

TO V. P. MILYUTIN

We cannot tolerate this indefiniteness *for a single day*. If anyone lodges a protest, raise it *immediately in the C.P.C.* (otherwise you will be to blame).

Have the German delegates *signed* a paper that we have informed them that we *do not guarantee* food, clothing or housing better than for the other *and rank-and-file* workers of Russia?

Written on April 23, 1920

First published in 1924 in the journal *Prozhektor* No. 4 (26)

Printed from the original

POSTSCRIPT TO A RADIO MESSAGE OF MAY 6, 1920[588]

Entirely supporting this statement, and the radio message of March 16, 1920, sent by Comrade Milyutin, I request that instructions be given that *any* delegation from foreign workers coming to Russia should, without fail, sign a statement that the content of these radio messages and my present postscript *for the information* of the workers abroad has been *brought to their knowledge*. The foreign workers must know the truth, that in settling here they are accepting privation.

May 6, 1920

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Published in 1933 in the Second and Third editions of V. I. Lenin, *Sobraniya Sochineny* (Collected Works), Vol. XXIX

Printed from the original

TO S. I. BOTIN[589]

11:30 p.m. June 4

Comrade Botin,

When you called on me today I had only two minutes, because I had to go back to an important meeting.

Now I have a quarter of an hour free, and therefore can (and must) tell you in more detail and more clearly that mistakes have obviously been made, and that you should frankly, honestly and resolutely repudiate these mistakes. Otherwise a most important undertaking will be ruined.

The mistake was, firstly, that there was distrust of the "expert", which prevented his being told *everything* at once and speedy organisation of the *experiment*; secondly, that the "spade" or preparatory work was done by you personally, which distracted you from the *real* work, when the whole mass of the "spade", i.e., preparatory, work *must* be passed on to the mechanics, assembly-men, electricians, etc., of whom we can find a *dozen*. And to separate your *real* work from the preparatory or auxiliary jobs, the *constant* advice of an "expert" is necessary.

Now you have promised me to have full trust in the "expert", and I believe that you have been entirely convinced of his Party attitude and his absolute loyalty to the revolution. So I must ask you to fulfil your promise to me in its *entirety* (otherwise the mistakes will be inevitably *repeated*). Tomorrow morning, therefore, *show everything to the "expert" and tell him how matters stand* (while your *assistants* are bringing up the cars and doing the preparatory work). Then, together with the "expert", the *experiments* will be carried through without further delays.

Please reply to me that you promise to do this.

Best wishes,

Lenin

Written on June 4, 1920

First published on January 21, 1927 in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 17

Printed from the original

TO THE STATE PUBLISHING HOUSE AND TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY AND N. I. BUKHARIN

A vast amount of material, *particularly on the foreign policy* of the Entente, is published *every week* in our newspapers and in foreign ones (not only communist, but also *bourgeois* papers of *various* countries).

This material (see also the *Bulletin* of the People's Commissariat for *Foreign Affairs*) is lost for international communist agitation; yet it is extremely valuable.

I suggest that a committee be set up to summarise this material and publish *monthly* booklets.

The content: the *facts* of the foreign policy of the Entente (plunder; wars; insurrections; *financial* strangulation).

The number of copies: as small as possible, since the main aim is translation into *other languages*.

A subcommittee of a few professors should (under strict control) collect *all* that is valuable, *particularly from the bourgeois newspapers* (which best of all *expose* their "rivals").

A committee of *Party* comrades will read the professors' manuscripts to correct them, and *make the professors* do that.

Newspapers get lost; booklets will remain, *and will help the foreign comrades*.

Your opinion, please.

August 8, 1920

Lenin

First published in 1924
in the journal
Kniga o Knigakh No. 3

Printed from the original

TO N. I. BUKHARIN

Comrade Bukharin,

I think we *should* publish in Russian De Leon's *Two Pages*, *etc.*, with Fraina's foreword and notes[590]. I shall also write a few words

If you agree, *will you give the word* through the State Publishing House.

If you don't, let's discuss it.

Lenin

Written in the late summer of 1920

First published in 1924 in the journal *Zhizn* No. 1

Printed from the original

TO ANNA YELIZAROVA[591]

The main principle of administration, in the spirit of all the decisions of the R.C.P. and the central Soviet institutions, is the following:

—a definite person is fully responsible for some specified work.

I have been doing something (for such-and-such a time), and I am responsible for it. I am hindered by X, who is not the responsible person, who is not in charge.

This means squabbling. This means chaos. This means interference by a person *unsuitable* for responsible work. I demand his *removal*.

Written in the autumn of 1920

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 11 (94)

Printed from the original

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Comrade *M. N. Pokrovsky*

Comrade M. N.,

I congratulate you very much on your success. I was extremely pleased with your new book, *Russian History in Brief Outline*. The presentation and approach are original. It reads with tremendous interest. I think it ought to be translated into the European languages.

Let me make a small remark. To turn it into a *textbook* (and it should become one), it needs to be *supplemented* with a *chronological index*. This is what I mean: do it approximately in this way (1) a column of dates; (2) a column of bourgeois assessments (briefly); (3) a column of *your*, Marxist assessment, *with references to the pages of your book*.

Pupils should know *both* your book *and* the *index*, so that there should be no *superficiality*, so that they should *know the facts*, so that they should learn to compare the old science and the new. What's your opinion about this supplement?

December 5

With communist greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Written on December 5, 1920

First published in 1928 in the journal *Arkhivnoye Dyelo* No. IV (17)

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM TO FACTORIES MAKING ELECTRIC PLOUGHS[592]

I request that every effort be made to fulfil the order of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture for 22 electric ploughs with spare parts not later than April 1, 1921. Telegraph weekly on the state of fulfilment of the order to Gorbunov, Council of People's Commissars.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 31, 1920

First published in 1956 in the journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4

Printed from the original

ON POLYTECHNICAL EDUCATION

NOTES ON THESES BY NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA[593]

(Private. Rough draft. *Not to be made public.*
I will think this over once again.)

That is *not* the way to write about polytechnical education: it sounds abstract, for the remote future; current, present-day, deplorable reality *is not taken into account.*

It is necessary

(1) to add one or two theses about the importance of polytechnical education *in principle*

{ *according to Marx*
according to our R.C.P. Programme }

(2) to say clearly that on no account can we renounce the principle and the putting into effect immediately, *so far as is possible*, of education specifically on polytechnical lines.

17th thesis *out.*

On secondary education (12-17) to say:

The Republic's extremely difficult economic situation requires at the present time, unquestionably and immediately,

the fusion* of secondary schools and technical schools,

transformation* of secondary schools into technical schools,

but at the same time, *to avoid transformation into trade schools*, the following exact rules should be laid down:

1) Early specialisation to be avoided; an instruction to be worked out on this.

2) *General educational* subjects to be enlarged in *all* technical schools.

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* (Correction: fuse not the whole secondary school, but from 13-14 years, as *indicated* and *decided* by *educationalists*.)

Annual programmes to be drawn up:

(If there are no such programmes yet, Lunacharsky to be hanged)	Communism History in general " of revolutions " of the 1917 revolution	Geography Literature etc.

(3) A *binding* task to be the *immediate* transition to *polytechnical* education or, more accurately, immediate realisation of a number of *steps to polytechnical education*, feasible at present, such as:

Jointly with Goelro

a) visit to a power station, the nearest one, and a number of lectures with experiments there; *a number of practical jobs*, any that are possible with electricity; work out at once detailed programmes (for 1 visit; for a course of 5, 10 lectures; of 1, 2 months, etc.);

b) the same to *every decently* organised *state farm*;

c) the same to *every decently* organised *works*;

Jointly with Goelro

one, and a number of lectures with ex-

d) mobilisation (for lectures on electricity and polytechnical education, taking charge of the practical work, excursions, etc.) of *all* engineers, agronomists, all graduates from university physics and mathematics faculties;

e) organisation of small museums on polytechnical education, mobile exhibitions on trains, steamers. etc.

This is of supreme importance. We are beggars. We need joiners, fitters *immediately*. *Unquestionably*. *All* must become joiners, fitters, etc., *but* with such-and-such an addition of general educational and polytechnical minimum knowledge.

The task of the secondary school (more accurately: of the upper classes of the secondary school, 12-17 age group) is to turn out

a *joiner*,
a *carpenter*,
a *turner*, and so forth,

who knows his job thoroughly, who is fully capable of becoming a skilled man and has been trained for this in practice, *but with this addition*, *however*, that this "craftsman"

should have a *broad general education* (should have a minimum *grounding* in such-and-such sciences: which exactly to be indicated);

should be a Communist (indicate exactly *what* he should know);

should have a polytechnical outlook and the foundations (*beginnings*) *of polytechnical education*,

(Grinko has evidently overdone it to the point of stupidity, *rejecting* polytechnical education [maybe, partly, O. Y. Schmidt too].[594] *This to be corrected*.)

namely:

(aa) *fundamental* conceptions of electricity (define precisely which),

(bb) the application of electricity to the *engineering* industry,

(cc) ditto the *chemical* industry,

(dd) basic idea of the plan for electrification of the R.S.F.S.R.

(ee) a visit to a power station, a works, a state farm *not less than 1-3* times,

(ff) *such-and-such* foundations of agricultural science, etc. *The minimum of knowledge* to be worked out *in detail*.

Written at the end of 1920

First published in 1929 in the journal *Na Putyakh k Novoi Shkole* (Towards a New School) No. 2

Printed from the original

1921

NOTES FOR A SPEECH AT THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) ON THE SUBSTITUTION OF FOOD REQUISITIONING BY A TAX[595]

NOTES FOR A SPEECH ON THE SUBSTITUTION OF FOOD REQUISITIONING BY A TAX

1. General political significance of this question: = the question of *peasant* (petty-bourgeois) *counter-revolution*.
   Such counter-revolution is already facing us.
2. Theoretical excursion
   (α) bourgeois or socialist revolution? *The struggle will decide.*
   (β) *The Renegade Kautsky* (p. 102, 1918 edition[596])....

in the press smooth out "inter-relations between the proletariat and the peasantry" smooth out in the press

3. Who will overcome whom? 2 different classes.
   The lesson of "Kronstadt"[597]
   — — — in politics: more unity (and discipline) within the Party, more struggle against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries;
   — — — in the economy: to *satisfy* the *middle* peasantry as fully as possible.
4. All the peasantry (almost) has become middle. "Poor Peasants' Committees.[598]
5. What *economic* satisfaction can we give the middle peasantry? The petty commodity producer?

N. B. (α) to give freedom of *turnover*, freedom to trade (= freedom of capitalism);
(β) to obtain *commodities* for this purpose.

6. "Freedom of turnover"=freedom to trade=freedom of capitalism.

   Back to capitalism?

   Our too hasty, rigid, unprepared "communism" was necessitated by the *war* and the impossibility of either obtaining commodities or setting the factories going.

   There are also a number of other possible transitions. The "rope" can be given *more* slack, *without allowing any break in it*; it can be "slackened", "eased out".

7. ||N.B. Co-operation. *Cancellation* of the resolution of the Ninth Congress. Draft of a new resolution[599] (to manoeuvre more freely) || *Co-operation*=Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks politically economically the best form of free turnover ||

8. How to get the commodities?
   (α) A loan (100 millions in gold)
   (2 proposals).
   (β) Trade agreement with Britain, America.
   (γ) Concessions.

9. State capitalism, a bloc with it, *on top*; freedom of turnover for the peasants, etc., *below*.

   Crutches and a bandage?
   Beaten almost to death.

10. Over-fatigue, exhaustion among the workers too. A breathing space" like that of Brest, an economic breathing space.

    To improve the position of the workers (10 millions in gold and a *special resolution*).[600]

    To improve the position of the peasants and promote *turnover*.

11. Individual exchange of commodities?

    Yes! We shall intensify production, get turnover going, provide a breathing space, strengthen the *petty bourgeoisie*, but even more so *large-scale production* and the *proletariat*. The one is bound up with the other.

12. It is impossible to consolidate large-scale production, the factories and the proletariat, without *to some extent* reviving the petty bourgeoisie and *its* turnover.

13. *A tax in kind.*
Legislative history (briefly)
Oct. 30, 1918.[601]
A different way of putting it now.
Its economic significance:
(1) *An incentive* to the petty producer: raise production. Most important of all.
(2) State monopoly not essential now. (Not all surpluses.)
(3) Precise obligations to the state.
Weakening of bureaucracy.
(4) All "turnover" to be more free, and it is *possible* to rid them of some of the food "detachments".

Crop failure and a good crop	Popov and his "reference notes"[602]	Announce beforehand? Alter after ascertaining the harvest	N.B.

14. *Firmness* of the "apparatus" to be preserved.
But an apparatus *for* policy (=reviewing and correcting relations between classes), and not a policy for the apparatus!
(A good) bureaucracy in the service of policy, and not a policy in the service of (a good) bureaucracy.
The maximum elasticity is now needed, and *for this purpose*, for flexible manoeuvring, the greatest firmness of the apparatus.

Written in the first half of March 1921

First published on March 21, 1931 in *Pravda* No. 79

Printed from the original

ON THE KRONSTADT REVOLT

SUMMARY OF A TALK WITH A CORRESPONDENT *of THE NEW YORK HERALD*

I believe that there are only two kinds of government possible in Russia—a Government by the Soviets or a Government headed by a tsar. Some fools or traitors in Kronstadt talked of a Constituent Assembly, but does any man in his senses believe for a moment that a Constituent Assembly at this critical abnormal stage would be anything but a bear garden. This Kronstadt affair in itself is a very petty incident. It no more threatens to break up the Soviet state than the Irish disorders are threatening to break up the British Empire.

Some people in America have come to think of the Bolsheviks as a small clique of very bad men who are tyrannizing over a vast number of highly intellectual people who would form an admirable Government among themselves the moment the Bolshevik regime was overthrown. This is a mistake, for there is nobody to take our place save butcher Generals and helpless bureaucrats who have already displayed their total incapacity for rule.

If people abroad exaggerate the importance of the rising in Kronstadt and give it support, it is because the world has broken up into two camps: capitalism abroad and Communist Russia.

Published in English
on March 15, 1921
in *The New York Herald Tribune*
No. 197

Published in Russian
on March 26, 1921
in *Petrogradskaya Pravda*
No. 67

Printed from
the *Petrogradskaya Pravda* text

TO N. I. BUKHARIN

The question is of theoretical interest *too*:

the proletarian state power

holds *a material base* { factories, railways, foreign trade.

Consequence: in its hands is a *commodity stock* and its *wholesale* (railway) transport.

What is the proletarian state power doing with this stock?

Selling it:

(α) to the workers by hand and brain for money, or for their labour without money;

(β) to the peasants *for grain*.

How does it sell? Through whom?

Through a *commission agent* (= *a trader*) for his percentage on commission.

It gives preference to the co-operatives (trying to organise the entire population in them).

Why is this *impossible*? Yet this is *capitalism* + socialism.

Written in March-April 1921

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

TELEGRAM
TO THE PETROGRAD REGIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, TRADE UNION COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

To three addresses
1) Regional Economic Council, Petrograd
2) Avdeyev and Uglanov, Petrograd Trade Union Council
3) Mikhailov, Executive Committee, Petrograd Soviet

In view of Comrade *Mikhailov*'s complaints about food bonuses not being issued to workmen on electric ploughs,[603] I request that, considering the importance of manufacturing twenty electric ploughs for the autumn ploughing, the question be settled urgently and agreed. May 27.

Let me have an exact reply.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on May 27, 1921
First published in 1956
in the journal
Istorichesky Arkhiv No. 4

Printed from a telegram copy

TO S. G. SAID-GALIEV[604]

To the first question—yes

To the second question—for a long time yet.

To the third—not "pedagogues and nurse-maids", but helpers.

To the fourth—please let me have exact, brief, clear information on the "two tendencies".

Written on July 20, 1921

First published in 1923 in the book: *Chetvyortoye soveshchaniye TsK R.K.P. s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami natsionalnykh respublik i oblastei* (*Stenograficheskiy otchot*) (Fourth Conference of the C.C. of the R.C.P. with Responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions [Stenographic Report]), Moscow

Printed from the original

NOTE TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov,

This matter should be followed up[605] (especially from the point of view of (1) who is responsible? (2) has it been properly organised as an *independent* undertaking?)

If necessary, consult Korostelyov.

Make a note of this business, and *follow it up*.

August 5

Lenin

Written on August 5, 1921

First published in 1956 in the journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4

Printed from the original

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

September 3

Comrade Gorbunov,

I have just signed credentials for the chairman and members of the Extraordinary Commission for Exports of the Council of Labour and Defence[606] (Rykunov, Pyatigorsky, Valayev and Vladimir Spiridonovich Yermakov). It will be your task to study the membership of this Commission and its terms of reference, then systematically to review its activity and its *reports*, and to inform me.

I take advantage of this opportunity to point out to you the need for a proper division of labour between you and Smolyaninov (and Boris Volin, if we succeed in getting him), and proper organisation of the whole work of the office of the Council of People's Commissars find the Council of Labour and Defence.

The functions should be clearly demarcated between yourself and Smolyaninov. Each must "*carry on supervision*" of specified *undertakings* (electric ploughs; Hydropeat Board; collective supply; wage rates, etc., etc.).

For each subject, both "old" and newly arising, there must be systematic filing of all papers and reference notes, so that it should always be easy to find what is required.

In addition to the distribution between you of the business of the "economic front", the most important front at the present time, there should also be a division between you (or you should take them all on yourself) of the non-economic People's Commissariats, "following up" their work on the basis of the reports of the gubernia and uyezd economic conferences and otherwise.

On each "subject" it is necessary from time to time (once a week, once a month or every two months, according to the nature and importance of the business—and then also *suddenly*) to carry out a *check on actual* fulfilment. This is most important and most essential. A record should be made of the results of each check-up.

I think that when there are three of you (you+Smolyaninov+B. Volin or someone else, if we can't have Volin) this will be enough (with a few office assistants) to carry on the whole work, of course on condition of absolute efficiency, on the one hand, and of referring everything that can and should be referred to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, to the *State Planning Commission* and other appropriate institutions, on the other. To read the uyezd reports it will be necessary to recruit a number of other people, each being obliged to sign that he has read it, on a sheet attached to each report: we shall draw in both writers and some of the oldest members of the Party, as well as some "experts". When the number of reports arriving begins to grow, you will draw up a list of "helpers in the reading of reports" and establish a *strict* procedure for returning what has been read.

Take a typed copy of this letter, and send it to me, together with your reply about a plan for distributing and carrying on all the work of the Executive Secretary of the C.P.C. and the Council of Labour and Defence.

In particular, it is necessary to *follow up* with *special* attention the work of the Hydropeat Board, both in connection with the orders for peat pumps already placed abroad for the 1922 season, and in connection with the recent communication from R. E. Klasson that he has solved the problem of dehydration.[607]

Then I ask you to investigate the affair of the idleness of the Swedish works, Nydqvist och Holms (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 194, p. 4).[608] "*They were slow in getting out*" the order for water-driven turbines! Of which we have a terrible lack! This is the height of disgrace and shamelessness! Make sure to *find out* who is to blame so that we can send these scoundrels to rot in prison.

Find out who *precisely* is *personally* responsible for the work of this factory, and for the orders placed with it.

Altogether, the establishment of specified personal responsibility is the most important job for the Executive Secretary of the C.P.C. and the Council of Labour and Defence. I will require this more strictly than anything else. If it proves necessary, call in immediately for this purpose the People's Commissariat for Justice, and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, or an "expert" from them.

One more thing. It seems to me that the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council has fallen asleep altogether. It is essential either to wake it up, or really to set going a drive to disperse these scientific loafers, and establish precisely and without fail who will be responsible for keeping us abreast of European and American techniques sensibly, in good time, practically, not bureaucratically. In particular, Moscow should have one specimen of *all* the most important *latest machines*: to learn and to teach. (Two engineers have told me that in America they make roads with a machine which transforms a dirt road into a hard road simply by the force of its own pressure; how important this would be for our roadless semi-civilised country!)

We must see that the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council, and its numerous idlers abroad, should stop idling, or that *we should replace them by others*.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 3, 1921

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO A. S. KISELYOV

Comrade Kiselyov, Chairman of the Narrow Council
Copies to Comrades Bogdanov, Unshlikht, Avanesov and Kursky

I draw your attention to the note by Mikhels in *Izvestia* No. 203 of Sept. 13.[609]

The author writes that since 1918, 2.5 million poods of most valuable metal cargoes have been lying in store, almost in a swamp, unregistered and unguarded, and are being pilfered and ruined.

I ask you urgently to check up if that is true.

If it is, take all the necessary steps immediately to register, preserve, etc., this property, and to bring those guilty most strictly to book.

Give me a detailed written report, pointing out the names and posts of the persons guilty of this scandal, and make a communication to the Council of Labour and Defence.

I ask you to do all this with the utmost urgency.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 15, 1921

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original
signed by Lenin

NOTE TO G. I. KRUMIN[610]

Discuss the following, and let's make a final draft:

That it should be recognised as absolutely necessary to pay particularly great attention to collecting *information* (both through special correspondents, without however appointing *them only for this purpose*, and through all the special representatives of the *Council of Labour and Defence* and the People's Commissariats; and likewise—most important of all—from the *regular* local reports *to the appropriate* bodies), information coming directly from local bodies (works, mines, separate log camps, etc.). The collection and *analysis* of information coming, not only from the Chief Boards, but from these organs operating on the spot, must become one of the most important tasks of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Written on October 7, 1921

First published on January 26, 1924 in the newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 96

Printed from the newspaper text

TO V. A. AVANESOV

October 15

Comrade Avanesov,

Should not *part* of the shock transport works be handed over by the Supreme Economic Council to the People's Commissariat for Communications (in connection with yesterday's question)?[611]

The consumer must be given an incentive.

Think it over.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

As regards storage. Let's decree:

Workers in stores receive a *bonus* for clearing 1/8, 1/4, 1/2 of the store if they dispatch (deliver) its contents directly to state productive enterprises (factories, state farms, and the like).

The same bonus is given to those drawing these materials from the stores for delivery to the same factories, etc.

Unless there is personal interest, no damned thing will come of it. We must *find a way* to produce incentives.

But Troyanovsky is not clever. *You* will answer for such a "chairman", you personally. Bear that in mind.

You need a clever man on this job.

Lenin

Written on October 15, 1921

First published in part on January 21, 1927 in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* No. 17

Published in full in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

NOTES FOR A REPORT AT THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF POLITICAL EDUCATION WORKERS[612]

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE TASKS OF POLITICAL EDUCATION WORKERS

1. Not in the straightforward Communist fashion, but "by outflanking and with a special approach".
2. Defeat and retreat—for a new advance.
3. Who will be able to take advantage sooner, the capitalists or ourselves?
4. "Personal incentives".... Peasants, workers, experts, a mass of stupidities in our attitude to the latter.
5. *To learn* from capitalists and lessees.
   A serious and *harsh* schooling.
6. *Increase in production* at all costs.

You are outside the institutions? It is even better that you are outside.

7. *Literacy*. Liquidation of illiteracy, and not in the clouds+and liquidating the Commission for Liquidation. July 19, 1920.[613]
   A disgraceful list of gubernias and uyezds lagging in respect of literacy.
8. *Raising of cultural level*
   (after every great political upheaval, a long time goes into "digestion", "assimilation", training to make use, finishing the rough-hewn work of initial construction).
9. Improvement of legality ... teach people to struggle *in a civilised way* for legality, without at all forgetting

the limits of legality in a revolution. That's not the evil *now*, it's the *multitude* of illegalities.

10. In particular, *graft*. Who has done what to fight graft.

10 bis. Bureaucracy and red tape.

11. Production propaganda, bringing to the fore economic successes *possible* here and now for the peasant, ability to single out, use for propaganda, *follow up* success.

12. *Practical successes in the building* of the economy—that is the point. The touchstone of everything.

Three enemies:	13. ΣΣ Four commandments:
Communist *conceit*—this is the enemy	(1) Don't split hairs, don't be pompous in your communism, don't use great words to cover up your slackness, idleness, apathy, backwardness;
Illiteracy	(2) Wipe out illiteracy;
Graft	(3) Fight graft;
ΣΣ ΣΣ	(4) Check all your work, so that words should not remain words, by *practical* successes in economic construction.

Written before October 17, 1921
First published in 1924
in the journal
Molodaya Gvardiya No. 2-3

Printed from the original

TO D. I. KURSKY ON THE QUESTION OF LEASES AND CONCESSIONS IN AGRICULTURE[614]

Comrade Kursky,

You should go deeply into the question of *leases* and *concessions* in agriculture.

You have not gone into it sufficiently

Prohibition of leasing in principle is of vast importance. He who works the land has possession of it.

There must be no leasing.

But leasing of a *state farm* or "uncultivated land"?

This must be separated out

This is a special type.

Whoever works has possession *here too*. The state is the owner, the tenant of the state farm cultivates. This is, strictly speaking, not a tenant, nor is it a lease in the ordinary sense.

Rather it is transfer of *management*.

It is essential to make a more detailed and circumstantial study of the matter.

1921

Lenin

Written on October 25, 1921

First published in 1924 in the preface by D. I. Kursky to the book *Pyaty Vserossiisky syezd deyatelei sovetskoi yustitsii. Stenograficheskiy otchot* (Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviet Judiciary. Stenographic Report), Juridical Publishing House of the People's Commissariat for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R., Moscow

Printed from the original

NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE R.C.P.[615]

NOTE TO N. I. BUKHARIN

Comrade Bukharin,

I enclose my notes in connection with the theme assigned to you by the Central Committee today. I have been thinking about this theme, and planned:

(α) setting out the *subjects* of dispute, difference and split;

(β) alternation of periods of split and periods of unity;

(γ) alternation of periods of a majority for the Mensheviks and for the Bolsheviks (maybe it could be represented in a diagram?).

Drop me a line about your opinion.

Lenin

December 1

Should not this be taken as a *canvas* for your article? Or something of this kind?

LIST (CHRONOLOGICAL) OF SUBJECTS OF DISPUTE

1903. Oct. The question of organisation: §1 of the Rules.
1904. "The Zemstvo campaign."
1905. May. Attitude to the revolution, to the strike struggle, to the armed uprising.
1905. Aug. Boycott of the Duma, or participation?
1905. Oct.
1905. Dec. Insurrection.
1906. Jan.-Mar. Boycott of the Duma, or participation?

1906. April-May. Attitude to the First Duma.
1906. July. Attitude to the armed uprising
" Sept. " " the underground struggle.
1907. Jan.-Feb. Elections to the Second Duma: Left Bloc, or with the Cadets?
1907. April. Second Duma.
1909-10. Liquidationism.
1911. Plenum of the Central Committee.
Unity or split?
1912. The split (liquidationism).
1913. "Strike fever", etc.
1913. Attitude to the Third Duma.[616]
1914. Attitude to the imperialist war.
1917. Feb.-Mar. Attitude to the February revolution.
1917. May. The Coalition Ministry.
1917. July. The First Congress of Soviets.[617]
1917. Sept. The Kornilov revolt and the Democratic Conference.
1917. Oct.
Soviet power;
terror;
Brest Peace Treaty;
conspiracies and civil war.
1918. Civil war. Attitude of the Mensheviks.
1918. " " " " " "
1919.
1920.
1921.

STRUGGLE OF BOLSHEVIKS AND MENSHEVIKS:
(ALTERNATION OF NUMERICAL RELATIONS)

1903. *The Congress* $\frac{20}{24}$ 44 votes[618] (one party).

1905. Two congresses. *Za* (*Zirka* = approximately) (two parties).[619]
1906. Stockholm Congress. Exactly (number of votes) *one* party.
1907. London Congress. Exactly (number of votes)[620] *one party*.

(Groups in the Dumas.)

1911-12. *Collections by workers* (from the miscellany on liquidationism)[621] (one and two parties)

1917. June. First All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

1917. Nov. 1.5(?) millions. *Elections to the Constituent Assembly.*
9 millions.[622]

1.5 millions
9 millions

Written on December 1, 1921
First published in 1924
in the journal *Bolshevik*
No. 7-8

Printed from the original

TO V. A. AVANESOV, D. I. KURSKY AND A. D. TSYURUPA

Very urgent

Avanesov, Kursky and Tsyurupa

I suspect a small military stratagem on the part of Osinsky and Bogdanov, who today, in my absence, are raising the question of reversing the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence about the prosecution of persons guilty of bureaucratic delays in the manufacture of the Fowler ploughs.[623] Please give attention to this matter, and use your influence against reversing the decision. There is no doubt that in this affair there are people guilty of red tape, and from the standpoint of principle it is essential not to leave such matters within the confines of bureaucratic institutions, but to bring them out into the public court—not so much for the sake of inflicting strict punishment (perhaps a reprimand will suffice), but for the sake of publicity and for dispelling the universal conviction that guilty persons are not punished.

December 13, 1921

Lenin

Dictated by telephone

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from a typescript copy

TO P. A. BOGDANOV

December 23, 1921

Comrade Bogdanov,

I consider all your arguments about the Fowler ploughs affair to be completely wrong in principle. True, your error is not so indecent (excuse my strong language) as that of Osinsky, who has frankly become a defender of the worst kind of bureaucracy; nevertheless what you say does *not look good* either.

We must not be afraid of the courts (our courts are proletarian) or of publicity, but must drag bureaucratic delays out into daylight for the people's judgement: only in this way shall we manage to really cure this disease.

Your argument is that the people involved are exceptionally good, devoted and valuable workers.

Let's suppose that this is true, that you are not a victim of "departmental bias".

What follows from this?

Only this, that the court—if it agrees with you *in this respect* (and you, probably, since you firmly believe it, will present a number of most serious witnesses to prove it)—will bring in a verdict that:

> they are guilty of failing to eliminate bureaucratic delays and of mismanagement; but, taking into account their exceptional loyalty to the Soviet power, completely proved by a number of witnesses, their outstanding conscientiousness and zeal, also completely proved, taking into account the general defects in the machinery of the Supreme Economic Council, partly due to the change of Presidium, etc.

> ... decides not to inflict any punishment, in the belief that the accused will take this seriously to heart, as will the entire Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council.

Well, if *approximately* such a decision were taken, can you deny its usefulness—it's *social* significance, 1,000 times greater than a secret-Party-Central-Committee-idiotic hushing up of a rotten case about rotten bureaucracy and avoiding publicity?

You are absolutely wrong in principle. We don't know how to conduct a public trial for rotten bureaucracy: for this all of us, and particularly the People's Commissariat for Justice, should be hung on stinking ropes. And I have not yet lost all hope that one day we shall be hung for this, *and deservedly so*.

If you think that in the R.S.F.S.R. we cannot find a *single* sensible prosecutor and three sensible judges, really sensible (not over-hasty, not shouters, not phrase-mongers), then I accuse you also of pessimism about the Soviet power. I am sending a copy of this letter (together with your letter) to Comrade Kursky, with a special request that he read it himself and let it be read by as many jurists as possible, and that he, Kursky, should consider himself specifically responsible for selecting an unquestionably *sensible* prosecutor *and sensible* judges for *this* trial. And that Kursky should be personally responsible for (1) the maximum acceleration of the proceedings and (2) letting me have a *stenographic* report of this trial (to draw the conclusion as to whether at last our *very feeble* People's Commissariat for Justice is *learning* to organise and carry through public trials of bureaucracy). It is time we began to learn.

I don't understand why a sensible prosecutor should not in face of *the whole public* completely shatter, ridicule and disgrace a "Bogdanovist" and "Osinskyist" defence of bureaucratic red tape, and at the same time draw up a wise, correct and balanced charge.

Why should not a sentence be possible *approximately* on the following lines:

> Attaching exceptional importance to the public trial of cases of bureaucratic delay, we hand down in this case a very lenient sentence, in view of the

exceptionally rare conscientiousness of the accused; at the same time giving a warning that in future we shall punish for such delays the *most saintly*, *but negligent* dunderheads (the court perhaps will express itself more politely), because we, the R.S.F.S.R., do not need saintliness, but *efficient* management.

And, therefore, if we inflict no penalty on this occasion on Lomov and Styunkel[624] on account of their "saintliness", we sentence Unksov[625] (I think that's the name?), whose duty it was to submit reports to the *Council of Labour and Defence* and who failed to do so, to a week's arrest; we proclaim Ilyin[626] (director of the former Ilyin factory?) and the *entire works committee* of this factory, and the *entire* executive of the (corresponding) trade union, and the entire membership of the communist group of such-and-such a factory, or such-and-such factories, *guilty* of red tape, negligence and connivance at bureaucracy, and inflict on them a *severe reprimand* and *public* censure, with a warning that it is only for this first time that we are inflicting such mild penalties, but in future will for such behaviour send all such trade union and communist scoundrels (the court, perhaps, will express itself more mildly) mercilessly to jail.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

1922

ON THE QUESTION OF STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR

TO COMRADES BUKHARIN, ZINOVIEV AND MOLOTOV (FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU)

On the subject of yesterday's report from Hanover that the International Federation of Metalworkers is raising the question of struggle against war and has adopted a resolution to respond to war with a strike,[627] I suggest the following:

1. That a number of articles be printed in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, giving a reminder of the fate of the Basle Manifesto and a detailed explanation of all the childishness or all the social-treachery, now being repeated by the metalworkers.

2. That at the next enlarged meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern there be put on the agenda the question of struggle against war, and that circumstantial resolutions be adopted explaining that only a ready and experienced revolutionary party, with a good illegal machinery, can successfully wage a struggle against war, and that the means of struggle is not a strike against war, but the formation of revolutionary groups in the warring armies and their preparation for the carrying out of a revolution.

February 4, 1922

Lenin

Received by telephone by
L. A. Fotieva

First published on
January 20, 1929
in *Pravda* No. 17

Printed from a typescript copy

ON THE TASKS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR JUSTICE UNDER THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Letter to D. I. Kursky

Copies to: 1) Molotov for members of the Political Bureau
2) A. D. Tsyurupa
3) Rykov (when he returns)
4) Comrade Yenukidze for members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

Special request: Please, do not duplicate; let read and sign; prevent divulging; prevent blabbing out to enemies.

February 20, 1922

Comrade Kursky,

The activity of the People's Commissariat for Justice is apparently not yet at all adapted to the New Economic Policy.

Previously, the militant organs of the Soviet power were chiefly the People's Commissariat for the Army and the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission. An *especially* militant role now falls to the People's Commissariat for Justice (P.C.J.); unfortunately, there is no evidence of any understanding of this on the part of the leadership and the senior members of the P.C.J.

Intensification of reprisals against the political enemies of the Soviet power and the agents of the bourgeoisie (*specifically* the Mensheviks and S.R.s); mounting of these reprisals by revolutionary tribunals and people's courts in the swiftest, most *revolutionary* and *expedient* manner;

compulsory staging of a number of *model* (as regards speed and force of repression, and *explanation* of their significance to the masses of people through the courts and the press) trials in Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov and several other key centres; influence on the people's judges and members of revolutionary tribunals through the Party in the sense of improving the activity of the courts and intensifying the reprisals—all of this must be conducted systematically, persistently, with doggedness and mandatory reports (in the most concise, telegraphic style but business-like and exact, with obligatory statistics of how the P.C.J. chastises and learns to chastise the "communist" scoundrels who predominate among us and who know how to chatter and put on airs, but not how to work).

The fighting role of the P.C.J. is equally important in the sphere of *NEP*, and here the P.C.J.'s weakness and apathy is even more outrageous. There is no evidence of any understanding of the fact that we recognise and will continue to recognise only *state* capitalism, and it is we—we conscious workers, we Communists—who are the state. That is why we should brand as good-for-nothing Communists those who have failed to understand their task of restricting, curbing, checking and catching red-handed and inflicting exemplary chastisement on any kind of *capitalism that goes beyond the framework of state capitalism in our meaning of the concept and tasks of the state.*

It is the P.C.J., it is the people's courts that are here faced with an especially militant and especially responsible task. There is no sign that it has been grasped. The papers make noises about the abuse of *NEP*. These abuses are innumerable.

But where is the noise about *model trials* of the scoundrels abusing the New Economic Policy? There is no such noise, because there are no such trials. The P.C.J. has "forgotten" that that is its business, that it is its duty to pull up, shake up and rouse the people's courts and teach them to be *ruthless and swift* in chastising—*with every means*, *including the firing squad*—for abuse of the New Economic Policy. *It* is responsible for this. There is no evidence of any vibrant activity in this sphere on the part of the P.C.J., because there is no such activity.

The educational role of the courts is tremendous. How do we show concern for this? How do we take account of the real results? There is nothing of the sort, but that happens to be the ABC of juridical work.

It is just as elementary that triple penalties should be inflicted on Communists, as compared with non-Party people. There again the P.C.J. has shown little concern.

Under the tsar, the procurators were sacked or promoted on the strength of the percentage of cases they won. We managed to adopt the worst of tsarist Russia—red tape and sluggishness—and this is virtually stifling us, but we failed to adopt its *good* practices. Every member of the P.C.J. Collegium, every worker of this Commissariat should be assessed according to his record, on the strength of the following figures: how many Communists have you jailed with triple sentences, as compared with non-Party people, for the same offences? How many bureaucrats have you jailed for red tape and procrastination? How many merchants caught abusing *NEP* have you sentenced to be shot or to some other no-joke penalty (for ridiculous penalties are frequently imposed in Moscow, under the very nose of the P.C.J.)? You can't answer the question? This means that you are an idler who should be expelled from the Party for "communist chatter" and for "communist conceit".

The new civil legislation is being drafted. I find that the P.C.J. is "swimming with the tide". But its task is to swim *against* the tide. Its task is to create a new civil law, and not to adopt (rather, not to allow itself to be duped by the old and stupid bourgeois lawyers who adopt) the old, bourgeois concept of civil law. It should not give in to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which "ex officio" conducts the line of "adaptation to Europe", but *combat* this line and work out a *new* civil law, a new attitude to "private" contracts, etc. We do not recognise anything "private", and regard *everything* in the economic sphere as falling under *public* and not private *law*. We allow *only* state capitalism, and as has been said, it is we who are the state. Hence, the task is to extend the application of state intervention in "private legal" relations; to extend the right of the state to annul "private" contracts; to apply to "civil legal relations"

not the *corpus juris romani* but *our revolutionary concept of law*; to show systematically, persistently, with determination, through a series of model trials, *how* this should be done wisely and vigorously; to brand through the Party and expel those members of revolutionary tribunals and people's judges who fail to learn this .or refuse to understand it.

Unless the P.C.J. rouses itself at once and vigorously starts working in a new, militant way, along new lines, it will be disgraced before Genoa (and the whole world).

I propose to you that

1) you read my letter to all members of the P.C.J. Collegium;
2) ditto—at a meeting of 100-200 Communists exclusively, who practise in the sphere of civil, criminal and constitutional law;
3) prohibit, on pain of Party responsibility, to chatter about it (about this letter), for it is stupid to disclose our strategy to the enemy;
4) get a number of Communists, working in the courts and in the P.C.J., who are quite agreed with the spirit of this letter, to publish some articles in the press and give a number of public lectures on these topics;
5) allocate *responsibility* between all members of the Collegium (and if possible between other prominent Communists working in the P.C.J.):

a) for the sections in charge of the new *civil* legislation (*specifically* and *highly* important);
b) ditto criminal legislation;
c) ditto constitutional and political legislation } less urgent
d) for staging and conducting model, widely publicised and *educational* trials in the said centres;
e) for the business-like—and not just for the record—control over people's courts and revolutionary tribunals, to see that they manage in fact to *intensify reprisals* also against the political enemies of the Soviet power (the P.C.J. will be the *first to blame* if these reprisals are not also intensified) and against *NEP abuses*.

We allow you to trade and make money, but insist that you be *thrice* as honest, that you submit truthful and exact accounts, that you abide not only by the letter but also by the *spirit* of our, communist legislation, that you do not allow the *slightest* departure from our laws—that is what the P.C.J. should adopt as its main commandment in respect of NEP. If the P.C.J. fails to make our capitalism "disciplined" and "decent"; if the P.C.J. fails to prove by a series of model trials that it *knows* how to trap offenders against this rule and *chastise*, not with the disgracefully stupid fine of 100 or 200 millions—which is shortsighted from the communist standpoint—but with *shooting*, then the P.C.J. is good for nothing and I shall deem it my duty to get the Central Committee to agree to a total replacement of all senior workers of the P.C.J.

Please inform me as soon as possible of the allocation of the said work between all members of the P.C.J. Collegium to show me, with the utmost precision, who specifically (with the exception of the People's Commissar, who is responsible for *everything*) is responsible for which departments of *civil* law (and then also of criminal law, etc.), and for the staging of model trials (each member of the Collegium must show *his* mettle in staging and conducting *several* model trials) and for the business-like control over revolutionary tribunals and people's courts, judicial investigators, etc., in such-and-such a gubernia or such-and-such a district of Moscow.

What we need is not a division of "departments" and bureaucratic slumber on that, but personal responsibility on the part of every *Communist* on the Collegium for a specific area of live revolutionary work. That is what the People's Commissar must achieve and prove that he is capable of achieving it.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. There must not be the slightest mention of my letter in the press. Let anyone, who so wishes, write in his own name, without any mention of mine, and provide as many concrete data as possible.

First published in part in 1924 in the book: *Pyaty Vserossiisky syezd deyatelei sovetskoi yustitsii. Stenograficheskiy otchot* (Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviet Judiciary. Stenographic Report), Juridical Publishing House of the People's Commissariat for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R., Moscow

First published in full in V. I. Lenin, *Sobraniye Sochineny* (Collected Works), Fifth Edition

Printed from the original

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DRAFT DIRECTIVES TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[628]

Comrade Tsyurupa,

I think we are still radically at odds. The main thing, in my opinion, is to shift the centre of gravity from writing decrees and orders (our stupidities in this respect verge on idiocy) to *selection of people* and *checking fulfilment*. This is the essential point.

Is the Narrow Council unsuitable for this? Let's assume that. Then *you and Rykov* must devote 9/10ths of your time to it (it is *ridiculous* to expect the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Executive Secretary to do more than fulfil *simple* instructions). All of us are sunk in the rotten bureaucratic swamp of "departments". Great authority, common sense and strong will are necessary for the everyday struggle against this. The departments are shit; decrees are shit. To find men and check up on their work—that is the whole point. If you+Rykov set about this for 9/10ths of your time, and make the Executive Secretary (and sometimes also members of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars) your assistants, then perhaps we can get by.

Send me once again your draft about the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.

Lenin

Written on February 21, 1922

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO A. L. SHEINMAN

February 28

Comrade Sheinman,

Your words that the State Bank is now a "powerful apparatus" (Feb. 22) made me laugh. Let me say in confidence: this is the height of childishness, the height of Communist-mandarin childishness.

A "powerful apparatus"! The "powerful apparatus"= transferring from one state pocket into another such remarkable "real values" as Soviet rubles.... Current accounts expressed in gold rubles (and even that falsely, not at the *real* parity) 2.8-7.9-10.3 million rubles (on Dec. 16, Jan. 16, and Feb. 1). Ha-ha! And how are they made up? 90-98 per cent are revenues from our *state trusts*, i.e., the same official bits of paper from the same bureaucrats!

At present the State Bank=a bureaucratic paper game. There is the truth for you, if you want to hear not the sweet communist-official lies (with which everyone feeds you as a high mandarin), but the *truth*.

And if you don't want to look at this truth with open eyes, through all the communist lying, you are a man who has *perished* in the prime of life in a swamp of official lying. Now that is an unpleasant truth, but it is the truth.

Either to seek and *gradually* to find (testing and checking one hundred times) *people* capable of organising trade on behalf of the State Bank, checking on trade, encouraging business-like traders, *closing down* allegedly commercial, but in reality communist-bureaucratic trading and factory "Potemkin villages"[629]—or the entire State Bank and all its work is zero, worse than zero, self-deception with a new bureaucratic rattle.

And until you prove to me by acts, backed up by experience, that the State Bank has *begun to find* such men, inspectors, agents, etc., until then there is nothing to talk about: I won't believe a word you say.

Please don't be angry for this frankness.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on February 28, 1922

First published in 1949
in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 1

Printed from the original

TO V. A. TIKHOMIROV[630]

Copies to Comrades Molotov and Tsyurupa

Comrade Tikhomirov,

In my opinion, no alterations are needed.

It is not the co-operative movement that should be adapted to the *New Economic Policy*, but the *New Economic Policy* to the co-operative movement.

The parallel with the trade unions is incorrect, a parallel with the Soviets would be nearer the truth.

The old structure should be retained. All attention and all effort should be concentrated on selecting *people* (this is our weak spot), and *getting the better of private trade*.

Everything towards this end.

No reorganisations.

Are there any practical successes? I am afraid, not.

Turnover Sept. —1
Oct. —3
Nov. —6
Dec. —10 million pre-war rubles?
and Jan. —1922?

What is the percentage of expenses? Are the local co-operatives growing weaker or stronger?

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on March 1, 1922
First published in the newspaper *Kooperativnaya Zhizn* No. 255, November 6-7, 1927

Printed from the original

TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

March 19

Comrade Stepanov,

I have just finished looking through 160 pages of your book.[631]

Just as I was furious in cursing you (up to and including bad language) for being able at such a time to spend months over refuting Cunow,[632] so I am delighted with this book. Now this is a real achievement! Now this is a model of how one should teach the Russian savage *from the ABC* onwards, and to teach him not a "half-science" but the *whole of science.*

Write (after you have had a *proper* rest) another such little book on the history of religion *and against all* religion (including the Kantian and other subtly idealistic or subtly agnostic religion), with a survey of material on the history of atheism and *on the links* between the church and the bourgeoisie.

Once more: greetings and congratulations on a splendid success.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. There is something wrong on page 97. Respondek has muddled matters.[633] I advise you to take the original source and have a check made. I enclose a letter to Popov (you can send it through my secretary).

P.P.S. I am sending my preface to the secretary.[634]

Written on March 19, 1922

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 10 (93)

Printed from the original

NOTES FOR A SPEECH ON MARCH 27, 1922[635]

1. On *Genoa* briefly to repeat what was said on Mar. 6, 1922.[636]

(+delegation composed. — Directives carefully discussed more than once.—"*We are ready*.")

2. *NEP*. The main points of this "question":
(a) Testing the "link" with the peasant economy.
3. (b) The test by competition between state *and* capitalist enterprises (both *commercial* and *industrial*; both *Russian* and *foreign*).
4. (c) "State capitalism." Scholastic *versus* revolutionary and practical meaning of this term.

((*State* capitalism. "*We*" are the state.))

5. (d) Halting the retreat. Not in the sense: "We've already learned", but in the sense: don't have nerves, don't invent, but learn on the *present ground*; "regrouping of forces and preparation"=the watchword of the day. Preparation for the offensive *against private capital*=the watchword.

The scouting sortie has been made. *Mixed companies*.

6. "Evolution or tactics?
Ustryalov in *Smena Vekh*[637]: more useful than "sweet-sounding communist lies".

7. Which side will win? What do we lack? Cultured methods, *ability to administer* (including ability to carry on state trade).
8. *Todorsky, p. 62, to underline.*[638] Already in Oct. 1918!

(Cf. conqueror and conquered: who is more cultured? 4,700 responsible Communists of Moscow and Moscow bureaucracy.)

Two *typical* examples

9. Example No. 1: *Moscow Consumers' Co-operative Society* fights the red tape of the *People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.*[639]

"Copy of the white cow."[640] What did "they" (without Krasin and Kamenev) lack? *Culture.*

(*Material of the "case" of the M.C.C.S. versus the P.C.F.T.*)

10. Example No. 2: How "he" (and "they") *overdid the administering* (in the Donets Basin).

(In this case there was *insufficient* ability to manage + a certain *political* mistake.)

11. "State trusts." An example ... for next year!

(Role of the Communists: they're *bad*!)

12. Summing up: we have quite enough resources to win in *NEP*: both political and economic. The question is "*only*" one of *cultured methods*!
13. The whiteguards (including the *Mensheviks* and *S.R.s* and Co.) see in this *something* in their favour! Vain hope! A review of what has been completed and not completed is very valuable:

(α) A bourgeois-democratic revolution, "they" say! Against them (400 years' worth of dung cleaned out in 4 years!).
(β) Exit from the war: a *revolutionary* exit from a reactionary war. And what about them?
(γ) The Soviet state. The first in the world. A new epoch: worse than the *first locomotive*!

The three are inseparable.

The fourth, and *main* one, is not finished: laying the *foundations of a socialist economy*. To be redone again and again.

14. What "link in the chain" must we get hold of now?
    1917—withdrawal from the war,
    1918—Soviet state versus Constituent Assembly.
    1919 and 1920—repelling invasion.
    1921: economic approach to the peasantry. *The search for an economic policy*.
    1922: The *essential* is not in institutions, not in reorganisations, not in new decrees, but in the *selection of personnel* and in *checking performance*. Selection of personnel and checking performance.
    On three (3) conditions:
    (α) Absence of intervention.
    With Mensheviks and S.R.s: *shooting* for political *abetting*.
    (β) The financial crisis not to be excessively severe.
    (Not very severe? Purging the state trusts.)
    (γ) Making no *political mistakes*.

15. "The key feature of the moment" (the link in the chain)= the gap between the grandeur of the tasks imposed and our *poverty*, not only material but also *cultural*.
16. We must be at the head of the masses, other vise we are a drop in the ocean.

    "*The phase of propaganda by decrees*" *is over*. The masses will understand and appreciate *only* business-like practical work, *practical success* in economic and cultural work.

ΣΣ =Selection of people and checking of performance!

Additions:

1. The Party versus the Soviet bodies. (Don't bother it with petty jobs. Raise the responsibility of personnel in Soviet bodies.)
2. All-Russia Central Executive Committee? Longer sessions. More careful discussion. More circumstantial checking.
3. Council of People's Commissars and Council of Labour and Defence.
   My deputies (Rykov and the usefulness of Wilhelm II).
   Correspondence since Jan. 1922.
   Checking performance, pulling up, *purging from above*.
4. C.P.C. Raise its prestige, free it from minor tasks.

5. C.L.D. Develop and expand the *activities of the regional economic conferences*.
6. Narrow Council of People's Commissars. Free it also from minor tasks.

Draft directives (on the instruction of the Central Committee) will be submitted.

Written on March 25-26, 1922
First published in 1926
in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 4

Printed from the original

TO D. I. KURSKY

Top Secret

Comrade Kursky, People's Commissariat for Justice
Copy to Comrade Krylenko

On my instructions, the former Moscow Extraordinary Commission began an investigation into the criminal negligence, red tape and inactivity displayed by the Scientific and Technical Department and the Inventions Committee.

The results of the investigation were put before the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal which, instead of examining the case in substance, discovering and punishing the guilty (and that in these institutions there are a sufficient number of learned wastrels, loafers and other scoundrels, has been noted more than once in the press, in the articles by Comrade Sosnovsky and others), adopted an extremely patronising attitude to the accused, tried them without a prosecutor, and in the end found the charge not proven and acquitted all the accused.

At the present time I have been informed that the Moscow Gubernia Branch of the State Political Department has appealed against the decision of the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal to the Judiciary Supervision Section of the People's Commissariat for Justice. I ask you to study this case personally, pay particular attention to it, try together with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to collect supplementary material on the activity of these institutions, if necessary appoint an investigating committee by agreement with Comrade Avanesov—not composed of officials and drivellers, but of people who really know how to investigate properly, to procure the material required and find

the culprits. A political trial should be mounted in the Revolutionary Tribunal (making use of Comrade Sosnovsky for the press) to really shake up this "scientific" swamp.

I suggest that the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal be severely reprimanded for its indulgence and formal bureaucratic handling of the case.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 31, 1922

First published
on January 21, 1931
in *Pravda* No. 21

Printed from a typescript copy

TO N. OSINSKY

Copies to
1) The Editorial Board of *Pravda*
2) Comrade Steklov
3) Rykov and Tsyurupa

April 12, 1922

Comrade Osinsky,

I very much welcome your article in today's *Pravda*: "New Data from Local Experience". It is just such articles that we need most of all, and I think that every People's Commissariat ought to "provide itself" with a publicist (very closely connected with the work of the People's Commissariat and the People's Commissar) to make such reviews.

The worst of our features is an excess of general disquisitions in the press, and political prattle with an extreme lack of *study* of local experience. Both in the provinces and in the centre, powerful tendencies resist its truthful publicity and truthful evaluation. They are afraid of washing dirty linen in public, afraid of the naked truth, and brush it aside with a meaningful glance, taking a superficial attitude, as Comrade Trotsky correctly said.

We need more and more concreteness in studying local experience, details, the little things, practice, business-like experience, going deeply into real life—uyezd, volost and village; examination of what, where, by whom and why (by what means) success is achieved, in spite of the abyss of poverty and ruin, in reaching genuine improvement, even if on a small scale, and courage to unmask mistakes and incapacity, popularising and *advertising* with all our strength every local worker who is in any way out-

standing, and making him a model. The more such work is done, the deeper we go into living practice, distracting the attention of both ourselves and our readers from the stinking bureaucratic and stinking intellectual Moscow (and, in general, Soviet bourgeois) atmosphere, the greater will be our success in improving both our press and all our constructive work.

Once again I welcome your initiative, and very much wish that you should continue it further, on a wider scale and more *deeply* in the same direction.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in part on February 17, 1956 in *Pravda* No. 48

Published in full on April 22, 1956 in *Pravda* No. 113

Printed from the original

TO MEMBERS OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION

August 21

Svidersky, Reske, Rozmirovich, Ruzer
and other members of the Collegium of the *W.P.I.*

I very much regret that Tsyurupa did not manage to do any work in the *Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*.[641] I am afraid that the work is not quite rightly organised. The *type* of work is *individual investigations and* reports. This is old hat. But there is no *reorganisation* of the machinery or its improvement. There are no model staffs composed entirely of Communists, or entirely of students of Schools of Soviet and Party Work; there are no systematically worked-out *rates* of work, which might be applied to other departments; there are no systematic statistical studies of what *Soviet employees* can do in this or that branch of government in the course of a week, and so forth.

I had constantly hoped that the influx of new people into the Collegium of the W.P.I. would liven up the work, but from my questioning of Stalin I have not been able to see this. Please write to me, and then we shall organise a meeting, if necessary. You have a staff of 8,000 instead of 9,000. Would it not be possible to cut it down to *2,000*, with salaries for 6,000 (i.e., to treble the payment) and improve their qualifications?

If Avanesov arrives soon, show this to him too.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on August 21, 1922

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO V. A. AVANESOV

September 1, 1922

Comrade Avanesov,

Yesterday I talked it over with Comrade Svidersky, and convinced myself that he too attaches the greatest importance to the "department of normalisation". He has given the job of collecting the literature to Yermansky. I am somewhat doubtful whether Yermansky will do this successfully. He is a Menshevik, and his book shows a certain maliciousness (although the book is nevertheless a good one).[642] Please either check up on his performance of the assignment, or take steps *yourself* to have it carried out.

Both German and American literature should be obtained. *Everything* more or less valuable should be collected, especially as regards normalising *bureaucratic* work (procedure for dispatch of business; forms; control; typing of copies; inquiries and replies, etc., etc.).

In my opinion, the *most necessary* thing for us now is to learn from Europe and America. If I am not mistaken, I have heard that you have an excellent knowledge of German. If not, find a translator. Maybe something useful will be found in the Scandinavian countries also.

Everything must be got together, and *don't rely* on Yermansky *without a special chechup*.

Maybe through Krestinsky[643] you will be able to get hold of some *unpublished* material? Or through the ambassador in Norway?

I think that we must work out normalisation of *paper* work, and then apply it everywhere. This is most important. If they allowed you to look at one of the best institutions in Germany or Norway, it would be worth staying over there for a week.

The main thing is norms (i.e., how many people for such-and-such a sum total of work). After that we shall make our own Central Statistical Board work as well.

Please, *after making use of this letter*, send it on to A. D. Tsyurupa. So long as he is ill, I don't want to worry him.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent to Berlin

First published in part on January 21, 1927 in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* No. 17

Published in full in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

TO L. M. KHINCHUK

Comrade Khinchuk,

Please send me the proofs (first proofs, even if uncorrected) of your new book.[644]

Would it be possible (provided this does not delay publication: there should be no delay in *any* circumstances) to add tables showing the growth of turnover by quarters,

the number of selling-points in the villages
(and by districts),
volume of sales in the villages,.
percentage of expenditure (to turnover),
number of employees,
and so forth.

Generally speaking, I think it essential to have precise data to show *how deeply* commercial turnover has penetrated the countryside, *how widespread* it is, and *just how* the process works.

If for some reason it cannot be printed, please send it to me.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on September 12, 1922

First published in 1924 in the journal *Soyuz Potrebitelei* No. 5

Printed from the original

TO L. M. KHINCHUK

Comrade Khinchuk,

I decided to send you the pamphlet, in order not to delay it. Please send it to me again in page.

Could you add

1) Details on reduction of staff? *By departments*?
2) The same, about normalisation?
   (They say you have a department.)
3) The same, comparing data (all the data) by quarters?
4) The same, showing in *how many* volosts (and per cent) and in how many villages (and per cent of all villages) there are selling-points?
5) Price of tea? Is it not too low? Do you realise that this is an *article of luxury*? How do you determine the allowable *maximum* price of tea?
6) A division of products into necessities and luxuries.
7) Sales of agricultural *implements*, including improved ones? Propaganda measures about them?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. The pamphlet is a very good one.

Written not earlier than September 18, 1922

First published in 1924 in the journal *Soyuz Potrebitelei* No. 5

Printed from the original

NOTES FOR A REPORT "FIVE YEARS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION" AT THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN[645]

1. Not a reporter, but only a *brief introduction* to the debate (illness, etc.).[646]
2. The theme: has *NEP* been tested by experience? (The experience) for or against?
3. The question of "state capitalism" was touched on already in 1918.
4. Quotation from pamphlet.[647] *Seite* 5.

"State capitalism would be progress."

5. Quotation: "5 elements" of the economy of Russia.
6. Quotation: which element predominates?[648]
7. What is the plan or idea or essence of *NEP*?

(α) Retention of the land in the hands of the state;

(β) *the same* for all commanding heights in the sphere of *means* of production (*transport*, etc.);

(γ) freedom of trade in the sphere of petty production;

(δ) state capitalism in the sense of attracting *private capital* (both concessions and *mixed companies*).

8. The result follows: in *1918* retreat was assured.
9. We have been alone for 5 years; there is as yet no revolution in any other countries; war and hunger. Shall we perish?
10. To *retreat* a little. We retreated. *Results*?
11. Spring of 1921*—to autumn of 1922. What results?

* The MS. erroneously says 1911.—*Ed.*

12. *The ruble*. Its stabilisation < 3 months 1921
    > *5 months 1922*
    We are getting back on our feet alone, without help. (Quadrillion? Yes, but it won't take long to strike out.)
13. The peasantry? *The tax in kind* (*successful* collection; hundreds of millions).
14. Light industry? *General revival*.
15. Heavy industry?
    Very grave situation.
    A turn for the better 1921-22, but very slight. (*Revenue of the State Bank*: *20 mln. in gold*, *possibility of helping*.)
16. Summing up: this means success is possible, there is *in fact* success.
    A system which is not arbitrary, not muddled, practically tested.
    We are getting back on our feet alone, without outside help.
17. The difficulties are *very great and will continue to be for another few years*.
    Mass of stupidities. Yes. Untrodden path.
    No-help, on the contrary.
    An alien machinery.
    Our stupidities 2×2=5.
    "Their" stupidities 2×2=a tallow candle.
    1) Kolchak }}
    2) Peace of Versailles. }}
18. Therefore
    the prospects are excellent.
    And will be even better if both
    we use the next five-year period *mainly*
    for study
    and the *Communist International*,
    since the resolution on *organisational structure* of the parties (1921) has *not been carried out*.[649]
    Prospects
    ...will be even better.

The title:

"on the organisational structure of the Communist Parties"

"on methods and content of their work"

Organisatorischer Aufbau der kommunistischen Parteien, Methoden und Inhalt ihrer Arbeit.

Speech at Comintern on Nov. 13, 1922

Written before November 13, 1922

First published on January 21, 1926 in *Pravda* No. 17

Printed from the original

OUTLINE OF SPEECH AT THE TENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[650]

1. Fifth anniversary (Vladivostok).
2. Civil war *united* working class and peasantry, and this is a *guarantee of invincible strength*.
3. Civil war trained and tempered (Denikin and others were good *teachers*; taught seriously; all *our best Party workers were in the army*).

3 *bis*: ... *3 bis*: *Diplomacy* (N.B.). Apparatus is easier to build.

4. We have overcome last year's famine too.
5. Now *concentrate* on *economics*: how (N.B.) to *approach* socialism?
6. Not otherwise than through *NEP*.
7. *A year's testing*?
8. *Finances. A small step* forward.
9. *Kritsman*, 1920—16%, 21—50%, 22 60%.[651]
10. Growth of trade, both *internal*
11. — — and external.
12. — Mixed companies: *learning*.
13. Industry: light industry has *improved*,
14. — — — heavy *difficult*, but not hopeless: there is a small step forward.
15. *Central Council of Co-operative Societies*: its special significance.
16. The state apparatus in general: *bad beyond description*; *lower than the bourgeois level of culture*.

("frightened" in November 1917); it is a question of culture *in general*, and it *will take years to raise it*.

17. Hundreds of thousands of employees in the state apparatus. *Increase*.
N.B. 18. Census of 1922 (Oct.-Nov.).
19. Its results.
20. *Article by Kin*.[652]
21. Not alterations, but *redistribution* and *reduction*.
22. *A job for many* years: (we are alone, it is we who are carrying, and we should be *the ones who are being carried*).
23. More rapidly (1917-22)
more slowly (1922-27?) ("watchword").
24. Patronage of town Party cells over village cells and *vice versa*.

Often: this apparatus does not belong to us, we belong to it!

Supply of raw materials and other things for the *next year*! *N.B.* (danger).

Written in the first half of December 1922

First published on September 27, 1925 in *Pravda* No. 221

Printed from the original

1922-1923

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS[653]

GRANTING LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS TO THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR "AUTONOMISATION"

Dictated in December 1922-
January 1923

Published in 1956 in the journal
Kommunist No. 9 and as a pamphlet

Printed from
the shorthand notes

I

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS

I would urge strongly that at this Congress a number of changes be made in our political structure.

I want to tell you of the considerations to which I attach most importance.

At the head of the list I set an increase in the number of Central Committee members to a few dozen or even a hundred. It is my opinion that without this reform our Central Committee would be in great danger if the course of events were not quite favourable for us (and that is something we cannot count on).

Then, I intend to propose that the Congress should on certain conditions invest the decisions of the State Planning Commission with legislative force, meeting, in this respect, the wishes of Comrade Trotsky—to a certain extent and on certain conditions.

As for the first point, i.e., increasing the number of C.C. members, I think it must be done in order to raise the prestige of the Central Committee, to do a thorough job of improving our administrative machinery and to prevent conflicts between small sections of the C.C. from acquiring excessive importance for the future of the Party.

It seems to me that our Party has every right to demand from the working class 50 to 100 C.C. members, and that it could get them from it without unduly taxing the resources of that class.

Such a reform would considerably increase the stability of our Party and ease its struggle in the encirclement of hostile states, which, in my opinion, is likely to, and must, become much more acute in the next few years. I think

that the stability of our Party would gain a thousandfold by such a measure.

Lenin

December 23, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

II

Continuation of the notes.
December 24, 1922

By stability of the Central Committee, of which I spoke above, I mean measures against a split, as far as such measures can at all be taken. For, of course, the whiteguard in *Russkaya Mysl* (it seems to have been S. S. Oldenburg) was right when, first, in the whiteguards' game against Soviet Russia he banked on a split in our Party, and when, secondly, he banked on grave differences in our Party to cause that split.

Our Party relies on two classes and therefore its instability would be possible and its downfall inevitable if there were no agreement between those two classes. In that event this or that measure, and generally all talk about the stability of our C.C., would be futile. No measures of any kind could prevent a split in such a case. But I hope that this is too remote a future and too improbable an event to talk about.

I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the immediate future, and I intend to deal here with a few ideas concerning personal qualities.

I think that from this standpoint the prime factors in the question of stability are such members of the C.C. as Stalin and Trotsky. I think relations between them make up the greater part of the danger of a split, which could be avoided, and this purpose, in my opinion, would be served, among other things, by increasing the number of C.C. members to 50 or 100.

Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure

whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the C.C. on the question of the People's Commissariat for Communications has already proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work.

These two qualities of the two outstanding leaders of the present C.C. can inadvertently lead to a split, and if our Party does not take steps to avert this, the split may come unexpectedly.

I shall not give any further appraisals of the personal qualities of other members of the C.C. I shall just recall that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev[654] was, of course, no accident, but neither can the blame for it be laid upon them personally, any more than non-Bolshevism can upon Trotsky.

Speaking of the young C.C. members, I wish to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most outstanding figures (among the youngest ones), and the following must be borne in mind about them: Bukharin is not only a most valuable and major theorist of the Party; he is also rightly considered the favourite of the whole Party, but his theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is something scholastic about him (he has never made a study of dialectics, and, I think, never fully understood it).

December 25. As for Pyatakov, he is unquestionably a man of outstanding will and outstanding ability, but shows too much zeal for administrating and the administrative side of the work to be relied upon in a serious political matter.

Both of these remarks, of course, are made only for the present, on the assumption that both these outstanding and devoted Party workers fail to find an occasion to enhance their knowledge and amend their one-sidedness.

Lenin

December 25, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

ADDITION TO THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 24, 1922

Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may appear to be a negligible detail. But I think that from the standpoint of safeguards against a split and from the standpoint of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky it is not a detail, or it is a detail which can assume decisive importance.

Lenin

Taken down by L. F.
January 4, 1923

III

Continuation of the notes.
December 26, 1922

The increase in the number of C.C. members to 50 or even 100 must, in my opinion, serve a double or even a treble purpose: the more members there are in the C.C., the more men will be trained in C.C. work and the less danger there will be of a split due to some indiscretion. The enlistment of many workers to the C.C. will help the workers to improve our administrative machinery, which is pretty bad. We inherited it, in effect, from the old regime, for it was absolutely impossible to reorganise it in such a short time, especially in conditions of war, famine, etc. That is why those "critics" who point to the defects of our administrative machinery out of mockery or malice may be calmly answered that they do not in the least understand the conditions of the revolution today. It is altogether impossible

in five years to reorganise the machinery adequately, especially in the conditions in which our revolution took place. It is enough that in five years we have created a new type of state in which the workers are leading the peasants against the bourgeoisie; and in a hostile international environment this in itself is a gigantic achievement. But knowledge of this must on no account blind us to the fact that, in effect, we took over the old machinery of state from the tsar and the bourgeoisie and that now, with the onset of peace and the satisfaction of the minimum requirements against famine, all our work must be directed towards improving the administrative machinery.

I think that a few dozen workers, being members of the C.C., can deal better than anybody else with checking, improving and remodelling our state apparatus. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection on whom this function devolved at the beginning proved unable to cope with it and can be used only as an "appendage" or, on certain conditions, as an assistant to these members of the C.C. In my opinion, the workers admitted to the Central Committee should come preferably not from among those who have had long service in Soviet bodies (in this part of my letter the term workers everywhere includes peasants), because those workers have already acquired the very traditions and the very prejudices which it is desirable to combat.

The working-class members of the C.C. must be mainly workers of a lower stratum than those promoted in the last five years to work in Soviet bodies; they must be people closer to being rank-and-file workers and peasants, who, however, do not fall into the category of direct or indirect exploiters. I think that by attending all sittings of the C.C. and all sittings of the Political Bureau, and by reading all the documents of the C.C., such workers can form a staff of devoted supporters of the Soviet system, able, first, to give stability to the C.C. itself, and second, to work effectively on the renewal and improvement of the state apparatus.

Lenin

Taken down by L. F.
December 26, 1922

IV

Continuation of the notes.
December 27, 1922

GRANTING LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS TO THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

This idea was suggested by Comrade Trotsky, it seems, quite a long time ago. I was against it at the time, because I thought that there would then be a fundamental lack of co-ordination in the system of our legislative institutions. But after closer consideration of the matter I find that in substance there is a sound idea in it, namely: the State Planning Commission stands somewhat apart from our legislative institutions, although, as a body of experienced people, experts, representatives of science and technology, it is actually in a better position to form a correct judgement of affairs.

However, we have so far proceeded from the principle that the State Planning Commission must provide the state with critically analysed material and the state institutions must decide state matters. I think that in the present situation, when affairs of state have become unusually complicated, when it is necessary time and again to settle questions of which some require the expert opinion of the members of the State Planning Commission and some do not, and, what is more, to settle matters which need the expert opinion of the State Planning Commission on some points but not on others—I think that we must now take a step towards extending the competence of the State Planning Commission.

I imagine that step to be such that the decisions of the State Planning Commission could not be rejected by ordinary procedure in Soviet bodies, but would need a special procedure to be reconsidered. For example, the question should be submitted to a session of the All-Russia Central

Executive Committee, prepared for reconsideration according to a special instruction, involving the drawing up, under special rules, of memoranda to examine whether the State Planning Commission decision is subject to reversal. Lastly, special time-limits should be set for the reconsideration of State Planning Commission decisions, etc.

In this respect I think we can and must accede to the wishes of Comrade Trotsky, but not in the sense that specifically any one of our political leaders, or the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, etc., should be Chairman of the State Planning Commission. I think that personal matters are at present too closely interwoven with the question of principle. I think that the attacks which are now made against the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, and Comrade Pyatakov, his deputy, and which proceed along two lines, so that, on the one hand, we hear charges of extreme leniency, lack of independent judgement and lack of backbone, and, on the other, charges of excessive coarseness, drill-sergeant methods, lack of solid scientific background, etc.—I think these attacks express two sides of the question, exaggerating them to the extreme, and that in actual fact we need a skilful combination in the State Planning Commission of two types of character, of which one may be exemplified by Comrade Pyatakov and the other by Comrade Krzhizhanovsky.

I think that the State Planning Commission must be headed by a man who, on the one hand, has scientific education, namely, either technical or agronomic, with decades of experience in practical work in the field of technology or of agronomics. I think this man must possess not so much the qualities of an administrator as broad experience and the ability to enlist the services of other men.

Lenin

December 27, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

V

Continuation of the letter
on the legislative nature of
State Planning Commission
decisions.
December 28, 1922

I have noticed that some of our comrades who are able to exercise a decisive influence on the direction of state affairs, exaggerate the administrative side, which, of course, is necessary in its time and place, but which should not be confused with the scientific side, with a grasp of the broad facts, the ability to recruit men, etc.

In every state institution, especially in the State Planning Commission, the combination of these two qualities is essential; and when Comrade Krzhizhanovsky told me that he had enlisted the services of Comrade Pyatakov for the Commission and had come to terms with him about the work, I, in consenting to this, on the one hand, entertained certain doubts and, on the other, sometimes hoped that we would thus get the combination of the two types of statesmen. To see whether those hopes are justified, we must now wait and consider the matter on the strength of somewhat longer experience, but in principle, I think, there can be no doubt that such a combination of temperaments and types (of men and qualities) is absolutely necessary for -the correct functioning of state institutions. I think that here it is just as harmful to exaggerate "administrating" as it is to exaggerate anything at all. The chief of a state institution must possess a high degree of personal appeal and sufficiently solid scientific and technical knowledge to be able to check people's work. That much is basic. Without it the work cannot be done properly. On the other hand, it is very important that he should be capable of administering and should have a worthy assistant, or assistants, in the matter. The combination of these two qualities in one person will hardly be found, and it is hardly necessary.

Lenin

Taken down by L. F.
December 28, 1922

VI

Continuation of the notes
on the State
Planning Commission.
December 29, 1922

The State Planning Commission is apparently developing in all respects into a commission of experts. Such an institution cannot be headed by anybody except a man with great experience and an all-round scientific education in technology. The administrative element must in essence be subsidiary. A certain independence and autonomy of the State Planning Commission is essential for the prestige of this scientific institution and depends on one thing, namely, the conscientiousness of its workers and their conscientious desire to turn our plan of economic and social development into reality.

This last quality may, of course, be found now only as an exception, for the overwhelming majority of scientists, who naturally make up the Commission, are inevitably infected with bourgeois ideas and bourgeois prejudices. The check on them from this standpoint must be the job of several persons who can form the Presidium of the Commission. These must be Communists to keep a day-to-day check on the extent of the bourgeois scientists' devotion to our cause displayed in the whole course of the work and see that they abandon bourgeois prejudices and gradually adopt the socialist standpoint. This work along the twin lines of scientific checking and pure administration should be the ideal of those who run the State Planning Commission in our Republic.

Lenin

Taken down by M. V.
December 29, 1922

Is it rational to divide the work of the State Planning Commission into separate jobs? Should we not, on the contrary, try to build up a group of permanent specialists

who would be systematically checked by the Presidium of the Commission and could solve the whole range of problems within its ambit? I think that the latter would be the more reasonable and that we must try to cut down the number of temporary and urgent tasks.

Lenin

December 29, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

VII

Continuation of the notes.
December 29, 1922

(ADDITION TO THE SECTION ON INCREASING THE NUMBER OF C.C. MEMBERS)

In increasing the number of its members, the C.C., I think, must also, and perhaps mainly, devote attention to checking and improving our administrative machinery, which is no good at all. For this we must enlist the services of highly qualified specialists, and the task of supplying those specialists must devolve upon the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

How are we to combine these checking specialists, people with adequate knowledge, and the new members of the C.C.? This problem must be resolved in practice.

It seems to me that the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (as a result of its development and of our perplexity about its development) has led all in all to what we now observe, namely, to an intermediate position between a special People's Commissariat and a special function of the members of the C.C.; between an institution that inspects anything and everything and an aggregate of not very numerous but first-class inspectors, who must be well paid (this is especially indispensable in our age when everything must be paid for and inspectors are directly employed by the institutions that pay them better).

If the number of C.C. members is increased in the appropriate way, and they go through a course of state management year after year with the help of highly qualified specialists and of members of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection who are highly authoritative in every branch—then, I think, we shall successfully solve this problem which we have not managed to do for such a long time.

To sum up, 100 members of the C.C. at the most and not more than 400-500 assistants, members of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, engaged in inspecting under their direction.

Lenin

December 29, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

Continuation of the notes.
December 30, 1922

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR "AUTONOMISATION"

I suppose I have been very remiss with respect to the workers of Russia for not having intervened energetically and decisively enough in the notorious question of autonomisation,[655] which, it appears, is officially called the question of the union of Soviet socialist republics.

When this question arose last summer, I was ill; and then in autumn I relied too much on my recovery and on the October and December plenary meetings[656] giving me an opportunity of intervening in this question. However, I did not manage to attend the October Plenary Meeting (when this question came up) or the one in December, and so the question passed me by almost completely.

I have only had time for a talk with Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who came from the Caucasus and told me how this matter stood in Georgia. I have also managed to exchange a few words with Comrade Zinoviev and express my apprehensions on this matter. From what I was told by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who was at the head of the commission sent by the C.C. to "investigate" the Georgian incident, I could only draw the greatest apprehensions. If matters had come to such a pass that Orjonikidze could go to the extreme of applying physical violence, as Comrade Dzerzhinsky informed me, we can imagine what a mess we have got ourselves into. Obviously the whole business of "autonomisation" was radically wrong and badly timed.

It is said that a united apparatus was needed. Where did that assurance come from? Did it not come from that same Russian apparatus which, as I pointed out in one of the preceding sections of my diary, we took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil?

There is no doubt that that measure should have been delayed somewhat until we could say that we vouched for our apparatus as our own. But now, we must, in all conscience, admit the contrary; the apparatus we call ours is, in fact, still quite alien to us; it is a bourgeois and tsarist hotch-potch and there has been no possibility of getting rid of it in the course of the past five years without the help of other countries and because we have been "busy" most of the time with military engagements and the fight against famine.

It is quite natural that in such circumstances the "freedom to secede from the union" by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riffraff like a fly in milk.

It is said in defence of this measure that the People's Commissariats directly concerned with national psychology and national education were set up as separate bodies. But there the question arises: can these People's Commissariats be made quite independent? and secondly: were we careful enough to take measures to provide the non-Russians with a real safeguard against the truly Russian bully? I do not think we took such measures although we could and should have done so.

I think that Stalin's haste and his infatuation with pure administration, together with his spite against the notorious "nationalist-socialism", played a fatal role here. In politics spite generally plays the basest of roles.

I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who went to the Caucasus to investigate the "crime" of those "nationalist-socialists", distinguished himself there by his truly Russian frame of mind (it is common knowledge that people of other nationalities who have become Russified overdo this Russian frame of mind) and that the impartiality of his whole commission was typified well enough by Orjonikidze's "manhandling". I think that no provocation or even insult can justify such Russian manhandling and that

Comrade Dzerzhinsky was inexcusably guilty in adopting a light-hearted attitude towards it.

For all the citizens in the Caucasus Orjonikidze was the authority. Orjonikidze had no right to display that irritability to which he and Dzerzhinsky referred. On the contrary, Orjonikidze should have behaved with a restraint which cannot be demanded of any ordinary citizen, still less of a man accused of a "political" crime. And, to tell the truth, those nationalist-socialists were citizens who were accused of a political crime, and the terms of the accusation were such that it could not be described otherwise.

Here we have an important question of principle: how is internationalism to be understood?*

Lenin

December 30, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

Continuation of the notes.
December 31, 1922

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR "AUTONOMISATION" (Continued)

In my writings on the national question I have already said that an abstract presentation of the question of nationalism in general is of no use at all. A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small nation.

In respect of the second kind of nationalism we, nationals of a big nation, have nearly always been guilty, in historic practice, of an infinite number of cases of violence; furthermore, we commit violence and insult an infinite

* After this the following phrase was crossed out in the shorthand text: "It seems to me that our comrades have not studied this important question of principle sufficiently."—*Ed.*

number of times without noticing it. It is sufficient to recall my Volga reminiscences of how non-Russians are treated; how the Poles are not called by any other name than Polyachishka, how the Tatar is nicknamed Prince, how the Ukrainians are always Khokhols and the Georgians and other Caucasian nationals always Kapkasians.

That is why internationalism on the part of oppressors or "great" nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies), must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations but even in an inequality of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice. Anybody who does not understand this has not grasped the real proletarian attitude to the national question, he is still essentially petty bourgeois in his point of view and is, therefore, sure to descend to the bourgeois point of view.

What is important for the proletarian? For the proletarian it is not only important, it is absolutely essential that he should be assured that the non-Russians place the greatest possible trust in the proletarian class struggle. What is needed to ensure this? Not merely formal equality. In one way or another, by one's attitude or by concessions, it is necessary to compensate the non-Russians for the lack of trust, for the suspicious and the insults to which the government of the "dominant" nation subjected them in the past.

I think it is unnecessary to explain this to Bolsheviks, to Communists, in greater detail. And I think that in the present instance, as far as the Georgian nation is concerned, we have a typical case in which a genuinely proletarian attitude makes profound caution, thoughtfulness and a readiness to compromise a matter of necessity for us. The Georgian who is neglectful of this aspect of the question, or who carelessly flings about accusations of "nationalist-socialism" (whereas he himself is a real and true "nationalist-socialist", and even a vulgar Great-Russian bully), violates, in substance, the interests of proletarian class solidarity, for nothing holds up the development and strengthening of proletarian class solidarity so much as national injustice; "offended" nationals are not sensitive to anything

so much as to the feeling of equality and the violation of this equality, if only through negligence or jest—to the violation of that equality by their proletarian comrades. That is why in this case it is better to overdo rather than underdo the concessions and leniency towards the national minorities. That is why, in this case, the fundamental interest of proletarian solidarity, and consequently of the proletarian class struggle, requires that we never adopt a formal attitude to the national question, but always take into account the specific attitude of the proletarian of the oppressed (or small) nation towards the oppressor (or great) nation.

Lenin

Taken down by M. V.
December 31, 1922

Continuation of the notes.
December 31, 1922

What practical measures must be taken in the present situation?

Firstly, we must maintain and strengthen the union of socialist republics. Of this there can be no doubt. This measure is necessary for us and it is necessary for the world communist proletariat in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its defence against bourgeois intrigues.

Secondly, the union of socialist republics must be retained for its diplomatic apparatus. By the way, this apparatus is an exceptional component of our state apparatus. We have not allowed a single influential person from the old tsarist apparatus into it. All sections with any authority are composed of Communists. That is why it has already won for itself (this may be said boldly) the name of a reliable communist apparatus purged to an incomparably greater extent of the old tsarist, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements than that which we have had to make do with in other People's Commissariats.

Thirdly, exemplary punishment must be inflicted on Comrade Orjonikidze (I say this all the more regretfully as I am one of his personal friends and have worked with him abroad) and the investigation of all the material which Dzerzhinsky's commission has collected must be completed or started over again to correct the enormous mass of wrongs and biased judgements which it doubtlessly contains. The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.

Fourthly, the strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics of our union, and these rules must be checked with special care. There is no doubt that our apparatus being what it is, there is bound to be, on the pretext of unity in the railway service, unity in the fiscal service and so on, a mass of truly Russian abuses. Special ingenuity is necessary for the struggle against these abuses, not to mention special sincerity on the part of those who undertake this struggle. A detailed code will be required, and only the nationals living in the republic in question can draw it up at all successfully. And then we cannot be sure in advance that as a result of this work we shall not take a step backward at our next Congress of Soviets, i.e., retain the union of Soviet socialist republics only for military and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual People's Commissariats.

It must be borne in mind that the decentralisation of the People's Commissariats and the lack of co-ordination in their work as far as Moscow and other centres are concerned can be compensated sufficiently by Party authority, if it is exercised with sufficient prudence and impartiality; the harm that can result to our state from a lack of unification between the national apparatuses and the Russian apparatus is infinitely less than that which will be done not only to us, but to the whole International, and to the hundreds of millions of the peoples of Asia, which is destined to follow us on to the stage of history in the near future. It would be unpardonable opportunism if, on the eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awakening, we undermined our prestige with its peoples, even if only by

the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities. The need to rally against the imperialists of the West, who are defending the capitalist world, is one thing. There can be no doubt about that and it would be superfluous for me to speak about my unconditional approval of it. It is another thing when we ourselves lapse, even if only in trifles, into imperialist attitudes towards oppressed nationalities, thus undermining all our principled sincerity, all our principled defence of the struggle against imperialism. But the morrow of world history will be a day when the awakening peoples oppressed by imperialism are finally aroused and the decisive long and hard struggle for their liberation begins.

Lenin

December 31, 1922
Taken down by M. V.

NOTES

[1] A review of D. B. Ryazanov's article, "Remarks on the *Rabocheye Dyelo* Programme", sent in by Steklov. The article was published in the journal *Zarya* (Dawn) No. 1, April 1901.

"The *Rabocheye Dyelo* Programme" ("Editorial Note") was issued in *Rabocheye Dyelo* No. 1 in April 1899 and published separately that same year under the title "Programme of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, a periodical organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats".

Rabocheye Dyelo (The Workers' Cause)—a magazine of the Economists, and an organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, published in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902 and edited by B. N. Krichevsky, A. S. Martynov and V. P. Ivanshin.

A criticism of the views of *Rabocheye Dyelo* group is given in Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.) p. 29

[2] *Mr. Grishin's stalwarts*—an expression used by Plekhanov in a postscriptum to his publication, *Iz zapisnoi knizhki Sotsial-Demokrata* (From a Social-Democrat's Notebook), Sheet 1, Geneva, 1900, p. 6.

Grishin—the party name of T. M. Kopelsohn, the Bund's representative abroad and a member of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 29

[3] A reference to the concluding paragraph of the first draft programme of the Emancipation of Labour group published in 1884 (not as erroneously stated in the letter). In the second draft programme (1888) it was altered into a special note appended to the draft. p. 31

[4] Karl Marx, *Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Moscow, 1960). p. 31

[5] A conference held at Bellerive near Geneva in August 1900 and attended by V. I. Lenin, N. E. Bauman, V. I. Zasulich, G. V. Plekhanov, A. N. Potresov and Y. M. Steklov. It discussed a programme for *Iskra* and *Zarya*. p. 31

[6] The addressee is unknown. p. 32

[7] *Revolutionary Sotsial-Demokrat organisation* was formed by the members of the Emancipation of Labour group and their supporters in May 1900, following the split of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad at its Second Congress. In October 1901, on Lenin's proposal, the revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation united with the *Iskra* organisation abroad into the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 32

[8] A reference to the newspaper *Iskra*. p. 32

[9] The Literary Group, consisting of Lenin, L. Martov and A. N. Potresov, was set up on Lenin's initiative after his return from exile in early 1900. Its main task and programme of action were to organise an all-Russia political newspaper and unite the best Social-Democratic forces around it. p. 32

[10] *Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was set up in Geneva in 1894 on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group. It had its own printing press for issuing revolutionary literature and published the journal *Rabotnik* (Worker). Initially, the Emancipation of Labour group directed the Union and edited its publications. But afterwards opportunist elements ("the young" or Economists) gained the upper hand within the Union. At the Union's first congress in November 1898, the Emancipation of Labour group announced that it would no longer edit the Union's publications. The final break and the group's withdrawal from the Union took place at the Union's second congress in April 1900; the Emancipation of Labour group and its followers walked out of the congress and set up an independent organisation, *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 32

[11] A reference to A. I. Yelizarova. p. 34

[12] *Family Pictures*—a journal which was used for the secret transmission of reports or articles for *Iskra*. p. 34

[13] *Die Neue Zeit*—a theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to October 1917, it was edited by K. Kautsky and then by Heinrich Cunow. p. 34

[14] A reference to A. N. Potresov. p. 34

[15] A reference to the draft declaration of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* on the publication of a newspaper. It was drawn up by Lenin in late March and early April 1900 (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 320-30). The draft was rewritten by Lenin when he arrived abroad, after the August 1900 conference with members of the Emancipation of Labour group (G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, and V. I. Zasulich). In the first half of October, the declaration was published as a leaflet (ibid., pp. 351-56).

In contrast to the original draft, which set forth a programme for the two organs—newspaper and journal—the declaration issued by the *Iskra* editors concerned only the newspaper, it having been decided that the tasks of the journal *Zarya* would be dealt with separately, in its first issue. For reasons of secrecy it was decided not to circulate the declaration abroad until it reached Russia. p. 34

[16] A reference to the Marxist scientific and political journal *Zarya* and its "responsible editor" as required by German press laws. p. 34

[17] A reference to P. B. Axelrod's article, "Wilhelm Liebknecht", carried in *Iskra* No. 1. Apart from this short article on the death of the prominent leader of the German and international working-class movement, Axelrod was also writing a long article for *Zarya*, which, however, was not published. p. 34

[18] A reference to the congress of the Second International and the congress of the French Socialist Party held in Paris in September 1900. Neither *Iskra* nor *Zarya* carried E. L. Gurevich's or Y. M. Steklov's article on the subject. p. 35

[19] *Zagorskaya* (I. G. Smidovich-Lehmann) was the secretary of *Iskra*'s editorial office until the arrival of N. K. Krupskaya in April 1901. p. 36

[20] *The Parisians* (D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov, E. L. Gurevich)—representatives of the *Borba* literary group abroad. Lenin called them "Parisians" because they then lived in that city.

In his letter to Axelrod Lenin apparently refers to the difficulties in the talks with them concerning their work on *Iskra* on a permanent basis, in view of their claims for a say in editorial policy (see pp. 67-68, 69-70). p. 36

[21] The pamphlet was compiled by the Kharkov Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and published in January 1901 by *Iskra*. It described the first mass demonstration by Kharkov workers on May Day in 1900. It appeared abroad with a preface by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 357-65). p. 36

[22] Axelrod's advice in his letter to Lenin of October 15, 1900, dealt with the editing of letters from Russia for *Iskra*. His idea was to make use of some letters together with other material for domestic reviews or editorials (see *Lenin Miscellany III*, p. 66). p. 37

[23] The police were very eager to know the whereabouts of Lenin, and, in general, of the whole group which subsequently constituted *Iskra*'s Editorial Board. *Obzor zhandarmskikh doznany za 1901 god* (Review of Gendarme Investigations for 1901) stated that Lenin was living in Munich and working for *Iskra*. The police also knew that A. N. Potresov was in Munich. In the circum-

stances, Potresov's trip to Russia mentioned in the letter was a hazardous undertaking. p. 37

[24] A reference to a delay in the printing of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. p. 37

[25] The statement on *Iskra*'s publication whose draft and final test were written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 320-30, 351-56). The idea was to send it to the Russian Social-Democratic Society in New York of which S. M. Ingerman was secretary (see p. 46). p. 40

[26] *St. Petersburg group*—the *Rabocheye Znamya* group emerged in the second half of 1897. It took a negative attitude to Economism. It set itself the aim of conducting political propaganda among the workers and published the newspaper *Rabocheye Znamya* (Workers' Banner), of which three issues appeared. It also published several pamphlets and proclamations. Among its leaders were S. V. Andropov, V. P. Nogin and M. B. Smirnov. In January 1901, the St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Znamya* group merged with the *Sotsialist* group, but from January to April those leaders of the united group who were in Russia were arrested. Most of the members of the St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Znamya* group joined the *Iskra* organisation.

Lenin refers to S. V. Andropov, a Social-Democrat and an active member of the *Rabocheye Znamya* group, subsequently one of *Iskra*'s first agents. p. 41

[27] The "special reasons" meaning the need for secrecy. J. H. W. Dietz, at whose printing press in Stuttgart the journal *Zarya* was printed, feared harassment by the police in the event they found out that the journal was in some way connected with the illegal *Iskra*. *Iskra* was then printed in Leipzig. p. 41

[28] *St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation*—an Economist organisation set up in the summer of 1900. Its appeal "To the Workers of All Factories", published in its newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought) No. 9, September 1900, called on the workers to organise circles for the working out of a programme of struggle and for mutual assistance. In the autumn of 1900, the Workers' Organisation merged with the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. The programme and charter of this united organisation were carried in *Rabochaya Mysl* No. 11 in April 1901.

Following the victory of the *Iskra* trend within the St. Petersburg Committee and its recognition of the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya* as the leading Social-Democratic organs, a section of the St. Petersburg organisation under the influence and leadership of the proponents of Economism split off from the St. Petersburg Committee in September 1902 and once again formed a separate organisation called the Committee for Workers'

Organisation, which rejoined the Party organisation after the Second Congress of the Party in early 1904. p. 42

[29] *Nakanune* (On the Eve)—a Narodnik monthly published in Russian in London from January 1899 to February 1902, under the editorship of Y. A. Serebryakov. There were a total of 37 issues. p. 43

[30] A reference to Axelrod's article, "Wilhelm Liebknecht". p. 45

[31] L. Martov's article, "New Friends of the Russian Proletariat", appeared in No. 1 of *Iskra* in December 1900. p. 45

[32] A reference to the *Borba* group (D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov and E. L. Gurevich), which emerged in Paris in the summer of 1900 and was formed into a separate group in 1901, following the "unity" conference. The group's publications distorted Marxist theory, rejected *Iskra*'s revolutionary tactics and took a hostile attitude to Lenin's organisational principles of party building. In view of these departures from Social-Democratic views and tactics, its splitting activities and lack of contact with Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the group was not allowed to attend the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and was dissolved by its decision. p. 45

[33] A reference to L. Martov. p. 46

[34] During preparations for the publication of *Iskra*, differences on the place of publication arose between Lenin and A. N. Potresov, on the one hand, and G. V. Plekhanov and P. B. Axelrod, on the other. The latter opposed *Iskra*'s publication in Germany and wanted to have it issued in Switzerland, under their immediate direction. Lenin and Potresov opposed this. Following the conference in Corsier (near Geneva) m August 1900 with members of the Emancipation of Labour group, Lenin and Potresov decided that in the interest of the cause *Iskra* and *Zarya* should be published in Germany. The essence of these differences of principle was described by Lenin in "How the 'Spark' Was Nearly Extinguished" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 333-49). Lenin and Potresov won out and the publication of *Iskra* was started in Germany, initially in Leipzig and then in Munich. *Zarya* was published legally in Stuttgart. p. 46

[35] See pp. 39-40. p. 47

[36] The article by Puttman (the pen-name of A. N. Potresov), "What Has Happened?", and the article by Byvaly (the pen-name of Bogucharsky [V. Y. Yakovlev]), "About the Old and the New", to which the reference is made in the letter, were carried in *Zarya* No. 1 in April 1901. The article by D. Koltsov (B. A. Ginzburg) on the international congress in Paris did not appear in *Zarya*. p. 48

[37] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's article, "A Few Words about the Latest International Socialist Congress in Paris (An Open Letter to the Comrades Who Have Authorised Me as Their Delegate)", which was carried in *Zarya* No. 1 in April 1901. p. 48

[38] *Bakharev*—the pen-name of V. P. Makhnovets. The reference is to his pamphlet, "How to Behave at Interrogations", Geneva, 1900, issued by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 49

[39] The name of the pamphlet is unknown. p. 49

[40] V. I. Zasulich's article on the Decembrists did not appear in the press. On December 14 (27), 1900, Plekhanov spoke at a meeting of Russian political émigrés in Geneva on "The 14th of December, 1825". This speech was published in *Zarya* No. 1 in April 1901. p. 50

[41] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's article, "Once More on Socialism and the Political Struggle", carried in *Zarya* No. 1 in April 1901. p. 50

[42] See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85. p. 50

[43] G. V. Plekhanov did not write the item because he included the gist of it in his article, "Once More on Socialism and the Political Struggle". p. 51

[44] A reference to the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class founded by Lenin in the autumn of 1895. p. 51

[45] A reference to the Economist trend, which emerged in Vilna in the mid-1890s. It was led by A. I. Kremer, who issued a pamphlet in 1896, entitled "On Agitation". The St. Petersburg trend, which arose later, was led by Takhtarev and others. p. 52

[46] Lenin's article, "The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement", was published as an editorial in *Iskra* No. 1, in December 1900 (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 366-71). p. 53

[47] A reference to the Programme of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and the Charter of the Allied Workers' Organisation. The propositions set out in the documents served as a basis for agreement on the merger of these organisations in the autumn of 1900. p. 53

[48] On the reverse of the title page of *Zarya*'s first issue was the following inscription: "*Verantwortlich für die Redaktion*: *K. Fentz in Stuttgart*" (Responsible Editor: K. Fentz in Stuttgart).

K. Fentz—Y. S. Ettinger, a Social-Democrat, who joined *Iskra* in 1900, a member of the League of Russian Revolutionary

Social-Democracy Abroad; she subsequently sided with the Mensheviks. p. 53

[49] A reference to the fact that I. G. Smidovich-Lehmann was expecting a child. p. 55

[50] There was no article in *Iskra* No. 1 on French affairs by Danevich (E. L. Gurevich). His first article, "Letters from France. Letter One", appeared in *Iskra* No. 6 in July 1901. No articles by Danevich on the subject were carried by *Zarya*. p. 55

[51] A reference to the transportation of *Iskra* literature to Russia via the Baltic provinces, which was undertaken by Latvian students, Ernests Rolau and Eduards Skubiks, who were then resident in Zurich. It later turned out that the police had been aware of the existence of this transportation group; both consignments of *Iskra* publications organised by Rolau and Skubiks in December 1900 and June 1901 had been confiscated. Transportation was finally organised in mid-1901. p. 55

[52] A reference to the article by Lubov Axelrod (Orthodox), "Why We Don't Want to Go Back?" (on the book written by the liberal, subsequently a reactionary, N. A. Berdayev, *Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy*) carried in *Zarya*'s double issue No. 2-3 in December 1901. p. 56

[53] A reference to I. S. Blumenfeld, then an *Iskra* compositor in Leipzig.

Preparations for publishing *Iskra* and *Zarya* abroad were assigned to A. N. Potresov, who went abroad for that purpose in April 1900. With the assistance of German Social-Democrats, the setting of *Iskra* was arranged in German Social-Democratic printing presses first in Leipzig and then in Munich. *Zarya* was published legally in Stuttgart by Dietz.

Blumenfeld apparently needed the Nusperli passport for registration in Leipzig. p. 57

[54] The article, "The International Socialist Congress in Paris", by Kh. G. Rakovsky, was published in *Iskra* No. 1 in December 1900. p. 57

[55] A reference to one of G. V. Plekhanov's articles which appeared in *Zarya* No. 1 in April 1901. p. 57

[56] A reference to the amendments to Lenin's article, "The Split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 378-79) on which G. V. Plekhanov insisted in his letter to Lenin on December 8, 1900 (see *Lenin Miscellany III*, p. 116). p. 58

[57] A reference to F. Adler's article on Austrian affairs which he was to write for *Iskra*. The article did not appear in the paper. p. 59

[58] Lenin travelled from Munich to Leipzig to put the finishing touches to the first issue of *Iskra*. p. 61

[59] A reference to Axelrod's article, "The Results Achieved by International Social-Democrats". p. 61

[60] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's article, "Criticism of Our Critics. Part One. Mr. Struve as Critic of Marx's Theory of Social Development. Article One", published in *Zarya* No. 1, April 1901. p. 61

[61] A reference to F. Engels's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*. p. 63

[62] A reference to *Iskra*. p. 63

[63] While in exile in Shushenskoye, Lenin read and translated into Russian Kautsky's *Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Eine Antikritik* (Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme. An Anti-Critique). In 1905, it was published under the title, *K. Kautsky. A Collection of Articles* without any mention of the translator's name. The second edition in 1906 said: "Translated by Lenin." p. 63

[64] The article, *Socialism, Trade-Unionism and Political Action* by H. M. Hyndman, was ordered by S. V. Andropov for *Rabocheye Znamya* No. 3, but was never published. The English original and Lenin's translation are now at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 64

[65] The full name of "Alexei" (Martov) is Yuli Osipovich Tsederbaum. p. 65

[66] *Iskra* No. 1. p. 66

[67] In starting the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya*, Lenin set the task of uniting around the editorial board all Russian Social-Democrats who could be of use for literary work. That is why he tried to have the small *Borba* group work with *Iskra*, though it was not important either ideologically and politically or in respect of ties with the workers' mass movement. p. 67

[68] A reference to the talks between the *Iskra* editorial board and P. Struve, on behalf of the liberals, about the publication of a general political supplement to *Zarya* called *Sovremennoye obozreniye* (Contemporary Review). The talks lasted through January 1901 (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 380-82; Vol. 34, pp. 55-57). They were subsequently broken off and no supplement appeared. p. 67

[69] Lenin went to Prague and Vienna to obtain a consular passport for N. K. Krupskaya for a trip to Germany. p. 71

[70] The article "Autocracy and Finance" was published in *Iskra* No. 4. p. 71

[71] *Iskra* No. 2. p. 72

[72] The identity of the "doctor's group" is unknown. p. 73

[73] *Iskra*'s representative in Berlin was M. G. Vecheslov. p. 73

[74] Illegal *Iskra* and *Zarya* literature was transported to Russia in double-bottomed suitcases. p. 73

[75] St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was transporting its illegal literature through Finland and Stockholm as early as the end of the 18909. Transportation was organised by K. H. Branting, a Swedish Social-Democrat, Garder, a Norwegian Social-Democrat, and A. Weidel, a Swedish worker who settled in Finland for that purpose. But Garder's arrest in 1900 disrupted the arrangement and the route via Finland. A route running from Stockholm to Abo and across the Russian frontier was restarted in 1901.

In the letter Lenin asks about the results of efforts to resume transportation across Finland. p. 73

[76] The letter was an exhibit at the Royal Library exposition in Stockholm in 1955. It was first published in Sweden on March 8, 1955, in *Morgon-Tidningen* (Morning Newspaper) No. 65, and then on March 11, in *Helsingin Sanomat* (Helsinki News) No. 68. p. 76

[77] A reference to the following incident. On April 5, 1901, Russian students in Geneva staged a demonstration in front of the Russian Consulate in protest against the harassment of political émigrés. The Russian Government took the occasion to exercise pressure on the Swiss authorities to secure the deportation of prominent political expatriates, chiefly Plekhanov, from Switzerland. However, Plekhanov was able to prove that he had nothing to do with the demonstration. Members of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board had feared an unfavourable outcome. p. 78

[78] *Promyshlenny Mir* (Industrial World)—a financial, economic, commercial, industrial and technical weekly published in St. Petersburg from November 1899 to 1905.

S. Frank, *Marx's Theory of Value and Its Importance. Critical Essay*, St. Petersburg, 1900. Plekhanov's review of the book was published in *Zarya*'s double issue No. 2-3 in December 1901. p. 78

[79] *Na Slavnom Postu* (At a Glorious Post)—a literary collection published by the Narodniks to mark the 40th anniversary (1860-1900) of the literary and social activity of N. K. Mikhailovsky, one of their ideologists. It contained articles by N. Annensky,

N. Karyshev, P. Milyukov, N. Mikhailovsky, P. Mokievsky, V. Myakotin, A. Peshekhonov, M. Rafailov, N. Rubakin, V. Semevsky, V. Chernov, A. Chuprov, S. Yuzhakov and others. Neither *Iskra* nor *Zarya* published any review of the book. p. 78

[80] Lenin is replying to Plekhanov on the question of *Iskra*'s tactics and slogans for marking May 1, 1901 in Russia as set forth in May Day *Listok* "*Iskry*". In a letter to the Munich section of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board on April 19, Plekhanov wrote that the workers in Russia should not be urged to demonstrate during the May Day celebrations, because the government would jump at the occasion to shed blood and the workers would be defeated. Plekhanov believed that the main task at the time was to build up local Social-Democratic organisations. The letter shows that in the concrete historical situation Lenin was in agreement with Plekhanov. p. 78

[81] *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo* (The National Economy)—a socio-economic magazine, published from 1900 to 1905 in St. Petersburg, first as a monthly, then as a bi-monthly. p. 78

[82] The bulletins were to be published by the *Iskra* promotion group in Berlin, but were not because of a shortage of money and material.

The Neutral Group of Social-Democrats in Berlin was formed round V. A. Bazarov in the autumn of 1900 and set itself the task of healing the split between the supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the Emancipation of Labour group after the Second Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. Among its members were also M. G. Vecheslov and I. B. Basovsky. According to Bazarov, the group sent its representatives to Geneva in early 1900 to persuade the *Iskra* and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations to be reconciled with the Union. The group issued three or four political proclamations and was disbanded in the summer of 1901. p. 79

[83] Beginning with issue No. 4 in May 1901, *Iskra* appeared periodically, once or twice a month. p. 79

[84] The *Sotsialist* group was organised in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1900; its members were dissatisfied with the Economist trend of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle. The group laid emphasis on political struggle. In January 1901, it merged with the *Rabocheye Znamya* (Workers' Banner) group, but after the arrests in the spring of 1901 the group broke up. p. 81

[85] Two May Day leaflets were issued in 1901: in April, *Listok* "*Iskry*" (*Iskra*'s leaflet) signed by the *Iskra* organisation, and the all-Party leaflet, *Pervoye Maya* (The First of May), adopted at a conference of several Southern committees at the beginning of February. A comparison of the two shows that the latter pursued

the general aims of spreading socialist ideas among the masses, whereas the former put forward slogans of political struggle against the autocracy, in response to the broad student movement which had been revolutionised by workers' participation. p. 81

[86] *2a 3b*—P. N. Lepeshinsky, —*r*— — —P. A. Krasikov. p. 82

[87] *Deb.*—V. K. Debogory-Mokrievich, a revolutionary Narodnik of the 1870s, who lived in Bulgaria from 1894 and died there. In 1901, the *Zarya* Editorial Board asked him for some extract from his memoirs. Although he agreed, and the members of the editorial board corresponded on the subject, his memoirs were not published in *Zarya*. p. 84

[88] The conference mentioned here was held in Geneva in June 1901. It was attended by the representatives of *Iskra*, *Zarya*, the *Borba* and the *Rabocheye Dyelo* groups, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, the Bund and the revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation. It was preliminary, and the final decisions were put off until the "Unity" Conference in October 1901, at which the *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the *Iskra* groups formally split up. p. 84

[89] *Listok Rabochego Dyela* (*Rabocheye Dyelo* Supplement) was published by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad in Geneva, at irregular intervals, in 1900 and 1901.

Its No. 7 appeared in April 1901 and dealt with the student movement. p. 84

[90] A reference to the events of May 4 and 7, 1901, in St. Petersburg, in Vyborgskaya Storona and at the Obukhov Steel Works (known as "Obukhov defence"). *Iskra* No. 5 (June 1901) carried a letter, "May Day in Russia", and Lenin's article, "Another Massacre" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 25-30). p. 85

[91] The author was I. V. Babushkin. His report, "Ivanovo-Voznesensk", appeared in *Iskra* No. 5, June 1901, in its section "May Day in Russia". Babushkin's role in the Russian Social-Democratic movement (until his execution in Siberia by a tsarist punitive expedition in 1905), in establishing *Iskra* and in supplying it with workers' reports, is described in detail in Lenin's obituary in *Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 2, December 18 (31), 1910 (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 361-64). p. 85

[92] A reference to Nevzorov's (Y. Steklov) article, "Well, Where Do We Begin?", directed against Lenin's "Where To Begin?" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 13-24) published in *Iskra* No. 4, May 1901, as a leading article. For Lenin's assessment of Nevzorov's article see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 75. p. 87

[93] Lenin's article written in June 1901, entitled "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism". It criticises

the secret minute of the tsarist Minister Witte, "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo", and the preface written by the Liberal, P. B. Struve (R. N. S.), published abroad illegally. The article was published in the *Zarya*'s double issue No. 2-3, December 1901 (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80).

For over a month, members of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board polemised over the article in their letters. Lenin accepted some of the proposals to reword some of his formulations but flatly refused to modify the sharply accusatory tone and tenor of the article (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 83-84, and p. 91 of this volume). p. 87

[94] On Lenin's initiative, *Iskra*'s editorial board started to draft the R.S.D.L.P. Programme in the summer of 1901. The draft was published in *Iskra* No. 21, June 1, 1902. p. 88

[95] V. P. Nogin and S. V. Andropov. p. 88

[96] P. B. Axelrod's item, "The Latest Electoral Victory of the Austrian Workers", dealing with V. Adler's election to the Lower Austria Landtag, was published in *Iskra* No. 6, July 1901. p. 88

[97] P. Scriptum to Orthodox's article was written by the author, L. I. Axelrod, for her article "Why Don't We Want to Go Back?", on N. A. Berdayev's article "Struggle for Idealism", which appeared in the magazine *Mir Bozhy* (God's World) No. 6, June 1901. The latter, a liberal, later became a reactionary.

Lenin and G. V. Plekhanov insisted on the publication of P. Scriptum, but on a majority decision of the Board (Y. O. Martov, V. I. Zasulich and A. N. Potresov) the article was published without P. Scriptum in *Zarya* No. 2-3, December 1901. p. 89

[98] Members of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board nicknamed A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich the "Struvefreundliche Partei" (Party friendly to Struve). p. 89

[99] A reference to Lenin's article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80). p. 89

[100] E. Vandervelde, *La propriété foncière en Belgique* (Land Property in Belgium), Paris, 1900. p. 89

[101] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's editorial remarks on Lenin's article, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism". p. 91

[102] *Vorbote* (Herald)—a monthly, the central organ of the German section of the First International; published in Geneva from 1866 to 1871. p. 92

[103] A reference in V. M. Chernov's article, "Types of Capitalist and Agrarian Evolution", to Rittinghausen's proposal that society

should transfer land for use by "solidarised communities" which he tabled in the agrarian commission of the Fourth Congress of the First International in Basle in 1869 and which was adopted by a majority. p. 92

[104] See Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 19, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, S. 316-30. p. 92

[105] A series of articles by W. Wolff published under this title in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in March and April 1849. In 1886, the articles, with some changes, were published in pamphlet form with a preface by F. Engels, "On the History of the Prussian Peasantry" (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 21, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, S. 238-47). p. 93

[106] A reference to Lenin's work, "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 103-222). p. 95

[107] A reference to Lenin's article, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism". See Note 93. p. 96

[108] A reference to the "Unity" Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad held in Zurich on October 4 and 5, 1901. It was attended by six members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation abroad (among them V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya and Y. O. Martov), eight members of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation (including three members of the Emancipation of Labour group: G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and V. I. Zasulich), 16 members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats (including five members of the Bund's Committee Abroad), and three members of the *Borba* group. On the first item of the agenda, "Agreement in Principle and Instructions to Editorial Boards", Lenin, who attended the Congress under the name of Frey, delivered an eloquent speech, exposing the Union's opportunist activity. This was Lenin's first public speech before Russian Social-Democrats abroad. When the opportunist amendments and addenda to the June resolution, adopted by the Third Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats, were announced at the Congress, the revolutionary section of the Congress (members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations) read out a statement saying that unity was impossible and left the Congress. On Lenin's initiative, these organisations in October 1901 united into the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 96

[109] *Iskra* No. 7. p. 96

[110] A reference to Lenin's article "The Serf-Owners at Work" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 95-100). p. 96

[111] A reference to the article "In Defence of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Workers" by I. V. Babushkin, which was signed "A Worker for

Workers" and appeared in a special supplement to *Iskra* No. 9, October 1901. It was in reply to V. Dadonov's article, "Russian Manchester (Letters About Ivanovo-Voznesensk)", published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 12, 1900.

Russkoye Bogatstvo (Russian Wealth)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to mid-1918. In the early 1890s, it was an organ of the liberal Narodniks. Beginning with 1906, it actually became an organ of the Popular Socialists, a semi-Cadet party. p. 97

[112] *Review of Home Affairs* for *Zarya*'s double issue No. 2-3, 1901, was written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 251-301).

A review of foreign affairs for the same issue of *Zarya* was written by Y. O. Martov and signed "Ignotus". It dealt with the Lübeck Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 97

[113] A reference to the "Unity" Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad held in Zurich (see Note 108). Before the Conference, E. Gurevich-Danevich, a representative of the *Borba* group, went to Zurich and then to Munich for talks with *Iskra*'s editors. p. 98

[114] A reference to Lenin's book, *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). p. 100

[115] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism*. The first volume of the book, translated by Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya, was published in 1900; the second volume, edited by Lenin, in November 1901. p. 100

[116] G. V. Plekhanov attended the I.S.B. conference in Brussels on December 30, 1901 (Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky were elected to the Bureau at the Paris Congress of the Second International in 1900). *Iskra* No. 15 of January 15, 1902, carried Plekhanov's report on the conference, entitled "From Brussels. A Letter to *Iskra*'s Editorial Board". p. 104

[117] See N. K. Krupskaya's letter to L. I. Goldman and S. O. Tsederbaum of August 1901, in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*, pp. 196-97. p. 105

[118] A reference to the connection between *Iskra*'s Kishinev and Baku printing shops and the centralised transportation arrangements by I. B. Basovsky. p. 105

[119] Lenin informed Lyubov Axelrod of the publication of the articles by P. B. Struve and S. N. Bulgakov and sent her the clippings from *Novoye Slovo* (New Word), Vol. 8, May 1897. Axelrod used the material in her article, "Some Philosophical Exercises by Certain 'Critics'", which was directed against Struve and Bulgakov, and appeared in *Zarya* No. 4, August 1902. p. 106

[120] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly)—the main organ of German opportunists and an organ of international revisionism, published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During the First World War it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 106

[121] A reference to the second draft Party Programme drawn up by Plekhanov.

The "settlement in committee" consisted in agreeing two draft programmes—Lenin's and Plekhanov's—in a co-ordinating committee appointed by the *Iskra* Editorial Board to work out a single draft programme of the R.S.D.L.P. Prospective members for the committee were Martov, Zasulich, Dan or Deutsch (see *Lenin Miscellany II*, pp. 91-92).

The draft agreement did not "fall through", as Lenin had feared: Plekhanov agreed to a settlement in committee, and the agreed draft was approved by the *Iskra* Editorial Board in Zurich on April 14, 1902, in Lenin's absence. The draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, worked out by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, was published in *Iskra* No. 21 on June 1, 1902. p. 107

[122] A reference to P. B. Axelrod's article which he intended to issue in pamphlet form as a supplement to *Iskra*. The article, entitled "The Emergence in Our Country of Bourgeois Democracy as an Independent Revolutionary Force", appeared only in 1906 in a collection of his articles, *The Struggle of Socialist and Bourgeois Trends in the Russian Revolutionary Movement.* p. 107

[123] The departure of the Munich section of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board (Lenin, V. I. Zasulich and Y. O. Martov; A. N. Potresov was unwell and stayed in Switzerland) for London was discussed in March 1902 when it was informed that the Russian and German police had got wind of the publication of *Iskra* in Germany. In late March, the question was settled and Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya left Munich for London on April 12. Martov and Zasulich arrived later. p. 108

[124] *Kanun revolutsii* (Eve of Revolution)—a non-periodical publication of the *Svoboda* (Freedom) group, edited by Y. O. Zelensky (L. Nadezhdin). No review of its No. 1 appeared in *Zarya*. p. 108

[125] A reference to Lenin's notes on G. V. Plekhanov's second draft programme (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 35-55) the MS. of which was kept by A. N. Potresov until April 2. For Potresov's opinion of Lenin's notes, see *Lenin Miscellany II*, pp. 105-07. p. 108

[126] A "Congress" or meeting of *Iskra*'s editorial board was proposed in P. B. Axelrod's letter to Lenin of March 25, 1902 (see *Lenin Miscellany II*, pp. 99-101). Lenin refused to attend. The meeting between G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, P. B. Axelrod and Y. O. Martov was held in Zurich on April 14, 1902, where they

discussed and adopted a draft programme worked out by a commission, which had adopted Plekhanov's draft as a basis but with amendments suggested in Lenin's counter-draft and remarks. p. 108

[127] *Sotsial-Demokratichesky Kalendar na 1902 god* (Social-Democratic Calendar for 1902) was issued by the *Borba* group in Geneva in 1902. p. 109

[128] *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia)—an illegal paper of the League of Socialist-Revolutionaries published in Russia from late 1900 (No. 1 dated 1900 actually appeared in January 1901). It was published in Geneva from January 1902 to December 1905 as an organ of the S.R. Party. p. 109

[129] A reference to the re-establishment of the Organising Committee for convening the Party's Second Congress, as the first committee, elected at the Belostok conference, had nearly all been arrested. N. K. Krupskaya, informing F. V. Lengnik of this, wrote in her letter: "Of all those elected to the committee for preparing the Congress, only one man, a Bundist, escaped arrest. We are sending him to you, and the two of you will have to make preparations for the Congress. But you must be diplomatic with him and not show your hand" (see *Lenin Miscellany VIII*, p. 238). In this way Lengnik was to be co-opted to the Organising Committee. A month later, Lenin wrote about it to I. I. Radchenko in St. Petersburg (see pp. 113-14).

The "Bundist" was K. Portnoi. p. 112

[130] *Bund*—General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia; was founded in 1897. It consisted mainly of Jewish handicraftsmen from Russia's Western regions. The Bund conducted a nationalist and separatist policy in the Russian working-class movement. Inside the R.S.D.L.P. it supported opportunist and Menshevik views. p. 112

[131] From the end of June to mid-July 1902, Lenin lived in Loguivy (on the northern coast of France) together with his mother, M. A. Ulyanova, and his sister, A. I. Yelizarova. p. 115

[132] A reference to an unsigned editorial note to a letter from Vilna (about the mass corporal punishment of demonstrators arrested on May Day). It was published in *Iskra* No. 21, June 1, 1902, in the "From Our Social Life" section, and dealt with the attempt on the life of the Vilna Governor von Wal by the worker G. D. Lekkert (Lekukha). Lenin and *Iskra* had repeatedly exposed the harmful effect of individual acts of terrorism on the mass workers' movement, and in the event censured Martov and Zasulich who approved of Lekkert's act.

Further on, there is a reference to G. V. Plekhanov's article on Lekkert's act, which was to be published in *Iskra*'s next issue. Plekhanov accepted Lenin's proposal and wrote an editorial for

Iskra No. 22, entitled "The Russian Working Class and the Police Whipping". p. 115

[133] Lenin's letter makes it clear that L. D. Deutsch, a member of the League's administration intended to call (in Switzerland) a congress of *Iskra* workers in Russia considering that, at that time, some of them, including P. N. Lepeshinsky, V. A. Noskov and F. I. Shchekoldin, were abroad. The idea of the congress must have come from Noskov and Shchekoldin, members of the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P., who were in Zurich and who had made a number of proposals concerning the organisation of *Iskra* (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 110-13). Lepeshinsky also favoured a congress, as did G. V. Plekhanov and P. B. Axelrod. No congress was held. p. 117

[134] *Sonya* was the secret name for the *Iskra* centre in Samara. p. 117

[135] A reference to the volume and page of S. N. Bulgakov's book, *Capitalism and Agriculture*, in a note to "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 122) which was then being proof-read and was to appear in *Zarya* No. 4. p. 118

[136] See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 174-79. p. 119

[137] *Manya*—a code name for the Committee of Workers' Organisation in St. Petersburg. p. 119

[138] *Vanya*—a code name for the St. Petersburg Committee. p. 119

[139] The Central Committee of the St. Petersburg organisation uniting the St. Petersburg League of Struggle and the Workers' Organisation. p. 119

[140] To send for political literature to Vardö (Norway).
The composition of the group transporting literature via Vardö has not been established. p. 120

[141] *Sasha*—a code name for the Second Congress of the Party. p. 120

[142] Speeches in the tsarist court were delivered on October 28-31 (November 10-13), 1902, by P. A. Zalomov, A. I. Bykov, M. I. Samylin and a number of other workers from Sormovo and Nizhni-Novgorod who were put on trial for their participation in the demonstrations on May 1 and 5 (14 and 18), 1902. Out of 23 organisers and leaders of the demonstration who had been arrested, 13 were sentenced to exile in Siberia for life. The speeches were initially published by the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. as leaflets, and then reprinted in *Iskra* No. 29 on. December 1, 1902, under the title "Nizhni-Novgorod Workers on Trial", with a preface by Lenin.

For Lenin's assessment of their behaviour at the trial see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 280-81. p. 124

[143] G. V. Plekhanov promised to analyse K. Tarasov's (N. S. Rusanov) article "The Evolution of the Russian Socialist Thinking" published in *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (Herald of the Russian Revolution). But he did it not for *Iskra*, but in his preface to A. Tun's *History of Revolutionary Movements in Russia* (1903). p. 125

[144] *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will)—a secret political Narodnik terrorist organisation which came into being in August 1879, after the split in the Narodnik *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom) society. p. 125

[145] *Zhizn people*—members of the *Zhizn* (Life) Social-Democratic group. p. 125

[146] *Rabochaya Mysl* (Worker's Thought) No. 16, November-December 1902, carried a "Protest of the Workers' Organisation Committee" against the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. which had acknowledged *Iskra* and *Zarya* as the Party's leading organs. The same issue had a letter from the Workers' Organisation Committee to the *Svoboda* (Freedom) group and the editorial board of the magazine *Otkliki* (Comment), expressing gratitude for their sympathy and offering support. The pro-*Iskra* St. Petersburg Committee issued, in place of *Rabochaya Mysl*, its *Listok Rabochei Mysli* (*Rabochaya Mysl* Leaflet) in December 1902 and January 1903. *Listok* No. 1 was destroyed by a committee decision in view of its poor wording. p. 127

[147] The first Russian newspaper, *Vedomosti o voyennykh i inykh delakh, dostoinykh znaniya i pamyati, sluchivshikhsya v Moskovskom gosudarstve i vo inykh okrestnykh stranakh* (Recorder of Military and Other Affairs in the Moscow State and Neighbouring Countries Worthy of Knowledge and Memory), was published on January 2, 1703. To mark its bicentenary, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issued a leaflet, "Two Centuries of a Press in Bondage", on January 3, 1903, branding Russia's disgraceful censorship, and describing the struggle for freedom of the press (from Radishchev to Herzen). It also noted the wide spread of illegal revolutionary publications in late 19th and early 20th centuries, and called for a struggle against the tsarist government. p. 127

[148] A reference to the meeting of all six members of the former *Iskra* Editorial Board and F. V. Lengnik, a member of the Central Committee, on the question of agreement. Lenin and Plekhanov tried to co-opt Y. O. Martov to the editorial board and get other former Menshevik editors and contributors to *Iskra* to work on it, but they failed because the Mensheviks demanded the co-optation of all four former editors. Lenin saw the "absurdity" of the demand

and abandoned the idea of negotiations. However, on October 4, 1903, Plekhanov made another effort to co-opt two editors but this was also rejected. For details on the October 4 meeting and the subsequent correspondence, see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 349-57. p. 128

[149] A reference to the "personal conflict" between Lenin and Martov at the League's Second Congress, which amounted to the following: Martov accused Lenin that in his report at the Congress he had portrayed Martov as a liar and intriguer in presenting the question of organising the C.O. Editorial Board at the Party's Second Congress. Accordingly, he challenged Lenin to appear before a court of arbitration. Lenin protested against such tactics, took up Martov's challenge and, in his turn, challenged him to appear before a court of arbitration on the issue. The conflict was ironed out through the mediation of G. M. Krzhizhanovsky during his stay abroad in the latter half of November 1903, by means of an exchange of notes between Lenin and Martov. The Editorial Board failed to meet Lenin's wish that the two notes should be published in an annex to the minutes of the League's Congress (see Letter to F. I. Dan of December 2, 1903). The fact that the "personal conflict had been ironed out" was certified only in an editorial footnote to the relevant section of the minutes. It said: "The question of a court of arbitration has been eliminated through an exchange of explanations between Comrades Lenin and Martov which took place after the League Congress (*Minutes of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad*, p. 66). The notes were later published in the *Commentary to the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad*, Geneva, 1904. p. 130

[150] *Iskra* No. 62 of March 15 carried a report on the Nikolayev arrests in the "Chronicle of the Revolutionary Struggle" section: "In the early hours of March 9, the printing press was confiscated and the four men there arrested. In addition, the police arrested ... many others." Lenin set forth the essence of the conflict in the Nikolayev Committee during the discussion of the question at the Party Council's meeting on June 18, 1904 (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 440-41).

The names of the persons indicated in Lenin's letter by their initials, or the group of agitators, mentioned at the end of the letter, have not been identified. p. 131

[151] During the stay of Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya in the mountains in July and August 1904 and the trip of V. A. Noskov (a member of the Central Committee's Section Abroad) to Russia, the section was in the charge of V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, M. N. Lyadov and P. N. Lepeshinsky, the Central Committee's agents abroad. Bonch-Bruyevich was in charge of the C.C.'s forwarding office; Lyadov was the treasurer, and Lepeshinsky, the deputy C.C.

representative abroad on connections with *Iskra*'s Editorial Board. The agents consulted Lenin on all important questions and transmitted to him all the correspondence coming from Russia. p. 133

[152] A reference to the official written authorisation that was to have been issued by the C.C. representatives abroad (Lenin and V. A. Noskov) to the collegium of C.C. agents abroad in Geneva, to conduct the business of the C.C.'s Section Abroad in the absence of the C.C. members. V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich informed Lenin of a fresh conflict with *Iskra*'s Editorial Board, who had refused to deal with the C.C.'s agents abroad without such an official document. p. 133

[153] A Party library in Geneva was organised by the C.C.'s Section Abroad and was run on members' payments from special collections. The 300 francs mentioned by Lenin had been borrowed by the library from the Party treasury and soon repaid. p. 133

[154] A reference to the open letter of 37 Bolsheviks (the Geneva group) to Plekhanov on his reply to the open letter of M. N. Lyadov, which the latter addressed to Plekhanov on June 1, 1904 in *Iskra* No. 67, concerning his article in *Iskra* No. 66 (May 15, 1904), "Silence Is No Longer Possible!".

Plekhanov sharply criticised the activity of the C.C.'s representatives abroad and invited C.C. members to repudiate Lenin and his pamphlet *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*. Lyadov demanded that Plekhanov make public facts and documents confirming his assessment of this activity, and also state the real grounds for his demand that C.C. members repudiate Lenin. Plekhanov replied to Lyadov in the same issue of *Iskra* in a rude manner, but said nothing on the substance of Lyadov's charges. This prompted the group of Bolsheviks abroad to issue their open letter, which stated that Plekhanov had declined to provide factual confirmation of his charges against the C.C. and its representatives abroad, and censured him for his behaviour in this case and towards the majority of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in general. p. 134

[155] V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich sold for cash 30 copies of *Zarya* from the C.C. forwarding office to *Iskra*'s Editorial Board and M. N. Lyadov protested against this. p. 135

[156] The meaning of the words is not quite clear, but judging by the context, they apparently refer to M. N. Lyadov. p. 135

[157] The Bolshevik literature and documents mentioned here include: 1) a pamphlet by Galyorka (M. S. Olminsky) and Ryadovoi (A. Bogdanov), *Our Misunderstandings*; 2) a statement by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich concerning the start of publication of Bolshevik Social-Democratic literature with a letter from Glebov (V. A. Noskov) refusing to print this statement in the Party printing shop; and

3) a pamphlet by Galyorka, *Down with Bonapartism!* (Bonch-Bruyevich's statement was printed on the last sheet of the pamphlet, *Our Misunderstandings*, of the Geneva edition of 1904). p. 135

[158] Lenin and "Ilya" (I. S. Vilensky) who was in charge of the Party's printing shop discussed the conflict between Lenin and the conciliatory majority of the Central Committee on who was to run the Party's printing shop at Geneva. p. 135

[159] The "agreement" on a joint solidarity statement abroad on behalf of the Central Committee was concluded between Lenin and V. A. Noskov, who came abroad as the C.C. representative abroad and a second member of the Party Council. (He replaced F. V. Lengnik, who returned to Russia.) The "agreement" was signed on May 26 with the participation of M. M. Essen, a third member of the C.C., who was abroad at the time (see present edition Vol. 7, pp. 430-31 and 426-29). p. 135

[160] A reference to Lenin's letter to five members of the Central Committee in Russia with his motivated protest against the C.C.'s "July Declaration" (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 462-63).

July Declaration of the Central Committee—a resolution adopted by the conciliatory members of the C.C., L. B. Krasin, V. A. Noskov and L. Y. Galperin, in July 1904. It consisted of 26 points, nine of which were published in *Iskra* No. 72 of August 25, 1904, under the title "Declaration of the Central Committee". It was adopted without the knowledge of two C.C. members, Lenin, who was in Switzerland, and Rozalia Zemlyachka, which deprived them of the opportunity of standing up for the views of the Party's majority in the C.C. The declaration recognised the Menshevik Editorial Board of *Iskra*, co-opted by Plekhanov, and co-opted another three conciliatory members of the C.C., namely, A. I. Lyubimov, L. Y. Karpov and I. F. Dubrovinsky. The conciliators came out against the convocation of the Party's Third Congress and dissolved the C.C. Southern Bureau, which had been campaigning for the Congress. They revoked Lenin's powers as C.C. representative abroad and prohibited the publication of his works without the permission of the C.C. collegium.

The adoption of the July Declaration signified a total betrayal of the decisions of the Party's Second Congress by the conciliatory members of the C.C. and their open backing of the Mensheviks.

Lenin was supported by the Party's local committees—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Baku, Tiflis, Imeretian-Mingrelian, Nikolayev, Odessa and Yekaterinoslav—which resolutely condemned the July Declaration. p. 135

[161] A reference to the "Letter to Central Committee Agents and Committee Members of the R.S.D.L.P. Siding with the Second Party Congress Majority" (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 464-65). p. 135

[162] V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich managed to sign a contract with a Russian co-operative printing shop in Geneva for publishing Bolshe-

vik literature following the virtual split between Lenin and the literary group abroad, and the conciliatory Central Committee. p. 136

[163] A reference to the coup d'état in the Central Committee by its three conciliatory members (V. A. Noskov, L. B. Krasin and L. Y. Galperin) at the "July" sitting (see Note 160). p. 136

[164] At V. A. Noskov's suggestion, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich intended to apply to the Central Committee for the permission to organise a "V. Bonch-Bruyevich and N. Lenin Publishers of Social-Democratic Literature". p. 137

[165] The pamphlet *Our Misunderstandings* by Galyorka and Ryadovoi. p. 137

[166] Lenin wrote his letter to V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich on the free space of V. A. Noskov's letter of September 12, 1904, which he had received through Bonch-Bruyevich (see *Lenin Miscellany XV*, pp. 167-68). p. 137

[167] The addressee has not been ascertained. p. 142

[168] The notification issued by the Bureau of Majority Committees on the convocation of the Party's Third Congress contained a clause, in the section dealing with organisational questions for decision at the Congress, on re-organising the centres. It said: "There is to be only *one* centre, and that in *Russia*" (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsy i plenumov TsK* [The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings], Part One, 1954, p. 72). Lenin expressed his attitude to this clause in the document "Modification of the Clause in the Rules Concerning the Centres" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 197-99), proposing the retention of two centres, one abroad, the C.O. Editorial Board, and one in Russia, the Central Committee, whose periodical meetings "*actually* will *always* play the role of supreme or highest 'Council' of the Party" (ibid., p. 199). p. 142

[169] "*From the Editors*" was written by Lenin and published in *Vperyod* (Forward) No. 8 on February 28 (15), 1905. In the present edition, it is entitled "The Convening of the Third Party Congress" (see Vol. 8, pp. 177-80). p. 142

[170] *Vperyod* No. 8, of February 28 (15), 1905, carried the following statement in the "From the Party" section, drawn up by M. S. Olminsky: *From the Editors*: We have just received information that can be interpreted as the C.C.'s consent to a congress right away. Without in any way vouching for its authenticity for the time being, we do consider it plausible. The C.C. has been opposing a congress for many months, dissolving organisations and boycotting and disorganising committees favouring a congress.

These tactics have failed. Now, being guided by its rule of 'expediency is all, formality, nothing', the C.C. is prepared, for the sake of 'expediency' (*that is*, *prevention of a congress*), to declare formally a hundred times, if need be, that it wants a congress convened at once."

Lenin added the following: "We hope that neither the Bureau nor the local committees will let themselves be duped by the trickery of the Party 'Shidlovsky Commission'. The same attitude to the C.C.'s consent was expressed by Lenin in his letter to S. I. Gusev on February 25, 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 298). p. 142

[171] A reference to the arrest of C.C. members in the home of the writer Leonid Andreyev in Moscow on February 9 (22), 1905. p. 143

[172] Lenin's letter to the secretary of the Labour Representation Committee in Britain was written in the following circumstances. In 1904, in connection with the strikes in Russia, Russian Social-Democratic organisations in London set up a committee in aid of the Russian strikers, which sent out an appeal for aid to British trade unions. It was also decided to appeal to the Labour Representation Committee, of which James Ramsay MacDonald was secretary. The negotiations with the Committee were assigned to K. M. Takhtarev and N. A. Alexeyev (who were members of the Russian Social-Democratic organisation in London before its split). The Labour Representation Committee responded to the appeal, stipulating that a part of the money should go in aid of the widows and orphans of the numerous victims of the fusillade of January 9 (22), 1905. p. 144

[173] A reference to the opening of the Third Party Congress. Lenin wrote to P. A. Krasikov on Wednesday, April 5, expecting it to open not earlier than Monday (April 10). However, the Congress opened only on April 25. C.C. members who were on the Organising Committee for the convocation of the Congress made a final effort to reach agreement with the Party Council (Plekhanov, Axelrod and Martov), to have them recognise the C.C. decision on the convocation of the Congress and approve the work done by the O.C. The talks dragged out until the arrival of the delegates from Russia in Geneva and the departure of the Bolsheviks for London. p. 145

[174] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat)—a non-periodical published at long intervals by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva from March 1905 to April 1912. There were 16 issues in all. Its publication was resumed in Petrograd in 1916, but only one issue appeared. p. 145

[175] A reference to the joint appeal to the Party on behalf of the C.C. and the Bureau of Majority Committees (B.M.C.) of March 12, 1905, setting the task of the Congress: to work out general Party tactics and establish organisational unity. The appeal listed the

authorised committees and said that the C.C. and the B.M.C. were setting up an Organising Committee for the convocation of the Congress. The appeal appeared in *Vperyod* No. 13, on April 5 (March 23), 1905. p. 145

[176] The newspaper *Vperyod* No. 13 carried a draft report of the Bureau of Majority Committees to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. under the title "Question of Organisation" containing draft changes in the Party's Rules (prepared by "Ivanov"—A. A. Bogdanov). p. 145

[177] A reference to a report prepared by P. A. Krasikov, who was nominated a delegate to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. from the Committee of the Organisation Abroad. The Committee headed Bolshevik groups abroad which had broken with the League Abroad, when it fell under Menshevik control after its Second Congress. p. 145

[178] The addressee has not been ascertained. p. 146

[179] Lenin examines in detail Engels's *Die deutsche Reichsverfassungskampagne* (The German Campaign for an Imperial Constitution) in his report at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on May 1, 1905, dealing with the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 393-95). This work of Engels is an essay on the history of the Baden-Pfalz uprising of 1849, in which he personally took part as an A.D.C. of Willich.

In the spring and summer of 1905, some legal publishing houses set up in Russia undertook the publication of the works of Marx and Engels in Russian translations. Lenin edited Marx's *The Civil War in France* and other works for Burevestnik Publishers in Odessa. Engels's pamphlet was not published in Russian before the October Revolution. p. 146

[180] Lenin went to Paris where, on May 24 (June 6), 1905, he gave a lecture on the Party's Third Congress and its decisions. p. 148

[181] The Central Committee's letter of August 24 (September 6), 1905, was signed by three members of the C.C. (A. A. Bogdanov, D. S. Postolovsky and L. B. Krasin). It was in reply to Lenin's letter of August 1 (14), 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 326-27). p. 149

[182] The Central Committee resolution, entitled "The Central Committee on the Duma", was published in *Proletary* (The Proletarian) No. 19, October 3 (September 20), 1905. p. 149

[183] *Letuchy Listok TsK RSDRP* (Leaflet of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.) was issued at various intervals and dealt with current tactical and organisational questions in the light of the decisions of the Party's Third Congress. There were four issues in all. p. 151

[184] A reference to the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Nikolayev on joint political action. Both committees appointed representatives to a commission, called "United Organisation of Social-Democrats of the Town of Nikolayev", with the task of working out a plan for joint action and agitation connected with it. To ensure the preparations for the action, the commission set up a technical group, a funds commission, and a combat group.

A report from Nikolayev on this agreement was published in the "From the Party" section of *Proletary* No. 9 of July 26 (13), 1905. p. 152

[185] *Cadets*—Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia, which was founded in 1905. They advocated a constitutional monarchy. During the first Russian revolution of 1905-07, they styled themselves the party of "people's freedom", while actually betraying the people's interests and holding secret talks with the tsarist government on how to crush the revolution. As the Opposition Party in the Duma, they strove to share power with the tsarist government and supported it on all major issues of domestic and foreign policy.

During the First World War, Cadet leaders, among them Milyukov, were the chief proponents of the annexationist policy of Russian imperialism. After the February revolution of 1917, they entered the bourgeois Provisional Government and fought the revolutionary movement of workers and peasants; they stood up for the landed estates and wanted to force the people to continue the imperialist war. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Cadets took part in the counter-revolutionary armed struggle against Soviet Russia. p. 154

[186] The conference of Social-Democratic organisations in Russia to which Lenin refers was held in Riga on September 7-9 (20-22), 1905. It was called by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. to work out the tactics in respect of the Duma. It was attended by representatives of the C.C., the O.C. of the Mensheviks, the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democrats, the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. Over Menshevik protests, the conference passed a resolution on active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. The conference decisions were published in *Proletary* No. 22 on October 24 (11), 1905 (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, pp. 91-94). They are assessed in Lenin's articles "The First Results of the Political Alignment" and "The Hysterics of the Defeated" (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 396-404 and 405-07). p. 154

[187] A reference to the meeting between M. A. Reisner and V. V. Vorovsky. p. 154

[188] *International Socialist Bureau*—the executive organ of the Second International, was established by decision of the Paris Congress

of 1900. Lenin was a member of the Bureau from 1905 to 1912 as a representative of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 155

[189] For reasons of secrecy Berlin was called Odessa, and Königsberg—Warsaw.

Further on, the reference is to the general meeting of C.C. and C.O. members with Lenin, which is also mentioned in his letter of October 5, 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 348-49). p. 155

[190] In 1907, M. S. Kedrov's Zerno Book Publishers in St. Petersburg started publication of a three-volume collection of Lenin's works under the title "Twelve Years". However, they managed to issue only the first volume and a part of the second, because of intensified harassment and strict censorship under Stolypin. p. 156

[191] After his return from the Party's London Congress, Lenin lived in Finland, near St. Petersburg. In view of the arrests that had started, the Bolshevik Centre decided to transfer the publication of *Proletary* from Finland to some foreign country. Accordingly, Lenin, together with A. A. Bogdanov and I. F. Dubrovinsky, was instructed to go to Switzerland. Lenin left Finland in December 1907, spent a few days in Stockholm waiting for N. K. Krupskaya, stayed three days in Berlin and arrived at Geneva on January 7, 1908. p. 157

[192] A reference to the *Proletary* printing shop and its forwarding section. p. 157

[193] The arrests in Berlin were connected with the changing of money expropriated in Tiflis on June 13, 1907. The organiser of the expropriation, Kamo (Ter-Petrosyan), and all its participants managed to escape. But the tsarist government informed the police abroad of the serial numbers of the 500-ruble banknotes seized in the expropriation; in December 1907, persons changing these banknotes were simultaneously arrested in Berlin, Munich, Paris, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Geneva. In November 1907, Kamo was betrayed by the provocateur Y. A. Zhitomirsky and arrested in Berlin. The Russian Government, having established Kamo's identity, secured his extradition as a criminal. During the search for the Tiflis expropriators, arrests were carried out in the Russian Social-Democratic colonies in Paris, Munich, Geneva and Stockholm. p. 157

[194] A reference to Lenin's *Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). p. 158

[195] *Trudoviks*—petty-bourgeois democrats in the Dumas, mainly peasants and intellectuals of the Narodnik stripe. Their group was organised in April 1906 by the peasant deputies of the First

Duma, who wavered between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats.
During the First World War most of the Trudoviks took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 158

[196] The Land Bill of 104 Duma deputies was motioned by I. N. Mushenko, a member of the Agrarian Commission of the Second Duma who was the official rapporteur of the Socialist-Revolutionary group. p. 158

[197] The Russian Proletarian Library, collected by the Social-Democrat G. A. Kuklin, who joined the Bolsheviks in 1905, and a book storehouse and a printing press were conveyed by him into the full possession of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in July 1905, as he said in his "Statement" which appeared in *Proletary* No. 7 on July 10 (June 27), 1905.
In response to Lenin's request, Gorky sent a letter to the editors of Russian magazines and newspapers calling for collections of material on the history of the 1905-07 revolution, files of various local publications, in particular, dailies, etc. Gorky's letter was published in a number of magazines and newspapers in September 1908. p. 161

[198] During the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (April 30-May 19 [May 13-June 1], 1907), in view of the Party's financial difficulties, a loan was obtained, with Gorky's help, from an Englishman, with an obligation of repayment by January 1, 1908. It was repaid by the Bolshevik Party in 1922.
C.C. Meeting—a Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Geneva on August 11-13 (24-26), 1908. With regard to the London debt, the Plenary Meeting decided to form a commission, consisting of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Bundists, instructing it to write to the Englishman and tell him of the difficulties in repaying the debt (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, p. 188). p. 162

[199] In October 1908, Y. M. Steklov asked Lenin to write an article "Chernyshevsky and the Peasant Question" for a collection on Chernyshevsky s life and work. He asked Lenin to inform Bogdanov of his letter. Lenin sent Bogdanov Steklov's letter with his own note.
The collection was not published. p. 164

[200] *Octobrists*—a counter-revolutionary party of big industrialists and landowners formed soon after the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905 (whence their name). In it, the tsar, terrified by the revolution, promised "civil liberties" and a constitution. The Octobrists fully supported the government's domestic and foreign policies. p. 165

[201] On August 4, 1909, a general strike broke out in Sweden in response to the lockout of 83,000 workers in various industries

announced by the federation of industrialists on August 2. The strike lasted for more than a month. p. 166

[202] A reference to Lenin's article "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" (see present edition, Vol. 16 pp. 29-61). p. 166

[203] A possible reference to Rosa Luxemburg's articles, "Ermattung oder Kampf?" (Exhaustion or Struggle?) and "Die Theorie und die Praxis" (Theory and Practice), published in *Die Neue Zeit* Nos. 35, 36, 43 and 44 in 1910. Lenin referred to them in "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 382-83). p. 167

[204] The Chief Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania intended to substitute V. L. Leder for A. Warski, its representative on the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editorial board. p. 167

[205] *Liquidationism*—an opportunist trend dominant among the Mensheviks after the defeat of the first Russian revolution (1905-07).

Its supporters demanded the liquidation of the proletariat's illegal revolutionary party and the establishment in its stead of an opportunist party engaged only in activity permitted by the tsarist government. Lenin and other Bolsheviks tirelessly exposed the liquidators, who had betrayed the cause of the revolution. The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (January 1912) expelled the liquidators from the Party. p. 167

[206] Soon after the C.C. Plenum in January 1910, I. F. Dubrovinsky (Innokenty), V. P. Nogin (Makar) and I. P. Goldenberg (Meshkovsky) were arrested in Russia. p. 171

[207] A reference to the convocation of the Russian section (collegium) of the C.C. and co-optation of new members. The latter became necessary because of the arrest of a number of C.C. members elected at the London Congress in 1907. The liquidators, who took a negative attitude to the resumption of C.C. activity in Russia, strongly opposed the meeting of the remaining C.C. members and co-optation of new ones. Their formal refusal to take part in the effort to restore the C.C. served as the immediate cause for the cancellation of the agreement concluded at the C.C. Plenary Meeting in January 1910. As a result of Lenin's insistent demand J. J. Marchlewski went to Russia. p. 171

[208] A reference to Lenin's trip to Copenhagen for the Eighth International Socialist Congress of the Second International. p. 171

[209] On September 28, 1910, Lenin returned to Paris from Copenhagen where he had stayed after the Eighth International Socialist Congress of the Second International and from where he had gone

to Stockholm to visit his mother, M. A. Ulyanova, and his sister, M. I. Ulyanova. p. 172

[210] Karl Radek, in quoting the Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association, omitted the words of Marx to the effect that in the event of it being impossible to prevent the diplomatic activity of one's government, the working class must "combine in simultaneous denunciation, and indicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 385). p. 172

[211] A reference to J. Marchlewski's article against L. Martov, entitled "Ein Missverständnis" (A Misunderstanding), published in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 4, October 28, 1910, pp. 100-07. For details, see Lenin's letter to Marchlewski of October 7, 1910 (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 424-29). p. 174

[212] Lenin's article, "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia", was published only on April 29 (May 12), 1911, in *Diskussionny Listok* (The Discussion Bulletin), a supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the central organ of the R.S.D.L.P., No. 3 (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 374-92). p. 174

[213] Lenin's draft reply to Camille Huysmans's letter has not been found. p. 177

[214] *Mysl* (Thought)—a Bolshevik legal magazine, published in Moscow from December 1910 to April 1911; was closed down by the tsarist government. p. 178

[215] The first part of the Russian translation of K. Kautsky's pamphlet, *Taktische Strömungen in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* (Tactical Trends among German Social-Democrats), Berlin, 1911, appeared in *Mysl* No. 5, April 1911, and this was the pretext for its closure. p. 178

[216] A reference to K. Kautsky's article, "Malthusianismus und Sozialismus"-(Malthusianism and Socialism), published in *Die Neue Zeit* Nos. 18, 19, 20, February 1911. p. 179

[217] Y. M. Steklov's book, *N. G. Chernyshevsky, His Life and Work (1828-1889)*, appeared in 1909. p. 179

[218] The Central Committee Bureau Abroad was set up by decision of a Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in August 1908 as the general Party centre abroad, which was subordinate to the Russian Collegium of the Central Committee. Soon after the January Plenum of the C.C. in 1910, the liquidators obtained a majority in the Bureau, and it became the rallying point of anti-Party forces. The Bureau's liquidationist tactics forced the Bolsheviks to

recall their representative (Alexandrov—N. A. Semashko) in May 1911. Later the representatives of the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats were also recalled.

The Bureau dissolved itself in January 1912. p. 180

[219] The *Organising Commission Abroad* and the *Technical Commission Abroad* were formed in June 1911 at a meeting of Central Committee members to prepare for the Prague Party conference.

The Bolsheviks withdrew from the commissions and disclaimed any responsibility for their activity, because most of their members (M. K. Vladimirov, V. L. Leder, A. I. Lyubimov and others) followed a conciliatory line and refused to abide by the decisions of the Russian Organising Commission. p. 180

[220] *Golosists*—Menshevik-liquidators (P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov, A. S. Martynov, A. N. Potresov and others) grouped round *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social-Democrat) which was published first in Geneva, and later, from February 1908 to December 1911, in Paris. p. 180

[221] *Otzovism* (from *otzyvat*—recall)—an opportunist trend which emerged among the Bolsheviks in 1908. Behind the otzovists' revolutionary slogans was the demand for a recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Duma and an end to activity in legal organisations. They declared that in the conditions of reaction, the Party should conduct illegal activities only, and refused to take part in the Duma, trade unions, co-operatives and other legal and semi-legal mass organisations. For details on the otzovists, see Lenin's article "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 29-61). p. 181

[222] *Vperyod* group—an anti-Party group consisting of otzovists, ultimatumists, god-builders and empirio-monists (proponents of the reactionary idealist philosophy of Mach and Avenarius); the group was organised in December 1909, on the initiative of A. Bogdanov and G. Alexinsky, and included A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Lyadov, M. N. Pokrovsky and A. V. Sokolov. They published the magazine *Vperyod* (Forward). In 1912, they united with the Menshevik-liquidators into an anti-Party bloc (August bloc), which was organised by Trotsky. The group failed to find support among the workers and broke up in 1913. It was finally disbanded after the February revolution in 1917. p. 181

[223] A reference to Lenin's "Notes of a Publicist", specifically the part where he analyses the stand of the "conciliators" adopted at the January 1910 Plenum of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 226-31). p. 183

[224] In the summer of 1911, the Bolshevik centre set up a Party school in Longjumeau near Paris for Party workers coming from Russia. Among the lecturers were Lenin, Inessa Armand and N. A. Se-

mashko. Among those who attended the lectures and seminars were G. K. Orjonikidze, Y. D. Zevin, I. I. Schvarz, the workers I. S. Belostotsky, A. I. Dogadov, and I. V. Prisyagin. Graduates carried out important Party work in Russia.

For details of the letter mentioned by Lenin, see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 446-47. p. 185

[225] The "fair" was apparently a code name for the meeting of C.C. members in Paris on May 28-June 4 (June 10-17), 1911. p. 185

[226] Lenin read his lecture "Stolypin and the Revolution", in Berne on September 28, 1911 and in Geneva on October 3, 1911. p. 188

[227] A reference to the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*; L. B. Kamenev's pamphlet *Two Parties*, with Lenin's preface (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 225-28); G. V. Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*; and S. T. Arkomed's book *The Labour Movement and Social-Democracy in the Caucasus*, Part One, with G. V. Plekhanov's preface, Geneva, 1910. p. 188

[228] *Council of State*—an advisory body in tsarist Russia, consisting mainly of big landowners and senior officials appointed by the tsar. p. 189

[229] *Curias*—in Russia, divisions of voters classified by estate and property qualifications for elections to the Duma, which were designed to pack the Duma with members of the ruling classes.

There were four curias in the elections to the First and Second Dumas: worker, urban, landowner and peasant. p. 191

[230] Elections to the Duma were held in several stages: workers, peasant delegates, landowners and the urban bourgeoisie, at their congresses, elected representatives who, at their uyezd meetings, chose electors to the gubernia meetings where the deputies were finally elected. p. 191

[231] A reference to the 19th International Peace Congress held in Geneva from September 22 to 28, 1912. p. 193

[232] *Metallist*—one of the names of the magazine *Rabochy po metallu* (Metalworker), organ of the metalworkers' trade union; published in St. Petersburg from August 30 (September 12), 1906 to June 12 (25), 1914. Initially, the editorial board, like the executive of the trade union, was in the hands of liquidators. After an election in 1913, the executive and the editorial board passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks. p. 194

[233] *Sovremenny Mir* (Contemporary World)—a monthly literary, scientific and political magazine, published in St. Petersburg from 1906 to 1918. The Mensheviks were closely connected with the magazine. The Bolsheviks contributed to it during the bloc

with Plekhanov's pro-Party Menshevik group and in early 1914. During the First World War, the magazine became an organ of the social-chauvinists. p. 200

[234] A reference to the commission of the Basle (Extraordinary) Congress of the Second International for working out a manifesto against the war danger. The Congress, called in connection with the Balkan war and the mounting threat of a world-wide imperialist war, was held on November 24 and 25, 1912. The commission consisted of one delegate each from France, Germany, Britain and Russia. By agreement between representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. and the International Socialist Bureau, the Russian member was I. Rubanovich, a Socialist-Revolutionary. On November 25, the Congress unanimously adopted a manifesto calling on the workers to make use of the proletariat's organisation and strength for waging a revolutionary struggle against the threat of war. p. 202

[235] The I.S.B. meeting, held in Brussels on October 28 and 29, 1912, decided to call an extraordinary socialist congress. Russia was represented by Plekhanov and Rubanovich. The I.S.B. held a special closed sitting to discuss Russian affairs. p. 202

[236] Kautsky's article, "Der Krieg und die Internationale" (War and the International) published in No. 6 of *Die Neue Zeit* on November 8, 1912, pp. 191-92. p. 202

[237] Lenin's article "The Results and Significance of the U.S. Presidential Elections" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 402-04). p. 204

[238] *Theodore Roosevelt*—U.S. President from 1901 to 1909. p. 204

[239] *Appeal to Reason*—a newspaper of the American Socialists founded in 1895. p. 205

[240] The article did not appear in *Pravda*. p. 209

[241] *Zaprosy Zhizni* (Demands of Life)—a weekly, published in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1912. Cadets, Popular Socialists and Menshevik-liquidators contributed to the magazine. The article by student M., "Student Moods", appeared in No. 47 on November 23, 1912. p. 209

[242] The report of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. delegation on the Basle Congress of the Second International. The report appeared in No. 30 of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* on January 12 (25), 1913. p. 211

[243] The withdrawal of six representatives of the C.C. from the R.S.D.L.P. subsection at the Basle Congress in protest against the endorsement of the credentials of the representative of the St. Petersburg Initiating Group, an organisation which was hostile to the Party and fought it. p. 211

[244] *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—a legal theoretical monthly of the Bolsheviks, published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to lune 1914. The magazine was organised on Lenin's initiative in place of *Mysl* (Thought), a Bolshevik journal closed down by the tsarist government. It had a circulation of up to 5,000. Lenin directed *Prosveshcheniye* first from Cracow and then from Poronin.

On the eve of the First World War, the magazine was closed down by the tsarist government. In the autumn of 1917, its publication was resumed, but only one (double) issue appeared. p. 212

[245] The six Bolshevik deputies in the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 212

[246] See *Pyaty* (*Londonsky*) *syezd RSDRP* (Fifth [London] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.). Minutes, Moscow, 1963, p. 660. p. 212

[247] Martov's article "The International Bureau on Social-Democratic Unity" quoted Plekhanov as saying at an I.S.B. meeting in Brussels (October 28 and 29, 1912) that "the time is not far off when the Russian Social-Democrats will unite *not only among themselves but also with the S.R.s*". p. 213

[248] The first article was published (under a similar title) in *Pravda* No. 191 on December 12, 1912 (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 437-38). In 1954, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party handed the C.P.S.U. Central Committee material of Lenin's Cracow-Poronin archives, discovered in Cracow, among which were the manuscripts of the third and fifth articles, "The Working Class and Its 'Parliamentary' Representatives". They were first published in April 1954 in the journal *Kommunist*. The second and fourth articles have not been found. p. 216

[249] The resolution of the Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the Third All-Russia Conference), held at Helsingfors from November 5 to 12 (18 to 25), 1907, "On the Tactics of the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, pp. 182-84). p. 216

[250] The resolution of the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Paris from Decemher 21 to 27, 1908 (January 3 to 9, 1909), "On the Duma Social-Democratic Group" (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, pp. 198-201). p. 217

[251] The pro-Party Mensheviks—a small group of Mensheviks led by Plekhanov, who separated from the Menshevik-liquidators and opposed the trend from 1908 to 1912. p. 217

[252] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal Menshevik-liquidator monthly, published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1914. It was the liquidators' centre in Russia. p. 217

[253] *Jagiello, Y. I.*—a member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.S.P.), elected deputy to the Fourth Duma from the city of Warsaw. The Bolsheviks strongly objected to his admission to the Social-Democratic group because he had got through with the support of the bourgeoisie and the P.S.P. bloc with the Bund. Under the pressure of Bolshevik deputies his rights in the group were restricted: on all internal Party matters he had voice but no vote. p. 219

[254] *Polish Socialist Party—P.S.P.*—a petty-bourgeois nationalist party set up in 1892. p. 219

[255] Stalin's article "Jagiello As Not a Full Member of the Social-Democratic Group", published in *Pravda* No. 182, December 1, 1912. p. 222

[256] *General Association of German Workers*—a political organisation of the German workers set up at a congress of workers societies in Leipzig in 1863, with the active participation of Ferdinand Lassalle. The fact that it was set up was of positive significance for the working-class movement, but Lassalle, who was elected President, took it along an opportunist path. It confined its aims to working for a general franchise and non-violent parliamentary activity. Engels said that "'universal, equal and direct suffrage' was propounded by Lassalle as the only and infallible means of winning political power by the working class" (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 16, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, S. 327). Its leadership demanded the establishment of workers' producer associations subsidised by the state which would allegedly transform the Prussian state into a "free state of the people"; they regarded the peasantry as a reactionary mass. The Lassalleans approved of the counter-revolutionary way of unifying Germany "from the top", through dynastic wars waged by Prussia. It broke up in 1875. p. 225

[257] *The Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878. It banned all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party and mass working-class organisations, closed down all working-class publications and prohibited all socialist writings. Social-Democrats were deported. The Law was revoked in 1890 under the pressure of the mass working-class movement. p. 225

[258] Lenin's book, *Twelve Years*: A Collection of Articles. Volume One. *Two Trends in Russian Marxism and Russian Social-Democracy*, was published in St. Petersburg in 1907 under the pen-name of Vl. Ilyin. It was confiscated by order of the tsarist government and was issued in a second edition in 1918. p. 227

[259] *Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs set up by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary-movement. They killed revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and staged anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 229

[260] *The Triple Alliance*—an imperialist bloc of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, which took shape between 1879 and 1882.
The Triple Entente—an imperialist bloc of Britain, France and Russia, which was formalised in 1907 as a counter-weight to the Triple Alliance. p. 229

[261] *Yemelyan Pugachou*—the leader of the peasant war of 1773-75. p. 232

[262] *The Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary landowners' organisation which had a great influence on the tsarist government's policy; formed in May 1906, under the chairmanship of the big landowner, Count A. A. Bobrinsky. During the Third Duma period, a considerable number of its members were on the Council of State and within the leadership of reactionary organisations. p. 233

[263] The general strike took place in Belgium from April 14 to April 24, 1913. The Belgian workers demanded a change in the Constitution: universal and equal suffrage. The strike was on a massive scale: of the total of more than one million, between 400,000 and 500,000 took part. *Pravda* gave wide coverage to the strike and reported on donations by Russian workers to the strike fund. p. 234

[264] *Vestnik Finansov, Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* (Finance, Industry and Trade Messenger)—a weekly of the Ministry of Finance; published in St. Petersburg from 1885 to 1917. p. 236

[265] *Promyshlennost i Torgovlya* (Industry and Commerce)—an organ of the council of congresses of industrial and commercial representatives. It was a mouthpiece of Big Business and Big Industry and was published in St. Petersburg from January 1908 to December 1917. p. 240

[266] *Progressists* (Progressist Party)—a party of the counter-revolutionary liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie and landowners in Russia. At first, it was a group in the Third Duma consisting of deputies from the bourgeois and landowner parties of Peaceful Renovation and Democratic Reform. It became a party in November 1912. p. 249

[267] An exclamation of V. Kokovtsev, then Minister of Finance (later, Prime Minister), in the Duma on April 24, 1908. p. 251

[268] On June 3 (16), 1907, the tsarist government arbitrarily dissolved the Second Duma and issued a new electoral law which greatly increased the representation of the landownes and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and sharply reduced the number of peasants', workes' and non-Russian deputies. It assured the

reactionary bloc of landowners and big capitalists of complete domination of the Third and Fourth Dumas. The June 3 coup ushered in the period of Stolypin reaction known as the June Third regime. p. 252

[269] The Zemstvos were local self-government bodies dominated by landed nobility in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia, first set up in 1864. They had jurisdiction only of local economic matters (hospitals, roads, statistics, insurance, etc.) and were under the Governor and the Ministry of the Interior, which could invoke any undesirable decisions. p. 258

[270] S. T. Arkomed's book *The Labour Movement and Social-Democracy in the Caucasus* with a preface by G. V. Plekhanov, Geneva, 1910.

N. Jordania (Kostrov) contributed his articles to the Georgian magazine *Tskaro* (Source) published in Baku and to the newspaper *Chveni Tskhovreba* (Our Life). p. 260

[271] *Pravda* No. 119, May 25, 1913, with the article *Doubtful Lapse* by V. (M. S. Olminsky). p. 260

[272] The Second, Berne, Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad at which Lenin gave his report, "The State of Affairs in the Party", on August 3, 1913. p. 261

[273] An apparent reference to the article "From the History of Ukrainian Marxism" by O. N. Lola (V. Stepanyuk), published in *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment) No. 6, June 1914. p. 261

[274] *Yuri*—apparently, A. Bekzadian, a Social-Democrat (Bolshevik) who carried on active underground work in Baku in 1904-06. During the years of reaction he lived abroad. p. 261

[275] *Basok-Melenevsky* (*M. M.*)—a member of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic organisation, Spilka (Union). His nationalism was fully revealed during the war. The article by Basok referred to has not been identified. p. 262

[276] *Spilka*—the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union, an organisation close to the Mensheviks. It was formed in late 1904 after its breakaway from the petty-bourgeois, nationalist Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, and dissolved during the period of reaction. For a number of years only small Spilka groups continued to exist. p. 262

[277] The Second All-Ukraine Student Congress, held in Lvov on June 19-22 (July 2-5), 1913, was timed for the celebration of an anniversary of Ivan Franko, the great Ukrainian revolutionary democrat, writer, scholar and public figure. Representatives of Ukrainian students from Russia also attended. The Congress heard a report, "Ukrainian Youth and the Present Condition of the Nation", by the Ukrainian Social-Democrat Dontsov, who pro-

pounded the "independence" of the Ukraine, a slogan backed by the National Democrats but opposed by a group of Ukrainian Social-Democrats who had emigrated from Russia. However, the protest was not supported by the Congress and following the debate it adopted Dontsov's resolution setting forth the programme of the Ukrainian separatists. p. 262

[278] *A. Bekzadian* was the R.S.D.L.P. representative at the German Social-Democratic Party Congress held in Jena from September 14 to 20, 1913. p. 263

[279] The Bolsheviks wanted to take the opportunity of the German Social-Democratic Party Congress in Jena so as to settle the affair of the trustees' money. The affair dragged on, because L. Tyszka and Rosa Luxemburg, who sympathised with the conciliators, used their influence with the trustees—Clara Zetkin, K. Kautsky and F. Mehring—to prevent the return of the money to the Bolsheviks. p. 263

[280] *V. L. Leder*—a Polish Social-Democrat (a "Rozlamist") who supported the Left wing of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. p. 264

[281] The Commission to review the decision of the trial of Karl Radek on charges of unethical behaviour was set up by the Chief Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania under a decision of the court, Radek was expelled from the party and from the German Social-Democratic Party.

The Commission was set up in Paris in early September 1913 on the initiative of the bureau of the sections abroad of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania (Rozlamists).

The Commission worked for five months and arrived at the conclusion that there was no ground for the party trial of Radek and his dismissal from the party.

Lenin sided with the opposition (Rozlamists) and believed that the charges sprang from the acute struggle which the Chief Executive waged against the opposition, and were motivated by factional considerations. He supported the review of the Radek case.

For details on the differences between the Chief Executive and the opposition, see present edition, Vol. 19, Note 135. p. 264

[282] An extract from V. Voitinsky's novel *The Waves*, entitled "A Ray of Light in the Night", was published in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 4, 1914. But Lenin's letter of mid-November 1913 to A. M. Gorky (see p. 266 of this volume) shows that Gorky was *against* the publication of Voitinsky's novel in *Prosveshcheniye*. That is why it is not quite clear whether the reference is to *The Waves* or to another of Voitinsky's manuscripts. p. 265

[283] Voitinsky's manuscript (see p. 265 of this volume). p. 266

[284] See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 121-24. p. 266

[285] N. I. Bukharin's article "Mr. Struve's Hocus-Pocuses" appeared in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 12, 1913, as a review of P. B. Struve's book, *The Economy and Price*. Part One. *The Economy and Society.—Price-Value*. St. Petersburg-Moscow. Ryabushinsky Publishers, 1913. On Lenin's advice, the section on the serf economy was deleted. p. 267

[286] The secretary of the *Pravda* editorial board, K. N. Samoilova, informed the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in her letter of January 25 (February 7), 1914, of the closure of the newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda* (Proletarian Truth), and the possible closure of *Put Pravdy* (Path of Truth). Her fear arose from the fact that as a result of the publication, in *Put Pravdy* of January 23, 1914, of the article "That is Why It Exists..." under the signature of "M. F." (M. Firin, subsequently exposed as the provocateur M. Y. Chernomazov) which revealed the continuity between the various names of *Pravda* (Truth), *Rabochaya Pravda* (Workers' Truth), *Severnaya Pravda* (Northern Truth), *Pravda Truda* (Labour Truth), etc., Petrovsky was prosecuted. p. 268

[287] Lenin's trip to Paris, Brussels, Liège and Leipzig in January and early February 1914 in connection with the work of the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region, and his lectures on the national question. p. 268

[288] See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 95-98. p. 268

[289] *Borba* (Struggle)—a journal published by Trotsky, seven issues of which appeared in St. Petersburg from February 22 (March 7) to July 1914. Trotskyites, liquidators and members of the *Vperyod* group contributed to the magazine, which under the cover of Trotsky's "non-factionalism" fought Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. p. 268

[290] The Bolshevik *Pravda* was issued under the name of *Proletarskaya Pravda* (Proletarian Truth) from December 7 (20), 1913 to January 22 (February 4), 1914, and under the name of *Put Pravdy* (Path of Truth) from January 22 (February 4) to May 21 (June 3). p. 269

[291] *Mysl* (Thought)—a Bolshevik legal philosophical and socio-economic journal published in Moscow from December 1910 to April 1911. It was started by Lenin to offset and fight the liquidators' magazines. p. 269

[292] Trotsky's publication of his anti-Party, factional journal *Borba*. p. 270

[293] The anti-Party August bloc was set up by Trotsky in 1912 at a liquidators' conference in Vienna, which was attended by Bund-

ists, members of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region and various groups of liquidators, Trotskyites, and otzovists abroad.

The bloc, made up of various anti-Party elements, soon fell apart under Bolshevik pressure for the illegal proletarian party. p. 270

[294] The question of the break between the Lettish Social-Democrats and the Menshevik Organising Committee was decided at the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region held from January 26 to February 8, 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 360-62). p. 270

[295] The statistical data on cash collections for *Pravda* and *Luch*, mentioned by Lenin, are given in his article "The Working Class and Its Press" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 363-79). p. 270

[296] Workers' votes cast for both Social-Democratic groups in the Duma: the Bolshevik Six and the Menshevik Seven (see table in Lenin's article, "How the Workers Responded to the Formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Duma", present edition, Vol. 20, p. 538). p. 270

[297] The pamphlet, *From the History of the Workers' Press in Russia*, was issued as No. 1 of the newspaper *Rabochy* on April 22, 1914. The whole issue was devoted to the history of the working-class press in Russia. p. 270

[298] A review by V. Yan-sky (S. S. Danilov) of V. Levitsky's book *August Bebel. His Life and Work*, which said: "Levitsky tries to draw the reader's attention specifically to Bebel's attitude to 'compromises', and compacts with the liberals, in an effort to set Bebel up as a model for someone.... Levitsky's exposition is not free from factionalism, and presents the great German leader and his views in the wrong light." p. 270

[299] Isaac A. Hourwich, *Immigration and Labour. The Economic Aspects of European Immigration to the United States*, New York and London, 1912. p. 271

[300] See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 454-57. p. 271

[301] *A. Cahan*—editor of the New York Jewish socialist newspaper *Vorwärts*, founded in 1897. The material referred to (Census Reports. Twelfth Census 1900. Vol. V. Agriculture. Washington, 1902. Thirteenth Census of the United States, taken in the year 1910. Vol. V. Agriculture. Washington, 1913) was received from America partially in May 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 140) and the rest shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. Lenin used them as a basis for his work: *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part*

One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102). p. 271

[302] A reference to Lenin's works: *The Development of Capitalism in Russia. The Process of the Formation of a Home Market for Large-Scale Industry* (see present edition, Vol. 3) and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). p. 272

[303] *Novy Mir* (New World)—a Menshevik newspaper published by a group of Russian émigrés in New York from 1911 to 1917. From 1912 to 1916 it was edited by John Ellert (N. N. Nakoryakov). p. 272

[304] The resolution of a group of workers in the Vyborg district, "On the Withdrawal of Comrade Buryanov from the Seven", and the "Open Letter to A. F. Buryanov", signed by the Zurich group for the promotion of the R.S.D.L.P.

In their resolution the Vyborg workers welcomed Buryanov's withdrawal from the Seven, as fresh evidence of its political bankruptcy, but censured his neutralist stand as being incorrect. The Zurich group, mostly Mensheviks, assessed this as a major step towards the unification of the two Social-Democratic groups in the Duma. The two documents appeared in *Put Pravdy* No 22, February 26, 1914. p. 273

[305] A congress of the Second International set for Vienna in 1914 and a congress of the R.S.D.L.P. then being prepared. Neither took place because of the outbreak of the war. p. 274

[306] Lenin's letter was in reply to one from V. B. Stankevich, a member of the editorial board of *Sovremennik* (Contemporary), March 9 (22), 1914, in which he stated that the magazine would "in principle be an inter-factional organ ... we shall maintain the need for the full organisational unity of all socialist trends" and asked Lenin for permission to include his name among the contributors. For Lenin's attitude to the *Sovremennik* group, see his article "Workers' Unity and Intellectualist 'Trends'" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 294-97). p. 276

[307] See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 148-51 and 226-29. p. 277

[308] *Pro-Party Bolsheviks*—a small group of conciliators who inclined to liquidationism. p. 277

[309] *F. N. Samoilov*—a Bolshevik deputy of the Fourth Duma; in February 1914 went abroad on the advice of his doctors; in the spring and summer of 1914, received treatment in Switzerland. p. 279

[310] On May 12, 1914, A. A. Troyanovsky wrote Lenin a letter suggesting improvements in the work of the editorial board of the maga-

zine *Prosveshcheniye* and enclosing a draft "constitution" to organise the work.

Troyanovsky's article on the national question did not appear in *Prosveshcheniye*. p. 285

[311] *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* appeared in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye* Nos. 4, 5 and 6, for April, May and June 1914, under the signature V. Ilyin (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 393-454). p. 285

[312] The work of L. Martov, F. Dan and G. Plekhanov in *Sovremennik*. p. 286

[313] V. Karpinsky was delegated to the Vienna International Congress of the Second International (which was not held). p. 286

[314] *J. Hanecki and A. Malecki*—delegates to the Brussels "Unity" Conference from the opposition of the Polish Social-Democratic Party (Rozlamists). One of the issues between the Chief Executive of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, of which Tyszka was a member, and the opposition was the attitude to the liquidators and the P.S.P. Lenin censured the policies of the Chief Executive and sympathised with the opposition. p. 287

[315] An international congress was to have been held in Vienna on August 23, 1914. In connection with the outbreak of war between Austria and Serbia, the International Socialist Bureau decided to convene the congress in Paris earlier, namely, on August 9. It was not held. p. 288

[316] The delegation to the Brussels "Unity" Conference included, from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Inessa Armand (Petrova), M. Vladimirsky (Kamsky) and I. Popov. p. 288

[317] Lenin was apparently in need of a cabled reply to summon someone from Russia in the event F. Samoilov was unable to attend the Congress. p. 289

[318] An apparent reference to the trip to Brussels to attend a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau. p. 290

[319] The outbreak of the First World War found Lenin in the village of Poronin (Galicia). On July 25 (August 7), the Austrian authorities carried out a search of Lenin's quarters, and the gendarme sergeant-major confiscated the manuscript of Lenin's article on the agrarian question, taking the tables in it to be a code. Lenin was arrested the next day. After a fortnight's detention, he was released through the efforts of Russian and Polish Social-Democrats and with the help of Austrian socialists Viktor Adler and deputy of the Austrian Parliament Hermann Diamant. He was allowed to leave Austria for Switzerland. On August 23 (Septem-

ber 5), 1914, Lenin arrived in Berne together with N. K. Krupskaya and her mother. Y. V. Krupskaya. p. 291

[320] The collection of the latest books at the Society. p. 292

[321] Publication of a newspaper in Switzerland required the warranty of some influential Swiss figure. With that end in view, V. A. Karpinsky held talks with the Swiss socialist, deputy of the Federal Parliament, Jean Sigg, who agreed to help in the publication. p. 293

[322] The manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", was published in its Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, November 1, 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34). p. 293

[323] An apparent reference to the resolution of a group of Social-Democrats ("Theses on War") adopted by a Bolshevik conference in Berne on September 6-8, 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 15-19). p. 293

[324] Plekhanov's lecture, "On the Attitude of the Socialists to the War", given in Lausanne on October 11, 1914, was organised by the local Menshevik group for the promotion of the R.S.D.L.P.

In the debate that followed, Lenin was the only speaker (no one else took the floor). Reports on Plekhanov's lecture, Lenin's speech and Plekhanov's summing-up speech appeared in the Paris Menshevik newspaper *Golos* (Voice) Nos. 31, 32 and 33 on October 18, 20 and 21, 1914, under the title of "Russian Social-Democratic Leaders on the War".

The speeches were taken down by a *Golos* correspondent (initials: I. K.). p. 294

[325] Italo-Swiss Socialist Conference, in whose preparation Lenin took part, was held at Lugano on September 27, 1914. Lenin's theses on the war were discussed at the conference and were partially included in the resolution. The conference was attended by R. Grimm, Paul Pflüger and others from Switzerland, and Serrati, Lazzari, Morgari, Turati, Modigliani and others from Italy. The resolution of the conference characterised the war as imperialist and called on the proletariat to wage an international struggle for peace. While the decisions of the conference were not consistently internationalist or thoroughly revolutionary, they were, nevertheless, a step forward in the preparation for restoring international proletarian ties. p. 294

[326] On August 4, 1914, the Social-Democratic Group in the Reichstag joined the bourgeois deputies in voting a 5,000 million war loan to the Kaiser Government, thereby endorsing Wilhelm II's imperialist policy. It later turned out that the Left-wing Social-Democrats opposed the granting of war credits during the discussion of the question before the Reichstag sitting, but

subsequently voted for them in conformity with a majority decision of the opportunist Social-Democrats. p. 294

[327] Karl Kautsky's article "Die Sozialdemokratie im Kriege" in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 1, October 2, 1914. p. 294

[328] The Serbian Social-Democrats, who were the first to have to take a stand on the war, did not waver in adopting an internationalist attitude: in parliament, their deputies voted against war credits. Their newspaper, *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Newspaper), published in Niš, also conducted a campaign against the chauvinists. p. 295

[329] Lenin's lecture on "The Proletariat and the War" was given in Lausanne on October 14, 1914, two days after Plekhanov's social-chauvinist lecture, and was carried in the Paris *Golos* Nos. 37 and 38 on October 25 and 27. The report of the lecture was filed by a *Golos* correspondent (initials: I. K.) who noted that "Lenin's lecture was held before a great concourse of people". p. 297

[330] See Engels, *Socialism in Germany*, Section One. p. 300

[331] On September 27, 1914, the central organ of the German Social-Democrats *Vorwärts*, carried an article, "Germany and Foreign Countries" which timidly suggested that the German and French proletariat were involved in the war against their will. On this pretext the paper was banned by the Commander of the Brandenburg district, General von Kessel. Haase and Fischer requested that the bail be lifted. Kessel agreed, provided *Vorwärts* refrained from dealing "with the subject of class hatred and the class struggle". The editors accepted the condition, and the paper reappeared on October 1, frontpaging General Kessel's order on the resumption of its publication. p. 300

[332] *Golos* (Voice)—a Menshevik-Trotskyist daily published in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915, advocating a Centrist stand.

Early in the First World War (1914-18), *Golos* carried Martov's articles against the social-chauvinists. That was when Lenin approved of the paper's activity. Following Martov's turn to the right, the paper began to defend the social-chauvinists, preferring "unity with the social-chauvinists to drawing closer to those who are irreconcilably hostile to social-chauvinism" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 113).

From January 1915, *Golos* was replaced by *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word). p. 300

[333] The anti-war resolutions of the international socialist congresses of the Second International in Stuttgart (1901), Copenhagen (1910) and Basle (1912). p. 302

[334] Lenin made five amendments in the manifesto of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. which copy is now at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U. The manifesto was published under the title "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" in the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, November 1, 1914. p. 303

[335] The Bolsheviks' reply to E. Vandervelde's telegram urging the Duma Social-Democratic group to support the Russian Government in the war against Germany. The reply signed by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, November 1, 1914. The Bolsheviks said they believed that in the interests of democracy and socialism it was an urgent task of the revolutionary proletarian party in the period of imperialist war to extend and strengthen the class organisations of the workers and to develop their class struggle against the imperialist bourgeoisie and their own governments. p. 303

[336] Lenin read his lecture on the war at Montreux (near Clarens) on Monday, October 26, and in Zurich, on Tuesday, October 27, 1914. p. 304

[337] The Congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party took place in Stockholm on November 23, 1914. On the opening day, A. Shlyapnikov, under the pseudonym of Belenin, made a declaration on behalf of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in accordance with the instructions given in the present letter (see also present edition, Vol. 21, p. 108). p. 307

[338] A. Pannekoek's article, "Der Zusammenbruch der Internationale" (The Collapse of the International), was published in the Swiss Left-wing Social-Democratic newspaper, *Berner Tagwacht* Nos. 245, 246 and 247 of October 20, 21 and 22, 1914. p. 307

[339] The formation within the German Social-Democratic Party of an internationalist Left-wing group headed by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, which formed the nucleus of the Spartacus League. p. 307

[340] An apparent reference to the article "The Opening of Parliament", published in the British bourgeois journal *The Economist* No. 3, 716, November 14, 1914.

Lenin's article "Bourgeois Philanthropists and Revolutionary Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 192-93) gives a review of *The Economist*'s stand on peace. p. 308

[341] The loan of 3,000 kronen was obtained by the R.S.D.L.P. from the Swedish Social-Democratic Party in 1907 during its Fifth Congress (London). p. 308

[342] The arrest of Bolsheviks attending a conference at Ozerki, near

Petrograd, among them members of the R.S.D.L. group in the Fourth Duma.

The conference was held from November 2 to 4 (15 to 17), 1914, and was attended by Bolsheviks from Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kharkov and Riga.

On November 4 (17), when the conference had just ended, the police, on information of a provocateur, raided the premises. During the search, copies of Lenin's theses on the war and *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, which carried the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. manifesto, *The War and Russian Social-Democracy*, were confiscated from Duma Bolshevik deputies Petrovsky, Badayev and others. All the participants in the conference were arrested, except for the deputies, because of their parliamentary immunity. But they too were arrested two days later, put on trial and exiled for life to Eastern Siberia. Lenin analysed the results of the trial in his article "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group", which was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40 on March 29, 1915 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 171-77). p. 310

[343] The reply of the Petrograd liquidators (P. P. Maslov, A. N. Potresov, N. Cherevanin [F. A. Lipkin] and others) to E. Vandervelde's telegram urging the Russian Social-Democrats not to campaign against the war. The liquidators justified the Belgian, French and British socialists who had entered their bourgeois governments, and supported the social-chauvinists, and declared that they, for their part, did not oppose the war. Their reply was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 34, with a note from the Editorial Board. p. 310

[344] A reference to the appeal to women which Alexandra Kollontai wrote and sent to Lenin in her letter of November 28, 1914, for publication in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. It was not published. p. 311

[345] A reference to Kautsky's articles: 1) "Die Internationalität und der Krieg" (Internationalism and War), *Die Neue Zeit* No. 8, November 27, 1914; and 2) "Die Sozialdemokratie im Kriege" (Social-Democracy in the War), *Die Neue Zeit* No. 1, October 2, 1914. In "Die Sozialdemokratie im Kriege" he wrote that "if it comes to war, every nation has to defend itself as best it can. It follows that Social-Democrats of all nations have an equal right or an equal duty to take part in this defence; none should hurl reproaches at another." p. 311

[346] The General Commission of the German trade unions accused *Vorwärts* of giving insufficient attention to practical problems and slack defence against attacks by other Socialist parties, and also of generalising German acts of cruelty while justifying those of the enemy (see *Vorwärts* Nos. 321, 323 and 325, November 24, 26 and 28, 1914—"Aus der Partei"). p. 312

[347] Lenin read his lecture, "The War and Social-Democracy", in Zurich, apparently not earlier than October 27, 1914. In connection with it, *Vorwärts* No. 308 published an item, "Lenin über die ukrainische Frage" (Lenin on the Ukrainian Question) on November 10, 1914. *Vorwärts* No. 319, November 22, 1914, carried an item saying that Lenin had asked the Editorial Board to inform readers that he had dealt not only with the struggle against tsarism (and, in this connection, with the Ukrainian question), but also with the collapse of the Second International and the stand taken by the German and Austrian Social-Democrats during the war. p. 312

[348] *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36 appeared on January 9, 1915, but the masthead erroneously said "December 12, 1914". A correction appeared in No. 39, March 3, 1915. p. 313

[349] A reference to V. A. Karpinsky's remarks on Lenin's article "On the National Pride of the Great Russians", in his letter to Lenin of December 9, 1914 (see *Lenin Miscellany XI*, pp. 257-58). p. 313

[350] An apparent reference to a report "Working-Class Petersburg and the War (A St. Petersburg Worker's Notes on the Early Stages of the War)", published in the magazine *Kommunist* No. 1-2, 1915. p. 314

[351] A reference to L. Martov's letter to the *Golos* Editorial Board, "About My Imaginary Solitude" (*Golos* No. 87, December 23, 1914). The letter and his report on "The War and the Crisis of Socialism", read in Berne on December 16, 1914, marked Martov's retreat from his stand in the early stages of the war. p. 314

[352] A reference to the Conference of Socialists of Neutral Countries held in Copenhagen on January 17 and 18, 1915, in which the Social-Democratic parties of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland took part. Lenin was against the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. sending an official representative to the Conference. p. 314

[353] An apparent reference to the appeal of the St. Petersburg liquidators: "To Minister Vandervelde, Belgium." p. 315

[354] A reference to a questionnaire in *The Labour Leader* No. 52, December 24, 1914, on the question of peace, called "Peace and Goodwill Shall yet Reign. Messages of Fraternity Across the Battlefields". Kautsky's views headed the list. p. 315

[355] The Central Committee Section Abroad did not have a printing shop of its own, and the Central Organ was set up at a private type-setting shop belonging to Lyakhotsky, an old Ukrainian émigré (well known among political émigrés as Kuzma), and printed in Geneva. Lyakhotsky's type-setting shop was the only one in Switzerland which had Russian type, and so catered for

various organisations. The setting of *Sotsial-Demokrat* became extremely difficult in early 1915, when *Borotba*, a newspaper of the Ukrainian nationalists, was also composed there. Kuzma and Kuzmikha (his wife), who had great influence on her husband, sympathised with *Borotba*. The problem was being constantly discussed and this is reflected in Lenin's and N. K. Krupskaya's letters to V. A. Karpinsky and others. In early 1915 Russian type was found in Benteli's printing shop in Bumplitz (near Berne) and a number of issues of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and other material were printed there.

The suggestion to send a compositor from Paris apparently came from G. Y. Belenky, but it was not implemented. p. 316

[356] The telegram was in reply to Granat Publishers, who had informed Lenin that his article "Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)", written for their Encyclopaedic Dictionary, had to be abridged. The abridged article, signed V. Ilyin, appeared in Vol. 28 of the Dictionary. The full text was published in 1925 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 43-91) p. 317

[357] *Russkaya Shkola* (Russian School)—a pedagogical journal for teachers and parents published and edited by Y. Gurevich from 1890 to 1918. Its No. 7-8 for 1911 carried N. K. Krupskaya's article "Co-education".

Svobodnoye Vospitaniye (Liberal Education)—a pedagogical monthly edited by I. Gorbunov-Posadov from 1907 to 1918. It carried a number of Krupskaya's articles on questions of teaching and co-education. p. 317

[358] Photographs of the Social-Democratic deputies (in prison garb) who were convicted in the case of the R.S.D.L. group in the Duma. They were intended for sale among Swedish workers. p. 319

[359] The *Menshevik Organising Committee* (O.C.) was formed at the August 1912 conference of Menshevik-liquidators, Trotskyites and other anti-Party groups and trends. Martov, Axelrod, Martynov and Semkovsky, mentioned in the letter, were members of the O.C. Secretariat Abroad. p. 319

[360] A. G. Shlyapnikov made a trip to Britain, where he tried to find a job. p. 321

[361] The summary of a lecture. It is not known whether or not it was read. p. 322

[362] Julian Borchardt's group, *Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands* (International Socialists of Germany), together with the *Internationale* group (Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin and others) constituted the revolutionary opposition among the German Social-Democrats and openly opposed the war. p. 323

[363] On the eve of the 1905 Russian revolution, the priest Gapon, on assignment from the Okhranka (Secret Political Police), formed an organisation, the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers, with the aim of distracting the workers' attention from revolutionary struggle. On January 9 (22), 1905, Gapon provoked the workers into marching to the Winter Palace to hand in a petition to the tsar. On the tsar's orders, the demonstrators were shot down. p. 327

[364] *Volksrecht* (People's Right) No. 97, April 27, 1915, carried an article, "Die Anleihenspirale" (Loan Spiral), which exposed the financial machinations of Helferich (German Minister of Finance) designed to ensure the success of the second 10-billion war loan. p. 327

[365] An apparent reference to the miscellany, *What Russia Expects from the War*, published by the Cadets. p. 329

[366] Swiss Socialist R. Grimm, an organiser of the Zimmerwald Conference, wanted to carry out preparations for the conference without the Bolsheviks. Later he had to abandon his intentions and a Bolshevik took part in the preliminary meeting on the convocation of the conference. p. 329

[367] The two conferences in Berne were: 1) International Conference of Socialist Women in March 1915 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 199-203); and 2) International Socialist Youth Conference in April 1915. p. 329

[368] A reference to the "swing" of the Centrists from justifying the war to struggling for peace. A call for peace and party unity "in spite of differences of opinion", i.e., in essence, unity with the social-chauvinists, was expressed in the "manifesto" *Das Gebot der Stunde* (Demand of the Time) signed by Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein and Hugo Haase and published in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* No. 139, June 19, 1915. p. 330

[369] The Dutch Left-wing Social-Democrats, Anton Pannekoek, Herman Gorter and D. J. Wijnkoop. p. 330

[370] Report of a delegate of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. on the preliminary meeting held at Berne on July 11, 1915, on the convocation of an International Socialist Conference.

It was attended by representatives of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland, the Italian Socialist Party, the Executive of the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the P.S.P. Lewiça (Left-wing), the Menshevik Organising Committee and the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The meeting decided on another meeting which was to take the final decision on calling the conference. The second meeting was not held. p. 332

[371] *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays of Light)—a monthly of the group of Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany (Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands), published under the editorship of J. Borchardt. It was issued irregularly in Berlin from 1913 to 1921. p. 332

[372] See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 195-97. p. 332

[573] The *Stern* (Star) group was never set up. The Bremen Left-wing Social-Democrats formed the *Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands* group. p. 332

[374] A reference to the *Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad* in Berne between February 27 and March 4, 1915, convened on Lenin's initiative. It had the significance of an all-Party conference because it was impossible to call a congress or an all-Russia conference during the war. The main item on its agenda was the question of war and the Party's tasks. Lenin gave the report.

Lenin also wrote all the main resolutions and the introduction to them. They appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat* and also as a supplement to the pamphlet *Socialism and War*, which was published in Russian and German. The resolutions of the Berne Conference were also published in leaflet form in French and circulated among the delegates to the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference and mailed to Left-wing Social-Democrats in other countries. p. 333

[375] A reference to the drafts of a manifesto, declaration and resolutions written for preliminary discussion among Left-wing delegates of various socialist parties and for subsequent motioning at the Zimmerwald Conference on behalf of the Left (see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 193-94). p. 334

[376] J. Borchardt's pamphlet, *Vor und nach dem 4. August 1914. Hat die deutsche Sozialdemokratic abgedankt?* Verlag der Lichtstrahlen (Before and After August 4, 1914. Have the German Social-Democrats Recanted? Lichtstrahlen Publishers), Berlin, 1915, in which he first sharply criticised the treacherous behaviour of German Social-Democrats at the outbreak of the war. For Lenin's opinion on this pamphlet see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 130. p. 334

[377] A reference to the resolution adopted by the International Conference of Socialist Women held in Berne from March 26 to 28, 1915. See Lenin's article "On the Struggle Against Social-Chauvinism" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 199-203). p. 335

[378] Ch. Dumas, C. Racovski, *Les Socialiste et la Guerre*, Bucharest, 1915. p. 336

[379] A reference to N. Lenin, G. Zinoviev, *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards the War*). p. 338

[380] The resolutions of the Berne Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad (February 27-March 4, 1915) appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 40, March 29, 1915 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64). p. 339

[381] A reference to the Resolution on the National Question, adopted by the August (Summer) Joint Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. with Party officials held at Poronin (near Cracow) from September 23 to October 1 (October 6 to 14), 1913 (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 427-29). p. 339

[382] Instead of a second preliminary meeting at Zimmerwald the conference proper was held there from September 5 to 8, 1915. It was the scene of a struggle between revolutionary internationalists led by Lenin, and the Kautskyite majority. Lenin organised his supporters into the Zimmerwald Left, a group in which the Bolshevik Party was alone in consistently following a correct and internationalist line against the war.

The conference adopted a manifesto, which declared the war to be imperialist, condemned the behaviour of the "socialists" who voted for the war credits and took part in bourgeois governments, and called on the workers of Europe to campaign against the war, for a peace without indemnities and annexations.

The conference also adopted a resolution expressing sympathy with the victims of war and elected an International Socialist Commission (I.S.K).

On the significance of the Zimmerwald Conference, see Lenin's "The First Step" and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, Sept. 5-8, 1915" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 383-88 and 389-93). p. 341

[383] Lenin's "The Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Wing at Zimmerwald" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 345-48). p. 341

[384] A reference to the International Socialist Conference held at Zimmerwald from September 5 to 8, 1915. p. 342

[385] The pamphlet, *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards the War*), was published in German in 1915, on the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference. p. 342

[386] A reference to the credential from the Lettish Social-Democratic Party for the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference. J. A. Berzin had not apparently intended to attend the conference at first and had handed the credential to Lenin. p. 343

[387] A reference to "The Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Wing at Zimmerwald". p. 343

[388] *Yelizaveta Rivlina*—a member of the Communist Party from 1908; at the time, secretary of the Lausanne Bolshevik group. p. 345

[389] Paul Golay did not attend the Zimmerwald Conference. Charles Naine was a delegate from the Swiss Social-Democratic Party and took an active part in its work. p. 345

[390] *Charles H. Kerr*—an American publisher of socialist literature, with whom Alexandra Kollontai negotiated by letter on the publication in English of the pamphlet *Socialism and War* and *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1. It did not prove possible to issue the pamphlet in America. p. 346

[391] An apparent reference to T. Nerman, who took part in the First International Socialist Conference as a delegate from the Norwegian Socialist Youth Organisation. p. 347

[392] Lenin's report on the Zimmerwald Conference, "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, Sept. 5-8, 1915", appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 45-46, October 11, 1915 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 389-93). p. 348

[393] A reference to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. towards the War*). p. 348

[394] The pamphlet *Socialism and War*. p. 349

[395] The joint declaration (against the war) issued by the French and German delegations at the International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 45-46, October 11, 1915). p. 349

[396] The Manifesto of the International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald published by *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 45-46, October 11, 1915. The Left, having signed this manifesto, issued a special statement, which they submitted to the presidium of the conference, on their motives for supporting the manifesto. The statement appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47, October 13, 1915. p. 349

[397] A reference to Romain Rolland's articles in *Journal de Genève* from August to October 1914. The French Government held up the re-issue of these articles, and they were published only in 1915 in the collection, Romain Rolland, *Au-dessus de la mêlée*. Paris. Paul Ollendorff; Neuchâtel, Attinger Frères, 1915. p. 350

[398] *Vperyod* (Forward)—a periodical of the *Vperyod* group, published in Geneva from August 25, 1915 (No. 1 to February 1, 1917 (No. 6). Among those who took part in the publication were A. V. Lunacharsky (A. Voinov), P. I. Lebedev (V. Polyansky), and D. Z. Manuilsky (I. Bezrabotny). p. 350

[399] A reference to the miscellany *The International and the War* No. 1, issued by the Secretariat Abroad of the Organising Committee of the R.S.D.L.P, in 1915. p. 350

[400] The magazine *Kommunist* was founded by Lenin and published by the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* jointly with G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosch, who financed the publication. N. I. Bukharin was also on the editorial board. Only one (double) issue appeared. It carried Lenin's articles "The Collapse of the Second International", "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist", and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy".

Lenin expected to turn the magazine into an organ of the Left-wing Social-Democrats, but serious differences soon developed between the *Sotsial-Demokrat* Editorial Board and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosch, which were aggravated after the appearance of the first issue. p. 350

[401] *Avanti!* (Forward!)—a daily, the central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in Rome in December 1896. Its No. 260 of September 19, 1915 carried an item, entitled "Il convegno internationale di Zimmerwald" (International Conference at Zimmerwald), which, contrary to the secrecy agreed upon, gave all the particulars of the organisation of the conference and even carried a number of photographs of the house where it was held. p. 351

[402] A reference to the manifesto adopted by the First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald, and a report on it carried, with some distortions, by *Berner Tagwacht* (Berne Sentinel) No. 218, September 18, 1915, and in *Bulletin der I.S.K.* (I.S.C. Bulletin) No. 1, September 21, 1915. p. 352

[403] A reference to the International Socialist Commission (I.S.C.) in Berne, the executive of the Zimmerwald group, set up at the Zimmerwald Conference held from September 5 to 8, 1915. On the I.S.C. were the Centrists R. Grimm, O. Morgari, Charles Naine and A. Balabanova, who acted as interpreter. The official report of the Conference, which appeared in *Bulletin der I.S.K.* on September 21, 1915, said: "This Secretariat must in no case substitute for the existing International Bureau but must be dissolved as soon as the latter is in a position to play its proper role." The copy at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee shows this place underlined by Lenin with the following note in the margin: "Kein Beschluss darüber" (No decision on this). p. 352

[404] The draft resolution proposed by the Zimmerwald Left and a statement giving the motives on which the Left Social-Democrats voted for the official manifesto at the Conference. p. 352

[405] A reference to the pamphlet *Socialism and War*. p. 352

[406] Lenin gave a lecture, entitled "The International Socialist Conference of September 5-8, 1915", in Zurich on October 23, 1915. p. 353

[407] A reference to P. Axelrod's pamphlet *Die Krise und die Aufgaben der internationalen Sozialdemokratie* (The Crisis and the Tasks of International Social-Democracy), Zurich, 1915. p. 353

[408] During his trip to arrange the transportation of Bolshevik literature to Russia, A. G. Shlyapnikov discovered in Vardö (a port in the north of Norway) a stock of literature left over from 1906 and 1907, when the illegal shipping arrangements were disrupted. It included sets of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, and various pamphlets. A part of this literature was sent to Russia on Lenin's instructions. p. 354

[409] A reference to: 1) a resolution on the attitude to non-proletarian parties adopted at the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907; 2) a resolution on the Narodniks adopted by the August (Summer) 1913 Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party officials (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, pp. 164-65 and 316-17). p. 354

[410] A reference to A. G. Shlyapnikov's illegal trip to Russia. p. 355

[411] *Bulletin der Internationale Sozialistische Kommission zu Bern* was published by the Executive of the Zimmerwald Group from September 1915 to January 1917 in English, French and German. Altogether six issues appeared. Its No. 1 carried the Manifesto of the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald and an official report on the Conference. p. 356

[412] The draft resolution proposed by the Zimmerwald Left. p. 356

[413] The official report on the Zimmerwald Conference, carried in the first issue of *Bulletin der Internationale Sozialistische Kommissin zu Bern*, did not say that Borchardt had signed the draft resolution of the Left. p. 356

[414] The leaflets the C.C. Bureau Abroad intended to publish for circulation in Russia. p. 357

[415] A reference to Alexandra Kollontai's pamphlet *Who Needs the War?*, issued in 1916 by the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. Lenin's corrections to this pamphlet are in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*, pp. 324-30. p. 357

[416] The idea of Lenin's moving from Switzerland to a neutral Scandinavian country, which did not materialise. p. 357

[417] The draft resolution proposed at the Zimmerwald Conference by the Left. p. 358

[418] A statement on Ledebour's peremptory demand that the Conference should not pass a resolution prohibiting organisations attending the Conference from voting for war credits (he said the

question should be decided on the strength of each country's strategic position). The statement was quoted in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47, October 13, 1915 ("Two Statements at the International Conference"). p. 358

[419] A reference to *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47, which was issued on October 13 (two days after the double issue, No. 45-46) and which dealt almost entirely with the state of Social-Democratic work in Petrograd and Moscow. It also carried Lenin's "Several Theses Proposed by the Editors", dealing with topical issues of Social-Democratic work in Russia (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 401-04).

The gist of Karpinsky's reply is not known but it appears to be negative, because *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47 was not printed by Kuzma, but by Benteli in Bumplitz. p. 359

[420] This may be a reference to *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1, issued in November 1915, and carrying F. Platten's Zurich address. On the strength of this, Lenin's letter in the Fourth Edition of his *Sobraniya Sochineny* (Collected Works) is dated "late November-early December 1915".

But it is also possible that Lenin was referring to the leaflet *Gegen die Lüge der Vaterlandsverteidigung* (Against the Lies of Defence of the Fatherland) No. 1, which was issued in February 1917, and signed by "a group of Zimmerwald Left-wingers in Switzerland". This leaflet bears no publisher's address, which warrants the assumption that Lenin's letter might have been written in February 1917. p. 361

[421] A possible reference to the struggle between the Left and the Centrists at the Aarau Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland on November 20-21, 1915, or the referendum on the calling of an extraordinary Party congress announced by the Swiss Left-wing Social-Democrats in January 1917. p. 361

[422] A reference to the second election of representatives from the workers to the war industries committees (central and regional). The social-chauvinists were defeated at the first election on September 27 (O.S.), 1915, when the Bolsheviks carried through their resolution to the effect that it was impermissible for representatives of the proletariat to take part in "organisations which in anyway promoted the present war". With the help of the bourgeoisie, the social-chauvinists launched a successful campaign to nullify the first election. At the second election held on November 29 (O.S.), 1915, the Bolsheviks read out a statement censuring the actions of the defencists and walked out. In this way, the defencists, with the aid of the bourgeoisie, managed to elect 10 of their men to the "workers' group" from among the Mensheviks and S.R.s. p. 362

[423] A possible reference to the resolution of the Geneva Bolshevik

group on the election to the war industries committee in Petrograd. p. 362

[424] A reference to *Vorbote* (Herald), organ of the Zimmerwald Left, whose No. 1 was issued in Berne in January 1916, and No. 2 in April 1916. Anton Pannekoek and Henriette Roland-Hoist were its official publishers. Among those taking part were Lenin, K. Radek, H. Gorter and D. Wijnkoop. The magazine carried Lenin's "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International" and "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses)" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 108-20 and 143-56). p. 362

[425] The changes in the constitution boiled down to the representatives of the Zimmerwald Left being invited to work in *Vorbote* not as editors, as had been planned earlier, but as contributors (see pp. 394-95). p. 363

[426] A reference to Lenin's work on his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. p. 365

[427] In Zurich, Lenin read two lectures: on February 17, 1916, "Two Internationals", and on February 26, 1916, "'Conditions of Peace' in Connection with the National Question". p. 365

[428] N. K. Krupskaya's book *Public Education and Democracy* was not published by Parus, as had been planned, and was only issued in 1917 by the Zhizn i Znaniye Publishers. p. 367

[429] In view of the need to work in Zurich libraries, Lenin and N. K. Krupskaya moved to Zurich in February 1916. p. 368

[430] In Geneva, Lenin read a lecture, "'Conditions of Peace' in Con-Connection with the National Question", on March 1, 1916. It was attended by 200 persons. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee has no information on the lecture at Lausanne. p. 369

[431] A reference to the enlarged conference of the International Socialist Commission held in Berne from February 5 to 9, 1916. Lenin took an active part in the work of the conference: he wrote the "Draft Resolution on the Convocation of the Second Socialist Conference" and the delegation's proposals on the terms of representation at the conference (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 121-22). Lenin criticised the false internationalism of the Mensheviks; spoke on the discussion of the draft appeal of the I.S.C., "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups"; tabled amendments to the draft of the appeal and made a statement on behalf of the Bolsheviks and the Territorial Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania against inviting Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein to the Second International Socialist Conference.

Soon after the conference, Lenin circulated among the Bolshevik groups abroad a brief about the meeting, instructing them to start immediate preparations for the forthcoming Second International Socialist Conference. p. 371

[432] The internationalist club was organised at Geneva in December 1915 by Left-wing internationalist émigrés. p. 371

[433] The letter is Lenin's reply to Y. Larin's proposal to take part in a collection criticising defencism and substantiating the Zimmerwald platform. It was to be published legally in Russia. Among the contributors abroad were to be Axelrod, Lunacharsky and Martov. In Russia, they were being selected by N. Sukhanov. The terms on which these were accepted included, in particular, the stipulation that "the articles of the collection should not contain any attacks by contributors against each other". The collection was not issued. p. 372

[434] The effort to publish *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 in America was unsuccessful. p. 373

[435] *Socialist Propaganda League* was founded in Boston in 1915, as an independent group within the Socialist Party. It adopted the platform of the Zimmerwald Left and rallied the revolutionary elements of the Socialist Party. p. 373

[436] A letter to the secretary of the Socialist Propaganda League in America, written by Lenin in November 1915 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 423-28). p. 373

[437] The talks with Charles Kerr, the publisher of socialist literature, on the publication in America of the pamphlet *Socialism and War* in English did not yield any results. p. 374

[438] *Internationale Korrespondenz* (International Correspondence)—a weekly, published in Berlin by the German social-chauvinists from the end of September 1914 to October 1, 1918. p. 374

[439] A hint at the differences and the struggle between Lenin, on the one hand, and Radek, Pyatakov and others, on the other, on the question of self-determination of nations, as a result of which *Kommunist* ceased publication. p. 375

[440] The proposals by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Zimmerwald Conference were written in response to the I.S.C.'s "Appeal to All Affiliated Parties and Groups" (see *Internationale Sozialistische Kommission zu Bern. Bulletin* No. 3, February 29, 1916).

There are two variants of the proposals in manuscript of which the initial 15-point text is published in this volume. For the second (final) eight-point variant see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 169-79.

The *Second International Socialist Conference* was held in Kienthal (Switzerland) from April 24 to 30, 1916. It was attended by the representatives of Germany (7), Italy (7), Russia (8, including Lenin and Petrova [Inessa Armand]), Poland (5), France (4), Switzerland (5), etc., a total of 43 persons, of whom 12 were firm supporters of the Left.

On the agenda there were the following items: the struggle to end the war, the proletariat's attitude to the questions of peace, parliamentary activity and mass struggle; the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau, etc. At this Conference, the Left was stronger than at Zimmerwald. Lenin secured the adoption of a resolution criticising social-pacifism and the activity of the International Socialist Bureau. The Conference helped to bring out and rally the internationalist elements who, in 1919, on the initiative of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, get up the Third, Communist, International. But the Conference failed to adopt the basic planks of Bolshevik policy, namely, transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, defeat of one's own imperialist government in the war, and organisation of the Third International. p. 377

[441] The congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland was held at Arnhem on January 8 and 9, 1916. p. 378

[442] *London Conference of Socialists of the Entente Countries* was held on February 14, 1915. It was attended by social-chauvinists and pacifists from the socialist parties of Britain, France, and Belgium, and by the Mensheviks and S.R.s from Russia.

Although the Bolsheviks had not been invited, Litvinov (Maximovich) went to the conference on Lenin's instructions to read out a declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, based on a draft written by Lenin. It demanded the withdrawal of socialists from bourgeois governments, a complete break with the imperialists, refusal to co-operate with them, resolute struggle against one's own imperialist government and condemnation of the voting of war credits. Litvinov was reading the declaration, when he was interrupted and ruled out of order. He handed the text of the declaration to the presidium and left the conference. For details on the London conference, see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 132-34 and 178-80.

The *Vienna Conference of Socialists of Germany and Austria*, a kind of response to the London Conference of Socialists of the Entente Countries, was held in April 1915. It endorsed the social-chauvinist "Defend the Fatherland" slogan. p. 379

[443] A reference to K. Kautsky's article "Nochmals unsere Illusionen" (Once Again about Our Illusions) in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 8, May 21, 1915. p. 379

[444] A reference to the editorial article in *Avanti!* No. 65 of March 5, 1916, entitled "Polemica in casa nostra" (Polemics in Our Camp),

in which the editors quoted an extract from Trèves's article in *Critica sociale*, and polemised with him. p. 380

445 *Circular of the International Socialist Commission*—an appeal from the I.S.C. to all parties and groups of the Zimmerwald Association, adopted unanimously at the February meeting of the I.S.C. in Berne in 1916. The delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, led by Lenin, tabled a statement saying that it regarded the appeal as a step forward in comparison with the decisions of the First International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald, but did not find it satisfactory in every respect. The appeal appeared in *Bulletin der I.S.K.* No. 3 on February 29, 1916 and in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 52 on March 25, 1916. p. 383

446 A reference to the news of the arrest by the Swedish authorities in Stockholm of the Russian émigrés, N. I. Bukharin, G. L. Pyatakov, Y. Surits and A. I. Gordon. After a few days' detention, they were released and deported from Sweden. p. 388

447 The *Conference of Socialists of Neutral Countries* set by C. Huysmans for June 26, 1916 was held in The Hague on July 31. It was attended by eight delegates from Holland, by K. Branting from Sweden, by Th. Stauning from Denmark, and one delegate each from Argentina and the United States. This Conference of socialist Right-wingers adopted a resolution favouring freedom of trade as a condition of "stable peace and international solidarity". p. 389

448 A reference to C. Huysmans's report at the extraordinary congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland in Arnhem on January 9, 1916, on the activity of the International. He put forward a programme of "democratic peace" and made the following proposals: 1) limitation of armaments; 2) national self-determination; 3) democratisation of diplomacy; and 4) establishment of a court of arbitration. He dealt with the Zimmerwald Conference and its Left wing. The newspaper *Volksfreund*, in an article entitled "De Brouckère über die Internationale" (De Brouckère about the International) in its No. 38 of February 15, 1916, carried the full text of a letter from the editor of the banned Belgian Social-Democratic newspaper, *Le Peuple*, L. de Brouckère, to P. Renaudel (the editor of *l'Humanité* during the First World War). In the concluding part of its article, *Volksfreund* wrote: "Just as it is impossible to restore, together with Huysmans, the old image of the Second International with the aid of phrases, so the new International, together with de Brouckère cannot be a shadow repeating the actions of the imperialism of the Entente. The new International will either become a militant, cohesive organisation against the imperialism of the East, the West and of Central Europe, or it will be a mere phrase or a tool of imperialism." p. 389

[449] A reference to the item "Huysmans über die Internationale" (Huysmans on the International) in the newspaper *Volksstimme* (People's Voice) No. 8, January 12, 1916. p. 389

[450] *Zeth Höglund*—a leader of the Left-wing Social-Democrats and the youth movement in Sweden; on May 3, 1916, he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment at hard labour for his anti-war action. p. 389

[451] A reference to the publication of *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 in English. p. 389

[452] The Second International Conference held in Kienthal (Switzerland) from April 24 to 30, 1916. p. 390

[453] Among the French delegation at the Kienthal Conference were Jean Longuet's supporters: P. Brizon, A. Blanc and J. Raffin-Dugens, who after the war joined the French Communist Party; Brizon soon left the party. p. 390

[454] The Left wing at the Kienthal Conference was stronger than at Zimmerwald. At the First International Socialist Conference, the Zimmerwald Left consisted of eight persons, and of twelve at Kienthal, and on some issues obtained nearly one half the votes. This was a reflection of the change in the balance of forces in the international working-class movement in favour of the internationalists.

Lenin, referring to the strengthening of the Left at the Conference, has the following delegates in mind: Katslerovich (Serbia), Platten, Nobs, Agnes Robmann (Switzerland) and Guilbeaux (France), who joined the Zimmerwald Left. The German *Internationale* group was represented by Berta Thalheimer and E. Meyer. p. 390

[455] The name given to G. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosch because they had emigrated from Russia to Switzerland via Japan. p. 390

[456] There was no agreement on Lenin's terms. *Sbornik Sotsial Demokrata* was issued in place of *Kommunist*. p. 391

[457] Lenin's plan was not accepted by the Bukharin-Pyatakov group, who insisted on their own plan, under which, apart from Lenin's articles on the right of nations to self-determination, the publication was to contain articles by Radek, Pyatakov and Bukharin on the national question. p. 391

[458] The miscellany referred to here was to have been published abroad on the basis of material brought by Shlyapnikov from Russia and describing the condition of the Jews during the war. However, it did not appear. p. 391

[459] Lenin's lecture at Geneva, "Two Streams in the International Labour Movement", was given on Friday, June 2, 1916, according to the posters issued by the Geneva Bolshevik group, now in the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. The lecture at Lausanne was given on June 3. p. 392

[460] A reference to Radek's article "Ein ausgespieltes Lied" (Their Song Is Over) which appeared in *Berner Tagwacht* No. 108, May 9, 1916. For Lenin's assessment, see the article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 354-55). p. 395

[461] The article by A. Kulisher, "The Dublin Putsch", referred to here, appeared in *Rech* No. 102, April 15 (28), 1916. p. 395

[462] The Committee of the Organisation Abroad was set up in December 1911 at a conference of Bolshevik groups abroad. p. 395

[463] A reference to Alexandra Kollontai's letter to Lenin on May 28, 1916, reporting the withdrawal from the Central Committee of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party of its secretary F. Strom and three of its members, which deepened the "actual although not yet formal split of the party". She went on to say: "The Swedes are working well to build up the Left wing. They are drawing up a clever plan of battle, which they intend to fight against the Right wing at the party congress to be held in winter, as a result of which the party's formal break-up will follow logically. They should be supported in their desire to stand apart." Concerning the talks on the publication in America of Zimmerwald Left literature, Kollontai wrote: "There is no reply from America yet, but a few days ago the mail arrived and I received a reply on the letters sent simultaneously with letters to the Socialist Labour Party and to Charles Kerr." p. 397

[464] The Conference of Socialists of Neutral Countries set for June 26, 1916 was held at The Hague on July 31, 1916. Lenin is referring to the participation in it of a Left-winger from the Norwegian Social-Democratic Party. p. 397

[465] A reference to L. Rybalka's pamphlet, *L'Ukraine et la Guerre* (The Ukraine and the War), Lausanne, 1916. In a letter to Lenin on May 28, 1916, Alexandra Kollontai called it a "disgracefully chauvinist" piece of writing. p. 397

[466] On A. Shlyapnikov's proposal, the C.C. Bureau in Russia examined the friction within the editorial board of *Kommunist* and adopted the following resolution: "Having heard the statement of Comrade Belenin (A. Shlyapnikov) concerning the differences within the collegium of workers of the Party press on various points of the Party programme and tactics, the C.C. Bureau deems it necessary to inform the C.O. editorial board abroad of the

following: 1) The C.C. Bureau in Russia, declaring its complete solidarity with the main line of the C.C., being conducted in the C.O., *Sotsial-Demokrat*, expresses the wish that all C.C. publications should be edited in a strictly consistent spirit, in complete accord with the C.C. line adopted by it at the outbreak of war; 2) The Bureau goes on record as opposing the transformation of C.C. publications into discussion publications; 3) The Bureau believes that the differences between contributors on some questions of the minimum programme and the C.O. editorial board cannot be an obstacle to their participation in C.C. publications, and invites the C.O. Editorial Board to accept their collaboration on other questions which are not at issue, 4) The Bureau suggests that private publishers should be used in Russia and abroad to clear up and eliminate differences through the issue of special discussion collections." p. 400

[467] A reference to the draft agreement on the further publication of *Kommunist*, drawn up by G. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosch, and transmitted by A. Shlyapnikov to Lenin. In the text of the draft Lenin struck out the following points:

"The founders of the publishing house and its responsible representatives are Comrades P. and N. Kievsky";

"The consent of at least two editors is required for the insertion of articles by contributors in the *Kommunist*'s Discussion Section....";

"The sixth person is to be co-opted to the publishing house on the recommendation of Comrades Lenin and Zinoviev. Comrades Lenin and Zinoviev have the right to recommend a seventh person to the publishing house from among Party writers but his admission is to be subject to a vote and is to be decided by a simple majority of the editors...."

The Point 6 mentioned by Lenin is given in the draft agreement as follows:

"6. The Right of the C.C.

"The Party C.C. or its Bureau have the right to insert their official documents, statements, etc., in the magazine *Kommunist*, without however taking up more than 15 per cent of the total space." p. 401

[468] Differences between Lenin, and Radek and the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania on the national question. The essence of these differences is set out by Lenin in his article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 320-60). p. 401

[469] See Note 467. p. 401

[470] A reference to K. Radek's intrigues against Lenin as a member of the *Vorbote* editorial board. For details, see pp. 394-95. p. 404

[471] A reference to "Thesen über Imperialismus und nationale Unterdrückung" (Theses on Imperialism and National Oppression),

first published in *Vorbote* No. 2, April 1916, on behalf of the organ of the Polish Social-Democratic opposition, *Gazeta Robotnicza* (Workers' Newspaper). p. 404

[472] A reference to the split within the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania which lasted more than four years, from 1912 to 1916.

Leon Tyszka, a member of the Chief Executive, was a leading figure in the split. He supported the Executive and took a conciliatory stand in respect of the anti-Bolshevik groups within the R.S.D.L.P. on questions of Party organisation. For details on the split, see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 495-98. p. 404

[473] Lenin's article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" was published in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1, October 1916 (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 320-60). p. 404

[474] In May 1916, Inessa Armand returned to Switzerland from Paris. It is not known whether a passport was obtained. p. 408

[475] Yu. Delevsky, *Social Antagonisms and the Class Struggle in History*, St. Petersburg, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishers, 1910. p. 408

[476] A reference to the participation of a Left-winger from the Norwegian Social-Democratic Party in the Conference of Socialists of Neutral Countries. p. 409

[477] A reference to the mailing of the manuscript of Lenin's *Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism*. For reasons of secrecy, such material was bound in specially prepared covers of other books. p. 412

[478] The person in question has not been identified. p. 412

[479] At the time, G. L. Shklovsky headed the Commission for Intellectual Assistance to POWs under the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad. The Commission operated in Berne, and Shklovsky kept Lenin informed of its activity and sent him the most interesting POW letters. The commission was set up on Lenin's initiative and widely circulated Bolshevik literature on various aspects of the war and current events, established ties with POWs, and contacted revolutionary-minded men who helped to spread the Party's influence in POW camps. p. 412

[480] In his earlier letters, G. Belenky, secretary of the Bolshevik group in Paris, had suggested to Lenin that the publication of the second issue of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* should be organised in Paris, but failed to say beforehand that the edition could only be a legal one. The planned publication of leaflets in Paris was not carried out. p. 414

[481] A reference to the amendments to Bebel's resolution on anti-militarism tabled at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International, held from August 18 to 23, 1907. Bebel's resolution had the basic defect of failing to state the active tasks of the proletariat, which gave the opportunists (Vollmar and others) an opportunity of reading it their own way. Accordingly, on behalf of the Russian and Polish delegations, Rosa Luxemburg motioned amendments to Bebel's resolution which were signed by Lenin. They 1) said that militarism was the chief instrument of class oppression; 2) stated the task of carrying on agitation among the youth, and 3) emphasised the task of Social-Democrats not only to struggle against the outbreak of wars or for the earliest halt to wars, but also use the wartime crisis to speed the downfall of the bourgeoisie. All these amendments were in the main included in Bebel's resolution and adopted by the Congress. For details, see Lenin's articles "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 75-81 and 82-93). p. 415

[482] Lenin read his lecture on the 1905 revolution in German at a meeting arranged by working-class youth at the Zurich People's House on January 22 (9), 1917. For the text of the lecture, see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 236-53. p. 416

[483] Lenin's article "Strike Statistics in Russia" appeared in the magazine *Mysl* (Thought) No. 1, December 1910, and No. 2, January 1911 (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 393-421). p. 416

[484] *Diskussionny Listok* (The Discussion Bulletin) No. 3, April 29 (May 12), 1911, carried Lenin's article "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia", whose second section contains a summing up of the statistics of the strikes in Russia referred to by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 374-92). p. 416

[485] A collection of articles by Vl. Gorn, V. Mech and Cherevanin, *The Struggle of Social Forces in the Russian Revolution*, Moscow. Issue Three, *The Peasantry and the Revolution*. p. 416

[486] Pyotr Maslov's book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, Vol. 11, *The Crisis of the Peasant Economy and the Peasant Movement*, St. Petersburg, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishers, 1908. p. 416

[487] The book *Moscow in December 1905*, published in Moscow in 1906. For Lenin's review of it, see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 171-78. p. 416

[488] A reference to the theses "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party", written in late October or early November 1916, and published as a leaflet in French in 1918 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 137-48). p. 416

[489] A reference to W. Münzenberg's speech at a sitting of the Exec-

utive of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party on January 7, 1917, on the question of postponing the party congress set for February 11, 1917, in Berne, to discuss the war question (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 217-19 and 283). p. 417

[490] *Parteibeschlüsse* (Party Decisions)—an unsigned editorial article in the daily of the Swiss Social-Democrats, *Berner Tagwacht* No. 6, January 8, 1917. p. 417

[491] The Zurich Social-Democratic newspaper, *Volksrecht* (People's Right) No. 11, January 13, 1917, carried an article "Zur Parteitagsverschiebung" (On the Postponement of the Party Congress), signed "g", opposing the decision of the Executive of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party of January 7 to postpone the convocation of the congress indefinitely. p. 417

[492] A reference to the resolution of the Left-wingers against the postponement of the congress and for its convocation in the spring of 1917. The text of the resolution in German with Lenin's corrections is now at the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. The resolution served as a basis for the referendum which was held when local organisations came out in favour of calling the congress in the spring (*Volksrecht* No. 19, January 23, 1917, "Das Referendum gegen den Parteivorstandsbeschluss ergriffen" (The Referendum against the Executive Decision Is On). p. 418

[493] A reference to the draft statement adopted on January 15, 1917 at a meeting of the Swiss Left-wing Social-Democrats demanding Grimm's expulsion from the I.S.C. p. 418

[494] Sophia Ravich wrote to Lenin about the opportunism of the Geneva Social-Democratic organisation, among whose members a handful of Bolsheviks spread internationalist ideas. p. 419

[495] A reference to the attitude adopted by E. Nobs and F. Platten during the sharpening of the struggle within the Swiss Social-Democratic Party on the question of militarism and the behaviour of Social-Democrats in Parliament on the question of war credits. Thus, for instance, E. Nobs was against the motivated referendum stated by the Left on an urgent convocation of a congress. Both took part in a private meeting of Centrists held on February 3, 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 283-86). p. 419

[496] A reference to the leaflets published in Zurich by a group of Swiss, German, Polish and Russian supporters of the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin took part in editing *Bulletin* No. 1, organised its translation into foreign languages and did everything to circulate it. p. 419

[497] The Cantonal Congress of the Zurich Social-Democratic organisation in Töss was held on February 11 and 12, 1917. The Party organ, *Volksrecht* No. 36, of February 12, 1917, dealt with it in an editorial, entitled "Der Parteitag in Töss" (Party Congress at Töss)

Two draft resolutions on the war question were tabled at the Congress: 1) that of the minority of the war commission drawn up by the Right in a spirit of social-chauvinism; and 2) the Centrist draft of the majority. The Congress adopted the latter by 93 to 65. To prevent the social-chauvinist resolution from going through, the Left voted for the majority resolution but tabled Lenin's "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue", which was adopted by the Congress. p. 419

[498] On February 1, 1917, a meeting of some members of the Zimmerwald Conference was held at Olten with the participation of organisations invited to attend a conference of socialists from the Entente countries (March 1917) (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 284). p. 419

[499] The referendum on the convocation of an extraordinary congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party to discuss the attitude to the war was announced by the Swiss Left-wing Social-Democrats in connection with the Executive's decision to postpone the congress indefinitely. Despite the struggle started by the leaders of the party, R. Grimm, I. Schmid, F. Schneider, H. Greulich and G. Müller (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 283-86), against the referendum, it was enthusiastically welcomed by the workers of German- and French-speaking Switzerland. But the party congress was held only in June 1917. p. 419

[500] At a conference of representatives of Russian political parties at Geneva on March 19, 1917, L. Martov proposed a plan to secure the passage of political émigrés via Germany in exchange for the same number of Germans and Austrians interned in Russia. All participants in the meeting recognised Martov's plan as being the best and most acceptable.

The plan was discussed in émigré circles and was adopted by the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. at the end of March (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 27-29; *Lenin Miscellany II*, 1924, pp. 385-94). p. 420

[501] The *Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to All the Citizens of Russia* issued by the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. and published in *Supplement to Izvestia* (News) of the Petrograd Soviet No. 1, February 28 (March 13), 1917. Lenin read extracts from the Manifesto carried by *Frankfurter Zeitung* No. 80, March 22, 1917, under the title, "Das Manifest der Sozialrevolutionäre" (Manifesto of Revolutionary Socialists). It demanded a democratic republic, an 8-hour working day, confiscation of landed estates in favour of the peasants, confiscation of grain stocks, and—the most important thing—an end to the plunderous war. On the significance of the Manifesto, see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 320 and 357. p. 421

[502] Lenin read his lecture, "The Russian Revolution, Its Significance and Its Tasks", in German at a meeting of Swiss workers at People's House in Zurich on March 27, 1917.

The basic propositions outlined in the plan for a lecture were elaborated by Lenin in his famous *Letters from Afar* (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 295-342). A brief account of the lecture appeared in the Zurich newspaper *Volksrecht* Nos. 77 and 78 on March 31 and April 2, 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 355-61). p. 422

[503] A reference to the decision of the Petrograd Soviet of March 2 (15), which approved, against the "protests of the minority", Kerensky's unauthorised entry into the bourgeois Provisional Government as Minister of Justice. p. 423

[504] For Thesis No. 4 on the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, see Lenin's article "Several Theses" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 402). p. 423

[505] The teaching of Marx and Engels on the state in the transitional period was set forth in detail in *The Critique of the Gotha Programme* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 32-33). p. 423

[506] For Thesis No. 11, see Lenin's article "Several Theses", which was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 47, October 13, 1915 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 403-04). p. 424

[507] The rough draft of the telegram test written in German in someone else's hand has a note by Lenin in Russian: "Sent Saturday night, March 31, and received by Grimm on the morning of April 1." p. 427

[508] See present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 27-29, and this volume, p. 420. p. 427

[509] On March 31, 1917, the Central Committee Collegium Abroad adopted a decision on the immediate return of the émigrés to Russia via Germany (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 365-66). p. 428

[510] *M. Goberman*—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik, member of the Bolshevik group in Lausanne. *Abram* (mentioned below?—A. Skovno—Bolshevik, member of the Bolshevik group in Switzerland. Both returned to Russia with Lenin. p. 428

[511] A reference to the resolution of the internationalist Mensheviks and S.R.s, aimed against the decision of the C.C. Collegium Abroad to accept R. Grimm's proposal to travel immediately to Russia via Germany. The Mensheviks and the S.R.s wanted to wait for permission from the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. p. 428

[512] Lenin and a group of political émigrés left Switzerland on April 9, 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 27-29). p. 430

[513] Upon his arrival in Russia on April 3 (16), 1917, Lenin spoke about the new tasks facing the Bolshevik Party at a meeting of Petrograd Party workers organised that very night at the former Kšesinska mansion to mark his arrival. His speech was apparently based on the preliminary draft of the April Theses. p. 431

[514] *All-Russia Conference of Party Workers* (March Conference) was timed by the Russian Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. for the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and opened on March 27 (April 9), 1917. On its agenda were: attitude to the war, attitude to the Provisional Government, organisation of revolutionary forces, etc.

The meeting of April 4 (17) at which Lenin gave his report was held in the Taurida Palace. Lenin explained his April Theses and quoted them in part. The text of his speech is reproduced from secretarial notes containing lacunae indicated with dots, apart from some places of the notes which are not quite clear.

All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, called by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, was held at Petrograd from March 29 to April 3 (April 11 to 16), 1917.

It was attended by representatives of the Petrograd Soviet and 82 local Soviets, and also of army units at the front and in the rear. It discussed the questions of the war, the attitude to the Provisional Government, the Constituent Assembly, land, food, and other problems

The Conference, which was dominated by Mensheviks and S.R.s, took the attitude of "revolutionary defencism" (325 against 57) and adopted a decision to support the bourgeois Provisional Government and also to call an international socialist conference on the question of withdrawal from the war. G. V. Plekhanov made two speeches in a spirit of social-patriotism. There were interruptions from the defencist majority when the Bolshevik P. I. Starostin called for an end to the war.

The Conference added 16 members to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, including six from the Army and Navy. p. 434

[515] A reference to a resolution on Tsereteli's report on the attitude towards the war, tabled by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, controlled by Mensheviks and S.R.s, and adopted by the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 30 (April 12), 1917. Behind a façade of general statements about freedom and defence of the revolution, the resolution urged support for the Provisional Government's foreign policy, i.e., continuation of the imperialist war. p. 435

[516] A reference to the international socialist conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal. p. 436

[517] *Popular Socialists*—members of a petty-bourgeois Trudovik Po-

pular Socialist Party formed in 1906 by Right-wingers of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (S.R.). They sided with the Cadets; Lenin called them "Social-Cadets", "philistine opportunists", "S.R. Mensheviks", vacillating between the S.R.s and the Cadets. He said, the party "differs very little from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both republicanism and the demand for all the land" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 228). Among the party's leaders were A. V. Peshekhonov, N. F. Annensky and V. A. Myakotin. p. 438

[518] A reference to the money belonging to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee which had been left abroad. p. 444

[519] *Steinberg*—a Russian engineer resident in Stockholm, a go-between in the correspondence. p. 444

[520] The "Liberty Loan" issued by the Provisional Government on April 6 (19), 1917 to finance the war. p. 445

[521] *The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)* was held in Petrograd from April 24 to 29 (May 7-12), 1917. p. 445

[522] A reference to the attitude taken by *Pravda* in March 1917 before Lenin's arrival in Russia.

From mid-March, the paper carried articles by L. Kamenev, whom the C.C. Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. gave permission to insert articles without signature. In these articles, the question of supporting the Provisional Government was presented in the light of the Menshevik formula "insofar as ...", "until the Provisional Government is played out". They guaranteed support for all its steps designed to "eradicate all the relics of the tsarist and landowner regime"; the government was invited to renounce annexations, etc.—all of which tended to sow illusions. Kamenev's editorial, "Without Secret Diplomacy", called for a continuation of the war, a stand which clashed with the Bolshevik attitude to the imperialist war.

Pravda's criticism of the conciliators was half-hearted. The editors sharply cut down Lenin's criticism of the conciliatory leadership of the Petrograd Soviet and his exposure of the monarchist aspirations of the Provisional Government in his first "Letter from Afar" carried by *Pravda* on March 21 and 22 (April 3 and 4). J. V. Stalin took the erroneous position of exerting pressure on the Provisional Government for an immediate opening of peace talks.

Upon his arrival in Petrograd, Lenin became a member of the editorial board, and *Pravda* started its struggle for his plan to transform the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one. p. 445

[523] A trend among Swedish Social-Democrats. During the First World War, they took an internationalist stand and supported the

Zimmerwald Left. In May 1917 they formed the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden whose congress in 1919 decided to join the Communist International. In 1921, the party's revolutionary wing took the name of the Communist Party of Sweden. p. 445

[524] A reference to the agreement to form the bourgeois Provisional Government concluded on March 1 (14), 1917 by the Duma Provisional Committee and the S.R. and Menshevik leaders of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Under the agreement the S.R.s and the Mensheviks handed over state power to the bourgeoisie, giving the Duma Provisional Committee a free hand in forming the Provisional Government, which was set up on March 2 (15), 1917. It included Prince Lvov, the Cadet leader Milyukov, the Octobrist leader Guchkav and other representatives of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. The S.R. Kerensky was taken into the government as a representative of "democracy".

The "contact commission" referred to below was formed under a decision of the conciliatory Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of March 8 (21), 1917, to "influence" and supervise the activity of the Provisional Government. On it were M. I. Skobelev, Y. M. Steklov, N. N. Sukhanov, V. N. Filippovsky and N. S. Chkheidze (later also V. M. Chernov and I. G. Tsereteli). It helped the Provisional Government use the Petrograd Soviet prestige to veil its counter-revolutionary policy. The Mensheviks and S.R.s hoped it would help them keep the masses from active revolutionary struggle for transfer of power to the Soviets. The commission was dissolved in mid-April 1917 and its functions transferred to the Executive Committee Bureau. p. 445

[525] A reference to Lenin's pamphlet *Letters on Tactics. First Letter*, published in 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 43-54). p. 445

[526] For Lenin's Theses Nos. 8 to 11, see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 403-04. p. 448

[527] Lenin notes in parenthesis the paragraphs of the resolution on the agrarian question adopted on April 28 (May 11), 1917 by the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 292-93). p. 449

[528] *Frederik Borgbjerg*—a Danish reformist and a leader of the Danish Social-Democratic Party. In the spring of 1917 he came to Petrograd with the proposal to organise a conference of socialists from the belligerent countries. Lenin exposed the imperialist nature of his proposal and called Borgbjerg "an agent of the German Government". On Lenin's initiative the April Conference came out resolutely against the proposal (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 247-50, 251-53). p. 449

[529] A possible reference to Vasilyevsky Ostrov, which by that time had had its elections to the district Soviet; following this, the defencists, who were left in a minority, refused to submit to the majority and twice (April 28 and May 2) walked out from the meetings and disrupted the proceedings. p. 450

[530] *First All-Russia Congress of Peasants' Deputies*, held at Petrograd from May 4 to 28 (May 17-June 10), 1917, was attended by 1,115 delegates from the gubernias and army units. The Bolsheviks took an active part in the proceedings and exposed the imperialist policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the conciliatory policy of the Mensheviks and the S.R.s. On May 22 (June 4) Lenin delivered a speech on the agrarian question (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 486-505). However, all the Congress decisions bore the mark of S.R. domination. The Congress approved the policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the entry of "socialists" into the Provisional Government. It called for a continuation of the war "to a victorious end" and an offensive at the front. It came out against the immediate transfer of landed estates to the peasants and postponed the solution of the land question until a Constituent Assembly. p. 450

[531] *First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* was held in Petrograd from June 3 to 24 (June 16 to July 7), 1917. It was attended by more than 1,000 delegates. The Bolsheviks, who were then in a minority in the Soviets, had 105 delegates. The S.R.s and Mensheviks were in the majority. On the agenda were the following questions: the attitude to the Provisional Government, the war, preparations for a Constituent Assembly, etc. Lenin spoke on the attitude to the Provisional Government and on the war (see present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 17-28 and 29-42). The Bolsheviks motioned resolutions on all the major questions. They exposed the imperialist nature of the war, the danger of conciliation with the bourgeoisie and demanded the transfer of all power to the Soviets. The Congress decisions supported the Provisional Government, approved of the offensive then being prepared for and opposed the transfer of power to the Soviets. This may be the original plan of Lenin's speech at the Congress or of an article which he did not have the time to write. p. 452

[532] A reference to the "new", coalition Provisional Government which was formed on May 5 (18), 1917, and which began to function officially the following day. Together with representatives of the bourgeoisie it included the S.R.s Kerensky and Chernov, Pereverzev who was close to the S.R.s, the Mensheviks Skobelev and Tsereteli and the Popular Socialist Peshekhonov. p. 452

[533] A conference of members of the Fourth Duma on May 20 (June 2), 1917 decided to support the postponement of the land reform until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

By "Peasant Soviet" is meant the first All-Russia Congress

of Peasants' Deputies, which under the influence of the S.R. majority also put off the solution of the land question until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. p. 452

[534] *Chief Land Committee* was formed by the bourgeois Provisional Government in April 1917. On it were the chiefs of the Ministry of Agriculture and other officials appointed by the government, representatives of gubernia land committees and political parties. The Cadets and the S.R.s had an overwhelming majority on it. Officially, it was the committee's task to supervise the collection and processing of material for a land reform. Actually, it was designed mainly to fight the peasant movement for the take-over of landed estates. In its declaration on the land question of May 20 (June 2), 1917, it said that no one could solve the land question until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. After the October Revolution, the committee fought against the implementation of Lenin's decree on land and was dissolved in December 1917 under a decision of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 452

[535] Lenin's work *Marxism on the State* was written in Zurich in January and February 1917 and contains all the principal statements by Marx and Engels on the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat, extracts from books and articles by Kautsky, Pannekoek and Bernstein, with remarks, additions, generalisations and conclusions by Lenin.

When setting out from Switzerland to Russia in April 1917, Lenin left it along with other material for safekeeping abroad.

After the events of July 1917, when Lenin was in hiding at Razliv station, he asked that his notes be sent to him. He used them to prepare his book *The State and Revolution*. p. 454

[536] These speeches are published according to the minutes of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) for 1917, which are now at the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. The minutes consist of short records of speeches by participants in the meetings and of C.C. resolutions. Most of them were taken down by Yelena Stasova. These secretarial notes were not officially approved. p. 456

[537] The question of *Pravda*'s Editorial Board was dealt with by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in view of the fact that, as the minutes say, "the best men have gone into government, Party work has seriously suffered and this is especially noticeable in the Party organ, which has altogether failed to satisfy readers, provide articles explaining decrees, etc." After a discussion the C.C. decided to appoint a three-man editorial board consisting of Bukharin, Stalin and Sokolnikov. p. 456

[538] A reference to the establishment of the supreme economic body of the Soviet state which it was planned initially to call "Supreme Economic Conference". p. 456

[539] A reference to the treacherous behaviour of Kamenev, Rykov, Milyutin and Nogin who abandoned their leading posts at the most crucial period of the revolution, the emergence of the Soviet power. By violating Party discipline they thwarted the will and decisions of the Second Congress of Soviets, subverting the newly gained dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants.

On October 29 (November 11), 1917, the S.R.-Menshevik Vikzhel (All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Union), a centre of anti-Soviet activity, passed a resolution on the need to form a government from all "socialist" parties, and the same day negotiations were started on the question between it and the Bolshevik Central Committee. In its resolution the C.C. pointed out that the conciliator parties conducted negotiations with the aim of subverting the Soviet government, and that in view of this the C.C. permitted the Bolsheviks' delegates to take part in the talks with the sole purpose of showing up the unsolvency of the policy of setting up a coalition government and thus putting an end to the talks, but Kamenev and Sokolnikov behaved treacherously at these talks, accepting Vikzhel's demand for a "socialist" government which was to include representatives of counter-revolutionary parties (S.R.s and Mensheviks), alongside the Bolsheviks. This conciliatory policy was supported by Nogin, Milyutin and Rykov.

On November 2 (15) the Bolshevik Central Committee adopted Lenin's resolution on the question of the opposition within the Central Committee, urging all sceptics and waverers to cast off their hesitation and support the Soviet Government (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 277-79). On November 3 (16), the majority of the Central Committee, on Lenin's initiative, presented the minority with an ultimatum (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 280-82) demanding that they completely submit to the Central Committee decisions and policy and stop their subversive and disorganising activity; it declared that any attempt to force the Party to give up power—handed to the Bolshevik Party by millions of workers, soldiers and peasants at the All-Russia Congress of Soviets—was betrayal of the proletarian cause. The minority retaliated by announcing their resignation from responsible posts. On November 4 (17) Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and Milyutin announced their resignation from the C.C. There is no record of their application for a return to the C.C. or of Lenin's draft resolution in reply. The C.C. adopted Lenin's reply as a basis, and passed it on for editing to a three-man committee of C.C. members, having resolved to publish it in the event the four men demanded the publication of their letter. Their application was not published. p. 456

[540] The question of setting up a Supreme Economic Council (S.E.C.) was raised directly after the October Revolution. On October 26 or 27 (November 8 or 9), 1917, a meeting of the Central Council of the Petrograd factory committees in which Lenin took part discussed the project for a governing economic body. In his speech

at an enlarged meeting of the Petrograd Trade Union Council on November 9 (22), Lenin drew attention to the need to create machinery for running the Soviet economy and said that preparations for the establishment of such organisations were already under way. The draft for the organisation of a supreme economic body was worked out by a special commission set up by the Council of People's Commissars.

The Bolshevik group of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee discussed the matter and stressed the need to make the Supreme Economic Council a militant organ of the working-class dictatorship by investing it with legislative powers. On December 1 (14) the question was taken up by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The Left S.R.s demanded an enlargement of the S.E.C.'s peasant section and insisted that the Council should be under the All-Russia Central Executive Committee instead of the Council of People's Commissars, as the draft proposed. This was opposed by Lenin and the amendments were voted down by a majority. The decree on the Supreme Economic Council was approved and published in *Gazeta Vremennogo Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* (Gazette of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government) No. 25 on December 5 (18).

Lenin devoted much attention to organising the work of the Supreme Economic Council, directed its activity and spoke at congresses of economic councils. The question of organising its activity was repeatedly discussed by the Council of People's Commissars. Thus, a government decision of December 23, 1917 (January 5, 1918) said that the S.E.C. must be transformed from a discussion body into one actually directing industry. On January 19 (February 1), 1918, the government discussed the question of the S.E.C.'s activity and the need to eliminate duplication in the work of the S.E.C. and economic commissariats and departments, and adopted a circular binding the S.E.C. and all commissariats to work in close contact with each other. The draft circular had been amended and edited by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXI*, pp. 122-23).

When large-scale industry was fully nationalised, the S.E.C. became its organ of management. p. 458

[541] After the October revolution the board of the Urals Mining Societies stopped remitting money to the plants in retaliation to the introduction of workers' control over the enterprises, and this led to an extremely difficult situation at the plants. The workers had not been paid wages for several months and were starving. The Urals Regional Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies sent one of its members, V. Vorobyov, to inform the government in Petrograd of the state of affairs in the Urals and to settle the wages issue. Vorobyov gave all the details to Y. M. Sverdlov, who took him to Lenin. When Vorobyov informed Lenin of the state of the Urals industry and the mood of the workers, Lenin gave him the note in question.

On December 23, 1917 (January 5, 1918) the Council of People's

Commissars adopted a decision on the urgent remittance of 5 million rubles to the Urals branch of the State Bank. The decision was to have another 50 million remitted there by January 1 (14), 1918.

In January 1918, the Urals Regional Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies closed down the bureau of the Urals mining industry conference, which was in Yekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk). In late December 1917 and early 1918, the most important enterprises in the Urals were nationalised. p. 459

[542] Written during a four-day vacation in Finland from December 24 to 27, 1917 (January 6 to 9, 1918). The first topic for elaboration, "Now there is no need to fear the man with the gun", was heard by Lenin in a car on the Finnish railway (see present edition, Vol. 26, p. 463). It was also in Finland that Lenin wrote his articles "Fear of the Collapse of the Old and the Fight for the New", "How to Organise Competition?" and "Draft Decree on Consumers' Communes" (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 400-03, 404-15, 416-17), which elaborated most of the subjects mentioned here. Nearly all these subjects were most fully elaborated in his article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 235-77). p. 460

[543] See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 306-07. p. 460

[544] Reference to a sentence from the speech of the Minister of Food Supply in the coalition government, A. V. Peshekhonov, at a sitting of the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on June 5 (18), 1917 (*Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies No. 85, June 7 [20], 1917). p. 460

[545] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's speech at the 16th sitting of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the relative value of democratic principles. He said all democratic principles should be subordinated to the exclusive benefit of the revolution and the working class. To ensure the success of the revolution, the Social-Democrats could temporarily limit the operation of any of the democratic principles. In the interests of the revolution, the Social-Democrats could even come out against universal suffrage. "The revolutionary proletariat could restrict the political rights of the higher classes in much the same way the higher classes used to restrict its political rights." The revolutionary people could even go to the extent of dispersing a bad parliament (see *Protokoly II syezda RSDRP* [Minutes of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.], Priboi Publishers, 1924, p. 156). p. 461

[546] In his "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace" (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 442-50) Lenin elaborated topics 20 and 20 bis; the sentence "*Die Deutschen brauchen eine Niederlage*" is analysed in Thesis 11. p. 461

[547] The article "Their Plan", which appeared in *Pravda* No. 223, January 6, 1918 (December 24, 1917), said: "Lloyd George spoke in the sense that Russia should first determine her future frontier with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and then it will be time for negotiation on a general peace." Hence the conclusion drawn in the article that the Allies were putting out feelers for peace negotiations with Germany at the expense of the weak nations. p. 462

[548] See Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family or the Critique of Critical Critique*, Moscow, 1956, p. 110. p. 462

[549] The article "The Proletariat and the Banks", which appeared in *Pravda* No. 206, December 18 (5), 1917, under the signature of P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov). p. 463

[550] *Draft Decree on Consumers' Communes* was written by Lenin on December 25-28, 1917 (January 7-10, 1918), and published in part in *Sobraniye Sochineny* (Collected Works) of V. I. Lenin, Fourth Edition (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 416-17). It was fiercely opposed by bourgeois co-operators. The Soviet government believed that the bourgeois apparatus of accounting and control should be utilised, and made some concessions to the co-operators. Negotiations with them were conducted in March and early April 1918. At first, the co-operators insisted on complete independence of co-operative societies from the organs of the Soviet power and on servicing their own members only. The draft decree worked out in late March was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on April 10, with Lenin making a number of amendments in the draft. Clauses 11, 12 and 13 were fully written by Lenin.

The decree was approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 11, 1918, and the following resolution of the Bolshevik group was adopted: "Consumers' co-operatives, which cater for a sizable section of the population, have until now been pursuing an economic policy which frequently ran counter to, or outside, the economic policy conducted by the Soviet government. This was due to the fact that the leadership of consumers' co-operative societies was chiefly in the hands of the non-labouring classes. At present, with the consolidation of the Soviet power, consumers' co-operatives have expressed their readiness to work under the direct guidance and control of Soviet organs of power. The decree on consumers' co-operatives, worked out on the basis of negotiations between the central co-operative organisations and the Council of People's Commissars, is a compromise solution with essential shortcomings. But, considering the organisation of the proper distribution of food and goods among the population to be one of the most-important and urgent tasks of the present period, whose solution requires a number of socialist measures in this sphere and the substitution of a state trade apparatus for the private commercial apparatus, the Central Exec-

utive Committee adopts the decree on consumers' co-operatives as a transitional measure leading to the implementation of state distribution of food and goods in the country" (*Protokoly zasedany VTsIK 4-go sozyva* [Minutes of the Fourth All-Russia Central Executive Committee], Moscow, 1920, p. 104). The decree was published over the signature of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Vl. I. Ulyanov (Lenin), in *Pravda* No. 71, April 13 (March 31), 1918, and *Izvestia* No. 75, April 16 (April 3), 1918. p. 464

[551] -A reference to the directive issued by the People's Commissariat for Food to local Soviets on organising a food supply apparatus, its draft for a Commissariat for Supply, and the statute of the Supreme Economic Council on district economic councils.

Because the old food supply agencies sabotaged the decrees of the Soviet government, the People's Commissariat for Food issued a directive to local Soviets on December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918) that they should rely on the delegate organisations from the consuming gubernias and armies (delegates' committees), set up under the food supply agencies, take over the food supply effort and organise their own food supply apparatus. At the same time, the People's Commissariat for Food was working out a draft for its reorganisation into a Commissariat for Supply, which was to take charge of supplying the population not only with foodstuffs but other goods as well, sharply curtailing private trade in the process. The local agencies of the Commissariat for Supply were to be turned into supply departments under the Soviets.

On December 23, 1917 (January 5, 1918), the Supreme Economic Council adopted the Statute of District (Regional) and Local Economic Councils, which were to organise and regulate local production under the guidance of the S.E.C. p. 464

[552] In response to the introduction of the 8-hour working day, Kharkov capitalists stopped paying wages to workers in time. The workers appealed to V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko for help. When the local revolutionary committee, to which the latter applied, failed to take steps, he summoned 15 of the major capitalists to his railway car and ordered them to find 1 million rubles in cash to pay the workers. Following their refusal, they were detained and placed under arrest in a second-class carriage. They were told that unless they got the money in time, they would be sent to work in the mines. This had an effect, the money was collected and paid in, and the capitalists were released. p. 466

[553] A possible quotation from the unsigned article of "a prominent member of the German Independent Social-Democratic Party", which appeared in *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life) No. 7, January 11 (24), 1918. p. 468

[554] A reference to the following words of J. V. Stalin as entered in the minutes: "Comrade Stalin believes that in adopting the slo-

gan of a revolutionary war we play into the hands of imperialism. Comrade Trotsky's stand is not a stand. There is no revolutionary movement in the West—no facts of it—only a potential, and that is something we cannot reckon on. If the Germans start an offensive this will strengthen the counter-revolution over here."

Lenin's reference to G. Y. Zinoviev's speech applies to the following words: "Of course, we are faced with a serious surgical operation, because if we conclude a peace we shall strengthen chauvinism in Germany and for a time weaken the movement all over the West. Beyond that is another prospect—the collapse of the socialist republic" (*Protokoly Tsentralnogo Komiteta RSDRP*[*b*]. *Avgust 1917-fevral 1918* [Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). August 1917-February 1918], Moscow, 1958, pp. 171-72). p. 469

[555] *Central Rada*—a bourgeois nationalist organisation set up at a congress of Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties and groups in Kiev in April 1917. Its chairman was M. Grushevsky, and his deputy, V. Vinnichenko. Among its members were Petlyura, Yefremov and other nationalists. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Rada proclaimed itself the supreme organ of the "Ukrainian People's Republic" and took the path of open struggle against the Soviet power. Some states tried to set up a centre in the Ukraine pivoted on the Rada for fighting against the proletarian revolution. France gave the Rada a loan of 200 million francs. The Rada helped the Don and Kuban whiteguard generals in their fight against the Soviet power, and tried to disarm Soviet, regiments and the Red Guard in the Ukraine. A manifesto to the Ukrainian people from the Council of People's Commissars, written by V. I. Lenin on December 3 (16), 1917, exposed the Rada's counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet activity (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 361-63). In December 1917 and January 1918 armed uprising against the counter-revolutionary Rada swept the Ukraine, restoring Soviet organs of power. In January 1918, Soviet troops in the Ukraine started an offensive and on January 26 (February 8) took Kiev and overthrew the rule of the bourgeois Rada. p. 471

[556] A reference to a resolution adopted by a congress of frontline Cossacks on January 10 (23). The Congress was held in Kamenskaya and was attended by delegates from 46 Cossack regiments. It recognised the Soviet power, and set up the Don Revolutionary Military Committee, which declared war on Kaledin.

Cossack delegates took part in the work of the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies held in Petrograd from January 10 to 18 (23-31), 1918. p. 472

[557] The resolution, "On the Federal Institutions of the Russian Republic", adopted by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies on January 15 (28),

1918, said that the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic was being established on the basis of a voluntary union of the peoples of Russia as a Federation of their Soviet Republics. p. 472

[558] The telegram was sent to V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko in connection with the complaint lodged against him with Lenin by the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets. Antonov-Ovseyenko had appointed commissars from his staff to the railway stations and several towns of the Donets Basin, without agreeing this with the local organs, which had aroused the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian authorities.

Antonov-Ovseyenko took steps to eliminate the friction upon receipt of the telegram and letter from Lenin (see p. 474) and recalled his commissars. p. 473

[559] The Central Committee meeting on January 24 (February 6), 1918 dealt with one question, namely, the agenda of the Seventh Party Congress. On the basis of the proposals submitted, the Central Committee approved the following agenda for the Congress: 1) review of the programme; 2) current situation (internal situation, external situation, economic situation); 3) trade unions, factory committees, etc.; 4) organisational question; 5) miscellaneous. A commission headed by Lenin was set up to work out the Party's programme (see *Protokoly TsK RSDRP. Avgust 1917-fevral 1918* [Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., August 1917-February 19181, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, pp. 223-25).

When speaking of the October Bolsheviks Lenin had in mind those members of the Party who joined it after the October Socialist Revolution. The Central Committee decided that only those members who had been in the Party for more than three months, that is, those who had joined it before the Revolution, were entitled to voice and vote at the Congress. In opening the Seventh Congress Y. M. Sverdlov, who was in the chair, announced the C.C. decision that "the Congress is to be deemed competent only if more than one-half the delegates of the preceding, Sixth Congress of the Party are present" (see *Protokoly syezdov i konferentsy VKP(b). Sedmoi syezd* [Minutes of Congresses and Conferences of the R.C.P.(B.). Seventh Congress], 1928, p. 1). p. 475

[560] *Rumcherod*—Central Executive Committee of Soviets of the Rumanian Front, Black Sea Fleet and Odessa Region. p. 477

[561] In view of the German offensive against the Soviet Republic, the Central Committee met twice on February 18, 1918. At the morning sitting, after an exchange of opinion one question was put to the vote at Lenin's insistence. He called for an immediate proposal to the Germans to resume the peace negotiations. A majority of seven to six voted it down. The Central Committee was to have met at 2.00 p.m. the following day, but when news came that the Germans had taken Dvinsk (Daugavpils) the Central

Committee met the same night, and Lenin reiterated his proposal with the utmost vigour. The Central Committee decided to inform the German Government on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars that the Soviet Government was prepared to conclude peace. The initial draft of the radiogram was written by Lenin on the spot and sent to Berlin the same night on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars (see present edition, Vol. 26, p. 525).

Lenin's statements are taken from the secretarial record of the C.C. minutes. His statements in a different version are given in Vol. 26 of the present edition, pp. 520-21. p. 478

[562] The meeting of the Party's Central Committee on February 23, 1918, was called in connection with the even harsher peace terms which the Germans presented, and the demand that they be examined within 48 hours. The Left Communists Bukharin, Uritsky, and Lomov (Oppokov) once again objected to Lenin's peremptory demand that the German terms be accepted and peace signed at once. Trotsky opposed the signing of the peace and declared that in view of his disagreement with Lenin's stand he was resigning from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Sverdlov, Zinoviev and Sokolnikov favoured signing the peace. In his first speech, Stalin proposed that the peace talks should be resumed and added that "peace does not have to be signed". Following Lenin's criticism of his stand, he spoke out in favour of signing the peace at once. Lenin, Stasova, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Smilga voted for the immediate signing of the peace; Bubnov, Uritsky, Bukharin and Lomov (Oppokov) voted against, and Trotsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky and Joffe abstained. After the vote, the group of Left Communists—Bukharin, Lomov, Bubnov, Pyatakov, Yakovleva and Uritsky—announced that they were resigning from their responsible Party and government posts, reserving the right to conduct agitation inside and outside the Party. p. 479

[563] The telegram from V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko of February 26, 1918 stating the content of his talks with a delegation of the Little Army Council of the Don forces, which raised the question of autonomy for the Don region with the right of independently solving the land question. p. 483

[564] *Fourth* (*Extraordlnary*) *All-Russia Conference of Soviets* was held in Moscow from March 14 to 16, 1918. It was called to decide on the ratification of the Brest Peace Treaty. On the eve of the Congress, on March 13, the Bolshevik group of the Congress met to hear Lenin's report on the treaty (see *Lenin Miscellany XI*, Second Edition, 1931, pp. 68-70). A preliminary vote in the group yielded the following results: 453 votes for Lenin's motion to ratify the Brest Treaty; 36, against; 8, abstained.

On March 14, Lenin gave his report on the ratification of the peace treaty at the Congress. B. Kamkov, on behalf of the Left

S.R.s, was the rapporteur against ratification. By a roll call vote the Congress passed Lenin's resolution (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 200-01): 784, in favour; 261, against; 115, abstained, including the Left Communists who read out a special declaration on the motives of their abstention. p. 484

[565] A reference to the example Lenin gave in his summing-up speech at the Seventh Congress: "... two men are walking together and are attacked by ten men, one fights and the other runs away—that is treachery; but suppose we have two armies of a hundred thousand each and there are five armies against them; one army is surrounded by two hundred thousand and the other must go to its aid; knowing that the other three hundred thousand of the enemy are in ambush, should the second army go to the aid of the first? It should not" (see present edition, Vol. 27, p. 114). p. 484

[566] The results of the vote on the motion to ratify the Brest Peace Treaty at a meeting of the Communist group of the Fourth (Extraordinary) All-Russia Congress of Soviets on March 13, 1918. See Note 564. p. 485

[567] A reply to a telegram from the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the Turkestan Territory held in Tashkent from April 20 to May 1, 1918. The Congress sent greetings to the Council of People's Commissars and welcomed its correct national policy. The main item on its agenda was the question of autonomy for the territory. The Congress adopted a decision to set up a commission for the convocation of a constituent congress of Soviets of the Turkestan Territory to define the frontiers and the sphere of competence of Turkestan's autonomy. p. 486

[568] A reference to the forthcoming *Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets* which opened in Moscow on July 4, 1918. Y. M. Sverdlov reported on the activity of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and Lenin, on the work of the Council of People's Commissars. On these reports the Congress adopted a resolution motioned by the Communist group, expressing complete approval of the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Government". It rejected a resolution motioned by the Left S.R.s voicing no confidence in the Soviet Government and proposing to scrap the Brest Peace Treaty and to change the Soviet Government's foreign and domestic policies. The Congress adjourned in view of the counter-revolutionary revolt started by the Left S.R.s in Moscow on July 6 and re-assembled on July 9. Having heard the government's report on the events of July 6 and 7, the Congress fully approved its resolute action in stamping out the criminal venture of the Left S.R.s.

The Congress discussed the reports on the food question and the organisation of the Red Army, and concluded its work by

adopting the first Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. which gave legislative form to the gains of the Soviet working people. p. 487

[569] A reference is to the mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps, which was formed in Russia before the October Revolution from among Czechs and Slovaks who had been taken prisoner as soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army. Under an agreement of March 26, 1918, the Soviet Government allowed the corps to leave Russia via Vladivostok, provided the corps handed in its arms and removed Russian officers from its command posts. But in late May, on instructions from, and with the support of, the imperialists of the U.S.A., Britain and France, the counter-revolutionary command of the corps provoked mutiny against the Soviet power. They operated in close contact with the whiteguards and the kulaks and occupied a considerable part of the Urals, the Volga area, and Siberia, everywhere restoring the power of the bourgeoisie. Whiteguard governments, with the participation of the Mensheviks and S.R.s, were set up in the areas occupied by the corps.

Many soldiers of the corps came to realise that they had been duped by their counter-revolutionary command and went over to the side of the Red Army, refusing to fight against Soviet Russia. About 12,000 Czechs and Slovaks fought in the ranks of the Red Army.

In the autumn of 1918 the Volga area was liberated by the Red Army; the whiteguard Czechs were routed in 1919 simultaneously with the rout of Kolchak. p. 488

[570] Lenin's directive was to block the advance of the whiteguard army towards Tsaritsyn. In mid-July, Tikhoretskaya railway station was taken by the whiteguards, but their further advance was halted by the Red Army, which had swiftly re-formed and organised, on Lenin's instructions, reliable protection of the road to Tsaritsyn. p. 488

[571] A reference to the report of the chairman of the Penza Gubernia Party Committee, Yevgenia Bosch, on the state of affairs in the gubernia.

On August 5, 1918, a kulak revolt broke out in Kuchkino Volost, of Penza Uyezd, and soon spread to neighbouring volosts. By means of deceit and coercion, the kulaks managed to recruit many middle and even poor peasants. It was stamped out in Penza Uyezd on August 8, but the situation in the gubernia remained tense. A Left S.R. revolt started in the uyezd centre of Chembar on the night of August 18. The Penza leaders did not take sufficiently vigorous action to suppress the counter-revolutionary revolts. Lenin sent several telegrams to Penza demanding resolute measures in fighting the kulaks. p. 489

[572] A reference to the Board for the Issue of State Papers which printed banknotes and stamps. It was evacuated from Petrograd to Penza. p. 489

[573] M. S. Kedrov's departure for Moscow coincided with the start of the offensive by the Entente interventionist troops in the direction of Vologda and Kotlas.

Lenin proposed that the defence of Kotlas should be organised at all costs, because there were large stocks of explosives there, and accordingly sent a demolition group to prepare their blast off at the critical moment. Lenin ordered the commander of the Moscow district, N. I. Muralov, to find the heavy artillery battery sent from Moscow to the Urals and place it at the disposal of M. S. Kedrov.

The Red Army held Kotlas—and its war stocks—and this was of great importance for the outcome of the civil war in the North. p. 491

[574] The decision of the Council of People's Commissars on reports by the People's Commissariats was adopted at its sitting of August 29, 1918, and had been written by Lenin at the sitting itself. p. 493

[575] The letter of G. Gulov, a Red Army man of peasant stock, was published in *Izvestia* No. 24, February 2, 1919. Gulov quoted his talks with middle peasants and said that they were still "not clear about the status of the middle peasant and the attitude of the Communist Party to him". He asked Lenin to explain to Communists "who the middle peasant was and what assistance he would be able to render our socialist government, given the right approach to him". For a detailed explanation of the Party's attitude to the middle peasantry, see Lenin's report on work in the countryside, which he gave at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on March 23, 1919, and the resolution of the Congress on the attitude to the middle peasants (see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 198-215 and 217-20). p. 500

[576] After the October Revolution, Trotsky for a time formally accepted the Party's policy on the peasant question, and he follows this line in his letter to middle peasants, which Lenin mentions. In saying that he had no differences with Trotsky on current policy in the peasant question, Lenin did not touch upon his differences with Trotsky on the basic, principled problems of the socialist revolution and socialist construction in connection with Trotsky's "theory of permanent revolution", which was fundamentally erroneous and politically harmful. While Lenin and the Party worked on the premise that, given a correct policy in respect of the middle peasants, and a sound alliance between the working class and the peasantry, socialist society could be built in Russia, Trotsky denied the possibility of socialism winning out in one country, and spoke of an inevitable clash between the proletariat and the peasantry. In 1923, in his theses for the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), Trotsky put forward the slogan of a "dictatorship of industry", which meant the development of industry through the exploitation of the peasantry. This policy would have broken up the alliance of the working class and the peas-

antry and ruined the Soviet system. In subsequent years, Trotsky openly opposed Lenin's plan for the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union and the Party's policy and openly waged a counter-revolutionary struggle against the Soviet power. The Communist Party routed Trotskyism and other defeatist trends, secured a sound alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry and brought the Soviet people to the victory of socialism. p. 500

[577] The notes may have been written by Lenin at a sitting of the Council of People's Commissars on March 8, 1919, during the discussion of the question of reorganising state control. Lenin's directions, briefly stated in these notes, were taken as the basis for the C.P.C. decision of March 8, 1919, on the reorganisation of state control. It stressed the need to amend the draft decree by adding the following points:

"a) Systematic participation of workers' organisations; b) systematic participation of witnesses from among proletarian elements; c) inspection raids and other revolutionary measures to eliminate red tape; d) exact delimitation of rights and duties in respect of other Commissariats; e) strict demarcation of inspection and control functions from auditing functions which are to remain with the Commissariats Concerned."

The revised decree with Lenin's amendments was approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on April 2, 1919 and published in *Izvestia* No. 79, April 12, 1919 (see *Sobraniye Uzakoneny i Rasporyazheny Raboche-Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* [Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government] No. 12, April 24, 1919). p. 508

[578] L. B. Kamenev was then the representative of the Council of Defence at the Southern Front. Lenin sent the telegram to him in connection with the news that Lugansk had been taken by the whiteguards on May 4, 1919. p. 508

[579] In view of the worsening of the position of the Red Army forces on the Southern Front, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) decided in early May 1919 to mobilise at least 20,000 workers in the Ukraine to strengthen the armies on the Southern Front. The C.C. directive of May 9, 1919 said: "The figure of 20,000 is to be taken as a minimum, and a fortnight as the maximum to save our position on the Southern Front. The work must be conducted with exceptional energy. Cable at once about all measures you take. Every three days cable the C.C. on the results achieved."

On May 16, 1919, the Kharkov Chief Coal Board asked Lenin that all miners be exempted from the draft. In reply, Lenin sent the telegram in question the same day. p. 510

[580] A note written by Lenin in connection with the following fact. The Office of the Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars received complaints from peasants F. Romanov (Yaroslavl Gubernia) and I. Kalinin (Moscow Gubernia) that the local

authorities had wrongfully confiscated horses. The complaints were sent to a special commission dealing with such cases and were returned to the Council of People's Commissars with the remark, "Too busy to deal with such trifles", which so outraged Lenin. p. 511

[581] A possible reference to the resolution of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on September 21 and 26, 1919, on the mobilisation of Communists and the dispatch of the best members of the Party and the working class to the Southern Front; a circular issued by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) as a follow up to the September decisions stating the need to gear the whole state apparatus to the defeat of the Denikin army; and a letter of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Moscow, Kaluga, Tula, and Ryazan gubernia, and the Sychov, Gzhatsk, Vyazma and Yukhnov uyezd Party committees. p. 515

[582] P. F. Okhrimenko tells of the following circumstances. In late autumn of 1919 he arrived in Moscow from Kamenka in the Ukraine, which had been taken by the whiteguards. At the time, he had translated a revolutionary poem by E. Carpenter, which was published in *Pravda* No. 250, November 7, 1919. M. I. Ulyanova was then Secretary of the *Pravda* Editorial Board. When Okhrimenko came to collect his remuneration, he told her of his plight. She heard him with great attention and asked him to call again the next day. When he did, she handed him this note from Lenin. Soon he was provided with all the things he needed. p. 516

[583] Written on the following occasion: on December 13, 1919, telegram No. 927 was sent by the Central Board of State Associations of Machine-Building Plants to the Council of Defence asking that the Kulebaki and Vyksa factories should be supplied with fodder in connection with their work on defence orders. They said that their exercise of the right of procuring fodder on their own had been futile because of red tape in the Commissariat for Food and the unfriendly attitude and arbitrary action on the part of local gubernia food committees.

Having examined the request on December 17, 1919, the Council of Defence 1) adopted a decision on measures to assure the said factories of fodder and 2) instructed D. I. Kursky to draft an additional circular concerning the undeviating fulfilment of the laws passed by the Sixth Congress of Soviets with a popular explanation which Kursky was to submit for the next sitting of the Council of People's Commissars. His draft submitted to the Council on December 23 already included all of Lenin's additions proposed in his note to Kursky.

On December 23, 1919, the draft was examined by the Council of People's Commissars, which decided: to circulate the draft to the commissars for their opinion and, in the absence of objections, to submit it to Lenin for signature. The decree was signed

on December 30, 1919 (see *Sobraniye Uzakoneny*... No. 1-2 for 1920). p. 517

584 *Council of Defence* (*Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence*) was formed under a decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 30, 1918, to direct the defence of the Soviet Republic. The decision set before the Council the task of implementing the All-Russia C.E.C. decree of September 2, 1918, which declared the Soviet Republic a military camp, and instituting a military regime in transport and food supply, and also in the war industry. It was vested with full powers in mobilising men and resources for defence. The Council directed the supply of the front with reinforcements, arms, food and clothes.

Lenin was at the head of the Council, on which were representatives of the All-Russia C.E.C., the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the Extraordinary Commission for Supplies, the People's Commissariat for Communications, the People's Commissariat for Food, and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.

In early April 1920, following the elimination of the main fronts, the Council of Defence was transformed into the Council of Labour and Defence, and on December 29, 1920, with the Civil War over, the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets turned it into a commission of the Council of People's Commissars, in which capacity it operated until the end of 1937. p. 517

585 Written in addition to an earlier one sent to Kursky (see p. 517). It gives instructions on the nature of the article for the newspaper *Bednota* (The Poor). However, the paper did not carry any article on combating red tape. p. 518

586 The meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions was called on March 15, 1920, to discuss the theses of M. P. Tomsky on the tasks of the trade unions, published in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life) No. 54, March 10, 1920. They had been discussed beforehand by a commission set up by the group, but it had retained all the principled propositions of the theses. The author held that industrial enterprises should be run on collective lines and said so in his theses. This was supported by the majority of the group. At the meeting of the group, Lenin spoke several times, making amendments and criticising various points of the theses, and supporting the principle of one-man management. p. 520

587 In view of the fact that no generally accepted type of management for Soviet enterprises had crystallised, various combinations were allowed while the process was on, namely: 1) the enterprise is headed by an executive from among the workers, who has a specialist engineer for an assistant; 2) the enterprise is headed by a specialist engineer, who is the actual manager of the enterprise, and he has a worker commissar with broad powers and the

duty to deal with every aspect of the business; 3) the enterprise is headed by a specialist director, with one or two Communist assistants with powers and the duty to look into every branch of management but without the right to rescind the director's instructions; and 4) the enterprise is headed by a small well-knit group whose chairman is responsible for the work of the group as a whole. This form of organisation in industry was adopted by the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*.... Part One, 1954, p. 483). p. 523

588 In connection with the mass applications by German workers, technicians and engineers to settle in Soviet Russia and work there, the Soviet Government broadcast an announcement on March 16, 1920, that special delegations should be sent out to find out about living conditions for the settlers. In an additional broadcast on May 6, 1920, it once again stressed the need to make a study beforehand of the economic conditions of life in Soviet Russia, since foreign workers who settled in Russia would receive no more wages than Russian workers.

Copies of these broadcasts with a note by Lenin were sent by deputy chairman of the Supreme Economic Council Milyutin to the People's Commissariat for Labour, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and members of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council as a brief for negotiations. Contracts were valid only when the pledge specified by Lenin was signed.

However, because the talks conducted by these agencies on the resettlement of German workers were slow, Lenin had to write another note to Milyutin (see p. 524). p. 525

589 A reference to the experiments of S. I. Botin, who was working on the problem of distance controlled blasts with the aid of electromagnetic waves. Lenin realised the great importance of this in conditions of the Civil War and foreign intervention, and devoted much attention to and concern for the inventor.

The "expert" in this case is A. M. Nikolayev, a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraph in 1918-24, and chairman of the Radio Council. In the summer of 1920, Nikolayev was seconded, on Lenin's assignment, to work with S. I. Botin as a specialist and attorney for the inventor's secrets. p. 526

590 The book by the American revolutionary Socialist, Daniel De Leon, *Two Pages from Roman History*, New York, 1920. There was no Russian edition of the book. p. 528

591 A. I. Yelizarova tells the following: "This was in the autumn of 1920. Since that January, my department, under a decision of the Council of People's Commissars, had been transferred from the People's Commissariat for Social Security to the People's Commissariat for Education. I hesitated to move with it at once: I

was afraid that I would not be able to work with the People's Commissariat for Education—because of the differences on some points—especially after the sudden appointment as my deputy of a total stranger from the Commissariat for Education in place of one of my associates. Vladimir Ilyich suggested that I give it a try, and if things didn't work out and I failed to establish a working arrangement with this person, then I could make an effort to get another deputy. In fact things did not work out...." She informed Lenin of this and he handed her the note at a sitting of the Council of People's Commissars (A. I. Yelizarova, "A Page from Reminiscences about Vladimir Ilyich in the Council of People's Commissars". *Vospominaniya o V. I. Lenine. Ch. 2* [Reminiscences of Lenin. Part Two], 1957, pp. 293-94). p. 529

592 Sent to the Petrograd Economic Council, factory managements and factory trade union committees in Petrograd (Baltic, Metal, Obukhov, Siemens-Schuckert, Dumeau, Severny Cable, and the Arsenal), and also to the Electrical and Metal Departments of the Supreme Economic Council, the Moscow plants of Dynamo and Izolyator, and the Kolchugino Works. p. 531

593 Written on N. K. Krupskaya's theses, "On Polytechnical Education", which she drew up for a report at a Party conference on public education called by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B) directly after the Eighth Congress of Soviets on December 31, 1920. The task of the conference was to prepare material on "organising education in the Republic" for the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). Lenin kept in touch with the work of the conference, which was to hear N. K. Krupskaya's report on polytechnical education, but she did not give it because she fell ill. p. 532

594 *G. F. Grinko*—People's Commissar for Education in the Ukraine, who put forward his own scheme for public education. It was based on two principles: 1) for children under 15 there was to be a "single system of social education, with all organisational forms (nursery schools, children's homes, seven-year schools, etc.) on labour lines, and 2) after the age of 15 there was to be "special training in some sphere of production or organisational group (industrial, agricultural, economic, etc.)".

This scheme clashed with the programme of the R.C.P.(B.) in the sphere of public education: "1) Free and universal general, polytechnical education (giving an idea of the theory and practice of all the main branches of production) for children of both sexes until the age of 17.... 8) Broad network of occupational education for persons from the age of 17 linked up with polytechnical knowledge" (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, pp. 419-20).

O. Y. Schmidt, who was then deputy chairman of the Chief Administration for Vocational Training, favoured, like Grinko, technical vocational training for young people "at an earlier age ... that is, from 15". He argued that the "interests of production, the interests of economic development imperatively demanded

a reduction of the so-called general educational, and actually the purely verbal, school and a transition to concrete, special instruction as early as possible". Schmidt tried to turn a makeshift measure, caused by the difficulties of the transition period, into a principle, and wrote articles in the press arguing in favour of monotechnical instead of polytechnical education, that is, training in some branch of production. For a criticism of these views, see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 123-25. p. 534

[595] Lenin's Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus Grain Appropriation System was given at the 14th sitting of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on March 15, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 214-28). The Congress adopted a decision to substitute a tax in kind for the requisitioning of surplus food and to pass from the policy of War Communism to the New Economic Policy (NEP). The decision of the Congress on NEP ensured the sound economic alliance between the working class and the peasantry for the construction of socialism. p. 535

[596] A reference to Lenin's book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, 1918, p. 102 (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 305-06). p 535

[597] A reference to the counter-revolutionary mutiny in Kronstadt which broke out on February 28, 1921. It was organised by the S.R.s, Mensheviks and whiteguards and involved a sizable section of the Kronstadt sailors, most of whom were new recruits from the countryside, were politically undeveloped and voiced the peasants' discontent with the surplus food requisitioning. The mutiny was facilitated by the economic difficulties in the Soviet state and the weakening of the Bolshevik organisation in Kronstadt.

The counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, not daring to come out openly against the Soviet system, resorted to a new tactic: to deceive the masses, the leaders of the mutiny put forward the slogan of "Soviets without the Communists", in the hope of getting the Communists out of the leadership in the Soviets, destroying the Soviet system and restoring the capitalist system in the country.

On March 2, the mutineers arrested the naval command. They established contacts with foreign imperialists, who promised them financial and military aid. The seizure of Kronstadt by the mutineers created a direct threat to Petrograd.

The Soviet Government sent Red Army units under the command of M. N. Tukhachevsky to suppress the mutiny. The Communist Party sent more than 300 delegates of the Tenth Party Congress with military experience, headed by Kliment Voroshilov, to storm Kronstadt. On March 18, the uprising was liquidated.

[598] Committees of landless and land-starved peasants in the Ukraine, set up in 1920 to defend the interests of the poor and middle peasants. Dissolved in 1933. p. 535

599 At the Tenth Congress Lenin motioned the proposal to annul the resolution of the Ninth Congress on the attitude to the co-operatives, because it was based on the surplus food appropriation principle, and the Tenth Congress had adopted a resolution substituting it by a tax in kind. The Tenth Congress adopted Lenin's resolution on the co-operatives (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 229-32 and *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, p. 564). p. 536

600 A reference to the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence of February 28, 1921, allocating 10 million gold rubles on the purchase of food and prime necessities abroad. On Lenin's proposal, the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) passed a resolution on improving the condition of workers and poor peasants (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, p. 565). p. 536

601 A reference to the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, "On the Levy of a Tax in Kind on Rural Entrepreneurs in the Form of a Deduction of a Portion of Their Farm Produce", of October 30, 1918, published in *Izvestia* No. 248, November 14, 1918. p. 537

602 For the Tenth Congress of the Party, P. Popov used material of the Central Statistical Board to write a pamphlet on the question of the tax and the requisitioning under the title *Grain Production of the Soviet and Federated Republics* (*Grain Output*). Lenin quoted it in his report (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 227). p. 537

603 An apparent reference to the non-fulfilment by Petrograd organs of the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence of January 28, 1921, on "Bonuses to Industrial and Office Workers Engaged in the Making of Electric Ploughs" (see *Istorichesky Arkhiv* [Historical Archives], 1956, No. 4, p. 18).

L. M. Mikhailov was chairman of the commission set up under the Petrograd Soviet with the task of distributing orders for electric ploughs among the Petrograd plants and organising their production. p. 540

604 The note was in reply to a letter from S. G. Said-Galiev, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, who raised four questions:

"1. Is there need for the existence of small autonomous republics within the Russian Soviet Federation in general, and of the Tatar Republic in particular?

"2. If the answer is 'yes', then for how long, or, in other words, until the fulfilment of what tasks or the attainment of what goals?

"3. Is it right to say that the Communists of the formerly dominant nation, as having a higher level in every respect, should play the part of pedagogues and nurses to the Communists and all other working people of the formerly oppressed nationalities whose name has been given to the said autonomous republic (region

commune), and that the former should give up their places to the latter as they grow?

"4. In all autonomous republics, the Tatar Republic in this case, there are two clearly distinct trends (groupings) among the native Communists (Tatars): one of them takes the standpoint of class struggle and works for further class differentiation of the sections of the native population, and the other has a shade of petty-bourgeois nationalism....

"Is it right ... that the former should enjoy the full and all-round support of the whole of the R.C.P.(B.) and its supreme organs, whereas the latter (insofar as they are sincere and have a burning desire to work for the proletarian revolution and insofar as they are useful because of their work) should merely be made use of and simultaneously educated in a spirit of pure internationalism, without, however, being given preference over the former, as has been recently the case not only in the Tatar Republic?" p. 541

605 Written in the margin of a report by the representative of the Council of Labour and Defence on the Petrograd electric plough commission, V. I. Ugrimov, concerning the state of work at the plants engaged in fulfilling the orders of the commission. p. 542

606 *Extraordinary Commission for Exports* under the Council of Labour and Defence was formed on August 10, 1921, to help the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in building up an export stock and concentrating it in its hands. The Commission consisted of representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Food. p. 543

607 *R. E. Klasson* (1868-1926)—an outstanding electrical engineer, specialising in hydropeat extraction, who introduced a number of inventions in the industry. p. 544

608 A reference to the item entitled "Order for Hydroturbines in Sweden", carried by *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 194, September 2, 1921, saying that the power section of the State Planning Commission was told, during its discussion of conclusions on a project for turbine installations, worked out for the Volkhov and Svir construction sites, that the order for hydroturbines could be placed with the Swedish plant of Nydqvist och Holms, which was at the complete disposal of the Soviet Government as of July 1, 1921. At that time, its large turbine department was idle for lack of orders. Speakers at the sitting noted that because of delay in placing the order, the turbine department of the plant was being run at a loss. The power section decided to take steps to place the order at once and to raise this matter at the next sitting of the Council of People's Commissars through the Presidium of the State Planning Commission. Lenin's intervention speeded up the solution of this question. p. 544

[609] *V. A. Mikhels*—a journalist who wrote the item "Destitute Billionaires", pointing to the crying disorder at the warehouses in Lizino station of the Moscow-Kazan Railway, where 2.5 million poods of metal, costly machines, equipment and tools had not been inventoried and were lying in the open.

Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council P. A. Bogdanov sent Lenin (in reply to his letter of September 15) a report from the chief of the State Warehouse Administration under the Supreme Economic Council, I. K. Yezhov, who complained of a shortage of warehouse space, multiplicity of authority, and a struggle for warehouse space between various departments. For Lenin's reply to Yezhov's report, see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 523-24. p. 546

[610] The Fuel Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence, which was headed by Lenin, decided on September 30, 1921 that G. I. Krumin was to "work out the question of improving the business of publication in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* of reports on the fuel operations of the Central Timber Board, as a matter of priority, and to submit to the Council, within a week, a draft decree, which he was to show Lenin beforehand" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). The draft submitted by Krumin apparently did not satisfy Lenin, and he wrote the document which served as a draft for the C.L.D. decision of October 7. p. 547

[611] A reference to the sitting of the Council of Labour and Defence on October 14, 1921, to discuss the report of the Chief Transport Commission of the Council for June-August 1921. It said that there was a sharp drop in labour productivity in railway and water transport shops because of food and money difficulties and shortage of most materials and spare parts supplied by the transport plants of the Supreme Economic Council.

The reference is to A. A. Troyanovsky, chairman of the Council's commission to organise the warehouse business, which was set up on October 14, 1921. p. 548

[612] *Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Workers* was held in Moscow from October 17 to 22, 1921. It was attended by 310 delegates. Lenin's report was given at the end of the afternoon sitting on October 17, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 60-80). p. 549

[613] The date of the decree on the establishment of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Abolition of Illiteracy. It was set up under the People's Commissariat for Education and its five members were approved by the Council of People's Commissars. It had a standing conference of representatives from the department for work in the countryside under the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the department for work among women under the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), the Central Committee

of the Russian Young Communist League, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Universal Education Board (see *Izvestia* No. 162, July 24, 1920). p. 549

[614] Written during the preparations for the Ninth Congress of Soviets which discussed the question of measures to build up and develop agriculture. Lease of land was prohibited under the legislation then in force (Decree on Land adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets and the Law on the Socialisation of Land). The transition to NEP and the need to take steps to strengthen and develop peasant farming raised the question of allowing some lease of land. The Ninth Congress discussed it and adopted a relevant decision. Only labour and short-term lease of land was allowed under the Land Code of the R.S.F.S.R. adopted by the Fourth Session of the Ninth All-Russia Central Executive Committee in October 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 392).

Concessions in agriculture were governed by special legislation.

[615] Written in connection with the discussion of the tactics of a united working-class front. Initially the question was discussed by the Party's Central Committee on December 1, 1921, which approved the line of joint action with workers in the Second, the Two-and-a-Half and the Amsterdam Internationals. It was dealt within a special (19th) paragraph of the theses "On the United Working-Class Front and the Attitude to Workers in the Second, the Two-and-a-Half, and the Amsterdam Internationals, and also to Workers Supporting Anarcho-Syndicalist Organisations". The theses were adopted by the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and the Eleventh All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) (December 19-22, 1921) acceded to them. A more detailed discussion of the theses was held by the first enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee (February 21-March 4), which adopted them. They were endorsed by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern.

For the above-mentioned Paragraph 19, see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*..., Part One, 1954, pp. 585-86). p. 552

[616] The reference is evidently to the Fourth Duma. p. 553

[617] *First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies* was held from June 3 to 24 (June 16 to July 7), 1917. p. 553

[618] The numerical proportion of the votes of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., where 20 Bolshevik delegates had 24 votes, and the Mensheviks—following the withdrawal of 2 *Rabocheye Dyelo* delegates and 5 Bundists, who supported them—20 votes, a total of 44. p. 553

[619] A reference to the Bolshevik Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P held in London in April and May 1905, and the parallel conference of Mensheviks in Geneva. p. 553

[620] A reference to the distribution of votes at the Fourth (Stockholm, "Unity") Congress and the Fifth (London) Congress of the Party, that is, the period when the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks were formally members of the same party, with a single Central Committee and regular conferences, etc.

Of the 112 delegates with vote at the Fourth Congress, the Bolsheviks had 46, the Mensheviks, 62, and the rest belonged to non-factional Social-Democrats. The Mensheviks had a small edge and so the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions on some questions. In his Appeal to the Party on the question of this Congress Lenin wrote:

"We must and shall fight ideologically against those decisions of the Congress which we regard as erroneous. But at the same time we declare to the whole Party that we are opposed to a split of any kind. We stand for submission to the decisions of the Congress....

"We call upon all our fellow-thinkers to accept such submission and such ideological struggle." (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 314). However, the Congress decision on Party unity remained on paper, for the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks kept to their respective views and retained their separate organisations.

Of the 336 delegates with vote at the Fifth Congress, the Bolsheviks had 105, the Mensheviks 97, the Bundists 57, the Polish Social-Democrats 44, the Lettish Social-Democrats 29, and "non-Party" delegates 4. The Bolsheviks had the Poles and the Latvians with them, and so commanded a stable majority. On all questions of principle the Congress passed Bolshevik resolutions. The Congress elected a Central Committee consisting of five Bolsheviks, 4 Mensheviks, 2 Polish and 1 Lettish Social-Democrats. Candidate members included 10 Bolsheviks, 7 Mensheviks, 3 Poles and 2 Latvians.

The Congress marked a major victory for Bolshevism over the Party's opportunist wing, the Mensheviks. For details on the Fifth Congress, gee Lenin's article "The Attitude towards Bourgeois Parties", present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 489-509. p. 553

[621] The miscellany *Marxism and Liquidationism*, published in 1914, gave figures on the workers' collections for various purposes by supporters of the Bolsheviks and of the liquidators. These figures proved that the majority of workers rallied round the Bolsheviks. Collections in aid of strikers at various factories and in various industries, for persons who had been victimised, and for various other needs of the working-class movement, carried through the Duma groups of the Bolsheviks and the liquidators, reached the following figures for the period from October 1913 to June 6, 1914 (according to reports in Bolshevik and liquidators' papers): through the Bolshevik group, 12,891.24 rubles (number of

workers' groups, 1,295); through the liquidators' group, 6,114.87 rubles (number of workers' groups, 215); the Bolsheviks received only 6 per cent from non-workers, and the liquidators, 46 per cent. The number of group collections by workers for the working-class press was distributed as follows (by May 1914): for the Bolshevik papers (*Pravda* and *Rabochy Put*) roughly 6,000 and for the liquidators' newspaper (*Luch*) a total of 1,500 (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 381-87). p. 554

[622] A reference to the proportion of votes polled by the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks during the election to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917. For details, see Lenin's article "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (present edition, Vol. 30, p. 254). p. 554

[623] In October and November 1921, the case of red tape in the manufacture of the ploughs was repeatedly on the agenda of the Council of Labour and Defence. The collegium of the Metal Department of the Supreme Economic Council, which was instructed by the Presidium of the Council in May 1920 to manufacture the ploughs, displayed impermissible laxity and irresponsibility which doomed the programme from the outset. The Extraordinary Three-Man Committee set up to co-ordinate the operations took an extremely formal attitude to the task, and confined itself to the writing of reports and all sorts of correspondence between the departments. Its members did not have the courage to inform their superiors that the plan could not be fulfilled and that it was no use wasting money. It failed to inform either the Council of Labour and Defence or the Council of People's Commissars of the state of affairs. At great cost over a period of almost two years, five experimental ploughs were manufactured out of a planned total of 2,000. The case was referred to the Moscow Military Tribunal, which in early January 1922 ruled that there was substance in the charges against the officials of the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Agriculture to the effect that they had been derelict in their duties, but, in view of their previous record in rehabilitating the economy, decided to forgo punishment. In addition, on the proposal of the tribunal, the Council of Labour and Defence issued an administrative rebuke to the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture for their insufficiently serious attitude to the manufacture of the Fowler ploughs (see Lenin's letter to Bogdanov on December 23, 1921 in this volume, pp. 556-58). p. 555

[624] Members of the collegium of the Metal Department of the Supreme Economic Council. p. 558

[625] *M. I. Unksov*—an engineer, in charge of the Machine Cultivation Department of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, and chairman of the Extraordinary Three-Man Committee for the manufacture of the Fowler ploughs. p. 558

[626] *P. P. Ilyin*—chief of the Fourth State Motor Works, and its former owner. The plant was given part of the plough order but failed to fulfil it. p. 558

[627] A reference to the following telegram published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on February 3, 1922: "Hanover, January 31 (Radio). The International Metalworkers' Federation has proposed to the Commission for the Convocation of an International Workers' Congress due to open in Rome on April 21, that a general strike of the organised workers should be declared in the event of the outbreak of war. The Metalworkers' Federation has elected a special commission for the vigorous propaganda of its proposal." This decision was taken by the Vienna conference of the Executive Committee of the International Metalworkers' Federation, which was affiliated to the reformist Amsterdam International of Trade Unions. The latter existed from 1919 to 1945. p. 559

[628] Written in reply to A. D. Tsyurupa's objections to Lenin's proposal on a draft directive to the Narrow Council (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 540). p. 568

[629] *Potemkin villages*—an early 19th-century expression denoting window-dressing. During a tour of the south of Russia by the Empress Catherine II in 1787, the Governor-General of the Yekaterinoslav Vicegerency, G. A. Potemkin, gave her the impression of exceptional welfare among the population by stage-mounting various decorative villages, arches, parks, etc. p. 567

[630] Differences on organisation appeared among workers in consumers' co-operative societies in early 1922. There was the question of separating workers' co-operatives from the rest, and this was generally accepted among the leadership and rank-and-file co-operators. One of them, Tikhomirov, informed Lenin of this mood, and was sent the present note in reply. p. 569

[631] The MS. of a book by I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, *The Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Transitional Phase of the World Economy*, which he prepared under an assignment from Lenin.

It was published in March 1922 with Lenin's introduction. p. 570

[632] H. Cunow's book, *Ursprung der Religion und des Gottesglaubens*, Published in Germany in 1913 and translated by Skvortsov-Stepanov into Russian in 1919. That same year it was issued by Kommunist Publishers under the title *The Origin of Religion and Belief in God.* p. 570

[633] A reference to a table from the book by Dr. G. Respondek, *Weltwirtschaftlicher Stand und Aufgaben der Elektroindustrie*, Berlin. 1920, cited by Skvortsov-Stepanov on p. 97 to show the level of electrification of some industries in the United States. Lenin

questioned the figure of 1,585,953 given under the head of "HP Requirements" for the textile industry, electrical engineering and foundries and machine-building plants.

In explaining why the figure was the same for these branches, Skvortsov-Stepanov said in a note to the table: "These figures are dubious because of their absolute equality. The table has been taken from Respondek's book, p. 3. He himself is a sufficiently careful writer. He must have taken these data from American sources which are not always precise." p. 570

[634] Lenin's introduction to Skvortsov-Stepanov's book, *The Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Transitional Phase of the World Economy*, Gosizdat, 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 245-46). p. 570

[635] The notes for a political report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 263-309). p. 571

[636] A reference to Lenin's speech on the international and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic at a meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Congress of Metalworkers, March 6, 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 212-26). p. 571

[637] *Smena Vekh* (Change of Landmarks)—a collection of counter-revolutionary articles, issued in Prague in July 1921. Its authors (N. V. Ustryalov, Y. V. Klyuchnikov, Y. N. Potekhin, S. S. Lukyanov, A. V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, and S. S. Chakhotin) were representatives of intellectuals from the anti-Soviet whiteguard camp. They had come to realise that it was hopeless to try to overthrow the Soviet power with the aid of foreign armed intervention and were hoping that the Soviet state would evolve round to their views. p. 571

[638] A reference to the book by Alexander Todorsky, *A Year with Rifle and Plough*, issued by the Vesyegonsk Uyezd Executive Committee in 1918. Lenin's article, "A Little Picture in Illustration of Big Problems" (see present edition, Vol. 28, p. 387), contains a quotation from the book in a copy of which (p. 62) he underlined it. This copy is now at the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 572

[639] For details, see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 292-94. p. 572

[640] A reference to the incident from Lenin's law practice, which he related in the political report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Eleventh Party Congress (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 294-95). p. 572

[641] A. D. Tsyurupa was ill and unable to take part in the work of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. p. 580

[642] A reference to O. A. Yermansky's book *The Taylor System and Scientific Organisation of Labour*, Gosizdat, 1922. For Lenin' s review of the book, see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 368. p. 581

[643] N. N. Krestinsky was then R.S.F.S.R. Ambassador to Germany. p. 581

[644] L. M. Khinchuk's book *Central Union of Consumers' Societies in Conditions of the New Economic Policy*, referred to by Lenin, was published by the All-Russia Central Union of Consumers' Societies in late 1922. The author took account of Lenin's remarks and inserted some of them in the final text. p. 583

[645] The plan for Lenin's report "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution", which he read in German at the morning sitting of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 418-32). p. 585

[646] Lenin was named the chief rapporteur in the list of speakers on the question of "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution", but in view of his prolonged illness (from May 26 to October 2, 1922), he was unable to give a big report on the whole subject, which is why he intended to make a short introductory speech to the debate on one aspect of the subject, namely, the question of NEP. p. 585

[647] A reference to the quotation from Lenin's article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 334-35). He must have taken it from the pamphlet *The Main Task of Our Day*; "*Left-Wing*" *Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality* (published by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies, 1918, p. 16). A copy of the pamphlet, with the underlined passages mentioned by Lenin in the plan of his report and in the report at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, is now at the Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 585

[648] See present edition, Vol. 27, p. 336. p. 585

[649] A reference to the resolution "On the Organisational Structure of the Communist Parties, and on the Methods and Content of Their Activities", adopted by the Third Congress of the Com-

intern in 1921. For Lenin's detailed statement on the resolution, see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 430-32. p. 586

[650] Lenin wrote the outline of his proposed speech at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in the first half of December 1922. On the matter of the speech Lenin wrote to J. V. Stalin for members of the Central Committee on December 15 (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 460). But because of his poor health, Lenin was unable to speak at the Congress. p. 588

[651] The data given by Lenin are a reflection of the lag of prices behind the money circulation between June and November 1920 (by 16 per cent), 1921 (50 per cent) and 1922 (60 percent). This was evidence of the stabilisation of the ruble and apparently served to confirm Point 8 of the outline "Finance. Small Step Forward".

Lenin must have taken the data from L. N. Kritsman's introduction to a collection entitled, *Along New Paths. The Results of the New Economic Policy for 1921 and 1922* (Issue II, *Finance. Works Edited by a Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence*, Moscow, C.L.D. Publication, 1923). On December 10, 1922, during his preparations for the speech, Lenin asked for the proofs of the collection. p. 588

[652] A possible reference to the article by F. Kin, "Specialists (A Statistical Survey)", published in *Pravda* No. 197 on September 3, 1922. On the strength of a poll of 230 engineers working in Soviet administrative bodies and trusts the author drew the conclusion that there were two kinds of specialists: those hostile to the Soviet power, and others who were steadily being drawn into co-operation with it. The author maintained that one of the tasks of the Soviet power was to promote this differentiation of bourgeois specialists in every way. p. 589

[653] This is known as Lenin's "*Testament*" and was dictated from December 23 to 26, 1922, and the Addition to the Letter of December 24, 1922, on January 4, 1923.

This letter, like those that follow, are part of Lenin's last works, which are equivalent to an outline programme. They are "Pages from a Diary", "On Co-operation", "Our Revolution" (Apropos of N. Sukhanov's Notes)", "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Recommendation to the Twelfth Party Congress)", and "Better Fewer, But Better", and were dictated in January and February 1923 and published at the time in *Pravda* (see present edition, Vol. 33).

Lenin considered it necessary to have the present letter made known to the Party Congress after his death. Accordingly, it was read out to the delegations of the Thirteenth Congress which was held from May 23 to 31,1924. The Congress unanimously decided

not to publish the letter, because it was addressed to the Congress and had not been intended for the press.

The letters mentioned above were, under a decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., read out to the delegates of the Twentieth Party Congress, and then circulated among Party organisations.

In accordance with the instruction of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the letters were published in the magazine *Kommunist* No. 9 in 1956 and issued in pamphlet form in a mass edition. p. 591

654 A reference to the capitulatory behaviour of Zinoviev and Kamenev at the sittings of the Party Central Committee on October 10 (23) and 16 (29), 1917, when they spoke and voted against Lenin's resolution on immediate preparations for an armed uprising. Though they were given a firm rebuff at both sittings, they issued a statement in the Menshevik *Novaya Zhizn* (October 18) about the Bolshevik preparations for the uprising, which, they said, was a gamble. In this manner, they gave away to Rodzyanko and Kerensky a great Party secret. That same day, Lenin, in his "Letter to Bolshevik Party Members", condemned their behaviour and said it was an unprecedented act of strike-breaking (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 216-19). p. 595

655 *Autonomisation*—the idea to unite the Soviet Republics through their entry into the R.S.F.S.R. on the principle of autonomy. This was at the basis of the "Draft Resolution on Mutual Relations of the R.S.F.S.R. and Independent Republics", which was proposed by Stalin and adopted, in September 1922, by a C.C. commission set up to work out for the C.C. plenum the question of further relationships between the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian Republic, the Byelorussian Republic and the Transcaucasian Federation. In a letter to the members of the Political Bureau on September 26, 1922, Lenin seriously criticised the project. He proposed a totally different solution of the question, namely, voluntary union of all the Soviet Republics, including the R.S.F.S.R., in a new state entity, the Union of Soviet Republics, based on complete equality.

He wrote: "We recognise ourselves equal with the Ukrainian Republic, and the others, and join the new union, the new federation together with them and on an equal footing...." The C.C. Commission, in accordance with Lenin's instructions, revised the draft resolution, which was approved by a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in October 1922. Preparatory work for the unification of the Republics was started on the basis of the C.C. decision. On December 30, 1922, the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. adopted its historic decision on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Lenin attached exceptional importance to the correct conduct of national policy and the implementation of the Declaration and Treaty, adopted by the Congress of Soviets. On December 30 and 31, he dictated his letter "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'". It was read out at a meeting of leaders of delegations to the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in April 1923. The Congress adopted a resolution, "On the National Question", based on Lenin's injunctions. p. 605

656 The plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) held in October and December 1922 had on their agenda questions of the formation of the U.S.S.R. p. 605

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В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ
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COLLECTED WORKS

37

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1893 – 1922

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PREFACE

This volume contains 274 personal letters, telegrams and notes from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to his relatives. They were written between 1893 and 1922, to his mother, Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova, his sisters, Anna and Maria, his brother, Dmitry, his brother-in-law, Mark Timofeyevich Yelizarov (husband of Anna Ulyanova), and his wife, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya.

Many of these letters were published in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* for the years 1924, 1929 and 1930 and in *Lenin Miscellanies* Nos. III, XXIV, XXV, XXXV; separate editions of the *Letters to Relatives*, edited by Lenin's sisters, were published in 1930, 1931 and 1934.

The Preface to the 1930 edition by Maria Ulyanova and the article by Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova, "Apropos of Lenin's Letters to Relatives", which formed the preface to the 1931 and 1934 editions, discuss the content and significance of the letters; these two articles precede the letters in the present volume.

Lenin wrote to his mother and to other relatives at least once in every week or ten days. The longer intervals between letters in this volume show that a considerable number of letters have been lost. Most of Lenin's letters were written before the revolution, a time when his relatives were subjected to frequent house searches and arrests. Many of his letters fell into the hands of the secret police and bear traces of their examination—passages of interest to the police are underlined in red pencil, etc. Some of the letters seized during searches were not returned, some were found after the revolution in police dossiers; only odd pages of some letters have survived. Many letters were lost during

the First World War (1914-1917), when letters from abroad were subjected to a particularly strict scrutiny by the censors.

The periods best represented are the late nineties, when Lenin was writing his *Economic Studies and Essays* and *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, and the years 1908-09 when he was preparing his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*; in these years Lenin's letters concerned the despatch to him of the literature he needed, and contained instructions on how the books should be published and on correction of the proofs.

Almost all the letters are printed from the originals; in a few cases, however, they have been printed from copies in the files of the Police Department in the form (in full or as extracts) in which they were found there.

Eleven of the letters were published for the first time in the Fourth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, from which the translation of this volume has been made (these letters are marked with an asterisk in the table of contents).

In the letter to his mother dated July 1, 1912, Lenin mentions that he is moving from Paris to Krakow. This change of address was necessary to bring him closer to St. Petersburg, the centre of the working-class movement, so that he could improve contacts with *Pravda* and with the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma, and carry out the day-to-day work involved in his guidance of the Party organisations. In his letter of July 15, 1919, addressed to the propaganda boat *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Lenin informed his wife of the situation obtaining on the Eastern Front—the capture of Yekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk)—and also of the great change then taking place in the South.

Among the items first published in the Fourth Edition are some brief notes addressed to his wife and to his sister Maria between 1919 and 1922.

Fifty-four letters addressed by Lenin's wife to his mother and sisters are given as an Appendix to this volume; these letters describe Lenin's way of life when he was in exile in Siberia and when he was living abroad and help to elucidate certain facts mentioned in Lenin's letters; eight of Krupskaya's letters were published for the first time in

the Fourth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*. These are also marked with an asterisk in the table of contents, Letters written jointly by Lenin and his wife are contained in the body of the volume.

The items are arranged chronologically; letters posted in Russia are dated according to the Old Style, those from abroad according to the New Style; the editors have added dates at the end of undated letters. The source and destination of the letter and, where necessary, the date are indicated by the editors at the end of each letter; below this, information is given on where the letter was first published in Russian. It should be borne in mind that the note on printing given on the right of the page refers always to the Russian original, not to the translation.

The volume is furnished with a name index, a list of literature mentioned in the letters, and explanatory notes.

The illustrations include photographs of Lenin's relatives and some of the places where he lived. Facsimiles of two of Lenin's letters are also given.

PREFACE TO *LETTERS TO RELATIVES* (1930 EDITION)

The letters in this collection are addressed mainly to Lenin's mother, Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova, and to me* and cover the period from 1894 to 1917,** i.e., they begin from the first years of Lenin's revolutionary activities and continue up to his return to Russia after the February Revolution. It was in this period, almost a quarter of a century, that our Party emerged and took shape. Throughout this remarkable period of twenty-five years, Vladimir Ilyich stood at the head of the Party, guiding and nurturing it. His entire life was one of revolutionary struggle and his private life was part of that struggle, part of his labour on behalf of the cause of the proletariat.

We have a complete edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* and a fairly extensive literature on Leninism (works of

* What was in the letters, however, was usually intended for the whole family, or at least for those members who were living together at the time, "so as not to repeat myself", as Lenin put it.

** The collection does not include the correspondence between Lenin and his relatives during his period of exile (for which see *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* Nos. 2-3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 for 1929), or that of 1896, when he was in the remand prison in St. Petersburg (December 9, 1895 to January 29, 1897, O.S.) and was frequently visited by his mother and sisters, so that his personal correspondence with them was insignificant (see the article by A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova "Vladimir Ilyich in Prison" in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 3 for 1924 and the two letters of Lenin written in 1896 that are appended to the article). Between November 1905 and December 1907, Lenin lived in St. Petersburg or in Finland, saw his relatives frequently and wrote to them rarely. There are also many letters addressed to his sister Anna and his mother, especially at the time when I was living abroad. These letters will be published separately. (All the letters indicated by Maria Ulyanova as being omitted from the 1930 collection have been incorporated in the present volume.—*Ed.*)

scientific research and popular writings) but Lenin the man, with his brilliant, all-round individuality, has been but little described or, rather, has scarcely been described at all.

The letters here offered to the reader *to some extent* fill this gap. They enable the reader to form *to some extent* a picture of Lenin's life, his habits, inclinations, attitude to people, etc. We say here "to some extent", mainly because the collection of letters to his relatives in this period is far from complete. During the frequent moves from town to town, the numerous house searches and arrests to which first one, then another member of our family was subjected, many of the letters fell into the hands of the police and were not returned* or were lost in some other way. There were also frequent cases of letters going astray in the post, especially during the imperialist war. For this reason one and the same question is repeated in a number of successive letters. These letters, furthermore, bear the imprint of police conditions in tsarist times. It is true that all our official correspondence (all communications concerning revolutionary events, party life, etc.) was conducted secretly, in invisible ink and usually in books and journals, sent through other, "clean" addresses.** Our personal lives were so closely bound up with revolutionary work that our legal, personal correspondence no doubt suffered badly and we cut it down because of police conditions. Vladimir Ilyich had good reason to write to me, when I was in exile in Vologda, that "as far as letter-writing is concerned—it is very difficult in our situation (in yours and mine especially) to carry on the correspondence one would like".***

This applied equally, to all our family and not only to me, because Vladimir Ilyich was not only a blood relation but was related to us by his views and convictions. All

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* In the Central Archives, for instance, we found extracts from six of Lenin's letters that had been placed in the files of the Moscow Gendarmerie as "material evidence". These extracts are published as an appendix to this volume (see pp. 553-54).—*Ed.*

** It was, of course, impossible to keep them in Russia and only a few have been preserved in copies made abroad.

*** Letter No. 252.—*Ed.*

the family (including Anna's husband, Mark Yelizarov) were at that time Social-Democrats, supported the revolutionary wing of the Party, took a greater or lesser part in revolutionary activities, were keenly interested in the life of the Party and were delighted at its successes and grieved by its failures. Even our mother, who was born in 1835 and who was over sixty at the end of the century, when house searches and arrests became particularly frequent, showed full sympathy for our revolutionary activities.

All the legal correspondence of revolutionaries was examined by the police and recourse had to be made to various hints, secret signs, etc., in some way to touch upon questions that interested us, confirm the receipt of some illegal letter, make enquiries about acquaintances and so on.

The reader will notice that letters sent by Vladimir Ilyich to his mother, sisters or brother contain scarcely any names, because the use of names might involve those mentioned in unpleasantness. It stands to reason that we had not the slightest desire to do anything that would, at best, make things unpleasant for someone. The names and surnames that do, on rare occasions, occur in Vladimir Ilyich's letters are those of comrades and friends whose connection with us was in any case known to the police owing to various circumstances (exile together on the same charge, attendance at the same educational establishment, etc.) or had to do with purely business matters (names of publishers, booksellers, etc.). To avoid mentioning the names of anybody living in more or less legal conditions about whom Vladimir Ilyich wanted to tell us something, to whom he wanted to send regards, etc., he made frequent use in his letters of nicknames and explanations connected with facts or events known to us. Vladimir Ilyich called Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov, for instance, "the historian" (in view of his writings on history); at one time he carried on a lively correspondence with him through my sister and me.*

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* Unfortunately only one letter from this correspondence has survived, the one dated December 16, 1909. See *Lenin's Works*, Second (Russian) Edition, Vol. XIV, pp. 212-16. (Two letters from the correspondence of Lenin and Skvortsov-Stepanov have survived—December 2 and 16, 1909. See *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, pp. 407-10 and Vol. 16, pp. 117-22.)—*Ed.*

When he sent greetings to V. V. Vorovsky, who was in exile in Vologda at the same time as I, Vladimir Ilyich wrote "Greetings to Polish friends, and I hope they help you in every way."* By "China traveller" he meant A. P. Sklyarenko, who was employed on the railway in Manchuria at the time, and "the gentleman we went boating with last year"** was V. A. Levitsky, etc.

The despatch of underground publications, secret correspondence, books containing letters in invisible ink, etc., had to be referred to in Aesopian language, etc.

At the end of December 1900 I gave G. B. Krasin, who was going abroad, the *Manifesto of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries* to take to Vladimir Ilyich; for purposes of secrecy I concealed it in an album of photographs. Vladimir Ilyich was very pleased with this package and wrote in a letter dated January 16, 1901, "many thanks to Manyasha for the books she sent, and especially for the unusually beautiful and interesting photographs from our cousin in Vienna; I should like to receive such gifts more often".***

Iskra and other underground publications were sent to Russia in envelopes to "clean", legal addresses. We also used these addresses to obtain literature for ourselves. Information concerning such packages was sometimes contained in legal letters to enable us to make enquiries of the addressee in good time. Information of this kind seems to be contained in Vladimir Ilyich's statement (letter of December 14, 1900), "I remember that I sent you the things that interested you on the ninth." And in her letter of February 8, 1916, Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote, "Volodya was very pleased with your big letter. Perhaps you will write again."**** Since our legal letters were never exceptionally long and during the imperialist war, when this letter was written, we corresponded mainly by postcard, even registered postcards, and since many letters were lost in transit, the words quoted apparently refer to an illegal letter concealed in a book.

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* Letter No. 237.—*Ed.*

** Letters Nos. 114 and 130.—*Ed.*

*** Letter No. 120.—*Ed.*

**** Letter No. 117 and Krupskaya's Letter No. 54.—*Ed.*

When Vladimir Ilyich was first living abroad in 1900 and still did not know whether his stay would be more or less permanent, he did not give us his private address; when he was living in Switzerland or in Munich we wrote to him in Paris or Prague for reasons of secrecy. In his letter of March 2, 1901, for instance, he sent us his new address, adding "I have moved together with my landlord".* Franz Modráček, to whose address we sent our letters, actually did move at that time to a new apartment, but Vladimir Ilyich remained in Munich in the old one.

Characteristic of Vladimir Ilyich were his great punctuality and thoroughness and his strict economy in spending money, especially on himself. Vladimir Ilyich probably inherited these qualities from our mother, whom he resembled in many ways. Our mother was of German descent on her mother's side and these qualities were deeply ingrained in her character.

Vladimir Ilyich's carefulness with money and his frugality in spending it on himself can be seen from his letter of October 5, 1895.**

"I am now, for the first time in St. Petersburg, keeping a cash-book to see how much I actually spend. It turned out that for the month August 28 to September 27 I spent altogether 54 rubles 30 kopeks, not including payment for things (about 10 rubles) and expenses for a court case (also about 10 rubles) which I shall probably conduct. It is true that part of this 54 rubles was spent on things that do not have to be bought every month (galoshes, clothes, books, an abacus, etc.), but even discounting that (16 rubles), the expenditure is still excessive—38 rubles in a month. Obviously I have not been living carefully; in one month I have spent a ruble and 36 kopeks on the horse trams, for instance. When I get used to the place I shall probably spend less."

He really did live economically, especially when he was not earning anything and had recourse to "philanthropy",

* Letter No. 125.—*Ed.*

** The letter referred to is that of October 5, 1893 (Letter No. 1), —*Ed.*

as he called his mother's financial aid. He economised to such an extent that he did not even subscribe to *Russkiye Vedomosti** for himself when he was living in St. Petersburg in 1893, but read the paper in the Public Library when it was "two weeks old". "When I get a job here perhaps I will subscribe to it," he wrote to me.**

Vladimir Ilyich retained this trait all his life and it made itself felt, not only in Russia when he was not earning anything and when he was abroad and could not find a publisher for his literary works (one has only to recall that *The Agrarian Question* was lying about for ten whole years and saw the light of day only in 1917) and was thus in a critical position (see, for instance, his letter to Comrade Shlyapnikov of September 1916***), but also when he was materially well provided for, i.e., after the 1917 Revolution.

There was one thing, however, that Vladimir Ilyich found it difficult to economise on—books. He needed them for his work, so that he could keep himself up-to-date on foreign and Russian politics, economics, etc.

"To my great horror," he wrote in a letter to his mother, sent from Berlin August 29, 1895, "I see that I am again in financial 'difficulties'; the 'temptation' to buy books, etc., is so great that the devil alone knows where the money goes."**** Even in this, however, he tried to cut down, mainly by going to work in libraries, especially as they provided him with a quieter working atmosphere when he was abroad—there was none of the hubbub and endless, wearisome talk that was so typical of the exiles, who were bored by surroundings unusual and alien to them, and who liked to unburden themselves in conversation.

Vladimir Ilyich used libraries not only when he was living abroad but also in Russia. In a letter to his mother from St. Petersburg he wrote that he was satisfied with his new room, which was "not far from the centre (only some 15 minutes' walk from the library)".***** Passing through

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* At that time *Russkiye Vedomosti* was the most decent and interesting of all bourgeois papers.

** Letter No. 2.—*Ed.*

*** *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 236.—*Ed.*

**** Letter No. 10.—*Ed.*

***** Letter No. 1.—*Ed.*

Moscow on his way to his place of exile he even made use of the few days he was in the city to work in the library of the Rumyantsev Museum. When he was living in Krasnoyarsk and had to await the start of the navigation season to continue his way to Minusinsk Uyezd, he worked in Yudin's library, and had to walk about 5 versts every day to do so.

During the period of banishment, when there was no possibility of using a library, Vladimir Ilyich tried to make up for this by asking us to arrange for library books to be sent him by post. A few experiments of this sort were made but too much time was wasted (about a month there and back) and library books were issued for a restricted period.

Vladimir Ilyich resorted to this method at a later date, too. In a letter to his sister Anna dated February 11, 1914,* he wrote: "With regard to the summaries of crime statistics for 1905-1908, I would ask you not to buy them (there is no need, they are expensive) but to get them from a library (either the Bar Council or the Duma Library) and send them for a month."

When he was living abroad Vladimir Ilyich also made constant use of libraries. In Berlin he worked in the Imperial Library. In Geneva there was his favourite "club" (Société de lecture), where he had to become a member and pay certain dues—very small ones, to be sure—in order to work in the "club's" library. In Paris he worked in the Bibliothéque nationale, although he complained that it was "badly organised"; in London he worked in the British Museum. And only when he was living in Munich did he complain that "there is no library here"; in Krakow, too, he made but little use of the library. In his letter to me of April 22, 1914 he wrote that "here (in Krakow.—*M.U.*) the library is a bad one and extremely inconvenient, although I scarcely ever have to go there...." His work for the newspaper (*Pravda*), all sorts of dealings with comrades, who came to Krakow in greater numbers than to France or Switzerland, his guidance of the activities of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, Party conferences and meetings, etc.,

* The letter has been lost and the extract quoted here has been taken from the files of the Police Department (see Letter No. 247).—*Ed.*

required so much effort that there was little time left for scientific studies. Even then, however, Vladimir Ilyich "often thought of Geneva, where work went better, the library was convenient, and life was less nerve-racking and time-wasting".*

After his arrest in Galicia at the beginning of the imperialist war Vladimir Ilyich again went to Switzerland; from there he wrote "the libraries here are good, and I have made quite decent arrangements as far as the use of books is concerned. It is even pleasant to read after my daily newspaper work".** Later he went with his wife from Berne to Zurich in order, among other things, "to work in the libraries here" (continuing, however, the same intensive Party political work, as his correspondence in that period with Comrades Karpinsky and Ravich, just published in *Lenin Miscellany XI*, clearly illustrates***) which, according to him, were "much better than those in Berne". But although Vladimir Ilyich was better off abroad as regards the reading of foreign books, journals and newspapers—he visited libraries for this purpose—the shortage of Russian books made itself sharply felt. "I can easily get German books here, there is no shortage of them. But there is a shortage of Russian books," he wrote in a letter dated April 2, 1902.**** "I see very few new books", he wrote on April 6, 1900. There is no doubt that Vladimir Ilyich's work was greatly hampered by his frequently not having the necessary book to hand when he lived abroad. This is why his letters to his relatives frequently contained requests for certain books that he needed for his work (statistics, books on the agrarian question, on philosophy, etc.) and also new publications, journals and fiction. And again, it is possible to judge, *to some extent*, what branches of knowledge he was interested in and needed literature about at any given time, and for which writings he used them.

Among this literature considerable attention was paid to various statistical returns.

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* Letter No. 252.—*Ed.*

** Letter No. 254.—*Ed.*

*** Part of this correspondence was included in the *Collected Works*, Vol. 36.—*Ed.*

**** Letter No. 37.—*Ed.*

From his works, and from the rough copies, notes and calculations that preceded those works we see clearly what great importance Vladimir Ilyich attached to statistics, to "precise facts, indisputable facts".* His unfinished and as yet unpublished article "Statistics and Sociology" by P. Piryuchev (a new pen-name that Vladimir Ilyich adopted to facilitate the publication of this work) is typical in this respect; it is devoted to the question of "the role and significance of national movements, the relationship between the national and the international".**

The following passage is from this article: "The most widely used, and most fallacious, method in the realm of social phenomena is to tear out *individual* minor facts and juggle with examples. Selecting chance examples presents no difficulty at all, but is of no value, or of purely negative value, for in each individual case everything hinges on the historically concrete situation. Facts, if we take them in their *totality*, in their *interconnection*, are not only stubborn things, but undoubtedly proof-bearing things. Minor facts, if taken out of their totality, out of their interconnection, if they are arbitrarily selected and torn out of context, are merely things for juggling with, or even worse.... We must seek to build a reliable foundation of precise and indisputable facts that can be set against any of the 'general' or 'example-based' arguments now so grossly misused in certain countries. And if it is to be a real foundation, we must take not individual facts, but the *sum total* of facts, without *a single* exception, relating to the question under discussion. Otherwise there will be the inevitable, and fully justified, suspicion that the facts were selected or compiled arbitrarily, that instead of historical phenomena being presented in objective interconnection and interdependence and treated as a whole, we are presenting a 'subjective' concoction to justify what might prove to be a dirty business. This does happen ... and more often than one might think."***

In 1902, Vladimir Ilyich asked for "*all* the statistics****

* *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 272.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 271.—*Ed.*

*** *Ibid.*, pp. 272-73.—*Ed.*

**** These statistics which Vladimir Ilyich used for his book *The*

from among the books he had had with him in Siberia, to be sent to him abroad, for, as he said in a letter dated April 2, 1902, "I am beginning to miss these things". Later, in order to get statistical material from various towns and to get it more regularly, Vladimir Ilyich wrote a special appeal* to statisticians participating in the Congress of Doctors and Naturalists (there was a sub-section for statisticians at this congress) held in Moscow in the winter of 1909. A number of provincial statisticians responded and in a letter dated January 2, 1910, Vladimir Ilyich wrote, "I have also received a letter about statistics from Ryazan—it is splendid that I shall probably be getting help from many people."**

In 1908, when Vladimir Ilyich was working on his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, he ordered a book by Professor Chelpanov about Avenarius and his school, the book *Immanent Philosophy* and others. He wrote to me about this work of his, "I have been doing a lot of work on the Machists and I think I have sorted out all their inexpressible vulgarities (and those of 'empirio-monism' as well)."***

When Vladimir Ilyich inquired whether his manuscript about the latest form of capitalism (*Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*)**** had been received he wrote, "I regard this work on economics as being of exceptionally great importance and would especially like to see it in print in full" (letter of October 22, 1916).***** As we know, this wish was not fulfilled (although Vladimir Ilyich "did his utmost to adapt himself to the 'restrictions'", as he wrote in a letter to M. N. Pokrovsky on July 2, 1916);****** Vladimir Ilyich's work underwent a large number of changes and many

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Development of Capitalism in Russia, together with other books of his, were returned from abroad in 1929, and by the extracts he made and the marginal notes in the books it will be possible to draw a number of valuable conclusions on the way he worked. (Some of this material was published in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII* in 1940.—*Ed.*)

* For the publication of this letter we are once again indebted to the Moscow Gendarmerie, who kept it in their files.

** Letter No. 200.—*Ed.*

*** Letter No. 166.—*Ed.*

**** *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304.—*Ed.*

***** Letter No. 260.—*Ed.*

****** *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 227.—*Ed.*

cuts were made, and only ten years later was it published in its original form.

From Vladimir Ilyich's letters to his relatives we see in what connection he set about writing his (as yet unpublished) article "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture".* In a letter dated October 22, 1916, he wrote to me, "You write that the publisher wants to put out *The Agrarian Question* as a book and not as a pamphlet. I understand that to mean that I must send him the continuation (i.e., in addition to what I have written about America I must write what I have promised about Germany). I will start on this as soon as I have finished what I have to write to cover the advance received from the old publisher."** The manuscript of this work, which is now in the possession of the Institute, is unfinished; apparently the revolution "hindered" Vladimir Ilyich and he could not finish it.

The letters here presented to the reader give something of a picture of the conditions under which Vladimir Ilyich carried on his literary work, and also of those trials he had to undergo to publish the results of that work. I am referring here to what he published legally. Vladimir Ilyich worked in unfavourable conditions throughout the entire pre-revolutionary period (with the exception of the period of the first revolution and the *Zvezda* and *Pravda* period—1912-14—when he was able to contribute to the legal press and when we had, for a short time, at least, our own legal publishers); this was while he was abroad and experienced, for instance, a great shortage of Russian books and other material needed for his work.

Censorship conditions also created considerable difficulty; Vladimir Ilyich's articles were cut and distorted (like his article "Uncritical Criticism", for instance) or were confiscated (*The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II), and so on and so forth. Great difficulties were also caused by lack of contact with Russia, because of which it was frequently impossible to establish direct communications with publishers, etc. Typical of the situation are his frequent attempts to obtain work for Granat's Encyclopaedic Dictionary. "I would like

* *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 423-46.—*Ed.*
** Letter No. 260.—*Ed.*

to get some work for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary," he wrote to me in his letter of December 22, 1914, "but it is probably not easy to arrange unless you have an opportunity to meet the secretary of the editorial board."* Vladimir Ilyich had no such opportunity, and when he applied directly to the Granat office he either received no answer at all, or received one only after a considerable delay. "Is it possible to obtain some more work for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary?" he wrote to me in 1915. "I have written to the secretary about this but he has not answered me."** "In this place, unfortunately, I am cut off from all contact with publishers," he wrote in 1912.***

If it had not been for the great help from comrades and relatives in seeking publishers, reading the proofs of his works, etc., there would have been even greater difficulties in getting his writings published. But we, his sisters and brother, were not always in a position to help him in these matters, especially when we were in prison or in exile. In 1904, for instance, he asked mother to give him the address of Anna's husband, Mark Timofeyevich, for whom he had some "literary business" (letter of January 20, 1904).****

Vladimir Ilyich, however, not only had the ability to work systematically, persistently and fruitfully, he also had the ability to rest—when the opportunity offered. For him the best form of rest was out in the open, close to nature and away from people. "Here (in Stjernsund in Finland, where he was resting after returning "terribly tired" from the Fifth Party Congress.—*M.U.*) you can have a wonderful rest, swimming, walking, no people and no work. No people and no work—that is the best thing for me."***** He enjoyed a really excellent rest there, where Lidiya Mikhailovna Knipovich surrounded him with

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* Letter No. 254.—*Ed.*

** Letter No. 255. As regards replies from publishers at this time, things were no better in other houses for Vladimir Ilyich. With reference to this see Letter No. 3 (dated November 27, 1901) from Lenin to L. I. Axelrod, published in *Lenin Miscellany XI*, p. 326 (*Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 100).—*Ed.*

*** Letter No. 230.—*Ed.*

**** Letter No. 150.—*Ed.*

***** Letter No. 155.—*Ed.*

exceptional care and attention, and he recalled it in a letter to me when I had just got over a bad attack of enteric fever. "Now would be the time to send you to Stjernsund," he wrote.*

Vladimir Ilyich was extremely fond of nature and in his letters one constantly comes across references to the beauties of nature, no matter where he happens to be. "The scenery here is splendid, I am enjoying it all the time. The Alps began immediately after the little German station I wrote to you from; then came the lakes and I could not tear myself away from the window of the railway carriage," he wrote to mother when he was on his way to Switzerland in 1895. And again he wrote to mother, "I take walks—walking is not at all bad here at present and, it seems, there are plenty of nice places in Pskov (and also in its environs)." From abroad he wrote, "I saw Anyuta a few days ago, took a trip on a very beautiful lake with her and enjoyed the wonderful views and the good weather." "A few days ago I had a wonderful outing to Salève with Nadya and a friend. Down below in Geneva it was all mist and gloom, but up on the mountain (about 4,000 feet above sea level) there was glorious sunshine, snow, tobogganing—altogether a good Russian winter's day. And at the foot of the mountain—*la mer du brouillard*, a veritable sea of mist and clouds, concealing everything except the mountains jutting up through it, and only the highest at that. Even little Salève (nearly 3,000 feet) was wrapped in mist." "Nadya and I have travelled and walked round a great deal of the surrounding country and have found some very nice places," we read in a letter dated September 27, 1902. Vladimir Ilyich was probably right when he wrote, "We are the only people among the comrades here who are exploring *every bit* of the surrounding country. We discover various 'rural' paths, we know all the places nearby and intend to go further afield."**

If they were unable to get out of town for the summer and drop straight into "rural life" ("we get up early and go to bed almost with the roosters"),*** Vladimir Ilyich

* Letter No. 164.—*Ed.*
** Letters Nos. 6, 103, 110, 149, 142, 148.—*Ed.*
*** Letter No. 237.—*Ed.*

and Nadezhda Konstantinovna, when they were living in Switzerland, sometimes went walking in the mountains. There is a description of one such journey in a letter Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote to my mother on July 2, 1904. "It is already a week since we got away from Geneva and are now resting in the full sense of the word. We have left our work and our worries in Geneva and here we sleep ten hours a day, and go swimming and walking—Volodya does not even read the newspapers properly; we took a minimum of books with us, and even those we are sending back to Geneva tomorrow, unread, while we ourselves shall don our rucksacks at four in the morning and set out for a two weeks' walking tour in the mountains. We shall go to Interlaken and from there to Lucerne. We are reading Baedeker and planning our journey carefully.... Volodya and I have made an agreement not to talk about our work—work, he says, is not a bear and will not escape to the woods—not even to mention it, and, as far as possible, not to think about it."*

Such journeys, however, were rare and were undertaken only when work and the factional squabbling had had too bad an effect on health and on nerves, as was the case in the winter of 1903-04 after the Second Party Congress and the split. As a rule, if Vladimir Ilyich went to the country for the summer, he continued his work there, whenever it was possible, after a few days' complete rest. If it was impossible to get out of town, or if such trips were too short, they made excursions to the country, sometimes to the mountains, on foot or on their bicycles, usually on Sundays. "Quite unintentionally we are taking to foreign ways and arrange our outings on Sundays of all days, though that is the worst time because everywhere is crowded," Lenin wrote in a letter to his mother (March 29, 1903).** On such outings they usually took sandwiches with them instead of having lunch and set off for the whole day. No wonder Vladimir Ilyich and Nadezhda Konstantinovna belonged to the "excursionist" party while other comrades formed the "cinemist" party (those who liked the cinema), as they jokingly called themselves.

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* Letter No. 151.—*Ed.*
** Letter No. 148.—*Ed.*

Vladimir Ilyich was, indeed, not very fond of the different amusements in which other comrades found relaxation after hard work. I do not think he ever went to the cinema, especially when he was living abroad, and he visited theatres only on rare occasions. He went to see *The Weavers* when he was in Berlin on his first trip abroad, and he went to the theatre when he was living abroad in exile, mostly, however, when he was living there "somewhat alone" (i.e., without his family), or when he happened to be in a big city on business after a period of intensive work and he took advantage of the trip to "snap out of himself". The theatres abroad gave Vladimir Ilyich little satisfaction (at times he and Nadezhda Konstantinovna left the theatre after the first act, on which occasions their comrades jokingly accused them of wasting money), and of the plays he saw in the later period, only *The Living Corpse* created an impression on him. He liked the Moscow Art Theatre very much, however; he had been there with Lalayants ("Columbus") before he went abroad, when he was staying in Moscow, and in a letter to his mother in February 1901 he said that "he still remembers with pleasure" that visit to the theatre. But what we would like would be to visit the Russian Art Theatre and see *The Lower Depths*,"* we read in his letter of February 4, 1903. He did not manage to see *The Lower Depths* until many years later, when he was living in Moscow after the revolution.

His visits to concerts were also relatively rare, although he loved music. "We recently went to our first concert this winter", we read in the same letter, "and were very pleased with it—especially Chaikovsky's latest symphony (*Symphonie pathétique*)." "I was at the opera a few days ago and heard *La Juive* with the greatest pleasure; I had heard it once in Kazan (when Zakrzhevsky sang)—that must be thirteen years ago, and some of the tunes have remained in my memory," he wrote to mother on February 9, 1901.** Afterwards he often whistled those tunes (he had his own peculiar way of whistling through his teeth). Later, during his life abroad, Vladimir Ilyich rarely visited concerts or ope-

* Letter No. 146.—*Ed.*
** Letter No. 122.—*Ed.*

ras. Music had too powerful an effect on his nerves, and when they were upset, as was often the case in the turmoil of life among the émigrés abroad, it affected him badly. Vladimir Ilyich was always very busy and his budget was a modest one and this had its effect on his secluded (as far as amusements were concerned) way of life.

Vladimir Ilyich paid relatively little attention to the various sights: "I have little taste for such things in general and in most cases have seen them only by accident. In general, I much prefer wandering around and seeing the evening amusements and pastimes of the people to visiting museums, theatres, shopping centres, etc."* Vladimir Ilyich usually did his "wandering around" in the evenings when he was living in Berlin in 1895, and this enabled him to study "the Berlin mores and listen to German speech".** It was not, however, only when he was in Berlin on his first trip abroad that he made a study of customs; there are quite a number of passages in his letters to his relatives which show that when he was living in Paris, or was there on a short trip, he found pleasure in examining the local way of life and he remarked the free and easy manner of the public in the streets and on the boulevards. "Paris is a very inconvenient town for a man of modest means to live in, and very tiring," he wrote after spending a few days in that city. "But there is no better and more lively town to stay in for a short time, just for a visit, for an outing."*** Vladimir Ilyich also studied Czech life when he was passing through Czechoslovakia and was sorry that he had not learned the Czech language; he gave a lively description of the manners and customs of the Galician peasants that he had an opportunity of observing when he was living in Galicia, and of the carnival in the Munich streets with its battles of confetti and streamers, etc. He loved life in all its forms and had a rare talent for observing and studying it on a broad scale.

The letters published here give a picture of Vladimir Ilyich's attitude towards his relatives and, to some extent, his feelings for people in general. How much care and

* Letter No. 10.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*

*** Letter No. 249.—*Ed.*

attention is displayed in those letters! Vladimir Ilyich was greatly attached to his relatives, especially to mother, and in all his letters, in those addressed to other members of our family as well as to mother, there is always a note of solicitude for her, the wish that things should go better for her and that she should have a more peaceful and comfortable life. His letters are full of questions about health, whether good arrangements have been made for an apartment, whether it is not cold. "I am worried that your apartment is so cold; what will it be like in winter if the temperature is only 12° now? You must not catch cold.... Is there nothing you can do? Perhaps you should put in a small stove," he wrote in a letter to his mother in 1909.* These letters contain a great deal of advice to "have a good rest in summer", "run about less, rest more and keep well", etc.

Vladimir Ilyich was particularly attentive to his mother at those times when some misfortune overtook her, and misfortunes were many in her life. First one, then another member of our family was arrested and exiled, sometimes several of us were arrested at the same time and she, though advanced in years, had to go again and again to prisons to visit her family and take things to them, to sit for hours in the waiting-rooms of the gendarmerie and the secret police, and was often left completely alone with her heart aching for her children who had been deprived of their liberty. How worried Vladimir Ilyich was at such times, and how heavily the lack of personal contact with his mother weighed upon him, can be seen from his letter of September 1, 1901. At that time my brother-in-law, Mark Yelizarov, and I were in prison, my sister Anna was abroad and could not return to Russia because she would have been arrested on the same charge, and our brother Dmitry could not remain with mother because he had to graduate from the University of Yuriev. She was left alone in the same way in a strange town in 1904 when my sister, my brother Dmitry and I were arrested on charges connected with the Kiev Party Committee and the Central Committee.

Vladimir Ilyich always wanted mother to live with him, and he frequently invited her to do so. This was difficult

* Letter No. 198.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

to arrange, however, because mother was always with those of her children who were particularly in need of her help, and in Russia that help was needed almost always by those who had fallen into the hands of the police. And so it turned out that each time Vladimir Ilyich was living in exile abroad, both the first and the second time, she was able to stay abroad only for a very short while to see him. In 1902, she lived for about a month with Vladimir Ilyich and our sister Anna at Loguivy in the north of France. The second time, and this was the last time she was to see her son, was in Stockholm, where she and I went in 1910 specially to visit him. Vladimir Ilyich always provided her with detailed itineraries for such trips and advised her to stop the night in hotels in order not to overtire herself with the journey. It was also in Stockholm that mother for the first and last time heard Vladimir Ilyich speak in public; it was at a meeting of worker exiles. When we left, Vladimir Ilyich accompanied us to the boat—he could not go aboard the vessel because it belonged to a Russian company and he might have been arrested on it—and I still remember the expression on his face as he stood there looking at mother. How much pain there was in his face! He seemed to feel that this was the last time he would see her. And so it was. Vladimir Ilyich did not see any of his relatives again until he came to Russia after the February Revolution, and mother died shortly before it, in July 1916. We did not receive the first letter Vladimir Ilyich wrote when he had news of mother's death. The next letter has not survived either, but from what I remember of it it showed what a heavy loss it was to him, how much pain it caused him, and how tender he was to all of us, who were also distressed by our loss.

Vladimir Ilyich also devoted considerable attention to us, his sisters and brother, and to Mark Yelizarov; he was always interested to know how we were getting on, whether we were earning anything, whether we had had good holidays, etc. He tried to get books for us to translate and sometimes sent foreign books to us for that purpose, showed an interest in what we read and studied, invited us to stay with him, and so on. Vladimir Ilyich also displayed a great interest in his comrades, inquired how they were getting

on and tried to help them materially as well. He undertook to write prefaces for his comrades' translations, so as to make it easier for them to get the books published and thus have an opportunity of earning something.

Comrades who are unacquainted with life in exile abroad and with the way legal correspondence was carried on under tsarism may think it strange that Vladimir Ilyich frequently says in his letters that he is "living very quietly", "peacefully", "modestly" and so on in periods such as that of the imperialist war, for instance, when it is obvious from literature and from his underground correspondence that he was displaying tremendous energy in the struggle against the chauvinism that was influencing most of the Social-Democratic parties. It must not be forgotten that at that time Vladimir Ilyich could only make his voice heard in the press, and then only in a publication that appeared once in several weeks or even, in several months, and which (like pamphlets) it was difficult to send from place to place; he could also speak at small meetings of exiles abroad or at small study circles for foreign workers. It stands to reason that such opportunities were far too little for Vladimir Ilyich; Nadezhda Krupskaya said that at the beginning of the revolution in Russia he created the impression of a lion trying to break out of its cage—was not his former life in exile abroad and out of contact with Russia, and especially during the imperialist war, a cage that greatly restricted him, that did not permit him to branch out and could not satisfy him, the natural leader, the voice of the people? He was eager for work on a broader scale, his was truly the eagerness of the caged lion, and he had to work hard at persuading two or three comrades to obtain access to broader masses. And for a nature like his was not "sleepy Borne" really too "quiet" and movement there too "gradual"?...

In his legal correspondence there are only occasional glimpses of his fury against "disgusting opportunists of the most dangerous type" and against "extreme vulgarities about voting for credits", etc. Here he was hampered by the censor and one has only to see which phrases from his letters (see Appendix, pp. 553-54) "attracted the attention" of the gendarmes and secret police and which became "material

evidence", to understand that both he and his relatives were at that time in a situation in which it was very difficult "to carry on the correspondence one would like".*

We had good reason to make the proviso at the beginning of this preface that Vladimir Ilyich's letters to his relatives are of significance and interest mainly because they provide a picture of him as a man (of course that picture is far from complete and, owing to conditions of police surveillance, somewhat one-sided). In this respect, it seems to me, they constitute a valuable contribution to the literature on Vladimir Ilyich, and one can only regret that so many letters to relatives and to comrades have been lost. There are other documents, especially his rich literary legacy, which speak of Lenin as the leader, the politician, the scholar.

Vladimir Ilyich's second period of exile abroad was particularly burdensome to him. When he arrived in Geneva after having lived in and near St. Petersburg, it was especially painful to return to the old ash-heap. "We have been hanging about this damned Geneva for several days now," he said in a letter to me on January 14, 1908. "It is an awful hole, but there is nothing we can do. We shall get used to it."** With his customary persistence and energy he got down to work, because he could "get used to" any conditions. "The only unpleasant thing was the actual moving, which was a change for the worse. That, however, was inevitable," he wrote in the next letter to mother.*** And this change from better to worse, this absence of the literature he needed for his work and of new books and newspapers made itself particularly felt at this time because in St. Petersburg he had been able to road all the newspapers and journals and keep up-to-date on books. And he asked us to obtain for him "the minutes of the Third Duma (the officially published verbatim reports and also the announcements, questions and bills brought before the Duma)", and to "send them *all*, missing nothing". He was also interested in the "programmes, announcements and leaflets of the

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* Letter No. 252.—*Ed.*
** Letter No. 158.—*Ed.*
*** Letter No. 159.—*Ed.*

Octobrists, the Rights, the Cossack group, etc." He was deprived of these necessary documents, whereas in the Duma "all these 'bits of paper' probably lie about on the floor and nobody picks them up". He also asked us to send him "*everything* new that the Mensheviks publish",* trade union journals that had survived the debacle, etc.

During his life in exile abroad Vladimir Ilyich felt the shortage, not only of books (although we tried to provide him with at least the most interesting books that appeared on the market), but also of Russian newspapers. Things were particularly bad in this respect during the imperialist war when at times Vladimir Ilyich had no Russian papers at all. "Please send Russian newspapers once a week after you have read them, because I have *none at all*," he wrote in a letter dated September 20, 1916.**

Vladimir Ilyich was also in dire need of an income, especially during his last years abroad. "There will soon be an end to all our old sources of subsistence and the question of earning something is becoming acute," wrote Nadezhda Krupskaya on December 14, 1915. She said that Vladimir Ilyich was "seriously troubled" because he was very conscientious where money was concerned or in accepting help from anybody, whoever it might be. "I shall get down to writing something or other, because prices have risen so hellishly that life has become devilishly difficult," he wrote on September 20, 1916.***

Just a few months before the February Revolution, in the autumn of 1916, Vladimir Ilyich had to look for books to translate and to correspond with publishers about getting them published. How unproductive a use for his labour it would have been if he had been compelled to spend his time translating, but this, too, was eventually "hindered" by the revolution.

Such were the conditions under which he lived abroad shortly before the revolution: lack of contact with Russia and the masses of working people, whom he was always trying so hard to exercise a direct influence over, the dif-

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* Letters Nos. 158, 162, 158.—*Ed.*

** Letter No. 259.—*Ed.*

*** Krupskaya's Letter No. 53, Lenin's Letter No. 259.—*Ed.*

ficult living conditions in exile abroad—although energy and persistence were never lacking—so it is no wonder that his "nerves were on edge" and his whole organism seriously undermined.

His reporting of Nadezhda Konstantinovna's joke that he "must have been 'pensioned off'"* touches a bitter note in the letter of February 15, 1917.

After this letter in which the difficult conditions in which Vladimir Ilyich was forced to live in pre-revolutionary times could be seen behind the jokes, came the glad tidings by telegraph, "Arriving Monday 11 p.m. inform *Pravda*".**

That was the end of his period of exile, and also the end of his correspondence with his relatives.

I received only two tiny notes from Vladimir Ilyich after this,*** they were as short as his underground existence in Finland in the days of Kerensky and Kornilov on the eve of the Great October Revolution.

M. Ulyanova

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* Letter No. 262.—*Ed.*

** Telegram No. 264.—*Ed.*

*** Letters Nos. 265 and 266.—*Ed.*

APROPOS OF LENIN'S LETTERS TO RELATIVES*

A man's private correspondence is important in the compilation of his biography and in revealing him as an individual because it shows him in his day-to-day life, shows his relations with people and thus throws light on certain aspects of his character that are shown insufficiently or not at all by his scientific or public activities; in any case private correspondence adds new lines to the depiction of his character. Although Vladimir Ilyich's letters are, as a rule, very brief, condensed, and devoid of any effusiveness, which he never liked, any more than he liked other forms of verbosity; although behind the letters one feels the man of action accustomed to grudge the time he devotes to anything personal, they nevertheless reflect in some degree the character of the writer.

It should not be forgotten that the correspondence was carried on under conditions of tsarist censorship, when one had always to be prepared for the letters to be read by the police, with the result that they had to be particularly brief and condensed. "It is very difficult ... to carry on the correspondence one would like,"** Vladimir Ilyich wrote to Maria. Letters in invisible ink allowed of greater freedom; in these, in addition to purely business matters, one came across accounts of the latest Party news, of congresses and conferences, and precise characterisations—in two or three words—of people, parties and trends given by Vladimir

* This article was written by Lenin's sister Anna Ilyinichna Ulyanova-Yelizarova for the collection of *Letters to Relatives* published in 1931 and 1934.—*Ed.*

** Letter No. 252.—*Ed.*

Ilyich, the sharp, decisive expressions he used in ordinary, free conversation. Such letters, however, had to be destroyed immediately they had been read, so, of course, not a single one of them has been preserved. They were written between the lines of other letters or, more frequently between the lines of a book or journal or some reprint or other. And when Vladimir Ilyich acknowledged the receipt of books and wrote that some diary of the Congress of Technicians or reprint from the archives was "very interesting and thank Anyuta very much for it"* that meant, of course, that the secret letter had been received. Nor did I keep letters that were written in ordinary ink but were not sent to my own address; among such were, for instance, the letters I received in 1913-14 at the office of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* under an agreed-upon pseudonym. And it was not always convenient to keep letters sent to my private address—I recall a couple that Vladimir Ilyich himself asked me to destroy.

As far as concerns the letters in this collection, it must be said that although they were written to people close to the writer and consequently contain much that has to do with the family alone and has little general interest, the addressees were people close to Vladimir Ilyich not only by blood but also in their convictions; he was also writing to them on business, so that the legal letters were often supplementary to the others and, therefore, formed a link in the whole chain of correspondence. Vladimir Ilyich, of course, did not write to mother on business matters, but at the same time he had nothing to hide from her, knowing that she was fully in sympathy with his revolutionary efforts and all his work. The result was that a letter addressed to one member of the family was, more often than not, intended for all. Requests to us, his sisters, brother and brother-in-law, were often contained in letters to our mother; as a rule they were read by all members of the family and were often forwarded to those living in other towns.

The significance of Vladimir Ilyich's letters to his relatives naturally becomes all the greater for their having been written in the quarter of a century in which our Party, the

* Letter No. 42.—*Ed.*

party that Vladimir Ilyich did so much to build, emerged and took shape.

The most intensive and substantial correspondence belongs to the 1897-99 and 1908-09 periods, in which two big books by Vladimir Ilyich—*The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*—were published, because these letters contained business requests connected with the two publications, with the reading of the proofs, etc. Quite apart from this, the letters of the first of these two periods are fuller and more frequent since they were written when Vladimir Ilyich was in exile in Siberia, a condition that makes even the most restrained people turn to letter-writing because of the involuntary seclusion and the lack of contact with the life of the outside world. The letters written by Vladimir Ilyich in this period, especially the more detailed ones addressed to mother, give us an excellent picture of the conditions under which he lived, his inclinations and habits—in these letters he stands out, if one may put it so, in clearest relief as a person.

Furthermore—and this is most important—in his letters from exile Vladimir Ilyich showed that he was not cut off from life, for in them he touched upon questions of Marxist theory and practice that were the most vital questions of the day. We see from the letters—although it occurs in a veiled form, the only possible form—his attitude to members of the Emancipation of Labour group, to Plekhanov and Axelrod, his complete agreement with them and his profound respect for them, his contact with them both through letters and through the talks I conducted with them on his instructions during my trip abroad in 1897. In these letters Vladimir Ilyich stated emphatically that "the isolation from political life" of which Axelrod had given warning must not on any account be permitted. "I believe the author to be wholly and a thousand times right, especially against narrow adherents of 'economics'",* meaning Maslov and Co., the editors of the newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik*, who had accused the journal *Novoye Slovo*, headed by Struve, of liberalism and sympathy for the bourgeoisie. At that time Vladimir Ilyich considered it a matter of

* *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 26.—*Ed.*

current importance not to confine propaganda and agitation to the economic struggle alone. "It is important that the illusion should not be allowed to develop that anything can be achieved by the struggle against the factory-owners alone," he said to me shortly before his arrest. "From the very outset the political consciousness of the workers must be aroused." It was for this reason that Vladimir Ilyich, in complete agreement with the Emancipation of Labour group, took the side of Struve in his differences with the *Samarsky Vestnik* writers, as Fedoseyev and Martov also did, and wrote to Maslov and Co. in Struve's defence. One of the letters from Vladimir Ilyich (according to Maslov) was written in a militant tone and concluded with the words: "If you want war, let it be war". In 1899, Vladimir Ilyich on several occasions spoke against the Samarans in his letters.

"As far as the Samarans are concerned, I doubt very much whether they have said anything sensible (I have already had a letter about the accusation of 'bourgeois sympathies')."—letter of February 13, 1899.* Concerning the review of Gvozdyov's book he wrote: "I did not enjoy writing the review. I did not like the book—nothing new, generalities, an impossible style in places...." "It would be very useful and very interesting to talk on this subject (on the article about the heritage.—*A. Y.*) to people who do not limit themselves to Gvozdyov's theories (have you read his book about kulaks?** I think it is very, very weak)."***

Vladimir Ilyich continued his struggle against "economism" in agreement with Axelrod and Plekhanov, who in 1895, at the time of Vladimir Ilyich's first trip abroad, insisted on the need to get away from the disputes between study circles and the Narodniks, to break down the isolation and go over to the organisation of a political party of Social-Democrats; he noted, however, another extreme in Axelrod's new pamphlet (on the relationship between

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* Letter No. 76.—*Ed.*

** Gvozdyov, R., *Kulachestvo-rostovshchichestvo, yego obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskoye znacheniye*, St. Petersburg, 1899.

*** Letters Nos. 74 and 79.—*Ed.*

liberal and socialist democracy in Russia). Vladimir Ilyich showed that the author did not stress the class character of the movement sufficiently, that he was too kindly towards the Frondist agrarians and should have spoken of using them but not of supporting them.

In these letters we find some expression of Vladimir Ilyich's indignation at the revisionist trend then emerging—Bernstein's book, articles by German revisionists in *Neue Zeit* and Bulgakov's article. In respect of the last-named he wrote, "Bulgakov simply made me mad; such nonsense, such utter nonsense, and such eternal professorial pretentiousness—what the devil is this?!..." "Kautsky he *distorts outright*.... I am thinking of writing 'about Kautsky's book'" (against Bernstein.—*A.Y.*)—see letter of May 1, 1899.*

About Bernstein he wrote the following: "Nadya and I started reading Bernstein's book immediately; we have read more than a half and its contents astonish us more and more as we go on. It is unbelievably weak theoretically—mere repetition of someone else's ideas. There are phrases about criticism but no attempt at serious independent criticism. In effect, it is opportunism ... and *cowardly* opportunism at that, since Bernstein does not want to attack the programme directly.... Bernstein's statement that many Russians agree with him ... made us very indignant. We people here must indeed be getting 'old' and must be 'lagging behind the new words' ... copied from Bernstein. I shall soon be writing to Anyuta on this subject in detail."**

Ilyich asked his sister Maria to get him reports of the Hanover Party Congress (letter of August 22, 1899) that was to be held in October. The chief issue at the Hanover Congress, of course, was that of Bernstein. When Vladimir Ilyich sent his review of Bulgakov's article*** to *Novoye Slovo* (it was published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*) he wrote, "Of course, polemics among one's own people are unpleas-

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* Letters Nos. 85 and 87.—*Ed.*

** i.e., in invisible ink (see Letter No. 98.—*Ed.*).

*** Lenin's article "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 105-159) was sent to the journal *Nachalo* but was printed in *Zhizn* for January-February 1900.—*Ed.*

ant and I tried to tone the article down, but to keep quiet about differences is not only unpleasant, it is *downright harmful*—and, furthermore, one cannot keep quiet about the chief differences between 'orthodoxy' and 'criticism' that have come to the fore in German and Russian Marxism".*

Tugan-Baranovsky also made Vladimir Ilyich indignant (letter of June 20, 1899). "I have seen *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 5, and find that Tugan-Baranovsky's article in it is monstrously foolish and nonsensical; he has simply arbitrarily introduced changes into the rate of surplus value in order to 'refute' Marx; he assumes an absurdity—a change in the productivity of labour without a change in the value of the product. I do not know whether every such nonsensical article is worth writing about. Let him first fulfil his promise to develop it in detail. In general, I am becoming a more and more determined opponent of the latest 'critical stream' in Marxism and of neo-Kantianism (which has produced, incidentally, the idea of separating sociological from economic laws). The author of *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus*** is quite right in declaring that neo-Kantianism is a reactionary theory of the reactionary bourgeoisie and in rebelling against Bernstein."***

Vladimir Ilyich's second article—"Once More on the Theory of Realisation"****—was directed mainly against Struve, whose sympathy for revisionism was becoming more and more obvious. It is true that at this time Vladimir Ilyich's criticism was still of a friendly nature since he was criticising one of his own side.

"I am now finishing an article in reply to Struve. It seems to me he has got things badly mixed up and his article may cause a good deal of misunderstanding among supporters and malicious glee among opponents" (March 7).*****

There gradually arose, however, misgivings of a more serious nature that come out more markedly in the letters to Potresov written in the same year (*Lenin Miscellany IV*).

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* Letter No. 87.—*Ed.*
** Plekhanov.
*** Letter No. 90.—*Ed.*
**** *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 74-93.—*Ed.*
***** Letter No. 80.—*Ed.*

He also wrote that he had begun studying philosophy from the few philosophical books in his possession.

"Volodya is busy reading all kinds of philosophy (that is now his official occupation)—Holbach, Helvétius, etc.," Nadezhda Krupskaya wrote in a letter to our mother on June 20, 1899.*

And lastly there was the document known as the *Credo*, probably the biggest political fact of the period, and the reply** to it compiled by 17 Social-Democrats; this is also mentioned in the letters.

"I shall write to Anyuta soon about the *Credo* (which interests and *exasperates* me and everybody else) in detail."*** (August 1, 1899.)****

"As far as the *Credo der Jungen* is concerned, I was amazed at the emptiness of the phrases. It is not a *Credo* but a pitiful collection of words I intend to write in greater detail about it." (August 25, 1899.)*****

I had sent this document to Vladimir Ilyich and quite by chance given it this name. I had not regarded it as being of any particular significance and in a letter in invisible ink I had said as briefly as possible "I am sending you a *Credo* of the young."

Later, when the name had come to be accepted and there was talk about an "Anti-Credo", I was worried about having exaggerated the importance of the document with this incorrect name, and wrote to Vladimir Ilyich about it in invisible ink. It seems this place in the letter remained unread because when he returned from exile I told him the document had not been the "symbol of faith" of any group of the young but came from the pen of two authors, Kuskova and Prokopovich, and that I had given it the name of *Credo* myself; Vladimir Ilyich was surprised and asked: "You did?" But then, after a short silence, be said in any case it had been necessary to reply to it. And that is how the document went the rounds under that name.

Thus we see that in his letters to his relatives sent from

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* Krupskaya's Letter No. 16.—*Ed.*

** *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82.—*Ed.*

*** i.e., in invisible ink.

**** Letter No. 92.—*Ed.*

***** Letter No. 97.—*Ed.*

his place of exile, Vladimir Ilyich reacted to all the most urgent questions of the Party life of that time; there are signs in these letters of the main course he was mapping out, the course that was to avoid the narrowness of economism and also the threatening danger of diffusion that lay in offering favours to the liberals, and also the purely intellectualist attraction to revisionism and criticism for criticism's sake. While still in exile he was already selecting his comrades for the future Party organisation and for "undisguised literature";* he wrote to Potresov about the need for this and naming for it, of all his comrades in exile, only Martov, "the only one who really took all this (the interests of a journal, of the Party) seriously to heart". He drew up a plan for *Iskra*.

In Vladimir Ilyich's letters for the 1908-09 period—the time when his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* was being published—there are also statements on general matters, especially on the subject of his book, although such statements are fewer than in the letters sent from Siberia which were, in general, much more detailed. The attempts to revise the philosophical aspect of Marxism (they were headed by Bogdanov and Lunacharsky in Russia) made Vladimir Ilyich no less indignant than Bernstein's politico-economic revision. We saw that when he was still in Siberia this neo-Kantian trend in Marxism aroused in him the desire to undertake the study of philosophy. In the years of reaction following our first revolution the "god-seeker" trend made him take up philosophical studies seriously and write a book analysing this deviation from Marxism.

"My illness has held up my work on philosophy very badly," he wrote to his sister Maria on July 13, 1908. "I

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* L. Kamenev's interpretation of these words in the Preface to Lenin's letters and in Note No. 41 (*Lenin Miscellany IV*, p. 19) is obviously incorrect. "Disguised literature" is of course to be understood, not to mean liberal literature wearing the cloak of Social-Democracy, but our own Social-Democratic literature that is compelled by the censor to take on legal form, i.e., there must be illegal as well as legal Social-Democratic literature. This passage gives no indication of a need to differentiate between us and "disguised liberals". There is no other way of understanding it.

am now almost well again and will most certainly write the book. I have been doing a lot of work on the Machists and I think I have sorted out all their inexpressible vulgarities (and those of 'empirio-monism' as well).'"*

Vladimir Ilyich was terribly indignant at "*popovshchina*"**, a word he used for all kinds of god-seeking and all other attempts at dragging religious views into Marxism in some form or another. Because of the censorship he proposed changing the word "popovshchina" into "fideism", with a footnote explaining it (*fideism* is a doctrine which substitutes faith for knowledge, or which generally attaches significance to faith).***

That is how it appeared in the book. In the manuscript, the phrase to which this footnote was added read as follows: "Supported by all these supposedly recent doctrines, our destroyers of dialectical materialism proceed fearlessly to downright *popovshchina* (clearest of all in the case of Lunacharsky, but by no means in his case alone!)". And Vladimir Ilyich came down very heavily on these "destroyers"; he asked me not to tone down anything concerning them and I had difficulty in getting him to agree to a certain toning down for the sake of the censorship.

"'Mentally projected god' will have to be changed to 'mentally projected for himself—well, to use a mild expression—religious conceptions' or something of the sort".****

In the manuscript this phrase had the following wording: "People can think and mentally project for themselves any kind of hell, all sorts of devils. Lunacharsky even mentally projected for himself a god." When there was no question of censorship he wrote to me: "*Please* do not tone down *anything* in the places against Bogdanov, *Lunacharsky* and Co. They must not be toned down. You have deleted the passage about Chernov being a 'more honest' opponent than they, which is a great pity. The shade of meaning you have given is not the one I want. There is now no overall consistency in my accusations. The crux of the issue is that our Machists are *dishonest*, mean-spirited, cowardly enemies

* Letter No. 166.—*Ed.*
** From the colloquial Russian "pop", meaning "priest".—*Ed.*
*** *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 19.—*Ed.*
**** Letter No. 175.—*Ed.*

of Marxism in philosophy." Further he said: "Please do not tone down the places against Bogdanov and Lunacharsky's *popovshchina*. We have *completely broken off* relations with them. There is no reason for toning them down, it is not worth the trouble." (March 9, 1909.)

"Especially—do *not* throw out Purishkevich," he wrote on March 21, "and the others in the section on the criticism of Kantianism!"*

Vladimir Ilyich compared the Machists to Purishkevich because the latter had once said that he criticised the Cadets more consistently and with greater determination than the Marxists did, and the Machists assured us that they criticised Kant more consistently and with greater determination than the Marxists did. But, Mr. Purishkevich, Vladimir Ilyich said to him, "it must not be forgotten that you criticised the Constitutional-Democrats for being *excessively* democratic while we criticised them for being *insufficiently* democratic. The Machists criticise Kant for being too much of a materialist, we criticise him for not being enough of a materialist. The Machists criticise Kant from the right, we from the left." (*Works*, Vol. XIII, p. 163.)**

When he later sent a supplement to Chapter Four, Section One, "From What Angle Did N. G. Chernyshevsky Criticise Kantianism?" Vladimir Ilyich wrote: "I regard it as extremely important to counterpose Chernyshevsky to the Machists."*** Vladimir Ilyich mentioned the political aspect of the differences known in those days as the differences with the *Vperyod* group in only a couple of words in his legal letters. "Things are bad here—*Spaltung* (split. —*A. Y.*), or rather, there will be one; I hope that in a month or six weeks I shall be able to give you exact information. So far I can do no more than guess" (May 26).**** Details of this split were given in the "Report on the Extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*" and in the appended resolutions: 5. The Break-away of Comrade Maximov (Bogdanov) and 4. The Party School Being Set Up Abroad at X—(Capri),

* See Letters Nos. 183, 182, 184.—*Ed.*
** *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 199.—*Ed.*
*** Letter No. 185.—*Ed.*
**** Letter No. 191.—*Ed.*

for which the extended editorial board declared it could bear no responsibility "in view of the fact that the initiators and organisers of the school are one and all representatives of otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building" (June 1909, *Works*, Vol. XIV, pp. 89-103).*

Social affairs are touched upon still more scantily in the letters of the following years, which were, in general, fewer.

The first years of the second exile abroad were particularly dull and miserable and were a sad experience for Vladimir Ilyich. I saw that for myself when I visited him in Paris in the autumn of 1911. He seemed to be less vivacious than usual. One day when we were out walking together he said to me: "I wonder if I shall manage to live to the next revolution." The sad expression on his face reminded me of the photograph of him taken in 1895 by the secret police. The time was one of profound reaction. Only a few signs of a renascence were to be seen—the publication of *Zvezda* and *Mysl*, for example.

A note of pleasure resounded in his letter of January 3, 1911. "Yesterday I received *Zvezda* No. 1. from Russia and today *Mysl* No. 1. That is something to cheer me up!... It really is a pleasure!"**

His depression was deepened, of course, by the "bitter squabbles", which had a bad effect on work; Vladimir Ilyich wrote about this in 1910, having in mind the differences that existed between the C.C. Bureau Abroad and the *Vperyod* group. He referred to "a period so full of squabbles" in his letter of January 3, 1911, and apologised to my husband for his unpunctuality in answering letters.

It can be seen from his letters that Vladimir Ilyich's mood greatly improved after he moved to Krakow in the autumn of 1912. He wrote that he felt better than in Paris, he was resting his nerves, there was more literary work and fewer squabbles. The work for *Pravda*, the improved situation in working-class circles and in revolutionary work naturally had a beneficial effect on Vladimir Ilyich. There was a noticeable lessening of the squabbles, so much so that Gorky, Vladimir Ilyich wrote, was less unfriendly

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 425-51.—*Ed.*

** Letter No. 215.—*Ed.*

towards us. It will be remembered that it was shortly after this that Gorky became one of the editors of the Bolshevik journal *Prosveshcheniye*.

Vladimir Ilyich wrote of the proposal for *Pravda* to publish pamphlets; he said that he was seeing more people from Russia and seemed to feel closer to Russia; he invited my husband, Mark Yelizarov, to the health resort at Zakopane, saying that trains went there direct from Warsaw; he also invited me, hinting that people living in the frontier zone could make the journey for thirty kopeks.

In general he was pleased with Krakow and wrote that he was not thinking of moving anywhere "unless the war chases us away, but I do not greatly believe in the war".* I moved to St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1913 where I was employed by the Bolshevik journal *Prosveshcheniye*, the journal *Rabotnitsa* and also *Pravda*. In addition to the letters in invisible ink, I had at that time a considerable correspondence with Vladimir Ilyich on literary matters; they were addressed to the office of *Prosveshcheniye* in the name of Andrei Nikolayevich. Out of this official correspondence I have so far been able to recover only two letters that had been copied by the police and which are not included in this collection of letters to relatives.

During the war, of course, letters were fewer and many of them were lost. The few that were preserved, even the postcards, touch upon questions that were most painful for Vladimir Ilyich. A postcard dated February 1, 1910 said, "We have been having 'stormy' times lately, but they have ended with an attempt at peace with the Mensheviks—yes, yes, strange as it may seem; we have closed down the factional newspaper and are trying harder to promote *unity*. We shall see whether it can be done...."**

The postcard of March 24, 1912 says, "...there is more bickering and abuse of each other than there has been for a long time—there has probably never been so much before. All the groups and sub-groups have joined forces against the last conference and those who organised it, so that matters even went as far as fisticuffs at meetings here."***

* Letter No. 229.—*Ed.*
** Letter No. 204.—*Ed.*
*** Letter No. 222.—*Ed.*

In his letter of November 14, 1914 he wrote, "It is very sad to watch the growth of chauvinism in a number of countries and to see such treacherous acts as those of the German* (and not only the German) Marxists or pseudo-Marxists.... It stands to reason that the liberals are praising Plekhanov again; he has fully deserved that shameful punishment.... I have seen the disgraceful, shameless issue of *Sovremenny Mir*.... Shame! Shame!"**

Official correspondence in invisible ink became more intensive in those years, when all correspondence with the Central Committee was greatly reduced, and in the only postcard from Vladimir Ilyich that has been preserved for the year 1915 he thanked me "very, very, very much for the book, for the most interesting collection of pedagogical publications and for the letter". The collection of pedagogical publications was "interesting", of course, on account of what was written between the lines in invisible ink.

In Vladimir Ilyich's letters to his relatives, therefore, we see his comments on the struggle for the correct understanding of Marxism and for its correct application at the various stages of development of the proletarian movement which he conducted throughout his life.

Now let me try to draw some conclusions on the basis of these letters, to show in brief those aspects of Vladimir Ilyich's personality, the features of his character, that, in my opinion, stand out in his letters to his relatives.

The first thing we notice (and this has been mentioned in the reviews of the letters published in part in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*) is the permanence of his attachment, his enduring, unchanging attitude towards the same people in the course of many long years. It is true that these are his immediate relatives, but the permanence of his affection, the steadiness and stability of his character are

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* The voting of the German Social-Democrats for war credits on August 4, 1914.

** Containing an article by Iordansky, "Let There Be Victory!" (See Letter No. 253.—*Ed.*)

clearly delineated in these letters. We can also see from the same letters the permanence of his conviction and his faith in his cause; in Vladimir Ilyich's letters to people who were close to him, such people as one could be most outspoken with, there is not the slightest vacillation or doubt, not the slightest tendency to veer in any other direction.

Nor do we see any traces of whining and despondency in him—such behaviour is, in general, not in keeping with his character—or any complaints about his position, be it in prison, in exile in Siberia or abroad, or even any sour note in his descriptions. Of course, this was also because most of the letters were addressed to mother, who had suffered so much on account of her children, a fact of which Vladimir Ilyich, who deeply loved and respected his mother, was profoundly aware. He felt that his own personal activities were causing his mother a great deal of worry and pain and as far as lay in his power he tried to make things easier for her.

His energy could be felt in letters to other members of the family as well, even to those who were at various times living apart from mother. I remember, for instance, the letters he wrote me between 1900 and 1902, when I was living abroad, and which I naturally had to destroy before I returned to Russia. I remember that his letters were always refreshing and an antidote to all depression and nervousness; they inspired enthusiasm and made one pull oneself together morally. His self-confidence did not, however, crush one; it gave one energy and an urge to greater self-fulfilment; his witty jokes filled one with the joy of living and this was the best lubrication for any kind of work. His letters display a great sensitiveness to the mood of the other person and friendly, comradely attention to him—this can be seen in his solicitude for his mother and other members of the family and his solicitude for his comrades—his questions and tales about them when he was in prison, in exile or abroad (see, for example, the letters of March 15 and April 5, 1897).

At the same time one notices the simplicity and the natural manner of Vladimir Ilyich, his great modesty, the complete absence not only of conceit and boastfulness but of any attempt to play up the services he had rendered or to

show off; and this was in his youth, when some sort of showing off is natural in a talented person. For a long time he would not agree to call his big, fundamental monograph *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, which, he said, "is too bold, too broad and promises too much ... and should be more modest" (February 13, 1899) and the argument that the book would sell better with that title he "did not like" either (January 10, 1899).*

All the labour that he devoted to the study of material for his book on philosophy and other works while in prison, in exile and later when he was abroad, the writing of legal and illegal pamphlets and articles, many of which were lost—all this labour he regarded as something perfectly natural and normal. Here his tremendous industry, his natural restraint and his tenacity in carrying through whatever he had undertaken are also apparent. The time limits fixed for *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* or for certain chapters of the book were, as a rule, kept to, as can be seen from the letters printed below.

Since he was exacting to himself he was naturally exacting to others. He always gave many instructions and insisted on their being carried out; he trained everybody who at any time worked with him in the accuracy and thoroughness that was his own. Vladimir Ilyich was always displeased with unpunctuality, with delays in work, in carrying out instructions or in answering letters. In his letters sent from exile he inveighs against Struve for his slackness in answering; in the letters of 1908-09 he expresses his displeasure with Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov for his careless reading of the proofs of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, which he had undertaken to correct, and so on.

From Vladimir Ilyich's letters we can also see his great modesty and his complete lack of fastidiousness in life, his ability to be content with little; no matter what conditions fate provided for him he always wrote that he needed nothing and was eating well—whether it was in Siberia where he had to provide everything for himself out of an allowance of eight rubles a month, or when he was living abroad and we were able to check up on him during

* See Letters Nos. 76 and 60.—*Ed.*

our rare visits and were always able to prove that he had far from enough to eat. He was always worried by the fact that his circumstances forced him to accept financial aid from mother longer than is usual, instead of helping her. On October 5, 1893, he wrote, "...The expenditure is still excessive—38 rubles in a month. Obviously I have not been living carefully; in one month I have spent a ruble and 36 kopeks on the horse trams, for instance. When I get used to the place I shall probably spend less."* Later, too, he was worried and asked mother not to send him money and not to save money from her pension when he heard that this was what she wanted to do on learning of his straitened circumstances from a letter sent to someone else (letter of January 19, 1911).

He was also embarrassed at having to take money from the Party, when his income from writing was not enough to live on. With some bitterness Vladimir Ilyich related Nadezhda Krupskaya's joke that he "must have been 'pensioned off'", when money came to him from Russia (February 15, 1917).**

For reasons of economy Vladimir Ilyich tried wherever possible to use books from libraries. He spent next to nothing on amusements; visits to theatres and concerts were so rare that they could not affect his budget (see letter of February 9, 1901). Vladimir Ilyich, indeed, preferred the open air to social forms of recreation, where there were a lot of people. "Here," he wrote from Stjernsund (Finland) on his return from the Fifth Party Congress, "you can have a wonderful rest, swimming, walking, no people and no work. No people and no work—that is the best thing for me" (June 27, 1907). The walk is a pleasure although I have to walk about 5 versts a day, an hour's walk, he wrote from Siberia in 1897.***

With their rucksacks on their backs, he and his wife would wander over the mountain slopes and passes of Switzerland. He climbed in the Alps and when he lived near Krakow he went climbing in the Tatras. It was not only such

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* Letter No. 1.—*Ed.*
** Letter No. 262.—*Ed.*
*** Letters Nos. 155 and 19.—*Ed.*

outstanding beauties of nature that attracted him; he rode or walked round the environs of big cities such as London or Munich. "We are the only people among the comrades here who are exploring *every bit* of the surrounding country. We discover various 'rural' paths, we know all the places nearby and intend to go further afield."* "We find the road to out-of-the-way places to which none of the exiles ever go." He was interested in sport-shooting, skating, cycling and chess, and engaged in these amusements with all the ingenuousness of a youth or even a boy.

He describes some of his mountain trips very vividly, if briefly—the trip to Salève near Geneva, for instance, or his Shu-shu-shu in Siberia.

In the letters there is also evidence of Vladimir Ilyich's ability to make the most of the present moment; in prison, in exile and in the worst times abroad he delved into scientific and theoretical problems, erected and strengthened, so to speak, the scientific buttresses of the cause to which he devoted his life—work for the proletarian revolution—at times when fate decreed that he must remain more or less aloof from direct participation. And when life brought him into greater contact with people—in the country, travelling, in trains—he showed his ability to take in reality, to understand the masses, to rise to generalisations from minor facts and to determine and consolidate the line that leads from theory and the general ideals of life to life as it really is and back again. He showed his ability to gather impressions from everywhere, from all conversations, from letters. We see how Vladimir Ilyich hungered after ordinary letters that simply drew a picture of the life around one without setting out to achieve any general aims, how hungry he was for them and asked for them to be sent more often.

And, lastly, we see in these letters Vladimir Ilyich's ability to maintain his composure and equilibrium both in prison and after (see the letter with his advice to our sister Maria, May 19, 1901), how, after imprisonment or various social and political disturbances that had undermined this equilibrium, he would make determined efforts to return to normal. He realised that this equilibrium was

* Letter No. 148.—*Ed.*

essential for the mental or political work that was the aim of his life. For the same reason he spent the whole three years of his exile in Shushenskoye, never asking for a transfer to a town in the way most exiles did. He wrote that temporary visits to the town were better than permanent residence there. Speaking of the suicide of Fedoseyev he wrote, "For people in exile, these 'exile scandals' are the worst thing of all." "No, don't wish me comrades from among the intellectuals in Shushenskoye—I'd rather not!" (January 24, 1898).*

In bringing to a close this brief indication of the traits and peculiarities in the character of Vladimir Ilyich which, in my opinion, are shown by the letters to his relatives published below, I hope that they will help the reader to gain a clearer picture and a closer understanding of Vladimir Ilyich as a person.

A. Ulyanova-Yelizarova

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* Letters Nos. 53 and 38.—*Ed.*

V. I. LENIN
1897

1893

1
TO HIS MOTHER[1]

October 5

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received your letter of October 2. At long last I have found myself a good room, or so it seems; there are no other lodgers and the landlady has a small family; the door between my room and their drawing-room is papered over, so that sounds are faint. The room is clean and light. There is a good entrance. Since, in addition, it is not far from the centre (only some 15 minutes' walk from the library) I am quite satisfied.

I saw Tillo yesterday and today. He did not get the ticket and, unfortunately, cannot get it because the person he was counting on is not here. Incidentally, he says that when his own position in the provisional railway administration is more secure, perhaps he will be able to. That, it seems, will not be soon.

I went to Volkov Cemetery soon after my arrival—everything, the cross and wreath, is intact.[2]

Your loving,
V. Ulyanov

Please send me some money, mine is nearly at an end.* I have been informed from Samara that the fee for the Grafov case (the Kazan case that I conducted in Samara) has been promised for November. That will give me 70 rubles (if the promise is fulfilled, and what chance there is of that, I don't know). I have been promised a job in a consulting lawyer's office here, but when that will be arranged (and whether it will be arranged) I do not know.

* I shall have to pay 10 rubles when I am appointed assistant, which should be soon.

Write and tell me about the state of your finances; did you get anything from Auntie? Did you get the September rent from Krushvits? Is there much left of the deposit (500 rubles) after moving and settling down?[3]

I am now, for the first time in St. Petersburg, keeping a cash-book to see how much I actually spend. It turned out that for the month August 28 to September 27 I spent altogether 54 rubles 30 kopeks, not including payment for things (about 10 rubles) and expenses for a court case (also about 10 rubles) which I shall probably conduct. It is true that part of this 54 rubles was spent on things that do not have to be bought every month (galoshes, clothes, books, an abacus, etc.), but even discounting that (16 rubles), the expenditure is still excessive—38 rubles in a month. Obviously I have not been living carefully; in one month I have spent a ruble and 36 kopeks on the horse trams, for instance. When I get used to the place I shall probably spend less.

Written October 5, 1893
Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

2

TO HIS SISTER MARIA[4]

Manyasha,*

I read with interest your letter of September 27 and would be very glad if you would write to me occasionally.

I have not been to the Hermitage Museum or to theatres., I somehow do not want to go alone. In Moscow I shall be glad to go to the Tretyakov Gallery and other places with you.

I read *Russkiye Vedomosti*[5]** (two weeks old) in the Public Library. When I get a job here perhaps I will subscribe to it. It is not worth while saving them for me, but I think they should not be torn up too soon—there may be something interesting that will be needed.

From what you say about the French teacher I see that if the Moscow schoolgirls are ahead of you it is not by very much. The average girl probably doesn't know the language any better than you? Write and tell me whether you spend a lot of time doing your homework.

Tell Mitya[6]*** that he should tell the bookseller to go to hell if he asks 25 rubles for Klyuchevsky—he should not pay more than 4 rubles.[7] How is Mitya getting on with his studies?

Till we meet,

Yours,

V. U.

Can you read my writing?

Written in October 1893
Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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* *Manyasha*—one of the many pet names formed from Maria.—*Ed.*

** Translations of the titles of books, articles and periodicals mentioned in the letters will be found in the Index of Literary Works and Sources given as an appendix to this volume.—*Ed.*

*** *Mitya*—the pet name for Dmitry.—*Ed.*

1894

3

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

December 13, 1894

I have not had a letter from home for a long time. How are you, Manyasha? They did write that you are going to school again.

You ought to force yourself to take a walk for about two hours every day. It is not worth while poring over your lessons so industriously—you will ruin your health.

What do you do apart from school work? What are you reading? Do you see M. I.?* Is she going to the Crimea or not? And write to me, if it is convenient, about what happened to Klyuchevsky at the University. They say he delivered a lecture of some sort and then published a book. I have not seen even the title of the book—it would be interesting to know about it.[8]

How is your new acquaintanceship proceeding?

Yours,
V. U.

I wrote a long time ago asking someone to find out about Volume III of *Capital*. It has been promised me (an acquaintance,** whom Mark[9] knows). Now I do not know anything. Will he fulfil his promise? Does he still promise or does he now refuse? I should like to know because it is not easy to get that book. Tell Mark this, please.

Regards to everybody.

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* Did she get my letter?

** It is not known who is referred to. It may have been R. E. Zimmermann (Gvozdyov), whom Mark Yelizarov knew in Samara, or it may have been V. A. Yonov.—*Ed.*

Is Mother well? Kiss her for me.

I shall be expecting a letter from you.

Tell Anyuta[10]* I have been to Al. Andreyevich and it was a waste of time. He has received a promise and is waiting, but whether he will wait in vain or not, nobody knows.

Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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* *Anyuta*—one of the many pet names formed from Anna.—*Ed.*

4

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

December 24

Manyasha,

At last I have found time to answer your letter of the 15th.

I cannot agree with your views of the school and your studies.

First—the doctor said don't go till Christmas and you think it will not be convenient to miss your lessons. People miss months, not only weeks; it will not be any better if you have to take to your bed by the spring.

Secondly—you write that either you will stop studying altogether or, if you go on, you can't be "just off-hand about it". It seems to me that the main thing now is to *graduate*. For that there is no sense in working extra hard; what does it matter if you get threes* and an occasional two* by way of exception? In any case you will get your remove since you had good marks in the first and second terms. And that is all you need. Moreover, since you did everything thoroughly at the beginning, you will finish up well even if you do no homework. You must agree that those who go all the way through with threes do not, first, do their homework and, second, do not know the first thing about the subject. [At least that is how it was at my school.] So you will have an advantage over them.

It seems to me that your only chance of finishing the course is to be "off-hand" about it. If you don't, you will be seriously ill by summer.

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* In Russian schools a mark of "three"=fair, "two"=poor.—*Ed.*

If you cannot take things easy, then it is better to give up studying and go abroad. You will always be able to graduate and a trip now will freshen you up, enliven you, and get you away from moping at home. You will have a chance to look around and stay on there to learn something more interesting than Ilovaisky's *History* or Filaret's *Catechism* (?).

Do you take good walks now? Probably not. Why shouldn't you go skating? Again you'll say, "It's dull". But you must not allow yourself to get so weak—that will be even less "amusing". You must force yourself.

About Shelgunov, I agree with you that some of his things are out of date. Which of his articles do you like? On Russian or historical problems? On economics or philosophy?

Yours,
V. U.

Written December 24, 1894
Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

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the original

1895

5

TO HIS MOTHER

Salzburg, May 14 (2), 1895

I am making use of a two-hour stop at a small Austrian town (not far,* now, from my destination) to fulfil my promise to write on the way.[11]

This is my second day of travel abroad and I am practising the language; I have discovered that I am weak at this and have the greatest difficulty in understanding the Germans—or rather, *I don't understand them at all.*** I ask the guard on the train a question, he answers and I don't understand him. He repeats the answer more loudly. I still don't understand, and so he gets angry and goes away. In spite of this disgraceful fiasco I am not discouraged and continue distorting the German language with some zeal.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

I shall probably not be able to write another letter very soon.

Sent to Moscow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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* A little over 24 hours.

** Their pronunciation is so strange and they speak so quickly that I do not understand even the simplest words.



M. A. ULYANOVA
1898

6

TO HIS MOTHER

May 20 (8)

I wrote the last letter on the way here. Now I have settled down in one place. I do not think, however, that it will be for long as I shall be moving on somewhere.

The scenery here is splendid, I am enjoying it all the time. The Alps began immediately after the little German station I wrote to you from; then came the lakes and I could not tear myself away from the window of the railway carriage; if I could find out something about local conditions and prices (one could surely put up cheaply in the country districts) it would perhaps be possible to spend the summer here. The fare is not much and the scenery is splendid.

I have seen my god-daughter and her family.[12] We spoke, incidentally, on the subject of prices which Mark raised.* I seems that servants are very expensive here—25 to 30 francs a month, all found—and they have to be fed well.

Have you found a place for the summer at last? I do not need the address, I suppose, because I can always write to Mark, but I should like....**

Written May 20, 1895
Sent from Switzerland to Moscow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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the original

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* I am now fixed up... (The continuation of the footnote was on the second page of the letter which has been lost.—*Ed.*)

** The rest of the letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

7

TO HIS MOTHER

Paris, 8 juin 95

I received your letter just before I left for Paris. It is a pity things turned out so badly over Mitya's illness; I don't understand how they can refuse to postpone his examination if he has a doctor's certificate to the effect that he has been ill. Why doesn't he want to take the matter further? Why should he lose a year?

Manyasha is probably finishing or has finished her examinations by now. She ought to have a good rest this summer.

I am only just beginning to look round me a bit in Paris; it is a huge city, spread out a good deal, so that the suburbs (where I spend most of my time) give you no idea of the centre. It makes a very pleasant impression—broad, light streets, many boulevards, and lots of greenery; the people are quite unrestrained in their manners—at first it comes as rather a surprise after one had been accustomed to the sedateness and primness of St. Petersburg.

I shall have to spend several weeks here to see it properly.

Lodgings here are very cheap; for instance, 30 to 35 francs a month for two rooms and a kitchen, 6 to 10 francs a week for a furnished room—so I hope to get fixed up without spending too much.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Are you satisfied with your place in the country?*

Sent to Moscow

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* The end of the letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

8

TO HIS MOTHER

18 juillet (July 6), 1895

I wrote my last letter, unless I am mistaken, on the 8th. Since then I have wandered about quite a lot and have landed up at a Swiss spa; I have decided to take advantage of the fact and get down seriously to the treatment of the illness (stomach) that I am so fed up with, especially as the doctor who runs the place has been strongly recommended to me as a specialist in his field. I have been living at this spa for several days and feel not at all bad; the board is excellent and the treatment seems to be effective, so I hope to get away from here in four or five days. The cost of living here, as far as I can see, is very high; treatment is still more expensive, and I have already exceeded my budget and no longer expect to manage on my own resources. If you can, send me another 100 rubles or so to this address: *Suisse*, *Zürich*. Parterre. Seilergraben, 37. *H-n Grünfest*[13] [*nothing else*; there is no need for anything to be passed on to me].* In any case I shall await an answer at this address and shall not send you my address because it would be useless—anyway, I shall be leaving here before I get an answer.

How did you enjoy your journey down the Volga? What was new there? Is everybody well? A letter has probably been sent me, but I have not yet received it [the last news I had was from Mark, in Paris—a postcard], because I have

* The best way to send money is in a registered envelope, through the post.

been on the move all the time. If it was sent to the Paris address I shall receive it.

Are you having a hot summer? Here it is very hot, but I am now living in a good place, a long way from the town, amid greenery and close to a big lake.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Switzerland to Moscow

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9

TO HIS MOTHER

Berlin, den 10. August 1895

I do not know whether you received my last letter which I sent from here about a week ago. I will repeat my address, just in case: Berlin, Moabit, Flensburgerstrasse, 12[II] (bei Frau Kurreick) Herrn W. Ulianoff.

I am fixed up here very well—a few steps away from me is the Tiergarten (a splendid park, the best and biggest in Berlin), the Spree, where I bathe every day, and a station of the urban railway. There is a railway here that traverses the whole town (above the streets). The trains run every five minutes, so it is easy for me to go "to town" (Moabit, where I am living, is actually considered a suburb).

The only bad thing is the language—I understand far less conversational German than French. The pronunciation of the Germans is so unlike what I am accustomed to that I do not even understand public speeches, although in France I understood practically everything in such speeches from the very outset. The day before yesterday I was at the theatre; they played Hauptmann's *The Weavers*. Although I had read the whole play beforehand in order to be able to follow it, I could not catch all the phrases. Still, I am not discouraged and only regret that I have too little time to study the language thoroughly.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

If you have already sent me some money, please write and let me know immediately; if not, send it here.

I have had no letters from you for such a long time, probably because they (the letters) are following me around in my wanderings.

Sent to Moscow

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10

TO HIS MOTHER

August 29, 1895

I received your letter a few days ago, Mother dearest, and today I also got a letter from Mark to whom I am writing a short postscript.

I am still living in the same way and am so far pleased with Berlin. I feel very well—perhaps the regular life [I got tired of moving from place to place and, travelling like that, I did not manage to eat properly or regularly], the bathing and so on, according to doctor's orders, are having their effect. I am still working in the Königliche Bibliothek* and in the evenings I wander about studying the Berlin mores and listening to German speech. I am now getting used to it and understand it somewhat better than before, but still very, very poorly.

I am lazy about visiting the Berlin Sehenswürdigkeiten**; I have little taste for such things in general and in most cases have seen them only by accident. In general, I much prefer wandering around and seeing the evening amusements and pastimes of the people to visiting museums, theatres, shopping centres, etc.

I do not think I shall be staying here long—"visiting is all very well, but there is no place like home".

I am going to remain here for a while, however, and to my great horror see that I am again in financial "difficulties"; the "temptation" to buy books, etc., is so great that

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* Royal Library (Ger.).—*Ed.*

** Sights (Ger.).—*Ed.*

the devil alone knows where the money goes. I must again appeal for "philanthropy"; if you can, send me from 50 to 100 rubles.

Mark writes that your housing situation is tragic—there is nothing at all to let. In this respect Moscow, it seems, is worse than St. Petersburg. All this bother about a flat is very unpleasant. I hope you soon get it settled.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Sent from Berlin to Moscow

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11

TO HIS MOTHER

September 7 (August 26), 1895

Today I received your letter with the money, Mother dearest, and thank you for it. I am surprised to hear of such a great difference in the weather; you write that it is cold in Moscow, but here it is hotter than it was all through August, so I thought you were probably still living in the country.

There have been no changes in my way of life here and I have got so used to it that I feel myself almost at home and would willingly stay longer; but the time has come to leave and I am beginning to think of various practical problems like buying things and a suitcase, and about tickets, etc. Is there anything I can bring you? I can buy anything here in some big shop; it seems to me manufactured goods here are cheaper than ours and probably better. Perhaps Mitya needs some books—let him write [for instance he may need some album of anatomy, or something else to do with medicine] and Manyasha, too. If she has nothing in mind, you or Anyuta advise me what to bring her. I feel I should be buying all sorts of stuff....*

Sent from Berlin to Moscow

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* The rest of the letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

12

TO HIS MOTHER

December 5, 1895

I received a letter from Anyuta yesterday, Mother dearest, in which she told me that you are thinking of going with the Ardashevs[14] to Kazan, and I hasten to write to you.

The Ardashevs intended leaving today. D. A. has suggested that I take on the business of proving one of his relatives' right to an inheritance, although we have not yet come to a complete agreement.

Life goes on as usual. I am not very pleased with the room, first, because of the landlady's fault-finding, and second—it seems that the next room is separated from mine by only a thin partition, so that everything can be heard and sometimes I have to run away from the balalaika with which my neighbour amuses himself right in my ear. Up to now, this has fortunately not happened very often. He is out most of the time, and then the rooms are very quiet.

I do not yet know whether I shall stay here for another month.[15] I'll see. In any case when the lease of my room runs out at Christmas it will not be difficult to find another.

The weather is very fine here now and my new overcoat is just right for this season.*

Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

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* The rest of the letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

1896

13

TO A. K. CHEBOTARYOVA[16]

January 2, 1896

I have a plan that has occupied my mind ever since I was arrested, and the more I think of it the more interested I become. I have long been engaged on a certain economic problem (on the sale of manufactured goods on the home market). I had gathered some literature on the subject, drawn up a plan of operations, and had even written something, expecting to publish as a book if the size exceeds that of an article for a journal. I am very anxious not to abandon this work but I am apparently now faced with the alternative—either write it here or give it up altogether.

I am well aware that the plan to write it here will meet with many serious obstacles. Perhaps, however, it is worth while trying.

Obstacles that one might call "independent" will, I think, be removed. Prisoners are allowed to do literary work; I made a special point of asking the prosecutor about this, although I knew beforehand (even convicts in prison are allowed to write). He also confirmed that there is no limit to the number of books I may receive. Books, moreover, may be returned; consequently one can make use of libraries. And so everything is all right from that point of view.

There are other, more serious obstacles—getting the books. I need a lot of books—I am giving a list below of those which I have in mind at present—and to obtain them will require a considerable amount of trouble. I do not even know whether they can all be obtained. It will probably be all right to count on the library of the Free Economic Society,[17]*

* I have taken books from there and left a deposit of 16 rubles.

which allows books to be taken away for two months on payment of a deposit, but that library is not very complete. If it were possible to use (through some writer or professor*) the University library or the library of the learned committee of the Ministry of Finance, the question of obtaining books would be settled. Some books would have to be bought, of course, and I think I can allot a certain sum for that.

The last and most difficult problem is that of delivering the books. It is not merely a matter of bringing a couple of books or so; at regular intervals, over a lengthy period they will have to be obtained from the libraries, brought here** and taken back. That is something I do not yet know how to arrange. Unless it can be done this way—find some door porter or janitor, or a messenger or some boy whom I could pay to go for books. The exchange of books—because of the conditions under which I work and also because of the terms on which books are lent from the library—would, of course, have to be done correctly and punctually, so all that must be arranged.

"Easier said than done"…. I have a very strong feeling that this business will not be easy to carry out and that my "plan" may turn out to be more fantasy. Perhaps you will think it useful to pass this letter on to somebody, to get some advice—and I will await an answer.

The book list is divided into the two parts into which my essay is divided: A. The general theoretical part. This requires fewer books and I hope, at any rate, to write this part, even though it requires greater preparation. B. The application of theoretical postulates to Russian data. This part requires very many books. The chief difficulties will be caused by (1) publications of local authorities—some of them, incidentally, I have; some can be ordered (minor monographs) and some can be obtained through statisticians with whom we, are acquainted; (2) government publications—the records made by commissions, the reports and.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* Lenin had in mind P. B. Struve, A. N. Potresov and their connections.—*Ed.*

** I think that once a fortnight would be enough, or perhaps, even, once a month—if a larger number of books were delivered at a time.

minutes of congresses, etc. This is very important; it is more difficult to get these. Some of them, probably most of them, are in the library of the Free Economic Society.

The list I am appending is a long one, because it is drawn up for work on an extensive scale.* If it should turn out that certain books, or certain classes of books, cannot be obtained, I shall have to narrow down the subject somewhat to suit the situation. This is quite possible, especially as concerns the second part.

I have omitted from the list books that are in the library here; those that I have are marked with a cross.

Since I am quoting from memory I may have mixed up some of the titles and in such cases I have placed (?) against them.**

Sent from the remand prison
in St. Petersburg

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* If it is possible to work on this scale, the list will, of course, be considerably extended in the course of the work.

** The list of books appended to the letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

14

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

January 12, 1896

I got your parcel yesterday and just before yours somebody else brought me food of all kinds, so I have now got quite a stock—I could, for instance, start trading in tea, but I don't think it would be allowed because I should certainly win the competition with the shop here. I eat very little bread, I try to maintain something of a diet—and you brought such enormous quantities that I think it will last me almost a week and get as hard as the Sunday pie at Oblomovka.[18]

I now have everything I need, and even more than I need.* My health is quite satisfactory. I even get my mineral water here—it is brought to me from the chemists' on the day I order it. I sleep about nine hours a day and see various chapters of my future book in my sleep.

Is Mother well, and all the rest of our family? Give my regards to everyone.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

If you should happen to be here at any time, please bring me a pencil, one with the lead in a metal holder. The ordinary pencils, made of wood, are a nuisance here—knives are not allowed. I have to ask the warders to sharpen pencils

* Someone, for instance, brought me a frock coat, waistcoat and travelling rug. All this was immediately "dispatched" to the storeroom as superfluous.

and they don't do such jobs willingly and never without procrastination.

I should like to get the enema in an oval box that is* in the drawer of my wardrobe. This should not be impossible, even without a letter of attorney; push 25 kopeks into the landlady's hand and tell her to take a cab and come here to deliver it and *get a signature for it*. Unfortunately, however, this highly respected matron is as stubborn as Korobochka.** At present there is no urgent need of it, so it is not worth buying one.

Sent from the remand prison
in St. Petersburg

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

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* Perhaps it would be better to say "was".

** A character from Gogol's *Dead Souls* who haggled over the price she was to receive for serfs long dead.—*Ed*.

15

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

January 14, 1896

Yesterday I received your letter of the 12th and am sending you a second letter of attorney. Actually I am not sure it is necessary; yesterday I got some of my things, which made me think my first letter giving power of attorney had been received. In any case I am sending one, in answer to your letter and Alexandra Kirillovna's. Now I have underclothes and everything—*quite enough*; do not send any underclothes as there is nowhere to keep them. But they can be sent to the storeroom, so as to end the matter once and for all.

I am very thankful to A. K. for the trouble she took about the dentist; I am ashamed of having caused so much bother. The dentist does not require a special pass because the prosecutor has already given permission and I did not even write to the dentist until I had received it. The day and time he comes does not matter. I cannot guarantee that I will not be absent—under interrogation, for instance—but I think the sooner he comes the greater the chance of avoiding that obstacle, which is not likely to occur in any case. I shall not write to Mr. Dobkovich (the dentist, assistant to Vazhinsky); he lives next to my former lodgings (Gorekhovaya, 59) and perhaps you will go to him and explain matters.

Regarding my own books, I have sent a list of those I should like to get.* Thanks for the books by Golovin and Schippel sent yesterday. From my own books I must add

* The book list has been lost.—*Ed.*

only *dictionaries*. I am doing a translation from the German* and would ask you to send me Pavlovsky's dictionary.

I was sent some underclothes, apparently not mine; they must be returned. When you are here you must ask them to bring you the underclothes and things I don't need—and I will hand them over.

I am quite well.

V. Ulyanov

I am very glad to hear that Mother and Mark are better now.

Sent from the remand prison
in St. Petersburg

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

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* It has not been established what translation this refers to.—*Ed.*

16

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

January 16, 1896

Yesterday I received your letter of the 14th and hasten to answer it, although there is not much hope of your receiving my reply before Thursday.[19]

I have already written about the need to return some underclothes that do not belong to me. I have got the things together and you must now *ask for* them when you are here, or tell whoever comes to ask for them in your name. I am not returning all of the things, because some are in the wash (perhaps you will ask somebody to get the rest later); I have allowed myself to keep, for the time being, a travelling rug that has done me excellent service here.

I have obtained information about the books; a small box may be left in the storeroom here.* It is not, of course, worth while sending all my books here. Some of the books in the list you sent me are not mine—for example, *Fabrichnaya promyshlennost*, *Kobelyatsky*—these are Alexandra Kirillovna's and I think I took another book from her. Then the publications of the Saratov Zemstvo[20] and the Zemstvo statistical reports for Voronezh Gubernia were lent me, I believe, by some statistician. Perhaps you will find out whether they can be kept for a time. It is not worth while bringing them here. *Pogozhev* and *Sbornik obyazatelnikh postanovleni po SPB* are not mine either, I think (could they be from the library?). The legal codes and

* You can put a few clothes in there, too—an overcoat and suit, a hat. The waistcoat, frock coat and rug that were brought me can be taken back.

textbooks are obviously not needed at all. At the moment the only books I should like you to bring me are *Ricardo*, *Beltov*, *N.—on*, *Ingram*, and *Foville*. The Zemstvo publications (Tver, Nizhny Novgorod and Saratov) should be counted and be tied up in a bundle,* but do not bother to list them; I think you can also deliver that bundle to the storeroom. Then you will be finished with my books and not have to bother about them again. I shall be able to get the books from the storeroom (after they have been examined).

I am afraid I am causing you too much trouble. Please do not work too hard, especially in delivering books according to the list; there will be time for everything, and at the moment I have enough books.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Please add some pillow-slips and towels to the list of linen.

I am re-reading Shelgunov with interest and am busy with Tugan-Baranovsky; he has published a sound piece of research but his diagrams, those at the end, for instance, are so confused that I must confess I do not understand them; I shall have to get Volume II of *Capital*.

Sent from the remand prison
in St. Petersburg

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* together with the *Military Statistical Returns* and the *Summary*.

1897

17

TO HIS MOTHER

Ob Station. March 2[21]

I am writing to you once more while I am on my way, Mother dearest. The halt here is a long one and there is nothing to do, and I have decided to write yet another letter en route, my third. I still have two more days' journey ahead of me. I drove across the Ob in a horse-sleigh and bought tickets to Krasnoyarsk. Since traffic here is still "temporary", I had to pay the old rates, which meant handing over 10 rubles for a ticket and 5 rubles for luggage for something like 700 versts! The way the trains run here is beyond all bounds. To do that 700 versts we shall crawl for forty-eight hours. Beyond Krasnoyarsk, the railway goes only as far as Kansk, i.e., for 220 versts—and altogether to Irkutsk it is about 1,000 versts. And so I shall have to go on by road—*if I have to go at all*. Another 24 hours is taken up by those 220 versts on the railway; the further you go, the slower the trains crawl along.

You have to use a horse-sleigh to cross the Ob because the bridge is not ready, although its skeleton has been built. The crossing was not too bad—but I was able to manage without warm (or rather the warmest) clothing only because it was a short one—less than an hour. If I have to go to my destination by road (and I most probably shall have to), I shall obviously have to acquire a sheepskin coat, felt boots and even, perhaps, a fur cap (you see how spoiled I was in Russia! But how else am I expected to travel by sleigh?).

Despite the devilish slowness of the journey it has tired me far less than I expected. I may even say that I am hardly tired at all. I am surprised at this myself, because before

this a journey of some three days from Samara to St. Petersburg would wear me out. The fact of the matter most probably is that I sleep very well every night without exception. The country covered by the West-Siberian Railway that I have just travelled throughout its entire length (1,300 versts from Chelyabinsk to Krivoshchokovo—three days) is astonishingly monotonous—bare, bleak steppe. No sign of life, no towns, very rarely a village or a patch of forest—and for the rest, all steppe. Snow and sky—and nothing else for the whole three days. They say that further on there will be taiga, and after that, beginning at Achinsk, mountains. The air in the steppe, however, is wonderful; breathing is so easy. There is a hard frost, more than twenty degrees below, but it is easier to bear here than in Russia. It does not seem to me that it is twenty below. The Siberians say it is because the air is "soft", and that makes the frost easier to bear. Quite probably it is so.

In the train I met the *Arzt** that Anyuta visited in St. Petersburg. I learned a few things from him about Krasnoyarsk, etc., that will be useful to me. He said that I should definitely be able to stay there for a few days. That is what I think of doing, in order to find out what my position in the future will be. If I send a telegram "staying a few days" that will mean that the length of my stay is not known even to me. And so I shall wait there for the doctor,** meet him, and if I do have to go on to Irkutsk, we shall go together. According to that same person, I cannot expect any delay in my being appointed a place; most probably it has been decided already because the whole thing is arranged beforehand. And so, until next time.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.

P.S. Accuse me of anything you like except infrequent letters! When *there is something to write about*—I write very often.

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* V. M. Krutovsky.—*Ed.*
** Y. M. Lyakhovsky.—*Ed.*

My talk with the *Arzt* has made very much clear to me (even if only approximately), and for this reason I feel quite calm; I have left my nervousness behind in Moscow. It was due to the uncertainty, nothing more. Now there is less uncertainty and I therefore feel better.

Written on March 2, 1897
Sent to Moscow

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18

TO HIS SISTER MARIA[22]

Manyasha,

I got your letter from the doctor and was very glad to have some news from home. I have received the bag Mother sent and think it will be very convenient. I shall probably take advantage of your proposal to make extracts from books in the Rumyantsev Library.[23] Yesterday I managed to find the famous local library belonging to Yudin, who gave me a hearty welcome and showed me his collection. He gave me permission to work in the library and I think I shall be able to. (There are two obstacles in the way; first, his library is outside the town, although the distance is short, about two versts, so it will make a pleasant walk; second, the library is not fully organised, so I may be a nuisance to the owner by making frequent requests for books.) We'll see how it works out in practice. I think the second obstacle, too, will be removed. I have not seen all his library by far, but in any case it is an excellent collection of books. There are, for example, complete sets of journals (the most important) from the end of the eighteenth century up to date. I hope I shall be able to make use of them for the information I need so much for my work.

I see from the newspapers that in the spring fast trains will be coming here—8 days from Paris* to Krasnoyarsk, which means six days from Moscow. It will then be much more convenient to correspond.

Yours,
V. U.

Written on March 10, 1897
Sent from Krasnoyarsk to Moscow

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* Obviously St. Petersburg was meant.—*Ed.*

19

TO HIS MOTHER

March 15, 1897

All this time I have been on the look-out for letters from you, Mother dearest, but so far in vain; enquiries at the post office tell me nothing. I am beginning to think that you have not written to me because you are waiting for the telegram I did not manage to send on arrival. In view of the great length of postage time between us (i.e., letters taking too long en route), you must write without waiting for an address. If I am sent away from here I will leave word at the post office for letters to be forwarded. So please write to me more often to the last address known to you—I am miserable without letters from home. All I have had is Manyasha's note, brought by the doctor.

Today I said good-bye to the doctor. He went on to Irkutsk. He was not allowed to stay here any longer, i.e., the local authorities would not allow it. So far I am not being troubled and I do not think they can bother me because I have sent an application to the Governor-General and am now awaiting a reply. Incidentally, it is not absolutely impossible that I, too, shall have to make that journey. In these parts the spring thaw is considered to begin from today and a journey by post horses becomes more expensive and more difficult. The weather is excellent, real spring weather. I spend my time here in two ways—first, in visiting Yudin's library, and second, in getting to know the town of Krasnoyarsk and its inhabitants (many of them exiles).[24] I go to the library every day and since it is two versts from the outskirts of the town I have to walk some five versts; it takes about an hour. I am very glad to have the walk and enjoy it, although it sometimes makes me quite

sleepy. There turned out to be far fewer books on my subject in the library than might have been expected from its general size; nevertheless there are some that are useful to me and I am very glad that I do not have to waste my time here completely. I also visit the town library, where I can see journals and newspapers that arrive here on the eleventh day after publication, but I cannot get used to such old "news". If I have to live a few hundred versts from here, the post will take still longer and it will be still more necessary to write frequently without waiting for a reply; if you wait for a reply it will be more than a month!

It is a great pity nothing is known about the party.[25] I have quite given up expecting a telegram from Anyuta and have decided that either she has not been able to find out anything, or that there has been a delay. I have heard that no more columns are to come here on foot, which means that the party will come by rail. If that is so, I cannot understand why they are being delayed in Moscow. Will it be possible to pass books on? Food? Letters? If these questions are not too late I should be very glad to get an answer to them from Anyuta.

March 16. I missed the post yesterday. The train for Russia leaves here late at night, but the station is a long way away.

Many kisses for you and my regards to everyone. Tomorrow, perhaps, I shall try at last to send off to Anyuta the books that were borrowed for a short time.

Yours,
V. U.

Did my letter with the address arrive? Just in case, I shall repeat it—Bolshekachenskaya Street, House of Klavdiya Popova. You may also write *Poste restante* and I will ask for letters at the post office. When I leave here, letters will be forwarded.

Sent from Krasnoyarsk to Moscow

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20

TO HIS MOTHER

March 26, 1897

At last, Mother dearest, I have received news of you and am very glad. First, I have received a telegram in answer to mine. I had inquired at the station but there was nothing there. The *Schwester** found your letter there later, and Anyuta's must, therefore, have been lost. Secondly, I got a telegram just after nine yesterday evening saying they were leaving, was overjoyed about it and ran headlong to the *Schwester* to share my joy with her. Now we are counting the days and are "travelling" by the mailtrain that left Moscow on the 25th. The last telegram I understood to mean that they are travelling at their own expense, otherwise it would not have been signed by Glob. I think he has also sent a telegram to his mother[26] in Chelyabinsk, otherwise he might travel past her while she is sitting and waiting for news! (The *Schwester*'s letter to her was posted not long ago, so she will probably not yet have left.) I am very thankful to Manyasha for her letter and for the extracts from letters received. I am enclosing herewith a reply to one of those extracts—let Manyasha deal with it as before. I count on exploiting her further for letter-writing and even for literary work. You may send me books and letters here; I don't know yet when they'll chase me out and whore to. It would probably be better to send them to the *Schwester*, and register the more important ones for there seems to be a terrible lot of carelessness at the post office here and letters, apparently, get lost (to that, I suppose, must be added outside hindrances**).

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* A. M. Rosenberg, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's sister.—*Ed.*

** A reference to the tsarist censorship.—*Ed.*

There is nothing new I can write about myself; my life goes on as usual. I stroll to the library outside town, I stroll in the neighbourhood, I stroll round to my acquaintances and sleep enough for two—in short, everything is as it should be.

Yours,
V. U.

I am sending Anyuta a list of those books I should very much like to obtain and which, it seems, can be bought only in the St. Petersburg second-hand bookshops, so you will have to write to the director* and ask him to do it or get somebody else to. I am very angry with myself for getting one name wrong (or rather, one year) in a letter from the remand prison, and making Anyuta travel about for nothing. Could not a search also be made in the Moscow libraries? Perhaps they are to be found somewhere.

1. *Yezhegodnik Ministerstva finansov*, St. Petersburg, 1869, First Issue.

2. *Statistichesky vremennik Rossiiskoi imperii*, published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior.

Second Series, Sixth Issue: *Materialy dlya statistiki fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti v Yevropeiskoi Rossii za 1868 god.* Edited by I. Bock. St. Petersburg, 1872.

3. *Statistichesky atlas glavneishikh otraslei fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti Yevropeiskoi Rossii s poimennym spiskom fabrik i zavodov.* Compiled by *D. Timiryazev.* Third Issue. St. Petersburg, 1873 (I found the first two issues here in Yudin's library. The original price of the three books was (1) 2 rubles, (2) 1 ruble and (3) 1 ruble 50 kopeks, but they are not on sale).

Sent from Krasnoyarsk to Moscow

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* S. I. Radchenko.—*Ed.*

21

TO HIS MOTHER

April 5, 1897

Today there was good news, Mother dearest, and I hasten to tell you about it. First, I received a telegram from the doctor in Irkutsk, "Hear you being sent Minusinsk". Secondly, A. M. has at last learned the Governor-General's reply—Gleb and Basil are also being sent to Minusinsk District. E. E. will be arriving tomorrow and will press for their release and also ask permission for them to travel at their own expense. I expect she will succeed (judging by precedents we know of).[27]

I am very pleased with my place of exile (if the rumours prove true, and I do not think they are wrong) because Minusinsk and its district are the best in these parts both on account of the excellent climate and the low cost of living. The distance from Krasnoyarsk is not very great, the post goes there two or three times a week, so that to send a letter and get an answer will take 30 to 35 days instead of the present 22 or 23 days—no more. I do not expect I shall be able to leave before the river is open to navigation, because the spring thaw and floods are now at their height. and the party on its way, to Irkutsk is being kept here until May. When the river is open to navigation it is possible to go to Minusinsk by steamer.

It is a great pity no attempt was made to get Anatoly Alexandrovich sent to Minusinsk District, too; it would be very, very good for him after the pleurisy he has had. We sent a telegram to St. Petersburg asking them to set things going; since there has been a delay of the whole party there is now ample time, so we may hope they will

be able to get him sent there if they tackle the job energetically.

For the time being letters should, of course, be sent to me at the old address; if I go away I will leave the new address and they will be sent on to me. I think you can send my books on now, without waiting for the final address; in any case you cannot send goods to Minusinsk (there is no carrier's office there), and they take a long time to come here by rail. So send them here, to A. M.'s address, if no other, or, better still, addressed to the bearer of the receipt, and send the receipt by registered post to A. M. From here the goods can be sent on to Minusinsk by boat in the spring.

They say that Gleb and Basil look very ill—pale, yellow and terribly tired. They will probably get better when they come out.

I am in good health and am living quite well; the weather is marvellous. I intend to write Manyasha a letter in a "literary" vein; I do not know, however, whether that intention will be put into effect. I have seen *Novoye Slovo*[28] and read it with great pleasure.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Krasnoyarsk to Moscow

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22

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

April 17, 1897

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received three of your letters. Today I collected some detailed information about the villages we are being sent to (officially I have not yet been informed of this[29]). I am going to the village of Shushenskoye (I think I spelt it wrongly in previous letters—Shushinskoye). It is a big village with more than fifteen hundred inhabitants, where there are the volost council, the office of the Zemstvo assessor (he is the same as a superintendent of police in Russia, but has greater powers), a school, etc. The village stands on the right bank of the Yenisei, fifty-six versts to the south of Minusinsk. Since the volost authorities are quartered there the post will be fairly regular—I have heard there is a post twice a week. You go by steamer to Minusinsk (the steamers do not go further up the Yenisei) and by horse transport the rest of the way. Today the ice broke on the Yenisei, so in seven to ten days the steamers will probably begin and I expect to leave at the end of April or the beginning of May. You can and should write to my present address,* because I shall leave a request to forward my letters when I go. I cannot, however, tell you exactly when I shall be going. Gleb and Basil are going to the village of Tesinskoye, also the seat of a volost council, etc., thirty-seven versts to the north of Minusinsk on the River Tuba (a right tributary of the Yenisei). A telegram about them was sent to the Police

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* I now receive all your letters regularly. The first must have been lost at the station where there is not much order.

Department today asking for permission for them to travel at their own expense. I hope the permission will be granted at the mother's request, she is ill all the time here, and then we shall go to Minusinsk together. I shall, therefore, spend the summer in "Siberian Italy", as the people here call the south of Minusinsk District. I cannot yet say whether this name is deserved or not, but people say that the Krasnoyarsk region is not so good. The environs along the River Yenisei of even this town, incidentally, remind me of Zhiguli or of Swiss scenery; I have recently taken a number of walks (the days were quite warm here and the roads are already dry) and have enjoyed them very much. I should have enjoyed them more if it were not for thoughts of our Turukhansk people and our Minusinsk prisoners.[30]

I live very well here; I have comfortable lodgings, and am especially pleased with the full board. For my work I have obtained some books on statistics (I think I have already written about that*) but I do not do much work; mostly I just roam about the place.

Thank Manyasha for her letter; I have given her so much work now that I am afraid she will get fed up with figures.[31] My books should be sent to Krasnoyarsk to be delivered to the bearer of the receipt (either by goods train or through a carrier's office, whichever is better) and I will then ask acquaintances to send them on to Minusinsk, and there again I shall have to look for acquaintances—there is no other way.

Why is Mitya thinking of going where there is plague?[32] If he is so anxious to travel and practice medicine I am ready to suggest a place at some resettlement centre. In Eastern Siberia, for instance. I have heard, *incidentally*, that a resettlement centre is to be opened in "my" village of Shushenskoye, Minusinsk District, Yenisei Gubernia.... So he is welcome. We can go shooting together—if only Siberia can manage to make a sportsman out of me, and if he does not find work (and shooting) for himself in places not so far distant.... Ho, ho! If in three weeks and a bit I have become such a Siberian that I am inviting people from "Russia", what shall I be like in three years? All

* See Letters Nos. 19 and 20.—*Ed.*

jokes aside, however, I really am surprised at his "plague" plans; I hope there will not be any plague, and that he will not have to go there.

Yours,
V. U.

Anyuta,

About books—how to send them, see above. What to send? If I get a fee of some 150 rubles[33] (perhaps in three doses, a teaspoonful every hour—every month, that is), then you can spend some on books. Then buy me the last three issues of *Promysly Vladimirskoi gubernii* (3 rubles 75 kopeks), *Vliyaniye urozhayev*, *etc.*, by Chuprov and Posnikov (5 rubies), *Ukazatel fabrik i zavodov za 1890 god*, St. Petersburg, 1894 (5 rubles?). I will give you further titles later—depending on the size of the fee, which need not be sent all at once (to the *Schwester*, of course). Write and tell the writer* that I should be very glad if he would let me have part of my fee, and if he would agree to send me books instead of money—Russian and foreign, some for review and others for myself. He knows the subjects I am interested in and he could send the books to you. I should be glad to take all sorts of things for translation and could distribute them among the people in Minusinsk and Turukhansk** (not very urgent), taking the organisation of the work upon myself and guaranteeing its timely and correct fulfilment. That, however, is something special, but I should very much like to arrange for the fees to be paid in books—*only if that will not be too much trouble for the writer**** (add this, word for word).

I think I shall have to subscribe to journals and newspapers—there probably will not be anything in Shushenskoye. Depending on available finances, you may subscribe to

* Here and further the "writer" (*écrivain*) referred to is P. B. Struve.—*Ed.*

** etc. Fedoseyev has been sent, I have been told, to the town of Kirensk in Irkutsk Gubernia.

*** I rely entirely on his choice, and this method of payment interests me because it is the only way for me to receive *immediately* important new publications; the timeliness of articles and reviews is very important in magazine work. If I must first find out here and then order by post, the delay will be five weeks, minimum (!!!).

Russkiye Vedomosti, *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, *Vestnik Finansov*[34] (without any supplements), *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*.[35] That makes quite a lot, so they may be ordered only if there are big receipts. If money is short, *Russkiye Vedomosti* will, perhaps, be enough. You will see for yourself, especially when I write from Shushenskoye and inform you of my budget. (I believe you are angry with the *écrivain*; when you write to him in my name, do not show it. I bear no "*rancune*"* because of the loss of my last "literature".** It was not his fault at all.)

Send my best regards to the Bulochkins.[36] Why do you not write about them in greater detail? What sort of *finale* was there? Could there have been none at all? That would be excellent. If opportunity offers, give my regards to other acquaintances, the bookseller and others.

V. U.

I hope you will inform me beforehand when you intend to go to the West, so that I shall have time to write to you and give you many, many things to do for me.

Sent from Krasnoyarsk to Moscow

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* Grudge, malice (Fr.).—*Ed.*

** It is not known what this refers to.—*Ed.*

23

TO HIS MOTHER

Minusinsk, May 7, 1897

We arrived here, Mother dearest, only yesterday.[37] Tomorrow we intend to go to our villages, and I wanted to write to you in greater detail about our journey here, which proved to be very expensive and very uncomfortable (so there is no sense in your coming here), but I don't know whether I shall manage it because today I am quite worn out after the journey and tomorrow I shall probably be even busier. If I do not manage to write in greater detail tomorrow, I shall confine myself to what is written here, so that you have some news of me, and will postpone a detailed letter until I arrive at "Shu-shu-shu"... as I call the place where I shall eventually find peace.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent to Moscow

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24

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

May 18, 1897

This week, Mother dearest, I received two letters from you (dated April 20 and 24) and am answering the latter by the first post from here, which leaves this evening. Write and tell me when you get the letter from here, on which day, that is. Your letters took so long to reach me because they were forwarded from Krasnoyarsk and a lot of time was wasted sending them on. About finance—I do not remember your asking me twice (as you write in your letter of April 24), or perhaps I have forgotten it. As long as my finances were good I did not write. But before I left Krasnoyarsk (about the 26th or 28th), I sent a *registered* letter with a request for some money, which is probably now on its way here from, Krasnoyarsk[38]. Later, I also wrote from here saying that I should have enough for about a fortnight.

As far as concerns your idea of coming here only to beg a change of residence for me—it is really not worth while. First, I could probably obtain permission to move myself, if I were to set about it. Secondly, the village of Tesinskoye is hardly likely to be any better than Shusha. According to the preliminary information we gathered earlier, Tesinskoye is much worse than Shusha as a place, for the shooting, etc. Thirdly, the journey here is not so simple—I have already written about this and will write again today in greater detail to Manyasha; she accuses me (I am joking, of course) of "being horribly inhospitable". So far I have had no letters from Tesinskoye[39], but as I know nothing about them I shall not do anything; it is possible they will ask to be sent

somewhere else if Tes turns out in reality to be as bad as we have heard.

Shu-shu-shu is not a bad village. It is true it is in a rather bare locality, but not far away (one and a half to two versts) there is a forest, although much of it has been felled. There is no road to the Yenisei but the River Shush flows right past the village and there is a fairly big tributary of the Yenisei not far away (one or one and a half versts), where you can bathe. The Sayan Mountains or spurs from them are visible on the horizon; some of them are quite white, the snow on them probably never melts. And so we have something artistic here, too; it was not for nothing that when I was in Krasnoyarsk I tried writing verses "In Shusha at Sayan's foot..." but, unfortunately, I got no further than the first line!

I am surprised that you do not write a word about sending me the remainder of the books. It would be a pity if they have not yet been sent (I wrote about this a long time ago from Krasnoyarsk*). Now the steamers will be going as far as Minusinsk (the water is rising rapidly), so a bale can easily be sent here,. Later it will be difficult again, for the Yenisei has lots of shallows, and, high water will not last long. Perhaps, however, the books have been sent?

As for my complaints that you do not write very often, that is all a matter of the past and was due to the amazing (for us, who are unaccustomed to such things) delay in receiving answers to our letters, I remember I wrote about it a month or six weeks ago, so it must have referred to the letters you wrote at the end of March! I now receive letters more often than before and I do not think that they get lost because the loss of some would be revealed when the next were received. Apparently not a single letter has gone astray, except the first one that Anyuta sent to the station. Here in the village I shall have to work still harder at my correspondence, so it will be better if letters come more frequently from "Russia".

You say that "Anya says the reply to the editors has been read". I do not quite understand this. Did she read the reply herself or have the editors already had time to

* See Letter No. 20.—*Ed.*

read it? Does Anya know any details about the dispute with the editors, about the war against them by gold-prospector and company? Has she heard the "other side", i.e., somebody from the editorial office?[40] I am waiting for a letter from her. Have you subscribed to a paper for me? I have no papers at all here. They are also needed in Minusinsk since there is no reading-room there.

Regards to Mark. He never lets me know how he is. I can inform him and Mitya that the shooting here, apparently, is not at all bad. Yesterday I travelled about 12 versts to shoot duck and great snipe. There is a lot of game, but without a dog the shooting is difficult, especially for such a poor shot as I. There are even wild goats, and in the mountains and in the taiga (30-40 versts from here, where the local peasants sometimes go shooting) there are squirrel, sable, bear and deer.

I am sorry I did not take a waterproof. It is indispensable here. Could you send me one in a small parcel? I do not know when I shall next be in town or whether I should find anything suitable in such a town-cum-village as Minusinsk. Perhaps I shall also ask Mark (if there is any money) to buy me a good revolver; but so far, I do not see the need for it.

Yours,
V. U.

What news is there of Columbus?* I have heard that he is married and is ill. Do you know anything about him?

Anatoly and Yuly have again been put in prison; they did not want to leave before navigation begins and so the Governor-General ordered them to wait in gaol! The steamer for Yeniseisk is supposed to leave Krasnoyarsk some time after May 20.

May 18, 1897

Manyasha,

I have received the extracts you made. A big *merci* for them. I shall probably not be able to study them in detail

* I. Kh. Lalayants is referred to.—*Ed.*

until autumn, for at the moment I am mostly loafing around doing nothing. I cannot yet say whether I shall need anything else or what it might be.

As for my being "horribly inhospitable", I shall dispute that with you. Before one can be hospitable, i.e., receive guests, must one not first know where one is going to live? That is something I did not know when I was in Krasnoyarsk. The "Shu-shu-shu" that I hear and repeat cannot be called knowledge when I have no idea of how to get to that Shu-shu-shu, of what the place is like or how I shall live there, etc. And before being hospitable one must know for certain that the guests can reach you and be lodged, I will not say comfortably, but at least reasonably well. I have not been able to say this until very recently, that is, until the middle of May. You will most likely read my letter in June. This means that it will take the better half of the summer to pass on information and make preparations. Does this make sense? You have, of course, already learnt from my letter describing the journey by road that a trip here is quite a troublesome affair and rather unpleasant. It was a good thing that the weather was excellent—but what if there had been rain! The weather here is changeable in the extreme. Yesterday I went shooting. In the morning the weather was wonderful and it was hot, a real summer's day. In the evening a terribly cold wind sprang up with rain into the bargain. We came home plastered with mud and if we had not had *fur* coats would have frozen on the way. The local folk say that such happenings are not infrequent in summer and so they take fur coats with them *even in summer* when they travel.* Until I have settled down and looked the place over I ought not to invite people here.

In any case, if ever you do come here, I shall have to send a *telegram* from Minusinsk in advance to tell you whether steamers are going as far as the town and whether navigation is reliable. If not, it may happen that the steamer will take you only half way. The Yenisei forms numerous bars and shallows, so navigation as far as Minusinsk is very

* I am thinking of acquiring a half-length sheepskin coat for when I go shooting.

short-lived and you have to "catch" it. Even now I don't know for certain whether steamers are going as far as Minusinsk—I think they are, because the water is rising very fast.

Incidentally, about telegrams. Our "postman" (the one who serves our volost) is in Minusinsk on Thursdays and Mondays (the days the post arrives in Minusinsk). If you have to send telegrams, therefore, the best time is on Wednesday or Sunday, i.e., so that they arrive in Minusinsk on Thursday or Monday *morning*. Then I get them on Tuesday or Friday morning. Of course they can be sent for delivery by messenger on another day, but that is much more expensive and is only for emergencies.

In general I am very surprised that you are unwilling to go abroad. Can it possibly be more interesting to stay in some village near Moscow? If you *travel* to Moscow to take music lessons, can you not also travel to the nearest town from there? Incidentally, I think you will be reading this letter somewhere abroad.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Send me all sorts of catalogues, especially of second-hand books, and especially of foreign books.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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25

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

May 25, 1897

The day before yesterday I received your letter of May 5, Mother dearest, and am answering by the first post. I, too, am now wondering how it could have happened that I did not write for a long time at the end of April; I must have missed a day or two because of the fuss and bustle at that time, but after that I wrote very frequently, both before my departure from Krasnoyarsk and on the way here. From here I have also been writing frequently—every week. There really is nothing to write more frequently about; by the way, I answer all letters immediately, so I may sometimes have written twice in one week.

I have no information about the health of E. E. now—she must be better because no one at Tesinskoye writes anything about it. She was pretty badly exhausted by the journey, especially the road journey, and was anxious to reach the village and rest. I really do not remember your letter to her, addressed to me, I may have passed it on and forgotten it.

I simply roared with laughter when I read in your letter that Mitya, "the queer fish", is not coming here! I wrote that as a joke!* What sense would there be in his trekking a distance of 4,500 versts and losing a *month* (there and back) on the journey for the sake of the joys of Shu-shu-shu! I am sorry that you are so long in making up your mind

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* See Letter No. 22.—*Ed.*

what to do in summer because of me and are missing the best time and the best accommodation, etc.

It is a pity that the books were sent so late (if they have been sent—you write that you will be sending them "in a day or two"). I thought they were already on the way. I shall now have to find out when they will arrive in Krasnoyarsk. Probably not before the end of summer!

Life here is not bad, I go shooting quite a lot; I have got to know the local sportsmen and go shooting with them.[41] I have begun bathing; up to now I have had to go quite a long way, about two and a half versts, but soon I shall be able to go to a place about a verst and a half away. Such distances mean nothing to me because, apart from shooting and bathing, I spend a lot of time walking. I am longing for newspapers; I hope I shall soon be receiving them now that you have sent them.

I have had a letter from Basil in Tesinskoye. He says it is an awful place, quite bare, neither forest nor river near (there is one two versts away—too far for him!), no shooting and no fishing. And so, if anyone moves at all, they will have to come here, since there is no point in my going there. A. M. visited them for one day (May 14) from Krasnoyarsk; she came with a resettlement party, and then went back to Krasnoyarsk; she intends to go to Tesinskoye soon to live there.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

May 25, 1897

Anyuta,

I am very sorry to hear that your trip abroad is hanging fire because of me. I am fixed up here so well (certainly better than any of the other comrades) that there is no need at all for Mother to worry about me, and as far as a summer holiday is concerned I think that she can get a better rest abroad than in this place, since she would have to travel thousands of versts on all kinds of transport. By the way, I expect all this is superfluous now—meaning the "now" when you will be reading this letter.

At first I couldn't understand why you wrote in your letter, "*I repeat* that I do not show him, etc."[42]—but then I remembered that I had spoken to you about it, in Moscow or even, I think, in St. Petersburg. I had completely forgotten it—there was so much confusion there—otherwise I would not have spoken about it a second time. I imagine that the editor is up to his ears in work and for that reason does not give any but purely business information.* In view of this my request for books in payment of fees was probably out of place; how would he find time to bother about such a relatively troublesome business? If you have not yet written to him about this, please don't write. The fee I received for the first article will last me about a year, when added to my allowance[43]—and the remainder for the next two articles[44] I am thinking of using for journals and books. (I do not know how much you have already sent me; 30 or 40 rubles would be enough and the rest can go for journals.)

As regards journals, I have already written** (in any case I am repeating it, although I think that some of them, at least, have been sent here) that you should subscribe to (1) *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, (2) *Russkiye Vedomosti*,*** (3) *Vestnik Finansov* (from the beginning of the year), (4) *Soziale Praxis*, (5) *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* (*herausgegeben von Braun*). I think I have also written partly about books, especially about *Ukazatel fabrik i zavodov*, third edition, St. Petersburg, 1894 (I think it costs 5 rubles) and the book by Chuprov and Posnikov on grain prices.**** If they have not been sent with the other books (which would be a pity because in that case they will be travelling about three months), then please send them by post as printed matter. These are the books (and also the

* He should send the journal directly to my address; tell him that. The money should be sent to you.

** See Letter No. 22.—*Ed.*

*** Perhaps you will calculate whether it would not be a saving to send me your copy when you have read it. If you arrange it to fit in with my mail days (we shall learn to do that soon), you would have to send them *only twice a week*. That means less trouble in sending them and much less expense than would be involved in sending them daily, which would be no less than the cost of the newspaper itself.

**** See Letter No. 22.—*Ed.*

Yezhegodnik if you managed to find it) that I need more than any others for my work. Please send me direct any particularly interesting new books, so that I shall get them quicker and shall not lag too far behind. By the way, if a report of the Free Economic Society's discussions on grain prices (in connection with the book by Chuprov and Posnikov) has been published, send it to me[45].

I am still thinking about the possibility of using a Moscow library; have you managed to do anything about it; i.e., have you managed to join some public library? If it is possible to take out books for two months (as you can in St. Petersburg at the library of the Free Economic Society) it would not cost very much to send them by post *as printed matter* (16 kopeks a pound, and you can send 4 pounds for 64 kopeks, and 7 kopeks to register them), so it would probably be more profitable for me to spend money on postage and have a lot of books than to spend much more money on *buying* a few books. I imagine that it would be much more convenient for me; the only problem is whether you can get books for such a long period (leaving a deposit, of course) from some good library—the University,* or the library of the Moscow Bar Association (you must get information from there, get their catalogue and find out the terms for the acceptance of new members, etc.), or some other. There are probably a number of good libraries in Moscow. You can even find out about private libraries. If any of you are staying on in Moscow they can probably find, out about all this.

If you go abroad, write to me and I will send you details of books from there. Send me more catalogues of all kinds of second-hand books, etc. (libraries, bookshops).

Yours,
V. U.

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* I think it would be easy for Mitya to arrange this either through some law student or by going straight to the professor of political economy and saying that he wishes to work in that field and take books from the central library. The only thing is that he will have to postpone it now till autumn.

As far as news from St. Petersburg is concerned I have almost lost all hope; there is nobody to expect a letter from, I've already given up hope of the director.

When you write to the Bulochkins send them my regards. They should send me their photographs in exchange for mine. How are their affairs going on?

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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26

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

June 8, *alten Styls* (June 20)

The day before yesterday, Mother dearest, I received a letter from you and Manyasha from Warsaw. It was only from this letter that I learned that you had put an end to all your doubts and had set out on your journey. Excellent. I hope you will make good arrangements and will have a nice rest this summer. I don't know why you are afraid you will soon feel *Heimweh*.* If your trip is only for the summer? I doubt it. I shall continue writing as frequently as before and the extra three or four days the post takes, with Moscow at such a considerable distance anyway, will not mean much.

You have, of course, received all my previous letters from Shusha and now know that I am fixed up here quite well. I have been here exactly a month today and still say the same—I am very satisfied with my board and lodging and have even forgotten about the *Mineralwasser*** you mention and hope that I shall soon forget its name. I am now expecting visitors here—one of the comrades wants to come from Minusinsk and Gleb wants to come here for the shooting. And so I shall not be bored. Yuly left on May 27 for Turukhansk from Yeniseisk. Anatoly stayed there; the doctor who examined him on the instructions of the Governor-General found him weak. He will probably be sent to Minusinsk District now. Perhaps he will come here.

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* Nostalgia (Ger.).—*Ed.*

** Mineral water (Ger.).—*Ed.*

The doctor* was not sent to Yakutsk either. He is being sent to Kirensk.

Thanks to Manyasha for the postscript.

Kisses for her and for you,

Yours,

V. U.

Anyuta,

I think I have already written to you about the journals and newspapers. I am sorry I have not written to Mark. That oversight will probably cause considerable delay.

Send me more "literary manifestations" of all kinds—at least catalogues and prospectuses to begin with. The best thing is to write everywhere for them so as to obtain as many as possible. I should very much like to get the classics of political economy and philosophy in the original. It would be a good thing to find out the cheapest editions (people edition,** etc.), and the prices. You probably will not find very much except at second-hand booksellers'. However, I shall wait until I hear how you have fixed yourselves up and then there will be time enough to write.

Gleb sends you his special regards. They are all now living in Tesinskoye, A. M. as well (she has given up her job). They have had a lot of visitors recently, so they had a merry time. They write that they are fixed up quite well. I am still without newspapers. The May issue of *Novoye Slovo* for some reason has not arrived, either. Send me the newspaper you will be reading, or even the issues you buy casually. I can at least have a look at them.

Good-bye for the time being. Write more often.

Yours,

V. U.

Written June 8, 1897
Sent from Shushenskoye
to Switzerland

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* Y. M. Lyakhovsky.—*Ed.*

** Lenin wrote these words in English.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW MARK YELIZAROV

June 15, 1897

In the last post but one, Mark, I received your letter of May 23. At last you, too, are getting down to the business of "spoiling paper"—that's fine. I hope that the "terrible boredom" you complain of will make you write more often—I should be very glad of it. Moreover we are in rather the same position. We are both living in villages and quite alone—true, I am a bit further away—and so we must make an effort to correspond more often.

It was news to me that Kokushkino is up for sale, and that Mitya has gone to Kazan to see about it.[46] Has he power of attorney to handle the estate? Write and tell me how the matter is settled. On the one hand it seems to be a good thing that it will be finished with once and for all, but on the other hand the "finish" is a most unpleasant, troublesome and, most likely, unprofitable one.

I have not only not received the box of books—I did not even know that it had been sent. Who was it sent to and when? To whom was the carrier's receipt sent? Write to me about all this. From Mother's letter I know that they intended sending it through a carrier's office. That means it will take a long time, probably two or three months. If any new books were bought to be sent with the others, please let me know (if you remember) what they were, because I do not risk ordering any at the moment, thinking they are already on the way.

I have begun receiving *Russkiye Vedomosti* and read it with a voracity that can be explained only as a reaction to the long absence of newspapers. Has anything else been

ordered? (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, *Vestnik Finansov*—in Rybkina's[47] name; German publications). I receive the newspapers on the thirteenth day after Wednesday and Saturday. That means that the post from Moscow here leaves on those days; bear that in mind in case you have to make any calculations about sending things.

The day before yesterday I received the report of the Society for the Organisation of Popular Entertainment.[48] Thanks.

I have not yet received a single letter from our people abroad. On account of their travelling they probably had to wait a long time between my letters and wrote to me less often. I do not know how to write to them now. It would hardly be convenient to write to Demo and I have no new address. The last time I wrote to Mother was a week ago, the same time as I sent you a postcard. Today I shall not write a special letter to her, but please send this letter on to her so that she will not worry and will have some news of me.

It would not be a bad thing if Mitya, on his return, were also to take up paper-spoiling. I have not yet given an answer to his "theoretical" letter; the fact of the matter was that I was so absent-minded when I was in Moscow that I did not remember anything of what he told me about the question that interested him. I could not gain a completely definite impression from his letter—first, because it was too short and, secondly, because I have here no Russian translation of the book he quotes and cannot get the necessary information.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. I am thinking more keenly and more often over the idea of arranging for parcels of books to be sent here from some capital-city library; I am at times beginning to think that without that arrangement I shall not be able to carry on literary work here; an outside stimulus is very necessary and I have absolutely nothing of the sort here.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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28

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

July 19, 1897

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received your letter and Manyasha's dated the 29th. *Merci* for them.

Because of the exceptionally long time our letters take, answers to questions arrive so long after they are asked that many of them turn out to be unnecessary. In this letter, for instance, you are still worrying about money and the bale of books—it is now, of course, a long time since you received my letter explaining all that; I received the money a long time ago, I did not draw it for some time because I did not need it and because nobody came from A. M. I still have not received the bale of books; I do not know if it has arrived in Krasnoyarsk (it was expected there at the end of June), and from there it will be brought by someone coming here whom I expect shortly. To send it from Krasnoyarsk by post would probably cost quite a lot because the post is not sent by steamer but by rail to Achinsk and from there by road to Minusinsk.

Similarly you also must know by now not only that Mark has received an offer to go to St. Petersburg, but also what decision he has made; he wrote me that he was awaiting an answer from you from abroad.

I received your letter with details of the Kokushkino business and have already answered it. Yesterday, too, I received the first letter from Mitya in which he, too, described his trip to Kazan.

As far as hygiene is concerned, I do not think I am any worse off here than you are in Spiez.[49] I also bathe (some-

times twice a day) in the Yenisei, take walks* and go shooting. It is true that there are no decent walks near here, but for shooting we sometimes wander a long way, and there are some nice places.

Yesterday I received news from Tesinskoye about a wedding—Basil and A. M. I am invited to be best man.[50] It will not take place very soon, of course.

I am very sorry about Pyotr Kuzmich!** Your letter was the only news I had heard of him.

Kisses—and please do not worry about me.

Yours,
V. U.

I have received a letter from the doctor from Verkholensk (Irkutsk Gubernia), where he has been sent. N. Y. Fedoseyev has also been sent there.

Manyasha,

You ask me to describe the village of Shu-shu-shu.... Hm! Hm! I think I did describe it to you once. It is a big village with several streets, rather muddy, dusty—everything as it should be. It stands in the steppes—there are no orchards or greenery of any kind. The village is surrounded by dung, which the people here do not cart to the fields but dump outside the village, so that if you leave the village you always have to pass through a certain amount of dung. There is a stream called the Shush right beside the village; now it is very shallow. At about a verst or a verst and a half from the village (or rather from *me*—the village is a long one) the Shush joins the Yenisei which breaks up here into a large number of streams with islands between them so that there is no way of reaching the mainstream on foot. I bathe in the biggest stream, which is now also very shallow. On the other side (the opposite direction from the River Shush) there is, at a distance of about a verst and a half, what the peasants quite seriously call "the pine grove"; it is really a very poor bit of woodland, in which

* I wear a net to protect myself from the swarms of mosquitoes we have here. And they say this is nothing compared with the north!

** Pyotr Kuzmich Zaporozhets.—*Ed.*

most of the trees have been felled so that there is no real shade (but a lot of strawberries!); it bears no resemblance to real Siberian taiga which I have as yet only heard about but have never been in (it is at least some thirty or forty versts from here). Mountains ... when I wrote about those mountains I was very inaccurate, for they are *about 50 versts* from here so that you can only look at them, when they are not hidden by clouds, in exactly the same way as you can see Mont Blanc from Geneva. Because of this the first (and last) line of my poem contains a sort of poetic hyperbole (the figure is used by poets!), about "Sayan's foot".* I can give only one answer, therefore, to your question about which mountains I have climbed—the sandhills in the "pine grove", so called—and in general there is plenty of sand about here.

My work is progressing very, very slowly.** I do not know whether I shall need any extracts from books. I hope that by autumn I shall make an arrangement with some Moscow or St. Petersburg library.

I read with pleasure your description of life abroad and, your impressions from there. I should be glad if you would write to me more often.

Your plan to send "a pood of cherries" here, over a distance of six thousand versts and a bit, made me open my mouth in amazement (not from a desire to gorge myself on cherries—there aren't any here but there will be water melons) at the richness of your imagination. What are our chemists, compared with this!

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye
to Switzerland

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* See Letter No. 24.—*Ed.*

** This refers to Lenin's work on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.—Ed.*

29

TO HIS MOTHER

August 17

The day before yesterday, Mother dearest, I received your letter of July 29 (August 10) and also a letter from Manyasha.

I am surprised that you are always saying that I do not write often; for a long time, as far as I remember, I have been writing every week and sometimes twice a week—with every post, that is.

I am also beginning to wonder about the box of books; since I received information from Krasnoyarsk at the end of June that the books should arrive about that time and that a further 9 rubles would have to be paid on them, I have heard nothing more, although I immediately (July 1) sent two letters to Krasnoyarsk about the books, one of them with money.* An acquaintance who had promised to see about my books has turned out to be irresponsible in the extreme and does not even answer my letters.** I have written a postcard with a pre-paid answer to Popova, perhaps she will reply. It is a most annoying business! The worst of it is that they do not even write, do not inform me of the state of affairs! Has the carrier's office been holding it up? The scoundrels probably do not even guarantee to deliver goods in time, nor accept responsibility for delays, do they?

Anyuta also writes about the loss of your letters (by the way, I have received Gumplowicz and *Archiv* from

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* The letters have been lost.—*Ed.*

** It is not known who this was.—*Ed.*

her—my thanks for the two books). I do not know which letters have been lost, I always acknowledge those I receive. One letter was lying about for some two months in Minusinsk, as I wrote before. I then wrote a complaint to the Minusinsk post office and enclosed the envelope of that letter as documentary evidence.* If registered letters or packages by book post are lost, you must keep the receipts and absolutely must demand compensation; that is the only way to teach these Siberian Ivan Andreiches[51] to be careful.

There is nothing I can write about myself. The letters are short because life is very monotonous; I have already described the appearance of things from the outside; inwardly day differs from day only because today you are reading one book, tomorrow you will read another; today you take a walk to the right of the village, tomorrow to the left; today you write one article, tomorrow another (I have now been distracted from my main work by writing an article[52]). I am perfectly well, of course, go shooting now and again. The weather is nasty—wind, cold, autumn rain, so I stay at home most of the time. Probably there will be some fine days in September. I intend going to Minusinsk to buy myself a few things—a lamp, some things for the winter, etc. I am thinking of going with Prominsky.

Thank Manyasha for her letter. She wrote asking me what I should like from abroad; Mitya, she says, wants a steel watch.... Hm! Hm I have a watch and it still keeps time, but an alarm clock would be (or, rather, might be) very useful because here I sleep far too much and have probably not only made up for the sleep I lost in the remand prison but have badly overdone it.... Only how will you send it here?... Unless you wait till someone comes....

It is quite clear that Anyuta, as long as she lives in the country, cannot fulfil my requests for books. If she should chance to be in Berlin or Leipzig on the way back, then perhaps she will be able to. I have already written that the writer has agreed to my request to send me books, and that

* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

I have received several from him (and shall probably receive more in future)—which means that I am well enough off in this respect and as yet do not experience any shortage.

Kisses for you and my sisters,

V. U.

Written August 17, 1897
Sent from Shushenskoye
to Switzerland

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30

TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW AND HIS SISTER MARIA

September 7

I am sending you a registered package, Mark, containing my article.* Please send it on to the writer as quickly as you can (it is already late) together with the enclosed letter to him.[53]

At last, on September 5, I received *Novoye Slovo* for June. I am afraid another copy will come from you—what should I do with it?

The next half of this letter is for Manyasha, from whom I received a letter dated 18 (30) August postmarked Lausanne. I hope our people are all borne again by this time.

All the best,
V. U.

I read in *Russkiye Vedomosti* that the statisticians in Tula have not been confirmed.[54] Was the Chicagoan among their number? Why did he not answer my second letter sent through Manyasha from Krasnoyarsk?**

What is the library situation like?

September 7, 1897

Manyasha,

On September 5 I received your letter of 18 (30). Thanks. That was an excellent idea to take excursion tickets to see all Switzerland.

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* *In case of emergencies*, and for a check, let me tell you that it consists of 130 numbered pages.

** The Chicagoan—V. A. Yonov. His correspondence has been lost.—*Ed.*

I am very glad that you have begun to enjoy being abroad. What are your plans for the winter? You are probably busy now searching for an apartment. The problem of finding accommodation in a big city is a difficult and tedious business! You are probably running around searching, if Mark and Mitya have not yet found anything for you.

Mother's letter, in which she spoke about her petition, I received and answered immediately.[55] The efforts made by Gleb and Basil to get transferred to Minusinsk have not come to anything although they were very energetic about it.[56] I am not trying to get a transfer and so far do not intend to; I have no complaints to make about Shu-shu-shu and I do not like that state of uncertainty when you start making applications, get excited waiting for a reply, keep getting ready to leave and so on.

Well, all the best. I have not written much because today I am late with the despatch of my article and am in a great hurry. Kiss Mother.

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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31
TO HIS MOTHER

September 30

I am writing to you from Tesinskoye, Mother dearest, as I promised. I arrived here yesterday evening. It took us a long time to get here because there were three of us (Basil, I and a boy I took with me) with our luggage on a one-horse cart, and the horse a lazy one at that.

The Tes people* are well fixed up. They have an excellent flat in a big two-storey house (in Shusha there are no such houses), the best in the village. They have the entire top floor, four good rooms with a kitchen and an entrance hall. The rooms are big, light, and clean with high ceilings and the furniture is good—in short, an excellent apartment for six rubles a month. Gleb now has a job of some sort. Thanks to this they have been able to manage and the financial crisis is over—there was, however, a time when things were tight. A. M. has taken a job as a nurse in the village of Sagaiskoye, several dozen versts from here in the same district. She will probably not keep the job for long because her health will certainly not permit her to continue such work and she is expected to return in a month. Gleb does not look too well, he is always poorly and gets irritable. Basil is flourishing. E. E. feels quite at home in the family and is doing all the household chores; she had a hard time in the summer and even now it is not easy for her, as she has to do all the work herself. It is impossible to find servants here. In summer you cannot get anyone, even tem-

* G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, his mother, and V. V. Starkov.—*Ed.*

porarily. At the moment there is a woman who comes in and helps with the work.

We all went shooting together today. The weather is excellent and we are enjoying ourselves. I have permission for five days and will leave on Friday or Saturday—straight back to Shusha, about 70 versts from here.

I received a letter from Mark quite a while ago (dated September 12). I am awaiting news of how he finished up his "liquidator's trip" to Kazan. He wrote to me, among other things, about a dog. In Shusha I have a mongrel pup and hope to have it as a gun dog next year. It would cost a mint of money to bring a dog here from Russia. He also asks about my book—it is still frozen. When I get back to Shusha I hope to get down to work more seriously and will then write in greater detail. Kisses for you and Manyasha.

Yours,
V. U.

Everybody here also says that I have put on a lot of weight this summer, am sunburned and look like a real Siberian. That is what shooting and village life do for you! All the Petersburg ailments have been shaken off!

All the people in Tes send you, it goes without saying, lots of greetings.

Written September 30, 1897
Sent from Tesinskoye to Moscow

First published in 1931 in
Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

32

TO HIS MOTHER

October 12, 1897

On the 7th, Mother dearest, I received a letter from you and Mitya dated September 20. I was in a great hurry last time and, as I remember, did not write much. Today I must make up for it.

Thanks to Mitya for his letter. In answer to his questions—I am receiving *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii* for 1897 and have also received one issue for 1896 and will send it when I have read it (for the time being I have given it to the people at Tesinskoye).

I still go shooting. The shooting is not as successful as it was (shooting hares, grouse and partridge is new to me and I shall have to get used to it), but it is no less pleasant. Whenever there is a fine autumn day (and this year there have been many of them) I take my gun and wander off across the fields and forest. Usually I go with Prominsky; I take my landlord's dog, which I have trained to follow me, and which has some (although not much) skill as a gun dog. I have acquired a dog for myself—I got a pup from an acquaintance here and hope that I shall be able to train it by next summer; I don't know whether it will turn out a good dog and whether it will have any hunting sense. I don't know how to spot that kind of thing, and no very definite opinion of the qualities of my Pegasus can be had from his pedigree. The quilted jackets we all had bought for us in St. Petersburg are very convenient for shooting and I can never praise mine enough. In general, as far as my winter clothes and other things (which you ask about) are concerned, I have ample. I have already

bought many winter things in Minusinsk and will buy some more. In general, shopping in Minusinsk is difficult; there is practically no choice, the shops are the village type of general store (all sorts of odds and ends; goods are delivered periodically and I got there at a time when the old stock had run out and the new had not arrived) and it is difficult for one accustomed to city shops to find anything in them. Incidentally, it is high time I got rid of these big-city habits; they are of no use here and I must get used to local ways. I seem to be fairly well acclimatised, but as far as shopping is concerned I still think in the St. Petersburg way—you have only to go into a shop and get what you want....

I will tell you about my journey in greater detail. I was in Minusinsk for two days only and all the time went in running round the shops, in seeing about Basil's case (we wrote a complaint together about the magistrate's sentence and the magistrate himself admitted that it was too severe.[57] We'll see what the higher court has to say) and in visiting acquaintances. There are now many political exiles in Minusinsk—A. V. Tyrkov (the March 1, 1881 case), N. S. Tyutchev and Y. K. Yakovlev (Narodnoye Pravo group), S. I. Melnikov (Narodnaya Volya Party), Blazejewski (Polish worker), S. G. Raichin (my closest acquaintance and a man of the same views), F. Y. Kon (Polish intellectual who has served a sentence of penal servitude), and Stoyanovsky (arrested in connection with the Ginsburg case and has served a sentence of penal servitude). I saw almost all of them. I think I shall be able to go there again in winter. Such temporary visits are probably better than living in Minusinsk, which does not attract me. Its only advantage is the post (this advantage is even greater in Achinsk, so I would naturally "prefer" Achinsk). But this is only by the way, for I have settled down completely in Shushenskoye and have got used to the idea of wintering here and am not applying for a transfer and advise you not to.

I went to Tesinskoye with Basil. We had a good time there and I was very pleased to see the comrades and to have company after my Shushenskoye solitude. That company, however, seems to be worse off than I am. Not as far as lodgings, etc., are concerned, in that respect they are better

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

off, but they are not adjusted. Gleb is often quite ill, is often despondent; Basil, too, it seems, is not so "flourishing" after all, though he is the most balanced of the Tes crowd. E. E. does the housekeeping, enjoys life at Tesinskoye, but is also often ill. Keeping house is not easy for her since there are no servants; it is extremely difficult to find a servant in the Siberian villages—in summer it is absolutely impossible. You can live well if you are fixed up as I am with full board and lodging, but keeping house yourself is very difficult. The Tes people live much more "sociably" (so to speak) than I do; they are acquainted with the district nurse in Tesinskoye and not far from them (about 15 versts) there are some former women students whom they see quite often.[58] I have not lost hope that their despondency will pass. Gleb and Basil now have jobs[59]; they could not live without work, for the allowance they receive is only 24 rubles (the authorities won't give Basil an allowance for his wife because he got married while in exile).

Again about the library. Which library did Mitya get the *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii* from? If he got them from the Petrovskaya library, can he get their catalogue (a new one)? I think they lend books for an indefinite period.

Yours,
V. U.

I am perfectly well, of course; I am working, I feel fine.

The doctor (from the north) asks me to give you his regards.* (I correspond with him and Columbus fairly regularly.)**

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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* A. P. Sklyarenko.—*Ed.*

** The letters have been lost.—*Ed.*

33

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

October 19, 1897

I received Manyasha's letter of September 29th, Mother dearest, on October 14; it told me about the delay of my letters to Mark.* I must admit I was afraid of this before, when I knew that Mark was leaving. The delay, however, was not very great, so small, in fact, that the manuscript I sent reached its destination in time.[60]

I am still living as usual, in peace and quietness. The weather is getting wintry, we have long since sealed ourselves up behind double windows, keep the stove going, etc. The real cold is still to come, of course, and so far there have been mostly autumn days when it is pleasant to stroll through the forest with a gun. I shall probably continue that exercise through the winter. Shooting in winter, going after hares, for instance, is no less interesting than it is in summer, and I regard it as one of the important advantages of rural life.

I usually get the magazines in the first half of the month. I am now reading the September issues with interest. Soon I hope to get some information from the editors about the article I sent. If it is accepted I shall subscribe to a few more magazines-I think I had better do it through the same editorial office, so that there is no more muddle and I don't get the same copies twice.

I am awaiting news of the arrival of Anyuta, Mark and Mitya.

Yours,
V. U.

I had a letter recently from Yuly. He writes that he had moved to a new flat, much better than the old one,

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* See Letter No. 30.—*Ed.*

and is now fixed up so comfortably that he has been able to work for the past month; he has written something and sent it off. We shall see how he will stand the winter in Turukhansk. Anatoly has found work, temporarily.[61]

Manyasha,

Merci for the letter. Why do you keep saying that I should write more frequently? Do you think I do not write often as it is? You say yourself that you now receive two of my letters at a time—what more do you want?

Up to now I have not received the *L. G.** and *Bulletin*. I do not know the reason for the delay. If you happen to be near the shop in which you ordered them, look in and hurry them up.

Buy me *Programmy domashnego chteniya na 3-i god sistematicheskogo kursa*; it costs 50 kopeks at the warehouse in Nikitskaya Street, Rikhter House, apartment 3. (I read about this book today in *Russkiye Vedomosti* and want to see what it is like. It is probably to be found in other bookshops besides that warehouse.) And subscribe for me to the new monthly publication *Izvestiya knizhnykh magazinov tovarishchestva M. O. Wolfe*, 35 kopeks *a year* (Kuznetsky Most, 12, Moscow). I want to see what sort of publication it is. In general I have nothing that gives me bibliographical information and which will tell me about new books. If you are interested in this publication, subscribe to it in your own name and send it on to me afterwards. Its programme is so extensive and the price so low that one cannot help thinking there may be some catch in it. We'll see.

I recall that either Anyuta or you wrote to me about having sent the second issue of Mehring. I have not received it. It is quite possible that the first got through by chance.

All the best,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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* *The Labour Gazette.—Ed.*

34

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTERS MARIA AND ANNA

December 10, 1897

According to my estimate, Mother dearest, this letter should arrive by Christmas. I have decided to send it off by the first post and not wait until Sunday (I am used to writing to you on Sundays). I have received a letter from Gleb in which he says he has submitted an application for permission to come to me for ten days during the holidays. I hope lie will get permission. It will give me great pleasure. They have written from Tesinskoye that Zinaida Pavlovna has been sentenced to three years' exile in northern gubernias, and that she is asking to be sent to Minusinsk District.* I believe Nadezhda Konstantinovna** intends to do the same, although her sentence is not yet properly known; it will probably be very much the same.

I kiss you warmly,

Yours,

V. U.

I hope that Mitya will be free by the time you receive this letter. They are not likely to hold him long.[62]

Anyuta,

I am now reading the French translation of Labriola's *Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History*. It is a very sensible and interesting book.*** The idea came to me

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* Zinaida Pavlovna Nevzorova.—*Ed.*

** Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

*** For Lenin's opinion of the book see *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 486.—*Ed.*

that you ought to translate it. (The original is in Italian and Kamensky in *Novoye Slovo* says that the French translation is not very good. You would, of course, have to get the original.) The book is in three parts: (1) In Memory of the Communist Manifesto, (2) Historical Materialism (the biggest part) and (3) Appendix: The Manifesto of the Communist Party (translated into French by Laura Lafargue). It goes without saying that only the second part is suitable for translation, and *not all of that* (I have not yet finished reading it). If something is left out, it will not by any means detract from this extremely clever defence of "our doctrine" (Labriola's expression). I am writing to St. Petersburg this very day to find out whether the writer proposes using this material for the journal. You can either get his opinion from N. K. (I am writing to her) or propose directly to him that you start the translation.[63]

V. U.

Manyasha,

I received your letter of November 24 and the second issue of the Vyatka *Returns*. Earlier I received the *Ulozheniye* and *Ustav*[64]—I do not remember whether I acknowledged them.

You say that "goods for Minusinsk are *still* not being accepted from Moscow". Perhaps they will soon be accepted. Mark could probably find out. Books are no longer urgent. Perhaps you can send them with someone coming at Christmas or with the girls* who intend to come here (I am writing to Mother about them) or, eventually, with someone else. If things are sent to Krasnoyarsk the delay is, in any case, tremendous. If any book is needed for work, I shall write and it can be sent by post. We had better wait a while before using the carrier's office.

Savchenko's book, it seems, is Peskovsky's.

Programma domashnego chteniya has arrived; I have looked at it, it is dull and I do not want to write a review.

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* The girls are Nadezhda Krupskaya and Zinaida Nevzorova.—*Ed.*

Wolfe's little publication starts quite well and is fabulously cheap.

I have ordered Seignobos. I do not intend to order Ziber yet. If I get some money I shall probably order it, too. Kalmykova's bookshop gives me a discount of 15 per cent, so I order books from there; it is convenient, too, because it saves you trouble.

All the best,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTERS MARIA AND ANNA

December 21, 1897

I received your letter of December 5 the day before yesterday, Mother dearest. I am very, very glad that there is a hope of Mitya's business being cleared up. In any case it is obvious that it is mainly a misunderstanding and that there can be no question of anything serious. You ask me whether I received a package sent on November 16—what package do you mean? If, in general, it is possible to send things to Minusinsk you should address them to me direct, because my letters go through Minusinsk Post Office anyway and I have given our postman power of attorney to collect my mail.

I seem to have got mixed up over all these packages you have sent or intended to send me. Have you sent anything to Popova in Krasnoyarsk? I think not, but just in case I will ask an acquaintance who is going there soon (from Minusinsk) to make enquiries.*

I am in no hurry for books. I now have so many that I cannot manage them all, let alone more.

Yours,
V. U.

Manyasha,

I received your postcard of December 2 and the two Semyonov volumes. *Merci* for them. I shall send them back

* It is not known who this acquaintance was.—*Ed.*

soon, not later than a week from now (I am afraid our postman will not go for the mail at all on Wednesday 24th).

These first two volumes proved to be without interest. Such things are, of course, inevitable when you order books you know nothing about, and I was prepared for it beforehand.

I hope at least that we shall not have to pay any fine—they will extend them for another month.

I did not understand your sentence "To get into the jurists' library—I asked Kablukov about it—you must be a jurist and submit two recommendations from members of the Society of Jurists". Is that all? You do not have to be a member of the society yourself? I shall try to get a recommendation through St. Petersburg.

I know for a fact that one does not have to be a jurist to join the society.

All the best,
V. U.

Anyuta,

Merci for your letter of December 5 and for the list. It is a pity you took so much trouble copying it a second time. I seem to have expressed myself badly about the accounts; it stands to reason that it is of interest to me to know results—plus or minus so much—and not those details that caused you so much trouble and nevertheless mean nothing to me.*

It is strange that they do not send me any accounts from the office of the journal. I am shortly sending something else[65] there. I shall have to put a note in with it (when I send the manuscript) asking them to send an account of the fees and expenditure on the journals, etc. It seems that I have overstepped the mark through not knowing exactly how much I own.

It seems that there was some misunderstanding between us about my question concerning how the project for the

* This apparently refers to financial settlements for literary work.—*Ed.*

journal got into the hands of our acquaintance;[66] I understood that it came from you, and now I see quite well that it did not. It stands to reason that what I said about my first assumption does not hold now that the opposite has been proved. Oh, that Yegor! I'll give him what for.

The photos, including the group, have still not arrived.[67] I have written to Nadezhda Konstantinovna but have not received a reply. Should I write to Yuly's sisters?

By the way, I received a letter from Yuly dated October 29 (sic!). He writes that he lives reasonably well, they have all moved into one house (this is much more convenient and cheaper and the meals are more easily arranged at the expense of their one and only "lady"), they have received their allowances so he is looking and feeling better and is not a bit despondent. Our poet friend* should be coming to me soon for the holidays, if he does not let me down again. Anatoly is still worried about his wife who has been locked up in Yeniseisk (for three months), the cells are cold and she has been taken ill.[68] A bad business! It would have been far better for her to have done her term in Russia!

Fedoseyev and Lyakhovsky have not written a word. The devil knows what's happening where they are.

I should like to have Saint-Simon and also the following books in French:

K. Marx. *Misère de la philosophie*. 1896. Paris. 3 frs 50

Fr. Engels. *La force et l'économie dans le développement social*. 2 frs 50

K. Marx. *Critique de la philosophie du droit de Hegel*. 1895. 1 fr

all these are from the "bibliothèque socialiste internationale" where Labriola came from.

All the best,

V. U.

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* G. M. Krzhizhanovsky.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

December 27, 1897

The money has arrived, Mother dearest, both the first and the second lots (i.e., of November 16 and December 8). We are now receiving our allowance regularly, too, so that in this respect things have returned to normal and I think for a long (relatively long) time no emergency additions will be necessary.

Gleb has now been living with me for several days, having obtained permission for a ten-day trip here. We are having an excellent time and do a lot of walking because the weather is mostly very warm. Ever since one day, when the frost was said to be 36° R (about ten days ago) and after a few days of snowstorm ("of weather", as the people here say), the days have been very warm and we go shooting very zealously but without much luck. What shooting is there to be had here in winter! The walks are pleasant, though. Because of the holidays there was no outgoing mail on Wednesday this week and no incoming mail on Friday; this is the third time since I have been living in Shusha that the mail has missed a turn—that is not very often. Thanks to my guest, I scarcely notice it.

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

I am sending an article of mine for the journal. It would be good if you could pass it on quickly; perhaps you will be in time for the January issue.[69]

Gleb sends his regards. He asks you to tell Manyasha that he expects he will have a lot to argue about with her.

Manyasha,

Do not work so hard, Manyasha, over Stange; it is quite probable that I was mistaken. How could I remember after so many years! You have found one article so we may consider ourselves lucky. It has even occurred to me that the second was not in *Ekonomichesky Zhurnal* but in *Severny Vestnik* for 1891 (at least I recently came across a reference to that effect somewhere). In any case there is no need to go through *Ekonomichesky Zhurnal* up to 1895.

As far as concerns your visit to me—I shall be very glad. Things are different now and I have no particular reasons for objecting. If you wait for a steamer up the Yenisei you can travel without any particular discomfort. It is quite possible that Nadezhda Konstantinovna will also come to me; the matter will probably be settled soon, and may even have been settled by the time you are reading this letter. If she is allowed to choose Shu-shu-shu as her place of exile instead of the north of Russia, she will not, of course, be allowed to put it off until spring but will have to travel at once.

Best wishes,

V. U.

I recall that Mark once wrote to me asking if he should get a gun dog for me in Moscow. My attitude at the time was very cool since I counted on my Pegasus, but he has let me down badly. I would now be in hearty agreement with such a plan, of course, but as far as I can see, it is purely Utopian and would not be worth the trouble. The transport is very expensive. Gleb gets fantastic ideas—why not take a little pup and bring it in a basket! We had a good laugh over that plan, which is, of course, little better than any other. It was simply that Mark let his imagination run away with him; from this postscript you can see what petty problems sometimes engage the attention of the inhabitants of Shu-shu-shu and Te-te-tes.

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

January 4, 1898

I have received, Mother dearest, your letter of December 15. One mail delivery was missed this week (January 1), so I do not know the outcome of Anyuta's efforts.[70] It is probable, however, that the outcome is favourable because if the case has already gone to St. Petersburg it means that it is a petty one and there is no reason for any great delay.*

You need have no fears about my big coat. With my winter suit (which we all brought with us from St. Petersburg) it is quite enough *even for travelling* (and I very rarely have to travel). For walking it is too warm and I wear a quilted jacket—there have been a couple of cold days (yesterday and the day before) but they are the exception. Altogether, the winter here is exceptionally warm. Nor is there any need to be afraid of my going shooting; there is no danger. Now, by the way, there will be an end to all shooting, probably until spring.... (The money has arrived, the first and the second lots, both for the same sum.)

It is 55 versts from Shusha to Minusinsk, in winter there is a shorter road—50 versts.

Gleb left here the day before yesterday, after a stay of ten days. There was a real holiday this year in Shu-shu-shu and the ten days passed unnoticed. Gleb liked the place and said that it is much better than Tesinskoye (I said the same thing about Tes! I made fun of Gleb by saying that anywhere is better than where we are), that there is forest near here (in which it is good to walk in winter) and an excellent view of the distant Sayan Mountains. He was

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* See Letter No. 34.—*Ed.*

enthusiastic about the Sayans, especially on a clear day when the sun is on them. Gleb, by the way, has become very fond of singing, so my silent rooms grew merry during his stay and fell quiet again after he left. But he has no music and no songs. I think we had a lot of that rubbish (from the times when we also used to "bawl"). If nobody needs them any longer it would be a good idea to send them to him; he would be very glad. Basil is the musician (on the guitar) and would rearrange them for him. Gleb's health improved somewhat during his stay with me due to the regular life and plenty of walking; he was much livelier when he left.

I think I have already written that Nadezhda Konstantinovna intended asking to be sent here (she was sentenced to three years in the northern gubernias). If that plan is carried out it will afford a good opportunity for books, music and everything.

Kisses,
Yours,
V. U.

January 4, 1898

Mark,

I have received your letter of December 16 in which two interesting announcements with theses were enclosed. I must admit that the prohibition of the lectures by Tugan-Baranovsky and Struve did not very greatly surprise me since the latter's article on the same subject was cut out and the theses were perfectly clear. I did not understand, however, which minister banned the lectures. But, of course, it does not take the St. Petersburg government departments long to get in touch with each other[71]....

I was very surprised to learn that the Chicagoan is in St. Petersburg. The last time I heard of him it was said (or rather, written) that he was somewhere in the Caucasus. So he has a job now. He does not answer my letter and I suppose I shall have to stop expecting him to; he is probably very busy now at his job, and with his perpetual journeyings could have forgotten it a dozen times over. I'll manage without him. How did you find him? How

is he looking (not in the physical sense) and what does he plan to do? What contacts has he made and is he thinking of resuming his attempts at literary work? (Perhaps Anyuta will write and give me answers to some of these questions, as many [answers, that is] as she can, so I am probably wasting your time asking you.) By the way, have you written to him about my last request (I wrote to Manyasha about it)—to inform H. Braun about permission for a translation?*

The lecture (Lozinsky's) is really a masterpiece of foolishness.[72] If P.B. does not write about it in the home news,[73] send me the issue of *Trudy Volno-ekonomicheskogo obshchestva* containing it—if it is easy to find. He should be put in his place beside Mr. Yuzhakov. If you send the lecture buy me at the same time the verbatim report of the discussion in the Free Economic Society, 1896, on the currency reform. Some Narodnik, it might even have been Lozinsky, also distinguished himself on that occasion.]

What have you heard about *Syn Otechestva*?[74] I wrote to St. Petersburg that they should subscribe to it for me if it is worth the trouble.** It is interesting because of the Narodniks on its staff. Do you ever see that sheet?

All the best,
V. U.

P.S. I have a gun dog again, a setter. A friend brought it from town. We'll see how it turns out, whether it will live till spring (it is still very young and I am again afraid it will get distemper). It has one disadvantage—it is of the female estate....

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* It is not known what translation is referred to.—*Ed.*

** The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

38

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

January 24, 1898

I have received letters from Manyasha and Anyuta and also two books—Semyonov (Vol. III) and *Yuridichesky Vestnik*. Many thanks to Manyasha for the latter. I have also received Basil's photograph

Please buy me the books—Kablukov, *Lektsii po ekonomii selskogo khozyaistva*, and V. V., *Ocherki kustarnoi promyshlennosti* (1 ruble 50). The latter may perhaps be found second-hand; the former was recently issued for students and Manyasha can probably get it for me even if it is not on sale (as is possible, judging from the absence of advertisements in *Russkiye Vedomosti*).

I have nothing new to say about myself. It is pleasanter now three of us go shooting together—we are having real spring weather; it is even thawing today.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna has been given reason to hope that her three years' exile in Ufa Gubernia will be changed to two years in Shusha[75] and I am expecting her and Yelizaveta Vasilyevna.[76] I am even getting lodgings ready—the next room in the same house.* If other guests come in summer we can take the whole house (the owners will move into the old log cabin in the yard), which would be much more convenient than our setting up house here ourselves.

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* An amusing competition is going on between us and the local parson, who is also asking our landlady for a room. I am protesting and insist that she wait until my "family" affairs have been finally settled. I still do not know whether I shall be able to get rid of my rival.

What I do not know is whether N. K.'s case will be settled by spring; it is said that we shall get an answer in February, but so far that is only a rumour.

It is most annoying that Mitya's case is dragging on so long; it will be unpleasant for him if he has to lose a year. Still, he will probably be allowed to enter another university or to take his examinations as an external student.*

Yours,
V. U.

I am enclosing a letter to Columbus.**

Anyuta,

I have read in the newspapers about the publication of your translation of de Amicis's book. If you have any spare copies please send me some. On what terms did you do the translation? Was there a contract with the publisher, and what sort?

My head is now fall of plans to issue my articles as a separate book.[77] A few days ago I received N. Vodovozov's *Ekonomicheskiye etyudy*, and that gave me the idea. It would be very inconvenient to publish the article about the handicraftsmen as a separate pamphlet. It would be far better to print it together with the Sismondi article. It could then be published without preliminary censorship (10 printer's signatures are needed for that and these articles will make about 12—about 200 pages, that is), which is much more convenient. It could be given the title of *An Assessment of the Romantic Doctrines of Narodism*. Such a book would be more interesting and varied. The main question, in my opinion, is whether the censors will permit the reprinting of an article from a suppressed journal. I should imagine they will permit it, as it is an abstract article and was published a long time ago, long before the journal was suppressed. I am also writing to N. K. about this—she should ask the writer's opinion. I do not want to wait until their new plans are put into effect. The articles are actually not very suitable for a journal, as they

* See Letter No. 34.—*Ed.*
** The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

are too long. Let the other articles that I think it would be dangerous to include in the book (they would not be allowed) and not very suitable (they are of a different character) go for the journal. The article about handicraftsmen is quite mild and full of figures. As far as the financial side of the business is concerned I think it is much more favourable than the censorship side of it. Assuming that the price is a ruble fifty kopeks and only a thousand printed* we can allow 500 rubles for the publication and the same sum each for the booksellers and the author. The sale of 500 copies would cover costs, and that number is certain to be sold.

The question is who will undertake the publication. There is no one to be relied on in St. Petersburg. Would not Mark undertake the publishing job (buying paper, contract with the printer) and Manyasha the proofreading?** If that plan can be put into effect I will immediately send corrections to the article on Sismondi (it must be broken up into §§ and some important misprints need correcting). If you agree, *telegraph* me "send corrections". I calculate that the book could come out in April, if not sooner.

It seems to me we should try ourselves and not wait for the plans of the *Novoye Slovo* people, who move at a snail's pace. And, besides, it is a pity for me to write for nothing—I must earn something, too. The objection may be raised that the articles are quite different in character, but I do not think there is anything wrong in that; Vodovozov's are also different in character, and, in general, such collections of articles are published. There is, moreover, something common to them both; they are a criticism of Narodnik economics—one is abstract and the other uses Russian data. Please answer me as quickly as possible about this—can the plan be carried out or not? If it can, we must start on it without losing time.

N. Y. F. does not write to me and does not even answer, although I have written him two letters.*** Scold him for

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* If 2,000 copies are printed the price may be reduced to 1r. 25k.

** The proofs will not be very difficult since half the book is a reprint and the other half from a manuscript I have rewritten in a fair copy.

*** The correspondence between Lenin and Fedoseyev has been lost.—*Ed.*

that if you write. I have heard of the "scandal" in Verkholensk—some disgusting scandal-monger has been attacking N. Y.[78] No, don't wish me comrades from among the intellectuals in Shushenskoye—I'd rather not! When N. K. arrives there will be a whole colony anyway.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

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TO HIS MOTHER

February 7, 1898

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received letters from you and from all the family dated January 22 and 23 and was very glad to get them; I send you my thanks for all the good wishes. I guessed, of course, that you would write to Nadezhda Konstantinovna and invite her to visit you; it is to be hoped she will be allowed to. I still know nothing about her transfer to Shu-shu; she keeps writing that it will be settled "in a day or two", but it is still dragging on. Now, however, we probably shall not have to wait long for a final decision.

As to what you should send with N. K.—I think you should give her a real load of books since we do not know whether there will be an opportunity in summer. Manyasha intends going abroad (and that, of course, is a bit more interesting than Shu-shu and the Siberian mosquitoes), and you will probably go off to Kokushkino with Mitya.... It's bad that in two and a half months he has already begun to look puffy. First—does he stick to a diet in prison? I suppose not. In my opinion that is essential. Second—does he do physical jerks? Probably not, either. Also essential. I can at least say from my own experience that *every day*, with great pleasure and profit I did my gymnastics before going to bed. You loosen up so well at times that it makes you warm even in the worst cold, when the cell is like an ice-well, and after it you sleep better. I can recommend to him an exercise that is very convenient (even if funny)—bow to the ground 50 times. I set myself that stint and was not embarrassed when the warder watched me through the peephole and was

amazed that a prisoner who had never expressed a desire to attend the prison church should suddenly have become so pious! He must bow not less than fifty times without bending his legs and must touch the floor with his fingers each time. Tell him that. Most of these doctors, you know, only talk about hygiene.

I have already written something about clothes. I do not need any underclothes except socks. As for the local tailors, I do not place much hope in them. It is very inconvenient to get clothes made in Minusinsk; one has to go there. There is a tailor here who makes clothes for everybody (he told me so today), including former political exiles, even for all the priests (he boasted to me of that). Although it all sounds very impressive, you had better buy ready-made clothes in Moscow and give the material you have to Mitya or Mark. One thing I do ask you for in particular—a pair of moleskins, because I tear my clothes terribly when I am out shooting. If my straw hat is still in good shape (it's a Paris hat, after all, the devil take it!) she should bring it. Prominsky, as a matter of fact, has begun making hats (sometimes they look like felt boots!) but they are suitable only for spring and autumn and not for summer. The only other thing is—kid gloves, if they can be bought without knowing the size (which I doubt). I have never worn them, either in St. Petersburg or Paris, but I want to try them in Shu-shu-shu in summer as a protection against mosquitoes. I can wear a net over my head but my hands get badly bitten. Gleb assures me that the local mosquitoes bite through gloves but I do not believe him. The gloves have to be suitably chosen, of course, not for dances but for mosquitoes. Then I need some paper, *ruled in squares*; I do not suppose there is any in Minusinsk—anyway I do not need much, about four quires with squares of different sizes from the smallest to the largest.

Anyuta asks when the wedding is to be and who we are "inviting"! Isn't she in a hurry! First of all Nadezhda Konstantinovna has to get here, and then we have to get permission from the authorities to marry—we are people without any rights at all. So how can I do any "inviting"?

As far as concerns *verbalisme* and *phraséologie* it seems to me that they should be translated as verbalism (with an

explanation) and phraseology.... That, of course, is not really translation but simply transcription, but what else can you do? "Dilettantism" is quite wrong for verbalism—almost the opposite, in fact. Verbalism is probably closer to scholasticism, i.e., to superfluous (pseudo) learnedness, than to dilettantism. But I don't remember exactly how Labriola uses these words.

Merci for Bogdanov. I have read half of it. Very interesting and to the point. I am thinking of writing a review.[79]

In reply to Manyasha's questions: what sort of voice has Gleb? Hm, hm! I suppose it must be baritone. He sings the things that Mark and I used to "bawl" (as Nanny[80] used to say).

The next question—will Paris go to her head? Very likely. She has now seen for herself what it is like abroad and can judge. I lived only one month in Paris, did very little work and spent most of the time running round to see the "sights". It is not clear to me either whether Manyasha wants to go to study or for the summer only.

Thanks to Mark for his letter. He must not, however, forget Gogol's "Ivan Andreiches".[81] I do not know what progress has been made in Russia, but here in Siberia they are doubtlessly flourishing, and they are interested in other things besides knowing whether a government official is arriving and whether the young ladies are on the way. I am surprised that you have not even heard about *Syn Otechestva*. I saw in *Russkaya Mysl*[82] today (the issue of November or December 1897) that the newspaper declares itself a Narodnik organ *pur sang*.*

Till next time.

Yours,

V. U.

The real cold has now arrived, so we have given up shooting and only go for walks—in the forest, though. My lodgings are warm, however, and my clothes still warmer.

Manyasha should send Nadezhda Konstantinovna the list of books I should like to have—she will look for them in St. Petersburg, if, of course, it is not too late by now.

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* Genuine (Fr.).—*Ed.*

If we have any other children's picture books let N. K. bring them for Prominsky's children.

A. Semyonov. *Obzor istoricheskikh svedenii o promyshlennosti i torgovle*. Three volumes. An old book, published in the fifties or sixties, or even earlier.

Sbornik svedenii i materialov po vedomstvu Ministerstva finansov. St. Petersburg, 1865, No. 6.
1866, No. 4 and No. 5.
1867, *No. 6* (*June*) especially.

Materialy po opisaniyu promyslov Vyatskoi gubernii. Five issues. Vyatka, 1880 (Manyasha already has the second issue).

Vasilenko. *Promysly selskogo naseleniya Poltavskoi gubernii*.

Svod svedenii ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii selskogo naseleniya Yevropeiskoi Rossii. St. Petersburg, 1894. Published by the Office of the Committee of Ministers.

Shcherbina. *Ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya v raione Vladikavkazskoi zheleznoi dorogi*.

Bezobrazov. *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Rossii*.

Trudy obshchestva selskikh khozyayev yuzhnoi Rossii (those issues for 1895 that carried articles by Mr?? Perhaps Borinevich?... on suburban farms near Odessa).

Ragozin. *Zhelezo i ugol na yuge Rossii*.

Mendeleyev. *Tolkovy tarif*.

Yuridichesky Vestnik, 1887, Nos. 11 and 12.

Lyudogovsky.... (? *Osnovy selskokhozyaistvennoi ekonomii*? or something like it. I do not remember the exact title. A book published in the 70s.)

Statistical tables compiled in the Statistical Division of the Council of the Ministry of the Interior according to the data of 1849-52.

Statistichesky vremennik Rossiiskoi imperii. Series I, Issue 1, St. Petersburg, 1866.

Vremennik Tsentralnogo statisticheskogo komiteta. 1894, No. 34 (average grain and potato harvest for 1882-92).

Vremennik Tsentralnogo statisticheskogo komiteta. 1889, Nos. 10 and 12.

Vremennik Tsentralnogo statisticheskogo komiteta. The issue for 1897 (one of the last issues) which carried the processed data of the army-horse census of *1893-94*.

(See the catalogue or the list of publications of the Central Statistical Committee.)

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

February 14, 1898

I have received a book (Bulgakov[83]) from Manyasha, Mother dearest, and thank her for it. She asks whether I received a registered package sent by Anna on December 27.* It is difficult for me to remember now because it was a long time ago. I remember that I received some foreign catalogues and *Neue Zeit*.[84] Manyasha's letter is dated January 26, so it is quite possible that my answer to the letter of December 27 had not reached Moscow by then.** I received Bogdanov's book before that; I liked it very much and have written a review.*** Bulgakov's book is not too bad, either, but I do not like the chapter on turnover and his formulation of the question of the foreign market is not quite correct. I was, of course, very pleased to receive it.

Again our allowance is being delayed—owing to the new year. Another piece of news—a new chief of police has arrived from Yeniseisk (it is the one who wanted to take the shotguns away).[85] He does not seem to have done anything to distinguish himself yet. For some unknown reason Prominsky has had his allowance reduced from 31 rubles a month (he has five children) to 21 rubles—seven people cannot live on that sum in Shusha and his hatter's business (that is his trade) is not a going concern here. Another

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* I have received *Neue Zeit* No. 3.

** See Letter No. 38.—*Ed.*

*** See Letter No. 39.—*Ed.*

comrade* went to see a doctor in Minusinsk and has been admitted to hospital there.

It is still very, very cold here; the Siberian winter intends to make itself felt after all. But I seem to have got fairly used to the frosts, and do quite a lot of walking every day.

Yours,
V. U.

Did you send N. K. money to subscribe to *Vestnik Finansov*? I did not expect it at all (because I asked her to subscribe only in the event of my finances being in a brilliant state) and now I get it from her as I always did.

Today I am sending Anyuta the books from the library and the technical reports by registered post.

Mark,

Nadezhda Konstantinovna writes that the writer has proposed either to look for money for the publication of my articles or a publisher for them, and for this reason she will not take the manuscripts away from him. I answered that she should take them and send them to you because one can "look" for many years, and, indeed, who would willingly go to so much trouble. I shall start on the corrections to Sismondi in a couple of days without waiting for your answer to one of my earlier letters and as soon as they are finished I shall send them to you.[86] (The writer's proposal is important to me only because it shows the feasibility of this enterprise from the standpoint of censorship, which is actually the only thing that interested me.) As regards my other manuscripts, with the exception of the article on handicraftsmen,**[87] do not think they should be included, first, because they are of a different character, suitable only for a journal, the subjects are polemical and of temporary interest, and, secondly, because it is not worth the risk.

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* O. A. Engberg.—*Ed.*

** That is, the articles on the "heritage" and on Yuzhakov. The note on Mikulin's book is, of course, absolutely unsuitable for inclusion in the book.[88]

When you receive this letter you should be able, I think, to begin negotiations with the printers (in the plural, because you will probably have to seek and haggle) and look for a shop in which to buy paper. While these preliminary searches are going on I shall send the corrections, and you will then be able to go straight on with the printing. It seems to me important not to waste time, so that the book can come out in April.

All the best,
V. U.

I think the article on Sismondi had better go first, followed by the handicrafts.

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TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

February 18, 1898

Today I am sending you, Mark, the corrections to the Sismondi article by registered post. There were fewer corrections than I expected—only the misprints and the division of the article into chapters (two) and paragraphs. It is to be expected that the compositors will find it much easier to work from a printed text, so there will be fewer mistakes and less proof-reading to do (but the proofs *absolutely must be read*). The magazine pages I am sending can go straight to the printers, but give them *strict* warning not to lose them* (they usually do lose manuscripts) and that each time they should send the *original* (manuscript or magazine page) *together with the proofs*; without this it is *terribly difficult* for a stranger (not the author) to correct them (I know this from my own experience) and there will be many unpleasant misunderstandings and mistakes. I hope Manyasha will find time to undertake the proof-reading. In general, it is very important for the proofs to be read by one person from beginning to end, otherwise there will be a muddle because of the signs the proof-readers use, and, furthermore, they usually forget, when subsequent proofs are received (there must be at least two), to verify whether the mistakes indicated in the first proofs have been corrected and whether fresh mistakes were not made in correcting the old ones. Accurate printing and an elegant edition are very important.

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* If it has to be torn up into separate pages (printers usually do that), number them all with special numbers to prevent losses.

The article (together with this letter) will arrive at the very beginning of March and if you set about the printing immediately and carry it out without delay, and if you hurry the printer, you may manage to finish it and present it to the censor by Easter. That would be very good; the sale of the book will probably be much slower if it does not come out until May. I am awaiting news from you on the way things are going.

I have been thinking a lot about the other two articles (on the "heritage" and on Yuzhakov); on the one hand, caution tells me that they should not be printed, but, on the other hand, it is a pity to abandon them, especially the second.... The fact is that it analyses a book and not a magazine article.... Perhaps we should try? If experienced people had not decided that it was impossible I should not have been averse to trying. We should have to cross out a few places recalling the defunct journal* (I have no rough copy of the Yuzhakov article, so the publisher will have to do it. It is not a big job), and then place them at the end, so that if they are removed (in case the authorities demand it) it will not spoil the preceding articles. If you estimate the cost of the publication at 40 rubies a printer's signature, the loss on those two articles (together four signatures) would not be so great. In any case the book should not be delayed on account of them.

If they have not yet sent you the manuscripts from St. Petersburg, write an urgent letter to Nadezhda Konstantinovna to send them immediately and start printing what I send today.

All the best,

V. U.

Please hand or send the enclosed letter to N. K. She asks me to write to Moscow now, since they will probably be moving her soon.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

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* This refers to the journal *Novoye Slovo*, suppressed by the tsarist government in December 1897.—*Ed.*

42

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

February 24, 1898

Today, Mother dearest, I received a pile of letters from all parts of Russia and Siberia and have therefore been in a holiday mood all day.

From Manyasha and Anyuta I received their letters of February 9 and also *Yuridichesky Vestnik*[89] and *Statistichesky Vremennik* and also the *Dnevnik syezda* (of technicians).[90] Thank you for everything. The last-named was very interesting and thank Anyuta very much for it. She writes that the book by de Amicis is a children's book. I did not know that, but even children's books will be useful here, for Prominsky's children have nothing to read. I even thought of doing a thing like subscribing to *Niva*.[91] That would be very nice for the Prominsky kids (pictures every week), and for me a complete edition of Turgenev in 12 volumes as promised by *Niva*. And all this for seven rubles, including postage. Very tempting! If only Turgenev is published decently (that is, without distortions, cuts, clumsy misprints), it would be well worth while subscribing. Have any of our people seen the *Niva* supplements for past years? I think they issued Dostoyevsky? Was it decently done?

I now expect to set my money affairs right, since the book edition of the articles should also bring in something whatever happens, and, moreover, I am getting a big translation from English (from St. Petersburg)—Adam Smith—and I shall get something for that.[92] I shall then be able to pay off my debts (I must not forget them). That is why I think it is also possible to subscribe to *Niva*. Whether Turgenev

will be "decently" published, our people must decide, they have more facts to go on.

Today I received *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 1 for 1898. I have been receiving *Vestnik Finansov* for a long time.

I shall have to ask you to send a smallish sum of money by N. K. (there will be no need for it earlier. The allowances were paid today), since there may be some fairly big expenses to meet. That means that my debt will increase slightly.

Things here are still the same—no news, no visitors and still no acquaintances.

Anyuta writes that N. K. has written to her saying that a publisher has been found in St. Petersburg. She wrote to me only that they had "promised to look for one". We may have an amusing muddle; the plan was evolved in St. Petersburg *independently* and prior to my letter, and mine was also independent, prior to the receipt of the St. Petersburg letter. And so we are dancing round each other like people who have bumped into one another in the street and do not know whether to step left or right to allow their vis-à-vis to pass.

The matter has probably settled itself by now.

Kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

I understood from Manyasha's letter that both books (*Yuridichesky Vestnik*, 1887, No. 12, and *Statistichesky Vremennik*) had been bought and would not have to be returned.

N. K.'s case is still dragging on. She will probably have to drop the claim for a shorter term, but they do promise to permit her to come here.

I am enclosing a letter to her because she may now be in Moscow. If not, send it on.

Manyasha,

Send me, in addition, the following things:

(1) Hardmuth pencil No. 6 (Anyuta bought me one last year and I liked it very much, but it has now, unfortunately, served its time).

(2) A box of sealing wax and some sort of a seal to seal my letters. (If we have not got an old seal, either buy or order a cheap one.) There is no need for a name on the seal, even initials are not necessary, as long as there is some sort of a figure or drawing on it that is easily remembered and described to others.

(3) *essuie-plume** } I had both of these but, alas,
(4) small scissors } they got lost somewhere on the road. In place of the former I am now using the skirt of my jacket and have inked it up beautifully. The scissors I get from the landlord—sheep shears. Their advantage is that they always arouse laughter and general amusement.

Au revoir,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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* Pen-wiper (Fr.).—*Ed.*

43

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

March 1, 1898

I am still waiting for news, Mother dearest, of Mitya's release, but it is a long time coming.

I am quite well and life goes on as usual. Even winter at last seems to be coming to an end. We have got very tired of it here. Today and yesterday there has been real spring weather.

I am enclosing a letter for N. K. in case she has not yet left, and a business letter for Mark on the other side of the paper.

Yours,
V. U.

Mark,

I have received some information that compels me to change my original plan to publish the book in Moscow.* The writer informs me that censorship conditions in Moscow are impossible. Bulgakov's book (about markets) was held up for a year by the censors! That is something quite unbelievable! If that is the case we cannot even think of Moscow; we must turn all our attention to St. Petersburg. The writer has every chance of publishing it at the moment but he wants to delay it till autumn (wrongly, in my opinion). As regards financing the edition, I think we can raise "an internal

* This refers to the publication of *Economic Studies and Essays*. —*Ed*.

loan" from Mother, because the book will certainly pay for itself.

This information has put me so much off my balance that I have nothing to propose. You will probably be seeing N. K.; talk to her about it and come to a decision. To make a "decision" from here means writing, writing, writing, and all for nothing, without knowing anything, depending on guesswork, etc.

Yours,
V. U.

I hope you have not had any more unnecessary trouble over this unfortunate business. (N. K. writes that she has not sent the manuscripts.) Awaiting your answer.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

March 8, 1898

This week, Mother dearest, I do not think I have had a single letter from you. From this I gather that Mitya is still inside, and that is very sad.

I do not know now whether this letter will find N. K. in Moscow. In case she is still there I am adding one forgotten request. Send me one of our sets of chessmen; it turns out there are some players among our comrades in Minusinsk and I have once already recalled old times most enjoyably. I was wrong in thinking Eastern Siberia an outlandish place where no chessmen would be needed. There are all kinds of places in Eastern Siberia.

Life goes on as usual. From Tesinskoye they write that E. E. has had her allowance stopped—"mothers are not regarded as members of the family" (a new interpretation!). They have also reduced Prominsky's allowance from 31 rubles to 19 a month. Anatoly has at last "rescued" his wife after a lot of trouble. Yuly writes from Turukhansk that he is living tolerably well—not the kind of fellow to lose heart, fortunately.

Yours,
V. U.

I am enclosing a letter for Nadezhda Konstantinovna.

Please send me as much money as possible with her; if she has already left, send it to Yelizaveta Vasilyevna's address. There may be fairly heavy expenses, especially if we have to set up house for ourselves, so I am going to make my debt a good round sum and raise another internal loan. By autumn I shall probably receive enough for my translation to cover my debts—*I believe more than five hundreds.**

* The italicised phrase is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

Anyuta,

I should like to ask you to get me some English textbooks. I asked for something to translate and have received the Webbs'[93] big book. I am afraid I may make mistakes.

I need (1) an English grammar, especially *syntax*, and especially a section on idioms. If N. K. has not got a Nurok (I think she had one but I do not know if it was hers), send me yours (or Manyasha's) at least for the summer, unless you (or Manyasha) need it. The only thing is that I do not know whether Nurok will give enough on this question. If you could get a good textbook of English it would be a very good thing.

(2) A dictionary of *geographical* and proper names. They are very difficult to translate and transcribe from English and I am very much afraid of making mistakes. I do not know whether suitable dictionaries exist. If there is no information in *The Book about Books* or in some other reference work or catalogue, perhaps there is some other source from which you could find out.

If you have a chance to find out and to get something (in this case I do not grudge money, for the fee will be a large one and I must make a good job of the first attempt)—but there is no need to take any particular trouble; I shall get the German translation and will be able to refer to it.

Yours,
V. U.

What do you think about summer? Will Mitya be allowed to go to Kokushkino? Are you thinking of staying there or not?

Moscow is a rotten town, isn't it? It is a rotten place to live in and a rotten place to publish books in—so why stay there? I really was surprised when Mark informed me that you were against moving to St. Petersburg.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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TO HIS MOTHER

March 14, 1898

I have received, Mother dearest, your letter of February 28. I did not expect you to return from Kazan so soon. A few days ago I got a letter from there from Alexander Ivanovich which greatly surprised me. He says he is now working, that Nikolai Ivanovich is in St. Petersburg; and that they are living in the same place in Kazan.[94] I must make up my mind to answer it some time. I know nothing about his health—it is difficult to draw any conclusion from his letter; if he is the same as he used to be, it will be difficult for him to go to work and it will not be easy for him to make a living, either.

If books can be sent by express on the railway and the charge is the same as for a slow train, it is, of course, better to send them that way. The thing is when and to whom to send them? It is risky to send them to Achinsk, for Nadezhda Konstantinovna to take them on with her from there; they may be delayed and get left in Achinsk. They will most likely have to be sent to Krasnoyarsk again and wait for someone coming from there. I shall probably be able to find someone more easily now.

With regard to being transferred from here, I am not so far thinking of it. In my opinion it would be premature. I shall wait until Nadezhda Konstantinovna arrives and see how things turn out. I am not writing to her today because I hope that she will have left Moscow by the time this letter arrives. If, despite my hopes, she is still there when it comes, please tell her that yesterday I received the German

translation of Webb (it is a great help to me—I could not have managed without it) and *Vestnik Finansov*.

There is no need to worry about my health—I am now quite well.

We are now having fine weather, the sun is getting appreciably warm and the roads are beginning to deteriorate. Winter, however, retreats very reluctantly here and there is still a long wait ahead for the warm weather.

You will probably receive this letter about April 1, or only shortly before. I offer you and Manyasha my best wishes on the occasion of your name day. I hope Mitya will definitely be out by Easter.

Yours,
V. U.

From Manyasha I have received *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*,[95] at first one issue (I forget which)—there were no interesting articles in it. Yesterday I received four more issues (Nos. 53-56) in which I read some interesting little articles badgering Marxists. *Merci* for them.

In the near future, in three or four weeks or perhaps earlier, we must expect the spring breakdown of communications with Russia; for a fortnight or perhaps as much as three weeks, there will be no post to and from Russia.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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46

TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

March 28

Mark,

I received your letter of March 10 acknowledging receipt of my manuscripts and proposing various plans.

You have, of course, received my letter in which I reject the idea of publishing in Moscow (I wrote that letter *immediately* after I learned about censorship conditions in Moscow)*.

It stands to reason that if things are so impossibly bad with the Moscow censor it is no use thinking of publishing there. Why should we risk such a large sum of money when there may be a delay of a year or a year and a half (*at least*)? You must gather the manuscripts together, do them up in one packet and send them back to St. Petersburg, to the writer, since he is kind enough to take the trouble upon himself. Write to him about the money, telling him we have it, and that he should inform you how much he needs; and that he should see about the publication in autumn, without losing time, as soon as his own work permits.

Such is the outcome of two months' correspondence! I hope you have not yet done anything definite. If you have bought paper you can send it on to St. Petersburg, and if you have started having it set you must pay for the pages already set. It is better to lose a few dozen rubles than risk hundreds. The writer (and you can believe him) speaks confidently about St. Petersburg.

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* See Letter No. 43.—*Ed.*

Of course, if I had had any idea of the charms of our "first capital city" and its censors I should never have dreamed of publishing a book in Moscow. I found out too late, from N. K.'s letter, after she had consulted the writer.

All the best,
Yours,
V. U.

My work has come to a complete standstill*; I am busy with the translation and spend a lot of time over it. After that we'll see—the rough translation will soon be ready, but it will require *radical* revision.

P.S. I am surprised that you write as if you want to publish the book in Moscow—and at the same time point out how impossible censorship conditions are there. Why kick against the pricks?

Written Match 28, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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* The work referred to is Lenin's book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.—Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

May 10, 1898

At last, Mother dearest, my visitors have arrived.[96] They got here on the evening of May 7, and on that very day I was clever enough to go shooting, so they did not find me at home. Nadezhda Konstantinovna, I find, is not looking at all well—she will have to take more care of her health while she is here. As for me—Yelizaveta Vasilyevna exclaimed, "Oh, how fat you're getting!"; and so, you see, you could not wish for a better report!

The terribly sad thing is that they did not bring any good news about Mitya!

I received your letter sent with them and that of April 20. A big *merci* for the things you sent. N. K. has made arrangements in Minusinsk about the books that are to come and I hope I shall get them soon without any trouble. I may fetch them myself as I intend going "to town".

About steamers. They took N. K. only as far as Sorokino (some 70 versts from Minusinsk) after they had waited a week in Krasnoyarsk. The water in the river is still low; there will be high water about the end of May or beginning of June. It is 55 versts from Minusinsk to Shusha. The local steamers make irregular trips; there is no timetable, but, on the whole, once navigation begins they will probably run more or less regularly and without any unusual delays. I would very much like you to come here if you could manage it—if only Mitya is released soon.

By the way, Anyuta asked me who I was going to invite to the wedding; I invite all of you, only I do not know whether it would not perhaps be better to telegraph the

invitations! As you know, N. K. has been confronted with a tragi-comic condition—she must get married *immediately* (sic!) or back to Ufa! Since I am not at all disposed to allow that, we have already begun "bothering" the authorities (mainly for identification papers, without which we cannot get married), so that we shall be able to marry before the Fast of St. Peter*; we permit ourselves to hope that these strict authorities will consider this a sufficiently "immediate" marriage?! I am inviting the people from Tesinskoye (they are already writing that I shall certainly need witnesses) and I hope they will be allowed to come.

Regards to all.

My kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

I almost forgot—Nadya tells me that some books on philosophy were on their way to me, and that they went past here to Irkutsk. Why is it that I have *never* heard anything about this? Has some letter been lost? I would ask Anyuta to find out what happened.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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* Marriage could not be celebrated during any of the three fasts practised by the Russian Orthodox Church—Lent, St. Peter's and Christmas.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

May 17, 1898

This week, Mother dearest, I received Manyasha's letter of May 1.

I have not yet received my books but I hope to get them soon. Nadezhda Konstantinovna made detailed arrangements for them in Minusinsk.

It is probably not worth while subscribing to a newspaper; I hope to get *Syn Otechestva* from Tesinskoye.

The weather here is still foul—wind and rain. Spring just can't settle down.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all. Have I got the address right?

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

June 7, 1898

I received your long letter of May 20 the day before yesterday, Mother dearest, *merci*. Last time I forgot to tell you that I had received the box of books in Minusinsk and brought it from there myself.[97]

I cannot understand why you have not had any letters from me for a long time; I have been writing to you every Sunday "from time immemorial".

Our wedding has been somewhat delayed. I handed in an application for the necessary papers to be sent to us a month ago, and myself went to the police chief in Minusinsk to enquire the reason for the delay. It turned out that the "status sheet" has *not yet* (Siberian ways!) been received in Minusinsk although I have been here in exile over a year (the "status sheet" is a paper identifying the exiled person and without it the police chief knows nothing about me and cannot give me any certificate). It has to be obtained from the Krasnoyarsk prison authorities—I am afraid the police chief will not hurry with this. In any case there cannot be a wedding earlier than July.* I asked him to allow the people to come from Tes to my wedding and he refused outright on the grounds that one political exile in Minusinsk (Raichin) got leave of absence to go to a village last March and disappeared.... My arguments that there was no reason to fear that the Tes people would disappear had no effect on him.

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* Lenin and Krupskaya were married on July 10, 1898.—*Ed.*

The Tes people have been given permission to stay in Tes till autumn, then they will move to Minusinsk.

I think I have already written you about steamer traffic on the Yenisei. The water is still high—it is even rising again; it is very hot and the snow is probably melting in the forests on the mountains. The steamers here (they are all tugs) do not run to a schedule; they take two days and sometimes more to get to Minusinsk from Krasnoyarsk. From Minusinsk it is 55 versts by road to Shusha. I hope I shall get a telegram from you if Mitya is released and you decide to come to us. Yelizaveta Vasilyevna is worried that the journey may be too much for you. If you can travel second class on the railway I do not think it will be too tiring.

Regards to all. I am anxiously awaiting a letter from Anyuta. Did she receive *Voprosy Filosofii*?

My kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

June 14, 1898

I received a letter dated May 30 from Manyasha, Mother dearest; tell her *merci* for it. But why does she not say a word about *Voprosy Filosofii* that I sent on May 14? Did she receive the book? (I sent it at Anyuta's request; Manyasha writes that my letters of May 10 and 17 have been received.)

Life goes on as usual. I think Nadya is going to write today.

We are now having real summer weather. The heat is exceptional—Y. V. finds it very difficult. Nadya and I have begun bathing and have gone over to a summer system.

There is little news, and what there is is bad. In Tesinskoye Comrade Yefimov (a worker from Yekaterinoslav) has gone mad; he is suffering from persecution mania and Gleb has taken him to hospital. There has been a very nasty affair which concerns Yuly in Turukhansk; one of the exiles (a scandal-monger) made all sorts of silly accusations against him and they had to part company; Yuly is now living alone, is ill, his nerves are all to pieces and he cannot work. God save us from these "exile colonies" and exile "scandals"! Yuly has asked his father to try to get him transferred somewhere else, no matter where.

I am quite well (Nadya and Y. V., too). I am finishing the translation and shall then go back to my work again.[98] I have been informed that the collection of my articles is soon to be printed.



The house in which Lenin lived during his exile in Shushenskoye

Regards to all. Is Mitya working? He should have some regular work, just "reading" in general is not much use.

My kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

If anybody should be coming here ask Manyasha to send me from among my books (1) Borovikovsky, *Zakony grazhdanskiye* (Vol. X, Part I), and (2) *Ustav grazhdanskogo sudoproizvodstva* (pocket edition).

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

July 15, 1898

Yesterday I received your letter of June 27.

I had a letter from the doctor yesterday, about N. Y.—he shot himself with a revolver. He was buried on June 23. He left a letter for Gleb, and manuscripts, also for him. They say he asked me to be given a message to the effect that he died full of faith in life and not from disappointment.

I did not expect such a sad ending. Probably the trouble caused by that scandal-monger had a terrible effect on him.

I believe I have already written about a box of books addressed to me from Vilno (I have not yet received it). Can those be the books that have gone on to Irkutsk? When I get them I will inform you. By the way, the mix-up over my books worries me far less (I have plenty of books) than the mix-up over the library book (which you say you will return in a few days). I did not anticipate such an indescribably lengthy delay! So all our efforts to avoid delays, to manage the return in six weeks instead of six months, have been a waste of time, have they? If so, it will be a very sad state of affairs, especially as all my chances of using the St. Petersburg libraries came to an end when N. K. left. I have even thought of asking you whether you could see the librarian yourself and persuade him to give you exact terms for the despatch of books, time of sending, general punctuality, etc. It would not seem a very difficult thing to do and yet in eighteen months absolutely nothing has come of it. I think it's about time we gave it up—it is no joke trying to do battle against "long distances".

I am extremely surprised that you have not received *Voprosy Filosofii*. It would be a pity for it to get lost, for it is a competently written book and not a cheap one; the set, furthermore, would be broken up. I addressed it to Maria Ulyanova by registered post on May 15. I still have the receipt. Could I have sent it to the wrong place? (I may have sent it to your address at Sobachya Ploshchadka). Please get all the information you can and let me know. I will present the receipt at the post office and claim compensation for the loss. I *always* inform you in my letters of books that I send. So, if a book is a long time coming, you may expect information about it in due course. It seems as if another of my letters has gone astray.

Sergei Ivanovich has written to me that he will be glad to have the post of doctor in Sredny Kolymsk. I think he is right. It is better to have a job; without it you go under in exile. He will probably be able to live there well enough on 2,500 rubles a year.

Nadya and I are making a fair copy of the Webbs' book. I have to post it, by the terms of the contract, in the middle of August. I am utterly fed up with this copying (about 1,000 pages for the two of us). The translation was interesting, for it is a very, very useful book.

Yesterday Nadya received a letter from Apollinariya Alexandrovna in Krasnoyarsk. She is being sent to the village of Kazachinskoye in Yeniseisk District, about 100 versts up the river from Yeniseisk. There are a number of political exiles there—Lepeshinsky, Lingling, Rostkovsky, Grigoryeva. She has been in Krasnoyarsk for about 10 days and is now apparently continuing her way to her place of exile.

When do they intend to release Mitya? I did not expect them to make such a fuss over nothing. And where will he go when they let him out?

Kiss Mother, and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Are you going to the Caucasus with Mark or not?

I was very glad to learn that you have sent the money for the publication to the *écrivain*. A big *merci* for that.

I shall now await events. But tell them to reserve 25 copies for me as author—I will send them to comrades and acquaintances. When you get them, send me 12 or 15 copies at once; I will write to you about the rest and tell you where to send them.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

August 2, 1898

A few days ago I received your letter of July 15, Mother dearest.

I hope Mitya will have been released by the time you receive this. His release has been promised so many times that he will probably be free by autumn. The investigation of his case is dragging on much too long.

I think Manyasha's plan to go to Brussels is a good one. She can probably study there better than in Switzerland. She will probably soon be able to cope with the French language. They say that the climate there is good. Nadya has an acquaintance* who lived in Belgium for about five years and is now preparing to go back there from Russia (to Liége). He is married to one of Nadya's close friends.* Nadya is writing to her today asking her to write to Manyasha (in Podolsk) and give her all the information and addresses that might be useful to her.

If the janitor at your old flat says that the postman brought "a yellow book" in May, it must have been the *Voprosy Filosofii* that I sent. So we may hope that the book has not been lost and that we can still get it back. I will wait another week to see what Mark can find out about it at work, and then report the loss.

I am very glad Anyuta intends to inform everyone not to send anything to the address of S. M.[99] That foolish

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* For purposes of secrecy Lenin's relatives removed names from his letter. The "friend" was N. L. Meshcheryakov and the "acquaintance", his wife, A. I. Meshcheryakova (Chechurina).—*Ed*.

person recently received something for me and wants to make a whole "affair" of it.... Of course I pay no attention to these foolish antics (probably caused by our quarrel with the Minusinsk crowd) and I shall receive the books that were sent to her. But it would be pleasanter to manage without her. If there are still people who have not been informed, let Anyuta write to them. A few days ago I received some of the books (mostly on philosophy) that Anyuta bought for me. The books for me that have now been received are still in Minusinsk; they include the continuation of the philosophical series.

Among the books the following got in by accident—I think they are Anyuta's—Baedeker, *Suisse*, and *Jahrbuch des Unterrichtswesens in der Schweiz*, 1892, 1893 and 1894 (three volumes); Anna should write and tell me what to do with them. If I am to return them to her, should it be now or in the autumn (when we intend sending a box of books by rail).

[Apollinariya Alexandrovna Yakubova]* is being sent to the village of Kazachinskoye, Yeniseisk District (I believe I wrote this before); it is on the post road a hundred or more versts upstream from Yeniseisk. The political exiles there are Lingling, Rostkovsky and others. She has not yet written to us from there.

The Tes people expect to get transferred in the middle of August.

A detailed letter has arrived from the doctor in Verkholensk in which he describes the death of N. Y. Fedoseyev, and returns a letter from Anna to N. Y. which arrived after his death (he does not know whose letter it is) and asks what to do with the 25 rubles. (They are collecting money there for a memorial.) They (the comrades in Verkholensk) have also undertaken to pay N. Y.'s debts (about 80 rubles).

The doctor writes that the filthy accusations made against him by some scoundrel (also a political exile) concerning money affairs had a very adverse effect on N. Y., and he decided not to take *any* money from anybody (and he

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* For purposes of secrecy Lenin's relatives removed this name from the letter.—*Ed.*

stuck to his decisions), so that he suffered extreme hardship, could not work, and, as the doctor put it, "when he realised he could not work he decided that he would not live".... After his death a telegram arrived in Verkholensk to the effect that Maria Germanovna* had been given permission to join him....

Kisses for you and regards to all. I wish Mark a pleasant journey and a good holiday.

Yours,
V. U.

Y. V. and Nadya send regards.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

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* M. G. Hopfenhaus.—*Ed.*

53

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

August 16

This week, Mother dearest, I received Anyuta's letter of July 30. I received it on Monday, August 10, in Minusinsk where I had gone to have my teeth seen to.[100] I was very surprised to get this letter, which came, as it turned out, by express train. Incidentally, the transfer of letters from this express train (which goes to Tomsk) to an ordinary train usually involves a loss of time. On Tuesday August 11, I received a Moscow newspaper for July 29 by ordinary train and the letter by express was sent on July 30, i.e., not much quicker.

I cannot send letters by express train from here; to do so I should need friends in Ob[101] to whom I could send letters for posting on the express.

Try once again sending a letter by express and we will see when it arrives.

Today I am sending my Webb translation to St. Petersburg. I have written that they should send my fees to you; if the *écrivain* does not know your address, inform him for this purpose.

There ought to be some news about my collected articles, but there is none and Nadya and I are beginning to think it a fiasco....

Manyasha, I think, is wrong to hesitate. It would be useful for her to live abroad and study in one of the capitals, and studying in Belgium is especially convenient. What subjects does she think of reading?

You see, I was right in postponing the report that *Voprosy* had been lost; the book has not been lost but has been delayed so long that the reason for sending it is no longer valid.

Yours,
V. U.

Anyuta,

By this mail I am sending you a registered packet containing *Negri*, *Tempeste*, and the catalogue you asked for. The address is the same as in this letter. Acknowledge receipt.

At the same time as your letter I received news from Archangel that M. G. also shot herself (July 18) two days after she received news of N. Y.'s death. A terribly tragic story. And the wild slanders of some scoundrel by the name of Yukhotsky (*a political exile*! exiled to Verkholensk) played a major part in this finale. N. Y. was terribly shaken by them and disheartened. Because of them he decided not to accept help *from anyone* and he suffered terrible privations. They say that two or three days before his death he received a letter in which the slander was repeated. The devil knows what it all means! For people in exile, these "exile scandals" are the worst thing of all, but I would never have believed that they could assume such proportions! The slanderer was exposed a long time ago and condemned by all comrades, but I never thought that N. Y. (who had some experience of exile scandals) would take it so much to heart.

The day before yesterday I received Shakhov, Gumplowicz and *Izvestiya* (two issues, January and March); the delay of one mail day was the fault of our postman.

Yuly hopes to get out of Turukhansk soon. In Tesinskoye they are having a wedding and will soon be moving to Minusinsk.* Basil has got a job as a technician with a local industrialist.

Yours,
V. U.

Written August 16, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* The wedding was that of G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and Z. P. Nevzorova.—*Ed.*

54
TO HIS MOTHER

August 26

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received your telegram of the 21st about Mitya's release and also your letter and Anyuta's. I was very glad to get all the news, especially about Mitya. His being released means the investigation is finished; now it will be interesting to know what the prosecuting authority is preparing for him.[102] I am waiting for news of how you are getting fixed up for the winter.

Anyuta's letter is very interesting and I was very glad to learn that my fears of a fiasco were premature.* I am sending a registered package (to the same address as the letter) containing the manuscript of an article written a few days ago. Please send it on to the *écrivain* with a request to try and place it somewhere; if it is too late for the collection of articles, try one of the journals (*Mir Bozhy*, or perhaps *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* would be more convenient).[103] I don't know whether it is convenient for me to send manuscripts direct to St. Petersburg. I did that with Webb because the deadline (September 1) was only a fortnight away, but I don't know whether it gave rise to any dissatisfaction there. For the time being I shall continue sending them to you.

I have already written about having received Gumplowicz, Shakhov, Wolfe's *Izvestiya* and books from Friedmann.

I thank "Auntie"** very much for her regards, etc. It is

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* This is a reference to the publication of *Economic Studies and Essays*.—*Ed*.

** A. M. Kalmykova.—*Ed*.

a pity that there are only regards. I am not at all to blame that I "do not reply". What does. Anyuta think? Should I answer now or would it be better to wait, *if I have to?*

The weather here is showing signs of autumn, although the last few days have been very fine. That our house will not be a suitable one to winter in is something we do not think about and are not afraid of. It is always possible to find other lodgings.

Yours,
V. U.

What about Manyasha Is she still hesitating or has she at last come to a decision?

Written August 28, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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55

TO HIS MOTHER

Krasnoyarsk, September 16, 1898

I have been living here for several days, Mother dearest. I expect to leave tomorrow if the steamer is not a day late. I shall have to leave without A. M. and E. E. (I think I wrote to you from Minusinsk, didn't I, that we had arranged to travel together?) E. E. has been admitted to the local hospital; one of the doctors is an acquaintance of A. M.'s, and E. E., it seems, has been decently provided for and feels better. The doctors have not yet been able to give an exact diagnosis—either it is just a pain caused by a blow (she fell from a carriage about six or eight weeks ago) or an abscess of the liver, a serious complaint that is difficult to cure and requires lengthy treatment. I am very sorry for A. M., who has not recovered from the death of her child and her own illness; she becomes so agitated at times that she almost has nervous fits. I would rather not leave her here alone, but my time is up and I must leave. I am asking the local comrades to visit her. As a result of my trip and of the need to help A. M. and make certain purchases, my finances are in a sorry state. Please send Yelizaveta Vasilyevna (from whom I have received a loan) about a half of the sum that should be sent you for the (whole) Webb translation (sent to St. Petersburg on August 15*). If it has not yet been sent I think it will be better to wait a little while (or get someone to bring the money if the opportunity arises). I shall not experience a crisis so there is no particular hurry.

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* The translation was sent on August 16 (see Letter No. 53).—*Ed.*

I am very pleased with my trip here; I have had my teeth treated and have had a breath of fresh air after eighteen months in Shushenskoye. Few though the people in Krasnoyarsk may be, it is nevertheless pleasant, after Shusha, to see people and talk about something else besides shooting and Shushenskoye "news". The journey back is quite a long one (five days or so); the Yenisei steamer makes devilishly slow headway against the stream. I shall have to stay below decks because the weather has turned unusually cold (it goes without saying that I am wearing my winter clothes [and here I have also bought a sheepskin coat for Nadya] so I shall not suffer from the cold). I have got in a supply of candles and books, so as not to die of boredom on the boat. I shall probably have travelling with me Lepeshinskaya, the wife of an exile, who is going to work in the village of Kuraginskoye (about 40 versts from Minusinsk, where our comrade Kurnatovsky lives); her husband has been transferred to the same place. Yesterday I heard the good news that Yuly had been transferred, but I do not yet know exactly where to. The last letter I received from home was from Anyuta dated August 24. Thank her very much for it and for the books (*Neue Zeit*, reprints from the *Archiv*, Kokhanskaya's[104] biography and others).

I shall answer when I arrive in Shusha, in about ten days, that is; it is a pretty long delay but there is nothing I can do about it.

Yours,
V. U.

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

I have just seen A. M. and learned that Elvira Ernestovna is much better and that the doctors do not think she is in any danger; they promise that in about eight days she will be discharged in good health and will be able to travel to Minusinsk. That is very pleasant news.

Sent to Podolsk

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56

TO HIS MOTHER

October 11, 1898

This week It have received no news from you, Mother dearest. I suppose you are fixing things up with Mitya and the tourists that have arrived. It seems that Anyuta's trip was not very successful. That is a great pity because one does not manage to go to the Crimea very often. How is Manyasha? Has she left yet? Did they arrange details of addresses and letters with her? If they did, write and tell me and I will write to her from here. I am greatly surprised at the stubborn silence of St. Petersburg; I sent the Webb translation on August 15 and up to now they have not even acknowledged receipt of it (I sent it by registered post, of course, addressed to P. B., care of the warehouse). There is also amazing silence about the collection of articles; the last letter was dated August 7 which said that proofs of over a hundred pages had been read, and means that the book was half ready. Surely there could not be a delay of more than a month. Probably it is a fiasco, but even so I expected them to send me the book (by registered post—there is nothing inconvenient in that). I am quite at a loss, but Nadya and I are more and more inclined to think it a fiasco. That would be unfortunate in the extreme. I have finished the rough copy of my "markets" and have begun polishing it.* The writing of the fair copy is proceeding simultaneously, so I am thinking of sending it piecemeal and having it printed as I send it, to prevent any

* By "markets" Lenin means *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.—*Ed*.

delay (I expect to send the first package off in a month's time at the very latest); if the printing of the book begins in December, it could be in time for this season. It will be necessary, however (if the previous book was a fiasco), to find a publisher and conclude a contract with him. I am writing all this in case Anyuta sees the *écrivain*—she often goes to St. Petersburg or learns something by chance, and in general (even if she does not see or learn anything) it is interesting to talk and hear other people's opinions.

We have no news at all. The weather is cold—soon it will be winter. Autumn this year is not so good as last year.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

I almost forgot to tell you that with the last post (October 8) I sent you a registered packet containing two books, one issue of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* and one of *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii*; Anyuta asked me to return them both, and I must apologise for the delay.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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57

TO HIS MOTHER

November 1, 1898

The day before yesterday I received your letter of October 14, Mother dearest, and was very glad to get it. Today I have Gleb staying with me; he has come alone for three days. E. E. is still ill, the illness is a serious one, and she will probably have to be sent to St. Petersburg or Moscow, the local doctors are no good.

I am not writing much because I am late for the post—we have been out walking all day. The weather here is excellent—clear, frosty, calm days; there is no snow yet. Regards to all. Did Mark's health improve in the Crimea? I am expecting a letter soon from Anna. How is Mitya getting on?

Please, send the enclosed letter on to A. P. Sklyarenko*; I have lost his address.

If Anyuta is really thinking of going to St. Petersburg, it would be good if she were to do something about my big composition.** I am sending the first two chapters soon (in a week or ten days) direct to Anyuta; I shall at least know what is happening to them. Then I shall write about my plans for this composition.

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

I have still not received a letter from Manyasha.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

** Here and in the next letter *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* is referred to.—*Ed.*

58

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Anyuta,

Today I am sending to Mother's address two notebooks of the "markets". These are the first two chapters, about a quarter or a fifth of the entire work. Altogether there are eight chapters and I am now finishing work on the third, so that by January it will most probably be finished because Nadya copies it quite quickly, as I write it. Although I am abridging the first rough copy very considerably it is still an enormous size. In the first two chapters 1 reckon there are about 270,000 letters, and if you count 33,000 letters as a printer's signature, there will be about eight and a half signatures. The whole book, therefore, will be about 35 or 40 signatures; I still hope to keep it down to 35, but even that will be a thick book (560 pages). It is desirable to have it printed in a big format with average-sized type, so that there will be about 2,400 letters to a page and more than 33,000 letters to the signature—that will be more convenient since there will be fewer pages.

As far as concerns the actual publication, apparently we shall have to place our hopes on finding a publisher. If you happen to be in St. Petersburg, perhaps you will discuss it with the *écrivain*. Would Mrs. M. Vodovozova undertake to publish the book?[105] [I do not count on an independent edition because I consider the collection of articles to be a flop—although up to now I have not heard *a single word* about it or about the translation! If it should so happen that this is not the case, our own edition will also be possible; then it will be necessary to find a good, intelligent proof-

reader, pay him properly and make it a condition for him to send off every signature immediately it is read.]

Printing can (and should) begin now (I say "should" because otherwise it will not be out by spring); it can then be sent by chapters and I promise that I shall not be late. If a publisher is found, a detailed contract must be concluded with him, and one absolutely definite condition must be the despatch of proofs [it is very difficult for anyone but the author to find misprints, for instance, in tables; and then there may be corrections and addenda, etc.]. In spring the *écrivain* wrote to me that it could be printed in serial form in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* or some other journal. Of course I am not against that, but it is hardly feasible for any journal to take such a big thing—that would be very unusual. It is far more likely that they would take a chapter or two for publication. The second chapter, and the first as well, are independent and complete. Having this in mind, we hurried to send off those parts that were ready immediately. The only thing is, that if they are given to a journal an agreement must be reached on the deadline for printing them and also on the author's right to publish the whole book without waiting for the journal to complete publication.[106]

I am sending the Preface to the book, not for it to be printed (it will probably have to be revised or added to after a time)[107] but in order to give an impression of the plan of the book as a whole. I will send the summaries for the table of contents with each chapter. If such detailed summaries are not required (although in my opinion detailed contents are more convenient for the reader), they may be abridged and only the titles of the sections left.* By the way, these section titles should not be set in bold-face type or italics (that is too imposing) but should, on the contrary, be set in the smallest available type. That would take up less space and be more in accordance with the purpose of the headings. As far as the tables are concerned, I also think they would best be set in small type, so as to take as little space as possible.

I feel that all these details may prove to be of no value—

* The detailed table of contents to *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was not abridged.—*Ed.*

ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

but for my part, at least., I want to do all I can. It is quite possible that the *écrivain* will want, or will agree, to take the matter into his own hands—the one pity is, however, that he is unbelievably and incomprehensibly unpunctual in maintaining communications and is, apparently, absolutely incorrigible in this respect. In general, he is rather too lavish with his kindness; his wife, for instance, herself read the proofs of the beginning of the collection of articles—a tedious job that takes up a lot of time. Why should she have undertaken it when she already has so much to do? Under the circumstances it would have been much more convenient to hire (even if it has to be one they recommend) a special proof-reader[108] and demand that he is punctual in his work and informs you of the despatch of every signature of the proofs.

Here I have to stop. Please answer quickly, if only to acknowledge receipt of the manuscript.

Yours,
V. U.

Written between November 7 and 11, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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59

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

November 11, 1898

We received your letter, Manyasha, and were very glad to have it. We have now got out the maps and are trying to find out just where Brussels is—the devil take it. We have discovered it and have given it some thought—a stone's throw from London, and from Paris and from Germany, which puts it pretty well in the very centre of Europe.... Yes, I do envy you. During the first period of my exile I decided not to look at a map of European Russia or Europe; there was always such a bitter taste in my mouth when I opened those maps and looked at the various black dots on them. Now it does not worry me, I have learned to be patient and look at the maps more calmly; we even begin to wonder which of those dots it would be interesting to reach later on. During the first half of my exile I looked mostly backwards, I suppose, but now I am looking ahead. Oh well, *qui vivra, verra.** As for newspapers and books, please get hold of whatever you can. Send all sorts of catalogues from second-hand booksellers and bookshops in all languages. There is a request I should like to make of you today, but I have decided to put it off till next time. I would remind you of what I wrote to you or to Anna last year—the most interesting newspapers are the official organs that contain verbatim reports of parliamentary discussions. If you find out where such newspapers are sold (are there only Belgian or are there also French and English newspapers in Brussels?) and send the *interesting* issues

* He who lives will see (Fr.).—*Ed.*

(you keep up with the press, I hope?), it will be fine. I advise you not to confine yourself to Belgian newspapers but to subscribe to some German paper; you will not forget the language, and will get excellent reading material; the cost of the newspapers is not great.

Are you going home for Christmas?

Yours,
V. U.

After a long wait I have received my collection of articles at last.* I will ask Anyuta to send you a copy.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Brussels

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* *Economic Studies and Essays.—Ed.*

60

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

November 15, 1898

How are you managing to winter in Podolsk, Mother dearest? This is not a very merry winter for you—Mark has to live away from you, Mitya is chained to Podolsk. He did not answer my questions about how he has to do his army service—in the ranks or as an assistant surgeon? Is there any information about his case, when it will end and how? Or none at all? How is Mark keeping? Is he not miserable alone in Moscow or is he up to his neck in work at his office and his evening lectures (does he still give them?)?[109]

We have no news. The only change is in amusements—now that winter has come I go skating instead of shooting; I recall the old days and find that I have not forgotten how, although it is about ten years since I last skated. Nadya also wants to learn to skate, but I am not sure whether she will manage it.

Regards to all,

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

Anyuta,

I forgot to write to you by the last post that I had received *Neue Zeit* then. Yesterday I got a bill from A. M. Kalmykova. I have accumulated a debt of about eight rubles and still go on ordering and ordering. I cannot understand why I still have not had the fees for the translation I sent to St. Petersburg as long ago as August 15! If the money comes, please send fifty rubles or so to the book warehouse, and if it does not come by the time this letter arrives, I

do not know what to do. If it is possible, it would be a good thing to send even ten rubles to the warehouse; as far as the fee for the translation is concerned, I have been told it will be paid in any case (there should not be any objections from the censors)—and so it is only a matter of time.

Last time I wrote to you I asked you to send the book to various acquaintances of mine but forgot that you do not know the addresses.[110] I do not know the Archangel addresses myself. Today at a guess I am writing to M. E. Grigoryev* at that sawmill where he works. I think you have had some correspondence with Archangel; would it not be better, then, if you were to send them to your acquaintances to be handed on? If that cannot be done, leave them until you get the addresses. The address of Lalayants is: Is. Christoph. Lalayants, House No. 11, corner of Bogoslovskaya and Krutoi streets, Voronezh. It would be a good idea to send a copy to the Samaran, who writes in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*.** He is in St. Petersburg, but I don't know his address.

Am I not loading you down too much with requests?

Wolfe's are advertising a library of French classics *at ten kopeks an issue*. Have you seen what sort of an edition it is?

Yours,
V. U.

I was amazed to read that Labriola is being published in Russian! I can imagine in what distorted form!

Could it have been you who translated Labriola?

I read in *Frankfurter Zeitung*[111] a very interesting article about the Stuttgart *Parteitag*.[112] We are thinking of subscribing to that newspaper next year. Do you read any foreign newspaper?

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

** This refers to P. P. Maslov.—*Ed.*

61

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

November 22, 1898

Today, Mother dearest, I have to write a long business letter to Anyuta. For this reason I shall not write to you, especially as Nadya has already compiled a very lengthy description of our life here and I have nothing to add to it. Her story is true in the main—only there is some exaggeration about my work on the "markets".*

Yours,
V. U.

Ask Mitya to send *Pamyatnaya knizhka Tulskoi gubernii*** to Alexei Pavlovich Sklyarenko as soon as possible; I don't know his address.

Anyuta,

I received two of your letters together—dated November 1 and 4. There is a good side to the publication having been handed over to Vodovozova; at any rate, the work is certain to be done. Her account for the *Studies* seems to be perfectly correct and the smallness of the fee is due to the small number of copies.[113] I cannot, of course, accept such a fee for the "markets". I intend to take advantage of Vodovozova's offer (if you see her, convey to her, of course, many thanks from me) to publish my "markets"—as for the financial conditions, I leave it to you (if it will not be too

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* See Krupskaya's Letter No. 11.—*Ed.*

** Which I am sending by registered post to your address today.

much trouble) to discuss that with her; I do not know which is better, a definite fee or "all the net profit". The more advantageous of those two methods of payment must, of course, be chosen, especially as I do not need the money in a hurry. The most important of the conditions attending publication is to ensure *perfectly good* proof-reading. Unless this is done it *really is not worth while publishing anything*. The proof-reading of the *Studies* was very bad. Apart from those misprints *distorting the meaning** that I sent you,[114] there are numerous minor ones that comrades are already complaining to me about. It is absolutely necessary to have a very intelligent, professional proof-reader; that must be made an absolute condition and I am even willing to pay such a proof-reader double in view of the author's being unable to read the proofs himself. This is especially true of tables—there are always mistakes galore, and in the "markets" there are a lot of tables. Then (even if you have the best proof-reader) I *must* have copies of the final page proofs sent to me immediately, signature by signature, and I will send you a list of misprints. The delay in issuing the book because of this will be (if they are sent punctually) at most a month; that is no great misfortune as long as the book is printed decently. With regard to the date of issue—the work can begin now (we have the third chapter in a fair copy and in a few days I shall finish the fourth, that is, half of the book; the second half is much easier, so I can confidently undertake to send to Moscow the last chapter by February 15, or even earlier); this would be particularly convenient for me, because I would have time to send in not only the misprints to the first signatures but perhaps some more important changes. The format and the type should provide for about 2,400 letters to a page; the whole work would then be no more than 30 signatures, say 500 pages in round figures (more pages would probably be too many and would be bulky for the reader). Lastly, with regard to the chart in Chapter II—special attention will be needed to make sure there are no mistakes in it. Please talk to Vodovozova

* At the same time as I sent the corrections to you I sent them to the *écrivain* with a request to print them, *without fail*, on a separate sheet, to be put into the book when it was sold. It is now necessary to make the same request of Vodovozova.

about all this and answer me as soon as possible after you receive this letter. We shall send Chapters III and IV when they are finished, in about a fortnight.

Please send Manyasha another three copies of the *Studies*. Alexander Leontyevich's* address is Gudina's House, Opernaya Street, Archangel. I have sent them to all the comrades here. Another copy must be sent to the Samaran who writes in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*.

Out of the third of the fee you have received, a half will cover the money sent by Mitya for Yelizaveta Vasilyevna. From the other half, please send a half to Kalmykova's warehouse (I have run into debt there, and I order a lot of things) and use the remainder to subscribe to journals and newspapers for 1899; it is time, especially for the foreign publications.

Russkiye Vedomosti for one year —*8 rubles 50 kopeks* (pay for ten months for me);
Russkoye Bogatstvo for one year —*9 rubles*
Mir Bozhy for one year —*8 rubles*
Niva for 1899 —*7 rubles*
Frankfurter Zeitung for the first quarter of 1899 —*4 rubles 70 kopeks*
Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik, herausgegeben von Heinrich Braun. For 1899 —*12 marks*.

We here greatly appreciate newspapers and journals, especially those that arrive in good time; that is why I ask you to subscribe as early as possible.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.
(Bios has been given to Basil, we no longer have it.)

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* A. L. Malchenko.—*Ed.*

62

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHER

November 28, 1898

I have received letters from you and Mitya dated November 9, Mother dearest.

With regard to telegrams to me here—you must bear in mind that our postman goes to Minusinsk on Monday and Thursday in the morning. This means that you must send telegrams on Sunday or Wednesday morning, so that I receive them on Tuesday or Friday morning (these are our mail days, local Shushenskoye "holidays").*

One letter came from Manyasha and we answered it,** but we have not yet had any more from her.

I am very, very glad you like Podolsk. It is a pity, of course, that Mark cannot live with you.

I have another request to make of Anyuta—to add to the list of subscriptions *Trudy imperatorskogo Volnogo ekonomicheskogo obshchestva*, price 3 rubles a year (6 issues), including delivery—if that publication is still appearing.

If you take out the subscriptions through Wolfe's they already have my address because I receive their *Izvestiya*.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.

Y. V. sends regards to all.

I have finished one half of my book and am now sure that it will be shorter instead of longer than I assumed.

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* The telegraphic address is Minusinsk, Shushenskoye, Ulyanov.

** See Letter No. 59.—*Ed.*

Mitya,

Your information about my shooting is inaccurate. Who told you about it? Maybe Anyuta made some chronological errors and produced some ancient myths about hares as up-to-date news. In the autumn I made quite a good kill among the hares here—there are masses of them on the islands in the Yenisei and we soon got fed up with them. Prominsky shot several dozen because he wanted the skins for a coat.

It is more interesting to shoot black grouse and partridge, but more difficult. In July I got a few grey-hen, but now people go after them on horseback with rifles; in winter you can't get near enough on foot (except on rare occasions). For partridge (autumn) you need a good dog and my Jenny is either too young or simply no good. In winter they mostly catch partridges in traps and snares.*

We now have a new attraction, a skating rink that takes me away from shooting quite a lot.

Next summer I hope to go shooting much more—there will be less work, the dog will be used to its job and it will be my last (I hope) summer in Siberia.

All the best,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* Last year I got a few partridge (very few, though), but this year not a single one.

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TO HIS MOTHER, HIS SISTER ANNA AND HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

December 6, 1898

I got your note, Mother dearest, that you added to Anyuta's letter. I am answering her in detail. I have nothing new to say about myself—life goes on as usual. The weather is still fine and today I am going out for the winter shooting. Anatoly writes that lie is ill, poor chap, probably with typhus. Yuly is freezing in Turukhansk (2° below zero in his room in the mornings) and is anxiously awaiting a transfer. Yak. M. (Lyakhovsky) writes that 180 rubles are needed for a memorial-stone to Fedoseyev, and that so far only 70 rubles have been collected, and he asks all acquaintances to be informed of this.* He writes that on October 18, A. Yergin, Frelikh, Zmeyev, Alyushkevich, Talalayev, Tyutryumova-Abramovich and Goldman arrived at Alexandrovskaya Prison. All of them are on their way to Yakutsk.

Yours,
V. U.

Anyuta and Mark,

I have received both your letters, thanks for them and here is a detailed answer.

It is surprising that the *écrivain* rejected the proposal

* The address to which money can be sent is Y. M. Lyakhovsky, Verkholensk, Irkutsk Gubernia.

to employ a professional proof-reader (for the *Studies*)—there are numerous misprints, and I am particularly worried about those that distort the meaning, a list of which I sent to you and to him. I am expecting an answer in a day or two as to whether they can be stuck in somewhere; they are essential.

I think there is hardly any sense in undertaking an edition of our own; first, it is desirable to establish permanent relations with Vodovozova, who is suitable as a publisher; second, the sum (needed for the edition) is very, big, and the matter is very tedious, complicated and difficult. In doing it ourselves for the first time we are certain to make all sorts of mistakes and I am very anxious that this publication should be outwardly irreproachable, even if it costs a few hundred rubles extra. Thirdly, there is no very great difference in time; my letter will arrive by Christmas and Vodovozova is arriving in February—it may perhaps be possible to communicate with her in writing. And how much time would be wasted (in the case of our own edition) on travelling, searching, etc. It is very hard to keep track of a publishing job from another town. Would it not be better, therefore, to write to Vodovozova? Ask her when she can start setting the book, how much time it will take, will it be possible to issue the book before the end of April, etc. As far as the terms are concerned, I think it is better to take the net profit rather than fees per signature. In the former case I would expect to receive about one-third of the gross sum or even more; in the latter, to make up such a sum it would be necessary to pay a minimum of 75 rubles for each printer's signature, which would be burdensome and risky for the publisher.

I have finished four chapters and even the writing of the fair copy will be finished today, so I shall be sending you Chapters III and IV in a day or two. I hope you will receive the whole book in February. If you are going to read the manuscript, by the way, please send me your remarks. In my rough copy I have marked off the pages of the fair copy, so that I can send corrections. And, again, about the *Studies*—send me any press reviews that you or any acquaintances come across, because here I do not keep up with the current press.

If small type and tables cost more to set, the publisher will have to spend quite a lot on the "markets" because there are many tables, and some diagrams as well. The total volume of the book, as far as I can tell at present, comes to about 450 pages at the rate of 2,400 letters to a page, which is less than I anticipated. If the pages are like those in Vodovozova's publications (they are very widely spaced with no more than 2,000 letters to a page) there will be no less than 550, so smaller type is desirable. It is very desirable to print all the tables in small type, otherwise they will take up a lot of space, be less graphic and not be taken in at a glance by the reader. The tables that are printed sideways on a whole page are particularly inconvenient (i.e., you have to turn the book round to read them). All this is very important to the reader. It would be a good thing to have the type used in the tables in the *appendices* to Vodovozova's book *Zemlevladeniye i selskoye khozyaistvo*; all the tables in the second and other chapters should be set in this type (most of the tables are in Chapter II; there are fewer in the other chapters, but there are some). You must talk to the publisher about all this and also about sending me the proofs (as I have already written). To speed up publication it could be done at two printing works, Part 1 (the first four chapters) and Part 2 separately, with the pages numbered individually. With regard to Mark's proposal to change the title and make it a two-volume edition—I do not think this would be convenient. The more modest and heavier-sounding title is better because of the censorship; to change the title would mean that I would have to make a large number of petty, and, therefore, onerous changes in the text. It is not a good thing to split it into two volumes. If you take the format and type of the *Studies* as the standard, each volume would be smaller than that book (and they could not be sold as separate volumes because the composition is a single whole with cross references to different chapters, etc.). As to price, I did not expect it to be more than 3 rubles and consider a higher price to be undesirable (and a lower price would mean losing money). As many copies as possible should be printed*;

* I agree completely with Mark that there "must be" *at least* 2,400. But what will the publisher say?

it is a pity that such a small number of the *Studies* was put out. With regard to censorship obstacles to the "markets"—I do not expect any, unless there is to be a period of toughness and special severity against our people. If the *Studies* sell well, the "markets" will probably sell better. This should be impressed on the publisher. There is also the question of the number of copies to be supplied to the author (I hope you sent Manyasha another three copies of the *Studies*). I think we should take fifty, because this time I shall have to send them to many people and sometimes to exchange them for Zemstvo statistical publications.

Well, I think I have chattered away long enough—and there must be many repetitions of what has been said before in other equally long business letters! You must be bored with reading all these repetitions. It is very much like my writing—the first rough copy of the "markets" I have scratched about and abridged most ruthlessly.

All the best,

V. U.

All our people send their regards.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

December 12, 1898

From Anyuta I have received *Neue Zeit* and the report of the Committee on Literacy, also a postcard dated November 28. I am answering her on another page. Mail days here are Tuesday and Friday, but that, of course, is not what interests you. We receive Wednesday's and Friday's newspapers, on the fourteenth day from the day of issue, that is. It is, therefore, more convenient for you to write on Tuesdays and Fridays (from Moscow, of course; about Podolsk I do not know). Nadya and I have submitted an application to go to Minusinsk for Christmas and stay there for a week.[115] We shall receive letters just the same, so there is no need to change the address.

Yours,
V. U.

Anyuta,

Today I am sending a registered letter containing the third and fourth chapters of the "markets" to Mother's address. I have made a more exact calculation of how much I have written; in the first four chapters there are about 500,000 letters.* That is fewer than I imagined (and the second part will be less than the first). My fears were groundless; the type that gives 2,000 letters to the page will

* I have counted about 900 letters to a page (and about 1,600 letters in those long pages that have been used for Chapter II).

be quite all right. I have nothing against an edition of two separate volumes—decide yourselves with the publisher. The only thing is the figures—the figures!—they will get them all wrong unless they send me the proofs to correct.*

Please make two corrections to the manuscript: (1) in the Preface strike out everything from "As we know" in the second sentence to "opponents' views" in the third; in the next sentence instead of "it seemed to us" write "it seemed to the author".

I think it might be rather dangerous to speak about "opponents" in the very first paragraph.[116]

(2) On page 44 cross out the footnote at the end of Section VI and in place of it write: "cf. V. Ilyin, *Economic Studies*, St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 30".[117]

Please acknowledge receipt of these corrections.

Thanks for *Neue Zeit* and the report of the committee. Is it possible to obtain the missing numbers of *N. Z.* for 1897-98; we have Nos. 7-8 and 11-24; Nos. 1-6 and 9-10 are missing. I should very much like to have a full set for 1897-98.

You write that you received my letter of November 15** and did not receive the previous one about books. I no longer remember exactly when I sent it, but I know for sure that immediately after I received books from St. Petersburg I sent you an ordinary letter *with a list of misprints that distort the meaning* and a request to distribute a few copies among acquaintances, including another three for Manyasha (in addition to one for herself), one to St. Petersburg, not to the old man but to the Samaran, one to Kokushka (I have not sent him one); and three for you, three for the Chicagoan, the author of *The Factory* (T.-B.) and *Markets* (Bulgakov),[118] two for Grigoryev and Columbus —I make it fourteen copies about which I wrote, as I remember, in the lost letter.

I was very surprised to learn from the doctor that the censor seems to have banned the translation of the Webbs'

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* Figures followed by decimal fractions should be printed in a special manner; the fractions should be printed in smaller type than the whole numbers and *should be printed below the line*, i.e., not 6.3 but $6._3$. This is very important in order to prevent mistakes.

** See Letter No. 60.—*Ed.*

book finally and unconditionally. How can that be? I am of the opinion that it is a rumour—due to the translation *History of Trade Unionism*, which is more *zensurwidriges*.* Our translation is still in the press, isn't it?

All the best,
V. U.

I wrote to the Statistics Department of the Zemstvo Board of Tver Gubernia asking them to send me their *summaries* (Vol. XIII, Issue 1, 1897). They have not sent it, *canaille*. Is there anyone of your acquaintance who could get it? Krasnoperov (if he is there) would surely not refuse.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* Contrary to the censor (Ger.).—*Ed.*

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

December 20

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Today Volodya has unexpectedly gone out shooting so I am writing. Recently the frost here has been as much as 20° below zero, but today it is only two and a half degrees below and Volodya was tempted to go out with his gun, especially as the Shushenskoye sportsmen have a theory that this is the best time to go after grouse; the birds have not eaten during the heavy frosts and are now so busy eating that they do not see a man approaching. Volodya has taken somebody else's gun because he has broken his own; the barrel proved to be made of cast iron and cracked merely from being dropped on the ice. We sent the gun to Minusinsk but the gunsmith there refused to repair it. And so we shall have to buy another. We have heard that a very good double-barreled gun is for sale in Minusinsk and Volodya is thinking of acquiring it.

We are now busy preparing for a trip to Minusinsk. Actually our preparations boil down to Volodya pinning a sheet of paper to the wall and writing down everything we have to buy in town. Mother is not going with us—first she said "no" because the road was bad, and now she says it is too cold. We are going on Christmas Eve and shall return on the first or second, so Volodya's next letter will be from Minusinsk. I do not know whether Volodya told you that Kurnatovsky and the Lepeshinskys are coming to Minusinsk for Christmas, and that they intend to skate, play chess, sing, argue, etc. It looks as though we shall have a good time.

When the "markets" are finished there is a plan to settle down to the study of languages in general and German in particular. Volodya is ordering Pavlovsky's Russian-German Dictionary from the warehouse and asks Anyuta to get hold of Turgenev in German and a decent German gram-

mar. I have heard that one of the best German grammars is that of F. Fiedler but I do not know for sure.

Oh, by the way, we suspect that our surmise about *Zhizn*[119] was incorrect. If so, it is not, of course, worth while subscribing to it.

We have received only one letter from Manyasha. Why doesn't she write? Perhaps her letters do not reach us—she should register them. Volodya has come home and is making a fuss about my staying indoors and not going skating. So I shall close now. "Happy New Year!" Kisses for you and Anyuta, regards to D. I. and M. T.* Mother sends best regards to all. There is nothing to write about at the moment, but there may be after Minusinsk. Again, kisses,

Yours,
Nadya

I add my New Year's greetings.

With regard to the translation of Turgenev—I should think it would be best to enquire at Wolfe's and at the same time to get a catalogue of *Reclaim*[120] editions. It does not matter to us which of Turgenev's books you get, the only thing is that the translation must be a good one. We should like a German grammar that is as complete as possible, especially as regards syntax. It would probably be better if it were in German. Perhaps we should go over to Wolfe altogether for ordering books and for information. Kalmykova's warehouse is not very forthcoming with information; I asked them to get me a reprint of N. Karyshev's article "Material on the Russian National Economy" from the Second Issue of the *second* part of *Izvestiya Moskovskogo selskokhozyaistvennogo instituta* for 1898, but they refused to fulfil my request or even send me the address of *Izvestiya*. Can you get it?

All the best,
V. U.

Written December 20, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov and Mark Timofeyevich Yelizarov.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA[121]

Mile M. Oulianoff,
Rue des Minimes, 40,
Bruxelles,
Belgique

December 22, 1898

I have received Kovalevsky's book from you, Manyasha, but not a single letter. This surprises me (and all of us); since that first letter from you we have not had another. Are letters being lost? Or, perhaps, you are so full of your new life that no time is left for letters? I have had Kovalevsky's book for a long time; I got it in November, when I ordered it from a Petersburg shop; I started reading it but, I must admit, did not finish it—it is a boring compilation. Write and tell us when you think of coming for the summer, what newspapers and journals you are reading, and whether you have got to know Brussels properly and the publishing business there. Send me *Journal officiel*,[122] when it contains interesting parliamentary speeches. I intend writing you a long letter after Christmas, to celebrate which we are going to Minusinsk in a few days.

Yours,
V. U.

Nadya sends regards.

I received your letter of December 20.* I am now in Minusinsk. I will reply on return.

Yours,
V. U.

Written on December 22 and 28, 1898
Sent from Minusinsk

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* New Style.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

Minusinsk, December 28, 1898

I am writing to you, Mother dearest, from Minusinsk; Nadya and I are here for Christmas and will remain until the first. We are having an excellent time here. This is just the kind of holiday from work that we needed. Among other things we skate very strenuously, sing, and so on.

Yours,
V. U.

I am writing to Anna separately.

Yesterday I got a letter from Manyasha with her new address in Brussels.

Anyuta,

I have received your postcard of December 5 and your letter of December 8. Thanks for them. I read a detailed account of the *écrivain*'s lecture in *Russkiye Vedomosti*. Of course, it was hardly worth while putting forward such new views in a short lecture: The remains of Fedoseyev's work would be interesting in this respect; I think he held very different views on landowners' farms before the reform.[123]

(I do not remember whether I informed you that we have received *N. Z.* up to No. 24 inclusive.)

With regard to *Pamyatnaya knizhka Tulskoi gubernii*, I wrote that it was for A. Sklyarenko whose address I did not have at the time. I informed you a long time ago that I had received the report of the literacy committee.*

I am in agreement with the writer's advice (to send it to the printer immediately, use the same format and type as Tugan-Baranovsky's book[124] and not send the proofs

* See Letters Nos. 61 and 64.—*Ed.*

here). The type used in that book will be compact enough; it will come to about 500 pages. I have finished another two chapters (V and VI) and chapter five has been rewritten. I hope to finish in January.

Of course, I agree to entrust the second proofs to you and shall be very, very grateful to you for this strenuous and thankless work. I nevertheless think a professional proof-reader is indispensable; in my opinion two rubles a printer's signature is too little—pay him three rubles or more per signature for the reading of *two* proofs and take the *third* (not the second) proof yourself. For misprints send them to me (not one signature but 5-10 at a time). I do not think, however, that it will be very convenient for me to send you the rough copy; I sometimes need to make additions, inserts, etc., and I cannot do this without the rough copy. Could you not pay the proof-reader more and have him send the pages of the fair copy with the proofs? If that is impossible I will, of course, send the rough copy (you can demand it by telegram "send rough copy").

Yours,
V. U.

I answered *immediately* on receipt of your letter regarding my consent to Vodovozova's terms.* Bios is being read and you are asked not to take it away. Can you not get it in Moscow?

Sent to Podolsk

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* See Letter No. 63.—*Ed.*

1899

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TO HIS MOTHER

January 3, 1899

Nadya and I returned from Minusinsk yesterday, Mother dearest, where we had spent a week with Gleb and Basil very pleasantly and saw the New Year in among comrades.[125] There were many toasts on New Year's eve but the one most heartily greeted was that proposed by one of the comrades "to Elvira Ernestovna and absent mothers".

Today we have not been able to get back into our routine, but tomorrow we shall set to work again. Chapter VI of my book is finished (but not yet rewritten); in a month or so I shall finish the book altogether. I answered Anyuta's letters of December 5 and 8 while still in Minusinsk*; I wrote to her that I agreed to the immediate despatch of the first chapters to the printer, to having the proofs corrected without the author (it is desirable to have three and not two proofs) and the despatch of the final (clean) copy only to the author and, in general, that Anyuta should take charge of publication and do as she thinks fit. I hope Anyuta received my letter. At the same time I sent a letter to Mitya asking him to buy me a gun. Will it cause any difficulties of a financial nature? Something seems to have gone amiss with my fees and I keep ordering books from Kalmykova's warehouse, so I am beginning to have twinges of conscience.

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,

V. U.

Y. V. and Nadya ask me to convey their regards.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* See Letter No. 67.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

January 10, 1899

Your letter and Anyuta's, sent on December 24, I have received, Mother dearest. As Nadya will write in detail, there has been a hitch with the parcel.*

You write that my letter of the 6th** arrived on the 22nd and that such a delay seems strange to you. I do not know the reason. Perhaps the letter was late in leaving Minusinsk; sixteen days is not long, seeing that we receive newspapers from Moscow on the thirteenth day.

With regard to the proofs of the "markets", I have to admit that the writer's statement that the manuscript is exemplary does not appease me; the writer has on one occasion shown himself to be a poor proof-reader and, in general, it is not his business and not within his capacity to handle such tedious work properly. I think, therefore, that it will be necessary to insist on three proofs and not two (the last to go to Moscow), and on Anyuta being in direct contact with the proof-reader. I am afraid of its being published as badly as the *Studies*—that would be very sad. In general it is very difficult, impossible even, to give you answers to all minor and partial questions from here; they must be settled there, on the spot. I am not, therefore, quibbling over the change of the title, even though I do not like it, and the idea that it will "go" better with a broader title is something else I do not like. I deliberately chose

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* See Krupskaya's Letter No. 12.—*Ed.*

** See Letter No. 63.—*Ed.*

a modest title. If, however, it is preserved as a sub-title it is not so important and, I repeat, all minor questions must be decided immediately on the spot. My answers from here are always delayed and useless. If it is possible and convenient I should like to have the last proofs, even if at the rate of 5-10 signatures at a time.

I read in *Russkiye Vedomosti* about Tugan-Baranovsky's debate. Yes, he should have answered Kablukov[126] more sharply!

We shall soon be sending the fifth and sixth chapters; there may possibly be a delay with the end but it will not be very great. I do not think it will hold matters up.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.

I am sending an addendum to the second chapter, page 152 of the fair copy.[127]

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

January 17, 1899

At last we have received the parcel,[128] Mother dearest. *Merci* for it. On Tuesday we also received *Neue Zeit* from Anyuta. It is most satisfactory that all last year's issues of *Neue Zeit* are gradually reaching us. Anyuta, of course, has read *Die historische Berechtigung*, etc., in the issues she sent me. I had read that article before this and am in complete agreement with its arguments (as are other comrades here). By this mail I am sending you two more notebooks with parts of my book (Chapters V and VI) (+a separate page—the table of contents); these two chapters contain about 200,000 letters and the last two chapters will contain approximately as many. I should like to know whether they have begun to print the beginning, about how much time it takes to set a signature and if Anyuta is reading the last proof as she originally intended doing. If that is the case I do not think there would be anything inconvenient in sending the author the first few signatures together with other books. However, the pros and cons of this have probably already been considered without reference to my opinion.

We have no news. Yuly has not written for a very long time, which surprises and worries me. Anatoly is still unwell, poor fellow; he recently went down with typhus and

there were some subsequent lung and heart complications. We advise him to apply for a transfer to Minusinsk District because the climate in Yeniseisk District is much worse, but he will have his own way.[129]

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Mlle Marie Ouljanoff,
Rue des Minimes, 40,
Bruxelles,
Belgique

January 24, 1899

I have received the catalogues you sent, Manyasha. A big *merci* for them. There are some interesting things in them. I intend sending you a list of the books I should like to acquire. Write and tell me if you have become familiar with Brussels in general and with book publishing and bookselling in particular. I should like to read the verbatim reports of some interesting parliamentary discussions. In Paris, for instance, they are to be found in the *Journal officiel*, each issue of which can also be bought separately, of course. I do not know whether it is obtainable in Brussels. The Belgian government newspaper most probably publishes similar reports too.

Where did you get the English catalogues? Are there English bookshops in Brussels or did you order them from London?

I am now busy with urgent work; there is not much left for me to do to finish my book, and then I shall most likely have to start contributing to the magazines. That is why I am writing very little, especially as Nadya says that she will write in detail about our life here.

If you come across anything in second-hand bookshops on the economics of farming in France, Britain, etc. (farming statistics, *enquêtes*, the reports of British commissions),

or on the history of industrial forms (among others, Babbage, Ure—the older writers on this subject), please buy them if the prices are moderate.

Have you much work? When are you thinking of coming home?

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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TO HIS BROTHER

January 26, 1899

I have received your letter about guns and hasten to reply without awaiting the promised price list. I have the price list of the gunsmith's shop belonging to I. Schönbruner (Stary Gazetny Street, between Tverskaya and Nikitskaya Streets, in the house of Tolmachov), which Mark sent me last winter. The most suitable on the list seem to me to be the centre-fire guns by August Francott in Lüttich, pp. 6-7 (45-55 rubles with a choke barrel—incidentally, is it true that the choke increases the concentration of the shot and the accuracy of the gun, as the price list claims and as I have heard from sportsmen? If so, it must be a very useful thing—12 and 16 calibre, weight about 7½ lbs)—and on page 22, a light gun by the same firm (6½ lbs, and a barrel of 14½ vershki* and not 17, also with a choke, 65 rubles for a 12 calibre).** You ask about calibre and weight. I have a 12 calibre gun and I have some cartridges (brass) of that calibre left (made by Y. Torbek; I paid 12 kopeks each for them); this is the size.***

However, you'll probably have to buy new cartridges (25, brass, will be enough, I think) because the cartridges have to fit the gun exactly. And so you must choose the calibre and weight yourself; it is not important, as long

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* About 25½ inches; vershok=1¾ inches (approx.).—*Ed.*

** There are cheaper guns: 42 rubles (p. 10), 35 rubles (p. 14, fig. No. 18, without choke). If it shoots well and is reliable, that will do. I am not interested in the ornament. 12 calibre is a bit big, perhaps 16 calibre would be better.

*** Here Lenin drew a small circle in pencil.—*Ed.*

as it has a good range (it goes without saying that, all other things being equal, a light gun is preferable; perhaps it really is better to have a heavier barrel, in case of necessity it can be scoured, and it won't break or buckle so easily. I have been spoiled, you know, with my light plain-bore gun!). I was particularly interested in the terms Schönbruner offers; "selection of the gun is made by the purchaser if he is present at the test, or by the shop" (p. 3), and not a word about any special payment for a test! But you should not leave it to the shop, of course, to make the selection, you must test the gun yourself and measure the spread of the shot* and take the test sheets. It is strange that they should test it "at 50 arshins**" (p. 3 N.B.)! What the devil do they mean by that? What game can you shoot at a distance of 17 sagenes?*** I always tested my gun at 25 to *30* sagenes. That, incidentally, may be due to my inexperience. If you "hold a consultation" (oho!) all this will probably be weighed up. I was extremely surprised to learn that Schönbruner considers the weight of a gun for transport purposes to be 35 pounds (sic! p. 108—"over long distances"). That's scandalous—17 rubles 50 kopeks! The gun weighs 7½ lbs which is 4 rubles and for the box (you write) about 2 rubles, which comes to about 7 rubles, just as I wrote to you and as I have been told in Minusinsk. Would it not be better to order a box yourself and send it? A device for filling cartridges, the simplest kind (I have one that cost a ruble seventy-five kopeks; the thing for getting the caps out is just a spike on a stick. In Schönbruner's price list, p. 75, fig. No. 133, the "ordinary local" kind are I ruble 75 kopeks). I do not need a game bag (when I kill anything I bring it home on a bit of ordinary string!), I have a cartridge pouch, a soldier's (leather) cartridge box that holds 12 cartridges, and the other 8 or 9 go in my pocket; there is also a sling, although it would be better to fit a ring for it in the shop, if it can be done. What do you mean by "caps of a suitable calibre"? Caps are the same size for all breech-loaders, aren't they? I am marking out the size

* It is as well to take the measurement if they test the gun in the shop, otherwise there will be a lot of trouble getting it.

** Arshin = 28 inches.—*Ed.*

*** Sagene = seven feet.—*Ed.*

of my caps at the top*; if they are not the same size you had better send about 500, of course, or even more; here only the kind I have are available.

With regard to wads—I use ordinary newspaper and thought buying them an unnecessary luxury. If I am wrong in that (if wads are important for striking power) and if they are really cheap (as you write), then send me either some wads or an instrument for cutting them (in the price list p. 92, 75 kopeks; I have heard that it is a very convenient thing to have. Write and tell me whether you use one and what sort of cardboard you use). There is no need to buy a cover specially—I have a simple one, the old one they gave me in the shop in Krasnoyarsk with the gun.** One of the comrades tells me that wire brushes are very useful.

I think that is all. If there is a second-hand gun that has been tested and has no defects in the barrel, of course it is worth while taking it. Address the gun to Yelizaveta Vasilyevna. There is no great hurry—it should be here by March 1, and even the end of March will be all right.

I am very, very glad that your case is taking a turn for the better, and that there are fresh hopes of getting into the University. The mistake at the beginning of § II of Chapter IV (p. 346) you did well to notice; thanks for that. It should read $41._3$ million chetverts[130] and not $14._3$.*** In my first rough copy I had it right, in the second rough copy I made a mistake and did not notice the absurdity. *Please send the correction immediately*. With regard to the word "rational" in the quotation from Kablukov, there is no need to change it; there is no doubt that here Kablukov means "reasonable" and not technically rational; *I also* understood "rational" to mean "reasonable" and not "technically rational". I ridiculed him on this point because

* Here Lenin drew an arrow pointing to the margin where he showed the size of the cap in pencil.—*Ed.*

** Will the cover from a single-barrelled gun do? Incidentally, I think it would be better to get one made here, they sting you badly in the shops.

*** *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 257.—*Ed.*

his argument is pure tautology, since the Narodniks consider natural economy to be "reasonable". Should the reader understand "rational" in the second case differently from the first (i.e., different in Kablukov's words than in mine)?*

Tobacco plantations actually number 75—95—650 *thousand* (i.e., 75,000, 95,000, 650,000).**

Skating is something I do with the greatest of zeal. In Minusinsk, Gleb showed me a number of tricks (he is a good skater) and I have been practising them with such industry that once I hurt my hand and could not write for two days. My old skill has not been forgotten. This kind of exercise is far better than winter shooting, when you flounder up to your knees in snow, spoil your gun and rarely see any game!

All the best,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 256.—*Ed.*
** *Ibid.*, p. 300.—*Ed.*

73

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Vinogradov's House,
Bronnitskaya Street,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

January 30, 1899

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received *Neue Zeit* from Anyuta and a price list from Mitya. *Merci* for them. Today I read an announcement about *Nachalo*[131] in *Russkiye Vedomosti*. It is a good thing I have managed to finish my "markets" just in time for the beginning of *Nachalo* (I finished them at long last today. On Wednesday I am sending in the last two chapters) and now I shall be free to do a little work on current affairs. I have received a little book to review, but have not yet managed to read it.[132]

I do not remember whether I wrote about Anatoly being ill all the time. He has had another misfortune; an order has arrived transferring him to the village of Antsiferovo (several dozen versts to the north of Yeniseisk on the road to Turukhansk)[133]—further banishment to punish him because an exile by the name of Makhnovets (who only arrived this winter) ran away and gave somebody Anatoly's address. From this the conclusion was drawn in some incomprehensible manner that Anatoly must have known about the escape! So far Anatoly has not been moved because of his illness—he cannot even go out of the house. He has applied to be transferred to Minusinsk District or to Russia for treatment.

Nothing has been heard about Yuly's transfer.

Three exiles have also been transferred from the village of Kazachinskoye (where A. A. Yakubova lives); those transferred are Lengnik, to a place not far from us, Arefyev and Rostkovsky, so the Kazachinskoye colony has been very, very much thinned out.

Kurnatovsky (he lives in the village of Kuraginskoye, some 100 versts away from us) asked to be transferred to Shusha; he has been refused; he is now being transferred to the village of Yermakovskoye (about 40 versts from Shushenskoye), where he will be quite alone.

We are having exceptionally good weather; very light frosts (10-12°), bright days and sunshine that is already springlike. This is not a Siberian winter!

Many, many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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TO HIS MOTHER

February 3, 1899

Today, Mother dearest, I am sending you the last two parts of my "markets", Chapters VII and VIII, and two Appendices (II and III)[134] and the headings of the last two chapters. At last I have finished a work that at one time had threatened to drag on infinitely. I would ask Anyuta to send them on to the writer as soon as possible together with the enclosed review of Gvozdyov's book. The writer sent me the book "for review" and I thought it would be awkward to refuse from here. But I did not enjoy writing the review. I did not like the book—nothing new, generalities, an impossible style in places (he writes about "connivances at farming" and things like that). He is at the same time a supporter and an opponent of the Narodniks and, most important of all, a *Nachalo* collaborator. Little as I like that "Samara" spirit,* I nevertheless decided to restrain myself and fill up four-fifths of the review with remarks against the Narodniks and one-fifth against Gvozdyov. I do not know whether the editors will like it; I do not know their relations with the "Samarans". Nadya is writing to the *écrivain*'s wife about all this today.

Many kisses for you and best regards to all.

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* See Note 40.—*Ed.*

3/II 99.

Получено 2-е семья, дорогая
мамочка, остается еще [illegible]
двух уроков, завтра VII и VIII, зато
два пустых (V и VI) и свободных
полдня впереди. Наконец-то кончил
я с работой, которая одна
время угрожала затянуться до сегодняшнего
дня. Попрошу Анюту прислать
мне посылку, вышлет ее
прилагаемой квитанцией на книгу
Ивонова. Пусть пришлет эту книгу
называется „Из рецептов", и потому я
не подобным отсюда отказываться.
Но не очень трудно было писать
рецепты. Книга эта не получилась
ничего новаго, одни повторения, сплошь
заимствованы (называя „руководство
по лечению сифилитических
заболеваний" и т. п.). А в общем время

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TO HIS MOTHER

February 7, 1899

Today I am sending you, Mother dearest, another small package (registered)—first, the issue of *Izvestiya*[135] I was asked to return and, second, a review[136] that I ask you to pass on to the writer. By the next post I will send a little addition to Chapter VII. I hope it will not be too late. I think I forgot to write last time that according to my rough calculation the whole book contains about 934,000 letters. This is not very much, altogether something like 467 printed pages, counting 2,000 letters to a page. If, however, there are fewer letters to the page, for instance 1,680 (as in Tugan-Baranovsky's *Crises*)—which, of course, would make the edition unnecessarily expensive—there will be about 530 pages.

Anyuta apparently did not receive the letter (written a very long time ago) in which I asked her to send me (1) a decent German translation of Turgenev and (2) a detailed German grammar (oven one in German for Germans, because those for Russians are usually very brief).* I want to make a real study of German. Now I ask you to send me a Russian-German Dictionary, one of those we have at home, Lenström, or bettor, Reiff's dictionary of Russian and three European languages. I wanted to order Pavlovsky's

* See Letter No. 65.—*Ed.*

Russian-German Dictionary from Kalmykova's, but it is being issued in parts and only half of it has appeared.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

February 13, 1899

Anyuta,

I have received your letter of January 27 and am delighted with the news about the "markets". If my letter of January 10 was, as you say, too pessimistic, this one will probably be far too optimistic. I am very grateful to V. A., Mitya and especially you for the trouble you have taken with the book, about the fate of which—as far as a satisfactory edition is concerned—I am now quite reassured. With regard to the title—I am inclined to agree that mine is too long; it is, true enough, a necessary one, but it would be better as a sub-title. The title itself should be more modest than *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, which is too bold, too broad and promises too much. *On the Problem of the Development of Capitalism in Russia* would, in my opinion, be better. *I did not receive* Ribot's booklet (*Affektivnaya pamyat*) which you say you sent.[137] There seems to have been a delay, either in your sending the registered packet or in the delivery here.

I wrote in an earlier letter about the approximate number of letters in the entire composition, so it should be easier for you to calculate how many more pages there will be. I am anxiously awaiting the first two chapters—typographically the second is the most difficult. You did well to convince V. A. not to make changes "according to sense" (incidentally, with regard to the little illustration you were

quite right—that is indeed what I meant to say, little and not nice. As regards sharpness of tone, I am now in favour of toning down such passages and decreasing their number. I have realised that they are much stronger in print than in speech or in a letter, so one must be more moderate in this respect). I am also very, very pleased with the tables, with your having convinced the printer not to omit decimal fractions but to print them below the level of the whole numbers and in a different type and not to print the tables sideways. Even if it makes the publication somewhat dearer, it does not matter very much. Judging from your approximate estimate of the cost, you will probably be able to fix the price at no more than 2 rubles 50 kopeks for an edition of 2,400 copies.* With regard to all that, however, I leave it entirely to you to decide. It will also be interesting to see how well the diagram comes out.[138] What do the statisticians say about it (V. A. and the other**)? Several remarks have been made to me about its being unusual. Does it serve its purpose of being clear and convincing?

The publisher*** wrote to me about the "Heritage"; there is a certain grain of truth in his remarks.[139] As far as the Samarans are concerned, I doubt very much whether they have said anything sensible (I have already had a letter about the accusation of "bourgeois sympathies").[140] The question of "from whom we received the inheritance" is not the one I posed in my reply to Mikhailovsky—do we renounce that heritage "that *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* attacks" and which I gave an exact definition of?[141] If polemics were to be started against the Samarans on the fundamental question of the attitude of Marxism to the liberal-enlightener trends, and of the role and significance of the "extra-economic", it would be very interesting and useful.

All the best to you, Mark and Mitya, and many kisses for Mother.

V. U.

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* To make the book cheaper for the public it would be a good thing to sell it for cash from the office of the journal, etc., with a discount—for 1 ruble 75 kopeks, say. I do not know whether it can be done.

** It is not known who the other statistician was.—*Ed.*

*** A. N. Potresov.—*Ed.*

FROM THE J. M. C. NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Today Mikhail Alexandrovich (Silvin) passed through here. He has been transferred to the village of Yermakovskoye (some 40 versts from us). He seems quite well, physically and mentally; he has changed little; we were very glad to see him.

I am sending you yet another addition to Chapter VII.[142]

I am surprised that O. Popova is taking so long in setthug up for Webb.[143] Nadya said that the terms were to pay the translator in any case, even if the censor banned publication of the book. Our finances are again at rock bottom. Please send 200 rubles to Y. V.'s address. If there is still nothing from O. Popova and nothing is expected for a week or two, I would ask you to borrow the money; otherwise we shall be in trouble.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

February 21, 1899

I am sending you another review, Mother dearest, and ask you to send it on to the writer.[144] I have never received the Ribot booklet that Anyuta promised; I am surprised at this and it is strange that Anyuta should single out the page on which the type is supposed to be the same as that used in the "markets"—page 24. Is Ribot's book set in different types? This book is of no importance to me in itself, by the way, since I hope to get the first batch of proofs soon.

We are all well here, there is no change, but we are expecting visitors this week.* We are enjoying spring weather; it has been thawing for several days.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to all.

Nauchnoye Obozreniye for some reason do not think it necessary to send me either the first issue of the journal or reprints of my article. I have heard about P. Struve's objection but have not yet seen it.[145]

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* See next letter.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

February 28, 1899

Today we said "Good-bye" to our guests, Mother dearest; the people from Minusinsk came here—Gleb, Basil, Z. P., local workers and others—and stayed here from Wednesday till today (Sunday). We had an excellent time and are now returning to our usual tasks. The Minusinsk people intend asking permission to come here for the summer; conditions are very bad in town in the summer. I do not know, however, whether material circumstances may not keep them tied to the town. If they can come here we shall be able to spend an excellent summer. Elvira Ernestovna, Gleb tells us, is ill all the time. A. M. did not come—she is acting as district nurse in the village of Kuraginskoye.

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

Are you planning how to spend the summer and what are you thinking of doing?

Anyuta,

I have received the issues of *Neue Zeit*;[146] *merci* for them and for the agricultural returns,[147] and also for the clean proofs of "markets". I was very much pleased with the last. You must have had a lot of trouble with them, but as a result there are practically no misprints. I have not found any in the tables (although you write about them) and those in the letterpress are a mere bagatelle. I think the type is satisfactory. There will be about 30 printer's signatures (that is the maximum, there will probably be fewer), just the number I counted on. The tables have been set excellently. It is particularly good that the decimal fractions stand out well and there are no tables printed

sideways.* The tables set in 6 point (p. 46) and in 5 point (p. 39) have come out very well—I could not wish for anything better.[149] The sub-titles and the numbers of the sections are all set in suitable type. In short, on this occasion I have no reason to regret that the author cannot read the proofs. In one of my next letters I shall send you a short list of my acquaintances to whom I should like you to send the book directly from Russia. It would cost more to send a lot of copies to me and for me to send them from here, and it would be less convenient. I hope that by the time you receive this letter you will have gone a long way past the second chapter, which, from the proof-reader's point of view, is the most treacherous chapter. I shall give the Preface a little more thought—perhaps I shall send another, or perhaps the old one can stay.[150]

I am adding a list of misprints to this letter.

I have received *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 1 with the article by P. B. Struve against Ilyin only from the Minusinsk people. I am thinking of answering it, although it seems to me that P. B.'s article is more *for* than against me. I do not know whether I can now write and quote from the "markets", i.e., will they be out in the first half of April? Write and tell me what you think. (It is important for me to quote in order to avoid repetitions.)[151]

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

I am enclosing a letter to Mark.

I do not know whether it would be convenient to write to him at your address or direct. (Administration of the Moscow-Kursk Railway—is that enough?)[152]

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* There are column headings printed sideways but they are not in the least inconvenient. In exceptional circumstances, tables printed sideways are not so bad, but those set in 5 point type and upright are much better. It will be a good thing if the table on p. 504 can be set in 5 point type.[148]

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TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

February 28, 1899

Mark,

I received your letter of February 8. Your chess game came in very handy. The people from Minusinsk were here at the time as visitors and as they are now enthusiastic chess players we had some exceedingly tough battles. We analysed your game, too. Judging by that, you have begun to play much better. You must have given much thought to each move and (perhaps?) consulted your neighbours. Otherwise, you know, I shall now be afraid to play against a man who has defeated Lasker![153]

With regard to the "forces of the true believers" arrayed against me for my article on the "heritage"[154]—I await with interest something in the press about this. The fundamental question of "support" is, in my opinion, a very important one (in connection with the question of "economics" and extra-economic relations. By the way, do the forces connect the two issues?). It would be very useful and very interesting to talk on this subject to people who do not limit themselves to Gvozdyov's theories (have you road his book about kulaks? I think it is very, very weak*). We shall wait a while.

I read your remarks on the "markets" with great interest. We shall see what sort of impression they produce as a whole—what the critics say, especially those who are to our way of thinking. It is now impossible to correct the

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* See Letter No. 74.—*Ed.*

book (except in individual passages, of course), that is, it is impossible to change its general character, its laconic style (as it is there are about 500 pages! More would be absolutely impossible!)—masses of figures, tables, etc., and a narrow subject. Only one correction would have been possible here—to divide the book into two parts or two volumes and spend a year or two on reworking each of them. For various reasons I found this plan not very suitable. The question of foreign markets is touched upon in general terms only in Chapter VIII, in one § and in connection with the problem of the border regions of Russia. In general I had to reject the examination of the foreign market completely.

I have not heard anything at all about your plans to leave your job. Which school of engineering do you think of entering? A higher school? How many years is the course and what rights does the diploma give you? Are you thinking of becoming an engineer-technologist? Will you be excused a year or two, i.e., not have to take the first part of the course, since you are a graduate of a mathematical faculty?

All the best,
V. U.

Regards from Nadya and Y. V.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER*

March 7, 1899

This week, Mother dearest, I have received three little books by Turgenev in German. *Merci* for them. I am glad you got the *Reclaim* edition—I think it is the most convenient. I am now waiting for a dictionary from Russian into German (I remember we had two—Lenström and Reiff, an old dictionary from Russian. The latter would be better, although the first of them is quite all right), and also some sort of a grammar. I wrote about this to Anyuta; Mark has a *Book about Books* in which several *detailed* German grammars written in the *German* language are listed. I wanted to order Pavlovsky's Russo-German Dictionary from Kalmykova but it seems that it is not finished and is being published piecemeal.

I am now finishing an article[155] in reply to Struve.** It seems to me he has got things badly mixed up and his article may cause a good deal of misunderstanding among supporters and malicious glee among opponents. If it is not possible to place the reply in the journal (for the simple reason that Tugan-Baranovsky or Bulgakov will get their answers in first; I still have not had the January issue of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*) I think I shall include it in the "markets" as a fourth Appendix (the article is no more than

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* An envelope addressed to Lenin's sister Maria in Brussels in his mother's band was attached to this letter.—*Ed.*

** At this point Lenin's mother added a note, apparently for her daughter Maria: "We read it with pleasure; it is well written."—*Ed.*

about sixteen pages). Of course it would be better in the journal.

There are no changes here. The weather is warm. Spring is already making itself felt.

There is little good news from the comrades. Apollinariya Alexandrovna was allowed to go to Yeniseisk for three weeks. Poor Anatoly is sick all the time, his temperature goes up to 40° C. They say he has consumption—he is not allowed to know this, of course. His transfer to Minusinsk District has still not been settled.

Yours,
V. U.

Many kisses. Y. V. and Nadya send regards.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Mlle Marie Ouljanoff,
Rue des Minimes, 40,
Bruxelles,
Belgique

March 7

Again I am guilty of great unpunctuality, dear Manya, but do not be angry. Your letter came just before our guests arrived. We resolved to celebrate Shrovetide in style and invited everyone from the town (six people).* Our quiet Shusha suddenly became crowded and noisy. We spent the time in real holiday fashion and the five days passed before we realised it. On the last day Mikhail Alexandrovich also came (he is now our nearest neighbour and we hope to see him often—he lives 35 versts from here). After the visitors it took us all a long while to get back to normal again. Volodya has immersed himself in an article in reply to Struve. Still that eternally new question of the markets. It looks as though Volodya will have to put in quite a lot of time on polemics in defence of the postulates made in his *Studies*. He intends to write about Kablukov, too. I have no regular occupation, I just read. I have now been ten whole months in Shusha and have not managed to get anything done, I am always going to do something. Spring is in the air. The ice on the river is covered with water all the time and the sparrows in the willow trees are chirping furiously; the bullocks low as they pass up and down the street and the landlady's hen under the stove

* See Letter No. 78.—*Ed.*

clucks so loudly in the morning that she wakes everyone up. The streets are muddy. Volodya is more and more often thinking of his gun and waders, and Mother and I are thinking of planting some flowers. From this description you can get some idea of the way we pass our time and will realise that there is not a great deal of material here for letter-writing. Judging by your letter, your life is the exact opposite of ours—there is life and movement all round you. You seem to be entering into local life and to be full of its interests. Thanks for the newspaper cuttings, send some more. Your irritation at your lack of knowledge of French only impresses upon us the pitiful knowledge of languages that Volodya and I possess—his knowledge is a little better, but mine is very poor. We have got hold of Turgenev in German and intend to start translating from Russian into German, but so far we have neither a dictionary nor a grammar and, even if we had, it is hardly likely we should study. Apparently we shall get to know languages only when we go abroad and necessity forces us to study them seriously. When are you thinking of coming home? Will you have to take any examinations? Do you feel very homesick in Brussels? Have you many friends?

Oh yes—did you know that Anatoly is very ill? The doctors have diagnosed consumption and he has a high temperature all the time. Kuba was given permission to go to Yeniseisk for three weeks and she has gone there. She writes rarely and only to clear her conscience, so I don't know how she is getting on—probably not too well. Zina is still the same as usual, merry and vivacious. And so, good-bye. Many kisses. All the best. Mother asks me to kiss you. Write more often.

Yours,
Nadya

Best wishes, Manyasha, and I, too, thank you for the cuttings. I have nothing to add to Nadya's letter.

V. U.

Written March 7, 1899
Sent from Shushenskoye

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

March 17, 1899

Yesterday, Mother dearest, I received your letter of February 28. A very big *merci* for your photograph. I think it came out quite well and I am all the more glad because the one I have is rather old. It would be wonderful if you could visit us in Shusha. In summer the journey is a relatively easy one—by rail to Krasnoyarsk and then by steamer to Minusinsk (at the beginning of May the steamers do not usually go as far upstream as Minusinsk but in summer they go further, sometimes, though rarely, even to Shusha). Shusha is not a bad place to stay in summer. Gleb and Basil are applying for permission to be transferred here for the summer (summer in Minusinsk is very bad); I do not know whether permission will be given.* Manyasha wrote to us recently and we are writing to her today.

Y. V. received the money.

It is a good thing that Mitya intended going for a gun soon after your letter. The shooting season here begins at the end of March and we are already discussing plans for the shoot.

Many kisses and congratulations for your name day. This letter will probably arrive before the first of April.

Yours,
V. U.

Y. V. sends regards, Nadya will also write to you today.**

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* It was not.—*Ed.*
** This letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

Anyuta,

I have received the *Izvestiya*[156]—a big *merci* for it—and the clean proofs.* By and large I am very pleased with them; the book is neatly printed, the tables are clear and without misprints, and very few of the tables are printed sideways. But I don't know about the diagram, how did that come out? I am sending you a list of the misprints in signatures 4 to 11. A few of them (I have underlined them) either make reading difficult or distort the meaning (these are very few). Perhaps it will be convenient for you to do this: in addition to the list of misprints at the end of the book you put in a special sheet at the beginning (it should be glued in) asking the reader to correct, before reading, the most important misprints, of which these (the ones I have underlined) are of significance, the remainder being given at the end of the book. I believe this is sometimes done.

Since it is no use hoping for any book to appear without misprints, I can tell you (contrary to your expectations) that I feel *fully* satisfied. As far as accuracy is concerned the *Studies* will not compare at all with this publication; there are few misprints and most of them are quite unimportant.

As for the contents, do as you please; you may confine it to the section headings or add the detailed contents I have compiled.[157]

I am sending a list of acquaintances to whom I would like you to send the book when it comes out. Mitya will have plenty to do sending off such a heap of packages! But that is better than sending a lot here (three copies will be enough for me).

I am also sending a Postscript to the *Preface*. If it is not too late I should very much like to print it, so as to make reference to Kautsky's splendid book.[158] Perhaps it will be possible to set the Postscript, even if the Preface has already been set. As soon as you receive this, write and

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* These were the proofs of Chapters II and III of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.—*Ed.*

let me know whether it is possible and, in general, when the end is expected.

V. A-ch has let himself in for a job! It must be very difficult to read the proofs of such a book!

All the best, and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Columbus and the doctor have not written to me for a long time.

Anyuta,

I have one other request to make of you. Perhaps you will chance to be in St. Petersburg or will see the writer—if so, please find out about the Webbs' book. Why have they not paid any fee for it all this time, for, according to Nadya, it should have been paid irrespective of whether the book appeared or not. We should get it out of O. Popova. We are not writing to the writer about it because we think this question cannot really be dealt with in writing. I tell you only in case you see him personally.*

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Mlle Marie Ouljanoff,
Rue des Minimes, 40,
Bruxelles,
Belgique

March 17

My greetings will not arrive in time, dear Manya, they will be late, but I nevertheless send you many, many kisses. Thanks for the views of Brussels, although I do not want to think of foreign countries too soon, I do not even want to think about Russia. All I allow myself to think about is the summer. In her last letter to us, M. Al. wrote that she is coming to see us this summer with Anyuta, and today in a letter to Podolsk I plunged into a description of the charms of Shusha.* I even outlined a trip to Lake Perovo, where we shall catch crucians and fry them. You see, the Minusinsk crowd are asking to come to Shusha for the summer, and we are thinking of acquiring a horse, so that it will be easy to go everywhere. I have become quite a "patriot" and can talk with great enthusiasm about the Yenisei, the islands, the forest, etc. All the same I am sorry I am not a man; I should wander around a lot more. Although I should very much like to see you, I do not intend to tempt you with Shusha, because, speaking impartially, Shusha is a village like any other, and if I were asked today to choose between a place to spend the summer—near Moscow or in Shusha, I should choose the former.

* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

Volodya is now greatly interested in Kautsky's *Agrarfrage* and is writing a review of it.* So far I can only glance at the book and lick my chops. In general, we have quite a lot of books and the very abundance of them only makes one conscious of how much there is to be read and how little one reads. We are not yet receiving *Nachalo*, so far only that boring *Russkoye Bogatstvo*.

However, I must stop. Mother sends you kisses and congratulations. Volodya intends to write himself.

We received M. Al.'s photo in the last post. It is an excellent likeness, isn't it?

Many kisses,

Yours,

Nadya

March 17

I apologise, dear Manyasha, that this time, too, I am writing very little, just adding my congratulations to Nadya's. The fact is that today a lot of letters have to be written to Turukhansk (the post goes once a month),[159] and then I have to send Anyuta a list of the misprints in the clean proofs she sent me.

We have very little news. There is a lull in literary activity—we keep waiting. Foreign newspapers write of events in St. Petersburg and Finland (judging by *Frankfurter Zeitung*) but what they write is inked over, so we know very, very little.[160]

All the best. Perhaps *au revoir*?

Yours,

V. U.

Written March 17, 1899
Sent from Shushenskoye

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* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 94-99.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Vinogradov's House,
Bronnitskaya Street,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

March 21, 1899

I am sending you a note (or a review) on Kautsky's book, Mother dearest; I would ask Anyuta to send it on. I have not yet received the first issue of the journal.* We hope to get it the day after tomorrow.

If Anyuta has not yet written anything to Manyasha about German books, is she going to write? If Manyasha is leaving soon, let her leave instructions at the post office to send books on to some other address (a friend's, etc.). Perhaps Anyuta will also write to her about her own friends? If possible I should like to obtain the missing issues of *Novoye Vremya* for 1897-98.

Many kisses and regards to all.

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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* The journal referred to was *Nachalo*.—*Ed*.

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

April 4, 1899

I have received your letter and Mitya's, Mother dearest. There is no need for you to worry about a place to stay in Shusha, there is plenty of room here. We had four visitors staying with us at Shrovetide. If your health permits we should be very, very glad to see you, so as not to have to wait until my term is up (sometimes the term is extended—although I hope mine will not be). Nadya is writing in greater detail,* but as regards the season I must make a correction to her letter, at the beginning of May the water is still low—the steamer put us ashore half way. It is no good travelling an extra hundred versts by road. The best thing is to reach Krasnoyarsk at the *end* of May, when you can easily go by boat as far as Minusinsk, and from there it is only 55 versts. As a summer resort Shusha is not much worse than any other, I think (if worse it is). It is only a question of the journey.

There is no need for you to be worried about the gun. I am used to it and am very careful.** Shooting is the only form of amusement here, and some sort of "loosening up exercise" is necessary because of my sedentary life.

Thank Mitya for the trouble he took over the gun (which I have not yet received).

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* See Krupskaya's Letter No. 15.—*Ed.*

** A centre-fire gun is much safer than an ordinary one.

I read in *Russkiye Vedomosti* that Mark beat Chigorin! So that's what he's like! I'll have to cross swords with him one day!

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

By the way, I almost forgot—some books will be sent to you C.O.D. from Vyatka. They are for me; please ask Mitya to make a list of them and send it to me.

April 4, 1899

Anyuta,

I have received *Prakticheskaya Zhizn* and Heyse's *German Grammar*. Many thanks for the latter, it is an excellent book. I wrote you last time that I had received Tsion.[161]

By the last post I sent a telegram to Petersburg in answer to the following, which I received on March 26. "Proposed price of book two rubles, author's royalties about 1,500 rubles, wire consent Kalmykova's warehouse."* I gave my consent—because I cannot, after all, haggle by telegraph—and on the eve of publication! How can I hold it up for that! Actually I am not much in favour of that "consent". I was rather surprised that they (who? I do not know, there is no signature) should have done things in a roundabout way and, instead of asking you as the person in charge of the whole business, applied directly to me. I now regret that I did not answer "Apply to Yelizarova in Moscow, she is in charge of the affair." That is how I should have answered! Because 1,500 is very little for three years' work, it works out at 50 rubles a printer's signature. Furthermore, since the *Studies* are selling exceedingly well there need be no worry about the "markets". If that is the case there is no reason for making the booksellers a present of 30 per cent. One could, if the publisher were a more practical man or woman, offer the booksellers half that percentage and also sell the book through the *Nachalo* office, which, it is to be hoped, would not refuse. By the

* The telegram has been lost.—*Ed.*

way, it is probably a waste of time writing all this now, since the deed seems to have been done. Of course, we shall have to make concessions on the fees because of the cheapness of the book. Since it is not we, but other people, who are publishing the book there is no sense in making special claims. And so, all the preceding is merely platonic contemplation and not "business" propositions.

I believe it most probable that even the list of misprints in signatures 11 to 16 (I received them from you the day before yesterday) will be too late, so I am sending it only in case, and without making a fair copy.*

I have at last received issue No. 1-2 of *Nachalo* from comrades. (Please subscribe to it for us, if you have not done so. I did a very foolish thing in again relying on the *écrivain*. I hope I shall not be so silly in the future.) In general, I liked it very much, but B. Avilov is rather weak, more scathing than sound.[162] Bulgakov simply made me mad; such nonsense, such utter nonsense, and such eternal professorial pretentiousness—what the devil is this?![163] No wonder *Syn Otechestva* has already praised him! We'll see how he finishes up. I am thinking of writing "about Kautsky's book and Bulgakov's article".[164] I have given up the plan to write about Kablukov, he is not worth a second article. The *écrivain*, as usual, is silent, and we do not expect any information on journal affairs from him although we feel a considerable need for such information.

All the best,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* This list has been lost.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

April 11, 1899

I received Mitya's parcel on Tuesday, Mother dearest. Send him a big *merci* for all his trouble. I am pleased with the gun (the weather is bad at present; the usual spring squalls—strong winds from across the Yenisei; so there has been practically no shooting). A charge of 2¾ measures seemed too big (the gun kicks) and so I have begun using 2½ measures. I don't understand how they could have used 3 in the shop! I have not yet been able to observe that the left barrel is better than the right—probably because I fired from too great a distance, 60 paces or so, about 30 sagenes.

If you come here bring some plain black tulle for mosquito nets—I cannot go about here without a net. The locality is rather swampy. And also, please bring me another 200 wads for powder and for shot (similar to those Mitya sent me. There are none to be had here, and they are light and easily packed).

At Easter I intend to make a shooting trip to a much better area.

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

(Next Sunday there will be no post on account of Easter. Then the ice on the Yenisei may begin to move—it usually does soon after the twentieth of April. There may be some

interruption of our correspondence; but you should not let that worry you. Last year, I believe, there was practically no interruption.)

Anyuta,

I shall send to Mother's address by the next post an article on Kautsky and Bulgakov. Please send it on to the writer with a request that he inform you immediately whether the editors accept it. I believe it quite possible that they may not do so, because the *écrivain* is probably on Bulgakov's side and may find polemics inconvenient, especially sharp polemics. As far as possible I tried to modify my tone but I was unable to speak coolly about that disgustingly professorial and clumsy article, which strikes a terribly dissonant note. I do not, of course, want to restrict the editors' right to make "corrections", but there is no need to write about this since it is understood, unless the author makes specific provisos. If they do not accept the article, inform me, please, as quickly as possible and send the article, if you can, to. *Zhizn* or *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* [*Mir Bozhy* is hardly likely to accept it]. There has been no information from the writer on literary matters, and we do not hope for any. Meanwhile it is devilishly inconvenient to write without constant and regular communication. A long time ago, in January, I think, I wrote them (or Nadya wrote) that I intended doing an article about Kablukov; they did not inform me that they had another article.* You hear nothing about reviews. (The review of Kautsky's book should be cancelled or sent somewhere else in view of this article against Bulgakov.) You never know what they have and what they have not. It would be a very good thing, if it were possible, to start a correspondence with the Chicagoan, who is in the know and probably has fairly close connections, so that he could answer all questions and in general keep you *au courant* with journal affairs. I do not know whether this could be done.

* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

How am I to send manuscripts if you (and Mother) go away?[165] In any case, leave the post office an address to which letters and parcels can be forwarded.

Oh, yes—in my article I have referred to my "markets". If the book does not come out by the time you send on the manuscript, please cross out the footnotes containing such references or write in the manuscript that they should be taken out.[166]

All the best,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

May 1, 1899

On Tuesday, Mother dearest, I received Anyuta's letter of April 12 and on Friday I received my book* (3 copies) and the manuscript of the translation. I am writing to Anyuta separately.

This year spring has come particularly early. The trees are breaking into leaf and the water in the river is rising rapidly. The steamer could no doubt get as far as Minusinsk already, but nobody can say definitely whether the high water will last and for how long.

Mikhail Alexandrovich (Silvin) wrote me that his fiancée wants to visit him at the end of May (not earlier than the 23rd). Her name is Papperek (Olga Alexandrovna), address, Yegoryevsk in Ryazan Gubernia (she teaches at a secondary school there). If you decide to come, perhaps you could set out together. In any ease it will provide a convenient opportunity to send things. Mikhail Alexandrovich has asked her to call at Podolsk on the way, but you must, of course, get in touch with her because there may be circumstances that prevent her from doing so. Yermakovskoye (where M. A. lives) is 40 versts from here, and the road there from Minusinsk is through Shushenskoye.

Yours,

V. U.

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* *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.—Ed.*

Many kisses and regards to all.

How are you fixed up now? How are you feeling? When are you expecting Manyasha?

May 1, 1899

Anyuta,

I have received your letter of April 12, my book and the Webb translation (*three* registered packages).

I am very pleased with the appearance of the book. The publication is excellent thanks to the great trouble you took with the proofs. It goes without saying that you did well to raise the price. It is quite enough that there will be a 25 per cent discount for students. Have you sent the book to all our acquaintances? I think you should take a further fifteen or so copies as the author's reserve; we shall have to exchange them for various symposia, etc. I have already written to you about the *Studies* and asked you to obtain a few more copies (send me two copies, but there is no hurry). I am very pleased with the title of the book; the *écrivain*'s correction proved worth while. If royalties arrive do not send them yet. (I am writing to Mother about a good opportunity to send things here that will soon occur.)

I am willing to take the job of editing the Webb translation. I shall edit it in conformity with my own translation of the first volume. Since I have been given the job of editing there is nothing else to wait for, and the first volume should be sent to the press immediately, should it not? Or will that again depend on P. B.'s "preparations"?

For the editing job the following are *indispensable*—(1) *the English original of Volume 2* (I have only Volume 1), (2) *the German translation* of Volume 2 (K. Hugo, I have only Volume 1 although Volume 2 has also been published). If these books have not yet been sent, please write quickly and tell them to send them immediately. I am afraid this may also cause a delay. Is it not possible to give someone the job of getting those books from them and sending them to me?[167]

I did not very much like P. B.'s sending my reply to him on to *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*; is he trying to avoid polemics in *Nachalo*?[168] If he is, my article about Bulgakov will

obviously not be published. At last I have received *Nachalo*—two issues, complete. By and large I liked it very much. But Bulgakov's article is outrageous. Kautsky he *distorts outright*, and then there is that attack on *Zusammenbruch*[169] —it is an echo of Bernstein's "criticism" [the warehouse refused to send me Bernstein's book; I have asked Manyasha, but I do not know whether she will bring it. Can you get it?] I am writing a second article against him.* Of course, polemics among one's own people are unpleasant and I tried to tone the article clown, but to keep quiet about differences is not only unpleasant, it is *downright harmful*—and, furthermore, one cannot keep quiet about the chief differences between "orthodoxy" and "criticism" that have come to the fore in German and Russian Marxism. Our opponents are already taking advantage of the differences anyway (Mikhailovsky in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* No. 4). While polemising among ourselves we can agree on general solidarity against the *Narodniks*. I want to do this at the end of my article.[170] One of Bulgakov's chief faults is that he did not say exactly in what he agrees with Kautsky against the Narodniks.

All the best,
V. U.

In *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 3 I saw a note by Maslov against my article on the heritage. It seemed quite uninteresting.

I am sending Negri. And what are these farming returns?

A copy of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* should be given to Maslov. Please do that through the *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* office or through P. B., or through V. A.

Please send all reviews of the book and ask V. A. to send those from the St. Petersburg newspapers.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* See Note 164.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Vinogradov's House,
Bronnitskaya Street,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

May 9, 1899

I have received a letter from Manyasha, Mother dearest, in which she says she is thinking of coming home soon. I shall await news of what you decide to do about coming here.

For the last few days we have had what the Siberians call strong "weather"—by "weather" they mean the wind that blows from across the Yenisei, from the West; it is cold and violent, like a whirlwind. In spring there are always whirlwinds that tear down fences, roofs and so on. I was out shooting in the pine grove and I actually saw huge birches and pines being uprooted by a whirlwind. Such unpleasant "weathers", however, occur only in spring and autumn, and if there is a wind in summer it is not strong, so that *should* not cause you any alarm. Today has been better—there seems to be a turn towards summer. From mid-May to mid-August there is no reason to beware of Siberian "weather".

Next Sunday I am sending to your address the manuscript of an article of mine*; if you go away, arrange for it to be forwarded to its destination.

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* The second article "Capitalism in Agriculture".—*Ed.*

We are all well and all of us send regards to you and everybody.

Many kisses,
Yours,
V. U.

Anyuta,

Today I finished my second article against Bulgakov. When I have corrected and rewritten it I will send it to Mother's address. I am anxiously awaiting a reply about the first article; I should get it by the middle of May.

Many of the "disciples"[171] are going over to *Zhizn*. Do you know who is actually the editor of it?

There is a very interesting discussion going on now in Germany over Bernstein's book—and I have not seen that book or anything written about it (with the exception of some casual notes in *Frankfurter Zeitung*). A great pity.

Has Mitya sent my book to everybody on my list? If V. A. was to send off some of them, please ask him if he has sent them to *everyone*. P. N. Lepeshinsky (Kuraginskoye, Minusinsk District, Yeniseisk Gubernia) wrote me, for instance, that he had *not received* the book, although he was on my list. I think you should have about fifteen reserve copies (there is no need to send them here).

All the best,
V. U.

Regards to Mark.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA AND HIS MOTHER

May 29, 1899

Anyuta,

I have received your postscript to Mark's letter.

You had not previously written to me about a proposal that I write a short course of political economy. I have decided to refuse the offer; it is difficult to write to order (in particular, it is difficult to compete with Bogdanov. Why not republish his book?[172]), and it would be difficult to finish it by autumn. In general, I want to write less and read more. Since my correspondence with the *écrivain* has come to a complete halt, please let him know of my refusal.

I have not yet started on Webb. *I am still waiting* for the original (of Volume 2) and the German translation (of Volume 2). If there is a delay it will not be my fault. There is more reason to fear a delay on the part of the écrivain, incidentally. Is the first volume in the press?

I learnt that a telegram had been sent me about the publication of the book only from your letter. I am writing to the Minusinsk post office asking them to search for the telegram. Was the address correct? You should write: "*Minusinsk*, *to Shushenskoye by post*, *Ulyanov*", and pay seven or fourteen kopeks extra for postage. If you did not add "by post", it is possible that the telegram is still lying there. In general, I have not noticed that the despatch of telegrams to this place is a hopeless undertaking; others have arrived in time. You should send them so that they arrive in Minusinsk on Sunday or Wednesday evening and I will receive them on Tuesday or Friday morning.

I am sending the article on Sismondists that you asked for and the reply to Nezhdanov.[173] It would be most convenient to print the latter in the same *Zhizn*.* If, however, contrary to expectations *Nachalo* revives, I should prefer it in that journal.

I am now doing some reading and studying languages a little. In general I am doing very little work and do not intend writing anything.

I am very sorry the *écrivain* did not write anything to me about Gvozdyov. I wanted to curse him for all I was worth, but I saw that he was a contributor to the same journal and felt myself duty bound to be as gentle with him as possible. It would have been strange to squabble in the same journal. Perhaps the writer wanted to get rid of it—get rid of the "Gvozdyov school", as I now call these things. I do not know this and, in general, I do not know what sort of fellow Gvozdyov is. It is difficult to judge from a distance.

Yours,
V. U.

May 30, 1899

I am sending you a registered package, Mother dearest, containing my article and a reprint of the article on the Sismondists that you asked for. I am writing in greater detail to Anyuta and Mark, from whom I received a letter this week. It was strange that their letter (dated May 14) was postmarked "*Krasnoyarsk*". Was it sent by the Siberian express?

We here are all quite well and send regards to everybody.

Many kisses,
Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* If my answer to Struve has not yet been published, you might perhaps add this to it as a postscript and throw out my mention of a reply to Struve.[174]

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHER

June 20, 1899

I have received your letter of May 31, Mother dearest. *Merci*. With regard to the statistical returns—from Tver and Vyatka—I think I have already written that *there is no need to send them all to me*; I am not working on this now and do not intend to until my term of exile is finished. If any particular book is needed it will be better for me to order it separately, otherwise I shall have a mountain of books to bring back. But you are probably sending only a few statistical returns. Mikhail Alexandrovich writes that he does not expect his fiancée until the end of summer.

We do not think it worth while asking for a transfer to Krasnoyarsk. We have been talking recently with Yelizaveta Vasilyevna, who is thinking of asking for permission for me to go with them to Ufa this autumn because of the difficulty of a winter journey for her and Nadya. If she carries out her intention I will let you know.

We have been paid our allowances.

We have news from Yermakovskoye that Anatoly is no better.

We have also heard that Lyakhovsky has made a trip to Chita as a doctor.

It is a pity you are having such bad weather and have no opportunity for a good rest in the country. June has been rainy here, too.

Life here goes on as usual. I am not working much at present and soon, when the shooting season opens, I shall probably work even less.

I have received the May issue of *Nachalo*—pretty badly cut up. I do not think there is anything of particular interest in it. I am losing all hope of that journal regaining its health. I have had a letter telling me that the Ministry of the Interior has demanded that the editors reveal the names of the authors who wrote in the first and in the April issues under pseudonyms. It would be interesting to know whether we have any mutual acquaintances among the "revealed".

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Mitya,

I have seen *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 5 and find that Tugan-Baranovsky's article in it is monstrously foolish and nonsensical; he has simply arbitrarily introduced changes into the rate of surplus value in order to "refute" Marx; he assumes an absurdity—a change in the productivity of labour without a change in the value of the product. I don't know whether every such nonsensical article is worth writing about. Let him first fulfil his promise to develop it in detail.[175] In general I am becoming a more and more determined opponent of the latest "critical stream" in Marxism and of neo-Kantianism (which has produced, incidentally, the idea of separating sociological from economic laws). The author of *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus** is quite right in declaring that neo-Kantianism is a reactionary theory of the reactionary bourgeoisie and in rebelling against Bernstein. I am extremely interested in Bogdanov's new book (*Osnovniye elementy istoricheskogo vozzreniya na prirodu*, St. Petersburg, 1899) and have ordered it; the review of it in the May issue of *Nachalo* was written ridiculously, with pompous phrases but no mention of the real problem. I am very sorry that I somehow missed the advertisement of the book when it was published. I think it should be a sensible book and that such a review should not be left unanswered.[176]

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* *Essays on the History of Materialism* by G. V. Plekhanov.—*Ed.*

Am very pleased with the gun. We did not shoot much in spring. Soon the real season will begin and I intend to spend more time shooting this summer.

All the best,
V. U.

Please send me a *list* of the Zemstvo statistical returns that have been sent to me—titles and brief contents, i.e., tables or tables+text, nothing else.

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova.
Cottage No. 3,
Town Park,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

July 11, 1899

I am writing a few lines, Mother dearest, to tell you that we are all quite well. This week I received the books Manyasha wrote to me about (Labriola and Jules Guesde). *Merci* for them.

We have put off the journey to Minusinsk for a while. Perhaps we shall go for a short time this week. The weather here is rotten; it has been a bad summer, all wind and rain.

I have received a letter from Lyakhovsky; he has been working as a doctor, it seems, in Chita and thinks of going later to Sretensk, also as a doctor.

I still have not received the original of the Webbs' book, although the writer promised it.

Yours,
V. U.

Y. V. and N. K. send regards.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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TO HIS MOTHER

August 1, 1899

I do not think there is very much news this week, Mother dearest. The weather has changed to real summer, it is very hot and rather interferes with shooting, which I am indulging in very strenuously because it will probably be over soon.

I do not remember whether I wrote about the doctor (Y. M. Lyakhovsky), that he has made a trip to Chita as a doctor and intends to accept a similar post in Sretensk.

Visitors have arrived—M. A. with his wife and others. Excuse me for cutting this letter short. We are all well and send regards. I shall write to Anyuta soon about the *Credo* (which interests and *exasperates* me and everybody else) in detail.[177]

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Cottage No. 3,
Town Park,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

August 7, 1899

I have received your letter of July 15, Mother dearest. A big *merci* for it and for carrying out my request in respect of Anatoly.* I hope to see him again in a few days; they say he is very bad, the blood is flowing from his throat and he even coughs up pieces of lung.... The Governor was in Yermakovskoye and gave Anatoly permission to go to Krasnoyarsk, but now he himself does not want to go.

We are expecting visitors today—Gleb and his wife and Basil from Minusinsk. It is said that Gleb has received permission to move to the railway and take a job as engineer. He will, of course, take advantage of the offer to get together a little money for his journey home. It would otherwise be rather difficult for him and Basil to get away from here, even impossible in winter.

We have not put in any requests after all—it doesn't seem to matter, we shall wait for January 29, 1900....** If only we can get away from here at that time—where we shall be till then is not important.

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* The nature of Lenin's request in respect of A. A. Vaneyev is not known.—*Ed.*

** The date Lenin's term of exile ended.—*Ed.*

E. E.'s health has improved. The Minusinsk people have had a good summer. A. M. has obtained a job in Minusinsk, I believe.

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Manyasha,

I recently read Stammler's book here, in German, and felt very dissatisfied with it. In my opinion it is learned nonsense and fruitless scholasticism. It would be interesting to know who praised it to you. It is true that Struve and Bulgakov, both of whom, like Stammler, take a stand on neo-Kantianism,[178] praised it in *Novoye Slovo*. Stammler in my opinion is an excellent argument *against* neo-Kantianism. To attempt to fight Marxism armed with nothing but foolishly compiled *definitions* in the way Stammler does (he has never written anything but textbooks for students of Roman Law...) is too absurd an undertaking. It was correctly said in *Neue Zeit* (Cunow) that Stammler's book is of negative significance.

A few days ago I received the April issue of *Nachalo* and read almost all of it. It is very interesting in general and the article "Out of Turn" in particular.

Webb (the original) *we have still not received*! It seems I shall have to postpone it till my return since I can get nothing done.

I have read P. N. Skvortsov on markets in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 7[179]—in my opinion the article contains very little and the author's point of view is not clear to me. My reply to Struve has still not been published*—the devil knows, this is disgraceful and muddleheaded!

All the best,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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* "Once More on the Theory of Realisation", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 74-93.—*Ed.*

94

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Cottage No. 3,
Town Park,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

August 15, 1899

I have received letters from Manyasha and Mitya. Mother dearest, informing me that you have received my telegram and have taken a firm decision not to make the journey.* Are you better now? When (and where) is Manyasha leaving? When are you moving to a new apartment or to Moscow? I am sending you today a registered package with a book I should have returned long ago. I apologise for the delay. Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Nadya and Y. V. send regards

Sent from Shushenskoye

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* This refers to a proposed trip to Shushenskoye.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Cottage No. 3,
Town Park,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

August 22, 1899

The day before yesterday I received your letter, Mother dearest, letters from Anyuta and Manyasha, a book from Anyuta (*Nauchnoye Obozreniye*) and cuttings from Manyasha. *Merci* for everything. I was terribly pleased to know that you are up and about again. What caused the epidemic of malaria in Podolsk? Is it a swampy place? Do you feel quite well now? It looks like being a good autumn here, dry and warm. What is it like where you are?

Letters sent by express train do not seem to come any quicker than those sent by ordinary mail, which surprises me very much. I received your letter of August 7 on the 20th (and on the same day I also received the newspaper of the 7th). Is the delay not caused by the express train taking letters to Krasnoyarsk (at any rate the envelope bears the stamp "Krasnoyarsk 14.VIII") and from there a letter goes back to Achinsk (the post road is from Achinsk to Minusinsk)? Either this train does not stop at Achinsk or the mail is not taken off it there. That must be the reason, because letters go quickly from Moscow to Krasnoyarsk (from 7th to 14th) but the gain is lost on the way back from Krasnoyarsk to Achinsk.

As far as the transfer is concerned, *we only talked* about it but *did not submit any* applications. We do not think it worth while applying—we will wait until January 29, 1900.

Life here goes on as usual. The weather is fine and Nadya and I go walking a lot. We are all in good health.

I embrace you, Mother dearest, and hope you will keep well.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

August 22

I received your letter long ago, dear Manya, but I have been terribly lazy lately and have got all behind with my letter-writing; there are several letters I must answer. It must be due to my present way of life; I spend whole days (as much as five hours at a time) out walking, somehow it is even difficult to read. The summer was foul, but autumn so far has been marvellous. Volodya also does a lot of walking, but he still does some work, although far less than before.

What have you decided? When are you leaving and where are you going? When I read your letter to Volodya in which you asked him what institution you should enter, I remembered what a quandary I was in at your age. First I decided to become a village schoolmistress, but I was unable to find a place and wanted to go to the provinces. Then when the Bestuzhev courses were started I joined them, expecting to be told about everything I was interested in, but when they began to talk about something quite different I left. In short, I was in a hopeless quandary. I was twenty-one before I heard that there was such a thing as the "social sciences"; up till then my idea of serious reading had been either the natural sciences or history, and so first I would try to read Rossmässler, then the history of Philip II of Spain. You are placed in very different circumstances. Whether it is worth while learning "how to make a living", I don't know; I think it is not worth while. If money is needed you can get a job on some railway, where at least you will be able to work off the necessary number of hours and have

no cares, you will be as free as a bird; but all this pedagogy, medicine and so on absorbs a person more than it should. It is a pity to waste time on special training when there is so much you want to know and should know, and, after all, your knowledge of languages will always feed you. Volodya and I are in trouble with languages; we both are rather bad at them; we take a lot of trouble over them, but we are still not good. We have taken up English again. How often we have done so before! I am beginning for the tenth time, at least. You are probably far ahead of me by now. Anya knows English quite well, doesn't she? But I keep forgetting to ask you whether you have made the acquaintance of Meshcheryakov? I believe he is in Moscow now. He is as much in love with Belgium as you are. At one time I corresponded with him, and I then had a good knowledge of all Belgian affairs and was very interested in them. If you see him, try to find out where his wife is. A friend of hers wrote me that she had gone to Munich. I should be sorry to lose touch with her. She is a very nice person. I don't know whether we shall ever meet again. All my St. Petersburg acquaintances have been so scattered in all directions that I don't know who is where. At first we wrote to one another, but now our correspondence is gradually drying up. It is no good writing letters, you can never really discuss anything, and you begin ... the result is that before you know where you are a misunderstanding arises. I do not know how Kuba is getting on, she wrote little, but it looked as if her nerves were giving out. But I have written so much there will be no space left for Volodya, so I had better stop. Many kisses for you, Maria Alexandrovna and Anyuta. Mother sends regards to all.

All the best,
Nadya

August 22, 1899

I was very pleased, Manyasha, when I read that at last you had got Bernstein for me;[180] I have been *and still am waiting very impatiently for it*. People have written to me from *Yakutia* that they are reading Bernstein and we

FROM MARXIST LIBRARY MAO ZEDONG NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

have not yet got it here! The more they shout about him, and the more various thick-headed bourgeois and "young" (in all respects) non-bourgeois make use of him, the more necessary it is to make the speedy acquaintance of this "newest" hero of opportunism.

On October 9, 1899 (N.S.) there will be a *Parteitag** in Hanover and they will talk about Bernstein.[181] I should *very much* like to have reports of it. Please try to get them for me; it is quite possible to do so in one of the following ways. Write to your acquaintances abroad (I ask Anya to do this, too) to send those issues of the newspapers in which the reports are printed, even if it is only *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which can enter Russia. If the acquaintances do not undertake to send either *Vorwärts*[182] or *Frankfurter Zeitung*, perhaps you can subscribe to *Frankfurter Zeitung for October* through the Moscow post office. (I know you can subscribe for three months, but that is too long and too expensive, 4 rubles 70 kopeks. Perhaps you can subscribe for a month?) If you are abroad yourself, then please buy those issues and send them.

I am not sending you any literary jobs because I am not writing anything now and do not intend to write. But if you go abroad I shall probably ask you to look out for some good old books for me.

All the best,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* Party congress.—*Ed.*

97

TO HIS MOTHER

August 25, 1899

Last Sunday we returned home, Mother dearest, and got a letter from Manyasha with newspaper cuttings (a big *merci* for them), and then *Neue Zeit* from Anyuta and reprints (2) of my articles against Levitsky.[183] I was particularly glad to receive them. Anyuta wrote that you are still undecided whether to come here or not, and that you would come if you were sure the boat would take you to Minusinsk and back. When we read that, we decided to send you a telegram saying that the boats run until the middle of September (last year a boat took me as far as Minusinsk after the twentieth—of course, it was the last), so you would have time to come if you have fully regained your health and Mitya's case permits it. I hope you receive the telegram sent on the 22nd in good time. In reply to it we shall await either you in person or a letter. Up to now (for two years) autumn here has been fine, but I don't know what it will be like this year after a rainy summer.

Of the books sent by Anyuta I am particularly glad to have Mehring; I have just finished reading the second volume and am very, very satisfied. As far as the *Credo der Jungen** is concerned, I was amazed at the emptiness of the phrases. It is not a *Credo* but a pitiful collection of words! I intend to write in greater detail about it.

The writer's silence is exasperating. He does not send Webb. He does not publish articles about the "markets",

* The creed of the young (Ger.).—*Ed.*

and nothing has been seen or heard about the anti-Bulgakov article. I think you should take back all the manuscripts and send them in to editorial offices yourselves so as to get precise and timely answers regarding whether they will be published, and to have direct contact. It is, of course, inconvenient for me to do it myself, but Anyuta could do it, I think, if other affairs do not prevent her from giving her time to it; it would be better to send them direct than to send them through the writer. If he has held up my article against him merely because he has not yet finished his own answer to it-that is simply swinish on his part! It is useless for me to write to him, because he does not answer.

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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98

TO HIS MOTHER

September 1, 1899

I did not manage to write to you on Sunday, Mother dearest, and am writing in the middle of the week.

Yesterday we received books by Bernstein and Vandervelde* and two issues of *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*—Bernstein was wrapped in one of them—and *half* another issue (No. 223) came *in a separate packet*, which surprised us more than a little. Has something been lost, or has there been a mistake?

As regards Bernstein—I have decided that I may consider it mine; Manyasha did not say exactly that she wants it back by a certain date, but wrote that she is taking steps to obtain another copy. I need that book very much. If, contrary to expectations, Manyasha needs the copy she sent me, she should write to me about it *immediately*.

Nadya and I started reading Bernstein's book immediately; we have read more than a half and its contents astonish us more and more as we go on. It is unbelievably weak theoretically—mere repetition of someone else's ideas. There are phrases about criticism but no attempt at serious, independent criticism. In effect it is opportunism (or rather, Fabianism—the original of many of Bernstein's assertions and ideas is to be found in the Webbs' recent books), unbounded opportunism and possibilism, and cowardly opportunism at that, since Bernstein does not want to attack the programme directly. There is little doubt but what it

* It is not known which of Vandervelde's books is referred to here.—*Ed*.

will be a fiasco. Bernstein's statement that many Russians agree with him ... (pp. 170 and 173, footnotes) made us very indignant. We people here must indeed be getting "old" and must be "lagging behind" the "new words" ... copied from Bernstein. I shall soon be writing to Anyuta on this subject in detail.*

Yesterday (at long last!) we received Webb, Volume II in English (no German—we are asking for it today)—without any letter or news about the first volume!

I now find that it is *essential* to make a few changes and add something to my article against Bulgakov. I will do this in thorough copy I have here. I ask Anyuta to demand the immediate return of the *second article* and to keep it until she receives my corrections.[184]

We have little news. Anatoly gets worse and worse. Gleb is leaving soon for Nizhneudinsk (Irkutsk Gubernia) to work on the railway. Yelizaveta Vasilyevna yesterday received a money order for 100 rubles.

Many kisses for you,

Yours,

V. U.

Regards from all.

P.S. I have found out that the *Frankfurter Zeitung* is delivered to someone not far from here, so you need not subscribe to it. I ask Manyasha to obtain for me (order from Dresden or try to find them among acquaintances) issues of the *Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung* for 1898 (1) containing Parvus's articles against Bernstein and (2) issues Nos. 253, 254 and 255 for 1898.[185]

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* Here a letter in invisible ink is meant.—*Ed.*

99

TO HIS MOTHER

September 11, 1899

I have very sad news for you, Mother dearest. Anatoly died on September 8, and on September 10 we buried him at Yermakovskoye. There bad been no hope of his recovery for a long time past and the disease had been developing terribly fast lately. His wile is staying in Yermakovskoye for the time being. There is a threat that Mikhail Alexandrovich Silvin will be recruited for the army; he has received a notice to report in Minusinsk and is going there on September 14. If he is taken, he will have to serve two years—two months more than his term of exile.

Nadya and I have now got down to the second volume of Webb without waiting either for the proofs of the first volume (which would be very useful in editing the translation of the second volume) or the German translation of Volume II. The job will probably take quite a long time.

I am sending you with this letter a registered packet containing the corrections to my article about Bulgakov. I ask Anyuta to transfer these corrections to the manuscript (cutting out the old and pasting in the new) and to get in touch with the editors about its publication. I should like to know the fate of the article as soon as possible.

We are all well.

Many kisses, my dear, and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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100

TO HIS MOTHER

October 17, 1899

This week I have received a lot of interesting things from home, Mother dearest, and send you many thanks for them all. I was very glad to make the acquaintance of the new French journal, which promises to be very interesting; the mere fact of its appearance under the editorship of Longuet is noteworthy.[186] I am finishing reading the Stuttgart minutes, also with considerable interest. And then, the booklet on the professional congress in Moscow (which I received on Friday) was also very interesting and instructive.[187]

There is a lull in the literary news. I believe I have already written about reading of the publication of Volume I of Webb and *ordering one for myself* because they apparently think it superfluous to send me one. I have heard about a new St. Petersburg paper—*Severny Kuryer*[188]—and intend to order it as soon as I see announcements in the press. Yuly wrote to me from Turukhansk that a lengthy article by M. Engelhardt had been published in *Novosti*; it was called "The Cards Are Being Revealed" and it simply tore Ilyin's book on capitalism to pieces. It would be interesting to read it if finding and purchasing that particular issue in Moscow would not be too much trouble. I rarely see *Zhizn*; the seventh issue was sent to me quite unexpectedly direct from St. Petersburg, maybe even direct from the editorial room (*sic*!!??!!). Comrades sometimes send me *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*; people living near here whom I am sometimes able to meet receive it.

There have been no changes here. How have you fixed yourselves up in Moscow? Who is going abroad, Anya or Manyasha, and when? Did you leave Mitya alone in Podolsk?

Many kisses for you and regards to everybody.

Yours.

V. U.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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1900

101

KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

January 19

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

At last matters have been settled—we may go to Russia, no further term of exile being envisaged. We are sending our luggage off on the 28th and we ourselves shall leave on the 29th. We shall have company—V. V. and Olga Alexandrovna. The Lepeshinskys also intended going, but I have very grave doubts of their being ready in time. O. A. is in a hurry to get to M. A., who has been sent to Riga; V. V. is also in a hurry. We shall probably leave Minusinsk on the 30th. The only thing I am afraid of is that there may be a delay because of me. We did not realise until recently that we ought to find out whether I would have to apply for permission to travel at my own expense. V. V. asked the police officer and discovered that the application had to be made to the Police Department, since the local officer cannot issue me with a travel permit himself because he has received no instructions about me. We are today sending telegrams to the department and to the Knipoviches, but further complications are almost certain.[189] Volodya wants to stay in Ufa for a couple of days until we know whether I shall remain in Ufa or will be sent to some place like Sterlitamak or Belebei. We do not talk of anything but the journey nowadays. We have packed the books in a box and had it weighed—about 15 poods.* We are sending the books and some of our things by carrier; I don't think we shall have very many things. Because of the frosts we wanted to get a sleigh with a hood but we could not find, one in the

* Pood = 36 lbs.—*Ed.*

town and to have one made here is a risky business, it probably would not last as far as Achinsk. We have plenty of warm clothes so I don't suppose we shall freeze, and the weather seems to be getting warmer; yesterday Oscar saw a cloud somewhere and the temperature this morning was only 28° below. The worst of it, is that Mother keeps catching colds and is coughing again. Volodya and I go out every day, despite the frosts; we have become accustomed to fresh air but I don't know how Mother will make the journey. Still, I wish the 29th would come soon; once we are going we might as well go. The day of our departure seems to be so close that today Mother wanted to start making *pelmeni** to take with us. We have been advised to take *pelmeni* to eat on the way, everything else spoils in the frost. Mother intends making mountains of the stuff, with no fat or onions.

We are not doing much reading now. Volodya, incidentally, is writing a reply to Skvortsov.[190] We shall send Webb off today, at long last; he has made us thoroughly tired of him, I must say.

Well, good-bye. Many kisses, for you and for Manyasha and Anyuta. It is a pity I shall not be able to come to Moscow. Mother sends her regards.

Yours,
Nadya

You will probably receive this letter after a telegram from me. I hope we shall be meeting soon.

Yours,
V. U.

(I have heard [A. N. wrote] that the censor has slashed (!!) Prokopovich's book—and so I cannot answer him. A strange incident![191])

Written January 19, 1900
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* Tiny meat dumplings.—Ed.

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TO HIS MOTHER

March 15, 1900

I received your letter a few days ago, Mother dearest. I sent an application about Nadya on the 10th and shall soon be expecting an answer.[192] If the worst comes to the worst and the answer is unfavourable, I really am thinking of asking you (if you are quite well enough) to go there and see about it personally. That, however, is a matter for the future—we'll see when the time comes.

I have received *Zhizn*, so do not send me another.[193] Please ask Anyuta to send *Archiv* to *Nadya* (I have a second copy here for the time being). I am not doing too badly here, I go frequently to the library and do some walking.

Excuse the short letter—I am late for the post.

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

There is a doctor here who is well spoken of—I want to see him about my catarrh. They say there are various epidemics about in St. Petersburg now that spring is approaching.*

Sent from Pskov to Moscow

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* This is a reference to the arrests made there at the time.—*Ed.*

103

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

April 6, 1900

Today I received a letter from Manyasha (dated April 3), Mother dearest, in which she reproaches me for my silence. I really am at fault, I did not even congratulate you and Manyasha on April 1. The fact is that at that time I was once again "in a whirl" (as Nadya put it in a letter to the Siberian comrades) over the arrival of a long-expected traveller* (who has by now most likely arrived home).

Life goes on here as usual, I am quite well and today tried doing without my "waters". I take walks—walking is not at all bad here at present and, it seems, there are plenty of nice places in Pskov (and also in its environs). I have bought some postcards with views of Pskov in a local shop and am sending three of them—to you, Manyasha and Anyuta.**

Yesterday I received a letter from M. A., who writes (on April 4) that he is going back to Siberia (with O. A.) tomorrow or the next day—the army authorities have again changed the place where he is to do his service. He promises to send his new address from Achinsk.

---

* Y. O. Martov.—*Ed.*

** Two of them—to his mother and his sister Maria—have been preserved.—*Ed.*

Nadya is most probably in bed; the doctor finds (as she wrote in a letter a week ago) that her illness (gynaecological) needs persistent treatment and she must remain in bed for anything from two to *six weeks*. (I have sent her some more money—I received 100 rubles from Vodovozova—because her treatment will entail considerable expense. So far I have enough money, but if I run short I shall write to you.) So she would not be able to come to me now, even if she had permission (I still have no reply and have almost given up expecting one). I am thinking of going to visit her in the spring, in about six weeks—or perhaps earlier.

An acquaintance of mine here* has applied for a passport and is thinking of going abroad for a cure after April 20; I shall be rather lonely here without him.

I am taking lessons in German from a local German at 50 kopeks a lesson. We translate from Russian and talk a little—there is not much progress and I am wondering whether I should not give it up; for the time being, however, I shall continue. I am not working very much and have still not finished the Index to Webb.

I go to the library and read the newspapers. I see very few new books, I have not seen Davydov's.** I do not intend to answer P. Struve (I sent a short note against him to be inserted into my reply to Skvortsov);[194] I have seen Kachorovsky and am thinking of answering him. Has Manyasha seen *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* Nos. 3 and 4? There is an excellent article on Pisarev there.[195]

And so Mitya has given up his job and gone back to his studies? Excellent. Is Manyasha working very hard? Where and how are Anyuta and Mark?

Best wishes for Easter to you, dear, and many kisses. Thank Manyasha for her letter. Regards to Mitya.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Pskov

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* A. N. Potresov.—*Ed.*

** Will Manyasha send it, if she has it?

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

April 26, 1900

Today, Mother dearest, I am sending you the pamphlet by Mech with the reprint from *Nauchnoye Obozreniye** which I promised. Forgive me for keeping it so long. How are you? What arrangements has Anyuta made, where is she now and what has she decided to do for the summer?

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Pskov

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* It is not known what pamphlet and reprint Lenin referred to.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

April 30, 1900

I have received your letter and Manya's of the 25th, Mother dearest. I shall probably get away from here earlier, in something like a fortnight from now, but I cannot say anything at all definite.

I think I wrote telling you I had asked permission to spend six weeks in Ufa.[196] I hope to receive an answer soon.

Nadya writes that her health is improving. She has not received *Archiv* from Anyuta. Here is something I should like to ask Anyuta to do—can she *get back that "Archiv" before I arrive* and not send it to Nadya, because I now need it (I could take it to Nadya myself) and the second copy that I expected never reached me. I should very much like to have it when I visit you.

Ask Manyasha to send me Nadya's translation.* I will send it to the journal.

Filippov writes that even from the article against Skvortsov the censor has thrown out almost a third! That is really too bad!

Many kisses for you and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Pskov

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* It is not known which translation this refers to.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

May 5, 1900

Your letter of the 2nd with Manyasha's postscript, I received only today, Mother dearest. I do not know why the letter was delayed (you expected me to receive it on the 3rd or not later than the 4th); it is postmarked "Mail train 2nd" and "Pskov 4th", so there does not seem to have been any real delay; the letter arrived in Pskov on the 4th and was delivered this morning. A letter is not likely to reach me as quickly from Podolsk as from Moscow.

There is no need for you to worry about me, Mother dearest. My health is much better, I gave up taking the mineral water a long time ago and have never felt any desire or need to return to it. Yesterday I received a certificate from the local Chief of Police to the effect that he has no objection to my making a journey abroad; today I paid the stamp duty (ten rubles) and in two hours' time I shall receive my passport. And so I shall be moving to warmer parts in summer; I cannot leave here immediately because there are some matters I must settle with editors and with certain publishers of translations and also wind up some financial affairs (I hope, by the way, to get a few coppers from Filippov; if I get none, either from him or Popova, I will write and ask you to send me something). I must, moreover, wait here for an answer to my request to the Department for permission to live in Ufa for six weeks on account of my wife's illness. I submitted the request on April 20 and there should be an answer in about a week. I shall definitely visit Nadya, but I still do not know whether I shall be able to live with her for six weeks or whether (which is the more probable) I shall have to make do with a shorter period. In any case the receipt of the passport (I have to receive

it here in Pskov, my last place of residence) does not restrict me because the law says that I may go abroad any time within three months on a passport issued in the interior gubernias, so that I shall not be late oven if I leave Russia on August 5. I am therefore leaving here between the 15th and the 20th, as I wrote you before; I shall try to leave earlier, of course. Please write and tell me what to do with my things; shall I leave them in Moscow (is Mark there and what is his address? will he be in Moscow long? does he visit you often?) or bring them straight to Podolsk (I don't know if that will be convenient; I suppose I shall have to take everything with me, including books), and I should like Manyasha to write me in detail how to find you in Podolsk.

I embrace you and send regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

I shall be seeing you soon!

Nadya writes that her health is improving.

I have just received, my passport from the Chancellery of the Governor and have enquired about my request to go to Ufa; now it turns out that I have been refused! That is something I certainly did not expect and am now quite at a loss what to do!

Sent from Pskov to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

May 10, 1900

I have just received your letter of the 8th, Mother dearest, and am replying at once. I am very glad permission has been granted for me to visit you and it goes without saying that I shall certainly take advantage of it; unfortunately I cannot leave here at once; I do not want to come back here, so I must stay on for 5-7 days or so to settle some financial affairs and certain editorial business. It doesn't matter, of course, whether I come a week earlier or later; I am, in general, in agreement with the arguments put forward by you and Anyuta (by the way—*merci* for the work on urban statistics which I received today) and think of doing as you advise, the only thing is I must give up the idea of a personal visit to St. Petersburg and shall, therefore, ask you to go, if you can manage it, by Thursday the 18th, or, if you can't, by Thursday the 25th, depending on when we meet.[197]

See you soon.

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Pskov

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TO HIS MOTHER

May 18, 1900

Just a few lines, Mother dearest, to let you know that my departure has unfortunately been delayed for a time, but not for long; I hope to see you on Sunday or on Tuesday evening, the 21st or the 23rd.[198] Many kisses and please do not worry about my health; I now feel quite well and walk a lot as we are having such glorious weather. After two or three days of rain everything is green, there is no dust yet, the air is wonderful, so you can't help wanting to be *ins Grüne*.*

Yours,
V. U.

See you soon.

Sent from Pskov to Podolsk

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* In the country (Ger.).—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia

July 2, 1900

Mother dearest,

Unfortunately I have to tell you that our meeting has to be postponed for a time. I must pay a short visit to a comrade in Siberia,[199] so I shall not be passing through Podolsk before the 20th or 21st (most likely the 20th, I think). Then all I shall have to do is get my things together, get visas in my passport and continue on my way. If the things have not yet arrived, I would ask Mitya to take the most energetic measures, up to and including a personal trip. Our people are all well and send their regards.

I embrace you fondly, Mother dearest, and send regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Ufa

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia,
Russia

August 31, 1900

I am surprised, Mother dearest, that I have not received a single letter from you; I wrote to you twice from Paris[200] and am now writing while travelling (I have been on a trip down the Rhine).[201] I am well and am having a good time; I saw Anyuta a few days ago,* took a trip on a very beautiful lake with her and enjoyed the wonderful views and the good weather—there has not been much good weather here either, mostly rain and thunderstorms. It's as bad a summer here for tourists as it is in Russia.

Many kisses for you and regards to all. I ask Manyasha to send me as soon as possible all the books there are for me; as regards the boxes—I hope to write soon.

Yours,
V. U.

You may write to me at the same address (or to Anyuta to forward to me, although that is slower than if letters are sent to Paris).

Sent from Nuremberg

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* Lenin's elder sister Anna was also abroad at the time.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk,
Moscow Gubernia,
Russia

Paris,[202] September 7, 1900

I received Manya's letter and postcard, Mother dearest, and was glad to have news from home. I returned from my Rhine trip several days ago, I am not thinking of staying here for long, and shall probably be moving on soon. I don't know where yet, but will write when it is certain.

Manyasha grumbles at the shortness of my letters; I admit my guilt, but by way of justification must say that here you are in a whirl all the time and there is such a wealth of impressions that it is difficult to choose what to dwell upon and describe in greater detail. I hope that when I leave here, when I am farther away from the turmoil of the exhibition with its peculiar exhibition atmosphere, I shall be able to concentrate better and write more clearly. Until then, please excuse me for the emptiness of my letters.

Many kisses for you, my dear, and regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Manyasha says nothing about your health; I hope that means you are well.

How are Mitya's affairs going? When is Mark moving, and when will you all be in Moscow? What do you know about Manyasha's case?[203]

Sent from Munich

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112

TO HIS MOTHER

September 19 (N.S.), 1900

Yesterday (no, not yesterday—the 16th) I received your letter of August 23, Mother dearest, and was very glad to get it. I have also received Manyasha's first letter and her postcard of August 24 saying that another letter with a reminder had come from the carrier's.[204] I have *already sent* Manyasha an address which she should pass on to them. I hope she has received it.

It is a great pity that Mitya has been refused admission to the University. It is a hell of a business, having to lose another year! Perhaps it can still be managed with the help of one of those guarantors you mention. Manyasha's position also seems to be indefinite, doesn't it?

I got a letter from Anyuta yesterday and hope to see her soon—we do a great deal of walking together. I intend taking the waters again soon and being more regular with the cure. The weather here is good now; the rainy days are over and it looks as if we shall be able to do some good walking. I have plenty of shirts and underclothes and money, Mother dearest, so there is no need to send anything for the time being; I hope I shall not have to write about this in the near future, and I shall try to reckon up in advance when the necessity arises.

I also got a letter from Nadya yesterday; she says they are fixed up quite well, she has heaps of lessons that keep her busy seven hours a day!

I embrace you fondly, Mother dearest, and send my regards to all. I hope you will soon be able to make final arrangements for the winter and will have better accommodation.

Yours,
V. U.

There's one thing I almost forgot to add—on September 17 (that will be the 4th by our calendar) I received Braun's *Archiv* that I had left behind. It was done very quickly! A big *merci* to Manyasha.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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113

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street, 25,
Moscow,
Russia

October 3, 1900

I have received, Mother dearest, Manyasha's letter of September 8 which was delayed when forwarded to me from Paris. I was very glad to learn that Mitya's affairs are being settled, and that he will probably be allowed to enter Yuriev University.[205] It would be fine if he could get everything settled soon! What is happening to Manyasha's case? She doesn't write about it. How are you? Are you comfortable? I am now quite well, I got over my influenza long ago and am working more regularly. We are having excellent weather here—and you? I have also received the books from Manyasha (*Bulletin officiel*), thanks for them. I am expecting the box and money to arrive soon.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,*
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street, 25,
Moscow,
Russia

November 6, 1900

Manyasha,

I have received your letter, Manyasha, many thanks for it.

I received the books a few days ago and was horrified when I opened the big box. It contained the medical books of an Anna Fedulova (from Barnaul in Siberia) who had studied in Lausanne and Geneva from 1893 to 1899. How absurd and disgraceful! I know nothing about this person and hear her name for the first time. How could her books have got here? How could they have been sent to Moscow to the wrong address? Why did nobody enquire about them during the months they were lying in Moscow?

Try to find out, if you can, what it is all about. For all the books I paid about 40 (forty!) rubles. So for someone else's books I must have overpaid about thirty rubles on account of the neglect of some utterly irresponsible persons.

I shall write to Siberia and to Switzerland, asking them to try and find the lady. In the meantime I have put the books into a warehouse. I must get in touch with the

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* The first part of the letter, written to Lenin's mother, has been lost.—*Ed*.

carrier's office that sent the box. Let me have their exact address. Perhaps the owner of the books will soon be asking for them. Did they issue a receipt for the books? If so, how could they have surrendered them (here) without it? Try and go to them to get an explanation, or—*better*—write to then, register the letter and send a stamp for a reply.

(1 think the owner of the books should refund my expenses since she is at fault for sending the books to a strange address without any notification.)

I have received a letter from Lirochka, who sends you and Mother thousands of the warmest greetings. I do not suppose I shall have an opportunity to see her.

I have, received my books in good order—*merci* for them.

I am repeating my address—just in case.

Herrn Franz Modráček, Smècky, 27. Prag. Oesterreich (Austria).[206]

The weather here has been bad, but today is wonderful, warm and sunny. We shall see what winter is like here.

I am still living as usual, I study languages a little, exchange German and Russian lessons with a Czech (conversations rather than lessons) and visit the library.

Please give Mother many kisses from me. Is she now quite well? How is Mark? Do not forget to obtain for me the address of the China traveller.*

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

November 7

Excuse me for having delayed sending the letter. Yesterday I received your books (*merci* for them—the selection is excellent) and your letter of October 10. Why did it take so long?

Sent from Munich

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* A. P. Sklyarenko.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

November 29, 1900

Today, Manyasha, I received your letter of November 6 and the letter that was enclosed in it. Thanks.

I did not receive your previous letter, so I don't know how to send the medical books. To whom? To the owner of the books? Can you not get the money they cost from her in advance?

I am quite well and life goes on as usual. Please give Mother many kisses for me and my very best regards to Mark.

Do you get my letters in good time? Check the postmarks, please, and let me know.

Yours,
V. Ul.

Sent from Munich

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

December 6, 1900

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received the letters forwarded to me by Manyasha. *Merci* for them. I do not know whether I shall soon get round to sending a reply to Siberia—I have also had a letter lying here unanswered for a long time.

Yesterday I had a letter from Anyuta. She writes that she does not yet know how long she will be in Paris. You have probably received letters from her, too.

Are you expecting Mitya home for the holidays? How is be getting on with his medicine and German?

What sort of weather are you having? You probably have a fine winter. Here we have slush and autumn rain—if the whole "winter" is going to be like this it will be worse than frost and snow. It is true that there are occasionally some very fine days, when it is dry and clear—but only by way of exception.

Where does Mark intend spending his vacation? In Moscow, or will he go away somewhere?

How is Manyasha getting on? Isn't she working too much? Is she quite well again now? Perhaps it would do her good to run around more, that is, to walk from one part

of the town to another. Anyuta writes that Manyasha may come here with Nadya.

Life goes on here as usual. I am wandering aimlessly in a strange land and still only "hoping" to put an end to the fuss and bother and settle down to work.

Nadya writes often. She is well, but Y. V. always seems to be out of sorts.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well. Regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Does Manyasha go skating? There is some sort of a *künstliche* (!) *Eisbahn** here; I keep intending to take a look at this fake. Even their ice is artificial—poor Prague people!**

Sent from Munich

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* Artificial skating rink (Ger.).—*Ed.*

** Prague was mentioned for purposes of secrecy. Lenin was living in Munich at the time.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street
Moscow,
Russia

December 14, 1900

I have received your letter, Manyasha, in which you repeat the address for the books. Tomorrow I am having the box mended—it has suffered from long journeys and I cannot risk sending it like that-and will then forward it through some carrier's office. I will send the receipt by registered letter direct to Fedulova and will write to you when it has been sent.*

I have had a letter from S. I.[207] and, I think, have informed you of it.

Yesterday I got a letter from Anya. She seems to be thinking of remaining here (abroad, that is) a little longer, but does not know how things are at home and whether you are expecting her very eagerly for Christmas.

Mitya did well to claim the money from the railway. Of course it could not be ignored.

All the best and please give Mother many kisses for me.

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* I don't think it will cost anything—I will send it carriage forward, which must be possible because we received it like that in Moscow.

Regards to Mark and Mitya. Excuse me for the brevity of this letter—it is late already. I will add something tomorrow if I have time. If not, I shall send it as it is.

Yours,
V. U.

I have just learned that the box has been mended. I shall, therefore, send it off today (or tomorrow at the latest) and inform you of its despatch only in the unlikely event of there being some delay. I will send the receipt by registered post to the same address. I remember that I sent you the things that interested you on the ninth. Have you received them?

Very best regards to all, to Mother *in particular*.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

December 26, 1900

Mother dearest,

You will probably receive this letter shortly before the holidays. All best wishes and may you have a good time; perhaps Mitya will come and you will all get together—at least everyone who is in Russia. Anya and I also thought of getting together, but we could not manage it. Here it is already *Weihnachten**—*Christbäume*** everywhere and the streets have been unusually lively over the last few days. I went to Vienna a few days ago and enjoyed the journey after several weeks of immobility.[208] But a winter without snow is unpleasant. Actually there is no winter at all, it is like a rotten autumn; everything wet and dripping. It is a good thing it is not cold and I can manage quite well without a winter overcoat, but somehow it's not very nice without snow. I am fed up with the slush and recall with pleasure the real Russian winter, the sleigh rides and the clean frosty air. I am spending my first winter abroad, the first winter that is nothing at all like a winter, and I cannot say that I have been very pleased, although at times there

* Christmas (Ger.).—*Ed.*
** Christmas trees (Ger.).—*Ed.*

are fine days like those we have at home in late autumn, when the weather is good.

There has been no change in my way of life; it is rather lonely and, unfortunately, rather purposeless. I keep hoping to arrange my studies more systematically but I don't seem to manage it. In spring things will certainly go better and I shall get "on to the rails". Since my Shushenskoye immobility I have done a lot of wandering through Russia and abroad and am now longing for some peaceful writing again; it is only the unaccustomed foreign atmosphere that prevents me really getting down to it.

Are you keeping well, Mother dearest? Are you not lonely without Anyuta? How is Manya's case coming along? By the way, I forgot to tell her that I have received Pushkin and am very grateful, and that I also got her letter of December 6. I have not answered because of my journey, and since then I have been very busy.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich

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1901

119

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

January 1, 1901

Mother dearest,

I wish you a Happy New Year and everything of the best, especially the best of health! To all of you—I hope Mitya is also with you—I send greetings and good wishes. A big *merci* to Manyasha for sending the maps in the folder I recently received. Her friend* informed me she has received the receipt for the books.

In the new year Manyasha will surely be allowed to travel again!

*Nochmals beste Glück-Wünsche.***

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich

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* It is not known who is meant.—*Ed.*
** Again, all good wishes (Ger.).—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

January 16, 1901

Mother dearest,

I have received your letter of December 26th with Manyasha's postscript and was very glad to hear that Mitya was with you and that you had a good time at Christmas. It is a pity it is so terribly cold; when I tell the Germans (or the Czechs) about a temperature of 28° below zero Réaumur they simply gasp and wonder how the Russians manage to stay alive. Here 8° or 10° below zero R is considered cold, *furchtbare Kälte** and almost everybody manages with only an autumn coat (admittedly most of them wear woollen jerseys as well). The houses here are not at all adapted to severe cold, the walls are thin, the windows are not caulked up tight and very often there are not even *Winterfenster*.** You have no need to worry about me; I eat well at a boarding-house where I have been staying since autumn. I feel quite well, probably because I run around a lot more than I sit still. Nadya's arrival is not far away now—her term will be up in two and a half months,*** and then I shall make all the proper arrangements.

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* Terrible cold (Ger.).—*Ed.*

** Storm windows (Ger.).—*Ed.*

*** Krupskaya's term of exile ended on March 11, 1901.—*Ed.*

I send hearty greetings to Mitya and Mark, and many thanks to Manyasha for the books she sent, and especially for the unusually beautiful and interesting photographs from our cousin in Vienna; I should like to receive such gifts more often.[209]

Many kisses, my dear, and I hope you will keep well.

Yours,
V. Ul.

Sent from Munich

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

January 27, 1901

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received a letter and a postcard from Manyasha and also a photo of Mitya, and Protopopov's book. Thanks for everything. I was very glad to get Mitya's photo—I think it is a good one. I have already begun to long for photographs and will certainly ask Nadya to bring my album, and if you have any new photographs, please send them.

I don't need any warm clothing now. Winter here seems to be over—I mean real winter with snow and temperatures below zero. It was warm and rainy right up to the end of December. Then it snowed and the temperature began to drop to 10°-15° below zero R (mornings) and the Germans complained of the "terrible" cold. In their houses it really is terribly cold, even when there are only three degrees of frost outside; the houses are badly built. A thaw set in about a week ago, all the snow disappeared in one night, and the weather is now like March in Russia or April in Siberia. It is possible—even probable—that there will be some more snow, but only for a very short time. The coldest period is over; last month I had to spend five rubles

on *Holz und Kohle** instead of one or two rubles, as in previous months.

I am quite well and there are no changes. I correspond with Anyuta and hope to see her soon.

Many kisses for you, my dear, and best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. Less than two months remain to the end of Nadya's term of exile; she will be coming soon and will, of course, be seeing you. And in summer I hope that we shall be together.

Sent from Munich

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* Wood and coal (Ger.).—*Ed.*

122

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

February 9, 1901

Mother dearest,

How are you? What news is there, what does Mitya write from Yuriev—he is probably working hard now the examinations are drawing near.

I recently received some old manuscripts from Manyasha and the Vienna gifts.[210] A big *merci* for them.

The weather here is again turning wintry, i.e., there has been some snow. It is not cold, however, and the snow melts during the day.

I was at the opera a few days ago and heard *La Juive* with the greatest pleasure; I heard it once in Kazan (when Zakrzhevsky sang)—that must be thirteen years ago, and some of the tunes have remained in my memory. The music and singing were good. I have also been to theatres (German) on a few occasions and sometimes understood something, the general idea, at any rate. Do you go to the Moscow theatres?

Anyuta wrote recently that her work will detain her for a while yet.

Are you thinking of applying for permission for Nadya to visit you, my dear, just for a few days? She would probably like that very much, but the metropolitan cities are

usually forbidden—after Ufa,[211] she writes, they are the only prohibited places.

I should like Manyasha to drop me a line saying when she subscribes to magazines for me, so that I know when to ask for them at the post office.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich

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123

TO HIS MOTHER

February 20, 1901

Mother dearest,

It is quite a time since I had a letter from you. The only news I have had was from Manyasha, sent on the 6th, and for that many thanks. How are you? Not freezing too badly? Are you keeping well?

It is cold here again, and there has been so much snow—more than for the last 13 years—so people say. There have been cases of trains being held up by snowdrifts. But it seems to be winter's last effort. I am used to it by now and have adapted myself to the local winter—nevertheless if I have to spend the next winter in these parts I shall write for a quilted coat. Without it you either have to wear a woollen jersey or put on two sets of underclothes (as I do). At first it was not very comfortable but I got used to it long ago. And in any case the cold here is not like the Russian cold. If it's 10° below zero that's a "terrible frost".

The carnival ended here a few days ago. This is the first time I have seen the last day of a carnival in a foreign country—processions of people in fancy dress, general buffoonery, showers of confetti (tiny scraps of coloured paper) thrown in your face, paper streamers and so on. People here do know how to make merry publicly, in the streets!

I am quite well, probably because I run about rather a lot, and do not sit still for long. In general life is much the same.

Nadya's term of exile will soon be over (March 24 by the calendar here, March 11 by yours). In a day or two I shall send an application for a passport for her. I should like Manyasha to send a box of "my" pen-nibs with her. Believe it or not, I have not been able to find them here. Foolish people, these Czechs and Germans—no English nibs, only "our own" make, which is awful rubbish.

What does Mitya write? When will the exams be over?

What does Mark intend to do this summer?

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health. Regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Do you go to the theatre? What is this new play of Chekhov's, *Three Sisters*? Have you seen it and do you like it? I read a review in the papers. They act well at the Moscow Art Theatre—I still remember with pleasure my visit to that theatre last year with poor old Columbus. Is he well? I keep intending to write to him but am always too busy.

Sent from Munich to Moscow

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DMITRY ULYANOV
1903

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

February 27, 1901

I have received Manyasha's letter of February 2, 1901, Mother dearest, and also the journal *Promyshlenny Mir*,[212] for which *merci*.

It does not seem worth while now sending the articles that have been returned from *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*,[213] better simply send them with Nadya.

How does one write to A. V. in Nikolsk? I wrote to him once in Harbin but have no idea whether my letter reached him or not. Please let me have his exact address (and, if you happen to write to him, give him mine), I should from time to time like to know something about him, at least.

Anya, it appears, has delayed her departure somewhat. She has probably written to you herself.

Excuse the brief letter. I have no time at the moment. In a few days I shall write more.

Best regards to all.

Many kisses for you,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Munich

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125

TO HIS MOTHER

March 2, 1901

Mother dearest,

This is to tell you of a change in my address. I have moved together with my landlord:

Herrn Franz Modráček, *Vršovice bei Prag*, No. 384. Oesterreich.*

I am going to Vienna now.[214] It seems that there is no Russian consul here (!) and I must have my signature witnessed on my application for Nadya's passport. I hope to be able to write something to you from Vienna.

I am sorry I have not studied Czech. It is interesting that it is very much like Polish and contains many old Russian words. I recently went away for a time and when I returned to Prague its Slav character struck me very forcibly—names ending in *-čik*, *-ček*, etc., words like *lze*, *lekarna*, and so on and so forth. The weather is now warm and spring-like and I shall probably have a nice trip to Vienna.

Are you all well at home? How are Mitya's affairs? I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Prague to Moscow

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* F. Modráček through whom Lenin maintained a correspondence with Russia, moved to a new address.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow,
Russia

Vienna, March 4, 1901

I have come here, Mother dearest, on a hunt for "papers" for Nadya. There was no Russian consul in Prague and my application for a passport for Nadya had to be witnessed. Vienna is a huge, lively and beautiful city. After the "province" where I live it is pleasant to see the metropolis. There is something to look at here, so it is worth while stopping off (should any of you be travelling this way). For this purpose I have sent Nadya a pocket *Führer durch Wien*. I hope she will soon be seeing you—there should be no hitch with the passport now. I ask Manyasha, when she happens to be in the centre of the town, to buy *Hendschel's Telegraph* (two marks) for Nadya (it is not worth the trouble of sending one from here).

Among other things, I have seen the Museum der bildenden Künste* here, and even saw a Viennese operetta. I did not like it very much, I was also at a meeting where a *Volksuniversitätskurse*** was in progress. I got in at the wrong time and went away quickly.

Regards to everyone; many kisses for you, my dear.

Yours,
V. U.

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* Museum of Fine Arts (Ger.).—*Ed.*
** People's University Course (Ger.).—*Ed.*

It is probable that a letter from Anyuta, or perhaps yours or Manyasha's, is waiting for me at home.

Just in case of accidents I am repeating my new address: Herrn Franz Modráčk. Vršvice bei Prag. Oesterreich.

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TO HIS MOTHER

May 19, 1901

Mother dearest,

I have just received your letter with Mark's letter enclosed and immediately have sent them both on to Anyuta, who has left for Berlin. She wants to do some work in the libraries there. I hope she will find it much more convenient in Berlin than here—the Prague* libraries are not up to much.

I am very sorry you have been unable to get a decent apartment, and that your summer place is not good either. The summer does not look promising for those who spend it in the country if one may judge by the beginning and by the weather here—cloudy and rainy. It is all right for us, of course, because we stay in town all summer, but it will be rotten for you. Perhaps Mitya will be able to find you something better. I also hope very much that Mark and Manyasha will soon manage to be with you.[215] Judging by Mark's letter, he has to some extent adapted himself to the new conditions and found himself an occupation, so as not to be bored and not to impair his health too greatly. I am writing to him and Manyasha and ask you to send them the letters.

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* Prague is mentioned for secrecy; the reference is actually to Munich.—*Ed.*

Many kisses for you, my dear; from the bottom of my heart I wish you good health and vigour and, especially, that you will soon be together with Manyasha and Mark.

Yours,
V. U.

Regards to Mitya. He must be very busy? I Suppose.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA[216]

May 19, 1901

I have decided to write you a few lines, dear Manyasha, or you will be thinking I have turned into a real pig. I have been forgetting my obligations surprisingly often since I have been here. It is true that now Nadya and Y. V. have arrived we are much more comfortable; we have our own apartment and I am beginning to work more regularly, but there is still more than enough bother.

How are you? I hope you have got yourself into a more correct regime for that is so important in solitary confinement. I have just written a letter to Mark in which I described in exceptional detail how best to establish a "regime"; as regards mental work, I particularly recommended translations, especially *both ways*—first do a written translation from the foreign language into Russian, then translate it back from Russian into the foreign language. My own experience has taught me that this is the most rational way of learning a language. On the physical side I have strongly recommended him, and I repeat it to you, to do gymnastics every day and rub himself down with a wet towel. In solitary confinement this is absolutely essential.

I saw from one of your letters that Mother sent on to me that you have found some ways of employing your time. I hope this will enable you to forget, even if only occasionally, your surroundings, and that the passage of time (which usually passes quickly in prison unless conditions are particularly bad) will be even less noticeable. I also advise you to arrange your work on the books you have in such a way as to vary it; I remember quite well that a change

of reading or work—from translation to reading, from writing to gymnastics, from serious reading to fiction—helps a great deal. Sometimes a change of mood for the worse—one's mood changes so easily in prison—is due simply to fatigue from monotonous impressions or monotonous work, and a change of occupation is often enough to bring one back to normal and calm one's nerves. I remember that after dinner, for recreation in the evening, I read fiction *regelmässig*,* and never enjoyed it anywhere as much as I did in prison. The main thing is never to forget the obligatory daily gymnastics. Force yourself to go through several dozen (no allowances!) movements of all kinds! This is very important. Well, good-bye for now. Many kisses; I wish you good health and vigour.

Yours,
Vlad. Ulyanov

Sent from Munich to Moscow

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* Regularly (Ger.).—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

June 7, 1901

Mother dearest,

I have received your letter of May 10 and newspapers from Mitya. Many thanks for the letter and the papers. I would ask Mitya in future to send any interesting issues of Russian newspapers that he can get hold of; there is no library here and I seldom see anything but *Russkiye Vedomosti*....

Anyuta is now in Berlin and has already written to me that she has received the royalties that were sent her, and that in general she receives your letters more quickly than before.

I am very glad that you like your summer place and can spend a lot of time in the open air. From what Anyuta said I had imagined your new place to be much too flimsy and cold. What is it like there when it rains?

It is sad there is no change in the affairs of Mark and Manyasha. Just before Anyuta left I wrote letters to them containing a lot of stuff about how to spend one's time in prison. I don't know whether the letters got there and actually reached them.

We have fixed our apartment up very nicely here. Rents are cheaper here than in such (relatively) big towns in Russia; we furnished the place with second-hand things we bought cheap, and Yelizaveta Vasilyevna and Nadya manage the housekeeping themselves without any particular trouble—housekeeping here is much easier. The place is a good one, too—on the outskirts; there is water near us

and a park with lots of greenery. There are good connections with the centre, thanks to the electric trams.

A few days ago I received 250 rubles from my publisher and the financial side of things is now not bad. In general, I am fixed up here comfortably in all respects and have only one wish—for our two to be released as soon as possible, so that you will not have to remain almost alone.

Y. V. and Nadya are well and send their best regards to you and all our people. Nadya intends to write soon.

Many kisses for you, my dear, and I wish you very good health.

Yours,
V. Ul.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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130

TO HIS MOTHER

July 1, 1901

Mother dearest,

It is quite a long time since I had news of you. Are you well? I recently received from Anya a letter of Mark's with a postscript to me that you had sent her. I was very glad to hear from him (there has been no reply to my letter from Manyasha), but I was sorry to learn of the rather wretched arrangements in their cells. Their imprisonment has come at a bad time—summer. By the way, the summer here is not hot and there is a lot of rain. What is your summer like?

I have received the 75 rubles that Mitya sent, which probably came from the sale of my gun. *Merci* for the money. Did he receive Nadya's letter in which she asked him to send me three copies of my book on capitalism?

Have you any acquaintances in Podolsk? Do you see the gentleman we went boating with last year?[217] You probably go to Moscow once a week, or perhaps more than once, don't you? Have any of the Siberian friends called on you when passing through?[218]

I embrace you, Mother dearest, and wish you good health. Very best regards from all to Mitya, Mark and Manyasha.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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TO HIS MOTHER

July 17, 1901

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received a letter from you which had been forwarded to me by Anyuta. I was exceedingly glad to learn that there is a hope of our people being released shortly. Perhaps the authorities will realise that there is no "case" to be made of it. Even if they do make out a "case", they should let them out soon, because now, in incomparably more important cases, people are released on remand "until the investigation has been completed". It is a good thing that Manyasha feels well and vigorous, as I see from the letter Anyuta sent on to me.

Anyuta wrote me a few days ago that she is thinking of going to stay in the country; it would not be a bad thing, although I must say that towns abroad are better adapted to the summer—the streets are watered more often, etc.—and it is easier to spend the summer here in town than it is in Russia. We, for instance, are able to swim every day in a very good swimming pool at a relatively low cost, there are places for walks and one does not have to go far to get out of town. The traffic in the streets here is far less than in an equally large Russian city; this is because the electric trams and bicycles are completely ousting cabs. The commercial traffic in the suburb where we live is exceedingly small. For this reason we are quite content with our present place of residence and do not intend to go to a village or summer resort.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well. Best regards to Mitya and especially to Mark and Manyasha.

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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132

TO HIS MOTHER

August 3, 1901

Mother dearest,

I have received your letter of June 13. A big merci for it. It is very strange that they won't allow even Mitya a visit. There is one consolation—the case is coming to an end and soon our people will be released and sent into exile. Perhaps it can be arranged not too far from Moscow—I am talking about Manyasha, since Mark, as you say, has decided to go to his brother.[219] Since Mark's case will probably end without a conviction there perhaps remains a hope of his being able to complete the course[220]—if not in the normal period, at least with the loss of only a year; he may be able to get special permission, since he has graduated in mathematics.

When is Mitya going away, and for how long? When will he be through with his examinations? What does he think of doing? Is he still as keen to become a public health officer?

Life here goes on as usual. I had thought of taking a short trip with Nadya but the weather is too changeable. We are again having rainy days now. This summer has been just the kind to spend in town, rather than in the country.

I am expecting a letter soon from Anyuta with her new address.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well. Best regards to Mitya, Mark and Manyasha.

Yours,
V. Ul.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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133

TO HIS MOTHER

September 1, 1901

Mother dearest,

We recently received your letter to Nadya with a letter from Manyasha enclosed. It was very sad to learn that our people's affairs are in such a sorry state! I just don't know what to advise, my dear. Please don't worry too much—the prosecutor's office, is probably making so much trouble by way of a last attempt to work up a "case" out of nothing, and when these attempts fail they will have to grant a release. It might help to go to St. Petersburg, if your health permits, and complain of something so unheard of as no interrogation for six months. That constitutes such a definite and obvious illegal act that it is the best thing to submit a complaint about it. In any ease, Petersburg would send an inquiry to Moscow and cause the latter to abandon a little of its provincial high-handedness (that was what happened when Mitya was arrested). That is the argument in favour of a trip to St. Petersburg. There is, of course, also an argument against it—the outcome is doubtful and it will cause you a great deal of anxiety. You are in the best position to decide whether it is worth while undertaking anything of the sort, and you have probably discussed it with acquaintances. You should also complain of the refusal to allow Mitya to see Manyasha,[221] because that is something very much out of the ordinary.

As far as concerns Anyuta, I shall not, of course, write to her about what you have told me, so as not to upset her too much. I hope I shall soon—perhaps in a few weeks—be seeing her and will try to reassure her a little.

When you have some spare time, my dear, please write and tell me how you are keeping, whether you are quite well and what you are thinking of doing in the autumn. Are you moving to Moscow or will you remain in Podolsk for the time being? When is M. V. leaving?[222] When you see Manyasha and Mark again, give them best regards from all of its. Now summer has passed—summer is the worst time to be in prison—and after the interrogation they will probably realise a little more clearly how trivial the whole affair is.

I embrace you again and again, my dear, and wish you good health and vigour. You remember, when I was locked up, you imagined the case to be more serious and dangerous than it was, and, of course, Manyasha's and Mark's case bears no comparison with mine! They are probably being held a long time, partly because so many people have been arrested and the case has not yet been properly sorted out—anything so absurd would, of course, be impossible in St. Petersburg.

I again kiss you,

Yours,

V. Ul.

Life here goes on as usual; Yelizaveta Vasilyevna is rather poorly, there is influenza about again. Nadya seems to be quite at home by now and is used to this way of life.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

134

TO HIS MOTHER

September 21, 1901

Mother dearest,

I have received your letter of August 22. *Merci* for it and also for the money (35 rubles), which we at last received after long delays that had been caused accidentally by a friend. Our finances are not in too bad a state. My publisher has sent me something and I hope to manage on that for quite a time, especially as the cost of living here is not high if you run your own house. There is no need to send anything, *merci*.

We also received your letter to Nadya a short while ago and I replied to it.* Did you get my reply?

I have had the news from Anyuta that the investigation of the case involving our people is finished and the case has been handed over to the prosecutor. That is a good thing; they will now probably be less worried and the time they will be kept locked up will be shorter. Perhaps your request to have them released on bail will be granted. Surely they will not keep them in prison now that the investigation is over—that is hardly likely,

As regards our acquaintances in St. Petersburg things are pretty bad. There does not seem to be anybody left there, with the possible exception of one old friend** whom you know and whose wife visited you in Moscow when Yelizaveta Vasilyevna was at your place. But he is not

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* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

** This refers to I. N. Chebotaryov, a close acquaintance of the Ulyanov family.—*Ed.*

much use. Nadya has an old friend, Apollinariya Ivanovna Knipovich, Peterburgskaya Storona, Bolshoi Prospekt, No. 42, Apt. No. 16—although I do not know whether you can hope to get her to go bail. I will, however, write to her and if you are in St. Petersburg you can call on her.

We are still living as before. The weather here is a little better now, after a long period of rain, and we are making use of it for long walks in the beautiful country round about; since we did not manage to go away anywhere for the summer we have to take what chances we have! Yelizaveta Vasilyevna is now recovering and feels much better. She sends you and everybody her best regards, so does Nadya.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health—and also that our people will soon be released. Write and let me know when you have made arrangements for the winter. Is it not cold in that summer cottage by now?

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

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1902

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TO HIS MOTHER

February 26, 1902

I am sending you Nadya's letter,* Mother dearest. I have received your letter and Manya's of January 31. Thank Mitya for taking on the job of forwarding the books.

Anyuta also wrote to me about Mark's plan. Well, Harbin, I think, is not so very far away now and it will soon be nearer—when the line is opened. Anyway, Mark will probably not have to stay there very long. And if he cannot find something to do anywhere else—well, doing nothing is the worst possible thing. Give him very best regards from us all and tell him that we hope he will soon return from his distant wanderings.

Y. V. is now quite well. She sends you her best wishes and the same to Manyasha, Mitya and Mark. She intends going to Russia soon; I do not know whether she will or not, but she is talking seriously about it.

I thank Manyasha again for the books: I have received them all. Gorky, Volume 5, we have (quite by chance). Let her convey our very best wishes to the inhabitant of "the neighbouring farmstead"**; I am very glad that an old friend has turned up, the one with whom we spent many excellent evenings. I hope to write him a long letter soon,

I wrote in the last letter that I like your group*** very much.

Many kisses, my dear. Hoping you are well.

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Munich to Samara

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* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

** This refers to A. A. Preobrazhensky.—*Ed.*

*** Apparently a group photograph.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

March 24, 1902

Mother dearest,

It is quite a while since I last received any news of you. How are you? We have recently been having perfect spring weather—people go out in summer coats or even without them. There has been no winter at all this year, I should say, though I expect winter is still with you even now in Russia. In Samara, I suppose, the snow is now melting and the time of impassable mud or puddles hidden under the snow is beginning.[223]

What have you in mind for the summer? It would be a good thing if you could get away from town, at least as far as the Zhiguli Hills if you cannot go any further (as I hope you will be able to). How are you keeping now, my dear? In spring, I suppose, all sorts of colds and other illnesses are going around your way too.

What does the future hold in store for Mark? Anyuta writes that instead of Manchuria he is now counting on getting a job somewhere on the Volga. Did he get the job, and where does he intend to live?

I have not had any letters from Mitya either and do not know whether he is in Moscow, or in the south, or how matters stand with his job.

What about Manyasha? Is she still working for the Zemstvo council? She, too, will have to get away from Samara in summer—I still cannot forget how foul it is in the heat.

We are also thinking of where to go in summer, although the towns here in summer are quite different from those of Russia.

I sometimes see Russian magazines—far from all of them and not regularly either. How do you people like Veresayev's

new story in *Mir Bozhy*? At first I expected a lot, but I am not very pleased with the continuation.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send best regards to Manyasha and all acquaintances.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich to Samara

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137

TO HIS MOTHER

April 2, 1902

Mother dearest,

I received Manyasha's letter only a little while ago. Thank her very much. A few days ago I wrote you that I have had no news of you for a long time. I even started sending Anyuta letters asking about you.

As regards books—please tell Manyasha not to send them until I let you have a *new* address.[224] I am grateful to her for sorting out the books; the *only* German books I should like to receive are those that are not needed (and *not even likely to be needed*) in Russia by you or *by acquaintances*. That is because I can easily get German books here, there is no shortage of them. But there is a shortage of Russian books, so please, could *all* possible Russian books be picked out and even *all* the statistics and put in a separate box, for I am beginning to miss these things and am thinking of having them all sent. I am particularly grateful to Manyasha for putting in some Russian classics.

How are you keeping now, my dear? Are you still thinking of a trip abroad in summer? It would be excellent, if it would not tire you too much.

Best regards to Mark. Has he at last received permission to leave?

What about the "doctor"* in Manchuria? I really should

* A. P. Sklyarenko.—*Ed.*

very much like to correspond with him. Hasn't his address been discovered yet?

Has Manyasha conveyed my best regards to the "old acquaintance" whom I used to visit at the farmstead?* I was very glad to have news of him.

Manyasha should also have a holiday in summer—somewhere in the Zhiguli Hills, eh?

I embrace you fondly, my dear; regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Munich to Samara

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* See Letter No. 135.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

B.R.Y.*
Postlagernd,
Postamt 100,
Luisenstr., 6,
Berlin

April 10, 1902

I am being run right off my feet! We are leaving** on the 12th. For the time being, in case of anything urgent, write to this address.

Mr. Alexejeff,
14, Frederick Street,
Gray's Inn Road,
London, *W. C.*

(*for Lenin*—inside).

The address of the local doctor is *in any case* valid; he will always forward letters.

Thank Auntia*** for the letter, which I received today (and for the books).

All the best.

Lenin

Sent from Munich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

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* The initials under which Lenin's sister received letters poste restante.—*Ed.*

** If there is any change I will write.

*** Auntie—A. M. Kalmykova.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

May 8, 1902

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received a postcard with a view of the Volga and with congratulations from Manyasha. Many thanks for it. I do not know whether you have been receiving my letters regularly lately. I have had nothing from you except that postcard for quite a while.

Do you correspond with Y. V. who is now in St. Petersburg and does not seem to like it very much and is thinking of coming back?

I am hoping to see you soon, my dear.[225] I hope the journey will not tire you too greatly. You absolutely must choose day trains and spend the nights in hotels. Hotels abroad are not expensive and you can spend a comfortable night in one. It is quite impossible to travel for several days without a rest because of the speed of the trains here and of the short stops.

I am anxiously awaiting news of your departure. Perhaps you will send a telegram from Russia, or from somewhere abroad, when you board the train that will actually bring you here. That would be much more convenient.

I wanted to ask you to bring some of the clothes I left behind, but now I think it is not worth while; the things I left behind must have come in handy for Mitya and it is not worth the trouble of buying new things in Russia and bringing them here. If there is anything left that is of no use to anyone else, you could bring it (not much, of course, so as not to overburden you).

I advise you to take express trains in Germany and Austria (the extra fare in the third class is small but the time gained is tremendous), and buy *Hendschel's Telegraph* and draw up a timetable before you leave home. Manyasha, for instance, is probably familiar with that directory.

I embrace you fondly, my dear; best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from London to Samara

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140

TO HIS MOTHER

June 7, 1902

Mother dearest,

I have received a letter from Manyasha and am very grateful to her. With regard to an address for the despatch of books, I will try and send it soon. It is a great pity that you still have to be bothered with this burden! Well, we shall put an end to all that soon and you will be rid of all the books.

We are all expecting you, my dear, and I am corresponding with Anyuta regarding her plans—how and where to make arrangements for you to stay. The weather seems to be continuing fine, here and where Anyuta lives.* Yelizaveta Vasilyevna writes that she will probably be leaving soon; she does not seem to be very well pleased with her trip (I, incidentally, tried all the time to talk her out of it, showing her that there was no need for her to go and that she would soon be missing us).

I do not write about my health because I am quite well. Nadya, too.

What about Mark and his job? Did he take the position in Tomsk and when is he going there?

Manya's tale of her boat trip made me very envious.... How I should like to be on the Volga in summer! What a fine time you and Anyuta and I had on the boat in the spring of 1900.[226] If I cannot get to the Volga, the Volga

* At that time Lenin's sister was living near Dresden.—*Ed.*

people must come here. There are some nice places here, too, although of a different kind.

Au revoir, my dear.

Your *V.* embraces you fondly.

P. S. I received the Gorky and Skitalets books and read them with *very great* interest. I have read them myself and passed them on to others.

Sent from London to Samara

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141

TO HIS MOTHER

September 14, 1902

Mother dearest,

We were all extremely glad to receive your telegram and later your postcard. Did you continue your journey comfortably? Wasn't it too tiring? Please drop me a couple of lines about this when you have rested and have settled down a bit.

Anyuta's photographs (the ones she sent, I mean) arrived in good time and in good condition.[227]

There have been no changes here. We are all well. The weather here is surprisingly fine for autumn—it must be compensation for a bad summer. Nadya and I have often been out locally in search of "real countryside" and have found it.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send my very best regards to Manyasha and Anya.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from London to Samara

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142

TO HIS MOTHER

September 27, 1902

Mother dearest,

It is quite a while since I heard from you. I still do not know what sort of journey you had to Samara and how you are fixed up there. I doubt whether Manyasha is still living at the old address but I am writing there since I have no other and expect that the letter will he forwarded to her. Where is Anyuta? What news have you had from Mitya and Mark? What are you thinking of doing for the winter?

Are you well, my dear? Was the journey not too tiring?

Life goes on as usual; the only thing is that we have recently been a little busier. I have now got into a more regular way of life, but try to spend more time in the library.

The weather is extraordinarily fine—our reward for a dreadful summer. Nadya and I have travelled and walked round a great deal of the surrounding country and have found some very nice places. If you are having the same kind of weather you should take advantage of it somewhere in the country, because I expect there is little pleasure to be had from living in Samara itself, even at this time of the year.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well. Best regards to all from Nadya, Y. V. and me.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from London to Samara

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143

TO HIS MOTHER

November 9, 1902

Mother dearest,

I received your letter quite a long time ago but have somehow been unable to get down to answering it; and anyway I have been expecting an answer to my previous letter. Mitya's release[228]—in my last letter I wrote that I was sure of it—actually took place much quicker than I expected. I am particularly glad for Anyuta's sake, because she has not had to spend a long time hanging about various government offices (often an extremely unpleasant business, even more unpleasant than being in prison!) and has at last been able to go to Mark. She had been wandering from place to place without a home of her own, so to speak, for much too long.

What news is there now from her? Is Mark satisfied with his job? Does Mitya earn anything, and is he thinking of visiting you? I hope you are keeping well, my dear.

As for us, we are going on as usual and do nothing exciting. The weather is warm, similar to our August weather; even in a summer coat it is hot (of course people are *von unten warm angezogen*,* in the jerseys they wear abroad). I have got fairly well used to the local way of life and am acquiring a practical command of the language. Y. V. is now well and does not get ill very often. Nadya gets a little tired, but in general is reasonably well.

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* Warmly dressed underneath (Ger.).—*Ed.*

Not long ago I received some new Russian books such as Zheleznov's (*Politicheskaya ekonomiya*) but have had no time to read them. I was not very pleased with them when I glanced through them. I read mostly Moscow newspapers—still the same old thing. I see the local papers in reading-rooms.

How are you keeping, in general, this winter?

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send very best regards to all.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from London to Samara

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Printed from the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

December 17, 1902

Mother dearest,

A few days ago we received Manyasha's letter to Nadya with your postscript and I was very glad to hear from you because there had been no news for a long time. There was also a short letter from Anyuta; she seems to be well content with her new place. Manyasha writes that you will soon be seeing Mitya and his wife.* Give him very best regards from me and all of us. Perhaps Anyuta will visit you, too, and you will all he together for a short while during the holidays. That would be fine.

Our life here goes on just the same as usual. It was cold for a few weeks (cold here means "not thawing") but there was no snow and we all caught colds. But we are all right now. The weather is again wet—at this rate I shall soon get unused to our winter!

I see from Manyasha's letter that she liked Zheleznov's book. I have not read it, of course; I merely turned over the pages, and so cannot undertake to judge. When I have read it, I will write about it. What I wrote concerned only the first, *superficial* impression.

Manyasha also writes that she has taken up languages, even English. I thought of sending her a textbook on pronunciation, a very good one, in German. I have been doing some study lately and am very pleased with the book;

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* Lenin's brother and his wife visited Samara in the winter of 1902.—*Ed.*

I can't praise it enough. The book is, Henry Sweet, *Elementarbuch des gesprochenen Englisch*, Oxford, 1901, and it costs something like a ruble twenty-live kopeks. If Manyasha would like me to, I can send it; I do not need it any more. Since she has Toussaint, however, I don't know whether it is worth while, because Toussaint is excellent. I used not to believe in this system but now I am sure it is the only serious, efficient system. If you take a few lessons from a native foreigner after working through the first part of Toussaint you can certainly acquire a thorough knowledge of the language. There are Toussaint dictionaries now as well, in which the *pronunciation is indicated*; I strongly advise Manyasha to buy them because our Alexandrov is *wrong in many cases*. (For instance, I strongly advise her to buy Muret's pocket dictionary that uses the Toussaint method, *Taschenwörterbuch der englischen und deutschen Sprache*, *Teil I*, *Englisch-deutsch*, Preis 2 Mark. Berlin, 1902. *Langenscheidtsche* Verlagsbucbhandlung.)

Well, I have used up a lot of paper talking about books.... I want to order *Problemy idealizma*—this seems to be a "militant" review by the nonsense-mongering gentlemen.[229]

Y. V. and Nadya send their regards. I hope you will soon be receiving visitors and have some relief from your loneliness.

I embrace you fondly, my dear.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from London to Samara

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145

TO HIS MOTHER

December 26, 1902

Mother dearest,

Please send the enclosed letter to Anyuta; I have not got her address, I must have lost it (I have not yet written her a single letter) and perhaps she is not in Tomsk now, but with you. I believe you were hoping you would all be together for the holidays, Mitya as well. Write and tell me whether it turned out that way, and whether you made the acquaintance of Mitya's wife.

We still have absolutely nothing new to tell you. The cold is over and we now have what we would call autumn weather; by way of exception it is dry, and this is very pleasant. The holidays here will probably be rather boring—few meetings, the reading-rooms closed and the theatres all overcrowded and difficult to get into. However, I am hoping to see some new acquaintances during this period.

I have recently been reading the German newspapers more than usual; there have been some interesting happenings in Germany and sometimes I wanted to get the story straight from the source. Things seem to be quieting down there, too.[230]

How are you getting on? Are the worst frosts over? Have you any new acquaintances?

Hoping you will have a good time this holiday and will all keep well.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from London to Samara

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1903

146

TO HIS MOTHER

February 4, 1903

Mother dearest,

It is a very long time since I received as much as a single letter from you or any of our people. One of your letters must have gone astray, because I cannot believe that nobody has written to me all this time. I don't know whether Mitya came to visit you, whether he stayed for long, what his plans are, and where he is now. Have you had any news of Anyuta, did she move to Port Arthur[231] and when? Are you well? Is the weather in Russia really still as cold as ever?

The weather here is fine. It has been an exceptionally good mild winter, with very little rain or fog (*so far*). Y. V., it is true, still gets ill rather often; she is ill now but not very badly, so we are making do with home treatment and Russian remedies. It would probably be good for her to move somewhere further south. Nadya and I are both well and are jogging along as usual. We recently went to our first concert this winter and were very pleased with it—especially with Chaikovsky's latest symphony (*Symphonic pathétique*). Are there any good concerts in Samara? We went once to a German theatre but what we should like would be to visit the Russian Art Theatre and see *The Lower Depths*.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you everything of the best, especially health. Regards to all; perhaps you will forward the letter to Anyuta. Otherwise, when shall I learn her address?

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Have I got your address right?

Sent from London to Samara

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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147

TO HIS MOTHER

February 22, 1903

Mother dearest,

I have received your letter, for which a big *merci*. It was very interesting to hear about Anyuta. By the way, please send her this letter as I do not know her address. It is true she recently sent me a brief note for which I am very grateful, but she forgot to say anything about her address and, in general, she was so hazy about everything that I am completely bewildered. I learned about the "Chinese" philistines* only from you. In a way, that is closer to Europe, or to the New World! Rather interesting, I think, very much so, in fact!

I am very, very sorry about the old friend.**

Would it not be quicker to correspond with the Chinese lady through Japan or through some British port? True enough, it is farther by sea, but the Europeans are many times more punctual!

Life here goes on as usual. Nothing particularly good has happened and nothing bad either, and in general I feel much less *ueberarbeitet**** than before. I expect to take a trip to Germany in a few days.[232] The weather is astonishingly fine, it is hot in a light coat; sunshine and a warm, warm breeze.... Just right for walking.

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* Lenin's sister Anna and her husband Mark Yelizarov.—*Ed.*

** A. P. Sklyarenko.—*Ed.*

*** Overworked (Ger.).—*Ed.*

How are you getting on? Where are Mitya and his wife? How is Manyasha?

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Best regards to all, especially to Anya and Mark!

Sent from London to Samara

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Printed from the original

148

TO HIS MOTHER

March 29, 1903

Mother dearest,

I received your letter a few days ago—a big *merci* for it. So Anyuta has been delayed in the Far East longer than she expected. I thought she would be with you by now. Still, I suppose a long journey like that requires some preparation. Mitya, too, it seems, has not yet decided on where he is going to live. Is poor Manyasha very lonesome?

I am glad it is warmer now in Samara, because very cold winters are extremely tiring. Are you now feeling better, my dear?

It is warm here. We recently took Y. V. on a long outing too—we took sandwiches with us instead of lunch and spent the whole of one Sunday *ins Grüne* (quite unintentionally we are taking to foreign ways and arrange our outings on Sundays of all days, though that is the worst time because everywhere is crowded). We had a long walk, the air went to our heads as if we were children and afterwards I had to lie down and rest, as I did after a shooting trip in Siberia. In general, we do not miss a chance to go on outings. We are the only people among the comrades here who are exploring *every bit* of the surrounding country. We discover various "rural" paths, we know all the places nearby and intend to go further afield. I have been feeling very well lately, I work regularly and do not worry about the commotion around me. Nadya and Y. V. are also well.

I embrace you fondly, my dear. Please write from time to time (or ask Manyasha to) about yourselves and your plans.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Sent from London to Samara

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Printed from the original

1904

148

TO HIS MOTHER

January 8, 1904

Mother dearest,

I forgot to reply to Manyasha about the 150 rubles she was enquiring about. Let them remain with you, for the time being at any rate. I would, however, ask you to buy a few books with some of the money. I have already written about a Russian-French Dictionary. To this I should like to add Sechenov's *Elementy mysli* (a recently published book).

A few days ago I had a wonderful outing to Salève with Nadya and a friend.* Down below in Geneva it was all mist and gloom, but up on the mountain (about 4,000 feet above sea level) there was glorious sunshine, snow, tobogganing—altogether a good Russian winter's day. And at the foot of the mountain—*la mer du brouillard*, a veritable sea of mist and clouds, concealing everything except the mountains jutting up through it, and only the highest at that. Even little Salève (nearly 3,000 feet) was wrapped in mist.

So we are beginning to get to know Switzerland and its scenery. In the spring we intend to make a long walking tour.

I embrace you fondly, my dear. Are you keeping well? How are you?

Sent from Geneva to Kiev

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* F. V. Lengnik.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Laboratornaya, 12, Apt. 14,
Kiev

Mother dearest,

I am glad that you are feeling a little more at ease—the main thing is for our detainees to keep well.[233] In view of the large number of arrests they may simply have been caught in the dragnet....

Send me Mark Timofeyevich's address, I shall have some literary business for him. He is in St. Petersburg. Did you receive Nadya's letter, she wrote to you recently. My address: Geneva, Chemin privé du Foyer, 10.

Yours,
V.

Written January 20, 1904
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N. K. KRUPSKAYA
1903

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

July 2

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

We received Manyasha's letter the day before yesterday and yours yesterday. How glad I was! If only they will soon release Anya! I embrace you fondly, my dears. It is such a pity that you are both suffering from ill health. You absolutely must take a rest—the main thing is to get your lungs filled with fresh air; after all, Kiev is a city. The only thing is that in the north the summer is bad; Mother is living near St. Petersburg at the country house of some friends and complains of the terrible cold and the rain. I believe that there is everything conducive to rest at M. T.'s country place.

We are now on holiday, too. We have let our house and I am very glad we have, because keeping it clean and housekeeping in general took the whole day, there was sometimes such a hubbub at our place; the need to think about housekeeping all the time was a nuisance. If you go out for a walk, you are left without milk, if you are not up by seven o'clock you have the pleasure of going to town for meat, and so on. And in winter it was so cold. We shall now find something more convenient. In general I am dreaming of autumn, when I shall be able to sit down and work seriously. I am thinking of various ways of avoiding the constant turmoil; it is terribly tiring. We are now in Lausanne. It is already a week since we got away from Geneva and are now resting in the full sense of the word. We have left our work and our worries in Geneva and here

we sleep 10 hours a day, and go swimming and walking—Volodya does not even read the newspapers properly; we took a minimum of books with us, and even those we are sending back to Geneva tomorrow, unread, while we ourselves shall don our rucksacks at four in the morning and set out for a two weeks' walking tour in the mountains.[234] We shall go to Interlaken and from there to Lucerne. We are reading Baedeker and planning our journey carefully. In a week we have "recovered" quite considerably and have even begun to look healthy again. It has been a difficult winter and our nerves have been under such a strain that we cannot be blamed for taking a month's holiday, although I am already feeling guilty about it. The weather is a bit doubtful, there is no rain, but the air is rather misty. For the time being that is all I have to write about us. Volodya and I have made an agreement not to talk about our work—work, he says, is not a bear and will not escape to the woods—not even to mention it, and, as far as possible, not to think about it.

I shall be writing to Manyasha, probably this evening, and in the meantime I embrace all of you fondly, my dears, and send you many kisses.

Yours,
Nadya

Mother dearest,

I will add just a few words. Very best regards to Manyasha and congratulations on her release. This summer you absolutely must rest. Please go and stay in the country somewhere. We are taking walks and having a good holiday. I embrace you.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written July 2, 1904
Sent from Lausanne to Kiev

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the original

152

TO HIS MOTHER*

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Laboratornaya Street, 12, Apt. 14,
Kiev,
Russia

Greetings from the tramps, dear Mother and Manyasha.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written July 7 or 8, 1904
Sent from Frutigen (Switzerland)
First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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* This was written on a picture postcard with a view of the Kandersteg near Frutigen, through which Lenin and Krupskaya passed during their mountain tour.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA*

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Laboratornaya Street, 12, Apt. 14,
Kiev,
Russia

July 16, 1904

Greetings from our *Mon Repos*. In a day or two we shall be off once again. Is Mother well? It is a long time since we had any news. Please write.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Iseltwald (Switzerland)

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

* This was written on a picture postcard with a view of Iseltwald am Brienzersee.—*Ed.*

154

TO HIS MOTHER

August 28, 1904

Mother dearest,

I have not written to you for a long time because I was not certain of your address. Today we received letters from Y. V. and Manyasha. Thank her for the trouble she has taken over the translations. Nadya will write about this in detail. I have now received Hobson's book on imperialism and have begun translating it[235]—only a little at a time because I am still enjoying the summer way of life—walking, swimming and lazing around. Altogether, I have had an excellent rest this summer!

What about you? Is the cottage at Sablino a good one? Are you having a good rest? What is the outlook for the future? Are you keeping well? How are Anyuta and Manyasha after their imprisonment? Drop me a line about this because Manyasha only speaks about translations.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send regards to all.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Have I got the address right? If you change it, let me know in good time. My address: Rue de la Colline, 3, Genève, but *on the envelope* you absolutely must write: *V. I. Ulyanov*, *Personal*.

Sent from Geneva to Sablino
(near St. Petersburg)

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the original

1907

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LENIN AND KRUPSKAYA TO LENIN'S MOTHER

June 27, 1907

Mother dearest,

For a long time I have not written you anything. Anyuta has probably told you of our plans for a holiday. I came back terribly tired. I have now completely recovered. Here you can have a wonderful rest, swimming, walking, no people and no work.[236] No people and no work—that is the best thing for me. I expect to be here another fortnight or so and then to return to work. Nadya and her mother are well and are having a good holiday.

How are you all fixed up there? Are you well? Have you seen Anyuta? Where is she? With you now, or with Mark? When you can, drop me a line or ask Mitya to.

I embrace you fondly,

Yours,

V. Ul.

Regards from me to Mitya and his wife.

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Volodya does not usually send regards and so I send regards to you from Mother and myself. We also send regards to all our people. I can confirm the fact that we are having a good rest; we have all put on so much weight it's not decent to show ourselves in public.... Here there is a pine forest, sea, magnificent weather, in short, everything is excellent. It is also a good thing that there is no housekeeping to do. And what sort of a rest are you having? How

is your malaria? Have you got rid of it completely? Do you go mushrooming? How are you, in general, and what are you doing? Here we are cut off from the whole world; although there is a post six times a week nobody writes anything. Once again I embrace you fondly.

Yours,
Nadya

Sent from Stjernsund to
Mikhnevo, Serpukhov Uyezd,
Moscow Gubernia

First published in 1929
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156

LENIN AND KRUPSKAYA TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Dear Manyasha,

Thanks for the letter. I must apologise for not answering at once. I have got so "embedded" in summer holidays and in loafing (I am having a rest such as I have not had for several years) that I am still postponing all business matters, great and small.

I am against boycotting the Third Duma; I have been writing a little piece on this subject which will probably soon be out.[237] In my opinion that slogan must not be revived unless there is a situation of heightened political activity, unless there is a struggle against early constitutional illusions. Any fresh burst of enthusiasm (there may be one on account of the July strike of Moscow textile workers—up to 400,000 are expected to strike) must be expanded, preparations must be made, it must be made general, but it would be out of place to declare a boycott. We must not renounce the slogan altogether; if the situation arises we shall, in a moment of political upsurge, propose a boycott. To declare a boycott at the moment would be either premature bravado or the uncritical repetition of slogans that have a glorious revolutionary past. Such, in a few words, is my argument; it is developed in detail in the press.*

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* It should be out in about a fortnight.

Write and tell me how you are fixed up and whether you are satisfied. Best regards to Mark and all acquaintances.

We are having a wonderful rest and are loafing.

Many kisses,

Yours,

V. U.

Darling Manyasha,

I am adding a few words. There is nothing to write about since we are, at the moment, "outside public interests" and are leading a holiday life—bathing in the sea, cycling (the roads are bad, by the way, so you can't go far). Volodya plays chess, fetches water, at one time we had a craze for the English game of "Donkey", and so on. The only thing is that Lidya has a lot of bother with the housekeeping.... Everybody here is putting on weight splendidly. We could read a lot but none of the books here are very suitable and anyway we don't feel like reading.

Many kisses,

Yours,

N.

Our people (Lidya and Mother) send regards, of course.

Written at the end of June 1907
Sent from Stjernsund to Kinel Station (Samara Gubernia)

First published in 1931 in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from the original

157

TO HIS MOTHER

October 15, 1907

Mother dearest,

It is a long time since I wrote to you. I believe the last letter was the one I sent from my summer *Mon Repos*. We have now settled down to family life for the winter in the old place.[238] We hope the winter will not be as cold as the last. But we shall arrange things better now and "batten down the hatches". I am very pleased with the premises and with the way things have been fixed up. Manyasha has been staying with us and is still here, but she intends leaving today because winter is setting in; the first snow fell today and it has turned cold.

How are you getting along there? Will it be all right in the country when the real cold sets in? Please convey my best regards to Mitya. It was a pity I could not visit him in the autumn,[239] we could have had some magnificent shooting, the weather was splendid all the time. When is he getting his holiday, for how long, and where is he going?

I have had a couple of letters from Anyuta. She seems to be pleased with her trip.* The route is an interesting one and it will probably be very fine down south now.

Here we are living in a small company of good friends.** We have books and work. We take walks along the sea-

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* Lenin's sister Anna was abroad at the time.—*Ed.*

** At that time A. A. Bogdanov, I. F. Dubrovinsky, N. A. Rozhkov and G. D. Leiteisen lived at Kuokkala.—*Ed.*

shore. I think Manyasha felt very well here; she worked a lot, translating.

Nearly all of us recently paid tribute to autumn—with a dose of influenza for a couple of days. Now we are all well or convalescent. Yelizaveta Vasilyevna also feels quite well—only she sometimes gets too worried over the housekeeping.

I embrace and kiss you, my dear. I hope you will keep well.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Kuokkala to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd,
Moscow Gubernia

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1908

158

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Pavlovskaya Street, 6, Apt, 16,
Peterburgskaya Storona,
St. Petersburg,
Russia

January 14, 1908

Dear Manyasha,

I am sending you the copy of *Obrazovaniye*[240] that I brought with me by mistake. I don't think I owe you any more books, do I? If I do, please let me know.

We have been hanging about in this damned Geneva for several days now[241].... It is an awful hole, but there is nothing we can do. We shall get used to it. How are you? Are you freezing? Is Mother well? Please kiss her for me and give my regards to Anyuta, and to Mitya, too, if he has not yet left.

Yesterday I wrote to Lev Borisovich about an article* and asked him to obtain for me the minutes of the Third Duma (the officially published verbatim reports and also the announcements, questions and bills brought before the Duma). These can only be obtained through acquaintances. Please make an effort to see that someone agrees to get them for me, and send them *all*, missing nothing. Please send me also *all* the trade union journals that are still being published in Russia (in St. Petersburg, and Moscow as well) —buy them *immediately*. From the sum I am to receive from the publisher on January 4, please get 50 rubles from

* This letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

Yelizaveta Vasilyevna and send me *everything* new that the Mensheviks publish (if they do) and so on. I have ordered *Tovarishch* (*Nash Vek*)[242] for myself from January 1 and will also keep track of new publications. If L. B. is too lazy or too busy to write, please find out his answer (to my questions) and let me know. By the way, I need an answer about Granat (History of Russia); has a contract for my article[243] been concluded with him or has it fallen through? Let L. B. reconnoitre and inform you.

All the very best,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

*Tournez s'il vous plait.**

Have you sent my papers and Nadya's? If not, please send them as soon as possible by registered post. I need my papers in order to get my *permis d'établissement.***

My address: Vl. Oulianoff. 17. Rue des deux Ponts. 17. (Chez Küpfer) Genève.

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* Please turn over (Fr.).—*Ed.*

** Residence permit (Fr.).—*Ed.*

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LENIN AND KRUPSKAYA TO LENIN'S MOTHER

January 22, 1908

Mother dearest,

Today I received a letter from you and Manya and hasten to reply. I was very glad to receive news from you direct—I have not received any of Manyasha's earlier letters. We had to resort to forwarding letters until we arrived in Geneva and it was a nuisance.

We were greatly worried at the news of Anyuta's bad attack of influenza. Your apartment must be a bad one (Nadya says it is damp), if there are such complications. Are you all well now? How is Mitya? Has he gone away again in connection with his work?

We are now settling down here and our arrangements, of course, will not be worse than before. The only unpleasant thing was the actual moving, which was a change for the worse. That, however, was inevitable. About Capri—as soon as I arrived I found a letter from Gorky, who very insistently invites me there. Nadya and I have made up our minds to accept that invitation and take a trip to Italy (in Capri *now* the narcissi are in bloom, so the Gorkys write), but not yet. All our affairs must be settled first and then we can travel.

I wrote to Manyasha yesterday or the day before with further requests for books. Am I giving her too many orders?

I embrace you, my dear, and hope you are quite well. Regards to all from Nadya and myself.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Dear everybody,

What a rotten time you have had with this damned influenza! Perhaps it's because the flat is damp? I am glad you are getting better.... Many kisses for all of you; I hope you will soon recover and get your strength back completely.

Yours,
Nadya

Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Pavlovskaya Street, 6, Apt. 16,
Peterburgskaya Storona,
St. Petersburg,
Russia

February 7, 1908

Dear Manyasha,

I have received your letter of January 20, a letter from the young writer on the same subject, and today I received *Rech*.[244] I am very, very grateful for the newspaper, the article is really extremely interesting!

With regard to Webb—I have written to the young writer and have sent him something in the nature of power of attorney. In any case I repeat (1) I do not know how many copies of the first edition there were; (2) Struve was the manager of the editorial office at that time and he edited the first volume; (3) the second volume was translated by Y. Smirnov (Gurevich). I then received 20 rubles for a printer's signature for the translation of the first volume and 10 rubles a signature for editing the second. Let the young writer haggle—if need be, let, him go down to a half of that, provided the contract is concluded for a definite number of copies.

Yesterday I also received a letter from a colleague about Granat. Things are working out quite well for me there.

As regards our marriage lines and the palm oil wanted in Krasnoyarsk, I propose that you should not take too much trouble or give any large quantity of palm oil. It looks as if we shall manage without it.

In a month, *if not sooner*, we intend to set up our own apartment here.

With regard to the symposium in memory of Marx, it does not seem likely that I shall take part in it, either; such things cannot be written in a hurry.[245]

Our people are taking a surprisingly long time to get well! It's too bad. The influenza this year must be particularly malignant, or else you are having very bad weather. Write and tell me how Mother is.

I have not yet fully settled down here—for instance, I have not yet joined my "club", where it is convenient to read periodicals and easy to obtain new books.[246] I shall try (as soon as I have joined—probably in a day or two) to find whatever I can for you to translate. Do you receive *Neue Zeit*? In the science supplement to No. 1 there is an article by Kautsky "Nationalität und Internationalität". I have not yet seen it. Is it not suitable for translation? I have read Kautsky's *Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik* (a new pamphlet of 80 pages). I think it would be permitted. Talk to *Zerno**[247] about it; it would be a good thing to translate it. I am also surprised that no announcement is to be seen of a translation of Parvus's *Kolonialpolitik und Zusammenbruch*. Has no one any initiative? Ask *Zerno*. I could get in touch with the author here, abroad.

All the best, kiss Mother for me.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. I have not received Bonch's *Selected Works*.

Of the trade union journals I have received *Gudok* and *Tekstilnoye delo*. In future please send *all* such publications.

Sent from Geneva

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* Please ask them at the same time whether I may send new things *for you* to *their* address, things that *may be* suitable for translation.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

161

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

February 14, 1908

Dear Manyasha,

I recently wrote to you about some translations. I should now like to add that I have read *Ergänzungsheft* No. 1 to *Neue Zeit*—an article by Kautsky "Nationalität und Internationalität". I remember you said you receive *Neue Zeit*, so I shall not send it from here (give me an address to which I can send foreign books and articles, in case I need it). In my opinion this is a thing that can be published legally and is really worth translating. Propose it to the publisher (36 pages). The best thing of all would be to publish it (it is a criticism of Bauer) with the book by Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Anya probably has this book since she translated one chapter of it).

One of my colleagues here wants someone to ask the publisher whether he would undertake to publish Huschke's *Landwirtschaftliche Reinertragsberechnungen*, which I quoted in Part I of my *Agrarian Question*.[248] If an opportunity occurs, ask the publisher and I will promise to write a preface. But if the truth be told, it is too highly specialised a book....

I had a talk with the Director of the Police Department yesterday about my *Acte de mariage*. It seems that it is necessary. Ask some lawyer of your acquaintance to think of some other way of getting a copy from Krasnoyarsk (because probably no great hopes are to be placed in "palm oil"). There does exist some (legal) procedure which makes

it possible to obtain proof of marriage. Cannot Yelizaveta Vasilyevna apply to a justice of the peace or to the relevant authority in St. Petersburg and demand from him an *instruction* to issue a *certificate* to her requiring the Krasnoyarsk church authorities to supply her with a copy of the marriage lines (either for *legal action* against her daughter, or in connection with the disposal of an inheritance, etc.). Is it not possible by *some such means* to obtain the certificate or a copy of it? Ask a lawyer.

How is everybody? Have Mother and Anyuta fully recovered?

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. Very, very many thanks for the minutes of the Third Duma. I ask you most urgently *to continue* sending them, to send more often and to send them together with bills and questions.

Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

February 17, 1908

Dear Manyasha,

Please send me the following books:

1. *Minuvshiye Gody* No. 1 (January, price 85 kopeks) *containing letters from Marx to* Mikhailovsky and *from Mikhailovsky to Lavrov*.

2. *Materialy k istori russkoi kontrrevolyutsii*, Vol. 1. Price 2 rubles 50 kopeks.

3. *Nashi deputaty** (Third Convocation). 50 kopeks ("Osnova"—bookshop?).

4. Lokot. *Byudzhetnaya i podatnaya politika Rossii*. 1 ruble.

5. Almazov. *Nasha Revolyutsiya* (1902-7). 1 ruble 50 kopeks (work)—I do not know whether this last-named book is any use as I have no information about it. All the same, I must take a look at it!

6. *Ocherk zabastovochnogo dvizheniya rabochikh Bakinskogo neftepromyshlennogo raiona za 1903-6 gg*. Baku. 1907. Price 1 ruble 50 kopeks.

I have not received any Duma minutes of sittings later than the twentieth. I must have them *together* with the Bills! The newspaper *Stolichnaya Pochta*, for instance, recently reported the publication of a programme of "a group of moderate peasants". Please get it for me! It would not be bad to get hold of programmes, announcements and leaflets

* If there is an edition containing *portraits* the best thing would be to buy that.

of the Octobrists, the Rights, the Cossack group, etc., if you have any Duma contacts. All these "bits of paper" probably lie about on the floor of the Duma and nobody picks them up.

I wrote to you a few days ago about translations (of Kautsky); did you get that letter?* Did you get the manuscript of the second part of my Volume Two[249] (sent from here on February 5, 1908 N.S, by a roundabout route)?

I shall write to Mother about money.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

If you have an opportunity, please pass on the enclosed sheet to Meshkovsky. I should like to get a direct address for correspondence from him and from Lindov. Tell them that. What was the outcome of Lindov's "squabble" with Bonch[250] and the conflict at the publisher's on the same grounds?

Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

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* See Letters Nos. 160 and 161.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

March 10, 1908

Dear Anyuta,

I have received your letter of February 21. It really is terrible that you should have got hold of a damp apartment and are all so ill. And what a misfortune for Manyasha to get typhus! Lidiya Mikhailovna writes every day and says that her temperature is not very high. I am afraid, however, of taking comfort from this news—there are grave forms of typhus that are not accompanied by high temperatures.

How is Mother keeping now? If you have no time to write, ask L. Mikh., since she is the one who writes, to add a couple of lines.

Mark was actually wrong to leave such a large sum out of his resettlement allowance, because my publisher now pays me enough.[251] It goes without saying that you absolutely must spend that money to make things easier for Manyasha and Mother or to help them get away to a better place. Could they not come here?

I have sent Manyasha a book to translate (a German novel). Did she get it (from Leipzig[252])? I also wrote to her about a book by Anatole France (*La vie de Jeanne d'Arc*) and one by Sinclair (Alexinsky suggests they be translated).

All the best and please give Mother many kisses. Nadya has gone away on business but asks me to send you her regards.

Yours,

Vl. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Dear Manyasha,

I hope that by now you will be able to read this yourself and are almost well again. Your illness has dragged on a disgustingly long time! The main thing, however, is not to have a relapse. The most dangerous thing after that disease is fatigue or nervous excitement. Now would be the time to send you to Stjernsund!* When you have *completely* recovered, drop me a line. I am going to Italy[253] for a week or so. I shall write when I get back.

Love and kisses and get well soon.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Written between April 19 and 23, 1908
Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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* See Letters Nos. 155 and 156.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

June 20, 1908

Mother dearest,

It seems quite a while since I last wrote to you. I think the last time was a postcard from London.[254] I arrived back from there with a bout of abdominal catarrh. I am better now and have begun to eat properly, and after the diet feel hungry all the time. I have begun work again.

Life here goes on as usual. The weather is extremely changeable—one day it is hot, oppressive and stormy and then, like today, it is rainy and cold. Summer has not yet come into its own.

How are you getting on in the country? I hope that Manyasha has completely recovered. We are expecting her here. Best regards to Mitya.

I embrace you fondly, my dear.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. It is a pity that the Moscow publisher-philosopher* has refused to publish my book. I should like you, if you can, to write to some of your Moscow literary acquaintances and ask them whether they can find a publisher. I now have no contacts in this field.

I have been told that Anyuta read the proofs of the last part of my agrarian book. I have still not received a single copy! It is *extremely important*, for many reasons, for me

* This refers to P. G. Dauge.—*Ed.*

to obtain two or three copies, even if they are not stitched.[255] I realise, of course, that to ask for them direct would be careless, inconvenient, etc., from all points of view. If there is the slightest opportunity of doing so privately, or if Anyuta has even one copy, I ask you to send it to me, at least for a time. I stand very much in need of it at this very moment.

Regards from all of us!

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

July 13, 1908

Dear Manyasha,

I have just received your letter with Anyuta's postscript. I was very glad to get the news. I was extremely glad to learn that there is a possibility of its publication in autumn.* Your St. Petersburg correspondent, however, has forgotten to answer one of my questions, an important one—is it not possible to obtain *even one* copy of the book in printed form, whether it has been made up or not? If the book is to come out in the autumn this is not impossible. I am prepared to pay five or even ten rubles to get a copy now. The point is that it is absolutely essential for me to show this book, before autumn, to certain people who cannot read the manuscript. If I cannot show the book to these people before autumn, I stand to lose a lot in all respects. And so, since you have the St. Petersburg address, and the owner of that address answers you and is closely in touch with the whole business—I ask you very earnestly to write to him and enquire, if there is the slightest opportunity, to get me *just one copy*, even if it means giving the right person "palm oil" to the extent of five rubles.

My illness has held up my work on philosophy very badly. I am now almost well again and will most certainly write the book. I have been doing a lot of work on the

* See Letter No. 162.—*Ed.*

Machists and I think I have sorted out all their inexpressible vulgarities (and those of "empirio-monism" as well).*

I am writing to M. Iv-na in Paris and giving her a recommendation.**

Give Mother many kisses for me. Best regards to all. I keep forgetting to write to tell Anyuta that I have received 340 rubles. So far I do not need money. Best regards to Mitya, Mark, Anyuta and everybody.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. When you or anybody else happens to be in Moscow, please buy me two books by Chelpanov, (1) *Avenarius i yego shkola* and (2) *Immanentnaya filosofiya*. They cost a ruble each. Published by *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii*. The two hooks are issued as part of a series called either Essays and Research, or simply research, or monographs, or something of the sort

Are you having a good rest this summer? The weather here is fine. I go cycling and bathing. Nadya and Y. V. send best regards to everyone.

Sent from Geneva to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

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* Lenin refers to his work on *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.—*Ed*.

** M. I. Veretennikova, Lenin's cousin. The letter and recommendation have been lost.—*Ed*.

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

August 9, 1908

Dear Manyasha,

I am sending you a picture of the place I have just returned from. I went to the mountains for a holiday. The weather prevented my staying there longer. Nevertheless I had an excellent holiday. I hope that in about six weeks my too-long-delayed work will at last be finished. Then we shall be able to go walking together. I am hoping very much that you will pay us a long visit in autumn. You will, won't you? Of course, you will! It would be wonderful if Mother could come, too. The weather this summer has not been good, more rain and thunderstorms than usual. There is a hope that September will turn out fine here. Do come!

Maria Ivanovna was here on her way from Paris. We had a bit of a chat. I visited her last Sunday evening. She spent a couple of days in Geneva and then went on to Italy. She was not long in Paris—a fortnight altogether. In general she is doing her tour abroad in too much of a rush!

Give Mother many, many kisses for me.

Yours,

V. U.

We are all well and all send best regards.

P.S. Vers l'Eglise is not far from Diablerets.[256] We did not go there together. It is two and a half hours from Geneva by rail and about four hours on foot.

Sent from Geneva to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

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TO HIS MOTHER*

P.S. Today I read an amusing newspaper article on the inhabitants of Mars in connection with a new English book by Lowell, *Mars and Its Canals*. Lowell is an astronomer who has worked for a long time in a special observatory which, I believe, is the best in the world (in America).

It is a scientific work. It argues that Mars is inhabitable, that the canals are a miracle of engineering, that people on that planet must be two and two-thirds the size of our people here, and that they, furthermore, have trunks and are covered with feathers or animal skins and have four *or six* legs. Hmm... the author** cheated us by describing the Martian beauties only *in part*, according to the principle that "... the deceit that elevates is dearer to us than a host of vulgar truths".[257]

A new story by Gorky has been published—*The Last*.

Written in the summer of 1908
Sent from Geneva to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

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* The letter to which this is the postscript has been lost.—*Ed.*

** A. Bogdanov, author of the novel *Krasnaya Zvezda* (The Red Star).—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

September 30, 1908

Mother dearest,

I have not written to you for a long time; I hoped that Manyasha would come and tell me about you but her journey is constantly being postponed. It would be a good thing if she could come in the second half of October (New Style) and we could take a trip to Italy together. I am thinking of taking a week's holiday when I have finished my work (it is now drawing to a close).* On October 11 I shall be in Brussels for three days and shall return here afterwards and might think of a trip to Italy.[258] Why should not Mitya come here, too? He ought to take a rest after all his work with the sick. Of course, you must invite him, too—we could go for some splendid walks together. If there are money difficulties, you must take the money Anya has in the bank. I hope I shall now earn a lot.

It would be fine if we could take a trip to the Italian lakes. They say it is excellent there in the late autumn. Anyuta will probably come and stay with you soon, so you can send Manyasha and Mitya.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health.

What is autumn in the country like? Here it is not bad.

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* The work referred to was Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.—*Ed*.

The summer has been rotten, but now there are occasionally some real summer days.

All our people here are well and wish me to give you their best regards.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

October 27, 1908

Dear Anyuta,

I am surprised at your long silence. I suppose the move to Moscow caused a lot of bother and you have had no time for letters.

Please give me an address to which I can send the manuscript of my book.* It is ready. It amounts to 24 printer's signatures (at the rate of 40,000 letters a signature) and that is about 400 pages. In a fortnight I shall have finished reading it over and will send it off; I should like to have a good address to send it to.

Things seem to be bad as far as a publisher is concerned; I was informed today that Granat has bought the Mensheviks' "history"—in other words the Mensheviks have come out on top in that field. It is obvious that he will now refuse to publish my book.[259] Bear in mind that I am not now chasing after royalties, i.e., I am prepared to make concessions (any you like) and agree to the postponement of payment until the book shows a profit—in short there will be no risk for the publisher. As regards the censor, I will also agree to *all* concessions because in general everything in the book is undoubtedly legal, with the possible exception of some expressions that may be unsuitable.**

I shall await an answer.

Our people all kiss Mother and you. So do I.

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Mikhnevo,

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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* *Materialism and Empirio-criticism.—Ed.*

** *Ergo*—conclude a contract if there is the slightest opportunity, on *any* terms.



The first page of Lenin's letter to his sister Anna, October 27, 1908

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

November 8, 1908

Dear Anyuta,

Today I received postcards from you and Mother with the new address. Did you get my letter addressed to Prosnya, 44,4? I am afraid to send a big manuscript to your private address or any other except that of some *publisher*. If you can find me such an address, I will send the manuscript *immediately*. In the meantime I shall await an answer to this letter. Incidentally, if the censor turns out to be *very* strict the word "*popovshchina*" can everywhere be changed to "fideism" with a footnote to explain it (*Fideism*. is a doctrine which substitutes faith for knowledge, or which generally attaches significance to faith).[260] This is for emergencies—it is to *explain* the nature of the concessions I am making.

All the best, many kisses for Mother.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Moscow

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TO HIS MOTHER

November 17, 1908

Mother dearest,

Manyasha has left today for Lausanne to consult Dr. Mermod, a distinguished specialist on ear troubles. He made the appointment in writing—you have to wait your turn to see famous people here. The general opinion, however, is that he is a competent doctor. Four years ago I had a minor operation in his clinic and it was done magnificently. So I hope he will be able to help Manya, because her ear is troubling her quite a lot and prevents her from working. She has taken a room on the same staircase as ours but a floor higher; a stove has been put in the room and it is warm there. She has dinner and supper with us. Her only trouble has been with her Latin. It seems that Latin is obligatory and the only date for an examination was November 19. This left her only ten days. I did try to persuade her to risk it, covering all the grammar in a "forced march", especially as she knows French very well. She proved unable to work intensively, however, on account of her ear; the time was, so short that she stood a poor chance anyway. And so she dropped the Latin. She consoles herself with the idea that we shall probably all be going to Paris and she, of course, with us. In Paris, Latin is not obligatory. As regards this move of ours—it is almost fully decided, but I do not expect we shall be able to make a move in less than a month from now. There will be more than enough bother with the moving, of course. We hope that a big city will put some life into us all; we are tired of

staying in this provincial backwater. It is true, of course, that Paris is more expensive. But the climate is no worse than that of Geneva. Here the climate is rather damp and the mists are unpleasant. We are going to find out what to do with the bicycles. It is a pity to leave them behind; they are excellent things for holidays and pleasure trips, but the duty on them there is, I believe, quite high, although I hope to be able to manage that, too. Please tell Anyuta that I have already sent my philosophical manuscript to the acquaintance who lived in the town where we met before my departure for Krasnoyarsk in 1900.[261] I hope that by now he has received it and delivered it to you. If he has not, you must go and see him since he does not live far from you. I ask you very earnestly to drop me a line immediately on receipt of the manuscript. I have written to two friends in St. Petersburg asking them to help me arrange publication.* I asked them to write to Anyuta, if anything turns up, through our mutual acquaintance who works at *Znaniye*.** I hope for very little from *Znaniye* itself; the "boss" there,*** who gave Anyuta a half promise, is an old fox and will probably go back on it after sniffing at the atmosphere on Capri, where Gorky lives. We shall have to look elsewhere. I have already written that I am prepared to make every concession.****

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Moscow

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* It is not known who is meant.—*Ed.*
** V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich.—*Ed.*
*** K. P. Pyatnitsky, manager of *Znaniye* Publishers.—*Ed.*
**** See Letter No. 171.—*Ed.*

173

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

November 26, 1908

Dear Anyuta,

I had just sent off a "distress" letter to you, when yours of November 9 arrived to tell me you had received the work intact. I agree that I have been rather nervous both about sending it off and while I have been waiting. I am simply scared to death of losing a huge piece of work that took many months and the delay really does put my nerves on edge. You did very well to ask for an answer by telegraph. If it is refused—it must be published immediately through Bonch. It seems you will not be able to get another publisher. Bonch publishes on credit, through someone else, somehow, and it is not very likely that I shall receive anything, but, anyway, publish it he will.[262] I have already written to two colleagues in St. Petersburg and will write again. Of course, if anything turns up for you, hand it over, and, in general take charge of it yourself, although by all accounts there is very little chance.

If there is no publisher, send it direct to Bonch immediately; the only thing is he must not give it to anybody to read and must look after it very carefully! Write to him about it.

I am sending two corrections, or rather one correction and one addition. On page 60 (at the end of the "Introduction"), following the words "Valentinov confuses them" (lines 9-10), cross out everything as far as "we" (the last line but one) and substitute this:

"Valentinov confuses them, and while doing so very

amusingly tries to console us: 'We would not consider the "kinship" of Mach to ... a philosophical crime'"* (etc., p. 61).

Please put that into the text.

The addition I am sending on a separate sheet which can easily be pasted in. This is a footnote to the *last word* of Section 5 (Chapter Five).[263] I have no copy of this chapter at home and so I cannot tell you the last word, but it doesn't matter.

All the best,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. I am sending your letter to Manyasha in Paris. We have not yet had a letter from her from Paris.

P.S. Please repeat your address; Manyasha took it with her and I am writing from memory.

Sent from Geneva to Moscow

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* This is how the lower half of p. 60 should read.

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TO HIS MOTHER

December 10, 1908

Mother dearest,

Today we have at last settled up for the flat. Some of our things we are sending immediately by slow train. We are leaving on Saturday or on Monday at the latest. An apartment has been found for us—Avenue d'Orléans, 69 or 67, I will give you the exact address when I write from Paris.[264] You will now have to write to us through Manyasha. The apartment that has been taken is on the ground floor, three rooms, one for Manyasha.

I have just received a letter from Anyuta and have sent her a telegram: *acceptez immédiatement seconde condition.** I am very glad that you have managed things without *Znaniye* and I think you must hurry up and sign a contract on the second condition. The important thing now is not to lose time, to make sure that we have a publisher bound by a formal contract and then speed up publication. If it is possible the contract should contain a point on *immediate* publication. (If you can, haggle for a larger number of free copies for the author, but do not make an issue of it.) By the way—I advise Anya when she signs the contract to be careful, and not to give her own name if she can avoid it, so as not to be responsible under the press laws (and not go to prison in the event of trouble; she should get advice on this from people who know about such things). Can a contract not be drawn up in my name, so as to leave Anyuta out of it altogether, i.e., not even mention her?[265]

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* Accept the second condition immediately (Fr.).—*Ed.*

I have sent you two letters to the wrong address. They have probably not been delivered to you since you do not say a word about them. Perhaps it would be advisable to apply to the post office, attach the envelope from this letter to your application and point out that the writing is the same, that the letters are from the same city and addressed to M. A. Ulyanova or A. I. Yelizarova, and that the only mistake is in the name of the street. I wrote Khamovniki, *Sokolnichy* Street instead of Obolensky Street. Have you received those letters? If you have not, I will *repeat* the addition I sent in one of them.*

I am sending a few more minor changes to Chapter Five. Please send me the proofs as they come off the press (all to be addressed to Mlle M. Oulianoff, Boulevard St.-Marcel 27, Paris), so that I can take a look at them. If the worst comes to the worst I would, *entre nous*, agree to the first condition, but the second is so advantageous and the opportunity of publishing it immediately, and in Moscow at that, is so attractive that we must seize that opportunity with both hands. As far as the author's name is concerned, I do not insist—I don't care what name it is, let the publisher choose one himself.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send very best regards to Anyuta. So do we all.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Moscow

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* See Letter No. 173 and Note No. 263.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Paris, December 19, 1908,

Dear Anyuta,

Today I received your letter redirected from Geneva and a postcard through Manyasha. And so everything is signed and sealed. Excellent. I wrote to you about corrections in the letter that was lost. I shall repeat them. *I agree* to toning it down in respect of Bazarov and Bogdanov; in respect of Yushkevich and Valentinov, it should not be toned down. With regard to "fideism", etc., I agree *only* if forced to, i.e., if the publisher's demands are in the form of an ultimatum. As far as the proofs are concerned, it is not my plan to have them read here and keep people waiting for them to come from here. That is hardly possible. All I ask is that you send me immediately impressions made from the galleys (i.e., the first uncorrected proofs *in addition to* the printed signatures as they come off the press) so that I can, if *really necessary*, send a telegram or inform them of misprints, etc. Cauwelaert's name really should be spelt with an "o" in Russian, although he is probably a Fleming and the devil alone knows how the Flemings pronounce it, "co" or "cau".

From Geneva I sent you a letter to the right address containing corrections and additions. Did you get it?

We are now moving from the hotel to our new apartment —Mr. Vl. Oulianoff, 24. Rue Beaunier, 24.* Paris (XIV-me). We have found a very nice apartment, very elegant and

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* *au deuxième au-dessus de l'entresol*, i.e., it would be *the third* floor, *porte à droite* (door on the right.—*Ed.*).

expensive: 840 francs+tax (about 60 francs) and+concierge (also about the same per annum). For Moscow it would be cheap (4 rooms+kitchen+storerooms, water and gas), but here it is considered expensive. However, it will be roomy and, we hope, good. Yesterday we bought furniture for Manyasha; ours is being sent from Geneva. The apartment is almost on the outskirts of Paris, in the south, near Montsouris Park. It is as quiet as a provincial town. It is very far from here to the centre but soon there will be a *métro*—an underground electric railway—a couple of steps from here; there are also other means of communication. So far we are satisfied with Paris.

All best wishes. Regards from all. Kiss Mother for me.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Leave Purishkevich as it is.* I agree to tone down other abuse, the same applies to vulgar expressions. "Mentally projected God" will have to be changed to "mentally projected for himself—well, to use a mild expression—religious conceptions" or something of the sort.**

Sent to Moscow
First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 199.—*Ed.*
** *Ibid.*, p. 78.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Rue Beaunier, 24,
Paris (XIV-me)

December 24, 1908

Dear Anyuta,

Today I received your letter about the proofs and hasten to scribble a few words, though I believe my last letter cleared up all misunderstandings. I never assumed and still do not assume that proofs would be sent here to be corrected—i.e., with your having to wait for the corrected proofs to be returned from here. I ask you to send me the proofs *just in case*, i.e., either so that I can point out the misprints and arrange for the most important corrections, or so that I can stop the printing by telegraph in an emergency, etc., or, lastly, so that I can have at least one printed copy by me in case of certain highly improbable happenings.

That is why I ask you to get two copies of the *first* (or of the second, or, better still, of the first and the second) proofs printed; one copy you will read while the other comes *straight* to me without anybody holding it up for anything. I think such a thing is *quite* possible for the publisher; I shall not cause the slightest delay unless it is absolutely necessary. If pulling off two copies involves any expense (which is hardly likely and there is no need for us to raise the question), I will bear it myself.

If you send the *first* proofs regularly, the delay will *never* amount to a week because in any case it takes several days to correct it completely and to print what has

been read (correction of the first proof; correction of the second proof; imposition; printing). The publisher is exaggerating when he talks about *a week's delay*.

By the way—I will give you a telegraphic form to be used in case of need right away. I shall write "*arrêtez* 12 or 65, etc.", *arrêtez* meaning "delay the printing", or "wait for author's corrections", and the two figures meaning, the first figure the chapter, and the second the section (12=Chapter One, Section 2; 65=Chapter Six, Section 5, etc.). I repeat that I shall do this only in extreme cases.

Instead of printing the chapter headings in heavy type it is better, if possible, to set them in small type or in italics. This, however, is not important.

Has one of my letters with addenda and minor changes gone astray? I see from your letter you received corrections and addenda* regarding E. Becher, but before this there was another letter containing corrections.

I am very, very glad that the matter is moving fast. That is the main thing.

All the best. Kiss Mother.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

We all send regards. We have begun to settle down in Paris.

Sent to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 290.—*Ed.*

1909

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

February 6, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Yesterday I sent you a letter in which I said I had completely given up all hope of seeing the proofs and this morning the first of them arrived! I am sending you a list of misprints (in general there are not many) in case you need it; it would be interesting to know whether it will reach you quickly and be in time. I would rather not send the proofs themselves.

Коллекции instead of коллекцию (page 15, line 8 from the bottom of the manuscript; page 5, line 1 from the top of the galley).

Предположением instead of предположения (page 22, lines 3-4 from the bottom of the manuscript; page 7, lines 3-4 from the top of the galley).

Телесные instead of те лесные (page 28, lines 6-7 from the top of the manuscript; page 9, line 3 from the top of the galley).

Змоций instead of злюций (page 36, lines 3-4 from the bottom of the manuscript; page 10, line 2 from the bottom of the galley).[266]

That is all.

All the best, kiss Mother.

Yours,

V. U.

Regards from all. Manyasha and I are just leaving for the theatre to see a Russian play. They are doing Andreyev's *Days of Our Life*.

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

Yesterday we sent you a telegram and got a reply today.[267] Manyasha has been and still is eager to leave at once, but I think she now agrees to wait for a letter. How is Mother now? I read Mitya's letter and *I ask him to write to us* regularly now; as a doctor he is better able to see, especially after consultations with specialists, what course the disease is taking and *I ask him especially* to inform us *more often*, even if only in a brief letter. Please farm out the proofs—it is absolutely heartless to plant them on you at such a time. You have the manuscript, so hire some student, etc., (or through the "writer"*, etc.) as the last proof-reader, give him my address and don't waste your attention on the correcting of proofs. You have enough to worry about without that.... Give Mother many, many kisses. Everyone sends very best regards.

Mark does not want to go until his time is up; he says times are such that he will not be allowed in the capital in any case.

All the best,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Written February 16 or 17, 1909
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

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the original

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* I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, who rendered substantial assistance in getting *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* published.—*Ed.*

179

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

I am sending the corrections to the proofs I received today. I have received: (α) page proofs for pages 97-112; (β) galley proofs 81-97 (pp. 302-364 of the manuscript), not made up.

But between the first and the second there is something missing; the made-up pages end at page 274 of the manuscript (there are also pp. 274a, 274e) and the galleys begin at page 302. *This means that about 27 pages of the manuscript have been left out*! Does this not mean that a whole signature is missing? Could it have fallen out of the parcel? Or perhaps they forgot to send it or give it to you from the printer's? *Please* send me the proofs of the missing pages (pp. 274-302 of the MS) and, under all circumstances, take steps to ensure that they are not left out when the book is made up and printed. The missing part is *most* important for me and for my book.

Here is a description of the omission that is more accurate, according to the manuscript. The last words of the last made-up page, number 112, are "These active forces must". In the manuscript this will be page 274, or 274a or 274b. The gap comes after these words. The missing part is from page 274a to page 302, to the words "Let us continue the quotation from Bazarov" inclusive, that is, to the third line from the top inclusive. That is the exact size of the gap.[268]

There is one other mistake, or rather not a mistake but something in the galleys that may lead to a mistake when they are made up into pages; *seventeen* lines from the bot-

tom of galley No. 88, beginning from "гелем" (page 14 of the 4th German edition), etc. (page 338 of the manuscript) must be transferred *to the foot* of galley *No. 89*.

In other words the words "Religious experience" (line 18 from the bottom of galley No. 88, line 6 from the top of page 334 of the manuscript) are followed by "гелем" (p. 14, etc.), i.e., page 338, line 7 from the top. This must be watched carefully to make sure that there is no mistake when the pages are made up.

Please give the last proofs (and your correspondence with me) to someone *who knows languages* and pay him. Let Mitya take *one hundred rubles*, go to the "writer" and *hire** either the writer himself, or somebody he recommends for the work, to read the final proofs and get in touch with me. This *must* be done because you now have no time for proofs, *of course*, and will only worry yourself to death. *Will you please do as I ask immediately.*

Yesterday I wrote to you and Manyasha did, too. Give Mother many kisses. "*Un peu mieux*" is very indefinite...[269] Write.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. Please send me the part *that already has been printed* immediately; I will make a list of the misprints. This is very important because we shall be able to correct some things even after the book has been printed.**

Written February 17 or 18, 1909
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

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* It will take two or three hours.

** There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

Yesterday I received your letter with a postscript from dear Mother. Manyasha and all of us were awfully glad. Manyasha was more lively today and went out walking with Mark—today is *mardi gras*,[270] and the French are on the rampage. Give Mother many kisses from me and from all of us—we all fervently hope that she will now get better without any setbacks.

Today I received the proofs of signatures 8 and 9 (pp. 113-144) already made up into pages and was very pleased to see that there are no gaps and no mixed galleys (which I wrote about last time *before I had seen* the proofs of the made-up pages; by the way, you send the packages without any string, and single pages and even whole signatures may easily fall out).

The proofs of these two signatures are, on the whole, quite good, and that gives me great pleasure. I still cannot risk withdrawing my request to give the proofs to a professional proof-reader (about which I wrote in the last letter), because I am afraid you will find it difficult to devote time to such boring work during Mother's illness and to concentrate your attention on it.

I am sending the corrections to the page proofs of signatures 8 and 9 (pp. 113-144). When they begin to print the signatures, please send them to me from the first) so that

I can draw up a list of misprints that must be pointed out, even if only on a sheet pasted separately into the book.

All the best, and kiss Mother once more.

Yours,
*V. Ulyanov**

Written February 23, 1909
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Anna Ilyinichna Yelizarova,
Boldyrev's House, Apt. 30,
Obolensky Street, 5/7,
Khamovniki,
Moscow,
Russia

March 2, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Your letter and Mitya's have reached me here—many thanks for them. I wrote to you from Paris that the last proofs were excellent. If Mother is better and you are not too tired I shall not, of course, insist that you pass on the proofs to someone else. But are you not too worn out? I was glad to learn from Mitya's letter that Mother is better! At last—she must have had a rough time. Please send proofs as before, not only the page proofs, but the galley proofs as well (it does not matter if I correct them an extra time; the fewer mistakes the better). Please send the printed signatures at once to Paris, too.

I am taking a holiday in Nice. The place is wonderful—sunny, warm, dry and a southern sea. I am returning to Paris in a few days.

I embrace Mother fondly and send best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Nice

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

March 9, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

I arrived in Paris yesterday evening (after a splendid holiday in Nice) and read your letter of the 16th.

I am sending corrections to signatures 10 and 11 of the made-up pages. Only two are of importance. The title of Bogdanov's book is *Empirio-monism* and not *Empirio-criticism*. This misprint *must* be given special prominence in the list of errata if it is too late to correct it* (I do not know whether you received my postcard from Nice—I sent two from there—in which I mentioned this misprint). The other is on page 170, line 9 from the top—in the quotation from Plekhanov the word "*зму*" is unnecessary.

As regards giving the proofs to someone else—you are right, of course, to take all the necessary steps, because it would have been extremely difficult to combine such painstaking and tedious work with the job of nursing Mother. I can only express my amazement that the last proofs could be exemplary under such working conditions.

It is most important to me to get the book out as quickly as possible. There has been a very great delay. It will be unfortunate if it does not come out by March 15 (O.S.)! As far as breach of contract is concerned, I don't know whether you can make a claim. I doubt it. And is it worth while spoiling relations with the publisher irrevocably? It is not.

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* The misprint was corrected in a list of errata at the back of the book.—*Ed*.

Is the absence of proofs in recent days due partially to your having stopped sending them on account of my trip? I hope that, and not a delay in setting and printing, is the reason. Please send everything now.

I see from Mitya's letter that Mother's health is improving. At last! Many kisses for Mother and very best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. Please do not tone down the places against Bogdanov and against Lunacharsky's *popovshchina*. We have *completely broken off* relations with them. There is no reason for toning them down, it is not worth the trouble.

P.S. Give the "writer" a *thousand* thanks for consenting to help. It seems, after all, he is a real *Marxist* and not a "Marxist for an hour" like some others. Immediately present him with a copy of my book in my name.*

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

March 12, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Today I received the clean proofs of signatures 1-9 and 13—"clean" because they are on good paper and have apparently already been printed, although they have a stamp at the top of each signature (put on by the printer) saying "proof", which I do not understand.

Whatever the case may be, whether they are proofs or whether they are copies of signatures already printed, I must say that the jumbled paragraphs have been completely corrected and that, *in general*, these clean proofs are thoroughly satisfactory. I am now thinking of one thing and one thing only and I beg you—*speed up* the issue of the book. Things have now been properly organised, the proofs are excellent, but hurry, hurry, at all costs, for there has already been a devilishly long, an impossible delay. If, therefore, there is anything whatsoever hindering you, you must immediately hire an assistant proof-reader (if you have not yet done so).

I am sending a list of misprints that *have not been corrected* but which were pointed out in my previous corrections; this list is only for signatures 6-9 and for signature 13 (I will send the list relating to the first live signatures tomorrow or the day after because I have given the proofs to someone and must ask for them back).

These misprints absolutely must be shown in a list of errata at the end or the beginning of the book because there *are some* that distort the meaning. On the whole there are

so few misprints that *under no circumstances* must the book be delayed on account of them.

I have not seen signatures 10, 11 and 12 (pp. 145-192) made up into pages; for this reason I shall send the list of misprints for those signatures separately. I am heading them exactly—list of misprints for *such-and-such* made-up printer's signatures. The book *must* be published without waiting for my last list of misprints but with this present list printed under the heading of *errata*.

The most important—p. 126, line 16 from the top

All the best; kiss Mother for me.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. *Please* do not tone down *anything* in the places against Bogdanov, *Lunacharsky* and Co. They must not be toned down. You have deleted the passage about Chernov being a "more honest" opponent than they, which is a great pity. The shade of meaning you have given it is not the one I want. There is now no overall consistency in my accusations. The crux of the issue is that our Machists are *dishonest*, mean-spirited, cowardly enemies of Marxism in philosophy.*[271]

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

March 21, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

As you probably know from the newspapers there is a post office strike going on here.[272] Complete irregularity. I am not getting the proofs (I have received nothing since the page proofs of signature 13).

In any case I am sending this by registered post and ask you to send a *registered reply too*.

(1) I am sending a list of misprints in signatures 1-5.

(2) I am sending a correction to p. 630 of the MS.*

(3) Please include this in the *errata*; footnote at the beginning of Section 6 of Chapter Three (i.e., the section on freedom and necessity)—instead of "not only a smile" read "not a smile, but disgust".

This is an essential correction and if it is not made my idea will be distorted; I do not see anything funny in flirting with religion, but I see a lot that is disgusting.

I have already written about not, under any circumstances, toning down the passages against Bogdanov and Lunacharsky in the second half of the book and hope you have received the letters. Especially—do *not* throw out "Purishkevich" and the others in the section on the criticism of Kantianism!

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* This correction has been lost.—*Ed*.

I have received a postcard from Mark. How is Mother's convalescence progressing? Give her many kisses for me. We are all well and send regards.

Yours,
V. U.

March 22, 1909—today there is news of the end of the post office strike. Nevertheless I am sending this by registered post and ask you to answer also by registered post—just in case!*

Sent from Paris to Moscow
First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

I have just received your registered letter of March 7. Many thanks!

We were very glad to get the news that dear Mother is better and has begun to got up. I send her all my love.

How is Mark? Is there any news from him?

The strike here has finally come to an end. At last! An excellent proletarian affair was seriously interfering with our literary affairs....

I still have not received your proofs and the made-up pages. I have seen the clean proofs of signatures 1-9 (pp. 1-144) and signature 13 (pp. 193-208) only. I have not seen any proofs after Section 6 of Chapter Three (the beginning).

The postman, to be sure, gives us hope—the *sacs de Russie* that were not opened during the strike will be opened and delivered today or tomorrow. I am afraid to hope!

Nevertheless I am very, very glad that there is progress, that signatures 19 and 20 have now been made up and the end must he near. It has been a great strain on my nerves waiting for this long drawn-out book.

I am sending an addendum. Do not hold up the book for it. But if there is time, let them print it in different type (in smaller type, for instance) at the very end of the

book. I regard it as extremely important to counterpose Chernyshevsky to the Machists.*

I agree, of course, to 50 copies being placed at your disposal.

Best regards,

Yours,

V. Ul.

Written March 23 or 24, 1909
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, pp. 359-61.—*Ed.*

186

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

March 26, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Today I received the page proofs of signatures 15-18 and am sending you a list of misprints that *must* be given on a separate sheet at the end or at the beginning of the book.

I have received *only* signatures 1-9 and 13 of the "clean" proofs, i.e., *probably* those that have been printed (although they bear what seems to be a strange stamp, "Proof"). Please send me the remainder of the "clean" proofs, i.e., those already printed.

Write and tell me when you expect the book to be out. Many kisses for Mother.

Yours,
*V. U.**

Sent from Paris to Moscow
First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

April 5, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Yesterday I received the made-up pages of signatures 14-20 (pp. 209-320) which I already have (the only page proofs I have not now received is signature 10, i.e., pp. 177-192) and today I got galleys 226-234 (pp. 784-809 of the MS).

I am sending the misprints in signature 14 (pp. 209-224) —the misprints in the other signatures have already been sent—and corrections to the galleys. Actually there is one important correction here; in galley 234 (end of the first paragraph in Section 7 "on a Russian 'idealist physicist'") —page 809 of the manuscript—the words "materialist and thinker, Professor V. I. Vernadsky" have been set. This completely distorts the meaning. It should read "natural scientist and thinker", etc.[273]

If it is too late to correct it, there absolutely must be a notice of this misprint on a separate sheet since it distorts the meaning.

In answer to your question "where to put pages 802a and 802b and where are they? They are not in the manuscript"—those pages were sent separately (from Geneva) and they must be placed as a footnote to the word "object" on line 7 in the paragraph (in Section 6) that begins with the words "Rey became muddled because" (this is galley 232 and page 802 of the manuscript).*

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* The footnote was included (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 297). —*Ed.*

In any case (i.e., in case these specially sent addenda* did not reach you) I am sending them again. You *must not*, of course, delay the book on account of them. It seems that the book is "delaying itself" sickeningly at the publisher's ... *ad infinitum*. Obviously it will not come out before Easter!...

Very best regards. I send Mother kisses and hope you will both soon be in the Crimea.

Yours,
*V. U.***

Sent from Paris to Moscow
First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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* I have a copy of that addendum (footnote to p. 802) written on a single page with another addendum (end of Section 7, p. 812 of the MS). They have probably both been lost and I am repeating them both. The printing of the book must *not* be delayed for *either* of them.

** There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

April 6, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Yesterday I sent you a letter containing the misprints in signature 14 and two addenda. I hope you have received them.

This morning I received *clean* proofs of signatures 10, 11 and 12 and the page proofs of signature 21.

I am sending the misprints that *must* be printed in the book in a special list of errata.

It is a great pity that I have to send the misprints in small doses (see P.S.); I am afraid that some of the separate pages containing lists of misprints may get lost. Perhaps you will paste them together as you receive them and give them to the printer all at once?

As far as money is concerned—please send it on to me all at once (I am now in need of money); it is best done through the bank, specifically, through the *Crédit Lyonnais*. To prevent the people here from charging too much for the exchange it is best to buy francs in Moscow and send the exact sum to the Crédit Lyonnais in Paris, Agence Z, Avenue d'Orléans, 19, addressed to Mr. W. Oulianoff, current account No. *6420*.

This is the most convenient way. It is no use trusting to a messenger; by the method I have described you have only to keep the receipt, there is no need to send any cheques.

I hope, from the bottom of my heart, that Mother will soon manage to get out of Moscow. Mother absolutely must rest and take a holiday in the Crimea. Many, many kisses for her, regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. I have now sent lists of misprints for *all the 21 signatures*—1-18 signatures of the clean proofs and 19-21 of the page proofs. Please check up whether you have all these lists of misprints and let us know. I will repeat them if any have been lost.*

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

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* There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

April 8, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

Today I received the page proofs of signature 22 pp. 337-352). There are very few misprints in it. I am sending a list of them.*

In connection with the publication of the book I have two important requests to make of you.

(1) The experience of the previous month shows that the publisher and printer are capable of delaying the remaining four of five signatures for a long, long time, but it is *hellishly* important to me for the book to appear sooner. I have not only literary but also serious political commitments that are linked up with the publication of the book.[274] I therefore beg you to engage an assistant for yourself (or for the "writer", if you hand it over to him) to pay special visits to the printers and keep urging them along. It is not difficult, of course, to find a student for about fifteen rubles a week—there will be crowds of candidates for such a post. Offer him a bonus** of some twenty rubles if the book comes out by April 10,*** He will visit the printer, take the

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* The list has been lost.—*Ed.*

** Obviously you cannot handle the Russian blockhead without a bribe. Give the make-up man 10 rubles if the book comes out by April 10—you must bring pressure to bear on the printer *in addition to* the publisher.

*** Lenin gave this date in the Old Style; the letter itself is dated in the New Style.—*Ed.*

proofs from there, bring them back corrected *without delay*, will follow up the work *day by day*, etc. I do not grudge 100 rubles for this. You must do this or tell the "writer" to do it, for it will be *the end of me* if the book is delayed until the second half of April.

(2) I have now sent you the misprints in all the 22 signatures. Let them set a list of those misprints *immediately* and send me a proof; there will be time enough and it is very important to me because the book must be well produced.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Many kisses for Mother!

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

190

TO HIS MOTHER

May 21, 1909

Mother dearest,

A big merci for your letter of April 25. We were all greatly pleased to learn that you are staying in the Crimea and at last having a fairly decent holiday. This is how matters stand with Manyasha. She has put her name down for the examinations[275] and is now zealously swotting. We have to wait for the results—in a few weeks it will be known whether she will finish her examinations successfully. I have no doubt that she will, for she works very conscientiously. She is now quite well. Now and again we drag her out for walks—not long ago we took her to the forest at Clamart, a few versts from Paris, where the air is wonderful.

The best thing, of course, would be for her to stay here for another winter and for all of us to live together. We shall have to try to arrange that as soon as the examinations are over. We are going for a holiday in the summer (somewhere near the end of June or the beginning of July, I think)—we shall take her along with us—and then in the autumn she will wait for you here and in Paris we shall all be beautifully provided for.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you have a good holiday. We here are all well and send regards.

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. Best regards to Anyuta. I have received the book.[276] It has been beautifully published—but everyone grumbles at the price (2 rubles 60 kopeks), but that, apparently, is the publisher's fault.

Sent from Paris to Alupka (Crimea)

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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LENIN AND KRUPSKAYA TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

May 26, 1909

Dear Anyuta,

I received your letter a few days after I had sent a letter to Mother in Alupka.

I have received the book and find that it has been nicely published. There were no fewer misprints at the end than at the beginning and the proof-reader's ignorance of foreign languages is obvious (the English "A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking"* has been so distorted that it is ridiculous),[277] but that is an inevitable and insignificant shortcoming. On the whole I am satisfied with it. Everyone complains of the price—and rightly so. In future we shall have a point in the contract about the price as well as the number of copies. I was hard pressed by the publisher and would, in any case, have agreed to *any* terms, as long as the book was published,

The publisher has not yet sent any money and I am beginning to be afraid that he will swindle us.[278] I have written to Peres. Will you also please write to the publisher—three or four weeks have passed and he promised to pay in a week. (You absolutely must get a promissory note for the remaining sum.) Please send me the five hundred rubles that are in the bank (Crédit Lyonnais, Agence Z, Avenue d'Orléans, 19. Mr. Oulianoff. Current account No. 6420) since I cannot rely on the publisher.

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* Stepanov apparently did not look at it at all....

Things are bad here—*Spaltung*,* or rather, there will be one; I hope that in a month or six weeks I shall be able to give you exact information. So far I can do no more than guess.[279]

Manyasha is swotting hard. She is quite well and will probably pass her examinations. What will happen then I do not know. I think she wants to go home.

We have not yet decided when we shall go to the seaside or where we shall go.[280] But this summer we shall go for certain.

Many kisses for Mother and all the best to you.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Dear Anya,

You asked in your last letter why I do not write. All this winter I have been in a state of utter melancholy, the time has been frittered away, I could not work properly and so I was in no fit state to write. If Manyasha had not written about Volodya and Volodya about her I should have given you all the details about them both as I did before, but apart from that there is nothing to write, we are just jogging along. Every time they wrote I told them to give you my regards but I don't suppose they did. I shall try and write soon, but in the meantime I send many kisses to you and to dear Maria Alexandrovna from myself and from Mother.

Yours,
Nadya

Sent from Paris to Alupka (Crimea)

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

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* Split (Ger.).—*Ed.*

192

TO HIS BROTHER

Dear Mitya,

Manyasha has already written to you about her illness. I also want your advice. The doctor has diagnosed that she has inflammation of the gut projecting from the caecum (that's appendicitis, isn't it?). I asked a very good local surgeon and he confirmed it. He advises an operation. Everyone says it is not dangerous and effects a radical cure.

The surgeon (Dr. Dubouchez) is praised by everybody. He recently performed an operation (the same one) on the wife of a friend—it was excellent, a teaspoonful of blood, in eight days she began to get about. The hospital is a good one.

The attacks are not very bad now. There is no high temperature. The pains are not great. Please answer me *immediately*—I am in favour of an operation but am afraid to take the risk without your advice. *Answer immediately*.

There is no doubt that they perform good operations here. The doctor does not advise her to travel before the operation.

I shall not write to Mother because I am afraid of frightening her for no good reason. There is no danger, Manyasha does not even stay in bed all the time. Nor shall I write to Anyuta because Mother may read it.

Please write to Mark and through him to Anyuta (if you can do it without scaring Mother). It will probably be better not to write to the Crimea at all because they will get frightened.

And so I await an answer; here they advise us to get the operation done quickly. Do you also?

All the best,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Address: Mr. Wl. Oulianoff. 24. Rue Beaunier. 24. Paris (XIV). France.

Written in late June-
early July, 1909
Sent to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya*
Revolyutsiya No. 11

Printed from
the original

193

TO HIS MOTHER

July 19, 1909

Dear Mother,

Today I received your picture postcard of the Crimea (the postcard was enclosed in an envelope with a corner cut off; this greatly surprised us—did you do it or the local post office?).

You ask about money for Manyasha. I answered your last letter, but not immediately (we were moving to a new apartment at the time), so that your postcard and my letter crossed in the post.

I offered Manyasha some money since I have some. She refused absolutely to take it; she said she did not need it and showed me the 70 francs she had.

We are going to Brittany for our holiday, probably next Saturday. Y. V. has already gone there. Manyasha is recovering rapidly; now I can tell you everything that *happened* —she *had* appendicitis, that is, inflammation of the gut projecting from the caecum. If the disease is caught in time it is not at all dangerous and can be completely cured by an operation. After consulting Mitya and the best doctors here, we decided on an immediate operation. We put Manyasha into a surgical hospital for a week (it was a *very* good hospital). The operation was *very successful*; Manyasha came out of hospital in a week and has been at home for three days. She now walks and eats everything. She is convalescing rapidly. She felt better as soon as the appendix was removed. She will be able to travel by rail at the end of the week and we are thinking of leaving for Brittany together.

And there is *nothing to worry about*, It is a good thing that Manyasha had her operation here because the surgeons here are excellent. Chronic appendicitis would still be troubling her and would trouble her for a long time if she had not had the operation. Now she is quite well.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health. Do not be angry with me for not having written about Manyasha immediately.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. Regards from all.

My address: Mr. Wl. Oulianoff. 4. Rue Marie Rose. 4. *Paris*. XIV.

Sent from Paris to Alupka (Crimea)

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

194

TO HIS MOTHER

August 24, 1909

Mother dearest,

I received your letter yesterday and am answering by return of post. There is no need at all for you to worry about Manyasha. She is convalescing splendidly. She can't, of course, walk about much yet; she still has some pain in her leg (the right one). We asked the doctors in Paris and here in the country whether that was a bad sign. They all say "no". They say she is convalescing well, if somewhat slowly. They advise Manyasha to wear a bandage so that the scar is not shaken so much when she walks. Yesterday she walked five or six versts, slept excellently afterwards and feels quite well. Generally speaking, she looks *incomparably* better, she has a good appetite, sleeps well and looks perfectly healthy. In short—I am being *quite frank*—everything is going well although rather slowly, probably because of the great fatigue she experienced in winter. We are having a good holiday here. We have been here three weeks and expect to be here another two, or perhaps three. I cannot yet say whether Manyasha will be able to travel to Russia in a month's time. She has recovered very considerably during her three weeks' holiday. I advise her to drink as much milk as she can and to eat curds and whey. She prepares the curds and whey herself, but in my opinion she is not feeding herself up enough; I am always quarreling with her on those grounds.

Our rooms here are good, and the board is good and not expensive (10 francs a day for the four of us). Nadya and I often go cycling.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and wish you good health.

Yours,
V. U.

We all send our regards.

P.S. What news is there from Mark? Has he completely recovered from his operation? Give him regards from all of us.

Sent from Bombon (France)
to Sinelnikovo,
Yekaterinoslav Gubernia

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

October 25, 1909

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received a letter from you and Anyuta and also the money sent from the publisher. *Merci*. Today I got a note from Manyasha, who writes that she wants to take a cure. I also got the book (*Kriticheskoye Obozreniye*) she sent.

Manyasha writes that you are still living in furnished rooms. That must be extremely inconvenient. It will be a good thing if you can soon move into the flat you found with the aid of your acquaintances.

Mitya will probably visit you in Moscow when he hears of Manyasha's arrival. I should like him to drop me a line telling me how he finds Manyasha and which doctor (or doctors) he wishes to consult about her.

There are no changes here. We are all well and send our regards. After wonderful weather, during the first half of October, real autumn has begun. I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send my best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

196

TO HIS MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

November 4, 1909

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received Manyasha's letter with the new address. How are things in the new apartment? Is it warm there? Our apartment with central heating has turned out to be too warm—although it may be because of the warm weather we are having here. Manyasha did right to go to a competent doctor—she must now follow his advice exactly.

I have received *Rossiya*.[281] Many thanks. I have also had word from the historian—he must be a very narrow person. It is a pity that he intends writing nonsense! It seems as if we shall have to give him up for lost.[282]

I am leaving for Brussels tomorrow[283] and shall stay there a few days. I have written an answer to Anyuta in Saratov on the assumption that she is already there.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send very best regards to Manyasha and Mitya. So does everybody.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Paris

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

197

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

Today I received an issue of *Utro Rossii* with the vulgar nonsense about Gorky.[284] For some days now a number of newspapers in Paris (*L'Éclair*) and in Berlin (*Berliner Tageblatt*)[285] have been engaged in similar lies. Some days ago there was a good refutation of this mass of lies in *Vorwärts*, where it was very correctly demonstrated and very wittily explained that this is all one big nonsensical invention. Some fool heard rumours he did not understand and got everything wrong—scraps he had picked up about otzovism, the school, philosophy and so on. *Utro Rossii* must be a shady little rag to have cooked up an "interview" just for the sake of sensation. Today *Rech* is also engaged in the fabrication of similar scandal. The Cadets are happy to have something to lie and talk scandal about.

How are you? How is Mother? I have had no news from you for quite a while. Write and let me know how you are getting on, what you are doing, and how Mitya is. There have been no changes here. Winter is beginning—I go to

the library. The apartment is warm. Y. V. is feeling rather poorly. Nadya is zealously studying French.

All the best, kiss Mother many, many times.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. Did you get the reply to the historian? With regard to my books at Sablino[286]—*if the opportunity occurs*, it would be fine to ask one of our St. Petersburg friends to send them to me here, if not all of them, then at least what there is of Marx and Engels and the best of the classics.

Written December 3 or 4, 1909
Sent from Paris

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

Mother dearest,

I have received your letter and Manya's. A big *merci* for them. Today I received a second letter from Manyasha with the pleasant news that there is no need for me to write to our acquaintance a second time. I am worried that your apartment is so cold; what will it be like in winter if the temperature is only 12° now? You must not catch cold.... Is there nothing you can do? Perhaps you should put in a small stove. That is often done here (we do not need it because we have steam heating and it is *very* warm), and we did it in Siberia. So far there has been no great cold, here, at any rate, but the winter is still to come.

I am very, very grateful to Manyasha for the news. If she should have an opportunity I should very much like her to obtain for me the new Moscow agricultural statistics (1907-09) and to find out (even from a shop) how much *Izvestiya zemleustroitelnykh komissii* costs; I cannot get this publication through acquaintances and I need it.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you are keeping well. Best regards to Manyasha from me and from all of us here.

Yours,
V. U.

Written December 7 or 8, 1909
Sent from Paris

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

199

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

I recently learned, quite by accident, that there is to be a congress of statisticians in Moscow at Christmas—or rather one of the sections of the congress of doctors and naturalists will be congress of statisticians.[287] I have already heard the names of a couple of acquaintances who will be there (one from Moscow, the other from the provinces), and no doubt there will be more than two acquaintances there. It is extremely important to take advantage of this to get me the Zemstvo statistical publications. I urge you to try to find at least one statistician of your acquaintance at the congress and give him my address and my request to send me Zemstvo statistical publications: (1) on peasant and landowner farms—especially current statistics and house-to-house censuses; (2) handicraftsmen and industry; (3) on the law of November 9, 1906[288] and on the acquisition of commune lands by peasants. I think you may give my address direct. If they say that they cannot send them abroad, please give your address and I will send you the money, so that you can send the statistics on to me. They are absolutely essential to me. If it will be of any use I can write a brief appeal to the statisticians (I am sending one for you to use at your own discretion),[289] so that statisticians of your acquaintance can distribute

it (or show it) to those from other towns, adding their own request (or *trying to get* consent) to send the publications.

Drop me a line if you find someone who can do it. If you do not, I shall write to you again.

The publication I wrote about last time is not called *Izvestiya zemleustroitelnykh komissii* (although I have heard that *such* a publication exists *too*) but *Izvestiya Zemskogo Otdela* (Ministry of the Interior). Is there any civil servant of your acquaintance who can acquire this work?

All the best to you, kiss Mother.

Yours,
V. U.

Written December 10 or 11, 1909
Sent from Paris

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

1910

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

January 2, 1910

Dear Manyasha,

Today I received Mother's letter (to Nadya and me) with your postscript. I am very, very glad that you have made quite good arrangements and that Mother is pleased that there is no housekeeping for her to do. Let us hope that the end of winter will not disappoint us. Up to now the winter here has been more like spring than winter. Today, for instance, has been a real spring day, sunny, dry and warm, and Nadya and I took advantage of it for a wonderful morning excursion to the Bois do Boulogne. In general we have made good use of the holidays—we have been to museums, the theatre and the *Musée Grévin*,[290] which gave us much pleasure. This evening I intend to go to an estaminet to listen to a "*goguette révolutionnaire*"* by "songsters" (an unhappy translation of *chansonniers*). I am sorry I did not make use of my jawing with Frenchmen in summer to study French pronunciation *systematically*—now that I have got some books on phonetics I can see how weak I am.

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* A revolutionary entertainment (Fr.).—*Ed.*

Please read the enclosed letter and pass it on to Fyodor Odessky—he did not give me any other address. You ought to read the letter to know what I want. I have received the Moscow City Statistics, for which I am grateful. Please send me the three issues of Moscow City Statistics on the *elections* to the First, Second and Third Dumas. I have also received a letter about statistics from Ryazan—it is splendid that I shall probably be getting help from many people.

All the best, do not run around so much, rest more and keep well. Regards to Mitya. I embrace and kiss Mother. *Happy New Year!*

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Paris

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

201

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Dear Manyasha,

I have received your postcard—*merci* for the news. As far as the bicycle is concerned I thought I should soon receive the money, but matters have dragged on. I have a suit pending and hope to win it. I was riding from Juvisy[291] when a motorcar ran into me and smashed my bicycle (I managed to jump off). People helped me take the number and acted as witnesses. I have found out who the owner of the car is (a viscount, the devil take him!) and now I have taken him to court (through a lawyer). I should not be riding now, anyway, it is too cold (although it's a good winter, wonderful for walks).

I am enclosing the exact names of two books on land allotment that I need very badly. Have you managed to find anyone who can get them?

All the very best. Kiss Mother for me. Does she find it very cold in the new flat?

Yours,

V. U.

(1) *Obzor deyatelnosti Glavnogo upravleniya zemleustroistva i zemledeliya za 1907 i 1908*. St. Petersburg, 1909.

(2) *Obzor deyatelnosti uyezdnykh zemleustroitelnykh komissii (1907-8 gg)*.

I am not sure whether these are two different books or one and the same.[292]

If there are two, the second is the more important for me.

(3) *Yezhegodnik Glavnogo upravleniya zemleustroistva i zemledeliya*. St. Petersburg, 1908.

Written in early January 1910
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt, 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

January 12, 1910

Dear Manyasha,

I have just received your letter and hasten to scribble an answer because I am afraid I shall be busy for the next few days.[293] I will try to get some information about the man in German Switzerland. If this is needed in a hurry let me know exactly when I must find him by, so that the organisers can begin looking for him themselves (in the event of my not finding him).

I have received the statistics. A big *merci*!

Give Anyuta very best regards from me. Mark, too.

I embrace Mother fondly and hope she is well.

How are you? What is the winter like? It is warm here. I have begun to pay more attention to the theatre; I have seen Bourget's new play *La barricade*. Reactionary but interesting.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Paris

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original



View of Rue Marie Rose (Paris)
Lenin lived in House No. 4 from 1909 to 1912

203

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

I received your letter a few days ago and have been intending all the time to answer it. I have recently been very busy with urgent work and have not had a single hour to spare. I have also received the historian's letter and will answer it (if you have an opportunity tell him that), but cannot do so at the moment (immediately).

I have had a letter from Mitya and was extremely surprised at the news of his accident.[294] He says he is getting better and will soon start learning to walk. Please write and tell me how he is convalescing. Has he lost his job or is it still open and will it remain open until he has fully recovered? When he has recovered will he be able to cover his territory as before?

You do not write anything about Anyuta and I have not received anything from her for a long time. Does she like the new town?*

How is Mother keeping now? Has she recovered from her influenza?

We have had—and they still continue—floods in Paris such as have not been known for a long time. You have

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* Anyuta was in Saratov at the time.—*Ed.*

probably read about it in the newspapers. I managed to get as far as, the Seine on two occasions (horse buses are running reduced services, the metro and the trains are at a standstill). The resultant "Venice in Paris" is a truly strange sight. Many people are out of work. There will probably be all sorts of accidents, houses collapsing, etc. when the water subsides.

We are living quietly, no changes. Nadya runs around to all the schools that teach French and is zealously pushing ahead. My bicycle case ended in my favour.* I have received the Moscow City Statistics—a big *merci*.

Give Mother many kisses for me, Best regards from all.

Yours,
V. U.

Excuse me for writing so scrappily. My attention is being distracted.

Written January 30 or 31, 1910
Sent from Paris

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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* See Letter No. 201.—*Ed.*

204

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Davydov's House, Apt. 4,
Bozheninsky Street,
Devichye Polye,
Moscow

Dear Anyuta,

We have been having "stormy" times lately, but they have ended with an attempt at peace with the Mensheviks—yes, yes, strange as it may seem; we have closed down the factional newspaper and are trying harder to promote *unity*.* We shall see whether it can be done.... I have only just managed to get rid of a lot of urgent business arising out of these changes.

Paris is a rotten hole in many respects.... I am still unable to adapt myself *fully* to it (after living *here* for a year!) but I nevertheless feel that only extraordinary circumstances could drive me back to Geneva!

Written February 1, 1910
Sent from Paris

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from a copy
(made by the police)

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* This is a reference to the January (1910) Plenum of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.—*Ed*.

205

TO HIS BROTHER

February 13, 1910

Dear Mitya,

It is quite a while since I received your letter (and later *Niva* with the problem[295]) and, I am ashamed to say, I have kept putting off answering. How goes the convalescence? I hope that doctors are cautious and do not allow themselves to start work until they have fully recovered. I have often thought of the danger of accidents when I have been riding my bicycle through the centre of Paris, where the traffic is simply hellish. But to fall out like you did, in the country and in the middle of winter! It must have been a pretty wild horse and you were probably driving hell for leather, eh?

Drop me a line to let me know whether you have recovered. Anyuta wrote that there is a hope of the leg mending (completely or not? Will you be able to ride a bicycle?) but not the shoulder. Is that true? I cannot quite believe that it is absolutely impossible to mend a broken shoulder-blade. You must start a proper course of treatment and keep it up until you are completely cured.

With regard to Manyasha—I think it would be good for her to have a longer rest in summer. Mother says the same, but is afraid she will not be able to drag her out.... She should, however.

Life here goes on as usual. We live a quiet life. The weather is fine and I intend to start cycling again since I have

won the case and should soon get my money from the owner of the car.

All the best. Get better soon and properly. We all send regards.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Paris to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

206

TO HIS MOTHER

February 13, 1910

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I received letters from you and Anyuta. A big, big *merci* for them. I have now completed the affairs that obliged me to answer Manyasha too briefly and hurriedly (I shall soon be writing to her).

I received the chessmen[296] a long time ago—I simply forgot to mention them. I have so few opportunities to play here that I have probably forgotten everything.

I was very pleased to learn that you are satisfied with your flat and with the landlady, and that you are better and have begun to go out. It would be good if you could get out of Moscow earlier in spring and go to somewhere on the Volga or to the country. It is sure to be unpleasant in Moscow in spring.

We are having wonderful weather. The water in the Seine is still high but the floods are rapidly subsiding; they have caused tremendous damage (our part of the city was not touched at all).

I had a short letter from Mitya with the news that he is recovering. I am angry with myself for not having found time to answer him. It seems, indeed, that the Paris streets with their devilish traffic are not the only places where it is dangerous to ride....

I sometimes see Avgusta Pavlovna here. Her relatives are in Moscow—do you ever see them? She is very nice.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well.

Yours,

V. U.

Best regards from all.

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from a copy (made by the police)

207

TO HIS BROTHER

February 17, 1910

Dear Mitya,

I have received your problem* and got quite "worked up" about chess—I had forgotten literally everything. It must be a year since I played and, in general, during the past few years I have only played a few lightning or very rapid games. I solved your problem easily—R(Q 8)—Q6. But I saw a problem in *Rech* today that I could not solve at once and which I liked very much (the issue of February 1 No. 31. (1269), study No. 195). This is the position.

White: K(KKt3), Kt(KKt1), B(K7), P(KR5), P(Q3)

Black: K(K6), P(KR2), P(Q4), P(QR7) (i.e., the last pawn is within one move of becoming a queen). White to play and win. Beautiful bit of work!

How goes the convalescence? Are the leg and the shoulder both better? Will you soon start walking and driving again?

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Paris to Mikhnevo,
Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

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* See Letter No. 205.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

April 10, 1910

Mother dearest,

I hope you will receive this letter by April 11 congratulate you on the occasion of your name day, and Manyasha as well. A really big hug for you both.

I received your letter with the new address a day or two ago, and shortly before that I received a letter from Mitya. I did not know that your old apartment was so far from the centre. An hour's tram journey is awful! I have to travel half an hour by tram from here to the library* and I find even that too tiring. To travel every day an hour each way-that is quite impossible. It is a good thing that you have found an apartment near the Zemstvo offices.** But is the air breathable in such places? Isn't it too dusty and stuffy? Many thanks for the letter to the historian; he has been answered.

It would be simply wonderful for us to get together in August, provided the journey will not tire you too much. From Moscow to St. Petersburg you must book a sleeper, and from there to Åbo as well. The steamer *Bure* from Åbo to Stockholm is well equipped; it is in the open sea only two or three hours and in fine weather it is *like sailing down a river*. You can buy return tickets from St. Petersburg. If the railway journey does not tire you too greatly

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* This was the Bibliothéque nationale, where Lenin usually worked in Paris.—*Ed*.

** Lenin's sister Maria was at that time working at the Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo.—*Ed*.

you will be able to spend a marvellous week in Stockholm!

We still have not decided whether to take a place in the country for the summer. We are wavering—is it better to live *en pension* as we did last year to give Nadya and Y. V. a *complete* rest, or to take a cottage where we should have to do our own cooking, which Y. V. finds very tiring?

It is spring here. I have already got Nadya's bicycle out. We are just longing to be out walking or cycling. Love and kisses. Keep well. Very best regards to Manyasha.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

209

LENIN AND KRUPSKAYA TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

May 2, 1910

Dear Anyuta,

Yesterday I received your letter with the new address. *Merci* for the congratulations. There is no change at all here. Nadya is feeling rather poorly—her nerves are still not quite in order, although by and large we are all well. I have been cycling for some time and I often go for rides in the country round Paris, especially as we live quite near the *fortifications*, i.e., near the city boundary. We have not yet decided anything about our summer holidays; the summer here is a late one and it is possible we shall again go to Bombon, where there is a cheap boarding-house and complete quiet, although Nadya does not seem inclined to go there again. Perhaps this time we will try the socialist colony at the seaside.* Y. V. was there last year and liked it.

Give my best regards to the neighbour at Alakayevka** if you manage to see him. It is a pity that he is such a convinced enemy of correspondence because it would be pleasant to have some news, if only rarely, from "the heart of Russia" about what is going on in the new village. There is little information on this subject and it would be very pleasant just to have a chat with some knowledgeable person.

Regards to the North Manchurian*** also. How is he getting fixed up now, and will he rid himself of the "weakness" of the Russians ... and not only of writers?...

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* See Letter No. 213.—*Ed.*

** A. A. Preobrazhensky.—*Ed.*

*** A. P. Sklyarenko.—*Ed.*

With regard to my grudge against the doctor* (whom you asked me to do something to help) you were quite wrong, or perhaps I accidentally said something tactless. I have never had and still do not have the slightest grudge against him. He makes a good impression. We never got to know each other closely. Now he has moved out of town, where the children will be better off. He is in very poor circumstances; he has only just managed to find some *temporary* work for the tiniest imaginable emolument. I very seldom see him. The émigrés here are very poor.

My work is going extremely badly. I hope to get over this period of intense squabbling[297] and will then return to my work.

All the best. Regards to Mark. Best wishes from all.

Yours,

V. U.

Dear Anya,

I received your letter about our acquaintance a long time ago and answered it immediately in a letter to Manyasha. I have certain reasons for thinking that my letter was lost, although Manyasha answered one of the questions raised in it. I asked her to write and say whether she had received that letter but she hasn't written. The acquaintance to whom you asked me to show the letter is not here now and, furthermore, what I wrote to you was not said to him but to another person. I will write in detail in a few days. Many kisses. Regards to M. T. Mother sends regards.

N. K.

Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* M. F. Vladimirsky.—*Ed.*

210

TO HIS MOTHER[298]

Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov,
Mikhnevo Station,
Ryazan-Urals Railway,
Moscow,
Russia

June 18, 1910

Mother dearest,

Greetings to you, Anyuta and Mitya from our Sunday excursion. Nadya and I are cycling. Meudon Forest is a good place and close by, 45 minutes from Paris,[299] I have received and answered Anyuta's letter. A big hug from myself and Nadya.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Meudon (France)

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

211

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

M. I. U. c/o Savelyev,
Private Cottage,
Inonniemi, Terijoki Station,
Finland Railway,
Finland, Russia

June 18, 1910

Dear Manyasha,

Greetings from me and Nadya. We are on an outing in Meudon Forest. Marvellous! I received your letter (the big one) in the evening of the day I sent you my letter. And so everything has been received. We shall write and send you the latest books.

*Salut et fraternité.**

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Meudon (France)

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

* A form of greeting used during the French Revolution.—*Ed.*

212

TO HIS MOTHER

Dr. Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov,
Mikhnevo Station,
Ryazan-Urals Railway,
Moscow,
Russia

July 1, 1910

Mother dearest,

Best regards from Naples. I arrived here by steamer from Marseilles—cheap and pleasant. It was like travelling on the Volga. I am going to Capri from here for a brief visit.*

Love and kisses. Regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Naples (Italy)

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

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* Lenin went to Capri (Italy) to visit Maxim Gorky.—*Ed.*

213

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

M. I. U. c/o V. A. Savelyev,
Private Cottage,
Inonniemi, Terijoki Station,
Finland Railway,
Finland, Russia

July 28, 1910

Dear Manyasha,

I am writing this in Pornic*. I have been living here almost a week with Y. V. and Nadya. We are having an excellent holiday. We go bathing, etc. How are you getting on? Is Mother keeping well? How does the question of Copenhagen and Stockholm Stand?** Write to Pornic (Loire Inférieure). Rue Mon Désir. K. Los Roses. Mr. Oulianoff.

Regards to all,

Yours,

V. U.

I wrote to Mother in Mikhnevo a week ago from Paris. Did she get the letter?

Sent from Pornic (France)

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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* See N. K. Krupskaya, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, F.L.P.H., Moscow, 1959, pp. 209-10 for details of their stay at Pornic.—*Ed.*

** This refers to the projected trip by Lenin's mother and his sister Maria to meet him in Stockholm.—*Ed.*

214

TO HIS MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Yekaterina Lesonen's Cottage,
Leppenenö, Terijoki Station,
Finland Railway,
Finland via Stockholm

September 4, 1910

Mother dearest,

Hearty greetings to you and Anyuta from Copenhagen. The Congress ended yesterday.[300] I have made full arrangements with Manyasha; on September 4 (Old Style), i.e., September 17 (New Style), I shall be waiting for you on the wharf in Stockholm.* A comrade in Stockholm will rent for me two rooms for the week September 17-24. Manyasha has my present address. Write to me in Stockholm Hr. Ulianof, Poste Restante. I embrace you fondly.

Hoping to see you soon.

Yours,
V. U.

I shall be here until September 15, 1910.

Sent from Copenhagen

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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* After attending the 8th Congress of the Second International in Copenhagen, Lenin went to Stockholm to meet his mother and his younger sister Maria.—*Ed.*

1911

215
TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

January 3, 1911

Dear M. T.,

Many thanks for your letter. One feels so cut off here that your stories of impressions and observations of the Volga (how I miss the Volga!) are manna from heaven. Your observations are of the greatest interest because they tell me about the various people you meet in the way of business and on journeys and because you made them without any preconceived aim. I was also very pleased to get your letter in the summer and I am very much at fault for not having found time to answer it, but that was because of moving from the seaside to Paris and from Paris to Copenhagen and Stockholm.

As regards my trip to Italy—it seems that it will not come off now (or in the near future). Finances (Anya asked me about them, by the way) do not permit it. I have not found a publisher.[301] I sent an article to *Sovremenny Mir*,[302] but apparently there are difficulties there, too; several weeks have passed and there has been no answer. Long journeys will have to be put off until better times. It is, of course, only a stone's throw from here to Italy and you simply must pay a visit to Paris if you intend going to Italy. I suppose it is not for nothing that people say that if you have once been to Paris you will be drawn to it again.

Manyasha would certainly do better to take a longer rest in Saratov and not hurry off anywhere, it would be better in all respects.

Life here goes on as usual. Very little that is pleasant. The recent period has been so "squabblesome" that I must ask you to forgive me for unpunctuality in correspondence;

I have not answered Anyuta, who told me of the unsuccessful talks with Lvovich,[303] and I have not written to Mother for a long time. Now at least you have almost the entire family gathered together, so please make my excuses, give my best regards to Anya and Manyasha and kiss Mother many times.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

In Stockholm Mother told me about your fight with your boss. Since funds have gone up you must have won! Congratulations! Get rid of everything unpleasant!

Happy New Year! A Happy New Year to *everyone*!

Yesterday I received *Zvezda* No. 1 from Russia and today *Mysl* No. 1.[304] That is something to cheer me up! I hope you have seen it! It really is a pleasure!

Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

216

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Pankratyevskaya Street, 7, Apt. 5
Saratov,
Russia

January 19, 1911

Mother dearest,

We have just received your letter. Nadya thanks you very much for it and sends her regards. As for me, I am hurrying to correct the misunderstanding which, it seems, I was the unwitting cause of. Please do not send me any money. I am not now in need. I wrote that neither my book nor my article had been accepted—that was in one of my recent letters. But in the last letter I wrote that they say that my article will be accepted. I have written to Gorky* about the book and hope for a favourable reply. In any case my situation is not *now* any worse; at the moment I am not in need, I beg you, my dear, not to send anything and not to try to save anything from your pension. If things get bad I will write quite frankly, but at the moment they are not. It is not easy to find a publisher, but I shall keep on seeking—furthermore, I continue to receive the "salary"[305] I told you about in Stockholm. So please do not worry.

Nadya has written twice to Manyasha and will write today for the third time.** Does Manyasha get the letters

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 439.—*Ed.*

** For purposes of secrecy Krupskaya wrote the letters in invisible ink.—*Ed.*

I am very glad that Mitya sends good news about his transfer.* Best regards to Mark and Anyuta from all of us here.

We are all quite well. No changes to report. Yesterday I delivered a lecture here on Tolstoi—I shall perhaps deliver the lecture in several Swiss towns.**

The weather here is not bad. Dry and cold (our apartment is very warm) and it is pleasant out walking.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well.

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. Tanya's mother in Moscow has been taken ill.***

Sent from Paris

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

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* Lenin's brother Dmitry was to be transferred to Feodosia as public health officer.—*Ed.*

** Lenin did not go to Switzerland to lecture on Tolstoi.—*Ed.*

*** This refers to the arrest of S. N. Smidovich, a close friend of the Ulyanov family.—*Ed.*

217

TO HIS MOTHER

April 8, 1911

Mother dearest,

You will probably receive this letter on the Russian April 1. On the occasion of your name day I congratulate you and Manyasha. I hope you will soon be well—completely recovered. Today I saw the doctor*—the father of Anyuta's "godson"—and he says that after an attack of lumbago you have to take great care of yourself to prevent a relapse. By the way—his wife and children intend coming to Russia, but for the summer they want to go to the country.

I received your letter describing life in Saratov and expressing some ideas about Manyasha, my dear. Do not worry in advance, perhaps things may turn out quite differently from what you imagine by the time summer is over.

Where are you thinking of spending the summer? In Saratov itself? Is it a good place for the summer?

For a week we have had real winter weather here, snow and frost. Now there has been a new turn to spring. Y. V. caught cold in the frosty weather and is in bed. In general everything goes on as usual, we are leading a quiet life. Unfortunately there is little news from Manyasha. How does she feel? Best regards to her and to everybody. I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well.

Yours,

V. Ul.

Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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* M. F. Vladimirsky.—*Ed.*

218

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kupp's House,
Gogolevskaya Street,
Berdyansk,
Tavrida Gubernia,
Russia

Mother dearest,

Nadya and I send greetings to you and everyone. We have come here for a whole day.

Yours,
V. U.

Written August 20, 1911
Sent from Fontainebleau (France)

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

219

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

M. I. c/o Vasily Alexandrovich Savelyev,
Private Cottage,
Inonniemi, Terijoki Station,
Finland Railway,
Finland via Stockholm

Dear Manyasha,

Nadya and I send you hikers' greeting—we have come here for a whole day.

Salut chalereux!*

Yours,
V. U.

Written August 20, 1911
Sent from Fontainebleau (France)

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

* Hearty greetings! (Fr.).—*Ed.*

220

TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Ugodnikovskaya Street, 26,
Yelizarov's Apartment,
Saratov,
Russia

Mother dearest,

I am writing from Lucerne. I came to Switzerland quite unexpectedly (on account of the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Zürich).[306] I am travelling round lecturing.[307] Yesterday I went out climbing on the Pilatus—nearly 7,000 feet. The weather is wonderful so far and I am having an excellent holiday. I embrace you fondly and send very best regards to everyone.

Yours,
V. U.

Written September 28, 1911
Sent from Lucerne (Switzerland)

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

1912

221

TO HIS MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Ugodnikovskaya Street, 26,
Saratov,
Russia

Mother dearest,

A few days ago we received another present from you, fish, caviare and smoked sturgeon fillets. A big *merci*. We are greatly enjoying these dainties and thinking of the Volga as we eat them. You really have been plying us with dainties from home this year!

How are you getting on? To judge by the newspapers it is cold and snowing where you are. It is spring here. A week ago I got my bicycle out again and went to the Bois des Verrières (that is where Manyasha went) and brought back some bursting willow buds. I went there again today with Nadya—the cherries are already in bloom. We are having spring weather but it's not reliable, there is a lot of rain.

Where are you off to in summer? Y. V. thinks of going to Russia but I do not expect she will. We are thinking of sending her to friends of ours in Arcachon in the south of France.

Are you all well? I embrace you fondly, my dear. Best regards to Anyuta, Manyasha and Mark and also to Mitya.

Yours,
V. U.

Nadya and Y. V. send best regards.

Written March 8 or 9, 1912
Sent from Paris

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

222

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Anna Ilyinichna Yelizarova,
Ugodnikovskaya Street, 26,
Saratov

I have been sitting at home lately working on a translation* and have seen little of what is going on in Paris. Among our people here, by the way, there is more bickering and abuse of each other than there has been for a long time—there probably never has been so much before. All the groups and sub-groups have joined forces against the last conference and those who organised it so that matters even went as far as fisticuffs at meetings here.[308]

In short, there is so little here that is interesting or even pleasant that it's not worth writing.

Written March 24, 1912
Sent from Paris

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
a typewritten copy
(made by the police)

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* It is not known which translation Lenin refers to.—*Ed.*

223

TO HIS MOTHER

April 7, 1912

Mother dearest,

You will probably receive this letter about April 1 (Old Style). I congratulate you and Manyasha on the occasion of your name day; I embrace you fondly and wish you. everything of the best.

What is spring on the Volga like this year? Are you all keeping well? I have got into the habit of looking every day in *Rech* to see what the weather, in Saratov is like and I see that it is still cold.

It seems that we are having an early spring here this year. Some days ago I again went cycling in the woods—the fruit trees in the orchards are all covered in white, "as though bathed in milk", and such a wonderful perfume—a really delightful spring! It is a pity I cycled alone; Nadya has caught cold, has lost her voice and has to stay at home.

In summer we intend going to Fontenay, near Paris, and are thinking of moving there altogether.[309] Paris is expensive, rents have gone up. Besides, it will probably be healthier and quieter in the suburbs. I want to go and look for something soon.

We expected a long letter from Manyasha, but did not get one. I am sending her a prospectus, all that I could find. How are Mark and Anya keeping? What news is there from Mitya?

Again many kisses and best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

224

TO HIS MOTHER

May 27, 1912

Mother dearest,

I returned to Paris yesterday from a short business trip[310] and found your letter with the bad news about Anya and Manyasha.[311] I am sure they will not be able to hold them long because the absurdity of such an arrest is obvious. Things have come to such a pass that they say straight out to Anyuta "Not for long!" In the provinces today they probably pick up people for no reason at all, "just in case".

Have you any acquaintances, my dear? Does anybody visit you? Sudden loneliness is the worst thing that can happen at such times. Do you get letters and news from Mitya and Mark?

Have you any acquaintances in St. Petersburg? It would be a good idea to write to them, if there are any, and tell them about what has happened, perhaps they can get some information. Sometimes the provincial administration is overzealous, especially now, after May Day.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well and active.

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. We have not yet decided what to do for the summer. It isn't hot yet.

Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

225

TO HIS MOTHER

June 2, 1912

Mother dearest,

A few days ago I wrote to you about the arrest of Manyasha and Anyuta. There is something else I want to talk to you about. I am afraid you must feel very lonely now. I asked in my last letter whether any acquaintances visit you but I could not have received an answer to that letter yet.

I read in a St. Petersburg newspaper today about the large number of arrests and house searches that have been made in connection with the case of the railwaymen[312] in Saratov. They seem to be picking up people left and right.... I don't know whether you have yet managed to get any news of Manya and Anyuta. You will probably be seeing Anyuta soon, because when they arrested her they said it would not be for long. If the arrests are on a very big scale, however, it may take some time simply to sort out all the people who have been arrested.

Please drop me a line, my dear, to let me know if you are well, how you are feeling, and if there is any news and whether you have any acquaintances in Saratov. Perhaps you will feel a little less miserable if we write to one another more often.

There are no changes here. Yesterday we undertook an excursion to the Parc de St. Cloud, but we had bad luck—

it rained. The weather in general is not hot and we have not yet decided anything about summer.

Nadya and Yel. Vas. send you many kisses and wish you good health and good spirits. So do I and embrace you, my dear.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

226

TO HIS MOTHER

July 1, 1912

Mother dearest,

I received your letter about the trip up the Volga and the Kama and your new address. I must give you a new address, too. This summer we have moved a long way from Paris—to Krakow. Almost in Russia! Even the Jews are like Russians and the Russian frontier is 8 versts away (the journey by train from Granice to here takes two hours, from Warsaw 9 hours), the women go barefoot and wear brightly-coloured clothes, exactly as in Russia. My address here is:

Herrn Wl. Ulijanow,
Zwierzyniec, L. 218,
Krakau, Oesterreich.

I wish you and Anyuta a good holiday and a pleasant journey up the Volga. The hot weather is beginning and it must be good to be on the river.

With regard to Manyasha—it is to be hoped that after what they told you they will not be able to hold her very long.

Regards to Mark!

Please send me Mitya's address, my dear.

Getting settled here is taking up a lot of our time. For the summer we are living out of town, near a summer resort called "Salwator". We cannot yet speak Polish. Many difficulties and much bother.

Y. V. is ill. Looks like pneumonia.

I embrace you fondly, my dear; give Anya my very best regards.

Y. V. and N. K. send regards and embrace you.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Sent to Saratov

First published in the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original



Lenin's mother and sister Maria
1913

227

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Dear Manyasha,

Many thanks for the photographs* and the letter. At long last! How are you feeling now?

I am not surprised that you have chosen the north,[313] I would probably have done the same myself. I hope that they will not send you too far away—there are some nasty places there. Please write as soon as you arrive.

We have been having a lot of trouble during the past few days and so I could not answer you immediately.

This place is full of rumours of war, as, by the way, you can see from the papers. If there is a war I shall probably have to move to Vienna (or to that town where I last saw you).** But I do not believe there will be a war.

I kiss you fondly, my dear. So do Y. V. and Nadya.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. Write and tell me whether you will be receiving *Neue Zeit*.

Written at the end of November 1912
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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* Lenin received photographs of his mother and his two sisters.—*Ed.*

** Lenin here refers to his meeting with his mother and sister in Stockholm in September 1910.—*Ed.*

228

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

I was very glad to hear from you. Your hand must have been very painful for a long time—your writing is still weak.

Here we feel much better than we did in Paris—our nerves are at rest and there is more literary work and less squabbling. I hope it will be easier for us to meet, too—as long as there is no war; I do not greatly believe there will be one.

I receive very occasional news from Gorky, who is now less unfriendly in his attitude towards us than he was.

How are Mark and Mitya?

Give Mother many, many kisses from me.

Here we are having wonderful autumn weather, and we go out a lot.

Material conditions are so far bearable but not very reliable.... If anything happens I will write to you.

All the best and excuse the hurry.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. Y. V. and Nadya ask me to send their regards and kisses. Both are well.

Written in the autumn of 1912
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

229

TO HIS MOTHER

Mother dearest,

Please excuse me for the delay in answering your last letter; I have already received a second. Nadya will write you in detail about our way of life.*

We still have no news of Manyasha. Send her Nadya's letter and mine if they are of interest to her.

I do not think you need worry about her; Vologda is better than Astrakhan as far as climate is concerned (infectious diseases are worse and more dangerous in Astrakhan); she will make friends with people. After all, the town is not far from Petersburg and Moscow. The St. Petersburg papers probably arrive only a day late.

It is difficult to arrange for any translation work; some contact must be established with *publishers* in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Nadya suggests what I think is a good idea—write to the Sabashnikovs.** Perhaps Anyuta will also write to Krumbügel (if it is possible), etc. I, alas, have no contacts with publishers.

How is it that Mark is so often ill? That's no good! He should take a rest in summer, for instance, in the mountains—four hours' journey from here there is Zakopane, they say it is a wonderful place in the mountains.

We are not thinking of moving; unless the war chases us away, but I do not greatly believe in the war. We shall wait and see.

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* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

** The Sabashnikov Bros., publishers.—*Ed.*

Best regards to Mitya and Anyuta. How is her finger? It is time it was cured!

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well.

Yours,
V. Ul.

Written December 21 or 22, 1912
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

230

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Poste Restante,
Vologda,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

At last a brief note from you, very brief, it is true, has reached me. Write and tell me how you have settled down, whether you have made any friends, and whether there is any possibility of your finding work. Have the local authorities kept their promise not to prevent your looking for a job?*

I recently received a letter from Mother who tells me that Mark came back from St. Petersburg ill. Why is he so poorly these days? What was he like when you left—was he, on the whole, well?

I suppose you are now suffering from "prison anaemia", or rather from a worsening of your former anaemia. You ought to do something about it—go skating, for instance. That is something you must do, so do not neglect it! There is slush where I am now, but last year, when I found myself in a "cold" place, I immediately found a skating rink and had a go to see whether I had forgotten how to skate.

There are now great difficulties in the way of getting translations from French and German because of the copy-

* Lenin's sister was banished to Vologda.—*Ed.*

right convention. In this place, unfortunately, I am cut off from all contact with publishers. You should write to St. Petersburg or Moscow, if you have any acquaintances there, and try to find out from the publishers how they stand; translation is the best form of employment and quite a large number of translated books are published. Write and tell me what the prospects are.

Y. V. and Nadya are very anxious to send regards.

All the best,

Yours,

V. Ul.

Written December 24 or 25, 1912
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

231

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
c/o Gorokhova,
Muromtsev's House,
Kazanskaya Square,
Vologda,
Russia

December 28, 1912

I have received the letter with your address, dear Manyasha, and hasten to reply. Did you get the letter I sent you Poste Restante?

We could probably arrange to send you the journal *Gleichheit*,[314] which is published fortnightly. It is merely a matter of whether the censor will allow it. Try to find out—or should we just send it?

When do you receive the St. Petersburg newspapers? A day late or later?

A thousand good wishes and regards to all friends.

Ever yours,
Vl. U.

Sent from Krakow

First published in Russian and in French in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the Russian translation or the French original

1913

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TO HIS MOTHER

(December 21) January 3, 1913

Mother dearest,

Today I received letters from you and Anyuta. A big *merci*.

The compliments of the season to all of you! May you all have a good time and keep well and cheerful.

Today I also got a picture postcard from Manyasha with a view of the River Vologda. Not a bad little town, judging by the postcard.... She writes that she has settled in there quite well.

If Mitya is with you give him my best regards. And the same to Mark. I hope he is better by now.

Anyuta is still writing badly! What a nuisance that finger is!

We are all well. We intend to celebrate the Russian festivals more than the local ones.

I embrace you fondly and wish you all the best.

Yours,
Vl. U.

Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

233

TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS SISTER ANNA

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Tsarevskaya, 36,
Saratov,*
Russia

Mother dearest,

I received two parcels today. What a mountain of sweets you sent us! A big *merci* from us all. Nadya is quite cross with me because I wrote "about the fish", and about sweets, and because I have caused you so much trouble. I did not expect that everything would be in such gigantic quantities.... The duty on fish is not very high but for sweets it is quite a lot. And so we are now going to celebrate "New Year" again!

How are you two managing without Mark? The newspapers say that political exiles may get an amnesty. Let us wait until February 21....**

We are having wonderful winter weather without snow. I have bought some skates and skate with great enthusiasm—it brings back Simbirsk and Siberia. I have never before skated abroad.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send best regards to Anyuta. So do Y. V. and Nadya.

Yours,
Vl. U.

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* The address is taken from a copy found in a dossier of the Police Department.—*Ed.*

** Lenin refers to the amnesty granted on the occasion of the tercentenary of the House of Romanov.—*Ed.*

P.S. The number of our house has been changed, it is now Ulica Lubomirskiego, 49.

Dear Anyuta,

I had just written to Mother about the parcels when the letter from you both arrived. I am glad that Mark is pleased with his travelling—I hope he will be better off in Siberia. If you go to see Mitya* I hope you will call on us—it is almost on your way, the deviation is a very small one. If you did not have to pay a high stamp duty on passports it would be quite cheap; only those who live near the frontier can come here without passports, with "half passes" that cost 30 kopeks.

We live modestly, no changes.... We are drawing up plans for the publication of pamphlets at *Pravda*....[315] I do not know whether we shall be able to manage it, but there is a demand for it.

Manyasha writes occasionally. She still has not found any work.

What we are most badly off for here is *Russian* books! And there's nothing we can do about it.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Written February 24, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

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*Lenin's brother Dmitry was at that time employed as public health officer in Feodosia, Crimea.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

It is quite a while since I had news of you. Is Mother keeping well? Have you received the letter I sent immediately on receiving the "goodies"?

It seems that the amnesty did not affect the exiles in Vologda *at all*....[316]

Is there any news from Mitya or Mark in their new places?

Do you know the address of Krumbügel—he published my book on philosophy? Is it possible to get hold of him (if you tell me how to find him I can probably get an acquaintance in Moscow to do it) and find out whether there are any unsold copies of the book left? We could now probably find *another* means of disposing of them and could come to an agreement on the subject with the publisher.

All the best, kiss Mother for me.

Yours,
Vl. U.

P.S. Our address is now Lubomirskiego No. 49 (and not 47).

Written March 18, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Dear Manyasha,

Congratulations on the occasion of your and Mother's name day. I hope you will soon be spending the summer months with more company and in more healthy surroundings.

Many thanks for the letter. I was very glad to get the news and will try to write again in a day or two. Forgive me for breaking off so soon, but I am in a great hurry.

Regards to friends. All the best.

Yours,
V. U.

Written during the first half of April, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Vologda

First published in the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

236

KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

May 3

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

We have received your postcards and I am very glad to know that you are having a good rest. Here, too, it is real summer. Today we sent our things off to the country. Our new address is

Villa Terezy Skupień,
Poronin,
Galizien,
. . . . . .
Austria.

We shall be leaving in three days. The packing was an awful nuisance but as we are going to Poronin for five months we had to buy everything. I am quite invalided and tire very quickly. I have been going for electric treatment for a whole month, the swelling in my neck has not gone down but my eyes have become more normal and the palpitation is less. Treatment is free here in the nerve clinic and the doctors are very attentive. There is another advantage. While you are waiting your turn, you hear Polish spoken and speak yourself. I certainly want to learn Polish. In summer I shall have spare time and will read Polish books. We shall probably have a help in for four or five hours a day in summer and I shall have less to bother about. Mother did not go to Russia. Partly because of my illness and partly because there was no one to accompany her. But mostly because of my illness. In the last few days she has grown very tired from all the commotion in the house.

Volodya has been away and was not home for his birthday or for the holidays. The journey made a good break for him.[317]

I do not yet know whether there is anywhere to bathe in Poronin. Volodya is very fond of bathing—there will be no bath there and he will not be able to take a shower.

I want to get to the country as soon as possible. We live on the outskirts of the town, there are market gardens opposite our windows and the day before yesterday a nightingale was singing, but still it is a town, the children shout, soldiers are riding to and fro and the carts are noisy.

Well, I embrace you and Anya fondly and send regards to all. Is it possible that Anya's finger still hurts?

Mother sends regards.

Yours,
Nadya

Mother dearest,

I am adding a couple of words to Nadya's letter. I must apologise for not having written, but I have been away for a couple of days and now we are moving.

Many thanks to Mitya for the letter.[318] I have also received a very long and interesting letter from Mark. I will reply to it from Poronin.

Poronin is the station before Zakopane (a spa). There are *direct* coaches to Zakopane—from Warsaw second class and from Granice third class.

I embrace you fondly and send best regards to all.

Yours,
V. U.

Written May 3, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Feodosia
(Crimea)

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Yekaterininsko-Dvoryanskaya Street, 40,
Vologda,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

I believe I am in debt to you (to Mark Timofeyevich I most certainly am). At long last I have settled down to write. We moved here a few days ago (partly because of Nadya's illness—she has thyroid trouble which worries me greatly) to spend the summer in the village of Poronin, in the mountains seven kilometres from Zakopane. It is near the Tatra Mountains,* 6-8 hours by rail to the south of Krakow and communication with Russia and Europe is through that town. It is farther from Russia, but that can't be helped.

We have rented a country house (a huge one, far too big!) for the whole summer up to October 1 (New Style) and after a lot of bother and bustle have moved. I think Nadya is worse from the moving. I shall probably have to take her to Berne for treatment....

This is a marvellous place. The air is wonderful—the altitude is about 2,300 feet. Our rather damp situation on the plains at Krakow cannot be compared to it. We have plenty of newspapers and can work.

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* The Tatras are part of the Carpathians, 8,500 feet high. Pure Switzerland!

The local people are Polish peasants, "Hurals" (mountaineers), with whom I converse* in incredibly broken Polish, a language of which I know five words, and the rest in distorted Russian. Nadya speaks a little Polish and can read the language. The villages are almost Russian in type. Thatched roofs, poverty. The women and children go barefoot. The men wear the Hural costume, white cloth trousers and coats, half jacket and half cape, of the same material. This is not a holiday resort (Zakopane is) and, therefore, very quiet. I still hope that Nadya will get better in the quiet and the mountain air. We have started leading the rural life here—we get up early and go to bed almost with the roosters. We walk every day to the post office and the station.

Do you see *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye* regularly?[319] The people here were glad to see the anniversary issue[320] and to hear of the metalworkers' victory over the liquidators.[321]

How are you? Will you be able to keep your lessons for the summer? Do you get enough books?

Greetings to Polish friends,** and I hope they help you in every way....

Y. V. and Nadya send regards and kisses. I too.

Yours,
V. U.

Address: Herrn Ulianow, Oesterreich, *Poronin* (Galizien).

P.S. You had better send this letter to Mother, unless she will be visiting you soon.

Written May 12 or 13, 1913
First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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* (I prefer talking to Jews—in German).

** Lenin refers to V. V. Vorovsky who was in exile in Vologda.—*Ed.*

The house in Poronin (Poland) in which Lenin lived
in the summer of 1913 and 1914

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

May 25

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

We received your letter today. I hasten to reply to it.

I am getting better now. The palpitation has become less violent. I am following the doctor's advice and eating enough for three, guzzling milk and taking Robin's thyroid medicine and, in general, everything is fine. Volodya gets very worked up, people worry him a lot about Kocher. I am very glad that D. I. has written him a letter telling him that there is no need for an operation, etc., because people are talking all sorts of nonsense to him—that I may go blind, that I should lie motionless for eighteen months and so on. I have not got the disease in such an advanced stage and I shall recover in the summer.

Our real holiday is only just beginning. There was a terrible hurly-burly over the moving, and here at first we had to haggle. The people here have been spoiled by holidaymakers—they lie, swindle, etc. At first we were angry at this, but now everything is in its place. A girl comes to us; she cannot cook, but does all the household chores. Today the weather shows signs of changing; so far we have had a whole week of rain, but the place does not seem damp. This morning Volodya and I walked for about two hours, and now he has gone off alone to some indefinite point in space.

Every morning a fluffy black pup comes running to us from the neighbour's and Volodya spends a lot of time playing with it. This is the real summer cottage routine.

There is only one family here with whom we are

acquainted and they live a long way away, half an hour's walk. But that does not prevent us from seeing each other, sometimes twice a day.

I am glad there are no crowds here. I do a minimum amount of work. I read mostly Polish novels, and not very enthusiastically at that.

It is very beautiful here. Fortunately you cannot do a lot of cycling, because Volodya used to abuse that amusement and overtire himself; it is better to walk more.

Mother sends regards. She is still feeling miserable—her sister with whom she was brought up and with whom she had maintained close relations all her life, died a fortnight ago. Mother even wanted to go to Novocherkassk when she heard of her sister's illness, but she had no passport—it had been sent in for renewal.

Many kisses for Anya, and regards to all. Volodya will probably write himself. I embrace you fondly, my dear.

Yours,
Nadya

Mother dearest,

I embrace you fondly and send regards to all. Many thanks to Mitya for the letters. I am trying to persuade Nadya to go to Berne. She does not want to. She is now *slightly* better.

Yours,
V. U.

Written May 25, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Feodosia
(Crimea)

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Yekaterininsko-Dvoryanskaya Street, 40,
Vologda,
Russia

Sent by Wl. Ulianow in Poronin (Galizien)

June 18

Dear Manyasha,

On June 21 or 22 Nadya and I are going to Berne, where she will (probably) have an operation. The address there is: Herrn Schklowsky. 9. Falkenweg. 9. *Bern*. Switzerland. For W.I.U.

We shall probably be there from one to three weeks.

I am sending you a view of the Tatras, where we recently went on an excursion. Y. V. and Nadya send very best regards. Nadya is feeling well.

Best regards to Mother if she is at your place. Send this on to her if she is not.

Yours,
V. U.

Written June 18, 1913
First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova (for M. A.),
Yekaterininsko-Dvoryanskaya Street, 40,
Vologda,
Russia

June 24, 1913

Mother dearest,

I received your letter just before I left. Nadya and I have reached Vienna and today we are continuing our journey. I will write to you from Berne. I embrace you fondly, Anyuta and Manyasha, too. We are travelling comfortably and have taken a look at Vienna. The weather is fine.

Yours,
V. U.

Please convey my apologies to M. T. for not answering his interesting letter. Tell him not to be angry!

Sent from Vienna

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova (for M. A. Ulyanova),
Yekaterininsko-Dvoryanskaya Street, 40,
Vologda,
Russia

Mother dearest,

Nadya and I have been in Berne for several days. Kocher has not yet received us. He is a difficult person. He's a celebrity and likes to be begged. Some competent local doctors praise him to the skies and promise complete success. We shall wait. In the meantime write to me c/o Herrn Schklowsky. (For W. I.) 9. Falkenweg. *Bern*. Switzerland.

We shall probably have to spend a few weeks here.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send very best regards to Anyuta and Manyasha. So does Nadya.

Yours,
V. U.

Written June 28 or 29, 1913
Sent from Berne

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

Saturday, July 26, 1918

Mother dearest,

After a fortnight's "preparation" in the clinic, Nadya was at last operated on on Wednesday. The operation seems to have been successful because she looked quite well yesterday, and had begun to drink willingly. It seems to have been a rather difficult operation, they tormented Nadya for about three hours without an anaesthetic, but she bore it bravely. On Thursday she was very bad, a high temperature and delirium, so I was pretty scared. But yesterday there was an obvious improvement, no fever, the pulse was slower, etc.

Kocher, of course, is a wonderful surgeon, and anyone with thyroid trouble should go to him; he has a huge clientele of Russians, of Jews especially.

I am already thinking of the journey back; we expect to leave on August 4 (unless Kocher delays it, which sometimes happens) and we shall make overnight stops at Zurich, Munich and Vienna, and go on home from there. I shall be here long enough to receive another letter from you, after which you must write to Poronin. If I am delayed here I will write again.

The suppression of the paper I wrote for[322] leaves me in a very critical position. I shall try harder than ever to find publishers and translations; it is very difficult at present to find any literary work.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and send very best regards to Manyasha and Anya. Nadya sends her fondest regards.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Berne to Vologda

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Samarin's House, Apt. 3,
Moskovskaya Street,
Vologda,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

I received your letter a few days after I had posted you a letter from Nadya and me.

You make me ashamed of myself for my silence. I really am at fault—there has been a lot of bother over our moving and because of the influenza. Now Y. V. here is ill—she has had a very bad attack of influenza but is *now recovering*.

You ask about new German literature. I have just finished reading the four volumes of the Marx-Engels correspondence. I want to write about it in *Prosveshcheniye*.[323] There is much of interest. It is pity the publishers—those Bosches!—charge such a price for it—40 marks! I have not yet read Beer's new *History of Socialism in England*, but I soon shall.

Cunow's book on the origin of religion appeared recently. I would send it to you (I can buy it) but I am afraid it would not reach you. If you receive or can obtain *Neue Zeit*, there is a list in it of all the interesting things. I do not see any new bourgeois literature. If you like I can send you a list of all new books in German (a small publication I get every month, it is put out by Hinrichs, a bookseller in Leipzig).

All the best. Give Mother many kisses for me and for Nadya.

Yours,
V. U.

It is a long time since I had word from Anyuta.

I am reading Octave Mirbeau's *Dingo*. In my opinion it is no good.

Written November 12 or 13, 1913
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Samarin's House, Apt. 3,
Moskovskaya Street,
Vologda,
Russia

December 21

Dear Manyasha,

Under separate cover I am sending you some German book catalogues. Look them over and drop me a line to say if there is anything that interests you (when you have finished with them—there is *no* hurry—return them).

How are you and Mother getting on? Do you intend to see Mark or Anya during the holidays? Have you heard anything from Mitya?

Everything is still the same here; I have already got thoroughly used to the Krakow way of life—narrow, quiet, sleepy, but in some respects more convenient than life in Paris.

Forgive me for not writing often, business interferes.

Give Mother many kisses for me. Nadya and Y. V. also send regards and kisses.

Yours,
V. U.

Written December 21, 1913
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

December 26

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is an age since I last wrote to you. In general I have been conducting a sort of sit-down strike against letter-writing lately. Volodya is partly to blame. He has enticed me into the "excursionist" party. It is our local joke that we have a "cinemist" party (of cinema-lovers), an "anti-cinemist", or "anti-semitic", party, and an "excursionist" party, which is always finding excuses for excursions. Volodya is a confirmed anti-cinemist and an enthusiastic excursionist. He has recruited me into his party and so I have no time left for anything. To make things worse, we are having some wonderfully fine days. With just a light fall of snow—really excellent. And autumn, too, was fine. After all, what is there to do in Krakow but go walking. We have no sophisticated amusements of any kind. We did once go to a concert, a Beethoven quartet, we even clubbed together to buy a season ticket, but for some reason the music made us terribly miserable, although an acquaintance of ours,* an excellent musician, was in ecstasies over it. We do not want to go to the Polish theatre, the cinema here is quite absurd—all five-act melodramas.... Volodya and I have decided that after the holidays we will begin a study of the local University library, for, to our shame, we have never been there. If there is anything we thirst for here it is good literature. Volodya has practically learned Nadson and Nekrasov by heart and an odd volume of *Anna Karenina*

* Inessa Armand.—*Ed.*

is being read for the hundredth time. We left our literature (a tiny fraction of what we had in St. Petersburg) in Paris and here there isn't a Russian book to be had anywhere. At times we read with envy the advertisements of second-hand booksellers offering 28 volumes of Uspensky or 10 volumes of Pushkin, etc., etc.

Volodya, as luck would have it, has become a great fiction-lover. And an out-and-out nationalist. You cannot get him to look at the pictures by Polish artists at any price but he has picked up, for instance, a catalogue of the Tretyakov Gallery that some acquaintance had thrown away and is always burying himself in it.

We are all well. Volodya takes a cold shower every day, goes for walks and does not suffer from insomnia. He continues praising the local swamp. Mother is often unwell, first a gumboil, then a cough.... She sends her best regards. I had a letter from Manyasha, but it was in her usual scrawl so I understood nothing of it. She should write more often. I embrace her and you most fondly, wish you good health and everything of the best. Again I kiss you.

Yours,
Nadya

Many kisses, my dear, I wish you good health and spirits. Very best regards to Manyasha (I wrote to her a few days ago) and to Anyuta, who is probably with you.

Yours,
V. U.

PROPERTY OF TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Written December 26, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Vologda

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

1914

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

January 7

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

A Happy New Year to you, Manyasha and Anya, with all best wishes for everything that is good.

We spent the European New Year's Eve alone with Volodya sitting over plates of curds, and the Russian New Year's Eve we shall not celebrate at all because Volodya is going away for a month or six weeks to work in a library.[324] I envy him a bit because our place is more like a backwoods village than a town and I miss people quite a lot. There is simply no one here to bother about and no one to take care of.

We do not seem to be able to make acquaintances among the local inhabitants.

Winter tried hard to get going here, Volodya went skating three times and tempted me to buy skates, but the weather suddenly turned warm, all the ice melted, and today, for instance, there is a real smell of spring in the air. Yesterday, too, was not at all like winter. Volodya and I went for a long walk in the country and it was fine.

That, then, is all our news. I embrace you fondly, Mother sends regards.

How are your eyes? Did Anya come as she intended to?

Keep well!

Yours,

Nadya

Mother dearest,

I embrace you fondly and wish you a Happy New Year—you, and Manyasha and Anya!

Yours,
V. U.

Written January 7, 1914
Sent from Krakow to Vologda

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

247

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Anna Ilyinichna Yelizarova,
Goncharnaya Street, 11, Apt. 23,
St. Petersburg,
Russia

Dear Anyuta,

At last I am home after a long absence; I found and read all your letters, and today another one came, the one you thought might not arrive. We have them all. You were right about the delay with the articles, but there is nothing I can do. I have only two hands. *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1 has not arrived, although I have received a newspaper with a notice that it has been published. You are also delaying things. I am going to write about the self-determination of nations—perhaps it will be in time for No. 2.[325]

Please send me *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 11 (2 copies), *Put Pravdy* No. 2, *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 8 (126)[326]—do not ask anybody else to send them (that is hopeless) but send them yourself.

With regard to the summaries of crime statistics for 1905-1908, I would ask you not to buy them (there is no need, they are expensive) but to get them from a library (either the Bar Council or the Duma Library) and send them for a month. (Many thanks for the journal of the Ministry of Justice—I hope you got it back.) I heard that you people crossed out of the article on the X affair*

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* For the case of X (Danski, B. G.) see *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 524.—*Ed.*

something against the liquidators and I was very angry at this inappropriate and harmful conciliation; you are only helping the foul slander of the liquidators, delaying the inevitable process of chucking such scoundrels as Galina, Martov, Dan and others out of the working-class movement. You won't succeed in anything but disgracing yourselves. I am really mad at the disgusting blackmail engineered by Martov & Co. in the X affair; we shall gradually crush that gang of blackmailers,

I have not written home for a long time. I hope everything is all right there. Drop me a line or two.

I have just received *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1. Congratulations. In general it is good. Except for the misprints.... And the review of Levitsky's book with the foolish word "factionally" in it....[327] Who let that go through? Who is the author? N. K. will write about the women's magazine.[328]

Written February 11, 1914
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy
(made by the police)

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Samarin's House, Apt. 3,
Moskovskaya Street,
Vologda,
Russia

February 16, 1914

Dear Manyasha,

I recently returned from a trip (among other things, I lectured on the question of nationalities in Paris)[329] and still cannot settle down to write.

How are you? When will your term of exile be over?

How is Mother keeping? Has she completely recovered?

It is a long time since I had news of Mark or Mitya. I know nothing about their way of life or their plans.

There have been no changes here. We still live modestly. Nadya seems to be in for a relapse of her thyroid trouble—the symptoms are still mild but they are there. Perhaps I shall have to take her for another operation in spring.... It is still not certain and it is better so far to say nothing to her about if. I am quite well, so is Y. V.

All the best. Give Mother many kisses for me.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Krakow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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TO HIS MOTHER

February 21, 1914

Mother dearest,

I have received your postcard—*merci*. What a difference between, your weather and ours here! Here it is already spring-there has been no snow for a long time, it is warm, we do not wear galoshes and the sun is unusually bright for these parts. We cannot believe that we are in "wet" Krakow. It is a pity that you and Manyasha have to live in a nasty little town!... I have been to Paris and not to London and have had quite a good trip. Paris is a very unsuitable town for a man of modest means to live in, and very tiring. But there is no better and more lively town to stay in for a short time, just for a visit, for an outing. It made a good change.

In summer we shall probably go to Poronin again.

I embrace you fondly, my dear, and hope you keep well. Best regards to Manyasha.

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. Nadya and Y. V. also send many kisses.

Sent from Krakow to Vologda

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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KRUPSKAYA AND LENIN TO LENIN'S MOTHER

March 16

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is an age since I wrote to you. For some reason it seems difficult to write this year. We are very lonely here—there is really only one family in the whole town with whom we are acquainted. They have an amusing little boy but we do not see eye to eye with the mother. There is one other family but their company is painful, they are so worn out with poverty, so completely crushed. Nor do we get many letters. We live mostly on newspapers.

The weather here is not bad, the grass is showing green and so are the buds on the trees, but the mud on the roads is terrible. Volodya went for quite a long ride on his bicycle but had a burst tyre. We intend to go for long outings in the woods. We go walking a little every day—our house is on the very outskirts of the town and the fields are only five minutes' walk from us. We have already arranged for the old cottage in the country and are thinking of moving there on May 1. The house there is a bit on the big side for us and is a long way from the shops, but the rooms are very good and have stoves in them, there are two verandahs, and it is some distance from the road.

Perhaps I shall recover my breath there. Again I have thyroid trouble, not as badly as before, my eyes are almost normal and my neck swells only when I am excited, but the palpitation is rather bad. Actually the disease does not yet bother me very much and does not prevent my doing anything, but it is a bore to have to be careful of everything and to have to start an invalid routine again. It is damp

here in Krakow but in Poronin I shall probably get over it all very quickly.

Volodya is very fond of Poronin and particularly likes scrambling up the mountains. This time we intend to take a servant who will live in, so that there will be no bother with the housekeeping and we shall be able to go on long outings.

Anya is spoiling us this year by sending so many books. Has Manyasha received my letter?

Many kisses for her and for you, my dear.

Mother sends regards. She wanted to go to Russia, but it is a lot of trouble.

I wish you all the best and hope you keep well.

Yours,
Nadya

Many kisses, Mother dearest, and regards to all. Mitya as well—many thanks for the letter. I have also had a letter from Mark. Here we saw the "Beilis affair"[330] in the cinema (they made a melodrama of it). We went to the Shevchenko[331] celebration—it was in Ukrainian. I understand terribly little Ukrainian. There have been no changes. I embrace you fondly and hope you keep well.

Yours,
V. U.

Written March 16, 1914
Sent from Krakow to Vologda

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

251

TO HIS MOTHER

April 10, 1914

Mother dearest,

I embrace you fondly and congratulate you and Manyasha on the occasion of your name day. I now hope that the summer in Vologda will be better than the winter has been and it is, after all, the last summer!*

In these last few days I have caught a slight cold (that has to happen every spring!) but am now quite well.

Very soon, early in May, we are going to Poronin again.

I embrace you fondly and hope you keep well!

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Krakow to Vologda

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

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* Maria Ulyanova's term of exile ended in the autumn of 1914.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Samarin's House, Apt. 3,
Moskovskaya Street,
Vologda,
Russia

April 22

Dear Manyasha,

I have had news that you are annoyed at my prolonged silence. I am indeed at fault as far as letter-writing is concerned—it is very difficult in our situation (in yours and in mine especially) to carry on the correspondence one would like....

Yesterday we received a letter from Mother addressed to me and to Nadya. Give Mother many kisses for me. Perhaps you will be better off in summer than in winter.

I recently received information about the exiles at Olonets. They have collected material about the situation there and who the exiles are—most of them are workers, new people (post-revolutionary people), out of 150 people in the uyezd there are two liquidators and a few Left Narodniks. Apparently there are great changes in the composition of the exile groups—it would be of interest to collect the data and publish them occasionally in *Prosveshcheniye*.[332] Nadya has written to you and intends to write again.

In a fortnight or so we are again going to Poronin—there are mountains there and I hope that Nadya's thyroid trouble will pass—mountain air is good for people suffering

from this disease. The weather here is wonderful and I frequently go cycling.

No matter how provincial and barbarous this town of ours may be, by and large I am better off here than I was in Paris. The hurly-burly of life in the émigré colony there was incredible, one's nerves got worn down badly and for no reason at all, Paris is an inconvenient place to work in, the Bibliothèque nationale is badly organised—we often thought of Geneva, where work went better, the library was convenient, and life was less nerve-racking and time-wasting. Of all the places I have been in my wanderings I would select London or Geneva, if those two places were not so far away. Geneva is particularly fine for its general cultural level and the conveniences that make life easier. Here, of course, there can be no talk of culture—it is almost the same as Russia—the library is a bad one and extremely inconvenient, although I scarcely ever have to go there....

Autumn in the Tatras (the mountains near where we live in Poronin) is marvellous—at least, last autumn was delightful after a rainy summer. Your time will be up in autumn, won't it? I sometimes have dreams of our seeing one another in autumn. If it is fine in autumn we are thinking of staying in the country in October, too.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

Written April 22, 1914
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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the original

253

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Anna Ilyinichna Yelizarova,
Grechesky Prospekt, 17, Apt. 18,
Petrograd,
Russia

Wl. Uljanow,
Distelweg, 11,
Berne

November 14, 1914

Dear Anyuta,

I have received a letter from you and also from Mark, and, lastly, a postcard from Mother. Many, many thanks to everyone! I do not need any money at present. My incarceration was a very brief one,[333] only 12 days, and I was soon granted certain privileges, so that the "time" I did was very easy, the conditions and the treatment were good. Now I have had time to look round and settle down here. We are living in two furnished rooms, very good ones, and we eat in a neighbouring dining-room. Nadya feels quite well, so does Y. V., although she has aged badly. I have finished my article for the Granat Encyclopaedia (about Marx) and am sending it in a few days.[334] I had to abandon part (the bigger part, almost all) of my books in Galicia.... I fear for their safety.[335] It is very sad to watch the growth of chauvinism in a number of countries and to see such treacherous acts as those of the German (and not only the German) Marxists, or pseudo-Marxists.... It stands to reason that the liberals are praising Plekhanov again; he has fully deserved that shameful punishment.[336] Answer me as quickly as possible about how matters stand with the journal.[337] Is there any possibility of starting it? If so, when? Does the post office accept responsibility for manuscripts

sent by registered post? I embrace Mother fondly, send her many kisses and hope she keeps well; regards to all from all!

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. I have seen the disgraceful, shameless issue of *Sovremenny Mir*....[338] Shame! Shame!

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

254

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Kostomarovsky Street, 15,
Apt. 336,
Syromyatniki,
Moscow,
Russia

Expédié par Wl. Oulianoff,
Distelweg, 11,
Berne,
Switzerland

December 22

Dear Manyasha,

I was very glad to receive your letter of November 14 which arrived today. You addressed it to our old apartment; our present address is Distelweg, 11.

I will try to find out whether or not there is a bureau here that can give information about Russian prisoners of war, and also about that particular prisoner you are interested in.[339] Perhaps because of the coming holidays I shall not be able to find out immediately, but in any case I will try.

We are living fairly well, quietly and peacefully in sleepy Berne. The libraries here are good, and I have made quite decent arrangements as far as the use of books is concerned. It is even pleasant to read after my daily newspaper work. There is a pedagogical library here for Nadya and she is writing something on pedagogy.

I wrote asking Anyuta whether it is possible to find a publisher for an agrarian book; I could write one here. *If* you have an opportunity to do so, would you, too, try to find out?

Why didn't you write anything about yourself—how are you keeping? Are you earning anything? How much, where, and is it enough? Drop me a line if you can.

Very best regards,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Nadya and Y. V. send best regards.

If you have an opportunity, please find out (if it is not too much trouble) whether Granat received my article on Marx. I would like to get some work for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary, but it is probably not easy to arrange unless you have an opportunity to meet the secretary of the editorial board.

Written December 22, 1914

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

1915

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Kostomarovsky Street, 15, Apt. 336,
Syromyatniki,
Moscow,
Russia

Uljanow,
Distelweg, 11,
Berne (Switzerland)

February 9, 1915

Dear Manyasha,

I have received two pamphlets from you—by Oganovsky and Maslov. Many thanks! They are both rotten opportunists of the most harmful type (can there be anybody in agreement with them and with Plekhanov? It could not be worse). It is, however, extremely useful to know what they are writing. I shall therefore be extremely grateful if you send me things of this sort and also clippings from newspapers (and magazines) dealing with similar subjects. A long time ago (in the August or September issues), Y. Smirnov, for instance, wrote something extremely shallow in *Russkiye Vedomosti* about voting for credits, etc. I saw that, but I know nothing further about the literary activities of this man and others like him.

Here we are well off for foreign newspapers and books in the libraries. We are living fairly well. Berne is a small and dull but quite civilised town. Y. V. is ill with influenza.

There is a growth in the anti-chauvinist mood among the Germans; there has been a split in Stuttgart and in Frankfurt am Main.[340] An anti-chauvinist publication *Lichtstrahlen*[341] is appearing in Berlin.

If it will not be too much trouble, and if you should happen to be somewhere near (please do not go there specially

as there is *absolutely* no hurry) please find out from the Granats who accepted my article for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary, whether they sent the fee to M. T. Yelizarov (as I asked),* and whether it is possible to obtain some more work there for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary. I have written to the secretary** about this but he has not answered me.

Wishing you all the best—regards from me and from Nadya.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

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the original

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* The article was entitled "Karl Marx" and the fee for it was handed to Lenin's sister Maria, personally.—*Ed.*

** *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 317.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS MOTHER

Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Shirokaya Street, 48/9, Apt. 24,
Peterburgskaya Storona,
Petrograd,
Russia

Ulianow,
Seidenweg, 4aIII,
Berne

October 7, 1915

Mother dearest,

Nadya and I moved a few days ago to Berne. We wanted to stay longer in Sörenberg,[342] but it was snowing there and the cold was just impossible. This year autumn is very cold, and Sörenberg has a mountain climate. We have found a nice room here with electricity and bath for 30 francs. Nadya has put on quite a lot of weight; the palpitation has gone; she has even been up the mountains—let's hope there is no recurrence of that thyroid trouble.

How are you all getting on? Have you made good arrangements for the winter? Are you keeping well, and is the apartment warm? We thank Anyuta very, very, very much for the book, for the most interesting collection of pedagogical publications and for the letter.* I wrote to her about a publisher and am now awaiting an answer.[343] How is Manyasha? If you can, send her this letter; I should be glad to get a line from her too. Give or send our best regards to Mitya and Mark. I should be very grateful for a subscription to *Rech* (Anyuta wrote that she intended subscribing). There are not many newspapers, books or pamphlets in Russian, we see very few and thirst for them. Has

* Apparently a letter in invisible ink.—*Ed.*

Anyuta received my list of "the desirable" that I sent her a long time ago? (i.e., desirable Russian books). I send you many kisses and embrace you fondly. Anyuta, too. So does Nadya.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

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the original

1916

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Mlle. Marie Oulianoff,
Malaya Gruzinskaya, 7, Apt. 13,
Moscow,
Russia

Ulianow,
Spiegelgasse, 12
(bei Kammerer),
Zürich I

February 20, 1916

Dear Manyasha,

Many thanks for the newspapers you sent me a few days ago. Today I received a notice from the Central Committee of the German Red Cross Unions to the effect that Aaron Rosenfeldt is a prisoner of war at Bütow, 66 Regiment.[344] It has taken more than a year to get the information; neither the Geneva nor the Danish Red Cross could find anything out, but I accidentally came across the address of the German prisoner of war commission and wrote to them. They, too, took more than two months to reply!

Nadya and I are very pleased with Zurich; there are good libraries here—we shall stay a few weeks more and then return to Berne.[345] You may write to this address, the post office will forward the letters.

With all my very best wishes and Nadya's too.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

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Printed from
the original

258

TO HIS MOTHER

March 12, 1916

Mother dearest,

I am sending you some photos, one of them for Manyasha.

We are now living in Zurich. We came here to work in the libraries. We like the lake here very much and the libraries are much better than those in Berne, so we shall probably stay here longer than we had intended. You may write to this address, the post office always forwards letters.

I hope that the cold weather is already past and that you are not freezing in a cold apartment. I hope it will soon be warm and you will recover from the winter.

Nadya sends her very best regards to all. Many kisses, Mother dearest; keep well. Best regards to Anyuta and also to M. T.

Yours,
V. U.

Sent from Zurich to Petrograd

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

259

TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

His Excellency
Mark Timofeyevich Yelizarov,
Po Volge Steamship Co.,
Nevsky, 45,
Petrograd,
Russia

Uljanow,
Spiegelgasse, 14[II],
Zürich,
Switzerland

September 20, 1916

Dear M. T.,

Please show this postcard to Manyasha or send it on to her. I yesterday received her letter (postcard) dated August 8, and also some books, for which my best thanks. I was greatly worried by the news that Anyuta is in hospital.[346] What is the matter? Is it the same disease that made her once before, as she wrote, go into hospital for an operation? I hope that she and you will, at least, apply to only the very best surgeons because in such cases one should never have dealings with mediocre doctors. I shall impatiently await more frequent news, even if only in brief. Letters take a terribly long time nowadays! Many thanks to Manyasha for taking so much trouble over publishers; I shall get down to writing something or other, because prices have risen so hellishly that life has become devilishly difficult. How is Manyasha getting on? Does she earn a good salary? (I received 200 rubles and acknowledged it; thanks again.) If you can, please send Russian newspapers once a week after you have read them, because I have *none at all* (it is not worth while sending them more often). All the best and kisses for Manyasha. Nadya says the same.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

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the original

260

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Shirokaya Street, 48, Apt. 24,
Petrograd,
Russia

Oulianoff,
Spiegelgasse, 14II,
Zürich I,
Switzerland

October 22, 1916

Dear Manyasha,

I received your two postcards dated August 29 and September I at the same time. Thanks very much for the trouble you have taken with the publishers and for the money you sent. Has the new publisher received the manuscript on modern capitalism?[347] Please let me know when he does. I regard this work on economics as being of exceptionally great importance and would especially like to see it in print in full. You write that the publisher wants to put out *The Agrarian Question* as a book and not as a pamphlet. I understand that to mean that I must send him the continuation (i.e., in addition to what I have written about America I must write what I have promised about Germany),[348] I will start on this as soon as I have finished what I have to write to cover the advance received from the old publisher.*

And so I take it that the new publisher has *commissioned me* to continue the agrarian question! If you have the chance, remind him of that. (I have not received the 500 rubles, but shall receive them in a day or two, of course; I do not think it is an advance, but payment for the manuscripts received.)

Is it at all possible (if an opportunity offers, not especially) to find out whether Granat included my article on Marx

* The old publisher was V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich.—*Ed.*

in the Dictionary?* I did not get the promised reprints. If he does not answer, can you find out from the library by taking out the volume for that letter?

I have sent you three suggestions for translation (three books—Kemmerer; Gilbreth; Hobson). If they are not suitable let me know and I will look for others. If suitable, you must make sure that an order is given and the suggestion accepted. Then I will start work. Perhaps Anya will undertake the translation of one of the books? Give Anya my very best regards and Nadya's. I have sent you three postcards to M. T.'s** address and am now sending this to your address. Is it just as convenient? Nadya and I are still living in the same old way, quite quietly; the libraries in Zurich are better and it is more convenient to work. Many kisses from Nadya and me and regards to M. T. I am *very* grateful for the books you sent; we have also received the women's journal.

Yours,
V. U.

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* See Note 334.—*Ed.*

** Of the three postcards two have been lost and the third is published as Letter No. 259.—*Ed.*

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Shirokaya Street, 48/9,
Apt. 24,
Petrograd,
Russia

Oulianoff,
Spiegelgasse, 14II,
Zürich,
Switzerland

November 26, 1916

Dear Manyasha,

I had just sent a registered postcard to Mark Timofeyevich's address when the books (a novel in two volumes) came from you, and then a postcard saying you were expecting Anyuta in a day or two.* Many thanks for the books. I am very glad to get the news about Anyuta. My very best regards to her; I hope she will not be long in Astrakhan Gubernia and, while there, she should be careful not to get ill from the hot climate to which she is not accustomed. Nadya sends regards and thanks you for the news about Lidiya.

There have been no changes here. Prices are rising more than ever. Many thanks for the money (I have written to M. T. acknowledging receipt of 500 rubles=869 francs). If it is not too much trouble send me three or four times a month the Russian newspapers after you have read them—tie them up tightly with string or they will get lost. I have no Russian newspapers here. For translation I proposed

* This refers to the release of Lenin's sister Anna from prison. —*Ed.*

three books—Kemmerer, *Technischer Fortschritt*, Hobson, *Imperialism*, and Gitbreth, *Motion Study*. I have not yet received an answer and am awaiting one (because the publisher must find out whether they have been published before).

I again wish everybody all the best and send you and Anya many kisses.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

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the original

1917

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Mlle Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Shirokaya Street, 48/9, Apt. 24,
Petrograd,
Russia

Oulianoff,
Spiegelgasse, 14,
Zürich I,
Switzerland

February 15, 1917

Dear Manyasha,

I today received 808 francs through the Azov-Don Bank; in addition to that I received 500 francs on January 22. Please write and let me know what money this is, whether it is from a publisher, from which one, for what and whether it is for me. I must keep an account, that is, I must know what the publisher has paid for and what he has not. I cannot understand where so much money comes from; Nadya says jokingly that I must have been "pensioned off". Ha, ha! The joke is a merry one, for the cost of living makes one despair and I have desperately little capacity for work because of my shattered nerves. But joking aside, I must know more about this; please let me know. It is most likely that one (or more) of your letters has gone astray and I do not know what is going on. I am afraid to spend the money (sometimes money was sent through me to a sick friend).

I recently received these books from you: *Russkiye Zapiski*, *Tvyordige tseny na khleb*, *Trudovoye posrednichestvo*, *Tulskaya statistika*. I am very, very grateful.

Very best regards to Anyuta, M. T. and Mitya. There are no changes here, we live very quietly; Nadya often

feels poorly. The winter has been exceptionally cold, even now it is still cold. How are all of you there? Are you keeping well? We rarely get news of you.

All the best, many kisses,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

263

TO HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW

Registered.
His Excellency
Mark Timofeyevich Yelizarov,
Po Volge Steamship Co.,
Nevsky, 45,
Petrograd,
Russia

Wl. Oulianoff,
Spiegelgasse, 14,
Zürich I,
Switzerland

Dear Mark Timofeyevich,

From the enclosed you will see that Nadya is planning the publication of a Pedagogical Dictionary or Pedagogical Encyclopaedia.[349]

I am strongly in favour of this plan because, in my opinion, it fills a very serious gap in Russian pedagogical literature; it will be a very useful work and will provide an income, *which for us is extremely important*.

With the increase in the number of readers and the broader circles involved, there is now a quickly growing demand for *encyclopaedias* and similar publications. A properly compiled Pedagogical Dictionary or Pedagogical Encyclopaedia will become a handbook and go through a number of editions.

I am sure Nadya can do this because she has been working in pedagogy for years, has written about it and has undergone systematic training. Zurich is an exceptionally convenient centre for work of this kind; it has the world's finest pedagogical museum.

There is no doubt that such an undertaking would be profitable. The best thing would be for us to undertake

the publication of it *ourselves*, borrowing the necessary capital or finding a capitalist who would come in as a partner in the enterprise.

If that is *not* possible, and if it would be merely a waste of time to go chasing after it—you, of course, will know what is best, and when you have given it some thought and obtained some information, decide the matter for yourself—the plan should be offered to the old publisher, who will probably accept it. The plan must not be stolen, i.e., somebody else must not get in first. Then a *detailed* contract must be concluded with the publisher in the name of the editor (Nadya) that covers *all* the terms. If not, the publisher (the old publisher too!) will grab *all* the profit for himself and enslave the editor. *That happens*.

I should very much like you to give this plan your best attention, take a look round, talk with people, worry them, and answer* me in detail.

All the best,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. The publication is in two volumes, two columns to a page; to be issued in parts of 16 to 32 pages. Advertise for *subscribers*. Then the money will come in quickly.

Written February 18 or 19, 1917

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

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* If you are successful send a telegram "Encyclopaedia contract concluded" and Nadya will speed up the work.

264

TELEGRAM TO HIS SISTERS MARIA AND ANNA

Telegram No. 148,
Form No. 71,
Received April 2, 1917 at 20 hrs 8 m.

Ulyanova,
Shirokaya, 48/9, Apt. 24,
Petrograd,
From Torneo, 2. 18 hrs 12 m.

Arriving Monday 11 p.m. inform *Pravda*.

Ulyanov

Written April 2, 1917
First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the telegraph form

265

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Dear Manyasha,

I am sending you greetings and all best wishes. I am quite comfortable and am working on the question of the state, which has interested me for a long time.[350] I want to give you some advice—you absolutely must go away for medical treatment. There is nothing much doing at the present time, troubled though it is, and you must use it to get your leg and your nerves treated. I ask you very, very sincerely to go away—immediately and without fail. You can take a translation or some fiction with you, so that you will be better able to stand the boredom that to a certain extent is inevitable during medical treatment. But you absolutely must go. Please do as I ask and drop me a line in reply. I embrace you fondly.

Yours,
Ulyanov

Written in August 1917
Sent from Helsingfors (Helsinki)
to Petrograd

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the telegraph form

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TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Dear, sweet Mimosa,*

I ask you very much to go away for treatment, do not postpone it. You must not miss the chance. When you return it will be *easy* to arrange a job for you. You absolutely must go.

The Beer plan is an excellent one. Try also to get *Schlüter* on Chartism (in German);[351] it appeared after Beer and corrected that opportunist. A very good booklet could be written about Beer *and Schlüter*. Drop me a line in reply.

"Party Congresses" is also a good subject (in addition to the *minutes*, various booklets** are needed, I do not even approximately remember which ones). If you do write, send me the draft and we can discuss it.

I embrace you very fondly.

V. Ul.

Written at the end of
August-September, 1917
Sent from Helsingfors (Helsinki)
to Petrograd

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the telegraph form

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* Mimosa was one of the Pay nicknames used by Lenin's sister Maria Ulyanova.—*Ed.*

** Lenin's "Report" on the Stockholm Congress is in my possession quite by chance, and nothing else.... Too little!

1919

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TELEGRAM TO HIS WIFE

To Ulyanova-Lenina
Kazan or present whereabouts of
the Government propaganda vessel
Krasnaya Zvezda

Am forwarding Pozner's telegram. Please wire about your health and route you are following.[352]

Lenin
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Written July 2, 1919
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from
the original

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TO HIS WIFE[353]

July 9, 1919

Nadya dearest,

I was very glad to hear from you. I sent a telegram to Kazan and, as I got no answer, sent another to Nizhny, and from there I today received a reply to the effect that the *Krasnaya Zvezda* is supposed to arrive in Kazan on July 8 and stay there for not less than 24 hours. In that telegram I asked whether it would be possible to give Gorky a cabin on *Krasnaya Zvezda*. He is arriving here tomorrow and I want very much to drag him out of Petrograd, where he has exhausted his nerves and gone sour. I hope you and the other comrades will be glad to have Gorky travelling with you. He is really a very nice chap, a bit capricious, but that is nothing.

I read the letters asking for help that sometimes come for you and try to do what I can.

Mitya has left for Kiev; the Crimea, it seems, is again in the hands of the Whites.

There is nothing new here; on Sundays we take a holiday at "our" country house.[354] Trotsky is better; he has left for the South and I hope he will manage all right. I am expecting an improvement from the substitution of Kamenev (from the Eastern Front) for Vatsetis.

We are giving Pokrovsky (M. N.)* two months' leave

* M. N. Pokrovsky was at that time Deputy People's Commissar of Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—*Ed.*

for a rest; we want to appoint Lyudmila Rudolfovna Menzhinskaya as deputy commissar in his place (although it is not yet definite), *but not* Pozner.

I embrace you fondly and ask you to write and to telegraph more often.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

N.B. Obey the doctor's advice: eat and sleep more, then you will be *fully* fit for work by winter.

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original



V. I. LENIN
October 1918

269

TELEGRAM TO HIS WIFE

Ulyanova,
Kazan

We are all well.[355] I saw Gorky today and tried to persuade him to travel on your steamer, about which I sent a telegram to Nizhny, but he flatly refused. We are giving Pokrovsky leave of absence. Menzhinskaya has been provisionally appointed in his place. I received your letter from Uretsky and sent a reply back by him. Do you get the Moscow newspapers?

Lenin

Written July 10, 1919
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

270

TO HIS WIFE

Nadezhda Konstantinovna Ulyanova,
Government vessel *Krasnaya Zvezda*

July 15

Nadya dearest,

I am taking advantage of Krestinsky's visit to Perm to write to you. Maybe he will catch up with you.

Yesterday I received a telegram from Molotov in Kazan and answered him in time for you to get it before the vessel leaves Kazan, which should be, I am told, at 3 a.m.

I learned from Molotov that you did have a heart attack; that means that you are *overworking* yourself. You must stick strictly to the rules and obey the doctor's orders absolutely.

Otherwise you will not be able to work when winter comes. Don't forget that!

I have already wired you about affairs in the People's Commissariat of Education.

Things are going brilliantly on the Eastern Fronts. Today I learned of the capture of Yekaterinburg. In the south there has been a change, but there is still no serious turn for the better. I hope there will be.

I could not persuade Gorky to go, hard as I tried.

Yesterday and the day before I was in Gorki with Mitya (he has been here for four days) and Anya. The limes are in bloom. We had a good rest.

I embrace you fondly and kiss you. Please rest more and work less.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written July 15, 1919

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

271

TO HIS SISTER MARIA AND HIS WIFE

Maria Ilyinichna
and
Nadezhda Konstantinovna,

Please wake me not later than *10 o'clock* in the morning. It is now a quarter past four and I cannot sleep; I am quite well. If you do not wake me I shall lose another day tomorrow and shall not be keeping a proper regimen.

Written in 1919 or 1920

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

1921

272

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

On the white table behind the bed in my room there are two books and two newspapers, all Italian.

1) Turati, *Trent'anni di Critica Sociale*
2) Troves, *Polemiche Socialiste*
3) *Stampa* } Italian
4) and *another* } newspaper.

Written 1921

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

ANNA ULYANOVA-YELIZAROVA
1921

1922

273

TO HIS SISTER ANNA

Dear Anyuta,

This is what happened. The book, it seems, is from the Socialist Academy, and it is *forbidden* to take books home from there.

They made an exception for me!

It created an awkward situation—my fault, of course. Now you must take the greatest care that Gora reads the book *quickly at home* and *returns* it.

If necessary I can arrange for it to be sought in *another place*—so that the book will become my property.

Yours,
V. U.

Written at the end of 1922

First published in 1957
in the magazine *Yunost* No. 1

Printed from
the original

274

TO HIS SISTER MARIA

Manyasha,

Please bring the *big* map of Moscow Gubernia. It is lying on top of the bookcase in our dining-room.

Yours,
V. I.

Written 1922
Sent from Gorki Leninskiye
(near Moscow)

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

APPENDICES

I

ENTRIES CONCERNING LETTERS FROM LENIN TO HIS RELATIVES

(From the Files of the Moscow Gendarmerie)

During a search of the house of Lenin's sister Maria Ulyanova on the night of February 28, 1901, six letters from Lenin were seized and placed in her dossier as "material evidence". The files of the Moscow Gendarmerie (Dossier of the Moscow Group of the R.S.D.L.P., No. 69, Volume V, 1901, sheet 101)* contain the following entries concerning these letters.

1. A letter dated July 3, 1897, signed "Yours, *V. U.*" and beginning with the words "I have received your letter of June 16, dear Manyasha", was found in an envelope addressed to Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova (the mother of "Manyasha"). The letter contains a programme of Marxist studies, and among the source material mentioned are such Social-Democratic periodicals as *Vorwärts* and *Neue Zeit*.

2. A letter dated September 4, 1898, is signed "Yours, *V. U.*" but on the envelope the address of the sender is given as Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova. In this letter, which begins with the words "A few days ago, Mother dearest, I received your letter", the following phrases are outstanding: (1) "As for sending books to Sergei Ivanovich, I must say that I do not know where he is. Perhaps he is already in Sredne-Kolymsk"; (2) "Lyakhovsky wrote a few days ago—mostly about new exiles passing through Verkholensk"; (3) "Vas. Vas. (Starkov) is thinking of asking to be sent to Nizhneudinsk"; (4) "The Lepeshinskys are being moved to Kuraginskoye"; (5) "Apollinariya Alexandrovna wrote recently from Kazachinskoye".

3. A letter signed "*V. U.*", dated December 15, 1898, beginning with the words "I am sending Anyuta Y. M.'s letter which

* The dossier is now in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, C.C., C.P.S.U.—*Ed.*

he sent me with a request that I despatch it immediately", in which the phrase quoted, and the initials "Y. M." in that phrase, are deserving of attention.

4. A letter dated June 14, 1899, signed "Yours, *V. U.*", begins with the words "This week there has been no news from home, Mother dearest"; the name of Prince Yegor Yegorovich Kugushev is mentioned in the letter; the author of the letter asks for a copy of his book on the development of capitalism to be sent to the aforementioned Kugushev.

5. A letter by the same author dated "August 18, 1900, Paris", addressed to M. A. Ulyanova; it contains the address: "M. Dr. Dubon, chez.... Pour M. Goukowsky, 8 Boulevard Capucines, Paris".

6. A letter dated "October 20, Prague", signed "*V. U.*", addressed to Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova; it contains the address: "Herrn Franz Modráček (for V. I.), Smečky, 27. Prag. Austria."

Attempts to find these letters have not so far met with any success; it is possible that they were destroyed in one of the fires that occurred in the early days of the February Revolution.

II
LETTERS WRITTEN BY NADEZHDA KRUPSKAYA

1898

1
TO LENIN'S MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

February 15, 1898

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Did not Anna Ilyinichna receive the letter I sent on February 8 or 9? I wrote in some detail about myself in that letter. The trouble is that I still do not know when the sentence will be pronounced; at the Ministry of Justice they told me that the case would be reported on in either the first or the second week of Lent. They also said that I have been sentenced to three years in Ufa Gubernia (the sentence is not to be changed), but that the Department can, on its own authority, permit me to spend the time I am under surveillance in Shushenskoye. The situation is thoroughly vague. After the sentence has been pronounced I shall probably have to remain in St. Petersburg a couple of weeks, so we may expect to leave during the third or fourth week of Lent. We shall stay in Moscow for two or three days and I shall write and let you know the day of arrival as soon as I know it, for certain. As far as Volodya's work* is concerned, I have been *definitely* promised that a publisher will be found; they say that censorship conditions in Moscow are very bad and that there is a risk of the book lying at the censor's for a long time; I have been advised to publish the book in summer, so that it appears in autumn, the most suitable time for the publication of a book of this type. Because of all this, I did not take the manuscript back but asked Anna Ilyinichna what she thought would be the best thing to do—I have not received an answer. In the meantime I have sent Volodya a translation from English (the editor says that it does not matter even if Volodya does not know English very well, he can translate from the German version

* The work referred to is Lenin's *Economic Studies and Essays*.—*Ed*.

and use the English only to check with); it is a very interesting translation and the pay is good. I do not know whether Volodya intended taking translations although I gathered from one of his letters that he did; in any case, there is nothing to worry about because I have been told that we may both translate, the book is a big one. I am terribly ignorant on the administrative side of literary work.

Mother has been suffering from pleurisy and, has not been out for about a month; today a new doctor is coming to examine her—the one who treated her before was very casual. Mother sends her very best regards to all.

Still, I think I shall be allowed to go to Shusha—what do they care?

Many kisses,

Your loving,

Nadya

February 15

Dear Manyasha,

I have written once to Anna Ilyinichna but she evidently has not received my letter. Bulochka, too, is scolding me for not writing and also without any reason! Of course, there is nothing to write about, nothing is definite, one thing today, another tomorrow, but I do write about essential things and I answer letters.

I have not seen Kuba and probably shall not see her before I leave. I had a letter from her saying that now she does not have to talk she feels wonderful. She studies a lot, is very glad about the Thursdays and sends, regards to all.

I shall probably get V. V. I have given Volodya's list to an acquaintance, who has promised to get everything except Lyudogovsky (it has long been out of print) and the journal on economics. I do not know whether he will get them although he is an expert at obtaining books. I want to get in a good stock of books but I do not know what to take. I have few books of my own and they are very ordinary, so I don't really know whether it is worth taking them—Volodya probably has them all anyway. It is not very easy to get books from acquaintances—and what should one get? In a couple of weeks I have to go and my stock of books is still pitifully small. In general we are being rather slack and quite unmethodical about preparing for the journey. People say we ought to take as many warm things as

possible.... It probably will not be long now before we start. Kiss A. I. and tell her it is not nice of her to give such accounts of me everywhere—to Volodya she wrote about my looking like a herring, to Bulochka she complained of my slyness.... Many kisses for you, dear. Thank Dmitry Ilyich for his congratulations. I hope his case is over by the summer. *Au revoir*!

N. Krupskaya

Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

2

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

March 6

I am sending Volodya's articles. I did not send them before because I was waiting for him to reply to the letter in which I wrote about censorship conditions. He asked me to make enquiries, and the result of my enquiries is that the place of publication is most important. In this respect, Moscow is worse than St. Petersburg because even the most innocent books are held up for a long time and then hacked about very badly. Bulgakov's book was held up for a year by the censor. It appears that Vodovozova has also transferred her publishing house to St. Petersburg. The *écrivain* insists that it would be extremely unwise to publish the book in Moscow. So that's that.

About my departure ... Manya dear, I know nothing at all. There is a lady from Minusinsk living here who says that I shall not be able to leave after the 10th or 12th without the risk of getting stuck on the way. I was hoping all along that the sentence would be pronounced on March 4 and we would be able to leave on the evening of the 10th. The sentence, however, has been postponed until the 11th (not definite either) and this is what they say in the Department: my request will "*probably* be taken into consideration", and *if* I am given permission to go to Siberia, it will not be before the sentence has been pronounced, and *perhaps* I shall be given permission to go straight from St. Petersburg and not from Ufa Gubernia (!). I am going to the Department again tomorrow. I certainly don't want my journey to be postponed until spring. I am in a great hurry today but tomorrow evening I will write to Anna Ilyinichna and tell her about my trip to the

Department. Tomorrow, while I am there, I shall ask to be allowed to see Kuba—it would be such a pity to go away without having seen her once.

Many kisses,

N. Krupskaya

You address letters wrongly to House 18, Apt. 35, it should be the other way round, House 35, Apt. 18.

Written March 6, 1898
Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

3

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

We have now reached Shushenskoye and I am keeping my promise to write and tell you how Volodya is looking. It seems to me he is a picture of health and looks very much better than he did in St. Petersburg. One of the local inhabitants, a Polish woman,* says, "Pan Ulyanov is always in a good mood". He is terribly taken up with the shooting, in fact they are all such enthusiastic sportsmen that I, too, will probably soon be on the constant look-out for duck, teal and other such creatures.

The journey to Shusha is not at all tiring, especially if there is no need to wait in Krasnoyarsk; it is even promised that in June the steamers will go right up to Shusha. That will make everything just right. So if you can manage a trip the journey will not be too bad. It seems to me that Shusha is very nice, the forest and river are near. I am not writing a lot because this is only a postscript to Volodya's letter.** He has probably written in much greater detail. In Minusinsk I went to enquire about the books; a letter from you and a notice about the receipt of a parcel had come, but the addressee cannot get them from Krasnoyarsk; things were set right that same evening and we sent a power of attorney to Krasnoyarsk and the books will be here in a day or two. Many thanks. Things turned out quite all right with

* The wife of I. L. Prominsky.—*Ed.*
** See Letter No. 47.—*Ed.*

our innumerable bags and baggage, nothing was lost and people made room for us everywhere. Thanks, too, for the food. It lasted us for three days and it was much nicer than railway-station meals.... So here we are. They did put us ashore after all. Volodya is not satisfied with what I had to tell him about all of you. He says it is very little, but I told him all I knew. Kisses for all of you, regards to M. T. and D. I.

N. Krupskaya

Written May 10, 1898
Sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

4

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

June 14

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Volodya is sitting here engaged in an earnest conversation with a miller about some houses and cows and things, so I am taking the opportunity of writing you a few lines. I do not know where to begin, one day is the same as another and there is nothing happening outside the family. I seem to have been living an age in Shusha and have become completely acclimatised. Shusha is a very nice place in summer. We go walking every evening. Mother does not go very far, but we sometimes set off for more distant places. In the evenings there is no humidity in the air and it's just right for walking. There are a lot of mosquitoes and we have made nets for ourselves but they seem to go out of their way to bite Volodya, although in general they are quite bearable. The famous "gun dog" accompanies us on our walks and spends all its time chasing birds, which always makes Volodya indignant. At this time of the year Volodya does not go shooting (he is not really such an enthusiastic sportsman), it is nesting time or something, and even his waders have been put away in the cellar. Instead of shooting Volodya tried his hand at fishing. A few times he crossed the Yenisei to fish for burbot at night but the last time he came back without so much as a tiddler, and since then there has been no more talk of burbot. Across the Yenisei it is just marvellous. We once went across there and had heaps of adventures of all kinds and everything was fine. It is hot nowadays. We have to walk quite

a long way to bathe. A plan for morning swimming has been elaborated for which we are to get up at 6 a.m. I do not know how long this will last, but today we went swimming. Altogether our life here follows the "standard" summer-cottage routine, only we have nothing for the house.

They feed us well here, we have all the milk we like and we are all flourishing. I have not yet got used to Volodya's healthy appearance, in St. Petersburg I was accustomed to seeing him in a permanently out-of-sorts condition. Zinochka even gasped when she saw him in Minusinsk. And you should see what she looks like—thank God. With Lirochka it's a different story. We were sent a photograph from St. Petersburg; it was taken the day after she was released and she looks simply terrible. Can she have changed so much? Sometimes I think they might send her to Shusha. That would be fine. In Shusha she might recover a little.

Well, I have given you a whole heap of gossip. In her last letter Manyasha asked about photographs. On the way here I wrote to St. Petersburg and asked them to send you my photograph (home production) but they must have forgotten. As regards photographs that are not home-made, I shall write to St. Petersburg and ask them to go to the photographer's and order a few more pictures of me, and that they certainly will not refuse to do. I should very much like you and Manya to come to visit us here. There is still time for it. Give D. I. my regards. Volodya has finished talking to the miller and has already written two letters and I still cannot wind up my gossip.

Good-bye for now and many kisses. Mother sends regards to all. It is useless sending regards through Volodya, he thinks they should be taken for granted. Nevertheless I send many kisses to Manya and Anyuta and regards to M. T.

Yours,
N. Kr.

Written June 14, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

5

TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

August 9, 1898

It gave Volodya great satisfaction to read out to me all the reproaches that you have written about me. Well, I admit that I am guilty but deserving of leniency.

Today Volodya finished his "markets",* now he has only to cut it down and the job is done. In a few days, too, Webb will come safely to an end. Less than a half is left to be checked. I think the translation turned out all right in the end.

Another box of books for Volodya—among them Adam Smith, philosophy and two books of yours by Ada Negri—has arrived addressed to Madame Friedmann. She looked like raising a real storm but the outcome is that the books have been received, put on the shelves and catalogued. Volodya from time to time looks lovingly at the philosophy and dreams of the time when he will be able to wallow in it.

I received a letter from Lirochka yesterday, such a cheerful one, describing her life at Kazachinskoye. There are ten exiles there, most of whom live in a commune; they have their own vegetable garden, a cow and a meadow and live in one big house. Lira says she enjoys her freedom, goes picking berries and haymaking, does some housekeeping and never looks at a book. She proposes spending the summer in this way and then leaving the commune in autumn and settling down to work. It was a long and lively letter and I am very glad for her sake, she is at least getting a rest.

Life here goes on as usual and there is no news of any kind. Volodya has been busy all the time, although occasionally he has been snipe shooting. They had intended going somewhere after snipe today but the wind has been howling mercilessly for several days, day and night. There is no rain but just this raging wind.

We are [eating] . . . . . bottling rasp[berries]...** in spirit, salting cucumbers—everything is as it should be, just as in Russia. We once bought some water melons but, as was to be expected, they turned out absolutely white without

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* Lenin's book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.—Ed.*

** The dotted line indicates part of the letter cut out together with names on the other side of the page. The last syllable of the verb in the Russian has been cut away, so the sense might have been "We are [going]...."—*Ed.*

the faintest suggestion of red flesh. We have also tried cedar nuts.

Volodya is thinking of going into the taiga for a couple of days; he wants to see what the taiga is like, gather berries and cones and shoot hazel grouse. There has been a lot of talk about the taiga, and it is much more interesting than the talk about ducks.

That, I think, is all there is to tell about us.

When is Manya leaving for Brussels? I am glad for her sake. I have written a letter to [Anna Ivanovna Meshcheryakova] (the former [Chechurina]),* our schoolteacher and my very good friend. She will be living in Liege—the only thing I am afraid of is that she has left already and my letter will be too late.

And so good-bye; many kisses for you, Manya and Maria Alexandrovna. Regards to M. T. Mother sends regards to all—she has been feeling poorly lately. All the best.

Nadya

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from the original

6

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

A telegram about the release of D. I. eventually arrived with the last post. The post came when our place was full of visitors. During the past few days we have been subjected to an invasion of "aliens", some from Minusinsk, some from places round about—people of very different character. They brought discord into our peaceful life and towards the end we were growing a little bit crazy. The various "farm" discussions about horses, cows, pigs, etc., really wore us out. Everyone here is interested in farm life—even we acquired half a horse (one of the local residents hired a horse from the *volost* and we wanted to buy the fodder for it so as to be able to use it as much as we wanted), but our half horse turned out to be such a worn-out nag that it took an hour and a half to drag us three versts and we had to give it back; and so our efforts in this field turned out a fiasco. We do, however, gather mushrooms with great zeal, there are lots of saffron milk-cap and milk agaric

* The names in square brackets were cut out for secrecy.—*Ed.*

mushrooms here. At first Volodya announced that he did not know how to gather mushrooms and did not like it, but now you cannot drag him out of the forest, he gets real "mushroom fever". Next year we intend to have a vegetable garden and Volodya has already agreed to dig the seedbeds. That will be physical exercise for him. Up to now he has been enthusiastic only about his shooting. Right now he is arming himself for the hunt. He shoots grey-hen and we eat them and praise them. I do not think our "manor house" will be very cold. A clerk lived here before us and said it was all right, warm. In any ease we are taking all the necessary precautions—we have ordered some felt, we are sealing the windows up carefully, are piling up earth round the bottom of the house, etc. We have a stove in every room, so we do not expect it to be very cold. Well, that's enough gossip. I embrace you fondly, I am awfully glad for D. I.'s sake and for yours. Give him my very best regards. Many kisses for Anya and Manya. Mother sends best regards to all. She is gradually being drawn into Shushenskoye life and is not so bored now as she was at first.

Yours,
Nadya

Written August 26, 1898
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

7
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

September 11, 1895

Today I am going to write an enormously long letter; Volodya has gone off to Krasnoyarsk and the place seems empty without him, the "regime" has changed. As there is suddenly nothing to do this evening the best thing is to scribble a letter. I can run on about this and that for any length of time, but that is all it will be—just "this and that".

Today, dear Manya, I got your long, long letter, and Volodya received a postcard from Tula, I suppose from D. I. I have put it in his desk. I imagine it must be boring for D. I. to hang about in Tula and, in general, his present state of uncertainty is not of the pleasantest and in a strange town it is particularly miserable; but the worst is

over, that endless "sit-down at Azov".* By now D. I. may perhaps be in Podolsk ... in any case the question has probably been settled.

We are having a marvellous autumn, except that in the early morning it is cold and at night there are frosts. Because of this Volodya has taken all his warm things with him—a warm cap, winter coat, mittens and warm socks. He put in a request about his teeth a long time ago; now his toothache has gone and permission has come for him to spend a week in Krasnoyarsk. At first Volodya thought he would not go, but then he yielded to temptation. I am very glad that he will be making this trip, it will liven him up and he will be seeing people—he was vegetating here in Shusha. He was also glad to be going. The day before he left not a single book was opened. I spent all my time repairing his winter equipment, while he sat on the windowsill talking excitedly and giving me all sorts of advice—to have the double windows put in properly, to keep the door well locked (he even borrowed a saw from our landlord and set about sawing a piece off the door to make it fasten more easily. In general, he has been worrying a lot about our safety—he has persuaded Oscar to come to us to sleep and he has been teaching me how to use a revolver. He slept badly that night but when I woke him up in the morning—that was when the coachman was already here—he was so cheerful he began singing a song of triumph. I do not know whether he will be pleased with the trip. He couldn't resist taking a mountain of books with him—five of the fattest tomes—and intends to make notes in the Krasnoyarsk library in addition to that. I hope the books will remain unread. When in Krasnoyarsk Volodya is under an obligation to buy for himself two caps, linen for his shirts, a sheepskin greatcoat for family use, skates, etc. I wanted to order him to buy material for a blouse for Prominsky's daughter but since Volodya went to Mother to find out how many "pounds" of cloth to buy for a blouse he had to be relieved of that onerous duty. I have received a short note from Volodya sent from Minusinsk; although he grumbles at having to wait for a steamer I gathered that the journey is beginning satisfactorily.

During Volodya's absence I Intend: (1) to carry out full repairs to his suits; (2) learn to pronounce English, for which I have to learn by heart 12 pages of various exceptions in Nurok's book; (3) finish

* Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks were besieged in the fort of Azov in 1641; they "sat" in the fort for over a year before abandoning it to the Turks.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

reading an English book I have started. And then do some general reading. Volodya and I began to read *The Agitator* ("For Nadya" is written on *The Agitator* in Anya's hand and I keep intending to thank her for it, but so far have done nothing but intend) and we have been tormented by English pronunciation, so now I have promised him to learn Nurok by heart. These days I am doing the cooking. Mother has an awful cold in the head which has developed into a severe chill, so I am running the show. Mother has become quite used to Shushenskoye and in her letters describes the wonderful Shushenskoye autumn. Before Volodya left we all went with him on a shoot for grey-hen. The season is now open for grey-hen and partridge. They are noble birds—you don't have to crawl in swamps for them like you do for ducks and things. But no matter how many times we went out we never saw either a grey-hen or a partridge, but still the walks were fine. By the way, we once saw about twenty partridge; we were riding on a cart, all the Shushenskoye colony, when suddenly a whole flock of them rose from both sides of the road; you can imagine what our sportsmen were like. Volodya actually groaned. Still, he managed to take aim, but the partridge simply walked away without even bothering to fly. Altogether that was a sorrowful shoot; we didn't kill anything, though Oscar shot Jenny in the eyes and we thought the dog would be blinded, but she recovered. Jenny is awfully miserable without Volodya, she keeps close to me all the time and barks for no good reason.

You see what nonsense I am writing because there is nothing happening outside the family. That is why Volodya writes about one and the same thing in his letters—when things outside are so monotonous one completely loses one's sense of time. Volodya and I once got to the state when we could not remember whether V. V. had visited us three days or ten days before. We had to adduce a whole series of arguments to settle the issue. We only just managed it. Volodya intended writing home from Minusinsk, so some parts of my letter will probably be repeated. Perhaps not, though. Mine is a purely feminine letter, not much in it. I recently received a letter from the writer's wife, who writes that she is reading the proofs of Volodya's book,* she had the seventh signature at the time. She was afraid there would not be ten signatures in the book—there is a new law about the

* N. A. Struve read the first part of the proofs of the symposium *Economic Studies and Essays.—Ed.*

number of letters to a signature. If not, Karyshev* can be shoved in, too; it would be a good idea, except that the book will be held up. We are expecting it any day. Volodya hopes to finish the "markets" by the New Year, but he is rather doubtful about it. And that's that. I have received Maria Alexandrovna's letter of August 10 and for some reason was particularly glad to have it. Many kisses for her.

By the time you receive my letter you will probably be getting ready to leave. I wish you every success. There was a time when I very much wanted to go to Belgium. Perhaps I shall feel like going abroad again, just to take a look at the wide world—when that is possible. But for the time being it is not to be thought of. I suppose you will wait for Anya, won't you? When did she expect to get back? [Meshcheryakova]** is a very fine person, a bit wild, but amazingly forthright and good. It is time to stop. Again, many kisses for you and Maria Alexandrovna from me and Mother.

Yours,
N.

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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8
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

September 27

Today I am again writing instead of Volodya, dear Maria Alexandrovna. Volodya returned from Krasnoyarsk late in the evening the day before yesterday; two of Manya's letters were awaiting him and he intended to sit down and write a letter home, but first thing in the morning Oscar and Prominsky came to entice him away shooting at a place called Aganitov Island where, according to them, hares run around in thousands and flocks of grey-hen and partridge fill the air. Volodya began by hesitating but in the end yielded to temptation; by the way, it is a wonderful day today. In general this autumn has

* Lenin's article was entitled "On the Question of our Factory Statistics (Professor Karyshev's New Statistical Exploits)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 13-45.—*Ed.*

** The name was cut out for purposes of secrecy.—*Ed.*

been a good one except for a week or so when it was cold. Altogether, Volodya was pleased with his trip to Krasnoyarsk. He has probably written that he went to Krasnoyarsk with Elvira Ernestovna and Tonechka because E. E. had injured her liver and was quite ill.* We thought she had cancer or an abscess of the liver but fortunately it was neither, only a blow. And all she has to do is look after herself. They came back with Volodya. E. E. was in hospital in Krasnoyarsk and Volodya lived at Krasikov's. He saw lots of people in Krasnoyarsk, had plenty of talks and played about ten games of chess. One of the people now living temporarily in Krasnoyarsk is very likely to be sent to the village of Yermakovskoye, about 40 versts from us. He is a chess player and a very interesting conversationalist—Volodya made his acquaintance in Krasnoyarsk. I should very much like him to be sent there. We could visit each other, 40 versts is no great distance. Volodya travelled as far as Minusinsk (the steamer took five days to crawl there) with Lepeshinskaya, the wife of an exile who lives in Kazachinskoye. She has been given a job as nurse in the village of Karaginskoye, also not far from here, and her husband is joining her. He is a chess player, too. Lepeshinskaya told Volodya that Lirochka is in a state of nerves and irritable, lives in the commune and does the cooking every other week. They have three women there, one of them bakes bread and the others take turns at cooking. The day before yesterday I had a letter from Lirochka and she seems to be thoroughly fed up with the life of the colony; she writes that she is glad when she is alone and can do something. It turned out that the tooth of Volodya's that ached was not the one he had been trying to pull out but another, and this the Krasnoyarsk dentist duly pulled. Volodya found the way back home deadly boring although he had mustered quite a pile of books in addition to the masses he took from home. He did not want to stop in Minusinsk and did not even hand his travel permit in to the chief of police. In Krasnoyarsk he bought a long sheepskin coat. It is intended actually for me but in reality it will be a family coat for travelling and distant excursions. It cost twenty rubles and is so delightfully soft that once you are inside it you don't want to get out of it again. In general he bought everything he was supposed to, even toys for Prominsky's children and for Minya, the son of the felt-boot maker who lives next door. The lad is about five years old and often trots in to see us. The morning he heard that Volodya was back, he snatched hold of his mother's boots and began

* See Lenin's Letter No. 55.—*Ed.*

pulling them on. "Where are you off to?" "Don't you know Vladimir Ilyich has come back?" "You'll get in his way, don't go...," "Oh no, Vladimir Ilyich likes me!" (Volodya really is fond of him.) Yesterday, when we gave him the horse Volodya had brought from Krasnoyarsk for him, he was so taken with Volodya that he would not even go home to sleep but lay down on the mat with Jenny. An amusing lad!

At last we have engaged a servant, a fifteen-year-old girl, for two and a half rubles a month+boots; she is coming on Tuesday and that will be the end of our independent housekeeping. We have got in supplies of everything we can for winter. We still have to put the double windows in, although it is a pity to seal ourselves in when it is so fine outside! Mother is gradually being drawn into Shushenskoye affairs, she keeps well and is not bored. Thank Manyasha for the letter; of course I shall write to her abroad, too. I wonder how she will get fixed up there. It is a pity it is inconvenient for her to travel with the Meshcheryakovs, they are excellent people, Anna especially. We have received the German Zola and are going to start reading it. We shall now be receiving *Frankfurter Zeitung*. It will be sent from St. Petersburg and Volodya intends subscribing to some English newspaper. Why is there not a sound about Volodya's book? It will be a pity if it doesn't come out. The review of Karyshev's book should be sent to St. Petersburg, perhaps there are not ten printer's signatures and that is the reason for the delay. Well, that's enough gossip. Many, many kisses for you and Manyasha from me and Volodya. Mother sends best regards. When is Anya arriving?

Yours,
Nadya

Last time I forgot to write that we have received Bios. Does it have to be sent on?

It is strange that no letter from Volodya came with the Karyshev review. I remember that he wrote a letter at the time.*

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* See Letter No. 54.—*Ed.*

9
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

October 14

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Immediately Volodya had left for Krasnoyarsk I wrote you a detailed letter and did the same on his return from there. You have probably received both those letters. Well all that is a matter of the past. It is winter here now, our River Shush is frozen hard, we have had some snow but it has disappeared. It is quite cold (five below), which has not prevented Volodya going off to the island all day to shoot hares, although so far this year he has not yet managed to dispose of a single hare. He is warmly dressed and it will not do him any harm to get a breath of fresh air; he has recently been buried in his "markets" up to the ears, writing from dawn to dusk. The first chapter is ready now and it seemed very interesting to me. I play at being the "un-understanding reader" and am supposed to judge whether the exposition of the "markets" is sufficiently clear; I try to be as "un-understanding" as possible, but there is not much I can find fault with. It is awfully strange that we have not yet heard a word from the *écrivain* about the book, we think it has fallen through. Lately the post has been pretty miserable. Yesterday we had a good laugh; there was nothing in the post except newspapers, and Mother began to accuse the postman of mischievously hiding letters, our friends of being utterly selfish, us of giving him too few tips; and then she said we grudged money for the postman but otherwise wasted it. Why did we go to see Kurnatovsky the day before yesterday? We only interrupted his work and ate his dinner. In the end we all started laughing and got rid of the unpleasant feeling we always get when there is not much in the post. We did once go to see Kurnatovsky,* who works at a sugar refinery about twenty versts from here. It was on a Sunday and, although it was cold, the sun was shining in a clear blue sky and away we went. We were dressed in all our winter things, Volodya was in his winter coat and felt boots and they wrapped me in the "family" sheepskin, so that I was covered from head to foot. Kurnatovsky proved to be terribly busy, has no holidays and works 12 hours a day. We really did take him away from his work (but that was good for him) and we really did eat his dinner, too. We looked

* They made the journey on October 11, 1898.—*Ed.*

over the sugar refinery, the director was unusually attentive to the "important foreigners" (although Volodya in his felt boots and quilted trousers looked like the giant from Hop-o'-My-Thumb and the wind had made my hair stand on end); he tried to justify the rotten conditions in which the workers have to work, turned the talk to that subject himself and extended his kindness so far that, despite his elegant and prosperous appearance, he rushed to give Volodya a stool to sit on and himself brushed the dust from it. I almost burst out laughing. In a month's time Kurnatovsky is coming to us on a visit and perhaps Bazil and Tonechka will also manage to call in some day. I do not know whether Volodya told you that Bazil and Gleb are asking to be transferred to Nizhne-Udinsk, where they have been offered jobs as engineers. We now use the Minusinsk library through the people in Tesinskoye, although the library is a very poor one. Anyway, we have enough books. Anyuta once asked me what I am doing. I am busy on a popular booklet that I want to write, but still do not know how it will turn out.* That, so to say, is my chief occupation and in addition I do whatever else comes along—study English, read, write letters, take an interest in Volodya's work, go for walks, stitch on buttons.... We are now living like real householders; we have piled stable manure round the bottom of the walls outside our house, put in the double windows, made a wonderful little window that opens to air the rooms, planted a garden beside the house and put a fence round it. We have hired a girl who helps Mother with the housework and does all the dirty work. Thank you, dear Maria Alexandrovna, for your offer to send us underwear and household utensils. We do not need any clothes, before we left for Shushenskoye we overhauled our things very thoroughly and as far as household utensils are concerned, we brought some things with us from St. Petersburg and all we need are such kitchen utensils as beaters, tongs, fire irons and similar items. Volodya also has everything he needs; at one time he had no nightshirts but he bought some material in Krasnoyarsk and now they are ready, but for I don't know how many days he has been unable to find time to try them on. Volodya is always wondering where I get sufficient material for long letters; in his letters he writes only about things of general human interest, while I write about all the little things.... I am still in debt to Anyuta, I have not answered a letter of hers, but tell her not to grumble and not to count letters.

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* This appears to refer to Krupskaya's *Zhenshchina-Rabotnitsa* (The Working Woman), a book she wrote while in Shushenskoye.—*Ed*.

How are you all? Has Manya left? Was she very excited at leaving? Did she go alone or with the Meshcheryakovs? How has D. I.'s affair turned out? Has he received permission to live in Podolsk? Are Anyuta and M. T. pleased with their journey? But I could keep on asking questions till tomorrow. Regards to everyone and many kisses for you and Anyuta. Mother sends best regards. Volodya can write himself. Again many kisses.

Yours,
Nadya

What is Manya's address?

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10
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

November 11, 1898

We are today still feeling the excitement caused by yesterday's post. Yesterday we saw a boy from the volost centre climbing over our fence with a huge bundle. It proved to be our post, which was of such dimensions that it had to be brought from town wrapped in a sheepskin coat to make sure it was all delivered intact. It was not letters, of course, only books, but sometimes it is surprisingly pleasant to receive books. How are you keeping? Have you made many friends and, in general, do you still like Brussels? I used to receive enthusiastic letters from Meshcheryakov, who was greatly attracted by life in Belgium. Sometimes when I read a letter of his I longed to see how people lived out in the wide world. By the way, you probably get quite a lot of pleasure out of various folk choruses. They say the singing in Belgium is very fine. Gleb paid us a visit and one evening he and Volodya sang a little. I thought about you and thought how you would be listening to the Belgians. Gleb stayed four days with us. He came without Zina because Elvira Ernestovna was ill and could not be left. They went shooting but Gleb spent most of the time reading the first two chapters of the "markets". You think the "markets" are finished, do you? Nothing of the sort.

The book will not be finished until February. Volodya writes all the time from dawn to dusk and has practically no time left for anything else.

Many kisses from me and from Mother.

All the best,

Yours,

Nadya

Sent from Shushenskoye to Brussels

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11

TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

November 22

A. I.

It is quite a while since I wrote "home", as I put it. Today, as usual, I an going to chatter about this and that, only I don't know where to begin, I have forgotten what I wrote last time. The most outstanding event in our life recently was, of course, the arrival of *Studies and Essays*. We waited and waited and then gave it up; the day before the post came Volodya asked pessimistically what in particular we could hope for in the post. Then one grey morning we saw a boy from the volost centre clambering over our fence with a huge bundle of something; it turned out to be tremendous numbers of the *Studies* wrapped in the volost sheepskin.... Our mood soon changed. In his joy Volodya almost agreed to go to a wedding at the Matovs' (local Jewish shopkeepers for whom Volodya has a special antipathy because of their importunate ways).... But that was all a long time ago. Volodya has now buried himself resolutely and irrevocably in his "markets", grudges time for anything else, we have not been to the Prominskys for several months, he asks me to wake him at 8 o'clock in the morning, or at half past seven, but my efforts are usually fruitless, he gives a couple of grunts, pulls the clothes over his head and goes to sleep again. Last night he argued in his sleep about some Mr. N.—on and natural economy.... The other thing that keeps him busy, apart from the "markets", is the skating rink. On the initiative of Volodya and Oscar a skating rink has been cleared on the river near our house; the schoolmaster and some other locals helped.

Volodya skates beautifully and even keeps his hands in the pockets of his grey jacket like a thorough-going sportsman. Oscar skates badly and very carelessly, and so he is always falling. I cannot skate at all; they have fixed up a chair around which I do my best (by the way I have only been out twice and have achieved some success) and the schoolmaster is still waiting for his skates to come. We are a free spectacle for the local public; they are amazed at Volodya and amused at Oscar and me, and, all the time they keep ruthlessly cracking nuts and throwing the shells on our precious rink. Jenny thoroughly disapproves of the rink, she prefers running about the farmyard, burrowing in the snow with her nose and bringing Volodya all sorts of curiosities, like old horseshoes. Mother is afraid of the skating rink. There was one very fine day when we dragged her out for a walk; the ice on the river was wonderful, so transparent. We walked on the ice and Mother slipped and gave her head such a bang that it bled. Since then she has been more afraid of the ice than ever. Mother is displeased with Volodya; recently he mistook grey-hen for goose, ate it and praised it—a fine goose, not too fat. Oh yes, there is one other amusement. We intend going to the town at Christmas and Volodya is making some chessmen to be ready for the time when he will engage in a life and death struggle with Lepeshinsky. Volodya is carving the chessmen from bark, usually in the evenings when he has "written himself to a standstill". Sometimes he asks my advice—what sort of head to give the king or what should the queen's waist be like. I have only the very faintest conception of chess, I mix the knight with the bishop, but I give my advice boldly and the chessmen are turning out splendid. However, I have begun to write all sorts of nonsense. Many kisses for you and Maria Alexandrovna and my best regards to the male part of the family. Mother sends best regards to all.

Today the sun is shining so brightly in a beautiful blue sky, it will be excellent on the skating rink. However, good-bye for now.

Nadya

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12

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

January 10, 1899

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Many thanks for the letter and the parcel. We have not received it yet because we have a new postman and the registered mail has been held up. The postman tried to be stand-offish and did not want to take power of attorney to receive correspondence, but now everything has been arranged. We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves during the holidays in Minusinsk and had a break that will last us for a long time. At Christmas almost the whole district was in town, so we saw the New Year in very pleasantly at a big party. When the company broke up everyone was saying "A wonderful New Year's party!" The main thing was the splendid mood. We mulled some wine; when it was ready we put the hands of the clock at "12" and saw the old year out in proper style, everybody sang whatever he could and some fine toasts were pronounced—we drank "To Mothers", "To Absent Friends", and so on, and in the end danced to a guitar. One of the comrades draws well and he has promised to draw some of the outstanding scenes of the New Year's party. If he keeps his promise you will get a very good idea of our New Year's eve. Altogether it was a real holiday. Volodya battled on the chessboard from morning till evening and ... won all the games, of course; then we went skating (a pair of Mercury skates was sent to Volodya as a gift from Krasnoyarsk and on these you can cut figures and do all sorts of tricks. I, too, have some new skates, but I skate as badly on the new ones as on the old, or rather I do not skate but strut like a chicken, the art is a little too much for me!), sang in chorus and even went driving in a troika. We wore out our hosts completely! They admitted that another day of it and they would have taken to their beds. E. E. looks much better than she did in St. Petersburg despite her illness (she cannot eat meat or bread at all). She is very pleased with the way their family has taken shape and is afraid only of returning to Russia. There is nothing to be said in praise of the others. Tonechka looks particularly bad—she suffers from anaemia and eczema. Even Zina has grown thin and nervous. They all gasped and expressed astonishment at our healthy rustic appearance, and E. E. even declared that I am fatter than Zinochka. Mother did not go away with us for the holidays

and was pretty miserable. They have all announced their intention of coming to us in Shushenskoye for Shrovetide. All of us, the Shushenskoye public, including Oscar and Prominsky, dream of the arrival of the visitors and have already decided who will stay with whom, what treat we can best arrange for them, etc.

However, it is still a long time to Shrovetide and we have returned to our normal occupations and have cleared the skating rink; Volodya is hurrying with his "markets". I have received Anya's letter of December 24 but shall not write a separate letter to her because I would only have to write the same things; there is one little note for her. She is indignant that I give my letters to Volodya to "edit", but in most cases I describe our Shushenskoye life in humorous terms and Volodya comes in for a lot of badinage in them; I would not write such letters if I did not give them to him to read before I send them off.

One of the letters I received from the *écrivain*'s wife* informed me that two of her letters to us had gone astray. A pity! About my photograph. Last spring I asked for a family photograph that you liked to be sent to you. Apparently my request was not fulfilled. I am now going to write for my latest pictures to be ordered and sent to Podolsk. I do not know if I should have recognised D. I. if I had met him in the street, in some other, more suitable circumstances. Perhaps I should. By the way, Vasily Vasilyevich has started reading Blos and has taken it to the factory and asked us to leave it with him for a while, and Zinaida Pavlovna was going to write to her sister in Tula and ask her to send her Blos to Podolsk. That's that. I must stop. I embrace you and Anya fondly and send regards to all. So does Mother.

Yours,
Nadya

Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* This refers to N. A. Struve, wife of P. B. Struve.—*Ed.*

13

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Many thanks for the parcel, the only thing is that you are spoiling us too much. On the whole I must admit I have a very sweet tooth and in self-defence I say that my "organism requires it" (I have to say something). By the way, I am now converting Volodya to my faith. I feed him sweets regularly, every day after dinner and after supper, and every time he says it's "outrageous", but eats them and enjoys them. Although we do have enough consuming capacity, we intend leaving some of the sweets for Shrovetide, when we shall be having guests and shall provide the feast of feasts. Here I must stop. I embrace you fondly. Kisses for Anya and regards to all.

Yours,
Nadya

Written January 17, 1899
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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14

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

January 24

Dear Manya,

You are probably thinking that I am a faithless creature—promised to write and then ... not a word. If the truth be told, you ought to be scolding me. I intended writing long ago, but kept on putting It off. First of all, let me tell you how we spent Christmas. We had a wonderful time. All the people from the district came into town, most of them for three or four days. There are very few of us in Shushenskoye and it was very pleasant to be among people. We now know everybody in the district. We had a real festive time—went skating. I was laughed at, but since Minusinsk I have made progress. Volodya learned a lot of figures in Minusinsk and he now amazes the Shushenskoye public with his "giant steps" and "Spanish leaps". Another amusement was chess. People played literally from morning to night. Only Zina and I did not play. But even I caught the infection and played once against a poor player and checkmated him. Then we

sang, in Polish and Russian. V. V. has a guitar and so we sang to guitar accompaniment. We also did some reciting and talked to our heart's content. Best of all was our New Year's party (Volodya, incidentally, was tossed, it was the first time I had seen that performance and I had a good laugh). We are expecting visitors here at Shrovetide. I do not know whether they will come, but I hope they do. I cannot say that the Minusinsk people look well; Tonechka has awful anaemia and she is terribly thin and pale. Zina has also grown thinner but the worst thing is that she has become extremely nervous; the male side is also weak. Gleb kept lying down, first on the sofa, then on the bed. On top of everything, we wore our hosts out completely. Towards the end of the holidays they were having 10 to 16 people to dinner every day. They themselves admitted that if they had had another day of it they would have collapsed. Mother did not go with us, she was afraid of the cold.

After Minusinsk we returned to our usual occupations. Volodya got down to his "markets". He is now writing the last chapter and the book will be ready by February. I got a letter from the *écrivain*'s wife in the last post. The letter was a jubilant one. The new journal *Nachalo* has been sanctioned, permission for it came quite unexpectedly and the fuss and bother going on there now is something terrible. The letter makes you feel how excited the people there are. She writes, by the way, that the Webb translation is very good, and that it will soon be out. Nice to know. We are having a marvellous steady winter. So far there has not been a suggestion of the terrible Siberian frosts, the sun shines as if it were spring and we are already talking about how the winter passed without our noticing it (although it has by no means passed). How are you getting on there? It seems that you count the letters you get and don't write very often yourself. That's not the way. Do you see much of Belgian life? In general, do you like what you have seen of it? But do write more often and I will try to be more punctual. Mother sends her kisses. When will you be going home? You have probably become a real Frenchwoman. I am jealous in advance of your knowledge of the language, how I would like to know even one foreign language thoroughly.

Good-bye and all the best.

Nadya

Written January 24, 1899
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15

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

April 4

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

A couple of weeks ago I wrote to you and, as usual, filled up the letter with all sorts of nonsense. Nothing has changed here, we are all well, and it is warm outside—the temperature reaches 17° and there are dry patches in the fields; we take long walks and we have seen two wild geese and a drake. Volodya has bought himself new waders for shooting excursions, almost to the waist, reads outside in the garden, and goes about in a summer coat, and I recently dug a little ditch wearing no coat at all; I am now thinking seriously of vegetable and flower gardening and pondering deeply over a booklet on the subject sent me by Gleb. As far as my health is concerned I am quite well but as far as concerns the arrival of a little bird—there the situation is, unfortunately, bad; somehow no little bird wants to come. You ask me whether our quarters are big. The apartment is a big one and, if you come—which we would very, very much like—there will be plenty of room for everybody. I remember that I once sent you a plan of the apartment—I am not sure, though, perhaps I only intended sending it. It consists of three rooms, one with four windows, one with three and the other with one. It is true the apartment has one disadvantage—the rooms are all adjoining, but since we are all of one family that does not worry us much. Volodya and I are thinking of giving you the room we now live in (the one with three windows) and we will move into the middle one; our present room has the advantage that no one has to go through it to get to another room. However, we shall see. The main thing is that you should be well enough to travel here, my dear; we shall always be able to find room for you. If you come in May, the journey on the steamer will be a good one. We came on the first boat when the countryside was bare, but even then it was beautiful; I think it should be a pleasant journey in summer. The railway journey, however, is very tiring. I believe Volodya has written that the people in Minusinsk have changed their minds about spending the summer in Shushenskoye and have rented a cottage near the town, the only one in the district. Do you like bathing? Our bathing place is some distance away—about 20 minutes' walk. I know Anya likes to bathe. I remember I once came to visit you at Beloostrov and Anya and I went bathing in the rain.

We have received *Nachalo* from town and Volodya is highly indignant over Bulgakov's article and is already thinking out a reply to it. We had to wait quite a long time for that *Nachalo*. At first I thought the postman had lost the post. He is an awful muddler, that postman of ours—loses a newspaper, forgets to hand over a receipt or takes letters to the wrong address. I am always cursing him under my breath with all the Siberian swearwords. But enough of that. This letter will probably arrive just in time for Easter. Although Volodya objects, I intend to colour some eggs and make an Easter cake from curds. Do you know that it is the custom here at Easter to decorate the room with spruce boughs? It is a very pretty custom and we intend to "keep" it (I nearly wrote "keep it up", but then remembered that next Easter we shall be in Russia again). Mikh. Al. and Kurnatovsky may visit us. Good-bye. Many kisses for you and Anya. Regards to all, from Mother as well.

Yours,
Nadya

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16
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

June 20

It is ages since I wrote to you, dear Maria Alexandrovna. Somehow I could not get down to writing, especially as I thought you might still be coming here. Now I don't want to put off my letter-writing any longer. We are all the same as ever. Volodya is busy reading all kinds of philosophy (that is now his official occupation)—Holbach, Helvétius, etc. My joke is that it will soon be dangerous to talk to him because he has soaked up so much philosophy. There is no shooting for the time being and the famous gun is scarcely ever taken out of its cover. We go for our daily walk and swim regularly, we pick sorrel, berries, etc., and Volodya gathers everything with the enthusiasm of a hunter; I was surprised one day to see him tearing up sorrel with both hands.... There has been a lot of talk about shooting expeditions; the places they intend to go to—some place called

Forty Lakes, where there is so much game they will need a cart to bring it home, and so on. All that will be after St. Peter's Day,* and we intend going to Minusinsk at that time, probably on the steamer; we have already received permission. We had visitors recently; first there was Anatoly and his wife, and then Lepeshinsky and his wife and three-months-old daughter. Anatoly looks very bad, he is not likely to get better and his wife is completely broken, such a quiet little thing. Even the favourable climate here can no longer help Anatoly. The Lepeshinskys filled our apartment with hubbub—the baby's cries, lullabies, etc.—the two days they were here. They have a fine little girl, but the two parents are so fond of her they don't give her a moment's rest—they sing, dance and pester her all the time. No new people have been sent here and since summer began Oscar and Prominsky have been putting in an appearance less often, both of them are busy in the vegetable garden. Mother and 1 have planted a lot of things (even melon and tomatoes) and we have been eating our own radishes, lettuce and dill for a long time. The flower garden is also in bloom, there are blossoms on the mignonette, and the others (stocks, sweet peas, daisies, pansies and phlox) will be blooming in the more or less distant future; the garden gives Mother pleasure, too. The girl who worked for us last winter is staying on this summer, so the housekeeping is no bother. Since only seven months remain before we leave, the talk often turns to the subject of Russia and Volodya intended writing to you about our plans in that direction. How are you keeping? Have you got rid of your fever, and Anyuta of her cough? I have not answered Anyuta's letter but she should not be angry as I had intended having a good chat with her when we met. It is a great pity you are not coming here, but it is not long before we return to Russia and if we get away from here at the proper time we shall be home in Russia by February. Then you will see how Volodya's health has improved in Shushenskoye; you cannot compare him with what he was in St. Petersburg. I embrace you fondly, my dear—keep well. Many kisses for Anyuta and Manyasha, regards to M. T. and D. I. Mother sends regards to all.

Yours,

Nadya

Written June 20, 1899
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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* July 12, N.S.—*Ed.*

17
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

July 3

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Yesterday I received your letter of June 10. We are getting our letters written today because we had intended to go visiting, but it is doubtful whether we shall make the trip since some "weather" is beginning. Volodya must have praised it too much—he kept saying "lovely, lovely weather" and now it has changed till it is like nothing on earth. There is wind every day that makes the shutters rattle. But it isn't cold and we take a daily walk as we did before. Although the shooting season has begun, Volodya has not yet got "hunting fever". He has been shooting only a couple of times. He shot some grey-hen and we made some good meals off them. We keep intending to go visiting, we have permission to go to town, but the permit is lying at the volost centre and we don't know whether we shall go or not. We were all ready to go when we learned that Vasily Vasilyevich was at the factory and on his way back would call for us to go with him—and we have invited Gleb and Zina to come at that time.... I want to see Zina and have a chat with her, it is a long time since I last saw her. The only thing is that after all those meetings with comrades one feels somehow dissatisfied. You intend to say everything there is to say but when you meet the talk somehow gets pushed into the background by all sorts of excursions, chess playing, skating, etc. The result is more like fatigue than pleasure. However that may be, it is good to see people. We have heard from Yermakovskoye that Anatoly is very bad, Lepeshinsky's wife is a nurse and she thinks the end is not far off. The doctor at Yermakovskoye is a great optimist and assures Dominika that there is still hope. About Mikh. Al.—he is all alone because his fiancée* has postponed her arrival until the end of summer. Yermakovskoye is now the most populated place in our district. I have been wondering all the time whether they will send anybody else to Shushenskoye, but they have not done so. Prominsky's time will be up in the autumn and the main question for them now is whether they will go home at the cost of the government; it is a big family, eight of them, and they will never manage it on their own resources. In the time we have been here we have got quite used to our Shushenskoye comrades and if for any reason a day

* O. A. Papperek.—*Ed.*

passes without Oscar or Prominsky coming we feel that there is something missing.... Why is Lirochka so bored? She wrote to us that she has so much work she has to get up at 5 or 6 in the morning to get everything done. It is true that all her work is the sort that gives her little satisfaction, but that is something she cannot change. Kazachinskoye is no worse than any other place. I should very much like to see her but now I am hardly likely to. If she is transferred to our district, it will be when we are no longer here.

Well, good-bye. Many kisses. Mother sends very best regards. Has Anyuta left yet? If not, kiss her for me, and kiss Manya, too, many, many times.

Yours,
N. Ulyanova

Written July 3, 1899
Sent from Shushenskoye to Podolsk

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18

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is quite a long time since I wrote to you and I have not even answered Manyasha's letter of September 14 and my conscience is troubling me on account of it. There is nothing new to write about and I have described our daily life many times. A few days ago Kurnatovsky visited us and he told us about the people at Yermakovskoye. A son has been born to Dominika but the child is ill, they think it is consumptive, and she herself is sick all the time and very miserable. Mikh. Al. has been found fit for service in the army and he is now enjoying his last few months of freedom. In December he will be sent nobody knows where but for the time being he is very busy. His wife is always rather poorly, she is miserable and amuses herself by taking walks in the vegetable garden with a calf and her dog, Kurtashka. They promised to come to us as soon as the sleigh road is open. On the two days Kurnatovsky was with us, the men all went out shooting first thing in the morning; Kurnatovsky is fanatically keen on this sport. Somebody has heard from Kazachinskoye that Yaku-

bova has disappeared from there, enquiries are being made about her everywhere, and the people at Yermakovskoye have been asked whether she has been there; according to their information she was there a week ago. There are rumours that she has escaped abroad, somebody has seen her in Berlin. So that's that.

It is already autumn here and soon we shall go skating. That will be better because we have got rather fed up with walking and Volodya's shooting will soon be over. He is now busy with the Webbs' book. He has to work on alone because two of us together take longer. It is boring enough work because the translation is a poor one and it has to be almost all retranslated. Actually I don't do anything and I don't know where all the time goes. There remain three months and 13 days to the day of our departure, that is very little. I have already applied to the police department for permission to go to Pskov. Mother intends to make the same application in her own name.

Well, good-bye. Many kisses, regards to all.

Yours,
Nadya

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Sent from Shushenskoye to Moscow

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19

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

March 28

There have not been any letters from you or Anyuta for a long time. It looks as if my last "collective" letter was not to your liking. Somehow I could not write at that time. The Siberians recently gave me a good trouncing for a "collective" letter. Volodya came in for a good dose, too; he wrote a letter of twenty lines for five persons and expected to get five letters in answer to it They made merciless fun of him. So that was that. Congratulations, dear Marusya, and here's wishing you all the best. Since I have written all the gossip

about myself in a letter to Maria Alexandrovna,* I am going to write about mutual acquaintances. Yegor came to see us. I was awfully glad to see him because I had not known what to think about him. He looks radiant and very much alive. He kept talking the whole time without a stop. He told us that Vasily Vasilyevich had got a good job in Omsk, that Tonya had given birth to a girl and that both were doing well, E. E. is in ecstasies over her granddaughter (she was quite indifferent to the first). Gleb has also got a good job, assistant manager of a railway depot near Tomsk. So far, Zina is still in Nizhneudinsk. And so everything is all right with them. But poor M. A. is having a bad time in Riga. He wrote that the barracks were worse than a prison; he is not allowed out alone, always in the company of a soldier, and then only as far as the shop. They took away all his books except the German dictionary and Civil Law. The food is bad and he cannot take any into the barracks, it would be stolen immediately. The clothing they gave him is so bad he had to get some of his own. The worst thing of all is that M. A. has been posted to the very company that dealt brutally with the workers; the soldiers received an award of 10 rubles each for killing a worker, and when they were on patrol they opened fire on their own Initiative. So you see!

The comrades in Minusinsk are all keeping well. I recently received a letter from them which made me very glad. Altogether, I never imagined that I had become so fond of the Minusinsk crowd. Baramzin, the man we left our dog with, intends to bring us (really to Volodya) a drawing of her, he draws very well. Our dog seems to be having a good time and has become a general favourite. Talking of the dog reminds me of Lirochka. She once passed on some instructions through me, and one of them concerned a most detailed description of a moth-eaten mongrel. One of our mutual friends recently got a letter from her and sent me an extract from it. I was not at all pleased with the theoretical part of the letter. She says that Bernstein offers nothing in the way of theory—"That is some sort of idiocy!" But the practical significance of the book, she says, is tremendous; he has turned his attention to the needs of the masses and calls for reality, for concrete things. She believes the book to be a success because the orthodox trend had begun to pall. She says about the resolution**

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* This letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

** This apparently refers to the "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 167-182).—*Ed.*

that here energy finds an outlet in inventing a path that development must follow. In general, Lirochka to me is now an X. She and I formerly held astonishingly identical views, but something has been happening to her in the past three years and I don't understand her any more. Perhaps we would come to an agreement if we met, but there's something lacking in our correspondence. She is not the Lirochka I knew and it is no use writing about mists, weather and so on, and she doesn't seem to want to write about anything else, and she can't, anyway. To tell the truth, I cannot reconcile myself to her marriage. Her husband* created the impression on me of a kind of narrow self-assurance.... But I have said too much on this subject. Good-bye. Kiss Anyuta and give M. T. my regards.

Yours,
Nadya

Written March 28, 1900
Sent from Ufa to Moscow

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20
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House, No. 25,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow

March 30

Dearest Manyasha,

The day before yesterday I sent a letter to you and M. A. and yesterday got one from you. I am very glad that M. A. may possibly go to visit Volodya, as it looks as if I shall not be able to move from here for a long time. Yes, Volodya has got thinner, but it was only very recently that he lost weight, before that he looked very healthy. I think it is not so much the catarrh that bothers him as insomnia. Recently his insomnia has been chronic, he was very excited before our departure and the frosts were so fierce that he did not go out at all. As soon as we set out Volodya cheered up and began

* K. M. Takhtarev.—*Ed.*

to eat and sleep properly. I think he will be able to check the catarrh with the waters that did him good before; in general, Volodya takes care of his health. He writes that he is being well fed. It is a pity, of course, that he has to live away from the family.

I gathered from your letter that Yuly came to see you and so all my news is now stale.

I am sending you my translation and the book. I don't understand any of the underlined passages and, apart from that, I imagine I have translated a lot of the rest all wrong. I do not know the language at all, and the dictionary is little help; one phrase often has several meanings the way I read it. You must take a look at the entire translation and correct it where it is wrong. That's all. Good-bye, my darling Englishwoman. Many kisses for M. A. and Anya.

Yours,
N. U.

Written March 30, 1900
Sent from Ufa

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21
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

July 26

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

I have just received a postcard from Volodya, sent from Austria.... The letters are a long time on the way—I got the postcard on the eighth day, which means I shall receive Volodya's letters on the ninth or tenth day. Volodya writes that he feels very well and I am very, very pleased about it, of course. How are you keeping? Are you quite well? After the impassable mud and the dampness here, we are now enjoying wonderful days. You are probably having excellent weather too and you can take advantage of the summer. Things are all right here now. I am sorry you and Anyuta got such an unfavourable impression of Ufa; the weather was terribly muggy at the time and our place was all higgledy-piggledy. We are still living in the same apartment but we shall probably soon be moving to a winter apartment, an excellent one that we have tried, across the road diagonally from us. I am now quite well and so is Mother. She sends you all her regards.

When Volodya was staying here in Ufa he wrote Filippov a scathing letter about his having printed Volodya's article in such distorted

form.* A letter came from Filippov after Volodya had left in which he tried to gloss it over. "Dear Sir, an opportunity of settling the affair has occurred. I am sending you the manuscript of Skvortsov's article, so that you can reply. I ask you to bear the censorship conditions in mind and keep the article short." It seemed as if he wanted to appease Volodya by sending him the article, but two days later he changed his mind and sent another letter, this time not for forwarding to V. I. as before, but to be forwarded to Mr. Ulyanov. The outward appearance of the letter alone was evidence of his disdain—a torn-off half sheet of paper on which the letter had been typed with corrections to the typing. The letter was foolishly abusive, the man does not seem to understand what he is talking about. I wrote him that I had received the two letters and could not send them on to Volodya because I did not know his address, but would send them immediately I did; I said I was returning the manuscript because if it were sent abroad there would be a long delay in getting it printed and the author would hardly be likely to approve of it. Volodya would probably not want to accept favours from that idiot. Skvortsov's article is also excessively abusive. The same meaningless quotations from Marx and complete failure to understand one's opponent. There is no point even in polemicising with such a person. I doubt whether Volodya will answer him.

Maria Andreyevna called the day after Volodya's departure. She was very nice and awfully kind. I felt a twinge of conscience—I do not know how to be nice to people. I wanted to demonstrate my kindness by offering to help her make jam, only I remembered in time that I had never made any jam and the Lord alone knows what I might have made.... They are going to live at the farmhouse all the winter.... Well, good-bye. Many kisses for you and Anyuta and I will drop Manyasha a few lines.

Yours,

Nadya

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Sent from Ufa to Podolsk

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* The letter has been lost. The article was "Uncritical Criticism (Regarding Mr. P. Skvortsov's Article 'Commodity Fetishism' in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 12, 1899)" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 609-632).—*Ed.*

22
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

July 26

Thank you, Manyasha dear, for the books and the photograph—that is probably your doing—and for the postscript to Volodya's letter. I have been intending to write for a long time but kept on putting it off. How are you all? I have not heard anything of you for ages. When are you thinking of returning to town, what plans have you made for the winter? When I received a letter from Volodya saying that Maria Alexandrovna and Anyuta were coming with him I was very glad and thought I would be able to discuss everything with Anyuta. There are many things I wanted to talk about. When they arrived, however, I was so distracted that all my ideas flew away—and there were other visitors here besides the family. It turned out that I did not have a real talk at all and I do not know when I shall see them again. Oh well, we shall see what will happen; I have only seven and a half months left to remain in Ufa, the time will pass very quickly. I have found pupils to teach and am taking German lessons myself. I have discovered a German from Berlin and with some difficulty persuaded him to talk to me twice a week. So far we have had only one talk. The German is a chatterbox, so I may get something out of it. In addition to that I have been reading the silliest German novels and have been so busy at my German that I do not go anywhere; I am becoming unsociable and have no desire to go anywhere. Good-bye. I embrace you fondly.

N. Ulyanova

P.S. Did Volodya tell you that a young lady from here is coming to see you? She is the niece of an old acquaintance. Tell her whatever you can about studies at Brussels University.

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23

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk (Moscow Gubernia)

August 26

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is again a long time since I wrote to you, but all I have to write about is myself and that is boring. Nevertheless, I will write. I am keeping perfectly well, so is Mother. It is three weeks now since we moved to a new apartment. It is very convenient, downstairs, two rooms and a kitchen, newly decorated, and a garden under our windows; the owners are nice people. We lived in this apartment once before, but now it has quite a different appearance. Our address is *Priyutskaya Street*, *Kulikova's House*. We seem to have settled down at last. I am now pretty busy; I still retain my summer pupils and winter lessons have also begun. Two lessons will remain for the winter, both quite pleasant and paying quite well (62 rubles). I shall spend about 6 hours a day on them. Since I like teaching, it will be quite all right, not a bit tiring. The bad thing is the mud in Ufa, you can drown in it, and in the evenings, when there is supposed to be a moon and the streets remain unlit for that reason, you are quite likely to land up in a ditch—and one of my lessons is in the evening. On Sundays I take German lessons from an excellent German. Everything would have been all right except that there has been so much commotion at our place lately that I have not been able to take up a book for a fortnight. And so I have not been busy at my German at all and that is a great pity. Volodya complains of the turmoil of life in Paris, but that is Paris and turmoil is in the nature of things; but when there is turmoil in Ufa it is like nothing on earth. This, of course, is the time when some people are going, some are coming and others are passing through. People passing through say that Zina is very miserable, that she has recently changed very considerably, and grown thin and pale. They also say that Mikh. Al. is having a bad time, and that O. A. could not find any pupils for a long time. Mikh. Al. has been posted to the Krasnoyarsk Regiment, a regiment that was about to set out on a march (it has started by now). The Siberians are lazy correspondents and so I know little about them. I am partly to blame, by the way. Lidya intends moving to Ufa, she has made an

application, but I don't know whether she will be able to get transferred; I should very much like to see her before I leave here. Volodya writes very rarely and has apparently given me the wrong address, since he does not seem to have received my letters. I am now writing to him in Paris. I don't know where to send the magazine he asks for, *Zhizn*. In the end I shall probably send it to you, perhaps he has given you his proper address. I gathered from his last letter that he is leaving Paris but he did not say where for. I am returning Manyasha's French book together with *Zhizn*. She wrote that she had to return it in September. Anyuta, by the way, took a Gorky book to read in the train and its owner is asking for it back; if it is not too much trouble, please send it to me. I ask Manyasha to excuse me for not writing to her separately—I should only have to repeat everything. How are you? Are you keeping well? Has Anyuta gone for long? Have you received a reply from St. Petersburg about whether D. I. has been accepted into the University? Are you moving to Moscow soon? Well, good-bye. Many, many kisses for you and Manyasha. Mother sends regards to all.

Yours,
Nadya

P.S. Have just made a discovery—I have not got the issue of *Zhizn* that Volodya wrote about and so am sending only the French book.

Written August 26, 1900
Sent from Ufa

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24
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Kedrova's House,
Podolsk (Moscow Gubernia)

September 11

Our letters must have crossed in the post, Manyasha dear. At the end of August I wrote to Maria Alexandrovna a most minutely detailed letter describing my way of life. I wanted to send the French

book with a young lady who was supposed to come to visit you but who, it turned out, had found a travelling companion to go to Paris with; I think she is going to Paris for no particular purpose, just for amusement, she has not much intention of studying and cannot come to Podolsk. And so I sent the book to you by post, I did not go to the post office myself and in my hurry forgot to write "Registered" on the parcel and so it went by ordinary book post. I am afraid it might get lost. Please write and let me know if you received it. Speaking of books—when Volodya was staying here he promised to send an acquaintance *The Development of Capitalism* but forgot to do it and now asks for it to be done. To prevent any unnecessary posting please send one copy direct to the following address: Birsk (Ufa Gubernia), Pavel Fyodorovich Savinov. I think that is all there is to be done. Has D. I. got anything? When are you moving to Moscow? Are you all well? When is Anya returning?

There are no changes here, we are both well. I am busy with my teaching, I teach all subjects, even Latin; there are crowds of people here with nothing to do, as before; I am busy with German but there seems very little time for it. It is, of course, much easier to study the language with a German teacher than to work alone. Volodya seldom writes, says little about himself and complains of the turmoil. Olga Alexandrovna is not coming to Ufa because she has got fixed up in Krasnoyarsk, and Mikhail Alexandrovich is in the regular army. Zina is anxious to get to Russia and does not write in very great detail. I am expecting to see a returning comrade in a few days; he should have passed through here a long time ago but he was taken ill with dysentery just before he left and is still recovering slowly.

Here in Ufa there is absolutely impassable mud such as I have never in my life seen before, and all the time it is raining, raining.... Perfectly beastly.

Well, good-bye, many kisses for you, for you and Maria Alexandrovna. Regards from Mother.

Nadya

Written September 11, 1900
Sent from Ufa

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25

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow

October 1, 1900

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

I received a letter from Manya a long time ago but, as usual, allowed other things to intervene. You probably moved to Moscow a long time ago. How are you? Are you keeping well? Has D. I. left for Yuriev? Will Manyasha's case soon come to an end?* I once received a letter from Anyuta and answered it immediately, but my letters are not always delivered at the proper time and I sometimes receive letters from Volodya in different order from what he wrote them in. Although Volodya now writes more frequently, I still know very little about the way he is living there; I know he has taken up some English language courses, and that he cannot get into his stride.... Zina and her husband blame me for not writing enough about Volodya, but what can I write to them? Volodya is quite unable to write about the ordinary side of life. Let him write to them himself. They are not thinking of moving to Russia yet and have not done anything about it—I think they should. It will soon be March 11 and even Zina will be her own mistress then. Five months and eleven days—I no longer know whether that is much or little. I do not know whether I shall be able to leave Ufa on the 11th by the morning train as I have long been intending. Incidentally, there is nothing so very bad about Ufa except the mud, and I have long since become an Ufa patriot. We have fixed ourselves up well—in provincial style—a good apartment, good food, etc., in short we have adapted ourselves somewhat to provincial life. Time goes like a machine that has been wound up and I have some nice children as pupils. In general, I am very fond of teaching children, and at the moment the children are very nice, especially one tiny little girl. I give lessons to the numerous progeny of a local millionaire merchant—he has five of them. They are very strict, the way our merchants are, and I actually like the way the children are brought up. The parents do not dress them up, they have

* Lenin's sister Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova was arrested on September 30, 1899 and sent to Nizhny Novgorod until the preliminary investigation was over. She returned to Moscow at the end of December.—*Ed.*

very few toys, no nursemaids, plenty of freedom, the youngsters are in the street all day, the children clean their own boots, tidy up their rooms (even wash clothes). In general, there is nothing aristocratic about them and they are not spoiled. They all learn very willingly, both the youngsters and the older ones. The youngest girl (seven years old) is very nice, a delightful character, clever, pretty, and such an industrious and attentive pupil I have never seen. Every day she is "simply longing" to read, write and do arithmetic. And when there is something just a bit more interesting, her eyes flash. She now waits for me every time on the staircase and reports to me on all the events in the lives of the children. In short, this little girl has completely captivated me. Such wonderful children do exist! She is a happy-go-lucky kid, laughs a lot and has not been drilled (sometimes she wipes her nose on her frock). There is also a nice boy, but of a different kind. In general, I usually get interested in the boys and girls I teach, the pity is that the lessons take up too much time, they are foolishly arranged. I have taken up some French language courses here (soon German courses will open). Three times a week, an hour a time, six rubles a month; the courses are conversational, and so far I am very satisfied. I am the senior in a group of four. The Frenchman is an experienced teacher and conducts a very lively lesson, but the pupils are rather inert. It is a pity I have no French books here at all, and the French teacher gives us June newspapers to read or magazines with no beginning and no end. *Has Manyasha (she probably has) any French fiction or, in general, any French books?* None of the people here know any languages, so I with my half-baked knowledge am considered a specialist in this field; it is difficult to get any foreign books. I also go to the German teacher and write essays ten pages long for him, but we meet only once a week and that is too little for practice. I read German fiction on my own, but it's still more difficult for me to speak German than French. And that is how the day passes up to 8 o'clock in the evening, and in the evening I am rarely able to do anything, few evenings pass without somebody calling in. There you have the smallest details of the way I spend my time. Mother sends her best regards and I send many kisses. I shall not write a separate letter to Manyasha since I should only have to repeat what I have written, but instead I simply embrace her. That's all. All the best.

Yours,

Nadya

Sent from Ufa

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26

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

November 8

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

I received your letter a few days ago and yesterday a letter from Manyasha with newspaper cuttings enclosed; many thanks, I have already read them.

I recently wrote to you, but our letters, as usual, crossed in the post. I am now better, but Mother is still feeling rather bad, first she has palpitation, then she catches cold. We now have an excellent apartment, even a piano. We have an acquaintance who sings well and we manage some music in the evenings, rather strange music, it is true, for the piano groans, wheezes and rattles, but still it is music. Visitors make Mother tired and I, too, would be glad if they did not come so often; the fact of the matter is that I come home so tired at nine o'clock that there is not much I can do, anyway.

A few days ago I got a letter from Volodya that was two and a half weeks on the way and another that took a fortnight. The letters take a terribly long time to come. Volodya advises me to make a start with my English but I don't suppose I shall follow his advice. I have arranged with the German to have lessons three times a week and things will go better. Apparently I have been infected by Volodya's *idée fixe*—I must master languages at all costs. I now have some other work in addition to my teaching and language lessons and in the spring I will tell you all about it in detail. Only four months are left to March, when I shall come to you and then go on to Volodya. At the moment I am not allowing myself to think deeply on this subject, because if I do the time will drag heavily.

I don't know what to do about getting to Moscow in spring; I suppose it would be the wrong thing to tender an application beforehand. But why should I start guessing in advance? Spring is a long way off. It is winter here, a good, healthy winter. I hope the time will pass quickly for you until Christmas, and that at Christmas....*

Written November 8, 1900
Sent from Ufa to Moscow

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

* The end of the letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

27
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Sharonov's House,
Bakhmetyevskaya Street,
Moscow

December 2

Dear Manyasha,

Many thanks for the album, excuse me for the trouble I have caused you in getting it sent on; thanks also for bothering to supply me with French books. I have not yet managed all the old ones for I read terribly little. I know very well that unless I read I cannot master a language, but there is no time. How I sometimes envy you your solitude! It would give me the greatest pleasure to pore over my books of an evening, but I never manage to. Hustle, bustle and again hustle! One would have thought this could be avoided in Ufa. I do not know how it happens because I am not, I believe, very sociable. It is true that I have lost my shyness, only on rare occasions am I overcome by a sudden wave of shyness and cannot utter a word; now, however, that rarely happens and soon passes, but it used to be a real misfortune. That is why I understand you so well when you write about .your being shy. I know what a tormenting feeling it is and how difficult it is to get over it....

I have another request to make of you. Volodya asked for someone to write to Filippov about manuscripts and about payment for the Skvortsov article. I am writing about the manuscripts today but a letter must be written to *Soikin* about payment, mentioning the exact number of pages. I have not got a copy of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* handy, so I cannot count the number of pages; more important than that—I am afraid there may be some delay in sending the money and that I shall have left Ufa in the meantime—I want to avoid complications. It is also possible that Filippov has sent the money to Moscow and that may make things awkward. So please write to Soikin in Volodya's name telling him to send the money to you. I think it would be better to do this before the New Year.

What were you sick with? What did you have, influenza? I hope you have completely recovered.... Have you? And is Maria Alexandrovna keeping well? For some reason you did not write anything about her. What are you doing? What are you reading?

If you have not gone abroad by that time, we shall see one another

in March. Only three and a half months left, actually not very much. Do you know, I sometimes wonder whether I shall be given a passport to go abroad with Volodya away, perhaps his consent is necessary. Do you know whether Mark Timofeyevich's consent was required before a passport was issued to Anyuta? In general, as we get nearer to March I am getting alarmed at the possibility of delays. It is true that Volodya's letters have now become calmer and he writes that he is quite well, but it would not be a bad thing if those three months passed more quickly.

The Siberians write very seldom, and from people passing through I have learned only that Gleb has grown thin and Zina has got fat. That's not much.

Well, good-bye, I embrace you fondly and kiss you. Many, many kisses for Maria Alexandrovna as well. Mother sends regards.

Yours,
N. Ulyanova

Written December 2, 1900
Sent from Ufa to Moscow

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

28

TO LENIN'S MOTHER AND HIS SISTER MARIA

December 22

Dear Maria Alexandrovna and Manyasha,

It seems quite a time since I wrote to you. Today I am in something of a holiday-eve mood and I am spending the day in a most unusual manner. I shall not have any lessons for a fortnight, yesterday I gave my last lesson, my French teacher has also gone away for the holidays, and so I am, as the saying goes, as free as the birds of the air. I began today by cleaning up the house and then got down to letter-writing and finishing off all kinds of unfinished jobs. I wanted to write you a letter for Christmas but I have been so busy, and this letter will probably arrive in the New Year, if you bear in mind the holidays and the snowdrifts. I wish you, dear people, a happy New Year; I send you many kisses and wish you good health and everything, everything that is good. I hope that this year I shall be able to spend some time with you. Mother also sends her best wishes. Here it is "seriously"

cold, thirty below zero every day, and sometimes there is a snowstorm on top of the frost. I parade in Mother's fur coat and felt boots and she does not go out at all—the cold immediately takes her breath away. The post is greatly delayed by the snowstorms.

How are you spending the holidays? Has D. I. arrived? Oh, there's something else—what is Anyuta's address? I wrote to her at Volodya's address a long time ago and do not know if she received my letter. I'd like to write to her, but I don't know where to send a letter. Olga Alexandrovna, from whom I recently received a letter, is also asking about the address. What a pity, Manyasha dear, that they would not let you go abroad—I had already begun to envy you. Perhaps we shall be able to go together. I am trying not to think of spring and my journey yet; if I do, I get lost in wild ideas. People had a good laugh at my expense yesterday. I started crossly trying to preach that it was essential to maintain an even temper and got so angry that I proved brilliantly that I was not even-tempered myself. Unfortunately my acquaintances are all nervous wrecks, people with "moods"; of course, if one's nerves are out of order there is nothing one can do about it, only why let oneself go—that I cannot stand.

Olga Alexandrovna writes that they are badly off; she is living in Krasnoyarsk where Mikhail Alexandrovich enjoys some privileges on account of her. She has one small lesson, a poor one, and hopes to find another. M. A. gets terribly fatigued by army service and is bored by doing nothing and being a soldier. All the Siberians write regularly, except the Taiga and Omsk people, who maintain an unconscionable silence. Gleb, they say, is completely worn out at his job; I am surprised that they hang on there. We live on the main highway and people are passing through all the time so that we have a life of variety. Not long ago one of our Minusinsk acquaintances was here; he had been released for a month to visit his mother. By the way, Manyasha, you asked me about O.,* you wanted to know what sort of person she is. I have very little personal knowledge of her but have heard many good things about her. I had intended to send a letter with her but, first, she did not go direct and, second, I had influenza at the time and could not think properly. I thought she would get to know Anyuta. Here I am, chattering away nineteen to the dozen. My study of languages is making poor headway. I suppose I am not good at them.

* This refers to G. I. Okulova.—*Ed.*

And so, good-bye. Once more I embrace and kiss you; regards to M. T. and D. I.

Yours,
Nadya

The Kautsky translation* is not here now, it was sent temporarily to Astrakhan, it will be returned soon, but Volodya has asked for it to be sent to him, only I don't know if it's fit for posting, it has acquired such a battered look.

Written December 22, 1900
Sent from Ufa to Moscow

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in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

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the original

1901

29

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

February 2

Dear Manyasha,

I have not answered your last letter until now because when I received it I wrote to Astrakhan asking then to send me the *Counter-criticism* quickly; so far I have not had a reply but expect one in a couple of days. In the meantime ask Filippov for the translation, I wrote to him once at Volodya's request, asking him to send all Volodya's manuscripts to your address. I suppose he has not sent them.

I was beginning to let my correspondence lag but today I am in a tranquil mood and am, therefore, inclined to chatter, although there is actually nothing to chat about. Nothing here has changed except that the sun is shining in a joyful, springlike way, and I just dream of spring, I keep returning to the idea that there are only six weeks left and then ... then I shall be quite crazy with joy, especially when I have travelled to where Volodya is. At present there is no time to get really bored, there is plenty of work of all kinds. I ought to be trying to get everything done in time, but sometimes I laze around unpardonably, really unpardonably. I feel the urge to go out and

* This refers to the manuscript of Lenin's translation of Karl Kautsky's book *Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Eine Antikritik*, Stuttgart, 1899.—*Ed.*

sometimes, instead of sitting down to work, I go wandering about the streets and once I started reading a novel first thing in the morning. The boredom in Ufa is terrible, but you can build up your health here—I, for instance, have got so fat lately it's simply awful. But Mother cannot boast of her health, she is always feeling poorly. She is already making preparations to leave, and is busy sewing something and counting the days. After Ufa, you know, only Moscow and St. Petersburg are banned; at least there have been three such cases. But people do get terribly attached to one place. They stay put in Ufa, where you can earn good money, or else they move on to Samara. And what's good about Samara!

Oh how little I read! All this time I have read only Berdyayev. And how poor is my progress with languages. I have not been to the French courses since Christmas because our group broke up and the Frenchman teaches me very perfunctorily when I go alone. I have German lessons on rare occasions. The results depend on my mood, sometimes I chatter away well enough and sometimes I say the weirdest things. All our people in Ufa have now joined forces with *Samarskaya Gazeta* and write for it—so do I.* Since I have so little experience in this field, it causes me plenty of worry. Altogether I am making attempts this year to get into the literary world. Some of the attempts are successful, but the trouble is that I cannot write the way I want to and I just hate my stuff. That's that. Why don't you write anything about yourself? How are you? When is your case coming to an end? Good-bye, or rather, *au revoir*! Many kisses. I fondly embrace Maria Alexandrovna and send her many kisses; I am terribly impatient to get to Moscow. Mother sends regards to all. Good-bye, Manyasha dear, excuse me for my unpunctuality.

Yours,
N. U.

Written February 2, 1901
Sent from Ufa to Moscow

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

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* *Samarskaya Gazeta* (Samara Gazette) No. 36 (February 16, 1901) published Nadezhda Krupskaya's article "The School and Life".—*Ed.*

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TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

February 12, 1901

Dear Manyasha,

Many thanks for the cuttings. I read them with great interest. I have just received a notice from the post office about the arrival of a parcel. I suspect it is the Kautsky manuscript; if it is, I will send it to you tomorrow for certain. It is a great pity that there has been such a delay. Do you know whether *Essays and Studies* is obtainable? People are begging me to get a copy, they write that it is not on sale anywhere.

Just a month left. Wonderful, isn't it? The time will come when there is just one day left! Yes, everything will come!

There is something I almost forgot. Mother has a big request to make of you. She would like you to insure a lottery ticket she has, serial number *7328*; this has to be done before March 1 and it cannot be done in Ufa because if the ticket wins it will become known here only in April and she would have to come back to Ufa—in short, it would not be worth her while. Keep the receipt yourself. The insurance will cost about three rubles, Mother wanted to send the money now, but I managed to convince her that it would do when she sees you. That's that.

Are we really going to miss Anya? I want very much to see her. Write and tell me when she thinks of coming. I shall have another journey to make, to Astrakhan, and I do not know whether I should go to Moscow before or after—I am thinking of making it dependent on when Anya will come.

Well, good-bye for the time being. This week there have been such crowds of people here that I am awfully glad the holidays are over.

Many kisses for you and Maria Alexandrovna, and I embrace you both. Mother sends regards.

Hoping to see you soon.

Yours,
Nadya

Has Filippov sent you any sort of an answer? The blockhead!

Sent from Ufa to Moscow

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

31

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

June 11, 1901

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

I have not written all this time because at first I relied on Anyuta to describe our way of life and after that Mother and Volodya wrote to you. We are all quite well, and Volodya shows no sign of catarrh. Mother is also keeping well. She finds life with us very monotonous, but I do not. It is true that Volodya and I are terrible homebirds. So far I have been to only one picture gallery and know practically nothing about the town. That is partly because it is summer and when we go for walks we go out in the country, not to town. We are living in a suburb, where we have the conveniences of a big city—shops, trams, etc.—combined with the proximity of the country. Yesterday, for instance, we went for a good walk along the road. It is a marvellous road lined with poplars and with fields and orchards on all sides. We have been for only one long ride and that was not a success—we got caught in a storm and came home very tired. We are thinking of going to the mountains some time. Anyuta kept advising us to move to a village for the summer. Mother, too, thinks it would be better, but for many reasons it would be inconvenient. We cannot move too far because Volodya would have to travel to town every day, and that would be too tiring. Apart from that he goes to the library fairly often. There is a park and a place to bathe not far from us—about twenty minutes walk. In general life here is gradually beginning to conform to a pattern and Volodya is getting along better with his work.... As far as I am concerned, well, I work very little so far, or, to tell the truth, I do not work at all. Time passes, but where it goes I just don't know.

I intend to visit the local schools. This place is a sort of child's kingdom. Everybody pays so much attention to them and the children are so nice and healthy. I have been in our city schools and cannot help drawing comparisons; I find that the children here live a lot better. My intentions will probably remain only intentions. Still I have plenty of time. Vodovozova has sent a cheque for six hundred odd marks, but I have not yet received the money or any letter. Altogether people in Russia write terribly little to us, we might well think that all our old friends have forgotten our existence. There has not been a whisper either from Zina or Bazil.... Nor do we know whether Gleb has left that Taiga of his....

How are you getting on, dear Maria Alexandrovna? Are you keeping well? Give D. I. my regards.

A letter for Manyasha is enclosed,* and give M. T. my regards. Is there anything new? Is anything more known?

Our people all send regards and I send many kisses.

Yours,

Nadya

P.S. Volodya asks D. I. to send three copies of *The Development of Capitalism* to the doctor.

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

32

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

July 16, 1901

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Anyuta has sent us your letter to Volodya and also Manya's letter. Why did they not give Manya my letter? Very odd! It would be a good thing if the rumours that she is shortly to be released came true.... When you see Manya, tell her that I send her my best regards and many, many kisses. I was greatly surprised at the place in your letter where you said that Volodya would know about your way of life from your letter to Mother. That letter must have gone astray because Mother has not received a letter from you and quite recently told me to ask whether you had received her letter. Mother is ill all the time, she has a cough and sleeps poorly. Today she went with us to the bathing place, and got terribly tired, though it is no more than fifteen minutes walk. We go almost every day, the bathing here is excellent and, in general, although we live in a town the country is very near to us. It is a fine place in all respects. It is now quite warm, but not too hot to bear.

The time seems to pass awfully quickly. Somehow you scarcely notice how week after week goes by; it is not as if there was a lot to do, although it seems "you never do anything but are never without something to do".

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* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

I am taking up German again, it's a nuisance not to know the language; I have found a German woman who will give me lessons in exchange for Russian lessons. We'll see how it goes. Volodya and I keep intending to go to a German theatre, but we are terribly inactive in this respect, we keep saying "we ought to go" and that is the end of it, for something else always intervenes. Anyuta is more active in that sphere. By the way, I have to admit that our present mood is not very suitable for it. To get the best out of a foreign country you have to go there when you are young and are interested in every little thing.... However, I am in general satisfied with our present way of life; at first it was a bit miserable, everything very alien, but now, as we are beginning to take part in the life of the local people, that feeling is disappearing. The only thing is that people in Russia are miserly with their letters. Well, I must stop. I embrace you fondly, my dear. Keep well and cheerful.

Mother sends regards to you and Dm. I. We are awaiting a letter from him. All the very, very best.

Yours,
Nadya

Sent from Munich to Podolsk

First published in 1929 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from the original

33
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

August 2

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

We received your letter to Volodya yesterday. Unfortunately we see from it that nothing has changed, and I did not write to Manyasha the last time because I thought she would soon be with you. But good things always happen when you least expect them. Sometimes, when I have been away from home a long time and my thoughts have been occupied with something altogether different I find myself coming home with the idea that there simply must be a telegram waiting to say that our folks are with you.... Please, dearest, when you go to see Manyasha, give her many, many kisses from me and give M. T. my regards. I will write to Manyasha.

There are no changes here. Volodya is now working quite hard and

I am glad for his sake; when he throws himself completely into some task he feels well and strong—that is one of his natural qualities; he is in very good health, there does not seem to be a trace of the catarrh left and no insomnia, either. Every day he takes a cold rub down and we go bathing almost every day, too. But Mother is always feeling poorly, first rheumatism, then general weakness, and then she catches cold.

In a week or so Volodya and I intend going to Switzerland for a short time to see Anyuta. I am very glad that Anyuta did not go to Rügen, as she originally intended, but to Lake Thun. It is probably better there. We are going for only a few days, but I am looking forward to the journey with pleasure—first, I want to see Anyuta, and second, I want to have a look at the mountains. I don't know what these mountains are like, I have never seen them, except in pictures. While we are away, an acquaintance of ours is going to stay with Mother, so she will not be afraid of being alone. In the autumn Mother wants to go to St. Petersburg; I am trying to persuade her to spend the winter with us but do not know what she will decide. Summer is drawing to a close and I have not even noticed how it passed; it is as though there has been no summer. Summer is not a real summer in town.

Well, good-bye, dearest, I embrace you fondly and wish you health and strength. Give D. I. my regards and thank him for the book I received a long time ago. Mother sends regards to all.

Yours,
Nadya

Written August 2, 1901
Sent from Munich to Podolsk

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

1902

34
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is a long time since we had a letter from you and I am beginning to get seriously worried.... How are you keeping? Where is Anya now? If she is still with you, give her a lot of kisses for me. What about

Manyasha? Have you got decently fixed up, have you rented a suitable apartment?

We are all well. This is a wonderful autumn and Volodya and I often go out in the country. Mother is gradually getting used to the new surroundings, although she does not like big cities. She sends her regards to all. I embrace you fondly, you and Manyasha, and Anyuta, too, if she is with you.

Yours,
Nadya

Written September 27, 1902
Sent from London to Samara

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
the original

1903

35

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

March 4, 1903

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is ages since I wrote to you, so long that I have even forgotten when I sent my last letter. The fact of the matter is that I have completely forgotten how to write letters and regard them with feelings of loathing. Every time it requires quite a lot of will power to take up the pen. Once I start to write, however, the letter writes itself, I even begin to like it, but it is very difficult to start.

Volodya is not at home now,* he has gone for a breath of fresh air. I am always glad when he makes a trip somewhere because it has a very refreshing effect on him. A change of surroundings soothes the nerves—otherwise life drags on very monotonously, the same impressions and the same people day after day. And one does get sick of poring over books. This time I wanted to go with Volodya but again it didn't come off—a lot of work had piled up and Mother is so very sick that I did not want to, could not, in fact, leave her alone. She

* In late February and early March 1903 Lenin visited Paris where he lectured at the Russian Social Sciences Higher School and spoke to Russian political émigrés on the agrarian programme.—*Ed.*

has had a very bad attack of influenza and has had to keep to her bed for about a week. At first the doctor was afraid it might be typhus. She has now completely recovered, but the weakness remains. She wants to get out into the country as soon as possible, but we shall not be able to manage it before May, and even then I don't know how. Volodya is not keen on going to the country, he is very fond of Prague.* I have also got used to Prague but shall nevertheless be glad to get away from here. I should like to write in greater detail about the way we live, but there does not seem to be anything to write. How I should like to stay with you now! You wrote about your apartment in your last letter and I got a very clear conception of the way you live there. I was able to picture to myself the frosty weather, the fire in the stove, how you wait for Manya to return from work and how Manya comes in out of the frost. Life in Samara must be like life in Ufa. "Give me the wings of a swallow...." But now I am beginning to ramble. Sometimes I feel terribly homesick, today especially. By the way, that is how I am, I am always feeling drawn to somewhere else.

You will probably think we have no amusements at all here, but we go somewhere almost every evening; we have been to the German theatre a number of times and to concerts and we study the people and the local way of life. It is easier to observe here than anywhere else. Volodya is very keen on these observations and gets as enthusiastic about them as about everything he does. It was hard to begin this letter and now it is a pity to stop. I embrace you and Manya fondly, my dear ones. All the best.

Yours,
Nadya

Mother sends regards.

Sent from London to Samara

First published in the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

* Prague is mentioned instead of London for secrecy.—*Ed.*

1904

36

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

M. A. Ulyanova,
Laboratornaya, 12, Apt. 4,
Kiev

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Your letter came as a great shock to us—and it is so sad.* I can only hope they will soon be released. We have heard that there have been wholesale house searches and arrests in Kiev. During such raids many people are caught in the dragnet. Judging by the fact that they have arrested all of them, the case will be a trivial one. I don't know what conditions in the Kiev lock-ups are like now—they used to be bearable. Have they allowed you to see anyone? I have asked an acquaintance of mine to visit you. Since you moved to Kiev so recently, I am afraid you have not got any acquaintances there, the city is a big one and you are strange to it. It's a great pity that I have lost the address of a friend of Anyuta's and cannot write to her. I shall await your letter anxiously. Perhaps it will bring pleasanter news.

We are not living too well in Geneva; Mother is often poorly. We feel unsettled somehow and the work goes badly.

Can you send books and things to the people in prison? Have you had any letters from them? Does Mark Timofeyevich intend taking a holiday and visiting you? Mother is sorry she is not in Russia with you. Wishing you health and strength.

Yours,
Nadya

Written January 15, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1929
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 11

Printed from
a typewritten copy
(made by the police)

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* See Note No. 233.—*Ed.*

1909

37

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

To begin with, let me embrace you fondly. This letter is being written mainly to tell you that, because actually there is nothing much to write about. Manyasha has told you about our way of life. It differs from last year only in the apartment being very warm and Volodya having become a stick-at-home. He has been working a lot this winter and he always feels better when he is working.

For over a week now he has been getting up at eight in the morning to go to the library; he returns from there at 2 o'clock. At first he found it difficult to get up so early, but now he is very satisfied and has begun to go to bed early. It would be a very good thing if he could manage to keep it up.

To think we have been living in Paris for a whole year already! We have become fairly used to it, but it's a pity we see so little of the real local life.

Recently we went to a little theatre near here and enjoyed it. The audience was pure working class, mothers with babies, hatless, lively and talkative. It was interesting to see the audience's spontaneous reaction to the play. They applauded not good or bad acting, but good or bad actions. The play itself was just as ingenuous, naïve as the audience, with lots of pretty words that suited the taste of the audience. We got the impression of something very lively, very spontaneous. I was sorry that Manyasha was not there. I was also sorry she was not here when we went to see a demonstration of a hundred thousand people.* That created a very strong impression. In general we seldom go anywhere, and if we do, only on Sundays.

How are your eyes? Are they getting better? Mother, too, often complains that it is difficult for her to read in the evenings. Is the light good in your apartment? A pity it's chilly, though. It's a good thing you're living with somebody you know. If they are nice people, it's much pleasanter. Perhaps you will take a place together somewhere later on....

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* A demonstration of 100,000 people took place in Paris on October 5, 1909 as a protest against the execution of Ferrer in Spain; Ferrer had been accused of preparing the uprising in Barcelona in July 1909 brought about by the despatch of government troops to Morocco.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Again, I embrace you fondly. Mother sends very best regards. I wrote to Manyasha recently and yesterday I made a discovery—my letter to her was lying undisturbed in Volodya's pocket! How many times have I sworn I would never give him letters to post. This time he assured me he would not forget it. But he did!

Yours,
Nadya

Written in the twenties of December, 1909
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1930 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 1

Printed from the original

1910

38

TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

Anna Ilyinichna Yelizarova,
c/o Yekaterina Lesonen,
Leppenenö Village,
Terijoki Station, Finland Railway,
Finland

August 24

Dear Anya,

I have received your letter and passed it on. Shkurka* left** yesterday, and Mother and I are thinking of staying here till mid-September. It's really rather nice here. I embrace you fondly, M. A. as well, if she has not left. Best regards from Mother.

Nadya

Written August 24, 1910
Sent from Pornic (France)

First published in the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

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* V. I. Lenin.—*Ed.*

** This refers to Lenin's trip to Copenhagen for the Eighth Congress of the Second International.—*Ed.*

1911

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TO LENIN'S MOTHER

August 26

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

I have been intending to write to you for a very long time, but there is always something that prevents it. A few days ago we received Anya's letter. The money, 100 francs, Volodya received a long time ago, but the list of books to be bought and sent with that money has not arrived. We see from your postcards and Anya's letter that the arrangement in Berdyansk was not a real summer affair. It looks urban rather than rural, though, of course, there's the bathing.... Our summer has not been very fortunate, either. Mother got ill several times, she had pneumonia and the doctor said that her lungs are, in general, not in good condition, that she needs rest, good food, and so on. In that respect our place here is no good; there is not the tiniest garden round the house, not even a yard, and if we want to get out of doors we have to go somewhere, which is not the same thing at all. It is hot in the house and noisy. Although the food is good—we eat in a commune and the cuisine is Russian, filling, home-cooked food—we have to walk a verst through the town and that is very tiring; we have begun taking the meals home but there is the bother of washing the dishes.... In short, it means nothing to a healthy person but is bad for one who is ill. And the heat here is simply unbearable. Mother is better but the illness set her back a lot, she coughs and has fits of depression.

Volodya is making good use of the summer. He does his work out in the open, rides his bicycle a lot, goes bathing and is altogether pleased with country life. This week we have been cycling our heads off. We made three excursions of 70 to 75 kilometres each, and have explored three forests—it was fine. Volodya is extremely fond of excursions that begin at six or seven in the morning and last until late at night. But the result is that we don't get our work done. Still, never mind! The weather is beginning to break. We have the rooms here until September 13, but if the weather keeps fine we can arrange with the landlord to stay longer. That would be good but there will be a big problem. The commune closes early in September, there is nowhere to cook at home and the restaurant is bad and expensive. We have,

indeed, fixed ourselves up here very cheaply. For the apartment we pay 10 francs a month, dinner and supper cost 1 franc 30 centimes a head. There are some other expenses, of course, but they are insignificant. Volodya is not sure when to advise Anya to come—now or later, direct to Paris. As regards work—he is busier at the moment, although it is difficult to foresee what will happen in autumn. Living conditions are better in town, things are pretty inconvenient here. I think Anya should come when it best suits her, it doesn't make much difference to us. Volodya will be very busy during the next couple of weeks or so. Only she should not come while we are moving; although that does not really matter, either. The moving job is not difficult. How long it is since we met!...

Well, I have told you everything there is to know about us and now I give you both many kisses. For your health's sake try to take advantage of the bathing before you leave.

Mother sends best regards.

Yours,
Nadya

Written August 26, 1911
Sent from Longjumeau (France)
to Berdyansk

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Printed from
the original

40
TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

September 21

Dear Manyasha,

I have received your two letters dated August 29 and 31. Many thanks.

Today, at long last, we moved back to town, there have been some fine autumn days lately, but today it is cold and raining. Mother has caught cold again recently and coughs a lot.

Volodya is going away for a few days,* and has asked me to go with him to the exhibition in Turin but I shall not be able to go, although I should like to make the trip. Still, I have had a good rest this summer and am more attracted to books than to holiday-making.

How is Maria Alexandrovna after her journey? Was she very tired?

* See Letter No. 220.—*Ed.*

When does Anya intend coming to see us? I am already in the mood to go sightseeing in Paris with her....

Many kisses for all of you, regards to M. T.

Mother sends regards.

Yours,
Nadya

P.S. I will send you a long letter soon. This is only by way of greeting.

Written September 21, 1911
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
the original

1912

41
TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

March 9

Dear Anya,

This year I have somehow fought shy of letter-writing. Life goes on so monotonously here that I don't know what to write about. This winter I have been at home working persistently and for months on end have not left this part of the town. It has been raining all the time and I could not go cycling or walking. I have read little and have not been to any lectures. That is probably why I got so fed up with the winter. I am glad that spring has come, it is very early this year. Volodya and I have already been out in the country a couple of times. It is true that after these excursions I was so tired I couldn't budge, but it was wonderful, all the same. This week has been all going out. We went to the theatre, the play was idiotic, but these French fairly yelled their heads off. Still, there was some wonderful music during the entr'actes—Chaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Borodin. Today we are going to see Sophocles' *Electra*.... And all this because it is spring. How you have been spoiling us this year with parcels! Because of this Volodya has even learned to help himself from the larder and eats out of turn, i.e., not at the proper times. Whenever he comes in, he starts eating. Now he drinks milk before going to bed (instead of wine) and eats eggs in the mornings.

I soaked the herring as you told me and they are very nice, like salmon. I am thinking of making pancakes soon.

Mother is not feeling very well. I don't know what she will do in summer. First she wants to go to Russia, then she doesn't want to. She asks me to send her regards to all.

I have written about my niece.

We very rarely see M. F., he is very busy. He is in a hurry to finish a translation (this year he has translated three thick books), and has now been given some regular medical translation work. Kolya* is very pleased with his school, they play the gramophone to the children, tell them stories, give them crosses and teach them to write pot-books. He is beginning to chatter in French.

That is all the news. Has Manyasha received my letter? Why has she not written for so long?

I embrace you and Maria Alexandrovna fondly, Manyasha too. I should like to write more about Volodya to make the letter interesting, but couldn't manage it. Another time, perhaps. Regards to M. T. Somehow you all write very rarely.

Yours,
Nadya

Written March 9, 1912
Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

42
TO LENIN'S MOTHER

May 27

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Your letter was indeed a sad one, one misfortune after another.** But I do believe Manyasha and Anyuta will soon be released. Judging by the newspapers there are now house searches going on all over Russia, and they are arresting everyone who has been inside before, arresting them on sight, as a precaution against "something

* M. F. Vladimirsky's son.—*Ed.*
** See Note No. 311.—*Ed.*

happening", and then, a couple of weeks later, they let them go. I have heard of several such absurd arrests.

But it's a pity you have to worry so much and so deeply while things are being sorted out.

Look after yourself, my dearest. I embrace you fondly, and kiss you.

Yours,
Nadya

Mother sends her very best regards.

Written May 27, 1912
Sent from Paris to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

1913

43

TO LENIN'S MOTHER AND SISTER ANNA

January 4

Dear Maria Alexandrovna and Anya,

The compliments of the season from me and Mother to you and Mark Timofeyevich. Actually there is nothing to write about. Life is very monotonous. I have scarcely any acquaintances here. Of late I had been getting to know a young girl—not really a girl but the mother of the sweetest baby girl—but she left for Russia a few days ago.

We go walking every day, but don't overdo it. The weather is fine, but the mud is awful.

The holidays passed quietly, quite unnoticeably. The libraries here are Polish and there is a University library, but we are always busy and neither Volodya nor I have ever been to it.

And we have not been to a concert once.

We are all well.

I embrace you and send many kisses.

Yours,
Nadya

Written January 4, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1931
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

44

TO LENIN'S MOTHER AND SISTER ANNA

Dear Maria Alexandrovna and Anya,

Many kisses for the presents, only it is all so luxurious, we are not a bit used to it. Today Volodya invited some friends to share the parcel and to celebrate some brilliant publishing plans that emerged today. He is letting his dreams run away with him, every day a new book ... all his old notebooks have been perused, old lists of figures have been unearthed and the cobwebs wiped lovingly from them.

For the time being many kisses from me and from Mother, who is busy about the house.

About the mustard—that was Volodya inquiring on his own initiative—I know how to make mustard.

We are having winter weather here again.

The photographs were so good it was a pity to give them up. Volodya was particularly pleased with them.

About publishing and so forth, Volodya will probably write himself.*

Yours,
Nadya

Written February 24, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

45

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

March 18

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

It is an eternity since we had a letter from you or from Anya and we are very worried, not knowing what the matter is. Perhaps a letter has gone astray, or perhaps one of you is ill. It's so easy to catch cold in spring! Here the grass is already green and dandelions and daisies have appeared, but there is a most annoying wind. Mother has managed to catch cold and has been wheezing heavily for about a week. It is a pity she cannot go out. And so we have been thinking that the

* See Letter No. 233.—*Ed.*

climate is worse in Saratov and someone may have caught cold. What does Mark Timofeyevich write? Where is he now?

Life here goes on like clockwork and actually there is nothing to write about. We live as we did in Shushenskoye, from one post to the next. Until eleven we fill in the time somehow; at eleven the first postman comes, and then we impatiently await the six o'clock post.

The letters we have been receiving recently are all rather gloomy and so our mood falls into line with them. We live a sort of reflected life.

Still, I am glad spring has come because the last winter seemed a very long one. People are already renting places for the summer, but things are very uncertain with us. Mother will go first to St. Petersburg if she is strong enough.

The amnesty turned out to be an absolute myth. I do not know how it will affect Manyasha, but she will get a one-third reduction in any case.*

We have not had a latter from Manyasha for a long time and do not know how she is getting on.

I embrace you and Anya fondly and wish you good health above all else. I hope her hand is better and that she will manage to write to us. Volodya, I suppose, will write himself.** Mother asks me to send regards.

In a week or less it will be Easter here—so early!***

Many kisses,

Yours,

Nadya

Written March 18, 1913
Sent from Krakow to Saratov

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

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the original

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* See Letter No. 234 and Note No. 316.—*Ed.*

** See Letter No. 234.—*Ed.*

*** Catholic Poland used the Gregorian Calendar and Easter usually came earlier than in Orthodox Russia which used the Julian Calendar.—*Ed.*

46

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Yekaterininsko-Dvoryanskaya, 40,
Vologda,
Russia

Dear Manyasha,

I congratulate you and send you many kisses. Lidya will stay on at the old place until May because Anna Mikhailovna and Lodik* have come to her. She has been getting ill rather often recently. We are moving to the country for five months; it's lovely there—forest, mushrooms, mountains, and a stream. All I am afraid of is that we shall get bored. It will be good to put Shkurka out to graze. There is a big verandah attached to the house, just right for him to sit and work. It is a huge house, big enough for a whole workshop, but for the time being Shkurka and I will be alone there because Mother is going to Russia for a couple of months. She also sends her congratulations. I am dreaming of being able to work a little in summer, for although I sit over my books I don't do any reading at all, and I am really terribly anxious to get down to work. This month will be wasted. I am up to my neck in day-to-day affairs and on top of all that it has been discovered that I have thyroid trouble. The doctor has frightened me and every day I go to the clinic for electrical treatment; that takes three hours and after it I wander about half the day like a lunatic. They feed me bromide and, in general, it is all terribly sickening. I intend writing you a long letter but somehow time gets frittered away.

Many kisses,
Yours,
Nadya

Written April 10, 1913
Sent from Krakow

First published
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

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the original

* This refers to A. M. Wrzosek (Runina) and her son.—*Ed.*

1914

47

TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

Anna Ilyinichna Yelizarova,
Goncharnaya Street, 11, Apt. 23,
St. Petersburg

Dear Anya,

I have received your postcard with your address. The news about M. A.'s illness is disturbing. What was wrong with her? Has she completely recovered? And how, in general, are they living there? Oh yes, about Beer. To translate it, you must first obtain the permission of the author and then find a publisher. The first can be managed by writing to him, but it will be more difficult to find a publisher. An acquaintance of ours long ago proposed translating Beer and offered it to various publishers, to Semyonov in particular, and they all refused. Volodya at first thought you should translate §4 and §5 of Chapter Four and all of Chapter Six for *Prosveshcheniye*, and then came to the conclusion that it would be better to write an article (about Beer) based on these chapters, leaving out all the uninteresting trivialities (which would make the article more popular in form) but retaining the more interesting passages untouched. If you have received the book, perhaps Manyasha will undertake the job. Volodya has not yet returned.* This time he will probably be tired after the journey. There is quite a lot of work waiting for him at home. We are already beginning to think about a place for the summer. Volodya wants to go to the same place as last year. The place is good for one's health, although it pours with rain all the time. The winter has been an unlucky one for us, we have not been able to work much. It is still three months to summer, by the way. Perhaps you could obtain something about the public education congress, speeches and so on. I need them very much. I have written all about *Rabotnitsa*** to twenty places. The thing seems to be developing sporadically. Some people seem to have taken the matter up seriously. I don't know how it will turn out, but Volodya, by the way, will write to you about it. Why are you so much against Sibirsky? I embrace you fondly. I wanted mostly to write to you about Beer.

Nadya

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* See Letter No. 246.—*Ed.*
** See Note No. 328.—*Ed.*

Mother sends regards. She is keeping more or less well. I, too, am keeping well on the whole, only my heart gets rebellious occasionally, apparently owing to the thyroid trouble. I want to go to the doctor in a day or two and ask him whether it is not a relapse. I shouldn't think so.

What does Mark Timofeyevich write?

Written January 31, 1914
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1929
in the Fourth Edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
a typewritten copy
(made by the police)

48
TO LENIN'S SISTER ANNA

Dear Anya,

The periodical for women is developing sporadically so far. Moscow has promised to arrange a social evening to get money for it, but I don't know whether it will come off. Supplements to the newspaper would cost more and not less. A journal would have an organising significance and in that respect is better than supplements. In St. Petersburg they say "a hundred rubles is not money". I don't know about that, but somehow we start everything without money. When the first issue appears, perhaps it will be possible to get some, although, I repeat, I don't see any in the offing.

I am very worried about how the editorial side will be arranged. Things so far are in a bad way because there are two of us here and two more in Paris, but as far as the fifth member of the board is concerned things are not so simple. There are some very competent people in Paris. You know Lyudmila. The other is still more reliable as far as principles are concerned and whatever she undertakes she does well.* I should like the Parisians to co-opt a third person and have an editorial office there, but somehow this is not being done. The actual editorial office will be in Russia, of course. I do not think this at all important because the matter is such an elementary one that it will not be difficult to come to an agreement. At first there will be some slight confusion, then we shall talk matters over and in the end

* The Parisians were Lyudmila Stal and Inessa Armand.—*Ed.*

we shall be able to work together and everything will be all right. And the disadvantage is that we are not all competent literary workers, and some of our ideas may not be expressed clearly.... Still, I hope everything will turn out all right. Please write more about this matter.

A few days ago I read through all the articles in our newspapers about women's affairs and saw that the insurance campaign had made the question of women very prominent. I have sent a short article on this issue today. If only I were a competent writer—nothing comes out the way I want it to. While you are writing a thing it seems good, but when you see it in print you are ashamed to look at it.

I am worried about the article for *Prosveshcheniye*.* It is written exclusively from newspaper articles, and from very few newspapers at that. The resolutions were reported everywhere very differently and many factual errors may easily have crept in. Apart from that, the article was written at a time when I was feeling very ill and the work did not go well. Then they wrote to me that E. K.** would write about the congress. His reports were the best. I was very pleased, but it was my article that appeared. So there you are.

So please let me have the details about the periodical for women, I think you will get down to it seriously. It may develop into something big. At any rate I am beginning to get an appetite for it.

Nadya

Written February 11, 1914
Sent from Krakow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1955
in the journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4

Printed from a typewritten copy
(made by the police)

* Krupskaya's article "Results of the Congress on Public Education" was published in 1914 in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1.—*Ed.*

** It is not known whom this refers to.—*Ed.*

49

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Samarin's House, Apt. 3,
Moskovskaya Street,
Vologda,
Russia

April 15

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

The compliments of the season; we wish you health and everything else of the best. It is summer here. Yesterday it was as hot as Africa. All the leaves are out. We are all well.

I embrace you and Manyasha fondly.

Yours,
Nadya

Written April 15, 1914
Sent from Krakow

First published in 1930
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

50

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Her Excellency Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Samarin's House, Apt. 3,
Moskovskaya Street,
Vologda,
Russia

June 8

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Many kisses for you and Manyasha. I received Manya's postcard and short letter and replied to them the same day.

How are you keeping?

It is pouring with rain from morning to night here, for a whole week I have been unable to step outside except in raincoat and galoshes.

Mother is poorly all the time, her heart troubles her. This year she has frequently suffered from [palpitation],* and because of her ill[ness and] the rain she is in a bad [mood].

[We are] travelling. I have made a [discovery]—Basedow's disease gets a lot [better] from excursions into the mountains, but

* A corner of the postcard has been torn off and the words in brackets have been filled in by the editor according to the sense.—*Ed.*

in such weather I cannot, of course, go anywhere. By the way, the disease has not made itself very much felt this year.

That is all.

Again I embrace you.

Yours,
Nadya

Written June 8, 1914
Sent from Poronin

First published in 1930
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

1915

51

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

September 24, 1915

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

Every day we are expecting a letter from you, but for a long time there has been no news of you, or of Anya, or of Manyasha. The last letter we had was about your going to the country for the summer.* You must be back in town by now. It will be September 11 by the Russian calendar.... Did you have a good rest in summer? I should very much like to know how you are keeping, my dear. Are you quite well?

There are no changes here. We shall soon be returning to town. The mountains do me a lot of good. The thyroid trouble seems to have gone altogether. This last week we have been having magnificent weather and Volodya and I have been up all the nearby mountains. Twice I climbed the Rothhorn, 7,500 feet, which gives you an excellent view of the Alps, without getting a bit tired, and that is something not every healthy person can manage. In view of this I regard my illness as eliminated and am assuming the status of a healthy person.

Now I have a request to make of Anya. During the winter I studied pedagogy quite a lot and during the summer have been writing a pamphlet on education. It is almost finished. It will be quite ready in a month and will amount to nearly a hundred pages. The subject is "The Elementary School and Democracy". I have managed to collect quite a lot of interesting material, very little of which has been

* By the way, a letter came later saying that Manyasha is visiting you.

analysed before. Do you think some publisher might snap it up? I don't know the present situation on the book market or whether a publisher can be found. I will try writing to Gorbunov, although the subject is one that is only of partial interest to his publishing house.

Today I received the last issue of *Rech* (August 31), which we have recently been reading with particular interest. It's a pity we shall not be getting it any more. We don't receive any other Russian newspapers. In general things are bad as far as Russian newspapers and journals are concerned. In town they are available in the reading-room, but there is a great demand for them and if you come a bit late there's nothing left; apart from that it is not always convenient to go to the reading-room. *Sovremenny Mir* was sent to an acquaintance from another town for one day. Altogether, on account of the post and the general breakdown everybody gets newspapers by chance.

We are thinking of returning to town in a week. If the weather is very good we shall try to stay a little longer. After all, it does not matter where we live.

Well, I must close. Many kisses for you and Anya and I embrace you both.

Yours,
Nadya

Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Petrograd

First published in 1930
in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4

Printed from
the original

52

TO LENIN'S MOTHER

Her Excellency
Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanova,
Shirokaya Street No. 48/9, Apt. 24,
Peterburgskaya Storona,
Petrograd,
Russia

Mme. Oulianoff,
Seidenweg 4a^{III},
chez M-me Schneider,
Berne

October 11, 1915

Dear Maria Alexandrovna,

I very much want to write you a few lines and to give you and Anya many kisses. Many thanks to Anya for the trouble she is taking; today I received the *Zhurnal Zhurnalov* and about a week ago a whole

pile of the latest educational publications. I was terribly in need of them. Thanks, many, many thanks. Today or tomorrow I shall write her a long letter. How is Manyasha getting on? Volodya is all the time expecting letters from her. Do you know her address?

Again many kisses,

Yours,

Nadya

First published in the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

53

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Malaya Gruzinskaya, 7, Apt. 13,
Moscow,
Russia

December 14

Dear Manyasha,

Did you receive the long letter I sent you in spring? I wrote then, amongst other things, that Mother had died, gave some details of our way of life, etc.*

Now I am writing for one special reason. We shall soon be coming to the end of our former means of subsistence and the question of earning money will become a serious one. It is difficult to find anything here. I have been promised a pupil, but that seems to be slow in materialising. I have also been promised some copying but nothing has come of it. I shall try something else, but it is all very problematic. I have to think about a literary income. I don't want that side of our affairs to be Volodya's worry alone. He works a lot as it is. The question of an income troubles him greatly.

This is what I wanted to ask you about. Lately I have been putting in a lot of study on education in general and the history of education in particular, so I am well equipped in this field. I have even written a whole pamphlet, "The Elementary School and Democracy". The first part of it is ready and is called "The Role of Productive

* The letter has been lost.—*Ed.*

Labour in Public Education". A hundred odd pages. I think it has turned out quite interesting. I should like to ask you to find me a publisher. I can send the manuscript by return of post if asked for. Perhaps *Svobodnoye Vospitaniye* or some other publisher would take it. By the way, I have sent an article on Rousseau to *Svobodnoye Vospitaniye*. They must have received the letter because they have begun sending me the journal, but I don't know whether they have received the manuscript. Can you find out whether they got the article and whether it will be published? I shall soon be sending them something on other, more topical subjects.

I asked Rakhil's brother* to go to *Svobodnoye Vospitaniye*, but he has quite a few affairs of his own to look after and is not a very suitable person for such negotiations.

It is a pity, too, that business with the Granats went wrong. Volodya wrote to them in summer** but got no answer, and so I don't know whether they left a place for my article "Labour School", what size it should be and by what date it had to be submitted. I am now busy working on the question of apprenticeship. The libraries in Switzerland are, in general, well equipped and work goes well. I also have plenty of time, but the real problem is to find whom to write for. It is difficult to arrange anything from here. Do what you can.

Do you know what has happened to Lidya? I have had no news of her since summer. Is she well? How is she doing?

I write to our people from time to time, although there is nothing much to write about.

I send you many kisses, dear Manyasha, drop me a couple of lines some time. Keep well!

Nadya

Do you ever see Zinaida Pavlovna? Has she completely recovered from the operation? Where are they? What are they doing?

Written December 14, 1915
Sent from Berne

First published in 1930
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

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* L. S. Rivlin.—*Ed.*

** *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 317.—*Ed.*

1916

54

TO LENIN'S SISTER MARIA

Her Excellency
Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova,
Malaya Gruzinskaya, 7, Apt. 13,
Moscow,
Russia

Sent by Mme Oulianoff,
Seidenweg 4a[III] à Berne

February 8, 1916

Dear Manyasha,

Thanks for inquiring about the Gorbunovs,* they really did write. I have begun to receive their journal again and I see that it has been considerably reduced in size. On Volodya's advice I sent the pamphlet to Petrograd. Volodya wrote to the publisher about it.** Anya wrote that we may also try Bonch or the Popovs. The postcard you sent in spring about the Granats was received. Volodya wrote to you and to the Granats but got no answer. Perhaps you will ask them *the date by which it must be sent and what length it should be.* Write more often to Volodya, he is always anxious to receive your letters and you have now started writing very occasionally. It is true that it is somehow difficult to write. Do you know anything about Lidya, I have had no news of her since spring, although I have written to her. Many kisses. Volodya was very pleased to receive your long letter. Perhaps you will write again some time.

All the best,
N.

The newspapers and books have arrived. Volodya wrote to you when he received them.

First published in 1930
in Lenin's *Letters to Relatives*

Printed from
the original

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* I. I. and V. V. Gorbunov-Posadov.—*Ed.*
** *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 367.—*Ed.*

NOTES

[1] *Ulyanova, Maria Alexandrovna* (1835-1916)—mother of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, daughter of A. D. Blank, a doctor, who held advanced views. A well-educated woman, she spoke several languages and was an accomplished musician. Study at home enabled her to qualify as a schoolteacher in 1863. She possessed rare talents as an educationalist and devoted herself entirely to her family and children. Having a strong character and great will power, she shared her children's ideas and brought them up to be honest, industrious and sympathetic towards the needs of the people. She was a warm supporter of her children in their revolutionary struggle and endured the misfortunes that came upon her family with courage and fortitude. Her children's attitude to her was one of love and affection and Lenin always displayed exceptional consideration for her. She is buried in Volkov Cemetery in Leningrad. Letter No. 1

[2] One of Lenin's younger sisters, Olga Ilyinichna Ulyanova (1871-1891) is buried in Volkov Cemetery, Leningrad. She was a talented and industrious girl with a strong character. In 1887 she graduated from secondary school with a gold medal and entered the Higher Courses for Women (Bestuzhev's) in St. Petersburg. She died of enteric at the age of 19. Letter No. 1

[3] The money referred to is what Lenin's mother should have received from Kokushkino and Alakayevka.

Kokushkino—a village 40 versts from Kazan in which A. D. Blank, Lenin's maternal grandfather, owned some land, a house and a separate cottage. When he died, this property was inherited by his daughters, and Lenin's mother's share was under the control of her sister, L. A. Ponomaryova.

Lenin was exiled to the village of Kokushkino for his participation in the student disturbances in December 1887. The cottage, in which Lenin lived during his exile, has been restored and is now a Lenin Museum.

Alakayevka—a village some 50 versts from Samara (now Kuibyshev) near which Lenin's mother acquired a farmhouse; the Ulyanov family lived there every summer from 1889 to 1893. When the family moved to Moscow from Samara the farmhouse was rented to Krushvits, mentioned by Lenin in this letter.

Letter No. 1

[4] *Ulyanova, Maria Ilyinichna* (1878-1937)—a leading figure in the Communist Party and public affairs; Lenin's youngest sister. She joined the revolutionary movement while still a student, became a professional revolutionary in 1898 and was later among the Bolsheviks; she did Party work in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Saratov and in other towns in Russia and abroad. In 1900 she began taking an active part in the work of the newspaper *Iskra* (The Spark) and from the autumn of 1903 was in the secretariat of the C.C. of the Party. In 1904 she worked in the St. Petersburg Bolshevik organisation. She was arrested and exiled several times for her revolutionary activities. From March 1917 to the spring of 1929 she was a member of the *Pravda* editorial board and the executive secretary of the paper. She became a member of the Central Control Commission at the 14th Party Congress and a member of the Soviet Control Commission at the 17th Party Congress. She was a member of the Moscow Soviet and in 1935 was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
Letter No. 2

[5] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Recorder)—a Moscow newspaper that began publication in 1863; moderate liberal in its views. It was suppressed in 1918 at the same time as other counter-revolutionary periodicals. Letter No. 2

[6] The Mitya here referred to is *Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov* (1874-1943)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik, physician by training; Lenin's younger brother. He began his revolutionary activities in 1894 in Marxist student groups in Moscow; in 1900 he entered the *Iskra* organisation. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. he was delegate from the Tula Committee, an *Iskra* supporter and member of the majority. After the Congress he was appointed agent of the Central Committee. He was arrested and imprisoned several times for his revolutionary activities. From 1905 to 1907 he was a member of the Simbirsk Bolshevik Committee; he then worked as doctor in Serpukhov and Feodosia, all the time maintaining contact with the central Bolshevik organisations. He was mobilised in 1914 and conducted revolutionary work among the soldiers. After the October Socialist Revolution he was engaged in Party and government work in the Crimea; in 1921 he took up work at the People's Commissariat of Health in Moscow; from 1925 to 1930 worked at the Sverdlov Communist University and from 1933 onwards in the medical department of the Kremlin; he was active in promoting the Lenin Central Museum. Letter No. 2

[7] This apparently refers to lithographed copies of lectures on Russian history by Vasily Klyuchevsky, the publication of which began in the 1880-81 academic year. In the Central Party Archives at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism there is a lithographed copy of Klyuchevsky's *Course of Modern Russian History* for

the 1883-84 academic year which bears notes in Lenin's hand.
Letter No. 2

[8] Lenin refers in this letter to a speech made by Klyuchevsky "In Memory of the Late Emperor Alexander III, May He Rest in Peace" which was published as a pamphlet. Students of Moscow University bought up several hundred copies and added to them mimeographed pages containing D. I. Fonvizin's fable "The Intriguing Fox"; these were distributed as a "revised and supplemented edition". A copy of this edition was presented to Klyuchevsky at a lecture and he was shouted and whistled down. Over fifty students were arrested and some of them were sent out of Moscow. Letter No. 3

[9] The Mark referred to in this letter is *Mark Timofeyevich Yelizarov* (1863-1919), professional revolutionary, Bolshevik, Soviet statesman, husband of Anna Ilyinichna Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Lenin's elder sister. He joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1893, did Party work in St. Petersburg, Moscow and the Volgaside towns, took an active part in the First Russian Revolution and was one of the leaders of the railwaymen's general strike in 1905. He was many times arrested and exiled. After the October Revolution he became People's Commissar of Railways and then a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Trade and Industry. Letter No. 3

[10] The Anyuta here referred to is *Anna Ilyinichna Ulyanova-Yelizarova* (1864-1935)—professional revolutionary, leading figure in the Communist Party, Lenin's elder sister. She joined the revolutionary movement in 1886 and the Social-Democratic movement in 1893. In 1898 she became a member of the first Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. From 1900 to 1905 she worked in the *Iskra* organisation and on Bolshevik illegally issued newspapers and was a member of the editorial board of the newspaper *Vperyod*. Between 1904 and 1906 she maintained contact with the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party which was abroad, and acted as treasurer to the St. Petersburg Committee. From 1908 to 1910 she was engaged in revolutionary activities in Moscow and Saratov and from 1912 to 1914 collaborated in the Bolshevik periodicals *Pravda*, *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment) and *Rabotnitsa* (The Working Woman). She was arrested and exiled a number of times. In 1917 she was secretary to the editorial board of *Pravda* and editor of the magazine *Tkach* (The Weaver). From 1918 to 1921 she worked in the People's Commissariat of Education. She was active in the work of founding the Lenin Institute and herself did research work there. She was the author of a number of reminiscences of Lenin. Letter No. 3

[11] On April 25 (May 7), 1895 Lenin went abroad on the instructions of St. Petersburg Marxists to establish connections with the Emancipation of Labour group and familiarise himself with the West-

European working-class movement. Lenin visited Switzerland, France and Germany and returned to Russia in the autumn of 1895. Letter No. 5

[12] This refers to Anna, the two-year-old daughter of A. A. Schucht whose family was in Geneva at the time. Lenin had known the Schucht family in Samara. Letter No. 6

[13] The address given was apparently that of Saul Grünfest, one of those who organised the Minsk printing press of the General Redistribution Group. In 1882 he went abroad and joined the Emancipation of Labour group, for which he did some administrative work. Letter No. 8

[14] *D. A. and Y. N. Ardashev*—maternal relatives of Lenin's. Letter No. 12

[15] Three days later, during the night of December 8-9, 1895, Lenin was arrested in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. He spent over fourteen months in solitary confinement in a remand prison after which he was exiled to Siberia. Letter No. 12

[16] This letter was sent from prison to A. K. Chebotaryova, wife of I. N. Chebotaryov, a close friend of the Ulyanov family; since Lenin had boarded with the Chebotaryovs she was officially recognised as a person to whom he was allowed to write a letter from prison. The letter, however, was actually addressed to acquaintances who had not been arrested, including Nadezhda Krupskaya, and its purpose was to find out who else had been arrested besides Lenin. To avoid mentioning names, Lenin linked up the nicknames of his acquaintances with the contents of scientific books he asked to be sent to him.

This is the first of the letters written in prison that have been preserved. Here Lenin outlines his plan of work on his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* which he began in prison and finished in exile. Letter No. 13

[17] *Free Economic Society*—a privileged learned body, one of the oldest in Europe, founded in St. Petersburg in 1765 for the dissemination throughout the state (says its charter) of information useful in agriculture and industry. Letter No. 13

[18] In Goncharov's novel *Oblomov* there is a passage which speaks of a gigantic pie that was baked on holidays; the master's family ate it for two days and on the third and fourth days it went to the servant girls; the pie lived on until Friday, when one corner of it, already hard and without any of the filling, found its way to Antip who crossed himself and with a loud noise set fearlessly about the destruction of that amazing fossil.... Letter No. 14

[19] Thursday and Monday were visiting days in the remand prison. Lenin's mother and his sister Maria visited him on Mondays, when they were allowed a half-an-hour's personal visit; his other sister, Anna, visited him on Thursdays, when she was allowed a longer time but had to converse with him through a grille. Anna brought him books and carried on a correspondence in code.
Letter No. 16

[20] *Zemstvo*—a local government body headed by the local nobility in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia; Zemstvos were introduced in 1864. The competence of the Zemstvos was very limited (the building of hospitals and roads, statistics, insurance, etc.). The activities of the Zemstvos were under the supervision of the governor and the Ministry of the Interior, who could annul any orders the government did not approve of. Letter No. 16

[21] This letter was sent by Lenin on his way to exile in Siberia.

On January 29, 1897, the sentence of exile in Eastern Siberia for three years under the surveillance of the police was confirmed. Lenin obtained permission to go to his place of exile at his own expense and not under escort; he was ordered in his travel permit to report to the Governor-General of Irkutsk for further instructions. Lenin did not go as far as Irkutsk, but remained in Krasnoyarsk to await an answer to his application sent on March 6, for the permission of the Governor-General to remain in Krasnoyarsk or Minusinsk District of Yenisei Gubernia. Letter No. 17

[22] This appears to be the second part of a family letter. The first part of the letter addressed to Lenin's mother has not been found. Letter No. 18

[23] The extracts to be made from various books in the Rumyantsev Library (now the State Lenin Library) were needed by Lenin for his work on the book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Letter No. 18

[24] When he was in Krasnoyarsk Lenin maintained friendly relations with P. A. Krasikov, V. A. Bukshnis, N. A. Merkhalev, A. A. Filippov, V. A. Karaulov, N. V. Yatsevich, P. Y. Kulakov and V. N. Kudryashev. Letter No. 19

[25] This refers to a party of exiles who were going to Siberia at the cost of the state. Among them were some of Lenin's closest associates in the St. Petersburg League of Struggle—G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, Y. O. Zederbaum (L. Martov), A. A. Vaneyev and V. V. Starkov. The party was held up because of badly organised transport. They did not arrive in Krasnoyarsk until April 4, 1897. At the station Lenin met those of his comrades who arrived with this party of exiles. Letter No. 19

[26] Lenin's assumption was a mistaken one; Gleb (G. M. Krzhizhanovsky) and all his companions went into exile at the expense of the state.

Krzhizhanovsky's mother, E. E. Rosenberg, followed her son into exile. Letter No. 20

[27] G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Starkov, Y. O. Zederbaum and A. A. Vaneyev were held in Krasnoyarsk prison from April 4 to April 23, 1897, because they were on their way to exile at the cost of the state. An order of the Governor of Yeniseisk dated April 10 appointed the village of Tesinskoye in Minusinsk District as the place of exile of Starkov and Krzhizhanovsky; they left for Minusinsk with Lenin at their own expense on board the steamer *Svyatoi Nikolai* on April 30. Letter No. 21

[28] *Novoye Slovo* (New Word)—a scientific, literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1894 by liberal Narodniks; from the spring of 1897 it was run by "legal Marxists". It was suppressed by the government in 1897. Letter No. 21

[29] Lenin did not receive the official order to leave for the village of Shushenskoye in Minusinsk District until April 24, 1897; it was then that he received the certificate permitting him to travel to that place. Letter No. 22

[30] *Minusinsk prisoners*—V. V. Starkov and G. M. Krzhizhanovsky who were exiled to Minusinsk District.

Turukhansk people—Y. O. Zederbaum and A. A. Vaneyev who were exiled to Turukhansk. Letter No. 22

[31] Lenin apparently gave a detailed list of extracts from various publications in a previous letter which has been lost; he needed them for work on his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Letter No. 22

[32] At that time Dmitry Ulyanov was an undergraduate of the Faculty of Medicine, Moscow University. Letter No. 22

[33] The fee referred to was probably in payment of his article "A Charaeterisation of Economic Romanticism (Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists)", the first part of which was published in the April 1897 issue (No. 7) of *Novoye Slovo*. Letter No. 22

[34] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth)—a monthly journal published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918. From the early nineties it held Narodnik liberal views and in 1906 became an organ of the Popular Socialist Party.

Vestnik Finansov, *Promyshlennosti i Torgovli* (The Financial, Industrial and Commercial Herald)—a weekly published by the Ministry of Finance; it appeared in St. Petersburg from November 1883 to 1917. Letter No. 22

[35] *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* (Social Legislation and Statistical Archives)—a monthly published from 1888 to 1933 in Berlin, Thüringen and Leipzig. Letter No. 22

[36] *The Bulochkins*—this refers to Zinaida Pavlovna Nevzorova (whose nickname was "Bulochka", Russian for "bread roll") and her sisters Sofia and Avgusta; Zinaida and Sofia were arrested in 1896 in connection with the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Apparently Lenin used the surname "Bulochkin" in the plural to include Nadezhda Krupskaya, who was arrested on August 12, 1896. "What sort of *finale* was there?" means "What sentence was passed on them?" Letter No. 22

[37] Lenin, Krzhizhanovsky and Starkov arrived in Minusinsk on May 6, 1897 and were sent from there to their places of exile on May 8. Letter No. 23

[38] This letter has been lost. It was apparently a request to the *Novoye Slovo* editors to forward the fee for the first part of his article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism". Letter No. 24

[39] Lenin had not received any letters from Krzhizhanovsky and Starkov, who were sent to the village of Tesinskoye. Letter No. 24

[40] The "dispute" and "war" were started by P. P. Maslov ("Gold-Prospector") and the editors of the newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik* (Samara Herald) against the editors of *Novoye Slovo* headed by P. B. Struve; the latter were accused of feelings of sympathy for the bourgeoisie and of liberalism. In this dispute Lenin took the side of *Novoye Slovo* (see pp. 48-49.). Letter No. 24

[41] During his stay in Shushenskoye Lenin went shooting with O. A. Engberg and I. L. Prominsky, who were exiled in the same village, and the local peasants I. S. Yermolayev and P. T. Strogonov. Letter No. 25

[42] These words of Lenin's sister were apparently in answer to his letter of April 17, 1897 (Letter No. 22). Letter No. 25

[43] Lenin was paid the sum of 8 rubles a month as an exile; he lived mainly on this money. Letter No. 25

[44] The articles referred to are the separate parts of Lenin's article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" published in four issues (7-10) of *Novoye Slovo*. Letter No. 25

[45] The book *Vliyaniye urozhayev i khlebnykh tsen na nekotoriye storony russkogo narodnogo khozyaistva* (The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices on Certain Aspects of the Russian Economy)—edited by Professors A. I. Chuprov and A. S. Posnikov, was discussed at meetings of the Third Division of the Free Economic Society on March 1 and 2, 1897. Professor Chuprov read

the paper to the Society. Lenin needed the book and the verbatim report of the Society's meeting for his work on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* Letter No. 25

[46] Dmitry Ulyanov went to Kazan in connection with the sale of Kokushkino after the death of L. A. Ponomaryova. The very unpleasant ending of which Lenin writes was that both shares, that of Ponomaryova and of Lenin's mother, might be left to the latter with all their debts. Letter No. 27

[47] *Rybkina*—Nadezhda Krupskaya's Party nickname.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya (1869-1939)—professional revolutionary, prominent figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet state; the wife of Lenin.

She began her revolutionary activity in 1890 in student Marxist groups in St. Petersburg. From 1891 to 1896 she was a teacher at the Sunday Evening School outside the Neva Tollgate and conducted Social-Democratic propaganda among factory workers. She met Lenin when they were working together in the winter of 1894. In 1895 she was one of the organisers of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In August 1896 she was arrested and sentenced to exile for three years; she started her term of exile with Lenin in Shushenskoye and finished it alone in Ufa. After her return from exile in 1901 she went abroad and worked as secretary of the newspaper *Iskra*. She played an active part in preparing the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which she attended as a delegate with voice but no vote. After the Congress she was secretary of the editorial board of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. She played an active part in preparing for the Third Congress of the Party. While working abroad she maintained an extensive correspondence with Party organisations in Russia. During the years of reaction she took part in the struggle against the liquidators and the otzovists. In 1911 she worked in the Party school at Longjumeau; after the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (1912) she helped Lenin establish contact with Party organisations in Russia, with *Pravda* and with the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma. In 1915 she was a delegate to the International Women's Conference in Berne.

Nadezhda Krupskaya returned to Russia with Lenin after the February Revolution of 1917 and worked in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party; she took an active part in preparing and carrying out the October Socialist Revolution. After the revolution she became a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education and in 1921 became head of the Chief Committee for Political Education; in 1929 she was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Education. Nadezhda Krupskaya was one of the founders of the Soviet system of education and a leading theoretician in the field of pedagogy. She wrote a number of books on problems of public education and communist upbringing, and on the women's and youth movements.

She also wrote her reminiscences of Lenin. She participated in all Party Congresses (except the 1st and 5th), became a member of the Central Control Commission in 1924 and a member of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in 1927. She was a member of all convocations of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and was a deputy to the First Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and a member of its Presidium. Letter No. 27

[48] *The Neva Society for the Organisation of Popular Entertainments*, the report of whose committee is mentioned here, was founded in St. Petersburg in 1885; at first it was a private circle and later, in 1891, was formed into an independent society with a set of rules and an official name. The society had its own theatres, concert halls and sports premises in the area beyond the Neva Tollgate, where most factories were concentrated. The society arranged carnivals, lectures, concerts, plays, dances, etc.; it, also organised workers' choirs, reading-rooms and kindergartens. One of the Society's reading-rooms was used by members of Marxist study circles for meetings and talks with workers. Before her arrest in 1896, Nadezhda Krupskaya and other Marxist women teachers made extensive use of the reading-room. Letter No. 27

[49] *Spiez*—a village on the shore of Lake Thun in Switzerland, where Lenin's mother and his sister Maria were spending a holiday at that time. Letter No. 28

[50] Lenin attended the wedding of V. V. Starkov and A. M. Rosenberg, which took place in Tesinskoye on July 30, 1897. Letter No. 28

[51] Lenin refers here to Ivan Kuzmich Shpekin, the postmaster in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*. Letter No. 29

[52] In August and September 1897, Lenin worked on the article, "The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Pen Gubernia and General Problems of 'Handicraft' Industry". Material from this article was also used in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.

The article was intended for the journal *Novoye Slovo* but was not published in that journal, which was suppressed in December 1897. The article was first published in 1898 in a miscellany of Lenin's writings entitled *Economic Studies and Essays* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 355-458). Letter No. 29

[53] Lenin sent Mark Yelizarov "The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia" to be passed on to P. B. Struve; the letter to Struve has been lost. Letter No. 30

[54] Lenin here refers to a report from Tula published in the "Home News" column of the newspaper *Russkiye Vedomosti* for August 6, 1897. The report spoke of an investigation to be carried out by

the Zemstvo authorities of the gubernia for the purpose of making an assessment of property. The gubernia Zemstvo engaged a number of statisticians for this work but for some reason they were not confirmed by the local administration and the investigation was postponed until the following year. Letter No. 30

[55] On August 6, 1897, Lenin's mother sent the Governor of Yeniseisk a petition to have Lenin transferred to Krasnoyarsk for treatment on account of his poor health and because of her wish to visit him in exile. Her request was refused. Lenin's letter to his mother, mentioned here, has been lost. Letter No. 30

[56] After a number of applications the Governor of Yeniseisk permitted G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and V. V. Starkov to move to Minusinsk; they arrived there on August 31, 1898.
Letter No. 30

[57] For going to Minusinsk without leave V. V. Starkov was arraigned before the court and sentenced to three days arrest. Such breaches of the regulations were punishable by a written or verbal "reproof" or by a fine but not by arrest. Lenin's intervention released Starkov from an illegal sentence. Letter No. 32

[58] *Former women students*—Yekaterina and Glafira Okulova who lived with their father in the village of Shoshino, where they were under police surveillance. Glafira Okulova (*Zaichik*—Bunny) was later an active *Iskra* supporter and Bolshevik.
Letter No. 32

[59] G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and V. V. Starkov worked for the commission on regulating the bed of the River Minusinka in the town of Minusinsk, where they went twice from Tesinskoye to attend meetings of the commission. Letter No. 32

[60] Here and below the manuscript referred to is that of Lenin's article "The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia".
Letter No. 33

[61] When A. A. Vaneyev was in Yeniseisk he found work in the office of the engineer in charge of improving navigation on the River Angara. Letter No. 33

[62] Lenin's brother, Dmitry, was arrested on November 7, 1897, in connection with the case of the Moscow Workers' Union; he was kept in prison until August 20, 1898, was expelled from Moscow University and banished to Tula; later he was kept under police surveillance in the town of Podolsk, Moscow Gubernia.
Letter No. 34

[63] Lenin's letters to Struve and Krupskaya proposing the publication of a translation of the second part of Antonio Labriola's

book in *Novoye Slovo* have been lost. The translation appeared in 1898 in St. Petersburg in an edition by Berezin and Semyonov; it was given the title *K voprosu o materialisticheskom vzglyade na istoriyu* (On the Question of the Materialistic View of History). The English title of this essay of Labriola's is *Historical Materialism.* Letter No. 34

[64] The books referred to are *Ulozheniye o nakazaniyakh ugolovnykh i ispravitelnykh* (Ordinance on Criminal and Correctional Penalties) and *Ustav o nakazaniyakh, nalagayemykh mirovymi sudyami* (Code of Penalties Imposable by Magistrates). Lenin needed these books for his work as a consulting lawyer in Shushenskoye. He later recalled, "...when I was in exile in Siberia I had occasion to act in the capacity of a lawyer. I was not a certified lawyer, because, being summarily exiled, I was not allowed to practise; but as there was no other lawyer in the region, people came and confided their troubles to me." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 295.) Letter No. 34

[65] Lenin apparently refers to his essay "Gems of Narodnik Project-mongering", which he wrote for *Novoye Slovo*; he did not at the time know that the journal had been suppressed by the government in December 1897.

In 188 the essay was included in the miscellany *Economic Studies and Essays* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 459-89). Letter No. 35

[66] It has not been established what journal is meant. It is possible that as early as 1897 the issue of another periodical was planned in view of the constant persecution of *Novoye Slovo* by the authorities and of its shaky position. After the suppression of *Novoye Slovo* its place was taken by *Nachalo* (The Beginning), which appeared in the first half of 1899 edited by P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky and others. Letter No. 35

[67] Lenin wrote about these photographs to his sister Anna in a letter dated May 25, 1897 (see Letter No. 25). He expected, moreover, to be sent a group photograph of the leaders of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class (V. I. Lenin, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Starkov, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, Y. O. Zederbaum, A. L. Malchenko), which was taken in 1897 in St. Petersburg before they left for Siberia. Letter No. 35

[68] This refers to D. V. Trukhovskaya, the wife of A. A. Vaneyev, who was sentenced to three months' imprisonment in St. Petersburg; she followed her husband into exile and did her three months in Yeniseisk prison. Letter No. 35

[69] Lenin sent his article "The Heritage We Renounce" to *Novoye Slovo*. Since the journal had been suppressed the article was

not printed. It appeared later in the miscellany *Economic Studies and Essays*. (*Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 491-534.)
Letter No. 36

[70] This probably refers to the efforts made by Lenin's sister Anna on behalf of their brother Dmitry, who had been arrested and whose case was being examined in St. Petersburg (See Note 62).
Letter No. 37

[71] The lectures referred to are "The Development of Our Factory Legislation" by M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky and "The Law of June 2, 1897 and the Rules of September 20 on the Length of the Working Day" by P. B. Struve that had been fixed for December 6, 1897 in the Third Division (Agricultural Statistics and Political Economy) of the Free Economic Society. The announcements containing the theses of these lectures have been lost.

The article by Struve which Lenin speaks of as cut out by the censor was a regular review in the "Current Home News" column of the November 1897 issue of *Novoye Slovo*.
Letter No. 37

[72] The lecture referred to was "Peasant Landed Property and Measures to Prevent Peasants Losing Their Land" delivered by M. A. Lozinsky on December 13, 1897 in the Third Division of the Free Economic Society. Letter No. 37

[73] This refers to Struve's article in the "Current Home News" columns of *Novoye Slovo*. Letter No. 37

[74] *Syn Otechestva* (Son of the Fatherland)—a daily liberal newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1856 to 1900 and again from November 18 (December 1), 1904. From November 15 (28), 1905 the paper became an organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The newspaper was suppressed on December 2 (15), 1905.
Letter No. 37

[75] On January 8, 1898, Lenin sent a telegram to the Director of the Police Department asking for permission for his fiancée, Nadezhda Krupskaya, to spend her period of exile in the village of Shushenskoye. Krupskaya sent a request to the Minister of the Interior to be allowed to spend her term of exile in Shushenskoye with her betrothed and to have her sentence reduced from three to two years. She was given permission to spend her period of exile in Shushenskoye instead of Ufa Gubernia where she had formerly been ordered to go, but the sentence was not reduced.
Letter No. 38

[76] *Krupskaya, Yelizaveta Vasilyevna* (1842-1915)—mother of Nadezhda Krupskaya, who lived with her daughter and Lenin in exile and abroad; she helped them in their revolutionary work; she was given various jobs to do—looking after illegal litera-

ture, taking things to prisons for arrested comrades, etc. She always took good care of Lenin, who had great respect for her.
Letter No. 38

[77] The plan was put into effect; in the autumn of 1898 the first collection of Lenin's articles under the general title of *Economic Studies and Essays* by Vladimir Ilyin was published in St. Petersburg. It contained the essays "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism", "Gems of Narodnik Project-mongering", "The Heritage We Renounce", etc. Letter No. 38

[78] This refers to Yukhotsky, who began a campaign of slander against N. Y. Fedoseyev while in the Moscow transit prison; he accused him of embezzling money collected for the needs of exiles. Although such accusations were obviously false, Yukhotsky did not cease his persecution of Fedoseyev even in exile at Verkholensk where they were sent at the same time. Yukhotsky's persecution was one of the causes of Fedoseyev's tragic death.
Letter No. 38

[79] Lenin's review of A. Bogdanov's book *Kratky kurs ekonomicheskoi nauki*, 1897, was written in February 1898 and published in the April number of *Mir Bozhy* (The Wide World). (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 46-54.) Letter No. 39

[80] The Nanny referred to was Varvara Grigoryevna Sarbatova, a peasant woman from Penza Gubernia who was Nanny in the Ulyanov family for almost twenty years. Letter No. 39

[81] By Ivan Andreich (as in Letter No. 29) Lenin means Ivan Kuzmich, the postmaster in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General* who was fond of opening other people's letters. Lenin apparently wanted to warn Mark Yelizarov of the need for greater caution in his correspondence. Letter No. 39

[82] *Russkaya Mysl* (Russian Thought)—a literary and political monthly published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918; up to 1905 it held liberal Narodnik views. In the nineties it sometimes published articles by Marxists. After the 1905 Revolution it became an organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. Letter No. 39

[83] This refers to S. Bulgakov's book *Markets Under Capitalist Production. A Theoretical Study.* Lenin reviewed this book in his article "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory (Apropos of the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)". (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 55-64.) Letter No. 40

[84] *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party published in Stuttgart from 1883

to 1923. Up to October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky, later by H. Cunow. Letter No. 40

[85] In one of his August 1897 letters that has been lost Lenin apparently spoke of a letter he had received from A. A. Vaneyev, informing him of the illegal actions of the Yeniseisk District Chief of Police Stoyanov, who demanded that Vaneyev hand over his shotgun. Letter No. 40

[86] In this letter and the next the corrections mentioned are to the article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism"; they were made when the article was republished in the symposium *Economic Studies and Essays*. Letter No. 40

[87] Lenin refers to "The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of 'Handicraft' Industry". (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 355-458.) Letter No. 40

[88] This refers to Lenin's articles "The Heritage We Renounce" and "Gems of Narodnik Project-mongering", both of which were published in the symposium *Economic Studies and Essays*. The note on A. A. Mikulin's book has not been found. Letter No. 40

[89] *Yuridichesky Vestnik* (The Legal Herald)—a liberal-bourgeois monthly published in Moscow from 1867 to 1892. Letter No. 42

[90] *Statistichesky Vremennik Rossiiskoi Imperii* (Statistical Calendar of the Russian Empire)—published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior. Lenin used material from the *Statistichesky Vremennik* for 1866, 1868 and 1872 for his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.

The book mentioned, *Dnevnik vysochaishe razreshonnogo Vtorogo syezda russkikh deyatelei po tekhnicheskomu i professionalnomu obrazovaniyu, izdavayemyi komitetom syezda* (Diary of the Royally Sanctioned Second Congress of Russian Specialists on Technical and Vocational Education published by the Committee of the Congress), was probably sent to Lenin with a letter in invisible ink. Letter No. 42

[91] *Niva* (Cornfield)—an illustrated weekly that published the works of various classical and other well-known writers as supplements; founded in 1869. Letter No. 42

[92] Lenin did not translate Adam Smith's book. Apparently at the time the letter was written he did not know exactly the author or the name of the book he was to translate. This is confirmed by the fact that a few days later he speaks of having received *The History of Trade Unionism* by Sidney and Beatrice Webb for translation. Letter No. 42

[93] Lenin received Book I of the Webbs' *The History of Trade Unionism*. In the course of a few months he translated the book and wrote a number of commentaries to the Russian translation. When Nadezhda Krupskaya arrived in Shushenskoye they worked together on the translation of the first volume of the book. Letter No. 44

[94] Alexander Ivanovich and Nikolai Ivanovich Veretennikov were Lenin's cousins on his mothers side. At the time Alexander was seriously ill, and for this reason Lenin was greatly surprised to receive a letter that he had found himself work. Letter No. 45

[95] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (Moscow Recorder)—a newspaper founded in 1756. From 1863 it expressed the views of the most reactionary landowners and clergy. In 1905 it became one of the chief organs of the Black Hundreds. It was published up to the Great October Socialist Revolution. Letter No. 45

[96] Nadezhda Krupskaya and her mother joined Lenin at the village of Shushenskoye on May 7, 1898. Letter No. 47

[97] At the end of May, Lenin and Krupskaya went to Minusinsk, where they took part in a conference of exiled members of the Narodnaya Volya Party and Social-Democrats that was held on account of the flight from exile of the Social-Democrat S. G. Raichin. Letter No. 49

[98] Lenin refers to the translation of Volume I of the Webbs' book and work on his own book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Letter No. 50

[99] This refers to S. M. Friedmann whose address was used by exiles to receive literature and money. The "trouble" Lenin mentions was caused by the flight of S. G. Raichin (see Letter No. 49), who received money from abroad at Friedmann's address without her permission. In view of this the Minusinsk colony of exiles requested other exiles not to use Friedmann's address so as to avoid drawing the attention of the police to her. Letter No. 52

[100] Lenin was allowed to travel to Minusinsk to have his teeth treated; he stayed there three days, from the 10th to the 12th of August. Since there was no experienced dentist in Minusinsk, Lenin applied to the Governor of Yeniseisk for permission to go to Krasnoyarsk for a week to have his teeth treated. Permission was granted and at the beginning of September Lenin left Shushenskoye for Krasnoyarsk, where he stayed at the house of a Social-Democrat in exile, P. A. Krasikov. Lenin took advantage of the trip to work in Yudin's library and to meet Krasnoyarsk Social-Democrats. Letter No. 53

[101] *Ob*—a railway station on the left bank of the river of that name; as there was no bridge across the river at that time, express trains went only as far as Ob station. Letter No. 53

[102] Dmitry Ulyanov was banished to Tula and was then kept under police surveillance at Podolsk in Moscow Gubernia.
Letter No. 54

[103] The article referred to is "On the Question of Our Factory Statistics (Professor Karyshev's New Statistical Exploits)"—see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 13-45. Lenin made extensive use of the material contained in this article and the conclusions drawn from it in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. The article was not published either in *Mir Bozhy* or *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* but first appeared in *Economic Studies and Essays*.

Mir Bozhy (The Wide World—literally God's World)—a liberal literary and popular scientific monthly. It was published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1906; from 1906 to 1918 it appeared under the name of *Sovremenny Mir* (The Contemporary World).

Nauchnoye Obozreniye (Science Review)—published in St. Petersburg from 1894 to 1904; from 1903 it became a general literary magazine. It published Lenin's articles "Uncritical Criticism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 609-32), "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory" and "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 55-64 and 74-93).
Letter No. 54

[104] This was a book by the writer N. S. Sokhanskaya (pen-name Kokhanovskaya) which was used by Lenin's sister Anna to send Lenin messages written in invisible ink between the lines.
Letter No. 55

[105] This refers to *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* by Vladimir Ilyin, which M. I. Vodovozova published at the end of March 1899. Letter No. 58

[106] The first six sections of Chapter III of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* were published as a separate article in the journal *Nachalo* (The Beginning) No. 3, March 1899, under the title "The Ousting of Corvée by Capitalist Economy in Contemporary Russian Agriculture". An editorial note accompanying the article said, "This is an extract from the author's extensive investigation of the development of capitalism in Russia." Letter No. 58

[107] Lenin later made an addition to the Preface of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* which was published as a postscript.
Letter No. 58

[108] Lenin's sister Anna undertook to correct the author's proofs of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*; her brother Dmitry helped her; the proofs of the statistical tables were read by V. A.

Yonov whom Lenin had known long before in his Samara days. Letter No. 58

[109] This apparently refers to Mark Yelizarov's teaching at evening and Sunday schools for workers. Letter No. 60

[110] The letter mentioned here has not been found. It is known from the letter of November 11, 1898, that, Lenin received the copies due to him as author of the book *Economic Studies and Essays* which he requested be sent to a number of comrades and acquaintances. Letter No. 60

[111] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a daily newspaper, organ of big German stockbrokers; published in Frankfurt am Main from 1856 to 1943. It reappeared in 1949 as *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and is the mouthpiece of the West German monopolists. Letter No. 60

[112] *Stuttgart Parteitag*—the Stuttgart Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held October 3-8, 1898, which first discussed revisionism in the German Social-Democratic Party. A special statement, sent to the congress by Eduard Bernstein who was living in exile, was read; it contained an exposition and defence of the opportunist views he had earlier expounded in *Die Neue Zeit* in a series of articles under the general heading of "Problems of Socialism". There was no unity among Bernstein's opponents at the congress; fearing a split in the party, some of them, led by Bebel and Kautsky, tried to combine the theoretical struggle against Bernsteinism with cautious internal party practice; others (Rosa Luxemburg, Parvus), a minority, adopted a much more militant position and tried to get a more profound and extensive discussion and showed no fear of a split. The congress did not pass any resolution on this issue but from the discussion and from other resolutions it was clear that most of the delegates remained loyal to the ideas of revolutionary Marxism. Letter No. 60

[113] The book *Vladimir Ilyin. Economic Studies and Essays* was published in an edition of 1,200 copies. Letter No. 61

[114] As we know from a later letter (December 12, 1898, No. 64 in this volume), the letter containing the list of misprints in *Economic Studies and Essays* was lost in the post. Lenin subsequently made corrections only to the article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism", when it was published in the book *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, 1908. Letter No. 61

[115] The trip was sanctioned and Lenin and Krupskaya stayed in Minusinsk from December 24, 1898 to January 2, 1899. They took part in a meeting of Marxist exiles, who came from various parts of Minusinsk District. Letter No. 64

[116] These corrections were never made to the Preface of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* Letter No. 64

[117] The forty-fourth page of the manuscript (the fair copy) coincided with page 20 of the first edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 58). The correction indicated by Lenin was not made to the first or the second editions. Letter No. 64

[118] The writers referred to are M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, author of *The Russian Factory, Past and Present*, and S. N. Bulgakov, author of *Markets Under Capitalist Production. A Theoretical Study*. Letter No. 64

[119] *Zhizn* (Life)—a literary, scientific and political journal published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901. In April 1902 the publication of the journal was again started abroad by the Social-Democratic group *Zhizn* (V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, V. A. Posse, V. M. Velichkina, G. A. and M. A. Kuklin, and others).

The group ceased to exist in December 1902 and the publishing office was closed down. Letter No. 65

[120] Lenin here refers to the German firm of *Reclam* that published several thousand booklets on literature (*Universal Bibliothek*) at 20 pfennigs each. Letter No. 65

[121] This was written in Shushenskoye on a postcard. The postscript shows that Lenin took it with him to Minusinsk and did not post it until December 28. Letter No. 66

[122] *Journal Officiel de la République Française*—Official Journal of the French Republic, published in Paris. Letter No. 66

[123] The lecture referred to was "The Basic Features in the Development of Russian Serf Economy from the Beginning of the 19th Century to 1861", delivered by P. B. Struve on December 7, 1898 at the Moscow Jurists' Society. A report of the lecture was published in *Russkiye Vedomosti* on December 9, 1898.

N. Y. Fedoseyev's views on the causes of the collapse of serfdom can be assessed only from an article entitled "Historical Information", published in the newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik*, January 16 and 17, 1897, and a letter to Andreyevsky headed "Where Did the Russian Working Class Come From and How?" No basic work by N. Y. Fedoseyev on the subject has yet been found. Letter No. 67

[124] Lenin here refers to M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky's book *Promyshlenniye krizisy v sovremennoi Anglii, ikh prichiny i vliyaniye na narodnuyu zhizn* (Industrial Crises in Present-day England, Their Causes and Their Effect on the Life of the People). Letter No. 67

[125] See Krupskaya's Letters Nos. 12 and 14 for a description of how Lenin, Krupskaya and their comrades in Minusinsk spent New Year's Eve. Letter No. 68

[126] The debate was on the occasion of Tugan-Baranovsky's presentation of his thesis *The Russian Factory, Past and Present* for the degree of Doctor of Political Economy at Moscow University on December 19, 1898. Letter No. 69

[127] This addition to Chapter Two of Lenin's book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was apparently the footnote on the book by V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov), *The Destiny of Capitalism in Russia* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 184). Letter No. 69

[128] The parcel was sent to Lenin by his mother, who later wrote to her daughter Maria, "I sent a chess set for Volodya and some sweets for Nadya to Shushenskoye on December 17, expecting that they would receive them for the holidays, certainly for the New Year, but they did not receive them until a month later, about January 17." Letter No. 70

[129] A. A. Vaneyev applied to be transferred to a place with a milder climate and the Governor-General of Irkutsk ordered him to be sent to Tunka, in Irkutsk Gubernia. Only after a second request, accompanied by a doctor's certificate, did he manage to get transferred to Yermakovskoye in Minusinsk District at the beginning of June 1899, where he died three and a half months later. Letter No. 70

[130] *Chetvert*—a Russian measure of capacity used prior to the introduction of the metric system; it equalled about 45 gallons. Letter No. 72

[131] *Nachalo* (The Beginning)—a monthly scientific, literary and political magazine, organ of the "legal Marxists"; it appeared in St. Petersburg in the first half of 1899, edited by P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky and others. It carried several of Lenin's book reviews and the first six sections of Chapter III of his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* Letter No. 73

[132] As can be seen from the next letter, this refers to R. Gvozdyov's book *Kulak Usury, Its Social and Economic Significance*; Lenin's review of the book was published in *Nachalo* No. 3 for 1899. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 67-69.) Letter No. 73

[133] A. A. Vaneyev was not transferred to the village of Antsiferovo because of ill health. Letter No. 73

[134] This refers to the appendices to Chapter VII of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*—"Table of Statistics on the Factory Industry of European Russia" and "The Chief Centres of Factory

Industry in European Russia" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 601-02 and 603-07). Letter No. 74

[135] Lenin apparently returned one of the issues of Wolfe's *Izvestiya* with a letter in invisible ink. For purposes of secrecy he wrote that he had been asked for it. Letter No. 75

[136] This refers to Lenin's review of Parvus's book *The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis. Economic Essays*. The review was published in *Nachalo* No. 3 for 1899 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 65-66). Letter No. 75

[137] It can be seen from the next letter that Lenin's sister Anna sent him the pamphlet as a sample of the type in which his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was being set. Letter No. 76

[138] Lenin refers here to the "Chart Illustrating Tables A and B" in Chapter II of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, between pp. 136 and 137). Letter No. 76

[139] A. N. Potresov sent his criticism of the article "The Heritage We Renounce" in a letter to Lenin; he said, in particular, that the article produced the impression that the author proposed accepting the heritage of Skaldin. Lenin agreed in part with Potresov's criticism but wrote in reply that he nowhere proposed accepting Skaldin's heritage and had used his name and not that of Chernyshevsky and his followers for reasons of censorship (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, pp. 28-29). Letter No. 76

[140] This accusation was made by one of the "Samarans" (see Note 40), P. P. Maslov, in an article entitled "Idealizatsiya naturalnogo khozyaistva" published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 3 for 1899. Lenin seems to have been informed by Y. O. Martov about this article. Letter No. 76

[141] Here Lenin refers to Chapter V of his article "The Heritage We Renounce" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 491-534). Letter No. 76

[142] It has not been established with any degree of accuracy which addendum to Chapter VII of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* Lenin was referring to. It is quite possible that he referred to the footnote to the last paragraph but one of the chapter in which Lenin stated that Marx's classification of the capitalist forms and stages of industry was more correct than that of Held and Bücher, which confuses the manufactory with the factory and regards working for a buyer-up as a special form of industry" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 549). Letter No. 76

[143] This refers to the fee due to Lenin for his translation of *The His-*

tory of Trade Unionism by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. The book was published by O. N. Popova in 1899. Letter No. 76

[144] This appears to refer to Lenin's review of the directory *Torgovo-promyshlennaya Rossiya. Spravochnaya kniga dlya kuptsov i fabrikantov* (Commercial and Industrial Russia. Handbook for Merchants and Factory Owners), published in *Nachalo* No. 3 for 1899 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 70-73). Letter No. 77

[145] Lenin here refers to his article "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory" published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 1 for 1899 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 55-64). Struve's article in reply to it, "Markets Under Capitalist Production (Apropos of Bulgakov's Book and Ilyin's Article)", appeared in the same issue of the journal.

The market theory gave rise to a lively polemic in which A. Izgoyev, P. Nezhdanov, B. Avilov and P. Skvortsov also participated. In No. 8 of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* Lenin published another article, "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 74-93). Struve delayed publication of this article, apparently in order to print his "Answer to Ilyin" in the same issue. The polemics on this problem continued—*Zhizn* No. 12 for 1899 carried P. Nezhdanov's article "The Polemics over the Market Question" and Lenin's "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 160-65). Letter No. 77

[146] *Die Neue Zeit* was a journal published by the German Social-Democratic Party; although subscription to it was permitted in Russia it was frequently confiscated if addressed to a politically unreliable person. For this reason Lenin referred to it in Russian (*Novoye Vremya*). Lenin's relatives had the journal sent to them in Moscow, and sent it on to Lenin in Shushenskoye. Letter No. 78

[147] Lenin refers here to one of the books of agricultural returns which was published by the gubernia Zemstvos, and which he used in writing his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Letter No. 78

[148] Lenin probably refers here to the table showing categories of industries in Chapter V of his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (see *Collected Works*, Vol 3, p. 347). This table was printed in the smallest available type, as Lenin requested. Letter No. 78

[149] This refers to the table in the second section of Chapter II of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (First Edition) on the distribution of allotment land among the various groups of householders and the table in the first section of that chapter illustrating the ousting of the middle group of householders in the Dnieper Uyezd of Taurida Gubernia (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 86 and 71). Letter No. 78

[150] Lenin added only a postscript to the Preface of his book (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 26-27); he mentions this in Letter No. 82.
Letter No. 78

[151] Lenin here refers to his article "Once More on the Theory of Realisation", in which he does not quote *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* because he does not know when it will be published; instead he quotes "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism", published in the collection *Economic Studies and Essays*.
Letter No. 78

[152] There follows, in the original, a list of the misprints. Some of the corrections were made in the handwriting of Lenin's sister Anna.
Letter No. 78

[153] Mark Yelizarov won a game of chess against the German chess player Emanuel Lasker during a session of simultaneous play on several boards. Lasker was in Moscow at the end of January and in early February 1899. Letter No. 79

[154] By "true believers" Lenin apparently means the "Samarans" (see Notes 40 and 140). Letter No. 79

[155] Lenin's article "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" was written in reply to P. B. Struve's "Markets Under Capitalist Production (Apropos of Bulgakov's Book and Ilyin's Article)" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 74-93). Letter No. 80

[156] Apparently communications were written in invisible ink between the lines of Wolfe's bibliographical journal *Izvestiya*.
Letter No. 82

[157] The table of contents gave details of the contents of each section.
Letter No. 82

[158] This was Karl Kautsky's *Die Agrarfrage*, 1899; Lenin's review of this book was published in *Nachalo* No. 4 for 1899 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 94-99); his conspectus of it was published in *Lenin Miscellany XIX*. In the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, C.C., C.P.S.U., there is a copy of the book with notes in it made by Lenin. Letter No. 82

[159] Lenin wrote to Y. O. Martov in Turukhansk but their correspondence during exile in Siberia has been lost. Letter No. 83

[160] The event referred to was a student strike that took place in thirty higher educational establishments in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Riga, Tomsk and other towns.

The disturbances in Finland were caused by the suspension of

the Finnish Constitution on February 3 (15), 1899. Evidently the censor inked over the reports of these events published in *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Letter No. 83

[161] Lenin apparently made use of the journal *Prakticheskaya Zhizn* and I. Tsion's book *Nigilisty i nigilizm* to send letters in invisible ink. Letter No. 85

[162] The article referred to is B. Avilov's "Novy opyt 'ekonomicheskoi garmonii' (N. Kablukov, *Ob usloviyakh razvitiya krestyanskogo khozyaistva v Rossii*. M., 1899), published in *Nachalo* No. 1-2 for 1899. Letter No. 85

[163] Bulgakov's article was "*K voprosu o kapitalisticheskoi evolyutsii zemledeliya*", published in *Nachalo* Nos. 1-2 and 3 for 1899. Letter No. 85

[164] Lenin made a critical analysis of the views of S. N. Bulgakov, the "legal Marxist", in two articles under the common title of "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)". They were intended for publication in *Nachalo* but since that journal was banned they appeared in Nos. 1 and 2 of *Zhizn* for 1900 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 105-59).

The importance which Lenin attached to his articles against Bulgakov can be seen from his letter to A. N. Potresov of April 27, 1899 (*Collected Works*, Vol. 34, pp. 32-33), in which he expresses an exceedingly negative opinion of Bulgakov's revisionist writings. Letter No. 85

[165] Lenin refers here to the proposed visit of his mother and sister Anna to Shushenskoye. Letter No. 86

[166] The article "Capitalism in Agriculture" was published much later (in January and February 1900), when *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* had already appeared, so the references were not crossed out. Letter No. 86

[167] Lenin began editing the second volume of the Webbs' *Industrial Democracy* only at the beginning of September 1899. In the course of this work he had not only to edit the translation but also to retranslate a considerable part of the text and write a number of footnotes. The work was finished on January 19, 1900. Letter No. 87

[168] P. B. Struve handed Lenin's article "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" over to *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* because of the unstable position of *Nachalo* following the confiscation of the April 1899 issue. Letter No. 87

[169] There was a remark in Bulgakov's article "*K voprosy o kapitaltsti-*

scheskoi evolyutsii zemledeliya" rejecting the Marxist theory of *Zusammenbruch* (socialist revolution).

Somewhat earlier Bernstein had made a similar criticism in his *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*, 1899 (the English translation was entitled *Problems of Socialism*). Letter No. 87

[170] No such remark was made at the end of the second part of "Capitalism in Agriculture". It is possible that Lenin spoke of this in the first variant of his article; judging by Letters 98 and 99 he must have rewritten the article. Letter No. 87

[171] *Disciples*—followers of Marx and Engels; this term was used in the nineties as a legally-permitted name for the Marxists. Letter No. 88

[172] This refers to A. Bogdanov's *Kratky kurs ekonomicheskoi nauki*. Letter No. 89

[173] The articles referred to are "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism. (Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists)" and "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov", the latter having been published in the December (No. 12) 1899 issue of *Zhizn* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 129-315, and Vol. 4, pp. 160-66). Letter No. 89

[174] Lenin refers to the following sentence from the first paragraph of his article "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov": "As far as the other questions are concerned, those raised by Mr. P. Nezhdanov in respect of the market theory and, in particular, of P. B. Struve's views, I shall confine myself to a reference to my article in reply to Struve ('Once More on the Theory of Realisation'; the delay in its publication in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* was due to circumstances over which the author had no control") (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 160). Letter No. 89

[175] Lenin mentioned Tugan-Baranovsky's article in a footnote to the last paragraph of his article "Uncritical Criticism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 632) and in a letter to A. N. Potresov dated June 27, 1899 (*Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 39). Letter No. 90

[176] The review was that by G-d of A. Bogdanov's book *Osnovniye elementy istoricheskogo vzglyada na prirodu*. It is not known whether Lenin wrote anything in reply to the review. From his letter to Maxim Gorky, dated February 25, 1908 (*Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 448) we know that he had the book in Siberia.

It is known from a letter to A. N. Potresov, dated June 27, 1899, that Lenin at that time assumed that A. Bogdanov was the pseudonym of G. V. Plekhanov (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 41). Letter No. 90

[177] Lenin's detailed analysis of the *Credo* appears to have been sent in a letter written in invisible ink.

Credo, or Creed, was the, name under which the programme or manifesto of the group of Economists, written by Y. D. Kuskova, became known. It was sent to Lenin in Shushenskoye by his sister Anna. Lenin's sister later recalled that she had received the Credo in St. Petersburg from A. M. Kalmykova and "in the next letter in invisible ink to my brother, one of those written in books and journals, added this composition, rewritten in invisible ink.... I gave the document the first name that came into my head and wrote 'I am sending you some "*Credo* of the young".'"

After having received the *Credo* Lenin wrote "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" which was discussed and adopted at a meeting of seventeen Marxists exiled to Minusinsk District (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82). Letter No. 92

[178] Lenin refers here to S. Bulgakov's article "*Zakon prichinnosti i svoboda chelovecheskikh deistvii*", and P. B. Struve's article "*Yeshcho o svobode i neobkhodimosti*", published in the May (No. 8) issue of *Novoye Slovo* for 1897. The two articles are a continuation of the polemics between Struve and Bulgakov over the philosophy of Kant, Stammler, Zimmel and others in the journal *Voprosy Filosofii i Psikhologii* for 1896 and 1897. Lenin spoke of Stammler in his "Uncritical Criticism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 609-32) and also in a letter to A. N. Potresov dated June 27, 1899 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 40). Letter No. 93

[179] This was P. Skvortsov's article "*K voprosu o rynkakh* (*Po povodu zametki g. Petra Struve* '*K voprosu o rynkakh pri kapitalisticheskom proizvodstve*')" published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 7 for 1899. Letter No. 93

[180] Bernstein's book (see Note 169). For Lenin's opinion of the book see Letter No. 98. Letter No. 96

[181] *The Hanover Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party* was held October 9-14, 1899. The report on the chief item on the agenda—"The Attack on the Basic Views and Tactics of the Party", was delivered by August Bebel. Lenin wrote that this speech against the opportunists would "long remain as a model of the defence of Marxist views and of the struggle for the truly socialist character of the workers' party" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 300). Although the congress opposed Bernstein's revisionist views, it did not give an extensive criticism of Bernsteinism. Letter No. 96

[182] *Vorwärts* (Forward)—a daily newspaper, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. Letter No. 96

[183] The two articles mentioned, in which Lenin criticised the views of the liberal Narodnik N. V. Levitsky, have not been found. They were apparently intended for *Nachalo*. "About a Certain Newspaper Article" is the only article known to have been written by Lenin in the Siberian period about N. Levitsky's "*O nekotorykh*

voprosakh, kasayushchikhsya narodnoi zhizni" (Certain Problems Affecting the Life of the People) published in *Russkiye Vedomosti* on August 30, 1897 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 316-22).
Letter No. 97

[184] Owing to the loss of the manuscript, it is impossible to say what corrections to his second article on "Capitalism in Agriculture" Lenin is referring to. As can be seen by the next letter, he sent them long before the article was published. Letter No. 98

[185] *Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung* (Saxon Workers' Gazette)—a Social-Democratic daily published in Dresden from 1890. From May 1, 1908 it was published as *Dresdener Volkszeitung* (Dresden Peoples Gazette).

An article by G. V. Plekhanov "*Wofür sollen wir ihm dankbar sein? Offener Brief an Karl Kautsky*" (What Should We Thank Him For? An Open Letter to Karl Kautsky) appeared in issues 253, 254 and 255; in this article Plekhanov criticised Bernstein sharply. Bernstein polemised with Plekhanov over this article in a footnote to the last chapter of his *Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus*. Letter No. 98

[186] The journal referred to was *Le Mouvement Socialiste*, a social and political journal that first appeared in Paris in January 1899. It published a number of letters from Frederick Engels and articles by him. A number of the leaders of world Social-Democracy contributed to the journal, among them Wilhelm Liebknecht, Harry Quelch, Jean Jaurès, August Rebel and Rosa Luxemburg. It also carried articles by the opportunists and revisionists that dominated the Second International. *Le Mouvement Socialiste* went out of existence in June 1914. Letter No. 100

[187] This booklet was apparently used by Lenin's sister as the vehicle of a letter in invisible ink and Lenin's statement that the "booklet on the professional congress in Moscow was very interesting and instructive" obviously refers to the contents of the letter.
Letter No. 100

[188] *Severny Kuryer* (Northern Courier)—a social, political and literary daily that appeared in St. Petersburg in 1899 and 1900.
Letter No. 100

[189] That same day, January 19, 1900, Nadezhda Krupskaya applied to the Yeniseisk Gubernia Council for permission to travel to Ufa at her own expense. She did not receive it by the 29th and left Shushenskoye with Lenin. She received her travel permit in Minusinsk.

The Knipovich family were close friends of Krupskaya's.
Letter No. 101

[190] This refers to Lenin's article "Uncritical Criticism (Regarding

Mr. P. Skvortsov's Article 'Commodity Fetishism' in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* No. 12, 1899)" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 609-32). Letter No. 101

[191] S. N. Prokopovich's *The Working-Class Movement in the West. An Essay in Critical Investigation* (Vol. I, Germany, Belgium) was held up by the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee (May 22, 1899) and was later passed for publication by the head of the Central Press Board. It appeared at the end of January 1900. Lenin wrote a review of this book (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 183-92). Letter No. 101

[192] On March 10, 1900, Lenin applied to the Director of the Police Department for permission for Nadezhda Krupskaya to serve her term of police surveillance in Pskov instead of Ufa Gubernia. The request was refused. Letter No. 102

[193] Lenin's second article "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" was published in *Zhizn* No. 2 for 1900. It is probable that this is the issue referred to in the letter. Letter No. 102

[194] Lenin refers to P. B. Struve's article "*Osnovnaya antinomiya teorii trudovoi tsennosti*" (The Basic Antinomy of the Theory of Labour Value) published in *Zhizn* No. 2, for 1900. The inserted note against Struve mentioned in the letter is the footnote at the end of the article "Uncritical Criticism". (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 632). Letter No. 103

[195] This refers to Vera Zasulich's article "Dmitry Ivanovich Pisarev". It was published in *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7 for 1900 under the pseudonym of N. Karelin. Letter No. 103

[196] On April 20, 1900, Lenin applied to the Director of the Police Department for permission to live in Ufa for six weeks on account of the illness of his wife. The petition was refused. Letter No. 105

[197] Visitors were received on Thursdays at the Police Department. Lenin asked his mother to try to get permission in St. Petersburg for him to go to Ufa to Krupskaya. The permission was granted. Letter No. 107

[198] Lenin's journey to Podolsk was delayed. On May 20, 1900 he went secretly to St. Petersburg to meet local Social-Democrats and establish means of communication to be used after his leaving Russia. On May 21 he was arrested for illegal entry into the capital. He was released on May 31 and was dispatched to Podolsk in the company of a police official, arriving on June 1. Letter No. 108

[199] Lenin intended going to Siberia to see G. M. Krzhizhanovsky but went to Ufa instead (cf. Note 226). On June 10, 1900 he returned to Podolsk from Ufa and on July 16 went abroad to organise the all-Russia illegal newspaper *Iskra* (The Spark). Letter No. 109

[200] Lenin did not live in Paris in 1900, and if he went there at all it was only for a short time; for purposes of secrecy he sent letters to Russia through Paris. Letter No. 110

[201] This was said for the sake of secrecy. Early in September 1900 Lenin actually went to Nuremberg on his way to Munich for talks with the German Social-Democrat A. Braun about organisational and technical assistance in publishing *Iskra*. Letter No. 110

[202] Lenin was in Munich at this time. Paris is named for purposes of secrecy, as is the exhibition mentioned in the letter. Letter No. 111

[203] Lenin's sister Maria was arrested in the autumn of 1899 and banished to Nizhny Novgorod until the preliminary investigation was completed; she returned to Moscow at the end of December the same year. Letter No. 111

[204] This refers to the carriers through whom Lenin's books were despatched. Letter No. 112

[205] Lenin's brother Dmitry was at this time under police surveillance in Podolsk Moscow Gubernia; he was later allowed to enter Yuriev University, from which he graduated in 1901. Letter No. 113

[206] Lenin used F. Modráč's address in Prague for the despatch of letters to and from Russia. Letter No. 114

[207] This refers to S. I. Mickiewicz, who was a that time in exile in Yakutia in connection with the case of the Moscow organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. His correspondence with Lenin has been lost. Letter No. 117

[208] In the latter half of December 1900, Lenin went to Leipzig, where the first issue of *Iskra* was being printed, to do some final editing before the paper appeared. Vienna is mentioned in the letter for reasons of secrecy. Letter No. 118

[209] Lenin refers to the *Manifesto of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries* that G. B. Krasin sent him in an album of photographs. The manifesto was reviewed by G. Plekhanov in an article "New Wine in Old Bottles", published in *Iskra* No. 5. Letter No. 120

[210] It is not known what manuscripts are meant. For "Vienna gifts" see Note 209. Letter No. 122

[211] Krupskaya stayed in Moscow for a few days on her way from Ufa to Germany. Letter No. 122

[212] *Promyshlenny Mir* (Industrial World)—a weekly dealing with finance, economics, commerce, industry and technology, published in St. Petersburg from November 1899 to 1905. Letter No. 124

[213] This probably refers to Lenin's reviews of Kautsky's book *Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme. A Counter-critique* and Prokopovich's book *The Working-Class Movement in the West*, written at the end of 1899 and first published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VII* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 193-203 and 183-92). Letter No. 124

[214] Lenin went to Prague and Vienna to organise Krupskaya's journey abroad. Letter No. 125

[215] Lenin's sister Maria and his brother-in-law, Mark Yelizarov, had been arrested on the night of February 28, 1901, in connection with the case of the Moscow organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. Letter No. 127

[216] This letter was given to Maria Ulyanova in prison and it bears the stamp of the Deputy Prosecutor of the Moscow Department of Justice. Letter No. 128

[217] This refers to V. A. Levitsky, who was at that time public health officer in Podolsk Uyezd of Moscow Gubernia. Lenin made the acquaintance of Levitsky at the summer cottage of his relatives before going abroad; he asked Levitsky to write for *Iskra*, and one article by him, *Probuzhdeniye kirpichnikov*, was printed in *Iskra* No. 1. Letter No. 130

[218] The *Siberian friends* were G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Starkov, M. A. Silvin and others who were in exile at the same time as Lenin. Letter No. 130

[219] On release from prison, Mark Yelizarov intended going to Syzran, where his brother, P. T. Yelizarov, lived. Letter No. 132

[220] At that time Mark Yelizarov was a student of the Moscow Engineering Institute of the Ministry of Railways. Letter No. 132

[221] The visit was not permitted on the ground that Dmitry Ulyanov had shortly before been arraigned on a political charge. Letter No. 133

[222] This refers to M. V. Zvorykina, a school friend of Maria Ulyanova's. She had at one time stayed with Lenin's mother in Podolsk. Letter No. 133

[223] Lenin's mother lived in Samara while her daughter Maria spent her term of exile there. Letter No. 136

[224] Lenin refers here to books belonging to him that had been sent from Siberia to his mother's address in Moscow. Some of these books are now at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

The new address mentioned in the letter was necessary because the centre for publishing Iskra was transferred from Munich to London; Lenin left on April 12, 1902 (see next letter).
Letter No. 137

[225] In the summer of 1902, Lenin's mother went abroad to visit her son. From the end of June to July 25, Lenin lived with his mother and his elder sister, Anna, in Loguivy (north coast of France).
Letter No. 139

[226] Lenin recalls his trip to Ufa with his mother and his elder sister in the summer of 1900. From Nizhny Novgorod they travelled by steamer along the rivers Volga, Kama and Belaya, to visit Krupskaya who was finishing her term of exile in Ufa.
Letter No. 140

[227] This refers to photographs of Lenin's elder brother, Alexander Ulyanov, that his sister Anna sent him; she was afraid to carry them across the frontier because of the possibility of being arrested.
Letter No. 141

[228] Lenin's brother Dmitry was arrested in August 1902 at Khadzhibei Lagoon near Odessa where he was working as a doctor; he was accused of "distributing proclamations calling on the peasants to join the workers' revolutionary movement". He was released three weeks later. Letter No. 143

[229] The symposium contained articles by S. N. Bulgakov, Prince Y. N. Trubetskoi, N. A. Berdyayev, S. L. Frank, Prince S. N. Trubetskoi, S. F. Oldenburg and others. Letter No. 144

[230] A persistent struggle was going on in Germany in 1902 around the draft of a tariff reform proposed by the government. The German Social-Democrats, headed by August Bebel, were fighting against higher bread prices. Letter No. 145

[231] Lenin's sister Anna went to Port Arthur with her husband, Mark Yelizarov, who was at that time employed on the railway in the Far East. Letter No. 146

[232] Lenin wrote about Germany for purposes of secrecy. In February 1903 he went to Paris to lecture at the Russian Social Sciences Higher School there; between February 23 and 26 he delivered four lectures on "Marxist Views on the Agrarian Problem in

Europe and in Russia". (In the Central Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, C.C., C.P.S.U., there are two variants of a plan of these lectures in the form of notes.) Early in March Lenin spoke at a meeting of Russian political émigrés in Paris on the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats. He returned to London on March 9.
Letter No. 147

[233] On the night of January 1, 1904, Lenin's sisters Anna and Maria, his brother Dmitry and the latter's wife were arrested in connection with a case against the Central Committee and the Kiev Committee of the Party. Letter No. 150

[234] Krupskaya recalls the following in connection with this holiday.
"At the end of June 1904, Vladimir Ilyich and I took our rucksacks and set off for a month in the mountains, following our noses. We spent a week or so in Lausanne to muster a little strength, and then set out for somewhere beyond Montreux; we found our way through the wildest forests to a place where some loggers told us how to reach the road and where to spend the night. Through Aigle we descended into the valley of the Rhone, went to Bex-les-Bains to an old school and college friend of mine, and then wandered along the Rhone for a long time—about 70 versts; this was the most tiring part of the journey. In the end we crossed the Gemmi Pass into Oberland, reached the foot of the Jungfrau, and then, with our legs aching and completely worn out, we stayed at Iseltwald on the Brienzersee for about a week and from there again took to the road through Interlaken and Zimmental back to the Geneva area. The winter of 1903-04 had been a particularly difficult one, our nerves were in a bad state and we wanted to get away from people and forget for the time being all business and alarms. The mountains helped us. The changing impressions, the mountain air, solitude, healthy tiredness and healthy sleep were a real cure for Vladimir Ilyich. His strength and vivacity and high spirits returned to him. In August we lived on Lac de Bret, where Vladimir Ilyich and Bogdanov evolved a plan for the further struggle against the Mensheviks." Letter No. 151

[235] This refers to Hobson's *Imperialism*, published in 1902. There is no printed edition of Lenin's translation of the book in existence and the manuscript of the translation has been lost.
Letter No. 154

[236] On his return from the Fifth (London) Party Congress Lenin rested for several weeks at N. M. Knipovich's country house near the Stjernsund Lighthouse (now the Ozerki Housing Development, Vyborg District, Leningrad Region). Letter No. 155

[237] Lenin refers to his article "Against Boycott. Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 15-49).
Letter No. 156

[238] After the Seventh International Congress in Stuttgart, in which he took part, Lenin stayed at Vaza Cottage at Kuokkala (now Repine, Sestroretsk District, Leningrad), where he had formerly lived when in hiding from the tsarist police. Letter No. 157

[239] At that time Lenin's brother Dmitry was employed as the village doctor at Lipitino, Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia. Letter No. 157

[240] *Obrazovaniye* (Education)—a monthly literary, popular scientific, social and political journal published legally in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1909. Articles by Social-Democrats were published in the journal between 1902 and 1908. Letter No. 158

[241] After the defeat of the First Russian Revolution, Lenin was hunted by the tsarist police and had to leave Kuokkala in November 1907 and move to Oggelby (near Helsingfors). In accordance with the decision of the Bolshevik centre to transfer the publication of the newspaper *Proletary* to Geneva, Lenin left Oggelby. He stayed in Stockholm for a few days and arrived in Geneva on January 7, 1908. This was his second period of exile abroad, which lasted until April 1917. Letter No. 158

[242] *Tovarishch* (Comrade)—a bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from March 15 (28), 1906 to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908), actually as the organ of the Left Cadets. *Nash Vek* (Our Age) was published in January 1908 in place of *Tovarishch*. Letter No. 158

[243] The article referred to is Lenin's "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century", which he wrote for the Granat Brothers Encyclopaedic Dictionary. Because of the censorship the article could not be published at that time. It first appeared in 1918 in pamphlet form (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 69-147). Letter No. 158

[244] *Rech* (Speech)—organ of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party published daily in St. Petersburg. Lenin probably referred to *Rech* No. 12 of January 15 (28), 1908, which carried an article entitled "Resolution of the Baku Social-Democrats Against Expropriation and Terror". Letter No. 160

[245] Lenin nevertheless wrote an article for the symposium *Karl Marx (1818-1883)*, entitled "Marxism and Revisionism" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 29-39). Letter No. 160

[246] The club referred to is the *Société de lecture* (Reading Society) in Geneva; to work in the reading-room it was necessary to be a member of it and pay a certain fee. Lenin had worked there in 1904-05, before he left for Russia. Letter No. 160

[247] *Zerno* (Grain or The Seed) was a publishing house headed by M. S. Kedrov; in 1907 it launched the publication of a collection of Lenin's works under the general title of *Twelve Years*. It was planned as a three-volume edition but only the first volume and Part I of the second appeared. Volume I appeared in November 1907 (the date on the cover was 1908) and was confiscated soon after its appearance, although a large part of this first printing was saved and was distributed illegally.

Zerno published a symposium on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marx's death and the *Kalendar dlya vsekh* (Calendar for All) for 1908, which carried Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 82-93). Letter No. 160

[248] This book is quoted in Lenin's "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 179). Letter No. 161

[249] The manuscript referred to was that of Lenin's "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907" written in November and December 1907 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). It was to have been included in the second part of Volume 2 of the Lenin collection *Twelve Years* but was confiscated by the police and destroyed before leaving the printers'. Only one copy was saved and several of the end pages of this were missing. The book was published in part in the newspaper *Proletary* No. 33 of July 23 (August 5), 1908. It was first published in full in 1917. Letter No. 162

[250] The nature of the disagreement between V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich and Lindov (G. D. Leiteisen) has not been established. Letter No. 162

[251] This apparently concerns the fees for the second, enlarged edition of *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* issued in 1908 by Pallada Publishers in St. Petersburg. Letter No. 163

[252] Lenin was in Leipzig in early January 1908, while on his way from Sweden to Geneva. Letter No. 163

[253] Some time towards the end of April (after the 20th) Lenin visited Maxim Gorky in Capri (Italy) and spent several days there. Letter No. 164

[254] Lenin worked on his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* in the British Museum (London) in May 1908. Letter No. 165

[255] This refers to Lenin's *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*. It is possible that Lenin wished to show it to those attending the Plenary Meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., which was to be held in Geneva in

August 1908. It is not known whether Lenin's request was fulfilled. Letter No. 165

[256] *Diablerets*—a group of mountains in the western part of the Bernese Alps at the juncture of the Cantons of Berne, Vallais and Vaud; the highest point is 10,000 feet above sea level. Letter No. 167

[257] These words are from Alexander Pushkin's *The Hero*. Letter No. 168

[258] In October 1908 Lenin went to Brussels to attend a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau; the trip to Italy did not take place. Letter No. 169

[259] This refers to the publication of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* which Lenin expected the Granat Brothers Publishing House to handle. Letter No. 170

[260] In the first edition of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* the word "fideism" was used instead of *popovshchina*, a derogatory Russian term for "clericalism", although "popovshchina" remained unchanged in a number of places. Lenin also suggested changing the word to "Shamanism"; his sister Anna, in a letter dated January 27, 1909, replied by saying, "'Shamanism' has come too late. Anyway, is it any better?" The explanatory note was given in the Preface to the first and subsequent editions (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 19). Letter No. 171

[261] This refers to V. A. Levitsky, a close acquaintance of the Ulyanov family during their stay in Podolsk; in 1900 Lenin left Podolsk for Ufa and not Krasnoyarsk, as the letter states. Letter No. 172

[262] It was difficult for V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich to publish the book at the publishing firm *Zhizn i Znaniye* (Life and Knowledge) he organised in 1907 because that firm had not had time to consolidate its position. Letter No. 173

[263] The manuscript of this "separate sheet" has been lost. The footnote concerned Erich Becher's *Philosophische Voraussetzungen der exakten Naturwissenschaften*. Lpz., 1907, which, as Lenin said in the note, he read only after he had finished writing the book (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 290). Letter No. 173

[264] Lenin and his family had moved from Geneva to Paris because the newspaper *Proletary* was published there. Letter No. 174

[265] Lenin's book was accepted by the private firm of L. Krumbügel (*Zveno* Publishers). The contract was drawn up in the name of Lenin's sister, Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova, and signed by her.

The contract was for 3,000 copies at 100 rubles per printer's signature, each signature being 40,000 letters, and 50 copies for the author (see her letter to the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 2-3 for 1930). Letter No. 174

[266] All the misprints here listed were corrected before the book was published. Letter No. 177

[267] The telegram has been lost. It inquired about the health of Lenin's mother, who was ill at the time. Letter No. 178

[268] The pages mentioned were missing in the galley proofs but were later received by Lenin when he read the page proofs (see Letter No. 180). Letter No. 179

[269] This refers to Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova's reply to Lenin's telegram inquiring after his mother's health.

Un peu mieux—a little better. Letter No. 179

[270] *Mardi gras*—Shrove Tuesday, a day of carnival in France. Letter No. 180

[271] Since the manuscript has been lost it is impossible to indicate exactly which place in the book this refers to. Apparently it refers to Section 1 of Chapter Two, "The 'Thing-in-Itself' or V. Chernov Refutes Frederick Engels"; here Lenin speaks of the writings of Bogdanov, Valentinov, Bazarov, Chernov and other Machists against the basic materialist tenet recognising the objective existence, independent of man's consciousness, of matter—the "thing-in-itself" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 98). Letter No. 183

[272] The strike of French post and telegraph workers lasted from March 15 to March 23, 1909. Letter No. 184

[273] This misprint was not given in the list of errata nor was it corrected in the text of the first edition of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. It was first corrected in the Third Edition (Russian) of the *Collected Works* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 300). Letter No. 187

[274] Lenin hurried the publication of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* because of the enlarged conference of the *Proletary* editorial board (this was actually the Bolshevik centre) at which a decisive battle against Bogdanov and his followers was to be fought. Letter No. 189

[275] Lenin's sister Maria was preparing to take the entrance examination to the Sorbonne language courses in order to obtain the diploma of a teacher of French. Letter No. 190

[276] Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* appeared between May 12 and 17 (N.S.), 1909;

it was published in Moscow by L. Krumbügel's firm *Zveno*.
Letter No. 190

[277] Lenin was referring to the inaccurate translation of the title of William James's *Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* that he mentions in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 342). Letter No. 191

[278] Lenin received royalties for his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* from Krumbügel in full (see his sister Anna's letter to the editor of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* published in No. 2-3 of that journal for 1930). Letter No. 191

[279] Lenin refers here to the coming conference of the extended *Proletary* editorial board; it was called on Lenin's initiative and took place in Paris from the 21st to the 30th of June (N.S.), 1909. The conference was attended by nine members of the Bolshevik centre—the highest body of the Bolshevik group, elected by the Bolshevik delegates to the 5th (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and also representatives of the St. Petersburg, Moscow Regional and Urals organisations. The conference proceeded under Lenin's guidance and his speeches on all the main points on the agenda shaped the character of the conference. The theses put forward by Lenin formed the basis of the decisions adopted by the conference.

The conference roundly condemned otzovism and ultimatumism as harmful and dangerous trends in the working-class movement. A. Bogdanov, leader and inspirer of the otzovists, ultimatumists and God-builders, was expelled from the Bolshevik group.
Letter No. 191

[280] Lenin spent late July and August on holiday with his family—his wife (N. K. Krupskaya), her mother (Y. V. Krupskaya) and his sister (M. I. Ulyanova)—in the village of Bombon (Department de Seine-et-Marne) near Paris. Letter No. 191

[281] This may refer to the issue of the newspaper *Rossiya* containing reports of the discussion of a land distribution Bill in the Duma in October 1909.

Rossiya (Russia)—a reactionary daily, published in St. Petersburg from November 1905 to April 1914. In 1909 it became the newspaper of the Ministry of the Interior. Letter No. 196

[282] Lenin refers to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, about whose position at this period he afterwards wrote in a letter to Maxim Gorky (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, pp. 74-75). Two letters from Lenin to Skvortsov-Stepanov written in 1909 have been preserved (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 117-22, and Vol. 34, pp. 407-10).
Letter No. 196

[283] Lenin went to Brussels to attend the Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau (ISB). On November 7, 1909 he spoke at a meeting of the session on the split in the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Holland and voted in favour of admitting to the International the Dutch Marxists (*Tribune* supporters) who represented the Left wing of the working-class movement in Holland. On November 8 Lenin attended a meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Committee of the ISB after which he returned to Paris. Letter No. 196

[284] On November 45, 1909, the newspaper *Utro Rossii* (Morning of Russia), organ of the Moscow industrialists published by P. P. Ryabushinsky, printed a libellous story about "M. Gorky's Expulsion from the S. D. Party". The "interview" of which Lenin writes was published on November 17 under the heading "The Excommunication of Maxim Gorky". This libellous account was taken up by *Rech* and other bourgeois papers, Russian and foreign. In reply to the inventions about Gorky's expulsion that were being spread by bourgeois newspapers Lenin wrote his article "The Bourgeois Press Fable About the Expulsion of Gorky" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 106). Letter No. 197

[285] *L'Éclair* (Lightning)—a Paris newspaper published from 1888 to 1939.

Berliner Tageblatt (*Berliner Tageblatt und Handelszeitung*—Berlin Daily and Commercial Gazette)—published from 1871 to 1939. Letter No. 197

[286] Lenin's sister Anna, her husband Mark Yelizarov, and Lenin's mother were living at the village of Sablino near a railway station of the same name, not far from St. Petersburg. Lenin visited his relatives there in 1905 and 1906. A room was allotted to him in the cottage and he was able to work and rest there. Letter No. 197

[287] The Twelfth Congress of Russian Naturalists and Physicians was held in Moscow from December 28, 1909 to January 6, 1910; a sub-section of statisticians took part. Letter No. 199

[288] This refers to Stolypin's decree of November 9 (22), 1909 "Supplement to Certain Provisions of the Operative Law on Peasant Landownership and Land Tenure", which granted peasants the right to leave the communes and set up farmsteads. (For further details of Stolypin's agrarian policy see *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431.) Letter No. 199

[289] The manuscript of Lenin's note of request to the statisticians has been lost. Copies of it were made and distributed among statisticians; one copy was seized during a search at the house of Lenin's sister Maria in 1909. The text of the copy was preserved in the records of the Department of Police. Letter No. 199

[290] *Musée Grévin*—a waxworks containing the, very lifelike and authentically dressed effigies of historical personages.
Letter No. 200

[291] *Juvisy*—a small town near Paris, where there was an aerodrome; Lenin, who was greatly interested in aviation, went there to watch the aeroplanes in flight. Letter No. 201

[292] The book referred to was *Obzor deyatelnosti uyezdnykh zemleustroitelnykh komissii* (*1907-1908*). There was no other book.
Letter No. 201

[293] Lenin meant that he would be attending the Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P, held January 2-23 (January 15-February 5), 1910, in Paris; it was known as the "Unity Plenum".
Letter No. 202

[294] In the 'winter of 1909-10 Lenin's brother Dmitry broke his leg and dislocated his collarbone (see Letter No. 205). Letter No. 203

[295] This was a chess problem by Lenin's brother published in the first volume of the literary and popular-science supplements to the magazine *Niva* for 1909, p. 533. Letter No. 205

[296] The chessmen mentioned here were turned on a lathe by Lenin's father, Ilya Ulyanov. Lenin's mother sent him the chessmen in memory of his father. When Lenin moved from Galicia to Switzerland at the beginning of the First World War the set was lost.
Letter No. 206

[297] Lenin refers to the internal Party struggle, which grew sharper after the January ("Unity") Plenum of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in 1910. Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky about this on April 11, 1910 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, pp. 419-22). Letter No. 209

[298] The picture postcard of Meudon Forest was sent to Lenin's mother who at that time was staying with Lenin's brother Dmitry, a rural doctor in the village of Lipitino, near Mikhnevo Station, Serpukhov Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia. Letter No. 210

[299] In her memoirs, Nadezhda Krupskaya wrote: "Meudon is a small town some nine kilometres from Paris. Thousands of Parisians go there on holidays in summer to spend their time in the open air. We often went there on weekdays, to cheer ourselves up and to race through the marvellous woods of Meudon on our bicycles."
Letter No. 210

[300] This refers to the Eighth Congress of the Second International held in Copenhagen August 28-September 3; Lenin took an active part in it. Letter No. 214

[301] Lenin was trying to find a publisher for one of his works on the agrarian question—either "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907" or "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431, and Vol. 15, pp. 69-147). Letter No. 215

[302] It is not known which article Lenin refers to here. No article by him was published in *Sovremenny Mir* in that period. We have, however, the evidence of Bonch-Bruyevich that an article of Lenin's was discussed by the editors (see Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova's preface to Lenin's "Letters to Relatives (1910-1916)" in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* No. 4 for 1930).

Sovremenny Mir (Contemporary World)—a literary, scientific and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to 1918. Letter No. 215

[303] This apparently refers to talks on the publication of Lenin's agrarian articles by G. F. Lvovich, who in 1905-06 published Lenin's translation of Karl Kautsky's *Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Eine Antikritik* (Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme. A Counter-critique). Lenin's translation of part of the book was published under the title of *K. Kautsky. Sbornik statei* (Collection of Articles). The second edition stated that it was "Translated by Lenin". Letter No. 215

[304] *Zvezda* (Star)—a Bolshevik legal newspaper published in St. Petersburg from December 16 (29), 1910 to April 22 (May 5), 1912. The newspaper *Nevskaya Zvezda* was a direct continuation of *Zvezda* and was launched because of the frequent confiscation of the latter. These newspapers published about 50 of Lenin's articles. *Zvezda* enjoyed great prestige among factory and other workers in Russia; it prepared the way for *Pravda*, the Bolshevik mass legal newspaper.

Mysl (Thought)—a legal Bolshevik monthly dealing with philosophical, economic and social problems; it was published in Moscow from December 1910 to April 1911—five issues in all. It was founded on Lenin's initiative to combat the liquidators' legal publications and to train advanced workers and intellectuals in the spirit of Marxism. The first four issues of the journal carried six articles by Lenin. Letter No. 215

[305] This refers to the Party "salary" which was paid to Lenin at times when he had no other means of subsistence.
Letter No. 216

[306] The meeting of the International Socialist Bureau was held on September 23-24, 1911 in Zürich. Lenin spoke in defence of Rosa Luxemburg against the opportunists among the German Social-Democrats. Letter No. 220

[307] Lenin delivered a lecture on "Stolypin and the Revolution" in a number of Swiss towns—in Zürich on September 26, in Berne on September 28 and in Geneva on October 2. Letter No. 220

[308] After all the attempts of the liquidators, Trotskyites and conciliators to prevent the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. had been defeated, they launched a savage campaign against the decisions of the conference in order to discredit them.

The Sixth (*Prague*) *All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was convened by the Bolsheviks; it was held from January 18 to January 30, 1912; it expelled the Menshevik liquidators from the Party and strengthened the Party as a nation-wide organisation; the conference laid down the political line and tactics of the Party in the new period of revolutionary upsurge, and elected the Central Committee. A Russian Bureau of the C.C. was set up to guide the work in Russia. Letter No. 222

[309] Lenin did not move at that time. On June 23, 1912 he and his family moved from Paris to Krakow, so that Lenin could maintain closer contact with Russia and give better guidance to the work of the Bolshevik Duma group and the newspaper *Pravda*. Letter No. 223

[310] It has not been established where Lenin went. According to G. M. Vyazmensky, Director of the Archives of Russian Social-Democracy in Berlin, Lenin visited the archives in summer of 1912 and saw there the *Izvestia TsK R.S.D.R.P.* (Bulletin of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.) for 1907, which he had been looking for over a long period. It is possible that the journey of which Lenin speaks was to Berlin. Letter No. 224

[311] On May 7, 1912 Lenin's sisters Maria and Anna were arrested in Saratov in connection with the case of the Saratov R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Letter No. 224

[312] The newspaper *Rech* for May 17 (30), 1912 carried the following telegram: "Saratov, May 16. The houses of 18 railway employees were searched." An earlier issue, of May 10 (23), had stated: "Saratov, May 9. The gendarmerie searched 16 houses and made as many arrests, mainly among workers." Letter No. 225

[313] Lenin's sister Maria was to be exiled to Astrakhan Gubernia in connection with the Saratov R.S.D.L.P.(B.) case. At the request of her relatives the place of exile was changed to Vologda Gubernia. Letter No. 227

[314] *Gleichheit* (Equality)—a Social-Democratic fortnightly, organ of the women workers' movement in Germany and later of the international women's movement; it was published in Stuttgart from 1890 to 1925; from 1892 to 1917 it was edited by Clara Zetkin. Letter No. 231

[315] *Pravda* (The Truth)—the legal Bolshevik daily that was launched in St. Petersburg on April 22 (May 5), 1912.

Pravda was under Lenin's ideological guidance; he wrote for it almost daily and sent instructions to the editors. Some 270 articles by Lenin were published in *Pravda*; Gorky, too, published his stories in *Pravda*.

The newspaper was suppressed by the tsarist authorities eight times but continued to appear under changed names—*Rabochaya Pravda*, *Severnaya Pravda*, *Pravda Truda*, *Za Pravdu*, *Proletarskaya Pravda*, *Put Pravdy*, *Rabochy*, *Trudovaya Pravda* (Workers' Truth, Northern Truth, Truth of Labour, For Truth, Proletarian Truth, The Path of Truth, The Worker, Labour Truth). Under these difficult conditions the Bolsheviks succeeded in publishing 636 issues of *Pravda* in a little over two years. On July 8 (21), 1914, the newspaper was finally suppressed and did not re-appear until the February bourgeois-democratic revolution, in 1917.

Beginning from March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* was published as the organ of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. On April 5 (18), on his return from abroad, Lenin joined the editorial board and became its leading figure. From July to October 1917 Pravda was constantly persecuted by the counter-revolutionary bourgeois Provisional Government, and frequently changed its name: *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy*, *Rabochy Put* (The *Pravda* Sheet, The Proletarian, The Worker, The Workers' Path). On October 27 (November 9), following the October Revolution, the Central Organ of the Party again appeared under its old name of *Pravda*. Letter No. 233

[316] It was the general rule to reduce the term of exile by one-third in the event of an amnesty, but only for those exiles who received a favourable report from the local administration. Most of the Vologda exiles were amnestied. Letter No. 234

[317] Lenin's trip was apparently undertaken in connection with the lecture on "The Social Upswing in Russia and the Tasks of Social-Democracy", which he delivered on April 26, 1913 in Leipzig. Letter No. 236

[318] The letter contained the medical advice given to Lenin by his brother for the treatment of Nadezhda Krupskaya. Lenin's letter has been lost but its contents are known from a letter written by his mother to her daughter Maria on April 30, 1913. "I have just received a letter from Volodya in which he also wrote to Mitya to inform him that in spite of electric treatment for three weeks, Nadya's eyes, neck and heart are no better.... Acquaintances advise him to take her to Kocher in Berne, a first-class specialist on such illnesses—it can be cured, they say, but it is dangerous to neglect it, the illness is a serious one and later it will become hopeless.... Volodya is in great difficulty—should they abandon the cottage they have now moved to, which is on a mountain, and there is the excellent mountain air she was told was good for

her, or take her to Kocher, who is a surgeon and will probably want to operate; many people say that operations in such cases are difficult and the outcome is doubtful.... So Volodya asks Mitya's advice.... Mitya was not here when the letter arrived, he came two days later, read the letter, got out his medical books copied out something from them, consulted someone here and only yesterday sent an answer by registered post." Letter No. 236

[319] *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—a Bolshevik legal journal dealing with questions of theory published monthly in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. Its circulation reached 5,000 Copies.

The journal was founded on Lenin's initiative in place of the Bolshevik, journal *Mysl*, formerly published in Moscow and suppressed by the authorities.

On the eve of the First World War *Prosveshcheniye* was prohibited by the tsarist government. In the autumn of 1917 the journal was restarted, but only one issue (a double number) appeared; it contained two articles by Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and "The Revision of the Party Programme". Letter No. 237

[320] The anniversary issue of *Pravda* (No. 92) appeared on April 23 (May 6), 1913. The issue carried two articles by Lenin, "The *Pravda* Anniversary. Workers Support the Workers' Paper" and "A Few Words on Results and Facts". Letter No. 237

[321] The elections to the Executive of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union took place on April 21 (May 4), 1913. Some 800 persons attended the meeting and over 400 were unable to get into the overcrowded hail. The Bolsheviks put forward a list of candidates for election that had been published in *Pravda* No. 91 and distributed among those present at the meeting. Despite the insistence on the part of the liquidators to elect candidates irrespective of political allegiance, the majority of those present voted for the *Pravda* list; 10 out of 14 members of the Executive were elected from the Bolshevik list. The newly elected Executive sent a telegram to Lenin greeting him as "the true leader of the working class". Letter No. 237

[322] The paper referred to is *Pravda*, which the tsarist government suppressed on July 5, 1913, beginning from issue No. 151. On July 13 the paper re-appeared under a new name—*Rabochaya Pravda*. Letter No. 242

[323] In September 1913, four volumes of the Marx-Engels correspondence were published in German. Lenin planned a big work about this correspondence, the beginning of which was his article "The Marx-Engels Correspondence" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 552-58).

In a thick notebook containing 76 pages, now in the Central

Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Lenin made notes on about 300 letters and made extracts from 15 that are of theoretical importance; he also compiled a short thematic index to his notes. The four volumes on which Lenin worked have been preserved; they have passages underlined or encircled and also marked N.B. in the margins; the remarks are made in pencil in four different colours. This material was published in Moscow as a separate edition in 1959 under the title of *Konspekt* "*Perepiski K. Marksa i F. Engelsa*" (Conspectus of the Marx-Engels Correspondence).

It had been intended to publish Lenin's essay in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* in 1914 (as reported in *Proletarskaya Pravda* on December 14, 1913) but it remained unfinished and was first published in *Pravda* on November 28, 1920 on the occasion of the centenary of Engels's birth. Letter No. 243

[324] In mid-January 1914, Lenin left Krakow for Paris where he spoke at a meeting of Bolsheviks on the intention of the International Socialist Bureau to interfere in the affairs of the R.S.D.L.P., then at two memorial meetings dedicated to the events of January 9, 1905; lie also delivered a lecture on the "Question of Nationalities" in the Grand Hall of the Geographical Society. From Paris Lenin went to Brussels to attend the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area. He delivered there a report on behalf of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in which he criticised the opportunist position of the Latvian Social-Democrats on questions of the struggle against the liquidators and took a firm stand against the conciliatory tendencies at the congress. He delivered a lecture to the delegates on the question of nationalities in which he outlined the theory and tactics of the Bolsheviks in this field. After the congress Lenin lectured on the same issue at Liège and Leipzig, returning to Krakow on February 6, 1914. Letter No. 246

[325] This article, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", was written between February and May 1914 and printed in the April, May and June issues of *Prosveshcheniye* (Nos. 4, 5 and 6) (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 393-454). Letter No. 247

[326] *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (New Workers' Gazette, Our Workers' Gazette, Northern Workers' Gazette) was the legal newspaper of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg in 1913 and 1914. Letter No. 247

[327] The book *August Bebel. His Life and Work. 1840-1913* was written by V. Levitsky (V. O. Zederbaum) and reviewed in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* No. 1 for 1914 by V. Yan-sky (S. S. Danilov). Letter No. 247

[328] This refers to the journal *Rabotnitsa* (The Working Woman)

published legally in St. Petersburg from February 23 to June 28, 1914. The first, issue appeared on International Women's Day, February 23 (March 8). Seven issues appeared. Active collaborators were Nadezhda Krupskaya, Inessa Armand, Lyudmila Stal, Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova and others.

Further information about the publication of the journal is to be found in Krupskaya's letter (No. 48) to Lenin's sister Anna. Letter No. 247

[329] This refers to Lenin's lecture on the question of nationalities delivered in the Grand Hall of the Paris Geographical Society on January 23, 1914. Letter No. 248

[330] *The Beilis affair*—the trial of the Jew Beilis organised by the tsarist authorities in Kiev in 1913 for purposes of provocation; Beilis was falsely accused of the ritual murder of the Christian boy Yushchinsky (the boy was actually killed by the Black Hundreds). By staging this trial the tsarist authorities hoped to arouse anti-Semitic feelings and by means of anti-Jewish pogroms divert the masses from the revolutionary movement that was developing in the country. The trial aroused tremendous social unrest; in many towns there were workers' protest demonstrations. Beilis was acquitted by the court. Letter No. 250

[331] Lenin and Krupskaya attended the celebrations in honour of the centenary of Shevchenko's birth. Letter No. 250

[332] In *Prosveshcheniye* No. 11 (1913) there was a short article by Mikhail Sadko on "Who Is Being Exiled?" There were no other articles on the subject in the journal. Letter No. 252

[333] On August 7, 1914 Lenin's apartment in Poronin was searched by the Austrian authorities on receipt of false information accusing him of espionage. Lenin was ordered to report to the gendarmerie in the district town of Novy Targ, where he was arrested and imprisoned next day.

Polish Social-Democrats and members of the Austrian Parliament came to Lenin's defence and he was released on August 19. He obtained permission to leave Austria for neutral Switzerland, arriving there on September 5, 1914. Letter No. 253

[334] This refers to Lenin's article "Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)", written between July and November 1914 for Granat's Encyclopaedic Dictionary. An abridged version of the article, signed V. Ilyin, was published in 1915 in Volume 28 of the dictionary. It was first published in full in 1925 in *Marx*, *Engels*, *Marxism* (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 43-91). Letter No. 253

[335] Lenin's fears were fully justified. After he had left, the greater part of his books and papers fell into the hands of the gendarme-

rie and were passed on to the General Staff in Warsaw. In 1954 some of this material was discovered in Poland and sent to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and part of the documents has been included in the *Collected Works*. Letter No. 253

[336] During the First World War G. V. Plekhanov adopted a social-chauvinist stand by defending the Menshevik tactics of defencism; this met with favourable comments in the bourgeois press. Letter No. 253

[337] The journal referred to is *Prosveshcheniye*, publication of which was to be resumed. In a letter to her sister Maria on April 11, 1915, Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova wrote that it was intended to issue one or two numbers of the journal in summer. In a letter dated April 23, she wrote: "We shall speak about restarting the journal, or rather, of publishing a summer issue, so as not to lose the right to publish it, but so far we have not got down to it. Volodya simply thirsts for a journal and a newspaper of our own." Letter No. 253

[338] In *Sovremenny Mir* No. 9 for 1914 there appeared an ultra-chauvinist article by N. Iordansky entitled "Let There Be Victory!". Letter No. 253

[339] Lenin's sister Maria asked him to try to get information about a prisoner of war, A. Rosenfeldt. In a letter to V. A. Karpinsky in January 1915 Lenin asked whether there was a bureau in Geneva giving information on Russian prisoners of war in Germany. Letter No. 254

[340] Lenin here refers to the split in the German Social-Democratic Party between the majority, the opportunist Centrists who followed Kautsky, and the radical Left wing. Letter No. 255

[341] *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays of Light)—a monthly journal published by Left Social-Democrats (the International Socialists of Germany) under the editorship of J. Borhardt. It was published irregularly from 1913 to 1921 in Berlin. Letter No. 255

[342] Early in June 1915 Lenin and Krupskaya had left Berne for the mountain village of Sörenberg, where they spent the summer. Letter No. 256

[343] The letter has been lost. Lenin was looking for a publisher for his book *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America*, written in 1915 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102). It was probably about this book that Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova wrote to her sister Maria on February 27, 1915; "Thanks for trying to find someone for Volodya's book—

because of this I shall postpone the conclusion of an agreement with Bonch (he offers 50 rubles a signature for 3,000 copies)."

Lenin began his study of U.S. farming statistics much earlier, as can be seen from his letters to the New York economist I. A. Hourwich on February 27 and to N. N. Nakoryakov on May 18, 1914.

When Lenin finished work on the book at the end of 1915 he sent the MS to Gorky in Petrograd for the *Parus* Publishing House (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 212). It was eventually published in pamphlet form in 1917 by the *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers.

Letter No. 256

[344] It was later revealed that the information given concerned another man of the same name; A. Rosenfeldt, in whom the Ulyanovs were interested, had been killed at the front. Letter No. 257

[345] On February 21, 1916, Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova wrote this to her sister Maria: "I have had a letter from Nadya who writes that their landlady drove them to desperation; they went all over the place but could not find another room anywhere, then hit upon the idea of going to Zürich for a couple of weeks to work in the local libraries. She wrote about this trip and the little shake-up as of something pleasurable." Krupskaya's letter has been lost. Letter No. 257

[346] Lenin wrote about his sister Anna's illness for reasons of secrecy; actually she had been arrested on July 21, 1916. She was released in October and banished to Astrakhan Gubernia; since she was really ill, however, she was allowed to remain in Petrograd; during the winter her house was twice searched but nothing was found. In February 1917 she was again arrested although nothing was found on this occasion either; a few days later she was released by the revolutionary people. Letter No. 259

[347] The book referred to was Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* which he wrote in the first half of 1916 and on July 2 sent via Paris to Parus Publishers in Petrograd; on Gorky's initiative this publishing house put out a series of popular booklets on the countries of Western Europe during the First World War. The series was edited by M. N. Pokrovsky, who was in Paris at the time, and through him Lenin maintained contact with the publishers. The manuscript did not reach Pokrovsky and a second copy had to he sent. In September 1916 Gorky wrote to Pokrovsky saying, "Lenin is really magnificent". The *Parus* editors, however, protested strongly against Lenin's criticism of Kautsky's apostasy and made some substantial changes to the text—they removed the criticism of Kautsky's theory of ultra-imperialism and distorted several of Lenin's formulations.

Lenin's book was first published in Petrograd in mid-1917 under the title *Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism*. (*A Popular Outline*) with a Preface by Lenin dated April 26, 1917.

Letter No. 260

[348] *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America* is the full title of the part published. Lenin intended writing two further parts—on Germany and Austria—and started collecting material. During a search of his house at Poronin on August 7, 1914 three notebooks containing statistical analyses on the agricultural systems of Germany, Austria and Hungary were seized. The Central Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, C.C., C.P.S.U., is in possession of some of the material prepared by Lenin for the next part (on Germany). Lenin was unable to carry out his intention of writing Part Two, Germany. Letter No. 260

[349] Enclosed with the letter was a plan of this work drawn up by Nadezhda Krupskaya. Latter No. 263

[350] Lenin refers here to his book *The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*, on which he was working in August and September 1917 when in hiding (at Razliv and in Helsingfors) (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 385-497). Letter No. 265

[351] Lenin recommended these books to his sister Maria because she intended writing a book on the British working-class movement. Letter No. 266

[352] At this time Krupskaya was on board the government propaganda vessel *Krasnaya Zvezda* as representative of the People's Commissariat of Education. Propagandists and representatives of a number of People's Commissariats were on board the vessel which sailed from Nizhny Novgorod to Perm, stopping at towns and villages, factories and factory settlements. Krupskaya kept a detailed diary of the voyage.

The telegram from V. M. Pozner which Lenin mentions ran as follows: "The Provisional Executive Committee of the Union of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture has to inform you that the Second All-Russia Communist Conference opens on July 25, two days prior to the opening of the congress appointed for July 27 by a decision of the second session. The Executive Committee requests you to speak on 'The New Personnel in Education and Work Among the People'. Please inform us of your consent." Telegram No. 267

[353] Krupskaya has the following to say about her correspondence with Lenin: "The letter of July 9, 1919 is the only private letter from Vladimir Ilyich that I still have. We did not live much apart. We carried on a considerable correspondence when Ilyich was in prison and during his first year of exile, when he was alone, also during my stay in Ufa. In those days we wrote mostly in invisible ink and letters were destroyed as soon as they had been read.

In 1919 I travelled on the propaganda vessel *Krasnaya Zvezda* for about two months. It was difficult to correspond in this period because of the constant movement of the vessel. But even those few letters I received from Ilyich were all, except one, destroyed, following the habit of underground work acquired in the past." Another letter and a telegram sent by Lenin to the propaganda ship were discovered later (see Letter No. 270 and Telegram No. 269). Letter No. 268

[354] Lenin here refers to Gorki, near Moscow, where he spent any leisure time he had. Lenin first went there on September 24 or 25, 1918. At first he spent his days off there but later, on the insistence of his doctors, he lived there for some time, although even during this period of rest he continued working hard.

Towards the end of 1921 Lenin's health deteriorated seriously. On December 6 he was granted leave of absence and spent the time in Gorki. During his illness (May 23-October 2, 1922) he lived in Gorki and went there on a visit for a few days in early December. From May 15, 1923 to his death on January 21, 1924, Lenin lived in Gorki, leaving there only on rare occasions.

The place is now called Gorki Leninskiye and a Lenin Museum was opened there on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death. Letter No. 268

[355] This telegram is in answer to the following telegram from Krupskaya: "Moscow, Comrade Lenin. July 10, 1919. Kazan. Arrived in Kazan today. Am well. Very much work. Am moving on. Are you keeping well? *Ulyanova*." Telegram No. 269

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[1] The article was cut out by the censor.—*Ed.*

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— 1900, No. 1, pp. 84-110; No. 2, pp. 59-68, 297-306.—(85, 86, 87, 88, 98, 99, 100, 103)
Zhurnal Ministerstva Yustitsii (Journal of the Ministry of Justice), St. Petersburg.—(247)
Ziber, N. I., *David Rikardo i Karl Marks v ikh obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskikh issledovaniyakh* (David Ricardo and Karl Marx in Their Socio-Economic Studies). An Essay in Critico-Economic Investigation, 3rd ed., St. Petersburg, Sytin's Printing Works, 1897, 546, II pp. (Politico-Economic Library).—(34)
Zvezda (The Star), St. Petersburg, 1910, No. 1, September 16, 4 pp.—(215)

INDEX OF NAMES

A

Akimov (*Makhnovets*), *V. P.* (1872-1921)—Social-Democrat; arrested in 1897 and banished in April 1898 to Yeniseisk Gubernia. In September 1898 escaped abroad and became one of the leaders of the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad.—(73)

Al. Andreyevich—see Zalezhsky, A. A.

Alexander Ivanovich—see Veretennikov, A. I.

Alexander Leontyevich—see Malchenko, A. L.

Alexandrov, *A.*—compiler of an English-Russian Dictionary.—(144)

Alexeyev (*Alexejeff*), *N. A.* (born 1873)—member of the Party from 1897; trained as a doctor. His revolutionary activities began in St. Petersburg at the close of the nineties; in the spring of 1897 he joined the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Arrested early in 1898 and banished to Vyatka Gubernia for four years; escaped from there abroad in 1899. From 1900 to 1905 lived in London; was member of the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and then of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democrats Abroad. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was Bolshevik representative in London.—(138)

Alexinsky, *G. A.* (born 1879)—Social-Democrat at the beginning of his political career; sided with the Bolsheviks during the revolution of 1905-07. Became an otzovist in the period of reaction, was one of the organisers of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group.—(163)

Al. K., *Alexandra Kirillovna*—see Chebotaryova, A. K.

Almazov, *P.*—author of the book *Nasha Revolyutsiya* (Our Revolution).—(162)

Alyushkevich, *N. O.* (born 1873)—took part in the revolutionary movement in St. Petersburg from 1892; arrested in 1893 in connection with the organisation of the Central Workers' Circle and kept under special police surveillance. Later, in Novgorod, took part in the organisation of a print-

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Editor's note: The figures in brackets at the end of each entry indicate the number of the letter in which the name occurs; figures preceded by the letter K refer to Krupskaya's letters. The italicised figures refer to preface pages.

ing press, for which he was again arrested in 1897; in 1898 sentenced to five years exile in Eastern Siberia.—(63)

A. M., *Ant. M.*—see Rosenberg, A. M.

Amicis, *Edmondo*, *de* (1846-1908)—Italian writer, member of the Italian Socialist Party from 1894. His book *Schoolfellows* was published in Moscow in Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova's translation in 1898.—(38, 42)

A. N.—see Potresov, A. N.

Anatoly, *Anatoly Alexandrovich*—see Vaneyev, A. A.

Andreyev, *Leonid* (1871-1919)—Russian novelist and playwright.—(177)

Andreyeva, *M. F.* (1868-1953)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1904; well-known Russian actress, prominent in public life, wife of Maxim Gorky.—(159)

Anna Ilyinichna, *Anyuta*, *Anya*—see Ulyanova-Yelizarova, A. I.

Apollinariya Alexandrovna—see Yakubova, A. A.

Ardashev, *D. A.* (1864-1915)—Lenin's cousin, notary public.—(12)

Ardasheva, *E. N.*—wife of D. A. Ardashev.—(12)

Arefyev, *V. S.* (1875-1901)—began taking part in the revolutionary movement in the early nineties; arrested in 1894 and banished to Vyatka, and later to Kazachinskoye, Minusinsk District, Siberia. When in Vyatka, contributed to the periodicals *Vyatskaya Gazeta* (Vyatka Gazette) and *Vyatsky Krai* (Vyatka Area), and when in Siberia, contributed to *Vostochnoye Obozreniye* (Eastern Review) and *Sibirskaya Zhizn* (Siberian Life), for which he was expelled from Kazachinskoye. On return from exile, joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.—(73)

Armand (*Petrova*), *Inessa* (1874-1920)—member of the Bolshevik Party from 1904, professional revolutionary, active in world communist and working women's movements. Did Party work in Moscow, St. Petersburg and abroad. Was active during the revolution of 1905-07. Several times arrested and banished; went abroad in 1909, lived at first in Brussels and later (1910) in Paris. Was elected secretary to the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad. In 1911 took part in the Party school at Longjumeau. Returned clandestinely to Russia in 1912 and as representative of the C.C. did extensive work preparing for elections to the Fourth Duma in St. Petersburg. During the world imperialist war took part in the World Women's Socialist Conference (1915), World Youth Conference (1915), and the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences of internationalists. After the October Socialist Revolution was member of the Moscow Gubernia Party Committee, and of the Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee; was chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Economic Council. Became head of the Women's Department of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) in 1918.—(245, K 48)

Arzt—see Krutovsky, V. M.

Aunt, *Auntie*—see Kalmykova, A. M.

Aunt—see Ponomaryova, L. A.

A. V.—see Sklyarenko, A. P.

Avenarius, *Richard* (1843-96)—German bourgeois philosopher, subjective idealist.—*33* (182, 184, 188)

Avgusta Pavlovna—see Nevzorova, A. P.

Avilov, *B. V.* (1874-1938)—Social-Democrat, journalist and statistician.—(85)

Axelrod, *P. B.* (1850-1928)—Social-Democrat, took part in the activities of the Emancipation of Labour group, one of the editors of *Iskra* and *Zarya*; became a Menshevik following the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903). —*48*, *49*

B

Babbage, *Charles* (1792-1871)—British mathematician and mechanic; professor of mathematics at Cambridge University from 1828 to 1839; famous as the compiler of logarithmic tables.—(71)

Baedeker, *Karl* (1801-59)—compiler of guides to the Rhine- and, Middle, North and South Germany, Switzerland, etc., that earned a reputation for accuracy. His sons continued the publication of such guides.—(52, 151)

Baramzin, *Y. V.*—Social-Democrat, became an *Iskra* supporter in 1891, was leader of Marxist study circles; banished to Eastern Siberia in 1898; in 1899 was one of the 17 Social-Democrats who signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo* of the Economists.—(K 19)

Basil—see Starkov, V. V.

Bauer, *Otto* (1882-1938)—one of the leaders of the Right wing of the Austrian Social-Democrats and the Second International; he propagandised the bourgeois-nationalist theory of "cultural-national autonomy".—(161)

Bazarov (*Rudnev*), *V. A.* (1874-1939)—participated in the Social-Democratic movement from 1896; contributed to a number of Bolshevik publications between 1905 and 1907. Left the Bolsheviks during the period of reaction and advocated "God-building" and empirio-criticism; was one of the chief Machist reformers of Marxism.—(175, 179)

Becher, *Erich* (1882-1929)—German philosopher (see also *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 401).—(176)

Beer, *Max* (born 1864)—German historian.—(243, 266, K 47)

Beethoven, *Ludwig van* (1770-1827)—German composer.—(245)

Beltov, *N.*—see Plekhanov, G. V.

Berdyayev, *N. A.* (1874-1948)—reactionary idealist philosopher and mystic. In his first writings took the stand of a "legal Marxist" and then became an open enemy of Marxism.—(K 29)

Bernstein, *Eduard* (1850-1932)—leader of the extreme opportunist wing of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International; the theoretician of revisionism and reformism.—*50*, *51*, *53* (87, 88, 90, 96, 98, K 19)

Beilis, *M. T.* (born 1873)—clerk in a Kiev brickyard. A Jew

by nationality, he was falsely accused of the ritual murder of a Christian boy in 1911.—(250)

Bezobrazov, *V. P.*—economist.—(39)

Blazejewski, *M. V.* (1831-97)—Warsaw worker, participant in the Polish uprising of 1863. Was in Vilna in 1894, where he was arrested for revolutionary activities among the workers; in 1895, though sick and ageing, he was banished to Eastern Siberia for six years. Towards the end of his life he sided with the Social-Democrats.—(32)

Blos, *Wilhelm* (1849-1927)—historian, publicist, member of the German Social-Democratic Party. Author of *The French Revolution, 1789-1804* and *History of the German Revolution of 1848*.—(61, 67, K 8, K 12)

Bogdanov, *A.* (*Malinovsky*, *A. A.*) (1873-1928)—Social-Democrat, philosopher, sociologist, economist. Joined the Bolsheviks after the Second Party Congress. Headed the otzovist movement during the years of reaction and subsequent revolutionary revival and was leader of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group. Attempted to create his own philosophical system, empirio-monism, a variant of the subjective idealism in Machist philosophy which Lenin criticised sharply in his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.—*53*, *55*, *56* (39, 40, 89, 90, 157, 168, 175, 182, 183, 184)

Bock, *I. I.* (1848-1916)—statistician, in the seventies editor of Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior.—(20)

Bonch-Bruyevich, *V. D.* (1873-1955)—joined the Party in 1895. In 1904 headed the communications department of the C.C. and later organised the publication of Bolshevik literature (Publishing House of Bonch-Bruyevich and N. Lenin). Was later active in organising Bolshevik newspapers, journals and Party publishing offices. After the October Revolution he was the office manager of the Council of People's Commissars (until October 1920), then chief editor of the *Zhizn i Znaniye* (Life and Knowledge) Publishers; held other responsible posts and also did research.—(160, 162, 172, 173, 260, 261, K 54)

Bookseller—see Potresov, A. N.

Borinevich, *A. S.*—Zemstvo statistician.—(39)

Borodin, *A. P.* (1833-1887)—Russian composer.—(K 41)

Borovikovsky, *A. L.* (1844-1905)—publicist, jurist.—(50)

Bourget, *Paul* (born 1852)—French writer, elected to the French Academy in 1894. In his play *La Barricade*, Bourget reveals himself as a fanatical enemy of the working-class revolutionary movement.—(202)

Braun, *Heinrich* (1854-1927)—German Social-Democrat, journalist, one of the founders of *Die Neue Zeit*, editor of *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* and a number of other periodicals; deputy to the Reichstag.—(25, 37, 61, 112)

Bulgakov, *S. N.* (1871-1944)—bourgeois economist, idealist philosopher. In the nineties was a "legal Marxist". Attempted to revise the Marxist agrarian policy.—*50* (40, 43, 64, 80, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 97, 98, 99, K 2, K 15)

Bulochkins—see Nevzorova, A. P., Nevzorova-Krzhizhanovskaya, Z. P., Nevzorova-Shesternina, S. P.

C

Cauwelaert, *Jan F.*, *van* (born 1880)—Belgian jurist and statesman. Between 1905 and 1907 published a number of articles expressing idealist views on philosophy in the *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; in 1907 he became professor extraordinary at Freiburg University.—(175)

Chaikovsky, *P. I.* (1840-1893)—Russian composer.—*38* (146, K 41)

Chebotaryov, *I. N.* (1861-1934)—member of the Narodnaya Volya, participant in the revolutionary movement from 1886.—(134)

Chebotaryova, *A. K.*—wife of I. N. Chebotaryov.—(13, 15, 16, 134)

Chechurina, *A. I.*—see Meshcheryakova, A. I.

Chekhov, *A. P.* (1860-1904)—Russian writer.—(123)

Chelpanov, *G. I.* (born 1862)—philosopher and psychologist, —(166)

Chernov, *V. M.* (1876-1952)—one of the leaders and theoreticians of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.—*54* (183)

Chernyshevsky, *N. G.* (1828-1889)—revolutionary democrat and utopian socialist, scientist, writer and literary critic; one of the great forerunners of Russian Social-Democracy.—*55* (185)

Chicagoan—see Yonov, V. A.

Chigorin, *M. I.* (1850-1908)—founder of the Russian chess school. Published the magazines *Shakhmatny Listok* (Chess Sheet) and *Shakhmatny Vestnik* (Chess Herald).—(85)

Chuprov, *A. I.* (1842-1908)—economist, professor, Narodnik publicist.—(22, 25)

Columbus—see Lalayants, I. Kh.

Cousin—see Krasin, G. B.

Cunow, *Heinrich* (1862-1936)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat. Historian, sociologist and ethnographer, professor. Editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, from 1917 to 1923. Was at first a Marxist but later became a revisionist and falsifier of Marxism.—(93, 243)

D

D. A.—see Ardashev, D. A.

Dan (*Gurvich*), *F. I.* (1871-1947)—one of the leaders of the Mensheviks. Headed the liquidator group abroad during the period of reaction and the subsequent revolutionary revival. Was a social-chauvinist during the First World War.—(247)

Danielson, *N. F.* (*N. —on*) (1844-1918)—writer on economics, one of the liberal Narodnik theoreticians in the eighties and nineties.—(16, K 11)

Danski, *B. G.* (*Komarovski*, *K. A.*, *X.*) (born 1883)—member of the Polish Socialist Party from 1901. In 1911 joined the R.S.D.L.P. and contributed to the newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. Was editor of the journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* in 1913 and 1914.—(247)

Dauge, *P. C.* (1869-1946)—took part in revolutionary activities from the late eighties, became a Bolshevik after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Engaged in publishing from 1907-1912.—(165)

Davydov, *I. A.* (1866-1942)—member of the first Marxist study circles in Moscow. Arrested and banished several times for revolutionary activities. In 1900 published the book *Chto zhe takoye ekonomichesky materialism?* (What Is Meant by Economic Materialism?) about which Lenin made a number of critical remarks on reading it. After the October Revolution he worked in Petrograd on public education bodies and in several publishing houses. Member of the C.P.S.U. from 1920. From 1924 to 1933 was lecturer and later professor of political economy at Leningrad University.—(103)

D. I., *Dmitry Ilyich*—see Ulyanov, D. I.

Director—see Radchenko, S. I.

Dobkovich, *V. I.* (1868-1937)—dentist, member of the first Russian Association of Dentists. After the October Revolution worked in the Petrograd Health Department.—(15)

Doctor—see Lyakhovsky, Y. M.

"*Doctor*"—see Sklyarenko, A. P.

Dominika—see Trukhovskaya, D. V.

Dostoyevsky, *F. M.* (1822-1881)—Russian writer.—(42)

Dubouchez—surgeon.—(192)

Dubrovinsky, *I. F.* (1877-1913)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. One of the leaders of the Moscow Workers' Union. *Iskra* agent from 1902. Co-opted on to the Central Committee after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. One of the organisers and leaders of the Moscow armed uprising in 1905.—(157)

E

Écrivain—see Struve, P. B.

Editor—see Struve, P. B.

E. E., *Elvira Ernestovna*—see Rosenberg, E. E.

Engberg, *O. A.*—worker at the Putilov Plant. Exiled to Eastern Siberia under police surveillance in October 1897 for participation in the revolutionary movement. Served a term of exile in Shushenskoye, Yeniseisk Gubernia.—(40, 101, K 7, K 8, K 11, K 12, K 16, K 17)

Engelhardt, *M. N.*—author of the article "*Otkryvayushchiyesya karty*".—(100)

Engels, *Frederick* (1820-1895).—(35, 197, 243)

F

Fedoseyev, *N. Y.* (1871-1898)—one of the first Marxists in Russia, organiser and leader of Marx-

ist circles.—*49*, *63* (22, 28, 35, 38, 51, 52, 53, 63, 67)

Fedulova, *A. J.*—a doctor with a practice in Barnaul, later in Tomsk.—(114, 115, 117)

Feuerbach, *Ludwig Andreas* (1804-1872)—German materialist philosopher and atheist.—(179, 180, 183)

Fiedler, *F. F.*—compiler of a German grammar.—(65)

Filaret (*Drozdov*, *V. M.*) (1782-1867)—one of the most reactionary figures in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, a zealous defender of serfdom. Became Metropolitan of Moscow in 1826. Author of the scholasticist *Catechism of the Orthodox Church*.—(4)

Filippov, *M. M.* (1858-1903)—Russian scientist, philosopher and writer; supported the "legal Marxists". Founded the journal *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* in 1894.—(105, 106, K 21, K 27, K 29, K 31)

Foville, *A.*—author of *La France économique*.—(16)

France, *Anatole* (*Thibaut*, *Jacques Anatole*) (1844-1924)—prominent French writer.—(163)

Frelikh, *N. N.*—solicitor; while in St. Petersburg in 1894 maintained contact with a Narodnaya Volya group and helped to publish proclamations; arrested in 1898 and banished to Eastern Siberia for five years.—(63)

Friedmann, *S. M.*—wife of a doctor in Minusinsk whose address was used by exiles to obtain literature and money.—(52, 54, K 5)

G

Galina—see Rozmirovich, Y. F.

Gilbreth, *F. B.*—author of *Motion Study*. A Method for Increasing the Efficiency of the Workman.—(260, 261)

Ginsburg, *S. M.* (1863-1891)—revolutionary, terrorist; carried on propaganda among soldiers and young people. In 1887-88 she attempted to unite isolated revolutionary groups and recreate the Narodnaya Volya Party. She organised the attempt on the life of Alexander III. Was arrested in 1889 and sentenced to death; the sentence was commuted to penal servitude for life. Committed suicide in the Schlüsselburg Fortress.—(32)

Gleb—see Krzhizhanovsky, G. M.

Goldenberg, *I. P.* (*Meshkovsky*) (1873-1922)—Social-Democrat, became a Bolshevik after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Attended the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907 and was elected to the C.C. by the Bolsheviks.—(162)

Goldman—see Gorev, B. I.

Gold-Prospector—see Maslov, P. P.

Golovin, *K. F.* (1843-1913)—reactionary publicist and writer. In his writings (including the book *Muzhik bez progressa ili progress bez muzhika*) he upheld the interests of the big landed proprietors and the monarchy.—(15)

Gora—see Lozgachov, G. Y.

Gorbunov-Posadov, *I. I.* (1864-1940)—Russian writer and educationalist, publisher.—(K 51, K 54)

Gorev (*Goldman*), *B. I.* (born 1874)—Social-Democrat, member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1897 was arrested and banished to Olekminsk. —(63)

Gorky, *Maxim* (*Peshkov*, *A. M.*) (1868-1936)—Russian proletarian writer, founder of socialist realism and of Soviet literature.—*56* (135, 140, 159, 168, 172, 197, 216, 228, 268, 269, 270, K 23)

Grachevskaya, *M. A.*—cousin of Lenin on his mother's side.—(K 21)

Grafov.—(1)

Granat, *A. N.* and *I. N.*—In 1892 they headed a publishing firm founded in Moscow by a group of scholars and scientists.—*34*, *35* (158, 160, 170, 253, 254, 255, 260, K 53, K 54)

Grassmann, *Hermann* (1809-1877)—German mathematician, physicist and philologist (see also *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 402).—(183)

Grigoryev, *M. G.* (born 1871)—Social-Democrat, member of the Kazan group of revolutionaries headed by N. Y. Fedoseyev. Carried on revolutionary work in Nizhny Novgorod from 1891-93, was arrested in 1894 and banished to Samara under police surveillance. In 1895 and 1896 took part in a Marxist study circle in Samara and contributed to *Samarsky Vestnik*. Was arrested in May 1896 and in 1897 banished to Archangel Gubernia. On return from exile retired from politics.—(60, 64)

Grigoryeva, *N. A.* (born 1865)—one of the first women workers to devote herself to the revolutionary movement; in 1891 and 1892 was active in organising Marxist groups in St. Petersburg and represented Vyborg District in the Central Workers' Circle. Arrested at Narva in 1894 and in 1895 banished to Eastern Siberia for five years; later entered the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.—(51).

Guesde, *Jules* (*Basil*, *Mathieu Jules*) (1845-1922)—one of the organisers and leaders of the French socialist movement and the Second International. On the outbreak of the First World War took a social-chauvinist stand and joined the bourgeois government of France.—(91)

Gumplowicz, *Ludwig* (1838-1909)—Polish bourgeois jurist and sociologist.—(29, 53, 54)

Gurevich, *E. L.* (*Smirnov*, *Y.*) (born 1865)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. During the period of reaction and the subsequent revolutionary revival was a liquidator, one of the founders and a contributor to *Nasha Zarya*, the periodical of the Menshevik liquidators. During the First World War was a social-chauvinist.—(160, 255)

Gvozdyov, *R.* (*Zimmermann*, *R. E.*) (1866-1900)—a writer whose stories and articles on economics were published in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, *Zhizn* and *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*. In 1896 he was one of the leading figures on *Samarsky Vestnik*, a daily newspaper. His best known work was *Kulachestvo-rostovshchichestvo*, *yego ob-*

shchestvenno-ekonomicheskoye znacheniye, which was reviewed by Lenin.—*49* (3, 74, 79, 89)

H

Hauptmann, *Gerhart* (1862-1946)—German playwright; one of his best known plays is *The Weavers*, in which he shows the plight of the workers under capitalism.—(9)

Helvétius, *Claude Adrien* (1715-1771)—French materialist philosopher and atheist, one of the 18th-century bourgeois theoreticians of the French Revolution.—*52* (K 16)

Hering, *Ewald* (1834-1918)—German physiologist, best known for his work on the physiology of the sense organs. His philosophy showed idealist tendencies.—(179, 183)

Historian—see Skvortsov-Stepanov, I. I.

Hobson, *John Atkinson* (1858-1940)—English economist, bourgeois reformist and pacifist—(154, 260, 261)

Holbach, *Paul Henri Dietrich* (1723-1889)—French materialist philosopher and atheist, one of the theoreticians of the 18th-century revolutionary French bourgeoisie.—*52* (K 16)

Hopfenhaus, *M. G.* (1862-1898)—a friend of N. Y. Fedoseyev; Lenin conducted his correspondence with Fedoseyev through her.—(52, 53)

Hugo, *C.*—translated the Webbs' *Industrial Democracy* into German, published in Stuttgart in 1898.—(87)

Hume, *David* (1711-1776)—English philosopher, subjective idealist, agnostic; bourgeois historian and economist.—(180)

Huschke, *Leo*—German bourgeois economist.—(161)

I

Ilovaisky, *D. I.* (1832-1920)—historian and publicist of aristocratic, monarchist ideas, author of official history textbooks for the pre-revolutionary elementary and secondary schools in Russia.—(4)

Ilyin, *V.*—Lenin, V. I.

Ingram, *John Kells* (1823-1907)—British economist and philologist, professor of Dublin University, president of the economics division of the British Association, author of *A History of Political Economy* and a number of articles on economics in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.—(16)

K

Kablukov, *N. A.* (1849-1919)—economist and statistician, professor of Moscow University; supporter of liberal Narodniks. From 1885 to 1907 headed the department of statistics at the Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo; *Sborniki statisticheskikh svedenii po Moskovskoi gubernii (1877-79)* (Summaries of Statistical Data on Moscow Gubernia) was compiled under his guidance. He contributed to several newspapers and magazines.—(35, 38, 69, 72, 81, 85, 86)

Kachorovsky, *K. R.* (born 1870)—economist. In the early nineties was a member of the St. Petersburg Narodnaya Volya group. Later contributed to the Party press of the Social-Democrats although he did not formally belong to the Party. Author of a number of studies on the agrarian question.—(103)

Kalmykova, *A. M.* (*Aunt*, *Auntie*) (1840-1926)—progressive, prominent in public affairs; took part in the Narodnaya Volya movement, closely connected with the Emancipation of Labour group and the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Because of her revolutionary activity she was kept under police surveillance. From 1889 to 1902 maintained a book warehouse that was used by Social-Democrats as a meeting place; she gave the Bolsheviks financial aid.—(34, 54, 60, 61, 65, 68, 75, 80, 85, 138)

Kamenev, *L. B.* (*Rosenfeld*) (1883-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. Sided with Bolsheviks after the Second Congress. During the years of reaction maintained a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators, otzovists and Trotskyites. Following the 1917 February Revolution opposed the Party policy of advancing to the socialist revolution and was against the armed uprising. Occupied a number of important posts after the October Revolution. Often wavered and opposed Lenin's policies. In 1927 was expelled from the C.P.S.U. at the Fifteenth Congress as an active member of the Trotskyite opposition; he was twice reinstated and again expelled for anti-Party activities.—*53* (158)

Kamenev, *S. S.* (1881-1936)—an officer of the old army (colonel) who went over to the Soviet side after the October Revolution. In September 1918 placed in command of the Eastern Front. From July 1919 to April 1924 commanded the Armed Forces of the Republic. Joined the C.P.S.U. in 1930.—(268)

Kamensky, *N.*—see Plekhanov, G. V.

Kant, *Immanuel* (1724-1804)—founder of classical German philosophy. The Kantian philosophy was a variation of subjective idealism and agnosticism but had, at the same time, certain materialist tendencies.—*55*

Karpinsky, *V. A.* (1880-1965)—founder member of the C.P.S.U., prominent Party writer and propagandist. Joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898; Bolshevik.—*31*

Karyshev, *N. A.* (1855-1905)—economist and statistician, Zemstvo member; author of many books and magazine articles on peasant farming in Russia, in which he upheld the views of the liberal Narodniks.—(65, K 7, K 8)

Kautsky, *Karl* (1854-1938)—one of the leaders of the German Social-Democrats and the Second International, at first a Marxist, later a renegade from Marxism and theoretician of the most dangerous and harmful variety of opportunism—

Centrism (Kautskyism).—*50* (86, 87, 160, 161, 162, K 28, K 30)

Kemmerer, *E. B.*—author of the book *Technischer Fortschritt* (Technical Progress)—(260, 261)

Klyuchevsky, *V. O.* (1841-1911)—leading Russian bourgeois historian, professor of Moscow University; member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party.—(2, 3)

Knipovich, *A. I.* (1860-1919)—wife of N. M. Knipovich. Did not herself participate in the revolutionary movement but helped Social-Democratic organisations.—(101, 134)

Knipovich, *L. M.* (1856-1920)—began her revolutionary activities in the late seventies in Narodnaya Volya groups in Helsingfors; joined Social-Democrats in the nineties. Played an important part in establishing communications between *Iskra* and local Party organisations in Russia. Several times arrested and banished. Carried on Party work in St. Petersburg, Tver and Odessa.—*35* (156, 163, 261)

Knipovich, *N. M.* (1862-1939)—prominent zoologist and public-spirited scholar. Elected *Privat-dozent* of St. Petersburg University in 1893 but later expelled from the University as politically unreliable. From 1911-1930 held the chair of zoology and general biology at the Women's St. Petersburg (later First Leningrad) Medical Institute.—(101)

Kobelyatsky, *A. I.* (1862-1907)—compiler of a handbook on factory legislation, Deputy Minister of Railways.—(16)

Kocher, *Theodor* (1841-1917)—Swiss surgeon. Professor of Berne University; developed a number of methods for the operative treatment of the central nervous system and of diseases of the thyroid gland, including goitre.—(238, 241, 242)

Kokhanskaya—see Sokhanskaya, N. S.

Kokushka—see Malchenko, A. L.

Kon, *Felix* (1863-1941)—prominent in Polish revolutionary movement, in which he participated from 1882. In 1884 arrested for revolutionary activities and sentenced to 10 years 8 months penal servitude. After serving his sentence he lived in Siberia until 1904, where he engaged in literary and other work.—(32)

Kovalevsky, *M. M.* (1851-1916)—historian, bourgeois-liberal politician; became professor of Moscow University in 1880. Went abroad in 1887. Jointly with Roberti, established the Russian Higher School of Social Sciences in Paris. Returned to Russia in 1905 and was elected member of the First Duma; was later a member of the State Council. He was one of the founders of the Democratic Reform Party that occupied a place to the right of the Constitutional-Democrats.—(65, 66)

Krasikov, *P. A.* (1870-1939)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik, frequently persecuted by the tsarist government.—(K 8)

Krasin, *G. B.* (*Cousin*)—brother of L. B. Krasin; member of

a St. Petersburg Marxist circle in 1893.—27 (120)

Krasnoperov, *I. M.* (born 1840)—one of the middle-class intellectuals prominent in the sixties; connected with army revolutionary circles. Took part in the "Kazan plot" organised in 1863 at the time of the rising in Poland for the purpose of diverting troops from that country. Received a sentence of 8 years penal servitude, later commuted to imprisonment and then to police surveillance. When released from surveillance, he became head of the Department of Statistics of Samara and later of Tver Zemstvos; he contributed to *Russkiye Vedomosti*.—(64)

Krestinsky, *N. N.* (1883-1938)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1903, and the Bolsheviks in 1905. Worked in St. Petersburg trade unions, in Duma groups and in the Bolshevik press from 1907 onwards. In 1917 was chairman of the Yekaterinburg and Urals Regional Committees of the R.C.P.(B.). Was People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R. from 1918 to 1921 and Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). Was later Soviet Ambassador to Germany and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.—(270)

Krumbügel, *L.*—publisher of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.—(174, 175, 176, 182, 187, 189, 191, 195, 229, 234)

Krupskaya, *N. K.* (*Rybkina*) (1869-1939)—wife of V. I. Lenin (see Note 47)

Krupskaya, *Y. V.* (1842-1915)—N. K. Krupskaya's mother (see Note 76).—(38, 44, 47, 49, 55, 61, 62, 65, 68, 72, 70, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 90, 94, 96, 98, 101, 116, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 151, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 166, 191, 193, 197, 208, 209, 213, 218, 221, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 233, 237, 238, 239, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 253, 254, 255)

Krushvits—tenant of the Alakayevka farm in 1893.—(2)

Krutovsky, *V. M.* (*Arzt*) (1856-1945)—follower of the Narodniks in the eighties; physician by profession. Lived in Krasnoyarsk. Was frequently kept under police surveillance (sometimes having to report to the police). After the February Revolution was Gubernia Commissar of the Provisional Government. In the thirties taught at the Krasnoyarsk Medical School and was a member of the Society of Physicians.—(17)

Krzhizhanovsky, *G. M.* (*Poet Friend*) (1872-1959)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893; like Lenin, was one of the organisers of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In December 1895 was arrested and banished to Siberia (Minusinsk District) for three years.—(20, 21, 22, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 44, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 68, 72, 78, 79, 82, 83, 93, 98, 109, 130, K 9, K 10, K 14, K 15, K 17, K 19, K 27, K 28, K 31)

Kuba—see Yakubova, A. A.

Kugushev, *Y. Y.* (born 1871)—whilst a student at the St.

Petersburg Institute of Technology (early nineties) took part in publishing Lenin's book *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*. In 1898 was arrested for revolutionary propaganda among workers; he was banished to Vyatka Gubernia, where he continued his revolutionary work. After the October Revolution worked in the Soviet Trade Mission in London.—Appendix I, p. 554

Kurnatovsky, *V. K.* (1868-1912)—professional revolutionary. In 1886 attended Narodnik study circles but left the Narodniks in 1893 and joined the Emancipation of Labour group abroad. Returned to Russia in 1897, was arrested and banished to Eastern Siberia. Met Lenin in Minusinsk. In August 1899, together with 16 others, signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo* of the Economists. After his return from exile he did revolutionary work in Tiflis. In 1903 was again arrested and banished to Yakutia. During the First Russian Revolution he organised the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Cossacks' Deputies in Chita and was one of the leaders of the armed rising of Chita workers. The rising was defeated, Kurnatovsky was arrested and sentenced to penal servitude for life. In 1906 he escaped abroad.—(55, 65, 73, K 9, K 15, K 18)

Kuskova, *Y. D.* (1869-1958)—bourgeois politician and publicist, one of the authors of the *Credo*, a document that clearly expressed the opportunist nature of Economism and called forth a strong protest from Russian revolutionary Marxists.—*52*

L

Labriola, *Antonio* (1843-1904)—Italian writer and philosopher; abandoned bourgeois ideology and became a Marxist at the end of the eighties.—(34, 35, 39, 60, 91)

Lafargue, *Laura* (1845-1911)—active in the French working-class movement; daughter of Karl Marx, wife of Paul Lafargue. Did a great deal to spread Marxism in France; jointly with her husband she translated into French *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and a number of other writings by Marx and Engels.—(34)

Lalayants, *I. Kh.* (*Columbus*) (1870-1933)—active in the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. Member of Fedoseyev's Marxist study group in Kazan in 1888-89 and in 1892 conducted revolutionary propaganda in Nizhny Novgorod. In 1893 joined the Marxist group in Samara that was under Lenin's leadership. In 1895 was banished to Yekaterinoslav, took part in forming the local League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and in preparing the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Helped to publish the first issue of the underground Social-Democratic newspaper *Yuzhny Rabochy* (Southern Worker) in the spring of 1900. Was arrested

in April 1900.—*38* (24, 32, 38, 60, 64, 82, 123)

Lasker, *Emanuel* (1868-1941)—outstanding German chess player, Doctor of Mathematics. Won the world championship in 1894 and retained it for 27 years. Author of several books on chess.—(79)

Lavrov, *P. L.* (1823-1900)—prominent Narodnik theoretician; supporter of the subjectivist school in sociology, author of *Istoricheskiye pisma* (Letters on History) (1868-69).—(162)

Lebedeva, *M. I.* (died 1894)—a woman member of the first Marxist circle in Samara.—(3)

Leiteisen, *G. D.* (*Lindov*) (1874-1919)—Social-Democrat, became a Bolshevik after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.; contributed to the newspapers *Vperyod*, *Proletary* and other Bolshevik publications.—(157, 162)

Lengnik, *F. V.* (*Lingling*) (1873-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Took part in the Social-Democratic movement from 1893; arrested in 1896 in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, and in 1898 was banished to Eastern Siberia for three years. In August 1899 he was one of the 17 exiles who signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo* of the Economists.—(51, 52, 73, 149)

Lenström, *N.*—compiler of a Russo-German and German-Russian Dictionary.—(75, 80)

Lepeshinskaya, *O. B.* (1871-1963)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1898. In 1897 followed her husband, P. N. Lepeshinsky, into exile in Siberia and served as district nurse in the village of Kuraginskoye, Yeniseisk Gubernia. From 1903 to 1906 she lived in Geneva and worked with a group of Bolshevik exiles. She returned to Russia in 1906 and lived in Orsha, where she took an active part in the revolutionary movement; later had a medical practice in Moscow and in the Crimea. In 1919 and later, did pedagogical and research work in Tashkent and Moscow Universities and in the biological and medical institutes of Moscow. Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R.—(55, 65, 101), Appendix I, p. 553 (K 8, K 16)

Lepeshinsky, *P. N.* (1868-1944)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898 after becoming associated with the Social-Democratic movement in the early nineties. Arrested in 1895 and banished to Siberia in 1897, at first to Yeniseisk Uyezd and then to Minusinsk Uyezd of Yeniseisk Gubernia. Made Lenin's acquaintance while living in exile.—(51, 55, 65, 88, 89, 101) Appendix I, p. 553 (K 11, K 16, K 17)

Lev Borisovich—see Kamenev, L. B.

Levitsky, *N. V.* (born 1859)—liberal Narodnik, economist, contributed to *Russkiye Vedomosti*; secretary of a Zemstvo board, barrister at law.—(97)

Levitsky, *V.* (*Zederbaum*, *V. O.*) (born 1883)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. One of the leaders of the liquidators in the period of reaction and subsequent revolutionary re-

vival. Was a social-chauvinist during the First World War.—(247)

Levitsky, *V. A.*—a close acquaintance of the Ulyanov family, was public health officer in Podolsk Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia (see Note 217).—*27* (130, 172)

Lidiya, *L. Mikh.*, *Lidiya Mikhailovna*, *Lidya*—see Knipovich, L. M.

Lindov—see Leiteisen, G. D.

Lingling—see Lengnik, F. V.

Lirochka—Yakubova, A. A.

Lokot, *T. V.*—author of *Byudzhetnaya i podatnaya politika Rossii* (Russia's Budget and Taxation Policy).—(162)

Longuet, *Jean* (1876-1938)—member of the French Socialist Party, publicist; son of Charles Longuet and Jenny Marx. Was an active contributor to the French and international socialist press.—(100)

Lowell, *Percival* (1855-1910)—American astronomer, studied Mars.—(168)

Lozgachov, *C. Y.* (born 1906)—ward of A. I. and M. T. Yelizarov; joined the C.P.S.U. in 1929; from 1925 to 1934 a technician and rate-setter. In 1934 entered Moscow Law School and on graduation became an investigator. In the war years, 1941-45, he served as a jurist in the army and rose in seniority from investigating officer of a division to corps and army investigator. Since 1946 he has worked as a legal consultant and engineer in charge of safety precautions.—(273)

Lozinsky, *M. A.* (born 1864)—editor of law publications, for a time Governor of Tiflis; in 1892 became a member of the First and Third Divisions of the Free Economic Society.—(37)

Lunacharsky, *A. V.* (1875-1933)—joined the revolutionary movement in the early nineties. Became a Bolshevik after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Was one of the editors of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary* and, later, of the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*. In the years of reaction deviated from Marxism, was a member of the *Vperyod* anti-Party group and advocated combining Marxism with religion. During the First World War was an Internationalist. Early in 1917 he became a member of the "inter-district" group and with the group was accepted into the R.S.D.L.P. at the Sixth Congress. After the October Revolution became a prominent statesman; People's Commissar of Education until 1929 and then Chairman of the Science Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. Author of a number of books on art and literature.—*53*, *54*, *55* (182, 183, 184)

Lvovich, *C. F.*—publisher.—(215)

Lyakhovsky, *Y. M.* (Doctor) (born 1871)—Social-Democrat, in 1896 arrested in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and banished to Eastern Siberia for three years. Served his term of exile at Verkholensk in Irkutsk Gubernia and then worked

in the offices of the Transbaikal Railway. Later retired from politics and emigrated to North America where he acquired a medical practice.—(17, 18, 19, 26, 28, 35, 51, 52, 63, 64, 82, 90, 92), Appendix I, p. 553

Lyudmila—see Stal, L. N.

Lyudogovsky, *A. P.*—author of the book *Osnovy selskokhozyaistvennoi ekonomii i selskokhozyaistvennogo schetovodstva* (Fundamentals of Farm Economics and Farm Accountancy), St. Petersburg, 1875.—(39)

M

Mach, *Ernst* (1838-1916)—Austrian physicist and philosopher, subjective idealist, one of the founders of empirio-criticism.—(173)

Makhnovets, *V. P.*—see Akimov, V. P.

Malchenko, *A. L.* (*Kokushka*) (born 1871)—Social-Democrat; engineer-technologist, employed at the Nevsky Engineering Works. Member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Arrested in 1895; in 1897 banished to Archangel Gubernia for three years. Later withdrew from revolutionary activity.—(35, 61, 64)

M. Al., *Maria Alexandrovna*—see Ulyanova, M. A.

M. A., *Mikh. Al.*, *Mikhail Alexandrovich*—see Silvin, M. A.

Manya, *Manyasha*, *Maria Ilyinichna*, *Maria Ulyanova*—see Ulyanova, M. I.

Maria Andreyevna—see Grachevskaya, M. A.

Mark—see Yelizarov, M. T.

Martov, *L.* (*Zederbaum*, *Y. O.*, *Yegor*, *Yuly*) (1873-1923)—participated in the Social-Democratic movement from the early nineties. In 1895 took part in organising the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, was arrested and banished to Turukhansk for three years in connection with the League. After return from exile took part (in 1900) in preparing for the publication of *Iskra*. Became the leader of the Mensheviks after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Adopted a Centrist position during the First World War. After the October Revolution opposed Soviet power. Went to Berlin in 1920, where he published the counter-revolutionary, Menshevik periodical *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* (Socialist Herald).—*49*, *53* (19, 22, 24, 26, 33, 35, 44, 50, 54, 55, 63, 70, 73, 100, 102, 247, K 19, K 20)

Marx, *Karl* (1818-1883)—*51* (35, 90, 160, 162, 179, 183, 197, 243, 254, 260, K 21)

Maslov, *P. P.* (*Gold-Prospector*, *Samaran*) (1867-1946)—economist, Social-Democrat; author of a number of works on the agrarian question, in which he tried to revise Marxism. In 1896-97 worked on the newspaper *Samarsky Vestnik*. On moving to St. Petersburg contributed to the journals *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, *Zhizn*, *Nachalo*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

became a Menshevik.—*48*, *49* (24, 60, 61, 64, 87, 255)

Mech.—(104)

Mehring, *Franz* (1846-1919)—was prominent in the German working-class movement, one of the leaders and theoreticians of the Left wing of the German Social-Democratic Party. Was an editor of the Party's theoretical journal *Die Neue Zeit* and later edited *Die Leipziger Volkszeitung*. Mehring fought against opportunism and revisionism in the Second International and condemned Kautskianism. He was an internationalist during the First World War and welcomed the October Socialist Revolution. He played a prominent role in the building of the Communist Party of Germany.—(33, 97)

Melnikov, *S. I.* (born 1860)—began his revolutionary activities in the early eighties; in 1884 banished to Eastern Siberia for three years for participation in a Narodnaya Volya group; transferred to Western Siberia in 1887. While in exile, in 1888, arraigned for publishing and distributing a protest and manifesto in the name of "Russian Political Exiles" and banished to Yakutia for three years; settied in Poltava on return from exile in 1892 but in 1895 was again arrested and in 1896 banished to Eastern Siberia for eight years. Served his term of exile in Minusinsk. Later withdrew from revolutionary activity.—(32)

Mendeleyev, *D. I.* (1834-1907)—great Russian scientist, who was also prominent in public affairs.—(39)

Menzhinskaya, *L. P.* (1878-1933)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1904; carried on Party activities in St. Petersburg, fulfilling various underground duties; in 1914 was member of the journal *Rabotnitsa* (The Working Woman). After the October Revolution worked in the People's Commissariat of Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—(269)

Mermod, *Arthur* (1852-1915)—physician (laryngologist) in Strasbourg and later in Lausanne; in 1903 became a professor at Lausanne University.—(172)

Meshcheryakov, *N. L.* (1865-1942)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1901; took part in the revolutionary movement from 1885. In 1893 went to Belgium to complete his education. In 1901 joined the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democrats Abroad. Returned to Moscow in 1902 as *Iskra* representative.—(52, 96, K 8, K 9, K 10)

Meshcheryakova, *A. I.* (*Chechurina*, *A. I.*)—teacher at a Sunday evening school in the Neva Tollgate district of St. Petersburg in the early nineties.—(52, 96, K 5, K 7, K 8, K 9)

Meshkovsky—see Goldenberg, I. P.

M. F.—see Vladimirsky, M. F.

M. G., *Maria Germanovna*—see Hopfenhaus, M. G.

M. I.—see Lebedeva, M. I.

M. Iv-na, Maria Ivanovna—see Veretennikova, M. I.

Mickiewicz, *S. I.* (1869-1944)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893; physician; one of the organisers of the Moscow Workers' Union. Arrested in 1894 and

in 1897 banished to Yakutia. On return from exile conducted revolutionary work in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov. Contributed to Bolshevik newspapers. In 1918 worked at the Moscow Department of Education. Was Deputy Director of Medical Services at first on the Southern and then on the South-Eastern Front. Took up trade union work in 1921. From 1924 to 1934 was Director of the Museum of the Revolution. Later engaged in literary activities.—(51, 117), Appendix I, p. 553

Mikhailovsky, *N. K.* (1842-1904)—prominent liberal Narodnik theoretician, publicist, literary critic, positivist philosopher, a follower of the subjective school in sociology. In 1892 was chief editor of the journal *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, in the columns of which he conducted a fierce struggle against the Marxists.—(76, 87, 162)

Mikulin, *A. A.*—mechanical engineer, factory inspector in Vladimir District and later Senior Factory Inspector of Kherson Gubernia.—(40)

Mirbeau, *Octave* (1850-1917)—French novelist and playwright.—(243)

Mitya—see Ulyanov, D. I.

Modráček, *František* (*Franz*) (1871-1960)—Czech worker; joined the Social-Democratic Party in 1897; Lenin used his address in 1900 and 1901 to send underground correspondence to Russia. Modráček later joined the reformists. In 1924 returned to the Social-Democratic Party—*28* (114, 125, 126), Appendix I, p. 554

Molotov (Skryabin), *V. M.* (born 1890)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906. Did important Party and government work after the October Revolution. In the summer of 1919 represented the Central Committee of the Party and the Central Executive Committee on the Volgaside.—(270)

M. T.—see Yelizarov, M. T.

Muret, *E.*—compiler of an English-German Dictionary.—(144)

M. T.—see Zvorykina, M. V.

N

Nadson, *S. Y.* (1862-1887)—Russian poet.—(245)

Nanny—see Sarbatova V. G.

Negri, *Ada* (1870-1945)—Italian poetess.—(53, 87)

Nekrasov, *N. A.* (1821-1878)—Russian poet, revolutionary democrat.—(245)

Nevzorova, *A. P.* (1872-1926)—joined the revolutionary movement in St. Petersburg in the early nineties. Arrested several times and kept under police surveillance. Abroad from 1908 until 1917; she was active in the Paris group formed to support the Bolsheviks. After the October Revolution worked at the People's Commissariat of Health, and from 1925 in the C.C. of the Party.—(22, 25, 206)

Nevzorova-Krzhizhanovskaya, *Z. P.* (1870-1948)—began her revolutionary activities in the nineties; took part in the work of the St. Petersburg

League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In June 1896 was arrested. Spent her term of exile with G. M. Krzhizhanovsky in Tesinskoye, Yeniseisk Gubernia, and, later, in Minusinsk. In 1899 she was one of the 17 Social-Democrats who signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo* of the Economists.—(22, 25, 34, 53, 78, 81, 93, K 1, K 4, K 10, K 12, K 13, K 14, K 17, K 19, K 22, K 24, K 25, K 27, K 31, K 53)

Nevzorova-Shesternina, *S. P.*—joined the revolutionary movement in St. Petersburg in 1893. Member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1896 arrested and, after six months solitary confinement, banished to Nizhny Novgorod. Later she did various Party jobs in the Nizhny Novgorod, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other committees.—(22, 25)

Nezhdanov, *P.* (*Lipkin*, *F. A.*) (born 1868)—publicist, one of the "critics of Marx", later a Menshevik, persistent liquidator.—(89)

Nikolai Ivanovich—see Veretennikov, N. I.

N. K., *Nad. Konst. Ulyanova*, *Nadezhda Konstantinovna*, *Nadyusha*, *Nadya*—see Krupskaya, N. K.

N. —on—see Danielson, N. F.

Nurok, *P. M.* (1827-1888)—author of textbooks of English.—(44, K 7)

N. Y., *N. Y. F.*—see Fedoseyev, N. Y.

O

O. A., *Olga Alexandrovna*—see Papperek, O. A.

Odessky, *F.*—(200)

Oganovsky, *N. P.*—economist, author of books on the agrarian question.—(255)

Okulova, *G. I.* (born 1878)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1839. In 1896 she was arrested for participation in a student demonstration and banished from Moscow to her native Minusinsk Uyezd in Yeniseisk Gubernia; she was kept under police surveillance in the village of Shoshino. In 1899 she returned from exile and worked in Kiev, Ufa and Poltava and was a member of the Kiev Committee; in December 1902 was again arrested and banished to Yakutsk Region for five years. In 1905 she arrived in St. Petersburg and took an active part in the work of the Bolshevik Committee. In 1918 she headed the Political Department of the Eastern Front, after which she taught in higher educational establishments.—(32, K 28)

Okulova, *Y. I.*—G. I. Okulova's sister; was kept under surveillance of the police in the village of Shoshino for participation in a student demonstration in 1897.—(32)

Oscar—see Engberg, O. A.

P

Papperek, *O. A.*—wife of M. A. Silvin.—(87, 93, 101, 103, K 18, K 23, K 24, K 28)

Parvus (*Helfand*, *A. L.*) (1869-1924)—Menshevik. Left Russia in the eighties; at the turn of the century took part

in the work of the German Social-Democratic Party—he belonged to its Left wing. During the First World War became an extreme chauvinist and agent of German imperialism.—(98, 160)

Pavlovsky, *I. Y.*—compiler of German-Russian and Russo-German dictionaries.—(15, 65, 75, 80)

P. B.—see Struve, P. B.

Pearson, *Karl* (1857-1936)—English mathematician, biologist and idealist philosopher.—(179)

Peres, *L. S.* (born 1877)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. Was in exile in Siberia at the beginning of the century. Later active in workers' study circles in Tiflis, Voronezh and Moscow. Worked in bookshops and had connections with I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov and with L. Krumbügel.—(191)

Peskovsky, *M. L.* (1843-1903)—publicist, distant relative of Lenin's; wrote moderately liberal articles for the newspapers *Golos*, *Russkoye Obozreniye*, and *Molva* and for the magazines *Vestnik Yevropy*, *Russkaya Mysl* and others.—(34)

Philip II (1527-1598)—king of Spain (1556-98).—(96)

Pisarev, *D. I.* (1840-1868)—prominent Russian revolutionary democrat, publicist and literary critic; materialist philosopher.—(103)

Plekhanov, *G. V.* (*Beltov*, *N.*, *Kamensky*, *N.*) (1856-1918)—outstanding figure in the Russian and international working-class movement, first propagandist of Marxism in Russia. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became a Menshevik and during the First World War, a social-chauvinist.—*48*, *49*, *51*, *58* (16, 34, 90, 182, 253, 255)

Pogozhev, *A. V.* (1853-1913)—public health officer and writer on questions of workers' life and factory legislation.—(16)

Poincaré, *Henri* (1854-1912)—French mathematician and physicist. His philosophy was close to that of Mach.—(184)

Pokrovsky, *M. N.* (1868-1932)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905; historian. Chairman of the Moscow Soviet after the October Revolution. In 1918 Deputy People's Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—*33* (269)

Ponomaryova, *L. A.* (1832-1895)—Lenin's mother's sister (see Note 3).—(1)

Popova, *K. G.*—owner of the house in Krasnoyarsk in which Lenin lived from March 4 to April 30, 1897, until his departure for Shushenskoye.—(19, 29, 35)

Popova, *O. N.* (1848-1907)—publisher.—(76, 82, 106, 129, 134, K 54)

Posnikov, *A. S.* (1846-1921)—economist, professor of political economy at Odessa University and Petrograd Polytechnical Institute.—(22, 25)

Potresov, *A. N.* (*Publisher*, *Bookseller*) (1869-1934)—joined Marxists in the nineties; banished to Vyatka Gubernia for participation in the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Went abroad in 1900 and

helped to found *Iskra*.—*51*, *53* (13, 22, 76, 101, 103)

Pozner, *V. M.* (1877-1957)—Doctor of Philosophy, professor. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1897 and the R.C.P.(B.) in 1917. Member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. from November 1917 to November 1919. Carried on Party and government work in Turkestan from 1920 to 1922. From 1931 to 1939 worked in the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., and from 1939, in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.—(267, 268)

Preobrazhensky, *A. A.* (1863-1938)—Narodnik, member of the farming commune at the Sharnel hamlet (Samara Gubernia) situated a few versts from Alakayevka, where the Ulyanovs spent the summers from 1889-93. Later joined the Social-Democratic movement and in 1905 worked in Samara.—(135, 137, 209)

Prokopovich, *S. N.* (1871-1955)—bourgeois economist and publicist, a leading figure among the Economists and one of those who advocated Bernsteinism in Russia.—*52* (101)

Prominsky, *I. L.* (1859-1923)—participant in the Polish Social-Democratic movement of the eighties. Arrested in 1894 and in 1897 banished for three years to the village of Shushenskoye, Minusinsk District, Eastern Siberia.—(29, 32, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 62, K 7, K 8, K 11, K 12, K 16, K 17)

Protopopov.—(121)

Publisher—see Krumbügel, L.

Publisher—see Potresov, A. N.,

Publisher—see Vodovozova, M. I.

Purishkevich, *V. M.* (1870-1920)—big landowner, arrant reactionary, Black Hundreds supporter, monarchist.—*55* (175, 184)

Pushkin, *A. S.* (1799-1837)—Russian national poet.—(118, 245)

Pyatnitsky, *K. P.* (1864-1938)—one of the founders of the Znaniye Publishers; managing director of the firm.—(172)

Pyotr Kuzmich—see Zaporozhets, P. K.

R

Radchenko, *S. I.* (Director) (1868-1911)—Social-Democrat, began revolutionary activities in 1890. One of the organisers of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class in 1895. Arrested in connection with the League of Struggle in 1896.—(20, 25)

Ragozin, *Y. I.*—author of *Zhelezo i ugol na yuge Rossii*.—(39)

Raichin, *S. G.* (born 1864)—Social-Democrat, in the eighties a member of the Emancipation of Labour group. Sent abroad by the group at the end of 1891 to establish contacts with Social-Democrats. Arrested in April 1892 and banished to Minusinsk in Eastern Siberia for 10 years; escaped in 1898 and later withdrew from the Social-Democratic movement.—(32, 49)

Ravich, *S. N.* (1859-1957)—Social-Democrat, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. Was engaged in Party work in Khar-

kov, St. Petersburg and abroad. Carried on Party and government work after the October Revolution.—*31*

Reiff, *F.*—author of New Parallel Dictionaries of the Russian, French, German and English Languages in Four Parts.—(75, 80)

Rey, *Abel* (1873-1940)—French positivist philosopher.—(187) *Ribot*, *Th.*—author of the booklet *Récherches sur la mémoire affective*.—(76, 77)

Ricardo, *David* (1772-1823)—prominent English economist.—(16)

Rimsky-Korsakov, *N. A.* (1844-1908)—Russian composer.—(K 41)

Rivlin, *L. S.* (1876-1960)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899, Bolshevik. Carried on Party work in St. Petersburg, Gomel and other cities and was persecuted by the tsarist government. Lived in exile abroad from 1907 to 1917.—(K 53)

Rosenberg, *A. M.* (*Schwester*) (1875-1941)—G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's sister, followed her fiancé, V. V. Starkov, into exile.—(20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 78, 93, K 9, K 12, K 14, K 19)

Rosenberg, *E. E.*—G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's mother, followed her son into exile.—(20, 21, 22, 25, 31, 32, 44, 55, 57, 68, 78, 93, K 8, K 1, K 12, K 19)

Rosenfeldt, *A.*—see Notes 339 and 344.—(254, 257)

Roßmäßler, *Emil Adolf* (1806-1867)—German naturalist.—(96)

Rostkovsky, *Y. P.* (born 1870)—joined the revolutionary movement in the nineties while a student at St. Petersburg University. Was interrogated in connection with the printing of a revolutionary appeal to workers on a Narodnaya Volya press and also for being in the possession of and distributing illegal literature; he was banished to Tomsk where he was again arraigned in 1896 and banished to Eastern Siberia for revolutionary activities. He returned from exile in 1901 and later joined the Socialist-Revolutionaries.—(51, 52, 73)

Rousseau, *Jean Jacques* (1712-1778)—French educationalist, philosopher and writer.—(K 53)

Rozhkov, *N. A.* (1868-1927)—historian and publicist. In the nineties held views close to those of the "legal Marxists"; joined the R.S.D.L.P. early in 1905 and for some time sided with the Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the revolution of 1905-07 became one of the ideologists of the liquidators.—(157)

Rozmirovich, *Y. F.* (*Troyanovskaya*, *Galina*) (1886-1953)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. After the conference at Poronin between the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and leading Party functionaries (October 6-14, 1913), she was sent to Russia as secretary of the Bolshevik Duma group and of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.—(247)

Rybkina—see Krupskaya, N. K.

S

Sabashnikov, *M. V.* and *S. V.* (1871-1943 and 1873-1909)—Russian book publishers. The

firm they founded in Moscow in 1890 enjoyed great popularity.—(229)

Saint-Simon, *Henri Claude* (1760-1825)—French utopian socialist.—(35)

Samaran—see Maslov, P. P.

Sarbatova, *V. C.* (1820-1890)—nursemaid in the Ulyanov family from 1870.—(39)

Savchenko, *A. N.*—author of the book *Sravnitelny uchot dokhodnosti v imeniyakh Yugo-Zapadnogo kraya pri boleye tipichnykh sevooborotakh i ekonomicheskikh usloviyakh perekhoda k mnogopolnomu khozyaistvu.*—(34)

Savinov, *Pavel Fyodorovich*—banished in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle.—(K 24)

Schippel, *Max* (1859-1928)—German Social-Democrat.—(15)

Schlüter, *H.*—author of the book *Die Chartistenbewegung.*—(266)

Schönbruner, *I.*—Moscow gunsmith.—(72)

Schucht, *A. A.* (1860-1933)—in the early eighties member of Narodnaya Volya, carried on revolutionary work in the tsarist army. Arrested in 1887 and banished to Siberia. On return from exile met Lenin in Samara in the early nineties. Lived abroad. After the October Revolution was a teacher and librarian. Joined the C.P.S.U. in 1917.—(6)

Schucht, *Anna* (born 1893)—daughter of A. A. Schucht.—(6)

Schwester—see Rosenberg, A. M.

Sechenov, *I. M.* (1829-1905)—naturalist, materialist, founder of the Russian school of physiology. Professor at the Medico-Surgical Academy in St. Petersburg and later of St. Petersburg and Moscow Universities; honorary member of the Academy.—(149)

Seignobos, *Charles* (1854-1942)—French bourgeois historian, Sorbonne professor, liberal.—(34)

Semyonov, *A. V.*—author of *Izucheniye istoricheskikh svedenii a rossiiskoi vneshnei torgovle i promyshlennosti s poloviny XVII-go stoletiya po 1858 god.*—(35, 38, 39)

Shakhov, *A. A.* (1850-1877)—historian of West-European literature. Lectured at Moscow University and at the Women's Higher Courses in Moscow.—(53, 54)

Shcherbina, *F. A.* (1849-1936)—Zemstvo statistician, Narodnik.—(39)

Shelgunov, *N. V.* (1824-1891)—Russian publicist, materialist philosopher, disciple of V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen and N. G. Chernyshevsky.—(4, 16)

Shevchenko, *T. C.* (1814-1861)—Ukrainian poet, painter, thinker, revolutionary democrat.—(250)

Shklovsky, *G. L.* (1875-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. In 1909 went into exile in Switzerland and was member of the Berne group of Bolsheviks.—(239, 241)

Shlyapnikov, *A. G.* (1885-1937)—joined the Bolshevik Party in 1901. During the First World War engaged in Party work in Petrograd and abroad; provided communications between the Russian Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. and the Bureau Abroad.—*29*

S. I., *Sergei Ivanovich*—see Mickiewicz, S. I.

Siberian friends—see Krzhizhanovsky, G. M., Silvin, M. A., Starkov, V. V.

Silvin, *M. A.* (1874-1955)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1891. In 1895 became a member of the leading centre of the League of Struggle. Arrested in 1896 and in 1898 banished to Eastern Siberia for three years. In August 1899 he was one of the 17 Social-Democrats who signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo* of the Economists. He was called up for service in the army shortly after this and served in Siberia and later in Riga.—(76, 81, 87, 90, 92, 99, 101, 103, 130, K 15, K 18, K 19, K 23, K 24, K 28)

Sinclair, *Upton* (born 1878)—American writer.—(163)

Sismondi, *Jean Charles Leonard Simonde*, *de* (1773-1842)—Swiss economist and historian.—(38, 40, 41)

Sister—see Tistrova, O. V.

Skitalets (*Petrov*, *S. G.*) (1868-1941)—Russian writer.—(140)

Sklyarenko, *A. P.* (*A. V.*, *Doctor*) (1870-1916)—in the late eighties worked in Narodnik study circles in Samara. Was several times arrested and banished. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became a Bolshevik. Was one of the leaders of the Saratov organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1910 he worked in St. Petersburg and contributed to the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*.—*27* (32, 57, 61, 67, 114, 124, 137, 147, 209)

Skvortsov, *P. N.*—statistician, "legal Marxist".—(93, 101, 103, 105, K 21, K 27)

Skvortsov-Stepanov, *I. I.* (*Historian*, "*Writer*", *Stepanov*) (1870-1928)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1896. Marxist writer.—*26*, *60* (178, 179, 182, 189, 191, 196, 197, 203, 208)

S. M.—see Friedmann, S. M.

Smidovich, *S. N.* (1872-1934)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1898. She worked as propagandist in Moscow, Tula, Kiev and Kaluga; was several times arrested and banished. In 1914 began to take an active part in the work of the Moscow Regional Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. From 1919 to 1922 headed the women's department of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); from 1922-1924 headed the department of working and peasant women of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). Elected a member of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) at the 14th and 15th Congresses.—(216)

Smirnov, *Y.*—see Gurevich, E. L.

Smith, *Adam* (1723-1790)—English economist, leading representative of the classical bourgeois school of political economy.—(42, K 5)

Soikin, *P. P.* (1862-1932)—Russian publisher, printer.—(K 27)

Sokhanskaya (Kokhanskaya), *N. S.* (1823-1884)—Russian authoress. Her autobiography, written in 1847-48, was published in 1896.—(55)

Stal, *L. N.* (1872-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905; she conducted revolutionary work

in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa, Nikolayev, and other towns. Went abroad in 1907 and lived in France until 1917.—(K 48)

Stammler, *Rudolf* (1856-1939)—German professor, jurist and philosopher of the neo-Kantian school.—(93)

Stange, *A. G.*—author of *Kak pomoch kustaryam-zamochnikam Pavlovskogo raiona.*—(36)

Starkov, *V. V.* (*Basil*) (1869-1925)—engaged in revolutionary activities from the nineties, was member of a Marxist group of students of the St. Petersburg Institute of Technology. Joined the leading centre of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle in 1895, was arrested in December of that year and in 1897 was banished to Eastern Siberia for three years.—(19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 44, 47, 49, 52, 53, 61, 68, 78, 82, 83. 93, 101, 130), Appendix I (K 7, K 9, K 12, K 14, K 17, K 19, K 31)

Stepanov—see Skvortsov-Stepanov, I. I.

Stoyanov—police inspector at Yeniseisk District.—(40)

Stoyanovsky, *M. V.* (1867-1908)—in 1889 arrested in connection with the case of Sophia Ginsburg, who was accused of being a member of the Narodnaya Volya Party; he was sentenced to death, which was later commuted to 4 years penal servitude, and deprived of all property rights; he was banished to Eastern Siberia for life and lived in Minusinsk.—(32)

Struve, *N. A.* (1874-1943)—wife of P. B. Struve and daughter of the teacher A. Y. Gerd. Left Russia with her husband after the October Revolution—(58, 74)

Struve, *P. B.* (*Writer*, *Editor*, *Écrivain*) (1870-1944)—bourgeois economist and publicist, prominent "legal Marxist", contributor to and editor of the magazines *Novoye Slovo* (1897), *Nachalo* (1899) and *Zhizn* (1900). Later became one of the leaders of the Constitutional-Democrats.—*49*, *51*, *60* (13, 22, 25, 30, 34, 37, 38, 40, 43, 46, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 61, 63, 67, 69, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 97, 103, 160, K 2, K 7, K 9, K 12)

Sweet, *Henry*—English grammarian, author of a textbook of spoken English.—(144)

T

Talalayev, *V. T.* (born 1871)—took part in the revolutionary movement in the nineties. Arrested in 1897 and in 1898 banished to Eastern Siberia for five years.—(63)

T.-B.—see Tugan-Baranovsky, M. I.

Tillo, *A. E.*—railway engineer, joined Social-Democrats in the eighties.—(1)

Timiryazev, *D. A.* (1837-1903)—statistician, editor of the *Yezhegodnik Ministerstva Finansov* and of *Vestnik Finansov*, *Promyshlennosti i Torgovli*.—(20)

Tistrova, *O. V.* (died in 1913)—sister of Y. V. Krupskaya (Lenin's mother-in-law); schoolteacher, lived in Novocherkassk.—(238)

Tolstoi, *Lev* (1828-1910)—Russian writer.—(216, 245)

Tonechka—see Rosenberg, A. M.

Torbek, *Y. Y.*—owner of a Moscow factory producing revolver and shotgun cartridges.—(72)

Treves, *Claudio* (1868-1933)—one of the reformist leaders of the Italian Socialist Party.—(272)

Trotsky (*Bronstein*), *L. D.* (1879-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897, Menshevik. In the years of reaction and the subsequent revolutionary revival actually adopted a liquidationist position undercover of "non-factionalism". In 1912 organised the anti-Party August bloc. During the First World War maintained a Centrist position. He returned to Russia in 1917, after the February Revolution, and was admitted to the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Congress. Trotsky, however, did not adopt the Bolshevik position and conducted a covert and overt struggle against Leninism, against Party policy. Held a number of important posts after the October Revolution. Conducted fierce factional fight against the general line of the Party, against Lenin's programme of socialist construction, claimed that it is impossible to build socialism in one country. In 1927 expelled from the Bolshevik Party, in 1929 expelled from the U.S.S.R. for anti-Soviet activities, and in 1932 deprived of Soviet citizenship. While living abroad Trotsky, the arch enemy of Leninism, continued his struggle against the Soviet state and Communist Party and against world communism.—(268)

Trukhovskaya, *D. V.* (1874-1920)—wife of A. A. Vaneyev; took part in the work of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, was arrested in 1896 for distributing leaflets and proclamations and sentenced to imprisonment. She followed Vaneyev into exile and served her term of imprisonment (November 18, 1897 to January 18, 1898) in the prison at Yeniseisk.—(35, 44, 99, K 17, K 18)

Tsion, *I. F.* (1842-1912)—Russian physiologist. Professor of St. Petersburg University and of the Medico-Surgical Academy. Was compelled to leave the Academy in 1875 because his extreme reactionary views brought him into conflict with other members of the faculty and evoked vehement protests from the students. His best known scientific studies concern the blood circulation and nervous system.—(85)

Tugan-Baranovsky, *M. I.* (1865-1919)—Russian bourgeois economist, prominent "legal Marxist" in the nineties—*51* (18, 37, 64, 67, 69, 75, 80, 90)

Turati, *Filippo* (1857-1932)—prominent figure in the Italian working-class movement, one of the founders of the Italian Socialist Party and leader of its reformist Right wing.—(272)

Turgenev, *I. S.* (1818-1883)—Russian writer.—(42, 65, 75, 80, 81)

Tyrkov, *A. V.* (1859-1924)—joined the Narodnaya Volya Par-

ty in 1879; arrested in 1881 for participation in the attempt on the life of Alexander II, was imprisoned in the Fortress of Peter and Paul and in 1883 banished to Eastern Siberia. In 1904 banishment for life was commuted to banishment for 20 years. —(32)

Tyutchev, *N. S.* (1856-1924)—Narodnik, later Socialist-Revolutionary. Arrested in 1878 and banished to Eastern Siberia. Returned from exile in 1890; later took a leading part in the organisation of the liberal Narodnik party "Narodnoye Pravo" (People's Right). When the organisation was broken up in 1894 he was again arrested and in 1895 was sent to Minusinsk in Eastern Siberia for 8 years; he joined the Socialist- Revolutionary Party in 1904. In 1918 he took up work in the revolutionary history archives in Petrograd; in 1923 became a contributor to the journal *Katorga i Ssylka* (Penal Servitude and Exile) —(32)

Tyutryumova-Abramovich, *P. A.* (1865-1920)—was arrested in St. Petersburg in 1886 and banished to Kazan under police supervision; went abroad in 1887; in 1892 joined Social-Democrats. On her return from abroad she was arrested (1897) and for participation in revolutionary circles abroad sentenced to banishment in Eastern Siberia for five years; in 1905 she returned to European Russia, where she took part in Party work, siding with the Bolsheviks.—(63)

U

Ulyanov, *D. I.* (1874-1943)—Lenin's younger brother (see Note 6)

Ulyanov, *V.*—Lenin, V. I.

Ulyanova, *A. I.* (born 1882)—wife of D. I. Ulyanov; joined the revolutionary movement at the beginning of the century; medical worker.—(144, 145, 147, 150, 155)

Ulyanova, *M. A.* (1835-1916)—Lenin's mother (see Note 1).

Ulyanova, *M. I.* (1878-1937)—Lenin's younger sister (see Note 4).

Ulyanova, *O. I.* (1871-1891)—Lenin's sister (see Note 2).

Ulyanova, *Ulyanova-Lenina*—see Krupskaya, N. K.

Ulyanova Yelizarova, *A. I.* (1864-1935)—Lenin's elder sister (see Note 10).

Ure, *Andrew* (1778-1857)—English chemist, writer and economist; professor of one of the Glasgow colleges.—(71)

Uspensky, *G. I.* (1843-1902)—Russian writer and publicist; revolutionary democrat.—(245)

V

V. A., *V. A-ch*—see Yonov, V. A.

Valentinov, *N.* (*Volsky*, *N. V.*) (1879-1964)—Menshevik, journalist, editor of a number of Menshevik journals. On philosophical issues he favoured a revision of Marxism and defended the subjective idealist views of Mach and Avenarius.—(173, 175)

Vandervelde, *Emile* (1866-1938)—leader of the Belgian Work-

ers' Party, chairman of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International, extreme opportunist. During the First World War he was a social-chauvinist, becoming a member of the bourgeois government, in which he held a number of ministerial portfolios. Was hostile to the October Revolution and gave active support to the armed intervention against Soviet Russia.—(98)

Vaneyev, *A. A.* (1872-1899)—Social-Democrat. In 1895 played an active part in organising the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, was a propagandist in workers' Social-Democratic study groups and was in charge of the technical preparations for the publication of the newspaper *Rabocheye Delo*. Was arrested at the same time as Lenin in connection with the League of Struggle case and in 1897 was banished to Eastern Siberia. Signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the *Credo* of the Economists together with sixteen others.—(19, 21, 22, 24, 29, 33, 35, 44, 63, 70, 73, 80, 81, 90, 93, 98, 99, K16, K17)

Vaneyev's wife—see Trukhovskaya, D. V.

Vasilenko, *V. I.* (1873-1938)—author of *Kustarniye promysly selskikh soslovii Poltavskoi gubernii*.—(39)

Vatselis, *I. I.* (1873-1938)—colonel in the old Russian army, took the side of Soviet power after the October Revolution. From September 1918 to July 1919 was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the R.S.F.S.R.—(268)

Vazhinsky, *F. I.* (1847-1910)—well-known St. Petersburg dentist, honorary member of the first Association of Dentists. He founded the first dentists' school in Russia (it was later named after him) and was the first to place dentistry in Russia on a scientific footing.—(15)

Veretennikov, *A. I.* (born 1857)—Lenin's cousin, teacher of Latin and Greek; lived in Kazan and Simbirsk.—(45)

Veretennikov, *N. I.* (1871-1955)—Lenin's cousin, graduated from Kazan University in 1896 and then taught physics and mathematics in various schools. After the October Revolution he headed one of the departments of the People's Commissariat of Finance. From 1924 to 1928 he worked in the Statistics Department of the C.C., C.P.S.U., and later returned to teaching.—(45)

Veretennikova, *M. I.* (1862-1931)—Lenin's cousin, teacher. She lived in Kazan and Yaransk and in her last years in Moscow.—(166, 167)

Vernadsky, *V. I.* (1863-1945)—naturalist, mineralogist and crystallographer; founder of the sciences of geochemistry and biogeochemistry. Elected to the Academy of Sciences in 1912.—(187)

Vladimirskaya, *L. S.* (born 1883)—member of the Party from 1917, wife of M. F. Vladimirsky. Carried on revolutionary work in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow. Emigrated to France in 1909 and was a member of

the Bolshevik group in Paris. Returned to Russia in June 1917. During the October Revolution and later, worked in Moscow. In 1919-20 worked at the C.C. of the Party, then for a number of publishing houses and magazines and for Pravda. From 1931 to February 1937 worked at the Comintern and then in the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin under the C.C., C.P.S.U.—(218)

Vladimirsky, *M. F.* (Kamsky) (1874-1951)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1895, Bolshevik. Carried on Party work in Moscow, Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod and abroad. Persecuted by the tsarist government. Took an active part in the 1905 armed insurrection in Moscow. Emigrated in 1906 to France, where he worked in Bolshevik organisations: Held a number of important posts after the October Revolution. Was elected to the C.C., C.P.S.U. at the Seventh Party Congress and at the Fourteenth Party Congress became a member of the Party Central Control Commission. From 1927 to 1951 was Chairman of the Central Auditing Board of the C.P.S.U.(B.).—(209, 218, K41)

Vodovozov, *N. V.* (1870-1896)—publicist, "legal Marxist". Wrote a number of articles on the history of social thought and the working-class movement and in some of them defended Malthusianism. Jointly with his wife, organised the publishing house which in 1899 issued Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.*—(38, 63)

Vodovozova, *M. I.* (*Publisher*) (born 1869)—book publisher in St. Petersburg. Her firm helped to spread Marxist literature in Russia in the nineties.—(58, 61, 63, 64, 67, 103, 129, K2, K31)

Vorontsov, *V. P.* (*V. V.*) (1847-1918)—economist and publicist, liberal Narodnik theoretician in the eighties and nineties.—(38, K1)

Vorovsky, *V. V.* (*Orlovsky*) (1871-1923)—publicist and literary critic, prominent in the Bolshevik Party. Began his revolutionary activities in student study circles in 1890. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became a Bolshevik. In 1905 was co-editor (with Lenin) of the newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. Headed the Odessa Bolshevik organisation from 1907 to 1912. Was several times arrested and banished for his revolutionary activity. Engaged in leading diplomatic activities after the October Revolution. Was assassinated by a white-guard in Lausanne on May 10, 1923.—*26* (237)

V., *V. I.*, *V. I. U.*, *V. U.*, *V. Ulyanov*, *Vlad. Ulyanov*, *Volodya*, —Lenin, V. I.

V. V., *Vasily Vasilyevich*—see Starkov, V. V.

V. V.—see Vorontsov, V. P.

W

Webb, *Beatrice* (1858-1943)—British writer, prominent in public affairs. Joint author (with her husband) of a number of works on the history of the British working-class movement.—(44, 45, 51, 53,

54, 55, 56, 64, 76, 82, 87, 89, 91, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 160, K 5, K 14)

Webb, *Sidney* (1859-1947)—British writer, prominent in public affairs, joint author (with his wife) of a number of works on the history and theory of the British working-class movement.—(44, 45, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 64, 76, 82, 87, 89, 91, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 160, K 5, K 14)

Wolfe, *M. O.* (1825-1883)—publisher; in 1853 he opened the "universal bookshop" in St. Petersburg and in 1856 set up his own printing works. Shortly before his death the firm became a joint-stock company.—(33, 34, 54, 60, 62, 65)

"*Writer*"—see Skvortsov-Stepanov, I. I.

Writer—see Struve, P. B.

X

X—see Danski, B. G.

Y

Yakovlev, *Y. K.* (born 1870)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1890. Arrested in 1894 and in 1895 sent without trial to Eastern Siberia for five years. Spent his term of exile in Minusinsk.—(32)

Yakubova, *A. A.* (*Kuba*, *Lirochka*) (1870-1917)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1893, later became an important figure among the Economists. Was a member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. —(51, 52, 73, 80, 81, 96, 114), Appendix I (K 1, K 2, K 4, K 5, K 8, K 17, K 19)

Yefimov, *M. D.*—a worker at the Alexandrovsky South Russia Works in Yekaterinoslav (now Dniepropetrovsk); joined the first Social-Democratic group in 1894 and participated in the May Day celebrations in 1895. Arrested at the end of July 1897 for revolutionary activities and banished to Eastern Siberia for three years. While in exile in 1899 was one of those who signed Lenin's "Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" against the Economist *Credo*. —(50)

Yegor—see Martov, L.

Yelizarov, *M. T.* (1863-1919)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik; husband of Lenin's elder sister Anna (see Note 9). —*28*, *35*, *40*, *56*, *57* (3, 6, 8, 10, 15, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 51, 52, 57, 60, 62, 63, 65, 72, 76, 78, 79, 85, 88, 89, 103, 106, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 143, 147, 150, 151, 155, K 3, K 4, K 9, K 19, K 27, K 28, K 31, K 33, K 36, K 40, K 41, K 43, K 45, K 47)

Yelizarov, *P. T.* (1854-1920)—brother of M. T. Yelizarov, farmer in the village of Bestuzhevka, Samara Gubernia. Was engaged in farming until 1898; after this he was a grain merchant and rented flour mills in Syzran. Worked on the Syzran municipal council from 1912 to 1917.—(132)

Yelizarova—see Ulyanova-Yelizarova, A. I.

Yergin, *A. A.* (born 1868)—one of the organisers of the un-

derground printing press in St. Petersburg known as the Lahta Press of the Narodnaya Volya group. This press printed a number of proclamations and Lenin's pamphlet *Explanation of the Law on Fines Imposed on Factory Workers*. While working in the Narodnaya Volya organisation Yergin moved towards the Social-Democrats in his views. In December 1895 he was arrested in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats. When the printing press was destroyed in 1896 he was also arraigned in connection with that and after two years in prison was sentenced to eight years exile in Eastern Siberia.—(63)

Yonov, *V. A.* (*The Chicagoan*) (born 1863)—member of the Narodnaya Volya Party in the late eighties, later a Social-Democrat. Knew Mark Yelizarov and Lenin in Samara. Statistician by profession; he corrected the statistical tables in Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.—(3, 30, 37, 64, 76, 82, 86, 87, 88)

Yudin, *G. V.*—merchant, bibliophile, had a private library of about 80,000 volumes at Krasnoyarsk. In 1907 Yudin sold the greater part of his library in the U.S.A., where it made part of the Library of Congress in Washington —*30* (18, 19, 20)

Yukhotsky, *I. A.*—railway conductor at Novorossiisk port. Arrested in Odessa in 1895 and banished to Eastern Siberia for five years early in 1897.—(38, 52, 53)

Yuly—see Martov, L.

Yuly's sisters—see Zederbaum, L. O. and Zederbaum, N. O.

Yushkevich, *P. S.* (1873-1945)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik; his philosophy was positivist and pragmatist, trends closely connected with Machism. —(175)

Yuzhakov, *S. N.* (1849-1910)—one of the theoreticians of the liberal Narodniks, sociologist and publicist.—(37, 40, 41)

Y. V., *Yel. Vas.*, *Yelizaveta Vasilyevna*—see Krupskaya, Y. V.

Z

Zakrzhevsky, *Y. F.* (1852-1915) —Russian operatic singer. Left the stage in 1907 and taught singing in Kazan.—38 (122)

Zalezhsky, *A. A.*—cousin of Lenin, a doctor.—(4)

Zaporozhets, *P. K.* (1873-1905) —Social-Democrat, active in revolutionary work. Arrested in December 1895, at the same time as Lenin, Krzhizhanovsky and others in connection with the case of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, and banished to Eastern Siberia for five years. Became mentally deranged in prison and was sent to a mental hospital, where he died from consumption.—(28, 35)

Zederbaum (*Kantsel*), *L. O.*—Social-Democrat, L. Martov's sister. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became a Menshevik. In 1898 was a member of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic group

Rabocheye Znamya (Workers' Banner).—(35)

Zederbaum, N. O.—L. Martov's sister.—(35)

Zederbaum, O. A.—L. Martov's father.—(50)

Zheleznov, V. Y. (born 1869)—economist, lecturer in political economy at Kiev University and later professor of Moscow Agricultural Institute.—(143, 144)

Ziber, N. I. (1844-1888)—Russian economist, publicist; contributed to a number of radical and liberal magazines in the eighties. One of the first popularisers of Marx's economic works in Russia.—(34)

Zina, Zinaida Pavlovna—see Nevzorova-Krzhizhanovskaya, Z. P.

Zmeyev, V. Y. (born 1873)—worker at the former Goldberg factory in St. Petersburg; member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1896 moved to Novgorod and took an active part in setting up the League of Struggle printing press in Novgorod; arrested in 1897 and in 1898 banished to Eastern Siberia for five years.—(63)

Zvorykina, M. V.—a school friend of Lenin's sister Maria. At one time was the guest of Lenin's mother at Podolsk, —(133)

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В. И. ЛЕНИН
СОЧИНЕНИЯ
Том 37

На английскот языке

A Note on the Transcription

This digital edition of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks,* the whole of Volume 38 of the Fourth (English language) Edition of the *Collected Works*, might be regarded as a "synthesis" of the Third (1972) and Fourth (1976) Printing of the volume.

We began our preparation of this volume using the Fourth Printing, having assumed that this edition marked an improvement over the previous one. Only much later did it become clear, after some spot-checking with the Third Printing, that in certain very important respects the newer printing reflected a carelessness that rendered it inferior to its predecessor. For example, in the Fourth Printing there was the inconsistent use of Greek and German characters for the same words which introduced unnecessary confusion; there were also instances where verticle lines that Lenin placed in the margins adjacent to his comment were omitted. On a couple of other ocassions small blocks of text were re-ordered, and while such practice can clearly fall within the purview of editorial discretion, there were also a couple of places where a few lines of text are repeated, word for word, with no accompanying editorial note to indicate that such a *faux pas* had its source in Lenin's reading notes (which suggests that the problem was with the editorial staff). In nearly all cases where there were disrepancies between the Third and Fourth printings, be they substantive or merely annoying, the greater confidence in the Third Printing prevailed.

Notwithstanding such carelessness, we proceeded to use the Fourth Printing as the basis for the formatting, layout and pagination of this digital edition. The afore-mentioned *faux pas* were removed and this required some reformatting, and this proceeded on the basis of the 1972 printing. Perhaps it is worth noting that neither edition was particulaly generous in translating into English the German expressions and phrases Lenin's frequently used in the body of the texts. Nor

was it ever indicated why some German text was rendered into English and other text (by far most) never was. In those instances when translations were ventured, unlike the 1972 edition which placed them in the footnotes, the 1976 edition placed the English translations directly in the body of the text and omitted the German altogether. The latter edition also revised some of the editors' endnotes, expanding on a few items, reducing others, and most salient of all: omitting the repetative phrase "reactionary philosophy" from every note pertaining to idealist philosophers.

Although Marx to Mao has always tried to limit its role to that of transcription, we are confident that in spite of, or perhaps because of, our ocassional editorial intrusion in this instance, nothing has been done to degrade the integrity of the material we are placing before the reader.

In preparing this digital edition of the *Philosophical Notebooks* we encountered one nagging technical problem: establishing a consistent and uniform appearance for the veritical parallel lines (both "normal" and "bold" faced) appearing throughout the volume. We have reached the limit (as we know it) of what we can do to control this. The file has been tested on two different versions of Acrobat Reader (4.0 and 6.0), but there has been no cross-platform testing. We can only apologize if these marginal markings are aesthetic disasters on your particular system.

1 May 2008

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

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LENIN

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38

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PREFACE

Volume 38 of the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works* of V. I. Lenin comprises resumes and excerpts from books, plus his critical remarks and evaluations concerning various aspects of Marxist philosophy; it also includes notes, fragments and other philosophical material.

The volume includes Lenin's philosophical writings first published in *Lenin Miscellanies IX and XII* in 1929-30, and then, from 1933 to 1947, published repeatedly as a separate book under the title of *Philosophical Notebooks*. This material comprises the contents of ten notebooks, eight of which, relating to 1914-15, were entitled by Lenin *Notebooks on Philosophy*. In addition, the volume includes comments on books dealing with problems of philosophy and the natural sciences made by Lenin as separate notes in other notebooks containing preparatory material, as well as excerpts from books by various authors, with notes and underlineation by Lenin.

Unlike previous editions of *Philosophical Notebooks*, this volume contains Lenin's comments and markings in G. V. Plekhanov's pamphlet *Fundamental Questions of Marxism* and in V. Shulyatikov's book *The Justification of Capitalism in West-European Philosophy, from Descartes to E. Mach*, markings and underlinings on those pages of A. Deborin's article "Dialectical Materialism" which were not included in earlier editions; comments in G. V. Plekhanov's book *N. G. Chernyshevsky*, including markings, which in the course of work on this edition were proved to have been made by Lenin; and a number of notes on books

and reviews of books on philosophy and the natural sciences. Published in this volume for the first time is a note which Lenin wrote late in 1904 on a review of *The Wonders of Life* and *The Riddle of the Universe*, two works by the German biologist Ernst Haeckel.

A large number of the items included in *Philosophical Notebooks* relate to 1914-16. It is no coincidence that Lenin devoted so much attention to philosophy, and above all, to Marxist dialectics, precisely during the First World War, a period in which all the contradictions of capitalism became extremely acute and a revolutionary crisis matured. Only materialist dialectics provided the basis for making a Marxist analysis of the contradictions of imperialism, revealing the imperialist character of the First World War, exposing the opportunism and social-chauvinism of the leaders of the Second International and working out the strategy and tactics of struggle of the proletariat. All the works of Lenin written during that period — the classical treatise *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Socialism and War, The United States of Europe Slogan, The Junius Pamphlet, Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination* and other writings — are inseparable from *Philosophical Notebooks*. The creative elaboration of Marxist philosophy, the Marxist dialectical method, and a profound scientific analysis of the new historical period were the basis for Lenin's great discoveries, which equipped the proletariat with a new theory of socialist revolution. *Philosophical Notebooks* is inspired by a creative approach to Marxist philosophy, which is indissolubly bound up with reality, the struggle of the working class and the policy of the Party.

The volume opens with Lenin's conspectus of *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism* by Marx and Engels. The conspectus written in 1895 traces the formation of the philosophical and political world outlook of Marx and Engels. Lenin quotes and marks those passages in the book which show how Marx approached "the concept of the social relations of production" (p. 30 of this volume) and which characterise "Marx's view—already almost fully developed—concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat" (p. 26). Lenin gives prominence to Marx and Engels' crit-

icism of the subjective sociology of Bruno and Edgar Bauer and their followers and their idealist views on the role of critical-minded people." Lenin stresses the theses advanced by the founders of scientific communism: that the real and actual makers of history are the people, the working masses; and that "with the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass who perform it will therefore increase" (p. 82). These theses are organically linked with the struggle waged by Lenin at that time against idealist Narodnik views on "heroes" and "the crowd," against attempts to provide a theoretical basis for the cult of the individual. Lenin made a detailed résumé of the chapter of the book in which Marx thoroughly characterises the significance of 17th-18th century English and French materialism.

Philosophical Notebooks pays great attention to German classical philosophy, one of the sources of Marxism. In a summary of Ludwig Feuerbach's book, *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*, which he wrote apparently in 1909, Lenin emphasises Feuerbach's contributions as a materialist and atheist. He also points out those propositions in the Lectures expressing the materialist conjectures contained in Feuerbach's views on society. On the other hand, Lenin reveals the weaknesses and limitations of Feuerbach's materialism, noting that "both the anthropological principle and naturalism are only inexact, weak descriptions of *m a t e r i a l i s m*" (p. 82). In comparing Marx and Engels' works of the same period with *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*, which Feuerbach delivered in 1848-49 and which were published in 1851, Lenin writes: "How far, *even* at *t h i s time* (1848-1851), *h a d* Feuerbach *l a g g e d b e h i n d M a r x (The Communist Manifesto*, 1847, *Neue Rheinische Zeitung,* etc.) and *Engels* (1845: *Lage*)" (p. 77).

In elaborating the theory of materialist dialectics, Lenin paid special attention to the study and critical analysis of Hegel's philosophical legacy. His résumés of Hegel's *The Science of Logic, Lectures on the History of Philosophy* and *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* occupy a central place in *Philosophical Notebooks*.

Lenin sharply criticises Hegel's idealism and the mysticism of his ideas. But Lenin also reveals the significance

of Hegelian dialectics and points out the necessity for evaluating it from a materialist standpoint. "Hegel's logic," wrote V. I. Lenin, "cannot be *applied* in its given form, it cannot be *taken* as given. One *must separate out* from it the logical (epistemological) nuances, after purifying them from *Ideenmystik*..." (p. 266). In summarising Hegel's writings, Lenin formulates a series of highly important propositions on the essence of materialist dialectics.

The brilliant article "On the Question of Dialectics," written in 1915, is related to Lenin's summary of Hegel's works. Though small in size, this article is a crystallisation of unsurpassed depth and richness of thought of all the important and essential elements in materialist dialectics.

Lenin's résumés of Lassalle's *The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus*, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Feuerbach's *Exposition, Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz* trace the historical preparation of materialist dialectics. Lenin examines the history of philosophy from Heraclitus and Democritus to Marx and Engels, and presents a profound Marxist evaluation of the work of outstanding thinkers. He reveals the progressive contribution which they made to the development of philosophical thought, and at the same time, discloses the historical limitations of their views.

In his comments on books concerned with the natural sciences, as well as elsewhere in the volume, Lenin criticises attempts to reconcile a scientific explanation of nature with a religious world outlook, the vacillations of natural scientists—spontaneous materialists—between materialism and idealism, and their inability to distinguish between mechanistic and dialectical materialism. He inveighs against a contemptuous attitude toward philosophy and philosophical generalisations and demonstrates the vast importance of materialist dialectics for the natural sciences and for philosophical generalisations based on the discoveries of modern science.

The last section of *Philosophical Notebooks* is made up of markings and comments by Lenin in books on philosophy (by G. V. Plekhanov, V. M. Shulyatikov, A. M. Deborin and other authors), which show how scathingly Lenin crit-

icised distortions of dialectical and historical materialism. This criticism is a vivid example of the uncompromising struggle by Lenin against vulgar matorialism and the slightest deviations from Marxist philosophy.

The remarks made by Lenin in Plekhanov's book on Chernvshevsky are of considerable interest. They are evidence of his great attention to the history of Russian social thought and his high opinion of its progressive, materialist traditions. Lenin stresses the revolutionary democracy and materialisrm of Chernyshevsky and his determined struggie against idealism. In pointing out tho shortcomings of Plekhanov's book and Plekhanov's failure to see the class content of Chernyshevsky's activity, Lenin writes: "Because of the theoretical difference between the idealist and materialist views of history, Plekhanov overlooked the practical-political and class difference between the liberal and the democrat" (p. 546).

In *Philosophical Notebooks*, Lenin consistently upholds the principle of partisanship in philosophy, and demonstrates the organic connection between dialectical materialism and revolutionary practice.

Philosophical Notebooks contains invaluable ideological richness, and is of immense theoretical and political significance. In it Lenin elaborates dialectical and historical materialism, the history of philosophy, focussing his attention on the problems of materialist dialectics. Along with his basic philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, *Philosophical Notebooks* is an outstanding achievement of Lenin's creative genius.

Lenin's excerpts and comments provide a definition of dialectics as the science of the most general laws of development and cognition of the objective world. Of exceptional importance is his proposition on the identity of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge. He pointed out that the fundamental failure of metaphysical materialism was its inability to apply dialectics to the process and development of cognition; dialectics, he stressed, is the theory of knowledge of Marxism. In his *Philosophical Notebooks* Lenin advanced Marxist dialectics still further by elaborating the question of the dialectical process of cognition and the dictum that the dialectical way of cognising

objective reality consists in the transition from living perception to abstract thought and from this to practice.

In elaborating materialist dialectics, Lenin concentrated on the problem of contradictions. It is in *Philosophical Notebooks* that he explains that the doctrine of the unity and struggle of opposites is the essence and core of dialectics, that the struggle of opposites is the source of development. "The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts ... is the *e s s e n c e* (one of the 'essentials,' one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics" (p. 359).

It may be presumed that the preparatory material of *Notebooks on Philosophy* is evidence of Lenin's intention to write a special work on materialist dialectics, a task which he had no opportunity to fulfil. Although the material in *Philosophical Notebooks* does not constitute a complete work written by Lenin for publication, it is an important contribution to the development of dialectical materialism. The study of the great ideological content of *Philosophical Notebooks* is of tremendous importance for a thorough grasp of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the theoretical foundation of scientific communism.

* * *

The summaries as well as the rest of this volume are given chiefly in chronological order. Remarks made in books have also been arranged chronologically in a separate section.

All of Lenin's underlineation has been reproduced in type. Words underscored by a wavy or a straight thin line have been set in italics; those underscored by two lines — in spaced italics; those underscored by three straight thin lines — in boldface, etc.

The text of this edition has been checked with Lenin's manuscripts; quotations have been verified with original sources.

Notes, an index of the sources mentioned by Lenin, name and subject indexes are appended.

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

V. I. LENIN
1917

CONSPECTUS OF THE BOOK *THE HOLY FAMILY* BY MARX AND ENGELS[1]

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

First page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript
Conspectus of the book *The Holy Family* by Marx and Engels.—1895
Reduced

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Reduced

THE HOLY FAMILY,
OR
CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL CRITICISM

AGAINST BRUNO BAUER & CO.

BY FREDERICK ENGELS AND KARL MARX

FRANKFORT-ON-MAIN, LITERARY PUBLISHING HOUSE (J. RUTTEN)
1845[2]

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This little book, printed in octavo, consists of a foreword (pp. III-IV)* (dated *Paris*, September 1844), a table of contents (pp. V-VIII) and text proper (pp. 1-335), divided into nine chapters (Kapitel). Chapters I, II and III were written by Engels, Chapters V, VIII and IX by Marx, Chapters IV, VI and VII by both, in which case, however, each has signed the particular chapter section or subsection, supplied with its own heading, that was written by him. All these headings are satirical up to and including the "Critical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog" (the heading of Section 1 of Chapter VIII). Engels is responsible for pages 1-17 (Chapters I, II, III and sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV), pages 138-142 (Section 2a of Chapter VI) and pages 240-245 (Section 2b of Chapter VII); |i.e., 26 pages out of 335.|

The first chapters are entirely criticism of the *style* (*t h e w h o l e* (!) first chapter, pp. 1-5) of the *Literary Gazette* ||*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* of Bruno Bauer[3]—in their foreword Marx and Engels say that their criticism is directed against its first eight numbers||, criticism of its distortion of history (Chapter II, pp. 5-12, especially of English history), criticism of its themes (Chapter III, pp. 13-14 ridiculing the Gründlichkeit** of the account of some dispute

* Engels, F. und Marx, K., *Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik*, Frankfurt a. M., 1845.—*Ed.*

** pedantic thoroughness—*Ed.*

of Herr Nauwerk with the Berlin Faculty of Philosophy), criticism of views on love (Chapter IV, 3 by Marx), criticism of the *account* of Proudhon in the *Literary Gazette* ((IV,4)—Proudhon, p. 22 u. ff. bis* 74. At the beginning there is a mass of *corrections of the translation*: they have confused formule et signification,** they have translated la justice as Gerechtigkeit*** instead of Rechtpraxis,**** etc.). This criticism of the translation (Marx entitles it—Charakterisierende Übersetzung No. I, II u.s.w.*****) is followed by Kritische Randglosse No. I u.s.w.,****** where Marx *defends* Proudhon against the critics of the *Literary Gazette*, counterposing his clearly socialist ideas to speculation.

Marx's tone in relation to Proudhon is very laudatory (although there are minor reservations, for example reference to Engels' *Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie*[4] in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*[5]).

Marx here advances from Hegelian philosophy to socialism: the transition is clearly observable—it is evident what Marx has already mastered and how he goes over to the new sphere of ideas.

(36) "Accepting the relations of private property as human and rational, political economy comes into continual contradiction with its basic premise, private property, a contradiction analogous to that of the theologian, who constantly gives a human interpretation to religious conceptions and by that very fact comes into constant conflict with his basic premise, the superhuman character of religion. Thus, in political economy wages appear at the beginning as the proportionate share of the product due to labour. Wages and profit on capital stand in the most friendly and apparently most human relationship, reciprocally promoting one another. Subsequently it turns out that they stand in the most hostile relationship, in *inverse* proportion to each other. Value is determined at the beginning in an apparently rational way by the cost of production

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* und folgende bis—and following up to—*Ed.*
** formula and significance—*Ed.*
*** justice—*Ed.*
**** juridical practice—*Ed.*
***** characterising translation No. I, II, etc.—*Ed.*
****** critical gloss No. I, etc.—*Ed.*

of an object and its social usefulness. Later it turns out that value is determined quite fortuitously, not bearing any relation to cost of production or social usefulness. The magnitude of wages is determined at the beginning by *free* agreement between the free worker and the free capitalist. Later it turns out that the worker is compelled to agree to the determination of wages by the capitalist, just as the capitalist is compelled to fix it as low as possible. *Freedom* of the contracting Parthei*" [this is the way the word is spelled in the book] "has been supplanted by *compulsion*. The same thing holds good of trade and all other economic relations. The economists themselves occasionally sense these contradictions, and the disclosure of these contradictions constitutes the main content of the conflicts between them. When, however, the economists in one way or another become conscious of these contradictions, *they themselves* attack *private property* in any one of its *private* forms as the falsifier of what is in itself (i.e., in their imagination) rational wages, in itself rational value, in itself rational trade. Adam Smith, for instance, occasionally polemises against the capitalists, Destutt de Tracy against the bankers, Simonde de Sismondi against the factory system, Ricardo against landed property, and nearly all modern economists against the *non-industrial* capitalists, in whom private property appears as a mere *consumer*.

"Thus, as an exception—and all the more so when they attack some special abuse—the economists sometimes stress the semblance of the humane in economic relations, while, more often than not, they take these relations precisely in their marked *difference* from the humane, in their strictly economic sense. They stagger about within that contradiction without going beyond its limits.

"*Proudhon* put an end to this unconsciousness once for all. He took the *humane semblance* of the economic relations seriously and sharply opposed it to their *inhumane reality*. He forced them to be in reality what they imagine themselves to be, or, more accurately, to give up their own idea of themselves and confess their real inhumanity. He therefore quite consistently represented as the falsifier of econom-

* party—*Ed*.

ic relations not one or another particular type of private property, as other economists have done, but private property as such, in its entirety. He has done all that can be done by criticism of political economy from the standpoint of political economy." (39)

Herr Edgar's reproach (Edgar of the *Literary Gazette*) that Proudhon makes a "god" out of "justice," Marx brushes aside by saying that Proudhon's treatise of 1840[6] does not adopt "the standpoint of German development of 1844" (39), that this is a general failing of the French, and that one must also bear in mind Proudhon's reference to the implementation of justice by its negation—a reference making it possible to have done with this Absolute in history as well (um auch dieses Absoluten in der Geschichte überhoben zu sein)—at the end of p. 39. "If Proudhon does not arrive at this consistent conclusion, it is owing to his misfortune in being born a Frenchman and not a German." (39-40)

Then follows Critical Gloss No. II (40-46), setting out in very clear relief Marx's view—already almost fully developed—concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat.

..."Hitherto political economy proceeded from the *wealth* that the movement of private property supposedly creates for the *nations* to an apology of private property. Proudhon proceeds from the opposite side, which political economy sophistically conceals, from the poverty bred by the movement of private property, to his conclusions negating private property. The first criticism of private property proceeds, of course, from the fact in which its contradictory essence appears in the form that is most perceptible and most glaring and most directly arouses man's indignation—from the fact of poverty, of misery." (41)

"Proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such they form a single whole. They are both begotten by the world of private property. The question is what particular place each occupies within the antithesis. It is not sufficient to declare them two sides of a single whole.

"Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain *itself*, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, *in existence*. That is the *positive* side of the contradiction, self-satisfied private property.

"The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, the condition for its existence, that which makes it the proletariat, i.e., private property. That is the *negative* side of the contradiction, its restlessness within its very self, dissolved and self-dissolving private property.

"The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-alienation. But the former class feels happy and confirmed in this self-alienation, it recognises alienation *as its own power*, and has in it the *semblance* of human existence. The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in its self-alienation; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. To use an expression of Hegel's, the class of the proletariat is in abasement *indignation* at this abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its human *nature* and its conditions of life, which are the outright, decisive and comprehensive negation of that nature.

"Within this antithesis the private property-owner is therefore the *conservative* side, the proletarian, the *destructive*, side. From the former arises the action of preserving the antithesis, from the latter, that of annihilating it.

"In any case, in its economic movement private property drives towards its own dissolution, but only through a development which does not depend on it, of which it is unconscious and which takes place against its will, through the very nature of things, only inasmuch as it produces the proletariat *as* proletariat, misery conscious of its spiritual and physical misery, dehumanisation conscious of its dehumanisation and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounced on itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it executes the sentence that wage-labour pronounced on itself by begetting wealth for others and misery for itself. When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappears as well as the opposite which determines it, private property.

"When socialist writers ascribe this historic role to the proletariat, it is not, as Critical Criticism would have

one think, because they consider the proletarians as *gods*. Rather the contrary. Since the abstraction of all humanity, even of the *semblance* of humanity, is practically complete in the fully-formed proletariat; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman and acute form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through the no longer removable, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative *need*—the practical expression of *necessity*—is driven directly to revolt against that inhumanity; it follows that the proletariat can and must free itself. But it cannot free itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing *all* the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of *labour*. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment *considers* as its aim. It is a question of *what* the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this *being,* it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is irrevocably and clearly foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organisation of bourgeois society today. There is no need here to show that a large part of the English and French proletariat is already *conscious* of its historic task and is constantly working to develop that consciousness into complete clarity." (42-45)

CRITICAL GLOSS NO. 3

"Herr Edgar cannot be unaware that Herr Bruno Bauer based all his arguments on '*infinite* self-consciousness' and that he also saw in this principle the creative principle of the gospels, which, by their infinite unconsciousness, appear to be in direct contradiction to infinite self-consciousness. In the same way Proudhon considers equality as the creative principle of private property, which is in direct contradiction to equality. If Herr Edgar compares French *equality* with German self-consciousness for an instant, he will see that the latter principle expresses *in Ger-*

man, i.e., in abstract thought, what the former says *in French*, that is, in the language of politics and of thoughtful observation. Self-consciousness is man's equality with himself in pure thought. Equality is man's consciousness of himself in the element of practice, i.e., therefore, man's consciousness of other men as his equals and man's attitude to other men as his equals. Equality is the French expression for the unity of human essence, for man's consciousness of his species and his attitude towards his species, for the practical identity of man with man, i.e., for the social or human relation of man to man. As therefore destructive criticism in Germany, before it had progressed in *Feuerbach* to the consideration of *real man*, tried to solve everything definite and existing by the principle of *self-consciousness*, destructive criticism in France tried to do the same by the principle of *equality*." (48-49)

"The opinion that philosophy is the abstract expression of existing conditions does not belong originally to Herr Edgar. It belongs to *Feuerbach*, who was the first to describe philosophy as speculative and mystical empiricism, and proved it." (49-50)

"'We always come back to the same thing... Proudhon writes in the interests of the proletarians.'* He does not write in the interests of self-sufficient criticism or out of any abstract, self-made interest, but out of a massive, real, historical interest, an interest that goes beyond *criticism*, that will go as far as a *crisis*. Not only does Proudhon write in the interests of the proletarians, he is himself a proletarian, un ouvrier. His work is a scientific manifesto of the French proletariat and therefore has quite a different historical significance from that of the literary botchwork of a Critical Critic." (52-53)

"Proudhon's desire to abolish non-owning and the old form of owning is exactly identical to his desire to abolish the practically alienated relation of man to his *objective essence*, to abolish the *political-economic* expression of human self-alienation. Since, however, his criticism of political economy is still bound by the premises of political economy, the reappropriation of the objective world

* Marx is quoting Edgar.

is still conceived in the political-economic form of *possession*.

"Proudhon indeed does not oppose owning to non-owning as Critical Criticism makes him do, but *possession* to the old form of owning, to *private property*. He declares possession to be a '*social function*.' In a function, 'interest' is not directed however toward the 'exclusion' of another, but toward setting into operation and realising my own powers, the powers of my being.

"Proudhon did not succeed in giving this thought appropriate development. The concept of '*equal* possession' is a political-economic one and therefore itself still an alienated expression for the principle that the *object* as *being for man*, as the *objective being of man*, is at the same time the *existence of man for other men*, his *human relation to other men*, *the social behaviour of man in relation to man*. Proudhon abolishes political-economic estrangement *within* political-economic estrangement." (54-55)

This passage is highly characteristic, for it shows how Marx approached the basic idea of his entire "system," sit venia verbo,* namely the concept of the social relations of production.

As a trifle, it may be pointed out that on p. 64 Marx devotes five lines to the fact that "Critical Criticism" translates maréchal as "Marschall" instead of "Hufschmied."**

Very interesting are: pp. 65-67 (Marx *approaches* the labour theory of value); pp 70-71 (Marx answers Edgar's charge that Proudhon is muddled in saying that the worker cannot buy back his product), 71-72 and 72-73 (speculative, idealistic, "ethereal" (ätherisch) socialism—and "mass" socialism and communism).

p. 76. (Section 1, first paragraph: *Feuerbach* disclosed real mysteries, Szeliga—vice versa.)

p. 77. (Last paragraph: *anachronism* of the *n a ï v e* relation of rich and poor: "si le riche le savait!"***)

pp. **79-85**. (All these seven pages are *extremely* interesting. This is Section 2, "*The Mystery of Speculative Con-*

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* if the Word may be allowed—*Ed*.

** "blacksmith"—*Ed*.

*** "if the rich only knew it!"—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

struction"—a criticism of speculative philosophy using the well-known example of "fruit"—*der* Frucht—a criticism *aimed directly against Hegel as well*. Here too is the extremely interesting remark that Hegel "very often" gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself—die *Sache* selbst—within the speculative presentation.)

pp. 92, 93—*fragmentary* remarks against Degradierung der Sinnlichkeit.*

p. 101. "He" (Szeliga) "is unable ... to see that *industry and trade* found universal kingdoms that are quite different from Christianity and morality, family happiness and civic welfare."

p. 102. (End of the first paragraph—barbed remarks on the significance of *notaries* in modern society.... "The notary is the temporal confessor. He is a *puritan* by profession and 'honesty,' Shakespeare says, is 'no puritan.' He is at the same time the go-between for all possible purposes, the manager of civil intrigues and plots.")

p. 110. Another example of ridiculing abstract speculation: the "construction" of how man becomes master over beast; "*beast*" (*das* Tier) as an abstraction is changed from a lion into a pug, etc.

p. 111. A characteristic passage regarding Eugène Sue[7]: owing to his hypocrisy towards the bourgeoisie, he idealises the grisette morally, evading her attitude to marriage, her "naïve" liaison with un étudiant** or ouvrier.*** "It is precisely in that relation that she" (grisette) "constitutes a really human contrast to the sanctimonious, narrow-hearted, self-seeking wife of the bourgeois, to the whole circle of the bourgeoisie, that is, to the official circle."

p. 117. The "mass" of the sixteenth and of the nineteenth centuries was different "von vorn herein."****

pp. **118-121**. This passage (in Chapter VI: "Absolute Critical Criticism, or Critical Criticism in the Person of Herr Bruno." 1) Absolute Criticism's First Campaign.

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* debassing of sensuousness—*Ed.*

** a student—*Ed.*

*** worker—*Ed.*

**** "from the outset"—*Ed.*

a) "*Spirit*" and "*Mass*") is *e x t r e m e l y* important: a criticism of the view that history was unsuccessful owing to the interest in it by the mass and its reliance on the mass, which was satisfied with a "superficial" comprehension of the "idea."

"If, therefore, Absolute Criticism condemns something as 'superficial,' it is simply previous history, the actions and ideas of which were those of the 'masses.' It rejects *mass* history to replace it by *critical* history (see Herr Jules Faucher on Topical Questions in England[8])." (119)

NB "The '*idea*' always exposed itself to ridicule insofar as it differed from '*interest*.' On the other hand, it is easy to understand that every mass '*interest*' that asserts itself historically goes far beyond its real limits in the '*idea*' or '*imagination*' when it first comes on the scene, and is confused with *human* interest in general. This *illusion* constitutes what *Fourier* calls the *tone* of each historical epoch" (119)—as an illustration of this the example of the French Revolution (119-120) and the well-known words (*1 2 0* in fine*):

NB "With the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass who perform it will therefore increase."

How far the sharpness of Bauer's division into Geist** and Masse*** goes is evident from this phrase that Marx attacks: "In the mass, not somewhere else, is the true enemy of the spirit to be sought." (121)

Marx answers this by saying that the enemies of progress are the products endowed with independent being (verselbständigten) of the self-abasement of the mass, although they are not ideal but material products existing in an outward way. As early as 1789, Loustalot's journal[9] had the motto:

Les grands ne nous paraissent grands
Que parceque nous sommes à genoux.
*Leuons-nous!****

* at the end—*Ed.*
** spirit—*Ed.*
*** mass—*Ed.*
**** *The great only seem great to us*
Because we are on our knees
Let us rise!—*Ed.*

But in order to rise (122), says Marx, it is not enough to do so in thought, in the idea.

"Yet *Absolute Criticism* has learnt from Hegel's *Phenomenology*[10] at least the *art* of converting *real objective* chains that exist *outside me* into *merely ideal*, merely *subjective* chains existing merely *within me*, and thus of converting all *exterior* palpable struggles into pure struggles of thought." (122)

In this way it is possible to prove, says Marx bitingly, the pre-established harmony between Critical Criticism and the censorship, to present the censor not as a police hangman (Polizeischerge) but as my own personified sense of tact and moderation.

Preoccupied with its "Geist," Absolute Criticism does not investigate whether the phrase, self-deception and pithlessness (Kernlosigkeit) are not in its own empty (windig) pretensions.

"The situation is the same with '*progress*.' In spite of the pretensions of '*progress*,' continual *retrogressions* and *circular movements* are to be observed. Far from suspecting that the category '*progress*' is completely empty and abstract, Absolute Criticism is instead so ingenious as to recognise '*progress*' as being absolute, in order to explain retrogression by assuming a '*personal adversary*' of progress, *the mass*." (123-124)

"All communist and socialist writers proceeded from the observation that, on the one hand, even the most favourable brilliant deeds seemed to remain without brilliant results, to end in trivialities, and, on the other, all *progress of the spirit* had so far been progress against the *mass of mankind*, driving it to an ever more *dehumanised* situation. They therefore declared '*progress*' (see *Fourier*) to be an inadequate abstract *phrase*; they assumed (see *Owen*, among others) a fundamental flaw in the civilised world; that is why they subjected the *real* bases of contemporary society to incisive *criticism*. This communist criticism immediately had its counterpart in practice in the movement of the *great mass*, in opposition to which the previous historical development had taken place. One must be acquainted with the studiousness, the craving for knowledge, the moral energy and the unceasing urge for development of the French

and English workers to be able to form an idea of the *human* nobility of this movement." (124-125)

"What a fundamental superiority over the communist writers it is not to have traced spiritlessness, indolence, superficiality and self-complacency to their origin but to have denounced them *morally* and *exposed* them as the opposite of the spirit, of progress!" (125)

"The relation between 'spirit and mass,' however, has still a *hidden* sense, which will be completely revealed in the course of the reasoning. We only make mention of it here. That relation *discovered* by Herr Bruno is, in fact, nothing but a *critically caricatured culmination of Hegel's conception of history*; which, in turn, is nothing but the speculative expression of the *Christian-Germanic* dogma of the antithesis between *spirit* and *matter*, between *God* and the *world*. This antithesis is expressed in history, in the human world itself, in such a way that a few chosen *individuals* as the *active* spirit stand opposed to the rest of mankind, as the *spiritless mass*, as *matter*." (126)

And Marx points out that Hegel's conception of history (Geschichtsauffassung) presupposes an abstract and absolute spirit, the embodiment of which is the mass. Parallel with Hegel's doctrine there developed in France the theory of the *Doctrinaires*[11] (126) who proclaimed the sovereignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of the people in order to exclude the mass and rule alone (allein).

Hegel is "guilty of a double half-heartedness" (127): 1) while declaring that philosophy is the being of the Absolute Spirit, he does not declare this the spirit of the philosophical individual; 2) he makes the Absolute Spirit the creator of history only in appearance (nur zum Schein), only post festum,* only in consciousness.

Bruno does away with this half-heartedness, he declares that *Criticism* is the Absolute Spirit and the creator of history in actual fact.

"On the one side stands the Mass, as the passive, spiritless, unhistorical *material* element of history, on the other—the *Spirit*, *Criticism*, Herr Bruno and Co. as the active ele-

* after the event—*Ed.*

ment from which all *historical* action arises. The act of the transformation of society is reduced to the *brain work* of Critical Criticism." (128)

As the first example of "the campaigns of Absolute Criticism against the Mass," Marx adduces Bruno Bauer's attitude to the *Judenfrage*, and he refers to the refutation of Bauer in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*.[12]

"One of the chief pursuits of Absolute Criticism consists in first bringing all questions of the day into *their right setting*. For it does not answer, of course, the *real* questions—but substitutes *quite different* ones.... It thus distorted the 'Jewish question,' too, in such a way that it did not need to investigate *political emancipation*, which is the subject-matter of that question, but could instead be satisfied with a criticism of the Jewish religion and a description of the Christian-German state.

"This method, too, like all Absolute Criticism's originalities, is the repetition of a *speculative* verbal trick. *Speculative* philosophy, in particular *Hegel's* philosophy, must transpose all questions from the form of common sense to the form of speculative reason and convert the real question into a *speculative* one to be able to answer it. Having distorted *my* questions and having, like the catechism, placed *its own* questions into my mouth, speculative philosophy could, of course, again like the catechism, have its ready answer to each of my questions." (134-135)

In Section 2a (..."'Criticism' and 'Feuerbach'—Damnation of Philosophy...")—pp. 138-142—written by Engels, one finds Feuerbach warmly praised. In regard to "Criticism's" attacks on philosophy, its contrasting to philosophy the actual wealth of human relations, the "immense content of history," the "significance of man," etc., etc., right up to the phrase: "the mystery of the system revealed," Engels says:

"But who, then, revealed the mystery of the 'system'? *Feuerbach*. Who annihilated the dialectics of concepts, the war of the gods known to the philosophers alone? *Feuerbach*. Who substituted for the old rubbish and for 'infinite self-consciousness' not, it is true, '*the significance of man*'—as though man had another significance than that of being

man—but still '*Man*'? *Feuerbach*, and only *Feuerbach*. And he did more. Long ago he did away with the very categories that '*Criticism*' now wields—the 'real wealth of human relations, the immense content of history, the struggle of history, the fight of the mass against the spirit,' etc., etc.

"Once man is conceived as the essence, the basis of all human activity and situations, only '*Criticism*' can invent *new categories* and transform *man* himself again into a category and into the principle of a whole series of categories as it is doing now. It is true that in so doing it takes the only road to salvation that remained for frightened and persecuted *theological* inhumanity. *History* does *nothing*, it possesses *no* immense wealth,' it 'wages *no* battles.' It is *man*, and not 'history,' real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; 'history' is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve *its own* aims; history is *nothing but* the activity of man pursuing his aims. If *Absolute* Criticism, after *Feuerbach's* brilliant reasoning, still dares to reproduce the old trash in a new form..." (139-140) etc.—then, Engels says, this fact alone is sufficient to assess the Critical naïveté, etc.

And after this, in regard to the opposition of Spirit and "Matter" (Criticism calls the mass "*matter*"), Engels says:

"Is Absolute Criticism then not *genuinely Christian-German*? After the old contradiction between spiritualism and materialism has been fought out on all sides and overcome once for all by *Feuerbach*, 'Criticism' again makes a basic dogma of it in its ugliest form and gives the victory to the '*Christian-German spirit*.'" (141)

In regard to Bauer's words: "To the extent of the progress now made by the Jews in theory, they are emancipated; to the extent that they wish to be free, they are free" (142), Marx says:

"From this proposition one can immediately measure the critical gap which separates *mass* profane communism and socialism from *absolute* socialism. The first proposition of profane socialism rejects emancipation *in mere theory* as an illusion and for *real* freedom it demands besides the idealistic '*will*,' very tangible, very material conditions.

How low '*the Mass*' is in comparison with holy Criticism, the Mass which considers material, practical upheavals necessary, merely to win the time and means required to deal with '*theory*'!" (142)

Further, (pp. 143-167), the most boring, incredibly caviling criticism of the *Literary Gazette*, a sort of word by word commentary of a "blasting" type; Absolutely nothing of interest.

The end of the section ((b) The Jewish Question No. II. Pp. 142-185)—pp. **167-185** provides an interesting answer by Marx to Bauer on the latter's defence of his book *Judenfrage*, which was criticised in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. (Marx constantly refers to the latter.) Marx here sharply and clearly stresses the basic principles of his entire world outlook.

"Religious questions of the day have at present a social signifcance" (167)—this was already pointed out in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. It characterised the "*real* position of Judaism in civil society today." "Herr Bauer explains the *real* Jew by the *Jewish religion*, instead of explaining the mystery of the Jewish religion by the *real Jew*." (167-168)

Herr Bauer does not suspect "that real, worldly Judaism, and hence religious Judaism too, is being continually produced by present-day civil life and finds its final development in the *money system*."

It was pointed out in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* that the development of Judaism has to be sought "in der kommerziellen und industriellen Praxis"* (169),—that practical Judaism "vollendete Praxis der christlichen Welt selber ist."** (169)

"It was proved that the task of abolishing the essence of Judaism is in truth the task of abolishing *Judaism in civil society*, abolishing the inhumanity of the present-day practice of life, the summit of which is the *money system*." (169)

In demanding freedom, the Jew demands something that in no way contradicts political freedom (172)—it is a question of *political* freedom.

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* "in commercial and industrial practice"—*Ed.*

** "is the perfected practice of the Christian world itself"—*Ed.*

"Herr Bauer was shown that it is by no means contrary to political emancipation to *divide* man into the non-religious *citizen* and the religious *private individual*." (172)

And immediately following the above:

"He was shown that as the state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from *state religion* and leaving religion to itself within civil society, so the individual emancipates himself *politically* from religion by regarding it no longer as a public matter but as a *private matter*. Finally, it was shown that the terroristic attitude of the French *Revolution* to *religion* far from refuting this conception, bears it out." (172)

The Jews desire allgemeine Menschenrechte.*

"In the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* it was expounded to Herr Bauer that this 'free humanity' and the 'recognition' of it are nothing but the recognition of the *selfish*, *civil individual* and of the *uncurbed* movement of the spiritual and material elements which are the content of his life situation, the content of civil life *today*; that the *Rights of Man* do not, therefore, free man from religion but give him *freedom of religion*; that they do not free him from property, but procure for him *freedom of property*; that they do not free him from the filth of gain but give him *freedom of choice of a livelihood*.

"He was shown that the *recognition of the Rights of Man by the modern state* means nothing more than did the *recognition of slavery by the ancient* state. In fact, just as the ancient state had slavery as its *natural basis* the *modern state* has civil society and the *man* of civil society, i.e., the independent man connected with other men only by the ties of private interest and *unconscious* natural necessity, the *slave* of labour for gain and of his own as well as other men's *selfish* need. The modern state has recognised this as its natural basis as such in the *universal Rights of Man*."[13] (175)

"The Jew has all the more right to the recognition of his 'free humanity'" "as 'free civil society' is of a thoroughly commercial and Jewish nature and the Jew is a necessary link in it." (176)

* the universal rights or man—*Ed.*

That the "Rights of Man" are not inborn, but arose historically, was known already to Hegel. (176)

Pointing out the contradictions of *constitutionalism*, "Criticism" does not generalise them (faßt nicht den allgemeinen Widerspruch des Konstitutionalismus*). (177-178) If it had done so, it would have proceeded from constitutional monarchy to the *democratic representative state*, to the perfect modern state. (178)

Industrial activity is not abolished by the abolition of privileges (of the guilds, corporations, etc.); on the contrary it develops more strongly. Property in land is not abolished by the abolition of privileges of landownership, "but, rather, first begins its universal movement with the abolition of its privileges and through the free division and free alienation of land." (180)

Trade is not abolished by the abolition of trade privileges but only then does it become genuinely free trade, so also with religion, "so religion develops in its *practical* universality only where there is no *privileged* religion (one calls to mind the North American States)."

..."Precisely the *slavery of bourgeois society* is in *appearance* the greatest *freedom*...." (181)

To the dissolution (Auflösung) (182) of the *political* existence of religion (the abolition of the state church), of *property* (the abolition of the property qualification for electors), etc.—corresponds their "most vigorous life, which now obeys its own laws undisturbed and develops to its full scope."

Anarchy is the law of bourgeois society emancipated from privileges. (182-183)

... *C) CRITICAL BATTLE AGAINST THE FRENCH REVOLUTION*

"The ideas"—Marx quotes Bauer—"which the French Revolution gave rise to did not, however, lead beyond the *order* that it wanted to abolish by force.

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* does not conceive the general contradiction or constitutionalism—*Ed*.

"*Ideas* can never lead beyond an old world order but only beyond the ideas of the old world order. Ideas cannot *carry anything out* at all. In order to carry out ideas men are needed who dispose of a certain practical force." (186)

The French Revolution gave rise to the ideas of communism (Babeuf), which, consistently developed, contained the idea of a new Weltzustand.*

In regard to Bauer's statement that the state must hold in check the separate egotistic atoms, Marx says (188-189) that the members of civil society are, properly speaking, by no means atoms, but only imagine themselves to be such, for they are not self-sufficient like atoms, but depend on other persons, their needs continually forcing this dependence upon them.

"Therefore, it is *natural necessity*, *essential human properties*, however alienated they may seem to be, and *interest* that hold the members of civil society together; *civil*, not *political* life is their *real* tie.... Only *political superstition* still imagines today that civil life must be held together by the state, whereas in reality, on the contrary, the state is held together by civil life." (189)

Robespierre, Saint-Just and their party fell because they confused the ancient realistically-democratic society, based on slavery, with the modern, spiritualistically-democratic representative state, based on bourgeois society. Before his execution Saint-Just pointed to the table (Tabelle a poster? hanging) of the *Rights of Man* and said: "C'est pourtant moi qui ai fait cela."** "This very table proclaimed the rights of a man who cannot be the man of the ancient republic any more than his *economic and industrial* relations are those of the *ancient times*." (192)

On the 18th Brumaire,[14] not the revolutionary movement but the liberal bourgeoisie became the prey of Napoleon. After the fall of Robespierre, under the Directorate, the prosaic realisation of bourgeois society begins: Sturm und Drang*** of commercial enterprise, the whirl (Taumel) of the new bourgeois life; "*real* enlightenment of the *land*

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* world order—*Ed.*

** "Yet it was I who made that."—*Ed.*

*** storm and stress—*Ed.*

of France, the feudal structure of which had been smashed by the hammer of revolution, and which the numerous new owners in their first feverish enthusiasm now put under all-round cultivation; the first movements of an industry that had become free—these are a few of the signs of life of the newly arisen bourgeois society." (192-193)

CHAPTER VI. ABSOLUTE CRITICAL CRITICISM, OR CRITICAL CRITICISM IN THE PERSON OF HERR BRUNO

FROM MARX TO MAO

...3) ABSOLUTE CRITICISM'S THIRD CAMPAIGN...

d) *CRITICAL BATTLE AGAINST FRENCH MATERIALISM* (195-211)

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

This chapter (subsection d in the third section of Chapter VI) is one of the most valuable in the book. Here there is absolutely no word by word criticism, but a completely positive exposition. It is *a short sketch of the history of French materialism*. Here one ought to copy out the whole chapter, but I shall limit myself to a short summary of the contents.

The French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and French materialism are not only a struggle against the existing political institutions, but equally an open struggle against the *metaphysics* of the seventeenth century, namely, against the metaphysics of *Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibnitz*. "Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics as Feuerbach, in his first decisive attack on Hegel, opposed sober philosophy to drunken speculation." (196)

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century, defeated by the materialism of the eighteenth century, underwent a victorious and weighty (gehaltvolle) restoration in German philosophy, especially in speculative German philosophy of the nineteenth century. Hegel linked it in a masterly fashion with the whole of metaphysics and with German idealism, and he founded ein metaphysisches Universalreich.* This

* a metaphysical universal kingdom—*Ed.*

was followed again by an "attack on speculative metaphysics and metaphysics in general. It will be defeated for ever by materialism, which has now been perfected by the work of speculation itself and coincides with humanism. Just as Feuerbach in the theoretical field, French and English socialism and communism in the practical field represented materialism coinciding with humanism." (196-197)

There are two trends of French materialism: 1) from Descartes, 2) from Locke. The latter mündet direkt in den Socialismus.* (197)

The former, mechanical materialism, turns into French natural science.

Descartes in his physics declares matter the only substance. Mechanical French materialism takes over Descartes' physics and rejects his metaphysics.

"This school begins with the physician *Le Roy*, reaches its zenith with the physician *Cabanis*, and the physician *Lamettrie* is its centre." (198)

Descartes was still living when *Le Roy* transferred the mechanical structure of animals to man and declared the soul to be *a modus of the body*, and ideas to be mechanical movements. (198) *Le Roy* even thought that Descartes had concealed his real opinion. Descartes protested.

At the end of the eighteenth century *Cabanis* perfected *Cartesian materialism* in his book *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme*.[15]

From the very outset the metaphysics of the seventeenth century had its adversary in materialism. Descartes—*Gassendi*, the restorer of Epicurean materialism, in England—*Hobbes*.

Voltaire (199) pointed out that the indifference of the Frenchmen of the eighteenth century to the disputes of the Jesuits and others was due less to philosophy than to *Law's* financial speculations. The theoretical movement towards materialism is explained by the practical Gestaltung** of French life at that time. Materialistic theories corresponded to materialistic practice.

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* flows directly into socialism—*Ed.*

** mould—*Ed.*

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century (Descartes, Leibnitz) was still linked with a positive (positivem) content. It made discoveries in mathematics, physics, etc. In the eighteenth century the positive sciences became separated from it and metaphysics war fad geworden.*

In the year of Malebranche's death, Helvétius and Condillac were born. (199-200)

Pierre Bayle, through his weapon of scepticism, theoretically undermined seventeenth-century metaphysics. He refuted chiefly Spinoza and Leibnitz. He proclaimed atheistic society. He was, in the words of a French writer, "the last metaphysician in the seventeenth-century sense of the word and the first philosopher in the sense of the eighteenth century." (200-201)

This negative refutation required a positive, anti-metaphysical system. It was provided by *Locke*.

Materialism is the son of Great Britain. Its scholastic *Duns Scotus* had already raised the question: "*ob die Materie nicht denken könne?*"** He was a nominalist. Nominalism is in general the first expression of materialism.[16]

The real founder of English materialism was *Bacon*. ("The first and most important of the inherent qualities of matter is motion, not only as mechanical and mathematical movement, but still more as impulse, vital spirit, tension, or ... the throes (Qual) ... of matter."—202)

"In *Bacon*, its first creator, materialism has still concealed within it in a naïve way the germs of all-round development. Matter smiles at man as a whole with poetical sensuous brightness."

In Hobbes, materialism becomes *one-sided*, menschenfeindlich, mechanisch.*** Hobbes systematised Bacon, but he did not develop (begründet) more deeply Bacon's fundamental principle: the origin of knowledge and ideas from the world of the senses (Sinnenwelt).—P. 203.

Just as *Hobbes* did away with the *theistic* prejudices of Bacon's materialism, so Collins, Dodwell, Coward, Hartley, Priestley, etc., destroyed the last theological bounds of Locke's sensualism.[17]

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* became insipid—*Ed.*

** "*whether matter can think?*"—*Ed.*

*** misanthropic, mechanical—*Ed.*

Condillac directed Locke's sensualism against seventeenth-century metaphysics; he published a refutation of the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Malebranche.

The French "civilised" (205) the materialism of the English.

In *Helvétius* (who also derives from Locke), materialism was given a properly French character.

Lamettrie is a combination of Cartesian and English materialism.

Robinet has the most connection with metaphysics.

"Just as *Cartesian* materialism passes into *natural science proper*, the other trend of French materialism flows directly into *socialism* and *communism*." (206)

Nothing is easier than to derive socialism from the premises of materialism (reconstruction of the world of the senses—linking private and public interests—destroying the anti-social Geburtsstätten* of crime, etc.).

Fourier proceeds immediately from the teaching of the French materialists. The *Babouvists*[18] were crude, immature materialists. Bentham based his system on the morality of Helvétius, while *Owen* takes Bentham's system as his starting-point for founding English communism. *Cabet* brought communist ideas from England into France (populärste wenn auch flachste** representative of communism) 208. The "more scientific" are *Dézamy*, *Gay*, etc., who developed the teaching of materialism as *real humanism*.

On pp. 209-211 Marx gives in a note (two pages of small print) *extracts* from *Helvétius*, *Holbach* and *Bentham*, in order to prove the connection of the *materialism* of the eighteenth century with *English* and *French communism* of the nineteenth century.

Of the subsequent sections the following passage is worth noting:

"The dispute between *Strauss* and *Bauer* over *Substance* and *Self-Consciousness* is a dispute *within Hegelian* speculation. In Hegel there are *three* elements: *Spinoza's Substance*, *Fichte's Self-Consciousness* and *Hegel's* necessary

* sources—*Ed.*

** the most popular, though most superficial—*Ed.*

and contradictory *unity* of the two, the *Absolute Spirit*. The first element is metaphysically disguised *nature* in *separation* from man; the second is metaphysically disguised *spirit* in separation from nature; the third is the metaphysically disguised *unity* of both, *real man* and the real *human race*" (220), and the paragraph with its assessment of Feuerbach:

"In the domain of theology, *Strauss* quite consistently expounded *Hegel from Spinoza's point of view*, and Bauer did the same from *Fichte's point of view*. Both *criticised* Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was *falsified* by the other, while they carried each of the elements to its *one-sided* and hence consistent development.—Both of them therefore go *beyond* Hegel in their Criticism, but both of them also remain within *the framework* of his speculation and each represents only *one* side of his system. *Feuerbach* was the first to bring to completion and criticise *Hegel from Hegel's point of view*, by resolving the metaphysical *Absolute* Spirit into '*real man on the basis of nature*,' and the first to bring to completion the *Criticism of religion* by sketching in a masterly manner the general basic features of the *Criticism of Hegel's speculation* and hence of *every kind of metaphysics*." (220-221)

Marx ridicules Bauer's "theory of self-consciousness" on account of its idealism (the sophisms of absolute idealism—222), points out that this is a periphrasing of Hegel, and quotes the latter's *Phenomenology* and *Feuerbach's* critical remarks (from *Philosophie der Zukunft*,[19] p. 35, that philosophy negates—negiert—the "materially sensuous," just as theology negates "nature tainted by original sin").

The following chapter (VII) again begins with a series of highly boring, caviling criticisms |1). Pp. 228-235|. In *section 2a* there is an interesting passage.

Marx quotes from the *Literary Gazette* the letter of a "representative of the Mass," who calls for the study of reality of natural science and industry (236), and who on that account was reviled by "criticism":

"Or"(!), exclaimed "the critics" against this representative of the Mass,—"do you think that the knowledge of historical reality is already complete? Or (!) do you know

of any single period in history which is actually known?"

"Or does Critical Criticism"—Marx replies—"believe that it has reached even the *beginning* of a knowledge of historical reality so long as it excludes *from* the historical movement the theoretical and practical relation of man to nature, natural science and industry? Or does it think that it actually knows any period without knowing, for example, the industry of that period, the immediate mode of production of life itself? True, spiritualistic, *theological* Critical Criticism only knows (at least it imagines it knows) the major political, literary and theological acts of history. Just as it separates thinking from the senses, the soul from the body and itself from the world, it separates history from natural science and industry and sees the origin of history not in vulgar *material* production on the earth but in vaporous clouds in the heavens." (*238*)

Nota bene

Criticism dubbed this representative of the mass a *massenhafter Materialist*.* (239)

"The criticism of the French and the English is not an abstract, preternatural personality outside mankind; it is the *real human activity* of individuals who are active members of society and who as human beings suffer, feel, think and act. That is why their criticism is at the same time practical, their communism a socialism in which they give practical, tangible measures, and in which they do not only think but even more act; it is the living real criticism of existing society, the discovery of the causes of 'decay'." (244)

‖ The whole of Chapter VII (228-257), apart from the passages quoted above, consists only of the most incredible captious criticisms and mockery, noting contradictions of the most petty character, and ridiculing each and every stupidity in the *Literary Gazette*, etc.‖

In Chapter VIII (258-333) we have a section on the "Critical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog"—and further on *Eugène Sue's* Fleur de Marie[20] (evidently a novel with this title or the heroine of some novel or other) with certain "radical" but uninteresting observations by Marx.

* *mass materialist—Ed.*

Worth mentioning perhaps are only p. *2 8 5* ×—a few comments on Hegel's theory of punishment, p. *2 9 6*—against *Eugène Sue's* defence of the prison cell system (Cellularsystem).

((*Apparently*, Marx here attacks the superficial socialism propagated by Eugène Sue and which, *apparently*, was defended in the *Literary Gazette*.))

Marx, for example, ridicules *Sue* for the concept of state reward for virtue, just as vice is punished (pp. 300-301, giving even a comparative table of justice criminelle and justice vertueuse!*).

Pp. *3 0 5 – 3 0 6*: Critical remarks against Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

3 0 7: But sometimes Hegel in his *Phenomenology*—in spite of his theory—gives a *true* description of *human* relations.

3 0 9: Philanthropy as a *Spiel*** of the rich. (*309-310*)

312-313: Quotations from *F o u r i e r* on the humiliation of women, very striking ‖ contra the moderate aspirations of "Criticism" and of Rudolf—Eugène Sue's hero? ‖

×"According to Hegel, the criminal in his punishment passes sentence on himself. *Gans* developed this theory at greater length. In *Hegel* this is the *speculative disguise* of the old *jus talionis**** that *Kant* expounded as the *only juridical* penal theory. For Hegel, self-judgment of the criminal remains a mere '*Idea*,' a mere speculative interpretation of the *current empirical penal code*. He thus leaves the mode of application to the respective stages of development of the state, i.e., he leaves punishment just as it is. Precisely in that does he show himself more critical than his critical echoer. A *penal* theory that at the same time sees in the criminal the *man* can do so only in *abstraction*, in imagination, precisely because *punishment*, *coercion*, is contrary to *human* conduct. Besides, the practical realisation of such a theory would be impossible. Pure subjective arbitrariness would replace abstract law because in each

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* criminal justice and justice for virtue!—*Ed.*

** *plaything—Ed.*

*** *the law of the talion—an eye for an eye—Ed.*

case it would depend on official 'honest and decent' men to adapt the penalty to the individuality of the criminal. Plato long ago had the insight to see that the *law* must be one-sided and must *make abstraction* of the individual. On the other hand, under *human* conditions punishment will *really* be nothing but the sentence passed by the culprit on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade him that *violence from without*, exerted on him by others, is violence exerted on himself by himself. On the contrary, he will see in *other* men his natural saviours from the sentence which he has pronounced on himself; in other words, the relation will be exactly reversed." (285-286)

"The mystery of this" (305) (there was a quotation from *Anekdota*[21] above) "courage of Bauer's is *Hegel's Phenomenology*. Since Hegel here puts self-consciousness in the place of man, the most *varied* human reality appears only as a *definite* form, as a *determination of self-consciousness*. But a mere determination of self-consciousness is a '*pure category*,' a mere 'thought' which I can consequently also transcend in 'pure' thought and overcome through pure thought. In Hegel's *Phenomenology* the *material*, *sensuous*, *objective* bases of the various alienated forms of human self-consciousness *are left* as they are. The whole destructive work results in the most *conservative philosophy* sic! because it thinks it has overcome the *objective world*, the sensuously real world, by merely transforming it into a 'thing of thought,' a mere *determination of self-consciousness*, and can therefore dissolve its opponent, which has become *ethereal*, in the '*ether of pure thought*.' The *Phenomenology* is therefore quite consistent in ending by replacing all human reality by '*Absolute Knowledge*'—*Knowledge*, because this is the only mode of existence of self-consciousness, and because self-consciousness is considered as the only mode of existence of man;—*Absolute* Knowledge for the very reason that self-consciousness knows only itself and is no more disturbed by any objective world. Hegel makes man *the man of self-consciousness* instead of making self-consciousness the *self-consciousness of man*, of the real man, and therefore of man living also in a real objective world and determined by that world. He stands the world

on its head and can therefore *in his head* dissolve all limitations, which nevertheless, of course, remain in existence for *evil sensuousness*, for *real* man. Moreover, everything which betrays the *limitations of general self-consciousness*—all sensuousness, reality, individuality of men and of their world—is necessarily held by him to be a limit. The whole of the *Phenomenology* is intended to prove that *self-consciousness* is the *only reality* and *all reality*...." (306)

..."Finally, it goes without saying that if Hegel's *Phenomenology*, in spite of its speculative original sin, gives in many instances the elements of a true description of human relations, Herr Bruno and Co., on the other hand, provide only an empty caricature...." (307)

"Thereby Rudolph unconsciously revealed the mystery, long ago exposed, that human misery itself, the infinite abjectness which is obliged to receive alms, has to serve as a *plaything* to the aristocracy of money and education to satisfy their self-love, tickle their arrogance and amuse them.

"The numerous charitable associations in Germany, the numerous charitable societies in France and the great number of charitable quixotic societies in England, the concerts, balls, plays, meals for the poor and even public subscriptions for victims of accidents have no other meaning." (309-310)

And Marx quotes from Eugène Sue:

"Ah, Madame, it is not enough to have danced for the benefit of these poor Poles.... Let us be philanthropic to the end.... Let us have *supper* now *for the benefit of the poor*!" (310)

On pp. 312-313 quotations *from Fourier* (adultery is good tone, infanticide by the victims of seduction—a vicious circle.... "The degree of emancipation of woman is the natural measure of general emancipation...." (312) Civilisation converts every vice from a simple into a complex, ambiguous, hypocritical form), and Marx adds:

"It is superfluous to contrast to Rudolph's thoughts Fourier's masterly characterisation of *marriage* or the works of the materialist section of French communism." (313)

P. 313 u. ff., against the *political-economic* projects of *Eugène Sue* and *Rudolph* (presumably the hero of Sue's novel?), projects for the association of rich and poor, and the organisation of labour (which the state ought to do), etc.—e.g., also the *Armenbank** |7)—b) "The Bank for the Poor" pp. 314-318| = interest-free loans to the unemployed. Marx takes the *f i g u r e s* of the project and exposes their meagreness in relation to need. And the idea of an Armenbank, says Marx, is no better than Sparkassen**..., i.e., die Einrichtung*** of the bank "rests on the delusion that only a different *distribution* of wages is needed for the workers to be able to live through the whole year." (316-317)

Section c) "*Model Farm at Bouqueval*" 318-320, Rudolph's project for a model farm, which was praised by "Criticism," is subjected to devastating criticism: Marx declares it to be a utopian project, for on the average one Frenchman gets only a quarter of a pound of meat per day, only 93 francs in annual income, etc.; in the project they work *twice as much* as before, etc., etc. ((Not interesting.))

320: "The miraculous means by which Rudolph accomplishes all his redemptions and marvellous cures is not his fine words but his *ready money*. That is what the moralists are like, says Fourier. One must be a millionaire to be able to imitate their heroes.

"Morality is 'Impuissance mise en action.'**** Every time it fights a vice it is defeated. And Rudolph does not even rise to the standpoint of independent morality based at least on the consciousness of *human dignity*. On the contrary, his morality is based on the consciousness of human weakness. He represents *theological morality*." (320-321)

..."As in *reality all* differences boil down more and more to the difference between *poor* and *rich*, so in the *idea* do *all* aristocratic differences become resolved into the opposition between *good* and *evil*. This distinction is the last form that the aristocrat gives to his prejudices...." (323-324)

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* *bank for the poor—Ed.*
** savings-banks—*Ed.*
*** the institution—*Ed.*
**** "impotence in action"—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

..."Every movement of his soul is of infinite importance to Rudolph. That is why he constantly observes and appraises them...." (Examples.) "This great lord is like the members of '*Young England*,' who also wish to reform the world, to perform noble deeds, and are subject to similar hysterical fits...." (326)

Has not Marx in mind here the English Tory philanthropists who passed the Ten Hours Bill?[22]

FR. ÜBERWEG.
OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

(REVISED BY MAX HEINZE)
THREE VOLUMES. 1876-1880. LEIPZIG[23]

The book is rather strange in character: rather short sections with a *few words* on the content of doctrines and very long explanations given in small print, consisting three-quarters of names and titles of books moreover, out of date: bibliography up to the sixties and seventies. Something unleserliches!* A history of names and books!

Written in 1903
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*, p. 347

Published according
to the manuscript

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* unreadable!—*Ed.*

FR. PAULSEN.
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

1899[24]

Highly characteristic is the frank formulation of the question in the introduction: the task of modern philosophy is "to reconcile the religious world outlook and the scientific explanation of nature" (p. IV*). Sic! And this idea is developed most circumstantially: there is said to be a struggle on two fronts—against materialism and "Jesuitism" (both Catholic and Protestant). Materialism, of course, is understood (described?) as rein mechanisch, physikalisch u.s.w.**

The author also says directly that modern philosophy rests on Kant and is the representative of "idealistic monism."

Up to p. 10 ..."Peace between science and faith..."

And p. 11: "The real corner-stone of *Kant's* philosophy" (to create this peace) ..."is to give to both their due: to knowledge against the scepticism of Hume, to faith against its dogmatic negation in materialism—that is the sum-total of his undertaking." (12)

"What is capable of disappointing this hopeful" (the hope of this *peace*) "expectation is the absolutely anti-religious radicalism that is at present becoming widespread in the broad mass of the population.... Thus atheism now appears" (as formerly among the bourgeoisie) "as an article of faith of Social-Democracy" (pp. 14-15). "It is the catechism turned inside out. And like the old dogmatism, this new, negative dogmatism, too, is hostile to science, ?

* Paulsen, Fr., *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Berlin, 1899.—*Ed.*
** purely mechanical, physical, etc.—*Ed.*

insofar as by its dogmas it puts fetters on the spirit of criticism and doubt." (He recalls the term *Antipfaffen** and assures us that Christianity has no predilection for the rich, that it (Christianity) will go through the same struggle towards which Europe is advancing.)

Refuting materialism and defending the theory of Allbeseelung** (which he interprets in an *idealist* sense), Paulsen ignores: 1) that he is not refuting materialism, but merely *some* arguments of *some* materialists; 2) that he *contradicts* himself in interpreting modern psychology in an idealist sense.

× Cf. p. 126. "A force ... is nothing but a tendency to a certain action, and hence in its general essence coincides with an unconscious will."

(Ergo—Seelenvorgänge und Kraft*** are by no means so unüberbrückbar**** as it previously seemed to the author, p. 90 u. ff.*****)

Pp. 112-116: Why could not the Weltall****** be the bearer of des Weltgeistes?******* (because man and his brain are the *highest* development of mind, as the author himself admits.

NB When Paulsen criticises materialists—he counterposes the *highest* forms of mind to matter. When he defends idealism and interprets modern psychology idealistically—he approximates the lowest forms of mind to Kräfte,******** etc. That is the Achilles heel of his philosophy).

Cf. especially pp. 106-107, where Paulsen opposes the view that *matter* is something *dead*.

× Contra p. 86: "Motion has absolutely nothing of thought in it...."

The author seems to dispose too lightly of the concept that Gedanke ist Bewegung.********* His arguments

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* *anti-clericalism—Ed.*
** universal soul embodiment—*Ed.*
*** soul processes and force—*Ed.*
**** incompatible—*Ed.*
***** und folgende—et seq.—*Ed.*
****** universe—*Ed.*
******* universal spirit—*Ed.*
******** forces—*Ed.*
********* thought is motion—*Ed.*

amount *only* to "ordinary common sense: senseless," "thought is not motion, but thought" (87). Perhaps heat, too, is not motion, but heat??

Quite stupid are the author's arguments that a physiologist will not cease to speak about thoughts, instead of movements equivalent to these thoughts? And no one will *ever* cease to speak about heat.

One who has fallen in love does not speak to "his lady-love about the corresponding vascular-motor process.... That is obviously nonsense" (86-87). Precisely what is done by Herr Paulsen! And if we experience a lack of heat, we do not speak about heat being a form of motion, but of how to get some coal.

Paulsen considers that the statement that thought is Bewegung* is sinnlos.** But he himself is against dualism, and speaks about the "equivalent" (*140* and 143)—"the physical equivalent of the psychical" (or Begleiterscheinung***). Is not that the same begriffliche Konfusion**** for which he contemptuously abuses Büchner?

When Paulsen declares that his parallelism is "not local" but "ideal" (p. 146), his dualist character shows still more clearly. That is no explanation of the matter, nor a theory, but a simple verbal trick.

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in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according
to the manuscript

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* motion—*Ed.*
** senseless—*Ed.*
*** accompanying phenomenon—*Ed.*
**** conceptual confusion—*Ed.*

NOTE ON A REVIEW OF *THE WONDERS OF LIFE* AND *THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE* BY E. HAECKEL

Frankfurter Zeitung, 1904, No. 348 (December 15).

First morning edition

A Feuilleton on New *Biological* Books[25]

Ernst Haeckel: *Lebenswunder* (Gemeinverständliche Studien über biologische Philosophie). Stuttgart. (Alfred Kröner.)

(To Haeckel, "the spirit is a physiological function of the cerebral cortex." P. 378 of his book. To be sure, the reviewer is *against* this opinion.)

Welträtseln by the same author ((published earlier)) (in which it is demonstrated that, properly speaking, there are *no* world riddles).

Written late in 1904

Published for the first time according to the manuscript

REMARKS ON BOOKS ON THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SORBONNE LIBRARY[26]

Sorbonne. New books: C. 819 (7)*

Richard Lucas, *Bibliographie der radioaktiven Stoffe*, Hamburg und Leipzig, 1908, 8°.

(A. 47. 191).*

Mach, *Grundriss der Physik* (bearbeitet von Harbordt und Fischer), Leipzig, 1905-8, 2 Volumes, 8°.

(A. 46. 979)* S. Φ. φ. 587.*

Max Planck, *Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie*, Leipzig, 1908 (2 Auflage) 12°.

(A. 47. 232).* *S. φ. φ. 63.**

Eduard Riecke, *Handbuch der Physik*, 4 Auflage, Leipzig, 1908, 2 Volumes, 8°.

(A. 47. 338).* S. Φ. φ. 301[a].*

Fénelon Salignac, *Questions de Physique générale et d'Astronomie*, Toulouse, 1908, 4°.

(D. 55. 745).* C. 818 (2).*

J. J. Thomson, *Die Korpuskulartheorie der Materie*, Braunschweig, 1908, 8°.

S. D. e. 101 (25).*

In the Sorbonne library:

I. *Vierteiljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, *p. 5 3 (8°)* (A. 16. 404).*

II. *Archiv für Philosophie*, 2-te Abteilung, p. *4 8* . (A. 17, 027).*

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* Letters and numbers denote press-marks—*Ed.*

Vierteiljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1909, Heft I. Raoul Richter's review (sympathetic, indeed laudatory) of:

Ludwig Stein, *Philosophie Strömungen der Gegenwart*, Stuttgart, 1908, (Enke) XVI+452 Seiten. (12 Mark.)

Seiten 1-293—philosophical trends—
294-445—philosophical problems

Ten trends in philosophy[27]:

1) neo-idealism (voluntarist metaphysics)
2) neo-positivism (pragmatism) of W. James
3) "new movement in natural philosophy" (Ostwald and the "triumph" of energetics over materialism)
4) "neo-romanticism" (H. St. Chamberlain, etc.)
5) neo-vitalism
6) evolutionism (Spencer)
7) individualism (Nietzsche)
8) geisteswissenschaftliche Bewegung* (Dilthey)
9) philosophiegeschichtliche**
10) neo-realism (Eduard von Hartmann!!!).

New books:

Max Schinz, *Die Wahrheit der Religion nach den neuesten Vertretern der Religionsphilosophie*, Zürich, 1908, 8°. (307 pages. 6. 50 Mark.)

Kr. Guenther, Vom *Urtier zum Menschen*, (Ein Bilderatlas.) Stuttgart, 1909. (7-19 issues ≧1 Mark.)

A. Pelazza, *R. Avenarius e l'empiriocriticismo*, 1908? 9? Torino (Bocca). 130 Seiten.

Spaventa, *La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia europea*, 1908? 9? Ban (Laterza).

New books (1909):

L. Boltzmann, *Wiener wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, (Barth).

H. Strache, *Die Einheit der Materie, des Weltäthers und der Naturkräfte*, Wien (Deuticke).

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* humanities movement—*Ed.*
** philosophical-historical—*Ed.*

P. 48.

Archiv für Philosophie, *2 Abteilung* = Archiv für *s y s - t e m t a t i s c h e* Philosophie, 1908, Heft 4. Vitalis Norström's *s e c o n d* article (Seiten 447-496) ((interesting; almost all of it about Mach)).

Where is the first??
Note—is it late??

Written in the first half of 1909
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Published according
to the manuscript

CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH'S BOOK *LECTURES ON THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION*[28]

Written not earlier than 1909
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according
to the manuscript

L. FEUERBACH.
COLLECTED WORKS VOL. 8, 1851
LECTURES ON THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION

8°. R. 807

The *preface* is dated 1. X. 1851.—Feuerbach speaks here of the reasons why he did not take part in the 1848 revolution, which had "such a shameful, such a barren end" (VII).* The revolution of 1848 had no Orts- und Zeitsinn,** the *constitutionalists* expected freedom from the *word* des Herrn,*** the *republicans* (VII-VIII) from their *desire* ("it was only necessary *to desire* a republic for it to come into being")…. (VIII)

"If a revolution breaks out again and I take an active part in it, then you can … be sure that this revolution will be victorious, that Judgment Day for the monarchy and hierarchy has arrived." (VII)

Feuerbach did not understand the 1848 revolution

First lecture (1-11).

P. 2: "We have had enough of political as well as philosophical idealism; we now want to be political materialists."

Sic!!

3-4—Why Feuerbach fled to the seclusion of the country: the break with the "gottesgläubigen Welt"**** p. 4

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* Feuerbach, L., *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 8, Leipzig, 1851.—*Ed.*
** sense of place and time—*Ed.*
*** of the monarch—*Ed.*
**** "God-believing world"—*Ed.*

down with "Überspanntes"!

(Z. 7 v. u.*) (cf. p. 3 in f.**)—to live with "nature" (5), ablegen*** all überspannten"**** ideas.

7-11 Feuerbach gives an outline of his works (7-9): Geschichte der neuren Philosophie (9-11 Spinoza, Leibnitz).

Second Lecture (12-20).

12-14—Bayle.

"sensuousness" in Feuerbach

15: *Sinnlichkeit****** for me means "the true unity of the material and the spiritual, a unity not thought up and prepared, but existing, and which therefore has the same significance as reality for me."

Sinnlich****** is not only the Magen,******* but also the Kopf******** (15).

(16-20: Feuerbach's work on Immortality: paraphrased.)

Third Lecture (21-30).

The objection was raised to my *Essence of Christianity*[29] that for me *man* does not depend on anything, "there was opposition to this alleged deification of man by me." (24) "The being, whom man presupposes ... is *nothing other than nature*, not your God." (25)

"The unconscious being of nature is for me the eternal being, without origin, the first being, but first in point of time, and not in point of rank, the physically but not morally first being...." (27)

My denial includes also affirmation.... "It is, of course, a consequence of my doctrine that there is no God" (29), but this

* Zeile 7 von unten—line 7 from bottom—*Ed.*
** at the end—*Ed.*
*** to discard—*Ed.*
**** "extravagant"—*Ed.*
***** *sensuosness*—*Ed.*
****** sensuous—*Ed.*
******* stomach—*Ed.*
******** head—*Ed.*

follows from the conception of the essence of God (=an expression of the essence of nature, of the essence of man).

Fourth Lecture.

"The feeling of dependence is the basis of religion." (31) ("Furcht"* 33-4-5-6)

"The so-called speculative philosophers are ... *those* philosophers who do not construct their notions in accordance with things, but rather construct things according to their notions. (31)

cf. Marx und Engels[30]

(Fifth Lecture.)

—it is especially *d e a t h* that arouses fear, belief in God. (41)

"I hate the idealism that divorces man from nature; I am not ashamed of my dependence on nature." (44)

"As little as I have deified man in *Wesen des Christenthums*, a deification with which I have been stupidly reproached ... so little do I want to deify nature in the sense of theology ...." (46-47)

Sixth Lecture—The cult of animals (50 u. ff.**).

"What man is dependent on is ... nature, an object of the senses ... all the impressions which nature makes on man through the senses ... can become motives of religious veneration." (55)

(Seventh Lecture.)

By egoism I understand, not the egoism of the "philistine and bourgeois" (63), but the philosophical principle of conformity with nature, with human reason, against "theological hypocrisy, religious and speculative fantasy, political despotism." (63 i. f.) Cf. *6 4*, *v e r y i m p o r t a n t*.

"egoism" and its significance

Idem 68 i. f. and 69 i. f.—Egoism (in the philosophical sense) is the root of religion.

* "fear"—*Ed.*

** und folgende—et seq.—*Ed.*

(70: Die Gelehrten* can only be beaten with their own weapons, i.e., by quotations) ... "man die Gelehrten nur durch ihre eigenen Waffen, d. h. Zitate, schlagen kann...." (70)

on the question of the word energy

Incidentally, on p. 78 Feuerbach uses the expression: Energie d. h. Thätigkeit.** This is worth noting. There is, indeed, a subjective moment in the concept of energy, which is absent, for example, in the concept of movement. Or, more correctly, in the concept or usage in speech of the concept of energy there is something that excludes objectivity. The energy of the moon (cf.) versus the movement of the moon.

the sensuous = the primary, the self-existing and true

107 i. f. ..."Nature is a primordial, primary and final being...."

111: ..."For me ... in philosophy ... the sensuous is primary; but primary not merely in the sense of speculative philosophy, where the primary signifies that beyond the bounds of which it is necessary to go, but primary in the sense of not being derived, of being self-existing and true."

..."The spiritual is nothing outside and without the sensuous."

NB in general p. 111 ... "the truth and essentiality (NB) of the senses, from which ... philosophy ... proceeds...."

112 ..."Man thinks only by means of his sensuously existing head, reason has a firm sensuous foundation in the head, the brain, the focus of the senses."

See p. 112 on the veracity (Urkunden***) of the senses.

* the pundits—*Ed.*
** energy, i.e., activity—*Ed.*
*** evidence—*Ed.*

114: Nature=the primary, unableitbares, ursprüngliches Wesen.*

NB

"Thus, *Die Grundsätze der Philosophie* is interconnected with the *Wesen der Religion*."[31] (113)

"I deify nothing, consequently not even nature." (115)

116—Answer to the reproach that Feuerbach does not give a *definition of nature*:

"I understand by nature the totality of all sensuous forces, things and beings which man distinguishes from himself as not human.... Or, if the word is taken in practice: nature is everything that for man—independent of the supernatural whisperings of theistic faith—proves to be immediate and sensuous, the basis and object of his life. Nature is light, electricity, magnetism, air, water, fire, earth, animal, plant, man, insofar as he is a being acting involuntarily and unconsciously—by the word 'nature' I understand nothing more than this, nothing mystical, nothing nebulous, nothing theological" (above: in contrast to Spinoza).

It turns out that nature= everything except the supernatural. Feuerbach is brilliant but not profound. Engels defines more profoundly the distinction between materialism and idealism.

..."Nature is ... everything that you see and that is not derived from human hands and thoughts. Or if we penetrate into the anatomy of nature, nature is the being, or totality of beings and things, whose appearances, expressions or effects, in which precisely their existence and essence are manifested and consist, have their basis not in thoughts or intentions and decisions of the will, but in astronomical, or cosmic, mechanical, chemical, physical, physiological or organic forces or causes." (116-117)

* underivable primordial being—*Ed.*

Here too it amounts to opposing matter to mind, the physical to the psychical.

121—against the argument that there must be a prime cause (= God).

"It is only man's narrowness and love of convenience that cause him to put eternity in place of time, infinity in place of the endless progress from cause to cause, a static divinity in place of restless nature, eternal rest instead of eternal movement." (121 i. f.)

124-125. Owing to their subjective needs, men replace the concrete by the abstract, perception by the concept, the many by the one, the infinite Σ* of causes by the single cause.

objectiv = außer uns**

Yet, "no objective validity and existence, no existence outside ourselves" must be ascribed to these abstractions. (125)

"Nature has no beginning and no end. Everything in it is in mutual interaction, everything is relative, everything at once effect and cause, everything in it is all-sided and reciprocal...." (129)

there is no place there for God (129-130; simple arguments against God).

..."The cause of the first and general cause of things in the sense of the theists, theologians and so-called speculative philosophers is man's understanding...." (130) "God is ... cause in general, the concept of cause as essence personified and become independent...." (131)

"God is abstract nature, i.e., nature removed from sensuous perception, mentally conceived, made into an object or being

* summation—*Ed.*

** objective = outside ourselves—*Ed.*

of the understanding; nature in the proper sense is sensuous, real nature, as immediately manifested and presented to us by the senses." (133)

immediately

The theists see in God the cause of the movement in nature (which they make into a dead mass or matter). (134) The power of God, however, is in reality the *power of nature* (Naturmacht: 135).

..."Indeed it is only through their effects that we perceive the properties of things...." (136)

Atheism (136-137) abolishes neither *das moralische Über* (= das Ideal)* nor *das natürliche Über* (= die Natur.)**

...."Is not time merely a form of the world, the manner in which particular beings and effects follow one another? How then can I ascribe a temporal beginning to the world?" (145)

time and world

..."God is merely the world in thought.... The distinction between God and the world is merely the distinction between spirit and sense, thought and perception ...." (146)

God is presented as a being existing outside ourselves. But is that not precisely an admission of the truth of sensuous being? Is it not (thereby) "recognised that there is no being outside sensuous being? For, apart from sensuousness, have we any other sign, any other criterion, of an existence outside ourselves, of an existence independent of thought?" (148)

being outside ourselves = independent of thought

NB nature outside, independent of matter = God

..."Nature ... in isolation from its materiality and corporeality ... is God...." (149)

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* *the moral highest* (= the ideal)—*Ed.*

** *the natural highest* (= nature)—*Ed.*

NB theory of "the copy"

"To derive nature from God is equivalent to wanting to derive the original from the image, from the copy, to derive a thing from the thought of the thing." (149)

Characteristic of man is Verkehrtheit (149 i. f.) verselbständigen abstractions*—for example, **time** and **space** (150):

"Although ... man has abstracted space and time from spatial and temporal things, nevertheless he presupposes those as the primary grounds and conditions of the latter's existence. Hence he thinks of the world, i.e., the sum-total of real things, matter, the content of the world, as having its origin *in* space and time. Even Hegel makes matter arise not only in, but out of, space and time...." (150) "Also, it is really incomprehensible why time, separated from temporal things, should not be identified with God." (151)

time outside temporal things = God

time and space

"In reality, exactly the opposite holds good, ...it is not things that presuppose space and time, but space and time that presuppose things, for space or extension presupposes something that extends, and time, movement, for time, is indeed only a concept derived from movement, presupposes something that moves. Everything is spatial and temporal...." (151-152)

cf. Engels idem in *Ludwig Feuerbach*[32]

"The question whether a God has created the world ... is the question of the relation of mind to sensuousness" (152—the most important and difficult question of philosophy (153), the whole history of philosophy turns on this question 153)—the conflict between the Stoics and the Epicureans, the Platonists and the Aristotelians, the Sceptics and the Dogmatists, in ancient philosophy; between the nominalists and

* perversity of endowing abstractions with independence—*Ed.*

realists in the Middle Ages; between the idealists and the "realists or empiricists" (sic! 153) in modern times.

It depends in part on the nature of people (academic, versus practical types) whether they incline to one or another philosophy.

153

"I do not deny ... wisdom, goodness, beauty; I deny only that, as such generic notions, they are beings, whether in the shape of gods or properties of God, or as Platonic ideas, or as self-posited Hegelian concepts...." (158)—they exist only as properties of **men**.

(materialism) contra theology and idealism (in **theory**)

Another cause of belief in God: man transfers to nature the idea of his own purposive creation. Nature is purposive—ergo it was created by a rational being. (160)

"That which man calls the purposiveness of nature and conceives as such is in reality nothing but the unity of the world, the harmony of cause and effect, the interconnection in general in which everything in nature exists and acts." (161)

..."Nor have we any grounds for imagining that if man had more senses or organs he would also cognise more properties or things of nature. There is nothing more in the external world, in inorganic nature, than in organic nature. Man has just as many senses as are necessary for him to conceive the world in its totality, in its entirety." (163)

If man had more senses, would he discover more things in the world? No.

important against agnosticism

168—Against Liebig on account of the phrases about the "infinite wisdom" (of God).... Feuerbach and natural science!! NB. Cf. Mach and Co.[33] today.

174-175-178—Nature = a republican; God = a monarch. This occurs *not* only once in Feuerbach!

188-190—God was a patriarchal monarch, and he is now a constitutional monarch: he rules, but according to laws.

Where does *spirit* (Geist) come from?—ask the theists of the atheist. (196) They have too disdainful (despektierliche: 196) an idea of nature, too lofty an idea of spirit (zu hohe, zu vornehme (!!) Vorstellung*).

NB (cf. Dietzgen)[34]

Even a Regierungsrath** cannot be directly explained from nature. (197)

witty!

"The spirit develops together with the body, with the senses ... it is connected with the senses ... whence the skull, whence the brain, thence also the spirit; whence an organ, thence also its functioning" ((197): cf. above (197) "the spirit is *in the head*").

"Mental activity is also a bodily activity." (197-198)

Idem Dietzgen[35]

The origin of the corporeal world from the spirit, from God, leads to the creation of the world from nothing—"for whence does the spirit get the matter, corporeal substances, if not from nothing?" (199)

...“Nature is corporeal, material, sensuous....” (201)

nature is material

Jakob Boehme = a "*materialistic theist*" (202): he deifies not only the mind but also matter. For him God is material—therein lies his mysticism. (202)

...“Where the eyes and hands begin, there the gods end.” (203)

(The theists) have "blamed matter or the *inevitable necessity of nature* ... for the evil in nature" (212)

the necessity of **nature**

* too lofty, too noble (!!) an idea—*Ed.*
** a state counsellor—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

2 1 3 in the middle and *2 1 5* in the middle "natürliche" und "bürgerliche Welt."* — a germ of historical materialism

(226): Feuerbach says that he is ending the first part here (on nature as the basis of religion) and passing to the second part: the qualities of the human spirit are manifested in Geistesreligion.**

(232)—"Religion is poetry"—it can be said, for faith = fantasy. But do I (Feuerbach) not then abolish poetry? No. I abolish (aufhebe) religion "only *insofar*" (Feuerbach's italics) "as it is *not* poetry, but ordinary prose." (233) — NB

Art does not require the recognition of its works as *reality*. (233)

Besides fantasy, of great importance in religion are das Gemüth*** (261), the *practical* aspect (258), the search for the better, for protection, help, etc.

(263)—In religion one seeks *consolation* (atheism is alleged to be trostlos****).———

"A concept, however, congenial to man's self-love, is that nature does not act with immutable necessity, but that above the necessity of nature is ... a being that loves mankind." (264) *And in the next sentence* "Naturnotwendigkeit"***** of the falling of a stone. (264) — the necessity of nature

p. *287 twice* in the middle: likewise "Notwendigkeit der Natur."****** — NB

Religion = childishness, the childhood of mankind (269), Christianity has made a god of *morality*, it has created a *moral God*. (274)

* the "natural" and "civil world"—*Ed.*
** spiritual religion—*Ed.*
*** feeling—*Ed.*
**** comfortless—*Ed.*
***** "natural necessity"—*Ed.*
****** "necessity of nature"—*Ed.*

Feuerbach against misuse of the word religion

Religion is rudimentary education—one can say: "education is true religion...." (275) "However, this is ... a misuse of words, for superstitious and inhuman ideas are always linked with the word religion." (275)

Eulogy of *education*—277.

NB

"**Superficial** view and assertion ... that religion is absolutely of no concern to life, namely to public, political life." (281) I would not give a farthing for a political freedom that allows man to be a slave of religion. (281)

Religion is innate in man ("this statement ... Simply means") = superstition is innate in man. (283)

the necessity of nature

"The Christian has a free cause of nature, a lord of nature, whose will, whose word, nature obeys, a God who is not bound by the so-called causal nexus, by necessity, by the chain which links effect to cause and cause to cause, whereas the heathen god is bound by the necessity of nature and cannot save even his favourites from the fatal necessity of dying." (301) (Thus Feuerbach says systematically; Notwendigkeit *d e r* Natur.)

NB

NB

"The Christian, however, has a free cause because in his wishes he is not bound by the interconnection of nature, nor by the necessity of nature," (301) ((And *t h r e e t i m e s* **more** on *t h i s* page: Notwendigkeit der Natur.))

And p. 302; "...all **the laws or natural necessities** to which human existence is subjected...." (302)

cf. 307: "Lauf der Natur."*

NB

"To make nature dependent on God, means to make the world order, the necessity of nature, dependent on the will." (312) And p. 313 (above)—"Naturnotwendigkeit"!!

* "course of nature"—*Ed.*

320: "necessity of nature" (der Natur)...

In religious ideas "we have ... examples how in general man converts the subjective into the objective, that is to say, he makes that which exists only in his thought, conception, imagination, into something existing **o u t s i d e thought, conception, imagination**...." (328)

what is *the objective*? (according to Feuerbach)

"So Christians tear the spirit, the soul, of man out of his body and make this torn-out, disembodied spirit into their God." (332)

Entleibter Geist* = God

Religion gives (332) man an ideal. Man needs an ideal, but a human ideal corresponding to nature and not a supernatural ideal:

"Let our ideal be no castrated, disembodied, abstract being, let our ideal be the whole, real, all-sided, perfect, developed man." (334)

Mikhailovsky's *ideal* is only a vulgarised repetition of this ideal of advanced bourgeois democracy or of revolutionary bourgeois democracy.

"Man has no idea, no conception, of any other reality, of any other existence, than sensuous, physical existence...." (334)

Sinnlich physisch** ((excellent equating!))

"If one is not ashamed to allow the sensuous, corporeal world to arise from the thought and will of a spirit, if one is not ashamed to assert that things are not thought of because they exist, but that they exist because they are thought of; then let one also not be ashamed to allow

NB

* disembodied spirit—*Ed.*

** sensuous, physical—*Ed.*

things to arise from the word; then let one also not be ashamed to assert that words exist not because things exist, but that things exist only because words exist." (341-342)

A God without the immortality of the soul of man is only a God in name:

..."Such a God is ... the God of some rationalist natural scientists, who is nothing but personified nature or natural necessity, the universe, with which of course the idea of immortality is incompatible."

|349|

The last (30th) lecture, pp. (358-370), could be put forward almost in its entirety as a typical example of an enlightening atheism with a socialist tint (concerning the mass that suffers want, etc., p. 365 middle), etc. Final words: it was my task to make you, my hearers,

"from friends of God into friends of man, from men of faith into thinkers, from men of prayer into workers, from candidates for the beyond into students of this world, from Christians, who, as they themselves acknowledge and confess, are '*half-beast*, *half-angel*,' *into men*, *whole* men" (370 end).

Feuerbach's italics

Next follow *Additions and Notes*. (371-463)

Here there are many details, quotations, which contain repetitions. I pass over all that. I note only the most important of that which affords some interest: the basis of morality is egoism (392). ("Love of life, interest, egoism")... "there is not only a singular or personal, but also a social egoism, a family egoism, a corporation egoism, a community, egoism, a patriotic egoism." (393)

A germ of historical materialism!

..."The good is nothing but that which corresponds to the egoism of all men...." (397)

"One has only to cast a glance at history! Where does a new epoch in history begin? Only wherever an oppressed mass or majority makes its well-justified egoism effective against the exclusive egoism of a nation or caste, wherever classes of men (sic!) or whole nations, by gaining victory over the arrogant self-conceit of a patrician minority, emerge into the light of historical glory out of the miserable obscurity of the proletariat. So, too, the egoism of the now oppressed majority of mankind must and will obtain its rights and found a new epoch in history. It is not that the aristocracy of culture, of the spirit, must be abolished; no indeed! it is merely that not just a handful should be aristocrats and all others plebeians, but that all should—at least *should*—be cultured; it is not that property in general should be abolished; no indeed! it is merely that not just a handful should have property, and all others nothing; all should have property." (398)

NB
NB
A germ of historical materialism, cf. Chernyshevsky[36]

NB
Feuerbach's "socialism"

These lectures were delivered from 1.XII.1848 to 2.III.1849 (Preface, p. V), and the preface to the book is dated 1.I.1851. How far, *even* at *this time* (1848-1851), *had* Feuerbach *lagged behind Marx* (*The Communist Manifesto* 1847, *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, etc.) and *Engels* (1845: *Lage*[37])

Examples from the classics of the use of the words *God* and *nature* without distinction. (398-399)

Pp. **402-411**—an *e x c e l l e n t*, *philosophical* (and at the same time simple and clear) explanation of the essence of religion.

NB "In the final analysis, the secret of religion is only the secret of the combination in one and the same being of consciousness with the unconscious, of the will with the involuntary." (402). The *Ego* and the *non-Ego* are inseparably connected in man.

NB "Man does not grasp or endure the depths of his own being and therefore splits it into an 'Ego' without a 'non-Ego,' which he calls God, and a 'non-Ego' without an 'Ego,' which he calls nature." (406)

P. 408—an excellent quotation from Seneca (against the atheists) that they make nature into a god. Pray!—Work![38] (p. 411)

NB Nature is God in religion, but nature as Gedankenwesen.* "**The secret of religion is the identity of the subjective and objective,**' i.e., the unity of the being of man and nature, but as distinct from the real being of nature and mankind." (411)

Sehr gut! "Human ignorance is bottomless and the human force of imagination is boundless; the power of nature deprived of its foundation by ignorance, and of its bounds by fantasy, is divine omnipotence." (414)

Sehr gut! ..."Objective essence as subjective, the essence of nature as different from nature, as human essence, the essence of man as different from man, as non-human essence—

an excellent passage! that is the divine being, that is the essence of religion, that is the secret of mysticism and speculation...." (415)

Speculation in Feuerbach = idealist philosophy. NB.

* thought entity—*Ed.*

A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript:
Conspectus of Feuerbach's book *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*.—
1909
Reduced

A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript:
Conspectus of Feuerbach's book Lectures on the Essence of Religion.—
1909
Reduced

"Man separates in thought the adjective from the substantive, the property from the essence.... And the metaphysical God is nothing but the compendium, the totality of the most general properties extracted from nature, which, however, man by means of the force of imagination—and indeed in just this separation from sensuous being, matter, nature—reconverts into an independent subject or being." (417)

NB profoundly correct! NB

The same role is played by *Logic* ((*418*)—obviously Hegel is meant)—which converts *das* Sein, *das* Wesen* into a special reality—"how stupid it is to want to make metaphysical existence into a physical one, subjective existence into an objective one, and again logical or abstract existence into all illogical real existence!" (418)

Excellent (against Hegel and idealism)

..."'Is there, therefore, an eternal gulf and contradiction between being and thinking?' Yes, but only in the mind; however in reality the contradiction has long been resolved, to be sure only in a way corresponding to reality and not to your school notions, and, indeed, resolved by not fewer than five senses." (418)

beautifully said!

428: Tout ce qui n'est pas Dieu, n'est rien, i.e., tout ce qui n'est pas Moi, n'est rien.**

bien dit!

431-435. A good quotation from Gassendi. A very good passage: especially *433 God* = a collection of adjectival words (without matter) about the concrete and the abstract.

NB

|435| "The head is the house of representatives of the universe—and if our

NB

* being, essence—*Ed.*

** All that is not God is nothing, i.e., all that is not I is nothing.—*Ed.*

the individual and the universal = Nature and God

heads are stuffed with abstractions, Gattungsbegriffen,* then of course we derive (ableiten) "the individual from the universal, i.e., ... nature from God."

ha-ha!!

436-437: (Note No. 16.) I am not against constitutional monarchy, but only the *democratic republic* is "'**immediately** reasonable' as the form of state 'corresponding to the essence of man.'"

hits the mark!

..."The clever manner of writing consists, among other things, in assuming that the reader also has a mind, in not expressing everything explicitly, in allowing the reader to formulate the relations, conditions and restrictions under which alone a proposition is valid and can be conceived." (447)

Interesting is the answer to (Feuerbach's) critic Professor *von Schaden* (448-449) and to *Schaller*. (449-450-463)

NB "being and nature," "thinking and man"

..."I do indeed expressly put nature in place of being, and man in place of thinking," i.e., not an abstraction, but something concrete———die *dramatische* Psychologie.** (449)

That is why the term "the anthropological principle" in philosophy,[39] used by Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky, is *narrow*. Both the anthropological principle and naturalism are only inexact, weak descriptions of *materialism*.

bien dit!

"Jesuitism, the unconscious original and ideal of our speculative philosophers." (455)

* generic concepts—*Ed.*
** *dramatic* psychology—*Ed.*

"Thinking posits the discreteness of reality as a continuum, the infinite multiplicity of life as an identical singularity. Knowledge of the essential, inextinguishable difference between thought and life (or teal ity) is the beginning of all wisdom in thinking and living. Only the distinction is here the true connection." (458)

concerning the question of the fundamentals of philosophical materialism

End of Volume 8

Volume 9 = "*Theogony*" (1857).[40] There does not seem to be anything of interest here, to judge from skimming over the pages. Incidentally, p. 320, Pars. 34, 36 (p. 334) and following should be read. NB Par. *36* (p. 334)—on looking through it, *nothing* appears of interest. Quotations, and again quotations, to confirm what Feuerbach has already said.

CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL'S BOOK *THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC*[41]

Written in September-December 1914

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Hegels Werke
Bd. I. *Philosophische Abhandlungen*
" II. *The Phenomenology of Mind*
" III-V. *The Science of Logic*
" VI-VII. (1 and 2) *The Encyclopaedia*
" VIII. *The Philosophy of Law*
" IX. *The Philosophy of History*
" X. (3 parts) *Aesthetics*
" XI-XII. *The History of Religion*
" XIII-XV. *The History of Philosophy*
" XVI-XVII. *Miscellaneous Writings*
" XVIII. *Philosophical Propaedeutic*
" XIX. (1 and 2) *Hegel's Correspondence*



The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectus of Hegel's Book *The Science of Logic*.—
September-December 1914
Reduced

The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic.—
September-December 1914
Reduced

Full title of *Collected Works* G. W. Fr. Hegel[42]

Collected Works of G. W. Fr. Hegel,
Vol. III (Berlin, 1833)
(468 pages)

"Complete edition by circle of friends of the deceased: Marheineke, Schulze, Gans, Henning, Hotho, Michelet, Förster."

"*The Science of Logic*."[43]

Part 1. *Objective Logic*.

Section 1. The Doctrine of *Being*.

(Bern: Log. I. 175

FROM MARX TO MAO

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Vol. III,* p. 5—a shrewd statement about logic: it is a "prejudice" that it "teaches how to think" (just as physiology "teaches ... to digest"??)

..."logical science, which is the true content of genuine metaphysics or pure speculative philosophy...." (6)

..."Philosophy cannot borrow its method from a subordinate science, such as mathematics...." (6-7)

..."But it can be only the nature of the content which stirs in scientific cognition, while at the same time it is this very reflection of the content which itself initially posits and produces its determination." (7)

(The *movement* of scientific cognition—that is the essential thing.)

"Understanding (Verstand) makes deter-

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* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—*Ed*.

minations" (bestimmt), Reason (Vernunft) is negative and dialectical because it dissolves into nothing ("in Nichts auflöst") the determinations of Understanding. (7) The combination of these two—"Reason which understands or Understanding which reasons" (7) = the positive.

Negation of "the simple" ... "movement of Mind...." (7)

"It is along this path of self-construction alone that Philosophy can become objective, demonstrative science." (7-8)

(The "path of self-construction" = the **path** (this is the crux, in my opinion) of real cognition, of the process of cognising, of movement from ignorance to knowledge.*)

This is characteristic

The movement of consciousness, "like the development of all natural and spiritual life," rests on "the nature of the pure essentialities which make up the content of Logic" (Natur der reinen Wesenheiten**).

Turn it round: Logic and the theory of knowledge must be derived from "the development of all natural and spiritual life."

Up to here: preface to the First Edition.

---

* In the manuscript the words "from ignorance to knowledge" are struck out with a horizontal line, apparently instead of being underlined.—*Ed.*

** the nature of pure essentialities—*Ed.*

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

"To present the realm of thought in its philosophical aspect—that is, in its own (NB) immanent activity, or (which comes to the same thing) in its necessary (NB) development...." (10)

excellent!

"The familiar forms of thought"—an important beginning, "die leblosen Knochen eines Skeletts.* (11)

> What is necessary is not leblose Knochen, but living life.

The connection between thought and language (the Chinese language, incidentally, and its lack of development: 11), the formation of nouns and verbs. (11) In the German language words sometimes have "entgegengesetzte Bedeutung"** (12) (not simply "different" but *opposed* meanings)—"a joy to thought..."

the history of thought = the history of language??

The concept of *force* in Physics—and of *polarity* ("the things distinguished *inseparably* (Hegel's italics) bound up together"). (12) The transition from force to polarity—a transition to "higher Denkverhältnisse."*** (12)

nature and "das Geistige"****

NB also p. 11.... "But if Nature in general is opposed, as physical, to what is mental, then it must be said that logic is rather something supernatural...."

* "the lifeless bones of a skeleton"—*Ed.*
** opposed meanings—*Ed.*
*** relations of thought"—*Ed.*
**** "the mental"—*Ed.*

Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,* but ... "was *bekannt* ist, darum noch nicht *erkannt*."** (13)

"Infinite progress"—"liberation" of "forms of thought" from the matter (von dem Stoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration of the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning of Knowledge....

"It was only after nearly everything that was necessary ... was available, that people began to trouble themselves about philosophic knowledge," says *Aristotle* (13-14); and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyptian priests, the beginning of the mathematical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with "pure thought" presupposes "a long stretch of road already traversed by the mind of man." In this kind of thought

interests "move the lives of peoples"

"those interests are hushed which move the lives of peoples and individuals." (14)

The categories of Logic are *Abbreviaturen**** ("epitomiert"***** in another passage) for the "endless multitude" of "particulars of external existence and of action...." (15) In turn, these categories *d i e n e n******* people in practice ("in the intellectual exercise of living content, in production and interchange"). (15)

the relation of thought to interests and impulses...

"We do not say of our feelings, impulses and interests that they serve us—rather, they are regarded as independent faculties and powers... all this is just what we are."(15)

And concerning forms of thought (Denkformen) it cannot be said that they serve

---

* are familiar to all—*Ed.*

** "what is *familiar* is not on that account necessarily *known*"—*Ed.*

*** *abbreviations—Ed.*

**** epitomised—*Ed.*

***** *s e r v e—Ed.*

us, for they permeate "all our ideas" (16), they are "the Universal as such."

Objectivism: the categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man—compare further the antithesis—

of "subjective thinking" and "the objective concept of the very essence of things." We cannot "get beyond the nature of things." (16)

against Kantianism

"Also the remark against the "Critical Philosophy." (17) It conceives the relation between "three terms" (We, Thought, Things) so that thoughts stand "in the middle" between things and us, and so that this middle term "separates" (abschließt) "rather than ... connects" (zusammenschließen) us. This view may be met, says Hegel, by the "simple observation" that "these very things which are supposed to stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ... are themselves thought entities (Gedankendinge)" ... and "the so-called Thing-in-itself is only ein Gedankending der leeren Abstraktion.*"

In my opinion, the essence of the argument is: (1) In Kant, cognition demarcates (divides) nature and man; actually it unites them; (2) In Kant, "the *e m p t y a b s t r a c t i o n*" of the Thing-in-itself instead of living Gang, Bewegung,** deeper and deeper, of our knowledge about things.

* a thought entity of empty abstraction—*Ed.*
** progress, the movement—*Ed.*

In Kant, Ding an sich* is an *empty* abstraction, but Hegel demands abstractions which correspond to *der Sache***: "der objective Begriff der Dinge die Sache selbst ausmacht,"*** which correspond—speaking materialistically—to the real deepening of our knowledge of the world.

It is incorrect to say that Denkformen are only "Mittel," "zum Gebrauch."**** (17)

It is also incorrect to say that they are "äußere Fomen,"***** "Formen, die nur *an dem* Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbst seien" (forms which are merely forms attached to the content, and not the content itself). (17)...

NB

What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be gehaltvolle Formen,****** forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content.

And Hegel draws attention to "thoughts of all natural and spiritual things," to the "substantial content...." (18)

—"To bring into clear consciousness this logical character, which gives soul to mind and drives and operates in it, this is our problem." (18)

Logic is the science not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development "of all material, natural and spiritual

* the Thing-in-itself—*Ed.*
** the *essence*—*Ed.*
*** "the objective concept of things constitutes their very essence"—*Ed.*
**** a "means," "for use"—*Ed.*
***** "external forms"—*Ed.*
****** forms with content—*Ed.*

things," i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the *History* of knowledge of the world.

"Instinctive action" (instinktartiges Tun) "is broken up ... into an infinitely diverse matter." On the other hand, "intelligent and conscious action" brings out "the content of that which motivates" (den Inhalt des Treibenden) "out of its immediate unity with the subject" and makes it "an object for it" (for the subject).

"In this web, strong knots are formed now and then, which are foci of the arrest and direction of its" the spirit's, or the subject's "life and consciousness...."

How is this to be understood? Man is confronted with a *web* of natural phenomena. Instinctive man, the savage, does not distinguish himself from nature. Conscious man does distinguish, categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.

..."Truth is infinite" (19)—its finiteness is its denial, "its end." The forms (Denkformen*), if one regards them as forms, "distinct from the substance and merely attached to it" (19), are incapable of embracing truth. The inaneness of these forms of formal logic makes them deserving of "contempt" (19) and "derision." (20) The

* forms of thought—*Ed.*

Law of Identity, $A = A$,—vacuousness, "unerträglich."* (19)

It is unfair to forget that these categories "have their place and validity in cognition." (20) But as "indifferent forms" they can be "instruments of error and sophistry" (20), not of truth.

"Contemplative thought" should include "der Inhalt"** as well as the "external form." (20)

NB

...“With this introduction of Content into logical consideration,” the subject becomes not Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff der Dingo.***

NB

not things, but the laws**** of their movement, materialistically

...“the logos, the reason of that which is.” (21)

And on page (22) at the beginning, the subject of logic is expressed in the words:

“development” of thinking in accordance with its necessity

...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner Notwendigkeit.”

The categories have to be *derived* (and not taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (not by “exposition,” not by “assurances,” but with *p r o o f s*) (24) proceeding from the simplest, most fundamental (Being, Nothing, Becoming (das Werden)) (without taking others)—here, in them, “in this germ, the whole development.” (23)

* “insufferable”—*Ed.*

** “content”—*Ed.*

*** things, but the essence, the concept of things—*Ed.*

**** The word “laws” is linked by an arrow with the word “logos” in the next Paragraph—*Ed.*

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

Logic is usually understood as being the "science of thinking," the "bare form of cognition." (27)

Hegel refutes this view. He is against Ding an sich* as "something beyond thought." (29)

Forms of thinking apparently "have no applicability to Things-in-themselves." (31) Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,** which does not cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is not Verstand*** also a Thing-in-itself? (31)

"Transcendental idealism, carried more consistently to its logical conclusion, has perceived the nullity of the spectre of the *Thing-in-itself* left over from the critical philosophy—that abstract shadow detached from all content—and has had the aim of demolishing it altogether. Also, this philosophy (Fichte?) made a beginning of making reason develop its own determinations out of itself. But the subjective attitude of this attempt did not admit of its being carried to completion." (32)

Logical forms are tote Formen****—for they are not regarded as an "organic unity," (33) as "their living concrete unity" (ibidem).

---

* Thing-in-itself—*Ed.*
** True cognition is absurd.—*Ed.*
*** understanding—*Ed.*
**** dead forms—*Ed.*

In the *Phenomenology of Mind* I have examined the movement of consciousness, from the first direct contradiction (Gegensatz) between itself and the object, up to absolute knowledge. (34) This path goes through all the forms of the relation of consciousness to the object...."

"Truth, as science, is pure self-consciousness unfolding itself..." (35) "objective thinking" ... "the concept, as such, is that which exists in and for itself." (35) (36: clericalism, God, the realm of truth, etc., etc.)

37: Kant imparted "an essentially subjective signification" to "logical determinations." But "thought determinations" have "an objective value and existence." (37)

The old logic has fallen into Verachting.* (38) It requires transformation....

39—The old, formal logic is exactly like a child's game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces (in Verachtung gekommen**: (38))

40 Philosophy must have its own method (*not* that of mathematics, *contra* Spinoza, Wolff und Andere***).

NB 40-41: "For method is the consciousness of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of its content,"

and the rest of page 41 gives a good explanation of dialectics

..."es ist der Inhalt in sich, die Dialektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welche ihn fortbewegt." (42)

"The given sphere of phenomena is moved forward by the content itself of this sphere, the dialectic, which

* disrepute—*Ed.*
** It has fallen into disrepute.—*Ed.*
*** and others—*Ed.*

it (this content) has *in* (an) itself" (i.e., the dialectic of its own movement).

"The negative is to an equal extent positive" (41)—negation is something definite, has a definite content, the inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition, development (of concept and thought), there is not "*eines inneren, notwendigen Zusammenhangs*"* (43) of all the parts and "Übergang"** of some parts into others.

And Hegel puts forward two basic requirements:

1) "The necessity of connection"
and
2) "the immanent emergence of distinctions.

Very important!! This is what it means, in my opinion:

1. *Necessary* connection, the objective connection of all the aspects, forces, tendencies, etc., of the given sphere of phenomena;

2. The "immanent *emergence* of distinctions"—the inner objective logic of evolution and of the struggle of the differences, polarity.

Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics in Parmenides.[44]

"Dialectic is generally regarded as an external and negative procedure, that does not belong to the subject-matter itself, that is based on pure vanity, as a subjective craving to shake and break down what is fixed and true,—or that at best leads

* "*an inner, necessary connection*"—*Ed.*
** "transition"—*Ed.*

to nothing but the inaneness of the dialectically treated matter." (43)

(44)—The great merit of *Kant* was that he removed "den Schein von Willkür"* from dialectics.

Two important things:

(1) Die Objektivität (**NB**: unclear, return to it!!)
#
des Scheins**

(2) die Notwendigkeit des Widerspruchs***

selbstbewegende Seele****... ("inherent negativity") ... "the principle of all physical and spiritual life." (44)

#

Is not the thought here that semblance also is objective, for it contains *one of the aspects* of the *o b j e c t i v e* world? Not only Wesen,***** but Schein, too, is objective. There is a difference between the subjective and the objective, **BUT IT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS**.

The dialectical =

= "comprehending the antithesis in its unity...."

subtle and profound!

45 Logic resembles grammar, being one thing for the beginner and another thing for one who knows the language (and languages) and the spirit of language. "It is one thing to him who approaches Logic and the Sciences in general for the first time and another thing for him who comes back from the sciences to Logic."

Then logic gives "the essential character of this wealth" (des Reichtums der Welt-

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* "the semblance or arbitrariness"—*Ed.*
** the objectivity of semblance—*Ed.*
*** the necessity of contradiction—*Ed.*
**** self-moving soul
***** essence—*Ed.*

vorstellung*), "the inner nature of spirit and of the world...." (46)

"Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular." (47)

cf. *Capital*

A beautiful formula: "Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular, the individual, the single" (all the wealth of the particular and single!)!! Très bien!

"—Just as one and the same moral maxim in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite accurately does not have the significance and scope which it has in the mind of a man of years and experience, for whom it expresses the full force of its content.

a good comparison (materialist)

Thus, the value of logic only receives due appreciation when it is the result of experience of the sciences; then it presents itself to the mind as universal truth, not as a *particular* department of knowledge *alongside* other departments and realities, but as the essence of all this other content...." (47)

"sum-total of experience of the sciences" **NB**

("Essence") the "essential content of all other knowledge"

"The system of logic is the realm of shades" (47), free from "all sensuous concreteness...."

* the wealth of the world view—*Ed.*

(50)—...“not abstract, dead and immobile, but concrete....”
[This is characteristic! The spirit and essence of dialectics!]

Kant: to restrict “reason” and strengthen *faith*[45]

(52) Note ... the results of Kant’s philosophy...: “that reason can cognise no valid content, and with regard to absolute truth must be referred to faith....”

(53) Once again, that Ding an sich = an abstraction, the product of thinking that abstracts.

BOOK ONE:

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

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THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

WITH WHAT SHOULD ONE BEGIN SCIENCE?

(59) * ...(en passant) "the nature of cognition" (idem p. *6 1*)

(The theme of logic. To be compared to present-day "epistemology.")

(60) ..."There is *nothing* (Hegel's italics) in Heaven, Nature, Spirit, or anywhere else, which does not contain immediacy as well as mediacy...." NB

1) Heaven—Nature—Spirit. Heaven away: materialism.
2) Everything is vermittelt = mediated, bound into One, connected by transitions. Away with Heaven—law-governed connection of the *whole* (*p r o c e s s*) of the world.

(62) "Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the **WHOLE** extent of its **DEVELOPMENT**...."

1st line nonsense.
2nd line brilliant.

What should one begin with? "Pure Being" (Sein) (63)—"no assumption to be

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—*Ed*.

made," the beginning. "Not hold in itself any content...." "to be mediated by nothing...."

NB

(66) ..."The advance" (des Erkennens*)... "must be determined by the nature of the subject and the content itself...."

(68) Beginning contains both "Nichts"** and "Sein,"*** it is their unity:
..."that which is beginning, as yet is not: it is merely advancing towards Being ...." (from *not-Being to Being*: "not-Being, which is also Being").

Nonsense about the absolute (68-69). I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism which has been stood on its head (according to Engels[46])—that is to say, I cast aside for the most part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc.

(70-71) One cannot begin philosophy with the "Ego." There is no "objective movement." (71)

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* of knowledge—*Ed.*
** "nothing"—*Ed.*
*** "being"—*Ed.*

SECTION ONE:
DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY)

(77) Pure Being—"without any further determination."

(Bestimmung* is already Qualität.**)

Transition of Sein—into *Dasein****

(Existent (?) Being / Finite Being)

—and this into Fürsichsein (Being for Self?)

Sein—Nichts—Werden****

"Pure Being and pure Nothing are ... the same." (78)

(81: This seems to be a "paradox.") Their union is *Werden*.

"Movement of immediate disappearance of the one into the other...."

> Nichts is opposed to dem *Etwas*.***** But Etwas is already a *determinate* Being distinguished from another *Etwas*, but it is a question here of simple Nichts. (79)
>
> (The *Eleatics* and *Parmenides*, especially the former, arrived at this abstraction of *Being*.) According to *Heraclitus* "all things flow" (80)..., i.e., "everything is Becoming."

---

* determination—*Ed.*
** quality—*Ed.*
*** *Existent Being*—*Ed.*
**** Being—Nothing—Becoming—*Ed.*
***** Something—*Ed.*

Ex nihilo nihil fit?* Out of *Nichts* comes *Sein* (Werden)....

(81): "It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of Being and Nothing ... in *every* (Hegel's italics) example, in every fact and thought" ... "*neither in heaven nor on earth is there anything not containing both Being and Nothing*." Objections presume *b e s t i m m t e s* Sein** (I have 100 taler or not) 82 i. f.***,—but that is not the question....

"The necessary connection of the whole world"... "the mutually determinant connection of the whole" NB

"A determinate or finite Being is such as refers itself to another; it is a content which stands in a relation of necessity with other content or with the whole world. In view of the mutually determinant connection of the whole, metaphysics could make the assertion—which is really a tautology—that if the least grain of dust were destroyed the whole universe must collapse." (83)

(86): "What is first in science has had to show itself first, too, historically."

It sounds very materialistic!

(91): "Becoming is the subsistence of Being as much as of not-Being...." "Transition is the same thing as Becoming...." (92 i. f.)

(94) "Parmenides, equally with Spinoza, will not admit transition from Being, or the absolute Substance, to the negative, finite."

For Hegel, however, the *unity* or *indivisibility* (p. *9 0* this term is sometimes better than unity) of "Being" and "Nothing' gives the *transition*, Werden.

---

* Out or nothing comes nothing?—*Ed.*

** *D e t e r m i n a t e* Being—*Ed.*

*** in fine—at the end—*Ed.*

The absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite = parts, stages of one and the same world. So etwa?*

(92: "We shall reserve for such Being as is *mediated* the term *Existence*.") NB

102: According to Plato in the "Parmenides," the transition from *Being* and the *One* = "äußere Reflexion."**

104: It is said that darkness is the *absence* of light. But "as little is seen in pure light as in pure darkness...."

107—Reference to infinitely small magnitudes, which are taken in process of disappearing....

"There exists nothing that is not a mean condition between Being and Nothing."

"Unbegreiflichkeit des Anfangs"***—if *Nothing* and *Being* exclude each other, but that is not dialectics, but *Sophisterei*.**** (108)

"For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless supposition which is allowed without criticism or reflection; while we term dialectic that higher movement of Reason where terms appearing absolutely distinct pass into one another through themselves, through what they are, and the assumption of their separateness cancels itself." (108) Sophistry and dialectics

Werden. Its Moments: Entstehen und Vergehen.***** (109)

Das Aufheben des Werdens******—*das Dasein*. concrete, determinate Being (?)

* Perhaps so?—*Ed.*
** "external reflection"—*Ed.*
*** "incomprehensibility of the beginning"—*Ed.*
**** *sophistry*—*Ed.*
***** arising and passing away—*Ed.*
****** The superseding of Becomnig.—*Ed.*

110: aufheben = ein Ende machen
= erhalten
(aufbewahren zugleich)*

NB

112: Dasein ist *bestimmtes* Sein** (*NB* 114 "ein Konkretes"***),—Quality, separate from Anderes,—*v e r ä n d e r l i c k u n d e n d l i c h.*****

114 "Determinateness, taken thus isolated and by itself as *existent* determinateness, is Quality..,." "Quality, which is to count as something separately existing, is Reality." (115)

117 ..."Determinateness is negation...." (Spinoza) Omnis determinatio est negatio,****** "this statement is of immeasurable importance...."

120: "Something is the first negation of negation...."

(Here the exposition' is somewhat fragmentary and highly obscure.)

abstrakte und abstruse Hegelie*******— Engels

125—...Two pairs of determinations: 1) "Something and Other"; 2) "Being-for-Other and Being-in-Self."

127—**Ding an sich**********—"a very simple abstraction." The proposition that we do not know what Things-in-themselves are seems sagacious. The Thing-in-itself is an abstraction from all determination [Sein-für-Anderes*********]

* supersede = terminate-maintain (simultaneously to preserve)—*Ed.*
** Existent Being is *Determinate* Being—*Ed.*
*** "concrete"—*Ed.*
**** an other—*v a r i a b l e a n d f i n i t e*—*Ed.*
***** every determination is negation—*Ed.*
****** abstract and obscure Hegelianism.—*Ed.*
******* Thing-in-itself—*Ed.*
******** being-for-other—*Ed.*

|from all relation to Other|, i.e., a Nothing. Consequently, the Thing-in-itself is "nothing but an abstraction, void of truth and content."

NB

This is very profound: the Thing-in-itself and its conversion into a Thing-for-others (cf. Engels[47]). The Thing-in-itself is *altogether* an empty, lifeless abstraction. In life, in movement, each thing and everything *is usually* both in itself" and "for others" in relation to an Other, being transformed from one state to the other.

Sehr gut!! If we ask what Things-*in-themselves* are, so ist in die Frage gedankenloser Weise die Unmöglichkeit der Beantwortung gelegt*.... (127)

129 En passant: dialectical philosophy, which is unknown to "metaphysical philosophy, which includes also the critical philosophy."

Kantianism = metaphysics

Dialectics is the teaching which shows how *Opposites* can be and how they happen to be (how they become) *identical*,—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,—why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another. En lisant Hegel**....

134: "*Limit* (is) simple negation or first negation" (das Etwas.*** Every Something has its *Limit*) "while Other is at the same time negation of negation...."

* the question, in thoughtlessness, is so put as to render an answer impossible—*Ed.*

** in reading Hegel—*Ed.*

*** Something—*Ed.*

137: "Etwas mit seiner immanenten Grenze gesetzt als der Widerspruch seiner selbst, durch den es über sich hinausgewiesen und getrieben wird, ist das **Endliche**."

("**S o m e t h i n g**, taken from the point of view of its immanent Limit—from the point of view of its self-contradiction, a contradiction which drives it [this Something] and leads it beyond its limits, is the *Finite*.)

When things are described as finite,—that is to admit that their not-Being is their nature ("not-Being constitutes their Being").

"They" (things) "*are*, but the truth of this being is their *end*."

NB

thoughts on dialectics en lisant Hegel

Shrewd and clever! Hegel analyses concepts that usually appear to be dead and shows that there *is* movement in them. Finite? That means *moving* to an end! Something?—means *n o t t h a t* which is Other. Being in general?—means such indeterminateness that Being = not-Being. All-sided, universal flexibility of concepts, a flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites,—that is the essence of the matter. This flexibility, applied subjectively = eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility, applied *objectively*, i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.

139—The Infinite and the Finite, it is said, are opposite to one another? (see p. 148) (cf. p. 151).

141—*Sollen* und *Schranke**—Moments of des Endlichen.**

143—"At Ought the transgression beyond finitude, Infinity, begins."

143—It is said that reason has its bounds. "When this assertion is made it is not seen that by the very fact that something has been determined as a boundary, it has already been surpassed."

sehr gut!

144: A stone does not think, therefore its restrictedness (Beschränktheit) is no bound (Schranke) *for it*. But the stone also has its bounds, for instance its oxydisability, if it "is a base capable of being oxydised."

Evolution*** of the stone

144-145:—Everything (human) passes beyond its bounds (Trieb, Schmerz,**** etc.), but *Reason*, if you please, "cannot pass beyond its bounds"!

"It is true that not every passage beyond the bound is a veritable emancipation from it!"

A magnet, if it had consciousness, would consider its turning to the north as freely made (Leibnitz).—No, it would know then *all* directions of space, and it would consider the *one* direction as a *boundary* to its freedom, a limitation of it.

The dialectics of things themselves, of Nature itself, of the course of events itself

148 ..."It is the nature of the finite to pass beyond itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite...." Not external (fremde) power (Gewalt) (149) converts the finite into the infin-

* *Ought, or Should-be*; and *Bound or Boundary—Ed.*

** the Finite—*Ed.*

*** In the MS., the Russian letter "и" appears above the last letter of the word for "evolution". In Russian, the ending "и" forms the plural of the word—*Ed.*

**** impulse, pain—*Ed.*

ite, but its (finite's) nature (seine Natur).

151: "Schlechte Unendlichkeit"*—infinity qualitatively counterposed to finitude, not connected with it, separated from it, and if the finite were *diesseits*,** and the infinite *jenseits*,*** as if the infinite stood *above* the finite, *outside* it....

153: In fact, however, sind sie**** (the finite and the infinite) *untrennbar*.***** They *are a unity*. (155)

To be applied to atoms versus electrons. In general the infiniteness of matter deep within...

158-159: ..."The unity of finite and infinite is not an external juxtaposition of these terms, nor an improper connection contrary to their determination, and binding together entities separate and opposed and mutually independent and hence incompatible; on the contrary, each in itself is this unity, and is so only in *transcending* itself, neither excelling the other in Being-in-Self and affirmative Existent Being. It has been demonstrated above that finitude exists only as a passing beyond itself; it thus contains infinity, which is its Other...."

The connection (of all parts) of infinite progress

..."The infinite progress, however, asserts more than this" (than the mere comparison of the finite with the infinite): "in it is also posited the *connection* (Hegel's italics) of terms which also are distinct...." (160)

167 "The nature of speculative thought ... consists solely in seizing the opposed moments in their unity."

The question how the infinite arrives at finite is sometimes considered as

* "bad infinity"—*Ed.*
** *on this side—Ed.*
*** *on that side—Ed.*
**** they are—*Ed.*
***** *inseparable—Ed.*

the essence of philosophy. But this question amounts to elucidating their connection....

168 ..."In the other subjects, too, the art of *putting questions* demands some education; still more so in philosophical subjects, if a better answer is to be received than that the question is idle." ‖ Bien dit!

[The relation to the *Other* has disappeared; what has remained is the relation to *Self.*]

173-174: *Fürsichsein*—Being-for-Self—infinite Being, consummated qualitative Being. [The relation to the *Other* has disappeared; what has remained is the relation to *Self.*] Quality reaches its climax (auf die Spitze) and becomes quantity.

The idealism of Kant and Fichte... (181) "remains in the dualism" ((unclear)) "of existent Being and Being-for-Self...,"

> i.e., that there is no *transition* of the Thing-in-itself (mentioned in the following sentence) to the appearance? of the object to the subject?

> Why Fürsichsein is *Eins** is not clear to me. Here Hegel is extremely obscure, in my opinion.

The *One* is the old principle of the ἄτομον** (and the void). The void is considered *Quell der Bewegung**** (185) not only in the sense that space is not filled, but also enthüllt**** "this profounder thought, ‖‖ *NB*: Selbstbewegung.*****

* *One*—*Ed.*
** atom (indivisible)—*Ed.*
*** *source of motion*—*Ed.*
**** contains—*Ed.*
***** self-movement—*Ed.*

that the negative in general contains the ground of Becoming, the unrest of self-movement." (186)

1 8 3: "The ideality of Being-for-Self as totality thus, first, passes into reality, and into the most fixed and abstract of all, as *One*."

Dark waters...

The thought of the ideal passing into the real is *profound*: very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is clear that this contains much truth. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not überschwenglich.*

189—Note: The monads of Leibnitz. The principle of *Eins*** and its incompleteness in Leibnitz.

Obviously, Hegel takes his self-development of concepts, of categories, in connection with the entire history of philosophy. This gives still a *new* aspect to the whole *Logic*.

193 ..."It is an old proposition that *One* is *Many*, and more especially that the *M a n y* are *O n e*...."

195 ..."The distinction of One and Many has determined itself to be that of their relation to one another; this is divided into two relations, *Repulsion* and *Attraction*...."

---

* inordinate—*Ed.*
** *the One*—*Ed.*

In general, all this Fürsichsein* was, probably, in part required by Hegel to deduce the transition of *quality* into *quantity*" (199)—quality is determinateness, determinateness for self, Gesetzte,* it is the One—this gives the impression of being very far fetched and empty.

Note, page *203*, the remark, which is not devoid of irony, against that

"procedure of knowledge reflecting on experience, which first *perceives* determinations in the phenomenon, next makes them the basis, and assumes for their so-called *explanation* corresponding *fundamental materials* or *forces* which are supposed to produce these determinations of the phenomenon...."

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* Being-for-self—*Ed*.
** the posited—*Ed*.

SECTION TWO:
MAGNITUDE (QUANTITY)

Kant has four "antinomies." In fact, *every* concept, every category is similarly antinomous. (217)

The role of scepticism in the history of philosophy

"The old scepticism did not shrink from the labour of demonstrating this contradiction or antinomy in every concept which it found in the sciences."

Analysing Kant very captiously (and shrewdly), Hegel comes to the conclusion that Kant simply repeats in his conclusions what was said in the premises, namely he repeats that there is a category of *Kontinuität** and a category of *Diskretion*.**

Wahrhafte Dialektik***

From this it follows merely "that, taken alone, neither determination has truth, but only their unity. This is the true dialectic consideration of them, and the true result." (226)

229: "*Die Diskretion* [translation? separateness,**** *d i s m e m b e r m e n t*] like *die Kontinuität* [continuity (?), successiveness (?),***** *continuity*] is a **moment** of *Q u a n t i t y*...."

---

* *continuity—Ed.*
** *discreteness—Ed.*
*** true dialectics—*Ed.*
**** In the MS., the word "separateness" is crossed out.—*Ed.*
***** In the MS., the words "contiguity, successiveness" are crossed out.—*Ed.*

232: "*Quantum*—which, first, means quantity having any determinateness or limit at all—is, in its complete determinateness, *Number*...."

234: "*A n z a h l* amount enumeration? and Unit constitute the moments of Number."

248—On the problem of the role and significance of *number* (much about Pythagoras, etc., etc.)

Among other things, an apt remark:

"The richer in determinateness, and hence in relation, thoughts become, the more confused, on the one hand, and the more arbitrary and senseless, on the other hand, becomes their representation in such forms as numbers." (248-249) ((Valuation of thoughts: richness in determinations *a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y* in relations.))

In regard to Kant's antinomies (world without beginning, etc.) Hegel again demonstrates des Längeren* that the premises take as proved that which has to be proved. (*267*-278)

Further the transition of quantity into quality in the abstract-theoretical exposition is so obscure that nothing can be understood. Return to it!!

2 8 3: the infinite in mathematics. Hitherto the justification has consisted *o n l y* in the *correctness of the results* ("welche aus sonstigen Gründen erwiesen ist"**),... and not in the clearness of the subject cf. Engels[48]. NB

* in detail—*Ed.*
** "demonstrated on other grounds"—*Ed.*

285: In the infinitesimal calculus a certain inexactitude (conscious) is ignored, nevertheless the result obtained is not approximate but *absolutely* exact!

285: Notwithstanding this, to demand Rechtfertigung* here is "not as superfluous" "as to ask in the case of the nose for a demonstration of the right to use it."[49]

Hegel's answer is complicated, abstrus,** etc., etc. It is a question of *h i g h e r* mathematics; cf. *E n g e l s* on the differential and integral calculus.[50]

Interesting is Hegel's remark made in passing—"transcendentally, that is really subjective and psychological"... "transcendental, that is, in the subject." (288)

Pp. 282-327 u. ff.—379

A most detailed consideration of the differential and integral calculus, with quotations—Newton, Lagrange, Carnot, Euler, Leibnitz, etc., etc.,—showing how interesting Hegel found this "vanishing" of infinitely small magnitudes, this "intermediate between Being and not-Being." Without studying higher mathematics all this is incomprehensible. Characteristic is the title *Carnot*: "Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du calcul infinitésimal"!!!***

The development of the concept Verhältnis**** (379-394) extremely obscure. Note

* justification—*Ed.*

** abstruse—*Ed.*

*** *Reflections on the Metaphysics of the Infintesimal Calculus*—*Ed.*

**** relation—*Ed.*

only, p. 394, the remark on *symbols*, that there is nothing to be said against them in general. But "*against all Symbolism*" it must be said that it sometimes is "a convenient means of escaping from comprehending, stating and justifying the *conceptual determinations*" (Begriffsbestimmungen). But precisely this is the concern of philosophy.

"The common determinations of force, or substantiality, cause and effect, and others, are themselves too only symbols used to express, for example, vital and spiritual relations; that is, they are untrue determinations of those relations." (394)

NB?

SECTION THREE:

MEASURE

"In Measure, to put it abstractly, Quality and Quantity are united. Being as such is the immediate self-identity of determinateness. This immediacy of determinateness has transcended itself. Quantity is Being which has returned upon itself in such a manner that it is simple self-identity as indifference to determinateness." (395) The third term is Measure.

Kant introduced the category of *modality* (possibility, actuality, necessity) and Hegel remarks that in Kant:

"This category means that it is the relation of the object to thought. In the sense of this idealism, thought in general is essentially external to the Thing-in-itself ..., objectivity, which is a quality of the other categories, is lacking in the categories of modality." (396)

En passant: (397)

Indian philosophy, in which Brahma passes to Siva (change = disappearance, arising)....

The peoples deify *Measure*. (399)

? Measure passes into Essence (Wesen).

(Regarding the question of Measure it is not without interest to note the remark made in passing by Hegel that "in devel-

oped civil society aggregates of individuals belonging to different trades are in a certain relation to one another.") (402)

On the question of the category of Gradualness (Allmähligkeit), Hegel remarks:

"Recourse is so readily made to this category in order to render intelligible to the eye or to the *mind* the disappearance of a Quality or of Something; for thus the illusion is created that one can almost be eye-witness of disappearance; for, Quantum being posited as limit external and variable by its very nature, *change* (as a change of Quantum only) needs no explanation. But in fact nothing is thereby explained; the change is also essentially the transition of one Quality into another, or (a more abstract transition) of one existence into a non-existence; and this contains a determination different from that of gradual, which is only a decrease or increase and a one-sided retention of magnitude.

"But already the ancients were aware of the connection by which a change appearing as merely quantitative turns into one which is qualitative, and they illustrated the confusions which arise from ignorance of this connection by popular examples..." (405-406) ("bald"—the removal of one hair from a head; a "heap"—the removal of one grain...) "what" (here) "is refuted is" das einseitige Festhalten an der abstrakten Quantumsbestimmtheit ("the one-sided clinging to abstract quantitative determinateness," i.e., "without taking account of the manifold changes and concrete qualities," etc.). ..."Therefore those changes are no idle and pedantic joke; they are in themselves correct and the product of a consciousness which takes an interest in the phenomena which occur in thought.

NB

"Quantum when it is taken as indifferent limit is that side from which an Existent Being can unsuspectedly be attacked and destroyed. It is the *cunning* of the Notion to seize it from this side, where its Quality does not appear to come into play; and this so much so that the aggrandisement of a state or of a property, and so on, which leads in the end to disaster for the state or the owner of the property, may at first actually appear as their good fortune." (407)

"It is a great merit to become acquainted with the empirical numbers of nature (as the distances of the planets from one another), but an infinitely greater merit to cause the empirical Quanta to disappear and to raise them into a *universal form* of quantitative determinations, so that they become moments of a law or Measure"; the merit of Galileo and Kepler... "They *demonstrated* the laws which they discovered by showing that the totality of details of perception corresponds to these laws." (416) But höheres Beweisen** of these laws must be demanded in order that their quantitative determinations be known from Qualitäten oder bestimmten Begriffen, die bezogen sind (wie Baum und Zeit).***

Gesetz oder Maß*

?

The development of the concept des Maßes,**** as a spezifische Quantität**** and as reales Maß***** (including Wahlverwandtschaften******—for example,

* law, or measure—*Ed.*
** higher proof—*Ed.*
*** qualities or determinate concepts (like space and time) that are related—*Ed.*
**** measure—*Ed.*
***** specific quantity—*Ed.*
****** real measure—*Ed.*
******* elective affinities—*Ed.*

chemical elements, musical tones), very obscure.

A lengthy note on chemistry, with a polemic against Berzelius and his theory of electro-chemistry. (433-445)

The "nodal line of measure relations" (Knotenlinie von Maßverhältnissen)—transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and *leaps*.

NB And again *p. 448*, that gradualness explains nothing without leaps. NB

In Hegel's *note* as always, factual material, examples, the concrete (hence Feuerbach said jestingly on one occasion that Hegel banished *nature* to his *notes*, Feuerbach, Works, II, p. ?).[51]

Pp. 448-452, a note included in the *table of contents* (not in the text!! pedantry!!): "Examples of such Nodal Lines; in this connection, that there are no leaps in nature." Leaps!

Examples: chemistry; musical tones; water (steam, ice)—*p. 449*—birth and death.

Abbrechen der Allmähligkeit, p. (450) Breaks in gradualness

"It is said that there are no leaps in nature; and ordinary imagination, when it has to conceive an arising or passing away, thinks it has conceived them (as was mentioned) when it imagines them as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we saw that the changes of Being were in general not only a transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from the qualitative into the quantitative, and conversely: a process of becoming other which

Leaps!

Leaps!

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breaks off graduality and is qualitatively other as against the preceding Existent Being. Water on being cooled does not little by little become hard, gradually reaching the consistency of ice after having passed through the consistency of paste, but is suddenly hard; when it already has quite attained freezing-point it may (if it stands still) be wholly liquid, and a slight shake brings it into the condition of hardness.

"The gradualness of arising is based upon the idea that that which arises is already, sensibly or otherwise, actually there, and is imperceptible only on account of its smallness; and the gradualness of vanishing is based on the idea that not-Being or the Other which is assuming its place equally is there, only is not yet noticeable;—there, not in the sense that the Other is contained in the Other which is there in itself, but that it is there as existence, only unnoticeable. This altogether cancels arising and passing away; or the In-itself, that inner thing in which something is before it attains its existence, is transmuted into a smallness of external existence, and the essential or conceptual distinction into a difference external and merely magnitudinal.—The procedure which makes arising and passing away conceivable from the gradualness of change is boring in the manner peculiar to tautology; that which arises or passes away is prepared beforehand, and the change is turned into the mere changing of an external distinction; and now it is indeed a mere tautology. The difficulty for such Understanding which attempts to conceive consists in the qualitative transition of Something into its Other in general and its op-

posite; Understanding, on the other hand, fancies identity and change to be of that indifferent and external kind which applies to the quantitative.

"In the moral sphere, insofar as it is considered in the sphere of Being, the same transition from quantitative to qualitative takes place, and different qualities appear to base themselves on differences in magnitude. A 'more' or 'less' suffices to transgress the limit of levity, where something quite different, namely, crime, appears; whereby right passes over into wrong, and virtue into vice.—Thus too do states—other things being equal—derive a different qualitative character from magnitudinal difference...." (450-452)

Further:

Transition of Being into Essence (Wesen), expounded extremely obscurely.

End of Volume I.

BOOK TWO:

ESSENCE

BOOK TWO:

ESSENCE

Volume IV. (Berlin, 1834) Part I. Objective Logic. Book II: The Doctrine of Essence

SECTION ONE:

ESSENCE AS REFLECTION IN ITSELF

"The truth of Being is Essence." (3)* Such is the first sentence, sounding thoroughly idealistic and mystical. But immediately afterwards, a fresh wind, so to speak, begins to blow: "Being is the immediate. Knowledge seeks to understand that truth** which Being, *in and for itself*, is, and therefore it does not halt" (*does not halt* NB) "at the immediate and its determinations, but *penetrates* (*NB*) through (*NB*) it, assuming that *behind* (Hegel's italics) this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being. This cognition is mediated knowledge, for it is not lodged immediately with and in Essence, but begins at an Other, at Being, and has to make a preliminary passage, the passage of transition beyond Being, or rather of entrance into it...."

theory of knowledge

"*passage*"

This Bewegung,*** the path of knowledge, seems to be the "activity of cognition"

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*

** Incidentally, Hegel more than once pokes fun at [cf. the passages cited above on gradualness] the word (and the concept) erklären (explanation), obviously opposing to the metaphysical solution once for all ("it has been explained"!!) the eternal process of cognition penetrating deeper and deeper. Cf. Volume III, p. 463: "can be *cognised* or, as they say, *explained*."

*** movement—*Ed.*

(Tätigkeit des Erkennens) "external to Being."

Objective sigifi-cance

"However, this movement is the movement of Being itself."

"Essence ... is what it is ... by virtue of its own **infinite movement** of Being." (4)

"Absolute Essence *has no Determinate Being*. Into this, however, it must pass." (5)

Essence stands midway between Being and the Notion, as the transition to the Notion (=Absolute).

Subdivisions of *Essence*: Semblance or Show (Schein), Appearance (Erscheinung), Actuality (Wirklichkeit).

Das Wesentliche und das Unwesentliche.* (8) Der Schein. (9)

In the unessential, in Semblance, there is a moment of not-Being. (10)

> i.e., the unessential, seeming, superficial, vanishes more often, does not hold so "tightly," does not "sit so firmly" as "Essence." Etwa**: the movement of a river—the foam above and the deep currents below. *But even the foam* is an expression of essence!

Semblance and scepticism, Kantianism, respectively:

"Semblance then is the phenomenon of scepticism; or again the appearance of idealism, such an immediacy, which is neither Something nor Thing, and, generally, is not an indifferent Being which could be outside its determinateness and relation to the subject. Scepticism did not dare to

* The Essential and the Unessential.—*Ed.*

** approximately—*Ed.*

affirm 'it is'; **modern idealism did not dare to regard cognition as a knowledge of the Thing-in-itself;** with the former, Semblance was supposed to have no basis at all in any Being; with the latter, the Thing-in-itself was supposed incapable of entering into cognition. But at the same time scepticism admitted manifold determinations of its Semblance, or rather its Semblance had for content all the manifold riches of the world. In the same manner the appearance of idealism comprehends the whole range of these manifold determinatenesses."

NB

You include in Schein* all the wealth of the world and you deny the objectivity of Schein!!

"Semblance and appearance are immediately determined so diversely. The content may then have no basis in any Being nor in any thing nor Thing-in-itself; for itself it remains as it is: it has only been translated from being into Semblance; thus Semblance contains these manifold determinatenesses, which are immediate, existent and reciprocally other. Semblance itself is, then, immediately determinate. It may have this or that content; but whatever content it has is not posited by itself but belongs to it immediately. The idealism of Leibnitz, Kant or Fichte, like any other form of idealism, did not reach beyond Being as determinateness, beyond this immediacy any more than scepticism. Scepticism allows the content "that which is immediately given"!! of its Semblance to be *given*

the immediacy of Semblance

they did not go deeper!

* Semblance or Show—*Ed.*

to it; for it, it is *immediate*, whatever content it is to have. The monad of Leibnitz develops its presentations out of itself; but it is no creative and connecting force,—the presentations arise in it like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate relative to one another, and therefore to the monad itself. Similarly Kant's phenomenon is a *given* content of perception; it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject which are immediate to one another and to the subject. The infinite limitation or check of Fichte's idealism refuses, perhaps, to be based on any Thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the Ego. But this determinateness is *immediate* and a *limit* to the Ego, which, transcending its externality, incorporates it; and though the Ego can pass beyond the limit, the latter has in it an aspect of indifference by virtue of which it contains an immediate not-Being of the Ego, though itself contained in the Ego." (10-11)

cf. Machism!!

...“Determinations which distinguish it” (den Schein) “from Essence are determinations of Essence....” (12)

Semblance = the negative nature of Essence

It is the immediacy of not-Being which constitutes Semblance; in Essence, Being is not-Being. Its nullity in itself is *the negative nature of Essence* itself....” (12)

...“These two moments thus constitute Semblance: Nullity, which however persists, and Being, which however is Moment; or again negativity which is in itself, and reflected immediacy. Consequently these moments are the moments of Essence itself....”

“Semblance is Essence itself in the determinateness of Being....” (12-13)

Semblance is (1) nothing, non-existent (Nichtigkeit) which exists
—(2) Being as moment

"Thus Semblance is Essence itself, but Essence in a determinateness, and this in such a manner that determinateness is only its moment: Essence is the showing of itself in itself." (14)

That which shows itself is essence in *one* of its determinations, in one of its aspects, in one of its moments. *Essence* seems to be just that. Semblance is the showing (Scheinen) of essence itself in itself.

..."Essence ... contains Semblance within itself, as infinite internal movement...." (14)

..."In this its self-movement Essence is Reflection. Semblance is the same as Reflection." (14)

Semblance (that which shows itself) is the *Reflection* of Essence in (it) itself.

..."Becoming in Essence—its reflective movement—is hence the movement from Nothing to Nothing and through Nothing back to itself...." (15)

This is shrewd and profound. Movements "to nothing" occur in nature and in life. Only there are certainly none "from nothing." Always from something.

"Commonly Reflection is taken in the **subjective** meaning of the movement of judgment which passes beyond a given immediate presentation, seeking universal de-

terminations for it or comparing them with it." (21) (Quotation from Kant—*Critique of the Power of Judgment*[52])…. "Here, however, **neither the reflection of consciousness** nor the more determinate reflection of understanding, which has the particular and the universal for its determinations, is in question, but only Reflection in general…."

> Thus here, too, Hegel charges Kant with **subjectivism**. This *NB*. Hegel is for the "objective validity" (sit venia verbo*) of Semblance, "of that which is immediately given" [the expression "*that which is given*" is generally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21 i. f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophers dispute whether essence **or** that which is immediately given should be taken as basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists). Instead of *or*, Hegel puts **and**, explaining the concrete content of this "and."

"Die Reflexion is the showing of Essence into itself" (27) (translation? Reflectivity? Reflective determination? Рефлексия is not suitable).**

…"It" (das Wesen) "is a movement through different moments, absolute self-mediation…." (27)

Identity — Difference — Contradiction (+Gegensatz*** in particular antithesis) (Ground)…

Therefore Hegel elucidates the one-sidedness, the incorrectness of the "law of identity" (A=A), of the category (all determi-

* If it may be called that—*Ed*.

** Variants of the translation of the German word "die Reflexion" into Russian are given within the parentheses.—*Ed*.

*** The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed*.

nations of that which is are categories—pp. *2 7 - 2 8*).

"If everything is self-identical it is not distinguished: it contains no opposition and has no ground." (29)

"Essence is ... simple self-identity." (30)

Ordinary thinking places resemblance and difference next to ("daneben") each other, not understanding **"this movement of transition of one of these determinations into the other."** (31)

And again, against the law of identity (A=A): its adherents

"since they cling to this **rigid** Identity which has its opposite in Variety, they do not see that they are thereby making it into a **one-sided** determinateness, which as such has no truth." (33)

NB

terms underlined by me

("Empty tautology": 32)

("It contains only *f o r m a l* truth, which is *a b s t r a c t* and incomplete." (33)

Kinds of reflection: *external*, etc.; expounded very obscurely.

The principles of difference: "All things are different...." "A is also not A...." (44)

"There are no two things which are entirely alike...."

There is a difference in one or another aspect (Seite), Rücksicht, etc., "insofern,"* etc.

bien dit!!

"The customary tenderness for things, whose only care is that they shall not contradict one another, forgets here as elsewhere that this is no solution of the contradiction, which is merely planted elsewhere, namely, into **subjective or external reflection;** and that the latter does in fact

* consideration, etc., "insofar as," etc.—*Ed.*

contain the two moments—which this removal and transplantation proclaim to be a mere positedness—in one unity as transcended and related to each other." (47)

(This irony is exquisite! "Tenderness" for nature and history (among the philistines)—the endeavour to cleanse them from contradictions and struggle....)

The result of the addition of plus and minus is nought. "*The result of contradiction is not only nought*." (59)

The solution of the contradiction, the reduction of positive and negative to "only determinations" (61) converts *Essence* (das Wesen) into *Ground* (Grund) (ibidem)

NB ...“Resolved Contradiction is, then, Grund, that is, Essence as unity of Positive and Negative....” (62)

"Even a slight experience in reflective thought will perceive that, if anything has just been determined as Positive, it straightway turns into Negative if any progress is made from that base, and conversely that a Negative determination turns into Positive; that reflective thought becomes confused in these determinations and contradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintance with the nature of these determinations leads to the conclusion that this confusion is a fault which should not occur, and attributes it to a **subjective** error. And in fact this transition does remain mere confusion insofar as the ***necessity*** for this ***metamorphosis*** is not present to consciousness." (63)

...“The opposition of Positive and Negative is especially taken in the meaning that the former (although etymologically it expresses being posited or positedness) is to be an objective entity, and the latter subjective, belonging only to external

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reflection and in no way concerned with the objective, which is in and for itself and quite ignores it." (64) "And indeed if the Negative expresses nothing but the abstraction of subjective caprice...." (then it, this Negative, does not exist "für das objective Positive"*)....

"**Truth**, too, is the Positive, as knowledge, corresponding with its **object** but it is this self-equality only insofar as knowledge has already taken up a negative attitude to the Other, has **penetrated the object**, and transcended that negation which the object is. Error is a Positive, as an opinion affirming that which is not in and for itself, an opinion which knows itself and asserts itself. But ignorance is either indifference to truth and error, and thus determined neither as positive nor as negative,—and if it is determined as a deficiency, this determination belongs to external reflection; or else, objectively and as proper determination of a nature, it is the impulse, which is directed against itself, a negative which contains a positive direction.—It is of the greatest importance to recognise this nature of the Determinations of Reflection which have been considered here, that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and therefore in the fact that each contains the other in its own concept. This must be understood and remembered, for without his understanding not a step can really be taken in philosophy." (65-66) This from the Note 1.————

Truth and Object

that which is in and for itself

Note 2. "*The Law of the Excluded Middle*."

Hegel quotes this proposition of the excluded middle. "Something is either A or not A; there is no third" (66) and "*a n a l -*

* "for the objective positive"—*Ed.*

y s e s" it. If this implies that "alles ein Entgegengesetztes ist,"* that everything has its positive and its negative determination, then it is all right. But if it is understood as it is generally understood, that, of all predicates, either a given one, or its not-Being, applies, then this is a "triviality"!! Spirit ... sweet, not sweet? green, not green? The determination should lead to determinateness, but in this triviality it leads to nothing.

And then—Hegel says wittily—it is said that there is no third. **There is** a third in this thesis itself. *A* itself is the third, for *A* can be both + *A* and − *A*. "The Something thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded." (67)

> This is shrewd and correct. Every concrete thing, every concrete something, stands in multifarious and often contradictory relations to everything else, ergo it is itself and some other.

Note 3 (at the end of Chapter 2, Section 1 of Book II of the *Logic*). "*T h e L a w o f C o n t r a d i c t i o n.*"

"If now the primary Determinations of Reflection—Identity, Variety and Opposition—are established in a proposition, then the determination into which they pass over as into their truth (namely Contradiction) should much more so be comprehended and expressed in a proposition: *a l l t h i n g s a r e c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n t h e m s e l v e s*, in this meaning, that ***this proposition*** as opposed to the others expresses much better the ***truth and essence of things***.—Contradiction,

* "everything is a term of an opposition"—*Ed.*

which emerges in Opposition, is no more than developed Nothing; and this is already contained in Identity, and occurred in the expression that the law of identity states nothing. This negation further determines itself into Variety and into Opposition, which now is posited Contradiction.

"But it has been a fundamental prejudice of hitherto existing logic and of ordinary imagination that Contradiction is a determination having less essence and immanence than Identity; but indeed, if there were any question of rank, and the two determinations had to be fixed as separate, Contradiction would have to be taken as the more profound and more fully essential. For as opposed to it Identity is only the determination of simple immediacy, or of dead Being, while Contradiction is the ***root of all movement and vitality***, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything ***moves and has impulse and activity***.

"Ordinarily Contradiction is removed, first of all from things, from the existent and the true in general; and it is asserted that there is nothing contradictory. Next it is shifted into subjective reflection, which alone is said to posit it by relating and comparing it. But really it does not exist even in this reflection, for it is impossible to imagine or to think anything contradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, both in actuality and in thinking reflection, is considered an accident, a kind of abnormality or paroxysm of sickness which will soon pass away.

"With regard to the assertion that Contradiction does not exist, that it is nonexistent, we may disregard this statement. In every experience there must be an ab-

solute determination of Essence—in every actuality as well as in every concept. The same remark has already been made above, under Infinity, which is Contradiction as it appears in the sphere of Being. But ordinary experience itself declares that at least there are a number of contradictory things, arrangements and so forth, the contradiction being present in them and not merely in an external reflection. But it must further not be taken only as an abnormality which occurs just here and there; it is the Negative in its essential determination, the ***principle of all self-movement***, which consists of nothing else but an exhibition of Contradiction. External, sensible motion is itself its immediate existence. Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is *existent* Contradiction itself.

"And similarly internal self-movement proper, or impulse in general (the appetitive force or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple Essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is in itself and is also the deficiency or the negative of itself, in one and the same respect. ***Abstract*** self-identity ***has no vitality*** but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself and ***to change***. Something therefore is living only insofar as it contains Contradiction, and is that force which can both comprehend and endure Contradiction. But

if an existent something cannot in its positive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other and contain Contradiction within itself, then it is not living unity, or Ground, but perishes in Contradiction. Speculative thought consists only in this, that thought holds fast Contradiction and itself in Contradiction and not in that it allows itself to be dominated by it—as happens to imagination—or suffers its determinations to be resolved into others, or into Nothing." (67-70)

Movement and "***self***-*m o v e m e n t*" (this NB! arbitrary (independent), spontaneous, **internally-necessary** movement), "change,'' "movement and vitality," "the principle of all self-movement," "impulse" (Trieb) to "movement" and to "activity"—the opposite to "*d e a d B e i n g*"—who would believe that this is the core of "Hegelianism," of abstract and abstrusen (ponderous, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This core had to be discovered, understood, hinüberretten,* laid bare, refined, which is precisely what Marx and Engels did.

The idea of universal movement and change (1813 *Logic*) was conjectured before its application to life and society. In regard to society it was proclaimed earlier (1847) than it was demonstrated in application to man (1859).[53]

"In movement, impulse, and the like, the *simplicity* of these determinations conceals the contradiction from imagination; but this contradiction immediately stands revealed in the determinations of relation. The most trivial examples—above and below, right and left, father and son, and so

* rescued—*Ed.*

on without end—all contain Contradiction in one term. That is above which is not below; 'above' is determined only as not being 'below,' and is only insofar as there is a 'below,' and conversely: one determination implies its opposite. Father is the Other of son, and son of father, and each exists only as this Other of the other; and also the one determination exists only in relation to the other: their Being is one subsistence..... (70)

"Thus although Imagination everywhere has Contradiction for content, it never becomes aware of it; it remains an external reflection, which passes from Likeness to Unlikeness, or from negative relation to intro-reflectedness of the different terms. It keeps these two determinations external to each other, and has in mind only these and not their transition, which is the essential matter and contains the Contradiction.—On the other hand, intelligent reflection, if we may mention this here, consists in the understanding and enunciating of Contradiction. It does not express the concept of things and their relations, and has only determinations of imagination for material and content; but still it relates them, and the relation contains their contradiction, allowing their concept to show through the contradiction.—Thinking Reason, on the other hand, sharpens (so to speak) the blunt difference of Variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, that is, Opposition. The manifold entities acquire activity and vitality in relation to one another only when driven on to the sharp point of Contradiction; thence they draw negativity, which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and vitality...." (70-71)

NB

(1) Ordinary imagination grasps difference and contradiction, but not the transition from the one to the other, *this however is the most important.*

(2) Intelligence and understanding. Intelligence grasps contradiction, *enunciates* it, brings things into relation with one another, allows the "concept to show through the contradiction," but does not *express* the concept of things and their relations.

(3) Thinking reason (understanding) sharpens the blunt difference of variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into *essential* difference, into *opposition*. Only when raised to the peak of contradiction, do the manifold entities become active (regsam) and lively in relation to one another, they receive* acquire that negativity which is the *inherent pulsation of self-movement and vitality.*

Subdivisions:

Der Grund—(ground)

(1) Absolute Ground—die Grundlage (the foundation). "Form and Matter." "Content."

(2) Determinate Ground (as the ground [for] a determinate content)

Its transition to *Conditioning Mediation*
die bedingende Vermittelung

(3) The Thing-in-itself (transition to *Existence*). Note. "*The Law of Ground.*"

* The word "received" is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

Customary proposition: "Everything has its sufficient Ground."

"In general this just means that what is must be considered not as an existent immediate, but as a posited entity. We must not remain at immediate Determinate Being or at determinateness in general, but must pass back to its Ground...." (76) It is superfluous to add: *sufficient* Ground. What is insufficient, is not Ground.

Leibnitz, who made the law of sufficient ground the basis of his philosophy, understood this more profoundly. "*Leibnitz* especially opposed the sufficiency of Ground to *causality* in its strict meaning of *mechanical* efficacy." (76) He looked for "Beziehung" der Ursachen* (77),— —"the whole as essential unity."

> He looked for *ends*, but teleology does not belong here, according to Hegel, but to the doctrine of the Notion.

..."The question cannot therefore be asked, how Form is added to Essence; for Form is only the showing of Essence in itself—it is its own immanent (sic!) Reflection...." (81)

> Form is essential. Essence is formed. In one way or another also in dependence on Essence....

Essence as formless identity (of itself with itself) becomes *matter*. (82)

"...It" (die Materie**) "is the real foundation or substratum of Form...." (82)

"If abstraction is made from every determination and Form of a Something,

* "relation" of causes—*Ed.*

** matter—*Ed.*

indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract. (—Matter cannot be seen or felt, etc.—what is seen or felt is a *determinate Matter*, that is, a unity of Matter and Form)." (82)

Matter is not the *Ground* of Form, but the unity of Ground and Grounded. (83) Matter is the *passive*, Form is the *active* (tätiges). (83) "Matter must be formed, and Form must materialise itself...." (84)

"Now this, which appears as the activity of Form, is equally the proper movement of Matter itself...." (85-86) NB

..."Both—the activity of Form and the movement of Matter—are the same.... Matter is determined as such or necessarily has a Form; and Form is simply material, persistent Form." (86)

Note: "Formal Method of Explanation from Tautological Grounds."

Very often, Hegel says, especially in the physical sciences, "Grounds" are explained tautologically: the movement of the earth is explained by the "attractive force" of the sun. And what then is attractive force? It is also movement!! (92) Empty tautology: why does this man go to town? Because of the attractive force of the town! (93) It also happens in science that at first molecules, the ether, "electrical matter" (95-96), etc., are put forward as "ground and then it turns out "that they" (these concepts) "are determinations deduced from that for which they are meant to be the grounds—hypotheses and figments derived by an uncritical reflection...." (96) Or it is said that we "do not know the inner nature itself of these forces and classes of matter..." (96) then there remains indeed nothing to "explain," but one must simply limit oneself to the facts....

Der reale Grund*... is not tautology, but already "some other determination of Content." (97)

On the question of "Ground" (Grund), Hegel remarks inter alia:

"If it is said of Nature that it is the ground of the world, then what is called Nature is *identical* with the world, and the world is nothing but Nature itself." (100) On the other hand, "if Nature is to be the world, a manifold of determinations is added externally...."

Since everything has "mehrere"—"Inhaltsbestimmungen, Verhältnisse und Rücksichten,"** so any number of arguments *for* and *against* can be put forward. (103) That is what Socrates and Plato called sophistry. Such arguments do not contain "the whole extent of the thing," they do not "exhaust" it (in the sense "of constituting its connections" and "containing all" its sides).

The transition of Ground (Grund) into condition (Bedingung).

And purely logical elaboration? Das fällt zusammen***** It *must* coincide, as induction and deduction in *Capital*

If I am not mistaken, there is much mysticism and leeres*** pedantry in these conclusions of Hegel, but the basic idea is one of genius: that of the universal, all-sided, **vital** connection of everything with everything and the reflection of this connection—materialistisch auf den Kopf gestellter Hegel****—in human concepts, which must likewise be hewn, treated, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually connected, united in opposites in order to embrace the world.

* real Ground—*Ed.*

** "multiple"—"content determinations, relations and considerations"—*Ed.*

*** empty—*Ed.*

**** Hegel materialistically turned upside down—*Ed.*

***** It coincides.—*Ed.*

Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the *d i a l e c t i c a l* elaboration of the history of human thought, science and technique.

A river and the *drops* in this river. The position of *every* drop, its relation to the others; its connection with the others; the direction of its movement; its speed; the line of the movement—straight, curved, circular, etc.—upwards, downwards. The sum of the movement. Concepts, as *registration* of individual aspects of the movement, of individual drops (="things"), of individual "*streams*," etc. There you have à peu près* the picture of the world according to Hegel's *Logic*,—of course minus God and the Absolute.

The word "**moment**" is often used by Hegel in the sense of moment of *c o n n e c t i o n*, moment of concatenation

"When all the Conditions of a thing are present, it enters into existence...." (116)

Very good! What has the Absolute Idea and idealism to do with it?

Amusing, this "derivation" of ... *existence*....

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SECTION TWO:
APPEARANCE

The first phrase: "*Essence must appear....*" (119) The appearance of Essence is (1) Existenz (Thing); (2) Appearance (Erscheinung). ("Appearance is what the Thing is in itself, or its truth" p. 120. "The intro-reflected self-existent world stands opposed to the world of Appearance...." (120) (3) Verhältnis (relation) and *Actuality*.

Incidentally: "Demonstration in general is mediated cognition...." (121).

..."The various kinds of Being demand or contain their own kind of mediation; consequently the nature of demonstration too is different for each....." (121)

> And again ... on the existence of God!! This wretched God, as soon as the word existence is mentioned, he takes offence.

Existence differs from Being by its mediation (Vermittlung: 124). [?By concreteness and Connection?]

..."The Thing-in-itself and its mediated Being are both contained in Existence, and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-itself exists and is the essential Existence of the Thing, while mediated Being is its unessential Existence...." (125)

?The Thing-in-itself is related to Being as the essential to the non-essential?

..."The latter" (Ding-an-sich) "is not supposed to contain in itself any determinate multiplicity, and consequently obtains this only when brought under external reflection, but remains indifferent to it (—The Thing-in-itself has colour only in relation to the eye, smell in relation to the nose, and so forth.)..." (126)

..."A Thing has the Property of effecting this or that in an Other, and of disclosing itself in a peculiar manner in its relation to it...." (129) "The Thing-in-itself thus exists essentially...." (131)

The Note deals with "The Thing-in-itself of Transcendental Idealism...."

..."The Thing-in-itself as such is no more than the empty abstraction from all determinateness, of which it is admitted that nothing can be known just because it is meant to be the abstraction from all determination...." (131)

Transcendental idealism ... places "all determinateness of things (both with regard to form and to content) in consciousness..." (131) "accordingly, from this point of view, it falls within me, the subject, that I see the leaves of a tree not as black but as green, the sun as round and not as square, and taste sugar as sweet and not as bitter; that I determine, the first and second strokes of a clock as successive and not as simultaneous, and determine the first to be neither the cause nor the effect of the second, and so forth" (131).... Hegel further makes the reservation that he has here investigated only the question of the

Thing-in-itself and "äußerliche Reflexion."*

the core = against subjectivism and the split between the Thing-in-itself and appearances

"The essential inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as to an ultimate determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness and multiplicity of the Properties, to the Thing-in-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and determines itself as an entity endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue determination." (132)

law (of appearances)

..."Many different Things are in essential Reciprocal Action by virtue of their Properties; Property is this very reciprocal relation, and apart from it the Thing is nothing...." (133)

Die Dingheit** passes over into Eigenschaft.*** (134) Eigenschaft into "matter" or "Stoff"**** ("things consist of substance"), etc.

"Appearance at this point is Essence in its Existence...." (144) "Appearance is the unity of semblance and Existence...." (145)

Unity in appearances: "This unity is the Law of Appearance. Law therefore is the positive element in the mediation of the Apparent." (148)

Here in general utter obscurity. But there is a vital thought, evidently: the concept of *law* is **one** of the stages of the cognition by man of

* "external reflection"—*Ed.*
** thinghood—*Ed.*
*** property—*Ed.*
**** "substance"—*Ed.*

unity and *connection*, of the reciprocal dependence and totality of the world process. The "treatment" and "twisting" of words and concepts to which Hegel devotes himself here is a struggle against making the concept of *law* absolute, against simplifying it, against making a fetish of it. *NB* for modern physics!!!

NB
Law
is the enduring (the persisting) in appearances

"This enduring persistence which belongs to Appearance in Law...." (149)

(Law is the identical in appearances)

"Law is the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself." (149) (Law is the identical in appearances: "the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself.")

NB

...."This identity, the foundation of Appearance, which constitutes Law, is the peculiar moment of Appearance...." (150)

Law = the quiescent reflection of appearances
NB

"Hence Law is not beyond Appearance, but is *immediately present* in it; the realm of Laws is the *quiescent* (Hegel's italics) reflection of the existing or appearing world...."

This is a remarkably materialistic and remarkably appropriate (with the word "ruhige"*) determination. Law takes the quiescent—and therefore law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate.

* "quiescent"—*Ed.*

NB
Law is
essential
appear-
ance

"Existence passes back into Law as into its Ground; Appearance contains them both—simple Ground and the dissolving movement of the appearing universe, of which Ground is the essentiality." "Hence law is *essential* appearance." (150)

Ergo, *law* and *essence* are concepts of the same kind (of the same order), or rather, of the same degree, expressing the deepening of man's knowledge of phenomena, the world, etc.

NB
(Law is the
reflection of
the essential
in the move-
ment of the
universe)
(appearance,
totality)
((law =
part))
(Appearance
is *richer*
than law)

The movement of the universe in appearances (Bewegung des erscheinenden Universums), in the essentiality of this movement, is law.

"The realm of Laws is the ***quiescent*** content of Appearance; Appearance is this same content, but presents itself in unquiet change and as Reflection into other.... Appearance, therefore, as against Law is the ***totality***, for it contains Law, ***but also more***, namely the moment of self-moving Form." (151)

But further on, although unclearly, it is admitted, it seems, p. 154, that law can make imp for this Mangel* and embrace both the negative side and the Totalität, der Erscheinung** (especially 154 i. f.). Return to this!

The World in and for itself is identical with the World of Appearances, but at the

* deficiency—*Ed.*
** Totality of Appearance—*Ed.*

same time it is opposite to it. (158) What is positive in the one is negative in the other. What is evil in the World of Appearances is good in the world which is in and for itself, Cf.—Hegel says here—*The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 121 et seq.

"The Appearing and the Essential World are each ... the independent whole of Existence. One was to have been only reflected Existence, and the other only immediate Existence; but each continues itself in the other, and consequently in itself is the identity of these two moments.... Both in the first instance are independent, but they are independent only as totalities, and they are this insofar a each essentially has in itself the moment of the other...." (150-160)

> The essence here is that both the world of appearances and the world in itself are *moments* of man's knowledge of nature, stages, *alterations* or deepenings (of knowledge). The shifting of the world in itself further and further *from* the world of appearances—that is what is so far still not to be seen in Hegel. *NB*. Have not Hegel's "moments" of the concept the significance of "moments" of transition?

..."***Thus Law is Essential Relation.***" (160) (Hegel's italics)

(Law is *relation*. This *NB* for the Machists and other agnostics, and for the Kantians, etc. Relation of *essences* or between essences.)

The term *world* expresses the formless totality of multifariousness...." (160)

And the third chapter ("*Essential Relation*") begins with the proposition: "The

truth of Appearance is Essential Relation...." (161)

Subdivisions:

The relation of *Whole* to *Parts*; this relation passes into the following one (sic!! (p. 168)):—of *Force* to its *Manifestation*;—of *Inner* to *Outer*.—The transition to *Substance*, *Actuality*.

..."The truth of the relation consists, then, in *mediation*...." (167)

"Transition" to Force: "Force is the negative unity into which the contradiction of Whole and Parts has resolved itself; it is the truth of that first Relation." (170)

((This is one of *1,000* similar passages in Hegel, which arouse the fury of *naïve* philosophers like Pearson, the author of *The Grammar of Science*.[54]—He quotes a similar passage and exclaims in fury: What a galimatias is being taught in our schools!! And in a *certain limited* sense he is right. To teach **that** is stupid. One must first of all *extract* the materialistic dialectics from it. Nine-tenths of it, however, is chaff, rubbish.))

Force makes its appearance as "belonging" (als angehörig) (171) "to the existing Thing or Matter...." "When therefore it is asked how the Thing or Matter comes to *have* a Force, then the Force appears as connected with it externally, and *impressed* on the Thing by all alien power." (171)

..."This is apparent ***in all natural, scientfic, and, in general, intellectual development;*** and it is essential to understand that the First, when as yet Something is *internal*, or in its *concept*, is, for this reason, only its immediate and passive existence...." (181)

#

The beginning of everything can be regarded as inner—passive—and at the same time as outer.

But what is interesting here is not that, but something else: Hegel's *criterion* of dialectics that has accidentally slipped in: "*in all natural, scientific and intellectual development*": here we have a *grain* of profound truth in the mystical integument of Hegelianism!

Example: the germ of a man, says Hegel, is only internal man, dem Anderssein Preisgegebenes,* the passive. Gott** at first is not yet Spirit. "*Immediately, therefore, God is* **only** *Nature.*" (182)

(This is also characteristic!!)

Feuerbach daran "knüpft an."*** Down with Gott, there remains *Natur.*****

* something given up to otherness—*Ed.*

** God—*Ed.*

*** "links up to this"—*Ed.*

**** nature—*Ed.*

SECTION THREE:
ACTUALITY

..."Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence...." (184)

Subdivisions: 1) "*The Absolute*"—2) Actuality proper. "*Actuality*, *Possibility* and *Necessity* constitute the formal moments of the Absolute." 3) "Absolute Relation": *Substance*.*

"In it itself" (dem Absoluten) "there is no Becoming" (187)—and other nonsense about the *Absolute*....

The Absolute is the absolute Absolute...

The Attribute is a relative Absolute...

In a "note" Hegel speaks (all too generally and obscurely) of the defects of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibnitz.

usually: from one extreme to the other totality = (in the shape of) dispersed completeness

Inter alia note:

"The one-sidedness of one philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as a *dispersed completeness*." (197)

Actuality is higher than *Being*, and higher than *Existence*.

(1) Being is Immediate

"*Being is not yet actual*." (200)

It passes into other.

* Here Lenin's manuscript gives the list of chapters of Section III: 1) "The Alsolute"; 2) "Actuality"; 3) "The Absolute Relation."—*Ed*.

(2) Existence (it passes into Appearance)	—arises out of Ground, out of conditions, but it still lacks the unity of "Reflection and immediacy."
(3) Actuality	unity of Existence and Being-in-Self (Ansichsein)

..."Actuality also stands higher than Existence" (200)....

..."Real Necessity is a relation which is *full of content*".... "But this Necessity is at the same time relative...." (211)

"Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity." (215)

(Continued)*...

(End of Volume II of the *Logic*, the Doctrine of Essence)...

It is to be noted that in the small *Logic* (the *Encyclopaedia*)[55] the same thing is expounded very often more clearly, with concrete examples. Cf. idem Engels and Kurio Fischer.[56]

On the question of "possibility," Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and says in the *Encyclopaedia*:

"Whether a thing is possible or impossible depends on the content, i.e., on the sum-total of the moments of Actuality which in its unfolding discloses itself to be Necessity." (*Encyclopaedia*, Vol. VI, p. 287,** § 143, Addendum.)

> "***The sum-total, the entirety of the moments of Actuality,*** which in its ***unfolding*** discloses itself to be Necessity."

* At this point Lenin's manuscript continues in a new notebook.—*Ed.*

** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed.*

The unfolding of the sum-total of the moments of actuality *NB* = the essence of dialectical cognition.

Cf. in the same *Encyclopaedia*, Vol. VI, p. 289, the eloquent words on the vanity of more delight at the wealth and flux of the phenomena of nature and on the necessity

..."of advancing to a closer insight into the *inner* harmony and *uniformity of nature*...." (289) (***Closeness to materialism.***)

Ibidem. *Encyclopaedia*, p. 292: "Developed Actuality, as the coincident alternation of Inner and Outer, the alternation of their opposite motions combined in a single motion, is Necessity."

Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 294: ..."Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood...."

Ibidem, p. 295 "it happens to him" (dem Menschen*)... "that from his activity there arises something quite different from what he had meant and willed...."

Ibidem, p. 301 "*Substance is an essential stage in the process of development of the Idea....*"

Read: an important stage in the process of development of *human knowledge* of nature and *matter*.

Logik,** Vol. IV

..."It" (die Substanz) "is the Being in *all* Being...." (220)***

The Relation of Substantiality passes over into the Relation of Causality. (223)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* to man—*Ed.*
** *Logic*—*Ed.*
*** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*

..."Substance attains ... Actuality only when it has become Cause...." (225)

> On the one hand, knowledge of matter must be deepened to knowledge (to the concept) of Substance in order to find the causes of phenomena. On the other hand, the actual cognition of the cause is the deepening of knowledge from the externality of phenomena to the Substance. Two types of examples should explain thus: 1) from the history of natural science, and 2) from the history of philosophy. More exactly: it is not "examples" that should be here—comparaison n'est pas raison,*—but the *quintessence* of the history of both the one and the other + the history of technique.

..."Effect contains nothing whatever which Cause does not contain..." (226) und *umgekehrt***....

> Cause and effect, ergo, are merely moments of universal reciprocal dependence, of (universal) connection, of the reciprocal concatenation of events, merely links in the chain of the development of matter.

NB:

"It is the same fact which displays itself first as Cause and then as Effect,—here as peculiar persistence and there as positedness or determination in an Other." (227)

> **NB** The all-sidedness and all-embracing character of the interconnection of the world, which is only one-

NB

* comparison is not proof—*Ed.*

** and *vice versa*—*Ed.*

sidedly, fragmentarily and incompletely expressed by causality.

"But we may here and now observe that, insofar as the relation of cause and effect is admitted (although in an improper sense), effect cannot be greater than cause; for effect is nothing further than the manifestation of cause." (230)

in history "minor causes of major events"

And further about history. Hegel says that it is customary in history to quote *anecdotes* as the minor "causes" of major events—in fact they are only *occasions*, only äußere Erregung,* which "the inner spirit of the event would not have required." (230) "Consequently, these arabesques of history, where a huge shape is depicted as growing from a slender stalk, are a sprightly but a most superficial treatment." (Ibidem)

This "inner spirit"—cf. Plekhanov[57]—is an idealistic, *mystical*, but a very profound indication of the historical causes of events. Hegel subsumes history **completely** under causality and understands causality a thousand times more profoundly and richly than the multitude of "savants" nowadays.

"Thus a stone in motion is cause; its movement is a determination which it has, while besides this it contains many other determinations of colour, shape, and so on, which do not enter into its causal nature." (232)

Causality, as usually understood by us, is only a small particle of universal interconnection, but (a materialist ex-

* external stimulus—*Ed.*

tension) a particle not of the subjective, but of the objectively real interconnection.

"But the *m o v e m e n t* of the Determinate *Relation* of *C a u s a l i t y* has now resulted in this, that the cause is not merely extinguished in the effect, and with it the effect too (as happens in Formal Causality),—but the cause in its extinction, in the effect, becomes again; that effect vanishes into cause, but equally becomes again in it. Each of these determinations cancels itself in its positing and posits itself in its cancellation; what takes place is not an external transition of causality from one substratum to another, but this its becoming other is at the same time its own positing. Causality, then, presupposes or conditions itself." (235)

"The movement of the relation of causality" = in fact: the movement of matter, respective the movement of history, grasped, mastered in its inner *connection* up to one or other degree of breadth or depth....

"At this point Reciprocity presents itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed substances conditioning each other; each is, in relation to the other, at once active and passive substance." (240)

"In Reciprocity, original Causality presents itself as an arising out of its negation (or passivity) and as a passing away into it—as a Becoming....

"Necessity and Causality have, then, vanished in it; they contain both the immediate identity (as **connection** and **relation**) and the absolute **substantiality of dis-**

"connection and relation"

"unity of substance in the distinct"

tincts, and therefore their absolute contingency,—the original unity of substantial variety, hence absolute contradiction. Necessity is Being, *because* it is;—the self-unity of Being, which has itself for *ground*; but, conversely, because it has a ground,

relation, mediation

it is not Being, it is nothing whatever but *Semblance*, *relation* or *mediation*. Causality is this posited transition of original Being, or cause, into Semblance or mere positedness, and conversely of positedness into originality; but the identity itself of Being and Semblance is, still, inner Necessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self) transcends the movement of Causality; and concurrently, the substantiality of the sides

necessity does not disappear, when it becomes freedom

which are in relation is lost—Necessity reveals itself. Necessity does not become Freedom because it vanishes, but only because its identity (as yet an inner identity) is manifested." (241-242)

When one reads Hegel on causality, it appears strange at first glance that he dwells so relatively lightly on this theme, beloved of the Kantians. Why? Because, indeed, for him causality is only *one* of the determinations of universal connection, which he had already covered earlier, in his *entire* exposition, much more deeply and all-sidedly; always and from the very outset emphasising this connection, the reciprocal transitions, etc., etc. It would be very instructive to compare the "*birth-pangs*" of neo-empiricism (respective "physical idealism") with the solutions or rather with the dialectical method of Hegel.

It is to be noted also that in the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel stresses the inadequacy

and emptiness of the *bare* concept of "reciprocal action."

Vol. VI, p. 308*:

"Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the Notion, nevertheless, precisely on this account one should not rest content with applying this relation, insofar as it is a matter of conceptual cognition. If one gets no further than considering a given content merely from the point of view of reciprocity, then such an attitude is in fact quite without concept; it is then merely a matter of a dry fact, and the requirement of mediation, which is the point of immediate concern in applying the relation of causality, still remains unsatisfied. On closer examination, the deficiency in the application of the relation of reciprocal action is seen to be that this relation, instead of being the equivalent of the Notion, has itself to be grasped first of all. And this occurs through its two sides not being left as an immediate datum but, as was shown in the two preceding paragraphs, being recognised as moments of a third, higher determination, which is precisely the Notion. If, for example, we regard the customs of the Spartans as the effect of their constitution, and the latter, conversely, as the effect of their customs, such a view may perhaps be correct, *but it is a conception that gives no final satisfaction*, because in point of fact it enables neither the constitution nor the customs of this people

mere "reciprocity" = emptiness

the requirement of mediation, (of connection), that is the point at issue in applying the relation of causality

NB

NB

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed.*

all the "special aspects" and the whole (Begriff"*)

to be understood. Such understanding can only come about when these two aspects, and likewise all the other special aspects of the life and the history of the Spartans are recognised to be grounded in this Notion." (308-309)

— — — — —

At the end of the second volume of the *Logic*, *Vol. IV*, *p. 243*, in the transition to the "Notion," the determination is given: "the Notion, the realm of Subjectivity, or of Freedom...."

NB Freedom = Subjectivity
("or")
End, Consciousness, Endeavour
NB

BOOK THREE:

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

BOOK THREE:

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

Vol. V. The Science of Logic

Part II: *Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion*

ON THE NOTION IN GENERAL

In the first two parts, says Hegel, I had no Vorarbeiten,* but here, on the other hand, there is "verknöchertes Material"** (which it is necessary "in Flüssigkeit bringen"***...) (3)****

"Being and Essence are the moments of its becoming" (= des Begriffs).***** (5)

> Should be inverted: concepts are the highest product of the brain, the highest product of matter.

"Accordingly Objective Logic, which considers *Being* and *Essence*, really constitutes the *genetic exposition of the Notion*." (6)

9-10: The great significance of the philosophy of Spinoza as the philosophy of substance (this standpoint is very *advanced*, but it is incomplete and not the most advanced: in general the refutation of a philosophic system does not mean discarding it, but developing it further, not replacing it by another, one-sided opposed system, but incorporating it into something

* previous works—*Ed.*
** "ossified material"—*Ed.*
*** "to render fluid"—*Ed.*
**** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*
***** of the Notion—*Ed.*

more advanced). In Spinoza's system there is no free, independent, conscious subject (it lacks "*the freedom and independence of the self-conscious subject*") (10), but in Spinoza also *thought* is an attribute of substance (10 i. f.*)
13 i. f.: Incidentally—just as at one time it was the fashion in philosophy "das Schlimme nachzusagen" der Einbildungskraft und den Gedächtnisse**—so now it is the fashion to belittle the significance of the "notion" (= "das höchste des Denkens"***) and *to praise* "*das Unbegriefliche*"**** [allusion to Kant?].

Passing to criticism of *Kantianism*, Hegel regards as Kant's great merit (15) the advancement of the idea of the "transcendental unity of apperception" (the unity of the consciousness in which the Begriff is created), but he reproaches Kant for his *one-sidedness* and *subjectivism*:

from intuition to cognition of objective reality...

"The object is truly in and for itself only as it is in thought; as it is in intuition or ideation, it is appearance...." (16) (Hegel *raises* Kant's idealism from being subjective to being objective and absolute)....

Kant admits the objectivity of concepts (Wahrheit***** is their object), but all the same leaves them subjective.

He makes Gefühl und Anschauung****** precede understanding (Ver-

* in fine—at the end—*Ed.*
** "to speak ill" of imagination and memory—*Ed.*
*** "the summit of thought"—*Ed.*
**** "the incomprehensible"—*Ed.*
***** truth—*Ed.*
****** sensation on and intuition—*Ed.*

stand). Hegel speaks of this as follows:

"Now, first, with regard to this relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages which are supposed to precede it, it is of importance what science it is that is being treated, in order to determine the form of these stages. In our science, since it is pure logic, these stages are *Being* and *Essence*. In psychology, *sensation* and *intuition* and also *ideation* in general precede understanding. In the Phenomenology of Mind, since it is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent was made through the stages of sensuous consciousness and, next, perception, to understanding." (17) In Kant the exposition is very "incomplete" here.

After that—the **CHIEF THING**—

> ..."The Notion must not here be considered as an act of self-conscious understanding, or as subjective understanding: what we have to do with is the Notion in and for itself, which constitutes a **STAGE AS WELL OF NATURE AS OF SPIRIT. LIFE, OR ORGANIC NATURE, IS THAT STAGE OF NATURE AT WHICH THE NOTION EMERGES**." (18)

The "eve" of

There follows a very interesting passage (pp. 19-27) *where Hegel refutes Kant*, ***precisely epistemologcally*** (Engels *probably* had this passage in mind when he wrote in *Ludwig Feuerbach*[58] that the *main* point against Kant had already been made by Hegel, insofar as this was possible from an idealistic standpoint),—exposing Kant's duality and inconsistency, his, so to speak, vacillation between empiricism (= materialism) and idealism, Hegel himself arguing *wholly and exclu-*

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s i v e l y from the standpoint of a ***more consistent*** idealism.

> Begriff is still not the highest concept: still higher is the *I d e a* = the unity of Begriff and Reality.

"'It is only a notion' is a thing commonly said; and not only the Idea, but sensuous, spatial, and temporally palpable existence is opposed to the Notion, as something which is more excellent than it. And the abstract is counted of less worth than the concrete, because from the former so much of that kind of material has been omitted. To those who hold this view, the process of abstraction means that *for our subjective needs* one or another characteristic is taken out of the concrete in such a manner that, while so many other properties and modifications of the object are omitted, it loses nothing in value or dignity. They are the real and are reckoned as counting in full, only they are left on the other side; and it is only the *incapacity* of understanding to absorb such riches that forces it to rest content with meagre abstraction. But if the given material of intuition and the manifold of ideation are taken as the real in opposition to that which is thought and to the Notion, then this is a view the renunciation of which is not only a condition of philosophy, but is assumed even by religion; for how can these be needed and have significance if the fugitive and superficial appearance of the sensuous and the individual are taken for the truth?.. Consequently, abstracting thought must not be considered as a mere setting-aside of the sensuous material, whose reality is

Kant belittles the power of reason

the more consistent idealist clings to *G o d*!

said not to be lowered thereby; but it is its transcendence, and the reduction of it (as mere appearance) to the essential, which manifests itself in the Notion only." (19-21)

> *Essentially*, Hegel is completely right as opposed to Kant. Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract—provided it is *correct* (NB) (and Kant, like all philosophers, speaks of correct thought)—does not get away *f r o m* the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of *matter*, of a *law* of nature, the abstraction of *value*, etc., in short *all* scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and *c o m p l e t e l y*. From living perception to abstract thought, *and from this to practice*,—such is the dialectical path of the cognition of *truth*, of the cognition of objective reality. Kant disparages knowledge in order to make way for faith: Hegel exalts knowledge, asserting that knowledge is knowledge of God. The materiatist exalts the knowledge of matter, of nature, consigning God, and the philosophical rabble that defends God, to the rubbish heap.

"A principal misapprehension here is that the natural principle or the beginning, which is the starting-point in natural development or in the history of the individual in its formation, is taken as the true and as that which is first also in the Notion." (21) (—It is correct that people begin with *that*, but *truth* lies not in the beginning but in the end, or rather, in the continuation. Truth is not the *initial* impression).... "But, philosophy is not

meant to be a narrative of what happens, but the cognition of what is *true* in happenings." (21)

In Kant there is "psychological idealism" (22): Kant's categories "are *only* determinations which are derived from self-consciousness." (22) Rising from understanding (Verstand) to reason (Vernunft), Kant belittles the significance of thought, denying it the capacity to "reach perfected truth." (23)

"It is declared" (Kant) "to be an abuse if logic, which ought to be merely a *canon of judgment*, is regarded as an *organ* for the production of *objective* discoveries. The notions of Reason, in which a higher force (an idealistic phrase!) and a deeper (*c o r r e c t*!!) content were of necessity divined, are less *Konstitutives** it should be: Objektives** than even the categories; they are *mere* ideas. Their use may certainly be permissible, but these intelligible essences, which should wholly unlock the truth, are to signify no more than *hypotheses*; and it would be completely arbitrary and reckless to ascribe any truth to them in and for themselves, since they *can occur in no kind of experience*. Could it ever have been thought that philosophy would gainsay the validity of the intelligible essences because they are without the spatial and temporal material of sensuousness?" (23)

Here, too, Hegel is essentially *right*: *value* is a category which entbehrt des Stoffes der Sinnlichkeit,* but it is *t r u e r* than the law of supply and demand.

* constitutive—*Ed.*
** objective—*Ed.*
*** dispenses with the material of sensuousness—*Ed.*

Only Hegel is an idealist: hence the nonsense of "*k o n s t i t u t i v e s*,"* etc.

Kant, on the one hand, quite clearly recognises the "*o b j e c t i v i t y*" (24) of thought ("des Denkens") ("an identity of the Notion and the thing" (24))—but, on the other hand,

NB

"the assertion is made again that we surely cannot know things as they are in and for themselves, and that truth does not allow cognising reason to approach it; that truth which consists in the unity of object and Notion is after all only appearance, and the reason now is that content is only the manifold of intuition. Of this argument it has been remarked that this manifoldness, insofar as it belongs to intuition as opposed to the Notion, is transcended precisely in the Notion, and that the object is led back by the Notion into its non-contingent essentiality; the latter enters into appearance, and for this very reason the appearance is not merely non-essential, but manifestation of Essence." (24-25)

Hegel in favour of the cognisability of the Thing-in-itself

appearance is manifestation of essence

"It will always remain a matter for astonishment how the Kantian philosophy knew that relation of thought to sensuous existence, where it halted, for a merely relative relation of bare appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the Idea in general, and, for example, in the idea of an intuitive understanding; but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from reality;—so that it affirmed as *truth* what it pronounced to be finite knowledge, and declared to be superfluous, improper, and figments of thought that which it recognised as *truth*, and of which it established the definite notion." (26)

NB

NB

* *c o n s t i t u t i v e—Ed.*

!! Ha-ha!

In logic, the *Idea* "becomes the creator of Nature." (26)

Logic is "formelle Wissenschaft"* (27) as *against* the concrete sciences (of nature and mind), but its object matter is "die reine Wahrheit"**.... (27)

Kant himself, in asking what truth is (27) (the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 83) and giving a trivial answer ("correspondence of knowledge with its object"), strikes at himself, for "the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism" is

—that "cognition is not capable of apprehending Things-in-themselves" (27)—

—and it is clear that all this is "an untrue idea." (28)

In arguing against the purely formal conception of logic (which Kant, too, is said to have)—saying that from the ordinary standpoint (truth is the correspondence [“Übereinstimmung”] of knowledge with the object) correspondence "essentially demands two sides" (29), Hegel says that the formal element in logic is "pure truth" (29) and that

..."this formal element must therefore be thought of as being in itself much richer in determinations and content, and as having infinitely more influence upon the concrete, than it is generally held to have...." (29)

?

..."But, even if the logical forms are to be regarded as nothing more than formal functions of thought, yet this character would make them worthy of an investigation as to how far they correspond to the truth in themselves. A system of logic which neglects this can claim at most

* "formal science"—*Ed.*
** "pure truth"—*Ed.*

to have the value of a *natural-historical description of the empirical phenomena of thought*." (30-31) (Herein is said to lie the immortal merit of Aristotle), but "it is necessary to go further...." (31) ?

Thus, not only a description of the forms of thought and not only a *natural-historical description of the phenomena* of thought (wherein does that differ from a description of the forms??) but also *correspondence with truth*, i.e.??, the quintessence or, more simply, the results and outcome of the history of thought?? Here Hegel is idealistically unclear, and fails to speak out fully. *Mysticism*.

Not psychology, *not* the phenomenology of mind, ***but*** logic = the question of truth.

In this conception, logic coincides with the *theory of knowledge*. This is in general a very important question.

Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, Vol. VI, p. 319*; "But in point of fact they" (die logischen Formen**), "turned round as forms of the notion, constitute the *living spirit of the actual*...."

The general laws of *movement of the world* and of *thought*

Begriff in its development into "adäquaten Begriff,"*** becomes the Idea. (33)****

NB "Notion in its objectivity is the object which is in and for itself." (33) NB

= objectivism + mysticism and betrayal of development

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed.*
** the logical forms—*Ed.*
*** "adequate notion"—*Ed.*
**** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*

SECTION ONE:
SUBJECTIVITY

The dialectical movement of the "Notion"—from the purely "formal" notion at the beginning—to the *Judgment* (Urteil), then—to the *Syllogism* (Schluß) and—finally to the transformation of the subjectivity of the Notion into its *objectivity*. (34-35)*

The first distinguishing feature of the Notion is *Universality* (Allgemeinheit). NB: The Notion grew out of *Essence*, and the latter out of *Being*.

The further development of the *Universal*, the *Particular* (Besonderes) and the *Individual* (Einzelnes) is in the highest degree abstract and "*a b s t r u s e*."

En lisant... These parts of the work should be called: a best means for getting a headache!**

Kuno Fischer expounds these "abstruse" considerations very poorly, taking up the *lighter* points—examples from the *E n c y c l o p a e d i a*, and adding banalities (against the French revolution. Kuno Fischer, Vol. 8, 1901, p. 530), etc., but not showing the reader *how* to look for the key to the difficult transitions, nuances, ebbs and flows of Hegel's abstract concepts.

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*
** Lenin wrote this in English.—*Ed.*

Obviously, here too the chief thing for Hegel is to *trace* the *transitions*. From a certain point of view, under certain conditions, the universal is the individual, the individual is the universal. Not only (1) *connection*, and inseparable connection, of all concepts and judgments, but (2) *transitions* from one into the other, and not only transitions, but also (3) *identity of opposites*—that is the chief thing for Hegel. But this merely "glimmers" through the fog of extremely abstruse exposition. The history of thought from the standpoint of the development and application of the general concepts and categories of the Logic—voilà ce qu'il faut!**

Or is this *after all* a tribute to old formal logic? Yes! And another tribute—a tribute to mysticism = idealism

Voilà, an abundance of "determinations" and of Begriffsbestimmungen* in this part of the *Logic*!

Quoting, on p. 125, the "famous" syllogism—"all men are mortal, Gaius is a man, therefore he is mortal"—Hegel shrewdly adds: "Boredom immediately descends when such a syllogism is heard approaching"—this is declared to be due to the "unnützen Form,"*** and Hegel makes the profound remark:

True!

NB "All things are a *Syllogism*, a universal which is bound together with individuality through particularity; but of course they are not wholes consisting of *three propositions*." (126)

"All things are a *syllogism*"... *NB*

Very good! The most common logical "figures"—(all this in the Par. on the "First Figure of the Syllogism") are the most common relations of things, set forth with the pedantic thoroughness of a school textbook, sit venia verho.****

* notion-determinations—*Ed.*
** That's what is needed!—*Ed.*
*** "otiose form"—*Ed.*
**** If I may be allowed to say so.—*Ed.*

Hegel's analysis of syllogisms (E.—B.—A., Eins*; Besonderes**; Allgemeines,*** B.—E.—A., etc.) recalls Marx's imitation of Hegel in Chapter I.****

On Kant

Inter alia:

"Kant's Antinomies of Reason are just this, that first one determination of a Notion is made the foundation of the Notion, and next, and with equal necessity, the other...." (128-129)

One would have to return to Hegel for a step-by-step analysis of any current logic **and** *theory of knowledge* of a Kantian, etc.	*NB*: Umkehren***** Marx *applied* Hegel's dialectics in its rational form to political economy	The formation of (abstract) notions and operations with them *already* **in**cludes idea, conviction, *consciousness* of the law-governed character of the objective connection of the world. To distinguish causality from this connection is stupid. To deny the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the individual and in the particular, is impossible. Consequently, Hegel is much more profound than Kant, and others, in tracing the reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of notions. Just as the simple form of value, the individual act of exchange of	*N B* Concerning the question of the true significance of Hegel's *Logic*

* individual—*Ed.*
** particular—*Ed.*
*** universal—*Ed.*
**** Chapter I of *Capital*—*Ed.*
***** to be inverted—*Ed.*

		one given commodity for another, already includes in an undeveloped form *all* the main contradictions of capitalism,—so the simplest *generalisation*, the first and simplest formation of *notions* (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) already denotes man's ever deeper cognition of the *objective* connection of the world. Here is where one should look for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel's *Logic*. This NB.	

Two aphorisms:

Concerning the question of the criticism of modern Kantianism, Machism, etc.:	1. Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from a vulgar-materialistic standpoint than from a dialectical-materialistic standpoint, *insofar as* he merely *rejects* their views a limine,* but does not *correct* them (as Hegel corrected Kant), deepening, generalising and extending them, showing the *connection* and *transitions* of each and every concept. 2. Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians and Humists more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than of Hegel.

..."An experience which rests upon induction is taken as valid *although* admittedly the perception is *not completed*; but no more can be assumed than that no example	NB

* from the threshold—*Ed.*

can be produced contrary to this experience, insofar as the latter is true in and for itself." (154)

This passage is in the §: "The Syllogism of Induction." The simplest truth obtained in the simplest inductive way is **always** incomplete, for experience is always unfinished. Ergo: the connection of induction with analogy—with *surmise* (scientific foresight), the relativity of all knowledge and the absolute content in each step forward in cognition.

Aphorism: It is impossible completely to understand Marx's *Capital*, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the *whole* of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!

aphorism

The *transition* from the syllogism of analogy (about analogy) to the syllogism of necessity,—from the syllogism of induction to the syllogism of analogy,—the syllogism from the universal to the individual—the syllogism from the individual to the universal,—the exposition of *connection* and *transitions* [connection *is* transition], that is Hegel's task. Hegel actually *proved* that logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but the *reflection* of the objective world. More correctly, he did not prove, but *made a brilliant guess*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In the *Encyclopaedia* Hegel remarks that the division of *Understanding* and *Reason*, of *Notions* of one kind or the other must be understood in such a way

"that our mode of behaviour is either to stop short at the merely negative and abstract form of the Notion, or to conceive the latter, in accordance with its true nature, as that which is at once positive and concrete. Thus, for example, if freedom is regarded as the abstract opposite of necessity, this is merely the Notion of understanding of freedom, whereas the true and rational Notion of freedom contains necessity as transcended within it." (Pp. 347-348, Vol. VI*)

(abstract and concrete notions)

Freedom and Necessity

Ibidem p. 349: *Aristotle* described the logical forms so completely that "essentially" there has been nothing to add.

Usually the "figures of the syllogism" are regarded as empty formalism. "They" (these figures) "have, however, a very fundamental meaning, based on the necessity that *every moment*, as determination of the Notion, itself becomes the whole and the *mediating Ground*." (352, Vol. VI)

Encyclopaedia (Vol. VI, pp. 353-354)

"The objective meaning of the figures of the syllogism is in general that everything rational is manifested as a threefold syllogism, such that each of its members assumes the position of one of the extremes as well as that of the mediating middle. Such, for example, is the case with the three branches of philosophy, i.e., the Logical Idea, Nature and Mind. Here it is Nature that is first of all the middle, connecting member. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself in the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Mind."

NB

NB

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed.*

NB

+"Spirit, however, is only spirit through being mediated by Nature...." "It is Spirit that recognises the logical Idea in Nature and so raises it to its essence...." "The logical Idea is the absolute Substance both of Spirit and of Nature, the universal, the all-pervading." (353-354)

(NB: Hegel "*only*" deifies this "logical idea," obedience to law, universality)

"Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself in the Logical Idea and Mind." Logic is the science of cognition. It is the theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = "the logical Idea") *embrace* conditionally, approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature. Here there are *actually*, objectively, **three** members: 1) nature; 2) human cognition = the human **b r a i n** (as the highest product of this same nature), and 3) the form of reflection of nature in human cognition, and this form consists precisely of concepts, laws, categories, etc. Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature *as a whole*, in its completeness, its "immediate totality," he can only *eternally* come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc., etc.

In regard to analogy an acute observation: It is the **instinct** of reason which allows one to divine that one or another empirically found determination has its roots in

the **inner nature** or genus of an object, and which bases itself further on this determination." (357) (Vol. VI, p. 359)

And p. 358: justifiable contempt for the philosophy of nature has been evoked by the futile play with *empty* analogies.

Against himself!

In ordinary logic* thought is formalistically divorced from objectivity.

"Thought is held here to be a mere subjective and formal activity, and what is objective is held to be, in contrast to thought, something firm and present for itself. This dualism, however, is not the truth, and it is thoughtless procedure to accept the determinations of subjectivity and objectivity in this way without further question, and without inquiring into their origin...." (359-360) In reality, subjectivity is only a stage of development from Being and Essence—whereupon this subjectivity "dialectically 'breaks through its Barrier'" and "opens out into objectivity by means of the syllogism." (360)

Very profound and clever! The laws of logic are the reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.

Vol. VI, p. 360

"The realised Notion" is the object.

This transition from the subject, from the notion, to the object is said to seem "strange," but by the object one should understand not simply Being, but some-

* The word "logic" in the manuscript is linked to the word "here" in the following quotation from Hegel.—*Ed.*

thing definitive, "something independent, concrete and complete in itself...." (361)

"The world is the other being of the Idea."

Subjectivity (or the Notion) and the object—*are the same* and *not the same*.... (362)

Nonsense about the ontological argument, about God!

NB ...."It is wrong to regard subjectivity and objectivity as a fixed and abstract antithesis. Both are wholly dialectical...." (367)

SECTION TWO:
OBJECTIVITY

(Logic) V, 178: *

The twofold significance of objectivity: ..."similarly a twofold significance appears for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the independent Notion, but also is that which is in and for itself...." (178)

objectivity

..."The knowledge of truth is placed in the cognition of the object 'as object without the addition of any subjective reflection..." (178)

cognition of the object

Discourses on "mechanism"—further on—extremely abstruse and almost complete nonsense.

Further, idem about *chemism*, the stages of "judgment," etc.

The paragraph entitled "*L a w*" (198-199) does not give what could be expected from Hegel on such an interesting question. It is strange why "law" is referred to "mechanism"?

The concept of law approximates here the concepts "order" (Ordnung); uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessity; the "soul" der objective's Totalität,** the "principle of self-movement."

this approximation is very important

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*

** of objective reality—*Ed.*

All this from the standpoint that mechanism is the other-being of spirit, of the Notion, etc., of the soul, of individuality.... Obviously, playing with empty analogies!

To be noted: on p. 210 the concept of 'Naturnotwendigkeit'* is encountered—"both Mechanism and Chemism are, then, comprehended under natural necessity"... for we see here "its" (des Begriffs) "submersion into externality" (ibidem).

"nature = submersion of the Notion into externality" (ha-ha!)

freedom and necessity

"It was mentioned that the opposition between Teleology and Mechanism is, in the first instance, the more general opposition between freedom and necessity. Kant sets out the opposition in this form under the Antinomies of Reason, as the 'Third Conflict of Transcendental Ideas.'" (213) Briefly repeating Kant's proofs, thesis and antithesis, Hegel notes the hollowness of these proofs and directs attention to the result of Kant's considerations:

Hegel versus Kant (on freedom and necessity)

"Kant's solution of this Antinomy is the same as the general solution of the others: that reason can prove neither of these propositions, since we can have no determinant principle a priori about the possibility of things according to mere empirical laws of nature; consequently the two must ***not be regarded as objective propositions but as subjective maxims;*** on the one hand I ought always to reflect

* "natural necessity"—*Ed.*

upon all natural events according to the principle of pure natural mechanism; but this does not prevent me from investigating certain forms of nature, should the occasion be given, according to another maxim, namely, that of final causes;—as though these two maxims (which further are supposed to be required only by human reason) were not in the same opposition in which the propositions stand.—As was observed above, from this whole standpoint the only question which is demanded by philosophic interest is not looked into, namely, which of these two principles is true in and for itself; but, for this point of view, it is irrelevant whether the principles are to be considered as objective determinations of nature (that is here, as determinations existing externally) or as mere maxims of a subjective cognition.—But in fact this is a ***subjective, that is, a contingent, cognition,*** which applies one or the other maxim as the ***occasion may suggest*** according to whether it thinks it appropriate to the given objects, but otherwise does not ask about the truth of these determinations themselves, whether both are determinations of the objects or of cognition." (215-216)

Bien!

Hegel:

..."The End has turned out to be the *third* term with respect to Mechanism and Chemism; it is their truth. Since it still stands within the sphere of Objectivity or of the immediacy of the total Notion, it is still affected by externality as such; an objective world to which

Materialist Dialectics:

The laws of the external world, of nature, which are divided into *mechanical* and *chemical* (this is very important) are the bases of man's *purposive* activity.

In his practical activity, man is confronted with the objective world, is depend-

it relates itself still stands opposed to it. From this side mechanical causality (in which generally Chemism must be included) still appears in this End-relation (which is external), but as subordinated to it and as transcended in and for itself." (216-217)

..."From this results the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of the objective process: the Other, which in them lies in the infinite progress, is the Notion which at first is posited as external to them, which is End; not only is the Notion their substance, but also externality is the moment which is essential to them and constitutes their determinateness. Thus mechanical or chemical technique spontaneously offers itself to the End-relation by reason of its character of being determined externally; and this relation must now be further considered." (217)

ent on it, and determines his activity by it.

From this aspect, from the aspect of the practical (purposive) activity of man, the mechanical (and chemical) causality of the world (of nature) appears as though something *external*, as though something secondary, as though something hidden.

Two forms of the *objective* process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and the *purposive* activity of man. The mutual relation of these forms. At the beginning, man's ends appear foreign ("other") in relation to nature. Human consciousness, science ("der Begriff"), reflects the essence, the substance of nature, but at the same time this consciousness is something external in relation to nature (not immediately, not simply, coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL AND CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE serves human ends just because its character (essence) consists in its being determined by external conditions (the laws of nature).

((***TECHNIQUE*** and the ***OBJECTIVE*** world. ***TECHNIQUE*** and ***ENDS***))

..."It" (der Zweck*) "has before it an

* the End—*Ed.*

objective, Mechanical and Chemical world, to which its activity relates itself as to something already given...." (219-220) "To this extent it still has a truly extra-mundane existence, namely, insofar as this objectivity stands opposed to it...." (220)

> In actual fact, men's ends are engendered by the objective world and presuppose it,—they find it as something given, present. But it *seems* to man as if his ends are taken from outside the world, and are independent of the world ("freedom").
>
> ((NB. All this in the § on "The Subjective End." NB)) (217-221)

"The End binds itself with objectivity through a Means, and in objectivity with itself." (221 §: "The Means.")

"Further, since the End is finite it has a finite content; accordingly it is not absolute or utterly in and for itself reasonable. The Means however is the external middle of the syllogism which is the realisation of the End; in it therefore reasonableness manifests itself as such—as preserving itself in this external Other and precisely through this externality. To that extent the Means is higher than the finite Ends of external usefulness: the plough is more honourable than those immediate enjoyments which are procured by it, and serve as Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. **IN HIS TOOLS MAN POSSESSES POWER OVER EXTERNAL NATURE, ALTHOUGH AS REGARDS HIS ENDS, HE FREQUENTLY IS SUBJECTED TO IT**." (226)

the germs of historical materialism in Hegel

NB

Hegel and historical materialism

Vorbericht, i.e., preface, of the book dated: Nuremberg, 21. VII. 1816

This is in the §:
"The Realised End"

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS ONE OF THE APPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE IDEAS OF GENIUS—SEEDS EXISTING IN EMBRYO IN HEGEL.

"The teleological process is the translation into objectivity of the Notion (sic!) which exists distinctly as Notion...." (227)

THE CATEGORIES OF LOGIC AND HUMAN PRACTICE

When Hegel endeavours—sometimes even huffs and puffs—to bring man's purposive activity under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the "syllogism" (Schluß), that the subject '(man) plays the role of a "member" in the logical "figure" of the "syllogism," and so on,—**THEN THAT IS NOT MERELY STRETCHING A POINT, A MERE GAME. THIS HAS A VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MATERIALISTIC CONTENT.** It has to be inverted: the practical activity of man had to lead his consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times *in order that* these figures *could* obtain the significance of *axioms*. This nota bene.

NB

NB

NB

"The movement of the End has now achieved that the moment of externality is posited not only in the Notion, and the Notion is not only Ought and tendency, but, as concrete totality, is identical

with immediate Objectivity." (235) At the end of the § on "The Realised End," at the end of the section (Chapter III: Teleology)—of Section II: "*Objectivity*," the transition to Section III: "**The Idea.**"

NB

Remarkable: Hegel comes to the "Idea" as the coincidence of the Notion and the object, as *truth*, *through* the practical, purposive activity of man. A very close approach to the view that man by his *practice* proves the objective correctness of his ideas, concepts, knowledge, science.

From the subjective Notion and subjective end to *objective* truth

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SECTION THREE:
THE IDEA

The beginning of Section III: "*The Idea*"

...“The Idea is the adequate Notion: ***objective truth***, or the truth as such.” (236)

In general, the introduction to Section III (“The Idea”) of Part II to the *Logic* (“Subjective Logic”) Volume V, pp. 236-243 and the corresponding §§ of the **Encyclopaedia** (§§ 213-215)—**ARE PERHAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OF DIALECTICS**. Here too, the coincidence, so to speak, of logic and epistemology is shown in a remarkably brilliant way. NB NB

The expression “Idea” is used also in the sense of a simple representation. Kant.

Hegel against Kant

“Kant has claimed the expression *idea* again for the Notion of reason. Now according to Kant the Notion of reason is to be the Notion of the unconditioned, and, with respect to phenomena, to be transcendental, which means that it is impossible to make any adequate empirical use of it. Notions of reason (according to Kant) are to serve for the conceptual comprehension, and Notions of understanding for the bare understanding, of perceptions. But, in fact, if the latter really are Notions then they are Notions,—con-

against the transcendental in the sense of the separation of (objective) truth from empiricism

ceptual comprehension takes place through them...." (236) ||| très bien!

See also below on Kant

It is equally incorrect to regard the Idea as something "unreal"—as people say: "*it is merely an idea*."

..."If *thoughts* are merely *subjective* and contingent they certainly have no further value; but in this they are not inferior to temporal and contingent *actualities*, which also have no further value except that which is proper to contingencies and phenomena. And if conversely the Idea is not to be rated as true because, with respect to phenomena, it is *transcendental*, and no object can be assigned to it, in the sensuous world, coinciding with it, this is a strange lack of understanding,—for so the Idea is denied objective validity because it lacks that which constitutes appearance, or the *untrue being* of the objective world." (237-238) ||| très bien!

In relation to practical ideas, Kant himself admits that the appeal to experience against ideas is pöbelhaft*: he holds ideas as a Maximum to which one should endeavour to bring actuality closer. And Hegel continues:

"But, the result having been reached that the Idea is the unity of the Notion and Objectivity, the truth, it must not merely be considered as a *goal* which must be approached while it still remains a kind of *beyond*; it must be held that whatever is actual is only insofar as it contains and expresses the Idea. The object, and the objective and subjective world, not

Hegel against "Jenseits"** of Kant

* vulgar—*Ed.*

** "beyond"—*Ed.*

The conformity of concepts with objects is *not* subjective	merely *ought to conform* to the Idea, but are themselves the conformity of Notion and reality; that reality which does not correspond to the Notion is mere *appearance*, or that subjective, contingent, capricious entity which is not the truth." (238)

"It" (die Idee) "is, *first*, simple truth, the identity of the Notion and Objectivity as a universal.... (242)

..."*Secondly*, it is the *relation* of the Subjectivity, which is for itself, of the simple Notion to its Objectivity which is *distinct* from it, the former is essentially the *impulse* to transcend this separation....

..."As this relation, the Idea is the *process* in which it sunders itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again brings the latter back under the power of the subject, returning to the first simple universality. The self-identity of the Idea is one with the *process*; and the thought which frees actuality from the semblance of purposeless changeability and transfigures it into the Idea must not imagine this truth of actuality as a dead repose or bare *picture*, matt, without impulse or notion, or as a genius, number, or abstract

The Idea (read: man's knowledge) is the coincidence (conformity) of notion and objectivity (the "universal"). This—first.

Secondly, the Idea is the **relation** of the subjectivity (= man) which is for itself (= independent, as it were) to the objectivity which is *d i s t i n c t* (from this Idea)....

Subjectivity is the **impulse** to destroy this separation (of the idea from the object).

Cognition is the *process* of the submersion (of the mind) in an inorganic nature for the sake of subordinating it to the power of the subject and for the sake of generalisation (cognition of the universal in its phenomena)....

The coincidence of thought with the object is a **process**: thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matt), without impulse, without

thought. In the Idea the Notion reaches freedom, and because of this the Idea contains also the *harshest opposition*; its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes it, coinciding in it with itself."

NB

motion, like a genius, like a number, like abstract thought.

The idea contains also the strongest contradiction, repose (for man's thought) consists in the firmness and certainty with which he eternally creates (this contradiction between thought and object) and eternally overcomes it....

Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The *reflection* of nature in man's thought must be understood not "lifelessly," not "abstractly," *not devoid of movement*, ***not without contradictions,*** but in the eternal *process* of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution.

NB

"The Idea is ... the Idea of the *True* and of the *Good*, as *Cognition* and *Volition*.... The process of this finite cognition and (NB) ***action*** (NB) makes the universality, which at first is abstract, into a totality, whence it becomes *perfected objectivity*." (243)

The Idea is *Cognition* and aspiration (volition) [of man]... The process of (transitory, finite, limited) cognition and **action** converts abstract concepts into *perfected objectivity*.

Also in the *Encyclopaedia* (Vol. VI).* *Encyclopaedia* § 213 (p. 385)

..."The Idea is *truth*, for truth is the correspond-

Individual Being (an object, a phenomenon, etc.)

ence of objectivity with the Notion.... But also *everything* actual, insofar as it is true, is the Idea.... The individual Being is some one aspect of the Idea; hence it requires also other actualities, which likewise appear as existing specially for themselves; it is only in all of them together and in *their relation* that the Notion is realised. The individual by itself does not correspond to its Notion; this limitation of its determinate existence constitutes its finitude and its downfall...."

is (only) **one side** of the Idea (of truth). Truth requires still other sides of **reality**, which likewise appear only as independent and individual (besonders für sich bestehende*). *Only in their totality* (zusammen), and in their *relation* (Beziehung) is truth realised.

(The *totality of all* sides of the phenomenon, of reality and their (reciprocal) *relations*—that is what truth is composed of. The relations (= transitions = contradictions) of notions = the main content of logic, **by which** these concepts (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world. The dialectics of *things* produces the dialectics of *ideas*, and not vice versa.)

Hegel brilliantly *divined* the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, *nature*) in the dialectics of concepts #

This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, *without* the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of *all* notions, in the *identity of their opposites*, in the *transitions* of one no-

indeed **divined,** not more

* existing specially for themselves.—*Ed.*

tion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly *divined* **PRECISELY THIS RELATION OF THINGS, OF NATURE.**

what constitutes dialectics?

= . . . . . .
mutual dependence of notions
" " *all* "
without exception
transitions of notions from one into another
" all " without exception.

= NB
Every notion occurs in a certain **relation**, in a certain connection with *all* the others

The relativity of opposition between notions... the identity of opposites between notions.

"Truth is first of all taken to mean that I *know* how something *is*. This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness, or formal truth, bare correctness. (§ 213, 386) Truth in the deeper sense, on the contrary, consists in the identity between objectivity and the Notion....

"A bad man is an untrue man, i.e., a man who does not behave in conformity with the notion of him, or his position. Nothing, however, can exist entirely devoid of identity between the notion and reality. Even what is bad and untrue *has being* only insofar as its reality still, somehow, conforms to its notion....

..."Everything deserving the name of philosophy has always been based on the consciousness of an absolute unity of that ***which the understanding accepts as valid only in its separation....***"

The differences between Being and Essence, between Notion and Objectivity, are relative

"The ***stages of Being*** and Essence hitherto considered, as well as those of Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when so distinguished, ***something permanent, resting*** upon ***themselves.*** But they have proved to be dialectical, and their truth consists only in being ***moments of the idea.***" (387-388)

Vol. VI, 388

The moments of the cognition (= of the "idea") of nature by man—these are the categories of logic.

Vol. VI, p. 388 (214):

"The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason (this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); also subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality in its own self; that whose nature can be conceived only as existent, etc. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite self-return and self-identity.

(the idea) truth is all-sided

"It is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said of the Idea is self-*contradictory*. But that can quite as well be rendered to the understanding or rather it is already accomplished in the idea. And this work, which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as that of the understanding.—The understanding may demonstrate that the Idea is self-contradictory, because, for instance, the subjective is only subjective and is always confronted by the objective; that Being is something

quite different from the notion and therefore cannot be extracted out of it; and that likewise the finite is only finite and the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore not identical with it; and so on with all the determinations. Logic, however, demonstrates the opposite of all this, namely, that the subjective, which is to be subjective only, the finite, which is to be finite only, the infinite, which is to be infinite only, and so on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass into their opposites. Thus, this transition, and the unity in which the extremes are included as transcended, as appearance or moments, is revealed as their truth. (388)

"The understanding, when it tackles the Idea, falls into a double misunderstanding. First, it takes the extremes of the Idea (be they expressed as they will, so long as they are in their unity) still in that sense and determination in which they are not in their concrete unity, but remain abstractions outside of the Idea.

NB: Abstractions and the "concrete unity" of opposites.

"It" (der Verstand*) "no less mistakes the *relation* between them, even when it has been expressly stated; thus, for example, it overlooks even the ***nature of the copula in the judgment***, which affirms that the ***individual***, the subject, ***is just as much not individual, but universal.***—In the second place, the understanding believes *its* reflection,—that the self-identical Idea contains its own negative, the contradiction,—to be an *external* reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself. In fact, however, this is not the understanding's own wisdom. ***The Idea itself is the dialectic*** which for ever sepa-

NB the individual = the universal

A beautiful example: the simplest and clearest. The dialectic of notions and its material-its roots

The dialectic is not in man's understanding, but in the "idea," i.e., in objective reality

* the understanding—*Ed.*

"eternal life" = dialectics

rates and distinguishes the self-identical from the differentiated, the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soul from the body. Only insofar ***is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal spirit....***" (389)

VI, § 215, p. 390:

The idea is ... a process

..."The Idea is essentially a *process*, because its identity is the absolute and free identity of the notion, only insofar as it is absolute negativity and for that reason dialectical."

This NB

Hence, Hegel says, the expression "unity" of thinking and being, of finite and infinite, etc., is *falsch*,* because it expresses "*quietly* persisting identity."** It is not true that the finite simply neutralises ("neutralisiert") the infinite and *vice versa*. Actually, we have a *process*.

If one calculates ... every second more than ten persons in the world die, and still more are born. "Movement" and "moment": catch it. At every given moment ... catch this moment, Idem in simple *m e c h a n i c a l* motion (contra Chernov).[59]

"The idea as a process runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the idea is *Life*.... The second form is ... the idea in the form of *Knowledge*, which appears under the double aspect of the *theoretical* and *practical* idea. The process of knowledge results in the restoration of unity enriched by difference, and this gives the third form, that of the *Absolute* Idea...." (391)

* *false—Ed.*

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The idea is "truth" (p. 365, § 213). The idea, i.e., *truth* as a process—for truth is a *p r o c e s s*—passes in its *development* (Entwicklung) through three stages: 1) life; 2) the process of knowledge, which includes human *practice* and *technique* (see above); 3) the stage of the absolute idea (i.e., of complete truth). Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain. By checking and applying the correctness of these reflections in his practice and technique, man arrives at objective truth.	Truth is a process. From the subjective idea, man advances towards objective truth *t h r o u g h* "practice" (and technique).

Logic. Volume V.

Section III. Idea. Chapter I. *Life*.

The question of *Life* does not belong to "logic as it is commonly imagined." (Bd. V, p. 244*) If, however, the subject-matter of logic is *truth*, and "*t r u t h a s s u c h w e s e n t l i c h i m E r k e n n e n i s t*,**" then cognition has to be dealt with—in connection with cognition it is already (p. 245) necessary to speak of *life*.

Sometimes so-called "pure logic" is followed by "applied" (angewandte) logic, but then...

...."every science must be absorbed in logic, since each is an applied logic insofar as it consists in apprehending its object in forms of thought and of the Notion." (244)

every science is applied logic

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—*Ed.*

** *e s s e n t i a l l y i s i n c o g n i t i o n*—*Ed.*

The idea of including *L i f e* in logic is comprehensible—and brilliant—from the standpoint of the *process* of the reflection of the objective world in the (at first individual) consciousness of man and of the testing of this consciousness (reflection) through practice—see:

...“Consequently, the original *Judgment* of Life consists in this, that it separates itself as individual subject from the objective....” (248)

Encyclopaedia*
§ 216: Only in their connection are the individual limbs of the body what they are. A hand, separated from the body, is a hand only in name (Aristotle).

Life = individual subject separates itself from the objective

If one considers the relation of subject to object in logic, one must take into account also the general premises of Being of the *concrete* subject (= *l i f e o f m a n*) in the objective surroundings.

Subdivisions:**

1) Life, as “the living **individual**” (§ A)
2) “The Life-process”
3) “The Process of Kind” (Gattung), **reproduction of man**, and transition to *cognition*.

(1) “**subjective totality**” and “**indifferent**” “**objectivity**”
(2) **The unity of subject and object**

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed.*
** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834, pp. 248-262.—*Ed.*

...“This objectivity of the Living Entity is *Organism*; the objectivity is the *means* and *instrument* of the End....” (251)

Encyclopaedia § 219: ...“Inorganic nature which is subdued by the living being suffers this because it is *in itself* the same as life is *for itself*.”

Invert it = pure materialism. Excellent, profound, correct!! And also NB: shows how *extremely* correct and apt are the terms “an sich” and “für sich”!!! **NB**

Further, the “subsumption” under logical categories of “sensibility” (Sensibilität), “irritability” (irritabilität)—this is said to be the *particular* in contrast to the universal!!—and “reproduction” is an idle game. Forgotten is the *nodal line*, the transition into a *different* plane of natural phenomena.

And so on. Pain is “actual existence” of contradiction in the living individual.

Hegel and the *play* with “organic Notions” !!!

The comic in Hegel

Or again: reproduction of man ... “is their” (of two individuals of different sex) “realised identity, is the negative unity of the kind which intro-reflects itself out of the division....” (261)

Hegel and the play with “organism”

Logic. Volume V.

Section III. The Idea.

Chapter II. *The Idea of Cognition*

(pp. 262-327)

...“Its” (des Begriffs**) “reality in general is the *form of its determinate existence*, and what matters is the determination

subjective consciousness

* “in itself” and “for itself”!!!—*Ed.*

** the Notions—*Ed.*

and its submersion in objectivity	of this form; upon this depends the distinction of that which the Notion is in itself or as subjective, and of what it is as submerged into Objectivity, and next in the Idea of Life." (263)	
mysticism!	..."Spirit not only is infinitely richer than Nature, but the absolute unity of opposites in the Notion constitutes its essence...." (264)	? mysticism!

Hegel against Kant

In Kant "the Ego" is "as a transcendental subject of thoughts" (264); "At the same time this Ego, according to Kant's own expression, is awkward in this respect, that we must always make use of it in order to make any judgment about it...."

? i.e., that in Kant the "Ego" is an empty form ("self-extraction") without concrete analysis of the process of cognition

(p. 265)

NB: Kant and Hume—sceptics

"In his" (= Kant's) "criticism of these determinations" (namely: absrakte einseitige Bestimmungen "der vormaligen—pre-Kantian—Metaphysik"* concerning the "soul") "he" (Kant) "simply followed Hume's sceptical manner: holds fast to that which appears as Ego in self-consciousness, from

NB

* abstract one-sided determinations of "former—pre-Kantian—metaphysics"—*Ed.*

which however everything empirical must be omitted, since the aim is to know its essence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now nothing remains but the phenomenon of the *I think* which accompanies every idea; and nobody has the slightest notion of this 'I think.'" (266) # # #

Apparently, Hegel perceives scepticism here in the fact that Hume and Kant do not see the *appearing* Thing-in-itself in "phenomena," divorce phenomena from objective truth, doubt the objectivity of cognition, remove, weglassen, alles Empirische* from the Ding-an-sich....** And Hegel continues:

Wherein does Hegel see the scepticism of Hume and Kant?

..."It must certainly be admitted that it is impossible to have the slightest notion of Ego or anything else (the Notion included), if *no Notion is formed* and a halt is made at the simple, fixed, *general idea* and *name*." (266)

It is impossible to understand without the process of understanding (of cognition, concrete study, etc.)

In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to begin understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal. In order to learn to swim, it is necessary to get into the water.

According to Hegel, the old metaphysics, in the endeavour to cognise *truth*, divided objects in accordance with the characteristic of truth into substances and phenome-

* everything empirical—*Ed.*
** Thing-in-itself—*Ed.*

Kant restricts himself to "phenomena"

Kant's Critique *rejected* the investigation of truth .... (269) "But to stand fast at appearance and what proves to be mere sensuous representation in everyday consciousness is tantamount to a renunciation of the Notion and of philosophy." (269)

§ A:

"*The Idea of the True*. At first the subjective Idea is *impulse*.... Consequently, the impulse has the determinateness of cancelling its own subjectivity, of making concrete its reality (which was abstract at first), and of filling it, for *content*, with the world which is presupposed by its subjectivity.... As Cognition is the Idea as End or as subjective idea, so the negation of the world which is presupposed as being in itself is *first* negation...." (274-275)

i.e., the first *stage*, moment, beginning, approach of cognition is its finitude (Endlichkeit) and subjectivity, the negation of the world-in-itself—the end of cognition is at first subjective....

Hegel against Kant:

Kant elevated *o n e* side to the Absolute

in Kant, the Thing-in-itself is an absolute "Jenseits"*

"Strangely enough this side of *finitude* has latterly" (obviously Kant) "been seized upon and has been taken to be the *absolute* relation of Cognition—as though the finite as such was to be the absolute! From this point of view the Object is assigned the unknown property of being a *Thing-in-itself beyond* cognition, which, together with truth, is considered an absolute. *Beyond* for Cognition.

* "Beyond"—*Ed*.

The determinations of thought in general, the categories and the determinations of reflection as well as the formal Notion and its moments, are here given the position not that they are finite determinations in and for themselves, but that they are so in the sense that they are subjective as against that empty *Thinghood-in-itself*; the error of taking this relation of the untruth of Cognition as valid has become the universal opinion of modern times." (276)

Kant's subjectivism

Kant took the finite, transitory, relative, conditional character of human cognition (its categories, causality, etc., etc.) as *subjectivism*, and not as the dialectics of the idea (= of nature itself), divorcing cognition from the object.

..."But cognition must by its own process resolve its finitude and therefore its contradiction." (277)

But the process of cognition leads it to objective truth

..."It is one-sided to imagine analysis in such a manner as though nothing were in the object except what has been *put into* it; and it is equally one-sided to think that the determinations which result are simply *taken out* of it. The former idea is, as is known, the thesis of subjective idealism, which in analysis takes the activity of Cognition only as a one-sided *positing*, beyond which the *Thing-in-itself* remains hidden; the latter idea belongs to so-called realism, which takes the subjective Notion as an empty identity that absorbs the thought determinations *from without*." (280)

Hegel against subjective idealism and "realism"

..."But the two moments cannot be separated; in its abstract form, into which

The Objectivity of logic

analysis elaborates it, the logical is certainly present only in Cognition; while conversely it is not only something *posited* but also something which *is in itself*." (280)

Logical concepts are subjective so long as they remain "abstract," in their abstract form, but at the same time they express also the Things-in-themselves. Nature is *both* concrete *and* abstract, *both* phenomenon *and* essence, *both* moment *and* relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source.

Very good is § 225 of the **Encyclopaedia** where "*cognition*" ("theoretical") and "will," "practical activity," are depicted as two sides, two methods, two means of abolishing the "one-sidedness" both of subjectivity and of objectivity.

NB

And further *2 8 1 - 2 8 3* very important on the *t r a n s i t i o n* of the categories into one another (and against Kant, p. 282).

Logic, VoI. V, p. 282 (the end)*

..."Kant ... takes up the determiniate connection (the relation-notions and the synthetic principles themselves) from *formal logic* as *given*. They ought to have been deduced by the ***exposition of the transition*** of this simple unity of self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this veritably synthetic ***p r o g r e s s, that of the self-producing Notion.***" (282)

* At this point Lenin's manuscript continues in a new notebook "Hegel. Logic. Section III"—*Ed.*

Kant did not show the *t r a n s i - t i o n* of the categories into one another.

280-287—Turning once more to higher mathematics (showing, inter alia, that he is familiar with Gauss' solution of the equation $X^m - 1 = 0^{60}$), Hegel again touches on the differential and integral calculus, and says that:

"to this day mathematics by itself, that is, in a mathematical manner, has failed in justifying these operations, which are based upon this transition" (from one magnitude to another), "for the transition is not of a mathematical nature." Hegel says that *Leibnitz*, to whom is ascribed the honour of having discovered the differential calculus, effected this transition "in a most inadequate manner, a manner both thoroughly notionless and unmathematical...." (287)

"*Analytic* cognition is the first premise of the whole syllogism,—the immediate relation of the Notion to the Object. Consequently, identity is the determination which it recognises as its own: it is only the apprehension of what is. Synthetic Cognition endeavours to *form a Notion* of what is, that is, to grasp the multiplicity of determinations in its unity. Hence it is the second premise of the syllogism in which terms various as such are related. Its goal is therefore necessity in general." (288)

Regarding the practice in certain sciences (e.g., physics) of taking various "forces," etc., for "explanation," and of pulling in (stretching), adjusting the facts, etc., Hegel makes the following clever remark:

"It is now seen that the so-called explanation and proof of the concrete element

which is brought into Propositions is partly a tautology and partly a confusion of the true relationship; partly, too, it is seen that this confusion served to disguise the trick of Cognition, which takes up the data of experience one-sidedly (the only manner in which it could reach its simple definitions and formulas), and does away with refutation from experience by proposing and taking as valid experience not in its concrete totality but as example, and only in that direction which is serviceable for the hypotheses and the theory. Concrete experience being thus subordinated to the presupposed determinations, the foundation of the theory is obscured, and is exhibited only from that side which is in conformity with the theory." (315-316)

remarkably correct and profound

(cf. the political economy of the bourgeoisie)

against subjectivism and one-sidedness

The old metaphysics (e.g., of Wolff [example: ridiculous pomposity over trivialities, etc.]) was overthrown by *Kant* and *Jacobi*. Kant showed that "strict demonstration" led to antinomies,

"but he" (Kant) "did not reflect upon the nature of this demonstration, which is bound to a finite content; yet the two stand and fall together." (317)

i.e., Kant did not understand the *universal* law of the dialectics of the "Finite"?

Synthetic cognition is still not complete, for "the Notion does not become unity with itself in its object or its reality.... Hence in this Cognition the Idea does not yet reach truth because of the inadequacy of the object to the subjective Notion.—But the sphere of Necessity is the highest point of Being and of Reflection: in and for itself it passes over into the freedom of the Notion, while the inner identity passes over into its manifestation, which is the Notion as Notion...."

..."The Idea, insofar as the Notion is now *for itself* the Notion determinate in

and for itself, is the *Practical* Idea, or *Action*." (319) And the following § is headed "B: The Idea of the Good."

Hegel on practice and the objectivity of cognition

Theoretical cognition ought to give the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, an- und für-sich.* But the human notion "definitively" catches this objective truth of cognition, seizes and masters it, only when the notion becomes "being-for-itself" in time sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and of mankind is the test, the criterion of the objectivity of cognition. Is that Hegel's idea? It is necessary to return to this.

Why is the transition from practice, from action, only to the "good," das Gute? That is narrow, one-sided! And the *useful*?

There is no doubt the useful also comes in. Or is this, according to Hegel, also das Gute?

All this in the chapter "The Idea of Cognition" (Chapter II)—in the transition to the "Absolute Idea" (Chapter III)—i.e., undoubtedly, in Hegel practice serves as a link in the analysis of the process of cognition, and indeed as the transition to objective ("absolute," according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clearly sides with Hegel in introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge: see the Theses on Feuerbach.[61]

* in and for itself—*Ed.*

Practice in the theory of knowledge:

(320) "As subjective It" (der Begrifi) "has again the presupposition of an otherness which is in itself; it is the *impulse* to realise itself, or the end which tries to give itself objectivity in the objective world, and to carry itself out, through itself. In the Theoretical Idea the subjective Notion stands opposed, as the universal which is indeterminate in and for itself, to the objective world, from which it draws determinate content and fulfilment. But in the Practical Idea it stands opposed as actual to the actual. But the self-certainty which the subject has in the fact of its determinateness in and for itself, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the *non-actuality* of the world;...."
.....

Alias:
Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it.

The notion (= man), as subjective, again presupposes an otherness which is in itself (= nature independent of man). This notion (= man) is the *impulse* to realise itself, to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself, and to realise (fulfil) itself.

In the theoretical idea (in the sphere of theory) the subjective notion (cognition?), as the universal and in and for itself indeterminate, stands opposed to the objective world, from which it obtains determinate content and fulfilment.

In the practical idea (in the sphere of practice) this notion as the actual (acting?) stands opposed to the actual.

The self-certainty which the subject [here suddenly instead of "Notion"] has in its being in and for itself, as a determinate subject, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the *non-actuality* of the world.

i.e., that the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity.

...“This determinateness, which is contained in the Notion, and is equal to it, and includes within itself the demand of the individual external actuality, is the *Good*. It appears with the dignity of absoluteness, because it is the totality of the Notion within itself—the objective in the form simultaneously of free unity and subjectivity. This Idea is ***higher than the Idea of Cognition which has already been considered,*** for it has not only the dignity of the universal but also of the ***simply actual***....” (320-321)

...“Consequently, the activity of the end is not directed against itself, for the purpose of absorbing and assimilating a given determination; it aims rather at positing its own determination, and, by transcending the determinations of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality....” (321)

The essence:

The “good is a “demand of external actuality,” i.e., by the “good” is understood man's *practice* = the demand (1) also of *external* actuality (2).

Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality.

“The activity of the end is not directed against itself....

but aims, by destroying definite (sides, features, phenomena) of the *external* world, at *giving itself reality in the form of external actuality*....”

...“The realised Good is good by virtue of what it is already in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realisation gives

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

it an external existence....” (322) Presupposed to it (the Good) is the ***objective world***, in the presupposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the Good consists ***and which, as being other, pursues its own course***; and in it even the realisation of the Good is exposed to obstacles, and may even be made impossible.....” + (322-323)

NB

NB

The “objective world” “pursues its own course,” and man’s practice, confronted by this objective world, encounters “obstacles in the realisation” of the End, even “impossibility....”

+ ...“Thus the Good remains an *Ought*; it is in and for itself, but Being, as last and abstract immediacy, remains determined against it as a not-Being too.... ++ (323)

The Good, welfare, well-meaning aspirations remain a **SUBJECTIVE OUGHT**....

++ ...“Although the Idea of the perfected Good is an absolute postulate, it is no more than a postulate,—that is, the absolute infected with the ***determinateness of subjectivity***. There are still ***two worlds in opposition***: one a realm of *subjectivity* in the *pure* spaces of *transparent* thought, the other a realm of ***objectivity*** in the element of an externally **manifold actuality**, which is an unexplored realm of darkness. The complete development of the unresolved contradiction, of that absolute end which the barrier of this actuality insuperably opposes, has been considered more closely in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 453 et seq....” (323)

Two worlds: subjective and objective

A gibe at the pure "spaces of transparent thought" in the realm of subjectivity, which is confronted by the "darkness" of "objective," "manifold" actuality. NB

..."In the latter" (= der theoretischen Idee* in contrast to der praktischen Idee**) ..."Cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the self-identity of the Notion, which for itself is indeterminate; fulfilment, that is, objectivity determined in and for itself, is given to it, and that which *truly is* is the ***actuality that is present independently of subjective positing***. The Practical Idea on the other hand counts this actuality (which at the same time opposes it as an insuperable barrier) as that which in and for itself is null, which is to receive its true determination and sole value through the ends of the Good. Will itself consequently bars the way ***to its own goal insofar as it separates itself from Cognition and external actuality does not, for it, retain the form of that which truly is***; consequently the Idea of the Good can find its complement only in the Idea of the True." (323-324)

Cognition ... finds itself faced by that which truly is as actuality present independently of subjective opinions (Setzen***). (This is pure materialism!) Man's will, his practice, itself blocks the attainment of its end ...in that it separates itself from cognition and does not recognise external actuality for that which truly is (for Nota bene

* the Theoretical Idea—*Ed.*
** the Practical Idea—*Ed.*
*** positing—*Ed.*

NB

objective truth). What is necessary is the *union of cognition* and *practice*.

And immediately following this:

NB

..."But it makes this transition through itself" (the transition of the idea of truth into the idea of the Good, of theory into practice, and vice versa). "In the syllogism of action one premise is the immediate relation of the ***good end to actuality,*** of which it makes itself master, directing it (in the second premise) as ***external means*** against external actuality." (324)

The "syllogism of action" ... For Hegel *action*, practice, is a *logical syllogism*," a figure of logic. And that is true! Not, of course, in the sense that the figure of logic has its other being in the practice of man (= absolute idealism), but vice versa: man's practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man's consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition, these figures have the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.

First premise: The *good end* (subjective-end) versus actuality ("external actuality").

Second premise: The external *means* (instrument), (objective).

Third premise or conclusion: The coincidence of subjective and objective, the test of subjective ideas, the criterion of objective truth.

..."The realisation of the Good in the

teeth of an opposing and other actuality is the mediation which is essential for the immediate relation and actualisation of the Good...." (325)

..."If now in spite of this" (through activity) "the end of the Good should not be realised, then this is a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint which the Notion has before its activity—the standpoint of that actuality which was determined as null and yet was presupposed as real. This relapse becomes a progress to bad infinity; it has its only ground in the fact that in the transcendence of this abstract reality the transcendence is equally immediately forgotten, or that it is forgotten that this reality has already been presupposed as non-objective actuality which is null in and for itself." (325)

The non-fulfilment of ends (of human activity) has as its cause (Grund) the fact that reality is taken as non-existent (nichtig), that its (reality's) objective actuality is not being recognised.

"By the activity of the objective Notion external actuality is altered, and its determination is accordingly transcended; and by this very process it loses merely apparent reality, external determinability, and nullity, and it is thus *posited* as being in and for itself...." (326) +

The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, **c h a n g e s** external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the features of Semblance, externality and

nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).

+ ..."Presupposition in general is here transcended,—that is, the determination of the Good as an end which is ***merely subjective*** and restricted in its content, the necessity of realising it by subjective activity, and this activity itself. ***In the result*** mediation transcends itself; the result is an immediacy which is not the reconstitution of the presupposition but rather the fact of its transcendedness. The Idea of the Notion which is determined in and for itself is thus posited *no longer merely in the active subject*, but equally as an immediate actuality; and the latter conversely is posited as it is in ***Cognition,*** as ***objectivity which truly is.***" (326)

The result of activity is the test of subjective cognition and the criterion of **OBJECTIVITY WHICH TRULY IS**.

..."In this result then Cognition is reconstructed ***and united with the Practical Idea***; the actuality which is found as given is at the same time determined as the realised absolute end,—not however (as in inquiring Cognition) merely as objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, but as objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion. This is the Absolute Idea." (327) ((End of Chapter II. Transition to Chapter III: "The Absolute Idea."))

Chapter III: "The Absolute Idea." (327)

..."The Absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea; each of these by itself is one-sided...." (327)

The unity of the theoretical idea (of knowledge) *and of practice*—this NB—and this unity *precisely in the theory of knowledge*, for the resulting sum is the "absolute, idea" (and the idea = "das objektive Wahre"*). |Vol. V, 236|

What remains to be considered is no longer Inhalt,** but ... "the universal element of its form—that is, the *method*." (329)

"In inquiring cognition the method is likewise in the position of a *tool*, of a means which stands on the subjective side, whereby the subjective side relates itself to the object.... But in true cognition the method is not merely a quantity of certain determinations; it is the fact that the Notion is determined in and for itself, and is the middle member" (in the logical figure of the syllogism) "only because it equally has the significance of objective...." (331)

..."The absolute method" (i.e., the method of cognition of objective truth) "on the other hand does not behave as external reflection; it draws the determinate element directly from its object itself, since it is the object's immanent principle and soul.—It was this that *Plato* demanded of cognition, that it should *consider things in and for themselves*, and that while partly considering them in their universality, it should also hold fast to them, not catching at externals, examples and comparisons, but contemplating the things alone and bringing before consciousness what is immanent in them...." (335-336)

This method of "absolute cognition is *analytic*... "but equally it is *synthetic*".... (336)

* "the objectively true"—*Ed.*
** content—*Ed.*

One of the definitions of dialectics

"Dieses so sehr synthetische als analytische Moment des *Urteils*, wodurch das anfängliche Allgemeine aus ihm selbst als das *Andere seiner* sich bestimmt, ist das *dialektische* zu nennen"... (336) (+ see the next page).*

"This equally synthetic and analytic moment of the *Judgment*, by which (the moment) the original universality |general concept| determines itself out of itself as other in relation to itself, must be called dialectical."

A determination which is not a clear one!!

1) The determination of the concept out of itself |the thing *itself* must be considered in its relations and in its development|;

2) the contradictory nature of the thing itself (das Andere seiner**), the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon;

3) the union of analysis and synthesis.

Such, apparently, are the elements of dialectics.

One could perhaps present these elements in greater detail as follows:

Elements of dialectics

1) the *objectivity* of consideration (not examples, not divergences, but the Thing-in-itself)

×

2) the entire totality of the manifold *relations* of this thing to others.

3) the *development* of this thing,

* In the manuscript, there is an arrow from the parenthesis pointing to the paragraph: "Dialectics is ...." located on the following page of the manuscript. (See p. 223 of this volume.)—*Ed.*

** the other of itself—*Ed.*

(phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life,

4) the internally contradictory *tendencies* (*and* sides) in this thing.
5) the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum *and*

#

unity of opposites

6) the *struggle*, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc.
7) the union of analysis and synthesis—the break-down of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts.
8) the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with *every other*. ×
9) not only the unity of opposites, but the *transitions* of ***every*** determination, quality, feature, side, property into *every* other |into its opposite?|.
10) the endless process of the discovery of *new* sides, relations, etc.
11) the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence.
12) from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form.
13) the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and

14) the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation).
15) the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content.
16) the transition of quantity into quality and *vice versa*. ((*15* and *16* are *examples* of *9*))

In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.

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+ (continuation. See the previous page.*)

...“Dialectics is One of those ancient sciences which has been most misjudged in modern metaphysics [here obviously = theory of knowledge and logic] and in the popular philosophy of ancients and moderns alike....” (336) Diogenes Laertius said of **Plato** that he was the father of **dialectics**, the third philosophical science (as Thales was the father of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy), but that those who are particularly loud in talking about this merit of Plato’s give little thought to it....

Plato and dialectics

...“Dialectics has often been considered an *art*, as though it rested upon a subjective *talent* and did not belong to the objectivity of the Notion....” (336-337) It is an important merit of Kant’s to have re-introduced dialectics, to have recognised it as “necessary” (a property) “of reason” (337) but the result (of the application of dialectics) must be “opposite” (to Kantianism). *See below*.

The objectivity of dialectics

* See p. 220 of this volume.—*Ed*.

There follows a very interesting, clear and important **outline of dialectics**.

..."Besides generally appearing as contingent, dialectics usually has this more detailed form, that when in respect of any particular object, e.g., the world, motion, point etc., it is shown that it has any particular determination—e.g. (in the order of the above-mentioned objects) finitude in space or time, presence at this place, absolute negation of space—it is, however, shown further that it has with equal necessity the opposite determination, e.g., infinity in space and time, non-presence at this place, and a relation to space, consequently spatiality. The older Eleatic school applied its dialectics chiefly against motion; Plato frequently against contemporary ideas and concepts (especially those of the Sophists), but also against pure categories and reflection-determinations; the developed later scepticism extended it not only to the immediate so-called data of consciousness and maxims of ordinary life, but also to all the concepts of science. The conclusion which is drawn from such dialectics is *contradiction* and the *nullity* of the assertions made. But it may occur in a double sense,—in the objective sense, the *object* which thus contradicts itself being held to cancel itself and to be null (—this was, for instance, the Eleatic conclusion, by which, for example, the world, motion, and the point were deprived of *truth*), or in the subjective seuse, *cognition being held to be defective*. The latter conclusion is sometimes understood to mean that it is only this dialectics that effects the trick of an illusive show. This is the ordinary view of so-called sound common

from the history of dialectics

the role of scepticism in the history of dialectics

dialectics is understood to be a trick

sense, which holds fast to the evidence of the *senses* and to customary ideas and expressions...." (337-338)

Diogenes the Dog,[62] for example, proved movement by walking up and down, "a vulgar refutation" (338), says Hegel.

Kantianism = (also) scepticism

..."Or again the result reached—that of subjective nullity—relates, not to the dialectic, itself, but rather to the cognition against which it is directed, and in the sense of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, to *cognition* in general...." (338).

..."The fundamental prejudice here is that the dialectic has *only a negatitve result*." (338)

Among other things, it is said that it is a merit of Kant's to have drawn attention to dialectics and to the consideration "of the determinations of thought in and for themselves."* (339)

That is correct! *Image* and *thought*, the development of both, nil aliud*

"The object in its existence without thought and Notion is an image or a name: it *is* what it *is* in the determinations of thought and Notion...."

The object manifests itself as dialectical

..."It must not therefore be considered the fault of an object, or of cognition, that they manifest themselves as dialectical by their nature and by an external connection...."

Concepts are not immobile but—in and for themselves, by their nature = *transition*

..."Thus all opposites which are taken as fixed, such as, for example, finite and infinite, or individual and universal, are contradictory not by virtue of some external connection, but rather are transitions in and for themselves, as the consideration of their nature showed...." (339)

* nothing else—Ed.



A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript:
Conspectus of Hegel's book *The Science of Logic*.—
September-December 1914

A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript:
Conspectus of Hegel's book The Science of Logic.—
September-December 1914

"Now this is the standpoint which was referred to above, in which a universal
#
first term *considered in and for itself* shows itself to be its own Other...." (340)

#
The first universal concept (also = the first encountered, universal concept)

..."But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing ***which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics,*** it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated—and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentially *contained* and *preserved* in the Other.—To hold fast the positive in *its* negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the *examples* of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." (340)

This is very important for understanding dialectics

Not empty negation, not futile negation, *not sceptical* negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics,—which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element—no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.

Dialectics consists in general in the negation of the *first* proposition, in its replacement by a *second* (in the transition of the first into the second, in the demonstration of the connection of the first with the second, etc.). The second can be made the predicate of the first—

— "for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal...." (341)

...“The first or immediate term is the Notion *in itself*, and therefore is the negative only *in itself*; the dialectical moment with it therefore consists in this, that the *distinction* which it *implicitly* contains is posited in it. The second term on the other hand is itself the *determinate entity*, the *distinction* or relation; hence with it the dialectical moment consists in the positing of the *unity* which is contained in it....”—(341-342)

“*in itself*” = potentially, not yet developed, not yet åunfolded

(In relation to the simple and original, “first,” positive assertions, propositions, etc., the “dialectical moment,” i.e., scientific consideration, demands the demonstration of difference, connection, transition. Without that the simple positive assertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. In relation to the “second,” negative proposition, the “dialectical moment” demands the demonstration of “*u n i t y*,” i.e., of the connection of negative and positive, the presence of this positive in the negative. From assertion to negation—from negation to “unity” with the asserted—without this dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, or scepsis.)

... —“If then the negative, the determinate, the relation, judgment, and all determinations which fall under this second moment, do not of themselves appear as contradictory and dialectical, this is a mere fault of thought which does not confront its thoughts one with another. For the materials—*opposite* determinations in *one relation*—are *posited* already and are at hand for thought. But formal thought makes identity its law, and allows the

contradictory content which lies before it to drop into the sphere of sensuous representation, into space and time, where the contradictory terms are held *apart* in spatial and temporal juxtaposition and thus come before consciousness ***without mutual contact***." (342)

NB

"Come before consciousness without mutual contact" (the object)—that is the essence of anti-dialectics. It is only here that Hegel has, as it were, allowed the ass's ears of idealism to show themselves—by referring time and space (in connection with sensuous representation) to something *lower* compared with *thought*. Incidentally, in a *certain* sense, sensuous representation is, of course, lower. The crux lies in the fact that thought must *apprehend* the whole "representation" in its movement, but **for that** *thought* must be dialectical. Is sensuous representation *c l o s e r* to reality than thought? Both yes and no. Sensuous representation cannot apprehend movement *a s a w h o l e*, it cannot, for example, apprehend movement with a speed of 300,000 km. per second, but *thought* does and must apprehend it. Thought, taken from sensuous representation, also reflects reality; time is a form of being of objective reality. Here, in the concept of time (and not in the relation of sensuous representation to thought) is the idealism of Hegel.

..."In this connection this thought* makes it its fixed principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but in truth the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion; in point of fact formal

* formal thought—*Ed.*

thought does think contradiction, but immediately disregards it, and with the assertion of that principle" (the statement that contradiction is unthinkable) "passes over to abstract negation." (342)

"The negativity which has just been considered is the *turning-point* of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the internal source of all activity, vital and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone.—The second negative, the negative of the negative, which we have reached, is this transcendence of the contradiction, but is no more the *activity* of *an* external reflection than the contradiction is; it is the *innermost* and *most objective* moment of Life and Spirit, by virtue of which a subject, the person, the free, has being." (342-343)

the kernel of dialectics

the criterion of truth (the unity of the concept and reality)

Important here is: 1) the characterisation of dialectics: self-movement, the source of activity, the movement of life and spirit; the coincidence of the concepts of the subject (man) with reality; 2) objectivism to the highest degree ("der objektiviste Moment"*).

This negation of the negation is the third term, says Hegel (343)—"if *number* is applicable"—but it can also be taken as the *fourth* (Quadruplicität**), (344) counting *two* negations: the "simple" (or

* "the most objective moment"—*Ed.*
** quadruplicity—*Ed.*

"formal") and the "absolute." (343 i.f.)

> The difference is not clear to me, is not the absolute equivalent to the more concrete?

"That this unity, as well as the whole form of the method, is a *triplicity* is wholly, however, the merely superficial and external side of the manner of cognition" (344)

NB: the "triplicity" of dialectics is its external superficial side

—but, he says, that is already "an infinite merit of Kant's philosophy" that it at least (even if ohne Begriff*) demonstrated this.

"Formalists, it is true, have also seized upon triplicity, and have held fast to its empty *framework*; and this form has been rendered tedious and of ill-repute by the shallow misuse and the barrenness of modern so-called philosophic *construction*, which consists simply in attaching the formal framework without concept and immanent determination to all sorts of matter and employing it for external arrangement. But its inner value cannot be diminished by this vapid misuse, and it must still be deemed of high value that the outward form of the rational has been discovered, albeit not understood." (344-345)

Hegel savagely attacks formalism, tedious and idle play with dialectics

The result of the negation of the negation, this third term is "not a quiescent third term, but, as this unity" (of contradictions), "is self-mediating movement and activity...." (345)

The result of this dialectical transformation into the "third" term, into the synthesis, is a new premise, assertion, etc., which in turn becomes the source of a further analysis. But into it, into this "third"

* without any concept—*Ed.*

stage has already entered the "*c o n t e n t*" of cognition ("the content of cognition as such enters within the sphere of contemplation"*) — and the *method* is extended into a *system*. (346)

The beginning of all consideration, of the whole analysis—this first premise—now appears indeterminate, "imperfect"; the need arises to prove, "derive" (ableiten) (347) it and it turns out that

"this may seem equivalent to the demand for an infinite *backward* progress in proof and derivation" (347)—but, on the other hand, the new premise drives *f o r w a r d*....

..."Thus, cognition rolls forward from content to content. This progress determines itself, first, in this manner, that it begins from simple determinatenesses and that each subsequent one is *richer* and *more concrete*. For the result contains its own beginning, and the development of the beginning has made it the richer by a new determinateness. The universal is the foundation; the progress therefore must not be taken as a flow from Other to Other. In the absolute method the Notion *preserves* itself in its otherness, and the universal in its particularisation, in the Judgment and in reality; it raises to each next stage of determination the whole mass of its antecedent content, and by its dialectical progress not only loses nothing and leaves nothing behind, but carries with it all that it has acquired, enriching and concentrating itself upon itself...." (349)

(This extract is not at all bad as a kind of summing up of dialectics.)

But *expansion* requires also *deepening* ("*In-sich-gehen*"*) "and greater extension is also higher intensity." (349)

* *Going into itself—Ed.*

"The richest consequently is also the most concrete and *subjective*, and that which carries itself back into the simplest depth is also the most powerful and comprehensive." (349)

This NB: The ***richest*** is the ***most concrete*** and most ***subjective***

"In this manner it comes about that each step in the progress of further determination in advancing from the indeterminate beginning is also a *rearward approach* to it, so that two processes which may at first appear to be different (the regressive confirmation of the beginning and its progressive further determination) coincide and are the same." (350)

It is impermissible deprezieren* this indeterminate beginning:

..."It requires no apology that it" (the beginning) "may be admitted merely as provisional and hypothetical. Any objections which might be advanced—about the limits of human cognition, or the need of a critical investigation of the instrument of cognition before the problem is attacked—are themselves suppositions which, as concrete determinations, imply the need for their mediation and proof. Formally then they are no better than that *beginning* against which they protest, and rather require a derivation by reason of their more concrete content; so that it is ***sheer presumption*** to demand that they should have preferential consideration. Their content is untrue, for they make incontrovertible and absolute what is known to be finite and untrue (namely, a restricted cognition which is determined as form and instrument as against its

NB: Hegel against Kant

* to depreciate—*Ed.*

against Kant (correct)

content); and this untrue cognition is itself form and regressive confirmation.—The method of truth too knows the beginning to be incomplete because it is beginning, but also knows this incomplete term in general as necessary, because truth is only the coining to itself through the negativity of immediacy...." (350-351)

Science is a *circle of circles*

By reason of the nature of the method which has been demonstrated, science is seen to be a *circle* which returns upon itself, for mediation bends back its end into its beginning, simple ground. Further, this circle is a *circle of circles*.... The various sciences ... are fragments of this chain...." (351)

NB: the connection of the dialectical method with "erfülltes Sein"* with Being that is full of content and concrete

"The method is the pure Notion which is related only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation which is Being. But now it is also Being *fulfilled*, the self-comprehending Notion, Being as the concrete and also thoroughly intensive totality...." (352)

..."Secondly, this Idea" ((die Idee des absoluten Erkennens**)) "still is logical, it is enveloped in pure thought, and is the science only of the divine Notion. The systematic development is itself a realisation, but is maintained within the same sphere. Since the pure Idea of Cognition is to that extent enclosed in subjectivity, it is an *impulse* to transcend the latter, and pure truth, as the last result, also becomes the *beginning of another sphere and science*. This transition need here only be intimated.

* "fulfilled Being"—*Ed.*
** the idea of absolute cognition—*Ed.*

"For the idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure Notion and its Reality, and thus gathers itself into the immediacy of *Being*; and in doing so, as totality in this form, it is *Nature*." (352-353)

Transition from the Idea to *Nature*...

This sentence on the **last** (353) page of the *Logic* is highly noteworthy. The transition of the logical idea to *nature*. It brings one within a hand's grasp of materialism. Engels was right[63] when he said that Hegel's system was materialism turned upside down. This is not the last sentence of the *Logic*, but what comes after it to the end of the page is unimportant.

NB: In the small Logic (*Encyclopaedia*, Par. 244, Zusatz* p. 414** the *last* sentence of the book reads: "diese seiende Idee aber ist die Natur"***

End of the *Logic*. 17.XII.1914.

It is noteworthy that the whole chapter on the "Absolute Idea" scarcely says a word about God (hardly ever has a "divine" "notion" slipped out accidentally) and apart from that—*this NB*—it contains almost nothing that is specifically *idealism*, but has for its main subject the *dialectical* **method**. The sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel's logic is the *dialectical method*—this is extremely noteworthy. And one thing more: in this *most idealistic* of Hegel's works there is the *least* idealism and the *most materialism*. "Contradictory," but a fact!

Vol. VI, p. 399****
The *Encyclopaedia* § 227—excellent on

* addendum—*Ed*.
** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed*.
*** "but this Idea which has firing is Nature"—*Ed*.
**** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—*Ed*.

the *analytical* method (to "analyse" the "Given concrete" phenomenon—"to give the form of abstraction" to its individual aspects and "herausheben"—"to bring into relief"—"the genus, or force and law" p. 398—and on its application:

NB: "genus, or force and law" (genus = law!)

It is not at all "an arbitray matter" (398) whether we apply the analytical or the synthetical method (as man pflegt zu sprechen*)—"it is the form of the very objects that have to be cognised upon which it depends" (399)

> Locke and the empiricists adopt the standpoint of analysis. And they often say that "in general cognition cannot do more." (398)

Quite correct! Cf. Marx's remark in *Capital*, I, 5, 2[64]

"It is, however, at once apparent that this turns things upside down, and that cognition which wishes to take things as they *are* thereby falls into contradiction with itself." The chemist, for example, "martert"** a piece of flesh and discovers in it nitrogen, carbon, etc. "But then these abstract substances have ceased to be flesh."

There can be many definitions, for objects have many aspects.

"The richer the object to be defined, i.e., the more numerous the aspects which it offers to one's notice, the more various also are the definitions framed from them" (400 § 229)—for example, the definition of life, of the state, etc.

In their definitions, Spinoza and Schelling present a mass of "speculation" (Hegel here obviously uses this word in the good sense) but "in the form of assurances."

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* is usually said—*Ed.*
** "tortures"—*Ed.*

Philosophy, however, must prove and derive everything, and not limit itself to definitions.

Division (Einteilung) must be "natural and not merely artificial, i.e., arbitrary." (401)

Pp. *4 0 3 - 4 0 4*—anger at "construction" and the "play" of construing, whereas it is a question of Begriff, of "Idee," of "Einheit des Begriffs und der Objektivität...."* (403)

In the small *Encyclopaedia* § 233, section **b** is entitled *D a s W o l l e n*** (which in the *large Logic* is "Die Idee des Guten"***).

Activity is a "contradiction"—the purpose is real and not real, possible and not ... etc.

"Formally, however, the disappearance of this contradiction consists in activity abolishing the subjectivity of the purpose and along with it the objectivity, the opposite, in virtue of which both are finite, and abolishing not merely the one-sidedness of this subjectivity, but the subjectivity as a whole." (406)

The standpoint of *Kant* and *Fichte* (especially in moral philosophy) is the standpoint of purpose, of subjective ought (407) (without connection with the objective)....

Speaking of the Absolute Idea, Hegel ridicules (§ 237, Vol. VI, p. 409) "declamation" over it, as if everything were revealed in it, and he remarks that

"the absolute idea" ... is ... "the universal," "but the universal not merely as ab-

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* the Notion, the "idea," "the unity of the Notion and objectivity"—*Ed.*

** *v o l i t i o n*—*Ed.*

*** "The Idea of the Good"—*Ed.*

stract form, to which (sic!) the particular content stands contrasted as an Other, but, as the absolute form into which all determinations, the whole fullness of the content posited by it, have retreated. In this respect the absolute idea can be compared to an old man, who utters the same statements of religion as a child, but for whom they have the significance of his whole lifetime. Even if the child understands the religious content, it is for him still only something outside of which the whole of life and the whole of the world lie." (409)

très bien!

A beautiful comparison! Instead of banal religion, one must take all kinds of abstract truths

excellent!

..."The interest lies in the whole movement...." (§ 237, 409)

..."The content is the living development of the idea...." "Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image of the absolute, but at first in a limited way...." (401)

§ 238, Addendum:

"The philosophical method is both analytical and synthetical, but not in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or a mere alternation of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way that it holds them transcended in itself, and ***in every one of its movements,*** therefore, it proves itself simultaneously analytical and synthetical. Philosophical thought proceeds analytically, insofar as it only accepts its object, the Idea, allows the latter its own way and, as it were, only looks on at its movement and development. To this extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought, however, is equally synthetic and shows itself to be the activity of the Notion itself. That, however, involves the effort to refrain from our own fancies and private

très bien!

very good! (and graphic)

opinions, which always seek to obtrude themselves...." (411)

(§ 243, p. 413)... "Thus the method is not an external form, but the soul and notion of the content...."

(End of the *Encyclopaedia*; see above on the side the extract from the end of *Logic*.*)

FROM MARX
TO MAO

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* See p. 234 of this volume.—*Ed*.

NOTES ON REVIEWS OF HEGEL'S *LOGIC*[65]

Preußische Jahrbücher[66] (Bd. 151) 1913, March, an article by Dr. Ferd. J. Schmidt: "Hegel and Marx." The author hails the return to Hegel, reviles "theoretico-cognitive scholasticism," quotes the neo-Hegelians *Constantin Rössler* and *Adolf Lasson* (of the *Preußische Jahrbücher*) and, in connection with *Plenge*'s book, states that Marx did not understand the significance of the "national idea" as a synthesis. Marx's merit—that of organising the workers—was a great one, but ... one-sided.

NB An example of the "liberal" (or rather bourgeois, worker-loving—for the author is probably a conservative) castration of Marx.

MacTaggart, *Ellis M'Taggart*: *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Cambridge, 1896 (259 pp.). Review in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*,[67] Bd. 119 (1902), S. 185———, says that the author is an expert on Hegel's philosophy, which he defends against Seth, Balfour, Lotze, Trendelenburg, etc. (the author MacTaggart is obviously an arch-idealist).

Emil Hammacher: *Die Bedeutung der Philosophic Hegels*. (92 SS.) 1911, Leipzig.

Review in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Bd. 148 (1912), p. 95. Says that the book contains rather good observations on "the reappearance of post-Kantian idealism at the present time," that Windelband is an agnostic (p. 96), etc., but that the author completely failed to understand Hegel's "absolute idealism," as incidentally also Riehl, Dilthey and other "stars." The author is said to have undertaken a task beyond his powers.

Andrew Seth: *The Development from Kant to Hegel with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion*, London, 1882. Review in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Bd. 83, S. 145 (1883).

The author is said to defend Hegel against Kant. (Laudatory in general.)

Stirling: *The Secret of Hegel*. Review in the same journal, Bd. 53 (1868), p. 268. The author is said to be an exceptionally fervent worshipper of Hegel, whom he interprets for English readers.

Bertrando Spaventa: *Da Socrate a Hegel*, Bari, 1905. (432 pp. $4,_{50}$ lire). Review ibidem, Bd. 129 (1906)—the book is said to be a *collection of articles*, inter alia about Hegel, of whom Spaventa is a faithful adherent.

Stirling: *The Secret of Hegel*.

Italian:

Spaventa: *Da Socrate a Hegel*.

Ralf. Mariano.

German:

Michelet and Haring. Dialekitische Methode Hegels (1888).

Schmitt. Das Geheimnis der Hegelschen Dialektik (1888).

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Regarding recent literatuire on *Hegel*. Neo-Hegelians: *Caird*, *Bradley*.

J. B. Baillie: *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, *London*, 1901 (375 pp.). A review in ***Revue Philosophique***,[68] ***1902***, *2, S 3 1 2*. Says that he does not merely repeat Hegelian terminology (like *Véra*), but tries to examine and explain *historically*. Incidentally, Chapter X: the relation of logic to nature (Hegel is said not to have achieved his aim). Hegel's significance is that he "demonstrated the *objective* character of knowledge." (p. 314)

William Wallace: *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially of His Logic*, Oxford and London, *1894*. Review in *Revue Philosophique, 1894*, 2, p. 538. Second edition, the first was in 1874. The author translated Hegel's *Logic*.

By the same author: 1894 a translation of *The Philosophy of Mind*,[69] with an explanatory chapter. Review ibid.

"Mr. Wallace accurately expounds the Hegelian conception of this science (logic) ... a science which governs both the philosophy of nature and that of mind, since pure thought or the idea is the common basis both or material reality and psychical reality."

[On *Wallace*, a laudatory but shallow review in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Bd. 111 (1898), p. 208.]

P. Rotta: *La renaissance de Hegel et "la philosophia perennis"* in the Italian *Rivista di Filosofia*, 1911, I—(review in *Revue Philosophique*, 1911, 2, p. 333).

Rotta is a supporter of Caird. Seemingly, nil.

Among other things ... "Bradley's neo-Hegelian conception of an invisible energy transferred from one manifestation to another, present and operative in all changes and all particular activities."[70]

an idealist interpretation of energy??

J. Grier Hibben: *Hegel's Logic, an Essay in Interpretation, New York, 1902* (313 pp.).

Review in *Revue Philosophique*, **1904**, Vol. *I*, p. 430: "In spite of its title, the work of *M. H.* is not an interpretative commentary but rather an almost literal summary." The author has compiled something in the nature of a *dictionary of the terms* used in Hegel's *Logic*. But this, it is said, is not the essence of the matter: "The commentators are still in dispute over the very position taken by Hegel over the fundamental meaning and true aim of his dialectic. The celebrated criticisms of *Seth* are opposed by recent exegeses which attribute a quite different significance to the *Logic*, taken as a whole, notably such as those of *MacTaggart* and *G. Noël*." (431)

The writer of the review* notes in general "the rebirth of Hegelianism in the Anglo-Saxon countries" ... "in recent years."

According to Hibben, Hegel's *Logic* "n'est pas on simple système spéculatif, une plus ou moins savante combinaison de concepts abstraits; elle est en même temps 'une interprétation de la vie universelle dans toute la plénitude de sa signification concrète.'"** (p. 430)

NB

NB

Written in December 1914
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according to the manuscript

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* L. Weber—*Ed.*

** "is not a simple peculstive system, a more or less scientific combination of abstract concepts; it is at the same time "an interpretation of universal life in all the fullness of its concrete significance."—*Ed.*

CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL'S BOOK *LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY*[71]

Written in 1915

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according
to the manuscript

HEGEL. LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, WORKS, VOL. XIII

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

p. 37* ..."If the truth is abstract it must be untrue. Healthy human reason goes out towards what is concrete.... Philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction, it leads back to the concrete...."

p. 40: comparison of the history of philosophy with a ***circle***—"a circle ... which, as periphery, has very many circles...."

A very profound correct comparison!! Every shade of thought = a circle on the great circle (a spiral) of the development of human thought in general

..."I maintain that the sequence in the systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the logical deduction of the Notion-determinations of the Idea. I maintain that if the fundamental

NB

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. XIII, Berlin, 1833—*Ed.*

conceptions of the systems appearing in the history of Philosophy ***be entirely divested*** of that which pertains to their outward form, their relation to the particular and the like, the various stages in the determination of the Idea itself are found in its logical Notion." (43)

"Conversely in the logical progression taken for itself, there is, so far as its principal elements are concerned, the progression of historical manifestations; but it is necessary, of course, to be able to discern these pure Notions in what the historical form contains." (43)

P. 56—ridicule of the chasing after fashion,—after those who are ready "auch jedes ***Geschwöge*** (?) für eine Philosophie auszuschreien."* Pp. 57-58—excellent for strict historicity in the history of philosophy, so that one should not ascribe to the ancients a "development" of their ideas, which is comprehensible to us but which in fact was not present in the ancients.

Thales, for example, did not possess the conception ἀρχή** (as a *principle*), did not possess the concept of *cause*...

..."Thus there are whole nations which have not this concept" (of cause) "at all; indeed it involves a great step forward in development...." (58)

Extremely lengthy, empty and tedious on the relation of philosophy to religion. In general, an introduction of almost 200 pages—impossible!!

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* "to all every **twaddle** (?) a philosophy"—*Ed.*

** beginning—*Ed.*

VOLUME XIII.
VOLUME I OF *THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY*.
HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

IONIC PHILOSOPHY[72]

"Anaximander (610-547 B. C.) supposes man to develop from a fish." (213)

PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANS[73]

...“Hence the determinations are dry, destitute of process, undialectical, and stationary....” (244) || negative determination of *dialectics*

This refers to the general ideas of the Pythagoreans;—“number” and its significance, etc. Ergo: it is said in regard to the primitive ideas of the Pythagoreans, their primitive philosophy; their “determinations” of substance, things, the world, are “dry, destitute of process (movement), undialectical.”

Tracing predominantly the *dialectical* in the history of philosophy, Hegel cites the views of the Pythagoreans: ...“one, added to even, makes odd (2 + 1 = 3);—added to odd, it makes even (3 + 1 = 4);—it” (Eins*) “has the property of making gerade (= even), and consequently it must

* one—*Ed.*

itself be even. Thus unity contains in itself different determinations." (246)

("harmony of the world")

Musical harmony and the philosophy of Pythagoras:

relation of the subjective to the objective

"The subjective, and, in the case of hearing, simple feeling, which, however, exists inherently in relation, Pythagoras has attributed to the understanding, and he attained his object by means of fixed determinations." (262)

Pp. 265-266: the movement of the heavenly bodies—their harmony—the harmony of the *singing* heavenly spheres inaudible to us (in the *Pythagoreans*): Aristotle, *De coelo*, II, 13 (and 9)[74]:

..."Fire was placed by the Pythagoreans in the middle, but the Earth was made a star that moved around this central body in a circle...." But for them this fire was not the sun.... "They thus rely, not on sensuous appearance, but on grounds.... These ten spheres" ten spheres or orbits or movements of the ten planets: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Sun, Moon, Earth, the Milky Way and the Gegenerde* (—antipode?) invented "for an even number," for 10[75] "like all that is in motion, make a sound; but each makes a different tone, according to the difference in its size and velocity. This is determined by the different distances, which bear a harmonious relationship to one another, in accordance with musical intervals; by this means a harmonious sound (music) arises in the moving spheres (world)...."

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* Antichthon—*Ed*.

Concerning the soul, the Pythagoreans thought "*die Seele sei*: *die Sonnenstäubchen*"* (p. 268) (= dust particle, atom) (Aristotle, *De anima*, I, 2).[76]

An allusion to the structure of matter!

the role of dust (in the sunbeam) in ancient philosophy

In the soul—seven circles (elements) as in the heavens. Aristotle, *De anima*, I, 3—p. 269.

Pythagoreans: "guesses," fantasies on the resemblance of the macrocosm and the microcosm

And here immediately are recounted the fables that Pythagoras (who had taken from the Egyptians the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the transmigration of souls) related about himself, that his soul had dwelt 207 years in other people, etc., etc. (271)

NB: the linking of the *germs* of scientific thought with fantasy à la religion, mythology. And nowadays! Likewise, the same linking but the proportions of science and mythology are different.

More on the theory of numbers of Pythagoras.

"Numbers, where are they? Dispersed through space, dwelling in independence in the heaven of ideas? They are not things immediately in themselves, for a

NB

* "*the soul is solar dust*"—*Ed.*

thing, a substance, is something quite other than a number—a body bears no resemblance to it." 254

Quotation from Aristotle?—*Metaphysik*, I, 9, is it not? From Sextus Empiricus? Unclear.

Pp. 279-280—the Pythagoreans accept the **ether** (..."A ray penetrates from the sun through the dense and cold ether," etc.)

Thus the **conjecture** about the ether has existed for thousands of years, remaining until now a *conjecture*. But at the present time there are already a thousand times more *subsurface channels* leading to a solution of the problem, to a scientific determination of the ether.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL[77]

In speaking of the Eleatic school, Hegel says about *dialectics*:

what is dialectics?

...“We here” (in der eleatischen Schule*) “find the beginning of dialectics, i.e., simply the pure movement of thought

(α) in Notions; likewise we see the opposition of thought to outward appearance or sensuous Being, or of that which is implicit to the being-for-another of this implicit-

(β) ness, and in the objective existence we see the contradiction which it has in itself, or dialectics proper....” (280) See the next page.**

* In the Eleatic school—*Ed.*

** The next page of the manuscript contains the text given below.—*Ed.*

Hegel on dialectics (see the previous page)

Here are essentially two determinations (two characteristics, two typical features Bestimmungen, keine Definitionen*) of dialectics[78]:

α) "the pure movement of thought in Notions";

β) "in the (very) essence of objects (to elucidate) (to reveal) the contradiction which it (this essence) has in itself (*d i a l e c t i c s p r o p e r*)."

In other words, this "fragment" of Hegel's should be reproduced as follows:

Dialectics in general is "the pure movement of thought in Notions" (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the "art of operating with them" (Engels)[79] always demands study of the *m o v e m e n t* of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).

In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself (an sich), of the essence, substratum, substance—from the appearance, from "Being-for-Others." (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on *without end*.

Dialectics in the proper sense is the

* determinations, not definitions—*Ed*.

study of contradiction *in the very essence of objects*: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the *essence* of things is so as well.

Sextus Empiricus presents the point of view of the Sceptics as follows:

the comparison is a tempting one...

..."Let us imagine that in a house in which there are many valuables, there were those who sought for gold by night; each would then think that he had found the gold, but would not know for certain whether he had actually found it. Thus philosophers come into this world as into a great house to seek the truth, but were they to reach it, they could not tell whether they had really attained it...." (288-289)

Xenophanes (the Eleatic) said:

Gods in the image of man

"Did beasts and lions only have hands,
Works of art thereby to bring forth, as do men,
They would, in creating divine forms, give to them
What in image and size belongs to themselves...." (289-290)

"What especially characterises Zeno is dialectics, which ... begins with him...." (302)

..."We find in Zeno likewise true **objective *dialectics***." (309)

(310: on the refutation of philosophic systems: "Falsity must not be demonstrated as untrue because the opposite is true, but in itself....")

dialectics

"Dialectics is in general α) external dialectics, in which this movement is different from the comprehension of this movement; β) not a movement of our intelligence only, but what proceeds from the

nature of the thing itself, i.e., from the pure Notion of the content. The former is a manner of regarding objects in such a way that reasons are revealed and aspects of them shown, by means of which all that was supposed to be firmly fixed, is made to totter. There may be reasons which are altogether external too, and we shall speak further of this dialectics when dealing with the Sophists. The other dialectics, however, is the immanent contemplation of the object: it is taken for itself, without previous hypothesis, idea or obligation, not under any external conditions, laws, grounds. We have to put ourselves right into the thing, to consider the object in itself and to take it in the determinations which it has. In regarding it thus, it" (er) (sic!) "shows from itself that it contains opposed determinations, and thus transcends itself; this dialectics we more especially find in the ancients. Subjective dialectics, which reasons from external grounds, does justice when it is granted that: 'in the correct there is what is not correct, and in the false the true as well.' True dialectics leaves nothing whatever to its object, as if the latter were deficient on one side only; but it disintegrates in the entirety of its nature...." (p. 311)

objective dialectics

With the "principle of development" in the twentieth century (indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century also) "all are agreed." Yes, but this superficial, not thought out, accidental, philistine "agreement" is an agreement of *such a kind* as stifles and vulgarises the truth—if everything develops, then everything passes from one into another, for development as is well known is not a simple, universal and eternal *growth, enlargement* (respective dim-

Regarding the question of *d i a l e c t i c s* and its objective significance...

	inution), etc.—If that is so, then, in the first place, evolution has to be understood *more exactly*, as the arising and passing away of everything, as mutual transitions.—And, in the second place, if *everything* develops, does not that apply also to the most general *concepts* and *categories* of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance. +

NB	I. The principle of development... II. The principle of unity...	+ In addition, the universal principle of development must be combined, linked, made to correspond with the universal principle of the *unity of the world*, nature, motion, matter, etc .

	..."Zenos treatment of motion was above all objectively dialectical...." (p. 313)
NB. This can and must be *turned round*: the question is not whether there is movement, but how to express it in the logic of concepts	..."Movement itself is the dialectic of all that is...." It did not occur to Zeno to deny movement as "sensuous certainty," it was merely a question "nach ihrer (movement's) Wahrheit" (of the truth of movement). (313) And on the next page, where he relates the anecdote how Diogenes the Cynic, of Sinope, refuted movement by walking, Hegel writes:
Not bad! Where is this continuation of the anec-	..."But the anecdote continues that, when a pupil was satisfied with this refutation, Diogenes beat him, on the ground that, since the teacher had disputed with reasons,

the only valid refutation is one derived from reasons. Men have not merely to satisfy themselves by sensuous certainty but also to understand...." (314)

dote taken from? It is not to be found in Diogenes Laertius, VI, § 39,[80] or in Sextus Empiricus, III, 8[81] Hegel p. 314). Did Hegel invent it?

Zeno has four ways of refuting motion:

1. That which is moving to an end must first cover *half* of the path. And of this half, again first *i t s* half, and so on *ad infinitum*.

   Aristotle replied: space and time are infinitely divisible (δυνάμει*) (p. 316), but not infinitely divided (ἐνεργείᾳ**), Bayle (*Dictionnaire*,[82] Vol. IV, article Zeno) calls this reply of Aristotle's *pitoyable**** and says:

   ..."*i f* one drew an infinite number of lines on a particle of matter, one would not thereby introduce a division that would reduce to an actual infinity that which according to him was only a potential infinity...."

And Hegel writes (317): "Dies si ist gut!"****

> i.e., *i f* one carried out the *i n f i n i t e* division to the end!!

...."The essence of space and time, is motion, for it is universal; to understand it means to express its essence in the form

correct!

* in potentiality—*Ed.*
** in actuality—*Ed.*
*** *pitiful*—*Ed.*
**** "This *if* is good!"—*Ed.*

of the Notion. As unity of negativity and continuity, motion is expressed as the Notion, as thought; but neither continuity nor discontinuity is to be posited as the essence....” (pp. 318-319)

“To understand means to express in the form of notions.” Motion is the essence of space and time. Two fundamental concepts express this essence: (infinite) continuity (Kontinuität) and “punctuality” (= denial of continuity, *d i s c o n t i n u i t y*). Motion is the unity of continuity (of time and space) and discontinuity (of time and space). Motion is a contradiction, a unity of contradictions.

Überweg-Heinze, 10th edition, p. 63 (§ 20), is wrong when he says that Hegel “defends Aristotle against Bayle.” Hegel refutes both the sceptic (Bayle) and the anti-dialectician (Aristotle).

Cf. Gomperz, *Les penseurs de la Grèce*,[83] p. ..., the forced *recognition*, under the lash, of the unity of contradictions, without recognising dialectics (owing to cowardice of thought)....

2. Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. “First the half” and so on endlessly. Aristotle answers: he will overtake it if he be permitted “to overstep the limits.” (320)
   And Hegel: “This answer is correct and contains all that can be said” (p. 321)—for actually the half here (at a certain stage) becomes the “limit”....

...“If we speak of motion in general, we say that the body is in one place and then it goes to another; because it moves it is no longer in the first, but yet not in the second; were it in either it would be at rest. If we say that it is between both, this is to say nothing at all, for were it between both, it would be in a place, and this presents the same difficulty. But movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time—and it is this which first makes motion possible.” (Pp. 321-322)

cf. Chernov’s objections against Engels[84]

NB correct!

Movement is the presence of a body in a definite place at a given moment and in another place at another, subsequent moment—such is the objection which Chernov repeats (see his *Philosophical Studies*) in the wake of *all* the “metaphysical” opponents of Hegel.

This objection is *incorrect*: (1) it describes the *result* of motion, but not motion *itself*; (2) it does not show, it does not contain in itself the *possibility* of motion; (3) it depicts motion as a sum, as a concatenation of states of *rest*, that is to say, the (dialectical) contradiction is not removed by it, but only concealed, shifted, screened, covered over.

“What makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united.” (322)

correct!

We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse,

kills,—and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept.

And in that lies the *essence* of dialectics.

And precisely *this essence* is expressed by the formula: the unity, identity of opposites.

3. "The flying arrow rests."
   And Aristotle's answer: the error arises from the assumption that "time consists of the individual Nows" (ἐκ τῶν νῦν) p. 324.

4. Half is equal to the double: motion measured in comparison with all unmoving body and in comparison with a body moving in the *opposite* direction.

At the end of the § on Zeno, Hegel compares him to *Kant* (whose *antinomies*, he says, "do no more than Zeno did here"). (p. 326)

The general conclusion of the dialectic of the Eleatics: "the truth is the one, all else is untrue"—"just as the Kantian philosophy resulted in 'We know appearances only.' On the whole the principle is the same." (p. 326)

But there is also a difference.

Kant and his (subjectivism, scepticism, etc.)

"In Kant it is the spiritual that destroys the world; according to Zeno, the world of appearance in itself and for itself has no truth. According to Kant, it is our thought, our spiritual activity that is had;—it shows excessive humility of mind to believe that knowledge has no value...." (327)

The continuation of the Eleatics in Leucippus and among the *Sophists*...

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

After Zeno (? he lived *after* Heraclitus?)[85] Hegel passes on to Heraclitus and says:

"It" (Zeno's dialectics) "may, to that extent, also be called subjective dialectics, insofar as it rests in the contemplative subject, and the one, without this dialectics, without this movement, is one abstract identity...." (328) **NB**

but it was previously said, see the passage quoted from p. 309, and others, that Zeno's dialectics is *objective* dialectics. Here is some kind of superfine "distinguo." Cf. the following:

"Dialectics: (α) external dialectics, a reasoning which goes hither and thither, without reaching the soul of the thing itself; (β) the immanent dialectics of the object, but (NB) following within the contemptation of the subject; (γ) the objectivity of Heraclitus, i.e., dialectics itself taken as principle." (328) NB NB

α) subjective dialectics.
β) in the object there is dialectics, but *I* do not know, perhaps it is Schein,* merely appearance, etc.
γ) fully objective dialectics, as the principle of all that is

(In Heraclitus): "Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I would not have adopted in my *Logic*...." (328)

"Heraclitus says: Everything is becoming; this becoming is the principle.

* semblance, show—*Ed.*

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NB

This is contained in the expression: Being no more *is* than not-Being...." (p. 333)

"The recognition of the fact that Being and not-Being are only abstractions devoid of truth, that the first truth is to be found only in Becoming, forms a great advance. The understanding comprehends both as having truth and validity in isolation; reason on the other hand recognises the one in the other, and sees that in the one its other', (NB "its other') "is contained—that is why the All, the Absolute is to be determined as Becoming." (334)

"Aristotle says (*De mundo*,[86] Chapter 5) that Heraclitus 'joined together the complete whole and the incomplete' (part)" ... "what coincides and what conflicts, what is harmonious and what discordant; and from out of them all (the opposite) comes one, and from one, all." (335)

Plato, in his *Symposium*,[87] puts forward the views of Heraclitus (inter alia in their application to music: harmony, consists of opposites), and the statement: "The art of the musician unites the different."

Hegel writes: this is no objection against Heraclitus (336), for difference is the essence of harmony:

Quite right and important: the "other" as *its* other, development into *its* opposite

"This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming, change,—not becoming other, now this and then an other. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different. from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from *its* other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...." (336)

"So also in the case of tones; they must be different, but so that they can also be united...." (336) P. 337: incidentally

Sextus Empiricus (and Aristotle) are reckoned among the ... "best witness"....

Heraclitus said: "die Zeit ist das erste körperliche Wesen"* (Sextus Empiricus)—p. (338)

körperliche**—an "unfortunate" expression (perhaps, Hegel says (NB), it was chosen by a sceptic (NB)),—but time, he says, is "das erste sinnliche Wesen"***....

..."Time is pure Becoming, as perceived...." (338)

In regard to the fact that Heraclitus considered fire as a process, Hegel says: "Fire is physical time, it is this absolute unrest" (340)—and further, in regard to the natural philosophy of Heraclitus:

> ..."It" (Natur) "is process in itself...." (344) "Nature is the never-resting, and the All is the transition out of the one into the other, from division into unity, and from unity into division...." (341)
>
> "To understand Nature means to represent *it* as process...." (339)

Here is what is said to be the narrowness of natural scientists:

..."If we listen to their account" (Naturforscher****), "they only observe and say what they see; but this is not true, for unconsciously they transform what is immediately seen by means of the Notion. And the strife is not due to the opposition between observation and the absolute Notion, but between the limited rigid notion and the Absolute Notion. They show that changes are non-existent...." (344-345)

NB

NB

* "Time is the first corporeal existence"—*Ed.*

** corporeal—*Ed.*

*** "the first sensuous existence"—*Ed.*

**** of natural scientists—*Ed.*

...“Water in its decomposition reveals hydrogen and oxygen: these have not arisen for they were already there as such, as the parts of which the water consists” (346) (thus Hegel mimics the natural scientists)....

“As we find in all expression of perception and experience; as soon as men speak, there is a Notion present, it cannot be withheld, for in consciousness there is always a touch of universality and truth.” (346)

Quite right and important—it is precisely this that Engels repeated in more popular form, when he wrote that natural scientists ought to know that the results of natural science are concepts, and that the art of operating with concepts is not, inborn, but is the result of 2,000 years of the development of natural science and philosophy.[88]

The concept of transformation is taken narrowly by natural scientists and they lack understanding of dialectics.

...“He” (Heraclitus) “is the one who first expressed the nature of the infinite, and who first understood nature as infinite in itself, i.e., its essence as process....” (346)

On the “concept of necessity”—cf. p. 347. Heraclitus could not, see truth in “sensuous certainty” (348), but in “necessity” (είμαρμένη*)—((λόγος**)).

(“*absolute connection*”) “*Absolute mediation* (348) || NB

* fate—*Ed.*
** logos—*Ed.*

"The rational, the true, that which I know, is indeed a withdrawal from the objective as from what is sensuous, individual, definite and existent; but what reason knows within itself is just as much necessity or the universal of being; it is the essence of thought as it is the essence of the world." (352)

NB: Necessity = "the universal of Being" (the universal in Being) (connection, "absolute mediation")

LEUCIPPUS

368: "The development of philosophy in history must correspond to the development of logical philosophy; but there will still be passages in the latter which are absent in historical development."

The development of philosophy in history "must correspond" (??) to the development of logical philosophy

Here there is a very profound and correct, essentially materialist thought (actual history is the basis, the foundation, the Being, which is *followed* by consciousness).

Leucippus says that atoms are invisible "because of the smallness of their body" (369)—Hegel, however, replies that this is "Ausrede"* (ibid.), that "Eins"** cannot be seen, that "das Princip des Eins" "ganz ideell"*** (370), and that Leucippus is no "empiricist," but an idealist.

((?? *stretching of a point* by the idealist Hegel, of course, stretching a point.))

* "subterfuge"—*Ed.*
** "One"—*Ed.*
*** "the principle of the One" is "altogether ideal"—*Ed.*

([Straining to make Leucippus conform to his logic, Hegel expatiates on the importance, the "greatness" of the principle (368) Fürsichsein,* descrying it in Leucippus. It savours in part of stretching a point.]**

But there is also a grain of truth in it; the nuance (the "moment) of separateness; the interruption of gradualness; the moment of the smoothing out of contradictions; the interruption of continuity—the atom, the one. (Cf. 371 i.f.):—"The one and continuity are opposites...."

Hegel's logic cannot be *applied* in its given form, it cannot be *taken* as given. One *must separate out* from it the logical (epistemological) nuances, after purifying them from *Ideenmystik****: that is still a big job.)

materialism (Hegel is afraid of the word: keep away from me) versus atomism

The Atomists are, therefore, generally speaking, opposed to the idea of the creation and maintenance of the world by means of a foreign principle. It is in the theory of atoms that natural science first feels released from the need for demonstrating a foundation for the world. For if nature is represented as created and held together by another, then it is conceived of as not existent in itself, and thus as having its Notion outside itself, i.e., its basis is foreign to it, it has no basis as such, it is only conceivable from the will of another—as it is, it is contingent, devoid, of necessity and Notion in itself. In the idea of the atomists, however, we have the conception of the inherency of nature, that is to say, thought finds itself in it...." (372-373)

* Being-for-itself—*Ed.*

** In Lenin's manuscript these five lines have been crossed out—*Ed.*

*** *mysticism of ideas—Ed.*

In the presentation—according to Diogenes Laertius, IX, § 31-33—of the atomism of Leucippus, the "vortex" (Wirbel—δίνην)* of atoms, Hegel finds nothing of interest ("no interest," ..."empty representation," "dim, confused ideas"—p. 377 i.f.).

NB

Hegel's blindness, the one-sidedness of the Idealist!!

DEMOCRITUS

Democritus is behandelt** by Hegel in a very stiefmütterlich*** fashion, in all pp. 378-380! The spirit of materialism is intolerable to the idealist!! The words of Democritus are quoted (p. 379):

> "Warmth exists according to opinion (νόμῳ) and so do cold and colour, sweet and bitter; only the indivisible and the void are in accordance with truth (ἐτεῇ)" (Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*, VII, § 135).[89]

And the conclusion is drawn:

> ..."We see this much, that Democritus expressed the difference between the moments of Being-in-itself and Being-for-other more distinctly...." (380)

By this "the way is at once opened up" to "the bad idealism," that... "*meine* Empfindung, *mein*...."****

"bad idealism" (my feeling) Cf. Mach[90]

..."A sensuously notionless manifold of feeling is established, in which there is no reason, and with which this idealism has no further concern."

Hegel versus E. Mach...

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* Diogenes Laertius (p. 235)—"vertiginem"—Latin translation.
** treated—*Ed.*
*** step-motherly—*Ed.*
**** "*my* feeling, *mine*"—*Ed.*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS

NB the concept of genus is "the essence of nature," is **l a w...**

Anaxagoras. Νοῦς*—"the cause of the world and of all order", and Hegel elucidates this:

..."Objective thought ... reason in the world, also in nature—or as we speak of genera in nature, they are the universal. A dog is an animal, this is its genus, its substantial; the dog itself is this. This law, this understanding, this reason is itself immanent in nature, it is the essence of nature; the latter is not formed from without as men make a chair." (381-382)

"Νοῦς is the same as soul" (Aristotle on Anaxagoras)—p. 394

and ...** the elucidation of this *l e a p* from the general in nature to the *soul*; from objective to subjective, from materialism to idealism. C'est ici que ces extrêmes se touchent (et se transforment!)***

On the homoeomeriae[91] of Anaxagoras (particles of the same kind as the whole body) Hegel writes:

tranformation (its significance)

"Transformation is to be taken in a double sense, according to existence and according to the Notion...." (403-404) Thus, for instance, it is said that water can be removed—the stones remain; blue colour can be removed, red, etc., will remain.

"This is only according to existence; according to the Notion, they only interpenetrate, it is inner necessity." Just as one cannot remove the heart by itself from

* reason—*Ed.*

** A word has remained undeciphered here.—*Ed.*

*** It is here that these extremes come into contact (and are transformed!).—*Ed.*

the living body without the lungs perishing, etc.

"Nature likewise exists only in unity, just as the brain exists only in unity with the other organs" (404)

> whereby some conceive transformation in the sense of the presence of small qualitatively determined particles and their growth (respective diminution) combination and separation. The other conception (Heraclitus)—the transformation of the *one* into an *other*. (403)

Existence and Notion—are to be distinguished in Hegel approximately as follows: fact (Being) taken separately, torn from its connection, and connection (the Notion), mutual relation, concatenation, law, necessity.

415: ..."The Notion is that which things are in and for themselves...."

Hegel speaks of grass being the end for animals, and the latter for men, etc., etc., and concludes:

"It is a circle which is complete in itself, but whose completion is likewise a passing into another circle; a vortex whose midpoint, that into which it returns, is found directly in the periphery of a higher circle which swallows it up...." (414)

So far the ancients are said to have furnished little: "Universal is a meagre determination: everyone knows of the universal, but not of it as essence." (416)

NB: the "universal" as "essence"

..."But here we have the beginning of a more distinct development of the relationship of consciousness to Being, the development of the nature of knowledge as a knowledge of the true." (417) "The mind

"development of the nature of knowledge"

has gone forth to express essence as thought." (418)

"We see this development of the universal, in which essence goes right over to the side of consciousness, in the so much decried wordly wisdom of the Sophists." (418)

((End of the first volume)) The second volume begins with the Sophists.

VOLUME XIV.
VOLUME II
OF *THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOPHISTS [92]

Speaking of the Sophists, Hegel in extreme detail chews over the thought that sophistry contains an element common to all culture (Bildung) in general, our own included, namely, the adducing of *proofs* (Gründe) and Gegengründe*—"reflecting reasoning";—the finding of the most diverse points of view *in everything*; ((subjectivity—lack of objectivity)). In discussing Protagoras and his famous thesis (man is the measure of all things) Hegel places *Kant* close to him:

Protagoras and Kant

...."Man is the measure of everything,—man, therefore, is the subject in general; the existent, consequently, is not in isolation, but is for my knowledge—consciousness is essentially the producer of the content in what is objective, and subjective thinking is thereby essentially active. And this view extends even to the most modern Philosophy, as when, for instance, Kant says that we only know phenomena, i.e., that what seems to us to be objective, to be reality, is only to be considered in its relation to consciousness, and does not exist without this relation...." (31)**

* counterproofs—*Ed.*
** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—*Ed.*

The second "moment" is objectivity (das Allgemeine*), "it is posited by me, but is likewise in itself objectively universal, not posited by me...." (32)

the relativism of the Sophist...

Diese "Relativität"** (32) "Everything has a relative truth only" (33), according to Protagoras.

Kant and the Sophists and Phenomenologism[93] à la Mach NB

..."Kant's phenomenon is no more than an external impulse, an x, an unknown, which first receives these determinations through our feeling, through us. Even if there were an objective ground for our calling one thing cold and another warm, we could indeed say that they must have diversity in themselves, but warmth and cold first become what they are in our feeling. Similarly ... things are, etc. ... thus experience was called a phenomenon...." (34)

not, only relativism

"The world is consequently not only phenomenal in that it is for consciousness, and thus that its Being is only one relative to consciousness, but, it is likewise phenomenal in itself." (35)

scepticism

..."This scepticism reached a much deeper point in Gorgias...." (35)

NB

..."His *d i a l e c t i c s*" ... that of Gorgias, the Sophist |many times: p. 36, idem p. 37.|

Hegel on "common sense"

Tiedemann said that Gorgias went further than the "common sense" of man. And Hegel makes fun of this: **every** philosophy goes *f u r t h e r* than "common sense" for common sense is not philosophy. Prior to Copernicus it was *contrary* to common sense to say that the earth goes round the sun. (36)

* the universal—*Ed.*
** the "relativity"—*Ed.*

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"It" (der gesunde Menschenverstand*) "is the mode of thought of its time, containing all the prejudices of this time." (36)

common sense = the prejudices of its time

Gorgias (p. 37):
1) Nothing exists. Nothing is.
2) Assuming that Being is, it cannot be known.
3) Even if it is knowable, no communication of what is known is possible.

..."Gorgias is conscious that they" (Being and not-Being, their mutual sublation) "are vanishing moments; the unconscious conception has this truth also, but knows nothing about it....." (40)

"Vanishing moments" = Being and not-Being. That is a magnificent definition of dialectics!!

..."Gorgias α) justly argues against absolute realism, which, because it has a notion, thinks it possesses the very thing itself, when actually it possesses only something relative; β) falls into the bad idealism of modern times: 'what is thought is always subjective, and thus not the existent, since through thought an existent is transformed into what is thought....'" (41)

(and further below (p. 41 i.f.) *Kant* is again mentioned).

Gorgias, "absolute realism" (and Kant)

To be added on Gorgias**: He puts "either—or" to the fundamental questions. "But that is not true dialectics; it would be necessary to prove that the object must

dialectics in the object itself

* common sense—*Ed.*

** This excerpt was made by Lenin somewhat later in outlining the philosophy of Socrates (pp. 43-44 of Hegel; see p. 273 of this volume).—*Ed.*

be necessarily in one or another determination, not in and for itself. The object resolves itself only into those determinations; but from that nothing follows regarding the nature of the object itself." (39)

To be added further on Gorgias*:

In the exposition of his view that the existent cannot be imparted, communicated:

NB

"Speech, by which the existent has to be expressed, is not the existent, what is imparted is thus not the existent, but only words." (Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*. VII. § 83-84)—p. *41*—Hegel writes: "The existent is also comprehended as non-existent, but the comprehension of it is to make it universal." (42)

cf. Feuerbach[94]

..."**This** individual cannot be expressed...." (42)

Every word (speech) already *universalises* cf. Feuerbach.[95]	The senses show reality; thought and word — the universal.

Final words of the section on the Sophists: "The Sophists thus also made dialectic, universal Philosophy, their object, and they were profound thinkers...." (42)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES

Socrates is a "world-famed personage" (42), the "most interesting" (ibid.) in the philosophy of antiquity—"subjectivity of

---

* the universal—*Ed.*
** the "relativity"—*Ed.*

thought" (42) | "freedom of self-consciousness" (44) |.

"Herein lies the ambiguity of dialectics and sophistry; the objective disappears" (43): is the subjective contingent or is there in it ("an ihm selhst"*) the objective and universal? (43)**

"True thought thinks in such a way that its content is as truly objective as subjective" (44)—and in Socrates and Plato we see, Hegel says, not only subjectivity ("the reference of any judgment to consciousness is held by him—Socrates—"in common with the Sophists")—but also objectivity.

"Objectivity has here" (in Socrates) "the sense of the universal, existent in and for itself, and not external objectivity" (45)— idem 46: "not external objectivity but the spiritual universal." ‖ NB

And two lines further down: Kant

"Kant's ideal is the phenomenon, not objective in itself...." (46)

Socrates called his method *Hebammenkunst****—(p. 64) (derived from his mother, he said) ((Socrates' mother = midwife))— to help in bringing thoughts to birth. ‖ shrewd!

Hegel's example: everyone knows, he says, what Werden is, but it surprises us if we analyse (reflektierend) and find that it is "the identity of Being and not-Being"— "so great a distinction." (67) ‖ Werden = Nichtsein und Sein.****

Meno (Plato's "Meno")[96] compared Socrates to an electric eel (Zitteraal), which makes anyone who touches it "narkotisch"*****

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* "in it itself"—*Ed.*

** Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt on Gorgias' philosophy, beginning with the words: "To be added on Gorgias...." (See p. 271 of this volume.)—*Ed.*

*** *the art of midwifery—Ed.*

**** Becoming = not-Being and Being.—*Ed.*

***** "drugged"—*Ed.*

(69): and I, too, am "narkotisch" and I *c a n n o t* answer you.*

très bien **dit!!**** ...“That which is held by me as truth and right is spirit of my spirit. But what the spirit derives thus from itself, what it so holds, must collie from it as the universal, as from the spirit which acts in a universal manner, and not from its passions, interests, likings, whims, aims, inclinations, etc. These, too, certainly come from something inward which is ‘implanted in us by nature,’ but they are only in a natural way our own....” (74-75)

Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism.

Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of stupid.

NB To be elaborated:

Plekhanov wrote on philosophy (dialectics) probably about 1,000 pages (Beltov + against Bogdanov + against the Kantians + fundamental questions, etc., etc.).[97] Among them, *a b o u t* the large Logic, *i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h* it, *its* thought (i.e., dialectics *p r o p e r*, as philosophical science) nil!!

Nuance! Protagoras: “man is the measure of all things.” Socrates: “man, as thinking, is the measure of all things.” (75)

Xenophon in his *Memorabilien* described Socrates better, more accurately and more faithfully than Plato. (Pp. 80-81)

* Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt on Gorgias' philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added further on Gorgias....” (See p. 272 of this volume.)—*Ed.*

** very well put—*Ed.*

THE SOCRATICS

In connection with the sophisms about the "heap" and "bald," Hegel repeats the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa: dialectics. (Pp. 139-140)

143-144: At length about the fact that "language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech." ("It"? The most universal word of all.)

NB in language there is only the *universal*

Who is *it*? *I*. Every person is an I. *Das* Sinnliche?* It is a *universal*, etc., etc. "This"?? Everyone is "this."

Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest.

"That the universal should in philosophy be given a place of such importance that only the universal can be expressed, and the 'it' which is meant, cannot, indicates a state of consciousness and thought which the philosophical culture of our time has not yet reached." (143)

Hegel includes here "the scepticism of our times" (143)— Kant's? and those who assert that 'sensuous certainty is the truth." (143)

For das Sinnliche "is a universal." (143)

Thereby Hegel hits every materialism *except* dialectical materialism. NB

NB

* the sensuous—*Ed*.

To call by name?—but the name is a contingent symbol and does not express *Sache selbst** (how can the particular be expressed?) (144)

Hegel and dialectical materialism

Hegel seriously "believed," thought, that materialism as a philosophy was impossible, for philosophy is the science of thinking, of the *universal*, but the universal is a thought. Here he repeated the error of the same subjective idealism that he always called "bad" idealism. Objective (and still more, absolute) idealism came **very close** to materialism by a zig-zag (and a somersault), even partially *became transformed into it*.

sensation in the theory of knowledge of the Cyrenaics...

The Cyrenaics[98] held sensation for the truth, "the truth is not what is in sensation, the content, but is itself sensation." (151)

"The main principle of the Cyrenaic school, therefore, is sensation, which should form the real criterion of the true and the good...." (153)

"Sensation is the indeterminate unit" (154), but if thinking is added, then the universal appears and "simple subjectivity" disappears.

NB** the Cyrenaics and Mach and Co.

(Phenomenologists à la Mach & Co. *inevitably* become idealists on the question of the *universal*, "law," "necessity," etc.)

Another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, "recognised" "this incongruity between sensation and universality...." (155)

* *the very essence of the thing—Ed.*

** Cf. Überweg-Heinze, § 38, p. 122 (10th edition)—and also about them in Plato's *Theaetetus*.[99] Their (the Cyrenaics') scepticism and subjectivism—*Ed.*

They confuse sensation as a principle of the theory of knowledge and a principle of ethics. This NB. But Hegel *separated* the theory of knowledge.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

In regard to Plato's plan by which philosophers ought to rule the state:

..."The territory of history is different from that of philosophy...."

We must recognise that action represents at the same time the endeavours of the subject as such for particular ends.... All those particular ends are really only means for bringing forth the Idea, because *it* is the absolute power." (193)

Particular ends in history create the "Idea" (the law of history)

Concerning Plato's doctrine on ideas:

..."because sensuous perception shows nothing purely, or as it is in itself" (*Phaedo*)—p. 213—therefore the body is a hindrance to the soul.

"purity" (= lifelessness?) of universal conceptions

The significance of the *universal* is contradictory: it is dead, impure, incomplete, etc., etc., but it alone is a *s t a g e* towards knowledge of the *c o n c r e t e*, for we can never know the concrete completely. The *infinite* sum of general conceptions, laws, etc., gives the *concrete* in its completeness.

NB
the dialectics, of cognition
NB

The movement of cognition *to* the object can always only proceed dialectically: to retreat in order to hit

NB

more surely—reculer pour mieux sauter (savoir?)* Converging and diverging lines: circles which touch one another. Knotenpunkt** = the practice of mankind and of human history.
(Practice = the criterion of the coincidence of one of the infinite aspects of the real.)

These Knotenpunkte represent a unity of contradictions, when Being and not-Being, as vanishing moments, coincide for a moment, in the given moments of the movement (= of technique, of history, etc.)

"empty dialectics" in Hegel

In analysing Plato's dialectics, Hegel once again tries to show the difference between subjective, sophistic dialectics and objective dialectics:

"That everything is one, we say of each thing: 'it is one and at the same time we show also that it is many, its many parts and properties'—but it is thereby said: 'it is one in quite another respect from that in which it is many'—we do not bring these thoughts together. Thus the conception and the words merely go backwards and forwards from time one to the other. If this passing to and fro is performed with consciousness, it is empty dialectics, which does not unite the opposites and does not come to unity." (232)

NB

"empty dialectics"

Plato in the "Sophistes":

"The point of difficulty, and what we ought to aim at, is to show that what

* to fall back, the better to leap (to know?)—*Ed.*
** nodal point—*Ed.*

is other is the same, and what is the same is other, and indeed in the same regard and from the same point of view." (233)

NB

"But we must be conscious of the fact that the Notion is neither merely the immediate in truth, although it is the simple—but it is of spiritual simplicity, essentially the thought which has returned into itself (immediately is only this red, etc.); nor that it is only that which reflects itself in itself, the thing of consciousness; but is also in itself, i.e., it is objective essence...." (245)

NB objectivism

The concept is not something immediate (although the concept is a "simple" thing, but this simplicity is "spiritual," the simplicity of the Idea)-what is immediate is only the sensation of "red" ("this is red"), etc. The concept is not "merely the thing of consciousness"; but is the *essence of the object* (gegenständliches Wesen), it is something an sich, "in itself."

..."This conviction of the nature of the Notion, Plato did not express so definitely...." (245)

Hegel dilates at length on Plato's "Philosophy of Nature," the ultra-nonsensical mysticism of ideas, such as that "triangles form the essence of sensuous things" (265), and such mystical nonsense. That is highly characteristic! The mystic-idealist-spiritualist Hegel (like all official, clerical-idealist philosophy of our day) extols and expatiates on mysticism, idealism in the history of philosophy, while ignoring and slight-

idealism and mysticism in *Hegel* (and in Plato)

ing materialism. Cf. Hegel on Democritus—nil!! On Plato a huge mass of mystical slush.

Speaking of Plato's republic and of the current opinion that it is a chimera, Hegel repeats his favourite saying:

what is real is rational

..."What is real is rational. But one must know, distinguish, exactly what is real; in common life all is real, but there is a difference between the phenomenal world and reality...." (274)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Incorrect, says Hegel, is the generally held opinion that the philosophy of Aristotle is "*realism*" (299), id. p. 311 "empiricism") in contrast to the *idealism* of Plato ((Here again, Hegel clearly squeezes in a great deal *under* idealism.))

NB

In presenting Aristotle's polemic against Plato's doctrine on ideas, Hegel *s u p - p r e s s e s* its materialistic features. (Cf. *3 2 2 - 3 2 3* and others.)

NB

((merely invert it)) precisely!

He has let the cat out of the bag: "The elevation of Alexander" (Alexander of Macedon, Aristotle's pupil) "... into ... a god is ... not matter for surprise ... God and man are not at all so very wide asunder ...." (305)

Hegel has made a complete mess of the criticism of Plato's "ideas" in Aristotle

Hegel perceives the idealism of Aristotle in his idea of god. (326) ((Of course, it is idealism, but more objective and *further removed, more general* than the idealism of Plato, hence in the philosophy of nature more frequently = materialism.))

Aristotle's criticism of Plato's "ideas" is a criticism of *idealism as idealism in general*: for whence concepts, abstractions, are derived, thence come also "law" and "necessity," etc. The idealist Hegel in cowardly fashion fought shy of the undermining of the *foundations* of idealism by Aristotle (in his criticism of Plato's ideas).

NB

When *one* idealist criticises the foundations of idealism of *another* idealist, *materialism* is always the gainer thereby. Cf. Aristotle versus Plato, etc., Hegel versus Kant, etc.

"Leucippus and Plato accordingly say that motion has always existed, but they give no reason for the assertion." (Aristoteles, *Metaphysik*, XII, 6 and 7.) p. 328

Aristotle *thus* pitifully brings forward god *against* the materialist Leucippus and the idealist Plato. There is eclecticism in Aristotle here. But Hegel *conceals* the weakness for the sake of *mysticism*!

Hegel, the supporter of dialectics, could not understand the *dialectical* transition *from* matter ***to*** motion, *from* matter ***to*** consciousness—especially the second. Marx corrected the error (or weakness?) of the mystic.

NB

Not only is the transition from matter to consciousness dialectical, but also that from sensation to thought, etc.

What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being.

The following passage shows especially clearly how Hegel conceals the weakness of Aristotle's idealism:

"Aristotle makes objects into thoughts; hence, in being thoughts, they exist in truth; that is their αὐσία.*

"The meaning of this is not, however, that natural objects have themselves the power of thinking, but as they are subjectively thought by me, my thought is thus also the Notion of the thing, which therefore constitutes its substance. But in nature the Notion does not exist as thought in this freedom, but has flesh and blood; yet it has a soul, and this is its Notion. Aristotle recognises what things in and for themselves are; and that is their αὐσία. The Notion does not exist for itself, but it is stunted by externality. The ordinary definition of truth is: 'truth is the harmony of the conception with the object.' But the conception itself is only a conception, I am still not at all in harmony with my conception (with its content); for when I represent to myself a house, a beam, and so on, I am by no means this content—'I' is something other than the conception of house. It is only in thought that there is present a true harmony between objective and subjective; *that constitutes me* (Hegel's italics). Aristotle therefore finds himself at the most advanced standpoint; nothing more profound can one desire to know." (332-333)

naive!!

* substance—*Ed.*

"In nature" concepts do not exist "in this freedom" (in the freedom of thought and the fantasy of *man!!*). "In nature" they (concepts) have "flesh and blood."—That is excellent! But it is materialism. Human concepts are the *soul* of nature—thus is only a mystical way of saying that in human concepts nature is reflected in a *distinctive way* (this NB: in a *distinctive* and *d i a l e c t i c a l* way!!).

Pp. 318-337 *s o l e l y* on the Metaphysics of Aristotle!! Everything essential that lie has to say against Plato's idealism is *s u p p r e s s e d*!! In particular, there is suppressed the question of existence *o u t s i d e* man and humanity!!! = the question of materialism!

Aristotle is an empiricist, but a *thinking* one. (340) "*The empirical, comprehended in its synthesis, is the speculative Notion....*" (341) (Hegel's italics.)

(cf. *Feuerbach*: To read the gospel of senses in interconnection = to-think[100]

The coincidence of concepts with "synthesis," with the sum, summing up of empiricism, sensations, the senses, is *indubitable* for the philosophers of *all* trends. *Whence* this coincidence? From God (I, the idea, thought, etc., etc.) or from (out of) nature? Engels was right in his formulation of the question.[101]

NB

Kant

..."The subjective form constitutes the essence of the Kantian philosophy...." (341)

On the teleology of Aristotle.

"end" and cause, law, connection, reason

..."Nature has its means in itself and these means are also end. This end in nature is its λόγος,* the truly rational." (349)

..."Understanding is not only thinking with consciousness. There is contained in it also the whole, true, profound Notion of nature, of life...." (348)

Reason (understanding), thought, consciousness, *without nature*, not in correspondence with nature is falsity = materialism!

It is repulsive to read how Hegel extols Aristotle for his "true speculative notions" (373 of the "soul," and much more besides), clearly spinning a tale of idealistic (= mystical) nonsense.

Suppressed are *a l l* the points on which Aristotle *wavers* between idealism and materialism!!!

Regarding Aristotle's views on the "soul," Hegel writes:

lets the cat out of the bag in regard to "realism"

"All that is universal is in fact real, as particular, individual, existing for another" (375)—in other words, the soul.

Aristotle. *De anima*, II, 5:

sense-perception and cognition

"The difference" (between Empfinden, and Erkennen**) "is: that which causes the sensation is external. The cause of this is that perceptive activity is directed on the particular, while knowledge has as its object the universal; but the universal is

* logos—*Ed.*
** sense-perception (sensation) and cognition—*Ed.*

to a certain extent, in the soul itself as substance. Everyone can therefore think if he wishes but sense-perception does not depend on him, since the necessary condition is that the object perceived be present." (377)

Aristotle comes very close to materialism

The crux here—"außen ist"*—*o u t s i d e* man, independent of him. That is materialism. And this foundation, basis, kernel of materialism, Hegel begins wegschwatzen**:

"This is an entirely correct view of sense-perception," writes Hegel, and he goes on to explain that there is undoubtedly "passivity in sense-perception: "it is a matter of indifference whether subjectively or objectively; in both there is contained the moment of passivity.... With this moment of passivity, Aristotle does not fall short of idealism, sense-perception is always in one aspect passive. That is, however, a bad idealism which thinks that the passivity and spontaneity of the mind depend on whether the determination given is from within or from without, as if there were freedom in sense-perception; the latter is a sphere of limitation"!!... (377-378)

NB!!

the idealist is caught!

((The idealist stops up the gap leading to materialism. No, it is not gleichgültig*** whether *from without* or *from within*. This is precisely the point! "*From without*"—that is materialism. "From within" = idealism. And with the word "*passivity*," while keeping silent about the term ("***from without***") in Aristotle, Hegel described in a different way the same *f r o m w i t h o u t*.

* "is external"—*Ed.*
** to talk out of existence—*Ed.*
*** a matter of indifference—*Ed.*

NB

Passivity means precisely from without!! Hegel replaces the idealism of *sense-perception* by the idealism of *thought*, but ***equally by idealism***.))

NB
an evasion
of *materialism*

...“Subjective idealism declares that there are no external things, they are a determination of our Self. This must be admitted in respect to sense-perception. I am passive in sense-perception, sense-perception is subjective; it is existence, a state, a determination in me, not freedom. Whether the sense-perception is external or in me, is a matter of indifference, it *exists*....” (378)

Then follows the famous analogy of the soul with wax, causing Hegel to twist and turn like the devil confronted with holy water, and to cry out about it having “so often occasioned misapprehension.” (378-379)

Aristotle says (*De anima*, II, 12):

NB
Soul = *Wax*

“Sense-perception is the receiving of sensible forms without matter” ... “as wax receives only the impress of the golden signet ring, not the gold itself, but merely its form.”

“otherwise”
in practice

a cowardly
evasion of
materialism

Hegel writes: ...“In sense-perception only the form reaches us, without matter. It is otherwise in practical life—in eating and drinking. In the practical sphere in general we behave as single individuals, and as single individuals in a determinate Being, even a material determinate Being, we behave towards matter in a material way. Only insofar as we are of a material nature, are we able to behave in such a way; the point is that our material existence comes into play.” (379)

((A close approach to materialism—and equivocation.))

Hegel gets angry and scolds on account of the “wax,” saying: “everyone can under-

stand it" (380), "we do not get beyond the crude aspect of the analogy," (379) etc.

"The soul should by no means be passive wax or receive determinations from without..." (380)

..."It" (die Seele*) "changes the form of the external body into its own...." (381)

ha-ha!

Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 2:

..."The effect of being perceived and of sense-perception is exactly one and the same; but their existence is not the same...." (381)

Aristotle

And Hegel comments:

..."There is a body which sounds and a subject which hears: their existence is twofold...." (382)

Hegel conceals the weaknesses of idealism

But he leaves aside the question of Being *outside* man!!! A sophistical dodge *from* materialism!

Speaking about thinking, and about reason (νοῦς), Aristotle (*De anima*, III, 4) says:

..."There is no sense-perception independent of the body, but νοῦς is separable from it..." (385) "νοῦς is like a book upon whose pages nothing is actually written" (38)—and Hegel again becomes irate: "another much-decried illustration" (386), the very opposite of what he means is ascribed to Aristotle, etc., etc. ((and the question of Being *independent* of mind and of man is suppressed!!))—all that for the sake of proving "Aristotle is therefore not a realist." (389)

tabula rasa

ha-ha!

ha-ha! he's afraid!!

Aristotle:

"In this way he who perceives nothing by his senses learns nothing and understands nothing; when he discerns anything

* the soul—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Aristotle and *materialism*

(θεωρῆ*) he must necessarily discern it as a pictorial conception, for such conceptions are like sense-perceptions, only without matter....” (389)

distortion of Aristotle

...“Whether the understanding thinks actual objects when it is abstracted from all matter requires special investigation....” (389) And Hegel *scrapes* out of Aristotle that ostensibly “νοῦς** and νοητόν*** are one and the same” (390), etc. A model example of the idealistic misrepresentations of an idealist!! Distorting Aristotle *into* an idealist of the eighteenth-nineteenth century!!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STOICS[102]

In regard to the “criterion of truth” of the *Stoics*—“the conception that is laid hold of” (444-446)—Hegel says that consciousness only compares conception with conception (*not with the object*—(446): “truth ... is the harmony of object and consciousness” = “the celebrated definition of the truth”) and, consequently, the whole question is one of the “objective logos, the rationality of the world.” (446)

Hegel against the Stoics and their criterion

“Thought yields nothing but the form of universality and identity with itself; ...hence everything may harmonise with my thought.” (449)

there are “reasons” for everything

“Reasons, however, prove to be a humbug; for there are good reasons for everything....” (449) “Which reasons should be esteemed as good thereby depends on the end and interest....” (ibidem)

---

* perceives—*Ed.*
** reason.—*Ed.*
*** what is apprehended by reason—*Ed.*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

Speaking of Epicurus (342-271 B. C.), Hegel *immediately* (before describing his views) adopts a hostile attitude to materialism and declares:

"It is already (!!) self-evident (!!) that if sense-perceived Being is regarded as the truth, the necessity for the Notion is altogether abrogated, in the absence of speculative interest everything falls apart, and, on the contrary, the vulgar view of things prevails; in point of fact it does not go beyond the view of ordinary human understanding, or rather, everything is lowered to the level of ordinary human understanding"!! (473-474)

Slander against materialism Why?

Slander against materialism!! "Necessity for the Notion" is not in the slightest "abrogated" by the theory of the *source* of cognition and the concept!! Disagreement with "common sense" is the foul quirk of an idealist.

NB

Epicurus gave the name of *Canonic** to the theory of knowledge and the criterion of truth. After a brief exposition of it, Hegel writes:

"It is so simple that nothing can well be simpler—it is abstract, but also very trivial; more or less on the level of ordinary consciousness that begins to reflect. It consists of ordinary psychological conceptions; they are quite correct. Out of sense-perceptions we make conceptions as the universal; thanks to which it becomes lasting. The conceptions themselves (bei

!!!!

* In the manuscript the word "Canonic" is linked by an arrow with the word "It" at the beginning of the following paragraph.—Ed.

!!!

der δόξα, Meinung*) are tested by means of sensations, as to whether they are lasting, whether they repeat themselves. That is quite correct on the whole, but quite superficial; it is the first beginning, the mechanics of conception with respect to the first sense-perceptions...." (483)

The "first beginning" is forgotten and distorted by idealism. *Dialectical* materialism alone linked the "beginning" with the continuation and the end.

NB: p. ***4 8 1***—on the significance of *words* according to Epicurus:

Everything has its evidence, energy, distinctness, in the name first conferred on it" (Epicurus: **Diogenes Laertius**, X, § 33). And Hegel: The name is something universal, belongs to thinking, makes the manifold simple." (481)

Epicurus: objects outside us

"On the objective manner in general in which the images of external things enter into us, and on our relation to external things, by which conceptions arise—Epicurus has evolved the following metaphysical explanation:

NB theory of knowledge of Epicurus...

"From the surfaces of things there passes off a constant stream, which cannot be detected by our senses ... and this because, by reason of the counteracting replenishment, the thing itself in its solidity long preserves the same arrangement and disposition of the atoms; and the motion through the air of these surfaces which detach themselves is of the utmost rapidity, because it is not necessary that what is detached should have any thickness." "The

* in opinion—*Ed.*

sensation does not contradict such an idea, when we consider" (zusehe) "how images produce their effects; they bring us a correspondence, a sympathetic link with external things. Therefore something passes out from them which within us is like something external." "And since the emanation passes into us, we know of the definiteness of a sensation; the definite lies in the object and thus flows into us" (pp. 484-485, *Diogenes Laertius*, X, § 48-49).

The genius of Epicurus' conjecture (300 B.C., i.e., more than 2,000 years before Hegel), e.g., on light and its velocity.

Hegel completely *c o n c e a l e d* (NB) the *m a i n t h i n g*: (*N B*) the existence of things *o u t s i d e* the consciousness of man and *i n d e p e n d e n t* of it

—all that Hegel *suppresses* and merely says:

..."This is a very trivial way of representing sense-perception. Epicurus elected to take the easiest criterion of the truth—a criterion still in use—inasmuch as it is not apprehended by sight, namely: that it does not contradict what we see or hear. For in truth such matters of thought as atoms, the detachment of surfaces, and so forth, are beyond our powers of sight and hearing; [certainty we manage to see and to hear something different]* but there is abundance of room for what is seen and what is conceived or imagined to exist alongside of one another. If the two are allowed to fall apart, they do not contradict each other; for it is not until we relate them that the contradiction becomes apparent...." (485-486)

A model of distortion and slander against materialism by an idealist

* The words in brackets are missing in Lenin's manuscript.—*Ed.*

Hegel has *avoided* Epicurus' theory of cognition and begun to speak of *something else*, which Epicurus does not touch on *here* and *which is compatible* with materialism!!

P. (486):

Error, according to Epicurus, proceeds from an *interruption* in movement (in the movement from the object to us, to sense-perception or to conception).

"It is impossible," Hegel writes, "to have a more meagre (theory of knowledge)." (486)

Everything becomes *dürftig*,* if it is distorted and despoiled.

This, *auch*,** is wonderful!!!! Epicurus (341-270 B. C.). Locke (*1632-1704*). Differenz*** = 2,000 years

The soul, according to Epicurus, is a "certain" arrangement of atoms. "This is what Locke also (!!!) said.... These are empty words ..." (488) ((no, they are the guess-work of genius and *signposts for science*, but not for clericalism)).

NB. **NB**. (489), id. (490):

and electrons?

Epicurus ascribes to the atoms a "**krummlinigte**" **Bewegung**,**** this according to Hegel is "most arbitrary and wearisome" (488) in Epicurus—((and the "God" of the idealists???)).

nonsense! lies! slander!

"Or else Epicurus altogether denies Notion and the Universal as the essential...." (490) although his atoms "themselves have

* *meagre—Ed.*
** *also—Ed.*
*** difference—*Ed.*
**** "**curvilinear**" **motion**—*Ed.*

this very nature of thought"... "the inconsistency ... which all empiricists are guilty of...." (491) ‖ NB

> This *a v o i d s* the essence of *m a t e r i a l i s m* and materialist dialectics.

"In Epicurus there is no ... final end in the world, wisdom of a Creator; everything consists of events, which are determined by the chance (??) external (??) coming together of configurations of atoms...." (491) ‖ he pities God!! the idealistic scoundrel!!

And Hegel simply *h u r l s a b u s e* at Epicurus: "His thoughts on particular aspects of Nature are, however, in themselves feeble...." (492) ‖ !!

And immediately afterwards is a *polemic* against the "Naturwissenschaft" heute,* which, like Epicurus, allegedly judges "by analogy," and "explains" (492)—e.g., light as "vibrations of the ether...." This is an analogy quite in the manner of Epicurus...." (493) ‖ and the "manner" of natural science! and its successes!!

((*Modern n a t u r a l s c i e n c e* versus Epicurus,—against (**NB**) Hegel.))

In Epicurus, "the kernel of the matter, the principle, is nothing else than the principle of our usual natural science...." (495) ... "it is still the manner which lies at the basis of our natural science...." (496) ‖ Epicurus and modern natural science

> Correct is only the reference to the ignorance of dialectics in general and of the dialectics of concepts. But the criticism of *m a t e r i a l i s m* is schwach.**

---

* "natural science" today—*Ed.*

** feeble—*Ed.*

!NB!

"Of this method (of Epicurean philosophy) we may say in general that it likewise has a side on which it possesses value. Aristotle and the more ancient philosophers took their start in natural philosophy from universal thought a priori, and from this developed the Notion. This is the one side. The other side is the necessary one that experience should be worked up into universality, that laws should be determined; that is to say, that the result which follows from the abstract Idea should coincide with the general conception to which experience and observation have led. The a priori is with Aristotle, for instance, most excellent, but not sufficient, because it lacks connection with and relation to experience and observation. This development of the particular to the general is the discovery of laws, natural forces and so on. It may be said that Epicurus is the inventor of empirical natural science, of empirical psychology. In contrast to the Stoic ends, conceptions of the understanding, is experience, the sensuous present. There we have abstract, limited understanding, without truth in itself; and therefore without the presence and reality of nature; here we have this sense of nature, which is more true than these other hypotheses." (496-407)

NB!!

NB

NB

NB

NB

NB

NB

(THIS ALMOST COMPLETELY APPROACHES DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM.)

Hegel on the pros of materialism

The importance of Epicurus—the struggle against *Aberglauben** *of the Greeks and Romans* (*498*)—and modern priests??

all this nonsense about whether a hare ran across the path (493), etc. (and the good Lord?).

* *superstitions—Ed.*

"And from it" (the philosophy of Epicurus), "more than anything, those conceptions which have altogether denied the supersensuous have proceeded." (498)

NB

|| But this is good only for "endlichen"*.... "**With superstition there also passed away self-dependent Connection and the world of the Ideal**." (499)

for what did they (the classics) value idealism??

This **NOTA BENE**.

P. 4 9 9: Epicurus on the *soul*: the *f i n e r* (NB) atoms, their more **rapid** (NB) **motion**, their **c o n n e c t i o n** (NB) etc., etc., with the body (*D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s*, X, § 66; 63-64)—very naïve and good!—but Hegel becomes irate, he **hurls abuse**: "meaningless talk," "empty words," "no thoughts." (500)

for Hegel the "soul" is **a l s o** a prejudice

The Gods, according to Epicurus, are "das Allgemeine"** (506) in general—"they consist partly in number" as number, i.e., abstraction from the sensuous....

"In part, they" (the gods) "are **the perfected type of man**, which, owing to the similarity of the images, arises from the continuous confluence of like images on one and the same subject." (507)

N B
Gods = the perfected type of man, cf. *F e u e r b a c h*[103]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCEPTICS[104]

Speaking of **Scepticism**, Hegel points to its apparent "invincibility" (Unbezwinglichkeit) (538):

NB

"If anyone actually desires to be a Sceptic, he cannot be convinced, or be brought to a positive philosophy, any more than he who is paralysed can be made to stand." (539)

Bien dit!!

"Positive philosophy in relation to it" (den denkenden Skeptizismus***) "may

* "finite" things—*Ed.*
** "the universal"—*Ed.*
*** thinking scepticism—*Ed.*

have this consciousness: it contains in itself the negative of Scepticism; Scepticism is not opposed to it, nor outside it, but is a moment of it; but it contains the negative in its truth, as it is not present in Scepticism." (539)

(The relation of philosophy to Scepticism:)

"Philosophy is dialectical, this dialectic is change; the Idea, as abstract Idea, is the inert and existent, but it is only true insofar as it grasps itself as living; this is that it is dialectical in itself, in order to transcend that quiescence and inertness. Hence the philosophic idea is dialectical in itself and not contingent; Scepticism, on the contrary, exercises its dialectic contingently—for just as the material, the content comes before it, it shows that it is negative in itself...." (540)

NB dialectics of Scepticism is "contingent"

The old (*ancient*) Scepticism has to be distinguished from the *new* (only Schulze of Göttingen is named). (540)

Ataraxie (imperturbability?) as the ideal of the Sceptics:

not a bad anecdote about the Sceptics

"Pyrrho once pointed out to his fellow-passengers on hoard a ship, who were frightened during a storm, a pig, which remained quite indifferent and peaceably ate on, saying to them: in such imperturbability the wise man must also abide" (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 68)—pp. 551-552.

NB Scepticism is not doubt

"Scepticism is not doubt. Doubt is just the opposite of the tranquillity that is the result of scepticism." (552).

..."Scepticism, on the contrary, is indifferent to the one as well as to the other...." (553)

Schulze-Aenesidemus passes off for Scepticism the statement that everything sensuous is truth (557), but the Sceptics did

not say so: one must sich danach richten, orientate oneself by the sensuous, but that is not the truth. The new Scepticism does *n o t* doubt the reality of things. The old Scepticism does doubt the reality of things. NB

Tropes (turns of speech, arguments, etc.) of the Sceptics: everything in *S e x t u s Empiricus* (second century A. D.)

a. The diversity of animal organisation. (558)
Differences in sensations: the jaundiced (dem Gelbsüchtigen) sees as yellow what to others appears white, etc.

b. The diversity of mankind. "Idiosyncrasies." (559)
Whom to believe? The majority? Foolish, for all men cannot be interrogated. (560)
Diversity of philosophies: Stupid reference, Hegel waxes indignant: ... "such men see everything in a philosophy excepting Philosophy itself, and this is overlooked...." NB
"However different the philosophic systems may be, they are not as different as white and sweet, green and rough, for they agree in the fact that they are philosophies and this is what is overlooked." (561) NB
..."All tropes proceed against the 'is,' but the truth is all the same not this dry 'is,' but essentially process...." (562) NB

c. The diversity in the constitution of the organs of sense: the various sense organs perceive differently (on a painted panel something appears erha-

ben* to the eye but not to the touch).

d. The diversity of circumstances in the subject (rest, passion, etc.).

e. The diversity of distances, etc.

the earth going round the sun or vice versa, etc.,

f. Intermixture (scents in strong sunshine and without it, etc.).

g. The composition of things (pounded glass is not transparent, etc.).

h. The "*relativity* of things."

i. The frequency, rarity of happenings, etc.; habit.

k. Customs, laws, etc., their diversity....

These (10) are all *o l d* tropes and Hegel: this is all "empirical"—"do not have to do with the Notion...." (566) This is "trivial"..., but....

"In fact, as against the dogmatism of the common human understanding they are quite valid...." (567)

The **five new** tropes (are said by Hegel to be much more advanced, they contain *dialectics*, concern *concepts*)—also according to Sextus:

a. The diversity of the *opinions* ... of *p h i l o s o p h e r s*...

b. The falling into an infinite progression (one thing depends on another *and so on* without end).

c. Relativity (of premises).

d. Presupposition. The dogmatists put forward unprovable presuppositions.

e. Reciprocity. Circle (vicious)...

* raised—*Ed*.

"These sceptical tropes, in fact, *concern* that which is called a dogmatic philosophy (and in accordance with its nature such a philosophy must display itself in all these forms) not in the sense of its having a positive content, but as asserting something determinate as the absolute." (575)

NB

Hegel **against the absolute!** Here we have the germ of dialectical materialism.

NB

"To the criticism which knows nothing in itself, nothing (not nichts) (sic!!)* absolute, all knowledge of Being-in-itself, as such, is held to be dogmatism, while it is the worst dogmatism of all, because it maintains that the 'I,' the unity of self-consciousness, opposed to Being, is in and for itself, and that what is 'in itself' in the outside world is likewise so, and therefore that the two absolutely cannot come together." (570)

"Criticism" is the "worst dogmatism"

"These tropes hit dogmatic philosophy, which has this manner of representing one principle in a determinate proposition as determinateness. Such a principle is always conditioned; and consequently contains dialectics, the destruction within it of itself." (577) "These tropes are a powerful weapon against the philosophy of reason." (ib.)

Bien dit!!!

Dialectics = "destruction of itself"

Sextus, for example, reveals the dialectics of the concept of a *point* (der Punkt). A point has no dimensions? That means that it is *outside* space! It is the limit of space in space, a negation of space, and at the same time "it touches space"—"but at time same time it is also in itself something dialectical." (570)

NB

* Lenin's remark in parentheses was evoked by a misprint in the German text, which had nicht (not) instead of nichts (nothing) before the word "absolute."—*Ed.*

NB

"These tropes ... are powerless against **speculative** ideas, because the latter contain within themselves a **dialectical** moment and the **abrogation** of the finite." (580)

End of Volume XIV (p. 586).

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VOLUME XV. VOLUME II OF *THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY*

(THE END OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. MEDIEVAL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY UP TO SCHELLING, pp. 1-692)

BERLIN, 1836

THE NEO-PLATONISTS[105]

..."The return to God...." (5),* "self-consciousness is absolute Essence"..., "the world-spirit"... (7), "Christian religion".... (8) And *a mass of thin porridge* ladled out about God.... (8-18)

But this philosophical idealism, openly, "seriously" leading to God, is more honest than modern agnosticism with its hypocrisy and cowardice.

A. Philo—(about the time of the birth of Christ), a Jewish savant, a mystic, "finds Plato present in Moses" (19), etc. The main point is "the knowledge of God" (21), etc. God is λόγος,** "the epitome of all Ideas," "pure Being" (22) ("according to Plato")....

Ideas (of Plato) and the good Lord

(22) Ideas are "angels" (messengers of God).... (24) The sensuous world, however, "as with Plato" = οὐκ ὄν*** = = not-Being. (25)

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. XV, Berlin, 1836.—*Ed.*
** logos—*Ed.*
*** non-existent—*Ed.*

B. Cabbala,[106] the *Gnostics*[107] ——————— idem...

C. Alexandrian philosophy[108]—(= eclecticism) (= Platonists, Pythagoreans, Aristotelians). (33, 35)

Eclectics are either uncultured men, or cunning (die klugen Leute*—they take the good from every system, but...

on the eclectics... —they collect every good but do not have "consistency of thought., and consequently thought itself." (33)

Plato's ideas and the, good Lord They developed Plato....

"The Platonic universal, which is in thought, accordingly receives the signification of being as such absolute essence" (33)....

HEGEL ON PLATO'S DIALOGUES**

p.
(230)*** Sophistes
(238) Philebus
(240) *Parmenides*
(Timaeus) (248)

---

* clever people—*Ed.*

** This entry was made by Lenin in German on the back cover of the notebook containing the conspectus of Hegel's book *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*.—*Ed.*

*** Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—*Ed.*

CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL'S BOOK *LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY*[109]

Written in 1915

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according
to the manuscript

HEGEL. WORKS, VOL. IX (BERLIN, 1837)
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

(Edition of E. Gans)

Materials: Notes of the lectures 1822-1831. Hegel's manuscript *up to p. 73*, etc.

P. 5* ...“Speeches ... are transactions between people”... (hence these speeches are not mere talk).

7—The French and English are more educated (“they have more ... *national* culture”),—but we Germans rack our brains to discover how history *ought* to be written, rather than writing it. — shrewd and clever!

9—History teaches “that peoples and governments of a people have never learned anything from history; each period is *too individual* for that.” — very clever!

“But what experience and history teach is this—that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted according to the lessons that could have been drawn from it. Each period has such peculiar circumstances, it is a state of things so unique that one must and can judge of it only on the basis of itself.” — NB NB NB

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. IX, Berlin, 1837.—*Ed.*

p. 12—"reason governs the world...."

schwach!* 20: The substance of Matter is Gravity. The substance of Spirit is Freedom.

22: "World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom—a progress which we have to know in its necessity...."

24—(approach to historical materialism). What guides the actions of men? Above all, "Selbstsucht"**—motives of love, etc., are rarer and their sphere narrower. What, then, is the outcome of this interweaving of passions, etc.? of needs, etc.?

28 "Nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion...." Passion is the subjective and "therefore; the formal side of energy...."

28 i.f.***—History does not begin with a conscious aim.... What is important is that which

29 ...appears *unconsciously for mankind* as the result of its action....

29 ...*In this sense* "Reason governs the world."

30 30 ...In history through human actions "something else results in addition beyond that which they aim at and obtain, beyond that which they directly know and desire."

NB (cf. Engels[110]) 30 ..."They" (die Menschen****) "gratify their own interest, but something further is thereby brought about, which was latent in their interest, but which was not in their consciousness or included in their intention."

* feeble—*Ed.*
** "self-interest"—*Ed.*
*** in fine—at the end—*Ed.*
**** human beings—*Ed.*

32 ...“Such are the great men in history, whose own particular aims contain that substantial element which is the will of the World Spirit.... “great men”

36—the religiousness and virtue of a shepherd, a peasant, etc., is highly honourable (examples!! NB), but ...“the right of the World Spirit stands above all special rights....”

Here in Hegel is often to be found—about God, religion, morality in general—extremely trite idealistic nonsense.

97: “the gradual abolition of slavery is better than its sudden removal....”

50. The constitution of a state together with its religion, philosophy, thought, culture, “external forces” (climate, neighbours...) comprise “one substance, one Spirit....”

51 In nature movement takes place only in a cycle (!!)—in history, something new arises....

62. Language is richer among peoples in an undeveloped, primitive state—language becomes poorer with the advance of civilisation and the development of grammar. ?

67: “World history develops on a higher ground than that on which morality has its position (Stätte)....

73: An excellent picture of history: the sum of individual passions, actions, etc. (“everywhere something akin to ourselves, and therefore everywhere something that excites our interest for or against”), sometimes the mass of very good

Sehr wichtig!* see *below* this passage *more fully***

some general interest, sometimes a multitude of "*minute forces*" ("an infinite exertion of minute forces which produce a tremendous result from what appears insignificant"). The result? The result is "*exhaustion*." P. 74. *End of the "Introduction."*

P. 75—"**The Geographical Basis of World History**" (a characteristic heading): (75-101).

NB cf. Plekhanov[111]

75—Under the mild Ionic sky," a Homer could more easily arise—but this is not the only cause.—"Not under Turkish rule," etc.

!!!

82—Emigration to America removes "discontent," and the continued existence of the contemporary civil order is guaranteed (but this Zustland***—"riches and poverty" *8 1*)....

82. In Europe there is no such outlet: had the forests of Germany still been in existence, the French Revolution would not have occurred.

102: Three forms of world history: 1) despotism, 2) democracy and aristocracy, 3) monarchy.

Subdivisions: The Oriental World—The Greek—The Roman—The German World. Empty phrase-mongering about morality, etc., etc.

China. Chapter 1 (113 to 139). Description of the Chinese *character*, institutions, etc., etc. Nil, nil, nil!

India—*to 170*—To...

Persia (and Egypt)—to *231*. Why did the Persian Empire fall, but not China or India? Dauer**** is not as such

* very important!—*Ed.*
** See p. 313 of this volume.—*Ed.*
*** order—*Ed.*
**** duration—*Ed.*

vortreffliches* (229)—"The imperishable mountains are not superior to the rose that quickly loses its petals in its fleeting existence." (229) Persia fell because the "spiritual view of things" began here (230), but the Greeks proved superior, "higher principle" of organisation, "self-conscious freedom." (231)

232: "The Greek World" ... the principle (of "pure individuality"—the period of its development, flowering and decline, *"encounter with the succeeding organ of world history"* (233)—Rome with its "substance" (ibidem).

world history as a whole and the separate peoples—its "organs"

234: The geographical conditions of Greece: the diversity of its nature (in contrast to the monotony of the East).

2 4 2—The colonies in Greece. Amassing of wealth. Want and poverty "always" bound up with it....

Wealth and poverty

246. "The natural, as explained by men, its internal, essential element, is the beginning of the divine in general" (in connection with the mythology of the Greeks).

Hegel and Feuerbach[112]

2 5 1: "Man with his requirements behaves in a practical way in relation to external nature; in making it serve for his satisfaction, he wears it away, thereby setting to work as an intermediary. For natural objects are powerful and offer resistance in many different ways. In order to subdue them, man introduces other natural objects, thus turning nature against itself, and he invents tools for this purpose. These human inventions belong to the spirit, and such a tool must be regarded as

Germs of historical materialism in Hegel

* something excellent—*Ed.*

Hegel and Marx

higher than a natural object.... The honour of human invention for subjugating nature is ascribed to the Gods" (among the Greeks).

??

264: Democracy in Greece was bound up with the small size of the states. *Speech*, living speech, united the citizens, created *Erwärmung*.*
"Hence" in the French Revolution there was never a republican constitution.

Hegel and "contradictions" in history

322-323. "He" (Caesar) "removed the internal contradiction" (by abolishing the republic, which had become a "shadow") "and created a new one. For world rule had hitherto reached only to the rim of the Alps, but Caesar opened a new arena: he founded the theatre which was now to become the centre of world history."

categories of the possible and contingent *versus* actuality and confirmation in history

And then on the murder of Caesar: ..."In general, a political revolution is, as it were, sanctioned in man's opinion if it is repeated" (Napoleon, the Bourbons).... "By repetition that which at first appeared merely a matter of chance and possibility becomes something real and confirmed." (323)

"Christianity." (328-346) Banal, clerical, idealistic chatter about the greatness of Christianity (with quotations from the Gospels!!). Disgusting, stinking!

420-421: Why was the Reformation limited to a few nations? Among other reasons—"the Slav nations were *agricultural*" (421) and this brings with it "the relation of lords and serfs," less "Betriebsamkeit,**" etc. But why

* *ardour—Ed.*
** "industriousness"—*Ed.*

the Romanic nations? Their *character* (Grundcharakter* 421 i.f.)

4 2 9: ...“Polish freedom likewise was nothing but the freedom of the barons against the monarchs.... Hence the people had the same interest against the barons as the kings.... When freedom is mentioned, one must always be careful to see whether it is not really private interests that are being spoken of.” (430)

NB class relations

439: On the French Revolution... Why did the French pass “immediately from the theoretical to the practical,” but not the Germans? Among the Germans, the Reformation had “schon Alles gebessert,”** abolished “das unsägliche Unrecht,”*** etc.

!!

441: For the first time (in the French Revolution) humanity had arrived at the conclusion “that man bases himself on the head, i.e., on thought, and builds reality accordingly....” “This was ... a glorious dawn....”

In considering further the “course of the Revolution in France” (441) Hegel stresses in freedom in general—freedom of *property*, and of *industry* (ibid.).

...The promulgation of laws? The will of *all*.... “The few should *represent* the many, but they often merely *repress* them....” “The power of the majority over the minority is to no less degree a great inconsistency” (ibid).

cf. Marx and Engels[113]

?

444: ...“In its content this event” (the French Revolution) “is world historical....”

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* fundamental character—*Ed.*

** “already changed everything for the better”—*Ed.*

*** “unspeakable injustice”—*Ed.*

"Liberalism," (444) "liberal institutions" (443) spread over Europe.

p. 446—end

4 4 6: "World history is nothing but the development of the notion of freedom...."

(*N B*: Most important is Einleitung,* where there is much that is magnificent in the **formulation** of the question)

In general the philosophy of history yields very, very little—this is comprehensible, for it is precisely here, in this field, in this science, that Marx and Engels made the greatest step forward. Here most of all, Hegel is obsolete and antiquated.

(see the next page**)

---

* introduction—*Ed*.

** On the next page of the manuscript the excerpt "Hegel on World History" begins—*Ed*.

HEGEL ON WORLD HISTORY

"If then, finally, we regard world history from the standpoint of the category through which it should be considered, we have before us an endless picture of human life and activity under the most varied circumstances, with all kinds of aims and the most diverse events and destinies. In all these occurrences and events we see human action and effort in the forefront; everywhere something akin to ourselves, and therefore everywhere something that excites our interest for or against. Sometimes it attracts us by beauty, freedom and richness, sometimes by energy, sometimes even vice succeeds in making itself important. Often there is the comprehensive mass of some general interest that cumbrously moves forward, but still more often the infinite exertion of minute forces, which produce a tremendous result from what appears insignificant; everywhere the motleyest spectacle, and as soon as one vanishes another takes its place.

"But the immediate result of this consideration, however attractive it may be, is *exhaustion*, such as follows after a very varied spectacle, a magic lantern show; and even if we accord to each individual

representation its true worth, the question nevertheless arises in our minds, what is the final aim of all these particular events, is each one exhausted by its special aim, or ought one not rather think of a *single* ultimate aim of all these events; behind the loud noises at the surface is there not going on the labour and production of a work, an internal quiet, secret work in which the essential force of all those transitory phenomena is stored up? But if one does not bring thought, rational cognition, to world history from the beginning, one must at least approach it with the firm unshakable faith that it has reason in it, or at least that the world of the intellect and self-conscious will is not a victim of chance but must reveal itself in the light of the self-knowing idea." (73-74)*

((NB. In the Preface, p. XVIII, the publisher, i.e., the editor, Ed. Gans, states that *up to p. 73* the text was written by Hegel in 1830; the manuscript is an "Ausarbeitung."**))

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* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. IX, Berlin, 1837.—*Ed.*

** "elaboration"—*Ed.*

PLAN OF HEGEL'S DIALECTICS (LOGIC)[114]

[CONTENTS OF THE SMALL LOGIC (ENCYCLOPAEDIA)]

I. The Doctrine of Being.
- A) Quality
  - a) Being;
  - b) Determinate Being;
  - c) Being-for-self.
- B) Quantity
  - a) Pure quantity;
  - b) Magnitude (Quantum);
  - c) Degree.
- C) Measure

II. The Doctrine of Essence.
- A) Essence a Ground of Existence.
  - a) Identity—Difference—Ground;
  - b) Existence;
  - c) The Thing.
- B) Appearance.
  - a) The World of Appearance;
  - b) Content and Form;
  - c) Relation.
- C) Actuality.
  - a) Relationship of Substantiality;
  - b) Relationship of Causality;
  - c) Reciprocal Action.

III. The Doctrine of the Notion.
- A) The Subjective Notion.
  - a) The Notion;
  - b) The Judgment;
  - c) The Syllogism.

B) The Object.
  a) Mechanism;
  b) Chemism;
  c) Teleology.
C) The Idea.
  a) Life;
  b) Cognition;
  c) The Absolute Idea.

> The concept (cognition) reveals the essence (the law of causality, identity, difference, etc.) in Being (in immediate phenomena)—such is actually the *general course* of all human cognition (of all science) in general. Such is the course also of *natural science* and *poltical economy* and history. **Insofar** Hegel's dialectic is a generalisation of the history of thought. To trace this more concretely and in greater detail in the *history of the separate sciences* seems an extraordinarily rewarding task. In logic, the history of thought **must**, by and large, coincide with the laws of thinking.

It is strikingly evident that Hegel sometimes passes from the abstract to the concrete (Sein* (abstract)—*Dasein*** (concrete)—Fürsichsein***) and sometimes the other way round (the subjective Notion—the Object—Truth (the Absolute Idea)). Is not this the inconsistency of an idealist (what Marx called the Ideenmystik**** in Hegel)? Or are there deeper reasons? (e.g., *Being* = *Nothing*—the idea of Be-

* Being—*Ed.*
** *Determinate Being*—*Ed.*
*** Being-for-self—*Ed.*
**** mysticism of ideas—*Ed.*

coming, of development). First of all impressions *flash by*, then *Something* emerges, —afterwards the concepts of *quality* # (the determination of the thing or the phenomenon) and *quantity* are developed. After that study and reflection direct thought to cognition of identity—of difference—of Ground—of the Essence versus the Phenomenon—of causality, etc. All these moments (steps, stages, processes) of cognition move in the direction from the subject to the object, being tested in practice and arriving through this test at truth (=the Absolute Idea).

abstract "Sein" only as a *m o m e n t* in πάντα ῥεῖ*

Quality and sensation (Empfindung) are one and the same, says Feuerbach. The very first and most familiar to us is sensation, and *i n i t* there is inevitably also *q u a l i t y*....

If Marx did not leave behind him a "*Logic*" (with a capital letter), he did leave the *logic* of *Capital*, and this ought to be utilised to the full in this question. In *Capital*, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowldge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.

Commodity—money—capital

production of absolute Mehrwert**

production of relative Mehrwert

* everything flows—*Ed.*
** surplus-value—*Ed.*

The history of capitalism and the analysis of the *c o n c e p t s* summing it up.

The beginning—the most simple, ordinary, mass, immediate "Being": the single commodity ("Sein" in political economy). The analysis of it as a social relation. A *double* analysis, deductive and inductive —logical and historical (forms of value).

Testing by facts or by practice respectively, is to be found here in *each* step of the analysis.

Cf. concerning the question of Essence versus Appearance
— price and value
— demand and supply versus *Wert*
(= krystallisjerte Arbeit*)
— wages and the price of labour-power..

Written in 1915
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according
to the manuscript

* value (=crystallized labour)—*Ed.*

GEORGES NOËL: *HEGEL'S LOGIC*

PARIS, 1897[115]

|Bibliothèque de Genève, Ca 1219|

Printed in installments in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; edited by Xavier Léon.

The author is an *idealist* and a shallow one. A re-writing of Hegel, a defence of Hegel against "modern philosophers," a comparison with Kant, etc. Nothing of interest. Nothing profound. Not a word about *materialist* dialectics: the author evidently has no notion of it.

Note the *translations* of Hegel's terms:

Être [*Being*]—*Essence*—*Notion* (Mesure, etc. [Measure]).

Devenir (das Gewordene) [Becoming].

L'être déterminé (Dasein) [Determinate Being, Existent Being].

Être pour un autre (Sein-für-anderes) [Being-for-other].

Quelque chose (Etwas) [Something].

Limite (Grenze) [Limit].

Borne (Schranke) [Boundary].

Devoir être (Sollen) [Ought].

Être pour soi (Für-sich-Sein) [Being-for-itself].

Existence hors de soi (Außer-sich-Sein) [Being outside itself].

La connaissance (dos Erkennen) [Cognition].

Actualité (Wirklichkeit) [Actuality].
Apparence (Schein) [Semblance].
Être posé (Das Gesetzsein) [Posited Being].
Position (Setzende Reflexion) [Positing reflection].
Fondement *ou* raison d'être (Grund) [Ground].
L'universel (das Allgemeine) [The Universal].
Particulier (das Besondere) [The Particular].
Jugement (das Urteil) [Judgment].
Raisonnement *ou* Syllogismne (Schluß) (Reasoning *or* Syllogism (Conclusion)].

Note also the amusing attempts of the author to justify Hegel as it were* against accusations of "realism" (read: materialism). According to Hegel "philosophy as a whole is a syllogism. And in this syllogism, logic is the universal, nature the particular, and spirit the individual" (p. 123). The author "analyses" (= rehashes) the last sentences of the *Logic* on the transition from the Idea to Nature. It transpires that through nature (in nature) the understanding cognises the Idea = uniformity, abstractions, etc.... Help! Almost materialism!!....

NB! "To treat nature by itself, abstracted from mind, is that not to return implicitly to the most naïve realism?" (p. 129)

NB "True, by interposing a philosophy of nature between Logic and the philosophy of mind, Hegel adopts the standpoint of realism, but in doing so he is not guilty of any inconsistency.... Hegel's realism

* These three words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

is only provisional. It is a point of view that has to be superseded." (129)

"That realism has its relative truth is indisputable. A point of view so natural and universal is not an aberration of the human mind.... In order to supersede realism, it" (dialectics) "will have to give it first its full development and only thus will it demonstrate the necessity of idealism. Hence Hegel will put time and space as the most general determinations of nature and not as forms of the mind. On this point he seems to disagree with Kant, but this is only in appearance and in words....

NB

??!!

..."That is why he" (Hegel) "speaks of sensuous qualities as if they were really inherent in the body. It is surprising that on this account Herr Wundt accuses him of ignorance. Does the learned philosopher believe that Hegel had never read Descartes, Locke or even Kant? If he is a realist, it is due neither to ignorance nor inconsistency, but only tentatively and as a method of approach." (130)

NB
Hegel = a "realist"
NB

Comparing Hegel with Spinoza, the author says: "In short, Hegel and Spinoza agree in submitting nature to logic" (p. 140), but in Hegel logic is not mathematical logic but the logic of contradictions, of the transition "from pure abstraction to reality" (etc.). Of Spinoza it is said "with him" (Spinoza) "we are at the antipodes of idealism" (138); for "the world of spirits" (in Spinoza) "exists side by side with the world of bodies: it does not stand above it...."

..."The idea of evolution so characteristic of Hegelianism has no meaning for Spinoza...." (138)

Hegel develops the dialectics of Plato ("he recognises with Plato the necessary

coexistence of opposites" 140)—Leibnitz is close to Hegel. (141)

Noël defends Hegel against the charge of pantheism.... (here, he says, is the basis of this charge):

..."Absolute spirit, the final point of his" (Hegel's) "dialectics, is it basically other than the idealised and deified spirit of man himself? Does his God exist anywhere but in nature and humanity?" (142)

Noël's "defence" consists in stressing (chewing over) the fact that Hegel is an idealist.

Hegel not a "sceptic"

Is Hegel not a "dogmatist"? (Chapter VI: "The Dogmatism of Hegel"). Yes, in the sense of *non-scepticism*, in the sense of the *a n c i e n t s* (p. 147). But according to Kant that = cognisability of "Things-in-themselves." Hegel (just like Fichte) denies Things-in-themselves.

NB

"***Agnostic realism***" according to *K a n t* (p. 148 i.f.).

Kant an agnostic

..."Kant defines dogmatism from the point of view of agnosticism. A dogmatist is one who claims to determine the Thing-in-itself, to know the unknowable. Moreover, dogmatism can take two forms...." (149) Either it is mysticism, or

NB materialists = "dogmatists"

..."it can also naïvely raise sensuous reality to absolute reality, identify the phenomenon with the noumenon. It is then empirical dogmatism, that of the common mass and of the savant who is alien to philosophy. The materialists fall into this second error; the first was that of Plato, Descartes and their disciples...."

In Hegel, it is stated, there is not a trace of dogmatism, for "he will certainly

not be accused of not recognising the relativity of things with respect to thought, since his whole system rests on this principle. Nor will he be accused of applying the categories undiscerningly and uncritically. Is not his logic precisely a critique of the categories, a critique incontestably more profound than the Kantian critique?" (150)

..."There is no doubt that by the very rejection of noumena he" (Hegel) "puts reality in the phenomenon,[116] but this reality in the phenomenon as such is only an immediate reality, consequently relative and intrinsically incomplete. It is true reality only implicitly and on condition of its further development...." (151) ||| NB

..."Moreover, between the intelligible and the sensuous there is no absolute opposition, no hiatus, no unbridgeable gulf. The sensuous is the intelligible in anticipation; the intelligible is the sensuous understood...." (152) ||| not bad!

(Even you, a shallow idealist, have derived some benefit from Hegel!)

..."Sensuous being contains the absolute implicitly and it is through a continuous gradation that we raise ourselves from the one to the other." (153)

..."Thus, whatever may have been said about it, Kant's philosophy retains the fundamental vice of mystical dogmatism. We find in it the two characteristic features of this doctrine: absolute opposition between the sensuous and the supersensuous, and an immediate transition from the one to the other." (156)

In Chapter VII: "Hegel and Modern Thought," Noël takes the positivism of Auguste Comte and, analysing it, calls it "an *agnostic system*." (166) ||| positivism = agnosticism

(*Idem* 169: "positivist agnosticism")

In criticising positivism as agnosticism, the author sometimes castigates it not at all badly for its half-heartedness,—saying, for example, that the question of the source of laws or of the "permanence" of facts ("des faits permanents,"* 170) cannot be evaded:

..."Depending on whether one regards them" (les faits permanents) "as uncognisable or cognisable, one is brought back either to agnosticism or to dogmatic philosophy...." (170 i.f.).

The neo-criticism of M. Renouvier is described as eclecticism, something midway between "positivist phenomenalism and Kantianism proper." (175)

Chattering about morality, freedom, etc., Noël, the vulgariser of Hegel, has not the slightest word to say about freedom as the understanding of necessity.

French translations of Hegel: Véra: *Logic*, *The Philosophy of Mind*, *The Philosophy of Religion*, *The Philosophy of Nature*;

Ch. Bénard: *Aesthetics and Poetics*

Works on Hegelianism:

E. Beaussire: *Antécédents de l'hégélianisme*.
P. Janet: *La dialectique dans Hégel et dans Platon*. 1860.
Mariano: *La Philosophie contemporaine en Italie*.
Véra: *Introduction à la Philosophie de Hégel*.

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* "of permanent facts"—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
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J. PERRIN.
TREATISE ON PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY. PRINCIPLES

PARIS, 1903[117]

Note *J. Perrin*: *Traité de chimie physique. Les principes* (300 pp.). Paris, 1903. Review by *Abel Rey* in *Revue Philosophique*, *1904*, *1*, entitled: "Philosophical Principles of Physical Chemistry." (Perrin analyses the notions of *force*, etc., *cause*, etc., *energy*, etc.—against "*the view of energy* as a mysterious entity" (p. 401).... Abel Rey calls Perrin an opponent of "*neo-sceptic* systems.")

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PETER GENOV.
FEUERBACH ERKENNTNISTHEORIE UND METAPHYSIK

ZÜRICH, 1911 (BERNER DISSERTATION) (S. 89)[118]

Landesbibliothek

This purely amateurish work consists *almost exclusively* of quotations from Feuerbach's collected works |**Jodl edition**|. It can be useful *only* as a **collection** of quotations, and incomplete at that.

| the author has **far** from worked out his subject |

The author quotes mainly:

Vol. II, especially "Thesen und Grundsätze," and then "Wider den Dualismus."[119]

X, especially "Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus."

NB VIII, Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion (Feuerbach himself wrote in 1 8 *4 8* that this was a more mature work of his than The *Essence of Christianity*; published in 1 8 *4 1*) |VIII, SS. 26, 29; 102-109; 288; 329 and others|.

VII. Das Wesen der Religion (1 8 *4 5*: *Feuerbach regards it as important*).

IV. "Leibnitz" **with the notes of 1847** (*NB*) |IV, SS. 261; 197; 190-191; 274|.

VII. Addenda to *Wesen des Christentums*.

The author quotes (in the spirit of Feuerbach):
Ebbinghaus: *Experimentelle Psychologie*, SS. 110 und 45.
Fr. Jodl: *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, S. 403.
A. Forel: *Gehirn und Seele*, X Auflage, S. 14.

Lange[120] (II Buch, S. 104) against Feuerbach, he says, is obviously wrong (S. 83 and 88), distorting (and denying) Feuerbach's materialism.

At the beginning the author gives a sketch of Feuerbach's philosophical evolution,—*Todesgedanken* (1830)—still a Hegelian; *Der Schriftsteller und der Mensch** (1834)—beginning of the rupture; *Kritik des Antihegel* (1835)—against the enemies of Hegel, but not in favour of Hegel (cf. de Grün,[121] Bd. II, 409; I, 390 and 398).—*The Critique of Hegelian Philosophy*** (1839).—*The Essence of Christianity* (1 8 *4 1*)—the rupture—*Theses and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1842 and 1843).—*The Essence of Religion* (1845).—*Lectures on the Essence of Religion* (*1 8 4 7*).

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* Here the author was "not a pantheist, but a polytheist" (S. 15); "more a Leibnitzian than a Hegelian" (S. 15).

** The German titles of Feuerbach's works are: *Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie*; *Wesen des Christentums*; *Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie*; *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*; *Wesen der Religion*; *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*.—*Ed.*

PAUL VOLKMANN.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES

("SCIENCES AND HYPOTHESIS," IX) SECOND EDITION, LEIPZIG, 1910[122]

(Nat. IV. 171 in Bern library)

The author is an eclectic and vulgariser in philosophy, especially when speaking against Haeckel, about Buckle, etc., etc. Nevertheless, the tendency is materialist, e.g., p. 35*—"The question whether we dictate concepts to nature, or nature to us" is, he says, a combination of both points of view. *Mach*, he says, is right (p. 38), but I counterpose to it (Mach's point of view) the "objective" point of view:

"Thus I hold that logic in us has its origin in the uniform course of things outside us, that the external necessity of natural events is our first and most real schoolmistress" (p. 39).

He rebels against phenomenology and modern monism,—but completely fails to understand the *essence* of materialist and idealist philosophy. In fact, he reduces the matter to "methods" of natural science in a general positivist sense. He is not even capable of raising the question of the objective reality of nature *outside* the consciousness (and sensations) of mankind.

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* Volkmann, P., *Erkenntnistheorische Gründzüge der Naturwissenschaften*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910.—*Ed.*

MAX VERWORN.
THE HYPOTHESIS OF BIOGENESIS

JENA, 1903[123]

(Med. 5218)

cf. p. 9* definition of "Enzyme"[124]

The author expounds a special theme concerning "*living substance*" and its chemical metabolism. A special theme.

A bibliography is provided on this question.

P. 112—a "working hypothesis," this, he says, is the essence. For example, he says that materialism in the nineteenth century was of great benefit to the natural sciences,—but now "no philosophical natural scientist any longer considers the materialist conception to be adequate" (112). There are no eternal truths. The significance of ideas, their Fruchtbarkeit,** their role as a "ferment"—"which creates and acts." (113)

> |Characteristic here is the naïve expression of the view that "materialism" hinders! Not the haziest conception of dialectical materialism and complete inability to distinguish materialism as a *philosophy* from the individual hide-bound views of the *philistines* of the day who call themselves materialists|.

* Verworn, M., *Die Biogenhypothese*, Jena, 1903.—*Ed.*
** fruitfulness—*Ed.*

The aim of the author is a "mechanical analysis of the phenomena of life" (p. 1, Preface)—a reference to the last chapter of the *Allgemeine Physiologie*.

Instead of "living protein" (p. 25)—said to be an unclear concept, and instead of the "living protein molecule" ("since a molecule cannot he alive"), the author proposes to speak of the "biogen-molecule." (25)

The conversion of the chemical into the living—that, evidently, is the crux. In order to move more freely in this new, still obscure, hypothetical, down with "materialism," down with antiquated "shackling" ideas (the "molecule"), let us invent a new term (biogen), in order to seek new knowledge more freely! *N B*. Concerning the question of the sources and *vital* impelling motives of modern "idealism" in physics and natural science in general.

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FR. DANNEMANN.
HOW DID OUR PICTURE OF THE WORLD ARISE

(KOSMOS). STUTTGART, 1912[125]

(Nat. XII. 456)

In this pamphlet the author gives a kind of summary of his ***four-volume work***: "*Naturwissenschaftenin ihrer Entwicklung und in ihrerm Zusammehange*"...

About 5,000 years of the development of civilisation from ancient Egypt to our time. According to Homer, the world was only the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding countries. (P. 8)*

(((Much *popularisation*...)))

In Egypt the clear nights facilitated the pursuit of astronomy. They observed the stars and their movement, the moon, etc.

(The author carelessly, pompously, vulgarly, in feuilleton style outlines philosophical questions, banal.)

At first the month was reckoned as *30* days, and the year as *360* (p. 31). The ancient Egyptians already had *365* days. (P. 32) Eratosthenes (276 B. C.) determined the circumference of the earth as *250,000* "stadia" = 45,000 km. (instead of 40,000).

Aristarchus guessed that the earth revolved round the sun, p. 37 (1,800 years before Copernicus, 1473-1543). (Third century B.C.) he considered the moon to be

(The booklet is neither here nor there: for a philosophical work it is careless, sententious, petty, banal;— for a popular

* Dannemann, Fr., *Wie unser Weltbild entstand?* Stuttgart, 1912.—*Ed.*

work it is pretentious *30* (instead of 48) times smaller than the earth, and the sun to be 300 (instead of 1,300,000) times larger than the earth....

Ptolemy's system (second *century* A.D.) fifteenth century: the revival of astronomy—connection with navigation.

Copernicus (1473-1543): heliocentric system. Circles (not ellipses).

((Only in the middle of the nineteenth century improved measuring instruments showed alteration in the appearance of the fixed stars))

Galileo—(1564-1642).

Kepler—(1571-1630).

Newton—(1643-1727).

the telescope and so forth ((discovery of more than 20 million stars, etc.))

flattening of the earth at the poles — $1/229$ diameter instead of $1/299$

Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.) the world is governed by number and measure....

The four elements, substances, of the ancient philosophers: earth, fire, water, air....

Democritus (fifth century B.C.): atoms... seventeenth century: chemical elements.

Spectral analysis (1860)

Electricity, etc.

Law of conservation of force.

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LUDWIG DARMSTAEDTER.
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND TECHNIQUE

BERLIN, 1908, 2nd EDITION[126]

(Lesesaal in der Landesbibliothek)

Determination of the velocity of light:

1676: Olaf *Römer* (from the eclipse of Jupiter): 40,000 geographical miles (less than....300,000) km. per sec. (less than....298,000 km.)			
1649: *Fizeau* (toothed wheel and mirror): 42,219 geographical miles	= 313,000	km. per	sec.
1854: *Foucault* (2 revolving mirrors, etc.): 40,160 geographical miles	= 298,000	” ”	”
1874: Alfred *Cornu* (à la Fizeau)	300,400	” ”	”
	300,330	” ”	”
1902: Perrotin (idem) . . .	299,900	(± 80 m.)	”

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NAPOLÉON. *PENSÉES*

PARIS, 1913 BIBLIOTHÈQUE MINIATURE No. 14[127]

(Landesbibliothek)

NB ‖ "Cannon killed feudalism. Ink will kill modern society (p. 43)....

— — —"In every battle there comes a moment when the bravest soldiers, after the greatest tension, feel inclined to take to flight. This terror arises from a lack of confidence in their courage: it needs only an insignificant event, some pretext, to return this confidence to them: the great art consists in bringing this about" (pp. 79-80).

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ARTUR ERICH HAAS.
THE SPIRIT OF HELLENISM IN MODERN PHYSICS

LEIPZIG, 1914 (32 pp.) (VEIT & CO.)[128]

Reviewed in *Kant-Studien*, 1914, No. 3 (Vol. XIX), pp. 391-392, the author is described as a professor of the history of physics (P. Volkmann pays particular attention to this history), is said to emphasise the special connection between Heraclitus and Thomson, etc., etc.

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THEODOR LIPPS.
NATURAL SCIENCES AND WORLD OUTLOOK[129]

(SPEECH AT THE 78TH CONGRESS OF GERMAN NATURAL SCIENTISTS IN STUTTGART), HEILELBERG, 1906

(Bern Library, Nat. Varia. 160)

An idealist of the Kant-Fichte persuasion, who emphasises that both phenomenology (modern—"only phenomena." P. 40) and energetics and vitalism (ibidem) work in the spirit of idealism.

Matter—x

"Materiality"—"a conventional mode of expression"... (p. *3 5*)

"Nature is a product of the mind" (37), etc.

"In short, materialism is primarily nothing but a new name for the task of natural science." (32)

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CONSPECTUS OF LASALLE'S BOOK *THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS THE OBSCURE OF EPHESUS*[130]

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Reading Hall of the Berlin Library
V. I. Lenin worked here in 1914-16

Reading Hall of the Berlin Library
V. I. Lenin worked here in 1914-16

F. LASALLE.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS THE OBSCURE OF EPHESUS,
TWO VOLUMES

BERLIN, 1858 (pp. 379 + 479)

(Bern: Log. 119. 1)

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In the epigraph, inter alia, from Hegel—from his *History of Philosophy*—that there is not a single proposition of Heraclitus that he would not have adopted in his Logic.

Hegel. *Collected Works*, Vol. XIII, p. 328.*
My quotation from *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*.**

One can understand why Marx called this work of Lassalle's "school boyish" (see the letter to Engels of ...[131]): Lassalle simply *repeats* Hegel, *copies* from him, *re-echoing* him a million times with regard to isolated passages from Heraclitus, furnishing his opus with an incredible heap of learned ultra-pedantic ballast.

The difference with respect to Marx: In Marx there is a mass of *new material*,

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. XIII, Berlin, 1833.—*Ed.*

** Reference is being made to the conspectus of Hegel's work *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, in which Lenin makes this quotation. (See p. 259 of this voluine.)—*Ed.*

and what interests him is only the movement forward *from* Hegel and Feuerbach *further*, *from* idealistic *to* materialistic dialectics. In Lassalle there is a rehash of Hegel on the particular theme selected: essentially transcribing from Hegel *with respect to* quotations from Heraclitus and about Heraclitus.

Lassalle divided his work into two parts: "General Part. Introduction" (Vol. 1, pp. 1-68), and "Historical Part. Fragments and Evidence" (the remainder). Chapter III in the general part: "Short Logical Development of the System of Heraclitus" (pp. 45-68)—gives the quintessence of the method, of Lassalle's conclusions. This chapter is sheer plagiarism, slavish repetition of Hegel *concerning* Heraclitus! Here too (and still more in the historical part) there is a mass of erudition, but it is erudition of the lowest kind: the exercise set was to seek out the Hegelian element in Heraclitus. The Strebsamer* pupil performs it "brilliantly," reading through *everything* about Heraclitus in all the ancient (and modern) authors, and putting a Hegelian construction on *everything*.

Marx in 1844-47 went from Hegel to Feuerbach, and further *beyond* Feuerbach to historical (and dialectical) materialism. Lassalle in 1846 began (Preface, p. III), in 1855 resumed, and in August 1857 (Preface, p. XV) finished a work of sheer, empty, useless, "learned" *rehashing* of Hegelianism!!

Some chapters of the second part are interesting and not without use solely for the translations of fragments from Heraclitus and for the popularisation of He-

* industrious—*Ed.*

gel, but that does not do away with all the above-mentioned defects.

The philosophy of the ancients and of Heraclitus is often quite delightful in its childish naïveté, e.g., p. 162—how is it to be explained that the urine of persons who have eaten garlic* smells of garlic?"

and the answer:

> "is it not that, as some of the followers of Heraclitus say, one and the same fiery process of transformation takes place both in the universe and in (organic) bodies, and then after cooling appears there (in the universe) as moisture, and here takes the form of urine, but the transformation (ἀναθνμίασις**) from the food causes the smell of that from which it has arisen by mixing with it?..." (162-163)

On p. 221 ff.*** Lassalle quotes Plutarch, who says with regard to Heraclitus: ..."in the same way as everything is created by transformation out of fire, so also fire out of everything, just as we obtain things for gold and gold for things...."

Heraclitus on gold and commodities

In this connection, Lassalle writes about *v a l u e* (Werth) (p. *2 2 3* NB) [and about Function des Geldes****], expounding it in the Hegelian manner (as "separated abstract unity") and adding: ..."that this unity, money, is not something *actual*, but something *merely ideal* (Lassalle's italics) is evident from the fact...," etc.

incorrect (Lassalle's idealism)

(But all the same NB that this was written in a book that appeared in 1858, the preface being dated *August 1857*.)

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* V. I. Lenin wrote the word "garlic" above the word "Knoblauch."—*Ed.*

** evaporation—*Ed.*

*** et seq.—*Ed.*

**** function of money—*Ed.*

In note 3 on p. 224 (pp. 224-225) Lassalle speaks in still greater detail about money, saying that Heraclitus was no "political economist," that money is ((only(??))) a Wertzeichen,* etc., etc. ("all money is merely the ideal unity or expression of value of all real products in circulation") (224), etc.

Since Lassalle here speaks vaguely of moderne Entdeckungen auf diesem Gebiet**—the theory of value and money, it can be assumed that he has precisely in mind conversations with Marx and letters from him.

On pp. 225-228. Lassalle reproduces a long *p a s s a g e* from Plutarch, proving further (convincingly) that it is indeed Heraclitus who is referred to, and that Plutarch here expounds "the basic features of the speculative theology of Heraclitus" (p. 228).

The passage is a good one: it conveys the *spirit* of Greek philosophy, the naïveté, profundity, the flowing transitions.

Lassalle reads into Heraclitus even a whole system of theology and "objective logic" (sic!!), etc.—in short, Hegel "apropos of" Heraclitus!!

An infinite number of times (truly wearisomely) Lassalle emphasises and rehashes the idea that Heraclitus not only recognises motion in everything, that his principle is motion or becoming (Werden), but that the whole point lies in understanding "the processing identity of

* token of value—*Ed.*
** modern discoveries in this field—*Ed.*

absolute (schlechthin) opposites" (p. 289 and many others). Lassalle, so to speak, *hammers* into the reader's head the Hegelian thought that in abstract concepts (and in the system of them) the principle of motion *cannot* be expressed otherwise than as the principle of the identity of opposites. Motion and Werden, generally speaking, can be without repetition, without return to the point of departure, *and then* such motion would not be an "identity of opposites." But astronomical and mechanical (terrestrial) motion, and the life of plants, animals and man—all this has hammered into the heads of mankind not merely the idea of motion, but motion precisely with a return to the point of departure, i.e., dialectical motion.

This is naïvely and delightfully expressed in the famous formula (or aphorism) of Heraclitus: "it is impossible to bathe twice in the same river"—actually, however (as had already been said by Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus), it cannot be done even once (for before the whole body has entered the water, the latter is already not the same as before).

(NB: This Cratylus reduced Heraclitus' dialectics to *sophistry*, pp. 294-295 and many others, by saying: nothing is true, nothing can be said about anything. A negative (and merely negative) conclusion from dialectics. Heraclitus, on the other hand, had the principle: "everything is true," there is (a part of) truth in everything. Cratylus merely "wagged his finger" in answer to everything, thereby showing that everything moves, that nothing can be said of anything.

Lassalle in this work has no sense of moderation, absolutely *drowning* Heraclitus *in Hegel*. It is a pity. *Heraclitus in moderation*, as one of the founders of dialectics, would be extremely useful: the 850 pages of Lassalle should be compressed into 85 pages of quintessence and translated into Russian: "Heraclitus as one of the founders of dialectics (according to Lassalle)." Something useful could result!

The basic law of the world, according to Heraclitus (λόγος,* sometimes εἱμαρμένη**), is "the law of transformation into the opposite" (p. 327) (= ἐναντιοτροπή, ἐναντιοδρομία).

Lassalle expounded the meaning of εἱμαρμένη as the "law of development" (p. 333), quoting, inter alia,

the words of *Nemesius*: "Democritus, Heraclitus and Epicurus assume that neither for the universal nor for the particular does foresight exist" (ibidem).

And the words of Heraclitus: "The world was created by none of the Gods or men, but is eternally living fire and will always be so" (ibidem).

It is strange that, in rehashing the religious philosophy of Heraclitus, Lassalle does not once quote or mention Feuerbach! What was Lassalle's attitude in general to Feuerbach? That of an idealist Hegelian?

* logos—*Ed.*
** necessity—*Ed.*

Hence Philo said of Heraclitus' doctrine,

> ..."that it" (die Lehre*), "like that of the Stoics, derives everything *f r o m* the world, and brings it *i n t o* the world, but does not believe that anything came from God." (334) An example of "touching up" as Hegelian:

NB

Lassalle translates the famous passage of Heraclitus (according to *Stobaeus*) on "(Das) Eine Weise"** (ἓν σοφόν) as follows:

> "However many discourses I have heard, no one has succeeded in recognising that the wise is that which is separated from all (i.e., from all that exists)" (344)
>
> —considering that the words "beast or god" are an insertion, and rejecting the translations of Ritter ("wisdom is remote from all") (344) and Schleiermacher "the wise is separated from all," in the sense of "cognition" distinct from the knowledge of particulars.
>
> According to Lassalle the *meaning* of this passage is as follows:
>
> that "the absolute (the wise) is alien to all sensuous determinate being, that it is the negative" (349)—i.e., Negative = the principle of negation, the principle of motion. A clear misrepresentation as Hegelian! Reading Hegel *into* Heraclitus.

A mass of details on the (external) connection between Heraclitus and Persian theology, Ormazd-Ahriman,[132] and the theory of magic, etc., etc., etc.

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* the doctrine—*Ed.*

** "the One Wise"—*Ed.*

Heraclitus said: "time is a body" (p. 358)... this, Lassalle says, is in the sense of the unity of being and nothing. Time is the pure unity of Being and not-Being, etc.!

Fire for Heraclitus, it is said = the principle of motion | and not simply fire |, something similar is fire in the teaching of Persian philosophy (and religion)! (362)

If Heraclitus was the *first* to use the term λόγος ("word") in the objective sense (law), this, too, is said to be taken from the Persian religion.... (364)

— A quotation from the Zend-Avesta.[133] (367)

In § 17 on the relation between Δίκη* and εἱμαρμένη, Lassalle interprets these ideas of Heraclitus in the sense of "*necessity*," "*connection*." (376)

NB: "**the bond of all things**" (δεσμὸς ἁπάντων) (p. 379)

Plato (in the *Theaetetus*) is alleged to express the Heraclitean philosophy when he says:

"Necessity binds together the essentiality of Being...."

"Heraclitus is ... the source of the conception, common among the Stoics, that εἱμαρμένη, rerum omnium necessitas,** expresses *bond* and ligation, illigatio...." (376)

Cicero:

"I, however, call fate what the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, i.e., the order and sequence of causes, when one cause linked with another produces the phenomenon out of itself" (p. 377).

* justice—*Ed.*
** necessity of all things—*Ed.*

Thousands of years have passed since the time when the idea was born of "the connection of all things," "the chain of causes." A comparison of how these causes have been understood in the history of human thought would give an indisputably conclusive theory of knowledge.

Volume II.

Speaking of "fire," Lassalle proves, by repeating himself a thousand times over, that this is a "principle" for Heraclitus. He insists especially on the *idealism* of Heraclitus (p. *2 5*—that the principle of development, des Werdens,* in Heraclitus is *logisch*-präexistent,** that his philosophy = *Idealphilosophie*.*** Sic!!) (p. 25).

((Squeezing *into* Hegelian!))

Heraclitus accepted "pure and absolutely immaterial fire" (p. 28 *Timaeus*, on Heraclitus).

On p. 56 (Vol. II) Lassalle introduces a quotation from *Clemens* Al.,**** Stromata V; Chapter 14 about Heraclitus, which, translated literally, reads:

"The world, an entity out of everything, was created by none of the gods or men, but was, is and will be eternally living fire, regularly becoming ignited and regularly becoming extinguished...." NB

A very good exposition of the principles of dialectical materialism. But on p. 58

* of becoming—*Ed.*
** *logically* pre-existent—*Ed.*
*** *idealistic philosophy*—*Ed.*
**** *Clement* of Alexandria—*Ed.*

Lassalle provides the following "freie Übersetzung"* of this passage:

"The world — — was, is and will be continuous becoming, being constantly, but in varying measure, transformed from Being into (proceeding) not-Being, and from the latter into (proceeding) Being."

An excellent example how Lassalle verballhornt* Heraclitus, representing him as Hegelian, spoiling the liveliness, freshness, naïveté and historical integrity of Heraclitus by misrepresenting him as Hegelian (and in order to achieve this misrepresentation Lassalle presents a rehash of Hegel for dozens of pages).

The second section of the second part ("Physics," pp. *1 - 2 6 2*!!!, Vol. II) is absolutely intolerable. A farthingsworth of Heraclitus, and a shillingsworth of rehash of Hegel and of misrepresentation. One can only leaf through the pages—in order to say that it should not be read!

From Section III ("The Doctrine of Cognition") a quotation from *P h i l o*:

NB "For the One is that which consists of two opposites, so that when cut into two the opposites are revealed. Is not this the proposition which the Greeks say their great and famous Heraclitus placed at the NB head of his philosophy and gloried in as a new discovery...." ((265))

And the following quotation also from Philo:

..."In the same way, too, the parts of the world are divided into two and mutually counterposed: the earth—into mountains and plains, water—into fresh and salt.... In the same way, too, the atmos-

* free translation—*Ed.*
** corrects (ironic)—*Ed.*

phere into winter and summer, and likewise spring and autumn. And this served Heraclitus as the material for his books on nature: borrowing from our theologian the aphorism about opposites, he added to it innumerable and laboriously worked-out examples (Belege)" (p. 267). NB

According to Heraclitus the criterion of truth is not the consensus omnium, not the agreement of all (p. 285)—in that case he would be a subjectiver Empiriker* (p. 284). No, he is an *objectiver Idealist*** (285). For him, the criterion of truth, independent of the subjective opinion of all men, is agreement with the ideal law of the identity of Being and not-Being (285).

Cf. Marx 1845 in his theses on Feuerbach![134] Lassalle is here reactionary.

Here it is clearly seen that Lassalle is a Hegelian of the old type, an idealist.

On p. 337, quoting, inter alia, Büchner (note 1), Lassalle says that Heraclitus expressed a priori "the very same thought" as "modern physiology" ("thought is a movement of matter").

An obvious exaggeration. In the quotations about Heraclitus it is merely said that the soul is also a process of transformation—that which moves is known by that which moves.

* subjective empiricist—*Ed.*
** *objective idealist—Ed.*

A quotation from Chalcidius (in *Timacus*):

..."Heraclitus, however, links our reason with the divine reason that guides and rules the world, and says that, on account of inseparable accompaniment, it, too, possesses knowledge of the governing decree of reason and, when the mind rests from the activity of the senses, it predicts the future" (p. 342).

From Clemens (Stromata V.):

..."owing to its incredibility it—namely, the truth—escapes from becoming cognised...." (347)

Heraclitus, Lassalle says, is "the father of objective logic" (p. 351), for in him "natural philosophy" umschlägt* into the philosophy of *thought*, "*thought* is recognised as the principle of existence" (350), etc., etc. à la Hegel.... The moment of subjectivity is said to be lacking in Heraclitus....

§ 36. "Plato's Cratylus",[135] pp. 373-396

In the § on "Cratylus," Lassalle proves that in this dialogue of Plato's Cratylus is represented (not yet as a sophist and subjectivist as he subsequently became, but) as a true disciple of Heraclitus, who really expounded his, Heraclitus', theory of the essence and origin of words and language as an *i m i t a t i o n* of nature ("imitation of the essence of things," p. 388), the essence of things, "the imitation and copy of God," "imitation of God and the universe" (ibidem).

* is transformed—*Ed.*

Ergo:

Greek Philosophy indicated all these moments	The history of philosophy " " the separate sciences " " the mental development of the child " " the mental development of animals " " language NB: + psychology + physiology of the sense organs	these are the fields of knowledge from which the theory of knowledge and dialectics should be built kurz,* the history of cognition in general the whole field of knowledge

..."We have shown—says Lassalle—that the" (above-mentioned) "conceptual identity (precisely identity, and not merely analogy) between *word*, *name* and *law* is in every respect a principled view of the Heraclitean philosophy and of fundamental importance and significance in it...." (393)

..."Names are for him" (Heraclitus) "laws of being, they are for him the common element of things, just as for him laws are the '*common element of all*'"..... (394) — NB

And it is precisely Heraclitean ideas that Hippocrates *expresses* when he says: — very important!

"Names are the laws of nature." — NB

"For both laws and names are for the Ephesian ... equally merely products and realisations of the universal, both are for

* briefly—*Ed.*

him the achieved, purely universal, ideal being, freed from the stain of sensuous reality...." (394)

Plato analyses and refutes the philosophy of Heraclitus in his "*Cratylus*" and "*Theaetetus*," and in so doing (especially in the latter) he confuses Heraclitus (the objective idealist and dialectician) with the subjective idealist and sophist Protagoras (man is the measure of all things). And Lassalle proves that in the development of ideas there has actually stemmed from Heraclitus 1) sophistry (Protagoras) and 2) Platonism, the "ideas" (objective idealism).

One gets the impression that Lassalle, the idealist, left in the shade the materialism or materialistic tendencies of Heraclitus, misrepresenting him as Hegelian.

(IV. Ethik, pp. 427-462.)

In the section on ethics—nil.

On pp. 458-459 Lassalle writes that *Nemesios* said that Heraclitus and Democritus denied prevision (προνοίαν), whereas Cicero (*De Fato*) said that Heraclitus, as also Democritus and others (including Aristotle), recognised fatum—necessity.

..."This fatum is intended to signify only the *immanent natural necessity* belonging to the object, its natural law...." (459)

Naturnotwendigkeit* in Lassalle

(The Stoics, according to Lassalle, took *everything* from Heraclitus, making him banal and one-sided, p. 461.)

* natural necessity—*Ed.*

The index to Lassalle's book is compiled in a learned, pedantic manner, but senselessly; a heap of names of the ancients, etc., etc.

In general, ΣΣ,* Marx's judgment is correct, Lassalle's book is not worth reading.

* summa summarum—*Ed*.

ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS[136]

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

A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript
On the Question of Dialectics.—1915
Reduced

A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript *On the Question of Dialectics*.—1915
Reduced

ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS

The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts (see the quotation from Philo on Heraclitus at the beginning of Section III, "On Cognition," in Lassalle's book on Heraclitus*) is the *essence* (one of the "essentials," one of the principal, if not the principal, charactetistics or features) of dialectics. That is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the matter (Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* continually *grapples* with it and *combats* Heraclitus and Heraclitean ideas).

The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the history of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g., in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of *examples* "for example, a seed," "for example, primitive communism." The same is true of Engels. But it is "in the interests of popularisation..." and not as a *law of cognition* (*and* as a law of the objective world).

In mathematics: + and −. Differential and integral.
In mechanics: action and reaction.
In physics: positive and negative electricity.
In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.
In social science: the class struggle.

The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their "unity,"—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, *mutually exclusive*,

* See p. 348 of this volume.—*Ed.*

opposite tendencies in *a l l* phenomena and processes of nature (*including* mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their "*self-movement*," in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the "struggle" of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

In the first conception of motion, *s e l f* - movement, its *d r i v i n g* force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made *external*—God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the *source* of "*s e l f*"- movement.

The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second *a l o n e* furnishes the key to the "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the "leaps," to the "break in continuity," to the "transformation into the opposite," to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.

NB: The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute *within* the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute.

In his *Capital*, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday *relation* of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals *a l l* the contradictions (or

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the germs of *all* the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (*both* growth *and* movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the Σ* of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general (for with Marx the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics). To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with **any** *proposition*: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have *dialectics* (as Hegel's genius recognised): the **individual** is the *universal* (cf. Aristotele's, *Metaphysik*, translation by Schwegler, Bd. II, S. 40, 3. Buch, 4. Kapitel, 8-9: "denn natürlich kann man nicht der Meinung sein, daß es ein Haus (a house in general) gebe außer den sichtbaren Häusern," "οὐ γὰρ ἂν θείημεν εἶναί τινα οἰκίαν παρὰ τὰς τινὰς οἰκίας". Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other **kinds** of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. *Here already* we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of *necessity*, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, *this* is a leaf of a tree, etc., we *disregard* a number of attributes as *contingent*; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

Thus in *any* proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of *all* the elements of dia-

* summation—*Ed.*

** "for, of course, one cannot hold the opinion that there can be a house (in general) apart from a visible house."—*Ed.*

lectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. And natural science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in *any* simple instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics *is* the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the "aspect" of the matter (it is not "an aspect" but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.

* * *

Knowledge is represented in the form of a series of circles both by Hegel (see *Logic*) and by the modern "epistemologist" of natural science, the eclectic and foe of Hegelianism (which he did not understand!), Paul Volkmann (see his *Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge*,* S.)

"Circles" in philosophy: is a chronology of persons essential? No!

Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus.
Renaissance: Descartes versus Gassendi (Spinoza?)
Modern: Holbach—Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel—Feuerbach—Marx.

Dialectics as *living*, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade)—here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with "metaphysical" materialism, the fundamental *misfortune* of which is its inability to apply dialectics to the Bildertheorie,** to the process and development of knowledge.

* P. Volkmann, *Erhenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910, p. 35.—*Ed.*
** theory of reflection—*Ed.*

Philosophical idealism is *only* nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of *dialectical* materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a *one-sided*, exaggerated, überschwengliches (Dietzgen)[137] development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, *divorced* from matter, from nature, apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. But philosophical idealism is ("*more correctly*" and "*in addition*") a *road* to clerical obscurantism *through* ***one of the shades*** of the infinitely complex *knowledge* (dialectical) of man. NB this aphorism

Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is *anchored* by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness—voilà the epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has *epistemological* roots, it is not groundless; it is a *sterile flower* undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.

CONSPECTUS OF ARISTOTLE'S BOOK *METAPHYSICS*[138]

Written in 1915
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according to
the manuscript

ARISTOTLE. THE METAPHYSICS
TRANSLATED BY A. SCHWEGLER
TWO VOLUMES

TÜBINGEN, 1847

See above, quotation about "house."*

A mass of extremely interesting, lively, *n a ï v e* (fresh) matter which introduces philosophy and is replaced in the expositions by scholasticism, by the result without movement, etc.

Clericalism killed what was living in Aristotle and perpetuated what was dead.

"But man and horse, etc., exist as individuals, a universal for itself does not exist as an individual substance, but only as a whole composed of a definite concept and definite matter" (p. 125, Book 7, Chapter 10, 27-28).

Philosophy is often diverted by the *definition of words*, etc. *E v e r y - t h i n g*, all categories are affected

Ibidem, p. 126, § 32-33:

..."Matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter is sensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood, in a word, all movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensible things not qua sensible, e.g., the objects of mathematics...."

Highly characteristic and profoundly interesting (in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*) are the polemic with Plato and

* See p. 359 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the "puzzling" questions, delightful for their naïveté, and Bedenken* regarding the nonsense of idealism. And all this along with the most helpless confusion about the *fundamental*, the concept and the particular.

NB: At the beginning of *The Metaphysics* the *s t u b b o r n* struggle against Heraclitus, against his idea of the identity of Being and not-Being (the Greek philosophers approached close to dialectics but could not cope with it). Highly characteristic in general, throughout the whole book, passim,** are the living germs of dialectics *and inquiries* about it....

In Aristotle, objective logic is *everywhere confused* with subjective logic and, moreover, in such a way that everywhere objective logic is *v i s i b l e*. There is no doubt as to the objectivity of cognition. There is a naïve faith in the power of reason, in the force, power, objective truth of cognition. And a naïve *confusion*, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the *d i a l e c t i c s* of the universal and the particular—of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.

Scholasticism and clericalism took what was dead in Aristotle, but not what was *l i v i n g*; the *i n q u i r i e s*, the searchings, the labyrinth, in which man lost his way.

Aristotle's logic is an inquiry, a searching, an approach to the logic of Hegel—and it, the logic of Aristotle (who *everywhere*, at every step, raises *p r e c i s e l y* the question *o f d i a l e c t i c s*), has been made into a dead scholasticism by reject-

* doubts—*Ed.*
** everywhere—*Ed.*

ing all the searchings, waverings and modes of framing questions. What the Greeks had was precisely modes of framing questions, as it were *tentative* systems, a naïve discordance of views, excellently reflected in Aristotle.

..."Hence it is clear that no universal exists next to and in separation from its particulars. The exponents of the Forms are partly right in their account when they make the Forms separate; for the Forms are particular substances, but they are wrong in considering the one-over-many as form. The reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the imperishable substances of this kind which exist beside and outside particular sensible substances; so they make the forms the same in kind as perishable things (for these we know); i.e., they make Ideal Man and Ideal Horse, adding the word 'Ideal' to the names of sensible things # (p. 136, Book 7, Ch. 16, § 8-12) #. However, I presume that even if we had never seen the stars, nonetheless there would be eternal substances besides those which we knew; and so in the present case even if we cannot apprehend what they are, still they must be in existence. It is clear, then, both that no universal term is particular substance and that no particular substance is composed of particular substances (οὐσία)" (— § 13 at the end of the chapter).

!

!

Delightful! There are no doubts of the reality of the external world. The man gets into a muddle precisely over the dialectics of the universal and the particular, of concept and sensation, etc., of essence and phenomenon, etc.

(P. 146, Book 8—can it have been inserted afterwards?—Chapter 5, § 2-3).

..."There is a difficulty in the question (ἀπορία) how the matter of the individual is related to the contraries. For example, if the body is potentially (δυνάμει) healthy, and the contrary of health is disease, is not the body potentially both healthy and diseased?...

NB

..."Further, is not the living man potentially (δυνάμει) dead?"

(P. 181), Book 11, Chapter 1, § 12-14:

..."They" (the philosophers) "posit the objects of mathematics as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things, as a third class besides the Forms and the things of our world. But there is no third man or horse besides the Ideal one and the particulars. If on the other hand it is not as they make out, what sort of objects are we to suppose to be the concern of the mathematician? Not surely the things of our world; for none of these is of the kind which the mathematical sciences investigate...."

Ibidem, Chapter 2, § 21-23:

..."Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean by this matter and the material) or not? If not, all things are perishable, at least everything material is perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not...."

Pp. 185-186, Book 11, Chapter 3, § 12—mathematics sets aside heat, weight and other "sensible contrarieties," and has in mind "only quantity"... "it is the same with regard to Being."

Here we have the point of view of dialectical materialism, but accidentally, not consistently, not elaborated, in passing.

Windelband in his sketch of the history of ancient philosophy (Müller's *Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, V, I, S. 265) ("Reading room of the Bern Library") stresses that in Aristotle's *Logic* (die Logik) "has as its most general premise the identity of the forms of thought with those of Being," and he quotes *Metaphysik*, V, 7: "ὁσαχῶς λέγεται, τοσαχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει." That is § 4. Schwegler translates it: "Denn so vielfach die Kategorien ausgesagt werden, so vielfach bezeichnen sie ein Sein.* A bad translation.

An approach to God:

Book 12, Chapter 6, § 10-11:

..."For how can there be motion if there is no actual cause? Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the earth move themselves—the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the menses...."

Leucippus (idem, § 14) accepts eternal motion, but he does not explain why (§ 11).

Chapter 7. § 11-*19—G o d* (p. 213). ..."eternal motion must be excited by something ... eternal" (Chapter 8, § 4)...

B o o k 1 2, C h a p t e r 1 0—again a "re-examination" of the fundamental questions of philosophy; "interrogation marks," so to speak. A very fresh, naïve, doubting exposition (often hints) of various points of view.

* "In as many ways as categories are stated, in so many ways do they denote being."—*Ed.*

In Book 13 Aristotle again returns to a criticism of Pythagoras' theory of numbers (and Plato's theory of ideas), independent of sensible things.

‖ Primitive idealism: the universal (concept, idea) is a *particular being*. This appears wild, monstrously (more accurately, childishly) stupid. But is not modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of God, of the same nature (*absolutely* of the same nature)? Tables, chairs and the *ideas* of table and chair; the world and the idea of the world (God); thing and "noumen," the unknowable "Thing-in-itself"; the connection of the earth and the sun, nature in general—and law, λόγος,* God. The dichotomy of human knowledge and the *possibility* of idealism (= religion) are *given* already **in the first, elementary** abstraction

NB

NB

"house" in general and particular houses

The approach of the (human) mind to a particular thing, the taking of a copy (= a concept) of it *is not* a simple, immediate act, a dead mirroring, but one which is complex, split into two, zig-zag-like, which *includes in it* the possibility of the flight of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the *transformation* (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a *fantasy* (in letzter Instanz** = God). For even in the simplest generalisation, in the most elementary general idea ("table" in general), *there is* a certain bit of **fantasy**.

* logos—*Ed.*
** in the final analysis—*Ed.*

(Vice versa: it would be stupid to deny the role of fantasy, even in the strictest science: cf. Pisarev on useful dreaming, as an impulse *to* work, and on empty day-dreaming.)[139]

Naïve expression of the "difficulties" of the "philosophy of mathematics" (to use modern language): Book 13, Chapter 2, § 23:

..."Further, body is a kind of substance, since it already in some sense possesses completeness; but in what sense are lines substances? They could not be that, neither as form or shape as, for instance, the soul, nor as matter, like the body; for it does not appear that anything can be composed either of lines or of planes or of points...." (p. 224)

Book 13, Chapter **3** solves these difficulties excellently, distinctly, clearly, *materialistically* (mathematics and other sciences abstract *one* of the aspects of a body, phenomenon, life). But the author does not consistently *maintain* this point of view.

Schwegler in his commentary (Vol. IV, p. 303) says: Aristotle gives here a positive exposition of "his view of the mathematical: the mathematical is the abstraction from the sensuous." **NB**

Book 13, Chapter 10 touches on the question, which is better expounded by Schwegler in the commentary (in connection with *Metaphysik* VII, 13, 5): science is concerned only with the universal (cf. Book 13, Chapter 10, § 6), but only the particular is actual (substantial). Does that mean that there is a gulf between science and reality? Does it mean that Being and thought are incommensurable? "Is true knowledge

of reality impossible?" (Schwegler, Vol. IV, p. 338.) Aristotle answers: potentially knowledge is directed to the universal, actually it is directed to the particular.

Schwegler (ibidem) describes as höchst beachtenswert* **F. Fischer's** work: *Die Metaphysik, von empirischem Standpunkte aus dargestellt* | year of publication (1847) | , who speaks of Aristotle's "realism."

NB?

Book 14, Chapter 3, § 7: ..."why is it that while the mathematical is in no way present *in* sensible things, its attributes are present in sensible things?"... (p. 254)

(The last sentence of the book, Book 14, Chapter 6, § 21, has the same meaning.)

End of The Metaphysics.

Friedrich Fischer (1801-1853), Professor of philosophy in Basle. An article about him by Prantl (*Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, Vol. 7, p. 67) gives a disparaging account of him and says that "through a complete rejection of subjective idealism he nearly fell into the opposite extreme of an un-ideal empiricism."

ha-ha!!!

* most valuable—*Ed.*

NOTE ON THE COLLECTED WORKS OF FEUERBACH AND HEGEL*

LOG. 563

FROM MARX TO MAO

Collected Works of Feuerhach, Bolin's edition
Vol. I. Thoughts on Death and Immortality
" II. Critical Philosophical Notes and Basic Propositions
" III. The History of Modern Philosophy
" IV. The Philosophy of Leibnitz
" V. Pierre Bayle
" VI. The Essence of Christianity
" VII. Notes and Supplements to this book
" VIII. Lectures on the Essence of Religion
" IX. Theogony
" X. Letters on Ethics and Posthumous Aphorisms.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Log. I. 175

Collected Works of Hegel
III, IV and V. *Logic*
XIX, 1 and 2—Hegel's Correspondence.

www.marx2mao.com

Written in September 1914
First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*, p. 24

Published according to the manuscript

* Lenin wrote the list in German on a separate sheet.—*Ed.*

CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH'S BOOK *EXPOSITION, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ*[140]

Written between September
and November 4 (17), 1895

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Published according
to the manuscript

L. FEUERBACH. COLLECTED WORKS, VOL. IV, 1910. LEIBNITZ

etc.

In the brilliant exposition of Leibnitz some especially outstanding passages should be mentioned (this is not easy, for the whole—i.e., the first part (§ 1-13) is outstanding), and then the *supplements of 1847.*

(The book on Leibnitz was written by Feuerbach in 1836, when he was still an idealist) { § 20, § 21 and separate passages } *1847*

P. 27—The feature that distinguishes Leibnitz from Spinoza: in Leibnitz there is, in addition to the concept of substance, the *concept of force* "and indeed of active force..." the principle of "self-activity" (29)—

> Ergo, Leibnitz through theology arrived at the principle of the inseparable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter and motion. So, it seems to me, Feuerhach is to be understood?

p. 32: "Spinoza's essence is unity, that of Leibnitz is difference, distinction."

p. 34: The philosophy of Spinoza is a *telescope*, that of Leibnitz a *microscope*.[141]

"Spinoza's world is an achromatic lens of divinity, a medium through which we see nothing but the colourless celestial light of the single substance; Leibnitz's world is a many-faceted crystal, a diamond, which by its specific nature multiplies the simple light of the substance into an infinitely varied wealth of colours and darkens it." (Sic!)

p. 40: "Consequently, for Leibnitz, corporeal substance is no longer, as for Descartes, a merely extended dead mass, brought into motion from outside, but *as substance* it has within it an active force, a never-resting principle of activity."

For this, to be sure, Marx valued Leibnitz,[142] despite his, Leibnitz's, "Lassallean" features and his conciliatory tendencies in politics and religion.

The monad is the principle of Leibnitz's philosophy. Individuality, movement, soul (of a special kind). Not dead atoms, but the living, mobile *monads*, reflecting the whole world in themselves, possessing (vaguely) the capacity of sensuous representation (souls of a certain kind)—such are the "ultimate elements" (p. 45).

Each monad is different from the others.

NB ..."It would be quite contradictory to the beauty, order and reason of nature if the principle of life or of its own internal actions were to be linked only with a small or special part of matter" (Leibnitz—p. *45*).

"Hence the whole of nature is full of souls, as the ancient philosophers already correctly recognised, or at any rate of beings analogous to souls. For, by means of the microscope, one finds that there are a multitude of living beings not visible to the naked eye, and that there are more souls than grains of sand and atoms" (Leibnitz—p. *4 5*).

cf. electrons!

Qualities of monads: Vorstellung,* Repräsentation.

"Sensuous representation itself, however, is nothing more than the representation (reproduction in the mind and presentation) of the complex or the external, i.e., of multiplicity in the simple"... or ... "the transitory state, which contains and reproduces multiplicity in unity or simple substance" (p. 49, **Leibnitz**)—verworrene** (p. 50) (confuse,*** p. 52) Vorstellung in the monads (man also has many unconscious, verworrene, feelings, etc.).

Every monad is "a world for itself, each is a self-sufficient unity" (*L e i b n i t z*, p. 55).

"A mixture of vague conceptions, the senses are no more than that, matter is no more than that" (Leibnitz, p. 58).... "Hence matter is the bond of the monads" (ibidem).

My free interpretation:
Monads = souls of a certain kind.
Leibnitz = idealist. And matter is something in the nature of an other-

* sensuous representation—*Ed.*
** confused—*Ed.*
*** vague—*Ed.*

being of soul, or a jelly linking them by a worldly, fleshly connection.

"Absolute reality lies only in the monads and their conceptions" (Leibnitz, p. *60*). Matter is only a *phenomenon*.

"Clarity is only spirit" (p. 62)... matter, however, is "unclearness and unfreedom." (64)

Space "in itself is something ideal" (Leibnitz, pp. 70-71).

..."The material principle of the diversity of matter is motion...." (72)

"Similarly—Newton and his adherents to the contrary—there is no empty space in material nature. The air pump by no means proves the presence of a vacuum, for the glass has pores through which all kinds of fine matter can penetrate" (*L e i b n i t z*, 76-77)....

"Matter is a phenomenon" (Leibnitz, 78).

"The Being-for-itself of the monads is their soul, their Being-for-others is matter" (Feuerbach, 78). The human soul—the central, higher monad, entelechy,[143] etc., etc.

"Hence every body is affected by everything that goes on in the universe" (Leibnitz, 83).

"The monad represents the whole universe" (Leibnitz, 83).

"The monad, despite its indivisibility, possesses a complex impulse, i.e., a multiplicity of sensuous representations, which individually strive for their special changes and which, by virtue of their essential connection with all other things, at the same time are found within it...." "Individuality contains the infinite within it, as it were, in the germ" (Leibnitz, 84).

NB Leibnitz lived 1646-1716

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Here is dialectics of a kind, and very profound, *despite* the idealism and clericalism.

"Everything in nature is analogical" (Leibnitz, 6).

"In general, there is nothing absolutely discrete in nature; all opposites, all boundaries of space and time, and kind, vanish in the face of the absolute continuity, the infinite interconnection of the universe" Feuerbach, 87).

NB

"Owing to its peculiar nature, consisting solely of nerves and not of flesh and blood, the monad is influenced and affected by everything that takes place in the world...." Nevertheless "it is only a spectator of the world drama, not an actor. Therein lies the chief defect of the monads" (Feuerbach, 90).

The conformity of soul and body is a harmonie préétablie* by *God*.

"The weak side of Leibnitz" (Feuerbach, 95).[144]

"The soul is a kind of spiritual automaton" (Leibnitz, 98). (And Leibnitz himself said once that the transition from Occasionalism[145] to his philosophy is an easy one, Feuerbach, 100.) But in Leibnitz this is deduced from the "nature of the soul".... (101)

In his *Theodicée*[146] (§ 17) Leibnitz essentially repeats the ontological argument"[147] for the existence of God.

In his *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement*,[148] Leibnitz criticised Locke's empiricism,—

* harmony pre-established—*Ed*.

saying nihil est in intellectu, etc., *nisi intellectus ipse** (*!*) (*152*).

(Feuerbach in the first edition also idealistically criticises Locke.[149])

The principle of "*necessary truths*" lies "*within us*" (Leibnitz, 148).

Cf. Kant *likewise*

The ideas of substance, change, etc., lie within us (Leibnitz, 150).

"To be determined towards the best through reason is the highest degree of freedom" (Leibnitz, 154).

"The philosophy of Leibnitz is *idealism*" (Feuerbach, 160), etc., etc.

transition to Kant

..."The cheerful, lively polytheism of Leibnitz's monadology passed into the severe, but for that reason more spiritual and intense monotheism of 'transcendental idealism'" (Feuerbach, 188).

Pp. 188-220: supplements of **1847**.

P. 188: "Idealistic, a priori philosophy...."

ridiculing Kant

"But, of course, what for man is *a posteriori* is for a philosopher *a priori*; for when man has gathered experiences and has embraced them in general concepts, then he is, of course, in a position to make 'synthetic judgments a priori.' Hence what for an earlier time is a *matter of experience* is for a later time a *matter of reason*.... Thus, earlier, electricity and magnetism were only empirical, i.e., here accidental, properties perceived only in particular bodies, whereas now, as the result of comprehensive observations, they are recognised to be properties of all bodies, essential properties of a body.... Hence the history of mankind is the sole standpoint that

* there is nothing in the intellect *except the intellect itself.—Ed.*

yields a positive answer to the problem of the origin of ideas...." (191-192)

The soul is not wax, it is no tabula rasa*.... "The creation of a sensuous representation requires the addition of something distinct from the object, hence it would be sheer folly for me to seek to derive this distinct element, which is the basis of the real essence of the sensuous representation, from the object. But what is this then? The form of universality; for even the individual idea or sensuous representation is, as Leibnitz remarked, at least in comparison with the real individual object, originally universal, i.e., in this case undetermined, wiping out differences, destructive. Sensuousness is massive, uncritical, luxurious; but the idea, the sensuous representation, is restricted solely to the universal and necessary." (192)

"The basic thought, therefore, of the *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* is already, as in *Der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, that **universality**, and the *necessity* which is **inseparable** from it, express the essence belonging to the understanding or apperceiving being, and therefore cannot come from the senses, or from experience, i.e., from outside...." (193)

Leibnitz and Kant

necessity *inseparable* from the universal

NB

This idea occurs already among the Cartesians—Feuerbach quotes *Clauberg*, ***1652***.[150]

Kantianism = old lumber

"Undoubtedly this axiom" (that the whole is greater than the part) "owes its certainty not to induction, but to the understanding, for the latter has no other aim and vocation than to generalise the data of the senses, in order to save us the tedious

* smoothed tablet—*Ed.*

trouble of repetition, to anticipate, replace, spare, sensuous experience and perception. But does the understanding do this by itself, without a basis for it being present in sense-perception? Is then the individual case shown me by the senses an individual case *in abstracto*? Is it not a qualitatively determined case? But does not this quality, however, contain so much as an identity of the individual cases that is perceptible by the senses?... Do the senses show me only leaves and not also trees?... Is there no *feeling* of identity, likeness and difference? Is there no difference for my senses between black and white, day and night, wood and iron?... Are not the senses the unconditional affirmation of what is? Consequently, is not the highest law of thought, the law of identity, also a law of sensuousness; indeed, does not this law of thought rest on the truth of sense-perception?"..... (193-194)

NB

Leibnitz in *Nouveaux essais*: "Generality consists in the resemblance to each other of individual things, and this resemblance is a reality" (Book III, Chapter 3, § 12). "But is this resemblance then not sensuous truth? Do not the beings which the understanding refers to a *single* class, a *single* genus, affect also my senses in an identical, equal manner?... Is there for my sexual sense—a sense which theoretically also is of the greatest importance, although in the theory of the senses it is usually left out of account—no difference between an animal and a human female? What then is the difference between the faculty of understanding and that of sensuous perception or sensation? The senses present the *thing*, but the understanding adds the *name* to it. There is nothing in the under-

bien dit!

NB

standing that is not in sensuous perception, but what is found in the sensuous perception in fact is in the understanding only in name. The understanding is the highest being, the ruler of the world, but only in name, not in fact. What, however, is a name? It is a mark of difference, a striking characteristic, which I make the character, the representative, of the object in order thereby to represent it to myself in its totality.... (195)

bien dit!

...“The senses tell me just as well as the understanding that the whole is greater than the part; but it tells me so not by words, but by examples, for instance, that the finger is smaller than the hand.... (196-197)

...“Hence the certainty that the whole is greater than the part indubitably does not depend on the senses. But on what then? On the word: the whole. The statement that the whole is greater than the part says absolutely nothing more than the word ‘whole’ itself says.... (197)

...“Leibnitz, on the other hand, as an idealist or spiritualist, makes the means into an end, the denial of sensuousness into the essence of the mind.... (198)

...“That which is conscious of itself exists and is, and is called soul. We are, therefore, certain of the existence of our soul before we are certain of the existence of our body. Of course, consciousness is primary, but it is only primary for me, it is not primary in itself. In the sense of my consciousness, I *am*, *because* I *am conscious*; but in the sense of my life I *am conscious*, *because* I *am*. Which of these two is right? The body, i.e., nature, or consciousness, i.e., I? I, of course, for how could *I* admit *myelf* wrong? But can I then in fact sepa-

rate consciousness from my body and think by myself?... (201)

..."The world is the object of the senses and the object of thought. (204)

"In a sensuous object, man distinguishes the essence as it really is, as an object of sense-perception, from the essence of it in thought, abstracted from sensuousness. The former he calls the *existence* or also the *individual*, the latter the *essence* or the *genus*. The latter is defined by him as necessary and eternal—because, although a sensuous object may have vanished from the sensible world, it still remains as an object of thought or sensuous representation—but existence as accidental and transitory.... (205)

..."Leibnitz is *half*-Christian, he is a theist, or Christian *and* a naturalist. He limits the goodness and power of God by wisdom, by the understanding; but this understanding is nothing but a cabinet of natural objects, it is only the idea of the interconnection of nature, of the universe; hence he limits his theism by *naturalism*; he affirms and defends theism by that which abolishes it...." (215)

NB

P. 274 (from the supplement of *1 8 4 7*):

"How much has been said of the deception of the senses, how little of the deception of speech, from which, however, thought is inseparable! Yet how clumsy is the betrayal of the senses, how subtle that of language! How long have I been led by the nose by the universality of reason, the universality of Fichte's and Hegel's Ego, until finally, with the support of my five senses, I recognised for the salvation of my soul that all the difficulties and mysteries of the logos, in the sense of reason, find their solution in the meaning of

the word! For that reason *Haym*'s statement 'the critique of reason must become the criticism of language' is for me in a theoretical respect a soul-inspired statement.— As regards, however, the contradiction between me as a perceiving, personal being and me as a thinking being, it reduces itself in the sense of this note and the dissertation quoted" (of Feuerbach himself)[151] "to the sharp contradiction: in sensation I am individual, in thinking I am universal. However, in sensation I am not less universal than I am individual in thinking. Concordance in thinking is based only on concordance in sensation." (274)

..."All human communion rests on the assumption of the likeness of sensation in human beings." (274)

Spinoza and Herbart (1836).[152] P. 400 ff.* A *d e f e n c e* of Spinoza against the banal attacks of the "moralist" Herbart.

The objectivism of Spinoza, etc., is stressed. **NB**.

Verhältnis zu Hegel (1840 and später). S. 417 ff.**

Not very clear, intermittently emphasised that he was a disciple of Hegel.

From the notes:

"What is a dialectic that is in contradiction to natural origin and development? What is its necessity?..." (431)

Herr von Shelling (1843). Letter to Marx (434 ff.). According to the rough draft. Castigation of Schelling.[153]

End of Volume IV.

* et seq.—*Ed.*

** Relation to Hegel (1840 and later), p. 417 et seq.—*Ed.*

DR. JOHANN PLENGE.
MARX AND HEGEL

TÜBINGEN, 1911[154]

extremely vulgar!

Plenge fails to understand how "materialism" can coincide with *revolutionism* (calling the latter "idealism," etc.) and *waxes angry* over his lack of understanding!!!

A good example of how bourgeois professors vulgarise the fundamentals of Marxism, its theoretical fundamentals!! Ad notam of the imperialist economists"[155] and Co.!!

Theoretical aspect of dialectics has been overlooked!!

After a pretentious introduction (How I, I, I "read" Hegel and Marx) follows an essay of the Hegelian "doctrine" that is extremely shallow (idealism is not distinguished from "speculation," very, very few things have been grasped; still there is some good in this essay as compared with Kantianism, etc.). Then, comes a criticism of Marx which is altogether nonsensical.

Marx = ideologist"...

Marx is being accused of "pure ideology," when by "actual" proletarian he means a representative of a class. (82)

!

"Now the strong language of the apostate, who decisively renounced any sort of idealism ... now the ideal demand of the political enthusiast—such is the actuality of Karl Marx." (81-82)

"It is passing strange that this Jewish radical healer should have known all his life just *one* universal remedy for all social conditions that are in need of cure; criticism and political struggle." (56) — "nur"!!*

Marx's historical materialism is actually "nothing but ... a pathetical gesture," an extremely rationalistic doctrine," "in its most profound basis an idealist examination of society," etc., etc. ... (83) — Marx!! "did not understand" Hegel *9 7* **et al.**

..."agitational motives"... (84) (id. 86, 92 **et al.**) (*1 1 5* et al.)

Marx borrowed "this natural-scientific empiricism" (88), "Marx naturalises, social science" (ibid.).

..."His" (Marx's) "path is not that of the thinker, but ... of the prophet of freedom...."!!! (94-95)

Socialist revolution = subjectivist hope to present it as "an objectively scientific cognition" "is an illusion of an ecstatic dreamer, an illusion which degenerated into charlatanry" (p. 110). — !!

..."Marx ... was dominated by the passionate will of a radical apostle of freedom...." (111) — !!

Marx "agitationally whipping up all the instincts of hatred...." (115) — inde ira!!**

"Marxism ... becomes ethics of abstract negative, fanatical enthusiasm" (just like Mohammedanism according to Hegel!).... (120)

..."Temperament of a fanatic" of Marx (and his "hot head")—that's the point. (120)

And more of such vulgar gibberish!

Whence this quotation? The author did not give chapter and verse.

---

* "just"!!—*Ed.*

** hence the ire!!—*Ed.*

NB

NB

"Without revolution socialism cannot be realised. It stands in need of a political act, inasmuch as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution. But wherever its organic activity begins and its end-in-itself bares its soul, socialism casts off its political integument."

—After quoting this passage without giving its source Plenge continues: "'The political integument' that will be hurled aside is of course the whole of Marxism." (129)

How Plenge seeks out "contradictions": Marx, he says, wrote in *Rheinische Zeitung*[156]: "'The same spirit which constructs railways with the help of industry, constructs philosophical systems in the minds of philosophers' (p. 143). And then these means of production are emancipated from the spirit which created them and begin, in turn, sovereignly, to determine the spirit."

"Clever-r-r"

Example of how Plenge criticises Mehrwertstheorie*:

!!

"By its gross exaggeration it brings to a white heat the hard fact of capitalism that the urge for profit lowers wages and worsens working conditions. But then it suffers from the elementary mistake of duplication of concepts veiled by the terminology used...." (157)

..."Agitational requirements dictate that the inflammatory theory of surplus-value be given the most prominent place in the entire system...." (164)

* theory of surplus-value—*Ed.*

...“Marx is a revolutionary Jew of the nineteenth century who has re-tailored the garment borrowed from our great philosophy to suit his ends.” (171)

A pearl!!

(This Plenge is an extreme vulgariser; the scientific value of his trashy book is zero.)

Written not later than June 1916

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXII*

Published according to the manuscript

FROM MARX TO MAO

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NOTES ON BOOKS

F. Raab, *Die Philosophie von R. Avenarius. Systematische Darstellung und immanente Kritik*, Leipzig, 1912 (164 p.). 5 Mk.

Perrin, *Les atomes*, Paris (Alcan).[157]

Written not earlier than 1912
First published in 1938
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*

Published according
to the manuscript

From books on *philosophy* in the Zürich *Cantonal* Library[158]

Gideon Spicker, *Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaft zur Philosophie* (especially versus Kant and Lange's *History of Materialism*). Octavo. Berlin, 1874. *IV. W. 57 K.*

Hegel, *Phänomenologie* (hrs. Bolland, 1907), *IV. W. 165 g.*

Written in 1915
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXII*

Published according
to the manuscript

(Cantonal Library in Zürich[159])
(Signatur: *K. bi.*)

Flugschriften des deutsehen Monistenbundes. Heft 3: *A l b r e c k t R a u*. "*Fr. Paulsen über E. Haeckel*." 2-te *Aufl*. Brackwede, 1907. (48 SS.)

((A very sharp criticism of Paulsen from the standpoint of Feuerbach. A "Mohican" of the bourgeois)) NB enlightenment!

Written in 1915
First published in 1933
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to the manuscript

Section III. ("Works of informative and scientific content")[160]:

Theories of Origin... 1914.
(Present-day Culture III, IV).
E. Haeckel, *Gott-Natur*, Leipzig, 1914... Sch. 480 N 24.

Uhde, *Feuerbach*, Leipzig, 1914 ... XVI. 906.

A. Zart, *Bausteine des Weltalls*: *Atome*, *Moleküle*... Stuttgart, 1913.

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Ruttmann, *Die Hauptergebnisse der modernen Psychologie*, *Pe*. VII. 3551.

Suter, *Die Philosophie von Richard Avenarius*, 1910 (Diss). St. *Bro. 1 1. 3 4 1*

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First published in 1936
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to the manuscript

ON THE REVIEW OF JOH. PLENGE'S BOOK *MARX AND HEGEL*[161]

Joh. Plenge, *Marx und Hegel*, Tübingen, 1911. (184 SS.) (Mk. 4).
{An unfavourable review by O. Bauer in Vol. III, 3rd number of *Archiv für Geschichte des Sozialismus*.}

Written in 1913
First published in 1938
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*

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to the manuscript

ON THE REVIEW OF R. B. PERRY'S BOOK *PRESENT PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES*[162]

Mind. 1913. April. Review by F. C. S. Schiller of Ralph Barton Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*: a Critical Survey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism and Realism, together with a Synopsis of the Philosophy of William James, London and New York. (Longmans & Co.). 1912. 383 pages.

Schiller is against Perry's "realism" and makes the charge that "his mind is so preoccupied with the metaphysical antithesis between realism and idealism that he is always trying to reduce all other issues to this."

It is to be noted that Schilier quotes the following passage from Perry: "The organism is correlated with an environment, from which it evolved and on which it acts. Consciousness is a selective response to a pre-existing and independently existing environment. There must be something to be responded to, if there is to be any response" (p. 323 in Perry's book). And Schiller raises the objection:

Characteristic!!

"Unless the question is begged in the '*independently* existing environment'" (Schiller's italics), "nothing is here proved except the *correlation* of the mind and its 'environment'"... (p. 284).

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*

Published according
to the manuscript

ON THE REVIEW OF A. ALIOTTA'S BOOK *THE IDEALIST REACTION AGAINST SCIENCE*[163]

Antonio Aliotta: *La reazione idealistica contro la scienza*. 1 vol. 8°. XVI + 526 pages. Palerme. Casa editrice Optima, 1912.

Review in *Revue Philosophique* (Ribot). Paris, 1912, No. 12, pp. 644-646, by J. Segond, who states:

"He" (Aliotta) "shows us in agnosticism all the latest sources of contemporary reaction; he shows how it develops through German (Riehl) and French (Renouvier) neo-criticism, the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius, and English neo-Hegelianism; he describes and exposes the intuitionism of Bergson and Schmitt, the Anglo-American pragmatism of W. James, Dewey and Schiller, the philosophy of values and the historicism of Rickert, Croce, Münsterberg and Royce," etc. (645), and so on up to Schuppe, Cohen and others.

In the second part the author examines the energetics of Ostwald and "the new physics des qualités"* of Duhem and the "theory of models" of Hertz, Maxwell and Pastore. The author particularly dislikes, he says, mysticism (including that of Bergson), etc.

The point of view of the author is stated to be "the spirit of the happy mean of truly rational intellectualism, that of M. Aliotta and of M. Chiapelli." (645)

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to the manuscript

* of qualities—*Ed.*

REMARKS ON HILFERDING'S VIEWS ON MACH (IN *FINANCE CAPITAL*)[164]

Hilferding: Finance Capital. ("The Latest Phase in the Development of Capitalism"). Moscow, 1912

Published in German in 1910 (III Band Marx-Studien)

muddle...	p. 13—"According to E. Mach" "the 'ego' is only the focus in which the infinite threads of sensation meet most closely....
incorrect	In exactly the same way money is the focal
not "in the same way"	point in the network of social connections...."
incorrect	*p. 71* note. "Only our perception gives things the form of space" (a Kantian).

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Published according to the manuscript

REMARKS IN BOOKS

G. V. PLEKHANOV.
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF MARXISM

ST. PTSBRG, 1908

[23]...The idealists first convert thought into an independent essence, independent of man ("subject for itself"), and then declare that in it, in this essence, the contradiction between being and thought is resolved precisely because it, essence independent of matter, possesses a separate, independent being. And the contradiction is in fact resolved in it, for what is this essence after all? T h o u g h t. And this thought exists—i s—independently of anything else. But this solution of the contradiction is a purely formal solution. It is attained only because—as we have already stated above—one of its elements is eliminated: that is, being independent of thought. Being proves to be a simple property of thought, and when we say that a given object exists, it means only that it exists in thought.... NB

[24]...To be does not mean to exist in thought. In this respect Feuerbach's philosophy is far clearer than the philosophy of Dietzgen. "The proof that something exists," Feuerbach remarks, "has no other meaning than that something exists n o t i n t h o u g h t a l o n e."*

[28-29]...The materialist explanation of history was primarily of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e. Engels understood this perfectly when he wrote: "we need not so much bare results as study (das Studium); results are nothing without the development leading up to them.."**

* *Werks*, X, 187.

** Nachlass, I, 477.

[29-30]...Generally speaking, one of the greatest services rendered by Marx and Engels to materialism is their elaboration of a correct method. Concentrating on the struggle against the speculative element in Hegelian philosophy, Feuerbach did not appreciate its dialectical method and made little use of it. He says: "True dialectics is by no means a monologue of a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between I and You."* But, first, in Hegel, too, dialectics does not signify "a dialogue of a solitary thinker with himself"; secondly, Feuerbach's remark correctly defines the starting-point of philosophy, but not its method. This deficiency was made good by Marx and Engels, who understood that it would be wrong, in combating Hegel's speculative philosophy, to ignore its dialectics....

[31]...Many people confuse dialectics with the theory of development, and it is in fact such a theory. But dialectics differs substantially from the vulgar "theory" of evolution, which is wholly constructed on the principle that neither nature nor history makes leaps, and that all changes in the world take place only gradually. Hegel had already pointed out that the theory of development understood in this way is ridiculous and untenable....

NB

[33]...In general, the right to dialectical thought is confirmed by him** from the dialectical properties of being. Here too being determines thought....

[39]...Thus the feature of the geographical environment determine the development of the productive forces; the development of the productive forces in turn determines the development of economic relations and, then, all other social relations....

[42]...Each given stage of development of the productive forces has its corresponding definite type of weapons, military art, and, finally, of international—more exactly: Inter-social, i.e., also, incidentally, inter-

* *Werke*, II, 345.
** Engels—*Ed*.

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tribal—law. Hunting tribes cannot create large-scale political organisations precisely because the low level of their productive forces compels them, in the ancient Russian expression, to wander separately, in small social groups, in search of the means of subsistence....

[46-47]...According to Marx, the geographical environment influences man through the production relations arising in the given locality on the basis of the given productive forces, the primary condition for the development of which is this environment's features....

[65-66]...The character of the "economic structure" and the direction in which it changes do not depend on man's will, but on the state of the productive forces and on the changes that arise in production relations and become necessary to society due to the continued development of these forces. Engels explains this as follows: "Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which is accident." Here human activity itself is determined not as free, but as necessary, i.e., as in accordance with law, i.e., as being capable of becoming an object of scientific investigation. Thus, historical materialism, while not ceasing to point out that circumstances are changed by people, also gives us an opportunity for the first time of looking upon the process of this change from the standpoint of science. And that is why we are fully entitled to say that the materialist explanation of history provides the necessary prolegomena for any theory of human society that desires to come forward as science....

[68]...In primitive society which knew no division into classes, man's productive activity directly influences his outlook on the world and his aesthetic taste....

[81-82]...If we were to state briefly the view of Marx and Engels on the relation between the now famous "basis" and the no less famous

"superstructure," the result would be the following:

1) The state of the productive forces;

2) The economic relations determined by it;

3) The socio-political system which has grown up on the economic "basis" in question;

4) The psychology of social man as determined in part directly by the economy and in part by the socio-political system which has grown up on it;

5) Different ideologies reflecting the properties of this psychology....

[98]...Let us take as an example our agrarian problem as it stands today. To the intelligent Constitutional Democratic landowner, "the compulsory alienation of land" may seem to be more or less, i.e., in inverse proportion to the amount of "fair compensation," a sad historical necessity. But to the peasant, who is eager to come by "a bit of land," it is only this "fair compensation" that will seem to be a more or less sad necessity, while "compulsory alienation" is bound to appear to him to be an expression of his free will and the most valuable guarantee of his freedom.

In saying this, we touch perhaps on the most important point in the doctrine of freedom, a point not mentioned by Engels, of course, only because it is self-explanatory to one who has passed through the Hegelian school....

Feuerbach and Dietzgen. *24**

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* The reference is in page 24 of Plekhanov's book (see p. 403 of this volume).—*Ed.*

ABEL REY.
MODERN PHILOSOPHY

PARIS, 1908[165]

PREFACE

[6]*...Science, the creation of the intellect and reason, serves only to ensure our effective power over nature. It only teaches us how to utilise things, but tells us nothing about their essence....

[7]...Thus my essential task in this study has been to contrast two points of view: the positive, "scientific" and the "pragmatic". I have tried to be as impartial as possible in outlining these two points of view, since I am well aware of a third and serious danger in this kind of work: that of not giving one's adversaries their due. I do not flatter myself that I have fully achieved my aim. Such perfect "neutrality" is impossible....

NB

CHAPTER I

THE MODERN CENTRE OF PHILOSOPHIC DISCUSSIONS

§ 5. BASIC CONTRADICTION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

[28-29]...But contemporary systems of philosophy still oppose one another, battling over a fundamental contradiction that arises from the manner in which the philosophical problem is posed in our epoch. The form of the antithesis is therefore simultaneously the form taken by the succession of philosophical views at different times and the form taken by the views existing at the same time.

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* Rey A., *La Philosophie Moderne*, Paris, 1908.—*Ed.*

What, in the present position of the philosophical problem in general, are the possible alternatives? There can be only one, for it is a matter of keeping science and practice in the closest possible unity, without sacrificing one to the other, without opposing one to the other. This means either that practice will be the consequence of science or, on the other hand, science will be the consequence of practice. In the first case, science covers practice; in the second, practice covers science. It is a question of preserving a logical connection between the two terms, and it can only be varied by reversing them, making the first dependent on the second, or the second on the first. In the one case we get rationalistic, intellectualist, and positivist systems: the dogmatism of science. In the other, we get systems of pragmatism, fideism or active intuition (like that of Bergson): the dogmatism of action. According to the first systems, one has to know in order to act: cognition produces action. According to the second, knowledge follows the requirements of action: action produces cognition.

NB

It should not be thought that these latter systems resurrect contempt for science and the philosophy of ignorance. It is after serious investigation, scientific erudition often of the most excellent kind, after profound critical thinking about science, and even through thoroughly "thinking out this science," as certain of these philosophers like to put it, that they arrive at the derivation of science from practice. If in so doing they belittle science, it is only indirectly; for many of them, on the contrary, believe that they are revealing its full value....

NB

§ 6. THE INTEREST OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS

[33-35]...Let as, however, allow for a moment that the thesis of pragmatism is correct and that science is only a particular art, an appropriate technique for satisfying certain requirements. What results from that?

First of all, truth is reduced to an empty word. A true affirmation appears as the recipe for an artifice that will prove successful. And since there are several artifices capable of ensuring our success

in the same circumstances, since different individuals have extremely different requirements, we shall have to accept the pragmatist thesis: all propositions and arguments which lead us to the same practical results are of equal value and are equally true, all ideas which yield practical results are equally legitimate. From this new meaning of the word "truth," it follows that our sciences are purely contingent and fortuitous structures, that they could have been totally different and yet just as true, that is to say, just as suitable as means of action.

The bankruptcy of science, as a real form of knowledge, as a source of truth, there you have the first conclusion. The legitimacy of other methods differing considerably from the methods of intellect and reason, such as mystical feeling, there you have the second conclusion. It is for the sake of these conclusions that this entire philosophy, which to all appearance is crowned by them, was actually constructed.... (1) (2)

What a good argument it is, therefore, to pay back these powerful thinkers in their own coin! Scientific truths! But they are only truths in name. They, too, are beliefs, and beliefs of a lower order, beliefs that can be utilised only for material action; they have only the value of a technical instrument. Belief for the sake of belief, religious dogma, metaphysical or moral ideology, are far superior. NB NB

In any case, they need not be embarrassed before science, because its privileged position has crumbled.

Indeed, the bulk of the pragmatist army, in the face of scientific experience, hastens to rehabilitate moral experience, metaphysical experience and, particularly, religious experience. All these types of experience develop side by side with one another and can in no way hinder one another, because they are directed towards different needs, quite distinct aspects of practice (satisfaction of material needs, of moral consciousness or religious sentiments), and create different *values*.... NB

[37]...The metaphysicians would not be slow to take advantage of such a windfall. Besides restoring religion, pragmatism helps to restore metaphysics. Since Kant and Comte positivism during the nineteenth century has invaded almost the entire sphere of cognition....

[39-40]...Thus, the pragmatist attitude and those others which, while not being so philosophical, original and interesting, lead to similar conclusions, always have as their consequence the rehabilitation of obsolete guiding forms of human thought which since the middle of the eighteenth century had been victoriously displaced by scientific positivism: religion, metaphysics, moral dogmatism, i.e, basically social authoritarianism. That is why it is one of the two poles, between which all contemporary thinking, all contemporary philosophy, vacillates. It is the pole of dogmatic reaction, of the spirit of authority in all its forms. This attitude is the more dangerous since it is at first presented, by its greatest adherents too, as the boldest and latest revolt of the free spirit, a revolt against the only barrier still remaining and which hitherto served as a lever for overthrowing all the rest: science and scientific truth.

On the other hand, the opposite pole of modern philosophical thought, the purely scientific attitude—since in making practice the consequence of knowledge it subordinates everything to science—is characterised above all by an endeavour towards emancipation and liberation. It is here that one finds the innovators. They are the inheritors of the Renaissance spirit; their fathers and direct teachers are especially the philosophers and scientists of the eighteenth century, the great century of liberation, of which Mach so truly said: "He who, if only through books, has had the opportunity of participating in this upsurge and liberation, will throughout his life preserve a ?!! feeling of melancholy regret for the eighteenth century." For thinkers of this type a truth exists which, if not immutable, is one that can continually be approached. It cannot be reached except by scientific methods, and it cannot be found anywhere outside science; truth, science are the necessary and sufficient conditions for all human activity....

§ 8. THE METHOD.—RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

[48-49]...It is a matter of its [science's] *objective significance*. Some will think that it is insufficient to exhaust the reality which comprises its object, even though they admit, from a certain viewpoint, that it is necessary....

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF NUMBER AND EXTENSION. QUANTITATIVE PROPERTIES OF MATTER

§ 2. THE OLD ARGUMENT BETWEEN EMPIRICISM AND APRIORISM

[55]...But is not the elimination of all empirical element also an unattainable limit? The mathematician, the rationalists note, could continue to increase the wealth of his science even if the material world were suddenly annihilated. Yes, undoubtedly, if it were annihilated now, but could he create mathematics if the material world had never existed?...

§ 3. THE CONTEMPORARY FORM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF NUMBER AND EXTENSION. THE "NOMINALIST" AND "PRAGMATIST" ATTITUDE

[61]...Bergson, who perhaps more than any other helped to propagate these ideas in philosophical literature, would not accept without reservation the word "artifice." He believes that science is greater and higher than merely an artifice, in relation to matter. But for him matter is not true reality; it is reality that is diminished, regressive and dead. And in relation to true reality, which is living, spiritual and creative, mathematics and science as a whole can hardly have more than an artificial and symbolical character. In any case, the fact remains that it was for action on matter, and not for cognition of its essence, that mathematics was created by the intellect, that first instrument forged under the pressure of practical requirements in relation to matter....

[62]...Is it not mathematics which, of all the sciences, has in our day most strongly inclined certain minds towards pragmatism, and towards that sophistry of pragmatism, namely scientific agnosticism? In point of fact, it is in mathematics that we feel furthest from the concrete and real, nearest to the arbitrary playing with formulas and symbols, so abstract that it appears empty....

[62-63]...All the truths, more relative and less exact, which other sciences try to express mathematically and with which they endeavour to supplement mathematics, gravitate towards this absolute, as planets to the sun.

§ 4. RATIONALISM, LOGICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM

[65]...The rigid and homogeneous space of geometry is not sufficient; the mobile and heterogeneous space of physics is required. The universal mechanism of nature does not signify that matter contains nothing but geometry. According to modern hypotheses it can signify that there also exists the release or transformation of energy or the movement of electrical masses.....

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§ 5. GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF QUANTITY: BASICALLY IT IS A PROBLEM OF REASON

[74]...It is, in the first place, incontestable that reason, no matter how disinterested, has a utilitarian function. Scientists are neither mandarins nor dilettantes. And pragmatism is not wrong in emphasising the usefulness of reason, its pre-eminent usefulness. Only, has it the right to assert that reason has only a utilitarian function? Cannot the rationalists reply very plausibly that the usefulness of reason results only from the fact that, in deducing propositions from propositions, it simultaneously deduces from one another the relations between the facts of nature? It thus allows us to act on these facts; not that this is its aim, but this follows from it. Logic and the science of quantity created by the mind, insofar as it simply analyses the relations it perceives, extend their power to things themselves because quantitative relations are simultaneously the laws of things, and of the mind. If to know is to be able, then it is not, as the pragmatists think, because science was created by our practical requirements and for their sake, so that reason is of no value apart from its usefulness, but because our reason, in learning to cognise things, provides us with the means for acting on them....

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§ 6. IDEAS OF POINCARÉ. THE MATHEMATICIAN

[75-76]...The great mathematician, Poincaré,* insists particularly on this arbitrary nature of mathematics. NB

Of course, our mathematics fully corresponds to reality, in the sense that it is adapted to the symbolic expression of certain relations of the real; strictly speaking, it was not prompted by experience; experience merely gave the mind the occasion for creating it. But, our mathematics, as it gradually became constituted for conveniently expressing what we needed to express, is only one of the infinitely numerous possible mathematics or, rather, a particular case of some much more general mathematics which the mathematicians of the nineteenth century have tried to attain. Having got this clearly in mind, we at once realised that mathematics, by its essence and nature, is absolutely independent of its application in experience and, consequently, absolutely independent of experience. It is the free creation of the mind, the most striking manifestation of its own creative power. Poincaré

Axioms, postulates, definitions, conventions are, in essence, synonymous terms. Therefore, every imaginable mathematics can lead to conclusions which, when properly expressed by a suitable system of conventions, would permit us to discover absolutely identical applications to the real....

[77-79]...This theory is a good criticism of absolute rationalism and even of the attenuated rationalism of Kant. It shows us that it was not inevitably necessary for the mind to have elaborated just that mathematics which is so well adapted for describing our experience; in other words, mathematics is not the expression of a universal law of reality, whether our conception of reality (of the kind that is given us, of course) is the Cartesian, Kantian or some other. But Poincaré presents this conclusion in quite a different way from that of *pragmatism*.

Some pragmatists, and even all the commentators on Poincaré that I have had occasion to read, seem to me to have very largely failed to under-

* Poincaré, *La Science et l'Hypothèse*, livre I (Paris, Flammarion).

stand his theory. We have here an excellent example of distortion by interpretation. They have made of Poincaré—on this point as also on others, where their error is still greater—a pragmatist without the name. But who can fail to see that true pragmatism makes mathematics indirectly dependent upon experience? It is a decree of the mind, as with Poincaré, but a decree of the mind directed towards practical action, the free will of active thought, as the new philosophy conceives it. For the pragmatist there is no purely contemplative and disinterested thought; there is no pure reason. There is only thought which desires to understand things and to this end alters the representation that it makes of them, for its greatest convenience. Science and reason are the servants of practice. For Poincaré, on the other hand, thought has to be taken to a certain degree in the Aristotelian sense of the word. Thought thinks, reason reasons, for its own satisfaction; and then, over and above this, it turns out that certain results of its inexhaustible creative power can be useful to us for other ends than purely spiritual satisfaction.

But, in that case, practice is the servant of science and reason, which go far beyond the bounds of usefulness. "Thought is only lightning, but this lightning is everything."*

One may not fully accept Poincaré's theory; but it should not be distorted in order to invoke its authority. Insufficient attention has been paid to its connection with Kantianism, from which it fully borrows the theory of synthetic judgments a priori, with the proviso (and it is here that Kant's rationalism seems to Poincaré too rigid) that these synthetic judgments a priori, on which our mathematics (Euclidean) rests, are not to be considered the only possible and necessary postulates of rational mathematics....

Poincaré and Kant;

§ 7. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES AND THE OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES

[80]...Does Poincaré's theory assign to experience the role which seems to be its due? Strange!

* Poincaré, *La Valeur de la Science* (conclusion).

I would like to tell the pragmatists, who have constantly enlisted it for their own ends and used it author's name like an artillery piece, that I find very little of the pragmatic in it.... NB

§ 8. INDICATIONS RELATIVE TO THE GENERAL EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE

[87]...And if science then develops thanks to its material usefulness, it should not be forgotten that only owing to its intellectual usefulness and the disinterested satisfaction of the mind that desires to cognise things did it free itself at the outset from a crude empiricism in order to become true science. It first enables us to cognise reality, prior to allowing us to act on it. And it is necessary that it should *first* enable us to cognise in order *later* to allow us to act....

§ 9. MACH'S IDEAS, REASON AND THE ADAPTATION OF THOUGHT

[90-91]...Does this not give us a valuable indication of the nature and scope of logic and rational thought, of which mathematics has always been considered the pure emanation? And perhaps, also, of the nature and scope of reason? Here we are not far from the thought of Mach, who was also frequently made out to be a pragmatist without the name. NB

He seems to us to be much closer to rationalism in the sense which, in our opinion, should henceforth be put into that term—a rationalism which by no means excludes a psychological history of reason with its opportunities and temporary contingencies and, above all, does not in any way belittle the role of experience; reason being only codified experience and, reciprocally, the necessary and universal code of every kind of experience, taking into account simultaneously both the moment of evolution and the psychological organisation of man....

[93-94]...Hence one sees that reason, subjected to abstract analysis in the consciousness of the rational being, is capable, with the help of the principles discovered in it and the ideal development of these principles, of agreeing with the laws of the environment and expressing them. One sees, further, that, given what we are and

what the environment is, reason cannot be different from what it is: it is then, as the rationalists claim, necessary and universal. In a certain sense, it is even absolute, but not in the sense that this word is understood by traditional rationalism. For this latter it means that things exist as reason conceives

!! them. From our point of view, on the contrary, we do not know how things exist in themselves, and to this extent Kantian or positivist relativism

!! has its raison d'être. But we have the right to say that if, in a being of a totally different constitution, the needs of evolution had established a conformity with the environment different from our own (since one of the two factors of which it is the product would be different), one would always be able to establish a system of translation that would make these two kinds of conformity coincide with each other. There is nothing absurd in this hypothesis, because to a certain degree this should occur between domestic animals and ourselves....

NB [95-96]...Number and extension, despite their abstractness, arise from the nature of the real, because reality is multiplicity and extension, and

Compare *93-94* because relations in space are *real* relations arising from the nature of things.

In that case, does it not appear that extremely important conclusions could be deduced from these initial propositions? Scientific abstraction was often considered synonymous with non-reality. Increased abstractness would then signify continual movement beyond the limits of the real, further and further removal from it. Is that correct?

Mathematics, in progressively moving away from sensuous space in order to rise to geometrical space, does not become removed from real space, i.e., from the real relations between things. Rather does it come closer to them. According to the data of modern psychology, each of our senses seems to give us extension and duration (i.e., definite connections and relations of the real) *in its own fashion*. Perception begins to eliminate this subjectivity which depends on the individual or on accidental peculiarities of the structure of the species: it builds up a homogeneous and uniform

space, as well as a uniform duration—those syntheses of all our various sensuous notions of space. Why should not scientific work pursue this progress towards objectivity? In any case, its strictness, its exactitude, its universality (or its necessity, they are one and the same) are so many arguments in favour of the objectivity of its results. Consequently number, order and extension, in spite of our critical and subjective habits of thought, can be regarded as properties of things, i.e., real relations;—the more real because science has gradually freed them from the individual and subjective distortions, with which they were originally presented to us in concrete and immediate sensations. Should we not, therefore, rightly consider that what remains after all these abstractions is the real and permanent content, which imposes itself on every species with equal necessity, for it depends neither on the individual nor the moment of time, nor the point of view?...

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§ 10. WHAT DOES MATHEMATICS TEACH ITS?

[97]...Psychology, for its part, teaches that all our sensations (which are the direct and ultimate data of experience) possess one property: extensiveness or extension. This property is totally unlike geometrical extension, particularly if we consider the sensations that affect us most.....

sensation = the ultimate

[98]...Geometrical, space is the result of an abstract interpretation of optical space, which de-individualises, generalises, and makes more manageable for the mind the relations implied by this optical space. We would willingly supplement Mach's thought by saying that the aim of this operation has been to give these relations their most exact and precise expression, a universal and necessary expression, hence their objective' expression. Thus geometrical space is the outcome of an evolution, which has made our thought increasingly better adapted to certain properties of the environment. This was a prolonged and continuous experience, the success of which has constantly strengthened certain habits of thought that have become the principles of our geometry....

Mach + objectivity

[100]...Thus, what mathematics teaches us are the relations between things from the point of view of order, number and extension.

By analysing the real relations that exist between things, our mind naturally acquires the capacity to form similar relations from them, thanks to associations by resemblance. It can, therefore, also imagine combinations which are not found in reality, basing itself on those which are found in it. After having formed conceptions that are copies of the real, we can form ideas that are models, as Taine says, in a slightly different sense.

!!!

§ 11. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

[103-105]...Absolute rationalism would seem to have sufficiently good grounds for asserting, by a kind of idealist realism, that, the laws of reason coincide with the laws of things. But is it not at all wrong in separating reason from things, and in thinking that reason by itself alone, in splendid isolation, obtains cognition of the laws that govern things? It would have to be admitted, then, that by virtue of some sort of agreement or miraculous grace, we possess intuitive knowledge of these laws or at least a germ of it. Revived in this way, the Platonic myth of reminiscence seems to be an extremely gratuitous and extremely uneconomical hypothesis.

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Yes, the analysis of reason becomes co-extensive with the analysis of nature. Yes, mathematics, in being concerned with the former, is at the same time concerned with the latter, or, if you prefer, provides some of the elements necessary for the latter. But is it not simpler to suppose that this is because our psychological activity is gradually formed through adaptation to the environment and to the practical conditions in which it has to be exercised?...

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Hence, despite very great differences between absolute rationalism and the theory outlined here our the question of genesis and history, we reach, on the other hand, very similar conclusions on the question of the value and scope of mathematics: this value and this scope are *absolute*, in the human sense of the word. As regards the superhuman sense

and a transcendental point of view, I confess I that I have not yet unearthed the secret of it, and am very little concerned to do so. The possibility of attaining human understanding of things and of translating them truthfully into human language is enough for me....

Is not this conclusion superficial and too petty? In my view, pragmatism goes to the other extreme, diametrically opposed to that of traditional rationalism. The latter took the end point for the point of departure and transferred the properties of the result to the beginning. Pragmatism, on the contrary, approximates the end point to the point of departure to the extent of confusing the two and ascribes to the result the properties of the beginning. Is it not more rational to think that mathematics, after emerging from a utilitarian anthropomorphism, gradually burst through the subjective limits of this initial horizon? By constantly improving its analysis, it arrived at certain real, objective, universal and necessary relations of things.

golden mean!!

[107]...It has its foundation in the nature of things, just like our reason and our logic, of which it is a particular application and which are basically formed in a similar fashion.

It does not matter what path has been taken to arrive at reality if, by investigating it more and more closely, we finally envelop it from all sides.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF MATTER

§ 1. THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM OF MATTER

[109-110]...First of all, after the failures of the "physicist" philosophers, the great philosophical tradition of the Greeks, headed by the Eleatics and Plato throws doubt on the very existence of matter. Matter is only appearance or, at any rate, the barest minimum of existence; the science of material things, in its turn, can only be a purely relative science, and there is no true science but that of spiritual things. Thus the problem of matter begins to be solved by suppressing the problem itself. Matter can only exist as the indefinable

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boundary of the mind and as a function of the mind, and everything relating to matter is of a lower order....

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[111]...Thus disputes about the reality, of the external world, idealism, spiritualism, materialism, mechanism, dynamism, increasingly appear to be an outdated and sterile game which must be left to classic philosophy, understanding this expression in the sense in which Taine did, philosophy for the classroom....

[113]...Vulgar materialism borrows from it [physics] all that is basic as well as all that is exaggerated and monstrous in it. What a lucky chance for the religious spirit, if it can show that physics *knows nothing* about the things on which it allows us to act, and that its explanations are not explanations at all!

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§ 2. THE CRISIS IN PHYSICS AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: ENERGETISTIC PHYSICS

In point of fact, at the time when this philosophical hope was born and growing strong in the minds of educated and sincere believers, everything in physics seemed destined to justify and realise it.

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[114]...The new physics, energetistic physics, come into opposition with this traditional mechanistic physics. "Come into opposition"—is this phrase quite correct? As regards a large number of physicists, one would be tempted to say, rather: "is used interchangeably" (according to the case in hand) with the mechanistic method,

[115-116] Indeed, energy is nothing but the ability to perform work, it is a mechanical concept and can always be measured mechanically, i.e., with the aid of motion and the science of motion. Helmholtz, Gibbs and many others by no means broke with the mechanistic tradition when they added to mechanics the new chapter, generalising it in its application to physical realities. They wished for nothing more, and in fact they did nothing more than correct and further develop mechanical conception in line with the progress

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of physics, as had always been done since the time of Galileo and Descartes. Side by side with the principles of mechanics and within the mechanical interpretation of reality, they put forward the principle of the conservation of force or of energy, the principle of Carnot and the principle of least action, one which had already played an important role since the time of Maupertuis.

Thus, the word "energetics" has primarily the meaning which makes it part of the science of physics, as recognised by all scientists. Let us add that in France this part of physics is more usually called *thermodynamics*, and although, etymologically, this word has too restricted a meaning for the content implied by it, it has the advantage of eliminating all the misunderstandings caused by the other uses of the word "energetics." !

The second use of this word relates not to a part of physics, but to a *general theory of physics as a whole*...

[117]...This law was not incompatible with the mechanical conception. The latter had good reasons for claiming that the different manifestations of energy were basically only different appearances caused by one and the same basic reality—motion....

[120-122]...But if everything can be reduced to the principles of classical mechanics, then, in the opinion of the energeticists there was no explanation for this increasing waste of force, this diminution of usable energy. Nature ought to be capable of going back, as it were, and endlessly recommencing the same cycle of transformations; for classical mechanics is essentially the science of reversible transformations, for which time is of no account, and which, like happy peoples, have no history. In reality, however, the systems would be no happier than peoples. They would all the same have a history. That is why certain physicists have refused to regard physics simply as the continuation of classical mechanics. They have wanted to throw off the yoke of tradition, finding it, like all good revolutionaries, too narrow and too tyrannical. Hence the trivial criticism and later the revision of the basic principles of mechanics. From these efforts there arose a new conception of physics perhaps not so much in opposition to the former,

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as was sometimes asserted, but in any case containing profound modifications.

In general it can be said that, finding classical mechanics to be an insufficient basis for physics, the latter has ceased to see in physical phenomena that which until then was always seen in them: the various kinds of motion, forming precisely the science of classical mechanics. Until then, to explain a physical phenomenon, to study it, meant reducing it to forms of motion: the motion of material masses, of atoms, or vibrations of the universal transmitting medium—the ether. Thus, every physical explanation could be represented diagrammatically with the aid of the geometry of motion.

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The new conception, which, it was proposed, should replace the former, consisted in the first place in the absolute rejection of all the figurative representations, of those "mechanical models," as the English say, without which at one time there was no real physics. Mach severely accuses them of being nothing but "mythology." Like all mythology, it is childish; it could be useful when we did not know how to look at things directly; but he who can walk without crutches is not likely to make use of them. Let us throw away the crutches of atomism and vortices in the ether. Having reached the age of maturity, physics no longer has need of crude images for worshipping its gods. The abstract language of mathematics is alone capable of suitably expressing the results of experience. It alone will be able to tell us what actually is, without adding and concealing anything, with the strictest accuracy. Magnitudes, defined algebraically and not geometrically, and even less mechanically, numerical variations measured with the aid of a conventional scale, and no longer perceptible changes measured by displacements in space in relation to a local origin—there you have the materials of the new physics: *conceptual* physics in opposition to mechanistic or figurative physics....

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NB

[123]...This new general theory of physics, which Rankin already had in mind in 1855, was elaborated particularly by Mach, Ostwald and

NB

Duhem. "The aim of every science is to replace experience by the shortest possible operations of the mind," says Mach; this formula could be the motto of scientific energetics....

§ 3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF ENERGETICS

[127]...It is clear how philosophy, desiring to silence the arguments drawn from science against certain particular dogmas and against the religious standpoint in general, could use this ingenious interpretation. Do you put forward certain physical truths in opposition to certain beliefs? Well, the new physics desires only one thing, to return to the ideas of the great epoch of faith. After the stormy onslaught of three centuries, it returns, like a new prodigal son, to the paternal bosom of the most orthodox Thomism. NB

What is the most serious of all is that a scientist renowned for the mathematical precision and elegance of his works, particularly known for his active propagation of the new physics, for the limpid, admirably French form in which he has expounded it, and for his splendid generalisations in the sphere of energetistic mechanics—this scientist himself considered it possible to align himself with this philosophical interpretation of the new scientific theories. We refer to Duhem. Of course, in doing so he has tried carefully to draw a strict line between his scientific and his metaphysical conceptions.... !

[130]...Developing this point of view, the new philosophy could almost immediately deduce from the contemporary attempts at reforming physics the purely descriptive character of this physics, which made no pretence of explaining anything. And this played into the hands of "fideism." Science is powerless to go beyond the limit of qualities; therefore it has to restrict itself to describing them. It has to be a simple analysis of sensations, to use Mach's expression which, however, our new philosophy fears to borrow from him in its true sense, which is of a completely "scientific-like" character. NB

[131-134]...In contemporary literature, one can quite often encounter ideas of this kind in exposi-

NB tions varying considerably in quality: the sciences of matter tell us nothing about the real, for matter, as they understand it, matter itself, in the popular sense of the word, does not exist. Simple, everyday perception already distorts external reality. It builds it up wholly according to the requirements of our activity. Science then further processes these raw materials. What it shows us under the name of matter is only a rough scheme in which all the living wealth of the real is lost through the sieve of scientific laws, or a heterogenous mixture of abstract elements, arbitrarily isolated or combined, and entirely fabricated by us. Thus the road lies open for justifying the most mystical forms of idealism....

Without dwelling on these extreme misconceptions one can nevertheless note that even among serious and well-informed thinkers there remains

NB a tendency to apply to the physical sciences a criticism analogous to that which Poincaré applied to the mathematical sciences, despite the energetic protestations of Poincaré himself. From this point of view physics, like mathematics, is a symbolic language intended simply to make things more intelligible, by making them simpler and clearer, more communicable and, above all, more flexible in practice. To make something intelligible evidently means systematically to distort and alter the ideas we obtain directly from reality, in order to be able to make better use of the latter for satisfying our needs.

NB Intelligibility, rationality have nothing to do with the nature of things. They're merely instruments of action. Moreover, every new discovery seems to directly contradict our reason, for it upsets our old habits. The mind has to adapt itself to it (just as the body first has to learn to ride a bicycle), for the new law in its turn to appear to us as rational, arising from our apparent need of intelligibility. We grossly deceive ourselves when we think that this arbitrary symbolism teaches us anything that could satisfy our pure curiosity, our need for disinterested knowledge. For knowledge, for cognition in the full sense of the word, it is necessary to turn elsewhere....

§ 4. CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM OF PHYSICS

Although the attitude of the vast majority of physicists to this interpretation of physical science has been one of silence or contempt, it cannot be disregarded by philosophical criticism. Though scientists have the right to say: the dogs bark, the caravan goes on, philosophical criticism which is necessarily interested in the social and educational significance of doctrines, is compelled to stop and take notice. NB

[136-138]...The majority of the adherents of the new philosophy have addressed themselves exclusively to the scientists, supporters of energetistic physics and resolute opponents of mechanistic physics. But among physicists, the extreme supporters of energetistic physics are altogether a small minority. In the main, physicists continue to be mechanistic of course, they are changing their mechanical conceptions in order to bring them into accord with the new discoveries, for they are not scholastics. But they always seek to depict and explain physical phenomena with the aid of movements open to sensuous perception. NB

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that, while energetics has produced a number of elegant theories and expositions, almost all the great discoveries of recent times are due to mechanistic physicists and are connected with attempts to present a picture of the material structure of phenomena. It is worth giving some thought to this circumstance.

In order to provide theoretical physics with geometrical rigour, energetics decided to make it simply a more concise and economically-worded exposition of experimental data; but can the theory of physics be reduced to a mere instrument of economically-worded exposition? Can it totally ban hypotheses from a science that has always been made fertile by hypotheses? Should it not constantly orientate itself for the discovery of the real with the help of theories which, like the mechanis-

tic theories, are always anticipations of experience, attempts to obtain a clear idea of the real?

Does it not follow then that to construct the philosophy of physics by relying exclusively on purely energetistic physics amounts to a peculiar narrowing of the basis on which this philosophy should be built? The new philosophy in essence turns for confirmation of its ideas only to those who can be well-disposed towards it, and they are only a small minority. This is a convenient ruse, but a ruse nevertheless.

Besides, are they favourably inclined towards it as it imagines?

This is more than doubtful. Almost all the scientists appealed to by pragmatism or so-called nominalism have made serious reservations, including Poincaré. Let us now turn to them.

§ 5. WHAT CONTEMPORARY PHYSICISTS THINK

[138]...Thus, physics is a science of the real, and even if it seeks to express this reality in a "convenient" fashion, it is nevertheless always reality that it expresses. The "convenience" is only in the means of expression. What is concealed behind these means of expression which the mind can vary in searching always for the most convenient, is the "necessity" of the laws of nature. This necessity is not arbitrarily decreed by the mind. On the contrary, it constrains the mind, confines its means of expression within narrow limits. Within the limits close to the approximations of experience, and the small differences which physical phenomena, governed by one and the same law, retain because they are never identical, but only very similar—within these limits the law of nature is dictated to us from outside and by things themselves: it expresses a real relation between things.

[139]...Duhem will say, too, that one should not take the experience of the physicist as a copy of reality. Every physical experiment consists of measurements, and these measurements presuppose a multitude of conventions and theories....

[140]...Duhem will never deny this truth to the propositions of physics: they are the description of reality. Moreover, physical theory is not only an exact description of the real, it is a well-arranged description, for it always strives for a natural classification of physical phenomena—a natural classification, hence one which reproduces the order of nature. No dogmatist, whether Descartes, Newton or Hegel, has ever demanded more.... ha-ha!!

[141]...Moreover, even if the latter [Duhem] believes in the necessity for metaphysics side by side with science, then why does he adhere to Thomist metaphysics? Because it seems to him that it is in better agreement with the results of physical science....

[142-143]...Ostwald's "scientism" is very close to that of the great Viennese mechanist, Mach, who on these grounds even refuses to be called, a philosopher.

Sensation is absolute. Through our sensations we cognise reality. But science is the analysis of our sensations. To analyse sensations is to discover the exact relations between them, in short, to discover the order of nature, giving this expression its most objective sense, for the order of nature is nothing but the order of our sensations. NB NB

[144]...In the criticisms of Mach by the rationalists, he was sometimes reproached for a tendency towards pragmatism. He was accused of sceptical relativism. Is it because this brilliant historian of science often traces for us its humble beginnings in the primitive arts of our ancestors? After all, these were only a first attempt at adaptation. To give it a precise evaluation, it is necessary to take a look at the result, at the final point reached. Or is it because his biological theory of science makes truth into *human* truth? But human truth remains truth; moreover, it is the only truth for man. Sensation is evidently something human. Nevertheless it is the absolute, and human truth is absolute truth, because for man it is the whole truth and the only truth, the necessary truth. The properties of man and the universe being what they are, it is based on the nature of things. It is, in NB

human terms, the cognition of everything that exists....

[147]...It is possible to imagine the existence of microbes even though they were invisible up to the moment when some reagent reveals them. Why then should we not have the right to imagine matter as having a certain structure, which experience will some day reveal?

§ 6. MATTER ACCORDING TO CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS: GENERAL REVIEW

[148]...In that case what is the sense of the campaign begun by Brunetière and continued by religious-minded people, who were certainly sincere, but who desired to destroy everything that could be a stumbling-block; a campaign which, if it did not lead to pragmatism, at any rate led to some definite form of pragmatism?...

[149-150]...Just as in mathematics we use terms of order, number and extension to denote certain groups of relations on which our sensations depend, and just as mathematics takes these relations for its subject, so, further, we denote by the extremely general name of "matter" a very large number of relations—far more complex—on which our sensations also depend. Physics makes a study of these relations. This is all we wish to express when we say that physics is the science of matter....

NB

[152]...To many people it might seem natural that physics should have as its subject the *elements* capable of entering into these relations and giving them a real content, and *filling* them up as it were. This was Spencer's idea in his classification of the sciences. However, this idea cannot be considered a happy one. We register the elements of reality directly, immediately, just as they are, and as they cannot help being.

Their existence requires no justification. One cannot ask whether it is possible for them to be other than they are. To assert that would mean restoring the old metaphysical idol of the thing-in-itself, i.e., in essence, idle verbalism in one form or another. Experience should be simply accepted. It is its own justification, because in the scientific sphere it is for the positive mind the justification of every proposition.

NB *The essence of Rey's agnosticism*

[154-155]...Is then agnostic criticism of science correct? And is there a thing-in-itself which is out of the reach of science? etc., etc. Here, surely, we have metaphysics and its inevitable playing with words! Let us try to see clearly into this matter. NB

If the *relative* signifies something that deals with *relations*, then physics is *relative*. But if the relative means something that has not penetrated to the basis of things, then physics, as we understand it, is not relative, but absolute, because the basis of things, that at which analysis inevitably arrives in order to explain them, consists of relations or, rather, the system of relations on which our sensations depend. Sensations, the given, are permeated with subjectivity: these fleeting, lightning flashes are what they are made by a system of relations which will probably never be repeated in exactly the same form and which determines my state and the state of the environment at the moment under consideration. But here the scientist steps in to separate out the universal which is part of the composition of the individual moment, those laws of which it is the complex expression, those relations which made it what it is. ? ? ?

All scientific laws in effect tell us why and how the given thing is what it is, by what it was conditioned and created, because they analyse the relations on which it depends. And they will reveal to us *absolute human truth* when this analysis has been completed, if ever it can be. ha-ha!!

§ 7. THE CONCRETE DATA OF CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS

[156-157]...All the relations on which the transformation and reduction, the diffusion or dispersion of energy, depend are grouped in the general physical theory called energetics.

This theory tells us nothing about the nature of the energies considered and, consequently, about the nature of physico-chemical phenomena. It simply describes how, at the expense of what, and in what direction, physical or chemical changes of the state of a given body take place. NB

The energeticists claim that it is not possible to go further, that energetics gives us the complete, necessary and sufficient explanation of material phenomena, that is to say, the sum-total of the relations on which they depend. In order to give more objectivity to their view, some even raise energy to a sort of substance which is alleged to be the true material substance, the real and acting cause of all our sensations, the model according to which we should build our idea of nature.

an amusing fellow, this "positivist"

Here energy takes the place of the corpuscles of the atomic theories. It plays the same role and has the same kind of existence: it is the basis of things their final nature the absolute. According to Ostwald, for example, the description of the transformations of energy gives us absolute knowledge of the material universe. "When you are struck with a stick, what do you feel: the stick or its energy?" Energy—that is the substantial reality which lurks beneath all material phenomena...

Mechanists versus energetics. NB. Plus loin* than materialistically interpreted (p. 157) energetics!

[158]...The mechanists claim, on the other hand, that it is possible to proceed further. Energetics, in their opinion, remains as it were on the surface of things, but its laws should either be reduceable to other, more profound laws or, at any rate, supplement them, by presuming their existence.

As already said, the vast majority of physicists, and particularly the experimental physicists to whom physics owes its latest successes, belong to the mechanistic school.

The supporters of this school criticise in the first place the conception of energy and show that one cannot raise it, as some people do, to a physical or metaphysical entity.

The energy of a system signifies only the capacity of the system to perform work: potential when it does not result in detectable work, actual or kinetic in the opposite case. Consequently, the concept of energy is co-relative with the concept

* further—*Ed.*

of work, which is a mechanical concept. Hence, it does not seem possible to represent energy experimentally without turning to mechanics and motion. But, in that case, to provide an intelligible explanation of physico-chemical phenomena, should not energetics be joined with mechanics, be established as its continuation and, consequently, be reconciled with the consideration of mechanical ideas?...

[159-161]...From this point of view, mechanics, physics and chemistry form a vast theoretical system, and mechanics represents the fundamental basis of this system, just as motion is the ultimate essence of physico-chemical phenomena.

Of course, modern mechanists no longer claim that the mechanics of today, any more than the laws governing transformations of energy, have reached their final form, that science has found its unshakable foundation. Having encountered the criticism of the energeticists—and that is one of the advances which modern physics certainly owes to it—they abandoned the rather narrow dogmatism of the old mechanistic and atomic views. They think that the new discoveries should broaden the scientific horizon and introduce constant changes in the idea of the external world. Have we not been witnessing during the last fifty years the reconstruction, almost the overthrow, of classical mechanics? The old framework was smashed first of all by the principle of the conservation of energy (Helmholtz) and Carnot's principle. The phenomena of radioactivity, which allowed us to penetrate more deeply into the nature of the atom, led to the idea of the possibility of an electrical structure of matter and of the necessity of supplementing the principles of classical mechanics by those of electro-magnetism.

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Indeed, the mechanistic viewpoint now tends to adopt the form which is termed the electron theory. Electrons are the ultimate elements of all physical reality. Simple electrical charges, or else modifications of the ether, symmetrically distributed around one point, by virtue of the laws of the electro-magnetic field, perfectly represent inertia, i.e., the basic property of matter. The

The electron theory = "mechanism"

latter, therefore, is nothing but a system of electrons. Depending on the nature of the modifications of the ether (modifications as yet unknown) electrons are positive or negative; a material atom consists of an equal quantity of each of them, or at least, possesses positive and negative charges of equal size, the positive charge apparently occupying the centre of the system. The negative electrons, or perhaps only part of them, revolve round the remainder like planets round the sun. Thus, molecular and atomic forces are only manifestations of the movement, of electrons, just like the various forms of energy (light, electricity, heat)

Hence, the remarkable conclusion: the concept of the conservation of mass (or of the quantity of matter), which, together with the concept of inertia, formed the basis of mechanics, cannot, apparently, be retained in electro-magnetic mechanics: gravitational mass remains constant only at moderate velocities, less than one-tenth of that of light; but, being a function of velocity, it increases together with it, and the more rapidly the closer we approach the velocity of light. This hypothesis presupposes either the existence of various electrical charges and the ether, or the ether alone, of which the electron is only a modification.

Finally, at the present time, the works of Dr. Le Bon* and certain English physicists lead us, apparently, to the conclusion that neither the quantity of matter nor even the quantity of energy remains constant. They are both only relations depending on the state of the ether and on its motion.**

* Gustave Le Bon: *L'Evolution de la Matière.—L'Evolution des Forces*. (Flammarion, éditeur.)

NB

** Apparently, matter is converted into energy and energy into matter. By matter, of course, one should understand only gravitational matter, and by energy—only the capacity to perform detectable work. If by matter is meant the unknown basis of things, from which everything originates and into with everything returns, the ether, for example, or some other primordial entity, then Le Bon's conclusions by no means refute its eternal nature and constancy; they lead neither to creation out of nothing nor to absolute destruction.

[163-171]...Today nothing remains, nor should anything remain, of this idea. We have arrived at the diametrically opposite viewpoint. All physicists are prepared to revise the fundamental principles of their science or to restrict their application as soon as new experimental data provide the necessary motive for doing so.

The experimental method consists in rising from particular facts to general laws, and from the latter to still more general laws, constantly deepening the nature of the given thing by this ascending movement. It deduces particular laws from general laws in its systematising theories only to the extent that it encounters these general laws on its path; and it encounters them by means of particular experiments and by hypotheses which these experiments are called upon to verify.

But should it be concluded from this that physicists thereby abandon the hope of arriving at basic principles and increasingly deep-seated elements that will explain and embrace an ever greater part of the given thing? Such a conclusion, even though it opposes the mistake of the ancient mechanists, would be a no less dangerous error. The present-day spirit of the physico-chemical sciences, the scientific modern spirit, is not such as to retreat before the unknown. It advances more and more boldly towards conquest of it, but by increasingly reliable methods. The stability of the principles of physics will be assured only at the end of the task. That is why we are witnessing today, and will witness more than once again, so many revolutions produced in former, or in future, ideas by the unforeseen discoveries which have already thrown light on the path or are destined to do so in the future. Progressive physicists, as we have seen, are no longer frightened by doubt being cast on the principles of the conservation of mass or of gravitational matter.

Truth is not given ready-made; every day something more is added to it. That is the conclusion which should be constantly repeated. Thanks to scientific work, our mind daily becomes adapted more closely to its subject, penetrating

Agnosticism = shamefaced materialism[166]

more deeply into it. The assertions which we believed we could put forward after studying the mathematical sciences present themselves here, too, in an almost necessary way, and at least in a very natural way. Every moment scientific progress establishes between things and ourselves a conformity which is at once closer and deeper. We are comprehending more and better. And we invariably see that a result established by scientific experiment, i.e., carried through methodically, may no longer, in the light of new results, have the same degree of importance but yet continues to exist by itself, intact and indelible, eternal as truth, for it is a truth. He who would claim that this effort is fruitless, or that it will always be only strictly limited, is very daring and is refuted in advance by everything that the history of science reveals to us.

The dispute between energeticists and mechanists, a dispute often extremely lively, particularly on the part of the energeticists, is properly only a moment of the progress of the physico-chemical sciences and, moreover, a necessary moment. Far from breaking the unity of development which all historians have noted in these sciences, it would rather seem to have its natural place there, like the old disputes between Cartesians and atomists, between Cartesians and Newtonians or Leibnitzians, between the kineticists and the dynamists. And just as in the case of the old theoretical disputes, the encounter between the two great contemporary theories or, better still, their parallel development, has rather had fruitful results. It has promoted the forward movement of science.

In the first place, energetics has put us on our guard against certain abuses of mechanist models, against the temptation of taking these models for objective reality. Further, it has deepened thermodynamics and shown very well the universal significance of its basic laws which, instead of being restricted to researches relating to heat, have a legitimate and necessary application to the whole field of the physico-chemical sciences. By extending the scope of these laws, energetics has greatly contributed to making their formulas more exact. More than this, while energetics has

shown itself to be less fruitful than mechanism, from the viewpoint of discoveries, it nevertheless always represents a splendid instrument of exposition—sober, elegant and logical. Finally, and this is particularly notable in such chemists as Van't Hoff, Van der Waals and Nernst, but is more and more frequently encountered also among the physicists, both theories are readily accepted; in each case that theory which best lends itself to the investigation is selected. They are used concurrently; scientists start out from the general equations of mechanics or from the general equations of thermodynamics, depending on whether the path thus followed appears simpler or more successful. The point is that physical theories are essentially hypotheses, instruments of investigation and exposition, or organisation. They are forms, frameworks, which have to be filled in by the results of experiment. And it is these results alone that constitute the true, real content of the physical sciences.

It is on these that all physicists agree, and their constantly increasing quantity, ever more concurrent and harmonious, characterises the progress of physics, its unity and its lasting nature. They are the touchstone of the theories and hypotheses which served to discover them and which endeavour to organise them, while respecting their real affinities, reproducing as closely as possible the order of nature. And these theories, although they are always hypothetical and, it follows, are always losing something—at times a great deal—to the extent that experience brings us new discoveries, never, however, die completely. They become integrated by becoming transformed into more comprehensive, more adequate new theories. It was so with the Cartesian theory and with the atomic theory and, from the latter, with Newton's theory. Evidently it will be so with energetics and the old mechanism. And are not the kinetic hypotheses of the present day preparing for this integration and this reconciliation?

"The chronicler should note the fact that the majority of modern results in the field of physical chemistry were achieved by means of a successful combination of thermodynamic methods and the views of the molecular theory, in exactly the same way as the creators of the modern theory of

heat simultaneously devoted their best efforts to the development of atomistics, in particular the kinetic theory.

"...We should regard, as an outstanding result of the latter, the transference of atomistics to the science of electricity.... Through this marvellous widening of its horizon, atomistics threw a totally new light on a number of physical and chemical processes....*

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§ 8. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

If the unknown is boundless, it would nevertheless be wrong in our day to call it incognisable, as was done a few years ago.

The repeated and irreparable setbacks of metaphysical attempts led physics to constitute itself as a science by resolutely eliminating the problem of matter. Thereafter it sought only the laws of individual phenomena. This was "physics without matter." But the growing successes due to this new method permit us, it seems, to assert today, contrary to the too narrow positivism of the Auguste Comte kind, that it changed only the method and not the subject or significance of physics. Instead of approaching the problem of matter in all its generality and from its most difficult and basic sides, it approached it, on the contrary, through superficial details and from the most accessible side. This was putting common sense before audacious pride. Common sense was rewarded, for nowadays, as a result of so much work in approaching, we are beginning to comprehend the problem in all its generality and in all its depth.

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In conformity with history, invariably repeated by the human mind ever since it has been striving to know things, science has taken a new subject of study from the world of metaphysical chimeras. The nature of matter is no longer a metaphysical problem because it is becoming a problem of an experimental and positive order. True, this problem has not been solved scientifically; there is still room for many surprises; but one thing now seems

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* W. Nernst, *Revue générale des Sciences*, 15 mars, 1908.

certain: it is science and not metaphysics that will solve it.

Furthermore, I think, and I have tried in another place to demonstrate it, that kinetic ideas will always be closely linked with the progress of physics, because they constitute an eminently useful, if not indispensable instrument of discovery, and because they are best adapted to the conditions of our knowledge. That is why I see the future of physics in the continuation of mechanistic theories. NB That is why I have said that the energetics theory will probably be absorbed, as was the old mechanism, into a kinetic theory which is more flexible and stricter from the viewpoint of the admission of hypotheses. But mechanistic hypotheses, despite the repugnance felt for them by abstract minds too preoccupied with mathematical rigour, will probably always remain necessary for the progress of physics, because they are hypotheses, while the deliberate aim of the energetics theory is to exclude hypotheses. More than this: they are hypotheses that above all appear capable of becoming the object of experiments, because they are expressed in objective terms, in terms of perceptions, which if not real are at any rate possible. Indeed, science cannot do without guiding hypotheses.

CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

§ 1. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

[173-174]...With the problem of life we come to the basic differences which can separate philosophy from science. Up to now the argument has been, one might say, above all theoretical. The majority of the philosophers worthy of the name admit that, practically speaking, scientific results are valid for matter. If from the speculative point of view they were able to raise some objections to this validity, they nevertheless recognise that everything takes place as though the conclusions of science were, if not based on right, at least applicable in fact to material reality. To some NB extent this reality can be expressed by mathematical, mechanical and physico-chemical relations.

For matter, therefore, geometrism and mechanism remain a good formula of study....

[177] *Animism*, which was in former times partly supported by Plato and Aristotle, considers that all the phenomena of life are due to a rational force, hence to the soul. In contradistinction to the Greek physicians who sought the causes of health or sickness (the theory of humours) in the data of observation, in contradistinction to Descartes who absolutely separates the thinking soul from organic and material facts, Leibnitz and particularly Stahl support the view that the inner life processes, although they have nothing in common with conscious and rational actions, are nonetheless manifestations of the soul.

Barthez and the Montpellier school, persisting in the belief that the phenomena of life can be due only to a special cause, refer them to a vital force distinct both from material forces and the soul: hence the name *vitalism* given to this theory....

§ 3. THE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN MECHANISM AND NEO-VITALISM

[189-190] If we try in some way to synthesise neo-vitalism according to its chief representatives, scientists or philosophers, it seems we arrive at the following: the criticism which the neo-vitalists make of biological mechanism is closely linked with that which the pragmatist, anti-intellectualist or agnostic philosophies made of the mathematical and physico-chemical sciences. It appears to us that we change the problem when we pass from matter to life. Essentially, we are once more faced, as we surmised at the outset, with the same basic problem, and that problem is again the problem of the value of science insofar as it is knowledge. Only the particular terms in which it is essentially raised are changed.

With what, in fact, did the new philosophy reproach the mathematical or physico-chemical sciences? With being an arbitrary and utilitarian symbolism created for the practical requirements of our mind, our reason, which are faculties of

action and not of cognition. Thus, when we extend the physico-chemical method to biological facts we naturally also transfer in the results that it allows us to attain the consequences it implies, as regards the value of these results. Hence the physico-chemical mechanism will be an excellent formula for giving us a practical grasp of living things; it will be totally powerless to enlighten us as to what life itself is. As with the physico-chemical sciences in the sphere of matter, physico-chemical mechanism in the sphere of life will allow us to act, but never to know.... NB

[192-194]...The neo-Thomists restore force, aspiration, desire in matter, re-animate it with the spirit, although heathen, of hylozoism, from which the Greeks, and in particular Aristotle, seem never to have fully departed. Incidentally they distort the Hellenic doctrine. For them matter has no other activity but the force which the creator put into it: the memory, so to speak, of its creation and the indelible impression of it which it bears. Hence its activity is not essential but borrowed, it is creative only by authorisation. But precisely thanks to that, it does not escape at all from the complete grasp of mechanism.

Moreover, the nominalists, who have a close affinity to this neo-scholastic movement,* and the pragmatists, pursuing a regular flirtation with

* The neo-scholastics or neo-Thomists seek above all to rehabilitate the scholastic interpretations of Aristotelianism and therefore the philosophical doctrines of Saint Thomas.—The nominalists insist on the symbolic, artificial and abstract nature of science, on the huge abyss between reality an its formulas.—The pragmatists have a similar doctrine, but one which rests on a more general metaphysics. All cognition is directed towards action; consequently we know only what interests our way of acting. All these philosophies are agnostic in the sense that they deny that we can reach, with the help of our intellectual faculties, an adequate and precise knowledge of reality. Despite the fact that Bergson formulated a metaphysics close to pragmatism—and prior to it—he arrived at much less agnostic conclusions. Science, reason, attains part of the real, that which lends itself to being reduced to complete determinism and to being fully represented in the form of spatial multiplicity, in a word, that which is the object of the mathematical and physico-chemical sciences. It is only for the remainder that reason and science are inadequate and have to be supplemented by intuition and philosophy. Incidentally, all these doctrines are very shadowy and it is very difficult to define them. NB

these philosophies of belief (all too often one has rather to call them philosophies of believers), considered that they had the right to say that the content of their subject is not exhausted by the science of matter. In order truly to know, it is necessary "to proceed further." A fortiori, will they support the view that when we approach life the limits of science become still more restricted? Physico-chemical mechanism will be applicable only to the material conditions of life, but not to life itself.

To sum up, for the pure disciples of Bergson it will be all the material conditions of life, only these, but all of them, that mechanism will be able to attain. For the others, it will not even be all the material conditions of life, but, insofar as matter is already to a certain degree living and stamped with finality, only that which is mechanical and inert that we can abstract from it, only that which we can adapt from it for our practical needs. And these formulas can already serve for answering the question that has been raised and for fixing exactly the part of vitalism in mechanism.

Is it not possible to find a more expressive formula of demarcation? For the vitalist life plays the part of a creative force; but precisely because it depends besides on material conditions, it is not at all a creation ex nihilo. As a result of its operation it will certainly give something new and unpredictable, but in order to arrive at that, it will operate on pre-existing elements which it will have combined, and above all starting from pre-existing elements to which it will have added. The mutations observed by the botanist De Vries who, as a mechanist, interprets them differently would here be the manifestation itself and the proof of these creative additions.

NB

§ 4. NEO-VITALISM AND MECHANISM DIFFER ONLY IN PHILOSOPHICAL HYPOTHESES WHICH SUPPLEMENT SCIENCE

[204]...But in the vitalist method the entelechies and dominants have nothing in common with described elements: the ends cannot be described because they do not exist materially—at any rate they do not yet exist, for they are in the

letting the cat out of the bag!

process of becoming, of a progressive realisation.

Their influence is not perceptible to the senses. That is why it is more dangerous to turn to them in science than to turn to mechanical models—and the history of all the sciences proves it. The teleological hypotheses by their very nature escape experimental control and can only be harmful if they are chimerical.

§ 6. MECHANISM, TOO, IS ONLY A HYPOTHESIS

[216-218]...But it would be contrary to all the lessons of experience to assert that in the phenomena of life everything can be reduced to physico-chemical laws and that mechanism in its whole scope has been verified experimentally. On the contrary, we know very little about life. Experimental biology has to its credit a number of important results, if they are taken in themselves, but they are very insignificant when compared with all the results that we still have to obtain.

Why, then, concern ourselves with mechanist theories, one is led to think. Should not these very general hypotheses, the verification of which presupposes the complete achievement of science, be banned from science? Here again we find an opinion that we have already seen expressed by a number of physicists regarding physics and, in particular, mechanistic theories in physics. Let us recall that some energeticists were in favour of banning mechanist hypotheses from physics as being unverifiable, useless and even dangerous generalisations. Among biologists, too, we find some scientists who adopt the same attitude and align themselves directly with these energetics physicists. In their opinion biology should be restricted to a description of the phenomena of life, without going beyond what experience allows us to affirm. While using the energetistic scheme, it will restrict itself, when seeking general formulas for systematising its laws, to measuring exchanges of energy between the organism and its environment in the performance of various organic functions, and to the enunciation of the laws governing these exchanges.

NB

FROM MARX TO MAO
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un aspect timide du mécanisme*

But is not this already an admission that there is a basic analogy between the physico-chemical sciences and biology, at any rate from the standpoint of the description of facts and experimental verification? The energetics school in biology is less clearly differentiated from the mechanistic school than in physics. It is rather only a timid aspect of mechanism, for it opposes teleology and postulates a conformity between the phenomena of life and inorganic phenomena. NB

And this again brings us to our previous conclusions: every time it is possible to make a scientific analysis of a biological phenomenon, we again find ourselves up against the relations between biological activity and physico-chemical activity. Hence everything takes place as though, in connection with these facts, the mechanical hypothesis, or at least the physico-chemical theory of life, had been partially verified....

§ 7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: BIOLOGICAL INDICATIONS

[223-224]...Living matter is clearly conditioned by habit and heredity: everything takes place as though it remembered all its preceding states. It is said, however, that inanimate matter never manifests this property. It would even be a contradiction to imagine anything of the kind. All material phenomena are reversible. All biological phenomena are irreversible.

In these conclusions one forgets that the second principle of thermodynamics could have been called the principle of evolution or heredity.** One forgets about all the phenomena of "residual" electricity and hysteresis. One forgets that physics will not retreat even in the face of this conclusion: no phenomenon of reality is absolutely reversible, which, however, does not prevent this irreversibility of partial systems, when transposed in the infinity of time and space, i.e., in the total universe, from being conditioned by reversible phenomena—just as chance and coincidence are, probably, only a sign of our ignorance of necessary, very

* timid aspect of mechanism—*Ed.*

** Clausius called it the principle of *entropy* which exactly corresponds to the word "evolution," though derived from Greek rather than from Latin.

complex laws. However that may be, and no matter which way one looks at irreversibility, heredity cannot be an insurmountable obstacle for mechanist biology.

[227]...Scientific discipline tries primarily to find, beneath the appearances which our direct sensations of objects and living beings give us, the relations which link them together, the bonds of dependence which explain their appearance or disappearance, or their variations. The mechanistic theory of evolution is nothing but the effort to determine these relations of dependence as regards the aspects, forms and characters in which life and living beings appear to us.

Scientific discipline further tries to link every particular sphere it studies with the other spheres in which it is applied. Science cannot resolve to consider as isolated for all time the various orders of facts for whose sake it is divided into particular sciences. This division has entirely subjective and anthropomorphic causes. It proceeds solely from the requirements of research which compel the serialisation of questions, the concentration of attention on each of them separately, starting with the particular in order to arrive at the general. Nature is of itself one whole.

An approach to dialectical materialism

NB

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF MIND

§ 2. ANCIENT EMPIRICISM AND ANCIENT ANTI-METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS: PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL PARALLELISM

[242-243] Although metaphysical rationalism constituted the great philosophical tradition, its ancient affirmations a priori could not fail to evoke objections from critical minds. Indeed, in all times we see philosophers trying to resist the rationalist and metaphysical trends. These were in the first place the sensualists and materialists, then the associationists and phenomenists. In a general sense they may be called empiricists.

Instead of opposing mind to nature, they try anew to put mind in nature. Only, they continue to understand mind in the same simplified and

intellectualist manner as those whom they are combating....

[244]...The empiricist theory regarded mind in approximately the same way as atomism regards matter. This is the psychological atomism in which atoms are replaced by states of consciousness: sensations, ideas, feelings, emotions, sensations of pleasure and pain, movements, volitions, etc. ...

[245-246]...Thus our psychological states are only the sum-total of elementary consciousnesses, corresponding to the atoms of which our nerve centres are composed. Mind is parallel to matter. It expresses in its own form, in its own language, what matter, in turn, expresses in its own form, and in a different language. Mind, on the one hand, matter on the other, are two mutually-reversible translations of one and the same text.

For the idealists, the original text is mind; for the materialists, it is matter; for the dualist-spiritualists both texts are equally the original, since nature is written simultaneously in both languages; for the pure monists, we are concerned with two translations of an original text that, eludes us....

§ 3. THE MODERN CRITICISM OF PARALLELISM

[248-249]...When it is said that consciousness is one and continuous, one must beware of thinking that the theory of the unity and identity of the "Ego," the corner-stone of ancient rationalism, is being revived. Consciousness is *one*, but it does not always remain identical with itself, as is the case, moreover, with all living beings. It is constantly changing; not as something created once and for all, which remains what it is, but as a being that is being constantly created: evolution is creative. There would only be a need for the notion of identity and permanence if it were necessary, in order to discover the real appearances, to impose the link of syntheses and unity on the multiple states which seem to be revealed behind these appearances. But if one supposes that reality is essentially continuous, and that the gaps in it, are artificial, then there is no longer any need to appeal to the principle of unity and permanence.

The theories of Anglo-American pragmatism are extremely close to these. These theories are very diverse, particularly in the moral and logical applications that it has been sought to deduce from them. But what gives them their unity and allows us to group them together are precisely the general features of the solution they have given to the problem of consciousness. William James, the great psychologist of pragmatism, gave this solution its clearest and most complete form. His conception opposes at one and the same time, and for almost the same reasons, both the conception of metaphysical rationalism and that of empiricism.

[251-252]...William James claims also that to arrive at this theory he needed only to follow with the utmost rigour the teaching of experience: hence he calls it "the theory of radical empiricism" or of "pure experience." For him the old empiricism remained impregnated with metaphysical and rationalist illusions. He tried to free it from them completely.

James' "theory of experience"

Indubitably, these new theories of consciousness won very great favour in a very short space of time: the Englishmen—Schiller and Peirce, the Americans—Dewey and Royce, scientists like Poincaré, Hertz, Mach and Ostwald in France and Germany, and, on the other hand, almost everyone who wanted to reform Catholicism, while remaining faithful to it, could be associated with the trend of ideas which have been most systematically presented by Bergson and James. It is also incontestable that this favour seems to be largely merited.

NB James, Mach and the priests

[254-255]...True, rationalism claimed that empiricism, i.e., the explanation of the progress of the mind by experience alone, destroys all science or, if you prefer, all truth. The theory of innate or a priori reason was, above all, a legitimisation of the rights of science. We shall see, in connection with the problem of knowledge and truth, that pragmatism has in fact often led to sceptical conclusions, but these conclusions are by no means necessary. James himself, who at times seems to

stand extremely close to sceptical irrationalism, has pointed out that in a strict interpretation of experience it should not be considered as giving us only an idea of isolated facts, but as giving us in addition, and in particular, an idea of the relations existing between the facts.

But does it not then become impossible to say with the rationalists that the empiricists have no guarantee that tomorrow's experience will be identical with yesterday's or, in other words, that phenomena always follow one another in the same order since it is precisely the order of phenomena that is the subject of experience? When we come into contact with nature, the mind actually perceives not isolated phenomena, the terms between which it will later establish some relation or other, but the relations themselves, a definite continuity in which we then arbitrarily mark out the terms themselves, rather as we mark points on a line.

Thus, it seems that the new orientation which has appeared in philosophy and which has been given the name of pragmatism marks an indisputable advance in the scientific and philosophical conceptions of the mind.

§ 4. GENERAL CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

[256-258]...One would now have to establish accurately what constitutes the relations which form the psychological world and how they differ from the relations which comprise the rest of nature and experience. Perhaps the Viennese physicist, Mach, has made the clearest points on this subject.* In every experience that which is given depends on a multitude of relations which in the first place are divisible into two groups: those which have been verified in an identical way by all organisms externally analogous to our own, i.e., by all witnesses, and those which differ according to the witness. It is all the latter that are the subject of psychology and together they form what we call psychological activity. More exactly, the former are independent of our orga-

* *Année psychologique 1906*, XIIe année. (Paris, Schleicher.)

nism and biological activity. The latter do depend on them, intimately and inevitably.

If we take a piece of sulphur, their the geometrical, mechanical, physical and chemical properties are relations which are independent of our organism. Psychology has nothing to do with them. If a living being is concerned new relations are added to the previous ones: biological properties which, too, are independent of our organism. If it is a matter of our own organism itself, it also possesses properties which to a certain extent are independent of the conditions in which it is given to us in the experience; these are physico-chemical and biological properties. Mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry and biology are so many sciences, each of which takes a group of relations from the sum-total of relations included in the given thing, and which are independent and should be examined independently of our organisation. These are *objective* relations, the subject of the natural science, the ideal of which is to exclude from what is given all relations which make this given dependent on our organism....

[259-261] Experience shows us the reciprocal influence of the biological and the psychological, the system of relations between them. Why should not each of these two orders of facts be regarded as two orders of facts of nature, which act and react on each other, like all the other orders of natural facts: heat, electrical, optical, chemical and other phenomena? There is no more and no less difference between all these orders than between the biological order and the psychological. All phenomena should be regarded on one and the same plane and as able to condition one another.

Against this conception the objection will no doubt be raised that it fails to explain why there is experience and knowledge by the organism of this experience. But does it not seem that one could and should reply that this question, like all metaphysical questions, is badly framed, non-existent? It arises from an anthropomorphical illusion which always opposes mind to the universe. One cannot say why there is experience, for experience is a fact and as such imposes itself.

"experience is a fact"

So as to depart from abstractions and generali-

ties, let us try to develop in a more concrete form the definition of psychology that we have just given—and which appears to us the simplest and most scientific. Let us try to imagine the general conception of psychological activity to which it leads us.

Experience or, to use a less ambiguous term, the given, has up to now seemed to us to be dependent on mathematical, mechanical, physical and other relations. When we analyse these conditions, it appears to us, in addition, to be dependent on certain relations concerning which one can say, in general, that they distort it according to the individual to whom it is given: these distortions constitute the subjective, the psychological. Can we establish—of course very roughly and preliminarily—the general meaning of these new relations, of these distortions, i.e., the direction in which scientific analysis, in its progress through the centuries, dares to reveal the most general relations (principles) which they imply?

Why, in other words, is the given subjectively distorted, instead of being identical for all individuals, instead of being a direct datum, forming a single unity with the knowledge that we have of it? It is distorted to such a degree that a fairly large number of philosophers and common sense have gone so far as to smash the unity of experience, and to advance the irreducible dualism of things and the mind, which is nothing but the dualism of experience as had by all, to the extent that the sciences correct it, and experience as distorted in the individual consciousness....

experience of socially organised individuals

[271-272]...Images are not identical with sensations as subjectivism has maintained, if this word, ambiguous in the scope of its meaning, is given the sense of immediate experiences. On this point Bergson's analysis has been by no means fruitless. The image is the result of certain relations already involved in immediate experience, i.e., in sensations. Only the latter involve quite a number of others. Let there be given only the relations which form the system of the "image" (a partial system, if compared with the whole system of sensations and immediate experience)—more exactly, let there be given only those rela-

tions of the whole system which involve the dependence of what is given on the organism, and then we have precisely the image, the recollection.

In defining recollection in this way we have done no more than express the latest results of experimental psychology as well as the older ideas of common sense: recollection is an organic habit. All that is common to recollection and primitive sensation are the organic conditions. The former lacks all the extra-organic relations with what we call the external environment involved in sensation. NB

This complete dependence of the image and partial dependence of sensations on organic conditions also enables one to understand illusions, errors of the senses, dreams and hallucinations, when relations with the external environment are to some degree abnormally cut off, and experience becomes reduced for the individual to that which is taking place in his organism, i.e., to the relations which depend on the latter, hence to the purely psychological, the purely subjective.... NB

§ 5. THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

[280]...Our life, fully conscious, is only an extremely limited part of the sum-total of our psychological activity. It is as it were the centre of an illuminated area, around which extends a much larger semi-shaded region that gradually passes into absolute darkness. Ancient psychology made a very serious mistake in regarding fully conscious activity alone as psychological activity.

Although it is difficult to exaggerate the extent of the unconscious in our organisation, one should not, as is very frequently done by a certain kind of pragmatist psychology, exaggerate the qualitative importance of this unconscious.

According to some pragmatists, clear consciousness, intellectual and rational consciousness, is the most superficial and insignificant part of our activity....

§ 6. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE

[285-286]...To immediate and superficial observation, the higher psychological life, of course, seems heavily stamped with final cause. In generalising by a familiar procedure from the known to the unknown, one sees that from the earliest times attempts have equally been made at interpreting in a teleological way the entire lower psychological life. The simplest reflex, like blinking an eye when the light is too strong, the simplest physical pleasures and sufferings, the primitive emotions—do not all these facts appear to be required to maintain and advance the species, or to maintain and advance the individual? Beginning with the amoeba, that embryonic blob of protoplasm which stretches out to some light irradiations and tries to avoid others, has not all activity which can be called conscious always belonged to the category of *tendency*, and is not tendency purpose in action?

NB Nor should one be surprised that James, Tarde and many others conclude from these that psychological laws have a totally different character from the other laws of nature. They are *teleological laws*....

The teleological conception of psychological law is in essence nothing but a scientific facing for metaphysical conceptions, which make tendency, the will to live, instinct, the will, and action, the basis of everything that exists. Moreover, it has been accepted, elucidated and developed by the pragmatists, the adherents of the primacy of action. For them functional psychology and teleological psychology are synonymous terms....

NB

§ 7. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

[294-296]...The antithesis of activity, reality, which cannot be analysed, on the one hand, and of relation on the other, disappears and, both as regards mind and matter, should be left on the dump-heap of obsolete metaphysics. All the given is merely a synthesis, whose analysis is the concern of science, which traces it to its conditions and, further, resolves it into relations.

But in that case what becomes of the immortality of the soul, particularly its personal immortal-

ity, since for two thousand years now we have valued this above everything. Not to follow the law of things, not to follow the law of everything living, not to disappear, not to be superseded by something else! To run this fine risk, belatedly invented by the bad gambler, that is man, the bad gambler who wants to win the prize and demands that the dice be loaded in his favour!

To be sure a system of relations can hardly seem eternal or immortal. However, there is no absolute impossibility about it. Improbable—yes! Impossible—no! Only, on the ground on which we now stand, it would be necessary for experience to destroy the improbability or, at any rate, to convert it into probability.

It would be necessary for experience to force us to discover, beyond the subjective, the conditions which would exist after the disappearance of the organism, the relations which would make it partially dependent on something other than that organism. It is for experience to decide. It alone is capable of dispelling doubts. *A priori* there is nothing to stop certain conditions, certain relations, from being discovered which would involve—at least partially—the indestructibility of one part of what is given, for example consciousness.

But need this be said? Experience has so far never shown us anything of the kind. I am aware that spiritualists claim the opposite. But that is mere assertion. Their experiments, at least those that are not based on trickery or deception (and are not these a minority?), in the present state of things can at most induce us to think that there exist some forces of nature, some kinds of mechanical motion, of whose manifestations we know very little, and the conditions and laws—still less. It even seems probable that they depend on the human organism and are simply related to the unconscious psychological and biological activity.

Moreover, in the face of the poverty of the sham experimental verifications of the life beyond the grave, the theory of the immortality of the soul can only retain the form which Socrates and Plato already gave it: it is a risk one has to take—it is an appeal to the unknown and an appeal to which there hardly seems any chance of getting a reply....

immortality and Rey's agnosticism

CHAPTER VI
THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY

§ 1. IRRATIONAL MORALITY: MYSTICISM OR TRADITIONALISM

[301-302]...The new philosophies are, therefore, primarily moral doctrines. And it appears that these doctrines can be defined as: *a mysticism of action*. This attitude is not new. It was the attitude adopted by the sophists, for whom there was also neither truth nor error, but only success. It was the attitude adopted by the post-Aristotelian probabilists and sceptics, the attitude of some nominalists at the time of scholasticism, the attitude of the subjectivists of the eighteenth century, notably Berkeley.

NB

NB

The doctrines of the intellectual anarchists like Stirner and Nietzsche rest on these same premises. Thus, in the stock of modern nominalism and pragmatism the words are newer than the things....

[303]...When some modernists, like Le Roy, derive from pragmatism a justification for Catholicism, they perhaps do not derive from it what some philosophers—the founders of pragmatism—wanted to obtain. But they draw from it conclusions which can legitimately be drawn and which, incidentally, were drawn or almost so, by outstanding pragmatists like William James and the philosophers of the Chicago school. I think I can say even more than this. I believe that Le Roy draws the only conclusions that should legitimately be drawn from this way of thinking....

[304]...It is characteristic of pragmatism that everything is true that succeeds and, in one way or another, is adapted to the moment: science religion, morality, tradition, custom, routine. Everything must be taken seriously, and that which realises an aim and permits one to act must be taken just as seriously....

[305-306]...What has caused the downfall of traditions and dogmas up to now? Science, or if one prefers to consider the instrument rather than the product—reason. Science lives by freedom;

reason in the final analysis is nothing but free examination. Moreover, science and reason are, above all, revolutionary, and the Greco-Western civilisation founded on them was, is and will remain a civilisation of men in revolt. Revolt has so far been our only means of liberation and the only form in which we have been able to get to know liberty. I have in mind the spiritual revolt of reason that is master of itself, and not the brutal revolt that has been only the covering—often useful, sometimes necessary—for the precious metal constituting the former.

Thus, the chief aid that can be given to tradition, to the preservation of the ancient moral values, to use a fashionable term, is the depreciation of science. That is why pragmatism, nominalism, should have had as logical consequence—as was very well seen by the majority of those who adhered to it, with a rational understanding of the cause—the justification of certain motives of action: religious, sentimental, instinctive, traditional. On the same plane as the motives of action borrowed from scientific cognition or, still more logically, on a higher plane, for science aims only at industrial action, the new philosophy should have led to the legitimisation of an irrational morality: passionate impulses or submission to authority, mysticism or traditionalism. Traditionalism sometimes even goes so far that some (William James, for example) do not hesitate in regard to morality to return to the absolute of rationalist doctrines of morality....

NB

§ 4. THE SCIENCE OF MORALS

[314]...For this conception of morality as a rational art to be possible, it is clearly necessary that a science of morals should be possible. Here metaphysics renews its high hopes. In fact, sociology, of which this science of morals is only a section, has hardly come into being. Like psychology, only much less advanced than this, it is still in the period where it is necessary to argue against the metaphysicians concerning the method, the subject of science and its right to exist. It seems, however, that here as elsewhere the question will finally be decided in favour of scientific effort. One cannot prevent the metaphysicians from chattering, but one can allow them freedom of

speech and action. And so sociology, thanks to the work of Durkheim and his school, has been working and acting....

CHAPTER VII
THE PROBLEM OF COGNITION AND TRUTH

§ 1. TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS

[325-326]...Actually, scientists, pure scientists, concern themselves very little with this question of truth. For them it is enough to arrive at statements which receive universal assent and which, therefore, appear to be necessary. For them every experiment methodically carried out and properly controlled is true. Experimental verification—that they say, is the criterion of truth. And the scientists are perfectly right, for practice has always justified this attitude. To suppose that it will not always justify it would be to imagine the absurd, to doubt for the pleasure of doubting....

NB

[328-332]...The modern rationalists energetically defended themselves against the attacks of pragmatism, when the latter claimed that the reason of rationalists amounted, in the final analysis, to guaranteeing to our mind a true copy of reality. And, indeed, pragmatism reproached rationalism for dividing cognition into two synchronised parts: the objects or things-in-themselves and the ideas which the mind makes of them....

NB

§ 2. THE PRAGMATIST CRITICISM

In the rationalism of the nineteenth century, as in evolutionary empiricism and also among the modern rationalists, we, of course, already find this idea that the mind is not a mirror, nor truth a faithful image of things. Usually it is claimed that truth is the result of the work of the mind on things. But this again means putting things in opposition to mind. Pragmatism goes further.

All experience, all knowledge, is at the same time action: to live means to act, and only to act. From which it follows—and it is this that caused the name of pragmatism to be given to this system, which essentially defines it in the general view—that truth is defined as a function of action, i.e.,

a function of its practical results. This is success. Every experiment that is successful, i.e., that allows the expected result to be achieved, determines a truth. In order to get away from philosophical abstractions, let us note that in the final analysis this conclusion is merely a generalised expression of the faith of scientists in experimentation. At what moment does the scientist say that the hypothesis advanced by him is true? The moment the result he expected to see in the operation undertaken by him is actually apparent. Since this operation corresponds to the hypothesis or, more correctly, to the chain of hypotheses which he had in his mind, and the result obtained corresponds to the conclusion from this chain of hypotheses, his idea was successful; it has been verified by experiment.

To be sure, if one identifies success with experimental verification, then the pragmatist proposition appears to be true; it merely conveys the essence of the experimental method. But the trouble is that the word success is used sometimes in this limited sense and sometimes in its broad, popular sense, depending on the occasion and the philosopher. This is particularly noticeable in the case of William James. He claims that truth applies to everything that is verified experimentally, and, at other times, to everything that ensures any sort of success for our activity. Hence, if one adopts this latter proposition, one is almost necessarily brought to the conclusion that truth no longer exists. For what is successful today may not be successful tomorrow—a thing that often happens in practice, as proved by changes in laws and jurisprudence, moral rules and religious faiths, and scientific opinions. The truth of today is the error of tomorrow, truth on this side of the Pyrenees is error on the other side. The theme is commonplace. And these conclusions, which Peirce—the founder of pragmatism—firmly set aside and combated, and from which the great pragmatist philosophers, William James in particular, tried to escape by means of the most subtle evasions, are in general accepted by the majority of the epigones. Moreover, in regard to the problem of truth, pragmatism has become synonymous with scepticism, just as, in regard to morality or faith, it has become synonymous with irrational traditionalism.

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And yet, as in all criticism, there is, of course, an element of truth in the pragmatist criticism of rationalism. One can say of it what frequently has to be said of critical theories: the destructive part is excellent, but the constructive part leaves much to be desired. Certainly the theory of mind as a mirror of things and of truth as a copy, is crudely superficial. The evolution of scientific truths through all the mistakes which strew the path of science proves this.

sic!

ha!

On the other hand, when we regard ourselves as an organism operating in the environment of the universe, it is true that we cannot separate the realm of practice from that of truth for, in accordance with all that we have said above, and in accordance with all the lessons of science, we cannot separate truth from experimental verification. Only those concepts that succeed are true. But one has yet to discover whether they are true because they succeed or whether they succeed because they are true. Pragmatism is always inclined to choose between these alternatives in favour of the first. Common sense, apparently, can only choose the second....

§ 3. AN INDIRECT INDICATION OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

[332-334]...The given, the experience, is evidently that which is known. Consequently, it is necessary to assume complete unity between the given and the means by which it is cognised, to make a determined break with all dualism at the point of departure—but only at the point of departure. This is an important limitation. Does it not in itself already contain the key to the solution of the problem of truth?

At the point of departure the only possible method of cognition, i.e., the only method of discovery, is the experimental method, the elimination of all a priori methods, all dialectical reasoning.

Modern science fully confirms this proposition and thereby postulates the first statement which we have just advanced. The mathematical sciences themselves have experience for their point of departure; reasoning comes later, as we have seen, and always remains to a certain extent subordinate to experience.

But experience is not merely the immediate experience of the given; it includes also—and this in our view is James' great philosophical innovation—the relations implied by the given, and which form a rigid fabric between all immediate experience and past or future experience. If experience consisted only of immediate experience, we would have only sensations and not science; we would not even have perception in the full sense of the word. The object of science, and even of perception, is precisely to analyse immediate experience in order to arrive at the experience which has prepared it, or which prolongs it. To perceive and above all to note, to draw attention and to reflect—this is the beginning of this protracted experience.

From this second remark we can draw the following conclusion: all knowledge that experience gives us is interconnected and becomes systematised. But it does not become systematised, as in rationalism, as the result of an activity that is superior to it and which would impose its forms on it. While seeking to guarantee the stability of science, this concept on the contrary leads to scepticism, for it makes cognition a creation of the mind, and this dualism inevitably raises the question as to whether or not this creation of the mind, cognition, distorts the given. Here, on the other hand, our knowledge becomes systematised in exactly the same way as it is given to us, and the relations of the given have the same value as the given itself. In reality, the immediately given and the relations it involves form a unity and are indivisible. The acts of cognition are all of the same kind and of the same value....

§ 4. THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

[336-347]...In the absolute realism in which we have thus far been moving there is apparently no place for error. But let us recall that we made experience and cognition identical only at the point of departure. The time has come to show what this limitation implies.

réalisme absolu* (= historical materialism)

It is a fact established by experience that cognition by different individuals is not exactly the

* absolute realism—*Ed.*

same. This can be explained in two ways: either there exist as many different realities as there are individuals (which is absurd: we should be falling into subjectivism), or—and we are consequently forced to adopt this alternative since the given is unique and the same for all—the difference between the cognitions which individuals obtain about the given arises from the conditions in which they were and are situated, in other words, from certain individual relations which exist between them and the given, and which scientific analysis can reveal. This is the conclusion to which we were led by other considerations in connection with the problem of consciousness. We saw that the given involved relations independent of the cognising individual—objective relations—and relations in which the given depends on the cognising organism—subjective relations.

Once this is admitted, we see that in experience, and not now at the point of departure but in the measure that analyse it, bifurcation takes place between the cognising agent and the object of cognition. This relation, in accordance with what we have said, has the same value as the given itself. It imposes itself on us with the same justification as does the given; from which it follows that the difference between the mind and the object should not be regarded as something primary, but as the product of analysis, as two very common relations which analysis discovers in the given ... (W. James); and this distinction derives its value from the value given at the outset to experience taken as a whole, single and indivisible experience.

But in that ease mistakes and errors have a very natural explanation: they are the changes, the distortions, which depend on the individual and subjective conditions of cognition. While science, thanks to experience, makes an increasingly complete analysis of the given, it should, no matter how prolonged and arduous the task, gradually exclude all these "personal equations," which are far more complex than those which astronomers assign to the visual perceptions of the individual observer. It should draw a dividing line between objective and subjective relations. It was for just this purpose that it was created.

Do these considerations not lead us to a convenient and practical definition of truth? Truth is the objective. The objective is the sum-total of observations which are independent of the observer. In practice, it is that which everyone admits, which is the subject of universal experience universal agreement using these words in a scientific sense. In analysing the conditions of this universal agreement, in seeking behind this fact the law it conceals, its cause, we arrive at this conclusion: scientific work aims to "de-subjectivise," de-personalise, experience, methodically prolonging and continuing it. Hence scientific experience is the continuation of crude experience, and there is no difference in character between a scientific fact and a crude fact.

Rey's theory of cognition = shamefaced materialism

It has sometimes been said that scientific truth is nothing but an abstraction. Of course it is only an abstraction if one is considering crude experience, i.e., subjective and individual experience, for it excludes from this experience everything that depends solely on the individual who cognises through experience. But, on the other hand, this abstraction aims at discovering the given as it really is, independent of the individuals and circumstances which change it; it aims at discovering the objective, the concrete par excellence, the real.

NB

It would be interesting to try to verify this general theory by analysing some famous errors. Ptolemy's system, for instance, shows its experience encumbered with individual ideas which depend on the terrestrial conditions of astronomical observation: it is the stellar system as seen from the earth. The system of Copernicus and Galileo is much more objective, since it does away with the conditions which depend on the fact that the observer is situated on the earth. In a more general sense, Painlevé has pointed out that causality in mechanics, in the science of the Renaissance and in the science of our day, embraced the conditions of the appearance of phenomenon independent of space and time. But the point is that the conditions of the situation in space and time embrace, particularly in mechanics, almost the totality of

the subjective conditions which are no longer sufficiently crude to be eliminated by summary consideration.

truth and error (approach to dialectical materialism)

An important conclusion: error is not the absolute antithesis of truth. As very many philosophers have already claimed, it is not positive; on the contrary, it is negative and partial, it is in a sense a lesser truth. In ridding it—thanks to experience—of the subjective that it involves, we progressively approach the truth. Once the truth has been reached, it is in the full sense of the word absolute and a limit, for it is objective, necessary and universal. However, this limit is far removed from us in almost all cases. It appears to us almost like a mathematical limit, which one approaches closer and closer without ever being able to reach. The history of science, moreover, shows us the truth in the *becoming* of development; *the truth is not yet formed, but is rather in the process of formation*. Perhaps it never will be formed, but it will always be more and more formed.

?

A final question may perhaps be raised: Instead of being satisfied with what is, are we not still obsessed by the old metaphysical illusion of trying to discover why things exist? Why does experience have subjective conditions? Why is its cognition not immediately one and the same for all? It would appear that we have the right to refuse to reply; but here thanks to psychology it seems one could indicate in the positive. If full experience had to any degree knowledge of itself, like the god of the pantheists, this knowledge would indeed be immediately one and the same. But in experience, as it presents itself to us, the cognition of experience is given in a fragmentary way and it is only to those fragments of experience that we are ourselves.

phrase-mongering with "experience"

"experience"

Biology and psychology tell us that we are what we are, or rather have been shaped into what we are, by adaptation, a continuous equilibrium with the environment. From which, in general, it can be concluded that our cognition should above all correspond to the requirements of organic life. Moreover, it is at first restricted, vague, extremely subjective, as in instinctive life.

But once consciousness appears in the play of universal energies, it is preserved and strengthened because of its practical utility. Increasingly complex beings are evolved and develop. Consciousness becomes more exact, more precise. It becomes intelligence and reason. And at the same time (adaptation, adequacy in relation to experience,) becomes more complete. Science is merely the highest form of this process. Even if it never attains it, science has the right to hope for a cognition which will rather be at one with the given, which will be absolutely adequate to the object: objective, necessary and universal. Theoretically its claim is justified, because it is in line with the evolution that has taken place up to now. In practice this claim will most probably never be satisfied, for it marks the limit of evolution, and to attain it would require a state of the universe quite different from that at present, and a kind of identification between the universe and the experience of cognition.

l'expérience = le milieu?*

In any case, one conclusion impresses itself: scepticism in relation to science conceals the most complete and clearest metaphysical illusion that ever deceived philosophical thought. It consists in raising non-existent problems, in seeking a non-existent reality beyond reality in order to explain the latter. It is the result of the dualistic abstractions in which philosophy has always been only too willing to engage.

In particular, is it not overthrowing all experience to see in the embryonic, instinctive, vague, almost wholly subjective and instantaneous cognition of awakening consciousness, original and real experience, as Bergson, Le Roy and some pragmatists are inclined to do. Primitive experience, wholly stamped with subjectivity—yes, but also wholly stamped with error and unreality. This vague, nebulous experience is only the covering of experience. True experience of the real, on the contrary, is in the increasingly lucid limit towards which the human mind makes its way, and towards the increasingly rational form which it tends to adopt, towards reason. The most artificial of all abstractions is that which excludes from experience the results of rational labour and the progress of evolution.

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* experience = environment?—*Ed.*

This evolution has been definitely guided by practice and towards practice, for it is transmitted and realised owing to the constant adaptation of the being to its environment. Who would attempt to deny this today? That is one of the most decisive victories of pragmatism over a now fossilised rationalism. But it does not mean that truth is defined as a function of utility and success. On the contrary, it means that the utility and success are a consequence of the acquisition of truth. Why and how did cognition appear in nature? Because some beings were incapable of acting blindly. They had to know the circumstances of their action. And that is why, having taken from pragmatism everything that seemed to us to be excellent in its criticism of the old metaphysics, we resolutely turn our backs on it in the name of absolute positivism.

To express sensibly and accurately the relations between practice and truth, it seems, therefore, that one should not say that what is successful is true, but rather that which is true is successful, i.e., what is in conformity with reality, insofar as it concerns attempted action. Direct action is the result of exact knowledge of realities, in the environment of which it takes place. We act correctly in the measure that we know truly.

shamefaced materialism

§ 5. THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Everyone will agree, I think, that we affirm as true and objective that which is independent of the individual coefficient which is to be found in every individual in the act of cognition. But when divergencies appear it is a matter of saying at what moment the individual coefficient disappears. Confronted by any kind of experimental confirmation, can I draw a line between that which has been universally noted and that which has been noted only by me?

We said, in a general way, that the effort of science is in all cases directed precisely toward drawing this line. Basically, science has no other aim. It could be defined by this characteristic. In practice, then, we already have a primary means of distinguishing what is true and objective from what is subjective and illusory. That which

has been acquired by means of rigorously applied scientific methods will be true. Scientists have the duty of elaborating, perfecting and defining these methods. This primary criterion is more strict than the very vague rule given thus far: universal agreement. For universal agreement may be only universal prejudice. And a priori there is nothing to bar the hypothesis that such prejudices may exist in a truly universal manner during a particular period, although one could hardly cite any of them. But if we replace the expression "universal agreement" by the expression scientific control, then the objection collapses, for, insofar as it is a question of prejudice, it is impossible to indicate the reasons for it, whereas scientific control only exists when these reasons are manifest. Obviously, we see scientific control only where hypotheses are excluded, and we admit that it can just as well establish the limits of an approximation as a strictly exact truth.

confuses the issue

However, scientists will not engage in a search for any other criterion. And from the practical point of view they are perfectly right. But from the speculative and theoretical point of view one may find—and this is the opinion of all metaphysicians who have been engaged in creating a theory of knowledge—that the indicated criterion is unsufficient. Let us summarise in their crudest form all the objections that can be raised from this new point of view: is not all science, in its turn, with its methods and its control, a universal prejudice and, to use Bacon's expression, an idola tribus?* Indeed, one can imagine that no matter what efforts we make to draw a line between the subjective and the objective, we always remain enclosed, at least to a certain extent, in the subjective. Our cognition would always depend on our individual structure and, consequently, would also always distort its object. Taking the psychological hypothesis which we advanced in connection with consciousness, can it not be said that since cognition is the result of the adaptation of our being to the actions which it has to carry out in its environment, all cognition will always be, without our being able to take this into account, a distortion of the environment in accordance with the structure and the requirements of the human race?

* idol of the tribe—*Ed*.

It seems one could certainly reply: yes. But precisely because we cannot take this into account, the problem is insoluble and futile. It must be granted: the truth that man can attain is *human* truth. By this we do not mean to say that it is relative in the sceptical sense of the word. But we do mean to say that it depends on the structure of the human species, and is valid only for that species. Here, with some correction, one must repeat the famous words of Gorgias: we know nothing that is not human. If by chance we were to know something that had nothing of the human in it, we would be unable to take account of it; and if, which is impossible, we were able to take account of it, then we would be unable to inform others of it. Consequently, in looking for a sign and definition of truth, it is not a question of finding a sign and definition that would be valid for anything other than the human race, but simply a sign and definition that would be *absolutely and identically* valid for all representatives of the human race. It is in this sense that the criterion already referred to—scientific control—is sufficient.

relative in the sceptical sense!!!

Moreover, once and for all an end must be put to certain sophisms: truth, valid for the whole human race, human truth, is absolute truth for man, because if it is supposed, as the adherents of an extra-human absolute suppose, that it is not a copy of the real, it is still, at any rate for man, the only possible exact translation the absolute equivalent....

ha!

[351]...Perhaps, those who try to find reasons for doubting scientific results may still say: we are ready to allow that properly controlled experience gives us effectively and fully the transformation of a cause into a given effect and, it follows, an indubitable relation between the condition and the conditioned. But what can prove to us that this relation will manifest itself identically in a second experience? Leibnitz claimed that all facts differ, if only a little, from one another because we can distinguish them from one another (the principle of the indiscernible: in all the forests of the earth no two identical leaves are to be found). A modern scientist, Poincaré, claimed

also that physics never deals with identical facts, but simply with facts that closely resemble one another. In that case, what use is science to us; for if it wants to be strictly exact, then every new fact requires a new law.

This objection is of the same character as the following: every fact embraces infinity. Consequently, we would have to have complete science in order to have the very minimum exact knowledge of the smallest object. It is overcome in the same way and almost of itself ....

[352]...To sum up, the given is the subject of science, because it is analysable, and because this analysis reveals to us the conditions of its existence. Science is certain because every analysis it makes gradually brings us to experimental intuitions which have the same value as the given; hence science has the same degree of certainty as the existence of the universe which it explains and my own existence which is likewise known to me through experimental intuition.

finale = shamefaced materialism

CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE

[353-357]...Up to now philosophy has been above all a system of *values*, to use an expression now in vogue. It sought to establish a hierarchy of things and to make laws about the good, the true and the beautiful in the name of this hierarchy. In general, one can say that it never conceived natural facts on one and the same plane, impartially and objectively; on the contrary it arranged them on different planes in the name of wholly subjective personal preferences or collective prejudices, human of course but equally subjective for that very reason.

All Greek philosophy and scholasticism, the heir of Aristotelianism, present us with typical scales by which the value of things is measured. Both the philosophy of the Renaissance and all modern philosophy, despite the isolated efforts of a Spinoza, were crystallised in one and the same mould. Moreover, leaving aside Spinoza's system, since it represents an excellent attempt to conceive things from a viewpoint as little human and

subjective as possible, we always find, from the very beginnings of Greek philosophical thought, the same two or three general orientations along metaphysical lines. These are the orientations according to which all the textbooks still usually classify philosophical systems under the names of materialism, spiritualism and idealism.

In essence—considering things from the very general standpoint that we adopt here, i.e., the standpoint of the "particular scale of values" offered by each of these orientations—since spiritualism and idealism often present the closest analogies, it can be said that metaphysics has always confronted us with two great scales of value: the materialist scale and the idealist-spiritualist scale. These two scales oppose each other and each is almost the reverse image of the other.

NB

judgment of idealism and materialism

In the idealist-spiritualist scale, mind occupies the topmost position: it gives all the rest its sense and value either because, as in the case of idealism, it represents the sole reality, material appearances being created by it or existing only through it, or because, as in the case of spiritualism, it offers above material reality which is merely its support or its environment, the higher reality in which nature culminates and through which nature is explained.—In the materialist scale, on the other hand, everything derives from matter and everything returns to it. It is the eternal and immutable creator of all the spectacles of the universe, including the spectacle of life and of consciousness. Life is only one particular variety—among an infinite number of others—of the combinations which blind chance has evoked from the original matter. Consciousness, thought are only phenomena of life; the brain secretes them as the liver secretes bile. Basically, all the phenomena that we can observe—amber which electrifies, iron which heats, steam which vaporises, liquid which solidifies, light or sound, life or thought—are all nothing but the appearances embellished by the various combinations of vortices of a homogeneous fluid which fills all space, or of the atoms which collide in the infinite void.

nonsense!

It seems to me that one could represent the manner in which spiritualism and idealism argue

approximately in the same way: motion is inconceivable without a force to animate the moving body. Force is unintelligible except in relation to the effort we ourselves feel in muscular movement, in the tendency of life; it follows that effort presupposes life. But vital effort, in turn, is always directed to an end; bearing the stamp of purpose, it is conceivable only by the consciousness which directs it. Consequently, thought or, at least, something of the order of immaterial and free spirit is necessary both as the supreme principle of explanation and as the essential principle of existence and creation. Allow the spirit and everything in nature becomes clear. Suppress it, and nature becomes incomprehensible. It vanishes into nothingness.

Materialism on the other hand, claims—if I may use the same summary procedure—that every experiment that explains a psychological fact for us reduces it to organic facts. Organic matter comes closer and closer to inorganic matter. Force is nothing but a shock impulse; it is motion combined with something else. Hence at the basis of things we find only sheer, blind motion.

3,000 years of idealism and materialism

And soon it will be three thousand years during which these systems of value have been taken up by generation after generation, elaborated, sometimes made more precise, and very often obscured by the subtleties of thought which is never ready to admit itself conquered. And we are hardly any further advanced than we were at the beginning.

Does this not mean, then, that the questions these conflicting systems are debating are idle questions and badly formulated? Is not the desire to establish an explanatory hierarchy between things a purely anthropomorphic prejudice? And is not this prejudice derived much more from the aspirations of individual sentiment than from rational discussion? Basically, it is for ends totally different from objective cognition that these systems are put forward and opposed to one another, and concern for them has nothing in common with the impartial search for truth. Thus, since they are incompatible with a positive discussion, we shall not consider them any further.

ha!

Either I am greatly mistaken or modern philosophy in its vital and powerful trends—positivism and pragmatism—is tending towards this conclusion*....

[358-362]...Thus, all the preceding seems to show not only that contemporary philosophy is coming closer and closer to science and becoming an increasingly elegant part of it, but also that it is possible to arrive at a scientific conception of philosophy: it would be no more than the necessary complement to science. By setting aside the metaphysical poems of the individual imagination, it would initiate the collective collaboration of scientists, historians and critics.

All facts are subject to scientific explanation; none of them can be cognised objectively, that is *in truth*, otherwise than through the sciences. Evidently, science is still very limited and very superficial, but it can only be developed by those who seek to know; without it all speculation is barren.

Is philosophy therefore condemned? Is it nothing but a word devoid of sense and content? A few years ago many scientists would have said so. And it is true to say that if we mean by philosophy those speculations which, beyond experience or on this side of it, seek the origin, end, and nature of things, the useless foundations of science or action, burdening everything immediately known by an unknowable, which ought to justify it, if, in a word, we mean by it the old dialectics, whether rational or sceptical, idealist materialist, individualist or pantheist, then those scientists have apparently scored a victory. All this metaphysics has only an aesthetic interest which, incidentally, can be a passionate one for those who have a predilection for it: it represents the individual dreams of lofty but hardly practical minds.

But as this philosophy began to find fewer and fewer adherents, scientists created from it something else or other, and in the past few years

W. James on pragmatism

* In defining pragmatism, William James insists on the idea that it is a system which turns away from *a priori* explanations, from dialectics and metaphysics, in order constantly to turn to the facts and experiment.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the most outstanding fact in the field of philosophical knowledge has been the appearance of a large number of philosophies drafted by scientists in connection with their science, with it and for it. It is true that there have been learned philosophers before. Almost all great systems of philosophy are their work. But particularly in their methods and conclusions these systems lagged considerably behind and stand apart from the scientific works of their authors. Contemporary scientists, on the contrary, instead of seeking a general conception of the world, simply seek to supplement and clarify scientific experience by partial hypotheses that are much more exact and closely linked with this experience.

So, in a different way but to achieve almost identical results, Comte's idea is being vindicated: a section of scientific work is being collectively organised with the object of scientific generalisation and the synthesis of the sciences.

The manner in which scientific work is conducted makes this conception of philosophy clearer and more exact. Science is composed at once of the totality of experimental results and of the theories of this totality which are always hypotheses in one respect or another. But these hypotheses are indispensable to science, because it is precisely by their anticipation of future experience and the unknown that science advances. They systematise all that is known in such a way as to throw light on the unknown. Why should not *philosophy, therefore, in the same way, be a general synthesis of all scientific knowledge*, an effort to represent the unknown as a function of the known, in order to aid in discovering it and to keep the scientific spirit in its true orientation? It would differ from science only in the greater generality of the hypothesis; instead of being the theory of a group of isolated and very circumscribed facts, philosophical theory would be the theory of the totality of the facts that nature presents us with, the system of nature, as it used to be called in the eighteenth century, or at any rate a direct contribution to a theory of this kind.

blaguer!

fool!

The philosophical standpoint is not opposed to the scientific standpoint; it stands side by side with it. Even when a scientist is making every effort to attain positivity he is a philosopher, for positivity is itself a philosophy....

bim, bam!

Science should not differ from philosophy either in subject (it is the same: to give an account of experience), or in method (it should be the same, for the scientific discipline is by its very definition the only discipline which can satisfy our intelligence). No, the only difference between them is one of standpoint, and what distinguishes, and is the only thing that should distinguish, the scientific from the philosophical standpoint is that the latter is far more general and always appears somewhat of an *adventure*....

phew!

[364-369]...History shows us that when science becomes too far removed from the most common human concerns, forming the basis of most philosophical questions, when it leaves the burden of replying to these concerns to various speculations or traditional beliefs, out of necessity or excessive prudence, it vegetates or begins to decline. It is necessary, absolutely necessary, therefore, for the gains of science and the scientific spirit to be defended, in case of need in spite of themselves, against excessive presumption or adventurism, when they overstep their rights. For excessive temerity—seen, for instance, in some materialist generalisation—is no less dangerous for science in the case of sane and straightforward minds, than is timidity and lack of spirit in the case of ordinary people. Hence, one of the essential tasks of philosophy is to maintain the general atmosphere required for the development of science, for the normal maintenance and dissemination of the scientific spirit....

defence against materialism

But philosophy, of course, will only be able to fulfil the dual mission which we feel it is called upon to fulfil—to co-ordinate the efforts of scientists, to provide hypotheses which inspire discoveries, on the one hand, and, on the other, to create the necessary atmosphere for scientific advance—if it seeks to be nothing but the organising synthesis of the sciences, regarded and understood in the way scientists regard and understand them, in short, a synthesis established in an exclusively scientific spirit.

It is gratifying to see—to a lesser extent, of course, in pragmatism, but all the same to a sufficiently great extent—that philosophical research today, having decisively broken away from

the metaphysical errors of the preceding period, is extremely well informed regarding scientific works, seeks to conform to them and derives its inspiration from them.

Without doubt, a very vital and pronounced scientific sentiment is taking shape today which, in some people, is developing parallel with religious and moral sentiments and, as it were, on a different plane where conflict is impossible, while in others it has replaced the religious sentiment and fully satisfies their needs. For these, as Renan has beautifully expressed it, science has provided a symbol and a law. They have adopted a truly positive attitude which retains from ancient rationalism its unshakable faith in human reason, while at the same time acquiring from the incontestable triumph of the experimental method the incontestable conclusion that reason is nothing but the constant effort of the mind to adapt itself to experience and to cognise it more and more deeply, the reciprocal penetration of objective reality and subjective thought.

I believe that the future of philosophy lies on this side, because it is on this side that truth is to be found. As in all prophecies, this is nothing but an act of faith. It is for the future to say whether it will be justified or not. And as this is an act of faith, I consider legitimate all other acts of faith, on condition that the attitude of those who perform them is the same towards me. I even consider that it is fortunate that one ideological trend is confronted by trends of opposing ideas; it is by the criticism of its opponents that it is refined, developed, corrected and made precise.

The philosophical attitude which has been outlined in these brief studies could be called rationalist positivism, absolute positivism or scientism. To avoid any ambiguity it would, perhaps, be better to call it experimentalism; this would indicate simultaneously that it rests wholly on experience—but, contrary to the old empiricism, on controlled experience, the fruit of scientific experiment—and that it refuses in its absolute realism and its experimental monism to go beyond the bounds of experience.

!!
positivism, experimentalism, realism = "absolute or rationalist positivism"

experience = Σ* sensations

Experience is primarily and immediately the totality of our sensations, what we call phenomena. But it begins with analysis of itself as soon as attention, thought is applied to it, for this totality of sensations is nothing but a crude and very superficial view of the given. Almost immediately there is to be discerned in it and beneath it some of the relations that it involves and which form its true basis. Science strives to carry this analysis progressively forward, penetrating ever more deeply into the nature of the given. If the immediate given is represented by a point then, in order to obtain a picture of the real given, one has to imagine that this point is merely a projection of the straight line extending beyond it. This straight line can be broken up into several segments, each of which will embrace, without there being any impenetrable partitions between them, families of relations on which the immediate given depends. Each of these families will be formed by virtue of a definition which will be based on the natural affinities by which these relations are joined together. These will be relations of number and position, mechanical, physical relations, etc., and, finally, psychological relations determined by their dependence on the organism to which the given is related. There will be as many particular sciences as there are such groups of relations.

"chose en soi"?**

Philosophy, on the other hand, tries to conceive the straight line in its entire length and continuity. But the line in its totality, just as much as the point which is the projection of it, the immediate given, as also the relations which supplement it to the extent of its analysis, are of one and the same character.

These are the data of experience. And their totality comprises a single experience: human experience. It is our psychological constitution, and not the nature of things, which distinguishes the world from perception, the universe from science; and this distinction is temporary and contingent.

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* summation—*Ed.*

** "Thing-in-itself"?—*Ed.*

Experience, therefore, needs only to be explained. To explain it means simply to formulate the relations it involves, and which it itself brings to our attention if we know how to grasp its lessons. And science is beginning to concern itself with them. But, being all reality, experience is not in need of justification: it exists.

End

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* Written by Lenin on the cover of Rey's book.—*Ed.*

A. DEBORIN.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM[167]

[39]...As a world outlook, dialectical materialism provides an answer—not an absolute one, of course—to the question of the structure of matter, of the world; it serves as the basis of a most brilliant historical theory; on the basis of dialectical materialism, politics and morality become in a certain sense exact sciences. *Being foreign to all dogmatism*, dialectical materialism—correctly understood, of course—introduces everywhere a fresh stream of *theoretico-cognitive criticism*.

inexact

there is no point in using "foreign" words!

[40]...In this article we intend to call the reader's attention only to the theoretico-cognitive aspect of dialectical materialism, which in this case does not, as a method, as a guiding principle of investigation, provide absolute solutions to problems, but primarily assists in their proper framing. As a theory of knowledge, dialectical
1) materialism falls into a formal, or logical, part
2) and a real, or material, one.

In the case of primeval, primitive cognition, *experience* is identical with the object of experience, and the phenomenon with being, with the thing-in-itself. For primitive man, the world of inner experiences also constitutes the world of things. He knows no distinction between the internal and the external world. At a certain stage of cultural development, this primitive form of cognition comes into conflict with the social man's desire to subdue the forces of nature, with the new, higher stage of culture. The contrast between perceptions and things, between the world of inner experiences and the world of things, becomes more and more marked as man's requirements multiply,

experimental evidence grows and accumulates, and clashes between perceptions and the external world become more frequent. That is when the necessity arises for new forms of cognition.

...What we are interested in directly is the logical process which in modern philosophy has led to dialectical materialism.— The psychologism of Hume, Berkeley and others operates chiefly psychically, in the sensuous world. Sensuous images are the objects of cognition. The result of the development of British empiricism is, Esse=percipi, i.e., that exists which is given in perception, and all that is given in perception, has an objective being, exists.

[41]...Kant understood that genuinely scientific cognition is possible only through the medium of "mathematical contemplation." *Sense-perception* does not contain the conditions necessary for universally obligatory cognition. Sensuous images are not capable of embracing the totality of phenomena to be cognised. And Kant, passes from *psychologism* to *transcendentalism*....

[43]...Hegelian philosophy represents the last and closing link of this chain. We have seen that Hume, Kant, and Fichte placed the subject above the object, which they declared to be something *inseparable* from the subject....

[48]...Categories, i.e., pure universal concepts, such as time, space, or causality, are, from the point of view dialectical materialism, *logical* definitions, on the one hand, and *real forms of things*, on the other....

[49]...The limitation of transcendentalism consists in the fact that it does not extend its rights to the real sphere of things and considers that categories are merely *subjective*, and furthermore *a priori*, forms of consciousness. Transcendentalism embraces phenomena in categorical, i.e., logically-universal forms, making it possible to formulate strictly mathematical laws of nature, and to give them a universal character. But transcendentalism, as also sensualistic phenomenalism, is concerned only with phenomena. For them, being, things-in-themselves, are inaccessible....

listen to him!

[50]...Dialectical materialism attains the "absoluteness" and universality of cognition by declar-

ing the forms to be *universal*, *objectively real* "*perceptions*." On this rests the possibility of *mathematical*, or "geometrical" if you will, i.e., exact, cognition of reality. "Geometrical" space and "pure time" are universally real perceptions, and constitute the premise for the "mathematical" cognition of the sensuous world....

[51]...But at the same time dialectical consciousness shows an ability to rise to the "conception" of nature as a "whole," to the conception of the necessity, of the inherency, of the universal order of nature....

[52]...Man *cognises* to the extent that he *acts on*, and he himself is subject to the action of, *the external world*. Dialectical materialism teaches that man is impelled to reflect chiefly by the sensations he experiences as he acts on the external world.... Proceeding from the consideration that it is possible to dominate nature only by submitting to her, dialectical materialism calls upon us to coordinate our activity with the universal laws of nature, with the necessary order of things, with the universal laws of development of the world....

[53]...Thus Parmenides saw the true essence of things ("the One") in that which can be cognised by thought or *reason* and which lies behind fluctuating and mutable phenomena. Thereby, be divorced sense-perceptions from their basis, the phenomenal world from the meta-phenomenalistic.... ooph!

[54]...Whereas for the rationalistic metaphysicists true reality is given in the concept, for the sensualists the real is that which is given in sense-perception or perception. That which lies beyond the senses is inaccessible to cognition. The objects of cognition are phenomena, which are raised to the level of absolute reality. The content of empirical consciousness is changeable and fluctuating. Phenomenalism denies the real substratum of qualities. Given is diversity, the multiplicity of phenomena, but no unity of substance....

[55]...Kant contrived to combine the phenomenalistic doctrine of incognisability of things in and for themselves with the rationalistic metaphys- ?

icists' doctrine of the *existence* of absolutely real being, of "things-in-themselves."

[56]...The French materialists, headed by Holbach, counterposed *nature*, as the metaphysical essence of a thing, to its *properties*. This antithesis in a certain sense denotes the same dualism as that between Kant's "thing-in-itself" and "phenomena..."

rot!

[57]...However, we would be unjust to French materialism if we identified it with Kantianism. After all, eighteenth-century materialism recognises the *relative cognisability* even of the essence of things....

Clumsy to nec plus ultra!*

French materialism, taking as its point of departure the same consideration, that matter acts on our external senses, admits, however, that *certain properties* of things in and for themselves are *cognisable*. But French materialism is insufficiently consistent, since it teaches that only *certain* properties of things are cognisable, while the "essence" itself or the "nature" of them is concealed from us and is not fully cognisable.

This is a muddle

[58]...Kant borrowed this counterposing of the *properties* of the things to their "nature" from the agnostics, from the sensualistic phenomenalists (directly from Hume)....

In contrast to phenomenalism and sensualism, materialism regards the impressions which we receive from things in and for themselves as having *objective* significance. Whereas phenomenalism (and Kantianism) sees no points of contact between the properties of things and their "nature," i.e., the external world, the French materialists emphasise specifically that things in and for themselves, at least in part, are cognisable precisely through the *impressions* they produce upon us, that the properties of things are, to a certain extent, objectively real....

[60]...Dialectical materialism puts material substance, the real substratum, at the basis of being. It has looked upon the world "as a process, as a substance, which is developing continuously" (Engels). The metaphysicists' immutable and absolute being becomes *mutable being*. Substantial

* the highest degree.—*Ed.*

reality is recognised to be mutable, and changes and movements are recognised to be real forms of being. Dialectical materialism overcomes the dualism of "being" and "not-being," the metaphysically absolute antithesis of the immanent to the "transcendental," of the properties of things to the things themselves. On the basis of dialectical materialism, it becomes possible scientifically to connect the thing-in-itself with phenomena and the immanent with the transcendental, and to surmount the incognisability of things-in-themselves, on the one hand, and the "subjectivism" of qualities, on the other, for "the nature of the thing," as Plekhanov observes with very good reason, "manifests itself precisely in its properties." It is the impressions which we receive from things in and for themselves that enable us to judge *of the properties of things in and for themselves*, of objectively real being....

NB

[60-61]...The "immanent" acquires an objectively real character; the "transcendental," which lies beyond phenomena in the sphere of the "incognisable," is transformed from a mysterious essence that is inaccessible to our senses into an "immanent" content of our consciousness, into an object of sensuous perception. The "immanent" becomes "transcendental insofar as it acquires *objectively real* significance, insofar as it makes it possible to judge of the properties of things by impressions; the "transcendental" becomes "immanent" insofar as it is declared to lie in the sphere of the *cognisable*, even though beyond the subject. Beltov expresses himself in the same sense. "According to this theory," he says, "nature is primarily a totality of phenomena. But since things-in-themselves are a necessary condition for phenomena, or, in other words, since phenomena are caused by the action of the object on the subject, we are compelled to admit that the laws of nature have not only *subjective*, but also *objective* significance, i.e., that the mutual relations of ideas in the *subject* correspond, when man is not in error, to the mutual relations of things *outside it*."* This answers in the only correct and scientific form the question of the mutual relations of phenomena and things-in-themselves—that most important question of cognition, over which Kant

NB

NB
Correct truths are outlined in a diabolically pretentious, abstruse form. Why did Engels not write such gibberish?

* N. Beltov, *Criticism of Our Critics*, p. 199.

the metaphysicists and the phenomenalists racked their brains so much.

[62]...The unity of being and not-being is becoming, dialectics teaches. Put into concrete materialist language, this thesis implies that at the basis of all that exists is *substance, matter*, which is developing continuously...

NB

[64]...Hence the body does not consist only in its perceptibility, as the sensualistic phenomenalists believe, but exists quite independently of our perceptions, exists "for itself," as a"subject." But while the body exists independently of our perceptions, our perceptions, on the other hand, fully depend on the body acting on us. Without the latter, there are no perceptions, no notions, concepts or ideas. Our thinking is determined by being, i.e., by the impressions we receive from the external world. That being so, our ideas and concepts, too, have *objectively real* significance.

NB

[65]...The body, acting on our senses, is regarded as the *cause* of the *action* it produces, i.e., perception. The phenomenalists dispute the very possibility of framing the question in this way. The immanenists hold that the external world is not only inaccessible to perception, but also inconceivable, even if such a world existed....

!

[67]...It has to be assumed also that our perceptions, as a result of the action of two factors—the external world and our sensuousness"—are not identical in *content* as well with the objects of the external world, which is immediately intuitively* inaccessible to us....

NB ? ?)

[69]...From the point of view of dialectical materialism, the thing-in-itself is an object such as it exists in itself, and "for itself." It is in this sense that Plekhanov defines matter "as the totality of things-in-themselves, since these things are the source of our sensations."** This thing-in-itself,

* The sign indicates that the words "immediateiy intuitively" should be transposed.—*Ed.*

** "Das Bild dieses Seins außer dem Denken ist die Materie, das Substrat der Realität!" L. Feuerbach, *Werke*, Bd. 2, S. 289.

or matter, is not an abstract concept, which lies behind the concrete properties of things, but a "*concrete*" *concept*. The being of matter is not divorced from its essence or, vice versa, its essence is not divorced from its being.

[70]...An object, devoid of all qualities or properties, cannot even be conceived by us, cannot exist, cannot have any being. The external world is constructed by us out of our perceptions, ??
on the basis of those impressions evoked in us by the external world, by things in and for themselves.... Between the external and internal world there exists a certain distinction, and at the same time a definite similarity, so that we arrive at the cognition of the external world through impressions, but they are precisely impressions produced by objects of the external world. On the strength of the impressions produced upon us by the action of an object, we attribute definite properties to the latter. An impression is the resultant of two factors, and as such it is inevitably conditioned by the nature of these two factors and includes something which constitutes the nature of one and the other factor, something which is common to both....

[71]...Only on the basis of dialectical materialism, with its recognition of the external world, is the possibility presented of building a purely scientific theory of knowledge. He who rejects the external world also rejects the cause of our sensations and arrives at idealism. But the external world is also the principle of uniformity. And a clumsy, absurd word!
if, in our perceptions, we are confronted with a definite, regular connection between them, this only occurs because the cause of our sensations, i.e., the external world, constitutes the basis of this uniform connection....

[72]...Without the possibility of provision it is impossible scientifically to cognise the phenomena of nature and human life. ...But the objects of the external world are in causal relation not only to us, but also to one another, i.e, between the

objects of the external world themselves there exists a definite interaction, a knowledge of whose conditions, for its part, makes it possible to foresee and predict not only the action to be exercised upon us by objects, but also their objective relations and actions, which are independent of us, i.e., the objective properties of things....

[73]...Dialectical materialism by no means predetermines the question of the structure of matter in the sense of an obligatory recognition of the atomistic or corpuscular theory, or of any third hypothesis. And if the new theories of the structure of atoms are triumphant, dialectical materialism will not only not be confuted but, on the contrary, will be most brilliantly confirmed. What, indeed, is the essence of the new trend in the sphere of natural science? It is, above all, the fact that the atom, which physicists used to regard as immutable and most simple, i.e., an elementary and indivisible "body," is found to consist of still more elementary units or particles. It is assumed that the electrons constitute ultimate elements of being. But does dialectical materialism assert that the atom is the absolute limit of being?...

Aha! Plekhanov is silent on this "new trend," *does not know* it. Deborin does not view it *clearly*. Correct!

[74]...It would be erroneous to think, as our Machists do, that with the recognition of the electron theory *matter* disappears as a *reality*, and hence, together with matter, also dialectical materialism, which considers *matter* as the sole reality and the only suitable tool for systematising experience.... Whether all atoms consist of electrons is an undecided question; it is a hypothesis that may not be confirmed. But apart from this, does the electron theory eliminate the atom? It only proves that the atom is *relatively* stable, indivisible and immutable.... But the atom, as the real substratum is not eliminated by the electron theory....

s t u p i d term!

[75]...To sum up. From the formal aspect, dialectical materialism, as we have seen, makes universally obligatory and objective cognition possible thanks to the fact that, from its point of view, the forms of being are also forms of

thinking, that to every change in the objective || world there corresponds a change in the sphere of perceptions. As for the material aspect, dialectical materialism proceeds from the recognition of things-in-themselves or the external world or *matter*. "Things-in-themselves" are cognisable. The unconditional and absolute is rejected by dialectical materialism. Everything in nature is in the process of change and motion, which are based on definite *combinations of matter*. According to dialectics, one "form" of being changes into another through leaps. Modern theories of physics, far from disproving, fully confirm the correctness of dialectical materialism.

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V. SHULYATIKOV.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITALISM IN WEST-EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY (FROM DESCARTES TO E. MACH)

MOSCOW, 1908

sic!

[5] *...In intellectual circles a traditional attitude has been established towards philosophy.... Philosophical ideas are presented with too little and too feeble connection with any sort of class substratum ....

Very many Marxists adhere to the same view. They are convinced that a variegated medley of philosophical views is permissible in the ranks of the proletarian vanguard, that it has no great significance whether ideologists of the proletariat profess materialism or energeticism, neo-Kantianism or Machism....

[6]...To maintain such a viewpoint means falling into a naïve, most grievous error.... Without exception, all philosophical terms and formulas used by it**... serve it to denote social classes, groups, sections and their mutual relations. When dealing with the philosophical system of this or that bourgeois thinker, we are dealing with a picture of the class structure of society, depicted by means of conventional symbols and reproducing the social profession de foi of a definite bourgeois group....

incorrect ∨

incorrect!

[7]...These pictures must not be accepted as being something that could be utilised and brought

* The page references are to Shulyatikov's book.—*Ed.*
** philosophy—*Ed.*

into line with the proletarian world outlook. That would mean falling into opportunism, trying to combine what cannot be combined....

...the first brilliant attempt at this sort of re- sic!
appraisal took place as far back as several years ago. Comrade A. Bogdanov's article "Authoritarian Thought"* undoubtedly opens up a new era !!
in the history of philosophy: after the appearance of this article, speculative philosophy lost the right to employ its two fundamental concepts of "mind" and "body"; it was established that these concepts were formed against the background of authoritar- what
ian relations and the antithesis between them nonsense!
reflected a social antithesis—the antithesis of the organising "top strata" and the executive "lower strata." With amazing consistency bourgeois critics ignored the work of the Russian Marxist....

[8]...In these circumstances, a social and genetic analysis of philosophical concepts and systems is not only desirable, but definitely necessary. It is a task which is extremely difficult and complicated.... Contemporary fashionable systems, e.g., neo-Kantianism or Machism....

[9-10]...Our essay is not intended for a limited circle of experts.... Demos is revealing an interest in philosophy ... our exposition is of a somewhat elementary character.... The viewpoint we are defending ... can be more easily mastered if illustrated not by unwieldy, but by economically selected material....

I

THE ORGANISING AND ORGANISED "PRINCIPLES"

[11]...Economic inequality arose: the organisers were gradually transformed into the owners of the instruments of production,** which had once belonged to society....

* Included in the symposium of his articles "From the Psychology of Society."

** In the present case, we disagree somewhat with the explanations proposed by comrade Bogdanov. He

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

| ?? | now the nonsense is clear!!

[11-12]...Production relations of | "authoritarian" | society... The primitive ‖ savage ‖ everywhere begins to see the manifestation of organisatory will. "...the executor is accessible to external senses—this is the physiological organism, the body; the organiser is not accessible to them, he is presumed inside the body; this is the spiritual personality....

Fiction and empty phrases. Indeed, very "general"!! Words. The savage and primitive communism are slurred over. Materialism and idealism in Greece as well.



nothing but idealism!

[13]...The concept of the mind acquires an increasingly abstract character.

[14]...When in the history of Greek philosophy the famous question was raised: flow is it possible for the multifarious transient phenomena of the material world to have been derived from pure, immutable, non-material substance? What is the relation of "being" to "becoming"?— it was not, contrary to the assertions of all kinds of historians of philosophy, the highest flight of noble human thought, a most altruistic effort aimed at solving

does not attach to this last circumstance the importance it undoubtedly had; he does not even advance it. We had occasion to speak about the question elsewhere "From the History and Practice of the Class Struggle" (in the chapters devoted to the genesis of the ruling classes). Edition of S. Dorovatsky and A. Charushnikov.

the greatest mystery of the universe and thereby giving joy to the human race for all time. The matter was much simpler! To frame the question in that manner merely pointed to the fact that in the Greek towns the process of social stratification had gone a long way, that the gulf between the "upper" and the "lower strata" of society had become deeper, and the old ideology of the organisers, corresponding to less differentiated social relations, had lost its right to existence. Earlier, in spite of all the distinctions between substance and the world of phenomena, the direct connection between them had not been doubted. Now, the existence of this connection is denied. Substance and the world of phenomena are declared to be incommensurable magnitudes. Relations between them are only possible through a series of intermediary links. Or, in more philosophical language, we cannot establish their reciprocal relations either by means of the senses or by means of ordinary thought: to do so requires the assistance of some special "idea," some special intuition.

So, indeed! And Greek materialism?

and the sceptics??

II

ORGANISING AND ORGANISED "PRINCIPLES" IN THE PERIOD OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION

[15]...This very question—the question of the incommensurability of the mental and material "principles," of the absence of a direct connection between them, was put forward and solved by the originators of the new philosophy....

[16]...The spiritualistic sympathies of the Renaissance and subsequent epochs are usually mentioned in passing, but they are very characteristic.*

[17]...The medieval artisan, while being an organiser, at the same time fulfilled executive functions—he worked together with his apprentices. The bourgeois manufacturer knows only one

* It will be recalled that Marx in Vol. I of *Capital* and K. Kautsky note the dependence between abstract religious views and the development of commodity production.

not in the same sense as yours

type of function: he is purely an organiser. In the first case, it is true, a basis is provided for that dualistic "mode of presenting the facts explained by Comrade Bogdanov; nevertheless, the antithesis of organiser and executor is somewhat veiled. Hence the corresponding antithesis of mental and corporeal, active and passive, principles, in the sphere of ideology, could not take a sharp form....

what nonsense!

e.g., *trained workers and trainees* under them

to page 19

[17]...In the workshop of the medieval artisan there was no place for representatives of so-called untrained, unskilled labour. Work is found for them in the manufacturing workshop. They constitute the "lower stratum." Above them are other strata, other groups of workers, each differing according to the degree of skill. Among them certain organising layers are already formed. Going further up ascending scale, we see groups of administrators and technical managers of the enterprises. The owner of the enterprise is thus "freed" not only from every kind of physical labour, but also from many purely organisational duties....

word

[19]...In contrast to the medieval thinkers, the "fathers" of the new philosophy devote very much attention in their systems to the world of transient phenomena, make a detailed study of its structure and development, the laws governing the relations between its parts; they create a natural philosophy. The very same "elevated" position of the leaders of the manufacturing enterprises which inspired in the fathers of the new philosophy the "pure" idea of organising will, suggested to them, similarly, a mechanical explanation of the processes of material reality, i.e., the processes taking place among the organised mass.

The point is that the leader of the manufacturing enterprise is merely the final link in a fairly long chain of organising links. In relation to him, the other organisers are subordinate and, in turn, stand in opposition to him as organised persons. ...But insofar as their role differs from that of the chief leader, insofar as it consists in taking part in the technical work from which the chief leader is "freed," to that extent their "mental" character is blurred and their activity is appraised as activity of "matter"....

Who? See page 17

nonsense!

[21-22]...The bourgeois system in general is a two-faced Janus.... True, we find a definite formulation of dualism only in Cartesianism,—in the system created just at the dawn of the new economic era; true, subsequent philosophical systems, beginning with that of Spinoza, declare that the Cartesian counterposing of God and the world, of mind and body, is contradictory. ...The materialist and positivist systems of bourgeois philosophy, in turn, by no means testify to a triumph over the dualistic viewpoint. The difference between bourgeois metaphysics and the bourgeois "positive world outlook" is not as great as it may appear at first glance. ...The attack made by materialism is not directed against the fundamental premise put forward by metaphysics; the concept of the organising will is not done away with by materialism. It merely figures under another name: for example, "force" takes the place of "spirit".....

NB

[22-23]...In the seventeenth century, at the time of its "storm and stress," the English bourgeoisie preached the doctrine that everything in the world should be explained as a motion of material particles taking place from mechanical necessity. The English bourgeoisie were laying the foundations for large-scale capitalist economy.... They imagined the whole world in the form of an organisation of material particles united in accordance with immanent laws....

In this vulgarisation of the history of philosophy, the struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudalism is completely forgotten.

[23-24]...In the second half of the eighteenth century, the French bourgeoisie flooded the book market with similar treatises.... But we know what is meant by the internal structure of enterprises: it is the realm of matter and mechanical processes. Hence the generalisation: man is a machine, nature is a machine....

not hence

...The motion of matter is conditioned by itself, or rather by its own force (Holbach). The organisatory will, it is seen, has again become extremely transformed, but its presence is noted and is admitted to be absolutely essential.

and what about their struggle against clericalism? Shulyatikov has distorted history!

The manufacturers did not act as revolutionary representatives of "Sturm and Drang"....

<?

III

CARTESIANISM

[25]...The organised *require* an organiser....

[26]...The intermediary organisatory links—"individual minds" can only fulfil their organising role if there exists a superior organisatory centre. Only, the latter brings them into contact with the proletariat—"matter"—within the framework of organised whole, a manufacturing workshop....

NB what nonsense! *the proletariat = matter*

[27]...The Cartesian concept of man is nothing but the further propagation of a definite form of thinking, "a definite mode of presenting the facts, a definite type of their union in the psyche."

nonsense

We have seen that the world in Descartes' system is organised on the lines of a manufacturing enterprise....

...We are dealing with the cult of mental labour....

[28]...I am an organiser and, as such, can exist only by fulfilling organisatory and not executive functions: this is the meaning of the Cartesian assertion, if it is translated into the language of class relations....

...The common, naïve viewpoint sees the external world as it appears through the prism of the senses....

[29]...The concept of the worker as merely a saddler or merely a paper-hanger gives way to the concept of the worker in general. Trade no longer constitutes the "essence" of labour-power....

and what about Plato's ideas"?

[31]...Time, Descartes explains, must not be considered a property of matter: it is "a mode of

thinking," a generic concept created by the latter....

[32-33]...Henceforth philosophy is the faithful servant of capital. ...The revaluation of philosophical values was determined by changes in the organising upper strata and organised lower strata. New organisers, new organised—new concepts of God and spirit, new concepts of matter....

IV
SPINOZA

[37]...All relations between mind and body are only through God. All relations between the intermediary organisatory links and the organised mass are only with the sanction of the supreme organiser!...

...The motion of matter and the activity of the mind are only two aspects of *one and the same* process. There can be no question of any interaction between mind and matter.

[41]...Experience, sensuous perception, is for him an imperative condition for cognising things....

[42]...But ... when Spinoza died, as is well known, the fine fleur of the Dutch bourgeoisie with great pomp accompanied the hearse that carried his remains. And if we become more closely acquainted with his circle of acquaintances and correspondents, we again meet with the fine fleur of the bourgeoisie—and not only of Holland but of the entire world. ...The bourgeoisie revered Spinoza their bard.

Spinoza's conception of the world is the song of triumphant capital of all-consuming, all-centralising capital. There is no being, there are no things, apart from the single substance; there can be no existence for producers apart from the large-scale manufacturing enterprise....

infantile

V
LEIBNITZ

[45] Leibnitz's God is the owner of an exemplarily organised enterprise and is himself the supreme organiser....

phrase-mongering

VI
BERKELEY

a fine explanation! primitive materialism à la *Loria*

[51]...Hobbes' materialism corresponded to the Sturm-und-Drang period of the English capitalist bourgeoisie. The way was paved for manufacture, 1) quieter times began for the manufacturers: Hobbes' materialism gave place to the half-hearted system of Locke. The further consolidation of the position 2) of manufacture determined the possibility of anti-materialist utterances. 3)

what about the relativism of the Greeks?

[56]...“The attraction and repulsion of workers should take place without any obstacles”: in perceptual complexes there are decidedly no absolute elements. Everything is relative.

VII
HUME

vague and inexact

[61]...His kinship to all the thinkers who appear in the foregoing chapters is beyond doubt....

The position of philosophical scepticism adopted by Hume corresponds precisely to such a conception of the capitalist organism.

Go ahead, lump everything together! idealism as well as scepticism, everything “corresponds” to manufacture! Comrade Shulyatikov is simple, very simple.

IX
FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL

? What about Fichte? Fichte?

[81]...There arise systems of so-called objective idealism....

[88]...objective idealists....

[94]...But we know that in all the systems of bourgeois philosophy "matter" is regarded as the subordinate principle (even by the materialists who, we repeat, note its subordinate position by introducing the concept of "force")....

Nonsense. What about the contept of "motion"?

[98]...It is merely one step from Fichte's antithetical method and Schelling's potentialising theory to Hegel's dialectics. And in regard to the latter, after all that has been said in this chapter about the antithetical method, it only remains for us to make a few supplementary remarks. We have already made clear the "real background" of dialectics.

what nonsense!

Hegel merely more fully substantiated the theory of development through "contradictions," which had been outlined by two other objective idealists....

Fichte—an objective idealist!!!

[98-99]...The innovation made by Hegel emphasises the following fact from the sphere of "real" relations. The differentiation of functions and roles in manufacture reaches its maximum. A stratification takes place of each separate executive group and each separate organising group. The functions belonging to any one definite group are distributed among various, newly-formed groups. Each group breaks up and new groups are formed from it. And the ideologist of the manufacturers considers this breaking-up process to be the process of the *internal development* of this or that "principle"....

what nonsense!

X
THE REVIVAL OF THE "MANUFACTURING" PHILOSOPHY

[100]...Speculative philosophy loses prestige in bourgeois society. True, this does not occur all at once. But neither did the machine conquer the territory of industry all at once....

what nonsense!

[101]...How can the positive nature of the new ideological systems be explained? By the

simple law of contrasts, the simple endeavour "to do the opposite" of what constituted the "symbol of faith of yesterday?...

Individualised "complexes"—Ivan, Peter, Jacob vanish. In their place there appears in the workshops the worker in general. "Matter" is given back the "qualities that were expropriated from it....

[102]...Matter is rehabilitated. Bourgeois society introduces the cult of the new idol—"environment." True, in doing so, the fact is not lost sight of that nevertheless matter remains matter, i.e., the organised mass, and, as such, cannot exist without a "manager." And "force," as a specialist in organisatory duties, is assigned to matter. Treatises about Stoff und Kraft ("matter and force") are written....

what nonsense!

what nonsense!

[104] A comparison between the most recent organisation of the factories and the internal structure of manufacture already a priori dictates the reply: the new variety of bourgeois philosophy should reproduce substantial features of the philosophy of the manufacturing epoch....

[106] Neo-Kantianism gives way to a "turn" towards systems of "pre-Kantian" thought.

XI
W. WUNDT

NB

[108]..."*the object can never be separated from the idea, or the idea from the object....*"

[113]...The considerations that have been given are already sufficient to define Wundt clearly as a philosopher who sets himself the task of combating materialism or, to use the fashionable term, "Überwindung" des Materialismus," "overcoming materialism," and who, in so doing, does not declare himself to be on the side of the school which is regarded as the traditional opponent of materialism....

[114]...Such an equalisation of the intermediary organising links and representatives of "physical" labour, the "lower executives," is indicated in the sphere of philosophy precisely by the endeavour to characterise "subject" and "object," "psychical" and "physical," as comprising an "*indivisible*" whole, the endeavour to reduce the antithesis between the phenomena mentioned to a cognitive fiction. Avenarius' theory on principal coordination, Ernst Mach's theory on the relation of the psychical and physical, Wundt's theory on ideas-objects—these are all theories of the same order....

nonsense

this is *true*, but not as *stated*

[116]...Hitherto, Wundt's monist views could not be denied a certain consistency. Nor can he any more be suspected of idealist sympathies....

ha-ha! eclectic not true

[118]...Wundt takes just such a leap when, on the heel of his theory on "ideas-objects," he puts forward his views on "psycho-physical parallelism"....

[121]..."Attributes" are transformed into "series," but this reform, in essence, is more of a verbal character....

[123]...Primacy is asserted for the spiritual principle....

[123-124]...Everything corporeal has necessarily its psychical correlation. *No single* worker, however simple the function he fulfils, can produce any products, can find any application for his labour-power, can exist, without his being under the direct, detailed "guidance" of a definite organiser....

?

...But the psychical series constitutes the "organisers" and the "concomitance" of the latter signifies for the "physical series"—for the workers—nothing but dependence....

?

[128]...Thus, according to Wundt, philosophy should transcend the bounds of experience, "supplement" the latter. The philosophical analysis needs to be continued until we obtain the idea of a unity which embraces both series that are independent of each other. Having expressed this ,view, Wundt immediately hastens to make an important reservation for himself: he declares that we can conceive of the unity of the world *either* as a material unity

or as a mental unity: a third solution of the problem does not exist...

[129]...Wundt refuses to give the name substance to his idea of universal unity. He defines it as the idea of pure reason, i.e., in the Kantian sense. Just as Kant's God is the idea of the supreme "forming," non-substantial principle, so also Wundt's universal unity is the idea of non-substantial unity, thanks to which all phenomena acquire vital meaning, indisputable value. In the light of this idea, there disappears the "empty and cheerless" philosophy which sees in the outward order of phenomena, in their mechanical connection, the true essence of the latter. In its place we obtain the view of the cosmic mechanism as the external covering of spiritual activity and creation....

[130]...In this connection, Wundt strongly emphasises the element of *actuality*. He reduces the idea of universal unity, of the "foundation of the world, to the idea of a *universal will*....

[131]...We shall not enter on an analysis of his proposed formulation, nor shall we explain his theory of "voluntarism".....

...Consequently, the ideologists of the modern vanguard of the capitalist bourgeoisie cannot speak of any "permanent" organised principles but, on the contrary, have to describe the latter as something extremely changeable, something that is eternally in a state of motion....

nonsense! What about Schopenhauer?

XII

EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

[133]...Wundt's criticism had no crushing force; it struck at an imaginary target. Wundt's appearance on the scene and the subsequent reaction from the camp of Avenarius'* disciples did not signify a conflict between the philosophies of two different classes or two large groups of one and the same class. The socio-economic background

inexact

true!

Then Willy, Petzoldt (twice), Kleinpeter.

* Carstanjen was the first to reply.

of the philosophical contest in question was, in this case, the comparatively insignificant difference between the most advanced and the somewhat less advanced types of modern capitalist organisations....

correct

[134]...We should say more: the empirio-critical philosophy should be understood *primarily as an apologia* for the idea in question. The concept of functional dependence is a *denial* of causal dependence....

that is so really??

[135-136]...Høffding's conclusion must, in general, be considered correct. Only his reference to "motives of expediency" is unfortunate: these motives are vague and indefinite.

Of course, but it does not follow from this that functionality cannot be a *variety* of causality. really?

Avenarius, in this case, was merely making a concession to materialist phraseology, a concession determined by his social position. To many people the views of the "parallelists" might appear to be materialist in comparison with vulgar spiritualism. The same applies to the views of empirio-criticism. The possibility of their coming close to materialism is particularly strong. ...And wide sections of the reading public have formed the opinion that empirio-criticism is a materialist school of thought. More than that, even expert philosophers judge it erroneously: Wilhelm Wundt himself, the patriarch of modern philosophy, called it "materialism". Finally, what is most interesting of all, the empirio-critics, too, while dissociating themselves from materialism, at the same time sometimes use its terminology, and sometimes even begin as it were to waver in their anti-materialist views....

Hm?

a lie!

Why? You have not understood this! aha!

[137]...Such is the real background that inspired empirio-criticism with the idea of classifying human cognition on the basis of the principle of "biological" classification. But this sort of "biology," we repeat, has nothing in common with materialism....

[138-139]...dualism—according to Avenarius—is the fruit of a certain process of our abstracting thought—"introjection"....

But the antithesis of the "external" and "internal" world is the purest fiction.

An analysis of this antithesis is extremely important; it should lead to substantiating the monist world outlook. Commentators of Avenarius' system of philosophy strongly stress this point. "By exposing the impermissibility of introjection, one of them says,* "two aims are achieved ...."

oh, this is suspicious! A cheap explanation with no analysis of the substance!

[140]...the subordinate organiser, if his "absolute" viewpoint is adopted, i.e., if he is regarded as an organiser independent of the "will" controlling him, is confronted also merely by a "thing," or "body," in the shape of the workers. But let us take another case: for the supreme "will," the subordinate organiser is not only one who is organised, but one who organises.... The former "object," now converted into "subject," "organises" matter: man assimilates a tree, but a tree transformed, the "notion" of tree....

[141-142]..."the fullness of human experience" is also proved in Avenarius' theory of principal co-ordination....

In Avenarius, like in Wundt, the "series" turn out, in essence, to be "incommensurable." And instead of the materialist world outlook that one would expect after the categorical statements about "the fullness of experience," views are expressed testifying to the idealist sympathies of empirio-criticism....

But Wundt and Avenarius part company on the road of idealist constructions. The author of *The System of Philosophy* reveals a fancy for "Kantian" motives. The author of *The Human Concept of the World* proclaims views which bring him close to the position once taken by Berkeley.

true?

Let us hasten to make a reservation. We do not at all intend to assert that the works of the Bishop of Cloyne determined Avenarius' viewpoint, that they had a direct influence on him. But the similarity of the idealist positions of both philosophers is indubitable. The afore-mentioned theory of

* Rudolph Wlassak; quoted by Mach in *The Analysis of Sensations*, p. 52.

principal co-ordination, taken as a whole, is evidence of this similarity. true!

With the same straightforwardness as Berkeley, Avenarius presents the thesis that there are no objects outside the subject. Each "thing" must necessarily "he related" to the central nervous system, which plays the role of functional centre....

[144]...The supreme "leader" does not figure, not even in the shape of the Kantian idea of reason, Kant's "form," or in the shape of Wundt's "universal unity." Nevertheless, he is there, and is moreover the chief element of the philosophical system. All phenomena are regarded precisely *from his point of view*. His "invisible presence is postulated by the unusually high appraisal of the organisatory principle, presented parallel with the conception of organised organisers. And in the general picture of the world resulting from Avenarius' philosophical discourses, it is precisely the organisatory character of the organising factors that comes into the forefront....

Here Shulyatikov is under a misapprehension.

bien!

hm? hm?

For Avenarius the world represents an agglomerate of central nervous systems. "Matter" is absolutely deprived of all "qualities," whether "primary" or "secondary," which at one time were considered its inalienable property. Absolutely everything in matter is determined by the "spirit" or, to use the terminology of the author of the *Critique of Pure Experience*, by the central nervous system....

a misapprehension

[145] The viewpoint of idealism in the style of Berkeley is put forward with great consistency by the author of the *Critique of Pure Experience*....

NB

[146]...Mach's theory of the "*ego*" as a logical symbol....

Mach, like Avenarius, knows two "series"—the psychical and the physical (two kinds of combinations of elements). As with Avenarius, these series are incommensurable and at the same time represent nothing but a fiction of our thought. Alternately, the monist and the dualist viewpoint is put forward: alternately the intermediary organisatory links are described as the organised, and as the organising principle. And, as with Avenarius, in the final analysis the dictatorship of "the organisatory will" is proclaimed. An idealistic

a misappre-

hension aha!

picture of the world is drawn: the world is a complex of "*sensations*."

a misapprehension

[147]...Mach's objection cannot be called valid. The central concept of his philosophical system, the famous "sensation," is by no means a denial either of the organisatory principle or of the supreme organisatory principle.... Mach was prompted in his criticism of the conception of the "*ego*" by the view of the subordinate organisers as the organised "mass"....

nonsense!

NB

[148-149]...Besides dealing with the speculative constructions of Wundt, Avenarius and Mach, we could, for example, subject to analysis the views of such prominent representatives of modern West-European philosophy as Renouvier Bradley and Bergson....

The sphere of philosophy is a veritable "Bastille of bourgeois ideology.... It is necessary to bear in mind that, for their part, the bourgeois ideologists are not sleeping, but are strengthening their position. At the present time, they are even imbued with the conviction that their position is absolutely impregnable. The "idealist" sympathies of certain literary writers who take their stand under the banner of Marxism in turn, create particularly favourable soil for such a conviction....

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XI. Wundt [Ostwald] . . . . 107 [not in the book

The entire book is an example of extreme vulgarisation of materialism. Instead of a concrete analysis of periods, formations, ideologies—*empty phrases* about "organisers" and ridiculously strained, absurdly false comparisons.

A caricature of materialism in *history*.

And it is a pity, for there is an attempt made in the direction of materialism.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

G. V. PLEKHANOV.
N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY

SHIPOVNIK PUBLISHING HOUSE, ST. PETERSBURG, 1910[168]

INTRODUCTION

NB*

[51]...The unfortunate outcome [52] of the Crimean War compelled the Government to make a few concessions to educated society and effect at least the more pressing reforms that had long since become indispensable. Soon the problem of freeing the peasants was placed on the order of the day, a problem plainly affecting the interests of all social-estates. Needless to say, Nikolai Gavrilovich** eagerly set about elaborating the problem. His excellent articles on the peasants' cause were written in 1857 and 1858. The mutual relations of our social forces in the epoch of the abolition of serfdom are now fairly well known. We shall therefore mention them only in passing, only insofar as it may be necessary to elucidate the role adopted in this matter by our advanced publicists, chief of whom then was N. G. Chernyshevsky. It is well known that these writers zealously defended the interests of the peasants. Our author wrote one article after another, advocating the emancipation of the peasants and giving them land, and maintaining that the Government would find no difficulty whatever in redeeming the lands allotted to the peasants. He supported this thesis both with general theoretical considerations and with the most detailed estimates. "Indeed, in

* Here and elsewhere, a NB underscored with two slanting lines implies that Lenin's NB is in the corner of the page and apparently refers to all of it. The full text of the page in question is therefore given in such cases.—*Ed.*

** Chernyshevsky—*Ed.*

what way can the redemption of land prove difficult? How can it be too much for the people to bear? That is improbable," he wrote in the article "Is Land Redemption Difficult?" "It runs counter to the fundamental concepts of economics. Political economy teaches clearly that all the material capital which a certain generation takes over from previous generations is not too considerable in value compared with the mass of values produced by the labour of that generation. For example, all of the land belonging to the French people, together with all the buildings and their contents, together with all the ships and cargoes, all the livestock and money and other riches belonging to that country, is hardly worth a hundred thousand million francs, while the labour of the French people produces fifteen or more thousand million francs' worth of values annually, i.e., in no more than seven years the French people produce a mass of values equal to that of the whole of France from the Channel to the Pyrenees. Consequently, if the French had to redeem all France, they could do so in the lifetime of one [53] generation, using only one-fifth of their revenue for the purpose. And what is the point at issue in our country? Is it the whole of Russia that we must redeem with all her riches? No, only the land. And is it to be all the Russian land? No, the redemption would affect only those gubernias of European Russia alone where serfdom is deep-rooted," etc.* After showing that the lands to be redeemed would constitute no more than one-sixth of the area of European Russia, he puts forward as many as eight plans for carrying out redemption. According to him, if the Government were to accept any one of these plans, it could redeem the allotted lands not only without burdening the peasants, but also to the great advantage of the state treasury. Chernyshevsky's plans were all based on the concept that it is "necessary to fix the most moderate prices possible in determining the amount of redemption payments." We know now how much consideration the Government gave to the interests of the peasantry in the abolition of serfdom and how much it heeded Chernyshevsky's

* *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 335-336. (Here and elsewhere Plekhanov refers to the first Russian edition of N. G. Chernyshevsky's works published in St. Petersburg in 1905-06.—*Ed.*)

advice regarding moderation in fixing redemption payments. Whereas our government, in freeing the peasants, never for a moment forgot the benefits to the state treasury, it thought very little about the interests of the peasants. In the redemption operations fiscal and landlord interests were exclusively borne in mind.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 152

...[57] It was not on economic problems alone that Chernyshevsky had to wage a fierce polemic. Neither were his opponents only liberal economists. As the influence of the *Sovremennik* circle[169] in Russian literature grew, the greater were the number of attacks launched from the most varied [58] quarters both on that circle in general and on our author in particular. The contributors to *Sovremennik* were regarded as dangerous people who were prepared to destroy all time notorious "foundations." Some of "Belinsky's friends," who at first considered it possible to go along with Chernyshevsky and those holding his views, repudiated the *Sovremennik* as an organ of the "Nihilists," and began to exclaim that Belinsky would never have approved of its trend. Such, was I. S. Turgenev's attitude.* Even Herzen grumbled at the "clowns, in his *Kolokol*.[170] He warned them that: "while exhausting all their ridicule over the literature of exposures, our dear clowns forget that on this slippery path they may not merely 'whistle' themselves into becoming like Bulgarin and Grech, but even into being decorated with the Stanislav Order." Herzen affirmed that there were excellent things in the "literature of exposures" that the "clowns" were ridiculing. "Do you imagine that all the tales of Shchedrin and others can just be hurled into the water together with Oblomov[171] on their necks? You indulge yourselves too much, gentlemen!**.... The reference to Shchedrin was extremely unfortunate since Chernyshevsky himself was well able to appreciate his work. In general, everything shows that Herzen was misled by his liberal friends, such as Kavelin. The

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Up to here *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 152

NB

* Chernyshevsky relates that Turgenev could still tolerate him to some extent but had no patience at all with Dobrolyubov. You're just a snake but Dobrolyubov is a cobra," he said to Chernyshevsky (see the letter already quoted: "By Way of an Expression of Gratitude." *Collected Works*, Vol. IX, p. 103).

** The article "Very Dangerous!!" in *Kolokol*, No. 44.

"clowns"—or "whistlers," as they were called in Russia—were not ridiculing the exposures, but the naïve people who could not or would not go beyond innocent exposures, forgetting the moral of Krylov's fable *The Cat and the Cook**....

Herzen himself was to see very soon how bad in a political sense were those liberal friends who kept questioning his relations with Chernyshevsky. When he had to break with K. D. Kavelin he perhaps told himself that the "jaundiced ones were not entirely wrong.** [59]

NB

Incidentally, the majority of the articles in *Svistok* which evoked the especial dissatisfaction of the well-bred liberals did not belong to the pen of N. G. Chernyshevsky. Only rarely did he contribute to it, as he was overwhelmed with other work. In the closing years of his literary activity he contributed regularly to every issue of *Sovremennik*; what is more, every issue usually contained several articles by him. As a general rule, his articles were distributed among the various sections of the journal as follows: first of all, he contributed an article on some general theoretical problem, then he wrote a political survey, reviewed several new books, and, lastly, by way of relaxation and diversion, as it were, he made polemical sorties against his opponents. The *Sovremennik* of 1861 was particularly rich in polemical articles written by him. It was at that time that he wrote his well-known "Polemical Gems," "National Tactlessness" (attacking *Slovo* of Lvov), "Popular Muddleheadedness" (attacking Aksakov's *Den*; we shall speak of this article later), and numerous other polemical notes in the section of Russian and foreign literature.

NB

What is now especially interesting in "Polemical Gems" is our author's views on his own literary activity. We shall cite them here. Chernyshevsky was very well aware that he held a prominent place in Russian literature. His opponents dreaded him, and occasionally even paid him compliments. But his growing renown did not make him happy

* Regarding the article "Very Dangerous" and its more or less conjectural consequences, see, among others, Vetrinsky's book *Herzen*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 354.

** The history of this break may be followed in the letters of K. D. Kavelin and I. S. Turgenev to A. I. Herzen, published by M. Dragomanov in Geneva in 1892.

in the least. He had too low an opinion of Russian literature to consider the prominent place he occupied in it to be honourable. He was "completely cold to his literary reputation." The only thing he was interested in was whether he would be able to preserve the freshness of his thought and feeling till those better days when our literature would become really useful to society. "I know that better times will come for literary activity, when it will be of real benefit to society, and when he who possesses talent will really earn a good name. And so I am wondering whether when the time comes I shall still be able to serve society properly. Fresh strength and fresh convictions are needed for this. But I see that I am beginning to join the company of 'respected' writers, that is to say, of those writers who have been wrung dry, who lag behind the movement of social requirements. This rouses a feeling of bitterness. But what is there to be done? Age takes its toll. Youth does not come twice, [60] I can't help envying those who are younger and fresher than I...."*

[61] Meanwhile, feelings were rising at least in a section of Russian "society." The student youth were filled with unrest and secret revolutionary organisations were springing up which printed their own manifestoes and programmes and awaited an imminent peasant uprising. We already know that Chernyshevsky fully recognised the possibility of impending "troubled times"** in Russia and we shall yet see how strongly the rise of the social mood was reflected in his activity as a publicist. But was he in any way connected with the secret societies? It is not yet possible to reply with certainty to this question, and who knows whether we shall ever have the facts to answer it. In the opinion of M. Lemke, who made an excellent study of the N. C. Chernyshevsky case, "it can be p r e s u m e d (his italics) that he was the author of the proclamation 'To the Manorial Peasants,' which the court found him guilty of having written." Mr. Lemke supports his conjecture by pointing to the style and content of the proclamation. We find these arguments not without foundation. But we hasten to repeat with Mr. Lem-

NB

* *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 231.

** i.e., the possibility of a revolution—*Ed.*

ke that "all these are more or less probable considerations, and no more."* We also consider fairly well founded Mr. Lemke's opinion that the famous paper *Velikoruss* was, in part, the work of Chernyshevsky. Mr. Lemke supports his hypothesis by quoting Mr. Stakhevich, who for several years lived with Chernyshevsky in Siberia: "I noticed that Chernyshevsky was obviously sympathetically inclined towards the paper which appeared at irregular intervals under the title of *Velikoruss*; I recall three issues coming out. As I listened to Nikolai Gavrilovich's conversation, I sometimes noticed that both his thoughts and the way he expressed them [62] strongly reminded me of the paper *Velikoruss*, and I decided in my own mind that he was either the author or, at least, co-author of the paper which advocated the need for constitutional reforms."** We are in full agreement with Mr. Stakhevich: the style and content of *Velikoruss* are indeed very reminiscent of Chernyshevsky's journalistic articles. And if Chernyshevsky was in fact the author, then that, of course, explains the circumstance that *Velikoruss* was far wiser and more tactful than other such papers of the time.

NB

Simultaneously with the rise of the extreme party in Russia, there was a growth of the revolutionary movement in Poland. Had Chernyshevsky any formal relations with the Polish revolutionaries of whom there were not a few in St. Petersburg at that time? Again, there are no data on this point. Not wishing to indulge in conjectures, we shall limit ourselves, in clarifying Chernyshevsky's general sympathies towards the Polish cause, to data obtainable from his writings; however, even such data are not numerous.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 157

We know that the Slavophils[172] very much approved of the struggle of the Galician Ruthenians against the Poles. Chernyshevsky was always sympathetically inclined towards the Little Russians. He regarded Belinsky's negative attitude to the emerging Little Russian literature to be a great mistake. In the January issue of *Sovremennik* for 1861 he published a very sympathetic article

* M. K. Lemke, "The Case of N. G. Chernyshevsky," *Byloye*, 1906, No. 4, p. 179.

** M. K. Lemke, "The Trial of the *Velikoruss* Publishers," *Byloye*, 1906, No. 7, p. 92. Mr. Stakhevich's article was published in *Zakaspiiskoye Obozrenie*, 1905, No. 143.

on the occasion of the appearance of *Osnova*, the organ of the Little Russians. But his attitude towards the struggle of the Galician Ruthenians against the Poles could not be one of unconditional approval. First of all, he did not like the fact that the Ruthenians sought the support of the Viennese Government. Neither did he like the influential role of the clergy in the movement of the Galician Ruthenians. "Lay affairs," he wrote, "should be the concern of laymen." Finally, Chernyshevsky did not like the exclusively n a t i o n a l formulation of this question, which he regarded as primarily an e c o n o m i c one. In an article entitled "National Tactlessness" (*Sovremennik*, July 1861) attacking the Lvov *Slovo*, Chernyshevsky [63] sharply criticised the excessive nationalism of that organ. "It is very possible that a careful examination of existing relations," he wrote, "would show the Lvov *Slovo* that at the basis of the matter there is a question that is far removed from the racial question—the question of social-estates. It is very possible that it would see Ruthenians and Poles on each of the two sides—people differing in race, but of the same social position. We do not believe that the Polish peasant should be hostile to the alleviation of the obligations and, in general, of the living conditions of the Ruthenian settlers. We do not believe that the sentiments of the Ruthenian landowners should differ very much in this matter from the sentiments of the Polish landowners, If we are not mistaken, the root of the Galician question lies not in relations of race, but of social-estate."

The mutual hostility of the peoples composing Austria ought to have appeared even more tactless to Chernyshevsky, in that the Viennese Government then, as previously, derived great advantages from it. "When one reflects carefully, one is not surprised at the many years of existence of the Austrian Empire," he wrote in a political review in the same issue of *Sovremennik* that published the article "National Tactlessness"; "and why should it not maintain itself when there is such 'excellent' political tact on the part of the nationalities embraced within its borders." To Chernyshevsky the Austrian Germans, Czechs, Croats and, as we have seen, Ruthenians seemed equally "slow-witted." He was afraid that the Slav "slow-wittedness" which was particularly evident in 1848-49 would again go very far. At the beginning of the sixties Hungary was waging a stubborn

struggle against the Viennese reactionary centralists. The discontent of the Hungarians was running so high that at one time it could have been expected that there would be a revolutionary outburst in their country. In his political reviews, our author repeatedly expressed the fear that, in the event of a revolutionary movement in Hungary, the Austrian Slavs would again become obedient tools of reaction. The tactics of many Slav races in Austria at that time could only strengthen such fears, since the Austrian Slays even ventured to boast of the disgraceful role they had played in the 1848-49 events. Chernyshevsky strongly condemned these tactics and showed that it would have been more to their advantage if, on the contrary, they had supported the enemies of the Viennese Government, enemies from whom they could have obtained substantial concessions. He said this concerning the attitude of the Croats to the Hungarians [64], and repeated this to the Ruthenians. "The social-estate party, hostile to the Ruthenians," we read in his article "National Tactlessness," "is now ready for concessions.... It would do no harm for the Lvov *Slovo* to give this some thought; perhaps the concessions which people who seem to it to be enemies are sincerely prepared to make, perhaps these concessions are so great that they would thoroughly satisfy the Ruthenian settlers; in any event these concessions are without doubt far greater and far more important than the concessions the Ruthenian settlers can get from the Austrians...."

Up to here *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 158

NB

[65]...Finally, the first part of the novel *Prologue*[173] depicts the friendly attitude of Volgin to Sokolovsky (Sierakowski). Volgin likes Sokolovsky's utter devotion to his [66] convictions, the absence of conceited pettiness, his self-control, combined with the passionate zeal of the true agitator. Volgin calls him a r e a l m a n and thinks that our liberals could learn a great deal from him. All this is very interesting,* but it too in no way explains Chernyshevsky's practical relations with the Polish affair.[174]

NB

* Volgin particularly prized in Sokolovsky his "b a l a n c e d j u d g m e n t which he displayed in 1848 when of all his companions-in-arms in Volhynia Region he was the only one not to lose his head and to weigh coolly the chances of the armed insurrection. These proved to be all but nil.

idem *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, pp. 165-166

At that time Chernyshevsky was about 34 years of age. He was in the prime of his mental powers, and who knows to what heights he might not have risen in his development! But he had not long to live in freedom. He was the recognised leader of the extreme party, a highly influential exponent of materialism and socialism. He was considered the "ringleader" of the revolutionary youth, and was blamed for all their outbursts and agitation. As always happens in such cases, rumour exaggerated the affair and ascribed to Chernyshevsky intentions and actions which were foreign to him. In "Prologue to a Prologue,"[175] Chernyshevsky himself describes the liberal sympathetic gossip spread in St. Petersburg concerning Volgin's (i.e., his own) alleged relations with the London circle of Russian exiles.[176] The gossip was occasioned by the most insignificant incidents that had absolutely nothing to do with politics. And, as usual, things did not stop at mere gossip. The police-inspired press had long been engaged in literary denunciations of Chernyshevsky. In 1862, *Sovremennik* was suspended for some time. Then came non-literary denunciations as well. "The Director of the Third Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery," said the indictment of Chernyshevsky, "has received an anonymous letter warning the Government against Chernyshevsky, 'that youth ringleader and wily socialist'; 'he himself has said that he will never be convicted'; he is said to be a pernicious agitator, and people ask to be spared from such a man; 'all of Chernyshevsky's former friends, seeing that his tendencies were finding expression in deeds and not merely in words, liberal-minded people... have dissociated themselves from him. Unless you remove Chernyshevsky, writes the author of the letter [67], there will be trouble and bloodshed; they are a band of rabid demagogues, of reckless people.... Perhaps they will eventually be eliminated, but just think how much innocent blood will be shed because of them.... There are committees of such socialists in Voronezh, Saratov, Tambov and elsewhere, and everywhere they inflame the youth.... Send Chernyshevsky away wherever you like, but be quick to deprive him of the opportunity to act.... Deliver us from Chernyshevsky for the sake of public peace'"....

[71]...What is the secret of the extraordinary success of *What Is To Be Done?*[177] It is the same as

is generally responsible for the success of literary works, the fact that this novel gave a living and universally understood answer to questions in which a considerable section of the reading public was keenly interested. In themselves, the thoughts expressed in it were not new; Chernyshevsky had taken them wholly from West-European literature. In France,* George Sand had much earlier advocated free and, most important, sincere and honest relations in the love of a man for a woman. As regards the moral demands she puts on love, Lucrezia Floriani differs in no way from Vera Pavlovna Lopukhova-Kirsanova. And as for the novel *Jacques* [72], it would be simple to copy out a fairly large number of passages from it to show that in the novel *What Is To Be Done?* the thoughts and reasonings of George Sand's** freedom-loving, selfless hero are at times reproduced almost in their entirety. And George Sand was not the only one to advocate freedom in relations of this kind. It is well known that they were also advocated by Robert Owen and Fourier, who had a decisive

* Let us note in passing that Goethe's Wahiverwandschaften also represents a word in defence of such relations. This is well understood by some German historians of German literature who, while not daring to decry such on authoritative writer, and at the same time not daring to agree with him because of their own philistine virtuousness, usually mutter something totally unintelligible about the apparently strange paradoxes of the great German.

** On March 26, 1853, Chernyshevsky recorded in his diary the following conversation with his fiancée: "'Can you possibly think that I will deceive you?' 'I don't think that, I don't expect it, but I have considered such an event too.' 'What, then, would you do?' I told her of George Sand's *Jacques*. 'Then you, too, would shoot yourself?' 'I don't think so'; and I told her I would try to obtain George Sand for her (she had not read it, or at any rate does not remember the ideas in it)" (*Collected Works*, Vol. X, Part 2, Section 3, p. 78). We consider that it is not superfluous to note another passage from Chernyshevsky's conversations with his fiancée: "But what these relations would be like—the day before yesterday she said: 'We would have separate halves of the house and you ought not to come to me without permission'; I would have liked to arrange things that way myself, perhaps I think more seriously about it than she does;—she probably only means that she doesn't want me to bore her, while I understand it to mean that in general every husband should be extremely considerate to his 'wife in his matrimonial relations" (ibid., p. 82). Almost literally the same conversation takes place between Vera Pavlovna and Lopukhov in the novel *What Is To Be Done?*

* These numbers, inserted by Lenin, correspond to the lines on p. 72 of Plekhanov's book.—*Ed.*

influence on Chernyshevsky's outlook.*** And as early as the forties all these ideas met with warm sympathy in our country. In his articles Belinsky often called passionately for freedom and sincerity in relations of love. The reader will recall, of course, how bitterly the "impetuous Vissarion" reproached Pushkin's Tatyana because, while loving Onegin, she did not follow the dictates of her heart; she belonged to "another," her aged husband, whom she did not love but continued to live with. In their attitude to women, the best people of the "forties" adhered to the same principles as those of Lopukhov and Kirsanov. However, prior to the appearance of the novel *What Is To Be Done?*, these principles were shared only by a "select" handful; the mass of the reading public did not understand them at all. Even Herzen hesitated to expound them fully and clearly in his [73] novel *Who Is To Blame?* A. Druzhinin handles the question more resolutely in his story *Polenka Saks*.* But this story is too colourless, and its characters, belonging to so-called high society—officials and titled personages—did not at all appeal to the non-gentry, who after the fall of Nicholas regime formed the left wing of the reading public. With the appearance of *What Is To Be Done?* everything changed, everything became clear, precise and definite. There was no more room left for doubt. Thinking people were faced with the alternative of being guided in love by the principles of Lopukhov and Kirsanov, or of bowing to the sanctity of marriage and resorting, should a new sentiment arise, to the old, tested method of secret amorous adventures, or else completely subduing all affection in their hearts in view of the fact that they *belonged* to a marriage partner, whom they no longer loved. And the choice had to be made quite consciously. Chernyshevsky dealt with the issue in such a way that what had been natural instinctiveness and sincerity in love relations became utterly impossible. Mind control extended to love, and the general public adopted a conscious view of the relations

NB

NB

* It seems hardly necessary to recall what an energetic advocate Robert Owen was in this respect. As for Fourier, we quote here his very profound words: "les coutumes en amour ... ne sont que formes temporaires et variables, et non pas fond immuable" (*Oeuvres complètes de Ch. Fourier*, tome IV, p. 84).

** *Sovremennik*, No. 12, 1847.

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between man and woman. And this was particularly important in our country in the sixties. The reforms which Russia had undergone turned upside down both our social and family relations. A ray of light reached into recesses that had been in complete darkness. Russian people were compelled to examine themselves, to take a sober view of their relation to their kin, to society and family. A new element came to play a big role in family relations, in love and friendship: viz., *convictions*, which formerly only the very smallest handful of "idealists" had possessed. Differences of conviction led to unexpected ruptures. A woman "given in marriage" to a certain man often discovered with horror that her lawful "lord" was an obscurantist, a bribe-taker, a flatterer grovelling before his superiors. A man who had enjoyed the "possession" of his beautiful wife, and unexpectedly was affected by the current of new ideas, often realised in dismay that what his charming plaything was interested in was not at all "new people" or "new views," but new dresses and dances, and also [74] the title and salary of her husband....

[75]...In Vera Pavlovna's dreams we see that side of Chernyshevsky's socialist views to which, unfortunately, Russian socialists up to now have not paid sufficient attention. That which attracts us in these dreams is the fact that Chernyshevsky fully realised that the socialist system can only be based on the broad application to production of the technical forces developed by the bourgeois period. In Vera Pavlovna's dreams huge armies of labour are jointly engaged in production passing from Central Asia to Russia, from hot climate countries to the cold countries. All this, of course, could have been conceived with the aid of Fourier as well, but it is evident even from the subsequent history of so-called Russian socialism that the Russian reading public was not aware of this. In their ideas of socialist society our revolutionaries frequently went so far as to conceive it in the form of a federation of peasant communities cultivating their fields with the same antiquated plough as that used to scrape the soil in the time of Basil the Blind. But obviously such "socialism" cannot be recognised as socialism. The emancipation of the proletariat can come about only through the emancipation of man from the "p o w e r o f t h e l a n d" and nature in general. And this

NB cf. *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1.

emancipation has made absolutely indispensable those [76] armies of labour and that extensive application of modern productive forces to production which Chernyshevsky spoke of in Vera Pavlovna's dreams and which we have completely forgotten in our desire to be "practical."

Chernyshevsky was present at the birth of the new type of "new people" in our country. He has drawn this type in the shape of Rakhmetov. Our author joyfully welcomed the emergence of this new type could not deny himself the satisfaction of depicting at least a vague profile of him. At the same time he foresaw with sorrow how many trials and sufferings there were in store for the Russian revolutionary whose life must be one of severe struggle and great self-sacrifice. And so, in Rakhmetov, Chernyshevsky presents us with the true ascetic. Rakhmetov positively tortures himself. He is completely "merciless towards himself," as his landlady says. He even decides to test whether he can bear torture by spending a whole night lying on a length of felt with nails sticking through it. Many people, including Pisarev, regarded this as mere eccentricity. We agree that some aspects of Rakhmetov's character could have been drawn differently. But the character as a whole nevertheless remains completely true to life. Almost every one of our prominent socialists of the sixties and seventies possessed no small share of the Rakhmetov spirit.

1—"the revolutionary" in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (No. 1, p. 173)[178]

2—"Russian revolutionaries"
3—"enormous" (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 174)

We should like to say in closing our introduction that Chernyshevsky's significance in Russian literature has yet to be appraised properly. How much he is misunderstood in our country even by many of those who think very well of him can be seen from V. G. Korolenko's reminiscences of him. This gifted and intelligent author portrays him as a sort of "rationalistic economist" who, moreover, believes "in the power of Comte's organising reason."* if the words about "organising

* Korolenko, *Those Who Are Gone*, p. 78.

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reason" mean anything at all, then they mean that Chernyshevsky regarded social phenomena from an idealistic standpoint, from which they were considered by Comte himself. But he who looks on social phenomena from an idealistic standpoint cannot be called an economist for the simple reason that this name is applied, even if not very properly, to those who, while not believing [77] in the power of organising reason, do believe in the organising power of economics. An "economist" who believed in the power of organising reason would be like a Darwinist who accepted the cosmogony of Moses. But this is not the most important thing here. What is most important is the fact that Mr. Korolenko counterposes the sociological views of our "subjectivists"[179] to the "economism" of Chernyshevsky. "We, too, did not stand still when we ceased to be 'rationalistic economists.' Instead of purely economic patterns, the literary trend, represented chiefly by N. K. Mikhailovsky, has opened to us a veritable vista of laws and parallels of a biological character, while the play of economic interests was assigned a subordinate role."*

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"Did not stand still," indeed! The "vista of laws and parallels of a biological character," revealed by Mikhailovsky, was an enormous step backwards in comparison with Chernyshevsky's social views.** N. K. Mikhailovsky was a disciple of P. L. Lavrov, whose views on the course of social development corresponded to those of Bruno Bauer, as we have shown in the book *The Development of the Monist View of History*. Hence whoever would like to understand the relation between N. G. Chernyshevsky's world outlook and that of our "subjectivists" should first of all try to understand the relation between Feuerbach's philosophy, to which Chernyshevsky adhered, and Bruno Bauer's views. And this is clear and simple: Feuerbach is far ahead of Bruno Bauer.

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As an epigraph to our first article on Chernyshevsky, written while the news of his death was still fresh in mind, and completely revised in the present edition we have taken the following

* Korolenko, op. cit., pp. 7 9-80.

** No wonder Chernyshevsky's attitude to those "laws and parallels" was entirely negative, according to the selfsame Mr. Korolenko.

words from Chernyshevsky's letter to his wife: "My life and yours belong to history; hundreds of years will pass and our names will still be dear to people who will recall them with gratitude when those who lived with us are no more." This letter was written on October 5, 1862, i.e., when the author was already incarcerated.

PART ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND LITERARY VIEWS

SECTION ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS

Chapter One

CHERNYSHEVSKY AND FEUERBACH

[81]...In the first edition of this work, the first article of which, dealing, inter alia, with Chernyshevsky's philosophical views, was written in late
|8| 18|9|9, we expressed the conviction that in his philosophical views our author was a follower of Feuerbach. Naturally, this conviction of ours was based above all on a comparison of those ideas of Chernyshevsky which had a more or less direct bearing on philosophy, with Feuerbach's views....

Chapter Three

POLEMIC WITH YURKEVICH AND OTHERS

...[101] Yurkevich ascribes to Chernyshevsky the idea that there is n o d i f f e r e n c e a t a l l between material and psychical phenomena, and inquires triumphantly how it is that sensations arise from the movement of a nerve. This is the old nonsense that has long been flung at materialists and from which it merely follows that the people who want to "criticise' materialism do not even know the ABC of materialism. Nowhere in his article does Chernyshevsky say that there is no difference at all between so-called [102] physical phenomena, on the one hand, and psychical phenomena, on the other. On the contrary, he categorically admits the existence of this difference; but he believes that it in no way justifies attributing psychical phenomena to a particular non-material factor. We are already acquainted with his remark to the effect that there are very many different qualities in every object. Now we shall discuss

it in more detail. "For example," Chernyshevsky says, "a tree grows and burns; we say it has two qualities: the power of growth and combustibility. What similarity is there between these two qualities? They are totally different; there is no concept under which one could put both these qualities, except the general conception—quality; there is no concept under which we could put both series of phenomena corresponding to these qualities, except the concept—phenomenon. Or, for example, ice is hard and sparkles; what is there common to hardness and sparkle? The logical distance from one of these qualities to the other is immeasurably great or, it would be better to say, there is no logical distance between them, whether near or far, because there is no logical relation between them. From this we see that the combination of quite heterogeneous qualities in one object is the general "law of things." The same also with the quality we call the capacity for sensation and thought. Its distance from the so-called physical qualities of the living organism is immeasurably great. But this does not prevent it being a quality of the same organism which, at the same time, possesses extension and capacity for movement ....

not *im*measurably (although we still do not know this "measure")

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[103]...Even J. Priestley remarked in his *Disquisitions* that the idea that brain vibrations are identical with perception would be a very great abuse of materialist doctrine. "It is easy to form an idea of there being vibrations without any perceptions accompanying them. But it is supposed that the brain, besides its vibrating power, has superadded to it a percipient or sentient power, likewise; there being no reason that we know why this power may not be imparted to it."* This is precisely the point of view held by all the prominent materialists of modern times, including, of course, Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky. The opponents of materialism—the consistent or inconsistent, conscious or unconscious idealists—ought, in their criticism of this doctrine, to convince us above all that they know more about it than Priestley does, and show us what grounds specifically prevent them from recognising, together with Priestley, that

* *Disqusitions Relating to Matter and Spirit*. By Joseph Priestley, Vol. I, The second edition, Birmingham, MDCCLXXX, II, p. 121.

the brain, besides having the ability to vibrate, may also be capable of perceiving. They undoubtedly have such grounds. But these amount to the spiritualistic prejudice that by itself, i.e., unless animated by spirit, matter is dead and incapable not only of perception, but even of motion. To refer, in arguing with the materialists, to such grounds means to commit an obvious petitio principii, i.e., to argue from the very same proposition which has to be proved. The opponents of materialism themselves more or less vaguely sense this. Therefore, they are usually very careful not to show the grounds which hinder them from recognising the capacity for perceiving one of the properties of matter, and prefer to refute what no single prominent materialist has ever stated, at least in modern times, i.e, that perception is the same as motion.* We leave it to the reader to judge of this sort of criticism, a criticism which is more widespread in our country than anywhere else, and is more so now than ever before....

[105] ...It stands to reason," Chernyshevsky admits, "that when we speak of the difference in the state of the body during a chemical process and at a time when it is not in that process, we mean only the quantitative distinction between a vigorous, rapid course of that process and a very feeble slow course of it. Properly speaking, every body is constantly going through a chemical process. For example, a log, even if it is not set on fire or burnt in a stove but lies quietly, seemingly undergoing no changes, in the wall of a house, will nevertheless come in time to the same end to which burning brings it: it will gradually decay, and nothing will be left of it, too, but ashes (the dust of decayed wood, of which in the end nothing remains but the mineral particles of ash). But if this process—e.g., in the case of the ordinary decay of a log in a house wall—takes place very slowly and feebly, then qualities which are proper to a body going through the process manifest themselves with a microscopic feebleness that is completely imperceptible under ordinary conditions.

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* We allow that among the a n c i e n t materialists—Democritus and Epicurus for example—there could have been a certain lack of clarity on this account although this is far from having been proved it has to be remembered that the views of these thinkers have only reached us in an incomplete form.

For example, the slow decay of a piece of wood in a house wall also generates heat; but that quantity of it which in burning would have been concentrated into a few hours, in this case becomes diluted, so to speak, into several decades, so that it does not achieve any result that is easily perceptible in practice; the existence of this heat is negligible for practical purposes. It is the same as the taste of wine in a whole pond of water into which one has let fall a drop of wine: from the scientific point of view, the pond contains a mixture of water and wine, but to all practical purposes it can be assumed that there is no wine at all in it."

[106] This brilliant passage allows one to surmise that for Chernyshevsky in this respect too there was no cleavage between organised matter on the one hand and unorganised matter, on the other. To be sure, the organism of the animal (and even more so of the animal at the top of the zoological tree, that is, man) displays in the respect that is of interest to us such properties as are altogether alien to unorganised matter. But, after all, the burning of a piece of wood, too, is accompanied by a number of phenomena that are not to be observed during the process of its slow decay. However, there is no essential difference between these two processes. On the contrary, this is one and the same process, with this difference only that in the one case it is very rapid and in the other, extremely slow. Therefore, in the one case the properties which belong to a body undergoing this process manifest themselves with great force, while in the other case they do so "with microscopic feebleness that is completely imperceptible under ordinary conditions." In regard to the question of psychical phenomena this means that in an unorganised form also, matter is not devoid of the basic capacity for "sensation," which provides such rich "spiritual" fruits among the higher animals. But in unorganised matter this capacity exists to an extremely small extent. Therefore it is totally imperceptible to the investigator and, without risk of committing any appreciable error, we can equate it to nil. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that this capacity in general is inherent in matter and that in consequence there are no grounds for regarding it as something miraculous where it manifests itself particularly strongly, as

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can be seen, for example, among the higher animals in general, and pre-eminently in man. In expressing this idea—with the caution necessary under the conditions of our press at that time—Chernyshevsky came close to such materialists as Lamettrie and Diderot who, in turn, adopted the view of Spinozism, freed of the unnecessary theological appendages....

not logical, but epistemological

[107]...Yurkevich also asserted that quantitative differences are transformed into qualitative differences not in the object itself but in its relation to the sentient subject. But this is a very gross logical mistake. In order to become changed in its relation to the sentient subject the object must undergo a preliminary change in itself. If for us ice does not have the same properties as steam, it is because the mutual relations of the water particles in the former case are entirely different from those in the latter. But enough of this....

We know how contemptuous Chernyshevsky was of Yurkevich's arguments. He did not analyse these arguments—and had no possibility of doing so under the conditions of the censorship—but simply declared them to be obsolete and not in the least convincing.

"I am a seminarian myself," he wrote in his *Polemical Gems*. "I know from my own experience the position of people who get their education as Yurkevich did. I have seen people in the same position as he is. I therefore find it hard to laugh at him; it would mean laughing at the impossibility of having decent books available, laughing at the complete helplessness in the matter of developing oneself, at a situation that is unimaginably restricted in all possible respects.

"I don't know Mr. Yurkevich's age; if he is no longer a young man, it is too late to worry about him. But if he is still young, I gladly offer him the small collection of books in my possession."

Mr. Volynsky still finds this reply highly [108] unsatisfactory. He thinks that Chernyshevsky replied in this way solely because of his inability to decisively refute Yurkevich. Evidently some journalists at the beginning of the sixties also reasoned in this manner. For example, Dudyshkin, enumerating Yurkevich's allegedly irrefutable arguments point by point, wrote the following in

Otechestvenniye Zapiski, addressing himself to Chernyshevsky:

"The matter would appear to be clear; it now concerns not someone else, but you; not philosophy or physiology in general, but your ignorance of these sciences. Why drag in the red herring of seminary philosophy? Why confuse totally different things and say that you knew all that when you were in the seminary and even now remember it all by heart?"

To this Chernyshevsky replied that Dudyshkin's lack of acquaintance with seminary notebooks prevented him from understanding what was at issue. "If you took the trouble to look through these notebooks," he continues, "you would see that all the shortcomings which Mr. Yurkevich discovers in me, these notebooks discover in Aristotle, Bacon, Gassendi, Locke, etc., etc., in all the philosophers who were not idealists. Consequently, these reproaches by no means apply to me as an individual writer: they apply properly to the theory which I consider it useful to popularise. If you are incredulous, take a look at the *Philosophical Dictionary*, published by Mr. S. G., which takes the same line as Mr. Yurkevich, and you will see that the same thing is said there of every non-idealist: he does not know psychology, he is not acquainted with the natural sciences, he rejects inner experience, he is overwhelmed by facts, he confuses metaphysics with the natural sciences, he degrades man, etc., etc...."

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Chapter Four

THE DOCTRINE OF MORALITY

[111]...In general, very noticeable in Chernyshevsky's view of rational egoism is the endeavour, characteristic of all "periods of enlightenment" (Aufklärungsperioden), to seek support for morality in reason, and in the more or less well-founded calculations of the individual an explanation of his character and behaviour. Sometimes Chernyshevsky's arguments in this connection are as similar as two peas in a pod to the arguments of Helvétius and those who shared his ideas. They recall almost as strongly the arguments of Socrates, the typical representative of the epoch of enlightenment in ancient Greece, who, in coming forward as a champion of friendship, showed that it is

NB a d v a n t a g e o u s to have friends because they may [112] be of some use in times of misfortune. The explanation for such extremes of rationality is that the enlighteners were usually incapable of adopting the v i e w p o i n t o f d e v e l o p m e n t.*

We know that, according to Chernyshevsky's theory, man is by nature neither good nor evil but becomes good or evil depending on circumstances.** Were we to recognise that man is always prompted by calculation in his behaviour, then we should have to formulate Chernyshevsky's view on human nature differently; we should have to say that man is by nature neither good nor evil but only calculating, this property of his becoming more or less marked depending on circumstances. But such a formulation would hardly be to our author's liking.

What is good, and what is evil, according to his theory? This question is answered by the same article, "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy"—a very informative one, as the reader can see. "Individuals," says Chernyshevsky in it, "regard as good the actions of other people that are beneficial to them; society holds as good, what is good for the whole of society, or for the majority of its members. Lastly people in general, irrespective of a nation or a class, describe as good that which is beneficial for mankind in general." It often happens that the interests of different nations or estates run counter to one another or to human interests generally; it is also a frequent occurrence that the interests of one estate are opposed to those of the whole nation. How is one to decide in this case what is good and what is bad?

* See for particulars in our book *Beitäge zur Geschichte des Materialismus—Holbach, Helvetius und Karl Marx*, Stuttgart, 1896.

** It is worth noting, however, that in the past our author expressed a different view of human nature. According to that view, man is a being which by nature is inclined to respect and love truth and good, and to abhor all that is bad, a being capable of violating the laws of good and truth only through ignorance, error or under the influence of circumstances stronger than his character and reason, but a being never capable of preferring evil to good of his own free will." (See the article on Shchedrin's Provincial Sketches in Sovremennik, No. 6, 1857, reprinted in *The Complete Works*, Vol. III. The lines quoted are on pp. 221-222 of the volume.) This is closer to Socrates than to the present-day doctrine of development.

SECTION TWO

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S VIEWS ON HISTORY

Chapter Two
MATERIALISM IN CHERNYSHEVSKY'S VIEWS ON HISTORY

[159]...Chernyshevsky applied Feuerbach's views to aesthetics and in this, as we shall see below, he achieved results that in a certain sense are most remarkable. But here, too, his conclusions were not quite satisfactory because the perfectly correct idea of the aesthetic development of mankind implies the preliminary elaboration of a general conception of history. As regards this general conception of history, Chernyshevsky succeeded in making only a few, if very correct, steps towards its elaboration. One may cite as examples of such steps the large quotations from his writings that we have just made [160]....

Chapter Three
IDEALISM IN CHERNYSHEVSKY'S VIEWS ON HISTORY

Here is what we read in his article dealing with V. P. Botkin's well-known book *Letters of Spain* (*Sovremennik*, 1857, Book 2):

"The division of a people into hostile castes is one of the greatest obstacles to the improvement of its future; in Spain, there is no such disastrous division, no irreconcilable enmity between social-estates every one of which would be prepared to sacrifice the most precious historical achievements if only it could do harm to another estate; in Spain the entire nation feels itself a single whole. This peculiarity is so extraordinary among the peoples of Western Europe that it deserves the greatest attention and may in itself be considered an earnest of the country's happy future."*

This is not a slip of the pen, because, several pages further below in the same article, Chernyshevsky says: "The Spanish people have an indisputable advantage over most civilised nations in one, exceedingly important respect: the Spanish [161] estates are not divided either by deep-rooted hatred or by substantial conflicting interests; they

* *Collected Works*, Vol. III, p. 38.

do not constitute castes inimical to one another, as is the case in many other West European countries; on the contrary, in Spain, all the estates may strive jointly for a common goal....*

[163]...Utopian socialists took an idealist view of the entire future of contemporary society. They were convinced that the fate of that society would be decided by the "views" held by its members, i.e., the standpoint which they took, with regard to social reorganisation plan put forward by a particular reformer. They did not ask themselves why it was that the dominant views in that particular society were such and not others. That is why they were not eager for a further elaboration of those elements of a materialist interpretation of history which their doctrines undoubtedly were replete with. In fact, they were prone to look on mankind's past history as well from an idealist standpoint. For this reason, in their statements about that history we very often encounter the most undoubted and, it would seem, most obvious contradictions: facts which have apparently been interpreted in an entirely materialist sense are suddenly given an entirely idealist explanation; and, on the other hand, idealist interpretations are every now and again upset by perfectly materialist eruptions. This lack of stability, this recurrent shift from materialism to idealism and from idealism to materialism, a shift perceptible to the modern reader, but imperceptible to the author, makes itself felt also in the historical statements of Chernyshevsky, who in this respect is very reminiscent of the great utopians of the West. In the final analysis he inclines like them, we repeat, to idealism.

This can be clearly seen from his interesting article "On the Causes of the Fall of Rome (an Imitation of Montesquieu)," published in *Sovremennik* for 1861 (Book 5). In it he vigorously opposes the very widespread opinion that the Roman Empire in the West [164] fell because of its inherent inability to develop further, whereas the barbarians who put an end to its existence brought new seeds of progress with them....

No mention is made here either of the internal social relations in Rome, which accounted for its weakness and which were pointed out even by

* Ibid., p. 44.

Guizot in his first article "Essais sur l'histoire de France," or of the forms of communal life to which the German barbarians owed their strength at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West. Chernyshevsky forgot even the famous words of Pliny, which he himself quotes elsewhere: latifundia perdidere Italiam ("latifundia were the undoing of Italy"). In his "formula of progress," as the phrase went in our country afterwards, [165] there is no room for the internal relations in the country concerned. Everything is reduced to intellectual development. Chernyshevsky states emphatically that progress is based on intellectual development and that "its fundamental aspect consists precisely in the successes and development of knowledge." It does not occur to him that "the successes and development of knowledge" may depend on social relations, which in some cases are conducive to those successes and that development and in others hinder them. He depicts social relations as a mere corollary of the spread of certain views. We have just read this: "historical knowledge is broadened; this reduces the number of false notions that prevent people from organising their social life, which is, therefore, organised more successfully than before." This is very unlike what our author said in his article on Roscher's book. From what he said there it followed, moreover, that it is impossible, and indeed ridiculous, to judge scholars as if they were schoolboys, saying that a particular scholar was unfamiliar with a particular science and therefore came to hold erroneous views. It also followed from what he said there that what matters is not the amount of knowledge acquired by a particular scholar, but the interests of the group which he represents. In short, it followed from what he said there that social views are determined by social interests; and social thought, by social life. Now, it is the other way round. Now, it appears that social life is determined by social thought and that if a social system has certain shortcomings, it is because society, like a schoolboy, has studied poorly or little and therefore has conceived erroneous notions. It would be hard to think of a more striking contradiction.

[170]...Herzen formed his view of Russia's attitude to the "old world" under the strong influence of Slavophils and this view was wrong. But one can arrive at an erroneous view even when one employs a more or less correct method,

just as a correct view may result from the employment of a more or less erroneous method. It is therefore fair to ask oneself how the method by which Herzen formed his erroneous view was related to the method which led Chernyshevsky to a completely justified repudiation and ridicule of that view....

Chapter Five
CHERNYSHEVSKY AND MARX

[188]...We may be reminded that, as we have remarked, the reviews by Chernyshevsky which we have examined appeared after the historical views of Marx and Engels shaped themselves into a harmonious whole. We are not forgetful of this. But we believe that this matter cannot be settled by mere reference to chronology. The main writings of Lassalle, too, did not appear until after the historical views of Marx and Engels assumed a harmonious form, and yet, in ideological content, those writings, too, belong to the period of transition from historical idealism to historical materialism. The point is not when a particular work appeared but rather what was its content.

If in previous historical periods the advance of knowledge depended on the character of economic relations, in passing to our own period Chernyshevsky should have asked himself: what are the economic peculiarities of it that led to the discovery of social truth and ensured the future realisation of the latter. But in order to ask himself that question, he should have broken resolutely with idealism and firmly adopted a materialist interpretation of history. We shall not reiterate that Chernyshevsky was still far from a break with idealism and that his conception of the further trend of social development was completely idealist. We merely ask the reader to note that Chernyshevsky's historical idealism compelled him in his considerations of the future to give first place to "advanced" people—to the i n t e l l e c t u a l s, as we [189] now call them—who should disseminate the ultimately discovered social truth among the masses. The masses are allotted the role of backward soldiers in the advancing army. Of course, no sensible materialist will assert that the average "man in the street," just because he is an ordinary person, i.e., "one of the masses," knows no less

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than the average "intellectual." Of course he knows less. But it is not a matter of the knowledge of the "man in the street," but of his actions. The actions of people are not always determined by their knowledge and are never determined only by their knowledge but also—and chiefly—by their position, which is merely made clear and comprehensible by the knowledge they possess. Here again one has to remember the fundamental proposition of materialism in general, and of the materialist explanation of history in particular: it is not being that is determined by consciousness, but consciousness by being. The "consciousness" of a man from the "intelligentsia" is more highly developed than the consciousness of a man from the "masses." But the "being" of a man from the masses prescribes to him a far more definite method of action than that which the social position of the intellectual prescribes to the latter. That is why the materialist view of history allows one only in a certain and, moreover, very limited sense to speak of the backwardness of the man from the "masses," compared with the man from the intelligentsia; in a certain sense, the "man in the street" undoubtedly lags behind the "intellectual," but in another sense he undoubtedly is in advance of him. And precisely because this is so, an adherent of the materialist interpretation of history, while by no means repeating the absurd attacks on the intelligentsia that are coming from the Black-Hundred and syndicalist camp, would never agree to assign the intelligentsia the role of a demiurge of history which is generally assigned to it by idealists. There are various kinds of aristocraticalness. Historical idealism is guilty of an "aristocraticalness of knowledge."

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What in Chernyshevsky's historical views was a shortcoming resulting from the insufficient elaboration of Feuerbach's materialism later became the basis of our subjectivism, which had nothing in common with materialism and vigorously opposed it not only in the field of history but also in the field of philosophy. The subjectivists boastfully called themselves continuers of the best traditions of the sixties. In reality, they continued only the weak aspects [190] of the world outlook peculiar to that period....

Chapter Six
LAST HISTORICAL WORKS OF CHERNYSHEVSKY

[199]...Had Chernyshevsky consistently elaborated the idea expressed here, he would have had to renounce completely the idealist views expressed by him in the article—now familiar to us—concerning the causes for the fall of Rome. But the point is that he expresses such ideas only in passing, he does not enlarge on them. In expressing them, he does not at all find it necessary to repudiate historical idealism, and this is not due to a predilection for idealism as a philosophical theory. Chernyshevsky's attitude to this theory was in general extremely negative. While expounding the idealist view of the trend of historical development, he continues to regard himself as a consistent materialist. He is wrong. But the root of his error lies in one of the chief shortcomings of Feuerbach's materialist system. Marx expressed it rather aptly: "Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from the thought objects, but he does not conceive of human activity itself as being o b j e c t i v e activity. Hence, in the *Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude..."* ...Like his teacher, Chernyshevsky directs his attention almost exclusively to the "theoretical" activity of mankind and, as a result, mental development becomes for him the most basic cause of historical movement....

This is also the shortcoming of Plekhanov 's book on Chernyshevsky

[205]...It follows from Chernyshevsky that in history vice is always punished as it deserves. In reality, however, the historical facts known to us do not at all warrant this view, which may be comforting but is certainly naïve. The only question of interest to us is how it came to be held by our author. This question can be answered by reference to the period when Chernyshevsky lived. It was a period of social upsurge, a period having a moral need, so to speak, for such views as would bolster faith in the inevitable defeat of evil....

FROM MARXIST TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See his *Theses on Feuerbach*, written as early as the spring of 1845.

SECTION THREE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S VIEWS ON LITERATURE

Chapter One

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LITERATURE AND ART

[221]...The view of art as p l a y, supplemented by the view of play as a "child of labour," sheds a very bright light on the essence and history of art. It makes it possible for the first time to view them from a materialist standpoint. We know that, at the very beginning of his literary activity, Chernyshevsky made an attempt, which was most successful in its own way, at applying Feuerbach's materialist philosophy to aesthetics. We have devoted a special work to describing that attempt.* So we shall merely say here that although it was most successful in its own way, that attempt is affected, in the same way as Chernyshevsky's views on history, by the main shortcoming of Feuerbach's philosophy: insufficient elaboration of its historical, or to be more exact, dialectical aspect. And it is just because this aspect was not elaborated in the philosophy assimilated by him that Chernyshevsky could overlook the great importance of the concept of play for a materialist interpretation of art....

Chapter Two

BELINSKY, CHERNYSHEVSKY AND PISAREV

[236]..."Lasting enjoyment is afforded to man by reality alone; only those desires are of serious importance which are based on reality; success [237] may be expected only from hopes evoked by reality, and only from those deeds which are accomplished with the help of forces and circumstances offered by reality."**

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Such was the new notion of "reality." Chernyshevsky had Feuerbach in mind when he said that it had been formed by modern thinkers from the obscure allusions of transcendental philosophy. And he expounded Feuerbach's concept of reality quite correctly. Feuerbach said that sensuousness

* See the article "Chernyshevsky's Aesthetic Theory" in the collection *In Twenty Years*.

** N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, p. 206.

or actuality is identical truth, i.e, that the object in its true sense is given only by sensation. Speculative philosophy supposed that ideas of objects based only on sense experience do not correspond to the real nature of the objects and must be verified with the aid of pure thought, i.e., thought not based on sense experience. Feuerbach decisively rejected this idealistic view. He asserted that conceptions of objects based on our sense experience fully correspond to the nature of these objects. The only trouble is that our imagination frequently distorts these conceptions, which, therefore, come into contradiction with our sense experience. Philosophy should drive out from our conceptions the fantastic element that distorts them; it should bring them into accord with sense experience. It must return mankind to a contemplation of real objects undistorted by fancy, such as prevailed in ancient Greece. And insofar as mankind passes to such contemplation, it returns to itself, because people who submit to figments of the imagination can themselves be only imaginary and not real beings. In the words of Feuerbach, the essence of man is sensuousness, i.e., actuality, and not imagination and not abstraction. The task of philosophy and science in general is to restore reality to its rightful place. But if that is so, it follows of itself that the tasks of aesthetics as a branch of science are also to restore reality to its rightful place and combat the imaginary element in man's notions. It was on this conclusion from Feuerbach's philosophy that Chernyshevsky's aesthetic views were based; it constituted the main idea of his dissertation. And there is no doubt that Belinsky had the same conclusion in mind when, in his [238] second but last annual review of literature, he described the concept of "reality" as a new one....

[242]...Everyone knows that the criticism of the sixties, the criticism of Dobrolyubov for example, often crossed over into journalism. Hence, in speaking of Chernyshevsky, we shall not so much present proofs of this thought as illustrations of it. In 1858 Chernyshevsky's article "The Russian at a Rendezvous. Reflections on Turgenev's story *Asya*" appeared in the review section of *Atheneum*, No. 3. This article is one of the most brilliant examples of journalistic criticism. Very little, almost nothing, is said in

the article about Turgenev's actual story, which Chernyshevsky calls "practically the only good new story." The author merely draws attention to the scene in which the hero of the story makes his declaration of love to Asya, and, in connection with this scene, he indulges in "reflections." The reader will recall, of course, that at the critical moment Turgenev's hero turned coward and withdrew. It is this circumstance that caused Chernyshevsky to "reflect." He notes that indecision and cowardice are the distinctive features not only of this hero, but of most of the heroes of our best literary works. He recalls Rudin, Beltov, and the tutor of Nekrasov's Sasha, and sees the same features in all of them. He does not blame the authors of the novels on this account since they were only recording what is met with at every step in real life. There is no manliness in Russian people, therefore the characters in the novels have none either. And Russian people have no manliness because they are not in the habit of taking part in public affairs. "When we go into society, we see around us people in uniforms and civilian morning or evening dress; these people are five and a half or six feet tall, and sometimes even more; they grow or shave the hair on their cheeks, above the upper lip and [243] on their chin; and we imagine we are looking at men. This is a total error, an optical illusion, a hallucination, nothing more. Without acquiring the habit of elementary participation in civil affairs, without acquiring the feelings of a citizen, the male child grows up and becomes middle-aged, and then an elderly being of the masculine gender, but he does not become a man or, at any rate, not a man of a noble character.* Among humane, educated people, the absence of noble manliness strikes one still more than among ignorant people, because the humane, educated man likes to talk about important matters. He talks with enthusiasm and eloquence, but only until it becomes a matter of passing from words to deeds. "So long as there is no question of action, but merely the need to fill up empty hours, an empty mind, or an empty heart, with talk and dreams, the hero is very glib; but once it is a matter of expressing his feelings plainly and exactly, the majority of the heroes

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 143

* *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 97-98.

immediately begin to waver and feel tongue-tied. A few, the most courageous, somehow contrive to muster their forces and stammer something that provides a vague idea of their thoughts. But just attempt to take their wishes at face value and say to them: 'you want so-and-so; we're very glad; begin to do something about it and you'll have our support'—if such a remark is made one half of the very brave heroes faint, the other begin to gruffly reproach you for putting them in an awkward position; they begin to say that they did not expect such proposals from you, they are quite at a loss and cannot think properly because it is not possible to do so at a moment's notice and, moreover, they are honest people, and not only honest but very mild, and they do not want to cause you any unpleasantness, and that, in general, it is not possible, really, to trouble oneself about all that is said merely from having nothing to do, and that it is best not to undertake anything at all, because everything involves trouble and inconvenience, and at present nothing good can come of it, because, as already said, they never for a moment expected, or anticipated, and so on and so forth."*

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 143—"malicious and apt characterisation of Russian liberalism"[180]

One can say that the portrait is painted with a master's hand. However, the master was not a literary critic, but a journalist.

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[245]...As for the requirements of the period, they consisted, to his mind, [246] in concessions to the peasantry. Chernyshevsky exhorted the "estimable" gentlemen with this quotation from the Gospel: "Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing."(Mat., Ch. V, verses 25 and 26).**

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It is self-evident that every theoretical conclusion concerning the capacity of a given social class or stratum for definite practical action always requires a certain degree of verification by experience, and that, consequently, it can be considered

* *Collected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 90-91.
** Ibid., p. 102.

trustworthy a priori only within certain, more or less broad limits. Thus, for example, it was possible with complete assurance to foretell that even the most educated section of the nobility would refuse to sacrifice their interests for the sake of the peasants. Such a prediction in no way required practical verification. But when it was necessary to determine to what extent the educated nobility were capable of making concessions to the peasantry in their own interests, then no one could say in advance with absolute certainty: they will not go in that direction beyond such-and-such a limit. Here it was always possible to assume that under certain circumstances the educated nobility would go a little further, after arriving at a somewhat more correct understanding of its own interests. Being practical, as Chernyshevsky was in this case, he not only could but had to endeavour to persuade the nobility that certain concessions to the freed peasants were required in its own interests. Thus, what might have seemed to constitute a contradiction in his article—the demand for a judicious and resolute step on the part of people whose incapacity for decision and wisdom is here admitted and explained as a necessary product of circumstances—was actually no contradiction at all. Such imaginary contradictions can also be found in the political practice of people who take their stand on the firm ground of the materialist explanation of history. However, here it is necessary to make a very essential reservation. When a materialist applies his theoretical [247] conclusions in practice with a certain amount of caution, he can nevertheless guarantee that his conclusions contain a certain element of the most indisputable certainty. And this is because, when he says: "everything depends on circumstances," he knows from what side one must expect the appearance of the new circumstances that will change the will of people in the direction he desires; he knows quite well that, in the final analysis, they are to be expected from the side of "economics," and that the truer his analysis of the socio-economic life of society, the more trustworthy his prediction concerning the future development of society. Not so with the idealist, who is convinced that "opinions rule the world." If "opinions" are the basic cause of social movement, then the circumstances on which the further devel-

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opment of society depends are linked chiefly to the conscious activity of people, while the possibility of any practical influence on this activity is dependent on the greater or lesser ability of people to think logically and master the new truths discovered by philosophy or science. But this ability depends itself on circumstances. Thus, the idealist who recognises the materialist truth that the character and also, of course, the views of man, depend on circumstances, finds himself in a vicious circle: views depend on circumstances, circumstances on views. The thought of the "enlightener" in theory has never broken out of this vicious circle. In practice the contradiction was usually solved by a strong appeal to all thinking people, independently of the circumstances under which such people were living and acting. What we are now saying may appear unnecessary and for that reason a boring digression. But in point of fact this digression was essential for us. It will help us to understand the nature of the journalistic criticism of the sixties.

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Since the hopes of the "enlightener" are pinned on the intellect and good will of thinking people, i.e., in effect of the "enlighteners" themselves, it is obvious that critics desiring to support these people will demand from fiction above all an e x a c t depiction of social life with all its pros and cons, with its "positive" and "negative" phenomena. Only an exact portrayal of all aspects of life can furnish an "enlightener" with the factual data needed by him for passing judgment on that life....

[253]...However, N. Uspensky used to express himself even more emphatically. For example, he wrote: "Nothing is to be expected from the present-day peasants who not so long ago were the victims of serfdom:—they will not be resurrected!... It is unlikely that medicine will ever cure atrophy, because the disease is based on o r g a n i c damage...."* It was quite difficult for the "people of the seventies" to agree with this. It was chiefly this that gave rise to the unfavourable attitude of the critics of that epoch towards N. V. Uspensky.

The reader will perhaps ask: but was it easy for Chernyshevsky himself to agree with N. V. Uspen-

* N. V. Uspensky, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, 1883, p. 202.

sky's completely hopeless view of "the present-day peasants," since Chernyshevsky evidently considered possible at that time a broad movement of the people who were dissatisfied with the conditions of the abolition of serfdom. To this reply that, obviously, this would not have been easy for him if he considered himself bound to agree unconditionally with N. V. Uspensky. But that is precisely the point—he did not agree unconditionally with him. He considered N. V. Uspensky's essays quite truthful; but he did not draw a hopeless conclusion from them. He said: "Routine dominates the ordinary course of life of common people; and among the plain folk, like in all other social-estates, the routine is just as dull and banal as in all other social-estates. Mr. Uspensky's merit is to have had the courage to depict for us, without concealment or adornment, the routine thoughts and actions, feelings and customs of plain people. The picture is not at all attractive: at every step nonsense and dirt, pettiness and dullness.

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"But do not be in a hurry to draw conclusions from this regarding the validity or non-validity of your hopes, if you wish to alleviate the lot of the people; or of your misgivings, if you were so far concerned about the dullness and inertia of the people. Take the commonest, most colourless, weak-willed, shallow person; no matter how drab and petty the life he leads, it has in it moments of a totally different [254] shade, moments of energetic efforts, courageous decisions. The same is also encountered in the history of every nation."*

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The circumstances, on which everything depends in the last resort, may take such a turn that even an apathetic mass will become capable of vigorous effort and courageous decision. While waiting for the moment when the circumstances take a favourable turn, one must attentively study the backward mass. The initiative in taking courageous decisions will never come from the mass of the populace; but one has to know the character of the people making up this mass "in order to know in what way initiative may stimulate them."**

* N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 357.

** *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 346.

And the more accurately fiction represents the character of the mass of the people, the more it will facilitate the task of those who, under favourable circumstances, will have to take the initiative in making great decisions.

Now we shall ask the reader to recall that in one of the theses of his dissertation Chernyshevsky, emphasising the portrayal of life as the chief characteristic of art, adds: "works of art often have another significance—they explain life; often they also provide a verdict on the phenomena of life." What we have quoted, if only from one article "Is This Not the Beginning of a Change?", clearly shows to what extent literary criticism in the person of Chernyshevsky was inclined to value the portrayal of life chiefly as material for interpreting it and judging it (for passing a verdict on the phenomena of life). The same tendency of Chernyshevsky manifests itself definitely in all his other literary articles. Here is what he says, for example, in a review of a collection of poetry by A. N. Pleshcheyev (*Sovremennik*, 1861, No. 3).

He recalls with displeasure the time when our critics treated Pleshcheyev with scorn and even ill-will. "It seems monstrous now," he says. "Surely the noble sentiments and noble ideas which breathed from every page of Mr. Pleshcheyev's booklet were not so commonplace in the Russian poetry of the time as to be dismissed with scorn. When, indeed, is such a thing possible and permissible?" Pleshcheyev, according to him, had no great poetic talent and his aspirations [255] and hopes were quite vague. But he did possess great sincerity and as for expressing his hopes with greater precision, he could not do so for reasons beyond his control.

[262]...Pisarev possessed tremendous literary talent. But for all the enjoyment that the unprejudiced reader derived from the literary brilliancy of Pisarev's articles, it must be admitted that "Pisarevism" was a sort of reductio ad absurdum of the idealism of our "enlighteners...."

[266]...Some of Mikhailovsky's sociological articles have now been translated into French and, if we are not mistaken, also into German. Presumably, however, they will not make his name very well known in Europe. But it is very possible that they will earn praise from one or two of those European thinkers who are going "back to Kant!"

out of hatred of Marxism. In spite of the opinion of our latest historian of literature, there can be nothing flattering in these praises. But extremely worth noting is time irony of history which makes a theoretical weapon of reaction out of what was an innocent theoretical mistake in a more or less progressive utopism.

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PART TWO

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S VIEWS ON POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

SECTION ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S POLITICAL VIEWS

Chapter One

UTOPIAN SOCIALISM

[280]... His article goes on to tell of the strange and often ridiculous acts to which the Saint-Simonists were driven in their extreme exaltation. He calls them drawing-room heroes overcome by a fit of philanthropy. But he qualifies this severe judgment of them. The Saint-Simonist movement was the first expression of the concept of transforming society, and that first expression is of great [281] historic significance. It indicates that it is high time society concerned itself with the ideas of reform that first appeared in the unsatisfactory form of Saint-Simonism.

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In conclusion, Chernyshevsky says of reformist ideas: "We shall soon see that they have begun to appear in more reasonable forms and to reach people for whom they are no longer a delightful amusement but a matter of necessity, and when that class which the Saint-Simonists wished to humbug begins reasonably to concern itself about its own well-being, then probably, life on earth will be better for it than it is at present.* This is a highly important remark. It shows that in his views on the future of West European socialism Chernyshevsky came very close to the theory of the class struggle. But we know already of the role which this theory has played in his views on history. Sometimes it helped him to explain very successful-

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* N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. VI, p. 150.

ly certain isolated historical phenomena; but he looked on it as a rather serious obstacle to progress instead of a necessary condition for it in a society divided into classes. The reader will recall that Chernyshevsky saw the weak development of the class struggle in Spain as an earnest of that country's progressive development in the future. In his comments on events in France in 1848, as well as in the passage we have just quoted, he seems to incline to the idea that the emancipation movement of the proletariat is now becoming the motive force of social progress in Western Europe. But with him this idea remains one of the germs of a materialist interpretation of history to which we have repeatedly called the reader's attention in dealing with our author's views on history....

[282]...He explains the backwardness of the "ordinary people" of Europe as being due to the fact that well-known scientific conceptions have not yet reached the people. When they do, when "ordinary people" become acquainted with philosophical views "corresponding to their needs," then the triumph of the new principles in the social life of Western Europe will not be far off.* Chernyshevsky does not ask himself the question whether any phenomena exist in this life that could provide an objective guarantee that the new philosophical ideas will, in fact, ultimately reach the "ordinary people." He has no need for such a guarantee because, as he sees it, the very nature of these principles, and also the nature of man, quite sufficiently guarantee the triumph of the new principles....

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Chapter Two
UTOPIAN SOCIALISM
(Continuation)

[289]...Chernyshevsky regards the question of socialism, as he does all the other general questions of historical development, from the point of view of idealism. And this idealist attitude to the most important historical phenomena was typical of the socialism of all countries in the utopian period of its development. This feature of utopian

* Ibid., pp. 205-206.

excessive!

socialism is of such tremendous importance that it is necessary to dwell on it—without fear of a certain amount of repetition, which may very well occur in the process.

Chapter Three

CHERNYSHEVSKY'S "OWN" PLAN AND THE QUESTION OF THE LAND COMMUNE

[313]..."Let us suppose," he says, turning to his favourite method of explanation by means of a "parable"—"let us suppose that I was interested in taking steps to preserve the provisions from the store of which your dinner is prepared. Obviously, if I did so out of affection for you, then my zeal would be based on the assumption that the provisions belong to you and that the dinner being prepared from them is nourishing and good for you. Just imagine my feelings when I learn that the provisions do not really belong to you and that for every dinner prepared from them you pay money which is not only more than the dinner itself is worth but which, in general, you cannot pay without extremely embarrassing yourself. What ideas will enter my head in the face of such strange discoveries?... How stupid I was to bother about a matter when the conditions for its usefulness were not guaranteed! Who but a dolt can bother about the preservation of property in certain hands, without first being assured that the property will remain in those hands and on advantageous terms?... Rather let all these provisions, which only cause harm to the person I love, be lost! Rather let the whole matter, which only causes your ruin, vanish! Sorrow for you, shame on account of my own stupidity—that is what I feel."*

[315]...Credit is due to Chernyshevsky for the fact that, at the very beginning of his literary activity, he displayed, in his comments on the land commune, far more consideration than many a "Russian socialist" even in the mid-nineties, when to all appearances, only the blind could fail to see that our vaunted "age-long foundations" were crumbling. As far back as April 1857 he wrote: but "there is no concealing the fact that Russia, which until now has had a small share in

* *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 307.

economic progress, is being rapidly swept along with it, and our way of life, until now scarcely affected by the economic laws which reveal their power only in times of increased economic and commercial activity, is beginning rapidly to be subjected to them. Perhaps it will not be long before we, too, are drawn into the sphere of full operation of the law of competition."*

This is precisely what the theoreticians of our Narodism ever since sought to conceal from themselves and their readers for so long and with so much care. What the Scriptures say is true: star differs from star in glory .... Being convinced that our country lacks the conditions for making communal land tenure a source of well-being for the people, Chernyshevsky was to see that his sympathetic attitude to the commune bore in fact very little similarity to the Slavophils' sympathetic view of it. In his article "On the Causes of the Fall of Rome," he says that although the commune could contribute to the further development of Russia, it was nonetheless ridiculous to take pride in it, because 13161 it was after all a sign of our economic backwardness. He offers an example: European engineers, he says, now use applied mechanics to construct suspension bridges. But it appears that in a backward Asiatic country-he does not quite remember which one-local engineers have long since been building suspension bridges on suitable sites. Does that mean that applied mechanics in Asia may be placed on a footing with that in Europe? There are bridges and bridges, and the Asian engineers' suspension bridge is infinitely inferior to its European counterpart. To be sure, when European engineers arrive in the Asiatic country which has long been familiar with suspension bridges, they will find it all the easier to convince a mandarin that the suspension bridge of today is not a godless invention. But nothing more than that. Despite its suspension bridges, the Asiatic country will remain a backward country all the same while Europe will still be its preceptor. The same holds true for the Russian commune. Perhaps the latter will promote the development of our country; but the chief stimulus will come nonetheless from the West, and it does not really befit us to renovate the world, even by means of the commune....

* *Collected Works*, Vol. III, p. 185.

Chapter Four
SOCIALISM AND POLITICS

[317]...He who tries to obtain in idea of Chernyshevsky's political views on the basis of his writings, at first feels a little embarrassed, that is, if he himself is not indifferent [318] to politics. Indeed, the man who next to Belinsky was the most colourful exponent of progressive tendencies in our literature, at first glance appears to be politically indifferent. And it is not because he has employed a few unfortunate expressions, nor because of a slip of the pen, but on account of the general principles by which he is sometimes guided in judging the more important phenomena of West-European life. For evidence of this we refer to the article "Party Struggles in France Under Louis XVIII and Charles X" (*Sovremennik*, 1858, Nos. 8 and 9). There we read:

"The fundamental desires, the basic urges, of liberals and democrats are essentially different. Democrats intend to abolish as far as possible the predominance of the upper classes over the lower in the state structure; on the one hand to reduce the power and wealth of the upper social-estates, on the other to give more weight and well-being to the lower social-estates. How to change the laws in this sense and to support the new structure of society is almost a matter of indifference to them. On the other hand, the liberals cannot at all agree to give the predominance in society to the lower social-estates because owing to their lack of education and material poverty, these social-estates are indifferent to the interests that are of the utmost importance to the liberal party, namely, the right of free speech and a constitutional system. For the democrat, our Siberia, where the ordinary people are well off, stands far higher than England, where the majority of the people suffer great privations. Out of all political institutions, the democrat is irreconcilably hostile to only one—aristocracy; the liberal almost always finds that only with a certain degree of aristocracy can society attain the liberal system. Therefore the liberals are usually the mortal enemies of the democrats, and say that democracy leads to despotism and is fatal to freedom."*

Cf. Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 124

* *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 56-57.

[319]...Chernyshevsky then explains his ideas by arguments which bear out even more forcefully our supposition that by democrats he means socialists. He says: "From the theoretical aspect, liberalism may seem attractive to one whom good fortune has delivered from want: freedom is a very good thing. But liberalism takes a very narrow, purely formal view of freedom. To it freedom consists of abstract right, of formal permission of the absence of legal restraint. It refuses to see that legal right is of value to a person only when he has the material means of exercising that right.* The people have no material opportunity for availing themselves of political freedom. The majority of them are illiterate almost in all countries. So why should they treasure their right to free speech? Want and lack of education doom them to complete ignorance [320] of affairs of state. So why should they take any interest in parliamentary debates?" Chernyshevsky states emphatically that "there is no European country where the vast majority of the people is not completely indifferent to the decrees which are the object of the aspirations and concern of liberalism"**

[329]...In the political survey published in No. 6 of *Sovremennik* for 1859, Chernyshevsky remarks, after stating that the movement which insists on intervention by the German [330] Union in Austria's favour is growing stronger in Germany: "we have not been speaking of ordinary people, but actually of classes in which public opinion is concentrated, classes which engage in political affairs, read the newspapers and influence the course of affairs—that crowd which everywhere is a plaything of self-interest and intrigue."*** NB

The "ordinary people" do not read newspapers, do not occupy themselves with political affairs and have no influence on their course. That is the situation now, while their consciousness is still fast asleep. But when it awakens under the influence of the vanguard of the active historical army, consisting of the "best people," who have learned the lessons of modern science, then the "ordinary people" will understand that their task consists in the radical reconstruction of society, and then they will undertake the work of this re- NB

* *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 157.
** Ibid., p. 158.
*** *Collected Works*, Vol. V, p. 249.

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construction, which has no direct relation to questions of the forms of political structure. Such were Chernyshevsky's predominant views, which are to be found in the majority of his numerous political reviews.* If at times this essentially idealist view of politics makes way for a different view, the germ, as it were, of a materialist understanding, this is only an exception, quite like that which we encountered in studying Chernyshevsky's historical views: the reader will remember that in these views which are also essentially idealist, there are also germs of the materialist view of history. Let us now elucidate with the help of two examples the character that Chernyshevskys political reviews had taken under the influence of his aforementioned predominant views regarding the relation of politics to the chief tasks of the working class.

Because of the *theoretical* difference between the idealist and materialist views of history, Plekhanov *overlooked* the practical-political and *class* difference between the liberal and the democrat

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First example. In January 1862, in his political review, he enters into a controversy with the Prussian liberal *National Zeitung* regarding Austria's internal policy. The *National Zeitung* wrote: "Let the fate of Austria be a lesson to other states not to undertake expenditures that exceed their financial strength. The cause of Austria's ruin is her excessive army expenditures." Chernyshevsky does not like these reflections of the *National Zeitung*.

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[331]...Such arguments, which led to the conclusion that the despotic Austrian Government is acting perfectly correctly, should have astonished and in fact did astonish a large number of the readers of *Sovremennik*. They produced [332] an impression not so much of indifference to questions of political freedom as of direct sympathy with the obscurantists. Chernyshevsky's opponents frequently accused him of such sympathies. It was just because of accusations of this kind that at the end of his political review in March 1862 he made the ironical confession: "for us there is no better amusement than liberalism—and we

Cf. *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 144[181]

changed!!

* These reviews take up at least two volumes of his *Collected Works*.

Союза въ пользу Австріи, замѣчаетъ: „мы говорили не о простолюдинахъ, а собственно о классахъ, въ которыхъ сосредоточивается общественное мнѣніе, которые заняты политическими дѣлами, читаютъ газеты и обнаруживаютъ вліяніе на ходъ дѣлъ,—эта толпа, повсюду слушающая игрушкою своекорыстія и интрига" *).

„Простолюдины" не читаютъ газетъ, не занимаются политическими дѣлами и не имѣютъ вліянія на ихъ ходъ. Такъ обстоитъ дѣло теперь, пока еще глубоко спитъ ихъ сознаніе. А когда оно пробудится подъ вліяніемъ передового отряда дѣйствующей исторической арміи, состоящаго изъ „лучшихъ людей", усвоившихъ себѣ выводы современной науки, тогда „простолюдины" поймутъ, что ихъ задача состоитъ въ коренномъ переустройствѣ общества, и тогда они возьмутся за дѣло этого переустройства, но имѣющее прямого отношенія къ вопросамъ о формахъ политическаго устройства. Такъ былъ преобладавшій взглядъ Чернышевскаго, который и обнаруживается въ большинствѣ его многочисленныхъ политическихъ обозрѣній **). Если иногда этотъ, по существу своему идеалистическій, взглядъ на политику уступаетъ мѣсто другому взгляду, являющемуся какъ бы зачаткомъ матеріалистическаго пониманія, то это есть лишь исключеніе, совершенно подобное тому, съ которымъ мы встрѣчались при изученіи историческихъ взглядовъ Чернышевскаго: читатель помнитъ, что въ этихъ взглядахъ, тоже идеалистическихъ по своему существу, тоже встрѣчались зачатки матеріалистическаго взгляда на исторію. Поясним же теперь двумя примѣрами, какой характеръ должны были принимать политическія обозрѣнія Чернышевскаго подъ вліяніемъ только что указаннаго нами и преобладавшаго у него взгляда на отношеніе политики къ главнымъ задачамъ рабочаго класса.

Первый примѣръ. Въ январѣ 1862 года онъ въ своемъ политическомъ обозрѣніи вступаетъ въ споръ съ прусской либеральной „National Zeitung" по поводу внутренней политики Австріи. „National Zeitung" писала: „судьба Австріи да послужитъ для другихъ государствъ уроокомъ, чтобы они не дѣлали расходовъ, превышающихъ финансовую ихъ силу. Причиною разоренія Австріи служитъ безмѣрность расходовъ ея на войско". Чернышевскому не нравится это умиленіе „National Zeitung". Онъ

*) Сочиненія, т. V, стр. 249.

**) Эти обозрѣнія составляютъ по объему, по крайней мѣрѣ, два тома полнаго собранія его сочиненій.

A page from G. V. Plekhanov's
book *N. G. Chernyshevsky* with V. I. Lenin's notes

A page from G. V. Plekhanov's
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have an irresistible desire to look about for liberals in order to poke fun at them." But as a matter of fact, of course, he did not write his paradoxical reviews in order to "poke fun" at the liberals, nor to defend despotic governments. Basically the thought was that, while the given social relations existed, things could not proceed otherwise than they were doing and that anyone who wanted them to proceed differently should devote his efforts to a radical change in social relations. To act differently would be a waste of time. The liberals evoked Chernyshevsky's ridicule precisely because they proposed palliatives where a radical cure was necessary.*

Second example. In April of the same year, Chernyshevsky again appeared to take the side of absolutism in its struggle with liberalism in the Prussian Government's conflict with the Prussian Diet. According to him, the liberals should not have been surprised that the Prussian Government did not make voluntary concessions to them but preferred to agitate the country by dissolving the Diet "We find," he says, "that the Prussian Government acted as it should have.** This again was bound to astonish the naïve reader and seem to him a betrayal of the cause of freedom. It is clearly understandable, however, that here, too, our author was not at all taking up the cudgels in defence of despotism, but only wanted [333] to utilise the Prussian events in order to communicate to the more astute of his readers the correct view of the chief condition on which, in the final analysis, the outcome of all broad social conflicts depends. Here is what he says on this point:

Cf. *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 144 tone!

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"Just as quarrels between different states are

* In his *Essays on Political Economy* Chernyshevsky, pointing to the lack of agreement between the existing economic system and "the demands of a sound theory," sometimes interrupts his exposition with the question: "Should a system continue which allows such disagreement?" (See, for instance, *Collected Works*, Vol. VII, p. 513.) The reader of Chernyshevsky must have asked himself the same question on reading his political surveys, especially those leading to the "incongruous" conclusion that the apologists of despotism, and not its opponents, were in the right. In Chernyshevsky such a conclusion was just another argument against the contemporary life. But the liberals often failed to understand this.

** *Collected Works*, Vol. IX, p. 236.

at first carried on by diplomatic means, so the struggle for principles inside the state itself is at first carried on by means of civilian influence or so-called legal means. But just as a quarrel between different states, if it is sufficiently important, always leads to military threats, so too with the internal affairs of states, if the affair is not of minor importance. If the quarrelling states are very unequal in power, then the affair is usually solved by military threats alone: the weaker state succumbs to the will of the stronger, and this prevents open warfare. In just the same way, in important internal affairs, war is only prevented if one of the conflicting sides feels too weak compared with the other: then it submits as soon as it sees that the opposing party has really decided to resort to military measures. But if two quarrelling states are not so unequal in power that the weaker of them cannot hope to repulse an attack, then the affair may pass from threats to war. The defending side has a very big advantage on its side and, therefore, if it is not too weak, it does not lose heart at the decision of the stronger opponent to attack it"*

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It was from this point of view that he examined what was then taking place in Prussia. He defended and praised the Prussian Government—this must be noted—solely because "it was acting in the best possible way in favour of national progress" by destroying the political illusions of those naïve Prussians who, for no obvious reason, imagined that a system of genuinely constitutional rule would be instituted in their country of itself, without a struggle against the old order. And if he revealed not the slightest sympathy for the Prussian liberals and even poked fun at them, the explanation is that, in his just opinion, they too wanted to achieve their aims [334] without a determined struggle against their political enemies. In speaking of the possible outcome of the conflict between the Diet and the Government he remarks, with great perspicacity, that "judging by the present mood of public opinion in Prussia, it is to be presumed that the opponents of the present

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* *Collected Works*, Vol. IX, p. 241.

system find themselves too weak for military struggle and are ready to yield at the first determined threat from the government that it will resort to military measures."* And so it turned out Chernyshevsky was right in his contempt for the Prussian liberals. They indeed wanted constitutional order to be instituted in Prussia of itself. Not only did they not take determined action—for that they could not be blamed since, with the prevailing relation of social forces, this was not possible—but they condemned in principle every idea of such action, i.e., they hampered, insofar as it depended on them, a change in social forces that would have made it possible to resort to such action in the future. Chernyshevsky could not forgive them that, just as Lassalle could not. It is noteworthy that just when Chernyshevsky was ridiculing the Prussian liberals in his political articles, Lassalle was tearing them to pieces in his speeches. And it is even more noteworthy that in those speeches the German agitator sometimes used the same words as Chernyshevsky to describe the relation of social forces as the foundation of the political system in a particular country. Lassalle had in many respects the same mentors as Chernyshevsky. It is natural, therefore, that the political thinking of both tended in the same direction, and achieved results that coincided in part. We say "i n p a r t" because, in noting the great s i m i l a r i t y of Lassalle's views to Chernyshevsky's, one must not close one's eyes to the d i f f e r e n c e s between them. Lassalle does not confine himself to concluding that the constitution of any country is the juridical expression of the prevailing correlation of social forces. He seeks the causes which determine this correlation, and finds them in the social economy. Those of Lassalle's speeches which bear on this question are permeated with a materialist spirit, which is more than can be said, for instance, of his speech [335] on the philosophy of Fichte, or his "S y s t e m o f A c q u i r e d R i g h t s." Neither does Chernyshevsky ignore the question of the causes determining the relation of social forces, but in his analysis he stops at social self-consciousness, i.e., not crossing the boundary separating historical





* *Collected Works*, Vol. IX, p. 241.

idealism from historical materialism. In contrast to Lassalle, he is a far more consistent idealist in his comments on Prussian affairs than in many of his other articles dealing with politics or history. This difference, too, should be attributed completely to the "relation of social forces." In Prussia, no matter how weak Prussian capitalism was compared with what it is at present, a working-class movement in the modern sense of the word had nevertheless already begun; but in Russia the movement of the "non-gentry," which is usually called the movement of the intelligentsia, had only just begun to flourish. Influenced by the requirements of the working-class movement, even idealists are often compelled to reason materialistically. (Joe can find many examples in present-day France of how the requirements of the working-class movement exert their influence. The movement of the intelligentsia, on the contrary, sometimes drives even materialists to purely idealist reasoning. This is particularly marked in Russia today.

i.e., the democratic movement

Chernyshevsky's political reviews were intended for the "best people," who had to know what they should teach the backward masses. The work of the "best people" amounted, in the main, to propaganda. But not exclusively. The "ordinary people," generally speaking, do not figure on the political stage. And what takes place on that stage—again speaking generally—little affects their interests. But there are exceptional epochs during which the masses of the people awaken from their customary hibernation and make energetic, although often hardly conscious, efforts to improve their destiny. In such exceptional epochs the activity of the "best people" more or less loses its predominantly propagandist character and becomes agitational. This is what Chernyshevsky says of such epochs:

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"Historical progress takes place slowly and arduously... [336], so slowly that, if we limit ourselves to very short periods, the fluctuations produced in the advancing course of history by accidental circumstances may blind us to the action of the general law. In order to convince oneself of its immutability, it is necessary to con-

sider the course of events over a fairly long time.... Compare the state of the social institutions and laws of France in 1700 and today—the difference is extremely great, and it is all to the advantage of the present day; and yet almost all this century and a half was very arduous and gloomy. The same also in England. Whence comes the difference? It was being constantly prepared for by the fact that the best people of each generation found life in their time extremely difficult; little by little at least a few of their desires became comprehensible to society, and then, at some time many years later, on propitious occasions, society for six months, a year, or hardly more than three or four years, worked for the fulfilment of at least a few of this small number of desires which had penetrated to it from the best people. The work was never successful: when half the work was done society's zeal would be exhausted, its strength would give out, and once again the practical life of society would fall into a long period of stagnation; and, as before, the best people, if they survived the work inspired by them, saw that their desires were far from having been carried out and as before had to bemoan life's burdens. But in the brief period of noble enthusiasm much was reconstructed. Of course, the reconstruction took place hurriedly, there was no time to think about the elegance of the new structures, which remained unfinished, there was no time to bother about the subtle requirements of architectural harmony between the new parts and the surviving remains, and the period of stagnation inherited the reconstructed edifice with a multitude of petty incongruities and hideosities. But that period of indolence afforded leisure to examine carefully every detail and since the improvement of the details that it disliked did not require any particular effort, it was done little by little; and while an exhausted society busied itself with trivia, the best people were saying that the reconstruction was incomplete, and argued that the old parts of the building were becoming more and more dilapidated, and that it was necessary to resume work on a big scale. At first a tired society refused to heed them, regarding their jarring cry as interference with its rest; then, having recovered its energy, society began to defer more and more to an opinion which had previously aroused its indignation. [337] So-

ciety gradually became convinced that there was some truth in it, came to recognise that truth more and more from year to year, and finally was prepared to go along with those progressive people who argued that reconstruction was necessary; and, then, at the earliest opportunity it set to work with renewed fervour, again left it unfinished, and once more fell into a slumber, only to resume the effort later on."*

Chernyshevsky's political articles were aimed at showing the "best people" that the old structure of the contemporary social system was crumbling more and more and that there was a need to "resume work on a big scale." And everything points to the fact that towards the end of the first, i.e., pre-Siberian period of his literary activity, it began to appear to him that society was more and more heeding his opinion, and falling in with him. In other words, he began to think that in Russian history too there was approaching one of those beneficial leaps which rarely occur in history, but which push far ahead the process of social development. The spirits of the advanced sections of Russian society were indeed rapidly rising, and with them Chernyshevsky's spirits also rose. At one time he had found it possible and useful to make clear to the government its own interests in the matter of freeing the peasants; now he does not even think of addressing himself to the government. To count on it at all seems to him harmful self-delusion. In the article "The Russian Reformer" (Sovremennik, October 1861), which he wrote in connection with the publication of M. Korf's book *The Life of Count Speransky*, Chernyshevsky argues at length that no reformer should delude himself with such calculations in our country. Speransky's enemies called him a revolutionary. This opinion amused Chernyshevsky. Speransky indeed had very broad plans for changes, but it is ludicrous to call him a revolutionary, judging by the extent of the means he intended using to carry out his intentions. He could maintain his position only because he had managed to earn the trust of the tsar Alexander I. With this trust to support him, he intended to carry out his plans. That is why Chernyshevsky called him a dreamer....

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Cf. Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 161[182]

* *Collected Works*, Vol. V, pp. 400-491.

[338]...Only he who constantly remembers that the course of social life is determined by the relationship of social forces does not succumb to harmful delusions in politics, he who wishes to act in accordance with this basic principle has sometimes to go through a difficult moral struggle. Chernyshevsky tries to warn the "best people" of his time on this score, in view of what he thought was the imminent leap. Thus, as far back as January 1861, in analysing a book by the well-known American economist, Carey, whose insignificance, incidentally, he brilliantly exposes, he unexpectedly passes to the well-known Jewish heroine, Judith, and strongly justifies her action. He says: "The path of history is not paved like Nevsky Prospekt; it runs across fields, either dusty or muddy, and cuts across swamps or forest thickets. He who fears being covered with dust or muddying his boots, should better not engage in social activity, for this is a noble occupation when one is really concerned with the good of the people, but it is not exactly a tidy one. It is true, however, that moral purity may be understood differently; others, for example, may feel that Judith did not tarnish herself.... Broaden your considerations and on many individual questions you will have obligations that are different from those resulting from an isolated examination of the same questions*

Sotsial-Demokrat, p. 161 changed

At the beginning of the sixties the government conceived the idea of lifting censorship restrictions to some extent. It was decided that new censorship rules should be drawn up, and the press was allowed to express itself on the question of its own repression. Chernyshevsky lost no time in stating his personal views, which as usual strongly differed from the usual liberal views. [339] True, Chernyshevsky himself maliciously ridicules the people who suppose that the printing press has some specific power like belladonna, sulphuric acid, fulminate of silver, etc. "Our personal opinion is not inclined towards expecting unnaturally harmful results from objects and actions which do not possess the power to produce such calamities. We think the printing press is too weak to produce social misfortune. After all, it does not contain so much ink that the latter could come pouring out somehow and flood our country; nor has it springs

Cf. omission *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 162[183]

* *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, pp. 37-38.

that, after jumping out somehow and thumping the type, could fire it as case shot." However, Chernyshevsky admits that there are epochs when the press can be no less dangerous than case shot to the government of a country. These are the epochs when a government's interests differ from the interests of society and a revolutionary upheaval is imminent. A government in such a position has every ground for restricting the press, because the press, together with other social forces, is preparing its downfall. Almost all the successive French governments of this century have been continuously in this situation. All this is very painstakingly and calmly expounded by Chernyshevsky. Nothing is said in the article, until the very end, about the Russian Government. But in conclusion Chernyshevsky suddenly asks his reader—suppose it should turn out that the press laws are really necessary in our country? "Then we should again deserve to be called obscurantists, enemies of progress, haters of freedom, panegyrists of despotism, etc., just as we have already many times laid ourselves open to such censure." He therefore does not want to investigate the question of whether there is a need for special press laws in our country. "We fear," he says, "that a conscientious investigation would lead us to reply: yes, they are necessary."* The conclusion is clear they are necessary because the time for a "leap" is also approaching in Russia.

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In the same March issue of *Sovremennik* that printed the article we have just quoted, there appeared a polemical article entitled "Have We Learned the Lesson?", concerning the well-known student demonstrations of 1861. In it Chernyshevsky defends the students, who were reproached by our "guardians" for allegedly not wanting to study [340]; and, incidentally, he also tells the government many home truths. The immediate cause for this polemic was an anonymous article in the *St. Petersburg Academic Bulletin* entitled "To Study or Not To Study?" Chernyshevsky replies that in regard to students this question has no sense, since they have always wanted to study, but the restricting university regulations hindered them. The university regulations would have

* *Collected Works*, Vol. IX, pp. 130, 155.

idem *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 163

dealt with students—people of an age when by our laws a man may marry, be taken into the civil service, or "command an army unit"—as children. It is not surprising that they protested. They were even barred from having such completely harmless organisations as mutual aid societies, which were undoubtedly essential in view of the material insecurity of the majority of the students. Students could not but revolt against such regulations, because it was a question of "a crust of bread and the possibility of attending lectures. This bread, this opportunity was being withdrawn." Chernyshevsky declared outright that the people who made the university regulations actually wanted to deprive the majority of those who entered the university of any possibility of studying. "If the author of the article and those who agree with him consider it necessary to prove that this was not the aim in view when the regulations were drawn up, let them publish the documents relating to the meetings at which the regulations were decided on." The anonymous writer of the article "To Study or Not To Study?" directed his charge of unwillingness to study not only against the students but against the whole of Russian society. Chernyshevsky took advantage of this to carry the controversy about the unrest at the university on to a more general field. His opponent allowed that there were certain signs of the desire of Russian society to study. Proof of this, in his opinion, was the "hundreds" of new periodicals, the "dozens" of Sunday schools for adults that were appearing in our country. "Hundreds of new periodicals, but where did he count the hundreds?" exclaims Chernyshevsky. "And hundreds would really be necessary, but does the author want to know why hundreds of new periodicals are not being founded, as they should? It is because under the conditions of our censorship it is impossible for any lively periodical to exist anywhere, except in a few large towns. Every rich commercial town should [341] have several, even if only small, newspapers; several local news-sheets should be published in every province. They do not exist, because they are not allowed to.... Dozens of Sunday schools for adults.... Now that is no exaggeration, it is not the same as with the hundreds of new periodicals: in an empire with a population of over 60 million, the Sunday schools for adults are indeed to be counted only in dozens. Yet there should have been tens of thousands of them, and it would have

been possible to establish quickly tens of thousands of them, and for at least many thousands to be now in existence. How is it that there are only dozens? Because they are so suspect, so hampered, so circumscribed, that the people who are most loyal to the work of teaching in them have all desire to teach driven out of them."

idem *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 164

After referring to the existence of 'hundreds" of new periodicals and "dozens" of Sunday schools for adults as apparent signs of the desire of society to study, the author of the article which Chernyshevsky was analysing hastened to add that these signs were deceptive. "You hear shouting in the streets," he proclaims mournfully, "something or other is said to have happened somewhere, and you involuntarily hang your head and are disillusioned...." "Excuse me, Mr. Author of the article," objects Chernyshevsky, "what is the shouting you hear in the streets? The shouting of constables and police officers—we hear their shouting too. Are you speaking of that shouting? You are told something or other has happened somewhere....—what sort of thing, for example? There a theft has occurred, here authority has been exceeded, there the rights of the weak have been violated, here there has been connivance with the strong—we are incessantly being told this sort of thing. Because of this shouting which everyone hears, and this constant talk, one does indeed involuntarily hang one's head and become disillusioned."

The accuser of the students attacked them for their apparent intolerance of the opinions of others, for having recourse in their protests to whistling, pickled apples and similar "street weapons." Chernyshevsky replies that "whistling and pickled apples are not used as street weapons: street weapons take the form of bayonets, rifle-butts and sabres." He asks his opponent to recall "whether it was the students who used these street weapons against anyone, or whether they were used against the students ... and whether there was any need to use them against the students."

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Up to here *Sotsial-*

It is easy to understand the impression such article of Chernyshevsky's were bound to make on the Russian students. When [342], subsequently, student demonstrations occurred again at the end of the sixties, the article "Have We Learned the Lesson?" was read at student gatherings as being the best defence of their demands. It is also easy to understand what the attitude of the "guardians" must have been to such defiant articles. The great

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writer's "dangerous" influence on the student youth became more and more obvious to them.

Demokrat No. 1, p. 164

We know already how that influence was removed.

Holding a utopian socialist point of view, Chernyshevsky believed that the plans which those of like mind in the West sought to realise could be carried out under the most varied political forms. That's how it was according to theory. And as long as he did not step out of this sphere, he expressed this view without mincing words. When he started on his literary career, our social life seemed to furnish some confirmation, if only indirect, of the correctness of this view; hope arose among the advanced men of the day that the government would take the initiative in reaching a just solution of the peasant question. It was a vain hope, which Chernyshevsky abandoned almost before anyone else. And while in theory he did not, even afterwards, clearly see the connection between economics and politics, in his practical activity—and by this we mean his journalistic efforts—he was an uncompromising enemy of our old order, although his peculiar irony continued to mislead many liberal-minded readers on that score. In deeds, if not in theory, he became a man of irreconcilable political struggle and the thirst for struggle is felt In almost every line of each of his articles relating to the year 1861 and, in particular, to the year 1862, a fateful one for him.

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NOTES

[1] *Conspectus of the book "The Holy Family" by Marx and Engels* was written by Lenin in 1895 during his first stay abroad when he left Russia to establish contact with the Emancipation of Labour group. p. 19

[2] *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.*—the first joint work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. It was written between September and November 1844 and was published in February 1845 in Frankfort-on-Main.

"*The Holy Family*" is a mocking reference to the Bauer brothers and their followers grouped around the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (*General Literary Gazette*). While attacking the Bauers and the other Young Hegelians (or Left Hegelians), Marx and Engels at the same time criticised the idealist philosophy of Hegel.

Marx sharply disagreed with the Young Hegelians as early as the summer of 1842, when the club of "The Free" was formed in Berlin. Upon becoming editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* (*Rhine Gazette*) in October 1842, Marx opposed the efforts of several Young Hegelian staff members from Berlin to publish inane and pretentious articles emanating from the club of "The Free," which had lost touch with reality and was absorbed in abstract philosophical disputes. During the two years following Marx's break with "The Free," the theoretical and political differences between Marx and Engels on the one hand and the Young Hegelians on the other became deep-rooted and irreconcilable. This was not only due to the fact that Marx and Engels had gone over from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democratism to communism, but also due to the evolution undergone by the Bauer brothers and persons of like mind during this time. In the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, Bauer and his group denounced "1842 radicalism" and its most outstanding proponent—the *Rheinische Zeitung*. They slithered into vulgar subjective idealism of the vilest kind—propagation of a "theory" according to which only select individuals, bearers of the

"spirit," of "pure criticism," are the makers of history, while the masses, the people, serve as inert material or ballast in the historical process.

Marx and Engels decided to devote their first joint work to the exposure of these pernicious, reactionary ideas and to the defence of their new materialist and communist outlook.

During a ten-day stay of Engels in Paris the plan of the book (at first entitled *Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.*) was drafted, responsibility for the various chapters apportioned between the authors, and the "Preface" written. Engels wrote his chapters while still in Paris. Marx, who was responsible for a larger part of the book, continued to work on it until the end of November 1844. Moreover, he considerably increased the initially conceived size of the book by incorporating in his chapters parts of his economic and philosophical manuscripts on which he had worked during the spring and summer of 1844, his historical studies of the bourgeois French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, and a number of his excerpts and conspectuses. While the book was in the process of being printed, Marx added the words *The Holy Family* to the title. By using a small format, the book exceeded 20 printer's sheets and was thus exempted from preliminary censorship according to the prevailing regulations in a number of German states. p. 23

[3] *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (*General Literary Gazette*)—a German monthly published in Charlottenburg from December 1843 to October 1844 by Bruno Bauer, the Young Hegelian. p. 23

[4] *Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie* (*Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy*) was first published by Engels at the beginning of 1844 in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (*Franco-German Annals*)—see Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Moscow, 1959, pp. 175-209. p. 24

[5] *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (*Franco-German Annals*)—a magazine published in German in Paris and edited by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge. The only issue to appear was a double number published in February 1844. It included Marx's articles "A Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law (Introduction)" and "On the Jewish Question," and also Engels' articles "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy" and "The Position of England. Thomas Carlyle. 'Past and Present'." These works mark the final transition of Marx and Engels to materialism and communism. Publication of the magazine was discontinued chiefly as a result of the basic differences between Marx's views and the bourgeois-radical views of Ruge. p. 24

[6] This refers to Proudhon's work of 1840 *Qu'est-ce que la propriété? ou Recherches sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement* (*What*

Is Property? or Studies on the Principle of Law and Government). Marx presents a critique of this work in a letter to Schweitzer dated January 24, 1865 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 185-192). p. 26

[7] This refers to Eugene Sue's novel *Les mystères de Paris* (*Mysteries of Paris*), which was written in the spirit of petty-bourgeois sentimentality. It was published in Paris in 1842-43 and was very popular in France and abroad. p. 31

[8] Marx is referring here to articles by Jules Faucher entitled *Englische Tagesfragen* (*Topical Questions in England*), which were published in Nos. VII and VIII (June and July 1844) of the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*. p. 32

[9] *Loustallot's journal of 1789*—a weekly publication entitled *Révolutions de Paris* (*Parisian Revolutions*), which appeared in Paris from July 1789 to February 1794. Until September 1790 it was edited by Elisée Loustallot, a revolutionary publicist. p. 32

[10] *Phanomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Mind*) by G. W. F. Hegel was first published in 1807. In working on *The Holy Family*, Marx made use of Vol. II of the second edition of Hegel's works (Berlin, 1841). He called this first large work of Hegel, in which the latter's philosophical system was elaborated, "the source and secret of Hegel's philosophy." p. 33

[11] *Doctrinaires*—members of a bourgeois political grouping in France during the period of the Restoration (1815-30). As constitutional monarchists and rabid enemies of the democratic and revolutionary movement, they aimed to create in France a bloc of the bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy after the English fashion. The most celebrated of the Doctrinaires were Guizot, a historian, and Royer-Collard, a philosopher. Their views constituted a reaction in the field of philosophy against the French materialism of the 18th century and the democratic ideas of the French bourgeois revolution. p. 34

[12] The refutation of the views expounded by Bruno Bauer in his book *Die Judenfrage* (*The Jewish Question*), Braunschweig, 1843, was made by Marx in an article entitled "Zur Judenfrage" ("On the Jewish Question"), published in 1844 in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. p. 35

[13] *The Universal Rights of Man*—the principles enunciated in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen" and proclaimed during the time of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789-93. p. 38

[14] *The 18th Brumaire* (9 November 1799)—the day of the coup d'etat of Napoleon Bonaparte, who overthrew the Directorate and established his own dictatorship. p. 40

[15] *Cartesian materialism*—the materialism of the followers of Descartes (from the Latin spelling of Descartes—*Cartesius*). The indicated book—*Rapports du physique et du moral de l'hommne* (*Relation of the Physical to the Spiritual in Man*) by P. J. G. Cabanis—was published in Paris in 1802. p. 42

[16] *Nominalism*—the trend in medieval philosophy that considered general concepts as merely the names of single objects in contrast to medieval "realism," which recognised the existence of general concepts or ideas independent of things.

Nominalism recognised objects as primary and concepts as secondary. Thus, as Marx says in *The Holy Family*, nominalism represents the first expression of materialism in the Middle Ages (see Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 172). p. 43

[17] *Sensualism*—the philosophical doctrine that recognises sensation as the sole source of cognition. p. 43

[18] *Babouvists*—adherents of Gracchus Babeuf, who in 1796 led a utopian communist movement of "equals" in France. p. 44

[19] Lenin is referring to Feuerbach's *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (*Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*), 1843, which constitutes a continuation of the latter's aphorisms *Vorläufige Thesen zu einer Reform der Philosophie* (*Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*), 1842, in which the author expounds the basis of his materialist philosophy and criticises Hegel's idealist philosophy. p. 45

[20] *Fleur de Marie*—heroine of Eugène Sue's novel *Mysteries of Paris*. p. 46

[21] *Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik. Von Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk,*

Arnold Ruge und einigen Ungenannten (*Unpublished Recent German Philosophical and Other Writings of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk, Arnold Ruge and Several Anonymous Writers*)—a collection of articles that were banned for publication in German magazines. Published in 1843 in Zurich by Ruge and included Marx as one of its contributors. p. 48

[22] *Tory philanthropists*—a literary-political group—"Young England."

This group was formed in the early 1840s and belonged to the Tory Party. It voiced the dissatisfaction of the landed aristocracy with the increased economic and political might of the bourgeoisie, and resorted to demagogic methods to bring the working class under its influence and use it in its fight against the bourgeoisie.

"In order to arouse sympathy," Marx and Engels wrote in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, "the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight, apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone."

Ten Hours' Bill—a law on the 10-hour working day for women and juveniles, adopted by the English Parliament in 1847. p. 51

[23] The note on *Fr. Überweg's book* "*Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*." (*Bearbeitet von Max Heinze*). *3 Vls. 1876-1880, Leipzig* (Fr. Überweg, *Outline of the History of Philosophy*, revised by Max Heinze, 3 Vols., 1876-1880, Leipzig) is recorded in the same notebook containing the remarks on Paulsen's book *Introduction to Philosophy*. These entries were made in Geneva in 1903. p.52

[24] *Remarks on Fr. Paulsen's book* "*Einleitung in die Philosophie*," *1899* (Fr. Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, 1899) are contained in the same notebook in which the note on the book by Überwug is recorded (entries made in Geneva in 1903). After the remarks in the notebook on Paulsen's book, there follows: "Note on the Position of the New *Iskra*." (See Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 7.) p. 53

[25] *Note on a Feuilleton in the newspaper* "*Frankfurter Zeitung*" of November 15, 1904, which comments on two books by E. Haeckel—*Lebenswunder* (*Gemeinverständliche Studien über biologische Philosophie*) [*The Wonders of Life* (*Elementary Studies in Biologist Philosophy*)], Stuttgart (Alfred Kröner) and *Welträtsel* (*The Riddle of the Universe*)—was written on a separate sheet, which also contained a list of a number of foreign books on the agrarian question. The entry was made at the end of 1904. Lenin gave an evaluation of *The Riddle of the Universe* by E. Haeckel in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 364-372). p. 56

[26] *Remarks on Books on the Natural Sciences and Philosophy in the Sorbonne Library* were written on separate sheets during the first half of 1909. p. 57

[27] *Ten Trends in Philosophy*—a list of ten chapters in the first part of the book *Modern Philosophical Trends* by L. Stein. p. 58

[28] *Conspectus of Feuerbach's book* "*Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*" (*Lectures on the Essence of Religion*) is contained in a separate notebook whose cover was not preserved. On the first page in abbreviated form is written L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 8, 1851; also indicated is the press-mark—8°. R. 807. There is no indication exactly when the Conspectus was worked out by Lenin.

V. Adoratsky has suggested that it was written in 1909 (*Lenin Miscellany XII*). The following arguments speak in favour of this hypothesis. It has been established that the press-mark on the first page of the Conspectus is that of the French National Library (Paris) in which Lenin worked from January 13 to June 30, 1909. The contents of *Lectures on the Essence of Religion* borders upon those works of Feuerbach that were used by Lenin in 1908 in writing his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, and some of Lenin's remarks in the Conspectus are related to propositions formulated in his book. In the Conspectus, for example, Lenin notes: [(Feuerbach and natural science!! NB. Cf. Mach and Co. today)] (see p. 71 of this volume), and in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* he writes: "The philosophy of the scientist Mach is to science what the kiss of the Christian Judas was to Christ. Mach likewise betrays science into the hands of fideism by virtually deserting to the camp of philosophical idealism." (V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960, p. 303.) Certain remarks in Lenin's Conspectus are also related to theses in his article "On the Attitude of a Working-Class Party to Religion," written in May 1909. (See Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 15.) p. 61

[29] *Das Wesen des Christentums* (*The Essence of Christianity*)—L. Feuerbach's chief philosophical work. Its first edition came out in Leipzig in 1841. The book, which, as Engels said, proclaimed the triumph of materialism, exerted enormous influence on the ideological education of progressive intellectuals in Germany and other countries, including Russia. The first Russian translation of the book came out in 1861. p. 64

[30] The reference is to *The Holy Family* by Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, in which the authors wrote that Feuerbach outlined "in a masterly *manner the general basic features of Hegel's speculation*

and hence *of every kind of metaphysics*." (Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 186-187.) p. 65

[31] *Das Wesen der Religion* (*The Essence of Religion*) by L. Feuerbach was published in 1846. *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (*Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*) was published in 1843. p. 67

[32] The reference is to the well-known passage on the basic question of philosophy in Engels' book *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 369-370). p. 70

[33] Lenin contrasts here the attitude toward natural science of Feuerbach, the materialist, and of Mach, the subjective idealist. A critical evaluation of Mach's attitude toward natural science is given by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 363-364). p. 71

[34] Josef Dietzgen developed analogous ideas. For example, in the book *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind* (*Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. I, Stuttgart, 1922), in the paragraph "Spirit and Matter," he wrote: "Long ago, mainly during early Christianity, it became customary to look with disdain upon material, sensual and carnal things, which become moth-eaten and rusty" (p. 53). p. 72

[35] Josef Dietzgen wrote as follows in *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind* (*Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. I, Stuttgart, 1922), in the chapter "Pure Reason or the Capacity to Think in General": "Thinking is a function of the brain, just as writing is a function of the hand" (p. 11) and further "... the reader will not misunderstand me when I call the capacity to think a material power, a *sensuous phenomenon*" (p. 13). p. 72

[36] See Lenin's notations in Plekhanov's book *N. G. Chernyshevsky* (pp. 534-536, 538, 543, 544, 549-550 and 552 of this volume). p. 77

[37] *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (*New Rhine Gazette*) was published by Marx in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849.

Engels' book *The Condition of the Working Class in England* was published in 1845. Regarding the significance of this book, see V. I. Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 2, Moscow, 1960, pp. 22-23. p. 77

[38] Lenin is referring to the following passage in Feuerbach's book *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*. *Werke*, Bd. 8, 1851, S. 411 (*Lectures on the Essence of Religion*, *Works*, Vol. 8, 1851, p. 411): "...godliness consists, so to speak, of two component parts, of which one belongs to man's fantasy, the other to nature. Pray!—says one part, i.e., God, distinct from nature; work!—says the other part, i.e., God, not distinct from nature, but merely expressing its essence; for nature is the working bee, Gods—the drones." p. 78

[39] *The Anthropological Principle*—the main thesis of Feuerabach's philosophy that it is neccessary to consider man as part of nature, as a biological being.

The anthropological principle was directed against religion and idealism. However, by considering man apart from the concrete historical and social relations, the anthropological principle leads to idealism in the understanding of the laws of historical development.

Nikolai Chernyshevsky, in struggling against idealism, also took the anthropological principle as his starting-point and devoted a special work to this question under the title "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" (see N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 49-135). p. 82

[40] The reference is to L. Feuerbach's *Theogonie nach den Quellen des klassischen, hebräischen und christlichen Altertums*. *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 9, 1857 (*Theogony Based on Sources of Classical, Hebrew and Christian Antiquity*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, 1857). Page 320—beginning of § 34, which is headed "'Christian' Natural Science"; page 334 is in § 36, which is headed "The Theoretical Basis of Theism." p. 83

[41] *Conspectus of Hegel's book* "*The Science of Logic*" consists of three notebooks, which have a common pagination from 1 to 115. On the cover of the first notebook, in addition to the inscription "Hegel. Logic I," there is the entry: "Notebooks on Philosophy. Hegel, Feuerbach and others." On the cover of the second notebook, to the pagination 49-88, there is the appendage: NB p. 76 (pp. 192-193 of this volume). At the bottom of page 111, there is written: "End of *Logic*. 17.XII.1914." The conspectus was probably begun during the first half of September 1914, when Lenin moved from Poronin to Bern, Switzerland. p. 85

[42] The first edition of Hegel's works in German consists of 18 volumes (1832-45) and an additional volume in two parts (1887). p. 87.

[43] *Wissenschaft der Logik* (*The Science of Logic*) consists of two parts (three books). p. 87

[44] *Parmenides*—the name of one of Plato's dialogues, in which the philosophical views of Parmenides, the ancient Greek Eleatic philosopher, are discussed. p. 97

[45] Lenin is apparently referring to the following well-known statement by Kant in the preface to the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*: "I would have to restrict the field of knowledge to make place for faith." p. 100

[46] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 372.) p. 104

[47] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 371.) p. 109

[48] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 74-76, 186. p. 117

[49] An allusion to the couplet "The Question of Right," from Schiller's satirical poem "The Philosophers," which may be translated as follows:

Long have I used my nose for sense of smell
Indeed, what right have I to this, pray tell? p. 118

[50] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 186, 189. p. 118

[51] The reference is to a remark made by Feuerbach in his work *Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie* (*Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*), appearing in Vol. II, p. 257, of Feuerbach's *Works* published in German in 1846. p. 123

[52] The reference is to *Die Kritik der Urteilskraft* by Kant. p. 134

[53] Lenin is referring to the appearance of the following three works: Hegel's *Science of Logic* (the first two books were published in 1812 and 1813, respectively); Marx and Engels' *Manifesto of the Commu-*

nist Party (written at the end of 1847 and published in February 1848); and Darwin's *Origin of Species* (published in 1859). p. 141

[54] The reference is to K. Pearson's work *The Grammar of Science*, London, 1892. p. 154

[55] The reference is to *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. Hege!, *Werke*, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840 (*Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, Hegel, *Works*, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1840). "Logic" constitutes Part I of the *Encyclopaedia* and is referred to by Lenin as "small" to distinguish it from the "large" *Science of Logic*, which consists of three volumes. p. 157

[56] Lenin is referring to remarks by Engels on Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*. See Engels' letter to Marx dated September 21, 1874. Also see Engeis' letter to Conrad Schmidt dated November 1, 1891 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 519-520).

Kuno Fischer—a German bourgeois historian of philosophy and the author of *The History of Modern Philosophy*, one of whose volumes (Vol. 8) is devoted to Hegel. p. 157

[57] See G. V. Plekhanov, "For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel's Death" (*Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1960). p. 160

[58] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 371). p. 169

[59] A critique of the metaphysical views of the Machist V. Chernov is presented by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960). p. 200

[60] The solution of this equation was given by Gauss in his work *Disquisitiones arithrneticae* (*Arithmetical Studies*), 1801. p. 209

[61] Lenin is referring to Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach," written in 1845 and published by Engels in 1888 as an appendix to *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 403-405). p. 211

[62] The reference is to *Diogenes of Sinope*, a representative of the Cynic school who was nicknamed the "Dog," probably because of his beggarly life and disregard for public morals. p. 224

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[63] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 372). p. 233

[64] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1959, Chapter VII, p. 179. In footnote 1, Marx quotes from Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*: "Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally in her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act and react on each other in accordance with their own nature, in this way, without any direct interference in the process, carries out reason's intentions." (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, Erster Theil, "Die Logik," Berlin, 1840, S. 382.) p. 234

[65] *Notes on Reviews of Hegel's "Logic"*—written after December 17, 1914 at the end of the third notebook of the conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. p. 238

[66] *Preußische Jahrbücher* (*Prussian Annals*)—German conservative monthly on problems of politics, philosophy, history and literature, published in Berlin from 1858 to 1935. p. 238

[67] The reference is to *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* (*Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Criticism*), which was founded in 1837 by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, German idealist philosopher. Originally it was called *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie* (*Journal of Philosophy and Speculative Theology*). It was edited by German idealist philosophy professors. Publication ceased in 1918. p. 238

[68] *Revue Philosophique* (*Philosophical Review*)—a journal founded in Paris in 1870. p. 240

[69] *Philosophy of Mind*—English translation of the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which consists of three parts—"Logic," "Philosophy of Nature," and "Philosophy of Mind." p. 240

[70] The quotation is from the review of the book by A. Chiappelli, *Le pluralisme moderne et le monisme* (*Modern Pluralism and Monism*), in the journal *Revue Philosophique*, 1911, Vol. LXXII, p. 333. p. 241

[71] *Conspectus of Hegel's book "Lectures on the History of Philosophy"* consists of two notebooks on whose covers is written: Hegel. The conspectus was made in 1915 in Bern. p. 243

[72] *The Ionic school*, or Miletian school (from the town of Miletus, trading and cultural centre of the ancient world on the coast of Asia Minor), was the earliest school of naturalistic materialism (6th century B. C.) in the history of Greek philosophy. (See F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, Moscow, 1954, p. 250.) p. 247

[73] *Pythagorean philosophy* (6th-4th century B. C.)—an idealist philosophy that considered the essence of all things to lie in numbers. Named after Pythagoras, the founder of a philosophical, religious and political league in Crotona (Southern Italy) that fought for the supremacy of the aristocracy. p. 247

[74] Aristotle's work *De coelo* (*On the Heavens*) belongs to his natural-philosophic writings and consists of four books that are subdivided into chapters. In modern editions, these books are designated by Roman numerals and the chapters by Arabic ones. p. 248

[75] The number ten was viewed by the Pythagoreans as sacred, as the most perfect number, embracing the entire nature of numbers. p. 248

[76] Aristotle's work *De anima* (*On the Soul*) belongs to his natural-philosophic writings and consists of three books. p. 249

[77] *The Eleatic school* (end of 6th-5th century B. C.) was named after the town of Elea in Southern Italy. In contradistinction to the natural dialectic teachings of the Miletian school, and of Heraclitus, regarding the changeable nature of things, the Eleatic school believed in their indivisible, immovable, unchangeable, homogeneous, continuous, eternal essence. At the same time, some of the propositions of representatives of the Eleatic school, and particularly the proofs advanced by Zeno concerning the contradictoriness of motion (the so-called paradoxes of Zeno), despite their metaphysical conclusions, played a positive role in the development of ancient dialectics, having raised the problem of expressing in logical concept the contradictory character of the processes of motion. p. 250

[78] *Determination* is the comprehensive conception of the object which characterises its essential aspects and connections with the surrounding world, its internal development. Definition, in this case, is the abstract formal-logical determination that takes into account only the external features of the object. p. 251

[79] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, p. 21. Also see p. 264 of this volume. p. 251

[80] The reference is to the work of Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers*, consisting of ten books. It was published in ancient Greek by G. Gübner, Vols. 1-2, Leipzig, 1830-33. p. 255

[81] The reference is to the work of Sextus Empiricus, *Basic Tenets of Pyrrhonism*, in three books. p. 255

[82] The reference is to Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (*Historical and Critical Dictionary*), 4 Vols., Amsterdam and Leyden, 1740. p. 255

[83] Lenin has in mind the French translation of the first volume of Théodore Gomperz's work *Griechische Denker* (*Greek Thinkers*). p. 256

[84] The reference is to § 1 of the book by V. Chernov, *Philosophical and Sociological Studies*, Moscow, 1907. p. 257

[85] Heraclitus (c. 530-470 B.C.) lived prior to Zeno of Elea (c. 490-480 B. C.). Hegel discusses Heraclitus after the Eleatics because his philosopy, especially his dialectics, was superior to that of the Eleatics, in particular, the dialectics of Zeno. Whereas Eleatic philosophy embodied, in Hegel' view, the category of being, Heraclitus' philosopy was an historical expression of the higher, more concrete and genuine category of becoming. This is an example of how Hegel "adapted" the history of philosophy to fit the categories of his logic. At the same time Hegel's treatment of Heraclitus and the Eleatics reflected the actual law-governed nature of the history of philosophy as a science. Such deviations from the chronological order are quite legitimate in examining the history of individual aspects or categories of philosophy, since in this case their development emerges in a form free from historical accident. Lenin wrote the following in his fragment *On the Question of Dialectics* about the "circles" in philosophy: "Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialetics of Heraclitus" and remarks: "Is a chronology of *persons* essential? No!" (See present volume, p. 360.) p. 259

[86] The work *De mundo* (*On the Universe*), included in Aristotle's collected works, was written after Aristotle's death by an unknown author at the end of the 1st or beginning of the 2nd century A. D. p. 262

[87] *Symposium* (*Feast*)—a dialogue by Plato. p. 260

[88] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 21-22. p. 262

[89] The reference is to the work of Sextus Empiricus, *Against Mathematicians*, consisting of 11 books, six of which are devoted to a critique of grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music, and five (*Against Dogmatists*) to a critique of logic, physics and ethics. p. 265

[90] A critique of the subjective idealist teachings of Mach on sensations was presented by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Chapter 1, §§ 1 and 2 (V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 32-61). p. 265

[91] *Homoeomeriae*—according to Aristotle, a term used by Anaxagoras to denote tiny material elements consisting in their turn of an infinite number of smaller particles and containing all existing properties ("all in everything"). The elements themselves are inert and set in motion by νοῦς (mind, reason), believed by Anaxagora to be a kind of fine and light matter. He explained any emergence and destruction by the junction and separation of elements. In the extent fragments of Anaxagoras' work these elements are called "seeds" or "things"; the term homoeomeriae was introduced by Aristotle. p. 266

[92] *Sophists* (from the Greek *sophos*—a wise man)—the designation (since the second half of the 5th century B. C.) for professional philosophers, teachers of philosophy and rhetoric. The Sophists did not constitute a single school. The most characteristic feature common to Sophists was their belief in the relativity of all human ideas, ethical standards and values, expressed by Protagoras in the following famous statement: "Man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not." In the first half of the 4th century B.C., sophism disintegrated and degenerated into a barren play with logical conceptions. p. 269

[93] *Phenomenologism*—a branch of subjective idealism that considers phenomena to be only the totality of man's sensations. The Machists were phenomenalists. An important role in the Marxist criticism of phenomenologism was played by Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14). p. 270

[94] See § 27 of Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* for his views on being and essence. p. 272

[95] The reference is to the following statement of Feuerbach: "At the beginning of phenomenology we immediately come across a contradiction between the word which represents the universal, and the thing, which is always a particular." (See § 28 of Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*.) p. 272

[96] *Meno*—Plato's dialogue directed against the Sophists. It is considered to be one of Plato's early works. p. 273

[97] Lenin is referring to the following philosophical works by Plekhanov: N. Beltov, *The Development of the Monist View of History*, published as a separate volume in 1895 in St. Petersburg (see *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1900, pp. 542-782); articles against Bogdanov appearing in Social-Democratic periodicals and published in the collection entitled "From Defence to Attack" (1910); articles against the Kantians E. Bernstein, C. Schmidt and others appearing in the journal *Die Neue Zeit* and published in the collection: N. Beltov, "Criticism of Our Critics," St. Petersburg, 1906; and "Fundamental Questions of Marxism," published as a separate volume in 1908 in St. Petersburg. p. 277

[98] *Cyrenaics*—adherents of an ancient Greek school of philosophy, founded in the 5th century B. C. by Aristippus of Cyrene (North Africa). In the theory of knowledge, the Cyrenaics adhered to sensualism. They asserted that objective truth does not exist and that, with certainty, one can only speak of subjective sensations. In Cyrenaicism, the sensualist theory of knowledge is supplemented by sensualist ethics—the doctrine of sensual satisfaction as the basis of morality. The Cyrenaic school produced a number of representatives of ancient atheism. p. 276

[99] The reference is to § 38 "The Aristippian and Cyrenaic or Hedonistic School" in Überweg's book: *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums*. 10. Auflage, Berlin, 1909. (F. Überweg, *Outline of the History of Ancient Philosophy*, 10th edition, Berlin, 1909).

In the dialogue *Theaetetus*, Plato expounds his mystical theory of knowledge, calling cognition the rise of reason into the realm of ideas; this rise is like recollection since, according to Plato, reason, the soul, by their origin, belong to this supersensual world of ideas. p. 276

[100] See L. Feuerbach, *Against Dualism of Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit*. p. 283

[101] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring, Moscow*, 1959, p. 54. p. 283

[102] *Stoics*—adherents of an ancient Greek school of philosophy arising about the 3rd century B. C. and existing until the 6th century A. D. The Stoics recognised two elements in the universe: an enduring element—matter without quality; and an active one—reason, logos, god. In logic, the Stoics proceeded from the assumption that the source of all cognition is sensuous perception and that a conception can be true only if it is a faithful and full impression of the object. The Stoics taught, however, that perceptual judgment arises only as a result of agreement between the mind and a true conception. This the Stoics called "catalepsy" (or "seizure") and viewed it as a criterion for truth. p. 288

[103] See L. Feuerbach, *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*: "the God of man is nothing but the deified being of man." (L. Feuerbach, *Werke*, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840, S. 21.) p. 295

[104] *Sceptics*—in this case, adherents of the ancient Greek philosophical school founded by Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B. C.). The best-known of the ancient Sceptics were Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus (2nd century A. D.).

Tropes—the designation for the reasons for doubt advanced by the ancient Sceptics (ten tropes) and later supplemented (five tropes) by Agrippa. By means of these reasons the Sceptics tried to prove the impossibility of cognisinig things and the absolute relativity of all perceptions. p. 295

[105] *Neo-Platonists*—followers of the mystical philosophical doctrine, the basis of which was Plato's idealism. Neo-Platonism (Plotinus was the head of this school) developed during the period from the 3rd to the 5th centuries and was a combination of the Stoic, Epicucrean and Sceptical doctrines with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The influence of neo-Platonism was strong in the Middle Ages; it was expressed in the doctrines of the leading medieval theologians and is also to be seen in certain trends of modern bourgeois philosophy. p. 301

[106] *Cabbala*—a medieval mystical religious "doctrine" prevalent among the most fanatical followers of Judaism, as well as among adherents of Christianity and Islam. The basic thought of this doctrine is the symbolic interpretation of the Holy Scripture, whose every word and number acquires special mystical importance in the eyes of the Cabbalists. p. 302

[107] *Gnostics*—followers of mystical, religious-philosophical doctrines during the early centuries of our era. They tried to unite Christian

theology and various theses of Platonic, Pythagorean and Stoic philosophy. p. 302

[108] *Alexandrian philosophy*—several philosophical schools and trends that arose during the early centuries of our era in Alexandria, Egypt. Their distinguishing feature was their attempt to unite Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy and the mystical Eastern cults. p. 302

[109] *Conspectus of Hegel's book* "*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*" consists of a separate notebook on whose cover is written "Hegel." On the reverse side of the cover, in pencil, there is a list of Plato's dialogues with references to pages in Vol. XIV of Hegel, which contains the second book of *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. p. 303

[110] See F. Engels, *Ludwig Ferierbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Chapter IV (see Marx and Engels, *Sellected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 391). p. 306

[111] Regarding the influence of geographical conditions on the development of society see G. V. Plekhanov, "Fundamental Questions of Marxism," Chapter VI, and "N. G. Chernyshevsky," Chapter II. p. 308

[112] Lenin is evidently comparing the formulations of Hegel and Feuerbach, who approach the question of the origin of religion from opposite standpoints. See, for example, Feuerbach's thesis: "in a deified being, he (i.e., man—*Ed.*) objectifies solely his own being." p. 309

[113] Lenin is probably referring to the following passage in Marx's work *The Civil War in France*: "Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes..." (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, p. 520.) p. 311

[114] *Plan of Hegel's Dialectics* (*Logic*)—contained in a notebook directly following the conspectus of Georges Noël's book *Hegel's Logic* and a list of "writings on Hegelianism"; written in 1915. p. 315

[115] The remarks on Georges Noël's book *La logique de Hegel* (*Hegel's Logic*), Paris, 1897, are contained in a notebook on whose cover Lenin wrote the word "Philosophy." Probably written in Geneva in 1915. p. 319

[116] *Noumena* and *phenomena*—terms used by Kant in his theory of knowledge. Noumenon means a thing-in-itself, while phenomenon means a thing as it appears to us. According to Kant, phenomena are formed as a result of the action on man of something unknown (a thing-in-itself). Noumena are supposed to lie beyond phenomena, and their essence to be unknowable. p. 323

[117] *Note on J. Perrin's book "Traitê de chimie physique: les principes"* (*Treatise on Physical Chemistry*: *Principles*), Paris, 1903 is contained in a notebook following the conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic* and was written at the end of 1914. p. 325

[118] Lenin's remarks on Peter Genov's book "*Feurbachs Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik*." Zürich, 1911 (*Berner Dissertation*) (S. 89) [Peter Genov, *Feuerbach's Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics*, Zurich, 1911 (Bern Dissertation) (p. 89)] were written December 29-30, 1914, in Bern. p. 326

[119] "Thesen und Grundsätze" ("Theses and Principles") refers to two works by Feuerbach: *Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie* (*Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*) and *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (*Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*) contained in Vol. II of Feuerbach's works, published by Bolin and Jodl. This volume also contains the work *Wider den Dualismus von Leib und Seele, Fleisch und Geist* (*Against Dualism of Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit*). The phrase "particularly über Spiritualismus und Materialismus" refers to *Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus in besonderer Beziehung auf die Willensfreiheit* (*On Spiritualism and Materialism with Particular Reference to Free Will*) contained in Vol. X. p. 326

[120] The reference is to *Fr. A. Lange's book "Geschichte des Materialismus"* (F. A. Lange, *History of Materialism*) in which the history of materialism is given in distorted form. p. 326

[121] The reference is to *K. Grün's book "Ludwig Feuerbachs Briefwechsel und Nachlass"* (K. Grün, *Ludwig Feuerbach's Correspondence and Literary Heritage*). p. 327

[122] *Note on Paul Volkmann's book "Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften" (Wissenschaft und Hypothese.* IX) 2. *Auflags, Leipzig, 1910* [Paul Volkmann, *Epistemological Foundations of the Natural Sciences* (Science and Hypothesis. IX), 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1910] is contained in a notebook following the comments on Genov's dissertation. p. 328

[123] The remarks on *Max Verworn's book* "*Die Biogenhypothese.*" *Jena, 1903* (Max Verworn, *The Hypothesis of Biogenesis*, *Jena*, *1903*) are contained in a notebook following the note on Volkmann's book. p. 329

[124] On page 9 of his book, M. Verworn defines "enzyme" as follows: "Enzymes are products of living substance distinguished by the fact that they can cause a large number of specific chemical compounds to decompose, without themselves being destroyed in the process." p. 329

[125] The remarks on *Fr. Dannemann's book* "*Wie unser Weitbild entstand*" (*Kosmos*). *Stuttgart*, *1912* [F. Dannemasin, *How Did Our Picture of World Arise* (Cosmos), Stuttgart, 1912] were written by Lenin in a notebook preceding the conspectus of G. Noël's *Hegel's Logic*. p. 331

[126] The excerpts from L*udwig Darmstaedter's book "Handbuch zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik*," *Berlin, 1908* (Ludwig Darmstaedter, *Handbook on the History of the Natural Sciences and Technique*, Berlin, 1908) were entered in a notebook directly preceding the conspectus of G. Noël's *Hegel's Logic*. p. 333

[127] The excerpts from *Napoléon's book "Pensées," Paris, 1913, Bibliothéque miniature No. 14.* (Napoleon, *Thoughts*, Paris, 1913, Miniature Library No, 14) were made in Bern in 1915. They were entered at the bottom of the first page of the notebook containing the conspectus of Noël's *Hegel's Logic*. p. 334

[128] The note on *Artur Erich Haas' book "Der Geist des Hellenentums in der modernen Physik*," *Leipzig, 1914 (32 SS.*) (Velt & Co.) [Artur Erich Haas, *The Spirit of Hellenism in Modern Physics*, Leipzig, 1914 (32 pp.) (Veit and Co.)] is contained in a notebook following "The Plan of Hegel's Dialectics (Logic)." p. 335

[129] The note on *Th. Lipp' book "Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung"* (T. Lipps, *Natural Science and World Outlook*) follows the note on Haas' book, *The Spirit of Hellenism in Modern Physics*. p.336

[130] *Conspectus of Lassalle's book "Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos." Berlin, 1858* (*The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus*, Berlin, 1858) is contained in a notebook following the note on Lipps' book *Natural Science and World Outlook*. Following the conspectus of Lassalle's book, there is a fragment in the notebook entitled "On the Question of Dialectics." p. 337

[131] Lenin is referring to a letter from Marx to Engels dated February 1, 1858 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 121-123). p. 339

[132] *Ahriman*—the Greek name for the ancient Persian God personifying the source of evil, an eternal and irreconcilable enemy of his brother Ormazd, the Good Spirit. p. 345

[133] *Zend-Avesta*—the designation for the ancient Persian religious books expounding the Zoroastrian religion founded, according to legend, by the prophet Zarathustra (Zoroaster). p. 346

[134] Lenin is referring to *Theses on Feuerbach* by Marx written in 1845 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 403-405). p. 349

[135] *Cratylus*—Plato's dialogue, directed against the Sophists. p. 350

[136] The fragment *On the Question of Dialectics* is contained in a notebook between the conspectus of Lassalle's book on Heraclitus and the conspectus of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Written in 1915 in Bern. p. 355

[137] The reference is to the use by Josef Dietzgen of the term "überschwenglich," which means: exaggerated, excessive, infinite; for example, in the book *Kleinere philosophische Schriften* (*Minor Philosophical Writings*), Stuttgart, 1903, p. 204, Dietzgen uses this term as follows: "absolute and relative are not infinitely separated." p. 361

[138] *Conspectus of Aristotle's book* "*Metaphysics*" is contained in a notebook directly following the fragment "On the Question of Dialectics." The book was published by Schwegler in Greek wih a German translation. p. 363

[139] Lenin is referring to the article "Blunders of Immature Thought" by D. I. Pisarev, well-known democratic writer and literary critic. p. 371

[140] *Conspectus of L. Feuerbach's book* "*Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnizschen Philosophie.*" *Sämtliche Werke*. Bd. IV, Stuttgart. 1910 (*Exposition, Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz*, *Collected Works*, Vol. IV, Stuttgart, 1910) is con-

tained in a separate notebook on whose cover is written: "Feuerbach." The conspectus was made in Bern at the end of 1914 or the beginning of 1915. p. 375

[141] In the passage referred to by Lenin, Feuerbach states; "Spinoza's philosophy is like a telescope which makes objects visible to the human eye that are otherwise invisible owing to their remoteness; Leibnitz' philosophy is like a microscope which makes objects visible that are unnoticeable owing to their minuteness and fineness." (See L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 34.) p. 378

[142] See Marx's letter to Engels dated May 10, 1870. p. 378

[143] *Entelechy*—a term in idealist philosophy, used by Aristotle to denote the aim inherent in an object—an aim which through its activity is transformed from the possible to the actual. According to Leibnitz, entelechy is the urge of the monad towards realisation of the perfection potentially contained in it. p. 380

[144] Lenin is referring to the following statement by Feuerbach: "Pre-established harmony is Leibnitz' weak point, despite the fact that it is his pet creation.... Pre-established harmony, understood in a purely external sense in relation to the monad, basically contradicts the spirit of Leibnitz' philosophy." (See L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 95.) p. 381

[145] *Occasionalism*—an idealist, religious trend in 17th-century philosophy which distorted the teachings of Descartes in the spirit of clericalism and mysticism. The Occasionalists held the reactionary view that all physical and mental activity, and the reciprocal action between them, is due to the intervention of God. p. 381

[146] *Theodicée* (a vindication of the justice of God)—an abbreviated title of G. W. Leibnitz' book: *Essais de Theodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal* (*Theodician Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil*). p. 381

[147] *The ontological argument for the existence of God* was first advanced by Anselm, Bishop of Canterbury and medieval scholastic. It can be summarised as follows: God is the totality of perfection. Perfection includes existence. Therefore God exists.

On the essence of the ontological argument see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Chapter IV. p. 381

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[148] *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (*New Essays on Human Understanding*) by Leibnitz (written 1700-05 and published in 1765)—directed against the materialist trend of Locke's sensualist theory of knowledge. p. 381

[149] The first edition of L. Feuerbach's book *Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibniz'schen Philosophie* (*Exposition, Analysts and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz*) was published in 1837. p. 382

[150] The reference is to the work by Clauberg, German Cartesian philosopher: *Defensio Cartesiana*, Amsterdam, 1652 (*Defence of Cartesianism*). p. 383

[151] Feuerbach's dissertation in Latin, published in Erlangen in 1828 under the title "De Ratione una, universali, infinita," appeared in German translation under the title "Über die Vernunft; ihre Einheit, Allgemeinheit, Unbegrenztheit" (On Reason; Its Unity, Universality and Infiniteness") in Vol. IV of Feuerbach's works in German; Bolin and Jodl edition, Stuttgart, 1910. p. 387

[152] Lenin is referring to Feuerbach's work *Spinoza and Herbart* (1836), appearing in Vol. IV (1910) of Feuerbach's works in German; Bolin and Jodl edition. p. 387

[153] The reference is to Feuerbach's letter to Marx in 1843 in which Feuerbach sharply criticises Schelling's philosophy (see L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 434-440). Feuerbach's letter was written in answer to Marx's letter of October 20, 1843. p. 387

[154] The remarks on *Johann Plenge's book "Marx und Hegel." Tübingen, 1911* (J. Plenge, *Marx and Hegel*, Tübingen, 1911) are contained in the second notebook on imperialism (notebook "β"). p. 388

[155] *Imperialist economists*—Lenin's designation for the opportunists Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) during the First World War. The "imperialist economists" demanded that the Party delete the programmatic statement on the right of nations to self-determination. They also came out against the entire minimum programme of the R.S.D.L.P., which envisaged a struggle for democratic reforms that would facilitate the preparation and transition to the socialist revolution. Lenin laid bare the opportunistic essence of the position of Bukharin and those sharing his views, its kinship with "economism"—the opportunistic trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the

19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Like the old "economists," who could not understand the need for the political struggle of the working class under conditions of capitalism, the "imperialist economists" did not understand the significance of the struggle for democratic reforms under, conditions of imperialism.

Certain views of the "imperialist economists" were shared by Left Social-Democrats of Holland, America, Poland, etc. That is why Lenin called "imperialist economism" an "international disease" (Vol. 35, letter to Inessa Armand of November 30,1916).

A number of articles by Lenin are devoted to a criticism of "imperialist economisin": "On the Incipient Trend of 'Imperialist Economism" (pres. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 1-9); "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)" (pres. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 10-15); "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (pres. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 16-64). p. 388

[156] The reference is to the *Rheinische Zeitung für Politik, Handel und Gewerbe* (*Rhine Gazette on Problems of Politics, Trade and Industry*)—a daily newspaper that appeared in Cologne from January 1, 1842 to March 31, 1843. It was founded by representatives of the Rhineland bourgeoisie who were opposed to Prussian absolutism. Marx joined its staff in April 1842 and became one of its editors in October of the same year. During Marx's editorship, the revolutionary--democratic character of the newspaper became more and more marked. The newspaper was ultimately banned by the Prussian Government. p. 390

[157] The entry on the books by Raab and Perrin was made in a notebook entitled "Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc." not earlier than 1912. p. 392

[158] The entry on the books under the heading *From Books on Philosophy in the Zürich Cantonal Library* was made in the first notebook (notebook "α") on imperialism in 1915. p. 393

[159] The entry under the heading *Cantonal Library in Zürich* was made in the first notebook on imperialism (notebook "α") in 1915. p. 394

[170] The entry under the general heading *Section III*. (*Works of informative and scientific content*), containing reference to the books by Haeckel, Uhde and Zart, was made in a notebook on imperialism (notebook "ε") in 1916. p. 395

[171] *Note on the Review of Johann Pleage's book* "*Marx and Hegel*" was written in 1913, amidst bibliographical excerpts on various questions, in the notebook "Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc." p. 397

[162] *Remarks on the Review of R. B. Perry's book "Present Philosophical Tendencies"*—written after April 1913 in the notebook "Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc." p. 398

[163] *Remarks on the Review of A. Aliotta's book "The Idealist Reaction Against Science"*—written in 1913 at the end of the notebook "Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc." p. 399

[164] *Remarks on Hilferding's Views on Mach* (*in "Finance Capital"*)—contained in notebook "ϑ" on imperialism. p. 400

[165] *Lenin's Remarks and Notations in Abel Rey's book "La Philosophie Moderne,"* Paris, 1908 (Abel Rey, *Modern Philosophy*, Paris, 1908) constitute a sequel to the sharp criticism in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* of Rey's views as expounded in his book *La théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains* (*Modern Physicists' Theory of Physics*), Paris, 1907. p. 407

[166] Lenin is referring to the well-known characterisation of agnosticism given by Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 371). p. 433

[167] A. Deborin's article "Dialectical Materialism" is contained in the collection *Na Rubezhe*, St. Petersburg, 1909. p. 475

[168] *Lenin's Remarks in G. V. Plekhanov's book "N. G . Chernyshevsky," St. Petersburg, 1910*—written not earlier than October 1909 (the actual date of the book's appearance) and not later than April 1911. They were first published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*.

Many of Lenin's comments are devoted to a comparion of statements by Piekhanov in his book published in 1910 with his articles on Chernyshevsky published in 1890 and 1892 in *Sotsial-Demokrat,* a literary and political review (see *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Book 1, London, 1890; Book 2, Geneva, 1890; Book 3, Geneva, 1890; Book 4, Geneva, 1892).

These four articles by Plekhanov were brought together in the book *N. G. Chernyshevsky* appearing in Germany in 1894 in German. Plekhanov's book, which gave, in the main, a correct characterisation of Chernyshevsky's views and which sharply attacked the Narodniks, was favourably commented upon by Lenin in the article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy" (see pres. ed., Vol. 4, Moscow, 1961, p. 271).

Plekhanov's book *N. G. Chernyshevsky* published in 1910 was written at a time when he had already gone over to Menshevism.

It was in effect directed against Bolshevism, against the Bolshevist evaluation of the world outlook and activity of Chernyshevsky and the revolutionary democrats of the 19th century. In this book, Plekhanov abandons a number of basic propositions in his earlier evaluation of Chernyshevsky, obscuring his revolutionary democratism, his resolute struggle against liberalism and his backing of the peasant revolution.

Lenin carefully collates the text of the book published in 1910 with Plekhanov's articles in Sotsial-Demokrat, noting which of Plekhanov's basic formulations remained unchanged and which underwent radical change.

Lenin's remarks and notations in Plekhanovs book are inseparably linked with his numerous statements on Chernyshevsky—in the writings published before he became acquainted with Plekhanov's book (*What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democracy, The Heritage We Renounce, On "Vekhi"* and *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*) as well as in those written afterwards (*Peasant Reform and Proletarian Peasant Revolution, In Memory of Herzen, From the Past of the Workers' Press in Russia*, etc.) p. 501

[169] The *Sovremennik* circle included, among others, the revolutionary democrats N. G. Chernyshevsky, N. A. Dobrolyubov, N. A. Nekrasov, M. I. Mikhailov.

Sovremennik (*Contemporary*)—a monthly scientific-political and literary journal founded by A. S. Pushkin in 1836. In 1847 the journal was taken over by N. A. Nekrasov. From the mid-fifties on the journal became a militant organ of the revolutionary democrats, who advocated a peasant revolution and the overthrow of tsarism. Chernyshevsky was a most prominent contributor until his arrest in 1862. In 1866 *Sovremennik* was closed down by the tsarit government.

In 1859-62 the satirical magazine *Svistok* (*Whistle*) appeared as a supplement to *Sovremennik*. It wittily ridiculed the vain hopes of the liberals for bringing about a change in the political system of Russia through literary denunciations of government officials, and without resorting to revolutionary struggle. p. 503

[170] *Kolokol* (*The Bell*)—journal founded by A. I. Herzen in London and illegally circulated in Russia. It appeared from 1857 to 1868. The journal attacked the autocratic regime and serfdom. It played an important role in the development of the revolutionary movement in Russia.

"Clowns" and "whistlers" were nicknames given by liberals to the revolutionary democrats of *Sovremennik* and *Svistok*. p. 503

[171] *Oblomov*—the title of a well-known novel by the Russian author A. I. Goncharov which depicts the corruption of the serf-owning system in 19th century Russia. p. 503

[172] *Slavophils* represented a trend of social thought arising in mid-19th-century Russia, which held that Russia's development would take place along a distinct path of its own. This, according to them, stemmed from the communal system in Russia and its orthodoxy. The Slavophils were confirmed opponents of the revolutionary movement in Russia and the West. p. 506

[173] Chernyshevsky wrote the novel *Prologue* while serving at hard labour in 1865-70. With great difficulty, his friends smuggled the manuscript to St. Petersburg and then to London where it was published in 1877.

The novel describes Russia in the late fifties. A revolutionary situation was maturing in the country and the tsarist government, preferring to free the peasants "from above" rather than wait till they took action "from below," was preparing for the abolition of serfdom (the so-called Peasant Reform). The book describes the sharp struggle between various classes and groups over the reform and portrays real people of the day under fictitious names. Thus, Chernyshevsky himself, who headed the revolutionary party, appears under the name of Volgin; Kavelin, the liberal, appears under the name of Ryazantsev; Sierakowski, a prominent figure in the Polish liberation movement—under the name of Sokolovsky, etc. p. 508

[174] The reference here is to the uprising in Poland in 1863-64, one of the organisers of which was Zygmunt Sierakowski. The uprising against tsarist autocracy aimed at Polish national liberation. Broad support for the uprising came from the szlachta intelligentsia, students, clergy, artisans, workers and some sections of the peasantry. The Russian revolutionary democrats also sympathised with the uprising. Members of the secret organisation Zemlya i Volya, which had connections with Chernyshevsky, sought to render help to the insurrection. A. I. Herzen published a number of articles in *Kolokol* supporting the struggle of the Polish people.

However, the insurrection was ruthlessly suppressed by the tsarist government, and its leaders, including Sierakowski, were executed. p. 508

[175] *Prologue to a Prologue*—the title of the first part of the novel *Prologue*. p. 509

[176] The circle of Russian revolutionary emigrants in London who were grouped around A. I. Herzen and N. A. Ogaryov. p. 509

[177] The reference is to Chernyshevsky's novel which exerted great influence on several generations of Russian revolutionary youth.

Chernyshevsky wrote the novel in 1862-63 in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he was imprisoned in the summer of 1862. The novel was published in *Sovremennik* in 1863.

Vera Pavlovna, Lopukhov, Kirsanov and Rakhmetov mentioned by Plekhanov are the chief characters in the novel. p. 509

[178] Lenin is referring to the following passage in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, pp. 173-174):

"Chernyshevsky was present at the birth of the new type of 'new people' in our country—the revolutionary. He joyfully welcomed the emergence of this new type and could not deny himself the satisfaction of depicting at least a vague profile of him. At the same time, he foresaw with sorrow how many trials and sufferings there were in store for the Russian revolutionary, whose life must be one of severe struggle and great self-sacrifice. And so, in Rakhmetov, Chernyshevsky presents us with the true ascetic. Rakhmetov positively tortures himself. He is completely 'merciless towards himself,' as his landlady says. He even decides to test whether he can bear torture by spending a whole night lying on a length of felt with nails sticking through it. Many people, including Pisarev, regarded this as mere eccentricity. We agree that some aspects of Rakhmetov's character could have been drawn differently. But the character as a whole nevertheless remains completely true to life. Every prominent Russian revolutionary possessed much of the Bakhmetov spirit." p. 513

[179] *Our "Subjectivsts"*—supporters of the Narodnik doctrine which denied the existence of objective laws of social development and held that individual outstanding personalities, not the masses, make history. The chief exponents of this trend were P. L. Lavrov and N. K. Mikhailovsky. p. 514

[180] Lenin is referring to the following passage in Plekhanov's article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*: "We have never had occasion to read such malicious and at the same time such a highly accurate characterisation of Russian liberalism." (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, Book I, London, 1890, p. 144.) p. 532

[181] Lenin is referring to the following passage, subsequently radically changed by Plekhanov, in an article in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, p. 144):

"For the sake of impartiality, however, it must be added that our author was not only contemptuous of Russian liberals. In excellent political reviews that he wrote in *Sovremennik* until the very end of his free life, our author constantly displayed the most merciless contempt for all European liberals in general—particularly, the liberals of Austria (i.e., the Liberal Party of Austrian Germans),

Prussia and Italy. As is well known, in articles on the history of France, he also did not manifest much respect for the liberal party. All this, naturally, could not be pleasing to the spokesmen of Russian liberalism and, in their fight with him, they resorted to the method so often used by liberals of all countries in their clashes with people further advanced than themselves politically; they accused him of disliking freedom and even of sympathies for despotism. Of course, such accusations from liberals could only amuse Chernyshevsky. He had so little fear of them that at times he aroused his opponents to new accusations by making believe that he recognised their complete fairness. 'For us there is no better amusement than liberalism,' he says in one of his last political reviews, 'and we have an irresistible desire to look about for liberals in order to poke fun at them.' He then begins to poke fun at the Prussian liberals who, as he aptly puts it, were angered by the fact that political freedom in Prussia 'does not become established by itself.'

"This mockery did not prevent the attentive reader from understanding that it was not a lack of love for freedom that made Chernyshevsky contemptuous of liberalism. It was sufficient to read only a few of his political reviews to see how passionately he sympathised with every liberation movement, no matter where it began: in France or in Italy, in America or in Hungary. He simply believed that the role of the liberals in such movements is usually very ugly. They themselves do very little and often even impede the efforts of others by attacking people who are more daring and resolute than they." p. 544

[182] Lenin is referring to the following passage in Plekhanov's article in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, p. 161):

"In the article 'The Russian Reformer,' written on the occasion of the appearance of Baron M. Korf's book *The Life of Count Speransky*, Chernyshevsky demonstrates conclusively that no reformer in our country could depend on the government as regards important social reforms. Revolutionaries can depend on it even less. Enemies called Speransky a revolutionary, but such an evaluation appears laughable to Chernyshevsky. Speransky indeed had very extensive reform plans, but 'it is ludicrous to call him a revolutionary judging by the extent of the means he intended using to carry out his intentions.' He could maintain his post only because he had managed to earn the trust of the tsar Alexander I. With this trust to support him, he intended to carry out his plans. Precisely for this reason, Chernyshevsky considered him to be a dangerous dreamer. Dreamers are often simply ridiculous and their delusions trivial, but they can be dangerous to society when their delusions concern important matters. In their rapturous bustle off the track, they appear to achieve a measure of success, thus confusing many who, as a result of this illusory success, get it into their heads to follow them. From this standpoint, Speransky's activity may be called dangerous." p. 552

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[183] The statement in Plekhanov's article on Chernyshevsky appearing in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, p. 162), but omitted by Plekhanov in the 1910 edition of his book on Chernyshevsky, is the following: "With respect to the Russian Government, Chernyshevsky's tone becomes more and more defiant." p. 553.

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Ш

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Э

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B

Babeuf, Francois Noël (Gracchus) (1760-1797)—French revolutionary, prominent representative of equalitarian utopian communism, organiser of conspiracy of "Equals"—40, 44

Bacon, Francis Baron Verulam (1561-1626)—great English philosopher, founder of English materialism, naturalist, historian and statesman—43, 463, 521

Baillie, James Black (1872-1940)—vice-president of Leeds University, author of a book on Hegelian logic; translated Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* into English—240

Balfour, Arthur James (1848-1930)—British statesman and

diplomat, leader of the Conservatives; in his philosophical works was critical of Hegel's views—238

Barthez, Paul Joseph (1734-1806)—French physician and physiologist, vitalist—438

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Bauer, Bruno (1809-1882)—German idealist philosopher, prominent Young Hegehan, bourgeois Radical, became a national-liberal in 1866—23, 28, 31-32, 34, 35-39, 41, 44, 45, 49, 514

Bauer, Edgar (1820-1886)—German publicist, Young Hegelian, brother of Bruno Bauer—26, 28, 29, 30

Bauer, Otto (1882-1938)—a leader of Austrian Social-Democracy and the Second International, ideologist of revisionism—397

Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706)—French sceptic philosopher and forerunner of the French Enlighteners, author of *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, critic of religious dogmatism—43, 64, 255, 256, 373

Beaussire, Emile-Jacques-Armand (1824-1889)—French philosopher, author of a number of works on morals—324

Belinsky, Vissarion Grigoryevich (1811-1848)—Russian literary critic, publicist, and philosopher, played an outstanding role in the history of social and aesthetic thought—503, 506, 511, 529, 530, 542

Beltov—see Plekhanov, G. V.

Bénard, Charles (1807-1898)—French philosopher, translated and published several of Hegel's works in French—324

Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832)—English bourgeois sociologist, theoretician of utilitarianism—44

Bergson, Henri (1859-1941)—French idealist philosopher, irrationalist, considered intuition as the highest form of philosophical and aesthetic cognition—399, 411, 439, 445, 448, 462, 500

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Berzelius, Jöns Jakob (1779-1848)—famous Swedish chemist and mineralogist—123

Boehme, Jakob (1575-1624)—German pantheist philosopher, mystic, whose doctrine at the same time contains profound dialectical and materialist ideas—72

Bogdanov, A. (*Malinovsky, A. A.*) (1873-1928)—philosopher, sociologist and economist, Bolshevik till 1907 when he left the Party; sought to revise Marxism, distorting it from a Machist and vulgar materialist viewpoint; founded empiriomonism, a variety of empirio-criticism—275, 485, 488

Bolin, Andreas Wilhelm (1835-1924)—Finnish historian and materialist philosopher, follower of Feuerbach; together with Jodl published the second edition of Feuerbach's works—373

Bolland, Gerardus (1854-1922)—Dutch philosopher; neo-Hegelian; translated several of Hegel's works into Dutch—393

Boltzmann, Ludwig (1844-1906)—Austrian physicist, in philosophy adhered to mechanistic materialism; criticised the Machists subjective idealist and W. Ostwald's "energetic" theory—58

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Brunetière, Ferdinand (1846-1906)—French critic and man of letters, tried to apply the methods of the natural sciences, particularly the Darwinian theory of evolution, to the history of literature—428
Bruno—see Bauer, Bruno.
Büchner, Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig (1824-1899)—German physiologist, exponent of vulgar materialism, opponent of scientific socialism—55, 349
Buckle, Henry Thomas (1821-1862)—English liberal-bourgeois historian and positivist sociologist, author of the *History of Civilisation in England*—328
Bulgarin, F. V. (1789-1859)—Russian reactionary writer and journalist; bitter foe of progressive Russian writers, whom he denounced to the police—503

C

Cabanis, Pierre Jean George (1757-1808)—French physician, philosopher and political figure, a forerunner of the vulgar materialists—42
Cabet, Etienne (1788-1856)—French publicist, representative of utopian communism, author of *Voyage en lcarie*—44
Caesar, Gaius Julius (c. 100-44 B. C.)—famous Roman soldier and statesman—310
Caird, Edward (1835-1908)—English philosopher, Hegelian, author of the book *Hegel*—240, 241
Carnot, Lazare Nicolas (1753-1823)—French mathematician, political and military figure, bourgeois Republican—118
Carnot, Nicolas Leonhard Sadi (1796-1832)—French physicist and engineer, made several important discoveries concerning heat; was the first to formulate the thesis that work due to a supply of heat can be obtained only through the transfer of heat from a warmer to a cooler body—421, 431
Carstanjen, Friedrich—disciple of Avenarius, professor at Zurich University; editor of the magazine *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* after Avenarius' death—496
Chalcidius (4th century A. D.)—neo-Platonist; translated Plato's dialogue "Timaeus" into Latin and wrote comments to it—349
Chamberlain, Houston Stewart (1855-1927)—philosopher, neo-Kantian, racialist sociologist, advocated world domnination by German imperialism, his philosophy was a forerunner of fascist ideology—58
Chernov, V. M. (1876-1952)—a leader and theoretician of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, bitter foe of Marxism, eclectic and agnostic—200, 257
Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich (1828-1889)—outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, utopian socialist, materialist philosopher, writer and literary critic, leader of the revolutionary democratic movement of the sixties in Russia; developed

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Feuerbach's materialist philosophy, sought to revise Hegel's dialectics along materialist lines; his philosophical views mark a high point in pre-Marxist materialist philosophy. "But Chernyshevsky did not succeed in rising, or, rather, owing to the backwardness of Russian life, was unable to rise to the level of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels" (*Lenin*)—77, 82, 502-514, 516-526, 528-533, 535, 536, 538-547, 549, 550, 552, 553-557

Chiapelli, Alessandro (1857-1913)—Italian bourgeois philosopher, neo-Kantian, author of works on history of philosophy, literature, arts and religion; criticised scientific socialism—399

Cicero, Marcas Tullius (106-43 B. C.)—Roman orator, statesman and philosopher, eclectic—346, 352

Clauberg, Johann (1622-1665)—German philosopher, professor of philosophy at Duisburg; Cartesian, was close to occasionalists—383

Clausius, Rudolf Julius Emmanuel (1822-1888)—German physicist, together with Carnot. Mayer and Joule laid the basis for the science of thermodynamics—442

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 A. D.)—Christian theologian, idealist philosopher—347, 350

Cohen, Hermann (1842-1918)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, headed Marburg school of neo-Kantians—399

Collins, John Anthony (1676-1729) English deist philosopher, follower of Locke—43

Comte, Auguste (1798-1857)—French reactionary bourgeois philosopher and sociologist, agnostic, founder of positivism—323, 409, 436, 469, 513, 514

Condillac, Étienne Bonnot (1715-1780)—French philosopher, deist, sensationalist, follower of Locke—42, 43

Copernicus (*Kopernik*), *Nikolaus* (1473-1543)—Polish astronomer, founded the heliocentric system of the universe—270, 331, 333, 460

Cornu, Marie Alfred (1841-1902)—French physicist, known for his works on optics; refined Fizeau's method of determining the velocity of light—333

Coward, William (c. 1656-1725)—English physician and deist philosopher—43

Cratylus (5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek idealist philosopher, disciple of Heraclitus and teacher of Plato; arrived at sophism by drawing extreme relativistic conclusions from Heraclitus' dialetics—343, 350, 351

Croce, Benedetto (1866-1952)—Italian philosopher, historian, literary critic and political figure; in his works interpreted Hegel's dialectics in the spirit of subjective idealism; opponent of Marxism—399

D

Dannemann, Friedrich (b. 1859)—German historian of natural science—399

Darmstaedter, Ludwig (1846-1927)—German chemist, author of works on the history of chemistry—333

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809-1882)—English materialist biology, founder of a scientific

theory of the development of the organic world—141
Deborin (*Ioffe*), *Abram Moiseyevich* (b. 1881)—Soviet philosopher, Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; Bolshevik from 1903; Menshevik in 1907-17; member of the C.P.S.U. from 1928; in the thirties supported Menshevik idealist views; author of works on history of philosophy and dialectical materialism—475, 482
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Descartes, René (in Latin—Cartesins) (1596-1650)—French dualist philosopher, mathematician and naturalist—41, 42, 43, 321, 322, 360, 378, 421, 427, 438, 484, 490
Destutt de Tracy, Antoine Louis Claude (1754-1836)—French vulgar economist, sensationalist in his philosophic views, protagonist of constitutional monarchy—25
Dewey, John (1859-1952)—American philosopher, sociologist and pedagogue, the chief representative of pragmaticism—399,445
Dézamy, Théodore (1803-1850)—French publicist, outstanding representative of the revolutionary trend in utopian communism—44
Diderot, Denis (1713-1784)—French materialist philosopher, atheist, one of the ideologists of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie of the 18th century, a leading Encyclopaedist—520
Dietzgen, Josef (1828-1888)—German worker and Social-Democrat; philosopher, independently arrived at some fundamental principles of dialectical-materialism—72, 361, 403, 406
Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833-1911)—German idealist philosopher, professor at Berlin University, a founder of the "Lebens odor Erlebnis Philosophie" (life or experience philosophy), a reactionary irrationalist trend in bourgeois philosophy during the epoch of imperialism; his works include a book on the youth of Hegel (*Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels*)—58, 239
Diogenes, Laertius (3rd century A. D.)—ancient Greek historian of philosophy, author of a ten-volume work on ancient philosophers—223, 255, 265, 290, 291
Diogenes of Sinupu (c. 404-323 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher, one of the founders of the Cynic school of philosophy—224, 254
Dobrolyubov, Nikolai Alexandrovich (1836-1861)—Russian literary critic and publicist, materialist philosopher, revolutionary democrat—503, 530
Dodwell, Henry (1700-1784)—English materiallist philosopher—43
Druzhinin, A. V. (1824-1864)—Russian author and liberal critic, advocated idealist theory of "art for art's sake"—511
Dudyshkin, S. S. (1820-1866)—Russian journalist and liberal literary critic—521
Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie (1861-1916)—French theoretical physicist; philosopher and historian of natural science—399, 422, 423, 426, 427
Duns Scotus, John (c. 1265-1308)—medieval Scottish scholastic philosopher, repre-

sentative of nominalism, the earliest expression of materialism in the Middle Ages; author of "Opus Oxoniense"—43
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E

Ebbinghaus, Hermann (1850-1909)—German bourgeois psychologist, idealist, a leading representative of expirinental psychology; famous for his research concerning the nature of man's memory—326
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Engels, Frederick (1820-1895)—23, 24, 35, 36, 65, 67, 70, 77, 104, 108, 109, 117, 118, 141, 157, 169, 234, 251, 257, 262, 283, 306, 311, 312, 339, 357, 403-406, 479, 526
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Euler, Leonhard (1707-1783)—mathematician, physicist and astronomer; member of the Berlin and Petersburg Academies of Sciences; spent most of his life in Russia—118

F

Faucher, Julius (1820-1878)—German publicist, Young Hegelian—32
Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas (1804-1872)—German materialist philosopher and atheist; Feuerbach's materialism, in spite of its limited contemplative character, provided a theoretical source of Marxist philosophy—29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 44, 45, 61-67, 70-80, 82, 83, 123, 155, 169, 212, 272, 283, 295, 309, 317, 326, 327, 340, 344, 349, 360, 373, 375, 377, 381-383, 387, 394, 395, 403, 404, 406, 514, 516, 517, 523, 528-530
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, representative of classical German philosophy—95, 113, 236, 322, 476, 492-493, 549
Fischer, Friedrich (1801-1853)—professor of philosophy at Basle—57, 372
Fischer, Kuno (1824-1907)—German historian of philosophy, Hegelian, author of the fundamental Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, professor of philosophy at Jena and Heidelberg—157, 176
Fizeau, Armand Hippolyte Louis (1819-1896)—French physicist, known for his works on optics, determined the velocity of light in air by means of a rapidly revolving gear wheel specially designed for this purpose—333
Forel, Auguste (1848-1931)—Swiss neuropathologist, psychiatrist and entomologist—326
Forster, Friedrich Christoph (1791-1868)—German historian and writer, Hegelian, together with L. Boumann edited Volumes XVI and XVII of the posthumous edition of Hegel's works, containing articles on various themes—87
Foucault, Jean Bernard Léon (1819-1868)—French physicist, known for his pendulum experiment by which he demon-

strated the diurnal motion of the earth; by means of a revolving mirror, determined the velocity of light in air and water—333

Fourier, Charles (1772-1837)—French utopian socialist—32, 33, 44, 48, 49, 50, 510, 512

G

Galilei, Galileo (1564-1642)—Italian physicist and astronomer, a founder of classical mechanics—122, 332, 421, 460

Gans, Eduard (c. 1798-1839)—professor of Roman law at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited *Philosophy of Right* and *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—46, 87, 305, 314

Gassendi, Pierre (1592-1655)—French materialist philosopher, elaborated the Epicurean doctrines of atomism and ethics; also known for his works on astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and history of science—42, 81, 360, 521

Gauss, Karl Friedrich (1777-1855)—German mathematician, author of outstanding works on theoretical astronomy, geodesy, physics and eaarth magneticism—207

Gay, Jules (1807-c. 1876)—French utopian communist—44

Genov, Peter—Bulgarian historian of philosophy—326, 327

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang (1749-1832)—German, poet and thinker—510

Gomperz, Theodor (1832-1912)—German historian of philosophy, philologist, positivist, author of the three-volume *Griechische Denker*—256

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Grün, Karl (t817-1887)—German petty-bourgeois publicist, exponent of "true socialism"—327

Guenther, Konrad (1874-1955)—German zoologist, professor at Freiburg University, compiled the atlas *Vom Urtier zum Menschen*—58

Guizot, François-Pierre Gulllaume (1787-1874)—French bourgeois historian and statesman—525

H

Haas, Arthur Erich (1884-1941)—Austrian physicist, specialised in atomic physics—335

Haeckel, Ernest Heinrich (1834-1919)—German naturalist, professor of zoology at Jena University, evolutionist and natural-historical materialist, supported and popularised Darwin's teaching—56, 328, 394, 395

Hammacher, Emil (1885-1916)—German philosopher, objective idealist and mystic—238, 239

Harbordt—German scientist—57

Haring, Georg Wilhelm Heinr ich—German philosopher, together with Michelet wrote *Historisch-Kritische Darstellung der dialektischen Methode Hegels*—239

Hartley, David (1705-1757)—English physician, bourgeois psychologist and materialist philosopher—43
Hartmann, Eduard (1842-1906)—German reactionary idealist, mystic, militant defendant of the junker-bourgeois Germany—58
Haym, Rudolf (1821-1901)—German historian of literature and philosophy, positivist—387
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831)—German philosopher, objective idealist and dialectician, leading representative of German classical philosophy; Hegel's historic merit was that he provided an exhaustive analysis of idealist dialectics, which subsequently served as one of the theoretical sources of dialectical materialism—27, 31, 33, 35, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46-49, 70, 81, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95-97, 103, 104, 106, 110, 112-114, 116-118, 120, 121, 123, 129, 134-135, 137, 138, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153-157, 160, 162, 167, 169, 171-175, 177-181, 182, 185-187, 189-193, 196, 197, 203-207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 217, 224, 228, 229, 232, 234-236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 247, 250, 251, 254-267, 269, 270, 273-257, 297-299, 303, 305, 307, 309-312, 313, 314, 315-317, 319-324 327, 339, 340, 341, 342-345, 347, 348, 350, 352, 357, 359, 360, 366, 370, 373, 387, 388, 389, 393, 397, 404, 406, 427, 492, 493
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Heinze, Max (1835-1909)—German historian of philosophy, specialised in ancient Greek philosophy; edited, beginning with the 6th edition, Überweg's course of history of philosophy—52, 256, 276
Helmholtz, Hermann von (1821-1894)—great German naturalist; a founder of the law of conservation of energy; his philosophical views were close to the Kantians—420, 431
Helvétius, Claude-Adrien (1715-1771)—French materialist philosopher, atheist, an ideologist of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie of the 18th century—42, 43, 44. 522
Henning, Leopold (1791-1866)—professor of philosophy at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited *Science of Logic* and the first part of *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* ("Logic") for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—87
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 530-470 B. C.)—ancient Greek materialist philosopher, one of the founders of dialectics—105, 259, 262, 267, 335, 337, 339, 352, 357, 360, 366
Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776-1841)—German idealist philosopher, psychologist and pedagogue—387
Hertz, Heinrich Rudolf (1857-1894)—German physicist, specialised in electrodynamics, inconsistent materialist—399, 445
Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812-1870)—Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, author and publicist—503, 504, 511, 526
Hibben, John Grier (1861-1933)—American logician, professor at Princeton University—241
Hilferding, Rudolf (1877-1941)—an opportunist leader of German Social-Democracy and

the Second International; in his work *Das Finanzkapital* described imperialism from an anti-Marxist viewpoint, concealing its main contradictions—400

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Hoffing, Harald (1843-1931)—Danish positivist philosopher and psychologist—497

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Homer—great epic poet of Greece, legendary author of the Iliad and the Odyssey, is believed to have lived between 12th and 8th century B. C.—308, 331

Hotho, Heinrich Gustav (1802-1873)—historian of the arts, professor at Berlin University aesthete of Hegelian school; edited Lectures on Aesthetics for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—87

Hurne, David (1711-1776)—English philosopher, subjective idealist, agnostic, historian and economist—53, 132, 203, 360, 476, 478, 492

J

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743-1819)—German idealist philosopher, metaphysician and theist; opponent of rationalism, advocated faith and intuition, considering these the most trustworthy paths to knowledge—210

James, William (1842-1910)—American philosopher and psychologist, subjective idealist, a founder of pragmatism—58, 399, 445, 446, 450, 452, 453, 455, 457, 458, 468

Janet, Paul (1823-1899)—French eclectic philosopher—324

Jodl, Friedrich (1849-1914)—professor of philosophy at Prague and Vienna, follower of Feuerbach; together with Bolin published the second edition of Feuerbach's works—326

K

Kant, Immanuel (1724-804)—German philosopher, founder of German classical philosophy, subjective idealist and agnostic; Kant's theory of knowledge is characterised by contradictions, a conglomoration of elements of materialism and idealism, resulting in the theory of the objectively existing "thing-in-itself"—47, 53, 91, 92, 96, 98, 100, 113, 116, 117, 120, 134, 168-174, 178, 179, 186, 192, 193, 204-207, 208, 209, 210, 223, 225, 232, 233, 236, 239, 258, 269-271, 273, 275, 281, 283, 319, 321-323, 360, 370, 382, 383, 393, 409, 413, 414, 476, 477, 478

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Kavelin, Konstantin Dmitriyevich (1818-1885)—Russian publicist, historian and jurist, representative of feudal-bourgeois liberalism; supported the tsarist policy of reprisals and opposed the revolutionary-democratic movement during the preparation and carrying out of the Peasant Reform of 1861—503, 504

Kepler, Johannes (1571-1630)—German astronomer, basing himself on Copernican teach ings, discovered the laws of planetary motion—122, 332

Kleinpeter, Hans (1869-1916)—Austrian philosopher, subjective idealist, popularised empirio-criticism—496

Korolenko. Vladimir Galaktionovich (1833-1921)—Russian author and public figure—513, 514

Krylov, Ivan Adreyevich (1769-1844)—Russian fabullist; satirised various vices of society: bribery, servility, falsehood, hypocrisy, boasting—504

L

Lagrange, Joseph Louis (1736-1813)—French mathematician and mechanic—118

La Metirie, Julien Offrey de (1709-1751)—French physician, philosopher, prominent representative of mechanistic materialism—42, 44, 520

Lange, Friedrich Albert (1828-1875)—German philosopher, an earlier representative of neo-Kantianism—327, 393

Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864)—German petty-bourgeois socialist, headed General Association of German Workers; originator of opportunism in German labour movement, idealist and eclectic in his philosophical views—337, 339, 352, 357, 526, 549, 550

Lasson, Adolf (1832-1917)—German philosopher, professor at Berlin University, prominent representative of neo-Hegelianism—238

Lavrov, Pyotr Lavrovich (1823-1900)—Russian sociologist and pubicist, ideologist of the Narodniks, advocated an anti-scientific idealist, subjective method of sociology—514

Law, John (1671-1729)—English bourgeois economist and financier; contrôleur général des finances in France (1719-1720); known for issuing large amounts of paper currency which ended in financial collapse—42

Le Bon, Gustave (1841-1931)—French physician, psychologist and sociologist, idealist—432

Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1716)—German mathematician, versatile scientist, outstanding rationalist philosopher, objective idealist; his philosophy, containing dialectical ideas, greatly influenced the development of German classical phiiosophy—41-43, 64, 111, 114, 118, 131, 132, 144, 156, 209, 322, 326, 373, 375, 379-386, 438, 465, 491

Lemke, M. K. (1872-1923)—historian of Russian literature and the Russian revolutionary movement, collected historical and literary documents—505, 506

Léon, Xavier (1868-1935)—President of Société Française de Philosophie, editor of *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, idealist philosopher, author of works on Fichte's philosophy—319

Le Roy, Edouard (1870-1954)—French philosopher, mathematician, professor at Collège de France, pragmatist and neo-positivist, tried to achieve an "organic synthesis" of philosophy, science and religion, a leader of Catholic modernism—452, 462

Le Roy, Hendrik de (De Roy in Dutch, Regius in Latin) (1508-1679)—Dutch physician, philosopher, mechanistic materialist and sensualist, founder of a school of materialist followers of Descartes—42

Leucippus (5th century B. C.)—materialist philosopher of ancient Greece, founder of the atomistic theory—258, 263-265, 281, 369

Liebig, Justus von (1803-1873)—German scientist, a founder of agricultural chemistry, President of Bavarian Academy of Sciences—71

Lipps, Theodor (1851-1914)—German psychologist and philosopher, subjective idealist, supported phenomenologism—336

Locke, John (1632-1704)—English philosopher, metaphysical materialist, worked out a sensualist theory of knowledge—42, 43, 233, 292, 321, 381, 382, 492, 521

Loria, Achille (1857-1943)—Italian vulgar sociologist and economist, distorted Marxism—492

Lotze, Rudolf Hermann (1817-1881)—German physioloist and idealist philosopher—237

Loustallot, Elisée (1762-1790)—French publicist, revolutionary democrat, active in the French bourgeois revolution—32

Lucas, Richard—author of *Bibliographie des radioaktiven Stoffes*—57

M

Mach, Ernst (1838-1916)—Austrian philosopher, subjective idealist, physicist; like Avenarius, leading representative of empirio-criticism—57, 59, 71, 265, 270, 276, 328, 399, 400, 410, 415, 416, 417, 422, 423, 427, 445, 446, 474, 484, 495, 498, 499, 500

MacTaggart, John M'Taggart Ellis (1866-1925)—English philosopher, neo-Hegelian; author of the commentary to Hegel's *Logic*—238, 240, 241

Malebranche, Nicolas (1638-1715)—French idealist philosopher, metaphysician, a representative of occasionalism—41, 42, 43

Marheineke, Philip Konrad (1780-1846)—German Protestant theologist and historian of Christianity, professor at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited *Lectures on Philosophy of Religion* for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—87

Mariano, Raffaele (1840-1912)—Italian philosopher and publicist, Hegelian, professor of church history at Naples—239, 324

Marx, Karl (1818-1883)—21-23, 24, 26, 30, 32-35, 36, 37, 36, 40, 44-47, 49-51, 65, 77, 141, 147, 178, 180, 212, 235, 238, 281, 310, 311, 312, 316, 317, 339, 340, 342, 349, 352, 358-360, 378, 387, 388-391, 397, 404, 405, 487, 526, 528

Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau de (1698-1750)—French physicist, astronomer and geodesist, originated the principle of Least Action—421

Maxwell, James Clerk (1831-1879)—English physicist, advanced the theory of electro-

magnetic field and the electromagnetic theory of light—439
Michelet, Karl Ludwig (1801-1893)—professor of philosophy at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, Part II of *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* ("Philosophy of Nature") and *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—87, 239
Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstantinovich (1842-1904)—Russian sociologist, publicist and literary critic, ideologist of liberal Narodniks, editor of the magazines *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* and *Russkoye Bogatstvo*—75
Montesquieu, Charles Louis (1689-1755)—French representative of 18th-century Enlightenment, ideologist of constitutional monarchy, author of *L'Esprit des Lois* (*The Spirit of the Law*)—524
Müller, Iwan (1830-1917)—German philologist, professor of classical philology at Erlangen University—369
Münsterberg, Hugo (1863-1916)—German psychologist, professor at Harvard University, advocated voluntarism in his works on psychology—399

N

Napoleon I. Bonaparte (1769-1821)—French Emperor (1804-1814 and 1815)—40, 310, 334
Nauwerck, Karl (1810-1891)—German publicist; member of "The Free," a Young Hegelian circle in Berlin—24
Nemesius (c. 4th century A. D.)—bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia, author of the treatise "On Human Nature" where he sought to combine neo-Platonism with the Christian teaching of immortality of the soul, freedom of will and divine providence—344, 352
Nernst, Walter Hermann (1864-1941)—German physicist and physical chemist—435, 436
Newton, Isaak (1642-1727)—English physicist, astronomer and mathematician, founder of classical mechanics—118, 332, 380, 427
Nietzsche Friedrich (1844-1900)—German philosopher, voluntarist and irrationalist, his ideology was a forerunner of fascism—58, 452
Nikolai Gavrilovich—see Chernyshevsky Nikolai Gavrilovich
Noël, Georges (1856-1916)—French idealist philosopher, professor of philosophy, author of *La Logique de Hegel*—240, 241, 319-324
Norström, Vitalis (1856-1916)—Swedish philosopher, subjective idealist, professor at Göteborg—59

O

Ostwald, Wilhelm Friedrich (1853-1932)—German natural scientist and idealist philosopher, founder of the "energetic" theory, a variety of "physical" idealism—58, 399, 422, 427, 430, 445, 500
Owen, Robert (1771-1858)—great English utopian socialist—33, 44, 510

P

Parmenides of Elea (end of 6th-beginning of 5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher of

the Eleatic school, disciple of Xenophanes—97, 105, 106, 107, 302, 477

Pastore, Valentino Annibale (1868-1956)—Italian philosopher, member of Turin Academy of Sciences, specialised in mathematical logic, contributed to the magazine *Rivista di Filosofia*—439

Paulsen, Friedrich (1846-1908)—German educationalist and philosopher, neo-Kantian, author of works on ethics, pedagogy and history of public education in Germany—53-55, 394

Pearson, Karl (1857-1936)—mathematician and biologist, professor at London University, Machian approach to the theory of knowledge—152

Peirce, Charles (*Santiago*) *Sanders* (1839-1914)—American idealist philosopher, logician and psychologist; in 1878 enunciated the basic principles of pragmatism—445, 455

Pelazza, Aurelio (d. 1915)—Italian philosopher, author of the book *Riccardo Avenarius e l'empiriocriticismo*—58

Perrin, Jean Baptiste (1870-1942)—French physicist and physical chemist; his works were mainly concerned with experimental researches in Brownian movement—325, 392

Perrotin, Henri Joseph Anastase (1845-1904)—French astronomer, known for his observation of "canals" on Mars and rings about Saturn—333

Perry, Ralph Barton (1876-1957)—American idealist philosopher, professor at Harvard University, neo-realist—398

Petzoldt, Joseph (1862-1929)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, disciple of Mach and Avenarius, opponent of scientific socialism—496

Phaedo—ancient Greek philosopher, disciple of Socrates—277

Philo of Alexandria (c. 25 B. C.-50 A. D.)—ancient philosopher chief representative of Judaic religious philosophy at the beginning of 1st century A. D., sought to combine Judaic religion with Platonism and stoicism; his mysticism greatly ininfluenced Christian theology—301, 345, 348, 357

Pisarev, Dimitry Ivanovich (1840-1868)—Russian literary critic, materialist philosopher and revolutionary democrat—371, 513, 529, 536

Planck, Max Karl Ernst Ludwig (1858-1947)—German theoretical physicist, founder of quantum theory, inconsistent materialist—57

Plato (c. 427-347 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher, objective idealist, ideologist of slave-owning aristocracy—47, 90, 107, 146, 218, 221. 222, 260, 273, 274, 276-281, 283, 301, 302, 321, 322, 346, 350, 351, 360, 365, 370, 419, 438, 452, 490

Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich (1856-1918)—materialist philosopher, outstanding propagator of Marxism, prominent figure in world socialist movement, after 1903 became Menshevik and opportunist, in his philosophical works sometimes deviated from dialectical materialism—160, 179, 275, 308, 357, 360, 403, 479, 480, 482, 501, 528, 544

Plenge, Johann (d. 1874)—German sociologist, economist and idealist philosopher, professor at Leipzig and Münster (Westphalia)—238, 388, 390, 391, 397

Pleshcheyev, Alexei Nikolayevich (1825-1893)—Russian poet, in his poems expressed ideas of

revolutionary democrats of the 1840s-1860s—536
Pliny the Elder (*Gaius Plinius Secundus*) (23-79 A. D.)—Roman writer and scientist—525
Plutarch (c. 46-126 A. D)—ancient Greek writer, historian and idealist philosopher—341, 342
Poincaré, Jules Henri (1854-1912)—French mathematician and physicist, member of French Académie des Sciences, in philosophy sided with Machians, conventionalist—413, 414, 424, 426, 445, 465, 474
Prantl, Karl (1820-1888)—professor of philosophy at Munich University, idealist, author of works on the history of philosophy and logic—372
Priestley, Joseph (1733-1804)—English chemist and materialist philosopher—43, 517, 518
Protagoras of Abdera (c. 481-411 B. C.)—ancient Greek sophist philosopher; protagonist of democracy in slave-owning society—269, 270, 274, 352
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865)—French publicist, vulgar economist and sociologist, ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie, one of the founders of anarchism—24, 25, 28-30
Ptolemy, Claudius (2nd century A. D.)—ancient Greek mathematician, astronomer and geographer; founder of the doctrine of the earth as the fixed centre of the universe—334, 459
Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365-275 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher, founder of scepticism in ancient world—296
Pythagoras (c. 580-500 B. C.)—ancient Greek mathematician and philosopher, objective idealist, ideologist of slave-owning aristocracy—115, 247-249, 332, 370

R

Raab, Friedrich (b. 1890)—German economist and philosopher, from 1926 professor of political economy at Frankfurt—392
Rankine, William John Macquorn (1820-1872)—Scottish engineer and physicist, a founder of thermodynamics—422
Rau, Albrecht (1843-1920)—German philosopher and naturalist; follower of Feuerbach—394
Renan, Joseph Ernest (1823-1892)—French philologist, idealist philosopher, author of works on history of religion—471
Renouvier, Charles Barnard (1815-1903)—French idealist philosopher and eclectic, headed the so-called school of "neo-criticism," conventionalist—324, 399, 500
Rey, François Abel (1873-1940)—French philosopher, positivist, in questions natural science an inconsistent and spontaneous materialist—325, 407, 428, 430, 443, 452, 459, 465, 474
Ribot, Théodule Armand (1839-1916)—French philosopher and psychologist, founder and editor of the magazine *Revue Philosophique*—399
Ricardo, David (1772-1823)—English economist, leading representative of classical bourgeois political economy—25
Richter, Raoul Hermann (1871-1912)—German philosopher, neo-Kantian—58
Rickert, Heinrich (1863-1936)—German philosopher and sociologist, subjective idealist and agnostic, one of the main representatives of the Baden school of neo-Kantianism—399
Riecke, Eduard (1845-1915)—German physicist—57

Riehl, Alois (1844-1924)—German philosopher, neo-Kantian—239, 399
Ritter, Heinrich (1791-1869)—German theist philosopher, historian of philosophy—345
Robespierre, Maximilien François Marie Isidore (1758-1794)—leader of the French Revolution, Jacobin, head of the revolutionary government (1793-1794)—40
Robinet, Jean-Baptiste René (1735-1820)—French philosopher, materialist, deist—44
Römer, Ole Christensen (1644-1710)—Danish astronomer; was the first to determine the velocity of light, invented a number of astronomical instruments—333
Roscher, Wilhelm (1817-1894)—German economist, representative of the so-called historical school of political economy—525
Rössler, Constantin (1820-1896)—German publicist, professor of government at Jena, neo-Hegelian—238
Rotta, Paolo (b. 1873)—Italian philosopher, close to neo-scholasticism, Hegelian, professor at Milan Catholic University—241
Royce, Josiah (1855-1916)—American philosopher, objective idealist, representative of American neo-Hegelians—399, 445
Ruttmann, Wilhelm Julius (b. 1884)—German psychologist, author of *Die Hauptergebnisse der modernen Psychologie...*—396

S

Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Léon de (1767-1794)—leader in the French Revolution, Jacobin—40
Salignac, Fénelon—French scientist, author of *Questions de physique générale et d'astronomie*—57
Sand, George (1804-1876)—French authuress—510
Schaden, Emil August (1814-1852)—professor of philosophy at Erlangen University, mystic; critic of philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach—82
Schaller, Julius (1807-1868)—professor of philosophy at Halle University, Hegelian; criticised Feuerbach's materialist philosophy—82
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1775-1854)—outstanding German idealist philosopher, representative of German classical philosophy; developed ideas of Kant and Fichte; elaborated objective idealistic "Identitätsphilosophie" ("philosophy of identity"); became an official ideologist of the Prussian monarchy toward the end of his career, propagated the religious and mystical "Philosophie der Offenbarung" (philosophy of revelation)—236, 301, 387, 492-493
Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott (1864-1937)—English philosopher, prominent representative of pragmatism—398, 399, 445
Schinz, Max (b. 1864)—Privatdocent, professor of philosophy at Zurich University—58
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768-1834)—German theologlist and idealist philosopher, romanticist—345
Schmidt, Ferdinand Jakob (1860-1939)—German philosopher and pedagogue, professor at Berlin University, fideist, in regard to the theory of knowledge was close to the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism and to the immanents—238

Schmitt Eugen Heinrich (1851-1916)—author of *Das Geheimnis der Hegelschen Dialektik, beleuchtet vom konkretsinnlichen Standpunkte*, which he submitted in a contest arranged by the Hegelian Berlin Society of Philosophers; the work was recognised as outstanding but was not awarded a prize because of its "materialism and sensualism"; subsequently he turned to mysticism and gnosticism—239, 399

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860)—German idealist philosopher, ideologist of Prussian junkers; his voluntarist and misanthropic philosophy provided a source of German fascist ideology—496

Schulze, (*Anesidem*) *Gottlieb Ernst* (1701-1833)—German idealist philosopher, agnostic, Humean; sought to restore and modernise the argumentation of ancient scepticism—296

Schulze, Johannes (1786-1869)—German educationalist, Hegelian; edited *The Phenomenology of Mind* for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—296

Schuppe, Wilhelm (1836-1913)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, headed the so-called school of immanence—399

Schwegler, Albert (1819-1857)—German theologian, philosopher, philologist and historian—359, 365, 369, 371-372

Segond, Joseph-Louis-Paul (1872-1954)—French idealist philosopher and psychologist, author of several works on aesthetics—399

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (c. 4 B. C.-65 A. D.)—Roman philosopher, stoic, political figure, writer, Nero's tutor—78

Seth, Andrew (1856-1931)—English philosopher, professor at Edinburgh, author of works on philosophy—238, 239, 240

Sertus Empiricus (2nd century A. D.)—ancient Greek physician and sceptic philosopher, author of historical and philosophical works: *Pyrronische Hypolyposen and Adversus Mathemeticos*—250, 252, 255, 261, 265, 272, 297, 298, 299

Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)—great English dramatist—31

Shehedrin (*Saltykov-Shchedrin*), *Mikhail Yevgrafovich* (1826-1889)—Russian satirist, revolutionary democrat—503

Shulyatikov, V. M. (1872-1912)—Russian literary critic, Bolshevik; criticised idealism from the viewpoint of vulgar sociology, thus distorting Marxism—484, 486, 492, 494, 499, 500

Sierakowski, Zygmunt (1827-1863)—Polish revolutionary democrat, one of the leaders in the rising of 1863 in Poland; executed by the tsarist government on June 15, 1863—508

Sismondi, Jean Charles Lenard Simonde de (1773-1842)—Swiss economist, petty-bourgeois critic of capitalism—25

Smith, Adam (1723-1790)—English economist, leading representative of classical bourgeois political economy—25

Socrates (c. 469-399 B. C.)—idealist philosopher of ancient Greece, ideologist of slave-holding aristocracy—146, 223, 272, 273, 274, 451, 522

Spaventa, Bertrando (1817-1883) Italian idealist philosopher, leading representative of neo-Hegelianism in Italy, professor at Naples University—58, 239

Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903)—English bourgeois philosopher and sociologist, one of the founders of positivism—45, 428

Speransky, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1772-1839)—Russian statesman; early in the rule of Alexander I drafted state reforms designed to introduce elements of constitutional government, while retaining feudalism and autocracy in Russia; the draft was rejected and he was exiled—552, 553

Spicker, Gideon (1840-1912)—German idealist philosopher, author of several works on the history of philosophy—393

Spinoza, Baruch (*Benedict*) (1632-1677)—Dutch materialist philosopher, rationalist, atheist—41, 43, 44, 64, 67, 06, 106, 108, 156, 167, 168, 236, 321, 360, 377, 378, 387, 491

Stahl, Georg Ernst (1660-1734)—German chemist and physician, formulated the theory of phlogiston, vitalist in his works on physiology and medicine—438

Stakhevich, S. G. (1843-1918)—participated in the revolutionary movement in Russia in the sixties; in 1863 was arrested, sentenced to penal servitude and exiled to Siberia for life; author of reminiscences about N. G. Chernyshevsky, with whom he spent several years in Siberia—506

Stein, Ludwig (1859-1930)—German sociologist and philosopher, member of the Academies of Sciences in Berlin and Geneva, editor of the magazine *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, author of works on the history of philosophy—58

Stirling, James Hutchison (1820-1909)—English philosopher, founder of English neo-Hegelianism; physician by education—239

Stirner, Max (1806-1856)—German idealist philosopher, Young Hegelian, one of the ideologists of anarchism; his basic work is *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*—452

Stobaeus, Joannes (c. 5th century A. D.)—Greek writer, compiler of writings by Greek authors—345

Strache, Hugo (1865-925)—Austrian chemist and engineer, author of *Die Einheit der Materie, des Weltäthers und der Naturkräfte*—58

Strauss, David Friedrich (1808-1874)—German theologian and idealist philosopher, Young Hegelian, author of the book *Life of Jesus*, a historical criticism of the gospels—44, 45

Sue, Eugène (1804-1857)—French writer, author of cheap sentimental novels on social themes—31, 46, 47, 49

Suter, Heinrich (1848-1922)—Swiss professor of mathematics—396

Szeliga—pseudonym of Franz Zychlinsky (1816-1900)—Prussian officer, Young Hegelian, participated in the publication of B. Bauer's works—30, 31

T

Taggart—see MacTaggart

Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe (1828-1893)—French literary and art critic, historian and positivist philosopher—420

Tarde, Gabriel (1843-1904)—French sociologist, criminalist and psychologist; a founder of a psychological trend in sociology; voluntarist—452

Thales of Miletus (c. 624-547 B. C.)—ancient Greek materialist philosopher; founder of Miletian (Ionic) school—223, 246

Thomson, Joseph John (1856-1940)—British physicist, mem-

ber of the London Royal Society, of which he was President from 1915 to 1920; held mechanistic materialist philosophical views—57, 335

Tiedemann, Dietrich (1748-1803)—German historian of philosophy, professor at Marburg University, author of the six-volume *Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie*, which served Hegel as a source in his course of lectures on the history of philosophy—270

Timaeus (4th century-3rd century B. C.)—ancient Greek historian, author of works on the history of Sicily and Italy, which have come down to us in fragments—302, 347, 349

Trendelenburg, Friedrtch Adolf (1802-1872)—German idealist philosopher and logician, professor at Berlin University; critical of Hegel's philosophy, particularly his dialectics—238

Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich (1818-1883)—Russian writer, liberal in his political views—503, 504, 531

U

Uberweg, Friedrich (1826-1871)—German philosopher and psychologist, professor at Königsberg University, author of *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*—52, 256, 276

Uhde-Bernays, Hermann Hans (b. 1873)—German philologist, author of works on the history of literature and art—395

Uspensky, Nikolai Vasilyevich (1837-1889)—Russian democratic writer—534

V

Van't Hoff, Jacobus Hendricus (1852-1911)—Dutch chemist, a founder of modern physical chemistry and stereochemistry—435

Véra, Augusto (1813-1885)—Italian philosopher, forerunner of Italian Hegelians, translated Hegel's works into Italian and French—240, 324

Verworn, Max (1863-1921)—German physiologist, founder of the magazine *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Physiologie*, eclectic in philosophy, close to Machism—329, 330

Vissarion—see Belinsky, Vissarion Grigoryevich

Volkmann, Paul (1856-c. 1938)—professor of theoretical physics at Königsberg, author of *Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften...*, idealist, eclectic—328, 335, 360

Voltaire, (François Marie Arouet) (1694-1778)—French philosopher and writer of 18th century Enlightenment; deist and historian, opponent of absolutism and Catholicism—42

Volynsky, A. L. (1863-1926)—Russian reactionary critic, decadent, advocated the theory of "art for art's sake"—520

De Vries, Hugo (1848-1935)—Dutch botanist, anti-Darwinian, founder of reactionary pangenesis and mutation theories—440

W

Waals, Johannes Diderik, van der (1837-1923)—Dutch physicist, professor at Amsterdam University; known for his works on the kinetic theory of gases—435

Wallace, William (1844-1897)—leading representative of British Hegelians; translated Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* into English—239

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Willy, Rudolf (1855-1920)—German philosopher, follower of Avenarius, subjective idealist—496
Windelband, Wilhelm (1848-1915)—German philosopher, neo-Kantian, prominent historian of philosophy—239, 369
Wiassak, Rudolf (1865-1930)—Austrian physiologist—498
Wolff, Christian (1679-1754)—German idealist philosopher, metaphysician, popularised and vulgarised Leibnitz' philosophy, teleologist—96, 208
Wundt, Wilhelm Max (1832-1920)—German psychologist, physiologist and idealist philosopher—321, 494-500

X

Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 580-470 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher and poet, founder of the Eleatic school—252
Xenophon (c. 430-355/4 B. C.)—ancient Greek historian, was not in sympathy with Athenian democracy, protagonist of aristocratic Sparta—274

Y

Yurkevich, P. D. (1827-1874)—professor of philosophy, idealist and mystic; entered into polemics with Chernyshevsky on philosophical questions—516, 320, 521

Z

Zart, A.—German physcist, author of the book *Bausteine des Weltalls. Atome und Moleküle...*—395
Zeno of Elea (5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher of the Eleatic school, disciple of Parmenides—252, 254-259

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PREFACE

Volume 39 of the *Collected Works* contains Lenin's *Notebooks on Imperialism*, the materials he gathered for his classic *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written in the first half of 1916. In it, Lenin for the first time gives a profound and comprehensive analysis of the highest stage of capitalism, the inception of which dates to the turn of the century. He shows that imperialism is a development and continuation of the chief characteristics of capitalism, that its economic basis, its very substance, is the dominance of monopoly, that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism. Lenin conclusively proved that, in contrast to the pre-monopoly stage, when capitalism was still on the ascent, monopoly capitalism is, parasitic, decaying and moribund capitalism, with all the contradictions of capitalism carried to extreme limits, beyond which begins the socialist revolution.

The historic significance of Lenin's book lies in its economic substantiation of the new theory of socialist revolution. Proceeding from a Marxist analysis of imperialism and the law discovered by him of the uneven economic and political development of capitalist countries, Lenin scientifically proved that in the era of monopoly capitalism the simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in all or in most civilised countries was impossible, but that it was fully possible, and inevitable, first in several countries, or even in one country. Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution is an immense contribution to Marxism; it equips the working class of all countries with a clear and precise programme of struggle for liberation from imperialism, for the victory of socialism. The great power and vitality of Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution has been confirmed in practice by the experience of the proletarian revolutions in Russia, China and other countries

of Europe and Asia, which now form the world socialist system.

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism was the fruit of tremendous and intense labour. Striking evidence of this is the *Notebooks on Imperialism*, the mass of varied preparatory material that went into the writing of the book. Marx, it will be recalled, used a vast amount of factual material in working on *Capital*. Studying capitalism in the new era of history, Lenin also analysed and generalised a vast amount of data on the most diverse problems. He drew his data from hundreds of books, theses, pamphlets, magazine and newspaper articles, and statistical reports. The Notebooks contain extracts from 148 books (106 in German, 23 in French, 17 in English and two translations into Russian), and 232 articles (of which 206 in German, 13 in French and 13 in English) from 49 periodicals (34 German, 7 French and 8 English).

Although the *Notebooks* are not a work in its final form, they are of immense scientific value and represent an important contribution to Marxist political economy. The wealth of material brought together in the *Notebooks* provides a closer picture of monopoly capitalism, and supplements and elucidates the principal theses of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

The great scientific and cognitive value of the *Notebooks* is that they reveal Lenin's method of scientific work, his approach to the material under investigation—economic and historical facts, and statistical data. The *Notebooks* show us the methodology of Lenin's analysis, his research technique. The preliminary materials showing how Lenin drew up the plan for his *Imperialism* will be read with great interest. They trace the full process, from the first rough draft (or subject-outline), with an approximate enumeration of the problems, to the final research plan, with its detailed structure of the book and summarised contents of each chapter (see this volume, pp. 116-17, 196, 201-02, 230-43).

In the *Notebooks* Lenin meticulously traces the emergence and development of the principal features of monopoly capitalism: concentration of production and capital, which has reached such a high leyel as to create monopolies that play a decisive role in economic life; the merging of bank

capital with industrial capital and the rise of a financial oligarchy; the export of capital, which, as distinct from the export of commodities, has acquired exceptional importance; the formation of international monopolist associations of capitalists; the completion of the territorial division of the world by the biggest capitalist powers and their struggle for its redivision; the progressive parasitism and decay of capitalism. Lenin shows that the omnipotence and domination of finance capital and the monopolies is characteristic of imperialism. Reaction in every sphere is its political feature. Lenin reveals, against a massive background of factual material, the profound contradictions of imperialism.

To do this, Lenin draws on all available international literature on economics and technology, modern history, geography, politics, diplomacy, the labour and national liberation movements in the era of monopoly capitalism. No country, no branch of the economy, or of social policy and politics, remain outside his field of vision. He made a close study both of economic and historical monographs on the main development trends in the capitalist countries, and of small magazine and newspaper articles on particular problems. All these numerous and diverse sources are critically assessed and analysed to produce a firm and reliable foundation of facts and figures for a comprehensive substantiation of his theoretical propositions and conclusions about imperialism.

In his study of the monopoly stage of capitalism Lenin used sources reflecting diverse trends in economic science—books by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists and statisticians, historians and diplomats, financial experts and parliamentary leaders, reformists and revisionists. But in using these sources, and selectively drawing on their rich factual data, Lenin exposes the bourgeois ideologists and reformist apologists of imperialism and their pseudo-scientific views.

After working through the "half-thousand pages" of Professor Robert Liefmann's *Holding and Financing Companies*, Lenin remarks: "The author is a double-dyed idiot, who makes a great fuss about definitions—very stupid ones—all revolving around the word 'substitution'. His

factual data, however, mostly quite raw, are valuable" (see p. 373 of this volume). Lenin used Liefmann's statistical data, checked against and supplemented from other sources, in his *Imperialism* to illustrate the growing concentration of production and the growing incomes of the top monopolies. Of Schulze-Gaevernitz, the out-and-out apologist of German imperialism, the author of *British Imperialism* from which he made copious notes, Lenin wrote: "Scoundrel of the first order and vulgar to boot, Kantian, pro-religion, chauvinist,—has collected some very interesting facts about British imperialism and has written a lively, readable book. Travelled in Britain and collected a mass of material and observations. You've done a lot of plundering, you British gentlemen; allow us, too, a bit of plundering—with Kant, God, patriotism, and science to 'sanctify' it = such is the sum and substance of the position of this 'savant'!! (Also a lot of needless verbiage)" (ibid., p. 446). Lenin used the factual material in his *Imperialism*.

The *Notebooks* show how, from the welter of material in the numerous sources he used, Lenin selected trustworthy data on fundamental and typical phenomena of monopoly capitalism. "...a host of unnecessary and boring details; I omit them"—he writes about one book (p. 99). About another he remarks that it contains "a most painstaking summary of very rich data ((a mass of basic figures))..... I select the most important" (p. 474). In many cases Lenin compiles his own summaries and tables from scattered data. When studying any book Lenin takes special note of the sources used in it and afterwards examines and checks them.

The *Notebooks* set out detailed factual and statistical data characterising the principal features of the monopoly stage of capitalism. They contain revealing admissions by bourgeois experts of all countries concerning the new developments in the capitalist economy. All these materials, Lenin points out, are necessary "to enable the reader to obtain a more rounded-out idea of imperialism" (present edition, Vol. 22, p. 267).

The *Notebooks* contain important data on monopoly capitalism in Russia. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* was intended for legal publication and Lenin therefore had to discuss Russian imperialism, and in particular the

tsarist government's predatory policy, "with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language—in that accursed Aesopian language—to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up the pen to write a 'legal' work" (ibid., p. 187). The *Notebooks* were not trammelled by censorship and in them Lenin cites, appraises and comments on numerous facts relating to various aspects of Russian imperialism. This is a very valuable supplement to his remarks about Russia in *Imperialism*.

In analysing the highest stage of capitalism, both in the *Notebooks* and in *Imperialism*, Lenin uses mostly factual data and statistics of the period preceding the First World War: More recent and present-day data on the capitalist economy fully confirm Lenin's analysis of imperialism, its principal features and development trends, and convincingly demonstrate the growth of monopoly dominance and oppression, the progressing parasitism and decay of capitalism, the accentuation and deepening of its contradictions.

The *Notebooks* are a brilliant example of partisanship in science, a basic feature being their militant, attacking approach to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists, reformists and revisionists. Lenin makes a point of exposing Kautskyism; he sharply criticises the lackeys of imperialism parading as Marxists. The Kautskyites glossed over the contradictions of imperialism, sought to whitewash capitalism, and were "*in favour of* a cleanish, sleek, moderate and genteel capitalism" (see p. 116 of this volume). Lenin shows that "finance capital does not abolish the lower (less developed, backward) forms of capitalism, but grows out of them, above them", and that "finance capital (monopolies, banks, oligarchy, buying up, etc.) is not an accidental excrescence on capitalism, but its ineradicable continuation and product" (p. 196).

Lenin's scientific analysis of imperialism, confirmed by the reality of contemporary capitalism, fully exposed the fallacious and reactionary Kautskyite theory of ultra-imperialism. The *Notebooks* show that the opportunists and revisionists, instead of fighting to overthrow imperialism, strive for reconciliation with capital; they distort the essential character of imperialism as the highest and last stage of capitalist development, as the period of the decline of

world capitalism. "The struggle against imperialism without breaking with and combating opportunism is deception," Lenin wrote in an outline plan for his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (p. 241).

In our day, too, the *Notebooks* are a potent weapon of revolutionary Marxism. They help the Communist and Workers' Parties combat the ideology of imperialist reaction and all manifestations of modern reformism and revisionism. In this era of transition from capitalism to socialism, when the socialist system is successfully competing with the obsolescent capitalist system, the defenders of the old order exert every effort to embellish capitalism, divert the masses from active struggle for socialism, and infect them with reformist ideas of collaboration with capital. The imperialists encourage every manner of theory and plan for "reconstructing" and reforming capitalist society. Their aim is to perpetuate it under the guise of "people's capitalism" or "democratic socialism". And in this they are aided by the modern revisionists, who repeat the bankrupt ideas of Kautskyism and try to excise the revolutionary soul of Marxism. Declaring that Marxism-Leninism is "obsolete", they oppose the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Distorting reality, they maintain that modern capitalism has undergone a radical change—the proletariat, they allege, is no longer an oppressed and exploited class, and the capitalists have become working people. The antagonism between labour and capital, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, we are told, have been replaced by peace and co-operation, and capitalist society is on the way to prosperity and "universal well-being". For revolutionary Marxists the *Notebooks* are a guide and model of scientific criticism and exposure of these latter-day theories about the conversion of imperialism into "people's capitalism" and its peaceful evolution into socialism.

The plans and outlines of some of Lenin's articles and lectures during the First World War, included in this volume, complement the material of the *Notebooks* and are of especial value for an understanding of Lenin's theory of imperialism and socialist revolution. In the Preface to the first edition of his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (dated April 26, 1917), Lenin refers the reader

to his articles of 1914-17, published outside Russia. Appearing in the uncensored Party press, they substantiate and develop the propositions that imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution, that social-chauvinism (socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is a complete betrayal of socialism and defection to the bourgeoisie, that the split in the labour movement is inseparably connected with the objective conditions created by imperialism, etc.

The present volume includes Lenin's twenty notebooks on imperialism together with miscellaneous notes written between 1912 and 1916. They were first published in 1933-38 in L*enin Miscellanies XXII*, *XXVII*, *XXVIII*, *XXIX*, *XXX*, *XXXI*. Notebook "δ" ("Delta"), which was discovered later, was first published in 1938 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 9, pp. 171-84. All the *Notebooks* were put out in a separate volume in 1939.

The first fifteen notebooks, numbered by the letters of the Greek alphabet, are here given in the order followed by Lenin. He used them in the plan for his book on imperialism, as indicated in Notebook "γ" ("Gamma") (pp. 230-43 of this volume. Lenin's references to the pages of the *Notebooks* are followed by the corresponding pages of this volume, given in square brackets). The material of these fifteen notebooks was extensively used in the writing of *Imperialism*, *the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. The other five notebooks were not numbered by Lenin and are here published after the numbered ones in chronological order. In addition to the notebooks, the present volume contains miscellaneous notes made by Lenin in 1912-16. Directly connected with the *Notebooks*, they continue Lenin's elaboration of the theory of imperialism. They were published in *Lenin Miscellany XXIX* and, partly, *XXX*.

Compared with the preceding 1939 edition of the *Notebooks*, the section "Miscellaneous Notes, 1912-16" has in this volume been supplemented by the following items: 1) E. Corradini, *Italian Nationalism*; 2) Nitti, *Foreign Capital in Italy*; 3) R. Liefmann, "Does the War Bring Socialism Nearer?"; 4) *Conrad's Jahrbücher*, 1915, No. 2, August; 5) *Papers of the Society for Social Policy*; 6) "Social-Imperialism and Left Radicalism"; 7) E. Rappard, *Towards National Agreement*; 8) A Good Summary of Comparative

Figures; 9) A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*; 10) Eug. Philippovich, *Monopolies*. Several items have not been included in this edition as having no direct relation to the subject.

Lenin made all extracts in the language of the original. With the exception of the notebooks "κ" ("Kappa"), "Brailsford", "On Marxism and Imperialism", "Imperialism", and also, in part, the notebooks "ζ" ("Zeta") and "λ" ("Lambda"), which were made by N. K. Krupskaya on his instructions, all excerpts were made by Lenin personally.

All the headings in the *Notebooks* were given by Lenin. Excerpts from books, articles, outlines and source references are given separate headings taken from Lenin's contents table to each notebook, or from the text of the excerpts.

Lenin's arrangement of the material, his marginal notes, underlinings, etc., are fully reproduced in this volume by type variations: a single underlining by *italics*, a double underlining by *s p a c e d i t a l i c s*, three lines by **heavy Roman type**, and four lines by **s p a c e d h e a v y R o m a n t y p e**. A wavy underlining is indicated by ***heavy italics***, if double—by ***s p a c e d h e a v y i t a l i c s***.

The entire text has been rechecked with Lenin's manuscripts and the original sources. Any inaccuracies discovered in the deciphering of the manuscripts, or in checking with the original sources, have been corrected.

All the statistical data have been rechecked and are here given in full accordance with the manuscripts. Apparent inexact figures of totals, differences and percentages, which occur in some cases, have been left unchanged, since they are due to the figures being rounded off by Lenin.

Numerous references to *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* and to other Lenin's works are given in footnotes. This helps to bring out the close connection between the *Notebooks* and *Imperialism* and clearly shows how Lenin used his vast fund of preparatory material in his scientific study of imperialism.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

NOTEBOOKS ON IMPERIALISM[1]

Written in 1915-16 in Russian,
German, French, English
and other languages

First published in 1933-38 in *Lenin Miscellanies XXII*,
XXVII, *XXVIII*, *XXIX*, *XXX*, *XXXI*,
Notebook "δ" was first published
in 1938 in the magazine
Proletarskaya Revolutsia No. 9

Published according
to the manuscripts

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Written in 1915-16 in Russian,
German, French, English
and other languages

First published in 1933-38 in Lenin Miscellanies XXII,
XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI,
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Published according
to the manuscripts

NOTEBOOK "α"
("ALPHA")

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7-8. *Werner* on concentration in the Ruhr mining industry (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1913).
9. Meyer (capital investment) and source references.
10. —
11-12. Liefmann on the Frankfurt metal trade.
13-14. Bourgeois scientists on the struggle against imperialism ("Subject races").
15. Moride—"Multiple Stores".
16. Source references.
17. Idem.
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19. Notes from *Nashe Slovo*.
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OUTLINE FOR AN ARTICLE ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE "MARSH"

(NOTES ON KAUTSKYISM)[2]

Our Struggle Against the "Marsh"

The Marsh = K. Kautsky, Huysmans, etc.

Significance of the distinction between Plekhanov, Hyndman, Heine and K. Kautsky, Vandervelde, etc. 2 distinctions of "*shades*". Eclectics instead of dialectics. The "middle way": "reconciliation" of extremes, absence of clear, definite, firm conclusions; vacillation.

Conciliation and blunting of class contradictions *in words* and their accentuation *in reality*.

Conciliation with opportunism.

Glossing over the theoretical and practical-political differences with opportunism.

Repudiation (apostasy) of the *Road to Power* position and of the *revolutionary* essence (and revolutionary tactics) of the Basle Manifesto[3]....

The difference between the conceptions "Marxist centre" (=independent policy, independent ideas, independent theory) and "Marsh" (=wavering, lack of principle, "turntable" ("*Drehscheibe*"), weathercock).

Illegal organisation. Work in the army. Support for and development of mass action.

Official optimism: the objective course of events ... everything *is bound* to be for the best.

N.B. The "proletariat" and the "class struggle" "in general". "Process".

N.B. cf. Martov on the "hopelessness" of socialism *if*... opportunism is hopeless!!!

Recognition of **revolutionary** activity along the lines indicated above, not **denial** of legal activity and of the *struggle* for **reforms**, should be the essence of the "struggle against the Marsh".

The possibility of a fusion of socialism and syndicalism, should there be a new and deeper division.

Parliamentarism and a different conception of it. "Illegal parliamentarism".

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RAVESTEIJN ON THE BALKAN PROBLEM

W. van Ravesteijn, "The Balkan Problem", *Die Neue Zeit*, 1913 (31st year, Volume I). November 15, 1912.

N.B. "Such a federation" (of Balkan countries, including Turkey) "would be able to satisfy the cultural needs of this geographically integral area and to erect an insurmountable barrier to the advance of European imperialism, and also of Russian world power. All other solutions of the Balkan problem can be only of a temporary nature and cannot for long satisfy the interests of all the races and nations that live there" (p. 228).

"A federation of all the Balkan countries will naturally be resisted by European imperialism and tsarism with all their strength. Their common interest, now as in the past, is aggravation of mutual enmity and rivalry between these nations and Turkey so as the more easily to exploit their territories as colonial spheres. Will the statesmen of Turkey and the Balkan countries come to realise their common interests and put an end to this murderous war by entering into close relations with one another? If they fail to do this, they will sacrifice the interests of their peoples to European capitalism and the interests of the Balkan dynasties" (p. 229). N.B. N.B.

WERNER ON CONCENTRATION IN THE RUHR MINING INDUSTRY

G. Werner, "Concentration of Capital in the Ruhr Mining Industry", *Die Neue Zeit*, 1913, p. 138 (October 25, 1912).

Ruhr area:

1) Deutsche Bank group:

4 *persons* are directors or board members in *four* banks:

(α) Deutsche Bank . . . . . all 4
(β) Essener Kredit-Anstalt . . 2 of them
(γ) Essener Bank-Verein . . . 2 " "
(δ) Bergisch-Märkische Bank . 2

Mines within this bank's "sphere of influence":

20 mines — *66,233* workers; **18.6** mill. tons (1907)
72,594 " ; **19.3** " " (1910)

2) Dresdner Bank and Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein group:

9 persons are directors or board members in **both** *banks*. This group controls:

7 mines — *23,269* workers— **5.98** mill. tons (1907)
27,963 " — **7.2** " " (1910)

Magnates of capital	Chief banks	Firms, no. of mines, etc. (Mines? "Werke" or "Zechen")			1910 Workers (000)	1910 Tons Mill.)
4 persons—"personal union" of 4 banks	Deutsche Bank +3 other banks	(Deutsche Bank-konzern) (*20* mines)	α		72.6	19.3
Haniel		Private property and mine Gute Hoffnungshütte (*2* mines)	γ		35.1	9.9
Kirdorf	Discontogesell-schaft	Gelsenkirchener Bank Aktien-gesellschaft	δ	(*1*)	34.4	8.5
Stinnes	Discontogesell-schaft	Private property and Deutsch-Luxemburger	δ	(*2*)	34.6	9.1
	Berliner Handels-gesellschaft	Harpener Bank Aktiengesell-schaft	ε	(*1*)	25.9	7.1
9 persons—"personal union"	Dresdner Bank, Schaaffhausen-scher Bank-verein	Dresdner-Schaaffhausener Banken	β	(*7*)	28.0	7.2
	Berliner Handels-gesellschaft	Hibernia Aktien-gesellschaft	ε	(*1*)	18.3	5.4
		Thyssen	γ	(*1*)	16.2	3.9
		Krupp	γ	(*1*)	12.2	3.1
		Fisk		(*1*)	11.1	2.3
		Σ=			288.5	75.9
		Total in Ruhr area			354.2	89.3
		% of these firms			81.5	85

	No. of mines	Workers (000)	Mill. tons	
α)	20	72.6	19.3	Deutsche Bank
β)	7	28.0	7.2	Dresdner Bank + Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein
γ)	4	63.5	16.9	3 magnates
δ)	3	69.0	17.6	Discontogesellschaft
ε)	2	44.2	2.5	Berliner Handelsgesellschaft
Fisk)	1	11.1	2.3	

"In the Ruhr mining industry the interests of the whole nation come into conflict with the interests of a quite insignificant number of capitalists, who number hardly one hundred" (p. 144).

Incidentally, this article deals with the question of whether or not the syndicate will be renewed. Consult Conrad's chronicle for this period (October-December 1912, etc.).

MEYER (CAPITAL INVESTMENT) AND SOURCE REFERENCES

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Dr. A. Meyer, business editor of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. *Capital Investment* (Zurich, 1912).

Written by a "practician": advice to capitalists.

Statistics of company profits, pp. 130-32.

In Britain, *38,928* companies were formed from 1893 to 1902. Of these, 14,538=37 per cent had to go into liquidation!! In France the number of companies forced into liquidation was about 10 per cent (Leroy-Beaulieu).

To be noted from the literature:

Wilhelm Gehrden, *The Secret of Success on the Stock Exchange*, Berlin. (no date?)

a German private speculator, who describes his "personal experience", p. 139: "a very minute number" win on the stock exchange.
p. 149: one in fifty cases of winning in deals on margin. ((Abundant examples of swindling, etc., etc.))

Africanus, *Gold-Mining Shares as Capital Investment*, Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1911.

W. Ruppel, *Business in Mining Shares*, Jena, 1909.

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H. Brosius, *The Balance-Sheet* (Leipzig, 1906).

LIEFMANN ON THE FRANKFURT METAL TRADE

Robert Liefmann, "The International Organisation of the Frankfurt Metal Trade". *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Vol. I. Jena, 1913, p. 108 et seq.

The Merton concern grew out of the enterprises of *Merton* (Anglo-German family).

"Probably ***more than 200 million marks*** have been invested in the Merton concern as a whole, not counting, of course, the private property of the capitalists behind it" (p. 121).

"Through its enterprises, particularly those of the Merton concern, the Frankfurt metal trade which, incidentally, includes also some other firms of considerable importance, embraces, therefore, virtually the whole world" (p. 122).

Diagram (p. 120) (town names added): [see p. 37 —*Ed.*]

Trading capital (of Merton) has passed here into productive capital.

"The characteristic feature of modern wholesale trade in almost all its branches is its *penetration into production*" (p. 111).

After the *electrical* industry (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft in Germany, the General Electric Company in the U.S.A., etc.), probably "the most international branch of enterprise in Germany" (109) is the trade in


Arrows indicate the direction of control
Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft. 40 mill. marks. Frankfurt
Cuivres et Pyrites Société Anonyme. 20 mill. francs. Paris
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte. 20+18 mill. francs. Switzerland
African Metal Company Africa
American Metal Company $3,000,000 America
Metallgesellschaft 18 mill. marks Frankfurt
Henry R. Merton & Co. Ltd. £ 700,000 London
Australian Metal Company Australia
American Metallurgical Company $2,000,000
Société auxiliaire des Mines 5 mill. francs Paris
Compagnie des Minérals 2.5 mill. francs Belgium
Merton Metallurgical Company £1,000,000
Compania de Minerales y Metales Mexico

metals (especially copper, zinc, lead, and rare metals—the chief centre of which is Frankfurt).

The present head, *Dr. Wilhelm Merton* (member of the board of most of the companies), is in Frankfurt. His father, *Henry R. Merton*, is in London.

The chief difference between all these companies and other similar ones is that the capitalists at the head of the business still have a *direct* (p. 119) part in all trading and production enterprises. They "supplement" their capital by capital from the public.

Of course, the number of "companies" in which they have "holdings" is immeasurably greater than shown in the diagram.

BOURGEOIS SCIENTISTS ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM

N.B. Bourgeois scientists on the struggle against *imperialism*;

"Nationalities and subject races."

Report of the conference held in the Caxton Hall, Westminster, June 28-30, 1910. London, 1911 (XII + 178 pp.).

Review in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Vol. II, p. 193, signed *H. J. Nieboer* (Hague). The author of the review notes that the report contains brief speeches by representatives "of various peoples living under foreign rule: Egyptians, Indians, Moroccans, Georgians, Negro races of Africa, South American Indians, and also European nations such as the Irish and Poles" (p. 194).

||| "We are told that we must fight imperialism; that the ruling states should recognise the right of subject peoples to independence; that an international tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the Great Powers and weak nations.

N.B. || They do not go further than expressing these pious wishes. We see no trace of understanding of the fact

N.B. || that imperialism is inseparably bound up with capitalism in its present form and that, therefore, an

!! || open struggle against imperialism would he hopeless.

unless, perhaps, it is confined to protests against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses" (p. 195).* || N.B. !!

It is significant that the bourgeois "imperialists" in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* keep track of the national liberation movements in the colonies (at least the non-German ones).**

For instance, Vol. III, 2

the ferment and protests in India (p. 230)

idem in Natal (Africa) owing to restrictions on the immigration of Indians (230-31).

Vol. IV, 1, p. 130—the movement for self-government in the *Dutch Indies*.***

MORIDE, "MULTIPLE STORES"

Pierre Moride, "Multiple-Store Firms in France and Abroad", Paris, 1913 (Alcan). (Review in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, IV, 1, p. 286.)

			Branches	
Britain	497	firms with	20,644	
Germany	14,453	" "	34,464	(of which *31,799* are shops or larger stores
↓	↓		↓	
No. of employees	926,369	— — —	473,077	

France . . . . . ?	12,000	
	50,000	manual and non-manual employees
	125	million francs wages

— — — "a manifestation of the process of concentration which is seen in trade as well as in manufacturing industry" (p. 286).

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 286ff.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid.—*Ed.*

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N.B. *The Edinburgh Review*
1915, October:
"The Workshops and the War."
[A very interesting article on the attitude of the working class to the war and its economic effects (improved position of the workers, less unemployment, etc.).]
The Atlantic Monthly, 1916, apparently June. *White*, "The Different World After the War".

N.B. *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 37th year. Marx on *statistics of bond issues* in Germany and abroad.
? Albin **Geyer**, *Jahrbuch der Weltgeschichte*. 1913—14th year. Leipzig, 1914. (Karl Prochaska's *Illustrierte Jahrbücher*.)
[Supposed to be terse surveys of the year, rather than a collection of documents or handbook.]
[*Ch. K.*] *Hobson*, *The Export of Capital*, London, 1914.
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Schilder.
Levy, Monopolies and Trusts.
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Vogelstein, Capitalist Forms of Organisation.

SCHILDER, VOLUME 5 OF *WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV*

Sigmund *Schilder*. "World-Economic Background of the World War". *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*. Vol. 5 (I) (pp. 1-22).

A very good outline (Germanophile, of course).

The transition of other countries to protectionism caused *Britain* in the 19th-20th century to pass to plans for war.

Austria. Her Balkan aspirations.

Interesting to note: in *Serbia* (at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1908-09 there were voices *in favour of* war with Austria-Hungary on the following grounds. If we win, we shall take the Serbs away from Austria-Hungary. If we are defeated, *Serbia will be included in the customs frontier* of Austria-Hungary. *That would suit us too*. We have nothing to lose (p. 11). !! N.B.

For *Russia* > "first and foremost" "the private economic advantage of the military-bureaucratic ruling class" (12). Exception: the drive for the Dardanelles.

In *France* dissatisfaction over the Morocco-Congo agreement of November 4, 1911.

Belgium can retain her Congo only with the help of Britain; the agreement of *February 5, 1895* gave France "first option" to the purchase of the Congo (p. 16). N.B.

Japan aims at *domination* over China.

Turkey prior to 1913 was "an object rather than a subject of world politics" (19).

Portugal is dependent on Britain.

Spain (by the November 27, 1912 treaty with France) obtained a northern portion of Morocco (France was *against*, Britain was *in favour*). Spain has gone a long way in the 16 years, 1898-1914.

NOTES FROM *NASHE SLOVO*

Nashe Slovo No. 11 (February 10, 1915).

N.B. // Zalewski's article "Concerning the National Question". *In favour of* § 9.[4] He quotes from *Iskra* No. *44*: ..."However, our unreserved recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination does not in any way commit us to supporting every demand for national self-determination. As the party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and principal task to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather than that of peoples or nations."*

No. 82 (May 6, 1915). Leading article: "Imperialism and the National Idea".

(against Hervé. "The bare national idea is *reactionary*." The twentieth century = the century of imperialism; the nineteenth century, that of nationalism.)

No. 116 (June 17, 1915) "K. Kautsky on Plekhanov"
and No. 117 (June 18, 1915) (from a Bulgarian magazine)
and No. 118 (June 19), No. 130 (July 3, 1915) "The Nation and the Economy" by N. Trotsky+No. 135 (July 9).

No. 170 August 21, 1915 L. Martov against *Sotsial-*
and 171 August 22, 1915 *-Demokrat* (on defeat).
172 (August 24, 1915)

No. 192 (September 16, 1915) Martynov on "*The United States of Europe*".

No. 209 (October 8, 1915) N. Trotsky on Zimmerwald.

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* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 452.—*Ed.*

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? *Emil Brezigar*, *Harbingers of Economic Crisis in Germany*, Berlin, 1913 (1.80 marks).
Prognosis of the 1913-14 crisis.

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N.B.: *O. Schwarz, Financial Systems of the Great Powers*. (Series of Göschen publications.) Two vols. Leipzig, 1909.
N.B. | [Interesting tables on the development from the seventies to 1900. N.B.]
Principles of Social Economics, Tübingen, 1914 et seq.

TOTAL CAPITAL IN JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES

What amounts do "they" control?

Bank-Archiv, XIIIth year. June 15, 1914.
"German joint-stock company reports, 1907-8—1911-12"....

1911-12 ...	Number of joint-stock companies	4,712		
	their share capital	14,880	mill.	marks
	actual reserves	3,515	"	"
	income	1,470	"	"
	Number of companies paying dividends	3,481		
	Total dividend	1,220	mill.	marks=8.39%
	Growth of capital: from *1907 to 1912* (5 years)			
		=+2,766	mill.	marks nominal
		+3,346	"	" at market value
!! |||	above nominal	+ 579	"	" (!!)

KESTNER, *COMPULSORY ORGANISATION*

Dr. Fritz *Kestner*, *Compulsory Organisation. A Study of the Struggle between Cartels and Outsiders*, Berlin, 1912.

A systematic study of conflicts between cartels and "outsiders" and within cartels—and methods of "struggle":

1) Stopping supply of raw materials....
2) Stopping supply of labour by means of alliances....
3) Stopping deliveries....
4) Closing trade outlets....
5) Binding purchasers by exclusive agreements.
6) Systematic price cutting.
7) Stopping credit....
8) Boycott.*

[From *Inquiry into Cartels* (5 vols. 1903-06) and others.]

A host of examples. Very detailed examination of the state and legal significance....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 206.—*Ed.*

"The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the Rhine-Westphalian coal output ... in 1910—95.4 per cent (p. 11)....* The United States Steel Trust in 1911—45 per cent of the output of pig-iron".... (Other examples: 98 per cent—85 per cent, and so on.)

The entry of a particular enterprise into a cartel is a business act decided by considerations of profit. Like the operation of cartels in general, its implications are felt mainly in periods of depression. Conflicts between cartels and outsiders arise chiefly because of the differing impact restriction of trade outlets, the inevitable result of the cartel activity, has on individual enterprises. Restriction of trade outlets has a particularly severe impact on enterprises capable of expansion, which is why their resistance is the strongest" (pp. 25-26)....

..."The difference between the two concepts" (cartel and trust) "is really one of ownership: various owners in the cartel, only one in the trust" (p. 53 and a reference to Liefmann).

"It has been repeatedly established—and this can be regarded as a general phenomenon—that the profitability resulting from cartelisation attracts new entrepreneurs and new capital into the industry" (57). For example, the Potassium Syndicate raised prices. Result:

in	1879	there	were	4	enterprises
"	1898	"	"	13	"
"	1909	"	"	52	(p. 57)

Provisions concerning *higher* prices for outsiders sometimes take the form of *lower* discounts for them (p. 73)....

The Buchhändler Börsenverein—forbade the sale of books "to dealers selling at bargain prices" (84).

"Stopping the supply of materials, along with binding purchasers by means of exclusive agreements, which will be dealt with below, must be regarded as one of the most important means of compelling entry into the cartel" (91)....

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* Ibid., p 203.—*Ed.*

...Export subsidies... (107).

"dependent traders' organisations are set up" (109)...
(coal—paraffin....)

Price cutting.... There were cases of benzine prices being reduced from 40 to 20-22 marks (118)—of alcohol in Upper Silesia to 49.5 marks (in Breslau the price is 62.2 marks).... Credit refusal: Phoenix declined to join the Federation of Steel Plants. The director of the firm was against joining. The banks bought up its shares—withdrew its export subsidies—and secured a vote in favour of joining at a meeting of shareholders!! (pp. 124-25).

Agreements with members *within* the cartel ... (penalties; arbitration courts instead of general courts)....

The best means of control—"joint sales office" (153)....

"Jeidels (p. 87 of his book) is undoubtedly right that the foundation of a new big independent bank in Germany would be impossible" (p. 168).

"Even in the purely economic sphere a certain change is taking place from commercial activity in the old sense of the word towards organisational-speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to the merchant whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to estimate the needs of the buyer, and who is able to discover and, so to speak, 'awaken' a latent demand; it goes to the speculative genius who knows how to estimate, or even only to sense in advance, the organisational development and the possibilities of certain connections between individual enterprises and the banks..." (p. 241).*

"The heads of the big firms are able at any time to enlist the services of the most learned and skilful lawyers, and if they themselves are not highly versed in commercial matters, they can enlist the aid of outstanding businessmen. It is common knowledge that the central offices of big enterprises employ a whole number of persons who have no relation to the undertaking as such, including even a doctor of political economy for economic propaganda on behalf of the firm" (p. 242).

!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 206.—*Ed.*

The formation of cartels—and this has been established in the case of those formed so far—leads to an alteration of prices, and also incomes, *in favour of* heavy or *raw-materials industry* and to the detriment of manufacturing industry. The prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation of cartels has hitherto been observed only in respect of the most important means of production, particularly coal, iron and potassium, but never in respect of manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting from this raising of prices has been limited only to the industries which produce means of production. To this observation we must add that the industries which process raw materials (and not semi-manufactures) not only secure advantages from the cartel formation in the shape of high profits, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but have also secured a dominating position over the latter, which did not exist under free competition" (p. 204).* N.B.

Cartels, says Kestner, do not always lead to concentration (they may "rescue" small establishments joining the cartel), but the cartel always leads to "intensification of capital" (274) ... to an enhanced role of rich, big-capital enterprises (272 and 274).

Regarding the importance of cartels one should not overlook, Kestner says, the difference between an organisation, say, of consumers (this is socialism, p. 282), and an organisation of manufacturing or raw-materials industries.

"The present situation, the dependence of a much bigger section of industry on the output of raw materials, has a certain superficial resemblance to it [to a union of consumers, etc.]** but internally it is the exact opposite" (p. 282). ((Liefmann, he says, constantly overlooks this difference—*note, p. 282.*))

"It is a matter of dispute whether cartels have led to an improvement of the workers' position, as is asserted by some and contested by others, and whether they embody a co-operative democratic principle" ((Tschierschky!! The

* Ibid., p. 207.—*Ed.*

** Interpolations In square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

author rejects that view: note, p. 285)), "or whether they indicate, precisely in the case of Germany, an anti-democratic attitude, owing to the shift to heavy industry which is hostile to the trade unions" (285)....

VIENNA *ARBEITER-ZEITUNG* ON VIENNESE BANKS

Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 1916 (April 11, 1916), No. 101.

Figures on banks (eight big banks: Kreditanstalt; Unionbank; Verkehrsbank; Eskomptegesellschaft; Bankverein; Bodenkreditanstalt; Merkur + Allgemeine Depositenbank).

Capital—	657.4	mill. kronen
Reserves—	383.2	" "
	1,040.6	
Borrowed money	4,833.8	
Net profit	81.4	" "
Increase of deposits compared with 1914	1,067.9	

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LVII-LIX (*1915*).

Return to it

(Consists of separate booklets + bibliography, etc. Vol. LIX (1915. *May*): *The American Industrial Opportunity*. A collection of articles.)

Total wages in the *U. S. A.*[5]
1/10—$1,000 and > (p. 115)
2/10—$750-1,000
7/10—< $750

Includes an article by *William S. Kies*, "Branch Banks and Our Foreign Trade" (p. 301).

"Forty English banks operating in foreign countries have 1,325 branches; in South America five German banks have forty branches and five English banks have seventy branches.... England and Germany have put into Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, in the last twenty-five years, approximately 4,000 million dollars, and as a result enjoy together 46 per cent of the total trade of these three countries."*

((and further on New York's aspirations and attempts to replace them....))

A special examination of the "opportunity" for the U.S.A. to take advantage of the war to increase its trade, etc. with *South America*.	N.B.

p. 331 (in another article)...." Sir George Paish in the last annual of *The Statist* estimated that upwards of 40,000 million dollars of the capital had been supplied to the less developed countries by the five lending nations of the world, Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium and Holland"....**

200,000 million francs. *40,000 million dollars* = 160,000 million marks

cf. p. 2 here***

In another article on South American Markets": "Another fundamental proposition—and the most important of all in increasing trade with South America—is the investment of capital from the United States in loans and in construction and similar enterprises. The country whose capital is invested in a South American country is going to get the most of the contracts for materials used in construction enterprises, railway building, and the likes, as well as the contracts for public improvements carried on by the governments.

N.B.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 245.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 245.—*Ed.*
*** See pp. 66-67 or this volume.—*Ed.*

England's investments in Argentine railways, banks and loans are the living evidence of this fact" (314)....

110 corporations own capital = 7,300 million dollars, number of shareholders = 626,984.

Figures for *1910* given, inter alia, in "Stocks and Stock Market". Total American stocks = 34,500 million dollars (but without overlapping approximately) = 24,400 million dollars, and total wealth = 107,100 million dollars.

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* See p. 70 of this volume.—*Ed.*

STILLICH, *MONEY AND BANKING*

Dr. **Oskar Stillich**, *Money and Banking*, Berlin, 1907.

A **super**-popular piece.

a Proudhonist fool and banker against money

p. 95. Banker *Julius Hucke*, *The Money Problem and the Social Question* (5th edition), 1903.

p. 143: "No banking operation brings in such high profit as the issue of securities."* Profits from the issue of securities are higher than anywhere else.... There have been attempts to justify profits from the issue of industrial shares by pleading expenses and anticipated higher returns, but in reality this is economically unearned profit, and according to the *Deutsche Oekonomist* it amounts, on an average:

N.B.

1895—38.6%
1896—36.1%
1897—66.7%
1898—67.7%
1899—66.9%
1900—55.2%

N.B. idem more fully in Sombart, *The German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century* (*2nd edition*, 1909), p. *526*, appendix 8

N.B. "In the ten years, from 1891 to 1900, more than a thousand million marks were 'earned' by issuing German industrial stock."**

N.B. p. 138. "*Reconstructions*".... Shares are amalgamated and their nominal value decreased. A classic example of such writing down of share capital is the Dortmund Union founded by the Discontogesellschaft. In the first volume of my *Economic Studies in Big Industrial Enterprise* (Leipzig, 1904), I examined in detail the financial history of the unfortunate offspring of this bank. In

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 234.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 234.—*Ed.*

the course of thirty years, more than 73,000,000 marks were written off the books of the Union by a series of operations decreasing the nominal value of shares. At the present time the original shareholders of the company possess only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares"!! (138).*

good example !!!

!!!

Current Accounts—a means of exerting influence on industry.

"How great the banks' influence over their clients is shown, for example, by the following letter, reproduced from the *Kuxenzeitung*, sent on November 19, 1901 by the *Dresdner Bank* to the Board of the German North-West Cement Syndicate. The letter states: "As we learn from the notice you published in the newspaper *Reichsanzeiger* of November 18, we must reckon with the possibility that the next general meeting of your syndicate, to be held on the 30th of this month, may decide on measures which are likely to effect changes in your enterprise which are unacceptable to us. We deeply regret that, for these reasons, we are obliged henceforth to withdraw the credit which has hitherto been allowed you. Accordingly, we ask you to cease requests for money from our bank and at the same time we respectfully ask you to return not later than the end of the-current month the sums owing to us. But if the said next general meeting does not decide upon measures which are unacceptable to us, and if we receive suitable guarantees on this matter for the future, we shall be quite willing to open negotiations with you on the grant of a new credit"** (146-47).

good example!!

!!

!!!

* Ibid., p. 235.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 223-24.—*Ed.*

good example !!! !! ...“The daily occupation of a number of employees in our big banks consists solely of calculating the interest on current accounts. In the course of time they achieve real virtuosity in this matter.... They are an example of how capital suppresses personality and turns the individual into a machine” (148)....

N.B. “‘*Every bank is a Stock Exchange*’, and the bigger the bank, and the more successful the concentration of banking, the truer does this modern aphorism ring” (169).*

ha-ha!! (cf. K. Kautsky) “Through their subsidiary banks the *Pereires*” (founders of Crédit Mobilier) “wanted to entangle various nations financially and in this way promote world peace” (180)....

“Spheres of operation” “for bank capital”

in the seventies—German *railways* (nationalised at the close of the seventies)

in the eighties—Rhine-Westphalian *heavy* industry

in the nineties—*electrical* industry (and engineering).

attitude to employees “In 1906 the four Berlin “D” banks (Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Darmstädter Bank) concluded an agreement not to engage an employee of any of these banks who had not been freed from his post!” (203). The opposition of the employees compelled a “substantial” (??) “modification” (??) of this agreement ((in what respect? how????)).

End

N.B.: *H. Withers*, *Money and Credit in England*, 1911.
Philippovich
Sombart
Principles of Social Economics (Bücher, Schulze-Gaevernitz, etc., etc.).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 218.—*Ed.*

LIEFMANN, *CARTELS AND TRUSTS*

Professor Dr. R. Liefmann, *Cartels and Trusts and the Further Development of Economic Organisation*, 2nd edition, Stuttgart, 1910. Library of Jurisprudence and Political Science.

> A popular book giving a good outline of the subject matter. The standpoint is that of a dull-witted, smug, complacent bourgeois apologist.

The facts are not badly selected but, of course, apologetically.

N.B.: p. *161*:

"In Germany there have been a very large number of mergers that are not (???) of a monopolistic nature.... A typical example—not to cite numerous instances from a more remote period—is the gunpowder industry. Already in the seventies, 19 gunpowder factories merged in a single joint-stock company. In 1890, this merged with its most powerful rival to form the Vereinigte Köln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken. This big joint-stock company then formed cartels not only with other gunpowder factories, but also with the dynamite trust mentioned above. Thus there was formed quite a modern amalgamation of all the German explosives factories, which, together with the similarly organised French and American explosives factories, have divided the whole world among themselves, so to speak" (p. 161).*

division of the world

The number of industrial cartels in Germany (1905) was *385* (in reality more: p. 25).**

N.B. |||| **Riesser** (p. *137*), in quoting these statistics, adds: "*about 12,000* firms participated 'directly'

* Ibid., p. 252.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 202.—*Ed.*

in these cartels". *Riesser*, *The German Big Banks and Their Concentration*, 3rd edition, Jena, 1910.

The number of international cartels (with German participation) is *about 100* (p. 30: in 1897 it was about 40).*

Potassium Industry

First cartel	1879: 4 firms
Prices rise	1898: 10 firms
"Potassium fever":	1901—*21* firms
	1909—*52*

("Some collapsed")

The Steel Trust in America (1908: 165,211 workers) 1907—210,180 workers (total wages—$161 million), net profit—$170 million, capital—$1,100 million (p. 124).

In 1908, the biggest firm in the German mining industry, Gelsenkirchner Bergwerksgesellschaft, had 1,705 employees + 44,343 workers (wages—70.5 million marks).

(p. 135). In 1902 (June 17, 1902) *Schwab* founded the *Shipbuilding Company*, capital $70.9 million—of which Schwab had $20 million. Later this company *went bankrupt*; the public were robbed!

(173, etc.) "Interlocking", "holdings" (passim), "abolishing isolation" (p. 155)—these are Liefmann's "*catchwords*" for avoiding (and obscuring) Marx's concept of "socialisation".[6]

((End of extracts from Liefmann))

FROM *PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS*

Principles of Social Economics, *by S. Altmann ... K. Bücher and many others.*

Section V, Part II: "*Banking*" (Schulze-Gaevernitz and Jaffé), Tübingen, 1915.

I. Schulze-Gaevernitz, "The German Credit Bank" (1-190).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 252.—*Ed.*

II. Edgar *Jaffé*, "Anglo-American and French Banking" (191-231).
(More like a textbook, by paragraphs, apparently mostly chatter and "systematics".)

> There is also *interesting material*. The spirit of "*imperialism*" *throughout*.

p. 53: in 1914 eight Berlin big banks owned

share capital—	1,245	mill. marks
including Deutsche Bank	250	
Discontogesellschaft	300	
Dresdner Bank	200	
reserves	432	
	1,677	
borrowed money.	5,328	
("total capital")	7,005	

p. 140: Specialisation: "Money and Credit Operations".

	1882	1907
Establishments	5,879	13,971
Persons employed	21,633	66,275
(of whom women)	244	3,089
in 1907 there were 3 establishments with	>*1,000*	employees
Deutsche Bank in 1912 had	*6,137*	"
Dresdner Bank " 1912 "	*4,638*	"

cf. p. 11: there were 14,000 banking houses in Germany in 1907, of which 4,000 were auxiliary establishments....

p. 145: ..."The big banks have become the most important means for the *economic* unification of the German Reich....

"Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of Ministers of State" (145-46).*

"a dozen persons"

* Ibid., p. 303.—*Ed*.

ha-ha!!

"If, however, this is so, then the national welfare requires the development of a new spiritual type of bank magnate whose abstract [ha-ha!] urge for profit is permeated by national-political and therefore *national*-economic considerations....

Saint-Simon

"If we imagine the development of those tendencies we have noted carried to their logical conclusions we will have: the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined into cartels; the investment capital of the nation cast in the shape of securities. Then the forecast of that genius *Saint-Simon* will be fulfilled: 'The present anarchy of production, which corresponds to the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation, must make way for organisation in production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated manufacturers, independent of each other and ignorant of man's economic needs; that will be done by a certain public institution. A central committee of management, being able to survey the large field of social economy from a more elevated point of view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will put the means of production into suitable hands, and above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist which have assumed as part of their functions a certain organisation of economic labour, the *banks*.' We are still a long way from the fulfilment of Saint-Simon's forecast, but we are on the way towards it: Marxism, different from what Marx imagined, but different only in form!" (146)*

what Marxism!!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 303-304.—*Ed.*

"Of course, investments like those made by Britain, e.g., in the Suez Canal, on the basis of her political power—the shares were bought in 1876 for £*4* million and today are worth £*30* million—are still unattainable for Germany" ... (159-60).

good example! (envy) *4* and *30*

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p. 164 quotes *J. Lewin*, *German Capital in Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1914.

"The economic function of the banks is the already much discussed *management of the national property* [a reference to Lansburgh's article in the magazine *Die Bank*, 1908]. Today, the greater the development of credit operations, the greater becomes the share of the total capital going to entrepreneurs chosen by the bank. The banks now provide the channels through which flow not only annual savings but also previously accumulated (and continually renewed) capital. One recalls, above all, the enormous growth of 'borrowed money'. In our joint-stock banks in Germany these deposits amounted to about 1,280 million marks at the end of 1891; to about 6,305 million marks at the end of 1906; at the present time they are estimated at approximately *10,000* million marks.

"At the end of 1913, deposits of the nine big Berlin banks alone were about 5,100 million marks.* At the same time, however, the banks act as channels for still larger movements of capital in dealings in stock. In this matter, even if there is good will, they may *make mistakes*; they may direct thousands of millions into the wrong channel and,

N.B.

N.B.

10,000 million

5,000 million

* Ibid., p. 211.—*Ed.*

N.B. under certain circumstances, lose. At the present time a few big banks can to a certain extent determine the course of our economic development. Hence their economic responsibility to the shareholders becomes a national economic responsibility in relation to the state as a whole. They do, in fact, direct capital into industrial and commercial channels, primarily into the giant enterprises of heavy industry, and also into real estate—formerly into the estates of the nobility but nowadays into the leasehold houses of the big cities. Hence the rapid progress of the German iron industry, which is second only to America, and of the German big cities, which are overtaking even their American prototypes" (p. 12)....

N.B.

N.B. p. 27: "Borrowed money (of creditors and depositors) at the end of 1908: *8*,250 million marks in credit banks, *15,000* million marks in savings banks, *3,000* million marks in credit associations. Σ = 26,250 million marks.

N.B. "'Private banking houses' are increasing in number (1892: 2,180; 1902: 2,564; 1912: estimated at about 3,500) and decreasing in importance" (p. 16).

Everywhere (passim), throughout, Schulze-Gaevernitz's tone is that of triumphant German imperialism, of a triumphant swine!!!!

Characteristic of a crisis!! p. 35: 1870—31 banks with a capital of 376 million marks
1872—139 " " " " " 1,112 " "
(1873)—73 banks, the rest with a capital of 432 mill. marks liquidated by the crisis

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State Bank endorsement and clearing operations (*thousand million* marks)

1891	1901	1913
98.7	196.6	452.8
including turnover of cash payments		
24.3 (=24.7%)	29.7 (=15.1%)	43.4 (=9.6%)

N.B.

...“In 1909, the Bank of France discounted 7,500,000 bills below 100 francs, whereas the German State Bank discounted only 700,000 bills below 100 marks” (p. 54).

“Democratisation” of banking!![7] Compare the one-pound shares in Great Britain and the minimum of 1,000 marks in Germany (p. 111).* The average size of a bill of exchange in Germany = *2,066* marks (State Bank); in France it is *683* francs (Banque de France).

“G. von Siemens declared in the Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that the one-pound share was the basis of British imperialism” (p. 110).**

N.B.

“The British industrial state is based less on credit than the German, and more on its own capital” (55).

“Even today, Great Britain, as the international intermediary for payments, is said to earn about 80 million marks annually as commission on acceptances. It is said that *6,000 million* marks are paid annually through Great Britain for the overseas trade of Europe” (83).

p. 100: § entitled “The Banks’ Domination over the Stock Exchanges?”—This is said to be an exaggeration but “their [the banks’] influence is far-reaching”....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 228.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*

completely organised"[8]

"While formerly, in the seventies, the Stock Exchange, flushed with the exuberance of youth, opened the era of the industrialisation of Germany, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by shares, nowadays the banks and industry are able to 'manage it alone'. The domination of our big banks over the Stock Exchange, which is bound up with contango business—but not only with this—is nothing else than the expression of the completely organised German industrial state. If the domain of automatically functioning economic laws is thus restricted, and if the domain of conscious regulation by the banks is considerably enlarged, the *national* economic responsibility of the few directing individuals is immensely increased" (101).*

N.B.

(Quoted) *A. Löwenstein*, "History of the Württemberg Credit Bank System and Its Relation to Big Industry" ... *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*. Supplementary issue No. 5. Tübingen, *1912*.

Issues (p. 104):

	Internal securities			
	1909	1910	1911	
Germany with colonies	3.2	2.5	2.2	7.9:3=2.6
Britain with colonies	1.9	3.1	1.8	6.8:3=2.3
France with colonies	1.4	0.7	0.6	2.7:3=0.9

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 218.—*Ed.*

	Foreign securities 1909	1910	1911	My calculation Σ:3 =	ΣΣ
Germany with colonies . .	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.3 : 3 = 0.4	3,000 *million* marks
Britain with colonies . .	1.8	2.3	2.0	6.1 : 3 = 2.0	4,300 *million* marks
France with colonies . .	2.0	3.8	3.1	8.9 : 3 = 2.9	3,800 *million* marks

Issues in Germany (at market value)

000 million marks

	Social credit (state and mu-) municipal loans	Land credit (mortgages)	Industrial and trade credit	Internal securities Total	Foreign securities Total
[1886-1890]	1.8	1.2	1.3	4.3	2.3
[1891-1895]	1.8	2.2	0.8	4.8	1.5
[1896-1900]	1.7	1.9	4.3	8.2	2.4
[1901-1905]	3.3	2.3	2.6	8.3	2.1
[1906-1910]	6.0	2.6	4.8	12.6	1.5

The author concludes:

"The statistics of issues very clearly reveal the state-socialist and industrial colouring of the German national economy" (104).

Germany's "Prussian railway system", the author says, is "the greatest economic undertaking in the world" (104)....

Joint-Stock Companies in Prussia in 1911

(million marks)

	Invested capital			Annual profit				
	No. of companies	Nominal value	Market value	% (market)	Million marks	% of nominal value	% of market value	
177.9%	890	8,821	15,696	177.9	952	10.8%	6.1%	15,700 -8,800 6,900 mill.

N.B.

....“Advocates of the small share emphasise that it enables workers to participate in industry, interlocking the interests of the worker and the employer in a way that is socially and economically desirable. It is profit-sharing in a modern form” (pp. 110-11)—(in connection with one-pound shares).

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phrase-mongering and lies!!

!!

In the § on “speculation in securities” (p. 111 et seq.), instead of *exposing* speculation by the banks ((cf. the magazine *Die Bank*, Eschwege and others)), the scoundrel Schulze-Gaevernitz gets out of it by phrases: If our banks were speculative companies ... it would mean ... the collapse of the German national economy” (112) ... ((“if”)) ... saves the “propriety” of our “business world”, and our bank officials are forbidden to speculate in *alien* banks (of course, he says, this can be easily circumvented!! in large cities) ... but what about *bank directors*? For they are “in the know” (“Wissenden”)!! Here, he says, legislation is of no avail, what is needed is “strengthening of the commercial sense of honour and standing” (113)....

9 banks 83% of the total!!

“At the end of 1909, the nine big Berlin banks, together with their affiliated banks, controlled 11,300,000,000 marks, that is, about **83** per cent of total German bank capital. The Deutsche Bank, which together with its affiliated banks controls nearly *3,000,000,000* marks, represents, parallel to the Prussian State Railway Administration, the biggest and also the most decentralised accumulation of capital in the Old World” (137)....*

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 211.—*Ed.*

Agreements between banks: the Darmstädter Bank wanted to conclude an agreement with the city of Berlin on "revenue-use" of the Tempelhof area, at a 10 per cent profit. Later, when the Deutsche Bank made this deal—the Darmstädter Bank was found to be in its consortium!! (p. 139).... "Bank consortiums of this kind tend to make price agreements"....	towards a bank cartel
"Nevertheless, the 'general agreements' concluded in the summer of 1913 go so far that, after their implementation, there can hardly be any further talk of free competition in banking" ... (139) ...	(1913)

"The Discontogesellschaft, for example, employs a permanent staff of 25 to check accounts and the formal aspect of operations" (143).	25 persons control....
"Army service in Prussia and Germany, with the mass training it provides in disciplined work, performs important preparatory work for big firms, especially the banks. If it were not indispensable already on political grounds, it would have had to be introduced as a preparatory school for big capitalist firms and for raising the intensity of economic activity" (144-45)....	banks and the army!!

"Thirty years ago, businessmen, freely competing against one another, performed nine-tenths of the work connected with their business other than manual labour. At the present time, nine-tenths of this 'brain work' is performed by *employees*. Banking is in the forefront of this evolution (151).* In the gigantic firms, the official is everything, even the director is a 'servant' of the institution"....	N.B. N.B. N.B.

* Ibid., p. 219.—*Ed.*

...“The *Frankfurter Zeitung* (May 2, 1914) greeted the fusion of the Discontogesellschaft with the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein with the following words:

“‘The concentration movement of the banks is narrowing the circle of establishments from which it is possible to obtain credits, and is consequently increasing the dependence of big industry upon a small number of banking groups. In view of the close connection between industry and the financial world, the freedom of movement of industrial companies which need banking capital is restricted. For this reason, big industry is watching the growing trustification of the banks with mixed feelings. Indeed, we have repeatedly seen the beginnings of certain agreements between the individual big banking concerns, which aim at restricting competition’” (p. 155).*

N.B.

154-55: The question is: who is more dependent on whom, the banks on industry or vice versa?...

Wiewiorowski, *The Effect of the Concentration of German Banks on Crisis Phenomena* (Freiburg Thesis), Berlin, 1911.

N.B.

Völker, *Forms of Combination and Interest Sharing in German Big Industry*, Leipzig, 1909 ((*Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, Vol. 33, No. 4)).

Chapter X. “Foreign Investments.”

“For our banks to be able to channel the inflow of capital into foreign investments requires definite prerequisites of a private economic nature on the part of their clients. The chief stimulus is the need for a higher rate of profit than that from investment at home,

N.B.

N.B.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 220.—*Ed.*

where capital wealth is increasing and the rate of interest falling.... N.B.

"...The banks therefore aim primarily at stock issues, which usually yield higher profits in foreign countries poor in capital and rich in raw materials" (158).... N.B.

N.B. [cf. above, p. *44* quotation: from pp. 159-60*] N.B.

"According to statistical data, foreign capital investments are estimated at *7 0*,000 million marks for Britain, 35,000 million for France (1910), but hardly *20*,000 million for Germany in 1913" (160). 70 35 20

Quoting facts confirming "export stipulations" and the benefit accruing to industry from foreign investments, Schulze-Gaevernitz says, incidentally, that France also benefits from this:

"The French rentier state is thus experiencing a second industrial flowering"—the floating of the Turkish loan in **1910** was made conditional on Turkey not giving to *any* country *more* orders than to France... (p. 163). characteristic!!!

"Germany today is a typical 'entrepreneur operating abroad', whereas France, and gradually also Britain, are becoming ossified as rentiers.... Though the world of today has an Anglo-Saxon countenance, our banks, by means of railways, mines, plantations, canals, irrigation works, etc., are working to give this countenance traits of the German spirit" (164).... N.B.

(N.B.: p. 1, note. "Written **before** the war.")

In Chapter X.

C. "Political appraisal of foreign investments." N.B.

"The export of capital is a means for achieving the foreign policy aims and, at the same time, its success depends on foreign policy

* See p. 59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"a) *The creditor states*: *France*, *Great Britain*, *Germany*. Great Britain and France, the two big creditor powers of the world, are *political* bankers. The state and the banking community act as *one and the same* person. Such is the French Government and the Crédit Lyonnais. Such is the friendship of Edward VII and Sir E. Cassel. Hoping to win the main prize in the political lottery, France staked thousands of millions of francs, on the Russian card *alone*. Russia, by obtaining money from France, was even able to act as a political loan giver in the Far East—in China and in Persia. France, as a loan giver, had a hold over Spain and Italy, and as her clients they helped her in Algeciras. France was prepared to extend to the Kossuth ministry loans she refused to Count Kuehn: 'the earnest-money would have been the Triple Alliance'. As a political creditor, Great Britain cemented afresh the British world empire, without fear of pressure on the current value of her Consols. The guaranteed safety afforded colonial state loans in the metropolis enabled, for example, such a half-opened-up new country as Natal to enjoy cheaper credit than long-consolidated, highly respectable Prussia with her gigantic property in railways and state lands. This credit nexus is a 'bond of interests', stronger, perhaps, than Chamberlain's preferential tariffs would ever have been. Going beyond the imperial connections, the British creditor keeps Japan in political vassalage, Argentina in colonial dependence, and Portugal in unconcealed debt bondage. The governors of Portuguese Africa, for all their gold braid, are British puppets" (165)....

..."The total [of German capital in Russia] is estimated at 3,000,000,000. The preference shown by our banks for this greatest of all

the debtors in world history is understandable if one bears in mind the high bank profits from Russian securities" (166). N.B.

"There can be no doubt, that, in their efforts for political and economic independence, the semi-civilised countries not yet allotted as colonies cannot receive from any European power such unselfish support as from Germany. China, Persia and Turkey know that Germany has no territorial claims" (167). gem!!! gem!!

..."Conditions within a country that are inimical to freedom are an obstacle also to world political thought penetrating deeply into the soul of a people. How far we are from the slogan 'imperium *et* libertas', to which the Anglo-Saxons, from Cromwell to Rhodes, owe their greatest successes!" (168) {imperialism and democracy[9]} gem! (and N.B.)

the bribing of *wide* sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the upper strata of the proletariat is more subtle, more cunning

"The German banks abroad everywhere encountered the competition of the long-established British 'foreign banks', which even today far surpass them in volume of business and size of share capital" (173)....

..."All the more soberly, therefore, must we regard the fact that we have arrived late on the scene. The activity of the German foreign banks can be likened to the highly promising steps of an eager youth from whom the greater part of the world has been barred by its fortunate possessor. Hardly a *single* German banking establishment is to be found in the British Empire, to say nothing of the French and Russian empires, and yet it is claimed that the Britisher rules the world in the interests of *all*. The future of German foreign gem!

N.B. banking depends largely on solving a *political problem*: keeping of an open door to the still uncolonised countries, rebirth of the Moslem world, creation of a German colonial empire in Africa"... (174).

The second part of the book, the work of *Jaffé*, is a dry-as-dust survey of Anglo-American and French banking. Nil.

Section VI of *Principles of Social Economics*. "*Industry, Mining, Building*." Tübingen, 914.
Many source references (cf. **p. 37***).
For statistical data on big industry see ruled notebook.**

Copy from the **book**: pp. *34* and *143*, industry in 1882 and 1907

From the article by *M. R. Weyermann*: "Modern Industrial Technique."
N.B. quotes **K. Rathenau**'s book, *The Effect of Increased Capital and Output on Production Costs in German Engineering Industry*, 1906.

(pumps)

	Pump models		
Approximately 50%	*A*	*B*	*C*
output increase	197	880	1,593 marks
	162	738	1,345

Typewriters (p. 157)

Number produced	100	Price=	200 marks
" "	500	"	160
" "	1,000	"	140
" "	2,000	"	125

* See pp. 50-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** This refers to Notebook "μ". See pp. 464-65 or this volume.—*Ed.*

Issues of German industrial shares {according to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Dictionary of Political Science*} (("New Issues"))

1903—195,300,000	Beginning of boom	boom versus crisis
1904—267,600,000	" " "	
1905—492,500,000	Boom	
1906—624,300,000	Boom peak	
1907—240,200,000	Crisis	
1908—326,700,000	(Beginning of revival)	

According to *Behr*'s data, consumption of footwear in the United States was (p. 175):

1880—2.5 pairs per inhabitant	N.B.
1905—3.12 " " "	

From *Th. Vogelstein*'s article "Financial Organisation of Capitalist Industry and Formation of Monopolies".

"Ten years after May 9, 1873, when, in *Schönlank*'s exaggerated expression, the bells tolled the death of the economic boom and the birth of cartels, Fr. Kleinwächter published his book on cartels" (216). N.B.

From the history of cartels:

"Isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period preceding 1860; in these could be discerned the embryo of the forms that are so common today; but all this undoubtedly represents the prehistory of cartels. The real beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the sixties. The first important period of development of monopoly commenced with the international industrial depression of the seventies and lasted until the beginning of the nineties" (222). N.B.

"If we examine the question on a European scale, we will find that the development of free competition reached its apex in the sixties N.B.

and seventies. It was then that Britain completed the construction of her old-style capitalist organisation. In Germany, this organisation entered into a fierce struggle with handicraft and domestic industry, and began to create for itself its own forms of existence" (ibidem).

"The great revolution commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather, the depression which followed it and which—with hardly discernible interruptions in the early eighties, and an unusually violent but short-lived boom about 1889—occupies twenty-two years of European economic history" (222)....

..."During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was widely resorted to in order to take advantage of favourable business conditions. An ill-considered policy sent prices soaring more rapidly and steeply than would have been the case if there had been no cartels, and nearly all these cartels ended ingloriously in the 'grave of bankruptcy'. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit reigned in industry. The depression was no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted; it was regarded merely as a pause before another boom.

second epoch of cartels

"The cartel movement entered its second epoch: from a transitory phenomenon, the cartels became one of the foundations of economic life. They were winning one industry after another, primarily, the industries processing raw materials. By the early nineties the cartel system had already acquired—in the organisation of the coke syndicate, on the model of which the coal syndicate was later formed—a cartel technique which has hardly been improved on. For the first time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03 occurred entirely—in the mining and iron industries at least—within a cartel economy. And while at that time it appeared to be something novel, now the general public takes it for granted that large spheres of economic life have been, as a general

N.B.

rule, removed from the realm of free competition" (224)....*

Forms of cartels:

a) Cartels fixing sales conditions (terms, time limits, payment, etc....)
b) Cartels fixing the sales areas
c) Cartels fixing output quotas
d) Cartels fixing prices
e) Cartels fixing distribution of profit

Syndicate—single sales office (Verkaufsstelle)
Trust—*ownership* of all enterprises

sole and absolute power

Consult *Kondt*
Lindenberg
Sayous
Steller
Stillich
Warschauer
Weber

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 200-02.—*Ed.*

NOTEBOOK "β"
("BETA")

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17. Security statistics....

18-30. **Schilder.** Vol. 1 of *Development Trends in the World Economy.*

31-33. **Plenge**, *Marx and Hegel.**
34-36. *Gerhard Hildebrand*, *The Shattering*, *etc.*
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41-62. **E. Agahd**, *Big Banks and the World Market.*
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66. *Hegemann*, French Banks.
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Wallich, Concentration of German Banks.
68-69. *Zollinger* (international balance-sheet) and *Neymarck*.
70-74. *Taylor* (*Shop Management*).
74-75. *Seubert*, *The Taylor System in Practice*.
76-77. *Gilbreth*, *Motion Study*.
78-90. *Jeidels*, *Relation of the Big Banks to Industry*.
91. *Stillich* and *World Economy* (Halle). A note.
92-103. *Die Bank*, examined thoroughly, *except 1908* and 1915.

× N.B. *103* notes
N.B. ((on finance capital in general))

104. *Tschierschky*
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× 0 *turnover*
N.B. on the question of imperialism

Source references: 1. 10. 16. 17. 40. 91. 98 (French).

DIETZEL, SCHUMPETER, VOGELSTEIN

Zurich Cantonal Library.
Dr. **Heinrich Dietzel**, *World Economy and National Economy*, Dresden, 1900. (= *Jahrbuch der Gehe-Stiftung*, Vol. V.)
{{Nothing of interest. Examination revealed merely polemic against autarchy *in favour of* world economy. Nil. ("Nationalisation".)}}

Dr. Joseph Schumpeter, *Theory of Economic Development*, Leipzig, 1912.
((Also *nil*. Deceptive title. Examination revealed something in the nature of "sociological" chatter. Might have to consult again, but on the subject of development nil)).

Theodor Vogelstein, *Organisational Forms of the Iron and Textile Industries in Great Britain and America*, Leipzig, 1910.

This is the *first* volume, in which the historical part, of little interest, and an *enumeration* of facts, predominate.

See brief extracts from Vogelstein in another notebook.*

Franck, *Changes in the Agriculture of Württemberg*. Thesis, 1902.

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? *Johann Huber*, *Workers' Participation in the Capital and Management of British Production Co-operatives*, 1912, Stuttgart. (No. 4 of *Basle Economic Studies*.)

Goetz Briefs, *The Alcohol Cartel*, Karlsruhe, 1912 (No. 7 of *Baden Higher School Economic Studies*),

Kurt Goldschmidt, *Concentration in the German Coal Industry*, Karlsruhe, 1912.

Julius Wolf, *National Economy of the Present and Future*, Leipzig, 1912. Nil.

J. Lewin, *The Present Position of Joint-Stock Banks in Russia* (*1900-10*), Freiburg in Breissgau, 1912. (Thesis.)

K. Dove, *Economic Geography*, Leipzig, 1911.

" " *Economic Geography of the German Colonies*, 1902.

Kurt Schwabe, *In the German Diamond Country*, Berlin, 1910. (South Africa and the German colonial economy.)

Rud. Lenz, *The Copper Market under the Influence of Syndicates and Trusts*, Berlin, 1910.

Léon Barety, *Concentration of French Provincial Banks*, Paris, 1910. (The articles appeared in *Annales des sciences politiques*.) N.B.

Gustav Ruhland, *Selected Articles*, 1910 (published by the Farmers Union. Against plutocracy in Germany!!).

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* See pp. 71-73 of this volume.—*Ed.*

A. G. *Raunig*, *Equilibrium Between Agriculture and Industry*, Vienna, 1910.

Dr. Walter *Kundt*, *The Future of Our Oversees Trade*, Berlin, 1904. Nil. Chatter.

EXTRACTS FROM *DIE BANK*

Die Bank. *A Monthly Journal of Finance and Banking* (Publisher: Alfred *Lansburgh*), 1914, 2nd (half-year), p. 1042.

Imports and exports in million pounds sterling, from data of the Board of Trade (London):

(*7 months 1/I-1/VIII)	(First) *Half-year*					
	Imports			*Exports*		
	1912	1913	1914	1912	1913	1914
Great Britain	296.1	319.7	375.9	225.3	257.1	255.4
Germany	260.6	267.0	269.3	205.4	243.1	249.2
U.S.A.*.	215.3	212.2	237.7	255.6	271.8	245.7
France*.	192.2	196.4	198.6	149.0	156.4	153.8

(Ibidem, p. 713). Note on "*Banks and the Post Office*". The boundary between the banks and the savings banks "is being increasingly obliterated". Hence *complaints* by the banks. The *Erfurt* Chamber of Commerce speaks *in favour of* the banks *against* the "recent intervention of the post office in currency circulation" (in the form of the "issue of postal letters of credit"). The editors remark that postal letters of credit operate only within the German Empire, whereas bank letters of credit serve mainly persons going abroad, and "after all, the public exists not only for the sake of the banks" (714).

banks and the post office

this "not only" is magnificent!!!)

* Figures for the countries marked by an asterisk refer to January-July, the others, January-June.—*Ed*.

From the article "Thoughts on the Thousand Million Loan", p. 932: "A subscriber to the loan possesses liquid assets, but mostly in the form not of cash, but of a bank account or a savings bank, association, etc. deposit. In Germany these institutions control, in round figures, 35,000 million marks of such liquid assets, about half of which are at the immediate disposal of their owners, while the other half are available to them after preliminary notification—mostly after a month" (933).

What is involved is the *transfer* of ownership from private persons' accounts to the state's account (and vice versa in paying suppliers, etc.).

The credit institutions as a whole dispose of "not more than 500 million marks", on the basis of "their total cash and deposits in the State Bank" (933).

In 1871, France paid 5,000 million in such a way that only 742.3 million was paid in gold, silver and banknotes, the remainder (4,248.3 million) being in *bills*. (France recovered so rapidly in 1870–71 because she did not tamper with her currency and made no excessive issue of "uncovered banknotes".)

p. 903 et seq.: "*The Ousting of London as the World's Clearing House*" by *Alfred Lansburgh*.

A very good article, explaining the causes of Britain's power. The chief cause: "the absolute predominance of British trade and currency circulation over the trade of all other countries" (909). It exceeds German trade "by 50 per cent in round figures" (ibidem). In addition, there is the trade with the colonies!!

N.B. || "***Britain accounts for three-quarters of world trade***" (910).

"This means that three-quarters of all international payments pass directly or indirectly through Great Britain" (910).

"Sterling accounts" "predominate" also in *Japan*, China, Chile, Peru, South Persia, "the greater part of Turkey (910).—"Knowledge of English is widespread in commercial circles" (910).

Furthermore, Britain *finances* this trade of the whole world

(the lowest rate of interest; the most stable gold currency; one pound sterling = 7⅓ grams of *gold*, etc., etc.).

Great Britain's "vast" monetary resources, her *60* colonial banks (911), etc., etc.

The maxim of a bank director (the Bank of Brazil), *Kämmerer* (a German):

(913) "The first essential for opening an overseas banking establishment is credit, an accepting banker in London." N.B.!

p. 912, note: "Regarding the difficulties encountered by German overseas banks in introducing bills of exchange in marks in South America, cf. Jaffé, *British Banks*, second edition, 98-101, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 29, 1914; *Hamburger Nachrichten*, September 15, 1914" (I omit other quotations).

"For every country adopting a currency based on gold and holding, as occurs almost everywhere, a large portfolio of British bills of exchange in place of gold, not only subordinates a greater part of its international payments to the London Clearing House, but thereby also immediately assists the consolidation of British world financial power. The continual holding of a large portfolio of British bills of exchange means, in practice, that the country in question puts considerable resources at London's disposal, which for its part London can, and does, use to further finance the foreign trade of other countries and in this way strengthen its own sterling currency and its own clearing function. Thus, owing to the gold value of the pound sterling, Great Britain is always able to put at the service of her credit system, besides her own large capital assets, also several thousand million marks of foreign money" (913-14).

To deprive Britain of this role requires "huge financial resources and a low rate of interest" (916)... "And one must be in a position not only to pay out vast sums of money, but also to guarantee the absolute stability of the currency that is to replace the British, that is, one must be prepared at any time to pay in gold."

Hence, the term "utopian" is applied to the plan of the National City Bank (Morgan's Bank)[10] or the Swiss banks,

"which believe that a little good will is quite sufficient to wrest from London the international clearing accounts, or a considerable part of them. That is indeed a highly desirable aim, but it cannot be achieved until some other country can put at the service of world trade the amount of credit, the complex of commercial, banking and interest advantages, and the reliable currency foundation, which, prior to the outbreak of the war at least, Britain put at the disposal of world trade" (920)....

(1914, *November* and *December*.) "The Covering of War Costs and Its Sources", an article by *Alfred Lansburgh*.

Quotes Lloyd George as saying (in September 1914): "In my judgement, the last few hundred millions may win this war. This is my opinion. The first hundred millions our enemies can stand just as well as we can, but the last they cannot, thank God..." (p. 998).

Says Lloyd George is mistaken. There are four sources for covering war costs: (1) "First degree" reserves = cash (France and Russia have more than Germany, but Britain less. Here Germany is weaker). (2) "Second degree" reserves: short-term debt claims in world trade (Britain is much stronger: "Whereas Britain is the world's *banker* and keeps her money liquid, France is the world's *financier* and invests her money") (1001). (3) Net income from the country's production + (4) part of gross income devoted to depreciation (or accumulation). Here, he says, we are not weaker.

In this connection, however, Lansburgh is counting on *exports* which though secret ("hidden"), will not disappear.

Our (Germany's) low discount rate proves (December 1914!!!), he says, that exports are inadequate, do not correspond to "our expenditure abroad" (1103).

N.B. Cf. p. 1112: "Only when exports suffice fully to cover imports and war expenditure abroad will the national economy be really on a war footing."

1914, 1 (May). "**The Bank with 300 Million**", an article by A. Lansburgh.

The Discontogesellschaft swallowed up the *Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein* and increased its *share capital* to *300 million* marks (p. 415).*

"Thus for the first time a really big German bank has become a victim of the concentration process" (415).

The *Deutsche Bank* increased its capital to *250*,000,000 marks. The *Discontogesellschaft* replied to this by a "merger" with the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein and increased its capital to *300*,000,000.**

"With a capital of 300,000,000 marks, it becomes, for the time being, the biggest bank not only in Germany, but in the world" (422).

The "struggle for hegemony", which had seemed decided in favour of the *Deutsche Bank*, now flared up afresh:

"Other banks will follow this same path ... and the three hundred men, who today govern Germany economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five, or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this latest move towards concentration will be confined to banking. The close relations that exist between individual banks naturally lead to the bringing together of the industrial syndicates these banks favour. This, and business fluctuations, will lead to still more mergers, and one fine morning we shall wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before our eyes, and to find ourselves faced with the necessity of substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except that we have allowed things to follow their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of *stocks*" (426).*** (End of article.)

N.B.

N.B.

"**SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES**", an article by *Ludwig Eschwege*, p. 544 et seq. (May 1914).

Early in 1912, the *big banks* (yielding to the pressure of the State Bank) introduced a *new* type of balance-sheet.

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 215—*Ed.*

** Ibid.—*Ed.*

*** Ibid.—*Ed.*

But **thousands** of *joint-stock companies* continue to publish brief ("knappe") balance-sheets, not going beyond the requirements of the law—the brevity of the balance-sheet being alleged to be a guarantee against speculation!!! In fact, however:

"In reality, what is achieved by this [the "brevity of balance-sheet"] is merely that a few better-informed persons are able to enrich themselves *at the expense of the mass of shareholders*, especially if brevity is combined with a subtle system of misleading headings to make important data invisible to the ordinary shareholder. This gives the directors and their good friends a double advantage: being sole possessors of all information, they can benefit from a rise in market values in favourable situations, and escape anticipated losses by a timely sale of shares in unfavourable ones.

good example!

"Thus, for example, the *Spring-Steel Company of Kassel* was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell in a few years from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the Board, without consulting the shareholders, had loaned six million marks to one of its 'subsidiary companies', the *Hassia* Company, which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble the capital of the 'parent company', was never mentioned in its balance-sheet; this omission was quite legal and could be hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any point of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who as the responsible head had signed the false balance-sheets, was, and still is, the president of the Kassel Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders learned of the Hassia loan only much later, after it had been proved to be a mistake and when Spring-Steel shares dropped nearly 100 per cent, because those in the know were getting rid

!!!

of them. It was only then that the item in question was made evident by a change in the method of drawing up the balance-sheet. This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common in joint-stock companies, explains why their Boards of Directors are willing to undertake risky transactions with a far lighter heart than individual businessmen. Modern methods of drawing up balance-sheets not only make it possible to conceal the risky deal from the ordinary shareholder, but also allow the main interested parties to escape the consequence of an unsuccessful experiment, by selling their shares in time, whereas the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he does" (545).... N.B.

"The balance-sheets of many joint-stock companies remind us of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath it another inscription giving the real meaning of the document" (545).... #

A palimpsest is a parchment from which the original inscription has been erased and then another inscription imposed. #

..."The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making balance-sheets indecipherable is to divide a single business into several parts by setting up or attaching 'subsidiary companies'. The advantages of this system for various purposes—legal and illegal—are so evident that today big companies which do not employ it are quite the exception"* (545-46).

This assures "a certain impenetrability of their operations" (ibidem)....

An outstanding example is the *Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft* (with thousands of millions of marks in subsidiary companies)....

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 229-30.—*Ed.*

(c.f. 1908. No. 8: "The Rathenau System", *Die Bank* on methods of the *A.E.G.*)

((...Taxation is greater, for special taxes are imposed on them (subsidiary companies); on the other hand, profits are greater, and secrecy is assured!!...))

|| Author's italics: "Subsidiary companies are an ideal means for compiling objectively false balance-sheets without contravening the provisions of company law" (549).

..."The decisive factor is that the modern system of arranging balance-sheet items makes concealment possible" (ibidem)....

Another example:

The Oberschlesische Eisenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (pp. 550-51) has in its balance-sheet "holdings" = 5,200,000 marks.

What holdings? The author ascertained privately: 60 per cent are shares of the Gleiwitzer Steinkohlengruben

(and this company has debts of 20,000,000 marks!!)

((End))

Ibidem p. 340 (April) (Berlin big banks, February 28, 1914).

Balance-sheets of *Berlin* big banks.

Balance-sheets: February 28, **1914**	eight banks (Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Darmstädter Bank, Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, National Bank für Deutschland, Commerz- und Disconto-Bank + Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank).

Million marks

Share capital	= 1,140.0 mill.	Reserves	= 350.82
Bills, etc.	= 1,956.16 "	Consortium holdings	= 278.29
Debtors	= 3,036.63 "	Long-term holdings	= 286.81
Σ balances	= 8,103.71 "		

Savings banks (1910) (including post office savings banks)[11] (p. 446)

	Million marks		Million marks
Germany	16,780	Denmark	603
Austria	5,333	Luxemburg	49
Hungary	1,870	Sweden	961
Italy	3,378	Norway	570
France	4,488	Spain	340
Great Britain	4,518	Rumania	50
Russia	3,019	Bulgaria	36
Finland	190	U.S.A.	17,087
Switzerland	1,272	Australia	1,213
Holland	464	New Zealand	319
Belgium	830	Japan	662

p. *496*: Criticism of " statistics of issues":

for the most part these statistics (in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Deutsche Oekonomist* they are largely estimates) are very inexact, giving a maximum and not the reality. The issue of shares can be the transfer of debt into a *different* form. N.B.

Cf. *Dr. Hermann Kleiner*, *Statistics of Issues in Germany*, Berlin, *1914*,
and *M. Marx* (*Thesis*), *Statistics of Issues in Germany and Some Foreign States*, Altenburg, *1913*.

1914, 1, p. 316 (article by Lansburgh). "*The Stock Exchange versus the Banks*":

..."The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable medium of circulation that it was formerly, when the banks were not yet able to place the bulk of new issues with their clients."* N.B.

(March 1914) pp. 298-99, "*new era of concentration*" (in banking)—in connection with deteriorating business situation, etc.

("The Bergisch-Märkische Bank, this 80--million Rhenish enterprise with its 35 branches, will soon be merged in the Deutsche Bank": 298).

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 218.—*Ed.*

"For while merger does not always give strength, it nevertheless conceals from outside many weaknesses and sores" (299)—on the significance of mergers....

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p. 94. "*Bankruptcy statistics*[12]—their significance for an appraisal of the business situation.

(From *Quarterly Reviews of Statistics of the German Reich*) especially "the most serious economic crashes, i.e., cases where, owing to the lack of assets, liquidation proceedings either cannot be begun at all or have to be suspended" (p. 94).

N.B. ||

[See the table on p. 87.—*Ed.*]

During this period the number of large towns has increased from 28 to 48 (and their population still more), but the percentage of very big bankruptcies (completed owing to lack of assets) was previously *lower* than the average, but is now *higher*.

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p. 1 (*January 1914*), *from an article* ("*Causes of Crises*") *by Lansburgh*: (N.B. Business situation).

ergo from *1913* ||||

"For about a year now, the German business situation has been noticeably *deteriorating*."

crisis of 1914 ||||

"The period we are passing through reveals many, though not all, characteristic features of a crisis"...

"The most fatal cause of crises ... is progress" ... (11).

N.B. good example!! ||

Counter-measures? "More effective (than a cartel) is a *trust*, which either deliberately suppresses all inventions and improvements, or buys them up, as was done, for example, by the big German glass factories in respect of Owens's bottle-working patent, which united into a sort of special-purpose trust to buy what appeared to them an exceedingly dangerous invention" (p. 15).*

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 276.—*Ed.*

My additions according to Riesser		Total bankruptcies in the German Reich						No. of bankruptcies in large towns					
		Declared			Completed			Declared			Completed		
		Total	Of which No. rejected	Per cent	Total	Owing to lack of assets	Per cent	Total	Of which No. rejected	Per cent	Total	Owing to lack of assets	Per cent
Start of boom	1895	7,111	680	9.6	6,362	395	6.2	1,823	243	13.3	1,724	104	6.0
	1897	6,997	639	9.1	6,077	381	6.3	1,777	251	14.1	1,466	92	6.3
Business situation good	1899	7,742		8.8									
Crisis	1901	10,569		10.9									
	1903	9,627		15.1									
Revival	1905	9,357		17.6									
American crisis	1907	9,855		17.8									
	1908	11,571		19.0									
	1909	11,005		21.6									
	1910	10,783		22.2									
"Prosperity"[1]	1911	11,031	2,351	21.3	8,092	682	8.4	3,603	1,238	34.3	2,325	220	9.5
	1912	12,094	2,885	23.9	8,356	784	9.4	4,060	1,563	38.5	2,395	241	10.1

[1]) *Die Bank*, 1914, p. 5 (January 1914).

good example!

"*Transport Trust*", a note in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, p. 89.

The formation is expected (perhaps in the near future) of a Berlin "transport trust", i.e., an interest-community of the three Berlin transport companies—the elevated railway, tramway, and omnibus companies. We have been aware that this plan was contemplated ever since it became known that the majority of shares in the omnibus company had been acquired by the other two transport companies.... We may fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services they will have economies, part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the transport trust that is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can subordinate the means of transportation, which they have monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need only recall that the interests of the big bank that encouraged the formation of the Elevated Railway Company were already involved at the time the company was formed. Indeed, the interests of this transport undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests and so an essential prerequisite for the foundation of the transport company was created. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was to run across land which, when it became certain that the railway was to be constructed, this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself and some persons associated with it in the land company at the Schönhauser Allee railway station.* For it is common knowledge that land development, and the

!!

N.B.

!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 236-37.—*Ed.*

resultant rise in land prices, is best achieved by means of new transport routes." (There follows yet another example: no less than *eleven lines* already run to the Tempelhof area. Too many? The reason: many directors and members of Supervisory Boards live there!!! p. 90.)... "A transport monopoly involves a real estate monopoly...." N.B.

"*The Oil Comedy*", *Die Bank*, 1913, No. 4 (p. 388).

Excellent note, reveals the *essence* of the struggle for monopoly of oil in Germany.

Before 1907. "Until 1907 the Deutsche Bank oil concern was engaged in a sharp conflict with the Standard Oil Company" (389). The outcome was clear: defeat of the Deutsche Bank. In 1907, two courses were open to it: either liquidate its "oil interests" and lose millions, or submit. It chose the latter and concluded an *agreement* with Standard Oil ("not very advantageous" to the Deutsche Bank). The Deutsche Bankundertook "not to attempt anything which might injure American interests", but... the agreement would cease to operate with legislation establishing a German oil monopoly.

N.B.: Struggle of the Deutsche Bank against Standard Oil Company

And then *Herr von Gwinner* (a Deutsche Bank director), through *his* (private) *secretary* (Stauss) (*Die Bank*, 1912, 2, p. 1034), launched a campaign *for* a state oil monopoly!! The entire machinery of the big bank was set in motion ... but there was a snag. The government (though it had already drafted a bill and put it before the Reichstag) feared that, without Standard Oil, *Germany would not be able to obtain oil.*

See 1913, p. 736 et seq.

The war preparations bill (July 3, 1913) came to the rescue—the oil bill had to be

postponed. Standard Oil won, for the monopoly (for the time being) did not eventuate.*

N.B. The struggle of the *Deutsche Bank* and *Germany* against the *Standard Oil Company*.

Die Bank, 1913, No. 8 (August).

Alfred *Lansburgh*, "**Five Years of German Banking**".

Growth of Concentration:

Deposits (of all banks with a capital > *one* million marks)

1907-08 — 6,988 million marks
1912-13 — 9,806 " "

+2,800 million +40%

{ 9 Berlin big banks
{ 48 banks with > 10 million marks capital

57

+115 banks with > one million marks capital

Deposits of the 57 big banks increased by 2,750 million marks.

Increase in 5 years (million marks)

	Deposits	Capital	Reserves
All banks with > *1* mill. capital	+2,818	+390	+148
57 banks with > *10* " "	+2,750	+435	+153

The small banks show an absolute decrease: mergers, etc.

Percentage of total deposits (p. 728)

N.B.

	Berlin big banks (9)	Other banks with > 10 mill. marks capital (48)	Banks with 1-10 mill. marks (115)	Banks with < one mill. marks capital
1907-08	47	32.5	16.5	4 || 100
1910-11	49	33.5	14	3½ || 100
1912-13	49	36	12	3 || 100**

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 249-50.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 211.—*Ed.*

1913, No. 7, p. 628 et seq.

"*The State and Foreign Loans*" (Alfred Lansburgh).

The German government has forbidden foreign loans? What impels the banks towards that policy? The fact that they are already "*bogged*" (Mexico, China, Turkey, etc., threaten to go bankrupt).

What induced the banks to grant loans to *such* states in the first place? Profit!

..."There is not a single business of this type within the country that brings in profits even approximately equal to those obtained from the flotation of foreign loans" (630)....* N.B. important

a difference of up to 7-8 per cent between the subscription price and the bank's price; different conditions, for example, a deposit—six months' interest as "guarantee", etc., etc.

concerning the question of imperialism!!

Then "high politics" (France and Germany especially—grant loans in order to acquire allies, etc.).

The dependence of France on Russia ("a one per cent decline in Russian securities costs France 100 million. The mere threat by Russia to stop interest payments means more to her main creditor than the loss of an army corps"—p. 633). well put!

With such loans "it is not clear who is dancing and who calls the tune", ibidem. well put!

Mexico (p. 628) defaulted more than once (without complete bankruptcy), but is granted loans, for otherwise worse is threatened!!

"***Rivalry over Foreign Loans***" (1913, No. 10, p. 1024 et seq. Editorial note).

"A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being played on the international capital

* Ibid., p. 234.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

market. Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming into the big money markets with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans. The money markets are not very bright at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a loan for fear that its neighbour may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so secure some reciprocal service. In these international transactions the creditor always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favourable clause in a commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract to construct a harbour, a fat concession, or an order for guns..." (1025).*

"benefits"

N.B.

the "benefits" of imperialism—important in examining the question of monopoly and finance capital

1913, **August**, **p. 811**, note on "**Savings Banks and the Banks**"....

..."The keen rivalry between the savings banks and the banks, which flared up some years ago because each of these so dissimilar organisations is endeavouring to go beyond its own field of activity and penetrate that of the other, continues to occupy the attention of our Chambers of Commerce." The *Bochum* Chamber of Commerce demands, for example, that measures be taken against the savings banks, including that they be prohibited from discounting bills, dealing with current accounts, etc. (but allowing them "safes", cheques and endorsement).**

Same subject: "Banking Activity of Savings Banks" (p. 1022 et seq.)

The savings banks are being turned into institutions for the rich: in Prussia in

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 244.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 217.—*Ed.*

1909, out of 10,300 million marks of deposits, 4,780 million 46⅓ per cent consisted of deposits > 3,000 marks (15 per cent of deposits > 10,000 marks). Wealthy depositors often have more than one book. Savings banks engage in risky operations (bills, mortgages, etc.) under the spur of competition (4 or 4¼ per cent has to be paid!!). There is a proposal to "ban" this....

!! they want to go "back" to small capitalism (and not towards socialism)

An article "The Swamp" (L. Eschwege) (1913, p. 952 et seq.) on the swindles of speculators in real estate (plots sold at exorbitant prices, builders going bankrupt, workers not paid and ruined, etc. etc.). Attempts by Haberland, head of the gang, to monopolise the "information bureaus", i.e., monopolise all building work. The concluding words are typical:

"Unfortunately, the inevitable course of modern civilisation apparently leads to the economic productive forces falling more and more into the hands of powerful individuals who use them in a monopolistic way. The economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution has become, in many departments of economic life, a meaningless phrase. Under such circumstances, an incorruptible bureaucracy, conscious of its responsibility, is the granite rock that can save the public good from the encroaching flood of avarice. If this rock should crumble, even the widest political liberty cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree people,* in which case even the monarchy would have merely a decorative significance" (p. 962).

ha-ha!

only "would have"???

N.B. The author has a book entitled *Land and Mortgage Problems*, 1913 (2 vols.) N.B.

* Ibid., p. 238.—*Ed.*

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Von der *Heydt*'s *Colonial Handbook*. (Published by Fr. Mensch and J. Hellmann.) 1913 (Seventh year (16 marks). Data (financial) on all banks and joint-stock companies in the colonies.

? Leopold *Joseph*, *The Evolution of German Banking*, London, 1913. Perhaps a rehash of Riesser? Or not?

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SECURITY STATISTICS

"International *Statistics of Securities and Stock Issues*" by Mr. Zimmermann, *Bank Archiv*, 1912, July 1.

Statistics of "transferable securities", according to International Statistical Institute *Bulletins* (Alfred Neymarck).

In ***francs*** (000 million francs)

January 1, 1897—446,300 million.

		January 1, 1897	January 1, 1901	January 1, 1907	(p. 302)
1897— *in-exact* (p. 301) *1901*— cor-rected	Great Britain	182.6	215	125-130	(*actually* existing securities)
	Holland——	13.6	15		
	Belgium	6.1	8		
	Germany	92.0	80	60-75	
	Austria-Hungary	24.5	30	20-22	
	Italy	17.5	17	10-12	
	Rumania	1.2	1.5		
	Norway	0.7	1.0		
	Denmark——	2.7	2.2		
	France—	80.0	135	95-100	
	Russia	25.4	35	20-25	
	Spain		10		
	Switzerland——	——	8		
	Sweden and others	——	5		
		Σ = 446.3	Σ = 562.7		

United States of America	110-115
Japan	5
Other countries	30-35

000 million

1897—446.3
1899—460
1901—562.7 (342.4)
1907—732 (475-514)
1911—815 (570-600)[13]

The figures in brackets = an attempt to deduct overlapping and repetitions (about 1/3 of the previous figure) (p. 301) ("securities actually existing in trade or in the possession of individual states").

See p. *68* of this *notebook*.*

	Totals for entire five-year periods:	(p. 317) Issues 000 million francs
Neymarck, Vol. XIX, No. II, p. 206	1871-75 —	45.0
	1876-80 —	31.1
	1881-85 —	24.1
	1886-90 —	40.4
	1891-95 —	40.4
	1896-1900 —	60.0
	1901-05 —	83.7
	1906-10 —	114.1***

see pp. *68-69* here**

* See p. 147 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 147-49 of this volume.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 239.—*Ed.*

GRUNZEL, *THE BALANCE OF TRADE, PAYMENTS, AND OF THE ECONOMY*

Professor Dr. Joseph *Grunzel*, *The Balance of Trade, Payments, and of the Economy*, **Vienna, 1914.**

N.B. *pp. 26-29*: Short summary of data (mostly generally known) on export of *capital*, etc.

Foreign capital:

In Austria-Hungary:	9,809 million kronen	(incl. 4,653 German and 3,270 French)
Argentina	9,000 million mark	
China	3,737 " "	(national debt; in railways > *50* million *pounds sterling*, in banks *34*)
Japan	1,765 million yen	(this is national debt; 33 million yen in enterprises)
Canada	1,750 million dollars	(incl. 1,050 British, 500 American)
Mexico	1,000 million dollars	American + 700 British

SCHILDER, FIRST VOLUME OF *DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY*

Dr. Sigmund Schilder, *Development Trends in the World Economy*, Vol. I, Berlin, 1912. (Vol. I: *Planned?! Influences on the World Economy.*)

The title is too sweeping, the subtitle plainly fraudulent, for the author has specialised in tariff policy = there you have his planned influence!!

The author is secretary of a trade museum.

p. 4—Disagrees with Sombart (with his theory of declining "export quota"). Says this "quota" is *increasing*.

p. 6. An apparent weakening of protectionism ("signs of this"), 1910-11.

p. 6—"Unrest caused by high prices" in France in August and September 1911. *Dates* (*N.B.*): Vienna, September 17, 1911.

27-28. Agriculture **too, is developing** (not only industry), "even" ("sogar") (p. 28, line 8 from below): "in European industrial countries". (This "even" is a gem!)

N.B.: approach *to* the problem of equilibrium—is "world agricultural purchasing power" sufficient? p. 27.)

28-29. The development of agricultural associations (even *India* has 3,498 with 231,000 members, according to *The Times*, July 27, 1911).

Especially rapid development of agriculture in the *United States*.

In the 20th century one can expect the same in *Rhodesia*,

30: Canada, Sudan (Egyptian), Mesopotamia.

31—Governments develop agriculture in the colonies "to obtain buyers of industrial goods". (In India (until recently), and in Egypt, with this aim in view, Britain has *artificially* "hampered" the development of industry.)

35-36—Fear of a shortage of agricultural products is unfounded. Tropics and subtropics N.B. *Philippines*. Only 3-5 million acres are cultivated out of 74 million. (Population is 27 per square kilometre.)

38: "Though it may sound paradoxical to some, the growth of the urban and industrial population in the more or less near future is more likely to be hindered by a shortage of industrial raw materials than by a shortage of food." ‖ N.B.

A shortage of *timber*: it becomes steadily dearer; idem *leather*; idem textile raw materials (39).

"Associations of manufacturers are making efforts to create an equilibrium between agriculture and industry in the whole of *world economy*; as an example of this we might mention the International Federation of Cotton Spinners' Associations in several of the most important industrial countries, founded in 1904, and the European Federation of *Flax Spinners*' Associations, founded on this model in 1910" (42).* ‖‖ N.B. date! ‖ N.B.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 261.—*Ed.*

Within the countries—an agreement between the growers of *sugar beet* and the manufacturers.

"Eastern Europe" (an economic and political concept....)

The agricultural crisis, the drop in prices from the *seventies* to the *nineties* of the nineteenth century. Caused by American competition? + the impoverished position of the farmer in "*Eastern Europe*" and India (cf. Engels).

well said!

(43-44) "Thanks alone to the agricultural co-operatives combined with better educational facilities in the countryside, the letter of the law on emancipation of the peasants became a real fact."

47: The peasant revolt in Rumania in 1907 (spring) played a role, similar to that of the 1905-07 revolution in Russia, in improving the peasants' position.

N.B.

51: Only in *New Zealand* (from the early 1890s) has "Henry George's theory,[14] that of British land nationalisation", been applied "**in practice**" (population consists mostly of small-landowner families).... In Australia, from *1910*, "a similar course"....

cartels 1882-1912

63: The role of *cartels* (dumping and the struggle against free-trade countries) "during approximately the last three decades"....

The argument of English protectionists. N.B.

[N.B.: This caused the protectionist trend in *Great Britain*, *Belgium* and *Holland*: 67.]

66: The *Brussels* sugar convention (March 5, 1902; renewed August 28, 1907) put an end to the unification of government and *cartel* export subsidies (for sugar).

N.B.

72. Extreme protectionism resembles free trade in that, by making sales within the country more difficult (high prices), it stimulates *foreign* trade (imports (a) of cheap raw materials, etc.) (selling (b) abroad, for its own population grows poorer).

87—It is not true that "trade agreements" have proved "bankrupt".

writing on questions of *tariff* policy, the author adduces a host of unnecessary and boring details; I omit them.

98—Examples of trade agreements: an agrarian country needs cheap machinery (and its customers need cheap grain): the Bulgarian tariff of March 6-19, 1911—Austria's agreement with Germany (1905) (chemicals; artificial indigo, etc.).

(99)—reciprocal concessions (Germany's trade agreement with Portugal, November 30, 1908), etc.

Subtitle of Chapter IV, "Tariff Wars":

118—"Examples of the considerably useful impact of specific tariff, wars in promoting international trade" ... Russo-German war of 1893-94,—Franco-Swiss war of 1893-95.

Those of Switzerland and Spain in 1906 (from June to September 1, 1906) (they led to a *lowering* of tariffs).

Austria—Rumania (1886-94) Austria—Serbia (1906-10)	Ended in agreements :1909 :1910

127. { Tariff wars are becoming rarer, giving way to threats, negotiations, etc.

145. British free trade has been based *both* on her *military* might (the navy) and colonies.

True, an attitude of indifference to maintaining and increasing colonial possessions prevailed in Britain up to 1860s (in 1864, she even gave Greece the *Ionian Islands gratis*, without political or *economic* compensation).

146-48: Intensified acquisition of colonies by Britain began in the *eighties*. ((Cf. *Hobson*.)) About 1/3 of Britain's total exports goes to her colonies; no small amount and *N.B.*: *this* export is "especially profitable"

N.B. (149) owing to: (1) investment of *capital* in the colonies
(2) "*contracts*" ("public contracts") (*very* important!!)
(3) "Colonial preferential tariffs for British manufactures": (in the **majority** of the colonies)

151: state power (concessions, municipal and state institutions, etc.) and *trust* likewise important for capital investments: in this respect

(among the factors of "imperialism")

N.B. 151—"Of service to the British" (facilitating investment) "is the legend, assiduously cultivated by ruling circles of the British Empire and by the British press, in spite of Ireland and of certain measures in India, Egypt, etc.—the legend of the special *liberalism* and *humanity* which are alleged to be characteristic of the British regime at all times and in all places." (Written in 1912.)

154: "Inter-colonial preferential tariffs" are widely applied also in the British colonies.

(((N.B.: a step towards a customs union of the whole empire.
My addition.)))

Britain's *virtual* protectorate over *Portugal*, and partly over Spain (1901-10) ... *Norway* (from 1905) ... *Siam* (the 1860s up to 1904; in 1904 a treaty with France; their *joint* protectorate)....

"More interesting and perhaps even more significant than the examples so far mentioned [Egypt, Zanzibar...], where subtropical or tropical semi-civilised countries, after relatively short transitional stages of some few decades, have become or appear to be becoming real British colonies, are a number of other cases. These are cases where for a long time, decades or even centuries, a *country with a European civilisation* may virtually be a British protectorate, without, at least formally, being deprived of any external mark of full sovereignty.

"*Portugal* is the best known and outstanding example. Since the war of the Spanish Succession (1700-14) Great

Britain has almost continuously used her navy, and on occasion her army, to defend Portugal's European or overseas possessions from attacks or claims by Spain, France, etc. Conflicts between Britain, the protector, and Portugal, the protected, were accidental and, to a certain extent, family quarrels ... as, for example, the British ultimatum of January 11, 1890, against Portugal's attempts to land-link her western and eastern colonies in Africa.

"At any rate, only British support enables Portugal to maintain her possessions—which, though not large, are nevertheless important for such a small country—on the west coast of India, in South China (Macao) and on Timor, in face of the intense international political rivalry in southern and eastern Asia. In Portuguese East Africa a kind of customs union with British South Africa has even been added to Britain's political protectorate over Portugal" (treaty of December 18, 1901).... "And it has so far proved economically highly profitable for Portuguese East Africa. It is also a valuable acquisition, now and for the future, for British South Africa and, therefore, for Great Britain.

"This virtual protectorate of Great Britain over Portugal during its more than two hundred years' existence has proved extremely useful to British trade and shipping [the 1703 treaty with Portugal]....

"However, ever since Great Britain adopted peaceful free trade, she has been able through diplomatic action to influence the Portuguese customs tariff in a way hardly to be achieved by any other country, even by the offer of commercial privileges or the threat of a tariff war. Besides, as the dominating power, Great Britain can make especially wide use of all export and investment opportunities involving Portuguese government concessions" (railways in Portuguese Africa, etc.)....

"And indirectly, again owing to her protectorate over Portugal, Great Britain maintains not only her position in South Africa and her influence in the Congo, but also her maritime supremacy, the firm pillar of her colonial and world-wide political and economic power. For in war or peace, Portugal puts her ports and islands at the disposal of the British fleet for training purposes and as intermediate

shipping stations, allows the use of telegraph cables, etc." (159-61)....*

Bismarck's saying

169—In wartime Britain used the European states as "*excellent infantry*" ("according to Bismarck's description, as the 'silly strong man' of world politics").

170—Britain supported Belgium's separation from Holland (Holland was "cut in half" as a rival) so as not to permit a powerful state near London.

175-76. The struggle (of *Britain* it) against Russia over Persia (long-continued) until the *agreement* of June 9, 1908.

The struggle (of *Britain*) against France over Siam (long-continued) until the *agreement* of April 8, 1904.

178 et seq. "*Four* periods of British world politics" (their designation, p. 184):

1) First Asiatic period (against Russia), approximately 1870-85.
   1870—against Russia's Black Sea rights.
   1885—agreement on frontiers of Afghanistan.
2) African period (against France and in part Portugal and Germany), approximately 1885-1902 (1898 "Fashoda").
   1885—agreement on the Congo: "independence" (Britain wanted to devour it).
   1902—end of the Boer War.
3) Second Asiatic period (against Russia): approximately 1902-05.
   Treaty with Japan, 1902. Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.
4) "European" period (against Germany), approximately 1903—("anti-German")**
   1903: friction over the Baghdad railway.

194: The British Empire (with its colonies) accounts for: ">one-quarter of international trade turnover" (reference to Vol. II, appendix IX)

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 263-64.—*Ed*.

** Ibid., p. 296.—*Ed*.

too small: cf. Lansburgh: ¾*

214. Bukharin's table + Japan? + Portugal (216)—2.18 million sq. kilometres—13 million inhabitants.

220. The outlying regions often have a special (tariff) structure (distances too great even for modern facilities).

— Eastern Siberia in Russia
— Philippines in America, etc.

226. Six "special economic areas" in Russia: (1) Poland (Poles speak of "exports to Russia"); (2) the South; (3) Archangel; (4) Urals; (5) Moscow; (6) the Baltic (+Finland).

237 ...A trend "emerged" in 1911 towards a "Greater Colombia" in the northern part of South America against the United States. ||| N.B.

237 *and others*. The union of the modern gigantic world states into a single economic whole is stated to be an "approach" to "*universal free trade*".

> "As far back as the eighteenth century, after the secession of the North American colonies from Great Britain, it became apparent to the more far-sighted colonial peoples that such a brutal colonial policy [*suppression* of all industry in the colony] aimed exclusively at promoting the real or apparent interests of export of manufactures from the metropolis, could not be maintained for long. At any rate, that applied to regions of the temperate zone with active, intelligent populations whose living conditions do not substantially differ from those of European nations. In the tropical and subtropical regions, however, with populations at a lower cultural level, less energetic and militarily and politically weaker, this old colonial policy was still retained, even though to a lesser extent. True, nowadays, in both the tropics and subtropics, outright suppression of incipient industrial activity is as a rule avoided. But in most

* See p. 78 of this volume—*Ed*.

cases colonial governments devote more attention to developing agricultural and mining raw-material output than to industrial and political problems. And that for the most part they can do this without much damage to the economic development of the tropical or subtropical areas concerned is all the more important, since this enables them to operate this type of colonial policy for a long time. For the present acute political rivalry throughout the world, and the emergence of overseas Great Powers (U.S.A., Japan), afford the population of the tropics and subtropics—resentful
N.B. at the forcible, *ruinous* retarding of its economic development—many means of creating difficulties for
N.B. its oppressors and of giving them a distaste for brutal methods of rule" (240-41).

For example, Britain is more and more converting
N.B. Egypt into a country producing *only* cotton (in 1904, of 2,300,000 hectares of cultivated land, 600,000 were under cotton) and *hampering* industrial development (for instance, two cotton textile mills founded in Egypt in 1901 were made to pay the cotton *tax*, that is, the government imposed a "consumers' tax" on cotton!!!) (244-45).

"Present-day colonial policy".

In general, "modern" colonial policy is supposed to encourage production of raw materials and react to the development of industry "with indifference, if not with hostility" (247).

"However, it is probably no longer possible to
N.B. apply that type of colonial policy to the physically and intellectually more vigorous peoples of temperate climates; it can be applied only to the weaker peoples of the tropics and, in part, the subtropics. But even here it can be carried out only by the more powerful European metropolitan countries, Great Britain, France and Germany. The Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, have lost some of their colo-

nial possessions and are able to retain others only because of the good will and mutual rivalry of the big colonial powers. Belgium is a notable example. N.B.

"...But even the strongest colonial power, Great Britain, in its biggest and most important colony, *India*, is compelled to depart considerably from strict observance of the above—mentioned principle in its trade and industrial policy, so as not to make N.B. her position more difficult than it actually is in the face of popular, hostile agitation" (247-48).... N.B.

247, note.

"After many years of stubborn bloody struggles against the natives in revolt, the U.S.A., in the end, conceded the Philippines *parliamentary representation* (a Congress) with wide powers. This testifies to the acumen of North American statesmen in colonial policy. Less flattering evidence of this acumen, however, is the *land policy* of the North Americans in the Philippines, which is leading to the formation of latifundia." N.B. N.B. the Americans in the Philippines N.B.

Methods of colonial exploitation: appointment of *officials* from the ruling nation; —seizure of land by ruling-nation magnates; high taxes ("training in labour").

"For colonial peoples in subtropical areas ... such as the Indians of North India and the Egyptians, the educated strata of which have already assimilated European-American civilisation, the very fact of foreign rule is an insult that is borne with difficulty and thought of with extreme hatred" (249). !!!

In Egypt, the population is much more homogeneous (in language, nationality, etc.) than in India, "and the country (Egypt) is more European than, for instance, some areas of European Russia" (252).

(similarly, the "semi-civilised" population in Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Algeria, Tunisia, etc.) (258).

N.B. *Holland*, like Great Britain..., in her colonies follows a "free-trade policy which, at the same time, is mainly aimed at developing the output of agricultural and mining raw materials" (259).

Germany waged a tariff war against Canada (from July 31, 1898 to March 1, 1910) because of the latter's preferential tariffs in favour of Britain. It ended with the retention of these tariffs and a customs treaty with Germany.

Most British, Dutch and German colonies, "as far as can be foreseen", will remain under the open-door regime in relation to a *all* countries (271). *Trescher* (*Preferential Tariffs*, 1908) contested this, and Schilder says that he has *toned down* his conclusions.

As regards state *contracts* (269-70), the custom everywhere is: preference for "*one's own*" country.

"'**Open-door' areas**" (old type: Turkey (until 1908), Rumania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Morocco, Persia; new type: Congo, Afghanistan) "are almost always independent or, at least, formally independent states, and in most cases semi-civilised countries" ... (274).

(1) They usually lack *sovereignty*. They usually pass into the hands of the Great Powers: separate parts of these areas *split off*.

N.B. (2) "Individual areas of the 'open-door' country split themselves off from the state that previously ruled them and, after a more or less prolonged transitional period, acquire full political and economic sovereignty, the small and medium-sized Balkan states being in that category. On the whole, this phenomenon is not so frequent as that indicated under point 1" (274).

(3) Full independence (Japan) is *extremely rare*.

Ad. *2*. Growth of independence:

Japan in the 1890s.

Bulgaria in 1897-19*09* (fully sovereign!).

Siam *just now*.

Heading of § VI: "The swallowing-up of 'open-door'

areas by the Great Powers: the world economic usefulness of this historical process is seen from the examples of Bosnia, Algeria, ...Formosa, the Belgian Congo, etc...." || apologist!!

{ These advantages (like the benefits of independence of former "open-door" areas: § VII) the author sees in the growth of trade!! Only that!! The book is devoted *mainly* to ***customs policy***. }

Siam, especially since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, has been developing towards independence (p. 318 et seq.).

Growth of the national movement in China—Persia—Arabia—Egypt (p. 329), etc., etc.

§ IX: "The disappearance of 'open-door' areas is an irreversible but beneficial process for the world economy" (337)... These areas are "semi-barbarian", mostly semi-civilised.... "Apple of discord of the Great Powers" (337-38)....

Chapter IX. "*Foreign Capital Investments*".

|| *no longer* free competition || (Subtitle of section I. "Foreign Investments as a *Means of Promoting Exports*".) || N.B.

Customary condition: expenditure of part of the loan on *products* of the creditor country ("unusually frequent", 342).

Examples: Paris refused Bulgaria a loan in December 1909, and Hungary in September 1910.

...."these conditions *prevent extreme aggravation of competition on the world market*. International rivalry is replaced by a more restricted form of competition, involving only the relevant industrial enterprises of the creditor state, in some cases—and this *borders on corruption**—only certain enterprises which I for one or another reason are especially favourably placed ... for example, Krupp in Germany, Schneider & Co. in Creusot in France, etc." (346).... "Although it might be thought that such a *monopoly* could not be abused"... for one could apply to another country, in reality the choice is not easy... (346).

N.B. || "mildly" put || "monopoly"

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 244.—*Ed.*

During the last two decades, France has *especially often* had recourse to this method.

348, note, "accumulated capital" ... annually

in France > 3,000-4,000 million francs

in Germany 5,000 million francs

(Delbrück in the Reichstag, February 12, 1911).

N.B. The "tariff war" between Austria and Serbia (from July 7, 1906 to January 24, 1911 with a *seven months'* interval in 1908-09) was *partly* caused by competition between Austria and France (both backward countries) for supplying *war* materials to Serbia: Paul Deschanel told the Chamber of Deputies in January 1912 that from 1908 to 1911 French firms had supplied war materials to Serbia to the value of 45,000,000 francs (350).*

Another method: granting a loan (or with a loan in view) to bargain for "advantages" in a *trade treaty*:

For example, Britain (my expressions "robbed", "squeezed", etc.)

Austria in this way by the trade **treaty** of Dec. 16, 1865

France —Russia— " " " Sept. 16, 1905 (until 1917)

" —Japan— " " " August 19, 1911

Sometimes countries which borrow capital lend it to *other* countries, "trading in capital": e.g., the United States borrows from Britain and lends to South America, etc., etc. (p. 365 et seq.).

Switzerland readily lends to other countries (higher rate of interest), sets up factories in *protectionist* countries, and so on (p. 367).

..."The 1909 annual report of the Austro-Hungarian consulate in *São Paulo* (Brazil) states: 'The *Brazilian railways* are being built chiefly by French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial operations connected with the construction of these railways, the

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 245.—*Ed.*

countries concerned stipulate for orders for the necessary railway materials'" (371)....*

The 1909 report of the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Buenos Aires calculates the capital invested in *Argentina* as follows (p. 371)

British	8,750	mill. francs	(= £350,000,000)**
French	800	"	"
German	1,000	"	"

— Foreign capital in *Canada* (1910)—12,687 million francs (p. 373)

including 9,765 British
2,190 U.S.
372 French

— Foreign capital in *Mexico* (1886-1907)—3,343

including 1,771 U.S.
1,334 British

(the remainder) German, French, Spanish, etc.

British Imports and Exports (381-82)
(in £ million)

Average	Imports *gross*	Imports *net* without re-exports	Exports without re-exports	Excess of foreign trade imports net	British capital investment abroad and in the colonies £ million (seven-year periods) (pp. 386-87)
1855-59	169	146	116	33***	
1860-64	235	193	138	55	— 235 (1856-62)
1865-69	286	237	181	56	+ 196 (1863-1869)
1870-74	346	291	235	56	— 288 (1870-76)
1875-79	375	320	202	118	— 94 (1877-83)
1880-84	408	344	234	110	
1885-89	379	318	226	92	+ 430 (1884-1890)
1890-94	419	357	234	123	
1895-99	453	393	239	154	— 223 (1891-1897)
1900-04	533	466	290	176	— 107 (1898-1904)
1905-09	607	522	377	143	+ 792 (1905-1911)
1910	678	575	431	144	My total: Σ =
1911		578	454	124	=(1856-1911)
					£*2,365* million

* Ibid., p. 245.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 263.—*Ed.*
*** Thus given by Schilder.—*Ed.*

The author gives the table only on pp. 381-82 (without + and —), the remaining figures (capital investment) from *The Statist* are only in the text, moreover (curiously!), while giving annual data on imports for 1870-1911, he does not compute them in seven-year periods!

The author's conclusion is that, though the capital investment statistics are not fully accurate (none of *private* capital investments), they adequately show the correlation (between the *decline* in the excess of imports and the *growth* of capital investment) (p. 392).

pp. 392-93: *five* industrial countries are "***definitely pronounced creditor countries***": Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. *Holland* is "**industrially little developed**" ("industriell wenig entwickelt" (393)); the *United States* is a creditor country only in America*; while Italy and Austria are "only gradually developing into creditor countries" (393).

|| End of Volume I ||

N.B. p. 384, note. At the close of 1910, British foreign investments totalled £1,638 million (=40,950 million francs), of which £709 million (=17,725 million francs) in the United States =43.3% + £1,554 million (=38,850 million francs) in British colonies; foreign investments + private capital + £1,800 million (=45,000 million francs).

HILDEBRAND, *THE SHATTERING, ETC.*

Gerhard Hildebrand, *The Shattering of Industrial Domination and Industrial Socialism*, 1910 (Jena).

A summary (mostly a *random selection*) of figures on the "increased industrial independence of peasant countries" (p. 88)—"the industrial self-development of hitherto peasant countries" (138)....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 278.—*Ed.*

§ 11. "The Chinese danger".... By 1920-25 the Chinese will have gone such a long way, etc., etc.

..."The industrial monopoly of the West-European sphere of civilisation is doomed"... (203).

p. 207. The question amounts to this: will the proletariat in the industrial countries be able "to replace or retain the vanishing peasant basis of food and clothing"?

"The answer to the clear-cut question must be a downright, clear, remorseless *No!*" (207).

209: It is impossible to obtain (in Europe) 200 million sheep 15-20 million bales of cotton, etc.

"There is no point in it (the proletariat) wanting to expropriate the capitalists, for the industrial means of production are no longer utilisable" (210), and it will *not* be able to go over to agriculture (211)....

"The possibility is thus excluded of a democratic socialism in the sense of a uniform, tightly-knit regulation of production as a whole by the mass of the people who possess nothing and rule everything.... !

Much more probable than the domination of peasant production by an industrial democracy is the domination of industrial production by a peasant democracy" (213). !

"However, the realisation of democratic socialism through an industrial democracy is absolutely ruled out if we accept:

"1. that peasant economy holds sway in the most important spheres of organic production; ?

"2. that the peasant masses hold fast to the private basis of production;

"3. that the peasant countries naturally endeavour to draw into their sphere the greatest possible share of industrial production;

"4. that, under the prevailing conditions of international competition, especially with the Chinese quarter of mankind drawn into the nexus of world economy, and with the conversion of other hitherto agrarian countries into industrial states, they can ? quite freely dispose of their industrial incomes which have already been monopolised not by them (215);

"5. that, on the other hand, the industrial states are to a growing extent dependent on foreign peasant bases for their supplies of food and clothing raw materials" (216)....

!?! ...“The unfortunate thing is that the industrialisation of the East, following the penetration of Western technical culture, can proceed much faster than the agrarianisation of the West, with its industrial over-tension and, it can be safely said, its industrial degeneration" (219)....

"Agrarian educational colonies" (224)—"a peasant internal colonisation" (225)—those are the "means" proposed by the author.

!!! *Conclusion* (i.e., last chapter): "*United States of Western Europe*" (229)....*

The African peoples require "guidance and care" "for an indefinite time to come" (232).... In 20–30 years it will be difficult even for Russia + Great Britain + France "to oppose a Chinese-Japanese coalition" (231)....

!! there is the possibility of a "great Islamic movement" in Africa, which will be "simultaneously both revolutionary and reactionary" (233).

!!!! "To prevent" (p. 233 in fine) such a movement —is in the "vital interest" of Western Europe.

sic!! 234—"Consequently" "joint action in Africa by all the West-European states" is *essential*.

sic!!! N.B. 234—It is *hopeless* to expect Russia (+ Japan, China and the United States) to join in agreements (on disarmament and so forth)—the *West-European* nations must unite.

! 235: We must "slow up" (verlangsamen) "the tempo of capital formation in Western Europe"... "moderate" the "industrial tempo"... "strengthen the peasant basis" ... a customs union ... progressive taxation, etc....

236——an import duty on grain is needed, but a "moderate" one.

238—a democratic union of *workers* (down with "*Communist utopias*") *and peasants* (238).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 281.—*Ed.*

239—"as a matter of course", a "United States of Western Europe" *will need a strong army and navy.*

240—Britain will prefer to join rather than remain in "imperialist isolation"....

Useful for understanding the tendencies of opportunism and imperialism *within* Social-Democracy!

P. TAFEL, *THE NORTH AMERICAN TRUSTS, ETC.*

Diplomingenieur *Dr. Paul Tafel*, The *North American Trusts and Their Impact on Technical Progress*, Stuttgart, 1913.
(Preface indicates that the author worked in the U.S.A. for seven years.)

According to Liefmann, *Cartels and Trusts.*

p. 1—Beginning of trusts (about) 1880s.
1900—185 trusts.
1907—250 with *7,000 million* dollars.

date of origin of trusts

p. 2—Number of *shareholders* (*steel* shares) > *100,000*!!

pp. 8-9—America passed *directly* to railways. "Even today there are still no main roads in the U.S.A. that can be used for travel in summer and winter" (71, note 9)....

!

Economic conditions and forms of trusts dealt with at length.

p. 48: "The chief rival of the Steel Trust, the Jones and Laughlin Co. of Pittsburgh, is said to have more modern equipment in its mills than the Trust.—Leather trust shareholders blamed the board for the business doing badly, because it had neglected the technical equipment of the factories. The harvester-machine trust was praised for sparing no expense to equip its factories with the most up-to-date machinery in order to reduce production costs and thereby raise competitive power. [Quoted from *Kartell-rundschau*, 1910, pp. 53 and 902.]

"The tobacco trust has gone the farthest, perhaps, in this direction. An official report says: 'The trust's superiority over competitors is due to the magnitude of its enterprises and their excellent technical equip-

ment. Since its inception, the tobacco trust has devoted all its efforts to the universal substitution of mechanical for manual labour. With this end in view it has bought up all patents that have anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and has spent enormous sums for this purpose. Many of these patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same object in view, the trust has built its own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the average 300 workers; here experiments are carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots, snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected.'"* (*Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry*, Washington, 1909, p. 266.)

N.B.

"It is quite obvious that such a policy greatly stimulates technical progress. Other trusts also employ what are called development engineers whose business it is to devise new methods of production and to test technical improvements. The Steel Trust grants big bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions that raise technical efficiency, or reduce cost of production."**

Besides competition, the bad financial circumstances of the majority of trusts (owing to *over-capitalisation* (N.B.)) are a stimulus to technical progress.

The capital of the Steel Trust = about $1,000 million ("one-seventh of the total national property"). The shareholders received three new shares for each old one. (Cf. also **Glier** in ***Conrad's Jahrbücher***, 1908, p. 594.)

N.B.

Interest has to be "earned" on this *triple* capital!!!

The capital of the railways = $13,800 million. Of this, about *8,000 million* is fictitious capital!! (p. *52*).

!

To continue. What if there is a complete monopoly? (At

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 203-04.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 204.—*Ed.*

present the *greater* part consists of
(α) outsiders
(β) the world market

In the U.S.A., *only* the post office is run by the government. *Everything else* (including railways, telegraphs, etc.) belongs to private companies.

1880—177 telegraph and parcel-post companies with a capital of 66.5 million dollars;

1907—25 companies with a capital of 155 million dollars of which 6 ↔ 97.7 per cent of the total receipts. Price is uniform and for telegrams "excessively high" compared with Europe (p. 60). N.B.

Railways in disorder: *Michelsen* (a leading authority!) calls them "anarchic, uneconomic, cumbersome, unscientific, unworthy of the genius of the American people" (p. 63).

—railway cars *very often* lacking, whenever there is a boom (1902, 1906), in a number of *localities*, etc., etc. N.B.

cf. *Conrad's Jahrbücher* (Blum), 1908, p. 183 N.B.

In the *recent period* the technical condition of the American railways has *deteriorated*; they lag behind Europe (p. 63).

The process of railway concentration was completed in 1899; by 1904 the price per ton-mile had *risen* from 0.724 cents to 0.780 cents ((!! p. 62)).

The Role of Technology. *Camphor*

	Million pounds	Price per pound
1868 export	= 0.6	16.4 dollars (!!)
1907 "	8.4	168.5 "

(in 1905 it became possible to produce it *artificially*; ← the price fell; but raw material (turpentine) was dear)

The position of the trusts is shaky: "colossi with feet of clay" ... p. 67 (an American writer says)... the future is dark....

N.B. On the trusts, *The North American Review* is frequently quoted.... 1904; 1908; 1902, p. 779; 1906; 1910, p. 486; and others

E. A. Heber, *Industrial Labour in Japan*, *Zurich*, 1912.
N.B. A **very** detailed work.
J. Grunzel is quoted, *The Error in Regard to Productive Forces*.
Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung, *Vol. 20*, Nos. 3 and 4.
Quoted by Tafel
?? *J. Grunzel*, *The Triumph of Industrialism*, 1911.

NOTE ON K. KAUTSKY VERSUS IMPERIALISM

N.B. **Kautsky on Imperialism**

Hobson's book on imperialism is useful in general, and especially useful because it helps to reveal the basic falsity of Kautskyism on this subject.

Imperialism continually gives rise to *capitalism anew* (from the barter economy of the colonies and backward countries), giving rise *anew* to transitions from small-scale to large-scale capitalism, from weakly developed to highly developed commodity exchange, etc., etc.

The Kautskyites (K. Kautsky, *Spectator* and Co.) quote these facts about "healthy", "peaceful" capitalism, based on "peaceful relations", and *counterpose* them to financial robbery, banking monopolies, deals by the banks with the state, colonial oppression, etc.; they *counterpose* them as the normal to the abnormal, the desirable to the undesirable, the progressive to the reactionary, the fundamental to the accidental, etc.

This is the new Proudhonism.[15] The old Proudhonism on a new basis and in a new form.

Petty-bourgeois reformism: *in favour of* a cleanish, sleek, moderate and genteel capitalism.

N.B.
N.B. || On the concept of imperialism + the artificial halting of progress (buying up of patents by the trusts: e.g., in this notebook the example of the German bottle manufacturers*).

Approximately: N.B.

Imperialism =
(1) banking capital
(2) monopolies (trusts, etc.)

* See p. 86 of this volume.—*Ed.*

(3) division of the world. [Colonies]
(4) alliance (connection, *merging*) of banking (finance) capital with the state machine
(5) highest degree of concentration

E. AGAHD, *BIG BANKS AND THE WORLD MARKET*

E. Agahd—St. Petersburg. *Big Banks and the World Market.*

"The economic and political significance of the big banks in the world market from the standpoint of their influence on Russia's national economy and German-Russian relations." Berlin, 1914. Preface dated: **May 1914**.

Reviewed by *Spectator* (author is often naïve and "exaggerates the importance of the big banks", etc.) in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1915, 1 (33rd publication year), p. 61 et seq.

The author spent fifteen years in Russia as inspector of the Russo-Chinese Bank. There is much of the offended vanity of the unrecognised financial expert, much chatter (a host of phrases against "dilettantes" and "amateurs", etc.).

One can and should take Agahd's figures and facts, but not his arguments in favour of the British banking system (separation of deposit banks providing short-term commercial and industrial credits from speculative banks), nor his arguments against protectionism, etc., etc. The author wants an "honest", moderate and genteel capitalism, without monopolies, without speculation, without promotion of bubble companies, without "links" between the banks and the government, etc., etc.

α) Société Générale, etc.
β) Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (popularly called "Paribas")
γ) Banque de l'Union parisienne....

"The Paris banking trio, with assets of several thousand million francs, and with Russia as its chief market, controls the following Russian banks: (1) the Russo-Asiatic

Bank, (2) the St. Petersburg Private Bank, (3) the Union Bank, and has introduced on the Paris stock exchange the shares of some industrial concerns that are closely connected with these banks" (55)....*

N.B. Here, too, quantity passes into quality: banking manipulation and narrow banking specialisation *become* an effort to assess broad, mass, national and *world-wide* mutual relationships and connections (Zusammenhänge)—simply because billions of rubles (in contrast to *thousands*) lead to this, depend on this.

N.B. "In 1905-06, large sums of Russian capital were transferred to European, especially Berlin, banks; but great as was the panic effect of the brief rule of the masses in revolt against private ownership, the latter rapidly recovered its calm and reaction was back in the saddle with renewed strength.

"In 1907-08 we already see Russian capital flowing back, bringing with it new international capital" (59).

p. 59,

	Deposits (million rubles)		
	1906	1908	
× in ten Russian banks	614	875	× Siberian Commercial; Russian; International; Discount; Azov-Don; Private; "Petropari"?? (= St. Petersburg-Paris?); Volga-Kama; Northern and *State*.

"The above-mentioned figures, it should be noted, illustrate only a difference of 261 million rubles in St. Petersburg bank deposits during the *two years when business was completely stagnant*." (Agahd's italics.)

"If one adds the Moscow and provincial banks, and further the Crédit Lyonnais and private bankers, and undeposited money, the figure could well be doubled, and it would not be too high to estimate that about *500 million rubles of 'panic-struck capital'* [Agahd's italics] flowed abroad and back into the Russian banks in the form of cash"... (59).

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 231.—*Ed.*

"However, the total amount of '*panic-struck capital*' must have been much larger.

"The current rate of Russian 4 per cent Consols was quoted as follows:

	1905	— 65%
January	1907	— 73.5
October	1907	— 67
	1908-09	— 88
	1910-11	— 95
	1912-13	— 92.5

and, according to data of the Credit Office, dividend payments changed as follows:

	Million rubles abroad		in Russia
1908	202	—	195
1910	175	—	233

"These figures, of course, do not allow of an absolutely certain conclusion because current security prices varied considerably and ruble encashment in Russia could often have been advantageous.

"Nevertheless, it can be assumed that a considerable part of the cash sent abroad returned in the form of Russian annuities. Even if one puts this at only 500 million rubles, the amount of '*panic-struck capital*' rises to about a thousand million rubles" (60). N.B.

... "The danger of a fall in the value of the ruble, and a financial crisis, which was developing at the close of 1905, were averted when the Russian syndicate in Paris, with the participation of the British money market, took up the 5 per cent loan in the spring of 1906. N.B.

"The government treasury thus received almost one *thousand million* rubles in cash. In the following quiet years of 1907-08 the banks and the state treasury were in a very favourable position, that is to say, cash was freely available, the force of facts had powerfully stimulated thinking, and something sensible could be created on a realistic basis,—if desired.

N.B. "as well" N.B.

"These two years had a beneficial effect on trade and industry as well, and led to improvement and reconstruction. Private industry, i.e., industry not dependent on government orders (oil, sugar, textiles, paper, timber), remained thoroughly healthy, and it was only the labour question that assumed quite a different, i.e., a political, character" (61)....

"The years of change, 1905-08, caused many Russian capitalists to deposit their liquid money in German banks"... (see above).

sic!!

"Things went so far that one of the most conservative (and most independent) Russian banks bought Prussian Consols as a reserve against unforeseen developments.

N.B.

"At that time (1906) the Russian banks were not particularly rich in cash.—The intense peasant movement had caused much damage in the villages; the workers in the towns, however, had left trade and industry comparatively unharmed. The fact is well known that, in spite of the numerous strikes, there were only a few acts of sabotage against private property and warehouses belonging to trade and industry (the sabotage in Baku should be attributed to Armenians and Tatars) (apart from the gross disorders on the railways, which, however, should not be ascribed to the free workers)."

N.B. The author, of course, is an arch-bourgeois and nationalist in his political sympathies!

"In fact, the number of bills protested at that time rose only slightly, which caused the more surprise in financial circles of the continent, the less the contemporary (peasant) movement was understood" (66).

Bills of Russian banks protested, according to balance-sheets of November 1, 1905 and following years (p. 66):

			Million rubles						
			1905	1908	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911
N.B.	State Bank	Bills discounted,	188.8	171.4	215.7	194.8	211.8	243.8	
		of which protested	3.9	1.5	1.6	2.1	2.6	1.1	
	8 St. Petersburg commercial banks	Bills discounted,		352.0	376.0	445.0	523.0	677.0	788.0
		of which protested		4.9	2.2	2.6	5.2	2.9	4.1

"Berlin financial circles particularly weakened their relations with Russian private industry in 1905-06, that is, precisely when there was a large flow of cash from all parts of Russia. Until then the Lodz weaving and spinning mills (mostly German-owned) had depended mainly on the Berlin financial market and had always been good clients; nevertheless the Berlin banks deprived these firms of considerable credits, forcing many of them not only substantially to reduce production, but even send a consortium of very wealthy Lodz textile industrialists to the Caucasus to take part in mining enterprises there and seek contacts with the London and even the New York market. Contacts were not established chiefly due to the pogroms which took place at that time" (67).... !!

..."It should be borne in mind, that Russia's losses in the Japanese war, including Port Arthur, Dalny and the southern part of the Chinese-Eastern railway, amounted to approximately 4,500 million rubles, i.e., half of the national debt, on which, consequently, the Russian peasants have to pay interest and amortisation, without receiving any of the capital" (72). N.B.

From Chapter V: "Participation of the German big banks in the St. Petersburg banks, etc." N.B.

How does the Deutsche Bank place shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank in Berlin?

..."The Deutsche Bank keeps new foreign shares

N.B. !!! in its portfolio for a year and then sells them on the Berlin Stock Exchange with a 50 per cent middleman's profit. The public pays at the rate of 193 for 100"... (74)*

"so that a 'German' big bank comfortably and rapidly makes a profit (on the market price)"... (74).

..."Since, however, the Deutsche Bank has placed the shares among the Berlin public at 195 per cent, and subsequently still dearer (at present the market price is 230 with a 15 per cent dividend—the rate of interest is therefore 6½ per cent), the primary concern of the bank's board in St. Petersburg must be to ensure that dividends remain at the same level. *This is a categorical demand of the foreign bank. It is the only demand it makes.*—How it is done is a matter of complete indifference to it, and the result is wild speculation on the Stock Exchange and speculative share-promoting into which the St. Petersburg banks are directly forced by the 'holdings system'" (77).

N.B.

"Statistically, from the German standpoint, the operation appears as follows:

"Increase of capital since 1906-07:

16,000,000 rubles—nominal share capital at the average market price of about 200 (when put on the Berlin Stock Exchange)

10,000,000—from issues on reserve account

26,000,000—in all

32,000,000—actual capital at 200

6 million rubles — 6,000,000 rubles—difference—middleman's profit in favour of the Deutsche Bank and its clients" (78)....**

..."The Deutsche Bank thus offered the German public about 32,000,000 rubles of shares with the sole aim that it, the Deutsche Bank, should pocket the Judas reward of several millions in market price difference" (78).

!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 232.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 232.—*Ed.*

At a general meeting of Siberian Commercial Bank shareholders on March 23, 1913, a small group of shareholders headed by a barrister, Bibikov, protested against the decisions of this general meeting. (*Birzheviye Vedomosti* No. 14017, February 21, 1914; *S. Peterburgskaya Gazeta* No. 51, February 22, 1914; *S. Peterburgskaya Gazeta* No. 54, February 23, 1914.) The protesters proved ... "that the bank's director-general (a certain Soloveichik, connected by family ties with one of the Deutsche Bank directors) had put to his own private account seven million rubles of government subsidies and had used the money to buy shares of his own bank and thus acquire the majority of votes needed for his re-election" (79)... "If it is borne in mind that German capital operates here, and that such business methods are encouraged by the famous Deutsche Bank, increased importance attaches to the conclusion which I am endeavouring to prove in this book, viz., that the 'holdings system' prevents even a serious Russian side from ensuring a sound and orderly management of the credit institutions that are so important to Russia. The Deutsche Bank is, of course, in a position to procure for itself a majority of votes, but the Russian shareholders, who also participate in the bank, will never be able to secure a majority sufficient to put into practice their just wishes and reasonable views" (80).

!!

!!

...."Since 1906 there has been still further and greater German participation in the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, known as the *Russian Bank*, and the St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank, known as the *International*; the former belongs to the Deutsche Bank concern, the latter to the Discontogesellschaft in Berlin. Both these Russian banks employ three-fourths German money (share capital).* The Russian Bank and the International are the two most important Russian banks. Both are strongly speculative"... (82).

N.B.

* Ibid., p. 232.—*Ed.*

Increase of Capital, million rubles (p. 84)

	Capital			Reserves		
	1906	1912		1906	1912	
Russian Bank	20 —	50	(+30)	3 —	15	(+12)
International	24 —	48	(+24)	12 —	24	(+12)
	44	98	+54	15	39	+24*

ΣΣ = 78 + 32 (Siberian Bank) = 110

These banks have "obtained since 1906 a total share capital of 110 million rubles, whereby a middleman's profit of several million rubles passed into the exchequer of the promoters" (84)....

p. 97 ... "for that (*The Times Russian Supplement*) at any rate subsidies are paid from the Russian Ministry of Finance"....

Chapter 8: "Total Amount of St. Petersburg Banks Operating with Foreign Participation and Some Comments on the Figures."

000 million rubles

a 1) 0.4 + 0.8 = 1.2	1.3 + 1.7 = 3.0
a 2) 0.2 + 0.2 = 0.4	b) 0.5 + 0.4 = 0.9
a 3) 0.7 + 0.7 = 1.4	1.8 + 2.1 = 3.9

"At that time (1911) the Russian Credit Office [N.B.: in other passages: its director *Davydov*] gave the Russian banks, for stock-exchange operations in Paris and Petersburg, first 120 million francs and later a further loan, altogether about 100 million rubles, to subsidise the wild banking speculations which had reached a deadlock (the official designation was: for stabilising the market price of Russian state securities)"... (86).

p. 121: ...in *1912* the Russian commercial banks-altogether had *548* branches....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 232.—*Ed.*

	External investments (assets)		Marked in pencil are my columns and my totals ↓	*Million rubles* Liabilities (debits)			
	Productive (trade and industry)	Speculative (Stock Exchange and finances)	**Million rubles**	Capital and reserves	Deposits	Debts at other banks and rediscounts	Acceptance
St. Petersburg deposit banks							
a) Under the "holdings system"							
1) ***German holdings*** (4 banks: Siberian Commercial, Russian, International and Discount Bank)	413.7	859.1	1,272.8	207.1	658.8	429.0	48.6
2) ***British holdings*** (2 banks: Russian Commercial and Industrial; Russo-British)	239.3	169.1	408.4	55.2	204.8	111.5	16.2
3) ***French holdings*** (5 banks: Russo-Asiatic, St. Petersburg Private; Azov-Don; Union-Moscow; Russo-French Commercial)	711.8	661.2	1,373.0	234.9	736.4	308.0	29.5
	1,364.8	1,689.4	3,054.2	497.2	1,600.0	848.5	94.3
b) Independent Russian banks (St. Petersburg and Moscow) (8 banks: Moscow Merchants, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St. Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow (formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial, Moscow Private)	504.2	391.1	895.3	169.0	599.6	127.0	—
Total	1,869.0	2,080.5	3,949.5	666.2	2,199.6	975.5	94.3
	3,949.5			3,935.6			

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 231.—*Ed.*

The growth of "mutual credit societies" (p. 122)

(according to Credit Office figures)
million rubles

	Number	Members	Capital	Total assets	Deposits	Accounts
1907	261	158,000	39	319	203	246
1912	776	502,000	99	899	487	687

N.B.
N.B.

(136 and others.) Russian Ministers of Finance appoint bank directors (often from government officials), give the banks millions in subsidies through the "Credit Office", etc.

well put!

"This gives the key to the activity of those St. Petersburg banks—'Russian' in their external appearance, 'foreign' in the sources of their funds, 'dilettante' in their conduct of business, and 'ministerial' in the risks they take—which have grown into parasites of Russian economic life.—*And this precedent* [reference is to the Siberian Bank, etc.] *has now become a principle of organisation for the St. Petersburg banks*. The Berlin and Paris directors of the big banks believe that the following guarantee their interests

"1) the direct Credit Office subsidies to St. Petersburg banks,

!!
N.B.

"2) the credit balance of the Russian Finance Ministry (of which about 60 per cent is in Paris and 40 per cent in Berlin)" (137)....

"The Finance Ministry authorised the Russo-Chinese Bank [in which the author served!!] to issue a series of state-guaranteed securities to provide it with the necessary cash resources, without being concerned as to how these were used. Thus, for example, it handed over to the bank the issue of state-guaranteed railway shares in European Russia, and the income went directly into the bank's coffers. The railways would need the money gradually, in the course of 4-5 years (during their construction), and in the meantime the bank could freely dispose of the money and, in addition, earn

N.B.
!!

profit from the issue of the shares. This became an established procedure, for it was repeated several times each year" (149).

(The shares of four railways total £12,800,000 = about 120 million rubles.)

"The director (who is also the president) of the bank is a board member of a number of big railway and industrial companies (at present about 20), which likewise have to keep their free cash on current account in the bank, knowing that the Finance Ministry is greatly interested in the bank and supports it" (149).

20 companies!!

N.B.!!

That is how "business" is done....

This in Chapter 11: "The Merger of the Russo-Chinese Bank with the Northern Bank (Russo-Asiatic Bank) and the Protest against This at the 1910 General Meeting" (p. 147):

(the protest was moved by the author himself)

"Most of those present at the general meeting of the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was intended to confirm the merger, were State Bank and Credit Office officials holding proxy votes"... (153).

N.B.!!

The author registered a "**dissenting opinion**", entered in the minutes of the meeting of March 30, 1910 (p. 154).

"The holdings system is nonsense"—the author argued in his protest... (p. 154).

A "merger" was carried out by the French banks (Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas + Société Générale) which were "interested" in the Russo-Chinese Bank, saw its affairs were in a bad state, wanted to "extricate" themselves and *hoped*

"by the merger [of the two banks into one—the Russo-Asiatic], to create such a big 'Russian' institution that the Russian government would be compelled to 'uphold' the merged bank under all circumstances" (p. 151).

N.B. !!

"When the merger took place, the share capital was reduced by 33 per cent and these sums were put

!! to reserve account. This gave the bank the appearance of having created this reserve capital as a result of good business management, while at the same time enabling the new administration in the future to distribute the entire profit (!) on a diminished capital at a higher rate of interest,
N.B. because the reserve capital had, at one stroke, reached the legal maximum and no interest had to be paid on it. The shareholders were helpless even against this manipulation, for they were in France, while the general meetings took place in St. Petersburg"... (152).

..."When the Russo-Asiatic Bank states that its share capital is 45 million rubles and reserve capital 23.3 million rubles, every unprejudiced person will assume that the reserve has been derived from earned money, i.e., is the result of good business management. In reality, however, it comes out
!! of share capital, and is the result of bad business management. Neither bank had reserves prior to the merger" (153)....

And, in fact, this bank, with 120 branches (!!), has too *little* capital (a balance-sheet of *785*
!! million rubles with a capital of 73½ million + reserves—October 1, 1913)—"the risk of this overloading has to be borne by the Credit Office" (153).

..."Furthermore, it is quite clear that under the 'holdings system', which prevents the shareowners from passing judgement on the management of the company, because between them and the company stand the all-powerful big (foreign) banks,
N.B. which can use more or less 'masked combinations' to rob both sides, directors are appointed arbitrarily and according to private interests, so that,
ha-ha! in the end, any dilettante can become a bank director" (156-57).

The board of the Russo-Asiatic Bank consists of "a former Russian bureaucrat (as Director-Gener-
sic!! al and President of the bank), a former Russian Governor, a former French diplomat, and a former French lawyer" (158).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

All this criticism is stated to have been written in the autumn of 1913 and to have "become obsolete" owing to the Imperial rescript of January 30, 1914. ?

diplomacy?

The union of deposit and speculative banks is harmful because it

(1) "ties up" the country's productive means

(2) leads to a rise in prices, syndicates, etc.

"If clarity and order were established in banking conditions, I should indeed like to see whether there could be trusts, monopolies and syndicates" (179).... ha-ha! that what it comes to!!

"Let it be legally laid down that firms concluding agreements which militate against the consumer by eliminating competition (by dishonest competition) will not be granted official bank credits and, therefore, will not be allowed to issue securities, and then monopolies and syndicates might very soon be dissolved" (180). ha-ha!! simple!!

Subsidies of the Credit Office (pp. 202 and 204) to the St. Petersburg banks amount to *800-1,000* million rubles*. !!

The Credit Office ... "is the keyboard controlling all credit activity in the Empire". "It is a bureaucratic apparatus without a statute and without public control" (200).

..."In 1910 it was ... reformed and since then its task has been to 'co-ordinate' the activities of all the credit institutions of the country,** and '*it is the connecting link between these and the Stock Exchanges*'"..... The St. Petersburg banks report to it every eight to fourteen days, and in more detail every three months (201).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 238.—*Ed.*

** Ibid.—*Ed.*

Four "modes" of these subsidies*:

		Million rubles
(1)	Direct cash payments (to the banks) from assistance funds, up to	150
(2)	Assets in foreign banks (as concealed cover)	450
(3)	"Assignment of state-guaranteed stock issues"	150
(4)	"Discounting of financial bills (accommodation bills) with or without the endorsement of a foreign bank" . . . . . about	50
		Σ=800

"Deposits—1,648 million rubles, plus 800 in subsidies—amount to 2,448 million against 5,000 million, the total amount of free working cash in the country, according to data of Mr. Davydov (Credit Office), i.e., ...half the free working cash in the Russian Empire is tied up in international speculative banks, by the system of holdings. Years may elapse before this money is gathered in again (and put back in circulation)"... (204).

N.B.

Chapter 15 (p. 210): "*Relative Strength of the International Bank Trusts* in the Russian Market"....

N.B.

"Balance-sheet showing strength of the St. Petersburg banks (system of holdings)" (p. 211).

Million rubles

Assets		**Liabilities**	
Control of Trade and Transport		*Working Capital of the Banks*	
a) Industrial credits . .	1,350	a) Own funds	497
b) Shipping and private railways	1,509	b) Deposits (Russia) . .	1,600
c) Control of Russian private holdings . .	1,689	c) Credits	942
	4,548		3,039

* Subsidies of the credit office.—*Ed.*

Control of Production and Industry	
a) Syndicates in coal (Produgol)	
b) " " iron (Produamet)	
c) " " oil (General Oil, etc.)	
d) " " metallurgy (various)	
e) " " cement, building (various)	3,687
	8,235

Security Issues, 1908-12 (exclusive of government issues)	
a) In Russia	3,687
b) Abroad	1,509
	5,196
	8,235

{Table in full on pp. 211-12.}

"The strength relation of the three foreign groups of banks is:

(1) French bank trio plus 5 St. Petersburg banks	55 per cent	N.B. (p. 212)
(2) German-Berlin "D" banks plus 4 St. Petersburg banks	35 per cent	
(3) British-London syndicates plus 2 St. Petersburg banks	10 per cent"*	

..."On the other hand, the division of material liabilities (all in nominal values) is:

a) *Abroad*	(Million rubles)
Security issues	1,509
Bank demands (excluding counterdemands of the Credit Office) about	300
Holdings in bank shares	295
Other share holdings	500
	2,604

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 232.—*Ed.*

b) *Russia*

Security issues, deposits and miscellaneous . . .	4,831
Credit Office (without last railway loan)	800
	5,631 ‖
	Σ=8,235"

"The clear meaning of these statistics of proportions is that the one-third minority of capital-exporting countries dominates the two-thirds majority of Russia as a capital-importing country (p. 213), and, moreover, in such forms (subsidies, syndicates, cartels, etc.) that this minority can protect neither its own interests nor those of others. In consequence of this, last but not least,*] the private interests of a few boards of big banks dominate, not officially but secretly, and in such a way that all concerned suffer."

{ In this the author sees the cause of the rise of prices, even giving (p. 213) an approximate percentage rise of prices in 1908-13, but this cannot be taken seriously, it is not a proof, simply an unnecessary illustration.... }

On p. 214 he gives the following *official statistics from the Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta*:

		Million rubles
N.B.	Total amount of share capital (beginning of 1914)	3,600
	Plus industrial (stock)	400
	" railway shares	140
		4,140
	Plus state loans and guaranteed railway stock in Russian bands.	6,072
	" private mortgages	2,956
		13,168

| The St. Petersburg banks, he says, are "artificially [?] created international money trusts" (215). |

* These four words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

...“the programme of a modern big bank director is quite clear and obvious; it reads:

“*If we, the big banks, succeed in ruling over producers and consumers* (*through stock issues, credit and customs duties*), *then the profits will flow into our pockets and we become masters of the situation*” (Agahd’s italics) (218).

“if” is amusing (“a Narodnik”!)

Agahd “forgot” a trifle: capitalism and the capitalist class!!

The consequence of this, he says, may be “excessive raising of customs duties” and because of that “open hostility in the world market, which could even lead to war, what may also suit the big bank monopolists, because with the force majeure of war they can purge their balance-sheets without being held personally responsible for the losses” (220)....

“even” to war

one of the motives for war

On p. 234 the author quotes **S. Prokopovich** (on the conditions of Russia’s industrial development)—

Capital of Russian origin
447.2 mill. rubles = 21.1%
Capital of foreign origin
762.4 mill. rubles = 35.9%
Capital “from sale of stock”
915.6 mill. rubles = 43.1%

Σ is 100.1%

Here, says Agahd “the bank question, with which the author (Prokopovich) is not familiar”, plays the biggest role.

On the question of Russia's *balance of trade*, the author writes that the excess of the credit over the debit side was

1909— 570 mill, rubles (p. 238)
1910— 511
1911— 430

1,371*
— 600 —minus coupon payments abroad of 200 million rubles per annum

771 —"total excess in 3 years".

"Concerning this sum, therefore, it can be said that it has in part (I put it at 500 million rubles) more than normally enriched the country in cash resources thanks to especially good harvests. But this figure proves, plainly and obviously, that the apparently gigantic upswing in Russia was by no means due only to favourable harvests.

"To this must be added the import of capital under guaranteed and private stock issues of about 1,509 million rubles, of which, however, only a negligible amount was put on the market in the form of cash (most of it went into special undertakings).

N.B. "The director of the Credit Office (Davydov) gives the following estimate of the growth of the country's free working capital (by which he means private deposits in all the banks, savings-banks deposits (an increase of 576 million in cash and securities), current accounts of government agencies in the State Bank, excluding, however, current accounts of the Credit Office with foreign bankers and the debts of Russian banks abroad):
1906—2,592 million rubles
1912—5,000 million rubles" (p. 238).

* So given by Agahd.—*Ed.*

The growth, he says = about 2,500 million rubles, and import of capital about 1,600 + 771 (inflow due to good harvests) = 2,371 million rubles (p. 239)—"they approximately balance"....

"The Russian Finance Ministry utilises here" (in reference to Russia's excessive gold reserve) "its cash just as unscientifically, just as unsoundly from the economic standpoint, just as anti-nationally as most of the continental big banks in Berlin and Paris use their deposits. Russian government money serves to ensure the influence of some Berlin and Parisian big banks over the St. Petersburg banks (and their Russian deposits), while the country's productive economic life is weakened precisely where it ought to be strengthened" (247).

is it not the reverse? "the influence" of the Parisian and Berlin banks *compels*??

The national income (the "national budget agricultural production, i.e., the grain harvest and all other products") in Russia (1913) was only *9,000 million rubles* (249).

N.B.

...."Raising productivity and popular consumption is still the most profitable business" (265) (author's italics).

"Narodnik"

This is how the author criticises Witte's financial policy: "Then, too, they [Witte] went in for speculation and combinations and shifted the risk on to the Treasury, instead of properly organising things" (275)....

Speculation versus organisation!! Narodnik!! idem 281-82 and many more.

Author reproached Russian Finance Ministry: "No bounds were set for international speculation, nor was proper status allowed loyally co-operating foreigners in recognition of their achievements" (276)....

who is blaming whom? "honest broker"

... "good" banks ...	..."However, I again stress the difference between the speculating St. Petersburg banks (fiscal operations) and the productively employed Russian banks (national economy). One cannot but recommend the Volga-Kama Bank, the Moscow Merchants Bank, the Knoop and Wogau banks as models in directing banking business along lines that rule out speculation in deposit banks"... (280).
ha-ha!	"I have already expressed my *regret* that Russia is being involved in the 'money market of the civilised world'" (283).
!!	"Every country passing over to a money economy must reckon with the power of the Jewish international organisation," but (he intimates) the Jews are useful when they are subjected to the interests of the whole, as in Germany, where their talents are kept within the bounds of "reason and ethics" (284).
well said!	..."One can say: Under present circumstances the dividends of many big banks are paid out as if they were illegal payment for silence"... (286).

That "my" (Agahd's) "programme" should be "un-national"?? God forbid!! I am not a cosmopolitan, I am a nationalist (pp. *287* and *288*), I am for the independence of every nation, for good banking, for successful "deals".

gem (a nationalist)	..."If such a programme is not 'national', then please explain to me what is really meant by 'national'. Or will I be told that the founding and efficient management of lastingly profitable businesses does not come under this concept?" (288).

Author's italics:

for "peace" and a ("United States of Europe")	"Reform of the continental big-banking business is therefore in general the first condition for an economic-political agreement in Europe, and this is wholly in accord with the interests of the nations" (290)

and the last phrases in the book:

"And my final propositions *read* as follows: If the European (continental) Great Powers continue unswervingly their hitherto 'well-tried system', a world war will compel them to alter it. Freedom of the money market and freedom of the world market—through war or prudence. Let them choose and bear, in mind that Europe's ruling classes carry the entire responsibility."

threat of "world war"

End

BALLOD, STATISTICS

Professor Dr. *Karl Ballod*, *Fundamentals of Statistics*, Berlin, 1913. Ballod

A very good summary, apparently, of statistical data, the author being, above all, interested in statistics of *production* (***quantity*** of products)—cf. Atlanticus!!—

Ballod believes that in Germany there are *two iron slaves* (machines) for each worker

§ "***Technical Productive Power***"

Incomplete

	Steam	Water	Electricity	
Germany (1907)				(steam) *machinery*
8.8 mill. h.p. in industry	(7.3	+ 0.9	+ 1.5)	
America (U.S.A.)				
16.0 mill. h.p. in industry	(14.2	+ 1.8	+ ?)	
Britain (*) (1907)				
10.7 mill. h.p. in industry				
Total + locomotives 13 mill. h.p. (1895)				

Britain	(*) Figures for *Britain* from *Die Bank*, 1913, p. 190—Board of Trade data. Results of the "census of production" for *industry* (all). Gross sale value = £1,765 million; cost of raw materials = £1.028 million; further processing = £25 million. Net value [1 — — (2 + 3)] = £712 million. *Number of workers* = *6,985*,000. Machinery = *10,755*,000 *h.p.* [+ in agriculture, value = £196 million; workers, 2.8 million]. Total capital (in industry) = £*1,500* million.

Amount of *Water-Power*

	Million h.p.
Switzerland	1½-3
Sweden + Norway	8 (about 28 million)
Finland	4-6 (p. 255)
Niagara	4-5 (only one-tenth used)
Congo waterfalls (Africa)	28
South America (??)	1-2

OTTO, GERMAN OVERSEAS BANKS

Dr. Walter *Otto*, *Loan Acceptance*, *Company Formation and Holdings Business of Big German Overseas Banks*, Berlin, 1911.

(Lists each enterprise and gives tables of the "holdings" of the big banks, Part I according to continents and countries, Part II according to banks. **Raw material**.)

Percentages of the holdings of *British* and *French*, and *North American* groups are shown for **individual** enterprises, but there are no *summaries*.

Table on p. *245*: "Total functioning capital of German overseas banks" (10 banks) (I abbreviate from the annual figures):

1889— 45.6	million	marks
1890— 41.3	"	"
1900—206.5	"	"
1905—329.3	"	"
1908—607.1	"	"

DIOURITCH, *THE EXPANSION OF GERMAN BANKS ABROAD*

Georges Diouritch, The Expansion of German Banks Abroad, Its Connections with Germany's Economic Development, Paris (and Berlin), 1909 (798 pp.).

A gigantic volume with heaps of data; part is already in Riesser; I select some additional data:

p. 37: According to figures of *Der Deutsche Oekonomist* (1906, p. 452), German banks have a capital of *11,394* million (their own and borrowed money).

Of which	3,335	controlled by	Deutsche Bank group	17	banks
	2,145	" "	Dresdner Bank + Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein	13	"
	1,843	" "	Discontogesellschaft	8	"
	908	" "	Darmstädter Bank	6	"
	Σ 8,231	4 groups		44	"
		+4 less powerful groups			

ΣΣ=9,566=in all about 80% { Commerz- und Disconto-Bank; Mitteldeutsche Kredit-Bank; National-Bank für Deutschland; Berliner Handelsgesellschaft }

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p. 84 ... French capital invested abroad:

According to the *Journal officiel*, September 25, 1902	Europe	21,012 million marks (sic! misprint?). It is now said to be about *40,000 million*
	Asia	1,121
	Africa	3,693
	America . . .	3,972
	Australia and Oceania . . .	57
		29,855

pp. 126-27: "Big German bank connections with industrial companies through participation in their supervisory boards" (table compiled by Hans Arends and Kurt Wossner from data in the *Directory of Company Directors and*

Members of Supervisory Boards, Berlin, 1903): the author gives figures by industries; take only the totals:

Methods of participation						
Through administrators . . .	101	31	51	53	68	40
Through members of its own supervisory board	120	61	50	80	62	34
By one or the other of above methods	221	92	101	133	130	74
Through chairmanship of the board, or through more than two members	98	43	36	41	46	33

p. *213*. Participation of the chief countries in maritime telegraph cables of the world:

	1898	1903
Britain	68.33%	60.2
U.S.A.	11.10	18.2
France	10.10	9.0
Germany.	1.88	4.5
Russia.	4.32	3.8
Japan	0.90	0.8

p. 239... Electrical firms abroad (from *Fasolt*, *The Seven Big Electrical Companies*, *Their Development*... Dresden, 1904); I take only figures on *Russia* and totals (million marks):

Group		
Siemens and Halske	33.10	104.39
A.E.G.	2.88	52.04
Schuckert	1.60	25.66
Union Elektrizitätsgesellschaft . . .	2.88	17.53
Hellos.	21.60	27.70
Lohmeyer	—	5.12
Kummer.	—	0.69
	Σ=62.06	233.13

pp. 245 and 246. Oil output in Rumania

in 1886	53,000 tons
" 1907	900,000 "

Foreign capital in this industry*:

{Not a bad example}

German	74 million francs	
French	31	
Dutch	22	
Rumanian	16	
Italian.	15	
American.	12.5	(54)
Belgian	5	
British	3	
Other countries .	6.5	
	Σ=185	

p. 283 et seq.

British colonial banks:
32 banks . . . 2,136 branches . . . £50,300,000 (share capital)
×25=1,257,500,000 francs

French colonial banks:
20 banks 136 branches** . . . . . 326,800,000 francs

Netherlands colonial banks:
16 banks 67 branches . . . . . 98 million florins
×2(??)=196 million francs

((a mass of purely monographic data on each big bank and on some German overseas banks))

A few examples:
(p. *631*) Deutsch-Asiatische Bank (in Shanghai) (founded February 12, 1889)
Distribution of 5,000 shares (of 1,000 thalers each)

p. 743: Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank, founded January 5, 1905
4,000 shares (=2 million marks)

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 249.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 245.—*Ed.*

1.	Board of Discontogesellschaft	805	shares —— 250
	" " Seehandlung Bank	175	
	Deutsche Bank	555	—— 250
	Bleichröder	555	—— 100
5.	Berliner Handelsgesellschaft	470	
	Bank für Handel und Industrie	310	
	Robert Warschauer & Co	310	—— 100
	Mendelsohn & Co.	310	—— 100
10.	Jacob Stern (Frankfurt-am-Main)	470	
	M. A. v. Rothschild (" " ")	310	
11.	Norddeutsche Bank (Hamburg)	380	
12.	Sal. Oppenheim & Co. (Cologne)	175	—— 100
13.	Bayrische Hypotheken und Wechselbank (Munich)	175	
		5,000	

Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft	2,800
Delbrück Lev	100
Hansing & Co.	100
Van der Heydt	100
	4,000

Discontogesellschaft	800	Bleichröder	555
Deutsche Bank	555	Mendelsohn	310
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft	470	J. Stern	470
Darmstädter Bank	310	Rothschild	310
	2,135		1,645

KAUFMANN, *FRENCH BANKS*

Dr. Eugen Kaufmann, *French Banks*, Tübingen, 1911 (Supplement I to *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik).**

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 214.—*Ed.*

p. *362* (I abbreviate): Development of the French network of branches since 1870 (3 big banks: Crédit Lyonnais; Comptoir National, and Société Générale)

p. 356 The same three banks

p. 37 French savings banks

	Provincial branches	Deposit offices in Paris	Σ	Own working capital shown on balance-sheet	Borrowed money	Total deposits (mill. francs)	Number of depositors (mill.)
1870	47 +	17 =	64 —	(1872) *200* mill. fr. +	*427*		
1880	128 +	68 =	195 —	253	953		
1890	192 +	66 =	258 —	265	1,245	— 3,325	7.3
1900	505 +	120 =	625 —	615	2,300	— 4,274	10.7
1909	1,033 +	196 =	1,229 —	887	4,363	— 4,773 (1906)	12.5

The French Ministry of Finance has estimated (on the basis of inheritance taxes) the national wealth at 200,*000 million* francs (1903-05)—which is below the actual figure. !!

of which *55* (27%) belongs to *18,000* persons (p. 37)
75 (37%) " " *45,000* "

p. *85*: Excursus: "***French Ownership of Securities***" N.B.

	000 million francs		Per annum
Théry's calculation (1907)	61.4	French	1,300 *million* (p. 87)
N.B.	38.5	foreign	1—or rather (he says) *1*,500 **million** francs
	99.9		

About ***100***,000 million francs

Théry (1907) estimates ownership of securities throughout the world to be 730,*000 million* francs.

including	115-130	(Great Britain)	
	110-115	(U.S.A.)	
	100-100	(France)	these are Neymarck's figures
	60- 75	(Germany)	
	385-420		

(*)

N.B. (*) p. 287, a note (E. Kaufmann):... "Thus the Deutsche Bank, which, according to the balance-sheet, has holdings of 72 million marks, dominates a group of joint-stock banks which together have about *500 million* of capital and 1,300 million of borrowed money" (cf. *Lansburgh*, "The Holdings System in German National Banking", *Die Bank*, 1910, June, p. 504).

Théry's estimate

Russian (securities)	—10.9 thousand million francs
Austro-Hungarian	— 3.65
Egyptian	— 3.05
Turkish	— 2.5
Dutch	— 1.45
Swiss	— 1.45
Italian	— 1.4
Portuguese	— 1.35
British (including colonies)	— 1.30
Belgian (" ")	— 1.25
Brazilian	— 1.20
Argentine	— 1.10
Balkan states (except Turkey)	— 1.050

HEGEMANN, FRENCH BANKS

C. Hegemann, The Development of French Big Banks, Münster in Westphalia, 1908.

From his ***Table II*** (No. of sections—branches and deposit offices—of the same *three* big French banks) (p. 47).

	Sections abroad	Provinces	Paris	Σ
1870	62			62
1880	12	119	67	198
1890	24	194	66	284
1900	35	467	120	622
1906	44	660	179	883

!! 2 banks with 2,001-5,000 employees; 14— 101-200; 1,635—1-4
2 — 1,001-2,000 25— 51-100 110 ?
1 — 501-1,000 148— 21- 50
3 — 201- 500 261— 11- 20 Σ=2,945
744— 5- 10

HULFTEGGER, *THE BANK OF ENGLAND*

Otto Hulftegger, *The Bank of England*, Zurich, 1915. (Thesis.)

p. 400: Deposit increases in the Bank of England (exclusive of government money) and some big private banks:

	Deposits (£ *million*)			
	1890	1900	1912	Increase, 1890-1912
Bank of England	32.99	36.96	52.95	60%
Lloyds Bank Ltd.	19.28	51.02	89.39	364%
London City and Midland Bank	—	37.84	83.66	—
London Joint-Stock Bank. . .	11.62	17.16	33.83	191%
National Provincial Bank of England	39.59	51.08	65.66	66%
Parr's Bank	6.21	24.22	41.68	571%
London County and Westminster Bank	—	—	81.69	—

JAFFÉ, *BRITISH BANKS*

E. Jaffé, *British Banks*, 1904 (*Schmoller's Forschungen*) No. 109).

(pp. *234-35*)

Total deposits in all banks (£ *million*)	No. of branches	No. of inhabitants per branch
1858	2,008	
1872	2,924	10,767
1880 500-510	3,554 (1878)	
1881		9,461
1890 660-670		
1891		7,249
1900 840-850	6,512	
1901		6,238
1903 840-850	7,046	
1909: 915	7,861 (1908)	5,280

from *Dictionary of Statistics*

Webb, *A Complement to Mulhall*, 1911. August Webb.

In the U.S.A. in 1907 there were 23,900 banks, 1 per 3,600 inhabitants

MEHRENS, FRENCH BANKS

Bernhard Mehrens, The Origin and Development of the Big French Credit Institutions, Berlin and Stuttgart, 1911. (*Munich Economic Studies*, Brentano and Lotz; No. 107.)

p. *311*: French capital in securities (the same figures from Neymarck, as also in Kaufmann; see preceding page of this notebook).*

French capital in securities

	000 million francs	
N.B.	1850— 9 1869— 33 1880— 56 1890— 74 1902— 90 1906—100	Annual accumulation of capital in France —about 1,500-2,000 million francs according to Neymarck (pp. 311-12),— but as much as *2,500-3,000 million* according to Leroy-Beaulieu (p. 312, note).

	Total value of bills in France
in 1908 the Banque de France had 21.5 million bills valued at 12,300 million francs, p. *263*	1881— 27.2 1890—25.2 1900—28.9 1907—35.9 thousand mill. fr. (p. 211)

Capital Reserves (million francs)	
1892—250+ 69.5 1900—500+144.7 1908—575+216.2 in four banks	This is the capital and reserves of four banks: Crédit Lyonnais, Comptoir National, Société Générale + Crédit Industriel (p. 240).

WALLICH, CONCENTRATION OF GERMAN BANKS

Paul Wallich, Concentration in German Banking, Berlin and Stuttgart, 1905 (*Munich Economic Studies* No. 74, (Brentano and Lotz)) (p. 173).

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* See pp. 142-44 of this volume.—*Ed.*

{judging from a cursory examination, *nil* after Riesser, a clear but minor study, much poorer than Riesser's.}

ZOLLINGER (INTERNATIONAL BALANCE-SHEET) AND NEYMARCK

Dr. Walter Zollinger, Balance-Sheet of International Transfers of Securities, Jena, 1914. (*Problems of World Economy* No. 18, Leipzig, published by Harms.)

p. *106*: *Neymarck* (*Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique*, t. XIX, livr. II, 1912) gives the following figures of issues (22 for five years)** {cf. p. 17 in this notebook*}

000 million francs

1871-75— 45 1876-80— 31.1	76.1	1891-95— 40.4 1896-1900— 60	100.4	4-5% of 570,000 million=22.8-28.25 million fr.
1881-85— 24.1 1886-90— 40.4	64.5	1901-05— 83.7 1906-10—114.1	197.8	

p. 206

Ownership of Securities

(p. 223): {*A. Neymarck*}***

000 million francs

	End of 1908		End of 1910			
Great Britain	130-135		140-142	my calculation: 479=80%	Great Britain 142	
U.S.A. . . .	115-120		130-132		U.S.A. . . . 132	
France . . .	103-105		106-110		Germany 95	
Germany . .	80- 85		90-95		369 =61%	
Russia . . .	25-27	N.B.	29-31	N.B.		
Austria-Hungary . . .	21-22		23-24			
Italy	10-12		13-14			
Japan . . .	6-7		9-12			
"Other countries". . .	33-38		35-40			
Total . . .	523-551		575-600			

Checked with Neymarck, p. *223*

* See pp. 94-95 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 239.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid., pp. 239-40.—*Ed.*

(*) The figures for these "other countries", for 1902 only (32,000 million)*:

My calculation 1910			
Approximately 12.5	Holland	10	
7.5	Belgium	6	
7.5	Spain	6	
6.25	Switzerland . . .	5 ←	now 6, author believes
3.75	Denmark	3	
2.5	Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc. .	2	
40		32,000 million francs	

This according to Zollinger

(*) W. *Zollinger*, "International Transfer of Securities and Investment of Capital Abroad, and Their Influence on Producers and Consumers", in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. 69th year, No. 3.

N.B.

N.B. Cf. *Ferdinand Moos*, "French Credit Institutions and French and English Capital Investments Abroad". *Jahrbuch für Nationaloekonomie und Statistik*, third series, Vol. 39, 1910.

Switzerland has about 2,600 million francs worth of "foreign securities" (p. 147),

while France has about *900 million* francs in Switzerland—(1903) (148).

Swiss *railway* securities are held by

(Zollinger, p. 150)

	Million francs
France	— 420
Germany	— 67
Belgium	— 8
Britain	— 3
Holland	— 2
	Σ = 500 mill. fr.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 240.—*Ed.*

In *Switzerland*, foreign workers in industry = 24.4 per cent of all workers (Σ = 625,299), including 85,866 = 13.7 per cent *Italians*.

(Zollinger, p. 108) Security issues in Germany (from *Der Deutsche Oekonomist*)

	Securities Home	Foreign	Σ	
1886-90	4.4 +	2.3 =	6.7	thousand million marks
1891-95	4.8 +	1.5 =	6.3	
1896-1900	8.2 +	2.4 =	10.6	same figures in Neymarck, p. *232*
1901-05	8.3 +	2.1 =	10.5	
1906-10	12.6 +	1.5 =	14.1	

Security issues in France (Zollinger, p. III)

	French		Foreign		000 million francs
1902 —	64	+	66	=	130
1906 —	65	+	68	=	133
1910 —	69	+	73	=	142

"At the end of 1910, the world total of securities quoted and negotiable in the various financial markets was 815,000 million. Of this sum, 570,000-600,000 million are owned by nationals of various countries" (p. 223: Neymarck).

..."In fact, one must not confuse—as we always emphasise—the total value of securities quoted on one or several markets with the total owned by the capitalists of these countries. A security issue may be quoted and negotiated in several markets at the same time" (p. 203).

The author deducts the approximate sum of these duplications, arriving at a total of 575,000-600,000 million instead of 815,000.* N.B.

p. 201 et seq. *Bulletin*. Alfred *Neymarck*, "International Statistics of Securities".

Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique, p. 201. et seq.**

This article is *Neymarck*'s *ninth* study on this subject (the other eight are in *volumes* IX; XI, 2; XII, 1; XIII, 3; XIV, 2; XV, 2; XVI, 1; XVII and XVIII, 2). N.B.

* Ibid., p. 239.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*

N.B. They also contain several other of his articles on *the same* subject. See *index* in XIX, 3, for all 19 volumes

19 volumes (mostly with 2-3 numbers each)
Volume 1—1885
Volume 19—1911

In the present article, *Neymarck* also gives the following annual data on issues from 1871 to 1910:

39.1; 76.1 — 39.1 = 37.0 ÷ 7 = 5.3

1871	15.6	12.6	10.9	4.2	1.7	3.7	7.9	4.6	9.4	5.5	(1880)
[1881]	7.2	4.5	4.2	4.9	3.3	6.7	5.0	7.9	12.7	8.1	
(1891)	7.6	2.5	6.0	17.8	6.5	16.7	9.6	10.5	11.3	11.9	
(1901)	9.9	21.9	18.3	14.4	19.1	26.5	15.3	21.2	24.6	26.5	

Foreign capital

N.B.

Great Britain . . .	85,000 million francs	(1910) (p. 216)
France	40,000 ” ”	
Germany	20,000-25,000 ”	

Foreign trade (imports and exports) of all countries (*000 million* francs)

1867-68 — 55,000 million francs		Neumann-Spallart's figures (p. 219)
1876 — 70,000 ” ”		
1889 — 93,000 ” ”		
1910 — 132,000 _____		Neymarck's figure (p. 218)

000 million francs

Germany	20	U.S.A.	25
Great Britain . .	25	India (British) . . .	6
France	13	Japan	2.3
Belgium	6.7	Canada	3.5
Austria-Hungary	5.4	South Africa (British)	3
Italy	5.2	Egypt	2.2
Switzerland . . .	2.8		
Spain	2.0		42.0
	80.1		

80.1 + 42.0 = 122, but author counted 132!!??, and only for these countries!!!

The railways of the world (983,868 km. in 1909) are worth about **270**,*000 million* francs (p. 223).

	1885	1905	1909	
Europe	195.2	305.4	325.2	thousand km.
Asia	22.4	77.2	94.6	
America	246.1	450.6	504.2	
Africa	7.9	26.1	30.9	
Oceania	12.9	27.0	28.9	
	484.5	886.3	983.8	

The concluding words are amusing. §IX is headed: "International Public and Private Wealth and World Peace" (p. **225**)—..."Is it possible to believe that peace may be disturbed ... that in the face of these enormous figures anyone would risk starting a war?... Who would dare to incur such a responsibility?"...*

cf. Kautsky on "ultra-imperialism"[16]

"According to our previous statistics, the total of state funds and of securities, French and foreign, belonging to French capitalists could reach the following figures":

	000 million francs	of which foreign
Years: end 1850—	9	
1860—	31	
1869—	33	10
1880—	56	15
1890—	74	20
1902—	87 to 90	25 to 27
1910—	106 to 110	38 to 40

N.B. {Page 289} — cf. p. 67 of this notebook**

Distribution of French capital invested abroad by countries (p. 290):

	000 million francs
Russia	10-11***
Britain	½
Belgium and Holland	½
Germany	½
Turkey and Serbia	2-2½
Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece	2-3
Austria-Hungary	2-2½
Italy	1-1½
Switzerland	½

N.B.

Spain and Portugal	3-4
U.S.A. and Canada	2-3
Egypt and Suez	3-4
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico	4-5
China and Japan	1-2
Tunisia and French colonies	2-3

Σ (mine) = 34-43½

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 288.—*Ed.*
** See p. 146 of this volume.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 243.—*Ed.*

TAYLOR, *SHOP MANAGEMENT*

Fred. W. Taylor, Shop Management (translation and **additions** by ***Wallichs***). Second edition, Berlin, 1912.

Wallichs visited America in 1911. An example "from the Bethlehem steel plant" (p. 17):

	now	*formerly*
Total cost of transporting 924,000 tons	130,000	280,000 marks
Cost per ton	0.139	0.304 "
Earnings per worker	7.80	4.80 "
Tons transported per worker	57	16!!!

Another example (in marks) (p. 32)

	formerly		*now*
Daily wage	10.0		14.50
Machine costs	14.0		14.00
Total daily costs	24.00		28.50
Costs per item	÷5 =4.80	items per day	÷10 =2.85

sic!! "It should be borne in mind that at first a certain resistance is to be expected, especially from the backward section of the workers, who will always try by persuasion to prevent piece-workers from reaching the highest productivity" (28).

"...the difficult period of transition from the slow pace of ordinary work to the high speed which is the leading characteristic of good management" (29)....

p. 9: "The main aim of systematic go-slow practices is to keep the shop management ignorant of the potential productivity of machines and workers.

"This go-slow technique is so universal that hardly a competent workman can be found in a large establishment with conventional wage systems who does not devote a considerable part of his time to studying just how slowly he can work and still convince his employer that he is going at a good pace" (9)....

"Since 1883, the author has been introducing his method in the most diverse United States industries, and has never had to face strikes. He believes that, under his system, strikes are inevitable only if the majority of the workers belong to a union whose rules are so inflexible that members are allowed to work only on terms laid down by the union" (25).... !!

Another example (p. 33 et seq.). Girls tested polished steel balls *by hand*, rejecting them as spoilage if roughnesses, etc., were found.

Observation, control and "time studies" were introduced and the best workers chosen, etc., etc. "It turned out that the girls spent a considerable part of their time talking, or actually doing nothing. The most negligent girls were set apart or, if incorrigible, dismissed" (35)....

(p. 35)	*formerly*	*now*
Results: number of girls	120	35
{ their weekly wage	15—19 marks	27—35 marks
{ working day	10½ hours	8½ hours
{ quality of work	100%	158%

"System of functions" of the **foremen**

I) *in the workshop*

1. Organising foremen (of the work itself)
2. Foremen to adjust speed of work
3. Testing foremen
4. General supervisory foremen (order).

II. *in the office*

1. Route Clerk—sets tasks for each shop
2. Instruction Card Clerk—specifies how the job is to be done
3. Time and Cost Clerk
4. Shop Disciplinarian (general supervision)

N.B. It is a mistake to suppose that the factory works the better the fewer the number of its "non-productive" workers (productive=physical labour; "non-productive = supervisors, etc., foremen, etc.). *On the contrary.*

p. 50 [§133 (281-83)]. The best factories have one "non-productive" to six or seven productive workers. The worst have one "non-productive" to eleven productive.

p. 63. In the **excellent** Tabor Manufacturing Co. (with about 100 workers; makers of instruments and moulding-machines), **Wallichs** found one office employee to *three* workers!!!

p. 67. Conditions for "reform" ((time required for it =*2-4* years!!)) ... "that a body of workers of exceptionally high productivity should be enlisted, who will work extra hard and receive extra high wages"...

..."that the number of supervisory foremen and officials should be at least doubled" (67).

((Written reports at least in the form of *printed* index cards for *each* worker!! not to speak of foremen!!))

N.B. ..."however, quite a long time is still needed before they (the workers) learn to stay steadily at their work and make every minute count. Many of them, with the best of intentions, will fail in this and find that they have no place in the new organisation" (69).

N.B. ..."the opportunity of becoming a foreman or senior worker has become far greater, for under the new conditions an increased number of them are required" (75).

(*winning over* and *buying up* workers by *turning* them *into* foremen)

Time and motion studies are very difficult. A certain engineer (Sandford E. Thompson) (p. 81), for instance, spent **six** years conducting them in the building trades!!! He took every stop-watch observation himself and worked up and tabulated his data with the help of two assistants! ((Excavation, masonry, carpentry, cement work, plastering, and so on and so forth))

..."the tables and descriptive matter for one of these trades alone take up about 250 pages".... ‖ !

Further, by *tenths* of a second (p. 84) (special watches) —the smallest operations were studied (putting down a spade; taking up a wheel barrow; moving a wheel barrow; placing a wheel barrow; taking up a spade, etc., etc.), and measurement made (cubic metres) of the size of a wheel barrow, *idem* of a spade, etc., etc.

For measurement, the *best* (91) workers are to be chosen and paid a *higher* pay (**promising** an increase of pay)....

Yet another example: overhauling and cleaning of boilers. The author told his assistant to study this. The latter was a novice and did *nothing*. The author personally carried out the work, making a careful time study. It turned out that a great part of the time was lost owing to the "constrained position" of the workman (99). "*Protective pads*" were made "to fasten to the elbows, knees and hips, and special tools and appliances were made for the various work operations," etc., etc. (100).

"The whole scheme [many pages: how to perform the work] was much laughed at when it first went into use".... The result: cost of overhauling and cleaning of a set of boilers of 300 *h.p.* fell from **250** marks to **44** marks!!! ‖ 250 and 44

In the ten years the author worked at the Midvale Steel Works there were no strikes. The best workers did not join the unions, for they received the best (highest) pay.

"The firm followed the policy of raising the wages of each employee on a suitable occasion and promoting all who deserved it. A careful record was kept of each man's good points as well as his shortcomings, which was especially the duty of the foremen, so that justice could be done to each. When men throughout an establishment are paid according to their individual worth, it cannot he in the interest of those receiving high pay to join a union with the cheap men" (101).

There is a lot of talk about the unity of interests of the working class and the employers, etc. The author is *for* fines as the best disciplinary measure.... Fines for the benefit of the accident insurance fund ((from five pfennigs to 250 marks—the size of the fines *both against* officials *and against* oneself!!))....

N.B.
Under capitalism a "*torture* or a **conjuring trick**" only *60,000* workers

Wallichs's supplementary chapter ("Recent Successes")—in all, he says, about 60,000 workers in America are working on the principles of the reorganised institutions (well-thought-out leadership) (109)....

Gilbreth introduced it into the work of bricklayers and raised the number of bricks laid per worker from 120 to 350 per hour (109) by reducing the number of operations from eighteen to five....

Congress has appointed a committee to study the *Taylor* system (109)....

of course!

Very influential workers' unions are against the Taylor system (110)....

(Wallichs): ..."The expression 'well-thought-out leadership' is only a phrase, the content of which is better denoted by 'intensive productive activity'" (111-12)....

true!!!

Appendix. Discussion. Many maintain that Taylor is *reckoning without* his host: the workers' organisations will not permit it (119, 116 and others).

p. 129: Oberlin Smith proposes teaching the Taylor system in the schools....

End

SEUBERT, *THE TAYLOR SYSTEM IN PRACTICE*

Dipl. Ing. *Rudolf Seubert*, *The Taylor System in Practice*, Berlin, 1914.

The author spent eight months studying the Tabor Manufacturing Co. (Philadelphia) and promises a *detailed* practical description.

p. 6: "Those well acquainted with German and American conditions will at once concede that, as regards economic use of material, German industry is far in advance of American, but,

on the other hand, as regards economic use of human labour-power, Germany has still much to learn from the U.S.A." (7).... || characteristic!

"Time studies" are better called "productivity studies": not only is the *time* observed, but the *best work methods* are studied and deduced (9-10)....

—"The science of work" (10) |||| N.B.

Movement is studied by the cinematograph—a slanting position facilitates handling of the material (without looking) etc., etc. "No unnecessary or purposeless movements" (15). ||| N.B.

The method must be put into effect cautiously, in keeping with American *democratic* customs (p. 22) so that it shall not be regarded as "torture" (22). ||| sic!!!! N.B.

The wage increase is usually one-third, whereby the worker receives

an amount that, "as regards his position, already puts him (if + one-third) at the economic level of a fairly well-paid tradesman or technician" (22).... ||||| N.B. bourgeoisifying!!!

p. 30: "On the average" the Taylor reform takes "**five years**". The Tabor Manufacturing Co. was "in danger of **bankruptcy**" because of the expense of introducing the Taylor system. !!

The Tabor Manufacturing Co. was founded in the 1890s. In 1904 there was a strike (half-won). Things were going badly. Taylor offered to provide money if he were allowed to reorganise (32). Accepted.

After **five** years: production increased 80%;
costs decreased 30%;
wages increased 25%;

in 1912 45 workers (33)
48 (!!sic!!!) *officials* and *foremen* ((usually 1 : 3)) (clerks) (office workers and foremen). ||

Next come copies of the "keys" (abbreviations), formulas, papers, instructions—a mass of written material, highly complex ... office workers call it the "talmud" (p. 35)....

One employee is engaged solely in studying productivity (time studies), which enables him to study deeply all hand movements and operations, and to *improve* them.

...“In this way, hardly a day passes in the Tabor Manufacturing Co. without some aspect of the work being tested through productivity studies for its expediency and found capable of improvement” (107).

N.B.

N.B. p. 153: “Time and motion studies” = the most “interesting” and the most “sensational” feature of the Taylor system.

[Hours—hours and hundredths of an hour (p. 124). More convenient.]

Difficulties in applying the system in Germany: “In Germany, the social stratification of the working classes is a difficulty that should not be underestimated. In Germany, an academically educated man prefers to address one not so educated in a tone of command, and the same thing applies between the engineer and the foreman, and between the foreman and the worker. Under the Taylor system, where they must feel themselves co-workers, such a tone will no longer be permissible” (152).... It will take years to become accustomed to “workers being promoted to the posts of foremen and officials”....

!! N.B.

End

GILBRETH, *MOTION STUDY*

Frank B. Gilbreth, Motion Study as an Increase of National Wealth. (*Annals of the American Academy*, 1915, May, p. 96 et seq.)

...“The motions of every individual, no matter what his work may be, have been studied and standardised....

...“In laying bricks, the motions used in laying a single brick were reduced from 18 to 5, with an increase in output from 120 bricks an hour to 350 an hour. In folding cotton cloth, 20 to 30 motions were reduced to 10 or 12, with the result that instead of 150 dozen pieces of cloth, 400 dozen were folded, with no added fatigue. The motions of a girl putting paper on boxes of shoe polish were studied. Her

?

methods were-changed only slightly, and where she had been doing 24 boxes in 40 seconds, she did 24 in 20 seconds, with less effort. Similar studies have cut down the motions not only of men and women in other trades but also of surgeons, of nurses, of office workers; in fact, of workers in every type of work studied"... (96-97).

Assembly of braiding machines ... "where eighteen braiders had been assembled by one man in a day, it now becomes possible to assemble 66 braiders per man per day, with no increase in fatigue" (97)....

The latest method 1) micro-motion studies ... 2) use of the "chronocyclograph" (97)....

I. The "micro-motion clock" is placed in front of the worker and it registers "different times of day in each picture of a motion picture film" (98)....

II. "The chronocyclograph method of making motion study consists of fastening tiny electric light bulbs to the fingers of the operator, or to any part of the operator or of the material whose motion path it is desired to study"... (the movement of the light, its track, is photographed) (98).

These studies are in the interest of society as a whole.... "One typical result is the gradual filling in of the gap between the school and the plant. An intensive study of motions is proving that there are far greater likenesses in trades, and even professions, on the mechanical side, than we have ever believed possible. The demand of the industrial world will be more and more for young workers trained to be fingerwise" (101).... !! N.B.

This must be taught in the schools.

..."fingerwise, that is, training his muscles so that they respond easily and quickly to demands for skilled work"....

At present an "enormous waste" (102) is occurring from scattered, duplicated, etc., "investigations".... "It is the work of the United States Government to establish such a bureau of standardisation of mechanical trades. The standards there derived and collected would be public property, and original investigators could invent from these standards upwards" (103)....

a splendid example of technical progress under capitalism towards socialism.

JEIDELS, *RELATION OF THE GERMAN BIG BANKS TO INDUSTRY*

Dr. Otto *Jeidels*, *Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry with Special Reference to the Iron Industry*, Leipzig, 1905 ((Volume *24*, No. *2* of *Schmoller*'s *Forschungen*)).

The preface is dated: June 1905

Impossible to read *after* Riesser: repetitions, raw material, minor facts, nothing new.
This refers only to the beginning of the book. Apparently, Riesser stole from it. When it comes to the relationship to **industry**, Jeidels is richer, livelier, cleverer, more scientific.

a common phenomenon	p. 18: An example: the buying up of shares (1904) of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft in order to elect *Thyssen* on to the "Supervisory Board" (!!).

p. 57: Number of (joint-stock) banks and private bankers taking part in the issue of industrial stocks:

	No. of bankers	Issues per banker	No. of banks	Issues per bank
1871-72	90	4.4	31	6.1
1899	34	2.7	16	12.4

p. 103: The brothers Mannesmann sold their patents for "seamless pipes" for *16* million marks (!) (1890).

Every crisis (1857, 1873, 1900) leads to concentration, but especially 1900:

> "Side by side with the gigantic plants in the basic industries, the crisis of 1900 still found many plants organised on lines that today would be considered obsolete, the 'pure' [non-combined] plants, which were brought into being at the height of the industrial boom.

The fall in prices and the falling off in demand put these 'pure' enterprises in a precarious positions which did not affect the gigantic combined enterprises at all or did so only for a very short time. As a consequence the crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater concentration of industry than the crisis of 1873; the latter crisis also produced a sort of selection of the best-equipped enterprises, but owing to the level of technical development at that time, this selection could not place the firms which successfully emerged from the crisis in a position of monopoly. Such a durable monopoly exists to a high degree in the gigantic enterprises in the modern iron and steel and electrical industries owing to their very complicated technique, far-reaching organisation and magnitude of capital, and, to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry, certain branches of the metallurgical industry, transport, etc." (108)....*

N.B.

monopoly

p. 111: When it was found necessary to make the firm *Phoenix* join the *Stahlwerksverband*, the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein bought up the *majority* of its shares and ensured the adoption of the required decision.

In the same way, the *Dresdner Bank* "won" two places on the Supervisory Board of the Königs- und Laurahütte iron and steel mills (four years ago) and carried through what it wanted....

The role of the Supervisory Boards is very wide (in fact it could be = *management*)....

..."Seats on Supervisory Boards are freely offered to persons of title, also to ex-civil servants, who are able to do a great deal to facilitate relations with the authorities"...** (149).

sic! (simple!)

"Usually, on the Supervisory Board of a big bank, there is ... a member of parliament or of the Berlin City Council" (152)....***

the usual story!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 209.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 221.—*Ed.*

*** Ibid.—*Ed.*

155 (in fine)... "But the cases quoted [a number of "**names**" are cited: Dernburg—director of the Darmstädter Bank, Gwinner—director of the Deutsche Bank] clearly show that Industrial leaders are mainly on the Supervisory Board of companies of the same branch or the same region, whereas directors of the big banks, on the other hand, are on the boards of the most diverse enterprises"....

1. The director of the *Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein* is on the Supervisory Boards of *33* companies!! (p. 155).

p. 150: an example of *35* seats on Supervisory Boards being in the same hands... (35).

p. 156... "Simultaneously with this widening of the sphere of activity of certain big industrialists and with the assignment of provincial bank managers to definite industrial regions, there is a growth of specialisation among the directors of the big banks. Generally speaking, this specialisation is only conceivable when banking is conducted on a large scale, and particularly when it has widespread connections with industry. This division of labour proceeds along two lines: on the one hand, relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one director, as his special function; on the other, each director assumes the supervision of separate enterprises, or of a group of enterprises in the same branch of industry or having similar interests. One specialises in German industry, sometimes even in West German industry alone, others specialise in relations with foreign states and foreign industry, in information on the characters of industrialists, and others, in Stock Exchange questions, etc. Besides, each bank director often assigned a special locality or a special branch of industry; one works chiefly on Supervisory Boards of electric companies; another, on chemical, brewing, or beet sugar plants, a third, in a few iso-

"supervision" of social economy

N.B.

lated industrial enterprises, but at the same time works on the Supervisory Boards of non-industrial companies, such as insurance companies. To demonstrate this from the example of some Berlin bank directors would take us too far into the personal sphere. In short, there can be no doubt that the growth in the dimensions and diversity of the big banks' operations is accompanied by an ever greater division of labour among their directors with the object (and result) of, so to speak, lifting them somewhat out of pure banking and making them better experts, better judges of the general problems of industry and the special problems of each branch of industry, thus making them more capable of acting within the respective bank's industrial sphere of influence. This system is supplemented by the banks' endeavours to elect to their Supervisory Boards or those of subordinate banks, men who are experts in industrial affairs, such as industrialists, former officials, especially those with experience in the railway service or in mining,* from whom they want not so much connections with industrial enterprises as expert advice—advice, based less on academic education than on many years of technical, business and human experience"... (157).

N.B.

"system"

...."But as member of a Supervisory Board, a bank director has not only the advantage of being interested in conscientious performance of his office because of his responsibility to the bank; he also is the best informed as to the state of the market and can make his large office staff carry out the commercial and technical

N.B.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 221-22.—*Ed.*

assignments of the Supervisory Board. It is his knowledge of many companies that facilitates his judgement of a particular one and guards him against the overestimation that is often observed when a private person sits on the board of only one company" (157-58).

view of the "whole"

At the end of 1903, representation of the German big banks on the **SUPERVISORY BOARDS** of industrial companies was as follows (pp. 161-62)* :

	Deutsche Bank	Discontogesellschaft	Darmstädter Bank	Dresdner Bank	Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein	Berliner Handelsgesellschaft	(My) total for *six big banks*
By directors	101	31	51	53	68	40	344
By members of Supervisory Board . . .	120	61	50	80	62	34	407
Total . . .	221	92	101	133	130	74	751 (1,040)
By Chairman or more than two S.B. members . .	98	43	36	41	38	33	289

Copied from Riesser? Cf. pp. 170-71: members of Supervisory Boards according to *branches of industry*... pp. 137 and 139: issue of industrial securities

"universal nature"

..."The universal nature of banking operations in industry, as so far described, the possibility and necessity for a big bank systematically to use regular business

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 221.—*Ed.*

transactions, the granting of industrial credit, the issue of securities, and representation on Supervisory Boards, as a means of close and lasting relations with industrial enterprises—all this weaves such a tight net around the bank and the industrial enterprise that a competitive struggle with the latter over a particular business operation is often, and in the case of many companies permanently, excluded" (163)....

"a tight net"

"An examination of the sum total of industrial relationships reveals the universal character of the financial establishments working on behalf of industry. Unlike other kinds of banks, and contrary to the demand sometimes expressed in the literature that banks should specialise in one kind of business or in one branch of industry in order to prevent the ground from slipping from under their feet—the big banks are striving to make their connections with industrial enterprises as varied as possible in respect of the locality or branches of industry and are striving to eliminate the unevenness in the distribution of capital among localities and branches of industry resulting from the historical development of individual enterprises*. Hand in hand with this is the effort to base relations with industry on regular, lasting business connections, to give expression to them and to afford them the possibility of becoming wider and deeper by means of a ramified system of seats on Supervisory Boards. Compared with these two spheres of influence, the issue of stock is of relatively less importance for the big banks' relations with

"universal character"

"unlike" (the old)

* Ibid., p. 223.—*Ed.*

the "tendency"

industry. One tendency is to make the connections with industry general; another tendency is to make them durable and close. In the six big banks both these tendencies are realised, not in full, but to a considerable extent and to an equal degree" (180)....*

"new" relations of industry and the banks

"The connections between the banks and industrial enterprises, with their new content, their new forms and their new organs, namely, the big banks which are organised on both a centralised and a decentralised basis, were scarcely a characteristic economic phenomenon before the nineties; in one sense, indeed, this initial date may be advanced to the year 1897, when the important mergers took place, and when, for the first time, the new form of decentralised organisation was introduced to suit the industrial policy of the banks. This starting-point could perhaps be placed at an even later date, for it was the crisis of 1900 that enormously accelerated and intensified the process of concentration of industry and of banking, consolidated that process, for the first time transformed the connection with industry into an actual monopoly of the big banks, and made this connection much closer and more active" (181)**....

"scarcely before the nineties" 1897

crisis (1900)

after the crisis of 1900 (depression)

..."The sudden concentration in the Rhine-Westphalian mining industry, the formation of the Federation of Steel Plants, the mergers of the big electric companies, etc., have undoubtedly greatly accelerated practical solution of the question of the connections between the banks and industry" (182)....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 223.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 225.—*Ed.*

...“Modern industry has led the banks into entirely new fields of economic life ... the bank is to a certain extent passing from its role, in the main, of intermediary into the sphere of industrial production.... In this way [through the connection with industry] the big banks are in touch not only with development trends in individual plants, but also with the interrelationship between the different plants of a given industry and between different industries” (183).... N.B.

“Anyone who has watched, in recent years, the changes of incumbents of directorships and seats on the Supervisory Boards of the big banks, cannot fail to have noticed that power is gradually passing into the hands of men who consider the active intervention of the big banks in the general development of industry to be necessary and of increasing importance. Between these new men and the old bank directors, disagreement on this subject of a business and often of a personal nature is growing. The issue is whether or not the banks, as credit institutions, will suffer from this intervention in the industrial production process, and whether they are sacrificing tried principles and assured profit to engage in a field of activity which has nothing in common with their role of middlemen in providing credit and which is leading the banks into a field where they are more than ever before exposed to the blind forces of trade fluctuations. This is the opinion of many of the older bank directors, while most of the young men consider active intervention in industry to be a necessity as great as that which gave rise, simultaneously with big modern indus- N.B.

transition... to what?

try, to the big banks and modem industrial banking. The two parties are agreed only on one point: there are neither firm principles nor a concrete aim in the new activities of the big banks" (184)*.

"Banking business with foreign countries and abroad falls into three divisions, each of which corresponds to a definite stage of development: international payments, the taking up of foreign loans, and participation in industrial enterprises broad ... each ... has impressed its stamp on a definite period in the foreign policy of the German big banks.

1
2
3

..."On the significance of loans for German home industry, a business manager of the Discontogesellschaft, which specialises in foreign operations, made the following statement ten years ago to the Stock Exchange Enquiry Commission (*Proceedings of the Stock Exchange Enquiry Commission*, p. 371, statement by Russel): 'I should consider it a very great disadvantage if ... the floating of foreign loans in Germany was put, not in the hands of German capital and the German banks, but in foreign hands. It was to avoid this that the Foreign Ministry was so greatly—and in my opinion so rightly—interested in our having commercial offices, bank branches and contacts abroad. For only through such contacts can the desired foreign orders for German industry be found.

N.B.

N.B.

..."'The universal complaint of our export industry is that Germany lags greatly behind London in the big-order market. Almost all orders are concentrated in London, in this great world market, and it is only our closer connection with individual foreign firms that gives rise to a busi-

N.B. "orders"

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 224-25.—*Ed.*

ness relationship and regular employment for industry'" (186-87)....

...“In the dealings of the German big banks with foreign industrial enterprises, we should distinguish two stages, differing in basis and in time. The first, taken historically, coincides approximately with the flourishing period of foreign loans and relates, therefore, to different years in different countries: the seventies and eighties can be regarded as the heyday of *foreign railway construction*” (187).

two stages

railways

Two subtypes (“opposite poles”): the *Rumanian* railways and participation in *American* railways.

“This first stage is marked by participation in foreign industry being closely bound up with loan activity, although German home industry, as a supplier, can derive some benefit from this. The powerful initiative of the banks is decisive, but it only indirectly concerns industry, their main attention being devoted to profitable investments in foreign securities. It requires a situation in which home industry is not yet so concentrated and, at the same time, so expanding as it has become since the nineties.

since the nineties

In the second stage, on the contrary, foreign loans are of less importance, while the interest of the big banks in foreign industry increases, for this is less dependent on other financial connections with the country concerned. The big banks more frequently sponsor, or co-sponsor, industrial companies in other countries and, at the same time, collaborate closely with German home industry in foreign business operations” (188)....

second stage

...“In foreign expansion these [German concerns] are much more dependent on

the banks than in their domestic operations.... The bank operating abroad [in contrast to domestic operations], however, feels itself at home, has its branches, controls international payments, and might even be connected with the government of the given country by helping it float a loan" (189)....

4 forms

"Four forms of bank participation in foreign industrial enterprises can be distinguished: 1. The formation of branches or subsidiary enterprises for German home industry....

..."2. The formation ... of separate foreign enterprises which are only loosely or not at all connected with home industry.... But the really characteristic case is afforded by the recent *exotic* railway projects and the East Asian enterprises of the big banks jointly participating in the German-Asiatic Bank".... This is already "*a link in the conquest of an economic region*" (190).

my italics

(Baghdad—China, etc. Colonies.)

..."3. A third form is attempts by the big banks to secure a place for themselves in an industry abroad by founding their own enterprises, or in many cases merely by acquiring an interest in existing ones"... (191) holdings in South African *mining companies* (Deutsche Bank since 1894, etc.).

4. ..."The German banking world has also sought to secure for itself, or for German capital behind it, exclusive exploitation of some branch of industry abroad" (192) ... for example, the efforts "to organise under its control a part of the *oil* industry, mainly the Rumanian....

establish "its own" industry

division of the world

..."The world oil market is even today still divided between two great financial groups—Rockefeller's American Standard

Oil Co., and Rothschild and Nobel, who control the Russian oilfields in Baku. The two groups are closely connected. But for several years five enemies have been threatening their monopoly" (193):

(1) exhaustion of the American oil sources;
(2) the competition of the firm of Mantashev & Co. in Baku;
×(3) the Austrian oilfields;
×(4) the Rumanian oilfields;
×(5) overseas oilfields, particularly in the *Dutch* colonies (the extremely rich *Samuel*, and *Shell* Transport and Trading Co.).*

× = Participation of the *Deutsche Bank* and other German banks.

...“The driving force of the banks' activity abroad is not national zeal but the necessity, which becomes ever more imperative at a certain stage of capitalist development, of establishing abroad a favourable field for the investment of free German capital" (197)....

an elementary truth

"A similar role [aid to industrial enterprises] is played by the banks in establishing societies for technical research, the results of which are intended to benefit friendly industrial enterprises. Such, for example, are the Electric Railway Research Association, the Central Bureau of Scientific and Technical Research, set up by the Loewe concern, and the Central Mining Bureau, Ltd., in Frankfurt-am-Main, which is financed by leading banks as well as big industrialists" (210-11).**

technical role of the big banks (finance capital)

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 248-49.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 224.—*Ed.*

Sometimes the banks *bring* various industrial enterprises *into closer association* (in some cases leading to a cartel, in others assisting specialisation, etc.)....

bank = "inner connection" between enterprises

...“The bank to a certain extent embodies here the inner connection between a large number of enterprises which results from the development of large-scale industry; it represents the community of interests existing between them” (215)....

“What a rich opportunity of giving employment to friendly industrial enterprises is afforded the *Deutsche Bank* by such an undertaking as the Baghdad Railway!” (217)....

N.B. growth of connections

“However ‘incidental’, so far, the closer association has been of various enterprises and industries through the granting of bank-sponsored orders, it is at any rate an important symptom that with the growth of large-scale industry the connections become more numerous, and increasingly complicated and imperspicuous. The connections and interdependence of various industries and enterprises find in the big banks an organ which gives them expression and more and more makes the latent connection into a real hand-in-hand collaboration” (219)....

N.B.

!!

Complaints are heard of the “*terrorism*” of the banks—(219-20)—*they make it compulsory* (for orders and so on) to deal with a particular firm (220).

banks and ruin of enterprises

In the electrical industry a special role was played by the crisis (apparently 1900), and the banks intensified and accelerated the ruin of the relatively small enterprises and their absorption by the big ones (pp. 230-32).... “The banks refused a helping hand to the very firms in greatest need of capital, and brought on first a frenzied

boom and then the hopeless failure of the companies which were not connected with them closely enough" (232).*

details about the electrical industry not interesting. Cf. *more recent* ones in *Die Neue Zeit*. N.B.

The Loewe group

The Loewe sewing-machine factory, founded in 1889, added production of armaments, then later (in the seventies and eighties) ordnance, boilers, etc., etc., and later still electrical industry, subsidiary companies, etc. [not very well described by Jeidels].

In a § on the relation of the big banks to the cartels (253-58), the author has somewhat "spread himself" and become incoherent. He distinguishes four forms: (*1*) indifference (to unimportant cartels); (*2*) "definite interest" (254) in cartels such as that of the *coal* industry (in cartels which are *life-and-death questions* for the industry);

(3) "help" for a cartel, e.g., steel industry;

(4) a purely "banking relation"—the organisation, for example, of a "syndicate office" at the *Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein* (1899)....

difference from No. 2? not "definite interest"?

258-65: description of concentration in the coal industry (Thyssen and others). See Werner's better and newer material in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1913, in the other notebook.**

265 et seq., the *electrical* industry (see in *Die Neue Zeit****).

"The banks' highest principle here is primarily *conscious* promotion of concentration, which they have already indirectly assisted by financial support of successful enterprises" (268)....

"The transformation of the big banks' industrial policy from being the policy of a credit institution to a policy of indus-

"transformation"

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 246.—*Ed.*
** See Notebook "α", pp. 33-35 of this volume.—*Ed.*
*** See p. 338 of this volume.—*Ed.*

||| trial concentration reveals a triple contradiction in the development of modern banking" (268)....

|| 1) ..."The fact of progressive exclusion of competition among the big banks" (269)....

|| 2) "Decentralisation" of the banks (local branches and connection with provincial banks) leads to an "increasing coalescence of capitals, uniting bank and industry into an integral whole"....

3) ..."increasing concentration implies a more purposeful organisation".... (270)

"By expansion of industrial combination, various directions of which can be seen in the electrical and in large-scale iron and steel industries, the sphere of this consciously guided production can be considerably enlarged, and in this unmistakable movement the big banks are an important factor" (270)....

And the tendency is special patronage of *heavy* industry (coal and iron) to the detriment of any other....

N.B. || "The striving of the big banks for concentration and purposeful guidance of industry is contradictory when it is restricted to certain branches of industry and thereby results in a still greater lack of co-ordination in other branches" (271).*

End

STILLICH AND *WORLD ECONOMY*

A NOTE

Dr. Oskar *Stillich*, *Economic Studies in Big Industrial Enterprise*. Vol. I. *The Iron and Steel Industry*, Berlin, 1904.

II. *The Coal Industry*, Leipzig, 1906.

On looking through these, it is evident that they are *descriptions of individual* big enterprises (*technical*, **commercial**, and in part of the position of the workers).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 208.—*Ed.*

{ Only about individual enterprises. No summaries, no conclusions.... }}

Of the literature mentioned, note the reference to *J. German*, "*The Qualifications of Factory Workers*", in *Die Neue Zeit*, 21st year, Vol. II, No. 30.
((on the ousting of unskilled workers by machines and the increasing role of skilled workers where machines are used)) N.B.

World Economy—"A Yearbook and Textbook." Published by Ernst von *Halle*.

Year of publication I. 1906
II. 1907
III. 1908

Each volume consists of three parts: 1) International surveys; 2) Germany; 3) Other countries.

The surveys are *worse* than in Neumann-Spallart, for they are mostly without sum totals, giving only data by countries.

Fragmentary, incomplete, unsummarised. No data for different years (*mostly* none). Suitable, perhaps, for separate items of information.

There is absolutely none of the scientific approach, displayed in part by Calwer in his Introduction, to the analysis of the *connections* of world economy as **a whole;** only statistical raw material.

EXTRACTS FROM *DIE BANK*

Die Bank, 1912, 2.

"*Herr von Gwinner's Oil Monopoly*" (1032—) (Dr. Felix Pinner).

cf. p. 13 here*

The Reichstag, on March 15, 1911, adopted almost unanimously a request for an oil monopoly. The government seized upon this "popular" (1032) idea. It turned out that the banks... "could not agree on the booty" (1033). Only the **Deutsche Bank** was *in favour*!! The others (headed by the *Discontogesellschaft*) were against, partly because they considered the *Deutsche Bank*'s booty excessive.**

sic!

The struggle between the banks is useful for business: "Only when the interested parties exposed one another—and they did so thoroughly, in a masterly way and with intimate knowledge of their mutual weaknesses—did clarity become possible" (1034)....

The consumers are afraid of terrific ("colossal", 1034) prices. The *Standard Oil Co.* served the consumer *excellently*.

The oil trust could be fought only by an *electricity monopoly*, by converting water-power into cheap electricity. But we shall get an *electricity monopoly* only when this becomes profitable to the producers.

N.B.

"But the electricity monopoly will come when the *producers* need it, that is to say, when the next great crash in the electrical industry is imminent, and when the gigantic, expensive power stations now being put up at great cost everywhere by private electrical 'concerns', which are already obtaining certain franchises from towns, from states, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water-power will then have to be used. But it will be impossible to convert it into cheap electricity at state expense; it will also have to be handed over to a 'private monopoly controlled by the state', because private industry has already concluded a number of contracts and has stipulated for heavy compensation for its expensive steam-power plants, which

sic!

!!

"tribute" to finance

* See pp. 89-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 249-50.—*Ed.*

will impose too great a burden on the ground-rent of a state-controlled hydro-power monopoly. So it was with the nitrate monopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly, so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by a beautiful principle, understood, at last, that in Germany the monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result, of benefiting the *consumer*, or even of handing over to the *state* part of the promoter's profits; they have served only *to facilitate, at the expense of the state, the recovery of private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy*"* (1036, author's italics).

capital !!

N.B. N.B.

The Deutsche Bank was defeated by the Standard Oil Co. and in 1907 concluded with the latter (under compulsion) a very disadvantageous agreement by which, in 1912, the Standard Oil Co. was able to buy up cheaply the oilfields of the Deutsche Bank.

there is a table of "interconnections" in oil "concerns"

And so the Deutsche Bank set to work to build up a monopoly!!

Opposing the Deutsche Bank was the *Discontogesellschaft* (with its Deutsche Erdöl Aktiengesellschaft), which worked very cautiously for an agreement with the *Standard Oil Co.*

Die Bank, 1912, 2, p. 695:

"Statistics of English Joint-Stock Banks" (England and Wales). { Colonial banks }

							Deposits (£ million)
N.B.	1890—104	banks	(joint-stock)	with	*2,203*	branches	*368*
	1911— 44	"	"	"	*5,417*	"	*749*
			In Scotland				
	1890—10	"	"	"	975	"	
	1911— 9	"	"	"	1,227	"	

* Ibid., pp. 250-51.—*Ed.*

In Ireland

1890—9	banks	(joint-stock)	with		456	branches
1911—9	”	”	”	”	739	”

Colonial banks

N.B.

1890—30	”	”	”	”	1,742	”
1911—38	”	”	”	”	3,645	”

Die Bank, 1912, 2 (629 et seq.). “**Oil Strategy**” by Felix *Pinner*:

on the one hand, the Germans (Discontogesellschaft and *Erdöl* Aktiengesellschaft) want to unite Rumania (and Russia) against the Standard Oil Co.;

N.B. division of the world by the oil trusts

on the other hand, Standard Oil founded a company (Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappy) in Holland *herself*, buying up oilfields (and concessions) in the Dutch Indies—a blow against its chief rival: the *Anglo-Dutch trust* Shell (Koninklijke Shell), etc.

Struggle for division of the world. “Division of the World”, *p. 630*.

Anglo-Dutch trust—Asia.

Standard Oil—rest of the world.

Standard Oil wants to seize *everyhing*.

The Germans want to defend themselves (+ Rumania + Holland + Russia??).

Die Bank, 1912, 1.

Cinema trust!!

“**The Patriotism of the Trusts**”, by L. Eschwege: in Germany a trust has been formed for buying up film distributors! (The firm of Pathé (Paris) produces *80,000* metres of film daily at one mark per metre. The cinemas of the world put together yield an income of about **one thousand million** marks per year!!) (pp. 216-17). This industry lags behind in Germany; it is especially developed in France. In Germany

about forty distributing agencies buy up films and "lease" them to cinema owners. (A trust has been formed, Deutsche Filmindustrie A.-G. = Fiag, headed by the National-Liberal Deputy Paasche. Its capital = five million marks, of which "no small part", obviously, was intended to be used as "founders' profit")…. A monopoly is being launched. Will it succeed??

Die Bank, 1912, 1 (p. 223 et seq.), a short article by *A. Lansburgh*: "*The Financial Transactions of the Princes' Trust*" (the name given by the Stock Exchange to the "business affairs" of Prince Fürstenberg and Prince Hohenlohe, wealthy financiers). They invested millions (of their own and of the *Deutsche Bank*) in the building firm of Boswau & Knauer, It raked in as much as *100,000,000* marks (!! p. 229), embarked on a host of very risky enterprises and *went bankrupt*. The *Deutsche Bank* lost about twelve million marks, Fürstenberg about eight million (p. 226), the whole extent of the crash being *covered and concealed* (p. 226). Extremely indignant, the author writes: "Our whole economic development is infected by some of the Knauer poison" (230)…. "The principle by which they (Boswau & Knauer) have worked, is hardly different from that, for example, to which the two biggest German electrical concerns owe their successes" (228)….*

true face of the *Deutsche Bank!!!*

and sic!! "electrical concerns"

If Boswau & Knauer had managed to wriggle out by making others bear the risk, everyone would have praised them, and hundreds and hundreds would have been ruined!

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 236.—*Ed.*

Die Bank, 1912, 1.

L. Eschwege, *Etatisation of Capitalism* (p. 12—). The Reichstag elections. The battle of conservatives and democrats. "The question of whether the people or the bureaucracy should rule is still being debated, but the decision has already been made in favour of a third force, namely, the plutocracy" (12) ... "political freedom becomes an empty phrase in a country where the economic sources of wealth have become the monopoly of a few supermen" (12). Capitalism is being etatised: members of Zemstvos!! (municipality, district, etc.) are being appointed to Supervisory Boards. For example, in the Tempelhofer Feld Aktiengesellschaft. What a shady business!! "Petty hypocrisy" (15)—these delegates also receive bonuses, etc., etc. "A situation which is intrinsically dishonourable" results (16).... Government officials make "common cause with the plutocracy" (19)....

"Foreign Capital Investments in **Canada**", p. 82 et seq.

British	>2,000 million dollars	
American	420	
French	80	80
German	32	32
Belgian	11.5	11
Dutch		
		123

L. Eschwege, *The History of a Company Promotion* (p. 420 et seq.)—an aerodrome company.

Flugplatz Johannisthal near Berlin. The director Arthur Müller enlisted princes and princelings, took millions from them (share capital = 4½ million marks), "gratis shares" for himself, resold them (the expert opinion of a venal valuer was that this land would yield colossal profit ... in 10-20 years!!)—in general a gross deception, and everything *strictly legal*!!

American banking magnates	A. Lansburgh, "The Money Trust" (p. 432 et seq.). The National City Bank (Rockefeller and the *Standard Oil Co.*) controls a capital of about $*1,000 million*. The Bankers Trust Co. (Morgan) controls a capital of about $*1,500-1,750 million*.	2 banks—2,750 million dollars (=11,000 million marks)*

The author points out that nowhere are banks so strictly regulated as in America ("deposit" banks are strictly separated from "investment" banks; branch banks are forbidden, also the loan to any one person of more than 10 per cent of the capital, and so on). America has *26,000* "Lilliputian" banks (438)—and all to no purpose!! In reality the *multimillionaires* rule and control. A change in the laws will merely lead to a change in the *form* of their rule.

Die Bank, 1912, 1, p. 523 et seq.

L. Eschwege, "*Cultural Fertiliser*" = German immigrants in Brazil. Unscrupulous advertising of the Brazilian Government (like that of the Canadian). Agents are paid ten marks for each immigrant. Lies about the prosperity of the immigrants, their poverty, etc., etc. They are sold land at *speculative* prices, etc., etc.

Die Bank, 1911, 1, p. 1 et seq.

A. Lansburgh, "***Germany—A Rentier State***". N.B. title!

Deposits in German *savings* banks = about *16,500 million* marks. This is a transfer of capital from a latent to a patent state, *an aid to big capital*, a conversion into *loan capital* (mostly in mortgages). By refraining from disposing of their money themselves, the depositors "strengthen the power of big capital and weaken the strength of resistance of small-scale industry" (8).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 219.—*Ed.*

"People in Germany are ready to sneer at the inclination to become rentiers that is observed in France. But they forget that as far as the bourgeoisie is concerned the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like if that in France"* (10-11).

About 45 of the amounts (45 per cent, apparently) in savings banks consist of deposits of *3,000 marks* or over!!

Ibidem, *p. 218*: German Banks

	Banks	Own capital	Borrowed capital	
1883	160	890	+ 850	(mill. marks)
1907	440	4,450	+7,750	" "
	+175%	+400%	+ 812%	" "

Austrian Banks

	Banks	Own capital	Borrowed capital
		(million kronen)	
1883	38	500	620
1907	53	1,130	3,130
	+40%	+126%	+405%

Die Bank, 1911, 2, p. 605 et seq. "Twenty Years of English Banking", by Alfred Lansburgh.

Development of English banks

	Banks	Deposits and current accounts	*Scotland*	*Ireland*	Capital (England+Scotland+Ireland)	Reserves
1891**	110	408.5	+91.6	+38.5£ mill.	69.8	36.4
1911	46	776.6	106.6	62.5	78.7	49.0

Branches of 46 English banks		—5,218 (1910)
Isle of Man	2	9
Scottish	9	1,242
Irish	9	693

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 278.—*Ed.*

** In the first column the figures are for the years mentioned, in the following columns for 1890 and 1910.—*Ed.*

p. 813 et seq. Germany

	No. of banks	Own capital (thousand mill. marks)	Borrowed money	Total capital at the disposal of the banks		
1872	174	1	1	3,000	mill.	marks
1910	422	5	11	30,000	"	"

Development of banking in Germany

1872 ... 23 banks out of 174 had a capital of 10 million and >. They controlled 60 per cent of borrowed money.

1910-11 ... 53 banks out of 422 had a capital of 10 million and >. They controlled 82.5 per cent of borrowed money (p. 818).

Germany, output of iron 1870: 1,346,000; 1910: 14,793,000 tons.[17]

L. Eschwege, "Plutocracy and Officialdom" (p. 825 et seq.). Typical of a petty-bourgeois reformist. Two examples:

"Some years ago, owing to the rigid attitude of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, a strong anti-cartel movement swept through Germany. The Reich government appointed an Enquiry Committee to study the problem of cartels. In the course of its proceedings, Government Counsellor Völker distinguished himself by his brilliant mastery of the subject and his sharp business-like speeches against the cartel representatives. Shortly thereafter, Counsellor Völker accepted a highly paid post as leader of the German Steel Association, Germany's most powerful and closely-knit cartel organisation. With the

good example! (finance capital and the government)[18]

government thus deprived of its best expert, the enquiry petered out" (827-28). There is no need, he remarks, to point to America!

!! There is an Imperial Private Insurance Supervisory Office, which has done much to control private insurance companies. And then the insurance companies come along and entice the "controllers" with offers of lucrative posts (including directorships). "In recent years, no less than three control officials have made the leap from the Imperial Supervisory Office to a directorship in an insurance company" (831).

Die Bank, 1911, 1, pp. 94-95. Recent statistics on the iron industry.

(*Thousand tons*)

production of pig-iron	1810	15	158	54	—	—	—
	1820	—	—	20	198	—	1,650
	1850	—	2,228	564	405	204	4,187
	1870	1,346	6,059	1,665	1,178	360	12,021
	1890	4,625	8,033	9,203	1,962	727	27,427
	1910	14,793	9,664	27,250	3,500	2,870	60,000

Die Bank, 1910, 1 (p. 401 et seq.), Alfred **Lansburgh**, "The Bank in the Service of the National Economy"—in connection with Riesser's book, whom the author accuses of optimism and of ignoring the defects of the German banks.

"holdings" of the modern bank!! Idem: Alfred Lansburgh, "*The Holdings System* in German Banking" (497 et seq.) and "Dangers of the Holdings System". Both articles yield very little; generalities, already known. The table of "holdings" (p. 500) alone is good.

The *Deutsche Bank** has holdings.

(1) Permanently in *17* banks. ***Of these 9*** have holdings in *34* banks; ***of which 4*** also in ***7***.

(2) For an indefinite period	”	*5*	”															
(3) Occasionally	”	*8*	”	”	”	*5*	”	”	”	*14*	”	”	”	*2*	”	”	*2*
((My totals))		30				14				48	”	”	”	6	”	”	9

N.B. [of these, i.e., out of 8—*two* Russian: the Siberian Commercial Bank and the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, and one Austrian: the Wiener Bankverein]

both banks and bankers included

System of “holdings” N.B.

approximately thus

!! { in all the “concern” has about 500 million marks of its own money and *1,333 million* marks of borrowed money }



(the author has squares with the name of the bank)

apparently, these data on the Deutsche Bank can be taken to illustrate the holdings system

approximately thus:
the size of the bank in the centre (the Deutsche Bank) is not in proportion, for among the subsidiaries are banks with a capital of 70-80 million marks!



* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 212.—*Ed.*

Die Bank, 1910, 1, p. 288. A note: "German Concessions Abroad."

The Chamber of Commerce in *Barmen* writes in a Memorandum to the Minister of Trade:

good example of the role, significance and policy of *finance capital*

"A considerable amount of German capital is invested in the Transvaal gold mines, despite which, unfortunately, supplies from German engineering factories for the Transvaal mines are only very small, because the technical management of the mines is predominantly in English hands. From this point of view, it would be extremely regrettable if the *Mannesmann* concessions (in Morocco) were to be absorbed in the French mining syndicate. If that were to happen the technical management of the Moroccan mines would quite certainly fall wholly into French hands, and there would be no prospect of supplying German machinery and equipment. It would be an irreparable mistake if German capital, while sharing in Moroccan mining enterprises, were to leave the technical management in French hands, just as it has been left in English hands in the Transvaal. The German engineering industry would not benefit from such an exploitation of the Mannesmann mines, and German capital participation would only benefit the French engineering industry. On the other hand, German industry would benefit immensely if even only a comparatively small part of the Moroccan mines were under German technical management". (Quoted from pp. 288-89.)

"The Campaign Against the French Big Banks", p. 236 et seq.

Articles by Lysis (at first in *La Grande Revue*, 1906).

The book by his supporter, *Jules Domergue*, *The Question of Credit Societies*.

A reply to Lysis—*Testis*, *The Role of Credit Institutions in France*, 1907, a *book* (articles in *Revue politique et parlementaire*).

A superficial appraisal: Lysis exaggerates but, basically, is correct. The rentier state = France. Capital flows from a country with a low rate of interest into countries with a high rate of interest. Lysis, his critic alleges, is not an expert, etc.

According to Lysis, the banks charge up to 7 per cent as commission on the sale of foreign securities!!! 7%!!!

(1910, 2) p. 1200: from data of the American National Monetary Commission.

Statistics of Deposits and Savings

	Great Britain (£ million)				*France* (million francs)			
	Bank deposits		Savings-bank deposits		Bank deposits		Savings-bank deposits	
1880	425	8.4	78	1.6	?	?	1,280	0.9
1888	624	12.4	105	2.0	1,923	1.5	2,762	2.1
1908	1,160	23.2	212	4.2	4,703	3.7	5,226	4.2

N.B.

	Germany			(My) total *Thousand million marks*		
	Bank deposits	Deposits in credit societies	Savings-bank deposits	Britain	France	Germany
1880	529	364	2,614	10.0	?	3.5
1888	1,142	425	4,550	14.4	3.7	6.0
1908	7,067	2,207	13,889	27.4	7.9	23.1

And the editors remark that this "apparent" national wealth should not be identified with the national wealth in general.

From a note on the financier Eduard Engel, who died in November 1910;

career of bank directors

"Many Berlin directors only obtained their posts because their creditors saw no other way of saving their money except by launching the debtor on a career. While secretly cursing him for his frivolity, in public they praised his diligence—in their own well-understood business interests" (1202-03).

Die Bank, 1909, 1, p. 79. A note: "The Pull of the Bank"—government officials become directors of banks (Waldemar Müller, von Klitzing, Helfferich, Schönfeld) and in industry (Völker, Budde)....

"How about the integrity of a state official, whose secret longing is for a cosy niche in the Behrenstrasse [the Deutsche Bank]?"* (79).

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p. 301 et seq. Alfred Lansburgh, "The Economic Importance of Byzantinism"—an ardent little article (petty-bourgeois sentimentality) against the plutocracy's connection with the Kaiser, etc.

well put!

"We recall the journey to Palestine and the immediate result of this journey, the construction of the Baghdad railway, that fatal 'great product of German enterprise', which is more responsible for the 'encirclement' than all our political blunders put together"** (307).

Ludwig Eschwege, "*Revolutionising Tendencies* in *the German Iron Industry*".

technical revolution in the iron industry

The main centre in Germany for ore extraction and iron has shifted from the Rhine-Westphalian area to Lorraine-Luxemburg (in the South-West). The rich phosphate ore (the Minette ore of Luxemburg and Lorraine) was previously of no value. It has become excellent owing to (1) the Thomas method; (2) **electro-steel** (*electro-rods*: 15 years' guar-

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 237.—*Ed.*

** Ibid.—*Ed.*

antee against 9 years previously). Ores in Luxemburg-Lorraine amount to 2,000 million tons (enough for 200 years at the present rate of German consumption) (pp. 316-17).

A. Lansburgh, "How Great Is the *German National Wealth*?", p. 319 et seq.

A criticism of the well-known book by Steinmann-Bücher and his estimate: 350 thousand million marks (190-200—Lexis and Schmoller; Great Britain—250-300, France—200-225). The chief component figure given by Steinmann-Bücher (a) = 180 thousand million of "private property in real and personal estate"—*two or three times* (p. 324) the real amount, for he (*Ballod* p. 322), too, overlooked this!!) took *insurance* policies (162.6 thousand million, rounded off to 180!!), whereas insurance is always at the value *replacement* would cost, and not the real value. "They made the same mistake as the second-hand dealer who in taking stock listed old furniture and clothing at the price of new" (325). And a number of other mistakes of Steinmann-Bücher!!!

German national wealth (350?? thousand million)

Ludwig *Eschwege*, "Cement", 115 et seq. (1909, 1).

A strongly cartelised industry. Monopoly prices (*cost of production 180* marks per carload, sale price 280 marks!!, 230 marks!!). Sale price with delivery *400* marks per carload!! Profits yield 12-16 per cent dividend. Every effort is made to eliminate competition: false reports of the bad situation in the industry, anonymous notices in the press (capitalists, beware of investing your money in cement factories!!); buying up of "*outsiders*" (examples: 60,000-80,000-150,000 marks in "compensation": p. 125). Cartels by regions: South German, Upper

how do the syndicates operate?

Silesian, Central German, Hanoverian, Rhine-Westphalian, North German and Lower Elbe syndicates.*

Die Bank, 1909, 2. Articles by Eugen **Kaufmann** on *French banks*. Three big banks—*Crédit Lyonnais*, *Comptoir National*, *Société Générale*.

N.B. incomes of directors and board members

For all three: 1908—*749.1* million francs (capital + reserves) and *4,058* million deposits (in general, borrowed money).

Number of members of the board of management (administrative councils) 13-15-17. Their income *500,000-750,000* (!!) francs (Crédit Lyonnais) (p. 851).

"research service"

The Crédit Lyonnais has a "***Financial Research Service***" with >50 persons (engineers, economists, lawyers, statisticians, etc.)—costing *0.6-0.7 million* francs annually (it studies industrial enterprises, railways, etc., of various countries, collects information, and so on). The service is divided into eight departments: 1) industry; 2) railway and steamship companies; 3) general statistics; 4) information on securities; 5) financial reports, etc. Cuttings from financial newspapers and journals of the whole world, and so on and so forth.**

The number of branches (in France) (1908) (p. 857):

French big banks

	Paris and region	Provinces	Total	Abroad	
Crédit Lyonnais	53	192	245	22	
Comptoir National . . .	51	140	191	23	(mostly in the colonies) (p. 954)
Société Générale	89	636	725	2	
	193	968	1,161	47	Σ mine

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 207-08.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 222-23.—*Ed.*

The **Société Générale** figure includes **222** mobile branches in the provinces (open *once* or *twice* a week on market days).

Employees: boys (grooms) ages 13-16—30-40 francs per month; lower-grade office workers, above 16-60 francs per month. Then up to 2,000-2,400 francs annually. Departmental heads in the Crédit Lyonnais—up to 40,000 francs annually.

	Number of employees
Crédit Lyonnais	up to 5,000
Comptoir National	4,000
(including Paris	2,500)
Société Générale	7,000
(including Paris	1,000)
of whom 300-400 women.	

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p. 1101 (1909, 2). A note on the *Baghdad railway* "friction" with Great Britain, etc.: 500 million of German money in an unknown country, and friction with Great Britain and France; is not worth the bones of a single grenadier, is a "fatal adventure", etc. etc.

Baghdad railway

attitude to colonial policy

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p. 799. A note: "Banking in Occupational Statistics".

(Headings)	1882	(No. of women in brackets)	1895		1907	
(1 and 2) bankers, bank directors, etc.	6,896	(148)	7,719	(195)	11,070	(185)
(3) bank (and savings bank) employees. . .	12,779	(95)	23,644	(444)	50,332	(2,728)
(4 and 5) apprentices, watchmen, members of families, working part time, etc.	6,207	(56)	5,268	(170)	9,275	(382)
Σ=	25,882	(299)	36,631	(809)	70,677	(3,295)
No. of (3) per 100 (of 1 and 2) [employees per 100 bosses] . .	182.6		304.8		471.4	

banks, their economic structure

Alfred Lansburgh, "German Capital Abroad", p. *819* et seq. *Die Bank*, 1909, 2.

N.B. Kautsky *N.B.*

The author tries to prove Kautsky's favourite argument that trade develops better with independent countries.*

		1889	1908	Per cent increase
"Debtor countries" (of Germany)	Rumania . .	48.2	70.8	+ 47
	Portugal . .	19.0	32.8	+ 73
	Argentina . .	60.7	147.0	+143
	Brazil . . .	48.7	84.5	+ 73
	Chile	28.3	52.4	+ 85
	Turkey . . .	29.9	64.0	+114
		Σ=*234.8*	*451.5*	+ 92%
financially independent countries	Great Britain	651.8	997.4	53
	France . . .	210.2	437.9	108
	Belgium . . .	137.2	322.8	135
	Switzerland .	177.4	401.1	127
	Australia . .	21.2	64.5	205
	Dutch Indies	8.8	40.7	363
		Σ=1,206.6	2,264.4	+ 87%

author does *not* give these totals

cf. Kautsky (and Spectator)

The author draws the conclusion:

"This much is certain; it is a gross error to regard foreign capital investment, in whatever form, as a specially effective force in favour of German products, to regard it as the pioneer of German trade" (828).

this especially N.B.!!

(The author did not sum up the results, which *refute* him!!)

My addition:

He is refuted even more emphatically by the concrete data *he himself* cites on the relationship between loans and exports (pp. 826 and 827)**:

Years of loans:

"In 1890-91, a *Rumanian loan* was floated through the German banks, which

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 291.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 291-92.—*Ed.*

had already in previous years made advances on this loan. It was used chiefly to purchase railway materials in Germany. In 1901,* German exports to Rumania amounted to 55 million marks. The following year they dropped to 39.4 million marks and, with fluctuations, to 25.4 million in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891, thanks to two new loans.

1890-91

?

?

"German exports to *Portugal* rose, following the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000 (1890); then, in the two following years, they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000 and regained their former level only in 1903.

1888-89

"The figures of German trade with *Argentina* are still more striking. Loans were floated in 1888 and 1890; German exports to Argentina reached 60,700,000 marks (1889). Two years later they amounted to only 18,600,000 marks, less than one-third of the previous figure. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889, and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations, and with other credit operations.

1888

1890

?

"Exports to *Chile*, as a consequence of the loan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks (in 1892), and a year later dropped to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of exports to 84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908."

1889

1906

* Lansburgh's mistake; should be 1891.—*Ed.*

Strange that the author should not see how these facts *refute him*: the rise in exports occurs *precisely after* the loans and *in consequence* (infolge) of them.

Lansburgh's **petty-bourgeois** standpoint: "And German industry would profit [if the exported capital remained at home] not only in amount but in distribution. Capital would be distributed freely over many branches of industry, would flow along numerous channels, whereas from abroad, as experience has shown, it flows into the order books of a few privileged firms which, in addition, have to pay dearly for their privileges. Krupp could tell us a thing or two about how many millions in expenses, known as baksheesh or by some other name, have to be paid to support German credit activity abroad. Yet the natural distribution of capital, which has to cover as many branches of industry as possible, is of prime importance for the whole industrial development of Germany" (824-25).... "Production that in this way constantly regenerates itself by its own forces [by the investment of capital within the country] guarantees continued *harmonious* development"* (p. 825).

!!

gem!! he has "persuaded" Krupp!!!

"natural"!! ha-ha

"harmony"

The export of capital does *not* produce *stable* trade connections: the author tries to prove this by the examples (pp. 826-27), cited by me above: pp. 101-02 of this notebook**.

A. Lansburgh, "***Trends in the Modern Enterprise***" ("Two books"),

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 292.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 192-94 of this volume.—*Ed.*

p. *1043* et seq. A short review of *Levy*'s *Monopolies and Trusts* and *Liefmann*'s *Financial and Industrial Companies*. *Lansburgh* says, rightly, that both are one-sided: *Levy*'s accent is on the *technical* strength of concentration, *Liefmann*'s on the strength of financial (oligarchic) oppression.

Levy versus **Liefmann**

"The growing role of stocks and securities ("Effektifizierung") in industry vastly increases the scale of production, reduces the number of independent producers and makes it easier for the few—if they are not prepared to be bought up by some giant trust—to unite in order to suppress all newly-arising competition. Though that point is made neither by Liefmann nor Levy, it clearly emerges from both books. This might, perhaps, prompt someone to write a book that is urgently needed: a book that describes how a security-manipulating oligarchy has wrested control of the republic's economic life" (1051-52).

Sometimes the development is through concentration to cartels (Levy has shown this *particularly* clearly). But *not* always. "Substitution of securities" can lead *at one stroke* to a trust, e.g., "in colonial railway construction".... Technical concentration is progressive as regards technique; financial concentration can strengthen, and *does strengthen*, the omnipotence of monopoly capital *alongside backward* technique....

REMARKS ((ON FINANCE CAPITAL IN GENERAL))

Export to colonies (and financially dependent countries) versus export to independent countries:

Let us assume that the latter is *greater* and increases at a *faster* rate than the former. Does this prove the "non-necessity" of colonies and networks of *financial* dependence?

(K. Kautsky.) No, for (1) even in relation to independent countries (taking all exports) the share of cartels, trusts, dumping, increases....

(2) Finance capital does not abolish the lower (less developed, backward) forms of capitalism, but grows out of them, above them....

N.B. on finance capital and its significance

(3) There is a definite ratio between "normal" and monopoly sales, ergo between "normal" and monopoly exports. Capitalists cannot help selling staple commodities to millions of workers. Does this mean that it is "unnecessary" for them to acquire extra-profit through government, railway "contracts", etc.?

(4) The extra-profit from privileged and monopoly sales compensates for the low profit of "normal" sales.

(5) Compare with the banks: extra-profit as intermediaries in floating loans, promoting bubble companies, etc., compensates for low profit (sometimes no profit) on "normal" credit operations.

(6) The high technique of concentrated industry and the "high technique" of financial swindling, and the "high technique" (in reality, low technique) of oppression by finance capital—they are inseparably linked under capitalism. K. Kautsky wants to destroy the link, "whitewash" capitalism, take the good and throw away the bad: "modern Proudhonism", petty-bourgeois reformism "under the mask of Marxism".

ΣΣ = finance capital (monopolies, banks, oligarchy, buying up, etc.) is not an accidental excrescence on capitalism, but its ineradicable continuation and product.... Not merely colonies, but also (a) export of capital; (b) monopolies; (c) a financial network of connections and dependencies; (d) omnipotence of the banks; (e) concessions and bribes, etc., etc.

TSCHIERSCHKY, *CARTEL AND TRUST*

Dr. *S. Tschierschky*, *Cartel and Trust* (*A Comparative Study of Their Nature and Significance*), Göttingen, 1903 (p. 129).

(Little of value. Bourgeois prattle *in favour of* cartels—German, our own, toned down—against trusts)....

A most commonplace petty-bourgeois, this author. A "practitioner" = was employed by syndicates and cartels.

p. 12, par. 1. The American rectified spirit trust closed down *68* of the *80* factories it had bought up.

p. 13: The United States Steel Corporation has "*almost one-third of a million workers*". || ⅓ million workers

Its capital (1902) shares = $800 million
loans = $553 "

Output:	iron ore	13.3	million	tons
	coke	9.1	"	"
	pig-iron, etc.	7.1	"	"
	steel	9.0	"	"*
	bars	1.7	"	"
	etc.			

|| a model!!

p. 19 — cartels and trusts developed "since the last third or quarter of the nineteenth century". || last ⅓ or ¼ of the 19th century

p. 31 — one weaver in the *United States* looks after *16* looms (Northrop looms, an improvement of 1895).

p. 56 — ..."The idea of the cartel is no more than the application to modern industrial production of the modified co-operative idea".... || ha-ha!

"Conclusions"

..."On the basis of my investigations up now, I have no doubt that the trust embodies the advantages, but to a still greater extent the disadvantages, of capitalist large-scale industry, in the sense of an unceasing and reckless urge to go forward, whereas the policy of the cartel | characteristic! (rather cowardly!)

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 203.—*Ed.*

much more strives to bridle and to distribute. If the world market were dominated by great national trusts, it would experience far-reaching struggles over prices and sales, carried to the sharpest extremes.... In this connection, the cartels can and should be as much concerned for technical and economic progress as free competition is; perhaps they will not accelerate it so precipitately as the trusts" (128).*

!!! not accelerate!!!

HEYMANN, *COMBINED ENTERPRISES*

Hans Gideon *Heymann*, *Combined Enterprises in the German Large-Scale Iron Industry*, Stuttgart, 1904 (No. 65 of *Munich Economic Studies*).

A summary of data (for the most part rather fragmentary) on the advantages of large-scale production, especially "combined" production, i.e., uniting various successive stages....

"The representative of the Krupp firm told the iron Enquiry Committee (Minutes (1878), p. 82): 'I do not think that a plant producing 20,000-30,000 tons (annually) can stand up to one producing 100,000-150,000 tons.' Twenty-five years later *Carnegie* considered that twenty times as much as 150,000 tons was necessary. (*The Empire of Business*, New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1902, p. 233): 'Concerns making one thousand tons of steel per day have little chance against one making ten thousand'" (p. 232, note).

good example!!

The growth of capital and its "immobilisation" (N.B.) is one of the most important conditions for monopoly and cartels.

a condition for cartels....

"Combined enterprises often belong to more than a dozen cartels, as Völker's interesting table shows"... (249)....

? Völker? Iron cartels?
December 1903 (where?) (p. 256)....

—?

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 216.—*Ed.*

"We see ... everywhere the same spectacle in the production of finished goods. Pure enterprises perish, are crushed between the high price of raw material and low price of the finished product, while the combined enterprises earn enough profit from the high prices of materials, and they find sales thanks to the low prices of finished goods; for the big plants avoid excessive prices for fear of inevitable subsequent reductions, whereas the small ones in good times want to push up prices wildly. Exactly the same policy is pursued in America by the big Steel Corporation" (256).

N.B.

N.B.

Now competition has been done away with. There remain two or three dozen big plants. At the head are Thyssen, Lueg and Kirdorf (261). "Two gigantic associations": the coal syndicate and the steel syndicate ((87.5 per cent of stee output)) "must rule over the whole".

— — — Monopoly of the means of production. The land has been bought up (coal and ore).

"The head of the concern controls the principal company [literally: the "mother company"]; the latter reigns over the subsidiary companies ["daughter companies"], which in their turn control still other subsidiaries ["grandchild companies"], etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of production. Indeed, if holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the head of the concern needs only one million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And if this 'interlocking' is extended, it is possible with one million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million, etc."* (pp. 268-69).

better than in Liefmann and *earlier*

The summing up:

"There remain, on the one hand, the big coal companies, producing millions of tons yearly, strongly organised in their coal syndi-

* Ibid., pp. 227-28.—*Ed.*

cate, and, on the other, the big steel plants, closely allied to the coal mines, having their own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a tremendous output of ore and coal and producing finished steel goods, employing 10,000 workers quartered in company houses and sometimes owning their own railways and ports, are the typical representatives of the German iron and steel industry. And concentration goes on further and further. Individual enterprises are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises in one, or in several different industries, join together in giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a dozen big Berlin banks. In relation to the German mining industry, the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is definitely proved; true, this applies to a country where industry is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining industry is ripe for expropriation"* (278-79). (The concluding words of Chapter 5 in the book.)

N.B.

See p. 108.

Heymann's statistics:

Twenty-four combined enterprises (these 24 include—Krupp, Stumm, Deutscher Kaiser (Thyssen), Avmetz Friede, etc., etc., all "leaders").

		thousand tons	(1902) Total for Germany
Their output:	Iron ore	6,934	17,963
		(+?)	
	Coal	13,258=12.6%	107,436
	Pig-iron	5,849	8,523
		(+?)	
	Steel	8,215	7,664 (?)

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 198-99.—*Ed.*

		thousand tons	(1902) Total for Germany
(in operation)	Blast furnaces	147=58.8%	250
	Open-hearth furnaces	130=38.8	335
	No. of workers	206,920 ?	?
	Capital	581.4 million marks	
	+ Reserves	121.9 million marks	

Growth of large-scale production in the German iron industry

	Enterprises in operation		Output (mill. tons)		Workers (000)		Output per worker (tons)	No. of workers per enterprise
Pig-iron		%		%		%		
	1869 — 203	100	1.4	100	21.5	100	65.6	105.8
	1880 — 140	69	2.7	194	21.1	98	129.2	150.8
	1900 — 108	53	8.5	605	34.7	162	245.2	321.7

End of extracts from **Heymann**.

End.

ON THE QUESTION OF IMPERIALISM

On the question of **imperialism:**

Subjects: (approximately)

5.1 Finance capital.
4.2 Banks.
2.3 Cartels and trusts.
3. Monopoly.
1.4 Concentration and big industry.
6.5 Export of capital.
7.6 Colonies. Their significance.
8.7 History of the colonies.
9.8 Division of the world.

International trusts colonies Calwer

10.9 Free competition versus imperialism.
11.10 Back to free competition or forward to overcoming imperialism and capitalism?
12.11 Ultra-imperialism or inter-imperialism?
12 bis: Uneven growth.
13.12 Hobson, Kautsky, imperialism.

14.13 Apologists and petty-bourgeois critics of imperialism.
15.14 Parasitism in imperialist countries... ("decay") (("the rentier state")).
16.15 Definitive split of the working-class movement... ["imperialism and opportunism"].
17.16 Diplomacy and foreign policy 1871-1914.
18.17 The national question in the imperialist era.
19.18 *Interlocking* versus "*socialisation*" (cf. Riesser). Component parts of the concept "imperialism".

Roughly:

1. I monopoly, as the result of concentration
2. II export of capital (as the chief thing)
4. III division of the world: (α) agreements of international capital
5. IV division of the world: (β) colonies
3. V bank capital and its "threads"
6. VI replacement of free trade and peaceful exchange by a policy of force (tariffs; seizures, etc., etc.).

Hilferding's shortcomings:

1) Theoretical error concerning money.
2) Ignores (almost) the division of the world.
3) Ignores the relationship between finance capital and parasitism.
4) Ignores the relationship between imperialism and opportunism.

"Imperialism, the highest (modern) stage of capitalism."

Roughly:

these 6:

I. Three chief (fully independent) countries: Great Britain, Germany, United States

II. Secondary (first class, but not fully independent): France, Russia, Japan

III. Italy, Austria-Hungary

NOTEBOOK "γ"
("GAMMA")

Contents

γ 1—52

Hoeniger	P. 2	Bérard	[23-24]
Théry	[3]	Lair	[25]
Lescure	[5-6]	Russier	[27]
Patouillet	[9-12]	Tonnelat	[35]
Moos	[14-15]	Colson	[37]
Bruneau	[17-18]	Redslob	[39-41]
Lysis	[19-21]	*P. Louis*	[43-45]
Hubert	[22]	*Morris*	[47-50]

Source References:
2; *7* and *8*; *13*; *15*, *16* and *18*; *34*

HOENIGER, *ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GERMAN ARMED SERVICES*

Professor Dr. Robert *Hoeniger*: *Economic Significance of the German Armed Services*, Leipzig, 1913. (Gehe-Stiftung Lectures, Vol. V, Part 2.)

Banalities of a pro-militarist who seeks to prove that military expenditure is not a loss, for the money remains in the country and yields vast profits, that military service educates, strengthens, etc., etc.

A characteristic quotation:

..."The deputy *Erzberger* told the Reichstag (April 24, 1912): 'If the Minister of War were to satisfy all the

requests for garrisons addressed to the War Department, he would have to ask for military appropriations six times as large'" (p. 18).

The petty bourgeoisie gains in all sorts of ways from garrisons. One of the reasons why militarism is popular!

Source References:

Wilhelm *Ahr*, *The Armed Services and the National Economy of the Great Powers During the Last Thirty Years*, Berlin, 1909.

Hartwig *Schubart*, *The Relationship Between the National Economy and the National Defence Potential*, Berlin, 1910.

Militärwochenblatt. Supplements: 90 (1902) and 10 (1904).

Fr. *Braumann*, *The Economic Value of a Garrison*, Magdeburg, 1913.

Modern Civilisation, Part IV, Vol. 12 (*Military Technique*).

THÉRY, *ECONOMIC EUROPE*

Edmond *Théry*, *Economic Europe*, Paris, 1911.

(He is editor of *L'Économiste européen*, and author of a **mass** of works on economics.)

The book has *very many* comparative tables: {the text, apparently, is only an adjunct to the tables}.

Population (millions)

	1858	1883	1908	1858-83	1883-1908
Germany	36.8	46.2	63.3	+26%	+37%
Great Britain	28.6	35.7	45.1	25	26
France	34.6	37.9	39.3	9	4
Russia (European)	66.8	86.1	129.8	29	51
All Europe	278.1	335.1	436.1	20	30

Government expenditure (million francs)

	1858	1883	1908	1858-83	1883-1908
Germany	801	2,695	9,263	+236	+244
Great Britain	1,651	2,192	5,169	33	136
France	1,717	3,573	3,910	108	6*
etc.					

* Théry's figure.—*Ed*.

Expenditure on *Army and Navy*

	1883	1908
Germany	458	1,068
	+46	436
Great Britain	432	676
	270	811
France	584	780
	205	320
Russia	772	1,280
	122	231
etc.		

Output of Coal (million tons)

	1898-99	1908-09	
Germany	130.9	205.7	+57%
France	32.4	37.9	+17%
Great Britain	202.0	272.1	+10%

Pig-Iron (million tons)

Germany	7.4	12.7	+72%
France	2.5	3.6	+43%
Great Britain	8.8	9.7	+10%
etc.			

NOTES ON BOOKS BY MONTESQUIOU AND ESTÈVE AND ON AN ARTICLE BY REVERE

Montesquiou, *American Securities and French Holdings*, Paris, 1912. (Advice to capitalists: beware.)

L. *Estève*, *A New Psychology of Imperialism*: *Ernest Seillière*, Paris, 1913.

((A **psychological** interpretation of imperialism à la Nietzsche,[19] deals only with psychology.))

C. T. Revere, "Latin American Trade Possibilities", article in *The North American Review*, 1915 (Vol. 201), p. 78:

"*The South American Journal*, published in London, says British investments in Latin America at the end of 1913 totalled $5,008,673,000."

Cf. with **Paish** 1909*

$5,000 million × 5 = 25,000 million franks ‖ N.B.

LESCURE, *SAVINGS IN FRANCE*

Jean Lescure, *Savings in France*, Paris, 1914.

Author's preface says this work has been published in *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 137, III—in a survey of savings in various countries. N.B.

Note p. 110, table VI. "Statistics of French Wealth" (according to Mr. Neymarck).

Thousand million francs

	French securities	Foreign securities
1850	9	—
1860	31	—
1869	33	10
1880	56	15
1890	74	20
1902	from 87 to 90	from 25 to 27
1909	" 105 " 116	" 35 " 40

Deposited securities (million francs)
(p. 51)

	Crédit Lyonnais	Société Générale	Comptoir d'Escompte
1863	9.8	57.4	—
1869	54.6	88.3	—
1875	139.7	205.7	—
1880	244.6	253.7	—
1890	300.8	251.9	122.9
1900	546.3	347.6	365.4
1910	839.0	562.2	633.3
1912	859.6	446.5	674.3

* Re Paish see p. 389 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Number of accounts with the Crédit Lyonnais (p. 52) *:

1863	— 2,568	1890	— 144,000
1869	— 14,490	1900	— 263,768
1875	— 28,535	1912	— 633,539
1880	— 63,674		

p. 60: "Sums put to reserve by nine French iron and steel companies":

Average (annual) for 1904-08 = 23.8 million francs (for the present, no more notes from this source).

HISHIDA, *THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF JAPAN AS A GREAT POWER*

Hishida, *The International Position of Japan as a Great Power*, New York, 1905. (Thesis.)

Amateurish. A rehash of the history of Japan versus other countries from 660 B.C. to 1905.

"Since that time (the Chinese war 1894–95) the Far East has become a centre of the ambitions chiefly of France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States, in their efforts to satisfy the wants of 'imperial expansion', commercial and political" (p. 256).

"The economic activity of the Great Powers has assumed the form of 'imperialism', which signifies the ambition of the Great Powers to control, for economic or political purposes, 'as large a portion of the earth's surface as their energy and opportunities may permit'" (p. 269).

He quotes:

Reinsch, *World Politics*, New York, 1902.
Hobson, *Imperialism*.
Colquhoun, *The Mastery of the Pacific*, New York, 1902.
Debidour, *The Diplomatic History of Europe*, Paris, 1891 (2 vols).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 214.—*Ed.*

REFERENCES FROM ENGLISH SOURCES AND *CONRAD'S JAHRBÜCHER*

From English books

Ch. K. Hobson, *The Export of Capital*. 8° (290 pp.). 7s. 6d. (Constable), May 1914.

J. A. Hobson, *Traffic in Treason*: *a Study of Political Parties*. 8° (1s.) (Unwin), June 1914.

J. A. Hobson, *Work and Wealth*: *a Human Valuation*. (8°) (386 pp.). 8s. 6d. (Macmillan), June 1914.

J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government*. 8° (216 pp.). 2s. 6d. (Allen and Unwin), July 1915.

J. H. *Jones*, *The Economics of War and Conquest* (about Norman Angell), June 1915 (King), 178 pp. (2s. 6d.)

H. G. Wells, *The War and Socialism*. 1d. (Clarion Press), February, 1915.

Hartley Withers, *War and Lombard Street*. 8° (180 pp.). 3s. 6d. (Smith), January 1915.

Cl. W. Barron, *The Audacious War* (4s. 6d.), May 1915.

A. L. Bowley, *The Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United Kingdom 1906-1914*. 8° (64 pp.). *2s.*, March 1915.

A. W. Humphrey, *International Socialism and the War*. 8° (176 pp.). 3*s*. 6*d*. February 1915.

F. W. Hirst, *The Political Economy of War*. July 1915. 8° (342 pp.). 5*s*.

Vigilant, *Revolution and War*. 1s. net (September 1915).

J. Connolly, *The Reconquest of Ireland*. 6*d*. April 1915.

Conrad's Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie etc. (*N.B*. Third series, Vol. 49 = 1915, 1)
(Third series, Vol. 21 = 1901,
Vol. 40 = 1910.)

Glier, *The Present Position of the American Iron Industry*, *Third series*, *Vol. 35*, 587.

Jeremiah *Jenks*, *The Trusts in the United States*, *Third series*, *Vol. I*, 1.

Goldstein, *The Present State of the Cartel Movement*: *Russia* (Third series, Vol. *40*, 162).

Saenger, *The Economic Prospects of British Imperialism*, Berlin, 1906. (Reviewed in third series, Vol. *36*, 397).

30

1. Новая эра в кинематографе.

Рождение кин. искусства. Конгрессы кино.

Кинематографы, Кинетоскопы, Кинеграфы.

Кинематографы и пр.

Монополии.

Кинематографы и пр.

Банки.

31

7. Банки.

8. Новая эра "Конгрессы".

9. Фильмы.

10. Кадрование.

11. Род Кломи.

12. Радиотелеграфия.

Pages 30 and 31 of Notebook “γ” (“Gamma”)

PATOUILLET, *AMERICAN IMPERIALISM*

Joseph Patouillet, *American Imperialism*, Dijon, 1904. (Thesis.) (388 pp.)

A thesis. The frail effort of a student. Of no scientific value, *apart* from abundant quotations and a *summary* of certain facts. Mostly legalistic prattle; economic coverage poor.

Quotes (at the start) widely known passages from Hobson (*Imperialism*).

Speaks of the fact of *British imperialism* (p. 33 et seq.) and *German* (p. 36 et seq.) (sections I and II of Chapter II).

A few words about Japanese and Russian imperialism (p. 39 in fine).

p. 43: "In practice imperialism means a bid for the keys of the world—not military keys as under the Roman Empire, but the main economic and commercial keys. It means not the rounding off of territory, but the conquest and occupation of the big crossroads of world trade; it means acquiring advantageously located rather than big colonies, so as to cover the globe with a dense and continuous network of stations, coal depots and cables." (Quoted from *de Lapradelle*: "Imperialism and Americanism in the United States", *Revue du droit publique*, 1900, Vol. XIII, pp. 65-66. Quoted by Patouillet, p. 43.) ‖ ?

Driault (*Political Problems*, pp. 221-22): "The shattering defeat of Spain was a revelation.... It had seemed to be established that international equilibrium was a matter to be settled by five or six of the chief European powers; now an unknown quantity was introduced into the problem" (p. 49).

"Thus the Cuban war was an economic war inasmuch as its aim was the seizure of the island's sugar market; in the same way, the purpose of annexing Hawaii and the Philippines was to gain possession of the coffee and sugar produced by these tropical countries" (p. 51). (Idem, pp. 62-63).... ‖

"Thus, the conquest of markets, the drive for tropical produce—such is the prime cause of the policy of colonial expansion which has come to be known as imperialism. And the colonies serve also as excellent strategic points, the value of which we shall indicate: ... to ensure Asian markets ... they had to have these support points"... (p. 64).

Exports from the U.S.A. (percentages)

Total exports ($ million)	Year	North Europe	South America	America	Asia	Oceania	Africa
	1870	79.35	13.03	4.09	2.07	0.82	0.64
	1880	86.10	8.31	2.77	1.39	0.82	0.61
857.8	1890	79.74	10.98	4.52	2.30	1.92	0.54
1,394.5	1900	74.60	13.45	2.79	4.66	3.11	1.79
	1902	72.96	14.76	2.75	4.63	2.48	2.42

numerous indications of a coming struggle for control of the Pacific

Hawaii is half-way between Panama and Hong Kong.

The Philippines are a step towards Asia and *China* (p. 118). Idem 119-120-122.

The war with Spain over Cuba was justified by pleading the interests of *freedom*, the liberation of Cuba, etc. (p. 158 et seq.).

sic! The constitution calls for equality of all taxes, etc. in all the States of the U.S.A. This has been "interpreted" as *not applying* to the colonies, for these are *not part*, but *possessions*, of the United States (p. 175). "*Gradually*", we are told, the rights of the colonies will be enlarged (p. 190) (but equality will *not* be granted)....

Canada. Economic subordination prepares the way for political "integration" (p. 198).

"Germany" (sic) wants to "oppose a United States of Europe" to the United States of America (p. 205)....

United States of Europe[20] (and Wilhelm II)

...“Ever since 1897, Wilhelm II has repeatedly suggested a policy of union to combat overseas competition—a policy based on a European customs agreement, a sort of continental blockade aimed against the United States” (205).... “In France, a European customs union has been advocated by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu” (206)....

“happy result”

...“An entente between the European states would, perhaps, be one of the happy results of American imperialism” (206).

In America, developments have led to a struggle of the “*anti-imperialists*” against the imperialists (p. 268, Book II, Chapter I: “Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists”).... Imperialism, he says, contradicts freedom, etc., leads to the enslavement of the colonies, etc. (*all the democratic arguments*: *a number of quotations*). An American anti-imperialist quoted *Lincoln*’s words:

“When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism” (272).

—*Phelps*, *United States Intervention in Cuba* (New York, 1898) and others have declared the Cuban war “*criminal*”, etc.

Chapter III, p. 293, is headed: “Present United States Policy: the Combination of Imperialism and the Monroe Doctrine”[21]: both combined, and interpreted!!!

The South Americans reject (p. 311 et seq.) the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to mean that America belongs to the *North* Americans. They fear the United States and want independence. The United States *has* “*designs*” on South America and combats *Germany’s growing influence there*....

(Cf. especially Novikov in the source references.*)

In annexing the Philippines, the United States cheated Filipino leader *Aguinaldo* by promising the country independence (p. 373): “The annexation was described as ‘Jingo treachery’”.**

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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* See p. 213 of this volume—*Ed*.

** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 287.—*Ed*.

N.B. *Atkinson*, *Criminal Aggression*, *by Whom Committed?* Boston, 1899.
The North American Review, 1899, September. *Filipino*: "Aguinaldo's Case Against the United States."

N.B. In South America there is a growing trend towards *closer relations with Spain*; the (Spanish-American) congress in *Madrid* in 1900 was attended by delegates from fifteen South American states (p. 326) (*). More contacts with Spain, growth of the latter's influence and of "Latin" sympathies, etc. (**)

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sic! p. 379: "The era of national wars has evidently passed"....
(wars over markets, etc.).

N.B. (*) *Revue des deux mondes*, 1901 (November 15).
(**) Slogan: "Spanish-American Union."

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(References from **Patouillet** on **American Imperialism**, etc.)

Carpenter, *The American Advance* (*Territorial Expansion*), New York, 1902.
E. Driault, *Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century*, Paris, 1900.
W. E. Griffis, *America in the East*, New York, 1899.
D. St. Jordan, *Imperial Democracy*, New York, 1899.
De Molinari, *Problems of the Twentieth Century*, Paris, 1901.
Roosevelt, *American Ideals*, New York, 1901.—*The Strenuous Life*, London, 1903.
Paul *Sée*, *The American Peril*, Paris, 1903.
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Stead, *The Americanisation of the World*, Paris, 1903.
Annales des sciences politiques: 1902 (Vol. XVII). *E. Boutmy*, "The United States and Imperialism" (p. 1 et seq.).

Le Correspondant, 1890 (January 25). *Cl. Jannet*, "Economic Facts and the Social Movement in America" (p. 348 et seq.).

L'Economiste français, 1899, 1, VII. *Leroy-Beaulieu*, "American Expansion, etc."

Le Monde économique, 1896 (April 4 and 18). *Machat*, "United States and European Commercial Rivalry in America."

La Grande Revue, 1899 (October 1). *Weulersse*, "American Expansion."

Revue politique et littéraire (Revue bleue), 1896 (May 9). *Moireau*, "Jingoes and Jingoism in the United States" (pp. 593–97), 1900 (April 21). *Driault*, "Imperialism in the United States" (p. 502 et seq.).

La Revue de Paris, 1899 (March 15). *De Rousiers*, "American Imperialism."

The North American Review, 1898, September. *Conant*, "The Economic Basis of Imperialism."

1897, No. 2. *Chapman*, "The Menace of Pseudo-Patriotism."

1899, No. 1. *Carnegie*, "Americanism versus Imperialism."

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The Fortnightly Review, 1901, August. *Brooks*, "American Imperialism."

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Revue socialiste, 1904, February. *Colajanni*, "Anglo-Saxon Imperialism."

Le Mercure de France, 1904, April. *P. Louis*, "Outline of Imperialism."

Revue des deux mondes, 1903 (July 15). *Leroy-Beaulieu*, "The British Empire and then Crisis of Imperialism."

? *Novicow*, *The Federation of Europe*, 2nd edition, Paris, 1901.

‖ *E. Théry*, *The Economic History of Britain*, *the United States and Germany*, Paris, 1902.

V. Bérard, *Britain and Imperialism*, Paris, 1900.

Lair, *German Imperialism*, Paris, 1902.

MOOS, "FRENCH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND FRENCH AND ENGLISH CAPITAL INVESTMENTS ABROAD"

Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie, 3rd series, Vol. XXXIX (39), 1910.

Ferdinand *Moos*, "French Credit Institutions and French and English Capital Investments Abroad" (pp. 237-56).

scant

Only half a page on Britain, giving G. Paish's totals. But there are source references and figures on France:

Polemic: *Lysis*, "The Financial Oligarchy", Paris, 1907, and *Testis*, "Credit Institutions", Paris, 1907.

Henri Michel, "Speech in the Chamber of Deputies, November 30, 1909."

Le Monde économique, 1906 and 1907 articles (P. Beauregard).

Jules Domergue (Economic Reform).

M. Manchez (*Le Temps*, January 2, 1910) estimates French capital abroad at *35,000* million francs (p. 240).

Neymarck (*Le Rentier*) estimates French capital abroad at *25,000-30,000* million francs (p. 243).

The total value of securities on the Paris Stock Exchange = = 130,000 million franks (p. 243)

including $\begin{cases} 64{,}000 \begin{cases} \text{French} \\ \text{foreign} \end{cases} \\ 66{,}000 \end{cases}$

Portugal obtained from Brazil 2,400 million francs between 1696 and 1754 (p. 238).

Dutch capital in Britain in 1747 was *1,600* million gulden (ibidem).

Money flows to where the rate of interest is highest.

According to Lysis: Deposits (of four banks)—(Crédit Lyonnais + Comptoir National + Société Générale + Crédit Industriel et Commercial) (p. 252):

1885—	912	million	francs
1890—	1,302	"	"
1900—	2,171	"	"
1905—	2,897	"	" (according to Lysis)

"For a seat on the board, one need only hold 50-200-300 shares.... Thus, about 50 persons, who need not have more than eight million francs between them, year after year control more than *2,500 million* francs of deposits, and more than *1,500 million* francs of new annual investments, without having to give account to anyone" (252). ‖ 50 *persons*

In the case of loans, the borrowing state never receives more than 90 per cent (p. 253)—the banks get the remainder. The 1895 Chinese-Russian loan was for 400 million francs at 4 per cent. "The price on flotation was 450. The first market price was 495. The highest market price was 520. The difference in one month was 45 francs, or 10 per cent.... On this deal, the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas alone made a profit of 20 million francs" (253), and so on.

January 1907—Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies sharply attacked investment in *Russian loans*:))) N.B.

KOUZNIETSOW, *THE STRUGGLE OF CIVILISATIONS AND LANGUAGES IN CENTRAL ASIA*

P. Kouznietsow , *The Struggle of Civilisations and Languages in Central Asia*, Paris, 1912. (Thesis—Paris.) (353 pp.)

Deals **only with Turkestan**—its history and colonisation (mentions the Andijan uprising of 1898, warns for the future).... ((p. *295* and others)).

The development of culture, cotton-growing, railways, etc., etc. Many literature references.... The standpoint, apparently, is official.

RECENT LITERATURE CITED IN *CONRAD'S JAHRBÜCHER*

From recent literature:

Léopold *Lacour*, *Modern France. Political and Social Problems*, Paris, 1909.

De Leener, *Organisation of Leaders of Industry. Belgium*, Paris, 1909 (two vols.).

J. S. Nicholson, *A Project of Empire* (*Economics of Imperialism*), London, 1909. (310 pp.)

Henri Andrillon, *The Expansion of Germany*, Angoulême, 1909.

"The Development of Germany as a World Power" (supplement to *Annals of the American Academy*, January 1910).

!! *Nil*. An ambassador's speech!!!

Marcel Dubois, *France and Her Colonies*, Paris, 1910.

Jean Cruppi, *For French Economic Expansion*, Paris, 1910.

Jean G. *Raffard*, *Concentration of British Banks*, Paris, 1910.

L. *Gautier*, *The Financier State*, Paris, 1910.

N.B. || Eduard *Driault*, *The World Today. A Political and Economic Survey*, Paris, 1909. (372 pp.)

[A review in the *Jahrbücher*, Vol. 41, p. 269 speaks in a laudatory tone of this "textbook of world history", especially the significance of "economic processes for modern politics".]

Fr. E. *Lunge*, *American Economic Policy*, Berlin, 1910.

Godfernaux, *French Colonial Railways*, Paris, 1911 (439 pp.).

Aug. Terrier and *Ch. Mourey*, *French Expansion*. Paris, 1910.

? | Charles *Du Hemme*, *Financial Imperialism. The General Society for the Promotion of French Trade and Industry*. Prefaced by a Letter to the Finance Minister, Paris, 1910 (95 pp.)? (Paris, *Trade and Financial Review*).

J. Bourdeau, *Between Two Servitudes* (...Socialism... (!!!!) *imperialism*...), Paris, 1910.

Geoffray *Drage*, *The Imperial Organisation of Trade*, London, 1911. (374 pp.)

R. G. Lévy, *Banks of Issue*, Paris, 1911 (628 pp.).

Marcel *Gras*, *Machinism and Its Consequences*.... Paris, 1911. (Thesis.)

|| *Edmond Théry*, *Economic Europe*, 2nd edition, Paris, 1911. (332 pp.)

|| *Idem*. *The National Wealth of France*, Paris, 1911.

Lucien Hubert, *The German Effort*, Paris, 1911.

Ed. *Pfeiffer*, *The Fabian Society and the English Socialist Movement*, Paris, 1911. (Thesis.)

Arthur Boucher (Colonel), *Victorious France in the Coming War*, Paris, 1911. (93 pp.)

Jahrbücher, Vol. *42* (1911). N.B. Article by Goldschmidt on agrarian laws and agrarian structure of *New Zealand*. || N.B.

Schneider, *Jahrbuch der deutschen Kolonien*, 4th year, *1911*.

Mamroth, *Industrial Constitutionalism*, Jena, 1911 (review in Volume *43*, 1912).

Schachner, *The Social Question in Australia and New Zealand*, Jena, 1911 (a detailed account in *Volume 43*, 1912).

Overzier, *The American-British Shipping Trust*, Berlin, 1912 (4 marks).

Goldschmidt, *Concentration in Coal-Mining*, 1912 (*Baden Higher School Economic Studies*).

Ibidem: *Briefs*, *The Alcohol Cartel*, 1912.

Hillringhaus, *The German Iron Syndicates*, *Their Development Towards a Single Syndicate*, Leipzig, 1912 (3 marks).

Enrico *Leone*, *Expansionism and Colonies*, Rome, 1911 (235 pp.), 2 lire.

Jahrbücher, Vol. *44* (=1912, 2):

P. *Passama*, *New Forms of Industrial Concentration*, Paris, 1910 (341 pp.), 8.50 francs.

Bosenick, *Germany's New Combined Banking Economy*. (Analysis.) Munich, 1912. (366 pp.)

Argentarius, *Letters of a Bank Director*, Berlin (Bank Publishing House), 1912 (1 mark) (??).

P. *Hausmeister*, *Large-Scale Enterprises and Monopoly in Banking* (a popular sketch), Stuttgart, 1912.

Hennebicque Léon, *Western Imperialism. The Genesis of British Imperialism*, Brussels, 1913 (295 pp., 6 francs) [Vol. *45*].

René Pinon, *France and Germany. 1870-1913*, Paris, 1913.

Émile *Becqué*, *Internationalisation of Capital*, Montpellier, 1912 (432 pp.), 6 francs.

B. Ischchanian, *Foreign Elements in the Russian National Economy*, Berlin, 1913 (300 pp.), 7 marks.
Review in Vol. 47: a good deal on the import of capital. || Author estimates Russia's indebtedness to Western Europe at **6,000 million rubles**.

Paul Eckhardt, *Studies In World Economy*, Bielefeld, 1913 (140 pp.) (2.30 marks).

François *Maury*, *French Securities During the Last Ten Years*, Paris. 1912. (Ten years' statistics for capital-

ists. A **mass** of data with percentages and so on. Per cent of guaranteed securities, etc.)

LOUIS BRUNEAU, *GERMANY IN FRANCE*

Louis *Bruneau*, *Germany in France*, 2nd edition, Paris, 1914 (articles in *La Grande Revue*).

Quotes:

L. *Nicot*, *Germany in Paris* (1887).
G. *Montbard*, *The Enemy* (1889). It ends: "Germany must be destroyed if Gallia is to live."
M. Schwob, *The German Danger*, 1896.
" *Before the Battle*, 1904.
Em. *Jennissen*, *The German Spectre*, 1906.
André *Barre*. *The German Menace*, 1908.
Jean *d'Epée*, *Greater Germany*, 1910.
Henry *Gaston*, *Germany at Bay*, 19..?*

Germany lacks iron (deposits will be exhausted within 40 years (p. 3))—imports are increasing:

8 million tons in 1908
11 " " " 1911 (p. 2)

while in France deposits have been discovered at Meurthe and Moselle—in French Lorraine — — —

Iron output ...	2.6	million	tons in	1890
	4.4	"	" "	1900
	14.8	"	" "	1911
Nancy	200	million	tons of ore	
Briey	2,000			
Longwy . . .	300			
Crusnes . . .	500			
	3,000 million	tons of ore (p. 5).		

Deposits discovered in Normandy: 100-700 *million* tons of ore.

French iron ore exports to Germany:

1.7 million tons in 1909
2.8 " " " 1912 (p. 21).

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* The book was published in 1912.—*Ed.*

German coal exports to France:
1909—3 million tons
1912—5.7 " "

A Dutch merchant (Poorter) is buying up land with iron ore deposits in Normandy (already has 3,496 hectares), selling the ore to Germany (pp. 24-25). (Details follow.)

Stinnes and Krupp are buying up iron ore mines (30-31)—partly through Poorter.

Examples of "holdings" and composition of management boards (35)....

... (mostly Frenchmen + Germans)....

Thyssen, growth of his concern, etc.

Examples, composition of boards, financial holdings, etc., etc.

Migration of firms to France, etc.

No generalisations.

(See articles on this in *La Grande Revue.*)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES FROM *CONRAD'S JAHRBÜCHER*

Bibliographical references from *Conrad's Jahrbücher*:

Paul Pilant, *The German Peril*, Paris, 1913. R. G. Usher, *Pan-Germanism*, London (7-6) (1913?). The *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. *42* (1912): "Industrial Competition and Combination" (trusts (30 reports)).	Vol. **45**
Hans *Henger*, "French Capital Investments"... 1913, Stuttgart (*Munich Economic Studies* No. 125).	?

Léon Wenger: *Oil* (Thesis), Paris, 1913 (Vol. 47, 1914).

G. Michon: *The Big British Shipping Companies*, 1913. (Thesis.)

Schiemann, *Germany and High Politics*, 1913 (*Vol.* **13**), 1914.

O. W. Knauth, *The Policy of the United States Towards Industrial Monopoly*, New York, 1913. (233 pp.) (*Columbia University Studies.*) — N.B. (?)

?? E. *Friedegg*, *Millions and Millionaires*, Berlin, **1914**. (383 pp.)

P. Baudin, *The Money of France*, Paris, 1914.
Vol. *46* (1913, I). Article on Marx's theory of rent (Albrecht).
E. Rothschild, *Cartels*, etc., 1913.

Volumes *45-47* looked through.
Vol. *48* (1914, 2): Julius *Hirsch*, *Branch Enterprises*, *etc.*, Bonn, 1913. (*Cologne Studies* No. 1.)
Laudatory review in *Conrad's Jahrbücher*, Vol. *48*).
N.B. [*This volume—p.* **649**—contains nineteenth-century statistics of *livestock farming* (very full) for many European countries.]
Walter Straus, *German Power Grids and Their Economic Significance*, Berlin, 1913 (especially about agriculture and for agriculture).
N.B.

Conrad's *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie*, 1915, I (3rd series, Vol. 49): "Fluctuations in Immigration into the United States". (Statistical totals for 1870–1910.)
N.B.

LYSIS, *AGAINST THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY IN FRANCE**

Lysis, *Against the Financial Oligarchy in France*, 5th ed., Paris, 1908 (260 pp.). The chapters are dated November 1, 1906; December 15, 1906; February 1, 1907; May 1, 1907; November 15, 1907.

In the preface, Jean Finot states that the British press has confirmed the fact reported by Lysis (first in *La Revue*): A certain person made *12 million* francs (p. vii) out of the 1906 Russian loan, besides "a hundred million" (ibidem) in *commissions*!!

Date?? This was discussed at a sitting of the Chamber of Deputies (two days) (when?).

Four banks have an "absolute monopoly" (p. 11) (not a relative one)—in all bond issues.

"a trust of the big banks" (p. 12)
- Crédit Lyonnais
- Société Générale
- Comptoir d'Escompte + Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas
- Crédit Industriel et Commercial

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 233-34, Vol. 24, p. 403, Vol. 23, p. 197.—*Ed.*

The borrowing country receives 90 percent of the sum of the loan (10 percent goes to the banks, "distributing" and "guarantee" syndicates, etc.)—p. *26*.

Russo-Chinese loan	400	million	francs.	Profit	*about*	8%
Russian (1904)	800	"	"	"	"	10%
Moroccan (1904)	62.5	"	"	"	"	18¾%

"The French are the usurers of Europe" (29)....

"The financial press almost always enjoys subsidies" (35).

The Egyptian Sugar Refineries Affair: the public lost 90-100 million francs (39). The Société Générale issued 64,000 shares of this company; the price on issue was about 150 percent (!!).... The company's *dividends were "fictitious"* (39)....

"One of the *Société Générale* directors was a director of Egyptian Sugar Refineries" (39). ||| !!!

Fifty persons, representing eight million francs, control *2,000 million* francs in these four banks (40)....

What is to be done? "Return to competition" (42)....

"The French Republic is a financial monarchy" (48)....

The 1906 Russian loan: Mr. *X*, "an intermediary of the banks", made *12 million* (49).

It is impossible to understand anything from the reports and balance-sheets....

"1,750 million in three lines" (57)....

What is the source of bank profits? *Stock issues*. This is concealed.

"An example: without a prospectus, without publicity, *secretly*, by the muffled and hidden work of its 'cashiers' and 'business agents', the Crédit Lyonnais sold 874 million francs worth (nominal value) of Russian Nobility Land Bank bonds. At an average price of 96.80. The market price at present is 66. *The loss to the public: 269 million francs*!" (pp. 75-76)....

"Alarming export of French capital" (p. 93 et seq.).

France is the "world's usurer" (119).

The fall in the market price of Russian bonds (as against the price of issue) is such that out of *14,000 million* francs, 3,000-4,000 million are lost by the public: that is what the public pays the banks!!!

And endless wailing about the banks not supporting **French** industry.... Germany is advancing, we are marking time (187 and passim)... "anti-national policy", etc.

Chapter V is headed:

"Complete Domination of the Financial Oligarchy; Its Hold over the Press and the Government"....

The banks' means of pressure on the government: lowering the rate of interest... (!!)

secret subsidies:

1 million to a Minister
¼ million to an ambassador (p. 212) } !
bribes to the press...

(Has used only newspaper articles, nothing else).

Author's conclusions: regulation of banking
separation of banks of deposit from banks of issue (d'affaires)
control....

((A commonplace philistine))

NOTES ON BOOKS BY MACROSTY, BAUMGARTEN AND MESZLENY, AND BERGLUND

Henry W. *Macrosty*, *Trusts in British Industry*, Berlin, 1910.

> Mass of facts, major and minor. Essential for information, etc.

Baumgarten and Meszleny, *Cartels and Trusts*, Berlin, 1906 (an economic and *legal* survey. Apparently, nil novi).

Abraham *Berglund*, *The United States Steel Corporation*, 1907. (Thesis.)

(Description and literature references. Amateurish, but useful for information.)

HUBERT, *THE GERMAN EFFORT*

Lucien Hubert, *The German Effort*, Paris, 1911.
(A comparison of French and German (economic) development.)

Net railway income (per kilometre)

	1883	1906
France	19,165 francs	19,560
Germany	15,476	21,684
Great Britain	26,755	26,542

Merchant shipping (thousand tons)

	1890-01	1906-07	+%
Great Britain	5,107	9,732	+91
Germany	656	2,110	+222
United States	376	1,194	+217
France	485	721	+49
Norway	176	717	+308
Japan	76	611	+704
Italy	186	493	+165

Figures predominate, mostly given separately for *both* countries, without precise, comparative tables such as given above.
(Scientific value = 0)

BÉRARD, *BRITAIN AND IMPERIALISM*

Victor Bérard, *Britain and Imperialism*, Paris, 1900.
(381 pp.)

{ Cursory examination suggests a collection of newspaper articles: glib, extremely glib, journalism, but extremely superficial. Descriptive account, nothing more. "Joseph Chamberlain" is the heading of the first chapter. Quotations from his speeches, his career, fame, etc., etc. "Imperialism" forms the second chapter (or section: they are not called chapters nor are they numbered). This too is a "newspaper" account: "Markets, markets", **endless** examples and figures }

(on the decline of British trade, etc.) from Blue Books, but it is all fragmentary, superficial, and after Hobson and Schulze-Gaevernitz reads like a schoolboy's exercise—book.... Ditto about German competition, and so on and so forth. Nil. Nil.

A couple of examples which, possibly, might be useful:

Some of the arguments against imperialism:

"The same statistics prove further that the occupation of a territory by His Majesty's troops often benefits only foreigners and very little British subjects; in Egypt only German and Belgian trade has increased since 1881: British imports to Egypt amounted to £8,726,000 in 1870; £3,060,000 in 1880; £3,192,000 in 1892; £4,435,000 in 1897, whereas German imports rose from £E21,000 (Egyptian £=25.60 francs) in 1886 to £E281,000 in 1896, and Belgian imports rose from £86,000 to £458,000 in the same period" (p. 249).

"Having invented the extraction of sugar from beet, France became the world's leading sugar producer: she still had a monopoly in 1870, when Germany entered the field. A study of the French crops showed that, like Northern France, she had a favourable soil and climate in areas near her coal mines. But her soil was less fertile and her climate more severe. The fight against the French would have to be waged on unequal terms. Nevertheless, by 1882, French sugar manufacturers were already complaining: German sugar is penetrating the French market.... German beet has a 12 per cent sugar content; French growers say they cannot obtain more than 7 per cent"—the Germans had improved cultivation methods, fertilisers, selection, etc., etc.

"In less than twelve years of German competition, France, which invented beet sugar, was deprived of the profit from her invention. Her sugar law of 1884 was dictated by German science, Germany being henceforth the empress of sugar, and, in addition, of alcohol" (pp. 311-12).

Date at the end of the book: November 1898-April 1900.

LAIR, *GERMAN IMPERIALISM*

Maurice *Lair*, *German Imperialism*, Paris, 1902 (341 pp.)

Begins with a brief, routine description of British imperialism, then American, Russian, Japanese, and German ("Imperialism and Imperialists". Introduction).

Chapter I. "The Origin of German Imperialism." (1870.—Development and growth. Generally known data and figures. Much the same "journalistic" account as V. Bérard's.)

Chapter II. "The Soul of Imperialist Germany"... and the "Herr Doktor"—and Mommsen and Treitschke ... drawing-room gossip!—and a little quotation from Marx (requoted from Bourdeau).... Wretched piece of work. *Nil*

Chapter III. "Imperialist Policy."

ha-ha!! ...“The twentieth century inaugurates the reign of the barons of the big banks" (165)—and a quotation from Toussenel: "The Jews—the Kings of the Era" (!!).

Chapter IV. "*Yesterday*." More and more figures on Germany's economic growth. The Baghdad railway, etc.

Chapter V. "Today."—On the crisis of 1900, prattle....

Chapter VI. "Tomorrow."

...Resolution of the Paris International Socialist Congress, September 1900—"against imperialism" (p. 324) and wars....

A bit of everything!...

He quotes:

Forum, June 1899: "The Struggle for the Commercial Empire."

The North American Review, September 1898: "The Economic Basis of Imperialism".
Paul *Arndt*, *Germany's Trade Relations with Britain and the British Colonies*, 1899.
Julius Wolf, *The German Empire and the World Market.*

BRIEFS, *THE ALCOHOL CARTEL*

Goetz Briefs, *The Alcohol Cartel*, Karlsruhe, 1912. (*Baden Higher School Studies*. New series, No. 7.) It seems—at a glance—to be a specialised, uninteresting work.

Mono-poly

pp. 240-41: "Thus de facto the ring of alcohol plants [there remain three "outsiders", quite weak] has become a monopoly centred around the almost completely syndicated potato distilleries; this completes the external power structure of the cartel."

GOLDSCHMIDT, *CONCENTRATION IN THE GERMAN COAL INDUSTRY*

Kurt *Goldschmidt*, *Concentration in the German Coal Industry*, Karlsruhe, 1912 (122 pp.).... (Ibidem.* New series, No. 5) [little of value, no precise summary of data]

		Coal (million *tons*)	Steel (million *tons*)
1.	1 Krupp	2.4	0.98
2.	Haniel Family	8.7	0.59
3.	Stinnes "	2.5	
		5.5	0.79
		1.5	
4.	Thyssen	3.6	0.97
			0.27
6.	Gelsenkirchen	8.2	0.51
7.	Harpen	6.7	—
8.	Hibernia	5.1	—
9.	Phönix	5.4	1.13
		49.6	5.24
5.	Karl Funke	3.1	
		2.8	
	Σ (my)	55.5	5.24

* *Baden Higher School Studies.—Ed.*

||| "Nine concerns control 66.9 per cent of the coal output of the basin" (((the Rhine-Westphalian))) "and 48 per cent of the output of the federation of steel plants" (p. 69). |||

The *Stinnes concern* (pp. 69-70) comprises the following enterprises:

(1)	coal mines	19
(2)	iron and steel mills	7
(3)	iron ore mines	numerous {in Germany, Luxemburg, France}
(4)	trading (coal)	6
(5)	shipping	
	in Germany	12
	" Great Britain	5
	" Italy	3
	" France	2
	" Belgium	1
	" Switzerland	1
	" Russia	2

etc.

RUSSIER, *THE PARTITION OF OCEANIA*

Henri *Russier*, *The Partition of Oceania*, Paris, 1905. (Thesis.)

A very detailed *summary* of a mass of material. Unfortunately, there are no exact statistical totals (à la Supan). Well compiled. Many source references, maps, photographs.

Author divides the history of the "political partition" into periods:

1) discovery (16th-18th centuries)
2) missions (1797-1840)
3) "first conflicts" (1840-70)

N.B. ||| 4) "international competition", 1870-1904.

{ Author quotes, inter alia, the summary table (of the partition) from *Sievers and Kükenthal*, *Australia*, *Oceania and the Polar Countries*, Leipzig, 1902. Pp. *67-68*. *To be looked at.* }

This is followed by detailed *economic*, commercial and geographical information about each of the colonies.

To the economic causes of colonial policy the author adds (N.B.)—social causes:

"To these [enumerated above and well-known] economic causes must be added social causes.—Owing to the growing complexities of life, which weigh heavily not only on the masses of the workers, but also on the middle classes, one sees accumulating in all countries of old civilisation 'impatience, rancour and hatred that are a menace to public order, declassed energies and turbulent forces, which must be taken in hand and given employment abroad in order to avert an explosion at home'"* (Wahl, *France in Her Colonies*, Paris, p. 92)—(pp. 165-66).

gem!!

N.B. References to **British imperialism** (p. 171);—to *American* (p. 175), after the Spanish-American war of 1898;—to *German* (p. 180).

N.B. He quotes, among others, *Driault*, *Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century*, etc. (Paris, 1900), Chapter XIV, "The Great Powers and the Division of the World".

VOGELSTEIN, *CAPITALIST FORMS OF ORGANISATION IN MODERN BIG INDUSTRY*

Theodor **Vogelstein**, *Capitalist Forms of Organisation in Modern Big Industry*, Vol. I: "Organisational Forms of the Iron and Textile Industries in Great Britain and America", Leipzig, 1910.

pp. 54-56.

The British firms: Vickers, Son and Maxim, Ltd.; Browns; Cammels, now own (iron ore) mines, coal mines, iron and steel plants, shipyards, several explosives factories, etc., etc.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 262-63.—*Ed.*

The Rail Cartel:

Division of the world: 1884

"During the very severe depression of 1884, British, Belgian and German rail firms agreed on a division of export business, on the understanding that there would be no competition in their home markets. At first Great Britain was allotted 66 per cent, Belgium 7 per cent and Germany 27 per cent of the exports; later the figures were somewhat modified in favour of the continental countries. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain.... The British firms divided their share among themselves and fixed a price which enabled plants working under unfavourable conditions to continue in operation.... Joint war was declared against a British firm remaining outside the cartel, the cost of which was met by a levy of two shillings on all sales. But when two British firms retired from the cartel, it collapsed"....* (quoted from the edition of *1886*).... "Twenty years elapsed before a new international association was formed. In spite of all efforts, it was impossible, during these decades of rapid industrial development on the continent and in America, to reach agreement on territorial limits and quotas....

1886

"In 1904 an agreement was at last reached with Germany, Belgium and France on the basis of 53.50 per cent, 28.83 per cent and 17.67 per cent for the first three countries" (sic?? Britain, Belgium, Germany??). "France took part with 4.8 units in the first year, and 5.8 and 6.4 units in the second and third years, in a total amount which

1894

* Ibid., pp. 251-52.—*Ed*.

was increased by these percentages, hence in 104.8, 105.8 and 106.4 units.

"In 1905 an agreement was reached also with the United States, and in the following year ... Austria and the Altos Hornos plants in Spain were brought into the alliance. At the present time, the division of the world is complete, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways—since the world has been parcelled out without consideration for their interests—can now dwell like the poet in the heavens of Jupiter"* (pp. 99-100).

"division of the world"

good example!!

As regards the United States Steel Corporation, it is still an open question whether Charles Schwab is right in maintaining that the iron ore mines of Lake Superior (mostly bought up by the Steel Corporation) will soon be the only ones left—or whether Carnegie is right in thinking that many ore deposits will still be found in America.

The share of the Steel Corporation in *American* output (p. 275):

	1901	1908
Total output (extraction) of ore	43.9%	46.3%
" " of pig-iron . . .	42.9	43.5
" " " steel	66.3	56.1
" " " rolled goods . .	50.1	47.1**

PLAN OF THE BOOK *IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM*

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
(A popular outline)

Approximate title for censorship: "Principal Features of Modern (Recent, the Recent Stage of) Capitalism"

1. The *special* stage of capitalism in our time. Theme: its study, analysis, conclusions.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 252.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 203.—*Ed*

2. *Growth of large-scale production. Concentration of production.*
{ Censuses of 1882, 1895, 1907 in Germany
{ " " 1900, 1910 in the United States
Idem on Russia (*The Development of Capitalism*?).
Heymann's statistics... β *108* [200-01].*
Branches (of banks) and their growth: α 15 [39].
Assets of German joint-stock companies: α 22 [44].
"Combination": Hilferding ϑ 4 and 5 [334-37] (pp. 285, 358).
Concentration in the German coal industry: γ *26* [226-27]. *Especially* α 7-8 [33-35].
New era of concentration: β *11* [85-86].
Concentration of technique and finance. N.B. β *102-03* [194-96].

3. *Cartels and Trusts.*
(2)** General figures: Liefmann: α *40* [55-56]. Riesser ϑ *8* [360-63]. Tafel β *37* [113].
(1) Periods of development: Liefmann. Vogelstein: αα̇ *33-34-35* [71-72].
(4) Technique: Tafel: β *38* [113-14].
(5) *Compulsory Organisation* by Kestner. α *23* [44-45] *et seq.*, *27* [46-47], especially **28** [47-48].
Immobility (hindrance to outflow) of fixed capital. Hilferdingr ϑ *4* [334-35] (p. *274*).
‖ Merchants=agents: Hilferding. ϑ 5 [335-37] ‖
‖ (p. 322). ‖
Example: Cement: β *99* [189-90].
(3) Share of the United States Steel Corporation: γ **28-29** [228-30]. β *104* [197-98]. α *40* [55-56]. ι *8* [378].

3 bis. Crises÷ ***Disproportional development of agriculture and industry.***
(6) Crises and *monopolies*: β 78 [160-61] (Jeidels).

* Figures in square brackets refer to pages of this volume.—*Ed.*
** The numbering in round brackets was made by Lenin later, in pencil.—*Ed.*

β *90* [173-74] (especially in fine). Chance, risk, bankruptcies: ι *11. 12-13* [379-81].

4. *Monopoly.*

(2 bis) Percentage of industry involved: Vogelstein. Kestner: α *23-24* [44-45].

5. *International Cartels. "Division of the world" among them.*

Cf. Hilferding ϑ 5 [335-37] (p. 491).

6.* Total figure: Liefmann.

5. 5. Explosives trust: α 39 [55].

2. 4. Oil: β *13* [89-90]. β 64 [141]. β *87* [170-71]. β 92+93 [175-77 + 177-79].

3. 3. Shipping: ϑ Riesser *10* [364-65].

4. 2. Rail cartel: ϑ Riesser *11* [367-68].

Vogelstein: γ 28 [229].—Berglund, p. 169.

1. N.B.: Electricity trust. *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912: ϑ 7-8 [338-41] (cf. ϑ Riesser *1* [343-45]). + β *64* [140]. β 89 [172-73].

Trade in metals: α *11-12* [36-38].

Zinkhüttenverband: ϑ Riesser *13* [366].

7. Conclusions and significance.

6. *Banks.*

0. Their general role. Cf. Hilferding: ϑ *3* [333-34] (p. 105) and ϑ 4 [334-35] (p. 108, p. 116).

6. "The *form* of social production and distribution" (Marx). Hilferding ϑ 4 [334-35] (p. 262) N.B.: β *41* [117-18] **in fine**.

| Growth of British banks: β *95* [181-83] |

1. Their concentration: ϑ Riesser *1.5* [343-45, 349-51]. γ 5 [206-07] France; β *99-100* [88-92]; β 7 [80-81] (300 million: 300 persons); β 13 [89-90]. (β 78-79 [160-61]—Jeidels). α *45 and 48 + 1* [59-60 and 64-66 + 66].

4. Letters: ϑ Riesser *2 bis* [349].

5. Accounts: γ 5 [206-07].

2. Branches: ϑ Riesser 13 [353-54]. (β 50 [125-27]—Russia). β 66 [142-44] (France). β 67 [145-147] (Great Britain). *Banks in Russia (1905 and after)*: β *42 and 43* [118-20].

* Two columns of figures were pencilled in by Lenin later.—*Ed.*

Banks and the Stock Exchange: Hilferding. ϑ Riesser *3* [347-48] + β 10 [84-85]. (*N.B.*: α *42* [53-54]). ((α 42 [53-54])). α *46* [60-62]. 3. Banks and employees: ϑ Riesser 3 [347-48]. β *66* [142-44]. β *100* [190-91]. α *43* [56-58].
5 bis. Banks and the Post Office: β *3* [77-78].
" " savings banks: β 15 [92-93].

7. *Banks.*
7. Merged with industry. Hilferding: Marx, II, 79 (ϑ 3 [333-34]). β *80-81* [162-65] (Jeidels).
8. Members of Supervisory Boards, etc. Hilferding: 4 [334-35] (p. 159. 162).—ϑ Riesser 7 [354-359]. —β 79 [161-62] (Jeidels). β *81* [163-65]. (α *41* [52-53] example—bank's letter to an industrial company).
9. "Universal character" (Jeidels): β 81-82. *83*. 84-87 [163-65. 165-66. 166-70]. β 88 [171-72]. (Technical role.) β *90* [173-74].—β *99* [190-91]. N.B. Tendency of the banks towards monopoly. *Hilferding*: ϑ 4 [334-35] (p. 278). α *48* [64-65].

8. "*Finance capital.*"
1. "Holdings." β *96-97* [183-86] (β 53 [127-29]). βα *46 and 47* [121-123] (Germany. *Deutsche Bank*). β 56 [130-32]. β *94* [178-81]. ι **11** [380].

N.B. example of distribution of shares: β 65 [140-42].

Ad § III. "Holdings" in Russian banks: β *49* (and 48) [123-26 (and 122-23)].
2. "Interlocking."
3. "Subsidiary companies." β 9 [83-84]. β *105-06* [198-200] ι *7. 9* [377-78. 379].
Fraud.
Concessions.
Bribes.
7. "Transport trust" and urban land: β 12 [86-89] + β *94* [178-81].
(Speculation in land): β 15-16 [92-94].
8. Bank directors and officials (government): Russia β *50-51* and 53. 55 [125-27 and 127-28. 129-30]. β *95-96* [181-85]. β *99* [188-90].
4. ***Company promotion;*** "Founders' *profit*":

Hilferding: ϑ 5 [335-37] (p. 336). Lysis: γ *19. 20* [220-221. 221-22]. + β *65* [140-42]. German example: β *8* [81-83].
Foreign loans: Lysis γ 19-20 [220-22]. α *2* [66-67]. (German) β *14* [91-92].
9. **Statistics of issues** (1910-12): ϑ 9 [341-42]. ι *23* [386-87]. (*Idem* from 1871): β *17* and *68* [94-96 and 147-49]. β 68 [147-49] (Neymarck and Zollinger]. α *47* [62-64] (ad § 18).
6. Profit from issues: α *38* [52]. ι 3. 5 [374-75. 376-77]. β *14* [91-92].
5. N.B. "Reconstruction." Hilferding: ϑ [334] (p. 172). Stillich: α *38* and *41* [52-53]. Liefmann: ι 3 [374-75]. The financial history of France: λ *2-3* [437-38].

9. *Export of capital* (§ IV).
Introduction? Growth of capital and its contradictions.
Growth { Hobson—ϰ 9 [409-10].
Lescure: γ 5 [206-07]. β 67 [145-47].
(Mehrens). β *69* [146] (Neymarck).
Amount: Neymarck (β *68* and *69* [147-49 and 149-51]) + ϑ *Riesser 14* [371].
Harms: ζ *3*-5 [286-87]. ζ *30* [323].
Arndt: ε *1* [273].
Diouritch: β *63* [139-40].
Kaufmann: β 66 [142-44].

Schulze-Gaevernitz: a *2* [66-67].

Significance.
Connection with export of commodities. Exports and investment of capital: β *30* [108-10]. (*Hilferding* ϑ.) β *100-01* [191-94] (loans and exports). N.B. See 20.*
(Orders, etc.): β 14-15 [91-92].
Contracts: β **27** [105-06]. β 28 [107-08]. β 29 [108-09].
Banks in the colonies: β *65* [141-42]. β *30* [48-50]. (+ ϑ **Riesser 7** [354-59]).
Foreign loans (? § III ?) (α 2 [66-67]) N.B. Foreign capital in China, Japan, etc. β 17 [94-96].

* See p. 237 of this volume.—*Ed.*

German capital in Russia: γ 42 [249-50] (cf. β *58* [132-331). α *31* [68-69]. η 13 [330]. Foreign capital in Argentina and other countries β 29 [108-09] and β **30** [109-10].
Canada: β 94 [180-81].

"*Dumping*". Where to? Where? for §VII? see 16*

10. *Colonies.*
Their general significance: agriculture: β *18* [96-97].
Colonial loans ι *21* [386].
Colonial banks: ϑ Riesser *7* [354-59].
Social significance of colonies. Wahl: γ *27* [226-28].
Raw materials: β 18 [96-97].
Sales: exports to colonies. β *20* [98-100].
Suppression of industry and development of agriculture, etc. β *24-25* [103-05]. (India, etc.) β 26 [105-06].
America in the Philippines: β 26 [105-06].
***Britain*: *Suez*:** α *44* [58-59].
(1) Monopolies—(raw-material sources).
(2) Export of capital (concessions).
Finance capital = domination.

11. *Growth of colonies.*
Morris: γ 47 [251] et seq.
1860
1880 ϰ *2*-3 [406-08]
1900

12. "*Division of the world*": 1876 and 1914 (colonies). ζ 5-7 [294-99]. Britain's virtual protectorate over Portugal, Norway, Spain (N.B.): β 21, 22, 23 [100-01-03]. Siam (ibidem). Argentina—*Sartorius, p. 46* (Argentina): ξ 28 [545-46]. λ 25 [452-53]. (idem).
N.B.: (αα Colonies....)
(ββ Semi-colonies....)
(γγ Financially dependent countries....)—cf. α *31* [69-70].

3 13. *Uneven growth and "redivision" of the world.*
Britain versus Germany. Crammond: ι *35-36* [398-400].

* Ibid., p. 237.—*Ed.*

General (new discoveries) ι *12-13* [380-81].
Patents: λ *28* [453-54].
France versus Germany. Théry: γ 3 [204-05].
Hubert: γ 22 [223]. Bérard: γ *24* [223-24].
United States, Britain and Germany. *Vorwärts*, *1916*. μ 1 [461-63].
London as world market and money power. β 4-5 [78-80].
("¾ of trade", etc.) (cf. α *46* [60-62]).
(Not for §7 or 8??)
β 96 [183-85] (iron (world output): 1850-1910).
β 98 [186-88] (deposits).
Water-power: β *62* [137-38].
Cables: β 64 [140-41]. ζ 3 [290-93].
[[Iron, steel, electro-steel: β *99* [188-90].]]
[α *31-32* [69-71]: drive of German imperialism!]

Hobson: 103; 205; 144; 335; 386 [415-16; 419; 417-18; 429-30; 434-35].

2 14. *Picture of relationships in the world economy.*
R. Calwer. (Corrections.) μ [464-66].
Railways. 1890 and 1913. μ [484-490].
Comparison of their growth with that of iron and steel production. μ [490].
Chapter VII. 127-146-162.*

1 15. *Summing up. Principal economic* (*industrial*) *features of imperialism....*

α:	Concentration and monopoly.	1.
β:	Export of capital (chief thing).	3.
γ:	Bank capital and its "threads".	2.
δ:	Division of the world by industrial monopolists.	4.
ε:	Idem—colonies.	5.

K. Kautsky's definition. δ [268]
versus:
Incompleteness of Hilferding's definition: ϑ 5 [335-37] (p. 338) cf. ϑ 6 [337-38] (p. 495).
P. Louis in 1904: γ *43-45* [250-51].

* In Chapter VII, Lenin included §§13, 14 and 15 in reverse order; the numbers refer to the pages of the MS. of Lenin's book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.—*Ed*.

{ Distinction from the old colonial policy. *ϰ 1. 36.* 40 [405-06. 427-28. 429-31].
Hobson's definition or conception. *ϰ 11* [411].
ϰ 13-14. 17 [412-14. 415-16]. *ϰ 32* [425].
Chapter IX. 162.

16. "*The economic policy of finance capital*" *and the critique of imperialism?*
"Dumping."
"Protectionism"—its growth in Britain, Belgium, Holland. β 19 [97-99].
The new significance of protective tariffs. *Engels* in Hilferding. ϑ 5 [335-37] (p. 300).
Coercion ϰ 11 [411]; (annexations). *42* [431-33].
β *97* [185-86]: exports and finance capital.

17. *Back to free* competition or *forward* to overcoming *capitalism*? Hilferding: ϑ 6 [337-38] (*p. 567 N.B.*).

18. *Parasitism and* "*decay*" of capitalism. *The* "*rentier state*"... (α 2 [66-67]). α 3 [67-69]. β 30 [108-10] (five creditor states). (!!) β 95 [181-83] (Germany). λ *19* [445-47] (a creditor state). λ *21* (22-23) [448 (449-51)]. λ *25* [452-53]. λ 26. 27. 28. 29 [452-56]. ϰ 46-48 [434-36]. ϰ 18. 21. 25. 34 [415-17. 417-19. 420. 426-27].
ϰ 9 [409-10] (15%) and *10.39* [410-11. 429-30] Holland. γ 14 [214-15] (Moos).
Hildebrand = apprehensions about monopoly: β *34* [110-12] et seq.
Foreign workers in *Germany* (statistics, 1907).
Foreign workers in *France*. δ 8 [263-64].
Emigration and immigration. ϰ *5* [409].

Statistics of issues from §8.

N.B.: Sartorius ξ *29* [547-48].

1) 19. "*Ultra-imperialism*" *or* "*inter-imperialism*"?
ϰ 7 [430-32] (cf. λ 20 [447-48]).

20. *Kautsky* and *Hobson* versus Marxism.
N.B. Kautsky versus *Agahd*. β
Exports to Canada: λ *20* [447-48].
Trade with independent and dependent countries. β *100-02* [191-95].

Puerto Rico. λ *21* [448-49].

21. *Apologists and petty-bourgeois critics* of imperialism. The apologist Schilder: β *27* [105-07]. Hildebrand: β *35* [111-13].
Nieboer α *13* [38-39].—ϰ 25. 27. 30 [420. 421-22. 423-24] (Fabians). 31 [424-25]. Liefmann.
Hobson. ϰ *1* [405-06]. ϰ *15*.
16 [414-16]. Cf. β *40* [116-17] on K. Kautsky.
American anti-imperialists. Patouillet.
γ 11 [209-11]. V. Bérard on Egypt: γ *23* [224].
Agahd: β *41* [117-18] et seq. β *54* [128-30]. β *59* [133-34]. β *60*. *61* [135. 136-37].
(*Eschwege*. "Etatisation"; he is against it: β *94* [178-81]). β *100* [191]: against Baghdad.
Neymarck is for "peace": β 69 [149-51] (125).
The Pereires are for world peace. α *42* [53-54].

| *Apologists*: Riesser (ϑ) and Schulze-Gaevernitz (α 47 [62-64]). |

22. *Imperialism and opportunism*.
British liberal labour policy.
Definitive split in the working-class movement.
Upper stratum of workers. λ *18* [446]. *22*. *22-23*. *23*. *30* [449-50. 449-51. 450-51. 456-57]. ϰ *24* [419-20] (205) (bribery). [*ad 18?*].

2) 23. *Diplomacy and foreign policy* 1871-1914 {brief mention}. α *3*.
...Hilferding ϑ *6* [337-38] (p. 505) .... ϑ Riesser *11* [367-68].
British foreign policy (1870-1914)... β 23 [100-02].
German: β **97** [185-86].
Hishida: γ *6* [207].
Oceania: γ *27* [227-28].
Patouillet: γ *9* and *10* [209 and 210].
Hill: γ *46* [251].

3) **23 bis**: *Imperialism and democracy. Finance capital and reaction* (α **31** [68-70]).
Nieboer: α 13 [38-39].

4) 24. *The national question* in the era of imperialism (brief mention).

"National wars." Patouillet: γ *12* [210-11].
America and colonies. Patouillet: γ *10* [209].

Growth of the national movement. β **28-29** [106-08].
Hildebrand's arguments contra. β **35** [111-12].
Nieboer: α *13* [38-39].
Hilferding: ϑ. ϰ 17-19-20 [416-17-18]. ι 3 [374-75].
Conclusion. *The place of imperialism in history* (?).

25. "*Interlocking*" *versus* "*socialisation*".
{Rate of growth and over-ripening ... (their) compatibility).
"Decay" and birth of the new.... }

Bottle manufacturers. *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912 (30, 2), p. 567. The inventor's name is Owens, not Owen!

Liefmann: α **40** [55-56].
Riesser: ϑ 3 and *10* [346-47 and 363-65].
Saint-Simon and Marx (Schulze-Gaevernitz):
α **43-44** [56-59].
Rate of growth: ϑ Riesser 9 [362-63].

Technical progress and torment (Quälerei).
Taylor and "Motion Study" β *70-77* [152-60].

Summing up and conclusions. Imperialism and socialism. N.B.:
Optimism [regarding opportunism?].
Monopoly and free competition—banks and socialisation.—
Interlocking and socialisation—division of the world and redivisions.—
"Transition" to ... what? β *84* [166-69].
Tschierschky in favour of cartels (against trusts): afraid: β *104* [197-98].
Incompleteness of Hilferding's definition. §*15*. (To come here?)

ADDITIONS TO THE PLAN OF THE BOOK*

(b) Three contradictions of capitalism: 1) social production and private appropriation, 2) wealth and poverty, 3) town and countryside, inde—export of capital.
(a) Its distinction from export of *goods*.
The distinctive character of **modern** colonial policy:
(1) monopoly (raw materials);
(2)—(reserves of land);
(3) (delimitation—"autarchy");—monoculture: β *25* [103-05].
(4) (export of capital)
(5) concessions, etc.

N.B.	1. Social significance (domination (Hilferding, 511)) Hilferding **N.B.** cf. *Wahl*. 2. Dependence of "independent" countries.

p. 14, middle, "processing of raw materials"? Raw-materials industry? + (N.B.) (from *Die Neue Zeit*). Add about **chemical** trust. Add about "naïveté" of *Die Bank* in § on financial oligarchy.

PLANS OF SEPARATE CHAPTERS OF THE BOOK

III. Founder's profit and profit from stock issues
Reconstruction
Urban land holdings
Banks and the government
Statistics of issues
VI. 1. Supan. %% 1876. Idem 1900.
2. Morris.
3. Table.
3 *bis*: "dependent countries".
4. Colonies, formerly and now
exports—sale
raw materials
suppression of industry.
VIII. 1. The rentier state.

* The whole of the following text of additions was crossed out by Lenin in pencil.—*Ed*.

2. Hobson 9 and *10* [409-10 and 410-11] (income from *capital investment*: λ **21** [448-49].
3. Hobson *30* and *46-48* [423-24 and 434-36]. Prospects.
4. λ *28*. 29. [453-54. 455-56]. λ *24-25* [451-53].
4 *bis*. Foreign capital.
5. Decrease in the percentage of productive workers.
6. Engels and *Marx* on British workers.
300,000 Spanish workers in France.
La Bataille (June 1916).

IX. *Critique of imperialism.*
1. Critique = ideas in general.
2. Apologists. ("Fabians.")
3. Petty-bourgeois democrats.
4. Kautsky versus Hobson (*K. Kautsky and Spectator. N.B.*)
5. Forward or back?
6. Free competition versus customs duties, dumping, etc.
7. Exports to dependent countries.
8. Ultra- or inter-imperialism?
9. Political features of imperialism (diplomacy). { reaction / national oppression }

X. I. Imperialism is monopoly capitalism.

(a) Trusts	(1) Trusts
(b) banks	(2) seizure of raw materials
(c) division of the world	(3) banks
	(4) division of the world

II. Imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism.
(1) bourgeoisie, republican and monarchical? America and Japan?
(2) opportunism.
{ the struggle against imperialism without breaking with and combating opportunism is deception.

III. Imperialism is transitional or moribund capitalism.

I. and 1-4. — —
II. — and (1)+(2)."Optimism" about opportunism.— —

III. Interlocking versus socialisation.

Saint-Simon and Marx.—*Riesser* on rate of growth.—Transition to what? (β **84** [166-69] already mentioned). Taylor to come here?

GENERAL PLAN AND VARIATIONS OF CHAPTER HEADINGS

A. 1. Introduction.
B. 2-15. Economic analysis (principal relations of production).
C. 18. (Parasitism.)
D. 16-17. Economic policy (customs policy).
E. 19-22. Appraisal (attitude to ..., critique) of imperialism.
F. 23-24. Some political relationships and connections.
+ 18 parasitism.
25. ΣΣ.

Roughly:

I. Concentration of production, monopolies, cartels.
II. Banks and finance capital.
III. Export of capital.
IV. Economic division of the world: international cartels.
V. Political division of the world: colonies.
VI. General summary = the concept of imperialism and imperialist policy.
VII. Critique of imperialism.
VIII. Interlocking or socialisation?

Up to ten chapters, if II = two chapters + possible supplements, introduction and conclusion.

Roughly:

I.	Concentration of production and monopolies.—	about 30	pages
II.	Banks.—	" 20	"
III.	"Finance" capital (and the financial oligarchy).—	" 30	"
IV.	Export of capital.—	" 10	"
V.	Economic division of the world.—	" 10	"
VI.	Idem political.—	" 20	"—120
VII.	General summary = imperialism (K. Kautsky).—	" 10	"

VIII.	Parasitism.—	"	20	"
IX.	Critique of imperialism.—	"	20	"
X.	Socialisation. General significance of imperialism (?) The place of imperialism in history.—	"	10	"

Σ = 180

I. Concentration of production and monopoly.
II. Banks and their new role.
III. Finance capital and the financial oligarchy.
IV. Export of capital.
V. Division of the world by capitalist associations.
VI. Idem by the Great Powers.
VII. *Imperialism, as a special stage.*
VIII. The parasitism and decay of capitalism.
IX.
X.

		Page
I.	Concentration of production and monopolies.—	*3*
II.	Banks and their new role.—	*30*
III.	Finance capital and the financial oligarchy.—	*58*
IV.	Export of capital.—	*82*
V.	Division of the world between capitalist associations.—	*91*
VI.	Division of the world between the Great Powers.—	*106*
VII.	Imperialism, as a special stage.—	*127*
VIII.	The parasitism and decay of capitalism.—	*146*
IX.	Critique of imperialism.—	*162*
X.	The place of imperialism in history.—	*186*

Lenivtsyn. Heading: "The Basic Peculiarities of Contemporary Capitalism."

(α) Note No. 101 (N.B.)
(β) Publication in a magazine of the same publisher?*

* See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 226-27.—*Ed.*

TONNELAT, *GERMAN EXPANSION OUTSIDE EUROPE*

E. Tonnelat, *German Expansion Outside Europe*, Paris, 1908 (from 1906-08 articles in *La Revue de Paris*).

Author believes the occupation of Kiao-chow marks (pp. x-xi) the "beginning of the new period" of German colonisation, namely, the "*imperialist*" period (p. x and p. xi), the period of "world policy" (ibidem).

		pp.
Chapters: Germans in the	U.S.A.	(1-91)
" "	Brazil	(91-155)
" "	Shantung	(155-97)
" "	South Africa	(197-277)

In Brazil they "are not Germanising, but Americanising the south of Brazil" (p. 154)

(apparently, *nothing*)

(a general *account*, no more, about Germans abroad).

DRIAULT, *POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS*

J. E. Driault, *Political and Social Problems*, Paris, 1907.

((A general historical sketch of the "problems": Alsace-Lorraine, Rome and the Pope, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, the Mediterranean, Egypt, the "Partition of Africa", China, the United States (Chapter XI and its subsection: "Imperialism in the United States"), the Triple Alliance; the Franco-Russian Alliance, Chapter XIV, see my quotation,* Chapter XVI "The Social and Moral Problem". Mostly the remarks of a historian and "diplomat".))

From "*Conclusion*":

"The present time is, in fact, marked by universal tension, in which the existing

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 264-65.—*Ed.*

state of peace is merely a truce, which many find too long and which many do not observe. The world is seized by a strange fever of imperialism, by fierce cupidities arising on all sides and shamelessly allowed to take effect. Society is shaken by the struggle of classes, everywhere violently conducted and hardly mitigated in recent times. Even the human mind is upset by doubts and the need for certainty.

"Mankind is in the throes of revolution—a territorial revolution, a new delimitation of frontiers, an assault on the great markets of the world, armaments up to the hilt, as if people were going to hurl themselves at one another tomorrow, for mutual ruin and extermination—a social revolution based on the worst feelings, the hatred of the poor for the rich, the contempt of the rich for the poor, as if society were still divided into free men and slaves, as if it had not altered since olden times—a moral revolution, a laborious transition from faith to science, painful anguish for people of sensitive conscience, the hard necessity for the churches to renounce controlling people's souls in order to devote themselves to educating them.—A profound revolution, the outcome of that of the preceding century, but much more severe because of its incalculable consequences: for at issue is not only the political organisation of states, but the material and moral condition of mankind" (393-94).

cf. K. Kautsky 1909

((And then platitudes: the nineteenth century accomplished much, it liberated nationalities, etc., etc., but it left much to be done. "For this (19th) century was a century of science, but it put it at the service of force." The next century must be a "school of justice", etc., etc. A liberal, nothing more. That makes his admissions all the more characteristic: he senses the storm.))

COLSON, *THE ECONOMIC ORGANISM AND SOCIAL DISORDER*

C. Colson, *The Economic Organism and Social Disorder*, Paris, 1912.

(Reactionary blather. Nil. Nil.)

This author has written a six-volume *Course of Political Economy*. Books 4-6 contain information on banks, trade, finance, etc.

Supplements to these (4-6) books, with new data, are published *each year* (1 franc). (Consult.)

REDSLOB, *DEPENDENT COUNTRIES*

Dr. Robert **Redslob**, *Dependent Countries* (*An Analysis of the Concept of Original Ruling Power*), Leipzig, 1914 (352 pp.). Purely legal study. Constitutional-law position of

Alsace-Lorraine
Finland
Bosnia
(×) Canada
(×) Australia
(×) South Africa.

} { **only** legal analysis }

Examination of part of the chapters (×) shows that the author cites interesting excerpts from laws indicating *growth of independence* in these British colonies, which have *almost* attained the position of free countries. Nevertheless, they are *dependent* countries, says the author, since they do not enjoy *full* freedom (though development is obviously in that direction....)

separation is *spoken of* freely.
Agreement with Britain on legislation.

Use for comparing imperialism (economic) and political independence.

Things are *moving* towards free federation. Britain has granted parliamentarism, the author concludes, which she is now combining with "the organisation of a federal state" (p. 347). The South African parliament has authority to alter colony frontiers, unite several colonies *into one*.

"But only at the request of the colonies concerned" (339)....

In Australia, parliament can divide colonies into smaller units, can merge colonies—"but only with the consent of the population concerned, or of its parliament" (p. 335). N.B.

(there were plebiscites; the drafting of a constitution with the consent of all the colonies—by **agreement** with Britain....))

p. 330, a note, Mr. *Dibbs* (an Australian) spoke freely of *secession* from Britain and the formation of an independent Australian republic....

1900: "An Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia" (July 9. 63 and 64. Victoria).

A simple, brief account of the development of federalism and political freedom in Canada, South Africa and Australia. Very interesting, and should be used against the idiocy of the "imperialist Economists"....[22]

NOTES FOR ARTICLES "*THE 'DISARMAMENT' SLOGAN*" *AND* "THE MILITARY PROGRAMME OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION"*

"Disarming is emasculation. Disarming is a reactionary-Christian jeremiad. Disarming is not a struggle *against* the imperialist reality, but a *flight* from it into the beautiful future *after* the victorious socialist revolution!!" (cf. Victor Fischer)....

"Militarisation of the nation", "an armed people", what a misfortune!—one hears this more and more frequently. But we say: militarisation of the nation, an armed people, drawing children and, if you like, women, into military training—*so much the better*, the speedier will the war be turned into a civil war, into an uprising. Help? No, we will not help the trusts.

Disarmament instead of arming the people.

* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 77-87 and 94-104.—*Ed.*

1. The voice of the small countries.
2. Against all war?
3. National war.
4. "Theses."
5. Civil war.
6. Socialist war.
7. The oppressed class?
8. Concession to opportunism?
9. No opportunism and Kautskyism here.
10. Militarisation of the nation.
11. Commune.
12. First, the fight against opportunism and Kautskyism.
13. Second, a concrete programme.
14. Third, practical "demands".
15. Two lines of policy in Switzerland.

To the question "Militia or disarmament?"

I. Disarmament *or* disarming of the people *or* something similar? (instead of a militia).

II. The oppressed class has not sought to study and master the art of war? (Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, on militarism on the way to destruction).[23]

III. Concession to opportunism, or the ease of slipping into opportunism?

Not here, not in this.

+attempts to avoid revolution	All democratic changes facilitate this. (The republic. Separation of the church from the state, etc.).... Exception (America)....
	General struggle, all along the line, against overt and masked opportunism (Kautskyism).
+imperialism in Switzerland (Nakhimson)	Press down on the enemy (opportunism) everywhere. Changes in programme. No to Swiss militia (especially after 1907).

IV. Practice. Formulas or revolutionary practice? Now, at this moment—propaganda of disarmament or disarming? Nonsense! Help the revolutionary struggle in neighbouring countries, turn the imperialist war into a civil war. 20,000 × 2 pfennigs = 20,000 francs per annum. Three newspapers, their delivery.

ON ZAK'S BOOK *GERMANS AND GERMAN CAPITAL IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY*

Conrad's Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie, etc., III series, Vol. 49 (1915, January), p. 351.

Small item (in "Miscellaneous") by Waldecker on a book in Russian, by **A. N. Zak**, *Germans and German Capital in Russian Industry* (St. Petersburg, 1914)— (Zak = director of the Central Bank of Mutual Credit Societies). ‖ Zak

Total Share Capital in Russia:

(million rubles)

		Russian	Foreign		Σ
(round figures)	1903—	41.7	+16.8	=	58.5
	1904— —	92.5	26.7		119.2
	1905———	64.3	8.0		72.3
	1910———	190.5	33.7		224.2
	1912———	371.2	30.3		401.5

Number of Russian companies ... 1,237 capital = 410.3 ("operating" in Russia)

foreign ... 196

These companies have their head offices in:

Germany ———	24	companies	Switzerland. . . .	6
Sweden ———	3	"	Italy.	1
Britain ———	33	"	Austria.	3
Holland . . .	2	"	Turkey.	1
Belgium . . .	70	"	U.S.A.	6
France	48	"		

Branches of **Industry**

	German capital	Its profit
	(million rubles)	
1) Iron and steel	20 (1912)	5.5
2) Machine building	11.5	
3) Engineering	38.5	
4) Soda	½ of total capital	
5) Electrical	50	
6) Electrical engineering	57	
7) Gas	12.5 = 71.8% of total capital; +12.6% French + 7.4% Belgian + 8.2% Russian	
8) Petroleum (Deutsche Bank). . .	20	
9) Textiles.	(34-50% in Moscow Gubernia and Baltic provinces)	

Σ not given by the author

PAUL LOUIS, *OUTLINE OF IMPERIALISM*

Le Mercure de France, Vol. 50, April, Paris, 1904.
Paul Louis, *Outline of Imperialism*, p. 100 et seq.

"Imperialism is a general phenomenon of our age; more, a characteristic feature of the early twentieth century, and few nations have been able to avoid its influence.

"The world is passing through the era of imperialism, just as it has experienced the crises of liberalism, protectionism, colonialism,—just as it has experienced the collective effort of nationalities, just as in the last ten years it has witnessed the universal spread and increasing growth of socialism. All these elements, all these aspects of the life of mankind, are closely linked, and imperialism and socialism to a very large extent form the fundamental contradiction of our age. To show up this contradiction amounts practically to defining the essential principles of both" (100).

..."Imperialism is equally triumphant in Britain and the U.S.A., in Japan and the Russian Empire, in Germany, France and Italy" (100-01)....

"It [imperialism] emerges everywhere as capitalism's supreme effort to preserve its wealth, political domination, social authority. This involves territorial conquest, forcible or peaceful extension of possessions, closure of markets, creation of a closed empire" (101).

The wars of 1820-48 were bound up "with the formation of the great German and Italian nationalities" (102)....

..."Imperialism combines colonialism and protectionism" (105)....

"It [imperialism] should above all be studied in Great Britain, for there it has found its Promised Land" (106)....

But alongside Great Britain there has developed

(1) the competition of France, Germany, America and Japan;

(2) the struggle for colonial markets (of Europe and the colonial countries themselves);

(3) the merchant fleet of other countries.

"Imperialism arose from these three established facts" (107).

(Chamberlain's campaign. Imperial federation, etc.).

The same applies to the United states—Russia—Germany—Japan (109).

(Hence—the aggravation of nationalism, etc.)

"Nationalism, which merges with imperialism" ... carries the threat of war, etc. (112).

But these wars "will deal irreparable blows to the social institutions of participating countries" (113).

It will lead to the formation of gigantic empires—to growing discontent among the workers (113), the "mob" ... (113) (rising living costs, etc., etc.).

"The capitalist world regards imperialism, its last card, as the last refuge against the bankruptcy and spontaneous disintegration that threatens to engulf it with fatal certainty. But imperialism is also a remarkable, incomparable, artisan of revolution" (114).

(End of article)

HILL, *HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE*

David Jayne *Hill* in his *History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (Vols. I-III, Vol. I, preface dated February 1, 1905)

promises to examine in future volumes:

"the Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism, of the Revolutionary Era, of the Constitutional Movement, and of Commercial Imperialism, thus bringing the history of international development down to the present time."* (p. x).

N.B.

MORRIS, *THE HISTORY OF COLONISATION*

Henry C. *Morris*, *The History of Colonisation*, New York, 1900, *2 vols.*

A historical survey from the most ancient times until 1899.

Interesting statistical summaries.

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 296.—*Ed.*

Modern Development of French Colonial Power (p. 419. I)

	1815-30	1860	1880	1890	1899
Asia	197	197	69,147	201,000	363,027
Africa	1,034	185,650	624,624	2,128,814	3,320,488
America	16,000	48,011	48,011	48,043	48,011
Oceania	—	8,000	8,565	9,135	9,220
(Area in sq. miles)	17,231	241,858	750,347	2,386,992	3,740,746
	1815-30	1860	1880	1890	1899
Asia	179,000	221,507	3,333,500	18,000,000	22,679,100
Africa	95,000	2,800,000	3,702,482	16,800,000	33,257,010
America	225,000	300,000	391,084	372,805	383,750
Oceania	—	50,000	93,831	72,300	82,000
Population)	499,000	3,371,507	7,520,897	35,245,105	56,401,860

Idem of British (II, 88)

	1815	1860	1880	1890-91	1899
Europe		1,163	127	119	119
Asia		875,797	963,384	1,827,228	1,827,579
Africa		129,976	278,446	341,858	367,928
America		954,170	3,359,243	3,768,818	3,952,572
Australasia		580,134	3,083,770	3,175,153	3,175,840
(Area in sq. miles)		2,541,240	7,684,970	9,113,176	9,324,038
Europe	340,000	386,557	175,186	191,417	204,421
Asia	124,200,000	137,279,105	256,148,625	288,436,340	291,586,688
Africa	243,500	835,650	2,717,816	4,963,062	4,931,780
America	1,599,850	4,226,744	6,016,077	6,708,042	7,260,169
Australasia	25,050	2,401,024	2,877,440	4,416,843	5,009,281
Population)	126,408,400	145,129,080	267,935,144	304,715,704	308,992,339

The author gives the following table, II, 318, taking the figures from *The Statesman's Year-Book for 1900.*

	No. of colonies	Area (sq. miles) Metropolis	Area (sq. miles) Colonies, etc.	Population Metropolis	Population Colonies, etc.
United Kingdom	50	120,979	11,605,238	40,559,954	345,222,339
France	33	204,092	3,740,756	38,517,975	56,401,860
Germany	13	208,830	1,027,120	52,279,901	14,687,000
Netherlands	3	12,648	782,862	5,074,632	35,115,711
Portugal	9	36,038	801,100	5,049,729	9,148,707
Spain	3	197,670	243,877	17,565,632	136,000
Italy	2	110,646	188,500	31,856,675	850,000
Austria-Hungary	2	241,032	23,570	41,244,811	1,568,092
Denmark	3	15,289	86,634	2,185,335	114,229
(×) Russia	3	8,660,395	255,550	128,932,173	15,684,000
Turkey	4	1,111,741	465,000	23,834,500	14,956,236
China	5	1,336,841	2,881,560	386,000,000	16,680,000
U.S.A.	6	3,557,000	172,091	77,000,000	10,544,617
Total	136	15,813,201	22,273,858	850,103,317*	521,108,791

(×) In *Austria—Bosnia* and *Herzegovi-*

* So given by Morris.—*Ed.*

n a.—In Turkey—*Egypt*, *Bulgaria* (and Rumelia) and *Samos*. In China—*Manchuria*, *Mongolia*, *Tibet*, "*Jungaria*" and *Eastern Turkestan*.—In Russia—Bukhara 92,000 sq. miles, Khiva 22,300 sq. miles: ? + ? Port Arthur, etc.??

Not clear from the text (pp. 291-92), the references are mostly to *The Statesman's Year-Book*.

My calculations*

Great Britain			France		Germany		All three ΣΣ	
	Area (mill. sq. miles)	Population (mill.)						
1815–30	?	126	0.01	0.5				
1860	2.5	145.1	0.2	3.4	—	—	2.7	148.5
1880	7.7	267.9	0.7	7.5	—	—	8.4	275.4
1890	9.1	304.7	2.4	35.2	1.0	14.5	12.5	354.4
1899	9.3	309.0	3.7	56.4	1.0	14.7	14.0	380.1
Maximum (1890 to be deleted)		1860-80	1880-90		1880-90		1860-80	

Growth of *French* colonies (from *The Statesman's Year-Book* for 1900), I, 420.

	Year of acquisition	Area, sq. miles	Population
Asia			
India	1679	197	279,100
Annam	1884	88,780	5,000,000
Cambodia	1862	40,530	1,500,000
Cochin-China	1861	23,160	2,400,000
Tonking (+Laos)	1884-93	210,370	13,500,000
	Total	363,027**	22,679,100
Africa			
Algeria	1830	184,474	4,430,000
Algerian Sahara		123,500	50,000
Tunisia	1881	50,840	1,500,000
Sahara Region		1,684,000	2,500,000
Senegal	1637	120,000	2,000,000

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 255.—*Ed*.
** So given by Morris.—*Ed*.

Senegal	1637	120,000	2,000,000
Sudan	1880	300,000	2,500,000
Ivory Coast, etc.	1843	100,000	2,500,000
Dahomey	1893	50,000	1,000,000
Congo and Gabon	1884	425,000	12,000,000
French Guinea	1843	48,000	1,000,000
Obok & Somali Coast	1864	5,000	22,000
Réunion	1649	970	173,200
Comoro Isles	1886	620	53,000
Mayotte	1843	140	11,640
Nossi-Be	1841	130	9,500
Sainte-Marie	1643	64	7,670
Madagascar	1896	227,750	3,500,000
		3,320,488*	33,257,010
America			
Guiana	1626	46,850	22,710
Guadeloupe & Dependencies	1634	688	167,100
Martinique	1635	380	187,690
St. Pierre & Miquelon	1635	93	6,250
		48,011	383,750
Oceania			
New Caledonia & Dependencies	1854	7,700	53,000
Other French establishments	1841-81	1,520	29,000
		9,220	82,000
		ΣΣ=3,740,756*	56,401,860

German Colonies, II. 304

		Area, sq. miles	Population
Oceania			
Kaiser Wilhelm's Land	1885-86	70,000	110,000
Bismarck Archipelago	1885	20,000	188,000
Solomon Islands	1886	4,200	45,000
Marshall "	1886	150	13,000
Caroline "	1899	560	40,000
Marianne "	1899	250	2,000
Samoan "			
Savali	1899	660	12,500
Upolu	1899	340	16,600
		96,160	427,100

* So given by Morris.—*Ed.*

China			
Kiao-chow	1897	200	60,000
Africa			
Togoland	1884	33,000	2,500,000
Cameroons	1884	191,130	3,500,000
German Southwest Africa	1884-90	322,450	200,000
German East Africa	1885-90	384,180	8,000,000
		930,760	14,200,000
		ΣΣ=1,027,120	14,687,100

My calculations:			Ergo:			
(1880–90)	94,350	356,000	1860—	0	—	0
	930,760	14,200,000	1880—	0	—	0
	1,025,110	14,556,000	1890—	1,025,110		14,556,000
(1890–99)	1,810	71,100				
	200	60,000				
	2,010	131,000				
	1,027,120	14,687,100	1899—	1,027,120		14,687,100

British Colonies, II. 88

		Area, sq. miles	Population
India			
British India	1601-1856	1,068,314	221,172,952
Feudatory States		731,944	66,050,479
		1,800,258	287,223,431
Europe			
Gibraltar	1704	2	24,093
Malta & Gozo	1800	117	180,328
Asia			
Aden & Perim	1839	80	41,910
Ceylon	1795	25,333	3,448,752
Hong Kong	1842	406	354,400
Labuan	1846	30	5,853
Straits Settlements	1819	1,471	512,342
Africa			
Ascension	1815	35	430
Basutoland	1868-83	10,293	250,000
Cape Colony	1806	276,775	1,787,960

Mauritius	1810	705	337,856
Natal & Zululand	1824	35,019	902,365
St. Helena	1651	47	4,545
West Africa			
Gambia	1631	69	14,300
Gold Coast	1661	40,000	1,473,882
Lagos	1787	985	85,607
Sierra Leone	1789	4,000	74,835
America			
Bermudas	1609	20	16,291
Canada	1763	3,653,946	5,185,990
Falkland Islands & St. George	1833	7,500	2,050
British Guiana	1803	109,000	286,222
” Honduras	1670	7,562	34,747
Newfoundland & Labrador	1497	162,200	202,040
West Indies			
Bahamas	1629	4,466	53,256
Jamaica & Turks Islands	1655	4,359	733,118
Barbados	1605	166	190,000
Leeward Islands	17th century	701	127,800
Windward ”	” ”	784	155,000
Trinidad & Tobago	1763-97	1,868	273,655
Australasia			
Fiji	1874	7,740	121,738
New Guinea	1884	90,540	350,000
New South Wales	1788	310,700	1,357,050
New Zealand	1840	104,470	796,387
Queensland	1859	668,500	498,523
South Australia	1836	903,690	362,897
Tasmania	1803	29,390	171,340
West Australia	1829	975,920	168,490
Total colonies		7,523,780*	21,768,908*
Total India plus colonies		9,324,038	308,992,339

{The “history” itself, it seems, is a dry enumeration of facts.}

* So given by Morris. Under the heading “Australasia”, Lenin has omitted the data on Victoria: area 87,890 sq. miles and population 1,176,854.—*Ed.*

NOTEBOOK "δ"
("DELTA")

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STEFFEN, *WORLD WAR AND IMPERIALISM*

Gustaf F. Steffen, *World War and Imperialism. Socio-Psychological Documents and Observations of the World War 1914-15*, Jena, 1915. (Translated from the Swedish.)

(p. 3): "Imperialism is as old as the history of the world"....

"In its most general features, *imperialism* is an endeavour to build a great world state by conquest or colonisation or the peaceful political

union of already existing states, or by a combination of these methods; to build a world power which embraces the whole of mankind or which divides mankind between itself and some other world states" (4).... The concept of "the whole world" depends on the given people's "knowledge" of the earth, etc. "Imperialism is a purely psychical factor" (4).

!!?
ha-ha!!

"Social fantasy is the mother of imperialism"-(5).

Imperialism has its history. "There is primitive imperialism and higher, more mature imperialism" (6).

Caesar,—Napoleon, etc., etc.

Present-day "*imperialism of partition*" (partition of the world) in contrast to ancient "mono-imperialism" (a single monarchy)—(p. 15)....

On p. *14* the author promises to examine the "*special*" features of "present-day" "European imperialism"....

The world is divided among ten empires ... (p. 15) and fifty other independent states....

1. Russia
2. Great Britain

} with mono-imperialist "dreams of the future".... } "semi-European" states

(their characteristic feature being vast possessions *outside* Europe).

3. France—likewise of "somewhat lower imperialist rank" (16)....

("empires with extra-European orientation").

4. Japan.
5. Turkey—a weak empire.
6. China—a "dormant empire" (17) ... "Chinese imperialism" will still have to be reckoned with in the future (17)....
7. Germany.

—the war centres on her "imperialist position and power"....

8. Austria-Hungary.
9. Italy ("an imperialist newcomer", 18)....
10. United States.

What part of the world is "imperialised"?

Σ of these ten empires = 96.66 million square kilometres = 66% of the world. South America = 18.6 million sq. kilometres = 13% of the world (p. 18).

The author gives (Hübner's) totals (sq. km. and population) of all these states. Σ = 96.662 million sq. km. and 1,399,689,000 population.

The whole world (145,918,000 sq. km.) (1,657,097,000 population).

The Entente (68,031,000 sq. km.) (777,060,000 population)

Germany
+ Austria
+ Turkey 5,921,000 " " 150,199,000 "

It is all clearly a matter of "psychical" (25) factors!!

...."The world is now almost completely 'divided up'. But world history teaches us that empires tend to divide up *each other* after they have more or less divided among themselves the 'no-master' areas in all parts of the globe" (37). — well said!

(a detailed paraphrase of *Seeley*....)

Present-day British and French imperialism—like that of Spain, Holland, Portugal, France and Great Britain in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries—is "West-European imperialism based on overseas colonisation" (43).

Russia is different. Russia is more an Asiatic country. It is in the interest of *all* Europe to seal itself off from *Asia*. The Great Russians = a mixture with Asiatics; the frontier of Europe = the frontier of the Great Russians (p. 50). The alliance of France and Great Britain with Russia is an alliance *against* "the general vital interests of all Europe" (51). — Germanophile!!

Incidentally: p. 46, remarks that Sweden is "a former Great Power, dethroned by Russia herself". — "Swedish" imperialism

Nothing could be more legitimate than the foundation (1871) of the German Empire. Great Britain, France and Russia consider it their "right" to dismember and enfeeble Germany!! (56). — *favours* German imperialism

imperialism = a law of history!

"Imperialism is a universal [sic!] political stage of development, through which every [!!] great people with large internal forces and a momentous mission must pass" (56-57).

Percentage and per capita expenditure on the army and navy is *less* in Germany than in France and Great Britain (58). The "*legend*" (59) of Germany's excessive "militarisation"!

"This cause [of the 1914-15 world catastrophe], it seems to me, lies in the relative weakness rather than the relative strength of Germany" (60).... From the standpoint of Russia + Great Britain + France, a "preventive war" *was* **necessary**"....

"True, modern economic imperialism and imperialist expansion are possible to a certain extent even without the direct *acquisition of territories* in other parts of the world, which we call 'colonisation'. Capital, traders and entrepreneurs are dispatched, railways and canals are constructed, huge regions in all parts of the world are made accessible to modern capitalist development, and in this way, spheres of economic influence, or spheres of domination, in other parts of the world are acquired without direct seizure of territory or political conquest.

aha!

"Undoubtedly, *German* imperialism has hitherto, employed, to a considerable extent, these *more peaceful* methods of expansion. This could be, but might not be, merely preparation for colonial acquisitions in the previous sense" (62).

It has been aimed chiefly at Asia Minor and Mesopotamia—areas *not* belonging to the British Empire.

Great Britain seeks to deprive Germany of just *that* development which she herself extensively enjoys + France + Russia (62-63).

"The world war of 1914-15 is therefore really a world war—a war to give the new German Empire a share in ruling the world, a war in which the leading role is played by the mistress of the world, Great Britain, while the two next most powerful world powers—Russia and France—are interested participants" (63).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Great Britain + France + Russia = 46% of the earth and 43% of its population; + the U.S.A. + Germany = 55% and 53% (p. 68).... "In other words, the world is actually divided between some few states" (69)....

Seeley—1883 (*The Expansion*...)....

Charles Dilke—1890 (*Problems of Greater Britain*).

There should be three empires: Great Britain + the United States + Russia.

France and Germany = "*pygmies*" (!!) (p. 71).

James Anthony Froude—1885 (*Oceania or England and Her Colonies*).

The Empire and the Century, 1905 (a symposium of 50 authors).

The following is from the introductory article by W. F. Monnypenny "The Imperial Ideal":

Today the words 'Empire' and 'Imperialism' fill the place in everyday speech that was once filled by 'Nation' and 'Nationality'... the national ideal has given place to the Imperial" (72)....

Imperialism (Rome!) is older than "nationalism" (72-73). But "*modern*" imperialism is based "to a very large extent" on *nationalism* (73)....

J. A. Cramb, *Germany and England*, 1913.... ("Germany is our worst enemy"....) *For* a standing army.... "All England's wars for the past five hundred years have been fought for *empire*". (79).... Alliance with Russia is "unnatural" (80)....

"Bluntly stated, what it amounts to is that, in her general development, Germany is now vastly superior to France, Russia and Japan, and she *alone* can in the future present a real threat to Britain's world domination, and especially to her command of the seas. Hence an agreement between Britain and the three Great Powers mentioned was incomparably easier than one with Germany" (85). true!

Endless prattle—quotations from Trubetskoi—the German Chancellor is more moral than Lloyd George, etc., etc. *Chauvinist blather*! Pithy quotations from George Bernard *Shaw* on British hypocrisy (120-23), etc. But *Shaw*, he says, |||

!!! ||| has written a host of articles [inter alia in *The New Statesman*] on the need to "smash up" Germany (p. 128).

One of the causes is failure to "*understand*" one another (136);—*education* in a spirit of "national prejudices" (137). — — — Peace requires the shedding of national "independence" (138) (= the right to make war), etc., etc.

Quotations from Bernhardi ... he accuses his nation of lacking bellicosity (!!) ... and from Rohrbach (he, *too*, is "moderate"! (p. 150), Rohrbach's "humane (!!!) guiding impulses"). — — What a banal type, this *Steffen*!...

! ||| German imperialism is "defensive rather than aggressive" (157).

ha-ha!! ||| Germany is waging a "*defensive*" war (158)—it is "ludicrous" to think that she would have chosen for an attack "such a wildly unfavourable situation as the present one", etc., etc. German imperialism is "profoundly cultural, socially constructive", etc. (163).

This book, which promised something in the beginning, degenerates into the most vulgar Germanophile chauvinism! *N.B.*

The diplomatic documents are extremely confused—in *all* countries there were (some) diplomats *for* war,—the military, too, intervened (powerfully).... "The causes of the 1914-15 world war can be established only by studying world history" (180)....

And further, right to the end (p. 254), Germanophile quotations from well-known "books" ... Nil! Nil! Not worth the trouble reading this "Dreck"!

OPPENHEIMER, *BRITISH IMPERIALISM*

Dr. Felix Baron von **Oppenheimer**, *British Imperialism*, Vienna, 1905.

(a pamphlet of 64 pp. Nil, except the familiar talk about Chamberlain and "his" movement. Nil!)

HENGER, *FRENCH CAPITAL INVESTMENTS*

Hans *Henger*, *French Capital Investments in Securities*, Stuttgart, 1913 (*Munich Economic Studies*, No. 125).

Contains very little. Repeats *Neymarck*'s figures on total value of securities.

815,000 million; without duplications, 600,000 million francs, of which 106,000-110,000 million in France.

The total amount of the 4 per cent coupon tax (the tax on interest and dividends) increased

from 70.4 million francs in 1891
to 102.5 " " " 1910 (p. 1).

The total amount of securities (in French ownership):

(according to Edmond Théry)	1891—77,100	million francs
	1907—98,600	" "
(according to the author)	1891-95—79,000	" "
	1906-10—110,400	" "

Annual investment in joint-stock companies

France . . .	566.2	million francs
Germany . . .	1,080.5	" "

French economic progress:

	1890	1909	
Wheat harvest	117 mill. *hectolitres*	126	
Oat "	94 " "	117	
Iron output	3.5 mill. tons	16.6	(1911)
Merchant shipping	0.9 " "	1.4	(1909)
Steam engines in industry	55,967 (1891)	81,335	
In h.p. units	916,000	2,759,350	
Wealth of France (according to inheritance tax)	243,000 mill. francs (1892)	287,000	(1908)
Coal consumption	28.96 mill. *tons* (1885)	56.4	(1911)
(in Germany)	67.1	205.7	(1908))

French special (foreign) trade

	1891-93	1908-10	
	7,692 mill. francs	12,020	+56.2%
per head of population	200.4 francs	304.7	+52%
Figures for Germany:	7,117 mill. marks	15,197	+113.5%
per head of population	141.5 marks	238.6	+68.6%

{238.6 marks=294.5 francs. Less than in France!}

N.B. In the mining industry of France, the workers are, "in great part", foreigners: Poles, Italians and Spaniards.*

? "If the French produce less, if industry and trade in France do not develop as fast as in Germany, that, of course, is not an indication that France is in danger of becoming a rentier state" (78) ... the development (of industry and trade) is going ahead, though more slowly than in Germany.

N.B. He quotes: *Annuaire statistique de la France, 1910* (economic and social indices).

KAUTSKY, 1914 AND 1915
(ON IMPERIALISM, WAR, AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY)

K. Kautsky, "Imperialism", *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, 2 (32nd year), p. 908 et seq. No. 21 (September 11, 1914).

((A note to the article says it was written before the war, for the Congress, and has been slightly altered.))

It is not uncommon now to "identify with imperialism all the phenomena of present-day capitalism—cartels, protection, the domination of the financiers, and colonial policy" (908).

? In that case we have "the flattest tautology", in that case "imperialism is naturally a vital necessity for capitalism"** (908).

? Hobson! The term, he says, must be taken "not in this generalised sense, but in its historical determination" (909), as in *Britain*, i.e., "as a special kind of political strivings". "The British understand" (909) by imperialism the striving, on the one hand, to unite all parts of the empire with the metropolis, and, on the other, to extend the empire....

"Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 283.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 267-68.—*Ed.*

every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex ever bigger areas of *agrarian* [Kautsky's italics] territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit them"* (909).... | no good at all

Further, he discusses the "production proportion" (heading of §1) between agriculture and industry, between means of production and means of consumption.

§2: "Simple commodity production" (blather, old stuff).

§3: "Capitalist production": capitalist industry requires that "the agricultural area serving it as supplier and purchaser" should "constantly expand" ((slipshod!)).

§4: "Accumulation and imperialism."

The contradiction between industry and agriculture finds dual expression (917):

(1) over-production (in industry)....

(2) high costs (of raw materials and staple products)....

Imperialism was preceded by the "form" (striving for expansion) of free trade: "half-a-century ago it, too, was considered the last word in capitalism, as imperialism is today" (917)....

Free trade helped develop other countries (the United States + Europe); their protectionist policy: in place of the division of labour between British industry and the agriculture of all other countries, "they" (the other countries) "divided up the still free agrarian regions of the world among the big industrial countries, because these regions were incapable of resistance. Britain reacted to this. That was the beginning of imperialism. || N.B.

"It was especially assisted by the system, which arose simultaneously with it, of export of capital to the agrarian regions" (918).... || ?

Railways in the new countries—the development of trade—their protection by the state—the striving for annexations (+ preventing the development of industry in them)....

"These are the most important roots of imperialism which replaced free trade"....

---

* Ibid., p. 268.—*Ed.*

"Does it constitute the last possible form of capitalist world policy, or is some other form still possible?"

One "aspect of imperialism", that is "a vital necessity for capitalism", viz.: domination over and subjugation of agricultural regions, the construction of railways, can be overcome "*only* through socialism" (920)....

There is, however, *another* aspect of imperialism: the struggle waged by states, armaments, war, the resistance of India, Islam and Eastern Asia, the resistance of the proletariat—all this impels "the capitalists of all countries to unite" (920)....

ultra-imperialism* ha-ha

"From the purely economic point of view, therefore, it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go through a new phase, that of the *extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism*, against which, of course, we would have to fight as vigorously as against imperialism, although it will bring dangers in another direction, not in that of an armaments race and threats to world peace" (921)....

!! ha-ha!

This was written before the war. Austria's conflict with Serbia "did not arise exclusively from imperialist tendencies" (922)—it has "just as much (ebenso) a nationalist" "as an imperialist root" (922). True, he says, there are "contradictions", which imperialism created "between the other Great Powers". Armaments might be increased and peace (after this war) will be only a truce.

"From the purely economic point of view, nothing any longer prevents this huge discharge of tension from finally resulting in the abolition of imperialism through a holy alliance of the imperialists" (922).... The more prolonged the war and the exhaustion ..., the *nearer* we shall be to this solution....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 271.—*Ed.*

Ibidem, p. *9 8 1*—in the article on "Effects of the War"—internationalism "does not exclude" "national feeling" and defence of the fatherland, but requires their recognition "for each nation"; "in this sense" (sic!) the *Germans* and *French* voted the war credits.

p. *975*—ibidem—"our comrades" voted the war credits both to defend the fatherland and "liberate Russia from tsarism" (!!)....

p. 974—"there should be an appeal to the statesmen of the victorious countries to exercise moderation" (thrice). ‖ ha-ha!

p. 846 (August 21, 1914)—an article "The War" (dated August 8, 1914)—ends with an appeal for "trust", *but not* for "criticism"—"discipline in the Party"....

"Two Articles for Re-study" (1915, 2) § d: "The concept of imperialism."

Opposing Cunow, he asserts that (Hilferding's) "conclusions" about *finance capital* have been "*unanimously* [K. Kautsky's italics] adopted by all socialist theoreticians"* (p. 107) (April 23, 1915).

Cunow *equates* imperialism with "modern capitalism" (109).

Kautsky rejects this. In Britain in the 1890s (110), imperialism meant the striving for a great Britain (110), for empire, "a special kind of *imperial policy*" (110. K. Kautsky's italics)—colonies, protectionist policy.

"It ["this new policy"] was termed imperialism by everyone" (N.B.) (ibidem). ‖ ?

I was the "first" (he says) to study the "new imperialism" (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1897-98 (16, 1), "Old and New Colonial Policy") and to point to the export of capital, to the role of the financial top stratum. Hilferding in 1910 did not call this new phase of capitalism "imperialism" (110-11). "He [Hilferding], too, uses the term 'imperialism' to mean a special *kind of policy*, and not a 'phase of economy'. Imperialism for him [= Hilferding] is a policy preferred by finance capital" (111).... ‖‖‖‖ *N.B.* *Die Neue Zeit*, 1897-98, XVIth year, Vol. I evasion, arguing over words

* Ibid., p. 289.—*Ed.*

We must draw this distinction: imperialism is not a "phase of economy", but a special policy, like Manchesterism.[24] *We must distinguish between finance capital and imperialism—"its policy"* (111).

well, that's it!

"Imperialism is a special kind of capitalist policy, as was also Manchesterism, which it replaced. The latter, too, did not denote a definite 'phase of economy', *although it was necessarily connected with such a phase*" (111).*

Imperialism is the policy of the "economic phase" of finance capital!! Is that what you wanted? Petty-fogger and sophist, trickster,[25] twister—that's what you are! You evade the essence of the matter.

§ e) "the necessity of imperialism" (112 et seq.)

"That imperialism was inevitable and therefore necessary—no one will deny.... The debatable question is whether it is necessary in the future"... (113).

And, further, the passages quoted by me in *Kommunist*[26] (pp. **144-45** and others**)....

(ultra-imperialism is also possible ... etc. See *Kommunist*....)

Inter alia:

Kautsky: "Kiao-chow", *Die Neue Zeit* XVI, 2 (1898)—(No. 27, March 1898)—inter alia that the "policy of conquest" in China, etc.,

sic!!

"is not a progressive, but a reactionary policy, not a modern bourgeois policy, but part of a newly revived feudal-absolutist policy ... a reaction against Manchesterism.... Even from a more advanced bourgeois standpoint, it must be combated, just as we combat taxes on consumer goods, bonuses, narrow departmentalism, restrictions on freedom of movement", etc. (p. *25*)....

N.B.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 267.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., Vol. 21, pp. 223-24.—*Ed.*

N.B. *Die Neue Zeit* XV, 1 (1897). *Lafargue*, "Economic Functions of the Stock Exchange".

N.B. 1915, 2 (33rd year), article on Gerhart *Güttler*'s book, *The British Labour Party* (Jena, 1914).

ISCHCHANIAN, *FOREIGN ELEMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL ECONOMY*

Dr. of Philosophy *B. Ischchanian, Foreign Elements In the Russian National Economy. Foreigners in Russia—Their History, Distribution, Classification by Occupation, Interests and Economic and Cultural Importance*, Berlin, **1913** (Siemenroth). 7 *marks*.

Reviewed by Alexinsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1913-14, 32, 1, p. 435 et seq.

N.B. The following table is from Ischchanian (p. 438):

		Million francs	In general abroad (million)	In Russia (million)	Percentage of last column
N.B. Capital abroad	France has	40,000	40,000 francs	14,000 francs (×)	27.5
	Belgium "	—	2,715 "	634 "	23.4
	Germany "	32,500	26,000 marks	4,000 marks	15.38
	Britain "	78,700	63,000 "	775 "	1.20
	Other countries have	—	—	500 "	—
		151.2 (my total)			

United States?? 10,000?? minimum
160,000 mill. francs

> 44,500 mill. marks
(×) 14,582 mill. marks, of which 83.76% in state loans....

(×) My calculation:
14,634 fr. × 8 = 11,707 marks
+ 5,275 = 16,982 marks and not 14,582??

PANNEKOEK, "STATE EXPENDITURE AND IMPERIALISM"

Ant. Pannekoek, "State Expenditure and Imperialism" (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1913-14, 32, 1, No. 4, October 24, 1913, p. 110 et seq.).

(×) "In my opinion, the contradiction between principled and reformist tactics is that the latter is *too strongly* determined by *immediate interests*, by easily attainable and apparent results, and *sacrifices to them the inner strength of the proletariat*. Principled, Marxist tactics aim primarily at increasing the power of the proletariat, thereby securing the highest positive results; for these results, being concessions made by the ruling classes, depend primarily on the power of the proletariat" (p. 111).

?

And **before** the above passage:

"The essence of the socialist class struggle is inseparable unity of the struggle *for socialism* (**) and representation of all the immediate interests of the proletariat. Only the Party's fight for the current interests of the working class makes it the party of the proletariat, the party of the masses, and enables it to win victory" (×).

(**) not the right word; not so true!

N.B. Pannekoek's formulation of the question of reformism is *wrong*.

N.B.

Pannekoek has here *posed* a question of prime importance, but has answered it badly—or, at least, inaccurately. "The unity of the struggle for socialism *and for* reforms" or "and for the immediate interests of the workers"? But what is the struggle for socialism? In Pannekoek's formula, the distinction between the Left and the "Centre" is *blurred*, wiped out, has disappeared. Even Kautsky (who, incidentally, made no rejoinder to this article of Pannekoek's) would subscribe to Pannekoek's formula (the one given here). This formula is wrong.

The *struggle for socialism* lies in the *unity* of the struggle for the immediate interests of the workers (including reforms) and the revolutionary *struggle* for power, for expropriation of the bourgeoisie, for the overthrow of the bourgeois government and the bourgeoisie.

What have to be combined are *not* the struggle for reforms + phrases about socialism, the struggle "for socialism", *but two forms* of struggle.

For example:

1. Voting for reforms + revolutionary action by the masses....

2. Parliamentarism + demonstrations....

3. The demand for reforms + the (concrete) demand for revolution....

Economic struggle *together* with the unorganised, with the masses, and not only *on behalf of* the organised workers....

4. Literature for the advanced + free, mass literature for the more backward, for the unorganised, for the "lower masses"....

5. Legal literature + illegal....

{cf. same volume of *Die Neue Zeit*, p. 591, on "unskilled" workers in America}

NOTEBOOK "ε"
("EPSILON")

Contents

ε

Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (1916)
(foreign capital: *Arndt*) [1]
The Economist on the war and *The Daily Telegraph* [3 and 11, 14-15, 18-19].
Coal and Iron (Theses of N. I. Bukharin) [33-34].

CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD*

Capital *abroad*	Great Britain	France	Germany
1862	3.6	—	—
1872	15	10 (1869)	—
1882	22	15 (1880)	?
1893	42	20 (1890)	?
1902	(62)	37 Diouritch 27	Hilferding p. 492 12.5
1914	75—100	60	44

((Arndt)) Riesser see ε *1* (Neymarck)

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 242.—*Ed.*

FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS: ARNDT

Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (published by Bernhard Harms), Vol. 7, 1916, I.

"The Strength of French Capital", by Professor Dr. **Paul Arndt.**

The author refers to his article "New Data on Capital Investments Abroad" (in *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, *1915*, pp. 311 and 456) and he quotes from it figures on capital invested *abroad*: (p. 35)

		(Riesser, p. 395 and p. 404)
		000 million francs
British £3,000 million =75,000 million francs		62 (1900 Speyer)
French 60,000 million francs =60 " "		30 (1902 Dehn)
German 35,000 million marks =44,000 million francs		31 (25,000 mill. marks)
((Σ=179))		

France, one of the "economic Great Powers" (p. 37), holds fourth place after Britain, Germany and "North America".

SOURCE REFERENCES

Source references:

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"As far as official party documents are concerned, the collection appears to be complete" (p. 188).

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Lloyd George, *Better Times*, Jena, *1911*.

THE ECONOMIST ON THE WAR

The Economist, April 17, 1915.

Article: "The End of the War."

"But the longer the war lasts, the more prone will the peoples, as distinct from the governments, be to cry out against the carnage which is desolating day by day and week by week so many thousands of homes. Thus we are brought back again to the problem of State versus Man', and to the question *how far the rulers of the highly organised bureaucratic state will be able to hold out against internal revolutionary forces*"....

N.B.

ARGUMENTS OF THE SOCIAL-PATRIOTS

Arguments of the Social-Patriots

Upton *Sinclair*'s pamphlet, with *Blatchford*'s reply, sets out particularly clearly, frankly, accurately and vigorously the new (not Plekhanov's or Kautsky's, etc.) argument of the social-patriots:

Yes, the war is in the interests of the capitalists, etc., but we are *manifestly weak*, manifestly powerless to prevent

it. Talk of struggle against war, of "insurrection", etc., etc., is "piano opinion", hopeless "exaggeration" of our strength.

A variant of the "utopianism" argument, which was advanced also in Plekhanov's lecture.

From this point of view, the Basle resolution is a well-meaning attempt to frighten the governments, and not a resolute pledge to carry out revolutionary actions or revolutionary propaganda.

[This formulation, which reduces everything to a "preventive war", is extremely narrow—and was deliberately made so by Blatchford. The essential thing is to utilise the crisis *for* revolutionary propaganda and to prepare for revolutionary action.]

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, NOVEMBER 17, 1914

The Daily Telegraph, November 17, 1914.

Parliament.

..."Mr. E. Jones (Merthyr Tydfil) asked if censorship could not be applied to the writings of Mr. Keir Hardie in his journal"....

Later, at the end of the sitting, the same speaker said: I told Keir Hardie I was going to talk about him, and it is not my fault if he is not present.

He read extracts from Keir Hardie's articles of October 31 and November 7, in which Keir Hardie accuses the British and French of atrocities, and sneers at the loyalty of the Indian troops. Keir Hardie said that the Kaiser was brave, soldier-like, whereas he sneered at "our fireside-loving King".

Can the government tolerate such speeches from a Member of Parliament? "As a result in Merthyr Tydfil we have had considerable difficulty in the past few weeks in recruiting, although it had been going on handsomely before Mr. Keir Hardie began his tactics."

Then Mr. *J. A. Pease* said: "May I just say, in one word, that so far as the Government are concerned, they believe all the suggestions made by Mr. K. Hardie and referred

to by Mr. Jones to be entirely without foundation, and that they ought to be treated with contempt."

(End of the sitting.)

POPULATION AND AREA OF THE BELLIGERENT- AND NON-BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

(p. 29. *Deutsche Rundschau*. No. 10).

Population (million) 1910

Great Britain	421	Germany	78	
Russia	167	Austria	51	
France	86	Turkey	25	(approx.)
	674	(3 Great Powers)	154	
Japan	70			
(4 Great Powers)	744			
+Serbia				
+Belgium				

			Non-belligerents	
Belligerent group I	744	[750 versus 150]	China	431
" " II	154		U.S.A.	103
Belligerents	898		Italy	36
+			(3 Great Powers)	570
Non-belligerents	570			
	1,468			

Total world population = 1,600

1912
Square miles (million)

					Non-belligerents	
Great Britain	10.8	Germany	1.2		China	2.9
Russia	10.2	Austria	0.2	(241,000)	U.S.A.	3.7
France	4.8	Turkey	0.7		Italy	0.7
	25.8		2.1			7.3
Japan	0.3	(260,000)				
	26.1					
Group I	26.1					
" II	2.1					
Belligerents	28.2					
Non-belligerents	7.3					
	35.5					

Whole world — 52.0 million sq. miles.

Серн. Кабель у берегов (1904)

		Фонды (1917-18)
Англия	2.350	– (?)
(α) Англ. (С) + колонии	1.125	2.685,1
Америка	400	– (?)
(β) Сев.-Ам.	3.350	1.431,5
(γ) С. Шер.-Кав.	3.000	5.098,7
Σ =	9.225	
(α+β+γ) =	(7.475)	(9.215,3)

Исходящие телеграммы трех британских держав в 1913 году в миллионах марок

	Англия	Франция	Германия	Σ
Англия	37	4	10	51
Англия	11	1	4	16
Франция	18	7	2	19
Германия	8	–	1	9
Сумма	74	33	18	45
Итого	70	35	35	140

(Кирхенбах, с. 138) Эм. Д. Сер. кабеля:

1868	106.885 km
1870	211.000
75	294.000
1897	617.285
1908	1.006.748

(ibid.)

	1897	1908
Europe	223.869	323.691
America	313.417	513.824
Asien	33.729	92.436
Afrika	9.385	33.481
Australien	18.889	30.316
(нов.) Σ =	599.285	1.006.748

Сумма	Англия	Франция	Германия	Англия	Франция	Германия
37	4	10	37	4		
11	2,6	4	11	1		
4	12,8	18	4	23		
10	–	2	10	7		
8	–	1	8	–		
70	21,9	35	70	35		
Бельгия		2	1(?)	2		
Норв. Шв. (Кирхенбах)		1	1	5		
Канада		9	6(?)	4		
Россия		5	1	10		
Австрия		8	1	2		
Нейтральные		18	4	23		
Сам. Англия		15	1(?)	15		

Welkkabelnetz: (Kirchenbach, с. 149)

	1898	1908
England	208.747	253.898
Vereinigte Staaten	50.545	92.818
Frankreich	26.157	43.115
Deutschland	6.156	30.167
Dänemark	13.888	17.111
Niederlande	1.786	5.721
Japan	2.797	8.089
Spanien	3.237	3.565
Italien	1.968	7.989
Russ. Reich	3.233	7.724

(S. 198) Auftragsbestand (Gesamtbestand) Deutschlands (Kirchenbach) (S. 203)

	1898 Ein- Ausfuhr	1898 Ein- Ausfuhr	1910 Ein- Ausfuhr	1910 Ein- Ausfuhr	Überschuss Ein.	Überschuss Aus.
1. Europa	3239,9	2008,7	5797,1	5632,2	+681	+1246
2. Afrika	22,0	21,4	415,0	131,3		
3. Asien	122,2	14,1	828,3	312,3		
4. Amer.	635,4	613,2	2.150,7	1.255,		
5. Australien	35,1	22,7	899,0	71,2		
2-5. Σ =	3828,3	2679,5	9290,0	7.390,6	+1457	+1177

Σ = 7.347 (1883)

Der Gesamtbestand (Kabel, Gummi, Telegraphenstangen) Englands und seiner Kolonien

	1870 Mill. M.	1870 km	1882 Mill. M.	1882 km	1901 Mill. M.	1901 km	1910 Mill. M.	1910 km
Vereinigtes Königreich (+Irland)	9.180	312	12.658	355	14.977,0	360	20.507,1	453
Australien	4.540	124	7.326	185	6.705,3	171,9	10.212,5	260
Indien	4.240	106	6.409	141	9.852,6	172,2	16.408,8	257
Kanada	2.000	27	2.140	30	2.726,8	21,1	5.047,5	40
Südafrika-Kol.	1.660	47	3.015	75	3.002,3	65,7	4.450,4	88
Westafrika	1.480	61	2.000	70	2.474,4	76,1	4.170,4	123
Neuseeland } Westindien }	820	42	840 } 280	53	1.386,8	74	1.566,2	80
					390,3	31,0	934,1	77
Zentralasien	1420	388	2.520	602	6.391,0	1229	9.446,7	1657
Südasien	1280	252	3.380	421	3.239,4	476	6.137,4	841
Westafrika-Kol.	840	115	1.080	131	1.407,2	140,2	1.891,5	242
C. Afr. Ges.	3420	98	6.150	120	9.526,5	122,5	12.578,7	150

Page 3 of Notebook “ζ” (“Zeta”)

THE ECONOMIST AND *THE DAILY TELEGRAPH* ON THE WAR

The Economist, January 9, 1915. *N.B.*

Article: "*The European Deadlock*"....

..."It is not surprising that under such, conditions [the "appalling conditions of modern warfare"] the soldiers should, in places where mud has made progress almost impracticable, conclude impromptu truces, such as are described by a correspondent in *The Times* of yesterday. These truces naturally occur only in the parts of the field where the trenches are close together, but they bring home to the imagination the cruel absurdities of the war, and suggest to some a hope that from the soldiers in the field there might come a protest against the indefinite prolongation of its horrors" (p. 46).... N.B.

Idem, p. 54: "Industrial profits"

Net profits (after payment of debenture interest, etc.)

Reports published in quarter ending:	Number of companies	(£ millions)		±	Total capital	% of profit on capital
		1913	1914	%	1914	
March 31	301	20.5	22.1	+8.4	230.1	9.6
July 31	263	22.6	23.6	+4.2	181.9	13.0
September 30	131	10.6	9.5	—9.5	107.8	8.8
December 31	214	15.3	14.5	—5.6	116.4	12.4
Σ	909	69.0	69.7	+0.9	636.0	10.9

"misfortunes" of the capitalists!!!

The Economist, December 19, 1914. "War Supplement", p. 10; Russia's expenditure on the army and navy:

1903	466 million rubles	%	
1904	491	+25	+5.3
1905	496	+ 5	+1.0
1906	504	+ 8	+1.6
1907	493	—11	—2.0
1908	612	+119	+24.1
1909	631	+19	+3.0
1910	648	+17	+2.7
1911	669	+21	+3.3
1912	809	+140	+20.9
1913	944	+135	+16.6

The Economist, December 19, 1914, p. 1059, article: "The War and Modern Business."

..."Until the bloodiest storm in history burst at the end of July, it was hardly possible to tell where Krupp began or Creusot ended. War loans were inextricably mingled with peace loans, and deadweight debt with full capital issues. Whether to destroy or to construct, whether to build canals or forts, ocean liners or battleships, the whole world of business and finance seemed to have centred itself in London, Paris and Berlin. The financial houses were almost of necessity Anglo-German, Anglo-French and Anglo-American; directorships were interlaced, branches of agents existed in nearly all the cities of the Old World and of the New. Monster companies and corporations welcomed shareholders of all nationalities, with very little regard for the diplomatic alliances.... It was a truism six months ago to say that nationality was no obstacle to business arrangements.... All this came to an end all of a sudden.... And yet the businessmen and the working classes are admittedly innocent. The guilt of war is everywhere traced to a few men—emperors, diplomatists, statesmen, militarists, or 'philosophers'.... Let us hope for a swift disillusionment, a return of common sense, a revival of religion, and a reawakening of the human conscience"....

The Economist, 1915, No. 3724 (Jan. 9, 1915)* (p. 51):

N.B. "The Cost of the War to Europe"

for six months

		£ millions							£ millions			
		Army (mill.)	Cost of war	Loss of production	Value of lost lives	Population 1913 (mil.)	Foreign trade	(per head)	National income 1913	(per head)	National wealth 1913	
Germany		4.35	395	830	294	68	1,063	(15.6)	2,100	(31)	16,000	(235)
Austria-Hungary		3.50	320	500	141	50	264	(5.3)	...		...	
	Σ	7.85	715	1,330	435	118	1,327	(11.2)	? 3,000	(25)	? 25,000	(212)
Russia		5.4	490	110	218	170	269	(1.6)	...		...	
France		4.0	365	600	232	40	583	(14.6)	1,250	(31)	13,000	(325)
United Kingdom		1.0	90	100	83	46	1,344	(29.3)	2,250	(49)	18,000	(390)
	Σ	10.4	945	810	533	256	2,196	(8.6)	? 5,000	(20)	? 40,000	(156)
	ΣΣ	18.25	1,660	2,140 (α)	968	374	3,523	(9.4)	? 8,000	(21)	? 65,000	(174)

* Ibidem, p. *46*—possibility of a *protest* of the soldiers when close together in the trenches.

	Alliance countries	Entente countries	Both sides
Direct (war) costs for six months	725	990	1,715 (£ mill.)
Loss by cessation of production (Yves Guyot (α))	1,330	810	2,140
Total costs for six months	2,055	1,800	3,855
Normal national income for six months (say)	1,500	2,500	4,000
Proportion of direct costs to national income	48%	40%	43%
Ditto ... of total costs	137%	72%	96%
National wealth	25,000	40,000	65,000

(α) The Yves Guyot source is obviously not impartial!

Ibidem (January 2, 1915), p. 12:

"Disgust at the utter barbarism and ferocity of modern warfare is reported by all who have seen it. Everywhere people are beginning to ask how long human nature itself can endure the awful anguish of this indescribable war, how soon exhaustion and the approach of starvation will drive the peoples into revolt. Some of the German newspapers look for a revolution in Russia. They may have to count with one at home, for nothing is more likely than that the working classes of Germany will turn savagely upon the aggressive militarism which has been their bane."

N.B. This is from an article "The Realms of the Habsburgs", which says that in Russia the position of the population and nations is *worse* than in Austria.

January 9, 1915, p. 57: the Rumanians in Russia are worse off than in Austria....

Ibidem, p. 66: Russia's war expenditure (½ year) = *6,234* million rubles (*13* million *rubles* per day).
p. 72, a new book: *P. Vinogradoff*, *The Russian Problem* (1 shilling)?

The Daily Telegraph (No. 18631) Dec. 29, 1914.

The Independent Labour Party and the War.

"One of the resolutions on the final agenda for the annual conference of the Scottish Division of the Independent Labour Party to be held in Glasgow on Saturday, when Mr. Keir Hardie, M.P., is to address the delegates, asks that all members of the Independent Labour Party assisting the government in the present recruiting campaign be expelled. Another asks for an expression of regret that the National Labour Party did not call a conference at the outbreak of the war to determine the policy of the party."

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND SOURCE REFERENCES

The British Review, 1915, July, "How We Ought to Feel About the War", by *John Freeman*, pp. 87-88.... the "denationalised pamphlet" of Mr. *Barrett* (heading?) (from the "Workers' Freedom Group").

"One war, he proclaims, remains to be fought, war against the rich, the new reformation war"... p. 88. || N.B.

Recht und Wirtschaft, 1915, June.
"The German Trade Unions in the War", by Dr. W. *Troeltsch*.
(Eulogies!! Quotes from *Sozialistische Monatshefte*).

The split in Württemberg (Stuttgart). *Frankfurter Zeitung* No. 319, second morning edition, November 17.

Index of new books in the Winterthur *City Library*, 7th year, 1913-14 (has been appearing since *1907*).
In *fiction*
Lucien Descaves, *La saignée* (1870-71).
Nexö, *Pelle the Conqueror*.
A. Schnitzler, *Novellen*, 1914.

Literature on Switzerland:
Paul Berger, *After the Great Debacle*: *the Partition of Switzerland*, Lausanne, 1914.
Written before the war; predicts a German victory, says Switzerland is threatened by partition.
N.B. p. *31*, urges all-out struggle against "revolutionary socialism" in the army and schools.

A. Rüegg, *Experiences of a Waitress*, Zurich, 1914.
section III ("General Knowledge and Science Books"):
Theories of Origin, 1914.
(*Modern Culture*, III, IV.)
Aug. *Bernard*, *Morocco*, Paris, 1913.
E. Haeckel, *God-Nature*, Leipzig, 1914.
Rud. Kjellén, *The Great Powers of Today*, Leipzig, 1914.
A. Manes, *The Social Part of the World* (about Australasia), Berlin, 1914.
Rud. Martin, *German Rulers*, 1910.
Uhde, *Feuerbach*, Leipzig, 1914.
A. Zart, *Bricks of The Universe*: *Atoms*, *Molecules*, Stuttgart, 1913.
Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*.

COAL AND IRON

Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, *Kunst und Technik* (Leipzig), 1910, January (10th year, No. 4).
Hans Arlt, Dr., mining assessor in Munich. "Coal and Iron and Their Significance in the Present World War." Statistics of coal and iron *reserves* in the belligerent countries.
(Iron ore resources of the world)
(Coal " " " ")

(Geological congresses, Stockholm 1910 and Toronto *1913*).

In coal resources the order is:

1. United States
2. Canada
3. China
4. Germany

In iron:

1. United States
2. Newfoundland
3. Germany

Coal output in 1913:
Great Britain—287.4 million tons
Germany —278.9 " "
(Consumption: 250.3 Germany
233.8 Britain)

The important invention, by Thomas (1878), of the basic or Thomas method of obtaining iron did away with the Bessemer method.

The new method gave Germany a big lead, for it *frees* the ore from *phosphorus*, and German ore is *rich in phosphorus* (N.B.).

That is how Germany beat Great Britain. ‖ N.B.

The chemical industry produces coal tar (1 million tons in 1912 in Germany).

German-occupied French areas contain
about 70% of French coal resources
" 80% " " iron "

(Without America, France would have perished long ago.)

TRADE UNION LEADERS

Trade Union Leaders

The Daily Telegraph, *October 7*, *1915*.

"After hearing addresses by the Prime Minister and Earl Kitchener, and holding lengthy conferences on the subject of recruiting, the chosen leaders of Labour have issued a strongly-worded appeal for men, in which it is stated that 'if the voluntary principle is to be vindicated, at least 30,000 recruits per week must be raised'.

"Mr. C. W. *Bowerman*, M.P., Secretary of the Trades Union Congress Parliamentary Committee, handed a representative of *The Daily Telegraph* a copy of the appeal yesterday afternoon. It reads as follows:

The Crisis

An Appeal to Free Men

N.B. "Fellow countrymen.... At no time in the history of our nation has it been faced with a crisis of such gravity as the one which now exists.... Aggression [of Germany, etc... (the aim)]: secure such a victory as will free the world from the fear of that military tyranny which Germany would impose upon it...." An appeal to enlist in the army. For the sake of what?... "Not only because by so doing they will be defending their own interests, but also because their action will preserve the vital interests of the nation"....

"We know that defeat or an inconclusive peace would mean for us not only the loss of prestige as a nation and the certainty that the conflict would be renewed in a few years' time, but the loss of those personal liberties and privileges which have taken centuries of effort to win"....

N.B.

H. Gosling C. W. Bowerman	Trade Union Congress Parliamentary Committee.
J. O'Grady W. A. Appleton	General Federation of Trade Unions.
G. J. Wardle W. S. Sanders	Labour Party Executive.

Ibidem, October 9, 1915 (Saturday). In addition to *mass* meetings (××) there is to be

N.B. "the conference that is to take place on Monday (October 11, 1915) between the Earl of Derby, the new Director of Recruiting, and the signatories to the important Labour manifesto, published on Thursday (October 7, 1915) last." "This conference, to which the Labour representatives have been invited by his lordship, will be held at No. 12, Downing Street"....

halls gratis (××)... "that halls have already been placed at the disposal of the Executive [= of the three signatory organisations], free of expense, for the purpose of holding the mass meetings"....))

Besides mass meetings, tours of propagandists, "workshop meetings", "dinner-hour gatherings", etc., are being organised.

...there will be made available "a copious amount of propagandist literature, mainly in the form of hand-bills, for distribution at the various meetings"... etc.	N.B.
Ibidem, October 15, 1915. A eulogistic review of *Ellis Powell*, *The Evolution of the Money Market* (10s. 6d.), London, 1915 (*Financial News*).	N.B. on finance capital

NOTEBOOK "ζ"
("ZETA")

Contents

ζ

Harms, *World Economy* [2-3].
Supan [5-9].
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Junius [13-14].
Demorgny (Persia N.B.) [11].
{ *Le Temps* [16 and 19-20].
{ *The Daily Telegraph* and others [23-28].
{ Lloyd George on £*4,000 million* (May 4, 1915) [29-30].
Brauer on German (possible "defeatists") [17-18].

HARMS, *WORLD ECONOMY*

Bernhard Harms, *Problems of World Economy*, Jena, 1912. "*National Economy and World Economy*."

British capital invested abroad (1911) according to G. Paish ((*George Paish in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910-11, p. 167)) ("Great Britain's Capital Investments in the Colonies, etc."). (*B. Harms*, p. 228):

I. *British colonies* (£ *thousands*)

North America	Canada and Newfoundland	372,541
Australia	Commonwealth of Australia	301,521
	New Zealand	78,529
Africa	South	351,368
	West	29,498

Asia	India and Ceylon	365,399
	Straits Settlements	22,037
	Hong Kong	3,104
	British North Borneo	5,131
	Other British possessions	25,024
	Σ = British colonies	1,554,152

II. *Foreign countries*:

United States	688,078
Cuba	22,700
Philippines	8,202
Argentina	269,808
Mexico	87,334
Brazil	94,330
Chile	46,375
Uruguay	35,255
Peru	31,986
Other American countries	22,517
Russia	38,388
Turkey	18,320
Egypt	43,753
Spain	18,808
Italy	11,513
Portugal	8,134
France	7,071
Germany	6,061
Other European countries	36,319
Japan	53,705
China	26,809
Other foreign countries	61,907
Σ = foreign countries	1,637,684*
ΣΣ = Total	3,191,836

(In all, he says, £ 3½ thousand million)

Same, by continents (£ million)

		Per cent
America	1,700	= 53
Asia	500	16
Africa	455	14
Australia	387	12
Europe	150	5
	3,192	100%

* So given by Harms.—*Ed.*

Dr. Sigmund Schilder, Development Trends in the World Economy, Berlin, 1912—p. 150—refers to G. Paish, whose figures, he says, are minimised, for Paish takes issue prices (for *Latin* America *556* = £556 million, whereas London Stock Exchange quotations on May 31, 1909 Σ = £*767* million, including Argentina—£*281* million, Brazil—£140 million).—

The London *Economist*, August 26, 1911, estimates British capital in 10 South American republics (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay) at £*622* million, including Argentina—316, Brazil—162, Uruguay—42, Chile—41 (ibidem, p. *371*).

Foreign capital in *Canada* (1910)=*12,687* million francs, including British—9,765, U.S.—2,190, French—372. In *Mexico* (1886–1907)=*3,343* million francs, including U.S.—1,771, British—1,334 (p. 373).

Belgian capital abroad (Berlin *Export*, November 24, 1910) in million francs: Holland—70; France—137; Brazil—143; Italy—166; Egypt—219; Germany—244; Argentina—290; the Congo—322; Spain—337; Russia—441; other countries—338. Total—*2,750* million francs (p. 365).

French capital abroad

(ibidem, p. 235)	Thousand mill. francs
Russia	10.0
Great Britain	0.5
Belgium and Holland	0.5
Germany	0.5
Turkey, Serbia and Bulgaria	0.5
Rumania and Greece	4.0
Austria-Hungary	2.0
Italy	1.5
Switzerland	0.5
Spain and Portugal	3.5
Canada and United States	1.0
Egypt and Suez	4.0
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico	3.0
China and Japan	1.0
Tunisia and French colonies	3.0
	Σ=35.5*

Total now estimated at 40,000-42,000 million.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 242-43.—*Ed.*

German capital abroad (1904) exclusive of securities (non-European areas) (million marks)

Turkey (without Egypt)	350
Africa (including Egypt)	1,350
Persian-Arabian Peninsula and India	75
South-East Asia	250
East Asia	450
Australia and Polynesia	400
Caribbean countries	1,200
West coast of South America	550
East " " " "	1,600
United States and Canada	3,000
	Σ=9,225

German capital abroad (securities) (1897-1906)

	also million marks
Argentina	92.1
Belgium	2.4
Bosnia	85.0
Brazil	77.6
Bulgaria	114.3
Chile	75.8
Denmark	595.4
China	356.6
Finland	46.1
Great Britain	7.6
Italy	141.9
Japan	1,290.4
Canada	152.9
Cuba	147.0
Luxemburg	32.0
Mexico	1,039.0
Netherlands	81.9
Norway	60.3
Austria	4,021.6
Portugal	700.7
Rumania	948.9
Russia	3,453.9
Serbia	152.0
Sweden	355.3
Switzerland	437.6
Spain	11.2
Turkey	978.1
Hungary	1,506.3
United States of America	4,945.8
(My total)	Σ=921,909.7

Author estimates total German capital abroad at *35,000 million* marks (p. 243).

The (1904) figure = 9,225 plus, he reckons, the same amount in Europe	Σ = 18,000
Further, securities totalling about	17,000
	Σ = 35,000*

America	6,530.2
Asia (Turkey)	2,625.1
Africa	—
Australia	—
Europe	12,754.4
	Σ = 21,909.7

N.B. On the question of *German* capital investments abroad, *B. Harms* quotes (besides Sartorius): *Riesser, German Big Banks and Their Concentration*, 3rd edition, Jena, 1910.—*Paul Dehn, New Developments in World Economy*, Berlin, 1904.—*Paul Arndt*, "The Nature and Purpose of Capital Investment Abroad", *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, 1912, (No. 1–3).—

N.B. *Robert Liefmann, Holding and Financing* Companies, Jena, 1909.—

German capital abroad:

		Exclusive of securities (1904)	Securities (1897-1906)
	Africa	1,350	—(?)
(α)	Asia (including Turkey)	1,125	2,625.1
	Australia and Polynesia	400	—(?)
(β)	Central and South America	3,350	1,431.5
(γ)	U.S.A. and Canada	3,000	5,098.7
		Σ = 9,225	
		(α+β+γ)=(7,475)	(9,155.3)

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 243.—*Ed.*

Foreign capital of the three richest European countries, *approximately**:

	(thousand million marks) Great Britain		France		Germany		Σ	
America	37		4		10		51	
Asia	11		1		4		16	
Africa	10	29	7	8	2	7	19	44
Australia	8		—		1		9	
Europe	4		23		18		45	
Total	70		35		35		140	

Approx. Great Britain		Germany	Total approx. (*thousand mill.* marks)	thousand mill. marks Great Britain *approx.*	France *approx.*
37	America	6.5	10	37	4
11	Asia	2.6	4	11	1
4	Europe	12.8	18	4	23
10	Africa	—	2	10	7
8	Australia	—	1	8	—
70		21.9	35	70	35
Western Europe (Belgium, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries)			2	1 (??)	2
South Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal)			1	1	5
Balkans			2	0.5 (??)	4
Russia			5	1	10
Austria			8	0.5 (??)	2
All Europe			18	4	23
Balkans + Russia + Austria			15	2 (??)	16

World *railways* (Harms, p. 138) (ibidem):

1868	106,886 km.
1870	211,000
1875	294,000
1899	617,285
1909	1,006,748

* Ibid., p. 243.—*Ed.*

	(km.) 1899	1909
Europe	223,869	329,691
America	313,417	513,824
Asia	33,724	99,436
Africa	9,386	33,481
Australia	18,889	30,316
(my) Σ=	599,285	1,006,748

World telegraph lines (km.) (Harms, p. 141):

	1899	1909
Great Britain	208,747	253,898
North America	50,545	92,818
France	26,157	43,115
Germany	6,186	30,167
Denmark	13,888	17,111
Netherlands	1,786	5,721
Japan	2,797	8,084
Spain	3,237	3,565
Italy	1,968	1,989
Miscellaneous countries	3,233	7,724

Foreign trade (special trade) of Germany (p. *198*)

(million marks)

	1899		1909		Increase	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
1. Europe	3,239.9	2,509.7	5,196.8	5,623.9	+60%	+124%
2. Africa	39.6	22.1	418.0	181.3		
3. Asia	128.2	84.3	828.3	332.3		
4. America	635.4	613.6	2,190.7	1,255.0		
5. Australasia	35.1	23.5	293.0	71.8		
2-5. Σ=	838.3	743.5	3,730.0	1,840.4	*+345%*	+147%
ΣΣ=	7,343.5 (1889)					

(p. 203) Special trade (including noble metals) of the most important countries

	1870		1882		1901		1910	
	million marks	(marks) per head	million marks	per head	million marks	per head	million marks	per head
Great Britain (+Ireland)	9,180	312	12,658	355	14,977.0	360	20,507.1	453
France	4,540	124	7,326	195	6,705.8	171.9	10,212.5	260
Germany	4,240	106	6,409	141	9,852.6	172.2	16,408.8	257
Russia	2,000	27	2,140	30	2,926.8	26.1	5,047.5	40
Austria-Hungary	1,660	47	3,015	75	3,007.3	65.7	4,450.4	88
Italy	1,480	61	2,000	70	2,474.4	76.1	4,170.4	123
Spain	820	42	840	53	1,386.8	74	1,566.2	80
Portugal			280		390.9	71.0	434.1	77
Holland	1,420	388	2,520	602	6,391.0	1,229	9,446.7	1,657
Belgium	1,280	252	3,380	421	3,239.4	476	6,137.9	841
Sweden-Norway	840	115	1,080	131	1,407.7	190.2	1,891.5	242
United States of America	3,420	98	6,150	120	9,526.5	122.5	13,578.7	150

SUPAN, *TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN COLONIES* AND HÜBNER'S *GEOGRAPHICAL-STATISTICAL TABLES*

Professor Dr. Alexander *Supan*, *Territorial Development of European Colonies*, 1906 (pp. 256 and 257)*

Table 1. Colonial Possessions in 1876 and 1900 (by continents)**

	1876		1900		Increase (+) and Decrease (—)		From Otto Hübner's Statistical Tables (1914)	
	sq. km. (000)	population (000)	sq. km. (000)	population (000)	sq. km. (000)	population (000)	sq. km. (000)	population (000)
Asia	*22,772.9*	*291,495*	*25,012.7*	*390,636*	*+ 2,239.8*	*+ 99,141*	*25,297.1*	*422,658*
Great Britain	3,765.4	241,835	5,224.4	301,495	+ 1,459.0	+ 59,660	5,265.3	324,773
Netherlands	1,520.6	24,170	1,520.6	37,494	—	+ 13,324	1,520.6	37,717
France	160.0	2,683	664.2	18,073	+ 504.2	+ 15,390	803.5	17,272
Spain	296.3	6,000	—	—	— 296.3	— 6,000	—	—
Portugal	19.9	849	19.9	810	—	— 39	22.8	980
German Empire	—	—	0.5	84	+ 0.5	+ 84	0.5	192
Russia	17,010.7	15,958	17,286.8	25,045	+ 276.1	+ 9,087	17,388.1	33,164
United States (evidently Philippines)	—	—	296.3	7,635	+ 296.3	+ 7,635	296.3	8,460
Africa	*3,218.7*	*11,426*	*26,950.9*	*123,349*	*+ 23,732.2*	*+ 111,924*	*28,583.8*	*126,614*
Great Britain	706.9	2,331	9,201.2	53,097[2]	+ 8,494.3[2]	+ 50,766	9,675.7	52,069
Belgium, the Congo	—	—	2,382.8	19,000	+ 2,382.8	+ 19,000	2,365.0	15,003
France	700.0	2,875	10,211.2	31,518	+ 9,511.2	+ 28,643	9,660.3	37,750
Spain	9.8	319	220.3	673	+ 210.5	+ 354	560.5	589
Portugal	1,802.0	5,900	2,073.2	6,865	+ 271.2	+ 965	2,069.9	8,351
Italy	—	—	510.0	731	+ 510.0	+ 731	1,590.1	1,403
German Empire	—	—	2,352.2	11,465	+ 2,352.2	+ 11,465	2,662.3	11,449

Australia	*7,699.4*	*1,970*	*7,699.4*	*3,983*	—	*+ 2,013*	*(7,699.4)*	*(3,983)*
Great Britain	7,699.4	1,970	7,699.4	3,983	—	+ 2,013		
Polynesia	*711.9*	*934*	*1,238.9*	*2,440*	*+ 527.0*	*+ 1,506*		*7,760*
Great Britain	291.9	564	558.7	1,496	+ 266.8	+ 932	8,261.3	6,588
Netherlands	394.1	240	394.8	240	+ 0.7	—	394.8	240
France	23.3	93	24.2	88	+ 0.9	— 5	22.6	80
Spain	2.6	37	—	—	— 2.6	— 37	—	—
German Empire	—	—	243.8	449	+ 243.8	+ 449	245.1	641
United States[6]	—	—	17.4	167	+ 17.4	+ 167	17.4	211
America	*10,599.8*	*7,740*	*10,502.6*	*9,148*	*— 97.2*	*+ 1,408*	*9,184.1*	*10,731*
Great Britain	8,711.4	5,160	8,728.2	7,533	+ 16.8	+ 2,373	8,962.3	10,114
Netherlands	130.2	110	130.2	140	—	+ 30	130.2	140
France	82.0	346	82.0	428	—	+ 82	91.2	450
Spain	123.3	2,025	—	—	— 123.3	— 2,025	—	—
Denmark	0.4	38	0.4	31	—	— 7	0.4	27
Sweden	0.02	1	—	—	— 0.02	— 1	—	—
United States[6]	1,552.5	60	1,561.8	1,016	+ 9.3	+ 956	—	—
Arctic	*1,492.1*	*82*	*1,492.1*	*91*	—	*+ 9*		*15*
Great Britain[8]	1,301.1	1	1,301.1	1	—	—	1,374.0	2
Denmark[9]	191.0	81	191.0	90	—	+ 9	88.1	13
Antarctic	—	—	*3.5*	—	*+ 3.5*	—	—	—
France[10]	—	—	3.5	—	+ 3.5	—	—	—
Total	46,494.8	313,646	72,900.1	529,647	+ 26,405.3	+ 216,001	—	—

[2] With Egypt and the Sudan....

[6] Included among the colonies here are the Hawaiian Islands and Alaska, countries not bordering [on the main territory of the metropolitan country].

[8] The Arctic Archipelago of North America....

[9] Iceland and Greenland.

[10] (The islands St. Paul, New Amsterdam, Kerguelen)....

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 254.—*Ed.*

** The text of this table in the notebook was written by N. K. Krupskaya except in places set in heavy type.—*Ed.*

Table 2. Colonial Possessions in 1876 and 1900 (by continents)**

(From *Hübner's* tables) 1914

	1876 sq. km. (000)	1876 population (000)	1900 sq. km. (000)		Increase (+) and Decrease (—) population (000)	Increase (+) and Decrease (—) sq. km. (000)	Increase (+) and Decrease (—) population (000)	1914 sq. km. (000)	1914 population (000)
Great Britain	*22,476.1*	*251,861*	*32,713.0*		*367,605*	*+10,236.9*	*+ 115,744*	*33,538.6*	*393,546*
Asia	3,765.4	241,835	5,224.4		301,495	+ 1,459.0	+ 59,660	5,265.3	324,773
Africa	706.9	2,331	9,201.2		53,097	+ 8,494.3	+ 50,766	9,675.7	52,069
Australia	7,699.4	1,970	7,699.4	} 8,258.1	3,983	—	+ 2,013	} 8,261.3	6,588
Polynesia	291.9	564	558.7		1,496	+ 266.8	+ 932		
America	8,711.4	5,160	8,728.2		7,533	+ 16.8	+ 2,373	8,962.3	10,114
Arctic	1,301.1	1	1,301.1		1	—	—	1,374.0	2
Netherlands	*2,044.9*	*24,520*	*2,045.6*		*37,874*	*+ 0.7*	*+ 13,354*	*2,045.6*	*38,097*
Asia	1,520.6	24,170	1,520.6		37,494	—	+ 13,324	1,520.6	37,717
Polynesia	394.1	240	394.8		240	+ 0.7	—	394.8	240
America	130.2	110	130.2		140	—	+ 30	130.2	140
Belgium—The Congo	—	—	*2,382.8*		*19,000*	*+ 2,382.8*	*+ 19,000*	*2,365.0*	*15,003*
Africa	—	—	2,382.8		19,000	+ 2,382.8	+ 19,000	2,365.0	15,003
France	*965.3*	*5,997*	*10,985.1*		*50,107*	*+ 10,019.8*	*+ 44,110*	*10,581*	*55,552*
Asia	160.0	2,683	664.2		18,073	+ 504.2	+ 15,390	803.5	17,272
Africa	700.0	2,875	10,211.2		31,518	+ 9,511.2	+ 28,643	9,660.3	37,750
Polynesia	23.3	93	24.2		88	+ 0.9	— 5	22.6	80
America	82.0	346	82.0		428	—	+ 82	91.2	450
Antarctic	—	—	3.5		—	+ 3.5	—	(3.5)	—
Spain	*432.0*	*8,381*	*220.3*		*673*	*— 211.7*	*— 7,708*	*560.5*	*589*
Asia	296.3	6,000	—		—	— 296.3	— 6,000	—	—
Africa	9.8	319	220.3		673	+ 210.5	+ 354	560.5	589
Polynesia	2.6	37	—		—	— 2.6	— 37	—	—
America	123.3	2,025	—		—	— 123.3	— 2,025	—	—

Portugal	*1,821.9*	*6,749*	*2,093.1*	*7,675*	+	*271.2*	+	*926*	*2,092.7*	*9,331*
Asia	19.9	849	19.9	810		—	—	39	22.8	980
Africa	1,802.0	5,900	2,073.2	6,865	+	271.2	+	965	2,069.9	8,351
Italy	—	—	*510.0*	*731*	+	*510.0*	+	*731*	*1,590.1*	*1,403*
Africa	—	—	510.0	731	+	510.0	+	731	1,590.1	1,403
German Empire	—	—	*2,596.5*	*11,998*	+	*2,596.5*	+	*11,998*	*2,907.9*	*12,282*
Asia	—	—	0.5	84	+	0.5	+	84	0.5	192
Africa	—	—	2,352.2	11,465	+	2,352.2	+	11,465	2,662.3	11,449
Polynesia	—	—	243.8	449	+	243.8	+	449	245.1	641
Denmark	*191.4*	*119*	*191.4*	*121*		—	+	*2*	*88.5*	*40*
America	0.4	38	0.4	31		—	—	7	0.4	27
Arctic	191.0	81	191.0	90		—	+	9	88.1	13
Sweden	*0.02*	*1*	—	—	—	*0.02*	—	*1*	*0.02*	—
America	0.02	1	—	—	—	0.02	—	1	(0.02)	—
Russia	*17,010.7*	*15,958*	*17,286.8*	*25,045*	+	*276.1*	+	*9,087*	*17,388.1*	*33,164*
Asia	17,010.7	15,958	17,286.8	25,045	+	276.1	+	9,087	17,388.1	33,164
United States	*1,552.5*	*60*	*1,875.5*	*8,818*	+	*323.0*	+	*8,758*	*(1,875.5)*	*(9,687)*
Asia	—	—	296.3	7,635	+	296.3	+	7,635	296.3	8,460
Polynesia	—	—	17.4	167	+	17.4	+	167	17.4	211
America	1,552.5	60	1,561.8	1,016	+	9.3	+	956	(1,561.8)	(1,016)
Total	46,494.8	313,646	72,900.1	529,647	+	26,405.3	+	216,001	74,963.5	568,694

* The text of this table in the notebook was written by N. K. Krupskaya; words in heavy type were written by Lenin.—*Ed.*

A. Supan, p. 254:

"Percentage of territory belonging to the European colonial powers (including the United States)*

	1876	1900	Increase or Decrease
in Africa	10.8	90.4	+ 79.6
" Polynesia	56.8	98.9	+ 42.1
" Asia	51.5	56.6	+ 5.1
" Australia	100.0	100.0	—
" America [1])	27.5	27.2	— 0.3

"The characteristic feature of this period is, therefore, *the partition of Africa and Polynesia*"... (p. 254).

The plunder of the natives by the European countries is especially clearly revealed in the account of the *division* of ***Farther India*** (Siam with British "Burma" or Burmania from the West, and French Indo-China from the East)—in Supan, p. 299 et seq. The result (in rounded area figures) (000 sq. km.):

	1876	1900	
British Malacca	32	92	+ 60
British Burma	228	696	+ 468
French possessions	160	663	+ 503
Independent area.	1,665	634	— 1,031
Farther India, in the political sense	2,085	2,085	

"It should also be borne in mind that Siam is guaranteed only 239,000 sq. km."....

((*Hübner* (1914) shows Siam as having *600,000* sq. km.!! Not yet completely plundered!!))

Supan states: "There should be no doubt that this process [the division of *Farther India*] is not yet completed."

[1]) "Alaska is regarded here as a colony of the U.S.A."

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 254.—*Ed.*

Summarising the results of colonisation, Supan says that it has been carried out mainly in the last fifty years (1850–1900)—p. 306 et seq.—He distinguishes three types of colonies: 1) native (no whites or almost none. British India belongs in this category); 2) mixed (whites in a minority; a mixture); 3) migrational colonies (marked preponderance of whites).

He gives detailed figures for America (38,331,200 sq. km.; 144.2 million inhabitants, including 88.3 million whites); Africa (26,950,900 sq. km.; 123.3 million inhabitants); Asia (24,506,200 sq. km.; 390.6 million inhabitants); South Seas colonies (8,938,300 sq. km.; 6.4 million inhabitants). Supan sums up as follows (p. 313):

	sq. km. (million)	population (million)	density	number of whites
1) Native colonies	35.6	477.0	13	—
2) Mixed "	33.9	79.7	2.3	11.5 mill.
3) Migrational "	29.4	108.9	4	93.9
Colonised area	98.9	665.6	7	105.4

(In the *first* group is mainly India—with 365 million—in Asia, and 105 million in Africa.—In the *third* group are mainly North America—78.7 million, and Siberia and Central Asia—7.6 million).

N.B. Supan, *Population of the World*. No. X to XII. Supplementary issues to Petermann's *Reports*. Gotha, 1912. N.B.

What is imperialism?

"Great" Powers	Colonies 1876		Colonies 1914		Metropolis 1914		Total 1914	
	(million)							
	sq. km.	population	sq. km.	population	sq. km.	population	sq. km.	population
Great Britain	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5	0.3	46.5	33.8	440.0
Russia	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2	5.4	136.2	22.8	169.4
France	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5	0.5	39.6	11.1	95.1
Germany	—	—	2.9	12.3	0.5	64.9	3.4	77.2
Japan	—	—	0.3	19.2	0.4	53.0	0.7	72.2
U.S.A.	—	—	0.3	9.7	9.4	97.0	9.7	106.7
Total for six "Great" Powers	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4	16.5	437.2	81.5	960.6
Three countries, whose partition has been particularly vigorous (Turkey, China, Persia)							14.5	361.2
The whole globe (without Polar regions)							133	1,657
All colonies:	46.5	313.6	74.9	568.7				
Colonies *not* belonging to the Great Powers			9.9	45.3				

N.B. Russia 169 × 0.57 = *96.33* *N.B.*
96 million oppressed or without equal rights

	sq. km.	population (million)
All Europe	9.97	452.4
Great Britain + France + Russia + Germany	— 6.70	— 287.2
Other countries	3.27	165.2
All America	39.98	189.5
United States	— 9.40	— 97.0
All colonies	9.20	10.7
Other countries	21.38	81.8
All Asia	44.45	871.2
All colonies	— 25.3	— 422.5
	19.1	448.7
Three semi-colonies (Turkey + China + Persia)	— 14.5	— 361.2
remainder =	4.6	87.5
All Africa	29.9	136.2
All colonies	— 28.6	— 126.6
remainder =	1.3	9.6
All Australia	8.9	7.8
All colonies = (+Polynesia?)	7.7	3.4(?)

	population (million)	
6 Great Powers	437.2	
All colonies	568.7	929.9
3 "booty" countries	361.2	
	1,367.1	

300	privileged
150	oppressed
1,000	{colonies and booty}
1,450	
150	small states and candidates
1,600	

Approximately:

population (millions)
300— "Great Powers" and privileged oppressors and plunderers
300— dependent, unequal, plundered and small peoples
1,000— colonies and "booty"
1,600

China

Nationality of foreigners in the Treaty Ports

	1912	
	Firms	Individuals
Japanese	733	75,210
Russian	323	45,908
British	592	8,690
American	133	3,869
French	107	3,133
German	276	2,817
Portuguese	44	2,785
Italian	40	537
Austrian	17	328
Danish	11	279
Norwegian	8	250
Belgian	15	245
Spanish	6	224
Swedish	2	189
Dutch	13	157
Hungarian	3	27
Brazilian	1	9
Others	4	97
Total	2,328	144,754

	Metropolis sq. km.	Metropolis population (mill.)	Colonies sq. km.	Colonies population (mill.)	*Total* sq. km.	*Total* population (mill.)	Colonies (million) *1876* sq. km.	*1876* population	*1914* sq. km.	*1914* population
(α) Russia (Europe+Asia)	5.4	136.2	16.9	33.2	22.3	169.4	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2
(β) Great Britain	0.3	46.5	30.0	378.5	30.3	425.0	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5
(α) France	0.5	39.6	10.6	55.5	11.1	95.1	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5
(Σ) =	6.2	222.3	57.5	467.2	63.7	689.5				
[1]) Belgium	0.03	7.5	2.4	15.0	2.4	22.5				
Serbia	0.09	4.5	—	—	0.1	4.5				
(δ) Germany	0.5	64.9	2.9	12.3	3.4	77.2	—	—	2.9	12.3
Austria-Hungary	0.7	51.4	—	—	0.7	51.4				
Turkey	1.8	21.6	—	—	1.8	21.6				
	3.0	137.9	2.9	12.3	5.9	150.2				
(ε) Japan	0.4	53.0	0.3	19.2	0.7	72.2	—	—	0.3	19.2
China	11.1	329.6	—	—	11.1	329.6				
(ζ) U.S.A.	9.4	97.0	0.3	9.7	9.7	106.7	—	—	0.3	9.7
6 "Great" Powers (α-ζ)	16.5	437.2	61.0	508.4	77.5	945.6	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4

[1]) *Belgium* 29,452 sq. km. and 7.5 mill. population+2,400,000 sq. km. of colonies with 15 mill. population. Σ = 2.4 mill. sq. km. and *22.5* mill. population.

Serbia 87,303 sq. km. and 4.5 mill. population.
Σ=0.1 mill. sq. km. and 4.5 mill. population.

Turkey	1.8	21.6
China	11.1	329.6
Σ=	12.9	351.2
Persia=	1.6	10.0
Σ=	14.5	361.2

Balkan states before and after 1912-13* war

	Total area (sq. km.)			Population (000)		
	Previous territory	Newly acquired	Present territory	Previous territory	Newly acquired	Present territory
Rumania	131,353	8,340	139,693	7,248	354	7,602
Bulgaria	96,345	17,660	114,005	4,337	429	4,766
Serbia	48,303	39,000	87,303	2,912	1,533	4,445
Montenegro	9,080	5,100	14,180	285	150	435
Albania	—	28,000	28,000	—	800	800
Greece	64,657	51,318	115,975	2,632	1,624	4,256
Crete	8,618	—149,755		344	—4,583	
Turkey	169,317		28,180	6,130		1,891
Balkan countries	527,673	—337 [1])	527,336	23,888	307	24,195

[1]) The difference is due to inaccurate measurement, Albania, in particular, being shown smaller than she is.

* The text of this table was written in the notebook by N. K. Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

The whole world		Population			Special trade (1912)	
	mill. sq. km.	mill.	%	per. sq. km.	Imports	Exports
					(mill. marks)	
Asia	44.45	871.2	52.6	19.6	9,278	10,162
Europe	9.97	452.4	27.3	45.4	56,655	44,224
Africa	29.89	136.2	8.2	4.5	3,149	3,584
America	39.98	189.5	11.4	4.7	15,738	18,286
Australia	8.96	7.8	0.5	0.9	2,199	2,269
Polar countries	12.67	0.01	0.0	—	—	—
Total	145.92	1,657.1	100.0	11.4	87,019	78,525

Otto Hübner's Geographical-Statistical Tables

1914 edition (63rd year)*

Great Britain		***Railways*** (km.)
(1912)	Egypt	4,241
(1912)	Egyptian Sudan	1,725
(1912)	Malta	13
(1911-12)	Cyprus	98
(1911-12)	India	55,875
(1911)	Ceylon	971
(1911)	Straits Settlements	34
—	—	16
(1912)	Malay Protectorate	1,180
(1912)	Hong Kong	15
(1912)	North Borneo	211
(1912)	Union of South Africa	12,626
(1910)	Basutoland	26
(1912)	Rhodesia	3,872
(1912)	Nyasaland	182
(1912)	East Africa	943
(1912)	Zanzibar	10
(1912)	Nigeria	1,467
(1912)	Sierra Leone	365
(1912)	Gold Coast	270
(1912)	Mauritius	207
(1912)	Newfoundland	1,238
(1912)	Canada	47,150
(1912)	Jamaica	313
(1912)	Windward Isles	45
(1912)	Trinidad	135
(1912)	Honduras	40
(1912)	Guiana	152
(1912-13)	Commonwealth of Australia	30,141
(1912-13)	New Zealand	4,588
		168,149

* The text of page 10 in the notebook (pp. 305-07 of this volume) was Written by N. K. Krupskaya; words in heavy type were written by Lenin.—*Ed.*

	France	(km.)
(1919)	Algeria	3,491
(1912)	Tunisia	1,656
(1913)	West Africa	2,400
(1913)	Somali Coast	130
(1913)	Madagascar	368
(1913)	Réunion	126
(1913)	India	30
(1912)	Indo-China	1,374
(1908)	Martinique	224
(1913)	Guiana	16
(1913)	New Caledonia	17
		9,832
(1912)	*Belgian Congo*	1,235
	Italy	
(1912)	Libya	87
(1912)	Eritrea	120
		207
	German Empire	
(1913)	East Africa	1,602
(1913)	Cameroon	443
(1913)	Togoland	327
(1913)	South-West Africa	2,104
		4,476
	Netherlands	
(1912)	East Indies	2,355
		2,683
	Other possessions	337
		5,375
	Russia	
(1913)	Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia	17,036
(1911)	*Turkey*	6,660
	of which in	
1.	Europe	1,994
2.	Asia Minor	2,372
3.	Syria and Arabia	2,294
(1909)	Persia	54
	in use	12

	Total area (sq. km.)	Population	
Turkey, constitutional state since 1909	*1,794,980*	*21,600,000*	(1910)
Turkey in Europe	28,180	1,891,090	(1910)
Asia Minor	501,400	10,940,765	(1910)
Armenia and Kurdistan	186,500	2,357,436	(1900)
Syria and Mesopotamia	637,800	5,361,203	(1940)
Arabia	441,100	1,050,000	(1910)
China, republic since March 1912	*11,138,900*	*329,617,760*	
China proper	6,242,300	325,817,760	(1910)
Mongolia	2,787,600	1,800,000	
Tibet	2,109,000	2,000,000	
Japan, constitutional empire	*673,681*	*72,200,475*	
Japan proper	382,415	52,985,423	(1912)
Formosa	35,997	3,512,607	(1913)
Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin)	34,069	42,612	(1913)
Kwantung	3,374	501,767	(1913)
Korea	217,826	15,164,066	(1913)

N.B. In thousand sq. km. **(total area)**
PERSIA is about 1,645 **(total population of Persia in 1907: 9½ million)**

Under 1907 agreement:
British sphere of influence is about 355
Russian " " " " " 790

MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS

Mutual Accusations

La Revue de Paris, March 1, 1915 (No. 5, 1915)
article by G. **Demorgny** "*Turkish-German Methods in Persia*" (with a map of the Russian and British spheres of influence in Persia).

An imperialist laments German successes. (Characteristic for a description of imperialism.) ||| N.B.

Incidentally (p. 217):

"On December 24 (1914) a bomb intended to wipe out the Russian, French, Belgian and British ministers exploded in Teheran, but the attempt failed ||| N.B.

N.B. and the bomb killed one of the participants in the plot organised by a German-Turkish gang"....

Author quotes his articles in the magazine *Revue du monde musulman*, 1913, Nos. 22 and 23 (March and June 1913) and his books: *Problems of the Danube*, Paris, 1911 (Larose et Tenin);

The Administration of Persia, Paris, 1913 (Leroux), and *Persian Financial Institutions*, Paris, 1915 (Leroux).

The *Sitchkan-il year* (March 21, 1912-March 20, 1913).

1. Russian trade with Persia = *628,857,900* ***krans*** (1 kran = 0.4545 franc).

Persian exports to Russia = 69 per cent of total Persian exports.

Persian imports from Russia 58 per cent of total Persian imports (p. 205).

2. Persian imports from Britain = 25 per cent of total Persian Imports.

Persian exports to Britain 13 per cent of total Persian exports.

3. Turkey.
4. German trade with Persia = 24,316,252 krans.
5. France.
6. Italy.

((Countries listed in the order of their trade with Persia: 1-6))

Preussische Jahrbücher, 1915, No. 3 (March), article by Hans Delbrück (p. 485):

N.B. "On behalf of his Government, the British Minister in Norway, Findley, tried to hire an assassin in order to do away with the Irishman Sir Roger Casement". (From Delbrück's counter-charges against Great Britain.)

"ENGINEERING WAR"

The Daily Telegraph, March 15, 1915. "Engineering War."

"*Oil in Warfare*. The All-Oil Battleship."

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer was right when he said: 'This is an engineers' war.' We are seeing the impress

of the engineer on every phase of the stupendous struggle now in progress throughout the world. No longer is engineering a side-line. It has become the principal feature of war, so much so 'that Eye-Witness' has seen fit to call the present 'the petrol war' in the course of his recent description of the part played by mechanical traction on the Continent. To call it 'the oil war' would probably be more accurate since this term would also include the Fleet, so far as many of its greatest and smallest craft—as represented by super-dreadnoughts and submarines—are concerned."

The Queen Elizabeth is one of the first "all-oil" vessels. Less cost. The chief thing is the speed in fuelling, etc., etc. A gigantic technical advance.

The transition to "internal-combustion-engined warships" is imminent. Commercial ships are already making the transition.

JUNIUS, *THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY**

Junius, *The Crisis of Social-Democracy*. Supplement: "Theses on the Tasks of International Social-Democracy." Zurich, *1916*, *109* pp. (105-09, theses).

"Introduction" dated *January 2*, 1916: the pamphlet is stated to have been written in April 1915.

p. 6: "The capitulation of international Social-Democracy ... the most stupid thing would be to conceal it"....

p. 24: "Two lines of development ... lead ... to this war." 1) 1870, N.B., the *annexation* of Alsace and Lorraine, and 2) imperialist development in the last 25 years.

p. 28: Bülow's speech on December 11, 1899. A clear imperialist programme: the British have "Greater Britain", the French their "New France", the Russians—Asia, the Germans "Greater Germany". N.B.

pp. 31-33: excellent account of the plunder of Turkish peasants in Asia Minor by German finance capital.

p. *42*: ..."The existence of only two countries—Belgium and Serbia—is at stake in the present war".

p. *43*: In Russia, imperialism is "not" so much "*economic expansion*" as "*the political interest of the state*".

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-20.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

p. *48*: The break-up of Austria was accelerated "by the emergence of independent national states in the immediate neighbourhood of the monarchy"....

..."The internal *un*-viability of Austria was shown"....

..."The Hapsburg monarchy is not the political organisation of a bourgeois state, but only the loose syndicate of cliques of social parasites" (49)....

..."An inevitable dilemma: either the Hapsburg monarchy or the capitalist development of the Balkan countries" (49)....

N.B. ..."Historically, the liquidation of Austria-Hungary is but the continuation of the disintegration of Turkey, but at the same time it is a requirement of the historical process of development" (49-50).

"German imperialism, chained to two decomposing corpses, steered straight into the world war" (50).

..."For ... an alleged attempt (at high treason) ... Duala Manga Bell of the Cameroons was hanged quietly, amidst the noise of war, without the troublesome procedure of a court trial.... The Reichstag group shrouded the body of Chief Duala in a discreet silence" (56).

p. *60*: two causes of the 1905 defeat:

? (1) its "huge" political programme; "some (of the problems), such as the agrarian question, are altogether insoluble within the framework of the present social order"....

(2) the aid of European reaction....

71: "The dangers to the 'free development of Germany' do not lie in Russia, as the Reichstag group thought, but in Germany herself"... (and, incidentally, the expression: "the Zabern policy", p. 71).

74: "Does not the socialist principle of the right of nations to self-determination imply that every people is entitled and bound to defend its freedom and independence?"... (75) "certainly, a people that surrenders to an external enemy is contemptible"....

75: A quotation from *The Civil War in France*: "The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug"....[27]

76: "In bourgeois society, therefore, invasion and class struggle are not opposites, as the official legend has it, but one is the means and expression of the other. And if for the ruling classes invasion represents a well-tried means against the class struggle, for the ascending classes the sharpest class struggle still proves to be the best means against invasion".... The history of the Italian towns in the *Middle Ages*, and especially *1793*.

77: The same applies to self-determination: "True, socialism recognises the right of every nation to independence and freedom, to independent mastery of its destinies. But it is a real mockery of socialism when the modern capitalist states are presented as the expression of this right of the nations to self-determination. In which of these states has the nation yet determined the forms and conditions of its (sic!) national, political or social existence?" By "self-determination of the German people", Marx, Engels, Lassalle understood "the united, great German republic". [Modern Germany has been built (N.B.) (77) "on the ruins of the German people's right to national (N.B.) self-determination (N.B.)"....]

77 ..."or is it, perhaps, the Third Republic with colonial possessions in four continents, and colonial atrocities in two of them, that is an expression of the 'self-determination' of the French nation?"...

78: "In the socialist sense of this concept, there is not a single free nation, if its existence as a state rests on the enslavement of other peoples, for the colonial peoples, too, are reckoned as peoples and as members of the state. International socialism recognises the right of free, independent and equal nations, but it is only socialism that can create such nations, and only it can realise the right of nations to self-determination. And this socialist slogan serves like all the other socialist slogans not to justify the existing order of things, but to indicate the way forward, and to stimulate the proletariat in its active, revolutionary policy of transformation".... N.B.

? ...In the imperialist situation of today there cannot be any more "national wars of defence" (78)... to ignore this situation means "*to build on sand*".

Hence "the question of defence and attack, the question of who is to 'blame', is quite meaningless" (78); for both France and Great Britain it is not a matter of "self-defence", they are defending "not their national, but their world political position"....

N.B.: ..."in order to dispel the phantom of 'national war' which dominates Social-Democratic policy at present" (81).

Imperialist policy is an international phenomenon, the result of "the world-wide development of capital" (79).... "It is only from this starting-point that the question of 'national defence' in the present war can be correctly posed" (80).... The system of alliances, military interests, etc., immediately *involve imperialist* interests and countries.... "Finally, the very fact that today all capitalist states have colonial possessions which in time of war, even if it begins as a 'national war of defence', are in any case drawn into the war from military-strategic considerations" ... the "holy war" in Turkey, the instigation of uprisings in the colonies...—"this fact, too, today automatically converts every war into an imperialist world conflagration" (82)....

The example of Serbia (behind which stands Russia), Holland (her colonies and *so forth*).... "In this way, it is always the historical situation created by present-day imperialism that determines the character of the war for the different countries, and it is because of this situation that nowadays national wars of defence are in general no longer possible" (84)....

He quotes K. Kautsky: *Patriotism and Social-Democracy*, 1907, p. 16 in particular, that "under these conditions a war for the defence of national freedom can no longer be expected anywhere" (Kautsky, quoted by Junius, p. 85). (K. Kautsky, pp. 12-14 on "national problems", that they can be solved "*only* (N.B.) *after* (N.B.) the victory of the proletariat".) [K. Kautsky, p. **23**. N.B.]

What then is the task of Social-Democracy? Not to be "passive". "Instead of hypocritically dressing the imperialist war in the cloak of national defence, we should take *seriously* [author's italics] the right of nations to self-determination and national defence and use them as a revolutionary lever *against* [author's italics] the imperialist war (85). The most elementary requirement of national defence is that the nation should take defence into its own hands. The first step in that direction is a *militia*, i.e., not merely immediate arming of the entire adult male population, but above all the decision by the people of the question of war and peace; it implies also immediate abolition of all political disfranchisement, since the people's defence must be based on the greatest political freedom. And it was the prime duty of Social-Democracy to proclaim these genuine national defence measures, and strive for their realisation" (86). But the Social-Democrats abandoned the demand for a *militia* until after the war!!! although we have said that "*o n l y* a militia" is capable of defending the fatherland!!!

?

??? N.B.

"Our teachers had a different conception of defence of the fatherland"... (Marx in *The Civil War*, in support of the national war of the Commune)... and ... Frederick Engels in *1892*, in support of a repetition of 1793.... But alongside this: "*When Engels wrote that, he had in mind a situation quite different from the present one*" (87)—prior to the Russian revolution. "He [Engels] had in mind a genuine national war of defence by a suddenly attacked Germany" (87)....

N.B.!

And further: "Yes, it is the duty of the Social-Democrats to defend their country during a great historical crisis. And precisely therein lies the grave guilt" of the Social-Democratic Reichstag group.... "They *did leave* the fatherland unprotected in the hour of its greatest peril. For their first duty to the fatherland in that hour was to show the fatherland what was really behind the present impe-

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N.B. rialist war; to sweep away the web of patriotic and diplomatic lies covering up this encroachment on the fatherland; to proclaim loudly and clearly that for the German people both victory and defeat in the present war are equally fatal...; to proclaim the necessity of immediately arming the people and of allowing the people to decide the question of war and peace ... finally, to oppose the imperialist war programme, which is to preserve Austria and Turkey, i.e., perpetuate reaction in Europe and in Germany, with the old, truly national programme of the patriots ?? and democrats of 1848, the programme of Marx, Engels and Lassalle—the slogan of a united, great German Republic. This is the banner that should have been unfurled before the country, which would have been a truly national banner of liberation, and which would have been in accord with the best traditions of Germany and with the international class policy of the proletariat" (88).

100: ..."Hence, the grave dilemma—the interests of the fatherland or the international solidarity of the proletariat—the tragic conflict which prompted our parliamentarians to side, 'with a heavy heart', with the imperialist war, is purely imaginary, a bourgeois-nationalist fiction. On the contrary, there is complete harmony between the interests of the country and the class interests of the proletarian International, both in time of war and in time of peace: both war and peace demand the most energetic development of the class struggle, the most determined fight for the Social-Democratic programme" (89)....

But what should the Party have done? Call a mass strike? Or call for refusal to serve in the army? It would be absurd to try to answer. The revolution cannot be "made". "Prescriptions and recipes of a technical nature" would be "*ridiculous*" (90); it is not a question of such things, but of a clear political slogan. (Expatiates against technique, etc., etc., "small conspiratorial circles", etc.) (N.B. 101-02).

§VIII (93-104) deals especially with the question of "victory or defeat", endeavours to prove that both are equally bad (ruin, new wars, etc.). To choose between them would be "a hopeless choice between two lots of thrashing" (98)... "except in one single case: if by its revolutionary intervention the international proletariat upsets all the calculations" (of both imperialisms) (98).... There can be no status quo (99), no going "backwards", only forward to the victory of the proletariat. Not harebrained schemes of disarmament, not "utopias" or "partial reforms" (99), but the struggle against imperialism.

p. 102—the threat of "mass collapse of the European proletariat" (102).... "When the hour strikes, the signal for the social revolution that will set mankind free will come only from Europe, only from the oldest capitalist countries. Only the British, French, Belgian, German, Russian and Italian workers together can lead the army of the exploited and enslaved in the five continents of the world" (103).

but America?? and Japan??

"THE SOCIALISTS AND PEACE"

Journal des débats, November 11, 1915.

"The socialists and peace".... "It certainly seems as if this conference [Zimmerwald] had been organised by the German socialists, whose intimate connection with the government of that country is well known. It is a manoeuvre on the part of our enemies which should not astonish us. They have resorted to it several times ever since they have felt that all is up with them." !

..."The French Socialist Party considered it necessary to speak out" (the Socialist Party resolution against the conference) "in order to dispel any ambiguity and to affirm once again that it remains faithful to the patriotic pact of the sacred union." !!

ITEMS IN *LE TEMPS*

Le Temps, November 13.

Item (on p. 2) on the *Vorwärts* article about Renaudel's speech and, *sympathetically*, on the *l'Humanité* article *against* Zimmerwald.

Ibidem November 12.

"The Socialists and Alsace-Lorraine."

An article by Compère-Morel in *l'Humanité* frankly states "that we do not consider Alsace-Lorraine as being such" (=as German territories, which we do not wish to "conquer").

BRAUER ON GERMAN "DEFEATISTS"

Hochland, Munich, No. 8, 1914-15, May 1915.

A Roman Catholic, aristocratic organ of the Austro-Munich clericalists

(published by Karl Muth)

Th. Brauer, *War and Socialism*.

..."The war is more than just an episode in the development of socialism: it leads (at least as a possibility) to a definite end of this development" (176)....

...(The "story" of Marx, Engels, Bebel....)

..."Theoretical 'annihilation' does not prevent 'opportunism' from living merrily on and winning respect. As the masses flocking to the socialist banner grow, so also, but to a much greater degree, grows their desire with regard to the present, and there is no preventing them, in their aspirations, from turning their eyes to the present-day state" (179-80)....

...Precisely in this (revolutionary) ideology, against which Bernstein fought—"precisely in this ideology the European war plays a great part as the prelude to the social revolution" (180).

(The trade unions grow wiser)

..."immediately before the war there was also a formal approximation between trade union socialism and 'bourgeois' social reform" (181).

"The volte-face of German Social-Democracy at the outbreak of the war, seen in its purely external aspect, came as a sudden sharp break. Right up to the eve of the war, the press carried exhortations, warnings and appeals in the old agitational jargon. Views were even expressed which, by referring to what allegedly happened in France after 1870, sounded like eulogy of defeat. Then, however, a single day brought about ... a turn which could not be more complete. The official explanations do not even remotely justify it. As everyone knows—and there is no need therefore to dwell on this—they can be easily refuted by previous official statements" (181). N.B.

...(The socialist masses, we are told, came into contact with the "full" reality of life)....

..."The far-seeing socialists, especially from the revisionist camp" (182) ... long ago pointed out the danger of such an [old-socialist] education of the people....

...(eulogy of patriotism)....

..."Now, at last, the reformists can hope to find a strong, impregnable basis for the new socialist and Social-Democratic programme they have so ardently desired" (183)....

..."If one wanted to describe briefly the practical success of revisionist activity, one would have to say that it has shattered faith in Marxism, both among the leaders and the upper stratum of practical organisers, and that, in default of an adequate substitute, they have made tactics their 'credo'" (184). N.B.

and in general (188) let us first have the opinion of those who will come back from the trenches.

N.B. *Report of Swiss Factory and Mining Inspectors on Their Work in 1912 and 1913—Aarau, 1914* (265 pp., 3 marks). N.B.

ARTICLES AND NOTES IN *LE TEMPS*

Le Temps, December 6, 1915.

"The anniversary of the battle of Champigny" was celebrated today.

Speech by M. Albert *Thomas*:

"No peace until our Alsace and our Lorraine have been definitely returned to France"....

...until German imperialism has been rendered harmless, etc., etc. (..."victory"....)... "to the finish"....

Ibidem, December 7, 1915.

An article (editorial) "Good Words".

N.B. "This demonstration is the more significant because M. Albert Thomas represents in the government, together with M. M. Guesde and Sembat, the United Socialist Party, certain elements of which cannot forget the dangerous tendencies which used to prevail among them before the war and remain obsessed by the vague ideal of an internationalism from which we almost perished"....

..."There is here" (in the Thomas speech) "a precise, formal claim for the simple unconditional return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. These words are in happy contrast to the too cautious formulas sometimes advanced by the extreme Left and open to regrettable misunderstandings."

Ibidem (p. 2) "Among the Socialists". Yesterday there was a preparatory meeting (for the Party Congress on December 25, 1915) of the Seine federation. Bourderon tried to speak, "but he was violently interrupted" (there were shouts that he had no credentials) (*idem Journal des débats*, December 7, 1915. When Bourderon said that he represented the minority, "violent protests were raised"...).

"Yesterday evening in the rue de Paris at Montreuil, M. Merrheim was to have given a lecture on the international pacifist conference in Zimmerwald. M. Merrheim's lecture was forbidden."

"AMERICAN ARMS SUPPLIERS"

Article in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1915, No. 485, 1st morning edition. April 23, 1915.

American Arms Suppliers.

"For some considerable time now the American press has carried reports on arms deliveries to the Entente powers. We take the following from a California newspaper:

"'War material destined for the Allies is now shipped by American producers to Canada, from where British ships carry it to England. Goods for France and Russia follow the same route, via England. Through agents or directly, the Allies have contracts with nearly all American armaments factories. Of course, the factories keep this a secret, for fear of having to stop their supplies, because all this material is contraband of war.

"'Fifty-seven U.S. factories are engaged exclusively in armaments production. They normally employ about 20,000 workers, but now, working two and three shifts, the number is about 50,000. They do not make explosives. These are produced at about 103 factories, whose output has doubled since the outbreak of the war. Many gun-cotton factories are working three shifts. The mass demand has, of course, resulted in higher prices. Thus, in February the French Government ordered 24,000,000 lbs of gun-cotton at 65 cents per pound, whereas in ordinary times the cost is 24-25 cents. ‖

"'In addition, there are items of equipment for troops and animals: footwear, utensils, saddles, tanned leather, etc. For America, the European war means a vast, profitable business.'"

Lloyd George in Parliament.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, APRIL 22 AND 23, 1915

The Daily Telegraph, April 22, 1915.

Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons:

"He astounded the House by saying that in a single fortnight of last month the British artillery fired more shells than during the whole continuance of the Boer War."

N.B. || If in September the output (of artillery shells) was *20*, in March it was *388*, 19 times as much.

(And in September it was more than in August, and in August more than in July!)

Before the war, he said, it was reckoned that there would he six divisions on the continent. There are now *36* = 720,000 men.

In March, the Defence of the Realm Act was passed "enabling [the government] to take over any suitable engineering firms and turn them to producing shells.

N.B. "Munitions without end—such is the best formula for saving life and securing a speedy end to the war"....

Ibidem, April 23.

"Patriotic Pledge by Employers":

I declare that, *in giving employment after the war*, I will give preference to those who have served in the army.

Signature

(The King and Ministers *favour* this)..

Ibidem. *Roosevelt's book. America and the World War.*

The author favours the rule: "speak softly, but carry a big stick" (he complains that people call him the "big stick", but forget the beginning of his saying). (The example of *Belgium*.)

Favours the United States of America introducing national "*military training*" à la Switzerland or Australia....

ARTICLES BY HUGO BÖTTGER IN *DER TAG*

Der Tag, 1915, No. 93 (edition A), April 22, 1915.

Article: "The Free Trade Unions and the Government" by Dr. *Hugo Böttger*, Reichstag deputy.

The author begins with the fact that the managing director of a mining company (in Gelsenkirchen), *Kirdorf* , reproached Minister *Delbrück* (Minister of the Interior) for maintaining "close contact with the trade union leaders".

This was dangerous for the workers would become more restless.

The author replies that there is no harm in this, that workers and employers are standing side by Bide in the trenches, that "if they (= the free trade unions = the Social-Democrats) are enlisted for joint work on certain labour and general national questions in the Ministry of the Interior, that is just as much a recognition of the need, as it is an obligation, for the duration of the war, to *renounce certain provisions of the Social-Democratic programme* which belong to the sphere of the **International** and, in common with all other sections of the population, to do their duty and defend the fatherland"....

N.B.

An article by the same author in No. *82* (April 9) "The Development of Our Policy", in which, inter alia, it is stated:

"It is surprising that even in Social-Democratic discussions the opinion clearly emerges, against the background of Marxist thinking, that now one has to reckon with the further development of imperialism, the development of large world powers, externally sovereign, as far as possible independent. Some reject this, others try to include imperialism in socialist development, and, of course, there can be no doubt as to which of these two trends is the wiser and has the greatest prospect of success"....

"THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR", ARTICLE IN *THE ECONOMIST*

The Economist, March 27, 1915. Saturday.

Article: "The Objects of the War" (in connection with Grey's speech on Monday (March 22??) in the Bechstein Hall).

The editors are concerned for peace and rejoice that Grey did not say anything likely "to lengthen or embitter the war"....

The end of the article reads:

"Statesmanship cannot contemplate a bitter end of universal mourning and almost universal bankruptcy.

A time may come before long when it will be possible to consult the dictates of humanity and at the same time to secure the objects indicated by Sir Edward Grey [the freedom of nationalities etc.].... If such an opportunity is lost, the war will not go on for ever. It will end in revolutionary chaos, beginning no one can say where and ending in no one can say what. Even if the war ceased tomorrow, there is hardly a family even in this comparatively prosperous country which will not suffer severely for years to come from the burdens entailed by the struggle" (p. 615). (End.)

N.B.

JOURNAL DE GENÈVE, APRIL 7, 1915

Journal de Genève, April 7, 1915.

A leading article entitled: "The Harm of Talking Too Much" discusses the book: *Lessons of the 1914 Yellow Book* by Henri *Welschinger*, Member of the Institute, published by Bloud et Gay, Paris.

On July 13, 1914 (note the date!), M. Ch. Humbert, "the reporter for the War Committee", anxious to demonstrate France's unpreparedness, told the Senate that France had practically no heavy artillery, even of 10-13-21 cm. Mortars of 28 cm. would be available ... in a year's time!!

And next day, July 14, 1914, the War Minister, Messimy, stated in the Senate that

at the end of 1915 (!!) France would have

200 long 105 mm. guns, and at the end of 1917 (!!!) 200 short 120 mm. howitzers.

N.B. "Could Germany draw any other conclusion than 'Let us march without losing time'?"

LLOYD GEORGE ON £4,000,000,000

Lloyd George in the *House of Commons*. Tuesday, May 4, 1915 (*The Daily Telegraph*, May 5.)

..."What is the income of this country? The income of this country in times of peace is £2,400,000,000.

"Now it is probably higher. Why? We are spending hundreds of millions of borrowed money here. Most of it is spent in this country. Men are working time and overtime, their wages are higher; profits in certain trades are higher, certainly considerably higher; and the result is that the income of this country at the present moment is probably higher than in times of peace. Some are probably making huge profits—(hear, hear)—and others have raised their income far beyond their ordinary standard. N.B. N.B.

"I have no doubt that it would be perfectly just when we come to consider, if we can have to do it, what taxes you have to raise or what contribution you have to levy in order to enable you to get through a war lasting two or three years—it would be perfectly legitimate to resort to those who have made exceptional incomes out of the war (cheers).... What are the ordinary savings of this country in times of peace? The ordinary savings are about £300-400 (millions) per annum. The income is higher, and I do not think it is too much to say that in every country in Europe the standard of living is considerably lower—I am not sure to what extent. N.B.

"But the savings of this country during the period of the war when the income is higher ought to be double." N.B.

And another passage from the same speech:

"We are an enormously rich country—certainly the richest in Europe. I am not sure that we are not the *richest country in the world*, in proportion to population. *We have £4,000,000,000 invested in foreign and colonial securities of the best*"!! £4,000,000,000

..."We have got *to finance the purchases of most of our Allies*"....

NOTEBOOK "η"
("ETA")

Contents

η

Extracts and notes relating to *imperialism*.
K. Kautsky (*The National State*, *etc.*) [3-4]
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K. KAUTSKY, *THE NATIONAL STATE*, *ETC.*

The National State, *the Imperialist State and the Alliance of States*, by **K. Kautsky**, Nuremberg, 1915 (50 pfennigs) (80 pp.).

In §1—"Some Remarks on Democracy and the National State"—K. Kautsky finds fault with the Right-winger (Winnig) and a Left-winger of Halle (from the Halle *Volksblatt*), who say that the principle of "the right of every nation to national self-determination" (p. 5 in the declaration of August 4) is out-of-date. Kautsky favours the Centrist position on this issue, and chews over all the old stuff about the link between democracy and the national state.

In this context, he opposes "primitive democracy" and "direct national legislation" (8); moreover he includes in "primitive democracy" "its most active variety, the mass strike" (8).

!

We are not for the status quo, he says, (14) but *for a different way* of breaking out of the national framework.... "The proletariat cannot emancipate itself by some of its sections, engaged in definite occupations or living in definite regions, benefiting from exploitation and oppression. That signifies rather a weakening of its position" (16)....

[And not a word of conclusion from this!! The sophist!]

On p. 17 a swindling distortion of the position of the Lefts. Like the Rights, *they too* (he says) agree that imperialism is inevitable, but demand that it be countered by "the immediate realisation" (17) of socialism....

"This looks very radical, but is **only (!!!)** capable of driving everyone who does not believe in the immediate practical implementation of socialism into the camp of imperialism." || petty swindler!!

This is followed by the most banal prattle about society being an organism and not a mechanism, and similar childish nonsense (with hints about the strong "national sentiments" (18) among the workers) and the conclusion that the inevitability of imperialism does not imply that it is foolish to fight it "within this [capitalist] mode of production" (21). || N.B.

"The petty bourgeois and small peasants, and even many capitalists and intellectuals", are against imperialism and favour other means of the extension of capital (apart from colonies) (21)....

LENSCH,
GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD WAR

Dr. Paul Lensch, *German Social-Democracy and the World War*, Berlin, 1915 (Vorwärts). 64 pp. (1.00 Mk).

A model of grovelling, chauvinist blather. A comparison with Plekhanov would be most useful!!

The war = a "product of imperialist policy" (5). In Jena (1911) Bebel said that instead of disarmament we had rearmament and things were moving towards "a great catastrophe" (5).... || N.B.

Pointing to the early twentieth-century wars and revolutions, Lensch exclaims: "what we are experiencing is a revolution" (6)....

We German Social-Democrats, "the strongest group in the International" (6), have been the most resolute in combating our government, etc., etc., have always held up Britain as an example (as if Britain were ruled not by a "capitalist clique", but by a "committee for carrying out the Ten Commandments and other laws of morality" (6-7)). He points to the old traditions of German history and of Liebknecht, who "never entirely got rid of a certain South-German particularism and hatred of Prussia" (7).

Things went so far that Kautsky maintained mastery of the seas was "indispensable" for Britain (7: where is the quotation from?) (from the standpoint of food supplies, in contrast to Germany)....

! ‖ "The danger of this line of reasoning, which, incidentally, corresponded to a view almost universally held in the Party, has become fully evident in the present world war" (7)....

..."this weak criticism in regard to other countries" (8) had its roots "in the enormous strength of the Party"... "in its internationalism".

"Undoubtedly, it [this world war] is an imperialist war" (9).... The policy in the East ... the Baghdad railway ... Britain and Egypt, etc., the (projected) partition of Turkey, Morocco, etc.

!! ‖ "Germany was not consulted at all in this dividing up of the world" (10), "and it was more to protest against this insulting disregard than to protect the not very considerable material interests of German trade in Morocco" that the German Government protested against the Anglo-French agreement over Morocco.

In 1908 (the Revel meeting), the powers were already about to partition Turkey (Russia + Great Britain + France), but were prevented by the revolution in Turkey (11).

In 1914, agreements were nearly completed between Great Britain and Germany for the division of spheres in Africa (13) and in the East, etc.—*Russia* is to blame for the war.

In 1913 Germany threatened war over Armenia (14)....

"For Germany, by which we mean the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, the question of capitalist expansion has become a question of national existence" (15). !!

The question now is not merely of dividing up colonies and spheres of influence, etc., but: "Shall the German people continue to exist as a great and independent nation, or shall a large part of its national territory, in the east as well as in the west, be torn away and forcibly subjected to foreign, rule?" (15). !!

"On which side are the interests of international socialism in general, and of the German labour movement in particular, in this struggle, insofar as it concerns the threat to British world domination?" (16).

British mastery of the seas is a continuation of the wars against the French revolution. The monopoly of Britain towards the middle of the nineteenth century: Britain must be the "workshop" of the world.

"The much-vaunted British 'freedom' was based on enslavement of the world" (20).

"Great Britain has in a certain sense been the ruling class of the world" (20)....

In Chemnitz in 1912 (p. 417 et seq. of the minutes) I, Lensch, quoted Engels on the decline of Britain's monopoly and said:

"International socialism, however, has not the slightest reason for helping to perpetuate this lasting supremacy of one capitalist state over all others. That would only make the conditions for the victory of socialism more difficult and protracted" (22-23). !

..."the great historical advance that the shattering of British maritime supremacy would mean for the whole world and especially for international socialism" (23-24) would be the more certain the longer there was peace.... The working-class movement was a threat to the British bourgeoisie....

..."Seen in that light, participation in the world war was for the British bourgeoisie nothing but a flight from socialism" (24)....

...“In fact, if there were a means for throwing back for decades the proletariat’s international liberation struggle against capitalism, it would be the collapse of Germany in this war against Britain” (25)....

“The hard core of the International”, the German Social-Democrats, would be shattered and the working class thrown back into the camp of capitalism, etc. (25)....

“Germany is the centre and homeland of scientific socialism” (26).... “The interests of the international proletariat are on the German side” (27)....

Russian tsarism.... *Marx and Engels* in 1848. *But now it is different*. Engels in 1891 (quotation, p. 29). *But now it is different*.

Germany, as a *complete national entity*, “is being born” “only now” “with this war” (31)....

The German-Russian war “has grown far beyond the bounds of an imperialist war. It represents the culmination of the German people’s painful process of development towards national unity” (33)....

A quotation from Engels on Russian *diplomacy* (35): as if written now....

Against the dismemberment of Russia (37) (“not dismemberment” (38)), against the formation of small states—“a certain national autonomy” is sufficient....

The downfall of tsarism (it should be awaited from the Russian proletariat) will accelerate development....

France and the war (§V).... Revenge.

“The interests of freedom and democracy are absolutely incompatible with the victory of French arms” (42), for France is allied with Great Britain and Russia.

German Social-Democracy would “*now*” regard the severance of Alsace-Lorraine “as a mutilation of Germany” (43).

“An honourable peace” (44) with the French republic—that’s what’s needed.

The German past and future (§VI):

National culture and its significance (according to O. Bauer, quotation p. 53). “Community of culture” (50 and others).

Capitalism *must* develop “towards democracy” (55)....

“*The danger of war*” (56)—the cause of delay in German democratic progress.

"Militarism" (58) in Germany?? On the contrary, universal conscription = the most and "almost the sole democratic institution" (Engels), whereas you have "hired troops" (59).... !!

"A middle-European alliance of states" (that, he says, is what Liszt wants)—(+ the Scandinavian countries + Switzerland + Italy + the Balkans + Turkey)—"a new era in world political development" (63)...—"the locomotive of world history" (62) = this war ... "an extraordinary step forward" "in the sense of democracy, world peace, freedom of the peoples and socialism" (82). "Yes, and socialism!" (62)....

Smash tsarism—make peace with France—smash the "coercive rule of the British bourgeoisie" (63)....

The International is now shattered, but it will revive, as it did after 1870 (64).

ARTICLE BY O. B. "EUROPEAN ALLIANCE OF STATES?"

Die Grenzboten, 1915, No. 9 (March 3, 1915).

The article "European Alliance of States?" is an open letter of a certain *O. B.* to Professor *G. Heymans* of Groningen.

This professor, with four other persons, form a committee calling itself "the European alliance of states". This committee has published Heymans's appeal: "To the Citizens of the Belligerent States", to which the open letter in *Die Grenzboten* is a reply.

The open letter, inter alia, raises the question of *c o l o n i e s* (p. 270). "Is their 'internal independence' not also desirable? And are not the Indians, Negroes and Tatars also fully 'equal' with Britons, Frenchmen and Russians?"... (270).

...."The British colonial empire, which is not founded 'on the equality and internal independence' of the colonial peoples any more than the other colonial empires, occupies about one-fifth of the globe. Ought Great Britain to retain this colonial empire until, perhaps, the British have died out in Britain herself, and will Germany not be allowed to

quotation from the committee's appeal

malicious! | obtain a single square metre of this empire, even if in the meantime her population has increased to 200 million?" (271)....

FINANCE CAPITAL IN RUSSIA

Finanz-Archiv (published by Schanz), Berlin, 1915 (32nd year, Vol. I):

Dr. Ernst Schultze, "French Capital in Russia" (pp. 125-33).

"At the end of 1899 there were in Russia *146* foreign concession companies, with a total capital of *765* million rubles or *2,075* million francs. Of this, *792* million francs belonged to France, *734* to Belgium, *261* to Germany and *231* to Great Britain" (125)....

	million francs
France	— — 792
Belgium	— — 734
Germany	— — 261
Great Britain	— — 231
	Σ=2,018

"Out of a world total of 732,000 million francs in securities, such as: state and municipal loans, mortgage deeds, industrial shares and bonds, only 20,000-25,000 million francs are said to have been invested in Russia. The chief holders of these securities were (127):

Σ	Σ						
		United States	110-115	thousand	million	francs	
130		Great Britain	125-130	”	”	”	420
100		France	95-100	”	”	”	
	75	Germany	60- 75				
25		Russia	20- 25				
	22	Austria	20- 22				
+12		Italy	10- 12				
5		Japan	5	”	”	etc.	” [1])
260	97	(my Σ=)	440-484				
+12							
272							

[1]) Axel von Boustedt and David Trietsch, *The Russian Empire*, Berlin, 1910, p. 227.

In France, during 1889-1908, securities were issued to the value of *24,000* million francs: 18,000 million abroad + 6,000 (25 per cent) in France.

In Germany, during 1883-1907, securities were issued to the value of *42,000* million marks: 10,000 million abroad and 32,000 (80 per cent) in Germany.

The French national wealth

(1905)— *204,000* million francs

1914 — about *250,000* " " (Caillaux, who, however, took *200,000* million in calculating income tax).

In 1912, France invested in Russian enterprises in Russia 367,660,000 rubles = about 990 million francs (including 115.5 million rubles in railways; 96.25 million in state enterprises; 70.9 million in trade banks, etc.).

At the present time, foreign capital in Russia is approximately as follows:

France	about 20	thousand	million	*marks*
Germany	4-5.5	"	"	"
Great Britain	0.25	"	"	"
Belgium	0.6	"	"	"
Σ (my)	24-26.35			

The author = a German chauvinist. Predicts gigantic French losses from the war: p. 133.

BARRON'S BOOK ON THE WAR

The Audacious War. By C. W. Barron—"Its Commercial Causes, Its Cost in Money and Men". An *announcement* (not a review) in *The Economist*, March 20, 1915:

"As publisher of *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Boston News Bureau* and *The Philadelphia News Bureau*, Mr. Barron went abroad to get the financial and diplomatic inside of the war, and he got it."

"Send orders to your bookseller or *The Wall Street Journal*. 44. Broad Street, New York City, N.Y. 4s. 6d. (post paid) (Houghton Mifflin Co., Publishers)."

LENZ ON MODERN WAR

Friedrich Lenz, "The Political Prerequisites of Modern War", *Deutsche Rundschau* XLI, 4, 1915, January.

Millions of English square miles (p. 81):

	1862	1888	1912
The British Empire:	4,600	9,300	10,800
The Russian Empire:	7,600	8,600	10,200
The Turkish Empire:	1,800	1,300	700
United States of America:	1,500	3,500	3,700
France with colonies (round figures):	400	1,100	4,800
German Empire with colonies (round figures):	240	600	1,200
Austria-Hungary:	239	241	241
Japan with colonies:	150	150	260
Italy " " :	100	110	700

At the beginning of October 1914 (p. 102):

?	Population (million)	Territory (English sq. miles)	Foreign trade (million marks)
	(1910)	(1912)	(1912)
(German-Austrian)	130	1,440,000	26,750
(Anglo-Franco-Russian)	670	26,090,000	76,750
(Neutral) (round figures)	800	24,470,000	58,000
	1,600	52,000,000	161,500

Population (ibidem, p. 83):

	Germany (prior to 1870 without Alsace-Lorraine)	France (from 1870 without Alsace-Lorraine)
1700	14	21 million
1788	16	25
1816	23	29
1860	36	37
1912	66	40
1925-30	80	40

NOTEBOOK "ϑ"
("THETA")

Contents

ϑ ϑ*R*	ϑ=1-10 ((+Riesser **1-16**))[28]

Hilferding. Finance Capital	[3-6]
The Electric Trust	[7-8]
Statistics of Issues	[9-10]
Riesser	[1-15]

HILFERDING, *FINANCE CAPITAL*[29]

Hilferding, ***Finance Capital*** ("The Recent Phase in the Development of Capitalism"), Moscow, 1912.

> German edition published in 1910 (Volume III of *Marxist Studies*).

p. 13.	"According to E. Mach", "the 'Ego' is only the focus in which the infinite threads of sensation converge.... In exactly the same way money is the node in the network of social connections"....	mishmash incorrect, not "in the same way"
p. 34.	"Ever since Tooke the quantity theory (of money) has been quite rightly regarded as fallacious"....	

incorrect — *p. 54*, note and especially 54-55. Hilferding is wrong here, see *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912, 30th year, Vol. 1.
(According to Hilferding, money enters into exchange without value.)

incorrect — *p. 71*, note. "Only our perception gives things the form of space" (a Kantian).[30]

p. 90-91 (and 91, note).

N.B. — How Marx predicted the domination of the banks over industry (N.B.) (*Capital*, II, p. 79).

93, note. Σ of bills per annum:

	(thous. million marks)	(of which, acceptances by banks)
	1885—12.1	16 per cent
	1905—25.5	31 " "

N.B. — 102 (and note). A large part of international trading transactions are through bills "accepted" by the banks.

105-06. *The role of the banks.*

108. *Three* functions of the banks:
1) intermediary in payments,
2) conversion of inactive into active capital,
3) aggregation of the income of *all* classes in money form and lending it to the capitalist class.

110, note. Excellent study by *Jeidels* and its shortcomings.

112. "International banker" countries:
(1) France, Belgium, Holland
(2) Great Britain
(3) U.S.A. and Germany.

116: *The role of the banks in production* ((chiefly from Jeidels)). *120* idem

154-55, note. Steel Trust and its dividend. — 7% on privileged shares and 2% on ordinary shares: it holds back profits for years, and then suddenly, at a suitable moment, distributes them.

157. A capital of five million controls *39* millions. "Tochtergesellschaft" translated "subsidiary company".
159. Seats on Supervisory Boards (60-70 million income from these throughout Germany)—using connections and acquaintances.
162. *Six* banks—*751* seats on Supervisory Boards (Jeidels).... In 1909 there were 12,000 such seats—197 persons held *2,918* seats. (Cf. **ibidem** *Morgan* in *America*.)
172. Significance of "reconstructions":
(1) a profitable operation;
(2) it makes companies dependent on the banks.
183 (at the end) and *184*.—Replacement of bills of exchange by entries in the bank's books.
199. Pressure of big capital on the Stock Exchange (and a note: the example of Morgan in 1907).
211. — — Banks replace the Stock Exchange....
222. Nature and significance of time bargains.

N.B. **262**. Quotation from *Capital*, III, 2, pp. 144-45 (Russian translation) on *the role of the banks versus socialism* (N.B.).

274. Heavy industry. Outflow of capital difficult (the path to monopoly).
(277-) 278: Tendency of the banks to *monopoly*.
281. *N.B.*: Cunow on cartels in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXII, 2, p. 210.
285. "Combination" = uniting extractive with manufacturing industry.
295: Corporations and "outsiders" (N.B.)....
298: No big industrial enterprise can exist without the help of the bank.
300-01. Engels on the *new type* of protective tariffs and on cartels (*Capital*, III, 1, p. 95).
302-03: Evolution of cartel forms (and 304 *especially*).
308. Concentration of trade (cf. *A. Lee* in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXVII, 2, p. 654).
320, note. Abolishing trade does not reduce the price of the product.
322-23: Merchants—agents—salesmen (N.B.) (and *324*).

331. (Verbal imitation of Marx.)
336. Example of founder's profit: The *Sugar Trust* (N.B.) in America (70 per cent on the *actually invested* capital, 10 per cent on the "watered" capital).*
338-39: **Definition** of *finance capital* (and *341*): finance capital = "capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists" (339).
346: Cartels = "*restriction of competition*".
353: Connection of cartels with *export* of capital.
355: Finance capital and "the organisation of social production" ... (cf. *353* and *354*).
358: With the growth of combination, production for internal needs increases (but for **commodity** production).
362. *Marx* on crises (III, 1, 219-20, Russian translation).
364. Volume II includes "the most brilliant parts of a remarkable work" (the "merit" of *Tugan-Baranovsky*[31]?! in a note).
382. "Schemes" (of Volume II) and the significance of "*proportionality*" ((cf. 426 and + 427)).

447: Universal cartel is "*economically* possible" ("socially and politically unrealisable") ... it would abolish crises.... But "to expect the abolition of crises from individual cartels" = lack of understanding.

Up to Section V: "The Economic Policy of Finance Capital".

N.B. p. 454, note. A quotation from Schulze-Gaevernitz (*British Imperialism*, p. 75): "Way back Sir Robert Peel said: 'We are getting a second Ireland in each of our colonies.'"
474: Export of capital = "export of value intended to produce surplus-value abroad".
487: In new countries, import of capital "arouses the resistance of peoples awakening to national

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 233.—*Ed*.

consciousness".... "Capitalism itself gives subject peoples means of liberation"... "the movement towards independence"....

487. The problem of the national movement in dependent countries (the urge of "subject peoples" for "liberation")....

488. Acceleration of capitalist development in new countries....

491: Struggle of "national groups of banks" for spheres of capital investment (*Paish* and others)....

493: > advantages of capital investment in the colonies.

495. The policy of finance capital (1.2.3.)

495: "The policy of finance capital has a triple aim: first, creation of the widest possible economic territory, (colonies) which, second, must be protected by tariff walls against foreign competition, (protectionism) and be converted, third, into a sphere of exploitation for national monopolist associations"... (monopolies)

N.B.: 484: *polemic* on *immigration* in *Die Neue Zeit*, 25th year, 2 (1907)

505. "The most important function of diplomacy now is that of agency of finance capital"....

506. *Karl Emil* on *German* imperialism. *Die Neue Zeit*, XXVI, 1.

510. The national state.

511. Finance capital seeks domination, not freedom.

512-13. The nation and imperialism.

513-14. Oligarchy in place of democracy.

567. "The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, can only be socialism, not free trade." N.B.
The restoration of free trade = "a *reactionary ideal*" (N.B.)

Finance capital = bank capital dominating industry.

[is it not sufficient to say: "finance capital = *bank* capital"?]

***Three main factors*:**

Definite degree of development and growth of *big* capital.... The role of the *banks*. (Concentration and socialisation.)	**corporations in America.**
Monopoly capital (control of so large a part of a particular industry that competition is replaced by *monopoly*)....	**(America and Germany)**
Division of the world.... (Colonies and spheres of influence)....	**Table—and the example of Argentina**

N.B. *Hilferding*: in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912 (30th year, Vol. 1), p. 556... "the endeavour typical of every capitalist monopoly to make its economic monopoly indestructible by backing it with a monopoly of natural resources"....

THE ELECTRIC TRUST

The electrical industry trust:

"The Path of the Electric Trust" by *Kurt Heinig* (Berlin). (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1912) (June 28, 1912), 30th year, Vol. 2, p. 474.)

An excellent illustration of imperialism*:

In *1907*, an *agreement* was concluded between the A.E.G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft) and the G.E.C. (General Electric Company)

A.E.G. Concern
G.E.C. Trust

on division of the world.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 247-48.—*Ed.*

G.E.C.—U.S.A. and Canada.

A.E.G.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, the Balkans.

		Turnover (mill. marks)	No. of employees	Net profit (mill. marks)
G.E.C. (*U.S.A.*)	1907	252	28,000	35.4
	1910	298	32,000	45.6
A.E.G. (*Germany*)	1907	216	30,700	14.5
	1911	362	60,800	21.7

298+262=660 million marks

Special (secret) agreements on "*subsidiary companies*". "In addition, mutual exchange of inventions and experiments!" (p. 475). N.B.

The number of **companies** (mostly joint-stock companies) in which the A.E.G. "has a controlling interest" is **175-200** (p. 484). Of these, the six chief companies have a capital of about *750 million* marks, while the total capital of all of these companies is *probably* about *1,500 million* marks.*

The number of "manufacturing companies" is *16*

production of rubber—cables—quartz lamps—insulators—railway signals—motor cars—typewriters—aircraft, etc.

Production of raw material, etc., by the same enterprise is characteristic of modern industry. N.B.

1) The number of *direct* A.E.G. agencies abroad = 34 (of which 12 are joint-stock companies)**

1)	1. St. Petersburg and Warsaw	7. Rumania	
	2. Lisbon	8. Vienna	
	3. Christiania	9. Milan	Altogether in *ten* countries
	4. Stockholm	10. Copenhagen	
	5. Brussels	South-West Africa	
	6. Paris	(((colony?)))	

* Ibid., p. 230.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 247.—*Ed.*

The two firms work jointly*

	General Electric Co. (G.E.C.)	Westinghouse Co.
America	Thomson-Houston Co. (merges with the Edison Co. ↓ In Europe it establishes the firm:	⇄ *Edison* Co. ↓ in Europe it establishes the firm: French Edison Co.
Germany	*Union Electric Co.* (Union-Elektriziäts-Gesellschaft) merges with the A.E.G.	↓ the French firm transfers its patents to the German firm: Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (=A.E.G.)
	Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (A.E.G.)	Siemens and Halske-Schuckert

The two firms work jointly

⏟	=	denotes a *merger*
⇄		merger
→		establishment of a new firm (to which the arrow points) by the old one.

...“there are no other electrical companies in the world *completely* independent, at least, of these two (A.E.G. and G.E.C.)” (p. 474)....** N.B.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 247.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*



STATISTICS OF ISSUES

N.B. "These statistics—*in contrast to the usual statistics of issues*—comprise not the securities issued in the various countries, but the credits received by these countries. Thus, for example, the Russian loan taken up in London and Paris is listed under Russia, not Great Britain and France.

Conrad's *Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik* (1913, p. 783)
Total issues for 1883-1912

(thousand million marks)

1883—3.4	1893—4.9	1903—14.8
4.0	14.4	11.7
2.7	5.3	15.5
5.4	13.5	21.5
4.1	7.8	12.4
6.4	8.5	17.2
10.3	9.2	19.9
6.6	9.6	21.4
6.2	8.0	15.8
1892—2.0	1902—17.8	1912—16.4
Σ=51.1	99.0	166.6

(My)

Total **Issues**

53.0

This is the total for the world.
By countries, p. 782, for 1910, 1911 and 1912
Total for these three years

(thousand million marks)

Germany and colonies	7.2
Great Britain	
and colonies	5.2
+ South Africa	0.4
+ Canada	3.0
(My) Σ	8.6

* Ibid.—*Ed.*

		thousand mill. marks
	U.S.A.	10.6
(including Egypt)	Great Britain and colonies	8.8
	Germany and colonies	7.2
(including Morocco)	France and colonies	4.9
		29.5*
	Russia	3.2
	Austria-Hungary	2.1
	Belgium and colonies	1.3
	Japan	1.7
		8.3
My **total:**		
4 big countries		29.5
4 secondary countries		8.3
rest of America		7.0
14 European countries		4.91
China+Persia		0.7
		50.41

France and colonies	4.8	
Austria-Hungary	2.1	
Russia	3.2	
Belgium	1.0	
—her Congo	0.3	
(My) Σ	1.3	
Holland and colonies	0.6	
Luxemburg	0.01	
Spain	0.6	
Portugal and colonies	0.1	
Denmark	0.2	
Sweden	0.1	Σ= =4.91
Norway	0.1	
Switzerland	0.7	
Italy	0.7	
Rumania	0.4	
Bulgaria	0.1	
Serbia	0.2	
Greece	0.5	
Turkey	0.6	
U.S.A.	10.6	
rest of America	7.0	
Egypt	0.2	
Morocco	0.1	10.3*
China	0.6	
Japan	1.7	
Persia	0.1	
ΣΣ =	52.2	
	16.4	
	15.8	
	21.4	
but exact ΣΣ =	53.6	

From the literature N.B.: *Harms's Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (six volumes already published).

* So given in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

(My) summary from Conrad's *Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik*.

On the statistics of cartels: *Number of cartels* ((in Germany)) (pp. 903-06)

	newly established	continued or enlarged	dissolved
1913	38	34	15
1914	31	38	6

My calculation increase or decrease of **instances:**

+72—15=57
+69— 6=63

RIESSER, *GERMAN BIG BANKS AND THEIR CONCENTRATION*

Dr. Riesser, *German Big Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with Germany's Economic Development*, *3rd* edition, *Jena*, *1910*.

(Some figures, but not all, added from the *fourth* edition, *1912*.)

The *German electrical industry* prior to 1900 (before the *1900 crisis*, caused largely by *over-production in the electrical* industry) (Riesser, *3rd edition*, p. 542 et seq.)*:

Seven groups (with 27 (sic!!) individual companies):

No. of banks *behind* each group

Community of interests 1902-03. Fusion *1904*

11— I. Siemens and Halske group (4 companies) ←
8— II. A.E.G. group (4 companies)
8—III. Schuckert group (4 companies) ←

1903 merger Siemens-Schuckert group

1908 "Co-operation"—establishment of Elektro-Treuhand-Gesellschaft with a capital of 30,000,000 marks

6—IV. Union-Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft group (2 companies)

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 246.—*Ed*.

9— V. Helios group ("went into liquidation": p. 582, *4th* edition) (5 companies)
8— VI. Lahmeyer group, in 1910 majority of shares held by A.E.G. (p. 583, 4th edition) (2 companies)
2—VII. Kummer group—failed in 1900 (7 companies)

many repetitions 7 groups

[Total companies = 28, and not 27 as given by Riesser, p. 542 (p. *582*, 4th edition). On p. 568 he, too, says: 28 companies)

Results of concentration process (p. 568 et seq.).

	Now
"The most modern of our industries" is the *electrical* ... *seven* groups, with a total of 28 companies belonging to concerns....	2
Chemical industry ... *two* chief groups (see below).	2
Mining industry—two syndicates (Steel Association; Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate)....	2
Shipping—two companies (Hamburg-America Steamship Co. (Hapag); and North-German Lloyd, "which are connected with each other and with an Anglo-American trust by a series of agreements")....	2
Banking—five groups ("embracing in all *41* banks belonging to concerns").	5
	13 my total

18 groups, my total

Increase in the *number* of common-interest associations between big and provincial banks (p. 505).

Growth of concentration (p. 542, 4th edition):

1881—	1	1908—	32 (41)
1895—	2	1911—	26 (46)
1902—	16		

(Riesser, p. 547 et seq.)

German chemical industry
(concentration)*

					Share capital (my totals)
I	Farbwerke, formerly Meister, Lucius & Brüning in *Höchst*-am-Main	(Share capital—20 loan capital—10) million marks	("Dual alliance") 1904 "association" Exchange of shares, interlocking directorships	("Triple alliance") 1908 (exchange of shares)	20
	Leopold Cassella and Co. in Frankfurt-am-Main	(share capital—20 loan capital—10)			20
	Kalle & Co. (in Biebrich-on-Rhine (3.2)				3
					43
II	Badische Anilin-und Soda-Fabrik in Ludwigshafen (share capital 21 million marks).		1904 association	1905 "Triple alliance")	21
	Farbenfabrik, formerly Friedrich Bayer and Co. in Elberfeld (21 million marks).				21
	Aktiengesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation in Treptow near Berlin (share capital 9 million marks).				

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 204-05.—*Ed.*

A "coming together" of groups I and II has already begun in the form of "agreements" on prices, etc.	43% 43% 14%	9
	100% profit	51

p. *560* et seq.: "Mining industry."

Two names: *August Thyssen* and *Hugo Stinnes*. Their gigantic and growing role (in the coal and iron industries).[32]

> ..."The common-interest agreement concluded on January 1, 1905 between the Gelsenkirchen Bergwerks, the Aachen Hütten-Verein Rote Erde and Thyssen's Schalker Gruben und Hütten-Verein united in a joint enterprise a number of competing banks, viz. the Discontogesellschaft, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, but, at the same time, further increased the power of Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen, who became members of the 'joint committee' of the new association" (p. 563) (p. 603 in the fourth edition).

(p. 577) idem, p. 624, fourth edition.

1882—28 banks with 50 or > employees: 2,697 employees —11.8% of the total

1895—66 banks with 50 or > employees: 7,802 employees —21.6%

+ 189.3% { up to 5 employees + 59.9%
6-50 employees + 34.5% }

1907 probably about ⅓

Deutsche Bank 1907—4,439 bank employees (p. 578)
1908—4,860 " "

"I estimate the number of bank officials in the *six* big Berlin banks at *18,000* at the end of 1910" (p. 625, fourth edition).

Riesser's book ends with a polemic against the socialists, upholds the official view and preaches harmony (in general, *Riesser is like that*):

Even the predicted socialisation "has not materialised" (p. 585). { ha-ha!! }

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p. 582 (p. 629, fourth edition):

"**Banks and the Stock Exchange**" (Riesser's italics):

"As regards the effect of the process of concentration on the functions and structure of the *Stock Exchange*, it is a fact that, with the influx of commissions to the big banks the latter to a certain extent *take over* the *functions of the Stock exchange* by *counter-balancing* purchase and sale commissions, handing over to the Stock Exchange only commissions that do *not* counter-balance one another. This applies equally to trade in securities, i.e., to the *capital market*, and discounting operations, i.e., to the *money market*.

"As a result, the *Stock Exchange*, already greatly disorganised by the Stock-Exchange laws, is increasingly deprived of the materials indispensable for correctly fixing current prices. It is thus *further weakened*, and this can have very dangerous consequences, especially at critical times, as bad examples have proved (*note*: in the recent period one can point to the day of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war).

"It follows also that the Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for national economy as a whole and for the circulation of securities in particular—that of being not only a most exact *measuring-rod*, but also an 'almost automatic *regulator* of the economic movements which converge on it'"* (*Note*. Quotations from Riesser: *The Need for Revision of the Stock-Exchange Law*, Berlin,

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 219.—*Ed*.

1901), and that it is proving less and less able, to express, and control, "through price fluctuations, general public opinion on the credit-worthiness and administration of the majority of states, municipalities, joint-stock companies and corporations.

N.B.

"In this way, Stock-Exchange *establishment and quotation of current prices*, which previously gave, as far as this is attainable, a faithful picture of 'economic processes nowhere else summed so reliably, and nowhere else so recognisable in their totality', consequently, a picture of *supply* and *demand*, must now lose both in accuracy and in stability and reliability, which is extremely regrettable in the public interest.

"In addition, it is to be feared that this tendency, which increasingly leads to *exclusion of intermediaries* (brokers, etc.), may produce an ever sharper *contradiction between the banks and the Stock Exchange*, and this may be very serious. This contradiction, moreover, would be expressed not only in a certain tension, already noticeable between the banks and other circles interested in the Stock Exchange, but also in the latter's most fundamental field of activity, namely, the establishment of current prices.

"Actually, today even among experts the concepts bank and Stock Exchange, which some consider, quite wrongly, to be completely equivalent, [*n o t e*: that is the view of *Eschenbach* in the *Transactions of the Union for Social Politics* of September 16, 1903: *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, Vol. CXIII] are in many cases termed direct opposites, which is also quite wrong" (note: cf. *Ernst Loeb* in the *Nationalzeitung* of April 18, 1904, No. 244) (p. 583) (p. 630, fourth edition).

Riesser (3rd edition 1910), p. 499: Increase in capital of the biggest (in 1908) banks

Germany*	1870	1908	1911
1. Deutsche Bank	15	200	200
2. Dresdner Bank	9.6	180	200
3. Discontogesellschaft	30	170	200
4. Darmstädter Bank	25.8	154	160
Σ (million marks)	80.4	704	
Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein	15.6	145	145
Berliner Handels-gesellschaft	16.8	110	110
ΣΣ =	112.8	959	1,015

France	1870	1908
1. Crédit Lyonnais	20	250
2. Comptoir National	50	150
3. Crédit industriel	15	100
4. Société Générale	60	300
Σ (million francs)	145	800
= mill. marks	116	640

three biggest banks: Germany: 54.6 — 550 (marks)
France: 130 — 700 (francs)
(104 — 560 (marks))

two biggest banks: Germany: 24.6 — 380 (marks)
France: 80 — 550 (francs)
(64) — (440)

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p. 367 | idem p. 398 |

Letters received and dispatched (number)**

1852	6,135	6,292	
1870	85,800	87,513	(Discontogesellschaft)
1880	204,877	208,240	{big Berlin bank}
1890	341,318	452,166	
1900	533,102	626,043	

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 215.—*Ed.*
** *Ibid.*, p. 214.—*Ed.*

Riesser, 3rd edition, p. 693 (Supplement VIII) (p. 745, 4th edition):

Development of Concentration Within Individual Big Banks and Banking Concerns.

The *eight* big Berlin banks had*:

At end of year	Branches (offices and branches) in Germany		Deposit banks and exchange offices		Commandite operations		Constant holdings in German joint-stock banks		Total establishments	
	#		#		#		#		#	
1895	16	18 (5)	14	23 (12)	11	13 (—)	1	2 (—)	42	56 (17)
1896	18	20 (5)	18	27 (12)	11	14 (—)	1	2 (—)	48	63 (17)
1900	21	25 (5)	40	53 (17)	11	12 (—)	8	9 (5)	80	99 (27)
1902	29	33 (7)	72	87 (35)	10	11 (—)	16	16 (5)	127	147 (47)
1905	42	46 (8)	110	149 (44)	8	12 (1)	34	34 (11)	194	241 (64)
1908	—	69 (10)	—	264 (73)	—	12 (2)	—	97 (31)	—	442 (116)
1911	104	104 (9)	276	276 (93)	7	7 (2)	63	63 (15)	450	450 (119)

p. 747
4th edition

[N.B. The 3rd edition deals with *eight* banks, the 4th edition with *six*.]

Figures from the *4th* edition, p. *745* (for *six* banks: Darmstädter Bank; Berliner Handelsgesellschaft; Deutsche Bank; Discontogesellschaft; Dresdner Bank and Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein).

(*in brackets, figures for* the Deutsche Bank)

N.B. Deutsche Bank. **Turnover:**

(million marks)

1870	1875	1885	1895	1905	1908	1911
239	5,500	15,100	37,900	77,200	94,500	112,100

These *eight* banks include, firstly, **five** banks which form "groups": Darmstädter Bank (Bank für Handel und Industrie), Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank and Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein,—and then the *three* following banks: Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Commerz- und Disconto-Bank, National Bank für Deutschland.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 213.—*Ed.*

Here are these "groups" [common-interest associations] of the (five) banks and their "capital strength" (p. *484* et seq.).

							Swallowed up	
			banks	(p. 520)	Million marks	Million marks	private bank offices	banks
1. Group	D.B.	Deutsche Bank . .	12	929.5	1,266.4[1])	786.8	1,045.4[1])	31	21
2. "	D.G.	Disconto-gesellschaft . .	6		662.6	—	564.7	23	8
3. "	Dr.B.	Dresdner Bank	8		321.3	—	285.7	7	1
4. "	S.BV	Schasffhausenscher Bankverein . .	4		209.9	—	278.5	11	6
5. "	Dm.B. my abbreviations	Darmstädter Bank (Bank für Handel und Industrie)	5		260.6	—	297.4	17	7
5.			35		2,720.7 {2,750 million}		ΣΣ 2,471.7 i.e. almost 2,500 *million* marks	89* p. 500	43

N.B. This includes *only* share capital and reserves, i.e., only the banks' *own* money, *not borrowed* money.

1) This includes "associated banks".

* In the manuscript the total "89 private bank offices" is connected by an arrow with the same figure in the following table ("Concern Banks") (see p. 352 of this volume).—*Ed.*

p. 537

on September 30, 1911

Swallowed up:

	Private bank offices	banks
Dm.B.	8	3
D.B.	45	30
D.G.	61	11
Dr.B.	2	1
	116	45

p. 697

41 banks in concerns of the five groups

41 concern banks belonging to the five big-bank groups had, on December 31, 1908:

			on October 1, 1911
branches		241	285
agencies		325	377
commandite banks		18	21
deposit banks		102	126
swallowed up	private bank offices	89	116
	banks	43	45
common-interest associations based on possession and exchange of shares		16	20

In all, the big banks and their concerns, taken together, had by December 31, 1908, swallowed up 164 private bank offices + 60 banks; *N.B.* (p. 500).

In Great Britain in 1899 there were 12 banks with *100* or more branches; altogether there were *2,304* branches ("Niederlassung").

In 1901 there were 21 banks with *100* or more branches; altogether there were *6,672* branches (p. 521) (p. 558). "At the beginning of 1905, a single bank, the London City and Midland Bank, had *447* branches, i.e., 257 *more* than the big Berlin banks and *52* provincial banks affiliated with them at the end of *1904*; on December 31, 1907 (#), according to *The Economist*, the British Joint-stock banks, then numbering only 74 (exclusive of colonial and foreign banks), of which 35 had the right to issue banknotes, had not less than *6,809* branches and sub-branches" (522). N.B.

Riesser continued

(#) Fourth edition (p. 558): "On December 31, 1908, deposit banks in Great Britain and Ireland, numbering then 63, had not less than *6,801* branches and sub-branches. Towards the end of 1910 the number of branches was *7,151*. At this time, *four* banks in England and Wales had more than *400* branches each, viz.:

London City and Midland Bank . .	689 (315 in 1900)
Lloyds Bank	589 (311 " ")
Barclay & Co.	497 (269 " ")
Capital and Counties Bank	447 (185 " ")

"Four other banks had more than 200 branches each and eleven (20, including Scottish and Irish) had more than 100 each"* (p. 559).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 213.—*Ed.*

In *France*, the number of agencies and branches (p. 522) (p. 559) was:

Banks	1894 Paris and suburbs		1894 Provinces	1908 Paris and suburbs		1908 Provinces	1908 Abroad (and Algeria)
Crédit Lyonnais	27	—	96	62	—	175	20
Comptoir d'Escompte	15	—	24	49	—	150	—
Société Générale . .	37	—	141	88	—	637	2

As regards **colonial** *banks* (nearly all founded by the Berlin big banks), Riesser's summary is as follows (additions for 1910 from the fourth edition, p. *375**):

N.B.

"At the end of the nineties there were only four *German overseas* banks; in 1903 there were six with 32 branches, and at the beginning of *1906* there were already *13*, with not less than 100,000,000 marks and more than *70* branches.

"This, however, is relatively insignificant in comparison with the successes of other countries in this field: already in 1904, *Great Britain*, for example, had *32* (1910: 36) colonial banks with headquarters in London and *2,104* (1910: 3,358) with headquarters in the colonies, and also *18* (1907: *30*) (1910: 36) other British banks abroad with *175* (2,091) branches. Already in 1904-05, *France* had 18 colonial and foreign banks with *104* branches; *Holland* had 16 overseas banks with *68* branches" (p. 346).

1910		1904
Thus:	Germany.	13— 70
72—5,449	Great Britain	50— 2,279
	France.	18— 104
	Holland	16— 68**

The first figure shows the number of colonial and foreign banks in general, the second—the number of their branches (or of individual banks in the colonies).

* Round brackets in the text indicate additions made by Lenin from the fourth edition of the book (p. 375). They were written in between the lines, above or below the figures to which they refer.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 245.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"Supplement VII" (p. 666 et seq.) contains a list of companies and banks in the big-bank "concerns", from which I take **foreign** banks:

Sphere (location of branches)	(Number of branches)	Location of bank	Name of bank	Capital *million* marks (etc.)	*Berlin big* bank which founded it or has holdings in it
	(—)	Amsterdam	Die Amsterdamsche Bank	6 florins	Darmstädter Bank
China, Japan, India, etc.	(12)	Shanghai	Deutsch-Asiatische Bank	7.5 taels	Darmstädter Bank+Berliner Handelsgesellschaft+Deutsche Bank+Discontogesellschaft+Dresdner Bank+Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein
Italy	(33)	Milan	Banca Commerciale Italiana	105 lire	Darmstädter Bank+Berliner Handelsgesellschaft+Deutsche Bank+Discontogesellschaft+Dresdner Bank
(? Belgium)	(—)	Brussels	Banque internationale de Bruxelles	25 francs	Darmstädter Bank+Berliner Handelsgesellschaft+Discontogesellschaft+Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein
(? Great Britain)	(—)	London	Bankers Trading Syndicate	£ 0.1	Darmstädter Bank
Rumania	(—)	Bucharest	Banka Marmorosch Blank	10 lei	Darmstädter Bank+Berliner Handelsgesellschaft
(? America)	(—)	?	Amerika-Bank	25 marks	Darmstädter Bank

Continuation

Sphere (location of branches)	(Number of branches)	Location of bank	Name of bank	Capital *million* marks (etc.)	*Berlin big* bank which founded it or has holdings in it
(?Great Britain)	(—)	London	London and Hanseatic Bank	£0.4	Common- und Disconto-Bank
(South America, etc.)	(22)	Berlin	Deutsche Überseeische Bank	20 marks	Deutsche Bank
East Africa	(?)	Berlin	Aktiengesellschaft für Überseeische Bauunternehmungen	2 marks	Deutsche Bank
Central America	(?)	Berlin	Zentral Amerika-Bank	10 marks	Deutsche Bank
Mexico	(2)	Mexico	Mexikanische Bank für Handel und Industrie	16 pesos	Deutsche Bank
Polynesia	(2)	Hamburg	Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Südseeinseln	2 3/4 marks	Discontogesellschaft
New Guinea	(?)	(?)	Neu-Guinea-Kompagnie	6 marks	”
Brazil	(5)	Hamburg	Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland	10 marks	”

Chile and Central America	(9)	Hamburg	Bank für Chile und Deutschland	10 marks	Discontogesellschaft
Rumania	(2)	Bucharest	Banca generala Romana	10 lei	"
Belgium	(?)	Antwerp	Compagnie commerciale belge	5 francs	"
German Africa	(15)	(?)	Deutsch-Afrika Bank	1 marks	"
Bulgaria	(?)	Sofia	Banque de Crédit	3 leva	"
German West Africa	(4)	Berlin	Deutsch-Westafrikanische Bank	1 marks	Dresdner Bank
Asia Minor, Turkey, Salonica, etc.	(12)	Berlin	Deutsche Orientbank	16 marks	Dresdner Bank + National-Bank für Deutschland + Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein
South America	(3)	Berlin	Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank	20 marks	Dresdner Bank + Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein

Connection Between the ***Banks and Industrial*** Enterprises (p. 383) (***according to Jeidels***) (1895-1903)

Number of industrial stock issues by years										
	p. 307				Number of companies for which these stock issues were made	Bank offices at industrial enterprises (p. 284)	(p. 306)	(p. 463) Number of industrialists on bank supervisory boards [1]	
p. 413	Σ for seven years								
1895-1910	1904-1910	My abbreviations		Number of industrial stock issues	p. 414 1895-1910	(1903-04)	(1911)	(1908)	(1910) (p. 501)
424	204—	Dr. B.	Dresdner Bank	—220	—181	—368	—191	—504	—11	—8
361	174—	S. BV.	Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein . .	—187	—207	—364	—211	—290	—19	—17
312	142—	B. HG.	Berliner Handelsgesellschaft . .	—170	—149	—281	—95	—153	—15	—13
302	151—	D. G.	Discontogesellschaft	—151	—154	—290	—111	—362	—4	—2
456	306—	D. B.	Deutsche Bank . .	—150	—139	—419	—250	—488	—4	—5
314	166—	Dm. B.	Darmstädter Bank	—148	—140	—285	—161	—313	—4	—6*

[1]) Including the directors of the *Krupp* firm (Dr. B.); *Hapag* and *Norddeutscher Lloyd* and Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks Aktiengesellschaft (D. Ges.); *Hibernia*; *Harpener* Aktiengesellschaft, *Oberschlesische* Eisenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft and others (B. H. Ges.), etc.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 220-21.—*Ed.*

(Apparently incomplete data) Number of overseas banks founded by the big banks (list in *Riesser*, p. 327 et seq.) (p. 354 et seq.)

Σ		D.B.	D.G.	Dr. B.	Dm.B.	B.HG.	S.BV.	N. B. f. D.	Total
11	1880-89	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	11
22	1890-99	4	6	2	2	2	4	2	22
24	1900-04	3	3	1	—	—	—	1	8
	1905, 1906-08	2	3	5	1	1	3	1	16

Not the whole decade, up to 1908-09.

R. E. May (in *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 1899, p. 271 et seq.) (p. 83) distribution of national income in Germany			(p. 82) data of Finance Minister Rheinbaben Prussia 1908			(pp. 99-100) in Germany	
	Number of people (mill.)	Income thous. mill. marks	Number of people (mill.)	%	*Tax* mill. marks	%	Number of joint-stock companies	Their capital (thous. mill. marks)
up to 900 marks	18 1/3	12 3/4	17.9	47.22	0			
900-3,000	3 2/3	6 1/2	16.2	42.54	83.7	34.26	1883	1,311 —3.9
> 3,000	1/3	5 3/4	1.9	5.50		66%*	1896	3,712 —6.8
	Σ= 22 1/3	25	36.0	95.26			1900	5,400 6.8 (7.8)
Gainfully employed population		N.B.	> 9,500 marks *0.87%* of population *43%* of tax				1908	6,249 —9.4

* So given by Riesser.—*Ed.*

Riesser gives list, not table. Supplement IV

Number of Industrial and Commercial *Companies* with Bank *Representation on Supervisory Boards*
Industries:

Banks	Mining, iron and steel, salt works	Quarrying	Metalworking	Machines and instruments [1]	Chemical	Soap, oil, etc.	Textile and leather	Paper	Pulp	Food	Trade	Insurance	Transport	Foreign companies	Building	Hotels and Restaurants	Rubber	Art products	Plantation companies	Exhibitions	Total
Darmstädter Bank	9	4	2	15	3	2	5	2	1	7	24	3	9	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Berliner Handels-gesellschaft	18	1	8	10	4	1	—	—	—	3	16	—	9	17	1	—	—	—	—	—	
Commerz-und Disconto-Bank	1	2	2	7	1	—	1	—	—	3	7	2	3	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	
Deutsche Bank	13	1	3	24	1	4	6	1	—	3	28	8	6	13	2	—	1	2	—	—	116
Discontogesell-schaft	13	2	2	8	5	2	—	—	—	1	29	2	4	21	—	—	—	—	2	1	
6) Dresdner Bank	10	2	3	14	1	—	2	1	—	2	29	3	11	8	—	1	—	—	—	—	
National-Bank für Deutschland	13	4	3	18	2	3	1	—	—	7	21	1	9	6	2	—	—	4	2	—	
8) Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein	18	2	4	15	2	1	4	—	—	1	20	1	16	6	3	—	—	1	—	—	
Total	95	18	27	111	19	13	19	4	1	27	174	21	67	78	9	2	1	7	4	1	
	140			+111			+83				+174		+166				+24				=698

[1]) including *electrical* industry.

"According to Board of Trade estimates for 1898, *Great Britain's* total *income* from *bank and other operations* amounted during that year to £18 million (i.e., about 432 million kronen)" (p. 399) (p. 431).... "'Allegedly' more than 6,000 million marks of European annual overseas trade payments go through Great Britain".... [p. 431, 4th edition]

income from banking operations !!! 450 million francs.

Britain's annual *income from shipping* is *1,800* million marks; *Germany's* is 200-*300* million marks (p. 400) (p. 432 idem).

1907 poll on bank employees in Germany: replies from 1,247 firms with 24,146 employees (p. 579) (p. 626)

	Number	Age of employees (years)	Average salary (marks)	Average salary, all private employees
264 joint-stock banks	16,391	20-39	1,459-3,351	1,467-2,380
708 private banks	5,938	40-54	3,638-4,044	2,413-2,358
275 co-operative banks	1,817	55-70	3,899-2,592	2,264-1,879

"The number of *clearing* accounts increased from 3,245 in 1876 to 24,821 (24,982) in 1908 (1910), but, apart from state bank offices, they are mainly handled by *big commercial* and *industrial houses*, so that clearing operations by the State Bank have retained a *somewhat plutocratic character*" (122) (p. 131).

N.B.

In 1907, the average amount of each account (State Bank) = 24,116 marks. Turnover = 260,600 *million* marks, 354,100 million in 1910 (p. 132). The postal cheque turnover (1909) = 23,847 owners of accounts and 49,853 in 1910, and their property = 94 million marks (p. 132).

Total Clearing House Transactions (p. 123)
(*thousand million* marks)

	1884	1908	1910
Germany	12.1	45.9	54.3
France	3.3	21.3	23.7
Great Britain	118.5	260.1	299
U.S.A.	143.2	366.2	422

In Germany cheques and cheque-clearing operations are less developed than endorsements

Total turnover of the State Bank in Germany
1908 = *305,250* million marks
1910 = 354,100 " "

Number of **cartels** in Germany
(p. 137) 1896 about 250
(p. 149) 1905 " 385

involving about 12,000 firms*

Deposits (in all banks) and in *savings banks*, *thousand million* marks (pp. 162-63)

	Germany			
including savings	9	1900	about	10
bank deposits	13	1906		15.5
	1909—15½			
Great Britain		(1903-05)	— —	10.5
U.S.A.		(1905)	— —	47 (59 in 1909)
France (only bank deposits)		(1905)	— —	4
Germany (only bank deposits)		1900	— —	1
		1906	— —	2.5
Great Britain (only bank deposits)		(1905)	— —	6.25
U.S.A. (only bank deposits)			— —	15

N.B. "The above data show that, even now, German deposits are not of major importance, compared with those of Great Britain and the U.S.A., and appear equally to lag considerably behind those of France" (164) (idem 177).

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 202.—*Ed.*

Riesser, p. 354 (p. 384):

"The progress of the preceding period (1848-70), which had not been exactly slow, compares with the rapidity with which the whole of Germany's national economy, and with it German banking, progressed during this period (1870-1905) in about the same way as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days compares with the speed of the present-day automobile ... which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but also the occupants of the car"....* || N.B.

And alongside the above, in the very next sentence, *Riesser*, this bourgeois vulgarian (essentially an out-and-out philistine) and lackey of the money-bags, sees the guarantee of "public security" and "real progress" in the "*greatest virtue*" of the leader: *moderation*!!!

And on the next page (355—p. 385) he admits that banks are ... "enterprises which, by their very functions and development, '*are not of a purely private-business character*',[1]) but are more and more outgrowing *the sphere of purely private-business regulation*".**

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[1]) From Riesser's speech as president of the first all-German bankers' congress in Frankfurt-am-Main, September 19-20, 1902.

But this admission does not prevent this bourgeois idiot from writing:

"The other consequence, too, predicted by the socialists, of the process of concentration, that it is bound to lead finally to the *socialisation of the means of production*, which the socialists aim at and which is to be realised in the 'state hail of the future', has not come true in Germany, and is hardly likely to come true later on"*** (p. 585) (p. 633). || !!ha-ha!! "refuta-tion...."

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* Ibid., p. 300.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 302.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid.—*Ed.*

(The Deutsche Bank **alone** has a *turnover of 94,500 million* marks (p. 361) (112,100 million in 1910, p. 391), has connections with a group of 12 banks, controls a capital of *1,000 million* marks—the capital of this group and "affiliated" banks—has swallowed up *52* banks, has 116 branches, bank offices, etc., in Germany—has seats on the Supervisory Boards of *120* trading and industrial companies, etc. And this is *not* "socialisation"!!)

Deutsche Bank:

Own capital = 200 million marks + 100 million reserves
turnover = 94,500 million marks
gross profit = 55 million marks (1908) (p. 352)
= 62.9 " " (1910) (p. 382).

The number of bank employees in the **Deutsche Bank** was *4,860* (1908)—p. *578* ((in 1895, there were 7,802 employees in *66* banks with 50 or more employees, ibidem)).

In discussing merchant shipping and its development in Germany on p. 114 et seq., Riesser notes the following:

H.-A.P.A.-G. (Hamburg-America), capital (1908) 125 million marks (+76 million in bonds), 162 ships (value 185.9 million marks).

North German Lloyd, capital (1908) 125 million marks (+76 million in bonds), 127 ships (value 189.1 million marks). 125 + 76 = 201.

> "In *1902-03*, both these companies concluded essentially identical agreements with the *International Mercantile Marine Co.*, founded by American bankers and shipowners on January 1, 1903, with a capital of 120 million dollars (= 480 million marks), and embracing nine American and British lines" (p. 115). This is the so-called *Morgan trust*.
>
> Content of the agreement: division of profits and **division of the world** (German companies would not compete in Anglo-American freight traffic; agreement stipulated which ports were to be used by each, etc., etc.). A *joint control committee* was set up. The agreement was for twenty years (terminable after a year's notice).

It was to be annulled in the event of war (p. 116, end) (p. 125, 4th edition).* And this is not "socialisation"!!

"As regards the *Reichsbank*, according to the information given by the Bank Enquiry Commission (p. 179), on September 1, 1906, the number of German firms and individuals *generally solvent* in their *dealings with bills of exchange* was *70,480*":

viz.:

a) merchants and trading companies	29,020	= 41%	N.B. insignificant number solvent
b) industrialists and industrial companies	21,887	= 31	
c) agriculturists and agricultural craft and factory enterprises . . .	9,589	= 14	
d) co-operatives of all kinds	883	= 1	
e) rentiers, artisans and similar craftsmen . .	9,101	= 13	
	70,480	100	

p. 194 idem

(Düsseldorfer) Stahlwerkverband founded March 30, 1904 (for three years and prolonged on April 30, 1907 for a further five years). Its output in 1904 was 7.9 million tons (p. 141) (p. 153).

On November 28, 1904, it concluded an agreement on *export of rails* between Great Britain 53.5%, Germany 28.83%, France and Belgium 17.67% (+ France 4.8-6.4%. ΣΣ = 104.8, 106.4%) (p. 147) (p. 159).

Rail cartel — Now, after the *United States Steel Corporation joined the cartel*, Germany's share = 21%

Cartel for sale of girders (export of girders)—shares:

Germany	73.45%
France	11.50%
Belgium	15.05%

Division of the world

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 251.—*Ed.*

"In February 1909 there was formed also the Internationaler *Zinkhüttenverband* (p. 159) at first until December 31, 1910, and afterwards prolonged, evidently for three years. There are three groups (according to the geographical location of the factories). Group A—all German and some Belgian plants, group B—ten Belgian, French and Spanish plants, and group C—British plants. Out of the total European output, about 513,000 *tons* in 1908, Germany's share at that time was put at 226.9, Belgium's—165, France's and Spain's together—55.8, Great Britain's—54.5. Member plants accounted for about 92 per cent of the total European output.

N.B.

"Under recent arrangements member companies can increase production at will, irrespective of fixed production quotas, with the proviso, however, that if stocks at a definite date (March 31, 1911, is the initial date) are 50,000 tons or more, then, under definite conditions, output must be cut by a certain percentage, in accordance with the company's production quota" (p. 160, 4th edition).

N.B.

Banks unite into groups (or consortiums) for especially large-scale undertakings:

I. a) Prussian Consortium—in 1909 28 banks (p. 310).
b) State Loan Consortium— 29 " (p. 311).
c) Rothschild group—in 1909 13 " (p. 312) (including the three Rothschild firms—Vienna, London and Paris).
2. Group for Asiatic business operations,
etc.
etc.

N.B.

"*The political patrol clashes* are fought on the *financial* field. But the moment for these financial clashes, the opponents, and the mode of fighting, are determined solely by the country's responsible foreign policy leadership" (p. *402*) (p. 434).

French capital in Tunisia and Morocco
" " " Russia

French capital in Italy (the beginning of political rapprochement *through* financial rapprochement)
German " " Persia (struggle against Great Britain)
the struggle of European finance capital groups over Chinese and Japanese loans
French and British capital in Portugal and Spain, etc. (p. 403).*

{ First edition of Riesser's book, preface dated July 4, *1905* }

Bills of exchange turnover in Germany (computed from the tax on bills) increased from *12,000 million* marks in 1885 to *25,500* million marks in 1905, and to *31,500 million* in 1907 (p. 228)—and to *33,400 million* in *1910* (p. 246).

Germany's national wealth (Mulhall 1895: *150,000 million*) 130,000—216,000 million (Riesser): *200,000* million marks (p. 76) (Steinmann: *350,000*).
Germany's national income *25,000-30,000 million* marks (p. 77).
France's national wealth: Mulhall (1895)—198,000 million marks; Foville (1902)—161,000; Leroy-Beaulieu (1906)—*205,000*; Théry (1906)—*161,000*.
National income = 20,000 million marks (Leroy-Beaulieu) (p. 78).
Great Britain: *204,000* million marks (Giffen 1885)—235,000 (Mulhall 1895), *228,000* (Chiozza-Money 1908).
United States: national wealth = *430,000* million marks (1904, Census Bureau).
In Germany, "about 1,200 million marks, i.e., about ⅓ of the yearly savings of the nation, is annually invested in securities" (p. 81)—(p. 86 *idem*).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 296.—*Ed.*

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N.B. p. 70 et seq. (abbreviated)

Tabular survey of outstanding events affecting the development of German banking in the second epoch:

1871-72: end of the war. Five thousand million. "Stormy" advance....

"The beginning of industrial cartellisation"....

1873. Crisis.

1874-78. Depression.

1879-82. Economic boom. Promotion of bubble companies.

1879. Gold currency. (Union with Austria.)

1883-87. Depression (1887. Union with Italy.)

1888-90. Boom. Promotion of bubble companies. Speculation.

1891-94. Depression.

1891. Failure of many Berlin banks.

1895. Beginning of boom.

1890-97. Boom intensified. Rapid development of electrical industry.

1897. Formation of the Rhine-Westphalian Iron Syndicate.

1898-1900. Favourable business conditions.

1899. Climax of reconstructions, formation of new companies and issues of stock.

1900-01. Crisis. Drop in mining securities, failure of many banks. "Vigorous intervention of the big banks. Intensified concentration"....

1901-02. "Prolonged and particularly marked demand for money" ... foundation of the United States Steel Corporation.

1902-06. "Revival."

1904. Foundation of the Stahlwerkverband. Stormy development of concentration.

1907. American crisis. Bank rate increased to 7½ per cent.

1908. End of acute crisis in America. "Revival." Money liquidity.
1909. Intensified money liquidity, etc.
1910. Progressive improvement... (4th edition, p. 78).

N.B. 1895-1900 "for the first time excess of immigration" N.B. (p. 75). N.B.

New literature

N.B. Dr. Max Augstin, *The Development of Agriculture in the United States*, Munich, 1914 (4 marks).

W. Wick, *The Little Mercury*, Zurich, 1914. (416 pp.) ("Commercial handbook").

In the fourth edition, Riesser has this on *foreign* investments (capital invested abroad) (p. 426 et seq.):

Germany (1905), at least 24-25 *thousand million* marks (this now "undoubtedly" "greatly exceeded", p. 436, end), including *16 thousand million* marks in foreign securities....

"Of the total securities owned by **France**, estimated by Edmond *Théry* (*Economic Progress in France*... p. 307) at the end of 1906 at 100 *thousand million* francs, and *Neymarck* in 1906 at 97-100 *thousand million* francs (with a yield of 4½ *thousand million* francs), at the end of 1908, according to Théry, about *38½ thousand million* wore in foreign securities.

"The estimates vary widely, of course, but an annual increment of *at least 1,000 million* francs is generally accepted. Henri *Germain*, former director of the Crédit Lyonnais, estimated this annual increase (in the years immediately preceding 1905) at *1,500 million* francs; Paul Leroy-Beaulieu recently even put it at *2,500 million* francs.

"The well-known British financial policy expert, *Sir Edgar Speyer*, in a lecture at the Institute of Bankers ('Some Aspects of National Finance') on June 7, 1900, estimated total *British* investments abroad at £*2,500* million, i.e., about *50,000 million* marks, with an annual yield of £110 million (×); his estimate for the end of

1910, in a lecture in the Liberal Colonial Club, is £*3,500* million, or about 70,000 million marks.

"This corresponds approximately to *George Paish's* estimate for 1907-08, about £2,700 million, i.e., about 54,000 million marks, nearly equally divided between India and the colonies (£1,312 million), and other foreign countries (£1,381 million). The same author gives the figure of £3,192 million, or about *64,000* million marks, for the end of 1910, and in a lecture to the Royal Statistical Society he estimates the 1911 income from British investments abroad, on the basis of the yearly Reports of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, at approximately £180 million which, however, Sir Felix *Schuster* in a discussion on *Speyer*'s lecture of May 27, 1911, regards as too high" (p. 427).

N.B. (×) "Incidentally, in this lecture he validly emphasised that intensified export, increased issues of foreign securities and a big economic boom are only different manifestations of the same phenomenon. One section of the second lecture is headed: Export of British Capital, Chief Cause of the Empire's Prosperity" (p. 428).

NOTEBOOK "ι"
("IOTA")

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LIEFMANN, *HOLDING AND FINANCING COMPANIES*

Professor Dr. Robert Liefmann, *Holding and Financing Companies*, Jena, *1909* (A Study of Modern Capitalism and Securities) (x + 495).

[cf. especially p. *11* of the extracts]

((The author is a double-dyed idiot, who makes a great fuss about definitions—very stupid ones—all revolving around the word "substitution". His factual data, however, mostly quite raw, are valuable. Opponent of the labour theory of value, etc., etc.))

pp. 104-449: "Descriptive part." The theoretical part = nonsense

p. 9: Against Sombart for following "wholly in the wake" of the Ricardo-Marx labour theory of value.

number of shareholders

p. 33: "In Prussia, the number of *shareholders* is only 2 per cent of the population." There are more in Britain and America. "According to the estimate for Prussia in the 1909 Bill for taxation of joint-stock companies, the average shareholding in Prussia is not even 10,000 marks. These holdings are distributed among approximately *700,000 persons*. All such estimates, however, are very unreliable" (34).

"There are no general *statistical* data at the present time on the spread of stock capital.... *Philippovich* (*Outline*, 7th edition, p. 164) estimates that 40 per cent of the British national wealth is in 'securities' (i.e., stocks and, mortgages). *Schmoller* (statistical supplements to the Minutes of the Stock-Exchange Enquiry Commission, 1892-93) estimated in 1892 that about one-quarter of total Prussian capital, nearly 16,000-20,000 million marks, was invested in securities. Sombart (*The German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 224) puts the stock capital of Germany in 1900 at 31,000-32,000 million marks" (37). "Today this figure is definitely too low; German stock capital should be put at 45,000-50,000 million marks, which nevertheless is only about one-fifth of the country's national wealth, estimated at 250,000 million marks" (37).

In America (×) the national wealth in 1904 was 107,000 million dollars. About one-third was stock capital. "For Great Britain he (×) gives the stock capital as 26,000 million dollars, for France—19,500 million dollars. The figure for the whole of Europe is about 75,000 million dollars" (38).

(×) *Charles A. Conant*, "The Concentration of Capital in New York and Those Who Manage It", *Bankers' Magazine*, November 1907 (quoted, p. 38). N.B.

Thus:

Stock capital	America	35 thousand million dollars		
	Great Britain	26 " " "	58.0	75
	France	19.5 " " "		
	Germany	12.5 " " "		58
		93.0 *difference*		17

× 5 = 465,000 million francs
[but Neymarck reckons *600,000* million]

44: ..."extraordinary *interweaving* of all economic interests".

51: The Union (mining, etc., joint-stock company in *Dortmund*) ((see also Stillich α pp. *38* and *41**)). Formed in 1872. "Share capital was issued to the amount of nearly 40 million marks in 1872 and the market price rose to 170 per cent after it had paid a 12 per cent dividend for a year. After that, however, no dividends were paid until 1880, and already in 1875 the first of the reconstructions had to be undertaken, which since then were repeated in almost every period of unfavourable market conditions.... And every time the chief sufferers were the original shareholders."** 170% (12%-0%) N.B.

"Even companies *founded* with other aims than these ('speculation in stocks') in fact often *go over* more or less exclusively to speculation in stocks. This may happen partly because the shareholders do not pay enough attention to the activity of their directors, and partly because in this respect they are deceived by the latter" (67). N.B. N.B.

* See pp. 52-63 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 235.—*Ed.*

71: In different countries, *different types* of companies predominate:

In America—*control* over other companies.
" Germany—*take-over* (Übernahme) companies.
" France—capital investment companies.
" Holland ("as a rentier state", p. 71)—ditto.
Belgium—à la Germany.
Great Britain—investment trusts....

Jeidels, *Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry*, Leipzig, 1905.

Dr. Riesser, *On the History of the Development of the German Big Banks*, *with Special Reference to Concentration Trends*, 1906.

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p. 117—one of many examples of shareholding by the Belgian Société générale (December 31, 1906—shares and bonds amounting to 198 million francs, a host of companies).

p. 136-37. One example:

an example of speculation

The London and Colonial Finance Corporation, "with a paid-up capital of only £21,745 in 1890 obtained a net profit of £80,567 = **370** per cent of capital and paid a 100 per cent dividend."

good example

Capital investment company (Kapitalanlagegesellschaft)—

—Aktiengesellschaft für rheinish-westphälishe Industrie. Founded *October 1871* (p. 156).

Dividend:	1872	— 35%	—35!!
N.B.	1873-1883	— 0	— 0
	1884-1895	— 3-9%	
N.B.	1896-1899	— 10-21%	
	1900	— 60%	60 !!
	1901-02	— 0	0 !!
	1905-06	— 40%	40 !!
	1907-08	— 6-4%	

Dr. Emil Wolff, *The Practice of Financing*, *etc.*, Berlin, 1905.

Francis Cooper, *Financing an Enterprise*, Two vols., New York, 1906.

Edward Carroll, *Principles and Practice of Finance*, 1902 (New York).

W. Lotz, "The Technique of Securities Issues". In *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 1890, p. 393 et seq.

"Thus nothing has come of using capital investment companies 'to ensure small owners the profitability of the big' (×)" (163).

p. *64*: "Louis Hagen, the Cologne banker, sat on the Supervisory Boards of 35 firms; the Deutsche Bank, according to Jeidels (××), had its directors on the Supervisory Boards in 101 companies, and its own Supervisory Board members in 120 companies" (p. 64).	N.B.

(×) *Jörgens*, pp. 45-46.

(××) *Jeidels*, *Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry*, 1905.

Various companies repeatedly issue stock for one and the same assets.

Example (American)... "their (railway companies') assets appear repeated five times over in the stock of the companies directly or indirectly controlling them" (182).	N.B. five times repeated!!

Ch. A. Conant, "The Tendencies of Modern Banking" (*Bankers' Magazine*, 1905).

The Northern Pacific Railway Co. Capital = 80 million dollars of foundation shares. Struggle between Harriman and *Hill*. *Hill* acquired foundation shares to the amount of 15 million. "This 'raid' forced up the market price of Northern Pacific shares nearly 1,000 per cent.... On May 9, 1901, there was a crisis on the Stock Exchange, ruining a large number of smallholders, while the chief participants, according to Harriman's testimony, suffered no losses through this manipulation" (184).	1,000% and crisis

(my italics) N.B.

Liefmann's italics

"With the further development of stock capitalism, the methods of *fleecing the public* of large *sums of money* and diverting it into one's own pockets have become more *subtle*. Today the method is to *form*, *and graft on one another new companies*, to which one and the same material assets are sold or leased; these assets pass from one company to another" (180).

The Standard Oil Company was founded in 1900.

N.B.

N.B.

"It has an authorised capital of $150,000,000. It issued $100,000,000 common and $106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following dividends were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all $367,000,000. From 1882 to 1907, out of total net profits amounting to $889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in dividends and the rest went to reserve capital"* (212).

N.B.

"In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel Corporation employed no less than *210,180* people (1908—165,211).... The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft, in 1908, had a staff of *46,048* workers and office employees, and 43,293 in 1907"** (p. 218).

(new technique *500*% dividend....

Internationale Bohrgesellschaft (in Erkelenz).... "Founded in order to apply the drilling method invented by engineer Anton Raky... (235)... the company paid a 500 per cent dividend in each of the years 1905-06 and 1906-07" (236).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 203.—*Ed.*

** Ibid.—*Ed.*

"In fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to own about 40 per cent of the voting shares of a company in order in normal times to direct its affairs"* (258). Further, there are also (especially in America) "non-voting shares" (259), bonds, etc., and if these are shares of a *company* controlling a number of other companies, then "he [the capitalist], with his own capital of five million dollars can control a capital 40-50 times as great" (259). N.B.

...and even "an amount of capital" "80-100 times as great" (as he owns) (260)....

"In Germany and other leading countries the trade in metals, other than iron, especially copper and zinc, also rare metals, is extremely concentrated" (301) ... "small number of firms" (mostly in private hands)....

..."very many German gas works of the earlier period were built by British firms and with British capital"... (321)....

..."only a comparatively few people have achieved virtuosity in this sphere" (355)—in financial matters, etc. ha-ha!!

..."The Swiss Credit Institute administers it [the Zurich Electrical Development Bank] for the 'Bank' is not an institution or office but, like all companies of the kind, is, so to speak, a large portfolio in which its securities and a few business books are kept" (376)....

Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A.E.G.)
—shares — 100 million marks
bonds — 37 " "
"securities owned" — 23 million marks, etc.

South African gold mines. "The huge profits, particularly in the late eighties and early nineties prompted British capital, and also, especially, French, as well as German, Belgian and Dutch, to acquire shares in the mines.... Share prices

* Ibid., p. 228.—*Ed.*

N.B. jacked up, reaching their peak in the 'boom', which ended in 1895. The decline in mining securities was further increased by the Transvaal war"... (414).

N.B. N.B. "The more **developed** an economic system is, the more it resorts to **risky** enterprises, or enterprises in other countries, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally, to those which are only of local importance.* Hence, special financing companies have been established in these fields, for enterprises requiring a long time for development, for example, railway and mining enterprises"... (etc.) (434).

N.B.

[The more developed, the more risky... N.B.]

N.B. Schulze-Gaevernitz repeats this *almost word-for-word* in an article "*Banking*", p. *21*. (Book III. *Principles of Social Economics*, Section V, Part II.)

"Especially if, as in the case of American controlling companies, real activity is centred in the subordinate companies, the parent company being no more than the owner of their stock, and the shareholders learn nothing of the activities of the subordinate companies, then it is clear that all legal regulations to assure maximum public control over the company's enterprises can be made unworkable. That danger can arise in all companies based on the substitution of stock, indeed in all cases when one company has considerable holdings in another" (439).

N.B.

N.B.

"At the end of 1904, 3.8 per cent of all limited liability companies had a capital of over one million marks, 9.1 per cent had a capital of over 500,000 marks each. The 3.8 per cent, however, represented 45.2 per cent of the total capital of all limited liability companies, and the 9.1 per cent accounted for 60.5 per cent of this capital" (459).

(In Germany? Apparently.)

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 208.—*Ed.*

460: Author's proposal: to oblige companies to "declare" in their accounts amounts of securities which are >1/20 "of the paid-up share capital".

((Idiotic red-tape-ism!))

"In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the organisation of the economic system".... Electricity and aviation.... "As a general rule, in such periods of radical economic change, **speculation** develops on a **large scale**",* and judging by previous experience a considerable role will doubtlessly be played by the principle of stock substitution and by the holding and financing companies for carrying out necessary large-scale capital transactions" (465-66).... N.B. N.B.

But, he says ... joint-stock capitalism has passed its "period of youth". The public has become wiser.... And with big technical inventions, "Gründungsschwindel" (flotation of bubble companies) "hardly", etc.... (466-67) ... (("Harmonist"))

..."the essence of *trade* is in general the substitution of demand"... (475).

((Ha-ha! "Theoretician"!))

..."commerce is an occupation having for its object the collection, storage and supply of goods" (476). ((In bold-face italics. Idiot!))**

Nil in theory

End.

* Ibid., p. 209.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 227.—*Ed.*

DIE NEUE ZEIT, 1911 (ON WAR N.B.) AND 1912 (INTER ALIA, ON A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE)

Die Neue Zeit, 30th year (1912)

[**N.B. Also** an article on the history of private fortunes in America.]

30th year, 1 (October 1911-1912)

articles by Varga (p. 660), Hilferding (p. 773) and Kautsky (p. 837 et seq.) on gold, commodities, money.

|| *Otto Bauer* on the same subject in **2nd volume**, **30th year**.

N.B. also, p. 1, "Bandit Politics" (October 6, 1911)—an article by Kautsky on the war in Tripoli, ending with the words: "It (our electoral struggle) can overnight turn !! || into a struggle for power" (p. 5). ||

30th year, 2 (1912)

an article by *Pannekoek* ("Mass Action and Revolution") (p. 541 et seq.) and one by *Kautsky*, "New Tactics" (August 2, 1912 et seq.) with *vile* passages about ministries, etc. (a vile opportunist article). [N.B. prior to Basle.] Radek, "Concerning Our Struggle Against Imperialism" (p. 233).

[Also a *polemic between Lensch* and *Kautsky* on *disarmament. N.B.*

[Also articles by *Eckstein* against Pannekoek

[**Pannekoek**'s article: "The Nature of Our Present-Day Demands", p. 810.

Deals specially with the "feasibility" of the demands.

|| "Why, in fact, does the programme contain demands for political democracy, a militia, democratisation of the judicial system, etc., all of them unrealisable under capitalism, but no demands for the right to work or a ban on the introduction of labour-saving machinery, likewise unrealisable under capitalism?" Two kinds of impossibility: "economically impossible" and "politically precluded" (811). The present-day demands are "not in an absolute sense" unrealisable under capitalism (812).

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2 (29th year).

pp. *248* and *276*. Minor "polemic" between Karl Kautsky and *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (Rosa Luxemburg) over a United States of Europe—remarks which do n o t touch on the essence of the matter, but are indicative of the polemic that is *being conducted* in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.

Leipziger Volkszeitung attacked also Ledebour for his statement:

"We put ... to capitalist society ... the demand ... that they [the statesmen] prepare to unite Europe in a United States of Europe in the interests of Europe's capitalist development, in order that later on Europe shall not be completely ruined in world competition" (p. 276).

This, it says, is the same argument Calwer used in urging a customs union against America.

Kautsky retorts: no, it is *not* the same. In Ledebour's statement there is *not* a word about a customs struggle, *only* about a United States of Europe, "an idea which ... is not necessarily spearheaded against the U.S.A." (277). ((Consequently, an idea of peaceful competition!))

Karl Kautsky, p. 248, says that both Parvus and Johann Philipp Becker are (or were) in favour of a United States of Europe.

Ibidem, pp. 943-44 (September 29, 1911), report of an article by *H. Quelch* (in *The Social-Democrat*, 1911, August), who says that the capitalists, too, favour peace (capital, he says, is *already* international): capital can already create a "United States of the *W o r l d*" (N.B.: sic! "of the world"), but this world-wide trust would oppress the workers still more. "Capitalist world peace ... the all-powerful international police, nowhere any right of political asylum ... peace and tranquillity would prevail in this slave state" ... (p. 944).

From the war Quelch (*c o n t r a r y t o* Karl Kautsky) expects *not* revolution, but economic prosperity, deliverance from the "pressure of production".

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2 (29th year, 2nd volume), No. 30, April 28, 1911 (pp. 97-107).

Karl Kautsky, "*War and Peace*".

Karl Kautsky pronounces in favour of peace propaganda and *for* United States of Europe (§3 of the article is *in fact headed*: "A United States of Europe").

Karl Kautsky is against the proposal to decide beforehand to *reply* to war by a strike (here there is a passage he quoted in 1915, that the people ("the population"), the "**crowd**", would itself kill opponents of the war if it considered the frontiers in danger, if it feared *invasion*—p. 104, etc., etc.).

But, in quoting *such* passages from this 1911 article, *Kautsky* in 1915 did *not* quote the following passages:

1) In §1: "**Dynastic War and People's War**." N.B. ((My emphasis.))

..."In the eighteenth century the princes regarded the states merely as their domains....

..."**In the same way** the capitalists of the various nations of Europe (and of the U.S.A.) now regard the various nationalities outside European civilisation as their domains, and the antagonisms between the various capitalist governments arise *merely* from the endeavour to enlarge or round off these domains—the colonies and 'spheres of influence'. *Just like* the dynastic antagonisms of the eighteenth century. And *today* the welfare of the peoples of Europe is *no more* related to this than two centuries ago"... (p. 99).

2) "The conviction is growing that a European war *is bound, by natural necessity*, to end in *social revolution*. This is a strong, perhaps the strongest, motive for the ruling classes to preserve peace and demand disarmament" (p. 100).

3) "War is followed by revolution with **inevitable certainty**, not as the product of a Social-Democratic plan, but due to the *iron* logic of *things*. The statesmen themselves now reckon with the possibility of this outcome" (p. 106).

..."Whether the revolution arises from the competition in armaments or from war—it will in any case be an *international phenomenon*" (p. 106)....

..."Even if the revolution does not arise from reaction against the burden of armaments or against the horrors of war, but from other causes, and if at the outset it is not international, but restricted to a single state, *it cannot remain so for long under present conditions*. It [the revolution] *is bound* to spread to other states" ... (107). And from this Karl Kautsky deduces the United States of Europe "and its eventual expansion into the United States of the civilised world".

p. 105: Karl Kautsky defines the United States of Europe as an alliance "with a *common trade policy*" (+ a single parliament, etc., a single army).

In §1 of the article (p. 97), Karl Kautsky describes "the change in the world situation" ("during the last two decades").... "Industrial capital has become finance capital, it has united with the landowner-monopolists".... "Social reform has come to a complete standstill"....

"Nevertheless [despite all the difficulties of realising the United States of Europe] the effort to peacefully unite the European states in a federative community is by no means hopeless. Its prospects are bound up with those of the *revolution*" (K. Kautsky's italics, p. 106).

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2, p. 96: an account of *Otto Bauer's* article in the symposium *Der Kampf* (1911, No. 3): "World war is its [capitalism's] last word.... If the Turkish revolution leads to a European war, the inevitable result will be a European revolution."

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2, p. 179.

An article by *Rothstein* on the congress in Coventry (1911), where the British Socialist Party adopted a **resolution** *in favour* of "the maintenance of an adequate fleet for national defence".

...“Thereby the Party Congress not only retreated from international Social-Democracy, but actually joined the worst jingoists” (p. 182)....

against Hyndman’s propaganda

“However aggressive Germany may be, her aggression concerns matters of as little importance for the British people as the gold-mines in the Transvaal.... But if, on the other hand, the actions of the British ruling classes, as expressed in the policy of encirclement (etc.) directed against Germany, are approved or permitted, then there really can come a time when even the proletariat will find itself compelled to take up arms and, by defending the country, do the job of the capitalist class”... (p. 183).

N.B.

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 1, article by *Askew* on British colonial policy in *Egypt*.

FINANZ-ARCHIV: 1915

Finanz-Archiv, 32nd year, *1915*.

“French Capital in Russia” (125-33).

Index to Finanz-Archiv, 32nd year (*Almost nil*.)

Finanz-Archiv, 31st year, 1914.

“*Colonial Debts and Colonial Loans*.”

In 1901 there were colonial securities totalling £600 *million = 12,000* **million** marks on the London Stock Exchanges (p. 8). These are mainly British colonies.

In 1897-1907 (p. 16), France gave the colonies loans of not less than *400* million francs.

Belgium > *250 million francs*.

Germany—(1911)—about *137.4* million marks (p. 28). 137.4×1.25 = 171,750,000 francs.

Millions of francs: 15,000; 400; 250; 171.75.

STATISTICS OF ISSUES. EGGENSCHWYLER. CROHN (ON ARGENTINA)

Walter Eggenschwyler (Zurich). “Statistical Data on the Problem: War, Progress of Production and Movement of Prices.” *Schmoller’s Jahrbuch*, 1915, No. 4.

(Author gives only annual figures)

	Public issues, world total (thous. million marks)		Average per year	Minimum	Maximum
1871-1880	76.1 ÷ 10	=	7.61	1.7	15.6
1881-1890	64.5 ÷ 10	=	6.45	3.3	12.7
1891-1900	98.0 ÷ 10	=	9.8	2.5	17.8
1901-1909	136.1 ÷ 9	=	15.1	7.9	21.5

Size of issues (total) (author gives only annual figures):

	Great Britain (million marks)	France (million *francs*)	=	(my calculation) 80% (mill. marks)	Germany (million marks)
1903-07	13,187 ÷ 5 = 2,637	18,469	=	14,775	16,630
1908-12	21,309 ÷ 5 = 4,262	23,122	=	18,497	19,783
Σά(for 10 years)	34,496 ÷ 10 = *3,449*	41,591		33,272 ÷ 10 = *3,641*	36,413

Ibidem (No. 2). *H. F. Crohn*, "Argentina in the Anglo-German Economic Struggle" (cf. p. 114 in Zollinger on the typicality of Argentina)....

An excellent illustration of imperialism!!

WALTER ZOLLINGER, *BALANCE-SHEET OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF SECURITIES*

Walter *Zollinger*, *Balance-Sheet of International Transfers of Securities*, 1914.

(p. 106) He cites following totals from *Neymarck* (*Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique*, Vol. XIX, Book II, 1912).

Figures in **francs***

1871- 80	76.1	thousand	million
1881- 90	64.5	"	"
1891-1900	100.4	"	"
1901-1910	197.8	"	"

(Σ = 438.8)

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 239.—*Ed.*

(Ibidem) Total of Securities*

(*thousand million* francs)

(1910 maximum)		other countries in 1902 (32)	
Great Britain	142	Holland	10
United States	132	Belgium	6
France	110	Spain	6
Germany	95	Switzerland	5
Russia	31	Denmark	3
Austria-Hungary	24	Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc.	2
Italy	14		
Japan	12		
Other countries	40		
	Σ=600		Σ=32

CALMES, "RECENT LITERATURE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT"

Albert Calmes (Professor of the Academy, Frankfurt-am-Main), "Recent Literature on Capital Investment", *Jahrbücher für Nationaloekonomie*, III series, Vol. 47 (Vol. 102), 1914, p. 522.

He praises the book of the Swiss.

N.B. *A. Meyer*, *Capital Investment*, Zurich, 1912 (p. 525: the general part, he says, is "excellent").

Fr. Ehrensperger, *Modern Capital Investment*, Berne, 1911.

Fr. Böttger, *Investment of Money and Management of Capital*, *Leipzig?* (193 pp.) ("he treats in more detail" "*the reading of balance-sheets*", p. 525).

Henry Loewenfeld, *The Art of Capital Investment.* (*All about investment*), Berlin, 1911 ("Leitmotive": "geographical distribution of capital investments").

Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Art of Investing and Managing One's Capital*, Paris, 1912 (451 pp.)—(highly praised).

Calmes, Vol. *105* (1915, No. 5), examines the new literature on financing.

N.B. See also, in *Jahrbücher*, III series, Vol. 39, 1910, article by *Moos* on "capital investment" in France and Great Britain.

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 240.—*Ed.*

ARTICLE BY PAISH IN *THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY*, JANUARY 1911

British capital invested in Indian, colonial and foreign loans and companies, and the income derived therefrom in **1907-08** (Paish, p. 168):

My summary in three main groups: A, B, C	Capital (£000)	Income (idem)	Per cent
A) Loans (government and municipal)	757,460	29,938	3.9
B) Railways	1,198,991	52,839	4.4
C) Banks, etc.	366,022	21,870	
C) Mines	243,386	26,145	
C) Oil, etc.	127,879	8,999	
C)	737,287	57,014	7.7
Total	2,693,738	139,791	5.2

Author divides table not into three (A, B, C), but into *very many* groups.

A) % = 3.2% — 4.7%
B) = 3.8 — 4.7%
C) = 3.3 — 30.5%

1910 (£000)

British Colonies

	Canada and Newfoundland	Australian Commonwealth	New Zealand	Total for Australasia	Africa South	Africa West	India and Ceylon	Straits Settlements and Malay States	Miscellaneous British possessions	(my) Σ
A)	92,948	198,365	64,721	263,086	115,080	8,541	182,517	7,943	6,969	677,084
B)	223,740	2,951	761	3,712	9,354	—	136,519	—	1,717	375,042
C)										503,026
Σ	(*) 373,541	301,521	78,529	380,050	351,368	29,498	365,399	22,037	33,259	(*) 1,555,152

(*) **Note:** Paish's total = 1,554,152, because for Canada he gives 372,541 in the summary table (p. 186), but 373,541 in the main table (p. 180).

	United States	Cuba	Philippines	Japan	China	Miscellaneous foreign countries
A)	7,896	2,282	—	42,784	22,477	818
B)	586,227	17,387	7,902	8,910	—	4,521
C)	93,955	3,031	300			
Σ	688,078	22,700	8,202	53,705	26,809	61,907

	Argentina	Mexico	Brazil	Chile	Uruguay	Peru	Misc. American countries
A)	38,339	8,276	40,221	17,071	9,860	81	3,838
B)	186,126	54,306	29,961	12,646	21,194	6,476	11,681
C)							
Σ	269,808	87,335	94,440	46,375	35,255	31,987	22,517

	Russia	Turkey	Egypt	Spain	Italy	Portugal	France	Germany	Other European countries	Σ	but without Egypt
A)	19,109	9,650	14,044	1,885	4,164	1,336	—	1,351	22,870	74,409	60,365
B)	2,013	6,146	1,916	5,473	3,284	4,432	—	—	495	23,759	21,843
C)			27,793				7,071			90,199	62,408
Σ	38,388	18,320	43,753	18,808	11,513	8,134	7,071	6,061	36,319	188,367	144,614

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXIV, January 1911.

Paish's article (and its discussion in the Statistical Society (article pp. 167-87; discussion, pp. 187-200)) shows that the author was *very* cautious and careful.

He excluded conversions—taking not nominal, but issue prices of securities—and to avoid duplication took *income* from securities, etc. The value of his data is therefore *infinitely* greater than that of the baseless "data" on France and Germany.

His main work relates to *1907-08*.

	£000,000		
	1907-08	1908-09 and 1910	1910
colonies:	1,312	+228	1,554
foreign countries	1,381	+288	1,637
Total	2,693	+516	3,191

N.B. Alfred Neymarck, Modern Finances, Vols. *VI* and *VII*. *French Savings and Securities 1872-1910. 2 vols. 8°*. Paris, 1911. N.B.

MÜLHAUPT, *THE MILK CARTEL*

Dr. Engelbert Mülhaupt, The Milk Cartel. A Study of Cartels and Milk Prices, Karlsruhe, 1912.

Baden Higher School Economic Studies, New Series, No. 9.

A very interesting and business-like little book, describing extremely interesting phenomena.

Literature sources N.B.: *Ph. Arnold* in *Conrad's Jahrbücher*, Vol. 41, *1911*, and in the article "Statistics of the Kingdom of Bavaria", Vol. *41* (1910).
Dictionary of Political Science, Vol. 6 (3rd edition) ("The Milk Industry").
Nachimson, "The Milk War", *Die Neue Zeit*, 1911 (*29th* year), *Vol. 2* (p. 668 et seq.).

The *monopoly* position of the farms (a region 50-100 *km.* around the big towns) and the *growth of co-operatives* are factors *in favour of* cartels in this field.

Following the invention of the centrifuge, co-operative dairy associations sprang up like mushrooms after a warm spring rain:

1870—	1				Number of agricultural co-operatives (p. 24):
1903—	2,245	with	181,325	members	1890— 3,000
1909—	3,039	"	270,692	" (p. 5)	1900—13,600
					1910—24,900

{according to *Petersilie*, *German Co-operative Statistics*, Berlin, 1911.}

The growth of prices for concentrated fodder, etc. (+ 13-50 per cent, 1896-1906, p. 7) etc., did *not* result in a growth of prices, until the strong cartel movement about 1900 (p. 7).

The enormous importance of *large-scale* production (storage, etc.) of milk (in relation to cheapness, hygiene, etc., etc.) *favours* cartels.

Berlin requires *daily*	1 million litres of milk
Hamburg with environs	0.5 " " " "
Vienna	0.9 " " " "
Munich	0.25 (p. 16) " " "
	etc.

Milk contains *9,000* ***bacteria*** per cubic centimetre (centimetres?? or millimetres?) immediately after milking; 12,000 after 2-3 hours; 120,000 after 9 hours; *millions* after 24 hours (page?).

Delivery is mostly by railway *(50-100 km.* from the town). Virtual monopoly position of peasants in *nearby* areas engaged in milk production.

"The co-operative movement has trained the farmer for the cartel" (25).

The history of some *milk cartels*.

The Berlin Milk Cartel. Founded *June 1900*. **A fierce struggle** against wholesale traders (the public *supported* the traders).

Bolle (the biggest Berlin milk firm—sells *45* million litres per annum; capital 10,000,000 marks; dividend 8 per cent, p. *91*) in 1903 made peace with the milk cartel. (In a short time, Bolle became a millionaire; as also *Pfund* in Dresden, who sells 21 million litres).

Milk syndicates always improve hygienic conditions.

But the present one was badly off *financially* and *went bankrupt* on February 27, 1907.

Hamburg. Founded in June 1900. During ten years it gave its members 10.3 million marks (p. 53), raised *their* price (from 11.2 to 14.1 pfennigs), and concluded an agreement with the big traders.

Frankfurt-am-Main. When was it founded?? In 1911 it was *very powerful*.

It concluded an agreement with the traders. Afterwards it demanded that *they* raise the price from 16 pfennigs to 17.

"Over this pfennig a three months' bitter war broke out between the farmers and the traders, who were supported both by the Social-Democratic and liberal workers' unions, and by the trade union association" (p. 54). The traders gave way.

"The struggle ended with traders, to the great astonishment of the consumers, forming an alliance with Vereinigte Landwirte [the United Farmers, a cartel], by which the latter were pledged not to deliver milk to traders who did not join in the price increase" (p. 55).

In *Vienna* there is a huge syndicate. It lowered sales costs from 7.67 hellers per litre in 1900 (turnover 0.56 million kronen) to 3.775 hollers in 1910 (turnover 6.74 million kronen) (p. 57).

large-scale production!!

Influence of cartels on the producers?

Prices rose by an average of 2 pfennigs in 1900-10 (compared with 1890-1900) (p. 61).

The price rise was caused by the *cartel* (otherwise higher production costs would not have increased the price).

"What other explanation is there for the striking fact that prices began to rise precisely in the years when the milk cartel appeared on the scene?" (63).

"Lastly, what other explanation, save the existence of cartels, is there for the fact that the highest price increases

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

were in the richest milk areas: Switzerland and Württemberg?" (64).

Bigger sales of milk *worsen* both food for cattle (p. 66) and *food for the population* (67).

Consumption of milk in Switzerland

	Litres per capita per day
1903-05	—1.01
1906-09	—0.98 (p. 68)

Same in Germany.

Effecton trade? Profits declined from 7-8 pfennigs per litre to 6-7 pfg. (72),—gradual squeezing out of trade.

On consumers? Better quality, hygiene, etc.

Best of all in *Basle*, where the consumers' association and peasants' milk association *directly* confront each other. The *milk trade* is run by the city in an *exemplary* way, but *as regards prices* the consumer is dependent on the *peasants*!!

"According to Professor Kasdorf, the average daily milk yield of a cow is 5 litres in Austria, 8-10 litres in Germany, and 12 litres in Denmark" (p. 83).

Milk production on Archduke Friedrich's big farm near Vienna:

1853—3.00 litres per cow
1850—4.67
1890—6.27
1900—6.86 (p. 84)
1910—8.00

Small-scale trade in milk still prevails (in Munich in 1910 there were 1,609 dairy shops, including

250 selling up to 50 litres
1,310 (81.4%) up to 150 litres)

conditions generally unhygienic; no safeguards against contamination when the milk is poured, etc.

N.B. ‖ and "an incredible waste of time, labour and capital" (87), delivery, unsold milk, 2-3 suppliers to a single house, etc., etc.

!!! ‖‖ "The social effects of the milk cartel" (Chapter V)—the prospect is for an "*armed peace*" (95) between the town and countryside, an outright war between consumers and sellers, as in Basle.

In Basle, the consumer *depends* wholly (as regards price) on the cartel of peasant milk producers.

Peasant dairy cartels are *best of all* organised in Switzerland—and the price of milk is the highest of all!! the power of these cartels being greatest of all!!

"The general consumers' association (in Basle) finds its hands completely bound in face of the price policy of the producers' cartel" (p. 77). N.B.

"Even in Switzerland, where direct relations between peasants and workers are closer than in other countries, there have been hard-fought battles and bitter price struggles between them" (p. 95).

CAPITALIST ASSOCIATIONS ON THE WAR

Capitalist Associations *on the war*

Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Edgar Jaffé) (Vol. 41, No. 1), 1915, September.

N.B. Pp. 296-97—"Employer Organisations on the War".

..."Consequently [employer organisations] are thinking in terms of the rise and development of a special German type; that is what the war is about. That view, in fact, fully coincides with the employers' interests. They are aware of a certain danger to themselves if it were to be said after the war: vestra res agitur (the matter concerns you), *your* skin and *your* interests are at stake! The war is being waged to decide who shall hold sway on the *world market*!" (*Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung*, February 7, 1915). In that event, obviously, all socio-political tendencies, all efforts to cover war expenditure out of employer profits would find ready acceptance. If, N.B.

> however, the war is being waged in the *interests of civilisation*, to defend a type of civilisation and not profit interests, then it falls to Society as a whole to bear the burdens of war, and it will not be possible to single out a class whose interests are pro-eminently promoted by the war.
>
> The employers regard the *effects* of the war, insofar as they extend to the internal political situation, as predominantly favourable. This applies especially to its effect on the Socialist Party, and in this respect they praise "fate as educator". For the war has led to unity of the nation and has cut the ground from under the most attractive socialist theories. (Ibid., August 2, 1915.) In this war the nation has for the first time really become a nation (to borrow Treitschke's expression)—and this is in itself justification for the war.... For centuries to come, war will still be the sole form of settling disputes between states, and it is a form to be welcomed, for the war has halted the trend towards democracy: "We have reached the limit of feebleness, the brink of degeneration and debility. From the final extreme, however, from sinking into the abyss, we have been saved by fate, which evidently has set our German people a special goal." (Ibid., August 16, 1914.)

"The meaning of the war in general is thus consistently being sought in a transformation of the *soul*; its serious economic and political implications are belittled; its serious political and economic consequences are rejected".

"The German Government's further measures, it is correctly pointed out, were likewise directed at *regulating consumption*, whereas the aim of socialism is socialisation of the *means of production*. (Ibid., February 28, 1915.) All these measures will therefore be discontinued with the coming of peace. These views are, on the whole, in the interests of the employers. And the antagonism between the class interests of the employers and the workers probably

finds its most salient expression also in the contrasting way the war is reflected in their ideologies. But the contrast is of a manifold nature. The socialists of the opportunist, revisionist trend see the war as an economic war. *They* take the view that the war is imperialist and even defend the right of every nation to imperialism. From that they deduce a community of interests between employers and workers within the nation, and that line, followed consistently, leads to their becoming a radical bourgeois reform party. On the other hand, the radical trend in the socialist workers' movement, while regarding the war as imperialist (at any rate, with reservations), negates this development—it demands intensification of the class struggle as a consequence of the war and emphasis on the proletarian standpoint, even during the war. The employers, however, as we have seen, deny that the war is an imperialist one. They do not want to be told: Tua res agitur (it is your concern). They reject both the positive, affirmative imperialist view of the revisionist socialists and the critical attitude of radical socialism. They seek salvation in the "civilisation meaning" of the war, an interpretation that does not hold any class responsible for the war, and does not accuse any class of especially benefiting from it. A grotesque picture: while the governments everywhere uphold the imperialist theory or, at least" (how nice!!) "contend that for the other side the economic interest is decisive, the chief representatives of economic interests retire behind the general civilisation meaning of the war. As a result, they come into contact with views to be found also in the camp of radical socialism; they regard the war as economically only an interim phase; all war-time phenomena, all measures taken by the state, stem from the present situation and will disappear together with

well said!

how nice!

gem!

the war. The employers' views on the war, too, however much they may appear to have a central *idea*, should therefore be regarded exclusively as (class) ideology" (pp. 295-97). (End of article.)

Note, pp. *293-94*:

N.B. "A theoretical article in *Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung* (August 15, 1915) in which tendencies towards a new (democratic) orientation in home policy are most emphatically rejected, is highly indicative....

N.B.! ..."First of all, Social-Democracy has still more to '*re-learn*': it will 'above all have to show, after the war as well, whether the *process of transformation* to which it refers has really become part of its *flesh and blood*. Only if this has been decisively demonstrated for a fairly lengthy period will one he able to say, with due caution, whether some of these changes in Germany's home policy are possible'." ..."In any case, so far there are no prerequisites for a future home policy (as urged by the Left parties). ...On the contrary, 'the harsh school of war provides us with the strongest possible arguments against further democratisation of our state system'" ... (p. 294).

CRAMMOND, GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1914, July (Vol. LXXVII, Part VIII) (pp. 777-807).

Edgar Crammond, "*The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires*".

Together the two empires account for 39 per cent of international trade (1911: 26.9 per cent Great Britain + 12.5 per cent Germany) and 53 per cent of the world's mercantile shipping.

		Germany		Great Britain
Population	1872	41.23 (million)		31.87 (million)
	1888	48.17 "		36.88 "
	1910	64.92 "	(1911)	45.22 "
+(1872-1910)		+23.69		+13.34
Births per 1,000		29.5 (1911)		24.4
Deaths " "		18.2		14.8
Urban population		57.4% (1905)		71.3% (1901)
Value of mineral production (1911)		£102,000,000		124,500,000

		United States	Germany (million tons)	Great Britain
Coal output	1911	450.2	234.5	276.2
	1886	103.1	73.7	160.0
		+347.1	+160.8	+116.2
		+336.6%	+218.1%	+ 72.6%
Ditto, crude steel	1910	26.5	13.7	6.1
	1886	2.6	0.9	2.4
		+ 23.9	12.7	3.7
		+910.3%	+1,335 %	+154.3%

		Germany (million)	Great Britain
Export of cotton goods	1887:	£10.0	72.0
	1912:	£24.3	122.2
Bank deposits:		£468.0	1,053.0
(1912-13) savings banks		839.0	221.1
	(My) Σ=	1,307.0	1,274.0
Net tonnage of shipping	1880:	1.2 million	6.6 million
	1911:	3.0 "	11.7 "
		+ 1.8	+ 5.1
		+156 %	+77.7%
Total tonnage of vessels entered and cleared on foreign trade	1880:	13.0 mill. tons (of which 39.1% German vessels)	49.7 (of which 72.2% British vessels)
	1911:	49.5 (50.4% German vessels)	138.9 (59% British vessels)
		+	—

		Germany	Great Britain
Shipbuilding: annual output	1898-1904:	240,800 tons	898,000
	1913:	618,800	2,203,000
Tonnage of vessels that passed the Suez Canal	1892:	809,000 tons	8,102,000
	1912:	4,241,000	17,611,000
Percentage of all vessels that passed the Suez Canal	1892:	7.4%	74.5%
	1912:	15.1%	62.9%
Gross income of railways	1888:	£58.4 million	72.9
	1910:	£149.5 "	127.2
		+156%	+74.3%
Foreign trade (exports + imports)	1888:	£323.6 million	558.1
	1912:	£982.6	1,120.1
		+ 204%	+100.7%
		+£659.0 million	+£562.0 million
Expenditure on army and navy (1912)		£70.0 million	102.4
National wealth:		£15,000 "	25,000 (*)
National income (Helfferich, for Germany)		£2,000 "	3,400
Capital investment abroad		£1,000 "	3,800
		=6.6% (of national wealth)	(=23%)
Income from capital invested abroad (1912)		£50.0 million	185.0
Income from shipping		£30.0 "	100.0
National income (Germany, according to Helfferich)	1896:	£1,075 "	1,430
	1912:	£2,000 "	2,140
Annual increase of national wealth (last 18 years for Germany) (and last 28 years for Great Britain)		=£272.0 "	£230.0 million

figures for the last five years are approximately the same.

(*) For the whole *Empire*. For Great Britain alone, without colonies = 16,500.

SALE, JAPAN VERSUS GREAT BRITAIN

A very interesting article in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1911, April.

Charles W. Sale, "*Some Statistics of Japan*", pp. 467-534.

The comparison with the United Kingdom is especially instructive:

	Japan	United Kingdom
Area (square miles)	147,648	121,390
Population (1910)	49,587,000	44,538,000
" per square mile	335	367
Birth-rate (per 1,000)	31.30	27.95
Death-rate (" ")	20.70	16.89
Increase (" ")	+10.60	+11.06
Grain, green crops, etc.	12,894,000 (acres) 13.6%	12,437,000 = 16%
Grasses and pastures	3,006,000 3.2%	34,565,000 = 44%
Forests	55,083,000 = 58.0	3,070,000 = 4%
Price of land (+cattle, etc.)	£1,299 million = 57% of total national wealth	£1,220 = 11%
Production (1907)		
rice, wheat, barley, oats	= 372.8 million bushels	307.3
Potatoes	3.9 (mill. tons)	5.2
Turnips, swedes	very little	36.3 (mill. tons)
Radishes	2.3 (mill. tons)	—
Hay	very little	15.6 " "
Net imports of drink, food and tobacco	£3.46 (million)	£212.4 million
Cattle (1908)	1.3 (")	11.7 "
Horses (1908)	1.5 (million)	2.1 (million)
Sheep	87,000(= 0.08 mill.)	31.3 "
Pigs	0.28 (million)	4.0 "
Number of coal miners underground (1908)	126,999	796,329
Coal raised (in tons)	14.8 (mill.)	261.5
Tons of coal per miner per annum	117	328
Value sterling	6.5 (mill.)	116.6
" per ton	8s. 9d.	8s. 11d.
Tons of coal exported	2.86 (mill.)	62.55
Value per ton exported	12s. 11d.	12s. 8d.
Railways (1908) in miles	5,020	23,280
Passengers (million)	146.9	1,265.1

		Japan	United Kingdom
Goods traffic (million tons)		25.4	499.9
Earnings (per mile of railway)		£1,690	4,854
Expenses (” ”)		868	3,133
Net earnings (”)		+822	+1,721
Steamships (100 tons and upward gross)		1,146,977	18,059,037
Shipping entered at Chinese ports (1,000 tons)	1902:	7,350 (13.6%)	26,950 (49.9%)
	1909:	18,949 (21.8%)	34,027 (39.2%)
Total value of product of textile factories (1907)		£37.77 (mill.)	247.27
Operatives		355,000	808,398
Value per operative		£106	£306
Imports + exports (including re-exports)	1889:	£20.99 (mill.)	744.0
	1909:	82.35	1,094.0
dem per capita	1899:	10s. 6d.	£19. 19s. 10d.
	1909:	£1. 12s. 10d.	£22. 5s. 8d.
National expenditure (1909)		£64.9 (mill.)	152.3
Post Office savings (1909)			
Number of depositors		8.66 (mill.)	11.1
Amount (£ mill.)		£10.8 (mill.)	160.6
” (per capita)		£1. 5s. 1d.	£14. 11s. 7d.
Value of agricultural products		£126 (mill.)	174.8
Number of farm labourers (including peasant proprietors)		11.50 (mill.)	2.05

N.B. “With less than a fifth the number of labourers, the product in the United Kingdom is larger, and 40 per cent greater in value” (p. 488)....

Agriculture in Japan has special features, it accounts for 60 per cent of the population (p. 481). Out of a total number of households of 9,250,000, 3,748,000 are engaged exclusively in agriculture; 1,662,000 combine other occupations with agriculture. Other farmers = 70,000. Landowners = 43,000. Σ = 5,523,000.

The land is very heavily taxed. Agriculture is on an extremely small scale:

	Per cent of farms (p. 482)
Area of farms: less than 1¼ acres (5 *tan*)	37.26
from 1¼ to 2½ acres (5 tan-1 *cho*)	32.61
" 2½ " 5 " (1-2 ")	19.62
" 5 " 12¼ " (2-5 ")	9.37
over 12¼ acres (5 *cho*)	1.14
	100.00

The productivity of agricultural labour is extremely low, chiefly owning to the small scale of agriculture and the absence of machines.

In Japan, the production of rice requires 110 days' labour per *acre*.

In Texas and Louisiana, the production of rice per acre requires one man for two days + a team for 1½ days.

(*American Economic Association Journal*, *1904*, November)

ARTICLE: "FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE WAR DEBTS OF EUROPE"

The Economist, February 13, 1915. Article: "Financial Arrangements and the War Debts of Europe"....

..."The more one looks into the financial and political future of Europe after the war the darker and more obscure do its problems appear. But that is all the more reason why independent men with knowledge and penetration and foresight should exercise their minds upon the political economy of this war. Never has there been such a collision of forces, never so much destruction in so short a time. Never has it been so difficult or so necessary to measure the calamity, to count the costs, to foresee and provide against the consequences to human society. Philanthropists profess to hope that the peace settlement will bring with it a great international reduction of armies and armaments, which will enable the nations to support their new war debt, and so to avoid the

bankruptcy court. No doubt the fear of bankruptcy will count for something; otherwise the peace settlement might be expected to breed another series of preparations for another series of wars. But those who know the forces which really control the diplomacy of Europe see no Utopias. The outlook is for bloody revolutions and fierce wars between labour and capital, or between the masses and the governing classes of Continental Europe". (End of article.)

N.B.

NOTEBOOK "κ"
("KAPPA")

J. A. HOBSON, *IMPERIALISM*

***Imperialism*. A Study by J. A. *Hobson* (London, 1902).**[33]

p. 4. Real colonisation consists in people of the metropolis emigrating to an empty uncolonised country and bringing their civilisation to it, but the forced subjection of other peoples is already a "**debasement of this genuine nationalism**" ("**spurious colonialism**"); it is already a phenomenon of an imperialist order. A model example of a real colony is seen in Canada and the self-governing islands of Australasia.

p. 6. "***The novelty*** of the ***recent*** Imperialism regarded as a policy consists chiefly in its adoption by *several* nations. The notion of a number of competing empires is essentially modern." **N.B.**

p. 9. "Nationalism is a plain highway to *internationalism*, and if it manifests divergence we may well suspect a perversion of its nature and its purpose. *Such a perversion is Imperialism*, in which nations trespassing beyond the limits of facile assimilation transform the wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires." !!

pp. 17-18. The nucleus of the British Empire is a population of 40 million, living in an area of 120,000 square miles. During the last *generation* alone, the increase in the possessions of the British Empire = 4,754,000 sq. miles with 88,000,000 people.

p. 19. The British colonies and dependencies in *1900* = 13,142,708 sq. miles with a population of 306,793,919 (*).

N.B. **Hobson *includes* the "protectorates" (Egypt, Sudan, etc.), which Morris does *not*!!**

(*) Hobson here quotes Morris, II, 87 and R. Giffen: "The Relative Growth of the Component Parts of Our Empire", a paper read before the Colonial Institute, January 1898.
(Further, *The Statesman's Year-Book* for 1900.)

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p. 20. Between 1884 and 1900, 3,711,957 square miles **(counting Sudan, etc.)** with a population of 57,436,000 were added to the British Empire.*

pp. 21-22. In *Germany*, literature on the necessity for her to have colonial possessions arose in the seventies. The first official aid to the German Commercial and Plantation Association of the Southern Seas was given in 1880. The "German connection with Samoa" belongs to the same period, but real imperialist policy in Germany began from 1884, when the African protectorates arose and the islands of Oceania were acquired. During the next fifteen years, a million square miles, with a population of 14,000,000, in the colonies was brought under the influence of Germany. Most of the territory was in the tropics, with only a few thousand whites.

In *France*, the old colonial spirit began to revive at the very beginning of the eighties. The most influential economist conducting colonial propaganda was Leroy-Beaulieu. In 1880, French possessions in Senegal and Sahara were extended, a few years later Tunisia was acquired, in 1884 France took an active part in the struggle for Africa and at the same time strengthened her rule in Tonkin and Laos in Asia. Since 1880, France acquired 3½ million square miles with a population of 37,000,000 almost wholly in

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 255-56.—*Ed.*

tropical and subtropical countries, inhabited by lower races and unsuitable for French colonisation.

In 1880, *Italy*'s Abyssinian expedition came to grief and her imperialist ambitions suffered defeat. Her possessions in East Africa were limited to Eritrea and a protectorate in Somali.

The African agreement of 1884-86 gave *Portugal* the extensive region of Angola and the Congo Coast, and in 1891 a considerable part of East Africa came under her political control.

The Congo Free State, which became the property of the King of *Belgium* in 1883 and which has been considerably enlarged since then, must be regarded as a morsel seized by Belgium in the struggle for Africa.

Spain has been kept away from the arena of the struggle for the world.

Holland does not take part in the modern imperialist struggle; her considerable possessions in the East and West Indies are of older origin.

Russia, the only one of the northern countries pursuing an imperialist policy, directs her efforts chiefly to the seizure of Asia, and, although her colonisation of Asia is more natural, since she proceeds by extending her state frontiers, she will soon come into conflict with other powers in regard to the division of Asia.

p. 23. Altogether the European states + Turkey + China + the United States of America, embracing an area of 15,813,201 square miles with a population of 850,103,317, possess 136 colonies with an area of 22,273,858 square miles and a population of 521,108,791. **(Taken wholly from Morris, II, 318, as Hobson himself pointed out.)**

pp. 26-27. "Expansion of Chief European Powers since 1884":*

			population
Great Britain (see p. 20)	3,711,957	sq. miles	57,436,000
France	3,583,580	" "	36,553,000
Germany	1,026,220	" "	16,687,100

* Ibid., pp. 255-56.—*Ed.*

Russia (?) 114,320 sq. miles (?) 3,300,000 (population)
(this is Khiva+Bukhara) (this=Khiva+Bukhara)
Russia ((Khiva (1873), Bukhara (1873*), Kwantung (1898) Manchuria (1900))

Although under a heading "since 1884", Hobson has included both Khiva and Bukhara

Belgium (Congo)	900,000	30,000,000
Portugal (**Angola**, **1886**; **East Africa**, **1891**, and ***others***).	800,760	9,111,757

N.B. N.B. **(*Hobson* adds, pp. 28-29, *two* maps of Africa, 1873 and 1902, clearly showing the increase in its partition).**

p. 34: *Percentages of Total Values*:

Annual averages for	Imports into Great Britain from Foreign countries	Imports into Great Britain from British possessions	Exports from Great Britain to Foreign countries	Exports from Great Britain to British possessions	p. 37 'Four-yearly' averages	Percentages of imports into colonies, from Great	Percentages of exports from etc. into Britain
					1856-59	46.5	57.1
1855-59	76.5	23.5	68.5	31.5	60-63	41.0	65.4
60-64	71.2		66.6		64-67	38.9	57.6
65-69	76.0		72.4		68-71	39.8	53.5
70-74	78.0		74.4		72-75	43.6	54.0
75-79	77.9		66.9		76-79	41.7	50.3
80-84	76.5		65.5		80-83	42.8	48.1
85-89	77.1		65.0		84-87	38.5	43.0
90-94	77.1		67.6		88-91	36.3	39.7
95-99	78.6		66.0		92-95	32.4	36.6
					96-99	32.5	34.9

***p. 38. Year ending December 1901*:**

(£000, 000)	Imports from	%	Exports to	%
Foreign countries	417.615=	80	178.450=	63.5
British India	38.001=	7	39.753=	14
Australasia	34.682=	7	26.932=	9.5
Canada	19.775=	4	7.797=	3
British South Africa	5.155=	1	17.006=	6
Other British possessions	7.082=	1	10.561=	4
	522.310=	100	280.499=	100

* So given in Hobson's book. It should be 1868.—*Ed.*

p. 39. Trade of the Empire with Great Britain: (£000)

Annual average		Total imports	Imports from Britain	% of British imports	Total exports	Exports to Britain	% of exports to Britain
1867-71	India	45,818	31,707	69.2	56,532	29,738	52.6
	Self-governing colonies	42,612	24,502	57.5	42,386	23,476	55.4
	Other colonies	23,161	7,955	34.3	23,051	10,698	46.4
1892-96	India	52,577	37,811	71.9	68,250	22,656	33.2
	Self-governing colonies	74,572	44,133	59.2	83,528	58,714	70.3
	Other colonies	39,835	10,443	26.2	36,626	10,987	29.3

From "The Flag and Trade" by Professor Flux, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, September 1899, Vol. LXII, pp. 496-98.

p. 48. "The total emigration of Britons represents no large proportion of the population; that proportion during the recent years of imperial expansion has perceptibly diminished: of the emigrants a small proportion settles in British possessions, and an infinitesimally small fraction settles in the countries acquired under the new Imperialism"....

Since 1884,, the emigration figures have been falling*: 1884 ... 242,179 (including 155,280 to the United States) and immigration must also be taken into account!! 1900 ... 168,825 (including 102,797 to the United States (p. 49)) (author gives annual and more detailed figures).

p. 58. (According to Mr. Mulhall) the size and growth of British foreign and colonial investments since 1862 were:

Year	Amount £	Annual increase per cent	(thousand million francs) Great Britain	France	Germany
1862	144,000,000		3.6	—	—
1872	600,000,000	45.6	15	10 (1869)	—
1882	875,000,000	27.5	22	(1880) 15	?
1893	1,698,000,000	74.8	42	(1890) 20	
				27 (1902)	12.5 (1902)
				40 (1910)	35 (1910)
1914	4,000,000,000		(75-100 (1914))	60 (1914)	44 (1914)**

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 282.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 242.—*Ed.*

p. 59. "In 1893 the British capital invested abroad
15% || represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth of the United Kingdom: nearly one-half of this capital (£770 mill.) was in the form of loans to foreign and colonial governments; of the rest a large proportion was invested in railways, banks, telegraphs and other public services, owned, controlled, or vitally affected by governments, while most of the
(*) remainder was placed in lands and mines, or in industries directly dependent on land values."*

The figure £1,698,000,000, according to Sir R. Giffen's calculations, should be considered less than the actual one.

(*) **p. 59. Investments: Loans foreign—£525,000,000, colonial—£225,000,000, municipal—£20,000,000, total of loans =£770,000,000. Railways: U.S.A.—£120,000,000; colonial—£140,000,000, and various—£128,000,000; total of railways—£388,000,000. Sundries: Banks=£50,000,000; lands=£100,000,000; mines, etc.=£390,000,000.**

$$\Sigma = \left.\begin{array}{r}770\\388\\540\end{array}\right\} 1{,}698$$

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p. 60. "It is not too much to say that the modern
N.B. || foreign policy of Great Britain is primarily a *struggle for profitable markets of investment*."

pp. 62-63. "Much, if not most, of the debts are 'public', the credit is nearly always private....

"Aggressive Imperialism, which costs the tax-payer so dear, which is of so little value
|||| to the manufacturer and trader ... *is a source of great gain to the investor*....

"The annual income Great Britain derives from commissions on her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimat-

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 277.—*Ed.*

ed by Sir R. Giffen[1]) at £18,000,000 for 1899, taken at 2½ per cent, upon a turnover of £800,000,000." Great as this sum is, it cannot explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain, which is explained by the income of "£90,000,000 or £100,000,000, representing pure profit upon investments".*

18 mill.

versus

90 mill.

[1]) ***Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXII, p. 9.**

Investors are interested in lessening the risks connected with the political conditions in the countries where they invest their capital. "*The investing and speculative classes* in general also desire that Great Britain should take other foreign areas under her flag in order to secure new areas for profitable investment and speculation."

N.B.

p. 63. "If the special interest of the investor is liable to clash with the public interest and to induce a wrecking policy, still more dangerous is the SPECIAL INTEREST OF THE FINANCIER, THE GENERAL DEALER IN INVESTMENTS. In large measure the rank and file of the investors are, both for business and for politics, the cat's-paw of the great financial houses, who use stocks and shares not so much as investments to yield them interest, but as material for ***speculation*** *in the money* market."

N.B.

p. 68. "Such is the array of distinctively economic forces making for Imperialism, a large loose group of trades and professions seeking profitable business and lucrative employment from the expansion of military and civil services, from the expenditure on military operations, the opening up of new tracts of territory and trade with the same, and the provision of new capital

* Ibid., p. 277.—*Ed*.

which these operations require, all these finding their central guiding and directing force in the power of the ***general financier***". (***Finance capital.***)

p. 72. The consequence of markets seized by France and Germany being closed to Great Britain has been that the latter has closed her markets to them. "Imperialism, when it has shaken off the 'old gang' of politicians who had swallowed Free Trade doctrine when they were young, will openly adopt the Protectionism required to round off this policy" (**72-73**)....

p. 78. The manufacturer and trader are satisfied by trading with other nations; the investors of capital, however, exert every effort "towards the political annexation of countries which contain their more speculative investments".

Capital investment is advantageous for a country, opening new markets for its trade "and employment for British enterprise". To refrain from "imperial expansion" means to hand over the world to other nations. "Imperialism is thus seen to be, not a choice, but a necessity" **(= the view of the imperialists)**....

pp. 80-81 (trusts). Free competition has always been accompanied by "over-production", which led to prices falling to such a level as to remove weaker competitors from the arena of competition. The first step in the formation of a trust is the closing down of the worst-equipped and worst-situated factories, and the cutting of production costs by using only the most up-to-date machines.

"This concentration of industry in 'trusts' ... at once limits the quantity of capital which can be effectively employed and increases the share of profits out of which fresh savings and fresh capital will spring." The trust arises as an antidote to over-production, to excessive investment of capital in the given industry; hence not all the capital which the participants in the trust want to put into circulation can be invested within the framework of the trust. The trusts endeavour to invest the surplus capital so as "to establish similar combinations in other industries, economising capital still further, and rendering it ever harder for ordinary saving men to find investments for their savings".

pp. 82-84. America's home market is saturated, capital no longer finds investment.

"It is this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufactures and for investments which is avowedly responsible for *the adoption of Imperialism* as a political policy and practice by the Republican Party to which the great industrial and financial chiefs belong, and which belongs to them. The adventurous enthusiasm of President Roosevelt and his 'manifest destiny' and 'mission of civilisation' party must not deceive us. *It is Messrs. Rockefeller*, Pierpont Morgan, Hanna, Schwab, and their associates *who need Imperialism* and who are fastening it upon the shoulders of the great Republic of the West. They need Imperialism because they desire to use the public resources of their country to find profitable employment for the capital which otherwise would be superfluous.

N.B.

"It is not indeed necessary to own a country in order to do trade with it or to invest capital in it, and doubtless the United States can find some vent for its surplus goods and capital in European countries. But these countries are for the most part able to make provision for themselves: most of them have erected tariffs against manufacturing imports, and even Great Britain is being urged to defend herself by reverting to Protection. The big American manufacturers and financiers will be compelled to look to China and the Pacific and to South America for their most profitable chances. Protectionists by principle and practice, they will insist upon getting as close a monopoly of these markets as they can secure, and the competition of Germany, England, and other trading nations will drive them to the establishment of special political relations with the markets they most prize. Cuba, the Philippines, and Hawaii are but the *hors d'oeuvre* to whet an appetite for an ampler banquet. Moreover, the powerful hold upon politics which these industrial and financial magnates possess forms a separate stimulus, which, as we have shown, is operative in Great

N.B. Britain and elsewhere; the public expenditure in pursuit of an imperial career will be a separate immense source of profit to these men, as financiers negotiating loans, shipbuilders and owners handling subsidies, contractors and manufacturers of armaments and other imperialist appliances."

p. 86. With the introduction of improved methods of production, concentration of ownership and control, the capitalists find it more and more difficult "to dispose profitably of their economic resources, and they are tempted more and more to use their governments in order to secure for their particular use some distant undeveloped country by annexation and protection".

N.B.

ha-ha!! the essence of philistine criticism of imperialism

At first sight it seems that the productive forces and capital have outgrown consumption and cannot find application in their own country. Therein, he says, lies the root of imperialism. But ... "*if the consuming public* in this country raised its standard of consumption to keep pace with every rise of productive powers, there could be no excess of goods or capital clamorous to use Imperialism in order to find markets".

p. 89. "The volume of production has been constantly rising owing to the development of modern machinery." Wealth can be used by the population or by a handful of rich people. The level of wages puts a limit on use by the population. Personal consumption by the rich, owing to their small number, cannot absorb a very large quantity of products. "The rich will never be so ingenious as to spend enough to prevent over-production." The chief part of production is devoted to "accumulation". The stream bearing this huge mass of products "is not only suddenly found to be incapable of further enlargement, but actually seems to be in the process of being dammed up".

p. 91. "Thus we reach the conclusion that *Imperialism is* the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets ***and*** *foreign*

investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home.

inevitability of imperialism

"*The fallacy of the supposed inevitability* of imperial expansion as a necessary outlet for progressive industry is now manifest. *It is not industrial progress* that demands the opening up of new markets and areas of investment, *but* MALDISTRIBUTION of consuming power which prevents the absorption of commodities and capital within the country."

cf. K. Kautsky

p. 94. "There is no necessity to open up new foreign markets; the home markets are capable of indefinite expansion."

cf. K. Kautsky

p. 96. "Trade unionism and socialism are thus the natural enemies of imperialism, for they take away from the 'imperialist' classes the surplus incomes which form the economic stimulus of imperialism."

p. 100. "Imperialism, as we see, implies the use of the machinery of government by private interests, mainly capitalist, to secure for them economic gains outside their country."

"The average yearly value of our *foreign trade* for 1870-75, amounting to £*636*,000,000, increased in the period 1895-98 to £*737*,000,000, the average public expenditure advanced over the same period from £63,160,000 to £94,450,000. It is faster than the growth of the aggregate *national income*, which, according to the rough estimates of statisticians, advanced during the same period from about £*1*,*200*,000,000 to £*1*,*700*,000,000."

pp. 101-02. "This growth of naval and military expenditure from about *25* to *60* millions in a little over a *quarter* of a century is the most significant fact of imperialist finance. The financial, industrial, and professional classes, who, we have shown, form the economic core of Imperialism, have used their political power to extract these sums from the nation in order

to improve their investments and open up new fields for capital, and to find profitable markets for their surplus goods, while out of the public sums expended || on these objects they reap *other great private gains* in the shape of profitable *contracts*, and lucrative or honourable *employment*."

|| *p. 103*. "While the directors of this *definitely* ***parasitic*** *policy* are capitalists, the same motives appeal to SPECIAL CLASSES OF THE WORKERS. In many towns most important trades are dependent upon || government employment or contracts; the Imperialism of the metal and shipbuilding centres is attributable in no small degree to this fact."*

p. 114. "In other nations committed to or entering upon an imperialist career with the same ganglia of || *economic interests masquerading as patriotism*, *civilisation*, *and the like*, Protection has been the traditional finance, and it has only been necessary to extend it and direct it into the necessary channels."

| *p. 115*. "both (*) ... will succumb more and more to the *money-lending* classes dressed as Imperialists and patriots."

p. 120. "Of the three hundred and sixty-seven || millions of British subjects outside these isles, not !! more than ten millions, or one in thirty-seven, have 1/37 || *any real self-government* for purposes of legislation and administration."

p. 121. "In certain of our older Crown colonies there exists a *representative element* in the government. While the administration is entirely vested in a governor appointed by the Crown, assisted by a council nominated by him, the colonists elect a ***portion*** of the legislative assembly....

"The representative element differs considerably in size || and influence, in these colonies, but *nowhere does it outnumber the non-elected element*. It thus becomes an *advisory* rather than a really legislative factor. Not merely is the elected always dominated in numbers by the non-elected element, *but in all*

N. B. || **(*) i.e.**, ***Great Britain*** and ***the United States.***

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 279.—*Ed.*

cases the veto of the Colonial Office is freely exercised upon measures passed by the assemblies. To this it should be added that in nearly all cases a *fairly high property qualification* is attached to the franchise, precluding the coloured people from exercising an elective power proportionate to their numbers and their stake in the country."

p. 131. "In a single word, *the new Imperialism has increased the area of British despotism*, far outbalancing the progress in population and in practical freedom attained by our few democratic colonies.

"It has not made for the spread of British liberty and for the propagation of our arts of government. The lands and population which we have annexed we govern, insofar as we govern these at all, by *distinctively* ***autocratic*** *methods*, administered chiefly from Downing Street, but partly from centres of colonial government, in cases where self-governing colonies have been permitted to annex."

p. 133. "The *pax Britannica*, always an ***impudent falsehood***, has become of recent years a grotesque monster of hypocrisy; along our Indian frontiers, in West Africa, in the Sudan, in Uganda, in Rhodesia, *fighting* ***has been well-nigh incessant***."

p. 134. "Our economic analysis has disclosed the fact that it is ***only*** the interests of competing *cliques* of *businessmen*—investors, contractors, *export* manufacturers, and certain professional classes—that are antagonistic; that these cliques, *usurping* the authority and voice of the people, use the public resources to push their private businesses, and spend the blood and money of the people in this vast and disastrous military game, ***feigning national*** antagonisms which have no basis in reality."

pp. 135-36. "If we are *to hold all* that we have taken since 1870 and to compete with the new industrial nations in the further partition of empires or spheres of influence in Africa and Asia, *we must be prepared to fight*. The enmity of rival empires, openly displayed throughout the South African war,

is admittedly due to the policy by which we have forestalled, and are still seeking to *forestall*, these rivals in the *annexation* of territory and of markets throughout the world."

pp. 143-44. "The organisation of vast native forces, armed with 'civilised' weapons, drilled in 'civilised' methods, and commanded by 'civilised' officers, formed one of the most conspicuous features of *the latest stages of the great Eastern Empires*, *and afterwards of the Roman Empire*. It has proved one of the *most perilous devices* of ***parasitism***, by which a metropolitan population entrusts the defence of its lives and possessions to the precarious fidelity of 'conquered races', commanded by ambitious pro-consuls.

!! "One of the strangest symptoms of the *blindness* of Imperialism is the reckless indifference with which *Great Britain*, *France and other imperial* nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. *Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire* has been done by *natives*; in India, as more recently in Egypt, *great standing armies* are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions, *except in the southern* part, has been done for us by natives."*

p. 151. "In Germany, France, and Italy the *Liberal* Party, as a factor in practical politics, has *either disappeared* or is reduced to impotence; in England it now stands convicted of a gross palpable betrayal of the first conditions of liberty, feebly fumbling after programmes as a substitute for principles.... This surrender to Imperialism signifies that they have preferred the economic interests of the possessing and speculative classes, to which most of their leaders belong, to the cause of Liberalism."

!! ha-ha!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 279.—*Ed.*

p. 157. "Amid *this general decline* of parliamentary government the 'party system' is visibly *collapsing*, based as it was on plain cleavages in domestic policy which have ***little*** significance when confronted with the *claims and powers of* ***Imperialism.***"

pp. 158-59. "Not merely is the *reaction* possible, it is ***inevitable***. As the despotic portion of our Empire has grown in area, a larger and larger number of men, trained in the *temper and methods of autocracy* as soldiers and civil officials in our ***Crown colonies***, protectorates, and Indian Empire, reinforced by numbers of *merchants*, planters, engineers and ***overseers***, whose lives have been those of a *superior caste* living an artificial life removed from all the healthy restraints of ordinary European society, have returned to this country, bringing back the *characters, sentiments, and ideas imposed by this foreign environment.*"

Chapter II (162-206)—twaddle. **It is headed "The Scientific Defence of Imperialism" and devoted to a "scientific" (in reality, commonplace-liberal) refutal of Darwinist "biological", etc., "scientific justifications" of imperialism.**

peace and colonies

pp. 204-05. "Suppose a *federal government of European nations* and their colonial offspring to be possible in such wise that internal conflicts were precluded, this peace of Christendom would be constantly *imperilled by the 'lower races'*, black and yellow, who, adopting the arms and military tactics now discarded by the 'civilised races', would overwhelm them in barbarian incursions, even as the ruder European and Asiatic races overwhelmed the Roman Empire."

Two causes weakened the old empires: (1) "economic parasitism"; (2) formation of armies recruited from subject peoples.*

* Ibid., p. 279.—*Ed.*

p. 205. "There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling State has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich
N.B. || its ruling class and ***to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence***."*

pp. 205-06. "This fatal conjunction of folly and vice has always contributed to bring about the downfall of Empires in the past. Will it prove fatal to a federation of European States?

"Obviously it will, if the strength of their combination is used for the same *parasitic purposes*, and the white *races*, *discarding*
N.B. || *labour in its more arduous forms*, LIVE AS A SORT OF WORLD ARISTOCRACY BY THE EXPLOITATION OF 'LOWER RACES', while they hand over the policing of the world more and more *to members*
N.B. || *of these same races*." ||

p. 207. "Analysis of the actual course of ***modern*** (**N.B. concept**) Imperialism has laid bare the combination of economic and political forces
!! which fashions it. These forces are traced to their sources in the ***selfish*** interests of certain industrial, ***financial***, and professional classes, seeking private advantages out of a policy of imperial expansion, and using this same policy to protect them in their economic, political, and social privileges against the pressure of democracy."

pp. 210-11 (note 2). "How far the
on the question of self-determination || *mystification* of motives can carry a trained thinker upon politics may be illustrated by the *astonishing* argument of Professor Giddings, who, in discussing '*the consent of the governed*' as a condition of government, argues that 'if a barbarous people is compelled to accept the authority
!! of a State more advanced in civilisation, the test of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of this imposition of authority is to be

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 279.—*Ed*.

found, not at all in any assent or resistance at the moment when the government begins, but only *in the degree of probability* that, after full experience of what the government can do to raise the subject population to a higher plane of life, a *free and rational consent will be given* by those who have come to understand all that has been done' (*Empire and Democracy*, p. 265). Professor Giddings does not seem to recognise that the entire weight of the ***ethical*** validity of this ***curious*** doctrine of retrospective consent is thrown upon the act of judging the *degree of probability that a free and rational consent will be given*, that his doctrine furnishes no sort of security for a competent, unbiassed judgement, and that, in point of fact, IT ENDOWS ANY NATION WITH THE RIGHT TO SEIZE AND ADMINISTER THE TERRITORY OF ANYOTHER nation on the ground of a self-ascribed superiority and self-imputed qualifications for the work of civilisation."

!!

ethical socialist

pp. 212-18 **(a reply to those defending imperialism on the ground of 'Christian' missionary activity):** "What is the mode of equating the two groups of results? how much *Christianity and civilisation balance*, *how much industry and trade*? are curious questions which seem to need an answer."

bien dit!!

p. 214. "He" **(Lord Hugh Cecil in his speech on May 4, 1900, in the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (!!!))** "thought that by making prominent to our own minds the importance of missionary work we should to some extent ***sanctify*** the spirit of Imperialism."

gem!

p. 224. "*The controlling and directing agent of the whole process*, as we have seen, is the pressure of *finan-*

"finance capital"

ial and industrial motives, operated for the direct, short-range, material interests of SMALL, ABLE, AND WELL-ORGANISED groups in a nation."

((from the side-lines, from afar, they look on and whip up passions, as during the Boer war.[34]))

pp. 227-28. "***Jingoism*** is merely the lust of the spectator, unpurged by any personal effort, risk, or sacrifice, gloating in the perils, pains, and slaughter of fellow-men whom he does not know, but whose destruction he desires in a blind and artificially stimulated passion of hatred and revenge. In the ***Jingo*** all is concentrated on the hazard and blind fury of the fray. The arduous and weary monotony of the march, the long periods of waiting, the hard privations, the terrible tedium of a prolonged campaign, play no part in his imagination; the redeeming factors of war, the fine sense of comradeship which common personal peril educates, the fruits of discipline and self-restraint, the respect for the personality of enemies whose courage he must admit and whom he comes to realise as fellow-beings—*all these moderating elements in actual war are eliminated from the passion* of the ***Jingo*** . It is precisely for these reasons that some friends of peace maintain that the two most potent checks of militarism and of war are the obligation of the entire body of citizens to undergo military service and the experience of an invasion.

quaint!

..."It is quite evident that THE SPECTATORIAL LUST OF JINGOISM is a *most serious factor* in *Imperialism*. The dramatic falsification both of war and of the *whole policy of im-*

perial expansion required to feed this popular passion forms no small portion of the art of the *real organisers* of imperialist, exploits, the small *groups of businessmen and politicians who know what they want and how to get it.*

"Tricked out with the real or sham glories of military heroism and the magnificent claims of empire-making, ***Jingoism*** becomes a NUCLEUS OF A SORT OF PATRIOTISM which can be moved *to any folly* or *to any crime.*" **sic!**

pp. 232-33. "The area of danger is, of course, far wider than Imperialism, covering the whole field of *vested interests.* But, if the analysis of previous chapters is correct, *Imperialism stands as a first defence of these interests*: for the ***financial*** and speculative classes it means a pushing of their private businesses at the public expense, for the *export* manufacturers and merchants a forcible enlargement of ***foreign*** markets and a related policy of Protection, for the *official* and *professional* classes large *openings* of *honourable and lucrative employment*, for the ***Church*** it represents the temper and practice of authority and the assertion of spiritual control over vast multitudes of lower people, for the *political oligarchy* it means the only effective *diversion of the forces of democracy* and the opening of great public careers in the showy work of empire-making." "**diversion**"

p. 238. Mr. Kidd, Professor Giddings and the "***Fabian***" (N.B.) ***Imperialists*** ascribe the need for "a control of the tropics by 'civilised' nations" to *material* necessity. The natural riches of tropical countries "are of *vital importance to the maintenance and progress of Western civilisation....* Partly **!!**

from sheer growth of population in temperate zones, partly from the rising standard of material life, this dependence of the temperate on the tropical countries must grow". Ever larger areas of the tropical countries have to be cultivated. At the same time, owing to the characteristics which the hot climate develops in the local inhabitants, the latter are incapable of progress: they are feckless, their wants do not grow larger. "The resources of the tropics will not be developed voluntarily by the natives themselves" (239).

pp. 239-40. "We cannot, it is held, *leave these lands barren*; it is our duty to see that they are developed for the good of the world. White men cannot 'colonise' these lands and, thus settling, develop the natural resources by the labour of their
!!! || own hands; *they can only organise and superintend* the labour of the natives. By doing this they can ***educate*** the natives in the arts of industry and stimulate in them a desire for material and moral progress, implanting new 'wants' which form in every society the roots of civilisation."

p. 251. "In a word, until some genuine international council exists, which shall accredit a civilised nation with the duty of educating a lower race, the
(*) claim of a 'trust' is nothing else than an ***impudent act of self-assertion***."

(*)!! trust (the colonies "trust" that they will be educated, they trust this "business" to the metropolises)!!

pp. 253-54. A trust of the chief European powers would mean the exploitation of the non-European countries. The Europeans' rule in China "sufficiently exposes the hollowness in actual history of the claims that considerations of a trust for civilisation animate and regulate the foreign policy of Christendom, or of its component
|| nations.... *When any common international policy* is adopted for dealing with *lower* races it has partaken *of the nature, not of a moral trust, but of a business deal*'".

(((On the question of a United States of Europe!!)))

pp. 259-60. "The widest and ultimately the most important of the struggles in South Africa is that between the policy of Basutoland and that of Johannesburg and Rhodesia; for there, if anywhere, we lay our finger on the difference between a '*sane*' *Imperialism*, devoted to the protection, education and self-development of a 'lower race', and an '*insane*' *Imperialism*, which hands over these races to the economic exploitation of white colonists who will use them as 'live tools', and their lands as repositories of mining or other profitable treasure."

p. 262 (note). "In the British Protectorate of Zanzibar and Pemba, however, ***slavery still exists*** ... and British courts of justice recognise the status"..... Liberation proceeds too slowly, many being interested persons. "Out of an estimated population of 25,000 slaves in Pemba, less than 5,000 had been liberated so far under the decree." **!!**

The sultan's decree on liberation of slaves was promulgated in 1897, but this statement was made in 1902, on April 4, at a meeting of the Anti-Slavery Society. **((1897-1902))**

p. 264. "The real history of Imperialism ***as distinguished from*** Colonialism clearly illustrates this tendency" **(the tendency to make the natives exploit *their* land for *our* benefit).**

p. 265. "In most parts of the world a purely or distinctively ***commercial*** motive and conduct have furnished the nucleus out of which ***Imperialism*** has grown, the early trading settlement becoming an industrial settlement, with land and ***mineral concessions*** growing round it, an industrial settlement involving ***force*** for protection, for securing further concessions, and for checking or punishing infringements of agreement or breaches of order; other interests, political and

religious, enter in more largely, the original commercial settlement assumes a *stronger political and military character*, the reins of government are commonly taken over ***by the State from the company***, and a vaguely defined protectorate passes gradually into the form of a colony."

p. 270. The local inhabitants are forcibly compelled to work for industrial companies; this is sometimes done in the guise of organising a "militia" from the local population, ostensibly for defence of the country but in fact it has to work for the European industrial companies.

N.B.

p. 272. A boat comes to the shore, the chiefs are captivated by gifts of beads and trinkets, in return for which they put their mark to a "treaty", the meaning of which they do not understand. The treaty is signed by an interpreter and the adventurer who has come to the country, which is thereafter regarded as the ally **(colony)** of the country from which he has come, France or Great Britain.

!!

p. 280. Where direct slavery has been abolished, ***taxation*** is the means by which the natives are forced to go to work. "These taxes are not infrequently applied so as to dispossess natives of their land, force them to work for wages, and even to drive them into insurrections which are followed by wholesale measures of confiscation."

p. 293. "But so long as the private, short-sighted business interests of white farmers or white mine-owners are permitted, either by action taken on their own account or through pressure on a Colonial or Imperial Government, to invade the lands of 'lower peoples', and transfer to their private profitable purposes the land or labour, the first law of '***sane***' ***Imperialism*** is violated, and the phrases about *teaching 'the dignity of labour'* and raising races of 'children' to manhood, whether used by directors of mining companies or by statesmen in the House of Commons, *are little better than wanton exhibitions of* ***hypocrisy***. They are based on a FALSIFICATION OF THE FACTS, AND A PERVERSION OF THE MOTIVES which actually direct the policy."

p. 295. "The stamp of '*parasitism*' is upon every ***white settlement*** among these lower races, that is to say, nowhere are the relations between whites and coloured people such as to preserve a wholesome balance of mutual services. The best services which white civilisation might be capable of rendering, by examples of normal, healthy, white communities practising the best arts of Western life, are precluded by climatic and other physical conditions in almost every case: the presence of a scattering *of white officials*, *missionaries*, *traders*, *mining or plantation overseers*, a ***dominant*** male caste with little knowledge of or sympathy for the institutions of the people, is ill-calculated to give to these lower races even such gains as Western civilisation might be capable of giving." **N.B.**

p. 301. "The Rev. J. M. Bovill, rector of the Cathedral Church", is "the professional *harmoniser of God and Mammon*". In his book *Natives under the Transvaal Flag*, he describes how the natives are allowed to erect tents near the mines, which enables them to "live more or less under the same conditions as they do in their native kraals". All this is mere ***hypocritical*** phrase-mongering; the life of the natives "is entirely agricultural and pastoral", but they are compelled to *labour* in the mines for a wage.

p. 304. "The natives upon their locations will be *ascripti glebae*, living in complete serfdom, with no vote or other political means of venting their grievances, and with no economic leverage for progress."

pp. 309-10. "But millions of peasants in India are struggling to live on *half an acre*. Their existence is a *constant struggle with starvation*, ending too often in defeat. Their difficulty is not to live *human* lives—lives up to the level of their poor standard of comfort—but to live at all and not die.... We may truly say that in India, except in the irrigated tracts, famine is chronic—endemic." **(size of peasant holdings in India)** **N.B.**

p. 323. "The delusion" (**that "we are civilising India"**) "is only sustained by the sophistry of

Imperialism, which weaves these fallacies to cover its nakedness and the advantages which certain interests suck out of empire."

p. 324. "The *new* Imperialism differs from the older, first, in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire the theory and the practice of ***competing empires***, each motived by similar lusts of political aggrandisement and commercial gain; secondly, in the *dominance* of ***financial*** or *investing* over mercantile interests."*

N.B.: the difference between the *new* imperialism and the old

pp. 329-30. "It is at least conceivable that China might so turn the tables upon the Western industrial nations, and, either by adopting their capital and organisers or, as is more probable, by substituting her own, might *flood their markets* with her cheaper manufactures, and refusing their imports in exchange might take her payment in liens upon their capital, reversing the earlier process of investment until she gradually obtained financial control over her quondam patrons and civilisers. **This is no idle speculation." (China may awaken)**....

pp. 332-33. "Militarism may long survive, for that, as has been shown, is serviceable in many ways to the maintenance of a ***plutocracy***. Its expenditure furnishes a *profitable support* to certain strong vested interests, it is a *decorative* element in social life, and ***above all*** it is necessary to *keep down* the pressure of the forces of internal reform. Everywhere the power of capital in its more concentrated forms is better organised than the power of labour, and has reached a further stage in its development; ***while labour has talked of international co-operation, capital has been achieving it***. So far, therefore, as the greatest financial and commercial

bien dit!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 269.—*Ed.*

interests are concerned, it seems quite probable that the coming generation may witness so powerful an international union *as to render wars between the Western nations almost impossible*. Notwithstanding the selfish jealousies and the dog-in-the-manger policies which at present weaken European action in the Far East, the *real drama* will begin when the forces of international capitalism, claiming to represent the civilisation of united Christendom, *are brought to bear on the peaceful opening up of* ***China***. It is ***then*** that the real 'yellow peril' will begin. If it is unreasonable to expect that China can develop a *national* ***patriotism*** which will enable her to *expel* the Western exploiters, she must then be *subjected* to a process of disintegration, which is more aptly described as 'the break-up' of China than by the term 'development'.

("a United States of Europe"

"Not until then shall we realise the full *risks* and ***folly*** of the most stupendous *revolutionary* enterprise history has known. The Western nations may then awaken to the fact that they have permitted certain little cliques of private profit-mongers *to engage them in a piece of Imperialism* in which every cost and peril of that hazardous policy is *multiplied a hundred-fold*, and from which there *appears no possibility of safe* withdrawal."

p. 335. **((N.B.: the prospect of parasitism.))** "The *greater* part of *Western* Europe might ***then*** assume the appearance and character already exhibited by ***tracts*** of country in the *South of England*, in the ***Riviera***, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of *Italy* and ***Switzerland***, *little clusters* of wealthy ***aristocrats*** drawing dividends and pensions from the *Far East*, with a somewhat larger group of professional *retainers* and *tradesmen* and a larger body of *personal servants and workers in the transport trade* and in the ***final*** stages of pro-

duction of the more perishable goods: all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple *foods and manufactures flowing in as* ***tribute*** *from Asia and Africa.*"*

p. 337. "But the economic *raison d'être* of Imperialism in the opening up of China is, as we see, quite other than the maintenance of ordinary commerce: it consists in establishing a vast new market for Western investors, the profits of which will represent the gains of an investing class and not the gains of whole peoples. The normal healthy processes of assimilation of increased world-wealth by nations are inhibited by the nature of this Imperialism, *whose essence consists in developing markets for investment, not for trade*, and in using the superior economies of cheap foreign production to supersede the industries of their own nation, and to maintain the political and economic domination of a class."

***essence* of imperialism**

p. 346. "For ***Europe*** to rule ***Asia*** by force for purposes of gain, and to justify that rule by the pretence that she is civilising Asia and raising her to a higher level of spiritual life, will be adjudged by history, perhaps, *to be the crowning wrong and folly of Imperialism.* What Asia has to give, her priceless stores of wisdom garnered from her experience of ages, we refuse to take; the much or little which we could give we spoil by the brutal manner of our giving. This is what *Imperialism* has done, *and is doing*, ***for Asia.***"

p. 350. "Speaking on Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill in 1886, Mr. Chamberlain said: 'I should look for the solution in the direction of the *principle of* ***federation***. My right honourable friend has looked for his model to the relations between this country and her self-governing and practically independent colonies.'" But federation is better, for then Ireland would remain an integral part of Great

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 279-80.—*Ed.*

Britain, whereas with self-governing colonies the connection is only a moral one. At the present time the development of democracy is towards federation, union, and not separation **(all this is from Chamberlain's speech)**.

Chamberlain is for federation against separation, against "centrifugal" tendencies.[35]

p. 351. "Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal Empires, each with a retinue of uncivilised dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism."*

N.B. *cf.* Kautsky on "ultra-imperialism"

Suggests that the idea is growing of pan-Teutonism, pan-Slavism, pan-Latinism, pan-Britishism, etc., there appears a series of "Unions of States".

The outcome of Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism" and of a United States of Europe *based on* capitalism would be: "inter-imperialism"!!

pp. 355-56. The "United Kingdom", with the present imperialist policy, "cannot bear the financial strain of the necessary increase of ships without substantial colonial assistance". This can lead to the separation of the colonies, whose interests are not bound up with (Great Britain's) imperialist policy, in deciding which **(policy)** they can have no voice. Each of them—as a federal country—would have only an insignificant minority, in view of the huge number of British colonies, which in most cases have very little in common. "Imperial federation" is advantageous to Great Britain and disadvantageous to the colonies.

p. 373. "The new Imperialism ***kills*** a *federation of free self-governing States*: the colonies may look at it, but they will go their way as before."

* Ibid., pp. 293-94.—*Ed.*

pp. 378-79. "The recent habit of investing capital in a foreign country has now grown to such an extent that the well-to-do and politically powerful classes in Great Britain *today derive a large and ever-larger proportion of their incomes from capital invested outside the* ***British Empire***. This growing ***stake*** of our wealthy classes in countries over which they have ***no*** political control is a ***revolutionary*** force in modern politics; it means a constantly growing tendency to use their political power as citizens of this state to *interfere* with the political condition of those States where they have an industrial stake.

policy of finance capital

"The essentially ***illicit*** nature of this use of the public resources of the nation to safeguard and improve private investments should be clearly recognised."

p. 380. "These forces are commonly described as capitalistic, but the gravest danger arises not from ***genuine*** industrial investments in foreign lands, but from the *handling of stocks and shares based upon these investments by financiers.*"

((petty-bourgeois utopia!!))

pp. 381-82. "Analysis of ***Imperialism***, with its natural supports, militarism, oligarchy, bureaucracy, protection, concentration of capital and violent trade fluctuations, has marked it out as the *supreme danger of modern national States*. The power of the imperialist forces within the nation to use the national resources for their private gain, by operating the instrument of the State, ***can only*** *be overthrown by the establishment of a genuine democracy*, the direction of public policy by the people ***for the people*** through representatives over whom they exercise a real control. Whether

petty-bourgeois democrat!!

this or any other nation is yet competent for such a democracy may well be a matter ***of grave doubt***, but until and unless the ***external policy*** of a nation is 'broad-based upon a people's will', there appears little hope of remedy."

democratisation of *foreign* policy

pp. 382-83. "*Imperialism* is only beginning to realise its full resources, and to develop into a fine art the management of nations: the broad bestowal of a franchise, wielded by a people whose education has reached the stage of an uncritical ability to read printed matter, favours immensely the designs of keen business politicians, who, by controlling the press, the schools, and where necessary the churches, *impose Imperialism upon the masses under the attractive* ***guise of sensational patriotism.***

"The ***chief*** economic source of Imperialism has been found in the ***inequality*** of industrial opportunities by which a favoured class accumulates superfluous elements of income which, in their search for profitable investments, press ever farther afield: the influence on State policy of these investors and their financial managers secures a *national alliance of other vested interests* which are threatened by movements of social reform: the adoption of ***Imperialism*** thus serves the ***double*** purpose of securing private material benefits for favoured classes of *investors* and traders at the public cost, while sustaining the *general cause of conservatism* by ***diverting*** public energy and interest from domestic agitation to external employment."

p. 383. "To term ***Imperialism*** a *national* policy is an ***impudent falsehood***: the interests of the ***nation*** are opposed to every act of this *expansive* policy. Every enlargement of Great Britain in the tropics is a distinct enfeeblement of *true British nationalism.* Indeed, Imperialism is commended in some quarters for this very reason, that by breaking the narrow bounds of nationalities it facilitates and forwards internationalism. There are even those who *favour or condone*

à la Cunow and Co.!!

the forcible suppression of small nationalities by larger ones under the impulse of Imperialism, because they imagine that this is the natural approach to a world-federation and eternal peace."

The defenders of imperialism favour swallowing up small nations!!

p. 384. "The hope of a coming internationalism enjoins above all else the maintenance and natural growth of *independent nationalities*, for without such there could be no gradual evolution of internationalism, but only a series of unsuccessful attempts *at a chaotic and unstable cosmopolitanism*. As individualism is essential to any sane form of national socialism, *so nationalism is essential to internationalism*: no organic conception of world-politics can be framed on any other supposition.

hodge-podge

pp. 384-85. Insofar as the **possibility** exists of true national governments representing the interests of the people and not of a handful of oligarchs, **to that extent** clashes between nations will be eliminated and peaceful internationalism **(along the lines of postal conventions, etc.)** based on common interests between nations will increasingly develop. "The economic bond is far stronger and more reliable as a basis of growing internationalism than the so-called racial bond" (pan-Teutonic, pan-Slav, pan-British, etc.) "or a political alliance constructed on some short-sighted computation of a balance of power.

pp. 385-86. "We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western States, *a European federation of Great Powers* which, so *far from forwarding the cause of* world-civilisation, *might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism*, a group

of *advanced industrial nations*, whose ***upper*** classes drew vast tribute from *Asia* and *Africa*, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the ***staple*** industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control *of a new financial aristocracy*. Let those who would *scout such a theory* as undeserving* of consideration examine the economic and social condition of *districts* in *Southern England* today which ARE ALREADY REDUCED TO THIS CONDITION, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible by the *subjection of China* to the economic control of similar groups of *financiers*, *investors*, and political and business officials, draining the *greatest* potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to *consume it in Europe*. The situation is far too complex, the play of world forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future *very probable*; but the influences which govern the ***Imperialism*** of Western Europe today *are moving in this direction*, and, unless *counteracted* or diverted, make *towards some such consummation*.**

N.B.

true

"If the ***ruling*** classes of the Western nations could realise their interests in such a combination (and each year sees capitalism more obviously international), and if China were unable to develop powers of forcible resistance, the opportunity of a *parasitic Imperialism* which should reproduce upon a vaster scale *many of the main features of the later Roman Empire visibly presents itself*."

* In *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin inserts in brackets: "It would be better to say: prospect" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 280, and Vol. 23, p. 109).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 280.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

p. 389. "The ***new*** Imperialism differs in no vital point from this old example" (the Roman Empire). It is just as much a ***parasite***. But the laws of nature, which doom *parasites* to destruction, apply not only to individuals, but to nations. The complexity of the process and disguising its substance can *delay but not avert final collapse*. "The claim that an *imperial* state forcibly subjugating other peoples and their lands does so for the purpose of rendering services to the conquered equal to those which she exacts is notoriously ***false***: she neither intends equivalent services nor is capable of rendering them."

End

NOTEBOOK "λ" ("LAMBDA")

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λ

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Schulze-Gaevernitz, British Imperialism [18-34]

SEMBAT, *EITHER PEACE OR A KING*

Marcel *Sembat*, *Faites un roi sinon Faites la Paix*,[36] **Paris, 1913 (Eug. Figuière). 5th edition ((278 pp.))** (Published July 20, 1913.)

"What if we were to discover, for example, that we are involved in a system of alliances which, owing to the armaments race, leads us straight to war; and that, nevertheless, this system rests on a basis which itself could suffice to ensure peace?" (p. xi).

"Are you not aware, then, that every day modern war becomes more and more like an industrial enterprise? That mobilisation is a huge industrial operation? That, like any industrial operation, it requires technical knowledge and ability?" (p. 13).

"Yes! One can imagine a republic less divorced from all the conditions of life and activity. This is the more necessary because the present republic is not only incapable of making war, as I have tried to indicate in the preceding pages, but is also quite incapable of making peace" (p. 25).

"Do not tell me that one can do without this, that you want no conquest, that you seek only to defend yourself: pure verbiage" (p. 28).

"After the Agadir crisis, I proposed one day in the Chamber of Deputies that we attempt to set up a new body" (p. 31).

"The proposal was for a council composed of all ex-Ministers of Foreign Affairs to direct foreign policy" (p. 31).

"Bring together all the ex-Ministers of Foreign Affairs? But, my dear friend, each one would think only of playing a trick on his successor! What can you be thinking of?" (p. 33).

N.B. "*The modern financial history of France*, if it were ever sincerely written, would be the history of a multitude of individual acts of plunder, like the sack of a conquered city!

N.B. "It is the history of a brainless nation put to the sack by adroit financiers. Let us see what happens when the French state is confronted, not by its own nationals, but by foreign governments" (p. 41).

"To win her* over, M. Delcassé offered her a good piece of Morocco and the promise of our friendly support and military and financial assistance. On condition of a reciprocal service! Two hundred thousand good Spanish soldiers would marvellously fill the gap in our military effectives" (p. 49).

"How many months have we allowed to elapse before recognising the Portuguese Republic?

"At the time of writing, we have still not recognised the Chinese Republic; the United States already treats it as an important personage! But we have sacrificed it to the financiers.

"When Norway was hesitating, did we make a gesture, or even say a word? Yet she was expecting it!" (p. 65).

"Were it not for our twenty years of deliberately quietening and discouraging the Spanish revolutionaries, there would be another republic besides Portugal! We would not have had to buy an alliance with Spain with bits of Morocco! We would not have had to discuss reinstating the law on three years' military service" (p. 68).

"My friend Jaurès, incidentally, has repeatedly told me: 'You exaggerate the danger. One should not believe that war is infallibly bound to break out. Every passing year consolidates peace and lessens the chances of war.

* Spain—*Ed.*

Are they not increased, on the other hand, by our predicting a conflict?'

"I should be glad if I could share this confidence and persuade myself that our joint efforts will dispel this danger for a long time to come. It is because I fear just the opposite, and, by reflecting on this matter for several years, I have felt the opposite idea growing and strengthening in me, that I have written this book" (pp. 76-77).

"Again, how can you expect the Germans to take our peace assurances seriously when the most notorious advocates of revenge declare themselves friends of peace?

"They are led to conclude that France wants revenge and only discretion prevents us from saying so aloud. They feel that we are on our guard, ready to use any opportunity that promises us victory. I ask all Frenchmen of good faith: Are they so wrong? Dare you, in your heart of hearts, affirm that they are wrong? If a clear, unique opportunity were really to occur, putting an enfeebled Germany at the mercy of our blows and offering us certain victory, would we hesitate to seize her? Who among us can guarantee that the will to peace would prevail and that a violent wave of bellicose patriotism would not overwhelm all resistance?" (p. 88).

"A defensive war is just as much a war as an offensive one, and the idea of defence can lead to attack" (p. 91). ||| **N.B.**

"That must be whole-heartedly encouraged! Socialists readily sneer at pacifist efforts! They regard them as a kind of international philanthropy *which, if it does not seek* to deceive others, *deceives itself*, and which closes its eyes to the economic determinism of war, just as private philanthropy takes no account of the mechanism that produces poverty. |||| **N.B.**

"Nevertheless, socialists are wrong to sneer. That does not prevent the majority of socialist deputies from joining the Arbitration Group and supporting all its demonstrations" (p. 93).

"Léon Bourgeois has reached the lofty idea of a Federation of Peoples and of a United States of Europe! Well! Now we are in the vicinity of the International!" (p. 95).

...“The whole proletariat!... an uprising rather than war ... the poisonous press ... the capitalist plots ... Creusot ... the arms manufacturers ... to capitalist force we shall oppose working-class revolt...” (p. 106).

“The people of Paris send fraternal greetings to the German people and declare their readiness to resist by all means, if necessary by a general strike and insurrection, the criminal doings of the war-makers...” (pp. 106-07).

“At bottom I think there is a little uneasiness, the uneasiness of people who are afraid to admit their thoughts” (p. 108).

“‘In the event of war, they will see very well! There *will** be something in the working-class districts!’

“There will? Yes! We have shouted very loud to inspire fear, but we are not at all sure that we can control the thunder, the roaring of which we are imitating.

“The general strike? Yes! The trade unions have voted for it! They will march! Insurrection? The barricades? Yes! The working-class districts will come into action especially if the people believe we are the aggressors, the provokers.

“But what if we are the provoked? If Wilhelm attacks us without further ado?

“‘The German socialists are there to take action!’ That phrase is meant for the opponent or the doubter, and also for the doubter within each of us: it is uttered in a decisive, peremptory tone. But then the inner voice murmurs: ‘And what if the German socialists, like ourselves, have more good will than power?... Take note: the chauvinist press is devilishly cunning when it is a question of confusing the issue, on both sides of the frontier!’” (pp. 108-09).

“And there will be new appeals, articles, more paper! Written by people who dare not say everything, and read by people who dare not admit everything!” (p. 110).

“The black list B is being drawn up at the War Ministry against us alone. In the event of war, it is we who are supposed to threaten the government with recourse to violence” (p. 112).

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* Sembat’s italics.—*Ed.*

"If we feel that we are being provoked, there will be a general commotion, an irresistible stream which, as in Italy, will carry away everything like straws in its overwhelming flood!" (p. 114).

"Better an insurrection!...

"I agree!... Can you visualise the place, the circumstances, the street, the features of the comrades, the number of the newspaper?" (p. 115).

"I fear we shall be able to do nothing when it breaks out" (p. 117).

"There you have the immense service so many times rendered to France by our eminent friend Edouard Vaillant when, at all tragic moments, he hurled in the face of the rulers his famous challenge: '*Better an insurrection than war!*'*

"The rulers understood: 'Let us be more cautious! Let us not imprudently risk war! Let us not light-mindedly risk defeat! It might perhaps be a new September 4!'" (p. 119).

"The beautiful days of Basle, when the processions of the International were thronging the steep streets on their way to the old cathedral!" (pp. 120-21).

"Of the three hundred thousand internationalists in Treptow, how many would have consented to leave a defenceless Germany to face the blows of the chauvinists?

"Not one! Bravo! I congratulate them! Nor shall we agree to surrender France to the pan-Germanists!" (p. 122).

"And so, in each country we rise against our government to prevent it from starting a war, and we put the International above the local fatherlands" (p. 122).

"It follows from this *that today one must not count on us, any more than on the pacifists, to preserve and guarantee the peace of Europe in all circumstances and against all dangers.**

"Sad truth? Whom are you telling that? But it is the truth! It is good to tell it!" (p. 123).

"Let us realise that to cry: 'Down with war! War against war!' without having in mind any practical effort to pre-

* Sembat's italics.—*Ed.*

vent an actual conflict, is to dabble in exorcism, sorcery, magic" (p. 124).

"Magic—the proclamation of an unsatisfied desire, which by means of mimicry hopes to hasten the hour of its satisfaction!" (p. 125).

"The possibility of an insurrection is, as I have said, a powerful means of pressure and an excellent threat. But when the time for threats has passed? When war has been declared?" (p. 126).

"What is to be done? Proclaim the Commune in each town, raise the red flag, revolt, with the insurgents choosing death rather than give way to the troops of the two countries? And are we, scientific socialists, to swallow this nonsense? For modern warfare is a big industrial enterprise. An insurgent town against an enemy army, without artillery, without munitions, is a handicraft worker against a large factory. A modern army would swallow the insurgent towns one after the other, like eating strawberries. In a twentieth-century war, that would be settled in a week! By a hurricane of shells and concentrations of artillery! How the devil would our towns find the time to unite and organise a joint defence, that is to say, if I am not mistaken, to return to a national army capable of withstanding the blow?

"...Heroic sacrifice is the beautiful impulse of a moment: it is not the programme for a party! It is not a tactic! Nor is it a serious military operation, or a strategy!" (p. 127).

"To shout vaguely: 'Down with war!', to threaten the sky with clenched fists and to imagine that this is a safeguard against war, is sheer childishness! It is not enough to fear war in order to save oneself from it, nor to curse it in order to avoid it" (pp. 128-29).

"No treaty obliges us to that. We do it voluntarily; each year, of our own good will we deprive French industry of its natural food while nourishing foreign industry with our savings. Everyone knows it. Everyone approves of it" (p. 199).

"'You give no thought to the fact,' he said, 'that they will demand the admission of German securities on the Paris Stock Exchange!'

"I have given much thought to it, and M. de Waleffe is quite right. In fact, the Germans will certainly demand that" (p. 202).

"For France, the sole result of a Franco-German entente should be to finally establish European peace and ensure for the future the conditions for France's free development and legitimate influence in a consolidated Western Europe" (p. 213).

"To unite with them" **((with whom?))** "to destroy the Germans or put them under their yoke, which we, too, would not escape for long, would mean showing the world a France working on the side of barbarism against civilisation" (p. 218).

"We have heard enough about limitation of armaments! about 'progressive and simultaneous' disarmament!

"These are exactly the proposals my old friend Dejeante put forward, with the boldness of youth, some fifteen or twenty years ago!" (p. 225).

"For my part, I make no attempt to conceal my opinion that a Franco-German rapprochement would be a tremendous historical development, fraught with great consequences and inaugurating a new era for the whole world. On the one hand, in present circumstances, it would be positive, narrow and limited, and, for France, dictated solely by the desire to avoid an imminent war. On the other hand, for the future, it would, I believe, be the embryo of a United States of Europe" (p. 230).

"...it would be the prelude to an invasion like that of the Burgundians or the Normans, a movement of races" (p. 244).

"The point is that the war instinct is intimately and deeply bound up with the idea of fatherland" (p. 246).

"'Down with war!...' Have you noticed one thing? There are never shouts of 'Long live peace!' at anti-war meetings.

"Never! or almost never!...

"Acclaim peace? We have come here to protest against and combat a scourge, an abomination, war, which we hate, and the scoundrels who are preparing it.

"'But, since you hate war, you must love peace!'

"That seems clear, logical, irrefutable. Yet, despite this logic, something deeply imbedded in the spirit of the people says no. And the spirit of the people is right.

"'Long live peace!'—just that cry and no more? Consequently, this peace suits us? We are satisfied? Never! If you like, let us shout: 'Long live the social revolution!' but not 'Long live peace!'. Down with war is all right because its meaning is clear and true. Yes, we hate all war of whatever kind; but it is not true that we love all peace. The working people do not love bourgeois peace, a peace in which, without a battle, they are treated as vanquished. They feel vaguely that by acclaiming such a peace they will create the impression that their only desire is to end the inquietude and return to the everyday routine, to the drudging of the treadmill.

"That is not the case at all!" (pp. 249-50).

"Our militants sense the mood of the crowd" (p. 251).

"But, at the bottom of his heart, he feels that the enthusiasm of the peasant, engendered by his dream of glory, is so bright a flame that one day of this fire is worth more than a whole life of benumbed torpor; and that the young man who will be killed next week on the fortifications of Tchataldja will have lived longer than if he died in his fields at the age of seventy-five.

"He feels this deeply, and if he despises this warlike enthusiasm, it is because he knows another enthusiasm and another war, which seem to him to be superior, and from the height of which he contemplates with compassion and disdain this old enthusiasm of the soldier, which he has known and outlived" (pp. 252-53).

"The worker who has nothing in peacetime, has nothing to lose in wartime. He risks only his skin, but in return he receives a rifle. And with this rifle, he could do a lot. He longs for that. No, it is certainly not economic interest that inspires the worker's hatred of war" (p. 255).

"Do you know what Germany would most certainly win by a new war against France?

"'The Lorraine ore deposits, perhaps?'

"No, much more! At the walls of Paris she will acquire Belgium and Holland, no less. Lower Germany ... and its colonial dependencies, which are considerable" (p. 257).

"For us, the frontiers of the present fatherlands are not

eternal, impassable barriers ... and we see rising above the French horizon the new sun of the United States of Europe" (p. 268).

"If we succeed in organising peace and Europe, then, I believe, the Republic, the Fatherland and the International will be in full accord, and we shall not have to relegate the Republic to the lumber-room" (p. 272).

LIST OF QUOTATIONS FROM SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ'S *BRITISH IMPERIALISM*[37]

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56 from the top
73 colonial possessions (*have doubled*)
75 (a second Ireland)
87 imperialism of the end of the 19th century
104 Multatuli
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SCHULZE-GAEVERNITZ, *BRITISH IMPERIALISM*

Dr. G. von *Schulze-Gaevernitz*, *British Imperialism and English Free Trade at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, Leipzig, 1906 (477 pp.).

Scoundrel of the first order and vulgar to boot, Kantian, pro-religion, chauvinist,—has collected some very interesting facts about British imperialism and has written a lively, readable book. Travelled in Britain and collected a mass of material and observations. You've done a lot of plundering, you British gentlemen; allow us, too, a bit of plundering—with Kant, God, patriotism, and science to "sanctify" it = such is the sum and substance of the position of this "savant"!!

(Also a lot of needless verbiage)

Introduction describes the "foundations of British world power"—the struggle against Holland, France ... the important role of puritanism, religious feeling ((especially)), sexual discipline, etc., etc.

N.B. (workers' *upper stratum* and religion)

In Britain, "religious sects have their stronghold in the middle classes, and partly in the **upper stratum of the workers**, whereas the broad middle strata of workers, especially those of the big towns, are in general little susceptible to religious influences".

the republic and imperialism!!!!

p. 56: The Republic and Cromwell gave a tremendous impetus to imperialism in Britain, and *especially* to the building of the navy: under Charles not more than *two* "ships of the line" were built annually; under the Republic, *22* ships were built in a single year (1654).

And at the apogee of Manchesterism and free trade, foreign policy went forward with particular rapidity: *1840-42* Opium War; naval expenditure (p. 73):

1837	3s. 3d.	per capita
1890	10s. 0d.	" "

"colonies *doubled*"

Between 1866 and 1900 colonial possessions *doubled* (ibidem).

"Sir Robert Peel said long ago: 'In every one of our colonies we have a second Ireland'"... (75). — N.B.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the British Empire's appetite was insatiable: Burma, Baluchistan, Egypt, the Sudan, Uganda, Rhodesia, the South African republics were being devoured" (87).

Incidentally, there is a mention of *Multatuli*, his description of European administration of the colonies (104). — to be verified!!

..."The Asiatic states, which Lord Curzon has called 'the glacis of the Indian fortress': Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Siam" (119).

"Great Britain is gradually becoming transformed from an industrial into a *creditor state*. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, there is an increase in the relative importance of income from interest and dividends, issues of securities, commissions and speculation for the whole of the national economy. In my opinion, it is precisely this that forms the economic basis of imperialist ascendancy. N.B. The creditor is more firmly attached to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer"* (122). — true!!

"He [Peel] thereby" (by establishing and safeguarding a gold currency) "raised the pound sterling to the level of world money—a position which it monopolised until the end of the nineteenth century" (159). — *N.B.*: "monopoly" until the end of the 19th century

"To substantiate these views" (in favour of a customs union of the colonies and Great Britain) "reference is made to the damage imperialist tariff policy causes German exports to Canada.

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 278.—*Ed.*

Canada is the only country where Germany's trade expansion has recently come to a halt. This is in contrast to the powerful growth of British trade, and to the advantage of the West Indian sugar producers" (p. 174).

to be returned to

(N.B.)

	Exports to Canada British (£ mill.)	Exports to Canada German (£ mill.)	German sugar exports to Canada (mill. *marks*)
1898	5.8	1.2	—
1899	7.0	1.2	—
1900	7.6	1.0	4.3
1901	7.8	1.3	6.2
1902	10.3	1.9	9.2
1903	11.1	1.8	2.4
1904	10.6	1.2	0

(p. 217) United Kingdom exports, in £ mill.

	1866	1872	1882	1902
To British possessions	53.7	60.6	84.8	109.0
" Europe	63.8	108.0	85.3	96.5
" non-British Asia, Africa and South America	42.9	47.0	40.3	54.1
" United States	28.5	40.7	31.0	23.8

N.B. "One can, therefore, fully agree with the imperialists in their appreciation of the value of colonial markets. But, in opposition to the financial reform advocates, it has to be noted that Great Britain has not so far required preferential tariffs in order to dominate these colonial markets. The best that

N.B. Britain can expect from such preferential tariffs is to strangle the slowly penetrating foreign capital in the future".

...Incidentally, imperialist trends are strengthened by the fact that "some of these [foreign] protectionist states gain possession of ever more extensive raw-material areas and monopolise them for their own highly protected industry and shipping....

..."The United States has acted especially brusquely in this respect. Previously, trade between the West Indies and the United States

was carried exclusively by British ships. After Puerto Rico had been drawn into a customs union with the U.S.A. and American coastal shipping was given preference, British freight carriers were cut out at a single stroke. In 1900, 97 per cent of the foreign trade of the conquered island was carried by American vessels" (229).

N.B. good example!!

"The German customs tariff hitherto in force a British Blue Book notes, amounted to about 25 per cent of the value of the main British export commodities; France, however, took 34 per cent, the United States 73 per cent, and Russia 131 per cent" (230).

figures *N.B.*

"Whereas from 1865 to 1898 the British national income approximately *doubled*, the 'income from abroad' during the same period, according to Giffen, increased *ninefold*"* (p. 246).

N.B. (very important) *doubled* and *ninefold*

The following quotations are from Robert *Giffen*, *Economic Enquiries and Studies*, 1904, Vol. II, p. 412 [and *Fabian Tract* No. 7].

The income from foreign capital investments in 1898 was from £*90* million (Giffen)
and up to £*118* million. Not less than £*100* million (p. 251):

population		income (estimate)	i.e. per capita
1861	28.9 mill.	£ 311.8 mill.	= £ 10.7
1901	41.4 "	£ 866.9 "	= £ 20.9

N.B.

Export of British Products (excluding ships)
(£ 000)

	(A) To countries with protective tariffs	(B) To neutral markets	(C) To British possessions	Total
1870	94,521	53,252	51,814	199,587
1880	97,743	50,063	75,254	223,060
1890	107,640	68,520	87,371	263,531
1900	115,147	73,910	93,547	282,604
1902	100,753	69,095	107,704	277,552

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 281.—*Ed.*

(A) = Europe and United States. (B) = South America, Asia and Africa = "non-European raw-material areas." (C) = British colonies.

((come back to this again and again)) "The workers [of Great Britain] organised in trade unions began to engage in practical politics long ago. The extension of the franchise made them masters of a democratised state system—the more so because the franchise is still sufficiently *restricted* to *exclude* the **really proletarian** lower stratum"* (298).

N.B. very important!!

"This powerful position of the worker is not dangerous for Great Britain, for half a century of trade union and political training has taught the worker to identify his interests with those of his industry. It is true that he opposes the employer in questions of the level of wages, hours of work, etc., but externally he is at one with the employer in all matters where the interests of his industry are concerned. It is not rare for employers' organisations and workers' trade unions to act together on current economic questions. For example, the Lancashire trade unions supported bimetallism until the Indian currency was put on a gold basis; today they are assisting the efforts to introduce cotton cultivation in Africa" (299).

N.B.

He quotes *E. Bernstein*: "British Workers and the Imperialism of Tariffs Policy" in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Vol. XIX, p. 134.

N.B.

Now (1903) the workers are against Chamberlain (458 votes to 2 at the 1903 Trades Union Congress).... "The *Co-operative Congress*, which embraces the *entire* **upper** *stratum of the workers*, adopted the same attitude" (p. 300).

N.B. (on the co-operatives) N.B.

That the position of the workers has improved is incontestable. Unemployment is not so considerable: "It [unemployment] is a problem that

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 282.—*Ed.*

concerns mainly London and the **proletarian lower stratum**, ***which is politically of little account***"* (p. 301) (author quotes the Board of Trade, *Labour Gazette*, December 1905, p. 355. "In November 1905 there were 24,077 unemployed in London as against 12,354 in the rest of England and Wales") (note No. 400). **N.B.N.B.**

"In view of these facts, the **upper** strata of the British workers see no reason at present for radical changes in British tariff policy" (*p. 301*). **=N.B.**

"What the Manchester Exchange used to be, the London Stock Exchange is now—the focal point of the British national economy. However, it is generally admitted that in the multiform world of the Stock Exchange, the leading place today is taken by exotic securities: colonial, Indian, Egyptian, etc., government and municipal loans; South American, especially Argentine and Japanese loans; American and Canadian railway and copper shares, but above all South African and West Australian gold-mining shares, African diamond shares, Rhodesian securities, etc.... "finance capital"

"In this connection, a new type of man is coming to the fore to take over the helm of the British economy. In place of the industrial entrepreneur with roots in his own country and heavily equipped with buildings and machines, we have the *financier*, who creates values in order to get them off his hands again as quickly as possible" (310). N.B.

Plant growth in the tropics is immeasurably more vigorous. There is "a tremendous future" for the *banana* (its flour), which is very easy to produce, and sorghum, dates, rice, etc. "These products are available in practically unlimited quantities, so that the old Malthusian notion

* Ibid., p. 282.—*Ed.*

of a limited supply of food is refuted and a possible exhaustion of grain areas is no longer a threatening danger" (315-16).

imperialist — (The European is of no use here, but the Negro, he says, cannot be trained without coercion.)

N.B.!! — "In that lies the cultural-historical justification of modern imperialism. Its danger is that Europe, under the extreme stress of the relations of political rule, will shift the burden of physical toil—first agricultural and mining, then the unskilled work in industry—on to the coloured races, and itself be content with the role of rentier, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic, and later, the political emancipation of the coloured races"* (317).

N.B. (prospect)

N.B. "Europe" =rentier (rides on the **Negroes**)

"South America, and especially *Argentina*, is so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as *almost a British commercial colony*"** (318).

(The tropics and subtropics are mostly in British hands.)

N.B. "At the top of the list of foreign investments are those placed in politically dependent or allied countries: Great Britain grants loans to Egypt, Japan, China and South America. Her navy plays here the part of bailiff in case of necessity. *Great Britain's political power protects her from the indignation of her debtors*"...*** (320).

N.B. "As a *creditor state*, she [Great Britain] relies increasingly on colonial, politically more or less dependent regions, on a 'New World'" (author quotes here note No. 422, data on incomes in 1902-03:

!!! from colonial loans—£21.4 million, from foreign

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 281.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 263.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid., pp. 277-78.—*Ed.*

loans—£7.56 million, of which Europe accounts for only £1.48 million!!!). "As a *creditor state*, Great Britain does not depend on the free-trade interests of Britain as an industrial country; on the contrary, under certain circumstances, she is interested in accelerating colonial development through financial reform. Such is the inner connection between the Stock Exchange and imperialism, between foreign policy and Britain's interests as a creditor.

N.B.

N.B.

"The creditor state is steadily advancing to the forefront, compared with the industrial state. At any rate, *Great Britain's income as a creditor is already many times greater than net profit from all her foreign trade*. Giffen estimated that in 1899, net profit from foreign trade was £18 million on a total import and export turnover of £800 million whereas, according to a most cautious estimate, the interest on foreign loans was already £90-100 million. Moreover, it is rapidly growing, while the per-capita foreign trade income is diminishing. It should also be borne in mind that wars and war indemnities, annexations and foreign concessions stimulate Stock-Exchange security issues and that the leaders of the financial world can use most on the press to cultivate imperialistic sentiment. There can be no doubt, therefore, about the economic foundations of imperialism" (321).

N.B.

((but, he adds, not only economics: also ideas, religion, and so on and so forth))

"The dependence of the most important and effective financial interests of the London Stock Exchange on political imperialism is especially noticeable: the South Africans received a victory reward in the form of Chinese labour that they could never have obtained from old Krüger or from a reformed Volksraad.[38] Nothing is more uncomfortable for them than an opponent as weighty as John Burns who believes the Chinese should be sent home and South Africa made a nursery for cultivating white

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trade unions. Even Cecil Rhodes, the idol of the South Africans, preferred unorganised black labour and is supposed to have shifted white employees whose trade union sympathies were known to him !!! to remote regions of the country, where they could freely preach their doctrines to the Bushmen and Zulus. The fear of a white labour movement on the N.B.N.B. Australian pattern is one of the ties which binds the Rand mining magnates to the chariot of political imperialism" (322).

N.B. ((and a note, No. 424, directly quotes this
N.B. statement: the local, South African "leaders of
N.B. industry" *fear* the example of Australia....))

"The number of *rentiers* in Great Britain can be reckoned at about a million" (323).

N.B.

	Population of England and Wales	No. of workers in main industries	Per cent
1851	17, 928,000	4,074,000	23
1901	32,526,000	4,966,000	15

="a decline in the proportion of productively employed workers to the total population"* ((p. 323))....

"The creditor state is laying a deep imprint on some parts of Great Britain. Free trade or financial reform is, in a certain way, an issue of struggle between the industrial state and the creditor state, but, at the same time, it represents the contradiction between the 'suburbia' of Southern England with its villas, where industry and agriculture have been forced into second place, and the productive factory regions of the North. Scotland, too, has been largely taken over by the rentier class and shaped to serve the needs of people who go there for three to four months in the year to play golf, travel in cars and yachts, shoot grouse and fish for salmon. Scotland is the world's most aristocratic 'playground'; it, as has been said with some exaggeration, lives on its past and Mr. Carnegie"** (324) ((here, as in many other places, the author quotes Hobson)).

This is from § 5 (of Chapter III), headed: "The Rentier State."

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 282.—*Ed.*
** Ibid.—*Ed.*

§ 6 is headed: "Capitalist Enervation." Author sets out facts showing Great Britain's lag (behind Germany) in industrial development.

Cites following figures inter alia:

Patents were granted (p. 347):

	To Great Britain	To Germany	To the U.S.A.
In Germany (1904)	574	—	474
" France (1904)	917	2,248	1,540
" Gr. Britain (1903)	—	2,751	3,466
" Italy (1904)	337	1,025	314
" Austria-Hungary (1904)	154	962	209
" Russia (without Finland) (1901)	146	438	196
" Switzerland (1903)	164	897	198
" Canada (1904)	310	185	4,417
" the U.S.A. (1903)	1,065	1,053	—
Total	3,667	9,559	10,814

[Author does not give totals.]

The old puritan spirit has disappeared. *Luxury* is increasing (360 et seq.).... "On horse-racing and fox-hunting alone, Britain is said to spend annually £14,000,000"* (361).... £ 14 million!!

Sport. The Puritans waged a struggle against it. Sport is the sole occupation of "members of the idle, rich class" (362).

"Characteristically, the favourite forms of national sport have a strongly plutocratic stamp" (362).

"They [these forms of sport] assume the existence of a breed of aristocrats who live on the labour of Negroes, Chinese and Indians, on interest and ground-rent flowing in from all over the world, and who value the land of their own country only as a luxury item" (363).

..."The public, and in particular the working-class public, becomes an inactive but passionately interested spectator" (of sport) (363).

..."The rentier stratum is essentially without culture. It lives on past and others' labour and, as William Morris said, it stifles in luxury" (363).

* Ibid.—*Ed.*

"For Great Britain, the question is whether the rentier class has a sufficiently strong neck to bear the social and political yoke which socialism would like to impose on it. Do the British rentiers already possess enough wealth to be bled for the honour of consuming goods produced by British workers, who have an eight-hour day and a 'living wage'?" (374).

"The social protective tariff", the idea behind it: the worker is interested in *high* prices (*Fabian Tract* No. *116*)—p. 375—so that the country should be richer and able to give the worker a greater share.

"It" (the realisation of such ideas) (der Ausbau) "is possible, perhaps, for a twentieth-century Great Britain on the basis of a rentier class which exacts tribute from extensive raw-material areas, pays for raw materials and foodstuffs with interest coupons and dividend warrants, and defends its economic domination by political imperialism. Any attempt to bring the socialist state of the future out of the clouds and on to the earth, would have to reckon with the fact that this is possible only on the basis of a strictly national organisation. The country closest to the social utopia, the Australian Commonwealth, would be lost if, with the words 'Proletarians of all countries unite', it took the Chinese coolie to its heart. The Britain of which the Labour Party dreams is *by no means to be dismissed out of hand as a utopia*, but it would be an artificial social structure and would collapse owing to a revolt of the debtors, whom the ruling creditor state would no longer have the strength to subdue by political means" (375).

And in note No. 512 he quotes from *Justice* magazine, December 16, *1905* (!), that "we" must "crush the German fleet".... "Hyndman [he remarks] embodies the connection between socialism and jingoism, which is especially directed against Germany" (p. 474).

N.B. Very valuable admissions

(1) the "connection" between socialism and chauvinism;

(2) the conditions for the "realisation" of social-chauvinism (the rentier state, keeping the colonies in subjection by political means, etc.)....

(3) workers' exclusiveness and aristocratic attitude (coolies).

Idealism in the service of imperialism:

"Economic activity as such does not raise man above the 'animal world'; this is achieved only by subordinating economic life to supra-economic aims. Thereby, and *only* thereby, does the simple workman, as also the world ruler, become civilised man in the economic sphere. Idealistic population policy, idealistic national policy, and idealistic social policy require a broad economic foundation, which is thus included in the 'realm of aims'; they present expanding claims for which the stagnated and fettered type of economy of the previous period does not suffice. In order to cope with our cultural tasks, we need the broad shoulders of the forward-storming Titan called modern capitalism" (401).

The nation which achieves this "will—for the good of mankind and by the will of God—be at the head of the human race" (402).

Germany at the head of the world

End

In general, everything of scientific value has been *stolen* from Hobson. He is a plagiarist in the cloak of a Kantian, a religious scoundrel, an imperialist, that's all.

Literature sources:

Richard *Jebb*, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, London, 1905.

A. F. W. *Ingram*, *Work in Great Cities*, London (year?)

Schulze-Gaevernitz is especially delighted by Bishop *Westcott*, who "organised friendly intercourse between employers and labour leaders by inviting leading persons from both sides to quarterly conferences in the Bishop's palace ... here people who had hitherto passionately fought one another learned mutual respect" (p. 415, note No. 53).

!!

Holland, *Imperium and Libertas*, London, 1901.
Hobhouse, *Democracy and Reaction*, London, 1904.

((has much of interest on the old, liberal colonial policy))

R. Cobden, Pamphlet by "a free-trader and friend of peace", Bremen, 2nd edition, 1876.
Cobden was a supporter of peace and **disarmament.**
Also discussed in *Nasse*, "The Development and Crisis of Economic Individualism in England", *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 57, No. 5, p. 445.

Cobden — For instance, Cobden's remark about colonial policy: "Is it possible that we can play the part of despot and butcher there [in India] without finding our character deteriorate at home?" (p. 423, note No. 104). Ibidem for the separation of Canada.

Cobden was against the Crimean War (p. 70 in Schulze-Gaevernitz).

John Morley, *Life of Cobden*, London, 1896, Vols. *1* and *2*.

Cobden (N.B.) — "Cobden declared Britain's mastery of the seas a 'usurpation', the possession of Gibraltar a 'spectacle of brute violence, unmitigated by any such excuses'.... For Cobden, British rule of India was 'an utterly hopeless task'... 'a gamble'.... Cobden demanded unilateral reduction of the British army and navy as a first step to international disarmament.... Cobden declared that war was only justified when part of the country's territory had been occupied by the enemy"... (70-71).

!! N.B.

N.B. — *Marcks*, *The Present-Day Imperialist Idea*, Dresden, 1903.

De Thierry, *Imperialism*, London, 1898.
G. P. Gooch, *The Heart of the Empire*, London, 1902 (a Liberal criticism of imperialism).
Doerkes-Boppard, *History of the Constitution of the Australian Colonies*, Munich, 1903.
Baron von *Oppenheimer*, *British Imperialism*, Vienna, 1905.

Irishman's hatred of Britain

The newspaper *The Gaelic American* in New York. Inter alia, the meeting of November 18, *1905* (p. 429, note No. 136)—a protest against the policy of Edward (Delcassé, etc.) of *involvement in a war with Germany*. N.B.
From the resolution:

"England's alliance with Japan guarantees Japanese aid to enable her to hold India in subjection, and she seeks American help to keep Ireland and South Africa down"....

On the "*oppositional* tone of the Indian press" ....

Meredith Townsend, *Asia and Europe*, 3rd edition, 1905.

Younghusband, "Our True Relationship with India" in the symposium *Empire and the Century*. N.B.

Also *his article* in *The Monthly Review*, February 17, 1902 (it is now easier for us to transport 200,000 troops to India than it was to transport 20,000 in 1857, and in face of excellent artillery, what can they do? p. 434, note No. 155).

Of the many books about Cecil Rhodes, the author mentions a "highly amusing lampoon" (note No. 171): *Mr. Magnus*, London (Fisher Unwin), 1896. Title? N.B.?

Africander, "Cecil Rhodes—Colonist and Imperialist" in *The Contemporary Review*, 1896, March.

Paul Jason, *Development of Income Distribution in Great Britain*, Heidelberg, 1905.

R. Giffen, *Economic Enquiries*, London, 1904. Two vols. ("extremely optimistic") (p. 458, note No. 342).

E. Bernstein, "British Workers and the Imperialism of Tariffs Policy" in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, Vol. XIX, p. 134.

L. G. Chiozza-Money, *British Trade and the Zollverein Issue*, London, 1902.

E. Jaffé, *British Banks*, Leipzig, 1905, pp. 125, 142, 172 and passim. "The ratio of bills drawn by foreign countries on Britain to bills drawn by Britain on foreign countries is as 9 : 1" (p. 464, note No. 404). N.B.

Charles Dilke, *The Problems of Greater Britain*, London (year?)
H. D. Lloyd, *Newest England*, 1902 (London).
Schulze-Gaevernitz, *Towards Social Peace*, Leipzig, 1890. Two vols.
⟶ The example of Australia, and her influence: "a socialism that addresses itself to the ruling class".

End

Multatuli.
Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (1913).

NOTEBOOK "μ"
("MU")

Contents

μ

Statistics

Schwarz	[1-3]*
Vorwärts, April 13, 1916	[1]
R. Calwer	[4]
Atlas of the World's Commerce	[8-9]
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Railways	[14-16]

SCHWARZ, *FINANCIAL SYSTEMS OF THE GREAT POWERS*

O. Schwarz, *Financial Systems of the Great Powers*. (Göschen series). Vols. I and II, Leipzig, 1909.

The accompanying table (pp. 1-2)* is *Table VI*, *slightly* (very slightly) abbreviated: "Economic development and welfare indicators."

(National wealth *mostly* according to Mulhall.)

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* See the table inserted between p. 460 and 461.—*Ed*.

m. = millions
md. = 000 millions

	Great Britain					France				
		year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum		year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum
Commodity imports (m.)	£	'75	373	'07	646	m. francs	'75	3,537	'05	4,779
Commodity expors (m.)	£	'75	292	'07	518	" "	'75	3,873	'75	4,867
Output of pig-iron (*mill. tons*)		'75	6.2	'07	10.1	m. tons	'75	1)2.5	'03	1)6.2
Output of cast iron (*mill. tons*)		'80	7.9	'03	9.1	" "	'80	1.7	'03	2.8
Output of steel (*mill. tons*)		'80	3.7	'03	6.0	" "	'80	1.4	'03	1.9
Output of coal (*mill. tons*)		'75	132	'07	268	" "	'80	16.9	'07	36.9
Number of spindles in cotton industry (m.)		'78	47.4	'07	50.7	sugar production	'82	10.6	'07	6.8
						m. kg.	'82	337	'07	727
Grain harvest wheat (mill.)	bushels	'86	63.3	'07	56.5	m. *hectolitres*	'75	102	'03	128
Grain harvest oats (mill.)		'86	170.4	'07	183.7	" "	'75	69	'03	106
Grain harvest barley (mill.)		'86	78.3	'07	67.1	" "	—	—	—	—
Grain harvest rye (mill.)			—		—	" "	'75	27.4	'03	20.4
Grain harvest grape harvest (mill.)			—		—	" "	'75	78.2	'03	35.2
Livestock cattle (mill.)		'74	6.1	'07	6.9	(m.)	'73	11.5	'06	14.0
Livestock sheep (mill.)		'74	30.3	'07	26.1		'73	23.9	'06	17.5
Livestock pigs (mill.)		'74	2.4	'07	2.6		'73	5.5	'06	7.1
Livestock horses (mill.)		'74	1.3	'07	1.6		'73	2.7	'06	3.2
Gainfully employed as percentage of population	%	'85	?10.0%1)	'01	44.0%			?	'01	51.3%
Railways length, *thousands*	miles	'76	16.9	'07	23.1	km.	'75	32.3	'02	49.9
passengers carried (m.)		'76	539	'07	1,259		'75	131	'03	527
goods "	(income from £ (m.))	'76	33.8	'07	58.4	m. tons	'75	58.9	'03	128
Posts and telegraph										
letters delivered (m.)		'76	1,019	'07	2,863		'75	367	'03	1,062
telegrams " "		'75	20.8	'07	93.8		'75	7.6	'03	37.4
Navy sailing vessels (m.)		'76	4.3	'07	1.6		'75	0.8	'03	0.6
tonnage steamships (*tons*)		'76	2.0	'07	2)16.5		'75	0.2	'03	0.6
National wealth	£ md.	'88	10.8	1896	11.8	md. francs	'88	224	1896	244
	£ m.	'82	3)601	'07	3)944					
Savings-bank deposits (m.)	Trustees and companies	'82	44.3	'07	52.2	m. francs	'82	2)65	'03	435
						Postal savings banks	'75	660	'03	3,188
	Postal savings banks	'82	39.0	'07	157.5					
	Property subject to inheritance tax					Endowments and inheritances				
	£ m.	'98	247.3	'07	282.3	m. francs	'75	5,321	'03	6,421
Life insurance	£ m.	'75	37.2	'00	656	m. francs	'76	1,507	'03	3,593
fire "	£ md.	'82	2.8	'02	10.6	" "	'76	3)79	'03	3)118
Per-capita consumption:										
wheat	kg.	'79-83	163.1	'02-06	166.2		'79-83	252.9	'01-05	237.8
rye	"		—		—					
meat	"	'90	4)44.6	'04	4)51.6					
spirits	litres	'85-89	4.3	'00-05	4.6		'85-89	7.6	'00-05	8.1
beer	"		124.8		138.7		'85-89	21.3	'00-05	26.6
wine	"		1.7		1.5		'85-89	92.2	'00-05	116.3
crude sugar	kg.	'84	30.6	'07	39.9		'79-83	9.6	'02-06	13.8
tobacco	"	'79	0.65	'06	0.80		'79-83	0.90	'01-05	0.98
coffee	"	'79	0.44	'06	0.31		'79	1.55	'06	2.51
tea	"	'79	2.14	'06	2.76		'79	0.01	'06	0.03
cocoa	"	'79	0.13	'06	0.55		'79	0.3	'06	0.6
coal (and brown coal)	tons	'83	3.85	'06	4.08		'83	0.8	'07	1.3
pig-iron	kg.	'81	194.9	'06	199.4		'81	52.1	'06	82.4
Notes and additions:	1) An obvious imprint 2) This is "gross" (10.0 net) 3) National income (from "deposits") 4) Including beef 21.1 and 24.6 pork 15.3 17.1 mutton 8.1 9.9					1) "Iron ore" Steam engines (million h.p.) ('75) 0.4 ('03) 2.1 2) "National savings bank") 3) Premiums paid				

Austria-Hungary					Italy					Russia				
	year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum		year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum		year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum
m. kronen " "	'74 '74	1,137 899	'04 '04	2,048 2,089	lire	'75 '75	1,207 1,022	'06 '76	2,417 1,835	m. rubles	'77 '77	321 528	'04 '04	584 955
	'80 '80 '80 '80	[1]0.6 0.3 0.7 13.3	'02 '02 1897 '06	[1]3.3 1.0 1.3 45.8		'80 '80 '80 '80	[1]0.14 0.01 0.08 0.3	'02 '02 '02 '07	[1]0.41 0.03 0.27 0.5	m. tons	'82 '80 '80 '80	[1]1.08 0.44 0.5 3.77	'01 '00 '01 '06	4.72 2.91 2.0 21.3
		?	'06	3.6			?	'07	3.5		'90	3.5	'06	6.6
estimated cereal crop (m. centners)		?	'03	} 597	m. *hectolitres* " " " "	'79-83 '79-83 '79-83	46.8 29.7 (maize) 36.3	'06 '06 '06	62.2 32.8 (maize) 29.8	m. poods (European Russia and Poland)		?	'06 '06 — '06	608 542 — 977 —
	'80 '80 '80 '80	13.9 13.7 6.9 3.6	'00 '07* '00 '07* '00 '07* '00 '07*	15.4 10.2 9.6 4.0	(+goats)	'75 '75 '75 '75	3.5 7.0 1.3 0.7	'05 '05 '05 '05	5.7 10.8 2.2 0.8	(European Russia and Poland) (+goats)	'88 '88 '88 '88	27.6 48.2 10.8 20.9	'07 '07 '07 '07	33.5 39.5 10.6 22.0
		?	'00	51.5%			?	'01	50.1%			?	1897	24.9%
km.	'70 '80 '83 '83	9.6 18.5** 54.5 71.8	'02 '03 '03	49.9 527 128	km. m. m. tons	'80 '87	8.7 45.5 15.1	'04 '03	16.2 68.0 23.7	km. [2]m. poods	'80	23.5 ? ?	'02 '06 '06	52.3 125.5 9.4
	'74 '74	[2]448 5.8	'06 '06	1,164 37.7		'85 '85	188 6.8	'04 '04	293 15.2	(letters and post-cards)	'83 '83	126.4 10.2	'04 '05	810 151
	'77 '77	0.3 0.05	'06 '06	0.05 0.3		'77 '77	0.9 0.02	'06 '06	0.5 0.5		'83 '83	0.5 0.1	'05 '05	0.3 0.4
m. [4]kronen	'88	105	1896	108	md. *lire*	'88	73.1	1896	89.6	md. rubles	'88	256	1896	283
Savings banks Postal savings banks	'80[3]) '91 '82-92 '86[3])	744 906 144 3	'06 '01 '06 '01	4,904 1,397 606 73	Savings banks Postal savings banks	'80 '80	687 ?	1895 1895	1,344 266	m. rubles	'92	250	'08	1,163
m. kronen *md.* kronen	'75 '82	823 15.0	'01-05 '00	3,451 46.8	m. lire *md.* lire	'75 '82	52 6.2	'00 '02	850 52.7	m. rubles *md.* rubles	'75 '82	33 16.3	'00 '02	536 39.2
	'80-84	} 155.9	'02-06	} 174.0		'84	} 123	'06	} 145	kg.	1888	} 13.2 108.7	'06	} 80.0 142.0
	'85-89 '85-89 '85-89 '83-7 '97 '79 '79 '94 '83 '79	8.8 32.0 22.4 6.5 0.7 0.5 0.004 0.02 0.4 11.8	'00-05 '00-05 '00-05 '02-06 '06 '06 '06 '05 '06	10.3 43.2 17.8 15.1 ? 1.0 0.03 0.07 0.8 29.6		'85-9 '85-9 '85-9 '79-83 '84 '79 — '94 '83 '91	1.5 0.8 96.2 2.6 0.6 0.5 — 0.02 0.08 3.9	'00-05 '00-05 '00-05 '99-03 '02 '03 — '06 '05 '03	1.3 0.78 112 3.1 0.5 0.5 — 0.04 0.2 6.1	litres	'85-9 '85-9 '85-9 '83-7 '97 '84 '94 '83 '81	6.46 3.3 ? 3.8 0.57 — 0.4 0.01 0.06 8.4	'00-04 '00-04 '00-04 '02-06 '04 '06 '04 '04	4.94 4.4 ? 7.2 ? — 0.5 0.02 0.15 26.1

[1]) Iron ore
[2]) Postcards+letters
[3]) Austria above; Hungary below
[4]) A misprint? *Md.*??

* For Austria 1900, for Hungary 1907.—*Ed.*
** The first figure is for 1870, the second for 1880.—*Ed.*

[1]) Iron ore

[1]) "Iron ore"
[2]) A misprint? Md. poods?

m. = millions md. = 000 millions	United States					Japan				
		year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum		year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum
Commodity imports (m.)	$ m.	'75	533	'06	1,227	m. yen	'75	$29_{.9}$	'06	$418_{.8}$
Commodity expors (m.)		'75	513	'06	1,744		'75	$18_{.6}$	'06	$423_{.8}$
Output of pig-iron (*mill. tons*)		'75	$2_{.0}$	'06	$25_{.3}$			?		?
Output of cast iron (*mill. tons*)							'90	$20_{.7}$	'03	$33_{.3}$
Output of steel (*mill. tons*)		'75	$0_{.4}$	'05	$20_{.0}$					
Output of coal (*mill. tons*)		'75	$46_{.7}$	'05	$350_{.8}$		'90	$2_{.6}$	'05	$11_{.8}$
Number of spindles in cotton industry (m.)	m. bales	cotton industry				spindles (m.)	'93	$0_{.4}$	'05	$1_{.4}$
		'75	3,827	'06	11,346					
Grain harvest wheat (mill.)	m. bushels	'69-78	$293_{.2}$	'06	$735_{.2}$	m. koku[1])				
Grain harvest oats (mill.)		'69-78	$306_{.9}$	'06	$964_{.9}$	rice	'95	$39_{.9}$	'06	$46_{.3}$
Grain harvest barley (mill.)		'69-78	$323_{.5}$	'06	$178_{.9}$	barley				
Grain harvest rye (mill.)		'69-78	$18_{.3}$	'06	$33_{.4}$	rye and wheat	'95	$19_{.5}$	'06	$20_{.4}$
Grain harvest grape harvest										
Livestock cattle (mill.)		'80	$39_{.7}$	'07	$72_{.5}$		'93	$1_{.1}$	'05	$1_{.2}$
Livestock sheep (mill.)		'80	$42_{.2}$	'07	$53_{.2}$		'99	$0_{.002}$	'05	$0_{.03}$
Livestock pigs (mill.)		'80	$49_{.8}$	'07	$54_{.8}$		'99	$0_{.2}$	'05	$0_{.2}$
Livestock horses (mill.)		'80	$10_{.4}$	'07	$19_{.7}$		'93	$1_{.6}$	'05	$1_{.4}$
Gainfully employed as percentage of population			?	'00	$38_{.4}$%					
Railways length, *thousands*	(miles)	'75	74	'05	217	(miles)	'81-2	$0_{.1}$	'05-6	$4_{.8}$
passengers carried (m.)		'82	375	'05	745		'91-2	$25_{.8}$	'05-6	$113_{.7}$
goods "		'77	360	'05	1,435		'91-2	$2_{.1}$	'05-6	$21_{.5}$
Posts and telegraph										
letters delivered (m.)							'93-4	397	'05-6	1252
telegrams " "		'75	17	'06	97		'93-4	$8_{.4}$	'05-6	$24_{.4}$
Navy sailing vessels (m.)		'75	$3_{.7}$	'06	$2_{.7}$		'94	$2_{.876}$	'06	$2_{.7}$
tonnage steamships (*tons*)		'75	$1_{.2}$	'06	$3_{.97}$		'94	$0_{.3}$	'06	$3_{.97}$
National wealth	$ md.	'80	$43_{.6}$	'04	$107_{.1}$					
Savings-bank deposits (m.)	Savings bank deposits	'75	924	'06	3,300	other savings banks	'95	$12_{.2}$	'06-7	$106_{.6}$
	State's bank deposits $ md.	'75	166	'06	2,741	postal savings banks (m. yen)	'95	$28_{.9}$	'06-7	$81_{.9}$
	national bank deposits	'75	686	'06	4,056	bank deposits	'95	2,832	'05	20,304
Life insurance	$ md.	'80	$1_{.6}$	'05	$13_{.4}$	m. yen	'92	$17_{.5}$	'05	$234_{.7}$
fire "	deposits by fire insurance companies	'90	158 $ md.	'05	296		'92	$12_{.6}$	'05	$851_{.1}$
Per-capita consumption:										
wheat	kg.	'79-83	$109_{.9}$	'02-06	$136_{.1}$					
rye		'88-91	$108_{.7}$	'04-6	$142_{.0}$					
meat										
spirits	litres	'85-9	$4_{.86}$	'00-05	$5_{.4}$					
beer		'85-9	$44_{.26}$	'00-05	$68_{.5}$					
wine		'85-9	$1_{.86}$	'00-04	$1_{.85}$					
crude sugar		'83-4	$21_{.7}$	'06-7	$33_{.9}$					
tobacco										
coffee		'79	$3_{.33}$	'06	$4_{.49}$					
tea		'79	$0_{.54}$	'06	$0_{.49}$					
cocoa		'79	$0_{.27}$	'06	$0_{.6}$					
coal (and brown coal)		'79	$0_{.9}$	'06	$3_{.6}$					
pig-iron		'79	$63_{.7}$	'06	$321_{.8}$					
Notes and additions:						[1]) Koku = $1_{.8}$ *hectolitres* = $4_{.96}$ bushels				

Germany				
	year 18'	sum	year 19'	sum
m. marks	'82 '82	29.9 18.6	'06 '06	418.8 423.8
m. tons	'87 '80 '80 '87	4.0 1.96 1.55 76.2	'07 '03 '03 '05	12.9 8.8 9.22 193.5
Sugar production 000 tons	'79-9	426	'06-7	2,242
m. *tons*	'78 '78 '78 '78	2.6 5.0 2.3 6.9	'07 '07 '07 '07	3.5 9.1 3.5 9.7
	'83 '83 '83 '83	15.8 19.2 9.2 3.5	'07 '07 '07 '07	20.6 7.7 22.1 4.3
		?	1895	42.7%
km.	'75	27.9 ?	'06 '06 '06	55.5 1,191 479.9
m.[1]	'76 '76	0.689 10.5	'06 '06	4.8 43.4
	'76 '76	0.9 0.2	'08 '08	0.4 2.2
md. marks	'88	153	1896	164
md. marks	'75	1.8	'07	13.9
banks deposits *m.*	'83	810 m.	'07	7,050
m.	'95	5,846	'04	8,972
md.	'75	58.6	'00	189
kg.	'78-82	61.4 128.0	'02-06	96.5 151.5
litres	'88-9 '88-9 '88-9 '83-4 '79-83 '79 '80 '70 '70 '79-83	8.1 96.9 6.12 7.7 1.2 2.46 0.019 0.042 0.184 66.0	'00-05 '00-05 '00-04 '06-7 '02-6 '07 '07 '07 '07 '07	8.2 119.7 6.58 18.7 1.6 3.03 0.063 0.528 3.360 168.5

[1]) An obvious misprint. Should be *md.*

Transcriber's Note: This table originally appeared as a single fold-out insert measuring roughly 12 inches in height by 24 inches in length. Its format, consisting of nine columns (the first contained the categories of quantification as they applied to the eight given countries) has been modified to accommodate the more limited visual field of a computer screen.

(Vol. II, p. 93)

State taxes have increased (marks per capita)

							Increase
In *Great Britain* 1875 to 1907-08							
	direct	from	7.6	to	26.6	=	250%
	indirect	”	31.9	”	32.6	=	2%
In *France* 1875 to 1907-08							
	direct	from	12.7	to	18.9	=	49%
	indirect	”	39.2	”	47.2	=	20%
In *Prussia* 1875 to 1908							
	direct	from	5.8	to	8.6	=	48%
	indirect	”	6.6	”	20.4	=	209%
In *Germany* 1881-82 to 1908							
	direct	from	6.3	to	10.4	=	65%
	indirect	”	1.4	”	24.2	=	112%

Vol. II, p. 63

Expenditure on the *army* and *navy* in *Germany*:

	1881-82	1891-92	1908
	408 mill. marks	536	1,069
per capita	9.0 marks	10.8	16.9

VORWÄRTS No. 103, APRIL 13, 1916

Vorwärts, 1916, No. 103 (33rd year), April 13, 1916. Leading article: “The Future Rulers of the World.”

National wealth (1912)

United States	187,740	*million*	dollars
Germany	75,000	”	”
Great Britain	90,000	”	”

United States exports for 10 months of 1915 (1914): to Asia 115.8 (77.6) million dollars; to South America 116.7 (70.4); to Oceania 77.6 (64.8); to Africa 29.1 (22.1).

Imports of munitions, etc., are paid for by the sale of American “securities”: Great Britain “divested” herself of *950* million dollars’ worth; France of *150*, Holland of 100; Germany of *300*; Switzerland of *50*.

Output (million tons)

	Coal (1913)		Iron ore (1913)		Pig-iron (1913)		Steel (1912)	
U.S.A.		517.14		59.44		31.46		31.75
Germany	278.98	570.99	35.94	52.19	19.30	29.94	17.30	24.31
Great Britain	292.01		16.25		10.64		7.01	

Consumption (thousand tons) (1913)

	Copper		Lead		Zinc		Tin	
U.S.A.		348.1		401.3		313.3		45.0
Germany	259.3	404.0	223.5	414.9	221.3	415.9	19.3	43.7
Great Britain	144.7		191.4		194.6		24.4	

Consumption

	Cotton (mill. bales)	
U.S.A.		5.55
Germany	1.26	4.54
Great Britain	3.28	

(This for 1912-13)

CALWER, *AN INTRODUCTION TO*

Richard Calwer, ***An Introduction to the World Eco***
1906

An interesting attempt to summarise the data (about *1900*)
(I try to summarise

# PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC REGIONS OF THE WORLD	Area (million sq. km.)	Population (million)	Population per sq. km.	Railways (000 km.)	Merchant shipping: Ships (000)	Merchant shipping: Net tonnage (mill.)
Central European	27.6 (23.6)	388.4 (146.1)	14.05	203.8	41.2	7.9
British	28.9 (28.6)	398.0 (355.4)	13.75	140.3	35.3	11.1
Russian	22.2	130.8	5.9	63.2	5.6	1.0
East Asian	12.4	389.4	31.4	8.2	5.2	0.9
American	30.3	148.5	4.9	378.9	25.7	6.0
Σ =	121.4	1,455.3	12	794.4	113.0	26.9
"Not counted"	14.6 (approx.)	70		22.3		
Whole world	136	1,525		816.7		

Figures in brackets refer to colonies.

*THE WORLD ECONOMY**

nomy (Vol. 30 of the *Maier-Rothschild Library*), (3 marks).

"*On the Principal Economic Regions of the World*" them in a table):

Telegraph Lines (000 km.)	Tele-grams (mill.)	Foreign trade (imports and exports) (1900) (*thous. mill.* marks)	Coal output (1900) (mill. tons)	pig-iron output (mill. tons)	Gold output (1900) (000 kg.)	No. of cotton spindles (1900) (mill.)	No. of sheep (mill.)	Wool output (mill. kg.)
520.2	168.9	40.9	250.8	14.6	8.2	26.0	89.1	214.4
313.3	121	24.8	249.4	9.4	279.9	51.2	158.5	447.0
171.8	20	3.3	16.1	2.9	36.0	7.0	62.4	191.1
60.7	17	2.4	8.3	0.02	12.4	1.8	{[1])175	59.0}
526.8	79	13.9	245.6	14.0	131.6	19.5	143.5	438.1
		85.3	770.2	40.9	468.1	105.5	628.5	1,349.6
		2.5	0.1	0.5	2.7			
		87.8	770.3	41.4	470.8			
				1911	39			
Germany		10.4	149.8	234.5				
Great Britain			5.3	228.8	276.2			
U.S.A.		9.2	244.6	450.2				
		34.9	623.2	960.9				
			= 81%					

[1]) "Other countries of the world" (i.e., East Asian plus the remainder).

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 272.—*Ed.*

R. Calwer lists colonial possessions as follows (*p. 90*):

			Population (mill.)
Germany . . .	2.6	(mill. sq. km.)	12.0
France	10.98		50.0
Holland . . .	2.0		37.9
Belgium . . .	2.4		19.0
Denmark . . .	0.2		0.1
Italy.	0.5	(before Tripoli!!)	0.7
Spain	0.2		0.3
Portugal . . .	2.1		7.3
Great Britain .	28.6		355.4
U.S.A.	0.3		8.6

Author includes in the "Central European region" *all* Europe except Great Britain and Russia.

"Not counted", i.e., not apportioned to the regions, include Afghanistan, *Persia*, *Arabia*, in Africa Abyssinia, *Morocco* (the author is out of date!!! the book was published in 1906!!!), and others.

Railway development for these five regions, 1890 and 1913 (main figures given later*):

		1890	1913	Increase
with colonies	Central Europe . .	166.2	268.9	+102.7
	British Empire . .	107.3	207.8	+100.5
	Russian Empire . .	32.4	78.1	+ 45.7
(Asia without colonies)	East Asian region	3.3	27.5	+ 24.2
	America (without colonies)	308.1	521.9	+213.8
	Σ =	617.3	1.104.2	

* See pp. 484-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

BULLETIN
OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE

(*Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique*),
XIX, 1 (p. 382)

Prime Motors (*h.p.*)
(other than electric)

			steam (000)	total (000)
A)	Denmark	1897	47.5	52 0
		1907	112.0	131
	Austria	1902	1,170.0	1,640.0
	Switzerland	1905	?	516.0
	Germany	1895	2,720	3,427
		1907	6,715	8,264
	Belgium	1901	683	?
		1906	872	?
	France	1901	1,761	2,285
		1906	2,605	3,551
B)	United States	1905	19,440	22,240
	New Zealand	1906	?	75
C)	Norway	1905	79	308
	Sweden	1896	104	296
		1905	282	735
	Finland	1907	70	161
	Switzerland	1901	84	284
	Holland	1904	331	?
	Italy	1899	390	742
		1903	615	1,151
	Japan	1895	57	60
		1907	237	281

Sources of data:
A) general industrial censuses
B) industries censuses
C) "administrative statistics".

I take only *steam* power (but without locomotives) and *total* [i.e. + water-power, etc., but without electric].

Extreme diversity and incompleteness of the data!!

BARTHOLOMEW, *ATLAS OF THE WORLD'S COMMERCE*

Atlas of the World's Commerce, etc., by J. G. Bartholomew, London, 1907.

Extensive data and diagrams giving percentages, etc., and covering the whole world. I quote some:

	Growth of world trade (£ mill.)	United Kingdom		U.S.A.		Germany		France	
		Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1800	302	—	—						
1840	573	52	51	20	23	25	27	31	28
1850	832	98	71	36	28	34	36	32	43
1870	2,191	259	199	88	89	179 (1875)	129	116	112
1890	3,450	356	263	159	174	207	166	177	150
1900	4,420	460	291	171	282	288	230	188	164
1905	5,440	487	330	242	329	336	279	191	194

United Kingdom (£ mill.)			
Imports from		Exports to	
other countries	colonies (of U.K.)	other countries	colonies
238	64	189	55
324	96	234	94
413	109	252	102
437	128	285	123

Has a very interesting Currency Map.

Countries with *legal* gold standard — (most of the world)
" " " *silver* " — China + Persia
" " " bimetallic standard — only part of Africa + France, Spain, Italy
Countries with *actual* gold standard — France (Britain) etc.
" " " bimetallic standard — *United States*, *India*
" " " paper " — *Spain*, *Russia*, South America

Share of different countries in world trade:	1885	1905	Ditto from another source *)*) 1885	1900	1885	1905
United Kingdom	18.1	15.0	19.2	16.3	30.9	25.8
British possessions	12.8	10.8	10.7	9.7		
Germany	10.0	11.3	10.3	11.0	29.2	28.9
France	9.9	7.1	10.4	7.5		
United States	9.3	10.5	9.7	9.8		
Holland	5.6	7.0	5.9	6.6		
Belgium	3.5	4.0	3.7	3.5		
Austria-Hungary	3.5	3.3	3.7	3.3		
Russia	3.4	3.0	5.6	4.6		
Spain	1.9	1.4	20.1	1.5		
China	1.4	1.8	1.8	2.5		
Japan	0.4	1.5	0.5	1.1		
Argentina	1.2	1.9	1.3	1.1		
Other countries	19.0	21.4				
			100	100		

)) "Another source"=*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 24th year, 1903, p. *25*.

Number of people speaking different languages

	(million)
English	111
German	75
Russian	75
French	51
Spanish	43
Italian	33
Portuguese	13

Colonial Trade 1905

	Destination of exports from British possessions	Destination of imports into British possessions
	(£ millions)	
United Kingdom	143.8	143.4
British possessions	58.5	56.1
Foreign countries	130.2	109.6

Mercantile marine of the principal countries (steam & sail) (million tons)		Growth of world *wheat* production (000 mill. bushels)		Wheat production (1901-03) (mill. bushels)		Consumption of *wheat* sugar meat (*lbs. per head*)			
British Empire	17.6	1891	2.5	United States	664.7	France	486	27	77
United States	4.2	1895	2.5	Russia	509.2	New Zealand	400	97	212
Germany	3.8	1900	2.5	France	311.5	Australia	357	101	239
Norway	1.8	1902	3.0	India	263.1	United States	315	68	150
France	1.7			Italy	157.0	United Kingdom	290	88	112
Italy	1.2			Spain	133.1	Austria-Hungary	231		
Japan	1.0			Austria-Hungary	205.8	Germany	195	27	111
Russia	0.9			Germany	139.8	Canada	155		90
Sweden	0.8			Canada	85.8	Holland	—	36	—
Spain	0.7			Argentina	77.2	Russia	—	14	51
Holland	0.7			etc. etc.					
etc.									
World's total	37.5								
of which steamships	31.7			World's total	3,026.6				

	Rice production mill. cwt
China	550
British India	448.3
Java	90.0
Japan	89.6
Indo-China	33.1
Siam	14.8
Italy and Spain	20.1
World's total	1,257.9

	Production of rye mill. bushels	*barley* mill. bushels
Russia	887.5	335.2
Germany	386.9	135.1
Austria-Hungary	130.7	124.4
France	51.2	
Asiatic Russia	37.1	
Japan	38.8	
United State	27.2	131.9
Spain	25.7	
etc.	India	101.1
World's total	1,672.9	1,218.6

	Tea production mill. lbs.
China	660
India	200
Ceylon	150
Japan	59
Java	19
Formosa	18
Natal	1.8
Caucasus	0.9

	Coffee production mill. lbs.
Brazil	1,659
Colombia	70
Java	86
Guatemala	74
India	31
Total exports	=2,283

Mercantile Marine (net tonnage). (Mill. tons)

	United Kingdom	United States	Germany	Norway	France	Japan
1860	4.6	—		0.6	1.0	
1870	5.6	4.2	1.0	1.0	1.1	
1880	6.6	4.1	1.2	1.5	0.9	0.09
1890	7.9	4.4	1.4	1.7	0.9	0.1
1900	9.3	5.2	1.9	1.5	1.0	0.9
1905	10.7	6.4	2.3	1.5	1.3	1.3

World production of sugar		of which beet sugar	Ditto coffee		Ditto raw cotton		Ditto pig-iron		Ditto raw copper		gold	
(mill. tons)			(000 tons)		(mill. cwt.)		(mill. tons)		(000 tons) tons)		(tons)	
1850	1.4	0.2	1855 —	321	1850 —	12.8		4.4	1851-60	49.9	1851	134
1860	2.2	0.4	1865 —	422	1860 —	22.8		7.2	1861-70	88.5	1860	192
1870	2.7	0.9	1875 —	505	1870 —	24.8		11.9	1871-80	117.0	1870	182
1880	3.7	1.8	1885 —	718	1880 —	32.2		18.1	1881-90	233	1880	164
1890	6.1	3.6	1892 —	700	1890 —	50.0		27.2	1891-900	364	1890	177
1900	9.8	6.1	1903 —	1,150	1900 —	61.7		40.4	1901	518	1900	377
					1903 —	65.0	1903	46.1	1905	723	1904	500

World Coal Production

Neumann-Spallart. Year of publication 1883-84, p. *322*.

Mill. metric tons		Total world turnover
1860 — 136		—
1866 — 185		44.2
1872 — 260		57.8
1876 — 287		55.8
1880 — 345		63.8
1885 — 413		61,700 mill. marks world's foreign trade, imports and exports
	in 1885:	
Great Britain	161.9	
Germany	73.6	
United States	103.9	

World *Mercantile* Marine:

1872 — 15.5	million	tons
1875 — 16.7	”	”
1880 — 19.3	”	”
1885 — 20.98	”	”

Chief countries 1885:

Great Britain	7.6
Germany	1.2
United States	2.6
Norway	1.5
France	0.9
Italy	0.9
Russia	0.3

Per-capita Consumption

	Tea, lbs. (1903)	Coffee	Wine, gallons	Beer	Spirits	Butter	(1903) Coal (cwt)
United Kingdom	6.0	—	0.3	28.8	1.0	19	78.4
United States	1.3	11	0.5	18.4	1.0	20	70.5
Germany	0.2	6	1.1	27.2	1.5	8	34.2
France	0.1	4	32.7	7.6	1.7	8	22.7
Russia	1.2	—		1.8	5	2.7	
Austria-Hungary			5.0	8.6	1.7	7	7.7
Holland	1.4	14.5	Belgium	40.1	1.6	15	
Australia[40]	7.1	—	0.8	1.6	0.7	17	24.5
Canada	4.0	—	5.0	0.9	22	33.4	
		Italy	27.5		Denmark	22	
		Spain	17.0			Belgium	58.4

Production

	Wine (mill. gallons)	Beer	Spirits (pure alcohol)	Fisheries (£ mill.)		Raw *cotton* (mill. cwt)
France	1,216	240	45.1	5	Brazil	0.5
Italy	880				Asia Minor	0.3
Spain	395		8.9		Turkestan	1.8
Russia		137	86.3	8	Africa	1.5
Austria-Hungary	169	420	55.2		Egypt	5.4
Algeria	124				China	4.0
Belgium		308			Mexico	0.4
Portugal	134				United States	45.4
Germany	49	1,512	84.1		India	9.6
Greece	66					
Canada				4		
Japan				5		
United States		1.561	58.6	13		
United Kingdom		1,253	29.2	10		
Holland			7.6			
World total	3,330				World total	70.0

(average for 1900-03)

GRAIN IN WORLD TRADE

Grain in World Trade, published by the Imperial Ministry of Agriculture, etc., *Vienna, 1900*.

A monumental work (*860 + 188* pp., 8° format)- a most painstaking summary of very rich data ((a mass of basic figures)) on grain production, consumption and trade for 1878-97 (in some cases other years). I know of nothing of comparable value. Apparently, the best in this field. [N.B. Borrows much from *Neumann-Spallart, Surveys of World Economy* (and Juraschek)].

I select the most important (*).

	Iron ore (mill. tons) (1900-02)	Steel (1901-03)	Coal (1901-03)	Cop- (1905)	Consumption of copper (000 tons)		Gold output (mill. ozs) (1901-03)		Oil (mill. gallons) (1902-04)
United States	30.7	14.3	284.0	0.41	215	Transvaal	4.9		
Germany	17.5	7.3	152.8	0.02	144	United States	3.7	. . .	3,573
United Kingdom	13.2	4.9	225.5	—	133	Australia	3.5		
Russia	5.4	2.0	16.1	0.009	29	Russia	1.1	. . .	2,728
France	5.0	1.6	31.9		63	Canada	0.9	Japan	51
Austria-Hungary	3.4	1.2	39.5		26	Mexico	0.5	India	87
Spain	8.0	0.2	0.04			India	0.5	Rumania	98
Mexico			0.06			New Zealand	0.4	Galicia	179
Italy					18	Rhodesia	0.3	Sumatra, Java, Borneo	231
Sweden	3.7	0.3							
Belgium	—	0.8	22.6						
Australasia				0.04					
World total	90.4	33.0	812.4	0.7	679		17.7		6,996

(*) Units of measurement: *metric centner* = 1 double centner. Metric quintal = double centner = 100 kilograms (double centner).

In other words, the unit used is metric quintal = 1 double centner = 1 *metric centner*.

Ton = 1,000 kilograms.

Acre = 40.467 *ares*.

Quarter = 2.09 *hectolitres*.

Pood = 16.379 kilograms.

Cf. p. 8, note 2: 3.674 bushels = 1 quintal (= 1 double centner).

p. 6, note 2: 1 *hectolitre* of wheat = 78 *kilograms*, etc. (oats, 1 *hectolitre* = 45 kilograms), etc.

[e.g. p. 271: 49,348 poods = 8,083 quintals.]

#*

World production, mil

Annual average	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Maize[1])	Total
1878-82	554.5	303.7	176.4	319.7	492.0	1,846.3
1883-87	579.7	330.2	182.9	356.9	543.9	1,993.6
1888-92	592.0	310.2	191.5	366.6	603.1	2,063.4
1893-97	642.7	370.1	214.4	408.7	608.4	2,244.3
Western Europe						
1878-82	233.4	130.4	102.8	159.3	70.1	
1893-97	250.1	145.2	100.5	171.2	74.2	
See next page*						
Eastern Europe						
1878-82	87.5	162.2	43.2			
1893-97	147.2	209.3	71.6			
Next page, note 1*						
Western Europe						
1876-85	10.89	10.17	13.0	11.73	11.23	
1886-95	11.16	10.89	13.18	12.01	10.93	
Yield per hectare[3])						
Eastern Europe						
1876-85	6.69	6.20	6.92	5.96	10.06	
1886-95	7.36	6.64	7.78	6.45	10.60	
Yield per hectare[3])						
United States						
1876-85	8.35	8.18	12.45	10.09	15.89	
1886-95	8.58	7.95	12.66	9.36	14.79	

[1]) Maize **in the U.S.A.:** 379.2; 426.9; 471.4; 465.8

[2]) These figures, p. 21, are from *Sundbärg*, who inclu the data for 1876-85 and 1886-95 refer *to per-capita*

[3]) These figures, p. 26, likewise from Sundbärg, denote

* See pp. 478-81 of this volume.—*Ed.*

lion metric centners

In percentages				p. 37		p. 39	
Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Maize	Total	Population of Europe, America and Australia	
100	100	100	100	100	100	440 mill. = 100%	
105	109	104	112	111	108	466	106
107	102	109	115	123	112	495	112
116	122	122	128	124	122	526	119
103	57	43	71	19			
96	56	39	73	17 2)			
kg. per capita							
102	153	45	82	45			
110	145	49	79	47 2)			

((i.e., > 75 per cent is in the United States)).

des Hungary, Galicia and Bukovina in Eastern Europe; grain output, *in kilograms*.

yield per *hectare* in metric centners.

Per-capita Consumption (kg.)

Europe

	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Maize
1878-82	111.9	89.8	44.4	76.7	36.7
1883-87	112.4	92.3	42.5	74.5	33.3
1888-92	108.1	81.8	41.4	70.6	35.3
1893-97	116.1	91.9	45.2	75.6	34.9

United States

1878-82	100	9	19	101	592
1883-87	107	8	21	131	621
1888-92	105	8	23	129	648
1893-97	78	6	16	117	525

#

Data given for following countries[1]):

Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1915

	Average wheat production			Rye production:	
	mill. double centners		mill tons (1,000 kg.)	mill. double centners	
	1878-82	1893-97	1913	1878-82	1893-97
1. Belgium	4.7	5.0	0.40	4.2	5.2
2. *Bulgaria*	7.4	9.9	1.65	1.9	1.9
3. Denmark	1.2	1.0	0.2	4.4	4.8
4. Germany	23.7	29.5	3.97	58.5	70.6
5. *Finland*	0.0	10.04	0.004	2.4	3.1
6. France	75.2	84.0	8.7	17.6	16.7
7. *Greece*	1.4	1.3	?	0	0
8. Great Britain	22.1	15.0	1.4	0.4	0.5
Ireland			0.03		
9. Italy	40.3	33.2	5.83	1.3	1.1
10. Holland	1.4	1.2	0.1	2.6	3.1
11. Austria-Hungary	37.9	52.4	1.6	29.5	31.2
Hungary			4.5		

[1]) Countries in italics = "Eastern Europe".

Europe+United States

Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Maize
118.2	79.4	41.9	82.6	127.5
118.2	80.7	40.1	86.1	132.1
114.1	71.2	39.4	83.1	136.9
116.1	79.0	41.3	85.7	125.2

(Europe+United States (p. 93))

First four cereals	Europe (first four cereals)	U.S.A. (first four cereals)
322.2	323.4	314.5
325.2	321.7	346.9
307.8	302.0	341.8
322.1	328.8	284.5

Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1915

Yield per *hectare*, double centners (100 kilograms)

mill. tons 1913	Wheat 1876-85	Wheat 1886-95	Wheat (2) 1913	Rye 1876-85	Rye 1886-95	Rye 1913
0.57	16.3	18.5	25.2	14.9	16.9	22.0
0.27			16.0			14.9
0.43	22.0	25.2	33.7	15.9	16.0	17.6
10.43	12.7	13.7	20.7	9.8	10.6	17.2
0.24	10.6	11.8	10.9	9.7	10.6	9.9
1.27	11.2	11.9	13.3	10.0	10.6	10.6
?	–	–	–	–	–	–
0	18.2	20.1	21.1	—	—	—
0.005			25.6			
0.14	8.0	7.4	12.2	—	—	—
0.42	16.9	18.7	24.2	12.9	14.3	18.5
2.7	10.8	10.7	13.4	9.9	9.9	13.8
1.34	9.6	12.4	12.8	8.3	10.2	11.9

(2) 1913 figures from *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1915. The remainder p. 781.

	Wheat			Rye	
	mill. centners		mill. tons	mill. double centners	
	1878-82	1893-97	1913	1878-82	1893-97
12. Portugal	1.7	1.9	?	1.3	1.3
13. Rumania	13.4	15.4	2.3	1.2	2.1
14. *Russia* (*European*+ *Poland*)	55.1	112.6	22.8	152.9	198.3
15. Sweden-Norway	0.9	1.2	0.2	4.9	5.7
Norway			0.08		
16. Switzerland	1.0	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.4
17. Serbia	2.4	2.2	0.4	0.3	0.3
18. Spain	23.1	24.7	3.0	5.1	4.4
19. Turkey (*European*)	7.7	5.6	?	3.3	3.5
Europe	320.9	397.3	Σ=57.0	292.6	354.4
20. Algeria	5.6	6.1	1.0	0	0
21. Egypt	4.8	3.3	?	—	—
22. Argentina	3.8	16.2	5.4	—	—
23. Australia	8.5	8.7	2.4	—	—
24. Canada	8.2	11.1	6.3	0.5	0.5
25. Cape colony and Natal	1.0	0.8	0.1	—	—
26. Chile	4.1	3.9	0.6	—	—
27. India	69.4	62.3	9.9	—	—
28. Japan	3.7	5.1 0.7	4.2	8.4	
29. Tunisia	1.0	1.8	0.1	—	—
30. Uruguay	0.8	1.8	0.1	—	—
31. United States	122.7	124.2	20.8	6.3	6.7
Non-European countries	233.6	245.4	Σ=47.4	11.1	15.7
World =	554.5	642.7	104.4	303.7	370.1
Luxemburg			0.02		
Mexico			0.3		
New Zealand			0.1		

N.B. See general conclusions on the next page.* **N.B.**

* See p. 483 of this volume.—*Ed.*

	Wheat			Rye		
mill. tons 1913	1876-85	1886-95	1913	1876-85	1886-95	1913
?	—	—	—	—	—	—
0.09	—	10.6	14.1	—	—	10.5
24.69	5.3	5.6	9.1	6.0	6.4	8.5
0.56	13.1	14.8	24.2	13.4	14.4	14.1
0.02			17.6			16.3
0.05	—	—	22.0	—	—	19.2
0.04	—	—	10.7	—	—	8.7
0.71	—	—	7.8	—	—	9.1
	—	—		—	—	
Western Europe	10.9	11.2		10.2	10.9	
Eastern	6.7	7.4		6.2	6.6	
	8.8	9.2		7.3	7.8	
0.00			7.2			13.7
—						
0.03			7.8			9.0
—			(7-10-16)			8.1
0.06			14.1			12.1
0.00			4.5			—
0.04			14.4			13.0
—		6.3	8.3			—
—	—	10.9	14.4		11.9	15.2
—	—					—
0.00			4.5			8.4
1.05	8.3	8.6	10.2	8.2	7.9	10.2
0.02						
0.00						
0.00						

Per-capita **consumption** (**kg.**)

		Germany	France	Great Britain	Italy	Austria-Hungary	Russia
Wheat	1878-82	55.3	214.0	188.1	123	—	—
	1883-87	57.2	213.0	164.6		91.8	—
	1888-92	59.8	213.0	171.1		92.5	18.9
	1893-97	71.8	204.0	167.0		100.5	37.4
	1913*)	96					
Rye	1878-82	129.3	38.0	1.3	—	—	—
	1883-87	118.6	37.0	2.1	?	66.2	—
	1888-92	108.5	36.0	2.1	3.3	60.4	111.0
	1893-97	126.7	38.0	2.7	2.9	59.2	139.0
	1913*)	153					
Barley	1878-82	48.7	31.0	?	—	—	—
	1883-87	51.8	31.0	67.0	?	41.9	—
	1888-92	55.8	32.0	68.6	6.0	37.6	17.8
	1893-97	59.8	31.0	71.7	5.2	38.4	27.1
	1913*)	108					
Oats	1878-82	89.1	91.0	?	—	—	—
	1883-87	84.1	95.0	84.6	?	51.9	—
	1888-92	86.9	96.0	87.4	8.1	48.8	48.1
	1893-97	85.3	92.0	85.8	7.2	51.6	65.7
	1913*)	128					
Maize	1878-82	5.1	20.6	48.5	65.0	—	—
	1883-87	3.8	23.4	41.7		68.2	—
	1888-92	8.4	23.3	44.9		77.6	2.3
	1893-97	14.4	22.4	53.8		82.2	4.7

*) *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1915.

The figures for 1913, written in pencil, are *obviously not comparable*, for even the 1893-97 figures are much higher.

The authors' general conclusions:

"As already indicated, grain production in the last decades has developed very unevenly in the various countries owing to differences in population and communications factors. In the centre of Western Europe, where development is towards, so to say, urbanisation—in Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, etc.—the decline in crop areas and the increase in relative yields have resulted in diminishing production of wheat, rye, barley and maize, whereas production of oats, used mainly for livestock, has increased. N.B.

"In all other parts of Western Europe, except for the border regions, a certain fluctuation is to be observed; expansion of crop areas has stopped, but yields are increasing considerably, and production of almost all cereal crops continues to increase. In the border regions between Western and Eastern Europe, in Sweden, Poland, Galicia, Hungary, etc., total production is growing very considerably owing to expansion of crop areas, and still more to much higher yields. In Eastern Europe, chiefly as a result of larger crop areas, grain production has risen enormously, but only in the main cereals, not the secondary ones. N.B.

"In overseas areas, a distinction should be drawn between such countries as the United States, Canada, Argentina and Uruguay, whose geographical position and the development of communications and the railway system have brought them into much closer contact with the densely populated centres of Western Europe, and all the other areas. The former have developed their grain production chiefly by extending crop areas, sometimes very rapidly- among the latter, however, only a few have increased production. Limited production has obliged Egypt and Japan to import grain; Algeria and Tunisia, as a result of French economic policy, mainly supply France, while India, South Africa and Australia, because of their population conditions and underdeveloped communications system, have not produced any stable, big surpluses over and above domestic requirements" (p. 36). N.B. N.B.

RAILWAYS[41]

Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 36th year, 1915, Berlin, 1915 (2 marks). "International Surveys", table 31 (p. 46). "Railways of the World, 1890 and 1913" (Source: *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen* (published by the Royal Prussian Ministry), 1892 and 1915).

The three groups (**1**, **2** and 3) are mine

Σ (and ΣΣ are mine, as also the lay-out

		(kilometres) 1890	1913
(1)	***Great Britain and Ireland***	32,297	37,717
(1)	***Malta, Jersey, Isle of Man***	110	110
(1)	***Portugal***	2,149	2,983
(2)	Spain	9,878	15,350
(1)	***France***	36,895	51,188
(1)	***Belgium***	5,263	8,814
(1)	***Netherlands*** (+Luxemburg)	3,060	3,781
(1)	***Switzerland***	3,190	4,863
(2)	Italy	12,907	17,634
(2)	Sweden, Norway and Denmark	11,566	21,354
(1)	***West-European, old colonial countries***	82,964	109,456
	Western Europe. Σ	117,315	163,794
(2)	Germany	42,869	63,730
	Western Europe. ΣΣ	160,184	227,524
(2)	Western Europe. ***Bulgaro-Magyar countries***	77,220	118,068
(3)	Austria-Hungary (+Bosnia+Herzegovina)	27,113	46,195
(3)	Russia (European) (+Finland)	30,957	62,198
(3)	Rumania	2,543	3,763
(3)	Serbia	540	1,021
(3)	European Turkey	1,765	1,994
(3)	Bulgaria		1,931
(3)	Greece	767	1,609
	Balkans. Σ	5,615	10,318
(3)	Eastern Europe. ΣΣ	63,685	118,711
	All Europe (Europa):	223,869	346,235

America		(kilometres) 1890	1913
Canada (+Newfoundland)		22,712	48,388
United States (+Alaska 1,054 km.)		268,409	410,918
Mexico		9,800	25,492
Central America [1])		1,000	3,227
Antilles [2])		2,338	6,022
North and Central America	Σ	304,259	494,047
Colombia and Venezuela		1,180	2,020
British Guiana		35	167
Dutch "		—	60
Brazil		9,500	24,985
Paraguay and Uruguay		1,367	3,011
Argentina		9,800	33,215
Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador		5,276	12,603
South America	Σ	27,158	76,061
Total for America		331,417	570,108

	(kilometres) 1890	1913
All French possessions	40	224
All British possessions	[23,181]	49,185
All Dutch"	—	60
United States	268,409	410,918
Puerto Rico	18	547
Mexico+Central America+Antilles	12,646	33,340
South America (except colonies)	27,123	75,834
Total	331,417	570,108

		1913
[1])	Guatemala	987 km.
	Honduras	241
	Salvador	320
	Nicaragua	322
	Costa Rica	878
	Panama	479
		Σ=3,227

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

				# 1890
	Cuba	3,752	. . . . .	1,731
independent [2])	Dominican Republic	644	. . . . .	115
	Haiti	225		
	Jamaica	313	British	
	Puerto Rico	547	U.S.	18
	Martinique	224	French	
	Barbados	175	British	474
	Trinidad	142	British	
		Σ= 6,022		2,338

The very first issue of the *International Survey* for 1903 gives the following figures for 1890:

Cuba	1,731
Dominican Republic	115
Antilles	492
	(km.) 2,338

(#) I have taken these figures from *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, 1892, p. 496, in which the figure *474* refers to Jamaica *and* Martinique *and* Barbados *and* Trinidad.

The following can be assumed for 1890:

French (Martinique)	40 km.	Σ=2,338
British	434	
United States (Puerto Rico)	18	
Independent	1,846	

Asia:	1890	1913
Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia and British Cyprus (98 km.)	800	5,468
Persia	30	54
British India } British	27,000	55,761
Ceylon } British	308	971
Dutch Indies { Java, Sumatra }	1,361	2,854
Malay states (Borneo, Celebes, etc.) [4])	100	1,380
Portuguese India	54	82
Siam	—	1,130
Indo-China and *Philippines* (United States) [1])	105	3,697
Russia (Siberia and Central Asia) [3])	1,433	15,910
China	200	9,854
Japan (+Korea)	2,333	10,986

All British possessions (Cyprus, India+ Ceylon, Malacca)....	27,408	58,204
All *French* possessions	105	2,493
Total Asia	33,724	108,147

[4]) *British* Borneo (the British part of it) in 1912 according to *The Statesman's Year-Book*: 130 *miles* (idem for 1915).

(*Dutch*) Celebes?

N.B. Apparently, *all* the "Malay states" should be included in British possessions.

439 km. is shown for 1901

	1913 km.	
[1]) Cochin-China, Cambodia, Annam, Tonkin	2,398	French
Pondicherry	95	French
Total French	2,493	
Malacca	92	British
Philippines	1,112	U.S.
	Σ=3,697	

The figure 105 in 1890 refers to Cochin-China, Pondicherry and Tonkin (all of which are French).

[3]) The Chinese-Eastern Railway (1,480 km.) is listed under *China* (in 1913 table).

	Africa:	1890		1913
	Algeria and Tunisia	3,104		6,382
	Belgian Congo	—		1,390
	Egypt (+Sudan)	1,547	1902	5,946
	Union of South Africa	3,825		17,628
	British colonies	[98] [6])	1,503	3,790
(*)	German "	—	470	4,176
(*)	Italian "	—	27	155
(*)	Portuguese "	[292] [6])	992	1,624
(*)	French "	[520] [5])	1,160	3,218
	(*)	[910] [2])		12,963
	Total Africa	9,386		44,309
	Total British possessions	[5,470]		27,364
	" French	3,624		9,600

[6]) approximate distribution
For 1885, Neumann-Spallart gives 147 km.(!!) for Mauritius; 440(!!!) for Angola + Mozambique!!

[5]) Taken from *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*, 1892, p. *1 2 2 9*

[2]) refers to:

1902		1890
169	(British) Mauritius	
127	French Réunion	126
	French "Senegal Region"?	394
543	Portuguese Angola	
449	Portuguese Mozambique	

	Australia:	1890	1913
(British) Empire	Australian Commonwealth	15,769	30,626
	New Zealand	3,120	4,650
U.S.A.:	Hawaii (with Maui Island: 11 km. and Oahu: 91)	—	142
	Total Australia	18,889	35,418
	Total	617,285	1,104,217

(Together with colonies)		1890	1913
	United States	268,427	412,719
	British Empire	107, 355	207,856
	Russia	32,390	78,108
	Germany	42,869	67,906
	France	40,664	63,505
		491,705	830,094
	Four small colonial powers (Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Italy)	25,086	39,377
	Eleven non-colonial countries (rest of Europe)	57,362	98,080
#	Japan	2,333	10,986
#	Semi-colonial countries — Asia	1,030	16,506
#	Semi-colonial countries — America	12,646	33,340
#	South America (10 countries)	27,123	75,834
	Total	617,285	1,104,217
#	but deducting the first five	125,580	274,123
	Independent and semi-independent countries of Asia and America	43,132	136,666

Total colonies (America, Asia Africa and Australia) 1890	1913		*Asia, Africa and Australia* Colonies:	1890	1913
74,948	170,029	. . .	British	51,767	120,844
3,769	12,317	. . .	French	3,729	12,093
1,361	2,914	. . .	Dutch	1,361	2,854
346	1,706	. . .	Portuguese	346	1,706
1,433	15,910	. . .	Russian	1,433	15,910
—	1,390	. . .	Belgian	—	1,390
—	155	. . .	Italian	—	155
—	4,176	. . .	German	—	4,176
18	1,801	. . .	United States . . .	—	1 ,254
81,875	210,398	. . .	Total colonies	58,636	60,382
		. . .	Japan	2,333	10,986
			Semi-colonies: { Asia Minor, Persia, Siam and China }	1,030	16,506
			Total	61,999	187,874
			Europe	223,869	346,235
			United States	268,409	410,918
			ββ all colonies	81,875	210,398
			# { semi-colonies: Asia	1,030	16,506
			# { ” ” America	12,646	33,340
			# { (Mexico, Central America + Antilles)		
			# Japan	2,333	10,986
			# South America (without colonies)	27,123	75,834
			Total	617,285	1,104,217
			#αα	43,132	136,666
			αα+ββ	125.0	347.1

The main source is *Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen*. I have gone through the **1892** edition (15th year of publication) and have inserted additions in the preceding pages.

The 1890 figures for the "Malay states" are given *only* in total; there is *nothing* in brackets (not even the words: "Borneo, Celebes, etc.", which occur in the 1915 edition of the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*).

There are data by decades: 1840 and subsequent years (up to 1890)—which appear also in the Brockhaus Encyclopaedia.

Value estimates (mostly 1888-91) are given:

Europe average 302,500 marks per *km.*
Railways outside Europe " 160,600 " " "

Σ= *131,000* million marks

World average = 212,100, i.e., about *131,000 million* marks (212,100 × 617,300)
212,100 × 200,000 = 40,000 million*

A comparison of these railway data with the following figures (*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1915) is revealing:

Coal Output (mill. tons)

	Germany	France	Russia	Great Britain	United States
1892	92.5	26.1	6.9	184.7	162.7
1912	255.7	39.2 (1911)	31.0	264.6	450.2 (1911)

Pig-iron Output (mill. tons)**

1892	4.9	2.0	1.1	6.8	9.3
1912	17.6	4.9	4.2	9.0	30.2

N.B. The disproportion between the development of iron and coal production, on the one hand, and railway construction, on the other (monopoly = colonies), is very striking.

This relates to the problem of monopolies and finance capital!!

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 274.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 275.—*Ed.*

DIE BANK

Die Bank Magazine, 1910, p. 222

Stock-Exchange prices and the business curve, 1898-1909

——— *Stock-Exchange prices* (Disconto-Kommandit, Harpener, Bochumer and Allgemeine Elektrizitäts average at end of month).

——— *Price of pig-iron* (quarterly average of Hamburg quotations for British pig-iron (Glasgow)).

····· *Labour market* (average quarterly influx of workers on the German labour exchanges; to facilitate comparison, the labour market curve has been *inverted*, with the maximum shown at the *bottom*).



The diagram is from Alfred *Lansburgh*'s article "The Stock Exchange's Power of Divination" (*Die Bank*, 1910, I, p. 222).

Can be used to illustrate *actual* fluctuations and *general* trends during a complete cycle in modern times (1900 crisis, 1907 depression, 1898-99 boom, etc.).

RAILWAY STATISTICS

The Statesman's Year-Book, *1915* (London, 1915) (52nd year). Edited by J. Scott Keltie.
"The British Empire", *1913-14*

Railways open

	+8 Malta
United Kingdom	23,441 miles
India	34,656
Cyprus	61
Ceylon	605
Straits Settlements and Federative Malay States	771
"Borneo and Sarawak"	130
Asia (except India)	1,567
Australia and Oceania	23,021
Africa	17,485
America	31,953
ΣΣ =	134,131 *

1 mile = 1.6 km.; 134 × 1.6 = 214,400 km.; 130 × 1.6 = 208.0
771 × 1.6 = 1,233.6 + 208 = 1,441 km.

Railways in the *Dutch* colonies (end of 1913)

1,512	miles	—Java
209	"	Sumatra "Dutch East Indies", including Borneo and Celebes.
Σ=1,721	"	

1,721 × 1.6 = 2,753.6 km.

Dutch West Indies (Curaçao, Surinam = Dutch Guiana) —no railways.

Neumann-Spallart, *Surveys of World Economy*, 1883-84. p. 508. "In *Mauritius* there has been no addition since 1882 to the two railways totalling 92 miles."

* So given in the *Statesman's Year-Book*.—*Ed*.

Ibidem, p. 512.

	1885
Angola	=350+
Mozambique	= 90
	440 km.

92 miles × 1.6 = 147.2 km. + 440 = 587
147.2 ÷ 587 = 25.1 per cent.

Σ 1890 = 910
−520
390 km.

1890	
about 98 km.	British (Mauritius)
292 "	Portuguese (Angola and Mozambique))
390	390 × 25.1 = 97.98
+520	French
Σ = 910	

Ibidem, p. 504. Jamaica (1885) — 107 km.
Barbados 42
Martinique ("short" railways)? ***no information***...

	1890	1913
Jamaica		313
Martinique		224
Barbados		175
Trinidad		142
	Σ = 474	854

We assume 40 km. in 1890 for Martinique (less than in Barbados)

Four small colonial powers

Holland	3,060	3,781	
	1,361	2,854 →	2,914
			−2,854
	4,421	6,635	60
Portugal	2,149	2,983	
	346	1,706	
Belgium	5,263	8,814	
	—	1,390	
Italy	12,907	17,634	
	—	155	
	Σ = 25,086	39,317	

(Eleven countries)

Spain	9,878	15,350
Switzerland	3,190	4,863
Scandinavia	11,566	21,354
Austria-Hungary	27,113	46,195
Rumania	2,543	3,763
Serbia	540	1,021
Bulgaria and Turkey	1,765	1,994
		1,931
Greece	767	1,609
	57,362	98,080

British railways in Africa [1913]

6,399	
1,775	
5,582	
3,872	
Σ=17,628	
5,946	
3,790	(1,099+192+418+302+1,567+212=3,790
27,364	

	Asia	America	British in Asia	
	1890		1913	
British railways	27,000	22,712	55,761	56,732
	308	434	971	+92
	100	35	56,732	56,824
	27,408	23,181	+1,380	
			58,112	
			+92 Malacca	
			58,204	

	1890	1913
Asia	33,724	108,147
Africa	9,386	44,309
Australasia	18,889	35,418
	61,999	187,874

Europe	166.2	268.9
British Empire	107.3	207.8
Russian Empire	32.4	78.1
Eastern Asia	3.3	27.5
America	308.1	521.9
	Σ=617.3	1,104.2

	1913
Europe	346,235
America	570,108
Others	187,874
	Σ=1,104,217

617,283	1,104,157

1. United States
2. British Empire
3. Russia
4. Germany
5. France
6. Small colonial powers (Holland, Portugal, Belgium, Italy)
7. Rest of Europe
8. Japan
9. South America
10. Semi-colonies . . . .

	1890	1913
Mexico	9,800	25,492
Central America	1,000	3,227
Independent Antilles	1,846	4,621
	12,646	33,340

	1890	1913	
Asia Minor	800	5,468	Asia Minor
Persia	30	54	Persia
		1,130	(Siam)
China	200	9,854	(China)
	1,030	16,506	

	1890	1913			
Asia British	27,408	58,204			
Africa "	5,470	27,364			
Australia "	18,889	35,276			
Great Britain	51,767	120,844			
France	3,729	12,093			
Holland	1,361	2,854		Portugal	
Portugal	292	1,624	+	54	82
Belgium	—	1,390		292	1,624
Italy	—	155			
Germany	—	4,176		346	1,706
United States	—	1,112 +			
		142			
					Russia
Colonies:	Σ=57,149	144,390		+1,433 ...	15,910
Japan	2,333	10,986			
Semi-Colonies {Asia Minor, Persia, Siam, China}	1,030	16,506			
	60,512	171,882			
	1,433	15,910			
	61,945	187,792		61,999	187,874
	54	82			

NOTEBOOK "ν" ("NU")

Contents

ν

Imperialism

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LA REVUE POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE

La Revue politique internationale, 1915, March-April (No. 14) (Lausanne).

"*Democratic Russia and the War*" by M. Grégoire Alexinsky, ex-Deputy of the Duma ((pp. 168-86)).

Editorial note: "It is curious to note the solidarity which at the present time, despite all differences of principle, binds the greater part of the Russian revolutionaries and liberals to autocratic tsarism" (p. 168).

Russia (even official Russia) could not have wanted the war. Russia had been preparing for 1918, 1920? A murderer five years *too early*??

[p. *177*: **editorial** note (from Alexinsky's book): there are "*two governments*" in Russia.]

Russia defended weak Serbia, etc. A "good deed" (181), in spite of tsarism's other vile actions.

For the neutralisation of the Straits—not for "a war of conquest", like Milyukov ... an Allied victory would be a boon for European progress.

PLEHN, *WORLD POLITICS*

Dr. Hans Plehn, *World Politics. An Outline of Recent World History after the Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, Berlin, 1907 (214 pp.), 3rd edition.

Not a bad outline, mostly devoted to Great Britain and Japan (and to America and Russia in connection with them. Great Britain—Japan—United States—Russia).

The second part (pp. 91-167) describes the British foreign policy structure (*not* a state, *but* "society").

WEGENER, *INDIA TODAY*

Professor Dr. Georg *Wegener*, *India Today. The Basis and Problems of British Rule in India.* (*Colonial Studies*, No. 61-63. 1.20 marks), Berlin, 1912 (52 pp.).

A very good, clear, brief outline.

India—4,575,000 sq. km.

315 million (1911) (1901—297)
(1801—100)

Danger of war on the part of Russia: the British are now armed "to the teeth" here.

There is no one nation, no one language.

"Bengalis"=70 million. The British partitioned Bengal (in order to weaken the national movement) in 1905, and

in 1911 (at the coronation in *Delhi*) promised to *annul* this measure.

The *caste* system.

The British rule by means of "divide et impera"....

Extreme diversity of geographical conditions.

Isolation from the rest of the world.

Medievalism (religion—the external world is nothing)—agriculture—vassalage.

Two-thirds of the country are directly under British rule, one-third consists of vassal states.

Complete dependence (of agriculture) on the summer rains (the summer monsoon=*trade wind*). Otherwise there is *famine*.

The army—75,000 British
—150,000 natives (of **different** ethnic groups). The British *especially* exploit the enmity between the Moslems (about 60 million) and the Hindus.

The chief danger of the Sepoy rising (1857) lay in the native army going over to the insurgents. The British were saved by dissension between different ethnic groups and the somnolence of the masses.

Deaths from plague were: 1905—1,069,140
1907—1,315,892, and so on.

British administration is purely "dictatorial" (31), an "autocracy" (31).

The Indian Civil Service consists of about 1,000 persons, a staff of excellently paid excellent officials.

Britain, he says, has given India very much (pax Britannica, railways, postal service, administration of justice, etc., etc.).

Causes of ferment:

1) Coercion of the people by foreigners....

2) Rapid growth of population. (Famines.)

3) "Increasing agrarianisation of India": Britain stifles industrialisation.

Swadeshi movement (=for home-produced goods) (boycott of British products).

4) Taxes. Land taxes levied on the peasants.

5) Emergence of an intelligentsia. Education has created "an intellectual proletariat of the worst, and politically most difficult, kind" (43)—the author is a reactionary scoundrel.

6) Formation of an Indian nation. (The "National Congress".)

7) Religious movement against the British, for Asians, for their own cause, for everything Asian ... (terrorism, etc.).

(The British entrust artillery and arsenals only to white troops, p. 48. In general, the British are extremely cautious.)

ENGELS, "CAN EUROPE DISARM?"

Friedrich Engels, "Can Europe Disarm?" *Nuremberg*, 1893. An off-print from *Vorwärts* (Wörlein & Co.).

> In the Berne Workers' Library, the *collection* begins with the pamphlet: *Karl Marx before the Cologne Jury*.

Preface: the articles were published in the Berlin *Vorwärts* in *March* 1893 "during the Reichstag debate on the Army Bill" (p. 3).

"I proceed, therefore, from this [the present, heutigen] situation, and for the time being propose only such measures as could be adopted today by any government without danger to the country's security. I am seeking only to establish that, from the purely military standpoint, there is absolutely no obstacle to a gradual abolition of standing armies" and if these armies are retained it is "against the internal enemy" (p. 3). ||| N.B. ||| N.B.

"A gradual reduction of the term of service by international agreement"—that is "the central point of my thesis" (p. 4)—"a general transition from the standing army to a **militia**" (p. 4, *idem*, p. 3).

(Thus the *essential point* for Engels = transition to a militia. This N.B.)

The preface is dated: London, March 28, 1893.

§ I. For twenty-five years now, Europe has been arming "unprecedentedly".... "Is it not stupid then to talk of disarmament?" (p. 5).

But the mass of the people ... call ... "for disarmament" "in all countries".... Is there no way out of the blind alley except through a devastating war?

"I maintain: disarmament, and thereby the guarantee of peace, is possible" (5) ... and Germany has the "power and vocation" to achieve it....

Further, §I describes briefly the transition to universal military service. Its "revolutionary" (p. 6) aspect is that it enlists all men for "national defence"....

There must be a transition to an "international maximum term of service" "with a militia system as the ultimate goal" (7).

at first a two-year maximum, followed by 1½, and so on! until??

§II. The possibility (military and technical) of a short term of service. A long one is unnecessary.

(Excessive parade drill (9), sentry duty (9), batmen (10) and such like idiocy.)

What of the cavalry? A rather longer term would be desirable—if the men had no previous riding training. But much can be done in this respect, too, and besides it should be possible to have "three- or four-year volunteers" (10).

In my life I have seen the collapse of so many vaunted customs, institutions, regulations, including military ones (10)———"that I would advise everyone especially to distrust military '*expert opinion*'" (p. 11, end of §II).

§III. The stupidity of conservatism in military matters, because military technology is especially revolutionary.

	Infantry fire	
40 years ago at ...	300 **paces**	
1870-71	600-1,000 "	(artillery: 3,000-4,000)
"new"	up to 3,000-4,000 "	(p. 11)

The necessity for military training of the youth, gymnastics, etc. (13-14), route marches (in summer), field exercises (14), etc., etc.

And the instructors?—retired non-commissioned officers. If they are dragged out "into the daylight of the school yard and the general code of civil law",—"then I will

wager that our rebellious (sic!!?) school youth will teach reason to the worst of these former oppressors of soldiers" (15). ||| ? N.B. N.B. ?

§ IV. Will other countries adopt it? Austria and Italy—yes.

France?—the "decisive country" (15). Will France deceive?

But Germany is much stronger: her population is greater; she has more officers, and that is very important. ("In all previous wars there was a shortage of officers after a few months of military operations" (17))....

Incidentally, the "undemocratic and politically objectionable" (16) institution of volunteers has a military value for Germany (> officers). But in France "the three-year soldiers have simply pushed out of the army the privileged one-year volunteers. This indicates that Germany's level of public political consciousness and the political institutions it permits are far below the French level" (16) | N.B.

§ V. Russia? Whether or not Russia will adopt it is unimportant. Unimportant in general; there are no officers.

The Russian soldier is very brave and fights well in a group. Now, however, individual action is required, and here he is of no use at all, and stands no comparison with "Western soldiers" (19).

Embezzlement by government officials, etc., in Russia (20).

"Russia has only to lose a few battles and the scene of operations will shift from the Vistula to the Dvina and Dnieper; an Allied Polish Army will be formed in the rear of the German army, under its protection; this will be just punishment for Prussia if she has then to restore a strong Poland for the sake of her own safety" (20). |

§ VI. The internal situation of Russia is "almost desperate" ... "this European China" (21) ... the ruin of the peasants after 1861.... "*This path*" (of economic and social revolution = capitalism—in Russia) "*is for the time being predominantly a destructive path*" (21). ||| N.B.

Impoverishment of the soil, deforestation, etc. in Russia. Russia's credit is falling. "It is not France that needs Russia, but rather Russia that needs France.... If she had a little

sense, France could obtain from Russia whatever she liked. Instead, official France crawls on her belly before the tsar" (23)....

N.B.?! Russia lives by exporting rye—mainly to Germany. "As soon as Germany begins to eat white bread instead of black, the present official tsarist and big-bourgeois Russia will at once be bankrupt" (23).

end of §VI

N.B. §VII. And how do things stand with us? Endless "tyrannical treatment of soldiers" (24) ... "a parasitic nobility", "the arrogance of the sons of the bourgeoisie".... Formerly they were accidentally shot during manoeuvres (25)—"I knew a youth from Cologne who was killed in this way in 1849 by a bullet intended for his captain" (25), nowadays, with the small calibre magazine rifle, "this can't be done, so easily and unnoticeably" (25)....

In France such treatment of the soldiers is **impossible**.... The French soldiers must despise the German soldiers when they read of the treatment they are subjected to in the barracks....

§VIII. Will this proposal be adopted?

Germany puts it to Austria, Italy, France. If the last-named adopts it, she will not worsen her position, but she will if she rejects it.

"All armies are unusually capable of learning after *great defeats*" (27)....

N.B. "We should not forget that twenty-seven years of Bismarck's administration made Germany hated everywhere—and with good reason. Neither the annexation of the North Schleswig Danes, nor the non-observance, and subsequent swindling cancellation, of the Prague Peace Treaty article relating to them, nor the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, nor the shabby measures taken against the Prussian Poles, have had anything at all to do with establishing 'national unity'" (27).... Bismarck made Germany hated....

N.B.

"Wherever you go you will find sympathy for France, but distrust of Germany" (28).... N.B.

"Let us not forget that Great Britain will decide the outcome of the next war" (28)—mastery of the seas, "will simply starve out" (France or Germany).

Germany would gain a great deal by making such a proposal (p. 29)....

End

MARX, *REVELATIONS ABOUT THE COLOGNE COMMUNIST TRIAL*, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ENGELS

In the article "On the History of the Communist League" (dated October 8, 1885) in the pamphlet: *Revelations about the Cologne Communist Trial* (Zurich, 1885) Engels writes, at the end of the article:

... Marx, "the most hated, most slandered man of his time" (p. 17)....

Marx's postscript (January 8, 1875) to the same pamphlet:

..."After the failure of the 1848 revolution, the German workers' movement continued to exist only in the form of theoretical propaganda, which was confined moreover to narrow circles, and the Prussian Government did not for a moment deceive itself about its practical harmlessness" (73). N.B.

ENGELS, *INTERNATIONAL ARTICLES FROM THE "VOLKSSTAAT"*

Friedrich Engels, *International Articles from the "Volksstaat"* (1871-75), Berlin, 1894.

PREFACE, 1894

In the preface (January 3, 1894), Engels says, inter alia, that in all these articles (1871-75) he calls himself a Communist

Communists or Social-Democrats?

and not a Social-Democrat, for *at that time* the Proudhonists in France, and Lassalleans in Germany called themselves Social-Democrats (p. 6).

N.B.

"For Marx and myself, therefore, it was quite impossible to choose such a loose expression to denote our special standpoint. Today things are different and the word* may be allowed to pass, however unsuitable it is for a party whose economic programme is not merely socialist, but directly communist, and whose ultimate political goal is to overcome the whole state and, therefore, democracy as well. The names of *actual* [Engels's italics] political parties, however, never fully correspond to them; the party develops, the name persists" (p. 7).

N.B.

N.B.

"THE BAKUNINISTS AT WORK"

N.B.

"The Bakuninists at Work" (1873). End.... "The Bakuninists in Spain have given us an incomparable example how *not* [Engels's italics] to make a revolution" (p. 33).

"A POLISH PROCLAMATION"

Ibidem "A Polish Proclamation" (June 11, 1874).

N.B.

"Russian militarism lies at the back of all European militarism. Acting as a reserve on the side of France in the war of 1859, and on the side of Prussia in 1866 and 1870, the Russian army on each occasion enabled the foremost military power to defeat its enemies one at a time. Prussia, as the foremost military power of Europe, is a direct creation of Russia, although since then she has unpleasantly outgrown her protector" (p. 35).

N.B.

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* Social-Democrat—*Ed.*

..."Besides, after the Napoleonic wars, Russia took the lion's share of the former Prussian and Austro-Polish provinces and openly came forward as the arbiter of Europe, a role she continued to play until 1853.... During the years of revolution, the suppression of Hungary by Russian troops was as decisive a development for Eastern and Central Europe as the June battles in Paris were for the West.... Russian domination in Europe ushered in the rule of reaction. The Crimean War freed the West and Austria from the insolence of the tsar.... We have seen above that the Russian army serves as the pretext for and mainstay of all European militarism.... It was only because the Russian army prevented Austria from siding with France in 1870 that Prussia was able to defeat France and consummate the Prusso-German military monarchy" (38)....

The talk about the "essentially aristocratic" character of the Polish movement is "silly".

"Much more than France, Poland, owing to her historical development and present position, is faced with the choice—to be revolutionary or to perish" (39).... N.B.

In 1871, most of the Poles (émigrés) were on the side of the Commune ... "was that the behaviour of aristocrats?" (39). N.B.

The Polish aristocracy sides more and more with Russia, in order to reunite Poland, even if under Russian rule; the revolutionary masses reply by offering an alliance with the German Workers' Party and by fighting in the ranks of the International" (39).

"*A people cannot be free if it oppresses other people*. The armed force it requires to suppress another people, is in the long run always turned against itself" (40)—as applied to Russia: the restoration of Poland "is a necessity ... for the **Russians themselves**" (N.B.) (40). N.B.

"ON SOCIAL RELATIONS IN RUSSIA"

"On Social Relations in Russia" (1875).

..."The big bourgeoisie of Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa: which has developed with unheard-of rapidity during the

last decade, chiefly due to the railways ... the entire Russian large-scale industry, which exists only thanks to ... protective tariffs,—have all these important and rapidly growing elements of the population no interest in the existence of the Russian state?" ... (p. 52) (against Tkachov).

A postscript (1894)—to the article "On Social Relations in Russia"—ends with this sentence:

"It [the revolution in Russia] will not only rescue the great mass of the nation, the peasants, from the isolation of their villages, which constitute their 'mir', their world, and lead them on to the big stage, where they will get to know the outside world and thereby themselves, their own position, and the means of salvation from their present state of want, but it will also give a new impetus and new, better conditions of struggle to the workers' movement of the West, and hasten the victory of the modern industrial proletariat, without which present-day Russia cannot find her way, whether through the village commune or through capitalism, to a socialist transformation of society" (p. 72).

LAUFENBERG, *ORGANISATION, WAR AND CRITICISM*

Laufenberg	*Organisation, War and Criticism.* Documents concerning the Hamburg Party debates by

Dr. Heinrich *Laufenberg*,
Fritz *Wolffheim* and Dr. Carl *Herz*.

"For distributing only to Party members, on presentation of their membership card."

(Published by Dr. H. Laufenberg, Hamburg) (pp. 1-77).

Year???? (1915) ((undoubtedly 1915)).

Echo[42] followed the government slogan (8)—**very interesting** quotations from *Echo* (9-15) (urging militarisation of the youth, 26 et seq.). Statements by Laufenberg and others in opposition to this.

Leaders' tactic that borders on informing against, etc.

Proposal for conference of "authorised delegates" rejected (23 and others).

...“The contradiction was bound to come into the open between the leaders, who follow the policy of the *Echo*, and the masses, who adhere to the old, proletarian principles and reject the neo-revisionist policy of harmony” (34).... leaders and masses

§VIII: “*Compact (Sammlung) of the leaders*” (N.B.) (against the masses).

The discussion showed:

“The debate, which spread over four evenings, was extremely indicative of the frame of mind of the so-called leading circles in Hamburg. Clearly evident was the fact, long known to any attentive observer of Hamburg party life, that this upper stratum of leaders had long ago inwardly broken with the radical views of the Hamburg party rank and file. Although they still employed radical formulas at meetings, in reality for these men Marxism had become an embarrassing uniform which was only donned for official party functions” (36). !! !! N.B. N.B.

von Elm, August *Winnig*, *Hildebrandt* and others, defended imperialism, etc. (p. 36). N.B.

(((H. Thomas *supports* Elm and the others, p. 47. etc.)))

...“In districts 1 and 2, where the executive committees control the organisations, no meetings were called during the first four months of the war” (37)....

p. 41: The opportunists refer to Kautsky (he, too, is stated to be in favour of muting criticism)—and the authors' *note* to the effect that Kautsky had ***protested*** against this “misuse” of his name. the opportunists and Kautsky

In the *Hamm* district—there were 6,000 members before the war—after four meetings, the vast majority *supported* Laufenberg (p. 47)....

§XI: “The carrot and the whip”—the opportunists, the “bosses” of the organisations, *Elm* (Adolf von Elm) and Emil Krause—“gave a seat” on the “Public Welfare Committee” (48) to a young worker (of the Workers' Education

Central Committee), so that he should act in a spirit of moderation....

N.B. !!! Laufenberg's pamphlet was sold by "Karl *Hoym*" (48), a worker in the (party) print-shop *Auer & Co.*, and he was subjected to persecution (Treiberei)—let him complain, they said, "to his Dr. Laufenberg" (48).

The police have gone to such lengths that, "as in the case of speeches by Comrades Scheidemann and Lensch, they have given speakers definite instructions about the content of their speeches and have forbidden discussion. Whereas the activity of *bourgeois* associations is not subjected to police interference, the corporate life of party and trade union organisations is now controlled by the police. We are thus in the same exceptional position as at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law" (52).... !!

The *press committee* (in whose name *H. Thomas* wrote) rejected Laufenberg's complaints ... (claims that the influence of Rosa, Mehring, Zetkin, etc., "in the party as a whole is quite insignificant" p. 53, etc.), and in Bremen, this same H. Thomas wrote, "after Comrade Pannekoek left Bremen" (54) meetings have been "much quieter (viel ruhiger)". N.B. !!

From Laufenberg's reply (to this committee) of January 22, 1915:

...."The laudatory reception the policy of the *Echo* enjoys in bourgeois circles, up to and including the *Hamburger Nachrichten* may prompt you to believe that the broad bourgeois public would protect your [the press committee's] back against the blows of the party opposition. This policy in fact coincides with the views that have enabled Comrades Dr. August Müller and von Elm to enjoy the well-deserved favour of the bourgeois world" (55). N.B. N.B.

...."*Echo*'s nationalist-chauvinist position (56)....

The press committee's reply of January 27, 1915, accuses Laufenberg and Co. of "*demagogy*" (59) ... and states that the party Executive Committee has declared "you and your friends" to be "saboteurs of the party" (62).... N.B.

From Laufenberg's reply of February 4, 1915: ... "local '**party bureaucracy**'" (63). N.B.

From *Thomas*'s reply (February 4, 1915)—the war is imperialist and we have not denied it, but we have denied that the cause is *only* German imperialism. We all recognise that the cause is "international imperialism" (65). N.B. international and German imperialism!

..."The meetings of party members in Hamburg Altona and Ottensen, whenever a discussion took place, adopted our [Laufenberg and Co.'s] point of view" (65). N.B.

Hamburger Echo is "the second largest Social-Democratic newspaper in Germany" (67).

The *New York Volkszeitung*—"has pursued a consistent proletarian policy during the world war" (67).

[*Echo* was angered by this, blaming "our old Schlüter" for it (p. 68) and describing as stupid the accusations that German Social-Democracy "has by its attitude lost the character of a workers' party and renounced its principles" (68).] N.B. *Echo* sets out the view of New York *Volkszeitung*

..."But this small wing [the opportunists] is not content with imposing on the party the tactics of national reformism. It is going further, attempting to split the party into two camps.... In contrast, the spokesmen of radicalism uphold the principle of unity of the German workers' movement" (73) ... (on the old bases of its 50 years' history).... N.B.

and the conclusion XV (§), "What should be done?"

..."The development of the proletarian organisations during the lengthy period of consolidation of the capitalist national states was premised on the belief that great political upheavals in the foreseeable future were out of the question, and that for a long time to come the struggle would centre on a parliamentary compromise with the old entrenched forces....

..."The world war changed the situation at a stroke. It showed that the capitalist economy had passed from the period of continuous upward development into the era of a stormy, explosive extension of its field of action. This confronts the proletariat with the task of adapting its class organisations to the revolutionary needs of the future.

"The monstrous events of last summer caught the proletarian organisations unprepared. It was left entirely to the local bureaucracy to determine our attitude towards these epochal political developments, as if it were a matter of the monthly control of dues stamps" (74)....

N.B

..."In our view, the main thing for the present opposition is to make the changes the situation requires in the form of organisation of the German proletariat. The previous general situation in Germany for decades compelled the proletariat to engage in predominantly *reformist* activity. In organisational matters this was based on the *leader principle*, in practical action *exclusively on parliamentarism*. The historic changes we are now experiencing compel the proletariat to undertake *mass action*, and this presupposes that the masses are *free* as regards their organisation, class-conscious and independent in determining the course of their actions" (75).

And the authors even propose a "*statute*" (76-77).

End

WIRTH, *HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD*

Albrecht *Wirth*, *History of the Modern World*, 4th edition, Leipzig, 1913 (and other sources).

[The introduction is characteristic: "1783-1870" (two dates and nothing else)]

TABLE OF COLONIAL SEIZURES AND WARS

	America and Western Europe (350)*	Eastern Europe (Austria+Balkans+Russia) (250)*	Other countries (mainly Asia and Africa) (1,000)*
1873-1879	Britain takes Fiji Islands (73).—United States: plans against Haiti (74).—Britain takes Quetta (76).—Britain takes Transvaal (77).—Britain at war with Afghanistan (78). Abrogation of Treaty on Schleswig-Holstein (Vienna, October 11, 1878). Britain fights Zulus 1879.—1879: Britain takes Cyprus. *Triple Alliance* (Germany+Austria+Italy) (79) (October 8, 1879).	General Russian advance in Turkestan: 1868-76.—Russia against Khiva (73).—Russia takes Sakhalin (75).—Russia takes Ferghana (76).—Russo-Turkish War (77). (Russia takes part of Bessarabia and Asia Minor.) 1878. British fleet before the Dardanelles. Threat. 1878: The Berlin Congress.	1868: Japanese reforms.—Khiva against Russia (73).—Fiji Islands against Britain (73).—Uprising in *Yünnan* (China) and *Achin* (73).—*Japan* against Formosa (74).—Uprising in Satsuma (Japan) (77).—Transvaal against *Britain* (77).—Afghanistan against Britain (78).—
1880-1891	Chile, Peru and Bolivia at war (80).—Germany takes Samoa (80).—France takes Tunisia (81). Even now 90,000 Italians and 35,000 Frenchmen in Tunisia.—Transvaal fights against Britain: February 27, 1881 (1879-80).—Italy in Massawa (81). Britain occupies Egypt (82).—Italy joins	Russia takes Merv (84). Serbo-Bulgarian war (85).—Russia on verge of war with Britain (85: agreement in Panjdeh on Afghanistan). (Anglo-Russian agreement on Afghanistan signed September 10, 1885).	Germany takes Samoa (80).—Transvaal becomes independent (81).—Kuldja returned (81).—"Disorders" in Korea (84).—Congo partitioned (85).—Uganda partitioned (90).—(June 17, 1890, exchange for Heligoland) (Zanzibar for Heligoland).

* These figures show population in millions.—*Ed.*

America and Western Europe	Eastern Europe (Austria+ Balkans+Russia)	Other countries (mainly Asia and Africa)
German-Austrian alliance, *1881* (Italy joins alliance on May 20, 1882?). — War between France and China ends in the peace of August 25, 1883: France takes Tonkin. — Germany acquires colonies in Africa (84). — France against China (84). — Britain against Egypt (84). — February 26, 1884: British treaty with Portugal: partition of Central Africa. — British agreement with Transvaal (84). — Britain takes Bechuanaland (84). — Partition of the Congo (85). — Berlin Congress on the Congo, November 15, 1884 (to February 26, 1885): the Congo partitioned. — Britain takes Burma (85). — 1885: gold discovered in Transvaal. — Britain on verge of war with Russia (85). — 1885: France's war against China and French defeats (March 30, 1885, fall of Ferry on this account). — Brazil a republic (89). — Britain and Germany on Uganda (90). — British ultimatum to Portugal (1890): Britain robs Portugal in	First Russian loan in France (500 million francs) December 1888. — Franco-Russian alliance (August 22, 1891?) (signed August 22, 1891). (Military agreement: end of June 1892.)	1868: Japanese reforms. — Khiva against Russia (73). — Fiji Islands against Britain

	Africa. Treaty between Britain and Portugal: June 11, 1891.—Franco-Russian alliance (1891).		
1892-1898	Revolution in Chile (92).—British agreement (?) on the Pamirs (92). France takes part of Siam (93). Britain at war with the Matabeles (93).—Partition of part of China. (95: Shimonoseki). France against Madagascar (95) (1894-1895).—Abyssinia against Italy (96). Britain against Egypt (96).—Germany seizes Kiao-chow (97). Spanish-American war for Cuba (98). Britain on verge of war with France (98). November 4, 1898, evacuation of Fashoda	Russian agreement (?) on the Pamirs (92). Partition of part of China (95).—Russian expedition in Abyssinia (96).— Greco-Turkish war (97).	Siam against Franco (93).—Matabeles against Britain (93). Sino-Japanese war (94) and the Shimonoseki treaty (95). April 17, 1895—Shimonoseki treaty. April 20, 1895—intervention of France+Germany+Russia. July 21, 1895—Peking treaty (Japan renounces victory over China...). Madagascar against France (95).—Philippines uprising (96).—Abyssinia against Italy (96). March 6, 1898—cession of Kiao-chow. March 27, 1898—cession of Port Arthur. April 11, 1898—cession of Kwang-chow-wan to France. ?— cession of Wei-hai-wei to Britain.
1899-1904	March 21, 1899: Britain and France divide up Africa.—Britain's war against the Boers (99).—United States' war against the Philippines (99). War against	Russia's secret treaty with Tibet on Russian protectorate recognised by China in 1902.	Boers against Britain (99).—War in the Philippines against America (99).—China against Europe (900): Boxer wars. End

	America and Western Europe	Eastern Europe (Austria+Balkans+Russia)	Other countries (mainly Asia and Africa)
	China (900) (end of 1900-September 1901).—Anglo-Japanese treaty: January 30, 1902. End of Britain's war against the Boers (1902).—1902: Sultan's Irade on the construction of the Baghdad railway, 1902.—United States takes Panama (903). 1903: Germany+Britain+Italy blockade Venezuela (shelled by the Germans) to extort payment of debts!! Britain against Tibet (904). Germany Against the Hereros (04).—Anglo-French agreement, April 8, 1904 (partition of Africa) (Morocco in exchange for Egypt).———	Russo-Japanese war (1904) (over Korea and part of China).	of Anglo-Boer War (902).—Panama and the U.S.A. (903).—Tibet against Britain (904).—The Hereros against Germany (04).—Russo-*Japanese* War (1904).
1905-1914	France on verge of war with Germany (Morocco) (1905).—Partition agreement in Algeciras (1906).—End of the Hottentot war against Germany (1907).—Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908). 1907-08: France and Britain each take a piece of Siam and neighbouring states. Anglo-Russian treaty (1907?) on	Portsmouth Peace treaty (1905). Revolution in Russia (1905). Russo-Japanese treaty: July 30, 1907 ("status quo"). Anglo-Russian treaty of August 31, 1907 (division of Persia).... *1908*: revolution in Turkey. Uprisings in Albania and Arabia (1909). Anglo-Russian	Partition of Morocco (Algeciras) (1905). *Japan* takes Korea, etc. (1905). Hottentot war against Germany. End (1907) (three years' war). Morocco against Spain (1909). Revolution in Persia (1909?) Russo-Japanese treaty (1910).

division of Persia. — Franco-Japanese treaty, June 10, 1907. — Anglo-Russian treaty, August 31, 1907 (division of Persia)... &meeting in Reval: June 1908. May (June) 1908: meeting in Reval (June 9, 1908) of British and Russian monarchs.
Spain against Morocco (909) — 1909-10.
Autumn 1909: meeting of Italian and Russian monarchs in Racconigi (preparation for Italo-Russian alliance against Austria). — Republic in Portugal (1910) (October 1910). (Britain, France and Germany) on the verge of war over Morocco (1911). May 21, 1911: French enter Fez. — November 4, 1911: agreement between France and Germany on exchange of part of the Congo for the right to Morocco. Italy against Tripoli (1911). Revolution and counter-revolution in Mexico (1911-13).

Britain and Germany divide up the Baghdad region (Asia Minor) (1913?)

April 1913: Germany allocates 1,000 million marks for armaments.

treaty (1907) ((meeting in Reval, June 1908)). May (June) 1908: meeting of British and Russian monarchs in Reval (June 9, 1908). — Autumn 1909: meeting of Italian and Russian monarchs in Racconigi. (Preparation for Italo-Russian alliance against Austria.) Russia against Persia 1909.
Treaty of Russia and Japan (1910).
First Balkan war, 1912
Second " " 1913 (June).

Russia encroaches on Armenia (1913?) (Ultimatum to Germany? 1913?)

Uprising in Korea—*1907-09*

Japan pacifies Korea (1907-09) (909: Assassination of Governor-General Ito). Morocco partitioned (1911). Tripoli against Italy (1911). Revolution in China (1911-12). Russia against Persia (1909).

Beginning of 1909: Russians enter Azerbaijan.

International crises:

1779?
1789-1871
1877-78 Russia against Turkey
1885 Russia against Britain
1895 Russia+Germany+France against Japan
1898 Britain against France
1904-05 Russia against Japan
1905 France against Germany
1911 France (France+Britain) against Germany

1872- 79 ("Triple" Alliance)
1879-1891 (Franco-Russian alliance)
1891-1898 (up to Fashoda)
1898-1904 (up to Russo-Japanese war)
1904-1914 (up to World War)
1914

Landmarks of diplomatic history:
1879: alliance of Germany and Austria (1881+Italy).
1891: Franco-Russian alliance.
1898: Fashoda
1904: Anglo-French agreement.
1907: Anglo-Russian, Russo-Japanese, Franco-Japanese agreements.

Speaking of the abolition of slavery and of European congresses on the subject (—1890—several! p. 132), the author points out that the United States abolished slavery, "but ever since then more and more Negroes in the southern States have been forced back into a state of feudal dependence, so that in many places they have as good as lost the right to vote" (132).

> "It seems to me that people pretty well always have the same amount of freedom.... Europe has now abolished slavery, but a sailor on a European ship would be despised by a Swahili slave for his low, exhausting labour; and what are many men and women workers in the big cities but serfs obedient to every gesture of their master?... The audacity of an Aristophanes

is unheard-of today, and in our time Luther would be prosecuted a hundred times a day for insulting the church and bringing it into contempt, incitement to class hatred, and lèse-majesté. Such is the case also as regards slavery" (133). — not bad!

In a small chapter on Ireland, the author says: "Pressure evokes counter-pressure, but mildness is interpreted as capitulation and weakness. What then should be done? I think that everything depends on the specific nature of the weaker people one wants to win over. The Albanians will never be made to submit by coercion. In Alsace-Lorraine, too, a conciliatory policy was the correct one.... The British exterminated the Tasmanians to the last man. But the Irish are not Tasmanians! They can't simply be exterminated" (133). — N.B.

The 1880s: Irish rising—martial law—Parnell, etc.

"Soon after Shimonoseki, Japanese writers were comparing the war against China with Prussia's war against Austria" (187), then would come an alliance against Europe. This view was especially sharply expressed by Prince *Konoye*, president of the Japanese Upper Chamber. — *N.B.* on an appraisal of 1894-95 war

p. 299: "the imperialist era" (now)—and, passim. ((E.g. p. 5, in the first passage of the book.)) — N.B.

"Stagnation of the German Empire" (p. 306 et seq.). 1899-1911 no acquisitions.

(p. 309) *Germany*— 541,000 sq. km. in 1870
3,200,000 " " " 1903
France— 536,000 " " " overseas
6,600,000

railway construction *in Asia*:
Germany: 1,100 km. (1884-1904)
Russia: 13,900 km. (1886-1904) *!!* (p. 311)

One of the "problems" of Africa (South): the Negroes multiply much more rapidly than the whites.

sic!! | "Many settlers positively want an uprising in order to check the dangerous growth of the Kaffir population and deprive it of its rights and landownership" (385)

chapter on "Changes in Africa".

p. 396: European possessions in Africa (Hänsch: *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 1912):

	1890		1912
Great Britain	2.1	mill. sq. km.	8.8
Germany	2.1		2.4
Belgian Congo	2.1		2.4
France	1.8		9.2
Portugal	1.8		2.1

well said! | "Carlyle says that already in the eighteenth century it was 'the job' of continental states to fight Britain's wars for her" (408).

N.B. | "The whole world is now involved in one or other system of alliances, taking part in one of the two great concerns which lay claim to possession of the world: the Triple Alliance reinforced by Rumania, or the group led by Great Britain. America alone still remains aloof. Things there are taking such a remarkable turn that both the above-mentioned concerns, which confront each other with such hostility in the entire Old World, stand united in supporting South America against North America" (411).

The population of *Persia* is far from nationally homogeneous: Persians, Kurds (2 million), Bakhtiari; Arabs; Baluchis; Armenians, Jews, Turks (1½ million) **and many others** (416).

The population of Turkey (1909): Turks—9 million; Arabs—7 million; Greeks—2½-3; Albanians—2½; Kurds 1½; Armenians—1¼; Bulgarians—1; Levantines—1; Serbs—¾; Jews—⅔; Wallachians—0.5; Berbers and Negroes in Tripoli—0.7; others—1. Total=29 million (p. 422)....

"The most important event in Persia's recent development, which is becoming ever more confused, was certainly the big loan issued jointly by Great Britain and Russia. It is the biggest in the history of Persia: 70,000,000 marks. ***A typical business deal of modern imperialism.*** Exactly the same thing was done in Morocco. A country excites the covetousness of some modern powerful state. The country—it might be Cuba, or Liberia, or Iran—finds itself in difficulties; disorders occur, which, however, could be settled if there were no outside interference. The foreign power does not allow the wounds to heal; it intensifies existing disorders and provokes new ones. It happens that a provocateur is killed—for example, Dr. Mauchamp in Marrakech or North American filibusters in Nicaragua—or the police in Tabriz are blamed for the disappearance of a Russian soldier who has deserted (and is found some days later in a distant maize field). In the search for the deserter, houses are broken into, even the harem of the high priest. Embitterment naturally arises against the foreign instigators of the disorders. Popular passions reach explosion point, there are atrocities. In reprisal, the foreign power sends in troops and at the same time presents the invaded country with a bill for the cost of the invasion. The country cannot pay it. What is to be done? With a friendly smile, the invading power announces it is prepared to help its dear friend out of this little difficulty and offers a loan. The interest is, of course, not so very low, for the security offered is very unreliable. Caught in the usurer's claws, the country can no longer escape its fate—it is to be civilised by the invading friendly power" (p. 443). N.B.

That was written by a bourgeois writer! N.B.

"Italian imperialism is manifested not only in conquests, but in a growing feeling of mutual guarantee, in pan-Italianism. An all-Italian rally was held in Rome as early as October 1908, and another in 1912 in Forli".... Italo-

Americans, etc. ... "there are six million Italian subjects abroad"... (476).

very typical!! "Even now, Albania is less known than the greater part of Central Africa" (50).

N.B. "In earlier overseas expansion, there was always a margin of elbow-room left, all Western nations had adequate place for development in their respective 'New Europes' and rivalry gave rise only to fruitful competition. But now North America will not hear of more immigrants, Australia is already closing its doors, Siberia is open only to citizens of one particular country, while South Africa is revealing, with horrible clarity, the grim fact that emigration can no longer help, as it has hitherto, to obtain a place in a world, which has shrunk; one European will have to strangle another. There is still plenty of land even now, but the former small states have become big powers, and the former big powers have become world powers and must already look about for adequate space for their future populations. The Yankees will not allow us a single acre of Brazil, and the French envy the Italians' possession of the barren wastes of Tripoli. The harder struggle for existence aggravates hostility among the Europeans and leads to attempts at mutual annihilation. That, in its turn, is to the advantage of the East" (215).

N.B.

N.B.

N.B.

Chapter: "The War over Cuba":

"The Yankees started out by preaching the equality of all men and aspiring for an ideal state full of peaceful, complacent happiness. They are ending with the conviction that men are incorrigibly unequal, and with a policy of conquest by force. They began with freedom in everything, freedom of trade and intercourse, toleration of other religions, races and states. They have arrived at the steepest protective tariffs, growing hostility to Roman Catholics and outright aggressiveness towards foreign

races and states. First they prohibited the immigration of Chinese and deprived them of citizenship, then, factually, though not juridically, abolished the rights of the Negroes, the very # people for whom they have so uselessly and foolishly fought the great Civil War, and, finally, by all kinds of petty methods they have restricted the influx of those same white immigrants whom they previously so passionately desired. United States world policy is attended by an increasingly intensive policy of self-isolation. Only dictatorship is lacking to crown this progressive exclusiveness and centralisation" (252)....

N.B. N.B. ha-ha!!

Idem, p. 345: "At bottom, the war (the Civil War) had no meaning, for the Negro, on whose behalf it. was waged, is now again well on the way to being deprived of all rights."

N.B.

The sharpening friction between Germany and the United States (Samoa (*)), Germany and Great Britain, Great Britain and France (Fashoda), the growth of armaments.... "The catchword used to denote all this general mood of aggressiveness was 'imperialism'" (253).

(*) Cf. p. 269: "From March to May 1899, the Germans and Samoans were engaged in an open fight against the British and Americans at Apia."

Chapter: "The Pacific Ocean and Australia":

"When Great Britain decided to allow her North American possessions to unite in the Dominion of Canada, the majority of the British people vehemently opposed continuation of such a risky policy. In particular, they believed there was a great danger that Australia would follow suit. Often enough one could hear the opinion expressed that the creation of such colonial allied states as Canada would be merely the prelude to separation from the Mother-

land. Today the emergence of an Australian Commonwealth is regarded in Britain as a triumph of colonial policy, and Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, is praised to the skies as the enlarger and strengthener of the Empire! Nothing has contributed more to this than Britain's experience in the South African war. Instead of utilising Britain's difficulties in their own interests, instead of seeking to loosen their ties with Britain, as pessimists had predicted, all the colonies without exception most warmly supported Great Britain in her struggle. They displayed not merely patriotism, but a degree of chauvinism that removed all doubt about the correctness of decades of liberal colonial policy. Australia headed the colonies that contributed troops to help the mother country. Her sacrifices should be appraised the more highly since all the Australian colonies were in severe financial difficulties. Britain's swift approval of the Union concluded between them is a recognition of their patriotism and testifies to the mother country's faith in their loyalty" (271).

N.B.

?
India?

N.B.: a union of the privileged, of participants in monopoly, in Australia—the monopoly owners of a vast territory—for jointly plundering the "yellows" and "blacks", etc.

A. von Peez, *Great Britain and the Continent*, 1910.

? Roloff, *European Historical Calendar* ... [i.e., Schulthess's]

?? Zimmermann, *World Politics*, 1901.

The "*double-insurance*" treaty (when? arose in *1884*; renewed in *1887* until *1890*). Germany+ Russia pledged themselves to benevolent neutrality in the event of an attack by a third power. By whom? Great Britain or Austria!! (A secret German move against Austria.)

On the history of the Franco-Russian alliance: Boulangerism 1886-89: January 7, 1886—Boulanger becomes a member of the government. April 4, 1889—accused of high treason, Boulanger flees to Brussels (September 30, 1891—Boulanger commits suicide).

Incidentally: *Wirth* gives figures on the results of the policy towards the *Poles* in Prussia: 1890-1910 German population in Prussia+29.37 per cent, Polish population +23.48 per cent (p. 101). Hundreds of millions of marks for "settling" the area!!

Literature:

Schmitz, *The Art of Politics*, 1912, Berlin.
Descamps, *New Africa*.

N.B. Leopold (Belgium)—business manipulator, financier, swindler; bought the Congo for himself and "developed" it. Slick operator!![43]

Warneck, *History of the Evangelical Missions*. (The role of the Missions in colonial plunder.)

Wirth, p. 85: Mission activity "almost doubled" in 1880-1900.

YOUNG EGYPT CONGRESS

Concerning the history of the national movement in **Egypt**:
Europäischer Geschichtskalender (Schulthess's), 1909, p. 605.
(student movement, national ferment, etc., etc.).

N.B. National movement in *Egypt*

September 13, 1909. Young Egypt Congress in Geneva (about 100 attending). Keir *Hardie* promised to defend their cause in the House of Commons, "the Irish M.P. *Kettle* recalled the fraternal unity of Egypt and Ireland".

N.B. *Fraternity* with Ireland

TARDIEU, *FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES*

André *Tardieu* (honorary first secretary of the Embassy). *France and the Alliances. The Struggle for Equilibrium*, Paris, 1909. ((Very useful book!))

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when? N.B. where? On p. 17 the author recalls: "M. Jaurès in his sacrilegious [!!] letter on 'the Triple Alliance, a necessary counterbalance to Franco-Russian chauvinism', was the only person who in defiance of history and geography, did not recognise this obvious truth" (the necessity of the Franco-Russian alliance).

sic! "M. Jaurès himself—who since then, it is true, has changed his mind" (when? where?), "declared on January 23, 1903, that he had no objection in principle to the alliance with Russia" (p. 29)....

Wars of England against France for domination: 1688-97; 1701-11; 1742-48; 1754-63; 1778-83; 1793-1815 (p. 41).

Germany against England:
treaty of June 14, 1890
" of November 15, 1893 } division of Africa.

!! The secret treaty of 1898, "the conditions of which were little known, disposed of the future of the Portuguese colonies" (52).

Italy laid claim to North Africa long ago (Mazzini in 1838! p. *95*). Bismarck wrote about this to Mazzini in 1866. Hatred over Tunisia (1881) impelled Italy towards Germany.

Setbacks in Abyssinia and financial crisis caused her to turn away from Germany. In 1900 the French banks "saved the Rome market" (101) [1]).

"The German economic crisis made it necessary for Italy to seek political rapprochement with France" (102) [1]). "The German money market was not in a position to act as the banker of Italy" (102) [1])....

December 1900: exchange of amicable notes between France and Italy.

N.B. dates 1882-1900: Italy the ally of Germany: p. 105.

PROMMATA TOMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"What would have happened if Italy's attitude towards us in 1905 had been the same as in 1889?" (109)....

Spain ... the "aid" of "French capital" (113)....

October 6, 1904, agreement between France and Spain (division of Morocco)....

The struggle between France and Germany (after 1870) was "on the one hand, a struggle for equilibrium and, on the other, a struggle for supremacy" (344)....

Mentioned, where? *Crispi* was formerly a "red" and has been zealously living this down!!

The author—Tardieu—is himself a diplomat, an expert! Many indications of the part played by finance. His survey of events is complete, good. Useful and necessary as a history of diplomacy from the *French* point of view.

Literature:

Rouire, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Asia.*
De Caix, *Fashoda.*

[1]) G. M. Fiamingo, *The Financial Reasons for Franco-Italian Friendship.*
A. Billot (our ex-ambassador in Rome), *France and Italy.*
Luigi Ghiala (or Chiala?), *Pages from Contemporary History.*
Victor Bérard, *The Moroccan Incident.*
René Pinon, *The Mediterranean Empire.*

MÉVIL, *FROM THE FRANKFURT PEACE TO THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE*

André *Mévil*, *From the Frankfurt Peace to the Algeciras Conference*, Paris, 1909. Scanned through; weaker, more fragmentary, more superficial, narrower in scope than the former (Tardieu), who is a historian and diplomat; Mévil is a pamphleteer.

More correctly, only a *sketch* of events *round about* 1905 [much narrower in scope].

POLITICAL HANDBOOK

Political Handbook, by *Laband* and others.
Vol. I. *Political Foundations*. (General, parliamentarism, etc.)
Vol. II. *Political Tasks*, *1912*. Survey of political problems: parties, colonies, ***foreign policy*** (N.B.) etc., etc.

N.B. Very useful brief survey, written by specialists, with literature references.

N.B.	the Polish question in Germany
"expansion	the foreign policy of all countries
of Germany"	the school question
"political aims	Bernstein's article on revisionism
of modern powers"	in Social-Democracy, etc.

GERMANY AND THE WORLD WAR

Germany and the World War.
(A collection of articles: 686 pp.). *Berlin*, *1915*.
(Published by O. Hintze, Fr. Meinecke and others.)

N.B. Professor Dr. *Hans Uebersberger* (Vienna). "Russia and Pan-Slavism"—a useful sketch of Russian diplomacy, lists a number of sources....

Martens, "A Collection of Treaties", 15, p. 237 (Chancellor Nesselrode's letter to Kiselyov, Minister in Paris, August 30, *1848*, on a Franco-Russian rapprochement against Germany).

Barsukov, "Life of Pogodin", 5, p. 330 et seq.; 9, p. 262 (Pogodin's Memorandum, in *1840*, on "liberation" of the Austrian Slavs).

Tyutchev. In a memorandum "Russia and Revolution" (for Alexander II)—"Bohemia will be free when Galicia is Russian" (*Russky Arkhiv*, 1873, p. 926 et seq.).

Memorandum of 1864. "Modern Politics" (drawn up on the instructions of Gorchakov); the Austrian Slavs must look to Russia to free them: (Eckhardt) "Secret Russian Memorandum, 1864" in *Deutsche Rundschau*, VI, 11, p. 209 et seq.

Moscow Slav Charitable Society. Its policy.

Danilevsky, "Russia and Europe": articles in *Zarya*, 1869-70, and a book: 1st edition in 1871.

Danilevsky argued that France's defeat would be to Russia's advantage, for it would foster dissension and enmity between France and Germany and *favour* Russian domination (appeared in *Zarya*, January 1871; reprinted in *Danilevsky's Collection of Economic and Political Articles*, St. Petersburg, 1890, pp. 27 and 29).

Fadeyev, *The Eastern Question—an Opinion*, St. Petersburg, 1870.

P. A. Saburov's Memorandum, *Russky Arkhiv*, 1912, 1, p. 470 (("the success of Prussian arms, 1870, is also a victory for us". Sic!!!)).

Ivan Sergeyevich *Aksakov*: speech of July 4, 1878 (against Russian diplomacy and, indirectly, against the tsar: dissatisfaction with the Berlin Congress).

Pokrovsky, "Russian Foreign Policy" in *History of Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 9, p. 204 et seq. (and p. 174) (Russia's claims on Bulgaria and her railways in 1877).

"Neo-Slavism" in 1908 and thereabouts.

cf. *Vestnik Yevropy*, 1909, No. 1, p. *386*.

May 1908: a Czech (Member of Parliament), a liberal Slovene and a Russophile Ruthenian, visit Russia (St. Petersburg).

Dmowski, *Germany*, *Russia and the Polish Question* (a plan to "reconcile" the Poles with Russia at the cost of oppressing the Ukrainians).

P. Struve, "Patriotica", p. *213* (*The Slav Days*).

Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik, 1910, No. 27, column 4.

Yevgeny Trubetskoi against Menshikov, for rapprochement with the Poles.

Goryainov (director of archives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs): *Bosporus and the Dardanelles*, *1907*.

G. Trubetskoi, *Russia as a Great Power*, p. 122 (for the time being, Italy is more useful in the enemy camp!!!)

Gr. Yevreinov (Senator), *Ideology of the Near-Eastern Question*, St. Petersburg, 1911.

Slavyanskiye Izvestia, 1913, No. 8 (January 6 (19), 1913); 1912, No. 45 (November 10 (23), 1912).

N.B. *Novoye Zveno*, *1914*, No. *13*, p. 407 (March 28, 1914)—Bryanchaninov, three months before Sarayevo, predicts a European war within 1½-2 months.

FRANKE, "THE GREAT POWERS IN EASTERN ASIA"

This article by Otto Franke, "The Great Powers in Eastern Asia", is included in the same volume.

A useful summary of the facts (partly with source references) about how China was robbed by Britain and France (Annam by France, Burma by Britain, Tibet by Britain, Siam by France and Britain—all former parts of China or areas dependent on her).

N.B. 1898: negotiations for an Anglo-German-Japanese alliance against Russia

p. *442*: "...The Japanese ambassador, Count Hayashi, reveals in his notes, the publication of which, unfortunately, was stopped by the Tokyo Government, that on the initiative of Joseph Chamberlain, negotiations were conducted in London in 1898 with Japan for an Anglo-Japanese-German triple alliance as a barrier to Russia's continued penetration into Eastern Asia. This coincided with confidential British overtures to Berlin on an Anglo-German alliance.

They did not strike a bargain!!

These were without result, if only because Great Britain had nothing to offer or propose to Germany other than the honour of taking the field against Russia. Japan, however, did not hesitate; she was ready to enter into such an alliance with Germany".... (442-43).

July 1910 (p. 456) treaty between Russia and Japan: Japan is given a free hand

in Korea. [Some weeks after she annexes Korea.]
—Russia in *Mongolia* (Russo-Chinese treaty concluded in the spring of 1911). N.B.

September 17, 1914: Russia concludes a treaty with "independent" Mongolia (establishing factual Russian protectorate) N.B.

1911: Anglo-Japanese treaty (replacing the old one)—Britain will remain neutral in the event of war between Japan and America (Japan *probably* given a "free hand" against Germany).

ONCKEN, "PRE-HISTORY OF THE WAR"

Ibidem Hermann *Oncken*, "Pre-History of the War".
pp. *475-77*: In 1898 Britain and Germany were negotiating an alliance against Russia (*The Saturday Review* threatened that the people would settle accounts with the dynasty if it allied itself with Germany!!). No agreement was reached: Britain said: "Germany demands too much" (477). This, author claims, is not true, Berlin made no demands (?!!?). A treaty was concluded *only* in October 1898, and it ' envisaged German and British economic penetration into the Portuguese colonies in the event of Portugal not fulfilling her obligations in regard to loan payments" (477). N.B. gem!

In October 1898 Great Britain and Germany were *dividing* Portugal's colonies. B

ADLER, *IMPERIALIST SOCIAL POLICY*

Georg Adler, ***Imperialist Social Policy***.—*Disraeli, Napoleon III, Bismarck*. A survey. Tübingen, 1897 (44 pp.). (Preface dated March 1897.)
((A reprint of articles from the magazine *Die Zukunft*)).

An instructive little book! After a short introduction on Chartism (phrases about "Chiliastic expectations" (2), about "illusions" (2) and their role in "mass movements", etc.), Adler devotes a brief chapter to Carlyle and his "social-aristocratic doctrine" (criticism of capitalism, hatred of democracy, "appeal for feudalisation of modern economic activity" (11), "the idea of a social aristocracy"). Then Chapter III: "Disraeli's Social Policy." A Jew, an adventurer, Disraeli began as a Radical, defected to the Tories, was heavily in debt, was laughed at on his maiden speech in Parliament (1838), but became Tory leader and Prime Minister in 1868. He propagated the ideas of the monarchy + a social aristocracy (in reality was playing on the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat). The electoral reform of 1867 (Carlyle furiously attacked it in his pamphlet: *Shooting Niagara*: *and After?*), small concessions and advances to the labour movement, which had lost its revolutionary character, brilliant foreign and colonial policy in 1874-80. Overall result = "an imperial-socialist" (p. 22)—and *passim* "imperial-socialist policy", etc.

!!

For example: "*Imperial-socialism*" and other things, p. 44, p. 43, p. 35.

Chapter IV, on Napoleon III. He too was an adventurer, a dreamer. The author of "The Extinction of Pauperism" (1844). Brilliant economic development,—brilliant foreign policy,—a furious struggle against **political** workers' organisations while *encouraging economic* organisations ((p. 32)),—mutual aid societies (flirting with *all* classes). **Lexis** in his book on "French **trade unions**" admits the undoubted improvement of the French workers' position during 1850-70 and a measure of success of Napoleon III's policy: "discipline and supervision of the workers, on the one hand, improvement of their material conditions, on the other—in his domestic policy Louis Napoleon never deviated from that idea" (Lexis quoted by Adler, p. 34).

Chapter V. "Bismarck's Social Policy."

Being a country of "schools and barracks", Prussia naturally became a model of "imperialist social policy" (36): Bismarck's campaign against free thought, his flirting with the workers, universal suffrage (to set the bourgeoisie and the proletariat at loggerheads), social legislation... social insurance (Adler extols it).

In conclusion (p. 43), Adler says that this "must not" (!!ha-ha!!) be compared with the Caesarism of declining Rome, for support is given to people who work, not to good-for-nothing plebeians. *Proudhon*, he says, wrote (where?) (a quotation from *Proudhon*: "We do not receive a penny from abroad", p. 43) that (Roman) Caesarism lived by plundering foreign nations, but this does not apply here. !!

..."Imperial-socialism ... in its enduring traits ... was, objectively, a great step forward towards integrating the proletariat in modern society and its practical collaboration in the latter's cultural tasks" (44). ((The roots of social-chauvinism!!))—hence "imperial-socialism" was "an illusion of world-historical importance", for it was useful, although it did not reconcile the proletariat, the enemy of Disraeli, Napoleon III and Bismarck.

Cf. Engels on Napoleon III versus Bismarck

"Bonapartism"

((End of Adler's pamphlet)).

SIEGFRIED, *NEW ZEALAND*

André Siegfried, *New Zealan*d, Berlin, 1909.

(**N.B.** Chapter 28: "Imperialism.")

A very useful outline of a *broad* economic and political scope. The distinctive feature of "imperialism": exclusiveness. *The yellow race is completely barred from entering the country*. **Savage** restrictions [e.g., £100!!!—p. 190] on immigration in general. A country at the edge of the world (*four* days to Australia!). Almost N.B.

as big as Italy, but with a population of less than one million!!! (*900,000*—p. 189; 929,000 in 1907, p. 234; half of France) ((magnificent climate, etc.)).

"Snobbishness" of the population (Chapter XXI): servility towards the aristocracy ("Sir" is a title of honour, before which they crawl), the British monarchy, the Court, etc., etc. Population growth is *very low*.

A country of inveterate, backwoods, thick-headed, egotistic philistines, who have brought their "**civilisation**" with them from England and keep it to themselves like a dog in the manger. (Exterminated the natives—the Maoris—by fire and sword; a series of wars.)

Example: persecution of the *Austrian* (N.B.) workers who emigrated to New Zealand (1893, 1898-) (p. 191): the "Labour Party" attacked them.

Equal rights for women.—Campaign against alcoholism.—Clericalism: intense religiosity; numerous sects.

Opposed to union with Australia: we are for ourselves. We are "the best country in, the world" (293) (!!)....

N.B. "New Zealand imperialism" (p. 294).... Its "special form" (ibidem) ... "colonial jingoism" (295 idem 296), which might be described as "Australasian imperialism" (295).

Two trends of imperialism (fully compatible):

1) Great-Power imperialism (participation in the imperialism of Great Britain).

N.B. "*local imperialism*" 2) "**Local imperialism**" (295)—its isolationism ... exclusiveness. N.B.

Protests against the French presence in New Caledonia—against the German occupation of Samoa (297), etc. This leads to irreconcilable hostility because of the "Greater New Zealand" idea....

In June 1901 New Zealand annexed the Cook Archipelago.

New Zealand is Great Britain's most "faithful", loyal colony.

The national debt: £51,200,000 (out of £66,500,000)—British capital

Trade—66 per cent with Britain

Arch-patriots in the Boer war (307) ...(sent troops against the Boers)....

Prime Minister Seddon—a representative of Australasian imperialism. "An imperialist of the first water" (310) ... (he died June 10, 1906. Was Prime Minister (1893-1906) (p. 71))

His first trip to Britain—1897
" second " " " —1902

"The champion of *social policy* in him [Seddon] began to yield pride of place to the *imperialist* and *protectionist* statesman" (311). Although a reformer (favoured reforms in New Zealand)—in Britain he made up to the *Tories*. The Conservatives lavished praise on the "socialist Seddon" (311). *The Times*, June 18, 1902, praised Seddon, the radical, the democrat, the imperialist!! (quotation p. 311).

N.B. social policy + imperialism!

N.B.

Growth of the idea and practice of preferential tariffs....

Their "socialism": "The New Zealanders are practical and opportunist to the point of cynicism" (67)———and the workers too (67), they are wholly "conservative", they have something to "guard" (ibidem).

N.B.

(Seddon—a representative of the "labour group in the Liberal Party" (68)).

Labour protection legislation—factory inspection—and of work in the home—a 48-hour working week (law of 1901) for men, 45 hours for women—minimum wage, etc.

Compulsory arbitration, etc.

The "key to all this is protectionism (140) and industrial *prosperity*.... ((It could not be maintained under free trade).... Old-age pensions (at 65)....

N.B.: the imperialist bourgeoisie is buying the workers by social reforms

Creation of **small** landownership; large estates (stolen, etc., in the basest fashion from the Maoris, etc.) bought out and sold to smallholders—that is "*democracy*, but not *socialism*" (175). ((True!))

"Converting big landownership into small! That is what the French revolution did, too" (175)....

HOETZSCH, *RUSSIAN TURKESTAN*

Otto Hoetzsch, *Russian Turkestan and Present Trends in Russian Colonial Policy... (Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 37th year, 1913, No. 2).

((The author knows Russian, has been to Turkestan N.B. and has made a thorough study of the relevant literature.))

N.B. *Russia* consumes about eleven million poods of cotton (100 million rubles) from Turkestan (+Khiva+Bukhara), and about 11-12 million from America.

Turkestan=1.5 million square versts (1 sq. verst= 1.13 sq. km.)
Khiva=0.05
Bukhara=0.2

Σ=1.75 (nearly four times the size of Germany). The population [of Turkestan]=5.3 million (1897) and 6.7 million (1910).

The population is an "Indo-Iranian" mixture, mostly "Turco-Mongolian".

Branches of the big Russian banks are to be found everywhere....

..."there is lively and constantly expanding colonial-economic activity"... (p. 388).

Islam prevails. *Complete* freedom of religion. *Pan-Islamism*:

N.B. ..."Pan-Islamic agitation among the Moslem Sarts and Kirghiz, which hitherto have been tranquil in this respect, has been introduced by the Moslem Tatars coming from the North, the Volga area (Nogaitsy) and Western Siberia. These Tatar intellectuals belong to the literary and political elite of present-day Islam, and are among its most energetic and influential adherents. And it is primarily to them that Islam owes its great internal and external strengthening and its cultural growth. In *1880*, Russia's

Pan-Islamism in Russia

1880

Moslem population was estimated at 11 million; their printed literature was confined to 7 or 8 books, and they had one printing-press; there were four leaders and twelve persons with higher education, including one who had studied in Western Europe. In *1910* there were already 20 million; they had over 1,000 printed books, 14 printing-presses and 16 periodical publications; 200 persons had received higher education in Russia and 20—in Western Europe, there were about 100 writers, six higher and 5,000 lower schools, 37 charitable institutions, three small banks and three village banks.[1]) This great "Moslem" movement, which embraced also such ethnic groups as the Votyaks, the Cheremisy, the Chuvashi, has been described in a study...[2]), dealing especially with schools and education. Russia's Moslem population has undergone considerable cultural development in the past 10 years: there is a mosque and a mullah to every 150 Kazan Tatars compared with 1 priest to 1,500 of the Russian and non-Russian population of the area; the Tatars have *one school* to every *hundred* of the population; the Orthodox Christians—one to *1,500-3,000*. Book and newspaper circulation among the Tatar Moslems is, proportionally, still greater.

and

1910

1880 and *1910*
12-200 with higher education,
1-14 printing presses,
0-16 periodical publications
8-1,000 books
N.B.

!!!

1:100
1:2,000

---

[1]) *Ostroumov*, *The World of Islam*, Tashkent, *1912*.
By the same author, *The Sarts*, Tashkent, 1908, also The Koran and Progress, Tashkent, 1903.

N.B.

[2]) *Bishop Andrei and N. V. Nikolsky*, *Basic Statistics of the Non-Russians of Eastern Russia*, Kazan, 1912.

While this cultural superiority and vitality lead to easier assimilation of the non-Russians, both Christian and pagan, with the Moslem Tatars, the latter are greatly disquieted by the government's school policy" (Russian-language schools!) "endorsed by the Duma . They are inclined to be less submissive and to join in the agitation that has now spread to the whole Moslem world, and are ready *to seek support among the Moslems of China and India*. Contact with the Turkestan Moslems comes as a matter of course; in fact *pan-Islamic unrest* is already being brought in *from the North*. The Russian Government fears this penetration of Tatar Moslems and has tried to keep them out of Turkestan. True, Russia's school policy in Turkestan is by no means discriminatory" ... freedom of religion and native schools.... The Sarts are eager to learn Russian: "the natives readily attend Russian-language schools".... "Economic realities are making the importance of the Russian language as the general commercial and official language increasingly clear to the practical Sart." A "very gradual" "cultural Russification" is taking place (406-09)....

N.B. drawing closer to the Moslems of India and China

"unrest"... "from the North"

On *irrigation*, p. 362 in No. 3: in the Transcaspian region + Syr-Darya + Samarkand + Ferghana, there are 2¼ million dessiatines of irrigated land, of which 1.0 million are under wheat, and 0.379 under cotton.

Hence (p. 363), out of a total land area of 159 million dessiatines, 156¾ are dry and barren; only 2¼ are irrigated.

Literature:
N.B.: Count York von Wartenburg, *Russian Penetration in Asia*, Berlin, 1900.
H. Vambéry, *Russian Power in Asia*, Leipzig, 1871.
Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, London, 1889.
Abaza, *The Conquest of Turkestan*, St. Petersburg, 1902.

SOCIALISM IN CHINA

Die Neue Zeit, 1913-14, XXXII, 1, pp. 711-12.

Summary of an article by A. Jax. (Shanghai) in *The Socialist Review* (1913, No. 1).

The article is headed "*Reaction in China*".

Author gives translations of the statutes of the Chinese socialist parties and organisations. He is struck by their "vagueness" and "pious wishes". In Chinese, socialism and society are one and the same word (Shih Hui). A number of socialists have been executed. A worker, Wen, (from Shanghai) (executed) founded the "Workers' **Party of the Chinese Republic**". Early in 1913 it carried out a successful three-day strike of Shanghai silversmiths. Its programme is extremely unclear.

There was also a "Chinese Socialist Party", as well as a "Pure (sic!) Socialist Party". Most of the leaders have been executed. Yüan Shih-kai crushed these parties.

Social-ism in China

NAHAS, *THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POSITION OF THE EGYPTIAN FELLAH*

Joseph **F. Nahas**. *The Economic and Social Position of the Egyptian Fellah*.
(Thesis.) Paris 1901

Egyptian *fellahs*

Amateurish. Contains *literature* references.

A description (all too brief) of the desperate poverty of the fellahs, who live in clay huts,

without furniture, *together with livestock*, and toil from morning to night. Downtroddenness, ignorance—as in Russia.

His approach is extremely typical: *liberal-Narodnik*, just as in Russia during the years 1880-1900!!

p. 38, note. Britain stifles industry!!!

DIE NEUE ZEIT, XXX, 1

KAUTSKY, "MASS ACTION"

Die Neue Zeit, XXX, 1 (1912).

N.B.: p. 45 (Karl Kautsky). The masses = 30 million. One-tenth are organised. *N.B.*

LINK, "ARE SAVINGS BANKS CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS?"

p. 60. Savings banks: 25 per cent of savings accounts = 87 per cent of total deposits. (Prussia, 1909.) (Deposits > 600 Mk)

POPULATION ESTIMATES

	Number of countries	Population million—approx.)	Of which dependencies	Of which colonies: *number*	Of which colonies: population (*mill.*)
(α) Western Europe	15	220	(10-15)	2	0.2
America	23	145	(none?)	7	13.5 (?)
Σ	38	365	(10-15)	9	14 (?)
(β) Eastern Europe and *its* part of Asia	12	215	(90-100?)	5	25 (?)
(γ) Rest of Asia, Africa and Australia	64 (?)	870	semi-dependencies about 300?	60	480 (?)
Σ	114 (?)	1,450	100-115	74	519

	Sq. km. (mill.)	Population (mill.)
Japan	0.4	46.5
China	3.9	319.5
	+7.3	10.6
Afghanistan	0.6	4.5
Persia	1.6	9.0
(4)		390.1
		+480
	0.2	870
	7.9	
	0.04	
	0.4	colonies
	0.14	498.5
	8.6	—17.3
	17.3	481.2

	Population (mill.)	Dependencies	Colonies
α)	400	<5%	< 5%
β)	250	40-50%	10%
γ)	900		>50%
	1,550		

about 480 million
? 60-100 (?)

	Total	Population (mill.) of which dependencies	colonies	
α	400	20 +	20 = 40	10%
β	250	100 +	25 = 125	50%
γ	900	— +	500 = 500	60%
	1,550	120 +	545 = 665	

	Sq. km. (mill.)	Population (mill.)		of which dependencies	colonies	Population (mill.)
Russia	5.3	106.2		about 60		
+						
+ Khiva	0.06	0.5	24.6		(5)	
Bukhara	0.2	1.5				
Caucasus	0.5	9.2				
Central Asia	3.5	7.7				
Siberia	12.5	5.7				
Russia	22.1	130.8		(60?)	(5)	—24.6
Austria-Hungary	0.6	45.3		(about 25)	—	—
Serbia	0.05	2.5		?	—	—
Rumania	0.1	5.9		?	—	—

	Sq. km. (mill.)	Population (mill.)	of which dependencies	colonies	Population (mill.)
Bulgaria	0.1	3.7	?	—	—
Greece	0.06	2.4	?	—	—
Turkey	0.1	5.9			
+			(?)		
Asia	1.8	17.2			
	1.9	23.1	(10?)		

without Arabia? + 2.5 million sq. km., 1.9 million population

213.7	(90-100)	(5)	(25) (?)

	Number of countries independent	dependent	
α 38	29	+ 7	7
β 12	7	+ 5	+ 5
γ 64	2-4	—60-62	12

Western Europe and America:

Eastern Europe:
Austria-Hungary
Russia, Balkans and Turkey (consequently, including part of Asia):

Rest of Asia, Africa and Australia.

NOTEBOOK "ξ"
("XI")

Contents

ξ

The War and Imperialism

Bernhardi	[5-10]
Ruedorffer	[11-19]
Mackay: China	[20-22]
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Belger	[24-26]
Rohrbach	[27]
Sartorius v. Waltershausen	[28-30]
Cromer	[33]
Ruedorffer N.B. 16 pp.	
Belger N.B. *26* pp.	

Great Britain (1897-1911)—£998,500,000		
	19,970	million marks
Germany	5,490	million marks
	5,500	million marks

PRESS EXCERPTS

L'Echo de Paris, October 13, 1914;

"The Junius Article", in connection with Jouhaux's conversation with Legien.

..."What a lesson—if only our trade-unionists were prepared to take advantage of it—is afforded by this conversation

of M. Jouhaux, secretary of the General Confederation of Labour, with the German socialist deputy, Herr Legien, on July 24 last, and at Brussels!—The date and place are symbolic. 'What do you intend to do to avoid war?' asked M. Jouhaux. 'Have you decided to take action? For our part, we are ready to respond.' And he adds: 'Though the questions were put several times, Legien made no reply. We left Brussels convinced that we would have to abandon our confidence in the good will of the German organisations.' What conclusion does he draw from this disappointment? I continue to quote his text: 'We shall draw up an indictment to remind everyone that the sole means of assuring firm and lasting international relations is everywhere to take identical action for peace against war.' The latest developments have shown him that such joint action is not possible. He considers that an accident and continues to cherish a utopia, the very thought of which makes one shudder. What would have happened if Herr Legien had been a less honest man and had promised his naïve questioner assistance which later would not have been forthcoming?" But let us not think of catastrophes which have not happened. And Junius goes on to lecture M. Jouhaux:

"People of the type of M. Jouhaux accept, and rightly, the existence of class, or rather occupational, interests.... But they fail to notice one thing, namely, that an occupation exists only within a country. Before belonging to a class, the worker or peasant, just like the bourgeois, belongs to a nation.... Consequently, if the workman belongs to a country before belonging to a class, the country's interest takes precedence over that of the class. The whole error of international trade unionism lies in not recognising this subordination, which is in the very nature of things. It is not a question of failure to accept class interests. It is a question of putting them in their right place.... The false dogmas of internationalism did not stand up for a single hour against the evidence of national necessity.... We only ask of them [the trade unionists] to understand the lesson of this war and, when considering their class interests, to do so in context with the national interest. Then we shall be able to reach agreement." *Junius*. (End of article.)

Volksrecht, No. 241, October 16, 1914.
W. "What the War Has Cost."
War costs:
First two months of war,
all belligerent states—*6,250* million francs.

Germany—1,800 million marks = 2,250 million francs

including aid to Austria, whose finances are in a sorry state

Great Britain————	2,150	
(of which hardly one-third falls on Great Britain herself)		
	4,400	mill. francs
France————	1,040	" "
Russia 300 million rubles =	750	" "
Σ =	6,190	" "

Russia—	750
France	1,040
	1,790

6,250 — 4,400 = 1,850 — 1,040 = 810

"The next eight weeks of war will cost twice as much"....

Leroy-Beaulieu—in *l'Humanité*—estimates the cost at 1,000 million a month for each of the five big states; seven months: 5×7 = 35 + 15 small states and neutrals. Σ = 50,000 million.

Clerics on the war:

The curé *Babut* (French) drew up a *projet de déclaration* (which he sent to German priests):

"The undersigned, Christians of Germany, Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia, Belgium, and Serbia, moved and distressed by the conflict which is ravaging and ensanguining Europe, declare:

"1° Being deeply attached to their respective countries, they do not wish to do or say anything that would not be consistent with the sincere and ardent patriotism that animates them,

"2° but at the same time they cannot forget or deny that God is the God of all nations and the Father of all people, that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of all; that He commanded

his people to regard and love one another as brothers, and that for the evangelical faith, as St. Paul declares, there are no Jews and Greeks, barbarians and Scythians—and, consequently, there are no Germans and French, Austrians and Russians, but Christ is everything in all people.

"In consequence, they pledge themselves, in the sight of and with the help of God, to banish from their hearts all hate of those whom they are now compelled to call their enemies, and to do good to them if the opportunity occurs; to use all their influence to ensure that the war is waged with as much humanity as possible, that the victor, whoever he may be, does not abuse his power, and that the persons and rights of the weak shall be respected; to continue to love with a fraternal love their brothers in the faith, whatever their nationality, to pray to God on behalf of all victims of the war without exception, and insistently to implore Him soon to cause the horrors of war to be succeeded by the blessings of a just and final peace, and to make the unfortunate and cruel events which we are witnessing help the advent of His divine Kingdom."

(*Journal de Genève*, October 17, 1914.)

This letter was written on August 4, 1914. It was sent by M. *Babut*, the venerable pastor of Nimes, to Herr *Dryander*, the German court chaplain in Berlin.

Dryander replied, with a long letter, dated September 15, 1914, and signed by himself and two other clerics (Lahusen and Axenfeld)—(*Journal de Genève*, October 18, 1914):

..."we fully agree with propositions 1 and 2. They are part of the patrimony common to all Christians. Patriotism and Christianity are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary, they presuppose each other"...

the remainder, however, we accept in principle, but we cannot sign it, not wanting to give occasion, *even the most remote*, for it to be thought that Germany is not waging the war in accordance with the principles of humanity, etc. We (the letter says) did not want war, we are a peaceful people, etc., etc. The aggressors are the British and the others, etc., etc.

N.B. *Volksrecht* (1914) No. 239 ("Towards Eternal Peace") and No. 242 (Bernstein).

Frankfurter Zeitung (1914) No. 291 (second morning edition), October 20 (Scheidemann in favour of the war).

BERNHARDI, *GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR*

Friedrich v. Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Berlin, 1913 (6th edition) (345 pp.).

The preface to the sixth edition is dated February 1913.

A typical militarist book, deploring the peace-loving spirit of the Germans, etc., etc. The author frequently quotes his **two-volume** work on modern war.

Glorification of war, its necessity ("creative and cleansing power": p. 9).... [Chapter I. "The Right to War"; Chapter II: "The Necessity of War."]

Laments Germany having shirked the issue in the Morocco incident, by giving way to France (p. 17 and others).

"Christian morality is a personal and social morality and by its very nature can never be political" (24-25).

Hatred of *Social-Democrats*: they "accept in principle lies and slander" as weapons in the party struggle (32). They "are for revolution" (73) ... (idem, 75).

Hegel, Luther were for war, etc.

..."Moreover, the Germans completely lack the revolutionary spirit, in spite of all the empty declamation of Social-Democratic instigators. Their whole nature impels them towards sound, lawful development" (80).

Germany has no such guaranteed colonies (markets) as Great Britain has (89)....

Chapter V. "World Power or Downfall"....

In 1912, Italy again joined the Triple Alliance, but is *hardly* to be counted on in the event of war (96). . . (idem, 180).

We must support Austria in her Balkan policy and try to take Tunisia for Italy (97).

Russia is shaken by revolution (100)—"the army is unreliable" (100), etc., Russia will hardly want an aggressive war against Germany (102)....

With a stagnant population (107), her expansion urge satisfied (107), etc., France offers no danger to Great Britain.

If Italy withdraws ... "the build-up of a very considerable superiority of power against Germany and Austria would become a possibility" (114)....

N.B.!! We are threatened both from land and sea (115)—we are living in a latent but great crisis (115). This has to be borne in mind, it is "obscured ... by deceptive diplomatic intrigue and the *official peace professions* of all states" (116).

We must settle accounts with France, whatever this may entail. "France must be so completely crushed that she may never get in our way again" (118)

ha-ha!! time of preparation.... Belgium ... is neutral, but France and Britain will try to combine their forces with her (123)—"in general, the concept of permanent neutrality contradicts the nature of the state" (123) ... "its supreme moral aims" (123).

..."It will take a year before the 30-cm. gun is ready" (141)....

Chapter 7: "The Character of Our Next War."

ha-ha!! The forces of the various states.... Figures.... France might have "excellent black troops" (150)....

We (with Austria) have less (?) than France+Russia, and we must aim for quality (156)....

Naval forces (according to the 1912 *Nauticus**)—the British fleet is > twice as strong as ours (170).

Russia is protected by her size (176)—she will not be fighting for existence ... the educated sections of the people are for revolution (ibidem), as in the Russo-Japanese War (177), a "unanimous national upsurge" is unlikely (177).

Switzerland, Belgium, Holland (the French and British will march through the two last-named) ... "neutrality is only a paper bulwark" (179).

Britain seeks to destroy our fleet (184 et seq. Chapter 8: "The Next Naval War").... She can paralyse our overseas

* A naval handbook.—*Ed.*

trade (186).... Harwich is being fortified (189), harbours are being built in Rosyth and Scapa Flow (191).... We must concentrate on the air fleet (195).... We must exert every effort to defeat the French navy from land (196)—"War to the Knife" (196) against France ... "to destroy France for ever as a Great Power" (196).

Only victory on land will give us a chance at sea (199).... Russia + France = 180 million inhabitants. Germany has 65 million (201).... Increase the army ... make higher demands on the soldier (205), troops of the line are more important. ...We must "attack" (206).

("Cadres", not "reserves", 210.) Quality is more important than quantity (213) ... "closed-ranks" fighting is of no use, the role of the individual soldier increases, that of his commanders decreases (214)....

Especially important to prepare for the movement (and supply) of large masses of troops, and special tasks resulting therefrom (226 et seq.). Military-technical details on this aspect....

Importance of cavalry—reconnaissance and "cover" (235)....

Necessity for "fluidity" (mobility, flexibility) of organisation (237)....

Prepare for the new, do not repeat the old (247 et seq.)....

Higher development of servicemen is needed—"lectures of a general scientific character" (267) in military academies, etc.

We (Germany) have to pursue a world policy (268, 269), and this requires sea power (Chapter 12: "Preparation for Naval Warfare")...—we cannot conduct offensive operations at sea,—defence of coasts, etc.

24-cm. guns "must be termed completely unsuitable for modern naval battles" (276)....

...The new Navy Law envisages the construction of 72 new submarines (277) ... the third squadron will be operational only in 1914 (278)....

Tsingtao must be better fortified (282)....

Surprise attacks:

Great Britain	September 2-5, 1807	against	Copenhagen.
" "	July 11-12, 1882	"	Alexandria (Egypt)....

Italy against Tripoli and Turkish vessels....

N.B. It was a mistake not to have "settled accounts" with France earlier—occasions could have been found (287): "I consider it the most grievous mistake German policy could ever have committed that we did not settle accounts with France when the world situation was wholly favourable and there was a sure prospect of success. There were many such opportunities" (287)....

The education of the people ought to be *more religious* and *patriotic*, and against the Social-Democrats (with their anti-patriotic convictions: 291) (Chapter 13)....

N.B. composition of army > from rural areas N.B. "Already today, only 6.14 per cent of German-born servicemen come from large towns, 7.37 per cent from medium-sized towns, 22.34 per cent from small and country towns, and 64.15 per cent from rural areas [1]), whereas the ratio of urban and rural population is quite different" (p. 292)

1905:	rural areas	42.5 per cent
	small towns	25.5
	medium-sized towns	12.9
	large towns	19.1

..."The rural population is most intimately bound up with the army" (292) ... large sections of the town population "are hostilely disposed to the army" (292)....

The beneficial effect of military training ((the army does not *withdraw* people from useful work, but *educates* them* [this passage is not in Chapter 13])) ... factory labour is harmful in many respects ... the short working day is harmful (294)....

In Russia (in contrast to Japan) the educated classes regarded patriotism as an outworn concept, etc., etc.—hence defeatists (304)....

The government should keep the popular press in hand (305)....

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[1]) Count Posadowski, *The Housing Question*, Munich, 1910.

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* Play on the German words "entzieht" and "erzieht".—*Ed.*

"I should consider it a blessing if all newspapers could be compelled to print certain government announcements so that readers would not be informed about public affairs so one-sidedly as they are through the party press" (306).... oho!!!!

In "financial and political preparation for war" (Chapter 14), one must not be guided by "petty-bourgeois views" (311) ... one must not give way to the "flabby philanthropy of our times" (312)....

	National wealth (marks per capita)	Expenditure on army and navy (marks per capita)
Germany =	5,000-6,000	16
France	about the same	20
Great Britain	6,000-7,000	29

(p. 315)

	Emigrants	Unemployed trade union members
From Germany	20,000 (1908)	4.4%
" Britain	336,000 (1908)	10.0%
" France		11.4%

(p. 318)

Germany's economic growth is faster (316-17)....

A people which spends about 5,000 million on tobacco and alcoholic drinks could spend "a few hundred million" (320) on defence of its honour, independence and future. !!

In 1870, Napoleon III banked on an alliance with Austria (Paris visit of Archduke Albrecht and Vienna visit of a French general ... 326), but he miscalculated....

Postscript (1913)—our position has deteriorated. The Balkan war, a blow at Turkey and the Triple Alliance.... No serious hopes of peace with Great Britain.... We must utilise Britain's "rapprochement overtures" for better preparation (343)....

((The book was written in the autumn of 1911: p. 338)).

End

RUEDORFFER, *BASIC FEATURES OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS*

J. J. Ruedorffer, Basic Features of Contemporary World Politics, Berlin, 1914 (xiii + 252 pp.)

(The preface is dated *October 1913*.)

A pretentious book by a diplomat, who wraps up the imperialist aspirations of the German bourgeoisie in florid phrases. The chief theme is the struggle between national and cosmopolitan tendencies.

His sociological and philosophical pretensions = the stupidest neo-Kantian blather about the nation as an individual, comparisons with a forest (repeated dozens of times), about divinity and such like nonsense.

Actually, his is a topical theme, but it is wrapped up in catch-phrases about Aristotle's "entelechy", etc.

To complete her plans in Africa (the Cape-Cairo railway), Great Britain "now only needs to settle her differences with Germany and Belgium" (94)....

N.B. ..."Thus Portugal, and to a lesser degree Spain, are in reality dependencies of the British Empire. Japan cannot escape from the fetters of the British money market; Britain does not need to gain a footing in South America, for the London Stock Exchange finances, and thus rules over, Argentina, the most important South American state, and one with the richest future....

"Britain's world power has ... besides mastery of the seas, two other main pillars: the homogeneity of British culture, and the London Stock Exchange" (95)

Germany has been put in a difficult position—deprived of possibilities for expansion (Asia for Russia, North Africa for France and Italy), hemmed in on both sides; has come too late (the colonies are taken) ((§7, Chapter 2, p. 101 et seq.)).

On the Moroccan issue she has had to give way to France (105).

"The fate of German world policy will be decided on the continent" (107).... "It is possible, perhaps, to imagine

a German world policy without naval superiority, but certainly not without superiority on land" (ibidem).

(Victory on the continent of Europe is the key to everything for Germany.)

Morocco ... "retreat" (108): we had to retreat somewhat....

"This chapter of German world policy illustrates best of all the peculiarity of the Reich's international position, its limited possibilities for expansion, the link between world and continental policy, the complex factors with which a German world policy has to reckon" (109)....

German nationalism, he says, is still young, ..."the manners of a parvenu" (112).

In America, the *people*, the nation, is only just taking shape (especially with Latin and Slav emigration).

"Financially, Argentina can be regarded as a colony controlled by the London Stock Exchange" (133).... The South American states "at the present time are, and probably will be for a long time to come, the object and not the subject of world politics" (131)....

"Present-day Japan is suffering from her successes" (137)—cannot cope with her colonies, has not built up strength, etc.... (Japan lacks a religious foundation: 138) ((what an idiot!!))....

The cosmopolitan tendency—prattle about catholicism ... about the cultural ideal....

"*Capital* and its power....

"If the history of the colonial expansion of the European Great Powers in recent decades is regarded from this standpoint, it will not be difficult to see that all the wars of recent times in which the European Great Powers have taken part, if not actually contrived in the interests of capital, were at any rate brought about by its interests"* (157).... N.B.

"The interweaving of the material interests of the civilised world, the emergence of a unitary world economy, is one of the basic facts of modern politics" (159)....

The struggle for "majority shareholding"** (161).... "All economic enterprises of immediate political importance, for example, railways, canal companies, etc., are today

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 244.—*Ed.*

** Ibid.—*Ed.*

national in character even if their capital is international in its origin or form" (161)....

International law and international arbitration? "On the whole, the instrument of arbitration serves only to prevent the outbreak of undesired wars, which can arise from unforeseen incidents and do not affect vital interests of the nation; but nowhere yet have vital questions of the nation been settled by arbitration or a desired war been prevented with its help" (167)....

International socialism? (§ 5, Chapter 3, Part I, p. 172 et seq.).

N.B. "If international socialism succeeds in completely divorcing the worker internally from the fabric of the nation and in making him merely a member of the class, then it will have conquered; for purely forcible means, by which the national state may then still attempt to keep the worker bound to it, must by themselves prove ineffective in the long run. If, however, international socialism does not succeed

N.B. in this, if the internal links which connect the worker with the organism that is called the nation remain, even unconsciously, then the victory of international socialism will be open to doubt as long as these links persist, and will turn into defeat if it should prove that in the last analysis these links are the stronger"* (173-74)....

There is no "impoverishment" and no accentuation of class differences (174). The workers become involved in the intensified national struggle and nationalism

N.B. (175).... "Hence it can be said that although the socialist movement since that time" (the recent period) "has experienced a prodigious upswing, and although in all countries the socialist parties have greatly increased their power and influence, the international factor in the movement has not only not grown correspondingly during the same period, but has even lost in importance and drive" (175).

The electoral struggle of recent years has caused the German Social-Democrats to "conceal or play down" their internationalism (176)....

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 244.—*Ed.*

..."It" (German Social-Democracy) "has rejected with indignation the assertion of its opponents that in the event of war the Social-Democrats would inspire the mass of the workers supporting them to turn their weapons against their commanders and thus, jointly with the French socialists, try to prevent a war, it even treats the charge of lack of patriotism as an insult....

"The question (of the "national" tendency) is in the centre of the discussion, it becomes the *kingpin* of socialism"* (176)

..."The question is only that of the actual significance of these manifestations" (in support of internationalism, etc., on the part of labour and socialist parties) "for political events and for the political decisions of the peoples and their leaders, It is very small in the case of all states with strong national sentiments. In general, it can be said that on all questions on which the governments can appeal to the national feeling of the people, they do not need to pay any attention to the internationalism of their socialist parties, that so far no national war has failed to take place because of the socialists' hostility to war, nor will it fail to take place in the future on that account. It is possible that, in deference to the peace theories of socialism, the governments will perhaps be impelled to carry out their actions under the cover of national feeling. This does not alter in any way the essence of the matter, but only makes some changes in the political form and technique which modern politics have to employ"** (177-78).

N.B.

!

N.B.

!

!!

he thinks they can be easily deceived!

Cf. p. *103*: "The Social-Democratic Party, too, in its parliamentary actions and its propaganda among the people, must year by year take greater account of the national argument" (idem, p. 110).

* Ibid.—*Ed.*

** Ibid.—*Ed.*

N.B. The British colonies are introducing preferential tariffs for the mother country (206)—Canada, Australia, South Africa = "a de facto increase in customs duties against non-English producing countries" (206)....

"A Franco-Italian antagonism over hegemony [in the Mediterranean and Africa] seems to be taking shape" (211)....

..."So long as Russia has little difficulty in expanding in Mongolia and Persia, her urge for expansion will not be directed against Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Constantinople" (211)....

N.B. Russia is protected by her geographical position "against national ruin" (216).—"In the event of defeat she has to fear at most the victory of the revolution and a slowing-down (?) of her development" (216)....

In general, wars can now be waged only in cases of "need" (218), but what does this mean?

N.B. defence or attack? "It is quite easy to distinguish in words between defence and attack, but extremely difficult in practice to decide beyond dispute who is the aggressor and who the defender" (218).

"It is not true that though the modern Great Powers arm, they do not make use of their arms" (219).—Their armaments enter into "calculations", they are taken into account in diplomatic negotiations, in exerting "pressure", etc., etc.

N.B. N.B. "The European alliances have crystallised around the two big antagonisms, the Franco-German and the Austro-Russian" (224)....

"Politically, however, her (Britain's) behaviour is wholly according to plan, her great influence in South America, especially in Argentina, is based on the activity of the London Stock Exchange in the issue of securities; also, in part, the vassal dependence of Portugal and Britain's predominant influence in Spain" (235)....

N.B. "This method of financial imperialism finds its purest expression in modern France. France has become the world's banker not because of her great wealth, but because of the greater liquidity of her capital. Germany, Britain and the U.S.A. are today far richer; but none of these richer countries has so

much liquid, investment-seeking capital as France" (235-36)....

There are two reasons for this: the greater "thriftiness" in France and the smaller demand for money for the needs of the economy.

The Germans have been wrongly blamed for not using the Moroccan incident so as to seize the "opportunity"—"to keep Spain on anti-French lines" (236)....

"The opportunity never arose, for Germany could not even dream of breaking the financial ties binding Spain to France and of undertaking to finance a country so much in need of money. France has always more or less openly given Austria and Hungary to understand that it is only because of their friendship with Germany and the Triple Alliance that their requests for money meet with difficulties on the Paris Stock Exchange" (236).... N.B. N.B. N.B.

..."If the German Reich still builds its international political influence only to a small degree on the flotation of loans, this is primarily due to the fact that, although richer than France, its capital is not so liquid" (237).... With a more rapid economic development, Germany is herself in need of capital....

..."Turkey has often found support in German banks against the political conditions attached to French loans; the same applies to Rumania, Hungary and other countries. In general it can he said that resistance to French financial imperialism will cause German policy to follow the same course" (238). N.B.

End

MACKAY, *CHINA*, *THE MIDDLE REPUBLIC. ITS PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.*

B. L. Baron von **Mackay,** ***China****, the Middle Republic. Its Problems and Prospects*, Berlin, 1914. ((264 pp. + supplements.))

A scoundrel, reactionary, blockhead and swine; has lifted from a dozen books a heap of slanders

against "radical democrats" (the Kuomintang and its leader Sun Yat-sen). Scientific value nil. *Pp.??*

Supplement V. *Kuomintang leaflet* = naïve, *democratic* republicanism ((the scoundrel of an author heaps abuse on it)). ["An Analysis of the Advantages of the Republic".]

N.B.

Source References:

James Cantlie and Sheridan Jones, *Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China*, London, 1913.

Vosberg-Rekow, *The Revolution in China*, Berlin, 1912

Joseph Schön, *Russia's Aims in China*, Vienna, 1900.

M. v. Brandt, *East Asian Questions*, Berlin, 1897.

Wilhelm Schüler, *Outline of the Recent History of China*, Berlin, 1913.

The chapter "International Political Troubles and Conflicts" (Chapter 13) contains a brief account of the plunder of China by Russia (Mongolia) [the secret Urga protocol, 1912], by Russia + Japan (Manchuria. The secret treaty of Russia and Japan, July 8, 1912), by Great Britain (Tibet), by Germany (Kiao-chow*), etc.

pp. 222-24: written after the Japanese ultimatum to Germany (August or September 1914)—gross abuse of Great Britain for her "policy, dictated solely by the interests of the shopkeepers and money-bags" (223), her crime against European civilisation, etc., etc. For his part, the author favours "*extending the German power position in China*" (228)....

!!!

Germany's share in Chinese trade = 4.2 per cent, but *factually* (he says) (N.B.) more than 7 per cent—and up to 25 per cent (!!?) if the total German trade turnover is taken into account.

Britain's share in Chinese trade = 50 per cent, but *factually* 21 per cent (p. 232).

..."just as 'international' capital becomes ever more national under the impact of modern imperialist

* Present name Tsingtao.—*Ed.*



Page 20 of Notebook “ξ” (“Xi”)
Reduced

power tendencies, so the mechanism of what we call world economy has to become more and more responsive to the laws of the national economies of the Great Powers" (235). N.B.

((Chapter 14: "Germany's Mission".))

Britain and the U.S.A. "last year alone raised 18 million marks to found new higher educational establishments in Shantung, Hankow and Hong Kong" (236)—compared with this sum, everything Germany allocated during the same period "appears minute". Where does the money come from? The chief source is the big British and American capitalists' commercial and industrial enterprises in China!! N.B.

Britain has "hundreds" of officials in "her maritime customs service" who know the Chinese language!! ("trained officers")—pioneers (239).... !!

Belgium and her commercial interests in China (243): Société d'Etudes des Chemins de fer en Chine,—its concessions on **two** *railways* in China.

p. 245—a map of railways in operation and scheduled for construction in China, in three groups

1) German———(medium-sized)
N.B. 2) British———(smallest)
3) Russo-Franco-Belgian———(largest)

According to *Hennig* (*World Communication Routes*, Leipzig, 1909), the following lines already exist;

1) Peking-Tientsin (and continuation to Dalny)
2) Kiao-chow—Tsinanfu*
3) Peking-*Hankow*
4) Shanghai-Pukow

..."The mouth of the Yangtze is Great Britain's East-Asian Shatt-al-Arah, and the Yangtze sphere of interest her East-Asian Southern Persia" (246-47)....

The Tientsin-Pukow railway is being built *jointly* by the British and Germans (247). N.B.

Great Britain has *1,900* km. of railway concessions in China (247).... N.B.

Germany has *700* km. of railway concessions in China (248)....

* Present name Tsinan—*Ed.*

Mackay p. 245

Chinese railways (those already in operation and those scheduled for construction)

French-Russian-Belgian Group
German Group
English Group
((unknown owner))

In the great work of irrigation and land reclamation in China, German technique is supreme (254-55 et seq.)....

The Chinese ought not to sympathise with the "radical democracy of the New World", nor with Anglo-Saxon Constitutionalism with its "faded monarchism", but with monarchical Germany (257). !!

Then follows a long, dreary and stupid eulogy of German culture.... !!!

End

LUCAS, *GREATER ROME AND GREATER BRITAIN**

Sir **C. P. Lucas**, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, *Oxford*, *1912* (184 pp.).

(A vapid, pretentious, supercilious comparison of Rome and Great Britain, mostly in a superficial legal style. Only his contribution to the characterisation of imperialism is worth mentioning:)

65—Parts of Algeria were better cultivated (irrigation) in Roman times than now (*Arnold*, *Roman Provincial Administration*).

66—Artesian wells (dug by the British) in Australia (depth 5,000 ft)...

68—The fight against malaria in the colonies (English doctors)... (Ronald Ross)
(Lord Lister)

(idem 70-71)

76-77: With the Romans, war went before trade. With the British *vice versa* (in the colonies)
(peace, trade, etc.).

80: In the eighteenth century, however, there were wars, too (Canada, Australia)

86... The old chartered companies
East India Co. until 1858
Hudson Bay Co. " 1869
New companies
Royal Niger Co. (1880-1890)
South Africa Co.

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 243, and Vol. 22, p. 260.—*Ed.*

91: With us, slavery (West India) was an exception [banal nationalist bragging...]
94: The Romans took no account of race, they did not exclude Negroes.
96-97:"Coloured" people do not have equal rights in the modern British Empire: in India they do not have the franchise—they are not accepted as officials, etc., etc.
98: "In the self-governing provinces of the British Empire at the present day the coloured natives of the soil, though British subjects, are, more often than not, excluded from the franchise, as in Australia, for instance, or parts of South Africa, or British Columbia"....
99: Restriction of immigration of Negroes, etc.

N.B. || 103: "In our own Empire where white workers and coloured workers are side by side, as in South Africa, it would be fair to say that they do not work on the same level, and that the white man is rather the overseer of, than the fellow-workman with, the coloured man."

107—In Australasia, the white workers are against the Negroes and yellow-skinned—as undercutters of wages....
142: Two parts of the British Empire:
1) sphere of rule (rule over "lower" races) ((India, Egypt, etc.))
2) sphere of settlement (British emigration to the colonies: Australia, America, etc.).
175—On the question of free trade and protection, the author is for "imperial preference" (175), for a "wise opportunism" (176).
"Imperial preference is the goal to be aimed at. Little by little is the way to the goal" (176).
176-77... "The existence of these British dependencies may, and probably will, be found to supply the strongest of all motives to the self-governing Dominions for remaining within the circle of the British Empire",—for all mature national states (Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, etc.) need colonies, but all are already occu-

pied, mostly by Great Britain ((and they, too (Australia, etc.), he argues, benefit from our plunder of India, Egypt, etc.)).

Source References: Bampfylde *Fuller*, *Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment*, 1910.
Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*.

BELGER, *SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AFTER THE WAR**

Erwin Belger (former General Secretary of the Imperial Alliance Against Social-Democracy), *Social-Democracy after the War* (60 pfennigs), Berlin, 1915 (Berlin, S.W. 11, Concordia Publishers). (45 pp.)
3—Praise of "their [Social-Democrats'] irreproachable, honourable behaviour"....
6—"Rosa Luxemburg"—malicious attacks against her on several occasions; against the "bandit party press" (6), etc.
9—The Reichstag sessions of August 4 and 5 ... "gave us great joy" ... "the bright spot of the picture was the Social-Democratic 'Yes!'" (10)....
...."Consequently, it [Social-Democracy] can with a clear conscience confront the international court of a world party congress" (13)....
...Our Alliance is now dying (16)....
...."Could one wish for a better German than the Mannheim hero Dr. Frank, this favourite of German Social-Democracy?" (21)....
(On August 4) "the world experienced a historic turning-point that is without equal" (21)....
...."It is hardly conceivable that anyone will suddenly be reconverted from a German *patriot* into an inveterate *internationalist*. This war must embed the concepts '*national*' and '*German*' so deeply in every heart that no one will be able to free himself from them any more" (26)....
...."Anyone who in the past, say, fifteen years ago, listened to Social-Democratic speakers at public meetings, must often have been astonished that their ugly, hateful, gross

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 243.—*Ed.*

abuse could be taken at all seriously by thinking people and so furiously applauded. But anyone who frequently attended Social-Democratic meetings in the last ten years could note with growing admiration how the level both of the speakers and their audience has risen" (32)....

Class hatred—there is the evil (33 et seq.).

..."What has become of class distinctions? There are no longer *any* parties, and still less are there any classes. The officer" ... the mechanic, etc. (36)....

The Kaiser's son and the leader of the Bavarian Social-Democratic youth associations, Michael Schwarz, have both been awarded the Iron Cross (36).... "Will this man, whom love of the fatherland called to the field of battle ... ever again tolerate that his young adherents shall hate the sons of his comrades-in-arms of 1914? He will not, if he does not want to fly in the face of all that is good" (36)....

..."Further consequence of altered tactics".... "Opposition at all costs" "was a dangerous weapon", etc.

"Can these rigid principles be maintained? To be honest towards oneself and others, the answer must be: *No!*" (38)....

"Social-Democracy as a party" must remain (41) without "utopias" (43), without ideas about "violence", "nonsense" (41) ... "a *purely* [the author's italics] labour party" ... a "*n a t i o n a l*" party.

"After the war there will be still less basis for us Germans to spread *international*, *utopian ideas*" (44)....

..."As already indicated above, the *German* workers, with the experience they have gained, will on cool reflection finally reject the international trend in Social-Democracy"... (44).

Is it not a fact that the Executive Committee—of the Social-Democratic Party—countered the lies of the French, of the International Socialist Bureau Executive Committee (45), etc.?

..."When they reach the point—and it will be reached eventually—of reshaping the entire obsolete Erfurt Programme, let them draw the necessary conclusions, and above all delete the international principles"... (45).

The party must "*realise that it belongs to the n a t i o n*" (45)....

Then the workers will have not an international party, ‖ not one "working for revolution" ... "but a German work-

ers' party, which recognises the strength of the national idea, is prepared for a business-like peaceful agreement and vigorously defends the interests of its adherents !" (45) (author's heavy type).

((Last words of the pamphlet.))

End

ROHRBACH, *WHY THIS IS A GERMAN WAR*

The German War, No. 1 (50 pfennigs) (Berlin, 1914). **Paul Rohrbach**, *Why This Is a German War*.

Chauvinist hysteria against a "decaying world".... We alone, he maintains, are fighting for our existence, France and Russia are fighting "blinded by national passion" (24), and Britain out of selfishness ("a war of sea pirates"—24)....

..."In fact, our choice, just as that of Austria-Hungary, was not between war and peace, but between war today and war one or two years hence; only in that case it would have become infinitely more dangerous for us" (22)....

..."It can be assumed that the French and Russian army commands planned the attack on Germany and Austria for the beginning or the first half of 1916" (20)....

WALTERSHAUSEN, *THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS ABROAD*

A. Sartorius Baron von Waltershausen, The National Economic System of Capital Investments Abroad,* Berlin, 1907. (442 pp.)

(Divided into four books ... most of which I have only managed to leaf through, selecting what is most important.)

Argentina = "in reality a trade colony of Great Britain" (45-46), "which has capital investments there of over £50,000,000" (46)....

50 × 25 = 1,250 million francs = 1¼ milliard francs

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 243, and Vol. 22, pp. 263, 278.—*Ed.*

French capital

in Russia	about	9-10	thousand million francs (1906 estimate) (p. 48)
” Belgium	”	0.6	” ” ”
” Britain	”	0.9	” ” ”
” Switzerland	”	0.4	(and *up* to 1.0)
” Germany	”	0.2-0.3	(Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Économiste Français*, 1902, II, p. 449 et seq.).
” Spain		3,000	million francs (p. 53)...
” Tunisia		512,000,000	francs ... (p. 50)

French capital abroad

30,000	million fr. (p. 55)	(L.-Beaulieu, ibidem)
34,000	” ”	(L.-Beaulieu, p. 98)
(*) 40,000	” ”	(1905: author's estimate, p. 98)

British capital in America (1857)—£*80 million* (p. 62—according to Marx's *Capital*, III, 2, p. 15, note).[44]

German capital abroad [securities only]
up to 10,000 million marks (1892) (p. 101) . . .
” ” 16,000 million marks (author's estimate, p. 102, for *1906*)
+10 not in securities (p. 104)
(*) 26,000 million marks

German capital in *German* colonies (1904) = 370 million marks (p. 133)

B. Harms (p. 234 et seq.)		(*) Ergo (1905) 000 million Mk	
70—	65	Britain	55
35—	34	France	32
35—	35	Germany	26
140	134		113

"It has been calculated that Britain now receives from the United States about *1,000 million marks* in capital gains and interest" (68).

(*) *British* capital abroad (*Speyer's* estimate for 1900) = **£2,500** million (p. 94)

×20 = 50,000 million Mk

+50 million per annum
× 5 (1901-05)

250×20 = 5,000
5+50 = 55, my calculations

Foreign capital

in ***Austria-Hungary*** (1903)=
(p. 107)

		9,809 *mill. kronen*
including	Germany	4,653
	France	3,270
	Holland	647
	Britain	356
	Belgium	243
	Switzerland	242
	Others	398

(*Idem* B. Harms, *Problems of World Economy*, Jena, 1912, p. 236.)

Rumanian Oil
(1905) (pp. 145-46)

Capital (private)	Million francs
Germany	92.1
Holland	8.0
Britain	5.2
France	6.5
Belgium	4.0
Italy	7.5
America	5.0

Colonial Banks (1905)
(branches)

	Branches	capital (*millions*)
Great Britain (p. 151)	2,136	£ 35.5
	+175	£ 17.2
France	136	328 fr.
Holland	67	98.3 guilders
Germany (p. 152)	87	60 marks

Belgian capital in Russia (1900) = 494 million francs (p. 182)

Foreign capital in the U.S.A. (p. 240)
American loans (1902):
$3,000 million
in enterprises, etc.

Great Britain—4,000 *million marks* (approx.) (p. 242)
Germany 2,000 *million marks*
France 450 million *francs*

...“There is often an equilibrium between the big money markets today, but under special circumstances the centre of gravity is at one time in London, at another in Paris, and at yet another in New York” (251)....

American capital in Mexico (1902)—$500 million (p. 243) . . . in *Cuba*—**$159** million (p. 244); since 1900 it has made “enormous progress” in Brazil (243)....
total *American* capital abroad (p. 245).

		$ million
(1897)—	600—	800
(1902)—	1,300—	1,500

In 1870-71, Leroy-Beaulieu estimated the (national) wealth of France at *140,000 million* francs, annual savings at *2,000 million* francs, (p. 348, chapter “Export Capital and War”); capital abroad=15,000 million (its income=600-700 million).

National Debt

Russia (1906)
—9,000 mill. rubles or
20,000 ” marks
(pp. 292-93)
of which
9,000-10,000 mill. marks to France
2,000-3,000 mill. marks to Germany
the remainder to Britain, Holland, *Austria* (*!!*)

The fourth book, “Export Capitalism and Society” (357-442), is devoted mainly to the **rentier state** (Holland as an example)—now Britain and France are becoming rentier states too—“Germany’s World Economic Tasks” (Chapter III, Book 4):

Here the author clearly reveals himself as a German imperialist patriot. He is *for* a peaceful division of spheres of influence (and profits) in Africa, etc. (pp. 424-25

and others), but he is ***quite ready to fight a war*** (end of p. 440).... Favours armaments....

..."China, Morocco, the Congo State, the Turkish Empire, Russia ... still offer certain prospects for capitalists and entrepreneurs" (423)....

..."Africa ... a European domain" (425), if America is conceded to the United States. N.B.

..."The greatest future for the export of European capital lies between Cape Blanc and Cape Agulhas" (425).... N.B.

The socialists (he quotes Marx and Engels) cherish "utopias".... In point of fact, the present social system affords the worker excellent prospects. The majority of rich men have come from workers and small people (he refers to *The History of Modern Wealth*, by *K. Schmidt-Weissenfels*, Berlin, 1893: "It contains instructive examples: Borsig was a carpenter, Krupp—a metalworker, Leitenberger—a small manufacturer, Lanna—a shipbuilding worker.... Siemens—a small-holder, Dreyse—a mechanic.... Rothschild—a small trader", etc.).... N.B.

We Germans have not yet learned to value our colonies and appreciate their importance as the British do (434)....

The workers, as a class, gain economically from the possession of colonies and from world policy.... Socialism is stagnation: "Unscrupulous demagogues dare to preach this idiocy to the politically immature mass of workers, presenting it as the gospel of prosperity and tranquillity" (437)....

..."Our Social-Democrats will not hear of the steady rise of our national prosperity.... They want to unite the proletarians of all countries for the destruction of capitalist society. We know that this idea has proved ineffectual both as propaganda and in terms of useful social results. Why, then, insist on the destruction of the old dwellings if it is impossible to build a common new house? There is no answer to that, save propaganda phrases as a counterweight to the life-giving concept of the nation" (438).... N.B.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

He praises the "realism" (438 and 439) of the British workers (their opposition to immigration) and would like the same for the Germans....

N.B. by the same author: "Contribution to the Question of a Central European Economic Federation" in *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, Vol. V, Nos. 7-11.

End

HENNIG, *WORLD COMMUNICATION ROUTES*

Richard Hennig, *World Communication Routes*, Leipzig, 1909 (284 pp.).

For the most part simply an account, an enumeration of railways, maps, etc.

Africa: **railways** (1907) (p. 213)

	km.	"under construction or definitely planned"
British colonies	13,117	15,113
Egypt	5,252	6,956
(Great Britain)	Σ=18,369	22,069
French colonies	5,657	9,849
Portuguese "	1,173	2,313
German "	1,398	1,988
Belgian "	642	—
Italian "	115	115
Total	27,354	36,334

There are interesting references to the unscrupulous struggle between the powers over concessions (for railways—e.g., in China), swindling, etc., etc.

HELFFERICH, *NATIONAL WELFARE IN GERMANY*

Dr. Karl Helfferich (head of the Deutsche Bank), *National Welfare in Germany 1888-1913*, Berlin, 1913.

A panegyric.... An official eulogy

Unimportant, adulation

Germany's national income is about *40*,000 million marks per annum, as against *22,000-25,000* million in 1895; out of the 40, about seven go for public purposes, about 25 for private consumption, and about eight for accumulation = 40 (p. 123). Germany's national wealth > *300,000* million (1) marks per annum as against *200,000* million in 1895.

p. 114			(000,000,000 marks)	per capita (marks)
German	national	wealth =	290-320	4,500-4,900
French	"	"	232.5	5,924
			(287,000 million francs)	(7,314 francs)
British	"	"	230-260	5,100-5,800
U.S.	"	"	500	5,500

(pp. 99-100)

			1908 (000,000,000 marks)	per capita (marks)
German	national	income	35	555
French	"	"	20	514
British	"	"	35	815

(p. 61)

	Coal output (million tons)			Pig-iron output (thousand tons)		
	1886	1911	+%	1887	1911	+%
U.S.A.	103.1	450.2	+336.6	6,520	24,028	368.5*
Great Britain	160.0	276.2	+ 72.6	7,681	10,033	30.6
Germany	73.7	234.5	+218.1	4,024	15,574	387.0*
Russia				612	3,588	486.3
Austria-Hungary	20.8	49.2	+136.5			
France	19.9	39.3	+ 97.5	1,568	4,411	281.3*
Belgium	17.3	23.1	+ 33.5	756	2,106	178.6

(1) Including 20,000 million marks of capital invested abroad (p. 113).

* So given by Helfferich.—*Ed.*

CROMER, *ANCIENT AND MODERN IMPERIALISM**

Earl of **Cromer**, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, London, 1910 (143 pp.)

Practically nil. The pretentious chatter, with a learned appearance and endless quotations from Roman writers, of a British imperialist and bureaucratic official, who ends by pleading *for* India to be kept in subjection, against those who allow the idea of her separation. It would be "a crime against civilisation" (123) to liberate India... etc., etc.

Parallels with Rome, the lucubrations and advice of a bureaucrat, almost entirely of an "administrative" character—that's all.

p. 101: in India (*Indian Census*, p. 173) 90 men and 10 women out of 10,000 of each sex read and write English (101)....

103: It is a good thing that we did not oppose the teaching of Dutch in South Africa: now this language will die out of itself....

107: Hatred of and anger against the "wretched youth" (Dhingra), who assassinated Sir Curzon Wyllie (and wrote his defence in English)....

110: quoted the *Journal of the Statistical Society*, Vol. XLI: *Walford*, "The Famines of the World"... (350 cases of famine). In India there have been cases when 3-10 *million* died of hunger (111).... *Romesh Dutt*: *Famines in India* (quotation, 113)....

122: There are 147 languages in India; 276 million people speak 23 languages (*Indian Census*, p. 248)....

124, note: advice to young Englishmen: "read, mark, learn and inwardly digest" the history of the "Indian Mutiny"....

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 260.—*Ed.*

NOTEBOOK "o"
("OMICRON")

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o

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|| Engels (on the working class in England)—p. 14
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Kautsky on religion (banalities)—15.

The French constitutions of 1791 and 1848 on *national wars*: *p. 30*.

"Epochs" of modern history, *p. 28*.

A saying of Saint-Simon's—*49*.

SCHMOLLER'S JAHRBUCH, 1915, No. 1

In an article: "National Nutrition in War and Peace", Karl *Ballod* (*Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 1915, No. 1) attempts a summary (incomplete) of data on national nutrition: Plant and Animal Foodstuffs

Total amount per capita per day

order	*calories*	including plant	including animal
4. Germany	2,708	2,164	*544*
2. Great Britain	2,900	1,925	*975*
5. Italy	2,607	2,367	240
3. France	2,749	2,205	*544*
6. Austria	2,486	2,030	*456*
1. U.S.A.	2,925	1,870*	*1,054*
7. Russia	2,414**	2,235	279
8. Japan	1,814	1,764	50

Germany
Plant+Animal

2,103+294=2,397
150 150
2,103+444=2,547
61 61
2,164+444=2,608
100
2,164+544=2,708

Great Britain
1,925
975
2,900

The order of the countries is mine. Ballod's figures for Germany are not fully allocated to plant and animal foodstuffs. My allocation is according to his partial data.

Ibidem, article by *Jäger*: "Marxist Neo-criticism" about Adler, who combines Marxism and Kantianism.

Ibidem a small article by Schmoller on the Marx and Engels correspondence: scornful about revolution: it should be replaced by reform (p. 432).

The trade unions are stronger than the party; bureaucracy (5,000-10,000 persons) in the Social-Democratic movement.... "In short, the German workers' Marxist party is undergoing a process of disintegration, or of bourgeois degeneration, however much it may deny this" (424).

N.B. also an article by *Georg Siegwart*: "Soil Fertility as a Factor in History."

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* Ballod's error; it should be 1,871.—*Ed.*
** Ditto. It should be 2,514.—*Ed.*

MARX, ARTICLE OF 1878 ON THE INTERNATIONAL AND REMARKS ON THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS

Marx 1878:

Die Neue Zeit, XX, 1, p. 585 (1901-02), M. Bach's translation of *Marx's* English article of 1878: "Mr. George Howell's History of the International Working Men's Association."

Marx treats this Howell (a typical liberal labour politician) with contempt, corrects a number of his lying assertions about the International, states that he, Marx, is the author of *The Civil War in France*, which he published a long time ago in *The Daily News*, speaks of the International passing into a new, "higher" form, and makes other remarks on particular points. Inter alia. Marx writes:

N.B. Marx (1865) (and 1878) on self-determination of *nations*

"By the way, a paragraph of the programme which I had the honour to indite for the General Council" (for the 1865 Conference) "reads: 'The necessity of annihilating the Muscovite influence in Europe by the *application of the principle of the right of nations to dispose of themselves*, and the reconstruction of Poland upon a democratic and socialist basis'" (p. 586). ((In *The Secular Chronicle*, Vol. X, No. 5, August 4, 1878. A little magazine of a "free-thinking republican trend". The publisher, Harriet Law, was a member of the International.)) ((My italics.))

THE BASLE MANIFESTO AND THE CHEMNITZ RESOLUTION

Imperialism. Grünberg's *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus*, 1915 (Nos. 1 and 2) contains the resolution of the *Chemnitz* Party Congress (September *1912* [September 15-21, 1912]) on **imperialism** (pp. **314-15**).

The resolution emphasises: the export of *capital*, the endeavour to obtain "new spheres for capital investment", employers' organisations, their influence on the state and "the expansion drive", the endeavour to control "large parts of the economic area of the world".... The result: "an unscrupulous policy of *plunder* and *conquest* ... is the consequence of this imperialist expansion drive.

Hence: conflicts between *states*—the danger of *war* the interests of suppliers of "war materials".

... "brutal imperialism"

Free trade, "agreement between nations", etc. to mitigate (mildern) its temporary effects.

The concluding sentence of the resolution reads:

"It is, however, the task of the proletariat to transform capitalism, which has been raised to the highest level, into socialist society, and so permanently ensure peace and the independence and freedom of the peoples." N.B.

Ibidem, p. 324—voting on Rosa Luxemburg's amendment (on the mass strike) at the Jena Congress (1913):

For Rosa—144 = 30%

Against ... 336

480

Ibidem, pp. 306-11—the Basle Manifesto (**November** 24-25, 1912)

N.B., ibidem, review of the book:

O. Festy, *The Working-Class Movement at the Beginning of the July Monarchy*, Paris, 1908 (359 pp.), 10 francs.

By the same author: "The Lyons Revolt of 1831", *Annales des sciences politiques*, 1910 (pp. 85-103).

DIE GLEICHHEIT, AUGUST 5, 1914

Die Gleichheit, 1914, No. 23, August 5, 1914.

"WAR AGAINST WAR"

First item "War against War" is a quotation from the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress[45]—if a war threatens

to break out, the International Socialist Bureau shall be convened and all means shall be applied to prevent war. If nonetheless war should break out, then *etc*.

"PROLETARIAN WOMEN, BE PREPARED!"

Second article: "Proletarian Women, Be Prepared!"

Written after war was declared on Serbia, but *before* the European war.

Austria believes that Russia, etc., will hardly be able to fight. The article speaks of Austrian "imperialism", its "crime". "It [Austrian imperialism] fights solely for the interests of the reactionary Habsburg dynasty, to satisfy the lust for gold and power of the unfeeling and unscrupulous big landowners and big capitalists"....

The German newspapers "unscrupulously" call for war....

"That must never be allowed to happen. The German proletarians—men and women—must prove by their action that they have awakened, that they have matured for freedom" ....

The German Government says it wants peace. "But the people have learnt that the government leaders' tongues are forked like those of snakes."

The bourgeoisie is chauvinistic, and

"Only the proletariat will oppose its broad breast to the approaching disaster of a world war"....

In Russia, the struggle of the proletariat more than anything else holds back war.

"Let us not be less resolute or weaker than they are" (=the Russian workers).

"Let us not lose a minute's time. War is at the door.... Come out from the factories and workshops, from the huts and garrets, in a mass protest"....

"The exploited masses are strong enough to bear the entire edifice of the present-day order on their shoulders.... Will they prove too weak, shrink from privations, be afraid of danger and death, when the fight for peace and freedom calls? Will they allow free passage to a militarism which has just been branded before the widest public opinion as the brutal executioner of their sons and brothers?"

For the working class, brotherhood of peoples is no "empty delusion", but a matter of vital importance, the "solidarity of the exploited of all nations".

"It [this solidarity] must prevent proletarians raising weapons of death against proletarians. It must inspire in the masses the determination to use all available weapons in the war against war. If the proletarian masses oppose the fury of world war with their all-conquering strength, this will be a battle won in their struggle for emancipation. The revolutionary energy and passion of their struggle will mean persecution. There will be danger, there will be sacrifices. But should that daunt us? There are moments in the life of individuals and of nations when it is only possible to win by staking everything. Such a moment has come. Proletarian women, be prepared!" (p. 354).

End of article

"POLITICAL SURVEY"

And in the "Political Survey"

(p. 363). "The revolutionary forces of the prole-, tarian masses in the countries of Western Europe are to a large extent still dormant, but they are there, and it is precisely the torch of war that can awaken them." N.B.

(revolution exists in embryo not only in Russia, but also "in other European countries"....)

This is followed by an item on the increase of strikes and barricades in Russia

(((and ten lines on the Brussels conference of July 16-18, 1914; unity will assist the movement....)))

DELBRÜCK, *GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE'S WILL*

Hans Delbrück, ***Government and the People's Will***, Berlin, 1914.

Generally speaking, a most foul, reactionary opus, with tricky arguments *against* democracy. Everything is trotted out *against* democracy—sophistries, historical examples, etc.

There is some value in (1) his exposure of *bourgeois* (**) democracy (the reference to revealing *English* sources, for instance).

Literature: (**)
Wilhelm Hasbach, *Modern Democracy* (1912).
Adolf Tecklenburg, *Development of the Franchise in France since 1789*.
J. Unold, *Politics in the Light of the Theory of Evolution* (the work of a journalist, he says).
Lowell, *The Constitution of England*.
Belloc and Chesterton, *The Party System*.

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(2) *The Polish question*. The author is an opponent of Prussia's Polish policy as being ineffectual.

P. 1. What is a people? The German people?— we have "many millions—Poles, Danes, Frenchmen" (p. 1).

N.B. "There are German-speaking people in Alsace-Lorraine who consistently reject political kinship with the German people" (p. 1).

Hegel on "the people"	A saying of Hegel's: "The people is that part of the state which does not know what it wants" (p. 41)....

N.B. a reactionary on *self-determination* of nations	"But it is manifestly impossible for every single fraction of a people, cut out at random, to have the right to self-determination. If we accept it for the Alsace-Lorrainers, then why not for each of the three ethnic groups Swabians, Franks and Frenchmen? And why not, finally, for each individual community?" (p. 2).

On the Social-Democrats: Michels, he says, admits that the Social-Democrats are losing their revolutionary character (fear for their

organisation). "Indeed, from another standpoint, too, it was long ago predicted that the growth of such a revolutionary party does not bring it nearer its goal of genuine revolution; on the contrary, it is internally separated from it" (p. 80). And pp. 82-83, against Mehring: organisation *always* requires leaders; the **masses**, even *the most educated* masses, need them. "Will these leaders use their power to carry out a revolution and bring about a general overthrow, at the risk of destroying not the existing state and society, but themselves, or will they prefer occasional compromises—that is the question" (83), which, he says, Mehring rejects out of hand. (Written 1914. Preface: November 11, 1913.)

In reply to Delbrück, Mehring says he did *not* write this article, and puts forth the argument, a very feeble one, that the Social-Democrats more than anyone else have "measures" to prevent bureaucracy (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1913-14, 32, I, p. 971).

N.B.

°**°

N.B.

N.B.

°**°

N.B.: the number of government officials in Germany = about 1,350,000 = about one-tenth of the number of electors: 13,300,000 in 1907, p. 182.

The Prussian policy of Germanising the Poles has up to now cost **1,000 million** marks. Why "*complete bankruptcy*"? (161).

The Poles are embittered against the German schools the Polish children "know from their own experience all the bitterness of foreign rule, for there is no deeper insult to national consciousness" than that inflicted through language (162).

Polish is being kept alive in the towns. Of the four estates (nobility, clergy, peasantry and bourgeoisie), only the last-named is irreconcilable. German colonisation embitters the Poles and unites them nationally. A trade boycott: "Poles, buy Polish!"

The Poles cannot be "conciliated" (p. 171), they should be divided and helped to form a Prusso-Polish party (172).

"Of course, the reconciled Poles remain, essentially, 'Prussians subject to notice', as we have described them" (p. 174)—that is inevitable, but we must pursue such a policy that the "ideally possible notice (Kündigung) never becomes actual".

"The reputation a people enjoys among other great civilised peoples is of vast importance for any foreign policy. The German people—and let there be no illusions on that score—is the most unloved of all, and it is by no means merely the envy harboured by other peoples, as we are so ready to put forward in excuse, that causes them to look at us with such a jaundiced eye. Our wrong nationality policy is to no small extent responsible for the hate we encounter everywhere" (175): the Poles and the *Danes* (N.B.) cry out about us to the whole world!!

VOLKSSTIMME (CHEMNITZ)

"AGAINST BOTH JUNIUSES"

Volksstimme (Chemnitz), Supplement to No. 131 (June 8, 1916).

A short article: "*Against Both Juniuses*."

"Political arguments will, of course, carry no weight with those who judge only by the enormous sacrifices and suffering of this war and speak only in embitterment and desperation. For one, however, who does not want to hit out blindly, but to analyse and judge, the situation is already quite clear. Our readers will know from our reports of the Junius pamphlet, which seeks to persuade the German proletariat that its greatest interest lies in Germany's defeat, to which end the working class must exert all its efforts. It is no accident that the anonymous author of the pan-German pamphlet attacking the Reichs-Chancellor a pamphlet emanating from the Tirpitz opposition and annexationist and blood-thirsty to a degree of madness, signs himself *Junius Alter*, the second Junius. Both Juniuses,

one propagating Germany's defeat and the other Germany's world domination, actually play into each other's hands. And, reading the pamphlet of the first Junius, we have repeatedly asked ourselves whether it was really written by a Social-Democrat who has lost all judgement, or whether it is the work of a Russian police agent! The German working class will send both Juniuses packing. It will continue to fight the external enemies until they are ready for a reasonable peace, and the internal enemies who want to sacrifice precious German blood for the sake of lunatic plans of conquest. Such is the policy of Social-Democracy, and the history of the working-class movement will thank the leaders who in these days are so vigorously championing this policy in the Reichstag in defiance of all attacks and slanders."

End. The *entire* item.

"QUITE CORRECT!"

Volksstimme (Chemnitz), 1916, No. 133 (Saturday, June 10, 1916):

N.B.:

"*Quite correct*. Apropos our remarks on Comrade Dr. Lensch's speeches on the colonial question, the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* writes:

"'The Chemnitz *Volksstimme* seems to be concerned for the cessation of Party strife. However, it is probably speculating on the prospects this will present for unity between social-patriots, social-imperialists and social-pacifists, thanks to the behaviour of even the extreme Left wing of the Party Centre. The Chemnitz Party organ is probably not far off the mark. But as regards the radical Left, the paper's hopes for a re-union with the social-patriots are, of course, in vain.'

"We can confirm that the Bremen newspaper's idea is quite correct. We do, in fact, consider it of the very greatest importance that Party strife should cease, or at any rate be so [sic!] restricted [sic!] that it would no longer endanger organisational unity. Even today we still confidently hope that the social-pacifists—which in the jargon of the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* means the Haase-Ledebour group—will once again join with the social-patriots (that means

us) and the social-imperialists—that refers to the trade union leaders Lensch, Cunow, etc.—to form a single, united Social-Democratic Party. We are aware that the Rühle-Knief group, which has already declared that *a split is the prerequisite for the Party's further activity* [Chemnitz *Volksstimme*'s italics], will not take part. But the proletariat can suffer this loss without damage to its fighting capacity".

((the entire item))

BREMER BÜRGER-ZEITUNG

"THE I.S.D AND THE *INTERNATIONALE* GROUP"

Bremer Bürger-Zeitung, 1916, No. 139, June 16, 1916.
"*International Socialists of Germany and the Internationale Group*".[46]

Comrade *Knief*, now on holiday, writes to us:

"The *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*'s editorial comment, the day before yesterday, on the statement of the *Internationale* group might give rise to erroneous views on the relation between the *International Socialists of Germany* (I.S.D.) and the *Internationale* group."

The relation between these groups has been repeatedly discussed on our pages, particularly in a leading article in No. 77 (of March 31), from which we quote:

"The opposition consists of *two* fundamentally different groups: the *Party Centre* (Kautsky ... Haase—Ledebour ... *Neue Zeit* ... *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, *Vorwärts*) ... and the *radical Left*, to which belong ... the I.S.D. and the *Internationale* group ... (*Lichtstrahlen*, *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*, the Braunschweig *Volksfreund*, *Sozial-Demokrat* (Stuttgart)), and also, although not quite consistently, some Rhenish press organs."

The Braunschweig *Volksfreund* was Left-radical under Thalheimer's editorship—now, however, with *Wesemeyer* as editor it "represents the standpoint of the Centre".

The *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* No. 74 (March 28) published (in the absence of Henke) a comment from the Braunschweig *Volksfreund* to the effect that that newspaper supported (at

that time) the attitude of the *Internationale* group (and regarded the "guiding theses of the 'Spartacus letters'" as its "tactical and theoretical programme")...

"Hence the I.S.D. and the *Internationale* group are not identical. Both represent the radical Left and on tactical issues are strongly opposed to the Party Centre and the Social-Democratic Labour Commonwealth. While, however, the I.S.D. adopted this position from the outset, the *Internationale* group has only gradually broken away from the opposition grouped around Ledebour-Haase. At the time, the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* greeted this process as a further step towards clarification (No. 74, March 28).... Since then, in its 'Spartacus letters', the Internationale group has sharply and vigorously fought the Social-Democratic Labour Commonwealth".

(Quoted from the last 'Spartacus letter'.)

"In this attitude to private property [the private property of the Social-Democratic Labour Commonwealth??], the I.S.D. and the *Internationale* group, as already stated, are in full agreement, although they differ on many other issues." ‖ N.B.

Both groups work "*within the framework* of the present organisation" "as long as this is not made impossible by the tyranny of the Party bureaucracy"....

All this is important (he writes), for people often make the mistake of "trying to erase the line of division between the Centre and radical Left"....

"How far the two groups will move towards separate organisational existence depends entirely on the development of inner-Party relations. In any case, in the interests of clarity it is to be welcomed that they should be distinguished also externally, by their names." (End.)

Johann Knief

HENKE, "NOT IDENTICAL, BUT THE SAME"

Ibidem, No. 140 (June 17, 1916).

Henke's reply: "Not Identical, But the Same"....

..."I have no recollection of having read of the difference between the two groups and of their higher unity in Left-radicalism. My scant interest ‖‖ N.B.

N.B. |||| in such sectarian groupings may perhaps have contributed to this forgetfulness.
|| "Myself, I do not belong to either group"....

> I have always stood by "socialist principles", etc., etc., and such like phrases but nothing specific.

Henke

"YET ANOTHER PERIODICAL IN BREMEN"

No. 141 (June 19, 1916)—prints the appeal to subscribe to *Arbeiterpolitik* (a radical Left weekly).

LITERATURE ON THE MILITIA

Militia, Army—etc.

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Gaston *Moch*, *The Army of a Democracy*, Paris, 1889 (in German, Stuttgart, 1900).
P. Schwerdt, *Officer and Social-Democrat*, Munich (R. Abt), 1899? (Stammhammer III).
Loebell, *How is Social-Democracy in the Army to be Counteracted?* Berlin, 1906 (2nd edition, 1907).
R. Günther, "The Armed Services and Social-Democracy" (*Grenzboten*, 1899, I).
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K. Bleibtreu, "The Army of Democracy" (*Die Zeit*, Vienna, July 21, 1900, No. 303).
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Revolutionary Socialism in the German Army, 4th edition, Paris (Eitel), 1901.
The Army and Strikes, Locarno, 1906.

"The Army During Strikes" (the strike of October-November 1902), by Lieutenant Z. (Paris, 1904) (*Bibliothèque socialiste* periodical, No. 23-24).

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LENSCH ON THE MILITIA (1912)

P. Lensch, "Militia and Disarmament", *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912 (30, 2).

?? mish-mash!! ??

—inter alia, this passage: "The militia system is the organisation of the armed services of a democratic state for the purpose of guaranteeing the country's external and internal security. The militia is, of course, quite unsuitable for wars of conquest and that is the reason why we support it" (p. 768).

Also a quotation from Engels, 1865 (to be copied out), to the effect that it is a matter of indifference to the workers which Great Power gets the upper hand, but they are not indifferent to learning the art of war.

ENGELS ON THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND

The same article contains the following quotation from *Engels* (apparently from the preface to the new edition of *The Condition of the Working Class*) (p. xxiii of *The Condition*, 2nd edition):

Engels on the working class and dominant position of England

"During the period of England's *industrial monopoly* the English working class have, to a certain extent, *shared in the benefits of the monopoly*. These benefits were very unequally parcelled out amongst them: the **privileged** minority pocketed most, but *even* the *great mass* had, at least a *temporary* share *now and then*. And that is the reason why, since the dying-out of Owenism, there has been no socialism in England. *With the breakdown of that* [*industrial*]

monopoly, the English working class will lose that privileged position; it will find itself generally—*the privileged and leading minority not excepted*—on a level with its fellow-workers abroad. And that is the reason why there will be socialism again in England".[47]

Engels on English socialism

BÜRKLI, "DEMOCRATISATION OF OUR ARMY SYSTEM"

Karl *Bürkli*, "Democratisation of Our Army System", Zurich, 1897. (Lecture delivered November 15, 1896, at the Winterthur Social-Democratic Party Congress.)

He says at the very outset (p. 5) that the bourgeoisie (of Switzerland) "has only achieved an inferior version of monarchical militarism; it has incessantly striven to imitate foreign models, implant a sort of neo-Prussianism".

N.B. as early as 1896

KAUTSKY 1910 AND 1912

KAUTSKY, "THE COPENHAGEN CONGRESS"

Die Neue Zeit, 1910 (28, 2) (August 26, 1910).

K. Kautsky, "The Copenhagen Congress"

p. 776: "In a war between Germany and England, the issue will not be one of democracy. but of world domination, i.e., of exploitation of the world. That is not an issue on which Social-Democrats should side with the exploiters of their nation" (and farther on (as well as earlier) directly opposes Hyndman).

N.B.

Compare Kautsky in XXIII, 2 (on patriotism and war).*

* See pp. 617-18 of this volume.—*Ed.*

KAUTSKY, "ONCE MORE ON DISARMAMENT"

K. Kautsky, 1912 (30, 2), September 6, 1912, article "Once More on Disarmament", p. 851:

!! ha-ha!!! "The starting point of the idea and name of imperialism—the uniting of all the component parts of British possessions into a closed giant state, an empire—this starting point has receded wholly into the background in the last few years and can be regarded practically as abandoned."

pp. 850-51: imperialism is not a "natural, necessary endeavour" of capital to expand, etc., but merely a "special method"—namely: force.

KAUTSKY ON RELIGION[48]

!!?? Kautsky on religion *K. Kautsky* on ***religion***. Inter alia, p. 353: On the question of religion our propagandists must state that this question is neither raised nor answered at our party meetings, because we want to make religion a private matter of the individual, *and* we demand of the state that it *too* should treat it as such"....

[vulgarian!]

SOCIALISTS AND NEGROES IN AMERICA[49]

attitude to Negroes *N.B.*: Socialists and Negroes *The Socialist Party and the Negroes* in America: *pp. 382-83*: The *Industrial Workers of the World*[50] is *for* the Negroes. The attitude of the Socialist Party is "*not quite unanimous*". A single manifesto on behalf of the Negroes in 1901. Only one!!!

Ibidem, p. 592: in the state of Mississippi, the Socialists organise the Negroes "in separate local groups"!! *Negroes and Socialists!!*

SOURCE REFERENCES

Die Neue Zeit, 32, 1 (1913-14).
Engels, "On Authority"[51]. *Marx*, "Political Indifference".
Ryazanov versus Brupbacher (and his defender Mehring).
N.B. "***The Movement to Leave the Church***": a series of articles.
Die Neue Zeit, 30, 2 (1912, April-September). Articles by Kautsky land Lensch) on militia and "disarmament".
Ibidem *Grimm* on the Swiss militia.
28, 2 (K. Kautsky on the *1910 Copenhagen* Congress and "disarmament". Idem Rothstein).
29, 1: Rothstein against Hyndman.
29, 2: Quelch on the same.

BELFORT-BAX ON IMPERIALISM (1900)

Die Neue Zeit, XIX, 1 (1900-01) November 21 1900), p. 247.

Belfort-Bax, "A widespread erroneous conclusion". N.B. *1900*

"One of the most frequent errors encountered in discussing the questions of *imperialism* and *the new colonial policy* has apparently found its way into some socialist minds".... And he goes on to analyse the argument of those who *favour* colonial policy because of the progressive nature of capitalism. Bax refutes them.... ..."*Capitalist-national imperialism* is capitalism's reply to international Social-Democracy. ...World history is now at the crossroads—either *national-capitalist* **imperialism** or international-Socialist Democracy!"...

imperialism

on imperialism

...The present economic system ... (by extending to new fields of operation) ... "artificially prolongs its existence"....

Incidentally, a Bernstein-Kautsky polemic. Bernstein recalls that, back in 1896-97, Belfort-Bax was berating Bernstein, while Kautsky *supported* Bernstein. Kautsky replies: Bax at that time went so far as to say "better slavery than capitalism"—literally so—and neither then nor now have I supported Bax *on that point*, regarding his statement as "sentimental utopia". But I have always been *against* colonial policy.

cf. ***Die Neue Zeit***, XIX, 1 (1901), p. 804: *N.B. M. Beer* on the decay of Britain and on *imperialism*. ***Die Neue Zeit***, XX, 1, p. 209: "Social imperialism" (Fabians), p. 243, the "imperialist-social era".

DEBS

on Debs

Die Neue Zeit, 1913-14, 32, 1, pp. 1007-08. *Debs* in the *International Socialist Review* (1913, March) is *for* unity of the Socialist Party + the Socialist Labour Party[52] and the Industrial Workers of the World (of which Debs was a founder) against the American Federation of Labour. The New York *Volkszeitung*, March 7, 1913, comes out furiously against Debs, saying that he is abusing his "privilege to make stupid statements" (sic!), that the Industrial Workers of the World = nought, that the American Federation of Labour = "the American labour movement", and that "it is impossible to 'educate in a progressive spirit' the workers' movement by the formation of so-called revolutionary organisations with radical programmes" (sic!) .... (Obviously, in America, too, one sees the usual picture: the New York *Volkszeitung* = the orthodox, the Kautskyites, whereas *Debs* is a revolutionary, but without a clear theory, not a Marxist.)

ITALIAN AND POLISH WORKERS IN SWITZERLAND

J. Lorenz, On the Question of Italians in Switzerland, Zurich?
" " *Polish Workers in Switzerland*, Zurich, 1910.

Source references. There was a revolt of Italians in Zurich, July 26-29, 1896.

Their numbers: 1860— 9,000
1870— 18,000
1900—117,000

Appalling poverty. For example: *fifty people* living in three rooms!! (p. 16). Bunks, plank beds, and charging 10-20 centimes a night, etc.

in 1910—400 persons. Appalling poverty.
Payment 1.50-1.60 frs. per day with board.
"Beatings" also occur (p. 11).

{ cf. the same author in *Neues Leben* 1916, 1 }

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN CANADA

The labour movement in Canada ("**bourgeoisified**")

..."The skilled, and especially the English-speaking, part of the *working class is completely bourgeoisified*. Its conception of trade unionism is still wholly that of the old, narrow-minded English trade unions. Besides, spiritually they are still completely in the grip of the church. To be regarded as an 'apostate' is the deepest shame, 'respectability' is the highest honour." This is beginning to change: a spirit, of discontent ... rising living costs. "Today forty-two men actually control more than a third of the country's total wealth".... The petty bourgeoisie,

labour movement *in Canada* (bourgeoisified)

42 men ... one-third of all wealth

especially in agriculture, is against the trusts. (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1913-14, 32, 1, p. 382, a paraphrase of an article by Gustav Meyer: "Agrarian Discontent in Canada" from *The New Review*, *1913*, September.)

South Africa

"labour leaders" narrow-minded, conservative old trade unions officials

Ibidem, p. *384* on South Africa (the Rand). Workers consist of Chinese, Kaffirs and whites (ruined by the Boer War). Endless tyranny by the British capitalists, the mine owners and the government. Little by little a class struggle of *all* the wage workers is developing, but slowly "owing largely to the hesitant attitude of the conservative and narrow-minded labour leaders, who are still wholly in thrall to the old trade unionism" (from the *International Socialist Review*, 1913, October, paraphrase).

LISSAGARAY, *HISTORY OF THE 1871 COMMUNE*

N.B.

Lissagaray, *History of the Commune*, 1894, p. 193 (epigraph, Chapter 17): "If the French nation consisted only of women, what a terrifying nation that would be." *The Daily News*, May 1871.

New Swiss army law passed November 3, 1907: +329,953
—267,605

MONOPOLY AND TECHNIQUE

N.B.

Trusts, *monopoly and technique*: "This technical progress, which alone can guarantee the continued ability to export is, however, *hindered rather than promoted by monopoly* formations" (*Die Neue Zeit*, 32,

1, 1913-14, p. 383, a paraphrase of an article by Louis C. Fraina. "Concentration, Monopoly, Competition: a New Trend in the National Economy", in *The New Review* (New York) (1913, September)). N.B.

LENSCH, *SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY, ITS END AND ITS SUCCESSES*

P. Lensch, *Social-Democracy, Its End and Its Successes*, Leipzig (Hirzel), 1916 (preface May 22, 1916).

Pp. 11-12. Marx, he says, had only "derision" for such "well-intentioned conceptions" as disarmament, "the right of nations to self-determination*", etc. (p. 41: "old petty-bourgeois dogmatism") !

p. 15—since the nineties Social-Democracy has been "gradually discarding of everything of a sectarian nature"... (hopes of a millennium, and so forth have been dropped, etc.).... "sect"

Everything was judged from an "agitational" standpoint (17) ... German Social-Democracy's "period of enthusiasm" ... (as early as 1889, the decision about May Day).

Growth of *imperialism*—close of the nineteenth century—of Great Britain, France, and also Germany (26-27)....

Growth of revisionism: both trends (revisionism and radicalism) were necessary and useful (31-35).... ha-ha!!

Marx and Engels were not "petty-bourgeois sentimentalists": "They knew that in war there would be shooting" (39)....

62-68. We should have voted against war credits on August 4 (in point of fact it would have been all the same), but for war credits on December 2, 1914—for it was the French and British who went back on internationalism. [The swindler!!]

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* In the manuscript, the words "right to self-determination" are joined by an arrow to the subsequent addition "(p. 41: 'old petty-bourgeois dogmatism')".—*Ed*.

That would have diminished international hatred of the Germans and so strengthened their *national* cause: 69-70.

What a swindler!!!

ha-ha!!! "The collapse of the International" (Chapter 3) was due to the fact that the French and British came out *for* war (sic!!).

sic! Of course, there will be a Third International, only "less utopian" (112) and more conscious of its "economic basis"....

sic! "The more mature a proletariat, the more active it has been in the war" (113)—this proposition of Renner's, he says, is "not valid", for their behaviour in Britain and France is due not to "maturity", but to the struggle for world domination against Germany.

The British workers were defending their (monopoly) exceptional position and their privileges (114-15)....

The aristocratic upper stratum (115) of the British proletariat.

ha-ha! So long as there are exploiter-nations, so long as there is no "equilibrium" of the "powers" (116), it is "too early" to speak of the international solidarity of the working class (117)....

And the "catalogue of pious wishes" (the right to self-determination (petty-bourgeois, etc.), against annexations, etc.) is abstract, takes no account of the concrete (121) aim of the war—to smash the "class domination" (114) (+122) of Great Britain, her monopoly (122), her "exceptional position" (120)....

clown! A "*revolution*" (123 and preface), that is what the present war is!! "*The rise of this*" (proletarian) "*class is taking place, it is true, amid the thunder of a revolutionary world war, but without the lightning of a revolutionary civil war*"... (124) (author's italics).

"The shattering of British world domination"=revolution.

submarines and Zeppelins (125)... "the beginning of the end" of Britain's ruling position (126) (their role will be still greater after the war)

131—In the last 34 decades of the nineteenth century, Great Britain added to her colonies 15 million sq. km., an additional 15 million

cf. my figures *

N.B. N.B. Britain + France + Russia= "a syndicate for dividing up the world" (132 and elsewhere) with the aim: "weltpolitisch aushungern" Germany** (132) *ha-ha* expression

175: Almost half of the British working class do not have the franchise.

The "principle of organisation"—such is the essence of Prussian history, and the source of Germany's strength. She is nearest of all to "*social revolution*" (184), she embodies the "revolutionary principle". Britain—the "reactionary". !!!

186: "Symbolic visit to Berlin trade union headquarters"... (the government appreciates the role of the trade unions). (All praise for the trade union leaders) (185-86).

188: I called this "*w a r s o c i a l i s m*", and the term has acquired "international legitimacy".

195: New expenditure (4,000 million per annum) after the war will inevitably lead to socialisation and monopolies.

198: "Democratisation of the army system"—from this... ="arming of the people" (204)=the meaning "of our Social-Democratic" programme....

209-10—The minority in the German Party is reactionary in the historical sense, and hence its fate is: "impossibilism and sectarian prattle".

* See p. 253 of this volume.—Ed.

** An untranslatable expression. Literally, "to starve Germany in relation to world politics", i.e., deprive her of all possibility of pursuing a world policy.—*Ed.*

The Social-Democratic Party will henceforward be less narrow; the "intellectuals" and even the officers will return to it (212).

The state will recognise the need for the Party and will allow Social-Democrats to be officers (!!).

N.B. Social-Democracy, which has "uplifted" the workers has raised them *nationally* (215 in fine) ("national upsurge")

(="the Social-Democrats are the most national of all parties") (216).

Sophistry instead of dialectics

Everywhere there is play with the catchword "dialectics", used in very banal sense. Not the slightest attempt to see the whole picture. One thing alone is *brought out* **sophistically:** British world domination must be undermined.

PERRIN DE BOUSSAC, *ON THE COLONIAL ARMY* AND *LABOUR BIBLIOGRAPHY*

Perrin de Boussac, *On the Colonial Army*, Thesis. Paris, 1901. Nil. School-boyish. Quotes *de Lanessan*, *Principles of Colonisation*—the role of the colonial army soldier as coloniser, farmer, land**owner**, etc. ((*N.B.* the *prospect* of a soldier of the colonial army becoming a colonial landowner!!))

N.B. *N.B.* N.B. *Labour Bibliography*, 1913. Boston. 1914: 150 pp. of a very *detailed* and fine bibliography.

CHEMNITZ *VOLKSSTIMME*

"BETRAYAL OF THE PARTY IS BETRAYAL OF THE NATION"

N.B. valuable admissions

Volksstimme (Chemnitz) No. 156 (Supplement I), July 8, 1916.

Article: "*Betrayal of the Party Is Betrayal of the Nation.*"

"For several months now, *numerous anonymous leaflets* have been making charges against the elected and well-tried leaders of the Party and trade unions in all manner of tones, including the use of the word '*dog*'. The charge laid against them is that in the great crisis of world history, the visible climax of which, for the Party's policy, was August 4, 1914, they sold and betrayed the proletariat. At first, this was dismissed with laughter. But the more the terrible gravity of the war made itself felt in terms of casualties and the increasing scarcity of food, and the less prospect there was of peace, owing to the enemy's persistent efforts to realise his plans of annihilation, more and more people were prepared to believe this insulting charge."

"more and more"

The use of the word "dog"—an obvious allusion to a leaflet which said that the social-imperialists ought to be treated with a "dog-whip"!

"To what end people like Scheidemann, David and Landsberg are supposed to have betrayed the proletariat, for what reward, has not been vouchsafed to us".... Not for posts in the Party: "refusal to vote for war credits involves no danger to life".... And *wherein* lies the betrayal is still less clear, for it is claimed that it follows from their convictions, their appraisal of the facts.... "In that case, the charge of betrayal has no meaning whatever."

"But for the Party it is extremely dangerous. One can doubt and dispute as to what the Party membership thinks. But there can be *no* doubt that today, too, at least three-quarters of those whom in the tranquil time of peace the proletariat chose as leaders because of their services, still consider that voting for the war credits was correct and necessary. Hence, over 90 of the 110 Social-Democrat Reichstag depu-

ties are supposed to have committed a betrayal on August 4, and over three-quarters of the leaders and Party functionaries are committing it even today. If this were true, the most sensible thing would be to let the Party commit suicide and to encoffin and inter it as quickly as possible. For if, after fifty years of organisational work, the proletariat has as its leaders men, practically all of whom are traitors, that would be overwhelming, irrefutable proof that the proletariat is politically quite incapable and will always be fooled. What other conclusion could there be? One could sack all the old leaders and elect entirely new ones, but there would be no guarantee that in the next big crisis the new leaders would not once again commit treachery”.... For many extreme radicals were for August 4 (Pfannkuch, Ebert, etc.).... “Consequently, what guarantee could we give the workers that if these men are traitors, every one of their successors, too, would not finally end up as a traitor?”

N.B.

cf. Martov!!

sic!!

Now the anonymous leaflets have gone to the length of calling for a strike in the munitions industry. That=high treason.

“It goes without saying that this idea of a mass strike will not have the slightest practical effect among the fanatically nationalist French or the haughty British”....

cf. Martov in *Investia*, etc.

The persons responsible are clearly not Social-Democrats, but either *madmen* or *Anglo-Russian stooges*.... This behaviour is so “devoid of honour and patriotism” that we can never have anything in common with such people, and so forth.

LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG[53]

Leipziger Volkszeitung, July 10, 1916.

PARTY AFFAIRS

"Betrayal of the Party Is Betrayal of the Nation"

That is how the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* heads an article in which it reacts violently to the charge of Party betrayal levelled "in numerous anonymous leaflets against the elected and well-tried leaders of the Party and trade unions in all manner of tones, including the use of the word 'dog'".

This defence is followed by attack. The second part of the article speaks of "high treason". It reads as follows:

"Meanwhile, the anonymous leaflet literature has led to outright high treason. We are not, of course, referring to Karl Liebknecht, whom a military tribunal, using legalistic deductions, is seeking to punish for attempted military betrayal, but whose behaviour at any rate has nothing whatever to do with high treason, as understood among the people. We refer to acts of high treason that cannot be discounted by any twisting of words. The *Hamburger Echo* reports that a leaflet now being distributed in working-class circles by unknown means *calls* for a *general* strike in *the munitions industry*.* Under the slogan 'Down with the War!' it urges a 'new mode of action', and the examples it cites unmistakably show that this means a mass strike. And so, while the enemy is attacking with the utmost fury, showering German soldiers with a hail of iron, they want to deprive the German artillery of shells; without its help the German infantry, the German proletarians in the army, are to be allowed to be slaughtered by enemy shells. It goes without saying that this idea of a mass strike will not have the slightest practical effect among the fanatically nationalist French or the haughty British.

"This propaganda, therefore, is outright high treason, betrayal of our class comrades in the army, and we should like to know what our comrades at the front will say about such craziness.

"We are firmly convinced that the German working class, too, will give a fitting answer to these individuals who come before them with such claims. The leaflets are, as we have said, anonymous; we do not know whether they have been put out by madmen or by Anglo-Russian stooges. They certainly could not have been put out by Social-Democrats. Anyone who allowed himself to support such propaganda, if only by passivity, would thereby forever cease to be part of the German Social-Democratic movement. For this propaganda is devoid of honour and patriotism, and we cannot, of course, have anything in common with a person who sinks so low.

"But the mere possibility of such an occurrence is enough to show what this anonymous leaflet literature can lead to. It began with

* The italics here and below are the author's.—*Ed*.

the most foul invective, for which the authors did not dare to admit responsibility before their Party comrades, and has now sunk to this provocateur activity. First there were cries of betrayal of the Party and now we have outright high treason! It is high time we got rid of it, once and for all. Anyone who has anything to say should have the courage to speak out on his own responsibility. Or perhaps, at a time when hundreds of thousands are sacrificing their lives for their cause, these people are too cowardly to risk being prosecuted. In any case, anonymity will not protect the *distributors* of the anonymous leaflets; if they are caught they must, of course, expect the most severe punishment.

"The dangers of this anonymous propaganda have now become fully clear. No distinction can be drawn between honest error and vile treason that is probably paid for with foreign money. Party comrades are, therefore, warned to put a final stop to these anonymous leaflets. They are a cloak for men who would plunge the German people, and above all the German proletariat, into calamity. Be on guard against provocateurs!"

We consider it necessary to reproduce these statements in order to show our readers what the *Hamburger Echo* and the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* regard as the task of the day. If these two newspapers were to attack the distributors on the issues posed by the leaflets, that would be their legitimate right. But if they raise an outcry against the propaganda as being high treason, that is a *denunciation* which deserves to be appraised by the working class at its true worth.

Moreover, as regards the issues involved, this accusation is completely unjustified, because, to the best of our knowledge, the leaflets suggest strike action only as a means of clearly expressing working-class demands on vital and pressing issues. There is no mention whatever of the purpose the *Hamburger Echo* and the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* ascribe to them.

MARX ON FRANCE'S WAR FOR FREEDOM (JANUARY 1871), ON IRELAND, AND ON THE COMING WAR (1874)

Marx on the war of 1870:

In the First Address of the International (July 23, 1870), Marx quotes a resolution adopted in Chemnitz by delegates representing 50,000 workers, who declared the war to be "exclusively dynastic" (p. 18, 3rd edition of *The Civil War*).

[*Ibidem*, pp. *17-18*: *for the Germans*, *it is a war of defence*.]

The Second Address (September 9, 1870) states: "The war of defence ended ... in the proclamation of the Republic"....

(p. 19) "The French working class ... under circumstances of extreme difficulty ... must not allow themselves to be deluded by the national souvenirs of 1792" ... "any attempt at upsetting the new government ... would be a desperate folly".... "Let them calmly and resolutely improve the opportunities of Republican liberty for the work of their own class organisation"[54] (p. 25).

N.B.

Letter of December 13, 1870: "However the war may end, it has given the French proletariat practice in arms" [Notebook: "*Marxism on the State*", p. 2, margin[55]].

An article in *The Daily News*, January 16, 1871: "France is fighting not only for her own national independence, but also for the liberty of Germany and Europe."[56]

Letter of April 12, 1871: enthusiasm over the "historic initiative" of the Parisian workers, etc. (Notebook: "*Marxism on the State*", p. 12).[57] *The Civil War in France*: May 30, 1871.

Marx in a letter to Kugelmann of February 14, 1871 (*Die Neue Zeit*, XX, 2, p. 608) quotes a letter published by him in *The Daily News*, *January 16, 1871*, which ends as follows: "France—and her cause is fortunately far from being desperate—fights at this moment not only for her own national independence, but also for the liberty of Germany and Europe"[58].

France in January 1871 fights both for her national independence and for the liberty of Germany and Europe....

Same source; in a letter of March 28, 1870, Marx quotes his complaints against Bakunin and the text of the General Council's resolution of January 1, 1870, which sets out, inter alia, the General Council's attitude to the *Irish* question:

...."The General Council's resolution on the Irish amnesty serve only as an introduction to other resolutions which will affirm that, quite apart from international justice, it is a pre-condition to the emancipation of the English working class to transform the present forced union—i.e., the enslavement

Marx on Ireland (1870)

of Ireland—into an equal and free federation if possible, into complete separation if need be"[59] (p. 478).—

(1874) *Same Source*, p. 800: letter of May 18, 1874.[60]

..."All diplomatic moves notwithstanding, a new war—sooner or later—is inevitable, and until it is over it is hardly likely that the position will anywhere develop into a powerful popular movement, or, at most, it will be of a local and minor character."

ULBRICHT, NATIONALITY AND IMPERIALISM

Edmund Ulbricht, *World Power and the National State*. (A political history, **1500-1815.**) Revised and published by Gustav *Rosenhagen*, Leipzig, 1910 (668 pp.).

In the text, repeated mention of "**imperialist** plans", etc.

Only 2½ pages, 666-68, are devoted to the period after 1815: "Retrospect and Prospect".

"Liberation wars also consummate the world-historical struggle for maritime and trade supremacy: the result—England's mastery of the seas.

"But the era of revolution and wars of liberation signify also the beginning of new developments. The revolution shattered the old feudal system of France and thereby gave an impulse to the transformation of the social order and the state; it was only with the help of the peoples that the other European states were finally able to maintain themselves against the forces the revolution had brought to life in France. Of all the ideas of the revolution, none proved more effective, from the very outset, than the national idea. Under the oppression of cruel foreign rule and in heroic struggle against it, the other European peoples also became conscious of the inner connection between state and nation. In the eighteenth century the big states rose to defend the independence

N.B.

of Europe and its equilibrium against the excessive power of a single state; now the peoples themselves have been rejuvenated and revitalised by the influx of new forces from the depths. The national idea becomes the crux and aim of almost all wars of the nineteenth century. N.B.

"Naturally, the peoples' increased consciousness of their strength was bound to make itself felt also in their own states. The masses began to demand a share in the administration of the state.

"The French revolution, Napoleon's world domination and the liberation wars made national feeling and the urge for political freedom invincible forces of recent history. National tendencies were interwoven and fused with the liberal and democratic ideas born of the age of enlightenment to produce the theory of the sovereignty of the people. According to this theory, statehood should be based on the undivided nation, and in such a way that the supreme will and supreme power are invested in the nation, and that only from its right is the right of the head of state derived" (667).

This theory threatened both the monarchies and their national composition; the Restoration was opposed to these ideas....

The nineteenth century as a whole, however, signified an advance towards political freedom and nationality.

"But that did not relegate to the background the competitive trade and political struggles, which have increasingly influenced the history of the nations ever since the epoch of early money economy and the great discoveries. True, at first Britain enjoyed absolute trade supremacy, and using that power and the doctrine of free trade, she overcame the era of economic struggles which mercantilism had brought with it. With the help of this doctrine which, like political liberalism, stems from the age of enlightenment, Britain conquered the world and won the battle for international free trade and intercourse. The economically weaker states submitted to this system for a time; even the youngest of the European national great powers—Italy and Germany—could not isolate themselves from the new doctrine.

"Then, however, the United States of America, after overcoming a severe internal crisis, emerged as a new, powerful competitor in the trade and political arena. A new era of economic struggles has begun, in which there has been a return to the policy of safeguarding national labour by protective tariffs and trade treaties, but without lapsing into the crude mercantilist policy of force. In this the United States has been followed by the French Third Republic and, since 1880, by the new German Empire as well. With the conclusion of the struggles for liberal and national state systems, and with the structure of the constitutional state completed, efforts are made to assure maximum scope for the enhanced power of the nation. In the colonial race, the Great Powers seek to acquire territories as markets for their goods and sources of essential raw materials. Their incessant diplomatic activity aims at opening up new trade areas for their industrious peoples. These expansion efforts, however, are accompanied by a growing urge for economic autarchy. Britain wants to form, with her colonial possessions, a uniform closed trading area, a Greater Britain. America strives for economic self-sufficiency, she wants to make herself independent of the Old World in regard to trade and industry. International rivalry for world power and world trade, in the proper sense of the word, has only just begun. It is leading to the rise of *several world empires* existing side by side, and **their policy**, if indeed they want to maintain themselves, **must be imperialism**.

ha-ha!!

N.B.

N.B.
N.B.

"imperialism"

"The name and concept of the *new imperialism* are derived neither from the Roman Empire nor from the medieval empire and Papacy; it is no longer a question of the world rule of a single power. Colonial expansion, participation in world trade, protection of overseas interests by means of powerful navies—these, from the example of the British Empire, have become the characteristic features of modern world powers. Such powers are quite capable I of existing side by side and of promoting the progress of mankind through peaceful competition between the nations" (667-68). (End of the book.)

"new imperialism"

"*characteristic features*"

ha-ha!!

N.B. *Old and new imperialism*

From the *Introduction*, p. XXIII: "*The old imperialism* went to its grave in the loneliness of St. Helena; its last representative died with Bonaparte, and this man of great deeds was still surrounded by the romantic glitter of a past imperial magnificence. A new period begins; its basis is the national idea, which proves stronger than the reactionary aspirations of the princes and statesmen of the first decades after Napoleon's downfall. What the sixteenth century began was completed by the nineteenth century, when the two nations of Central Europe, Italy and Germany, which for centuries had been a sphere of exploitation by foreign powers, at last achieved national unification. *On such a national basis*, however, the possibility arises of a *new*

"the old imperialism is dead"

N.B. "new world policy" *N.B.* "new imperialism"

world policy. ***The term imperialism acquires a new life and a new content.*** **Britain**, the never-conquered opponent of Napoleon, had already laid the basis for this in the eighteenth century when, unconsciously rather than consciously, by the acquisition of overseas colonies and the maintenance of a powerful navy, she founded a *new world empire* outside Europe. *She is now being followed by the other world powers*: economic necessity drives all the *nations of the world* to economic rivalry."

The book is divided into three sections.

"Section I: End of the medieval world empire and the emergence of national states in the epoch of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, 1500-1648.

"Section II: Formation of the five Great Powers of Europe in the epoch of princely absolutism.

"Section III: Emergence and decline of the new world power, France, and struggle of the powers for national independence, 1789-1815."

My addition: ("stages") of the epoch		
Ergo. 1500-1789	=	289 years
1789-1871	=	82 years
1871-1914	=	43 years

The chief factors

Section I:

Emergence of the "Spanish national state" (p. 24 et seq.) and then "founding of the Spanish-Habsburg world power" (p. 51 et seq.).

Charles V in the struggle for world supremacy (the German Reformation), 1517-1555.

The national kingdom in Denmark and Sweden (p. 148 et seq.).... "Subjection of Estland to Sweden", etc.

The development of Poland into a Great Power (163 et seq.) ... the Polish-Swedish union ... Poland and the struggle for Russia.

Beginning of the struggle with Spain. The Dutch "war of liberation" and the "secession of the Netherlands from Spain". The Armada 1588. Result of the struggle: "Rise of France, Britain and the Netherlands. Decline of Spain" (233 et seq.).

The Thirty Years' War, the period 1616-1659: "Spanish-Habsburg Catholic world policy in the struggle against German protestantism, against Denmark and Sweden against France and Britain" (273 et seq.).

(Including the alliance of Britain, Holland and Denmark against Austria.

The Swedes near Vienna. Sweden in a war against France, etc.).

Revolution in Britain, seventeenth century.

Section II:

Completion of the French national state" (Richelieu) and the "rise of France to dominance in Europe". 1661-1685.

Restoration of European equilibrium (War of the Spanish Succession); the rise of England, Austria, Russia and Prussia.

Russia's struggle against Sweden (and against Poland)....

"Sweden at war with Denmark, Poland, Brandenburg, Austria and the Netherlands" (1655-1660).

Austria's struggle against Turkey (seventeenth century).

Wars of the Great Powers (1740-1789).

The Seven Years' War (1758-1762) ("colonial war" of England and France).

The United States War of Independence (in alliance with France, Spain and Holland).

"Imperialist plans of Joseph II and Catherine II. The end of Poland."

Section III:

Wars against the French Revolution.

First Coalition War (1792-97).

Second " " (1799-1801/2).

Anglo-French War (1793-1799).
Napoleon's war against Prussia and "Napoleon's plans of world domination". (Collapse, 1812.)
"The Liberation Wars, 1813-15."

Poland prior to 1660 (as given in a historical atlas):
Under the Lublin Union—1569—*Poland* possessed the Baltic coast with Danzig, Courland, Lifland with Riga (ceded to Sweden under the *Oliva* peace of 1660), the Ukraine with Kiev, Poltava and Chernigov, Podolia, Volhynia, etc., Byelorussia with Smolensk.

(Ceded Smolensk, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, etc., to Russia under the Andrusovo Peace of 1667.) {Partition of Poland: First 1772, Third 1795}

South **America** entirely free now except for the three Guianas:

{Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch in the 16-17th centuries}	British	(1781)
	Dutch	(1667)
	French	(1674)

North America 1783. 13 states independent of England.

Louisiana (now a number of states):	Spanish	1763		
	French	1802	British	1763
	United States	1803	United States	1783.
Mississippi basin				

Mexico and Central America: Spanish
(Mexico, a republic since 1810)

Turkey: Empire of the Osmans under Mohammed IV (1648-1687) almost up to Vienna:
Austria, Rumania, Crimea, Caucasus,
the entire Balkan peninsula, etc.

Serbia {Hungarian since 1718, Turkish since 1739} a monarchy since 1817

Sweden until (before) 1719 (from the middle of the 17th century) possessed also Finland
Ingermanland (St. Petersburg).
Estland
Lifland
part of Germany (western Pomerania (Stettin) + Bremen)

(Norway since 1815 belonged to Sweden)

United States. War of Independence 1775-1783

In 1763 Canada was ceded by France to England

1778—treaty of friendship with *France*
1779—treaty of friendship with *Spain*

Independence of the 13 states proclaimed July 4, 1776.

1781—the English defeated by Franco-American troops

End of the war, September 3, 1783: Versailles Peace. Under it Spain, America's war ally, receives back Florida.

Florida joined the United States of America only in 1819.

Portugal was Spanish from 1580 to 1640

Holland: seceded from Spain in 1581

1796 Belgium belongs to France
Holland = Batavian Republic
1814-1831 Belgium belongs to Holland

"EPOCHS" OF MODERN HISTORY

On the question of the epochs of modern history cf. also **P. Herre**, *Sources of World History*, Leipzig, *1910*, which sets out, along with *literature references*, the usual division into epochs and cites, inter alia, the following "*epochs*": "The *epochs* of the medieval idea of world domination" (circa 800 to

N.B. "epochs" of modern history

circa 1250).—"The epoch of the emergence of national states" (circa 1250 to circa 1500).... "The epoch of the formation and development of national constitutional states" (circa 1789 to circa 1870).... "The *epoch of world states and world economy*" ("circa 1870 to circa 1910").

DER KAMPF MAGAZINE

ADLER AND RENNER

Der Kampf, 1916, No. 2. In an article "War Aims" (against annexations), Fr. Adler quotes from *Süddeutsche Monatshefte their* statement[61]:

clear!

"The states which make up the world today, are states based on power. But their power lies in land, people and property".... "They (the soldiers) expect 'real guarantees': they expect land, people and property"...

and for a parallel, the Constitution of *1791*, article VI:

The French Constitution of 1791 on national *wars*

"The French nation will never wage a war of conquest and will never use its forces against the liberty of any people"...

and the Constitution of *1848*: "The French Republic respects foreign nationalities just as it counts on respect of its own. It will never wage a war of conquest and will never use its forces against the liberty of any people"....

My addition:
texts of the French Constitutions of 1791, 1793, etc., see in **F. Helie**, *The Constitutions of France*

Renner on Trotsky

ha-ha!!

Ibidem, *No. 1*: in an article "Reality or Lunatic Idea", p. 17, *K. Renner* calls Trotsky "a very close friend of Hilferding".

From his arguments *in favour of* an alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary: "Were there *only* two big economic systems in the world, it would be easier for us Social-Democrats to demolish the last great partition wall, much easier than today, when we are in a confusing labyrinth and for that very reason have such a hard time finding our way. Let the whole world take the path of alliance, so much the better for us—the closer shall we come to the final goal" (19-20).

typical!!

(p. 16: "The movement for a so-called Central Europe is still basically a bourgeois movement and of that I shall speak first of all").

N.B. cf. Central Europe and a United States of Europe

We and they:

1) Renner, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, *Die Glocke* & Co. = lackeys of the imperialist bourgeoisie
2) Kautsky, Hilferding & Co. (+ a very close friend = Trotsky) = persuaders of the imperialist bourgeoisie
   counsellors and reformers of the imperialist bourgeoisie.[62]
3) the Lefts = revolutionary fighters *against* the imperialist bourgeoisie.

HILFERDING (KAUTSKYITE VIEWS)

Der Kampf, 1916, No. 2, pp. 59-60.

Hilferding advances Kautsky's usual argument that world economic ties militate *against* isolation, that the greatest increase in the British colonies' imports and exports

predatory tricks of finance capital

(1899-1913) has not been in trade with Great Britain (p. 57): "Germany has been spared the expense of acquiring and administering colonies, but as soon as her capitalist development allowed, she derived the same advantages as Britain from their productive capacity. There can be no question of the colonies being monopolised for Britain" ... (the same as Britain—is flatly untrue: railways, concessions, export of capital. Germany has outstripped Britain *in spite of* the latter's colonies. Without colonies, Britain would probably be still more behindhand. That, in the first place. And, in the second place, finance capital in Britain has *to a greater extent* "rested on its laurels". *Now German finance capital, too*, wants to do so).

the main thing:

"The distinguishing feature of imperialist policy is that it seeks to settle problems of economic competition by the exercise of state power in the interests of the capitalist stratum controlling the state. By protective tariff walls it ensures exploitation of the home market for its cartels. By its policy of colonies and spheres of influence it seeks to reserve parts of the world market as a monopoly for its capitalist class, and by economic and political means of compulsion it seeks to convert smaller countries into spheres of exploitation for its capital. That brings it into ever-increasing contradiction with the imperialist policy of other states. Hence, the striving to increase state power, the intensified armaments race on land and sea. It was this policy that led to the catastrophe. And the peoples are now faced with the alternative: will they (!!!) continue this policy after the war, or do they intend to break with it? Continuation of the insep-

N.B. "**they**"

arable protective-tariff, colonial and armaments policies, or a break with power policy!" (59-60).— N.B.

> We must first of all take *power* in our *own* hands and not talk vainly about "power".

"It is not a question of merely regulating trade relations, but of the power policy that seeks to secure a monopoly position for one's own capital at the expense of others, the policy from which the danger of war arose. That was the situation before the war. But does that mean that we are to be reconciled to it and not oppose by every means the continuation of this policy, and at a much higher level? We are of the contrary opinion: because we have seen what this monopolist power policy leads to, we must oppose its continuation and extension by every means" (61). N.B. N.B.

ENGELS AND MARX ON THE ENGLISH WORKERS

Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, second edition, 1892.

p. xx. An "aristocracy among the working class"—a "privileged minority of the workers" in contrast to the "great mass of the working people" (from the article of March 1, 1885). N.B.

The competition of other countries shattered England's "industrial monopoly" (xxi). N.B.

"A small privileged, protected minority" (xxii) (of the working class)—was alone "permanently benefited" in 1848-68, whereas "the great bulk of them experienced at best but a temporary improvement". S S

(See *p. 14* of this Notebook*)

p. xxiv: the growth of the "new unionism", of unions of *unskilled* workers:

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* See p. 588 of this volume.—*Ed.*

N.B. "They [these new unionists] had this immense advantage, that their minds were virgin soil, entirely free from the inherited 'respectable' bourgeois prejudices which hampered the brains of the better situated 'old' unionists."

And on the elections of 1892:

N.B. "Among the former so-called workers' representatives, that is, those people who are forgiven their being members of the working class because they themselves would like to drown their quality of being workers in the ocean of their liberalism, Henry Broadhurst, the most important representative of the old unionism, was completely snowed under because he came out against the eight-hour day".

After 1847: "Both these circumstances [1) the death of Chartism; 2) industrial prosperity] had turned the English working class, politically, into the tail of the 'great Liberal Party', the party led by the manufacturers" (xvii).[63]

Correspondence with *Sorge*.

Marx on the leaders of the English workers:

Fr. Engels to Sorge (September 21, 1872): ..."Hales kicked up a big row in the Federal Council and secured a vote of censure on Marx for saying that the English labour leaders had sold themselves—but one of the English sections here and an Irish section have already protested and said that Marx was right"....

Engels to Sorge, October 5, 1872: "Hales has begun here a gigantic war of calumny against Marx and myself, but it is already turning against Hales himself.... The excuse was Marx's statement regarding the corruption of the English labour leaders"....

Marx to Sorge, April 4, 1874[64]: ... "As to the urban workers here [in England], it is a pity that the whole pack of leaders did not get into Parliament. This would be the surest way of getting rid of the whole lot"....

N.B.

cf. here 40-41* still stronger

see the continuation p. 36**:

K. Marx to Kugelmann, May 18, 1874:

"In England at the moment only the rural labour movement shows any advance; the industrial workers have first of all to get rid of their present leaders. When I denounced these fellows at the Hague Congress, I knew that I was letting myself in for unpopularity, calumny, etc. But such consequences have always been a matter of indifference to me. Here and there it is beginning to be realised that in making that denunciation I was only doing my duty". (*Die Neue Zeit*, XX, 2, 1901-02, p. 800.)



Jaeckh, *The International*, p. 191: Marx said in The Hague: "It is only an honour if someone in England is not a recognised labour leader; for every 'recognised labour leader' in London is in the pay of Gladstone, Morley, Dilke and Co.".... (the Hague Congress, September 1872)

on the same subject, cf. *Jäckh* in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXIII, 2, p. 28.

KAUTSKY, "PATRIOTISM, WAR, AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY"

K. Kautsky, "*Patriotism, War and Social-Democracy*" (*Die Neue Zeit*, XXIII, 2; 1905).

A soldiers' strike = "heroic *folly*" (370), as are also the "attempts" of bourgeois pacifists to abolish war by arbitration. Both follies "arise from the mistake of regarding war as an isolated fact".

* See pp. 625-26 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Extracts from Engels's correspondence with Sorge are on pp. 36 and 37 of the Notebook (see p. 621 of this volume).—*Ed.*

But war threatens catastrophe: "However, the catastrophe that leads to the most complete collapse is defeat in a frivolous war" (371).

The proletariat is "today hardly anywhere strong enough" to make war impossible before its outbreak by means of revolution (and a soldiers' strike *is* revolution). "But in all capitalist countries it is already strong enough to ensure that every fruitless war entailing great losses be made the starting point of a revolution which establishes a proletarian regime" (371).

BAUER, *THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY*

Otto Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, St. Petersburg, 1909.

From §30: "Socialism and the Nationality Principle."

p. 534: ..."The socialist community will never be able to include whole nations within its make-up by force. Imagine the masses of the people, enjoying all the blessings of their national culture, taking a full and active part in legislation and administration, and, finally, supplied with arms—would it be possible to subordinate such a nation to the rule of an alien social organism by force? All state power rests on the force of arms. The present-day people's army, thanks to its ingenious mechanism, still constitutes a tool in the hands of a definite person, family or class, exactly like the knightly or mercenary army of the past. The army of the democratic community of a socialist society is nothing but the people armed, since it consists of highly cultured persons, working without compulsion in socialised workshops and taking full part in all spheres of political life. Under such conditions, any possibility of rule by a foreign nation disappears" (534).

N.B. **such** conditions

A United States of Europe is "not an empty dream", but the "inevitable end of the road on which the nations set foot long ago" (542).

If a socialist Germany wanted to send part of her work people to the Ukraine, she would not do so "without guaranteeing them their cultural independence" (543) ... (the end of §30).

In §9: "**Imperialism and the Nationality Principle**" (512-29 of the Russian translation), the author quotes Schulze-Gaevernitz on *British imperialism*, points to the disintegration of Turkey, to Italy's attempt to seize Albania: "Allusions will be made to Trento and Trieste, while having Albania in mind" (519). "In this way a predatory imperialist war can be presented to the mass of the Italian nation as a war for national freedom" (519)....

Baghdad, Russia in Persia, etc.—"such are the seeds and elements of those future conflicts" (518)....

In the same way "British imperialism unfolds before the mass of voters a seductive picture of an empire of 400 million people under the rule of the single British nation, while having in mind the monopoly profits of the iron and steel magnates and speculation on the London Stock Exchange".... "At some time Russian imperialism will probably proclaim the freedom and unity of Poland and the Ukraine in order to open new markets to the St. Petersburg, Moscow and Lodz manufacturers" ... "and German imperialism, too, will have to proclaim itself successor to the Greater Germany idea of 1848, and inscribe on its banner the realisation of the single Greater German fatherland, while having in mind the sacrifice of German workers and peasants to safeguard capitalist interests on the Tigris and Euphrates" (522-23).... N.B.

"The destruction of Austria within capitalist society can only be the work of imperialism" (528)....

"The disintegration of Austria presupposes the triumph of imperialism in Germany, Russia and Italy. But the triumph of imperialism implies the defeat of the working class in these countries" (527). The Austrian workers should not pin their hopes on the triumph of imperialism....

GRUMBACH, *THE MISTAKE OF ZIMMERWALD-KIENTHAL*

S. Grumbach. *The Mistake of Zimmerwald-Kienthal*, Berne, 1916 (95 pp.) (banal remarks of a social-chauvinist).

! p. 24: ...“Though on August 4, 1914, he (Kautsky) did not clearly understand the situation, he nevertheless remains for us (!!!) and the socialists of all countries one of the leading theoreticians of the International”....

p. 26 ...“The general equalisation preached by Zimmerwald and Kienthal”....

—p. *40*—The German Social-Democrats did not respond to the Vaillant-Keir Hardie *proposal*, and in spite of their promise did not discuss it at Chemnitz (1913) (for the 1914 Vienna Congress)!!! (Nonsense! As if Legien and Co. *could* do this!!) (Cf . Huysmans in a letter to the Swiss party—idem.)

The French minority, *too*, is for fatherland defence!! (—54—). [In August and November 1914, he says, Grimm stood for fatherland defence—68.]

p. 77: Lenin *in favour of* war by Morocco, etc.

(p. 4 of the German pamphlet.*) “Here lunacy becomes a method”! Morocco may defend herself, but France may not!! (Buffoon!)

p. 78: Lenin (*Vorbote*[65] No. 1**) sees “the beginning of revolutionary mass struggles” in hunger demonstrations in Germany!! What an *illusion*!!, author says. On the contrary, there is “complete absence of revolutionary qualities among the German people” (78).

82: Meyer *London* said in the U.S. Congress on January 18, 1916, that he would defend his country in the event of an attack!!!!

84-85: Ledebour’s statement against the German International Socialists and Borchardt’s against Ledebour. You will “never” succeed in having “**defence of the fatherland**” abandoned!!! Liebknecht, too, is *for* defence of the fatherland!!

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* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 300.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., Vol. 22, pp. 108-20.—*Ed.*

ENGELS, LETTERS TO SORGE

Engels to Sorge, June 3, 1885.... In connection with the shipping subsidy (after the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law), "the split will probably come and can then only be useful. A petty-bourgeois-socialist group is inevitable in a country like Germany, where the petty bourgeoisie, much more than historical law, 'goes down to an unknown date'"....

April 29, 1886: "In Germany in quiet times everything takes on a philistine character; here the sting of French competition is absolutely necessary. And it will not be lacking"....

February 22, 1888: ..."It only requires a start to be made somewhere and the bourgeois will be amazed at the latent socialism, which will then break out and become apparent" (291)....

December 7, 1889: ..."The most repulsive thing here [in Britain] is the bourgeois 'respectability' which has grown deep into the bones of the workers.... Even Tom Mann, whom I regard as the best of the lot, is fond of mentioning that he will be lunching with the Lord Mayor. If one compares this with the French, one realises what a revolution is good for, after all"....[66] ||| N.B.

February 8, 1890.... "The Fabians, a well-meaning band of educated bourgeois, who sought to refute Marx.... Their main aim is ... to draw the *bourgeois* to socialism and so introduce it peacefully and constitutionally" (331)....

((on the Fabians 393 (March 18, 1893)—p. 401 (November 11, 1893)...—they want to permeate liberalism with socialism; they themselves need to be permeated with the spirit of the workers)).

April 19, 1890.... In Britain there is a vast amount of friction, etc., of the traditional squabbles, prejudices of the skilled workers, etc., etc.

..."But *under* the surface the movement is going on, is embracing ever wider sections and mostly just among the hitherto stagnant *lowest* [Engels's italics] strata. The day is no longer far off when this mass will suddenly *find itself* [Engels's italics], ||| N.B.

N.B. ||| when it will dawn upon it that it itself is this colossal mass in motion"....[67] (336).

March 4, 1891 ... the dockers and gasworkers and their trade union have had a setback, their "new trade union has been shattered and the old conservative trade unions, *rich* [Engels's italics], and therefore cowardly, remain lone on the field" (359).

N.B. ||

September 14, 1891. The Newcastle Trades Union Congress is also a victory (as is, too, the international congress).... "The *old* [Engels's italics] trade unions, with the textile workers at the head and the entire party of reaction among the workers, exerted every effort to rescind the 1890 resolution on the eight-hour day. They failed ... and the bourgeois papers recognise the defeat of the *bourgeois labour party* [Engels's italics] completely and with horror, howling and gnashing of teeth" (368).

N.B. |||

N.B. ||||

October 24, 1891 ... on a possible war ... we Germans should (perhaps) "enact 1793" ... it will be a bad luck if there is a war and it "prematurely brings us into power, so we must be prepared for this eventuality" (371)....

Idem, 376: in such a war "we must play va-banque" (376).

|| ..."the masses [in Germany] are excellent and mostly better than the leaders"... (399) (October 7, 1893).

December 2, 1893.... Difficulties of the development of the workers' movement in America: 1) the system of "party government" (two parties; loss of votes for a third); 2) immigration divides the workers into two groups, the immigrants into subgroups; and, in addition, the *Negroes*; 3) the protective tariffs expose the workers "to the influence of a prosperity", which does not exist in Europe (403)....

412 (May 12, 1894), the *sectarianism* of the Social-Democratic Federation and of the German-American Socialists in America reduces theory to "rigid orthodoxy" ... ((they want undeveloped workers to swallow the theory all at once)).

DIE GLOCKE MAGAZINE

ERNST HEILMANN, "THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE"

Die Glocke, 1916, No. 20 (August 12, 1916).

Ernst Heilmann, "The Heart of the Dispute" (770-86).

Aim—to set out "the main ideas of the three contending groups" (770):...

"The majority, the Labour Commonwealth, and the *Internationale* (Liebknecht's group)" (771)....

1—wants "a German victory"

2—"an undecisive end to the war"

3—"a German defeat" (771)....

"The first two trends stand for defence of the fatherland, although the Labour Commonwealth stresses its great anxiety that the limits of pure defence should not be exceeded, whereas the adherents of the 'Third International' reject the principle of 'fatherland defence' as a misleading phrase" (771).... ||| N.B.

"The Liebknecht group has remained quite true to itself.... This trend has now consolidated itself in a new party and adopted the Spartacus programme. Following its theoretical leader, the Russian Lenin, it wants to make it obligatory for all Social-Democratic parties, by virtue of their international duty, to employ every available means for the defeat of their own country: illegal leaflets, secret organisations, mass strikes and insurrections" (771).... "In Russia, the adherents of this trend honestly and without embarrassment call themselves defeatists" (722).

"The Spartacus propaganda, which maintains that an enemy invasion is by no means the worst of all horrors, but, on the contrary, might lead to the achievement of freedom, probably has its strongest support among the Russian emigre theoreticians in Switzerland; it can have practical importance only for Germany, and is therefore propaganda for a German defeat" (772)....

"The Labour Commonwealth or Zimmerwald Right, whose theoretician is Kautsky and whose political leaders are Haase and Ledebour, not only deduces from the actual situation that this war is bound to end without victors or vanquished, but also desires such an outcome of the great struggle." ||| N.B.

"Criticism of this half-way position is extremely easy and simple. The assertion that the task of Germany's defence has been solved is so obviously contrary to the facts that it can only arouse laughter among intelligent people" (773)....

N.B. "It (the majority) is working for the speediest possible peace, which, however, can only be brought about by the present governments" (778).

N.B. "The idea of a catastrophe or revolution as a means of building a socialist society should be discarded once and for all, and not from a particular day, but as a matter of principle. **To be a socialist means being in principle an anti-revolutionary**" (author's heavy type); "the opposite conception is merely a carry-over from the emancipatory struggle of the bourgeoisie, from which we have not yet completely freed our minds" (780).... ha-ha!!

p. 782: examples (half a page of names) of the war sacrifices of dukes and generals (their officer sons, etc.): evidence "that in the face of the enemy we have all become equal" (783) (!!!!).

"In the final analysis, therefore, the crisis of the August 4 policy is but a renewal of the old struggle between the cataclysmal and evolution theories, which now, with the victory of evolutionary views, is drawing to a close. Hence, in spite of a dozen or so deserters from one side or the other, we again see the old battle lines of reformists and revolutionaries, or, if you like, revisionists and radicals, ranged against each other; and we hear the old slogans" (784)....

N.B. "Though denounced a hundred times, the evolutionary-historical point of view has been steadily gaining ground in the Party, and it will triumph, even if after the war the indignation of the peoples that have suffered from it leads here and there to revolutionary outbreaks. Stormy, even bloody epi-w may hamper or promote the development, but cannot alter its fundamental features" (785-86).

the hub here is in the first half of the sentence

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"Socialism is being increasingly realised from day to day because of the growing number of people who do not make their living from private economic activity, or receive wages or salaries from private hands. The worker in a state, municipal or co-operative enterprise is socialised just as is the health-insurance doctor or trade union official" (784).

!!

gem

LIEBKNECHT AND MARX

(LETTER TO LIEBKNECHT, 1878)

W. Liebknecht, Concerning the Oriental Question, or Should Europe Become Cossack? A Word of Warning to the German People, **Second edition**, Leipzig, 1878, pp. *57* and *59*.

N.B. to be found!!

Quoted in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1916, p. 1095 (No. 21, October 19, 1916), in an article by Schippel. He says that appended to this pamphlet of Liebknecht's are two letters of a "friend", obviously **Marx**. (The first edition of Liebknecht's pamphlet does *not* contain these supplements.[68]) He quotes Marx as follows:

"*The English working class* had been gradually becoming more and more deeply *demoralised* by the *period of corruption* since 1848 and had at last got to the point when it was nothing more than the *tail* of the great Liberal Party, i.e., of its oppressors, the capitalists. Its direction had passed completely into the hands of the *venal* trade union leaders and professional agitators. These fellows shouted and howled behind the Gladstones, Brights, Mundellas, Morleys, and the gang of factory owners, etc., in *majorem gloriam** of the tsar as the

(1848-78) Marx on the English workers in 1878

* To the greater glory.—*Ed.*

emancipator of nations, while they never raised a finger for their own *brothers* in South Wales, *condemned* by the mine-owners *to die of starvation. Wretches*! To crown the whole affair worthily, in the last divisions in the House of Commons (on February 7 and 8, when the majority of the high dignitaries of the 'great Liberal Party'—the Forsters, Lowes, Harcourts, Goschens, Hartingtons, and even the great John Bright himself—left their army in the lurch and bolted from the division in order not to compromise themselves too much by voting) the only workers' representatives there and moreover, *horribile dictu*,* direct representatives of the miners, and themselves originally miners—Burt and the miserable MacDonnell—voted with the enthusiastically pro-tsarist rump of the 'great Liberal Party'! But the swift unfolding of the Russian plans broke the spell and shattered the mechanical agitation (five-pound notes were the mainspring of the mechanism); at this moment Mottershead, Howell, John Hales, Shipton, Osborne and the whole gang would be in danger of their lives if they were to let their voices be heard in a public meeting of workers; even their corner and ticket meetings (with entry only by ticket) have been forcibly broken up and dispersed by the mass of the people."

N.B. Marx's letter (to Liebknecht?) of 1878

* Horrible to relate.—*Ed.*

THE JAPANESE AND THE CHAUVINISM OF THE AMERICAN WORKERS

Die Neue Zeit, 1913 (31, 2), pp. 410-12 (June 20, 1913).

N.B.
chauvinism among workers

Erwin Gudde, "New Exceptional Law against Japanese in the United States" (Date: San Francisco, May 21, 1913).

This law, which forbids the Japanese to buy land (it can be leased only for three years) was signed by the Governor on May 19, 1913, despite objections by Woodrow Wilson.

This is "an exceptional law of the worst kind" (410)—"a policy even worse than the Prussian policy towards the Poles" (412).

The American workers, too, are guilty of *chauvinism* (N.B.) (412). "The gentlemen of the American Federation of Labour not only want to deprive the 'yellows' of all rights, but want to drive them out of the country altogether" (411).

This exceptional law "is proof that the population of California, and above all its working class, are doing yeoman's service for the American *imperialists*, who for years have been preparing for a war against Japan. *The Socialist Party, too, has been found wanting in this matter*" (411).

American workers and their *chauvinism* towards the *Japanese*

N.B.

Workers back imperialists....

Socialist Party too!!!

This law is "only a link in a long chain of laws" (412)....

GREULICH AND THE *GRÜTLIANER*

GREULICH. "OPEN LETTER TO THE HOTTINGEN GRÜTLI-VEREIN"[69]

Grütlianer No. 230, 1916 (October 2, 1916).

Hermann Greulich, "Open Letter to the Hottingen Grütli-Verein".

Only a minority of the workers take part in the labour movement. "Consequently, living standards
|| have risen only slightly, and *only among the upper sections* of the working class. The mass of the workers remain a prey to want, care and privation. That is why doubts arise from time to time about the path we have chosen. The critics seek new paths, relying
|| chiefly on *more vigorous action* as the earnest of success. Attempts are made along these lines, but they usually end in failure, and then there is a return to the old tactics, pursued with greater force. These fluctuations are apparent to anyone who studies the workers' movement for a more or less lengthy period.... Then came the world war ... for the broad masses ... a cruel disillusionment ... appalling deterioration of living standards, reducing to want even those sections that
||| previously led a tolerable existence; this *strengthens*
!!! ||| *the revolutionary tendency*. Everything is now questioned: principles, tactics and organisation.... He who is capable of rising above the turmoil of the day ... will find this great dispute [over revolutionary principles and tactics] comprehensible and not fall into
!! || despair over it. Of course, stupidities have been committed—but by both sides ....

"So far it has been almost entirely left to me to act as
ha- || a mediator.... The Party leadership was obviously not
ha!! || up to its job and allowed itself to be influenced too
||| much by the hotheads.... The Central Committee of the Grütli-Verein decided on a '*practical national policy*' which it wants to pursue outside the Party....
||| Why has it not done so within the Party? Why has it almost always left it to me to fight the ultra-radicals?...

..."I am firmly convinced that the present ferment
!! | in the Party will in the end produce a good wine, provided the barrel is not closed before fermentation

is complete.... The Party can only be a proletarian one and not a sect, whose activity would not be understood by the proletariat.... If it (the Grütli-Verein)... rejects an understanding with the Party, then there is no longer any place for me in the Grütli-Verein. I believe in the future of the Party and I therefore always stand by it". (End.) Berne. *September 26, 1916.*

The same issue contains the reply of the Grütli-Verein Central Committee to Greulich: ultra-radicalism and "mediation"—against the existence of the Grütli-Verein; also an item in lighter vein, "Who is Spartacus?" (a glorification)!!!

"STONES INSTEAD OF BREAD"

Grütlianer No. 255, October 31. Editorial: "*Stones Instead of Bread*" by a "*trade union functionary*": argues that the "radical trend" gives "stones instead of bread". What is necessary, however, is the "reformist conception", "practical social reform", "democratic-socialist reform" ... (against the so-called "Marxists")....

!

"FUNDAMENTAL DIVERGENCE IN APPRAISAL"

No. 253, October 28, 1916. Editorial: "Fundamental Divergence in Appraisal". Quotes the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, which, it affirms, defends the "socialist point of view". The Zurich and Berne newspapers heap abuse on Pernerstorfer. We, however, *agree neither with the majority in Germany* nor with the Zurich and Berne newspapers; we are *for* "legal" ways. In the Adler business we see "*only* mental derangement"....

N.B. they favour the "Center"

"NO ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES DIVIDE US!"

N.B. No. 249, October 24, 1916. Editorial: "No Essential Differences Divide Us!" (in quotes)—a statement by *Huber* (Rorschach) at a meeting of Grütli delegates. Here is *Volksrecht* praising Adler!! *We however*, condemn him *on principle*!

"THE 'NATIONALIST CHAFF' IS SEPARATING FROM THE 'INTERNATIONALIST SOCIALIST WHEAT'"

No. 248, October 23, 1916. Editorial: "The 'Nationalist Chaff' Is Separating from the 'Internationalist Socialist Wheat'" (as the representative of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party stated at the *congress* of *Italian* socialists of Switzerland).

"NOTES FOR A LECTURE"

No. 235, October 7, 1916. Comment on the Grütli *programme*.

"NATURALISATION OF FOREIGNERS"

No. 243 (October 17, 1916) and *several* before it (Nos. 237 (October 10)-243) carry articles on "*Naturalisation of Foreigners*"....

The committee of "nine" (including Greulich and Wullschleger) put forward a petition in 1912.

!!!! Compulsory naturalisation after fifteen years. Payment for naturalisation not to exceed 300 francs!! *Nos. 242 and 243.*

"PARTY OF GRÜTLI-VEREIN?"

Grütlianer, *October 18*, *1916*. The "Social-Patriotic Party" of Switzerland.

"TRADE UNIONS AND THE MILITARY QUESTION"

N.B. *Grütlianer*, No. 216 (September 15, 1916): item headed: "**Trade Unions and the Military Question**".

(*) Kapellenstrasse, 6, Berne

"Discussing this question in the *Schweizerische Metallarbeiter-Zeitung* (*) (1916, No. 38 September 16, 1916), a correspondent

[*J. H.*, Basle] (**) draws the terse and clear conclusion that ''it is the duty of the trade unionists to see to it that the military question is fundamentally and clearly solved by the Party. The sharpest combating of militarism and rejection of fatherland defence—today, and disarmament, together with socialism—tomorrow."

(**) the article of this *J. H.* Basle is very good, it is purely working-class and revolutionary-internationalist

"The editor Comrade Schneeberger (in an 'Editorial Postscript') remarks that the trade unions as such should not concern themselves either with armaments reduction or disarmament. The fact that a man is a trade union member does not make him either a Social-Democrat or an anti-militarist; his political or religious views, as such, have nothing to do with his trade union membership. True, in most cases the trade unionist soon becomes an adherent of socialist or Social-Democratic views. However, he expresses these views not so much in the trade union as in the Social-Democratic organisations set up for this type of activity. This method has proved a very rational one and should therefore continue, all the more so that the trade unions have big enough tasks in the economic sphere.

!!

"Moreover, the trade unions and trade union bodies are not in a position to carry out any real educational work in this field.

"Generalities, of which there is no shortage in the abovementioned article, will not help. They are of as little use in convincing a person who—as is usually the case—has grown up with quite different views, as, say, in explaining the issues of the war in three sentences, or in making an impression on an impartial and unprejudiced reader by exaggerating the role of the Swiss armed forces in labour conflicts. One has only to consider the workers' struggles in Italy, Spain, France and Germany, even in free America, to realise that Swiss conditions are still preferable to the Russian.

"And the catchword 'The worker has no fatherland' is absolutely uncalled for at a time when

N.B. the overwhelming majority of Europe's workers have for two years now been fighting the 'enemies' of their countries side by side with their bourgeoisies, and those left at home are determined to 'hold out' in spite of want and hardship. In the event of a foreign attack, we would certainly see the same spectacle in Switzerland. Here, too, those who are now indulging in the loudest tirades will, perhaps, be the first to abandon their positions."

Grütlianer reprints the passages [marked] || in heavy type. In fact, it has reprinted the *entire* postscript under the editor's signature. The *Metallarbeiter-Zeitung* has the imprint: Editorial board: O. Schneeberger and K. Dürr ((N.B.)).

SCHWEIZERISCHE METALLARBEITER-ZEITUNG

E. TH. "SURVEY"

Schweizerische Metallarbeiter-Zeitung, 1916, No. 40 (September 30, 1916).... A "Survey" by *E. Th.*: "Economic nature" of the war.... "Collapse of the International".... "The capitalists of 'Germany' organised" against those of "England".... Besides being skilled workers (fitters, etc.) we must be politicians *and* strive for "socialisation of the means of production".... "There can be no separating trade unions and politics"; we risk "condemning ourselves to the role of sick-nurses of capitalism"....

very good!

"SURVEY (ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW)"

In No. 41 (October 7, 1916) an *unsigned* article: "Survey (Another Point of View)" says that **E. Th.** agrees neither with the author of the article "Trade Unions and the Military Question" *nor with the editorial postscript*. He is against "isolating" the trade unions, "restricting" them to "purely trade union questions".

N.B.

The author defends the opposite view in 3½ half-columns: we cannot do everything; there is more than enough to do already (lists of *reformist* issues!!); we have had six articles on imperialism, and from the Social-Democratic standpoint; in 1904, *Schneeberger*, representative of the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union in Lucerne, was opposed to "throwing ourselves (as a trade union) into political activity", and he received 56 votes to *18* at the Lucerne trade union congress; and "instead of planned [p. 2, column 3] fruitful work aimed primarily at achieving, as far as possible, the goals set out in the trade union statutes, we shall generate a boundless mania for improving the world, with all manner of projects vociferously proclaimed and not one realised. The majority of the workers stick to facts. However much they would like to see 'socialisation of the means of production' they will not plunge into adventures."

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NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG

Neue Rheinische Zeitung. A political-economic review, edited by Karl Marx (Nos. I—V/VI, each in one small volume), London, 1850.

No. ***I***, January 1850.—No. ***II***, February 1850.—No. ***III***, March 1850.—No. ***IV***, April 1850.—No. ***V/VI*** (without cover), 1850.

Apparently, *everything* (not everything*) from here has been reprinted by Mehring in the *Literary Heritage* (look up!). Note characteristic passage in a small "*Miscellaneous*" item in No. **IV**: "*Gottfried Kinkel*"[70] (trounced for his

p. 47 at the end

* Above the word "everything" Lenin later wrote "not everything", having found material from Nos. IV and II not reprinted by Mehring (see Lenin's remarks on pp. 635, 636 and 637 of this volume).—*Ed.*

vile monarchical speech before the military tribunal) (unsigned):

N.B.!

surrender of the left bank of the Rhine to the French

...“In the same way, Herr Kinkel denounces his own party to the military tribunal, by talking about plans for surrendering the left bank of the Rhine to France and declaring himself innocent of these criminal projects. Herr Kinkel is very well aware that the union of the Rhine province with France was only spoken of in the sense that in the decisive fight between revolution and counter-revolution this province would infallibly side with the revolution, whoever were to represent the latter—the French or Chinese”... (p. 71).

N.B.

p. 397, in Vol. III of Mehring’s edition

Mehring writes, pp. 479-80 (Vol. III), that he has omitted the whole “April survey” (i.e., in No. IV) and from the February (No. II) survey he has taken only material about California, etc., and about Chinese socialism.

On the side of the revolutionary nation—no matter whether the French or Chinese! Compare what Engels wrote in 1859 (?) in *The Po and the Rhine*,[71] where he fanned the national passions of the Germans against Napoleon III, who was making “our best provinces” an object of diplomatic intrigue, etc.

Highly characteristic in reference to the national question!

Everything depends on whether, at the given time, it is the nation that is revolutionary or Napoleon III!!

Ibidem, No. IV, p. *58* (p. 438, Vol. III of Mehring’s edition) (de *Girardin*, “Socialism and Taxation”).[72]

abolition of the state

...“Behind the abolition of taxes lies concealed the abolition of the state. For the Communists, the abolition of the state

has only one meaning, as the necessary result of the abolition of classes, together with which there disappears the need for an organised force of one class to hold down the others"....

Ibidem, p. 55: "Taxes, increased to enormous proportions during a revolution, may serve as a form of attack against private property; but even then they must either lead to new revolutionary measures or, in the end, lead to the re-establishment of the old bourgeois relations"....

p. 436, Vol. III of Mehring's edition

No. 5/6, **p. 158** (from the "Review, May-October", dated London, November 1, 1850. Unsigned).[73]

..."The hitherto existing organisation of the Chartist party is also falling to pieces . The *petty bourgeois* who remain in the party, together *with the labour aristocracy* form a purely democratic *group*, the programme of which is confined to the People's Charter and a few other petty-bourgeois reforms. The *mass of the workers* who live under *really proletarian* conditions, belong to the revolutionary group of the Chartists." (The leader of the first group is Feargus O'Connor, of the second—Julian Harney and Ernest Jones) p. 468, Vol. III of Mehring's edition).

N.B.: two groups of Chartism: (1) petty bourgeoisie + labour *aristocracy* (petty bourgeois reformists) (2) "mass" of really proletarian **revolutionaries**

No. II, pp. 71-73 (in the "Review")[74] on the counter-revolutionary role of *Russia* after 1848 and 1849, a possible "European war" against Russia (England will **decide**), and the "barbarian hordes of Russia" capable of "overwhelming Germany"

N.B.

not in Mehring

amusing!

Ibidem, p. 78—(London, January 1, 1850)—on revolution in China (a Chinese Republic—that is what the "European reactionaries" may find in China).

p. **445**, Vol. III of Mehring's edition

× "our European reactionaries in their shortly impending flight to Asia": **ha-ha!!**

× The European reactionaries will flee to Asia from the European revolution, they will reach the Chinese "wall" and find inscribed on it: "The Chinese Republic. Liberty! Equality! Fraternity!" Such is Marx's view.

not in Mehring

!!! *Ibidem*, p. 80: the example of Switzerland shows the meaning of the "ostensible 'independence' of small states in the midst of the modern great nations" (either the Holy Alliance will crush Switzerland or the revolution "*will not tolerate*" "such a treacherous and cowardly government in the heart of Europe"....)

not in Mehring

These remarks on Switzerland were in connection with the publication of a plan for an attack on Switzerland (by Germany+ Austria + Russia + France)—a *plan* against France, with auxiliary operations against Switzerland and Turkey. The "Holy Alliance" against revolution.

N.B. episode of the struggle of counter-revolution against revolution!

"This much is certain: the Holy Alliance will march already this year, either first against Switzerland or Turkey, or directly against France, but in both cases the Federal Council is doomed. By its cowardly neutrality it has predetermined its own downfall, whether it is the Holy Alliance or the Revolution that reaches Berne first. The counter-revolution cannot be satisfied with its con-

cessions because of its more or less revolutionary origin; the revolution cannot for a single moment tolerate the existence of such a treacherous and cowardly government in the heart of Europe, surrounded by the three nations most directly involved in the movement. *The behaviour of the Swiss Federal Council is the most striking and, it is to be hoped, the last example of the meaning of the ostensible 'independence' of small states* **in the midst of the modern great nations**" (p. 80). (End.)

not in Mehring

and p. 72—Switzerland was cowardly "in regard to both the Holy Alliance and the émigrés" (N.B.).... "If Switzerland insulted the Holy Alliance, on the other hand it betrayed the revolution" (73).

N.B.

p. 72—the certainty that a European war is impending (unleashed by Russia against Turkey). Revolution is growing in Paris—"the centre of revolution" (72)—and in "Western Europe" (sic!! *71-72*: "Western Europe")....

In France, revolution is growing (74), the peasants will be drawn into movement, hence "confidence in the speedy victory of the revolution" (74) (sic!!)....

A SAYING OF SAINT-SIMON'S

..."There is *Saint-Simon*'s well-known assertion, on account of which a court charge was brought against him, that the loss France would suffer by the sudden death of a thousand of her highest officials or the members of the royal family would be infinitely smaller than that which would be caused by the death of a thousand of her best workers" (p. 11 in Emil Kaler's "Wilhelm Weitling", Zurich, 1887, No. XI of the *Sozialdemokratische Bibliothek*).

((((According to the Brockhaus *Encyclopaedia*, German edition, Saint-Simon said this not about 1,000, but about 10,000 (N.B.)—in "A Political Parable", in the first issue of *L'Organisateur* 1820).))))

NOTEBOOK "BRAILSFORD"

Contents

Brailsford I[75]

cf. extracts from p. *164*

Brailsford II

BRAILSFORD, *THE WAR OF STEEL AND GOLD*

Henry Noel Brailsford. *The War of Steel and Gold*.

A Study of the Armed Peace, London, 1914.
(The book is dated March 1914) (p. 317)

"In the Balkans it is likely enough that Austria, backed by-the preponderant influence of the Triple Alliance, would have availed herself of one of the several crises which have followed the young Turkish revolution, to force her way to Salonica and to annex a part at least of Macedonia....

"Europe had a long experience of German 'hegemony' during the quarter of a century which elapsed between the fall of the French Empire and the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Nothing disastrous happened. No little states were over-run, no neighbour's landmarks removed, no thrones overturned, no national or religious liberties menaced" (p. 34).

"In Europe the epoch of conquest is over, and save in the Balkans and perhaps on the fringes of the Austrian and Russian Empires, it is as certain as anything in politics can be, that the frontiers of our modern national states are finally drawn. My own belief is that there will be no more wars among the six Great Powers" (p. 35).

"The present territorial arrangement of Europe follows with few exceptions the lines of nationality" (p. 35).

"Shall the Germans dig for iron ore on the slopes of the Atlas, and carry it in the form of steel rails to Baghdad? That is the typical question of modern diplomacy, and sanely regarded, it is a good deal more important than the typical question of the old world, whether the King of Spain should be a Bourbon or a Habsburg. To settle this question, and similar questions which belong to the same order, the young men of Europe are drilled, the battleships are built and the taxes squandered. Nothing is at stake which can affect the fortunes or ownership of a single acre of European soil. Nothing would be changed in the politics or religion or public life of any European state if these questions were settled otherwise or were not settled at all" (p. 36).

"But who in England would have cared if the iron ore of Morocco had gone to cast German cannon at Essen, instead of French cannon at Creusot?" (p. 36).

"The Entente Cordiale between Britain and France, which marked the beginning of the tension with Germany, was based, so far as the world knows, upon a single document, which was nothing but a business-like adjustment of French and British interests in Egypt and Morocco" (p. 37).

"A German firm, the Mannesmann Brothers, could indeed boast that it had obtained an exclusive concession to work all the mines of Morocco in return for money which it had lent to an embarrassed Sultan during its civil wars. That this was the real issue is proved by the terms which were more than once discussed between Paris and Berlin for the settlement of the dispute. A 'détente' or provisional settlement of the dispute was concluded in 1910, which had only one clause—that German finance should share with French finance in the various undertakings and companies which aimed at 'opening up' Morocco by ports, railways, mines, and other public works. No effect was ever given to this undertaking, and German irritation at the delays of French diplomacy and French finance culminated in the dispatch of the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir as a prelude to further 'conversations'. Had M. Caillaux remained in power, we know from the subsequent investigations before the Senate's Committee, how those conversations would have ended. He would have effected not merely an adjustment

of French and German colonial interests, but a general understanding which would have covered the whole field of Franco-German relations. The points on which he had begun to negotiate were all economic, and chief among them was a proposal to put an end to the boycott by French finance of the Baghdad railway, and to admit German securities to quotation on the Paris Exchange. The alarm which this bold step by M. Caillaux caused both to French patriots and to British imperialists is not yet forgotten, and its echo was heard both in London and Paris, when, towards the close of 1913, M. Caillaux returned to office. In those informal negotiations he had made the beginnings of a readjustment in Franco-German relations which would have transformed not merely French but European politics, if he had been Premier for a few months longer. French patriots took alarm and feared that he was about to rob them of their dream of a revenge for 1870. British imperialists in our Conservative press assailed him from a fear that if France composed her quarrel with Germany, this country would be left isolated. In a single sentence in the debate (November 27, 1911) which followed this Agadir crisis, Sir Edward Grey used a phrase which showed that our diplomacy had shared the fears of our Conservative press. There was a risk, as he put it, that France might be drawn into the orbit of German diplomacy. It was for that reason, and not because it really concerned us how much or how little compensation France paid to Germany in the Congo for her seizure of Morocco, that we were ready to back the less conciliatory diplomacy of M. Caillaux's successors, if need be, by force of arms. This was, perhaps, the most instructive incident in the recent history of European diplomacy" (pp. 38-40).

"The French Périer Bank the other day lent a million pounds to the Turkish Government, which it used to pay the first instalment of the purchase price of a dreadnought cruiser built in Newcastle. A few days later it was announced that the same bank, obviously as a part of its commission, had obtained a concession for a railway from Smyrna to the Dardanelles. While we must admit that the export of capital could not be carried out without some movement of goods, there is still a sharp distinction to be made between the financier's transaction and simple exchange of

goods from the standpoint of the sociology of class. Commerce carried on upon an elaborate structure of credit is more profitable to the investing classes than the simpler exchanges which lake place between nations on an equal level of economic development. If we send Welsh coal to France, and receive artificial flowers in exchange, capital makes two profits—the English colliery owner's profit, and the French sweater's profit. But if we lend money to the Argentine, and with it she buys rails here, and afterwards sends out meat to be sold here so that the interest on the loan may be paid, then capital has made three profits—the English steel trade's profit, the Argentine meat trade's profit and the English banker's and investor's profit. It is this third profit which our leisured class chiefly values, and to develop the sort of commerce which requires this credit basis, that is to say, commerce with weaker debtor nations, is the object of imperialism" (pp. 73-74).

"Mr. Mulhall calculated for the *Dictionary of Political Economy* that our foreign and colonial investments grew between 1882 and 1893 at the prodigious rate of 74 per cent per annum. But the decisive evidence is supplied by Sir Robert Giffen. Taking the year 1899, he reckoned that the profits on all our external trade in goods, both foreign and colonial, amounted only to 18 millions sterling. The profit on foreign and colonial investments in the same year he puts at between 90 and 100 millions sterling" (p. 77).

"Ten years later, as Sir George Paish stated in a paper which he read to the Royal Statistical Society, our profits from foreign and colonial investments amounted to 140 millions" (pp. 77-78).

"Behind them* are the embassies, and behind the embassies are the fleets of all Europe, which would steam at a few hours' notice to Turkish waters, if there were any delay or hesitation in paying over the revenues mortgaged to European railway companies or to the holders of Turkish bonds. Diplomacy and armaments are, in a word, employed to enforce the unconscionable and usurious bargains which Baron Hirsch and his imitators have struck, by means of bribery with Turkish Ministers whose hands no honourable man would condescend to shake" (p. 85).

* Holders of Turkish bonds.—*Ed.*

"The posts in the Army and the Civil Services have long been so numerous that they are opened to the sons of the prosperous middle classes. To these people India and Egypt have acquired at last a real meaning—they are the places where a son, a brother, or at least a cousin, is 'doing well'" (pp. 86-87).

"*The War Trust Exposed*, by J. T. Walton Newbold, M. A. (The National Labour Press, Manchester, 1d.), deals chiefly with the inter-relation of the British armaments firms. *Armaments and Patriotism*, by P. W. W. (*The Daily News*, 1d.) deals fully with Mr. Mulliner's share in creating the naval scare of 1909. *The War Traders*, by G. H. Perris (National Peace Council, 167, St. Stephen's House, Westminster, 2d.), contains most of the facts given in the other two pamphlets with some further matter. All of them are based on material which is official and undeniable" (p. 89, footnote).

> "It is a prosperous concern. In the present century Armstrongs has never paid less than 10 per cent, and its dividend often rises to 15 per cent. The great French works at Creusot (Messrs. Schneider) have paid as much as 20 per cent. The building and equipment of a dreadnought must mean at least *a quarter of a million in profits* to the firm which secures the contract. Such a stake is worth an effort, and these firms are well equipped for the exercise of political and social pressure. The share-list of Armstrongs alone includes the names of sixty noblemen or their wives, sons or daughters, fifteen baronets, twenty knights, eight Members of Parliament, five bishops, twenty military and naval officers, and eight journalists. Among those interested in these firms there were last summer two Liberal Cabinet Ministers, a law officer of the Crown and two members of the Opposition Front Bench. There is an amusing correspondence between these share-lists and the membership rolls of the Navy League and the National Service League" (p. 90).

N.B.

"The true facts were stated at the time by Admiral von Tirpitz in the Reichstag and also by the head of the Krupp firm. Parliament preferred to believe Mr. Mulliner. The

result was that Mr. McKenna calculated that Germany would have seventeen dreadnoughts at 'the danger-point', March 1912, and revised his own programme accordingly. Mr. Balfour even predicted for Germany twenty-one or twenty-five capital ships. The event showed that Admiral von Tirpitz had told the truth: when the time came Germany had nine. The scare cost us the price of the four 'contingent' dreadnoughts, a measurable quantity, while it added to Europe's stores of bitterness and mistrust what no figures can reckon" (p. 91).

"*The international relations* of the firms which *trade in armaments* offer a tempting field for satire. The inevitable comment lies on the surface of the facts, and they shall be *baldly* set down here. Capital has no patriotism. A leading German firm turns out to be conducted by French directors. German firms are rebuilding the rival Russian navy. British firms have branches in Italy which are building those Italian dreadnoughts that are represented as rivals to our own. The Nobel Trust and till lately the Harvey Company were formed of all the leading armaments firms, British, French, German or American. At one time the French firm of Schneider and the German firm of Krupp united in a syndicate to develop the iron ore fields of Ouenza in Algeria" (p. 92).

"All over the world these forces, concentrated, resolute and intelligent, are ceaselessly at work to defeat the more diffused and less easily directed forces which make for disarmament and peace. The number of persons who have anything to gain by armaments and war is relatively small, when measured against the whole population of the civilised world. But their individual stake is larger, and they work in alliance with Society, which regards Empire as a field for the careers of its sons, and with finance which treats it as a field for investment" (p. 93).

"Mr. Gladstone had come into power after the Midlothian campaign with a programme of resolute opposition to imperialism. The chief act of his administration abroad was the occupation of Egypt. Henceforward Liberalism had a lie in its soul" (pp. 103-04).

"Under such influences Liberalism became an imperialist party, with Lord Rosebery, and, later, Sir Edward Grey as the only possible directors of its foreign policy. Lord

Rosebery belonged by marriage to the Rothschild family, and it was the Rothschild influence which brought about the occupation of Egypt" (p. 105).

"There would have been no breach with France, and the *Entente Cordiale* might have been established some twenty years earlier. European armaments would have been less crushing, and Bismarckian diplomacy less triumphant. Above all, the alliance would never have been concluded which filled the treasury of the Russian autocrat with French gold, and so perpetuated the cruellest of European despotisms" (p. 108).

"'The following public works were commenced or completed during 1907 at Coomassie:—Post Office, female prison, hospital and dispensary, European hospital, laundry in which to wash Europeans' clothes, and several buildings for the Gold Coast Regiments.'

"Turning the page, one learns that 'a 13-hole golf course has been completed'. Gold mines, prisons, barracks, a laundry for Europeans built with public money, and a golf course, these are our works of civilisation. But there is no school" (p. 127).

"In other words, whichever party is in power, the Foreign Secretary will always be an imperialist, a personality whom *The Times*, the City and the Conservative Party can unreservedly trust. A Radical can no more become Foreign Secretary than a Roman Catholic can become Lord Chancellor. The doctrine of 'continuity' means that foreign affairs have in effect been removed from the sphere of party government, and are now influenced only by the opinions of the governing class, of those, that is to say, who move at court and in society, who regard the army and the civil service as careers reserved for their families, and survey the world beyond these islands mainly as a field for the investment of their surplus wealth" (p. 132).

"Still more important is the impotence of the House of Commons in regard to treaties. Unless they include financial provisions, there is no obligation to submit them to Parliament, and no discussion can take place upon them until they are already signed, ratified, and published to the world. One consequence of this is that a secret treaty is for us no less binding than a public instrument. A secret

treaty duly signed and ratified by one British Government would bind its successors. In theory the King and his Foreign Minister, acting with the consent of his colleagues in the Cabinet, can and do contract the most solemn and vital obligations in the name of the forty millions over whom they rule in these islands, without consulting their elected representatives" (pp. 137-38).

"It is frankly admitted in these letters that Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister, was quite unable to control Palmerston, who constantly acted in large issues without the authority either of the whole Cabinet or even of his chief. He even went so far as to recognise Louis Napoleon after the coup d'état entirely on his own responsibility, and against the wishes, not only of public opinion, but of the Queen and his own colleagues. To the suggestion that he should be dismissed, Lord John Russell always answered that if he were dismissed he would avenge himself by going into Opposition and overthrowing the Government. How just this fear was, events showed. He was eventually forced to resign at the end of December 1851. By February 1852 he had unseated his late colleagues. A Cabinet which cannot dispense with a Minister must be prepared to give him a free hand" (pp. 143-44).

"On the other hand, the world in which she* moved was a world of monarchs and governments. Nations she neither knew nor recognised. In the tremendous upheaval between 1848 and 1860, which was creating an Italian people, she saw nothing but a series of aggressions by Sardinia against Austria" (pp. 148-49).

"When Palmerston and Louis Napoleon were talking in 1848 of a plebiscite to decide the fate of Lombardy, she declared that 'it will be a calamity for ages to come' if peoples are allowed to transfer their allegiance by universal suffrage" (p. 149).

"There must be a more educative propaganda, a more conscious effort to fix principles, before any democracy can be trusted to stand firm in moments of national crisis" (p. 160).

"It is necessary to implant a general and rooted scepticism, which will instinctively ask, when the glowing words and

* The Queen.—*Ed.*

the specious abstractions are deployed, 'About what loan or concession or sphere of economic interest are you really talking?' Such a task is beyond the scope, it is sometimes beyond the insight, of the special propagandists of peace" (p. 160).

"Talking today of disarmament and arbitration, he will work tomorrow for a party which is hardly less dependent than its rival on the great contractors and bankers who maintain the modern connection of diplomacy and finance. The work of education and organisation on behalf of peace is carried on adequately only by the socialist parties, and they alone represent a force whose undivided vote will always be cast against militarism and imperialism" (p. 161).

"...War is an anachronism, indeed, well-nigh an impossibility in a society based on a respect for private property, and accustomed to conduct its business by a system of cosmopolitan credit" (p. 162).

"Let us admit at once that war is a folly from the standpoint of national self-interest; it may none the less be perfectly rational from the standpoint of a small but powerful governing class" (p. 163).

N.B.

"They are not the 'places in the sun' to which ***the modern imperialist*** turns his gaze. He seeks new countries to 'exploit', promising regions with virgin mines, untilled fields, cities without banks, routes without rails. These are the opportunities he covets. He is pleased to have them without conquest, and he does not desire war. His ideal is to fence them in as an economic sphere of interest, within which he may dump his capital as a national monopoly.

"This is the process which we must visualise if we would understand the survival of armaments, and it is a process of which Mr. Norman Angell's doctrine takes too little account" (p. 164).

"When the Triple Entente is dominant, it takes Morocco and divides Persia. When the Triple Alliance recovers its lead, it takes Tripoli, assures its hold in Bosnia, and makes progress in the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey" (p. 167).

"It is characteristic of our civilisation to disguise the connection of diplomacy with armaments on the one hand

and finance on the other under an elaborate code of courtesies and hypocrisies" (p. 168).

"If all the Great Powers were to resolve tomorrow by a sudden inspiration of good sense to reduce their armaments by half, that would not free us from the moral consequences of the elusive conflict to adjust the balance of prestige and force" (p. 169).

"It would give some guarantee, if the Committee was well selected, that the policy of the Foreign Office really reflected the will of the nation" (p. 213).

"It is only by concentrating on such proposals as these, but more especially on the creation of a permanent Committee for foreign policy, that a democracy may hope to exert a steady influence on the factors which make for peace and war, govern the growth of armaments, and limit our opportunities for humane service in the world" (p. 217).

"From 1854 to *1906* the City boycotted *Russia*. The loan of *the latter year* followed the hints in Sir *Eduard Grey*'s speeches, and the evidently inspired articles in *The Times* which foreshadowed the conclusion of the political understanding then in process of negotiation. The services of finance and diplomacy are mutual, and in the modern world they have become indispensable to each other. It is an immense reinforcement to diplomacy in dealing with a debtor state to know that it has, in effect, behind it the exportable capital of a wealthy nation to give or to withhold. If any power or group of powers held the monopoly of the world's money-market even for a few years, and used it with a conscious political purpose, they would in the end dictate to Russia, China, Turkey, and the Latin American Republics" (p. 221). N.B.

"Russia is sensitive because she depends as absolutely as any Latin American Republic upon her repute in Western markets. She must float by far the greater part of her loans abroad. She cannot even provide from her own resources for the municipal enterprise of her cities. Her undeveloped coal and iron and petroleum fields all await the fertilisation of foreign capital. If we can conceive for a moment what German opinion would mean to us, if we had to float Consols through the Deutsche Bank, if Manchester had to go

to Berlin for money to build her tramways, if a South Wales coal mine were awaiting the good opinion of some financier in Hamburg, we shall be able to realise dimly why and how much the good opinion of the English people matters to the Russian Government. Credit is a delicate possession. So long as British investors thought of Russia either as a hostile empire dangerous to ourselves, or as an unstable autocracy menaced by revolution, it was in vain that the Russian financier brought his proposals to the City. Prudence, patriotism and humanity were all against him. The change in the opinions of the moneyed classes began when the Conservative press advocated a *rapprochement*, when *The Times* ceased to give prominence to news damaging to the autocracy, and when it was known that an agreement over Persia was in process of arrangement. There was no mystery about the reasons for this change of attitude. Sir Edward Grey had said that it was necessary to restore Russia to her rank as a Great Power in order to redress the balance in Europe. In plain words, our diplomacy wanted Russian support against Germany, and France was urging and engineering the reconciliation. The early months of 1906 were the critical moment for Russian finance, and it happened to coincide with the critical moment in the development of her Constitution. While she was endeavouring to secure a loan of one hundred millions in Western Europe, the elections for the First Duma were about to be held. The Constitution was still a sheet of paper. Everything turned on the ability of the Duma to assert itself, to control the bureaucracy, to make itself the supreme power in Russia. There was one obvious method open to it. It must possess control of the purse, and that meant at the moment control over this foreign loan. If the loan were concluded before it met, the bureaucracy would meet it with its war-chest full. For a few months or weeks European public opinion was potentially the master of Russia's destinies. It professed full sympathy with the constitutional movement, and it had the means of giving its sympathy effect. The Russian Liberals (Cadets) were at one with the Socialists in urging that the granting of the loan should be made conditional on the consent of the Duma. This would have involved a delay of two or three months, but it would have

enabled the Parliamentary majority to drive its bargain with a Tsar who had already repented his concessions. Fresh from their sweeping victories at the polls, the Liberals and Socialists might have said to the Tsar's Ministers: 'We have Russia behind us, and we have Europe behind us. Your coffers are empty; your credit is exhausted. Concede our full rights of responsible government, and we will vote your taxes and sanction your loan. Deny our rights, and we are convinced that neither in London nor in Paris will you find the money to finance your oppressions.' But the great loan had already been floated in Paris and London by March 1906, and in May when the Duma assembled, it found itself confronted by a Government which had nothing to fear from Russia, and nothing more to hope from Europe. Europe had enabled it to pay its Cossacks. For two generations we closed our money-market to the Tsars. We opened it three months too soon. Had we waited those three months, as the Russian Liberal press implored us to wait, the progressive parties must have triumphed. The Cossack can do little, unless the financier stands behind him. But no Parliament can effectively wield the traditional weapon of supply, if foreign banks have first provided for the despot's needs. The decision, in this instance, rested with London. The Paris banks, weary of the burden of supporting the tottering Russian chaos, had made it a condition of their supporting this loan, that English banks should share the profitable burden. It lay with the English banks on their side to insist on the brief delay required to obtain the Duma's assent. It may be said that 'business is business'; one cannot fairly expect a banker, when he is offered a large commission for floating a loan, to weigh all the consequences which his action will have for the liberties of a foreign nation" (pp. 225-28).

"With all our buying, we never bought Russian loyalty, nor prevented her from coquetting with the German rival. Yet the cards were all in our hands. Whatever else Germany can do for Russia, she cannot lend her money. Had we made terms before we lent, had we even checked the flow of gold, we could have won some measure of control over Russian policy. If France had backed us (and we were earning her backing during the Moroccan crisis), it ought to have been

possible to say to Russia: 'No more money until Persia is evacuated.' Persia, after all, is a luxury for Russia; money is a necessity" (p. 229).

"Europe made or pretended to make some futile efforts to prevent the outbreak of the Balkan wars. They failed because they were insincere. Russia, as we now know, so far from wishing to prevent the war, had actually arranged it by presiding over the formation of the Balkan League. At the very moment when she joined the concert in declaring that none of the Allies would be allowed to keep the territory they won, she had set her seal to a treaty of partition, and accepted the post of arbiter in the division of the territory. It is such duplicity which makes concerts ineffective. Either of these wars could have been prevented, if the French banks had been forbidden to finance the combatants. They were not forbidden because Russia willed it otherwise" (pp. 230-31).

"The system known as peonage is, on the other hand, general throughout Latin America, and the capital by which it is worked is often foreign and sometimes British. It is the rule in Mexico and Brazil, and probably in all the more backward Republics of South America. The victim, usually a native, but sometimes a white or a half-breed, incurs a debt to the planter or merchant, and by the Latin American law of debtor and creditor, which knows no Truck Acts,* becomes in effect his slave until the debt is paid off. It never is paid off; the planter keeps the books. Under this transparent fiction of debt, slaves are bought and sold, villages broken up, peasant landowners reduced to the level of serfs, and tribes carried off to distant scenes of oppression. Children are bought and sold, and young women driven into commercial prostitution. All of this is a typical expression of Latin American civilisation. But foreign capital venturing into these regions adapts itself to its environment, and does in Mexico as the Mexicans do. It turns the rather slovenly, inefficient oppressions of the lazy Spanish landowner into a competent and extensive system, conducted with a ruthlessness and on a scale which transcend the habits of the country. The spectacle is not

* Payment of wages in kind.—*Ed.*

one which a European democracy ought to watch with indifferent eyes and folded arms. If the people of Mexico or Brazil developed a capitalistic system of their own, then however gross its evils might be, the process ought clearly to be allowed to follow its own natural evolution. For purely Mexican wrongs, the Mexicans themselves must find the remedy. But the European financier goes forth equipped. with resources taken from our stores on a career of conquest and exploitation, protected by our flag and backed by our prestige" (pp. 236-37).

"The debatable area, where recognition[76] might either be granted or refused, would still be considerable, and would include Russia, Turkey, China, Persia, the Portuguese colonies, and most of Latin America" (pp. 242-43).

"If we were to take the sum by which British and German armaments have increased in the present century, it would be possible to allocate the increase, roughly, somewhat as follows: 50 per cent or less for the settlement of the question, Who shall exploit Morocco?; 25 per cent or more for the privilege of building a railway to Baghdad and beyond it; 25 per cent or more for the future eventualities which remain unsettled—the fate of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the destinies of China. In the second place, the delimitation of spheres of interest is almost inevitably fatal to the national existence of the country partitioned, and as inevitably adds a vast burden to the commitments of the imperial power. Persia furnishes the obvious illustration. Sir Edward Grey is clearly resolved that he will not allow himself by the march of events to be drawn into the assumption of any direct responsibility for the administration of the British sphere. It is a laudable resolve, but Russia may at any moment frustrate it" (pp. 246-47).

"Our own claim to the lion's share, the Yangtze Valley, is admitted by no other power, and it is doubtful whether the Foreign Office still maintains it" (p. 248).

"It is the interest of the whole class which exports capital abroad. But it would be folly to ignore or minimise the direct interest of the trade. It is an interest which happens to be firmly entrenched in political circles, and as the exploit of Mr. Mulliner shows, it is a singularly alert and energetic interest. If public life continues to develop on the present

lines, the great scandal of tomorrow will be a discovery that the Liberal Party funds have been invested not in Marconis, but in Krupps" (pp. 267-68).

"What a monstrous theory it is that Britain and Russia, simply because they have considerable material interests, political, strategic and mercantile, in Persia, should have the right to dispose of the destinies of its people" (p. 290).

"It would, of course, be folly to suppose that the acceptance of this principle of the supremacy of the Concert [of the Great Powers] would at once create harmony, and bring about a reduction of armaments. But it would at once achieve this—it would make a standard for the conscience of the civilised world, it would provide an objective test by which the loyalty of any policy might be tried, and above all it would supply a common ground on which all the parties of peace might take their stand. It would conduce to a gradual slackening of the European tension, a gradual loosening of the existing alliances, and in time create an atmosphere in which a proposal for the reduction of armaments, and eventually some scheme for the creation of a loose Federal Council to decide the common affairs of Europe might at least be considered" (p. 293).

"On the plane of class-egoism, armaments are for the capitalist class entirely rational; the competition to accumulate them has an adequate motive, and the struggle for a balance of power is seen to be a phase and expression of modern finance" (p. 310).

"Men are reluctant to allow that the concerns which divide states are at bottom petty and sordid. We dignify them with great abstract words; we invoke the memories of heroic times. We play with the legendary inheritance of the balance of power, until we persuade ourselves that our homes are in danger, and our faiths and liberties at stake. These are the terrors of an older world, as insubstantial today as the ghosts of Marlborough and Wellington. The powers struggle today over nothing vital, nothing homely, nothing relevant to our daily life. A romantic sentimentalism in the masses plays into the hands of a shrewd realism in the ruling class" (pp. 315-16).

NOTEBOOK
"ON MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM"

Contents

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2) **Notebooks on *Marxism and Imperialism*.**[77]
1) "New Contributions to the Biography of Marx and Engels" by Fr. *Mehring*. 1-11.
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MEHRING, "NEW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BIOGRAPHY OF MARX AND ENGELS"

F. Mehring, "*New Contributions to the Biography of Marx and Engels*", *Die Neue Zeit*, 25th year (1907).

"I consider Mazzini's policy fundamentally wrong. He is working entirely in the interests of Austria by inciting Italy to a breach now. On the other hand, he fails to appeal to the peasants, that part of Italy that has been oppressed for centuries, and thus prepares new resources for the counter-revolution. Signor Mazzini knows only the cities with their liberal nobility and 'enlightened citizens'. The material needs of the Italian rural population—sucked dry and systematically enfeebled and besotted like the Irish—are, of course, too low for the heaven-in-words of his cosmopolitan-neo-Catholic-ideological manifestoes. But it would have required courage, to be sure, to tell the bourgeoisie and the nobility that the first step towards the independence of Italy is the complete emancipation of the peasants and the transformation of their share-cropping system into free

bourgeois property. Mazzini seems to think that a loan of ten million francs is more revolutionary *than winning over ten million human beings*. I am very much afraid that if worse comes to worst the Austrian Government will itself change the system of landownership in Italy and reform it in the 'Galician' manner" (pp. 58-59).[78]

"And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the *existence of classes in modern society* or the *struggle* between them. *Long before* me *bourgeois* historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I *did that was new* was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is *only bound up with particular* historical phases in the development of production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily *leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat*, (3) that this dictatorship *itself only* constitutes THE TRANSITION TO THE ABOLITION OF ALL CLASSES and to a classless society.* Ignorant louts like Heinzen, who deny not merely the class struggle but even the existence of classes, only prove that, despite all their blood curdling yelps and the humanitarian airs they give themselves, they regard the social conditions under which the bourgeoisie rules as the final product, the *non plus ultra* of history, and that *they are only the servitors of the bourgeoisie*. And the less these louts realise the greatness and transient necessity of the bourgeois regime itself the more disgusting is their servitude" (pp. 164-65).[79]

"On *January 1, 1870*, the General Council issued a confidential circular *drawn up by me* in French (for the reaction upon England only the French, not the German, papers are important) on the relation of the *Irish national struggle* to the emancipation of the working class, and therefore on the attitude which the *International Association* should take in regard to the Irish question. I shall give you here only quite briefly the *decisive* points.

* See present edition, Vol. 25, p. 416.—*Ed.*

"Ireland is the bulwark of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of that country is not only one of the main sources of this aristocracy's material welfare; it is its *greatest moral strength*. It, in fact, represents the domination of England over Ireland. Ireland is therefore the *great means* by which the English aristocracy maintains its domination in England herself.

"If, on the other hand, the English army and police were to withdraw from Ireland tomorrow, *you would at once have an agrarian revolution there*. But the overthrow of the English aristocracy in Ireland involves as a necessary consequence *its overthrow in England*. And this would fulfil the preliminary condition for the *proletarian revolution* in England. The destruction of the English landed aristocracy in Ireland is an *infinitely easier* operation than in England herself, because in Ireland the land question has hitherto been the exclusive form of the social question, because it is a question of existence, of life and death, for the immense majority of the Irish people, and because *it is at the same time inseparable from the national question*. This quite apart from the Irish being more passionate and *revolutionary in character* than the English.

"As for the English bourgeoisie, it has in the first place a common interest with the English aristocracy in turning Ireland into mere pasture land which provides the English market with meat and wool at the cheapest possible prices. It is equally interested in reducing, by eviction and forcible emigration, the Irish population to such a small number that English capital (capital invested in land leased for farming) can function there with 'security'. It has the same interest in 'clearing' the estates of Ireland as it had in the clearing of the agricultural districts of England and Scotland. The £6,000-£10,000 absentee-landlord and other Irish revenues which at present flow annually to London have also to be taken into account.

"But the English bourgeoisie has, besides, much more important interests in Ireland's present-day economy.

"Owing to the constantly increasing concentration of tenant-farming, Ireland *steadily* supplies *her own surplus*

[of labour] *to the English labour market, and thus forces down wages and lowers* THE MORAL AND MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE ENGLISH working class.

"***And most important of all!*** Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a working class divided into *two hostile camps*
N.B. *English* proletarians and *Irish* proletarians. The ordinary English worker *hates* the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels him-
N.B. self a ***member of the ruling nation*** and so turns himself into a *tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland*, THUS strengthening THEIR DOMINATION OVER HIMSELF. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards *him* is much the same as *that of the poor whites to the Negroes* in the former *slave* states of the U.S.A. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own coin. He sees in the English *worker at once the accomplice and the stupid tool of the English rule* in Ireland.

"This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the *pulpit*, the *comic papers*, *in short*, by all the means at the disposal of the *ruling classes*. This antagonism is the secret of the *impotence of the English working class, despite its organisation*. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it.

"But the evil does not stop here. It continues across the ocean. The *antagonism* between the English and Irish is the *hidden basis of the conflict between the United States and England*. It makes any honest and serious *co-operation between the working classes of the two countries impossible*. It enables the governments of both countries, whenever they think fit, to take the edge off the social

conflict by their mutual bullying and, *in case of need, by war with one another.*

"England, being the metropolis of capital, the power which has hitherto ruled the world market, *is for the present the most important country for the workers' revolution*, and moreover the ***only*** country in which the material conditions for this revolution have developed up to a certain degree of maturity. Therefore to hasten the social revolution in England is the most important object of the International Working Men's Association. The sole means of hastening it is to ***make Ireland independent.***

N.B.

"Hence it is the task of the International everywhere to *put* the conflict between England and Ireland *in the foreground*, and everywhere to *side openly with Ireland.* And it is the special task of the Central Council in London to awaken a consciousness in the English workers that for them the *national emancipation* of Ireland is *no* question of *abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment*, but the first *condition of their own social emancipation*" (pp. 226-28).[80]

"FOREIGN WAGE-REDUCERS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL"

"*Foreign Wage-Reducers and the Attitude of the International*", *Die Neue Zeit*, 25th year (1907).

"In inviting the trade unions of Great Britain and Ireland to take part in the Brussels Congress of *1868*, the General Council declared:

"'The fundamental principle of the Association is that the produce of labour ought to be the property of the producer; that the *brotherhood of labour* should be the basis of society; and that the working men of all countries should throw aside their petty jealousies and *national antipathies*, and make common cause with each other in their struggle with capital. *Labour is of no*

country! Working men have the same evils to contend with everywhere. Capital is but accumulated labour. Why should the labourer be the slave to that which he has himself produced? Too long have the capitalists profited by the national isolation of the sons of toil. Foreign competition has always furnished a plea for the reduction of wages'" (pp. 511-12).

"The ever-ready cry of the British capitalists that the longer working hours and lesser wages of the continental workers make a reduction of wages unavoidable can only be effectually met by the endeavour to *approximate the hours of labour and the rate of wages throughout Europe*.* This is one of the tasks of the International Working Men's Association" (p. 512).

"That is in fact *the only* method of safeguarding the *gains of the more favourably placed* sections of the international proletariat. These gains will always be in danger as long as they are the possession of only a minority, and the danger will be all the greater, the lower the level of the main mass of the proletariat compared with this minority. That holds good for the masses within a single country as it does for those *of the whole world market. An advanced proletariat* can maintain its position by solidarity with and *support of those who have been left behind*, but not by exclusiveness, by isolating itself from them and keeping them down. Where, under the influence of a ***short-sighted***, ***craft attitude***, it adopts the second method, the latter sooner or *later suffers a fiasco* and becomes *one of the most pernicious means of crippling the proletarian struggle for emancipation*" (p. 512).

N.B.

* *Die Neue Zeit*'s italics.—*Ed.*

SEELEY, *THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND*

The Expansion of England, by J. R. Seeley, M. A.

"Here is a fundamental characteristic of the European states during the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries, which is seldom borne in mind, namely, that each of the five Western states has an empire in the New World attached to it. Before the seventeenth century this condition of things was but beginning, and since the eighteenth it has ceased again to exist. The vast, immeasurable results of the discovery of Columbus were developed with extreme slowness, so that the whole sixteenth century passed away before most of these nations bestirred themselves to claim a share in the New World. There existed no independent Holland till near the end of that century, so that *a fortiori* there could be no Greater Holland, nor did either England or France in that century become possessors of colonies. France did indeed plan a settlement in North America, as the name Carolina, derived from Charles IX of France, still remains to prove, but the neighbouring Spaniards of Florida interfered to destroy it. A little later Sir Walter Raleigh's colony in the same neighbourhood disappeared altogether, leaving no trace behind it. Accordingly, during almost the whole of that century the New World remained in the possession of the two states which had done most to lay it open, viz., Spain and Portugal, Spain looking chiefly towards America and Portugal towards Asia, until in 1580 the two states coalesced in a union which lasted sixty years. The Dutch made their grand entrance into the competition for empire in the seven years from 1595 to 1602, and they were followed by France and England in the early years of the seventeenth century, that is, in the reign of our King James I.

"Again in the nineteenth century, the competition of these five states in the New World ceased. It ceased from two causes: wars of independence, in which Transatlantic colonies severed themselves from the mother-country, and the colonial conquests of England. I have described already the Hundred Years' War in which Greater France was swallowed up in Greater Britain; Greater Holland in like manner suffered serious diminution, losing the Cape of

Good Hope and Demerara to England, though even now a Greater Holland may be said to exist in the magnificent dependency of Java, with a population of not less than nineteen millions. The fall of Greater Spain and Greater Portugal has happened in the present century within the life-time of many who are still among us. If we estimated occurrences less by the excitement they cause at the moment and more by the consequences which are certain to follow them, we should call this one of the most stupendous events in the history of the globe, for it is the beginning of the independent life of almost the whole of Southern and Central America. It took place mainly in the twenties of this century, and was the result of a series of rebellions which, when we inquire into their origin, we find to have arisen out of the shock given to Spain and Portugal by Napoleon's invasion of them, so that in fact one of the chief, if not the chief, result of Napoleon's career has been the fall of Greater Spain and Greater Portugal, and the independence of South America.

"The result of all these mighty revolutions—of which, however, I fancy that few of you know anything—is that the Western states of Europe, with the exception of England, have been in the main severed again from the New World. This of course is only roughly true. Spain still possesses Cuba and Puerto Rico, Portugal still has large African possessions, France has begun to found a new empire in North Africa. Nevertheless these four states have materially altered their position in the world. They have become in the main purely European states again, as they were before Columbus crossed the Atlantic" (pp. 62-64).

"Thus then we see in the seventeenth and still more the eighteenth century a period when the New World was attached in a peculiar way to the five Western states of the European system. This attachment modifies and determines all the wars and negotiations, all the international relations of Europe, during that period. In the last lecture I pointed out that the struggle between England and France in those centuries cannot be understood so long as we look at Europe alone, and that the belligerents are really the World-Powers, Greater Britain and Greater France. Now I remark that in like manner during the same period we must

always read for Holland, Portugal and Spain, Greater Holland, Greater Portugal and Greater Spain. I remark also that this state of things has now passed away, that the Spanish Empire, and in the main also the Portuguese and Dutch Empires, have gone the same way as the Empire of France. But Greater Britain still remains. And thus we perceive the historical origin and character of this empire" (pp. 64-65).

"We had been involved in two great wars mainly by our colonies, and the final breach was provoked not so much by the pressure of England upon the colonies as by that of the colonies upon England. If we imposed taxes upon them, it was to meet the debt which we had incurred in their behalf, and we saw with not unnatural bitterness that we had ourselves enabled our colonies to do without us, by destroying for their interest the French power in North America" (p. 75).

"In the Middle Ages England was, from the point of view of business, not an advanced, but on the whole a backward country. She must have been despised in the chief commercial countries; as now she herself looks upon the business-system and the banking of countries like Germany and even France as old-fashioned compared to her own, so in the Middle Ages the Italians must have looked upon England. With their city-life, wide business-connections and acuteness in affairs they must have classed England, along with France, among the old-world, agricultural, and feudal countries, which lay outside the main current of the ideas of the time" (pp. 96-97).

"*Competition* for the New World between the five Western maritime states of Europe—this is a formula which sums up a great part of the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is one of those generalisations which escape us so long as we study history only in single states" (p. 108).

"How came we to conquer India? Was it not a direct consequence of trading with India? And that is only the most conspicuous illustration of a law which prevails throughout English history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the law, namely, of the intimate interdependence of war and trade, so that throughout that

period trade leads naturally to war and war fosters trade. I have pointed out already that the wars of the eighteenth century were incomparably greater and more burdensome than those of the Middle Ages. In a less degree those of the seventeenth century were also great. These are precisely the centuries in which England grew more and more a commercial country. England indeed grew ever more warlike at that time as she grew more commercial" (p. 120).

"Indeed it is not easy to approve the conduct of those who built up Greater Britain" (p. 145).

"Perhaps you may ask whether we can expect or wish her to prosper, if crime has gone into the making of her. But the God who is revealed in history does not usually judge in this way. History does not show that conquests made lawlessly in one generation are certain or even likely to be lost again in another" (p. 146).

"Like our colonial empire itself, our participation in the slave-trade was the gradual growth of the seventeenth century. By the Treaty of Utrecht it was, as it were, established, and became 'a central object of English policy' (the phrase is borrowed from Mr. Lecky. See *History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, II, p. 13). From this date I am afraid we took the leading share, and stained ourselves beyond other nations in the monstrous and enormous atrocities of the slave-trade" (p. 148).

"I have suggested that in the modern world distance has very much lost its effect, and that there are signs of a time when states will be vaster than they have hitherto been" (p. 308).

P. DEHN, *GERMAN COLONIAL AND WORLD POLICY*

German Colonial and World Policy, by Paul Dehn. (Second edition, Berlin, 1907.)

"There are on the seas at the present time, naval vessels excluded, about 40,000 large merchant ships, under steam or sail, with a net registered tonnage of 25,000,000 metric tons and a carrying capacity of 61,000,000 metric tons" (p. 37).

"It* yields the British more than 180 million marks annually, the Germans (with 220 steam fishing vessels) about 25 million and the French about 10 million marks" (p. 39).

"The length of Germany's sea coast is only 1,270 km., only a quarter of her land frontiers, whereas France faces the sea on three sides and her coasts stretch 3,175 km." (p. 41).

"According to the calculations of Professor Dr. Eckert, in his *The Maritime Interests of the Rhineland and Westphalia* (1906), a third of all Germany's imports by sea, and considerably more than a fifth of her total exports by sea, pass through Dutch or Belgian ports" (p. 42).

"At the beginning of 1907 the 'Veritas' business agency made a census of 14,656 steamships totalling 18.9 million registered tons. Of these, Great Britain had 6,249 with 9.8 million tons, Germany 1,351 with 2.1, the United States 885 with 1.2, and France 586 with 0.7 million tons. Of the sailing vessels, too, totalling 26,579 with 7.5 million registered tons, Great Britain had the largest share—6,338 ships and 1.8 million tons. Next came the United States of America with 3,695 ships and 1.5 million tons, followed by France with 1,356 and Germany with 991 ships, each with 0.5 million registered tons. In the period 1882-1905 the tonnage of British ships passing through the Suez Canal increased 103 per cent, while the German figure increased 1,561 per cent!" (p. 43).

"According to American statistical data, the total world area of coalfields amounts to about 1,500,000 square kilometres. Of this figure, 520,000 sq. km. fall to China, 500,000 to the United States, 169,000 to Canada, 91,000 to British India, 62,000 to New South Wales, 52,000 to Russia, 31,000 to Great Britain, 14,000 to Spain, 13,000 to Japan, 5,400 to France, and 4,600 each to Austria, Hungary and Germany, and 1,300 to Belgium. Exploitation depends on the depth, quality and location of the coal deposits.

* * *

"According to British data, about 840 million tons of coal, valued at approximately 6,000 million marks, was mined in 1905.

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* Sea fishing.—*Ed.*

World Coal Output, 1905

	million tons	share (per cent of total)	tons per capita
United States of America	350.8	41	4.25
Great Britain	236.1	28	5.5
Germany	119.3	14	2.0
France	34.8	4	1.0
Belgium	21.5	2.7	3
Russia	19	2.3	
Japan	10	1.2	
British India	8.4	3.5	
Canada	7.8		
Australia	9.8		
British South Africa	3.6		
Other countries	19.1		
	840		

"The three big coal-producing countries accounted for 83 per cent of total output" (pp. 46-47).

"In the period 1883-1903, coal consumption increased 24 per cent in Britain, 102 per cent in Germany and 129 per cent in the United States" (p. 47).

"Almost three-quarters of British coal exports go to continental Europe and the Mediterranean area" (p. 55).

"The British have accumulated big stocks of coal at all their naval bases, of which there are about forty in all parts of the globe" (pp. 56-57).

"These coal stocks total millions of tons. Peez once called them signal posts of British maritime supremacy" (p. 57).

"If the freight cost of British coal exports to various countries is reckoned at an average of only five marks per ton, the total export of 58 million tons in 1906 must have yielded British shipping an annual income of some 300 million marks" (pp. 57-58).

"Unfortunately, it has so far been impossible to oust British coal from the North Sea and Baltic regions. Berlin itself still obtains a sixth of its requirements (mostly coking coal) from Great Britain" (p. 62).

"The difficult position of German industry in regard to supplies of cotton has been statistically shown by State Secretary Dernburg. A price increase of four pfennigs per

pound increases the cost of the world's cotton consumption by 320 million marks. The price increases since 1899 have involved thousands of millions! In 1905, Germany consumed 1.6 million bales. In the recent period she paid annually, depending on the price fluctuations engineered by the New York speculators in anticipation of a rise, 150-200 million marks more* than she did previously, that is to say, five to seven times her annual subsidies to the colonies. She must free herself of this tax, this foreign tribute.

"In order to avoid the effects of Stock Exchange speculation, British merchants and manufacturers more and more frequently visit the Southern States and buy what they need on the spot. British manufacturers have bought large tracts of land in Texas to grow cotton there themselves or to lease the fields" (p. 81).

"The number of spindles in the United States increased from 14.6 million in 1890 to 23.2 million in 1906" (p. 82).

"United States' consumption in 1906 was 4.8 million bales (as against 3.6 million bales in Great Britain and 1.6 million in Germany). At the beginning of the 1860s, the United States consumed 20 per cent of its harvest, in the eighties—32 per cent, in the nineties—35 per cent, and since 1900—up to 40 per cent" (p. 82).

"If the United States has no longer to seek foreign markets for the major part of its cotton crop, supplying the world market with cotton becomes a power problem" (p. 83).

"Being in control of the cotton market, the United States has an unusually sharp weapon against Europe, its export tariff. The European states must at all costs free themselves of this sword of Damocles. No sacrifice can be too great, for in the last resort it is a question of power, which, however, can be resolved through peaceful effort" (pp. 87-88).

"After the excesses of the 1903 New York cotton speculation, on the initiative of the Colonial Economy Committee, there were international congresses of the European cotton industry—in mid-1904 in Zurich, in April 1905 in Brussels, in June 1906 in Manchester, and in May 1907 in Vienna—to devise counter-measures" (p. 88).

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* Dehn's italics.—*Ed.*

"The promotion of cotton growing under the German flag is one of the most important tasks of German colonial . economy and colonial policy. That was already appreciated by Bismarck" (p. 90).

"Encouraging cotton cultivation in the colonies will not only ensure for Germany the supply of this indispensable raw material, but also facilitate lasting prosperity of the colonies themselves, which will then develop as purchasers of German industrial goods.

"The Social-Democrat Calwer anticipates advantages for the German workers, too, from cotton cultivation in the German colonies" ... (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1907, No. 3) (pp. 96-97).

"Great Britain controls 18,369 km. of railway line in Africa, France 5,657, Germany 1,398, Portugal 1,173, Italy 115, and the Congo state 642" (p. 104).

"Apart from the Social-Democrat nihilists, the opponents of colonies, in spite of all their calculations, have nevertheless avoided drawing the final conclusion—they have hesitated to declare that possessions requiring such high subsidies are of no value, they have refrained from demanding abandonment of these possessions—and they were very wise not to have done so, for this ultimate conclusion would show up the fallacy of their whole argument" (pp. 113-14).

"The Social-Democrat agitators and press organs waged an especially furious campaign against German colonial policy shortly before the 1907 elections. The central organ wrote of colonial policy: It 'wants to establish a new German slave state at the cost of the goods and blood of the German proletariat:' This policy should be dealt a 'crushing defeat'.

"Despite all this, there have been voices in favour of colonies also in the Social-Democratic camp, repudiating those who confine themselves to deriding the German colonies as worthless deserts.

"The former Social-Democratic deputy Calwer, writing in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* early in 1907, argued against the sharply negative Social-Democratic attitude towards German colonial policy" (p. 121).

"Comrade Calwer showed he was alive to the needs of the international situation when, writing in the *Sozial-*

istische Monatshefte of March 1907, he criticised the Social-Democratic Party leadership for its hostility to the navy" (p. 130).

"Calwer justifiably ridicules those comrades who believe wages in Germany could at once be raised to the British or North American level without building up our position in the colonies and on the world market" (p. 132).

"In 1905-06 Persia's imports were valued at approximately 140 million marks. Of these the share of Russia was 70 million, of Britain 30, of British India 16, of France 8, of Austria-Hungary 5, and of Germany hardly 3 million marks" (pp. 148-49).

"If the Baghdad railway is actually to be built one day under German auspices, and the British do not renounce their proclaimed aims, the Persian Gulf, now an out-of-the-way area, can become a storm centre of world politics" (p. 158).

"As a result of the Monroe Doctrine, the colonial powers, above all Great Britain, but also France, Holland and Denmark, will before long have to reckon with the possibility of losing their colonies" (p. 196).

"According to semi-official data, German capital invested in real estate, industry, railways and trade at the end of 1904 amounted to 5,000-6,000 million marks for America as a whole, and to 2,800-3,400 million marks for Central and South America alone" (p. 229).

"It is estimated that more than 2,000 million marks of United States capital have been invested in Canadian real estate and factories.

"According to semi-official data for mid-1907, United States investments in Mexico amounted to approximately 3,500-4,000 million marks" (pp. 232-33).

"The two biggest electric companies of Europe and America—the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft in Berlin and the General Electric Company in New York—have an agreement on division of the world market into two spheres of interests. The American company was able to secure for its exclusive exploitation also Central and South America" (p. 249).

"Preferential tariffs, where they have been introduced, have proved inadequate to oust foreign commercial inter-

ests. Such preferential tariffs will always be imposed only to a very limited degree, since local interests, especially those of rising industries, and also those of declining agriculture, demand not merely a certain protection but also the exclusion of all foreign monopolies. The resistance is so strong that it will frustrate the efforts of British imperial and pan-American tariff supporters to attain their final goal—the creation of a completely closed customs union.

"Both these formations were contrary to the general economic development of the recent period with its urge for the expansion of international trade by overcoming artificial barriers, with the need of the strong states to gain a free sphere for economic activity beyond their own frontiers, indeed beyond their own continent. As a matter of fact, the drive for large, self-sufficient customs unions has abated" (pp. 254-55).

"There is no struggle for supremacy in Europe. Should it be provoked by Great Britain, it is by no means bound to lead to war. As long as the Liberal government remains in power, peace will be ensured, for among its most loyal supporters are precisely the British friends of world peace, who are not at all actuated by ill-will towards Germany" (p. 329).

NOTEBOOK "IMPERIALISM"

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REVENTLOW, *GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY*, *1888-1913*

German Foreign Policy, *1888-1913*, by Count Ernst zu *Reventlow*, Berlin, 1914.
Fourth Section.

"Moreover, since 1903 the German plan for the Baghdad railway, accepted by Turkey, has been a dangerous spectre" (p. 314).

"If one adds that the main purpose of the Balkan Committee was deliberate political propaganda, it needs no further proof that this Committee, disposing of large sums of money, was a powerful but at the same time irresponsible assistant of official British policy" (p. 314).

"The similarity of motivation behind the Sanjak railway and the future Baghdad railway was obvious" (p. 317).

"In 1906 the Paris *Revue Slave* wrote that the Slavs of Central Europe and the Balkans ought to strive for a big customs union with Russia, Hungary, Rumania and Greece. 'All these peoples would doubtlessly benefit much more from it than from a customs union with Germany.... Russia's revived strength will be unconquerable once all Slav elements, united under her moral aegis, come out in resolute opposition to all policies of brute force'" (p. 318).

"From the outset the movement bore a strong Jewish imprint, which brought it into association with the centres of European capital. The Young Turk movement was always supported and promoted by France and Great Britain, especially through the Balkan Committee" (p. 319).

"On July 19, 1908, King Edward VII paid a visit to the Russian tsar, meeting him in the Reval roadstead. This meeting marked the culmination of Anglo-Russian rapprochement and caused a sensation in the political world of Europe" (p. 319).

"At any rate, one must recall the mood of disquiet prevailing in Europe during the years 1906-08, particularly in Germany. We have seen how in 1906 and 1907 King Edward's Entente policy of 'encircling' Germany gained more and more political reality. With the Mediterranean agreements and the agreement with Russia that policy, it seemed, had run full circle" (p. 320).

"There was talk of a far-reaching plan for the partition of Turkey" (p. 322).

"London was taken completely by surprise, as was also Paris" (p. 327).

"There can be no doubt that if Germany supports the dual monarchy only conditionally and with reservations, this monarchy will be exposed to the strongest pressure by the Entente powers. At a certain point Great Britain and Russia will try to achieve the reverse, that is, convince Austria-Hungary by their pressure that she would do better to join the Triple Entente, that this would prove more advantageous than alliance with the German Empire" (p. 332).

KAUTSKY, *SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY*

Karl Kautsky, *Socialism and Colonial Policy*, Berlin, 1907.

"The capitalist mode of production has already played this role of the most powerful stimulus to the development of the productive forces. In the eighties of the last century it had already reached the limit beyond which it becomes more and more a hindrance to their further development. Not yet in the sense of making any further growth of these forces impossible—such a growth is still taking place—but

in the sense that a mode of production has already become possible in which productivity rises faster than under the capitalist mode. In the interests of self-preservation, the capitalist mode of production is compelled increasingly to block the growth of productivity" (p. 35).

"Today socialism has already become an economic necessity. The time of its arrival is only a question of power. To create this power for the proletariat by organisation and education is today more than ever the most important task of Social-Democracy. Nothing is more peculiar than those socialists who believe that alongside this they must be concerned also for a further development of the power of capitalism" (p. 37).

ENGELS, LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1882*

A Letter of Frederick Engels (**September 12, 1882**).

["It is a quarter of a century now (**1907–1882=25**) that the movement for colonies began in Germany. Being occupied in studying it, on one occasion I asked Frederick Engels about the attitude of the English workers to their colonies"]**

"To this ***Engels*** replied to *me on September 12, 1882*, as follows:

"'You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the WORKERS GAILY SHARE THE FEAST OF ENGLAND'S MONOPOLY OF THE WORLD MARKET AND THE COLONIES.*** In my opinion the colonies proper, i.e., the countries occupied by a European population—Canada, the Cape, Australia—***will all become independent***; on the other hand, the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated—India, Algeria, the Dutch, Portuguese

* The letter by Engels (with a preface and postscript by Kautsky) was printed at the end of Kautsky's pamphlet (see above) as a supplement.—*Ed.*

** This paragraph, which is Kautsky's preface to Engels's letter, was crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 284.—*Ed.*

and, Spanish possessions—must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and ***led*** as rapidly as possible ***towards independence***. How this process will develop is difficult to say. ***India will perhaps***, *indeed very probably*, ***make*** *a revolution*, and as a proletariat in process of self-emancipation *cannot* conduct *any colonial wars*, *it would have to be allowed to run its course*; it would not pass off without all sorts of destruction, of course, but that sort of thing is inseparable from all revolutions. The same might also take place elsewhere, e.g., in Algeria and Egypt, and would certainly be the best thing *for us*.* *We shall have enough to do at home*. Once Europe is reorganised, and ***North America***, that will furnish such colossal power and such an ***example*** that the semi-civilised countries will of themselves follow in their wake; *economic needs*, *if anything, will see to that*. But as to what social and political phases these countries will then have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organisation, I think we today can advance only rather idle hypotheses. One thing alone is certain: the *victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing*,* which of course *by no means excludes defensive wars of various kinds*.**[82]

N.B.

N.B.

"'The developments in Egypt have been contrived by Russian diplomacy. It is intended that Gladstone should take Egypt (which he is still far from having, and if he did have it, he would still be a long way from keeping it), so that Russia could take Armenia; according to Gladstone, this would once again be the liberation of a Christian country from the Mohammedan yoke. *Everything else in this affair is mere appearance, humbug, pretext*.*** Whether this intrigue will succeed will soon become clear.'

* Italics in Kautsky's pamphlet.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 352.—*Ed.*
*** Italics in Kautsky's pamphlet.—*Ed.*

"The end of the letter relates to the British occupation of Egypt following the rising led by Arabi Pasha. On this subject there was recently published a letter by Engels dated August 9, 1882, in which he warned against a purely sentimental approach to the Egyptian national movement. And from that the conclusion was drawn that the British annexation of Egypt met with special sympathy from Engels. We see now how far this was from being the case"* (pp. 79-80).

QUADFLIEG, *THE RUSSIAN POLICY OF EXPANSION, 1774-1914*

The Russian Policy of Expansion, 1774-1914, by Dr. Franz *Quadflieg*, Berlin, 1914.

"In the meantime, by the Kuwait treaty, Britain has transferred her differences with Russia on the Turkish issue to Armenia and Asia Minor; Russia is working secretly in Armenia; France is hankering after Syria, and Germany is after territorial acquisitions on the Euphrates. Thus for another century, probably with short intervals, the Turkish question will continue to agitate Europe, and Russian diplomacy will have to devote more attention to South Asia. Russia's gigantic expansion policy in Asia means that her future, too, lies on the seas; without a strong and freely-moving navy there can be no Russian Asia; passage through the Sea of Marmara is the more important for Russian naval policy because in 1905 Russia again lost her favourable position in Eastern Asia" (p. 96).

"Even after the partition Treaty of August 7, 1907, the above-mentioned projects could be carried out without violation of the treaty provisions. The 1907 treaty divided Persia into three parts, viz., Russian and British spheres of influence, and a zone common to both powers. The British and Russian governments undertook not to acquire any concessions of a political or commercial nature in the respective spheres of influence, and not to assist such acquisition by their own nationals or those of third states. The whole of northern Persia, i.e., north of the line Qasri—Shirin—

* This paragraph is Kautsky's postscript to Engels's letter.—*Ed.*

Esfahan—Yazd—Khakh up to the intersection of the Persian-Afghan-Russian frontiers is reserved for Russia, while Britain will exercise her influence in the East, i.e., south-east of the Bandar Abbas—Kerman—Birjand—Gazik line" (p. 134).

"The final act of Anglo-Russian policy was the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish agreement by Hakki-Pasha in London in 1913; we shall have to return to it in connection with Russian policy in Asia Minor. Under it Britain obtained the terminal portion of the Baghdad railway, Basra-Baghdad, i.e., another link of the Cyprus-India line. Furthermore, Turkey gave up the Kuwait Sultanate, which indeed was always only loosely dependent on Turkey, and was now to become a vassal state of Britain. This means that the entire South-West coast of the Persian Gulf from the mouth of the Euphrates to the Straits of Hormuz becomes British" (p. 135).

"Russian policy in Persia has been less successful than British because Britain can threaten Persia from the sea" (p. 136).

"Latterly Russia has reverted to her earlier policy of engineering revolts, i.e., is again using the Armenians to instigate revolts in the Turkish areas, though, of course, so far not much can be said about this. Britain, on the other hand, made use of the 1913 Balkan disorders to carry out peaceful reforms, so that Russia should not have any grounds for intervention; should, however, such intervention prove necessary, it would be the duty of Britain, since Turkey has promised her to introduce reforms. Under the Kuwait treaty, Britain guarantees the Sultan his Turkish possessions in Asia for forty years. She thus acquires the right, in the event of attempted Russian conquests, again to act as Turkey's protector and oblige the Russians to return possible acquisitions. In return, Turkey promises to carry out reforms in Armenia, Anatolia and other Asia Minor areas with a partially Christian population" (pp. 146-47).

"'Accordingly, Britain has guaranteed Turkey's territorial integrity for forty years, and under present conditions this is important in relation to Russia, which is engaged in subversive activity in Armenia'—writes Rohrbach"* (p. 147).

* *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* No. 280, April 4, 1913.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"The construction of a communications network, consisting of railways, waterways and military roads, shows that Russia does not consider the South-Asian problem settled. On the contrary, this construction programme suggests that at the appropriate time arms will decide who is to be the sole ruler of South Asia" (p. 171).

"Already in 1903 Prince Ito urged a Russo-Japanese alliance, since unity would be bound to make partition of the Chinese Empire considerably easier and give everyone concerned a proper share" (p. 173).

"The Russo-Japanese treaty of July 17 (30), 1907, testifies to the new trend of both Russian and Japanese policy. Britain was thus isolated and the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was greatly diminished" (pp. 173-74).

"Shortly after the Russo-Japanese agreement Britain concluded with Russia the convention of August 7, 1907, by which Russia renounced, for the time being, any further penetration in Afghanistan" (p. 174).

"The Russo-Japanese policy of rapprochement had its continuation in the treaty of July 4, 1910, which closely resembles a defensive alliance" (p. 219).

"It was broadened by a supplementary treaty of May 7, 1911. The two states pledged themselves to respect each other's spheres of influence in Manchuria and repel any foreign interference, in return for which Japan gave Russia complete freedom of action in Mongolia" (p. 220).

"In line with the May 7, 1911 treaty, Russia now raised the question of Mongolia. Basing themselves on the revolution and the fact that the Chinese immigration policy, by which peaceful settlers were followed by military contingents, violated the existing treaties between the Manchus and the Khalkha tribes, the Mongolian princes proclaimed the independence of their region. Russia hastened to recognise the independence of Mongolia, although she had done nothing to contribute to its realisation" (pp. 220-21).

"Though the semblance of Chinese overlordship remained, the Russian press was not far off the mark in asserting that Mongolia had become a Russian protectorate. Russian diplomacy had achieved the same results as in Korea prior to 1904. This time, having an agreement of Japan, Russia

may be more fortunate than she was then, when she had to combat Japanese resistance" (p. 221).

"The only question is whether China can reorganise herself. China is a compact mass of 300 million people who love their country and are not a little embittered by its treatment at the hands of foreigners. The 1911 revolution ended in the removal of the Manchus. Thereby China accomplished her first task—the overthrow of foreign rule—which she had so often and so unsuccessfully attempted. Will Yüan Shih-kai or someone else be the re-maker of China? Once awoken, China will be a more dangerous opponent of Russian expansion than Japan, and Prince Ukhtomsky was quite right when he said: 'China will regenerate herself through her own forces, as has so often happened in the many thousand years of her history, more slowly but perhaps more permanently than Japan, and then the question will no longer be Russia or Japan, but Russia or China'" (p. 222).

"The guiding motive of Russia's nineteenth-century Balkan policy was control of the Turkish areas, whether by their constitutional inclusion in the Russian Empire, or by dominion, on the basis of international law, over Turkey herself, or over a federation of Balkan states formed out of the Turkish Empire. Such dominion could be converted later into constitutional imperial rule.

"However diverse Russia's final aims in Central and South Asia, including Asia Minor, may have been in specific periods, they can be reduced to a single formula. The final aim is to bring the states concerned—Armenia with Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and the adjacent small states—under Russian influence, then under a Russian protectorate and ultimately incorporate them in the Russian Empire" (pp. 227-28).

"Russia has temporarily renounced Korea and part of Manchuria, but she has made a rapprochement with the Japanese in order the more surely to incorporate Mongolia and Northern Manchuria in the empire. By cleverly exploiting the special political and social relations which have always existed between Mongolia and the dominant state, China, this policy appears, with the consent of the Japanese government, to be achieving its aim. And from this it follows that in Eastern Asia, too, Russia is consistently

working to a well-devised plan of expansion, which may be modified according to circumstances but remains essentially unaltered, the aim being direct domination of the vast territories right up to the Chinese Wall and supremacy in Eastern Asia....

"It can therefore be concluded that the basic idea of nineteenth-century Russian policy was the creation of a world empire, that is, a state whose final frontiers are not determined by any of the decisive factors that go into the formation of a state. The frontiers aimed at coincide neither with nationality, language, race, nor even—what is certainly less often taken into account—religious boundaries. Nor are they determined by physical features, and therefore do not everywhere coincide with natural geographical boundaries" (pp. 230-31).

"'World empires,' says Sering, 'have always monopolised the earth, the source of all material wealth.' The modern world empires, Russia, Great Britain and America, go further. They have expanded, or seek to expand, their empires over all zones, not in a literal sense, but in such a way that everything the earth can yield will be produced within the bounds of their empire. Great Britain has already done that. Occupying a quarter of the inhabited surface of the globe, there is nothing, as Chamberlain proudly declared at the conference of colonial Prime Ministers, that cannot be produced in one or another part of the far-flung empire. Russia and America, if they succeed in realising their plans of world empire, will seize the next two quarters of the world and be in the same favourable position as the British Empire" (p. 234).

"The other path, specifically relating to Germany, is described by Schmoller as follows: 'We do not want to pursue, nor will we pursue, a chauvinistic world-power policy. We shall not embark on unlimited expansion of our navy and sea power, but we want to expand our trade and industry sufficiently to be able to live and support a growing population; we want to defend our colonies and if possible acquire somewhere an agricultural colony for Germany; we shall everywhere oppose exaggerated predatory mercantilism and a division of the world among the three world powers—Great Britain, Russia and North America—which strive to

exclude all other states and at the same time destroy their trade.' But this second path can now only be adopted, with any prospect of success, by a few Great Powers" (p. 237).

"*Britain has always been the friend of the weaker power*,* in order to bring down the stronger to a level that is no longer dangerous for her. First of all she allied with Holland to destroy the power of Spain, then with France to put an end to the rule of the Netherlands at sea, then she supported Frederick the Great to be in a better position to dismember France's colonial empire; in the same manner she allied with Japan to counteract the threatening growth of Russian power in East Asian waters; today she has become France's or Russia's friend so as to he able to destroy Germany's position as a naval power; she will become Germany's ally as soon as she has nothing more to fear from the German navy, either because the latter will be destroyed, or because Germany will voluntarily give up competing with her. And then her next opponent could prove to be the tsarist empire" (p. 246).

The following table illustrates the progress of Russian railway development (p. 239):

	Total length	Central Asia Region	Siberia and Manchuria
1858	1,165 km.	... km.	... km.
1878	22,910 "		
1890	32,390 "	1,433	
1908	73,699 "	4,519 "	10,337 "
1909	76,284 "	6,544 "	10,337 "

"The central European states—Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy—joined hands against the aggressive tendencies of Russian and French policy. This alliance has persisted for a long time because there can only be minor points of dispute between its three members; such disagreements exist only between Austria and Italy, since Austria still has an Italian-speaking population on the frontier with Italy. And this antagonism is intensified by the intrigues of Italian irredentists in Trieste and the Italian Tyrol. The conversion of this very loose international union into a firmer one cannot, therefore, be dismissed out of hand. We thus

* Quadflieg's italics.—*Ed.*

have the beginnings of a European association of states. Without any aggressive designs, three great European states have joined together to counter the attack of Slavism or, more precisely, the encroachment of Russia and of the small Slav Balkan states that follow Russia's lead" (pp. 248-49).

"The unity of the European continental powers, so necessary in face of the world powers, Britain and Russia, who are joined by a third, the United States of America, with its pan-American aspirations, which have made notable progress since the Monroe Doctrine, is in this way being frustrated. As long as the European states remain disunited, these three powers can go further in dividing up the rest of the world. The Anglo-Russian struggle in Asia showed that these two powers almost alone came into consideration, the other European states playing a very secondary role. As pointed out above, throughout the century Russia has, with short intervals, enlarged her empire first in one place and then in another. Equally, too, no decade has passed without Britain expanding her mighty empire, beginning with the occupation of Malta in 1800 and continuing up to the conquest of the Boer Republic in 1900. While Russia and Britain divided the non-European world between them, the North Americans have specially reserved for themselves the entire American continent as an object of conquest. Hence the Russian policy of conquest appears as merely the counterpart of British imperialism and North American pan-Americanism. Although outwardly differing in their individual aims, they all have the same ultimate goal—an independent world state cut off from the outside world by a high tariff wall. The movement to build world states began in the nineteenth century; in the twentieth century it will be the central feature of foreign policy. This tendency will manifest itself in the expansion of the leading powers and in the association of the smaller countries and those who arrive on the scene too late, i.e., in an association of the European states with the exception of Britain and Russia. Chamberlain's statement in his Johannesburg speech of January 17, 1903, will be confirmed: 'The day of small kingdoms with petty jealousies is past, the future is with the great empires'" (pp. 254-55).

NOTEBOOK "EGELHAAF"

EGELHAAF, *HISTORY OF RECENT TIMES*[83]

Gottlob Egelhaaf, *History of Recent Times from the Peace of Frankfurt to the Present Day*, 4th edition, Stuttgart, 1913.

Preface, November 1912

The author is a scoundrel, a Bismarckian. But the book is nonetheless very useful as a summary of facts and reference source. His simple summary provides a picture of *imperialism* and *democratic movements* as the chief distinguishing features of the *epoch*. (N.B. extremely important for an understanding of the epoch!!). Very little about socialism, owing to the author's hidebound reactionariness.

N.B. N.B.

Has a number of historical works, including a bulky volume on Wilhelm I and on *Bismarck*; also ***Outlines of History***—in three parts: ancient times, the Middle Ages, and the recent period, 1905-1909 (published in Leipzig), and *Annual Political Surveys*, 1908 etc. up to 1912.

It is highly characteristic that this idiot of an author, who with pedantic accuracy gives the dates, etc. of all minor monarchs, their relatives, the miscarriages of the Queen of the Netherlands (sic! p. **440**), etc., has not a word about the 1907 peasant uprising in Rumania (*)!!

(*) Incidentally. In the *Europäischer Geschichtskalender* for 1907 there are *only* government reports about the uprising (p. 340), which state that Russian sailors from the battleship *Potemkin* were "a dangerous element of ferment" (sic!!)....

The "Chronological Table" appended to the book has been compiled in an idiotic way, being a dry, *unsystematic* enumeration.

The following merits attention (outside the general system):

p. 5: Out of 5,000 million francs of the French indemnity (1871), the Germans used 120 million for the "war fund"

12 million	—"for monetary rewards (grants) to 28 meritorious generals and to the President of the Imperial Chancellery, Delbrück".	sic! *monetary rewards for generals*, etc.
350 million	—for fortresses and barracks....	
17 million	—to "shipowners who suffered losses owing to the war", etc.	civilised war and *plunder*

p. 7... "In the 1874 Reichstag elections, ten ultramontanes and five opponents of union were elected (in Alsace-Lorraine). On February 18 they attempted post factum to secure the holding of a popular referendum on whether the area should be part of France or Germany; the proposal was rejected without a debate by all against *23* votes."

N.B. !! !! on the question of self-determination

((Interesting to know who were these *23*? In the Reichstag elected on January 1, 1874, there were 15 "Alsace autonomists" + 9 Social-Democrats. 15 + 9 = 24?? (there was one Dane, 14 Poles, 4 Welfs).

Probably the Alsatians + the Social-Democrats voted *for*. Find out! Where? From Bebel?))

results of colonial wars:

The revolt of the Hereros (South-West Africa)—1904-December 1905. Their song: "To whom does Hereroland belong?" and the refrain: "Hereroland belongs to us." The German troops numbered up to 17,000 (pp. 298-99). The Hereros were "for the most part *wiped out*" (sic!)—"a serious loss for them and for us" (299), for "working hands" are lacking (!!)....

(rob the land and become landowners!)

"That the country is not without value and attraction is shown by the fact that, according to an official report of October 1906, *591 men* of the colonial army decided not to return to Germany, but to remain in the country as farmers and cattle-breeders. The number increased considerably in the following months, and since on May 10, 1907 the new Reichstag voted the farmers *5 million* marks compensation for war losses, rehabilitation could begin" (299).

1908, the British *together* with Germans in a colonial war!!

The uprising of the *Hottentots* (also in South-West Africa) from September 1904 to 1907. Some bands continued to resist until late December 1908 "necessitating renewed joint punitive measured by the German and British authorities" (300).

(workers of different countries)

The French Republic's hatred of Italy (because of the Pope, among other reasons) (and also this example): "in *August 1893* Italian workers in *Aigues Mortes* were beaten half dead by their French competitors" (345).

		Electoral Reforms in Britain		
Number of voters (millions)	0.4 0.8	...1st *1832*	(abolition of the "rotten boroughs". Electoral qualification. Increase in the number of voters from about 400,000 to 800,000)	Electoral reforms in Britain
	1.5	...2nd *1867*	(number of voters increased from 1,056,000 to 1½ million. House-owners and householders).	
	4	...3rd *1884*	(number of voters increased 75%), from 1½ to *4* million. Qualification—annual payment of rates. Domestic servants, lodgers and others excluded. "Thus, out of about six million adult males in Britain, about two million were still voteless until 1912" (368).	
	6.5	...4th *1912*	(all males over *21* years of age, without the former distinctions; qualification—*half-yearly* payment of rates (p. 377) (cf. Schulthess's *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*))	
			(Introduced June 17, 1912 passed July 12, 1912 to come into force June 1, 1914 ((1832-1912, i.e., 80 years!))	

criminal activity!!

A "trifle": Edward VII (1841-1910) "in early years was insatiable in dissipation often of a punishable kind (sic!!) and in sport" (425).

gem!!

"United States of the civilised world" (!!!)

The military campaign (1900-01) against the *Boxer* uprising in China (of the allied forces of *Russia*, *Japan*, *Germany*, *France*, *Britain* and the *United States*) was appraised by the French general *Frey* as follows: this campaign "has *for the first time translated into reality the dream of idealist* politicians—a *United States of the civilised world*" (469).... ((Letters of the Social-Democrats—"Huns' letters"—were, he says, lies or forgeries! (467) Well, of course!))

The Hague Conference and Korea!!!!

When the Korean prince (Yi Yong) appeared before the *Second* Hague Conference (which opened on June 15, 1907) with a complaint against the Japanese and a declaration of the independence of Korea, the Japanese deposed the Korean emperor, put his son on the throne, and on July 24, 1907, concluded a "treaty" with him, providing that all diplomatic relations shall be through the Japanese ambassador in Seoul.

Concerning the defeat of the revisionists at the Nuremberg Congress (1908) (258 to 119 *against* voting for the budget), the author, Egelhaaf, remarks:

"The *revisionists*, however, only differ from the radical Social-Democrats in their cautious tactics, meant not to frighten away the bourgeois masses and to go as far as possible with the bourgeois Lefts. They do not differ as regards the ultimate goal; complete socialisation, and because they claim to be moderate, *they are basically more dangerous than the 'wild men' of the extreme Left*" (523).

N.B.

opinion of a bourgeois: revisionists are "more dangerous than radical Social-Democrats"

N.B.

Bismarck favoured a republic in France for the sake of *separating* (N.B.) her from monarchical Russia—and the ambassador Count Harry *Arnim*, who "operated" in Paris *for* restoration of the monarchy, was *recalled* in 1874 (March 1874) and in 1875 was condemned to five years' penal servitude (!) for publishing a secret state document (he fled to Nice) (p. 93).

Bismarck *for* a republic in France

Ireland: in December 1796 General *Hoche* with an army of 20,000 appeared before the island and only storms prevented a landing (p. 380). (The French revolution evoked a movement in Ireland.)

N.B.!!

United States: 1775-83—war of liberation "with the help of France and Spain". 1819—"Spain sold her possession ... the peninsula of Florida to the United States for five million dollars" (p. 453).

not bad! ("ally"—and "buyer")

Literature cited: *Gilbert*, T*he South African War*, Paris, 1902.

CHIEF CRISES IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF THE GREAT POWERS AFTER 1870-71

Preparation for the war of 1914-16 ("landmarks")	(Chief) crises in the international policy of the Great Powers after 1870-71:	
1879: German-Austrian alliance	1877-78:	(Liberation of Balkan national states). *Turkey* plundered ("partitioned") (by *Russia* + Britain + Austria).
1891: Franco-Russian alliance	1885:	Russia on the verge of war with Britain. *Central Asia* plundered ("partitioned") (by *Russia* + Britain).
	1895:	(Sino-Japanese war.) *China* plundered ("partitioned"). (Japan + *Russia* + Britain + Germany + France.)
	1898:	Britain on the verge of war with France (Fashoda). *Africa* plundered ("partitioned")
	1904-05:	(Russo-Japanese war.) *China and Korea* plundered ("partitioned') (by *Russia* and Japan).
1907: Anglo-Russian alliance	1905:	Germany on the verge of war with France and Britain. *Morocco* plundered ("partitioned").
	1911:	Germany on the verge of war with France and Britain. *Morocco* plundered ("partitioned"). Morocco is *exchanged* for the Congo.

N.B. Secret treaty between Russia and Austria, January 15, 1877, for "partition" of Turkey....

N.B.: *1876*: Alexander II asks Bismarck whether Germany would be neutral in a war between Russia and Austria [Egelhaaf, p. 128].

January 10, 1891: British ultimatum to Portugal: Africa plundered ("partitioned").
1889: Seizure of Samoa islands (jointly by Britain, Germany and the U.S.A.).
1898: Spanish-American war. (Cuba and Philippines plundered.)
1898: Britain and Germany negotiate an alliance against Russia (could not agree!)
October 1898: Anglo-German treaty: Britain and Germany divide Portugal's colonies between them ("in the event of" her financial bankruptcy)....
1899: "Friction" between Germany, Britain and the U.S.A. over Samoa. Threats of war. Conflict. Treaty "partitioning" the islands: November 14, 1899.
1900: All the powers join to strangle China: Germany + Russia + U.S.A. + Japan + Britain + France.
1903: Debt payments are extorted from Venezuela (by bombardment): Germany + Britain + Italy.
1904: Anglo-French treaty (April 8): Britain and France divide Africa (preparing for war against Germany).
1907: Anglo-Russian treaty (August 31): Britain and Russia divide Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet (preparing for war against Germany).
1908: U.S.-Japanese treaty (November 28) guaranteeing their Pacific "possessions".
July 1910: Russo-Japanese treaty: Korea "exchanged" for Mongolia!
1911: Russo-German treaty (August 19): A kind of "double insurance" (Baghdad for Persia).
1911: Anglo-Japanese Treaty (Britain to be neutral in a war between Japan and the U.S.A.)... (see Franke in the symposium *Germany and the World War*).
September 17, 1914: "Treaty" between Russia and "independent" Mongolia. (Mongolia plundered.)

ESSAYED SUMMARY OF WORLD
((EGELHAAF AND

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
1870	Franco-Prussian war (70-71).	"Alliance of three emperors" (71). 72: Meeting of three emperors in Berlin.	(1866-67: Russia annexes Kokand.) 1868: Russia annexes Bukhara. 1873: Russia annexes Khiva.	73: Gold currency in Germany.	Paris Commune (71). 71-70: Trials of the Paris Communards.
-1875		1875: Franco-German conflict. Alexander II intervenes.		November 1875: Britain buys up Suez shares.	75: German S.D. Congress in Gotha. United party.
1876	77: Russo-Turkish war.	76: Russo-German negotiations on Russian war against Austria. January 15, 1877: Austro-Russian treaty (on partition of Turkey).	77: Britain seizes the Transvaal.		

HISTORY DATA AFTER 1870
OTHER SOURCES))

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
1868-71: Japan (Revolution and reform). 73: Republic in Spain. Intervention of German naval officer Werner August 1, 1873. 74: Alphonso XII in Spain, and 74-76: Carlist War.	(1867: Agreement between Hungary and Austria). 75: Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina.	61-72: Peasant reform and bourgeois-democratic reforms. *Russia.* 71: Beginning of the "Kulturkampf" in Germany (71-78). 71-79: Fight against royalists and clericalists in France (75: victory of the Republic). April 2, 1873: Electoral reform in Austria (four curias). 75: Civil marriage introduced in Germany.		Sept. 20, 1870: Italy takes Rome.
	76: Uprising in Bulgaria. 77: Russo-Turkish war.	March '76: Left Cabinet in Italy (Depretis) until '91. 1877: Universal education law (Italy).		

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
		78: Berlin Congress (Turkey plundered). Oct. 11, 1878: Austro-Prussian treaty (on annulling the Prague conditions about Denmark).	78: Britain seizes Cyprus.		78: Anti-Socialist Law in Germany (October 19).
	79: Britain's war against the Zulus.	79: Austro-German alliance (October 7, '*79*).	79: "Afrikanderbond" (union of Dutch in South Africa).	79: Protective tariff in Germany (alliance of industrialists and agrarians).	
-1880			80: Hamburg merchant Godeffroy founds trading company in *Samoa*. (Reichstag, April 27, '*80* refused a subsidy).		
1881	February 27, '*81*: Boer victory over the British (at Majuba Hill).	81 (August 81: 3): Britain recognises the independence of the Transvaal. 81: Russia subdues the Turkmens.	France seizes Tunisia. 81: Italy in *Assab*. ← 81		

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
		79: Resignation of Falk (end of the "Kulturkampf". See '87). 79: New court procedure introduced in Germany.		January 30, 1879: Resignation of Mac-Mahon. 79: Anti-Semitic movement in Germany (78: foundation of the Christian-Socialist Party).
March 1, 1881: Assassination of Alexander II.		81: Gladstone's Irish Land Bill.	81: Wilhelms I's message on social reforms.	

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
		82: Great Britain seizes Egypt. 83: "Triple Alliance" (Germany + Austria + Italy) (May 20, 1882). 84: Meeting of 3 emperors in Skierniewice. November 15, '*84*. Berlin. Conference on the Congo: Africa partitioned. "Independence" of the Congo!!	84: Germany seizes South-West African colonies + Cameroons. 84: Russia annexes *Merv*.		
-1885	85: War between France and China (over Tonkin).		85: German dispute with Spain over Caroline Islands. 85: Britain seizes Bechuana (South Africa). 85: Italy in Massawa. 85: France seizes Tonkin. 85: Britain seizes Burma.	85: Shipping subsidies in Germany. 1880-88: Railway to Samarkand.	

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
	82: Prague University divided into Czech and German parts.	82: Secular schools in France.	83: Health insurance in Germany.	
		84: Gladstone's electoral reform.	84: Accident insurance in Germany.	

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
1886	87: Russo-German "double insurance" treaty.			88: "Panama" in France. 88 (Oct. 4): Deutsche Bank obtains concession for Baghdad railway (to Angora). 89: Cecil Rhodes founds Chartered Co. of South Africa.	
-1890		90: Anglo-German treaty (exchange of Heligoland for part of Africa).			90: End of the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany.
1891		Jan. 10, '91: British ultimatum to Portugal (Africa plundered).		91: German trade agreements with Austria and other countries (customs duties lowered).	

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
	86: First Bill concerning the Poles (in Germany) (Settlement Commission).	86: Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill. 87: End of the "Kulturkampf" in Germany (May 23, 1887). 88: Democratic local self-government in Britain.	89: Old age insurance (in Germany).	86: Boulanger appointed Minister of War. 90: Fall of Bismarck.
		1891: Income tax in Germany.		

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
		91: Franco-Russian alliance.		92: Currency reform in Austria.	
			93: France seizes *Dahomey*.	93: Deutsche Bank obtains further concession for Baghdad railway.	way strike in Holland.
-1895	94-95: Sino-Japanese war. 1895: French war against Madagascar.	95: Shimonoseki peace. 95: Treaty on Pamirs (of Russia and Afghanistan).		95: Wilhelm II Canal.*	
1896		96: Abyssinian victory over Italy (March 1) (peace treaty October 26, 1896).	96: Jameson Raid (Britain in South Africa). 96: Britain seizes *Ashanti*.		

* The Kiel Canal.—*Ed*.

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
	95: Uprising in Cuba.	92: Small-holdings Act in Britain. 93: Gladstone's Second Home Rule Bill. 93: Two years' military service (Germany). 1893: Electoral reform in Belgium (majority vote). 94: Start of Dreyfus affair (France). 94: Civil marriage introduced in Hungary. 1888-1895: Vatican's negotiations with the Quirinal. No agreement!		92: Party of the "Rallies" (to the Republic) in France. 93: Farmers' League (Germany).
		96: Badeni forms the fifth curia in the Austrian Parliament.		

	A	B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
-1900	97: Greco-Turkish war. 98: Spanish-American war. 99-1902: War between Great Britain and the Boers.	97: Austro-Russian agreement on the Balkans. 98: Fashoda (Great Britain and France divide Africa (March 21, 1899)).	97: France seizes Madagascar. 97: Germany seizes Kiao-chow. 98: Wilhelm II in Jerusalem. 98 (?): Rising in Andijan. 99: Germany seizes Caroline, Sawaii and other islands.		
1901	1900-01: War against China (Boxer rising).	1902: Anglo-Japanese agreement.		1901: Completion of the Siberian railway. January 22, '02: Franco-German Co. obtains concession for Baghdad railway + shipping in Mesopotamia + mines.	

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
	98: Second Bill concerning the Poles (Germany). 99: Subjugation of Finland.	98: The "Away from Rome" movement in Austria.		97: Lueger becomes Mayor of Vienna. 98: First Navy Law (Germany). (April 30, 1898, Navy League founded). 1900: Second Navy Law in Germany.
	1902: Third Bill concerning the Poles (Gemany).	1901: "Commonwealth" of Australia. 1901: French law on associations (against Catholic orders.) 1902: Cancellation of the "Dictatorship Clause" in Alsace-Lorraine.		

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
				1902: Customs tariff in Germany. 1903: Chamberlain urges customs union of the British Empire.	
	1904-07: War against the Hereros.	1904: Anglo-French agreement. 1904: Loubet in Italy.	1904: British in *Lhasa*.		
-1905	1904-05: Russo-Japanese war.	1905: Second Anglo-Japanese agreement.	1905: Wilhelm II in Tangier (Morocco).	1905: Germany concludes new trade agreements.	
1906		1906: Algeciras Conference.			
	1907: End of the war in Africa (against the Hereros, etc.).	1907: Agreement of France and Russia with Japan. 1907: Anglo-Russian agreement.		1907 (August): Court imposes $29 million fine on Standard Oil Co.	

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
	1903: Hungarian crisis (conflict with Austria over which language to be used in the army).	1903: Combes dissolves Catholic orders in France. 1903: *Irish* Bill (agrarian).		
1905: Revolution in Russia. 1905: Norway becomes a separate state.	← 1905	1905: Two years' military service in Germany. 1905: Separation of the church from the state in France.		
1906: parliament in Persia. 1907: Coup d'état in Russia.	1906-07: Schoolchildren's "strike" in Prussian Poland (about 50,000).	1906: Expense allowance for Reichstag deputies. (July 12, 1906: Dreyfus rehabilitated.) 1907: Universal suffrage in Austria. 1907: Agricultural Act in Britain (benefits smallholders).		

A		B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
		1908 (June 9 '08): Meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas II in Reval. 1908: US-Japanese agreement on the Pacific.			
		1909: Franco-German agreement on Morocco.			1909: Barricades in Barcelona and Madrid. Assassination of Ferrer (October 13).
-1910		1910: Potsdam meeting (of Wilhelm II and Nicholas II).	1910: Japan annexes Korea.		1910: Briand crushes railwaymen's strike.

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
1908: Assassination of Carlos I in Portugal.	1908: Iceland demands independence from Denmark: allowed a parliament.			
1908: Revolution in Turkey.	1908: Fourth Bill concerning the Poles (compulsory purchase).			
	1908: Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria.			
	1908: Bulgaria proclaims her independence.			
1909: Overthrow of Abdul Hamid.		1909: New privileges for Irish farmers.		
1909: Overthrow of the Shah in Persia.				
1910: Republic in Portugal.	1910: Victory of National Party of Labour over the Party of Independents in Hungary.	1910: Conflict between Lower and Upper Houses of British Parliament.		
	1910: Finland's independence destroyed.			
	!! April 21, 1910: Belgian law on the Flemish language in secondary schools (in four Flemish provinces).			

	A	B	C	D	E
	War	Diplomacy	Colonial policy	Economic policy (trusts, etc.; customs agreements, etc.; large-scale concessions ...)	Workers' movement and socialist parties
1911	1911 (Sept. 29) (—Oct. 18, 1912): Turko-Italian war (Tripolitanian).	1911: Russo-German agreement on Persia.	1911: France and Spain "advance" in Morocco.	!! May 15, 1911: Court declares Standard Oil Co. illegal.	
		1911: Franco-German agreement on Morocco.			
	1912: Balkan wars (First and Second). (October 8-Oct. 17, 1912: declaration of war).				
			1913: Russian encroachment on Armenia.		
-1915	1914: European war.				

Continuation

F	G	H	I	K
Revolutionary movements (non-proletarian)	National movements and national question	Democratic reforms	Social reforms	Miscellaneous and comments
1912: Republic in China.		1911: Abolition (reduction) of privileges of British House of Lords. April 21, 1911: Separation of the church from the state in Portugal. 1912: Asquith's Home Rule Bill. May 25, 1912: Electoral reform in Italy (electorate increased from two to six million). June 17, 1912: Electoral reform in Britain (universal suffrage). April 11, 1912: Irish Home Rule adopted.	1911: Insurance Law in Britain.	

OUTLINE OF PLAN FOR "ESSAYED SUMMARY OF WORLD HISTORY DATA AFTER 1870"

I

3— I) Wars, diplomacy, colonial policy.
1— II) Economic policy (§ 8).
1—III) Workers' movement and socialist parties.
2—IV) *Other* revolutionary movements and other democratic national movements.
2— V) Democratic reforms,
social reforms.

II

1) Wars.
2) Diplomacy....
3) Colonial policy.
4) Workers' movement and socialist parties.
5) Revolutionary movements (bourgeois), not only socialist.
6) Democratic reforms (including those directed against the church).
7) Social reforms.
8) Economic policy
trusts; tariff legislation; trade agreements; tariff wars.
9) National movement.

FROM THE NOTEBOOK "AUSTRIAN AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS", ETC.

DISTRIBUTION OF COLONIES AMONG THE IMPERIALIST STATES

Otto Hübner, *Geographical-Statistical Tables*, *1916*, and *The Statesman's Year-Book*, 1916 (=St.) (figures from Hübner).

EASTERN EUROPE AND ITS PART OF ASIA

		Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)	
(Asia) 35,559	Russia in Europe	5,452	140,841	Finland: 81.4% Finns 10.7% Swedes Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks
(Asia)	" " Asia	16,637	33,259	
	Russian vassal states (Khiva and Bukhara)	271	2,300	
	Total Russia . .	22,360	176,400	*43*% Great Russians, i.e., belonging to the ruling nation
	+Caspian and Aral seas . . .	506	—	Hübner gives 44.3% ???
	Austria-Hungary with Bosnia . .	677	51,390	12.0 mill. Germans 10.0 mill. Hungarians 22.0 million, i.e., *42.8*% belong to the ruling nation
Balkans:	Rumania	140	7,602	about 92% Rumanians in 1899
	Bulgaria	114	4,767	80.7% Bulgarians 10.7% Turks

		Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)	
	Greece (+Crete)	120	4,822	In the old region (before 1912) there were 1,850,000 Greeks out of a total of 1,980,000 = 93.4%
	+Samos[1]. . .	0.5	53	
	Serbia	87	4,490	95.4% Serbs in *1910* (i.e., before 1912 war)
	Albania	28	850	"Albanians" (only ??)
	Montenegro . . .	14	435	Serbs, Turks, Arnauts
	Turkey in Europe	28	1,891	43% Turks
19,709 (Asia)	Turkey in Asia	1,767	19,709	33% Syrians, Arabs
55,268 (Asia)	All Turkey . . .	1,795	21,600	3: Russia + Austria + Turkey 249,390 6: Small Balkan states 23,019 272,409
	Eastern Europe		272,409	
+ 819,330	*Rest* of Asia			
874,598	China	1,139	329,618	mainly Chinese, and then "Punti"[84] Mongols, etc.
	Japan	674	72,673	mainly Japanese according to the Encyclopaedia > 99% of the population are Japanese)
including	Formosa	36	3,612	52,986 = Japan 19,687 = her colonies 72,673 = total
	Karafuto[85]	34	49	
	Kwangtung	3	517	
	Korea . .	218	15,509	

[1]) In Hübner included in Asia and given separately. In St. it is included in Greece.

semi-colonies (7 countries)

		Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)	
China: 329,618 27,049 = 356,667	1. Persia . . .	1,645	9,500	
	2. Siam . . .	600	8,149	— Siamese 1,800 Chinese 1,400 etc.
	3. Afghanistan	624	4,450	— Afghans 351,000 Tajiks 225,000, etc.
	4. Nepal . . .	154	3,000	— Mongols and Indians
	5. Oman . . .	212	1,000	— Arabs, Indians, Persians, Negroes
	6. Independent Arabia. . .	2,279	950	— ...?
7 British possessions		5,265	324,879	including 4) India 315,961 Ceylon 4,263
2 Dutch "		1,521	37,717	— about 98% natives
5 French "		803	17,267	
3 Portuguese "		23	980	
1 German 2) "		0.6	209	= 389,990 = Σ in European colonies in Asia
1 U.S. possession (Philippines)		296	8,938	+ 19,687 = Japanese colonies
			819,330	409,677 = Σ in colonies in Asia + 356,667 = semi-colonies 52,986 = Japan = 819,330

approximate number of "states" ("etwa")

2) Kiao-chow—0.5 and 192,000 + Tientsin—0.1 and 17,000

4) In British India in 1911 there were more than 100 ethnic groups; out of 313.3 million—74 per cent Aryan Indians.

Africa

	Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)	
French possessions	9,660	38,500	—85.8% Arabs, etc.
Algeria	575	5,564	8.9% French
			—88.4% natives
Tunisia	125	1,957	
Morocco	500	5,000	
West and Equatorial Africa	5,352	21,895	
East Africa	714	3,635	
British possessions	—	51,660	
Union of South Africa	1,222	6,212	
Nigeria	869	17,471	
Gold Coast	309	1,502	
Zanzibar	2	199	
Others	3,788	11,507	
Egypt	3,485	14,726	—92.7% Egyptians
+ Sinai	59	31	
+ Thasos[3])	0.3	12	
Belgian Congo	2,365	15,003	Negroes and minor groups
German possessions	2,707	11,527	
Portuguese "	2,070	8,352	
Italian "	1,590	1,368	36,839
Tripolitania	1,100	723	
Eritrea and Somali	490	645	
Spanish possessions	560	589	
Morocco (Tangier)	0.6	60	Mainly Arabs
Abyssinia	1,120	8,000	9,560 = "semi-colonies"
Liberia	95	1,500	
Three lakes (Chad, Tanganyika, Nyasa)	87	—	all the rest in Africa = colonies
		136,559	

Africa

French colonies	38,500
British colonies	51,660
Other colonies	36,839
Semi-colonies	9,560
	136,559

All African colonies = *126,999*

[3]) Hübner includes Sinai in Asia, Thasos in Europe and does *not* regard Egypt as a "British possession". *St.* puts Egypt as a British possession.

Western Europe + Great Britain + Japan	Sq. km. (000) without colonies	Population (000) with colonies
1871-1876 — —	(8 out of 14)	6
1914-1916 — —	(3 out of 14)	11

semi-colonies
9,560 in Africa
+ 356,667 in Asia
366,227

3+7=10 countries
= *all semi-colonies*

Australia and Oceania

	Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)	
British possessions:	8,261	6,675	
(Australian Commonwealth	7,704	4,922	— 82.3% Australians
New Zealand	271	1,085	— 69.7% New Zealanders
Fiji Islands	19	154	
German possessions	245	641	
Dutch possessions	395	240	
U.S. "	17.4	228	
Hawaii	16.7	208	
Tutuila	0.2	7	
Guam	0.5	13	
French possessions	23	81	
Unoccupied islands	13	—	
Total Australia and Polynesia:	8,955	7,865	
Asia		409,677	
Africa		126,999	
Europe		250	
America		12,306	
Total colonies		557,097	
Western Europe			
1. Germany	548	64,926	92.5% Germans. About 5 million "alien" nations. Poles — — 5.47% French — — 0.37 Danes — — 0.25 Population of Alsace-Lorraine = 1,871,000
2. Great Britain including European colonies Gibraltar, Malta, Gozo and Comino	318 (0.3	46,813 250)	95% English language *Ireland* 83,000 sq. km. *4,375,000* population = 4.4 million
3. France	536	39,602	93.7% French [2] Italians 1.3% [2] N.B.
4. Italy	287	35,598	99. 1% Italians
5. Spain (+Canary and Presidio Islands)	504	20,366	96.6% Spaniards

[2]) Data for 1881.

	Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)	
6. Belgium	29	7,571	43.4% Flemings (3) 38.1 French 81.5% by language only 53% Flemings
7. Holland	34	6,213	98.8% Dutch
(+coastal waters)	7	—	
8. Portugal (+Azores and Madeira)	92	5,960	99.5% Portuguese
9. Sweden	448	5,639	99.4% Swedes Finns — 25,000 Lapps — 7,000
10. Denmark (+Faroe Islands and Iceland)	145	2,860	96.3% Danes (*born in Denmark*)
11. Norway	323	2,358	98.9% Norwegians
Σ=310 +2[1]) 12. Luxemburg	2	260	93.1% Germans
13. Monaco	0.001	23	(Italians, French, etc.)
14. Marino	0.06	11	(Italians)
15. Liechtenstein	0.1	11	(Germans)
16. Andorra	0.4	5	(Spaniards)
17. *Switzerland*	41	3,765	69% Germans 21.1% French } 98.1% 8.0% Italians 31%? "alien" nations
Total Western Europe		242,161	

[1]) Hübner adds also "Thasos (to Egypt)". I include it in Egypt, in Africa. (3) In Belgium, 43.4% spoke *only* Flemish and 38.1% *only* French. Ergo, approximately: 43.4% of 81.5=53.2% Flemings in the population.

Western Europe

17—5 midget=12
Of which, without colonies (9, 11, 17) i.e. 3
9 with colonies
In 1876 (1, 4, 6, 9, 11, 17) i.e. **6** were without colonies
6 with colonies

No colonies:	Sweden	5.6	million population
	Denmark	2.9	" "
	Norway	2.3	" "
	Switzerland	3.8	" "
		14.6	

America

	Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)			
United States (without Hawaii)	9,369	98,902		74.3%	Americans
				88.7%	whites
+lakes and coastal waters	241	—		74.3%	Americans
				14.4%	foreign-born
				10.8%	Negroes and mulattos
				0.3%	Indians
Panama Canal zone	1	63			
Puerto Rico	9	1,184			
Total U.S.A.		100,149	(1783)		in this column year of independence
Brazil	8,497	24,908	(1829)	40%	whites
				55.9%	Indians, half-breeds, etc.
Mexico	1,985	15,502	(1823)	99.3%	Mexicans
Argentina	2,950	7,468	(1810)	78.5%	Argentinians
				16%	French, Spaniards and Italians
Peru	1,834	5,580	(1821)	86.4%	Indians, half-breeds, mulattos
				12%	whites
Colombia	1,206	5,071	(1819)	10%	whites
				90%	half-breeds, Negroes, Indians
Chile	758	3,505	(1820)		Creoles, half-breeds, etc.
Venezuela	1,020	2,756	(1813)	99%	mulattos
				1%	Creoles
Haiti (western part of Haiti island)	29	2,500	(1820)	90%	Negroes
Cuba	114	2,469	(1902)	66.4%	whites
				33%	Negroes, mulattos
Bolivia	1,470	2,521	(1825)	77.8%	Indians, half-breeds, etc.
				12.8%	whites
Guatemala	113	2,119	(1821)	65%	Ladins
				35%	Indians
Ecuador	307	1,500	(1822)	53%	Indians, Negroes, etc.
				33%	Spaniards and half-breeds

	Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)		
Uruguay	187	1,279	(1828)	"whites and mixed" "Foreigners, 181,000
Salvador	21	1,226	(1821)	mainly mixed and Negroes
Paraguay	253	752	(1811) > 90%	whites and mixed
Dominican Republic	48	708	(1843)	mainly Creoles and mulattos
Honduras	115	566	(1821) 95%	Indians and mixed
Nicaragua	128	460	(1821) 99%	Indians, Negroes, etc.
			1%	Europeans
Costa Rica	48	411	(1821) 99.5%	Creoles, Indians, Negroes
Panama	86	364	(1903)	about 9/10 mixed, Negroes and Indians

British possessions	8,962	10,431*	
Canada	8,528	8,075	British since 1763 54% Britons 28.5% French 1.5% Indians
Newfoundland and Labrador	129	245	British since 1713
West Indies	32	1,752	Jamaica Spanish since 1494 British " 1659 Dutch " 1667 British " 1803 British " 1786
Guiana	234	305	
Honduras	22	41	
Falkland Islands and Bermuda	17	24	Falklands British since 1833
French possessions	91	460	French 1674
Dutch "	130	141	Dutch 1667

* So given by Hübner.—*Ed.*

	Sq. km. (000)	Population (000)
Danish West Indies	0.3	27
All America:	39,977	192,873
United States		98,902
all colonies		12,306
rest of America		81,665

All colonies in America:	
British	10,431
French	460
Dutch	141
Danish	27
United States	63
	1,184
	12,306

	Types: Groups of countries	No. of states		Population (million)		% of oppressed nations		Epoch of national and democratic movements
I	Western Europe	(12) 17		242		7%		*1789* (1789. 1848) 1566 (*)-1871
	United States of America	1	19	99	394	11%	7%	*1783*-1865
	Japan	1		53		0%		-1871
II	Eastern Europe and its part of Asia	9		272		53%		(1848) *1905*. 1909*
	South and Central America	20		82		?		(1823-1911)**
III	Semi-colonies	10		366		?		*1911**
	Colonies	? about (60)?		557		100%		(?) Twentieth century*
	Total	(118)		1,671				

(*) 1566 = beginning of the Dutch revolution.

* See p. 718 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 713-14.—*Ed.*

Whole world:

	Sq. km. (000)	*Population* (000)
Asia	44,450	874,928
Europe	9,977	459,261
Africa	29,888	136,438
America	39,977	192,873
Australia	8,954	7,865
Polar regions	12,669	15
Whole world	145,917	1,671,380

(1916) *Colonies* (population in thousands)

	Europe	Asia	Africa	Australia	America	Total	had no colonies in 1871
Great Britain	250	324,879	51,660	6,675	10,421	393,895	
France	—	17,267	38,500	81	460	56,508*	*6,000* in 1876
Holland	—	37,717	—	240	141	38,098	
Portugal	—	980	8,352	—	—	9,332	
Germany	—	209	11,527	641	—	12,377	—
U.S.A.	—	8,938	—	228	1,247	10,413	—
Japan	—	19,687	—	—	—	19,687	—
Denmark	—	—	—	—	27	27	
Belgium	—	—	15,003	—	—	15,003	—
Italy	—	—	1,368	—	—	1,368	—
Spain	—	—	589	—	—	589	

		Population (000)
393,895	1. Great Britain	393,895
+56,508	2. France	56,508
450,403	3. Holland	38,098
	4. Portugal	9,332
	5. Germany	12,377
	6. United States	10,413
	7. Japan	19,687
	8. Denmark	27
	9. Belgium	15,003
	10. Italy	1,368
	11. Spain	589
	Total colonies:	557,297

* So given in the MS.—*Ed.*

Total colonies =	557	million	Including India =	320	million
Semi-colonies =	366	"	" China =	330	"
Together	923	"	China + India	650	"

Denmark has now (December 1916) dropped out of the list of colonial countries (? but Iceland [akin by nationality]).

Out of 10 countries with colonies, *five* acquired them *only* after 1871. || N.B.

Capital abroad, 000 million francs (1913)		(4) Richest countries	Population (millions)	Colonies (millions)	% of colonial peoples to population	Order in level of capitalist development	Output of pig-iron (million tons)	Length of railways (states + colonies) (000 km.)
Arndt ε 1 *								
75	78.7	1. Great Britain	47	394	842%	3	9.0	207.8
60	40.0	2. France . . .	40	56	141%	4	4.9	63.5
44	32.5	3. Germany . .	65	12.5	20%	2	17.6	67.9
179	10.0?	4. U.S.A. . . .	100	10.4	10%	1	30.2	412.7
	161.2	ἀἀΣ=	252	473				
	Isch-chanian δ 14**	Other colonial powers . . .	129	84	65%			
			381	557				

* See p. 271 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 269.—*Ed.*

Diagrammatic picture of the division of the world (in relation to national development)



	250 +	300 +	350 +	750 = 1,650
Dates (epochs) of great bourgeois-democratic national movements	1649 *1789* 1848 (*1871*)	1848 *1905*	*1911*	20th century

α = not < *160*,000 million (??) francs of capital abroad. Not less than *300*,000 million francs!!

α) Four countries: Great Britain + Germany + France + U.S.A. = 252 million population.
They have colonies with *473* million population.

β) 128 million in Eastern Europe (Russia + Austria + Turkey) = 144 million dependent
+ 129 million in West-Euro- + pean small countries = 84 million colonies
257 228
50 Japan
307 + part of South and Central *America*.

(γ) China + semi-colonial part.

(δ) 557 colonies + 144 = 701 million dependent + part of South and Central *America* + part of semi-colonies.

NOTEBOOK
"DATA ON PERSIA"[86]

Contents

Demorgny [1-41]
Jaeger [5-11]

DEMORGNY, *THE PERSIAN QUESTION AND THE WAR*

G. *Demorgny*, *The Persian Question and the War*, Paris, 1916.

((The author is a legal adviser to the Persian Government and professor of the Teheran School of Political Science. Also author of many books and articles on Persia—both in Persian and French.))

Highly instructive as a description of the truly miserable state of Persia, shamelessly humiliated and robbed by *three*—primarily—Great Powers. Russia, Great Britain and Germany. The author is, of course, wholly a French "patriot". All the more interesting, therefore, is his ruthless and compelled exposure of the *conflict*—a most bitter conflict—*between Russia and Great Britain*.

Formally, Persia is neutral in this war. In actual fact, however, both the Russians and the British, on the one hand, and the Turks and the Germans, on the other, are *fighting* and plundering on *Persian territory*.

p. *277*: August 27, 1915; the German Vice-consul Schoenemann attacks the Russian and British consuls, etc. N.B.!!

The book has a map of Persia showing the Russian and British "zones of influence".

The treaty between Russia and Great Britain (1907) demarcating their respective "spheres of influence" in Persia did not satisfy them ("the implementation (of the 1907 treaty) did not achieve the aim" (67))—their conflict and mutual distrust continued ("Anglo-Russian rivalry", p. 64 and passim). Germany exploited this, and her treaty with Russia (the Potsdam meeting, *1910*) was "a triumph for German diplomacy" (p. 57)—an attempt to divide Persia between Germany and Russia. "We shall divide Persia between us and oust Great Britain" (57)—thus Demorgny sums up the content (more correctly: the meaning and substance) of this treaty.

"Anglo-Indian imperialism" (p. *65* et seq.).

Great Britain is actually in full control of the "neutral zone", too (within Persia), and the struggle with Russia continues.

"Beginning with the government, everything of importance in the country joins either the Russian, German or British clientele" (78).

There are frequent quotations from *The Strangling of Persia*, by *Morgan Shuster*, New York, 1912. The Russians accused him of "dictatorial" behaviour and forced him to leave the country (January 11, 1912). The British tried to defend him but with no success. The author calls his book "bitter" ("a bitter book against Persia, Russia, Great Britain and Germany" (86)) and says that he "did not understand the situation", that he was "no diplomat" (a "poor diplomat" (85)).

Foreign powers cannot obtain concessions in Persia without the consent of Russia or Great Britain (80).

Let us (French) not forget *Syria* in our calculations (82)....

The consuls (of the three Great Powers) resort to shameless intrigues, hire gangs, incite conflicts, "consular fury" (p. 110 and elsewhere), slander "moderate" ambassadors, etc. (p. 89 and elsewhere, about Russia).

N.B.! well said!

"The aim is control over the national finances. This has become a new and very fashionable formula for a disguised protectorate" (93, note).

"Russian imperialism" (p. 120, etc.).... ||| N.B.

..."The Dzhulfa—Tabriz—Rezaiyeh—Teheran railway concession was granted on January 24 (February 6), 1913, to the Russian Discount Bank in Teheran" (168)....

"From 1912-14 Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia has continued in the same forms" (196).

"There was also the much discussed question of a big trans-Persian railway.... Anglo-Russian rivalry on this issue, skilfully fostered by the Persian Government, was adroitly exploited by Germany. On this issue, too, French interests have up to now been subordinated to the secret machinations of certain financial groups" (262)....

"On December 24" (1915 or 19*14*?) "a bomb intended to destroy the Russian, French, Belgian and British ministers was exploded in Teheran, but the attempt failed and the bomb killed one of the participants in the plot, which was organised by a German-Turkish gang. The German Legation was not discouraged, it recruited a thousand bandits at ninety francs per month each and gave them weapons. These men hastened to sell the rifles and cartridges and make off" (273).

A meeting of Russian industrialists in Moscow on November 23, 1910, was opposed to a trans-Persian railway, because, they argued, it would facilitate British and German competition (266-67). ||| sic!!

(In Persia now, 1915) "there are no longer spheres of influence, the Russians and the British now help one another against the Germans. Three hundred Cossacks have left Meshed in pursuit of four German officers and 83 Bakhtiars, who recently left Meshed for Afghanistan, where they want to instigate an uprising" (296). | N.B. | N.B.

Etc., etc.

There are figures on Persia's trade. Total turnover is 628 million krans (1 kran = 0.45 franc).

1) Russia—63% of total trade (p. 247)
2) Great Britain—25%
3) Turkey—9%
4) Germany (24 million krans)
5) France (11)
6) Italy.

JAEGER, *PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN QUESTION*

Professor Dr. *Th. Jaeger* (Hamburg), *Persia and the Persian Question*, Weimar, 1916 (Deutsche Orientbücherei. Published by Ernst Jäckh, XIV) (179 pp.).

N.B.: Better than the preceding book.

A very good, comprehensive, clear account, with precise information and frequent citation of documents. An excellent map of Persia, showing Russian and British zones of influence. The author, of course, is an imperialist scoundrel.

N.B. Reference is made to *Persia and the European War*. by a "Persian patriot" (price ? Place of publication?), which appeared while Jaeger's book was being printed.

Various quotations from *Curzon*'s book *Persia*, London, 1892. Two vols.

Jaeger's book begins with a quotation from the "Testament of Peter the Great", which Napoleon I "dictated in the form of theses when in 1812 he had to condition public opinion to accept his campaign against Russia" (p. 9).

1722-23: Peter the Great conquers Derbent, Baku, Resht and the greater part of Gilan (North-Western province of Persia, bordering on the Caspian Sea).

1735—Gilan, Derbent, Baku are returned to Persia.

1802—Georgia becomes a Russian province.

1800—Napoleon I and Paul I plan to attack India,

1807—Napoleon I's military mission to Persia (70 officers, etc., led by General *Gardanne*).

1808—Britain sends a special envoy to Persia, and helps Persia in her war against Russia.

1813—Persia defeated in the war against Russia. Gulistan Peace. Persia surrenders Derbent, Baku, etc., etc. Undertakes not to keep naval vessels in the Caspian Sea.

1814—Anglo-Persian treaty; a "defensive and offensive. alliance" (13)....

1825—War between Persia and Russia (which, he says, drew Persia into a war just as Britain did the Boers in

1899). Britain tricked Persia: this development does not come under our treaty!!

1828—Persia defeated in the war against Russia Turkmanchai Peace (Persia surrenders Nakhichevan, Yerevan, etc.); £3,500,000 war indemnity.

1890—Britain (a British company) obtains a 50-year tobacco monopoly concession for 300,000 marks + one-quarter of net profit.

With a capital of 13,000,000 marks, the company obtained a *net* profit, after all deductions, of 7,500,000, *i.e.*, > *50* per cent (p. 17). || good example!!

Popular disturbances as a result of this, etc. ("several hundred killed"!! p. 17)—the concession was bought by the Persian Government in 1892 for 10,000,000 marks (!!). The ten million marks were borrowed from Britain at 6 per cent!!! ||

August 5, 1906. The Persian Shah promised the people a constitution and a parliament.

1909. British insistence compels the recall from Persia of Russia's representative, *von Hartwig*, who had been most unscrupulously fomenting intrigues, etc. (He was transferred to Belgrade, where he was "one of the chief instigators of the assassination of the Archduke, the heir to the throne, and his wife", p. 21)

June 23, 1908. Coup d'état in Persia. Mejlis dissolved, with the help of Lyakhov.

May 31-June 13, 1908—Lyakhov's letter to the general headquarters of the Caucasian military area (full text)—from *Browne*: *The Persian Revolution, 1905-09*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 222. A *most brazen* plan for counter-revolution in Persia, bribery, pogroms, etc. ((pp. 26-28 in Jaeger)). || N.B.

November 29, 1911—Russia's ultimatum (the second) (to Persia): expulsion of Morgan Shuster, etc.

Russia steadily advances in Azerbaijan. (Railway from Dzhulfa to Tabriz begun.)

A series of quotations from Browne about the shameless robbery and violence committed by the Cossacks (38 et seq.).... The Cossacks hanged Moslem priests (41), etc.!!

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Letter of a Frenchman on the same subject (*Siècle*, *January 11, 1910*)—p. 39.

Swedish gendarmerie called in to preserve order... (42).

1914—The Russians settle Russian peasants in Azerbaijan....

Persia has neither a "modern civil service" nor "money" (49). The collection of taxes is put up for *purchase*. Quotes *Morgan Shuster*: *The Strangling of Persia*, 1912. ((At a Cabinet meeting Morgan exposed one of the ministers of having accepted a bribe of 83,000 tomans = 332,000 marks. The reply: I did not know about it, it was done by my private secretary!)).

N.B.

The *Belgian* customs officials act in the same way (de *Naus* bought himself a castle with money "earned" in Persia (53)).

Persia = 1,645,000 sq. km.

Population—four million ("probably") (ten million is an exaggeration, p. 60).

	1900-01		1912-13
Persia's trade: exports	60.2	mill. marks	165.8
imports	119.4	" "	215.7
Σ =	179.6		381.5
including		Russia	62.7%
		Britain	20.9%
			83.6%
Persian imports from Germany	0.9	mill. marks	4.6
Russia	45.5	— — —	131.6
British Empire	50.1	— — —	60.0
France	9.5	— — —	4.4
Turkey	5	— — —	9.5
Persian exports to Germany	0.07	— — —	7.8
Russia	35.3	———	120.0
British Empire	10.2	———	20.3
France	2.6	———	1.9
Turkey	7.2	———	15.3

Russia treats Persia as her "own" land, and does not allow free transit to Persia (67)....

The way round this is to send goods by *parcel post*:

		total		including Germany	
(pp. 68-69)	1904 —	10	————	1	!!
	1913 —	384,318		193,816	

Russia tried to prohibit parcel post transit from February 1, 1914, but met with opposition from *all* the powers (including Britain and France), and had to give way (pp. 70-71). N.B.!!

In 1902 Russia concluded a trade treaty with Persia by which she ensured a market for "her" sugar, oil, etc. (71)....

Morgan Shuster says this tariff is extremely harmful for Persia and profitable for Russia (73)—(p. 270 of Shuster's book)....

Russia thus ensures herself a *monopoly* (74) in North Persia, compelling the Persians to pay high prices for trashy goods!! !!

The struggle for influence in Persia: (Russian, French, German) schools, (Russian, British, German) hospitals, etc. German *chemists' shops* (88), rug marketing company (89)

Russian annexations in Central Asia from 1861 to 1891 (1911 estimates)

			Sq. km.	Population
(1869-73)		Transcaspian region	598,090	451,000
		Bukhara——	203,430	1,500,000
	(1873)	Khiva———	67,430	800,000
		Syr-Darya—	489,240	1,874,000
{ 1884	(1875-76)	Ferghana—	142,790	2,069,000
Merv }		Samarkand—	87,560	1,184,000
			1,588,540	7,878,000

May 5, *1903*. Lord *Lamington*'s speech in the House of Lords (p. 100 et seq.) (against Russia: we need the Persian Gulf—it is the defence of the Indian frontier...)

Also speech of Lord *Ellenborough*:

..."I should prefer to see Russia in Constantinople than a European arsenal on the shores of the Persian Gulf" (111). N.B.

Anglo-Russian treaty of *August 31, 1907* (text: p. 114 et seq.) ("Anglo-Russian treaty on partition")....

Russian zone—790,000 sq. km.

British zone—355,000 " " (p. 119)....

Note of the *British* and Russian ambassadors to Persia (of February 18, 1912)—p. 124 et seq.—loans of £100,000 are granted by each at ***seven*** per cent!!!, etc. ... Of course, the ministers, Russian placemen, *agree*!! 7%

The Potsdam treaty of *August 19, 1911*—(text: 130 et seq.). Germany recognises Russia's zone in Persia, Russia agrees not to oppose the Baghdad railway.

Reichs Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag (December 10, 1910) on the same subject....

(Russia shares with Britain, but afterwards re-insures with Germany!!)) double insurance!!

Germany needs a road to Persia and India—only for trade, of course, only!!—The Baghdad railway ends in the Gulf, that will not do, the Gulf can be closed by Britain. The railway must end in Bandar Abbas (!!).

Oman is, in fact, in British hands (p. 144).

Tabriz (population 220,000). Trade (1906-07):

exports—23.4 million marks		
imports—30.9 " "		
including Russia	34.0%	
Great Britain	31	
Austria	10	
Turkey	4.2	
France	3	
Italy	5.6	
Germany	4.5	
	Σ=92.3	(p. 150)

(This, author says, is below Germany's trading capacity.)

1914 *summer*: treaty on the division of railways in Asia Minor.

(p. 151)!! France gets *4,522* km. of railways in Turkey. Germany—*4,909* km.

Afghanistan—a mountainous region.

624,000 sq. km. *4,450,000* inhabitants. *Nominally* she is completely *independent*. In reality all *foreign* policy is in the hands of Great Britain; the Emir is on Britain's *pay-roll*. Under the Anglo-Russian treaty (August 31, 1907), Britain recognised freedom of trade in Afghanistan, and Russia recognised Afghanistan as being "*outside her sphere of influence*".

The British do not even allow foreigners to enter! Afghanistan (!! p. 154).

Militarily, the Afghans "should by no means be underestimated as adversaries" (157).

Britain treats them with the greatest caution:

"In this one sees the wisdom of Britain's 'velvet glove' policy, for the British could not behave to anyone more tolerantly and cautiously than they have to him" (the Emir of Afghanistan) (158). ||| ***N.B.***

Turkestan (= Central Asia). The Urals, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Ferghana, Samarkand, Semirechye, Syr-Darya, and Transcaspian regions (p. 161).

—3,488,530 sq. km. and 10,957,400

+Khiva and Bukhara

ΣΣά= 3,760,000 sq. km., 13¼ million inhabitants.

The population is almost exclusively Moslem.

"A special diplomatic mission from these countries, notably from the Kirghiz region, is now touring the Courts of the Quadruple Alliance powers, and of the neutral states, to put their complaints against Russian oppression and to *demand* liberation from the Russian yoke and *the restoration of their old states*" (162). | N.B.

On Turkestan, author refers to the German translation of the "memorandum" (Krivoshein's?), and "*Russian Turkestan*", the report of the Belgian consul, (*Recueil Consulaire de Belgique*, Brussels, Vol. 160, 1912). || N.B.

The Anglo-Russian agreement on *Tibet* (same year, 1907).—Both sides recognise the sovereign rights of China (text, p. 169), the territorial integrity of Tibet, etc., etc. (this shifts the struggle for Tibet to the "Court" in Peking)....

"The Baghdad railway issue ... becomes a Persian issue" (173)....

Baluchistan is nominally independent. Great Britain owns the railway and *200* yards of "British territory" ("leased"!!) on each side. The country maintains "the closest relations of friendship and alliance with Britain", (the country) "has, of course, put its whole foreign policy entirely in her (Britain's) hands, but for the rest is as much an independent native state as, say, Afghanistan or Nepal" (174-75). || !!

The author's conclusion:

"As against that" (in contrast to wicked Britain and Russia) "Germany's desire can only be not to insert herself as a third force between the two brothers—Russia and Britain—so that under certain circumstances, she shall not be attacked there by both of them; on the contrary, Germany's aim, as in all similar cases (Turkey, Morocco), can only be a strong, independent Persia with equal rights for all, at most with some special privileges for Germany" (176)....

ha-ha!!!

"only" !!!

	German exports to Turkey	Turkish exports to Germany
	1882 — — — 5.9	1.2 million marks
	1887 — — — 12	3.2
!!	1891 — — — 37	13.5
	1900 — — — 34.4	30.5
	1912 — — — 98.4	74.0 (p. 179).

July 17, 1914: The British House of Commons adopts (by 254 votes to 18) a government proposal to buy shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (rich oil deposits along the River Karun). The author compares this to the purchase of Suez Canal shares.

p. 158-59: The testament of the old Afghan Emir (Abd-ur-Rahman)—must strive for an alliance of Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan to safeguard the whole Moslem world against Russia....

N.B.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES
1912-16

The notes were made in 1912-16
in Russian, German, English
French and other languages

First published in 1936-37
in *Lenin Miscellanies XXIX*, *XXX*

Published according
to the manuscripts

PLAN OF AN ARTICLE ON SYNDICATES[87]

1. Growth of prices. Robbery. "Strike." Golubyatnikov....

Markov II and the Liberals

2. Syndicates (a "world-wide phenomenon") in Europe (America) and Russia
   (a) development of production
   (b) home market. Poverty of farmers and peasants
   (e) position of the workers. Deprived of rights
   (d) political freedom.
3. Syndicates and "**bureaucracy**".
4. Oil and sugar syndicates versus landowners... (syndicate of feudal landowners).
5. Syndicates and the *Urals*....
6. The official liberalism (or the liberal-bureaucratic view) ("pogrom socialism") versus class struggle. Bureaucratic carrion and *life*.
7. Thieves and thief solidarity.

7 *bis*. Capitalism and syndicates.

8. Means: (1) opening of frontiers
   (2) twenty million for workers' housing in the coal and oil areas
   (3) state industry and democratic control
   (5) (4) labour unions and political freedom
   (4) (5) enquiry and public commissions and full exposure.

OIL OUTPUT AND PRICES IN AMERICA

Statistical Abstract of the United States, pp. 211 and *223*. *Yezhegodnik* "*Rechi*", p. 681.

1900

75,752,691 dollars÷63,620,529 = 1.19 dollars

2 rubles 38 kopeks÷8 =29 (30) kopeks per pood 517 million poods. "*Rech*" *Annual*, p. 681 5,170÷636 = 8.1 poods per *barrel*

{Probably, there are more than 8 poods of oil in a *barrel*}

1907

1,407÷166 = 8.5 poods per barrel 1,512.0 million poods÷178.5 = 8.5 poods per barrel 1,455 million poods÷183 = (8) 7.9 poods per barrel

1908
1909

1910

127,896,328 dollars÷209,556,048 barrels
= 0.61 dollar (crude petroleum)
61 cents per barrel (= 42 gallons)
1 gallon = 61/42 = 1.4 cents.

1,714 million poods. *Yezhegodnik* "*Rechi*", p. 681 1,714÷209 = 8.1 poods per *barrel* 61 cents (about 1 ruble 22 kopeks per barrel) 122÷8 = 15 kopeks per pood

BEBEL ON A WAR OF GERMANY AGAINST RUSSIA[88]

Bebel, *in 1886, in favour of a war against Russia.*

Die Neue Zeit, *1886* (November 1886) (4th year (No. 11)), pp. 502-15, carried an article by Bebel: "Germany, Russia and the Eastern Question."

It advocates a (so to speak) "preventive" *war of Germany against Russia and France.*

In 1878, "one should have gone still further" (p. 513, column 1), i.e., not only moderate Russia's demands, but snatch the newly founded Balkan states from under Russian domination and set up a "Balkan alliance" (sic).

"Russia's refusal to comply with these conditions should have been answered by war, which would have crippled Russia's power for decades" (513, column 2)....

In 1886 (or 1885), *after Prince Alexander's return to Bulgaria* (evidently after the Bulgarian revolution of September 18, 1885), when both Serbs and Rumanians feared the strengthening of Russia, there should have been formed "an independent alliance of Balkan states supported by Germany and Austria-Hungary".

"If Russia had then ventured to declare war, Germany would have stood against her more unitedly than ever before, and in alliance with Austria, the Balkan states and, possibly, Turkey, she could wage war against Russia and France with the best prospects of success, a war which in any case she will be compelled to wage later on, but possibly—indeed even probably—under *much more unfavourable conditions*" (513, column 2).

the entire country, all classes in Germany, are dissatisfied with foreign policy: *511, column 2*

Bebel's italics

DIE NEUE ZEIT, 1912-13

Kurt Wiedenfeld, *The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate*, Bonn, 1912.
(The Cologne Trade and Industry Museum. *Modern Industrial Establishments* No. 1)
Review (Sp.) in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1913, Vol. 2, p. 946.
ibidem, controversy (series of articles) on the mass strike and Rosa Luxemburg. "Semi-official."
idem on the Armaments Bill.

Die Neue Zeit, 1912, 1.

Kautsky's polemic against Hilferding on money (ibidem Varga and Hilferding).

Kautsky, "Mass actions"....

Article by *Hue*, "Morocco and the German Ore Supply", sets out to prove that Germany does not need new ore sources (("does not suffer from lack of ore")), is richer in ore than any other country, that the "millions spent on the Herero revolt" ought to be used to improve mining, etc.

Hilferding, "On the Theory of Combination": concerning Marx's mistake in *Theories* and notes on *combination*.

NOTES ON DEFEAT OF ONE'S OWN COUNTRY IN THE IMPERIALIST WAR

Notes: *On Defeat of One's Own Country in the Imperialist War.*

1. Axelrod, 1st version (for defeat, but not fundamentally)
2. Axelrod, 2nd version (against).
3. The bourgeoisie and its revolutions
   1870 republican opposition!
   1905 Russia
4. Defeat of each and every government—either an absurdity or transition to civil war.
5. By agreement of all countries? Wait for that?
6. Russia: bourgeois revolution
   national question
7. Defeat of Russia + German and Austrian chauvinism
8. "Neither victory nor defeat"? = Status quo....
9. *Hochland* on Social-Democracy.*
10. "The chief enemy is in one's own country."
11. Loophole for chauvinism = rejection of "defeat".
12. Defeat and hardship for the people (sophistry)....
13. "Release" of the colonies (and oppressed nations) is a blessing for the revolution. (Imperialist war—for redivision of the colonies and for Great-Power privileges).

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* See p. 316 of this volume.—*Ed.*

14. "Defence of Great-Power privileges'
15. Three trends of hatred.

Another of the sophistries served up by Axelrod and others: "Internationalist" tactics, it is alleged, have still not been worked out, have not been discussed, they have only been outlined; it is too early to draw definite conclusions, and so on and so forth. Let it be said that there are not and cannot be any *special* "internationalist" tactics; they amount *wholly* to revolutionary tactics, to propaganda, preparation for and support of revolutionary actions.*

NOTES FOR LECTURE ON "IMPERIALISM AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION"[89]

ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Great-Power Nations

(*Hofkalender*, 1914)

1910

Germans 12 million in Austria-Hungary
60(?) " " Germany (out of 67)

Σ=72(?)

British (?) 45 in Great Britain and British colonies (out of 46)
(?) 80 in the United States

125 (?)

British	—	12
Great Russians (170×43)	—	73
Germans	—	72
French	—	38
	Σ=	308 million
Japanese	—	50
Italians	—	35
		393
Hungarians (?)	—	10
	Σ=	403 million

Colonies (population in millions)

1914: 570 1876: 314
+81% in 38 years

* The last paragraph was crossed out by Lenin. In his article "The Collapse of the Second International", written in the summer of 1915, Lenin criticises this sophistry of Axelrod's (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 211-12).—*Ed.*

OUTLINE OF LECTURE

Subject: Imperialism and the *self-determination* of nations

not the "national question

Away with two-thirds of the national programme (only self-determination)

+ Democratic reforms under imperialism?
+ Norway 1905. An "exception"?
+ Ireland 1869. "Utopia"?
+ National movements in Asia and the colonies... and Africa (Egypt)....
+ Why *division* into nations when imperialism is the epoch of the union of nations?

"Why" national movements in the Ukraine, China, Persia, India, Egypt, etc., "if" (when) the advanced countries have reached the stage of *imperialism*, which unites nations?, if capitalism (= imperialism) in the advanced countries *has outgrown* the bounds of national states? The Proudhonists and Marx in the 1860s. ("Other nations should sit on their behinds and wait until France achieves the social revolution.")

Marx 1848 in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Engels 1866 and Marx 1869: precisely in the interests of the working class of the *oppressing* nations it is necessary to demand freedom of secession for the *oppressed* nations.

Page 1: -2-3* (compress and alter)	Imperialism is oppression of nations on a *new* historical basis.... This is one half. The other half (of the problem) = emergence of *national movements in Eastern Europe* (the Ukraine after 1905), in Asia and Africa (China, India, Egypt)—in the *colonies* (among 1,000 million of the population of the globe 570 + 360 = 930)....

300-400 million out of 1,600 are oppressors

* Apparently, a reference to the pages of some manuscript of Lenin's.—*Ed.*

Self-determination of nations ["old, tattered" (schäbig) bourgeois-democratic slogan ((new for 1,000 million of the world's population!!))] must be converted from a deception to a truth.

pp. 4-5 delete.
p. 6 (to be revised)

Deception for Britain, France and for Germany
Two forms of deception: Plekhanov

contra "the most tattered" slogan of Parvus.

Only a bourgeois-democratic principle? What about the **BROTHERHOOD** of the workers?

No, it is **also** a socialist principle.

When we advance the slogan: freedom of self-determination, *that is*, freedom of secession, by our *whole* agitation we are demanding from the oppressors: try to hold the people by granting advantages, spreading culture, *and not* by force. If we do not accept and emphasise freedom of secession, we *in practice* leave the door open for the advocates of violence.

Nur so treffen wir den Nagel auf den Kopf [only so do we hit the nail on the head]—we teach the workers: drive away all those who do not recognise the democratic and socialist principle **sincerely** and **honestly**.

THESES

Five (?) (better four) theses: (1) Social-Democrats of an oppressor nation, particularly of the so-called Great Powers, must demand the right to self-determination = the right to secession for the oppressed nations, upholding this right not only in the legal, but especially in the illegal, press and especially in wartime.—(2) Social-Democrats of the oppressed nations must demand the fullest, including organ-

isational, merging, and not merely rapprochement, of the *workers* of the oppressed nation with the *workers* of the oppressor nation.—(3) On the basis of these principles, the Social-Democrats of all the advanced twentieth-century countries, and especially of the Great Powers, must make the principle: "the workers have no fatherland" the cornerstone of their national policy, without in any way denying the world-historic importance of the national emancipation movement of the backward East European and the Asian and African colonial peoples.—(4) Social-Democrats of all countries must uphold, *not* the federative principle, *not* the formation of small states, as the ideal, but the closest unity of nations, stressing the harmfulness of all separation of nations, the harmfulness of cultural-national autonomy, the advantage of **democratic** centralism, the advantage of very big states and unions of states.

5th thesis: In view of the elementary, ABC nature of thesis No. 1, its acceptance by all democrats and Marx + Engels 1848-76, and its confirmation by the experience of the war,—Social-Democrats who do not recognise this thesis should be treated as enemies of the proletariat and deceivers of the worst kind, and expelled from the Party.

It is not enough to accept the struggle against *all* national oppression, against all national inequality:

(α) Does "inequality" cover the right to independent statehood? or not?

(β) the right to secession or not?

(γ) the nature of daily agitation: its main aim and direction.

Unity of the workers, unity of the proletariat's international class struggle, is infinitely more important than the problem of state frontiers, which in the era of imperialism will especially often be resolved, by war.

IMPERIALISM AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION (OUTLINE)

[October 28, 1915]

Introduction

(1) The urgency of the Problem: A talking point every-

where. Why? (α) War inflames national enmity and threatens national oppression.

(β) Imperialism is the era of the oppression of nations on a *new* historical basis.

(2) The task of the "*Zimmerwald Left*"[90] is to unite, and on this basis *also* to smash social-chauvinism, to clarify the mind of the working class.

I. The Economic Standpoint

(3) "Capital has *outgrown* national bounds. The union of nations (in a single state) is inevitable and progressive." True! But Marxism is not Struvism,[91] it is not a justification and defence of coercion of nations, but a revolutionary struggle for socialism, the *union* of the workers of different nations, their *brotherhood*.

(4) Against coercion, *for* the democratic union of nations. "Freedom of secession" is the *highest* expression of *democracy*.

(5) Democracy, freedom of secession, *bénefit* economic union (Norway and Sweden; America versus Germany).

II. The Historical Standpoint

(6) "Self-determination is the tattered slogan of a bygone era of bourgeois-democratic revolutions and movements."

—Imperialism gives rise to the oppression of nations on a new basis. Imperialism gives new life to this old slogan.

(7) The East and the *colones* (>1,000 million of the world's population). "New" bourgeois-democratic national movements.

Colonies 1876—314 million
1914—570 " + 81%

III. The Political Standpoint

(8) We do not discard bourgeois-democratic slogans, but more consistently, fully and decisively implement what is *democratic* in them.

(9) The interests of brotherhood, of the solidarity of the *workers* of different nations, rather than the interests of *nations*.

IV. The Standpoint of State Frontiers

(10) We do not uphold the *existing* state frontiers.

(11) We do not support the utopia of small states, do not everywhere and always demand the "independence of national states"....

(12) Under all possible *changes* of state frontiers we put in the forefront the interests of the workers' class struggle.

(13) The "disintegration" of Russia (Great Britain, Austria?) = United States.

V. The Standpoint of the Proletariat's International Class Struggle

(14) The danger (and inevitability under capitalism) of national enmity and distrust (*à la* Axelrod? No!).

(15) The crux: the attitude of the *oppressing* nations to the **oppressed nations**.

(16) The class solidarity of the workers of different nations is impossible without recognising the right to secession.

VI. "Practical Feasibility"

(17) "Utopia"! Norway versus Sweden.

(18) The "exception"! ("Backwoods region.")
Yes, like *all* democratic reforms and changes.

(19) "In practice = nil."
No = (α) freedom of agitation for secession
(β) solution of the problem of secession by a referendum (2 §§ of the Constitution)

(20) "What guarantees are there? Only war can give the answer!"

(Our guarantees—educating the workers in the spirit of the brotherhood of nations.)

VII. The Military Standpoint

(21) "Self-determination of nations = justifying participation in war."

There are wars and wars. We do not "deny" national wars. They are possible now, too.

(22) "Given self-determination, Holland, Sweden, etc., have the right to defend themselves." *How* can one defend oneself in an *imperialist* war?

VIII. The Struggle Against Social-Chauvinism

(23) Social-chauvinism is as inevitable a product of imperialism as wireless telegraphy. The struggle against it is now the very heart of the matter.

(24) The struggle against the chauvinism of *one's own* nation.

(25) The main feature—*Great-Power* chauvinism.

(26) "Recognition of equality" = an evasion of the problem of *statehood*, of *secession*, of instances of imperialist *war*.

(27) Wir treffen den Nagel auf den Kopf (we hit the nail on the head) *only* by our formulation. Only this formulation *strikes at and smashes* international *social-chauvinism*.

*IX. Comparison with Divorce**

(28) Rosa Luxemburg on divorce (versus autonomy).

(29) Semkovsky's objection.

(30) Its incorrectness.

X. The Case Weill[92]

(31) The social-chauvinists expelled Weill, who betrayed *their* principles.

(32) From *our* point of view, participation in war is *not* a crime. How else can agitation be conducted in the army? or the war turned into a civil war?

(33) Choice of nation. (In what army?)

XI. Attitude of the Liberal Bourgeoisie

(34) In *Russia*: we (Constitutional-Democrats) are for equality, but we have never undertaken to defend the right to secession from the Russian state,

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 72-74.—*Ed.*

(35) Karl Kautsky on political *self-determination* ("cultural self-determination and autonomy is enough")....

XII. Experience of the R.S.D.L.P.

(36) How the question was posed at the 1903 Congress.
(37) Withdrawal of the Polish Social-Democrats and their re-entry in 1906.
(38) Abolition of §9 was never officially demanded.
(39) "Alliance" of the opportunists with Rosa in 1914 (the liquidators Semkovsky; Liebman; Yurkevich; Alexinsky).

XIII. The Example of Marx and Engels

(40) 1848. Germany *versus* the oppressed nations (*Literarische Nachlass*, III, pp. 109, 113 and 114).
1866. Engels and the *International* (Marx) on Poland and **Germany**.
1869. Marx on *Ireland*.
(41) From the standpoint of the interests of the **workers of the oppressing** nation.

(N.B.) Marx for *federation* with Ireland (N.B.)

XIV. The Zimmerwald Left "Formula"

(42) "No support for the rule of one nation over another"....

Question: does it include freedom of secession? Non-recognition of freedom of secession is "support for the rule".

This formulation="the first step towards closer unity"....*

E. CORRADINI, *ITALIAN NATIONALISM*

Enrico Corradini, *Italian Nationalism*, Milan, 1914.

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 383-88.—*Ed.*

Written *before the war*. The article "Nationalism and Socialism" (January 14, 1914) contains interesting formulations by an imperialist of a small nation. France and Great Britain = banks with a capital of 300 and 400 *thousand million* (p. 162). The plutocratic nations (France, Britain, Germany) "are pacifist" (sic!) (ha-ha!) "mainly because they are plutocratic" (188), whereas the proletarian nations (Italy), in fighting against Turkey were fighting the plutocratic nations (sic!! ha-ha!). Imperialism (he says) is a modern phenomenon, but it divides nations into plutocratic and proletarian; "it [nationalism] is the socialism of the Italian nation in the world" (156).

N.B.

N.B.

Other nations are big-time robbers: that is the substance of this wretched book. "Socialism" consists in our little and poor nation overtaking or trying to overtake the big robbers so that it may rob more!!

NITTI, *FOREIGN CAPITAL IN ITALY*

Revue d'économie politique (1915, No. 4, July-August) carries a review of Francesco *Nitti*'s *Foreign Capital in Italy* (156 pp.). He estimates it at only 500 million (??), including

Belgian	182 million
French	148
British	110
Swiss	46
German	28
(my) Σ	=504

doubtful, not too small? Collate with *Paish* and *Harms*[93]

R. LIEFMANN, "DOES THE WAR BRING SOCIALISM NEARER?"

Professor Dr. *Robert Liefmann*, "Does the *War Bring Socialism Nearer?*"

(No. 56 of *The German War*, published by E. Jäckh, Stuttgart-Berlin, 1915.)

The author contends against the view (of *Jaffé* and others) that the war brings us nearer to socialism. Taxes, monopolies, rationing—all this has no relation to socialism (communism, he says, = the regulation of *consumption*, socialism = the abolition of private property).

Banal arguments against socialism in general. Of course, he favours "reforms", "mitigation of class contradictions", etc.

But in general socialism is "dreams" (39), "fantasies* (37), "pernicious internationalism" (S.D.)—(37)....

The German Social-Democrats are being reproached for their attitude to the war, though "nothing has been heard" (37) (sic!) "of reproaches against" the French and British socialists.

praises Social-Democrats

"The behaviour of the German Social-Democrats ... is worthy of respect" (37)...

workers of other countries do not think of socialism

..."Abolition of the present economic system is impossible internationally, and ruinous nationally" (39)... "the workers of other countries, more alive to reality, do not think of trying it in practice" (ibidem) (particularly the *British* workers, p. 38)....

Let France "experiment" with socialism (39-40)

Social-Democrats *or* "reformists"?

"It is hard to say how far the German *Social-Democratic Party* membership is still really (!!) loyal to the ideal of socialism, and whether the Party is not merely a *social-reform party* on a *democratic basis*... (40). My statements "only recommend what within socialism itself is recommended by the revisionist trend" (40)....

I am *for* revisionism!

!!

"It would be most desirable for joint political work after the war if one could obtain from the Social-Democratic Party a clear **renunciation** of this ideal, or at least a declaration that, for the time being, the Party would not advocate measures for its realisation; in other words, if the *revisionist movement* within German Social-Democracy, which has this aim, were to win

general recognition, there would be no unclarity as to the post-war Social-Democrat position" (41).... ‖ !

CONRAD'S JAHRBÜCHER, 1915, No. 2, AUGUST

Conrad's Jahrbücher, 1915, No. 2, August (pp. 214-16).

Item by Diehl on the *Danish* law of May 10, 1915. War-profits tax. All *extra incomes* (after 1912-15) are taxed at ten per cent of the excess.

(Not only war profits, but all extra income.)

(Exemption granted only if tax-payer can prove that no part of his extra income was due to the war.)

N.B. [To the question of *reforms* under imperialism in general.]

PAPERS OF THE SOCIETY FOR SOCIAL POLICY

Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, *Vol. 145*, III. (*See overleaf*)*

Dr. Carl von Tyszka: "Wages and Living Costs in Western Europe in the Nineteenth Century" (Leipzig, 1914).

A very detailed summary of *French* and *British*, and an abbreviated summary of *Spanish*, *Belgian* and *German* data. *The results are in* **Britain's** *favour*. Summary Table (**abbreviated** by me):

Index: 1900 = 100. Comparative *movement of real wages*:

Years	Britain	Prussia	South Germany	France	Spain	Belgium
1870	53.8	57.8	(1875: 93.0)	69.0		51.0
1885	68.2	56.1	90.9	74.5	(1890: 89.5)	78.6
1900	100	100	100	100	100	100
1910	92.2	82.9	99.5	106.0	102.0	86.5 in 1905

Thanks to free trade, Britain suffered least from the increased cost of living (p. 289 and other passages).

* See p. 746 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Britain earlier became an "industrial country" (p. 101), and prices adapted themselves to a greater extent, passing completely onto this basis.

(94—the increase in wages proves to be *less* if one takes "weighed" averages, i.e., takes into account the *greater* increases in the lower-paid occupations. He cites data for 26 branches of the German engineering works.)

N.B. But it applies to all other industries.

N.B. Vol. 145: "Living Costs in the Large Towns" (I-IV).

N.B. ‖ A *very* detailed (in *145*, IV, 1915) work on Hamburg (1890-). *Prices* and *budgets*, *consumption*, *rents*, etc., compared with London.

Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik.

Vol. 140. II. "Urban Milk Supplies" (1914).

Fragmentary data on *individual* dairy farms (number of cows; output, etc.).

The development of retail and co-operative marketing of milk; ousting of beer (feebly and seldom).

Detailed data on prices.

Vol. 140. V. "Public Supplies of Milk in Germany" (1914).

‖ *Hans Hess*: "*The Electron in Various Fields of Physics*." *Himmel und Erde*, 1915, March (No. 3). (27th year, No. 3).

an interesting attempt to summarise the achievements of the electronic theory

"SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM AND LEFT RADICALISM"

Bremer Bürger-Zeitung, 1915, No. 291 (December 13).

Leading article: "**Social-Imperialism and Left Radicalism**".... "It [Left radicalism] was the trend in German radicalism which took shape during the campaign for the suffrage in Prussia and in the 1910-13 debates on disarmament"....

N.B. ‖ ..."He (Kautsky) sought to depict imperialism as a form of capitalist expansion which could give way to another, peaceful form"....

Among these Lefts were "Rosa Luxemburg, Pannekoek, Radek, Thalheimer, Zetkin and others"....

..."The Left radicals waged a sharp struggle against the survivals of the British Manchesterism ideology in foreign policy" (*Ledebour* and *K. Kautsky*, also *Eckstein*)....

The Left radicals and social-imperialists find common ground in that "the world has entered the imperialist era"....

..."For the Left radicals, even the *militia* is not a means for abolishing the expansionist tendencies of imperialism—they favour it only in the hope that it will bring to maturity the anti-imperialist tendencies of the masses. The social-imperialists, on the other hand, use every approach to a militia presented by this war, but which can be achieved only in opposition to the policy upheld by the war, as a bait for militarising Social-Democracy".

E. RAPPARD, *TOWARDS NATIONAL AGREEMENT*

Dr. William *E. Rappard*, *Towards National Agreement*, Zurich, 1915 (*Schriften für schweizerische Art und Kunst*, 26) (National Library)

"Prior to 1870 the population ratio of *Germany* and *France* was 9 to 8; today it is 13 to 8. Coal output in France in the last forty years has approximately doubled, in Germany it has nearly quadrupled, so that its ratio to French output is today six to one. As regards *pig-iron output*, a generation ago both countries were approximately on the same level. Today German output is almost three times that of France" (p. 15).

((400x : 200y = 6 : 1; 400x = 1,200y; 1x = 3y))

8:8; 13:8

3:1; 6:1

1:1; 3:1

A GOOD SUMMARY

‖ A good summary of comparative figures ‖

N.B. ‖ *Dr. Ernst Günther*: "*The Economic Resources* (*Kriegshefte aus dem*

Population (million) (round figures)

Years	Germany	Austria-Hungary	France	Great Britain	Russia	Germans + Austrians
1810	30	30	30	20	45	267
1910	65	51.5	39.5	46	136.5	258

Cultivated area *in Germany* (000 *hectares*)

	rye	wheat	oats	barley	*total cereals*	potatoes
1800	4,623	1,027	2,569	2,055	10,274	350
1901-10	6,080	1,849	4,271	1,666	13,866	3,291
	+23%	+80%	+67%	—19%	+35%	+840%

Average per hectare harvest during the last five years (double centners)

	wheat	rye	barley	oats	potatoes
Russia	7.0	8.0	8.7	8.2	76.7
U.S.A.	9.3	8.9	11.7	8.1	107.0
Hungary	2.2	11.5	13.9	11.4	78.0
Austria	13.9	13.9	15.4	12.9	99.0
France	14.0	11.3	14.3	13.1	98.9
Great Britain	20.7	—	17.9	16.7	153.3
Germany	21.4	18.2	20.8	19.7	136.0
Belgium	25.9	22.3	28.0	23.3	187.3

OF COMPARATIVE FIGURES

of Germany and Her Chief Adversaries", Essen, 1915
Industriebezirk No. 7). 80 pfennigs.

Of 1,000 Europeans there were			Mortality per 1,000:		
British	French	Russians	Epoch	*Germany*	*France*
93	153	200	20-25 years ago	25	22
103	88	300	now	16	18

Per hectare harvests (*double centners*)

rye	wheat	oats	barley
8.62	10.28	5.64	8.0
16.3	19.6	18.30	19.0
+90%	+90%	+227%	+137%

Per hectare wheat harvests (double centners)

1881-90	1901-10		
5.45	6.77	+1.32	+24%
8.27	9.30	+1.03	+12%
(1876-85)	(1899-1901)		
12.0	13.9	+1.9	+16%
18.2	20.0	+1.8	+10%
14.8	19.6	+4.8	+32%

No. of workers in textile industry (000)

	Great Britain	*Germany*
1895	1,018	945
1907	1,015	1,057

Export of machinery (million marks)

	Great Britain	*Germany*
1902	400	183
1913	674	678

Share of world coal output

	Great Britain	Germany	U.S.A.
1860	60% (81 mill. tons)	12.4% (16.5 mill. tons)	10.0%
1880	45	18	20
1900	30	20	32
1910	24	19	37
1913	21 (280 mill. tons)	21	39

Iron production (million tons)

Great Britain	Germany
7.8	2.6
9.1	8.5
10.5	19.5

Strength of German, French and British navies

	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1912
Germany 000 tons	1,146	1,614	2,835	4,569	7,698	8,454
%	100	141	247	399	672	739
Great Britain 000 tons	7,917	12,027	18,062	23,687	32,412	33,849
%	100	152	228	299	409	427
France 000 tons	1,528	1,767	2,444	2,622	3,082	3,139
%	100	116	160	172	202	206
German navy	100	100	100	100	100	100
British ”	691	745	637	518	421	400
French ”	133	109	86	57	40	37

No. of workers in engineering and shipbuilding industries (000)

	Great Britain	*Germany*
1881	217	206
1901	400	700

Railways (000 km)

Great Britain	*Germany*
29	34
38	63

Percentage share of world trade

	1886	1900	1910	1912
Germany	10.3	12.1	12.0	12.9
France	12.5	10.0	9.4	9.2
Great Britain	20.8	19.5	16.9	16.6

Foreign trade (imports and exports)

	Germany special trade (mill. marks)	%	Great Britain total trade	%	France special trade	%	Germany	Great Britain	France
1880	5,712	100	14,232	100	6,896	100	100	249	121
1890	7,473	130	15,253	107	6,633	96	100	204	89
1900	10,371	181	17,900	126	10,776	155	100	172	69
1913	20,868	365	28,644	201	12,307	178	100	137	59

A. B. HART, *THE MONROE DOCTRINE*

A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, Boston, 1916.

Appears to be an interesting account of United States foreign policy.

Contains a bibliography.

P. 373: the "anti-imperialists" defeated, 1898.

303-04: a table (very instructive) showing the development of the American state 1823-1915. (Growth of U.S. imperialism, etc.).

314: "The most striking change in the conditions of nations is the building up of large units. Consolidation applies not simply to banks and factories and railways, but to world powers." The next century will see five Great Powers: Great Britain, Germany, Russia, China and the United States (!!)....

Growth of protectorate and "influence" (and of financial interests! 332). The United States in Central America!—332—

N.B. "*Fixed* policy of protectorates" (335).

359: *Roland G. Usher*, *Pan-Americanism. A Forecast of the Inevitable Clash between the United States and Europe's Victor*, New York, 1915 (419 pp.).

The author demolishes it, but himself defends the "doctrine"... of "protectorates" (369) for the "safeguarding of American !! capital" (369)!!

ΣΣ (402) **in favour of** militarism!! **(N.B.)** (especially *§ 5*)—particularly (!!!) against Germany and Japan (403). **N.B.**

EUG. PHILIPPOVICH, "MONOPOLIES"

Eug. v. Philippovich, "**Monopolies**"[94]....

180 persons (families?) **25.000 million** dollars	In the United States (1912)—*180* owners or presidents of firms (18 banks) held *746* directorships in *134* corporations with a total capital of *25,325* million dollars (=101,300 million marks). "This could be a third of the American national wealth" (p. 159).

A.E.G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft). Capital (1912) = *378 million marks*. Its Supervisory Board has *32* members, who hold nearly *500 directorships* in various enterprises.

JOURNAL DE GENÈVE, APRIL 18, 1916

Journal de Genève, April 18, 1916.

Report from Rome says the International Institute of Agriculture has published statistics of the **world production** of cereals: N.B. N.B.

million metric centners	1915 and 1915-16	Per cent of 1914 and 1914-15	Per cent of average production of the last five years
wheat	1,161	119	116.4
rye	462	106.6	103.5
oats	706	114	108.7
maize	996	105.2	109.3
rice	638	167.2	113.7
barley	323	105.9	99.2

POTASSIUM CONSUMPTION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*, April 22, 1916, p. 6.

...According to data of the potassium syndicate, consumption of potassium for fertilisers in Austria-Hungary and Germany during recent years was as follows (in kg. per sq. km. of usable surface):

	1900	*1910*	*1913*
Austria	12.4	64.3	114.2
Hungary	0.5	6.1	19.8
Germany	334.4	1,025.1	1,529.3

ARCHIV FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK

N. B. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1916 (August 4, 1916) (Vol. 42, No. 1).

Article:—p. "The Trade Union Movement in 1915".... Subheading: "*Trade Union Ideologies*"....

Two trends which are *not* part of reformism or radicalism—*Korrespondenzblatt* and *Sozialistische Monatshefte*.

"On the other hand, there are only a few trade union journals which clearly express their dissident, more radical views. For the most part these are organs of trade unions whose membership consists mainly of unskilled workers or women" (325)....

..."For the organs of the old, big unions are wholly on the side of the majority, whereas the others are more reserved. There is no evidence, as far as we can see, of a definite attitude *in favour of* the views and tactics of the minority" (327)....

Of the metalworkers' union, the author says the Executive Committee supports the majority, wages in this trade are higher (330), fewer have been called up,* it is an old and very big union, "which has always been a bulwark of moderate views", but at a general meeting on June 30, 1915... a motion was passed that was, indirectly, practically a censure of the Executive Committee: "The adoption of this motion indicates at any rate that other views and moods prevail among the rank and file than those in the leadership" (332)....

A "petty-bourgeois stratum" is developing at the top (335)....

Korrespondenzblatt (April 17, 1915) declares that the struggle against imperialism is as much an absurdity as the destruction of machines.

It censures the *majority* in the French and British unions (the same as the majority it itself represents) and this evokes a malicious remark by the bourgeois author:

"It cannot be said, therefore, that the Right-wing tendency in Germany has altogether ceased to understand radical labour policy" (338).

Properly speaking, the author admits, the majority are no longer socialists (p. 340 and *elsewhere*).

IMPERIALISM AND THE SPLIT IN SOCIALISM[95]

PLAN OF ARTICLE

Imperialism and Opportunism (*the split in socialism*).

1. What is imperialism? (*definition* in the resolution + addenda).

* for military service.—*Ed.*

2. Tendencies towards decay (parasitism).
3. **Hobson** (1900).
4. Engels 1858, 1892 } especially *N.B.*: one must *appeal to the unskilled workers*, the **masses**.
   + the split among the workers owing to emigration and immigration (cf. Engels on America)
   + troops recruited from colonial peoples....
5. Kautsky (glossing over).
6. Germany versus Britain....
7. Optimism (Martov's) ... about opportunism.
8. Optimism and pessimism in our Party.
   (2 versus 20 years?) Tactics?
9. Time factor unknown (2 prospects and two lines)....
10. Democracy teaches *deception*....
    Working-class parties and *Social-Democratic* phrase-mongering.
11. The split (Trotsky's sophistries).
    Its growth ((Rühle, January 12, 1916)).
    Rühle + Liebknecht in Germany.
    The split in Britain.
12. Its inevitability.

CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF IMPERIALISM

A. Monopolist (1) cartels
(2) banks
(3) sources of raw material
(4) division of the world (international associations)
(5) territorial division of the world.

B. Parasitic (1) rentier
(2) "on the backs of the Negroes"*
(3) reaction. See overleaf**

PLAN VARIANT

1. Economic source: superprofit
2. Britain 48-68 (α) colonies
   (β) monopoly

* See p. 452 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See p. 756 of this volume.—*Ed.*

3. Colonies (France, etc.).
   Monopoly *of a different kind = finance* capital
3 bis: at that time one country, now the split everywhere
4. Riding "on the backs of the Negroes"
5. "Bourgeois labour party": "they have sold themselves"
6. The "masses". Quid est?
7. Appeal to the masses
8. Who represents the masses?
9. Mass actions
10. Deception. Lloyd-Georgism[96]
    + Britain 1850-90 and imperialism 1898-1914 {resemblance and difference}

"imperialist Economism"
" otzovism"
++ the struggle for reforms ("giveaway checkers") and the use of legal opportunities (their role in revolutionary tactics).

I >	300
II >	1,000
ad. *4.*	300
III	1,600

LEUTHNER, "RUSSIAN NATIONAL IMPERIALISM"

Die Neue Rundschau ((May 1915))
K. Leuthner, "*Russian National Imperialism*"

p. 590: —on Plekhanov, who has "gone over to the war camp".

..."In Russia, even extreme radicalism will soon appreciate the vital need for free access to the open seas"....

"The Russian people, and not only the Russian tsar... stand at our frontiers with their traditional resolve to conquer and subjugate."

"At the frontiers of the empire the Great Russian defends not the existence, independence and territorial integrity of his nation, but its domination over forty million non-Great Russians"....

GAZETA ROBOTNICZA'S[97] THESES ON IMPERIALISM AND NATIONAL OPPRESSION (SUMMARY)

I (1) Definition of imperialism (economic).
Alteration of *frontiers*.
The "national state". (Was) not the *sole* form
(under certain conditions + state of nationalities) colonies
and contributions
annexations—intensification of *national oppression*.

---

(2) (Contradicts working-class interests)...
(especially of *oppressed* nations)
(revanche)

---

(3) Against *annexations* and *national oppression* (must be vigorously combated (energisch bekämpfen))
(socialism does not need colonies)
against peace with annexations

---

(4) The struggle against forcible domination consists in
(1) rejection of defence of the fatherland....
(2) exposure (Denunzierung) of national oppression
(3) the struggle with moral coercion against the national movement
(5) Imperialism cannot be transformed in a way that would accord with the interests of the working class
imperialism cannot be purged of national oppression; only socialism ... the struggle must be revolutionary and, under socialism, for *joint determination*, not self-determination,
no delay, no holding out hopes.

II (1) There can be no freedom of nations under capitalism
(2) Self-determination presupposes classless society,
presupposes isolation of nations
utopia.
(3) There must be no utopias in the programme
"it raises unrealisable hopes of capitalism's ability to adapt itself"

in a "*national*-reformist" manner
what is required is...
clear-cut, undisguised socialism.

(4) Do not need these abstract "rights"...
a relic of petty-bourgeois democratic ideology....

IMPERIALISM AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT[98]

1. Definition { economic
{ political { reaction
{ national oppression
{ annexations

Imperialism = capitalism

α monopolist { 1) cartels
{ 2) big banks
{ 3) financial oligarchy (more than 100,000 million of share capital)
{ 4) colonies and export of capital (division of the world)

β parasitic { 1) export of capital
{ 2) 100,000 million of share capital

γ moribund ("transitional")

1a. Basle and Chemnitz

2. Contra K. Kautsky. Blunting the contradictions, concealment, evasions, etc.

3. Three lines: lackeys { opportunists crude, cynical } National-Liberals
reformists { " subtle, concealed } (Liebknecht)[99]
revolutionary Social-Democrats { Marxists

4. Fabians, Vandervelde, Jaurès and Co. (1907)....
+ *Sozialistische Monatshefte* + *Die Glocke* + Renner and Co.
+ Plekhanov and "disciples" in Russia.

(1) Disarmament....
(2) United States of Europe (cartel of imperialists)... (Organisation of "Central Europe")....
(3) Annexations....
(4) "Peace" (social-pacifism)....

(5) "Ultra-imperialism"....
(6) "Defence of the fatherland"....
(7) Imperialist character of the war....
(8) Freedom of trade ("peaceful relations").
(9) Colonies (cf. 1907 and 1914-16).... (Away from colonies?)
(10) Benefits from colonies
import and export from own colonies versus "freedom of trade"
(11) Imperialism and opportunism (sentiment versus trend).
(12) "Unity" with the opportunists.
(13) Trends in international Social-Democracy 1889-1914[100] versus present disintegration. { Millerandism[101] (Jaurès), Bernsteinism,[102] British "Liberal-Labour" [policy] }
(14) Voting for war credits.
(15) Mass actions = "adventurism"?
(16) Past (1909; 1910; 1911 K. Kautsky versus 1914-16) and present.
(Words and deeds.)
(17) K. Kautsky versus Pannekoek, 1912, on mass actions....
(18) Eclecticism versus dialectics.
(19) Engels and Marx on the roots of British opportunism.
(20) Glossing over { August 4, 1914 / August 2, 1914 and *ultimatum* to the opposition }
(21) Sympathy for Karl Liebknecht (everywhere) (or in Europe?)
(22) Zimmerwald and The Hague.

PLAN OF AN ARTICLE ON KAUTSKYISM[103]

On Kautskyism: { *Vorbote* No. 1 / *Kommunist* }

1. Definition of imperialism. (δ9*)
3 bis. 1912, imperialism loses its importance. (o 15**)

* See p. 264 of this volume.—*Ed.*
** See p. 590 of this volume.—*Ed.*

5. Character of the war (*Kommunist*)
2. Trade policy (free trade) (*Kommunist*)
4. Struggle against imperialism ("part of the capitalists *favour* it").
8. Annexations....

12 { Renner & Co., Cunow & Co.... Lensch *Volkstribüne* }

7. Peace: "everyone wants it" (lecture)....
3. Theory of ultra-imperialism
9. Monitor and Kautsky
10. Kautsky, November 26, 1915, *against* **street demonstrations.**
11. Chemnitz *Volksstimme* on unity with Kautsky & Co. (cf. Ernst *Heilmann* in *Die Glocke*).
6. Denial of the connection between the present crisis and opportunism (K. Kautsky, May 28, 1915) (*Kommunist*)

Previous attitude to war *up to*:

The Social Revolution 1902	1902
The Road to Power 1909	1905
1905 (o 33*)	1908
1910 (o 15)	1910
1912	1912

Rühle versus *Vorwärts*

{Revolution in connection with war.}

{Disarmament and a *United States of Europe*}

A. Economics and the main class relationship (1-4)
B. Politics (5-8)
C. The "Marsh", its inner-Party aspect (9-12).
D. Russian Kautskyites

{ Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze and Skobelev }

For translation

1) Kemmerer
2) Gilbreth, *Motion Study*
3) Hobson, *Imperialism*

* See pp. 617-18 of this volume.—*Ed.*

FRAGMENT OF AN ARTICLE

How far Engels was from the indifferent attitude to modern German annexations, so characteristic of certain doctrinaire distorters of Marxism among present-day German Social-Democrats, is evident from the following statement he made in 1893:

"We should not forget that twenty-seven years of Bismarck's administration made Germany hated everywhere—and with good reason. Neither the annexation of the North Schleswig Danes, nor the non-observance, and subsequent swindling cancellation, of the Prague Peace Treaty Article relating to them, nor the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, nor the shabby measures taken against the Prussian Poles, have had anything at all to do with establishing 'national unity'" (*Can Europe Disarm?* Nuremberg, 1893, p. 27).[104] Under the Prague Treaty of August 23, 1866, Austria ceded Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia on condition that the northern districts of Schleswig should be ceded to Denmark if by a free vote their population pronounced in favour of union with Denmark. The swindling cancellation of this article was effected by the Vienna Treaty between Germany and Austria of October 11, 1878. Even after fifteen years, in 1893, Engels remembers this deception and brands it as such, stressing the distinction between the creation of German national unity and the series of coercive and swindling oppressive measures in relation to peoples dependent on the Germans....*

LITERATURE LISTS

I

L. P. Hoffmann, *England in Decline* (published by the newspaper *La Patrie Egyptienne*), Geneva, 1914. ((Imprint: Egyptian Patriots' Club, 1914, 3, rue Versonnex, 3, Geneva.))

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* The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

"This pamphlet, published by the newspaper *La Patrie Egyptienne*, is sent gratis to anyone requesting it from the office at 3, rue Versonnex, Geneva".

Mohammed Fahmy, "The Truth about the Egyptian Question" (Geneva, 1913) (Memorandum to the 19th Peace Congress, 1912).

Dr. J. Goldstein, *Workers and Employers in the German Building Industry*, Leipzig, 1913 (*Zurich Economic Studies*, No. 5).

Prof. Dr. *W. Hünerwadel*, *The Historical Pre-conditions of the European War*, Winterthurt 1915. (Pamphlet, appears to be a tolerable survey, very brief and cursory.)

FROM MARX TO MAO

II

The Islamic Progress Society
Case Fusterie, Geneva.
Their publication *Bulletin de la société, etc.*, III year, Nos. 1 and 2, June-July 1915.

Lest We Forget
A Page from the History of the English in Egypt, May 1915. Signed *Dr. M. M. Riffat*.
An account of the flogging and execution of Egyptians on June 26, 1906, for having attacked British officers who were shooting pigeons and wounded a woman.

Pamphlet: *Sentence on Britain*, Berlin, May 2, 1915.
Preface by *Dr. M. M. Riffat*.
A summary of British promises and declarations about Egypt from 1882 until the *union* (annexation) of December 7, 1914.

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

III[105]

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NOTES AND INDEXES

NOTES

[1] Lenin's *Notebooks on Imperialism* is a collection of materials for his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. The book was written in 1916, at the height of the First World War, but Lenin had drawn attention to the new phenomena in the development of capitalism long before the war. Thus, at the end of 1899 he referred to America as a land of cartels, which, while limiting production for the home market, "expand it for the foreign market, selling their goods abroad at a loss and extracting monopoly prices from consumers in their own country" (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 202). In a 1908 article, "Marxism and Revisionism" Lenin stressed that the new giant trusts were evidence that capitalism was heading for a break-down.

Lenin's comprehensive study of the monopoly stage of capitalism began early in the First World War. Such a study was vital to the working-class revolutionary struggle in Russia and other capitalist countries. Correct leadership of that movement and successful opposition to the ideology of imperialist reaction and reformist conciliation with the imperialists required an understanding of the "fundamental economic question, that of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied, it will be impossible to understand and appraise modern war and modern politics" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 188).

Lenin's thorough study of the literature on imperialism apparently began in mid-1915, when he was in Berne. He compiled source references, drew up plans for the book, made copious extracts, notes and detailed conspectuses—which together form the contents of the *Notebooks on Imperialism*.

Early in January 1916, Parus, a legal publishing house founded in Petrograd in December 1915, asked him to write a book on imperialism. Lenin agreed, and on January 11, 1916 he wrote to Maxim Gorky from Berne: "I am getting down to the writing of a pamphlet on imperialism." In mid-February, Lenin left Berne for Zurich, where he continued to collect and analyse data on imperialism. He worked in the Zurich Cantonal Library but ordered books also from other towns.

In a short space of time Lenin studied and critically analysed a vast amount of source material and drew up an outline of the book, a scientific study of imperialism.

On July 2, 1916, Lenin wrote to M. N. Pokrovsky, then living in Paris and connected with the Parus publishers: "Today I am sending you the manuscript by registered book-post." The book, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, was first published in April 1917.

Lenin's notes, extracts, outlines, etc., fill fifteen notebooks denoted by the letters of the Greek alphabet from "alpha" to "omicron", besides which there is the "Brailsford" notebook and other materials. Lenin continued to collect data and make extracts on various aspects of imperialism after he had sent his manuscript to the publishers. Evidence of this is the Notebook "Egelhaaf", which Lenin began in October 1916 (see this volume, p. 680 and p. 765), the Notebook "Data on Persia" (p. 719) and others. p. 27

[2] The article on the struggle against the "Marsh" (Notes on Kautskyism) was apparently never written. p. 30

[3] This refers to Kautsky's pamphlet *Der Weg zur Macht* (The Road to Power), published in Berlin in 1909. Lenin called it Kautsky's "last and best work" against the opportunists.

The *Basle Manifesto* on war was adopted by the Extraordinary Congress of the Second International in Basle, November 24-25, 1912. It exposed the predatory aims of the war the imperialists were preparing and called on the workers of all countries to wage a vigorous struggle for peace, against the threat of war and "to oppose to capitalist imperialism the power of international proletarian solidarity". Should imperialist war break out, it said, socialists must take advantage of the economic and political crisis it will cause so as to advance the socialist revolution (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 208-17 and 307-08). The leaders of the Second International (Kautsky, Vandervelde, etc.) voted for the Manifesto at the Congress, but consigned it to oblivion and supported their imperialist governments when the war broke out. p. 30

[4] This refers to paragraph 9 of the R.S.D.L.P. Programme adopted at the Party's Second Congress. Paragraph 9 proclaimed "the right to self-determination of all the nations making up the state". p. 42

[5] The data on the annual wages of workers in the U.S.A. in 1913 are taken from an article by Scott Nearing, "The Adequacy of American Wages", published in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. LIX, p. 115. p. 48

[6] Marx's concept of "socialisation", based on a scientific analysis of the objective laws of development of capitalist society, points to the necessity and inevitability of the means of production passing from private capitalist ownership to social ownership. Lenin showed that the conflict between the production relations and the productive forces under capitalism becomes very acute in the era of imperialism. In this last stage of capitalism the concentration and social-

isation of production reach the highest level (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 205, 207, 302-03). This makes it easier, after the victory of the socialist revolution, for the workers' and peasants' state to take over the basic means of production and organise planned production in the interests of the people. p. 56

[7] Lenin refuted the apologetic inventions about the "democratisation" of capital as far back as 1902. He conclusively showed that individual workers acquiring small shares do not become owners of joint-stock enterprises, "propertied" people. The ones who profit from the issue of small shares are the big shareholders of the capitalist monopolies and joint-stock companies—they use for their enrichment even the very small crumbs of the people's savings (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 94). p. 61

[8] In the *Notebooks* and *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin exposes the bourgeois-apologetic nature of "organised capitalism", an unscientific theory that seeks to prove that imperialism is a special, transformed capitalism which has abolished competition, anarchy of production and economic crises, and has achieved planned economic development. This theory, advanced by the ideologists of monopoly capitalism—Sombart, Liefmann, etc.—was seized upon by Kautsky, Hilferding and other reformist theoreticians of the Second International. Lenin demonstrated that monopolies' rule, far from abolishing, intensifies competition and anarchy of production, and does not rid the capitalist economy of crises (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 208). p. 62

[9] In his study of imperialism, Lenin showed that political reaction in all aspects of home and foreign policy is the political superstructure of monopoly capitalism. Imperialism, he pointed out, is the negation of democracy in general (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 43). Monopoly capitalism curtails or nullifies even formal bourgeois democracy, and establishes its unlimited dictatorship.

The characteristic features of imperialist foreign policy are aggression, violation of the national sovereignty of weak and dependent countries. p. 69

[10] The *National City Bank* (from 1955 First National City Bank of New York)—United States' third largest bank and the centre of a financial-monopoly group embracing large industrial and financial corporations. p. 79

[11] All the data refer to 1910, except those for Switzerland (1908), and for Hungary and France (1909). p. 85

[12] *Bankruptcy statistics*—statistics of proceedings taken against insolvent debtors. p. 86

[13] Lenin used these data in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 239-40). In the *Notebook*

the world total of securities, 815,000 million francs, is given for 1911, and in *Imperialism*, for 1910. Lenin took the figure from Zimmermann's "International Statistics of Securities and Stock Issues", which cites as its source a survey by Alfred Neymarck, who gives the figure as referring to January 1, 1911. p. 95

[14] The petty-bourgeois American economist *Henry George* (1839-1897) maintained that the chief and universal cause for the division of the population into rich and poor was expropriation of the land from the people. Poverty was thus due to the land monopoly, and it could be eliminated, he declared, by the bourgeois state nationalising the land, leasing it to individuals and using the rent for social needs. In reality bourgeois land nationalisation does not undermine the foundations of capitalism, but assists its development, and does not save the working people from poverty and ruin. Of the "declamations of Henry George" and similar petty-bourgeois doctrines, Karl Marx wrote: "The whole thing is thus simply a socialistically decked-out attempt *to save capitalist rule* and actually *re-establish* it on an even wider basis than its present one." (See Marx's letter to Sorge, June 20, 1881, and Engels's preface to the American edition of his *Condition of the Working Class in England*.) p. 98

[15] *Proudhonism*—an unscientific, anti-Marxist variety of petty-bourgeois socialism deriving its name from the French anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon criticised big capitalist ownership from a petty-bourgeois standpoint and dreamed of perpetuating small private ownership. He proposed the formation of a "people's" bank and an "exchange bank", through which the workers could acquire their own means of production and ensure the sale of their product at a "fair" price. Proudhon did not understand the role and significance of the proletariat, rejected the class struggle, the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. An anarchist, he denied the necessity for the state. The Proudhonists idealised small-scale commodity production and exchange. "Not abolishing capitalism and its basis—commodity production—but *purging* that basis of abuses, of excrescences, and so forth; not abolishing exchange and exchange value, but, on the contrary, making it 'constitutional', universal, absolute, 'fair', and free of fluctuations, crises and abuses—such was Proudhon's idea" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 34).

The *new Proudhonism* is how Lenin described the reformist theories of the Kautskyites, who depicted the dominance of the monopolies and banks, the omnipotence of the financial oligarchy, colonial plunder, annexations and other intrinsic features of imperialism as accidental excrescences on capitalism, and concocted all manner of plans for "reconstructing" capitalism, removing monopoly "abuses", etc. Lenin exposed the reactionary nature of such theories, whose proponents "want to go 'back' to small capitalism (and not towards socialism)" (see p. 93 of this volume). p. 116

[16] *Kautsky's theory of ultra-imperialism* (*super-imperialism*)—an opportunist theory of a new phase of imperialism—"internationally united finance capital"—that would lead to an organised world economy, with imperialist contradictions abolished, by agreement between the capitalist countries. Lenin exposed the real social meaning and purpose of this "theory", which whitewashes and seeks to perpetuate imperialism. He described it as "a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary 'ultra-imperialism' of the future. Deception of the masses—that is all there is in Kautsky's 'Marxist' theory" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 294).

Kautsky's theory of "ultra-imperialism" is repeated in different versions by latter-day apologists of imperialism. It finds expression in all manner of bourgeois and reformist projects for a world capitalist state with a single government, and so forth. (For Lenin's criticism of Kautsky's anti-Marxist theory, see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 288-98). p. 151

[17] The figures on German iron output, written by Lenin in the margin, are from a table in the January 1911 issue of *Die Bank* (p. 95), in an item headed: "Iron and Steel Industry after 100 Years". Lenin quotes part of the table on p. 184 of this volume, under the heading "Recent Statistics on the Iron Industry". p. 183

[18] The data on the relations between finance capital and the governments, and Lenin's comments on them, were further developed in *Imperialism*, and other writings. Lenin showed that the development of monopoly and finance capital inevitably leads to a small group of industrial and financial magnates—a financial oligarchy—playing a decisive part in the economy and politics of the capitalist countries, the bourgeois state, too, being wholly subordinated to it. The monopolies subordinate and use the state machine by putting representatives of the government on their boards of directors and by having their own representatives enter capitalist governments. This has become a regular practice. In the U.S.A., for example, all the top government posts are held by men representing the main financial groups of Morgan, Rockefeller, etc. p. 183

[19] *Nietzsche, Friedrich* (1844-1900)—reactionary German philosopher, one of the ideologists of agrarian-bourgeois reaction. His works reveal him as a bitter enemy of democracy, the working class and Marxism. Nietzsche viewed social and political problems from the standpoint of subjective idealism and vulgar "social-Darwinism", the theory of the "superman". Its anti-democratic, reactionary character made Nietzscheism the accepted philosophy of fascism. Bourgeois ideologists widely use his theories to present imperialism as a social system that accords with "human nature", to justify aggression and extol predatory wars. p. 205

[20] The "United States of Europe" slogan, in its different variations, gained particularly wide currency during the First World War. It was vigorously boosted by bourgeois politicians and the Kautskyites, Trotskyists and other opportunists. In the political manifesto of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* on November 1, 1914, Lenin stressed that "without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, the Austrian and the Russian monarchies" it was a false and meaningless slogan (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 33). In his well-known article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", published August 23, 4915, Lenin wrote that "a United States of Europe, under capitalism, is either impossible or reactionary" (ibid., p. 340), and this was fully substantiated by his economic analysis of imperialism. p. 211

[21] *Monroe Doctrine*—a declaration of United States' foreign policy principles formulated by President James Monroe in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823. Based on the "America for Americans" slogan, the doctrine has been used by the U.S. as a cover for its colonialist plans in Latin America, for constant interference in the affairs of Latin American countries, the imposition of shackling treaties, the establishment and support of anti-popular regimes subservient to the U.S. monopolists, and aid for these regimes in their struggle against the national liberation movement. p. 211

[22] "*Imperialist Economists*"—an opportunist trend in the international Social-Democratic movement which made its appearance during the First World War. In the R.S.D.L.P. it came out in the open at the Berne Conference of the Party's sections abroad in the spring of 1915, when N. I. Bukharin put forward theses defending anti-Marxist views, which Lenin subsequently described as "imperialist Economism". Bukharin's theses were later supported by G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh. Similar ideas were expressed in the Draft Programme of the Revolutionary-Socialist Association and Social-Democratic Labour Party of Holland, in the American Socialist Labour Party, and in other parties. Lenin called "imperialist Economism" an international malady and launched a vigorous campaign against it. The "imperialist Economists" opposed self-determination of nations and the entire R.S.D.L.P. minimum programme, which envisaged a struggle for democratic changes. Lenin stressed the great significance of the national self-determination slogan in the era of imperialism. Marxists, he emphasised, should use all democratic institutions to prepare the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. "Through utilisation of bourgeois democracy to socialist and consistently democratic organisation of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and against opportunism" (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 27).

Lenin's criticism of "imperialist Economism" can be found in his works: "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism"; "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)"; "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (ibid., pp. 13-21, 22-27, 28-78) and in other writings. p. 247

[23] Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, Part II, Chapter III, "The Force Theory (Continuation)", writes as follows about the capitalist states: "The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the peoples are there only to provide soldiers and feed them. Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe. But this militarism also bears within itself the seed of its own destruction. Competition among the individual states forces them, on the one hand, to spend more money each year on the army and navy, artillery, etc., thus more and more hastening their financial collapse; and, on the other hand, to resort to universal compulsory military service more and more extensively, thus in the long run making the whole people familiar with the use of arms, and therefore enabling them at a given moment to make their will prevail against the war-lords in command.... At this point the armies of the princes become transformed into armies of the people; the machine refuses to work, and militarism collapses by the dialectics of its own evolution". p. 248

[24] *Manchesterism* (Free Trade)—a trend of bourgeois economic policy which advocated freedom of trade and non-interference by the state in private economic activity. It arose in England at the end of the eighteenth century; in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century the main support of Free Trade came from the industrial bourgeoisie of Manchester; hence the Free Traders were also called Manchesterites. The Manchester school was headed by Cobden and Bright. Free Trade tendencies in the era prior to monopoly capitalism also struck root in Germany, France, Russia and other capitalist countries. Free Trade was theoretically substantiated in the works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. p. 268

[25] Lenin calls Kautsky a sophist and trickster for distorting the true nature of imperialism, evading the issue and using sophistries and spurious theoretical arguments to gloss over the deep-seated contradictions of imperialism and justify unity with the apologists of capitalism, the avowed social-chauvinists. p. 268

[26] *Kommunist*—a magazine founded by Lenin and published by the editorial board of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* jointly with G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh, who financed its publication. N. I. Bukharin was also a member of the editorial board. The only (double) issue, which appeared in September 1915, contained three articles by Lenin: "The Collapse of the Second International", "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist" and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 205-59, 349-56, 357-66).

Lenin drew up the plan for the magazine in the spring of 1915. He intended to make *Kommunist* an international organ of the Left Social-Democrats. However, serious disagreements soon arose between the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh, and became more acute after the first issue was published. In view of the anti-Party attitude of this group, the *Sotsial-Demo-*

krat editorial board, on Lenin's proposal, decided that It was impossible to continue the magazine. p. 268

[27] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 540. p. 310

[28] The text inside double lines refers to the contents of Notebook "ϑ". The first three items in the notebook occupy pages 1-10, the pages devoted to Riesser are separately numbered 1-16. Accordingly, in the summary plan for his book on imperialism, Lenin uses the signs "ϑ" and "ϑ P" followed by the page number to denote material in this notebook. p. 333

[29] In the *Notebooks* and in *Imperialism*, Lenin repeatedly refers to Hilferding's book *Finance Capital*. While drawing on its factual data in discussing particular aspects of monopoly capitalism, Lenin criticises the author for his non-Marxist propositions and conclusions on cardinal problems of imperialism. Lenin describes Hilferding—a prominent German Social-Democrat and Second International leader—as a Kantian and Kautskyite, a reformist and "persuader of the imperialist bourgeoisie" (see p. 613 of this volume). By divorcing politics from economics, Hilferding gives an incorrect definition of imperialism and finance capital; he glosses over the decisive role of the monopolies under imperialism and the sharpening of its contradictions; he ignores such important features of imperialism as the division of the world and the struggle for its re-division, and the parasitism and decay of capitalism, thus taking "a step backward compared with the *frankly* pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 193). In spite of its serious errors, however, Hilferding's book played a positive part in the study of the latest phase of capitalism. p. 333

[30] *Kantianism*—the system of views of the eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, elaborated in his works *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *The Critique of Judgement* (1790). "The principal feature of Kant's philosophy," Lenin pointed out, "is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination within one system of heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends" (see present edition, Vol. 14, p. 198). Kant tried to "reconcile" faith and knowledge, religion and science. Kantianism has been the philosophy of all manner of opportunists, including the Kautskyites. Marx and Engels revealed the essential nature of Kantianism; Lenin subjected it to thoroughgoing criticism in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see present edition, Vol. 14, pp. 17-361).

Neo-Kantianism—a reactionary trend in bourgeois philosophy advocating subjective idealism as a revival of Kantian philosophy. It arose in the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany. The Neo-Kantians rejected dialectical and historical materialism. In his book, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*,

Engels described the Neo-Kantians as "theoretical reactionaries" and "cobweb-spinning eclectic flea-crackers". The Neo-Kantians advanced "ethical socialism" in opposition to scientific socialism. Their theory was seized upon by Eduard Bernstein and other revisionists.

Lenin exposed the reactionary nature of Neo-Kantianism and its connection with other trends of bourgeois philosophy (Machism, pragmatism, etc.). p. 334

[31] Lenin points out the falsity of Hilferding's assertion about Tugan-Baranovsky's "merit" in explaining the significance of Marx's theory of capitalist reproduction and crises. A bourgeois economist and prominent representative of "legal Marxism" in the nineties, Tugan-Baranovsky distorted and sought to refute Marx's theory. He denied the basic contradiction of capitalism and the resulting contradiction between the urge for continual expansion of production and restricted consumption owing to the proletarian state of the masses, and maintained that unlimited accumulation and unhindered expansion regardless of the consumption and living standards of the masses was possible. Now, too, bourgeois economists disseminate similar apologetic theories. Capitalist reality refutes these vulgarised doctrines and completely confirms the correctness of the Marxist theory of capitalist accumulation and crises. p. 336

[32] By the First World War, the *Thyssen Steel Company*, founded in 1871, was Europe's biggest iron and steel complex—it included the entire metallurgical cycle, plus coal and iron mines, general engineering and munition plants, transport and trading enterprises. In 1926, the Thyssen family played a leading part in the formation of the Steel Trust—the largest German war-industry combine and one of the most powerful German monopolies. The Thyssen concern helped bring the nazis to power; it was closely connected with a number of industrial and banking monopolies in nazi Germany and with international monopoly capital. After the Second World War the Steel Trust was split into two large concerns—Thyssen and Rheinstahl. The Thyssen concern holds a leading place in the West German iron and steel industry.

Hugo Stinnes started a steel mill in 1893; after the First World War it grew into a large monopoly concern with more than 1,500 enterprises in different industries. The concern went bankrupt shortly after Stinnes's death in 1924, but with the help of American banks his heirs managed to keep the concern in business. One of its offshoots, the Rhein-Elbe Union steel combine, became one of the main components of the Steel Trust. Control of the Stinnes concern passed to the Hugo Stinnes Corporation, a U.S. company in which the shares are held by Stinnes's heirs and American bankers who heavily invested in the concern. p. 346

[33] The extracts and accounts of various passages from Hobson's book were made by N. K. Krupskaya. In going though the extracts, Lenin underlined some passages, wrote comments and made notes

in the margin. The pages of the notebook were numbered by Lenin. His underlining is shown by the following type variations: a single underlining—*italics*; a double underlining—*spaced italics*; three lines—***small heavy italics***; a single wavy line—CAPITAL LETTERS; a double wavy line—SPACED CAPITAL LETTERS. All Lenin's additions have been set in a **heavy face**; where these were once underlined—***heavy italics***, where twice underlined—***spaced heavy italics***.

In the preface to *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin pointed out that he had made use of the book by J. A. Hobson with all the care it merited. John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940) was a well-known British economist, whose point of view was that of a bourgeois reformist and pacifist. The best-known of his writings are *Problems of Poverty*, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* and *Imperialism*. Lenin described the last-named as the "principal English work on imperialism" and a typical example of the petty-bourgeois criticism of imperialism. Lenin points out that Hobson's book "gives a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of imperialism" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 195). In the *Notebooks on Imperialism*, Lenin writes that "Hobson's book on imperialism is useful in general, and especially useful because it helps to reveal the basic falsity of Kautskyism on this subject" (see p. 116 of this volume). While making use of Hobson's rich factual data, Lenin criticised his reformist conclusions and his attempts, albeit veiled, to defend imperialism. p. 405

[34] *The Boer war* (1899-1902)—a colonial, predatory war of Great Britain against the South African republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, as a result of which these became British colonies. p. 422

[35] Lenin inserted here in the manuscript: "see the addition above, p. 7 of this notebook". And at the top of p. 7 he wrote: "(see p. 41 of this notebook)". Following this indication, the extract from p. 7 of the notebook has been included in the volume according to the sequence of the extracts from Hobson's book, and not according to the pagination of the notebook. p. 431

[36] The extracts from Sembat's book were made by N. K. Krupskaya. The markings and insertions (set in heavy type), underlinings (in italics if once underlined and in spaced italics if twice underlined) and pagination are Lenin's. p. 437

[37] *The list of quotations from Schulze-Gaevernitz's book* was compiled by Lenin when he read the book in order afterwards to make the corresponding extracts (see pp. 445-60 of this volume). Lenin entered the quotations from the first eleven pages in the sequence shown by him. These are followed in the notebook by a number of extracts from pp. 229-375 which are not mentioned in the list

(apparently, part of the manuscript has been lost). The end of the list, from p. 401, corresponds to Lenin's entries in the notebook. p. 445

[38] *Volksraad*—the Boer parliament. p. 453

[39] The data on coal output in 1911 were taken by Lenin from "International Surveys", table 19, in *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1915, p. 33. p. 465

[40] The figures for the consumption of tea and spirits refer to Australasia. p. 473

[41] In the preface to the French and German editions of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* Lenin particularly mentions the importance of data on the world's railways for a characterisation of monopoly capitalism: "The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development—sums up, as it were, modern monopolist capitalism on a world-wide scale" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 190). The railway statistics quoted in this volume on pp. 484-90 and 492-95 show how Lenin collected and analysed extensive data on railway development in different countries (Great Powers, independent and semi-independent states, and colonies) in 1890 and 1913. Comparing these data with figures of iron and coal output, Lenin revealed the disproportion between the development of the productive forces and railway construction in various countries (as a result of colonial monopoly). The results of his study, summarised in two short tables, are given in Chapter VII of *Imperialism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 274-75). p. 484

[42] Here and below the reference is to the *Hamburger Echo*, the daily newspaper of the Hamburg Social-Democratic organisation. Founded in 1875 as the *Hamburg-Altona Volksblatt*; its name was changed in 1887. During the First World War it adopted a social-chauvinist position. It was closed by the nazi government in March 1933 and resumed publication in April 1946. p. 506

[43] King Leopold II of Belgium (1835-1909) resorted to intrigue, violence and bribery to take possession of a vast territory on the Congo River (1879-84). The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 endorsed its conversion into the personal property of Leopold II under the title of "the Congo Free State". Its conquest was accompanied by savage atrocities towards the African tribes. In 1908 Leopold "ceded" his personal rights to the Congo to Belgium, at great profit to himself, and it became a Belgian colony. Capitalist monopolies—Belgian, British, French and others—were complete masters of the country. Merciless capitalist exploitation led to repeated anti-imperialist actions by the people, which were brutally suppressed by the colonialists. Under pressure of the national liberation movement, independence was proclaimed on June 30, 1960, but foreign monopolies' domination continues. p. 523

[44] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, Chapter XXX, p. 478. p. 566

[45] The *resolution of the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International* (August 1907) on "Militarism and International Conflicts", in the drafting of which Lenin took part, branded militarism as one of the chief instruments of class oppression and stressed that Social-Democrats should exert every effort not only to prevent war, or bring it to an end if it breaks out, but also to take advantage of the crisis it creates so as to hasten the overthrow of the capitalist class. See Lenin's articles "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 75-81, 82-93). p. 577

[46] *International Socialists of Germany* (*Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands*)—a group of German Left-wing Social-Democrats who during the First World War united round the magazine *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays), published in Berlin from 1913 to 1921. Without wide contacts with the masses, the group quickly fell apart.

The *Internationale* group—a revolutionary organisation of German Left Social-Democrats, founded at the beginning of the First World War by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Leo Jogiches (Tyszka), and Wilhelm Pieck. In April 1915 Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring started the magazine *Die Internationale*, which united the main Left Social-Democrat forces. At the All-German Conference of Left Social-Democrats in Berlin on January 1, 1916, the organisation was formalised and the name *Internationale* Group adopted. In 1916, in addition to the political leaflets it had been issuing, it began illegal publication and distribution of "Political Letters" signed "Spartacus" (they came out regularly until October 1918), and the group began to be called the "Spartacus" group.

The Spartacists conducted revolutionary propaganda among the masses, organised mass anti-war demonstrations, led strikes and exposed the imperialist nature of the world war and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. However, they committed serious errors in matters of theory and tactics.

In April 1917, the Spartacists joined the centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, but preserved their organisational independence. During the November 1918 German revolution, the Spartacists broke with the Independents and formed the Spartacus League, and on December 14, 1918 published their programme. At the Inaugural Congress (December 30, 1918-January. 1, 1919) the Spartacists founded the Communist Party of Germany. Lenin repeatedly criticised the errors of the German Left Social-Democrats and pointed to their inconsistency, but he highly valued their revolutionary work. p. 584

[47] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 405-19; Lenin quotes p. 417. p. 589

[48] Lenin quotes from Kautsky's article "Religion~, published in *Die Neue Zeit*, 32nd year, 1913-14, Vol. 1, No. 6, November 7, 1913, pp. 182-88 (beginning of the article) and No. 10, December 5 1913, pp. 352-60 (end of the article). p. 590

[49] Lenin quotes from a notice of an article by M. W. Ovington, "The Status of the Negroe in the United States", which appeared in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, Vol. 1, pp. 382-83, and from a notice in the same magazine on p. 592 of an article by I. M. Raymond, "A. Southern Socialist on the Negro Question". p. 590

[50] *Industrial Workers of the World* (I.W.W.)—a trade union organisation of workers in the United States founded in 1905. It embraced mainly unskilled or semi-skilled workers in various industries. Daniel De Leon, Eugene Debs and Bill Haywood, prominent figures in the American labour movement, had an active part in its formation. The I.W.W. organised a number of successful mass strikes and anti-war demonstrations during the First World War. Some of its leaders, notably Bill Haywood, welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution and joined the U.S. Communist Party. At the same time, I.W.W. activities had a strong anarcho-syndicalist tinge: it rejected proletarian political struggle, denied the leading role of the revolutionary workers' party and the need for proletarian dictatorship. Owing to the opportunist policy of its leadership, the I.W.W. degenerated into a sectarian organisation and rapidly lost influence in the labour movement.

The *Socialist Party of America* was formed in July 1901 at a congress in Indianapolis by a merger of break-away groups of the Socialist Labour Party and the Social-Democratic Party, one of whose founders, Eugene Debs, had an active part in organising the Socialist Party. In the First World War three trends developed in the Socialist Party: the social-chauvinists, who supported the government's imperialist policy; the Centrists, who opposed the imperialist war only in words; and the revolutionary minority, who took an internationalist stand and waged a struggle against the war.

The Socialist Party Left wing headed by Charles E. Ruthenberg, William Z. Foster, Bill Haywood and others, and supported by the Party's proletarian elements, fought the opportunist leadership and campaigned for independent working-class political action and for industrial trade unions based on the principles of the class struggle. The Socialist Party split in 1919; the Left wing withdrew from the party and became the initiator and main nucleus of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.

The Socialist Party is now a small sectarian organisation. p. 590

[51] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 636-39. p. 591

[52] The *Socialist Labour Party of America* was founded in 1876 at a Unity Congress in Philadelphia by a merger of the American sec-

tions of the First International and other socialist organisations. The Congress was held under the guidance of F. A. Sorge, long-standing associate of Marx and Engels. The bulk of the party consisted of immigrants largely unassociated with the American-born workers. In the early years, the party leadership was dominated by the Lassalleans, who committed errors of a sectarian and dogmatic nature. Marx and Engels severely criticised the American Socialists for their sectarian tactics. In the nineties the leadership passed to the Left wing, headed by Daniel De Leon. However, they committed anarcho-syndicalist errors. The S.L.P. repudiated the struggle for partial working-class demands, rejected work in the reformist trade unions, and gradually lost whatever ties it had with the mass labour movement. In the First World War it tended towards internationalism. Under the influence of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, its more revolutionary section took an active part in forming the Communist Party. At present the S.L.P. is a small organisation without any influence in the labour movement.

The *American Federation of Labour* (A.F.L.)—America's biggest trade union centre, founded in 1881. Organised on craft principles, it united mainly the "labour aristocracy". Its official organ, the monthly journal *American Federationist*, began to be published in Washington in 1894. The reformist leadership of the A.F.L. advocated class collaboration, defended the capitalist system, pursued a splitting policy in the international working-class movement, and actively supported the aggressive foreign policy of U.S. imperialism. In 1955 it merged with the other big trade union federation, the Congress of Industrial Organisations (C.I.O.), and the organisation is known as American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations (A.F.L.-C.I.O.). p. 592

[53] This article was gummed into Notebook "o" in the form of a cutting from the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* of July 10, 1916. The author has not been identified. p. 601

[54] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 497. p. 603

[55] See Marx's letter to Kugelmann, December 13, 1870.

The Notebook "Marxism on the State", which consists of preparatory materials for Lenin's *The State and Revolution*, was written in January-February 1917 in Zurich. The reference to the Notebook "Marxism on the State" was, apparently, made later, during Lenin's work on *The State and Revolution*. p. 603

[56] See Marx's letter to the editor of *The Daily News* of January 16, 1871. (Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1915, p. 256). p. 603

[57] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 463. p. 603

[58] The date given for Marx's letter in *Die Neue Zeit* is wrong; it should be February 4, 1871. p. 603

[59] See *The General Council of the First International, 1868-1870. Minutes*, Moscow, p. 405. p. 604

[60] See Marx's letter to Kugelmann, May 18, 1874. p. 604

[61] In his article "War Aims", Friedrich Adler quotes the statement of the Social-Democratic group in the Prussian Landtag of January 17, 1916. p. 612

[62] During the First World War Trotsky pursued a Centrist policy and supported social-imperialists. Lenin regarded Centrism as the most harmful and dangerous variety of opportunism, for masked opportunists are a hundred times more harmful and dangerous for the working-class movement. Led by Lenin, the Bolsheviks waged an implacable struggle against Centrism and its Trotskyist variety. Exposing the real nature of the Trotskyist slogan "neither victory nor defeat" Lenin pointed out that he who supports this slogan in the present war, "is consciously or unconsciously a chauvinist", "an '*enemy*' of proletarian policy", a supporter of the bourgeoisie (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 279). p. 613

[63] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 406-19. p. 616

[64] The date given for Marx's letter in *Die Neue Zeit* is wrong; it should be August 4, 1874. p. 616

[65] *Vorbote* (Herald)—theoretical journal of the Zimmerwald Left, published in German in Berne. Two numbers appeared: No. 1, January 1916, and No. 2, April 1916. The official publishers were Henriette Roland-Holst and Anton Pannekoek. Lenin took an active part in organising the magazine and—after publication of the first issue—in arranging its translation into French so as to ensure a wider readership. Lenin's articles, "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International" and "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses)", were published in its pages. p. 620

[66] Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 408. p. 621

[67] Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 412. p. 622

[68] Marx's letter to Liebknecht was first published in 1878, in the second edition of Liebknecht's book. p. 625

[69] *Grütli-Verein*—a bourgeois reformist organisation founded in Switzerland in 1838, long before the organisation of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. The name is derived from the Union of Grüt-

lians (conspirators), who rose against the Austrian oppression in the sixteenth century. In 1901 the Grütli-Verein affiliated to the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, but remained organisationally independent. Its newspaper, *Grütlianer*, followed a bourgeois-nationalist policy. In the First World War, the Grütli-Verein took up an extreme chauvinist position and became the mainstay of the Right-wing social-chauvinists. In November 1916, the Zurich Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party declared that the Grütli-Verein's social-chauvinist activity was incompatible with membership of the Social-Democratic Party. p. 628

[70] See Marx and Engels, Gottfried Kinkel. *Neue Rheinische Zeitung Politisch-oekonomische Revue*, Rütten and Loening, Berlin, pp. 218-19. p. 633

[71] The book by Engels, *The Po and the Rhine*, was published in Berlin in 1859. p. 634

[72] See Marx and Engels, A review of Emile de Girardin: "Le socialisme et l'impôt" (see *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* No. 4, 1850. *Politisch-oekonomische Revue*, Rütten and Loening, Berlin, pp. 205-12). p. 634

[73] See Marx and Engels, *Third International Review from May to October*. (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung Politisch-oekonomische Revue*, Heft 5 und 6, pp. 304-33). p. 635

[74] See Marx and Engels, *First International Review*. (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung Politisch-oekonomische Revue*, Heft 2, pp. 115-21). p. 635

[75] In his article "The Collapse of the Second International" Lenin gives an appraisal of Brailsford's book, *The War of Steel and Gold* and uses Brailsford's facts to expose social-chauvinist theories (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 218). p. 638

[76] This refers to government sanction for the operation of British capital abroad. p. 651

[77] The entries in this notebook were made by N. K. Krupskaya. The underlining of individual words, marginal notes, the pagination up to page 15, and the inscription on the cover, were made by Lenin. (Regarding the type used for emphasis, see Note 33). From p. 15 onwards, where extracts from Seeley's book begin (see p. 659 of this volume), Lenin made no marks. p. 653

[78] From Marx's letter to Weydemeyer, September 11, 1851. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 69.) p. 654

[79] From Mars's letter to Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 86.) p. 654

[80] From Marx's letter to S. Meyer and A. Vogt, April 9, 1870. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 285-87.) p. 657

[81] The main text of the notebook, which Lenin headed "Imperialism~, was written by N. K. Krupskaya. Underlinings in the text, marginal marks, the inscription on the cover and pagination were done by Lenin. (Regarding the type used for emphasis see Note 33.) p. 669

[82] Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 351. p. 672

[83] Lenin obtained Egelhaaf's book from the Zurich Cantonal Library. Two request cards filled in by Lenin establish the approximate date of his work on this book. He made his request for the book on August 4, 1916; the library answered that it could supply it "towards the end of October". On October 4, 1916, Lenin asked for another (1908) edition and received the same answer. The time of his work on the book can be put as October-November 1916. p. 680

[84] "*Punti*"—the Chinese name for the indigenous inhabitants of the southern provinces of China. In Hübner's tables, from which Lenin made extracts, "Punti" were erroneously given as a separate nationality. p. 708

[85] *Karafuto*—the Japanese name for the southern part of Sakhalin. p. 708

[86] The conspectuses of the books by Demorgny and Jaeger, included in this Notebook, were compiled by Lenin after he had written *Imperialism*, apparently at the end of 1916 or beginning of 1917. p. 719

[87] The article for which this was the plan was apparently never written. The plan relates to 1912 or 1913 and was written on the same page as the next item (see p. 732 of this volume). p. 731

[88] August Bebel's article, "Deutschland, Russland und die orientalische Frage" ("Germany, Russia and the Eastern Question"), was published in 1886 in *Die Neue Zeit* (4th year, No. 11). Lenin apparently read it in connection with a lecture by the Bundist Kosovsky (M. Y. Levinson). The lecture was delivered between October 10 and 20, 1914 (see *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 132). p. 732

[89] In the later part of October 1915, Lenin proposed to deliver lectures in Zurich and Geneva: "On the 22nd in Zurich, on the 20th in Geneva"—he wrote to V. A. Karpinsky in Geneva (see *Lenin Miscellany XI*, p. 184). The lecture in Zurich, "The International Socialist Conference of September 5-8, 1915", was delivered on October 23. Concerning the date of the Geneva lecture, Lenin wrote: "If possible, fix it for two days before or after" (ibid., p. 185). The subject of the Geneva lecture was, evidently, decided upon somewhat later: "I shall write about the lecture tomorrow" (letter to Karpinsky, October 6; ibid., p. 189). The conspectus, "Imperial-

ism and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", apparently relates to the Geneva lecture delivered by Lenin on October 28, 1915. p. 735

[90] Lenin described the Zimmerwald Conference of internationalist socialists (September 1915), as a "first step" in the development of the international movement against the imperialist war. Socialists from eleven European countries, including Russia, Germany, France and Italy, took part.

The Conference Manifesto was directed against the imperialist governments that had unleashed the world war, and condemned, although not strongly enough, the social-chauvinists. On the basis of the Manifesto, the Zimmerwald group was formed.

The Zimmerwald Left, led by Lenin, took shape at the Conference. It sharply criticised the Kautskyite majority of the Conference and proposed that the resolutions call for a complete break with social-chauvinism and for revolutionary struggle of the masses against their imperialist governments.

The Zimmerwald Left elected a Bureau which after the Conference continued to work for unity of the revolutionary internationalist forces. p. 739

[91] *Struvism*, "legal Marxism"—a bourgeois-reformist distortion of Marxism. P. B. Struve and other "legal Marxists" tried to use Marxism and the working-class movement in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Lenin described Struvism in the following words: "Struvism is not merely a Russian, but ... an international striving on the part of the bourgeois theoreticians to kill Marxism with 'kindness', to crush it in their embraces, kill it with a feigned acceptance of 'all' the 'truly-scientific' aspects and elements of Marxism *except* its 'agitational', 'demagogic', 'Blanquist-utopian' aspect. In other words, they take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, including the struggle for reforms, the class struggle (without the proletarian dictatorship) the 'general' recognition of 'socialist ideals' and the substitution of a 'new order' for capitalism; they cast aside 'only' the living soul of Marxism, 'only its revolutionary content" (see present edition, Vol. 21 p. 222). During the First World War, Struve was one of the ideologists of Russian imperialism; under cover of Marxist phrases he tried to justify the predatory war, annexations and the enslavement of small nations by the Great Powers. p. 739

[92] *G. Weill*—a German revisionist Social-Democrat, a native of Alsace-Lorraine. During the imperialist war he went over to the French, volunteered in the French army and was expelled from the Party. His credentials as a deputy were cancelled and he was declared a deserter. p. 741

[93] Reference is to "Great Britain's Capital Investments in Individual Colonial and Foreign Countries", by G. Paish, in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, Part 2, January

1911, pp. 167-87 (see *Lenin Miscellany XXVII*, pp. 443-47 and pp. 389-91 of this volume), and *Problems of World Economy* by B. Harms, Jena, 1912 (see *Lenin Miscellany XXVII*, pp. 203-19, *XXVIII*, p. 391 and pp. 286-93 of this volume). p. 743

[94] E. Philippovich's article "Monopolies and Monopoly Policy" was published in Karl Grünberg's *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. VI, 1916, pp. 157-74. p. 754

[95] "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism" was written by Lenin in October 1916 and published in December 1916 in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 105-20). p. 754

[96] *Lloyd-Georgism* was the name Lenin gave to the system of methods employed by the bourgeoisie to win over the broad masses, "a system of flattery, lies, fraud, juggling with fashionable and popular catchwords, and promising all manner of reforms and blessings to the workers right and left—as long as they renounce the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie" (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 117). Lenin named this system after the British political leader and Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1863-1945), whom he described as "a first-class bourgeois manipulator, an astute politician, a popular orator", who served the bourgeoisie well, bringing its influence to bear among the proletariat and giving sops to docile workers in the shape of minor reforms. p. 756

[97] "Theses on Imperialism and National Oppression", signed by the editorial board of *Gazeta Robotnicza* were published in No. 2 of the magazine *Vorbote*, from which Lenin made his summary.

Gazeta Robotnicza (Workers' Gazette)—illegal organ of the Warsaw Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, published from May to October 1906; 14 issues appeared under the editorship of G. Kamensky, after which publication ceased. After the split in the Polish Social-Democratic Party in 1912, two Warsaw Committees were formed and two organs were published under the same name, *Gazeta Robotnicza*; one by the supporters of the Chief Executive Committee in Warsaw (July 1911-July 1913), the other by the Opposition Warsaw Committee in Cracow (July 1911-February 1916). Lenin refers to the latter.

Gazeta Robotnicza supported the Zimmerwald Left and took an internationalist stand on the war. But on a number of important issues (organisational break with the Centrists, attitude to the minimum programme during the war) it leaned towards Centrism. On the national question, its editorial board opposed national self-determination. Lenin discusses this in his "Letter from the Committee of Organisations Abroad to the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 157-60). On the *Gazeta Robotnicza* theses, see also Lenin's article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (ibid., pp. 320-60). p. 757

[98] This item, apparently, is a plan for an article or several articles on the revolutionary Marxist attitude versus the opportunist attitude towards imperialism. The beginning of the plan corresponds to the text of "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 105-20). To bring out the connection between imperialism and opportunism, Lenin critically analyses, in the plan and the article, the attitude of Kautsky, the outstanding spokesman of opportunism. He reveals "the inseparable historical connection between social-chauvinism and opportunism, as well as the intrinsic similarity of their political ideology" (ibid. p. 105). Lenin used only part of the plan in writing "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism". That is suggested by the concluding sentence of the article: "In the next article we shall try to sum up the principal features that distinguish this [Marxist—*Ed.*] line from Kautskyism" (ibid., p. 120). p. 758

[99] The reference, apparently, is to the errors of Wilhelm Liebknecht (vacillations towards national-liberalism) in 1864-70, when the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany was in its concluding stage, and the Prussian and Austrian exploiting classes were trying to devise a method of completing the revolution *from above*. Lenin pointed out that "Marx not only rebuked Lassalle, who was coquetting with Bismarck, but also corrected Liebknecht, who had lapsed into 'Austrophilism' and a defence of particularism; Marx demanded revolutionary tactics which would combat with equal ruthlessness both Bismarck and the Austrophiles" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 78, and also pp. 119 and 308). The Mensheviks and other national-liberals tried to make use of Wilhelm Liebknecht's errors to justify their chauvinist stand during the imperialist war of 1914-18. p. 758

[100] Analysing the development of opportunism in the international Social-Democratic movement, Lenin demonstrated the inevitability of its transformation into social-chauvinism during the imperialist war of 1914-18. In "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International" he showed that the opportunism of the years 1889-1914 and the social-chauvinism of the period of the First World War have the same class basis and the same political content, namely, alliance of the servitors to the bourgeoisie and the big capital against the working class, class collaboration, repudiation of revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. "*Social-chauvinism is the direct continuation and consummation of British liberal-labour politics, of Millerandism and Bernsteinism*" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 112). p. 759

[101] *Millerandism*—an opportunist trend named after the French socialist Millerand, who in 1899 joined the reactionary bourgeois government of France and helped the bourgeoisie carry out its policy. p. 759

[102] *Bernsteinism*—an opportunist trend in international Social-Democracy which arose at the end of the nineteenth century and derived its name from the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein. In articles published in 1896-98 in *Die Neue Zeit*, the theoretical organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, and in his book *The Premises of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy* (1899), Bernstein came out against the Marxist theory of class struggle, the inevitable collapse of capitalism, against the socialist revolution and proletarian dictatorship. He urged Social-Democrats to confine themselves to achieving reforms that would improve the workers' economic position under capitalism. Bernstein's opportunist and revisionist views were supported by the Right wing of the German Social-Democratic Party and of other Second International parties. Only the Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin, resolutely fought Bernsteinism and its adherents and successors.

In characterising one trend of opportunism and social-chauvinism, Lenin uses Engels's appraisal of the British Labour Party as a "bourgeois labour party". In "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", Lenin states that a "bourgeois labour party" is inevitable and typical in all imperialist countries, and that "'bourgeois labour parties', as a political phenomenon, have already been formed in all the foremost capitalist countries" (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 118). p. 759

[103] See Lenin's articles: (1) Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International", published in *Vorbote* No. 1, January 1916 (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 108-20), and (2) "The Collapse of the Second International", published in 1915 in *Kommunist* No. 1-2 (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 205-59). p. 759

[104] See pp. 499-503 of this volume. p. 761

[105] Lenin compiled this list from the "Index of New Additions to the Zurich Library", 20th year, 1916, No. 1, January-March. p. 762

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PREFACE

The present volume contains Lenin's *Notebooks on the Agrarian Question*, which is preparatory material for his works analysing capitalist agriculture in Western Europe, Russia and the United States, and criticising bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories, and reformism and revisionism in the agrarian question.

The material in this volume relates to the period from 1900 to 1916. In the new conditions, with capitalism at its highest and final stage—the stage of imperialism—Lenin worked out and substantiated the agrarian programme and agrarian policy of the revolutionary proletarian party, and took Marxist theory on the agrarian question a step forward in its view of classes and the class struggle in the countryside, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, and their joint struggle against the landowners and capitalists, for democracy and socialism. The success of the revolution depended on whom the peasantry would follow, for in many European countries it constituted the majority or a sizable section of the population. In order to win over the peasantry, as an ally of the proletariat in the coming revolution, it was necessary to expose the hostile parties which claimed leadership of the peasantry, and their ideologists.

In the new epoch, these questions became especially pressing and acquired international significance. That is why bourgeois economists, reformists and revisionists fiercely attacked Marxism. It was subjected to criticism by bourgeois apologists, the ideologists of petty-bourgeois parties, and opportunists among the Social-Democrats. They all rejected Marx's theory of ground-rent,

and the law of concentration of production in agriculture, and denied the advantages of large- over small-scale production; they insisted that agriculture developed according to special laws, and was subject to the inexorable "law of diminishing returns". They said it was not human labour and the implements of labour, but the elemental forces of nature that were decisive in agriculture. These "critics of Marx" juggled with the facts and statistics, in an effort to show that the small-scale peasant economy was "stable" and had advantages over large-scale capitalist production.

Lenin's great historical service in working out the agrarian question lies in the fact that he defended Marx's revolutionary teaching against the attacks of his "critics", and further developed it in application to the new historical conditions and in connection with the working out of the programme, strategy and tactics of the revolutionary proletarian party of the new type; he proved the possibility, and the necessity, of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat at the various stages of the revolution, and showed the conditions in which this could be realised.

It was of tremendous importance to produce a theoretical elaboration of the agrarian question so as to determine the correct relations between the working class and the various groups of peasantry as the revolutionary struggle went forward. Under capitalism, the peasantry breaks up into different class groups, with differing and antithetical interests; the "erosion" of the middle peasantry yields a numerically small but economically powerful rich peasant (kulak) top section at one pole, and a mass of poor peasants, rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, at the other. Lenin revealed the dual nature of the peasant as a petty commodity producer—the dual nature of his economic and political interests: the basic interests of the toiler suffering from exploitation by the landowner and the kulak, which makes him look to the proletariat for support, and the interests of the owner, which determine his gravitation towards the bourgeoisie, his political instability and vacillation between it and the working class. Lenin emphasised the need for an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, with the leading role belonging to the proletariat,

as a prerequisite for winning the dictatorship of the proletariat and building socialism through a joint effort by the workers and peasants.

* * *

The *first* part of the volume contains the plans and outlines of Lenin's writings on the agrarian question, the main being the preparatory materials for "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vols. 5 and 13). The variants of the plan for this work give a good idea of how Lenin mapped out the main line and the concrete points for his critique of reformist bourgeois theories and of revisionism. Lenin defined a programme for processing the relevant reliable material from numerous sources to refute the arguments of the "critics of Marx" concerning the dubious "law of diminishing returns" and the Malthusian explanation of the root causes of the working man's plight, and to ward off their attacks on the Marxist theory of ground-rent, etc.

In preparing "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" and his lectures on the agrarian question, Lenin made a thorough study of the most important sources, and utilised European agrarian statistics to give Marxist agrarian theory a sound basis. He verified, analysed and summed up a mass of statistical data, and drew up tables giving an insight into the deep-going causes, nature and social significance of economic processes. Lenin's analysis of agrarian statistics shows their tremendous importance as a tool in cognising economic laws, exposing the contradictions of capitalism, and subjecting it and its apologists to scientific criticism.

The writings in the first part of the volume show the direct connection between Lenin's theoretical inquiry, his elaboration of Marxist agrarian theory and the practical revolutionary struggle of the working class.

The preparatory materials for his lectures on the "Marxist Views of the Agrarian Question in Europe and Russia", and on "The Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and of the Social-Democrats", both included in this volume, are a reflection of an important stage of Lenin's struggle against the petty-bourgeois party of Socialist-

Revolutionaries and opportunists within the Social-Democratic movement, in working out and substantiating a truly revolutionary agrarian programme and tactics for the Marxist working-class party in Russia.

Russia was then on the threshold of her bourgeois-democratic revolution. In Russia, capitalism had grown into imperialism, while considerable survivals of serfdom still remained in the country's economy and the political system as a whole. The landed estates were the main relicts of pre-capitalist relations in the economy; the peasant allotment land tenure, adapted to the landowners' corvée system, was also shackled with relicts of serfdom. These tended to slow down the development of the productive forces both in Russia's industry and agriculture, widen the technical and economic gap separating her from the leading capitalist countries of the West, and create the conditions for indentured forms of exploitation of the working class and the peasantry. That is why the agrarian question was basic to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia and determined its specific features.

Lenin laid special emphasis on the importance of theory in working out the Party programme: "In order to make a comparison of the programmes and to assess them, it is necessary to examine the *principles*, the theory, from which the programme flows" (see p. 53). Lenin's theoretical analysis of the economic nature of the peasant economy enabled him to determine correctly the community or the distinction of class interests between the proletariat and the various sections of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and to map out the Party's policy towards the peasantry. The main task of the agrarian programme during the bourgeois-democratic revolution was to formulate the demands that would secure the peasantry as the proletariat's ally in the struggle against tsarism and the landowners. "The meaning of our agrarian programme: the Russian proletariat (including the rural) must support the peasantry in the struggle against serfdom" (see p. 62). Lenin subjected the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to withering criticism and proved that their theoretical unscrupulousness and eclecticism had induced them to say nothing of the historical task of the period—destruction of the

relicts of serfdom—to deny the stratification of the peasantry along class lines, and the class struggle in the countryside, to invent all manner of projects for "socialisation of land", "equalisation", etc.

While Lenin aimed his criticism against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, he also exposed the anti-Marxist stand on the agrarian issue in Russia and the peasantry taken by P. P. Maslov, A. S. Martynov, D. B. Ryazanov and other Mensheviks-to-be, who denied that the peasantry had a revolutionary role to play, and who regarded it as a solid reactionary mass. By contrast, Lenin emphasised the dual nature of Narodism: the democratic side, inasmuch as they waged a struggle against the relicts of serfdom, and the utopian and reactionary side, expressive of the urge on the part of the petty bourgeois to perpetuate his small farm. In this context, Lenin pointed to the need to take account of the two sides of Narodism in evaluating its historical importance.

The first part ends with two plans for "The Peasantry and Social-Democracy" (see pp. 69-70). These plans warrant the assumption that Lenin had the intention of writing a special work on the subject to sum up his studies of agrarian relations and the experience gained by socialist parties abroad in working out agrarian programmes, and to substantiate the R.S.D.L.P.'s policy towards the peasantry. With his usual insight, he points to the "practical importance of the agrarian question in the possibly near future" (see p. 70), and notes the specific nature of class relations in the Russian countryside, and the need for the rural proletariat to fight on two flanks: against the landowners and the relicts of serfdom, and against the bourgeoisie. Lenin marked out the guiding principles which were to serve the Marxist party as a beacon in the intricate conditions of the class struggle in the countryside: "Together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landowners. Together with the urban proletariat against the peasant bourgeoisie" (see p. 69).

The writings in the *second* part of the present volume are a reflection of his critical processing of a great mass of facts and statistical data from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois agrarian works and official sources. Of special

interest in this part is the material on the study and processing of the results of special statistical inquiries into the state of agriculture, especially the peasant economy, in a number of European countries.

Lenin gives a model of scientific analysis of agrarian relations, application of the Marxist method in processing social and economic statistics, and critical use of bourgeois sources and writings. Lenin adduces reliable data to refute the assertions of bourgeois economists, reformists and revisionists, and shows that in agriculture as well large-scale capitalist production is more effective than small-scale production and tends inevitably to supplant it, that small peasant farms are being expropriated by big capital, and that the toiling peasantry is being ruined and proletarised. That is the *general law* governing the development of agriculture on capitalist lines, although it may *differ in form* from country to country.

In his critical remarks on the works of S. Bulgakov, F. Hertz, M. Hecht, E. David, and K. Klawki, Lenin refutes the bourgeois reformist theories which extol small farming and assert that it is "superior" to large-scale production. He exposes the tricks used by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists to minimise the earnings of the big farms and exaggerate those of the small. Lenin counters the false eulogies to the "viability" of the small farms—due allegedly to the small farmer's industry, thrift and hardiness, by showing that small-scale production in agriculture is sustained by the back-breaking toil and poor nutrition of the small farmer, the dissipation of his vital forces, the deterioration of his livestock, and the waste of the soil's productive forces.

Lenin has some particularly sharp words for the reformists and revisionists who "fool others by styling themselves socialists", and put more into prettifying capitalist reality than the bourgeois apologists themselves. Lenin makes a detailed analysis of E. David's *Socialism and Agriculture*—the main revisionist work on the agrarian question—and shows it to be a collection of bourgeois falsehood and bias wrapped up in "socialist" terminology.

At the same time, Lenin takes pains to sift and examine any genuine scientific data and correct observations and

conclusions which he finds in bourgeois sources and writings. He makes the following extract from O. Pringsheim's article: "Modern large-scale agricultural production should be compared with the *manufacture* (in the *Marxian sense*)" (see p. 108), and repeatedly makes such comparisons in his works (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 141 and Vol. 22, p. 99). On F. Maurice's book, *Agriculture and the Social Question. Agricultural and Agrarian France*, Lenin makes this remark: "The author has the wildest ideas of the most primitive anarchism. There are some interesting factual remarks" (see p. 173).

Lenin devotes special attention to an analysis of statistics on the agrarian system in Denmark, which the apologists of capitalism liked to present as the "ideal" country of small-scale peasant production. He exposes the trickery of bourgeois economists and revisionists and demonstrates the *capitalist* nature of the country's agrarian system. The basic fact which bourgeois political economists and revisionists try to hush up is that the bulk of the land and the livestock in Denmark is in the hands of landowners running farms on capitalist lines (see p. 225 and pp. 376-82). "The basis of Danish agriculture is large-scale and medium *capitalist* farming. All the talk about a 'peasant country' and 'small-scale farming' is sheer bourgeois apologetics, a distortion of the facts by various titled and untitled ideologists of capital" (see present edition, Vol. 13, p. 196). Lenin castigates the "socialists" who try to obscure the fact that production is being concentrated and that the petty producer is being ousted by the big producer, and the fact that the prosperity of capitalist agriculture in Denmark is based on the *massive proletarisation* of the rural population.

The *third* part of the volume contains material for a study of the capitalist agriculture of Europe and the United States from 1910 to 1916, including the material relating to Lenin's *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. Part One. *Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America*.

In this work, Lenin stresses that the United States, "a leading country of modern capitalism", was of especial interest for the study of the social and economic structure of agriculture, and of the forms and laws of its development

in modern capitalist conditions. "In America, agricultural capitalism is more *clear-cut*, the division of labour is more *crystallised*; there are *fewer* bonds with the Middle Ages, with the soil-bound labourer; ground-rent is not so burdensome; there is less intermixing of commercial agriculture and subsistence farming" (see p. 420). The important thing is that the United States is unrivalled in the vastness of territory and diversity of relationships, showing the greatest spectrum of shades and forms of capitalist agriculture.

Bourgeois economists, reformists and revisionists distort the facts in an effort to prove that the U.S. farm economy is a model of the "non-capitalist evolution" of farming, where the "small family farm" is allegedly supplanting large-scale production, where most farms are "family-labour farms", etc. N. Himmer, who gave his views in an article on the results of the U.S. Census of 1910, epitomises those who believe that agriculture in capitalist society develops along non-capitalist lines. Lenin makes this note: "Himmer as a *collection* of bourgeois views. *In this respect*, his short article is worth volumes" (see p. 408). The opponents of Marxism based their conclusions on facts and figures, major and minor, which were isolated from "the general context of politico-economic relations". On the strength of massive data provided by the U.S. censuses, Lenin gives "a complete picture of capitalism in American agriculture" (present edition, Vol. 22, p. 18). Lenin notes that through their agricultural censuses, bourgeois statisticians collect "an immense wealth of complete information on each enterprise as a unit" but because of incorrect tabulation and grouping it is reduced in value and spoiled; the net result is meaningless columns of figures, a kind of statistical "game of digits".

Lenin goes on to work the massive data of agricultural statistics into tables on scientific principles for grouping farms. The summary table compiled by Lenin (pp. 440-41) is a remarkable example of the use of socio-economic statistics as an instrument of social cognition. He brings out the contradictions and trends in the capitalist development of U.S. agriculture through a three-way grouping of farms: by income, that is, the value of the product, by acreage, and by specialisation (principal source of income).

Lenin's analysis of the great volume of facts and massive agrarian statistics proves that U.S. agriculture is developing the capitalist way. Evidence of this is the general increase in the employment of hired labour, the growth in the number of wage workers, the decline in the number of independent farm owners, the erosion of the middle groups and the consolidation of the groups at both ends of the farm spectrum, and the growth of big capitalist farms and the displacement of the small. Lenin says that capitalism in U.S. agriculture tends to grow both through the faster development of the large-acreage farms in extensive areas, and through the establishment of farms with much larger operations on smaller tracts in the intensive areas. There is growing concentration of production in agriculture, and the expropriation and displacement of small farmers, which means a decline in the proportion of owners.

In his book, Lenin shows the plight of the small and tenant farmers, especially Negroes, who are most ruthlessly oppressed. "For the 'emancipated' Negroes, the American South is a kind of prison where they are hemmed in, isolated and deprived of fresh air" (present edition, Vol. 22, p. 27). Lenin notes the remarkable similarity between the economic status of the Negroes in America and that of the one-time serfs in the heart of agricultural Russia.

An indicator of the ruin of small farmers in the United States is the growth in the number of mortgaged farms, which "means that the actual control over them is transferred to the capitalists". Most farmers who fall into the clutches of finance capital are further impoverished. "Those who control the banks, directly control one-third of America's farms, and indirectly dominate the lot" (ibid., pp. 92, 100).

Lenin's study of the general laws governing the capitalist development of agriculture and the forms they assumed in the various countries shed a strong light on the whole process of displacement of small-scale by large-scale production. This complex and painful process involves not only the direct expropriation of toiling peasants and farmers by big capital, but also the "ruin of the small farmers and a worsening of conditions on their farms that may go on for years and decades" (Vol. 22, p. 70), a process which may assume a variety of forms, such as the small farmer's

overwork or malnutrition, heavy debt, worse feed and poorer care of livestock, poorer husbandry, technical stagnation, etc.

Lenin analysed the capitalist agriculture of Europe and the United States decades ago. Since then, considerable changes have taken place in the agriculture of the capitalist countries. However, the objective laws governing capitalist development are inexorable. The development of capitalist agriculture fully bears out the Marxist-Leninist agrarian theory, and its characteristic of classes and the class struggle in the countryside. The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emphasises that the agriculture of the capitalist countries is characterised by a further deepening of the contradictions inherent in the bourgeois system, namely, the growing concentration of production, and ever greater expropriation of small farmers and peasants. The monopolies have occupied dominant positions in agriculture as well. Millions of farmers and peasants are being ruined and driven off the soil.

In the decades since Lenin made his analysis, there have been major changes in the technical equipment of agricultural production. But, as in the time of Marx and Lenin, the machine not only raises the productivity of human labour but also leads to a further aggravation of the contradictions in capitalist agriculture.

The mechanisation of production on the large capitalist farms is accompanied by intensification of labour, worsening of working conditions, displacement of hired labour and growing unemployment. At the same time, there is increasing ruin of small peasants and farmers, who are unable to buy and make rational use of modern machinery, and who are saddled with debts and taxes; the small and middle farmers who are supplanted by the large farms, become tenants, or wage workers; and the dispossessed tenant farmers are driven off the land. This is borne out by the massive statistics furnished by agricultural censuses in the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and other capitalist countries.

But in the teeth of these facts present-day bourgeois economists, reformists and revisionists of every stripe keep coming up with the theories long since refuted by

Marxism-Leninism and upset by practice itself—asserting that under capitalism the small farm is "stable", that it offers "advantages" over the large farm, and that under capitalism the toiling peasant can enjoy a life of prosperity.

Modern reformists and revisionists try to revive the old theories of the "non-capitalist evolution of agriculture through the co-operatives. However, the marketing co-operatives extolled by the bourgeoisie and their 'socialist' servitors fail to save the small farmers from privation and ruin. Modern reality fully bears out Lenin's analysis of co-operatives under capitalism. Lenin adduced concrete facts on associations for the marketing of dairy produce in a number of capitalist countries to show that these consist mainly of large (capitalist) farms, and that very few small farmers take part in them (see pp. 207, 209-10). In the capitalist countries today, co-operative societies, which are under the control of banks and monopolies, are also used mainly by capitalist farmers and not by the small farmers.

Lenin's critique of bourgeois reformist and revisionist views on the agrarian question is just as important today as a brilliant example of the Party approach in science, and of irreconcilable struggle against a hostile ideology, bourgeois apologetics, and modern reformism and revisionism. With capitalism plunged in a general crisis, and class contradictions becoming more acute, the bourgeoisie and its ideologists have been trying very hard to win over the peasantry, by resorting to social demagogy, propounding reformist ideas of harmonised class interests, and promising the small farmer better conditions under capitalism. Lenin s guiding statements on the agrarian question teach the Communist and Workers' Parties of the capitalist and colonial countries to take correct decisions on the working-class attitude towards the peasantry as an ally in the revolutionary struggle against capitalism and colonialism, for democracy and socialism.

Lenin stressed that, in contrast to those bourgeois pundits who sow illusions among the small peasants about the possibility of achieving prosperity under capitalism, the Marxist evaluation of the true position of the peasantry in the capitalist countries "inevitably leads to the recognition

of the small peasantry's blind alley and hopeless position (hopeless, outside the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the entire capitalist system)" (present edition, Vol. 5, p. 190).

The historic example of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has shown the peasants of the world the advantages of the socialist way of farming; they are coming to realise that only the establishment of truly popular power and producers' co-operatives can rid the peasants of poverty and exploitation, and assure them of a life of prosperity and culture. The experience of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies has toppled the theories spread by the servants of the bourgeoisie which say that the peasantry is basically hostile to socialism. There is now practical proof of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the peasant economy must and can be remodelled on socialist lines, and that the toiling peasants can be successfully involved in the construction of socialism and communism.

* * *

The bulk of the material contained in the present volume was first published from 1932 to 1938, in *Lenin Miscellanies XIX*, *XXXI* and *XXXII*. Seven writings were first published in the Fourth Russian edition, among them: remarks on M. E. Seignouret's book, *Essays on Social and Agricultural Economics*; a manuscript containing an analysis of data from the *Agricultural Statistics of France*; remarks on G. Fischer's *The Social Importance of Machinery in Agriculture*; a manuscript containing extracts from *Hand and Machine Labor*; and remarks on E. Jordi's *Electric Motor in Agriculture*.

The publishers have retained Lenin's arrangement of the material, his marks in the margin and underlinings in the text. The underlinings are indicated by type variations: a single underlining by *italics*, a double underlining by *s p a c e d i t a l i c s*, three lines by **heavy Roman type**, and four lines by **s p a c e d h e a v y R o m a n t y p e**. A wavy underlining is indicated by ***heavy italics***, if double—by ***s p a c e d h e a v y i t a l i c s***.

In the Fourth Russian edition the entire text of this volume was verified once again with Lenin's manuscripts and sources.

All statistical data were checked again, but no corrections were made where the totals or percentages do not tally, because they are the result of Lenin's rounding off the figures from the sources.

The present volume contains footnote references to Lenin's "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" and *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. This has been done to show the connection between the preparatory material and the finished works, and to give an idea of how Lenin made use of his notes.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.P.S.U. Central Committee

I

PLANS AND OUTLINES OF WORKS ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

PLAN OF "THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE 'CRITICS OF MARX'"[1]

FIRST VARIANT

Perhaps the following division:

A. Some of Bulgakov's general propositions and "theories"

B. Factual data against the critics
M. Hecht*
Baden Inquiry (connect with Winzer)**
"Solid peasantry"
K. Klawki***
The Condition of the Peasants[2]
(Hertz****, 15) Baudrillart[3]
French statistics. (Souchon and Maurice)*****
German statistics****** (connect with co-operatives)
Belgium (Vandervelde, Chłapowski*******?).

C. Class struggle *or* co-operation?
Distortion of Engels.[4]
Overall data on employers and wage workers. Capitalist system.
Böttger.[5] [Bulgakov's greater consistency]

D. Russian agrarian programme in No. 3 of *Iskra*[6].

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* See pp. 116-25.—*Ed.*
** Wine grower. See pp. 180-85.—*Ed.*
*** See pp. 138-59.—*Ed.*
**** See pp. 96-106.—*Ed.*
***** See pp. 170-77.—*Ed.*
****** See pp. 189-217.—*Ed.*
******* See pp. 178-79.—*Ed.*

SECOND VARIANT

A. Bulgakov on the law of diminishing returns (cf. Maslov, who is not quite right[7]).
A. Bulgakov on big and small farms.
((To B?)) Bulgakov on co-operation and individualism in agriculture.
B. Baden data (in connection with Hecht).
B. Baudrillart....
B. *The Condition of the Peasants....*
C) ... Böttger....
C) Distortion of Engels and Marx. ("The Peasant Question")
B. Moritz Hecht.
B) Co-operatives. (Cf. German statistics on dairy farms)
C) *Overall data on rural labourers and rural employers.*
D) Russian agrarian programme in No. 3 of *Iskra*.
B. K. Klawki.
B. French data on holders and proletariat in agriculture.
(To A?) Electric power in agriculture

Pringsheim*
Mack[8]
Kautsky[9]

THIRD VARIANT

CRITICS IN THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

A) 1. Introduction. Breach in orthodox Marxism (Chernov No. 4, 127[10]).
I 2. General methods of the critics' "theory" . Bulgakov: law of diminishing returns (cf. Maslov)
3. Bulgakov's own data in refutation of it.
4. Theory of rent (cf. Maslov).
5. Malthusianism: cf. Ireland.[11]

* See pp. 107-10.—*Ed.*

II 6. Hertz (+ Bulgakov). Agricultural machinery, large- and small-scale production (Bulgakov δ* Hertz: ε**). Con—Bulgakov I, 240, II, 115, 133.
7. Hertz. "Definition of capitalism" (and Chernov)
8. —mortgages (and Chernov). Cf. Bulgakov on savings banks II, 375.
9. —Engels on America[12] (Idem Chernov). Bulgakov II, 433 (cf. I, 49)
Electric power in agriculture (Pringsheim, Mack, K. Kautsky).
III 10. Chernov. Kautsky is annihilated (A—6 Chernov[13]). Ibidem Kautsky on usury, Kautsky on the distinguishing characteristics of the proletariat. Voroshilov.
11. Voroshilov about N. —on and others. (A—1 Chernov[13])
12. " "form and content" of capitalism
B)) IV 1. M. Hecht (Blondel,[14] Hertz, David, Chernov).
2. K. Klawki (against Auhagen) (Bulgakov)
V 3. *The Condition of the Peasants* (Quotations from Hertz and Bulgakov)[15]
4. Baden Inquiry.
5. Conclusions on "*solid peasantry*" (Bulgakov ε.*** Hertz—p. *6* N.B. Hertz δ.**** Chernov on petty-bourgeois peasantry. Chernov No. 7, 163; No. 10, 240).
VI 6. Baudrillart (Hertz p. 15 et al., Bulgakov II, 282)
7. Souchon and Maurice.
VII 8. French statistics. (Property and farm operations, cf. Hertz: "no proletarisation at all" p. 59. Employers and labourers establishments with hired labour) .
VIII 9. German statistics. Latifundia. (Cf. Hertz and Bulgakov).
9 bis. German statistics....***** (Cf. Bulgakov II, 106).

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* See p. 87.—*Ed.*
** See p. 104—*Ed.*
*** See p. 87.—*Ed.*
**** See p. 104.—*Ed.*
***** Several words illegible.—*Ed.*

10. German statistics. Industrialisation of rural industry (Bulgakov and Hertz, p. 88).
11. German statistics. *Co-operatives*. Cf. Baden data on the Winzers.

IX 12. Belgium. (Vandervelde, Chłapowski).

C)) X 1. Overall data on employers and labourers. (*Capitalist* system)
2. Nonsense about "peasantry".
3. Distortion of Engels ("The Peasant Question"). (Hertz, Chernov.)
4. Bulgakov (more consistent).
5. Class struggle *or* co-operation.
6. *Böttger*.

D) XI Russian agrarian programme and No. 3 of *Iskra*. *Iskra's approach* to the question. Objections of 2a3b[16]
The *pros* and *cons*.

FOURTH VARIANT

CRITICS IN THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

I

1. Introduction. Agrarian question—"breach" (first one) in orthodox Marxism. (Chernov No. 4, 127; No. *8*, *204*).
2. General theoretical propositions and reasoning of critics (Bulgakov, Hertz and Chernov). *Bulgakov*: *law of diminishing returns* (cf. Maslov). Bulgakov's phrases: I, 2, *13*, *17*, 18, 20, 21 (29-30 especially), 34, 35, 64 and many others. (Cf. K. Kautsky versus Brentano. No wonder Bulgakov is delighted with Brentano. I, 116.)
3. Refutation of this law with Bulgakov's own data: in *Britain*: I, 242, 260; in *Germany*: II, 132-33. In France II, 213.
4. Theory of *rent*. (Cf. Maslov.) Bulgakov I, 92, *105*. *111-**13***.
5. *Malthusianism*. Bulgakov I, 214, 255. II, 41 etc. II, 212 (France *N.B.*)— cf. II, 159.
Especially II, 221, et seq. 223, 237 and 233, *249*, *265* N.B. (and 261). Ireland II, 351, 384.
Bulgakov about Hertz I, 139 ("remarkable").

II

6. Bulgakov + Hertz. *Agricultural machinery* Bulgakov I, 43-51. Hertz pp. 40, 60-65. *Reactionary attitude towards agricultural machinery*: *Hertz*, *65*; *Bulgakov I*, *51-52*; *II*, *103*.
   Con on machines. Hertz 36 (America); 43-44; 15 (latifundia), 124 (steam plough). Bulgakov I, 240; II, 115, 133.

Machines in Britain: I, 252

(Hertz 67: higher yields from steam plough).

7. Bulgakov + Hertz. *Large- and small-scale production*. Bulgakov I, 142, 154; II, 135; 280 (Cf. 282-83).
   Con—Bulgakov I, *239-40*. Hertz 52, 81. (Machines on small farms). Con 74 (small farms >labour); 89-90 (peasant's labour rent); 91-92 (collateral employment).
   Bulgakov II, 247 (small farms< rich in capital).

Con—Bulgakov. In Britain: I, 311, 316, 318-19. Small-scale production was > damaged.
I, 333 (in Britain—? their (small farms') unviability has not been proved?)

France II, 188-89. (reduction in the number of medium farms—Bulgakov's dodges) II, 213 (small farms "in the vanguard" ??). Ireland II, 359-60

8. Hertz: "*definition of capitalism*" (p. 10)—and Chernov No. 4, 133.
9. Hertz (and Bulgakov in *Nachalo*[17]?)—*mortgages*. Hertz 24, 26, 28. (*Chernov* No. 10, 216-17). Kautsky's reply.
10. "Engels's mistake" (Hertz 31; Chernov No. 8, 203). Cf. Bulgakov I, 49 and II, 433 ("naïveté).
    Cf. *Electric power* in agriculture (Pringsheim, Mack, K. Kautsky's

III

11. Chernov—"*Form and content* of capitalism": No. 6, 209; No. 8, 228.
12. Chernov about *Russian* Marxists: No. 4, 139; No. 4, 141; No. 8, 238; No. 10, 213; No. 11, 241 and No. 7,166 (who are their comrades?) eulogises Nikolai—on and Kablukov: No. 10, 237.

Distortion of *Marxism*: *International*: No. 5, 35. Marx on agriculture No. 6, 216, *231* and many others. Engels on Belgium, No. 10, 234.
The journal *Nachalo* I, pp. 7 and 13.

13. Chernov. Kautsky is "annihilated": "have even failed to grasp what Marx says" (No. 7 ,169)—idem in the collection *At the Glorious Post* on usury, on the distinguishing characteristics of the proletariat.
Voroshilov: No. 8, 229. (Cf. K. Kautsky).

IV

14. *M. Hecht* (Blondel, p. 27, Hertz 68, 79; Chernov No. 8, 206. David).
15. *K. Klawki* (Bulgakov I, 58). A couple of words about Auhagen. Hertz 70 and Bulgakov I, 58. (Cf. Hertz 66; crops in Prussia and Southern Germany.)
16. *The Condition of the Peasants*. (Quotations by Bulgakov and Hertz.)

V

17. *Baden Inquiry* (Hertz's references 68, *79* especially); and Bulgakov passim: especially II, 272).
18. VII Conclusions on the "*solid peasantry*" (Bulgakov II, *138* N.B. and 456), on the peasant's attitude to the worker (Bulgakov II, 288; Hertz 4-15; 9. Hertz, *6* (with 1-2 hired labourers) and 5. Chernov No. 7, 163 ('petty-

Bulgakov II, 289 (" peasantophobia"). Bulgakov II, 176 ("the French peasantry split up into the proletariat and the proprietors") Bulgakov II, 118

bourgeois"); No. 10, 240 (peasant = working man)).	("solid peasants + technically advanced big ones").

VI

19. *Baudrillart* (Hertz, 15 et seq., *56-58*; Bulgakov II, 282).	Souchon on the need of big and small farms. Cf. Bulgakov I, 338 (Britain: verdict of history—for small farms) Cf. Rentenguter.[18]
Cf. Bulgakov II, 208 from Baudrillart, Vol. 1	
Souchon and Maurice. (Cf. Bulgakov II, 280 on hired labourers on small farms).	

VII

20. *French* statistics. Distribution of rural population. Hertz 55; Bulgakov II, 195-97 and Hertz 59 and *60*: (no pauperisation). Employers and workers (cf. Bulgakov II, 191). Establishments with hired labourers.	Hertz p. 55 and p. 140 on the migration of peasant hired labourers from the North to the South of France. (Cf. Bulgakov II, 191.)

VIII

21. *German* statistics. Acreage statistics. Fewer labourers owning land (Bulgakov II, 106). Latifundia. (Cf. Hertz 15; Bulgakov II, 126, 190, 363). Industrialisation (Bulgakov II, 116; Hertz 88).	—Bulgakov II, 260
	illusion that the big farm is vehicle of progress.
	—Hertz 21, 89 ("The chief task of socialism").
Co-operatives (cf. Baden data on the Winzers). Hertz 120.	

IX

22. *Belgium*. (Vandervelde. Subsidiary earnings. Chłapowski. The state of small-scale production Collateral earnings).

X

23. Overall data on owners and labourers in European agriculture (*Capitalist* system). (Cf. Maurice on concentration. Hertz 82 and 55 (1)).

Cf. Bulgakov II, 455 ("the grain problem > terrible than the social one")

24. Nonsense about the concept of "peasantry". (Cf. Russian statistics. Its advantages.)

25. Distortion of Engels ("The Peasant Question") on the question of co-operatives. Hertz 122 (Chernov No. 5, 42; No. 7, 157)

26. Bulgakov > consistent (II, 287, 266, 288). Hertz on *socialism*: pp. 7, 14, 10, 72-73, 123, 76, 93, 105.

Antithesis of town and country. *Hertz 76*

On socialism: Bulgakov II, 289, *456*, *266* [denial of class struggle: cf. also Bulgakov I, 303 *and* 301.—Britain].

Bulgakov in *Nachalo*

27. Class struggle *or* co-operation. Hertz 21, 89. ("The chief task of socialism".) (Cf. *Chernov*. Non-capitalist evolution No. 5, 47; No. 10, 229, 243-44.)

Class struggle or adaptation to the *interests* of the big and petty bourgeoisie.

Chernov in the collection. *At the Glorious Post 195*, 185, 188, 196.

(Is the money economy the best way? Hertz 20).

[Bulgakov versus socialism, see § 26]. Bulgakov II, 255 (in favour of vegetable plots: cf, II, 105. Agrarian.

Idem on corn taxes.
II, 141-48).

28. Böttger (Cf. K. Kautsky) (Quoted by Chernov No.)

XI

29. Russian agrarian programme and No. 3 of *Iskra*.
Approach
{ 1) class struggle
{ 2) its two forms }

30. Objections of 2a3b ("cut-off lands").
The *pros* and *cons*.

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CONTENTS OF "THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE 'CRITICS OF MARX'"

§§	I.	(Law of diminishing returns)	pp. 2- 27
	II.	(Theory of rent)	pp. 27- 48
	III.	(Machines)	pp. 48- 73
	IV.	(Town and country)	pp. 74-101
	V.	(Hecht)	pp. 102-117
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(§ V) с. 1-16 (102-112). Текст

§ VI с. 17-39 (118 — —) Варианты и Klawki.
Цит. т. 8. по Bruck. Zeitschr. Kraftfutter mittel

§ VI с. 39-43

§ VII 43-56 (Тад. анализы)

VII 56-67 Экспл. разлож. Крива и инкор. зрого в силосе.

VIII 67-89. Шрот хлоп. обр.
(1) хвал. свеж. корм
(2) знач. наторфрит
(3) хв. средних кл.: хуже свеж. р. сахара.

IX 89-121: Общ. зерн. корм.
89-94: скот в рацс. зерн.
94-99 карт. корм
99-108 мол. зерно
108-119 клоп.
112-121 с. кас. с. изурем.

+ Викгр.

45

X Скотн. общие при сахаре ок. 1/2 года

Шо ≥ ок. 2 год.

Lenin's manuscript,
Contents of "The Agrarian Question
and the 'Critics of Marx'".
Earlier than February 1906

CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS V-IX OF "THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND THE 'CRITICS OF MARX'"[19]

*) (§ V) pp. 1-16 (102-117). Hecht
*) § VI) pp. 17-39 (118-—). Auhagen and Klawki.
*) § VI pp. 39-43 Mr. Bulgakov's quotations from *The Condition of the Peasants*

Concentrated feed

§ VII 43-56 (Baden Inquiry)
VII 56-67 Meaning of the disintegration of the peasantry and Bulgakov's ignoring of this.
VIII 67-89 Results of German statistics
(1) increase of small farms
(2) meaning of latifundia
(3) increase of medium farms: worsening of draught animals.
IX 89-121 ***Overall German statistics***
89-94 livestock in various groups of farms
94-98 industries
98-108 dairy farming

tobacco-growing + wine-growing

108-112 *co-operatives*

112-121 *rural population* with and without land

*) rapid silent reading—about half an hour

120 pages ≧ about 2 hours[20]

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MARXIST VIEWS OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA[21]

OUTLINE OF LECTURES

FIRST VARIANT

MARXIST VIEWS OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA

A. ***General Theory of the Agrarian Question.***

1. *Growth of commercial agriculture.*—Phases of process.—Formation of market: towns.—Peasant-industrialist (Capital, III, 2?).[22]—Remnants of natural economy.—Degree of peasant's subordination to market.—Free competition in agriculture. For how long?

N.B. (Decline of natural peasant household industries *K. Kautsky* and *Engels*.[23])

Need of money (Usurers. *Taxes*).

2. *Law of diminishing returns*. Ricardo—Marx (Bulgakov and Maslov lately).
3. *Theory of rent*. Ricardo—Marx: differential and absolute rent. (Maslov's mistake.)

3a. *Separation of town from country* (cf. Bulgakov and Hertz. ***Zarya*** No. 2-3.[24] Nossig*).

4. *Present agricultural crisis*. (Parvus).

Inflation and consolidation of rent. Burden of rent.

* See pp. 263-64.—*Ed.*

5. The "*mission*" of capital in agriculture
   { 1) separation of landownership from Production
   2) socialisation
   3) rationalisation }

B. ***Small-Scale Production in Agriculture*** (*1-4*—one lecture; *5-6*, another).

1. *Technical superiority of large-scale production*. Statistics. Machines. (Large-scale *economy* and large-scale *landownership*.)
2. *Displacement*, *proletarisation of the peasantry*. Flight to towns.—Handicraft industries.—Collateral employment.
3. *Worsening of draught* animals. German statistics. Use of cow as draught animal.

Addition. Baudrillart, Souchon, Chłapowski

4. *Co-operatives*. German statistics[25] (Hertz, David, etc.)
5. *Comparison of profitability of big and small farms*. Klawki,* **Stumpfe**. Cf. Hecht, *The Condition of the Peasants*. { man / cattle / land }
6. *South-German Inquiries*. Baden, Bavaria, **Württemberg**.[26]

C. ***Statements of Principles by Marxists in the West.***

Transfer to end? of Section IV (D)

The Agrarian Programme of West-European and Russian Social-Democrats

1. *Marx and Engels in the 1840s. The Communist Manifesto.—Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[27]—Marx on American agriculture in the 1840s.[28]
2. *Resolutions of the International*,[29] Engels in 1874, his programme.[30]
3. *The agrarian debates of 1895*.[31] Engels in *Die Neue Zeit* on the French and German programmes.
   N.B. ***Social-Democrats in the Countryside***. (***Böttger*** Hugo).

* See pp. 138-59.—*Ed.*

4. *K. Kautsky in Soziale Revolution.*
[A § from D to this point? Principles of the Russian agrarian programme.]*

D. ***The Agrarian Question in Russia.***

To D. Russia's agricultural decline. Stagnation. *Famines.* ***Collapse or transition to capitalism?***

Narodnik theories	1. *Commune.* Fiscal nature ignored. Isolation ignored. 2. *People's production.* Chernyshevsky—.... (V. V., N.—on). 3. *No soil for capitalism.* No internal market. Decline.	Flight from "people's production" in the central areas to the capital and the border areas.	N.B.

4. Historical significance of Narodnik theories.
5. *Disintegration of the peasantry.* Overall data. Results. Meaning (=petty bourgeoisie)
6. *Class struggle in the countryside.* Formation of an agricultural proletariat. Transition from the corvée system to the capitalist economy.
7. Growth of commercial and capitalist farming.
8. *Struggle against the relicts of serfdom.* Freedom of movement (Maslov).[32] Withdrawal from commune. Freedom to alienate land.
9. Agrarian programme of the Social-Democrats. "Cut-off lands".

Essay II[33] (*agrarian statistics*)

1. Hecht + *Bavarian* Inquiry
2. (Auhagen) Klawki + *Württemberg* Inquiry
3. *The Condition of the Peasants* + *Stumpfe*
4. Baden Inquiry.
5. German agrarian statistics
   small-scale economy
   latifundia
   middle peasantry. Worsening of animals.
6. Livestock. Industries.

* Section C crossed out in MS.—*Ed.*

7. Dairy farming (tobacco-growing, wine-growing).
8. Co-operatives.
9. Rural population by status.

		Rent[34]
A. 1 dessiatine — 80 poods. 40 rubles of invested capital + 8 rubles of profit = 48 rubles÷80 =	60 kopeks	$51._2$ r. (64 k.) $3._2$ r.
B. 1 dessiatine — 75 poods. 40 rubles of invested capital + 8 rubles of profit = 48 rubles÷75 =	64 kopeks	48 r. (64 k.)
A)	— 64 r.	16 r.
B)	— 60 r.	12 r.
C) 1 dessiatine — 60 poods. 40 rubles of invested capital + 8 rubles of profit = 48÷60 =	80 kopeks	48 r.

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SECOND VARIANT

MARXIST VIEWS OF THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN EUROPE AND RUSSIA

A. *General Theory of the Agrarian Question.*
(One lecture for A)
1. Theory implies *capitalist* agriculture = commodity production + wage labour.
Growth of commercial agriculture: formation of market towns (in Europe and in Russia)
industrial development (Parvus)
international grain trade.
Forms of commercial agriculture:
its areas
specialisation
industries

example of concentration of dairy farming on farms with up to 2 hectares: p. 103 of the article*

David, p. 152, note: "On the whole, it is small-scale production that is prospering in vegetable- and fruit-growing as well as in agriculture. According to 1895 industrial statistics, of 32,540 fruit and vegetable farms,
40 per cent had an acreage of less than 20 ares,

! N.B. David (and K. Kautsky) on market-gardening

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 212.—*Ed.*

25 per cent from 20 to 50 ares,
and 'only' 6 per cent more
than 2 hectares."

Degree of the peasant's subordination to the market

need: percentage of cash budget.
Usurers. Taxes.
money: Decline of patriarchal household industries
(K. Kautsky and Engels)

Peasant = half industrialist and half merchant (*Capital*, III, 2, 346,[35] ***Development of Capitalism, 100****))

Formation of a class of *farmers* and a class of *agricultural hired labourers* is the start of the process (K. Kautsky. P. 27.[36] *Capital*, III, 2, 332.[37] *Development of Capitalism* 118**)

diverse forms of agricultural wage labour (*Development of Capitalism* 120***) — cf. article pp. 68-70 on the "dependent" and "independent" nature of small farmers****

(non)influence of the form of landownership (*Development of Capitalism* 242*****) — N.B. fragmentation, *parcellisation of* peasant holdings.

2. *Theory of rent.*

Marx's theory of value. Rent can come only from *surplus value*, that is from surplus profit.

Profit (=surplus value: *Capital*). Average profit (K. Kautsky, 67).

Surplus profit comes from the *differences in fertility* — Differential rent

Differential Rent I.
The price of grain is determined by the worst production
{ limited quantity of land
growth of market }
Differential Rent II: additional investment (expenditure) of capital into the land.

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* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp 155-56.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 176.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid., pp. 178-79.—*Ed.*
**** Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 195-96.—*Ed.*
***** Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 323-24.—*Ed.*

Differential Rent ***grows*** in a mass of (most) combinations.
Differential Rent originates from capitalist *enterprise* on the land
it comes from the difference in the quantity of *produce*.
Monopoly of private ownership of land. Absolute rent
—***Absolute rent***
or = monopoly price
(absolute rent) = or = from the ***lowest*** composition of agricultural capital
Absolute rent does not come from capitalist *enterprise* on the land but from the private *ownership* of land — it does not originate from the quantity of produce, but is a *tribute* Price of land
A tribute fixed in the *price of land*.
Price of land = capitalised rent. Removal of capital from agriculture
Fixing of high prices.
3. *Role of rent and capitalism in agriculture*.
Rent prevents grain prices from falling (*Parvus*) Role of rent

cf. *Capital*, III, 2, ?[38]

Rent *takes away* all agricultural improvements all profits over and above the average.
(Nationalisation of land would do away with absolute rent.)
Agrarian crisis does away with *absolute* rent.
{competition between lands without rent and lands with rent.}
Two *forms* of levying rent: Forms of levying rent
the ***farmer system*** (K. Kautsky, 85)
the ***mortgage system*** (K. Kautsky *87-89. Development of Capitalism*, 442*)

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 555.—*Ed.*

Both processes =
(1) separation of the landowner from agriculture. In this context, deal with the role of capitalism in agriculture.
(2) rationalisation of agriculture (competition)
(3) its socialisation
(4) elimination of indenture and labour service.

4. [3]. *Law of diminishing returns.*
Ricardo (and West). *Marx's correction. Zarya* No. 2-3, p.*
Bulgakov: the difficult problem of grain production. Refutation. *Zarya* No. 2-3, p.**
Maslov
con: on the one hand, against Bulgakov
on the other, admission of > productivity of extensive farming. Maslov pp. *72*, 83 et al. Especially *72*.
Con—Marx III, 2, 210[39] (*Development of Capitalism*, 186 and *187****)
Extract from Marx on R. Jones[40]
"concentrate all agriculture on 1 dessiatine"
Maslov, pp. 79 and 110 (without "the law" there would have been no differential rent)
p. 86 (incontrovertible fact of diminishing returns)
Con—p. *114* (there are different cases!)
Maslov p. *72*. Economists denying "the law" labour under a misunderstanding.
110: productivity of labour may grow, but "the law" remains. (No proof!)
130-31: con Marx (denial of absolute rent).
N.B. *109*: "he does not explain competition by the level of rent but vice versa".= Meaning of *Maslov*'s mistake. *Obscures tribute (rent) by means of ostensibly natural causes, as the* **cost** *of producing grain.*

5. *Contradictions of agricultural capitalism*: rationalisation of agriculture—and plunder of the soil
Meaning of separation of town from country (Bulgakov and Hertz and Chernov and *Zarya* No. 2-3, p.*)
Nossig, p. 103: ***extracts***

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 110.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 114-19.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 257-59.—*Ed.*

Elimination of indenture—and the debasement of the agricultural hired labourer and small peasant.

Development of the productive forces—and the growth of *tribute*, the rent, which prevents the lowering of prices and investment of capital into agriculture.

Superiority of the big farm (as capitalism develops).

To A. 1) K. Kautsky, 2) *Development of Capitalism*; 3) *Zarya* (2-3) 4) Maslov 5) Parvus 6) Extracts from Nossig.

B. Small- and large-scale production in agriculture. (Two lectures for B.)**

1. The approach to the question as an *isolated* one is incorrect
   (everything within the framework of capitalism. The important thing is not the displacement of small-scale farming but the *wholesale* capitalist transformation of agriculture.)
2. Technical superiority of large-scale production. Machines. *Zarya No. 2-3**** (objections of Bulgakov, Hertz, David, etc.)
   Commercial cost-cutting
   (α) machines
   fertilisers
   drainage
   α { division of labour
   α { co-operatives
   (β) buildings
   implements
   (γ) marketing and purchasing
3. Diverse forms of *displacement* and *decline* of small farms: household industries
   outside seasonal work
   wage labour
   worsening of nutrition
   more work

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 146-59.—*Ed.*

** Points 1, 2 and 3 of Section B in the manuscript are crossed out in plain pencil by means of two vertical lines, apparently in the process or an editorial reading.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 130-46.—*Ed.*

worsening of animals
" " land (plunder)
debts
etc.

4. *Detailed studies.*
(2nd agrarian article)

Hecht	N.B.	N.B.
Auhagen	+*Bavarian*	+Baudrillart
Klawki	+Württemberg	+Souchon
The Condition of the Peasants		
Baden Inquiry	+Stumpfe	+Chłapowski
	N.B.	N.B.

Result: (1) man
(2) cattle
(3) land

5. ***Overall data of German agrarian statistics*:**
(1) small farms
(2) latifundia
(3) medium farms. Worsening of animals
Distribution of animals. Industries.
Dairy farming (tobacco-growing, wine-growing)

6. —*Co-operatives*
7. —Loss of land and proletarisation.
Distribution of *rural population* by land holdings.

C. *The Agrarian Question in Russia*
(1 lecture for C).

1. Old views = Narodism
Peasantry = "people's production" (not petty bourgeoisie)
Commune = rudiments of communism (not fiscal)
no soil for capitalism: no internal market, peasantry is the greatest antagonist, no class struggle in agriculture.
Essence of Narodism
2. This is a whole world outlook, starting from Herzen and ending with N.—on.[41] A vast stretch of social thinking.
"*agrarian democracy*". Its historical meaning

Its historical meaning: *idealisation* of the struggle against serfdom and its relicts ("Agrarische Demokratie") Marx
Elements of *democracy*
+ utopian socialism
+ petty-bourgeois reforms
+ reactionary nature of the petty bourgeois.
Separate wheat from *chaff*.

{ *survivals among Socialist-Revolutionaries* }

3. Central question: *disintegration* of peasantry, its *transformation* into *petty bourgeoisie*, ***class struggle in the countryside***

disintegration of peasantry the mistake of the Davids)

Disintegration of peasantry.
Ways of studying it (*inside* commune).
Principal symptoms of it: *Development of Capitalism 81*
(14 symptoms, 2— and 12 +)*
Analysis of each symptom with a few examples. (*Extract* from Maslov on the buying of land by peasants.)
Con—*Vikhlyaev* p. ***108***.[42] Loss of horses, "statics" and "dynamics".
Conclusions = *petty bourgeoisie*. (*Development of Capitalism*, *115*, § 2**)
Overall results from data of horse census (*Development of Capitalism*, 92***).
Areas of disintegration: *South of Russia*, *dairy* farming, Amur (Maslov 324), *Orenburg* (Maslov 325), *Siberian butter-making*.
(there is disintegration wherever the peasant is in a better position
internal tendencies to disintegration)

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* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 129.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 172-73.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid., p. 144.—*Ed.*

The agrarian system of Russia. There would be no need for an agrarian programme, if it were a question of capitalism alone: (Engels. Böttger). But—the *relicts of serfdom*.

Delays in disintegration:

N.B.
- labour service
- high taxes
- no freedom of movement—(Maslov on commune: *extract*).
- usurer's capital

4. Transition from the corvée system to the capitalist economy.

(transitional system) Labour service system. (*Development of Capitalism*, 133, 135*)
cut-off lands, etc.

Class of hired labourers in agriculture: 3.5 million **at least**.

relicts of serfdom

5. *Migration of workers* in Russia as summarised development of capitalism *fleeing from people's production* (*Development of Capitalism 466-469*).**

Migration of workers in Russia

Hence, the essence of the present moment in the economic evolution (and the whole history) of Russia.

= *Elimination of the relicts of serfdom*
= freedom of capitalist development
= freedom of proletariat's class struggle

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 197-98, 199-200.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 585-88.—*Ed.*

A totally different agrarian question (than in Europe)	Stagnation, famines. Decline? *or* freedom for capitalism	Essence of our agrarian programme

There is the nucleus of *Narodism*, its *revolutionary*-democratic nucleus
Rich peasantry already there

Diverse forms of hired labour

10 million
Development of Capitalism
*462**

— elimination of the relicts of serfdom will formalise and enhance its power
— higher living standards will expand the internal market, and develop industry
— development of the *proletariat and the class struggle for socialism.*

Failure of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Ryazanovs to understand the agrarian programme
Rudin's theses**
"Moderate nature" of cut-off lands.
Empty talk: co-operation + socialisation + expropriation—it is *neither* agrarian *nor* a programme

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* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 581.—*Ed.*
** See p. 61.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES AND OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[43]

OUTLINE OF LECTURE

FIRST VARIANT

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES[44] AND OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

In order to make a comparison of the programmes and to assess them, it is necessary to examine the *principles*, the theory, from which the programme flows.

A) Attitude of the S.R.s to the Narodniks.[45]

1. S.R.s are neither for nor against.
2. *Rudin*[46] 29: "valuable legacy" ("the purified"!?)
3. R*udin* denies differentiation *Rudin 21.* (!)
4. Bashful concealment of Narodism.
5. And failure to understand its *historical* significance (the initial form of democracy "**agrarische Demokratie**").
6. Deviation: the orthodox, the dogmatists start from Russian relations and data, whereas the "heirs" of the Narodniks have *nothing* to say about this, but then they travel all over Belgium + Italy.

(! "Already land in some parts of Russia is flowing from *capital to* labour" *No. 8*, p. 8[47])

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 11, pp. 8-9: David and K. Kautsky and Guesde and Jaurès and Belgium and Italy!! Trying to *draw in* the peasant. ***Into what?***

B) Failure to Understand the Whole of the Historical and Economic Evolution of Russia.

1. Sitting between two stools; between the Narodniks and Marxism.

Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii No. 1 "the creative side" of capitalism.
(quotation in *Zarya* No. 1, editorial).

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 12, 6: the peasant—"*servant and master*" lives a life based on the !!! "*law* of *labour*"
The class struggle in the countryside (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. *11*).
! "We do not agree that the peasantry belongs" to the *petty-bourgeois* sections.
(A centre of Narodism and Marxism!)
"*family*" and "*bourgeois-capitalist*" economies

2. Failure to understand the total *change* of the two structures of life in Russia (the patriarchal structure based on serfdom and the capitalist)

See:

3. Are there any relicts of serfdom? Is there a task to develop capitalism?

No: *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 4. *Yes*: *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, *No. 15*, 6.

"The 1861 reforms have *cleared* the way (!) and given full (!!!) scope to the development of !! capitalism."

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 11, p. 9: "they failed to see that the ! creative role of capitalism in agriculture gives way to the destructive one", "the *disorganising*" one.

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 15, 6: if the peasantry is demanding an "equalisation of land" there are only two ways: (1) transfer to *individual* ownership or (2) to *collective* ownership, *socialisation*.

4. Cut-off lands—indenture. Let's assume that's so (Rudin *14*). "But not **widely comprehensive**" Rudin *14* (!)

This fails to give a *broad*!! provision of land" (Rudin *14*).
"Give" more, *promise* more!!

5. Mr. Rudin's two theses (17)
(α) Allotment of land will help the peasant to fight capitalism!
(β) it will slow down the capitalisation of large-scale farming, (a process!!) which is *grinding slow as it is* Perhaps+thesis (γ) the "blunting" of the class struggle (17).

! Don't analyse! What for? What does the peasant want? "*addition of land*" !! *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 7?
we do not count on the well-to-do peasants, for this is the start of the socialist movement *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 13, p. 5: "no doubt" that the peasant movement is not socialist. But from half-socialist ideas the propagandist may arrive at "*purely socialist conclusions*".

! The poor versus the rich, whereas *Ilyin* speaks of the merger of the bourgeois and the proletarian elements in the movement

C. Failure to Understand the Class Struggle and Efforts to Obscure It.

1. The peasantry will not stop at the cut-off lands. Rudin *18*.

Half-socialist programme of the peasants. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 3/1. "Labour principle."

2. The peasantry—"*labour*" principle
(and not class struggle?)
Rudin *18*.

3. What will happen *after* the cut-off lands? Consequent on the cut-off lands? (Class struggle.)

*Hence:**

E. Failure to Understand the Russian Revolution.

1. Is it bourgeois *or* democratic? *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 8*, p. *3/2* and "Revolutionary Adventurism". Sowing illusions.

2. Vulgar socialism: private property must not be defended. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 13, pp. *5* and *6*. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 15, 6.

(Socialists—vehicles of the bourgeois spirit!)

Con *Marx* in 1848. ~~~~~~~~~~

3. The peasant's equality ("*To All the Russian Peasantry*", *p. 28, §1*).[48]—and denial of the right to dispose of the land.

4. Freedom of movement—and the commune "*To All the Russian Peasantry*", *p. 28, §1*.

(***Maslov's*** data)

F. The Social-Democratic Agrarian Programme.

		Martynov
1. Unfeasible?	We vouch	"Fearful for Martynov" Rudin *26*.
2. Its **principles**	(α) Serfdom ⟶	
	(β) Class struggle	*Quote from Martynov.*[49]
	(γ) Socialism.	
3. Its meaning = *the rural proletariat must help the rich and well-to-do peasant to fight serfdom.*		Rudin "not all the peasants are hostile to the old*) regime" *15-16*. Against: ***quote from Engelhardt***[50]
5. What are we going to tell the peasant?		Agrarian system (10:1½—2—6½)[51]

(!) *) *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 8, p. 7, 1*: "*petty-bourgeois sections*" "*always in general*" "*hold on to the existing order*" (Sic!)

* Lenin indicated a switch of points by means of a bracket in blue pencil, but failed to alter the alphabetical order of the points. They are given as indicated.—*Ed.*

4. The question of reviewing the peasant reform has been raised by all the progressive (= liberal) intelligentsia of Russia.

Quote from V. V.[52]

Cf. *Ireland*.

1) agrarian non-capitalist struggle.
2) buying out now.
3) the Narodniks draw a comparison between Russia and Ireland.

Hence:

D. Vulgarised Petty-Bourgeois "Criticism"

Narodism + Bourgeois

1. Between the orthodox and the critics (*Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii No. 2*, p. 57). The small is growing.

Unprincipled attacks (wails) against the "*dogmatists*" etc. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 8* passim.

2. "New Way to Socialism" *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*.

3. Game: distortion of Engels (extracts). *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 14*, p. 6 and Rudin *21*.

Engels supplemented by Böttger: *Engels's prediction is coming true.*

4. Attitude to the small peasant on the part of *our programme* and the whole *working-class* = Social-Democratic socialism.

5. Co-operatives. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 11 ("all possible types").

in general!
(Levitsky)
Bourgeois and socialist co-operatives
German and Russian data!

German
Rocquigny[53]
Russian

G. Unprincipled Stand of the Socialist-Revolutionaries

1. Man without convictions—party without principles.
2. Rudin *16*: "the future will clarify".
3. Ibid: "try to prevail upon the farm hand" (!!)
4. ***No programme!*** Con—Rudin, *4*

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya also boasts in *No. 11, p. 6* ("Our programme has been put forward") (?)

Thus,

H. "*Universal men*"

We have seen the co-operatives,

but about

"Fellows, there's more land to be had!" *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 7.

Socialisation.

Four meanings:

1) = nationalisation. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, *p. 11.* (economic association et al.).

2) = socialist revolution ("To All the Russian Peasantry") *p. 31*, *§12.* (minimum?)

stressing this to be a minimum! socialisation = i.e., "transfer to the ownership of society and the use of the working people?"

3) = commune. Popular anarchy. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 8*, *pp. 4*, *2.*

"The peasantry proclaims the equalisation principle."

"We are free from idealisation", **but** it is easier to start from the "traditions of communal management". "Superstitious hostility to the communal principle."

!! "*Colossal organisation of the communal peasantry*" *No. 8*, p. 9.
no other class is so impelled to political struggle. Ibidem, p. 8
use on labour and equal lines to be "implemented to the end" No. 8, p. 8.

(Equalisation? between communes?)

4. = "Dutch meaning" *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 15*, *p. 8*, "the Dutch *type* is most suitable"*), i.e., *communalisation*

(petty-bourgeois triviality)

"*Universal men*" indeed!

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*) Dutch: "extension of the commune's rights in taxing, buying out and expropriating land". *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 15, 7.

SECOND VARIANT

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES AND OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

Three main themes: I. The Basic Principles of an Agrarian Programme. II. The Agrarian Programme of the Social-Democrats. III. The Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries .

I. ***The Basic Principles of an Agrarian Programme*** (= the views of Russian socialists of the agrarian question in Russia).

1. *Narodism*—the Σ of the old socialist views of the *agrarian question*. The *whole* history of Russian socialist thinking on the agrarian question is a history of Narodism and *its struggle against Marxism*.

2. *S.R.s neither here nor there*.

On the one hand—the "creative" side of capitalism (*Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* No. 1, *p. 2*)

not saying: "We are Narodist Socialists".

On the other hand—"*they do not recognise the petty-bourgeois nature of the peasantry*" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 11, p. 7*)

"*family and bourgeois-capitalist economies*"

ibidem

Rudin (21) *denies* the "*differentiation*" (Rudin 21) "already *land in some parts*" "*is flowing from capital to labour*" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 8).

the peasant—"***law of labour***", "**servant and master**" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 12, 6).

3. *Equivocation*. War on the "dogmatists", the orthodox, and at the same time avoidance of a straightforward stand on questions of Russian socialism, and travel all over Belgium + Italy!

Between the "**critics**" and the "orthodox"
David and K. Kautsky } etc. etc.
Jaurès and Guesde }

Compare *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii No. 2, p. 57*; (K. Kautsky and "critics")

4. "*Game*": quotations from **Engels.** "Agreeing" with Liebknecht, and with Marx and with Engels!!

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya ***No. 14***, ***p. 7***, quotations from Engels (idem Rudin briefly 21)
(total distortion of Engels)

Extracts from Engels.

Engels supplemented by **Böttger**. (The prediction is coming true.)

1 5. An instance of confusion in Russian issues: **are there any relicts of serfdom?** ***No***: *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 8, p. 4.*

Full scope given!!!

Yes, not juridical but economic. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. *15*, 6.

{No straightforward answer!! No principle at all!!} In the event, our agrarian programme or the "cut-off lands" *cannot* be understood!!

Nothing can be understood without clarifying your attitude to the relicts of serfdom and to the *whole* "change", all the post-reform economic evolution.

6. Socialists can *never* stand up for private *property*: "socialists" are "vehicles" of the "bourgeois spirit". *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. *13*, 5 and 6, *No. 15*, 6.

they have adopted the "slogans of the bourgeois camp", etc.

"introduction of the bourgeois spirit" into the programme. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 15, p. 7.*

(***vulgar socialism***)

Con—Marx in 1848*

* In the MS., Point 6 is crossed out in plain pencil.—*Ed.*

extracts

7. Failure to understand (1) relicts of serfdom
(2) historical significance of small *private free* property leads to total incomprehension of the cut-off lands.

Instead of assessing the *historical* significance they make an assessment in general in the sense of *provision*. *Rudin 14*: it involves indenture, etc., but not "*widely comprehensive*"!! (there is no "broad land provision") (*Rudin 14*)

good wishes instead of a *conclusion* from the evolution: either "allotment of land" to peasants as their private property, or the "organisation" of equalised peasant land tenure. } *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 15, 6*

2

8. Rudin's "Theses" (p. 17)
(1) *Allotment*, of land will help to fight capitalism
(2) it will slow down the capitalisation of privately owned farms, which is *grinding slow as it is*
(3) it will blunt the class struggle.

9. They will not stop at the cut-off lands (Rudin 18). Of course, not. **What then**? The class struggle or the "labour" principle (Rudin 18)??

II. *The Agrarian Programme of the Social-Democrats.*

1. *Unfeasible*? We vouch—(in what sense).

3

2. Its **principles**
(1) relicts of serfdom—cf. *Martynov*, *p. 34.*

Rudin, 26 "fearful for Martynov"

(2) class struggle
(3) socialist revolution of the proletariat.

3. The *land issue is being seen in the cut-off lands, whereas that is* **only** *a way of formulating the struggle against serfdom, of eliminating the relicts of serfdom.*

4. The question of reviewing the "1861 reform" has been *raised* by all the progressive (= liberal = bourgeois-democratic) thinking in Russia.

Quotation from V. V.

4 5. The **meaning** of our agrarian programme: the Russian proletariat (including the rural) must support the peasantry in the struggle against serfdom.

Rudin 15-16: "*not all the peasants are hostile to the old regime*".
Cf. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 7: "petty-bourgeois sections" "always in general" "hold on to the existing order".

5 6. *What are we going to tell the peasant*? The "peasantry's" agrarian system
Con Engelhardt
The Socialist Party and the immediate task= *start* of the class struggle for socialism.

III. *The Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.*

1. Man without convictions = party without theory
2. Rudin *16*: "the future will clarify": "We must go out both to the worker and to the peasant"
3. **No programme**. Con—*Rudin 4* and *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 11, p. *6*.
("our programme has been put forward")
4. *Reactionary* silence on the historic tasks of the moment—and invention of benevolent, confused wishes of "socialisation".
the peasant's equality "*To All the Russian Peasantry*", **p. 28, § 1**
—and no right to dispose of the land
freedom of movement—and no withdrawal from the commune. (***Maslov's data***)

5. *Co-operatives*: *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 8, p. 11* { German / Russian / Rocquigny }

6. **Socialisation**

(one in four parts)

1) = nationalisation. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 11. Talks on land, 15

2) = socialist revolution. "*To All the Russian Peasantry*", p. 31, § 12.

3) = commune. "*Colossal organisation of the communal peasantry*" *No. 8, p. 9.*

"easier to start from" "communal traditions", etc.

"equalisation principle to be implemented to the end" No. 8, p. *8.*
(although we are free from "idealisation"!)

4) *Dutch* herring
"extension of the commune's rights in taxing, buying out and expropriating land". *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 15, p. 7
"The Dutch type is most suitable."
Revolutsionnaya Rossiya No. 15, p. 8.
Universal men!!

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PLANS AND OUTLINES OF CONCLUDING SPEECH

PRELIMINARY PLAN

α Inadequacy of cut-off lands. Nevzorov 3.
Chernov 11.
easements. Nevzorov 6
contradictions between Lenin and Ilyin. Nevzorov
beyond cut-off lands: confusion (Chernov 1) #
to α "unfeasibility" {Chernov 10 no}
class struggle within commune (Chernov 2). Liberal
kulaks still there: Chernov 3
β { commune. Nevzorov 5
collective responsibility. Nevzorov 4
γ K. Kautsky and Engels. (Chernov 8) (and Chernov 16
|| { repetition of predictions about differentiation
proletarisation (Chernov 17)
the orthodox and the critics. No concentration (Chernov 18)
δ co-operatives (4-6 Chernov)
ε socialisation (7 Chernov)
ζ *implanting of petty bourgeoisie*. Chernov 9 and
{Nevzorov 1 *p r o d d i n g o n*}
Chernov 12 (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*)[54]
η Plekhanov (Chernov 13. Nevzorov 7)
ϑ *No. 1* of *Narodnaya Volya* (Chernov 14)
Böttger (Chernov 15)
ι Narodism = a tag (Chernov 19)

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PLAN

I 1—3 ι I 6—ζ
I 4—γ I 7—9 nil #

I 5—nil and α	II^{1}—ad α
	II 2—6 nil
III^{1-2} 3—=	III 5δ
III 4 nil	III 6ε

Nevzorov β

RESUMÉ OF LECTURE

1. *Between Narodism and Marxism.*
   ("Gofstetter")
   Narodism is a "tag" (Mr. Vladimirov)
   Kablukov, N,—on (Mr. Vladimirov)
   (*Karyshev's* and *Vikhlyaev's* "classical studies"
   } "family economy"? *Nil!*
2. *Between the orthodox and the critics.*
   Quotation from Engels (Mr. Vladimirov)
   and K. Kautsky (Mr. Vladimirov)
   } + *Böttger*
   Kautsky's "reservations": "not all is correct", etc.!!
   Repetition of *predictions* (Mr. Vladimirov)—
   No concentration, "*we do not believe in concentration*".
   (Minimum programme)
   "*There can be no difference of principle* between *an agrarian programme and a labour programme*" (Nevzorov)
3. ***Are there any relicts of serfdom?***
   Yes and no. Nil.
   cut-off lands not everywhere (Mr. Vladimirov).
   Poltava gubernia
   three types of cut-off lands (Nevzorov)
   easements (Nevzorov)
   Lenin con Ilyin. (Nevzorov)
   labour services are not maintained chiefly by cut-off lands (Nevzorov)
4. *Marx on small property.*
   (1) *implanting of petty bourgeoisie* (Mr. Vladimirov).
   (2) not our business to *prod on* (Nevzorov and quotation from K. Kautsky)

{promotion of technical progress}
(3) Nevzorov. (Marx against Marx)
Lenin against

5. *What lies beyond the elimination of relicts of serfdom? The class struggle or the labour principle? Nil?*

Our agrarian programme

6. Mr. Vladimirov: "No one said **unfeasible**."
Sic *Rudin, 13-14*

Russkiye Vedomosti = bourgeoisie.
Quotations from V. V., from *Russkiye Vedomosti* on *agricultural conference*.[55]

7. *The principles of an agrarian programme. No one has said a word.*
8. Have these principles changed?
Plekhanov and the 1886 programme.
{ Plekhanov and nationalisation
Plekhanov and expropriation
Marx and expropriation + mortgage
+ producers' associations.

Plekhanov said there: "*The most likely thing is that the lands will pass to the peasant bourgeoisie*" (as Engels believed)....

{Plekhanov—extreme weakness of character}

9. *The meaning of our agrarian programme* = the Russian proletariat must support the peasantry. *Nil.*

Socialist-Revolutionary Agrarian Programme

10. *Reactionary. Collective responsibility* and the *commune*. "*I disagree in principle*" (Nevzorov). *Equality of rights but no withdrawal from the commune.* Nil.

Class struggle within the commune? (Mr. Vladimirov). "For that reason" extension of communal land ownership.

11. *Co-operatives.* **Mr. Vladimirov.** *Two trends* (Where? in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* or *Iskra*?)

12. *Socialisation*. 4 meanings. ((Small communes = domination of the rural bourgeoisie.))

PLAN OF LECTURE RESUMÉ

finale: root of mistakes
failed to understand the difficulty
our agrarian system
resumé

RESUMÉ OF LECTURE

a) The root of Nevzorov's mistake is the effort to correct Plekhanov, without having understood him. The root of the S.R.s' mistake lies *deeper*: it is a confusion of the *democratic* and the *socialist* tasks, of the *democratic* and the *socialist* elements, of the democratic and the socialist *content* of the movement. This confusion is the result of the entire social nature of the Socialist-Revolutionary movement. Socialist-Revolutionarism = an attempt on the part of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia to obscure the working-class movement = radical, revolutionary petty-bourgeois democracy. Like the liberal democrats, they tend to *confuse* the democratic and the socialist tasks, and also to confuse the issue of the autocracy and the question of the agrarian programme.

b) The S.R.s and Nevzorov have absolutely failed to understand the *difficulty* in drawing up an agrarian programme. Theirs applies to everything, and can be used anywhere, hence: nowhere. Sd* China and Abyssinia. Sr* Peru and Uruguay. It is *neither a programme nor an agrarian one*. It does not reflect anything; it does not define the ***moment*** (the historical moment: cf. 3 conditions of the programme), it fails to *provide guidance* for the present, current struggle.

c) Our agrarian system. No answer.

Four horizontal strata [big + peasant bourgeoisie 1½ (6½ out of 14) + middle peasantry 2 (4 out of 14) + rural semi-proletariat and proletariat 6½ millions

* These abbreviations have not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

(3½ out of 14)[56]]. If that were all, there would be no need for an agrarian programme. But there are also the *vertical* partitions = commune, collective responsibility, cut-off lands, labour services, indenture. It is impossible to liberate the rural semi-proletarian and proletarian for the struggle, without also delivering the rural bourgeoisie of labour services.

d) Resumé of the differences between the S.R. and the S.D. agrarian programmes: 1) *truth* (semi-serfdom + class struggle + capitalist evolution) + 2) *untruth* (member of a trade union, "colossal organisation of the communal peasantry", balanced extension of socialisation, etc.).

A policy expounding untruths = a policy of revolutionary adventurism.

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1. Марш [illegible] и [illegible], [illegible] — [illegible] [illegible] Мелко [illegible].

2. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Lenin's manuscript,
"The Peasantry and Social-Democracy".
Not earlier than September 1904

THE PEASANTRY AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY[57]

The Peasantry and Social-Democracy
Marxist Theory and the Social-Democratic Programme

1. The agrarian question with West-European Social-Democracy. David, etc.
2. " " in Russia: the old Narodniks, the Liberals and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Practical significance during reforms.

3. *Large- and small-scale production*
   Auhagen
   Klawki, etc.
   Conclusions concerning ***the maintenance of labourers, livestock and land***
   Denmark.
4. ***Co-operatives***. **DAVID**, etc. French reactionaries
   Rocquigny
   Holtz
   Buchenberger
5. Specifics of Russia.
   Together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landowners.
   Together with the urban proletariat against the peasant bourgeoisie.
6. The importance of Social-Democratic agitation among the peasants, especially in the epoch of political revival. Development of the peasants' class-consciousness, and of democratic and Social-Democratic thinking.

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1. Theory of Marxism (α) on the condition, evolution and role of the peasantry—and (β) the Social-Democratic programme. Closely bound up.

2. Urgency of the peasant question. The agrarian programmes of the Social-Democratic parties: the French (petty-bourgeois nature. Criticism by Engels), the German (1895. Breslau), the opportunist and revolutionary wings of the *Russian*. (Critics. "**David.**") (Bulgakov)....
3. The *Russian* agrarian programme of the Social-Democrats, their special distinction from the *Narodniks* and the *Socialist-Revolutionaries*.
4. The principles of the Marxist theory concerning the peasantry (cf. *Development of Capitalism*, quotations from Marx)
   1) the role of large-scale production; 2) the petty-bourgeois nature of the peasant; 3) his past and future + {Souchon. Add K. Kautsky's *The Social Revolution*.
5. Large- and small-scale production in agriculture.... From the *Manuscript*: *Hecht*, Auhagen; Klawki, Baden, German statistics, Stumpfe.
6. Conclusion: the importance of the maintenance of labourers, livestock, land.
7. Add: Huschke, Haggard, Baudrillart, Lecouteux, *Prussian Inquiry*, Bavarian and Hessen Inquiries, Hubach.
8. Indebtedness. *Prussian statistics*.
9. Co-operatives. General approach to the question. Rocquigny, Holtz, Buchenberger, Haggard. Statistical data: *German* and *Russian* (public lease). *Denmark*.
10. Conclusions concerning the West.
11. Russia's specific features.... On two flanks.
    The peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat.
    Relicts of *serfdom* and the struggle against the bourgeoisie.
12. Together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landowners, etc. } Tie in with cut-off lands
    Together with the urban proletariat against the bourgeoisie } Tie in with cut-off lands
13. The practical importance of the agrarian question in the possibly near future. Exposure of the class antagonism in the countryside. Democratic and Social-Democratic agitation and propaganda.

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II

CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS LITERATURE AND ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE AGRARIAN STATISTICS

1900-1903

CRITICAL REMARKS ON S. BULGAKOV'S BOOK, *CAPITALISM AND AGRICULTURE*, VOLS. I AND II, PUBLISHED IN 1900[58]

Bulgakov

I. "*From the author*" "essay on the theory (?) of agrarian development in connection with the general development of capitalism"
— "slavishly dependent on the material"....

1. Chapter I, §1: "Law of diminishing returns"....
2. Note: "In industry man wields (!?) the forces of nature", but in agriculture *adapts himself* (?)

13. Note. Marx denies this law, but accepts Ricardo's theory of rent, which is based on it (??). (III, 2, 277?)[59]

16. "Increasing difficulties of existence"....

17. —"An evident truth", which needs merely to be stated (?)
—although agrarian progress temporarily nullifies the tendency indicated by this law.

18. The law of diminishing returns is of *universal significance*—***the social question is essentially bound up with it***.

20. *The agrarian crisis* is a direct consequence of the law of diminishing returns (?)

21. In agriculture, man is a "slave" to the laws of nature, in industry, he is master ("basic distinction").

25. Agriculture does not obtain the benefits latent in co-operation.
26-27. Marx's unhappy example (on co-operation)....
29-30. "Absolutely inapplicable to agriculture"

$\left(\text{the law} \ll \frac{v}{c}\right)$ [Skvortsov] idem 52.

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31. Holds forth on trifles—about machines....
32. "*Particular case* of law of diminishing returns—≫ labour with intensification of agriculture.
34. "The despotism of nature"... labour ≪ its productivity....
35. "The economy of low wages"... "the economy of high wages is not applicable in agriculture".
37. Anyone will do for agriculture: the Russian no < than the Englishman.
38. — ..."even centaurs"... Con II 433
43. The *agricultural machine* does not revolutionise production, does not create confidence or precision of work... in the hands of Mother Nature.... (Empty phrase!)
44. The machine cannot convert the worker into its adjunct.
45. "The plough stops at the will of the driver"... (sic!)
46. "The role of the machine is not exceptional (distortion and rubbish).
48. "I am sufficiently free from the Marxist prejudice" that any machine means progress.... Sometimes agricultural machines are reactionary (!!)
49. "Naïve" comparison between American and European agricultural machines.
50. Development of agriculture tends to narrow down the field of application of machinery....
51. "It makes no difference from the technical standpoint" whether labour is manual or machine.
51 and 52. ***The usefulness of the thresher is doubtful*** (!!)....
55. A loaf defies telling who produced it ...Mother Nature is above such distinctions....

59-60. Small farms also make use of machines: they hire them!
64. In agriculture, there are two elements beyond human control: the forces of nature (!!) and the social forces (!!)
67. Backhaus welcomes the division of labour in agriculture (Bulgakov—con).

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76. The decisive instance is the theory of cognition (in the question of value).
82. The price of grain is determined *not* by the last application of labour and capital, but by the average.
87. Marx adds nothing to Ricardo (on differential rent) —absolute rent is a specific instance of differential rent.
90. "The limited productivity of the land"
92. "Grain has no value" (!)
95-96. Marx's *unhappy* example of the waterfall —Marx's fetishism ... (idem 105)
98. Agricultural capital takes no part in determining the rate of profit.
104. Petitio principii = *absolute rent*....
105. Rent is "not a material thing" but a "*concept*",
106. The concept of value is an "*aerial bridge*" (?)
107. Marx's theory of rent: obscure, contradictory, nothing new, etc.
111. "Pursuing their own path", "by their own efforts" ("have failed to find a material definition of rent")
113. Rent is not surplus-value—it is paid out of *non-agricultural* labour. (Bulgakov has forgotten the history of rent)....
116. Brentano's "remarkable" *Agrarpolitik*....
120. There is no "**English rent**" in other countries. —Agricultural profit is divided between the landowner, the farmer and the labourer. {defeats himself}
125. Rent (in a landed estate)—not an English one??

131. "In Britain grain is more expensive than on the continent" (?).
139. "The mystical law of concentration" is "a Marxist prejudice"
...."Hertz's remarkable work"....
142. "The peasant economy is not going down at all"....
143. Marx vs. Marx: the dualism of the politician and the researcher.
146-147. Marx "obscures"—according to the law of culture, the peasant's requirements are growing....
148. Bulgakov himself keeps comparing the peasant with *capital*....
154. The peasant economy—"the most profitable *for society*".

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176. Hasbach: "The industry and thrift" of the small owner.
214. "Pre-capitalist overpopulation"....
237-238. The progress of English agriculture from 1846 to 1877.
239. The growth of bigger farms
..."not the result of conflict between small- and large-scale production"??...
239-240. Once farming is run on capitalist lines, it is indisputable that within certain limits the large is superior to the small (!!! N.B. !!)
242-243. *Tendency to concentration 1851*-1861-1871 until *1880* ... in Britain....
246. The scourge of competition strained all the productive skill ... but this did not refute the law of diminishing returns....
251. Under a pastoral economy the capital per area unit increases (> capital-intensive)....
252. Growth in the number of agricultural machines

1855	1861	1871	1880
55	236		
	1,205	2,160	4,222[60]

252. Reduction in the number of agricultural labourers ... 1851-1871 (and 1881-1891).

255. What explanation? *Overpopulation in the preceding period.*
(+ also the consolidation of land holdings
+ also the introduction of farming machines) (!!)

260. Marx (and *Hasbach*) regards this as confirming the law of concentration, the growth of $\frac{v}{c}$. (Bulgakov con!)

262. English population by occupations 1851-1881.

268. *Basic cause of the crisis*: the law of diminishing returns....

273. Per-acre productivity in Britain is not ≪. —Dairy farming, vegetable gardening, etc., have been *developing*.

279. Rent has suffered most of all (from the crisis)....

293. The labourer's wages and welfare are *growing*....

301. The agricultural labourers' movement has never been socialist.

303: "Large-scale production in agriculture has no positive social consequences" (there is not even a rudimentary trade union movement among agricultural labourers) (?).

306. Small farmers < stable

308-309. Distribution of farms and area in Britain *1880-1885-1895*

311. The crisis most severely affected the *small farmers.*

312. ***Engels's "fantastic construction".***

313: Many small holders were ruined at the beginning of the 19th century....

316. The condition of the yeomen is *worse than that of the labourers*....

318-319. *Small* holders have suffered >, their condition is
320-321. worse than that of the labourers, it is terribly *hard*....

325. Efforts to create a small peasantry. Small Holdings Act[61] 1892.

328 and *331.* Small Holdings Act was not widely applied. Small Holdings Act was of no practical importance.

333. Bulgakov's conclusions: > ruin of small farms *does not prove* (!!!) their unviability.... (!!!)
338. "The final result": restoration of the ***peasantry***. "A verdict against the capitalist organisation of agriculture."

II*

12. Three-field system prevailed from the 9th to the first third of the 19th century.
17. Insts[62] are diminishing....
30. *Communist Manifesto* gives a *wrong* picture of reality ("prophecy").
41. Prussia of the 1840s—***general overpopulation***.
44. Progress of German agriculture 1800-1850 (> than in 1,000 years) ??... "direct outcome of the growth of population" and "natural consumption"
45. Emancipation of peasants is the basis of capitalist agriculture.
46. Progress in agriculture is seen mainly on the *big* farms (that is, the *exchange* farms).
49. The crisis of the 1830s—capitalist baptism.
50. *Small farms were being ruined....*
56. *Big farms grow faster than small ones.*
57. 1852 and 1858. Distribution of farms and area.
62. A mass of small farms have been ruined... (since 1802)
63. "Flourishing of the large-scale economy" (distillation) ....
76. Growth in the soil's productivity and technical progress — — — mainly in the *large-scale economy*... ("apparently")
79. Quarter century of agricultural improvement—nil for the agricultural labourers.
80. ..."*fatal feature*": lack of economy of high wages
89. *Growth* of rentals 1849-1869-1898....

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* Vol. II of the summarised book.—*Ed.*

89-90. The peasant economy was the first to feel the brunt of the crisis. It soon turned out that it was most destructive for the *large-scale economy*.

103. The steam thresher was undoubtedly an evil for the labourers. This is also pointed out by Holtz; *a utopian idea*: to limit its use.

102. *The number of Insts* ≪ with an increase of free labourers.

104. Labourers *prefer* > free status.

103. "*Capitalist reorganisation of the labourers' old condition*" !!

105. It is *utopian* to set up wage labourers with land allotments. Cf. II 255.

106. Own farm is the ideal of all agricultural labourers.

106. Reduction in the number of *Insts*. 1882-1895 N.B.
number of labourers with land —
" " " without " +

106. Growth in the number of persons (agricultural labourers) for whom agriculture is a *side line*....

114. Number of agricultural machines in 1882 and 1895 by types.

116-117. Number of farms combined with industries... (figures interesting but obscure)....

117. "The crisis *has not deprived* the economy of the possibility of progress."

115. Large-scale farming is always more capital-intensive than small-scale, and therefore, *naturally* gives preference to the mechanical factors of production over live labour (!!)... ((the understating of the superiority of the big farms is interesting!))

115-116. "The reference to the supplanting of labourers by machines is quite groundless."

116. On the strength of what has been said the condition of the big farms is *critical* (!)...

118. *To hold its ground*, *large-scale production must* ! show *progress*: income is derived only by those ! farms which are up to the technical standard.

119. With small farms, the price of land is *higher*— ergo, ***big farms give away to small ones.***

119. Tendency: disintegration of the big farms into small ones ... and good luck!!
120. 1882 and 1895 statistics: *supplanting of big farms and in rather considerable proportions*. (!!?)
126. Middle peasant farming has grown stronger at the expense of the parcels and the big farms (5-20 hectares).
126. The growth of *latifundia* is a sign of decline (for intensiveness must lead to disintegration!!!)...
127. The increase (?) in farm employees. (?).
131. The growth of agricultural production, *especially* of the area under *root crops* and *beet root* || N.B.
132-133. Prussian agriculture is developing, and rural population? ∫ + *4.5*% (135)
133. "*Unremitting* and *even dissipating* labour on own farms" (N.B.)
135. Increase in the number of machines *not only* on the big but also on the medium-big farms.
135. Increase in artificial fertilisers (note).
135-136. How is progress possible when prices are falling? (contrary to normal conditions*)....
136. Germany owes her current progress above all to *peasant farming* ... (!!)...
138. Policy: to establish a *solid* peasantry ("The way German Social-Democracy must take!!") "*Possibility of establishing independent farms*"....
141. There is no denying the beneficial effect of the *corn tariffs*
143. —"the tariffs *cannot evoke unconditional censure*".
144. *Holtz* is right: labourers (!!) as well as producers.
145. ... "compromise" is the only way.
148. The technical progress of large-scale farming || is highly doubtful, its historical role is played out (!)

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159. France at the end of the 18th century: "A *natural-economy overpopulation*."

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* The word "conditions" is not in the MS., and has been inserted according to the meaning.—*Ed*.

168. Growth in the urban and industrial population of France.
171. *Area under large-scale farming in the 19th century was relatively larger than* in the 18th....
172-173. Distribution of côtes foncières* 1884 (*2 types of data*).
173-174. "*Absolute fantasy*" ("stemming from his prejudice") Marx's assertion (1850) concerning the indebtedness of the French peasant.
174. ≫ Growing *number of côtes*

Con Souchon, p. 87, since '83 ≪ **

176. "The peasantry is divided into a proletariat and small holders" (after the revolution).
179. "*Hands are rare*" = employers *are finding wages high* (Vicomte d'Avenel).
181. The *market* is the power behind progress in France. Which class? (? *big capitalists+ peasant owners*).
185. In France, there is an especial growth in the *area under root crops* and in the cattle population.
187. Rural population, 1882 and 1892.
188. *Distribution of farms*, 1882 and 1892.
190. Conclusion: "strengthening of peasant farms" and "*latifundia degeneration*" (!)
191. "Statistical sages" say ≫ under-1-hectare farms owing to increase in workers. *Con*: in these departments > peasant farms.
193. ?(!!) *There are fewer farms than plots*. "*Of course*, there is *no* reason to assume that many big estates are concentrated in the hands of one individual ... *there are only 2½ per cent of them*"
193. In wine-growing < 1 hectare may take up *all* the working time.
194. *Growth* in the number of farms with *managers* (*patently capitalist*)
Decline in the number of *day-labourer* farmers.
195. —refutation of "the fantastic assertion".

* An individual land holding in a commune in France.—*Ed.*
** See p. 171.—*Ed.*

195. *Growth in leases* ("*undoubtedly, small ones*")?
196. Reduction in the number of agricultural labourers.
207. French farm labourer is being *transformed* (??) into a *peasant*.
210. France owes her progress to small-scale farming (??)
211. Despite the progress of French agriculture, the rural population has dwindled....
212. *Agricultural machines* (? Answer: "excess population disappearing")
213. "*We have seen* that small-scale farming is ahead" (!!)

213 and 215. Eulogy of peasant farming.

214. There has been no concentration: the third estate bought its lands before the revolution.... "The expropriation of a section of the peasantry ....

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217. Population is limited by the means of subsistence....
218. Bulgakov "long" tended to underestimate Malthus ("invaluable work")
220. Population increase tends to stimulate the transition to new economic forms.
221. ...Some of the poverty "undoubtedly" springs from "absolute overpopulation"....
221. Overpopulation used to be more common in the past (?)...
223. Overpopulation is not a social but "merely" an "economic" theory.
223. opop = "special problem" (opop = overpopulation)
224. "Neo-Malthusianism", deliberate adaptation of the birth-rate....
225. Dühring (Lange): capacity of territory.
229. Capitalism is inevitable with a higher density of population... (Struve (Lange))

231. "The old political economy." Verelendungstheorie,* etc.
233. "*Emptiness*" of Marx's concept of stationary overpopulation....
237. "The peasants are not so hard hit by the crisis."
237. "*Rural* overpopulation"....
247. Peasant farming, having least capital at its disposal, is *naturally less stable* (but this has nothing to do with the question of its viability).
249. "Keeping within the territory's capacity" is the main negative condition of prosperity.
251. ...One way... of thinning out the population (cf. *note*).
253. Artisan-farmers in Germany.
255. *Development of vegetable plots* (*among industrial workers*) *should be welcomed* (!!) Cf. II 105
259. A kulak section, starvation leases, etc., tend to grow on the basis of overpopulation (!!)
259. N.B.: Who takes over from the ruined peasants? *The peasants themselves.*
260. "Illusions' on the part of "conservative Marxists" that large-scale production is a vehicle of progress.
261. "Boundless lust"....
263. ..."Depravity rather than increase in the poor population" ....
265. The problem of population is the main difficulty
N.B.: of collectivism....
266. Individual landownership is the supreme commandment.
271. The fatal indebtedness of the peasantry is a myth....
272. Indebtedness. Figures. Not high on peasant farms.
280. Kautsky's "fantasy", "pathetic effort to stretch a point" to prove that small farms furnish hired labour for big ones.
(There is no interlocking of big and small farms)

* Theory of impoverishment.—*Ed.*

280. Chronic Marxist prejudice that the peasantry is incapable of technical progress.
[Tables prove nothing]
282. Progress of peasant farming: *The Condition of the Peasants*

(I 72, 276 / II 222)

282-283. Peasant farming is *naturally* > labour-intensive than large-scale farming....
284-285. Peasant co-operatives ("and the big farms, of course".)
287. *It is short-sighted and utopian to regard the peasant association as a step forward to socialism* ("Hertz is too closely tied to the opinion of his party") "Narrowness" of collectives....
288. Socialisation in industry (!) individualism in agriculture.
The "slogan" of democratic development.
288. *The peasant is no less a working man than the proletarian....*
289. Against "peasantophobia"....
"*There is no room* in the villages *for the class struggle*" ... "no educational influence of this struggle" ... (bis) ...
290. The peasant has fewer political interests, as compared with the townsman....

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311. Ireland—overpopulation.
323. Two views of Ireland: the Malthusian, and that of agrarian relations.
324. Bulgakov: some of the evil is the fault of landlordism....
331. Middlemen,[63] *like the kulaks*, are not an inevitable concomitant of peasant farming.
339. Leasehold interest is of subordinate significance....
340. Against Manuilov.
346. Dispossession of land would have occurred even without the landlords, in virtue of overpopulation.
351. The famine of 1846 was beneficial. There is no reason for connecting evictions and emigration (*table proves the opposite*).

352. "Diminution of the population is the cause of Irish progress"....
358. Growth in potato patches (up to 1 hectare: held by rural labourers, among others) in Ireland.
357. In Ireland there is no reduction of area under crop (thanks to peasant farming!)
359. Farms in Ireland by size (and *3 6 2*) (***consolidation***).
360. *Capitalist agriculture* is developing in Ireland.
361. In time of crisis capitalist agriculture in Ireland tends to regress (??)
   1) farmer capital < (! by $0._{06}$%!)
   2) "fragmentary evidence".
363. "Latifundia degeneration" (!)
   { 30-200 acres —
   { 1200 and > acres + }
365. *Marx* is "tendentious" about Ireland, gives "a chaotic heap of figures"....
369-370. Progress used to come from capitalist farming, and latterly > from the peasants (!!)...
371. Development of co-operatives in Ireland.
375. "*Welfare is spreading widely among the lower orders*" (loan and savings banks)....
379. Marx's "tendentious distortion of reality"....
380. Now there is overpopulation once again.
384. History of Ireland: importance of the population adapting itself to the capacity of the territory....

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385. Law of diminishing returns is the scourge of mankind ....
386. Marx gave Wakefield an unfair and biased assessment.
393. —in Wakefield's assessment, Marx is an *economic reactionary*. ("The idea of putting capitalism in place of the savage does not deserve condemnation.")
396. North American population by occupations....
398-399. American industry 1850-1860-1870-1880-1890....

412. Millionaires and *paupers* have made their appearance in America.
414. Farm area 1850-1890 (≫)
422-423. Division of labour in American agriculture (rapaciousness).
425. Crisis in the Eastern States.
429. Dairy farming and market gardening in the Eastern States.
433: "Naïveté" about machine farming in North America.
435-436. *Distribution of farms*
438. No concentration (con the "overjoyed Marxists").
445. In 1896 I "did not deny" Zusammenbruchs theorie*... ("I would have made deletions")...
449. The growing prevalence of the internal market.
454. Urban civilisation *would have come up against* the *law of diminishing returns.*
455. *The grain problem is > terrible than*
(!) *the social one.*
456. Marx is quite wrong about agriculture.
456. N.B. || *It is not true that capitalism leads to collectivism*.
456. *Solid peasant* farming is supplanting large-scale farming ("democratic tide").
457. Marx's prediction—"*short-sightedness* turned to ridicule by history", "the *self-conceit* of scientific socialism".
457. ... "***over-estimation of social cognition***".... ....
458. "Sorcery and fraud" — — — — ignoramus.

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* The collapse theory.—*Ed.*

PLAN OF OBJECTIONS TO BULGAKOV'S BOOK

Note especially

α) law of diminishing returns;
β) theory of rent;
γ) refutation of α in Britain, Germany, France, Ireland and America;
δ) on agricultural machines;
ε) "solid peasantry" and the agrarian on the question of labourers (vegetable plots), machines and taxes; "latifundia degeneration"
II, 126, 190, 363 (con—Hertz 15*)
(Ad ε: cf. II 375)
ζ) complete break with socialism. II. 287, 266, 288
— co-operatives
— class struggle II 289
— capitalism does not lead to collectivism. II 456

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* See p. 98.—*Ed.*

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE WORKS OF S. BULGAKOV AND F. BENSING

Once again Mr. Bulgakov *garbles* a quotation in the grossest manner in Note 2, on p. 273 of Vol. II. The third column of his table does not apply to the "big farms", as he declares in the heading, but *to all farms in general* (*Untersuchungen*, etc.* S. 573, Anhang. III).

The last but one column of Mr. Bulgakov's table shows not the percentage of indebtedness of the "medium farms" (as Mr. Bulgakov says) but the average size of the *holding* (sic!) in *small-scale farming*. (L. c., Anhang, V, S. 575.) The last column shows not the percentage of indebtedness of the "small farms", but the average size of *holding* in *large-scale* farming (ibidem). It is incredible, but a fact that Mr. Bulgakov has managed to *confuse* the tables of the original he quotes and has "mixed up" the data on size of holdings and the data on the percentage of indebtedness.

The actual figures:

$843._{10}$	24	$643._{20}$	24	$485._{06}$	23
	$35._{13}$%		$26._{80}$%		$21._{09}$%

(average % of indebtedness)

*Klein-betrieb***		*Mittel-betrieb****		*Grossbetrieb*****
$35._{13}$	—	$26._{80}$	—	$21._{09}$

* *Untersuchungen der wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse in 24 Gemeinden des Königreichs Bayern* (*Study of Economic Conditions in 24 Communities of the Bavarian Kingdom*).—*Ed.*

** Small farms.—*Ed.*

*** Medium farms.—*Ed.*

**** Large farms.—*Ed.*

Once again: this is how Mr. Bulgakov quotes.

He refers to p. 77 of Bensing, where Bensing says that agricultural machines* have a *smaller* part to play in raising productivity than industrial machines.

But this is Bensing's introduction to a *chapter* whose *result*, **p. 99**, gives a considerable increase in production owing to agricultural machines.

Mr. Bulgakov quotes Bensing. I 32, 48, ***44***.

Bensing 4: Marx—Gegner der Maschinen in der Industrie**

Insert on Bensing in § on machines***:

1) Bensing's bourgeois attitude to agricultural machines (adopted by Bulgakov) is well illustrated by a similar attitude to machines in industry.

(p. 4. Marx—Gegner der Maschinen (cf. 1-2)

p. 5. Marx "dreht" distorts the beneficial effect of machines.

p. 11. Marx "allerhand Unheil nachsagt"**** ... to agricultural machines.

Bensing's standpoint is that of the bourgeois and the entrepreneur

female and child labour—*nil* (pp. *13-14*)!!

2) Higher productivity of agricultural machines

α) special inquiry

β) a comparison of literary data p. *99* (results)

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} 81{,}078 = 117.{}_4\% \\ 69{,}040 = 110\% \end{array}\right\} \text{ reduction of costs, p. } 167 \text{ (results).}$$

3) Bulgakov quotes Bensing p. 42, but says nothing about this being Bensing's illustration of the importance of machines: p. *45*.

Bensing on *electricity*: pp. 127 and 102.

N.B. also about *Feldbahnen****** pp. 127-29.

Can Bensing's calculations (pp. 145 et seq.) be used to determine $\frac{c}{v}$ and modify it?

Estate = *310* hectares (240 hectares of fields + 70 hectares of meadow).

It is better to take the even not-too-exact figures of Bensing himself, p. 171.

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* The word "machines" has been inserted by the editors.—*Ed.*

** Opponent of machines in industry.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 130-34.—*Ed.*

**** Predicts all sorts of misfortunes.—*Ed.*

***** Field supply railways.—*Ed.*

Fall I*.

v*=1+2=3 Lfd Nummer*** (pp. 147-48 table)	Mk =2,400 =2 persons		
	+9,700 =17 persons		
	17,525 =13,294 working days		5,242 men, 8,052 women
m**=10 (Abgaben+Lasten)+Reinertrag****=300	v=29,625		
+	c**=38,690 #		19 persons and
425			
725 Mk m= 725			*13,294* working days
	W**=69,040		

c=4+5+6+7+8+9+11+12+13 Lfd. Nr.

{ c here=annual wear and tear of c.
All c=57,000+14,000+150,000+(part of 35,500)
(namely 35,000—29,625) }

4,470
11,699
1,464
6,660
2,800
1,000
6,035
1,900
2,662
38,690 Mk #

	Mk	
Capital:	57,000	livestock
	14,000	dead stock
	150,000	buildings
	35,500	working capital
	256,500	

Fall II.

Mk	Mk	Mk		
1,776	v 29,625	1,776 =	1,184 working days	13,294
— 832.$_5$	— 1,446	— 330 =	— 220 ” ”	— 964
943.$_5$	28,179	1,446 =	964	12,330

Hence: *19 persons + 12,330 working days*

* Case One.—*Ed.*

** c—constant capital (the cost of the means of production); v—variable capital (the cost of labour-power); m—surplus-value; W—value of the gross product.—*Ed.*

*** Serial number.—*Ed.*

**** (Taxes+duties)+net income.—*Ed.*

m 300 taxes	*c* 38,690			c = 9,192.$_5$
1,368.$_5$ Reinertrag	+ 502.$_5$ (new machinery)			v = 28,179
		(¼.2,010)		m = 1,668.$_5$
1,668.$_5$	39,192.$_5$			W = 69,040.$_0$

Capital	
57, 000	
16,010	+ 14,000 2,010 16,010
150,000	
35,500?*)	
258,510	

Fall III A.

v 28,179	546 Mk = 439 working days		12,330
92	454 Mk = 304 " "		135
v = 28,087	92 Mk 135 working days)		12,195

Hence: *19* persons + *12,195* working days

c = 39,192.$_5$	*m* = 300 taxes	Mk
+ 362.$_5$ (¼ × 1,450)	4,878 Reinertrag	c = 39,555
		v = 28,087
39,555	5,178	m = 5,178
		W = 72,820

Capital	Mk
57,000	
17,460	+ 16,010 1,450 17,460
150,000	
35,500	

*) ? The author assumed the circulating capital = ½ livestock + dead stock 57 + 14 = 71 thousand. 71 ÷ 2 — 35.$_5$; consequently, here too he should have taken 57 + 16.$_{01}$ = 73.$_{01}$. 73.$_{01}$ ÷ 2 = 36,505 Mk.

Fall III B.

v 28,087	1,523 Mk = 1,269 working days	c 39,555		
− 1,482.$_5$	40.$_5$ = 27 ” ”	+ 150	{¼ × 600}	
26,604.$_5$	1,482.$_5$ 1,242 working days	c = 39,705		
		v = 26,604.$_5$		
		m = 6,510.$_5$	{300+6,210.$_5$}	
12,195	Hence: *19* persons and	W = 72,820		
1,242	*10,953* working days			
10,953		Capital. Dead stock		
		17,460		
		+ 600		
		18,000		

Fall III C.

v 26,604.$_5$	486 Mk = 360 working days	c = 39,705		
− 418.$_5$	67.$_5$ = 45 ” ”	+ 400	{¼ × 1,200+100}	
26,186.$_0$	418.$_5$ = 315 ” ”	c = 40,105		
		v = 26,186		
		m = 6,529	{300+6,229}	
10,953	Hence: *19* persons +	W = 72,820		
− 315	*10,638* working days			
10,638		Capital. Dead stock		
		18,060		
		+ 1,200		
		19,260		

Fall III D.

v 26,186	2,616 Mk = 2,024 working days	c = 40,105		
− 2,320.$_5$	295.$_5$ Mk = 197 ” ”	+ 400	(¼ × 1,600)	
23,865.$_5$	2,320.$_5$ 1,827	c = 40,505		
		v = 23,865.$_5$		
		m = 8,449.$_5$	(300+8,149.$_5$)	
10,638	Hence: *19* persons +	W = 72,820		
− 1,827	*8,811* working days			
8,811		Capital. Dead stock		
		19,260		
		+ 1,600		
		20,860		

Fall III E.

v = 23,865.$_5$	2,616 Mk = 1,400 working days	c = 40,105	
− 1,470	− 630 Mk = 420 " "	+ 400	(735 + 126)
v = 22,395.$_5$	−1,470 Mk = 980 working days	41,366	
+ 215.$_5$	+ 215 Mk*) = 140 " "	− 215*)	
22,610.$_5$		c = 41,151	
8,811		v = 22,610.$_5$	
− 980		m = 14,476.$_5$	(300 + 14,176.$_5$)
7,831		W = 78,238	
+ 140		Capital.	
		Dead stock	
7,971	Hence: *19* persons + *7,971* days	20,860	
		(Machine *hired*)	
		(Steam thresher)	

Fall III F.

v = 22,610.$_5$	1,890 Mk = 1,575 working days	c = 41,151	
− 1,035	855 690 " "	+ 250	(¼ × 1,000)
21,575.$_5$	1,035 Mk = 885 working days	c = 41,401	
		v = 21,575.$_5$	
7,971		m = 14,781.$_5$	(300 + 14,481.$_5$)
− 885	Hence: *19* persons +	W = 77,758.$_5$	
7,086	*7,086* working days	dead stock	
		20,860	
		+ 1,000	
		21,860	

*) These 215 Mk (= about ¼ of 861) I tentatively charge to v from the cost of the *hired* machine (thresher). [The same thing in Fall IV with the steam plough.]

Fall IV.

c = 38,786	dead stock	21,860	
v = 23,465.$_5$		+10,000	Feldbahn
m = 18,826.$_5$		31,860	
W = 81,078.$_0$	(steam plough *hired*)		

Hence = *17* persons and *9,096* working days

(introduction of the steam plough (one only) and the Feldbahn) changes the quantity of the livestock and the permanent labourers.

19 persons	
2 (Ochsenmeister und Pferdeknecht)* —1,250 Mk	Day labourers —*700* days (at 1.50 = 1,050 Mk)
17 persons	Hence, minus *2,300* Mk

Reduction of the livestock:

— 7	horses	4,200
—18	oxen	8,100
		—*12,300* Mk

Maintenance of dead stock:

before	= 24,866 Mk
now	= 20,981 Mk
	— 3,885 Mk

i.e., a reduction of *v* by 2,300 Mk (2 permanent labourers + 700 days)

" " " " *c* " 16,185 $\left\{+\begin{matrix}12,300\\3,885\end{matrix}\right\}$

Meanwhile, *c* increases by *1,000* ($\frac{1}{10}\times$10,000 Feldbahn) + $\frac{3}{4}$ (on my assumption) of the cost of hiring the Dampfflug, i.e., $\frac{3}{4}\times$16,760 = 4,190 × 3 = *12,570*, i.e., by 13,570

Sum total reduction of c is 16,185—13,570=***2,615***
v is reduced by 2,300 Mk, but is, on the other hand, increased by $\frac{1}{4}\times$16,760=*4,190*, at 1.5 Mk=c. 2,800 working days

* Labourer tending oxen and labourer tending horses.—*Ed.*

Hence *v* has increased by *1,890* Mk {—2 permanent labourers +2,100 working days.}

c = 41,401	v = 21,575.5	m = 300
2,615	+ 1,890	18,526.5
c = 38,786	23,465.5	18,826.5
v = 23,465.5		
m = 18,826.5		
W = 81,078.0		

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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF F. HERTZ'S BOOK, *THE AGRARIAN QUESTIONS IN RELATION TO SOCIALISM**

Hertz

VI. Typical approach (lack of historical view, tendency to ramble and delve into detail)

Russian translation 17.

1. K. Kautsky has "no doubt" *impeccably* cleared up two questions: *on rural labourers*
   on large-scale agriculture
   Alias—the "*peasant question*".
2. According to Hertz, K. Kautsky has two important points:
   N.B. { 1) in agriculture the interests of wage labourers are superior to the interests of the owners.
   2) the peasant is an antagonist of the labourer.
3. In Austria.
   8½ million active in agriculture.
   4¼ million rural labourers.
   Hertz believes that 0.8 million rural labourers are de facto co-heirs.
4. "Wortspiel"** by Kautsky: the peasant-entrepreneur (cf. Chernov).
5. The peasant's alternate transformation (in K. Kautsky) into a labourer and an entrepreneur.

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* Hertz, F., *Die agrarischen Fragen im Verhältnis zum Sozialismus*. Wien 1899.—*Ed*.

** Word juggling.—*Ed*.

6. *Note 15*. Hertz also regards holders with 1-2
! {labourers as Kleinbetrieb or peasant farm.
6. There is no *class antagonism* between the labourers and the small peasants.
7. Demands must be "immediately attainable"—communal ownership of land (K. Kautsky) does not meet the requirement.
9. Not every peasant with subsidiary employment is already a proletarian [*very stupid*].
"Help" is not exploitation.
10. "Definition" of capitalism [forgot all about commodity production and wage labour!!]
10. Real definition of capitalism: production under the domination of capital (!! that's all!!).
"Genetic" definition
10. *Note* 25. "The economic usefulness of the capitalist is still being debated." (Sic!)
11. "Extremely false"—"*die*" *Agrarfrage* (!)
11. Britain: now "a model for everyone", now "we are not Britain" (con—Bernstein).
12. "Normal" capitalism. (?!)
The most important thing: the fact that capitalist exploitation is not connected with progress *towards capitalist large-scale production.*
12. Agriculture in Russia. Nikolai—on.
12-13. Large landed estates have not made for progress in Russian agriculture?
13. New peasantry (according to P.S.[64])
14. *Also*—gilt *Nicolai—on* (??)* "Nowhere does the new mode of production supplant the old."
14. In Russia, capital does not go on to a *juridical* possession of the means of production, being satisfied with ≫ share of the products.
Sic! ((Socialism will possibly take a similar stand in respect of capitalism?
15. Latifundia in Austria are not as common as K. Kautsky believes (although there are model farms) (*and nothing more*).
15. Baudrillart's *excellent* works.

* Consequently, Nikolai—on remains in force (??).—*Ed.*

16. The Middle Ages bequeathed a great many peculiarities. *K. Kautsky* is ***totally unhistorical*** in his summing-up conclusions [Where? What? When?]
17. Austrian Alps: in 1867 (idem *1887*) the same economy as in the Middle Ages.
18. Colossal growth of debt.
20. Hertz agrees with Engels that the peasant must be rescued from "the vegetative life" of the patriarchal natural economy, but is the money economy the *best* way? (Sic!)
20-21. Peasants ruined in the Alps, the rich buying up peasant lands (for hunting). That is not a case of large-scale production displacing the small.
21. The transforming effect of capitalism in the Alps is a complete fiasco!
21. (!!) Hence K. Kautsky is wrong on the educative role of capitalism: *parcel leaseholds are designed to supplant large-scale production altogether*.
21. Accordingly, the "main task of socialism" is *to sustain the co-operatives!!!*
22. Concentration of mortgages. Mortgages are not always
    1) large farms owe > than small ones.
24. Small depositors in mortgage banks. Cf. figures. {Enormous % of holders and small % of capital.}
26. Savings banks in Austria. 1'd*
28. Russian saving banks, 65.5% workers, etc.
28. This tendency is not one of centralisation but of *decentralisation* (*!*).
29. Small artisans and workers are expropriating the landowners. *Bernstein is quite right about agriculture*: *a growing number of holders* (*!!!*).
31. Engels's mistake about America (displacement of small farmers by big ones).
33-34. In the Eastern United States of America, land prices have dropped, but the progress of agricultural production continues, and K. Kautsky is quite wrong. [Cf. Bulgakov II, 435-436].

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* Not deciphered.—*Ed*.

36. + America: *absence of parcels* allows the > use of machines.
36. The Americans take pride in the fact that they do not have such a *low-standing peasantry as Europe does*.
39. The modern Grossbetriebe should also be compared with the modern Kleinbetriebe Chernov .
40. There is a terrible waste of labour-power under the parcel economy in Europe: neither the large nor the small farms have any "absolute" superiority.
43. The fatalism of European peasants. An American would take a limitation of credit worthiness as an affront.
44. "dire misery" of the European peasant.
45. Characteristic headline: "*Socialist* Attacks on Small-Scale Production."
47-48. Countries according to crop yields: Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, France.

4 countries with small-scale cropping surpass France!

in % of farms!!

49. In large-scale production, the wheat crop is *only* 0.$_{49}$ hectolitre higher. [Yes, at a rough estimate!]
50. Growth in crop yields in France in the 19th century.
51. Decline in crop yields in Britain.
52. The growth in the number of agricultural machines in France is evidence (51) that the *Kleinbetrieb* does not shun science.
52. Growth in the number of holders (???)
53. Rural handicraft industry—*none* in France (we see nothing)?? [Souchon] (Maurice, p. 294).
53. *Distortion*. Parcel farms decline in ***area*** (on the question of the growth of wage labour!!)
54. Hypocritical over "normal" development.
55. Kautsky's assertion (about wage labour among

small peasants) "total zerfällt"*—data 1862 1882 1892 (Bulgakov) on the decline in the number of ***day labourers*** with land.

55. *An exclamation mark over the fact that Grossbetrieb is already > 40 hectares*!

56. K. Kautsky's quotation about the French peasantry has been taken from a reactionary, romantically-minded lady. Foville has refuted....

56-58. ***Baudrillart....***

59. The consumption of meat in the countryside is *much* < than in the towns (although it is growing faster!)

59. K. Kautsky's assumption (on the consumption of meat).

59. *Pauperisierung der französischen Bauern keineswegs stattfindet* (!!)**

60. The state of France is the "*goal*" of all other countries (!)

60. Is there an *absolut* überlegener Betrieb?***

61. K. Kautsky should have said: Grossbetrieb *may* be superior to Kleinbetrieb.

— K. Kautsky does not give any figures for *crop yields* on Grossbetrieb and Kleinbetrieb.

61. "*Feuilleton method*" ... (of Kautsky's).

62. Examines the arguments for Grossbetrieb
Buildings
Machines (co-operatives)
Credit (something he does not examine).

62-63. David in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*.

63. Steam plough: not possible everywhere
— excellent results on heavy soils
— but *not*—on light soils.

64. Describes in detail where the steam plough cannot be used.

65. It is absurd to say, he adds, that the steam plough is better *under any conditions* (? who? where?).

65. Threshing in winter: labour (!) cheap (N.B.).

65. Once again (bis) *absolut* (!!) (swindler!)

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* Does not hold water.—*Ed.*

** There is no pauperisation of the peasants in France at all.—*Ed.*

*** A farm with absolute superiority.—*Ed.*

65-69. *Incomes.*
66. —East-Elbe—and *South* (I!) *Germany*: and so on (comic)
67. Higher yields following the introduction of the steam plough.
68. —and in South Germany (Baden) even higher!!!
68-69. *M. Hecht**)—first-rate.
70-71. Auhagen. (Cf. K. Kautsky.)
72. Marx. Contrasts cash income with agriculture (!!!) K. Kautsky does not even touch upon the question.
72-73. Nachklang naturrechtlichen etc.* (communal land-ownership).
73-74. Chewing on an inexpressible commonplace $\left(\frac{w-k}{t}\right)$** with praise for Wagner (!)—
74. Accordingly, *rough method*—simply compares gross incomes.
74. *Kleinbetrieb* uses relatively > labour than *Gross-betrieb*.
76. The bulk of the peasantry still using the most primitive implements.
76. Abolition of the antithesis between *town and country* (Hauptwunsch alter Utopisten*** and *Communist Manifesto*), but "***we do not believe***"....
76-77. *The Condition of the Peasants* (Kutzleb??) [see separate sheet. Cf. *Bulgakov* II 282] *in part the same references!!*
79. "*First-rate*"—Moritz Hecht....
80. Stumpfe on peasant livestock farming.
81. Small holders *widely* (?) *use* agricultural machines (?)
82. *Grossbetrieb in Europe not > than* 1/3 *of the area.* ["*Cannot treble production*"]

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*) Remember to note à propos M. Hecht intensified (and *age-old*) use of urban waste, sewage, etc., ***as fertiliser***.

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* Echo of natural right, etc.—*Ed.*

** A formula used by Hertz to denote productivity, where w—value of gross product, k—costs of production, and t—time of production.—*Ed.*

*** The main dream of the old utopians.—*Ed.*

83. The *Grossbetrieb* has had the worst of the crisis.
84-85. *Engels* is wrong in expecting overseas competition to intensify.
87. Kautsky's "trick" (data on artificial wine).
87-88. Kautsky's groundless hopes for the industrialisation of agriculture: the displacement is insignificant. The merger of agriculture with industries often goes through the co-operatives.
88. "***IF***" ***Grossbetrieb has*** "***really***" ***combined large-scale*** industry and large-scale agricultural production. ("If"!?!)
88. 1) No concentration.
2) Growing number of independent holders.
3) " " of all holders.
4) Superiority of large-scale over small-scale production is relative.
89. 5) Two trends in development:
towards a growth of *medium* production.
towards parcel farms.
6) *Parcel leaseholds*—the ultimate goal of capitalist agriculture.
7) Capitalism fails to create any economic or psychological premises for socialist large-scale production.
8) "*The main task of socialism*" is to organise
!! small-scale production through co-operatives.
89. The small peasant as well as the small tenant is not a capitalist, but a worker.
89-90. Labour rent of the small peasant drops to subsistence minimum—(!!N.B.)
90. *The price of land*—the main cause.
91. The small holder buys land and pays his debts through *subsidiary employment* ((work for a wage...!))...
92. N.B. ((The contemporary peasant question is a transmuted form of the unemployment problem. (Hertz fails to make both ends meet).
92. For Kautsky the agrarian question is everywhere the same.
93. What will a socialist state do with its employees in agriculture? (Very clever!)

95. In agriculture, the lever of economic self-interest || (Selbstinteresse) is indispensable. [Russian translation p. *227*.]

!!! [socialist!]

103. Terrible *nonsense on the content* of the modern right of ownership, etc.

104. —division on the basis of property [pure scholasticism!]

105. —and all of this just to say that it's no use || waiting for a social revolution. We are in it. Property will not be transformed "all at once".

111. The peasants are "entering socialism": the co-operatives....

112. Every year, about *1,500* agricultural co-operatives arise.
—*1,050,000* farmers have united in a purchasing society ("*con*" K. Kautsky!!).
Kautsky is absolutely wrong....
In Austria (Hohenbruck) dairy farm co-operatives have less than 1 cow per farmer. [Cf. Germany!!]

112. **The co-operatives mostly benefit the small and**
Sic! **the smallest holders**.

113. Kautsky's objection "***Absolut unhaltbar***".—*Komisch** (?) on sale of milk. The peasants receive cash.

113. How "weak" the exploitation of the rural labourers by the co-operatives is! Hundreds of peasants have 2 or 3 labourers (!?). Associations graded:

118. ...Disqualifizierung minderwertiger Produkte.** ...regulations by dairy co-operatives on the maintenance of cattle, etc.

119. The co-operatives have started to build elevators with strict sorting of grain.

120. Wine-makers' co-operatiues: fully Grossbetrieb....

121. The poor are saved from ruin: their ***vineyards*** are !! || bought from them ***and leased back on***

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* Absolutely groundless.—Absurd.—*Ed.*
** Rejection of low-grade products.—*Ed.*

instalments! They open their own wine-cellars....
...what more does Kautsky want?...
122. Engels also speaks about co-operatives.
123. The *failures* of socialist co-operatives. *N.B.*
123. Centralised farming is !! "*absolutely* impossible".
124. That is for the small ones, whereas the big ones
!!!! are *socialised*! It pays to use the steam plough, etc.
129. The reactionaries also favour co-operatives.

PLANS OF OBJECTIONS TO F. HERTZ'S BOOK

1

α "Definition of capitalism" (p. 10)!
β *Mortgages* (pp. 24, 26, 28)
(Decentralisation)
γ Engels's mistake about America (p. 31)
δ Proprietary interests in agriculture (pp. 2, 3).
The peasant entrepreneur.
("Wortspiel") (p. 4) (p. 5) and p. *89*.
|| Kleinbetrieb—and *farms* with *1-2 hired labourers* (p. *6*, Note 15)
There is no class antagonism between the Kleinbetrieb and the hired labourers (p. 6).
On *subsidiary employment* (p. 9)
ε || The big farm has no *absolute* superiority (p. 40) (p. 60) (60-65)
{ Threshers: labour cheap in winter: p. *65*
Crop yields in France p. 49.
The Kleinbetrieb does not shun machines p. *52* (indiscriminate figures on France). Cf. 81 (widely??)
On the sale of milk: p. 113.
ζ *M. Hecht 68* and *79* et al. ("first-rate")
Crop yields in East-Elbe and South Germany (66)
Auhagen: 70-71.
ϑ Higher crop yields following the introduction of the steam plough (67)
124: advantages of the steam plough!

There are model farms among the latifundia in Austria: *p. 15* (con Bulgakov)

Con! || America: absence of parcels allows greater use of machines; no peasantry of such low standing (p. 36) and *43*, *44*.

ι Con. Kleinbetrieb uses relatively more labour (74). Most peasants have primitive implements.
The peasant's labour rent: pp. *89-90* (!!)
Small farmer resorts to collateral employment: *91* cf. *92*.

κ {{ Growth in the number of holders in France 52 (??)
In France there is no rural industry 53 (??)
Distortion on parcel farms (reduction in number) 53.
Refutation of Kautsky's assertion on wage labour among small peasants 55. }}

λ Hertz on N.—on etc. (p. 12).
(Cf. Chernov)
Is the money economy the best way? (p. 20)
Parcel leaseholds: the goal of capitalism: p. 21.
Industrialisation of production: Kautsky's groundless hopes (87-88)

σ Demands must be immediately attainable—con social ownership of land (p. 7)
p. 10: the economic usefulness of capitalism is still being debated.
p. 14. Perhaps socialism takes the same attitude towards capitalism as Russian capitalism does to the patriarchal economy.

Only a greater share!

Nachklang naturrechtlichen views: pp. 72-73.
Abolition of the antithesis between town and country:
In agriculture, the lever of self-interest is indispensable: 95.
What socialism will do with the employees: 93.
On social revolution: 105.
123: Centralised farming is *absolutely* impossible (!!)

τ "The main task of socialism" is to sustain the co-operatives (p. 21) and p. *89*.
124: Co-operatives *for the small ones*, !! *and socialisation for the big ones*.
Wine-growers' co-operatives 120
Co-operatives: "entering" socialism (111).
Number of members in co-operatives (112)
Dairy co-operatives (112)
To τ Engels on co-operatives
distortion 122.

2

α "theory"
β mortgages
γ Engels on America
δ on the peasantry and versus the proletariat
ε large- and small-scale production
ζ Hecht, Auhagen, etc.
ϑ admission of superiority of the large
ι admission of overwork in Kleinbetrieb
ϰ Hertz on French data
λ Hertz and Narodism
=
σ —attitude to socialism
τ —co-operatives

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ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM O. PRINGSHEIM'S ARTICLE, "AGRICULTURAL MANUFACTURE AND ELECTRIFIED AGRICULTURE"[65]

Dr. Otto Pringsheim (in Breslau), "Landwirtschaftliche Manufaktur und elektrische Landwirtschaft". [Braun's Archiv, XV (1900), S. 406-418.]

The author starts by pointing out that he will try to characterise "the forms which agricultural production assumes in the capitalist epoch" (406). Until now "the question of agrarian morphology" has hardly been dealt with. (Farms were classified into large and small in a stereotyped way, superficially, only by the area under cultivation—407.)

Is there not in agriculture an analogy with the capitalist household industry (the middle link between the handicrafts and large-scale industry)?—In Dutch tobacco-growing, in beetroot production (dependence on the sugar refineries, control over their crops, etc.—408). (Consequently: much weaker than in industry—409.)

Let us take a look at a typical specimen of the modern large-scale agricultural enterprise: an East-Elbe estate of 200-400 hectares

the prevalence of isolated manual labour
and simple co-operation
small division of labour
not permanent (reapers and binders)
permanent (in stock raising).

Machines*) are used sporadically (as in the industrial manufacture. Cf. *Das Kapital*, I[3], 335, 349[66] p. 410. No system of machines (410).

Modern large-scale agricultural production should be compared with the *manufacture* (in the *Marxian sense*) (410).

N.B. Marketing in agriculture is not so much on a world as on a local scale (411). And the size of the unit is not big: very few with a turnover of 100,000 marks, whereas in industry this was surpassed long ago (411).

[This indication is very important!] The exception proves the rule [Benkendorf's estate in Saxony, 2,626 hectares, of which 375 is cultivated by steam plough; livestock—123 draught horses + 70 pairs of oxen + 300 milch cows + 100 fattened bull-calves + 3,600 fattened lambs. A sugar refinery and a distillery, etc., 13 employees, etc. Outlays *1½-2 million* marks a year.—Böckelmann in Atzendorf: 3,320 hectares, own steam plough + (99 horses, 610 oxen), sugar refinery, etc.: Mitteilungen der deutschen Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft. 1899, Stück 17**)].****

On the whole, the nature of the large-scale agricultural enterprise is not like that in industry, and it will be easily proved that the middle peasants are not below this level.

But while the Davids and Hertzes, the Oppenheimers and Weisengrüns predicted the early end of large-scale agricultural production, there started a technical revolution which should apparently lead to a strengthening of the positions of large-scale agricultural production and take it to a higher stage of development... 412.

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*) *Backhaus, Agrarstatistische Untersuchungen über den preussischen Osten im Vergleich zum Western*,* 1898. *F. Bensing, Der Einfluss der landwirtschaftlichen Maschinen auf Volks- und Privatwirtschaft*,** 1898.

) On Benkendorf also see Thiel's *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*, 1887 (16. Jahrgang), S. 981.*

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* *A Comparative Agrarian Statistical Study of East and West Prussia.—Ed.*

** *The Influence of Agricultural Machinery on the National and Private Economy.—Ed.*

*** *Agricultural Yearbooks*, 1887, 16th year of publication, p. 981.—*Ed.*

**** Material of the German Agricultural Society, 1899, Part 17.—*Ed.*

Electrical Machines

advantages of electrical machines —for milking —farm supply railways —threshers —plough, etc., etc. This means opening up the possibility of the machine system in agriculture.... What could not be achieved by steam power will certainly be achieved by electrical machines, namely, the advancement of agriculture from the old manufacture stage to modern large-scale production (414).*	*Sinell*, *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft,* Band 14. *Benno Martiny*, *Arbeiten der deutschen Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft*, Heft 37. *Technische Rundschau*, 1899, No. 43 (Electrical supply tracks). *Adolf Seufferheld*, *Die Anwendung der Elektrizität im landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe*, *aus eigener Erfahrung mitgeteilt*, Stuttgart 1899. *P. Mack*, *Der Aufschwung u.s.w.* 1900**

Electricity will sharpen the competition between the big and small farms (the co-operatives will not make up for the advantages of large-scale production).... Writers who, like Hertz, in treating of competition between small- and large-scale production in agriculture ignored electrical engineering, must start their investigation all over again (415).***

Growing industrialisation of the countryside. Coalescence of industry and agriculture (cf. *Mack*):

—countryside drawing closer to town

—introduction of more educated workers (416)

—night work (examples in Bohemia and Saxony) (p. 417). A reference to Russia in note (p. 417)—V. Ilyin, p. 166****

—introduction of female and child labour, etc.

"The prospects for agriculture in the 20th century are truly brilliant" (417). *Max Delbrück*, "Die deutsche Land-

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 144.—*Ed.*

** Sinell, *Yearbook of the German Agricultural Society*, Vol. 14; Benno Martiny, *Transactions of the German Agricultural Society*, Part 37; *Technical Survey*; Adolph Seufferheld, *Report from Personal Experience on the Use of Electricity in Agricultural Production*; P. Mack, *Boosting*, *etc.*—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 142.—*Ed.*

**** Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 235.—*Ed.*

wirtschaft an der Jahrhundertswende" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1900, Februar)* predicts a doubling of crop yields in grain production, a trebling of potato crops, and an eightfold increase in the whole of production by the end of the 20th century over the beginning of the 19th century.

Lemström's study of the influence of electricity on the growth of plants also opens up unexpected prospects (418).

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* Max Delbrück, "German Agriculture at the Turn of the Century" (*Prussian Yearbooks*, 1900, February).—*Ed.*

CRITICAL REMARKS ON E. DAVID'S ARTICLE, "THE PEASANT BARBARIANS"

David's short article, "Bäuerliche Barbaren' (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*, 1899, No. 2, III. Jahrgang, S. 62-71) is a typical example of the outrageous approach to the small peasant concept. David gives a description according to Hecht (Moritz Hecht, *Three Villages in the Hard of Baden*, Leipzig, 1895) of three villages near Karlsruhe, lying within 4 to 14 kilometres. In one village (Hagsfeld) the majority are workers who go to work in Karlsruhe, in the second (Blankenloch), they are a small minority, and in the third (Friedrichsthal), all are farmers.

They have holdings of 1 to 3 hectares*) (only one has 9 hectares, and 18—4 to 6 hectares), and lease from ½ to 1 hectare. Twenty-nine are landless.

Price of hectare			
$4._2$-$4._4$	thousand	marks.	Grow *tobacco*, 45 % of farmland (area under crop) in Friedrichsthal (1,140 souls)
$4._8$-$5._0$	"	"	Raise *corn* (wheat), 47% of farmland (area under crop) in Blankenloch (1,684 souls)
9.-10.	"	" (p. 67)	Grow *potatoes*. 42 % of farmland (area under crop) in Hagsfeld.

*) "Holdings everywhere are *small and dwarf peasant farms*":

Hagsfeld	"average"	$2._0$	hectares	
Blankenloch	"	$2._5$	"	
Friedrichsthal	"	$1._8$	"	(!!)

Income (from tobacco)—up to 1,800 marks (gross, 690 net) per hectare.*) Crop yields are everywhere *much* higher than the ***average for Germany*** (p. 67)

Potatoes:	150-160	double	centners	per	hectare	(87.$_8$	for	German	Reich)
Rye and wheat:	20-23	”	”	”	”	(10-13	”	”	”)
Hay:	50-60	”	”	”	”	(28.$_6$	”	”	”)

Living standard is high (clothes, food, dwellings, etc.), for instance, consumption of sugar in the three villages is 17 kg per head (only 8.2 kg for German Reich!), etc.

David is jubilant: There's your “backward small peasants!” he says about these “still really and truly small holders” (p. 66). This only shows him up as a real and true petty bourgeois, because his is a most eloquent example of the *bourgeois village*, a visual example of the worthlessness of area statistics. These are nothing but rich tobacco-planters and suburban peasants—and suburban workers with plots of land!

From the outset, E. David attacks the theory of underconsumption and overwork (62) (“superhuman work and inhuman way of life”).

And, ridiculing orthodox Marxism, etc. (63), E. David says:

“I should subsequently like to contrast the *backward* small peasant described by Kautsky with a portrait of the *modern* small peasant. In fact, such a type does exist; but he is so different, as man and farmer, from the semi-barbarian beggar we find in Kautsky's book, that anyone wishing to engage in practical land agitation will find it very useful to have a closer look at him as well” (63).

Before that E. David “retells” Kautsky as follows: Agriculture has become “one of the most revolutionary, if not the most revolutionary of modern industries”, but small peasant farming is “the most irrational economy one can imagine”. (No reference to *Agrarfrage*).

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*) 1,825.$_{60}$ marks per hectare. And this holder has 2.$_5$ hectares plus milch cows and pigs (dairy farm near Karlsruhe) (p. 67). “Let the reader calculate the total income of this (!!) ‘backward small peasant’” (67).

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

"Comrade Kautsky starts from the premise that small peasant farming *cannot* be rational at all; that the successes of agricultural science and engineering virtually do not exist for it at all. Modern machinery, chemical fertilisers, soil improvement, rational crop rotation, improvement of seed and livestock, organisation of marketing and credit—all of this he imagines to be the privilege of capitalist large-scale agriculture from whose table, it is true, some small crumbs do fall to the small peasants, but these are quite insufficient to raise small farming to the economic and technical productivity which is characteristic of large-scale farming" (63).

(A specimen of "vulgarising" Marxism!)

Statistics of income from crops: in the south-western states (small farming) it is higher than in East Prussia (large-scale farming).

That the soil is better in the south-west is only a *part* of the explanation.

Even if the rye ana hay crops in Saxony are lower than in Hessen (the wheat crop is higher), this goes best to show how *backward* the concept of the general *backwardness* of peasant farming is (64).

Of course, machines are not *as* (not *equally*) accessible to small farming, but

1) machines do not play such a role in agriculture

2) the most important machines are also "accessible" (zugänglich) to small farming.

"Concerning steam and other threshing machines this is admitted even by Kautsky; their application is becoming ever more widespread on the small farms as well. But Kautsky is wrong when he says that 'apart from the thresher, the use of machinery in small farming is hardly in evidence'.

"Of the machines included in the count during the 1895 farm census, there is above all the seed drill, which is accessible to *a l l*, at any rate, to farms of 5 to 20 hectares, !! and smaller farms as well, insofar as they have an even area under crop. It is true that the *percentage* of small farms already using it is still insignificant, but if we look at the high, *absolute* figures and the *progress* between 1882 and

1895, we shall have a positive answer to the question of *whether or not* they can be used everywhere. This is borne out by the following survey. Seeders were used by*:

	Number of farms: 1882	1895				
Under 2 ha	4,807	14,949	(214)	+	10,142	
2-5	4,760	13,639	(551)		8,879	
5-20	15,980	52,003	(3,252)		36,023	
	25,547	80,591	(4,017)		55,044	
20-100	22,975	61,943	(12,091)		38,968	
> 100	15,320	26,931	(12,565)		11,611	(p. 65)

"The assertion that apart from the thresher, the use of machinery in small farming is hardly in evidence, is refuted by these figures, for the *seed drill*, at any rate."

and in the note there is a reference to *The Condition of the Peasants*, I, 106, to the effect that in the Weimar district, the "*seed drill* is common among the richer (!!) and is already making its way into the 30- or 40-acre farms".

(Let's note that $28._5$ ha = 100 Weimar acres
about $9._5$ ha = 30-40 " ")

"Nor can it be said that the *reaper* is absolutely beyond the reach of small farming. In 1895, it was already in use on 6,746 farms of 5 to 20 ha" (p. 65).

Then comes a quotation from a Frankfort-on-the Main factory catalogue: 20-25-30-60 pfennigs for ½ day's use of a machine: seeder (60 pfennigs), harrow (25 pfennigs), etc.

"But the *other achievements* of modern agriculture have penetrated into small peasant farming to a much greater extent than the machines. To give a visual picture of this I shall quote in somewhat greater detail one of the most fundamental (!!!) and interesting (!) monographs on the condition of the peasantry which have appeared in the recent period" ... ***Hecht*** (66)**
in these three villages:

"Holdings everywhere are *small and dwarf peasant farms*" (E. David's italics).

* Under the 1882 census, the count only dealt with seeders; and in 1895 broadcast sowers and seed drills were classified under separate heads. Consequently, the 1882 figures should be compared with the total number of machines of both types in 1895; the relatively smaller number of farms using the broadcast sowers, the less important type, is given in brackets after the total figure (E. David's note).

** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 160.—*Ed.*

"What has been said must cast doubt on Kautsky's assertion which is presented to us as a generally recognised truth: 'that in contrast to large-scale farming peasant farming rests *not on a higher productivity* but on *more modest requirements*'" (68).

For all *labour*-intensive crops, small farming is undoubtedly more rational (68).

Good dwellings, "clean room" ... carpets, lamps, photographs, mirrors, gold rings, postage stamps, etc. (69)

"Our Hard peasants are already at the pure *money economy* stage and—oh, miracle!—this has *not* ruined them. (! In defiance of Kautsky's prophecies! In fact, they are having it very well indeed, and any cash surplus—and they often have one—is instantly deposited in savings (! banks to earn interest" (68).

"I have quoted this study, based as it is on serious data, at such length because it gives an excellent characteristic of every aspect of the *most modern* type of West-German small peasantry' (70) ... that even the urban reader will understand....

"For it should not be imagined that Hecht's facts are exceptional cases, without any importance for the *general condition* and the *future* of small-scale farming" (70)

In *Mombach* (near Mainz), where E. David lives, the peasants are no worse off than the Hard peasants. They raise lettuce, asparagus, peas, etc.

E. David objects to Kautsky's taking "a few pictures of poverty" from the Rhön mountains, Spessart, upper Taunus, etc., and drawing *general* conclusions (71). His, David's, picture will help to find a *general correct average* (71) (my italics).

The condition of the peasants is now on the whole better than before. E. David quotes *The Condition of the Peasants*, I, 270—(last paragraph, first sentence: "*That welfare in general*" up to "*proves*")—and puts it in *italics*.

(*David* says *not a word* about hired labour among the Hard peasants. *Not a word either* about overwork (after other work).)

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ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM M. HECHT'S BOOK, *THREE VILLAGES IN THE HARD OF BADEN*[67]

Hecht

1. 4-14 kilometres from Karlsruhe.

				workers
2,957	Hagsfeld	1,273	inhabitants	350
	Blankenloch	1,684	”	103
	Friedrichsthal	1,140	”	11
		Total=4,097		

3. Lumbering in winter.
7. Density of population

	Hags-feld	(Friedrichs-) thal)	(Blanken-loch)
per hectare	$3._2$	$4._5$	$2._8$
Baden	$1._{04}$		
Germany	$0._{68}$		

Total land

Friedrichsthal	258	hectares
Hagsfeld	397	”
Blankenloch	736	”
	Total=1,391	

Distribution of land:		Friedrichs-thal	Hags-feld	Blan-kenloch
p. 7: Farm consists of 5-7 persons.	9 hectares	—	—	1
	6-8 ”	—	6	—
	5 ”	—	3	2
	4 ”	—	6	4
	2 ”	43%	?	55%
	under 2 ”	the rest		
	landless	— 8	14	7

Freedom of division

8. Additional lease of ½-1 hectare.
9. Heavy exodus (to America) in the 1830s and 1850s
10. Today the formation of a middle estate (in place of the former poor)

11. Extensive and subsistence farming—18th century.

Poverty of the population, *emigration* to the towns and to America

12. *Hagsfeld*—into an industrial township *Blankenloch* and *Friedrichsthal*—*specialisation* of agriculture, money economy. *The farmer has become merchant and entrepreneur*.
15. In *Hagsfeld*, farming is a *side line*.
15-16. —Only nine families are engaged in farming alone. —The Hagsfeld peasant has become a factory worker. The wives farm: they even have their linen washed in town.

16-17. *The price of land* Hagsfeld $4._2$-$4._4$ thousand marks
cf. Baden Blankenloch $4._8$-5
2 thousand marks Friedrichsthal 9 -10

17. Only specialisation gives an effectively high income. Potatoes for the aristocratic board. Seed potatoes.”
17. “Virtuosity” in developing potato grades

18. Potatoes 120 double centners × 4 = 480 marks per hectare
Carrots 1,300
Tobacco (takes a lot of hands)
18. Child labour in planting (stecken!) potatoes

(19) 220-230 planters of tobacco (a total of about 100 hectares)
20. *Friedrichsthal* income from tobacco = 147,473 marks a year
23. Friedrichsthal leases meadows and buys hay
24. The growth of *dairy* farming.
24. Everyone sells 2-3 litres of milk, rich families—10-20 litres
In *Hagsfeld* milk is sold, and butter (partly *margarine*) bought instead
25. Creamery in Friedrichsthal, "speculative mode of business", its precarious dependence on the cattle-dealers
26. Friedrichsthal—17,200 marks a year from the sale of pigs.
27. Growth in the number of *goats* in **Hagsfeld**: disintegration of the peasant estate.
28-29. Backwardness of *Blankenloch* with its more natural economy.
29-30. Reason: much land.
!! {The *community* facilitates the struggle for *existence*
30. Although the disintegration of the community pays from the standpoint of production, it is socially wasteful—maintenance of workers (especially with *Blankenloch's transition from agriculture to industry*). || N.B.
30. The people of Friedrichsthal carry manure from Karlsruhe (20-30 cartloads).

31. There is no day-labourer category: most peasants do without labourers
few "request" help
payment increases where town is near

32-33. Complete collapse of handicrafts.

35. The majority in *Hagsfeld* are factory workers (300-350), most of them *walking* the 3½ kilometres (only 100 ride)

factory workers	Hagsfeld	350
	Blankenloch	103
	Friedrichsthal	10-12

35. Factory working day = 10 hours

36. Factory working women sometimes *take work home* !!

38. *Celebration* of the fact that the *Hagsfeld* worker has a *patch of land*: "more important sense" of property !!

Utilisation of spare time

4 a.m.—at 7 a.m. to the factory
after 7 p.m.—1-1½ more !!

39. The worker has better nutrition, relaxes from factory work. The women stay at home—better from the moral standpoint.

40. *Hecht* is clearly making fun of the *socialists* "capitalists", "serfdom".

40. House owners socially higher

41. Social "poetry of own house".

58-59. The growth of Karlsruhe, *market*, etc.

62. It is a sad fact that in the sale of tobacco the well-to-do farmers sometimes cheat the poor.

63. In *Blankenloch* and *Hagsfeld* grain is sold in **autumn** and bought in *spring*.

65. The purchase of manure and liquid manure.

78. The richer families (3-4 hectares) have meat 5-6 times a week
the poorer—3-4 times
a handful—only on Sundays.

79. The *Hagsfeld worker*—wife takes dinner to town (150 out of 300 get their dinner from home, 150 have theirs in eating-houses)...

79 > Poor women ... carry dinner to the factory....

79-80. Cookery courses are read annually at *Blankenloch* and *Friedrichsthal* (on the initiative of her royal

highness the grand duchess) ... an undertaking
! equal in importance perhaps to the founding of
80 ! a consumers' co-operative or a savings bank.
! (That's Dr. Hecht, that's him all over!)

90. The *Hagsfeld* man... is no longer a peasant, he is a townsman.

91. Strict religious convictions—Social-Democrats are ignored, except possibly by factory men, but only the 20-30-year olds.

92-93. There is no "social gulf" between the rich and the
! poor. The "master" peasant (with 3-4 hectares) is on thee-and-thou terms with the labouring man and
93 woman, ana calls them by their first names.—
! They "sir" him, but eat at the same table: "patriarchal relations".

Consequently, in "the three villages"

On the one hand, rich petty bourgeois, tobacco-planters, dairy farmers, etc. (virtuosi raising special grades of potatoes, etc.).

Example of paying nature of tobacco-growing.
Wage labour in general. (Master and labourer)
Swindling of the small by the big.

The rich sell 10-20 litres of milk	The poor 2-3 litres
" eat meat 5-6 times a week	" 3-4 and a very few on Sundays only.

On the other hand. About one-half the total population are factory workers (4,000 inhabitants—about 1,000 working, of whom 464 are factory workers). Of the *factory workers*, the greater part walk. Poor women carry dinners to the factory.

Under-consumption (margarine)
Overwork (working at home for the manufacturers; work morning and night)
Growth in the number of goats.
Sale of grain in autumn and purchase in spring.
"Fiercely industrious" (and example)

Factory workers		Number of families roughly	hectares
			1 — = 9
350	Hagsfeld	1,273 ÷ 6 = 212	6 with 7 = 42 roughly
103	Blankenloch	1,684 ÷ 6 = 281	5 with 5 = 25 roughly
11	Friedrichsthal	1,140 ÷ 6 = 190	10 with 4 = 40 roughly
464		4,097 ÷ 6 = 683	22 — 116
		1/2 = 341	29 — 0
		2/5 = 273	

464 factory workers

Hagsfeld

212

9 (without side line)

203 — 350 factory workers

about 200 — 350 about

$\frac{200}{350} - \frac{1}{460}$

$\frac{460 \times 200}{350} = 263$ families of workers in all 3 villages* + 29 landless = 292

A total of *about* 700 families

of whom factory workers—*about* 300

I	25	— 30%
II	25	— 30%
III	50	— 40%
	100	100

For fertilisers

	hectares	*marks*	*per hectare*	
Friedrichsthal . .	258	28,000	108	28,000÷258=108
Hagsfeld	397	12,000	30	
Blankenloch . . .	736	8,000	11	

* The words "of workers in all 3 villages" have been inserted according to the meaning.—*Ed.*

Distribution of crop area in %

Inhabitants		Total land ha	Cattle	Potatoes	Tobacco	Grain	Pigs	Goats	Horses
1,140	Friedrichsthal	258	435	30%	45%	18%	497	—	40
				about 100 ha p. 19		(51.48*) ha)			
1,684	Blankenloch	736	634	17%	$10._4$%	47%	445	8	96
				(40 ha?)		about 236 ha			
1,273	Hagsfeld	397	225	42%	$0._6$%	—	220	93	35
4,097									

Crop yields are much higher in Friedrichsthal (p. 29 Hecht).

To sum up:

¼ rich and well-to-do peasants — only the *Friedrichsthal people* are well-to-do—and they are about ¼

¼ middle ones (those of Blankenloch—more backward economy, etc.)

½ factory workers with patches (p.t.o. for rough calculation)

	Families *roughly*	Cost of land: ha	Cost of land: '000 marks	Cost of land: '000 marks	Cattle in terms of horned 1 bull=1 horse =4 pigs= 10 goats
Friedrichsthal	190	258 × $9._5$		=2,451	599
Blankenloch.	281	736 × $4._9$		=3,606	842
Hagsfeld	212	397 × $4._3$		= 1,707	324
	683			7,764	1,765

Friedrichsthal:

100 ha of tobacco	45%
about 50 ha of grain	18%
about 65 ha of potatoes (⅔ of tobacco)	30%
	93%

$258._0 \div 1._8 = 143$ [69]
$736._0 \div 2._5 = 294$
$397 \div 2 = 196$

$143 + 294 + 196 = 633$ families

*) 143 Morgen = $51._{48}$ ha. (Hecht, 28) $258 \times {}^{18}/_{100} = 46._{44}$ ha[68] hence 678 Morgen = consequently $236._6$ ha.

"The little man" (in Friedrichsthal) obtains 30 kilogrammes of tobacco from ¼ Morgen (9 ares)—"the rich one" (with 3-3½ hectares)—only 25 kilogrammes. The poor one is more diligent (p. 71).

Twenty-four years ago one had 110 ares. Now he has 3½ hectares—made additional purchases. And all that due only to being "fiercely industrious" (71). "There are many more such examples." !

Then there is also the "sober marriage policy".

The well-known peasant saying: "We work not so much for our mouth as for our pockets" (71).

Hagsfeld—the cause of progress is not only the entry into market relations, not only the free division of land, but also *education in the spirit of a higher morality*, *endeavour and self-help* (71).

The virtues: diligence, thrift, temperance, which now mark the Hard peasant, are not innate but acquired (72).

And Hecht extols education by state, church, and school: in the sweat of your face shall you eat bread! Why does one get 4 centners of tobacco from 9 ares, and the other, 1? Why does one raise tobacco and the other rye? Lasiness. Why do neighbours (say, in the Bruchsal district) live worse, despite similar market conditions?—In our opinion the major cause of the better economic condition of our 3 villages is the more pronounced existence and development of *moral factors*. But the education of the Hard peasant is revealed not only in his greater industry, hardiness, the truly remarkable thrift and temperance (73)—but also in self-help.

Sale:	potatoes annually	Carrots	Tobacco annually	cereals annually	Milk	Pigs	Tobacco
Friedrichsthal					750 litres a week	17,200 marks a year	147,473 marks a year
Blankenloch	4,000 double centners	1,750 double centners	3,500 double centners	500 double centners	4,700	?(p. 26)	?
Hagsfeld					1,400	?	?

Purchase	*Friedrichsthal*	(marks) *Blankenloch*	*Hagsfeld*
Manure	25,000	5,000	3,000
Liquid manure	—	—	+ 8,000
Artificial fertilisers	3,000	3,000	1,000
Concentrated feed		40,000	
Hay	10,000	20,000	10,000
Grain	23,100	12,510	
Sugar	45-50 thousand marks		
Coffee	60,000 marks		

	ha		marks
	100 tobacco	100 ha	147,473
?	65 potatoes (2/3 of tobacco 30% and 45%)	65 ha about 600 marks per ha (p. 18 : 150 double centners at 4 marks)	about 36,000
?	50 grain	50 ha at 26 double centners (p. 22) = 1,300 double centners	
?	15 beetroot	about 15 ha 230 at 1,200 (cf. p. 18) [p. 22 = 6% = 1/7 of 100 = 45%] = 18,000 = about 18,000	
	milk	750 litres × 50 = 37,500 at 15 pfennigs = about (p. 64)	5,625
	pigs		17,200
			224,298

How big is the *average gross* income of a Friedrichsthal man? $1._8$ ha.

224,000 marks is, of course, *not all*; taking the round figure of 258,000 marks, this gives 1,000 marks per hectare and 1,800 marks for $1._8$ hectares.

The peasant of the 18th century, with his eight to ten hectares of land, was a peasant and a manual labourer; the dwarf peasant of the 19th century, with his one or two hectares of land, is a brainworker, an entrepreneur, and a merchant (p. 69).*

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 163.—*Ed.*

Concluding words: The dwarf peasant and the factory worker have both raised themselves to the position of the middle class.... "The three villages in the Hard of Baden" *now* belong to *one great*, *broad middle class* (94).*

Amen!

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* Ibid., p. 167.—*Ed.*

ANALYSIS OF MATERIAL FROM H. AUHAGEN'S ARTICLE, "ON LARGE- AND SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE"[70]

Hubert Auhagen, "Ueber Gross- und Kleinbetrieb in der Landwirtschaft" (*Thiels Jahrbücher*, Band 25, Jahrgang 1896. S. 1-55).

Auhagen is definitely **for small farming**	The village of Clauen (Hannover province) (Peine District)			*Excellent example!!*
	I — $4._{625}$ ha	100	100	
	II — $26._{50}$ "	573	625 drainage	

The author says that he tried to find a village with a "possibly uniform soil" (p. 1), but does not give any soil classification for I and II.

Both farms are among *the best in the area* (p. 1).

Cultivation of land—see ***separate sheet***.*

In I, cows are used in ploughing and on working days (105) receive more feed. On hot summer days, they are overworked (p. 9), but then the owner gives them more fodder beet.

Drainage	in	I— *480*	marks	(3% = $14._{40}$)	{cf. table**}
		II— *3,000*	"	(3% = $90._{00}$)	

The *same* value of the product is taken. There are no facts.

On the *small* farms, the cattle are given better care: "The cattle fatten under the owner's eye" (p. 27).

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* See p. 134.—*Ed.*

** See p. 130.—*Ed.*

In I and I, the same system and character of farming.

Not so livestock farming. In II, the cattle are fattened for slaughter and are not bred, and in I, *each head of cattle has been raised on the farm* (p. 28). It is very, very common for the big peasant to buy lean cattle from the small peasant and fatten them up—all over Germany (p. 28): small farming has advantages over big farming in the raising of cattle (p. 29). N.B.

Maintenance of structures—the small peasant mostly repairs everything *himself* (p. 30).

In II *dead stock* is on a very high level (machines), but I is not backward (p. 31), for the small peasant *makes do* (!!) just as well with simpler implements.

Depreciation in I—2%, in II—6%. II has had a cart for 10-12 years; I has farmed *22 years* after his father, and *has not bought a cart*, and does not remember ***his father buying one either***, and he had farmed for 30 years. !
Small implements are used on small farms to the utmost (31).

II spends 3,872.$_{93}$ marks on hired labour= 36.$_{53}$ per Morgen, while the small peasant economises *on all this*, because he is both ***master and labourer*** (*p. 33, too wordy*). That is the tremendous advantage of small farming!!!

Small farming—dearth of land.

The buyer of a small holding is usually very well aware that it would be better for him, financially speaking, to work for a daily wage and in addition to receive an income in the form of interest on his capital. But he rejects this higher profit for the sake of greater convenience (33)....

In the coal area of Saarbrücken "these small holders make up the best nucleus of the mine workers" (33)—as the author was told by a factory manager at Neunkirchen, and, contrary to ***Social-Democratic agitation***, Auhagen believes: !!

! "The best thing the state could do in this area to solve the labour problem is to help workers to acquire small plots of land, by granting credits" (33).

! Advantage of I: "He (the small peasant) frequently has the assistance of his children about the farm almost as soon as they learn to run" (34)!

Pp. 39-40—an example of the thriftiness of the small peasant (*cited by Kautsky*): a wife wore out one pair of shoes in 17 years of married life, etc., etc.

Why I has *higher* crop yields

1) more thorough working of the fields—work *themselves*;

N.B. "The ordinary day labourer, especially on the big farms, thinks as he works: 'I wish the holiday would come round sooner'; whereas the small peasant, in doing all kinds of urgent work anyway, hopes, 'I wish I could have another couple of hours today'" (p. 42).

2) I does his work in time: he has more *labour* per hectare. ***The small peasant can get up earlier and go to bed late*** (43) when time is very short.
3) I is not afraid of work: beetles were collected by hand.
4) I takes in his crop faster, the grain has no time to drop.
5) I has better seed material: it is, picked by hand in winter (no grain-sorter!).
6) I uses *more fertilisers*, *because he has more cattle* (*no figures*).

Sale I = $3{,}400._{80}$—$735._{31}$ per hectare
II = $14{,}097._{41}$—$531._{98}$ per hectare

The net income is also higher (see table of per cent on *capital**).

Auhagen himself is aware that the *living standards* are different (p. 49) and excludes housekeeping (*see table***)

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* See p. 131.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 130-31.—*Ed.*

—but what I should like to point out, as a phenomenon common for the whole of Germany, is the higher rent on small peasant farms as compared with the big peasant farms and landed estates (49) } Sic!

that is why *land fetches more under small farming*. Fragmentation of estates ... leads to ... *an increase in the value of the national property* (50) ||

Auhagen admits that the small peasants are *more* liable to have backward systems of farming (51). These are impossible among big peasants: they can hold on only by improving. But progress comes not only from the big farm, but also from the *well-to-do* owner (!). ||

Remarks on various parts of Germany (cursorily on the advantages of different-size farms in different areas).

"Ausgebaute" (those who settle on separate farmsteads outside the village) mostly run their farms better (54-55); there is more routine in the village.

Receipts

	I marks	II marks
I. *Cash from sales*:		
products of field cropping	1,596.40	7,991.15
" " vegetable gardening	—	90
" " livestock farming	1,804.40	21,171.26
Other receipts (payments for tillage and cartage)	42	200
Total receipts in kind	3,028.80*	29.452.41
II. *For use in household*:		
products of field cropping	182	178
" " vegetable gardening	30	50
" " livestock farming	346.15	233.50
	558.15	461.50
III. *For feeding hired labourers*:		
products of field cropping	—	350
" " vegetable gardening	—	35
" " livestock farming	—	377.04
	—	762.04
Total receipts in kind	558.15	1,223.54

* So in the original.—*Ed.*

Outlays	I marks	II marks	
A. Farming costs			
Taxes	63.55	321.54	
Insurance	89.95	600.13	
Maintenance and depreciation of drainage (3%)	14.40	90.00	
Depreciation of capital in structures (¾%)	47.25	187.50	
(α Maintenance of structures	15.00	178.60	N.B.
(β Depreciation of dead stock (2%) and 6%!!!)	14.42	291.66	N.B.
(γ Maintenance of dead stock	15.00	285.05	N.B.
Restocking of livestock	—	15,641.00*)	
Hired labour	—	3,872.93	
Artificial fertilisers	198.00	2,052.00	
Concentrated feed	141.50	1,537.50	
Cost of pairing	8.00	—	
Veterinary	6.00	48.00	
Restocking of seed	2.80	60.00	
Sundries	6.00	35.09	
Total farming costs	621.87	25,200.91	
B. Housekeeping costs			
Income tax	12.00	104.00	
Church tithes	22.10	100.95	
Products for farm	558.15	461.50	
Supplementary purchase of potatoes	—	50	
" " " meat	18.00	124.80	N.B.

*) Including 14,355 for the purchase of 55 bull-calves sold for 19,420.50. Without this !!

I has 0, whereas II has 1,286 marks

α+β+γ I has 44.42, II has 755.31

44.42 2,041.3

The total value of structures, dead and livestock implements = 9,151.60 43,259 !!

	I marks	II marks
Groceries	81.90	216.00
Clothes	220.00	588.00
Footwear	52	61
Son at school*)	—	700
Doctor and pharmacy	25	60
Tobacco	24	80
Drinks	26	70
Festivities, etc.	25	120
Fuel	59.15	—
Sundries	35.20	—
Total housekeeping costs	1,158.50**)	2,736.25
Total outlays	1,780.37**)	27,955.16

C

Total receipts	3,586.95	30,675.95
Total outlays	—1,780.37	—27,955.16
In hand	806.58**)[71]	2,720.79
% of selling price (33,651.6 and 149,559)	2.39%***)	
Adding housekeeping costs to income (p. 49), we have:	1,965.08	5,457.04
% of selling price	5.58%***)	3.71%
Total income from cropping	1,778 { ?p. 26 }	8,519.15
(p. 26) from livestock farming	2,150.55	6,613.80****)

***Family*:** I husband+wife — II husband+wife
2 daughters (16 and 9 yrs) — 1 daughter (9 yrs)
5 persons. 1 son (7 yrs) — 1 son—14 yrs*)
5 persons 1 nephew 17 yrs

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*) Board and tuition fees.

**) Author is mistaken: 1,750.37 and 836.58, in view of the erroneous figure of 1,128.50 (cf. p. 48 and p. 13), instead of 1,158.50.

) Author is mistaken: !! 5.45% and !!! 8.81%, because he takes the totals of 836.58 instead of 806.58, and 2,965.08 (sic!) instead of 1,965.08; what is more, he is ***very badly out in his %% calculations!!!

****) Additional income from bull-calves sold for 19,420.5 = 5,065.50.

I				II			
Land $4._{6250}$ ha				$26._{50}$ ha			
			marks				marks
Farmland	4 ha	at 5,400 =	21,600	25	at 4,000 =		100,000
Meadow	$0._{50}$	at 3,800 =	1,900	$1._{25}$	at 3,600 =		4,500
Vegetable garden	$0._{125}$	at 8,000 =	1,000	$0._{25}$	at 7,200 =		1,800
	$4._{625}$		24,500	$26._{50}$			106,300

(land II may be *worse*)
[reason for lower crop yields??]

Structures	6,300	25,000
Dead stock	$721._{20}$	4,861
Live "	$2,130._{40}$	13,398
Total (selling price)	$= 33,651._{60}$	149,559

	I	II	
Carriage	0	350	marks
Seed, drill	0	400	"
Fertiliser spreader	0	150	"
Harvesting machine	0	400	"
Thresher	0	700	"
Grain cleaner	0	100	"
Cattle weighing machine	0	150	"
Plough	25 (1)*	80 (2)*	
		etc.	

Labour

I	II
Family—3 family workers (+help in threshing)	*4* family workers?? or 3? (son at school)
Hired —	5—year round 6—from May 1 to Nov. 10 4—harvest (4-5 weeks) 3—threshing (4 weeks)

* Bracketed figures indicate number of ploughs.—*Ed.*

Consequently,		
working days 3×360	1,440	(?1,080)
mine *about*=1,080	1,800	5×360
	1,140	6×190
p.t.o.*	140	4× 35
[about 100:400?]? about=100:450	84	3× 28
	4,604	

	ha	ha
Land	4.625	26.50
Land	100	*573*

	total	labour
	3	11.8
	100	393

Teams
I—3 cows
II—4 horses + 3 oxen

Livestock

	I	*marks*	II
3 cows	1,260		1,200 (3)**
2 pigs	120		450
oxen	270 (1)**		6,750
horses and oxen	0		4,950 (4) (3)**
			0
young stock	260 (2)**		

(25 bull-calves for fattening)**

Consequently,

	I	II
Cattle	3	10
Horned+young stock	3	25
Pigs	2	3
Sow+12 piglets . .		0

Mine, all in terms of cattle

I		II
3		10
1.5		12.5
0.5		0.75
0.5		—
5.5	total	23.25

* See pp. 136-37.—*Ed.*
** Figures in round brackets indicate head of cattle: see table on p. 136.—*Ed.*

Soil management

Cultivation.

	Ploughing depth		Artificial fertilisers per ha		Crop yield in centners per ha	
	I	II	I	II	I	II
Sugar-beet [Fodder beet similarly p. 6]	25 cm	*30* cm	31.50 marks (3½ cent.)	40.50 marks (4½ cent.)	816	740
Rye	6cm	*15* cm	4 cent. superphosphate + 120 lbs Chile saltpetre	6 cent. superphosphate + 120-300 Chile saltpetre	64	56
Barley	6cm	*15* cm	4 cent. superphosphate	4 cent. superphosphate	60	56
Potatoes	6 cm + 25 *cm*	*10* cm + 20 cm	—	—	320	320
Beans	*9* cm	*24* cm	796 cent. of stall manure	1,440 cent. of stall manure	66	56
Clover	?	?	8 cent. superphosphate	4 cent. superphosphate	260	210
Winter wheat	*25 cm*	20 cm	480 cent. of stall manure	8 cent. of superphosphate ?	80	64

And so, II's cultivation and fertilisers are much better and the crop yields much worse!! {II clearly has the worse land} [No soil classification given]

	I	II
Total outlays on artificial fertilisers =	198.0—	2,052.0 marks
per ¼ ha . . .	10.70—	19.36 marks

Maintenance of cattle:

Pp. 8 and 20: Feed for cattle

	I		II	
	centner	marks	centner	marks
Beans	44.64	290.16	250.0	1,625.00
Rye	—	—	10.0	70.00
Wheat	0.40	3.20	15.0	120.00
Barley	19.81	118.86	67.0	402.00
Oats	—	—	239.0	1,505.70
Sugar-beet top . . .	408.0	81.60	2,312.0	462.40
Fodder beet	192.0	96.00	—	—
Potatoes	10.20	20.40	—	—
Clover (dry)	65.0	195.00	210.0	630.0
Total	805.22		4,815.10	
Milk (I counted the prices) . . .	1,320 litres	105.60	240 litres	19.20
Purchased feed . .	25 centners	141.50	275 centners	1,537.50
(My) total		1,052.32		6,371.80
% (mine)		100	:	606

There is no doubt that feed for cattle is better and more abundant in II

Milk production

I	II
3 cows *9,700* litres	3 cows *9,600* litres

From September 15, II keeps 25 bull-calves, which he fattens and sells by January 1. Then from January 1 to April 1, he keeps 30 bull-calves, fattening and selling them. Hence, the 55 bull-calves in the receipts and the outlays. It appears that Auhagen reckons the feed for 25 bull-calves a year. } N.B.

Let us compare with this the *full* data on the quantity of livestock

		I *marks*		II *marks*
horses	—	—	4	3,600
draught oxen	—	—	3	1,350
cows	3	1,260	3	1,200
cattle and young stock	3	530	25	6,750
pigs	2	120	3	450
sow and piglets	13	200	—	—
chickens	17	$20._4$	40	40
pigeons	—	—	40	8
Total value of livestock		$2{,}130._4$		13,398
% (mine)		100		629
Quantitatively		100		423
		($5._5$)		($23._{25}$)

If all are put in terms of cattle, then

cattle		3	—	10
small cattle	at ½	$1._5$	—	$12._5$
small cattle	at ¼	$0._5$	—	$0._{75}$
small cattle	at ⅛	$1._5$?? (1)*	—	—
		$6._5$ ($5._5$)*		$23._{25}$

And the keep of workers?

I. 3 workers of the *family* (p. 3) and 2 non-working members of the family.

Their keep = *1,158.*$_{50}$ *for three workers*

II. 3 workers (!!) of the family (p. 15 "always as supervisors, *when necessary*, as workers").

Non-working members of the family 2 { 1? for the son is at school? }

* Here Lenin gives in round brackets the difference (of one unit) in reckoning 12 piglets as cattle against his own calculation (see p. 133).—*Ed.*

Their keep = *2,736.*$_{25}$ *for 3 workers.*
Hired labourers $5 + 3 + 0._8 = 8._8$ annually.

$$\left.\begin{array}{r} \text{Marks} \\ \text{Their keep} = 3{,}872._{93} \div 8._8 = 440 \\ 1{,}158._{50} \div 3 = 386 \end{array}\right\}$$

$$\left\{\begin{array}{ll} \text{N.B.} & 440 \\ & 386 \end{array}\right\}$$

Hired labourers: ***5*** the year round; ***6*** from May 1 to November 10, i.e., 6⅓ months, i.e., 6 × 6⅓ = 38 months = 3⅙ years; ***4*** for 4-5 weeks, i.e., 4 × 5 = 20 weeks, and ***3*** for 4 weeks, i.e., 3 × 4 = 12 weeks, a total of *32* weeks.

$$\tfrac{1}{6} \text{ of year} + \frac{32}{52} = \tfrac{1}{6} + \tfrac{8}{13} = \frac{61}{78} = 78._2\%, \text{ i.e., less than } 80\%.$$

The small holder lives worse than the hired labourer of the big one, considering paid labour in I—*386* marks, II—*440* marks per labourer.

Results: for the small peasant

1. Soil management *worse*: ploughing depth (p. 6)* smaller, *less* fertiliser. ***Con***: crop yields. This means his land is better.
2. Keep of cattle *worse*: statistical data p. 7.**
3. Keep of labourer *worse*: p. 7*** (and p. 5****).
4. Maintenance of dead stock *worse*: p. 5.*****
5. Productivity of labour *lower* (cf. number of workers, p. *6****** and 5*******).

The small peasant lives worse than the hired labourer of the big peasant and gives scantier "nourishment" to land and farm.

The small peasant works harder: 3.********

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* See p. 134.—*Ed.*
** See p. 135.—*Ed.*
*** See pp. 136-37.—*Ed.*
**** See pp. 130-31.—*Ed.*
***** See p. 130.—*Ed.*
****** See pp. 132-33.—*Ed.*
******* See p. 131.—*Ed.*
******** See p. 128.—*Ed.*

CRITICAL REMARKS ON K. KLAWKI'S ARTICLE, "THE COMPETITIVE CAPACITY OF SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE"[72]

Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher. Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Landwirtschaft. Herausgegeben von Dr. H. *Thiel*.* Berlin, 1899. XXVIII (28). Band (1899). (Six issues a year.) (1081 pp.+ tables.)

Dr. juris *Karl Klawki*. "Ueber Konkurrenzfähigkeit des landwirtschaftlichen Kleinbetriebes" (S. 363-484).

Most extensive calculations for 12 farms in the Braunsberg district of East Prussia. (From paging through) make note of: p. 453 (and 452).

$\boxed{\alpha\alpha}$ (p. 452). "Big farms use an average of ¼ of their gross income in their own economy, medium farms, about ⅓, and small, roughly ½. Nevertheless, the share remaining on the small farms for marketing is greater than those on big and medium farms. The reason is above all that small peasants tend to limit their household expenses to the utmost. ***We cannot decide outright whether or not this partially results in some underconsumption***, because the available material does not enable us to draw the correct conclusions on the overall household budget of the farmer and his family."

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* *Agricultural Yearbooks*. Scientific agricultural magazine. Published by Dr. Thiel.—*Ed*.

Nutrition for one member of the family in marks (only from own farm?)*

	Big farms				Medium farms				Small farms			
χχ	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
(p. 453)	—	269	—	185	240	222	252	159	136	142	163	97
(My calculation) average	= 227					=218					=135	

According to Klawki (373)

Small	farm	1- 10 ha
Medium	”	10-100 ha
Big	”	> 100 ha

ββ ... (453). Part of the small peasants also diligently work as day labourers, and on such days receive from their employers board, in addition to their pay.... Whether there is any *under-consumption* among the small farms or not, we cannot say, but we *think it is probable* in the case of a small farm falling into Group IV. *But the fact is that the small peasants live very frugally and sell much of what they, so to speak, save out of their mouths.* (Sic!)

P. 479: If we find in the final analysis that it is the medium farm that can produce a certain quantity of products at the lowest cost, we must take into account that the small farm may assess all its labour-power at a correspondingly lower figure than that used on the large and medium farms, because it is its own. In time of agricultural crisis, and even at other times, it is the small farms that are most stable; they are *able to sell a relatively larger quantity of products than the other categories of farms by severely curtailing domestic expenses*, which, it is true, *must lead to a certain amount of under-consumption*.** (!)

* For an analysis of the table, see pp. 153-54 .—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 177.—*Ed.*

Crop yield	Small farms	Medium farms	Big farms	p. 441 averages
Wheat:	6-7 centners	7-8	8-9	(*per Morgen*) given by Klawki
Rye:	7	8-9	10	himself

"The case is similar with all other crops" (441).

"Only in flax, which is an extensive-farming crop, is there evidence of a growing tendency in favour of the small farms."*

Namely, medium farms	I	5	Stein of flax	(per Morgen?)	
	IV	6	"	"	
Small farms	I	6.5	"	"	(4.50 Mk of income)
	III	8	"	"	(4.50 Mk ")
	IV	8	"	"	(4.50 Mk ")

½ Stein of flax = 18½ pounds (406).

Disregarding the flax crop, which is on the whole of small importance at the present time, we have the highest yields on the big farms, and the lowest, on the small (441).

Causes:

1) Drainage is almost entirely absent on the small farms. Or the pipes are laid by the farmers *themselves*, and laid *badly*.
2) Ploughing is not deep enough—horses are weak. (Yoking of cows is doubtful. Doing heavy work, the cows will yield little milk.)
3) Mostly insufficiellt feed for cattle—horned cattle
4) Their manure production is inferior—their straw is shorter, most of it goes into feed, and less remains for litter (Unterstreuen).**

On the big farms the soil is fertilised with marl

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 171.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 171, and Vol. 13, pp. 193-94.—*Ed.*

(442). Those are above all the four causes for which small farms now lag in terms of income behind the big farms. Klawki then goes on to say that, in agriculture, machines are not all that important (common arguments. *Not a single* fact)....

The list of machinery refutes *Klawki*:

	Big farms				Medium farms				Small farms			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Steam thresher	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse-driven thresher. . .	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Grain-sorter . .	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Winnowing machines . .	1	1	2	—	1	1	0	0	0			
Seed drill . . .	1	1	0	—	0	0	0	0	0			
Manure spreader	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0			
Horse-drawnrake	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0			
Ring rollers . .	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0			
Total =	29				11				1			

The big farmer willingly lends the small farmer his roller, his horse-drawn rake and grain-sorter, if the latter promises to supply a man to do the mowing for him in the busy season ... (443). (Characteristic "exchange of good turns"!)*

Agriculture suffers from unfavourable marketing conditions. The peasants mostly sell "locally" and merchants in small towns force down prices very considerably (373).

The large estates are better off in this respect, for they can send considerable quantities of their products to the provincial capitals right away. This usually gives them 20 to 30 pfennigs more per centner than selling in small towns.**

* Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 173.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 173.—*Ed.*

But Klawki took the same prices for all (373).

The *big* landowners alone have exact book-keeping (374). Only as an exception among the peasants.

There are no technical agricultural enterprises. "Peat extraction is primarily of great importance to the small farms, because they have the necessary time and manpower for it" (439).

Flax growing has remained only among the small farmers: it requires a great expenditure of human energy. It is available in the families of the small holders, but the big farmers find hire hard and costly (440).

Improved crop rotation:	Big farms	Medium farms	Small farms	(441)
	I-IV	I, II and IV	II	
Old three-field system:	Big farms	Medium farms	Small farms	
	—	III	I, III and IV	

Livestock farming. The big farmers I process their milk into butter: "their own very profitable use of milk". The big farms II-IV send their milk to the towns and obtain a higher income than the middle farmers, who process their milk into butter at home and sell it to traders.

The *middle farmers* concentrate on the sale of well-fattened cattle.

The *small farmers* sell their cattle younger—they cannot feed them as long as the middle farmers because they are short of feed (444).

The butter produced on the medium farms (Klawki always calls them *big peasant farms*) is *superior* to that produced on the small farms (separators, daily churning), so that the latter are paid 5-10 pfennigs less per pound by the traders.*

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 173.—*Ed.*

Per Morgen (in marks)	Big farms	Medium farms	Small farms	
	(Average of 4 farms)			
(per Morgen of tilled farmland (444))*				
Receipts from cropping	16.5	18.2	22.7	c. 445 [1]
Receipts from livestock farming . .	15.8	27.3	41.5	
Total	32.3	45.5	64.2	p. 447
Sale of crop products	11	12	9	(p. 448-49)
Sale of animal products	14	17	27	
Total	25	29	36	
Including sale of milk and butter	7	3	7	(p. 450) [2]
Consumption of crop products on home farm	6	6	14	
Consumption of animal products on home farm	2	10	14	
Total	8 (1/4)	16 (1/3)	28	(about 1/2 of all receipts)

[1]) In general, the drop in prices leads to a displacement of crop farming by livestock farming.

The reason why small farms are superior in crop farming: the big farms spend more on the production of feed and the feeding of stock (*Klawki excludes the feeding of stock from receipts* (p. 441) *from agriculture*: this, he says, applies to livestock farming).

The small farms keep *many more* animals per Morgen, although their cattle are, of course, not as valuable (446), and their horses are worse (447). The stock on the medium farms is *not worse* than that on the big farms.

[2]) Medium farms use relatively much on the farm; for the big farms—marketing is profitable; on the small farms, butter and whole milk are used in very small quantities... not used at all on the small farms of Group IV (450).

* Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 170.—*Ed.*

Per Morgen (in marks)		Big farms	Medium farms	Small farms		
		(Average of 4 farms)				
Capital in structures		89	91	147	(p. 455)	
Dead stock		13	21	37	(my calculation)	
Capital in drainage		14	8	2	(")	
Livestock		29	49	59	(p. 459)	
Artificial fertilisers		0.81	0.38	0.43	(p. 460)	
Concentrated feed *)		2	0	0	(p. 461)	
Management and supervision		1.7	0	0	(p. 461)	
Level of outlays (aggregate) — *Without* cost of labour-power	(α)	21.51	16.94	5.33	(pp. 478-79)	per Morgen of landwirtschaftlich benutzte Fläche[73] in marks
Level of outlays (aggregate) — with cost of labour-power	(β)	23.31	27.03	51.67		
Quantity of produce valued at 100 marks is produced on expending	(α)	65	38	8 marks	(p. 479)	
	(β)	70	60	80		

In giving these 2 tables, Klawki says:

Both these tables most clearly show the great importance of the farmer's and his family's own labour-power. If we find in the final analysis that it is the medium farm that can produce a certain quantity of products at the lowest cost, we must take into account that the small farm may assess all its labour at a correspondingly lower figure than that used on the large and medium farms, because it is its own. In time of agricultural crisis, and even at other times, it is the small farms that are most stable; they are able to sell a relatively larger quantity of products than the other categories of farms by severely curtailing domestic expenses, which, it is true, must lead to a certain amount of under-consumption. This, as we have seen, is already taking place on the small farms of Group IV. Unfortunately, many small farms are reduced to this by the high rates of interest on loans. But in this way, although with

) Our peasant farms spend nothing on Kraftfuttermittel. They are very slow to adopt progressive methods and are particularly chary of spending cash (461).

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 172.—*Ed.*

!! great effort, they are able to stay on their feet and live from hand to mouth. Probably, it is the great diminution in consumption that chiefly explains the increase in the number of small-peasant farms in our locality, as indicated in the Reich statistics (cf. table on p. 372). (480).* ||!

In the Königsberg Administrative Area (p. 372)

	Number of farms		Farmland under cultivation, ha	
	1882	1895	1882	1895
Under 2 ha	55,916	78,753	26,638	33,890
2-5 "	11,775	14,013	37,998	44,596
5-20 "	16,014	18,933**	174,054	196,498
20-100 "	13,892	13,833	555,878	555,342
100 and over	1,955	2,069	613,038	654,447

And Klawki hastens to declare that this is an undesirable phenomenon. *But* there is progress even among the small farms: everything is for the best.

The *advantage* of the big farmer—that he sells in carloads, etc., which is much more profitable, and he is better able to assess the value of his grain (451). *The same* goes for cattle.

The big farmer sells his corn in centners, and his cattle by weight.

The peasant sells his grain by measure (Scheffel), and cattle by appearance, which makes him lose a great deal.***

The small peasants do all the repairs of buildings (etc.) themselves.

Medium farms III and IV and small farms lay their own drainage pipes. (Drainage is necessary in the locality, and there is an ever greater demand for pipes).

P. 460: most of them (farms) began using fertilisers by way of experiment.

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* Ibid., pp. 177-78.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 178.—*Ed.*
*** Ibid., p. 173.—*Ed.*

Labour costs.

Per 100 Morgen

	Big farms	Medium farms	Big farms	Medium farms
			I II III IV	I II III IV
Hired labour in days	887	744	1,061 970 771 613 1,061 970 771 746 1)	750 895 622 488 977 2) 895 622 488 3)
Manual labour in days	887	924 4)	(including the labour of the peasants) (p. 463)	
Value of produce per 100 working days (marks)	372	481 5)	(p. 463)	
Total cost of manual labour per 100 Morgen . .	1,065	1,064	(p. 465)	
Cost of 1 working day.	$1._{30}$	$1._{53}$	(p. 466)	
Average annual earnings of labourer	391	458		
Income per 100 marks of labour costs	305	470		
Ratio (p. 467) of kind to cash payments (p. 467):			Big farms *7 : 6* Medium farms *24 : 6*	
Disability and old-age insurance	$0._{29}$ mark per $0._{13}$ Morgen		None at all on small farms (p. 469)	
Hired labour in days per 100 Morgen. . . .	887	744		
Working days per 100 Morgen				
Permanent labourers	822	638	Instleute, etc. (p. 472)	
Day labourers . .	112	30	"free workers" !!	

There can be no calculation for the small farms. But it is obvious that they have some surplus-labour (464).

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[1]) The owner's two sons substitute for 2 full labour-power units.
[2]) 2 unmarried sisters of the owner substitute for 2 hired labouring women.
[3]) 2 sons of the owner substitute for the old owner himself.

} Upper row—without correction for substitution. Lower row—with corrections.

[4]) A part of the work is said to relate to housekeeping: maids. This partially reduces the difference.
[5]) Working much harder: the "example" set by the owner stimulates the labourers "*to greater diligence and thoroughness*".

			Stock		Hired labour		Scharwerker[74]	Day labourers								
			Live	Dead	Married	Unmarried		Year round	Harvesting	Summer	Potatoes Harvest & Beetroot	Receipts	Outlays	Profit	Net profit	Per ha
Big farms	I.	513.71 ha	55,954	19,270	21	8	23	6	6	—	25	53,996.57	—15,745.30	13,745.30 1)		35.24
		About 50 Morgen goes to the hired labourers														
” ”	II.	362.50 ha	35,394	20,133	13	2	19	—	3	12	—	43,459.96	— 12,094.73	10.094.73 1)		31.28
” ”	III.	430.20 ha	18,027.50	11,545	7	5	7	—	14	—	—	23,156.46	— 6,295.53	7,483.10 2)		33.36
” ”	IV.	125.00 ha	15,427	5,291	4	5	3	—	2	—	—	17,187.90	— 8,436.35	6,536.30 3)		58.08
		1,431.41 ÷4 =357.85	124,802.50 ÷4 =31,201	56,239 ÷4 =14,059			Services: corvée, small jobs and casual work							Balance profit	Net profit	
Medium farms [Big peasant estate]	I.	74.25 ha	13,933	5,303	3	2	—	—	2	—	—	12,586.74	—7,147.86	5,431.86 4)		80.41
	II.	57 ha	10,600	4,990	2	4	—	—	2-3	—	—	9,708.71	—5,226.88	3,726.88 5)		67.76
Old husband+wife+2 adult sons+daughter	III.	55.5 ha	9,170	3,458	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	7,433.28	+4,649.12	3,149.12 6)		69.20
Husband+wife +parents	IV.	15.875 ha	2,923	1,545		1			2	—	—	3,181.32	+2,419.63	1,219.63 7)		67.76
		202.625÷4 =50.6	36,626 9,156	15,296 3,824			Brother working as farm-hand, receives 100 marks									
Small farms (Husband+wife +parents)	I. 8)	7.125 ha	1,192	754								1,292.66	+1,184.80	184.80 9)		25.92

Husband+wife +adult son+adult daughter	II. [10])	7.00 ha	1,403	1,109	1,673.94	+1,535.59	535.59 [11])	76.52
(2 sons+daughter)	III. [12])	5.00 ha	1,059	576.50	1,135.08	+1,059.09	159.09 [13])	31.80
(Husband+wife +1 adult son +2 adult daughters)	IV.	2.875 ha	916	709	1,093.75	+ 992.62	192.62 [14])	67.00
		22.000÷4	4,570	3,148				
		=5.5	1,142	787				

1) Klawki deducts 2,000 Mk as remuneration for the farmer's labour.
2) Addition because of lower management costs (due to a combination of farming with forestry).
3) A deduction of 1,900 Mk (1,200 and 700 respectively) for the labour of the farmer and his three adult sons, who attended agricultural schools (397) and have in earnest [—resolutely, seriously] dedicated themselves to farming.

4) Deductions: 1,500 for the labour of the farmer and his wife+216 (2 sisters of the wife).
5) —1,500 (husband, wife+17-year-old daughter) ...
6) —1,500 (wife, daughter+2 sons) ... 5,916÷4=1,479
7) —1,200 (husband and wife) ....

8) The farmer does *20 days of day labour*. Engaged (like middle farmer IV) in peat extraction.
9) —1,000 ("assessment of labour-power" of husband+wife+parents).
10) The farmer used to be a *carter*, *and so does all the repairs and jobs himself* (430).
11) —1,000 (idem) [for 2 men+2 women]
12) The value of the farm produce going into the personal consumption of the farmer is relatively low on this farm and on small farm IV. But it should he borne in mind that on both these farms their owners and their respective household members *diligently* work as *day labourers*, and receive board, in addition to their pay (435)*.
13) —900 (2 sons and 1 daughter—orphans ?)
14) —800 !! Sic ! For 5 persons !!

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 177.—*Ed.*

1,000	Hence deductions for farmer's keep:
1,000	Grossbetrieb: 2,000-1,900 Mk
900	Mittelbetrieb: 1,716-1,200
800	Kleinbetrieb: 1,000-800 *
3,700 ÷ 4 = 925?	

Labourer's income = 850

There is no insurance of labourers on the small farms, and on the medium farms: No. I—$36._{78}$; II—$32._{31}$; III—$24._{60}$, and No. IV, insurance of employees—$7._{54}$

Big farm I. There is an *inspector*. The owner comes over from his main estate once a month (374)—(sic! 2,000 Mk for this) for a few days.** There is an experienced stewardess and a housekeeper. Outlays on salaries + office expenses = 1,350 + 150 marks + maintenance of inspector, etc.= 1,350. (Over and above the wages of the hired labourers and the day labourers!). Insurance of labourers = $644._{04}$.

Big farm II. *Inspector* and experienced woman pig-keeper. Owner—only direction and general supervision. (Salary—1,100, general management—100). Insurance of labourers = $59._{76}$.

Big farm III—owned by a bishop—run by manager with a fixed annual salary. (Salary = 1,800. Office expenses = 150). Insurance of labourers = $338._{25}$ marks.

Big farm IV ... would consider it more correct to call it a big-peasant estate. Insurance of labourers = $108._{10}$.***

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 175.—*Ed*.
** Ibid.—*Ed*.
*** Ibid.—*Ed*.

Crop in centners per Morgen (p. 441)												
	Big farms				Medium farms				Small farms			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Wheat	8.4	7	9.8	9.3	7	8.4	7.6	6.8	5.1	7.2	6.8	—
Rye	10.83	10.5	10.6	7.6	8.4	10.1	8.6	7.9	6	8.0	7.3	8.4
Barley	11.05	9.2	9.0	8.5	7.9	7.5	8.4	4.8	4.9	7.0	7.7	—
Oats	9.08	7.3	8.6	9.0	8.3	9.3	9.0	7.3	5.0	8.7	8.3	10.0
Peas	9.49	—	7.2	7.4	—	6.7	9.0	7.5	—	7.6	—	10.8
Potatoes	84	62	50	55	57	53	69	40	38	32	50	50
Fodder beet	225	200	135	200	200	200	125	100	70	100	200	100
Flax	—	—	—	—	5 Stein	—	—	6 Stein	6½ Stein	—	8 Stein	8

Big farm	Medium farm	Small farm				Big farm	Medium farm	Small farm
8.7	7.3	6.4	=	Wheat	=	34.7	29.8	19.1
9.9	8.7	7.7	=	Rye	=	39.5	35.0	29.7
9.4	7.1	6.5	=	Barley	=	37.7	28.6	19.6
8.5	8.7	8.0	=	Oats	=	34.0	33.9	32.0
8.0	7.7	9.2	=	Peas	=	24.1	23.2	18.4
63	55	42	=	Potatoes	=	251	219	170
190	156	117	=	Fodder beet	=	760	625	470
—	5.5	7.5*	=	Flax	=	—	11	22.5

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 170-71.—*Ed.*

Subsistence for one member of the family*) (Quantity of food products consumed on the farm itself) (p. 453)

	Big farms				Medium farms				Small farms			
XX	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Number of persons	—	5 [2])	—	6 [3])	8	6	5	5	4	5	3	5
Marks per person	—	269	—	185	240	222 [2])	252	159 [2])	136	142	163	97
(My calculation)	Average			227			218				135	

[1]) Inspector, housekeeper, stewardess and 2 maids engaged in housekeeping.
[2]) 2 children under 10 years = "one adult"
[3]) $1{,}108._{28} \div 6 = 185$. Husband + wife + 3 sons + ?

Big farm IV even has to buy butter for itself. Furthermore, we must take into account that the larger the farm, the greater is, as a rule, the quantity of additional food products purchased (453).*

The medium farm consumes very much, surpassing the "average rational nutrition standard".

It is interesting how Klawki makes an (absurd) attempt to smooth out this difference:

Let us assume, however, that the small farms are able to secure a higher cash income only by some under-consumption. To smooth out this fact, let us take the cost of consumption per person as 170 marks a year (?? why not 218-227?), an amount which should be regarded as being exaggerated rather than minimised, if we take into account the fact that the estimate includes food products coming only from the home farm itself. If on the strength of the figures

*) The food of the menials and, for example, flax, have been deducted from natural consumption. The other amounts are divided per head.

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 176.—*Ed.*

in the given table we assume that the small farm has an average size of 20-25 Morgen, and that the number of family members engaged in farming is 4, consumption would come to an average of 135 marks per person. Comparing with this figure the hypothetical consumption of 170 marks per person, we get + 35 marks, and with 4 persons, 140 marks. Dividing that by 20-25 Morgen, the figure comes to 6-7 marks per Morgen. This means that for this purpose the market would have to be deprived of produce worth that much. Thus, the small farm would be receiving only 29-30 marks of net income per Morgen, and would then be equalised with the medium farm; but it would still have an edge over the big farm.*

Let us take not 170 but 218 marks—135=83; 4+5+3+5=17; 17÷4=4¼; 83 × $4._{25}$=$351._{15}$; 351÷20=$17._5$ marks; 351÷25=$14._4$; $14._4$+$17._5$=$31._9$; $31._9$÷2=$15._9$.

Consequently, 14½-17½ marks per Morgen

average $15._9$

{36—$14._5$=$21._5$; 36—$17._5$=$18._5$} 36—$15._9$=$20._1$

	Big farm	Medium farm	Small farm
Receipts from sales	25	29	*20*.$_1$

P. 464: The small farms have the greatest capacity for resistance.

The small farmer can assess the ... labour-power used ... at a correspondingly lower price, because that is his own labour, whereas the big peasant and the landowner depend on the general conditions of wages and must more or less reckon with the demands of the labourers. The small farmer is also more capable than the big one, and above all than the landowner, to reduce the portion going into the management of his enterprise, the entrepreneur's profit, because at critical moments he is able to restrict himself severely (sic!) in his housekeeping.

This is the small farm's advantage in a crisis.

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 176-77.—*Ed.*

...In peasant households, the labourers are certainly better fed than by the landowners (467).*

The labourers cost more but produce more. (The exception is the big farm IV—rather, the big-peasant farm.)

		Wages for Scharwerker
Income of Instmann family (big farm I)	=799—120=679 Mk	
” of Deputant family[75] (big farm I)	=704— 60=644	
” of Instmann family, big farm II	=929—120=809	
” of Deputant family, big farm II	=658— 60=598	
” of Instmann family, big farm III	=779— 89=690	
” ” ” ” ” IV	=861— 75=786	
Medium farm II (Instmann family)	=737— 30=707	
Medium farm I ” ”	=same.	
If the Scharwerker are the Instmann's children, his family income	= 800-900 marks (p. 475)	
If the Scharwerker are the Deputant's children, his family income	= 600-700 marks	

(number of family members not given anywhere!)

Thus, it is not for the sake of higher wages that the Instmann is more willing to work for the peasant owner. The reason: the author says, it gives him more spare time, so he can do day labour (!?) (p. 476).

When lucky, such Instleute purchase a few Morgen of land out of their savings (from wages). For the most part they find themselves worse off financially; they are aware of this but are tempted by the greater freedom (476). Many—not the worst, by far—go to the towns.

The most important task of modern agrarian policy for the solution of the agricultural labourer problem in the East is to encourage the most efficient labourers to settle down by affording them the opportunity of acquiring a piece of land as their own property, if not in the first, then at least in the second generation (476).** !!

On p. 477, Klawki declares that the peasant finds it easier to obtain labourers. But the labourer problem is *being aggravated* even for the peasant. The peasants complain of the difficulty of obtaining labourers, especially labouring women.

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 174.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 178.—*Ed.*

Final compar

Marks per Morgen	Large farms I	II	III	IV
1) Total receipts	$35._{05}$	$33._{68}$	$25._{80}$	$38._{18}$
2) Total outlays	$26._{24}$	$25._{86}$	$17._{46}$	$23._{66}$
Net profit per Morgen	$8._{81}$	$7._{82}$	$8._{34}$	$14._{52}$
” ” ” ha	$35._{26}$	$31._{28}$	$33._{36}$	$58._{08}$

Average per *Morgen* $9._{87}$

Average: 1) $33._{18}$-$44._{18}$-$64._{24}$ Strangely enough, this calcu figures!

2) $\frac{23._{30}}{9._{88}}$-$\frac{27._{03}}{17._{15}}$-$\frac{51._{66}}{12._{58}}$

Con Klawki's calculations:

1) he takes the same prices (p. 3).* But the big farms get

2) he makes a correct reduction in the assessment of the to the medium farm and the small one (pp. ***7*** and ***8***)*

3) he fails to take account of labour on the medium and (laying pipes themselves), etc.

4) Consumption of own farm products tends to decrease *milk*))* (***9***-10).* (Included also: hired labour of the labourers!! Klawki's reasoning about this pp. 1 and 2,

5) The labourers work more intensively on the *medium* on the *big* ones.

6) The *big farms* have greater outlays on disability and (artificial fertilisers, concentrated feed, drainage).

7) No account is taken at all of labour in *supervision* on

* References to the pages of the MS. relate to the following pages of p. 5—p. 145; pp. 7-8—pp. 148-50; p. 5—pp. 145-46; p. 2—p. 140; p. 5—p. 146; p. 7—pp. 148-50; p. 11—p. 155; p. 1—pp. 138-39; p. 2—pp. 139-40; p. 5—pp.

ison: (p. 483)

Medium farms				Small farms			
I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
46.61	44.14	40.83	50.09	45.34	59.78	56.75	95.10
26.50	27.20	23.53	30.88	38.86	40.65	48.80	78.35
20.11	16.94	17.30	19.21	6.48	19.13	7.95	16.75
80.44	67.76	69.20	76.84	25.92	76.52	31.80	67.00
18.39				12.58 Mk			

cf. Bulgakov I 58

lation (which is mine) differs somewhat from Klawki's

more (pp. 3-4, p. 5)*

value of a family's labour-power from the big farm down

small farms for repairs (p. 5)*, drainage (pp. 2 and 5)*

from the big to the small farms (pp. 1, 2, 4 bottom (no small farms: p. 3 top, p. 7, p. *11* for allotting land to pp. 5, 10).*

farms (p. ***6*** note 5)* (and receive more: p. 11)* than

old-age insurance and on improvements in agriculture

the *medium farms*.

this volume: p. 3 of the MS.—p. 142 of this volume; pp 3-4—pp. 142-43; p. 1—p. 139; p. 2—p. 139; p. 4—p. 143; pp. 9-10—pp. 153-54; p. 3—p. 141; 144-45; p. 10—p. 154; p. 6—p. 147; p. 11—p. 155.—*Ed.*

Klawki's data are highly inadequate: very many gaps. For instance, there are no data at all on feed. The *total* crop is not classified by requirements: sowing, feed, consumption, sales.

It is hardly possible to fill in these gaps.

Thus, big farm I. Total of		$513._{71}$	ha
(consequently		$2{,}054._{84}$	Morgen)
Farmland under cultivation	=	$-1{,}540$	Morgen
(p. 375 and p. 382)		$514._{84}$	Morgen

Ploughland and artificial meadow	Morgen		Morgen
Wheat	— 12	***forest***	= $449._{84}$
Winter rye	—312	unsuitable for farming	= $2._{88}$
Spring rye	— 14		
Barley	— 22	ponds	= $20._{88}$
Oats	—180	roads	= $15._{04}$
Peas	— 42		$38._{80}$
Vetch	— 33		
Potatoes	— 42		$488._{64}$
Beetroot	— 22	***vegetable garden***	$25._{96}$ +
Lupine	— 33		
Clover and timothy	—540		$514._{60}$
	1,252		
Deputants' land[76] about	50	(probably $53._{84}$)	
	1,302	$1{,}305._{84}$	
Meadow	123	$123._{48}$	
	1,425	$1{,}429._{32}$	$-2{,}054._{84}$
Best pastureland (?)	= $110._{92}$	$110._{92}$	$1{,}540._{24}$
	$1{,}535._{92}$	$1{,}540._{24}$	$514._{60}$
Vegetable garden	$25._{79}$		

	ha	Morgen
Roads and yards	$3._{76}$	
Ponds	$5._{22}$	
Ploughland	$326._{46}$	= $1{,}305._{84}$
Meadow	$30._{87}$	= $123._{48}$
Best pastureland	$27._{73}$	= $110._{92}$
Forest	$112._{46}$	
Vegetable garden	$6._{49}$	
Waste land and loam	$0._{72}$	
	$513._{71}$	

Since K. Klawki gives the marketed products and those consumed on the farm in cash terms *only*, it would be necessary to 1) determine the gross crop by multiplying each number of Morgen for the types of cereals by the average crop; 2) subtract the sowing; 3) multiply the difference by average prices (and these prices are not given for all the products); 4) subtract the marketed products, etc. Furthermore, since the quantity of livestock has not been reduced to a single unit, it is *quite impossible* anyway to determine in figures how well the cattle is fed.

Consequently, such calculations are *useless*.

Cf. ***Brase***'s article,* especially pp. 292 and 297-98.

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Printed from the original

* See pp. 160-68—*Ed.*

BRASE AND OTHERS[77]

a.

ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM BRASE'S ARTICLE, "STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF FARM DEBT ON FARMING"

Thiels Jahrbücher. 28. Band (1899).

Dr. Brase. "Untersuchungen über den Einfluss der Verschuldung ländlicher Besitztümer auf deren Bewirtschaftung" (S. 253-310).

A study was made of landed estates (17) and peasant farms (34) "in one district of the Liegnitz Administrative Area" (*Lower Silesia*).

The author gives a list of all these estates, but without any summing up. 17 landowners, each with 75-924 ha (9 with 200-500 ha; 1 has under 100 ha, namely 75; 1 with 127 ha; 1 with 924; 1 with 819). For each estate he gives only the number of ha (and categories of land), quantity of livestock, assessed value and debt ("according to an 1896 study").

Two of the 17 have no debt at all (204 and 333 ha); two with over 100% of the value (105 and 104%); 1—90-100%; 3—80-90%; 2—70-80%; 2—60-70%; 1—50-60%; 2—40-50%; 1—30-40%.

Among the peasants, 5 are free from debt.

$$\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{1 with 7 ha}\\ \text{7—10-20 ha}\\ \text{the rest—}\\ \qquad\text{20-110 ha}\end{array}\right\}$$

2	up to 10 per cent of the assessed value
5	10-20
7	20-30
3	30-40
5	40-50
3	50-60
3	60-70
1	70-80
34	

The author regards as "unburdened by debt" those 1) without mortgage; 2) with mortgage but also with at least an equal amount of capital; 3) with insignificant debt (pp. 262-63).

Detailed description of the *farms* (landed estates are marked in small Latin letters: a-r)

a) 205 ha. Excellent estate: (8 horses + 14 oxen + 106 head of big horned cattle) the "pearl" of the district. (Debt = 87% of value). Very high crop yields, high culture. "The soil was only gradually brought up to this state by systematic drainage, abundant fertilisation, deep turning up and care for the ploughland by means of neat and timely cultivation, and drill and row crops" (p. 264).

All the structures are massive—"a vast amount of capital is invested here". 'The livestock is highly fattened, all, without exception."

All types of machinery. The crop-rotation system is rational, the fertilisation is very heavy (manure and artificial fertilisers).

"The erection of costly structures swallows up all the rent."

b) 301 ha; debt—46.$_3$%.

The soil has been improved by many years' cultivation, cleared of stones, etc., a great quantity of lime has been added.

The structures are all good, all massive, cost 170,000 Mk.

All the livestock (10 horses + 26 oxen + 100 head of big horned cattle + 400 sheep) is fed and kept rationally.

All types of machines (no enumeration).

Fertilisers well stored. Artificial fertilisers bought.

Ploughing 17-20 cm (beetroot: 30-35 cm). Row cultivation.

c) 758 ha. (Livestock: 26 horses + 54 oxen + 220 head of big horned cattle + 900 sheep). Debt—76.$_9$% of value. A model farm like *a* and *b*.

Land, structures and livestock are very good. Machinery.

"Stall (manure) fertiliser is stored in the best way." 20,000 kg of Chile saltpetre + 30,000 ammoniac superphosphate + 3,000-4,000 kg of kainite are bought.

Deep ploughing; row tillage; irrigation of meadows; very high yields.

d, ***e***, ***f***—not model farms, but "rational".

d) (75 ha) drained systematically. Heavy use of fertiliser. Artificial fertilisers. Deep ploughing. Drill and row tillage.

e) (229 ha). Drainage started. Structures massive, part of them new. Livestock well fed. Artificial fertilisers (10,000 kg of Chile saltpetre; 25,000 of superphosphate; 50,000 kg of potassium salts and lime).

Ploughing 12-17 cm, potatoes 20-25 cm, still deeper for beetroot.

f: drained. Deep ploughing, etc. "Rather more than less is being done for the structures and their maintenance" (272).

Very good feed for livestock. 8 litres of milk a day per cow.

5,000-6,000 marks' worth of artificial fertilisers a year (15,000 kg of Chile saltpetre; 30,000-40,000 of superphosphate, 50,000 of kainite).

g (819 ha). Good structures. Stables new in part. Drainage.

Milk—3,000 litres per cow (a year).

All livestock of the best quality. Feed good.

Artificial fertilisers. Machinery. Deep ploughing.

h (693 ha). Drainage. Good fertilisers. Massive structures, some of them new.

Livestock fed well. Concentrated feed purchased.

Artificial fertilisers. Deep ploughing.

i (527 ha). Massive structures, in good condition. Livestock well fed. Machinery. Deep ploughing. Artificial fertilisers.

k (445 ha). (Debt 95.$_7$ per cent.) Farming in a "simple" way. "Ramshackle" structures, thatched roofs.

Deep ploughing 12-17 cm. Row tillage.

Owner lives very frugally.

No artificial fertilisers, no feed is purchased. The horses are overworked (despite intensive feeding).

l (347 ha). Debt 42.$_3$ per cent. (Row tillage introduced, artificial fertilisers used, concentrated feed purchased, steam machines introduced, but the result was negative.)

A return to "extensive" farming: as little as possible artificial fertilisers and feed bought.

Livestock feed simpler. Milk—5 litres a day per cow.

m (924 ha, 750 ha of forest). Mainly forestry. Way of farming is simple and cheap.

n (572 ha) {very heavily in debt}. Unfavourable conditions. 1872 drainage *run down*. No money for new one. Too much was paid for the land.

All structures massive, but house for labourers is old thatched mud hut. There are machines, some out of order, lack of feed, poor soil—in short, everything is bad.

o (281 ha). New stables. 6-8 litres of milk a day.

Artificial fertilisers. Intensified feeding of livestock.

"The manure comes from the intensively fed livestock; it lies in the dung channels of the cattle shed until it is taken out into the fields, and is rationally preserved by means of kainite and superphosphate. Only rye and wheat straw is used as litter, heather and wood and other foliage no longer being used" (286-87).

Ploughing 17-20 cm. Row tillage.

p (127 ha). Bought at too high a price. Debt 57 per cent.

The new owner buys more artificial fertilisers and feed, better machinery, etc.

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q (204 ha) (Farming operations are too costly for this kind of land: "splendid estate", "everything that is best in technical but not in economic terms is being done"). The structures are massive, the stables are vaulted and adapted for the storage of manure. Feed is bought.

Machinery—rather in excess.

Intensive farming. Artificial fertilisers.

kg	
120,000	kainite
35,000-40,000	Thomas slag
5,000	superphosphate
5,000	ammoniac
2,500	Chile saltpetre

r (333 ha). Massive structures.

Cow sheds are not vaulted, maintenance careful.

New living quarters for labourers.

Modest dead stock. Ploughing 12-17 cm.

Irrigation of meadows.

Peasant farms are not listed separately.

"The big and middle peasants as a rule farm better, more intensively, than the small peasants, the big vegetable gardeners (Grossgärtner) and owners of dwarf plots" (292):

deeper ploughing (cows weak)

row tillage

artificial fertilisers and feed purchased.

"If, finally, the crop yields of the peasant farms lag behind those of most landed estates, this is due above all to the peculiarity of small and medium land holdings. The peasant ploughs 5 or 8 cm shallower, in an effort to spare his young horses, which he wants to sell at a profit. In general, he knows how to take care of his livestock much better than hired farm-hands usually do. He cannot have special implements for each separate purpose, improve cultivation methods endlessly, stage long experiments in tillage and the use of fertilisers, and many other things" (292).

The peasant tries to improve his farming methods by introducing artificial fertilisers and purchasing feed, and machinery.

"The peasant has long since realised the importance of deep ploughing and timely cultivation, the need for correct selection of valuable sorts of seeds for sowing, the keeping of stall manure, and many other similar things. Where he fails to eliminate the shortcomings which can be righted, thereby acting against his own convictions, or is forced to do so, he is, as a rule, short of capital to do this" (293).

The structures are "almost everywhere" massive and in good repair. The livestock is well fed.

This is the first group of peasant farms, *12* (south of a Kreisstadt (district town)) out of 34 (No. 1-11 and No. 18)

No. 18 = 110 ha

The second group consists of *22* (to the north) out of 34 (of these 22: 4 with 10-20 ha; 11, with 20-50 ha; 7 with 50-95 ha). The land is *damp* sand, which suffers from stagnant moisture. Ploughing 10-13 cm.

"*A primitive wooden plough is pulled* by a small *overworked horse* or weak *half-starved* team of cows" (296).

Too much ploughed under for cereal grains... *short straw*, thin stalks, empty ears and flat grains.... They usually keep *more cattle than the scanty stocks of feed warrant. There is frequently a shortage of feed and litter*.... In winter, this quantity of cattle somehow survives on straw, chaff, glume, and small quantities of roots and putrid hay. Feed

N.B.

is short at all times, and is of poor quality; in some parts, the drinking water, with a high iron-content, is harmful for the animals. *In consequence, the cattle are small, lean, with coarse wool, or simply grow sickly and starve in small dark sheds.* That is why one cannot expect them to be used correctly, or expect great quantities of good manure.

"*Fertilisers are produced for each crop*, but *in homeopathic doses*. It is impossible ... to make up for this poor and inadequate fertiliser by purchases of *kainite*. It is not fair to expect a sick man to be efficient. *Alongside the lack of means*, there is lack of management and experience. The peasant never uses lime, and green fertiliser only in separate cases... (297). *The cultivation of the fields is hopelessly primitive* but still burdensome; the collected manure is scattered, 2/3 or 3/4 of the seeds is sown by hand, then the field is ploughed, and then the other 1/3 or 1/4 is sown on the surface and harrowed with a home-made harrow. Rye is sown occasionally, from time to time, because of the lack of fertiliser. *It would, of course, be better to change the seeds, but that and much else is not done because of the shortage of capital.* The peasant avoids anything *that costs money*, as a matter of principle, if he wishes to last. He continues to thresh his grain the old way, *with a flail, either picking by hand or sifting all the rubbish.* Recently, some holders who are better off bought themselves a small horse-driven thresher. The straw is used mostly as feed, whereas it would do better (predominantly) as litter for the animals. Furthermore, there is need to chop up hay and straw for feed, to cover the potato and beet stores with straw, mend the holes in the thatch, and mix some hay with the straw to make it last as long as possible, so that when the straw crop is poor, nothing or very little remains for litter. It so happens that the use of forest leaves becomes the general rule. No more chopped straw goes into litter, but only conifer which is collected in the forest every year. The

upshot is that the few pines growing on the denuded sand go to seed, and that, despite the vast forests, there is a shortage of timber for building, once the dilapidated structures, repaired innumerable times, threaten to collapse altogether. Even the holders with more money at their disposal are in no position to erect new structures. There is lack of stone, gravel, clay, timber, and above all, *money*.... *Everything is in short supply. The unfortunate farmer* of these sad parts labours and toils with his *often numerous family* from dawn to dusk, day in, day out; his toil-hardened hands *and lean face are a sign of nothing but unceasing hard work*. He struggles for his unenviable existence, fights misfortune and care, and barely *manages to keep body and soul together*; *he strains his every fibre* to obtain some money, *before it is too late*, to pay off the urgent interest and *taxes*, but fears that he may be ruined anyway. He has *no means* for any radical *improvements*; but the fact is that *they alone* could help him and make his naturally poor scrap of land solidly productive and capable of giving better sustenance to its owner" (298)

—the only happy exception among these 22 holdings in the second group is the estate of the village headman at R. (No. 18: 110 ha, 43 head of big horned cattle, 4 pigs + 6 horses, a debt of *50*.$_3$ per cent; only three of these 22 peasants have a higher debt percentage than this).

On average, the master of R. takes in 2-3 times more grain, 3-4 times more potatoes, 6-8 times more beetroot than all the other holders in R., who farm the old way, and who, because of their debts, have no opportunity or reason to farm any other way. The master of R. raises crops which his neighbours are *unable to introduce successfully into their crop rotation*, because their soil *lacks the necessary cultivation and manuring*.... He (the master of R.) paid for his estate in cash, and has *capital* at his disposal. It is capital and labour that have yielded such excellent results. No peasant could have created "an oasis in a desert" if he had no financial support, as a prerequisite to back up his efforts (300).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

He has "*dry sand*" *which is being gradually brought into cultivation* (green fertiliser). He uses kainite, etc., "on a large scale" ... *he does row tillage*, ... *there is no lack of straw*, *new cow sheds* ... various machines.... Cattle well fattened.... Cow shed is built advantageously, and is spacious and full of light.... The cattle have clean and dry litter (299), etc.—yield a great quantity of good manure, etc., etc.

Keeps farm-hands....

(In conclusion the author argues hotly against the assumption that debts help to improve farming. On the contrary, he says, debts tend to oppress, etc. A farm needs capital; examples of rich peasants with capital, traders, a former policeman, etc., etc.)

Crop yield in kg per *ha*:

	wheat	rye	barley	oats	potatoes	fodder beets
Landowners	1,000-2,800	600-2,200	1,200-3,000	600-2,800	10-21 thous.	20-80 thous.
Peasants	400-1,800	300-1,400	250-2,000	440-1,800	4½-14 thous.	4-52 thous.

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b.

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There appears to be very little statistics proper here, but there seems to be something on the debts of peasants and the ruin of peasant farms under the influence of the *money* economy: Section IV (pp. 114-53): "Plight of Peasantry, etc.

Dr. Carl von Grabmayr (Landtagsabgeordneter in Meran). *Schuldnoth und Agrarreform*. Eine agrar-politische Skizze

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(*Alfred Hölder*. k.u.k. Hof- und Universitätsbuchhandler. Wien I. Rothenthurmstrasse. 13.)***

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Sociale Rundschau, herausgegeben vom k.k. arbeitsstatistischen Amte. Monthly; 2 K. a year = 2 Mk. Einzelne Hefte = 20 H. = 30 Pf.****

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* Dr. Carl von Grabmayr (Landtag Deputy in Meran). *The Debt Burden and Agrarian Reform*. An Agrarian-Political Essay with Special Consideration of the Situation in Tyrol.—*Ed*

** *Agrarian Reform in the Tyrolean Landtag*.—*Ed*.

*** *Statistical Monthly*. Vienna 1901, New Series. Sixth year of publication (27th year of publication or the whole series).
(Alfred Hölder, bookseller to the imperial and royal court, and universities, 13, Rothenthurmstrasse, Vienna.)—*Ed*.

**** *Social Surrey*, published by the Imperial and Royal Labour Statistics Department. Monthly 2 kronen a year = 2 marks. Each issue = 20 hellers = 30 pfennigs.—*Ed*.

CRITICAL REMARKS ON A. SOUCHON'S BOOK, *PEASANT PROPERTY*[78]

N.B. Souchon

Note in *Souchon*'s book:

Pages

6. Small property (in the opinion of French socialists)—without hired labour.

(N.B.)

12. *Social value of peasant property—defenders of property*
14. *A factor of social conservation*
16. *Safeguard against the urge for social innovations....*

N.B.

23. The small-farm regions are losing population *more rapidly* than the big-farm regions.

24. Figures on holders day labourers with land 1862 —*different* from; 1882 —the same as; day labourers without land 1892 —*different* from — Bulgakov's

And a reference to the 1892 Inquiry![79]

N.B.? N.B. II.195-96

25. The smallest holders are more inclined to move to the towns.

39. *Three* main arguments in favour of large-scale production:
    (a) lower general costs — Con—(41) *associations*
    (b) more division of labour and use of machinery — Con: machinery cannot always be used (43), disadvantages of the big: drop in the prices of corn (46)

(c) more melioration,
industries, etc. — Con: co-operatives (47)

57. ***Both the large ("model") and, the small property are necessary (!)***

57-58. There is a decline in the number of day labourers with land—con the theory of the importance of small holders as hired labourers.

61. It is believed that there are 57.$_4$% holders per 100 plots.

67. *Holders with collateral employment* (*not day labourers*)

68. Peasant farm = 5-20 ha (< 5 *ha cannot provide sustenance for a family*: *pages 68 and 69*, *note 2*) N.B.

		ha
72: 1,427,655	—agricultural labourers without land	
1,400,000	—agricultural labourers with land	7 million
1,300,000	—small holders with collateral employment (cf. 71 and 67) (handicraftsmen, etc.)	
1,000,000	—peasants	10 million
140,000	—big farmers (>20 ha) with hired labour	23 million
Σ= 5,267,655		40 (— minus state lands, etc.)

79. Agricultural crisis—very uncertain thing. They have been shouting about it for *40* years.

87. Since 1883, the number of land plots has been decreasing...
—a tendency towards concentration.

88-89—*The smallest holders m o v e to the towns*
89—"*Victims of concentration—the smallest holders*" {N.B.})

92-93. The agricultural crisis should end soon.
94. The number of agricultural *machines has been growing very slowly*, *moderately.*
156-158. *Allotments Act*[80]—of small importance (not less or more than 1 acre, conditionally, etc.)
163. *Rentengüter*—created by the *f e u d a l* party
164. ———— against the socialists
" exodus to the towns
" shortage of labour
167—by 1896, 605 estates with 53,316 ha were broken up into 5,021 Rentengüter
1,088 2.5-5 ha
1,023 5 -7.5 ha
169. *Facilitating the supply of labour* (N.B.)

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CRITICAL REMARKS ON F. MAURICE'S BOOK, *AGRICULTURE AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION. AGRICULTURAL AND AGRARIAN FRANCE*[81]

F. Maurice

[Only paged through. The author has the wildest ideas of the most primitive anarchism. There are some interesting factual remarks.]

Pp. Note

48. Farmers complain.... Which farmers?
    small: 5 million—12 million ha (N.B.)
    big $0._{869}$ —37 " "

85. (French) soldier's ration—1 kg of bread
    300 grammes of meat
    160 " vegetables
    16 " salt
    15 " coffee
    21 " sugar

117. 14,074,801 lots; $59._3$% farms—consequently—
    8,346,000 holders (?)

119. *1882*: $84._7$% farms—$25._1$% of the area
    $15._3$% (868,000)—$74._9$% ($37._1$ million ha) } "Extreme" concentra-(!!) tion

122. Distribution of rural population according to 1886 statistics.

122-123. Almost 720,000 absentee owners (Absenteeism).

131-132. Small cropping can feed many more people.

160. From 1831 to 1886, the countryside gave up ***6 million persons*** to the towns.

165. Rural population in *1851* and *1886*

$$\left\{\begin{array}{l} < \text{ number of holders} \\ = \quad \text{"} \quad \text{" half-croppers} \\ + \quad \text{"} \quad \text{" labourers} \end{array}\right\} \text{N.B.}$$

167. Permanent labourers in 1862 and 1882 (—). [The figures are the same as *Bulgakov's* (6)]

174. The growth of big towns from 1831 to 1886.

194-195. The author favours social peace, "stability of our institutions", and is against "excessive industrialisation of agriculture"

> And he calls himself a socialist! Konfusionsrath!*

195-197. Agriculture is now *extensive* (on big farms), yields little produce, etc.

It should be *small* and intensive.

197. Maurice's slogan: *small property*, *small-scale production*.

197. The new (future) phase of agriculture is the "*period of vegetable gardening*" (author's italics) or "*small cropping*" (!)—the only possible outcome (!). The tendency in modern society is towards a coalescence of labour and property.

198. How is this to be achieved?

"Very easy" (!)—

199 there is need for a *reform*—account must be taken of the current ideas prevailing among the *masses*—with *individual property* (!!) and the *family* (!!)

200. "Gradual" supplanting of big farms.

203. The right of every citizen to use the national territory must be proclaimed

> meaning, the nationalisation of land.

* Bungler.—*Ed.*

204. Initially state lands are to be leased to small farms
205. —large land holdings to be taxed.
etc.
234. (234-266) (!!)—draft law (!!) Casting of lots for land, etc.
278 —Descriptions of separate departments.
{The best thing in the book.}

Nord. Beetroot production (287. staple crop.) Intensified fertilisation.

Prevalence of (??) small cropping	1-10 ha:	32,000	farms—	248,000 ha
	10-50 :	10,000	"	206,000
	50 and >:	690	"	53,000

Farms:

N.B. 232 ha. Sugar refinery, etc. Model farm. Per ha: 30 hectolitres of wheat "are not appreciably superior to those of the region" (p. 291) ??? (cf. Nord *24*) 50,000 kg of beetroot (cf. Nord *45,000*)

N.B. 140 ha. 20 milch cows. 30 hl, 50,000 beetroot.
7 ha. 6 milch cows. 25 hl, 40,000 beetroot (sic!)
"With all the costs covered, and the family partly supplied with sustenance, ***the profit, rather, the wages, in this case,*** comes to between 15 and 1,800 francs a year" (291).

Great development of *industry* and *mines*.

294. *An entire population is semi-agricultural and semi-industrial, with a plot of land.* ***Impossible to survive on less than 5 ha.***
295. ***—pays for the cultivation of his land (!)*** [Sometimes with his labour!]
—fattens livestock for traders for a remuneration.
296. Cultivation of beetroot with the aid of *machinery*. *Child labour.*
—working for garment merchants in Lille (N.B.) N.B.
(14-hour working day—*per family* (!)—1-1¼ francs).
297. The condition of the rural labourer is *rather hard*.... Meat *on Sundays*.... Poverty....

298-299. *Growth in the number of small holders doing hired labour.*
Maurice's "moral":
"there is danger" in industrialising agriculture (beetroot),
"it is a mistake" (308) to regard agriculture as an industry, etc., etc. There is need to develop small-scale production!! etc.

309. *Aisne*. Big cropping prevails—in contrast to *Nord*.
Worse soil, lagging agriculture.

315.

	farms	ha
< 1 ha	29,000	14,000
1- 10	22,000	94,000
10- 50	7,000	169,000
50-100	991	404,000
100-300	1,016	
300 and >	69	

320. Growing production of beetroot. (Idem 316)

322. The labourers are highly dissatisfied ("not much better than serfdom"!)
... meagre pay and food....

340. Nor is the condition of the labourer better in Picardie or in Beauce

342. *Vegetable gardening* in the suburbs of Paris ... of 28,000 ha ... *1,800* ha are vegetable gardens divided into *10,000* enterprises.... From 1,000 sq. m. to 1 ha (344). ...

	farms	ha
< 1 ha	11,000	5,000
1- 10	2,600	23,000
10- 50	290	
50-300	13	
300-500	2	
		28,000

Vegetable gardeners mostly lease land at 2,000 fr....

345. — — Gross receipts from 1 ha = 20,000 fr.
(working capital 25,000 fr.)
net income = 10,000 fr.

345. Labourers per *ha* husband and wife (entrepreneurs) —2

{ Wages and keep = 6,000 fr. { 3 labourers, men —3
2 girls —2
1 day labouring woman —1 (for summer)

Normandy

. . . .

358. *The very small holders go in for wage labour.*

361. —For a minority Normandy is a "rich country", but for the mass of peasants, it is "*harsh and inhospitable*" ....

375. Vegetable gardeners near Cherbourg (sale of cabbage, etc., to Britain). Land costs 15,000-20,000 fr. (1 ha).

376. Farms from 1 to 10 ha....
(N.B.) *Each ha needs 2-3 men labourers* (300-500 fr.) and Maurice is jubilant: "*small* cropping"!

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REMARKS ON A. CHŁAPOWO-CHŁAPOWSKI'S BOOK, *AGRICULTURE IN BELGIUM IN THE 19TH CENTURY*[82]

From Chłapowo-Chłapowski.
Gainfully employed population in Belgian agriculture

	Members of families taking part in farming	Gesinde* and day labourers	Total (both sexes)
1846)	906,575	177,026	1,083,601
1880)	982,124	217,195	1,199,319
1895)	1,015,799	187,106 +1,905 Hofbeamte**	1,204,810

Ibidem 69-71—"modern" large-scale production
71-72. Parcel holders as labourers of big farmers.
99-*100*. Idem (N.B.)
102. Competition between small and big farms.
137. Growth of parcel holders=labourers.
139. Plight of rural labourers.
Idem *145-146*.
144. *More intensive work done by small farmers.* (N.B.).

* Farm-hands.—*Ed.*
** Farm employees.—*Ed.*

148. Elevation of labourers to small holders.
148. Relations between small and big farmers. (Support.)

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REMARKS ON THE MATERIAL OF THE BADEN INQUIRY[83]

*Erhebungen über die Lage der Landwirtschaft im Grossherzogthum Baden.** 1883. Karlsruhe.

(Three big volumes, rather 4, because to the 3rd is appended *Ergebnisse* der Erhebungen.**

A number of monographs on separate communities, followed by results. Very many budgets.)

Volume 1. Note (after paging)

Sandhausen community (Heidelberg district) Vol. I, VIII*), p. 30 [Vol. I, VIII★ (community)].

Budgets. Big peasant. $9._{80}$ ha. 1 farm-hand +1 maid + 379 days of hired labour.

Small peasant. $2._{96}$ ha ($1._{62}$ ha *his own* + $1._{36}$ *leased*)

raises tobacco and hops.

10 man-days (hired day labour).

[with tobacco and hops 1¼ working days of labour should be reckoned per *are*. Consequently, total = 370 days.

husband	—300		Total receipts =	$2{,}032._{32}$
wife	— 60	$370._{1}$	Outlays	$1{,}749._{91}$
day labourer	— 10			$282._{41}$

*) The description of each community is a special issue with its own pagination. That is why references must include volume and community: Vol. II, XI—XIth community in Volume II.

* *A Study of the State of Agriculture in the Grand Duchy of Baden.—Ed.*

** Results of the Study.—*Ed.*

ibidem

Day labourer = small leasehold farm.

$2._{30}$ ha	$12._{6}$ ares of own land	16	*working days of*
	$217._{2}$ " of leased land		*hired labour.*
a total of	$229._{8}$ ares	$1\frac{3}{4}$ working days per are.	

Gross receipts — $1{,}543._{50}$
outlays — $1{,}472._{58}$
$+70._{30}$

Σ = 410 working days { 16 — day labourer; 300 — husband; 94 — wife }

Ergebnisse, pp. 56-57. The per-head consumption of meat on *big-peasant* and *middle-peasant* farms.

Everywhere (8 examples) it is *much higher* on the big farms.

Volume II. II, XI community, p. 48. 18 *ares* of tobacco require 80 working days.

[The whole Baden Inquiry is a study of 37 typical communities. In the Ergebnisse, there are the most *detailed*, incredibly detailed, budgets (70), the *main* results of which are given in the table I have borrowed.

Of interest in the Ergebnisse is Anlage VI: "Uebersichtliche Darstellung der Ergebnisse der in den Erhebungsgemeinden angestellten Ertragsberechnungen" (S. 149-65).* This is a *tabulated* summing up of the budget (and economic) data on the separately described households. (37 + 33 = 70 budgets.)

See extract of data on these 70 budgets in notebook[84]

31 big peasants (or farmers)
21 middle peasants
18 small peasants (including one wine-grower).
70

In the Ergebnisse [I have ***only*** *paged through* the Ergebnisse, but not the material (Vols. 1-3) itself, for the essence is given in the budget table, and there is no time to make a special study of them] one is struck by the indiscriminate nature of the conclusions: the big, middle and small peasants are *not discriminated* systematically anywhere in the results either; it is always "in general", e.g., even on the

* Appendix VI: "Brief Review of the Results or the Assessment of Incomes in the Investigated Communities".—*Ed.*

question of consumption. A comparison is made of the *communities*, and not of the big, medium and small enterprises. (E.g., pp. 55-56.)

This table (on 1873 data) appears on p. *21* of the Ergebnisse.

		Number of agric. enterprises	%	Area ha	%
I "mixed" enterprises (of "day labourers and artisans")	0-10 Morgen (0-3.6 ha)	160,581	72.0	227,213	28.5
II small-peasant enterprises	10-20 Morgen (3.6-7.2 ha)	38,900	17.5	193,923	24.3
III middle-peasant enterprises	20-50 Morgen (7.20-18 ha)	18,346	8.3	193,936	24.3
IV big-peasant enterprises	50-100 Morgen (18-36 ha)	3,721	1.6	90,152	11.3
V large (among them big-peasant) enterprises . . .	100-500 Morgen (36-180 ha)	1,177	0.5	65,671	8.4
VI	500 and over (180 ha and over)	21	0.01	5,542	0.6
Community land, etc.	—	—	—	21,000	2.6
		222,746	100	797,597*	100

Collateral employment—handicraft industries (Görwihl, Wittenschwand, Neukirch) (p. 43)
lumbering
day labour
factory work, stone quarries, etc., etc.

There is also seasonal outside earth moving and lumbering (p. 45 from Neusatz).

In Neukirch, *40* ha is considered to be a minimum area for subsistence. P. 44.

It is interesting to note concerning data α α and β β** (see tables in notebook):

* There is an error of addition in this column (should be 797,497).—*Ed.*

** α α—average annual profit per ha (marks); β β—permissible limit of taxation of estate, together with debt, as % of its taxable capital value.—*Ed.*

With the *big* and *middle peasants*, whose holdings come to 7-10 ha in the corn areas and 4-5 ha in the commercial crop and wine-making areas ... (and to 20-30 ha when there are forests) ... the results of calculations ($\begin{smallmatrix}\alpha & \beta\\ \alpha & \beta\end{smallmatrix}$) are not bad (p. 66).... Here, there is no danger in having a 40-70 per cent, average 55 per cent, debt.

By contrast, the conditions for the *small peasant* population are taking on a less favourable shape, i.e., ... for those with *4-7 ha* under cropping, *2-4 ha* under commercial crops and wine-making ... up to 30 ha under forests.

For these small peasants, the average limit of permissible indebtedness lies ... in all respects much lower than should be established for the middle and big peasants.

...For the estates of these sizes, with an *average* family and in the *pure* corn areas, the limit of indebtedness... must not exceed 30 per cent of the assessed value of the holding if the *regular* payment of interest and of instalments is to be *fully* secured... (p. 66).

> The above-given statistics, consequently, confirm the widespread opinion that those owners of peasant holdings, who are on the borderline [*in the middle*] between the day labourers and the middle peasants [in the rural districts the farmers of this category are usually called the "*middle estate*"—Mittelstand], are frequently in a worse position than those in the groups above and below in size of holdings; for, although they are able to cope with *moderate* indebtedness, if it is kept at a certain and not very high level, they find it difficult to meet their obligations, being unable to obtain *regular* collateral employment (as day labourers, etc.), by which means to increase their income.* They can meet their obligations only when their children have grown up and are placed, so that family expenses are less of a burden on these small farms. By contrast, *day labourers* (or handicraftsmen) with *small holdings*, insofar as they have some regular collateral employment, are frequently in

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 187-88.—*Ed.*

a much better position materially than those belonging to the "middle estate", for, as computations in numerous cases have shown, collateral employment at times yields such a high net (i.e., money) income as to enable them to repay even *large* debts*; this explains the frequently observed fact that where such conditions obtain, small holders, like day labourers and others, gradually manage to take small-peasant holdings out of debt. These computations also show that it is the rural owners, who belong to the lowest sections of the independent peasant population, that have most reasons to make *cautious* use of their credit, which is why they have to make an especially careful review of their financial possibilities when buying any real estate (pp. 66-67).

N.B.

[Data for *communities* also *prevail* on the question of indebtedness.]

Cf. especially p. 97: "The final conclusion [on the question of indebtedness]: relatively less favourable position of the *small*-peasant population."

The study of indebtedness by groups of holdings has shown:

Almost everywhere ... it has turned out that it is the *lowest* groups of holders (day labourers with a land allotment) that have the *highest percentage* of indebtedness, and that, on the contrary, this proportion markedly declines for the *peasant population proper*, and in general tends to *drop* with the growth of the estates in size, sometimes *very rapidly* indeed, *frequently disappearing almost entirely* in the higher groups (big-peasant holdings) (p. 89).

In the final count, the studies of debt levels in the communities concerned give the following picture on the strength of these data:

Almost everywhere, there is a very considerable debt burden on the holdings of *day labourers*. Nevertheless, this part of the debt is the least dangerous (p. 97)—for this section of the rural population relies mainly on earnings not from the land, and experience shows that, given regular earnings ("to any extent"), day labourers manage to cope

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 188.—*Ed.*

with their debts (which mostly arise from the purchase of land).

The debt on holdings among *middle* and *big* peasants in the overwhelming majority of the communities studied, even in those which are considered *heavily in debt*, remains within the limits marked out by the size of estates, and such debt is *very small* in a rather large number of communities, to be found in *all* economic areas....

On the other hand, in a considerable number of the communities studied, the indebtedness of the *small-peasant population* is relatively larger and not entirely safe, considering the permissible limit of indebtedness, and in view of the fact that this higher indebtedness should *ultimately* be due largely to definite *external* conditions... (p. 97) (land, climate, land hunger, etc.), the same thing may be assumed for the country's other communities.

This indebtedness is the result mainly of *credit for land* (purchase of land and transfer of estates).

...in purchasing land, particular business-like caution must be exercised—something to which most study reports point—primarily by the *small-peasant* population and by the day labourers, ranking next to it (p. 98). N.B.

The small peasant *sells* relatively little *for cash*, but he stands particularly in need of money, and

...because of his lack of capital, he is especially hard hit by every murrain, hailstorm, etc.*

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* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 188.—*Ed.*

REMARKS ON M. E. SEIGNOURET'S BOOK, *ESSAYS ON SOCIAL AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS*[85]

M. E. Seignouret, *Essais d'économie sociale et agricole*, Paris 1897. (p. 232 et seq.)—in one of the essays he makes a comparison between small, big and medium wine-growing (*1869*—Gironde Agricultural Society) farms

fictitious example N.B.

I. small	1 ha 60 ares—	works himself and family only
II. medium	10 ha 25 ares—	himself and family and one labourer (ploughman helper) + day labourers
III. big	51 ha 25 ares—	does not work himself. Senior servant 1, ploughmen-servants (3) and wine-growers (6-7) at settled wages

To I: it takes working days: 250 male + 200 female
{50 male + 50 female remain for day labourers}

Value of property	*small* *fr.*	*medium* *fr.*	*big* *fr.*
Vineyards	4,800	24,000	110,000
Other land	900	10,500	55,000
House	1,000	2,000	18,000
Implements and livestock	—	1,000	4,000
	Σ=***6,700***	Σ=37,500	Σ=187,000

Outlays	*small*	*medium*	*big*
4%	268	1,500	7,480
taxes and prestations	36	190	805
Vine-props	25	120	550
Vine	15	70	350
Manure	40 various expenses	+ 125 33 shoeing of cattle and re-payment*	
Vine	15	70	350
Straw	16	fertiliser	400
Transportation	15		
House repairs	15	45	200
Fire insurance	4	10	30
Repair of barrels, etc.	+ 10 30	+ 130 60	150
Grape gathering (No. 1)	20	250	+ 2,000 1,170
		wages + 600 187 +	2,450
		more wages = 1,350	
250 male days at 2.$_{25}$ = 562	300 male days 2.$_{25}$ = 675	cane rush	210
200 female days at 0.$_{75}$ = 150	250 fem. days 0.$_{75}$ = 187	%	—215
		various = 625	
Σ = 1,210**	Σ = 4,182		Σ = 18,510

(No. 1) Payment or compensation for several days of work by men or women, purchase of food, estimated at 20 fr. p. 241).

* In this column, Seignouret says: "Veterinary insurance of animals or loss of their value is more considerable than with a small holder".—*Ed.*

** In the listing of outlays for the small farm, there is an omission of interest—4 fr.—*Ed.*

Receipts	*small*	*medium*	*big*
	4 barrels of wine at 240=960	18½ barrels at 250=4,625 from land—732	75 barrels at 275=20,625 90 hl. of wheat = 2,250
		receipts=5,357	the rest from land= 655
			Σ=23,530
	Balance—**250**	*Balance +1,175*	*Balance +5,020*

In other words

Receipts = 960—198=462
(498 =1,210—562—150)
day labour
50 male days at 2.25 = 112.50
50 fem. days at 0.75 = 37.50
612

and as *senior servant* (labourer)
he would have had **840** francs.

Written in June-October 1901

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Printed from the original

FROM GERMAN AGRARIAN STATISTICS[86]

((pp. 1-20))

Number of farms using machinery in *1882*

1882

	Steam ploughs	Sowers*)	Mowers	Steam threshers	Other threshers	Σ
< 2	3	4,807	48	4,211	6,509	
2- 5	7	4,760	78	10,279	23,221	
5-10	6	6,493	261	16,007	51,822	74,589
10-20	18	9,487	1,232	18,856	86,632	116,225
5-20	24	15,980	1,493	34,863	138,454	190,814
20-100	92	22,975	10,681	17,960	115,172	
100 and >	710	15,320	7,334	8,377	15,011	
	836	63,842	19,634	75,690	298,367	

These are apparently the machines taken on p. 5 of these extracts* for comparison with 1895 (the number of cases of use of five agricultural machines). Here are the 1907 data on these same machines (number of *c a s e s* of use):

1907	< 2 ha	131,489;	per	100	farms	of group	= 3.$_8$
	2-5	313,641;	”	”	”	”	= 31.$_2$
	5-20	968,349;	”	”	”	”	= 90.$_9$
	20-100	469,527;	”	”	”	”	= 179.$_1$
	100 and >	64,098;	”	”	”	”	= 271.$_9$
	Σ =	1,947,104					33.$_9$

*) A reduction in the number of farms using sowers in 1895 is allegedly due (p. 36★) partly to the fact “dass die Landwirte jetzt an Stelle der Säemaschinen die Drillmaschinen in Gebrauch genommen haben”.**

* See p. 194.—*Ed.*

** “That farmers now use seed drills instead or ordinary sowers”.—*Ed.*

Note the distribution of land under *vegetables* (gärtnerisch benutzt) and under *forest*

	Total farms	Their total area	Including vegetable gardens only	%	Land under vegetable ha	Farms with forest	%	Their forests ha	1907 Forests in 1907 ha
Under 2 ha	3,236,367	2,415,914	367,402	11.35	99,034	147,777	4.57	413,033	514,279
2-5 ”	1,016,318	4,142,071	1,387	0.14	50,420	222,749	21.92	546,860	654,607
5-20 ”	998,804	12,537,660	536	0.05	79,154	400,557	40.10	1,850,277	2,121,024
20-100 ”	281,767	13,157,201	96	0.02	57,091	146,997	52.17	2,197,830	2,186,484
100 and >	25,061	11,031,896	5	0.02	43,642	13,754	54.88	2,574,276	2,203,360
	5,558,317	43,284,742	369,399	6.65	329,341	931,834	16.76	7,582,276	7,679,754

These data show that there is concentration even in vegetable gardening, but its scale defies definition.

The forests are concentrated on the big farms (> 20 ha—$4._{77}$ million ha out of $7._{58}$, that is, over 60%).

Taking *all* the forests (and not only those connected with agriculture) we find that 953,874 farms have 13,725,930 ha of forest and 30,847,317 ha of all the land. Almost half these forests (6,733,044 ha out of $13._{7}$ million, that is, $49._{05}$%) is on farms with ***1,000 ha and over***.

There are special data on the concentration of truck gardening (*Kunst-und-Handelsgärtnerei*="hothouse industry", etc.?):

N.B.

Farms by size of truck gardens	Number of farms	%		Their land: garden	Their land: %		Average land per farm: total farmland	Average land per farm: garden	Average land per farm: other farmland
Under 10 ares	7,780	$23._{91}$		344	$1._{40}$		17,313	$0._{04}$	$2._{2}$
10-50 ares	13,724	$42._{17}$	$59._{71}$	3,230	$13._{70}$	$29._{30}$	56,519	$0._{24}$	$4._{1}$
50 ares-1 ha	5,707	$17._{54}$		3,677	$15._{60}$		77,945	$0._{64}$	$13._{6}$
1 ha-2 ha	3,397	$10._{44}$		4,208	$17._{85}$		162,277	$1._{24}$	$47._{7}$
2 ha-5 ha	1,441	$4._{43}$	$5._{94}$	3,987	$16._{92}$	$51._{39}$	157,934	$2._{76}$	$109._{6}$
5 ha and >	491	$1._{61}$		8,124	$34._{47}$		66,119	$16._{54}$	$134._{7}$
Total	32,540	$100._{00}$		23,570	$100._{00}$		538,107	$0._{72}$	$16._{5}$

Cf. David, p. 152, 40%—under 20 ares

Weinbaubetriebe: Farms with vineyards

Size of vineyard	Number of farms	%		Their land: vineyards	%		Their land: other farmland	Area per holder: vineyards	Area per holder: other
Under 10 ares	88,362	$25._{63}$		4,962	$3._{94}$		221,340	$0._{05}$	$2._{5}$
10-20 ares	81,936	$23._{76}$		11,399	$9._{04}$		258,756	$0._{14}$	$3._{1}$
20-50 ares	103,777	$30._{09}$		32,179	$25._{51}$		371,357	$0._{31}$	$3._{5}$
50 ares-1 ha	47,148	$13._{67}$		31,407	$24._{90}$		201,888	$0._{66}$	$4._{3}$
1-5 ha	22,542	$6._{53}$	$20._{52}$	35,399	$28._{07}$	$61._{51}$	158,247	$1._{57}$	$7._{0}$
5 ha and >	1,085	$0._{32}$		10,763	$8._{54}$		30,599	$9._{92}$	$28._{2}$
Total	344,850	$100._{00}$		126,109	$100._{00}$		1,242,187	$0._{36}$	$3._{6}$

$$\left\{\begin{array}{l}49\%\text{-}13\% \\ 30\%\text{-}26\% \\ 21\%\text{-}61\%\end{array}\right\}^{87}$$

Categories by size of *farmland* (landwirtschaftlich benutzte) area:

Under 20 ares	$1{,}134._{3}$	ha	vineyards 36,271	Under 1 ha—	15,477	ha	102,367= $87._{17}$%
20-50 ”	4,476	”		1-10—	86,890	”	
50 ares-1 ha	9,867	”		10-50—	19,015	”	$12._{83}$%
1-2 ha	20,794	”		50 and >	4,727		
2-5 ha	41,158	”			Σ=126,109		
5-20 ha	37,649	”					
20-100 ha	8,746	”					
100 and >	2,285	”					
	Σ=126,109	”					

In France			%	%
Under 1 ha	$136._{2}$	thousand ha	$7._{56}$	$42._{98}$
1-10	$637._{5}$		$35._{42}$	
10-40	$467._{9}$		$25._{98}$	$57._{02}$
40 and >	$558._{9}$		$31._{04}$	
	$1{,}800._{5}$		$100._{00}$	

The (relatively) large percentage of *dependents* in the 100 and > group ($0._{35}$% and $0._{39}$%) is due to the fact that *only* administrative personnel and supervisors have been included here among the *dependents* in agriculture, (p. 49★).

Furthermore, in the 100 and > group, the A—C independents are mostly *owners of forests*, *industrialists* and *traders*.

P. 47★
1 = A 1 Independents
2 = A 1 Dependents
3 = A—C Dependents + D
4 = A—C Independents
5 = Other occupations

Farms by main occupation %%

	1. Agriculture independents	2. Agriculture *dependents*	3. Agriculture+industry+trade+local industries and other *dependents*	4. Veg. gardening+industry+trade+other *independents*	5. Other occupations	Σ %
Under 2 ha	$17._{43}$	$21._{30}$	$50._{31}$	$22._{53}$	$9._{73}$	100
2- 5	$72._{20}$	$2._{48}$	$8._{63}$	$16._{31}$	$2._{86}$	100
5- 20	$90._{79}$	$0._{21}$	$1._{11}$	$6._{96}$	$1._{14}$	100
20-100	$96._{16}$	$0._{05}$	$0._{17}$	$2._{52}$	$1._{15}$	100
100 and >	$93._{86}$	$0._{35}$	$0._{39}$	$1._{50}$	$4._{25}$	100
Total	$44._{96}$	$12._{90}$	$31._{08}$	$17._{49}$	$6._{47}$	100

2,499,130+(717,037)+1,727,703+971,934+359,550=5,558,317

Data on the percentage of *independent* rural owners with subsidiary employment clearly show the *especially* advantageous position of holders of 100 ha and > (their subsidiary employment = forestry, large-scale industry, agricultural industries, military and civil service, etc.).

Under 2 ha	$26._{08}$	% of independent
2- 5	$25._{54}$	farmers with sub-
5- 20	$15._{26}$	sidiary employment
20-100	$8._{82}$	
100 and >	$23._{54}$	(P. 48★)
	$20._{10}$	

Independents		Dependents	
A 2—6	31,751	A 1)	717,037
B	704,290	A 2—6)	67,605
C 1—10	130,682	B)	790,950
C 11—21	32,994	C)	12,757
C 22	72,217	C)	101,781
		C)	836
	971,934	D)	36,737
+	1,727,703		1,727,703
Other occupations	359,550		
	3,059,187		
+			
A 1	2,499,130		
	5,558,317		

The use of machinery vastly prevails among the large farms (79% and 94%—as against 46% among the medium, and 14%-2% among the small) (p. 36★).

The same is the case with machinery for *dairy* farming (N.B.: p. 39★) (31%-3% among the large, 3%-1% among the medium, and 1 %-$0._{02}$ % among the small).

A comparison with *1882*:

	Steam *ploughs*:		Mowers		Steam threshers	
		> 20 ha farms	*total*	> *20 ha*		
1882:	836	802	19,634	18,015	75,690	26,337
1895:	1,696	1,602	35,084	27,493	259,364	62,120
	+ 860	+ 800	+15,450	+ 9,478	+183,674	+35,783
19*07*:	2,995	2,873	19*07*: 301,325	155,526	19*07*: 488,867	86,472
	(+1,299)	(+1,271)				

The *percentage* increase in the number of farms using machines is naturally highest among the *lower* categories: the small magnitudes grow faster in percentages.

(p. 36★ + p. 39★)

	Farms using machines in general per 100 farms	*Cases* of use of agric. machine per 100 farms	(see p. 2)* *1907*	Cases of use of five agricultural machines per 100 farms *1882*	P. 36★ *1895*	
Under 2 ha	2.03	2.30	3.8	0.50	1.59	+ 1.09
2- 5	13.81	15.46	31.2	3.91	11.87	+ 7.96
5- 20	45.80	56.04	90.9	20.59	43.86	+ 23.27
20-100	78.79	128.46	179.1	59.17	92.01	+ 32.84
100 and >	94.16	352.34	271.9	187.07	208.93	+ 21.86
Total	16.36	22.36	33.9	8.68	16.59	+ 7.91
			5-10 ha 71.1	13.5	32.9	
			10-20 122.1	31.2	60.8	

(cf. *Deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse 19. Jahrhunderts*, S. 51)**

Concerning the comparison of the number of farms using various machines in 1882 and 1895, it should be borne in mind that small and medium farms make wide use *only* of threshers, and use very few other machines.

Steam ploughs are being used (being *introduced*) only on the big farms.

Seed drills are used by	18-57% of big farms	5% of medium farms
Manure spreaders	3-37% ” ”	0.2% medium
Separators	10-15% ” ”	4% medium

* See p. 189.—*Ed.*

** *The German National Economy at the end of the 19th Century—Ed.*

Then (*N.B.*) there is only a handful of cases in which farmers use their own *and hired* machinery. Hence, the concentration of machinery should be even greater.

Also note on the concentration of livestock that in 1895 the figures were taken for the *whole* of the Deutsches Reich.

N.B.

				Horned cattle
Without land	663	agric. enterpr.	They have	6,905
Under $0._1$ are	663	” ”	” ”	4
$0._1$-2 ares	76,223	” ”	” ”	1,130
2-5 ”	212,331	” ”	” ”	4,986
5-20 ”	748,653	” ”	” ”	47,414
20-50 ”	815,047	” ”	” ”	176,987

On the question of “*latifundia* degeneration” (Bulgakov). Data on farms with 1,000 ha and >:

1895: *572* farms with
802,115 ha cultivated farmland
($2._{46}$% against $2._{22}$% in 1882)
1,159,674 ha total area ($2._{68}$% against $2._{55}$% in 1882)
including
798,435 ha farmland proper
3,655 ” vegetable gardens
25 ” vineyards
298,589 ” forests ($25._{75}$%)

Waste and unsuitable land—$1._{72}$% *minimum* of all categories.

1907: *369* farms with *693,656* ha total area
including 497,973 ha farmland
2,563 ” vegetable gardens
0 ” vineyards
145,990 ” forests

In [ ] data for 1907.

Livestock kept—in general—by $97._{90}$%; big cattle—$97._{73}$%; sheep—$86._{01}$%; pigs—$90._{73}$%, etc. Number of livestock: horses: 55,591 [42,502]; horned cattle: 148,678 [120,754]; sheep: 703,813 [376,429]; pigs: 53,543 [59,304]; goats: 175 [134].*

The use of agricultural machinery: in general—*555*. Steam ploughs—81 [120]; sowers—448 [284]; manure spreaders—356; mowers—211 [328]; steam threshers—500 [337]; separators—72 [137] + 140. (Σ of *cases* of use of machines = ***2,000***.)

Furthermore, of these (farms with 1,000 ha and >) linked

with sugar refineries	19	
distilleries	228	
starch factories	16	
flour mills	64	
breweries	6	
	Σ = 330	(33,000 ÷ 572) = $57._{7}$%

211 grow beetroot (26,127 ha)
302 grow potatoes for distillation and starch-making
21 have dairy trade in town (1.822 cows)
204 take part in dairy co-ops (18,273 cows)
20,400 ÷ 572 = $35._{6}$%
Of *5 7 2—5 4 4* are independent landowners by main occupation
(of 544—227 (42%) have no subsidiary employment
317 (58%) have subsidiary employment)
9—main occupation: independent foresters, traders and industrialists.
19—other occupations.
Without leased land—$63._{29}$% of these farms
Leased land=$12._{56}$% of their total area.

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 199.—*Ed.*

Prussia only

1895: number of farms using separators

	Total farms	Number of farms using separators: with manual drive	with mechanical drive	Σ	1907: Total farms	Number of farms using separators
No land	—	13	11	21	—	—
Under 0.$_1$ are	262	—	1	1	488	—
0.$_1$-2 ”	45,554	7	3	10	69,774	10
2-3 ”	146,672	28	12	40	206,958	27
5-20 ”	525,466	147	76	223	560,511	128
20-50 ”	520,236	326	56	382	515,114	378
50 ares-1 ha	410,944	555	83	638	385,867	1,515
1-2 ”	398,979	1,415	141	1,556	362,265	7,606
2-3 ”	233,596	1,618	189	1,807	223,325	11,828
3-4 ”	163,126	1,747	317	2,064	166,117	14,058
4-5 ”	126,058	1,697	433	2,130	131,472	14,991
5-10 ”	314,634	6,137	3,111	9,248	349,352	58,347
10-20 ”	214,095	6,492	4,565	11,057	233,808	60,777
20-50 ”	155,539	7,574	4,575	12,149	147,724	47,349
50-100 ”	32,575	2,279	953	3,232	28,252	8,506
100-200 ”	8,697	876	306	1,182	8,236	2,330
200-500 ”	8,050	798	589	1,387	7,871	2,031
500-1,000 ”	3,110	307	445	752	2,670	899
1,000 and > ”	533	70	132	202	340	129
Σ	3,308,126	32,086	15,998	48,084	3,400,144	230,909

		Number of draught animals (horses+oxen)				Total draught animals (horses+oxen+*cows*)		% of cows in total draught animals		
		1882	1895			1882	1895	1882	1895	
Under 2	ha	62,912	69,366	+	6,454	501,212	459,337			
2-5	”	308,323	302,310	—	6,013	1,385,769	1,412,015			
5-20	”	1,437,384	1,430,512	—	6,872	2,086,251	2,222,431	$31._{1}$	$35._{6}$	$+4._{5}$
20-100	”	1,168,544	1,155,438	—	13,106	1,193,319	1,213,350	$2._{1}$	$4._{8}$	$+2._{7}$
100 and >	”	650,450	695,230	+	44,780	650,607	698,129	$0._{02}$	$0._{4}$	$+0._{38}$
Total		3,627,613	3,652,856	+	25,243	5,817,158	6,005,262			

		Number of farms with draught animals				%		
		1882	*1895*			*1882*	*1895*	
Under 2	ha	325,005	306,340	—	18,665	$10._{61}$	$9._{46}$	$-1._{15}$
2-5	”	733,967	725,584	—	8,383	$74._{79}$	$71._{39}$	$-3._{40}$
5-20	”	894,696	925,103	+	30,407	$96._{56}$	$92._{62}$	$-3._{94}$
20-100	”	279,284	275,220	—	4,064	$99._{21}$	$97._{68}$	$-1._{53}$
100 and >	”	24,845	24,485	—	360*)	$99._{42}$	$97._{70}$	$-1._{72}$
		2,257,797	2,256,732	—		$42._{79}$	$40._{60}$	$-2._{19}$

*) Con: number of farms using steam ploughs

	1882	*1895*
20-100 ha	92	277+185
100 and > ha	710	1,325+615

	% using cows *only*			% using cows in *general**			% using horses and oxen		
	1882	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*	
Under 2 ha	83.74	82.10	—1.64	85.21	83.95	—1.26	14.79	16.05	+1.26
2-5 ”	68.29	69.42	+1.13	72.95	74.93	+1.98	27.05	25.07	—1.98
5-20 ”	18.49	20.30	+1.81	29.71	34.75	+5.04	70.29	65.25	—5.04
20-100 ”	0.25	0.28	+0.03	3.42	6.02	+2.60	96.58	93.98	—2.60
100 and > ”	0.00	0.03	+0.03	0.25	1.40	+1.15	99.75	98.60	—1.15
	41.61	41.82	+0.21	48.18	50.48	+2.30	51.82	49.52	—2.30

* I.e., using cows as well as horses and oxen.—*Ed.*

These data on the use of draught animals show the *greatest* worsening of farming *conditions*, and a *worsening of the quality of draught animals on the* ***middle-peasant farms***.

Of the 5-20 ha farms, draught animals are incomparably worse in the 5-10 ha group

	Total farms	With draught animals	Including those using cows	only cow	% of total farms with draught animals	
5-10)	605,814	548,378	50,619 + 30,970	+172,094	$=31.3\%$ (!!)	20.30%
10-20)	392,990	376,725	31,373 + 20,671	+ 15,704	$= 4.2\%$	
		%				
		90.5	253,683		$=46.3\%$ (!)	34.75%
		95.8	7,748		$=17.9\%$ (rather 18.0%)	

It is the 5-10 ha group that grew most from 1882 to 1895:

	% of farms			% of all area			% of farmland		
	1882	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*	
5-10 ha	10.50	10.90	+0.40	11.90	12.37	+0.47	12.26	13.02	+0.76
10-20 ”	7.06	7.07	+0.01	16.70	16.59	—0.11	16.48	16.86	+0.40

Data for *1895* on the use of machinery: [below: for 1907]

1895 Farms using listed machines in 1894/95

	steam ploughs	broad cast sowers	seed drills	manure spread ers	mowers	steam thresh-ers	other thresh-ers	*) row cultiva-tors	separators on own farm with manual drive	separators on own farm with mechan-ical drive	(My) Σ of last 2 columns
Under 2 ha	4	214	14,735	105	245	35,066	15,951	2,369	5,295	673	5,968
2-5	25	551	13,088	283	600	52,830	66,653	9,224	12,004	1,834	12,477 13,838
5-10	32	1,121	19,083	607	1,528	58,115	138,376	14,169	13,941	5,066	56,995 19,007
10-20	33	2,131	29,668	1,324	5,218	51,233	180,145	16,553	13,769	7,521	85,986 21,290
5-20	65	3,252	48,751	1,931	6,746	109,348	318,521	30,722	27,710	12,587	94,655
20-100	277	12,091	49,852	7,002	19,535	46,778	180,575	22,311	15,256	8,292	23,548
100 and >	1,325	12,565	14,366	9,328	7,958	15,342	15,169	7,911	2,539	1,787	80,137 4,336
Σ	1,696	28,673	140,792	18,649	35,084	259,364	596,869	72,537	62,804	25,183	6,696 87,987
											336,906

<2 ha		0.16	0.02
2-5		1.18	0.18
5-20		2.77	1.26
20-100		5.41	2.94
100 and >		10.13	7.17
Σ		1.13	0.45
		1895	1907
Σ cases of use of 5 machines =	5-10)	199,172	464,197
	10-20)	238,760	504,152
		437,932	

[See data on Prussia (separators) above, special*]

*) Note. "Farms using cultivators and separators could not be ascertained with adequate reliability; cf. the introductory text." [N.B. exaggerated for the most part; p. 39★ contains a review of reports for the states on the reasons (and nature) of mistakes in the information on separators. The review suggests that for the *most part* these data on the number of separators are *exaggerated*; these machines were frequently confused with others. Ergo, they could after all be used for a comparison with 1907 with reservations.] The text (p. 38★) says, on the other hand, that the data on these machines are for the most part ***wrong***, *with the exception of Prussia* (ibidem). ***Still*** (p. 39★) the percentage (of the number of farms) has been calculated!

* See p. 198.—*Ed.*

P. 60//1898:	Tobacco-planters		Their approx. tobacco area ha	ha (maximum)
I Under 1 are	61,040	88,000		600
II 1-10 ares	27,132			2,700
III 10 ares-1 ha	49,420			3,300
IV > 1 ha	1,579	51,000		
	139,171	139,000	17,652 ha	

N.B.:

88,000 (63%) — not > 3.$_3$ thousand ha (20%)

51,000 (37%) — about *15* thousand ha (80%)

139,000

[N.B. fiscal statistics!]

In view of the extremely rough classification into groups (4 groups only!!) it is impossible to make *any*, even approximate, distribution *between* groups III and IV.

It is clear only that *88*,000 planters (about *63*%) have no more than c. *3,000 ha* (not > 3,300 = *20* %).

Meanwhile, *51*,000 planters (c. 37%) have about *15,000* ha (c. 80%).

Number of farms linked with the following industrial enterprises

***1895*:**

	<2 ha	2-5 ha	5-10 ha	5-20 ha	10-20 ha	20-100 ha	100 ha and >	Σ
(1) Sugar refineries	154	34	(21)	52	(31)	34	76	350
(2) Distilleries	689	388	(465)	1,041	(576)	1,042	2,762	5,922
(3) Starch factories	33	29	(28)	45	(17)	58	274	439
(4) Flour mills	8,847	11,372	(11,754)	20,867	(9,113)	5,316	696	47,098
(5) Breweries	1,641	1,719	(1,905)	3,874	(1,969)	1,823	198	9,255
Total	11,364	13,542		25,875		8,273	4,006	63,064
	%	%		%		%	%	%
	$0._{35}$	$1._{33}$		$2._{59}$		$2._{97}$	$15._{98}$	$1._{14}$
Total number of farms . . .	3,236,367	1,016,318		998,804		281,767	25,061	5,558,317
Number of farms linked with the same *five* types of industrial enterprises in 1907	10,660	20,884		33,514		8,464	5,588	79,110

cf. Bulgakov II, 116 distorted

"And one should not imagine that they (agricultural industries) are linked mainly with the big farms" (Bulgakov II, 116). Caught out!!

!! "The bulk (of the beetroot and potatoes) was raised on the small farms" (ibidem)!!
Here are the data on the farms growing beetroot:

	farms	% of total	beetroot ha*)	%	Area under beetroot in 1907 ha	Number of farms raising potatoes for distillation and starch-making	% of total farms
Under 2 ha	10,781	$0._{33}$	3,781	$1._{0}$	9,730	565	$0._{01}$
2-5 "	21,413	$2._{10}$	12,693	$3._{2}$	18,858	947	$0._{09}$
5-20 "	47,145	$4._{72}$	48,213	$12._{1}$	77,582	3,023	$0._{30}$
20-100 "	26,643	$9._{45}$	97,782	$24._{7}$	125,961	4,293	$1._{52}$
100 and >"	7,262	$28._{98}$	233,820	$59._{0}$	281,691	5,195	$20._{72}$
Σ=	113,244	$2._{03}$	396,289	100	513,822	14,023	$0._{25}$

*) { 5-10 ha — 18,752
10-20 " — 29,461 }

There are no figures for the area under potatoes. The figures on the farms totally refute Bulgakov

On the question of the role of small and large farms in dairy farming [Bulgakov II. 117 has distorted this question as well] the data are:

	Total number of farms	% of them with horned cattle	Farms with dairy trade or milk products in towns				Farms participating in butter co-ops and amalgamated dairies			
			Number of farms	%	Number of cows of them	Cows per farm	Number of farms	%	Number of cows	Cows per farm
< 2 ha	3,236,367	$28._{59}$	8,998	$0._{3}$	25,028	$2._{8}$	10,300	$0._{3}$	18,556	$1._{8}$
2- 5	1,016,318	$92._{41}$	11,049	$1._{1}$	30,275	$2._{7}$	31,819	$3._{1}$	73,156	$2._{3}$
5- 20	998,804	$97._{65}$	15,344	$1._{5}$	70,916	$4._{6}$	53,597	$5._{4}$	211,236	$3._{9}$
20-100	281,767	$98._{60}$	5,676	$2._{0}$	58,439	$10._{3}$	43,561	$15._{4}$	418,563	$9._{6}$
100 and >	25,061	$97._{72}$	863	$3._{4}$	31,213	$36._{1}$	8,805	$35._{1}$	361,435	$41._{0}$
	5,558,317	$56._{52}$	41,930	$0._{8}$	215,871	$5._{1}$	148,082	$2._{7}$	1,082,946	$7._{3}$

	%	%	%	%	%
Under 2 ha	$58._{23}$	$21._{46}$	$11._{59}$	$6._{95}$	$1._{71}$
2- 5	$18._{28}$	$26._{35}$	$14._{03}$	$21._{49}$	$6._{76}$
5- 20	$17._{97}$	$36._{59}$	$32._{85}$	$36._{19}$	$19._{51}$
20-100	$5._{07}$	$13._{54}$	$27._{07}$ } $41._{53}$	$29._{72}$	$38._{65}$ } $72._{02}$%
100 and >	$0._{45}$	$2._{06}$	$14._{46}$	$5._{95}$	$33._{37}$
	100	100	100	100	100

Consequently, the concentration of dairy farming is *enormous*, with *large capitalist farms* producing the *bulk* of the marketed dairy products.

Of course, the concentration of *dairy* farming does not at all have to coincide with the concentration of *cropping*. That is why classification by *area* is not enough. There is also concentration *within* each group by size of farmland:

	Dairy farms under 2 ha			Dairy farms with 2-5 ha			Dairy farms with 5-20 ha			5-10 ha		
	farms	cows	per farm	farms	cows	per farm	farms	cows	per farm	farms	cows	per farm
With 1 cow	4,024	4,024	1	1,862	1,862	1	756	756	1	551	551	1
” 2 cows	2,924	5,848	2	4,497	8,994	2	2,687	5,374	2	1,946	3,892	2
” 3 and >	2,050	15,156	$7._4$	4,690	19,419	$4._3$	11,901	64,786	$5._4$	6,103	29,213	$4._9$
	8,998	25,028	$2._8$	11,049	30,275	$2._7$	15,344	70,916	$4._6$	8,600	33,656	

Unfortunately, only *three* groups are given. Let us also note that the group of under-2-ha dairy farms include farms *without any farmland at all*. These number 471,

and they have 5,344 cows (i.e., *11.*$_3$ cows per farm!!); of these farms only 6 have one cow each and only 17, two; consequently, the other 448 have 5,304 cows, i.e., **11.**$_8$ **cows** per farm. Clearly, the concentration of dairy farming is *much* greater than the data for area indicate, and special *dairy farmers* **are** emerging within dairy farming.

More examples: among the same peasants with dairies, etc., in towns, we find the following proportions in the *under-2-ha group*:

from *2 to 5 ares* . . . 158 farms (38 with 1 cow, 23 with 2 cows)—1,287 cows (*8.*$_1$ *c o w s* per farm), minus the farms with 1-2 cows, we have 97 farms with 3 and > cows, and a total of 1,203 cows *(12.*$_4$ per farm).

[Similarly among the farms taking part in dairy co-ops, we find in the under-2-ha group 56 farms with 466 cows (*8.*$_3$ per farm) ***without land***, and also 52 farms with 574 cows (*11.*$_0$ *per farm*) on *2 to 5 ares*.] In general, if we divide the under-2-ha group of farms into two subgroups: those with under 50 ares, and those with from 50 ares to 2 ha, we find that the *first* subgroup has many more cows *p e r f a r m* than the second; a clear indication that *dairy and livestock farming is* ***specialising*** *away from cropping*.

Farms *under 2 ha* with milk sales in *towns*:

	farms:	Including with 1 cow	with 2 cows	hence with 3 and >	Their cows	Per farm	Total cows	Farms under 2 ha participating in dairy co-ops: farms	cows	per farm
0-50 ares	1,944	722	372	850	9,789	11.5	11,255	869	3,514	4
50 ares-2 ha	7,054	3,302	2,552	1,200	5,367	4.5	13,773	9,431	15,042	1
	8,998	4,024	2,924	2,050	15,156	7.4	25,028	10,300	18,556	1.8

Furthermore, as regards the maximum scale of dairy farming concentration in Germany, the subdivisions of the *highest* groups are also of interest. In the category of farms selling milk in towns, we have

500-1,000 ha: 73 farms with 4,888 cows. Average: 66 cows
1,000 ha and >: 21 " " 1,822 " Average: 87 cows

In the category of farms participating in dairy co-ops:

500-1,000 ha: 1,573 farms with 97,403 cows. Average: 62 cows.
1,000 and > ha: 204 " " 18,273 " " 89 cows.

500 and > ha: 1,777 " " 115,676 "
200-500 ha: 3,708 " " 158,702

200 and > ha: 5,485 " " 274,378 " Average: about 50 cows.

Quantity of cattle
auf je *100 ha* landwirtschaftliche benutzter Fläche*:

		(*horned cattle*)	*pigs*
Germany	1882	—*48.49*	—26.46
	1895	—*52.44*	—41.71
Great Britain	1885	—*50.37*	—18.20
Denmark	1893	—*59.81*	—29.24
Holland	1895	—74.02	—31.76
Belgium	1880	—69.71	—32.59

See statistics for 1895, text, pp. 60★-65★

Cattle by categories:

	horned cattle			pigs		
	1882	*1895*		*1882*	*1895*	
Under 2 ha	10.5	8.3	—2.2	24.7	25.6	+0.9
2- 5 ”	16.9	16.4	—0.5	17.6	17.2	—0.4
5- 20 ”	35.7	36.5	+0.8	31.4	31.1	—0.3
20-100 ”	27.0	27.3	+0.3	20.6	19.6	—1.0
100 and > ”	9.9	11.5	+1.6	5.7	6.5	+0.8
	100	100		100	100	

But the tremendous decline in commercial *sheep-breeding* (from 1882 to 1895, the number of sheep fell by 8½ million (21.1-12.6), with 7 million of this loss on the >20 ha farms!) makes the position of the large farms less favourable in respect of the total quantity of livestock:

Total cattle (value):

	1882		*1895*		
Under 2 ha	9.3		9.4		+0.1
2- 5 ”	13.1		13.5		+0.4
5- 20 ”	33.3		34.2		+0.9
20-100 ”	29.5	44.3	28.8	42.9	—0.7
100 and > ”	14.8		14.1		—0.7
	100		100		

Germany 1907 (*without 0-2 ha*) per farm = 12.8 ha
2,357,573 farms with 30,103,563 ha of **farmland.**
Of them
1,006,277 2- 5 ha
652,798 5-10 ha

* Per 100 ha of cultivated farmland.—*Ed.*

Needless to say, the *proportion* of the big farms here has been understated, for the value of the livestock has been assumed to be the same everywhere, whereas livestock on the big farms is, of course, better, and fetches a higher price, so that the *ratio* between the groups could also be brought out incorrectly (improvement of livestock on the big farms).

But the total number of livestock did, of course, increase *less* than on the small.

The big farms lost *most* from the great decline in commercial sheep-breeding, and the *more considerable* (as compared with the small farms) increase in their raising of *horned cattle* and *pigs only made up* some, but not all of their loss.

The following ratio for converting livestock into big cattle is given on p. 54 of the book, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft am Schlusse des 19. Jahrhunderts**:

"*1 cow = 10 pigs = 10 sheep.*"

If we add that 1 cow = 10 goats, we find:

		1895	*1882*
1895.	horses	3,367,298	3,114,420
	horned cattle	17,053,642	15,454,372
	sheep (1/10)	1,259,287	2,111,696
	pigs (1/4)	3,390,660	2,107,814
	goats (1/10)	310,525	245,253
		25,381,412	23,033,555
		23,033,555	
		2,347,857	

* *The German National Economy at the End of the 19th Century.—Ed.*

	farms	
With 1 cow	6,718— 6,718	cows
" 2 "	10,338—20,676	"
	17,056—27,394	
With 3 and > cows,	24,874—188,477 ÷ 24,874 = 7	
Total	41,930—215,871[88]	

N.B. P. 69★ says that in America "*nicht* mitgezählt (from among the agricultural enterprises) sind dabei alle landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe unter 3 Acres (= $1._{20}$ ha), sofern sie nicht im Censusjahr wenigstens einen Brutto-Ertrag im Wert von $500 geliefert haben, was nur bei einigen wenigen in der Nähe von Großstädten gelegenen Gärtnereibetrieben u.d.gl. zutrifft",* which is why, allegedly, no comparison with Germany is *possible*.

N.B.

* "At the same time no account was taken of any under-3-acre farms, which in the census year failed to yield a gross income of at least $500, this generally being the case only with some few vegetable and similar other farms situated in the vicinity of big towns."—*Ed.*

Statistics of occupations of Germany's agricultural population in 1882 and 1895

(Gainfully employed population)

N.B. Agriculture *proper* [A 1] (thousand)

	Persons for whom agriculture is the *main* occupation:				Persons for whom agriculture is either the main occupation or a side line:			
	1882	*1895*				*1882*	*1895*	
A Independents (owners leaseholders)	2,253	2,522	+269		A)	4,372	4,682	+310
C 1 (members of their families)	1,935	1,899	—36		C 1)	2,500*)	2,960**)	+310
I	4,188	4,421	+233	+5.6%		6,971	7,642	+671
II								
C 3 (agricultural labourers with own or leased land)	866	383	—483	—55.8%	C 3)	876	443	—433
A+C1+C3=	5,054	4,804	—250			7,847	8,085	+238
B (employees)	47	77	+30	+63.8%	B)	48	78	+ 30
C 2 (farm-hands, men and women)	1,589	1,719	+130		C 2)	1,872	1,942	+ 70

C 4 (agricultural labourers without land)		1,374	1,445	+ 71	
	III	3,010	3,241	+231	+7.7%
Total		8,064	8,045	—19	—0.2%
	I	51.9 } 62.7	54.9 } 59.7	+3.0 }	—3.0
	II	10.8	4.8	—6.0	
	III	37.3	40.3	+3.0	
		100.0	100.0		

C 4)	1,441	1,518	+ 77
	3,361	3,538	+177
	11,208	11,623	+415

Same data *only* for subsidiary employment

	1882	*1895*	
A)	2,120	2,160	+ 40
C 1)	664	1,061	+397+59.8%
	2,784	3,221	*+437*
C 3)	9	60	*+51*
B)	1	1	± 0
C 2)	283	223	—60
C 4)	67	73	+ 6
	351	297	*—54*
	3,144	3,578	+434

*) Of them 21.7% for whom agriculture is subsidiary employment
**) " " 35.8% " " " " " "

In studying the changes in occupations, the following must be adopted as a basis:

1) agriculture *proper*: A1, and not A1-6 (Mr. Bulgakov, II, 133, takes precisely these A1-6, thereby obtaining a + number of gainfully employed population, i.e., adds to agriculture *truck gardening*, *forestry* and *fishery*, which is clearly wrong)

2) main occupation, i.e., persons for whom agriculture is the *main* occupation. Data on subsidiary employment are highly indefinite in the sense that they fail to show the importance of the subsidiary employment, etc.

Conclusions:

1. Bulgakov is quite wrong in saying that there is an *increase* in the quantity of agricultural labour. In the main occupation it has *decreased*. We *cannot* judge how far this is offset by an increase of agricultural labour in subsidiary employment.

2. Changes in the distribution of occupations (main occupation) show:

a) a growth of expropriation: the total number of land-*holders* (owners, leaseholders and labourers) had *dropped* by 250,000. The number of owners has increased by 233,000, and the number of labourers with land has *decreased* by 483,000, Consequently, it was the *poorest* section of the farmers that was expropriated.

The number of labourers used the capitalist way *increased* by 231,000 (+$7._7$%, i.e., a greater increase than that in the number of owners, which was $5._6$%).

Consequently, agriculture developed precisely and specifically the *capitalist* way.

[Let us note that it is quite wrong to include working members of farmer families (C 1) among hired *labourers*—as statistics, and Mr. Bulgakov, II, 133 along with it, do. C 1—co-owners, and C 2-C 4—hired labourers. Therefore, when determining the *capitalist* application of labour, C 1 should be added to A.]

As for C 3, it is, of course, an intermediate category: on the one hand, they are hired labourers, and on the other, holders. And it is this intermediate category that has been *eroded* most in 13 years.

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ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM THE BOOK, *AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS OF FRANCE. GENERAL RESULTS OF THE 1892 DECENNIAL INQUIRY*[89]

Part I

Pp.
80. Wheat crops (Nord—most of all)
87. Oat crops (idem)
90. *Reduction* in the area under cereals 1862-1882-1892
100. *Growth* of gross output of cereals 1834-1865-1885-1895
105. Especially great *growth* in 1882-1892 (!)
106. Reason: fertilisers, etc.
108. Wheat crops from 1815 to 1895 {Hertz, p. 50}
113. Wheat production (total) from 1831 to 1891 (++) and *114* especially averages for decades
115. Growth in consumption of wheat per head (and for *industrial* purposes *N.B.*)
137. Reduction in the raising of beans, etc.
143. Increase in the raising of *potatoes* et al., and higher yields (p. 144)
158. Growth in the production of *feed* in 1862-1882-1892

	1862	1882	1892	
artificial meadows	$2._8$	$3._1$	$3._0$	mill. ha
natural meadows	$5._0$	$5._9$	$6._2$	” ”

161. *N.B.* percentage growth of *meadows* from 1862 (N.B.)
163. Sugar plants *prevail* among the industrial crops ($52._{14}$%)
164. —Nord leading.

180. Sugar-beet: especially *Nord*
183. Growth in sugar production from 1887 to 1897.
198. Vegetable gardens mostly near big towns (N.B.).
203. Vegetable gardens decline from 1882.
206. Fallow declines.
242. Comparison with 1840 of all types of crops.
257. Nord is especially rich in livestock.
340. Consumption of *meat*.

	Wheat hl per 100 ha total farm-land	output hl	hl per ha
1. Nord	594	3,144,749	$25._5$
2. Pas-de-Calais	505	3,205,744	$20._2$
3. Somme	469	2,778,499	$21._2$
4. Ardennes	297	1,498,899	$21._4$
5. Oise	436	2,455,795	$22._8$
6. Aisne	482	3,412,329	$23._9$
7. Seine-et-Oise	409	2,167,158	$23._9$
8. Seine	381	103,379	$26._8$
9. Eure-et-Loire	455	2,579,191	$21._5$
10. Seine-et-Marne	453	2,570,100	$22._5$
		24	
Average for France	230	Σ=117,499,297 in the whole of France	$16._4$

France. 1892: *(Pp. 356-59)*

	% of farms		Average size of farms	Area cultivated		Area not culti-vated	Area total	
Under 1 ha	$39._{19}$		$0._{59}$	$2._{88}$		$1._{35}$	$2._{67}$	
1-10 ”	$45._{90}$		$4._{28}$	$24._{07}$		$13._{83}$	$22._{80}$	
10-40 ”	$12._{48}$	$14._{91}$	$20._{13}$	$30._{00}$	$73._{05}$	$21._{96}$	$28._{98}$	$74._{53}$
40 and > ”	$2._{43}$		$162._{21}$	$43._{05}$		$62._{86}$	$45._{55}$	
	Σ=100			100		100	100	

Distribution of Cultivated Area

	Ploughland		Meadows	Vineyards		Vegetables gardens		Woods and forests
Under 1 ha	2.78		3.20	7.56		16.26		1.18
1-10 "	25.71		29.27	35.42		34.48		11.96
10-40 "	32.33	71.51	36.43	25.98	57.02	25.99	49.26	18.94
40 and > "	39.18		31.10	31.04		23.27		67.92
Σ=	100		100	100		100		100

Number of farms (part 2, pp. 221-25)

	Under 1	1-10	10-40	40 and >
1862	?	2,435,401	636,309	154,167
1882	2,167,667	2,635,030	727,222	142,088
1892	2,235,405	2,617,558	711,118	138,671

Agricultural Machinery (part 2, pp, 256-59)

	Steam machines and traction engines	Ploughs*)	Horse-drawn hoes	Threshers	Seeders	Mowers	Harvesters	Tedders	Total
1862	2,849	3,206,421	25,846	100,733	10,853	9,442	8,907	5,649	3,867,851
1882	9,288	3,267,187	195,410	211,045	29,391	19,147	16,025	27,364	3,765,569
1892	12,037	3,669,212	251,798	234,380	52,375	38,753	23,432	51,451	4,321,401

Souchon (p. 94) should not be too happy about the number of machines having shown a moderate growth. If ploughs are not included in the "machines", the growth turns out to be rather strong. (p. 195).

(p. 195)

Growth of production	(part 2, p. 201) *Cheese* 2000 kg	*Butter* 2000 kg	Milch cows	Quantity of milk per cow	Total mill. hl
1882	114,696	74,851	5,019,670	15	68.206
1892	136,654	132,023	5,407,126	16	77.013

*) double and multi-share 1862—?
1882—157,719
1892—198,506

Vineyards

Part II, p. 89: from 1882, the number of ha has declined, but the number of hl of wine per ha increased from $15._{28}$ to $16._{12}$

Beet (sugar) (part 2, p. 63)

	ha	quintals per ha
1862	136,492	324
1882	240,465	368
1892	271,258	267

Number of farms: (part 1, 363)

	> 40 ha	40-100 ha	%	100 ha and >	%
1882	142,000	113,000	$1._{98}$	29,000	$0._{52}$
1892	139,000	106,000	$1._{84}$	33,000	$0._{58}$
	—3,000	—7,000		+4,000	

			%
Increase: < 1 ha	1882	2,168,000	$38._{22}$
	1892	2,235,000	$39._{21}$

			%
and 5-10 ha	1882	769,000	$13._{56}$
	1892	788,000	$13._{82}$

by % area under potatoes
10 and > %

Basses-Alpes	Loire
Rhône	Vosges
Puy-de-Dôme	Pyrénées-Orientales
Sarthe	Haute-Rhin (Belfort)
Haute Vienne	Seine
Saône-et-Loire	Ariège
Dordogne	Ardèche
Correze	
	15

by % of vineyards 5% and >		
	Indre-et-Loire	
	Gard	
Vaucluse	Lot-et-Garonne	Over 10%
Lot	Rhône	
Maine-et-Loire	Pyrénées-Orientales	
Loire-et-Cher	Gironde	
Tarn-et-Garonne	Gers	
Puy-de-Dôme	Aude	
Var	Hérault	
Haute-Garonne		
	17	

% of *area* under *cereals p. 65*
area (without %!!) under industrial crops: p. 164
vegetable gardens *p. 199* without %
vineyards p. 211, % *given*
All (?) (not all) crops by %%: *p. 238*.
potato % given p. *139*.

Area under vineyards in France (Bulgakov, II, 193)

	of total, farmland	Total area (ha)		This is area under vineyards c.
Under 1 ha	11%	1,327,253		145,000 ha
1-10 "	6%	5,489,200 5,755,500	=11,244,700	675,000 ha
10-40 "	2.7%	14,313,417		386,000 ha
40 and > "	3%	22,493,393		675,000 ha
Average	4.5%	49,378,763		1,881,000 ha

according to Note 4 on p. 184
vineyards total 1,800,000 ha

Departments with the most developed beetroot production: (p. 180)

	ha under beetroot	Area under farms 40 ha and >	Total area under all farms ha	Under potatoes ha		p. 139 % of ploughland
						%
1. Nord	47,903	167,836	511,166	1/3	19,714	5.3
Aisne	61,429	392,007	674,860	>1/2	13,286	2.6
Pas-de-Calais	37,325	250,733	629,350	<1/2	24,279	4.6
Somme	35,096	253,496	591,250	<1/2	15,374	3.1
4. Oise	24,828	296,201	529,933	>1/2	7,601	1.9
Seine-et-Marne	16,278	339,419	547,800	>1/2	10,001	2.4
Seine-et-Oise	9,992	287, 377	501,302	>1/2	16,802	4.4
8. Ardennes	5,212	271,518	485,290	>1/2	17,149	6.0
	Σ=238,063	2,258,587	4,471,001	>1/2	124,206	average for France 5.72%

Of total ha 271,258

(products on them—64 mill. quintals out of 72)

1892 = 271,000 ha

1882 = 240,000 ”

1862 = 136,000 ”

1840 = 58,000 ”

> 1/2 with average for France 45.55%

(of 1,474,144)

Written in 1901

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARISED DATA ON FARM IN GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, BRITAIN, U.S.A. AND DENMARK FROM THE CENSUSES OF THE 1880s AND 1890s[90]

	Farm area	Number of farms 1882	%	Number of farms 1895	%	Area under farms 1882	%	Area under farms 1895	%
Germany	Under 2 ha	3,068,831	58.03	3,236,367	58.23	1,825,938	5.73	1,808,444	5.56
	2- 5	981,407	18.60	1,016,318	18.28	3,190,203	10.01	3,285,984	10.11
	5- 20	926,605	17.56	998,804	17.97	9,158,398	28.74	9,721,875	29.90
	20-100	281,510	5.34	281,767	5.07	9,908,170	31.09	9,869,837	30.35
	> 100 ha	24,991	0.47	25,061	0.45	7,786,263	24.43	7,831,801	24.08
	Total:	5,276,344	100	5,558,317	100	31,868,972	100	32,517,941	100
France		1882		1892		1882		1892	
	Under 1 ha	2,167,667	38.22	2,235,405	39.21	1,083,833	2.19	1,327,253	2.68
	2- 5	1,865,878	32.90	1,829,259	32.08	5,597,634	11.29	5,489,200	11.12
	5- 10	769,152	13.56	788,299	13.82	5,768,640	11.63	5,755,500	11.65
	10-40	727,222	12.81	711,118	12.47	14,845,650	29.93	14,313,417	28.99
	> 40 ha	142,088	2.51	138,671	2.42	22,296,105	44.96	22,493,393	45.56
	Total:	5,672,007	100	5,702,752	100	49,591,862	100	49,378,763	100
Belgium		1880		1895					
	Under 2 ha	709,566	78.0	634,353					
	2- 5	109,871	12.1						
	5-20	74,373	8.2						
	20-50	12,186	1.3						
	50 ha and >	3,403	0.4	3,584					
	Total:	909,399	100	829,625					

				1895				1895	
Britain	1-5 acres			117,968	22.7			366,792	1.13
	5- 20			149,818	28.8			1,667,647	5.12
	20- 50			85,663	16.5			2,864,975	8.79
	50- 100			66,625	12.8			4,885,203	15.00
	100- 300			81,245	15.6			13,875,914	42.59
	300- 500			13,568	2.6			5,113,945	15.70
	500-1,000			4,616	0.9			3,001,184	9.21
	1,000 and >			603	0.1			801,852	2.46
		1880		520,106	100	1880		32,577,513	100
America		1880		1890		1880			
	Under 10 acre	139,241		150,194					
	10- 20	254,749		265,550					
	20- 50	781,574		902,777					
	50- 100	1,032,810		1,121,485					
	100- 500	1,695,983		2,008,694					
	500-1,000	75,972		34,395					
	> 1,000	28,578		31,546					
		4,008,907		4,564,641		536,081,835		623,218,619	
Denmark NZ, XIX, 2 623 (G. Bang)		1885		1895		1885		1895	
	Under 2.5 ha	117,816		125,602		Tönde Hartkorn* 6,226	Tönde Hartkorn average 10 ha	6,349	
	2.5- 10	67,773		66,591		34,506		34,102	
	10- 40	43,740		44,557		96,685		98,107	
	40-120	27,938		27,301		172,282		169,195	
	Over 120 ha	1,953		2,031		55,153		56,822	
		259,220		266,082		364,852		364,575	

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* Hartkorn—unit of area for the purposes of land-tax assessment by crop. Tönde—ton.—*Ed.*

FROM THE DUTCH

From the Dutch Agricultural Inquiry of 1890. {Thiels *Grohmann's*}

Insurance of dead and livestock of labourers

Number of typical communities		Total number of insured	Of them: Owners	Leaseholders	Both simultaneously
30	Labourers	4,551	1,693	2,055	803
44	Small peasants and peasants	4,319	1,700	1,363	1,256
44	Big peasants	2,671	972	1,013	686
30	Labourers	4,551	1,693	2,055	803
45	Small peasants and peasants	4,149	1,553	1,331	1,265
45	Big peasants	2,670	1,022	955	693

* Thiel's *Agricultural Yearbook*, Vol. 22 (1893).—*Ed.*

AGRICULTURAL INQUIRY OF 1890[91]

Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher. B. 22 (1893).* Article

and peasants by categories and percentages

Of the total number of insured those insured by items and percentages

Dwellings	%	Household effects	%	Livestock	%	Crops	%
2,020	44.4	1,524	33.5	730	16	720	15.8
3,084	71.6	2,263	52.4	1,712	39.7	1,787	41.4
2,059	77	1,827	68.4	1,472	55.1	1,631	61.0

Head of insured livestock by categories and percentages

Milch cows	%	Young stock	%	Sheep	%	Fattened pigs	%	He- and she-goats	%
4,062	89.3	1,416	31.1	4,041	88.8	6,028	132.5	3,089	68
17,470	421.0	11,129	268.3	11,441	275.8	12,414	299.2	802	19.3
28,166	1,050.5	22,513	843.2	21,667	811.5	13,562	507.9	349	13

Continued:

		Horses			
	Draught oxen	%	Geldings and mares	%	Young horses	%
	85	1.9	103	2.3	3	0.0
	253	6.0	3,545	85.5	346	8.4
	84	3.1	7,159	268.2	1,504	56.3

From the *Dutch* Agricultural Inquiry of 1890

Communities	Categories of farmers				Number of those using fertilisers other than manure		Number of those with farm hands (dinstboden)					Number of those who have labourers									
							1	2	3	4	5 and >	v. 1	t. 1	v. 2	t. 2	v. 3	t. 3	v. 4	t. 4	v. >4	t.*) >4
Laren	Labourers	1- 2	?	359	4	2	27	7	3	—	—	7	40	1	4	1	1	—	—		1
	Carters	2-10		181	1	—	51	18	4	1	—	2	30	—	2	—	1				—
	Small peasants	10-20	?	108	—	—	35	29	8	11	—	1	24	—	1	—	2				2
	Big ”	30-40		29	—	—	8	8	4	3	5	—	5	—	1	—	—				—
	Total			677	5	2	121	62	19	15	5	10	99	1	8	1	4	—	—	—	3
Geldermalsen	Farmers	50 and >	396	6			7	3	—	—	—	1	—	3	—		6				
	”	25-50	333	9			10	—				3	3	2	—		4				
	”	10-25	272	17			16	—				4	5	—	4		—				
	”	1-10	225	78			16	4				5	11	—	3		—				
?	Labourers	1 and <	16	24			—	—				—	—	—	—		—				
(voor-Vracht)	Carters	1-10	87	15			—	—				1	3	—	1		—				
	Total			149			49	7	—	—	—	14	22	5	8	—	10	—	—	—	—
Wamel	Big peasants		530	13			17	1				3	—	6	6		8				
	Small peasants		406	39			25	—				14	6	4	5		5				
	Tobacco-planters		84	38			—	—				4	13	—	—		—				
	Labourers		26	65			1	—				—	—	—	—		—				
	Total		1,046	155			43	1	—	—	—	21	19	10	10	—	13	—	—	—	—
Leeuwen	Big peasants		334	12			12	6				1	1	3	5		6				
	Small peasants		360	40			27	—				9	14	1	19		2				
	Tobacco-planters		191	90			13	—				—	43	—	—		—				
	Labourers		28	37			—	—				—	—	—	—		—				
	Total		913	179			52	6	—	—	—	10	58	4	24	—	6	—	—	—	—

Voorst	Big peasants	20-70	64	24	1	35	46	13		2	16	28	3	13	1	1				
	Small peasants	10-20	42	4	2	33	5	—		—	2	16	—	2	—	—				
	Carters	5-10	33	4	—	14	—	—		—	—	7	—	—	—	—				
	Labourers	2- 6	35	6	—	5	—	—		—	—	4	—	—	—	—				
	Total		174	38	3	87	51	13	—	2	18	55	3	15	1	1	—	—	—	—
Raalte	Labourers	1- 2	591	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—		—		—		—	—	—	—
	Carters	2-10	18		—	12	—	—	—	—	—		—		—		—	—	—	—
	Small peasants	10-20	195		2	58	17	1	—	—	2		—		—				—	—
	Big ”	20-60	191		10	50	71	11	10	2	2		2		1				1	
	Total		995	—	12	122	88	12	10	2	4	—	2		1		—	—	1	—
Dalfsen	Big peasants		129	2	2	72	17				2	3	1			3				
	Peasants		257	—	—	56	1				1	3	—			1				
	Small peasants		176	—	—	6	—				—	2	—			—				
	Labourers		379	1	1	5	—				—	3	—			—				
	Total		941	3	3	139	18	—	—	—	3	11	1	—	—	4	—	—	—	—

This column sometimes gives an amount in excess of the total because I summed up the number of farms keeping 1 (2 and so on) *men* and *women* farm-hands, whereas there are some farms which keep both. Unfortunately, the *total number* of farms using hired labour *is not given*.

This means that what can be summed up is only *either* the number of cases of labour hire *or* the number of hired labourers (by multiplying by 1, by 2, by 3, etc.).

Farming by “labourers” (1-2 ha) appears to be typical for all the communities.

*) v.=vast (ferme, bleibend)—permanent, t.=tijdelijk (temporel, passager)—temporary, v.=vrouwelijk (weiblich)—female.

The Inquiry is called *Uitkomsten van het Onderzoek naar den Toestand van den Landbouw in Nederland*,* and was carried out by an agrarian commission appointed by royal decree on September 18, 1886. Four big volumes (The Hague, 1890).

Descriptions by communities are on the lines of the Baden and other inquiries (but almost without budgets). Of special interest are the tables on many communities showing the distribution of farms among *labourers*, "carters", small peasants, and big peasants—(in Community No. 1, Laren, labourers usually have 1-2 ha; "carters", 2-10 ha; small peasants, 10-20 ha and big peasants, 30-40 ha; p. 7, Vol. I). Here are some of the heads in the table: 1) Getal = number of farms by size; 2) "state and location of land established with the participation of a definite number of farmers" (the location of the land ... on the farms is advantageous, middling, bad);—"gebruikte Mest" (use of fertilisers: manure, artificial fertilisers—by number of farms).—Number of horses and livestock of all categories.—Number of farms making butter and cheese (Zuivelboeren = peasants engaged in dairy farming). Number of farms using "old" (alt) and "new" methods of "dairy farming". Number of farms keeping "farm-hands" and "labourers" under three heads: 1 each, 2 each, "3 and more each".

In the summing up in Vol. IV, there are summaries for some few data relating to the communities, *but there is not a single summary for all the communities together* (a total of *95* communities were studied).

N.B.

There are different classifications by groups: 1) labourers, small peasants, big peasants; 2) land area 1-5 ha, etc., 60-70 ha, 70 ha and over, etc.; 3) *horses* (Community No. 92: small peasants—with one horse; peasants, with 2 horses; big peasants, with 3 or more horses); 4) vegetable gardeners, tobacco-planters, etc., are singled out.

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not later than April 1903

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* *Results of a Study of the State of Agriculture in the Netherlands.—Ed.*

REMARKS ON E. STUMPFE'S WORKS[92]

A

AN ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM STUMPFE'S ARTICLE, "ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM LAND HOLDINGS AS COMPARED WITH LARGE LAND HOLDINGS"

Stumpfe. "Über die Konkurrenzfähigkeit des kleinen und mittleren Grundbesitzes gegenüber dem Grossgrundbesitze."

Thiels landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher, 1896, Band *25*.

Stumpfe comes straight to the point by saying that if large units in agriculture were superior to the small, as they are in industry, the law on the settlement of Eastern Prussia would have been a mistake, and *the Social-Democrats would have been right* (p. 58).

According to the 1882 data, medium farms (10-100 ha!!) = $12._4$% of the farms and $47._6$% of the land—hence the "great economic importance of the *peasantry*" (p. 58). !

9 farms [Big and medium—kept books. Small farms—"strongest mistrust" p. 59].

Group I. Glogau district—sandy soil, rye and potatoes.
" II. Neumarkt and Breslau districts—good soil, beet crops, very intensive.
" III. Liegnitz district—lower intensiveness, weaker root crops.

	Group I	How much land ha?	Land classification Class ha	Crop area ha	Crop yield per Morgen Centners rye	potato	Livestock horses	horned cattle
Group I	Big farm {1892-93}	1,033	V— 52 VI— 203 VII— 198 VIII— 23	476 (1,903 Morgen)	$7._5$	79	23+	170
Group I	Medium farm	$21._{25}$	? almost the same land Note *No. 1**	19	5 oats: $7._5$	50	2+	9 (+6 pigs)
Group I	Small farm	$11._{25}$	V— $0._{25}$ VI— 3 VII— $3._{50}$ VIII— 3	10	$5._{25}$	?	1+	5 (+4 pigs)
Group II	Big farm (1892-93)	$471._5$	I— $212._5$ II— $120._5$ III— $59._0$	$361\frac{3}{4}$	$10._7$ wheat	beet 146 $12._{75}$	30+	180 (111 sheep**)
Group II	Medium farm	$51._5$	III— 25 IV— 13 V— 4 VI— $0._{75}$	$47._5$	$8._9$ wheat	beet 137 $11._3$	6+	29 (14 pigs)
Group II	Small farm	$8._5$	II— 1 III— 4 IV— $3._5$	$7._{25}$	?		0+	5 (6 pigs)
Group III	Big farm (1893-94)	445	?	?	?		29+	173 324 sheep 47 pigs
Group III	Medium farm	$40._{75}$	III— $11._5$ IV— $22._{25}$ V— $3._5$	$37._{25}$	?		7+	29 19 pigs
Group III	Small farm	$8._0$	III— $3._{60}$ IV— $1._{75}$ V— $2._{60}$	$7._{75}$	?		?	

* See p. 236.—*Ed.*

** A figure denoting the increase of sheep in 1892-93.—*Ed.*

Receipts (marks)								*Amount*
Sales								
grain		livestock and milk		Sundries		Farm economy		(Total receipts)
38,136		27,289		62,111 distillation		5,500 ("on manor account")		133,489
+453*								
1,257		758		—		—		2,015
618		491		—		—		1,109
64,476	milk	21,357	beet	46,144		from lease		***172,714***
		+						
	livestock	19,370	potatoes			2,866		
			+	1,457				
	sheep	6,455	fruits in general	4,767		5,852	(=stocks in hand)	
5,574		4,050	beet	767		rape and clover		***11,060***
+198*			potatoes	40				
1,010		1,095		—		—		***2,105***
34,334		18,201	potatoes	1,145		from lease		68,667
other cereals			receipts			117		
+seed			from					
12,005			sheepyard	2,865				
3,584	live-		potatoes	504		clover 153		8,544
	stock	1,910				pigs *1,007*		
	milk	780						
	poultry	76						
+530*								
632	livestock	176	beet	105				1,478
	milk	290		155	=cucumbers and cabbage			
	pigs	120						

(ctd on next page)

* Stumpfe lists these receipts (453, 198 and 530 marks) under the head of "Insgemein" ("General Receipts").—*Ed.*

[ctd]

Outlays

a) taxes b) fire and hail insurance	a) salaries and wages of farm-hands b) day wages	Sundries	purchases a) livestock b) feed c) artificial fertilisers	a) building repairs b) transportation, carriage, mail c) others	*total*
a) 953 + b) 2,120	7,093 + 19,221	4,939 (farm requirements) 36,593 (distillation)	a) 12,506 + b) 11,175 + c) 11,796	1,617 1,162 2,223	111,398
34 40	a + 347 b	50 (sundries)	90 — —	64 (blacksmith, saddle-maker cartwright)	625
a + b = 33	a + 90 b	42 + 30	63 — —	29 (blacksmith, etc.)	287
a) 1,374 b) 734 1,084	a) 9,933 b) 24,725 c) 4,089 food for farm-hands	sundries: 2,355 purchase of grain=5,423 steam plough = 2,530	a) 14,557 b) 24,552 c) 10,052 sheepyard expenses= 4,962	a) 692 b) 1,111 c) 2,914 6,168 = pay to artisans 1,595 heating 1,500 firewood and timber	***120,350***
a + 379 b	a + 1,560 b	purchase of seed 230	a) 554 b) 890 c) 634	general expenses 969 275 blacksmith, etc.	***5,500***
a) 30 b) 26	—	sundries: 65	a) 100 b) 225	blacksmith, etc. *31*	***503***
a) 1,288 b) 2,238	a) 5,336 b) 13,228 432 farm-hands and food	2,836 firewood and coal sundries: 661 sheepyard expenses *113*	a) 2,070 b) 5,320 c) 775 seeds: 177	a) 375 b) 117 c) 618 2,714 artisans	38,298
a) 159 b) 152	a + 1,137 b 218 food for farm-hands	262 artisans old-age insurance=34	a) 549 b) 900 c) 305	a) — b) — c) 770 seed 147	4,633
a) 34 b) 22	—	general *68*	a) 90 b) 110 c) 40	46 blacksmith, etc.	410

Profit (less remuneration to owner)	Net income marks	Same per ha		
22,091 1,500	20,591	36.72	Big farm	Group I
1,390 350 (!!)	1,040	50.12	Medium farm	
822 300 (!!)	522	52.20	Small farm	
52,364 1,500	50,864	118.40	Big farm	Group II
5,566 450	5,116	99.32	Medium farm	
1,602 450	1,152	135.56	Small farm	
30,369 900	29,469	76.04	Big farm	Group III
3,911 450	3,461	84.92	Medium farm	
1,608 350	718	89.72	Small farm	

Notes to Tables*

No. 1. "It was impossible to establish the land assessment there (medium farm of Group I), but the ploughland was almost of the same quality as on the landowner's estate (big farm I), possibly slightly more uniform" (p. 63).

About Group I, the author (who was employed on the estate for two years and has a knowledge of the countryside (p. 66)), says:

While, on the strength of the big outlays under the head of feed and artificial fertilisers, and also the large expenditure on wages, and taking account of the sandy soil, the landowner's estate should be characterised as highly intensive and undoubtedly quite up to the modern standard, the very opposite has to be said of the two peasant farms.

"In almost every respect they are still being run on the old lines, and their production should be classified as extensive, in terms of capital and labour. No feed or fertilisers are purchased; on the contrary, considerable quantities of straw and also rye and potatoes, especially, are sold. In consequence, there is insufficient compensation of nutritive substances.... The result is worse crops and a shortage of livestock.

Sic!

"The stubbornness with which local peasants stick to their old habits is very hard to understand, especially in view of the good example they daily have before them, which could, after all, stimulate them to competition. However, in the recent period, it appears, there, too, a turn for the better is beginning" (p. 61).

!??

Remuneration for the owner's labour is reckoned at 7,500 for the big farm (the usual salary of a manager!!) ÷ 5 (the owner has 5 estates!!) = 1,500. For the medium farm—350 ("the usual pay for the country" (p. 64) for managing such a farm!). For the small farm—300 ("a unit!!! half the size of the preceding one" p. 66).

No size of family is given.

Concerning Group II, Stumpfe remarks that the farms are not quite comparable, because the *land is better* on the big farm (the whole farm is a pearl among the Silesian estates (p. 74), according to a professor from Halle!!),

* See pp. 232-36.—*Ed.*

and it is *much better* situated, only 1 mile from Breslau (the small farms are much farther away). Still!! small farming is particularly profitable!!!

About the medium farm of Group II: "But the especially great advantage of peasant farming is that it is entirely in the owner's hands, and that work in one's own interest and for one's personal profit will nearly always be of higher value, and more economical and profitable than work in the interest of others" (p. 69). !

For the small farm, remuneration is 450 marks = (1) for the owner—350 + (2) 100 marks to his wife's parents, who substitute for *hired labour* (pp. 72-73). [I must say that the substitution is cheap!]

The medium farm is said to be on the modern level as well, and is in general quite faultless, not worse than the big farm.

(No detailed data on machinery!!)

The village has an amalgamated dairy, and there is joint use of machinery, joint purchase of fertilisers, etc.

About Group III we learn only that the big farm is excellently run (p. 74) [The entire description of Group III is **highly** superficial (pp. 74-77).]

Stumpfe's conclusion: the smaller the holding, the larger the rent (p. 77).)) !!

...There is not the slightest doubt that on peasant farms where the owner takes due care of the progress of operations or takes part in them himself, the work is performed qualitatively and quantitatively very differently from the way it is done on the landowners' estates, with the exception, perhaps, of the quantitative side in case of piecework (p. 78). !!

...which is why, despite the partially insignificant gross income, the net profit of the small farms was still higher... (p. 78).

Group I. Receipts in marks from (p. 78)

	cropping		livestock farming		general		total	
	total	per ¼ ha	total	per ¼ ha	total	per ¼ ha	total	per ¼ ha
Big farm	63,652	$28._{37}$	27,289	$12._{16}$	773	$0._{34}$	91,715	$40._{89}$
Medium "	1,257	$15._{14}$	758	$9._{13}$	—	—	2,015	$24._{27}$
Small "	618	$15._{46}$	491	$12._{27}$	—	—	1,109	$27._{72}$

etc., etc., the same thing all over again.

!! The peasant is also able to slash his expenses in the household budget (p. 80), etc.

!! { The same: *p. 83* ("living within their means")

He argues that there is a tendency on the part of sugar and distillation enterprises to branch out from agriculture, etc., and that *co-operatives* place the advantages also *within reach* of the small farms (p. 85), etc. (cf. *David*—echoes this).

The *machine* does not play the same part in agriculture (*cf. David*!).

!! "It is at any rate beyond doubt that the steam plough does not at all reduce production costs" (p. 87) (*cf. Bensing and Fischer*)

The small farmer *does the repairs himself* (!!) (p. 92) and his implements last longer (p. 92)—"This is undoubtedly also connected with the higher earnings of artisans on the big farms (not because the big ones pay more, but because) there are all sorts of discards of tools and wood ends, which would be in use on a small farm *for a long time yet* (!!). In general, this effort to make use even of the smallest objects, this possibility of pressing down to a minimum expenses on the farm's small current !! requirements is an important characteristic advantage of the small farm..." (p. 92).

The Social-Democrats have also issued their threats in the countryside—there will be strikes as well, and all this is a much greater danger to the big farms (94).

The big farmer's expenses on labour are higher, because he has to feed whole families of labourers, whereas the small farmer for the most part takes on unmarried men, and although the labourer's food is considerably better on the peasant farms and is, consequently, costlier than on the landowners' estates, we have here, on the other hand, the resultant much higher productivity of labour by young, strong and well-fed labourers, and this N.B. fact is of great importance, especially since much account has to be taken also of the incentive and educational element in the owner's preliminary and joint work (p. 95).

"All the organisation of the work on the big and small farms, in Silesia at least, is such that *there is decidedly no reason to doubt* the lower cost of labour on the peasant farms" (p. 96). N.B.

—again there is mention of the stimulating influence of the labour of the owner and *his children* (p. 96). The peasants provide better food for the farm-hands.

Disability and old-age insurance is another burden on the big farm: !

Group II

total 490	marks	big	farm	0.30	marks
34	"	medium	"	0.16	"
0	"	small	"	0	"

per Morgen

(p. 101) The Social-Democrat gentlemen have blundered badly over agriculture....

p. 102. Sering on settlement ("putting labour at the disposal" of the landowning gentlemen!!),—and "Landed estates are unable to compete with the immense capital which is contained in the *hands* and *feet* of these men [the settlers]" (Sering, quoted p. 102). !

p. 106: the big farms are mostly superior in *commercial* terms, but the **co-operatives** will help the peasant.

p. 108: the *peasants* usually sell their corn and livestock *less* profitably [but that is said to be balanced out by other things].

"It is not the German Junker that is the enemy of the peasant; the two have, apart from inessential issues which are mostly of internal importance, the same interests and the same adversaries. This is a conviction which has lately been strongly making its way" (p. *113*). N.B.

There you have Stumpfe!

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B

REMARKS ON E. STUMPFE'S BOOK, *SMALL HOLDINGS AND GRAIN PRICES*

Dr. Emil *Stumpfe* (*Der kleine Grundbesitz und die Getreidepreise*. Leipzig 1897, Band III, Heft 2 der *Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge* von *Miaskowski**) gives a rather interesting summary of quite extensive budgetary data on small farms (***181*** under-10-ha farms) in various parts of Germany, but *only* on their sale and purchase of *farm* products.

Stumpfe argues with David (*Neue Zeit* No. 36, 1894/5), who took the data of the Hessen Inquiry and reckoned the sales and purchases. (Kühn simply reckoned the sales per hectare). Stumpfe deducts 33-40% as the cost of fabrication from the purchase price, on the plea that you cannot take the price of the purchased product but only the price of the *raw material* which has gone into the making of the product!! This approach (an absurd one) spoils the whole work terribly. (Although this recalculation is done *only when* it gives a different result!)

N.B.: reckoning the *sum* of all types of pluses and minuses } However, I shall go over the cases of this recalculation, which the author always indicates: *No. 19* (Baden, 2-3 ha), the minus becomes a plus, *No. 31* (Baden *2-3 ha*), same thing, No. 50, the minus remains, *No. 112*, Württemberg 2-3 ha

* Miaskowski's *Contribution to State and Social Science.*

No. 40	still plus	No. 143	still plus
No. 41	same	No. 151	”
No. 48	”	No. 152	”
No. 49	”	Nos. 154-161	”
No. 51	”	No. 169	”
No. 60	”	No. 170	”
No. 75	”	No. 171	”
No. 79	”	No. 172	”
No. 94	”	No. 173	”
No. 98	”	No. 174	”
No. 100	”	No. 175	”
No. 111	”	Nos. 179-181	”

This means that only in three cases has Stumpfe's absurd approach distorted the state of affairs, by turning an overall minus (excess of purchases over sales) into a plus.

In the vast majority of cases, the result is still an *overall minus*. (Stumpfe calculates three types of plus and minus, separately for cereals (I), livestock products (III) and the rest (II)).

That is why I find that I can take Stumpfe's table with its conclusions on the *pluses and minuses* (sales and purchases, as a sum total), making note of *three* corrections.

Stumpfe makes a separate comparison of *sales* and *purchases* in I, II and III:

I	cereals and pulses	giving tables for
		(1) I
II	all other cropping products	(2) I + II
III	livestock products	(3) I + II + III

Stumpfe then gives separate results for the states, separating *southern Germany* (Baden 60*), Hessen 44, Württemberg 12 + Bavaria) from *northern* Germany (Saxony 6 + 28, Silesia 24, Hannover 7). I take only the results for **southern** and **northern** Germany.

(On 52 of these Stumpfe collected **himself**!!: 24 in Silesia + 28 in the Kingdom of Saxony.)

*) The number of under-10-ha farms. Stumpfe takes only the under-10-ha farms, putting the over-10-ha farms in a special annexe.

Farms	Southern and northern Germany	Number of farms	Mouths over 14 years	Mouths under 14 years
Under 2 ha	Southern	20	56	50
	Northern	7	19	12
	Σ	27	75	62
1½-2 ha	Southern	5	19	10
	Northern	7	19	12
	Σ	12	38	22
2-3 ha	Southern	21	66	47
	Northern	9	23	19
	Σ	30	89	66
3-4	Southern	10	40	17
	Northern	12	32	24
	Σ	22	72	41
4-6	Southern	26	103	55
	Northern	(25)	(74)	(49)
	Σ	51	177	104
6-8	Southern	23	102	31
	Northern	2	7	4
	Σ	25	109	35
8-10 ha	Southern	19	88	39
	Northern	7	25	18
	Σ	26	113	57

In general, Stumpfe's book is a grossly *biased defence* of taxes.

In his opening pages, Stumpfe analyses the question of the effect corn prices have on those of other farm products, insisting (correctly) on the tremendous and all-decisive importance of *corn* prices.

On how many farms sales greater (+) or purchases greater (—) +	—	Total farmland	Per ha adults	children	Adults + children (2 children = 1 adult
6	4	24.54	2.28	2	3.30
7	—	13.06	1.45	0.9	1.9
13	14				
3	2	8.73	2.2	1.1	2.7
7	—	13.06	1.45	0.9	1.9
10	2				
16*)	5	52.83	1.25	0.89	1.69
9	–	24.42	0.94	0.77	1.32
25*)	5				
9	1	37.20	1.07	0.45	1.29
12	1	42.93	0.74	0.55	1.01
21	1				
26	—	131.69	0.78	0.41	0.98
25	—	120.75	0.61	0.40	0.81
51	—				
22	1	156.99	0.65	0.20	0.75
2	—	14.50	0.48	0.27	0.61
24	1				
19	—	168.88	0.52	0.23	0.63
7	—	60.75	0.41	0.28	0.55
26	—				

*) Stumpfe has 19 and 2, and Σ of 28 and 2.

The area under cereals in Germany in 1878—$52._{59}$% of total farmland

1883—$53._{46}$%

1893—$54._{37}$%

The extension of the area under other cereals (and of livestock farming correspondingly) is rapidly leading to their respective overproduction, which tends again to even out prices (cf. Marx on Smith. But Stumpfe does not quote Marx and does not apply the theory of rent to the question)

Stumpfe's italics

"Thus, there is good ground for the thesis that there can be no prolonged disproportions in the rent yielded by the several crops per area unit, and that a levelling off must follow sooner or later" (p. 15).

Stumpfe also analyses the prices of livestock products, arguing along the same lines.

Stumpfe polemises with Reichschancellor Hohenlohe, who said on March 29, 1895, that only the over-12-ha farms wanted higher prices, that is, only 4 million out of the 19 million agricultural population, reckoning 3.5 persons per farm. Stumpfe makes roughly the following estimation of the agricultural population (1882 data) (p. 40)

		millions of agricultural population
Parcel farms	under 2 ha	$0._6 \times 3._5 = 2._1$ million
Small "	2 to 5 ha	$0._{99} \times 4._5 = 4._4$ "
Medium "	5 to 20 ha	$0._{96} \times 7 = 6._7$ "
Big-peasant	20 to 100 ha	$0._{29} \times 13 = 3._7$ "
Big "	over 100 ha	$0._{025} \times 90 = 2._2$ "
		$19._1$ million

Stumpfe believes that there is no more than 0.6 million agricultural population on the *3* millions of under-2-ha farms. "The owners of under-1-ha parcel farms ... are mostly craftsmen, small industrialists, factory workers, etc., consequently, anything but peasants or independent farm owners" (p. 39).

Sic! Stumpfe says something quite different on another occasion!

3.5 persons per farm with less than 2 ha, for "after all, grown up children mostly go into employment right away" (p. 40).

Here are the statistics of family size, according to Stumpfe's data:

The number per farm was (p. 82)

Groups	Number of farms	Adults	Children	Total
ha: 0- 1½	15	2.5	2	4.5
1½- 2	12	3.16	2.6	5.78
2- 3	30	3	2.2	5.2
3- 4	22	3.27	1.86	5.1
4- 6	49	3.6	2.1	5.7
6- 8	25	4.3	1.4	5.7
8-10	26	4.34	2.2	6.5
10-20	37	6	2	8
20 and over	12	8.75	2.1	10.85

And Stumpfe concluded: the "average" for the 5 to 20 ha group will be precisely about 7, for the 20 to 100 ha, about 13, if it is about 11 for the 20 to 30 ha group.

(A funny character! he's forgotten all about *hired* labour!!)

(Stumpfe's distribution of agricultural population is of some interest for the picture of *hired labour*.)

He says that all peasants—including the labourers on the big farms!!—all want higher corn prices. } !

Stumpfe himself suspects that the data he has collected (for Silesia, etc., see above*) will appear unlikely (p. 50),

* See p. 241.—*Ed.*

and so he defends himself in advance: why is it that, according to his data, the conditions in *northern* Germany are much better, when *southern* Germany is regarded as being more civilised?

And Stumpfe attacks *southern* Germany "...incredible fragmentation of holdings" (p. 48)—10-12-20 parcels per hectare!—hence "the intensified supply of farms with labour everywhere" (p. 49)—in general the population in the south is much more static (p. 49)—see, he says, the *Bavarian* Inquiry of *1895*, the new one!—a prevalence of three-field farming (Bavaria; inquiry)—"great backwardness of the whole economy" (p. 51), very frequently the system of compulsory crop rotation still *in evidence*, furthermore "fragmentation and stripping of farmlands prevent or hamper any kind of melioration" (p. 52), frequently make almost impossible the introduction and use of
ha-ha!! these new remarkably improved agricultural implements (p. 52), for example, out of 24 *Bavarian* communities only 4 use the seed drill. "The advan-
ha-ha! tages of farming with the use of the seed drill are so well-known and incontestable" (p. 52) etc., and other machines are rare too, old ploughs are "often of the most primitive form" (p. 52), rollers
! are unknown, etc.... This backwardness in machine and technical equipment....

ha-ha! (The very same Stumpfe who, on another occasion, deprecates the importance of machinery—when he defends the small farms!)

—not a single centrifuge (p. 53) in the places described by the *South-German* inquiries. "This technical backwardness is crowned" with reports from Christazhofen and Ingerkingen of threshing by horses (on horseback)—"such is the antediluvian method of husking grain"—Stumpfe exclaims.

...Fertilising methods leave very much to be desired (53), etc.

{—meanwhile, quotations from *The Condition of the Peasants*, *in favour* of small farms in the north (pp. 54-55). I must say these quotations look very much like Bulgakov's! *Make a comparison*!

In Silesia, peasants have seed drills, manure spreaders, etc., etc. (p. 55), the crop rotation system prevails, rollers (pp. 56-57).

"One need only list these very important (sic!) implements to discover the extremely different state of farming in southern and northern Germany" (p. 57). Then "there is the usual under-estimation" (p. 58)—in the north, the "*good example*" (p. 59) set by the landowners (sic!), the "teachers" of the peasants (!), a model, "pioneers in farming" (p. 59)! As for the South, it more or less completely lacks big farms (p. 60).

!!

Oh, Herr Stumpfe!!

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REMARKS ON G. FISCHER'S WORK, *THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF MACHINERY IN AGRICULTURE*[93]

Gustav Fischer. Die sociale Bedeutung der Maschinen in der Landwirtschaft. Leipzig 1902. (Schmollers *Forschungen*, XX. Band, 5. Heft.)

> The introduction quotes the writings of Social-Democrats on small farming. Among them *Sering*, *The Agrarian Question and Socialism* (con Kautsky), Schmoller's *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft.** Band 23, 4. Heft.

Sering has already said that agriculture is unlike industry, especially in the matter of machinery.

Chapter I. "The Cost of Machine Labour and the Limits of Its Profitability".

"It was on the big farms that conditions first existed for the use of agricultural machinery" (p. 4)—initially even the manufacturers were concerned only with machinery for the big farms. Now they supply machines for the small ones as well.

The author wants to discover the limits for these new machines according to the new data.

Here is the result of his calculations (pp. 24-25)

Kautsky on p. 94 of his *Agrarian Question* says, that, according to Kraft, the limits of full use are α) *1,000* ha; and b) *70* ha (p. 5)

* *Yearbook for Legislation, Administration and National Economy.—Ed.*

Type of machine	Limit of economic usefulness *ha*	Cost of machine labour under full use*) *marks per ha*	manual*) labour marks *per ha*	This is full use *ha*	AA see below*
(α) Steam plough (20 h.p.)	192	34	$51._{20}$	500	
Steam plough (12 h.p.)	121	$33._{8}$	$42._{7}$	250	
Broadcast sower	—	$0._{88}$	$0._{44}$	> 360	ha
Seed drill (3.766 m)	$21._{6}$	$2._{56}$	$6._{04}$	360	17
(β) Seed drill (1.88 m)	$13._{6}$	$3._{48}$	$6._{04}$	160	$8._{8}$
Manure spreader	—	$1._{12}$	$0._{55}$	> 280	
Cultivator (3.766 m)	4	$2._{13}$	16	180	$3._{7}$
Cultivator (2.0 m)	$1._{2}$	$2._{06}$	16	75	$1._{1}$
One-row cultivator	$0._{27}$	$4._{2}$	16	$22._{5}$	$0._{23}$
Hay mower	$13._{4}$ (or $6._{7}$)	$3._{5}$	5	58	$3._{4}$
Reaper with self-throwing	$9._{5}$	$6._{9}$	11	76	$7._{1}$
(β) Reaper-binder	—	$11._{25}$	11	76	$24._{3}$
Reaper with manual rake	$8._{1}$	$7._{0}$	11	68	$5._{1}$
Tedder	$2._{9}$ (or $1._{5}$)	$6._{3}$	$12._{5}$	35	$0._{95}$
Horse-drawn rake with seat	$13._{8}$ (or $6._{9}$)	1	$1._{6}$	90	$8._{0}$(4)
ditto without seat	$9._{45}$ (or $4._{73}$)	$1._{2}$	$1._{6}$	$67._{5}$	$3._{9}$($1._{9}$)

The author calculates his limits of usefulness as follows: he takes performance per day (5 ha per steam plough), determines the price of manual (resp. with the use of a team) labour in that time, and calculates the *minimum number of days* of machine work required for the price to be *the same*. This minimum (in terms of ha) is his limit.

(Hence, that is the *minimum* limit where the machine is still *not* cheaper than manual labour.)

The author frequently quotes Bensing (countering his statements, for instance, with that of Rimpau, to the effect that a horse-drawn plough works as well as the steam plough, provided it ploughs to the same depth: p. 8). !

Potato planters are still not feasible (the potatoes vary in size, and weigh 8 centners to ¼ ha, while

* See p. 250.—*Ed.*

seed-grain comes to less than 1 centner). But one recent invention is a hole potato-planter which makes regular holes, helps to furrow and hoe, although the potato is inserted by hand (p. 11).
N.B. Saves labour, and the *income increase* is reckoned at 5% (p. 12).

There has been no success so far in making *reasonably* good potato and beet lifters.

Chapter II. "The Possibilities of Using Machinery on Small Farms". (p. 27)

	Cereals			*Sugar-beet*	*Meadow) hay*
Reduction of costs *per hectare*	$17._{52}$	marks:	52 centners (crop)	$30._{78}$	$8._{30}$
As compared with manual labour *per centner*	$0._{36}$	marks per centner		$0._{05}$ (640 centners)	(:80)$0._{10}$ (centners)

Consequently, the cost reduction is *not large*. This, he says, is against *Bensing*, for he *fails to debit to the machine costs the cost of the teams* (p. 28)—"not quite right".

Considering that the cost of the teams does not apply to some machines set into motion by draught animals (for the cattle is there anyway, and is not fully used), we find the limits of economic usefulness still further reduced (p. 28) (see, AA in table*)

> "It goes without saying that farmers whose holding hardly, if at all, allows them to use machinery because of its size, are at a disadvantage, as compared with those who attain the highest possible use of machinery or are close to it, in view of the fact that the per-hectare cost of using machinery does

* See p. 249.—*Ed*.

not fall in proportion to the time of use, but at first drops sharply and then slower and slower" (p. 29).

For instance, a mower costs 5.94 Mk per ha for 8 days
" " 5.24 " per ha for 20 days

"...70 pfennigs per hectare is, of course, not much" (p. 30). || ha-ha!

Moreover, the "really" *lower* % of machine depreciation should be allowed the small farmer: he takes more care. See, he says, Auhagen,* Stumpfe,** *Herkner* (!) (*The Labour Problem*, Berlin, 1897, p. 226).

The *small* farmer can make *co-operative* use of machinery: hire of machinery (thresher very often, p. 31) (it is also most convenient with regard to the steam plough, p. 32) (although the *small* one cannot use the steam plough even on hire: p. 33, his fields are not long enough).

The hiring out of machinery ... is very common (p. 33). "The big landowner lets ... his small neighbours ... use his seed drill on hire".... || N.B. cf. Klawki!! N.B.

The *co-operatives* are developed to a greater extent than the statistics show. In 1890, Bavaria had 282 machine (thresher) co-operatives. But very many farms pool machines privately.

Chapter III. "*The Importance of Machinery for the Labour Problem*".

Machines are frequently introduced, even when they are *more expensive* (seeders, etc.) because of the *labour shortage*. Can the machines help when there is a shortage of labour?

Most say: yes (p. 37). *Von der Holtz is sceptical* (they tend to increase winter unemployment, etc.).

Here is the author's calculation of the labour saving through machinery: (p. 39)

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* See p. 130.—*Ed.*
** See p. 238.—*Ed.*

	ha worked per day	this requires		for equal performance by manual labour		saving in labour through machinery	
		men	youngsters or women	man-days	youngsters- or women-days	man-days	youngsters- or women-days
Broadcast sower	9	1	—	2	—	1	—
Seed drill 3.$_{77}$ m	9	4	—	2	—	2	—
Seed drill 1.$_{88}$ m	4	3	—	1	—	2	—
Manure spreader	10	1	1	2.$_{2}$	—	1.$_{2}$	—1
Cultivator 3.$_{7}$ m	9	3	—	—	120	—3	120
Cultivator c. 2.$_{00}$ m	3.$_{75}$	1	1	—	50	—1	49
Hay mower	3.$_{2}$	1	—	8	—	7	—
Reaper with self-throwing	3.$_{8}$	1	1	8	—	7	—1
Reaper-binder	3.$_{8}$	1	1	8	8	7	7
Reaper with manual rake	3.$_{4}$	2	—	7	—	5	—
Beet lifter	1.$_{7}$	2	9	—	13	—2	4
Tedder	7	1	—	—	14	—1	14
Horse-drawn rake with seat	6	1	—	—	4.$_{8}$	—1	4.$_{8}$
ditto without seat	4.$_{5}$	1	—	—	3.$_{6}$	—1	3.$_{6}$

> "With the exception of the seed drill, which is used in the spring and autumn seasons, and the manure spreader, which requires a roughly similar application of labour, all the machines, therefore, show a saving of labour, as compared with manual operations" (p. 38).

especially the cultivator (very important)

and the reaper—which is why it is used with the binder, even if it is more expensive (there are few hands during the harvesting!). The same goes for the steam plough.

"All the above-mentioned machines have the advantage of making the farmer more independent of the demand for labour. He can oppose the excessive wage demands at whose mercy he would otherwise have been placed without being able to offer any resistance, and, what is much more important, he can perform operations for which he would otherwise not have found any labour at all" (p. 40).

The manure spreader works better, more evenly, than the unskilled labourer.

The seed drill *helps to save* seed stock.

"The milk separator is also one of those machines which yield a qualitative performance coefficient unattainable under manual labour" (p. 41). In 1900, Germany had 2,841 dairy co-operatives.

The 1895 statistics show furthermore that it was the peasant farms that led in the absolute number of participants in them, whereas the large farms, at any rate, are still very far ahead in proportion to their total.

"Participation in dairy co-operatives or amalgamated dairies"
(p. 41)

	farms	percentage of each group
under 2 ha	10,300	0.3
2 to 5 ha	31,819	3.1
5 to 20 ha	53,597	5.4
20 to 100 ha	43,561	15.4
100 ha and over	8,805	35.1

"However, the relatively insignificant participation of the small farms in dairy co-operatives is partly due to the fact that they are mostly situated on the immediate outskirts of towns and sell more of their milk than large farms to urban buyers, without processing it" (p. 41). !?

The thresher leads to a substitution of *free labourers* for indentured day labourers who do the threshing (p. 42) (cf. Max Weber). Payment in kind is supplanted by payment *in cash*—"as a result of which even the smaller holder becomes more depend-

N.B. ent on ready cash than ever before.... Such are the socially unfavourable consequences of the introduction of the thresher" (p. 42).

Agricultural machines demand more intelligent workers (as compared to the industrial??)...

Chapter IV. "*Electricity in Agriculture*".

The author finds the expectations of Kautsky and Pringsheim exaggerated, gives two examples of *actual* use of electricity (on royal estates in 1895-96), contests one calculation, obtaining a higher cost of production instead of the lower one (inferred by the author of a report on the royal estates) and says that "electrification of farming is not yet able to yield any considerable reduction of costs, although it does provide all sorts of conveniences and comforts for the performance of operations" (p. 51).

Is it cheaper for the big farms? Not much, for the motors in agriculture are all too small.

The substitution of electric motors for field machines (Pringsheim) is a realm of speculation.

Finale:

"The production of electric power will remain cheapest at the big central stations, with which the small farmer can just as easily obtain a connection as the big one. The advantages secured by the latter from a somewhat better use of motors and any possible small rebate that he may be given will be insignificant. That is why any shift of social relations to the detriment of small farming should not be expected" (p. 54).

Chapter V. "*Machinery in North-American Agriculture*"

The limit of the economic usefulness of machines is (must be) even lower, because wages are higher.

There is the most rapid growth of *medium* farms (George K. Holmes on the progress of American agriculture in *Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture*, 1899).

(320 acres = 128 ha is taken to be a medium farm, because the whole of farming is extensive: p. 58.)

There is nowhere any swallowing up of the small by the big (p. 62), machines cannot give the big farms the edge they do in industry (p. 63).

The farms will be increasingly smaller with the growth of intensiveness.

The small farms have the same machines as the big ones.

Example:	300-320 acres	1 plough with seat	1 disc harrow	1 seed drill
	and 6,500 acres	22 "	32 "	10 "

etc. (Fischer sees no advantages from diversified machinery!)

"Thus, large-scale farming there does not obtain any advantages from the use of machinery" (p. 59)? ?

The small holder is more careful, more painstaking, he saves the $100 which the big farmer pays to his labourers as a bonus for the best cultivated lots, etc. (p. 59). !!

The large wheat farms, with very extensive farming, are to be found only in North Dakota.

Greater use? (156 acres per binder in one case, and 65 acres, on a small farm), but that is "only little" (p. 61). ?!

Final conclusions (pp. 64-66)

...the machines are used mostly because of the labour shortage; more and more are being introduced on the small farms

% increase from 1882 to 1895 (p. 65)

	Steam ploughs	Seed drills	Reapers	Steam threshers	Other threshers
under 2 ha	33	211	410	733	145
2- 5 ha	257	187	669	414	187
5- 20 ha	171	226	352	214	130
20- 100 ha	201	169	83	160	57
over 100 ha	87	76	9	83	1

ha-ha! | "This comparison shows that the percentage increase in the number of farms using machinery among the small farms ... is considerably greater than among the big ones...."

...These figures best of all prove (!?) that machinery in agriculture is not at all a domain of the big farms (p. 66), for there is a rapid growth in the understanding of its importance and the possibility of its use even on the parcel farms.

Sic!

Written in 1902

First printed in the Fourth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

NOTE ON P. TUROT'S BOOK, *AGRICULTURAL INQUIRY 1866-1870*[94]

Paul *Turot*, *Enquête agricole de 1866-1870*, *resumée par*... Paris 1877.

The Inquiry consisted of 33 volumes, which were not on sale. The first 4 volumes gave a general summary of which a resume was made by Mr. Turot. Although his work has been "crowned" with a gold medal, it is on the lowest possible level. It is not a summary of the Inquiry data, but a summary of the "data on the decisions" of the central commission in charge of the Inquiry. And its decisions are such, for instance, as that machinery should be imported duty-free, that inventors must be rewarded (pp. 84-87: no data at all on the use of machinery!!),—that labour cards, should not be introduced (pp. 81-84), etc. The rest of the chapters can be judged from the content of this, "Chapter III. Wages. Piece Work" (content—nil).

No wonder its pages remain uncut (at the British Museum).

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not later than April 1903

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REMARKS ON H. BAUDRILLART'S BOOK, *THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION OF FRANCE.* PART III. *THE POPULATION OF THE SOUTH*[95]

*Baudrillar*t (Henri), *Les populations agricoles de la France.* 3-me série. *Les populations du Midi.* Paris 1893.

Only some small notes can be made while looking through this book, which is, written in the same style and spirit as the earlier volumes.

Les bouches-du-Rhône. The city of Marseilles. Very superficial description of agriculture. Note is made of the common practice of *share-cropping* (métayer, ***méger***). Among others: le comte de Tourdonnet, *Étude sur le métayage en France** (without any indication of time or place).

For example. "...The peasant farmers, who share the status of small holder and rural labourer, are fairly well off"—for instance, outlays are 510 francs (husband + wife), receipts = 850 francs. "Consequently, a household is able (!!!) to live in a comfortable (!!) manner, having 500 francs and making savings" (!!). That's Baudrillart all over!

Pp. 267-69 on "the solidarity" of agriculture (at Hérault) and industry (cloth manufacture)—for instance, the factory at Villeneuvette (100 men + 300 women). The same line of employers since 1792 (Maistre), the workers are at the factory all their lives, "Christian" spirit in the master's

* Count de Tourdonnet, *An Essay on Share-cropping in France.—Ed.*

attitude to his workers. The owner of the factory "runs" it through "a small commune, with the aid of the municipal council which has sprung from its midst [of the factory management]", etc. Such is Baudrillart! Volume Three especially appears to be incredibly dry, monotonous, matter-of-fact and *absolutely empty*. It is quite impossible and unnecessary to read the meanderings of this "titled old man", and only "critics" of the Bulgakov stripe can take such a writer seriously.

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REMARKS ON É. COULET'S BOOK

Élie Coulet, *Le mouvement syndical et coopératif dans l'agriculture française*. La fédération agricole (thèse pour le doctorat). Montpellier 1898.*

[Contains a bibliography; there are indications of rural labourers being expelled by the syndicates; not a Socialist but *appears* to be a "Katheder", judging from a bird's-eye view. Rouanet's source. There seems to be some pretty interesting data there,]

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* *The Syndicalist and Co-operative Movement in French Agriculture*. The Agricultural Federation. (Doctoral thesis.)—*Ed*.

REMARKS ON G. ROUANET'S ARTICLE, "ON THE DANGER AND THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL SYNDICATES"

Revue socialiste*) (Vol. 29) *February* 1899 (pp. 219-37)

(Revue économique. "Du danger et de l'avenir des syndicats agricoles" par *M. Gustave Rouanet.*)

quotes Rocquigny, p. 42 in *Les syndicats agricoles*[96]

G. Rouanet's article was written on *Élie Coulet*'s book.[97] G. Rouanet slights the "syndicates" as the handiwork of the "agrarian party"—they consist *mainly* of large and middle landowners; their efforts in favour of the *labourers are ridiculously insignificant*; their aim: a landowners' trust, an association for marketing farm produce; their political programme: the interests of the big landowners, who are leading all this movement, carrying the small farmers and labourers with them, and whose goal is to establish complete domination of the state by the big landowners' party.

Like all trusts, the syndicates are working assiduously in favour of socialism.

Out of *1,391* syndicates with 438,596 members (1897 were established:

N.B. "societies against accidents at work: *one*; orphanages—*one*; employment agencies and offices: *thirteen*; courts of arbitration, reconciliation chambers: *three*; societies for aid to manual labour: *two*;

N.B. aid in kind (gifts of things to children)—*one*; aid

*) Manager: M. Rodolphe Simon. (78 Passage Choiseul, Paris) 1 franc an issue. Free: contents since 1885.

> in supply of implements (service for the hire of tools and farming implements): *two*" (p. 225) and Rouanet ridicules Deschanel.[98]

Rouanet repeatedly quotes Rocquigny, mentioning by the way that his democratie rurale = 300,000 large landowners!! (p. 231).

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ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM NOSSIG'S BOOK[99]

Nossig (*Revision des Sozialismus*. Band II. *Die moderne Agrarfrage**) gives the following interesting data on restoring soil fertility.

Grandeau (manager of the Station agronomique de l'Est) believes that there are 25 million ha of farmland in *France*

taken from the land annually:	metric tons	given same *thousands*	
Nitrogen	613,000	285	fertilisers produced by 49 million head of cattle (according to Tisserand)
Phosphoric acid	298,000	147	
Potash	827,000	549	
	—	+	
			That is the total cattle, but not all should be reckoned in terms of fertiliser!

i.e., *the deficit averages about 50 per cent!* (p. 101)

And the artificial fertilisers do not, by a long shot, make up for all that is taken from the soil.

In Britain, an average of $1._9$ million centners of phosphoric acid is taken from the soil, while *guano* and *bone fertiliser* cover only *one-half* (p. 109).

Thus, only the private owners, and not the land, have benefited from intensive agriculture with the use of artificial fertilisers (p. 109).

It is now being recognised that mineral and artificial fertilisers alone are not enough.

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* *Revision of Socialism*, Vol. II, *The Contemporary Agrarian Question*.—*Ed.*

In the past, they wanted to substitute them

(p. 111) by 125 kg of phosphoric acid
+60 kg of nitrogen
+60 kg of potash

It is now recognised that mineral fertilisers alone tend to dry up the soil, and that an addition of manure is also necessary.

Grandeau believes that out of 60,000 kg there must be at least

20,000 kg of natural fertiliser.

Grandeau: *Annalles de la Station agronomique de l'Est.*
Déherain: *Les plantes de grande culture**
especially pp. 27-29 (also 188-93).

The result arrived at by Nossig (who makes use of the *latest* agronomical data, and cites Grandeau, Déherain, Wollny, Hellriegel, Dünckelberg, Cohn, and many others) is that even intensive farming frequently comes to *plundering the soil.*

It increases yields temporarily, but fails to bring about a long-term and stable increase in soil fertility.

Human fertilisers must also be returned to the land (pp. 102, 108, 112).

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* Grandeau, *Annals of the East Agronomic Station*; Déherain, *Major Crop Plants.—Ed.*

CRITICAL REMARKS ON E. DAVID'S BOOK, *SOCIALISM AND AGRICULTURE*[100]

A

David.

20 *Marxism* has "simply" "applied" the laws of industry to agriculture.

23 A reference to "*The Peasant Barbarians*".*

28 "Success" (of agitation among peasants for Marxist programme) = zero.

typical narrow-mindedness of the opportunist: he starts out with the International resolutions, instead of a theoretical analysis.

{ The *Communist Manifesto* is ignored. Utopian socialism as well and Sismondi, etc. }

33 Engels's Prefatory Note to the *Peasant War* left out

33 In Vol. I Marx gives very little attention to agriculture.

36 Improvement of the peasants' condition in the third quarter of the 19th century

(clay floors, etc., have disappeared south and west.)

"*The peasantry*" on "the upgrade"

(and not the peasant bourgeoisie??)

43 Engels in 1894[101]—"das Heitere"— Rettungsvorschläge —"unheilbarer Widerspruch" (Absturz ersparen)**) he got it!

* See pp. 111-15.—*Ed.*

** What Lenin meant was the following statement by David: "The funny thing (das Heitere) is that Engels, while pointing to the peasant's absolutely hopeless condition (absoluten Rettungslosigkeit des Bauern), puts forward

49 A "***heavy blow***" at the Marxist doctrine: 1895 census, the *advance* of the middle peasantry.

49 Note. *Definition* of the **small farm** = without *permanent* employment of outside labour and without collateral employment
below: dwarf farms
above: medium farms (the owner also works)
big farms (owner's *supervision*)

51 1895 census: ***supplanting of large-scale by small-scale production(!)***

52 Kautsky's *Agrarian Question*—"desperate attempt"

52: the question of landed property—... in Vol. II

53 *Hertz* annihilated Kautsky. Bernstein

56 *Small-scale* production is superior in the *intensive* branches: the transition to intensive farming calls for *small-scale* production ((=without hired labour *!!??* cf. 49)).

57 Science *must* stand *above* parties—Sering, Conrad for the *small farm*

59 The peasant *prepares socialism after his own fashion*: ***co-operatives*** ("während die marxistischen Theoretiker" etc.) (die Wege ... dem Sozialismus)*
—*Producers*' co-operatives: "a compromise between the principles of association and individualism"
—"not socialist forms as yet"
—far from it. But even less—"transition to capitalism" (K. Kautsky).

60 —"mighty burgeonings of the process of socialisation" (= co-operatives)

---

a proposal for his salvation (Rettungsvorschläge)", a proposal "to spare the peasant this downfall (Absturz ersparen)" ...These proposals are in "irreconcilable contradiction (unheilbarer Widerspruch)" with Engels's views on the future of the small peasants.—*Ed.*

* In full, David's sentence runs as follows: "While the Marxist theorists (Während die marxistischen Theoretiker) were trying to make socialism plausible and palatable for the peasant in their own manner, the peasant himself worked energetically to pave the way for socialism after his own fashion (die Wege ... dem Sozialismus)."—*Ed.*

61 ... *Chapter I. "Essential* Distinction" ...

66 *Concentration* ... absolutely lacking.... (1895 census!!)

70 ... industry—*mechanical process*, *agriculture—organic process* (= **essence**!) **Wrong**. {ferment, etc.}
(1) no continuity;
(2) change of operations;
(3) territorial change. (Change in place of work);
(4) pace of work determined by nature;
(5) roomy working premises;
(6) production of manure—(no analogy!);
(7) there can be only a slow increase in the quantity of produce.

77 "nutrition (sic!), reproduction, care, protection" of vegetable and animal organisms: small farm not inferior, but often superior empty talk on the "*conservatism of nature*" (!!)

77 —in connection with this the "*law of diminishing returns*" (!)
("misunderstood, but basically the right idea").

Simple co-operation

82 "Neighbourly help" to the peasant (ha-ha!). It is (not need as such but) the example of the neighbours that impels the small peasant to ***tireless effort***.!!!

84 Marx, "incidentally"??? "***absolutely fails to see***" (nonsense) that capitalism causes supervision owing to the labourer's resistance. (And gives quotations from Marx!)

86 ***Hubert Auhagen*** (N.B.)—"instructive study"
cultivation of fields better on the small farm.

88	The big farm gets a worse job done and *pays more for it*!
89	Against agricultural training ... *the peasant learns from childhood!!!*
90	Of course, *there is a lot of backwardness*, but then *most* of the big farms are not model ones either!! (An example of dodging!)
92	"Critical moments." Marx is not right: there's a shortage of labour there. (He got it!!)
92	The peasant has > manpower per area, the greatest intensity, etc., feverish work } ("advantages")
94	*Simple co-operation does not allow large-scale production to attain the same results as the peasant community with the same labour reserve* (Nonsense!!)
95	A "normal" family (6-4 persons) is mostly sufficient ... —ha-ha! Help" ("Ausbitten")
97-99	*Saving* of means of production on the big farm. *Not a single fact*!
101	*In general* the big farm *obtains* > from the land...
107	*Rentengutsbildung** in *Prussia* ... *are to be welcomed in principle* ... (Sic!!) ... (Sic!!) (Sering ... is quite right ...) ... a greater quantity of labour for the remaining estate owners...
109 and *110*	*The small one builds cheaper* (David's italics)—"Advantage" (*Auhagen*) —"personal participation rules out high cost and jerry-building" (very nice, indeed!)
113	*Stumpfe*: "the smaller the farm, the higher the rent"...
114	Saving of implements (on big farms) is >

* See Note 18.—*Ed.*

than made up by the "*painstaking care*" ("repairs done personally"!!) (lovely!)

Stumpfe; ("...no rakes for 6 years...") *Auhagen*

117 The commercial advantages of the big farm? The small farmer sells to *consumers* (Sic!)

117-118 Conclusion: the *advantages* (of co-operation and savings on implements, etc.) are than balanced out by the *disadvantages* (ha-ha!)

Simple co-operation does not give the big farms any advantage at all....

Chapter III. *Division of Labour*

Cropping and livestock farming resist radical (!!) specialisation.

> That is why David ignores *greater*, not "radical" specialisation in large-scale farming

141 On the *big farms*, livestock is neglected The opposite on the *peasant farm*... (Denmark).

146 (145 and a welter of reasoning of every kind:) the peasant's "personal stake".

149 There is nothing more absurd than to imagine that the peasant is stupid: *diverse labour*, etc.

152 On the whole, it is the small farm that *prospers* in gardening. (Very characteristic! "figures"!!) (*Precisely!!*) lovely!

[**only** 6% over 2 ha]

155 Agriculture rules out the Nacheinander being transformed into "Nebeneinander" (wrong!)

159 On the big farm there are no differentiated tools (wrong)

170 Marx on machinery in agriculture (Vol. I)... "applies without hesitation"....

173 Does not deny the advantages of combining agricultural production with industries, *but* this is not of general importance (!!!)

178 Thresher. (Cheaper and better. Bensing (p. 175).) More often on the big farms. (The small ones frequently have nothing to thresh!!! Funny character.)
"Technically" there is nothing to prevent the small ones as well (!!!)

181 Steam plough *has not yet supplanted a single small farm* that's audacious!

183 ***Deep ploughing*** ... not only with the use of the steam plough pathetic dodge!

185 The steam plough is not a universal plough very novel!

191 K. Kautsky's "fantastic notions" about the steam plough (where?? charlatan).

192-193 *Hand and Machine Labor**—The machine is *cheaper*.

201 Electricity is also within reach of the *small* (dodges!)

207 There has been no sort of revolution from the electric plough (his wit is on the petty dullard level)

209 A reference to *Fischer* (that the machine is not a threat to the small holder)....

221 "On the small-peasant farm, the *cow* is the *i d e a l*, i.e., the cheapest and most rationally used draught animal" (N.B. N.B.)

* See pp. 282-86.—*Ed.*

some muscular activity out in the fresh air is beneficial....
...better feeding [Manilovism![102]]
cheap and again:
Auhagen **(without any mention of** *shallower* ploughing!)

239 Seed drill "*quite accessible*"
[Growth of small figures!] (Swindler).

246 ...Reaping machines ... can be introduced

250-253 *Conclusions* on *machinery*. A series of **swindles.** ***Big farm not mechanical***! Advantage not great (*one* example from Fischer, and nothing about the others!!) Does not give any increase in products. [*A lie*: *con Bensing*]

257-258 What *absolutely* tends to *paralyse* the effect of the agricultural machine in supplanting hand labour ... intensiveness tends to create much more hand labour than that supplanted by the agricultural machines.

A funny character: he has failed to think through the $\frac{c}{v}$!!

262 **only** (??) the transition to extensive farming brings about a redundancy of agricultural labour.

265 Decline of rent in Britain=*depreciation of the nation's land.*

267 Agricultural machines do not result in *automatic operations*?

Reaper?

271 The agricultural machine is *not* at all *to blame* for *female* and *child* labour (?)

281 The "machinomaniacs" notwithstanding, there has been no reduction in hard mechanical labour

Reactionary, Why? Slaves are cheap

284-285 Child labour: the small-peasant farm offers the **most** *favourable condition*. (Scoundrel)

282, 288 physical *labour* will *remain* such (and not pleasure) —"*many millions* will have to take up mechanical labour as an occupation" } an opportunists idea of the future!

292 Labour protection and child protection—at the expense of the big farm....

"Saving on high wages"—that's forgotten!!! Cf. Bulgakov

301 Lengthening of the working day by the machine v.s.*

nirgends very bold ....

299 the labourers' movement in East Prussia.... "isolation" of the countryside

323 Condition of labourers in East Prussia. Not the small farms, but the *big* ones manage to survive only by making use of the labourer's need....

325 The agricultural labourer cannot understand *how the big farm can be more paying than the small one*. Sic!

327 ***Producers' co-operatives*** in the country? Ideal?

He has *confused* them with associations in the commodity economy. Cf. 328: corn tariffs would have been demanded. Bungler!

328 *Rising to the small peasantry*!! ("'Heaven forbid!' the orthodox Marxist will say.")

* The words beginning with v.s. are not clear. David says: "Nowhere (nirgends) was anything heard about the use of agricultural machines lengthening the working day".—*Ed.*

342-343 "Intensive (deep... p. 344) mechanical cultivation of the soil" (to conserve the heat)... Small farm???

352 Deep ploughing ... not *always*, *must be* "*reasonably applied*"

352-355 The bigger the farm, the harder it is to have efficient supervision—but the small peasant—*heart and mind*!!

357 Melioration. Small farm???

360 The small holder *likewise* participates in melioration. Downright lie!

362 By no means is melioration confined to the big farm....
figures *without* % *to group*!!
"Whence it is sufficiently clear...."
Artificial fertilisers.
The small farmer has > practical knowledge ha-ha!
——— takes more care
——— "nothing in the way..."

415-417 The smaller the farm, the more feasible is harmony (in the sense of fertiliser) (? and the *raising* of fertility

417 Combination of parcel agriculture and industrial work—"*harmonious life*"... change of occupations, etc. ("Narodniks")

420 Abolition of antithesis between town and country ... "only" it will take **centuries** (Merci!)

424 *The small farmer has > livestock* **per ha**—*hence* ***manure***....

Simple!

427 ..."solid holding": extolled by David ... "gives an interest"...

428 —"Idealist or ass!" characteristic ... hm!

429 "Illusion" about the supplanting of proprietary farming by leasehold farming.

Chapter VIII

439 Introduction of > diverse plants in Europe, especially in the 19th century—*small farm*?

440-441 Selection and cultivation of improved varieties. — — — — Small farm?

455 Grain cleaning. "The modern grain cleaner, etc."
" " *Small farm*?

456 " " Painstaking work *on those long winter evenings*!!! "The small farm has a *decided* advantage."

459 *Crop rotation* is one of the most effective ways of combating weeds.... **Small farm?**

463 ... the interested eye.... — — —

465 Fighting harmful insects and animals—care of plants, etc.

466 *The big farm cannot obtain the advantages which the small holder, cultivating the land himself, has by reason of his very status in all these operations* (killing of insects, protection of plants, etc.). (David's italics.) It is true that today, because of the ignorance of their owners, many small farms present a still sadder sight than the big ones. However, ignorance is in no sense the specific, *organic* flaw of the small farm" (David's italics).
The whole of David is there!

479 Livestock breeding. Cf. the weight of horned cattle.

480 *Growth of average weight—on the small farm*??

481 "It is the **regions** with the small- and middle-peasant farms that are at the head of livestock breeding organisations"

(!is that all!)

486 The small farms breed the livestock and the big ones utilise it cf. V. V.[103]

490 Supply animals ... with clean straw in sufficient quantities.— — — — — — — — — Small farm?

494-495 *Stumpfe*: peasants are the best livestock breeders.

504 Around 1850-80 (p. 503) *thatched roofs* disappeared in the southern part of Germany, better stables, etc., etc., were built. — N.B. (cf. p. 36)

509 Repair work... The peasant does not pay, he does the repairs himself.... That saves the peasant many a thaler. — well, of course!

511 It is not true that "the cottage industry" is "a normal supplement" (Marx) "not true in any case" — this is interesting! Con Narodniks!

512 (and 518) "The ***lowest*** (!) (which then is the "highest" ???) area limit for the *small farm* is a plot which provides ***sufficient***!! work and normal sustenance to the members of the independent farming peasant family."

sufficient! that's extremely rare

Care must be taken not to confuse these with the *dwarf holdings*—which are *below* these limits ... otherwise the question will be merely confounded (!!)

It's a home truth that people who have not enough land ... need another occupation....

513 Reduction of minimum size of area ... under the influence of intensification. **Hecht** 513-516, *special note 516*

(Optimist)

518 The rural handicraftsmen belong to the army of *industrial workers*
"*The independent farming peasant belongs to another economic category*" (true!! But *which* category, my dear David?)

528 Kautsky's "totally groundless assertion" that the sugar industry is a classical example of the agricultural big industry } charlatan!
and % ... *of the total*
"This requires no further comment"—precisely!

528-529 "...All the advantages that the big farm has because of better or cheaper power and tools are more than made up by painstaking effort on the small farm" (("Gist"))

529 Not "*dependence*" (of the peasant on the sugar refinery); but "organisation"—!

531 Figures on industrial enterprises: *the fool has copied them without understanding them.*

532 "The vast majority of enterprises processing farm produce are connected with *small* farms" Downright distortion!

533-534 There is no industrialisation—*on the contrary* (!!),—with Kautsky it's only "St. Hegel", "the good old dialectical process".

539 Co-operation—*a transforming force*; *producers*' co-operatives—***a new economic principle of co-operation***.

540 *The making of milk products is developing most vigorously* — —

541-542 Denmark ... "sound" division of labour ... (*546* cf. trusts)

550-551 In Denmark in 1898 *179,740 cow houses*

30 and > cows		7,544	= 4%
10-29	”	49,371	= $27._{82}$%
< 10	”	122,589	= $68._{97}$% incl.1-3 head
			70,218 = $39._{85}$% c.
(???)		179,504	$100._{79}$ (??)

hence:

			c.
7,500	(30 and >)	× 30	= 225,000
49,400	(10-29)	× 11	= 536,000
52,400	(4-9)	× 5	= 250,000
70,200	(1-3)	× $1._5$	= 100,000
179,500			1,111,000

Out of 1,111,000 milch cows—about 900,000 are in co-operative dairies.
i.e., *33% have about 75%!!!* ||

555 ***Jibes over the sale of milk worsening nutrition— What a bore!***

556 Note: *Bang—the peasant eats better than the worker.*

560 The small farmer has more staying power in face of the crisis: “*the small ones can more easily stint themselves to the extreme*” ||

561 Dairy co-operatives—“far from being a socialist phenomenon” are *however* “even less” “purely capitalistic”.

569 (Trusts)—with corn, milk, etc.
David compares them with trade unions (“no objections can be produced”) | N.B.

573 France—highly developed co-operatives.

576 *Danish peasant + English worker* (direct marketing) ((oh, what a bore!

581 The two sections of the co-operative world—peasants and workers—are winning ground from the *capitalist entrepreneurs*) !

586 British consumer societies have abandoned the idea of *collectivising peasantry* in agriculture

588 against "theoretical optimists"!! (personal interests, etc.!)

592 Credit co-operatives—death to the *usurer* (con *Marxism!!*)

The "creative power" of the co-operative idea has led the Marxist doctrine on the "necessary ruin" of the peasant ad absurdum.

598 Full implementation of consumers' co-operatives will rid the peasant of *capitalist middlemen*.

(The root of David's mistake lies in the fact that he confounds release from middlemen and traders with release from *capital*.)

601 "*A pooling of the interests of the farmers and the industrial workers*" (David's italics).

604 —Associations of peasants and consumers' societies of workers—*a cell of the organisation system* ((*à la* trusts, of course))

611 "Law" of diminishing returns—the *distinction between mechanical and organic production culminates in it!!* of tremendous importance

614 Turgot (cf. "art can do no more")

615 (1) only from a definite level of intensiveness does the income (per outlay) decline (2) the law says *nothing* about transition from one scientific-technical stage to another. (*At one stage only*).

617 J. S. Mill—"basically right"....

619 *Marx* disdains *the great truth which lies at the root of the soil fertility law....*

620 — — His excursus into the history of economy is *false*

621 Marx contradicts himself in *Capital* III, 2,277— (This David is an ass)

626 Rent ... from the land...!!!

635 *Division of labour ... has no part* to play ... in agriculture

that's audacious! a specimen of his garbling!

637 ...there is no arbitrary decupling (of labour)...

643 In Germany (some big farms) have *doubled* their crops in 100 years (France $10._2$-$15._8$ hectolitres)

644 Productivity has not *doubled* ("definitely not") (more outlays, fertilisers, etc.)

Higher productivity—productivity of *labour*, Mr. David? probably > than double! What has that got to do with the growth of outlays on C??* Marvellous economist!

644 there is no doubt at all ... the natural expenditure of *living* human labour has increased

that's bold

reference: costs of production!!!—

ha-ha!

644 Productivity has increased but on a more modest scale than in industry

1) *nature is conservative*

645 2) limited effect of labour-saving inventions. "With the growth of intensiveness, machine labour gives way *percentage-wise* (!) to manual labour" $\left(\frac{c}{v}\ ?\right)$

654 In *organic* production, machinism and the growing mass of products are in antagonism to each other" (!!)

"the higher the intensiveness, the less machine labour there is."

655 *M. Hecht*—"typical" (his data) (!)

* C—constant capital.—*Ed.*

656 Bang in *Neue Zeit*: greater income with smaller size (*rise* in the category of independent farmers).

659 (Fischer:) the big farmer pays the labourers a reward for good work. "The small holder saves on this."

660 In agriculture, there is a tendency towards a reduction in *hired labour* and an ***increase*** in the farmer's *own labour*.

667 The law of diminishing returns leads to an extension of the area under crop throughout the world (overseas competition)

670 Growth in the *weight* of livestock.

674 The small farmers have more cattle.

683 The Social-Democrats stand for the all-round boosting, etc., of *peasant farming*.

687 Marxism is inapplicable (to agricul-
699 ture). *Transformation of big farms into small-peasant farms.*

700 Against agricultural associations' of rural labourers (cf. producers' associations!!)

701 *Producers' co-operatives* are a *compromise* ***between the individualist and the associative economic principles.***

701 The small peasant's work "contains more ideas"...

701 A fusion of society's supreme property right and the individual's usufruct...

703 A fusion of the small peasants and the rural labourers....

Written in March-April 1903

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Printed from the original

B

From *David*:

p. 109: "The small holder builds at lower cost than the big one." He works himself. "This advantage" (sic!) also applies to the maintenance of buildings.

p. 115 (from Auhagen): the small farmer bought no cart for 22 years (the big one wears out his in 10-12 years and sells it to the blacksmith) ...

p. 152: On the whole, it is the small farm that *prospers* (!) in gardening as in agriculture."

N.B. cf. statistics

221: "On the small-peasant farm, the *cow* is the ideal, i.e., the cheapest and most rationally used draught animal" (!!)

pp. 528-529-532. Sleight-of-hand *à la* Bulgakov, namely, that the small farm is more often combined with beet sugar and potato production.

550-551. Denmark ((and the cover))

424: The small farm has *twice* as much cattle per *ha* than the big one. (Cf. Drechsler[104].)

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EXTRACTS FROM THE BOOK, *HAND AND MACHINE LABOR*

Hand and Machine Labor (Thirteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1898, Vols. I and II, Wash., 1899.[105])

[A very interesting and original work, invaluable on the question of hand and machine production. Quantity of working time, the number of operations and the number of different workers in hand and machine labor, and also labor costs are compared by article produced or work accomplished ("unit"—altogether 672 units). In each unit the same data are given separately for each operation. Unfortunately, the data are excessively fragmented, and there is no attempt to summarise, or to give any general numerical, even if only approximate, conclusions.

cf. p. *93*: the general conclusion on agriculture:

"The aggregates presented by these 27 units necessarily vary very much with the crop produced, and the gains made by the supplanting of primitive methods by modern ones are quite different in different instances. With the exception noted in unit 22 there is a gain in each case, and in some instances, as in units 3 and 26, it is very large, though of course not comparable with those found in the manufacturing industries. An average deduced from the 27 units here reported shows that one man with the improved machinery in use to-day can cultivate and harvest nearly twice as large a crop as was possible under the primitive method."

(These 27 units—production of apple trees, wheat, cotton, barley, berries, tobacco, potatoes, etc. In Volume One, each unit is divided into operations.)

In general, the number of operations is much greater in machine production (division of labour! e.g., boots and shoes: 45-102 operations in hand production, and 84-173 in machine production), but in agriculture it may sometimes (perhaps more often) be *vice versa*). Reason: the combination of several operations in machine production. E.g, unit 27, wheat, 20 bushels (1 acre).
Hand method 8 operations
machine " —5 "

hand: (motive power / ox and hand)

Ia—breaking ground
Ib—sowing seed
Ic—pulverising topsoil and covering seed

machine:

N.B. I—breaking ground, sowing and covering seed, and pulverising topsoil (gangplow, seeder, and harrow —motive power: steam).

See examples on separate sheet.* {1597 pp. in the two volumes}

Information on separate operations is an excellent illustration of the *division of labour*. A pity that no effort is made to summarise for some of the "units".

Another thing that should be done is to sum up *the number of operations* (and % of operations) with motive power *other than hands*.

There are no summaries on *average ages* of workers (and sex) under hand and machine labour.

No summaries on *wages* under hand and machine labour.

All this can (and should) be calculated by number of *units* and number of *operations*. Otherwise, there remains nothing but **examples**, illustrations.

---

* See pp. 284-88.—*Ed.*

From *Hand and*
Some examples from "Summary of

Unit number	Name	Description: Hand	Description: Machine	Quantity
2	Apple trees	Apple trees 32 months from grafts		10,000 (1 acre)
14	Onions	Onions	Onions	250 (1 acre) bush.
27	Wheat	Wheat	Wheat	20 (1 acre) (bush.)
69	Boots	Men's cheap grade, etc.		100 pairs
91	Bread	1—pound loaves bread		1,000
176	Wheels	Carriage wheels, etc.		1 set (4)
212	Trousers	Cottonade trousers, etc.		12 dozen pairs
241	Cottonades	apparently a grade of fabric		500 yards

Text (Vol. I) contains *only* explanatory notes for each unit *separately*, so that *nothing* is *summarised*.

(A very important thing for a *detailed* study of the division of labour in *separate* units, the role of machines in *separate* operations, the importance of workers,' skills, and the English names of these skills. But all this is rough and raw, a handbook, and no more.)

It is very important to point out that for an *adequately exact* comparison of the level of technology in the various systems of production there must be precisely a *breakdown by operations*. That is the only scientific method. It would give such a great deal in application to agriculture!

The same Report, as on the previous page—Vols,. VI and VII deal with the *cost of production*. Two great volumes give the most detailed figures on each of the *hundreds* of enterprises studied for production costs, materials, wages, etc., and then the cost of living with budgets, level of labour productivity, etc. Unfortunately all of this is absolutely raw stuff, and almost useless without processing (except possibly for occasional references). Strangely enough, the authors of these works make no attempt at all to summarise or draw any general conclusions, however few!

FROM MARX TO MAO
BOOK HOUSE COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Machine Labor
production by hand and machine methods":

Year of production		Different operations performed		Different workmen employed		Time worked hand machine		Labor cost ($)		
hand	machine	hand	machine	hand	machine	hour minutes	hour minutes	hand	machine	Unit number
$18\frac{69}{71}$	$189\frac{3}{5}$	17	20	37	125	$1{,}240._{4}$	$870._{24}$	$193._{5}$	$111._{6}$	2
1850	1895	9	10	28	675	$433._{55}$	$223._{23}$	$30._{8}$	$22._{3}$	14
$18\frac{29}{30}$	$189\frac{5}{6}$	8	5	4	10	$64._{15}$	$2._{58}$	$3._{7}$	$0._{7}$	27
1859	1895	83	122	2	113	$1{,}436._{40}$	$154._{6}$	$408._{5}$	$35._{4}$	69
1897	1897	11	16	1	12	28	$8._{56}$	$5._{6}$	$1._{5}$	91
1860	1895	13	30	2	27	37	$4._{23}$	$9._{3}$	$0._{7}$	176
1870	1895	6	13	1	16	1,440	$148._{30}$	72	$24._{4}$	212
1893	1895	19	43	3	252	$7{,}534._{1}$	$84._{14}$	$135._{6}$	$6._{8}$	241

This is from Vol. I—General table, introduction and analysis.

In Vol. II, there is nothing but tables for each *operation* in each unit. Here is a sampling of the table headings in Vol. II: 1) operation number; 2) work done (description of each operation); 3) machine, implement or tool used (in each operation separately); 4) motive power (hand, foot, horse, ox, steam, electricity, etc.); 5) persons necessary on one machine; 6) employees at work on the unit—number and sex (of the workers);—occupation (skill or shop);—age (of workers);—time worked;—pay of labour (rate per— —)—labour cost (rate by time worked or by pieces in case of piece rates).

e.g. No. *241*. Hand labour: *3* housewives (only female) worked at odd hours, *50 years*; no machines.

Machine production: mostly steam frames and machines. Working 11 hours a day. Ages from 10 years (sic!) to 50 years. Both *male* and *female*.

Or No. 27 (wheat). Hand labour: hand, oxen, 4 *labourers*, 21-30 years. Plow, sickles, flails, shovels.

Machine production: gangplow, seeder, combined *reaper* and *thresher*. Steam and horse. *10* employees (all specialists: engineer, fireman, water hauler, separator man, header tender, sack sewers, sack fillers teamsters).

Let's try to take the results for 27 units (agriculture):

$\Sigma = 27$ acres of diverse crops

Years	Number of different operations		Number of different workers	Time worked *hrs mins*	Labour cost $
1829-1872	hand	304	366	9,758	$1{,}037._5$
1893-1896	machine	292	1,439	5,107	$597._8$

Determining the number of different workers with the exception of No. 14 (onions), hand—28, machine 675, we get:

hand—338
machine—764
subtracting also apple trees (No. 2), hand—37, machine—125, and No. 19 (strawberries), hand—32, machine—156, we get:

hand—269
machine—583, still more than double!

Of the 27 units only in one case (No. 22, tobacco) is the time worked and labour cost higher for machine labour (199 and 353 hours; $\$5._9$ and $30._2$). The author observes: "Unit 22 is unique in that the total time at the later date was nearly twice that at the earlier, a fact for which no other explanation appears than that previously offered" (p. 93); page 91: "The methods used at the two periods differ so largely that no comparison can be made."

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ANALYSIS OF L. HUSCHKE'S DATA[106] (ON SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURE)

Huschke (on small-scale agriculture)

Wheat and rye as feed %		% going on feed* oats		barley
$5._{84}$	Small farm	$67._{0}$ $77._{7}$	(p. 52)	$35._{0}$ $20._{5}$
$9._{09}$	Medium farm I	$72._{39}$ $68._{31}$	(p. 75)	$12._{22}$ $13._{90}$
$29._{56}$	Medium farm II	$54._{01}$ $75._{91}$	(p. 93)	$52._{59}$ $46._{52}$
$3._{55}$	Big farm	$82._{72}$ $74._{70}$	(p. 112)	$11._{81}$ $24._{08}$
(p. 165)		$\Sigma = 574._{72} \div 8 = 71._{84}\%$		$\Sigma = 216._{62} \div 8 = 27._{08}\%$

* Top figures in each column are for 1887-1891, lower figures, for 1893-1897.—*Ed.*

Hence, data on feed:
(average amount for decade)

	Head of cattle	Cereals double centners	Feed area ha	Outlays of feed marks	ha under oats
Small farm	11	47.5	5.5	90	2
		4.3	0.50	8	
Medium farm I	29	131	15.5	1,290	7.6
		4.5	0.53	44	
Medium farm II	25	203.5	12.0	404	6.9
		8.1	0.48	16	
Big farm	67	184	42.1	3,226	8.9
		2.7	0.63	48	
	Σ=132	565.5	75.1		
		4	0.57		

below = average per head of cattle*

For a precise calculation of the area under feed on each farm, the quantities of four cereals (wheat, rye, barley and oats) fed to the livestock should be given in terms of *hectares*, (1) the grain sown should be subtracted from the total crop; (2) the net crop obtained should be divided by the number of *hectares* under each cereal; (3) the number of double centners fed to the livestock should be divided by the quotient thus obtained.

This is too cumbersome a calculation for the four cereals, the four farms, and the two five-year periods.

On the other hand, the error could *not* be too great if we take *all* the oats as being *feed*, for the oats *not* going into feed are balanced out by the barley going into feed.

* This sentence was subsequently pencilled in over the table heading; it refers to the lower figures in columns 2, 3 and 4.—*Ed.*

Hence, let us assume that the *whole* area under oats is area under feed: (i.e., oats + mixture + all the fodder grasses + wheat).

	Total area under feed
Small farm	7.5
	0.68
Medium farm I	23.1
	0.79
Medium farm II	18.9
	0.76
Big farm	51.0
	0.76
	Σ=100.50
	0.75

These data show such (relatively) stable averages that they can apparently be relied upon: 0.75 ha per head of cattle. But for a comparison with the statistical data for the whole of Germany, it should be taken into account that Huschke's calculation of cattle is *different* from mine.

The difference is not due to any difference in rates, but to *Huschke*'s very detailed classification of cattle. He makes a distinction between foals, young cattle, calves, suckling-pigs (p. 53, Note 1), whereas I am *unable* to take account of these minute distinctions from the data of the general agricultural census of June 12, 1907.

N.B. This means that for a comparison, Huschke's data should be converted into the terms of the June 12, 1907 data, i.e., *all* horses, and *all* cattle = 1.0; *all* pigs = 1/4; *all* sheep = 1/10.

We then have:

				ha under feed
average for 10 (8) years	Small farm . . .	13.45	head of cattle	7.5
	Medium farm I .	31.85		23.1
	Medium farm II .	36.81	”	18.9
	Big farm	88.8	”	51.0
		170.91		100.50
				0.58

and for the whole of Germany (1907)—13,648,628 ha of feed (meadows + fodder plants + oats + mixed cereals) for 29,380,405 head of cattle, i.e., $0._{46}$ per head.

This looks very much like being true, because Huschke's farmers are (very) *good*.

From *Huschke's* data follow these conclusions

1) the big farm spends much more on *artificial fertiliser* (p. *144*)
2) " " " has a much deeper ploughing (p. *152*, *Note 2*)
3) " " " is better *equipped with dead stock*
4) " " " ensures the greatest crop increase in time
5) " " " feeds livestock better
6) " " " spends more on insurance (p. 139)
7) " " " obtains a better price for its products (p. *146*) (p. *155*).

		1887-91	*1893-97*	(p. 139)
cf. p. 144	To 1) *per ha.* Small farm	$17._{18}$	$16._{91}$—	in marks per ha seed, feed, fertiliser
	Medium farm	$40._{48}$	$32._{60}$—	
		$22._{80}$	$20._{74}$—	
	Big farm	$41._{34}$	$48._{95}$+	

To 3) A list of stock, p. *107* et al., p. 47.
Outlays on maintenance of dead stock, buildings and drainage in marks per *ha*.

	1887-91	*1893-97*		
Small farm	$14._{10}$	$7._{43}$	—$6._{67}$	
Medium farm	$13._{38}$	$15._{95}$	+$2._{57}$	Why so?
	$10._{70}$	$9._{91}$	—$0._{79}$	
Big farm	$9._{64}$	$11._{95}$	+$2._{31}$	

To *4*) Yields of four cereals (rye, wheat, oats and barley) in *double centners* per *ha*.

		1887-91	1893-97	
NB: the land on the big farm is worse **(p. 125)**	(p. 51) small farm	$20._{46}$	$20._{66}$	$+ 0._{20}$
	(p. 73) medium farm	$17._{90}$	$17._{13}$	$- 0._{77}$
	(p. 92)	$19._{09}$	$21._{06}$	$+ 1._{97}$
	(p. 111) big farm	$17._{46}$	$19._{77}$	$+ 2._{31}$

Livestock feed (double centners)

Head in terms of big cattle [1]	Price of cattle			wheat	rye	barley	oats	Σ
$+ 10._{75}$	2,765	(p. 47)	1887-91	$2._{19}$	$1._{68}$	$14._{24}$	$30._{74}$	$48._{85}$
$11._{3}$	3,019	Small farm	1893-97	$1._{44}$	$0._{40}$	$8._{81}$	$35._{56}$	$46._{21}$
				—	—	—	+	—
$+ 26._{8}$	9,474	(p. 74)		$12._{78}$	$1._{34}$	$21._{16}$	$77._{04}$	$112._{32}$
$30._{6}$	11,091	Medium farm I		$14._{26}$	$6._{38}$	$29._{75}$	$99._{87}$	$150._{26}$
				+	+	+	+	+
$+ 23._{5}$	10,574	(p. 87)		$12._{71}$	$2._{39}$	$59._{24}$	$94._{33}$	$168._{97}$
$25._{9}$	10,971	Medium farm II		$25._{71}$	$33._{74}$	$57._{38}$	$122._{09}$	$238._{92}$
				+	+	—	+	+
$- 67._{1}$	23,442	(p. 112)		$18._{61}$	$0._{63}$	$15._{90}$	$128._{83}$	$163._{97}$
$66._{6}$	23,300	Big farm		$15._{40}$	$1._{15}$	$41._{25}$	$146._{60}$	$204._{40}$
				—	+	+	+	+

[1]) Huschke gives $9._{4}$ and 10 (p. 53), but this does not follow from the rates he himself gives (p. 53).

?
= Perennial
fodder plants?

Use of Land (ha)

				1	2		3			
	Wheat, rye oats + barley	Potatoes	(Peas, beans, vetch) legumi-nous plants	Fodder-beet	Fodder vetch, maize, red clo-ver + alphalfa	Sugar-beet	S (total)	Meadows	Σ of all land	Total area under fodder (1+2+3)
Small farm	6.6	1	0.4	1	4	—	13.00	0.5	13.64	5.50
Medium farm I	33.5	4	5	2	12 (1) +1.5 (2)	3 Fallow	61	—	(50.16) 61.12	15.50
Medium farm II	20.5	2.5	4	2.5 (Rape)	9	2.5 2.5	43.5	0.99	45.06	12.49
Big farm	45.0	6.0	8.0 + 2.0	6.0 Rape 4.0 Beet-root	2.0 { mix-ture, maize, etc. } + 25 (?3)	3.0	101	5.08	108.42	(?)42.08

1) Perennial fodder plants ....
2) Mixture for fattening ....
3) Others, (p. 110) ? 101—76=25

Value of Livestock

α) 1st five-year period β) 1st five-year period		Head in terms of big cattle	marks	Price of average head of big cattle	
I (Small farm) (p. 47)	α)	$53._{85} \div 5 = 10._{75}$	$2{,}765._{00}$		$52._3 \times 10 = 523 \div 2 = 261._5$
	β)	$56._{60} \div 5 = 11._{32}$	$3{,}019._{00}$		
		$110.45 \div 10 = 11._{04}$	$5{,}784$		
			$\div 2 = 2{,}892._0$	$261._5$	$5{,}784 \div 110._{45} = 52._3 \times 5 = 261._5$
II (Medium farm) (p. 69)	α)	$135._2 \div 5 = 26._8$	$9{,}474._0$		
	β)	$153._2 \div 5 = 30._6$	$11{,}091._0$		
		$287._4 \div 10 = 28._{74}$	$20{,}565$		
			$\div 2 = 10{,}282._{50}$	$357._5$	$20{,}565 \div 287._4 = 71._5 \times 5 = 357._5$
III (Medium farm) (p. 87)	α)	$70._6 \div 3 = 23._5$	$10{,}574._{66}$		
	β)	$129._7 \div 5 = 25._9$	$10{,}971._{00}$		
		$200._3 \div 8 = 25._{04}$	$21{,}545._{66}$		$21{,}545._{66} \div 200._3 = 107._5 \times 5 = 537._5$
			$\div 2 = 10{,}772._{83}$	$430._0$	$107._5 \times 8 = 860 \div 2 = 430$
IV (Big farm) (p. 107)	α)	$335._5 \div 5 = 67._1$	$23{,}442._0$		
	β)	$333._{25} \div 5 = 66._6$	$23{,}300._0$		
		$668._{75} \div 10 = 66._8$	$46{,}742$		
			$\div 2 = 23{,}371._{00}$	$349._5$	$46{,}742 \div 668._{75} = 69._9 \times 5 = 349._5$

P. *123*:

I— $13._{64}$	ha 11	head of big cattle
II— $61._{10}$	29	
III— $45._{06}$	25	
IV— $108._{41}$	67	

This is wrong. 2,892 should be divided by $11._{04}$, etc. But the ratios do not change.

Written not earlier than September 1910- not later than 1913

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III

MATERIAL FOR A STUDY OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

1910-1916

GERMAN AGRARIAN STATISTICS (1907)[107]

44 pages. 40 vertical × 33 (horizontal) squares*

Statistik des Deutschen Reichs.

German statistical publications: *Puttkammer* und *Mühlbrecht*. Französiche Strasse, 28. Berlin. (*Free* catalogue.)

Vol. 2 1 2. Census of Occupations and Enterprises of June 12, 1907.

Agricultural Production Statistics.

First three subvolumes: *1 a*; *1 b*; *2 a*

From the "preliminary remarks" to tables 4 and 5 ("Part *1 b*"). These figures were first collected in 1907. "The ground for classifying under these 11 heads according to number of personnel was the data under letter C 1-3 of the master card; consequently, account was also taken of family members helping out (C 2 b) and casual labour (C 3 c)" (p. 455). "...The number of farms classified under heads 14-64" (establishments by number of labourers: 1, 2, etc., to 200) "is as a rule smaller than the total number of farms in the first column" (the number of *a l l* agricultural enterprises), "because it contains, in addition, figures for farms only with the greatest number of labourers and farms without personnel" (455).

* Size or square-lined sheet used in MS.—*Ed*.

On the whole, the *main* substance of the *three* volumes (*1 a*, *1 b* and *2 a*) is set down in this notebook.

secondary items left out: forest estates, columns of particular and detailed data, poultry in the cattle population column, etc., etc.

To show that it is not right to classify labour in agriculture by sex and age, I give the data (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1910) for the *whole of industry* according to the Census of June 12, 1907. Total personnel = *14,348,016*, including *women—3,510,464* (= 24.$_4$ %). Apparently, only the help and labourers have been classified by age. Their total: ***7,474,140*** men + ***1,862,531*** women, together = 9,336,671; including those of 16 years and over—6,923,586 men + 1,663,070 women; 14-16—527,182 men + 190,454 women, together—717,636; *under 14*: 23,372 men + 9,007 women [together = 32,379 = 0.$_3$% out of 9,336,671].

14-16 years . . .	717,636
under 14 years . .	32,379
	750,015 = 8.$_0$%

Then family members helping out (141,295 men & 790,602 women) are classified as follows: 16 years and over—126,738 men + 767,127 women; under *16* years: 14,557 men + 23,475 women.

Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band *202*. *Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907*. *Berufsstatistik** (according to the June 12, 1907 Census), {The exact title of Vol. 202:}

Vol. 202 (1909). (Price 6 Mk)

Section I
Introduction

" 211 (*in preparation*) Summaries.

* *Statistics of the German Reich*. Vol. 202. Census of Occupations and Enterprises of June 12, 1907. Occupations Statistics.

Pages 8 and 9 of Lenin's manuscript,
"German Agrarian Statistics (1907)".
September 1910-1913

8)

α β K γ

Teil C 9a. Tab. 6. Der Viehstand der größeren B-be.

Anzahl der größeren B-be, welche für ihre B-be halten:

						Gesamtvieh				
						Rohe Vieheinheiten B-be (Stückzahl)	und zwar			
							Pferde über 3 Monat	Rindv. über 1 Jahr	Pferde unter 3 Monat	Schafe
	719.035	185.382	498.870	685.773	1.370.485	164.902	6.573	157.024	1.310	48.348
	93.210	44.308	217.730	339.141	1.201.929	670.559	26.766	618.881	24.965	49.122
	17.812	7.884	59.634	910.947	988.465	954.878	20.685	760.651	173.542	55.702
	7.475	2.089	28.304	1.028.671	1.058.449	1.053.442	9.916	364.882	678.634	140.365
	1.589	207	3.345	257.089	260.689	250.051	1.368	6.762	251.921	85.909
	331	28	1.288	21.979	23.935	23.182	133	163	22.886	11.875
	140	16	820	11.911	12.747	12.722	53	81	12.588	7.954
	834.032	239.898	819.172	3.842.980	4.902.050	3.187.002	65.441	1.908.301	1.152.258	390.821
			4.662.152							
5-10 ha	4.824	1.574	21.179	625.221	647.974	644.040	7.232	299.631	337.117	65.583
11-20 ha	2.251	515	7.125	402.250	410.490	409.392	2.624	65.294 / 65.251	341.517	74.732

[illegible] + [illegible] (Kühen, Ochsen, Gänse)

[illegible] Dorfbuch

Geräte des Viehstandes

Schweine	Ziegen	Pferde	Gemeind. Stiere	Zum Kühe	Schafe	Schweine	Ziegen	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
		Rinder								
923.528	705.477	9.538	196.262	177.567	179.402	1.975.177	131.416		899.417	1.912.153	2.076.177
909.996	627.417	61.769	1.119.370	859.962	936.359	2.407.972	1.384.810		137.518	623.897	1.242.718
828.156	219.226	241.636	3.154.383	2.020.808	359.242	3.107.038	412.808		25.696	54.399	812.050
972.062	192.464	1.323.490	7.872.092	3.989.026	1.448.545	6.334.145	42.655		9.164	12.107	376.989
246.512	35.093	1.202.174	5.305.871	9.985.643	3.326.368	3.615.145	99.506		1.775	2.140	8.902
20.566	9.618	652.436	9.797.891	1.007.959	4.371.103	1.386.872	8.314		359	384	547
11.182	1.415	491.670	1.622.899	743.947	3.869.778	1.026.651	4.440		156	165	246
3.099.890	1.783.375	3.421.103	19.976.209	10.339.255	8.991.620	18.865.351	3.653.916		1.073.917	2.639.086	4.517.383
585.724	120.813	2.528.988	3.748.888	2.042.953	537.561	3.158.595	855.190		6.398	8.758	308.383
326.338	72.651	795.402	4.124.194	1.946.073	910.984	3.175.551	174.461		9.766	3.349	68.600
		[illegible]									

1895 statistics: *Statistics of the German Reich*, new series, Vol. 112 (Berlin 1898): "Agriculture in the German Reich according to the Agricultural Census of June 14, 1895".

Part 2 *a*. Table 10. Wine-growing Farms (by size of area under *vineyards*)

	Number of wine-growing farms	These farms have			Owners not farmers by principal occupation
		total area ha	area under vineyards *ha*	other farmland	
Under 2 ares	2,239	4,287	23	3,726	1,228
2-5	25,240	61,016	836	52,440	11,665
5-10	56,183	149,617	3,922	135,135	23,127
10-20	79,031	270,713	10,998	235,714	25,900
20-50	99,805	409,727	30,806	334,396	23,054
50-1 ha	44,373	227,764	29,328	171,583	7,156
1-2	16,167	124,645	20,973	85,140	2,578
2-3	2,747	35,262	6,315	19,777	541
3-4	868	25,104	2,927	10,620	189
4-5	437	10,433	7,119	13,581	201
5 and over	768	44,098	7,119	13,581	201
Total	327,858	1,362,666	115,107	1,067,330	95,753

1) top = Total
2) = main enterprises
3) bottom = ancillary enterprises

I have left out many details in this table on *owned* and *leased* land.

Part *1 a*. Table 1

	Agricultural enterprises in general		Of the total area			The farms	
	enterprises	area ha	land owned	land leased	other land	land only under vegetable gardens	land only under potatoes
Under 0.5 ha	2,084,060 89,166 1,994,894	619,066 142,995 476,071	369,752	157,132	92,182	623,711	360,944
0.5-2 ha	1,294,449 369,224 925,225	1,872,936 725,021 1,147,915	1,333,022	426,380	113,534	13,263	21,831
2-5	1,006,277 718,905 287,372	4,306,421 3,153,829 1,152,592	3,501,620	713,415	91,386	1,200	249
5-20	1,065,539 980,970 84,569	13,768,521 12,702,834 1,065,687	12,401,022	1,239,747	127,752	289	74
20-100	262,1914 254,664 7,530	12,623,011 12,702,834 525,768	11,622,873	946,723	53,415	27	2
100 and >	23,566 23,110 456	9,916,531 9,696,179 220,352	7,873,850	2,028,962	13,719	3	—
incl. 200 ha and >	12,887 12,737 150	7,674,873 7,555,522 119,351	6,063,052	1,607,373	4,448	—	—
Σ	5,736,082 2,436,036 3,300,046	43,106,486 38,518,101 4,588,385	37,102,139	5,512,359	491,988	638,495	383,100
5-10 ha	652,798 589,266 63,532	5,997,626 5,376,631 620,995	5,266,586	671,655	59,385	233	54
10-20 ha	412,741 391,704 21,037	7,770,895 7,326,203 444,692	7,134,436	568,092	68,367	56	20

* The column below has been transferred here from p. 127 of the MS. total number of enterprises, the second, the main enterprises, and the bottom, the

1) total
2) main enterprises
3) ancillary enterprises*

Table 2

have		Of the total area			
land under forest estates	waste and unsuitable land	ploughland ha	land under vegetable gardens and orchards without decorative gardens	vineyards ha	Of the total area farmland in general
38,762	22,788	246,961	76,431	6,256	359,553 24,400 335,153
118,994	61,782	976,345	71,296	29,046	1,371,758 462,317 909,441
237,117	117,939	2,350,006	73,454	39,346	3,304,878 2,446,400 858,478
445,922	218,712	7,728,039	138,511	34,185	10,421,564 9,710,848 710,716
141,258	80, 009	7,728,039	79,810	5,878	9,322,103 9,064,769 257,334
13,630	8,775	7,220,699	42,214	657	7,055,018 6,953,946 101,072
8,411	5,231	4,683,308	31,867	236	5,555,793 5,495,247 60,546
995,683	510,005	24,432,354	481,716	115,368	31,834,874 28,662,680 3,172,194
					under 2 ha 1,731,311 2-20 13,726,442 over 20 ha 16,377,121
240,369	117,892	3,379,657	69,450	23,379	4,607,090 4,182,257 424,833
205,553	100, 820	4,348,382	69,061	10,806	5,814,474 5,528,591 285,883

(p. 331 of this volume), as Lenin wanted it. The top figure of three shows the ancillary enterprises.—*Ed.*

1) top =*male*
2) lower =*female*
3) bottom = together

In this table, and from here on, all the totals (male + female) are *mine*

Part *1 b*. Table 4: Personnel on agricul

	Number working on June 12, 1907		Maximum working from June 13, 1906 to June 12, 1907		Of the . . . persons		
					1		
						personnel	
	total	of them permanent labour	total	of them casual labour	enterprises	12. 6. 1907	maximum
Under 0.5 ha	522,343 1,491,964 2,014,307	325,043 528,973 854,016	964,858 1,648,732 2,613,590	516,509 231,555 748,064	1,060,700	147,753 912,947	381,957 991,575
0.5-2 ha	801,850 1,536,895 2,338,745	492,153 802,695 1,294,848	1,240,243 1,812,754 3,052,997	563,252 397,971 961,223	492,565	60,418 432,147	242,890 524,494
2-5 ha	1,330,625 1,583,252 2,913,877	1,012,783 1,066,337 2,079,120	1,709,508 1,941,006 3,650,514	519,004 498,023 1,017,027	93,154	23,101 70,053	69,240 109,349
5-20 ha	2,324,888 2,270,970 4,595,858	1,882,107 1,618,741 3,500,848	3,045,451 3,024,803 6,070,254	992,858 1,047,081 2,039,939	14,227	8,391 5,836	23,602 20,285
20-100 ha	1,139,898 929,535 2,069,433	919,070 634,009 1,553,079	1,565,150 1,310,234 2,875,384	613,760 593,277 1,207,037	755	589 166	2,353 1,382
100 ha and over	728,224 509,105 1,237,329	542,097 291,815 833,912	844,301 625,384 1,469,685	301,164 330,517 631,681	62	62 —	694 611
incl. 200 ha and over	560,063 380,727 940,790	416,934 218,221 635,155	636,171 458,853 1,095,024	218,795 239,469 458,264	30	30 —	453 494
Total	6,847,828 8,321,721 15,139,549	5,173,253 4,942,570 10,115,823	9,369,511 10362,913 19,732,424	3,506,547 3,098,424 6,604,971	1,661,463	240,314 1,421,149 1,661,463	720,736 1,647,696 2,368,432
5-10 ha	1,239,883 1,251,454 2,491,337	1,001,675 892,956 1,894,631	1,593,788 1,616,384 3,210,172	483,185 502,028 985,213	11,822	6,563 5,259 11,822	17,668 15,890
10-20 ha	1,085,005 1,019,516 2,104,521	880,432 725,785 1,606,217	1,451,663 1,408,419 2,860,082	509,673 545,053 1,054,726	2,405	1,828 557	5,934 4,395

tural enterprises by number and sex

employed in agricultural enterprises, including managers:

2			3			4-5		
	personnel			personnel			personnel	
enter-prises	12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum	enter-prises	12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum	enter-prises	12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum
324,880	250,567 399,193	318,171 434,458	66,372	79,406 119,710	95,129 130,939	19,644	34,269 48,554 82,823	39,695 53,319 93,014
426,043	319,863 532,223	446,119 618,457	182,016	224,209 3321,839	277,889 367,778	81,584	151,820 194,193 346,013	176,531 220,032 396,563
330,535	296,159 364,911	414,281 474,573	312,821	431,143 507,320	539,652 611,119	222,679	449,854 498,361 948,215	529,782 577,755 1,107,537
121,400	126,194 116,606	212,595 208,956	252,719	385,231 372,926	542,336 537,519	475,524	1,058,301 1,032,429	1,361,568 1,344,729
2,354	2,943 1,765	7,977 6,302	8,605	15,911 9,904	33,406 24,169	57,167	150,793 111,409 262,202	247,806 193,646 441,452
32	55 9	392 375	49	95 52	522 462	158	500 233 733	1,378 999 2,377
15	24 6	237 252	14	32 10	181 209	27	88 36	362 331
1,205,244	995,781 1,414,707 2,410,488	1,399,535 1,743,121 3,142,656	822,582	1,135,995 1,331,751 2,467,746	1,488,934 1,671,986 3,160,920	856,756	1,845,537 1,885,179 3,730,716	2,356,760 2,390,480 4,747,240
102,110	104,613 99,607 204,220	166,855 165,933	194,618	290,540 293,314 583,854	389,482 397,234	274,771	590,891 599,881 1,190,772	728,042 738,760 1,466,802
19,290	21,581 16,999	45,740 42,023	58,101	94,691 79,612	152,854 140,285	200,753	467,410 432,548 899,958	633,526 605,969 1,239,495

[ctd on next page]

[ctd]	Of the . . . persons employed in agricul								
	6-10			11-20			21-30		
	enterprises	personnel		enterprises	personnel		enterprises	personnel	
		12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum		12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum		12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum
Under 0.5 ha	2,239	6,007 9,095 15,102	7,203 10,338 17,541	183	1,325 1,212	1,793 1,487	33	483 356	567 454
0.5-2 ha	11,710	33,370 45,959 79,329	38,251 51,753 90,004	972	6,147 7,096	7,263 8,093	144	2,115 1,372	2,788 1,918
2-5 ha	32,692	102,339 116,750 219,089	115,989 132,611 248,600	2,450	15,942 17,842	18,246 20,252	344	4,692 3,530	5,719 4,126
5-20 ha	185,008	629,332 629,739 1,259,071	766,674 778,448 1,545,122	11,760	76,534 80,289	87,732 93,320	1,363	16,593 16,632	18,976 19,151
20-100 ha	150,553	609,305 494,583 1,103,888	827,983 690,869 1,518,852	36,727	259,354 229,139	322,736 289,113	4,026	50,242 47,615	60,187 58,008
100 ha and over	992	5,551 2,610 8,161	10,345 6,736 17,081	3,569	35,656 20,330	49,619 33,356	3,966	61,029 39,705	76,503 54,314
incl. 200 ha and over	118	608 337 945	2,001 1,662 3,663	377	4,379 1,753	6,923 3,933	1,058	18,704 8,823	23,959 14,126
Total	383,194	1,385,904 1,298,736 2,684,640	1,766,445 1,670,755 3,437,200	55,661	394,958 355,908 750,866	487,389 445,621 933,010	9,876	135,154 109,210 244,364	164,740 137,971 302,711
5-10 ha	62,941	206,045 214,834 420,879	242,528 252,678 495,206	3,741	24,802 26,293 51,095	27,973 29,895	511	6,356 6,152 12,508	7,329 6,992
10-20 ha	122,067	423,287 414,905 838,192	524,146 525,770 1,049,916	8,019	51,732 53,996	59,759 63,425	852	10,237 10,480	11,647 12,189

tural enterprises, including managers:

31-50			51-100			101-200			over 200		
enterprises	personnel		enterprises	personnel		enterprises	personnel		enterprises	personnel	
	12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum		12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum		12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum		12. 6. 1907	maxi-mum
21	590 202	976 579	16	852 229	1,322 371	11	912 436	962 556	1	179 30	179 30
60	1,484 811	1,810 1,042	25	1,099 581	1,300 667	10	862 446	1,109 569	3	463 228	516 175
111	2,758 1,381	3,229 1,790	50	2,303 1,271	2,543 1,482	18	1,548 829	1,760 930	4	786 1,004	980 94,582
482	10,027 8,180	11,701 9,886	174	7,244 4,289	8,867 5,294	47	3,942 2,479	4,684 3,097	15	3,099 1,565	3,273 1,650
1,167	23,278 19,968	28,875 25,538	320	13,236 7,763	16,475 11,525	95	8,687 4,440	10,719 6,240	27	5,560 2,783	5,936 2,946
5,956	141,141 95,068	164,612 118,881	6,230	255,654 177,056	289,423 212,650	2,115	160,220 119,793	176,208 136,154	406	68,261 54,249	74,315 60,858
3,379	87,952 48,939	103,628 64,070	5,431	229,374 152,908	258,941 183,845	2,043	154,674 116,005	169,638 131,735	388	64,198 51,910	69,826 58,191
7,797	179,278 125,610 304,888	211,203 157,716 368,919	6,815	280,388 191,189 471,577	319,930 231,989 551,919	2,296	176,171 128,423 304,594	195,442 147,547 342,989	456	78,348 59,859 138,207	85,199 66,604 151,803*)
164	3,441 2,760 6,201	4,087 3,366	76	3,282 1,722 5,004	3,772 2,102	16	1,460 728 2,188	1,740 930	9	1,890 904 2,794	2,041 999
318	6,586 5,420	7,614 6,520	98	3,962 2,567	5,095 3,192	31	2,482 1,751	2,944 2,167	6	1,209 661	1,232 651

*) Σ maximum (>6 labourers) = 6,088,551. Σ (maximum) = 19,507,799.

vertical = male
order = female
= total

Ibid. Table 5. Personnel in agricultural enterprises

	Managers				Family	
	α *total*	of them			β working permanently	
		owners	lease-holders	others (managers, supervisors, etc.)	m./f.	of them under 14 years
Under 0.5 ha	279,464 135,017 414,481	135,084 92,817 227,901	98,928 33,816 132,744	45,452 8,384 53,836	31,353 369,641 400,994	2,364 2,841 5,205
0.5-2 ha	363,273 123,044 486,317	304,138 110,100 414,238	45,309 10,901 56,210	13,826 2,043 15,869	98,286 643,391 741,677	7,904 8,311 16,215
2-5 ha	681,216 73,917 755,133	635,969 70,880 706,849	38,392 2,611 41,003	6,855 426 7,281	272,863 920,203 1,193,066	16,468 16,647 33,115
5-20 ha	936,185 57,062 993,247	906,121 55,692 961,813	25,478 1,028 26,506	4,586 342 4,928	626,299 1,247,274 1,873,573	26,790 25,239 52,029
20-100 ha	242,975 13,585 256,560	228,370 12,974 241,344	11,360 451 11,811	3,245 160 3,405	185,277 275,514 460,791	5,258 4,749 10,007
100 ha and over	22,980 775 23,755	12,978 552 13,530	5,107 167 5,274	4,895 56 4,951	4,191 6,193 10,384	104 139 243
incl. 200 ha and over	12,702 436 13,138	6,287 301 6,588	2,957 108 3,065	3,458 27 3,485	1,548 2,138 3,686	76 107 183
Total	2,526,093 403,400 2,929,493	2,222,660 343,015 2,565,675	224,574 48,974 273,548	78,859 11,411 90,270	1,218,269 3,462,216 4,680,485	58,888 57,926 116,814
	220,716(total farms 225,697)415,295					
5-10 ha	562,393 35,692 598,085	544,423 34,868 579,291	15,448 618 16,066	2,522 206 2,728	333,626 741,594 1,075,220	15,548 14,927 30,475
10-20 ha	373,792 21,370 395,162	361,698 20,824 382,522	10,030 410 10,440	2,064 136 2,200	292,673 505,680 798,353	11,242 10,312 21,554

by status in production and by sex.

members		Outside labour					
(γ) working temporarily only		controllers, bookkeepers, etc. (α) m./f. (δ)	permanent labour		those in (α). (β) and (γ) under 14 years	casual labour	
m./f.	of them under 14 years		male and female farmhands (β) (ε)	day labourers, labourers and Instleute (γ) (ζ)		m./f. (η)	of them under 14 years
123,306	19,191	1,006	4,297	8,926	177	73,994	681
888,204	17,871	469	19,617	4,229	259	74,787	620
1,011,510	37,062	1,472	23,914	13,155	436	148,781	1,301
184,838	38,533	1,646	12,094	16,854	717	124,859	1,564
612,088	34,070	486	27,245	8,529	647	122,112	1,192
796,926	72,603	2,132	39,339	25,383	1,364	246,971	2,756
177,721	49,761	2,131	32,958	23,615	3,028	140,121	2,766
376,646	42,233	555	59,365	12,297	2,251	140,269	1,947
554,367	91,994	2,686	92,323	35,912	5,270	280,390	4,713
170,486	66,132	4,965	254,249	60,409	16,750	272,295	9,984
358,981	56,446	1,614	281,870	30,921	7,002	293,248	5,498
529,467	122,578	6,579	536,119	91,330	23,752	656,543	15,482
32,320	12,431	10,146	359,451	121,221	13,702	188,508	12,038
82,948	10,508	3,577	278,809	62,524	4,141	212,578	8,230
115,268	22,939	13,723	638,260	138,745	17,843	401,086	20,268
1,040	117	44,341	147,731	322,854	4,301	185,087	18,118
3,052	105	6,229	68,365	210,353	3,689	214,238	18,123
4,092	222	50,570	215,996	533,207	7,990	399,325	36,241
442	20	35,494	106,702	260,488	3,223	142,687	12,907
1,163	33	4,222	48,452	162,973	2,929	161,343	13,181
1,605	53	39,716	155,154	423,461	6,152	304,030	26,088
689,711	186,165	64,232	810,780	553,879	38,675	984,864	45,151
2,321,919	161,233	12,930	735,171	328,853	17,989	1,057,232	35,610
3,011,630	347,398	77,162	1,545,951	882,732	56,664	2,042,096	80,761
101,259		6,754	497,655	91,394		288,171	
108,928	39,776	2,264	77,028	26,364	6,171	129,280	3,769
221,400	34,115	641	101,642	13,387	3,187	137,098	2,266
330,328	73,891	2,905	178,670	39,751	9,358	266,378	6,035
61,558	26,356	2,701	177,221	34,045	10,579	143,015	6,215
137,581	22,331	973	180,228	17,534	3,815	156,150	3,232
199,139	48,687	3,674	357,449	51,579	14,394	299,165	9,447

[ctd on next page]

[ctd]

	Only in this column are totals (m.+f.) from the original. In other columns, the totals are mine	Ergo, there are more hired than family workers in the 20-50 ha group as well	
		(My calculation) Total labour	
	total number of persons	(α+β+γ) family	(δ+ε+ζ+η) hired
Under 0.5 ha	522,343 1,491,964 2,014,307	1,392,862 1,826,985	99,102 187,322
0.5-2 ha	801,850 1,536,895 2,338,745	1,378,523 2,024,920	158,372 313,825
2-5 ha	1,330,625 1,583,252 2,913,877	1,370,766 2,502,566	212,486 411,311
5-20 ha	2,324,888 2,270,970 4,595,858	3,396,287	1,199,57
20-100 ha	1,139,898 929,535 2,069,433	372,047 832,619	1,557,488 1,236,814
100 ha and over	728,224 509,105 1,237,329	10,020 38,231	499,085 1,199,098
incl. 200 ha and over	560,063 380,727 940,790	18,429	922,361
Total	6,847,828 8,321,721 15,169,549	6,187,535 10,621,608	2,134,186 4,547,941
	1,621,244	737,270	883,974
5-10 ha	1,239,883 1,251,454 2,491,337	998,686 2,003,633	252,768 487,704
10-20 ha	1,085,005 1,019,516 2,104,521	664,631 1,392,654	354,885 711,867

(My calculation) Number of workers under 14 years			% of minors in total			Number of workers per enterprise		
total	family	hired	total	family	hired	total	family	hired
44,004	42,267	1,737	2.2	2.3	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.1
92,938	88,818	4,120	3.9	4.4	1.3	1.8	1.6	0.2
135,101	125,109	9,992	4.6	4.9	2.4	2.9	2.5	0.4
213,841	174,607	39,234	4.7	5.1	3.3	4.3	3.2	1.1
71,057	32,946	38,111	3.4	3.9	3.1	7.9	3.2	4.7
44,696	465	44,231	3.6	1.2	3.7	52.5	1.5	50.9
32,476	236	32,240	3.5	1.2	3.5	73.0	1.4	71.6
601,637	464,212	137,425	3.9	4.4	3.0	2.6	1.8	0.8
							3.3	
119,759	104,366	15,393	4.8	5.2	3.1	3.8	3.1	0.7
94,082	70,241	23,841	4.5	5.0	3.3	5.1	3.4	1.7

Part 2 *a*. Table 6. Cattle population

	Number of agricultural enterprises				
	α no poultry or other livestock α	β poultry but no other livestock β	other livestock, but no poultry γ	both poultry and other livestock δ	total (β-δ)
Under 0.5 ha	714, 035	185, 382	498,870	685,773	1,370,025
0.5-2 ha	93,210	44,308	217,790	939,141	1,201,239
2-5 ha	17,812	7,884	69,634	910,947	988,465
5-20 ha	7,075	2,089	28,304	1,028,071	1,058,464
20-100 ha	1,569	207	3,346	257,069	260,622
100 ha and over	331	28	1,228	21,979	23,235
Incl. 200 ha and over	140	16	820	11,911	12,747
Total	835,032	239,898	819,172	3,842,980	4,902,050
			4,662,152		
20-50 ha					
5-10 ha	4,824	1,574	21,179	625,221	647,974
10-20 ha	2,251	515	7,125	402,850	410,490

I leave out the number of those owning poultry (and the number of chickens, ducks, geese)

in agricultural enterprises.

keeping for their farms:

cattle				number of owners		
χ total number of such enter-prises	they have					
	horses but no horned cattle	λ horned cattle but no horses	horses and horned cattle	of sheep	of pigs	of goats
164,907	6,573	157,024	1,310	48,348	923,528	705,477
670,552	26,766	618,821	24,965	49,122	908,996	627,417
954,878	20,685	760,651	173,542	55,202	828,156	219,066
1,053,432	9,916	364,882	678,634	140,365	972,062	193,464
260,051	1,368	6,762	251,921	85,909	246,512	35,093
23,182	133	163	22,886	11,875	20,566	2,618
12,722	53	81	12,588	7,964	11,182	1,415
3,127,002	65,441	1,908,303	1,153,258	390,821	3,899,820	1,783,375
644,040	7,292	299,631	337,117	65,583	585,724	120,813
409,392	2,624	65,251	341,517	74,782	386,338	72,651

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[ctd]

	Cattle population				
	horses	horned cattle		sheep	pigs
		total	of them cows		
Under 0.5 ha	9,598	196,262	173,567	179,402	1,975,177
0.5-2 ha	61,769	1,119,370	852,962	236,359	2,407,972
2-5 ha	241,636	3,154,323	2,030,808	359,943	3,107,038
5-20 ha	1,323,490	7,873,092	3,989,026	1,448,545	6,334,146
20-100 ha	1,202,174	5,305,871	2,285,643	2,326,268	3,655,146
100 ha and over	652,436	2,327,291	1,007,959	4,371,103	1,386,272
Incl. 200 ha and over	491,670	1,692,299	713,947	3,864,778	1,026,651
Total	3,491,103	19,976,209	10,339,965	8,921,620	18,865,751
20-50 ha					
5-10 ha	528,088	3,748,888	2,042,953	537,561	3,158,595
10-20 ha	795,402	4,124,194	1,946,073	910,984	3,175,551

		(My calculation)		
goats		$(\underline{\underline{\alpha}}+\underline{\underline{\beta}})$ no live-stock	$(\Sigma-\underline{\underline{\varkappa}})$ no cattle	$(\Sigma-\underline{\underline{\varkappa}}+\underline{\underline{\lambda}})$ no horses
1,312,416		899,417	1,919,153	2,076,177
1,384,811		137,518	623,897	1,242,718
	< 2 ha	1,036,935	2,543,050	3,318,895
419,208		25,696	51,399	812,050
429,656		9,164	12,107	376,989
99,506		1,776	2,140	8,902
8,314		359	384	547
4,440		156	165	246
3,653,910		1,073,930	2,609,080	4,517,383
255,190		6,398	8,758	308,389
174,466		2,766	3,349	68,600

Ibid. Table 7. Agricultural enterprises

	Enterprises using the following types of machines in the last year	steam ploughs			broadcast sowers		
		farms	own		farms	own	
			farms	number of steam ploughs owned		farms	number of sowers owned
Under 0.5	18,466	5	1	1	2,696	68	68
0.5-2	114,986	13	3	4	11,442	468	471
2-5	325,665	23	5	7	15,780	4,219	4,225
5-20	772,536	81	25	26	87,921	63,067	63,183
20-100	243,365	319	21	23	73,481	67,958	69,919
100 and >	22,957	2,554	360	381	15,594	15,527	28,255
200 and >	12,652	2,112	321	341	9,429	9,412	20,347
Σ	1,497,975	2,995	415	442	206,914	151,307	166,121
5-10 ha	419,170	31	15	15	33,272	19,220	19,246
10-20 ha	353,366	50	10	11	54,649	43,847	43,937

My symbols:

A= farms using machines in general
B= ” owning machines ”
C= number of own machines of a given type

with use of agricultural machinery

reapers			seed drills and planters			inter-row cultivators		
	own			own				
farms	farms	number of reapers owned	farms	farms	number of machines	A	B	C
231	178	189	998	21	23	31	13	13
1,132	569	598	3,899	224	226	270	200	202
6,812	4,422	4,459	4,983	1,578	1,581	1,140	1,052	1,060
137,624	125,640	130,561	33,123	24,319	24,370	4,146	3,726	3,773
136,104	131,292	158,375	30,795	28,125	28,438	6,011	5,597	5,794
19,422	19,297	47,381	9,327	9,274	13,493	2,814	2,793	4,978
10,943	10,887	32,270	5,761	5,741	9,479	1,716	1,706	3,537
301,325	281,398	341,563	83,125	63,541	68,131	14,412	13,381	15,820
36,261	30,816	31,128	10,443	6,273	6,280	1,395	1,214	1,227
101,363	94,824	99,433	22,680	18,046	18,090	2,751	2,512	2,546

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[ctd]

	steam threshers			(*other threshers*)			potato planters		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
Under 0.5	10,468	116	125	5,431	444	444	4	3	3
0.5-2	60,750	680	702	39,321	10,370	10,405	71	32	32
2-5	127,739	1,455	1,500	163,287	116,187	116,297	55	29	29
5-20	203,438	3,360	3,441	539,285	502,826	503,717	312	204	204
20-100	69,005	4,311	4,380	190,618	185,895	187,317	866	679	681
100 and >	17,467	9,906	10,436	9,061	8,656	9,746	1,352	1,342	1,624
200 and >	10,721	7,702	8,202	3,649	3,488	4,212	1,010	1,005	1,271
Σ	488,867	19,828	20,584	947,003	824,378	827,926	2,660	2,289	2,573
5-10 ha	118,840	1,687	1,733	275,793	249,979	250,490	116	84	84
10-20 ha	84,598	1,673	1,708	263,492	252,847	196	120	120	

potato lifters			grain crushers			separators		
A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
5	2	2	34	33	33	757	670	684
29	4	4	446	437	437	11,720	10,463	10,550
93	61	63	2,476	2,410	2,414	56,955	53,210	53,328
4,196	3,672	3,691	12,943	12,735	12,750	180,641	175,221	175,467
5,442	5,040	5,193	9,686	9,591	9,627	80,137	78,293	78,556
1,239	1,227	1,839	3,747	3,735	4,009	6,696	6,570	6,897
647	640	1,103	2,615	2,612	2,840	3,512	3,438	3,686
11,004	10,006	10,792	29,332	28,941	29,270	336,906	324,427	325,482
713	571	573	4,916	4,808	4,816	85,986	82,807	82,903
3,483	3,101	3,118	8,027	7,927	7,934	94,655	92,414	92,564

Σ — A alone adds up to 2,424,543 for all columns and C — 1,808,704

[Only the first five categories

Ibid. Table 8. Connection between agricul

	Number of agricultural			
	sugar refineries	distilleries	starch factories	
Under $0._5$	8	582	9	
$0._5$-2	12	4,199	7	
2-5	23	11,459	10	
5-20	67	13,859	29	
20-100	118	2,750	60	
100 and >	231	3,910	319	
200 and >	170	3,056	281	
Σ	459	36,759	434	
5-10 ha	33	8,800	19	
10-20 ha	34	5,059	10	

were counted in 1895]

tural enterprises and side-line industries

enterprises connected with:			
flour mills	breweries	saw mills	brick works
1,265	191	360	248
3,893	494	889	616
8,383	1,009	1,908	1,285
16,747	2.812	4,895	3,178
4,193	1,343	1,504	1,952
943	185	498	1,449
656	85	386	1,072
35,424	6,034	10,054	8,728
9,467	1,281	2,511	1,621
7,280	1,531	2,384	1,557

Ibid. Table 9. Owners and other supervisory person

	Owners and other supervisory personnel at agricultu				
	A. *1*. Agricul				
	Independent			108	
	total	of them		management and supervisory personnel	male and female farm-hands
		without side line	with side line		
Under $0._5$ ha	85,213	66,111	19,102	14,175	1,502
$0._5$-2 ha	364,755	253,337	111,418	4, 591	778
2-5 ha	717,699	495,439	222,280	406	127
5-20 ha	980,145	809,107	171,038	255	30
20-100 ha	253,877	230,363	23,514	216	4
100 ha and over	22,731	18,259	4,472	140	—
200 ha and over	12,568	9,541	3,027	64	—
Total	2,424,420	1,872,616	551,804	19,783	2,441
5-10 ha	588,958	468,744	120,214	142	25
10-20 ha	391,187	40,363	50,824	113	5

Total A (A.1+A.2-6) = under $0._5$ ha = 494,761
$0._5$-2 " = 568,575 } = 1,063,336

nel at agricultural enterprises by main occupation:

ral enterprises were distributed by *main occupation* as follows:						
ture	A. *2-6* Vegetable gardening, livestock farming fisheries, etc.		B. Industry			
			independent		*ancillary personnel*	
day labourers, labourers	independent	ancillary personnel	total	of them engaged in handicrafts	total	of them apprentices, assistants and workers
351,347	11,940	30,584	253,194	17,663	752,278	703,935
155,330	13,007	30,114	203,677	10,042	305,102	291,039
16,636	5,564	12,688	108,968	2,206	65,004	61,212
1,078	2,040	4,979	37,575	201	5,477	4,613
7	411	197	3,512	4	128	43
—	41	7	230	—	7	—
—	18	1	82	—	1	—
524,398	33,003	78,560	607,156	30,116	1,127,996	1,060,842
1,053	1,458	2,628	28,811	174	4,950	4,276
25	582	2,351	8,764	27	527	337

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	Owners and other supervisory personnel at agricul by *main occupa*					
	C. 1-11 Trade and Insurance		*C. 12-26* Transport and Communications		*C. 27* Hotels and Inns	
	Independent	Ancillary personnel	Independent	Ancillary personnel	Independent	Ancillary personnel
Under 0.5 ha	70,786	14,878	11,993	104,011	27,837	863
From 0.5 ha to under 2 ha	40,908	3,089	10,046	32,454	23,104	210
2-5	17,703	540	7,544	8,286	17,454	54
5-20	7,215	92	3,646	1,016	12,728	12
20-100	720	8	243	20	818	—
100 and >	36	—	3	—	10	—
200 ha and over	13	—	1	—	2	—
Total	137,368	18,607	33,475	145,877	81,951	1,139
5-10 ha	5,386	75	2,768	985	9,281	10
10-20 ha	1,829	17	878	121	3,447	2

tural enterprises were distributed *tion* as follows					This letter is mine		My figures
D	E	F	G	H	K		
Household services and casual hired labour	Private and public employment, the professions	No occupation, and no occupation reported	Domestic servants living in	Members of households without trade at all or only with side line	Managers of public enterprises	Total	of them hired labour (Σ of the columns marked in red pencil)
17,351	101,442	227,116	323	5,746	1,481	2,084,060	1,273,137 +14,175
3780	29,086	70,333	32	2,108	1,915	1,294,449	530,889 +4,591
501	11,297	13,823	9	242	1,732	1,006,277	
52	3,916	3,307	6	30	1,850	1,065,539	
2	756	407	1	3	861	262,191	
—	61	57	—	—	243	23,566	
—	24	13	—	—	100	12,887	
21,686	146,558	315,043	371	8,129	8,112	5,736,082	
44	2,636	2,515	6	26	1,041	652,798	
8	1,280	792	0	4	809	412,741	

Part *1 b*: Table 3. Ploughland

	Number of farms with plough land	Their total area in ha	Of the total area		
			Total	of this	
				spring wheat	winter wheat
				cereals accord	
Under $0._5$ ha	1,352,763	368,098	246,961	1,299	1,912
$0._5$-2 ha	1,232,970	1,588,736	976,345 $\boxed{49._1}$ $5._0$	8,115 $\boxed{0._4}$ $2._6$	21,819 $\boxed{0._9}$ $1._8$
2-5 ha	985,613	3,948,861	2,350,006 $\boxed{54._6}$ $9._6$	17,468 $\boxed{0._4}$ $4._9$	99,763 $\boxed{2._3}$ $7._5$
5-20 ha	1,050,696	13,124,460	7,728,039 $\boxed{56._1}$ $31._6$	72,891 $\boxed{0._5}$ $20._3$	430,479 $\boxed{3._1}$ $32._5$
20-100 ha	259,475	11,942,678	7,220,699 $\boxed{57._2}$ $29._6$	106,714 $\boxed{0._9}$ $29._8$	426,074 $\boxed{3._4}$ $32._2$
100 ha and over	23,262	9,368,409	5,910,304 $\boxed{59._6}$ $24._2$	151,878 $\boxed{1._5}$ $42._4$	343,725 $\boxed{3._5}$ $26._0$
200 ha and over	12,769	7,379,305	4,683,308	114,751	262,029
Total	4,904,779	40,341,242	24,432,354 $\boxed{56._7}$ $100._0$	358,365 $\boxed{0._8}$ $100._0$	1,323,772 $\boxed{3._1}$ $100._0$
			< 2 ha) 1,223,306 2-20) 10,078,045 > 20) 13,131,003	9,414 90,359 258,592	23,731 536,242 769,799
5-10 ha	641,983	5,034,959	3,379,657	26,818	178,520
10-20 ha	408,713	7,489,501	4,348,382	46,073	251,959

Bottom %% (Zahn, 1910, p. 574[109]): $\boxed{}$ = % of total area of figure is % of all area under a *given* cereal, etc. [see p. *30*

* See p. 327.—*Ed.*

and its cultivation

ploughland makes up					
under { all these 7 = total area under cereals (after Zahn) }					
spelt	rye	barley	oats	mixed cereals	sugar-beet
ing to Zahn					
1,615	32,386	8,511	10,667	1,444	1,257
14,235 $\boxed{0.6}$ 6.9	260,602 $\boxed{11.8}$ 4.8	56,479 $\boxed{2.6}$ 4.0	105,499 $\boxed{4.7}$ 2.7	15,809 $\boxed{0.7}$ 1.9	8,473 $\boxed{0.4}$ 1.9
53,576 $\boxed{1.2}$ 23.1	648,844 $\boxed{15.1}$ 10.6	157,406 $\boxed{3.7}$ 9.7	371,046 $\boxed{8.6}$ 8.8	51,873 $\boxed{1.9}$ 5.8	18,858 $\boxed{0.4}$ 3.7
117,920 $\boxed{0.9}$ 50.5	2,106,517 $\boxed{15.3}$ 34.5	542,951 $\boxed{4.0}$ 33.5	1,473,212 $\boxed{10.7}$ 35.0	204,784 $\boxed{1.5}$ 22.7	77,582 $\boxed{0.6}$ 15.1
42,730 $\boxed{0.3}$ 18.9	1,795,482 $\boxed{14.2}$ 29.4	476,069 $\boxed{3.8}$ 29.4	1,384,181 $\boxed{10.9}$ 32.9	273,528 $\boxed{2.2}$ 30.3	125,961 $\boxed{1.0}$ 24.5
1,460 $\boxed{0.0}$ 0.6	1,262,945 $\boxed{12.8}$ 20.7	379,896 $\boxed{3.8}$ 23.4	865,713 $\boxed{8.7}$ 20.6	354,560 $\boxed{3.6}$ 39.3	281,691 $\boxed{2.8}$ 54.8
282	1,018,704	298,069	651,013	288,599	221,857
231,536 $\boxed{0.5}$ 100.0	6,106,776 $\boxed{14.2}$ 100.0	1,621,312 $\boxed{3.7}$ 100.0	4,210,318 $\boxed{9.8}$ 100.0	901,998 $\boxed{2.1}$ 100.0	513,822 $\boxed{1.2}$ 100.0
15,850 171,496 44,190	292,988 2,755,361 3,058,427	64,990 700,357 855,965	116,166 1,844, 2,249,894	17,253 256,657 628,088	9,730 96,440 407,652
63,433	916,289	239,689	624,989	81,684	31,327
54,487	1,190,228	202,262	848,223	123,100	46,255

[ctd on next page]

agricultural enterprises (=43,106,486), and the second of this notebook*].

[ctd]

(This table is taken in *full*.)

	Of the total area ploughland makes up											
	of this sown to											
	potatoes		fodder plants		vege-tables in fields		other field crops		field pasture		fallow (bare)	
Under 0.5 ha	166,327		8,139		7,787		3,733		745		1,139	
0.5-2 ha	333,605		80,516		20,877		29,127		11,836		9,353	
	20.1	15.8	3.6	3.4	1.1	10.8	1.3	3.1	0.5	1.2	0.4	1.0
2-5 ha	447,484		262,426		42,916		94,397		42,207		41,742	
	10.4	14.1	6.1	10.1	1.0	16.2	2.2	8.9	1.0	3.9	1.0	4.2
5-20 ha	948,993		841,726		100,569		308,102		221,618		280,695	
	6.9	29.9	6.1	32.6	0.7	37.9	2.2	29.0	1.6	20.4	2.0	28.4
20-100 ha	609,723		720,375		62,546		310,916		492,910		393,490	
	4.8	19.2	5.7	27.9	0.5	23.5	2.5	29.2	3.9	45.5	3.1	39.5
100 ha and over	667,698		671,500		30,841		316,388		315,073		266,936	
	6.7	21.0	6.8	26.0	0.3	11.6	3.2	29.8	3.2	29.0	2.7	26.9
200 ha and over	562,501		528,225		22,351		254,403		246,139		214,385	
Total	3,173,830		2,584,682		265,536		1,062,663		1,084,389		993,355	
	7.4	100.0	6.0	100.0	0.6	100.0	2.5	100.0	2.5	100.0	2.3	100.0
< 2 ha)	499,932		88,655		28,664		32,860		12,581		10,492	
2-20)	1,396,477		1,104,152		143,485		402,499		263,825		322,437	
> 20)	1,277,421		1,391,875		93,387		627,304		807,983		660,426	
5-10 ha	470,609		381,869		49,776		134,387		79,264		102,003	
10-20 ha	478,384		459,857		50,793		173,715		142,354		179,692	

%% according to Zahn

	Cereals		Total area under cereals		Vegetable gardens		Meadows		Fat pastures		Vineyards	
< 2 ha	13.7	4.3	21.7	3.7	5.9	30.7	12.6	5.2	0.5	1.5	1.4	30.6
2-5	19.0	10.2	32.5	9.5	1.7	15.2	18.6	13.5	1.0	4.9	0.9	34.1
5-20	19.8	34.0	36.0	33.5	1.0	28.8	16.8	38.9	1.5	24.1	0.3	29.6
20-100	18.8	29.6	35.7	30.5	0.6	16.6	12.7	26.8	3.3	49.2	0.1	5.1
100 and >	17.8	21.9	33.9	22.8	0.4	8.7	9.4	15.6	1.7	20.3	0.0	0.6
Σ	18.6	100.0	34.2	100.0	1.1	100.0	13.8	100.0	2.0	100.0	0.3	100.0

	Total farmland		Area under forest husbandry		Small pastures		Waste and unsuitable land		Other land		Total area	
< 2 ha	69.5	5.4	20.6	6.7	2.2	5.2	2.4	4.0	5.3	12.4	100.0	5.8
2-5	76.8	10.4	15.2	8.5	2.2	9.1	3.1	9.1	2.7	11.0	100.0	10.0
5-20	75.7	32.7	15.4	27.6	2.6	33.5	4.4	40.9	1.9	25.4	100.0	31.9
20-100	73.9	29.3	17.3	28.5	2.8	33.7	4.4	37.4	1.6	19.5	100.0	29.3
100 and >	71.1	22.2	22.2	28.7	2.0	18.5	1.3	8.6	3.4	31.7	100.0	23.0
Σ	73.9	100.0	17.8	100.0	2.5	100.0	3.4	100.0	2.4	100.0	100.0	100.0

Ibid. Table 2. *Number and area of farms*

	Agricultural enterprises in general		Of the total area		
	number of enterprises	area	land owned	land lease	other land *)
Under 0.5 ha	357,945	85,395	6,332	20,068	48,995
0.5 -2 ha	182,806	182,068	77,613	60,207	44,248
2 -5 ha	34,998	113,967	73,209	35,407	5,351
5 -20 ha	3,751	27,679	19,590	7,434	655
20 -100 ha	—	—	—	—	—
100 ha and over	—	—	—	—	—
200 ha and over	—	—	—	—	—
Total	579,500	409,109	186,744	123,116	99,249
< 2 ha 2-20 ha > 20 ha					
5-10 ha	3,687	26,769	18,945	7,183	641
10-20 ha	64	910	645	251	141

*) Other land = Dienstland, Deputant land, etc.

I have made heavy cuts in this table, leaving out details for owned and leased land, etc.

of agricultural labourers and day labourers

Of the total area				Farms holding land exclusively	
plough-land	under vegetable gardens and orchards (without decorative gardens)	under vine-yards	farmland in general	under vegetable gardens	under potatoes
64,735	11,404	580	79,383	43,904	113,345
132,140	8,210	1,627	167,420	1,034	13,388
72,877	2,222	504	101,679	45	38
16,123	409	43	24,018	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—
285,875	22,245	2,754	372,500	44,983	126,771
15,665	398	43	23,235	—	—
458	11	—	783	—	—

per farm		
farmland ha	all livestock in terms of big cattle	Quantity of all livestock in terms of big cattle
0.17	0.4	826,963 854,016
1.1	1.54	1,922,168 1,294,848
3.2	4.2	4,243,647 2,079,120
		4,595,858 3,500,848
35.5	29.2	7,662,750 1,553,079
299.3	159.8	3,764,098 833,912
		940,790 635,155
5.5	5.1	29,380,405
		2,749,131 15,204,426 11,426,848 2,386,991
7.0	7.8	5,141,657 1,894,631
14.1	14.1	5,819,122

Per permanent labourer		bottom: *of them* permanent labourers
Farmland ha	All livestock in terms of big cattle	Number of *all* labourers
$0._4$	$0._9$	2,014,307 854,016
$1._6$	$1._5$	2,338,745 1,294,848
$1._6$	$2._3$	2,913,877 2,079,120
		4,595,858 3,500,848
$6._0$	$4._9$	2,069,433 1,553,079
$8._4$	$4._5$	1,237,329 833,912
		940,790 635,155
$3._1$	$2._9$	15,169,549 10,115,823
$<$ 2 ha 2-20: $>$ 20:		4,353,052 2,148,864 7,509,735 5,579,968 3,306,762 2,386,991
2.4	2.7	2,491,337 1,894,631
3.6	3.6	2,104,521 1,606,217

Statistics of the German

For comparison, I take the 1895 data

1895	number of agricultural enterprises	Farms with agricultural: no livestock	livestock in general	in particular: total number of such enterprises
< 2 ha	3,237,030	831,771	2,405,259	965,517
2-5	1,016,318	26,658	989,660	960,110
5-20	998,804	9,090	989,714	985,911
5-10 }	605,814	6,542	599,272	596,429
10-20 }	392,990	2,548	390,442	389,482
20-100	281,767	1,837	279,930	279,274
100 and >	25,061	380	24,681	24,638
1895:	5,558,980	869,736	4,689,244	3,215,450
1907:	5,736,082	1,073,930	4,662,152	3,127,002
	+177,102	+204,194	—27,092	—88,448
1895				
½-1 ha	676,215	91,406	584,809	521,172
1-2 ha	707,235	51,708	655,527	243,588*)
1882:	5,276,344	834,441	4,441,903	3,255,887

% of farms

	no livestock		livestock in general	
	1895	1882	1895	1882
< 2 ha	25.70	26.30	74.30	73.70
2-5	2.62	2.36	97.38	97.64
5-20	0.91	0.56	99.09	99.44
20-100	0.65	0.26	99.35	99.74
100 and >	1.52	0.38	98.48	99.62
Total	15.65	15.81	84.35	84.19

*) These figures erroneously transposed:
243,588 refers to 50 ares-1 ha
521,172 refers to 1 ha-2 ha

Reich, Vol. 112
on the number of farms with livestock:

or dairy production keeping for their farm					
big cattle			in general		
specifically					
horses and horned cattle	horned but no horned cattle	horned cattle but no horses	sheep	pigs	goats
28,954	40,080	896,483	141,466	1,731,919	1,330,953
152,440	20,968	786,702	80,057	799,803	192,272
584,561	10,601	390,749	184,648	887,424	160,808
278,748	7,536	310,145	87,985	527,741	98,071
305,813	3,065	80,604	96,663	359,683	62,737
267,190	1,473	10,611	122,498	266,073	34,306
24,357	149	132	15,072	22,222	2,609
1,057,502	73,271	2,084,677	543,741	3,707,441	1,720,948
1,153,258	65,441	1,908,303	390,821	3,899,820	1,783,375
+95,756	—7,830	—176,374	—152,920	+192,379	+62,427
+87,926					
5,067	12,213	226,308	34,911	428,775	357,522
21,752	18,829	480,591	41,101	483,609	246,734
996,244	42,180	2,217,463	749,217	2,950,588	1,505,357

with

big cattle in general		horses and horned cattle		horses but no horned cattle		horned cattle but no horses	
1895	1882	1895	1882	1895	1882	1895	1882
29.83	35.84	0.89	0.91	1.24	0.64	27.70	34.29
94.47	95.18	15.00	14.83	2.06	1.47	77.41	78.88
98.71	99.17	58.53	57.31	1.06	0.78	39.12	41.08
99.12	99.68	94.83	94.87	0.52	0.28	3.77	4.53
98.31	99.55	97.19	99.07	0.59	0.13	0.53	0.35
57.84	61.71	19.02	18.88	1.32	0.80	37.50	42.03

	1895			
	Number of farms		Number of those owning horned cattle	
	without big cattle:	without horses:	**1895**	**1907**
Under 2 ha	2,271,513	3,167,996	925,437	802,120—
2-5 ha	56,208	842,910	939,142	934,193—
5-20 ha	12,893	403,642	975,310	1,043,516+
5-10 ha	9,385	319,530	588,893	636,748+
10-20 ha	3,508	84,112	386,417	406,768+
20-100 ha	2,493	13,104	277,801	258,683—
100 and over	423	555	24,489	23,049—
1895	2,343,530	4,428,207	3,142,179	3,061,561—
1907	2,609,080	4,517,383	3,061,561	
	+265,550	+89,176	—80,618	
			3,213,707	
			(1882)	

cf. Schmelzle[110]

N.B.

Number of horned cattle per owning farm			Number of those owning livestock in general (Nutzvieh)		
1895	*1907*	+ %		*1895*	*1907*
1.53	1.64	7.2	Under 0.5 ha	1,164,923	1,184,643+
			0.5-2 ha	1,240,336	1,156,931—
			< 2 ha	2,405,336	2,341,574—
2.98	3.38	10.3	2-5	989,660	980,581—
5.05	5.89	16.6	5-10	599,272	646,400+
8.42	10.14	20.4	10-20	390,422	409,975—
16.74	20.51	22.5	2-20 ha	1,979,374	2,036,956+
79.92	100.97	26.3	20-100	279,930	260,415—
			100 and >	24,681	23,207—
			20 and >	304,611	283,622—
			Total	4,689,244	4,662,152—
			1882:	4,441,903	

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[Cows not counted separately in 1895]

Growth of livestock

	horses			*horned cattle*			
	1885	*1907*		1895	*1907*		
0.$_5$-2 ha	14,528	9,598	—	237,606	196,363	—	
< 0.$_5$ ha	74,356	61,769	—	1,177,633	1,119,370	—	
50-ares 1 ha	21,866			305,904			(1895 =100) *1907*:
1-2 ha	52,490			871,729			
2 ha	88,884	71,367	—	1,415,239	1,315,632	—	
2 -5	225,998	241,636	+	2,802,900	3,154,323	+	112.$_5$
5 -20	1,147,454	1,323,490	+	6,227,233	7,873,092	+	126
5 -10	441,345	528,088	+	2,974,531	3,748,898	+	126.$_0$
10 -20	706,109	795,402	+	3,252,702	4,124,194	+	126.$_8$
20 -100	1,254,223	1,202,174	—	4,650,993	5,305, 871	+	114.$_1$
100 and >	650,739	652,436	+	1,957,277	2,327,291	+	118.$_8$
Σ=	3,367,298	3,491,103	+	17,053,642	19,976,209	+	

1882	3,114,420		15,454,372
		cows:	12,689,526
	1882		
		bulls:	2,764,846

population

sheep			*pigs*			
1885	*1907*		1895	*1907*		
223,453	179,402	—	1,473,823	1,975,177	+	
344,234	236,359	—	1,992,166	2,407,972	+	
142,297			873,416			(1895 =100)
201,937			1,118,750			
567,687	415,761	—	3,465,989	4,383,149	+	126.4
489,275	359,943	—	2,338,588	3,107,038	+	132.8
1,871,295	1,448,545	—	4,210,934	6,334,146	+	150.0
682,591	537,561	—	2,106,453	3,158,595	+	
1,188,704	910,984	—	2,104,481	3,175,551	+	
3,498,936	2,326,268	—	2,658,560	3,655,146	+	132.9
6,165,677	4,371,103	—	888,571	1,386,272	+	167.2
12,592,870	8,921,620	—	13,562,642	18,865,751	+	
21,116,957			8,431,266			

[ctd on next page]

[ctd]

	goats		In terms of big cattle (sheep = 1/10; pig = 1/4; goat = 1/12)			
				see p. 43*		
	1895	*1907*	1895	1907		
< 0.5 ha	1,260,176	1,312,416	747,651	826,963	+ 79,012	
< 0.5-2 ha	1,225,174	1,384,810	1,886,552	1,922,168	+ 35,616	
50 ares-1 ha	754,841					1895
1-2 ha	470,333					=100
< 2 ha	2,485,350	2,691,226	2,634,503	2,749,131	+ 114,628	
2-5 ha	295,194	419,208	3,687,071	4,243,647	+ 556,576	
5-20 ha	252,096	429,656	8,635,557	10,960,779		126.9
5-10 ha	148,328	255,190	4,023,109	5,141,657	+1,118,548	
10-20 ha	103,768	174,466	4,612,448	5,819,122	+1,206,674	
20-100 ha	64,374	99,506	6,925,115	7,662,750	+ 737,635	
100 and >	8,237	8,314	3,447,412	3,764,098	+ 316,686	
Total	3,105,251	3,653,910	25,329,658	29,380,405	+ 4	
1882	2,452,527					

* See p. 368.—*Ed.*

	Agricultural enterprises			Total area			Cultivated farmland		
	1895	1907		1895	1907		*1895*	*1907*	
Under 0.5 ha	1,852,917	2,084,060	+	522,712	619,066	+	327,930	359,553	+
0.5-2 ha	1,383,450	1,294,449	—	1,893,202	1,872,936	—	1,460,514	1,371,758	—
< 2 ha	3,236,367	3,378,509	+	2,415,914	2,4192,002	+	1,808,444	1,731,311	—
2-5	1,016,318	1,006,277	—	4,142,071	4,306,421	+	3,285,984	3,304,878	+
5-10	605,814	652,798	+	5,355,138	5,997,626	+	4,233,656	4,607,090	+
10-20	392,990	412,741	+	7,182,522	7,770,895	+	5,488,219	5,814,474	+
2-20	2,015,122	2,071,816	+	16,679,731	18,074,942	+	13,007,859	13,726,442	+
20-100	281,767	262,191	—	13,157,201	12,623,011	—	9,869,837	9,322,103	—
100 and >	25,061	23,566	—	11,031,896	9,916,531	—	7,831,801	7,055,018	—
20 and >	306,828	285,757	—	24,189,097	22,539,542	—	17,701,638	16,377,121	—
Total	5,558,317	5,736,082	+	43,284,742	43,106,486	—	32,517,941	31,834,874	—

Zahn, *Annalen* 1910 p. 588	Horses			Horned cattle			Sheep			Pigs		
	1907	1895	1882	1907	1895	1882	1907	1895	1882	1907	1895	1882
< 2 ha	2.1	2.6	1.8	6.6	8.3	10.4	4.7	4.6	3.6	23.2	25.6	24.7
2-5 ha	6.9	6.7	6.5	15.8	16.4	16.9	4.0	3.9	3.5	16.5	17.2	17.6
5-20 ”	37.9	34.1	34.2	39.4	36.5	35.7	16.2	14.8	12.7	33.6	31.0	31.4
20-100 ”	34.4	37.3	38.6	26.6	27.3	27.0	26.1	27.8	26.0	19.4	19.6	20.6
> 100 ”	18.7	19.3	18.9	11.6	11.5	10.0	49.0	49.0	54.2	7.3	6.6	5.7
Σ	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Per 100 ha of farmland

< 2 ha	4.1	4.9	3.1	76.0	7.3	88.4	24.0	31.4	41.2	235.2	191.7	114.1
2-5 ha	7.3	6.9	6.4	95.4	85.3	81.8	10.9	14.9	22.8	94.0	71.2	46.6
5-20 ”	12.7	11.8	11.6	75.5	64.1	60.2	13.9	19.3	29.4	60.8	43.3	28.9
20-100 ”	12.9	12.7	12.1	56.9	47.1	42.1	25.0	35.5	55.5	39.2	26.9	17.5
100 ha and >	9.2	8.3	7.5	33.0	25.0	19.8	62.0	78.7	147.1	19.6	11.3	6.2
Σ	11.0	10.4	9.8	62.7	52.4	48.5	28.0	38.7	66.3	59.3	41.7	26.5

Goats		
1907	1895	1882
73.8	80.0	80.6
11.5	9.5	9.2
11.8	8.1	7.9
2.7	2.1	2.1
0.2	0.2	0.2
100	100	100
155.8	137.4	108.2
12.7	9.0	7.1
4.1	2.6	2.1
1.1	0.7	0.5
0.1	0.1	0.1
11.5	9.5	7.7

Zahn, p. 593

Forced sales per 10,000 agricultural enterprises (Bavaria) (*1903-1907*)

< 2 ha	41.6
2-5	39.7
5-10	35.0
10-20	32.9
20-50	46.3
50-100	102.4
100 and >	193.2
	39.4

Odd fact:

reduction in the number of *cows* since 1882!! Possibly not comparable data

1882:

	cows	pigs
< 2 ares	2,405	11,908
2-5 ares	8,164	41,524
5-20 ares	64,527	258,184
20 ares-1 ha	565,230	1,027,664
1-2	937,158	744,402
		2,083,682
2-5	2,385,617	1,487,852
5-10	2,133,423	1,307,490
10-20	2,267,912	1,339,383
		4,134,725
20-50	2,528,533	1,383,768
50-100	728,778	348,797
		1,732,565
100-200	313,957	136,012
200-500	455,384	204,181
500-1,000	249,831	116,865
1,000 and >	48,607	23,236
		480,294
	Σ=12,689,526	8,431,266

See p. 45*	1	2	3	4
	Population by *main* occupation of those gainfully employed			
	gainfully employed	household servants living in	members of family without main occupation	total number of persons in this category (1-3)
Σ [total]	2,295,210	118,677	4,723,729	7,137,616
A 1 m [men]	1,997,419	3,861	1,902,489	3,903,769
w [women]	297,791	114,816	2,821,240	3,233,847
A 2	137,710	15,731	282,476	435,917
	112,367	206	112,442	225,015
	25,343	15,525	170,034	210,902
A 3	17,416	5,529	21,475	44,420
	14,960	102	7,197	22,259
	2,456	5,427	14,278	22,161
B 1	44,368	3,272	19,671	67,311
	30,845	30	6,306	37,181
	13,523	3,242	13,365	30,130
B 2	28,722	428	67,834	96,984
	26,468	—	25,490	51,958
	2,254	428	42,344	45,026
B 3	3,476	390	2,937	6,803
	3,257	2	820	4,079
	219	388	2,117	2,724

* See p. 370.—*Ed.*

** Columns 7 and 8 are here reversed, as in the original. See Lenin's

5	6	8**	7**	9
of the gainfully employed (1)		in general engaged in *side line*, as an *occupation*, specified in preceding column	of the gainfully employed (1) with side line (as an occupation) notably in agriculture	total number of persons engaged in respective occupation (1+8)
side line	with side lines (auxiliary employment) in general			
1,779,464	515,746	1,334,235	48,749	3,629,445
1,508,547	488,872	1,221,485	42,686	3,218,904
270,917	26,874	112,750	6,063	410,541
107,089	30,621	613,701	7,590	751,411
84,176	28,191	570,865	6,520	683,232
22,913	2,430	42,836	1,070	68,179
15,130	2,286	326,049	676	343,465
12,899	2,061	303,203	568	318,163
2,231	225	22,846	108	25,302
42,547	1,821	1,001	924	45,369
29,213	1,632	769	830	31,614
13,334	189	232	94	13,775
20,074	8,648	1,064	7,927	29,786
17,871	8,597	997	7,893	27,465
2,203	51	67	34	2,321
3,109	367	229	169	3,705
3,894	363	221	167	3,478
215	4	8	2	227

[ctd on next page]

remarks on p. 370—*Ed.*

	1	2	3	4
	Population by *main* occupation of those gainfully employed			
	gainfully employed	household servants living in	members of family without main occupation	total number of persons in this category (1-3)
C 1	3,883,034	123	94,889	3,978,046
	1,051,057	—	37,772	1,088,829
	2,831,977	123	57,117	2,889,217
C 2	1,332,717	82	24,428	1,357,227
	707,538	—	9,697	717,235
	625,179	82	14,731	639,992
C 3	259,390	776	572,324	832,490
	213,717	—	216,958	430,675
	45,673	776	355,366	401,815
C 4	236,534	1,248	690,610	928,392
	219,220	—	276,140	495,360
	17,314	1,248	414,470	433,032
C 5	1,343,225	1,231	691,009	2,035,465
	646,236	—	265,412	911,648
	696,989	1,231	425,597	1,123,817
Total I A	9,581,802	147,487	7,191,382	16,920,671
	5,023,084	4,201	2,860,723	7,888,008
	4,558,718	143,286	4,330,659	9,032,663

5	6	8	7	9
of the gainfully employed (1)		in general engaged in *side line*, as an *occupation*, specified in preceding column	of the gainfully employed (1) with side line (as an occupation) notably in agriculture	total number of persons engaged in respective occupation (1+8)
side line	with side lines (auxiliary employment) in general			
3,741,662	141,372	2,951,361	1,239	6,834,395
980,807	70,250	589,229	762	1,640,286
2,760,855	71,122	2,362,132	477	5,194,109
1,319,072	13,645	79,539	617	1,412,256
697,078	10,460	21,914	599	729,452
621,994	3,185	57,625	18	682,804
19,108	240,282	63,962	238,219	323,352
13,104	200,613	55,512	198,884	269,229
6,004	39,669	8,450	39,335	54,123
4,670	231,864	6,040	231,719	242,574
4,001	215,219	5,267	215,096	224,487
669	16,645	773	16,623	18,087
1,317,664	25,561	116,403	936	1,459,628
632,159	14,077	52,448	504	698,684
685,505	11,484	63,955	432	760,944
8,369,589	1,212,213	5,493,584	538,765	15,075,386
3,982,749	1,040,335	2,821,910	474,509	7,844,994
4,386,840	171,878	2,671,674	64,256	7,230,392

There seems to be a mistake here.*

Distribution (in thousands) adopted in *The Agrarian Question*, p. 244[111]

	1882	*1895*	*1907*
a)	2,253	2,522	2,450
		+	—
c 1)	1,935	1,899	3,883
		—	+
I (a+c 1)	4,188	4,421	6,333
		+	+
II c 3)	866	383	259
		—	—
I+II	5,054	4,804	6,592
		—	+
b)	47	77	76
c 2)	1,589	1,719	1,333
c 4 and c 5)	1,374	1,445	1,580
III (b+c 2+c 4+c 5)	3,010	3,241	2,989
		+	—
Total	8,064	8,045	9,581
		—	+

Also collateral employment

	1882	*1895*	*1907*
a)	2,120	2,160	2,274
c 1)	664	1,061	2,951
c 2)	9	60	80
b)			2
c 3)			64
c 4-5)			122
	351	297	188
Total	3,144	3,578	5,493

* This is a later remark; it applies to the two places of the table Lenin subsequently corrected.—*Ed.*

Distribution of **ploughland** (p. 15*)

	(see p. 15*) cereals (5 first)	α oats and mixed cereals	β sugar beet and potatoes	γ fodder plants	α+β+γ	vegetables, etc.	others	Σ	field pastures and fallow	Σ
Under 2 ha	406,973	133,419	509,662	88,655	731,736	28,664	32,860	1,200,233	23,073	1,223,306
2-20 ”	4,247,815	2,100,915	1,492,917	1,104,152	4,697,884	143,485	402,499	9,491,783	586,262	10,078,045
20 and > ”	4,986,973	2,877,982	1,685,073	1,391,875	5,954,93	93,387	627,304	11,662,594	1,468,409	13,131,003
Σ	9,641,761	5,112,316	3,687,652	2,584,682	11,384,550	265,536	1,062,663	22,354,610	2,077,744	24,432,354

	meadows *ha*	fat pastures	vegetable gardens and orchards (without decorative gardens)	vineyards	farmland in general	lesser pastures and grazing areas
Under 2 ha	312,372	12,604	147,727	35,302	1,731,311	55,674
2-20 ”	3,114,864	248,037	211,965	73,531	13,726,442	452,162
20 and > ”	2,524,394	593,165	122,024	6,535	16,377,121	553,456
Σ =	5,951,630	853,806	481,716	115,368	31,834,874	1,061,292

	Head of livestock in terms of big cattle
Under 2 ha	2,749,131
2-20 ”	15,204,426
20 and > ”	11,426,848
	29,380,405

2,524,000 ha of meadows for 11,427,000 head of livestock (in terms of big cattle)=$0._{220}$**
3,115,000 ” ” ” ” 15,204,000 ” ” ” (” ” ” ” ”)=$0._{204}$**

The conclusion is that (20 and >) have more cereal for fodder than (2-20). And (2-20) have less than half as much again of meadows (than 20 and >) and almost 1.5 times as much livestock.

* See pp. 324-25.—*Ed.*

** The figures $0._{220}$ and $0._{204}$ show ha of meadows per head of livestock in the 20 ha and over group and the 2-20 ha group of farms.—*Ed.*

Farms in terms of hired labour	(Total labour per farm	Number of farms	Total labour
Almost without hired labour	(1-3)	3,689,289	6,539,697
Small minority of hired labour	(4-5)	856,156	3,730,716
Majority of hired labour	(6 and >)	466,095	4,899,136
(p. 41)* Total		5,012,140	15,169,549
Proletarian and small peasant	(Under 5 ha)	4,384,786	7,266,929
Middle peasant	(5-10 ha)	652,798	2,491,337
Big peasant and capitalist	(> 10 ha)	698,498	5,411,283
Total		5,736,082	15,169,549

) Estimated from % of labour given on p. 41 for the

All the details from *Wolff*, *Les Engrais*,** Paris, 1887.

Note sources estimating the quantity of manure: *Garola*, *S. 11409*), pages 121-124. *Stoeckhardt's* method: multiplied by $1._3$ (horses), $2._3$ (cows), $1._2$ (sheep), $2._5$ (pigs).

idem in Kraft's *Agricultural Dictionary* 8°. S. 10575

J. Fritsch, *Les Engrais* (Paris 1909?; Bibliothèque 1/2 dry matter (Trockensubstanz) of feed + litter [Einstreu] the quantity of litter and feed, weighed in a dry state]. should be multiplied by $1._3$ kg for horse; $1._5$ for draught ox; means that the methods of Heuzè and Stoeckhardt are similar.]

* See p. 366.—*Ed.*
** Fertilisers.—*Ed.*

Approximate*) figure		Per farm			Approximate*) number of machines	Agric. machines agric. farm
Farmland ha	Total livestock in terms of big cattle	labour	land	live-stock		
5,706,798	7,263,522	1.7	1.5	1.9	167,699	$0._{05}$
7,050,002	7,515,336	4.3	8.2	8.7	547,084	$0._{6}$
19,078,074	14,601,747	10.5	40.1	31.3	1,093,924	$2._{3}$
31,834,874	29,380,405	3.0	6.3	5.8	1,808,707	$0._{36}$
5,036,189	6,992,778				210,179	
4,607,090	5,141,657				398,495	
22,191,595	17,245,970				1,200,033	
31,834,87	29,380,405				1,808,707	

three categories by group.

Bibliothèque Nationale *8°. S. 9558*, page 100 et seq.

Engrais (Paris 1903.—At the Bibliothèque Nationale, *8°*. fodder (weight of the dry feed substance)+litter (litter straw)

Nationale: *8°. S. 13195*), p. 98 [according to *Wolff*: also in dry state. $\Sigma \times 4$. According to other writers, double According to M. *Heuzè*, S of litter and feed (in dry state) $2._{3}$ for cows; $2._{5}$ for pigs; $1._{2}$ for sheep. (Average $1._{8}$). [This

Female and child labour

(vertical order: 1) men
2) women
3) total).

(α) = temporary workers as % of *total* labour

	Permanent labour (workers)											
	family				hired				total			
			of them				of them				of them	
		%	under 14 yrs	%		%	under 14 yrs	%		%	under 14 yrs	%
Under 0.5 ha	504,658 815,475		3,205	0.6	24,315 38,541		436	1.1	325,043 528,973 854,016		5,641	0.7
0.5-2 ha	766,435 1,227,994		16,215	1.3	36,260 66,854		1,364	2.3	492,153 802,695 1,291,848		17,579	1.4
2-5 ha	994,120 1,948,199		33,115	1.7	72,217 130,921		5,279	4.0	1,012,783 1,066,337 2,079,120		38,394	1.8
5-10 ha	777,286 1,673,305		30,475	1.8	115,670 221,326		9,358	4.2	1,001,675 892,956 1,894,631		39,833	2.1
10-20 ha	527,050 1,193,515		21,554	1.8	198,735 412,702		14,394	3.5	880,432 725,785 1,606,217		35,948	2.2
20-100 ha	289,099 717,351		10,007	1.4	344,910 835,728		17,843	2.1	919,070 634,009 1,553,079		27,850	1.7
100 ha and >	6,968 34,139		243	0.7	284,847 799,773		7,990	0.9	542,097 291,815 833,912		8,233	0.9
incl. 200 ha and >												
Total	3,865,616 7,609,978		116,814	1.5	1,076,954 2,505,845		56,664	2.3	5,173,253 4,942,570 10,115,823		173,478	1.7
Under 2 ha												
2-20												
20 and >												

in agriculture

	Temporary labour (workers)											
	family				hired				total			
			of them				of them				of them	
		(α) %	under 14 yrs	%		(α) %	under 14 yrs	%		(α) %	under 14 yrs	%
	888,204 1,011,510	55	37,062	3.6	74,787 148,781	79	1,301	0.8	962,991 1,160,291	58	38,363	3.3
	612,088 796,926	39	72,603	9.1	122,112 246,971	78	2,756	1.1	734,200 1,043,897	45	75,359	7.2
	376,646 554,367	22	91,994	16.5	140,269 280,390	68	4,713	1.7	516,915 834,757	29	96,707	11.5
	221,400 330,328	11	73,891	22.4	137,098 266,378	54	6,035	2.3	358,498 596,706	24	79,926	13.4
	137,581 199,139	14	48,687	24.4	156,150 299,165	42	9,447	3.1	293,731 498,304	23	58,134	11.6
	82,948 115,268	14	22,939	19.9	212,578 401,086	32	20,268	5.0	295,526 516,354	25	43,207	8.3
	3,052 4,092	11	222	5.1	214,238 399,325	33	36,241	9.0	217,290 403,417	32	36,463	9.0
	2,321,919 3,011,630	29	347,398	11.2	1,057,232 2,042,096	45	80,761	3.9	3,379,151 5,053,726	33	428,158	8.4

[ctd on next page]

[ctd]

	All labour together											
	family				hired				total			
			of them				of them				of them	
		%	under 14 yrs	%		%	under 14 yrs	%		%	under 14 yrs	%
Under 0.5 ha	1,392,862 1,826,985		42,267	2.3	99,102 187,322		1,737	0.9	1,491,964 2,014,307		44,004	2.2
0.5-2 ha	1,378,523 2,024,920		88,818	4.4	158,372 313,825		4,120	1.3	1,536,895 2,338,745		92,938	3.9
2-5 ha	1,370,766 2,502,566		125,109	4.9	212,486 411,311		9,992	2.4	1,536,895 2,913,877		135,101	4.6
5-10 ha	998,686 2,003,633		104,366	5.2	252,758 487,704		15,393	3.1	1,251,454 2,491,337		119,759	4.8
10-20 ha	664,631 1,392,654		70,241	5.0	354,885 711,867		23,841	3.3	1,019,516 2,104,521		94,082	4.5
20-100 ha	372,047 832,619		32,946	3.9	557,488 1,236,814		38,111	3.1	929,535 2,069,433		71,057	3.1
100 ha and >	10,020 38,231		465	1.2	499,085 1,199,098		44,231	3.7	509,105 1,237,329		44,696	3.6
incl. 200 ha and >												
Total	6,187,535 10,621,608		464,212	4.4	2,134,186 4,547,941		137,425	3.0	8,321,721 15,169,549		601,637	3.9
Under 2 ha	2,771,385 3,851,905				257,474 501,147				4,353,052			
2-20	3,034,083 5,898,853				820,139 1,610,882				7,509,735			
20 and >	382,067 870,850				1,056,573 2,435,912				3,306,762			

α = family workers; β = supervisors, managers, etc.; γ = permanent male and female farm-hands; δ = permanent day labourers and labourers; ε = temporary labour.

Zahn 1
Annalen, 1910
p. 595

	Prussia α	β	γ	δ	ε	Σ=100% absolute figure	Bavaria α	β	γ	δ	ε	Σ=100% absolute figure
< 2 ha	88.5	0.1	1.5	0.8	9.1	2,594,470	89.3	0.1	1.9	1.0	7.7	382,369
2- 5 ”	84.5	0.1	3.2	1.2	11.0	1,497,799	89.6	0.1	3.6	1.0	5.7	461,674
5- 20 ”	72.1	0.1	10.9	2.1	14.8	2,518,338	79.2	0.1	13.2	1.3	6.2	934,697
20-100 ”	38.9	0.6	29.5	9.9	21.1	1,374,647	50.8	0.3	35.8	3.9	9.2	301,141
100 and >	2.9	3.9	17.5	44.4	31.3	1,035,270	5.0	4.6	22.1	41.5	26.8	21,771
Σ	65.9	0.6	10.5	7.6	15.4	9,020,524	78.5	0.1	12.4	2.0	7.0	2,101,652
	Saxony						Württemberg					
Under 2 ha	84.9	0.3	1.4	2.1	11.3	94,372	90.9	0.1	1.2	0.8	7.0	220,355
2- 5 ”	81.7	0.2	4.4	2.0	11.7	68,985	90.8	0.1	2.7	0.8	5.6	238,979
5- 20 ”	69.0	0.3	19.9	2.0	8.8	166,231	77.6	0.1	12.7	1.8	7.8	236,082
20-100 ”	34.4	1.6	42.4	8.3	13.3	86,601	46.8	0.8	32.5	5.1	14.8	51,785
100 and over	3.4	6.1	18.2	39.8	32.5	34,972	5.5	4.7	23.3	29.7	36.8	4,821
Total	62.6	1.0	17.8	6.2	12.4	451,161	83.1	0.1	7.6	1.6	7.6	752,022

	All Germany (Σ = 15,169,549 persons) α	β	γ	δ	ε
Under 2 ha	88.5	0.1	1.4	0.9	9.1
2- 5 ”	85.9	0.1	3.2	1.2	9.6
5- 20 ”	73.9	0.1	11.7	2.0	12.3
20-100 ”	40.2	0.7	30.8	8.9	19.4
100 and over	3.1	4.1	17.4	43.1	32.3
Total	70.0	0.5	10.2	5.8	13.5

Zahn (1910, p. 567) calls the 2-5 small-peasant farms, the 5-20 middle-peasant farms, the 20-100 big-peasant farms } ha-ha!

Owners of agricultural enterprises who are independent by main occupation (Zahn 1910, p. 567)	1907 absolute	1907 %	1895 absolute	1895 %	State on June 12, 1907 as a percentage of the 1906-1907 maximum**) men	women	total
Under 2 ha	449,968	13.3	564,077	17.4	60.1	87.5	76.8
2-5	717,699	71.3	733,813	72.2	77.8	81.6	79.8
5-20	980,145	92.0	906,786	90.8	76.3	75.1	75.7
20-100	253,877	96.8	270,931	96.2	72.8	70.9	72.0
100 and over	22,731	96.5	23,523	93.9	86.3	81.4	84.2
Total	2,424,420	42.3	2,499,130*)	45.0	73.1	80.3	76.9

) cf. p. 38 of this notebook below.

**) Zahn, 1910; p. 568: comparison of the total number of workers on June 12, 1907 with the *maximum*.

* See p. 361.—*Ed.*

Owners of agricultural enterprises who were not independent farmers by main occupation

Volume *2 1 1.* p. 89 ("Die berufliche und soziale Gliederung")[112]		employed in industry	employed in communications	employed in trade and inn-keeping	hired labour, casual work	Total
Total	1907	1,127,996	145,877	19,746	21,686	
	1895	790,950	101,781	13,593	36,737	
Under 0.5 ha	1907	752,278	104,011	15,741	17,351	
	1895	514,840	67,632	10,493	29,078	
0.5-2 ha	1907	305,102	32,454	3,299	3,780	
	1895	227,928	27,250	2,513	6,910	
2-5 ha	1907	65,004	8,286	594	501	
	1895	44,479	6,146	472	685	
5 ha and over	1907	5,612	1,126	112	54	
	1895	3,703	753	115	64	

In view of the very confusing nature of German occupations statistics, it is important to make the following clear and simple comparison for C *1* (members of families), according to Zahn (p. *486*), where those in the given occupation are the "gainfully employed, including members of their families without any occupation and their domestic servants".

	in the occupation 1882	1907	increase	millions
Independents (A including A 1, C 1) . .	20,586,372	20,881,542	295,170	+0.3
Employees	829,865	3,067,649	2,237,784	2
Workers (Class A 1, C 1)	18,814,615	28,396,761	9,998,383	10
Total . . .	39,814,615	52,345,952	12,531,337	

Data on live

	Straw	Oats, fodder grasses and hay			
	α 7 cereals*) ha	β oats	γ fodder grasses	δ meadow	β+γ+δ
Under $0._5$ ha	57,834 7	10,667	8,139 1	29,370 3	48,176 5
$0._5$-2 ha	482,558 25	105,499	80,516 4	283,002 14	469,017 24
2-5	1,399,976 33	371,046	262,426 5	800,045 19	1,433,517 34
5-10	2,131,422 41	624,989	381,869 7	1,056,821 20	2,063,679 40
10-20	2,817,332 45	848,223	459,857 8(1)	1,257,998 22(2)	2,566,078 44
20-100	4,504,778 59	1,384,181	720,375 9(3)	1,595,781 21(4)	3,700,337 48
100 and >	3,360,177 89	865,713	671,500 18	928,613 25	2,465,826 65
Total	14,754,077 50	4,210,318	2,584,682 9	5,951,630 20	12,746,630 43
Under 2 ha					
2-20 ha					
20 ha and over					

) All the first 7, including oats and mixed cereals.
(1) $7._9$; (2) $21._6 \Sigma = 29._5$
(3) $9._4$; (4) $20._8 \Sigma = 30._2$

* See pp. 324-25.—*Ed.*

stock feed [bottom = *per 100* head of total livestock in terms of big cattle]

Pastures			ε+ξ+η	Mixed cereals +sugar-beet+potatoes	Total area under feed β+γ+δ +mixed cereals
ε field pastures	ξ fat pastures	η small pastures			
745	535	12,833	15,113 2	169,028	49,620 6
11,836	12,069	41,841	65,746 3	357,887	484,826 25
42,207	42,027	96,771	181,005 4	518,215	1,485,390 35
79,264	77,783	140,225	297,272 6	583,620	2,145,363 41
142,354	128,227	215,166	485,747 8	647,739	2,689,178 46
492,910	419,935	357,443	1,270,288 16	1,009,212	3,973,865 52
315,073	173,230	196,013	684,316 18	1,303,949	2,820,386 75
1,084,389	853,806	1,061,292	2,999,487 10	4,589,650	13,648,658 16
					534,446
					6,319,931
					6,794,251

In the tables columns 3 and 4 are designated as they are here, but in the text Column 3 is called: landwirtschaftlich benutzte Fläche

1895:	Agricultural enterprises	Total area	Total farmland (with vegetable gardens and vineyards)	ploughland, meadow, pasture and other cultivated farmland (without vegetable gardens and vineyards)
½-1 ha	676,215	617,416	462,711	430,351
1-2 ha	707,235	1,275,786	997,803	947,796
5-10 ha	605,814	5,355,138	4,233,656	4,168,205
10-20 ha	392,990	7,182,522	5,488,219	5,436,867
Σ	5,558,317	43,284,742	32,517,941	32,062,491

Number of farms with leased land per 100		Leased land per 100 ha	
1895	1882	1895	1882
51.68	49.94	24.79	27.71
49.55	44.79	15.93	14.61
35.91	31.41	8.17	7.25
22.62	19.08	7.30	7.09
37.56	36.77	19.18	22.39
46.91	44.02	12.38	12.88

1895

	Farms with				Of total land	
	own land only	leased land only	more than half land leased	less than half land leased	own land ha	leased land ha
Under 2 ha	1,009,126	891,107	377,190	463,510	1,575,672	598,851
2- 5	443,268	47,185	95,745	360,663	3,364,418	659,894
5- 10	323,420	12,194	36,686	197,422	4,726,447	550,978
10- 20	261,101	7,513	14,256	90,597	6,626,528	473,903
5- 20	584,521	19,707	50,942	288,019	11,352,975	1,024,881
20- 100	208,674	9,969	8,202	45,558	12,102,060	960,200
100 and >	15,401	4,991	1,229	3,193	8,875,255	2,116,215
Σ	2,260,990	912,959	533,308	1,160,943	37,270,380	5,360,041

As for other land, it is given in 1895 under 4 heads (Deputant, Dienst, common and share-cropping) which it is not worth while citing

	%	%	%	%	%	%
Under 2	31.18	25.68	11.65	14.32	65.22	24.79
2- 5	43.62	4.64	9.42	35.49	81.23	15.93
5- 20	58.52	1.97	5.10	28.84	90.55	8.17
20- 100	74.06	3.54	2.91	16.17	91.98	7.30
100 and >	61.45	19.92	4.90	12.74	80.45	19.18
Σ	40.68	16.43	9.59	20.89	86.11	12.38

1895	A-1 Agriculture		A 2-6 Vegetable gardening, fisheries, etc.		B Industry		C 1-10 Trade		C 11-21 Transport and communications		C 22 Inn-keeping, etc.	
	independent	dependent	independent	dependent	independent	dependent	independent	dependent	independent	dependent	independent	dependent
< 2 ha	564,077	689,523	24,163	52,329	534,323	742,768	105,018	12,234	23,539	94,882	41,971	772
2- 5	733,813	25,212	4,578	10,602	121,263	44,479	17,315	419	6,432	6,146	16,308	53
5- 20	906,786	2,066	2,286	4,476	44,204	3,588	7,519	99	2,818	729	12,715	11
20- 100	270,931	148	592	194	4,320	111	787	5	197	24	1,209	—
100 and >	23,523	88	132	4	180	4	43	—	8	—	14	—
	2,499,130	717,037	31,751	67,605	704,290	790,950	130,682	12,757	32,994	101,781	72,217	836
5- 10	538,417	1,822	1,567	2,386	33,123	3,252	5,541	75	2,132	655	8,872	6
10- 20	368,369	244	719	2,090	11,081	336	1,978	24	686	74	3,843	5

1895	D		Σ					Details about *A 1* agriculture				
								independent		dependent		
	Casual hired labourer	Other types of occupation		Independent farmers	Independents in industry, trade, etc.	Hired labourers	Others and unidentified	without subsidiary employment	with subsidiary employment	managers, super-visers	male and female farm-hands	day labourers, labourers
< 2 ha	35,988	314,780	3,236,367	588,240	704,851	1,628,496	314,780	416,983	147,094	18,888	57,039	613,596
2-5	685	29,013	1,016,318	738,391	161,318	87,596	29,013	546,361	187,452	437	481	24,294
5-20	64	11,443	998,804	909,072	67,256	11,033	11,443	768,440	138,346	205	54	1,807
20-100	—	3,2491	281,767	271,523	6,513	482	3,249	247,037	23,894	142	—	6
100 and >	—	1,065	25,061	23,655	245	96	1,065	17,986	5,537	88	—	—
	36,737	359,550	5,558,317	2,530,881	940,183	1,727,703	359,550	1,996,807	502,323	19,760	57,574	639,703
5-10	52	7,914						444,417	94,000	110	45	1,667
10-20	12	3,529						324,023	44,346	95	49	140

Checked with *Statistics of the German Reich*, Vol. 112 (incorrect figures in [ ])

For a comparison I take the main data for 1882 and 1895 from *Handwörterbuch** (1909, 3. A), I, pp. 245-246.

		< 2 ha	2-5	5-20	20-100	100 and >	Σ
Number of farms	1882:	3,061,831	981,407	926,605	281,510	24,991	5,276 344
	%	$58._{03}$%	$18._{60}$%	$17._{56}$%	$5._{34}$%	$0._{47}$%	100%
”	1895	3,235,169	1,016,239	989,701	281,734	25,057	
		$58._{22}$	$18._{29}$	$17._{97}$	$5._{07}$	$0._{45}$	
According to *Statistics of the German Reich*	1895	3,236,367	1,016,318	998,804	281,767	25,061	5,558,317
		$58._{23}$	$18._{28}$	$17._{97}$	$5._{07}$	$0._{45}$	100%
	1907:	$58._{9}$	$17._{5}$	$18._{6}$	$4._{6}$	$0._{4}$	100
Their	1882:	1,825,938	3,190,203	9,158 398	9,908,170	7,286,263	31,868,972
	%	$5._{73}$	$10._{01}$	$28._{74}$	$31._{09}$	$24._{43}$%	100%
	1895	1,807,870	3,285,720	9,720,935	9,868,367	7,829,007	
		$5._{56}$	$10._{11}$	$29._{90}$	$30._{35}$	$24._{08}$%	100%
cultivated farmland	1895	1,808,444	3,285,984	9,721,875	9,869,837	7,831,801	32,517,941
	1907	$5._{4}$	$10._{4}$	$32._{7}$%	$29._{3}$%	$22._{2}$%	100%

Total area	1882	2,159,358 5.37	3,832,902 9.54	11,492,017 28.60	12,415,463 30.90	10,278,941 25.59	40,178,681 100%
	1895	2,415,914 5.58	4,142,071 9.57	12,537,660 28.96	13,157,201 30.40	11,031,896 25.49	43,284,742 100%
	1907	5.8	10.0	31.9	29.3	23.0	100%

	1882:		
	Number of farms	Their total area ha	Their farmland
5-10	554,174	4,780,980	3,906,947
10-20	372,431	6,711,037	5,251,451

Cultivated area by groups of main crops (ha and %)

(ibidem 249)

	cereals and pulses	root crops	fodder grasses	commercial crops	field pasture and fallow
Deutsches Reich 1893: [from *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften**]	15,992,120	4,237,661	2,519,375	261,090	2,760,347
	60.9%	16.2%	9.6	1.0	10.5%

N.B. The 1895 statistics have *no* classification of ploughland (Ackerbau) by cereals, and the ploughland is *not* even differentiated from the cultivated farmland.

* *Socio-Political Manual.—Ed.*

Essay at compiling tables with

	Number of farms	Workers (12.6.1907)			Of them *temporary* workers		
		total	family	hired	total	family	hired
Under 0.5 ha	2,084,060	2,014,307	1,826,985	187,322	1,160,291	1,011,510	148,781
0.5-2 ha	1,294,449	2,338,745	2,024,920	313,825	1,043,897	796,926	246,971
2-5 ha	1,006,277	2,913,877	2,502,566	411,311	834,757	554,367	280,390
5-10 ha	652,798	2,491,337	2,003,633	487,704	596,706	330,328	266,378
10-20 ha	412,741	2,404,521	1,392,654	711,867	498,304	199,139	299,165
20-100 ha	262,191	2,069,433	832,619	1,236,814	516,354	115,268	401,086
100 ha and >	23,566	1,237,329	38,231	1,199,098	403,417	4,092	399,325
Total	5,736,082	15,169,549	10,621,608	4,547,941	5,053,726	3,011,630	2,042,096
Groups		Average per farm (of those *classified* by number of workers)					
< 0.5		1.3	1.2	0.1			
0.5-2		1.9	1.7	0.2			
2-5		2.9	2.5	0.4			
5-10		3.8	3.1	0.7			
10-20		5.1	3.4	1.7			
20-100		7.9	3.2	4.7			
100 and >		52.5	1.6	50.9			
Σ		3.0	2.1	0.9			
Under 2 ha	3,378,509	4,358,052 1,324,193	3,851,905	501,147			395,752
2-20	2,071,816	7,509,735 3,655,513	5,898,853	1,610,882			845,933
20 and >	285,757	3,306,762 1,868,122	870,850	2,435,912			800,411

in pencil = incl. men**

* At the top of the table in the MS., there is a pencilled note: "Σ farms=
** This remark of Lenin's, pencilled in the MS., applies to the lower figu

bottom—number of men*

more rational classifications:

Maximum of workers	of them tempo-rary	Farms by total number of workers employed					
		1-3 workers			4-5 workers		
		Number of farms	Number of workers	ditto maxi-mum	Number of farms	Number of workers	ditto maxi-mum
2,613,590	748,065	1,451,952	1,909,576 477,726	2,352,229	19,644	82,823 34,269	93,014
3,052,997	961,223	1,100,624	1,890,699 604,490	2,477,627	81,584	346,013 151,820	396,563
3,650,514	1,017,027	736,510	1,692,687 750,403	2,218,214	222,679	948,215 449,854	1,107,537
3,210,172	985,213	308,550	799,896 401,716	1,153,062	274,771	1,190,772 590,891	1,466,802
2,860,082	1,054,726	79,796	215,288 118,100	392,231	200,753	899,958 467,410	1,239,495
2,875,384	1,207,037	11,714	31,278 19,443	75,589	57,167	262,202 150,793	441,452
1,469,685	631,681	143	273 212	3,056	158	733 500	2,377
19,732,424	6,604,971	3,689,289	6,539,697 2,372,090	8,672,008	856,756	3,730,716 1,845,537	4,747,240
			%			%	
			94.8			4.1	
			80.9			14.8	
			58.1			32.5	
			32.1			47.8	
			10.2			42.8	
			1.5			12.6	
			0.0			0.1	
5,666,587		2,552,576	3,800,275	4,829,856	101,228	428,836	489,577
9,720,768		1,124,856	2,707,871	3,763,507	698,203	3,038,945	3,813,834
4,345,069		11,857	31,857	78,645	57,325	262,935	443,829

[ctd on next page]

5,012,140" and "Σ (maximum)=19,507,799".—*Ed.*
res in Column 2, in the first three lines at the bottom.—*Ed.*

[ctd]

Farms by total number of workers employed

	6 workers and more			Total farms by number of workers			(absolute figures: p. 7)* % of women in *total* number of workers		
	number farms	number of workers	ditto maximum	number of farms	number of workers	ditto maximum	total	family	hired
Under 0.5 ha	2,504	21,908 10,348	26,817	1,474,100	2,014,307	2,472,060	74.1	76.2	53.2
0.5-2 ha	12,924	102,033 45,540	117,254	1,195,132	2,338,745	2,991,444	67.7	68.1	50.3
2-5 ha	35,669	272,975 130,368	310,602	994,858	2,913,877	3,636,353	54.4	54.7	51.6
5-10 ha	67,458	500,669 247,276	586,402	650,779	2,491,337	3,206,266	50.2	49.8	51.9
10-20 ha	131,391	989,275 499,495	1,226,351	411,940	2,104,521	2,858,077	48.4	46.2	49.8
20-100 ha	192,915	1,775,953 969,662	2,357,151	261,796	2,069,433	2,874,192	44.8	44.7	45.1
100 ha and >	23,234	1,236,323 727,512	1,463,974	23,535	1,237,329	1,469,407	41.0	26.2	41.6
Total	466,095	4,899,136 2,630,201	6,088,551	5,012,140	15,169,549 6,847,828	19,507,779	54.8	58.2	46.9
Group		% of workers to Σ of classified workers	Average number of workers per farm						
< 0.5		1.1	8.7						
0.5-2		4.3	7.0						
2-5		9.4	7.7						
5-10		20.1	7.4						
10-20		47.0	7.5						
20-100		85.9	9.2						
100 and >		99.9	53.2						
Σ			10.5						
Under 2 ha	15,428	123,941	144,071	2,669,232	4,353,052	5,463,504			
2-20	234,518	1,762,919	2,123,355	2,057,577	7,509,735	9,700,696			
20 and >	216,149	3,012,276	3,821,125	285,331	3,306,762	4,343,599			

* See p. 308.—*Ed.*

			B A *1* and B A *2-6*	*B* and *C*	pp. 13-14** marked in red pencil	E. F. H. and *K*
			including farmers by main occupation			
	(p. 2)* Subsidiary farms	Total farms	Independent farmers	Independent industrialists. craftsmen, traders, etc.	Hired labourers	Employees, others and unidentified
Under 0.5 ha	1,994,894	2,084,060	97,153	363,810	1,287,312	335,785
0.5-2	925,225	1,294,449	377,762	277,735	535,480	103,472
2-5	287,372	1,006,227	723,263	151,669	104,251	27,094
5-10	63,532	652,798	590,416	46,246	9,918	6,218
10-20	21,037	412,741	391,769	14,918	3,169	2,885
20-100	7,530	262,191	254,288	5,293	583	2,027
100 and >	456	23,566	22,772	279	154	361
Total	3,300,046	5,736,082	2,457,423	859,950	1,940,867	477,842
Under 2 ha	2,920,119	3,378,509	474,915		1,882,792	
2-20	371,941	2,071,816	1,705,448		117,338	
20 and >	7,986	285,757	277,060		737	

[ctd on next page]

* See p. 300.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 320-23.—*Ed.*

[ctd]

	Use of agricultural machines. (below: per 100 farms)							
			Number of machines owned					
		Total of A		(others)				
	(% of farms) Number of farms using machines in general	Number of *cases* of use of all types of machines	All except hand threshers and centrifuges	Hand threshers	Milk separators	Total	(p. 21)* Total livestock in terms of big cattle	Number of *cases* of farms linked with industries (p. 12)**
Under 0.5 ha	18,466 0.9%	20,660	457	444	684	1,585 0.1	826,963	2,663
0.5-2	114,986 8.8%	129,163	2,676	10,405	10,550	23,631 1.1	1,922,138	10,110
2-5	325,665 32.3%	379,343	15,338	116,297	53,328	184,963 18.3	4,243,647	24,077
5-10	419,170 64.2%	567,766	65,102	250,490	82,903	398,495 61.4	5,141,657	23,732
10-20	353,366 85.6%	635,934	176,900	253,227	92,564	522,691 126.6	5,819,122	17,855
20-100	243,365 92.8%	602,464	282,430	187,317	78,556	548,303 209.1	7,662,750	11,920
100 and >	22,957 97.4%	89,273	112,396	9,746	6,897	129,039 547.5	3,764,098	7,535
Total	1,497,975 26.1%	2,424,603 ? 543	655,299	827,926	325,482	1,808,707 31.5	29,380,405	97,872
Under 2 ha	133,452					25,216	2,749,131	12,773
2-20	1,098,201					1,106,148	15,204,426	65,664
20 and >	266,322					677,342	11,426,848	19,455

* See p. 338.—*Ed.*
** See pp. 318-19.—*Ed.*

Austrian Statistics, Vol. LXXXIIII, Part 1, *Austria*. Agricultural Census of June 3, 1902

For all this and details see black notebook[113]

Total for Reich		A. Purely family farms		Number of economically active persons						
Groups by size of productive area	Total number of farms	1. Only owner participating	2. Members of family participating	total	a) owners	b) family members	c) employees	d) supervisory personnel	e) servants	f) day labourers
As a result:	*2,856,349*	*547,107*	*1,677,830*	*9,070,682*	*3,424,016*	*4,389,405*	*12,294*	*57,657*	*942,766*	*244,544*
-0.5 ha	343,860	150,944	181,323	676,498	378,485	285,573				
0.5-1 ”	369,464	115,117	227,109	846,265	427,081	401,905				
1-2 ”	561,897	126,203	379,991	1,477,786	662,367	775,754				
2-5 ”	792,415	114,833	545,274	2,454,298	954,844	1,384,305				
5-10 ”	383,331	29,719	227,476	1,412,013	476,644					
10-20 ”	242,293	8,565	91,456	1,044,972	325,083					
20-50 ”	127,828	1,414	23,602	706,665	171,126					
50-100 ”	17,372	182	1,299	126,291	17,791					
over 100 ”	17,889	103	300	325,894	10,595					

Concerning the table on page 22.*

It is Table 1 taken from Vol. *202*.

I have two mistakes in the table: inadvertent transposition of columns *7* and *8*. That's one.

Then, the figures in Column 8 have been shifted.** Both mistakes have been *noted*.

The table refers to *Occupations Group* I (type of occupation A 1) = agriculture, breeding of animals used in agriculture, dairy farming, milk collector, agricultural wine-making, fruit-growing, vegetable gardening, tobacco-growing, etc. (p. 5) (type of occupation A 1)

"The subgroups of occupations under A, etc. (p. 4) include:

a) independents, also managing employees and other managers of enterprises; b) non-managing employees, in general scientifically, technically and commercially trained administrative and supervisory personnel, and also book-keepers and office workers; c) other assistants, apprentices, factory wage workers and day labourers, including family members employed in industry and servants" (p. 4).

"The subgroup of occupations I A (type of occupations A 1) includes:

A 1) owners and co-owners; A 2) leaseholders, hereditary leaseholders; A 3) managing employees, other managers of production; B 1) employees on farms, also trainees and apprentices; B 2) supervisory personnel; B 3) book-keepers and office workers; C 1) family members working on the farm of the head of household; C 2) agricultural farm-hands, male and female; C 3) agricultural labourers, day labourers, cultivating their own or leased land; C 4) agricultural labourers, day labourers, not cultivating their own or leased land, but other land; C 5) agricultural labourers, day labourers, not cultivating any land" (p. 5).

I leave out the subgroups of occupations I B = vegetable gardening and livestock farming (types of occupations A 2, A 3); II A: forestry and hunting (type of occupations A 4) and II B: fisheries (types of occupations A 5, A 6), which together with I A constitute the *group A of*

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* See pp. 342-45.—*Ed.*

** In the MS., the figures in Column 8 groups 1-5) were displaced. In this volume they are given as indicated by Lenin (see p. 343).—*Ed.*

occupations. In this section totals are given for A, B, C, but *without subdivision* into A 1-3, B 1-3, C 1-5.

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-later than June 1913

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PLAN FOR PROCESSING THE DATA OF THE GERMAN AGRICULTURAL CENSUS OF JUNE 12, 1907[114]

Capitalism in German agriculture, The economics of German agriculture according to the data of the 1907 Census.

The capitalist system of agriculture in Germany according to the June 12, 1907 Census

The following main groups of questions (or themes) in processing the June 12, 1907 (agricultural) Census.

pp. 1-8 [115]	1. 0. *Introduction.* General statement of the question: "areas". My analysis of the Σ data.
(I. 8-20) § I. (pp. 8-20)	2. 1. *Main Groups.* Proletarian,—peasant,—capitalist.
"*3 main groups of farms in Germany*"	**Co-relation of the three groups.**
§ II. Proletarian farms (20-30)	Importance of this grouping. Proof of its being correct

§ III. (30-40)		3. *Hired labour.*
§ IV. (60-50) I + II	1	4. 2. Female and child labour. The odious privilege of small-scale production.
§ V (50-59)		5. 3. Labour vs. farmland and quantity of livestock. (Waste in small-scale production)
§ VI (60-73)		6. 4. Machines (cf. with *Hungarian* statistics[116])
§ VII (73-87)		

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7. 5. *Livestock* { (Increase in quantity of livestock. Decrease in number of livestock *owners.* } Hence, growth of expropriation

Comparison with *Danish* data (cf. Dutch and **Swiss**)

grouping { *N.B.* American and Russian statistics }

9. 6. Main *occupation* of owners (cf. 1895)[117] (Farms as side lines.)

10. 7. Family, *family*-capitalist and capitalist farms *by number of workers.*

6 bis

8. Industries.

8. 9. Use of land. [*Quantity of livestock vs. fodder area.* Cf. Drechsler[118] and *Hungarian* statistics.]

10. Rural population by status in production (data not comparable).

11. Wine-growing farms (nothing interesting).

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* This line was red-pencilled in the MS. to denote that up to there the plan for the processing of German agricultural census data was used by Lenin in his article, "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" (Article I).—*Ed.*

American and Russian statistics	11. 12. *Comparison with 1895.* Growth of *medium* (peasant; farms. Transition to *livestock farming.*

1) American statistics, on grouping,
2) Danish } on concentration of
3) Swiss } livestock,
4) Hungarian on implements,
5) Russian on co-operatives.

The following themes remain for a second, article;

8. Livestock farming. Increase in quantity along with a decrease in the number of owners = expropriation. Cf. Danish and Swiss data.

9. Livestock feed. Cf. fodder area (cf. Drechsler).

10. Main and auxiliary occupation. Non-farmers and semi-farmers. Cf. 1895.

11. Family, family-capitalist and capitalist farms. Three main groups.

12. Cf. 1895. N.B.: American statistics on 2 groups.

Tables: (in 1st article[119])

1) p. 19— **3** main groups (and hired labour)
2) p. 31— number of workers (family and hired) per farm in the seven groups
3) p. 38— % of temporary workers in the seven groups
4) p. 42— % of women in the seven groups
5) p. 45— % of children in the seven groups —
6) p. 52— average size of farm and area per worker in the seven groups
7) p. 62— machinery (%, number of machines owned and %) in the *seven* groups
8) p. 69— hired labour and machines (*3* groups)
9) p. 79— ploughs on farm—8 groups
10) p. 86— % of cases of use of machinery in 1882, 1895, 1907 in the seven groups

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DANISH STATISTICS[120]

Danmarks Statistik.

I had the last 5 (|_|) (1888-1909)

Livestock: *1838*: Statistical Tables, Earliest Series, Part Five. *1861*: ibid., Third Series, Vol. 3.—*1866*: ibid., Third Series, Vol. 10.—*1871*: ibid., Third Series, Vol. 24.—*1876*: Fourth Series, C No. 1 .—*1881*: Fourth Series. *C* No. ***3***—⌊1888⌋: Fourth Series, C No. 6.—⌊1893⌋: Fourth Series, C No. 8.—⌊1898⌋: Fifth Series, C No. 2 (and *Statistical Bulletins*, Fourth Series, Vol. 5, Part 4)—⌊1903⌋: *Statistical Bulletins*, Fourth Series, Vol. 16, Part 6.—⌊1909⌋: *Statistical Tables*, Fifth Series, *C* No. 5.

Quantity of livestock in Denmark:

	Horned cattle (head)	Total livestock in terms of big cattle 1):	Population	Number of farms with horned cattle	Carts	Other vehicles	Two-horse teams	1898 p. 13★ Unification of livestock [horse=3; horned cattle=1; sheep=1/6 pig=1/4]	1898 p. 25★ Population in rural areas (roughly)	Total farms	Their total horned cattle (head)
1838:	854,726	1,565,538						2,162,707			
1861:	1,118,774	1,856,041						2,464,768			
1871:	1,238,898	2,008,606	1,811,000					2,606,293			
1881:	1,470,078	2,278,135	1,999,000	176,452				2,902,718			
1888:	1,459,527	2,338,042	2,140,000	177,186	265,775	123,305	136,534	2,983,022	1,411,547		
1893:	1,696,190			179,800				3,343,148	1,423,613		
1898:	1,744,797			180,641	292,703	159,330	143,875	3,563,975	1,444,700	278,673	1,744,797
1903:	1,840,466			179,225				3,815,000			
1909:	2,253,982			183,643	327,003	206,076	166,531			274,248	2,218,350

1838-
1888: $+70._{76}\% + 49._{34}\%$

1) 1 head of horned cattle = 1; 1 horse = 1½; 1 donkey = ½; 1 sheep and 1 goat = 1/10; 1 pig = ¼. Totals *without goats* and *donkeys* (1888, p. xv).

(In 1903—no data on quantity

Number of farms with ...

	1	2	3	4-5	6-9
1909:	9,167	16,785	19,092	31,273	32,710
1903:					
1898:	18,376	27,394	22,522	27,561	26,022
1893:	20,596	27,714	21,908	26,877	25,494
1888:	29,394	32,115	19,982	22,889	23,013

Danish 1909

Pages:

(p. 48★)

	farms	%	Land %	Horned cattle %
< $3._3$ ha	101,124	$42._2$	$2._6$	$4._9$
$3._3$-$9._9$ ha	50,732	$21._2$	$9._1$	$12._3$
$9._9$-$29._7$ ha	55,703	$23._3$	$31._2$	$35._2$
> $29._7$ ha	31,916	$13._3$	$57._1$	$47._6$
	Σ = 239,475	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$

of horned cattle by groups.

head of *horned cattle*:

10-14	15-29	30-49	50-99	100-199	200 and >	Total
22,498	37,384	11,360	2,440	640	294	183,641
20,375	30,460	5,650	1,498	588	195	180,641
19,802	29,865	5,335	1,447	594	168	
19,855	24,383	3,638	1,233	555	129	177,186

statistics
48★; 162

(p. 162) Number of farms *with* horned cattle	%	Head of horned cattle
38,696	38%	105,923
49,558	98%	267,817
55,188	99%	767,355
31,781	99%	1,039,740
175,223	73%	2,180,835
+4,738		+37,515
179,961		2,218,350

α) Under $3._3$ ha = roughly proletarians and semi-proletarians
β) $3._3$-$9._9$ ha = small peasants
γ) $9._9$-$29._7$ ha = big peasants, peasant bourgeoisie
δ) > $29._7$ ha = capitalist agriculture

	Farms %	*Land* %	*Horned cattle* %
α + β))	$63._4$	$11._7$	$17._2$
δ))	$13._3$	$57._1$	$47._6$
γ + δ))	$36._6$	$88._3$	$82._8$%

Number of farms by head of horned cattle

	1881	*1888*
1- 3 head	79,320	81,491
4-14	67,122	65,757
15-49	28,089	28,021
50 and over	1,921	1,917
Total	176,452	177,186

(p. 42★)
Number of farms by head of horned cattle

	1898	%	**1909**	%	+ or — *1898-1909*
1-3 head	68,292	$37._8$	45,044	$24._5$	—$34._0$%
4-14	73,958	$40._9$	86,481	$47._1$	+$16._9$%
15-49	36,110	$20._0$	48,744	$26._6$	+$35._0$%
50 and >	2,281	$1._3$	3,374	$1._8$	+$46._3$%
Σ =	180,641	$100._0$	183,643	$100._0$	+ $1._7$%

Number of *horned cattle* compared:

(p. 18★)

	per '000 population	per '000 ha
Denmark . . .	837 (682) [1])	578 (38) [2])
Germany . . .	330 (343)	382 (29)
Russia	270 (292)	68 (5)

In Germany, 10-20 ha farms have 33% of the hired labour
N.B.

1898

	Number of farms %
Without land	4.82
< 1 Tönde Hartkarn* . . .	52.49
1-4 ” ” . . .	16.34
4 and > ” ” . . .	10.69
	84.34
Unidentified area . . .	16.46
	Σ = 100.80

[1]) Bracketed figures are for 1883-1888
[2]) idem. *per sq. km.*

100 ha = 1 sq. km.

* Under 1 Tönde Hartkarn means “areas with a crop yield of under 1 ton”.—*Ed.*

1885	Number of farms by quantity of horned cattle	*1888*	*1881*	
— 147,584	50 and more head	1,917	1,921	— 4
2,671	15-49 ”	28,021	28,089	— 68
144,913	4-14 ”	65,757	67,122	—1,365
87,621 +	1-3 ”	81,491	79,320	+ 2,171
232,534			176,452	

Written in December 1910-1913

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AUSTRIAN AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS[121]

EXTRACTS

N.B. *Oesterreichische Statistik*, Band *83* (Vol. LXXXIII), Heft 1, (1902).

The name of this volume: Results of the Farm Census of June 3, 1902 (etc.). Vienna, *1909*.
Austrian Agricultural Statistics
Austrian Statistical Handbook
Vol. 27 —1908 etc. (back)
Vol. 28*) —1909 (last one)
Results of the Farm Census of June 3, 1902 (Vol. 27, p. 138).

		%
Number of enterprises in general . . .	2,856,349	100
” ” purely agricultural	2,133,506	74.7
” ” agricultural and forestry. .	713,382	25.0
” ” purely forestry	9,461	0.3

Average size of enterprise in ha:
total area = 10.5 ha
productive area = 9.9 ha

*) Vol. 29—1910 (Vienna, 1911, 6 kronen).
Nothing about agricultural statistics. Only references to previous years.
There are data on industry.

Agricultural and forestry enter

By type of

Number of enterprises with indication

	in general *)	under 2 ha	2-100 ha	over 100 ha
Machinery in general	947,111	139,548	796,811	10,752
Straw-cutters	804,427	109,218	685,418	9,791
Cleaners and graders	372,501	33,273	332,186	7,042
Threshers	328,708	10,089	310,316	8,303
Seeders	75,331	3,580	66,208	5,543
Crushers	45,117	9,073	33,682	2,362
Rakes and tedders	14,326	76	9,859	4,391
Mowers	13,151	68	10,182	2,901
Separators	8,674	248	7,543	883
Rootcrop lifters	6,175	205	4,720	1,250
Maize cultivators	4,608	277	3,863	468
Manure spreaders	2,438	25	979	1,434
Hay and straw presses	1,668	255	1,147	266
Steam ploughs	383	—	45	338
Narrow gauge lines	122	—	16	106
*) Percentage of farms using machinery	33.2	10.9	51.10	60.1

* Figures from *Austrian Statistics*, Vol. LXXXIII, Part 1, p. xxxiv and (p. 385) is a selective summary from a number of tables.—*Ed.*

prises using agricultural machinery:

machinery:

of use of machines: with cultivated area*

2-5 ha	5-10	10-20	20-50	50-100
288,931	220,588	174,876	100,520	11,896
248,163	190,237	149,706	87,038	10,274
87,271	92,355	95,292	52,322	4,946
43,142	76,744	109,982	72,595	7,853
6,592	11,993	25,450	19,840	2,333
9,216	7,417	8,403	7,475	1,171
155	417	2,134	5,511	1,642
261	575	2,530	5,616	1,200
562	799	2,488	3,246	448
608	904	1,498	1,356	354
490	698	1,321	1,113	241
54	97	183	406	239
250	248	276	284	89
1	—	4	19	21
—	3	1	5	7

pp. 27-29. The first part of the table (p. 884) is given in full, the second

Classification of agricultural and forestry enterprises by size of *productive* area (distinct from total area, farmland, ploughland and meadow, etc.)

(Vol. 27, p, 141)

	Under 0.5 ha	343,860	
	0.5- 1 ”	369,464	
	1- 2 ”	561,897	
	2- 5 ”	792,415	
	5- 10 ”	383,331	
	10- 20 ”	242,293	
My total	20- 50 ”	127,828	*
	50-100 ”	17,372	100- 200 8,099
	> 100 ”	17,889	200- 500 6,050
			500-1,000 2,100
	Σ	2,856,349	> 1,000 1,640

No general grouping by area, only data on enterprises (by produc

Area

	Number of enterprises	Plough land	Meadow	Vegetable gardens	Vineyards
Total . . .	2,856,3491	10,624,851	3,072,230	371,240	242,062
with 100 ha and over . .	17,889	1,640,937	391,047	32,617	7,372
under 100 ha	2,838,460	8,983,914	2,681,183	338,623	234,690

* These detailed figures by groups of area over 100 ha are taken from
** The data in the following table are taken from the same source,
*** The data are from the same source, 27th year of publication, 1908,

(Vol. 27, p. 143)

	Enterprises by farmland	%	by productive area**	%
Under 2 ha	1,322,565	46.5	1,275,221	44.6
2- 5 ha	810,225	28.5	792,415	27.7
5- 20 ”	613,290	21.6	625,624	21.9
20-100 ”	89,342	3.1	145,200	5.1
Over 100 ha	11,466	0.3	17,889	0.7
	2,846,888	100.0	2,856,349	100.0

with 100 ha and over and enterprises with < 100 ha
tive area)***

in *ha*:

Pastures	Mountain pastures	Forest	Lakes, swamps, ponds and unsuitable land	Total
2,655,371	1,399,724	9,777,933	1,857,373	30,000,794
652,273	900,899	5,477,565	750,866	9,853,576
2,003,098	498,825	4,300,368	1,106,507	20,147,206

Austrian Statistical Handbook, 28th year of publication, 1909 (p. 149).—*Ed.*
27th year of publication, 1908, pp. 141 and 142.—*Ed.*
pp. 146-47.—*Ed.*

(*Vol. 28,*

Enterprises by personnel

	Purely family enterprises	
	owner only	family members
Under 0.5 ha	150,944	181,323
0.5-1 ha	115,117	227,109
1-2 ”	126,203	379,991
2-5 ”	114,833	545,274
5-10 ”	29,719	227,476
10-20 ”	8,565	91,456
20-50 ”	1,441	23,602
50-100 ”	182	1,299
over 100 ”	103	300
Total	547,107	1,677,830

p. 152)

and productive area:

Enterprises with non-family personnel				
without employees or supervisory personnel				with employees and supervisory personnel
servants only	day labourers only	servants and day labourers	outside labour only	
with casual outside labour				
7,569	1,093	79	1,000	1,852
10,326	2,688	173	12,960	1,091
25,146	5,441	503	22,945	1,668
72,380	13,675	1,952	41,286	3,015
81,182	12,027	3,302	26,546	3,079
107,401	8,193	6,955	15,960	3,763
79,277	3,469	9,887	4,702	5,450
9,189	579	2,060	332	3,731
3,844	207	828	79	12,528
396,314	47,372	25,739	125,810	36,177

[ctd on next page]

[ctd]

	Personnel								
	All persons	male				female			
		over	%	under	%	over	%	under	%
		16 years old							
Under 0.5 ha	676,498	295,781	43.1	28,917	5.7	321,197	45.4	30,603	5.8
0.5-1 ha	846,265	366,460		44,368		389,709		45,728	
1-2 ha	1,477,786	632,150		96,609		651,033		97,994	
2-5 ha	2,454,298	1,045,423	42.6	191,088	7.8	1,032,920	42.1	184,867	7.5
5-10 ha	1,412,013	612,615	43.9	114,465	7.5	578,558	41.6	106,375	7.0
10-20 ha	1,044,972	466,357		70,279		444,227		64,109	
20-50 ha	706,665	329,369	47.6	44,257	6.1	296,132	41.3	36,907	5.0
50-100 ha	126,291	66,803		6,311		48,233		4,944	
over 100 ha	325,894	228,949	70.3	7,500	2.3	83,220	25.6	6,225	1.9
Total	9,070,682	4,043,907	44.6	603,795	6.6	3,845,229	42.5	577,752	6.3

Number of gainfully employed persons					
owners	family members	employees	super-visors	servants	day labourers
378,485	285,573	86	1,895	8,935	1,524
427,081	401,905	18	1,103	12,440	3,718
662,367	775,754	24	1,686	29,984	7,971
954,844	1,384,305	40	3,051	91,136	20,922
476,644	789,325	67	3,114	120,151	22,712
325,083	474,248	116	3,884	214,674	26,967
171,126	237,972	320	5,716	259,787	31,744
17,791	27,642	533	4,146	60,306	15,873
10,595	12,681	11,090	33,062	145,353	113,113
3,424,016	4,389,405	12,294	57,657	942,766	244,544

[ctd on next page]

[ctd]

	Purely family farms	Farms with non-family personnel	Total farms*
Under 0.5 ha	332,267	11,593	343,860
0.5-1 ”	342,226	27,238	369,464
1-2 ”	506,194	55,703	561,897
2-5 ”	660,107	132,308	792,415
5-10 ”	257,195	126,136	383,331
10-20 ”	100,021	142,272	242,293
20-50 ”	25,043	102,785	127,828
50-100 ”	1,481	15,891	17,372
>100 ”	403	17,486	17,889
	2,224,937	631,412	2,856,349
Under 5 ha		226,842	2,067,636
5-10 ”		126,136	383,331
10 and > ”		278,434	405,382
		631,412	2,856,349

* The three boxed figures are combined from Table 6 of *Austrian Stati*

** Source of this and the following tables: *Austrian Statistics*. Vol.

Number of farms connected with**			(My total) Farms providing hired labour	Number of farms connected with handicraft industries
agricultural wage labour	industrial wage labour	wage labour without further specification		
103,949	47,585	25,072	176,606	27,266
131,738	36,152	27,587	195,477	27,271
190,504	44,314	39,090	273,908	39,782
186,271	38,381	37,082	261,734	47,611
} 58,173	11,437	14, 036	83,646	23,833
670,635	177,869	142,867	991,371	165,763
(α+β) total with hired labour and craftsmen			(α)	(β)
1,049,655			907,725	141,930
} 107,479			} 83,646	} 23,833
1,157,134			991,371	165,763

[ctd on next page]

stical Handbook, 28th year of publication, 1909 (p. 152).—*Ed.*
LXXXIII, Part 1, p. 41.—*Ed.*

[ctd]

	Number of farms connected with				
	other agricultural enterprises	industrial enterprises	Total men	Total women	%
Under 0.5 ha	13,187	127,088	324,698	351,800	52.0
0.5-1 ”			410,828	435,437	51.5
1-2 ”			728,759	749,027	50.7
2-5 ”	8,659	72,385	1,236,511	1,217,787	49.6
5-10 ”	5,540	35,551	727,080	684,933	48.5
10-20 ”	4,922	21,689	536,636	508,336	48.6
20-50 ”	4,130	12,595	373,626	333,039	47.1
50-100 ”	1,354	2,702	73,114	53,177	42.1
over 100 ”	3,396	4,726	236,449	89,445	27.4
	41,188	276,736	4,647,701	4,422,981	48.7

Under 5 ha	221,319
5-10 ”	41,091
10 ha and over	55,514
	317,924

Total children (under 16 years)	%	Total family workers	Total hired labourers	Total workers
59,520	8.8	664,058	12,440	676,498
90,096	10.6	828,986	17,279	846,265
194,603	13.2	1,438,121	39,665	1,477,786
375,955	15.3	2,339,149	115,149	2,454,298
220,840	15.6	1,265,969	146,044	1,412,013
134,388	12.8	799,331	245,641	1,044,972
81,164	11.3	409,098	297,567	706,665
11,255	9.0	45,433	80,858	126,291
13,725	4.2	23,276	302,618	325,894
1,181,546	13.0	7,813,421	1,257,261	9,070,682

				Number of farms using machinery
	5,270,314	184, 533	5,454,847	428,479
	1,265,969	146,044	1,412,013	220,588
	1,277,138	926,684	2,203,822	298,044
	7,813,421	1,257,261	9,070,682	947,111

Vol. 28, p. 150
Maintenance of livestock in connection with size of **productive** area

	Horses	Horned cattle	Goats	Sheep	Pigs	Number of farms with livestock in general*
	a) Number of farms with this livestock					
Under 2 ha	78,760	720,490	244,373	71,004	486,891	
2-5 "	230,079	714,530	62,709	73,713	462,421	761,527
5-20 "	307,765	595,890	66,541	97,087	473,947	
20-50 "	79,769	121,655	20,797	32,657	110,988	122,844
50-100 "	10,410	14,692	3,265	6,679	12,816	14,934
over 100 "	10,771	12,110	2,156	4,178	7,695	12,620
Total:	717,544	2,179,367	399,841	285,318	1,554,758	2,544,792
	b) Quantity of livestock					
Under 2 ha	110,101	1,232,007	446,808	503,187	813,836	
2-5 "	379,087	1,975,503	148,818	599,797	981,935	
5-20 "	626,149	3,343,032	145,683	890,110	1,680,992	
20-50 "	215,739	1,493,417	50,397	379,272	674,273	
50-100 "	39,286	301,599	15,339	127,702	108,629	
over 100 "	170,569	679,699	19,711	302,278	105,430	
Total:	1,540,931	3,025,257	826,756	2,802,346	4,365,005	
	Number of farms with this livestock					
Under 0.5 ha	5,790	86,197	93,321	14,501	98,340	215,941
0.5-1 "	13,973	199,278	80,781	19,627	135,465	298,474
1-2 "	58,978	435,015	70,271	36,876	253,086	507,990
5-10 "	176,081	362,559	34,941	55,561	275,007	373,892
10-20 "	131,684	233,331	31,600	41,526	198,940	236,570
	Quantity of livestock					
Under 0.5 ha	7,535	121,406	157,412	103,588	151,416	
0.5-1 "	18,515	297,048	149,762	130,128	217,274	
1-2 "	84,051	813,553	139,634	269,471	445,146	
5-10 "	336,128	1,616,774	80,243	503,797	808,701	
10-20 "	290,021	1,726,258	65,440	386,313	872,291	

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* Source: *Austrian Statistics*, Vol. LXXXIII, Part 1, p. 21.—*Ed.*

REMARKS ON SCHMELZLE'S ARTICLE, "DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL LAND HOLDINGS, INFLUENCE ON THE PRODUCTIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE"[122]

Dr. *Schmelzle*. "Die ländliche Grundbesitzverteilung, ihr Einfluss auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Landwirtschaft und ihre Entwicklung" (*Annalen des Deutschen Reichs*, 46. Jahrgang, 1913, No. 6, S. 401-33).

The author talks platitudes refuses to differentiate between various, small, medium and large farms, but he does give many interesting indications of and references to the latest writings.

(Stumpfe)		Marks
	Cost of buildings per *ha*	
	on the big farms	360
(p. 407)	" medium "	420
	" small "	472

Quante [1])[123]: Cost of buildings per *ha* for		Marks
	under-5-ha farms	1,430
The implication is "higher cost of repairs, insurance and depreciation".	5-20 ha	896
	20-100 "	732
	100-500 "	413
	500 and over "	419

Dr. Vogeley [2])[124] reckons the averages

	for this per *ha*	Marks
	on middle-peasant farms	64.48
	" big " "	57.63

"Untersuchungen betreffend die Rentabilität der schweizerischen Landwirtschaft." Bericht des Bauernsekretariats. Bern 1911.*

			The earnings of an entrepreneur and his family per male working day 1901-09
Capital in implements			
per *ha*	under 5 ha	395 francs	2.01 francs
	5-10 "	309 "	2.27 "
	10-15 "	253 "	2.31 "
	15-30 "	231 "	2.26 "
	over 30 "	156 "	4.15 "
		cultivated farmland ha	of which ploughland
Per person working on the farms	over 15 ha	4.67	2.87 ha
2) 125	10-15 "	3.63	1.88 "
	under 10 "	2.59	1.32 "

Literature:

Werner und *Albrecht. Der Betrieb det deutschen Landwirtschaft am Schlusse des 19. Jahrhunderts.* Berlin 1902.**

M. Sering. Die Bodenbesitzverteilung und die Sicherung des Kleinbesitzes. Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik. Band *68*. (1893).***

Fr. Brinkmann: *Die Grundlagen der englischen Landwirtschaft.* Hannover 1909.****

Keup-Mührer: *Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung von Gross- und Kleinbetrieb in der Landwirtschaft.* Berlin 1913. [Price 11 frs 25]*****

2) *Arbeiten der Deutschen Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft.* Heft *118*; *133*; *123*; *218*; *130*.******

* *A Study of the Profitability of Swiss Agriculture*, Report of the Peasant Secretariat.—*Ed.*

** *German Agricultural Production at the Close of the 19th Century.*—*Ed.*

*** *Distribution of Land Holdings and the Security of Small Holdings.* Transactions of the Social Policy Association.—*Ed.*

**** *The Principles of British Agriculture.*—*Ed.*

***** *The National Economic Importance of Large- and Small-scale Production in Agriculture.*—*Ed.*

****** *Transactions of the German Agricultural Society.*—*Ed.*

[1]) *Thiels Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*. 1905. S. 955.*

E. Laur. Grundlagen und Methoden der Bewertung etc. in der Landwirtschaft. Berlin 1911.**

(Sammelwerk): *Neuere Erfahrungen auf dem Gebiet des landwirtschaflichen Betriebswesens*.*** Berlin 1910.

Petersilie: "Schichtung und Aufbau der Landwirtschaft in Preussen." Zeitschrift des Königlichen Preussischen Statistischen Landesamts. 1913.****

H. Losch: *Die Veränderungen im wirtschaftlichen etc. Aufbau der Bevölkerung Würtembergs*. (*Würtembergische Jahrbücher für Statistik*. 1911.)*****

M. Hecht: *Die Badische Landwirtschaft*. Karlsruhe 1903,******

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Germany 1907 (Dr. Arthur Schulz where?) (P. 410)

Calculated total number of permanently employed persons	Per permanently employed person				
	horses	horned cattle	pigs	sheep	poultry
2- 5 ha 2,346,000	0.10	1.34	1.19	0.15	6.25
5- 20 " 3,891,000	0.34	2.02	1.62	0.37	7.09
20-100 " 1,804,000	0.67	2.94	2.02	1.28	7.85
over 100 " 1,068,000	0.61	2.18	1.29	4.10	3.35

On the whole, says the author, small-scale production is weaker (p. 414). There are special crops, vegetable gardening, but their part is weak.

(P. 415.) Area under *cereals* per 100 ha of cultivated farmland in 1907

	Germany	Bavaria
< 2 ha	31.2	29.4
2- 5 "	42.4	38.8
5- 20 "	47.5	41.8
20-100 "	48.3	43.5
100 and over	47.6	34.9

* Thiel's *Agricultural Yearbook*.—*Ed*.

** *Principles and Methods of Assessment, etc., in Agriculture*.—*Ed*.

*** (Collection): *The Latest Experiments in Agricultural Production*.—*Ed*.

**** "Stratification and Structure of Agriculture in Prussia." Journal of the Royal Prussian Statistical Board.—*Ed*.

***** *Changes in the Economic, etc. Structure of the Population in Württemberg* (*Württemberg Statistical Yearbooks*).—*Ed*.

****** *Baden Agriculture*.—*Ed*.

Crop statistics (1901-10)

		double centners wheat	double centners rye
The result is said to be not in favour of small-scale production	Germany	19.6	16.3
	Belgium	23.6	21.7
	Denmark	27.8	17.3
	France	13.6	10.6
	Great Britain	21.4	17.6

Livestock farming: in Bavaria (1907) per 100 ha of cultivated farmland

		head of horned cattle (p. 419)
The big farms are said to have better livestock in general: (p. 419) Cf. Part *218*, *Transactions of the German Agricultural Society*	under 2 ha	137.6
	2- 5 ”	125.1
	5- 20 ”	109.8
	20-100 ”	98.7
	100 and over	62.7

p. 420: (From Part 81 of *The Contribution to the Statistics of the Kingdom of Bavaria*, p. 146★)

N.B.	Bavaria: Per farm with the following species of livestock						Head of horned cattle per 100 ha of cultivated farmland		
	horned cattle			pigs					
	1907	1882	increase from 1882 to 1907%	1907	1882	increase %	1907	1882	increase %
Under 2 ha	1.9	1.7	11.8	1.9	1.6	18.8	137.6	131.9	4.3
2- 5 ”	3.7	3.2	15.6	2.7	2.1	28.6	125.1	107.3	16.6
5- 20 ”	8.7	7.3	19.2	4.6	3.4	35.3	109.8	92.3	19.0
20-100 ”	21.4	17.3	23.7	10.2	7.1	43.7	98.7	80.7	22.3
100 and over ”	82.7	54.1	52.9	48.7	21.1	130.8	62.7	50.3	24.7

Cost-price per kilogramme of milk on farms with

5-10 ha of area	16.34	centimes
10-20 " " "	14.97	"
20-30 " " "	14.43	"
over 30 " " "	12.60	"

Schmelzle in *Weekly of the Agricultural Society in Bavaria*. 1912, No. 47 et seq.

{ *A Study of the Profitability of Swiss Agriculture*, l. c. (p. 422) }

		Gross income per ha without forest (1901-09)	Net profit as % of production capital (1901-09)	Growth of gross income per ha of cultivated area in 1906-09 as compared with 1901-05	
				Gross income in general	Gross income from livestock farming
			%	%	%
Small-peasant farms . . .	under 5 ha	169.70	2.35	+3.7	14.6
Small middle-peasant farms	5-10	148.20	2.91	17.7	21.2
Middle-peasant farms . . .	10-15	128.55	3.34	16.2	21.8
Big middle-peasant farms .	15-30	122.00	3.42	20.5	22.0
Big-peasant farms	over 30	100.00	4.48	16.9	15.7

Both wings of the Social-Democrats are said to be wrong: the Radicals in that they tend to forget the difference between agriculture and industry, and the revisionists in that they allege the superiority of small-scale production to be the cause (of the development towards small-scale production) (p. 433). The author is a *middle-of-the-roader* (11), a fool. He says small and middle (5-20 ha) peasant farms are growing stronger, area statistics for 1907, etc., etc.

Written not earlier than July 1913

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REMARKS ON E. LAUR'S BOOK, *STATISTICAL NOTES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SWISS AGRICULTURE OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS*[126]

Statistische Notizen über die Entwicklung der schweizerischen Landwirtschaft in den letzten 25 Jahren. (E. Laur). Brugg 1907.

Participation of Swiss agriculture in supplying the country with corn (estimated).

In the early 1880s = 1,850,000 quintals* = 38.$_5$% of demand

Now . . . . . = 850,000 " = 14.$_3$%

Reduction in area under corn

								%
	Zurich	(1885)	— 15,490	ha	—(1896)	13,590	—	12.$_3$
Canton	Berne	(1885)	— 48,170	"	—(1905)	43,340	—	10.$_0$
	Waadt	(1886)	— 38,510	"	—(1905)	28,330	—	27.$_2$

Maintenance of livestock	1886	1906	±%
Number of livestock owners	289,274	274,706	— 5.$_{04}$
Livestock owners with farms	258,639	239,111	— 7.$_{55}$
Owners of horses.	56,499	72,925	+ 29.$_{07}$
Owners of big horned cattle	219,193	212,950	— 2.$_{85}$
Owners of small cattle	232,104	206,291	— 11.$_{55}$
Horses	298,622	135,091	+ 36.$_{98}$
Horned cattle	1,212,538	1,497,904	+ 23.$_{54}$
Pigs	394,917	548,355	+ 38.$_{88}$
Sheep	341,804	209,243	— 38.$_{78}$
Goats.	416,323	359,913	— 13.$_{55}$

* Double metric centners (100 kg).—*Ed.*

Value of livestock

	1886	1906	±%
Horses	51,245 (000 fr.)	94,523	+ 84.45
Horned cattle	360,853	527,797	+ 46.26
Pigs	20,997	42,665	+103.15
etc.			
Total	448,579	680,722	+ 51.75

Milk production

Milch cows	663,102	785,577	+ 18.47
Milk goats	291,426	251,970	— 13.55
Milk from cows	14,678,000 hl* (2,210 l)	20,818,000 (2,650 l)	+ 14.84
” ” goats	874,000 hl (300 l)	756,000 (300 l)	— 13.55
Total milk output	15,552,000 hl	21,574,000 hl	+ 38.72
Consumption of milk by population	7,217,000 hl (300 l)	10,391,000	+ 44.00
Consumption of milk for breeding and fattening of calves	2,437,000	3,124,000	+ 27.80
Consumption of milk for breeding goats	87,000	75,000	— 13.80
Consumption of milk for breeding pigs	117,000	160,000	+ 36.75
Consumption of milk for condensation and baby food	369,000	886,000	—140.11
Consumption of milk for making chocolate	15,000	100,000	+566.67
Consumption of milk for technical processing on Alpine farms	5,311,000	6,939,000	+ 28.75
Milk consumed on farms and in households	5,450,000	6,563,000	+ 20.42
Milk marketed	10,102,000	15,095,000	+ 49.43
of this, milk and milk products for export	3,500,000	4,502,000	+ 28.63
of this, milk and milk products at home	6,602,000	10,593,000	+ 60.45
Value of milk output	215,500,000 francs	333,210,000 francs	+ 54.62
Value, of milk output less milk going into breeding and fattening of livestock	175,597,000	286,180,000	+ 62.05

* hl—hectolitres; l—litres.—*Ed.*

	1886	1906	±%
Total value of Swiss meat production	126,612,000 francs	214,810,000	+ 70.72
Total value of Swiss meat consumption	172,080,000	285,171,000	+ 65.71
Cost of one kg of meat	1.514	1.625	+ 7.33
Per-head consumption of meat	39.353 kg	50.103 kg	+ 27.31
Consumption of meat (quintals)	1,136,000	1,755,000	+ 54.48
of this, nationally produced	829,000	1,333,000	+ 60.79
of this, imported	307,000	422,000	+ 37.45

Value of total output (estimated)

	'000 fr. in mid-1880s	%	'000 fr. now	%	±%
Cereals	39,000	7.16	21,300	2.92	— 45.38
Potatoes	24,471	4.50	27,000	3.70	+ 10.33
Hemp and hay	1,894	0.35	1,900	0.26	+ 0.32
Tobacco	1,000	0.17	1,000	0.14	—
Various crops	250	0.04	400	0.05	+ 60.00
Hay for horses not used on farms	3,600	0.66	4,500	0.62	+ 25.00
Wine-growing	49,240	9.05	45,000	6.16	— 8.61
Fruit-growing	49,500	9.09	60,000	8.21	+ 21.21
Vegetable-gardening	25,926	4.76	26,400	3.61	+ 1.83
Horned cattle breeding	6,485	1.19	5,600	0.77	— 13.64
Fattening of horned cattle (including export)	96,250	17.68	156,300	21.40	+ 62.39
Horse breeding	288	0.05	350	0.05	+ 21.52
Pig breeding	38,221	7.02	61,480	8.43	+ 60.85
Sheep breeding	3,800	0.70	2,590	0.35	— 31.84
Goat breeding	12,260	2.25	13,260	1.81	+ 8.24
Poultry farming	13,256	2.43	14,000	1.01	+ 5.61
Bee-keeping	2,286	0.41	3,000	0.41	+ 31.23
Milk products	176,597	32.49	286,180	39.20	+ 62.05
Total	544,314	100.00	730,260	100.00	+ 34.16

Import of agricultural raw materials and machinery	mid-1880s quintals	now quintals	±%
Fertilisers and waste	181,720	913,340	+ 402.60
Feedstuffs	516,000	1,456,390	+ 182.25
Bran, oil-cakes (idem ground)	27,410	366,310	+ 1,236.41
Maize	287,370	634,620	+ 120.83
Flour	86,230	171,850	+ 99.30
Straw and straw for litter	110,000	567,410	+ 415.82
Seed	24,130	11,450	— 52.55
Agricultural machinery and implements	1,340	40,340	+ 2,910.45

	1885-1888	1905	
Import of competitive farm items	198,381,000 francs	351,681	+ 77.27
Export of competitive farm items	78,399,000 francs	81,512	+ 3.97

Agricultural population	1888	1900	%
Relating to agriculture	1,092,827	1,047,795	— 4.12
Male	568,024	555,047	— 2.28
Female	524,803	492,748	— 6.10
Technical and managing personnel, men	—	464	
" " " " women	—	14	
Man servants	61,320	57,849	— 5.66
Maid servants	9,927	6,779	— 31.71
Day labourers men	35,258	37,234	+ 5.60
Day labourers women	8,921	8,348	— 6.42
	115,426	110,210	

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REMARKS ON E. JORDI'S BOOK, *THE ELECTRIC MOTOR IN AGRICULTURE*[127]

Ernst Jordi, Der Elèktromotor in der Landwirtschaft. Bern 1910

The author is a practitioner from an agricultural school at Rütti, Berne. This school itself uses an electric motor for farming operations. The author has collected data on electric motors in Swiss agriculture. Result: highly recommends that peasant co-operatives use electric motors.

"At present, no other mechanical engine can match the electric motor's simple and reliable operation, insignificant wear and tear, great adaptability, instant readiness for use, minimal requirements in supervision and maintenance, and the consequent low overhead costs. . . . Production-wise, it will pay big farms to have their own motor in most cases. Medium and small farms are advised to purchase and run an electric motor co-operatively . . ." p. 79.

1 volt × 1 ampere = 1 watt

h.p. { kilowatt = 1,000 watts
1 h.p. = 736 watts

Cost of electricity: "effective h.p.—hour with the use of" (p. 78)

a. electric motor (4 h.p.)—*26* centimes
b. manpower—300 centimes
c. one-horse drive—100 centimes
d. water (very cheap) a few centimes
e. internal-combustion engine (4 h.p.)—60 centimes

Consequently, the electric motor is cheaper than anything (except water).

The author reckons Switzerland's water-power (according to official statistics) at *722,600* h.p. Roughly ¾ of a million h.p. (in a 24-hour day). Rather, up to 1 million = the work of 14-24 million men (p. 13)

Written in September-October 1914

First printed in the Fourth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

CAPITALISM AND AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA[128]

OUTLINE OF INTRODUCTION

AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL CENSUSES

The importance of America as a leading country of capitalism. A model. Ahead of the others. Most freedom, etc.

Agricultural evolution. The significance, importance and complexity of the question.

American agricultural statistics. Decennial censuses. Similar material.

Himmer as a *collection* of bourgeois views. *In this respect* his short article is worth volumes.

The gist of his attitude: "*family-labour*" farms (or farmers) or *capitalist* farms. Main propositions. "Decline of Capitalism"?

VARIANTS OF PLAN

I

3 main divisions and 2 *subdivisions*.

3 *sections* and 2 *subdivisions* (9 divisions)

> Cf. p. 4 of the extracts from the *1900* edition: in 1900 there were 5 divisions,* which is more *reasonable*.

Population density.

Per cent of urban population.

Population increase.

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* See p. 427.—*Ed*.

Settlement (homesteads).
Growing number of farms.
Increase in improved area.
Intensiveness of agriculture.
{ capital
{ fertilisers.
Hired labour.
Crops (agricultural).
Yields.
Average farm acreage and its changes
{ by divisions
{ in time.
Percentage distribution of total value of farms and value of agricultural implements + machines.
Sale-purchase of feedstuffs and livestock products.
Negroes in the South and their flight to the cities. Immigrants and their urge to move to the cities.
Hired labour in agriculture.

Expenditures for wages.

Occupation statistics.
Owners versus tenants
in general
in the South.
Mortgaged farms. Increase.
Number of farms owning horses and changes.
Number of farms (by groups) and changes.
Acreage of improved land (idem) and changes.
Dairy *cattle* (and its concentration). . . .
Plantations in the South.
Overall picture of industry and agriculture in their class structure and development.
Three methods of grouping. N.B.)
(1900). . . .
Latifundia and decrease in their acreage.

II

The main thing: three *sections* and
A) 2 divisions of the North (New England + Middle Atlantic). . . .

Add: the prices of **industrial** products

B) The South—"decline of capitalism".
C) Summaries of acreage groups.
D) Comparison of three types of groupings.
settlement.
latifundia.
Owners versus tenants.
Overall picture of agriculture and *industry.*

III

1. *Introduction.* The importance of the question. Material. "Himmer".
2. **General** essay 3(+2) *main* sections (*general* characteristic) resp. 3-5 §§

(homestead) West	Transition from homestead to settled areas
(industrial) North	(1 division)
(slave-holding) South	(1 division)

3. Average farm acreage (1850-1910)

---

4. Acreage groups.
5. *Ibid.* Percentage distribution of total value and value of machinery.
6. Groups by income.
7. " " principal source of income ("specialities")
8. Comparison of the 3 groupings.
9. Expropriation of the small farmers.
   - summaries for the United States
   - groupings
   - owners and tenants
   - ownership of horses

   } mortgaged farms.
10. Hired labour in agriculture.
11. Considerable decrease in the acreage of the latifundia.
12. Overall picture.

Further (after 13 §§) roughly:
14. Expropriation of small farmers

(α) flight from the countryside
(β) owners
(γ) ownership of horses
(δ) farm debt.

15. Overall picture *N.B.* +
((+*cf. America and Russia, if all the land goes to the peasants.*))
15. A comparative picture of evolution in industry and agriculture.
16. *Summary and conclusions.*

add to § 3, the North % of *large enterprises*

add: % of high-income farms

under 3 acres	$5._2$	N.B.
3 to 10	$0._6$	
10 to 20	$0._4$	
20 to 50	$0._3$	
50 to 100	$0._6$	

+ prices of livestock
Add: Latifundia, % of land

1900	1910
$23._6$	$19._7$

+ value of land:

$7._1$%	$7._6$%

+ increase in livestock
meadow + land: p. 6.

VARIANTS OF TITLE

***Roughly*:**

Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America.
(New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture.)
New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture.
Part One. Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America.

EXTRACTS FROM DIFFERENT VARIANTS

I

I.
From corvée to capitalist rent.
Marx.
III. Size of capital investment in land.

II

"Summary and Conclusions":
A) (Similar material.
(Range of nuances.
B) "*Seven theses.*"

---

16. *Summary and conclusions* | ***p. 20*: +*quotations***

III

Size of country and diversity.
Range of nuances, strands in evolution:
3. || α) Intensification due to vast industry.
4. || β) Extensive farming (livestock breeding—hundreds of dessiatines)
2. γ) Settlement
1. δ) Transition from feudalism to capitalism (slave-holding)
ε) comparative size of farms (?)

1. Machinery
2. Hired labour

3. Displacement of small-scale by large-scale farming

4. Minimisation of the displacement by acreage grouping.

5. Growth of capitalism as farms become smaller (intensification).

6. Expropriation of small farmers
   - owners and tenants
   - ownership of livestock
   - debts.
7. Uniformity with industry (§ 15).

IV

10. Defects of conventional methods of economic inquiry.
11. Small and big farms by value of product.
11. More exact comparisons of small and large enterprises.
12. Different types of enterprises in agriculture.
13. How is the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production in agriculture minimised?

V

4. *Average size of farms.*
   "*Decline of capitalism*" *in the South.*
   U.S.A. = *the South*, — *the North* +
   two divisions of the North, — *the West*, + *the South* ⌣
5. "*Disintegration of capitalism*" *in the North.* New England + Middle Atlantic.
6. *Capitalist character.*
6. *Groups by farm acreage.* **Overall result.**
7. Idem. *The South.*
8. *The North.* New England + Middle Atlantic.
9. *The West.*
10. *The capitalist character of agriculture.*
11. *Groups by value* (total value and value of machinery).
12. Groups by income.
13. Groups by speciality.
14. Comparison of the three groupings.
15. *Expropriation.*
16. *Overall picture.*

VI

10. Shortcomings in the grouping of farms by acreage
11. Grouping by income

12. Grouping by (principal source of income) speciality
13. Comparison of the three groupings.,
{ *cf. America and Russia, if all* the land went to the peasants } N.B.

VII

California
per acre

	1910	*1900*
Labour	$4._{38}$	$2._{16}$
Fertilisers	$0._{19}$	$0._{08}$

Understatement of the ruin of small-scale production when grouping is by acreage):

the *minority* of prospering farms are lumped together *with the masses* of backward farms and those on the way to ruin,

N.B.

Add:
among the high-income farms ($2,500 and over), there is a higher % of very small and small farms

under 3 acres—	$5._{2}$
3 to 10	$0._{6}$
10 to 20	$0._{4}$
20 to 50	$\boxed{0._{3}}$
50 to 100	$0._{6}$

VARIANTS OF CONTENTS

I

Contents:

1. General Characteristic of the Three Sections. The Homestead West.
2. The Industrial North.
3. The Former Slave-owning South.

4. Average Size of Farms.
"Disintegration of Capitalism in the South."
5. *The Capitalist Nature of Agriculture.*
6. Areas of the Most Intensive Agriculture.
7. *Machinery and Hired* Labour.

8. *Displacement of Small by Big Enterprises* (cultivated land).
9. Continued. Statistics on Value. ———
10. Defects of the Grouping by Acreage. ———
11. Grouping of Farms by the Value of Product. ———
12. Grouping by the Principal Source of Income. ———
13. Comparison of the Three Groupings. ———

14. *The Expropriation of the Small Farmers.*
15. Comparative *Picture* of Evolution in Industry and Agriculture.
16. Summary and Conclusions. Pp. 155-161.

End

——— means: "rewrite heading" of §

II

Introduction 1-5
1. General Characteristic of the Three Sections. The West. — 5
2. The Industrial North —12
3. The Former Slave-owning South —15
4. Average Size of Farms (The South: "Disintegration of Capitalism") —21
5. The Capitalist Nature of Agriculture —30
6. Areas of the Most Intensive Agriculture —*39*
7. Machinery and Hired Labour —*51*
8. Displacement of Small by Big Enterprises, Quantity of Improved Land —*60*
9. Continued. Statistics on Value —71
10. Defects of Grouping Farms by Acreage —78
11. Grouping of Farms by the Value of Product —*90*
12. Grouping by Principal Source of Income —105
13. Comparison of the Three Groupings —115
14. The Expropriation of the Small Farmers —127
15. A Comparative Picture of Evolution in Industry and Agriculture —141
16. Summary and Conclusions —155

REMARKS ON AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS

The most interesting thing American agricultural statistics provide—in novelty and importance for economic science—is the comparison of *three* groupings: by acreage (conventional); 2) by principal source of income; 3) by gross income—by value of products not fed to livestock (probably, gross cash income).

The second and third groupings are a novelty, which is highly valuable and instructive.

There is no need to say much about the second one. Its importance lies in showing the economic types of farm with a *bias* for some aspect of *commercial* agriculture. This grouping gives an excellent idea of the *impossibility of comparing* various types of farm (by acreage), and so of the *limits* within which the acreage grouping can be applied (resp. the conclusions to be drawn from this kind of grouping).

To 1) Farms of these types cannot be compared by acreage: *Hay & grain* as the principal sources of income. Average size of farm—$159._3$ acres (see, pp. 7-8 of my extracts*). Average expenditure for labour—$76 per farm ($0._{47}$ per acre).

Flowers & plants. Average size = $6._9$ acres. Average expenditure for labour = $675 per farm, $97._{42}$ per acre, that is, 9,742 ÷ 47 = 207 times greater.

Of course, the number of farms with *flowers* as the principal source of income is insignificant ($0._1$%), and that with *hay & grain*, very large ($23._0$%), but a calculation of

* See pp. 432-34.—*Ed.*

the average would give a false impression. The number of cereal farms (hay & grain) is 200 (214) times greater (1,319,856 ÷ 6,159 = 214), but their average expenditure for labour per acre is 1/207 of the figure for the flower farms.

The same applies, with due alterations, to vegetables ($2._7$% of all farms; expenditure for labour = $\$1._{62}$ per acre, with an average of $\$0._{43}$); fruits ($1._4$% of all farms, labour—$\$2._{40}$ per acre), etc.

The cereal farms are large *in acreage* ($159._3$ acres on an average) but have low income (in terms of *gross* incomes—an average of $665 of gross income per farm. On the flower farms—$6._9$ acres—$2,991 of gross income per farm. Fruits—$74._8$ acres, $915 of gross income per farm, etc,

Or take dairy produce. The farms are *smaller* than average: $121._9$ acres versus $146._6$—and smaller than the cereal farms ($159._3$ acres) but their gross income is *higher*: $787 (versus an average of $656, and $760 for the hay & grain farms). Expenditure for labour per farm = $105 (versus an average of $64, and $76 for hay & grain) and $\$0._{86}$ per acre, i.e. double the average ($\$0._{43}$ per acre). They have livestock valued at $\$5._{58}$ per acre (versus an average of $\$3._{66}$); implements & machinery, $\$1._{66}$ per acre (versus an average of $\$0._{90}$).

And that is not unique for the United States, but is the *rule* for all capitalist countries. What is the implication in the case of a *switch* from cropping to dairy farming?

For example (α) 10 grain farms switch to dairy farming.
(β) 10 farms × 160 = 1,600 acres
÷ 120 (average dairy produce farm)
= 13 farms

The scale of production is reduced. The smaller farm wins out!

Expenditure for labour 10 × 76 = $ 760 (α)
(β) 13 × 105 = $ 1,365 (β) *Almost twice*>!!

This means that the switch to dairy farming—as well as to vegetables, fruits, etc.—leads to a reduction in the

average farm acreage, to an increase in its *capitalist* expenditures (= intensification of its capitalist character), and to an increase in production

(gross income: $\alpha = 760 \times 10 = \$\ 7{,}600$
$\beta = 787 \times 13 = \$10{,}231$)

To 2) What are the limits for applying the grouping by acreage? *Ordinary*, grain, farms are *in the majority*. In America, hay & grain = 23%; livestock (extensive N.B. [mixed with intensive]) = $27._3$%; miscellaneous = $18._5$%. $\Sigma = 68._8$%. Consequently, general laws *may become apparent* even in general averages, but only in the gross totals, wherever there is known to be *no switch* from old farms to new (but where does that happen?), from farms with a similar investment of capital per hectare (per acre).

The great defect of American statistics is the failure to give *combined* tables. It would be extremely important to make a comparison of data on farms by acreage *within the limits* of one type of farm. That is not done.

Now for the third, new type of grouping—by gross income.

A comparison of it with the first, conventional grouping (by acreage) is highly instructive.

The quantity of livestock (value) per acre. By acreage: there is a *regular reduction*, without a single exception: from $\$456._{76}$ per acre (< 3-acre farms) to $\$2._{15}$ per acre (1,000 acres and over), i.e., some 200 odd times greater! This is a ridiculous comparison, because *heterogeneous* magnitudes are involved.

By gross income: there is an *increase* (with 2 not very big exceptions: when income is at *0* and at *$2,500 and* > to a maximum) *parallel* to the *increase* in acreage (also with two exceptions: at 0 and at the minimum).

Expenditure for labour per acre.

By acreage. There is a *reduction* (with one exception) from $\$40._{30}$ (< 3 acres) to $\$0._{25}$ (> 1,000 acres). 150-fold!!

By gross income. There is a regular *increase* from $\$0._{06}$ to $\$0._{72}$.

Expenditure for *fertilisers*. There is a *reduction* by acreage from $\$2._{36}$ per acre to $\$0._{02}$.

By gross income: there is an *increase* (with one exception)

from $\$0._{01}$ to $\$0._{08}$ $(0._{06})$,

implements & machinery per acre.

There is a *reduction* by acreage

from $\$27._{57}$ to $\$0._{29}$

There is an *increase* by gross income (with one exception)

from $\$0._{38}$ to $\$1._{21}$ $(0._{72})$.

Average quantity of improved land.

An *increase* by acreage from $1._{7}$ to $520._{0}$
An *increase* by gross income (with one exception) from $18._{2}$ to $322._{3}$.

The grouping by *income* combines the big and the small *acreage* farms, where they are similar in the level of capitalism. The predominant importance of such a "*factor*" as *land* remains and stands out in the grouping, but it is seen to be (co)subordinate to *capital*.

The grouping by income: the differences between the groups in expenditure for labour ($4—$786) per farm, are *tremendous*, but are relatively small per acre ($\$0._{06}$—$\$0._{72}$).

The grouping by acreage: the differences between the groups in expenditure for labour per farm ($16—$1,059) are *less* significant, but are tremendous per acre ($\$40._{30}$—$\$0._{25}$)

By acreage: income (gross per farm) by groups: $592—$1,913 ($55,334), i.e. the differences are *very small*.

Depending on whether you take gross income or acreage as the yardstick, the ratios between small and large farms (in America) turn out to be *diametrically* opposed (by the main indicators and by the most important one for the capitalist economy, namely, expenditures for labour).

It should be noted that America's agricultural statistics shows up its one *main* distinction from continental Europe.

In America, the % of parcel (proletarian?) farms is *insignificant*: $11._8$% of farms under 20 acres (= 8 ha).

In Europe, it is *great* (in Germany, more than one-half are under *2 ha*).

In America, agricultural capitalism is more *clear-cut*, the division of labour is more *crystallised*; there are *fewer* bonds with the Middle Ages, with the soil-bound labourer; ground-rent is not so burdensome; there is less intermixing of commercial agriculture and subsistence farming.

AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS*

(pp. 1-12 of extracts)

Pages
(of extracts)

1. number of farms in *acreage* groups, combined with grouping *by income*.
2. idem in %% for both groupings, combined with *each other*.
3. size of farms in divisions compared.
4. nil.
5. number of farms by *acreage* combined with the *principal source of income*.
6. grouping by *principal source of income*—% of total.

7 and 8 averages for farms by *principal source of income*.
9-10 averages (and % of total) for farms *by acreage and by income* [[without combination]]
11 and 12—nil.

The most interesting aspect of American statistics is the combination (even if not consistent) of the *three* groupings: by acreage, by income and by principal source of income.

A comparison of the groupings *by acreage* and by *income* (pp. 10 and 9 of the extracts) clearly shows the superiority of the *l a t t e r*.

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* *Twelfth Census*, 1900. *Census Reports*. Volume V, *Agriculture*. Washington, 1902.

Acre
(absolute

The United States

Income:	Number of *farms* 5,739,657	Under 3 41,882	3-10 226,564	10-20 407,012	20-50 1,257,785
$ 0	53,406	1,346	5,166	8,780	12,999
1-50	167,569	6,234	38,277	33,279	45,361
50-100	305,590	7,971	55,049	64,087	89,424
100-250	1,247,731	13,813	86,470	182,573	454,904
250-500	1,602,854	4,598	28,025	89,116	471,157
500-1,000	1,378,944	2,822	8,883	21,295	154,017
1,000-2,500	829,443	2,944	3,351	6,412	25,691
2,500 and over	154,120	2,154	1,343	1,470	4,232
$ 0-100	526,565	15,551	98,492	106,146	147,784
-1,000 and >	983,563	5,098	4,694	7,882	29,923
Rough % of low-income farms (0-100)	c: $9._1$	37	43	25	12
Rough % of high-income farms (1,000 and >)	$17._2$	13	2	$1._9$	2

age
figures)

50-100	100-175	175-260	260-500	500-1,000	1,000 and over
1,366,167	1,422,328	490,104	377,992	102,547	47,276
6,159	12,958	1,451	2,149	1,110	1,288
19,470	18,827	2,333	2,290	902	596
44,547	33,168	4,922	4,197	1,428	797
271,547	176,287	33,087	21,061	5,497	2,492
495,051	358,443	87,172	53,121	12,108	4,063
420,014	492,362	152,544	97,349	22,398	7,260
101,790	310,420	182,868	149,868	34,210	12,089
7,589	19,863	25,727	48,157	24,894	18,691
70,176	64,953	8,706	8,636	3,440	2,681
109,379	330,283	208,595	197,825	59,104	30,780

5	4	1.8	2.2	3	5
8	24	43	52	57	66

Comparison of the two main groupings (by acreage and income) is given in such tables: Per cent of the number of farms of specified values of products not fed to livestock:

	Per cent of all farms	0	1-50	50-100-	100-250-	250-500-	500-1,000-	1,000-2,500	2,500 and over		
All farms	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
Under 3	$0._7$	$2._5$	$3._7$	$2._6$	$1._1$	$0._3$	$0._2$	$0._4$	$1._4$		
3 and under 10	$4._0$	$9._7$	$\boxed{22._8}$	$18._0$	$6._9$	$1._7$	$0._6$	$0._4$	$0._9$		
10-20	$7._1$	$16._5$	$19._9$	$\boxed{21._0}$	$14._6$	$5._6$	$1._5$	$0._8$	$1._0$		
20-50	$21._9$	$\boxed{24._3}$	$27._1$	$\boxed{29._3}$	$\boxed{36._5}$	$2._4$	$11._2$	$3._1$	$2._7$		
50-100	$23._8$	$11._5$	$11._6$	$14._6$	$21._8$	$\boxed{30._9}$	$30._5$	$12._3$	$4._9$		
100-175	$24._8$	$24._3$	$11._2$	$10._8$	$14._1$	$22._4$	$\boxed{35._7}$	$\boxed{37._4}$	$12._9$		increase
175-260	$8._5$	$2._7$	$1._4$	$1._6$	$2._7$	$5._4$	$11._1$	$\boxed{22._0}$	$16._7$		
260-500	$6._6$	$4._0$	$1._4$	$1._4$	$1._7$	$3._3$	$7._1$	$18._0$	$\boxed{31._2}$	*maximum*	decrease
500-1,000	$1._8$	$2._1$	$0._5$	$0._5$	$0._4$	$0._8$	$1._6$	$4._1$	$16._2$		
1,000 and over	$0._8$	$2._4$	$0._4$	$0._2$	$0._2$	$0._2$	$0._5$	$1._5$	$12._1$		

	Groups of farms	Per cent of all farms	Per cent of the number of farms of specified acreage: Under 3	3-10	10-20	20-50	50-100	100-175	175-260	260-500	500-1,000	1,000 and over
Value of products not fed to livestock	0	$0._{9}$	$3._{2}$	$2._{3}$	$2._{2}$	$1._{0}$	$0._{5}$	$0._{9}$	$0._{3}$	$0._{6}$	$1._{1}$	$2._{7}$
	1-50	$2._{9}$	$14._{9}$	$16._{9}$	$8._{2}$	$3._{6}$	$1._{4}$	$1._{3}$	$0._{5}$	$0._{6}$	$0._{9}$	$1._{3}$
	50-100	$5._{3}$	$19._{0}$	$24._{3}$	$15._{7}$	$7._{1}$	$3._{3}$	$2._{4}$	$1._{0}$	$1._{1}$	$1._{4}$	$1._{7}$
	100-250	$21._{8}$	$33._{0}$	$38._{1}$	$44._{8}$	$36._{2}$	$19._{9}$	$12._{4}$	$6._{8}$	$5._{6}$	$5._{4}$	$5._{3}$
	250-500	$27._{9}$	$11._{0}$	$12._{4}$	$21._{9}$	$37._{5}$	$36._{2}$	$25._{2}$	$17._{8}$	$14._{0}$	$11._{8}$	$8._{6}$
	500-1,000	$24._{0}$	$6._{7}$	$3._{9}$	$5._{2}$	$12._{3}$	$30._{7}$	$34._{6}$	$31._{1}$	$25._{8}$	$21._{8}$	$15._{3}$
	1,000-2,500	$14._{5}$	$7._{0}$	$1._{5}$	$1._{6}$	$2._{0}$	$7._{4}$	$21._{8}$	$37._{3}$	$39._{6}$	$33._{3}$	$25._{6}$
	2,500 and over	$2._{7}$	$5._{2}$	$0._{6}$	$0._{4}$	$\boxed{0._{3}}$	$0._{6}$	$1._{4}$	$5._{2}$	$12._{7}$	$24._{3}$	$39._{5}$
	$\Sigma =$	$100._{0}$	$100._{0}$	→ decrease		minimum	→ increase				$100._{0}$	$100._{0}$
	Under 500	$58._{8}$										
	500-1,000	$24._{0}$	$6._{7}$	$3._{9}$	$5._{2}$	$12._{3}$	$30._{7}$	$34._{6}$	$31._{1}$	$25._{8}$	$21._{8}$	$15._{2}$
	1,000 and >	$17._{2}$	$12._{2}$	$2._{1}$	$2._{0}$	$2._{3}$	$8._{0}$	$23._{2}$	$42._{5}$	$52._{3}$	$57._{6}$	$65._{1}$

The text on page LXI gives valuable indications about *typical* farms by divisions

Divisions	Acreage	Gross income (not fed to livestock) $	Deriving its principle income from
North Atlantic	50-100	500-1,000	livestock or dairy produce
North Central	100-175	500-1,000	livestock or hay & grain
Western	100-175	500-1,000	” ” ” ” ”
South Atlantic	20-50	250-500	cotton
South Central	20-50	250-500	”

Сравнение трех группировок:

12

Значение выбранных экономических показателей	Процента к итогу (сумма показателей по району = 100)	По доходу (см. стр. 8) 3 фермы: крупнейшая	средняя	наименьшая	По количеству фермы (см. стр. 10) 2 фермы: крупнейшая	средняя	наименьшая	По специализации (см. стр. 9) 1 фермы: свиноводческая	средняя	крупнейшая
Общий размер хозяйства:	Число ферм	58,3	24,0	17,2	57,5	24,6	17,7	46,0	41,5	12,5
	Площадь земли	33,5	23,6	43,1	17,5	22,7	59,8	52,9	38,5	8,6
Размеры производства:	Размер валовой продукции	22,1	25,6	52,3	33,5	27,3	39,2	35,0	32,0	18,0
Уровень развития культуры: Интенсивность труда	Стоимость основных фондов и инвентаря	25,3	28,0	46,7	31,7	28,9	39,4	37,2	42,8	20,1
	Расходы на удобрения	22,1	26,1	44,8	41,9	25,7	32,4	36,5	31,8	31,7
Капиталоемкость производства:	Расходы на заработную плату	18,3	19,6	62,1	22,3	23,1	54,6	35,2	38,2	26,6

торговая культура

показатели удельного веса

показатели капиталоемкости

1910

% фер	57,0	23,8	18,2
% вл.	17,9	23,4	58,7
% зем	22,9	28,9	41,2

57,5 − 12,5 = 45,0

33,5 − 16,0 = 17,5

31,7 − 20,1 = 11,6

41,9 − 31,7 = 10,2

Page 12 of Lenin's manuscript,
"American Agricultural
Statistics".
Between May 5 (18), 1914
and December 29, 1915
(January 11, 1916)
Reduced

In *1900* there were *5 divisions*:

1)	North Atlantic = New England + Middle Atlantic	1910
2)	South Atlantic = idem	1910
3)	North Central = West + East North Central	”
4)	South Central = East + West South Central	”
5)	Western = Mountain + Pacific	”

Absolute figures

Principal source of income	Total number of farms	Farms classified: Under 3	3 and under 10	10 and under 20	20-50
The United States	5,739,657	41,882	226,564	407,012	1,257,785
Hay and grain	1,319,856	1,725	26,085	59,038	190,197
Vegetables	155,898	4,533	23,780	23,922	41,713
Fruits	82,176	1,979	10,796	13,814	22,604
Livestock	1,564,714	13,969	56,196	81,680	257,861
Dairy produce	357,578	5,181	15,089	20,502	59,066
Tobacco	106,272	397	5,827	12,317	26,957
Cotton	1,071,545	997	25,025	112,792	426,689
Rice	5,717	123	996	614	1,185
Sugar	7,344	50	345	629	2,094
Flowers & plants	6,159	3,764	1,387	492	355
Nursery products	2,029	121	262	307	429
Taro	441	171	141	47	31
Coffee	512	47	200	94	68
Miscellaneous	1,059,416	8,825	60,435	80,764	228,536
Total of underlined—highly capitalistic crops	724,126	16,366	58,823	72,738	154,502

(p. 18, table 3):

by acreage

50-100	100-175	175-260	260-500	500-1,000	1,000 and over
1,366,167	1,422,328	490,104	377,992	102,547	47,276
294,822	415,737	152,060	137,339	33,035	9,818
30,375	22,296	5,069	3,086	813	311
15,813	10,858	3,061	2,131	781	339
384,874	423,741	156,623	125,546	38,163	26,061
90,814	104,932	35,183	20,517	4,514	1,780
25,957	21,037	7,721	4,836	1,063	160
238,398	164,221	52,726	35,697	11,090	3,910
814	810	396	385	206	188
1,787	1,029	391	380	233	406
112	43	4	2	—	—
387	302	96	86	32	7
31	8	2	4	2	4
30	25	16	13	7	12
281,953	257,289	76,756	47,970	12,608	4,280
166,120	161,340	51,939	31,440	7,651	3,207

An extract from
for a general characteristic of grouping
%

The United States:	Hay & grain	Vege-tables	Fruits	Live-stock	Dairy-produce	Tobacco	Cotton
Number of farms	$23._0$	$2._7$	$1._4$	$27._3$	$6._2$	$1._9$	$18._7$
Number of acres in farms	$25._0$	$1._2$	$0._7$	$42._2$	$5._2$	$1._1$	$10._7$
Total value of farm property	$31._1$	$2._7$	$2._1$	$36._6$	$8._3$	$1._0$	$5._4$
Value of farms & improvements	$35._2$	$2._8$	$2._4$	$34._3$	$7._3$	$1._0$	$5._3$
Value of buildings	$24._8$	$3._5$	$2._4$	$33._7$	$12._0$	$1._5$	$4._8$
Value of implements & machinery	$28._7$	$2._8$	$1._9$	$30._9$	$9._4$	$1._1$	$6._2$
Value of livestock	$21._7$	$1._2$	$0._7$	$51._3$	$7._9$	$0._8$	6.1
Value of products	$26._6$	$2._8$	$2._0$	$32._8$	$7._5$	$1._7$	$12._2$
Amount expended for labour	*$27._4$*	*$4._5$*	*$4._1$*	$27._8$	*$10._3$*	*$1._5$*	$7._4$
Amount expended for fertilisers	$14._6$	$10._9$	$3._4$	$14._0$	$7._5$	$5._2$	$22._5$

Summary in 4 groups:

1) □ = crops with a great excess in % of expenditure for *capitalist* farms.
2) Cotton=special crops with *little* development of capitalism. omy forms; vestiges of slavery and its reproduction on a
3) Livestock—a minimum of capitalism.
4) Hay & grain="medium"+miscellaneous.

*) These, the most capitalist, crops are characterised by a age ($3._4$% of land with $6._3$% of the farms), and a use of ferti the land). And it is these crops that grew fastest over cereals increased=+$3._5$%, and under rice, +$78._3$%; tobacco

**) <=less than $0._1$%.

* This figure has been corrected to $45._0$ in the Fourth Russian edition of

Table 18 (p. 248)

by principal source of income

of total					Σ		By specialty of *farms*	
Rice	Sugar	Flowers and plants	Nursery products	Miscellaneous	Highly capitalistic	The same without dairy produce *)	medium (hay & grain + miscellaneous)	slightly capitalistic (livestock + cotton)
0.1	0.1	0.1	<**)	18.5	12.5	6.3	41.5	46.0
0.1	0.3	<	<	13.5	8.6	3.4	38.5	52.9
0.1	0.7	0.3	0.1	11.6	15.3	7.0	42.7	42.0
0.1	0.7	0.2	0.1	10.6	14.6	7.3	45.8	39.6
0.1	0.4	0.6	0.1	16.1	20.6	8.6	40.9	38.5
0.2	4.4	0.2	0.1	14.0	20.1	10.7	42.7	37.2
0.1	0.2	<	<	10.0	10.9	3.0	31.7	57.4
0.2	1.0	0.5	0.3	12.4	16.0	8.5	39.0	35.0*
0.5	*4.0*	*1.1*	0.6	10.8	26.6	16.3	38.2	35.2
0.1	3.8	0.8	0.2	17.2	31.7	24.2	31.8	36.5

labour over the % of land. In other words, these are strictly

Special economic relations (labour of Negroes, natural econ-
capitalist basis).

size of farm which is only about a little over *half* the aver-
lisers which is *7 times* the average (24.2% versus 3.4% of
the 10 years (1899-1909): in that period the total area under
+*17.5*%; sugar, +*62.6*%; vegetables, +*25.5*%, flowers, +*96.1*%.

Lenin's *Collected Works* (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 80).—*Ed.*

Average value of

	Land per		Implements & machinery per		All livestock per	
	farm	*acre*	*farm*	*acre*	*farm*	*acre*
The United States	2,285	15.59	133	0.90	536	3.66
Hay & grain	3,493	21.93	166	1.06	506	3.17
Vegetables	2,325	35.68	138	2.12	244	3.74
Fruits	3,878	51.82	175	2.34	251	3.35
Livestock	2,871	12.66	151	0.66	1,009	4.45
Dairy produce	2,669	22.05	201	1.66	676	5.58
Tobacco	1,214	13.47	77	0.85	235	2.61
Cotton	653	7.82	45	0.53	176	2.11
Rice	2,205	11.59	212	1.11	317	1.67
Sugar	12,829	35.30	4,582	12.61	957	2.63
Flowers	4,550	656.90	222	32.04	63	9.07
Nursery products	6,841	83.73	266	3.26	228	2.79
Taro	968	22.56	15	0.35	107	2.50
Coffee	3,083	22.48	63	0.46	160	1.16
Miscellaneous	1,317	12.33	101	0.94	291	2.73

The United States

$ Value of all farm property per farm	$ Value of all farm property per acre	%	Number of farms	
3,574	$24._{39}$	100	5,739,657	All farms
4,834	$30._{34}$	$23._{0}$	1,319,856	Hay & grain
3,508	$53._{85}$	$2._{7}$	155,898	Vegetables
5,354	$71._{54}$	$1._{4}$	82,176	Fruits
4,797	$21._{14}$	$27._{3}$	1,564,714	Livestock
4,736	$39._{12}$	$6._{2}$	357,578	Dairy
2,028	$22._{51}$	$1._{9}$	106,272	Tobacco
1,033	$12._{36}$	$18._{7}$	1,071,545	Cotton
3,120	$16._{40}$	$0._{1}$	5,717	Rice
20,483	$56._{36}$	$0._{1}$	7,344	Sugar
8,518	$1,229._{72}$	$0._{1}$	6,159	Flowers
9,436	$115._{49}$	less than	2,029	Nursery
1,276	$29._{73}$	$^{1}/_{10}$	441	Taro
3,775	$27._{53}$	per cent	512	Coffee
2,250	$21._{07}$	$18._{5}$	1,059,416	Miscellaneous

$\Sigma = 100._{0}$

Vegetables	$2._{7}$	Cereals	$23._{0}$
Fruits	$1._{4}$	Livestock	$27._{3}$
Milk	$6._{2}$	Miscellaneous	$18._{5}$
	$\Sigma = 10._{3}\%$		$68._{8}$
			+
		Cotton	$18._{7}$
			$87._{5}\%$
			+ special
			$12._{5}\%$ crops
			$100._{0}$

Farms classified by principal source of income. *)

The United States	Average expenditures for labour on farms in 1899 $		(all land) Number of acres in farms	(1899) Value of products not fed to livestock $	$ Average expenditures for fertilisers in 1899	Average acres improved land	Average *non-improved* land in farm
	per farm	*per acre*	Average *per farm*	Average *per farm*	*per acre*	*per farm*	
All farms	64	0.43	146.6	656	0.07	72.3	+ 74
Hay & grain	76	0.47	159.3	760	0.04	111.1	+ 48
Vegetables	106	1.62	65.1	665	0.59	33.8	+ 31
Fruits	184	2.46	74.8	915	0.30	41.6	+ 33
Livestock	65	0.29	226.9	788	0.02	86.1	+ 140
Dairy produce	105	0.86	121.9	787	0.09	63.2	+ 58
Tobacco	51	0.57	90.1	615	0.30	53.0	+ 37
Cotton	25	0.30	83.6	430	0.14	42.5	+ 41
Rice	299	1.57	190.3	1,335	0.07	80.9	+ 110
Sugar	1,985	5.46	363.4	5,317	0.77	140.5	+ 223
Flowers & plants	675	97.42	6.9	2,991	7.41	5.6	+ 1
Nursery products	1,136	13.91	81.7	4,971	0.84	67.7	+ 14
Taro	51	1.18	42.9	425	0.13	6.8	+ 36
Coffee	360	2.62	137.1	568	0.08	27.6	+ 110
Miscellaneous	37	0.35	106.8	440	0.08	46.5	+ 60

*) Page CXXVIII.

*The United States**:	Low income farms under $ 100	Non-capitalist farms Income < $ 500	Medium farms $ 500-1,000	Capitalist farms *) High-income farms $ 1,000 and >
Number of farms . . .	9.1	58.8	24.0	17.2
Number of acres in farms	5.1	33.3	23.6	43.1
Total value of farm property	2.5	23.7	26.1	50.2
Value of farm & improvements	2.3	22.0	25.8	52.2
Value of buildings . .	2.6	28.8	28.4	42.8
Value of implements & machinery	2.0	25.3	28.0	46.7
Value of livestock . . .	3.2	24.8	24.2	51.0
Value of products . . .	0.7	22.1	25.6	52.3
Amount expended for labour.	0.9	11.8	19.6	69.1
Amount expended for fertilisers	1.3	29.1	26.1	44.8

*) Farms with an income of > $1,000 must be as *capitalist*, because their expenditure for *labour* is high: $158-$786 per farm.

Farms with an income of under $500 must be regarded as *non-capitalist*, because their expenditure for *labour* is insignificant: under $18 per farm.

* The table was compiled by Lenin on the basis of the data in the table on pp. 436-37.—*Ed.*

% Table
Classification by value of products
$

The United States		Total	0
Number of farms			0.9
Number of acres in farms			1.8
Total value of farm property			0.7
Value of farm & improvements			0.6
Value of buildings			0.3
Value of implements & machinery			0.4
Value of livestock			1.4
Value of products			—
Amount expended for labour			0.3
Amount expended for fertilisers			0.2
Average expenditure for labour (p. CXXVIII, table, CXXII	$ per farm		24
	$ per acre		0.08
Average number of acres per farm		146.6	283.2
Average expenditures for fertilisers in 1899	$ per farm		2
	$ per acre		0.01
Value of all livestock	$ per farm	536	840
	$ per acre	3.66	2.97
Value of implements & machinery	$ per farm	133	54
	$ per acre	0.90	0.19
Average number of *improved* land per farm (acres)		72.3	33.4

18, p. 248)
of 1899 not fed to livestock

1-50	50-100	100-250	250-500	500-1,000	1,000-2,500	2,500 and >
2.9	5.3	21.8	27.9	24.0	14.5	2.7
1.2	2.1	10.1	18.1	23.6	23.2	19.9
0.6	1.2	6.6	14.6	26.1	33.3	16.9
0.6	1.1	6.0	13.7	25.8	34.9	17.3
0.7	1.6	8.6	17.6	28.4	31.5	11.3
0.5	1.1	6.9	16.4	28.0	30.9	15.8
0.6	1.2	6.8	14.8	24.2	29.3	21.7
0.1	0.6	5.9	15.5	25.6	32.0	20.3
0.2	0.4	2.5	7.9	19.6	35.9	33.2
0.2	0.9	7.9	19.9	26.1	27.0	17.8
4 0.06	4 0.08	7 0.11	18 0.19	52 0.36	158 0.67	786 0.72
62.3	58.6	67.9	94.9	143.8	235.0	1,087.8
1 0.01	2 0.03	3 0.05	7 0.07	10 0.07	18 0.08	63 0.06
111 1.78	118 2.01	167 2.46	284 3.00	539 3.75	1,088 4.63	4,331 3.98
24 0.38	28 0.48	42 0.62	78 0.82	154 1.07	283 1.21	781 0.72
18.2	20.0	29.2	48.2	84.0	150.5	322.3

Classification by

The United States	under 3	3 and under 10	10 and under 20	20 and under 50	50 and under 100	100 and under 175
Number of farms	0.7	4.0	7.1	21.9	23.8	24.8
Number of acres in farms	—	0.2	0.7	4.9	11.7	22.9
Total value of farm property	0.4	1.2	2.1	7.9	16.6	27.9
Value of farm & improvements	0.2	0.9	1.8	7.2	16.0	28.1
Value of buildings	0.8	2.7	3.6	10.7	20.4	28.9
Value of implements & machinery	0.3	1.2	2.2	9.0	19.0	28.9
Value of livestock	1.2	0.8	1.5	7.0	14.4	25.6
Value of products	0.7	1.2	2.5	10.8	18.3	27.3
Amount expended for labour	0.9	1.1	1.8	6.2	12.3	23.5
Amount expended for fertilisers	0.4	1.5	3.4	14.9	21.7	25.7
Expenditures for labour — per farm	77	18	16	18	33	60
Expenditures for labour — per acre	40.30	2.95	1.12	0.55	0.46	0.45
Average number of acres — per farm	1.9	6.2	14.0	33.0	72.2	135.5
Value of products not fed to livestock, average per farm	592	203	236	324	503	721
Expenditures for fertilisers — per farm	4	4	5	7	9	10
Expenditures for fertilisers — per acre	2.36	0.60	0.33	0.20	0.12	0.07
Value of all livestock — per farm	867	101	116	172	326	554
Value of all livestock — per acre	456.76	16.32	8.30	5.21	4.51	4.09
Value of implements & machinery — per farm	53	42	41	54	106	155
Value of implements & machinery — per acre	27.57	6.71	2.95	1.65	1.47	1.14
Improved land — per farm	1.7	5.6	12.6	26.2	49.3	83.2

Rough estimate:

In 1910, $45._9$% of the farms used hired labour. From 1900 to 1910, the number of hired labourers increased by (*roughly*) 27-48%.

Assuming that in 1900, *40*% of the farms used hired labour.

Take 40% of the medium, $24._8 \times 40\% = 9._{92}$. About *10*%.

Take $2._5$ times less from the small farms: $40 \div {}^5/_2 = \frac{80}{5} = 16$; $57._5 \times 16 = 9._2 = 9\%$.

Take 3 times more from the big farms: $40 \times 3 = 120\%$; $17._7 \times 120 = 21._{24}\%$. 9%—10%—21%.

area in acres					Amalgamation (by acreage)				
175 and under 260	260 and under 600	500 and under 1,000	1,000 and over	Total	Under 20	All under 100 acres	100-175	175 and >	
8.5	6.6	1.8	0.8		11.8	57.5	24.8	17.7	Number of farms
12.3	15.4	8.1	23.8		0.9	17.5	22.9	59.6	Land
15.1	15.3	5.9	7.6		3.7	28.2	27.9	43.9	Value of land
15.9	16.4	6.1	7.4		2.9	26.1	28.1	45.8	
13.9	12.0	4.0	3.0		7.1	38.2	28.9	32.9	
13.6	13.1	5.1	7.6		3.7	31.7	28.9	39.4	Implements & machinery
13.3	15.2	7.0	14.0		3.5	24.9	25.6	49.5	
13.7	13.6	5.2	6.7		4.4	33.5	27.3	39.2	Value of products
14.6	17.1	8.8	13.7		3.8	22.3	23.5	54.2	Expenditures for labour and fertilisers
12.5	10.0	4.2	5.7		5.3	41.9	25.7	32.4	
109	166	312	1,059						
0.52	0.48	0.47	0.25						
210.8	343.1	661.9	4,237.3	146.6					
1,054	1,354	1,913	5,334	656					
14	15	22	66	10					
0.07	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.07					
834	1,239	2,094	9,101	536					
3.96	3.61	3.16	2.15	3.66					
211	263	377	1,222	133					
1.00	0.77	0.57	0.29	0.90					
129.0	191.4	287.5	520.0	72.3					

Approximate:

((1900: || 22.3 || 23.5 || 54.2 [% of expenditure for labour] × 40

$9.0 + 9.4 + 21.6 = 40\%$

About: $11 + 12.3 + 17.7 = 40$

Comparison of the

1900

(Political-economic) significance of respective figures:	Per cent of total (total of three figures in horizontal rows=100)		By income [see p. 9] farms: Non-capitalist (<$500 of income)	Medium ($500-1,000)	Capitalist (1,000 and >)
Common and basic figures:		Number of farms	58.8	24.0	17.2
		Acreage	33.3	23.6	43.1
Scale of production:	Scale of production	Value of product	22.1	25.6	52.3
Level of farming; machinery, care of the land	Constant capital	Value of implements and machinery	25.3	28.0	46.7
		Expenditures for fertilisers	29.1	26.1	44.8
Capitalist character of enterprise	Variable capital	Expenditures for hired labour	11.3	19.6	69.1

1910

% of farms

% of all land

implements and machinery

* See p. 435.—*Ed.*

three groupings:

2 By acreage [see p. 10]* farms: Small (under 100 acres)	Medium (100-175)	Large (175 and >)	1 By principal source of income [see p. 6]** farms: Slightly capitalist (livestock and cotton)	Medium (hay and grain—miscellaneous)	Highly capitalist (spec. crops)		*Commercial* crops
$57._5$	$24._8$	$17._7$	$46._0$	$41._5$	$12._5$	1	Index of extensiveness of enterprise
$17._5$	$22._9$	$59._6$	$52._9$	$38._5$	$8._6$	2	
$33._5$	$27._3$	$39._2$	$35._0$***	$39._0$	$16._0$	6	
$31._7$	$28._9$	$39._4$	$37._2$	$42._7$	$20._1$	3	Index of intensiveness of enterprise
$41._9$	$25._7$	$32._4$	$36._5$	$31._8$	$31._7$	4	
$22._3$	$23._5$	$54._2$	$35._2$	$38._2$	$26._6$	5	
$58._0$	$23._8$	$18._2$					
$17._9$	$23._4$	$58._7$					
$29._9$	$28._9$	$41._2$					

$57._5 - 12._5 = 45._0$
$33._5 - 16._0 = 17._5$
$31._7 - 20._1 = 11._6$
$41._9 - 31._7 = 10._2$

* See p. 439.—*Ed.*
** See p. 431.—*Ed.*
*** In the Fourth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 80) the figure has been corrected to $45._0$.—*Ed.*

Thirteenth Census of the United States, taken in the

Three main sections of the United States	All *farmland* mill *acres*	%	Total population: (mill.) *1910*	%	(mill.) *1900*	%	1900-1910 % of pop. increase	Urban population (mill.) 1900	1910	1900-1910 % of increase
	(p. 30, table 2)									
The North	587.3	30.9	55.8	60.6	47.4	62.3	17.7	32.7	25.2	29.8
The South	562.1	29.5	29.4	32.0	24.5	32.3	19.8	6.6	4.7	41.4
The West	753.4	39.6	6.8	7.4	4.1	5.4	66.8	3.3	1.7	89.6
The U.S.A.	1,903.3	100.0	92.0	100.0	76.0	100.0	21.0	42.6	31.6	34.8

	Improved land in farms (mill. acres) *1910*	*1900*	% of increase	% of improved land (1910)	% of land in farms to total acreage *1910*	*1900*	% of improved land in farms *1910*	% of improved land to total acreage *1900*
					(p. 34, table 3)			
The North	290	261	10.9	60.6	70.4	65.1	70.1	49.3
The South	150	126	19.5	31.5	63.1	64.4	42.5	26.8
The West	38	27	39.8	7.9	14.7	12.4	34.2	5.0
The U.S.A.	478	414	15.4	100.0	46.2	44.1	54.4	25.1

year 1910. Volume V. Agriculture. Washington 1913

Rural population (mill.) 1900	1910	1900-1910 % of increase	% of urban population (1910)	Number of farms ('000) *1910*	*1900*	% of increase	All land in farms (mill. acres) *1910*	% of increase *1900*	
23.1	22.2	3.9	58.6	2,891	2,874	0.6	414	383	8.0
22.7	19.9	14.8	22.5	3,097	2,620	18.2	354	362	—2.1
3.5	2.3	49.7	48.8	373	243	53.7	111	94	18.2
49.3	44.4	11.2	46.3	6,361	5,737	10.9	879	839	4.8

(p. 37, t. 4) Average acreage per farm all land: *1910*	*1900*	% of increase	improved land: *1910*	*1900*	% of increase	(p. 42, t. 7) Value or all farm property ($ mill.) 1910	1900	% of increase	Value of land and buildings ($ mill.) 1910	1900	% of increase
143.0	133.2	7.4	100.3	90.9	10.3	27,481	14,455	80.1	23,650	12,041	96.4
114.4	138.2	—17.2	48.6	48.1	1.0	8,972	4,270	110.1	7,353	3,279	124.3
296.9	386.1	—23.1	101.7	111.8	—9.0	4,538	1,715	164.7	3,798	1,295	193.4
138.1	146.2	—5.5	75.2	72.2	4.2	40,991	20,440	100.5	34,801	16,615	109.5

	Value of land ($ mill.)			Value of buildings ($ mill.)			Value of implements and machinery ($ mill.)			Value of livestock ($ mill.)		
	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+
The North	19,129	9,369	104.2	4,521	2,672	69.2	856	517	65.6	2,975	1,897	56.8
The South	5,926	2,562	131.3	1,427	717	99.0	293	180	62.9	1,325	811	63.5
The West	3,420	1,127	203.6	377	167	125.0	116	53	119.0	625	367	70.1
The U.S.A.	28,475	13,058	118.1	6,325	3,556	77.8	1,265	750	68.7	4,925	3,075	60.1

Value ($ mlll.)

	p. 538, t. *8*	p. 476, p. 494, page 507, p. 517, p. 520, t. *3* t. *21* t. *33* t. *41* t. *45*						(My figure)	(My figures all farm products (α+β)
	of all crops (α)	of dairy products (1)	of wool	of poultry	of eggs	of honey and wax	of all domestic animals sold or slaughtered	all livestock products (β)	
	1909	*1909*	*1909*	*1909*	*1909*	*1909*	*1909*	1909	1909
The North	3,120	477	23	129	205	3	1,258	2,095	5,215
The South	1,922	114	6	61	75	2	414	672	2,594
The West	445	57	36	12	26	1	161	293	738
The U.S.A.	5,487	648	65	202	306	6	1,833	3,060	8,547

The same data ($ mlll.) but for 1899

		(2)					
The North	1,812	346	18	90	103	3	? data not comparable (p. 520)
The South	989	97	4	40	32	2	
The West	198	29	23	6	9	1	
The U.S.A.	2,999	472	45	136	144	6	

	p. 560, t. *24*	Average expenditures per acre improved land in farms for				
		labour		fertilisers		% of increase in expenditure for *labour*
	% of farms reporting expenditure for labour	*1909*	*1899*	*1909*	*1899*	
The North	55.1	1.26	0.82	0.13	0.09	+ 70.8
The South	36.6	1.13	0.69	0.50	0.23	+ 87.1
The West	52.5	3.25	2.07	0.06	0.04	+ 119.0
The U.S.A.	45.9	1.36	0.86	0.24	0.13	+ 82.3 p.t.o.* . . .

Note: (1) The original give Σ = 656. But this is wrong. Exclud

* See pp. 482-83.—*Ed.*

(p. 43, t. 8) Average value of farm property per acre of land in farms ($ and %)

All farm property			Land			Buildings			Implements and machinery			Livestock		
1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	%+
66.46	37.77	76.0	46.26	24.48	89.0	10.93	6.98	56.6	2.07	1.35	53.3	7.20	4.96	45.2
25.31	11.79	114.7	16.72	7.08	136.2	4.03	1.98	103.5	0.83	0.50	66.0	3.74	2.24	67.0
40.93	18.28	123.9	30.86	12.01	157.0	3.40	1.79	89.9	1.04	0.56	85.7	5.63	3.92	43.6
46.64	24.37	91.4	32.40	15.57	108.1	7.20	4.24	69.8	1.44	0.89	61.8	5.60	3.67	52.6

p. 540, t. 10

Percentage of value of all crops (1909)

value of all crops %	crops with acreage reported	cereals	hay and forage	tobacco and cotton	vegetables	fruits and nuts	Σ of foregoing
100	93.7	*62.6*	18.8	0.9	7.5	3.3	93.1
100	92.8	29.3	5.1	*46.8*	7.5	2.6	91.3
100	82.2	33.1	31.7	0.0	8.5	*15.5*	88.8
100	92.5	48.6	15.0	16.9	7.6	4.0	92.1

(p. 513, t. 12).

Percentage of improved farmland (1909)

100	67.8	*46.2*	18.8	0.1	1.5	0.1	86.7
100	63.3	32.1	5.7	*21.9*	1.5	0.1	61.3
100	51.4	24.1	*24.2*	0.0	1.4	0.1	49.8
100	65.1	40.0	15.1	7.0	1.5	0.1	63.7

ing (N.B.) home consumption—(2) Including home consumption

The *United States*	(p. 97, t. 1) Farm tenure. Number of farms ('000) 1910	1900	%+	(p. 99, t. 3) Average acreage per farm 1910	1900	%+	Average improved acreage per farm 1910	1900	%+
All classes	6,361	5,737	10.9	138.1	146.2	— 5.5	75.2	72.2	4.2
Farms operated by	3,949	3,653	8.1	151.6	152.2	— 0.4	78.5	76.2	3.0
Owners: owning entire farm	3,355	3,202	4.8	138.6	134.7	2.9	69.7	69.2	0.7
Owners: leasing additional land	594	451	31.6	225.0	276.4	—18.6	128.1	125.7	1.9
Managers	58	59	—1.7	924.7	1,481.2	—37.6	211.9	184.6	14.8
Tenants	2,354	2,025	16.3	96.2	96.3	— 0.1	66.4	61.9	7.3
Tenants: share tenants	1,528	1,273	20.0	93.2	92.4	0.9	69.1	65.0	6.3
Tenants: cash tenants	826	752	9.9	101.7	102.9	— 1.2	61.3	56.7	8.1

(p. 105, t. 7) % distribution of farms (Σ of vertical columns=100)	The United States 1910	1900	The North 1910	1900	The South 1910	1900	The West 1910	1900	p. 106, t. 9 Average The North (α) 1910	1900	(β) 1910	1900
Owners	62.1	63.7	72.4	72.6	49.9	52.3	83.8	80.3	139.8	133.0	93.9	88.1
Managers	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.5	0.7	2.2	3.1	301.7	340.9	163.5	152.0
Tenants	37.0	35.3	26.5	26.2	49.6	47.0	14.0	16.6	144.9	124.5	115.0	96.1

(p. 102, t. 6)	Number of farms ('000) 1910	1900	1890	1880	% of farms 1910	1900	1890	1880
Owners and managers	4,007	3,712	3,270	2,384	63.0	64.7	71.6	74.4
Tenants	2,354	2,025	1,295	1,025	37.0	35.3	28.4	25.6
share	1,528	1,273	840	702	24.0	22.2	18.4	17.5
cash	826	752	455	323	13.0	13.1	10.0	8.0
Σ =	6,361	5,737	4,565	4,009	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(p. 141, t. 27 The *U.S.A.*	Number of farms ('000) reporting domestic animals *1910*	*1900*
Total	6,035	5,498
Owners	3,794	3,535
Managers	52	54
Tenants	2,189	1,909

* This was later pencilled in by Lenin. A separate sheet containing Leninism under the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.—*Ed.*

(p. 115, t. 19) Number of farms ('000) and % + (—)

	The North			*The South*			*The West*		
	1910	1900	%+	1910	1900	+%	1910	1900	%+
Total	2,891	2,874	0.6	3,097	2,620	18.2	373	243	53.7
Owners	2,091	2,088	+0.1	1,544	1,370		312	195	
Owners	1,749	1,794	—2.5	1,329	1,237	7.5	276	171	61.9
Part owners	342	294	16.5	215	133	61.5	36	24	49.8
Managers	34	33	2.9	16	19	—13.2	8	8	7.3
Tenants	766	753		1,537	1,231		53	40	
Share tenants	483	479	0.6	1,021	772	32.2	25	21	14.7
Cash tenants	283	274	3.3	516	459	12.3	28	19	47.7

acreage per farm (α) all land (β) improved land

The South				The West			
(α)		(β)		(α)		(β)	
1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
149.3	162.8	56.4	55.4	241.5	282.8	84.5	94.5
1,514.7	2,734.1	198.6	169.4	2,323.2	3,303.9	439.1	363.2
64.5	71.2	39.3	38.1	313.1	337.4	151.5	148.3

% of farms with livestock to all farms		(p. 145, t. 28) Farms with horses ('000)		% of farms with horses (my calculation)		(My calculation from Divisions, p. 145, t. 28) Number of farms with horses ('000)					
1910	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*	The North		The South		The West	
my calculation						1910	1900	1910	1900	1900	1900
94.9—95.8		4,693	4,531	73.8	79.0	.2,600	2,620	1,771	1,694	320	217
96.1—96.7		3,216	3,107	81.5	85.0	..1,873	1,901	1,075	1,032	267	175
89.6—91.7		46	48	79.3	81.3	... 29	28	11	14	7	6
92.9—94.2		1,431	1,376	60.7	67.9	.. 698	691	685	648	46	36
						..					
% of farms with horses (my calculation)*						%	%	%	%	%	%
Total owners						89.9	91.1	57.1	64.6	85.9	89.3
managers						89.6	91.0	69.6	75.2 —5.6		
tenants						91.1	91.8	44.6	52.7 —8.1	86.8	90.0

these calculations is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-

(p. 158, t. 1)	*Mortgaged farms*		
	1910	*1900*	*1890*
Number of farms *owned* . .	3,948,722	3,638,403	3,142,746
Number of farms mortgaged .	1,327,439	1,127,749	886,957
%	$33._6$	$31._0$	$28._2$

% of mortgaged farms p. 160	The North	$41._9$	$40._9$	$40._3$
	The South	$23._5$	$17._2$	$5._7$
	The West	$28._6$	$21._7$	$23._1$

Number of mortgaged farms	1,006,511		886,957
Value of land and buildings	6,330	$ mill.	3,055
Total debt	1,726	” ”	1,086
% of debt to value	*$27._3$%*		*$35._5$%*

With reference to this increase in the proportion of farms mortgaged, it should be borne in mind that the fact of mortgage debt is not necessarily an indication of lack of prosperity. There
? can be no question that American farmers generally were more prosperous in 1910 than at the two preceding censuses. The percentage of mortgaged farms is said to be highest in the most prosperous states, such as Iowa and Wisconsin. In some cases a farm is mortgaged out of need, in others for improvements, etc. (p. 158).

The breaking-up of certain plantations into small
N.B. farms—farms owned by their operators but mortgaged for part of the purchase price—probably also has had something to do with the increase in the proportion of farms mortgaged in the South (p. 159).

The number of farms owned by *Negroes* (coloured people in general, but these are mostly Negroes)=*920,883* (=14.$_5$%) (1910), including only *17,884* in the North, and *12,858*, in the West. In the *South*, there are *890,141*, including owners—*218,467*, tenants, *670,474*, managers, *1,200*.

Thus, in the South, the Whites have more owners than tenants, and the Negroes, vice versa.

In 1900, the Negroes had 767,764 farms (including 740,670 in the *South*). Consequently, the number of Negro farms increased by +*19.$_6$*%, and White farms, by +*9.$_5$*%.

The total farm acreage increased in White farms by +4.$_4$% and in Negro farms, +11.$_7$%.

Improved land in farms increased: White, +15.$_2$%, Negro, +19.$_5$%.

Value of all farm property increased: White, +99.$_6$%, Negro, +134.$_0$%.

The South	Farmers: White *1910*	White *1900*	Negro *1910*	Negro *1900*	Average farm acreage White 1910	White 1900	Negro 1910	Negro 1900
Total	100	100	100	100	141.$_3$	172.$_1$	47.$_9$	52.$_1$
Owners	60.$_1$	63.$_0$	24.$_5$	25.$_2$	162.$_1$	177.$_2$	71.$_8$	71.$_6$
Managers	0.$_7$	0.$_9$	0.$_1$	0.$_2$	1,612.$_1$	2,962.$_8$	291.$_5$	269.$_0$
Tenants	39.$_2$	36.$_1$	75.$_3$	74.$_6$	83.$_8$	92.$_5$	39.$_6$	44.$_9$

In the *South*, the White *share-tenants* increased from 492,000 to 637,000 (+29.$_5$%) and Negro, from 281,000 to 384,000 (+37.$_0$%)

Quantity and value of livestock on White and Negro farms.
Total farms in the U.S.A. (p. 248)

		Number	Value $
Dairy cows	White	19,655,747	683,996,175
	Negro	969,685	22,240,132
Horses	White	16,780,511	1,903,652,666
	Negro	649,907	54,942,151
Mules	White	3,133,740	413,530,751
	Negro	653,576	84,451,579

Concerning the role, importance and place of *tenants* vis-à-vis *owners*:

Tenant farmers reported a much larger proportion of the value of land than of the value of buildings, implements & machinery, or livestock. This is largely due to the fact that tenant farmers in general are less well-to-do than farm owners and are less able to furnish their farms with expensive equipment (pp. 100-01). The average for the United States (1910) shows: the value of owners' land = $66._8$% of all property, and that of "tenants" = $74._9$% (p. 101, Table 5).

Concerning the owners of farms leased, the authors (p. 102) refer to the inquiry during the 1900 Census, when the *names* of owners of tenant farms were studied. They say there was no concentration or "absentee landlordism". The owners of leased farms are for the most part former tenants "who have either retired altogether, gone into other business, or taken up farms in newer sections of the country".

"In the South the conditions have at all times been somewhat different from those in the North, and many of the tenant farms are parts of plantations of considerable size which date from before the Civil War." In the South, "the system of operation by tenants—chiefly coloured tenants—has succeeded the system of operation by slave labour" (102).* || N.B. || N.B.

Concerning rent:

> The development of the tenant system is most conspicuous in the South, where the large plantations formerly operated by slave labour have in many cases been broken up into small parcels or tracts and leased to tenants. As more fully explained in Chapter I, these plantations are in

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 26.—*Ed.*

N.B. many cases still operated substantially as agricultural units, the tenants being subjected to a degree of supervision more or less similar to that which hired farm labourers are subjected to in the North" (p. 104).

N.B. "A very low proportion of tenant farms is ... shown for the Mountain and Pacific divisions, where it is doubtless attributable mainly to the fact that those divisions have been only recently settled and that many of the farmers in them are homesteaders who have obtained their land from the Government" (p. 104). *N.B.*

The whole Chapter II ("Farm tenure") does not contain any analysis of the causes of the *growth* (respective decrease) in the *number of owners* of land. These authors are bourgeois scum: they gloss over the most important thing (expropriation of the small farmers)!!

Growth of rural population (1900-10)	+ 11.$_2$%	
" number of farms	+ 10.$_9$%	(less)
" " owners	+ 8.$_1$%	(still less)

An obvious increase in expropriation!!

But the increase is even more evident if we take the *North*, the *South* and the *West*.

The total number of farms has gone up from 5,737,372 to 6,361,502, i.e., by *624,130* (p. 114, Table 18), i.e., by 10.$_9$ per cent. But in the *North* the increase is only 0.6% (+16,545 farms!!). This is stagnation. Moreover, there was also an absolute *reduction* in the number of farms in three out of the four divisions of the North, namely, New England, Middle Atlantic and East. In North Central, there was an *absolute drop in the number of farms* (by 32,000). **Only** in West North Central was there an increase by *49*,000 (hence, in Σ = +16,500). But West North Central includes states like the two Dakotas, Nebraska and Kansas, where homesteading is still extensive (see *Statistical Abstract*, p. 28).

In general, the number of owners in the entire North:

1900—2,088,000
1910—2,091,000
+3,000 = $0._1$%!!!

	The entire North owners:	part owners:
1900	1,794,216	293,612
1910	1,749,267	342,167
	—44,949	+48,555

Thus, there was a **reduction** in the number of owners!! The number of *part* owners went up!!

And this same North had 60% of all the improved land in the United States (1910)!!

In this North, the acreage of improved land increased by 10.9%, from 261 million to 290 million acres!!

In the *West*, the growth in the number of farms and the number of owners is understandable: the country is being settled, and there is a growing number of *homesteads* (see *Statistical Abstract*, p. 28 and the above quotation from p. *104*, p. *3* of these extracts).*

And the *South??* Share tenants (*mostly* Negroes) there mainly (1) account for the growth in the number of farms. This means greater exploitation of the Negroes. Then (2), there is a growing number of *owners*. Why?? Apparently it is due to the parcellisation of the *plantations*. P. 265 (Table 8) shows that the acreage in the 1,000-and->acre farms in the United States fell by 30,702,109 acres (—$15._5$%), including +2,321,975 in the *North*, and—1,206,872 in the West. Nearly the whole falls to the *South—31,817,212* (—$27._3$%). And this same South accounts, out of the total increase in the number

* See p. 451.—*Ed.*

of farms (+624,130), for +477,156*) (i.e., the bulk, about ¾), with a growing number of small farms:

under 20	acres	+ 115,192
20-49	”	+ 191,793
50-99	”	+ 111,690
		Σ = 418,675

The essence is the disintegration of the slave-holding plantations!!

The *South* (number of farms)

	White farmers	coloured
1910	2,207,406	890,141
1900	1,879,721	740,670

with the Whites having more owners than tenants. and the coloured *vice versa*.

*) 1910: 3,097,547
1900: 2,620,391
+477,156

	(p. 257, t. 1) Number of farms		(My abbreviation) Idem ('000)		(p. 309, t. 18) Number of farms with horses	
	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
Total	6,361,502	5,737,372	6,361	5,738	4,692,814	4,530,628
Under 20 acres	839,166+	673,870	839	674	408,60+	373,269
20-49	1,414,376+	1,257,496	1,415	1,258	811,538—	834,241
50-99	1,438,069+	1,366,038	1,438	1,366	1,116,415—	1,123,750
100-174 . . .	1,516,286+	1,422,262	1,516	1,422	1,302,086+	1,260,090
175-499 . . .	978,175+	868,020	978	868	890,451+	798,760
500-999 . . .	125,295+	102,526	125	103	116,556+	96,087
1,000 and over	50,135+	47,160	50	47	47,167+	44,431

(p. 257, t. 1)	Increase in number of farms (1900-1910)		(p. 257, t. 1) All land in farms (acres)			
	increase	%	1910	1900	increase	%
Total	624,130	10.9	878,798,325	838,591,774	40,206,551	4.8
Under 20 acres	165,296	24.5	8,793,820	7,180,839	1,612,981	22.5
20-49	156,880	12.5	45,378,449	41,536,128	3,842,321	9.3
50-99	72,031	5.3	103,120,868	98,591,699	4,529,169	4.6
100-174 . . .	94,024	6.6	205,480,585	192,680,321	12,800,264	6.6
175-499 . . .	110,155	12.7	265,289,069	232,954,515	32,334,554	13.9
500-999 . . .	22,769	22.2	83,653,487	67,864,116	15,789,371	23.3
1,000 and over	2,975	6.3	167,082,047	197,784,156	—30,702,109	—15.5

*) On the question of horse ownership, it should be noted not make up for the decrease in farms with horses. This The *South* showed the *greatest growth*—1900:1,155,000; 1910: growth in the number of farms reporting mules fails to make

(My abbreviation) *)				(p. 257, t. 2)							
				% of total							
Idem ('000)		% of farms with horses		Number of farms		All land in farms		Improved land in farms		% of improved land in farms	
1910	1900	*1910*	*1900*	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
4,693	4,531	73.8	79.0	100	100	100	100	100	100	54.4	49.4
409	373	48.9	52.4	13.2+	11.7	1.0+	0.9	1.7+	1.6	90.9	89.7
812	834	57.4	66.3	22.2+	21.9	5.2+	5.0	7.6—	8.0	80.6	79.4
1,116	1,124	77.6	82.2	22.6—	23.8	11.7—	11.8	14.9—	16.2	69.0	68.3
1,302	1,260	86.5	88.6	23.8—	24.8	23.4+	23.0	26.9—	28.6	62.7	61.4
890	799	91.0	92.0	15.4+	15.1	30.2+	27.8	33.8+	32.7	61.0	58.2
117	96	93.2	93.7	2.0+	1.8	9.5+	8.1	8.5+	7.1	48.8	43.4
47	45	94.1	94.2	0.8=	0.8	19.0—	23.6	6.5+	5.9	18.7	12.3

(ibidem)				% increase		Increase or decrease of share	
Improved land in farms (acres)							
1910	1900	increase	%	Number of *farms*	Improved *land*	Improved land	Number of farms
478,451,750	414,498,487	63,953,263	15.4				
7,991,543	6,440,447	1,551,096	24.1	24.5	24.1—	+	+
36,596,032	33,000,734	3,595,298	10.9	12.5	10.9—	—	—
71,155,246	67,344,759	3,810,487	5.7	5.3	5.7+	—	—
128,853,538	118,390,708	10,462,830	8.8	6.6	8.8+	—	—
61,775,502	135,530,043	26,245,459	19.4	12.7	19.4+	+	+
40,817,118	29,474,642	11,342,476	38.5	22.2	38.5++	+	+
31,262,771	24,317,154	6,945,617	28.6	6.3	28.6++	+	+

that the growth in the number of farms reporting mules does
growth=1900:1,480,652 (=25.8%); 1910:1,869,005 (=29.4%).
1,478,000, i.e., 1900—44.1%; 1910—47.7%. There, too, the
up for the increase in the number of horseless farms.

The authors give *no* valid reasons for their grouping. "Government land has for the most part been sold approximately that amount" (p. 257).

N.B. "As judged by improved acreage, which is probably less than 20 acres) are becoming of relatively less impor- This is the normal result of the fact that the very large the country, where agriculture is developing most rapidly" a relatively *greater* growth of the *share* of the big farms

	The North								The	
	Per cent of total						% of improved land in farms		Per cent	
	Number of farms		All land in farms		Improved land				Number of farms	
	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
Σ	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	70.1	68.3	100.0	100.0
< 20	9.5+	8.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	86.1	86.3	16.2	14.7
20-49	13.9—	16.0	3.3	4.2	3.6	4.7	76.2	76.2	30.9	29.2
50-99	24.2—	26.3	12.5	14.6	13.5	16.0	75.3	74.6	22.4	22.3
100-174	29.5+	29.0	28.1	—29.7	29.3	—31.6	73.2	72.6	18.1	—19.8
175-499	20.2+	18.0	38.1	36.0	39.8	37.3	73.1	70.5	10.4	11.6
500-999	2.2+	1.6	10.3	7.9	9.0	6.6	60.8	56.9	1.3	1.6
1,000 & >	0.5+	0.4	6.9	6.9	4.1	3.1	41.1	30.5	0.7	0.9

	(ctd)		Increase from 1900 to 1910: (absolute							
	The West		The North						The	
	% of improved land in farms		Number of farms		All land in farms		Improved land in farms		Number of farms	
	1910	1900	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%
Σ	34.2	29.0	16.5	0.6	30,725	8.0	28,573	10.9	477.2	18.2
< 20	87.3	85.0	25.1	10.0	116	4.8	95	4.5	115.2	29.9
20-49	73.9	71.4	—57.9	—12.6	—2,295	—14.2	—1,743	—14.2	191.8	25.1
50-99	62.2	57.4	55.2	—7.3	—4,072	—7.3	—2,708	—6.5	111.7	19.2
100-174	37.1	38.5	18.1	+2.2	2,503	2.2	2,435	2.9	42.7	8.2
175-499	43.4	46.7	65.9	12.7	19,720	14.3	17,966	18.5	18.6	6.1
500-999	46.6	44.1	18.5	40.4	12,430	40.9	8,756	50.6	—0.8	—2.0
1,000 & >	22.9	17.2	2.1	16.4	2,322	8.8	3,773	47.0	—2.0	—8.8

N.B. only:
or otherwise disposed of in quarter sections of *160* acres or N.B.

the best standard, the smaller farms (excepting those of
tance and the large farms of relatively greater importance.
farms are found for the most part in the newer sections of N.B.
(p. 258). This last explanation is wrong, for we find
in such *old* divisions as New England and Middle Atlantic.

South of total						The West Per cent of total					
All land in farms		Improved land		% of improved land in farms		Number of farms		All land in farms		% of improved land in farms	
1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	42.5	34.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1.6	1.2	3.5	3.2	93.3	91.9	16.7	15.5	0.5	0.4	1.2	1.0
8.4	6.7	16.4	15.8	83.1	82.0	15.3	14.0	1.6	1.2	3.6	2.9
13.6	11.2	20.0	19.4	62.7	60.2	11.8	11.7	2.9	2.2	5.3	4.4
20.8+	18.9	25.3+	25.2	51.6	46.4	27.5—	28.6	14.0+	11.3	15.2+	15.0
24.0	22.2	24.4	24.9	43.2	39.1	19.5	19.4	20.2	15.6	25.7	25.2
7.6	7.5	5.5	6.1	30.9	28.1	5.3	6.1	12.4	11.0	16.9	16.7
23.9	32.2	4.8	5.4	8.5	5.9	3.9	4.8	48.3	58.4	32.3	34.8

figures = 1,000 farms or acres)

South				The West					
All land in farms		Improved land in farms		Number of farms		All land in farms		Improved land in farms	
absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%
—7,583	—2.1	24,583	19.5	130.4	53.7	17,065	18.2	10,797	39.8
1,301	29.5	1,278	31.5	24.9	66.5	195	58.8	178	63.3
5,406	22.2	4,772	23.9	23.0	67.5	731	66.8	566	72.6
7,497	18.5	5,731	23.5	15.5	54.8	1,104	52.5	787	65.2
5,351	7.8	6,345	20.0	33.2	47.8	4,945	46.8	1,683	41.4
4,796	6.0	5,369	17.1	25.7	54.6	7,818	53.5	2,911	42.6
—118	—0.4	712	9.3	5.1	34.5	3,478	33.8	1,874	41.3
—31,817	—27.3	375	5.5	2.9	25.3	—1,207	—2.2	2,797	29.6

Three main groups clearly stand out (see + and — for **the United States**): small farms (under 49 acres), medium (50-174) and large (175 and >). (These limits are also indicated by the "official" allotment ["homestead"] = 160 acres). Taking these three groups, we obtain the following basic %% results:

		% of total				Increase (or —) 1900-10	
		1910		*1900*			
		Number of farms	Improved land	Number of farms	Improved land	% of farms	% of improved land
The United States	small	35.4	9.3	33.6	9.6	+	—
	medium (50-174)	46.4	41.8	48.6	44.8	—	—
	large	18.2	48.8	17.7	45.7	+	+
The North	small	23.4	4.4	24.7	5.5	—	—
	medium	53.7	42.8	55.3	47.6	—	—
	large	22.9	52.9	20.0	47.0	+	+
The South	small	47.1	19.9	43.9	19.0	+	+
	medium	40.5	45.3	42.1	44.6	—	+
	large	12.4	34.7	14.1	36.4	—	—
The West	small	32.0	4.8	29.5	3.9	+	+
	medium	39.3	20.5	40.3	19.4	—	—
	large	28.7	74.9	30.3	76.7	—	—

		% of total				1900-10 Increase (+) or decrease (—)	
		1910		1900			
		Number of farms	Improved land	Number of farms	Improved land	% of farms	% of improved land
The United States	small	58.0	24.2	57.4	25.8	+	—
	medium (50-174)	23.8	26.9	24.8	28.6	—	—
	large	18.2	48.8	17.7	45.7	+	+
The North	small	47.6	17.9	51.0	21.5	—	—
	medium	29.5	29.3	29.0	31.6	+	—
	large	22.9	52.9	20.0	47.0	+	+
The South	small	69.5	39.9	66.2	38.4	+	+
	medium	18.1	25.3	19.8	25.2	—	+
	large	12.4	34.7	14.1	36.4	—	—
The West	small	43.8	10.1	41.2	8.3	+	+
	medium	27.5	15.2	28.6	15.0	—	+
	large	28.7	74.9	30.3	76.7	—	—

The distinctive features of the three sections stand out clearly:

The North: 1) The highest development of capitalism. 2) Stagnation in the number of farms. 3) Reduction in the number and share of medium farms. 4) Growth in the number and share of large (and very small, but to a less degree). 5) Weak latifundia (> 1,000: $0._5$% of the farms and $6._9$% of the land).

The South: 1) The lowest development of capitalism. 2) The greatest development of share-tenancy ($49._6$% are tenant farms). 3) Vast latifundia (> 1,000 acres: $0._7$ % of the farms and $23._9$% of the land; in the North $0._5$% of the farms and $6._9$% of the land). 4) Disintegration of these latifundia of the former slave-owners (1900-10:—32 million acres—$27._3$%). 5) The highest % of small farms (43-47%). Summary: from slave-owning latifundia to small commercial agriculture.

The West: 1) Tremendous increase in the number of farms: $+53._7$%!! Homesteads and small commercial agriculture!! 2) Vast % of land in large farms (76-75%). 3) Very large latifundia (> 1 ,000: $3._9$% of the farms and $48._3$% of the land). 4) The lowest % of tenant-farmers and a *reduction* of it.

N.B. (on the question of "acreage statistics")

% of improved land in the < 20 acre farms = 73-96% by divisions, and in the > 1,000 acre farms $6._2$-$43._4$% by divisions.

The contrast between these two sets of percentages is the natural result of the fact that small farms throughout the country usually specialise in cropping, whereas large farms, which in some sections also specialise mainly in cropping, in other sections almost exclusively go in for stock raising (p. 264).

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In the South there is a "process of breaking up great plantations into small farms, chiefly operated by tenants" (p. 264).

The great development of small fruit and other farms on the Pacific coast, due, in part at least, to irrigation projects organised in recent years, is reflected in the increase in small farms of less than 50 acres in the Pacific division (p. 264).*

Concerning the commercial character of stock raising, it is interesting to note the % of farms selling *livestock*, and the % of stock sold and slaughtered

			(% of all farms selling stock)			Ratio (%) between number or domestic animals sold or slaughtered and number on hand:		
	Value of all domestic animals sold or slaughtered	on farms in *1909*	Cattle (excluding calves)	Calves	Swine	Cattle (excluding calves)	Calves	Swine
	($ mill.)							
The United States	1,833	100.0	32.0%	23.0%	28.9%	40.7%	100.9%	90.9%
The North . . .	1,258	68.6%	42.4%	34.5%	44.9%	42.9%	124.3%	97.5%
The South . . .	414	22.6%	23.3%	13.3%	15.9%	40.7%	68.2%	77.6%
The West . . .	161	8.8%	23.9%	13.5%	13.2%	33.4%	61.8%	87.9%
New England. .	30.4	1.7%	34.7%	34.6%	16.4%	43.6	320.8	126.8
Middle Atlantic	89.6	4.9%	36.2	48.6	23.0	28.6	241.2	123.5

* See present edition, Vol. 22, p. 51.—*Ed.*

(p. 349, t. 14) (My abbreviation of table)

	Number of farms reporting				Per cent of farms reporting				Average number per farm reporting				
	cattle		dairy cows		cattle		dairy cows		cattle		dairy cows		
	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	
The United States	5,284,916	4,730,480	5,140,869	4,513,895	83.1	82.4	80.8	78.7	11.7	14.3	4.0	3.8	+0.2
The North . . .	2,582,462	2,568,255	2,546,115	2,503,655	89.3	89.4	88.1	87.1	12.8	14.4	5.3	4.8	+0.5
The South . . .	2,426,302	1,972,548	2,334,605	1,835,841	78.3	75.3	75.4	70.1	8.0	11.3	2.4	2.3	+0.1
The West . . .	276,152	189,677	260,149	174,399	74.0	78.1	69.7	71.8	33.6	44.6	5.2	5.0	+0.2

(p. 367, t. *26*)

	Horses		Mules		(Horses)		(Mules)		(Horses)		(Mules)	
The United States	4,692,814	4,530,628	1,869,005	1,480,652	73.8	79.0	29.4	25.8	4.2	4.0	2.3	2.2
The North . . .	2,600,709	2,620,082	359,024	306,573	90.0	91.2	12.4	10.7	4.9	4.4	2.9	2.6
The South . . .	1,771,659	1,693,878	1,478,382	1,154,810	57.2	64.6	47.7	44.1	2.6	2.7	2.1	2.0
The West . . .	320,446	216,668	31,599	19,269	85.8	89.2	8.5	7.9	7.6	10.5	4.5	6.3

(p. 387, t. *36*)

	Swine (all swine)		(all swine)		(all swine)	
	1910	1900				
The United States	4,351,751	4,335,363	68.4	75.6	13.4	14.6
The North . . .	1,971,059	2,193,438	68.2	76.3	19.2	19.5
The South . . .	2,230,841	2,023,508	72.0	77.2	8.3	9.2
The West . . .	149,851	118,417	40.1	48.7	12.2	12.3

These data show the North *concentrating* livestock ownership against the South and the West. Data on average per farm: dairy cows: North—$4._8$ and $5._3$; horses—$4._4$ and $4._9$; mules: $2._6$ and $2._9$; swine—$19._5$ and $19._2$ (the smallest reduction).

> The figures for the divisions show that this applies wholly only to East North Central and West North Central. In New England, the average number of cows *declined*, but that of horses remained *the same* in New England and Middle Atlantic.

(p. 309, t. 18) (My calculation)

	Farms reporting dairy cows (ibid. '000) 1910	1900	1910	1900	% 1910	1900				See p. 5* Farms reporting horses	% of farms reporting horses
The United States	5,140,869	4,513,895	5,141	+ 4,514	$80._8$	$78._7$	$+2._1$				
< 20	443,331	334,361	444	+ 334	$52._9$	$49._5$	$+3._4$		+110,000	+36,000	$-3._5$
20-49	1,006,877	829,033	1,007	+ 829	$71._2$	$65._9$	$+5._3$		+178,000	—22,000	$-8._9$
50-99	1,260,346	1,150,172	1,260	+ 1,150	$87._1$	$84._1$	$+3._0$		+110,000	— 8,000	$-4._6$
100-174	1,361,251	1,264,680	1,361	+ 1,265	$89._8$	$88._9$	$+0._9$		+ 96,000	+42,000	$-2._1$
175-499	913,991	803,667	914	+ 804	$93._5$	$92._6$	$+0._9$		+110,000	+ 91,000	$-1._0$
500-999	112,167	92,670	112	+ 93	$89._6$	$90._3$	$-0._7$		+ 19,000	+ 21,000	$-0._5$
1,000 and >	42,906	39,312	43	+ 39	$86._0$	$82._9$	$+3._1$		+ 4,000	+ 2,000	$-0._1$

* See pp. 454-55.—*Ed.*

(p. 271, t. *12*) Number of farms

	The North 1910	The North 1900	The South 1910	The South 1900	The West 1910	The West 1900	
Σ	2,890,618+	2,874,073	3,097,547+	2,620,391	373,337+	242,908	6,034,783
< 20	276,042+	250,904	500,614+	385,422	62,510+	37,544	
20-49	401,332—	459,264	955,907+	764,114	57,137+	34,118	
50-99	699,417—	754,621	694,737+	583,047	43,915+	28,370	
100-174	852,051+	833,963	561,544+	518,836	102,691+	69,463	
175-499	582,778+	516,910	322,612+	303,986	72,785+	47,124	
500-999	64,313+	45,795	41,183—	42,015	19,799+	14,716	
1,000 & >	14,685+	12,616	20,950—	22,971	14,500+	11,573	

(My calculation for the divisions) Farms reporting domestic animals

	The North 1910	The North 1900	The South 1910	The South 1900	The West 1910	The West 1900	
Σ	2,769,135	2,766,215	2,923,891	2,503,219	341,757	228,983	6,034,783
< 20	226,816	216,345	405,764	327,690	52,386	32,200	684,966
20-49	374,099	431,353	900,990	728,509	53,112	31,941	1,328,201
-99	679,498	729,586	681,654	569,986	41,595	27,043	1,402,747
-174	833,045	819,122	554,235	511,269	91,144	65,585	1,478,424
-499	577,839	511,980	319,794	301,383	69,720	46,273	967,353
-999	63,354	45,391	40,775	41,647	19,498	14,556	123,627
1,000 & >	14,484	12,438	20,679	22,735	14,302	11,385	49,465

(My calculation for the divisions) Value of all domestic animals

	The North *1910*	The North *1900*	The South *1910*	The South *1900*	The West *1910*	The West *1900*	
Σ	$2,863._7$	$1,835._3$	$1,284._3$	$782._4$	$611._9$	$361._4$	ΣΣ 4,760 mill.
< 20	$49._5$+	$35._6$	$58._5$+	$33._3$	$41._9$+	$31._0$	
20-49	$138._6$+	$100._3$	$194._5$+	$91._2$	$27._9$+	$11._3$	
-99	$441._1$+	$293._0$	$239._6$+	$115._1$	$33._3$+	$14._2$	
-174	$881._9$+	$548._5$	$293._5$+	$155._3$	$94._6$+	$55._8$	
-499	$1,059._5$+	$633._0$	$280._2$+	$157._3$	$127._7$+	$65._2$	
-999	$190._0$+	$122._1$	$72._0$+	$46._8$	$77._1$+	$43._2$	
1,000 & >	$103._2$+	$102._7$	$146._0$—	$183._4$	$209._2$+	$140._8$	

Farms reporting horses

	The North		The South		The West		% of farms reporting horses The North	
	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900 ±
Σ	2,600,709—	2,620,082	1,771,659+	1,693,878	320,446+	216,668	89.9	91.4— 1.5
< 20	180,119+	176,851	183,375+	168,012	45,107+	28,406	65.2	70.5—5.3
20-49	330,346—	387,672	431,805+	416,991	49,387+	29,578	82.3	84.4—2.1
50-99	641,509—	696,599	435,226+	401,520	39,680+	25,631	91.7	92.3—0.6
100-174	805,125+	797,766	411,207+	399,859	85,754+	62,465	94.6	95.6— 1.1
175-499	567,012+	504,209	256,142+	249,479	67,297+	45,072	97.3	97.5—0.2
500-999	62,329+	44,810	35,055—	36,941	19,172+	14,336	96.9	98.0— 1.1
1,000 & >	14,269+	12,175	18,849—	21,076	14,049+	11,180	97.0	96.5+0.5

Farms reporting dairy cows

							% The North	
Σ	2,546,115+	2,503,655	2,334,605+	1,835,841	260,149+	174,399	88.8	87.1+ 1.7
< 20	166,143+	151,359	245,526+	164,950	31,662+	18,052	60.2	60.3—0.1
20-49	324,302—	361,715	641,207+	443,786	41,368+	23,532	80.8	78.7+2.1
50-99	635,791—	672,516	590,109+	455,892	34,446+	21,764	90.9	89.1+ 1.8
100-174	780,434+	774,299	504,825+	440,942	65,992+	49,439	93.5	92.9+0.7
175-499	558,017+	490,228	298,761+	274,032	57,213+	39,407	95.7	94.8+0.9
500-999	58,100+	42,579	37,048—	37,437	17,019+	12,664	90.3	93.1—2.8
1,000 & >	13,328+	10,959	17,129—	18,802	12,449+	9,551	90.8	86.9+3.9

Number of mature horses

	The North		The South		The West	
	1910	1900	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*
Σ	11,316,712	9,826,344	4,073,946	3,888,382	2,039,760	1,791,240
< 20	280,688		242,330		136,011	
20-49	719,887		654,711		142,956	
50-99	1,914,522		823,210		151,830	
100-174	3,521,068		1,043,386		427,684	
175-499	3,871,018		871,197		518,337	
500-999	689,898		185,274		263,827	
1,000 & >	289,631		253,838		399,115	

For 1900 there are data only on *all* horses (for 1910 these data are *not* available)

Number of dairy cows

	The North		The South		The West	
	1910	1900	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*
Σ	13,596,483+	11,986,550	5,688,368+	4,282,555	1,340,581+	866,528
< 20	278,221—	289,135	376,500+	262,187	71,223+	49,274
20-49	824,089—	848,854	1,089,372+	716,853	128,297+	66,612
50-99	2,670,595+	2,453,724	1,254,360+	898,269	154,263+	82,035
100-174	4,756,705+	4,147,973	1,418,157+	1,114,074	300,130+	280,275
175-499	4,469,057+	3,761,844	1,194,299+	950,115	362,757+	153,261
500-999	477,560+	383,171	221,737+	193,677	158,655+	111,629
1,000 & >	120,256+	101,849	133,943—	147,380	165,256+	123,442

Farms reporting mules

	The North		The South		The West	
	1910	1900	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*
Σ	359,024	306,573	1,478,382	1,154,810	31,599	19,269
< 20	5,693	6,743	102,402	77,900	1,442	1,333
20-49	26,405	28,900	435,559	311,829	2,277	1,236
50-99	66,539	63,078	370,582	276,723	2,628	1,290
100-174	119,581	101,259	320,772	263,195	8,019	4,071
175-499	121,574	92,258	206,335	182,037	9,472	5,084
500-999	14,906	10,795	28,584	27,739	3,796	2,799
1,000 & >	4,326	3,540	14,148	15,387	3,965	3,456

(p. 270, t. 11) Average value per farm ($)

		All farm property		Land		Buildings		Implements and machinery		Livestock	
		1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
The North	Σ	9,507	5,030	6,618	3,260	1,564	930	296	180	1,029	660
	< 20	2,849	1,875	1,334	919	1,213	728	98	71	205	157
	20-49	3,464	2,118	1,961	1,212	992	579	138	92	374	235
	50-99	5,772	3,455	3,602	2,128	1,279	773	223	146	667	408
	100-174	9,713	5,416	6,696	3,538	1,622	994	318	203	1,077	682
	175-499	17,928	9,342	13,369	6,451	2,209	1,349	484	290	1,867	1,253
	500-999	27,458	15,196	21,172	10,275	2,558	1,792	733	434	2,996	2,694
	1,000 & >	52,989	28,805	40,631	17,481	4,068	2,528	1,198	643	7,072	8,153
The South	Σ	2,897	1,629	1,913	978	461	274	95	69	428	309
	< 20	838	483	450	240	237	132	27	20	124	92
	20-49	1,217	673	734	393	230	125	42	29	212	126
	50-99	2,237	1,171	1,390	692	407	218	81	52	350	208
	100-174	3,692	1,818	2,415	1,099	608	328	128	78	541	313
	175-499	6,742	3,414	4,608	2,138	1,023	608	219	132	893	536
	500-999	14,430	6,908	10,423	4,431	1,780	1,056	453	285	1,775	1,136
	1,000 & >	47,348	26,807	36,390	15,660	2,897	1,930	1,065	1,211	6,996	8,006
The West	Σ	12.155	7,059	9,162	4,639	1,009	690	310	218	1,673	1,512
	< 20	5,025	2,953	3,342	1,523	867	507	108	79	710	844
	20-49	7,359	3,578	5,727	2,544	912	560	202	123	518	351
	50-99	9,404	4,358	7,386	3,101	967	570	263	162	789	524
	100-174	7,205	3,763	5,375	2,343	665	445	221	153	944	823
	175-499	14,111	7,667	10,844	5,184	1,082	790	398	282	1,788	1,412
	500-999	27,662	14,601	21,206	10,006	1,749	1,176	722	456	3,986	2,963
	1,000 & >	74,186	44,972	55,110	29,443	3,206	2,402	1,384	915	14,486	12,212
The United States	Σ	6,444	3,563	4,476	2,276	994	620	199	131	774	536
	< 20	1,812	1,139	956	564	605	375	56	42	195	158
	20-49	2,103	1,280	1,284	750	474	303	76	55	270	172
	50-99	4,175	2,489	2,649	1,536	848	532	156	106	522	325
	100-174	7,313	4,022	5,021	2,590	1,182	724	241	155	869	554
	175-499	13,955	7,175	10,291	4,872	1,734	1,059	390	234	1,540	1,012
	500-999	23,208	11,714	17,644	7,842	2,174	1,402	639	376	2,751	2,094
	1,000 & >	56,757	31,799	43,047	19,530	3,330	2,206	1,196	987	9,185	9,077

Average value per acre ($)									
All farm property		Land		Buildings		Implements and machinery		Livestock	
1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900	1910	1900
66.46	37.77	46.26	24.48	10.93	6.98	2.07	1.35	7.20	4.96
308.84	193.56	144.55	94.82	131.44	75.19	10.59	7.35	22.26	16.19
100.67	60.41	56.98	34.57	28.83	16.52	4.01	2.62	10.85	6.69
77.96	46.66	48.63	28.74	17.27	10.43	3.01	1.97	9.01	5.51
71.26	39.75	49.13	25.96	11.90	7.29	2.33	1.49	7.90	5.00
66.96	35.00	49.40	24.17	8.16	5.05	1.79	1.08	6.90	4.69
41.24	22.90	31.79	15.49	3.84	2.70	1.10	0.65	4.50	4.06
27.14	13.80	20.82	8.37	2.08	1.21	0.61	0.31	3.62	3.90
25.31	11.79	16.72	7.08	4.03	1.98	0.83	0.50	3.74	2.24
73.36	42.16	39.37	20.91	20.77	11.51	2.35	1.72	10.88	8.02
39.18	21.12	23.58	12.33	7.39	3.91	1.35	0.91	6.81	3.97
32.30	16.80	20.07	9.94	5.88	3.13	1.17	0.74	5.18	2.99
28.08	13.78	18.37	8.32	4.63	2.49	0.97	0.59	4.12	2.37
25.66	12.92	17.46	8.09	3.88	2.30	0.83	0.50	3.38	2.03
21.96	10.68	15.86	6.85	2.71	1.63	0.69	0.44	2.70	1.76
11.69	5.28	8.99	3.08	0.72	0.38	0.26	0.24	1.73	1.58
40.99	18.28	30.86	12.01	3.40	1.79	1.04	0.56	5.63	3.92
595.60	333.61	395.87	172.03	102.66	57.31	12.85	8.89	84.12	95.38
230.42	111.59	179.32	79.35	28.55	17.46	6.33	3.82	16.22	10.96
28.79	58.80	101.15	41.85	13.24	7.69	3.60	2.18	10.81	7.07
47.67	24.71	35.56	15.39	4.40	2.92	1.46	1.00	6.24	5.41
45.77	24.71	35.17	16.71	3.51	2.54	1.29	0.91	5.80	4.55
39.79	20.89	30.50	14.81	2.52	1.68	1.04	0.65	5.73	4.24
20.08	9.50	14.92	6.22	0.87	0.51	0.37	0.19	3.92	2.58
46.64	24.37	32.40	15.57	7.20	4.24	1.44	0.89	5.60	3.67
172.89	106.90	91.22	52.92	57.73	35.19	5.37	3.96	18.57	14.83
65.55	38.74	40.00	22.72	14.77	9.16	2.36	1.65	8.42	5.21
58.22	34.62	36.94	21.28	11.83	7.37	2.17	1.47	7.28	4.51
53.97	29.69	37.05	19.11	8.72	5.35	1.78	1.14	6.42	4.09
51.45	26.74	37.95	18.15	6.39	3.95	1.44	0.87	5.68	3.76
34.76	17.70	26.43	11.85	3.26	2.12	0.96	0.57	4.12	3.16
17.03	7.58	12.92	4.66	1.00	0.53	0.36	0.24	2.76	2.16

Note:

"...In the Mountain and Pacific divisions farms of 100 to 174 acres show a lower average value of buildings per farm than those of 50 to 99 acres. This condition is probably due to the fact that the farms of 100 to 174 acres in these divisions consist in considerable part of homesteads recently taken up by settlers who have not had time, or perhaps have not accumulated means, to construct expensive buildings" (p. 271).

Homesteds in *the West*

"...The high averages (value of all farm property—for *small* farms) in these two divisions [Mountain and Pacific] are partly due to the presence of numerous small and highly cultivated fruit and vegetable farms, many of which are irrigated" (p. 272)

Small farms in the West...

On the question of *crop yields*:

	Average yield per acre (bushels)						(p. 486, t. 14)		(p. 485)
	(p. 584, t. *15*)		(p. 593)		(p. 603)		Milk produced (gallons) average per *cow*		Dairy cows (1909) average per *farm*
	Corn (1)		*Wheat* (2)		*Oats* (3)				
	1909	*1899*	*1909*	*1899*	*1909*	*1899*	*1909*	*1899*	
United States . . .	25.9	28.1	15.4	12.5	28.6	31.9	362	424	3.8
New England . . .	45.2	39.4	23.5	18.0	32.9	35.9	476	548	5.8
Middle Atlantic . .	32.2	34.0	18.6	14.9	25.5	30.9	490	514	6.1
East North Central	38.6	38.3	17.2	12.9	33.3	37.4	410	487	4.0
West " "	27.7	31.4	14.8	12.2	27.5	32.0	325	371	4.9
South Atlantic . . .	15.8	14.1	11.9	9.5	15.5	11.7	286	356	2.1
East South Central	18.6	18.4	11.7	9.0	13.4	11.1	288	395	1.9
West " "	15.7	21.9	11.0	11.9	21.4	25.8	232	290	3.1
Mountain	15.8	16.5	23.1	19.2	34.9	30.4	339	334	4.7
Pacific	24.0	25.2	17.7	15.6	35.3	31.4	475	470	5.1

(1) *corn*. 1909: 20.6% of all *improved* land.
(2) *9.3%* " " " " " "
(3) *7.3%* " " " " " "

In the *North*, we must *consider separately* (α) New England+Middle Atlantic and (β) *East* and *West* North Centrals

α—31-41% (value of all crops)=hay and forage	*Mostly* sown grasses (from hay and forage)	α—crops are mostly higher
β—14-16%	The *part* of wild, meadow, etc. grasses is *considerable*	β—crops are mostly lower

α—17-21% (idem) vegetables	α labour and fertilisers (per acre) are high
β—4-7%	β labour and fertilisers (per acre) are low

α—Almost *no* homesteads	High population density.	Buy feed for livestock.
β—Homesteads *exist*	Low population density.	Sell feed for livestock.

Summing up the *original* (not the final!!) entries for homesteads over the 10 years (1900-10), (*Statistical Abstract*, p. 28), we obtain:

	The West	$55._3$ mill. acres		Pacific — $13._4$ Mountain — $41._9$
Homesteads	The North . . .	$55._2$ ”	”	(incl. *West North Central* $54._3$)
	The South . . .	$20._0$ ”	”	(incl. **West South Central** $17._3$)
		$\Sigma = 130._5$		

Thus, the *West* is a *solid* homestead area.

In the *North*—*one* division (West North Central) is a homestead area.

In the *South*—also *one* (West South Central) is a homestead area.

All farms = 1,182,099 . . . 89,923,619 acre

plantations or farms = 437,978 . . . 28,296,815 ”

325 counties

(*11* southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, *North* & *South* Carolina, Tennessee, Texas & Virginia.)

Chapter XII. *Plantations in the South*

Tenant plantations of ((1910))

All tenant *plantations*	All classes	5 to 9 tenants	10 to 19 tenants	20 to 49 tenants	50 tenants and over	Census Year:	Average acreage per farm: The South	Average acreage per farm: The North	Average improved acres per farm: The South	Average improved acres per farm: The North
Plantations	39,073	26,562	9,160	2,939	412	1910	114.4	143.0	48.6	100.3
Landlord farms	39,073	26,562	9,160	2,939	412	1910	138.2	133.2	48.1	90.9
Tenant farms	398,905	168,089	118,862	82,404	29,550	1890	139.7	123.7	58.8	87.8
Average acreage	724.2	495.0	953.2	1,688.0	3,535.3	1880	153.4	114.9	56.2	76.6
” improved acreage	405.3	273.8	528.2	974.9	2,084.1	1870	214.2	117.0	69.2	69.2
Average acreage — landlord farms — all land	330.9	227.3	438.4	785.5	1,374.6	1860	335.4	126.4	101.3	68.3
Average acreage — landlord farms — improved land	86.6	65.2	106.8	187.9	293.4	1850	332.1	127.1	101.1	65.4
Average acreage — tenant farms — all land	38.5	42.3	39.7	32.2	30.1					
Average acreage — tenant farms — improved land	31.2	33.0	32.5	28.1	25.0					
Acreage of all land	28,296,815	13,147,956	8,731,179	4,961,152	1,456,528					
landlord farms	12,929,417	6,038,777	4,015,807	2,308,518	566,315					
tenant farms	15,367,398	7,109,179	4,715,372	2,652,634	890,213					
% in tenant farms	54.3	54.1	54.0	53.5	61.1					

"As a matter of fact ... a large proportion of the tenants in the South actually occupied a very different economic position from that usually occupied by tenants in other parts of the country. The plantation as a unit for general purposes of administration has not disappeared, and in many cases the tenants on plantations are subjected to quite as complete supervision by the owner, general lessee, or manager, as that to which the hired labourers are subjected on large farms in the North and West" (p. 877).

Chapter XI. *Irrigation.*

Arid region: 1,440,822 farms. *1,161*,385,600 acres, $388._6$ million acres of land in farms, $173._4$ million acres of improved land. $307._9$ millions of dollars = cost of irrigation enterprises ($15._{92}$ per acre).

158,713 farms irrigated ($13._7$ millions of acres irrigated).

	Average yield per acre (1909)		
	on irrigated land	on unirrigated land	± %
corn (bushels)	$23._7$	$25._9$	$-8._5$
oats	$36._8$	$28._5$	$+29._1$
wheat	$25._6$	$15._3$	$+67._3$%
barley	$29._1$	$22._3$	$+30._5$%
alfalfa	$2._{94}$ tons	$2._{14}$	$+37._4$%

Taking into account the fact that Mr. Himmer (*Zavety*, 1913, No. 6) makes a downright lying assertion about the 1910 Census, to the effect that in the United States of America "there are no areas where colonisation is no longer continuing, or where large-scale capitalist agriculture is not disintegrating and is not being replaced by family-labour farms" (p. 60)*—let us dwell on the
2 divisions: New England
and Middle Atlantic. Colonisation = *0*. (No homesteads).

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 37-38—*Ed.*

The capitalist character of agriculture:

		1909	*1899*	%
Expenditure for labour (per improved acre)	New England .	4.76	2.55	+86%
	Middle Atlantic	2.66	1.64	+62%
	Pacific	3.47	1.92	+80%
	Mountain . . .	2.95	2.42	+22%
	Average for the United States	1.36	0.86	+58%

Thus, the capitalist character is **most pronounced** and is developing **most strongly**!!!

Himmer was "confused" over the fact that not only was the average farm acreage in these divisions declining in general (U.S.A. 146.2—138.1; New England 107.1—104.4; Middle Atlantic 92.4—92.2), but that there was also a decrease in the quantity of improved land (U.S.A.+72.2+75.2; New England 42.4—38.4; Middle Atlantic 63.4—62.6)!!!

Besides, in terms of improved acreage, New England farms are *the smallest*!!

The silly ass has failed to see the difference between small acreages and the capitalist character of agriculture.

		1909	*1899*	
Expenditure *for fertilisers* (per improved acre)	New England	1.30	0.53	+148%
	Middle Atlantic	0.62	0.37	+ 78%
	South Atlantic	1.23	0.49	+151%
	Average for the United States	0.24	0.13	+ 58%

Let us note that most fertiliser is used on land under *cotton* (the South!) (see 1900 Statistics). Cotton: 18.7% of the farms; 22.5% of the expenditure for fertilisers.

cf. p. 1 of extracts (1910) (p. 560)*

	% of farms hiring labour		
N.B.	New England. . .	66.0%	N.B.
	Middle Atlantic. .	65.8%	
	East North Central	52.7	
	West " "	51.0	
	Mountain	46.8%	
	Pacific	58.0%	

* See p. 444.—*Ed.*

Increase (or decrease) 1900-10

New England	Number of farms	%	All land in farms (acres) Amount	%	Improved land in farms (acres) Amount	%	Percentage of increase (1899-1909) in the value of all farm property	implements and machinery
Total	—3,086	—1.6	—834,068	—4.1	—879,499	—10.8	35.6	39.0
< 20	6,286	22.4	41,273	14.9	30,984	15.5	60.9	48.9
20-49	17	0.1	— 33,243	—2.9	—28,500	—4.7	31.4	30.3
50-99	—3,457	—7.0	—250,313	—7.2	—142,270	—9.1	27.5	31.2
100-174	—4,020	—8.4	—466,663	—7.7	—309,499	—12.3	30.3	38.5
175-499	—1,999	—6.7	—459,948	—6.1	—421,081	—15.3	33.0	44.6
500-999	6	0.3	36,311	2.8	—46,002	—12.8	53.7	53.7
1,000 and >	81	16.3	298,515	36.2	36,889	36.8	102.7	60.5
Middle Atlantic:								
Total	—17,239	—3.5	—1,669,034	—3.7	—1,465,317	—4.8	28.1	44.1
< 20	5,754	7.7	29,704	4.1	15,550	2.5	45.8	42.9
20-49	—5,955	—7.1	—225,471	—8.0	—210,859	—9.5	28.3	37.0
50-99	—11,639	—8.2	—772,300	—7.6	—623,012	—8.1	23.8	39.9
100-174	—5,745	—4.4	—746,852	—4.5	—605,047	—5.1	24.9	43.8
175-499	495	1.0	169,095	1.4	—59,57	—0.8	29.4	54.7
500-999	—59	—3.1	—27,161	—2.3	17,990	3.8	31.5	50.8
1,000 and >	—90	—16.1	—96,049	—8.0	—372	—0.2	74.4	65.2

These figures are a clear indication that the small *farms* are being displaced by the large.

In both divisions, *all* the medium groups (20-499) have been *losing* (%).

The gains were registered by (1) the smallest (< 20)
(2) the large (*500-999* and *1,000* and >).

In percentage and absolute terms (quantity of *improved* land), the *large* farms gained **more** than the small!!

[The small farms (under 20 acres) here are very frequently out-and-out capitalist farms] because they have the maximum % of land under vegetables and a minimum under *cereals*.

The % increase in agricultural implements and machinery (=constant capital in its most important form, which is directly indicative of technical progress) is at a *maximum* in the *large* farms, at a minimum in the *medium* farms, with the large ones doing *better* than the smallest!!!

(p. 266, t. 9)

Percentage distribution of total value

United States	All farm property		Implements and machinery	
	1910	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(α) < 20	3.7 —	3.8	3.7 —	3.8
(β) 20- 49	7.3 —	7.9	8.5 —	9.1
(γ) 50- 99	14.6 —	16.7	17.7 —	19.3
(δ) 100-174	27.1 —	28.0	28.9 —	29.3
(ε) 175-499	33.3 +	30.5	30.2 +	27.1
(ζ) 500-999	7.1 +	5.9	6.3 +	15.1
(η) 1,000 and >	6.9 —	7.3	4.7 —	6.2
New England:				
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	12.0 +	10.1	7.8 +	7.3
	13.3 —	13.7	11.5 —	12.2
	20.0 —	21.2	20.8 —	22.0
	24.2 —	25.1	27.9 —	28.0
	24.4 —	24.8	27.3 +	26.2
	3.9 +	3.4	3.3 +	2.9
	2.4 +	1.6	1.5 +	1.3
Middle Atlantic:				
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	8.9 +	7.8	6.5 =	6.5
	11.3 =	11.3	10.6 —	11.1
	24.6 —	25.5	27.2 —	28.0
	31.9 —	32.7	34.5 =	34.5
	20.3 +	20.1	19.4 +	18.1
	1.8 =	1.8	1.3 =	1.3
	1.2 +	0.8	0.6 +	0.5

United States	All farm property		Implements and machinery	
	1910	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*
The North: Total	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$
	$2._9$—	$3._3$	$3._1$—	$3._5$
small	$5._1$—	$6._7$	$6._5$—	$8._2$
	$14._7$—	$18._0$	$18._2$—	$21._3$
medium	$30._1$—	$31._2$	$31._7$—	$32._7$
	$38._0$+	$33._4$	$32._9$+	$29._0$
large	$6._4$+	$4._8$	$5._5$+	$3._8$
	$2._8$+	$2._5$	$2._1$+	$1._6$
The South: Total	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$
	$4._7$+	$4._4$	$4._6$+	$4._2$
small	$13._0$+	$12._0$	$13._7$+	$12._3$
	$17._3$+	$16._0$	$19._2$+	$16._7$
medium	$23._1$+	$22._1$	$2._4$+	$22._4$
	$24._2$—	$24._3$	$24._1$+	$22._3$
large	$6._6$—	$6._8$	$6._4$—	$6._7$
	$11._4$—	$14._4$	$7._6$—	$15._5$
The West: Total	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$	$100._0$
	$6._9$+	$6._5$	$5._9$+	$5._6$
small	$9._3$+	$7._1$	$10._0$+	$7._9$
	$9._1$+	$7._2$	$10._0$+	$8._7$
medium	$16._3$+	$15._2$	$19._6$—	$20._0$
	$22._6$+	$21._1$	$25._0$—	$25._1$
large	$12._1$—	$12._5$	$12._3$—	$12._7$
	$23._7$—	$30._4$	$17._3$—	$20._0$

Conclusions:

(1) Two old divisions (New England + Middle Atlantic). Maximum growth of the *big* farms. Erosion of the medium. Lesser growth of the smallest.

(2) The North (capitalism). Growth of *large* farms at the expense of the *small*.

(3) The South (transition from slavery to capitalism). Growth of *small* farms at the expense of the *large*. (*N.B.*: The role of the largest is *above* average.)

(4) The West (new lands. Maximum of homesteads). Growth of *small* at the expense of the *large*. (*N.B.*: The role of the largest and the large is **above** average.)

(5) Summary. ΣΣ: (The United States): *Displacement of all the small* and *all the medium ones*. Displacement of the *latifundia* (1,000 and >). Growth of *big capitalist* farms (*175-500*; *500-1,000*).

The United

It is interesting to compare the data on the %%

Number of farms 1910	Number of farms 1900		A) Quantity of improved *land* %% of acreage *1910*	A) *1900*	B)) (Value) all farm property *1910*	B) *1900*	C)) (Value) land *1910*	C) *1900*
+ 13.2	11.7	+ smallest (< 20)	1.7	1.6	— 3.7	3.8	— 2.8	2.9
+ 22.2	21.9	— small and	7.6	8.0	— 7.3	7.9	— 6.4	7.2
— 22.6	23.8	— medium	14.9	16.2	— 14.6	16.7	— 13.4	16.1
— 23.8	24.8	—	26.9	28.6	— 27.1	28.0	— 26.7	28.2
+ 15.4	15.1	+ large and	33.8	32.7	+ 33.3	30.5	+ 35.4	32.2
+ 2.0	1.8	+ latifundia	8.5	7.1	+ 7.1	5.9	+ 7.8	6.2
= 0.8	0.8	+ (latifundia)	6.5	5.9	— 6.9	7.3	+ 7.6	7.1
					(— 3.7	3.8		
					(—49.0	52.6		
					(+40.4	36.4		
					— 6.9	7.3		

This is remarkable!

There is an increase in the *value* of land!! (both in the large farms and the latifundia).

Only in two divisions is there *no* decline of the *latifundia* (1,000 and >), namely, the oldest and capitalist divisions, New England and Middle Atlantic!! In these two divisions, the role of the latifundia has *increased in all respects* (including even livestock!!) (Middle Atlantic = $0._6$—$0._6$ livestock, New England, $1._5$—$1._4$ livestock).

The exception (N.B.) is the maximum destruction of latifundia in *West South Central* = $21._3$—$41._9$, and in *the West* = $33._6$—$38._5$, i.e., just where the latifundia are *outsized*!!

Added

All the added value to all farm property = +$20,551 *million.*

	$ mill.	
Of this smallest	+ 753	
small and medium	+ 1,365	4,708 —
	+ 2,590	
	+ 5,368	5,368 —
large and latifundia	+ 7,422	
	+ 1,707	10,475 —
	+ 1,346	
		Σ = 20,551

In these 10 years, the *industrial workers* (1900: $4._7$ million, 1910—$6._6$ million) (+$40._4$%) increased their wages by *1,419* million (+$70._6$%).

States:

distribution of various elements in the farms

(Value) buildings		(Value) implements and machinery		(Value) livestock		(Value) all farm property		*All land*	
1910	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*	*1910*	*1900*
+ 8.0	7.1	— 3.7	3.8	— 3.3	3.5	— 3.7	3.8	+ 1.0	0.9
— 10.6	10.7	— 8.5	9.1	+ 7.8	7.0	— 7.3	7.9	+ 5.2	5.0
— 19.3	20.4	— 17.7	19.3	+ 15.2	14.5	— 14.6	16.7	— 11.7	11.8
— 28.3	29.0	— 28.9	29.3	+ 26.8	25.6	— 27.1	28.0	+ 23.4	23.0
+ 26.8	25.9	+ 30.2	27.1	+ 30.6	28.5	+ 33.3	30.5	+ 30.2	27.8
+ 4.3	4.0	+ 6.3	5.1	= 7.0	7.0	+ 7.1	5.9	+ 9.5	8.1
— 2.6	2.9	— 4.7	6.2	— 9.3	13.9	— 6.9	7.3	— 19.0	23.6

livestock	livestock
26.3—25	±%
$\boxed{+1.3}$	—0.2
26.8—25.6	+0.8
$\boxed{+1.2}$	+1.2*
46.9—49.4	=
$\boxed{-2.5}$	—4.6

value:

% of farms	mill. farms	idem (1900)
58.0	3.7	(3.3)
23.8	1.5	(1.4)
18.2	1.1	(1.0)
100.0	6.3	(5.7)

* Lenin left out the next group of 175 to 499: +2.1.—*Ed.*

Some economic elements (resp. classes) in the *U.S.A.*,

		1900	*1910*	+	+ %
Capitalists in industry:	Number of enterprises ('000)	207.5	268.5	+61	+29.4%
Urban population +34.8%	Number of wage workers ('000)	4,713	6,615	+1,902	+40.4%
Agriculture:	Number of farms ('000)	5,731	6,361	+624	+10.9%
Rural population +11.2%	Number of hired labourers (cf. p. 1 and over)*	82.3% : 70.6% = x : 40.4% x=47.1%			
Production of all cereals (mill. bushels)		4,439	4,513	+74	+1.7%

Industry: Value of products (number of enterprises ('000) and % of total)

Should be 1904 instead of 1900

production:	*1900*	*1910*	+	+ %
(< $20,000) small	144 66.6%	180 +67.2%	+36	+25%
($20,000-$100,000) medium	48 22.2%	57 —21.3%	+ 9	+18.7%
($100,000 and >) large	24 11.2%	31 +11.5%	+ 7	+29.1%
Total	216 100%	268 100%	+52	+24.2%

Agriculture: Number of farms ('000) and % of total

(under 99 acres) small	3,297 57.4%	3,691 +58.0%	+394	+11.5%
(100-174) medium	1,422 24.8%	1,516 —23.8%	+94	+ 6.6%
(175 and >) large	1,018 17.7%	1,154 +18.2%	+136	+13.3%
Total	5,737 100%	6,361 100%	+624	+10.9%

* See pp. 482-83.—*Ed.*

according to the 12th (1900) and 13th (1910) censuses

	1900	1910	+	%
Their capital ($ mill.)	8,975	18,428	+ 9,453	+ 105.3%
Their wages ($ mill.)	2,008	3,427	+ 1,419	+ 70.6%
Value of their property ($ mill.)	20,440	40,991	+20,551	+100.5%
Their wages ($ mill.)	357	652	+ 295	+ 82.3%
Their value ($ mill.)	1,483	2,665	+ 1,182	+ 79.8%

	1900	1910	+	%
Value of products ($ mill.)				
	927	1,127	+ 200	+ 21.5%
	6.3%	5.5%		
	2,129	2,544	415	+ 19.5%
	14.4%	— 12.3%		
	11,737	17,000	+ 5,263	+ 44.8%
	79.3%	+82.2%		
	14,793	20,671	+ 5,878	+ 39.7%
	100%	100%		
Value of their property ($ mill.)				
	5,790	10,499	+ 4,709	+ 81.3%
	28.4%	—25.6%		
	5,721	11,089	+ 5,368	+ 93.8%
	28.0%	—27.1%		
	8,929	19,403	+10,474	+ 117.3
	43.7%**	+47.3%		
	20,440	40,991	+20,551	+100.5%
	100%	100%		

	1900	1910	+	%
Value of products ($ mill.)	11,406	20,672	+9,266	+81%*

* In the Fourth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* this figure has been corrected to 81.2% (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 94).—*Ed.*

** In the Fourth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* this figure has been corrected to 43.6% (Ibid., Vol. 22, p. 98).—*Ed.*

Three types:
1) The North
2) The South
3) The West

For a characteristic of the population

(*Abstract of the Census*, p. 92)

		Per cent distribution by class of			
		total population	White native	White foreign-born	Negro
United States	rural	53.7	55.8	27.8	72.6
	urban	46.3	44.2	72.2	27.4
New England	rural	16.7	20.4	7.6	8.2
	urban	83.3	79.6	92.4	91.8
Middle Atlantic	rural	29.0	33.7	16.1	18.8
	urban	71.0	66.3	83.9	81.2
East North Central	rural	47.3	51.6	28.6	23.4
	urban	52.7	48.4	71.4	76.6
West North Central	rural	66.7	68.4	60.8	32.3
	urban	33.3	31.6	39.2	67.7
South Atlantic	rural	74.6	74.4	34.0	77.9
	urban	25.4	25.6	66.0	22.1
East South Central	rural	81.3	82.2	33.3	80.8
	urban	18.7	17.8	66.7	19.2
West South Central	rural	77.7	78.4	60.8	78.0
	urban	22.3	21.6	39.2	22.0
Mountain	rural	64.0	64.0	60.3	28.0
	urban	36.0	36.0	39.7	72.0
Pacific	rural	43.2	44.2	38.7	16.6
	urban	56.8	55.8	61.3	83.4

*) Total of two vertical figures = 100.

within the U.S.A. (1910)

N.B. *N.B.*
The Negroes are in flight *from the South* (*mostly to the cities*). The North is giving up its population to the *West*. The foreign-born avoid the *South*.

community:*) % of all population		[ibidem p. 175] % of population (1910)			Gain or loss (1910) from interstate migration	
Foreign-born	Negro	Born in division of residence	born in other divisions	foreign-born	White persons	Negro persons
14.5	10.7	72.6	12.3	14.7	—	—
27.7	1.0	66.2	5.5	27.9	— 226,219	+ 20,310
25.0	2.2	69.7	4.9	25.1	— 1,120,678	+ 186,384
16.8	1.6	73.4	9.3	16.8	— 1,496,074	+ 119,649
13.9	2.1	65.4	20.2	13.9	+ 472,566	+ 40,497
2.4	33.7	92.6	4.7	2.5	— 507,454	— 392,827
1.0	31.5	91.5	7.3	1.0	— 974,165	— 200,876
4.0	22.6	72.3	23.3	4.0	+ 1,434,780	+ 194,658
16.6	0.8	41.8	40.2	17.2	+ 856,683	+ 13,229
20.5	0.7	35.8	40.3	22.8	+ 1,560,561	+ 18,976

Volume IV. Occupation Statistics
Table 15, p. 54

Both sexes	Number of persons 10 years of age and over engaged in				
	1910	*1900*	*1890*	*1880*	
Agricultural pursuits	*12,567,925*	*10,381,765*	*9,148,448*	*7,713,875*	Overstatement in the number of women (×)
Agricultural labourers	6,088,414	4,410,877	3,586,583	3,323,876	12,567,925
Dairymen and dairywomen	35,014	10,875	17,895	8,948	—468,100
					12,099,825 | 10,381,765
Farmers, planters and overseers	5,981,522	5,674,875	5,281,557	4,229,051	116%
Gardeners, florists, nurserymen, etc.	143,462	61,788	72,601	56,032	+16%
Lumbermen and raftsmen	127,154	72,020	65,866	30,651	
Stock raisers, herders and drovers	122,189	84,988	70,729	44,075	
Woodchoppers	27,567	36,075	33,697	12,731	
Turpentine farmers and labourers	28,967	24,735	19,520	7,450	
Other agricultural pursuits	13,636	5,532		1,061	
Apiarists	2,145	1,339	1,773	1,016	

Agricultural labourers	6,088,414	4,410,877	6,088÷4,410=137%
Male	4,566,281	3,747,668	→ 4,566,281÷3,747,668=121.$_8$%
(×) Female	1,522,133	663,209	100—21.$_8$ = 78.$_2$

(p. 27)+(1910—1900)=129.$_5$% (1900—1890: +23.$_3$%, **page 26**).

(α) Female farm labourers working on the *home* farm	1,176,585 [+166.$_8$%]	441,055
(β) Female farm labourers working *out*	337,522 [+ 53.$_4$%]	220,048
idem *male* (α) (home farm)	—2,133,949	?
(p. 91) (β) (working out)	—2,229,444	?
	(Σ=4,433,393)	

Total number of *hired* labourers in agriculture:

	1910	*1900*
Female (working out)	337,522	220,048
Male (" ")	2,299,444	1,798,165
	Σ=2,566,966*	2,018,213

(**roughly**=78.$_2$% of 1910 figure)

see **p. 2 over****

* The total is with Lenin's correction, see p. 485.—*Ed.*
** See p. 485.—*Ed.*

Industrial statistics show

	wage workers	*wages*
1899	4.7 mill.	\$2,008 mill.
1909	6.6 "	\$3,427 "
	$+40.6\%$	$+70.6\%$

Consequently, the increase in the **number** of *hired labourers* in *agriculture* could **be estimated:**

		Increase in number of farms	Increase in rural population
The North	40%	$+\ 0.6\%$	$+\ 3.9\%$
The South	50%	$+\ 18.2\%$	$-\ 14.8\%$
The West	66%	$+\ 53.7\%$	$+\ 49.7\%$
	48%	$+\ 10.9\%$	$+\ 11.2\%$

(×) Concerning the number of women gainfully employed* in agriculture (1910), the author (p. 27) believes their number to be *overstated* and ***estimates*** these figures as the more *probable*: (p. 28)
total number of women engaged in agriculture: *1,338,950* instead of *1,807,050* (i.e.—468,100),
and total number of women engaged in *all* branches of the economy, *7,607,672*, instead of *8,075,772* (—468,100).

My addition: referring this entire overstatement only to those working on the home farms, we have: 1,176,585—468,100 = 708,485÷441,055 = **166**%+*66*%

* See p. 483.—*Ed.*

Thus, according to the Occupation Statistics (see p. **1 over**)*

	1910	*1900+*		
Total persons occupied in agriculture . .	12,099,825	10,381,765 +16%		
	**see No. 1 (below)			
Farmers . . .	5,981,522	5,674,875 + 5%	5,981,522	5,674,875 / 105.4
Hired labourers	2,566,966	2,018,213 +27%	2,566,966	2,018,213 / 127
(see p. *1 over*)	*see No. 2 (below)			

I must say, on the whole, that American Occupation Statistics are not worth a damn, for they say absolutely nothing about the "status of person in industry" (and make no distinction between the owner, the home-farm worker and the hired labourer).

That is why their scientific value is almost **nil**. ||| N.B. ||

N.B.

Then they say nothing at all about collateral employment.

My totals are from p. *235* of the *Statistical Abstract*.

No. 1: + 16%, whereas the *rural population* = + 11%. Why? Clearly, because of the increased number of *women* employed.

No. 2: Σ expenditure for *labour* + 48%. Why? Clearly, because *poor farmers* are also hired (collateral employment).

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* See pp. 482-83.—*Ed.*

** See p. 482.—*Ed.*

Occupation Statistics

Per cent distribution:
Total persons employed (10 years of age and >)

	Total persons occupied	Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry	Extraction of minerals	Manufacturing and mechanical industry	Transportation	Trade	Public service	Professional service	Domestic and personal service	Clerical occupation
United States . .	38,167,336	33.2	2.5	27.9	6.9	9.5	1.2	4.4	9.9	4.6
New England . .	2,914,680	10.4	0.3	49.1	6.5	10.6	1.7	4.8	10.7	5.9
Middle Atlantic	8,208,885	10.0	4.2	40.6	8.0	12.0	1.4	4.9	11.8	7.1
East North Central	7,257,953	25.6	2.6	33.2	7.6	10.6	1.1	4.8	9.2	5.3
West North Central.	4,449,043	41.2	1.8	20.0	7.8	10.4	1.1	5.2	8.5	3.9
South Atlantic .	5,187,729	51.4	1.8	18.6	5.0	5.1	1.0	3.0	10.5	2.6
East South Central	3,599,695	63.2	1.9	12.4	4.0	5.3	0.6	2.6	8.4	1.7
West South Central	3,507,081	60.1	0.7	12.6	5.2	7.0	0.8	3.3	8.1	2.1
Mountain. . . .	1,107,937	32.4	9.4	19.5	10.3	8.7	1.7	5.2	9.1	3.6
Pacific	1,934,333	22.6	2.4	27.2	10.3	12.6	2.0	6.0	11.3	5.5

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NOTES AND INDEXES

NOTES

[1] This work was written in parts: the first nine chapters, from June to September 1901 and the last three, in the autumn of 1907. In the Fourth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*, it appeared in Vol. 5 (chapters I-IX) and in Vol. 13 (chapters X-XII); in the Fifth edition of the *Collected Works*, the whole of it is in Vol. 5. The present volume contains the preparatory material: plans for and the contents of the work, critical remarks on the writings of bourgeois economists and revisionists, and elaboration and analysis of agricultural statistics.

The four variants of the plan in this volume reflect Lenin.'s elaboration of the structure and content of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'". Lenin's primary aim is to expose the general theoretical views of the "critics", the "law of diminishing returns" as scientifically unsound and the theory of rent connected with it, together with the Malthusian conclusions from both. He then outlines a detailed critical analysis of bourgeois and revisionist writings on the key problems of agrarian theory and agrarian relations (concentration of production in agriculture, machinery in agriculture, etc.), and exposure of the "critics'" tenuous and scientifically dishonest methods of inquiry and use of factual material. Lenin makes a special analysis of the statistical data and results of monographic descriptions of agrarian relations in France, Germany and other countries for an examination of the actual processes in agriculture, the capitalist system in contemporary agriculture and a critique of bourgeois and revisionist writings.

The variants of the plan show the successive extension of the range of questions and their content, and Lenin's changes in the order of the various points. Lenin repeatedly returned to the fourth variant, the most elaborate and complete. There, the Roman numerals of the eleven sections of the plan are in pencil, as are also the additional notes to point 12: "the journal *Nachalo* (*The Beginning*) I, pp. 7 and 13" and to point 21: "Latifundia. (Cf. Hertz 15; Bulgakov II, 126, 190, 363)". In point 12, beginning with "No. 4, 141" and to the end of the paragraph and in the note to this point (12) on the right, "Engels on Belgium, No. 10, 234", and also in the note to point 18, beginning with the words: "Bulgakov II, 289" and to the end of the paragraph, the words are lightly crossed in pencil. p. 29

[2] For extracts and critical remarks on the books *Bäuerliche Zustände in Deutschland*. Berichte, veröffentlicht vom Verein für Sozialpolitik. Bd. 1-3. Leipzig, 1883 (*The Condition of the Peasants in*

Germany. Published by the Social Policy Association. Vols. 1, 2, 3) see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 166-80. Lenin used this material in his work, "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 180-81, and Vol. 13, pp. 182-94). p. 29

[3] Lenin's remarks on Baudrillart's book, *Les populations agricoles de la France. La Normandie* (*passé et présent*) (*The Agricultural Population of France. Normandy* (*Past and Present*), Paris, 1880. See *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*, pp. 82-105. For Lenin's remarks on Baudrillart's book, *Les populations agricoles de la France*. 3'e série. *Les populations du Midi*, Paris, 1893 (*The Agricultural Population of France*, Part III. *The Population of the South*) see this volume pp. 258-59. p. 29

[4] A reference to the distorted translation and wrong interpretation of quotations from Frederick Engels's *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* in the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*). See *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 287-93. p. 29

[5] Lenin's remarks on the book by Hugo Böttger, *Die Sozialdemokratie auf dem Lande*, Leipzig, 1900 (*Social-Democrats in the Countryside*). See *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 304-06. p. 29

[6] *Iskra* No. 3, April 1901, carried Lenin's article "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry", which was an outline of the agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28). p. 29

[7] For Lenin's critique of P. Maslov's anti-Marxist view of the theory of rent, see present edition, Vol. 5, footnote on page 27. p. 30

[8] A reference to the book by P. Mack, *Der Aufschwung unseres Landwirtschaftsbetriebes durch Verbilligung der Produktionskosten. Eine Untersuchung über den Dienst, den Maschinentechnik und Elektrizität der Landwirtschaft bieten*, Königsberg, 1900 (*Boosting Our Agricultural Production by Reducing the Costs of Production. An Inquiry into the Services Rendered to Agriculture by Machinery and Electricity*). p. 30

[9] A reference to Kautsky's article, "Die Elektrizität in der Landwirtschaft". *Die Neue Zeit*, Stuttgart, 1900-1901, XIX. Jahrgang. Band I, No. 18, S. 565-72 ("Electricity in Agriculture", *New Times*, Stuttgart, 1900-1901, XIXth year of publication, Vol. 1, No. 18, pp. 565-72). p. 30

[10] In 1900, *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*), a journal of the liberal Narodniks, carried a series of articles by V. Chernov under the general title "Types of Capitalist and Agrarian Evolution". Lenin gave a critique of Chernov's views in "The Agrarian Ques-

tion and the 'Critics of Marx'". Here and below Lenin notes the issues and pages of the journal with Chernov's statements. p. 30

[11] Ireland was regarded as the example of a country of large landed estates and small ("starvation") leaseholdings, where tremendous wealth existed side by side with dire poverty and recurring famines a land from which masses of ruined farmers were in night. Bulgakov tried to cover up the poverty and the dying-out of the Irish farmers with Malthusian arguments about a "surplus" population and "shortage" of land, whereas the real reason lay in the monopoly of the landed estates and the fierce exploitation of the small farmers. p. 30

[12] In their preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Marx and Engels say this about landed property in the United States: "Step by step the small and middle landownership of the farmers, the basis of the whole political constitution, is succumbing to the competition of giant farms" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, p. 23). p. 31

[13] See *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 159. p. 31

[14] Lenin's remarks on Georges Blondel's book, *Études sur les populations rurales de l'Allemagne et la crise agraire* (*Studies of the Rural Population in Germany and the Agrarian Crisis*), Paris, 1897. See *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*, pp. 84-86. p. 31

[15] See *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 166-80. p. 31

[16] *2a3b*—a pseudonym of P. N. Lepeshinsky. p. 32

[17] Lenin gave a critique of Bulgakov's, "A Contribution to the Question of the Capitalist Evolution of Agriculture" which appeared in the journal of the Legal Marxists, *Nachalo*, Nos. 1-2 for 1899, in his works "Capitalism in Agriculture" (present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 105-59) and "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 103-222, and Vol. 13, pp. 169-216). p. 33

[18] *Rentengüter*—estates set up in Prussia and Poznan under laws passed by the Prussian Landtag on April 26, 1886, June 27, 1890 and July 7, 1891, for the purpose of settling German peasants in the eastern provinces of Germany. The establishment of these estates was designed to strengthen German and weaken Polish influence in these provinces and to assure the big landowners of cheap labour. This involved the break-up of large landed estates (sometimes bought from Polish landowners) into small and medium tracts title to which was transferred to German peasants upon the payment of the capital amount or the annual rent. When a settler bought the land by paying the annual rent, he was restricted in his disposal of it: he was not free, without government permission, to divide the estate, sell it in parcels, etc. p. 35

[19] This is an outline of the contents of the second part of Lenin's "The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx'" which was first published in *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*) No. 2 in February 1906. The pagination of the manuscript by chapters warrants the assumption that it dates to the period when Lenin was preparing the manuscript for publication in the journal. p. 39

[20] The two remarks at the bottom of the manuscript enclosed in rectangles are a reckoning of the time it took to read this part of the manuscript. The first remark relates to Chapter V and the first part of Chapter VI, and is the result of Lenin's trial in rapid silent reading on the basis of which he drew the conclusion (in the second remark) that it would take "about 2 hours" to read the whole manuscript. p. 39

[21] This material is preparatory for Lenin's lectures on "Marxist Views of the Agrarian Question in Europe and Russia" which he gave at the Higher Russian School of Social Sciences in Paris on February 10-13 (23-26), 1903. The school was founded in 1901 by a group of liberal professors who had been expelled by the tsarist government from higher schools in Russia (M. M. Kovalevsky, Y. S. Gambarov and E. V. de Roberti); assistance was given to the school by I. I. Mechnikov, Elise Reclus, G. Tard and others. It operated legally. The student body consisted mainly of young revolutionary Russian émigrés in Paris and Russian students. Lenin was invited to lecture on the agrarian question at the insistence of *Iskra*'s Paris group with the support of the Social-Democratic section of the students. Lenin gave four lectures on February 10, 11, 12 and 13 (23, 24, 25 and 26), 1903 and these were a great success.

In preparing for his lectures, Lenin studied many sources on the agrarian question and made numerous extracts from the works of Marx and Engels, the resolutions of the International, and from books and articles by Russian and foreign authors (P. P. Maslov, V. P. Vorontsov, David, Nossig, Böttger, Stumpfe, etc.); he also compiled tables on the basis of Bavarian, Prussian, Württemberg, Dutch and other agricultural inquiries, and made a special translation of Engels's article, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 295-300). Lenin drew up a programme for his lectures and mailed it to the school beforehand, and wrote two variants of the plan. p. 40

[22] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, p. 812, and also Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 155-56. p. 40

[23] See Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 426-27). p. 40

[24] The first four chapters of Lenin's "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" were published in *Zarya* (*Dawn*), a Marxist

scientific and political journal (published legally at Stuttgart in 1901 and 1902 by the *Iskra* Editorial Board). They appeared in No. 2-3 in December 1901, under the title "The 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question. First Essay". p. 40

[25] See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 215-22 and the extract "On the Question of the Co-operatives" from the German agricultural statistics in *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 302. p. 41

[26] For Lenin's remarks with an analysis of the data from the Bavarian and Württemberg inquiries see *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*, pp. 50-80, and 155-60. p. 41

[27] A reference to the following articles by Marx and Engels: "Die Gesetzenwurf über die Aufhebung der Feudallasten" ("The Bill on the Abolition of Feudal Services") and "Die Polendebatte in Frankfurt" ("Debates on the Polish Question in Frankfort") (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, Berlin, 1959, S. 278-83, 331-35 and 341-46). For extracts from these articles see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 303. p. 41

[28] A reference to an article by Marx and Engels entitled "Zirkular gegen Kriege" ("Anti-Kriege Circular"), section two "Oekonomie des *Volks-Tribunen* und seine Stellung zum Jungen Amerika" ("The Political Economy of *Volks-Tribun* and Its Attitude to Young America") (see Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 4, Berlin, 1959, S. 8-11). p. 41

[29] For extracts from the resolutions of congresses of the International see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 303-04. p. 41

[30] A reference to the 1874 second section of Engels's Prefatory Note to his work "The Peasant War in Germany" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 648-54. p. 41

[31] A reference to the debates at the German Social-Democratic Parteitag in Breslau in October 1895. p. 41

[32] Lenin's remarks on P. Maslov's book, *Conditions of Agricultural Development in Russia*, see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 307-09; see also Lenin's letter to Plekhanov (present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 150-51). p. 42

[33] "Essay II" means chapters V to IX of Lenin's "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", published in *Obrazovaniye* No. 2, February 1906 (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 159-222). p. 42

[34] Lenin calculated the rent on a page of the manuscript containing the entry: "Essay II (agrarian statistics)". p. 43

[35] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, p. 812. p. 45

[36] A reference to Karl Kautsky's book *Die Agrarfrage* (*The Agrarian Question*). p. 45

[37] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, p. 798. p. 45

[38] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, pp. 748-72, Chapter XXXXV "Absolute Ground-Rent". p. 46

[39] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, pp. 670-71. p. 47

[40] For the extract with Marx's comment on R. Jones (*Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, pp. 780-81) see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 309-10, and also Lenin's *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 305-06). p. 47

[41] N.—on.—N. F. Danielson. p. 49

[42] A reference to P. A. Vikhlyaev's "Sketches of Russian Agricultural Reality", St. Petersburg, 1901. p. 50

[43] Lenin's lecture on "The Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and of the Social-Democrats" was read in Paris on March 3, 1903, after the lectures on the agrarian question at the Higher Russian School of Social Sciences. The rules of the school did not allow Lenin to draw any conclusions concerning the programme and tactics of the Party in his lectures, and so he formulated them in a special lecture given outside the school, for members of the Russian colony. His lecture was discussed for four days, from March 3 to 6. Among his opponents were Nevzorov (Y. M. Steklov) from the *Borba* group, B. N. Krichevsky from *Rabocheye Dyelo*, Vladimirov (V. M. Chernov) from the Narodniks, N. Chaikovsky and O. Minor from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and V. Cherkezov from the anarchists.

The present volume contains two variants of the outline of the lecture, the plans and the outlines of the concluding speech and the resumé of the lecture. For Lenin's records of the speeches of his opponents and extracts from various sources and writings see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*.

The volume and content of the lecture outlines warrant the assumption that he also intended to use them as the plan for a pamphlet against the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Of his intention to write such a pamphlet, Lenin told Plekhanov in a letter of January 28, 1903 (see *Lenin Miscellany IV*, p. 208). p. 53

[44] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, founded in late 1901-early 1902 as a result of the merger of various Narodnik groups and circles (the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, etc.). The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-

05), and the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05), and later the newspaper *Znamya Truda* (*Banner of Labour*) (1907-14) were its official organs. The views of the S.R.s. were a mixture of Narodnik and revisionist ideas; the S.R.s tried, said Lenin, to "patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The S.R.s failed to see the class distinctions between the proletariat and the peasantry, glossed over the class stratification and contradictions within the peasantry, and denied the proletariat's leading role in the revolution. Their tactics of individual terrorism, which they claimed to be the main means of fighting the autocracy, did a great deal of harm to the revolutionary movement and made it more difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the S.R.s called for abolition of private property in land and for egalitarian tenure by communes, and also development of all types of co-operatives. This programme, which the S.R.s claimed would "socialise" the land, had nothing socialist about it, because, as Lenin proved, the elimination of private property in land alone would not do away with the domination of capital and mass poverty. The real and historically progressive content of their programme was the struggle to abolish the landed estates, a demand which was an objective reflection of the interests and aspirations of the peasants during the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the S.R.s' attempts to masquerade as socialists, waged a persistent struggle against the S.R.s for influence among the peasants and showed the harm their tactics of individual terrorism were inflicting on the working-class movement. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were prepared on definite terms to enter into temporary agreements with the S.R.s to fight against tsarism.

Because the peasantry consisted of diverse class elements, the S.R. Party ultimately failed to achieve ideological and political stability and suffered from organisational confusion, constantly vacillating between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As early as the years of the first Russian revolution, its Right wing split off from the Party to form the legal Trudovik Popular Socialist Party (Popular Socialists), which held views close to those of the Cadets, while its Left wing took shape as a semi-anarchist League of "Maximalists". During the period of the Stolypin reaction, the S.R. Party was plunged into total ideological and organisational disarray. During the years of the First World War, most S.R.s adopted social-chauvinist attitudes.

After the victory of the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, the S.R.s joined the Mensheviks as the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landowner Provisional Government, and their leaders (Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov) were members of the government. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasant demand for eliminating the landed estates and

came out in favour of preserving them. S.R. Ministers of the Provisional Government dispatched punitive expeditions against peasants seizing landed estates.

At the end of November 1917, the Left wing of the S.R.s formed an independent Left S.R. Party. In an effort to retain their influence among the peasant masses, the Left S.R.s gave nominal recognition to the Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon began to fight against the Soviet Government.

During the years of the foreign military intervention and the Civil War, the S.R.s engaged in counter-revolutionary subversive activity and gave active support to the interventionists and whiteguards, taking part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organising terrorist acts against the leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the Civil War, the S.R.s continued their hostile activity against the Soviet state at home and among the whiteguard émigrés abroad. p. 53

[45] *Narodism*—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement which emerged in the 1860s and 1870s. The Narodniks worked to overthrow the autocracy and hand the landed estates over to the peasants.

At the same time, they denied that capitalist relations were naturally developing in Russia and so believed the peasantry and not the proletariat, to be the chief revolutionary force; they regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. Their tactics—individual acts of terrorism—could not and did not bring them success; they failed equally in their efforts to revolutionise the peasantry by spreading the ideas of utopian socialism.

In the 1880s-1890s, the Narodniks were prepared to accept the tsarist regime; they expressed the interests of the kulaks and fought Marxism tooth and claw. p. 53

[46] Here and below the references are to A. Rudin's pamphlet, *On the Peasant Question*, 1903. Lenin wrote Plekhanov on January 28, 1903: "Have you seen the pamphlet by Rudin (a Socialist-Revolutionary, *On the Peasant Question*)? What brazen swindlers! I am itching to do something about this Rudin and No. 15 on socialisation!... It has occurred to me to write an article against Rudin and have a special publication of articles against the Socialist-Revolutionaries together with 'Revolutionary Adventurism'" (*Lenin Miscellany IV*, p. 208). p. 53

[47] A quotation from the appeal "From the Peasant Union of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to All Workers of Revolutionary Socialism in Russia", which was carried by *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, p. 8.

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya (*Revolutionary Russia*)—an illegal paper of the S.R.s, published in Russia from the end of 1900 by the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries (No. 1, dated 1900, actually appeared in January 1901). From January 1902 to December

1905, the paper was published abroad (in Geneva) as the official organ of the S.R. Party.

In his outlines of the lecture on "The Agrarian Programme of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and of the Social-Democrats", Lenin gave a critique of the article "The Peasant Movement" and the appeal which appeared in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8, and also of a series of articles in Nos. 11-15 under the general title of "Programme Questions". p. 53

[48] Lenin's remarks on the pamphlet *To All the Russian Peasantry from the Peasant Union of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*, 1902. See *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 315-16. p. 56

[49] A reference to A. S. Martynov's pamphlet, *The Workers and the Revolution*, published by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats, Geneva, 1902. p. 56

[50] See quotation from A. N. Engelhardt's book, *From the Countryside*, in *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 310. p. 56

[51] For a summary of these data see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 313, and for a commentary on them, the resumé of the lecture (this volume, p. 67). p. 56

[52] For the quotation from V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov) see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 311-12; Lenin gave a part of this quotation and a comment on it in his article "Reply to Criticism of Our Draft Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 449). p. 57

[53] Lenin's remarks on the book *Les syndicats agricoles et leur oeuvre* par le comte de Rocquigny (Count de Rocquigny. *Agricultural Syndicates and Their Activity*). See *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*, pp. 24-49. p. 57

[54] There is a mistake in the name of the source. It should be *Russkiye Vedomosti* (*Russian Recorder*), to whose editorial V. Chernov referred in the discussion of Lenin's lecture on March 4, 1903. See *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 270 and p. 282 (point 12). p. 64

[55] On February 4, 1903, *Russkiye Vedomosti* reported on a conference of landlords and tenants held in Dublin in December 1902. The conference produced a report stating the general terms on which, it believed, the land could be bought out from the landlords with the help of the Treasury. p. 66

[56] These figures characterise the different class sections of the peasantry owning horses, and mean that 1.5 million farms of the peasant bourgeoisie had 6.5 million horses of the total of 14 million on the peasant farms; 2 million middle-peasant farms had 4 million horses; 6.5 million semi-proletarian and proletarian farms (that is, the farms of the peasant poor) had 3.5 million

horses. For details see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 381, and *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, p. 343. p. 68

[57] These are two variants of the plan for an article or a lecture on "The Peasantry and Social-Democracy". There is no record of Lenin having done either.

Lenin's notes on his study of the authors referred to in these plans are published in this volume, and also in *Lenin Miscellanies XIX*, *XXXI* and *XXXII*. p. 69

[58] The summary and critical remarks on S. Bulgakov's book, *Capitalism and Agriculture*, were set down by Lenin in a notebook which he entitled, "*Agrarian Material. Russian* (*and Foreign*) Writings on the Agrarian Question". This preparatory material was extensively used in his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", in which he gave a comprehensive critique of Bulgakov's views. p. 73

[59] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1966, p. 745. p. 73

[60] These figures mean that 55 farmers owned agricultural machines in 1855 and 236, in 1861, and that the number of those using machinery was 1,205. In 1871, the two categories were counted together and gave a total of 2,160, and in 1881, 4,222. p. 76

[61] In 1892, the British Parliament passed the *Small Holdings Act* in an attempt to keep the farmers in the countryside and revive the yeomanry, the small peasants ruined in the 18th and the early 19th centuries who had been a source of cheap labour for the big capitalist farms. The Act was not extensively applied and was of small practical importance. p. 77

[62] *Instleute*, Instmann—agricultural labourers in Germany signing long-term contracts and living in their own dwellings on land owned by big landowners. In addition to cash, they also received a part of the crop from a specified plot of land (half-tenancy). p. 78

[63] *Middleman*—a type of kulak acting between landlords and tenants in Ireland. They leased tracts of land from landlords (from 20 to 150 acres and over), split them up into small parcels (from 1 to 5 acres) and leased them by the year to small tenants on harsh terms. p. 84

[64] P.S.—author of the article "Die neuere russische Gesetzgebung über den Gemeindebesitz" ("The Latest Russian Communal Legislation") in *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* (*Archives of Social Legislation and Statistics*), 7. Band, Berlin, 1894. S. 626-52. p. 97

[65] Lenin used this material in his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 140-44). p. 107

[66] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1965, pp. 335 and 348. p. 108

[67] Lenin gave a critical analysis of the data from M. Hecht's book, *Drei Dörfer der badischen Hard* (*Three Villages in the Hard of Baden*), Leipzig, 1895, in Chapter V of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'"—"'The Prosperity of Advanced, Modern Small Farms'. The Baden Example" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 159-67). p. 116

[68] In the first line of this note Lenin indicates a discrepancy in Hecht's data concerning the size of area under grain in Friedrichsthal. On p. 28 the author says that the area under grain was 143 Morgen = 51.48 ha, but on p. 21, the figure is said to be 18 per cent of the total area under crop which gives 46.44 ha. The second line of the note is a rough recalculation of 678 Morgen (the area under grain for Blankenloch on p. 28 of Hecht's book) into hectares. p. 122

[69] The first column of figures (dividend) shows the total area of land (in ha) for each village separately: Friedrichsthal, Blankenloch and Hagsfeld; the second column (divisor) shows the average quantity of land (in ha) per family for each village; the third column gives the rough number of families in each village. p. 122

[70] Lenin gave a part of his critical analysis of H. Auhagen's article "Ueber Gross- und Kleinbetrieb in der Landwirtschaft" ("On Large- and Small-Scale Production in Agriculture") in Chapter VI of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", entitled "The Productivity of a Small and a Big Farm. An Example from East Prussia" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 168-69). p. 126

[71] The source analysed by Lenin contains a mistake: the figure should be 1,806.58 instead of 806.58. Lenin corrected it in "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 168); there should be a corresponding change in the figure 1,965.08 and the percentages. p. 131

[72] While working on "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", Lenin made use of material from an article by the German economist K. Klawki, "Ueber Konkurrenzfähigkeit des landwirtschaftlichen Kleinbetriebes" ("The Competitive Capacity of Small-Scale Production in Agriculture") which appeared in Thiel's *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher* (Thiel's *Agricultural Yearbooks*), Bd. XXVIII, Berlin, 1899.

Klawki's article gives a description of 12 typical German farms (four each of the large, medium and small) operating in similar conditions. Lenin made a thorough examination of and critically reworked the data given in the article, which was a detailed inquiry but did not provide the necessary generalisations and correct conclusions. The data from Klawki's article were used by Lenin mainly in Chapter VI, "The Productivity of a Small and a Big Farm. An Example from East Prussia" (present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 167-81). Lenin showed the groundlessness of Bulgakov's

attempts to use Klawki's article to back up the bourgeois theory that small farms were superior to large farms. The scientific treatment of the data given in Klawki's inquiries, says Lenin, confirms the technical superiority of big farms and shows that the small farmer is overworked and underfed, being gradually degraded to day labourer or farm-hand on the large farm; Lenin shows that as the number of small farms grows there is a spread of poverty and proletarisation among the peasantry.

Lenin's conclusions, drawn after a thorough examination and reworking of the data in Klawki's article, are borne out by the mass data on peasant farms in Germany. In contrast to Klawki who failed to go into the substance of economic processes and ignored the comparative analysis of different groups of farms (basing his conclusions on indiscriminate averages), Lenin gave a profound Marxist analysis of the development of peasant farms under capitalism and brought out their various types. On the strength of these data, Lenin drew up a summarised table (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 170).

As a result of his careful verification and scientific tabulation of the data in Klawki's article, Lenin showed that the latter was wrong in calculating the comparative incomes on large and small farms. Lenin said the unscientific methods used by Klawki to show the superiority of the small farms were, in their main features practised by all bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists. That is why an examination of all these methods, as exemplified by Klawki's inquiry, is of great interest. Lenin took the concrete statistical data with which Klawki operated to expose the false methods used in the processing and employment of statistical data, and also the completely unfounded conclusions drawn by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists concerning the laws governing agricultural development under capitalism. p. 148

[73] *Landwirtschaftliche benutzte Fläche*—cultivated farmland. In his preparatory material, Lenin uses the term in most cases without translating it into the Russian, and includes in it farmland in the strict sense of the term (that is, land under crops, meadows and best pastures) and also orchards, vegetable gardens and vineyards. In some cases, Lenin translates this term as "farmland" (see p. 192). On p. 358, Lenin indicates that the German source substituted the term "Ueberhaupt landwirtschaftliche Fläche" for "landwirtschaftliche benutzte Fläche" to designate the same data.

In his work *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. Part One. *Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America*, Lenin wrote: "In grouping farms by acreage, American statisticians take total acreage and not just the improved area, which would, of course, be the more correct method, and is the one employed by German statisticians" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 49). p. 144

[74] *Scharwerker*—an able-bodied member of the family or a non-member living in the household of the agricultural labourer and

bound by the contract between the head of the household and the landowner to work on the landowner's estate but paid by the head of the family. p. 148

[75] *Deputant*—a labourer who is paid a permanent annual cash wage and in addition gets specified payments in kind as part of his wage—a plot of land and a dwelling on the landowner's estate. p. 155

[76] *Deputant's land*—land made available by the landowner to an agricultural labourer under contract in part payment of his wages in kind. p. 158

[77] The manuscript is a notebook bearing this title on the cover in a coloured pencil. The extracts must have been made at the same time as those from Klawki's article (see pp. 138-59), because at the end of the extracts from Klawki's article there is a note saying "Cf. ***Brase***'s article, especially pp. 292 and 297-98." p. 160

[78] Data from A. Souchon's book, *La proprieté paysanne* (*Peasant Property*), was to be used in "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" and in the lectures on "Marxist Views of the Agrarian Question in Europe and Russia", which Lenin gave in Paris on February 23-26, 1903 and also for his work "The Peasantry and Social-Democracy" (see pp. 29, 41, 49, 70). p. 170

[79] Souchon's reference (text and footnote 1 on p. 24 of his book) to *Ministère de l'agriculture française. Enquête de 1892*, p. 247 à 249 (*The French Ministry of Agriculture*, 1892 Inquiry). p. 170

[80] *The Allotments Act* was adopted on September 16, 1887, with the view of allotting small parcels of land to labourers. Souchon says the following: "The application of the Allotments Act in essence consists in giving the labourers tiny plots to enable them to eke out their earnings with some meagre agricultural resources, and at best to have one cow or a few sheep" (p. 151). p. 172

[81] Lenin intended to use the material on F. Maurice's book, *L'agriculture et la question sociale. La France agricole et agraire* (*Agriculture and the Social Question. Agricultural and Agrarian France*) Paris, 1892 in his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'". See plans for this work on pp. 29, 31, 35, 36. p. 173

[82] Lenin read the book by A. von Chłapowo-Chłapowski, *Die belgische Landwirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert. Münchener volkswirtschaftliche Studien*. Herausgegeben von L. Brentano und W. Lotz. Stuttgart, 1900 (*Agriculture in Belgium in the 19th Century. Munich Economic Studies*), when preparing "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'". This is indicated by his mention of the book in the preliminary plans for his work (see pp. 29, 32, 36). Lenin also intended to use this material in his lectures on the agrarian question in Paris (see p. 49). p. 178

[83] The present volume contains a part of Lenin's remarks on the Baden Inquiry.

The extracts from the Baden Inquiry are preparatory material for Chapter VII, "The Inquiry into Peasant Farming in Baden", in "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" in which extensive use of the data is made for an analysis and characteristic of the class stratification of the peasantry under capitalism. Lenin said the materials of the Baden Inquiry made it possible to distinguish and bring out different groups of peasants. However, the authors failed to give any scientific grouping of peasant farms; instead of comparing the various groups of farms, they compared whole communities. This method of using indiscriminate averages, thereby glossing over the class distinctions within the peasantry was used by the "critics of Marx" in the agrarian question.

Lenin gave a scientific characteristic of the class structure of the German countryside and for that purpose used the summarised data of the Baden Inquiry. He brought out three typical economic groups: the large-, the middle- and the small-peasant farms, and to do this he processed and analysed statistical data relating to 31 large 21 medium and 18 small farms.

For the three typical groups of peasant farms, Lenin determined the average size of landholding, the average size of family and employment of hired labour, and also the results of economic operations in the form of net profit. In working out the data on landholdings and net profit, Lenin gave two calculation variants for all the 70 farms, and for the group minus the 10 farms in the three communities which had exceptionally large holdings. This method of bringing out typical phenomena, with a simultaneous verification of conclusions on the data for the whole aggregate of phenomena, is of great importance for statistical methods.

As a result of his economic analysis, Lenin showed that the big-peasant farms using hired labour, permanent and casual, and obtaining the highest net profit per farm, were entrepreneurial and capitalist. Meanwhile, the small-peasant farms were hardly managing to make ends meet. On the strength of the scientifically processed data of the Baden Inquiry on the quantity of the key products consumed by the groups of peasant farms, Lenin showed that the small peasant was cutting back his consumption which was well below that of the middle and the big peasant. If the small peasant spent as much on cash products as the middle peasant did, he would run up a great debt and the middle peasant would also incur a debt if he spent as much as the big one. According to this, Lenin drew the conclusion that the "'net profit', not only of the small peasant, but also of the middle peasant is a *pure fiction*" (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 185). In this way Lenin exposed the false method used by the "critics of Marx" to understate the plight of the small peasants, their malnutrition and ruin.

On the strength of his analysis of the Baden Inquiry, Lenin concluded that the main features of the peasant economy in Germany were similar to those in Russia, and that the process of capitalist development was leading to the formation of a minority

of capitalist farms operating with hired labour, and forcing the majority of peasants increasingly to seek subsidiary employment, that is, to become wage workers. "The differentiation of the peasantry," Lenin wrote, "reveals the profoundest contradictions of capitalism in the very process of their inception and their further development. A complete evaluation of these contradictions inevitably leads to the recognition of the small peasantry's blind alley and hopeless position (hopeless, outside the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the entire capitalist system)" (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 190). In this way, Lenin showed the economic basis for the common interests of the working class and the small peasantry, and the need for their alliance in the struggle against capitalism.

The material Lenin obtained as a result of his work on the Baden Inquiry, apart from its great political and economic importance, was also of major methodological importance for an understanding of the methods Lenin used to process and apply statistical data in Marxist economic analysis (for instance, the use of scientifically tabulated statistical groupings of peasant farms, determination and use on their basis of differentiated averages for income, consumption, etc., by class groups of peasants). Lenin's methods for processing statistical data are a valuable contribution to the methodology of Marxist statistics.

p. 180

[84] The extracts of data on 70 budgets mentioned here are a big table entitled "Summary of Data on 70 budgets from the Baden Inquiry", which included the statistical data from the Baden Inquiry processed by Lenin. These extracts made in a notebook are at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. When tabulating these data for large-, middle- and small-peasant farms, Lenin determined the average landholdings, size of family, and current receipts and outlays (showing the major items) and calculated the surplus or deficit by comparing the receipts and outlays. In addition, the table contains the indicators on labour (such as the expenditure of labour per hectare, hired labour, showing day labour separately), and also data on subsidiary earnings, etc. For an analysis of these data see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 182-88. p. 181

[85] The text of Chapters VII and IX (as first published in the journal *Obrazovaniye* No. 2, 1906) of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" shows that in that work Lenin intended to examine French agricultural statistics and to give a critical analysis of the works of French economists. Judging by a note in Chapter IX (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 215), he made a special study of the state of wine-growing in France. It is possible, therefore, that he used E. Seignouret's book, *Essais d'économie sociale et agricole* (*Essays on Social and Agricultural Economics*), to prepare his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" in June-September 1901. p. 186

[86] Lenin's notebook entitled "From German Agrarian Statistics" contains remarks on and extracts from *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Neue Folge, Bd. 112. *Die Landwirtschaft im Deutschen Reich nach der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebszählung vom 14. VI. 1895*, Berlin, 1898 (*Statistics of the German Reich*, New Series, Vol. 112. *Agriculture in the German Reich According to the Agricultural Census of June 14, 1895*). It shows how Lenin processed the data of the two agricultural censuses in Germany (1882 and 1895), which he used to prepare "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (mainly chapters VIII and IX). The notebook dates to the first period of Lenin's writing of this work (1900-01). It contains some later extracts made by Lenin from the German agricultural census of 1907 in *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 212, Teil 1a.—*Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907. Landwirtschaftliche Betriebsstatistik*, Berlin, 1909 and Band 212, Teil 2a, 1910 (*Statistics of the German Reich*, Vol. 212, part 1a.—Census of Occupations and Enterprises of June 12, 1907. *Statistics of Agricultural Enterprises*, Berlin, 1909, and Vol. 212, part 2a, 1910). Lenin made these additions in 1910 for a work on German agriculture.

Lenin used the German agricultural statistics to show that the "critics" of Marx's economic doctrine were wrong when they said that in the West large farms were being supplanted by the middle- and small-peasant farms.

Having reworked the German agrarian statistics, Lenin showed two processes of proletarisation of the peasantry: first, more and more peasants were being deprived of their land which meant that farmers were being transformed into landless labourers; second, the peasants were increasingly dependent on subsidiary earnings, that is, there was a growing integration of agriculture and industry, which marked the first stage of proletarisation.

Lenin's treatment of German agrarian statistics sets a model for the scientific analysis and processing of statistical data. Lenin did not stop at grouping farms under one head (say, area), but went on to classify them under several heads, such as number of agricultural machines, area under special crops, etc., and used combined groupings, e.g., dividing each group (say, acreage) into subgroups by quantity of cattle and other characteristics. Lenin found that he had to rework and verify the statistical data he made use of; he reworked a number of tables (such as that characterising the concentration of commercial gardening, etc.), widening the intervals between the groups of farms to find the more typical, and at the same time bringing out the latifundia connected with industries (sugar refining, wine-making, etc.). Lenin calculated the percentages showing for instance, the share of separate groups of farms, determined the absolute averages showing the use of the major types of agricultural machines per 100 farms in each group of farms (grouped by acreage), etc. p. 189

[87] Lenin summarised these data on land concentration in wine-growing on the basis of the preceding table. The left column of

figures denotes the grouping of farms, the right column, the corresponding grouping of land for these farms. The first pair of figures relates to vineyards under 20 ares; the second, to vineyards of 20 to 50 ares; the third, to vineyards of 50 ares-5 hectares and over. p. 192

[88] Lenin examines the data on the number of cows on various farms in 1895 to characterise the concentration of cattle on the large farms. The total number of farms and the total number of cows on all farms of all three groups are given in the manuscript at the top of the table (for lack of space below). p. 213

[89] Fragmentary notes on separate sheets.

In addition, the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.P.S.U. Central Committee has unpublished preparatory material relating to French agricultural statistics, which contains summaries and extracts from various sources. Among them are, above all, the collections *Statistique agricole de la France. Résultats généraux de l'enquête décennale de 1892* (*Agricultural Statistics of France. General Results of the 1892 Decennial Inquiry*), *Statistique générale de la France. Résultats statistiques du Dénombrement de 1896* (*General Statistics of France. Statistical Results of the 1896 Census*) and also the results of censuses for other years. Lenin also made many statistical extracts with explanations and critical remarks on the following books: K. Kautsky, *Die Agrarfrage* (*The Agrarian Question*); S. Bulgakov, *Capitalism and Agriculture*, Vol. II; F. Maurice. *L'agriculture et la question sociale. La France agricole et agraire* (*Agriculture and the Social Question. Agricultural and Agrarian France*); A. Souchon, *La proprieté paysanne. Étude d'économie rurale* (*Peasant Property. An Essay on Agricultural Economy*); N. Kudrin, *The Peasant Question in France*; *The Bulletin of the Labour Bureau* for 1901, etc.

Most of the extracts from French statistics are summarised data, in particular, groupings of farms by acreage for various years. Lenin notes as a positive aspect of the French statistics the separate classification of the "active" (that is, the gainfully employed) population, and makes extensive extracts of data by categories within the "active" population. Lenin takes the same data from the above-mentioned book by Maurice and makes a comparison of similar statistical data taken from various sources; he characterises these sources and draws conclusions on the annual changes in the numerical strength and share of each group (category) of the "active" population.

This material from French agricultural statistics, reworked and summarised by Lenin, added up to a comprehensive picture of various aspects of farming among different class groups of peasant farms, confirming the Marxist propositions concerning the superiority of large farms and the growth of their role, and the proletarisation of the small peasants. p. 218

[90] This summarised table was compiled by Lenin on the strength of the statistics of the countries concerned for the corresponding years. The separate data on Germany, Britain and the United States were taken from the *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 112; some of the data on France, from the same source, and others, from the *Statistique agricole de la France. Résultats généraux de l'enquête décennale de 1892*. Tableaux; the data on Belgium from the *Statistique de la Belgique. Agriculture. Recensement général de 1880* (*Statistics of Belgium. Agriculture. General Census of 1880*) and from *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique 1896* (*The Statistical Yearbook of Belgium for 1896*); the data for Denmark, from *Die Neue Zeit*, XIX. Jahrgang 1900-1901, Band II, p. 623 G. Bang's article, "Die landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung Dänemarks" ("Agricultural Development of Denmark"). p. 224

[91] Lenin gave the name of Dutch agricultural inquiry of 1890 to "Uitkomsten van het Onderzoek naar den Toestand van den Landbouw in Nederland" ("The Results of the Inquiry into the State of Agriculture in the Netherlands") published in four volumes at the Hague in 1890. The results of this inquiry into 95 communities differed from similar inquiries in other countries in failing to provide full data, and, as Lenin remarked, failing to give summaries for all communities. But Lenin managed to extract interesting data from this source to characterise various groups of farms (typical communities) and also groups of farms (within separate communities) classified by area, the number of labourers and farm-hands, the number of horses and other characteristics. These data showed the capitalist nature of Dutch farming. p. 227

[92] Lenin intended to give a critique of E. Stumpfe's views on large- and small-scale production in agriculture in a number of his works (see this volume, pp. 42, 49, 70), in view of the fact that many of the "critics of Marx" referred to Stumpfe's works. p. 231

[93] G. Fischer's work, *Die sociale Bedeutung der Maschinen in der Landwirtschaft* (*The Social Importance of Machinery in Agriculture*) was studied by Lenin before Stumpfe's article "Ueber die Konkurrenzfähigkeit des kleinen und mittleren Grundbesitzes gegenüber dem Grossgrundbesitze" ("On the Competitiveness of Small and Medium Land Holdings as Compared with Large Land Holdings"). In his extracts from this article, Lenin mentions Fischer's work as having been studied by him (see p. 238). p. 248

[94] Lenin's remark at the end of the text "No wonder its pages remain uncut (at the British Museum)" warrants the assumption that Lenin studied Turot's book during his stay in London, where *Iskra* was then being published, that is, not earlier than April 1902. In London, Lenin made a study of the agrarian question in connection with the working out of the Party's agrarian pro-

gramme; before giving his lectures and talk in Paris (in February-March 1903), he studied the French agricultural economy. Turot's book is also mentioned in Lenin's notes on the book by E. Lecouteux (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*, p. 381). p. 257

[95] Lenin first mentioned Baudrillart in his extracts from Hertz's book *The Agrarian Questions in Relation to Socialism* (June-September 1901). In his plans for "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" Lenin refers to Baudrillart from mention of him by Hertz and Bulgakov. In the outlines of his lectures on "Marxist Views of the Agrarian Question in Europe and Russia" (1903, before February 10 (23)), Lenin refers to Baudrillart's works as having been studied by him earlier. This volume contains Lenin's remarks on one book by H. Baudrillart, *Les populations agricoles de la France*. 3-me sèrie. *Les populations du Midi* (*The Agricultural Population of France*. Part 3. *The Population of the South*), Paris 1893. For extracts from and critical remarks on another of Baudrillart's books, *Les populations agricoles de la France. La Normandie* (*The Agricultural Population of France. Normandy*), Paris 1880 see *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*, pp. 82-105. Both take up the greater part of a notebook which Lenin entitled "*Baudrillart*+Backhaus". p. 258

[96] The full name of the book is Comte de Rocquigny, *Les syndicats agricoles et leur oeuvre* (*Agricultural Syndicates and Their Activity*), Paris, 1900. For extracts with Lenin's critical remarks on this book see *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*, pp. 24-49. p. 261

[97] A reference to Élie Coulet's book, *Le mouvement syndical et coopératif dans l'agriculture française. La fédération agricole*. (*The Syndicalist and Co-operative Movement in French Agriculture. The Agricultural Federation*). Montpellier, 1898. See p. 260. p. 261

[98] Rouanet, quoting Deschanel's speech in the Chamber of Deputies extolling the activity of the agricultural syndicates in favour of the labourers, said: "That is how Mr. Deschanel writes the history of agricultural syndicates to the applause of members of these syndicates who thrilled with delight when they suddenly learned of the excellent things they had done." p. 262

[99] In his lectures, "Marxist Views of the Agrarian Question in Europe and Russia", and in his talks in Paris, Lenin mentions Nossig as one of "many writers who sympathise with the criticism of the Marxist theory rather than with this theory itself". He adds: "Their own data speak against them" (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 345). Notes on the manuscript indicate that Lenin repeatedly returned to it. Thus, some words are retraced in blue pencil, apparently to make for easier reading; the translation of some words is given in plain pencil in brackets. p. 263

[100] Lenin read E. David's book, *Socialismus and Landwirtschaft* (*Socialism and Agriculture*) soon after it was published. In a letter to G. V. Plekhanov on March 15, 1903, Lenin wrote: "I had already ordered David's book and am now reading it. Terribly watery, poor and trite" (present edition, Vol. 34, p. 150). In an article entitled "Les beaux esprits se rencontrent (Which May Be Interpreted Roughly as: Birds of a Feather Flock Together)" (which was published in *Iskra* No. 38, April 15, 1903) Lenin criticised the main propositions of David's book (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 431-33). Lenin gave a full-scale critique of David's book—"the principal work of revisionism on the agrarian question"—in Chapter X of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 171-82).

The nature of Lenin's underlinings shows that he returned to his remarks and brought out some places in blue and red pencils; in a second reading, he underlined in red pencil all the sources mentioned in the manuscript. p. 265

[101] A reference to Engels's article "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 420-40). p. 265

[102] Empty talk and unbridled flights of fancy, after a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, the landowner Manilov. p. 271

[103] A reference to the work of V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov), *Progressive Trends in Peasant Farming*, St. Petersburg, 1892, pp. 70-84 (see present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 274-75). p. 275

[104] A reference to Drechsler's data which he published as the results of two agricultural inquiries in 1875 and 1884. Lenin is referring to two works on this question: 1) "Die bäuerlichen Zustände in einigen Teilen der Provinz Hannover" in *Schrifen den Vereins für Sozialpolitik*. XXIV. 1883; 2) "Die Verteilung des Grundbesitzes und der Viehhaltung im Bezirke des landwirtschaftlichen Kreisvereins Göttingen" in *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher* herausgegeben von Dr. H. Thiel. XV. Band. Berlin, 1886 [1) "The Condition of Peasants in Some Parts of the Province of Hannover" in the *Works of the Social Policy Association*; 2) "Distribution of Land Property and Cattle in the Area of the Göttingen District Agricultural Society", in the *Agricultural Yearbooks* published by Dr. H. Thiel]. Lenin gave a critical analysis of the data from both works in Chapter XI of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 183-94). p. 281

[105] The notes and extracts from *Hand and Machine Labor* (*Thirteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, 1898, Vols. I and II), which first appeared in the Fourth Russian edition of Lenin's Collected Works, were made in a notebook containing extracts from books on economics, statistics and philosophy, and also from newspapers dated October 19 and 21, 1904. Lenin must have made these extracts at the Geneva Library in the autumn of 1904.

The following reference is noted on the second page of the manuscript: "See examples on separate sheet." The examples taken from both volumes of the book, *Hand and Machine Labor*, and noted down by Lenin on a separate sheet are given on pp. 284-86 of this volume. p. 282

[106] Lenin first mentions the work of Leo Huschke, *Landwirtschaftliche Reinertrags-Berechnungen bei Klein-, Mittel- und Grossbetrieb dargelegt an typischen Beispielen Mittelthüringens* (*Calculation of Net Income in Agricultural Production on Small, Medium and Large Farms from Typical Examples in Central Thüringia*) in two of his plans: "The Peasantry and Social-Democracy" (see p. 70). Lenin used some of the material published here in a footnote to Chapter VI, "The Productivity of a Small and a Big Farm. An Example from East Prussia", in the 1908 edition of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 179). He said he hoped "to return to Herr Huschke's interesting book" (ibid.). p. 287

[107] This is a notebook on the cover of which is written: "German Agrarian Statistics (1907)" and on top of that, in coloured pencil:

"1) German agrarian statistics,

"2) Russian agrarian statistics,

"3) Statistics on **strikes** in Russia + Hungarian agrarian statistics."

Lenin's study of the German agricultural census of 1907 relates to the period from 1910 (before September) to 1913 (after June).

Lenin attached special importance to an analysis of German agrarian statistics in studying the laws governing the development of capitalism in agriculture and in exposing bourgeois apologetics in the agrarian question. "Germany belongs to the leading and most rapidly developing capitalist countries. Her censuses of agricultural enterprises are possibly on a higher level than anywhere else in Europe. It is understandable therefore why German and Russian writers displayed such interest in the results of the latest census of 1907 (the first and the second censuses were taken in 1882 and in 1895). Bourgeois economists and revisionists sing out in chorus that Marxism—for the hundredth and thousandth time!—has been refuted by the data of the census" (see *Lenin Miscellany XXV*, p. 127). That is why Lenin believed that it was necessary to make a detailed analysis of the German census of 1907.

The material of German agrarian statistics was taken mainly from the three volumes of the collection *Statistik des Deutschen*

Reichs. Neue Folge. Band 112. *Die Landwirtschaft im Deutschen Reich nach der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebszählung vom 14. Juni 1895*, Berlin, 1898, *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*. Band 202. *Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907*, *Berufsstatistik*, Berlin, 1909, *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*. Band 212. *Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907*, *Landwirtschaftliche Betriebsstatistik* (Teil 1a; 1b; 2a), Berlin, 1909-10 [*Statistics of the German Reich*, New Series, Vol. 112. *Agriculture in the German Reich According to the Agricultural Census of June 14, 1895*; *Statistics of the German Reich*, Vol. 202, *Census of Occupations and Enterprises of June 12, 1907*; *Occupation Statistics*; *Statistics of the German Reich*, Vol. 212. *Census of Occupations and Enterprises of June 12, 1907. Statistics of Agricultural Enterprises* (Part 1a, 1b; 2a)].

This statistical material, like that which follows, was partially used by Lenin in the writing of his article "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 423-46). Lenin also planned to use the material of German agrarian statistics in another article on German agriculture.

The material of German agrarian statistics contains numerous extracts from tables, parts of tables and separate statistical data not only from the above-mentioned collection, *Statistics of the German Reich*, but also from articles by Zahn, Schmelzle and others. Some data on fertilisers were taken from French sources.

The material of German agrarian statistics which Lenin processed and systematised illustrated various forms of capitalist development in agriculture.

On the strength of the extensive statistical data on the agricultural population contained in German agrarian statistics, Lenin studied the proletarisation of the peasantry. The data on the use of machinery, the percentage of farms with draught cattle, and the composition of the draught animals, the growth of agricultural industries, dairy farming, etc., showed the development of large-scale capitalist production.

Special interest attaches to Lenin's explanations to the table (taken from the results of the 1907 Census in Volume 202 of the *Statistics of the German Reich*) which classifies the population by main occupation of the gainfully employed (see pp. 342-45, 370). The principle of classifying the rural population of Germany, according to the data for 1882 and 1895, into three main groups (I, II and III) was described and substantiated by Lenin in his work "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 217-22) which is indicated on p. 346 ("Distribution (in thousands) adopted in *The Agrarian Question*, p. 244").

For technical reasons, some tables from German statistics in this volume are given in parts. p. 297

[108] The data under the heads bracketed in the table were used by Lenin to calculate the number of hired labourers. See the last column of the table (p. 323). p. 320

[109] A reference to the article by Fr. Zahn, "Deutschlands wirtschaftliche Entwicklung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Volkszählung 1905 sowie Berufs- und Betriebszählung 1907" ("The Economic Development of Germany with Special Account of the 1905 Census of Population and the 1907 Census of Occupations and Enterprises") published in *Annalen des Deutschen Reichs* (*Annals of the German Reich*) No. 7 for July and No. 8 for August 1910. p. 324

[110] A reference to Schmelzle's article, "Die ländliche Grundbesitzverteilung, ihr Einfluss auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Landwirtschaft und ihre Entwicklung" ("Distribution of Rural Land Holdings, Its Influence on the Productivity and Development of Agriculture") published in *Annalen des Deutschen Reichs* No. 6 for June 1913. p. 335

[111] The two following tables giving the data for 1882 and 1895 are taken from Chapter IX of "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" published in the collection *The Agrarian Question*. Part I, St. Petersburg, 1908 (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 218-20). In the first table, Lenin made a correction of two misprints in the collection: he switched the designation of the categories "c 2)" and " 3)". p. 346

[112] Lenin gives the data from *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*. Band 211. *Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907. Berufsstatistik*. Abteilung X. "Die berufliche und soziale Gliederung des deutschen Volkes". Berlin, 1913 (*Statistics of the German Reich*. Vol. 211. *Census of Occupations and Enterprises of June 12, 1907. Occupation Statistics*. Section X. "Occupational and Social classification of the German People"). p. 355

[113] A notebook, entitled *Austrian Agricultural Statistics*, containing the first document under the same title and in it pages 4 and 5 of the original (see pp. 388-95). p. 369

[114] This plan reflects the three stages of Lenin's work on the material based on his study of the data of the 1907 German agricultural census and collected in notebook, *German Agrarian Statistics* (see pp. 297-371).

The first stage was the compilation of a general plan for the processing of these data under 13 heads (0-12). The second stage was the drawing up of the plan and the writing of the first article, "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture", in which Lenin dealt with the first five (0-4) points of the general plan (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 423-46). The other points remained for an-

other article. The third stage was the drafting of the plan for another article consisting of the five points or topics. This article was never written.

The time it took Lenin to work on the plan as a whole is determined by the time it took him to collect the material on German agrarian statistics on the basis of the 1907 Census, that is, from 1910 to 1913. p. 372

[115] This and the following markings in the margin on the left, opposite the various points of the general plan signify the numeration and size of the chapters of Lenin's article "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" (article I) (present edition Vol. 16, pp. 423-46), which was written on the basis of this plan. The Roman numerals (from I to VII) designate the chapters of the article, the Arabic numerals (from 1 to 87), boxed and in round brackets, the pages of the manuscript of the article. The left column of figures in the numeration of the points in the general plan, added in blue pencil, coincides with the numeration of the chapters of the article. p. 372

[116] Material on Hungarian agrarian statistics, which Lenin used in part in his article, "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 443-45), was published in *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*, pp. 274-97. p. 373

[117] The reference to 1895 means a comparison with the data of the German agricultural census of 1895. p. 373

[118] See Note 104. p. 373

[119] A list of statistical tables given by Lenin in "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" (article one), with an indication of the manuscript pages containing the tables (see present edition Vol. 16, pp. 433, 438, 440, 444, 445, 446). Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are on pages of the manuscript which have not been found. p. 375

[120] Extracts of data from Danish statistics date approximately to 1911, a fact established from the date of the latest of the Danish statistical publications quoted here by Lenin, The Statistical Tables for the 1909 Census.

Lenin took down the data to show the concentration of capital and production in Danish agriculture. He tabulated all the farms into four big groups (under 3.3 ha—proletarian and semi-proletarian farms 3.3 to 9.9 ha—small peasants; 9.9 to 29.7 ha—big peasants and peasant bourgeoisie; and over 29.7 ha—capitalist

agriculture) to show the distinction between the economic types of farms. The two lower groups (63.4 per cent of all farms) had, in 1909, 11.7 per cent of the land and 17.2 per cent of the big horned cattle; and the two higher groups (36.6 per cent of all farms) had 88.2 per cent of the land and 82.8 per cent of all horned cattle. This revealed the typical capitalist stratification of farms and the concentration on the entrepreneurial farms of almost 90 per cent of the land and more than 80 per cent of the big horned cattle. Lenin makes special mention of the increase in the number of large farms from 1898 to 1909. In that period, the total number of farms increased by 1.7 per cent, while farms with 15-49 head of big horned cattle went up by 35 per cent, and those with 50 and more head, by 46.3 per cent. Lenin used the data on the comparative quantities of horned cattle in Denmark, Germany and Russia per 1,000 population, per 1,000 hectares, and per square kilometre to show the high level of livestock farming in Denmark. p. 376

[121] The extracts from Austrian agricultural statistics apparently date to the period from 1910 to 1912, for Volume 28 of *Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch* (*The Austrian Statistical Handbook*) mentioned by Lenin in the beginning was issued in 1910, and Volume 29, mentioned in a later addition on the same page of the manuscript, was published not earlier than November 1911 (the Preface to the volume was dated October 1911).

The materials on Austrian agricultural statistics contain mainly data characterising area, personnel in agricultural and forest enterprises, the use of agricultural machinery and the maintenance of draught animals. The characteristic of agricultural and forest enterprises in respect of the area of cultivated land and the use of agricultural machinery is given as a statistical grouping in the form of a combined table reflecting the interconnection between the two. The second half of the table (see p. 385) was compiled by Lenin from a number of tables in the said collection with the view to further dividing up the medium group of farms (2-100 ha) into 5 subgroups by area.

The grouping of agricultural and forest enterprises by productive area (see pp. 388-95) classifies the enterprises with regard to hired labour, Lenin obtained the statistical data on strictly family farms and on farms with persons not belonging to the family by reworking the data of Table 6 from the collection *Öesterreichische Statistik*. The material on Austrian statistics illustrated the development of capitalism in agriculture and was apparently intended by Lenin for use in later works on the agrarian question. p. 383

[122] Schmelzle's article, "Die ländliche Grundbesitzverteilung, ihr Einfluss auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Landwirtschaft und ihre Entwicklung" ("Distribution of Rural Land Holdings, Its Influence

on the Productivity and Development of Agriculture"), was published in *Annalen des Deutschen Reichs für Gesetzgebund, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft* No. 6. This issue was published on June 10 1913, so that Lenin could not have read the article before July 1913. p. 397

[123] A reference to the work of H. Quante. "Grundkapital und Betriebskapital". *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher* von H. Thiel. XXXIV. Band, Heft 6. Berlin, 1905. S. 925-72 ("Land Capital and Production Capital". H. Thiel's *Agricultural Yearbooks*). p. 397

[124] A reference to Dr. K. Vogeley's work, *Landwirtschaftliche Betriebsverhältnisse Rheinhessens. Arbeiten der Deutschen Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft*. Heft 133 (*Production Relations in the Agriculture of the Rhine-Hesse. Transactions of the German Agricultural Society*, Part 133). p. 397

[125] A quotation from Schmelzle of Dr. A. Burg's work, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs im Vogelsberg. Arbeiten der Deutschen Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft*. Heft 123 (*A Contribution to the Study of Agricultural Production in Vogelsberg. Transactions of the German Agricultural Society*, Part 123). p. 398

[126] The extracts from E. Laur's book date approximately to 1913, since they were made by Lenin between two entries dating to 1913. Lenin made use of the statistical data from 1886 to 1906, which enabled him to give a comprehensive characteristic of tendencies in the development of Swiss agriculture in that period. Together with other material, these data were apparently intended by Lenin for a continuation of his work, *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. p. 402

[127] The manuscript of Lenin's remarks on E. Jordi's book, *The Electric Motor in Agriculture*, is among extracts from newspapers and journals for September 1914, in a notebook entitled "Engels, Savoy, etc., Certain Other Things, and Extracts on War". p. 406

[128] The documents published below are preparatory material for Lenin's *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. Part One. *Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America*. This material consists of two parts: the first contains diverse variants of the plan for this work, and the second, statistical material from the American censuses taken in 1900 and 1910. "Remarks on American Agricultural Statistics" is an introduction to this statistical material (see pp. 416-20).

Lenin wrote the variants of the plan on the back of sheets containing his article, in German, "Der Opportunismus und der

Zusammenbruch der zweiten Internationale" ("Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International") (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 108-20). The sheets are not numbered, so that the variants of the plan are arranged as they approximate the final plan given in the contents of the published book. Apart from complete variants of the plan, there are fragments of it on the same sheets.

"Remarks on American Agricultural Statistics" contain important methodological propositions on the study of types of farms and comparative characteristics of farm groupings under three heads: area, principal source of income, and gross cash income. Lenin emphasises the importance of grouping farms under the last two heads, and shows the limits of application and the shortcomings of the grouping by area alone, for it glosses over the displacement of small-scale production (lumping together a minority of growing farms with a mass of backward farms going to seed). In Lenin's grouping of farms by income, the land factor is subordinate to capital. The specific feature of Lenin's methodology in this case was the grouping (in a combined table) by two factors, which resulted in a comparison of the statistical data on farm area within the limits of one type of farm. Lenin believed the insufficient use of combined tables to be a flaw in American statistics, which failed to use combined tables showing type of farms (they gave 7-10 groups of farms, which Lenin reduced to three main groups, corresponding to three types of farm). On the 1900 Census Lenin wrote: "...here too, no classification gives all the essential characteristics of the type and size of farm" (present edition, Vol. 22, p. 61).

The second part of the preparatory material—"American Agrarian Statistics"—consists of the statistical data of the two American censuses taken in 1900 and 1910 processed by Lenin. They are: *Census Reports*. Volume V. *Twelfth Census of the United States*, taken in the year 1900. Agriculture. Part 1. Washington 1902, and *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, taken in the year 1910. Volume V. *Agriculture*. 1909 and 1910. Washington, 1914. On the back of the first three pages of extracts from the Thirteenth Census of 1910, there are extracts from Volume IV of the same census (*Statistics of Occupations*). In addition, there are some data drawn from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. Washington, 1912.

Lenin starts by giving a list of the extracts from the 1900 Census. The extracts from the Twelfth Census of 1900 take up 12 numbered pages (with certain phrases or words given in bold type or underlined), and those from the Thirteenth Census of 1910, 16 pages. In addition, there are several separate sheets with various calculations made by Lenin (e.g., the percentage of farms reporting horses in 1900-10). The results of these calculations are given in Lenin's *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 91-92).

Of the greatest value in Lenin's study and demonstration of capitalist development in general, and the displacement of small-scale by large-scale production in industry and agriculture, in particular, was the material of the Twelfth Census of 1900, which yielded the three different methods of grouping farms (by principal source of income, by acreage, and by value of the farm product—gross cash income). But here, as was noted above, none of the groupings is fully applied in respect of all the essential characteristics of the type and size of farm. In the results of the 1910 census, Lenin pointed out, even the traditional grouping of farms by acreage was not given in full. Lenin filled these gaps: he drew up a comprehensive (summary) table giving a comparison of the three groupings. In his analysis, Lenin showed that grouping by acreage (a method favoured by bourgeois statisticians) was limited and insufficient, and proved the need to modify the methods of inquiry, grouping, etc., in accordance with the forms of capitalist penetration into agriculture.

As has been said, the material of the Thirteenth Census of 1910 was poorer in content, so that Lenin was unable to make the same groupings, analyse them and draw the relevant conclusions. He made use of the absolute and part of relative data of the 1910 Census for a comparison. On pp. 442-45 of this volume, apart from data on agriculture, he gives data on population in the three main divisions of the United States: the industrial North, the former slave-holding South, and the homestead West; for these three main divisions Lenin wrote out data characterising the commercial character of livestock farming, notably, the concentration of livestock owned in the North. Lenin arrives at a general conclusion for the country as a whole that small and medium farms are being supplanted, and that large capitalist farms are growing. Further, on pp. 478-79 there are statistical data which Lenin used to refute the assertions of bourgeois economists that the law of the large-scale production supplanting the small-scale does not apply to agriculture. These data served as the basis for §15 ("A Comparative Picture of Evolution in Industry and Agriculture") of Lenin's *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture*. He arrives at the conclusion that "there is a remarkable similarity in the laws of evolution" in industry and agriculture.

Lenin began to work on the American 1900 statistics in Paris (in 1912), but did not finish working on this volume. In a letter to Isaac A. Hourwich, Washington, from Cracow on February 27, 1914, Lenin wrote: "When I made a study of American agricultural statistics (Vol. V. *Agriculture—Census of 1900*) in Paris, I found a great deal of interesting matter. Now, in Cracow, I am unable to obtain these publications" (see present edition, Vol. 36, p. 271). In a letter from Poronin to N. N. Nakoryakov in New York on May 18, 1914, he said he had received Volume V of the 1900 Census and asked for Volume V of the Thirteenth Census of 1910 (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 140).

New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture. Part One. *Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States of America* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102) was apparently completed in 1915, and in January 1916 sent from Berne to Maxim Gorky for Parus Publishers. In a letter he sent at the same time, Lenin wrote: "I have tried in as popular a form as possible to set forth new data about America which, I am convinced, are particularly suitable for the popularising of Marxism and substantiating it by means of facts.... I should like to continue, and subsequently also to publish, a second part—about Germany" (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 212). The book was first published in 1917 by Zhizn i Znaniye Publishers. p. 408

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PREFACE

The additional volumes 41 to 45 of the present edition contain the most important of the new material included in the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works* of V. I. Lenin.

Volume 41 contains works written before the Great October Socialist Revolution, from 1896 to October 1917, which are an essential supplement to the works published in the respective volumes of the present edition.

A great part of the volume consists of documents reflecting Lenin's efforts in creating and strengthening the Bolshevik Party and working out the ideological and organisational principles, the programme and the rules of a new type of proletarian party. Among them are: "Outline of Various Points of the Practical Section of the Draft Programme", "Record of Points One and Two of Plekhanov's First Draft Programme, and Outline of Point One of the Programme's Theoretical Section", "Initial Variant of the Agrarian Section and the Concluding Section of the Draft Programme", and Lenin's speeches at the Second Party Congress. They show that Lenin helped the *Iskra* Editorial Board to draft a truly revolutionary programme.

The record of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, the January and June (1904) sessions of the R.S.D.L.P. Council, "Draft Resolution of the Majority's Geneva Group", "Reply to L. Martov", "Report on the State of Affairs in the Party", and others show Lenin's struggle against the Mensheviks' splitting and disorganising activity after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

A large group of documents written by Lenin in connection with the work of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Congresses of the R.S.D.L.P. is of great importance for a study of the Party's strategy and tactics during the first Russian revolution. These documents contain propositions on the hegemony

of the proletariat, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

Considerable interest attaches to the works connected with the elaboration of Bolshevik tactics in the Duma (Parliament): the report and summing-up speech on the report on the election campaign for the Second Duma and other material of the Second Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the First All-Russia Conference), the articles "Are the Mensheviks Entitled To Conduct a Policy of Supporting the Cadets?", "The Third Duma and Social-Democracy", "Report to the International Socialist Bureau, 'Elections to the Fourth Duma'", "The Duma Group and the Majority Outside", etc.

A number of works dating from the period of reaction reflect Lenin's struggle against ideological vacillations and deviations from Marxism. Lenin waged an implacable struggle against the avowed opportunists, the Menshevik liquidators, and also against the "Left" opportunists inside the Bolshevik Party—the otzovists, the ultimatumists and the *Vperyod* splinter group. In addition to the material already published, the volume contains 14 works by Lenin shedding light on the conference of *Proletary*'s enlarged Editorial Board which condemned both liquidationism and otzovism.

The volume gives a fuller picture of the meeting held by members of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee in Paris in June 1911. In his "Report on the State of Affairs in the Party" and speeches at the meeting, Lenin defined the Party's tasks in the struggle against the anti-Party groups.

The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. brought to a close a long period of struggle against Menshevism. By expelling the Menshevik liquidators from the Party, it strengthened the Party as an all-Russia organisation, capable of giving a lead to the masses in a fresh revolutionary upsurge. The volume contains a number of documents which are of great interest for the study of the Conference. Among them are: "Report on the Work of the International Socialist Bureau", setting out important propositions on the new epoch, an epoch of socialist revolutions and "battles against the bourgeoisie", and on the

consequent sharpening of the struggle between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the reformists inside the European socialist parties, and "Speech on the Organisational Question", emphasising the need to strengthen the Party's ties with the masses and to combine legal and illegal work.

The volume contains Lenin's resolution for the Cracow meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee with Party workers, "On the Reorganisation and Work of the *Pravda* Editorial Board". This decision shows how the Central Committee, led by Lenin, gave effective and concrete guidance to *Pravda*, the Party's most important legal organ.

In some of his works—"Reply to Liquidators' Article in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*", "Letter to the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party", "On the Question of the Bureau's Next Steps", "Russian Workers and the International", "How the Liquidators Are Cheating the Workers", "Resolution on the Socialist Bureau's Decision"—Lenin gives a firm rebuff to attempts by the leaders of the German Social-Democrats and the Second International to "reconcile" and unite the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks by liquidating the Bolshevik Party.

Lenin's struggle for Party unity is characterised by the documents relating to the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Latvian territory: his report and summing-up speech, and the draft resolution on the attitude of the Social-Democrats of the Latvian territory to the R.S.D.L.P.

Of the documents supplementing Lenin's elaboration of the national question, the volume includes: "Theses for a Lecture on the National Question", "German Social-Democracy and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "Note to the Theses 'Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination'", "On the Declaration by the Polish Social-Democrats at the Zimmerwald Conference", plans of an unfinished pamphlet, *Statistics and Sociology*, and "Speech on the National Question" at the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.).

Lenin urged the need for the workers to struggle against the danger of the world war which was being prepared by the imperialists of all countries, and exposed the opportunists who denied that such a struggle was of any real importance,

an attitude which doomed the workers to a passive stand. He believed that it was a major task of the revolutionary Social-Democrats to conduct anti-militarist propaganda and spread the idea of international solidarity among the working people. This question is dealt with in the following articles: "Notes to the Resolution of the Stuttgart Congress on 'Militarism and International Conflicts'", "Notes to Clara Zetkin's Article 'International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart'", "Anti-Militarist Propaganda and Young Socialist Workers' Leagues" and "How the Socialist-Revolutionaries Write History".

A number of documents published in the volume relate . to the period of the First World War, namely, "On the Slogan to Transform the Imperialist War into a Civil War", "Editorial Note to the Article 'The Ukraine and the War'", "Draft Point Three of the Resolution 'The C.O. and the New Paper', Adopted by the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Sections Abroad", "Draft Resolution of the International Socialist Women's Conference", "Variant of the Draft Resolution of Left-wing Social-Democrats for the First International Socialist Conference", "Plan for a Lecture on 'Two Internationals'", speeches at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal International Socialist conferences, "Draft Resolution of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee To Terminate Publication of the Journal *Kommunist*", "Remarks on an Article about Maximalism" and others. These documents show the Bolshevik tactics with regard to war, peace and revolution; they explain the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war, and characterise Lenin's activity in rallying the Left-wing and revolutionary elements within the international working-class movement round the banner of internationalism, his struggle against social-chauvinism and Kautskyism (Centrism), and against the Left-wing opportunist, sectarian stand and splitting activities of the Bukharin-Pyatakov group.

A number of documents written after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in February 1917 contain Lenin's propositions concerning the Party's attitude to the bourgeois Provisional Government.

The volume contains material connected with Lenin's return from Switzerland to Russia in April 1917. It will be

recalled that the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois press started a campaign of slander and harassment over Lenin and the Bolsheviks' return home across Germany. This is fully exposed in the following: replies to a correspondent of the newspaper *Politiken* and to F. Ström, a spokesman of the Left-wing Swedish Social-Democrats, the group's communique, "Russian Revolutionaries' Trip Across Germany", speeches at a conference with Left-wing Swedish Social-Democrats on March 31 (April 13), at a meeting of the soldiers of an armoured battalion on April 15 (28), and at a meeting of the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on April 17 (30), "An Unfinished Autobiography", etc.

There is also a newspaper report of Lenin's speech upon his arrival in Petrograd on April 3 (16), 1917, when he addressed workers, soldiers and sailors in the Finland Station Square from the top of an armoured car.

Lenin's return, his elaboration of a concrete plan for going over from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution, and the open exposition of his plan in the press and in speeches at numerous meetings helped to orient the Party towards preparations for a socialist revolution. A tremendous part in this effort was played by the Petrograd City and the Seventh All-Russia Party conferences held in April 1917. Some of Lenin's reports and speeches at these conferences are published both according to the minutes and the newspaper reports, which gives a fuller idea of their content. The volume also contains "Report on the Results of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) at a Meeting of the Petrograd Organisation" on May 8 (21), 1917.

A number of documents in the volume deal with the drafting of the Party's second programme, which charted the building of a socialist economy in Russia. Among them are: "Outline of Fifth 'Letter from Afar'", "Preliminary Draft Alterations in the R.S.D.L.P. Party Programme", which was the basis for "Proposed Amendments to the Doctrinal, Political and Other Sections of the Programme" (see Vol. 24, pp. 459-63), "Report on the Question of Revising the Party Programme" at the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), etc.

The Party's policy on the basic aspects of the revolution, such as war, peace and the agrarian question, is explained in the "Speech at a Sitting of the Bolshevik Group of the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies", "Report on the Current Situation at the All-Russia Conference of Front and Rear Military Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)", the articles "The Attention of Comrades!", "Too Gross a Lie", "On the Grimm Affair", "Shame!" and others.

The theses "The Political Situation", which Lenin wrote after the July events, were published as an article in the newspaper *Proletarskoye Dyelo*, and that was how they appeared in Volume 25. Here they are given in their original form. They defined the Party's new tasks and tactics in the changed political situation. Great interest attaches to the "Letter Over the Publication of 'Leaflet on the Capture of Riga'", which was published for the first time in the Fifth Russian edition. Lenin gives important instructions in the item "On the List of Candidates for the Constituent Assembly" from his "Theses for a Report at the October 8 Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation, and also for a Resolution and Instructions to Those Elected to the Party Congress", part of which was published in Volume 26. In a letter to Y. M. Sverdlov, Lenin exposes Kamenev and Zinoviev's strike-breaking behaviour and voices his confidence in the victory of the revolution.

A considerable part of the documents consists of preparatory material, such as plans, notes, outlines and theses, which show Lenin's methods and thoroughness in preparing his works. The plans of unfinished or unwritten articles, and plans for speeches and lectures which either have not been recorded, or of which a record no longer exists, are of great importance, because some of them contain vital theoretical propositions and characterise the Party's tasks.

This volume contains 47 of Lenin's works which were first published in the Fifth Russian edition.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee

1896–1904

COMMUNICATION ON BEHALF OF THE "STARIKI" TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ST. PETERSBURG LEAGUE OF STRUGGLE FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE WORKING CLASS[1]

Mikhailov first put in an appearance at St. Petersburg in 1891 as a Kharkov student expelled for making trouble. He entered a student organisation which bore the name of "corporation"[2] even after it fell apart. There was a rumour at the dental courses about his behaviour during a suspicious acquaintanceship; he was accused of spending money collected for the famine-stricken, but he made good the loss. At that time, he became intimate with....*

In January 1894, a search was also carried out in the homes of many former members of the said "corporation", including Mikhailov himself. At the interrogations, all heard a detailed reading on the membership of the society, etc. The gendarmes declared that the case arose on the strength of information supplied by a former member. Mikhailov was cleared of all suspicion by the gendarmes saying that importance had been attached to this trivial case only because an obvious revolutionary was involved in it. At the same time, a strike took place at the Voronin factory.[3] Mikhailov insinuated himself among them and started to make collections for their benefit. In February, eight workers who had dealt with Mikhailov and one student who had collected money on his assignment (Talalayev) were arrested. After that Mikhailov again started to edge closer to the ouvriers** and managed to penetrate into circles

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* MS. illegible.—*Ed.*
** Workers.—*Ed.*

led by Narodovoltsi.[4] The latter were arrested in the summer of 1894. The inquiry revealed that the police had been informed of a great deal. At the inquiry involving our Stariki there was the charge that they were acquainted with some of these Narodovoltsi, but it happened....* The first Mikhailov case came to an end soon after* and others were exiled, but he was let off and told everyone that he had petitioned for clemency and that he had done so with the intention of continuing to work on the old lines. Unfortunately, some people failed to regard this fact as being sufficiently disgraceful and gave him their patronage, so that he who did not command any personal respect among the workers was given an opportunity to consolidate and extend his ties.

There follows a description of his methods, his pressing of money on workers, his invitations to them to visit him at home, the revelation of Party names, etc. In this way and because he enjoyed the full confidence of the said persons, he soon discovered the identity of many members of various groups. They were all arrested. When a worker ...* said that he had received books from Mikhailov, the latter was detained, but at once released and is still in St. Petersburg. As one of the accused at the inquiry, he informed on all his comrades; some of the accused ...* were read his detailed report on the membership of various groups. (Signatures.)

Written in 1896

First published in 1958 in Vol. 2 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

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FOR THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH STRUVE[5]

Representatives of the *Zarya-Iskra* Social-Democratic group and the *Svoboda* democratic opposition group have agreed on the following:

1) The *Zarya* group shall publish with the magazine of the same name a special supplement entitled *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* in the editing of which the *Svoboda* group will take part.

* MS. illegible.—*Ed.*

2) The editing shall be conducted on the following basis: each of the sides has the right of veto in respect of material and articles.

3) Programme of the publication: a) material and documents relating to the activity of the government,* government, public and class institutions, etc.;

b) articles on questions of domestic public life in Russia and the government's domestic and foreign policy;

c) domestic reviews.

4) Both sides undertake to make efforts to supply material for *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*. But the *Zarya*[6] Editorial Board is free to carry in its special editions the material at its disposal on the subjects specified in § 3, whenever it is more suitable in character for such editions.

5) The *Zarya* group undertakes to perform all the necessary operations in publishing, transporting and distributing *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*. For its part, the X group shall pay all the expenses this entails.

6) In the event the said enterprise is liquidated, each side shall receive one-half of the copies of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* in stock.

Note: The *Zarya* Editorial Board shall have the right to print announcements of its publications on the covers of *Sovrernennoye Obozreniye*.

Written before January 17 (30), 1901

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SECRET DOCUMENT

We draw readers' attention to Witte's minute published by *Zarya*,[7] which appeared in the hands of Dietz in Stuttgart. The minute, aimed against the draft of the former Minister for the Interior Goremykin on the

* The text given in brevier is in Potresov's hand.—*Ed*.

introduction of Zemstvos in non-Zemstvo gubernias,[8] is interesting as a document giving a brazen exposé of our rulers' most secret yearnings. We hope to deal in detail with this remarkable document and with Mr. R. N. S.'s introduction to it in the next issue of our newspaper.[9] This introduction, while showing that its author is aware of the political importance of the Russian working-class movement, is in all other respects marked with the usual immaturity of political thinking so characteristic of our liberals.

Iskra No. 5, June 1901

Printed from the *Iskra* text

REMARKS ON RYAZANOV'S ARTICLE "TWO TRUTHS"[10]

Pp.

1. The author regards as being of primary importance what Marx said (about the two ways) in *exceptional* circumstances and in virtually conditional terms.[11] However, the author distorts the fact, creating the impression that it was Marx himself who actually *raised* the question of the two ways.

7. "Laughter" at the men of the 70s (facing history) shows *not* "only an absolute incapacity for taking the historical standpoint", it is also evidence of theoretical *disparagement* of the men of the 70s, as compared with those of the 40s and 60s.

7a. The author touches up Mikhailovsky by emphasising that the latter had opposed V. V., but failing to say that he had gone along with V. V. very much more frequently and at greater length.

8. This is a glaring untruth: blaming Mikhailovsky for the *tragic* demise of the *Narodnaya Volya* and the "going among the people". The article is devoted to Mikhailovsky, whose Untergang* is purely *persönlicher*,** and whose fate contains a kopek's worth of the "tragic" and a ruble's worth of the comic.

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* Downfall.—*Ed.*
** Personal.—*Ed.*

9. It is *stupid* to confuse the *dressing-down* of Mikhailovsky with the "shovelling of dirt on the generation of the revolutionary socialists of the 70s".
9. NB "refuses" to follow the reflection of the revolutionary majority in legal writings.
9-10. All the "Gekreuzigte und Verbannte"* ??
(of the 70s) ?
lend an avid ear to the voice of the ignoramus.
13. "Social questions give way to personal ones" (*and down to the end of the page* NB). |??|
(A downright Pisarev approach.)
15. ...(Pisarev) "A buoyant sermon of personal happiness"
" " " of "individualistic |??|
ideals".
18. " " "immersed in matters of personal self-improvement".
24-25. (§ III) A characteristic of the utopian socialism of the *revolutionaries* (of the 70s), which is confused with the Mikhailovsky trend.
28-29. Mikhailovsky frequently "sacrificed" one of the truths. *But* we are not interested in the ''latest phase" of his activity. We are concerned with Mikhailovsky only as one who has given expression to a definite trend among the *young people* of the 70s and 80s.
31. What are the "limits" set "by nature to the mind"? (Theory of cognition.)
29-35. Exposition of the "system of truth".
35. ...This system "is an effort to discover the social element in reality..." which "would be concerned in realising the ideal".
41. From the dispute with Yuzov and Co. (a dry rehash), a leap over to Yakovenko (1886).
46-48. Pendant**=*Tkachov*.
Further *Axelrod*
and transition to Social-Democrats.
The whole exposition is dull and has little bearing on the "two foregoing" and on *Mikhailovsky*.

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* "The crucified and the exiled".—*Ed*.
** Counterpart.—*Ed*.

And N. —on (52)!!—with Mikhailovsky's conclusions from his work (53).

§V, from p. 57 to p. 77 (78-80 about the "critics")—the birth of Marxism. It's all deadly dull; only on p. 82 does he return to the "*o l d t r u t h*".

—85— We reject the division of the world into noumena and phenomena.[12]

Written in September-October 1901

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MATERIAL FOR WORKING OUT THE R.S.D.L.P. PROGRAMME[13]

1

OUTLINE OF VARIOUS POINTS OF THE PRACTICAL SECTION OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

13.1.02

Finished

§11. Supervision by the organs of local self-government with the participation of workers' delegates over the sanitary state of the living quarters provided for workers by their employers, over the internal regulations on these premises and the terms of their lease, to safeguard wage-workers against intervention by employers in their life and activity as private persons and citizens.

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§12. Correctly organised all-round sanitary supervision of working conditions at all enterprises employing wage labour.

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13. Extension of supervision by factory inspectors to all the trades, handicrafts and cottage

industries, and also to government enterprises and agricultural enterprises employing wage labour.

14.
etc.

Agrarian. With the aim of eliminating all the remnants of our old serf-owning system, the Social-Democratic Labour Party demands:

1) cancellation of redemption payments
2) freedom of withdrawal from commune
3) reduction of rents through the courts
4) cut-off lands.[14]

Axelrod and Berg: "*facilitating* the struggle by the *peasant mass* against capitalist relations (or certain capitalist tendencies)".

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2

OUTLINE OF PLEKHANOV'S FIRST DRAFT PROGRAMME WITH SOME AMENDMENTS

Paragraphs:

I. Domination of capitalist relations: the means of production in the hands of the capitalists, and the propertyless proletarians=wage-workers—2.*

II. Expansion of the sphere of domination of capital: growing economic importance of the big and decline of the small enterprises—1.

III. Capitalist relations weigh more and more heavily on the working class: occasioning a relative reduction in demand simultaneously with an increase in supply—4.

IV. Reduction in the price of labour-power. Growing social inequality—3.

* The figures in the MS. are in blue pencil and apparently indicate a desirable rearrangement of the test.—*Ed.*

+ consequently (capitalism causes??) the growth of social inequality, the growing gulf between the propertied and the propertyless (? + ?)

V. Crises—5.

VI. Growing discontent of the working class, sharpening struggle + growing realisation of the need for *social revolution*, *i.e.*

(explanation of it)—6.

VII. Social revolution in the interests of all oppressed mankind—7 .

VIII. In order to substitute socialist for commodity production the proletariat must have command of *political power—dictatorship of the proletariat*—8.

IX. The working-class movement has become international—10.

X. Russian Social-Democracy is part of international Social-Democracy—11.

XI. Russian Social-Democracy pursues the same ultimate aim. The task of Russian Social-Democracy is to

{ expose the irreconcilable character of the interests
explain the importance of the social revolution
organise the workers' forces } —9.

XII. The immediate aim is modified by the remnants of the serf-owning system (a burden on the entire working population + the main obstacle hindering the working-class movement).

XIII. It is necessary to work for juridical institutions constituting a complement to capitalism.

XIV. Autocracy—a remnant of the serf-owning system, the bitterest enemy; hence the immediate task is to overthrow the *monarchy*.

AMENDMENTS TO PLEKHANOV'S DRAFT PROGRAMME

	Proposed 21.1.02	
III. [The capitalist production relations weigh more and more heavily on the working class, as] technical pro-	III. Technical progress (by increasing the productivity of labour?) not only gives the capitalists the material pos-	"allows"

gress, [by increasing the productivity of labour,] not only, etc. {instead of occasioning—*engendering*}

+ The growth of unemployment, poverty, degradation and oppression is the inevitable result of this basic tendency of capitalism.

sibility of intensifying their exploitation of the workers, but converts this possibility into reality, engendering a relative reduction in the *demand* for labour-power simultaneously with a relative and absolute increase in its supply. The growth of unemployment, poverty, oppression and degradation is the inevitable result of this basic tendency of capitalism.

(of the said basic tendencies)

Make §5.

Incorrect: not all.

IV. Thus, the development of the productive forces of social labour is attended by the monopolisation of all the advantages of this development by a negligible minority, with the growth of social wealth proceeding side by side with the growth of social inequality, with the gulf between the propertied and the propertyless, between the class of property-owners and the class of the proletariat, growing.

Make §4.

V.* An even greater worsening of the condition of the working class and the petty producers is engendered by the industrial crises, which are the inevitable outcome of the said contradictions of capitalism,

in the absence of social control over production and owing to the constantly growing

owing to the lack of balanced development of production, and the growth of rivalry

With such a state of affairs in society, in the absence of balanced development of pro-

* "An even greater sharpening of these contradictions" is crossed out as an opening phrase in the MS.—*Ed.*

rivalry among the capitalist countries on the world market.*	among the capitalist countries on the world market. The poverty and destitution of the masses are accompanied by a waste of social wealth because markets are not to be found for the commodities produced.	duction, with the constantly growing rivalry among the capitalist countries on the world market, the sale of commodities necessarily lags behind their production.*

Written not later than January 8 (21), 1902

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3

RECORD OF POINTS ONE AND TWO OF PLEKHANOV'S FIRST DRAFT PROGRAMME, AND OUTLINE OF POINT ONE OF THE PROGRAMME'S THEORETICAL SECTION

I. The capitalist mode of production is the economic foundation of contemporary bourgeois society, under which the most important part of the means of production and circulation of products, made in the form of commodities, is the private property of a relatively small class of persons, whereas the majority of the population cannot subsist except by selling their labour-power. In consequence of this, they find themselves in the dependent condition of wage-workers (proletarians) by their labour creating the income of the owners of the means of production and the circulation of commodities (capitalists and big landowners).

II. The sphere of domination of the capitalist mode of production is expanding, as the continuous technical progress increases the economic importance of the big enterprises and thereby decreases the role of independent small producers in the economic life of society, depressing their living standard, displacing some into the ranks of the proletariat, and turning others into direct or indirect vassals and tributaries of capital.

* *
*

* This variant is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

I (?). Russia's economic development is leading to an ever greater spread and ever greater domination within || ? || her of capitalist relations of production.

Written not later than January 8 (21), 1902

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4

INITIAL VARIANT OF THE THEORETICAL SECTION OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

INITIAL FORMULATION	AMENDED FORMULATION
A.	
I. Russia's economic development and her increasing (intensified) involvement in international trade are leading to an ever greater spread {Reword} within her and to ever fuller domination of the capitalist mode of production.	I. Russia's intensified involvement in international trade and the growth of commodity production inside the country are leading to ever fuller domination within her of the capitalist mode of production, which is distinguished by the following basic features.
II.* Continuous technical progress is increasing the economic importance of the big enterprises and reducing the role of the independent small producers (peasants, artisans, handicraftsmen, et al.) in the country's economic life, depressing their living standard, turning some of them into direct or indirect vassal and tribu-	III. Continuous technical progress is increasing the number, size and economic importance of the big capitalist enterprises, and is depressing the living standard of the independent small producers (peasants, artisans, handicraftsmen), turning some of them into vassals and tributaries of capital, totally ruining others and displac-

* In the original § II and § III are transposed in blue pencil.—*Ed.*

taries of capital, and displacing others into the ranks of the propertyless class (the proletariat), which is deprived of the means of production.	ing them into the ranks of the propertyless class (the proletariat), which is deprived of the means of production.

III. The most important part of the means of production and the circulation of commodities is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small class of persons, whereas an ever growing majority of the population are unable to maintain their existence otherwise than by selling their labour-power. In consequence of this, they find themselves in the dependent condition of wage-workers (proletarians), who by their labour create the income of the owners of the means of production and the circulation of commodities (capitalists and big landowners).

IV. By increasing the productivity of labour, technical progress enables the capitalists to intensify their exploitation of the workers, engendering a relative reduction in the demand for labour-power (that is, the increase in demand is not proportional to [lags behind] the increase in capital) simultaneously with a relative and absolute increase in its supply. This, together with the above-mentioned basic tendencies of capitalism, leads to a growth of unemployment, poverty exploitation, oppression and degradation.

V. The condition of the working class and the small producers is even further worsened by the industrial crises, which are the inevitable outcome of the said contradictions of capitalism, by the lack of balanced development of production, which is intrinsic to it (and which no associations of industrialists can eliminate), and by the growth of rivalry among the capitalist countries on the world market. Poverty and destitution of the masses exist side by side with a waste of social wealth in consequence of the impossibility of finding markets for the commodities produced.

VI. Thus, the development of the productive forces of social {Reword} labour is attended	VI. Thus, the gigantic development of the productive forces of social and increasingly socialised labour is attended

by the monopolisation of all the principal advantages of this development by a negligible minority of the population, with the growth of social wealth proceeding side by side with the growth of social inequality, with the gulf between the propertied and propertyless, between the class of property-owners (the bourgeoisie) and the class of the proletariat, growing.

VII. But as all these inevitable contradictions of capitalism increase and develop,

the discontent and indignation of the working class also grow, and its solidarity increases, in virtue of the very conditions of the capitalist mode of production,

the number and the solidarity of the proletarians, their discontent and indignation grow,

the struggle between the working class and the capitalist class becomes sharper and the urge to throw off the intolerable yoke of capitalism mounts.

VIII. The emancipation of the workers must be an act of the working class itself. If the yoke of capitalism is to be thrown off, there must be a social revolution, that is,

VIII. The emancipation of the workers must be an act of the working class itself, because all the other classes of present-day society stand for the preservation of the foundations of the existing economic system.

The real emancipation of the working class requires a social revolution, naturally flowing from the entire development of the capitalist mode of production, that is, the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, their conversion into public property and the replacement of the capitalist production of commodities by the socialist organisation of the production of commodities by society as a whole, with the object of ensuring full well-being and free all-round development for all its members.

IX. To effect this social revolution the proletariat must

win *political power*, which will make it master of the situation and enable it to remove all obstacles along the road to its great goal. In this sense the *dictatorship of the proletariat* is an essential political condition of the social revolution.

X. The revolution of the proletariat will mean the emancipation of all the now oppressed and suffering mankind, because it will put an end to all types of oppression and exploitation of man by man.

XI. Russian Social-Democracy undertakes the task of disclosing to the workers the irreconcilable antagonism between their interests and those of the capitalists, of explaining to the proletariat the historical significance, nature and prerequisites of the social revolution it will have to carry out, and of organising a revolutionary class party capable of directing the struggle of the proletariat in all its forms against the present social and political system.

XII. But the development of international exchange and of production for the world market has established (created) such close ties among all the nations of the civilised (?) world, that the great aim of the proletariat's emancipation struggle can be achieved only through the joint efforts of proletarians in all countries. That is why* the present-day working-class movement had to become, and has long since become, an international movement, and Russian Social-Democracy regards itself as one of the detachments of the world army of the proletariat, as *part of international Social-Democracy*.

B.

I. The immediate aims of Russian Social-Democracy are, however, considerably modified by the fact that in our country numerous remnants of the pre-capitalist, serf-owning, social system retard the development of the productive forces in the highest degree, and lower the working population's standard of living; they are responsible for the Asiatically barbarous way in which the many-million-strong peasantry is dying out, and keep the entire people

* The words "the great aim of the proletariat's emancipation struggle can be achieved only through the joint efforts of proletarians in all countries. That is why" are crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

in a state of ignorance and subjection, denying them all rights. The Russian Social-Democrats still have to work for the free civic and political institutions which already exist in the leading capitalist countries and which are undoubtedly necessary for the full and all-round development of the proletariat's class struggle against the bourgeoisie.*

II. The most outstanding of these remnants of the serf-owning system and the most formidable bulwark of all that barbarism and all the calamities of which the politically free countries are already rid, is the tsarist autocracy; it is the bitterest and most dangerous enemy of the proletarian emancipation movement.

The tsarist autocracy is the most outstanding of these remnants of the serf-owning system and the most formidable bulwark of all this barbarism. It is the bitterest and most dangerous enemy of the proletarian emancipation movement and the cultural development of the entire people.

For these reasons Russian Social-Democracy advances as its immediate political task the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy and its replacement by a *republic* based on a democratic constitution that would ensure:

1) the people's sovereignty, that is....

Written between January 8 and 25 (January 21 and February 7), 1902

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Printed from the original

5

OUTLINES OF PLAN OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

I-VI. A) Russia's economic development and the principal features of capitalism.

VII-XII. B) The proletariat's class struggle and the tasks of the Social-Democrats.

C) The immediate aims of the Russian Social-Democrats and their political demands.

D) Social (factory) reforms.

* This sentence is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

E) Financial reform and demands with a view to eliminating the survivals of the serf society.
F) Conclusion ("tailpiece").

A) Russia's economic development and the general tasks of the Social-Democrats.
B) The special political tasks and political demands of the Social-Democrats.
C) Social reforms.
D) Financial and peasant transformations (reforms).

Written between January 8 and 25
(January 21 and February 7), 1902

First published in 1924
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Printed from
the original

6

INITIAL VARIANT OF THE AGRARIAN SECTION AND THE CONCLUDING SECTION OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

Besides, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party demands:

a) in the interests of organising the state economy on democratic lines—abolition of all indirect taxes and establishment of a progressive income-tax

b) in the interests of eradicating all the remnants of the old serf-owning system

1) abolition of land redemption and quit-rent payments as well as of all services now imposed on the peasantry as a taxable social-estate

2) annulment of collective liability and of all laws restricting the peasant in the free disposal of his land;

3) restitution to the people of all amounts taken from them in the form of land redemption and quit-rent payments, confiscation for this purpose of monasterial property and of the royal demesnes,[15] and imposition of a special land tax on members of the big landed nobility who received land redemption loans, the revenue thus obtained to be credited to a special public fund for the cultural and charitable needs of the village communes;

4) establishment of peasant committees

a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation or, when the land has changed hands, by redemption, etc.) of the land cut off from the peasants when serfdom was abolished and now used by the landlords as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage;

b) for the eradication of the remnants of the serf-owning system which still exist in the Urals, the Altai, the Western territory and other regions of the country;

5) empowering of the courts to reduce exorbitant rents and declare null and void contracts entailing bondage.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party believes that the complete, consistent and lasting implementation of the indicated political and social changes can be achieved only by overthrowing the autocracy and convoking a constituent assembly, freely elected by the whole people.

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7

OUTLINES OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

VARIANT 1

Commodity production is ever more rapidly developing in Russia, her participation in international trade is increasing* and the capitalist mode of production is becoming increasingly dominant.

A growing majority of the population are unable to maintain their existence otherwise than by selling their labour-power. In consequence of this they find themselves in the condition of wage-workers (proletarians) dependent on a relatively small class of capitalists and big landowners, who hold the most important part of the means of production and circulation of commodities.**

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* The words "her participation in international trade is increasing" are crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

** This paragraph is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

The most important part of the means of production is becoming concentrated in the hands of an insignificant minority of capitalists and big landowners as their private property. Ever greater numbers of working men losing their means of production are forced to resort to the sale of their labour-power. In this way they find themselves in the dependent condition of wage-workers (proletarians), who by their labour create the income of the property-owners.

The development of capitalism is increasing the number, size and economic importance of the big enterprises, and is depressing the living standard of the independent small producers (peasants, artisans, handicraftsmen), turning some of them into vassals and tributaries of capital and displacing others into the ranks of the proletariat.

The higher the level of technical progress, the more the growth of the demand for labour-power lags behind the growth of its supply, and the greater are the opportunities for the capitalists to intensify exploitation of the workers.

The growth of poverty, unemployment, exploitation, oppression and humiliation is the result of the basic tendencies of capitalism.

Insecurity of existence, unemployment, the yoke of exploitation and humiliation of every kind are becoming the lot of ever wider sections of the working population.

This process is still more aggravated by industrial crises, which are the inevitable outcome of the said contradictions of capitalism. Poverty and destitution of the masses exist side by side with a waste of social wealth in consequence of the impossibility of finding markets for the commodities produced.

Thus, the gigantic development of the productive forces of social and increasingly socialised labour is attended by monopolisation of all the principal advantages of this development by a negligible minority of the population. The growth of social wealth proceeds side by side with the growth of social inequality; the gulf between the class of property-owners (the bourgeoisie) and the class of the proletariat is growing.

(A) § III. Small-scale production is being ousted to an ever greater degree by large-scale production. The independent small producers (peasants, artisans and handicraftsmen)

are being turned either into proletarians or vassals and tributaries of capital.

As the result of continuous technical progress small-scale production is being ousted to an ever greater degree by large-scale production. The most important part of the means of production (of the land and factories, tools and machinery, railways and other means of communication) is becoming concentrated in the hands of a relatively insignificant number of capitalists and big landowners as their private property. The independent small producers (peasants, artisans and handicraftsmen) are being ruined in growing numbers, losing their means of production and thus turning into proletarians or else becoming servants and tributaries of capital. Increasing numbers of working people are compelled to sell their labour-power.

In this way they become wage-workers who are dependent on the property-owners and by their labour create the wealth of the latter.

These wage-workers (proletarians) thus find themselves in a condition of dependence on the property-owners, and by their labour create the income of the latter.

VARIANT 2

Commodity production is ever more rapidly developing in Russia, the capitalist mode of production becoming increasingly dominant.

The most important part of the means of production (of the land and factories, tools and machinery, railways and other means of communication) is becoming concentrated in the hands of a relatively insignificant number of capitalists and big landowners as their private property.

Increasing numbers of working people losing their means of production are compelled to sell their labour power. These wage-workers (proletarians) thus find themselves in a condition of dependence on the

Increasing numbers of working people are compelled to sell their labour-power and become wage-workers who are dependent on the property-owners, and by their labour create the wealth of the latter.

property-owners, and by their labour create the income of the latter.

The development of capitalism is increasing the number, size and economic importance of the big enterprises, is worsening the condition of the independent small producers (peasants, artisans, handicraftsmen), turning some of them into vassals and tributaries of capital, and displacing others into the ranks of the proletariat.

The higher the level of technical progress, the more the growth of the demand for labour-power lags behind the growth of its supply, and the greater are the opportunities for the capitalists to intensify exploitation of the workers. Insecurity of existence and unemployment, the yoke of exploitation, and humiliation of every kind are becoming the lot of ever wider sections of the working population.

This process is being still more aggravated by industrial crises, which are the inevitable outcome of the basic contradictions of capitalism. Poverty and destitution of the masses exist side by side with a waste of social wealth in consequence of the impossibility of finding markets for the commodities produced.

Thus, the gigantic development of the productive forces of social and increasingly socialised labour is attended by monopolisation of all the principal advantages of this development by a negligible minority of the population. The growth of social wealth proceeds side by side with the growth of social inequality; the gulf between the class of property-owners (the bourgeoisie) and the class of the proletariat is growing.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Written between January 25 and February 18 (February 7 and March 3), 1902

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

* On the back of the original is the following pencilled note: "...emphatically rejecting all those reformist plans which are connected with any extension or consolidation of tutelage of the working masses by the police and officials." This formulation was proposed by Lenin as an amendment to the concluding part of the Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 31).—*Ed*.

8

ADDENDA TO THE AGRARIAN AND FACTORY SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT PROGRAMME

"But with a view to eradicating the remnants of the old serf-owning system it will work for."

Perhaps we should insert "and in the interests of free development of the class struggle in the countryside".

This is *prompted* by the fact that at this point, too, we must resolutely draw a line between ourselves and *bourgeois democracy*, whose every shade will, of course, willingly subscribe to the former motivation alone.

* *
*

NB: add to the *factory* section:
that the law should establish weekly payments for workers under all manner of labour contracts.

Written between January 25 and February 18 (February 7 and March 3), 1902

First published in 1959 in Vol. 6 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

REPLIES TO PLEKHANOV'S AND AXELROD'S REMARKS ON THE ARTICLE "THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY"[16]

"4. establishment of peasant committees:

a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation or, when the land has changed hands, by redemption, etc.) of the land cut off from the peasants when serfdom was abolished and now used by the landlords as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage...."*

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 110.—*Ed.*

Plekhanov. *NB*. Please note this: *expropriation* (No. 3) does not rule out *redemption*; *redemption* does not rule out *expropriation* (proof superfluous); "redemption, etc." (No. 2) is nothing but redemption—"etc." should be deleted. The words in brackets could be replaced by these (by redemption, if after 1861 the land [and not lands] (No. 1) has changed hands by sale). This will make it clear that in other cases restitution shall take place without compensation for the present owners. Where the land has changed hands by inheritance, or *donation*, or *exchange*, there should be no redemption. I think we shall have time to alter this.

Axelrod. *I agree*. P. A.

No. 1. Once you have "lands" in the programme it is bad grammar to say "land" in brackets.

No. 2. "etc." includes exchange of lands, and servitude for land, and redemarcation, *etc*. It would therefore be quite wrong to delete it.

No. 3. "Expropriation" normally implies *deprivation* of property, that is, taking away without compensation. So it is not all that strange to contrast it with redemption as it may appear to the author of the remarks.

"It is our duty to fight against all remnants of serf-owning relationships—that is beyond doubt to a Social-Democrat—and since these relationships are most intricately interwoven with bourgeois relationships, we are *obliged* to penetrate into the very core, if I may use the word, of this confusion, undeterred by the complexity of the task."*

Plekhanov. There is no need to ask for *permission* to obtain knowledge of the core.

? ?

"...the workers' section contains demands directed against the *bourgeoisie*, whereas the peasants' section contains demands directed against the *serf-owning landlords* (against the feudal lords, I would say, if the applicability of this term to our landed nobility were not so disputable[1]).

[1] Personally I am inclined to decide this question in the affirmative, but in the given instance, it is of course neither the place nor the time for substantiating or even for proposing this solution, since what we are concerned with now is defence of the draft agrarian programme prepared collectively by the entire Editorial Board."**

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 114.—*Ed*.
** Ibid., p. 116.—*Ed*.

Axelrod. NB. I do think that such hints at differences could be waived in a *programme* pamphlet.

"However, to try to determine in advance, before the final outcome of the struggle, in the course of that struggle, that we shall perhaps fail to achieve the *entire* maximum, means lapsing into sheer philistinism."*

Plekhanov. "Try to determine" that we shall fail to achieve the entire maximum, etc.—that is very ineptly phrased. I propose to substitute for it the phrase I wrote in the text. I request a *vote* on this proposal. *Motive*: fear of gibes from opponents.

I also propose a vote on my proposal to *delete* the author's considerations about Russian feudalism. *Motive*: such reasoning is irrelevant in a general, you might say, *editorial*, article. The author's reservations merely suggest a *difference of opinion* on the Editorial Board.

Axelrod. I already spoke out in this vein above.

A bit of tact would suggest to the author of the remarks that it is highly improper to insist on a *vote* of the *stylistic* changes he proposes (perhaps for the worse?). It is equally ridiculous to fear that over the minor question of "feudalism" (the Martynovs?) will raise a cry about a "difference of opinion". My statement was a very general one.

"'Our movement' is the Social-Democratic labour movement. The peasant *masses* cannot just be 'brought' *into it*: that is not problematic, but *impossible*, and there was never any question of it. However, the peasant masses *cannot but be brought* into the 'movement' against all the remnants of the serf-owning system (including the autocracy)."***

Plekhanov. I propose that instead of the words: "peasant masses (in the phrase about *bringing in*") we write: the

See 28 reverse.****

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 118.—*Ed.*

** Plekhanov proposed the following rewording: "However, to stop ourselves before the final outcome of the struggle, in the course of that struggle, on the strength of the consideration...."—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 118.—*Ed.*

**** See preceding reply to Plekhanov's remark.—*Ed.*

peasant mass as such, i.e., *as an estate*, and, moreover, regarded *as a single whole*, etc.

I request a vote on this.

Axelrod. I agree. P. A.

"We must spread the idea far and wide that only in a republic can the decisive battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie take place; we must *create* and consolidate republican traditions among all the Russian revolutionaries and among the broadest possible masses of Russian workers; we should express through this "republic" slogan that we will carry to the end the struggle to democratise the state system, without looking back."*

Plekhanov. I advise the delation of the words: we must spread the idea that only in a republic can the decisive battle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie take place (*I request a vote on this*). I am not at all sure that in Britain, say political development must go through a republic. The monarchy there will hardly be a hindrance to the workers, so that its removal may turn out to be a *result* instead of a *preliminary condition* of the triumph of socialism.

Axelrod. In favour of the proposal. P. A.

The example of Britain is not very apt because of her exceptional position. To compare Russia with Britain *just now* is to sow great confusion among the public. The "necessity" of a republic is indicated by the remarks of Marx (1875) and Engels (1891) concerning the demand for a republic in Germany[17]—but there can always be exceptions.

"Hence, for the sake of simplicity, the entire content of Clause 4 may be briefly expressed as 'restitution of the cut-off lands'. The question arises: how did the idea of this demand originate? It arose as the direct outcome of the general and fundamental proposition that we must assist the peasants and urge them to destroy all remnants of the serf-owning system as completely as possible. This meets with 'general approval', doesn't it? Well then, if you do agree to follow this road, make an effort to proceed along it independently; don't make it necessary to drag you; don't let the 'unusual' appearance of this road frighten you;

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 120.—*Ed.*

don't be put out by the fact that in many places you will find no beaten track at all, and that you will have to crawl along the edge of precipices, break your way through thickets, and leap across chasms. Don't complain of the poor road: these complaints will be futile whining, for you should have known in advance that you would be moving, not along a highway that has been graded and levelled by all the forces of social progress, but along paths, through out-of-the-way places and back-alleys which do have a way out, but from which you, we or anyone else will never find a direct, simple, and easy way out—'never', i.e., whilst these disappearing, but so slowly disappearing, out-of-the-way places and back-alleys continue to exist.

"But if you do not want to stray into these back-alleys, then say so frankly and don't try to get away by phrase-mongering."*

Plekhanov. I put to the vote the question of crossing out this page. It lends a somewhat feuilleton character to the reasoning, which in itself is clear and consistent. In order to put forward the demand for restitution of the cut-off lands, there is no need "to crawl along the edge of precipices", etc. This imagery suggests that the author himself has not quite tied in the "cut-off lands" with his own orthodoxy.

Axelrod. I propose we leave out this page, starting from the words: "This meets..." to the end of the following page (47). P. A.

I put to the vote the question of whether it is *proper* to use such *cancan*-toned remarks in respect of a colleague. And where is it going to get us if we *all* start cudgelling each other **in that way??**

"Direct survivals of the corvée system, recorded times without number in all the economic surveys of Russia, are maintained, not by any special law which protects them, but by the actually existing land relationships. This is so to such an extent that witnesses testifying before the well-known Valuyev Commission[18] openly stated that serf-ownership would undoubtedly have been revived had it not

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 127.—*Ed.*

been directly prohibited by law. Hence, one of two things: either you refrain altogether from touching upon the land relationships between the peasants and the landlords—in which case all the remaining questions are solved very 'simply', but then you will also be ignoring the main source of all the survivals of the serf-owning economy in the countryside, and will 'simply' be avoiding a burning question bearing on the most vital interests of the feudal landlords and the enslaved peasantry, a question which tomorrow or the day after may easily become one of the most pressing social and political issues in Russia. Or else you want also to touch upon the source of the 'obsolete forms of economic bondage' represented by the land relationships—in which case you must reckon with the fact that these relationships are so complex and entangled that they do not actually permit of any easy or simple solution. Then, if you are not satisfied with the concrete solution we have proposed for this complex question, you *no* longer have the *right* to get away with a general 'complaint' about its complexity, but *must* attempt to cope with it independently, and propose some other concrete solution.

"The importance of the cut-off lands in present-day peasant farming is a question of reality."*

Plekhanov. I would advise throwing out all the reasoning about "simplicity" and "non-simplicity", and continuing the article with the words: "The importance of the cut-off lands...." The article will gain therefrom, because this whole passage spoils it by being terribly (??) dragged out. I propose a vote.

The reasoning about simplicity, as a summing up of the foregoing (and as a reply to a *host* of remarks made by those even who sympathise with us), is not at all superfluous, and I suggest we leave it in.

"Labour rent makes for stagnation in cultivation techniques and for stagnation in *all* social and economic relationships in the countryside, since this labour rent hampers the development of a money economy and the differentiation of the peasantry, disembarrasses the landlord (comparatively) of the stimulus of competition (instead of raising the technical level, he reduces the share of the sharecropper; incidental-

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 128.—*Ed.*

ly, this reduction has been recorded in a number of localities for many years of the post-Reform period), ties the peasant to the land, thereby checking the progress of migration, outside employment, etc."*

Plekhanov. I propose to delete the words: "and the differentiation of the peasantry"; they could bias the reader against a measure which in itself merits every approval. If you insist on leaving these words in, elaborate on them, explaining (even if only in a footnote) what you mean by them. I request a vote.

How? *Whom?* Why?—this baffles all understanding.

Furthermore: what means "comparatively disembarrasses"? The word "comparatively" does not fit in here.

It's quite plain. It means: it disembarrasses *relative* to the current state in Russia (and not as compared with, say, America).

"And in general: once it is generally acknowledged that the cut-off lands are one of the principal roots of the labour-rent system—and this system is a direct survival of serf-ownership which retards the development of capitalism—how can one doubt that the restitution of the cut-off lands will undermine the labour-rent system and accelerate social and economic progress?"**

Plekhanov. That is just why there is no need to go to such lengths to prove this.

A hasty conclusion. See end of this (55) and beginning of the next page.***

"As far as I can judge, *all* objections 'against the cut-off lands' fit into one or another of these four groups; moreover, most of the objectors (including Martynov) have answered all four questions in the negative, considering the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands wrong in principle, politically inexpedient, practically unattainable, and logically inconsistent."****

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* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 129-30.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 130.—*Ed.*

*** Lenin means the beginning of Chapter VII of his article (ibid., p. 130).—*Ed.*

**** Ibid., p. 131.—*Ed.*

Plekhanov. I propose that Martynov should be deleted: there's much too much of him stuck in all over the place.
Axelrod. Indeed, des Guten, i.e., Martynov, mehr als zu viel.* P. A.

See p. 28 reverse.**

Martynov has cited arguments reiterated by very many of our friends. It would be highly *tactless* to let these arguments go, without replying to them, and to refrain from mentioning Martynov, when he speaks to the point.

"And we shall not be in the least contradicting ourselves if we delete from our programme the struggle against the remnants of the serf-owning system in the subsequent historical period when the special features of the present social and political 'juncture' will have disappeared, when the peasants, let us suppose, will have been satisfied by insignificant concessions made to an insignificant number of property-owners and begin definitely to 'snarl' at the proletariat. Then, we shall probably also have to delete from our programme the struggle against the autocracy, for it is quite inconceivable that the peasants will succeed in ridding themselves of the most repulsive and grievous form of feudal oppression *before* political liberty has been attained."***

Plekhanov. I propose we *throw out* the part starting with the words: "And we shall not be..." and ending with: "...has been attained." Instead of *reinforcing*, they *weaken* the conviction carried by the foregoing.
Axelrod. In favour. P. A.

These words should stand, for they arise out of a *necessary* precaution. Otherwise, we could later be very well accused of lack of foresight.

"It may be argued: 'However slowly the labour-rent farming may be yielding to the pressure of capitalism, still it is yielding; it is, moreover, doomed to disappear completely; large-scale labour-rent farming is giving way to, and

* Too much of a good thing.—*Ed.*
** A reference to Lenin's reply to Plekhanov's remark on p. 55 of this volume.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 132-33.—*Ed.*

will be directly replaced by, large-scale capitalist farming. What you want is to accelerate the elimination of serf-owning by a measure which in essence amounts to the splitting-up (partial, but nevertheless splitting-up) of large-scale farms. Are you not thereby sacrificing the interests of the future to the interests of the present? For the sake of the problematic possibility of a peasant revolt against serf-owning in the immediate future, you are placing obstacles in the way of a revolt of the agricultural proletariat against capitalism in the more or less distant future!'

"This argument, however convincing it may seem at first glance, is very one-sided...."*

Plekhanov. It's pretty unconvincing even at first glance. It reeks of such wild pedantry, that the least said of it the better: I blush for the Social-Democrats. This sense of shame is the stronger now that thousands of Russian peasants are *rising up* to liquidate the old order. I request a vote on the proposal to declare this argument unconvincing even at first glance.

Axelrod. I believe we should throw out the compliment to our opponents à la Martynov. P. A.

I think it is ridiculous to see this as a "compliment to our opponents", when they are being refuted (this is even actually wrong, because the argument was repeated in their letters by *Iskra*'s closest friends). Besides, there's no point at all in the *abuse* heaped on them by the author of the remarks.

"...this *could not fail to exert the profoundest influence* on the spirit of protest and the independent struggle of the entire rural working population".**

Plekhanov. What does "independent struggle" mean?

See Belgium in April 1902.[19] She provides the answer to this "difficult" question.

"And in order to facilitate for our farm labourers and semi-farm labourers the subsequent transition to socialism, it is highly important that the socialist party begin to 'stand up' *at once* for the small peasants, and do 'everything possible' for them, never refusing a hand in solving the

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 133.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 134.—*Ed.*

urgent and complex 'alien' (non-proletarian) problems, and helping the working and exploited masses to regard the socialist party as their leader and representative."*

Plekhanov. Why are the words "everything possible" in inverted commas ("quotes")? I don't understand. Besides, the question of "semi-farm labourers" is not at all an alien one for the proletariat. It is now extremely bad policy to use this word, even in quotes.

Is it so hard to understand that everyone has his own way of using quotes? Perhaps the author of the remarks will want to "*vote*" on the quotes as well? I shouldn't be at all surprised!

"It is the Russian bourgeoisie who were 'late' with what is really *their* task of sweeping away all the remnants of the old regime, and we must and shall rectify this omission until it has been rectified, until we have won political liberty, as long as the position of the peasants continues to foster dissatisfaction among practically the whole of educated bourgeois society (as is the case in Russia), instead of fostering a feeling of conservative self-satisfaction among it on account of the 'indestructibility' of what is supposed to be the strongest bulwark against socialism (as is the case in the West where this self-satisfaction is displayed by all the parties of Order, ranging from the agrarians and conservatives pur sang, through the liberal and free-thinking bourgeois, to even as far—without offence to Messrs. the Chernovs and the *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*![20]—to even as far as the fashionable 'critics of Marxism' in the agrarian question)."**

Plekhanov. *I strongly advise* that we throw out here the words "*Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*". They stand alongside Chernov's name, and we could be accused of carelessly bringing the two together, giving a hint, and almost divulging a pseudonym. This should be avoided at all costs.

I agree, but I prefer to throw out "the Chernovs".

"Nationalisation of the land is a different matter. This demand (if it is interpreted in the bourgeois sense, and not

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 134.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 135-36.—*Ed.*

in the socialist) does actually 'go further' than the demand for the restitution of the cut-off lands, and in principle we fully endorse it. It goes without saying that, when the revolutionary moment comes, we shall not fail to advance it."*

Plekhanov. I quite adhere to this remark.[21] That's the "*crux*" of the matter.

Axelrod. I don't quite understand. Above you gave an excellent definition of the social-revolutionary character of the agrarian programme; besides nationalisation of the land is now anti-revolutionary even as a slogan for an *uprising*. I agree with Berg's proposal.

It's a pity the "adherent" quite forgot that the remark related to the *unedited* article. Just a little attention would have spared him this amusing mistake.

"But our present programme is being drawn up, not only for the period of revolutionary insurrection, not even so much for that period, as for the period of political slavery, for the period that precedes political liberty. However, in this period the demand for the nationalisation of the land is *much less* expressive of the immediate tasks of the democratic movement in the meaning of a struggle against the serf-owning system."**

Plekhanov. The point made above was that our agrarian programme is a social-revolutionary one.

Nationalisation of the land in a police state would mean a fresh and vast increase of that state. That is why it is not right to say, as the author says here, "much less expressive", etc. One measure is *revolutionary* and the other *reactionary*.

Axelrod. Plekhanov's proposal coincides with the meaning of Berg's remarks, and mine on the preceding page.

This is wrong. Nationalisation is not always "reactionary", regardless of time and character. That's an absurdity.

If the authors of the remarks refuse to take the

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 137.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 137-39.—*Ed.*

trouble to give a precise formulation to the amendments, even in a *second* reading (although this demand was specially accepted and communicated to all)—there will be endless delays through votes on "changes" in general (and then on the text of the changes??). It would be better to worry less about the author of a signed article *expressing* himself in his own manner.

"That is why we think that, on the basis of the present social system, the maximum demand in our agrarian programme should not go beyond the democratic revision of the Peasant Reform. The demand for nationalisation of the land, while quite valid in principle and quite suitable at certain moments, is politically inexpedient at the present moment."*

Plekhanov. *I agree* with Berg's remark.[22] But I propose this wording: in a police state, *nationalisation* of the land is harmful, and in a constitutional one it will be *a part* of the demand for the nationalisation of *all the means* of production. *I request a vote.*

Axelrod. I agree. P. A.

See p. 75 reverse.**

"Such composition of the courts would be a guarantee both of their democratic nature and free expression of the different class interests of the various sections of the rural population."***

Plekhanov. The style here is terrible. I propose a vote on improving it.

Axelrod. How?

A "terrible" concept of the "voting" game! It looks as if we have nothing better to do!

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 138.—*Ed.*

** A reference to Lenin's reply to Plekhanov's remark on p. 63 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 140.—*Ed.*

"...it is well known that in our countryside rent is more often of a serf-owning than a bourgeois nature; it is much more "money" rent (i.e., a modified form of feudal rent) than capitalist rent (i.e., the surplus over and above the profit of the employer). Reductions of rent would therefore directly help to replace serf-owning forms of farming by capitalist forms."*

Plekhanov. The author promised not to speak of Russian feudalism (see above), but has failed to keep his promise. That's a pity. I request a *vote* on the proposal to delete here the word *feudal* (rent).

That's not true. If you do take a look above, you will find that the author "promised" nothing of the sort. Once the author has made the specific reservation that this is *not a general opinion*, the quibbling here is doubly tactless.

"Even the autocracy has therefore been obliged more and more frequently to institute a special fund (utterly trifling, of course, and going more to line the pockets of embezzlers of state property and bureaucrats than for the relief of the famine-stricken) 'for the cultural and charitable needs of the village communes'. We, too, cannot but demand, among other democratic reforms, that such a fund be established. That can scarcely be disputed."**

Plekhanov. This passage here about the "autocracy" is *extremely inappropriate*. After all, why should we look to it for example? As if we are unable to make any proposals without looking to it for a cue?

The restitution to the peasants should be motivated by it being a revolutionary measure, rectifying an "*injustice*" which is not only still in everyone's mind, but which largely served to ruin the Russian peasant (cf. Martynov).

P.S. When the French émigrés demanded their billion (at

That *even* the autocracy has been obliged to go in for charity (in the smallest way) is *a fact*, fear of reference to which is rather strange. That this is put forward as an "example", is a "poor invention" by a man who wants to quibble.

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 141.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 142.—*Ed.*

the time of the Restoration)[23] they said nothing about charity. They had a better understanding of the class struggle.

I propose a vote on the proposal to rewrite this passage.

Axelrod. Cf. Plekhanov's remark to p. 90.[24] Read that and these remarks carefully and you will agree with them. P. A.

"But, then—the objection is raised—this tribute *cannot* be returned in full. Quite so (*just as the cut-off lands cannot be restituted in full*)."*

Plekhanov. Why can't the cut-off lands be restituted in full? The programme says nothing about it.

I call everyone's attention to the fact that the meaning of the paragraph we adopted has been changed here.

Axelrod. Why do you restrict and weaken a principled decision by an insertion?

That's absolutely wrong. Lenin's insertion in his article does not alter the meaning of *what the programme says*, and *cannot* do so. The author of the remarks has forgotten the elementary truth that "it is the law, and not the motives of the law, that is subject to application".

"Actually, of course, the annulment of collective liability (Mr. Witte may manage to put this particular reform through before the revolution), the abolition of division into social-estates, freedom of movement, and the right for each individual peasant freely to dispose of his land will rapidly and inevitably bring about the removal of the burden of taxation and serf-bondage that the land commune to a three-fourths extent constitutes at the present time. But this result will only prove the correctness of our views on the village commune, prove how incompatible it is with the entire social and economic development of capitalism."**

Plekhanov. There is now talk of its destruction. The relevant phrase should therefore be changed.

"Therefore" has nothing to do with it. The "talk" has been going on for quite some

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 143.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 144.—*Ed.*

time, and *even if it does lead to some action*, still nothing need be altered there.

I propose that instead of "capitalism" we say: "with all the social and economic development of our time". *Motive*: this will spare us any "demagogic criticism" by the proponents of the commune.

I find this fear of "demagogy" absolutely unwarranted, because these gentlemen will always come up with similarly "*bad* criticism".

"To this we reply that it does not at all follow from our formulation that every peasant must necessarily demand that a separate plot of land be allotted to him. What does follow is only liberty to sell the land; moreover, the preferential right of the commune members to purchase land that is being sold does not run counter to this liberty."*

Plekhanov. I quite agree with this remark,[25] and propose that it be put to the vote.

Axelrod. In favour.

"I agree" with what related to a deleted passage??!!?? A very fine proposal for a "vote", indeed!

"This objection would be groundless. Our demands do not destroy the association but, on the contrary, set up in place of the archaic (de facto semi-feudal) power of the commune over the muzhik, the power of a *modern* association over its members who join of their own accord. Nor, in particular, is our formulation at variance with the recognition, for instance, of fellow members' having the pre-emptive right, on certain terms, to buy the land put up for sale by a fellow member."

Plekhanov. I don't agree with this. This right would merely depreciate the peasant's land.

As for collective liability, it has partially already been abolished, and the rest will be abolished by Mr. Witte any day now.

Contradiction. I fail to understand: on the one hand, I *freely* enter an association and *freely* withdraw from it. On the other,

The author of the remarks overdoes his hostility to the commune. On this point great care must be taken to keep out of the embrace of Messrs. A. Skvortsov & Co. (into which the author of the remarks falls). *On certain terms*, the right of pre-emption may increase instead

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 145.—*Ed.*

the commune has a pre-emptive right to buy my land. *There's a contradiction in this.*

of decreasing the value of the land. My expression is deliberately broader and more general, whereas the author of the remarks is in too much of a hurry to cut the Gordian knot. By carelessly "denying" the commune (*as an association*) we may easily spoil all our "good will" to the peasant. After all, the commune is also connected with the conventional type of *settlement*, and so on, and only the A. Skvortsovs "remake" this in their projects with the stroke of a pen.

"To clear the way for the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, it is necessary to remove all remnants of serfdom, which now *overlie* the beginnings of capitalist antagonisms among the rural population, and keep them from developing."*

Plekhanov. This is the first time I see the word *antagonism* used in the *plural*.

The author of the remarks should not imagine that he is past seeing anything for the first time.

* * *

This alone is made fully clear by the remarks of the "author of the remarks". If he set himself the task of making it *impossible* for comrades who disagree with him, even on trifling matters, to work together with him on the board, he is rapidly and very surely moving towards that noble goal. But if he does reach it, he himself should bear the consequences.

(1) The remarks are written in such a careless manner that no effort has even been made to compare what there was before and what there is after the corrections.

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 146.—*Ed.*

(2) In fact, the list of corrections has simply been *thrown out*! "Don't buck me."

(3) Hardly *any of the alterations* proposed by the author of the remarks has been formulated by him personally—*contrary to the specified condition* adopted of necessity to avoid intolerable delays.

(4) The tone of the remarks is deliberately abusive. If I adopted such a tone in "analysing" Plekhanov's article on the programme (i.e., his *personal* "*article*" and not the draft of a general statement, a general programme, etc.) that would at once be the end of our collaboration. And so I "put to the vote": are members of the board to be allowed to *provoke* other members into doing so?

(5) It is the summit of tactlessness to use *votings* to interfere in the very manner in which the members of the board express themselves.

The author of the remarks puts me in mind of a coachman who thinks that to steer well, the horses have to be reined in and brought up as often and as hard as possible. Of course, I am nothing more than a horse, one *of* the horses of the coachman—Plekhanov—but even the most harassed horse may throw off the much too spirited coachman.

Written on May 1 (14), 1902

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

INTRODUCTION TO THE LEAFLET OF THE DON COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. "TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA"[26]

We give in full the splendid proclamation issued by the Don Committee of our Party. It shows that the Social-Democrats know how to appreciate the heroic behaviour of men like Balmashev, without, however, falling into the error of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.[27] The Social-Democrats bring to the fore the workers' (and peasants') movement. They make their demands on the government on behalf of the working class and the whole people, but without issuing any threats of further attempts and assassinations. They

regard terrorism as one of the possible ancillary means, and not as a *special* tactical method justifying separation from revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Written after May 9 (22), 1902

First published in 1931 in V. Pleskov's book *V gody boyevoi yunosti. Molodyozh nakanune pervoi revolutsii* (Fighting Days of Youth. Young People on the Eve of the First Revolution), Molodaya Gvardia Publishers

Printed from the original

INTRODUCTION TO THE LEAFLET "TO THE CITIZENS OF ALL RUSSIA"[28]

The leaflet of the Don Committee, which we reprint, sums up some remarkable events and gives them a highly correct and striking assessment, drawing practical conclusions which Social-Democrats will never tire of repeating. It was published in 6,500 copies and sent to various towns of Russia in December.

Written on December 20, 1902 (January 2, 1903)

Published on January 1, 1903 in *Iskra* No. 31

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A PAMPHLET AGAINST THE S.R.s[29]

The war is on. It is just beginning. Literary polemics. Why? Explain why war is inevitable.

Special attention should be devoted to theoretical differences involving principles.

A) *Middle-of-the-road and unprincipled stand between revolutionary Marxism and opportunist criticism.*

1. Article in No. 2 of *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (editorial). Its examination.
2. *Theory of cataclysm. Quote pp.* **55-56** = denial of the economic necessity of socialism. (Trusts forgotten.)

3. Agrarian question. Quote p. *57* ("even").
4. Theory of *value*. Quote p. *64*. "*Shaken*"! p. *66* ("even" once again!)
   {pp. 67 and 48—crisis of *all* socialism}
5. "*Violent and exceptional Marxism is becoming a part of history*" (*75*)!! NB
6. *Zhitlovsky in "Sozialistische Monatsheften"*....[30]
7. *Current Issue*. Praise of Hertz (note on p. 8).

"New standpoint"=through co-operation to socialism. to B. 3.

8. *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* No. 2, pp. 82 and 87. "Amendments", "revision", etc.*
9. Σ = total lack of principle. Anyone who wants to, can be a Socialist-Revolutionary.
10. Complete detachment from international socialism: "distinctive character".

B) *Middle-of-the-road and unprincipled stand between Russian Marxism and the Narodnaya Volya trend, rather: the liberal-Narodnik trend.*

1. The new revolutionary movement goes hand in hand with a struggle between the old theory and the new. Relics of Russian socialism (liberal-Narodnik trend) and Russian Marxism. What is the attitude of the Socialist-Revolutionaries? *The Eve of Revolution* is typical. (Total incomprehension of the importance of theoretical discussions.)
2. "Labour economy" (S.R theory) (from *Revolutsion-*

Degeneration of the old Russian socialism into a liberal-Narodnik trend.

* MS. indicates that point 8 is to go before point 6.—*Ed.*

naya Rossiya[31] No. 11, p. 7). *Vulgar socialism + Narodism.*
[Cf. *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* No. 2, pp. 100-01: *class struggle=struggle of all the oppressed*!!]

3. Progressive and negative aspects of capitalism. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 9, p. 4.

Contra: *Progressive significance of migration and vagabondage*: No. 8, p. 8, column 2[32]

Special sheet, bottom of p. 2

Cf. *Current Issue* (p. 8): "*New* standpoint": "*Through co-operation to socialism*". Cf. A 7

From German statistics: co-operation= prevalence of the bourgeoisie.

4. Σ=purely eclectic combination of Narodism and Marxism with the aid of "criticism".

C) *Middle-of-the-road attitude to the class struggle and the working-class movement.*

1. From the theoretical errors of their stand they pass on to practical ones. Their attitude to the *class struggle* and the *working-class movement*. What is their approach?
2. Quotation from *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* No. 2, *p. 224*. *Party* and *class*. Confusion, which means only one thing: moving away from the proletariat's class struggle and throwing open the door to an intelligentsia that is absolutely uncommitted and unstable.
3. *Intelligentsia + proletariat + peasantry* (No. 8, p. 6, column 2) (against "narrow" orthodoxy). Meaning= total denial of the class struggle. Confusion of different strata. Lumping together of intelligentsia's social reformism and a revolutionarism which is

merely democratic—and proletarian socialism—and crude peasant demands.

4. *Intelligentsia* and *proletariat*. And the Narodnaya Volya followers as well!!! *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* No. 3—pp. 9-11. *Special sheet*.
5. Their attitude in practice? Illustrated by Economism.[33] *Iskra*: long process of work, persuasion, education. *Iskra*'s shedding of illusions about unity. Cf.: Gloating
   + Putting spokes in revolutionary Marxism's wheels.
   Σ = dilettante on the sidelines.
6. How they explain their distinction from the Social-Democrats? No. 9, p. 4, column 2.

{ The point is not that "they want to be", but that the *working-class movement* is there.
Labour in general is an absurdity.

{ Failure to make a distinction between hired and independent labour = vulgarisation of socialism by petty-bourgeois element and total obliteration of division from the Narodniks.
"A purely ideological representative" of a principle. *No* principle at all!

D) *Regardless of their will, they are leading the working class towards subordination to bourgeois democracy.*

1. We have examined the theoretical stand of the S.R.s and their attitude to the working-class movement. Σ = middle-of-the-road stand, eclecticism.
2. Their attitude to Russian bourgeois democracy. There is none! *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* No. 2, Cf. "Modern Vestal *p. 132*!! The S.R.s already Virgin".[34] noticed this during the war against the Economists.
3. What about Mr. Struve? What about the liberal-Narodnik trend? That's to whom they give in!!! It means that they give in to bourgeois democracy, failing to explain to the workers the class antitheses, and failing to work out an *independent* socialist *ideology*.

4. What means *intelligentsia* + *proletariat* + *peasantry*? In practice, the *intelligentsia* and the *peasantry* constitute nothing more than *bourgeois* democracy!!
5. What about their attitude to the liberals? Have another look at the + and — of capitalism formula (No. 9, p. 4).

There is no class underlying the liberals (No. 9, p. 4).

There is much more of it than you have!

Our fight against the liberals is much more acute than yours is.

Curious fact: *they took the liberals at their word*!! *No. 9, pp. 3-4* (V. V.'s variants)

We are engaged in a *w a r* and not in verbose reasoning: on the one hand, on the other hand.

But we realise that the liberals represent a class, that they are resilient, and they *have a s o c i a l, p o p u l a r* movement, which the S.R.s have not!!

6. L. M. in *Zarya* (No. 2-3) was right: the S.R.s have a twofold name because their socialism is not at all revolutionary and their revolutionism has nothing in common with socialism. *That is what leads to their defeats by bourgeois democracy.*

That is the end of the principled criticism of the *whole* S.R. *stand*. Let us note that we reject the whole of their stand and *not merely* their errors in the (agrarian) programme, *not merely* their errors in tactics (terrorism).

Warning against petty-bourgeois socialism, revolutionarism and vacillation.

E) *A g r a r i a n q u e s t i o n.*

1. Primitive vulgar socialism. Credulity. No analysis of the movement. Failure to understand the struggle against the rem-

Unreadiness of *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* against *Iskra*. *Current Issue* (Hertz). NB *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 4, February,

nants of serfdom (No. 8, p. 4: the 1861 reforms have given scope to capitalism!!).

2. The peasantry's "equalitarian principle", etc., is merely labouring under a delusion of *democratic* demands. There is nothing socialist in it. You must tell the truth instead of stooping to demagogy.

bottom of p. 2: Polemics on the muzhik,[1] and No. 8 (*June*): call by the *Peasant Union*, etc. Indeed, you are less prepared than the Social-Democrats!

[1] The modern countryside can support and intensify the pressure on the government "and can probably do it more vigorously than we think, cut off as we have absolutely been in most cases from the muzhik for several years now because of government spying and oppression". *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 4 (February 1902), p. 2.

3. "Socialisation of the land." Bourgeois nationalisation? (What about its significance in a class state?) "Socialisation of the land" is an empty *promise* (minimum!).
   After all this = *de facto* "*the people are prepared for revolution*" of the Narodnaya Volya.
4. *Co-operation* (instead of the class struggle!) is a purely (bourgeois-) *petty-bourgeois* demand.
5. For the commune. Against free disposal.
6. *Narodnoye Dyelo*[35] No. 2, pp. 18-19. How is the peasants' and workers' struggle to be united? *Narodnoye Dyelo* No. 2, p. 51: "in the common popular spirit". Unprintable.
   Narodnoye Dyelo No. 2, p. 63: "there should be duping wherever and whenever possible"!!

   Examples of duping: *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 11, p. 6: have a snack and a drink of blood, pettifoggers and so on and so forth.

F) *Terrorism.*

1. Polemics over Balmashev. Unexampled.
   But isn't the criticism of the Germans unexampled?
   (First you breed dissatisfaction and then you yourself suggest that it should be voiced!!)
2. *Polemics over the April 3 proclamation. Quote* (*No. 11, bottom of p. 25*)[36] and a *fiction* deduced.
3. "*Vperyod*" *No. 5.* Quote, No. 5, pp. 7-8.

   by the way, p. 9 [37]

4. Terrorism. Quote from No. 7 (idem as in the April 3 proclamation: it is not words we attach importance to). No. 7, p. 4: "Terrorism induces people to *think politically*."
   —"surer than months of propaganda"
   —"will instil strength into the discouraged".[38]

   The logic of terrorism: it is brought out into the forefront, then comes the rest. Proof: back in *February* 1902 it was not a fighting organisation that *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (No. 4) brought out into the forefront. *See reverse* (α).*

5. "Not instead, but together." In practice there is *no* connection with the masses.
   Scepticism, lack of steadfastness. *4 years* (1897-1901), with the democratic period just beginning.

   Terrorism is not dangerous because there is a mass movement. "Frame of mind." Succumb to it? *See reverse* (β).**

   Distraction from immediate pressing tasks. *Leaders lagging behind the mass.*

   No. 12, column 1 on p. 3 ("theory of stages"). Ibid.: there should be no breaking into prisons.[39]

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* The text marked (α) is on the reverse of the MS.—*Ed.*
** The text marked (β) is on the reverse of the MS.—*Ed.*

(α)	"All the aspects of the revolutionary technique, methods of street fighting against the troops, *execution of the most hated servants of the tsar* (my italics), etc., *retreat into the background* before the most mature, most immediate and pressing problem: the establishment of a central revolutionary organisation" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, 1902, No. 4, February, p. 3).	What is the position today?
(β)	"...While the scribes waged a paper struggle..." (whether it is right to attach merely an exciting or also a deterrent significance to terrorism) "...*life brought out into the forefront such a need* of terroristic means *that in face of it all earlier objections had to cease*. Terroristic acts became necessary as a means of self-defence..." *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 7, p. 2 (June 1902).	

G) *Conclusion.*

Tasks of contemporary revolutionaries:

α) Theoretical defence and development of revolutionary Marxism.

β) Utmost participation in international ideological struggle.

γ) Development of Russian Marxism, its application; struggle against liberal-Narodnik trend, exposure before the working class of its bourgeois and petty-bourgeois character.

δ) Organisation of the proletariat. Host of flaws. Insistent demands.

ε) "A lot of people and a shortage of men." Leaders must prepare the masses for an *uprising*.

Written in the spring of 1903

First published in 1939 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[40]

JULY 17 (30)-AUGUST 10 (23), 1903

1

PROGRAMME OF THE R.S.D.L.P. REGULAR SECOND CONGRESS[41]

A. Standing orders of the Congress and its constitution.
B. List and *priority* of questions to be discussed and decided at the Congress.

A. Standing Orders of the Congress.

1. The comrade duly authorised by the Organising Committee[42] is to open the Congress.

In brackets are *desirable* addenda, explanations, advice and other remarks of a *particular* character.

2. The Congress is to elect a chairman, two assistants (and deputies) of the chairman, and 9 secretaries. These 9* constitute the bureau and have their seats at the same table.

Organising Committee's report.

3. Election of a committee to verify delegates' credentials and examine any applications, complaints and protests relating to the constitution of the Congress.

(This committee is also to receive the Organising Committee's statement concerning the persons, *as listed*, whom it has invited to attend the Congress with voice but no vote.)**

4. Decision on admitting the Polish Social-Democrats.[43]
to 3***

* Apparently, a slip of the pen: the total should be 12.—*Ed.*
** The bracketed text is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*
*** Point 4, like point 11 in Section B (List and Priority of Questions) was inserted by Lenin additionally. Because of this and changes in

5. Order of the Congress sittings: twice a day from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. (roughly).

6. Limitation on delegates' speeches: rapporteurs not more than 30 minutes per speech; the rest, not more than 10 minutes. No one is entitled to speak more than twice on any question. On points of order, not more than two speakers for and two against every proposal.

7. The minutes of the Congress are to be kept by the secretaries with the participation of the chairman or one of his assistants. Each sitting of the Congress is to start with the approval of the minutes of the preceding sitting. *Every speaker is to submit to the bureau of the Congress a summary of each of his speeches within two hours after the sitting.*

8. The voting on all the questions except the election of functionaries is to be by a show of hands On the demand of ten votes; roll-call votes are to be taken with a record of all votes cast entered in the minutes.

(To accelerate roll-call voting and avoid mistakes, the bureau of the Congress should give ballot papers on each question to every member of the Congress with the right of vote. On each ballot paper, the delegate writes his name (see §8*)

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the arrangement of the points, Lenin altered their numeration. We give here his final variant.

Lenin subsequently crossed out point 4 and wrote after it: "to 3"—*Ed.*

* According to initial numeration (actually §9).—*Ed.*

and his vote (yes, no, abstain) and also the question to which his vote applies. The questions may be designated by abbreviations or even by a figure, letter, etc. The bureau of the Congress keeps these ballot papers separately for each question until the end of the Congress.)*

9. Secret designation of each delegate's name (or without name: first and second delegate from such and such a Party organisation, etc.).*

10. The chairman's statement that the Congress has been finally constituted as the Regular Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and that, *consequently*, the decisions of this Congress shall invalidate all earlier contradictory decisions adopted by the Regular First[45] and sectional congresses—that, *consequently*, the decisions of this Congress shall be *absolutely* binding on all the Russian S.D.L. Party.

(It is *undesirable* to touch upon the question of the Bund[44] in connection with this point: it is better *directly* to put it first in the list of questions before the Congress.)

11. Discussion of list and priority of questions.

B. List and Priority of Questions.

1. *The Bund's status in the Russian S.D.L.P.* (Does the Russian S.D.L.P. accept the federal principle of

(It is *necessary* to write a *draft resolution* on this question beforehand, and it is desirable to put it through.)

* The text in brackets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

Party organisation put forward by the Bund?)*

NB: The reasons why this question is brought up into first place: formal (the Bund's statements, the *composition* of the Congress, subordination to majority), and moral (complete elimination of split and confusion on basic issue).

2. *Approval of the text of programme* of the Russian S.D.L.P.

First reading: adoption *as a whole* of one of the available drafts *as a basis* for detailed discussion.

Second reading: adoption of each point and clause of the programme.

(α. How many draft programmes shall be deemed subject to examination by the Congress? [*Iskra*'s, *Borba*'s,[46] *Zhizn*'s[47]?]

(β. Shall all the drafts be examined or one taken as a basis? Or otherwise: shall one of the proposed drafts be adopted *in the first reading*?)

(Necessity of having this question as a separate item: *end the struggle of trends within Social-Democracy*.)*

3. *Creation of the Party's Central Organ* (newspaper) *or confirmation of one.*

α) Does the Congress want to set up a new organ?

β) If it does not, which of the existing organs does the Congress want to *transform* into the Party's Central Organ?

4. *Reports by the committees* (including the report by the Organising Committee through one of its members) *and other Party*

α) How many reports are there?

β) *Are all the reports to be read* or referred to the committee?

* The text in brackets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

*organisations and individual members.**

γ) Are all the reports to be discussed separately or together?

(better separately)

δ) Order of reading the reports.

5. *Party organisation.* Approval of general organisational Rules of the Russian S.D.L.P.

First reading: selection of one of the drafts as a whole. Second reading: discussion of one of the drafts point by point.**

6. *Regional and national organisations.*

(Recognition or non-recognition of each of them separately in a specified composition and with (perhaps) such and such exemptions from the Party's general Rules.)***

7. *Separate groups in the Party.*

Borba
Zhizn
Volya[48]

Emancipation of Labour group[49]

Iskra's organisation in *Russia*[50]
Yuzhny Rabochy[51], etc.****

It is necessary to have a draft resolution on each separate group and separate organisation.*****

Final (or preliminary, that is, with the Central Committee authorised to make the

* Point 4 is crossed out. "Delegates' reports" is written on top in an unknown hand.—*Ed.*

** The text from the word "Approval" to the words "point by point" is crossed out.—*Ed.*

*** The text in brackets is crossed out.—*Ed.*

**** The text from the word "*Borba*" to the word "etc." is crossed out.—*Ed.*

***** The paragraph is crossed out.—*Ed.*

necessary inquiries and lay down the final decision*) *approval of the list of all Party committees, organisations, groups, etc.*		
8. *National question.*	It is necessary to have a resolution on the national question in general (explanation of "self-determination" and *tactical* conclusions from our explanation). (Perhaps also a special resolution against the P.P.S.?[52])	
9. *Economic struggle and the trade union movement.*	(*It is necessary* to have a resolution both on the principles and on the pressing tasks facing the Party.)	
10. *Celebration of May Day.*	*Ditto.*	
11. *International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam in 1904.*[53]	*Ditto.*	
12. *Demonstrations and uprising.*	*Ditto.*	
13. *Terrorism.*	*Ditto.*	
21. *Attitude of the Russian S.D.L.P. to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.* [and to the revolutionary socialists?? etc.?]	*Ditto.*	insert these two questions after No. 7.***
22. *Attitude of the Russian S.D.L.P. to Russian liberal trends.***	*Ditto.*	

* The text from the words "that is" to the word "decision" is crossed out.—*Ed.*

** Written in an unknown hand beside this point: "23. Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. to other revolutionary and opposition parties and trends existing in Russia". Written in Lenin's hand before the number of the point: "23".—*Ed.*

*** The text is crossed out.—*Ed.*

14. *Internal questions of Party work: organisation of propaganda.*	*Resolutions* desirable.
15. " " *agitation*	
16. " " **Party** *literature.*	
17. " " *work among the peasantry.*	
18. " " " *in the army.*	
19. " " " *among* **students.**	
20. " " " *among* **sectarians.**	

24. *Elections to the Central Committee and the Editorial Board of the Party C.O.*	The Congress is to elect *three* persons to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and *three* to the Central Committee. These 6 persons *together* shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority additional members to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee and duly report to the Congress. Following the approval of this report by the Congress, subsequent co-aptation is to be carried out separately by the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

[24. *Election of the Party Council.*[54]]

25. *The order governing the publication of decisions and minutes of the Congress and also the order governing the entry upon the exercise of their duties by elected functionaries and institutions.*

Written in the second half of June and the first half of July 1903

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2

SPEECHES DURING THE EXAMINATION OF THE LIST OF QUESTIONS SUBJECT TO DEBATE AT THE CONGRESS[55]

JULY 17 (30)

1

In the plan, the question of the programme is in the second place. The national question is a part of the programme and is to be dealt with when the latter is discussed. The question of regional and national organisations in general is an organisational one. But the question of attitude to the nationalities, in particular, is a tactical question and is an application of our general principles to practical activity.

2

The first item of the list relates specially to the Bund organisation. The sixth relates to the Party organisation. Upon the establishment of general rules for local, regional, national and other organisations, this special question is raised: which organisations and on what terms shall be recruited to the Party?

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov (The Regular Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Full Text of the Minutes), Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

3

SPEECH ON THE ACTIONS OF THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE[56]

JULY 18 (31)

The Organising Committee may meet, but not as a collegium exerting an influence on the business of the Congress. The Organising Committee's practical activity does not cease, but there is an end to its influence on the Congress apart from the commission.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

4

SPEECH ON THE ATTENDANCE OF THE POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AT THE CONGRESS[57]

JULY 18 (31)

I do not see any weighty arguments against an invitation. The Organising Committee has taken the first step in bringing the Polish comrades closer to the Russian. By inviting them to our Congress we shall take a second step in the same direction. I do not see this producing any complications.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

5

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE GENERAL SECTION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME

JULY 29 (AUGUST 11)

This insertion makes it worse.[58] It creates the impression that consciousness grows spontaneously. Yet, there is no conscious activity of workers in international Social-Democracy outside the Social-Democrats' sphere of influence.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

6

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEMANDS OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME

JULY 30 (AUGUST 12)

1

Lenin finds Strakhov's amendment unsatisfactory, because the committee's formulation specifically emphasises the *people's will*.[59]

2

Lenin opposes the word "regional", because it is very vague and may be interpreted in the sense that the Social-Democrats want the whole state split up into small regions.[60]

3

Lenin finds the addition of the words "and to every foreigner" superfluous, because it is implicit that the Social-Democratic Party will insist that the paragraph in question shall apply to foreigners as well.[61]

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

7

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEMANDS OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME

JULY 31 (AUGUST 13)

The word "militia" does not say anything new and makes for confusion. The words "universal arming of the people" are clear and quite Russian. I find Comrade Lieber's amendment superfluous.[62]

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

8

PROPOSALS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEMANDS OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME[63]

1) Let "and language" stand at the end of §6.
2) Insert new point:
"The right of the population to receive education in the native language, the right of each citizen to use the native language at meetings and in public and state institutions".
3) In §11 delete the sentence about language.

Written between July 30 and August 1 (August 12 and 14), 1903

First published in 1959 in Vol. 7 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

9

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE SECTION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME RELATING TO LABOUR PROTECTION

JULY 31 (AUGUST 13)

1

Lenin does not object to a 42-hour rest but, addressing Lieber, remarks that the programme speaks of supervision over all industries. An indication of the actual size will merely restrict the sense. When our programme is a bill we shall write in the details.[64]

2

I object to Comrade Lyadov's amendment.[65] His first two amendments are superfluous because in our programme we demand labour protection for *all* the branches of the economy and, consequently, for agriculture as well. As for the third, it applies entirely to the agrarian section and we shall return to it when debating our draft agrarian programme.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

10

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

AUGUST 1 (14)

1

Lenin tables this amendment: instead of "*will work for*" insert "*demand above all*".[66] The reports during the debates pointed out that the draft deliberately says "will work for" in order to emphasise that we do not intend to do this now but in the future. I motion this amendment to avoid giving ground for such misunderstandings. By the words "above all" I mean that we have *other* demands, apart from the agrarian programme.

2

I object to Comrade Lyadov's proposal.[67] We are not drafting a law, but are merely giving general indications. There are those among the townsfolk who also belong to the poll-tax paying estates; in addition, there are the small tradesmen in the suburbs and others, and if we were to write all this into our programme we should have to use the idiom of Volume IX of the Code of Laws.

3

I find Martynov's question superfluous.[68] Instead of putting forward general principles we are being forced into particulars. If we were to do so, we should never come to the end of the Congress. The principle is quite definite: every peasant has the right to dispose of his land, whether *belonging to the commune* or *held as private property*. That is nothing but the demand of the peasant's right to dispose of his land. We insist that there should be no special laws for the peasant; we want more than the right of withdrawing from the commune. We are unable just now to decide on all the particulars that may crop up in implementing this. I am against Comrade Lange's addendum; we cannot demand the abolition of all the laws governing tenure. That is going too far.

4

Martynov must be labouring under a misunderstanding. What we want is uniform application of general legislation, the one now accepted in all the bourgeois states, namely, that which is based on the principles of Roman law and which recognises both personal and common property. We should like to regard communal land-holdings as common property.

5

We are engaged in the drafting of addenda to § 4 in respect of the Caucasus. These addenda should be inserted after point a). There are two draft resolutions. If we adopt Comrade Karsky's amendment, the point will lose heavily in concreteness. In the Urals, for instance, there is a host

of survivals; over there, there is a veritable reservation of serfdom. Concerning the Latvians we could say that they fit the formula: "and in other regions of the state". I support Comrade Kostrov's proposal, namely: we must insert a demand for the transfer of land titles to the khizani, the temporarily bound and others.[69]

6

Paragraph 5 is connected with paragraph 16 of the labour programme: this does imply courts consisting equally of workers and employers; we must demand special representation for the farm labourers and the poor peasantry.[70]

7

I believe this to be unnecessary, since it would extend the competence of the courts out of all proportion.[71] Our aim is to secure a reduction of rents, but the establishment of tariffs would enable the landowners to argue their case by referring to definite facts. The reduction of rent-prices rules out any idea of their increase. Kautsky, speaking of Ireland, said that some results were obtained there by the introduction of industrial courts.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from
the text
of the book

11

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE PARTY RULES

AUGUST 2 (15)

Lenin insists on the inclusion of the words about material support, since everyone accepts that the Party must exist on the funds of its members. On the question of setting up a political party, there should be no references to moral considerations.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from
the text
of the book

12

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE PARTY RULES

AUGUST 4 (17)

1

Lenin finds the first formulation unsuitable because it lends the Council an arbitral character.[72] The Council, however, must be not only an arbitral institution, but also one co-ordinating the activity of the C.C. and the Central Organ. He also speaks out in favour of the Congress appointing a fifth member. It may well happen that the four members of the Council will be unable to elect a fifth; we shall then find ourselves without a necessary institution.

2

Lenin finds Comrade Zasulich's arguments unsatisfactory.[73] The case she described already implies struggle; in that case the Rules will be of no help. By leaving the election of the fifth member to the four members of the Council, we introduce struggle into the Rules. He considers it necessary to note that the Council is more than a reconciliation body. Thus, for instance, under the Rules, two members of the Council have the right to convene it.

3

Lenin favours the retention of this phrase; no one should be barred from taking his appeal to the centre. That is a necessary condition of centralisation.[74]

4[75]

There are two questions here. The first is about the qualified majority, and I object to the proposal to reduce it from four-fifths down to two-thirds. Introduction of a motivated protest would show lack of foresight and I object to it.[76] The second question is immensely more important—the right of mutual control over co-optation by the C.C. and the Central Organ. The mutual accord of the two centres is a necessary condition of harmony. This is a question of a break between the two centres. Those who do not want a split must see to it that there is harmony. We know from the life of the Party

that there have been people who introduced splits. This is a question of principle; it is an important question and the whole of the Party's future may depend on it.

5

The Rules may have been lame in one leg, now Comrade Yegorov makes them lame in both.[77] The Council is to co-opt only in exceptional cases. Complete confidence is necessary for both sides, for both centres, just because this is a complex mechanism. There can be no successful work together without full mutual trust. And the entire question of correct functioning together is closely bound up with the right of co-optation. Comrade Deutsch is wrong in exaggerating the technical difficulties.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

13

ADDENDUM TO PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE DRAFT PARTY RULES

The Central Committee and the Editorial Board of the Central Organ shall co-opt members only with the consent of all the members of the Party Council.

Motioned on August 5 (18)

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

14

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE PARTY RULES

AUGUST 5 (18)

1

Let me reply briefly to both objections.[78] Comrade Martov says that I propose the unanimity of the two collegiums in co-opting members; that is not right. The Congress has decided not to give the right of veto to each member of two, possibly rather extensive, collegiums, but that does not

mean that we cannot vest this authority in the institution co-ordinating all the joint work of the two centres. The joint work of the two centres demands complete unanimity and even personal unity, and that is possible only if co-optation is unanimous. After all, if two members find co-optation necessary, they are entitled to convene the Council.

2

Martov's amendment contradicts the already adopted point on the unanimous co-optation to the C.C. and the C.O.[79]

3

Comrade Martov's interpretation is wrong, because the exemption contradicts unanimity.[80] I appeal to the Congress and request it to decide whether Comrade Martov's amendment should be put to the vote.

4

I should not argue with Comrades Glebov and Deutsch in substance, but I considered it necessary to mention the League[81] in the Rules, first, because everyone knew of the League's existence, second, to make note of the League's representation in the Party under the old rules, and third, because all other organisations have the status of committees, whereas the League is introduced to bring out its special status.[82]

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from
the text
of the book

15

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE STATEMENT BY MARTYNOV AND AKIMOV[83]

Recognising the statement made by Comrades Martynov and Akimov as contradicting our concept of members of the Congress and even members of the Party, the Congress invites Comrades Akimov and Martynov either to withdraw their statement or to make a definite statement of their

withdrawal from the Party. As for the minutes, the Congress in any case offers them the opportunity to attend the special sitting to approve the minutes.

Written on August 5 (18), 1903
First published in 1927 in *Lenin Miscellany VI*
Printed from the original

16

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE STATEMENT BY MARTYNOV AND AKIMOV

AUGUST 5 (18)

1

The bureau has discussed the statement by Comrades Martynov and Akimov which they filed at the morning sitting. I shall not go into the motivation, although it is wrong and extremely strange. No one has ever declared the Union[84] closed and Comrades Martynov and Akimov made an incorrect inference from the Congress decision on the League. But even the closure of the Union could not deprive delegates of the right to participate in the work of the Congress. Similarly, the Congress cannot allow any refusal to take part in the voting. A member of the Congress is not free merely to approve the minutes without taking part in the rest of its work. For the time being, the bureau does not propose any resolution and refers this question for debate at the Congress. The statement by Martynov and Akimov is extremely abnormal and contradicts the status of member of the Congress.

2

What an absurd and abnormal situation we now have. On the one hand, we are told that the decisions of the Congress are being accepted, and on the other, there is the intention to withdraw over a decision on the Rules. By arriving here as a delegate of an organisation recognised by the Organising Committee, each one of us has become a member of the Congress. This title is not abolished by the dissolution of an organisation. What are we, the bureau, to do during the voting? We cannot simply omit those who

have left, because the Congress has already approved its constitution. There is one logical conclusion that suggests itself: withdrawal from the ranks of the Party altogether. The minutes may be approved with comrades of the Union being specially invited to attend, although the Congress is entitled to approve its minutes even without them.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

17

ADDENDUM TO MARTOV'S RESOLUTION ON THE BUND'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE R.S.D.L.P.

The Congress resolves that all measures be taken to restore the unity of the Jewish and non-Jewish labour movement and to explain to the possibly broadest masses of the Jewish workers the attitude of the Russian Social-Democrats to the national question.

Written on August 5 (18), 1903
First published in 1959
in Vol. 7 of the Fifth Russian
edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

18

SPEECH DURING THE ELECTION OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE

AUGUST 7 (20)

We were reproached for the existence of a compact majority. That is not a bad thing in itself. Since a compact majority[85] has been formed here, the question of whether the elected Central Committee will prove to be capable of functioning has already been weighed. There is no question of chance. There is a full guarantee. The election cannot be postponed. Very little time remains. Comrade Martov's proposal to postpone the election is groundless. I support Comrade Rusov's proposal.[86]

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

19
SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION OF POTRESOV (STAROVER) ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE LIBERALS[87]

AUGUST 10 (23)

Starover's resolution will be misconstrued: the student movement and *Osvobozhdeniye*[88] are not the same thing at all. It would be harmful to take the same attitude to both. Struve's name is too well known and the workers also know him. Comrade Starover thinks that a definite directive should be issued; I believe we need to define a principled and tactical attitude.

Vtoroi ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1904

Printed from the text of the book

THE LAW ON COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO WORKERS INJURED IN ACCIDENTS

The recent new law, the substance of which is stated in the title of the article, and the law on shop-stewards, which we analysed in the previous issue,* are rather typical specimens of the two trends in our labour legislation expressive of this or that concession to the spirit of the times. Apart from the aggressive reactionary laws of which we have a great abundance and which manage to pass through all the bureaucratic ordeals with especial rapidity, and which are moreover drawn up with especial thoroughness and applied with especial vigour, all the other laws in Russia relating to the working class may be classified under two heads, depending on their political character. These are either laws which in any way, even by a hair's breadth, extend the workers' independence, initiative and rights, in which case the laws are hedged with hundreds and thousands of exemptions, reservations, circular-letter explanations

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 508-15.—*Ed.*

and restrictions, all of which lead—as our draft programme puts it—to the "extension or consolidation of tutelage of the working classes by the police and officials". Such are the laws on shop-stewards, factory inspection in general, etc. Or these are laws expressing a concession which has no bearing on citizens' independence and initiative—in which case the autocratic government comes forward with incomparably greater generosity. And that is how it should be, of course, from the standpoint of the autocracy's general tactics, from the standpoint of police interests, "correctly construed". The policy of the police state has long been called that of the whip and carrot by West-European democrats, who have had all sorts of experience in fighting it. The carrot is the sops to the revolutionary classes, the economic concessions designed to sow discord within these classes, to win over a section of them and make it believe in the bourgeois government's sincerity and friendly attitude to the proletariat. The whip is the police harassment of all those who have no trust in the government and sow mistrust among others; the whip is keeping in check all those who want complete freedom and independence for the working class, for its unions, for its meetings, for its newspapers, and for its political institutions and organs.

The law on shop-stewards gives the workers representation which *could* serve them against the bourgeoisie and the government. Accordingly, the representation is so distorted and restricted as to enable only, or at any rate mainly, spies to benefit from it. Accordingly, in actual fact, what remains of workers' representation, as proclaimed by the law, is the collar, as in the case of Trishka's caftan. And that is needed to collar the ill-starred shop-steward and drag him off to the police station. On the other hand, the law on compensation for workers does not affect their political initiative in any way and, consequently, on that score there can be greater generosity. There it is less dangerous to act the "reformer"—and the need to act is *imperative*, because the growing labour movement is looming in an ever more formidable manner. The bureaucratic machine started its work on a bill on employers' responsibility *twenty years* ago. It took ten years to draw up the bill; finally, it was approved by a special commission and in

1893 it was promulgated and placed before the State Council[89] ... only to be pigeon-holed once again for another ten years! It seemed quite impossible to make haste any slower than that, and the bill would possibly have roamed the ministries and the chancellories for another decade or so had not the onslaught by the working class of Russia shaken up the whole of the autocracy.

Finally, and at long last, the bill, repeatedly worsened in many respects, has become law. For an assessment, let us compare it with the demand in our draft Party programme: in fact its "labour section" should he a guide in our work of agitation and propaganda. Nothing but a comparison of the separate points and demands of our programme with present-day reality and the attempts on the part of the ruling classes to reform it without giving anyone offence, will enable us, on the one hand, to give ourselves and the masses a fuller and more concrete understanding of the meaning and significance of our programme; and on the other, to see the defects of the laws in force; it will also help us to see in practice, from the facts, to what extent any reform is doomed to produce paltry results if the basis of the bourgeois system is retained.

Our draft programme (§7 of the "labour section") demands that the law should establish the *employers*' civil liability in general (for workers' injuries and disease), which means anyone who employs workers, anyone who derives profit from the unpaid labour of others, making use of their labour-power, but not being held liable for the destruction or damage of this *commodity* (labour-power) when in operation. However, the new law relates exclusively to workers and employees "in enterprises of the factory and works, mining and metallurgical industries". Consequently, all agricultural workers, handicraftsmen, builders, artisans and so on and so forth are excluded. This means the exclusion of the vast majority of wage-labourers, who often work in even worse and more dangerous conditions; for example, building and agricultural workers operating machines suffer from injuries as much as, if not more than, factory workers. How is this exemption to be explained? The answer is that outside factories and works the shoe does not yet pinch so badly: so far the labour movement has made a formidable

showing only among the leading sections of the proletariat, and it is only in this sphere that the government has shown "concern" (not for the workers, of course, but for their suppression). But the proletariat, that part of it which participates in the movement, that is, the class-conscious proletariat, does not struggle for the benefit and advantages of some single *section* of the workers, but for the whole class, for all the classes oppressed by the capitalist system. This brings out very well the difference between the reforms which the proletariat seeks, and the reforms which the government hands out as sops.

Furthermore, the new law binds the owners of enterprises to pay compensation to workers only for the loss of capacity for work, "*due to bodily injury* caused by operations in the production of the enterprise or arising in consequence of such operations". Our programme demands the establishment of liability not only for disability caused by accidents, but also by *hazardous working conditions*. Consequently, once again the new law narrows down the employers' liability. Everyone knows that masses of workers are disabled not by accidents alone, not by bodily injury, but by the diseases caused by the hazardous working conditions. Unless the employers are held liable for the workers' disability through disease, no amount of rules or instructions will do any good in the struggle against these hazardous conditions. Indeed let us consider what difference there is in substance between the accident in which a machine cuts off a worker's leg and the case of a worker who is poisoned by phosphorus, lead, dyes, etc. Has not medical science already created a whole department of occupational diseases whose origins have been traced to hazardous working conditions and proved as surely as twice two is four? However the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois government are not guided by logic or common sense, but by gross self-interest: accidents will cost them less than bodily injuries plus disease arising from hazardous conditions. And the whole point, for them, is not to "provide security" for the workers but to pay less.

The new law releases the worker from the onus of proving that the disability has occurred through the fault of the capitalist. That is undoubtedly a step forward from the

FROM MARX TO MAO
MULTI-HOUR NON-COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

past. But—the Russian Government is unable to take a step forward anywhere without a "but"!—but to make up for that, employers may prove not only ill intent on the part of the victim himself, but also "gross carelessness on his (victim's) part, unwarranted by the dispatch of operations". This addition largely paralyses the establishment of *real* liability and—given the packing of our courts by officials, careerists and bourgeois pedants—can paralyse the application of the law altogether. "Gross carelessness" is something quite vague and indefinable. It is entirely up to the officials to decide in what conditions and to what extent gross carelessness is or is not warranted. The capitalists have always regarded and will always regard any "carelessness" on the worker's part as gross and unwarranted, and will always he able to muster ten times more witnesses and "learned counsel" than the workers to prove their point (legal counsel are already being paid annual fees by the factories!). The writing of this whole point on gross carelessness into the law is a crass concession to the manufacturer's profit urge: the workers never get caught in the machine by preference, but always by mishap, but the fact is that *you can't be careful* when working ten or eleven hours a day among badly screened machines, in poorly lit shops, amid the din and roar, with your wits dulled by the work, and with your nerves on edge because of excessive tension. That being so, to deprive a disabled worker of compensation because of gross carelessness to penalise him additionally for permitting the capitalists their unscrupulous exploitation.

These points provide the basic and most important definitions of the new law, fully delineating its essence. We cannot, of course, deal here with all the particulars, but let us look only at the most characteristic ones. The amount of the compensation is determined in proportion to the victim's annual earnings, namely, the pension must not be in excess of two-thirds of his annual earnings (in the event of death or total disability). The annual earnings are determined on the basis of the average daily wage (or the average daily wage of an *unskilled worker*) multiplied by 260. This provision contains another *three* reductions in the size of compensation, *three* endorsements of the

employers' profit urge. First, even if the worker has worked 300 days in the year, his annual earnings are cut down to 260 days—without any grounds, simply because the law commands that they should be cut! Second, even if the worker has been earning more than an unskilled worker, the calculation—involving work, say, at enterprises running part of the year—is still based on the earnings of an unskilled worker. The government would very much like to reduce all workers to the status of unskilled workers—hence the lesson for the class-conscious proletariat, that only the close unity of all workers and all unskilled workers together can create a force capable of overcoming capital's profit urge. Third, the unskilled worker's average daily wage is determined once in three years (sic!) by the offices for factory, mining and metallurgical affairs, without, need we say, any of the workers participating. That is not their business, for who can doubt that the chancellories of the governor and the chief of gendarmes have an excellent knowledge of how the workers live and what they earn.

Let us note, too, that the law binds the owners of enterprises to notify the police immediately only about accidents which fall within the compass of the law. Which are they? They are those involving disability for more than three days. But who can tell *just after* an accident for how many days the worker has been disabled? This rule is ridiculously absurd and in many cases merely provides the manufacturers with a loophole for divesting themselves (and being divested by the courts) of the duty of informing the authorities of every accident. It is true that the law decrees that the victim may demand notification of the police of *all cases* of bodily injury *without exception*, *even where they do not fall under the law*: that is said in so many words in §20, of the "rules on compensation payable to injured workers", and we strongly advise all workers to campaign in every way for the constant application of this paragraph without fail. Let the workers insist that everyone injured should always demand unconditionally, on the strength of §20, that the factory inspector be notified of *every* accident; only then will it be possible to determine to any precise extent the number of accidents occurring and to study their causes. We are sure that the class-conscious

workers will make use of this right, but then great masses will not even be aware that such a right is open to them!

For failure to notify the police of accidents and in general for any failure to observe the rules of the new law the owners of enterprises are subject only to a cash fine of from 25 to 100 rubles. That is, of course, an absolutely negligible fine, which is not at all a dreadful one for the large factories (which employ the vast majority of factory workers). This case makes especially clear the necessity of implementing § 14 of our draft programme, which demands "the establishment of criminal responsibility for employers for breaches of labour protection laws". It is a mockery of the worker to threaten millionaires with 100-ruble fines for non-observance of a law on which depends the security of a worker disabled for life.

Par. 31, which entitles injured workers and their families to enter into agreement with the owners of enterprises concerning the type and amount of compensation payable to them, is one of the most pernicious and Jesuitical points of the new law. Need we say that the vast majority of these agreements will amount to systematic fraud and intimidation of the least developed workers who are sure of only one thing, namely, that Russian courts are biased, bureaucratic and expensive. Factory inspectors, who are to witness these agreements (equivalent to settlements out of court), will safeguard anyone's interests but those of the workers.

The factory inspectors, who are now being increasingly turned into mere assistants of the police, play the part of "reconcilers". What is more, it is the intention of the law to turn them into a peculiar category of magistrates. The law encourages employers and workers to apply to factory inspectors in clearing up the rights and duties of the parties, with the factory inspectors being empowered both to collect "all the necessary information" and to demand its submission to the parties, and to invite doctors for certification. This is already purely judicial business and it is assigned to officials under the governor! What is more, no procedure, no rules governing this court have been laid down: how the inspector is to collect the information, how he is—and is he at all—to submit this information to both parties, how he is to conduct the examination—all that is left entirely

up to him. This is something positively like the police courts of the pre-Reform period. The law even holds out the threat of a deprivation for failure to apply to the factory constable (in his capacity as magistrate): those who fail to apply to the factory inspector before going to court, lose their right to receive court and legal costs from the defendant.

It remains for us only to give another reminder at this point that the Social-Democratic Labour Party does not demand courts of that kind, not mediation by officials, but the establishment of industrial courts on which employers and workers are equally represented. That is the only kind of court, given a free political system in the state, that can assure the workers of anything like satisfactory mediation in the business of elucidating the rights and duties of the parties, and in the preliminary examination of claims involving disability compensation. There are such courts in all civilised states, and *as long as 40 years ago* even Russian officials used to propose their introduction in Russia. Forty years ago, a commission was appointed to revise the factory and handicraft regulations. The commission has published its "transactions", five volumes of them; the commission has written the drafts of new regulations; the commission has come out in favour of setting up industrial courts consisting of elected representatives—and... and the whole thing has been shelved! Heaps of good intentions are stacked up in the archives of innumerable offices in Russia, and will continue to be there until the working class gives all this rubbish a shake-up.

Iskra No. 47, September 1, 1903

Printed from the *Iskra* text

TO THE MINUTES COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Comrades! In reply to your inquiry as to whether or not we are willing to have our names published in the minutes of the Second Congress we inform you that, for our part, we have absolutely no objection to it, but cannot undertake to decide to what extent this is permissible for reasons of

security in the interests of our comrades in Russia. It is up to the competent Party body to decide on this question of secrecy.

Geneva, October 4, 1903

N. Lenin
G. Plekhanov

First published in 1927 in *Lenin Miscellany VI*

Printed from the original

TO THE MINUTES COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The C.C. requests the committee for publishing the minutes of the Congress to let it have immediately the full text as adopted by the Congress of 1) the Party Programme; 2) the organisational Rules of the Party, and 3) all the resolutions and decisions of the Congress.

Written on September 23 (October 6), 1903

First published in 1959 in Vol. 8 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE LEAGUE OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY ABROAD[90]

OCTOBER 13-18 (26-31), 1903

1

REMARKS ON THE AGENDA

OCTOBER 13 (26)

1

There is no point in limiting the deliberations on the Rules beforehand. This is to be a new set of rules and, consequently, the words "working out the Rules" may be left in.[91]

2

I need more than an hour for my report. I can, of course, fold it up, but I believe that that is not in the interests of the assembly. I request the chairman to ask the Congress for its opinion. Will it give me more time or must I cut down my report?

3

The League has elected two delegates. Comrade Martov has resigned, and I am now the only authorised delegate. Since there is no longer any time limitation on speeches, I do not understand the meaning of Martov's proposal.[92] There are many here who attended the Congress, and I think we may have not one co-report, but a whole series of them.

Protokoly vtorogo ocherednogo syezda Zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revolutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii, (Minutes of the Regular Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad), Geneva, 1903

Printed from the text of the minutes

2

PREPATORY REMARK TO THE REPORT ON THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

OCTOBER 13 (26)

I did indeed ask the assembly myself, and no one stopped me. I think that it is quite all right to talk freely about everything. There is a tremendous difference between private conversations and the meetings of the *Iskra* organisation. At any rate, let the meeting express its views. I shall not speak of the private meetings of the *Iskra* organisation until the League finds it necessary for me to do so.

Protokoly vtorogo ocherednogo syezda Zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revolutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii, Geneva, 1903

Printed from the text of the minutes

3

STATEMENT CONCERNING MARTOV'S REPORT

OCTOBER 16 (29)

I declare that now that Martov's so-called co-report yesterday has given an undignified turn to the debate, I consider it unnecessary and impossible to take part in any debates on this point of the Tagesordnung* and, consequently, also waive my summing-up speech, especially in view of the fact that if Martov has the courage to make definite and open charges, he must do so before the whole Party in a pamphlet which in my formal challenge yesterday I suggested he should write.[93]

Protokoly vtorogo ocherednogo syezda Zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revolutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii, Geneva, 1903

Printed from the text of the minutes

4

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE LEAGUE RULES

OCTOBER 17 (30)

1

There is no need to object at length to these arguments.[94] §6 gives the right to organise and consequently to reorganise as well,[95] and a reorganised League will still be the same League, the only Party organisation abroad.

2

To Comrade Martov's question about whether or not functionaries should be confirmed by the Central Committee, I reply that I see no obstacles to the elected administrative officers being approved by the Central Committee.

Protokoly vtorogo ocherednogo syezda Zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revolutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii, Geneva, 1903

Printed from the text of the minutes

* Agenda.—*Ed.*

5

SPEECH ON THE RESULT OF THE VOTING OF THE RESOLUTIONS ON THE LEAGUE RULES

OCTOBER 17 (30)

...Lenin declares on his own behalf and on behalf of the comrades who voted with him that he regards the rejection of Comrade Konyagin's resolution and the adoption of Comrade Martov's resolution as a crying violation of the Party Rules.[96] ("Which paragraph of the Rules specifically does the vote contradict?") I refuse to answer such questions, because this has been sufficiently well clarified in the course of the debate. ("State the paragraph of the Rules which the resolution we have adopted contradicts.") It is up to the Party's central institutions to interpret the Rules; and that is what they will do.

Protokoly vtorogo ocherednogo syezda Zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revolutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii, Geneva, 1903

Printed from the text of the minutes

DECISION OF THE PARTY COUNCIL

GENEVA. NOVEMBER 1, 1903

Copy

Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

The Council of the Party consisting of Valentinov, Ilyin, Ru and Vasilyev, who is authorised to represent the vote of Yefimov, the fifth member of the Council, met at Geneva on November 1, 1903, at the request of two members of the Council, Ilyin and Vasilyev, and decided: to recognise the acts of the representative of the Central Committee at the League Congress to be correct,[97] and to authorise him to reorganise the League through the inclusion of new members. Valentinov, Ilyin, Vasilyev, Vasilyev for Yefimov, Ru.

Published in 1904 in the pamphlet *Kommentarii k protokolam vtorogo syezda Zagranichnoi ligi russkoi revolutsionnoi sotsial-demokratii* (Commentary on the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad), Geneva

Printed from the original verified with the text of the pamphlet

R.S.D.L.P. COUNCIL[98]

JANUARY 15-17 (28-30), 1904

1

REMARK ON A POINT OF ORDER

JANUARY 15 (28)

Lenin raises a point of order and, when given the floor, motions a discussion of the question of the measures which could help to restore peace in the Party and normal relations between members of the Party who do not see eye to eye.

First published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the minutes (with Lenin's corrections)

2

REMARKS ON THE AGENDA

JANUARY 16 (29)

1

Lenin insists that his resolution should be put to the vote first[99] and refers to the existing custom giving voting priority to the resolution which was motioned earlier.

2

The right of introducing minority opinions has always been recognised as a part of the order of business. Comrade Martov made an attempt to separate the general from the particular.[100] I quite agree with this, but I merely give a somewhat different wording to his proposal.

First published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the minutes (with Lenin's corrections)

3

SPEECH MOTIONING A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE PARTY

JANUARY 16 (29)

Lenin (*reads out his resolution*): "To establish peace in the Party and normal relations between differing members of the Party there is need for the Party Council to explain which forms of the internal Party struggle are correct and admissible and which are incorrect and inadmissible."

Published in 1904 in the pamphlet N. Shakhov, *Borba za syezd* (Struggle for the Congress), Geneva

Printed from the minutes verified with the original

4

SPEECH CONCERNING THE MINORITY OPINION ENTERED BY THE C.C. REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 17 (30)

A rule has been established in the practice of all congresses in virtue of which those voting have the right to record their minority opinions. Of course, every minority opinion is essentially a kind of criticism. But this circumstance did not, after all, prevent the entry at the Second Congress of a minority opinion issued by the Bund representatives, an opinion which was the sharpest kind of criticism levelled at the decision adopted by the Congress. Our minority opinion gets out the motives for which we opposed Comrade Plekhanov's proposal and in general our attitude to this proposal. It is the more necessary to read out this minority opinion because at the end of it there is a motivated statement to the effect that we withdraw our resolution.

First published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the minutes (with Lenin's corrections)

5

SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF THE MINORITY OPINION OF THE C.C. REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 17 (30)

I resolutely protest against the idea that our minority opinion contained any accusations levelled at the Council. Such an interpretation is entirely wrong and Comrade Martov's attempt is an encroachment on our freedom of expression; his resolution is therefore unwarranted.[101]

First published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the minutes (with Lenin's corrections)

6

REMARK ON THE AGENDA

JANUARY 17 (30)

The representatives of the C.C. would like to move several other small points for discussion, but I request that the question of convening a Party congress should be placed on the order paper beforehand.

First published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the minutes (with Lenin's corrections)

7

DRAFT RESOLUTION MOVED ON JANUARY 17 (30)

The Party Council considers it improper for the representatives of the C.O. Editorial Board to communicate to the Secretary of the C.O. Comrade Vasilyev's opinion of him, because this opinion was submitted to the members of the Council only, being a part of the meetings within the Party's supreme body.

First published in full in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the minutes (with Lenin's corrections)

ON BEHALF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[102]

We whole-heartedly welcome the excellent idea of the "Group of Founders" to set up a library and archives of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and earnestly request all comrades and all those sympathising with this long overdue measure to give every possible assistance to our comrades who have undertaken the effort in organising this complex and important business.

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

January 29, 1904

Published in January 1904 together with the appeal by the "Group of Founders" in a separate leaflet "To One and All"

Printed from the text of the leaflet

TO THE RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT[103]

The war is on. The Japanese have already inflicted a series of defeats on the Russian troops, and the tsarist government is now straining every nerve to avenge itself for these defeats. Military districts are being mobilised one after another, and tens of thousands of soldiers are being hastily dispatched to the Far East; desperate efforts are being made abroad to secure another loan, and contractors have been promised bonuses running to thousands of rubles a day for accelerating the works required by the war department. The people's every fibre is put to the greatest strain because the struggle that has been started is no trifling matter; it is a struggle against a 50-million-strong people who are splendidly armed, splendidly prepared for the war, and who are fighting for the conditions which they believe to be urgently necessary for free national development. This is going to be a struggle by a despotic and backward government against a people that is politically free and is rapidly progressing in culture. The war against the sickly Turkey in 1877 and 1878, which exacted such a high

price from the Russian people, was negligible when compared to the war now started.

What in that case is at issue in the life-and-death struggle now being waged by the Russian workers and peasants against the Japanese? The issue is "Yellow Russia", the issue is Manchuria and Korea, the new lands seized by the Russian Government. It had promised all the other powers to preserve the inviolability of China, it had promised to return Manchuria to China not later than October 8, 1903, and it had failed to honour its promise. The tsarist government had so run away with itself in its policy of military adventures and plunder of its neighbours that it found no strength to go back. In "Yellow Russia" it has built fortifications and ports, it has laid a railway line and has concentrated tens of thousands of troops.

But how do the Russian people benefit from these new lands whose acquisition has cost so much blood and sacrifice and is bound to cost even more? For the Russian worker and peasant the war holds out the prospect of fresh calamities, the loss of a host of human lives, the ruin of a mass of families, and more burdens and taxes. The Russian army leadership and the tsarist government believe that the war holds out the promise of military glory. The Russian merchant and the millionaire-industrialist think the war is necessary to secure new marketing outlets for their goods and new ports in an unrestricted ice-free sea for the development of Russian trade. You can't sell much at home to the starving muzhik and the unemployed worker, you must look for marketing outlets in foreign lands! The riches of the Russian bourgeoisie have been created by the impoverishment and the ruin of the Russian workers—and so now, in order to multiply these riches, the workers must shed their blood to give the Russian bourgeoisie a free hand in conquering and enslaving the Chinese and the Korean working man.

This criminal war, which holds in store immense calamities for the working people, has been engendered by the interests of the greedy bourgeoisie, the interests of capital, which is prepared to sell and ruin its own country in its drive for profit. This hazardous gamble involving the blood and property of Russian citizens is the result of the policy

of a despotic government which tramples all human rights and keeps its people in servitude. In response to the wild war-cries, in response to the "patriotic" flag-waving by the flunkeys of the money-bag and the lackeys of the police-whip, the class-conscious Social-Democratic proletariat must come forward and demand with tenfold energy: "Down with the autocracy!", "Let a people's constituent assembly be convened!"

The tsarist government has plunged so deep into this reckless military gamble that it has at stake a great deal too much. Even in the event of success, the war against Japan threatens total exhaustion of the people's forces—with the results of the victory being absolutely negligible, for the other powers will prevent Russia from enjoying the fruits of victory as they prevented Japan from doing so in 1895.[104] In the event of defeat, the war will lead above all to the collapse of the entire government system based on popular ignorance and deprivation, on oppression and violence.

They who sow the wind shall reap the whirlwind!

Long live the fraternal union of the proletarians of all countries fighting for complete liberation from the yoke of international capital! Long live Japanese Social-Democracy protesting against the war! Down with the ignominious and predatory tsarist autocracy!

Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

Written on February 3 (16), 1904

Published in February 1904 as a separate leaflet

Printed from the text of the leaflet

THREE OUTLINES FOR A REPORT ON THE PARIS COMMUNE[105]

1

In Memory of the Paris Commune

Celebration of the greatest working-class uprising of the 19th century.

Historical outline.

1. *France under Napoleon III.*
Imperialism. (S. 45) — retribution for June 1848. Napoleon III.
— Expropriation of France by a gang of brigands.
α. Bonapartism { the workers not yet capable / the bourgeoisie no longer[106] }
β. Rapid industrial development. Plutocratic orgies. Flourishing of speculation. Corruption.
γ. —*Workers' movement*—
I.A.A.[107] 1862 London exposition[108]
— 1864 foundation

{ Proudhonism[109] / Blanquism[110] } S.10

2. *Dynastic war*. Rescue of a band of adventurers—*chauvinism*.
Left bank of the Rhine. On to Berlin (especially after 1866)[111]

{ July 19, 1870 war declared.
German pronouncements (Wilhelm I): Verteidigungskrieg.* (S. 20 in a speech from the throne: war against Napoleon III, *not* against the French people; idem Aug. 11, 1870 in a manifesto to the French on crossing the border.)

3. *Workers' protest.*

First Address of the General Council of the International {
— French manifesto of July 12, 1870 (S. 16) (and provincial resolutions on July 22, 1870) (S. 16-17) Manifesto of Paris members of the International of July 12.
— German protest (meeting at Chemnitz) (S. 18)
(meeting at Brunswick on July 16, 1870 (S. 18)—Berlin section of the International.
— Address of the *General Council* of the International 1) *July 23, 1870* against the war.

* Defensive war.—*Ed.*

4. *Outcome of war.*
Sedan Sept. 2, 1870. Napoleon III prisoner of war. Debâcle.[112]
Collapse of corrupt regime.
Proclamation of the republic Sept. 4, 1870 by workers in Paris.
Power in the hands of *rascals*, Louis Philippe's Minister of Police *Thiers*, General *Trochu*. *Jules Favre*, *Jules Ferry*, *Ernest Picard*. (power—to the delegates of Paris in the legislative corps)

...“*Government of national defence*”....

National defence=arming of the workers=revolution. Government of popular betrayal. Defence ... *against the Paris workers.*

5. *Advice of the International.*

Second Address of the General Council (Sept. 9, 1870) (S. 25).	Transformation of the defensive war into an offensive one. Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party protested against annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.[113] (Arrest of Bracke and others.) Not to allow oneself to be provoked to “desperate folly”. Not to be deluded by national memories of 1792. “*Organise your own class* calmly and resolutely”, use p. liberty.[114]

6. *Siege of Paris*. Comedy of *Trochu* (never!) and *Jules Favre* (not an inch of soil!).[115] Surrender of Paris. Jan. 28, 1871.	Comedy of defence: Guiod writing to Susane about one of the latter's protégés: let him go to Mont Valérien, he said, where the guns are being allegedly fired off,[116]
7. *National Assembly at Bordeaux.*	Under the terms of the surrender (Jan. 28, 1871)

—Chamber of Junkers. *Reactionaries.*
—Comedy of peace with Paris. *Urge to disarm Paris* ("disarmament of the revolution" Sept. 4, 1870). Alliance with the German army against Paris.

(S. 34), the National Assembly must be convened *within 8 days* (!).
Thiers' agitation for a *reactionary assembly*, Legitimists, etc. (450 monarchists out of 750 members).
Conspiracy against Paris: *Thiers' measures* (S. 35).

The pretence that the guns of the National Guard belong to the state! A lie! S. 36-37.

1) anti-republican demonstration by the National Assembly
2) ambiguity of Thiers' expressions
3) threat to Paris (décapiter décapitaliser*)
4) ban on republican newspapers
5) death sentence for Blanqui
6) appointment of *Vinoy* governor of Paris, *Valentin*, Police Prefect, *D'Aurelle de Paladines*, commander of the National Guard.

8. *Attempt to take away the guns. March 18*, **1871.** (from the National Guard). { Vinoy / Failure }
Commune.
March 18. Government's night to Versailles.

Manifesto of March 18: S.43.
March 18, 1871. *Central Committee* of the National Guard.
March 26, 1871. Commune.

(Clericals, Bonapartists, gendarmes.)

* Decapitate and decapitalise.—*Ed.*

It was not the Commune but the indignant soldiers who shot Lecomte and Clément Thomas, the Bonapartist officers.	Paris waging war against Versailles from early April. Begging Bismarck for troops (prisoners of war) (S. 57-58).

9. *The Commune's deeds.*
   Its *minuses*: — *lack of class consciousness* (Proudhonists, Blanquists)
   — **lack of organisation** (failure to take the bank and attack Versailles)
   — *infatuation with nationalistic and revolutionary talk.*
10. *Its pluses*:
    A) *Political reforms*
    α. separation of church from state (Apr. 2, 1871). Expropriation of church properties. Abolition of all state payments to the church.
    Free public education (S. 46)
    β. abolition of standing army (March 30, 1871) (S. 46)
    Working-class government γ. abolition of bureaucracy. *Government of the workers* (S. 49). Regierungsfähig.*
    (1) All officials elective and removable (S. 46). Apr. 1, 1871
    (2) Small salary, to be not over 6,000 francs (S. 46)

    managed to do with a quarter of the officials: Lissagaray, S.

    δ. Equal rights for aliens (March 30, 1871), a German—minister of the Commune[117] (S. 53). *Participation of Poles* (Dabrowski, Wróblewski).

    The banner of the Commune is the banner of a world republic

    ε. Self-government of communes.

* Capable of governing.—*Ed.*

11. B) *Economic reforms.*

Transformation of the Paris of idlers and pleasure-seekers into a working-class Paris (S. 55-56).

- Bakers' night work banned (Apr. 20) (S. 53).
- Fines banned (S. 53).
- The Commune won over a mass of Paris petty bourgeois *ruined* (elaborate) by Napoleon III (debts deferred) (S. 51). *The Commune addresses* **the peasants** (S. 51).
- Transfer of abandoned factories to workers' associations Apr. 16 (S. 54): statistical *census* of factories.

12. *Last fight.*

—Heroism of the Federals (Election of mayors on Apr. 30 against the National Assembly. Thiers gives in to Bismarck: peace treaty signed at Frankfort on May 10. Approved by the National Assembly on May 21.)

—Week of bloodshed May 21-28, 1871 (S. 62). Rifles not enough machine-guns.

—Balance 35,000 —— 20,000 killed
15,000 transported, etc.
(*Courts* busy for several years.)

Chorus of slander (S. 64-66).

13. *Results and lessons.* Revenge by the bourgeoisie. *Even the "national war" turned out to be a political fraud* (S. 67). Country betrayed (alliance with the Germans: S. 66).
Instability of bourgeois democracy.
Dictatorship of the proletariat.
Bismarck 1871. Confer *1904*.

Written before March 9 (22), 1904

First published in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

2

1. France under Napoleon III. Government of Bonapartists.
   Industrial development.
   Working-class movement— { Proudhonism and Blanquism }
   I. A. A.
2. Dynastic war. (July 19, 1870)
   Chauvinism
   On to Berlin.
   Left bank of the Rhine.—
   NB (German statements: *Verteidigungskrieg*.)
3. Workers' protest (working-class attitude)
   —French manifesto (Resolutions)
   —German protest
   —*Address* of the General Council of the International—*warning to workers*: organise, *watch out for*
   NB *provocations*.
4. Course and outcome of war.
   —Collapse of corrupt regime.
   —Siege of Paris.
   —*Proclamation of the republic on Sept. 4, 1870*. French workers—their cause—utilised by the bourgeoisie
   Government of "national defence".
   (Rascals in its midst.)
5. Defence of Paris. *Comedy* of Jules Favre (Trochu).
   —its surrender.
6. Attempt to disarm the proletariat. March 18, 1871. *The Commune*.
7. *Versailles government*. Chamber of Junkers, landowners (Ruraux, Krautjunker).
   —comedy of "peace" with Paris
   —bargaining with Bismarck
   —alliance with the German army against the proletariat.

8. *The Commune*.... Its minuses—lack of class consciousness (Proudhonism and Blanquism)
—lack of organisation { failure to take the bank and to attack Versailles }
—interlacing of nationalistic elements

9. +A) *Political freedom*
—*separation of church from state*
—abolition of standing army
—abolition of bureaucracy
—equal rights for aliens. Participation of Poles
—self-government of communes (*the Commune*).

10. B) *Economic reforms*
—bakers' night work banned
—fines banned
—debts deferred
—idle factories handed over to workers
—binding character (maintenance, etc.) of *any* cohabitation with a woman
—payment (pensions?) to *all* widows.

11. *Last fight*:
Heroism of the Federals.
Week of bloodshed.
Balance: *35,000*.
Terrorism.

12. *Results and lessons*:
Revenge by the bourgeoisie.
Challenge to battle.
Bismarck 1871 and 1904.

Written before March 9 (22), 1904

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Printed from the original

3

I. 1. Napoleon III and his band.
   2. Shame of France.
   3. *Bourgeoisie*'s guilt in Napoleon III.

II. 1. Dynastic war against Germany.
   2. French workers' protest (Paris, July 12, and Manifesto of the International, July 23).
   3. Wilhelm I's solemn promise (Aug. 11). His deception.
   4. German workers' protest (Sept. 5, 1870) and their arrest.

III. 1. Republic Sept. 4, 1870. Won by Paris workers.
   2. Seizure of power by *swindlers* (Favre, Trochu, Thiers—ticket-of-leave men[118]).
   3. "Government of popular defence"=government of popular betrayal. Fight against French *w o r k - e r s*.

IV. Marx's warning (Manifesto of the International Sept. 9, 1870).
   Dupont's letters.[119]

V. 1. Slave-owners' and monarchists' plot to disarm Paris.
   2. Bordeaux and the transfer of the National Assembly to *Versailles*.
   3. Dispatch of Vinoy, Valentin and de Paladines to Paris.
   4. Monarchist speeches in the Assembly of "Rurals".

VI. Start of civil war by Thiers: guns taken away March 18, 1871 (Lecomte and Clément Thomas killed).

VII. March 18, 1871. *The Commune*.
   1. Republic + self-government.
   2. *T h e C o m m u n e*'s *m e a s u r e s*.
   3. {{Its two mistakes}} (Failure to attack Versailles / " to take the bank)

VIII. War against the Commune: begging Bismarck for soldiers, ignominious peace. Week of bloodshed May 21-28, 1871.

35,000 killed $\boxed{20{,}000}$ *according to* $\overbrace{\text{bourgeois newspaper}}$ *estimates*.

13,450 (including 157 women)[120] sentenced by the courts (! after March 18 the courts were busy for another 5½ *years*!).

Written before March 9 (22), 1904

First published on March 13, 1926 in *Pravda* No. 63

Printed from the original

R.S.D.L.P. COUNCIL[121]

MAY 31 AND JUNE 5 (JUNE 13 AND 18), 1904

1

REMARK ON THE AGENDA

MAY 31 (JUNE 13)

Lenin motions the addition to the list of items on the agenda of the question raised by the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) concerning the desirability of calling a conference of R.S.D.L.P. and P.P.S. representatives to discuss the basis and terms of joint struggle by the two parties.

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

2

SPEECHES ON AN INTER-PARTY CONFERENCE[122]

MAY 31 (JUNE 13)

1

I second the proposal to invite both Latvian organisations.[123] As for the Armenian federalist organisation,[124] there can be no question of inviting it to the conference after what Comrade Martov has said about its intimacy with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Furthermore, I don't quite see the point of Comrade Plekhanov's insistent proposal of the need for an immediate reply to the Finns.

2

I think it would be too much to demand unanimity in decisions on questions of principle.[125] I can't see any of the Social-Democrats staying on if the conference adopted some monstrous decision.

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

3

SPEECHES ON R.S.D.L.P. REPRESENTATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS

MAY 31 (JUNE 13)

1

I should like to have an explanation as to whether it is convenient to send delegates both from the Council and from the individual organisations. Are there any similar examples in the practice of other countries at earlier congresses? I think this mode of representation is somewhat inconvenient in terms of both principle and practice (from the financial, technical and other standpoints). Would it not be better for the Council to be represented there in corpore? I don't see how we could be victimised. After all, our Party can't be deprived of its vote!

2

Since Comrade Plekhanov says that we shall not be able to secure the Party's separate representation at the Congress, while the dispatch of a large number of delegates to the Congress would cost a great deal, and anyhow we shall not be able to match the Bundists in this respect, it would be more dignified if the Council alone represented the Party at the Congress.

3

Moreover, we shall hardly have time to contact all the organisations to obtain their mandates.[126] In view of this, I motion that in case of necessity the Council should, without contacting the individual organisations, be empowered to represent each of them separately....

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

4

REMARK ON THE NEED OF CONTROL OVER THE GNCHAK NEWSPAPER[127]

MAY 31 (JUNE 13)

Lenin seconds Comrade Martov's proposal, remarking that there is need for control over the publication of the Gnchak newspaper, which has not always been Social-Democratic.

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

5

MOTION OF AMENDMENT TO MARTOV'S RESOLUTION ON THE RIGHT OF THE C.O. AND THE C.C. TO RECALL THEIR REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PARTY COUNCIL

JUNE 5 (18)

Comrade Martov remarked that he put forward his proposal regardless of the concrete cases and merely to avoid conflicts in the future. That is why I shall not refer to any concrete cases either and if the resolution is designed exclusively to lay down a definite rule for the future, I shall not argue against it. Perhaps it would be better to cut it down and reduce it to the right of the collegium to recall its representatives, deleting the sentence on non-responsibility to the Congress.

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

6

SPEECH ON CO-OPTATION TO THE COMMITTEES AND ON THE C.C.'S RIGHT TO APPOINT NEW MEMBERS

JUNE 5 (18)

What Martov said was news to me.[128] We have quite definite indications that the minority of the Moscow Committee proposed the co-optation of one of its candidates, without, however, connecting this question with factional

differences. Furthermore, speaking on the substance of the matter, I would consider it more correct and more in the spirit of the Rules to regard every fraction as a unit; nevertheless, this question is so insignificant that I agree to vote for Comrade Martov's resolution.

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

7

SPEECHES ON THE VOTING PROCEDURE IN DECIDING THE QUESTION OF CONVENING THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

JUNE 5 (18)

1

Lenin joins Glebov in regarding the votes of the Tver and the Riga committees as invalid,[129] and proposes that the organisations should be regarded as existing not since the issue of their proclamations but since their confirmation by the C.C. In addition, he says, the reference to the date of the Congress should be deleted from Martov's resolution. The rules of the leagues will determine how many votes they are to have at the Congress. Until their rules are approved, everything should remain as it was at the Second Congress. For example, the Caucasian League[130] should have six votes.

2

Comrade Martov and I essentially agree on the right of 9 committees in voting on the Congress. The Baku Committee, I believe, should not have a separate vote because it is a part of the Caucasian League. Inquiries should be made about all the five leagues and then the relevant decisions adopted.

3

In substance I would have nothing against Comrade Martov's proposal, but it would be formally wrong.[131] The Congress has not confirmed them and, consequently, they should be subject to the rule that they may vote for or

against the Congress only after one year. There is the less reason to discuss this, since the period has almost run out. But we should be very careful about the Caucasian League: they would be deeply mortified if we gave them only two votes instead of the six they had. Moreover, I think that Comrade Martov tends to confuse two points (*e* and *f*) of § 3 of the Rules, when he proposes that leagues should be given the same status as committees. Thus, I motion that we postpone the question of the Caucasian League and make inquiries through the C.C.

4

I join in Comrade Martov's opinion concerning the Caucasian League.[132] Then there is another juridical question of how the votes of the Council are to be counted in a general count of the votes required for the convocation of a congress. I think two interpretations would be correct: either, in determining the required number of organisations, to make the count without including the five votes of the Council in the overall total of votes belonging to all the organisations, and then to count each vote of the Council separately; or simply to take one-half of the existing number of organisations, without the Council, and to reckon this half as the number required in this case. I believe that it would be most correct to count each of the Council's votes separately.

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

8

SPEECHES ON THE QUESTION OF PUBLISHING THE MINUTES OF THE PARTY COUNCIL SITTINGS

JUNE 5 (18)

1

I absolutely disagree with Comrade Martov. It is desirable to establish for all the sittings of the Council the rule adopted on the minutes of the last sitting.[133] This publication will hardly be impeded by the requirements of secrecy and it would be highly important for Party members to

know what is going on in the Party's supreme body and the opinions which are held there by both sides.

2

I am very much surprised by Comrade Glebov's raising the question of the decision taken at the last sitting and his proposal to review it now. I believe such a review is inadmissible, either formally or morally.

3

No decision on their publication has yet been taken by the C.C. and I merely insist on the C.C.'s *right* to take such a decision, whenever it deems it necessary to do so.[134]

First published in full in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the minutes

STATEMENT ON THE TRANSFER OF THE POWERS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. C.C. REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Brunnen, July 28, 1904

In view of my departure from Geneva and in view of Comrade Glebov's sudden departure, I think it is natural that all the business of both C.C. representatives abroad should be handled by a commission of its agents, that is Comrades Olin, Bonch-Bruyevich and Lyadov.

C.C. Representative abroad, *N. Lenin*

First published in 1959 in Vol. 8 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE MAJORITY'S GENEVA GROUP

While by and large subscribing to the Riga Declaration[135] as being a quite correct and principled expression of the views and policy of the Party majority of the Second

Congress, the meeting deems it necessary to take a definite stand on the new step taken by the C.C.

The meeting voices its deep conviction that the C.C. declaration[136] (see *Iskra* No. 72[137]) strikes a major blow for clanishness as against the Party principle, and is another betrayal of the interests of the Party as a whole, a fresh attempt to corrupt the Party by introducing hypocrisy into Party relations. The meeting brands the opposition by an accountable Party organ to the convocation of a Party congress and its statement that any agitation for the congress is harmful as a disgraceful fact not to be found in the records of any dignified workers' party. To receive one's powers at a Party congress from the Party majority and to proclaim this majority's policy to be a group policy; to speak of peace between the two contending sides and to make a behind-the-scenes deal with the self-styled representatives abroad of one of the sides; hypocritically to extol the "lofty" stand of one's opponents of yesterday and to begin reconciliation by dismissing the members and agents of the C.C. who dared commit the crime of agitating for a congress—all this is clear evidence that the new C.C. in its new policy has decided to join the C.O. in treating the Party as a nonentity. The meeting vigorously condemns this policy of Bonapartism, urges all Party members to fight resolutely against usurpation and hypocrisy, and demands the full publication of the Council's minutes and all data on the activity of the central bodies which do not have to be withheld for reasons of secrecy.

The meeting calls on all members of the Party sharing the principled views of the majority to support the publishing house set up by Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich[138] and to agitate vigorously for the convocation of the Third Congress.

Written later than August 25 (September 7), 1904

First published in 1960 in Vol. 9 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

PLANS FOR AN ARTICLE "THE PEASANTRY AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY"[139]

1

The Peasantry and Social-Democracy

Marxist Theory and the Social-Democratic Programme

1. The agrarian question in West-European Social-Democracy. David, etc.
2. " " " in Russia: both the old Narodniks and the liberals and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Practical importance during reforms.

3. *Large- and small-scale production.*
   Auhagen
   Klawki
   etc. *Conclusions* concerning *maintenance of labourers, cattle and land.*

Denmark (David).

4. **Co-operatives. David**, etc. French reactionaries:
   Rocquigny
   Goltz
   Buchenberger.
5. Russia's specific features.
   Together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landowners.
   " " the urban proletariat against the peasant bourgeoisie.
6. The importance of Social-Democratic agitation among the peasants, especially in periods of political revival. Development of class-consciousness, democratic and Social-Democratic thinking among the peasants.

2

1. Marxist theory (α) on the condition, evolution and role of the peasantry—and (β) the Social-Democratic programme. Closely bound up.

2. The urgency of the peasant question. The agrarian programmes of the Social-Democratic parties: the French (petty-bourgeois character. Engels's critique[140]), the German (1895. Breslau, opportunist and revolutionary wings), *Russian*... (Critics. "**David.**"). (Bulgakov)....

3. It is the *Russian* agrarian programme of the Social-Democrats that especially distinguishes them from the *Narodniks* and the *Socialist-Revolutionaries*.

4. The principles of Marxist theory concerning the peasantry (cf. *The Development of Capitalism*,* quotations from Marx). (1) the role of large-scale production; (2) the peasant's petty-bourgeois character; (3) his past (—) and future (+). Add K. Kautsky, *The Social Revolution*.

5. Large- and small-scale production in agriculture....

   Stumpfe. **Souchon**.
   From MS.: *Hecht*, Auhagen, Klawki, Baden, German statistics....

6. Conclusion: the importance of the maintenance of labourers, cattle and land.

7. Add: Huschke, Haggard, Baudrillart, Lecouteux, *Prussian Inquiry*, Bavarian and Hessen inquiries, Hubach.

8. Debt. *Prussian statistics*.

9. Co-operatives. General statement of the question.
   Rocquigny, Goltz, Buchenberger, Haggard.
   Statistical data: *German* and *Russian* (communal lease). *D e n m a r k*.

10. Conclusions concerning the West.

11. Russia's specific features.... On two flanks.
    The peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat.
    Relics of *serfdom*, and the struggle against the bourgeoisie.

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* See present edition, Vol. 3.—*Ed*.

12. Together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landowners, etc. } connect with cut-off lands.
    " " the urban proletariat against the bourgeoisie. }

13. Practical importance of the agrarian question in the possibly immediate future:
    Exposure of class contradictions in the countryside. Democratic and Social-Democratic agitation and propaganda.

Written not earlier than September 1904

First published in 1938 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A PROPAGANDA TALK ON CRISES[141]

1. What is a crisis?—Stoppage in industry, unemployment, hitch in marketing, overproduction.
1. α) What is an industrial crisis?
b) Stoppage of factories, hitch in marketing, bankruptcies, unemployment.
γ) Overproduction....
2. *Overproduction*, **underconsumption***. (Elaborate the contradiction.)
2. α) Overproduction, and underconsumption*.
3. How can that be? (α) Division of contemporary society into two classes, the bourgeoisie and the **proletariat.** (β) Production for the market.
4. Competition, its international character, drive for markets, gigantic growth of production.
5. Reduction in demand for living labour: *intensification*, *machines*, women *and children*, *skilled* and unskilled workers.
5 bis: **Supply grows, marketing tight.**

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

6. Periodical crises, their regularity, their inevitability under capitalism. (Illusions in time of prosperity.)
8. 7.* *Reserve army*. Calamities of unemployment. *Bondage*: *right to live only when producing* profit.
   (percentage of old beggars): {1/3-1/2} ....
7. 8. The effect of the crisis on the workers and *petty proprietors*.
   Ruin, poverty: dawning socialist awareness....
   Meeting of unemployed in Britain in 1889.[142]
9. Crisis and capitalism. Crisis and the development of large-scale production—trusts, etc. The tasks of socialism. The socialist revolution: Social-Democratic labour parties.

Examples of large-scale production:
Morozov:
Steam-powered mills:
Iron and steel:

Written in the autumn of 1906

First published in 1959 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR THREE TALKS ON THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PROGRAMME

α) Contemporary system.
β) Socialist aims and the class struggle.
γ) Struggle against the autocracy.

for 2-3 hours Divide α-γ into three talks

Plan for first talk

on the Social-Democratic programme

1. The struggle of the workers against their masters to improve their condition is world-wide. Strikes—socialism. What does this mean?

* Point 7 was subsequently changed to point 8 and vice versa.—*Ed*.

α
2. Contemporary society is arranged as follows: it is divided into working people and exploiters. Two classes. Property-owners and proletarians. Who maintains whom?
3. Workers' plight: low wages. Malnutrition. Unemployment. Female labour. Child labour. "Degeneration of the nation." Prostitution. Social and political oppression.

β
4. In large-scale production, workers unite to fight against their masters. Under capitalism, the whole of society is more tightly knit, making possible a transition to socialist production. Example of the masters being quite *useless* in big factories and estates.
5. Socialist revolution=land and factories handed over to the workers. Socialist production, short working hours, etc.
6. Demands on modern society to *facilitate* the workers' struggle and *safeguard* them against degeneration: labour reforms, 8-hour working day, weekly payment of wages, living quarters, medical aid, schools, etc.

γ
7. Political demands. What is an autocracy? Struggle for political freedom. (Constitution—republic, freedom of speech, assembly, etc., etc.)
8. Revolutionary parties and their role in the working-class struggle. Narodnaya Volya and *Social-Democracy*.

Written in the autumn of 1904

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

NOTE BY THE *VPERYOD* EDITORIAL BOARD TO THE LETTER OF THEIR ST. PETERSBURG CORRESPONDENT[143]

Letter from St. Petersburg (pp. 1-6)*

From the Editorial Board. The conclusion at which the St. Petersburg correspondent arrives is completely in line

* The pages of the letter.—*Ed.*

with our own in the article: "Time to Call a Halt!" (*Vperyod* No. 1).* The Mensheviks have shown themselves to be completely unwilling to work together, submitting to the majority, and now that the institutions set up by the Second Congress have been disorganised and they have frustrated the convocation of a third congress, the Party has no other means of fighting them except a break. The earlier and more complete this break with the disorganisers, the....**

From the Editorial Board. The conclusion of our St. Petersburg comrade fully bears out the correctness of our own conclusion (*Vperyod* No. 1, "Time to Call a Halt!"). We advise all committees and organisations of the majority to exercise firmness in removing the disorganisers as soon as possible so as to have a chance to work, instead of engaging in squabbles.

Written after December 22, 1904
(January 4, 1905)

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from
the original

OUTLINE OF THESES FOR AN ARTICLE "HOW THEY DEFEND THEMSELVES"[144]

How They Defend Themselves

1) Two replies to Lenin's pamphlet on *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra"'s Plan****—the Editorial Board's *and* Plekhanov's. This *and* is also curious (Plekhanov is *nominally* on the Board), but the *distinction* between their replies is extremely interesting.

Plekhanov defends an incorrect stand very cleverly and cautiously. The Editorial Board, not cleverly.

Plekhanov says *nothing* at all about either 1) Starover's resolution and *its* connection with the *Iskra* plan, or 2) the "higher type of mobilisation". Ergo, what Plekhanov passes over in silence is the *e s s e n c e* of *Iskra*'s mistake (Starover's resolution is the beginning of the mistake, its

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 35-39.—*Ed.*
** Here the MS. breaks off. The text is crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*
*** See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516.—*Ed.*

starting-point. The final point—the consideration of the "higher" type).

The Editorial Board *emphasises* the connection of its stand with Starover's resolution, and *comes out for* the idea of the "higher type".

Both the Editorial Board and Plekhanov make a very weak *stand for* the talk on panic (clearly retreating and backtracking).

Plekhanov keeps harping on the contradiction between the old and the new Lenin[145] in an effort to prove that the *Iskra* Editorial Board was acting according to the old Lenin.

Plekhanov tries to create the impression that Lenin is *now* opposed to demonstrations before the Zemstvo men and is against dictating to them a "positive programme of action". This is an absurdity and a distortion.

What were my theses against *Iskra*?

1) The talk of panic is vulgar and irrelevant.

Reply? Plekhanov on the Tambovites (ha-ha!)[146] " on the anarchists (where?) Editorial Board's "obstruction"	The Editorial Board is almost being robbed: "superfluous".

2) "Agreements" with the liberals must be determined by the actual common struggle and not by "promises".
   N i l—Plekhanov.
3) Starover's terms rejected. (The Editorial Board makes a very weak case, with a virtual admission.)
4) "New type." Editorial Board—schwach.* Plekhanov—*n i l*. On the question of *uprising* see *Iskra* No. *62*. Leading.**
   "Purely utopian views"
   on preparations for an uprising.
   "Are beginning to manifest themselves"....

Written between December 28, 1904 and January 11 (January 10 and 24), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

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* Bad.—*Ed.*

** This word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

STATEMENT BY THE GROUP OF FOUNDERS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. LIBRARY AT GENEVA

The group which initiated the establishment of the R.S.D.L.P. library at Geneva has unanimously decided to hand it over to the Majority Committees' Bureau[147] for the general management of the library pending a decision by the Third Party Congress.

Written in late December 1904
and early January 1905

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from
the original

1905 – 1910

PLAN FOR AN ARTICLE "1895 AND 1905 (SHORT PARALLEL)"[148]

1895 and 1905
(Short Parallel)

There are here eigentlich* two topics: 1) the parallel of growing work; 2) present-day organisational tasks. They should be dealt with in *two* separate articles.

1. Compare the scope, proportions and forms of Social-Democratic work then and now.
2. Scope: only circles then. Scarcely the *first* beginnings of mass agitation. Propaganda very heavy and academic. The Social-Democrats making their way among the Narodnaya Volya movement, the Narodnoye Pravo[149] movement, etc.
3. Today. The Party. Ordinary mass agitation. Open political action in the street. Revolutionary epoch.
4. Forms. 10-16 persons (committee). 20-30 workers' circles. Maximum, 100-150 ties. "Readings." *Self-education*—the crux.
5. Today. The organisation has grown to many "storeys" St. Petersburg and Odessa [committee—districts—organisers' meetings (central circles)—groups, and then "the centre" and the bureau. Something like five new *storeys*].
6. "A Letter to a Comrade"** was written at a time when the new storeys were being put together and the Economists slowed down their growth. The ideas advocated in "A Letter to a Comrade" have now virtually been translated into life.

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* Strictly speaking.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 229-50.—*Ed.*

7. New tasks: γ) Abundance of storeys has brought up a new section of Party workers, Party members. Their participation should be formalised. (1) Information—resolutions—polls—direct ties with the Central Organ. (2) Elective principle? (3) Indication or selection of candidates for co-optation?
8. Another and perhaps even more important task: the work of adding new horizontal storeys should be supplemented by the work of new "vertical", you might say, ways of influence. That is: the growth of the movement makes it necessary and possible to supplement this current work on the storeys by the upper storeys addressing the mass in new forms of massive meetings. "Short meetings" and "mass rallies", as a natural product of work on many "storeys", of themselves lead up to that higher form which prevails abroad and will triumph here le lendemain de la révolution,* namely: to the "mass rallies" as the principal means of political influence on the proletariat and its Social-Democratic education.
9. Of course, this makes the "storeys" *equally* necessary. They will (always?) be necessary. The thing is to "supplement" and not to "substitute"....

Written before January 9 (22), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

A MILITANT AGREEMENT FOR THE UPRISING AND THE FORMATION OF A COMBAT COMMITTEE

PLAN:[150]

1) Motive behind agreement
2) Its aims
3) Programme (1) overthrow of autocracy
   (2) provisional revolutionary government
   (3) arming of the people
   (4) Constituent Assembly
   (5) revolutionary peasant committees.

* The day after the revolution.—*Ed.*

4) Formation of an *interim combat committee* for the purpose of
   (1) collecting money
   (2) clarifying manpower
   (3) informing masses of Russian workers about the agreement and broadly discussing means of implementation
   (4) preparing for a *Russian* conference to form a *Russian* Combat Committee.
5) The task of the Combat Committee: co-ordination of measures in preparing for an uprising.
   2/3 in view of the importance of total solidarity and maintenance of independence by each party.
6) The Combat Committee's attitude to terrorism.
7) Call to all socialists and all revolutionary democrats.

5 bis
The Combat Committee issues an appeal *only* on questions *entirely* within its programme and not otherwise than with a reservation about the Party's independence in every case.

Written in February-March 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

RECORD OF SPEECHES AT THE GENEVA BOLSHEVIK CLUB[151]

MINUTES OF MARCH 5, 1905

I

L e n i n. Proposes that all the results of the section's work should be made public—above all that Stepanov should submit his report in writing, and also the minutes. A general summary of these minutes should be handed over to the Congress; they could provide many practical indications during the work of the Congress. Stepanov's report is regrettably much too abstract in character. If exact conclusions in the form of resolutions are to be made from the reports, they must be more concrete. With that end in view I propose a poll among comrades in Russia

and abroad, specifying that they should give precise answers to the questions stated (yes, no, so many). A picture of their work, e.g., the town in which one worked, the questions one decided at meetings, etc. While the summarised conclusions could yield something, I repeat that no precise conclusions could be drawn from them. That is why I propose that the circle should set about working out a questionnaire to be circulated among comrades in Russia and abroad, for concise replies to all questions. If we have at our disposal raw material of this kind (if 100-200 comrades reply), the Congress could use it for precise conclusions.

I reiterate my proposals: first, a summary of all the minutes and also the minutes themselves should be submitted to the Congress; second, a start should be made on drawing up a questionnaire. This should be done right away, without any delay, and I propose that all work in the section should be dropped in favour or putting the minutes in order and writing a report on them for the Congress.

II

L e n i n. Now that the announcement of the convocation of the Third Congress is out, the work of the sections has taken on a different character. The sections have now been working for two months, but very little has been done, all things considered: the minutes are not all there, and there are no reports; we should make haste with this, so that all these efforts should be of practical importance and not go to waste, i.e., all this should be placed before the Congress. In order to submit the minutes as soon as possible, I propose that the whole circle should set about helping the secretaries. I repeat that unless the circle completes this work, all its efforts threaten to remain within the circle itself, whereas they could help to work out organisational plans. Furthermore, I propose that we should start right away on working out a questionnaire—we must make haste with all this, time does not wait. The Congress may take place very soon. The best thing is to entrust the working out of a questionnaire to a special committee.

III

L e n i n. I have no objections to Comrade Olga's proposal. As for my experience, I do not believe I have any, in view of the rapid change of events and conditions of work. I did draw up a questionnaire, but it was much too general. I propose that experienced comrades should be elected to a committee for drawing up the questionnaire, and that this business should be accelerated to the utmost.

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from
the minutes

NOTE BY THE *VPERYOD* EDITORIAL BOARD TO A RESOLUTION BY A GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE ST. PETERSBURG METALWORKS[152]

From the Editors. We publish this resolution by the worker-comrades as a characteristic manifestation of the mood that in certain circumstances may sway a considerable section of the fighting proletariat.* A Party split—especially a secret split—undoubtedly inflicts countless calamities on the labour movement. The above-mentioned Kharkov resolution[153] shows that there are Mensheviks in Russia who are much more conscientious about their Party duty than the comrades abroad. This is also shown by the new declaration issued by the C.C. together with the Majority Committees' Bureau.[154] Let us once again wish success to this latest attempt at unification.

Vperyod No. 14,
April 2 (March 30), 1905

Printed from
the *Vperyod* text
verified with the
original

* The first sentence was written by M. S. Olminsky.—*Ed*.

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[155]

APRIL 12-27 (APRIL 25-MAY 10), 1905

1

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS OF THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE FOR CONVENING THE THIRD CONGRESS ON THE REPRESENTATION OF CERTAIN ORGANISATIONS[156]

Caucasus

The Organising Committee, having examined the question of the Caucasian delegation on the basis of the facts published in various writings and the testimony of witnesses, comrades from the Caucasus, has arrived at this unanimous decision:

1. Among the votes at the Congress, it is necessary and solely correct to reckon the 8 votes of the Caucasian delegation, because back in the autumn of 1903, the C.C. approved the Rules of the Caucasian Union Committee, and under these Rules, the Caucasian Union Committee, as a Union Committee, was allowed 8 votes at the Congress.

2. As for the contradictory statements by Comrade Glebov in the Council and the Council's decision in May 1904 to regard temporarily, pending clarification of the question, as votes those of the four separate Caucasian committees (Baku, Batum, Tiflis and Imeretia and Mingrelia), the Organising Committee cannot consider this statement of Glebov's and the Council's decision an obstacle to the adoption of the conclusion stated in §1, since Comrade Glebov has clearly shown himself to be uninformed, which is why he unwittingly misled the Council.

3. Considering it unquestionable that there are now three delegates from the Caucasus with six votes, the O.C. states that Comrade Leonov, member of the Caucasian Union Committee, declares the following concerning the fourth delegate with two votes: the Caucasian Union Committee intended to allow the Batum Committee to approve this fourth delegate. When the Batum Committee gave a vague and evasive reply on this matter, the Caucasian Union Committee, at a sitting attended by Leonov, expressed the wish that in the absence of a special delegate from

Batum at the Congress the votes of the fourth delegate should be transferred to Comrade Kamenev (Yuri).

4. Stating this, the O.C. leaves it to the Congress itself to decide on the question of a fourth delegate from the Caucasian Union Committee.

Kremenchug

Concerning the powers of the Kremenchug Committee the Organising Committee declares:

1) The Kremenchug Committee was approved by the Central Committee only in August 1904, according to Comrade Mark, a member of the C.C., who attended the meeting of the C.C. at which the approval took place.

2) The Kremenchug Committee does not appear on the Party Council's list of 33 empowered organisations, which was published in *Iskra* No. 89.

On the strength of the above stated, the O.C. decides: not to regard the Kremenchug Committee among the full-fledged organisations with the right of vote at the present Congress.

Yekaterinoslav

The Organising Committee, having heard the report of Comrade Morozov, delegate of the Yekaterinoslav Majority Committee, and the written communication of Comrade Yevgeny, member of the old committee in Yekaterinoslav, reached the following unanimous decision:

The Organising Committee does not see any grounds to consider the present Yekaterinoslav Majority Committee less legitimate than the Minority Committee either in formal terms or in terms of succession and ties with local workers.

However, in view of the fact that the O.C. has no opportunity of hearing the explanations of the other side, it does not adopt a decision on the vote of the delegate from the Yekaterinoslav Majority Committee, leaving it to the Congress itself to decide on the matter.

Concerning the powers of the Kazan and Kuban committees, the O.C. has failed to reach any decision, as the votes of the C.C. and the M.C.B. were split.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The M.C.B. believes that these committees cannot be recognised as having the necessary powers because these committees did not appear on the list of committees approved until April 1, 1905, at the Council's sitting in May 1904 (delegates Lenin and Glebov from the C.C.). Even if the Kazan and Kuban committees were approved by the Central Committee after May 1904, they will at any rate be entitled to representation only after one year. Besides, these committees could not have been approved at the general meeting of the C.C. in July 1904, because the minutes of this meeting were in their entirety delivered by Glebov to Lenin abroad, and they contained no information concerning the approval of the Kazan and Kuban committees. Finally, nothing was said about it either at the August or September sitting of the C.C., which was attended by C.C. member Comrade Mark.

The C.C. believes that since these committees were inserted in the *Iskra* list, apparently on behalf of the Party Council, we have no ground for recognising these committees as lacking the required powers.

Written not later than April 11 (24)

Published in 1905 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov* (The Regular Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Full Text of the Proceedings), Central Committee publication, Geneva

Printed from the original

2

O.C. DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONGRESS[157]

Concerning the point of the agreement between the C.C. and the M.C.B. under which the Congress shall open in the presence of three-quarters of the delegates of the Russian committees, the O.C. resolves:

Both sides, making up the O.C., see this point as meaning that both the C.C. and the M.C.B. should have taken the most vigorous measures to achieve full representation at the Congress and also to guarantee to the Party that the C.C. and the M.C.B. have set themselves the aim of organising an all-Party and not a factional congress. This point

of the agreement was not at all meant to offset the effect of the paragraph of the Party's Rules under which a congress is valid in the presence of one-half of the total number of votes. As for the plenitude of representation at the Congress, all measures have been taken on that score. There is no news only from the Astrakhan and the Crimean committees. The selection of delegates and their dispatch abroad (in two instances, transfer of mandates from the Kuban Committee to comrades abroad, Parvus and a person to be appointed by the *Iskra* Editorial Board) have been carried out by the Don, Gornozavodsk, Kiev, Kuban, Tver, Kharkov, Smolensk, Siberian and Yekaterinoslav committees. Together with the delegates available from 19 committees, we would have, with these 9 committees, a total of 28 committees, that is, more than three-quarters out of 34 committees (the figure of 34 is the maximum number of empowered organisations initially on the O.C. list).

If 9 delegates from the said committees have failed to turn up at the Congress, despite the fact that they were given the corresponding mandates from the committees and arrived abroad, their absence is due to no fault of the O.C., but to the fact that all the efforts of the O.C. to achieve full representation at the Congress were frustrated by the illegal resistance of the three members of the Party Council.

Written not later than April 11 (24)

Published in 1905 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Geneva

Printed from the original

3

SPEECH ON THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE REPORT CONCERNING THE KAZAN COMMITTEE'S REPRESENTATION AT THE CONGRESS[158]

APRIL 13 (26)

References are being made to a statement of mine.* The Kazan man, who has arrived, said that he may possibly have been elected. He should be invited as a member of the

* See p. 150 of this volume.—*Ed.*

committee. I find the end of the Credentials Committee's resolution strange and propose its correction.

First published in 1937 in the book *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P. Protokoly* (The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Proceedings)

Printed from the text of the book

4

AMENDMENT TO A CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE PROPOSAL ON THE KAZAN COMMITTEE'S REPRESENTATION AT THE CONGRESS

APRIL 13 (26)

The following amendment is motioned: "Not as a delegate, but as a member of the committee not represented at the Congress but favouring the Congress."

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

5

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF A DEBATE ON THE O.C. REPORT

APRIL 13 (26)

I propose that we should take into consideration the statement by Comrade Sosnovsky and others on the desirability of limiting the debate on the O.C. report to the formal aspect only. Comrade Andreyev's resolution fails to achieve its aim.[159] The comrades wanted to have a discussion only on the legality of convening the Congress and not in substance. To discuss the report in substance is equivalent to discussing the Party crisis. The bureau will keep speakers within the limits of a discussion on the legality of convening the Congress.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

6

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE DEBATE ON THE O.C. REPORT

The Congress shall at present debate the O.C. report only from the standpoint of the Congress's validity.*

Motioned on April 13 (26)

Published in 1905 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Geneva

Printed from the text of the book

7

DRAFT AGENDA OF THE THIRD PARTY CONGRESS[160]

A) Tactical questions.

1. Armed uprising.

[2. Participation of Social-Democracy in a provisional revolutionary government.]**

2. Preparations for open political action by Social-Democracy.

3. Social-Democracy's attitude to the government's policy on the eve of the revolution, during the revolution and after it.

4. Attitude to the peasant movement.

B) Attitude to other parties and trends.

5. Attitude to the splinter section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

6. Attitude to non-Russian Social-Democratic parties and organisations in Russia.

7. Attitude to the liberals.

8. Attitude to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

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* The Minutes Committee recorded the end of the draft resolution as follows: "... the validity of the Congress and its final constitution, and not from the standpoint of the Party crisis".—*Ed.*

** The text in brevier in square brackets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

C) Party organisation.

9. Party Rules.

10. Relations between workers and intellectuals in Party organisations.

D) Internal Party work.

11. Delegates' reports.

12. Improvement of propaganda and agitation.

[13. May Day.]*

14. Election of functionaries.

15. Procedure governing the publication of minutes and entry into office of new institutions.

Motioned on April 13 (26)

First published in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

8

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE CONGRESS AGENDA

APRIL 13 (26)

I would have no objection to the proposal of Comrades Mikhailov, Voinov and Zimin.[161] But there is a danger that the Congress will overdo the agenda debate. The agenda at German Social-Democratic congresses runs to 5 or 6 items; we had up to 25 at the Second Congress. There is already a danger of our debate getting out of hand. I propose that we adopt as a basis the agenda with a better breakdown.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

9

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE CONGRESS STANDING ORDERS

APRIL 13 (26)

It is dangerous to substitute committees for Congress sittings. The committees discuss many interesting questions

* The text in brevier in square buckets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

which are then lost and do not get into the minutes. The committees do not have enough time for serious work, and it is not desirable to extend it to the detriment of the Congress work. It would be well to elect a resolutions committee right away, so as to give our work some direction at least. We also need a committee for examining the reports. I doubt whether we need organisational, agrarian and armed uprising committees. We have the old Rules, there is Ivanov's draft, there is Comrade N. F.'s opinion,[162] there is quite enough material.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

10

SPEECH MOTIONING A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON ELECTION OF COMMITTEES TO EXAMINE DELEGATES' REPORTS AND TO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

APRIL 13 (26)

I motion this resolution: "The Congress shall elect: 1) a committee for examining the delegates' reports and preparing them for communication to the Congress; 2) a committee for appointing rapporteurs and drafting resolutions on the principal items of the agenda."

The speeches of delegates have convinced me that it is the only way we can work fruitfully. If we adopt the system of a general debate and subsequent discussion in committee, the result will be similar to that at the Second Congress. Care must be taken to have the fullest possible publication of the Congress deliberations for the purpose of giving the Party the best information. In view of the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding the Congress, it is especially necessary to give our debates the greatest possible publicity and the fullest record in the minutes.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

11

STATEMENTS TO THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE OF THE CONGRESS

1

To the Credentials Committee of the Congress

At the sitting of the O.C. on April 24, 1905, I forgot to motion a proposal to invite Comrade Arnatsky (*real* [NB] name), a member of the Kazan Committee, to attend the Congress with voice but no vote.[163] I request the Credentials Committee to examine this proposal.

Comrade Arnatsky is abroad, in France, and told me he was ready to attend the Congress at his own expense. He will soon be going to Russia and could swiftly report to his committee on the Congress. Despite all its efforts, the Organising Committee was unable to contact the Kazan Committee or obtain a reply from Kazan. There is therefore almost no hope of the Kazan Committee taking part in the Congress. Our efforts abroad to contact Kazan from over here have likewise failed, and there has been no reply to our letters. Arnatsky has also failed to get in touch with Kazan from over here. In view of the impossibility of having a *delegate* from the Kazan Committee to attend the Congress, should we not invite Comrade Arnatsky, as a *member* of the committee, to attend with *voice but no vote*?

Lenin

Motioned on April 13 (26)

2

To the Credentials Committee

At the O.C. sitting I reported on the written request from Comrade Filatov (real name) for admission to the Congress with voice but no vote. Comrade Filatov is the author of the articles on the uprising in *Vperyod*, signed *V. S.* For the Congress he has prepared a letter and a pamphlet-report: "Application of Tactics and Fortifications to a Popular Uprising" (in a suitcase left in Boulogne). I request

that Comrades Belsky and Voinov who had worked with Comrade Filatov in Paris[164] should be asked to give him a reference.

Lenin

Motioned on April 14 (27)
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from
the original

12

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE'S REPORT[165]

APRIL 14 (27)

I think it would be wrong to have the Congress confirm the organisations immediately. I am opposed to the giving of a vote. I do not agree with Comrade Kamsky about a *coup d'état*.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from
the text
of the book

13

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONFIRMATION OF THE KAZAN AND KUBAN COMMITTEES[166]

The Congress resolves not to count the Kazan and the Kuban committees in constituting the Congress, but to confirm them as full-fledged committees for the future.

Motioned on April 14 (27)
Published in 1905 in the book
Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva

Printed from
the original

14

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PROCEDURE GOVERNING VOTING AT THE CONGRESS[167]

The Congress shall henceforth conduct all voting under §7 of the Regulations, separating the votes from the voices.

Motioned on April 14 (27)
Published in 1905 in the book
Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva

Printed from
the text
of the book

15

REMARKS ON RUMYANTSEV'S DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF OPEN POLITICAL ACTION BY THE R.S.D.L.P.

I think the resolution should be reworded as follows: Motives:

(1) stating that under the pressure of the revolutionary movement there is an actual beginning of open action by the political parties, etc.

(2) that in this the liberals have gone especially far, their *actual* privilege (Schmidt's point 1).

(3) that there is a *tremendous urge* among the workers for the same thing (Schmidt's point 2).

—*conclusions*:

(1) no occasion should be missed for open action, the workers to be organised into an independent force *in the course of the action itself*;

(2) even the slightest legal forms should be used in an effort to get the legal labour organisations under Social-Democratic influence;

(3) the idea should be spread in all labour organisations and among the broadest possible masses of the need of taking practical measures to set up, alongside our secret apparatus, an apparatus for open political action.

[+0) The *beginning* of the actual winning of freedom of action.

Better 2) 1)

1) The working masses strive for open action.

2) The liberals are making *intensive* use and are gaining a preponderance.

3) The need to prepare for a possible transition in the near future from the usual, exclusively secret forms of activity to open forms.

Resolves:

1) no occasion should be missed ... open action to be worked out by separate organisations on the spot

2) the use of even partial *legal* forms of organisation in an effort to subject them to Social-Democratic influence.]*

Written between April 16 and 19 (April 29 and May 2), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

* The text in brevier in square brackets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

16
THESES FOR A RESOLUTION ON THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS' PARTICIPATION IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Motives of the Resolution:

1) The necessity of political freedom and a democratic republic.

[2) The existence of a revolutionary bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy able and beginning to fight for it.
3) The necessity of the proletariat's support for revolutionary democracy....]*

4) The necessity of a provisional revolutionary government for the complete overthrow of the autocracy and *actual* guarantees of freedom for a constituent assembly.

[5) Recognition by revolutionary Social-Democracy of revolutionary action not only from below, but also from above.
6) The necessity of Social-Democracy's participation in a provisional revolutionary government in the event of a complete victory for the revolution, where it directs the uprising.]*

7) The bourgeois-democratic character of the revolution and the necessity of the proletariat's taking an independent position as distinct from bourgeois democracy.

[8) The existence of an organised Social-Democratic Labour Party capable of open organisation (with broad participation of the workers) and control over the Party's authorised agents;]*

Resolutive Section of the Resolution
on Social-Democratic Participation in a Provisional Revolutionary Government

1) The propaganda and agitation for the idea of a provisional revolutionary government as a necessary component part of a victorious revolution.
2) Discussion of the whole of our minimum programme at workers' meetings not only from a general standpoint, as

* The text in brevier in square brackets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

we all have discussed and should discuss the maximum programme, but from the standpoint of the possibility of its full and immediate implementation.

3) Recognition that *in the event of a victorious popular uprising* the Social-Democrats may take part in a provisional revolutionary government together with the revolutionary bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois democrats for the purpose of conducting a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts, for the purpose of completely clearing the democratic soil in Russia, for the purpose of using all the means ensured by the government for the broadest possible organisation of the working class.

These are subjective conditions. What about the objective ones? for the purpose of carrying on a relentless struggle against the counter-revolution. P. 3.

4) Necessary condition of such participation—control by the Social-Democratic Labour Party over its authorised representatives in the government and undeviating protection of the independent working-class party, hostile to all manner of bourgeois democracy in its striving for a full socialist revolution.

{NB *Armed* proletariat}

5) At any rate, regardless of whether or not the Social-Democrats succeed in taking part in a provisional revolutionary government, the idea must be spread in the working class of the necessity of independent workers' *revolutionary* organisations to exercise control over *every* revolutionary government and to exert pressure on it.

Written before April 18 (May 1), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

17

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF OPEN POLITICAL ACTION BY THE R.S.D.L.P.[168]

APRIL 19 (MAY 2)

Comrade Sergeyev is wrong. We have before us the integrated question of changing the character of Social-Democratic activity, and that is what the resolution states.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

18

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S TACTICS ON THE EVE OF A REVOLUTION

APRIL 19 (MAY 2)

1

I agree with Comrade Belsky's opinion.[169] We tend to minimise the concept of revolution when using this word in relation to the mere wresting of a few paltry rights.

2

I agree that "revolutionary way" is an expression for a more vigorous conduct of struggle, but this tends to minimise the concept of revolution. I propose either that we replace it by the words "regardless of the law", or that after "revolutionary way" we delete the words "minimal programme", as it could be taken to mean that we want to carry through the whole revolution in this way.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

19

RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE PEASANT MOVEMENT

1) Whereas the currently growing peasant movement, though spontaneous and politically unconscious, is nonetheless inevitably directed against the existing political order and against all the remnants of the serf-owning system in general;

2) Whereas it is one of the tasks of Social-Democracy to support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order;

3) Whereas, in view of the aforesaid, the Social-Democrats must strive to purge the revolutionary-democratic content of the peasant movement of all manner of reactionary admixtures, developing the peasants' revolutionary class-consciousness, and consistently putting through their democratic demands;

4) Whereas the Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the proletariat, must in all cases and under all circumstances work steadfastly for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and clarify for this class the irreconcilable antagonisms between its interests and those of the peasant bourgeoisie;

—The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party instructs all Party organisations

a) to carry on propaganda among broad sections of the people explaining that Social-Democracy sets itself the task of giving the most vigorous support to all revolutionary measures of the peasantry capable of improving its condition, including the confiscation of landlord, government, church, monastery and crown lands;

b) as a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into the peasant movement, to urge the necessity for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees, with the aim of carrying through all revolutionary-democratic reforms in order to release the peasantry from the tyranny of the police, the officials and the landlords;

c) with the aim of disorganising the autocracy and maintaining the revolutionary onslaught against it, to urge the peasantry and the rural proletariat to engage in all possible political demonstrations, collectively refuse to pay duties and taxes, to perform military service or obey the decrees and orders of the government and its agents;

d) to strive for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat, for its integration with the urban proletariat under the banner of the Social-Democratic Party, and for the election of its representatives to the peasant committees.

Motioned on April 20 (May 3)

Published in 1905 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Geneva

Printed from the original

20

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CONGRESS[170]

I consider it timely to adopt a resolution (on the attitude of the workers to the intellectuals).

Lenin

Written on April 20 (May 3), 1905

First published in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

21

OUTLINE OF A SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS IN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS[171]

Outline of my speech on May 3 (15th sitting).

I. It is not right to say (as Vlasov did) that in our country it is the intellectuals that are mainly the exponents of revolutionary Social-Democratic ideas.

II. It is not right to say (as Vlasov did) that the elective principle will not make for better information of the outlying districts, etc.

III. Vlasov said that it is the intellectuals that are at the head (of splits and oppositions). This is confirmed by Latyshev, Lyadov, Kramolnikov, etc.

IV. *Workers* ***must*** *be brought into the committees.*

Written on April 20 (May 3), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

22

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE PARTY RULES[172]

APRIL 21 (MAY 4)

1

Comrade Kitayev's proposal is more practical, for under it the convocation of an emergency congress demands a quorum equal to one-half of the number of votes at the preceding congress.

2

On the contrary, things are facilitated by the establishment of the specified number required to convene a congress. The required number of votes is established after each congress. One addition only is necessary, and that is a note under which the list of committees confirmed by the C.C. shall be published in the C.O.

3

The list of newly confirmed organisations shall be published immediately in the Party C.O., with a statement of the time of their confirmation by the C.C.

4

I am in favour of the initial wording of § 6 carried *Vperyod*,[173] as otherwise there is an irregularity.

5

I agree with the opinion of Comrade Petrov and the others. Comrade Belsky's proposal should be inserted in the note.[174]

6

In the interests of the C.O. I must come out in favour of Comrade Kitayev's amendment. With the newspaper issued weekly, there is need to be informed of developments and have sufficient quantities of material.[175]

7

I favour unanimous co-optation.[176] The C.C. is not big and for the sake of positive effort and political direction, we must ensure that its members are like-minded.

8

I agree with Comrade Kuznetsov: § 13 should be deleted from the Rules and the corresponding resolution tabled by Comrade Belsky in the Bureau adopted.[177]

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

23

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON GENERAL MEETINGS OF THE C.C.[178]

APRIL 21 (MAY 4)

I favour Maximov's resolution. If it is difficult to get together once in three months, the period could be extended to four months. The C.C. member abroad must know everything and take part in deciding on the most important matters. If there is difficulty for all to get together, a meeting does not have to be full.

First published in 1924 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. 1905 goda. Polny tekst protokolov*

Printed from the text of the book

24

SPEECH ON THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE KAZAN COMMITTEE'S REPRESENTATION[179]

APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

Lenin makes a reference to the minutes of the Second Congress showing that the Kazan Committee was listed as one of the organisations whose powers required formal confirmation. Since no formal confirmation has been forthcoming, there is no ground to rescind the resolution already taken by the Congress. The Kazan representative must remain at the Congress with voice only, while the committee, according to the Credentials Committee's proposal, should seek formal confirmation right away.

First published in 1937 in the book *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P. Protokoly*

Printed from the text of the book

25

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS IN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

I object to any examination of the resolutions one by one to avoid fragmentation and propose that they should be referred to committee for consolidation. In particular, concerning Comrade Kitayev's opinion that the Party committees should consist of organisers only, let me say that they alone would be insufficient for the functioning of the committees.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

26

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION TO THE PARTY RULES ON PERIODIC CONFERENCES OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS PARTY ORGANISATIONS[180]

APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

1

I should have no objection to this, but isn't the C.C. being burdened with too much work by being asked to organise these conferences?

I propose that instead of "the C.C. should organise" we say: "both the Central and the local committees should organise", and instead of "conferences of representatives of local committees", say: "conferences of representatives of various organisations of our Party".

2

That is right. I am against any additions which introduce nothing but formalism and red tape.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

27

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SPLINTER SECTION OF THE PARTY[181]

The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. authorises the Central Committee to take all measures to prepare and work out conditions for a merger with the splinter section of the R.S.D.L.P., the final approval of these conditions to be left to a new Party congress.

NB: not subject to publication

Motioned on April 23 (May 6)

First published in 1924 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. 1905 goda. Polny tekst protokolov*

Printed from the original

28

SPEECH ON RUMYANTSEV'S RESOLUTION ON THE SPLINTER SECTION OF THE PARTY[182]

APRIL 23 (MAY 6)

I find the first part unacceptable: how, given the split, is one to refrain from agitating? As for dissolving the Menshevik committees, that should be done with extreme caution.

First published in 1924 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. 1905 goda. Polny tekst protokolov*

Printed from the text of the book

29

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS NON-RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS[183]

APRIL 23 (MAY 6)

We are being offered something unacceptable. What, after all, does Comrade Mikhailov want? Does he want the agreements to be concluded only by the C.C. and local committees jointly? But the C.C.'s general resolutions are binding on local committees. It is unreasonable to consider the special case in which the Menshevik C.C. got something wrong. The local committees should also be allowed to display initiative. We should authorise the local committees as well to co-ordinate the activity with Social-Democratic organisations locally. If the C.C. does not happen to find itself in conditions where it cannot be located, it will, of course, always be consulted.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov, Central Committee publication, Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

30

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE TO THE LIBERALS

APRIL 23 (MAY 6)

It is inappropriate to raise the question of agreements with the liberals. Things in Russia have reached the point of an uprising, and in such conditions an agreement is highly unlikely. Even if some *Osvobozhdeniye* groups or liberal-minded students willing to act arms in hand are to be found, we really cannot conclude an agreement with a man like Struve.

Adds to Comrade Voinov's report on the Zemstvo congress in Moscow (quotes *The Times*).[184]

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

31

SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE C.C.[185]

APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

I am being accused of contradicting myself in the matter of the trial. If the Congress were a general one, the question of the trial would have been raised even earlier, but everything that has gone before clearly shows what the matter was. The C.C. is unable to make a report, because it is confused. The way out for the C.C. was found in the same thing: the Congress, which met later than it should have done. When the "accused pleads guilty", there is no need for any judicial proceedings.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

32

PROPOSAL ON PROCEDURE GOVERNING ELECTION TO THE C.C.

APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

I propose that we should first determine the number of persons we need to elect, conduct the election by secret ballot, and then come to an agreement concerning the extent to which the results of the vote shall be made public.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

33

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE TIME OF THE C.C.'S ENTRY INTO OFFICE

The Congress resolves that its newly elected C.C. shall enter upon the exercise of its office immediately.[186]

Motioned on April 25 (May 8), 1905

Published in 1905 in the book
Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva

Printed from the original

34

SPEECH ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

The Chairman points out that the question to what extent the Congress proceedings are to be reduced cannot be predetermined. All the debate concerning the agenda should be left out; he adds furthermore that the technical facilities abroad will have to be arranged from scratch and this may affect the speed of publication of the Congress proceedings.

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

35

AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION[187]

The Resolution as a Whole

a) Organise a literary-propagandist group to work out a general propaganda programme an to compile in conformity with it a series of popular booklets on the principal questions of the Party programme, tactics and organisation.*

a) Give special attention to the publication of pamphlets for work among the peasantry.

b) Make arrangements for the publication of a popular organ in Russia.

point c) substitute

adopted

c) Take measures to organise travelling groups of agitators and propagandists to help local centres.[188]

Lenin

Written on April 25 (May 8), 1905

Published in 1905 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Geneva

Printed from the original

36

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE EVENTS IN THE CAUCASUS

APRIL 26 (MAY 9)

1

It is wrong to say that the Party undertakes to appoint an uprising when the Caucasus starts a revolution. We merely authorise the C.C. to support the movement.**

* The text of the draft resolution is given in brevier.—*Ed.*

** The records of the Minutes Committee give the end of the speech as follows:

"We merely authorise the C.C. to support the movement but the conclusion does not follow that we should only agitate and propagandise, taking account of the situation in the Caucasus. I call everyone's attention to this paragraph.

"No one has requested the floor. The debate *is closed*."—*Ed.*

2

On the whole I agree with Comrade Petrov's amendment,[189] although it does not contain any revolutionary call.*

Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P.
Polny tekst protokolov,
Central Committee publication,
Geneva, 1905

Printed from the text of the book

PLAN FOR A REPORT ON THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND ITS DECISIONS[190]

The Third Congress and Its Decisions

A) Why did we have a congress and a conference?
B) The organisational question at the Congress and at the conference.
C) Tactical questions " ~ " ~ " ~ "

A)
1. Legality of *convoking* the Congress without the Council.
2. Validity of the Congress *itself*.
3. Why not attend the Congress? (One congress turned into two.)

B) Three main points of the organisational work of the Third Congress:

Bb)
1) § 1.
2) "Single centre."
3) "Guarantees of the minority's rights."

Bc) Organisational Rules of the conference.
(1) Directing "collectives" (?).
(2) "Local organisation" (? and § 1?).

C) (3) C.C. and E.C.—and O.C. ???

(4) Terms of agreement? at the Congress?

4.1. Provisional revolutionary government.

---

* The records of the Minutes Committee give the speech as follows: "L e n i n. Shouldn't we add 'to the proletariat and the peasantry of Russia'? Rybkin has just said the resolution could state that the Caucasus should not start an uprising until Russia is capable of supporting it. But this would require a change in the whole resolution. The important thing is the testimonials of local men. On the whole, I agree with Comrade Petrov's amendment, although it does not contain any revolutionary call."—*Ed*.

3.2. Armed uprising.
2.3. Present political situation.
1.4. Attitude to other revolutionary and opposition parties.
5.5. Executive Committee.
4.4. C.C.=E.C. + representatives of regional committees=conference.
3.3. Regional committees=elected at regional congresses.
2.2. Regional congresses=delegates of directing collectives.

---

1. Directing collective=committee + all district committees + special group.

The committee submits reports to district committees and dispatches, submits its "poll" to them.

The committee is almost wholly elected by members of district committees.

groups of local organisation
Some Menshevik compliments:
"gross breach of promise"
"foisting congress on the Party"
"unprecedented crime"
"betrayal of the Party's trust"
"high-handed trick"
"juggling"

"doing violence to the will of the organised proletariat (p. 13)

Menshevik terms

"*the whole Party*, i.e., the mass of its effective members, must be represented" p. 8

"how can tactical questions be decided without a preliminary discussion by the whole Party? Is it not flippant ... armed uprising ... even the writers have just started a discussion" (p. 10)

"we have heard" (pp. 10-11).

Written after May 15 (28), 1905
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REMARKS ON THE ARTICLE "ON A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT"[191]

1. Does it follow from Marx's "Address" to the Communists in March 1850[192] that Marx *regarded it as inconceivable* for Communists to take part in a provisional revolutionary government together with the bourgeoisie in the epoch of a democratic revolution?

2. Is it true that in this "Address" Marx *did not even raise the question* of Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government?

3. Is there any difference between: "regard participation as inconceivable" and "not to raise the question of participation"?

4. Is it true that in this "Address" Marx himself noted a strengthening of the petty-bourgeois democratic party and a weakening of the Communist workers' party in the recent period?

5. ...*

Written before May 21 (June 3), 1905

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Printed from the original

ESSAY ON THE PARTY SPLIT[193]

Economism and the old *Iskra* 1900-1903.	1) Economism and the old *Iskra*. (1901 Congress resolutions.)[194]
Second Party Congress. July 1903.	2) Second Congress. 51 = = 8 + 10 + 9 + 24.[195] (= = Economists and the old *Iskra*.)
Struggle for co-optation or "a state of siege" August-November 1903.	3) August 26, 1903-November 26, 1903.[196] (Never with Martynov![197] "Continuity." Letter of October 8, 1903[198]).

* Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

to 5.

Clanishness and the Party! peace with the Economists! Lenin's "heresies". November 1903-January 1904.

4) November 26, 1903-January 7, 1904. [Secret organisation.]

Efforts at reconciliation *old and new* "*Iskra*" ("gulf"). January-July 1904.

5) January 7, 1904-? July 9, 1904.

Russian committees and the *Iskra* Editorial Board. "22" and "19".[199] Struggle for congress. Denunciatory "document".

Struggle for congress. July 1904-May 1905.

6) July 1904-May 1905.

Majority Committees' Bureau = 3 conferences. *Vperyod*.

"Plan for Zemstvo campaign."

Third Party Congress. May 1905.

7) May 1905. Congress and conference.

After Third Congress. June 1905—

8) Après le III Congress.[200]

Written not earlier than May 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

THE LATEST NEWS REPORT

The *Potemkin* has appeared off Feodosia.[201] It has restocked its food supply and has sailed for an unknown destination, having seized a Russian merchant ship with a cargo of

cattle. It is reported that it has also obtained some coal from a British merchant ship. There is no question at all of surrender. The *Potemkin* has set itself the task of sparking off an uprising in all the coastal cities. Here is the text of a *manifesto* which the *Potemkin* is circulating (according to a report by a German newspaper from Bucharest).

"To all civilised citizens and to the working people! The crimes of the autocratic government have exhausted all patience. The whole of Russia, burning with indignation, exclaims: Down with the chains of bondage! The government wants to drown the country in blood, forgetting that the troops consist of sons of the oppressed people. The crew of the *Potemkin* has taken the first decisive step. We refuse to go on acting as the people's hangman. Our slogan is: freedom for the whole Russian people or death! We demand an end to the war and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage. That is the aim for which we shall fight to the end: victory or death! All free men, all workers will be on our side in the struggle for liberty and peace. Down with the autocracy! Long live the constituent assembly!"

Proletary No. 7
July 10 (June 27), 1905

Printed from the *Proletary* text verified with the original

NOTE BY THE COMMITTEE FOR PUBLICATION OF THE MINUTES OF THE R.S.D.L.P. THIRD CONGRESS TO THE TEXT OF THE MINUTES

Concerning the number of votes at the Congress, the Minutes Committee requests readers to bear the following in mind. At the Congress, there were 46 votes represented by 23 delegates, of whom one had one vote, one had three and the rest, two each. (With the arrival of Comrade Golubin, i.e., from the 18th sitting on, there were 24 delegates.) Almost all the voting at the Congress was counted according to the number of delegates, i.e., for the sake of simplicity, it was assumed that all the delegates had one vote each.

That is why the number of votes for and against adds up to 23 and not to 46. It goes without saying that this simplification of the count could not have any effect on the results, because both the number of votes for and the number of votes against were equally halved. There was not a single instance of a division of votes where a decision depended on a single comrade with three votes.

Written not later than July 1905

Published in 1905 in the book *Trety ocherednoi syezd R.S.D.R.P. Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Geneva

Printed from the original

DRAFT LEAFLET [202]

To All Citizens!

To the Russian People
and to All the Peoples of Russia

1. Full-scale war—bloodshed—fusillade of January 9—barricades in Riga—Caucasus, Poland—Odessa, etc., etc.—Peasant revolts.
2. Over what?

   Constituent assembly. *Freedoms* for the people.

   Trade

3. Government's response. Fraud of the Zemstvo people. The government issues the challenge. The Army and the Navy vacillate.
4. What is to be done? Revolutionary army and revolutionary government.
5. All class-conscious workers, all honest democrats, all peasants prepared for the struggle must rally together and organise in groups and detachments of the *revolutionary army*, obtaining arms, electing their commanders, and keeping themselves prepared to do everything to help the uprising.

6. Establishment of a revolutionary government should be stated as the aim. Consolidation of the uprising. Concentration of people's forces. *Organisation of freedom and struggle for freedom.*

7. The slogans and aims of the revolutionary government.

Five principal—central—foundation of people's form of government
- (1) Constituent assembly. [and elections]
- (2) Arming of the people.
- (3) Freedom.
- (4) Peasant committees.
- (5) Liberation of oppressed nationalities.
- (6) 8-hour working day.

8. Revolutionary army and revolutionary government. Workers, organise! Try to direct the crowd! Draw in the peasants!

Written in July 1905
First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

OUTLINE OF TACTICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOLSHEVIKS AND MENSHEVIKS OVER THE ATTITUDE TO THE BULYGIN DUMA

[1) Intensified agitation over the law on the Duma.] *

2) Support for the Left wing of bourgeois democracy proposing to boycott the Duma.
3) Intensified agitation against the Duma over the elections and during them.
4) The central slogans of agitation:
armed uprising
revolutionary army
provisional revolutionary government
(6 points).

[1) Idem] *

* The text in square brackets is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

2) None.
3) Intensified agitation not so much against the Duma as for the election of more resolute men.
4) Agitation slogans:
   constituent assembly
   people's agitation committees
   illegal representation
   revolutionary self-government.

Written between August 11 and 23 (August 24 and September 5), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

REMARKS ON THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS TO THE BULYGIN DUMA

1) To participate and elect only the supporters of the autocracy (*Moskovskiye Vedomosti*[203]).
2) *To participate and elect only liberals* (*Vestnik Yevropy*,[204] *Rus*,[205] *Osvobozhdeniye*, etc., etc.).
3) To participate and elect only determined supporters of democratic and free representation (*Iskra*).
4) *To participate and elect only those who have imperative mandates* (Kiev lawyers).
5) To participate and elect only with a revolutionary commitment (Cherevanin in *Iskra*).
6) Active boycott with a slogan for a popular representative constituent assembly (Bund).
7) Active boycott with slogans for an armed uprising, revolutionary army and revolutionary government (*Proletary*[206]).

{ *A part**: a popular representative constituent assembly to be elected independently through spontaneous generation. }

(*Iskra* and *partially* Bund.)[207]

Written after August 19 (September 1), 1905

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

* Apart.—*Ed.*

PLAN FOR AN ARTICLE "THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF SOCIALIST POLICY"[208]

The Principal Task of Socialist Policy

An independent *political party* of the proletariat with a clear-cut *socialist* programme.

First application in practice.

"C.D."[209] Its (objective) tasks. Cf. *Nasha Zhizn*,[210] September 18: win over the people, increase the people's confidence, etc., etc.

Cf. ibid. concerning the formation of the C.D. Party and the denial in *Birzheviye Vedomosti*.[211]

Is this confidence to be destroyed or maintained on certain "*conditions*"?

Vacillation by the new-*Iskra* men (Parvus, Cherevanin, Martov: "election of resolute men").

Unconditional struggle against the C.D.s. "Conciliators." Beginning of betrayal.

Objections: 1) "absenteeism". Slander. On the contrary, the most active agitation.*

2) support for revolutionary bourgeoisie. Ça dépend.** In parliament? Yes. If we are to choose between the conservatives and the C.D.s? Yes. But just now there is neither the one, nor the other, because there is *no parliamentarism as yet*. Struggle for it. Betrayal in struggle. A real*** support for the C.D.s at the present time means *revolutionary struggle* and uprising. In the street or in parliament? (Cf. Marx über Ledru Rollin. 1849.[212])

The use of legal and semi-legal means? Unquestionably, yes. Labour congress?—Yes. Meetings? Yes. But to make use of something which is close does not signify merger or diffusion. To make use of it, one must be independent, whole and united.

---

* These two phrases are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** Depending on the circumstances.—*Ed.*

*** Two possibilities: (1) The Duma merely grumbles. (2) The Duma struggles for a government of the *bourgeoisie*. (Tertium non datur. The Duma cannot struggle *consistently* for the revolution.) In the *first* and in the *second* case, an uprising is decisive. To (2)—a convenient pretext, nothing more. The danger of Petrunkevich & Co. in power.

The absurdity of the new-*Iskra* tactics: "agreement and support" plus "mock elections as a possible motive for an uprising". There can be 1,000 and 1 pretexts.

No. The tactic is now different: 1) Ruthless struggle against the C.D. conciliators. 2) Badgering them for having gone into the Duma. 3) Development of an independent Social-Democratic party in the struggle against the C.D.s and while agitating over the State Duma. 4) Preparation for an uprising which is coming and which—and not "parliamentarism"—is *n o w* the crux of the situation. 5) The use for this preparation, this agitation of all semi-legal and legal means. 6) Concentration on these slogans: armed uprising, revolutionary army, provisional revolutionary government.

Written after September 18 (October 1), 1905

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

NOTE[213]

Dialogue Between an *Osvobozhdeniye* Man and a Social-Democrat

Pp.	
1) impossibility of an uprising after the *Potemkin*.	—The impossible *becomes* (werden) possible.
2) reappraisal of the forces.	—"you are wretched,* and you are rich."[214]
3) K. Kautsky on a provisional revolutionary government.	—the uprising is connected with a provisional revolutionary government. Recognition of the uprising by the government = martial law.
4) unwisdom of the idea of boycott: failure to use the instruments.	—Once again learn from your enemies, if you don't believe your friends. The government's fear of a boycott.

* Total "wretchedness" from the standpoint of military technique, etc. But have a look at the movement and its spontaneous growth: January 9—Riga—Poland—1.5-million-strong strike—Odessa—Caucasus—Moscow. September 1905.

5) the uprising and "elderly" workers. Trade unionism. "A class party."
6) parliamentary rule: support neighbours, otherwise you will help *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*.

—"*non-combatants*." Indeed, it is correct to use them for trade unionism, but they will provide a *rearguard*.
—indeed, in parliament we shall support you against *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, when such is the choice, but that is not the point just now. The struggle is not in parliament, but over a parliament. You are not fighters.

Written in late September 1905

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

RUSSIA'S FINANCES

We have repeatedly pointed out that the autocratic government is more and more confused over its financial affairs (tricks would be an apter word, I think). It is increasingly obvious that a financial collapse is inevitable. Here is an interesting confirmation of this. The Berlin correspondent of the London *Economist*,[215] one of the most influential organs of the European financial barons, reported on October 11 as follows:

"A representative of the Mendelssohn Bank has been in St. Petersburg this week to take part in the negotiations between the Russian Government and French bankers for the much-heralded new Russian loan. According to apparently authentic statements given out here, the amount to be raised will be about £75,000,000 [about 700 million rubles], of which France is to take about half, while the rest is to be offered in Germany, Holland, England, and the United States. It is also stated that a large part of the issue is to be devoted to taking up the Treasury notes placed in France and Germany during the war.

That Russia should appeal to the money markets at just this juncture, when all the great centres are under unusual pressure, is taken as striking evidence of its financial straits. One version of the story, however, has it that only a small part of the sum above mentioned is to be offered for subscription now, while the rest will be raised later, presumably early next year. But this only increases the unfavourable

impression as to the urgency of Russia's needs. That there is no enthusiasm in Germany for a Russian loan just at this moment goes without saying. Not only the condition of the money market here, but, more than all, the continuance of political turmoil in Russia, and the visible weakening, not to say breakdown, of Governmental authority there, are facts that are being weighed in Germany in a manner that augurs ill for the forthcoming subscription."

Written after October 1 (14), 1905

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

INSERTIONS FOR V. KALININ'S ARTICLE "THE PEASANT CONGRESS"[216]

1

We see, consequently, that class-conscious socialists must unconditionally support the revolutionary struggle of all, even the prosperous, peasants against the officials and landowners, but class-conscious socialists must make the clear and straightforward statement that the "general redistribution"[217] the peasants want falls very far short of socialism. Socialism demands the abolition of the power of money, the power of capital, the abolition of all private ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the commodity economy. Socialism demands that the land and the factories should be handed over to the working people organising large-scale (instead of scattered small-scale) production under a general plan.

The peasant struggle for land and liberty is a great step towards socialism, but it is still a very far cry from socialism itself.

2

... The tactical resolution adopted by the Congress is truly astounding by its meagreness. We are inclined to think that there some of the peasant well-wishers (liberals) must have done some more "explaining" .

Here is the resolution:

"The activity of the Peasant Union, depending on local conditions, may be either open or secret (conspiratorial). All members of the

Union must spread their views and seek to realise their demands in every possible way, being undeterred by the resistance on the part of the Zemstvo chiefs, the police and other authorities. Among other things, they are insistently advised to make use of their right to draw up public decisions at village and volost meetings and private gatherings concerning improvements in state amenities and improvement of the people's welfare."

That kind of resolution is extremely unsatisfactory. Instead of a revolutionary call for an uprising, it merely gives liberal advice of a general sort. Instead of organising a revolutionary party, the resolution only organises an annex to the liberal party. The progress of the movement itself will inevitably and inescapably split up the liberal landowners and the revolutionary peasants, and we Social-Democrats will try to accelerate this split.

Proletary No. 25
November 16 (3), 1905

Printed from the *Proletary* text verified with the original

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE POWERS OF REPRESENTATION OF THE DISTRICT AND THE VYBORG ORGANISATIONS AT THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[218]

FEBRUARY 11 (24), 1906

1

Comrade Dan has no knowledge of parliamentary tactics. In all the countries of Western Europe a member of the bureau is not deprived of the right to motion proposals.

2

There are two proposals: a decision on the question of the 56 votes, and exclusion of the whole district organisation from the conference. I request a vote.

3

I request a vote on the following question: can a section of the St. Petersburg organisation here be deprived of representation?

4

I request my proposal to be put to the vote first: does the assembly agree to vote on Comrade Martov's proposal?

5

Comrade Nikolai motioned a proposal which he very correctly called radical[219]; when a motioned proposal supersedes all the others, it is voted on first.

First published in 1930 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 12

Printed from secretarial notes preserved in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.P.S.U. Central Committee

THE UNITY CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[220]

APRIL 10-25 (APRIL 23-MAY 8), 1906

1

SPEECHES AT THE SECOND SITTING OF THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE ROLL-CALL VOTE ON THE WRITTEN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS BUREAU[221]

1

I second Comrade Schmidt's proposal and invite all those wishing to support this proposal to give their signatures.

2

Comrade Larin's proposal is nothing but the grossest kind of mockery of the Congress minority by the majority....

I repeat: this is gross mockery of the rights of the minority at the Congress, it is an attempt to destroy the guarantees of the rights of the minority held out by the standing orders.

First published in 1907 in the book *Protokoly Obyedinitelnogo syezda R.S.D.R.P., sostoyavshegosya v Stokgolme v 1906 godu* (Proceedings of the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Stockholm in 1906), Moscow

Printer from the text of the book

2

SPEECH AT THE THIRD SITTING OF THE CONGRESS

Lenin objects to Dan's point[222] and speaks for the need to discuss the question of assessing the current situation and for putting the question of nationalities on the agenda.

First published in 1907 in the book *Protokoly Obyedinitelnogo syezda R.S.D.R.P., sostoyavshegosya v Stokgolme v 1906 godu*, Moscow

Printer from the text of the book

3

PROPOSAL ON FORMULATING POINT VIII OF THE DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE CONGRESS

To point VIII: "Attitude to the demand of a special constituent assembly for Poland", add the words: "in connection with the national question in the Party Programme".

First published in 1907 in the book *Protokoly Obyedinitelnogo syezda R.S.D.R.P., sostoyavshegosya v Stokgolme v 1906 godu*, Moscow

Printer from the text of the book

4

WRITTEN STATEMENT AT THE 15TH SITTING OF THE CONGRESS

The very first page of our resolutions says: "the class interests in a *bourgeois revolution*",[223] line 27 from the top.

First published in 1907 in the book *Protokoly Obyedinitelnogo syezda R.S.D.R.P., sostoyavshegosya v Stokgolme v 1906 godu*, Moscow

Printer from the text of the book

5

SPEECH AT THE 24TH SITTING OF THE CONGRESS[224]

I believe I shall express the will of the entire Congress in extending, on behalf of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, greetings to its new members and in expressing the wish that this unity should be the best earnest of our further successful struggle.

First published in 1907 in the book *Protokoly Obyedinitelnogo syezda R.S.D.R.P., sostoyavshegosya v Stokgolme v 1906 godu*, Moscow

Printer from the text of the book

AMONG THE NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Rech[225] is resentful over the fact that in view of the rumours of a semi-Cadet, semi-bureaucratic ministry, the Left-wing press has begun to talk of a horse-trading deal between the Cadets and the camarilla, of a betrayal which is inevitable in any such deals.

"Is it necessary to prove that these assertions are false and absurd?" writes the indignant *Rech*.

It appears, Messrs. Cadets, that it is, and even highly, necessary to do so, because in the same article ("Famine and Politics") we read:

> "This struggle (between the Duma and the present ministry), a slow and hard struggle, has resulted, however, in the question concerning a responsible cabinet being brought down from the sphere of abstract Considerations to the soil of concrete reality, and in it being discussed as one of the real possibilities."

That is very good. But what about the question of dissolving the State Council, the question of amnesty, the question of universal, etc., suffrage? Have all *these* questions likewise become "real possibilities" *already*? Surely, they have not, have they? After all, there is so far not even a rumour about them.

That being so, what is one to do? "It is necessary to prove."

Written on June 24 (July 7), 1906

Published on June 25, 1906 in the newspaper *Ekho* No. 4

Printed from the *Ekho* text

AMONG THE NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

On second thoughts, *Rech* finds that the general has asked much too much for his patronage of the Cadet ministry and it declares that the Cadets will not give up the principle of compulsory alienation of the land in favour of the peasants and total amnesty, whatever portfolios they may be offered. We think that the general, being the practical statesman that he is, will see no reason for spoiling the deal over a matter of principle. After all, under the Cadet plan not the whole of the land is subject to compulsory alienation, but only as much as has to be allocated to the peasants to enable them to pay the state taxes; furthermore, the owners of the alienated land are to be paid in cash "on a fair valuation" and these days money is ever so much easier to manage than land, which no longer brings in as much income as before, in view of the stubborn refusal of the peasants to cultivate it for others. As for the amnesty, the Cadets have already done their duty to the country by informing the supreme authorities of the people's unanimous desire to see prisoners and exiles at liberty, and, to refrain from encroaching on the inalienable prerogative of the crown in this business, have decided to kill the amnesty bill which the Trudovik group intends to table in the Duma.[226] What the devil does General Trepov still want? Let's have done with the bargaining, General, and hand over the reins to the new driver, "without any pangs,

without any fatal brooding, and without futile and empty doubts": after all, in case of failure the "extreme measures" will still be at your disposal....

Written on June 27 (July 10), 1906

Published on June 28, 1906 in the newspaper *Ekho* No. 6

Printed from the *Ekho* text

AMONG THE NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Following the unsuccessful affair of the Cadet-Octobrist-official ministry, the government has tried to scare the Cadets with the prospect of a dictatorship. Now the Cadets are trying to scare the government with the prospect of a revolution. *Rech* writes:

"The conflagration is spreading—such is the impression of the news coming by cable from every corner of Russia.... It is no longer the revolutionary intelligentsia or even the working class that is aflame; the peasantry, the troops are aflame too. That is, it is more correct to say that the whole of Russia is in flames.... At the slightest pretext, the peasants flock in their thousands to deal summarily with the authorities, the landowners, the estates and the manors."

On the subject of this "conflagration", Prof. Gredeskul hastens to show the depth of his understanding of the historical events:

"We are undoubtedly on the eve of crucial events. *Either the government will come to its senses within the next few days and hand the power over to a Duma ministry, or it will bring us to the greatest disasters*."

And so, it is either a revolution or a Cadet ministry. It is not surprising at all that a Cadet tries to use everything, the people's spontaneous revolutionary activity above all, to demonstrate the need for a Cadet ministry. However, he is labouring under a delusion: the antidote—a Cadet ministry—which the Cadet quacks are now prescribing for the revolution will not work against the poison of spontaneous revolutionary action by the mass, against its urge, to which *Rech* itself testifies, to realise its right to freedom of assembly (not the Cadet freedom of assembly, but full freedom) and to all the land.

You can go on trying hard, gentlemen, but the revolution has coped with the Witte-Durnovo system, and it will also cope with the Cadet antidotes.

* *
*

It is either a revolution or a Cadet ministry, says *Rech* and adds: we beg to inform you that we, for our part, are not afraid of the revolution, whereas you are going to get hurt. But those who know how to take a militant stand at a fighting moment are well aware of the worth of such talk. *Novoye Vremya*,[227] an organ of the pogromites and sergeant-majors, is also well aware that Messrs. Gredeskuls give a reminder of the revolution only because they fear it like the plague. That is why *Novoye Vremya*, we believe, gives a much better exposé of the psychology and political substance of the deal which is being prepared, when it says: "Messrs. Cadets, we both have the same fear of the revolution, but we have almost exhausted our resources in the struggle against it, and you still have a thing or two left, which is why you should get on with it and not drag things out for too long." That is just what they are saying. The Cadets say: we for our part can afford to wait. But the *Novoye Vremya* gentlemen urge: come, make haste, the revolution is pressing.

The latest issue of *Novoye Vremya* says as much:

> "...there will be an explosion the responsibility for which will fall not only on the present ministry, but also on the Cadet Party, which is guilty of the fact that being reluctant, for want of courage, to lose a part of its popularity among the extreme Left-wingers, it has led the Duma into a fatally drawn-out conflict and has committed a crime against the law of peaceful evolution, insisting on an immediate militant implementation of a political programme, a process which requires a very, very long time."

That's how things are: there is a bit of bargaining, a bit of scaring, and then a deal is done, for they have a common cause and a common aim.

Written on June 28 (July 11), 1906

Published on June 29, 1906 in the newspaper *Ekho* No. 7

Printed from the *Ekho* text

AMONG THE NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

The newspaper *Mysl*[228] carries an interesting "proscription list" of the Yaroslavl Administration. Dozens of persons (56 in the town of Yaroslavl and 17 in the town of Rybinsk) are marked off in it as "suspects", and a secret report requests the police department for "appropriate instructions". In this connection, *Mysl* says:

> "Let everyone pass judgement. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear. He that hath reason to understand, let him understand. The police department has now conceived a grandiose operation for the simultaneous radical and "final liquidation" of a number of organisations over the entire Russian land through a massive "seizure", unprecedented in scale, of persons suspected of adherence to the Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic parties, and the peasant and the railway unions. For that purpose, the department has demanded full lists of suspected persons from the local authorities. These "proscription lists", concentrated in one place, by now contain almost ten thousand names of persons over whom arrest hangs like the sword of Damocles."

And so, the government is hatching another plot. Military preparations against the people, "measures" to dissolve the Duma, and lists containing 10,000 names for arrest! As in October-December, the government has made a "dead set" at the revolution, utilising the relative freedom to lure out and destroy thousands of more fighters for freedom.

Let one and all, therefore, be at their post. The government is prepared—the revolutionary people must also be prepared.

Written on June 29 (July 12), 1906

Published on June 30, 1906 in the newspaper *Ekho* No. 8

Printed from the *Ekho* text

THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE)[229]

NOVEMBER 3-7 (16-20), 1906

1

REPORT ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR THE SECOND DUMA

NOVEMBER 4 (17)

Resolution of the St. Petersburg and Moscow Committees, Polish Social-Democrats and the Latvians[230]

1. We have had to accept a struggle on the Duma basis only through the fault of the treacherous bourgeoisie.

2. We must base the election campaign on opposition between revolutionary and "peaceful" struggle, showing the great danger of Cadet hegemony in the emancipation movement. Hence the question: is a bloc with the Cadets (agreement at the first stage) admissible?

3. At the first stage, Social-Democracy must, as a general rule, act independently; by way of exception—agreements at the first stage with the parties recognising the constituent assembly, armed uprising, etc.; at the second stage—agreements of a technical character, only for the proportional distribution of mandates. There is nothing more dangerous than to tell the masses: vote with us for the conciliators. Krushevan is dangerous not because he has a seat in the Duma, but because he is a particle of the Black-Hundred organisation supporting the government. For the sake of small separate exceptions you support Cadet hegemony, thereby upsetting the whole of our principled position (the Caucasus, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Poland refuse to have agreements). If the Black-Hundred men are returned, the Duma will simply be more violent. Why do you believe that it is not the Cadets but the Social-Democrats who are to blame for a return of the Black-Hundred men—in the event of a split in the vote?

First published in 1960 in Vol. 14 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the minutes

2

SUMMING-UP SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR THE SECOND DUMA

NOVEMBER 4 (17)

Agreement at elections is a bloc (you tell the masses: do ut des*). We say: we sometimes go along with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, but never with the opportunist and treacherous bourgeoisie. The election campaign will proceed between two extremes: 400 Cadets + 100 Social-Democrats (through agreement) and 200 Black-Hundred men + 250 Cadets + 20 or 50 Social-Democrats (without agreement). To put forward both an agent and a fighter is to hit out at one's own positions. The Black-Hundred men will be defeated through agreements, but then the Social-Democrats will also be defeated (morally).

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Printed from the minutes

3

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE MENSHEVIK ELECTORAL PLATFORM

NOVEMBER 6 (19)

I have merely said that the platform contrasts revolutionary and peaceful methods and nothing more, the rest being unsatisfactory. Nothing is said about how the Social-Democrats differ from other groups of "working people" (Socialist-Revolutionaries), as the Social-Democratic group in the Duma does in its declaration.[231] No distinction is made between scientific and vulgar socialism.

Nothing is said about the need to distinguish between the proletariat's stand and that of the petty proprietor. The platform does not come out for a bloc, but it is a bloc, because any petty bourgeois will subscribe to it. In a plat-

* Give and take.—*Ed.*

form we cannot remain silent about the other parties, and this one says nothing about them, apart from a vague indication: "more resolute", etc.

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Printed from the minutes

4

SPEECHES ON THE QUESTION OF CONVENING A "LABOUR CONGRESS"

NOVEMBER 7 (20)

1

Lenin insists that the question of a "labour congress" is a burning one and should be discussed.

2

Lenin points to the publication of letters by Plekhanov, Martov and others in the bourgeois press, and to the fact that Kostrov, for instance, failed to table in the Duma group the proposal on the demand for a Cadet ministry (which came from the C.C.), thereby committing a breach of Party discipline, and a good thing too. The agitation for a "labour congress" is used to put spokes in the wheels of our Party's activity. We have the C.C. organ, but no Central Organ, and why not? There is enough money, the C.C. organ is published regularly, but there is no organisation, and that is why there is no C.O.

First published in 1960 in Vol. 14 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the minutes

5

MINORITY OPINION ENTERED AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATES OF POLAND, THE LATVIAN TERRITORY, ST. PETERSBURG, MOSCOW, THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL REGION AND THE VOLGA AREA

The Bund delegates have tabled a resolution at the conference which almost entirely repeats the resolution of the Bund's Seventh Congress, and which gives a historical

assessment of the Duma boycott.[232] The undersigned delegates to the conference have abstained in the voting on this resolution for the following reasons. It is wrong and impossible to separate the question of *why* we go into the Duma[233] from the question of *how* we get there. Recognition that the boycott is correct means that the basic character of all our tactics remains absolutely the same under the present participation in the election as it was during the boycott of the First Duma. To recognise that the Cadet majority of the First Duma was a hindrance to the activity of the revolutionary elements, while endorsing agreements between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats at the first stage of the elections is to have our general premises beaten by our practical policies. To recognise and support Cadet hegemony in agitation before the masses by putting up common electoral rolls only to condemn this hegemony later in a special additional resolution, is to compromise in the strongest possible way all the tactics and all the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Those are the grounds on which we place before the entire R.S.D.L. Party the following minority opinion.

"The tactics of boycotting the State Duma, which helped the mass of the people to form a correct opinion of the impotence and lack of independence of that institution, found complete justification in the farcical legislative activities of the State Duma and in its dissolution.

"But the counter-revolutionary behaviour of the bourgeoisie and the compromising tactics of the Russian liberals prevented the immediate success of the boycott and compelled the proletariat to take up the struggle against the landlord and bourgeois counter-revolution also on the basis of the Duma campaign.

"The Social-Democrats must wage this struggle outside the Duma and in the Duma itself in order to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat, to further expose to the whole people the harmfulness of constitutional illusions, and to develop the revolution.

"In view of this state of affairs, and for the purposes mentioned above, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party must take a most energetic part in the present Duma campaign.

"The principal objects of the Social-Democratic election and Duma campaigns are: firstly, to explain to the people the uselessness of the Duma as a means of satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry. Secondly, to explain to the people the impossibility of achieving political liberty by parliamentary methods as long as the real power remains in the hands of the tsar's government, and to explain the necessity of an armed uprising, of a provisional revolutionary government and of a constituent assembly elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Thirdly, to criticise the First Duma and reveal the bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and especially to show how dangerous and fatal it would be for the cause of the revolution if the liberal-monarchist Cadet Party were to play the predominant and leading role in the liberation movement.

"As the class party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party must remain absolutely independent throughout the election and Duma campaigns, and here, too, must under no circumstances merge its slogans or tactics with those of any other opposition or revolutionary party.

"Therefore, at the first stage of the election campaign, i.e., before the masses, it must as a general rule come out absolutely independently and put forward only its own Party candidates.

"Exceptions to this rule are permissible only in cases of extreme necessity and only in relation to parties that fully accept the main slogans of our immediate political struggle, i.e., those which recognise the necessity of an armed uprising and are fighting for a democratic republic. Such agreements, however, may only extend to the nomination of a joint list of candidates, without in any way restricting the independence of the political agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats.

"*In the workers' curia the Social-Democratic Party must come out absolutely independently and refrain from entering into agreements with any other party.*

"At the higher stages of the election, i.e., at the assemblies of electors in the towns and of delegates and electors in the countryside, partial agreements may be entered into exclusively for the purpose of distributing seats proportionately

to the number of votes cast for the parties entering the agreement. In this connection, the Social-Democratic Party distinguishes the following main types of bourgeois parties according to the consistency and determination of their democratic views: (a) the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialist Party and similar republican parties*; (b) the Popular Socialists[235] and the Trudoviks of a similar type**; (c) the Cadets."

Proletary No. 8
November 23, 1906

Printed from the
Proletary text

LABOUR CONGRESS AND MERGER WITH THE S.R.s

(NOTE)

As our readers will know from No. 9 of *Proletary*,[236] the Menshevik Y. Larin has come out in his pamphlet in favour of a non-Party labour congress and for a merger of the Social-Democratic Party with the S.R.s, the P.P.S. and in general with all "socialist" parties. Larin himself says that the number of members in the S.R. Party is unknown. He adds that the Socialist-Revolutionaries estimate their membership at 50,000-60,000. Saying that this could be an exaggeration, Larin believes that the S.R.s must number at least 30,000.

We do not know where Larin got his figures of 50,000-60,000, for he mentions no source. We have never come across such data in any S.R. writings. The only fully published minutes of the First Congress of the S.R. Party (December 1905) *do not contain any* data on the S.R. Party's membership. The fact is that no such data could have been available, because elections to a party congress by all the members of the party, proportional to a definite number of party members, have never been held by any party in Russia except the Social-Democrats. The Social-Democratic Party alone proclaimed this principle in November 1905 in the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* on behalf of the Bolshe-

* Perhaps the Zionist socialists[234] also come under this category.

** Perhaps including certain Jewish democrats. We are not competent to judge of these matters without having the opinion of the Jewish Social-Democrats.

vik C.C.,[237] and the All-Russia Conference of the Bolshevik Organisations in December 1905[238] already consisted of representatives elected on the basis of one for 300 Party members. Representation on this principle was first applied to the whole Party at the Unity (Stockholm) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., with the controlling element in this case being the composition of the Organising Committee for convoking the Congress: it was made up of equal numbers of representatives from the two contending factions, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.

So, where Larin got his maximum of 50,000-60,000 remains an absolute mystery. However he used this figure (which is about one-third of the membership of the R.S.D.L.P.) to suggest to readers that in a merger of the two parties the Social-Democrats were fully assured of a preponderance over the S.R.s. Larin's mistake was already pointed out in a feuilleton in No. 9 of *Proletary*, which said that instead of "peace and positive work" such a merger would actually result in growing dissension, to say nothing of its being unacceptable for reasons of principle. Interesting confirmation of what we then said came from an article by Léon Remy in the French Socialist newspaper *L'Humanité*[239] on December 17, 1906. *Tribune Russe*,[240] the S.R. Party's *official* organ abroad, *quoted* Remy as saying that the "Council" of the S.R. Party "reckons the party to have about 150,000 organised members, and if the concept of membership is given a somewhat broader interpretation, such as that given to the Rules by some regional committees, the figure is 200,000".

To enable readers to judge for themselves how this curious figure was obtained, we cite *all* the district data given in Remy's article. North-west—21,000; Volga area—14,000 ("almost double the figure if all those accepting the party's programme are included"); Northern Caucasus—21,000; Transcaucasus—17,900; Centre—26,000 (including 5,000 in Moscow. It is odd that our Moscow comrades have been unable to discern these 5,000 even through a magnifying glass); North—20,000.

Here is a problem for the reader to solve: who has displayed more thoughtlessness—1) S.R.s, 2) Larin, or 3) Plekhanov and Axelrod?

The picture is hardly improved if in this matter of a merger with the S.R.s, the latter two disavow their ardent admirer Y. Larin. One need only give thought to drawing a line of distinction between the "all-Russia representatives" and the industrial workers and agricultural labourers, farm hands or journeymen and peasants, artisans or craftsmen and working men, etc.

Proletary No. 10
December 20, 1906

Printed from the
Proletary text

REPORT AT A CONFERENCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON ELECTORAL AGREEMENTS IN ELECTIONS FOR THE SECOND DUMA[241]

JANUARY 6 (19), 1907

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

The rapporteur notes the absence in St. Petersburg of any Black-Hundred danger tales of which are being spread about by the Cadets in order to induce the electorate to vote for them. The local Social-Democrats are faced with the question of how to release the masses of the population in the capital from the ideological hegemony of the Cadets. Considerable sections of the urban poor who are semi-proletarians keep wavering between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats. The Cadets have been trying to bribe them by promising seats in the Duma in order to reinforce their influence on them. That is why it would, perhaps, be advisable to enter an agreement with the revolutionary-democratic parties and groups so as to work together to undermine the influence of the Cadets. The rapporteur believes that it is up to the practical workers in the local organisation to decide on the actual need and possibility of an agreement and also on its forms.

Proletary No. 12
December 25, 1906

Printed from the
Proletary text

ARE THE MENSHEVIKS ENTITLED TO CONDUCT A POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE CADETS?

What determines Social-Democratic policy?

Essentially the class interests of the proletariat. Formally, the decisions of Party congresses.

Which are these decisions? First, the decisions of the Unity (Stockholm) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Second, the decisions of the November All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., approved by the C.C.

What does the resolution of the Stockholm Congress *instruct* us to do about the Duma?

...(point 1, a) "strive to *extend and sharpen* these conflicts (meaning the conflicts both between the government and the Duma, *and inside the Duma itself*) to limits making it possible to use them as starting-points for broad mass movements aimed at..." *etc*.

Have the Mensheviks abided by this direction of the Congress? In the matter of the presidium have they extended and sharpened the conflict between the Duma Left wing and the Cadets?

No, the Mensheviks have been committing a breach of the Congress's decision.

Furthermore, in the same resolution the Congress directed: "...that this intervention should be conducted in such a way as to make these sharpening clashes: (a) *reveal to the mass* the inconsistency of all the bourgeois parties which undertake to act as spokesmen for the people's will in the Duma, and (b) bring the *broad mass* (*the proletariat*, *the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie*) to an awareness that the Duma is *totally* useless", *etc*.

Consequently, the Mensheviks could, without risking anything at all, or abandoning absolutely legal ground—the Mensheviks were duty-bound to show the *mass*, i.e., *openly in the Duma*, that the *Cadet* presidium is a presidium of a party which has turned its back on the revolution.

What was the instruction to the Party contained in the resolution of the November All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which was approved by the Central Committee and adopted by the 18 Menshevik delegates?

"In its election campaign, the R.S.D.L.P., acting as an independent class party of the proletariat, sets itself the *aim*... 2) to explain to the masses that *all* hopes for a *peaceful* outcome of the struggle for power are *illusory*.

"...4) to stimulate the political *activity of the masses* and, organising *the forces of the revolution* outside *and inside* the Duma, to create conditions for transforming the latter into a strongpoint of the revolution...."

Starting from November 1906, the Mensheviks have moved so far over to the right that they at once broke their own resolution. Their first step tends to *disorganise* the "forces of the revolution" inside the Duma, *fortifying* the masses in the hope of a peaceful outcome, for a Cadet presidium elected by the entire Duma, without a protest from the Left, would be an official nation-wide *confirmation* by the Social-Democrats of the very hopes which they recognise as being "illusory".

The Cadets have openly and totally turned away from the revolution. The "forces of the revolution" are the Left, the Trudoviks, the S.R.s (the revolutionary bourgeoisie) and the Social-Democrats. To help organise, instead of disorganising, the "forces of the revolution" we are *duty-bound* to tell the masses: the Social-Democrats support a Left-wing, Trudovik presidium against the Cadets. In the event a Trudovik presidium were elected and failed to live up to democratic hopes, we should then use this to expose the democratic petty bourgeoisie before the mass, thereby strengthening the conviction that the proletariat is the only consistently democratic class.

What did the C.C. tell the Party and the people when starting the election campaign? We find that the official *electoral platform* of the R.S.D.L.P. says:

"...Citizens, the only men to elect to the Duma should be those who *not only* want Russia to be free, but strive *to help the people's revolution* to win this freedom.... The First Duma failed to do this. Its majority, led by the 'people's freedom' party, had hoped to secure freedom and and *through peaceful negotiations* with the government.... That is why it is not meek petitioners that should be elected to the Duma.... Citizens, elect revolutionary fighters who

will join you in carrying forward the great cause started in January, October and December of last year."

What fine, grand words, fitting for the proletariat! What a pity that for the Mensheviks they have turned out to be *empty* words.

In their *party* electoral platform they *condemned* the Cadet majority in the First Duma and its Cadet policies, but are now helping *artificially* to restore Cadet hegemony in the Left-wing Duma.

Novy Luch No. 3,
February 22, 1907

Printed from the
Novy Luch text

REPLY TO L. MARTOV[242]

That same issue of *Russkaya Zhizn*[243] carries Comrade L. Martov's feuilleton in which he returns to our editorial in No. 2* and, ignoring the explanation given by the group's committee on this matter, administers justice and metes out punishment.

What does Comrade Martov wish to achieve by this strange step? If he wants to challenge us to fight in this plane—in the plane of personal attacks and suspicions—he is making a big mistake. We are not going to follow him. We have a great deal too many *essential* differences over which we shall have to conduct a *principled* struggle in the group, in the press and in the Party, to allow ourselves to be pushed into the dirt road of petty scores and squabbles. Good luck, comrade, you can travel that road alone; we are not coming. We are glad to let you have the honour of putting in the last word which is, in fact, the very limit.

Novy Luch No. 7,
February 27, 1907

Printed from the
Novy Luch text

* See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 156-60.—*Ed.*

THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[244]

APRIL 30-MAY 9 (MAY 13-JUNE 1), 1907

1

SPEECH AGAINST THE PROPOSAL TO CLOSE THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE CONGRESS AGENDA[245]

MAY 1 (14)

I object most strongly against the closure of the debate. You cannot decide questions of principle mechanically by a simple vote.

First published in 1909 in the book *Londonsky syezd R.S.D.R.P.* (*sostoyavshiisya v 1907 godu*). *Polny tekst protokolov* (London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., 1907. Full Text of the Proceedings), Central Committee publication, Paris

Printed from the text of the book

2

SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF THE NAME-TICKET VOTE METHOD[246]

MAY 2 (15)

Together with the representative of the Latvian delegation, we insist on the preservation of the name-ticket voting procedure used until today. It is the most democratic, saves time and ensures clarity. There can be no question at all of rigging. Those who propose a roll-call vote merely wish to drag things out, thereby making name-ticket voting impossible.

First published in 1909 in the book *Londonsky syezd R.S.D.R.P.* (*sostoyavshiisya v 1907 godu*). *Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Paris

Printed from the text of the book

3

SPEECHES FROM THE CHAIR OF THE SIXTH SITTING OF THE CONGRESS

MAY 3 (16)

1

I propose a vote of thanks to the representatives of the British Social-Democratic Federation for their help in arranging the Congress. (*Applause.*)

2

I propose that we discuss the order of the items: C.C. report, report by the Duma group, and attitude to bourgeois parties and the Duma.

A unanimous decision has been taken by the representatives of all groups to arrange the other items in the following order:

5) labour congress, 6) trade unions and the Party, 7) unorganised action, 8) unemployment, the crisis and the lock-outs, 9) organisational questions, 10) Stuttgart Congress, 11) work in the army, 12) miscellanea.

First published in 1909 in the book *Londonsky syezd R.S.D.R.P.* (*sostoyavshiisya v 1907 godu*). *Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Paris

Printed from the text of the book

4

OBJECTION TO LIEBER'S AMENDMENT TO THE BOLSHEVIK RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE CONGRESS ON THE ATTITUDE TO BOURGEOIS PARTIES[247]

MAY 15 (28)

Lieber is wrong. This shows up the worth of Lieber's amendments. His is a schoolboy statement, and it is characteristic of his lack of principle.

First published in 1909 in the book *Londonsky syezd R.S.D.R.P.* (*sostoyavshiisya v 1907 godu*). *Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Paris

Printed from the text of the book

5

SPEECH ON DESIGNATING THE CONGRESS[248]

MAY 19 (JUNE 1)

I am surprised that the Mensheviks are afraid to call this the Fifth Congress. Do they think that our history is any sort of secret?

First published in 1909 in the book *Londonsky syezd R.S.D.R.P.* (*sostoyavshiisya v 1907 godu*). *Polny tekst protokolov*, Central Committee publication, Paris

Printed from the text of the book

ON THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT AT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION[249]

Considering:

1) that because of the drawn-out economic crisis through which Russia is now going, and in connection with the extreme intensification of government reaction, there is a marked sharpening of class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and also a deepening and extension of the peasants' struggle against the old system;

2) that this last year of the revolution has been marked by a rapid growth of the political awareness of all classes, a strengthening of the wing parties, a decline of constitutional illusions, a weakening of the "centre", i.e., the liberal parties, striving to stop the revolution by means of concessions acceptable to the Black-Hundred landowners and the autocracy;

3) that the class interests of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution demand the creation of conditions which would open up the possibility for the broadest struggle against the propertied classes, for socialism;

4) that the only way to create these conditions is to win a democratic republic, full popular power and the minimum of social and economic demands necessary for the proletariat (8-hour working day and other demands of the Social-Democratic minimum programme);

5) that the proletariat alone is capable of carrying the democratic revolution to the end, provided that, as the only consistently revolutionary class in contemporary society, it leads the mass of peasants in a relentless struggle against the landowners' estates and the serf-owning state,

the Congress recognises:

a) that the main task of the proletariat at the current historical moment is to carry the democratic revolution in Russia forward to the end;

b) that any minimisation of this task inevitably results in the working class being transformed from the leader of the people's revolution carrying with it the mass of the democratic peasantry, into a passive participant in the revolution tailing behind the liberal bourgeoisie;

c) that while supporting the implementation of this task with all its strength, the Social-Democratic Party should never lose sight of the proletariat's independent, socialist aims.

Written between May 21 and 25 (June 3 and 7), 1907

Published on July 7, 1907 in the newspaper *Zihņa* No. 78

Printed from the newspaper text
Translated from the Latvian

NOTES TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE STUTTGART CONGRESS ON "MILITARISM AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS"[250]

Accordingly, the Congress considers it to be the duty of the working class and especially of its representatives in the parliaments, in view of the class character of bourgeois society, to use every means to struggle against and to deny appropriations for the aggressive policy of states, *and to act in such a way as to educate working-class youth in the spirit of socialism and an awareness of the brotherhood of nations.**)

. . .

*) The Russian amendment also had this provision: "in such a way that the ruling classes would not dare to use it (youth) as an instrument to consolidate their class domination against the lighting proletariat". These words were deleted by the commission not because anyone disagreed

with them in principle, but because they were regarded by the Germans as being illegal and capable of providing a pretext for the dissolution of German Social-Democratic organisations. This abridgement did not alter the essential meaning of the corresponding passage of the resolution.

. . .

In the event of a danger of war, the working class and its parliamentary representatives in the countries concerned must, relying on the support of the International Bureau, do everything they can to prevent a declaration of war, by every *means* which they consider reasonable, *and the choice of which depends on the degree of aggravation of the class struggle and the general political situation.**)

. . .

*) The Russian amendment said that these means (to prevent war) are changed and *intensified* (sich ändern und *steigern*) depending on the aggravation of the class struggle, etc. The commission deleted "intensified", leaving only "changed".

Written in the second half of August 1907

Published in early September 1907 in the first collection of *Golos Zhizni*, St. Petersburg

Printed from the text of the collection

NOTES TO CLARA ZETKIN'S ARTICLE "INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTTGART"[251]

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTTGART*)

*) This article is a translation of an editorial in the German Social-Democratic fortnightly *Die Gleichheit* (Equality),[252] which is edited by Clara Zetkin and is the organ of the women's labour movement in Germany. The assessment of the Stuttgart Congress is here given with remarkable correctness and talent: clear, concise and bold propositions sum up the tremendous ideological context of the Congress debates and resolutions. For our part, we add several notes to this article to indicate to the Russian reader some facts coming from the West-European socialist press, facts largely distorted by our Cadet and semi-Cadet news-

papers (like *Tovarishch*[253]), which have told many lies about the Stuttgart Congress.

. . .

The question of relations between the Social-Democrats and the trade unions went best to show the unanimity of class-conscious proletarians of all countries. No one any longer objected in principle against the basic historical tendency of the proletarian class struggle—to connect as closely as possible the political and the economic struggle, and also organisations in both, into a single force of the socialist working class. Only the representative of the Russian Social-Democrats, Plekhanov, and the majority of the French delegation fell back on rather unsatisfactory arguments*) in an effort to justify some restrictions on this principle by referring to the special conditions prevailing in their countries.

. . .

*) The Russian Social-Democratic delegation in Stuttgart had a preliminary discussion of the questions in substance with a view to appointing its representatives to the commission. In the commission on relations between the trade unions and the socialist parties, Plekhanov did not represent all the Russian Social-Democrats, but only the Mensheviks. Plekhanov went into the commission to stand up for the principle of "*neutrality*". The Bolsheviks sent Voinov to the commission and he stood up for the *Party's view*, i.e., the decision in the spirit of the London Congress against neutrality, and for the closest contacts between the trade unions and the Party. Consequently, Clara Zetkin regarded as "unsatisfactory" the arguments *not* of the R.S.D.L.P. representative, but of the representative of the Menshevik opposition in the R.S.D.L.P.

. . .

And here, ultimately, the revolutionary energy and indomitable faith of the working class in its own fighting capacity won out, on the one hand, over the pessimistic credo of its own impotence and hidebound stand for the old and exclusively parliamentary methods of struggle, and on the other, oversimplified anti-militarist sport of the French semi-anarchists à la Hervé.*)

. . .

*) The author of the article, while contrasting the two deviations from socialism rejected by the Congress: Hervé's semi-anarchism, and opportunism, included in the "exclusively parliamentary" forms of struggle, fails to name any spokesmen of this opportunism. In the commission of the

Stuttgart Congress, on the question of militarism, the same antithesis was made by Vandervelde when he objected to the opportunist speech of Vollmar. Vollmar hints at Hervé's expulsion, said Vandervelde, but I protest against this and warn Vollmar, because the expulsion of the extreme Left-wingers would suggest the idea of expelling the extreme Right-wingers (Vollmar is one of the most "Rightist" German opportunists).

. . .

Finally, on the question of women's suffrage as well, the sharply principled class standpoint, which regards women's suffrage as nothing but an organic part of the proletariat's class right and class cause, won out over the opportunist bourgeois view which hopes to wheedle out of the ruling classes a mutilated and curtailed suffrage for women.*)

. . .

*) At the Congress in Stuttgart, this bourgeois standpoint was backed only by an Englishwoman from the Fabian Society (a quasi-socialist organisation of British intellectuals taking an extremely opportunist stand).

. . .

At the same time, the Congress—confirming the resolution of the International Women's Conference on this point—stated unequivocally that in their struggle for suffrage the socialist parties must put forward and uphold the principled demand for women's suffrage, regardless of any "considerations of convenience".*)

. . .

*) A hint at the Austrian Social-Democrats. Both at the International Socialist Women's Conference and in the Congress committee dealing with the women's question, there was a polemic between the German and the Austrian Social-Democratic women. Clara Zetkin had earlier reproached the Austrian Social-Democrats in the press for pushing into the background the demand for *women*'s suffrage in their agitation for electoral rights. The Austrians put up a very lame defence, and Victor Adler's amendment, which very cautiously conducted "Austrian opportunism" in this question, was rejected in the commission by 12 votes to 9.

Written in September and early October 1907

Published in October 1907 in the collection *Zarnitsy*, issue I, St. Petersburg

Printed from the text of the collection

ANTI-MILITARIST PROPAGANDA AND YOUNG SOCIALIST WORKERS' LEAGUES

It will be recalled that the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart discussed the question of militarism and in connection with it the question of anti-militarist propaganda. The resolution adopted on the point says, in part, that the Congress regards it as a duty of the working classes to "help to have working class youth brought up in a spirit of international brotherhood and socialism and imbued with class consciousness". The Congress regards this as an earnest of the army ceasing to be a blind instrument in the hands of the ruling classes, which they use as they see fit and which they can direct against the people at any time.

It is very hard, sometimes almost impossible, to conduct propaganda among soldiers on active service. Life in the barracks, strict supervision and rare leave make contact with the outer world extremely difficult; military discipline and the absurd spit and polish cow the soldier. Army commanders do everything they can to knock the "nonsense" out of the "brutes", to purge them of every unconventional thought and every human emotion and to instil in them a sense of blind obedience and an unthinking wild hatred for "internal" and "external" enemies.... It is much harder to make an approach to the lone, ignorant and cowed soldier who is isolated from his fellow-men and whose head has been stuffed with the wildest views on every possible subject, than to draft-age young men living with their families and friends and closely bound up with them by common interest. Everywhere anti-militarist propaganda among young workers has yielded excellent results. That is of tremendous importance. The worker who goes into the army a class-conscious Social-Democrat is a poor support for the powers that be.

There are young socialist workers' leagues in all European countries. In some, for instance, Belgium, Austria and Sweden, these leagues are large-scale organisations carrying on responsible party work. Of course, the main aim of the youth leagues is self-education and the working out of

a distinct and integrated socialist outlook. But the youth leagues also carry on practical work. They struggle for an improvement in the condition of apprentices and try to protect them from unlimited exploitation by their employers. The young socialist workers' leagues devote even more time and attention to anti-militarist propaganda.

For that purpose, they try to establish close ties with young soldiers. This is done in the following way. Before the young worker has joined the army, he is a member of a league and pays membership dues. When he becomes a soldier, the league continues to maintain constant contacts with him, regularly sending him small cash aids ("soldier's sous" as they call them in France), which, however small, are of substantial importance to the soldier. For his part, he undertakes to provide the league with regular information about everything that goes on in his barracks and to write about his impressions. Thus, even after he joins the army, the soldier does not break off his ties with the organisation of which he was a member.

An effort is always made to drive the soldier as far away from home as possible for his service. This is done with the intention of preventing the soldier from being tied with the local population by any interest, and to make him feel alien to it. It is then easier to make him carry out orders: to shoot at a crowd. Young workers' leagues try to bridge this alienation between the soldier and the local population. Youth leagues are connected with each other. When he arrives in a new town, the soldier, a former member of a youth league at home, is met by the local league as a welcome visitor, and he is at once brought into the circle of local interests and helped in every possible way. He ceases to be a new-comer and a stranger. He is also aware that if any misfortune befalls him he will receive help and support. This awareness adds to his courage, he gains assurance in his behaviour in the barracks, and is bolder in standing up for his rights and his human dignity.

Their close ties with young soldiers enable the youth leagues to carry on extensive anti-militarist propaganda among the soldiers. This is done mainly with the aid of anti-militarist literature, which the youth leagues publish and circulate in great quantities, especially in France,

Belgium and also in Switzerland, Sweden, etc. This literature is highly diverse: postcards with anti-militarist pictures, anti-militarist army songs (many of these songs are very popular among the soldiers), "soldier's catechism" (in France it was circulated in more than 100,000 copies), all sorts of pamphlets, leaflets, appeals; weekly, fortnightly and monthly newspapers and magazines for soldiers, some of them illustrated. *Barracks*, *Recruit*, *Young Soldier*, *Pju pju* (a pet name for the young recruit), and *Forward* are very widely circulated. For example, in Belgium the newspapers *Recruit* and *Barracks* have a printing of 60,000 copies each. Especially many magazines are published at the time of the draft. Special issues of soldiers' newspapers are mailed to the homes of all recruits. Anti-militarist literature is delivered to soldiers in the barracks and handed out to them in the streets; soldiers find it in coffee-houses and pubs, and everywhere else they go.

Recruits receive special attention. They are given a ceremonial send-off. During the recruitment, processions are staged in the towns. In Austria, for instance, recruits walk through the town dressed in mourning and to the strains of funeral marches. In front of them rolls a decorated red carriage. All the walls are plastered with red posters which say in large letters: "You will not shoot at the people!" Evening parties with ardent anti-militarist speeches are held in honour of the recruits. In short, everything is done to awaken the recruit's consciousness, to ensure him against the evil influence of the ideas and emotions which will be instilled into him in the barracks by fair means and foul.

The work of the socialist youth is not in vain. In Belgium, there are almost 15 soldiers' unions in the army, which are mostly affiliated with the Social-Democratic Labour Party and are closely allied with each other. In some regiments, two-thirds of the soldiers are organised. In France, the anti-militarist mood has become massive. During the strikes at Dünkirchen, Creusot, Loguivi, Monso-le-Min the soldiers ordered against the strikers declared their solidarity with the workers....

As time goes on, there are more and more Social-Democrats in the army and the troops become increasingly less reliable. When the bourgeoisie has to confront the organ-

ised working class, whom will the army back? The young socialist workers are working with all the enthusiasm and energy of the young to have the army side with the people.

Vperyod No. 16,
October 8, 1907

Printed from the
Vperyod text

HOW THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES WRITE HISTORY

In No. 5 of *Znamya Truda*,[254] the Central Organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, we find an editorial on the Stuttgart Congress, which is written in a torrent of words and immoderate boasting, the habitual style of the S.R.s. There is a reprint of the telegram in which the C.C. of the S.R. Party informed Europe that "the revolutionary struggle commands it to remain at its post". The selfsame C.C. voices its complete satisfaction over the "usual energy" displayed by the Socialist-Revolutionary representative in the Bureau.[255] "By its resolution, the Socialist International endorsed the view of the trade union movement which we have always supported," *Znamya Truda* assures us. Despite the dogmatist Kautsky, the Congress "turned out to be on our side" on the question of a legislative introduction of a minimum wage. Within three years, "we Russian socialists have grown into a great mass party, a fact the International has openly and respectfully (!!!) recognised".

In short, thirty thousand couriers were dispatched from Europe to pay their respects to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Meanwhile, the malignant Social-Democrats carried on with their "petty intrigues" in the Russian section, namely, they fought against the equality of votes for the S.D.s and the S.R.s which the Socialist-Revolutionaries demanded. The Social-Democrats demanded 11 votes for themselves, 6 for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and 3 for the trade unions. The Bureau resolved: 10 for the S.D.s, 7 for the S.R.s and 3 or the trade unions. "Adler and Bebel, who voted against our demand, declared that they had no wish at all to mini-

mise the importance of the S.R. Party, which they recognised as an important factor of Russian socialism and the revolution. But they wanted to be fair and to state the approximate balance of forces" (*Znamya Truda*).

Our Khlestakovs[256] are imprudent, oh so imprudent! There was not and *could not have been* any question in the Bureau either of the significance of the S.R.s, or of the "important factor". Once a party has been admitted to the Congress and the Bureau, the Bureau and its members will not bother to assess its significance and importance. The only thing the Bureau can assess is the *strength* of the parties for apportioning the votes. Bebel and Adler agreed with the arguments of our Social-Democratic representative in the Bureau that the S.D.s and the S.R.s are *not equal* in strength. Having agreed with these arguments, they naturally noted that they were not passing judgement either on principles or trends, that they were not deciding on the dispute between the S.D. and the S.R. programmes, but were merely weighing their strength for apportioning the votes. It is entirely in the Khlestakov spirit to interpret this self-evident reservation to mean recognition of the Socialist-Revolutionaries as "an important factor".

The S.R.s are being doubly imprudent when, in reporting from memory and distorting the meaning of Bebel and Adler's reservation, they say nothing at all about the *arguments on the substance of the case*. They give us Bebel's reservations with embellishments, but are silent on the substance of our dispute. Why is that so?

In substance, our representatives in the Bureau had the following argument. The Social-Democrat referred to the number of deputies in the Second Duma as the most precise criterion of party strength, adding that the electoral law favoured the peasants over the workers. The S.R. replied that apart from the S.R. group there were some near-S.R.s in the Duma—the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists. A portion of them, he implied, should be added to the S.R.s! Besides, the Popular Socialists have some "first-class writers" ("écrivains de premier ordre", said Rubanovich). Those were the Socialist-Revolutionary's very words.

To this the S.D. representative replied: indeed, the Popular Socialists do have some "first-class writers" as do the

French Radical-Socialists and the Radicals,[257] say, a man like Clemenceau (also a "first-class writer"). But is it proper for an independent party to refer to *another* party as evidence of its own strength? Is it proper, when the "first-class writers" among the Popular Socialists have not the slightest intention of requesting admission to the Congress?

Is it proper, let us add, to present oneself as an ultra-revolutionary in Russia and to drag along the Popular Socialists for help in Europe?

Proletary No. 17,
October 20, 1907

Printed from the
Proletary text

THE THIRD DUMA AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

The Third Duma,[258] convened on the basis of the electoral law which was promulgated by the tsar after the dissolution of the Second Duma on June 3, 1907, opened on November 1, 1907. The old electoral law, issued on December 11, 1905,[259] was a far cry from universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, and distorted the will of the people, turning the Duma into an ugly expression of that will—especially after the "interpretation" of the law given in the Second Duma by the Senate, consisting of old civil servants and justices entirely subservient to the tsarist autocracy. On June 3, the tsar deprived the workers, peasants and urban poor of the trifling electoral rights they had enjoyed. In this way, the autocracy committed another heinous crime against the people by forging popular representation and handing the Duma over to the landowners and capitalists, the mainstay of the tsarist autocracy and the age-old oppressors of the people. That they would dominate the Duma could have been predicted. That is exactly what happened.

At present, returns are in on the election of 439 members of the Duma. The eight non-party members aside, the other 431 belong to *four* main groups: 1) the largest—the *Right-wingers*, Black-Hundred deputies, numbering 187; 2) then the *Octobrists*[260] and parties close to them, numbering 119;

3) the Cadets and like-minded men, 93; 4) the Left-wingers, 32 (of them, 16 to 18 Social-Democrats).

Everyone knows who the Black-Hundred men are. It is true that among their adherents there is a section of ignorant, unclass-conscious workers, peasants and urban poor, but their governing core consists of feudal-minded landowners, for whom the preservation of the autocracy is the only salvation, because it alone can help them to plunder the public till, receiving grants, loans, good salaries and handouts of every sort; the autocracy with its police and army alone gives them the possibility of keeping in bondage the peasantry, which suffers from lack of land and is fettered with labour services and irredeemable debts and arrears.

The Octobrists also include landowners, mainly those who engage in large-scale sales of grain from their estates and require the patronage of the autocracy to secure lower customs tariffs on their grain abroad, to keep down the costs of transporting the grain abroad by Russian railroad and to secure the best possible prices from the treasury when it purchases the alcohol, which many landowners produce from potatoes and grain at their distilleries, for the vodka monopoly. But apart from these predatory and greedy landowners, many of the Octobrists are equally predatory and greedy capitalist manufacturers, factory-owners and bankers. They, too, are in need of the government's patronage to secure high tariffs on foreign goods, so that Russian goods could be sold at three times their price, to secure fat contracts from the treasury for the capitalist factories, etc. They want the police and the army to turn the workers into the same sort of slaves that the peasants are under the feudal-minded landowners.

Naturally, the Octobrists are very close to the Black-Hundred men. Should the Duma examine government revenue and expenditure—they will put their heads together to see that the full burden of the taxes falls on the peasants, the workers and the urban poor, while the revenues go into the pockets of the capitalists, the landowners and senior civil servants. Should the question arise of allocating land to the peasants or improving the condition of the workers—the Black-Hundred men and the Octobrists will pull together to sell, at a threefold price, only those lands which they

do not need, stripping the peasants, impoverished as they are, of everything they have; they will try very hard to fetter the hands and feet of the workers, who are already hard pressed by the burden of capitalist exploitation. And, of course, both the Black-Hundred men and the Octobrists will strain very hard to have the largest possible police and army to provide protection for their "precious" life and their "sacrosanct" property: after all, they fear the revolution like the plague, they are terrified by the prospect of a mighty drive by the workers and peasants rising to the great struggle for liberty and land. *Together the Octobrists and the Black-Hundred men will constitute a vast majority in the Third Duma: 306 out of 439 members*. This majority can do just what it wants. It is against the revolution, or, as the more common saying is, it is counter-revolutionary.

But there may be questions on which the Octobrists will differ with the majority of the Black Hundreds. The latter's effrontery knows no bounds. They are sure that the police truncheon, the whip, the machine-gun and the bayonet alone will put down any revolution, any popular urge for light and freedom. They would like to rely on the autocracy and do as they wish with the public revenue, using it for their own benefit, taking over all the lucrative posts and treating the country as their own estate. The Octobrists remember that up to now the landowners and the civil servants have run things in a way that gave them everything and left hardly enough for the capitalists. Two plunderers—a Black-Hundred man and an Octobrist—quarrel over a succulent titbit, over who is to get more. The Octobrists refuse to let the Black Hundreds have everything or even the greater share: just recently, the Japanese war gave them an object lesson, making them realise that the Black Hundreds bungled things in such a way that they inflicted losses even on themselves, to say nothing of the capitalists and the merchants. That is why the Octobrists want to take over some of the power in the state and wish to frame the constitution for their own benefit and, naturally, not for the benefit of the people. In so doing the Octobrists want to deceive the people by diverse laws which have the appearance of introducing reforms and improving things for the state and the people, but actually serve the

interests of the rich. Like the Black Hundreds, they are of course prepared to rely on the machine-gun, the bayonet and the whip against the revolution, but to be on the safe side they want to seal the eyes of the masses with the aid of fraudulent reforms.

To do all this, the Octobrists need allies other than the Black Hundreds. It is true that in these matters as well they hope to detach a section of the Right wing from the ultra-Black Hundreds of the Union of the Russian People,[261] but that is not enough. That is why they have to seek for other allies who are also hostile to the revolution, but who are enemies of the Black Hundreds, favour fraudulent or petty reforms, and support the constitution in the interests of the big and possibly a section of the middle bourgeoisie.

It is easy for the Octobrists to find such allies in the Duma: they are the Cadets, a party of that section of the landowners, the big and middle bourgeoisie which has quite adapted itself to conducting a really good capitalist economy, like that in the West-European countries, and based likewise on the exploitation and oppression of the workers, the peasants and the urban poor, but an exploitation which is clever, subtle and artful, an exploitation you do not see right through all at once. There are many landowners in the Cadet Party engaged in real capitalist operations, and similar factory-owners and bankers, many lawyers, professors and doctors with good incomes, derived from the rich. It is true that in their programme the Cadets promised the people a great many things: there was universal suffrage and all the freedoms, an 8-hour working day, and land for the peasants. But all that was said merely to attract the masses of people, for they never actually made any straightforward proposal for universal suffrage even in the first two Dumas; their bills on the freedoms were in fact aimed at giving the people as little freedom as possible; in the Second Duma they proposed a 10-hour day instead of the 8-hour day, and they were prepared to let the peasants have land which was of no use to the capitalist economy, and which carried redemption payments, and let them have so little of it that even if the peasants got it, they would still have to work for a wage on the neigh-

bouring landowners' estates. That was a clever trick to which the workers did not rise at all, very few peasants did and only some of the urban poor actually took the Cadets at their word. Today, after the dissolution of the two Dumas, the Cadets have grown very quiet and are making up to the Octobrists: they declared that they regard the revolutionaries and especially the Social-Democrats as their enemies, and, believing the Octobrists to be constitutional-minded, voted for an Octobrist to fill the post of Duma Chairman. The deal is ready. It is true that Minister Stolypin does not apparently want a permanent deal and wants to keep the Cadets in submission, thereby exerting an influence on the Octobrists, but *in practice there will still be constituted another majority in the Duma—the Octobrists and the Cadets*. Together they number 212, slightly less than half, but they will also have the non-party men behind them, and these number 8, so that the majority will be there; and even among the Rightists some might vote with the Octobrists and the Cadets on some questions. Of course, this *other majority will also be counter-revolutionary* and will fight against the revolution; it will merely cover up with trifling reforms which are of no use to the people.

Can these two majorities in the Third Duma defeat the revolution?

The great Russian revolution cannot stop until the peasants receive land in any appreciable quantity and until the masses of people secure the main influence on the administration of the state. Can we expect the two Duma majorities to produce all that? The question is in itself ridiculous: can the feudal-minded landowners and plunderous capitalists be expected to give land to the peasants and give up the supreme power to the people? No! They will throw a starving peasant a crust, after stripping him of everything he has, and they will help only the kulaks and the sharks to make themselves comfortable, taking all the power for themselves and leaving the people oppressed and subjugated.

The Social-Democrats must naturally do everything they can to continue the people's great cause—the revolution, the struggle for liberty and land.

In the Duma, the government behind the Octobrists, and the Cadets want to play a double game. The government,

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

while stepping up its persecutions and putting down Russia with the aid of bayonet, noose, prison cell and prison camp, pretends to be an advocate of reform. The Cadets, who have actually embraced the Octobrists, pretend that they are real champions of liberty. Both want to cheat the people and stamp out the revolution.

Let us see that this does not happen! The Social-Democrats, consistent and loyal fighters for nation-wide emancipation, will unmask the hypocrites and the cheats. Inside and outside the Duma they will expose the tyrannies of the Black-Hundred landowners and the government, and the Cadet tricks. They will—they must—understand that there is now need for more than a relentless struggle against the government; the Cadets must not be given either direct or indirect support.

The Social-Democrats must above all raise their voice to expose most sternly and relentlessly the foul tsarist crime perpetrated on June 3, 1907. Let the proletariat's spokesmen in the Duma explain to the people that the Third Duma cannot serve their interests, that it cannot meet their demands and that this can be done only by a sovereign constituent assembly elected through universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The government will propose new laws. The Octobrists, the Cadets and the Black Hundreds will do the same. All these laws will be a brazen swindle of the people, a gross violation of their rights and interests, a mockery of their demands, a mockery of the blood shed by the people in the struggle for liberty. All these laws will provide protection for the interests of the landowners and the capitalists. Each of these laws will be a fresh link in the chains of bondage which the oppressors and the parasites want to clamp on the workers, the peasants and the urban poor. Not everyone will understand this right away. But the Social-Democrats know and understand this, and that is why they will expose this boldly before the cheated people. In so doing, they must devote special attention to the laws which relate to the people's most vital needs: the laws on land, the laws on labour, on state revenue and expenditure. In branding the violence and fraud of the feudal-minded landowners and the capitalists, the Social-Democrats must

explain their demands to the entire people: full powers for the people (a democratic republic), unrestricted liberty and equality, the 8-hour working day and the easing of working conditions for labour, confiscation of large estates and the handing of land over to the peasants. They must also point to the great goal which the proletariat of all countries sets itself—socialism, complete abolition of wage slavery.

Alongside the Social-Democrats in the Duma there is a small group of Left-wingers, mainly the Trudoviks. The Social-Democrats should urge these men to go along with them. This is especially necessary when there is occasion to direct questions to the government which is running rampant all over Russia like a wild beast. Every day, the watchdogs of tsarism—the police, the gendarmes—and the higher authorities—ministers and governors—permit themselves gross acts of violence and lawlessness. They must be exposed and branded. And it is up to the Social-Democrats to do this. But a question to the government requires the signatures of 30 members of the Duma, and the Social-Democrats will hardly number more than 18. Together with the other Left-wingers they are 32. The Social-Democrats must draw up the questions and urge the Left-wingers to join them. If the Leftists really cherish the great cause of liberty, they must do so. A heavy blow will then be inflicted on the government, like those the Social-Democrats inflicted on it with their questions in the Second Duma.

Such are the main tasks of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma. Our comrades have some hard work to do. They will be there among enemies, malicious and ruthless. Efforts will be made to stop their mouths, and they will be showered with abuse, they will perhaps be expelled from the Duma, brought to trial, thrown into prison and exiled. They must be firm, in spite of all persecutions, they must hold high the proletariat's red banner and remain loyal to the end to the great cause of struggle for the people's emancipation. And all of us, comrades workers, must join forces in supporting them; we must lend a sensitive ear to their every word, respond to it, discuss their acts at meetings and rallies, reinforcing by our sympathies and approval their every correct step, helping them with all our strength

and resources in the struggle for the cause of the revolution. Let the working class be united in supporting its spokesmen, and in so doing may it strengthen its unity which it needs in the great struggle—the time when the "last decisive battle" is fought.

Vperyod No. 18,
November 1907

Printed from the
Vperyod text

PLENARY MEETING OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE[262]

AUGUST 11-13 (24-26), 1908

1

STATEMENT ON THE CONVOCATION OF THE C.C. PLENARY MEETING

Statement:

In view of the fact that attempts are being made to obscure the initial point of the incident under discussion, I categorically declare that at the outset I made a very definite statement of the following:

According to Grigory's communication, Ezra wrote to him that *the minor brother denies the Existenzrecht* of the plenary C. C.* It is this communication which has been entirely confirmed by Grigory, and not clearly refuted by Ezra, that constitutes the *illegality* of the act by the Mensheviks and the illegality of discussing *such* questions by the Bund Central Committee. I insist, therefore, on a search for the text of the letter itself.

Lenin

Motioned on August 12 (25), 1908
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

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the original

* The right to exist—*Ed.*

2

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE INCIDENT OVER THE CONVOCATION OF THE C.C. PLENARY MEETING

The C.C authorises the C.C. Bureau Abroad[263] to draw up a detailed report of the so-called incident over the convocation of the C.C. Plenary Meeting, Ezra's letters, Pyotr's statements and all the debates, and have this report preserved in the archives of the Central Committee, leaving it to the narrow C.C. to publish the report whenever the need arises.

Motioned on August 13 (26), 1908

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3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THIS ORGANISATION OF THE CENTRAL BUREAU ABROAD

1) Social-Democratic groups abroad shall be recognised as R.S.D.L.P. promotion groups.

2) The C.C. shall appoint a new Central Bureau Abroad consisting of 10 persons. In the absence of the C.C. Plenary Meeting, co-optation or substitution shall take place only with the approval of the C.C. Bureau Abroad.

3) The C.B.A. shall cater for the needs of the promotion groups abroad and fulfil general Party assignments from the C.C. Bureau Abroad.

4) The Bureau Abroad shall include one member of the C.C. (by appointment of a Plenary Meeting or the Bureau Abroad) with the right of veto.

5) A congress of all available promotion groups abroad shall be organised as soon as possible under the control of the C.C. Bureau Abroad.

6) The standing rules of the congress shall be approved by the C.C. Bureau Abroad

7) The C.C. Bureau Abroad is authorised to take all steps to make the congress an occasion for unifying all non-Russian Social-Democratic groups abroad into integrated local R.S.D.L.P. promotion groups. The C.C. Bureau

Abroad shall contact all the Central Committees of non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations on this question.

8) The groups shall pay 85-90 per cent of their receipts into the C.C. fund. The right to grant exemption in case of dire necessity (for instance, expenditures on émigrés) shall belong to the C.C. Bureau Abroad.

Motioned on August 13 (26), 1908

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THE FIFTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[264]

DECEMBER 21-27, 1908 (JANUARY 3-9, 1909)

1

OUTLINE OF SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF ORGANISATION[265]

I.

Composition (12 *apostles*
5 [in]violable
(belonging to angelic order)[266])

II. (A)

1. Strike movement and revolutionary onset;
2. Reformism and revolution;
3. Tasks of fighting nationalism;
   —raise before the congress;
4. How to work in legal societies.

III. (B)

(1) Duma group.
(2) Legal newspapers.
(3) Legal societies.
(4) Illegal agitators and their secret slogans.

IV. (C)

Resolutions and their popularisation....

V. (D)

Confidential agents and their promotion.

Written on December 24, 1908 (January 6, 1909)

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

2

EXPLANATION TO SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF ORGANISATION[267]

Statement of Fact

I declare that in my speech on the organisational question, which alone was discussed today, I did *not* say nor did I intend to say a *single word* either about the attitude of the Caucasians to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*[268] or about "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*" *in general*. That is why by starting his speech with a statement that on *this* question there were now no differences between the Caucasians and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Comrade Pyotr of Tiflis had no reason at all to mention my name. As for the earlier debates, I merely spoke of the differences between *some* members of the *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* Editorial Board and the Caucasians, which were revealed at the August Plenary Meeting of the C.C. in 1908.

N. Lenin

Motioned on December 24, 1908
(January 6, 1909)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

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the original

3

PROPOSAL ON PROCEDURE FOR VOTING RESOLUTIONS

If there is no demand for a vote on any of the resolutions tabled by someone at the conference, the conference shall vote on the resolution concerning the direction of the committee's work.

If there is a preliminary demand for a vote on someone's resolution as a basis right away, the demand shall be immediately complied with.

N. Lenin

Motioned on December 24, 1908
(January 6, 1909)

First published in 1933
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Printed from
the original

4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PUBLICATION OF CONFERENCE DECISIONS

The conference requests the C.C. to take steps to publish the conference resolutions and tabled drafts, and if possible, its minutes or a brief report as well.

Motioned on December 26, 1908
(January 8, 1909)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

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5

STATEMENT OF FACT[269]

I declare that I objected to Comrade Lyadov from the standpoint, which I repeatedly emphasised in my speech, that the C.C. has an *unquestionable* right of *veto*.

N. Lenin

Motioned on December 26, 1908
(January 8, 1909)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from
the original

6

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE MENSHEVIK DRAFT ON LIQUIDATING THE C.C.[270]

Statement of Fact

The letter of Comrades Martynov and Igorev, which they had promised to place before the C.C. but have failed to do over a period of four months, did not deal with the way the C.C. was to function but with its "right to exist" (Existenzrecht), i.e., it dealt specifically with the liquidationist plans.

N. Lenin

Motioned on December 26, 1908
(January 8, 1909)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from
the original

PLAN FOR LECTURES ON MARXISM[271]

Marxism	*The Agrarian Question*
(α) Theory of surplus value (Mehrwert).	(α) Commodity production in agriculture.
(β) Economic development.	(β) Small-scale vs. large-scale production.
(γ) Class struggle.	(γ) Wage labour.
(δ) Philosophical materialism.	(δ) Rent.

(α) 1. Earlier socialists: "unjust", etc. A symptom of emotion instead of understanding.
2. "Labour principle" (in Russia).
3. Commodity production.
4. Capitalism. Theory of *Mehrwert*.

(β) 1. Economic development. Industry (1907).
2. Russian handicraftsmen.
3. Agriculture.
4. Railways and trusts.
5. Finance capital.
6. Socialisation of production. Socialised *labour* and individual *appropriation*.

(γ) 1. The proletariat and its cohesion (serf peasant—pauper—proletarian).
2. Separate strikes. "Wrecking" of machines.
3. Trade unions and the movement.
4. Political struggle:
   Britain—Liberals
   France—Radicals (Republicans)
   Germany—Liberals (1860s) and opportunists.
5. Revolutionary aims of the working class: expropriation of the capitalists.
6. Revolutionary struggle and struggle for reforms.

(δ) Philosophical materialism.
1. Marx's theory—integrated world outlook.
2. Two main world outlooks and philosophical starting-points: religious obscurantism and materialism.
3. Engels (Ludwig Feuerbach).

4. 1789 France—Hegel and Feuerbach in Germany (before 1848).
5. Dialectical materialism.
6. Russia: Chernyshevsky
   Narodniks
   present-day opportunists (Bogdanov).

Written in 1908 or 1909
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

CONFERENCE OF THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD OF "PROLETARY"[272]

JUNE 8-17 (21-30), 1909

1

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON AGITATION FOR A BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS OR A BOLSHEVIK CONFERENCE SEPARATE FROM THE PARTY

JUNE 8 (21)

1

It is said, on the one hand, that there are no differences of principle, and there is a refusal to make open statements, and on the other, there is talk of basic differences in the Bolshevik faction. Isn't that duplicity? At the general Party conference Dan said: Doesn't everyone know that Lenin is being accused of Menshevism? I replied: Read *Proletary* and judge on that basis, instead of collecting gossip. At the time, Maximov was silent. Nothing is worse than the absence of open struggle. I say: Our unity based on principle has been disrupted, you say something else, and yet you call Lenin Martov.... Why is the present meeting illegal in Party terms? Members of the Bolshevik Centre elected at the Congress are talking about how best to conduct Bolshevik views. What is so inadmissible about that? In agitating for a special Bolshevik congress you show that you have lost all faith in the Party principle. We have

always stood for the Party principle, ever since the Second Congress, and are now continuing the same line, while you are preaching a split at the grass roots. There is also a pro-Party trend among the Mensheviks. We believe in the Party principle and stand up for it.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

2

Maximov says that there has been no agitation for a congress. Lyadov, Stanislav, and Vsevolod have spoken out with sufficient clarity. Since May 1908, Lyadov and Stanislav have been agitating in Russia. We have Stanislav's resolution, which says clearly enough what he wants.[273] This is a mockery of our faction. The Mensheviks have an orthodox-Marxist, Plekhanovite, trend and the Bolsheviks also have an orthodox-Marxist trend. Both the Mensheviks and we have the Valentinov-Maximov liquidationist trend, etc. Concerning Comrade Maximov's statement, I repeat that what I said was in *reply* to Maximov's words: "a fully Leninist-Plekhanovite faction is crystallising".

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Printed from the original

2

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF OTZOVISM AND ULTIMATUMISM[274]

JUNE 9 (22)

I want to deal with the "idea of the centre". Maximov has mixed things up over the Kotka conference[275]; this is how it was: if the Poles were in favour of a boycott and my vote were decisive, I declared that in that case I preferred to vote with the Bolsheviks. That was the condition I put in respect of the Poles. At that time, the whole Bolshevik Centre was against the boycott. The faction, however, was for the boycott, but there was no split, because

there was no group which wanted one. A year later, the faction turned out to be on our side. There are some "Bolsheviks" who are afraid of hitting out at the otzovists and of siding with the Mensheviks. At the conference I joined with the Mensheviks against the otzovists. That is what you think about the centre.

The story of the split as related by Maximov is a curious one. Maximov's papers say nothing about the centre but Mikha's letter has now been authenticated. The letter said that Lenin was conducting a Right-wing Bundist line. That is in the documents. Mikha wrote what Maximov is now saying. There is your idea of the centre. We got this letter from our Caucasian friends, who handed their mandate over to the Rightist Ilyich. Mikha conducted this policy in July 1908 with the participation of the group. Maximov says that we shall confer with Plekhanov. Of course, we shall, as we shall with Dan, and Martov in the C.O.[276] It took a fierce struggle at the conference to get the otzovists to be loyal. We confronted them with ultimatums. When Axelrod read the point about military-combat tasks, he said: "It is not hard to work with such 'Bolsheviks'." We shall not let the otzovists into the Duma commissions, where we were with Dan. Indeed! We shall confer with Plekhanov, as we shall with Dan and Martov. You can say as much in the press.

In the C.C. I confer with Marat. You, Marat, are a member of the faction of-divine otzovists. I am not talking about good intentions but about the political line. I ask you, comrades, to give thought to what is being said about Plekhanov. When Plekhanov speaks of his mistake in respect of the trade unions, we are reproached for failing to repulse him. When he is prepared to sacrifice his mistake, the question is whether we are attracting him by the article against Lunacharsky or whether you are repulsing the minority of the pro-Party Mensheviks[277] and the orthodox-Marxist Mensheviks for the sake of Bogdanov-Lunacharsky anti-Marxist propaganda. We have not made a deal with Plekhanov against Lunacharsky, but we can tell you who is flirting with whom. When Plekhanov kicks out Potresov, I am prepared to give him my hand. This is not a new centre, but a new caricatured Bolshevism. We are having

a replay of the old Rosa Luxemburg story.[278] But the replay here is caricatured, and "Bolshevism" must be safeguarded from it.

"Bolshevism" must now become strictly Marxist.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

3

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE PARTY SCHOOL ON CAPRI[279]

JUNE 10 (23)

I am surprised that we are not yet bored with all this. Comrade Maximov has no reason to be excited, because there has never been a single split without extreme accusations, and split incidents have always been confused with matters of honour. I remember the scenes with Krichevsky in 1901, with Martov in 1905, and with Plekhanov in 1907—and all of them attacked me with cries about honour. It is not a question of honour, but of the fact that in the process of struggle men tend to disorganise their faction and organise a new one. Take Lyadov as an example. He has not become a bad comrade, but he is disorganising our faction and trying to set up a new one. I think that Maximov is disorganising those whom he believes to be Mensheviks. He has a perfect right to do that, but he keeps telling us about Lenin's being invited to the school. The question of control is a ridiculous one too. We can't have that. It is clear that the school is a new centre, a new trend. Marat says that he will not abandon his posts. You, Comrade Marat, have succumbed to the factional fervour which is determined by the political struggle of the "divine" otzovists.

What is a faction? It is an alliance of like-minded persons within a party. In the Duma, the party is an alliance of like-minded men inside the Duma. After all, when a member of the Duma, like Khomyakov, goes over to another party he does not cease to be its chairman. The same applies

to a faction in the party. The party alone can relieve you of the post which you have taken up on behalf of the party, We are now quarrelling—it is because we have no alliance of like-minded men. No one is encroaching on your Party post and there is no point in bringing it in. We do not have a split in the Party, but in the faction. The writ of our conference does not run to Party posts. And honour has nothing to do with all this. For my part, I am used to that sort of thing: this is the fourth time I am being abused. We must recognise what there is: two centres, two trends and the school as a fact. And when we group out, everything will be much clearer.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

4

SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE FACTION'S UNITY

JUNE 12 (25)

I am not going to reply to Maximov; everyone is arriving at the conclusion that this is our last joint sitting with him. We should, therefore refrain from exchanging abuse at the last moment. That is undignified. Marat says that he is being invited to kick himself out. When Marat declared that he preferred to work with the anti-otzovists rather than with the otzovists, his declaration was met with cries of "Bravo!" No one accused him of setting up the break-away centre at Capri, his statement on god-building was quite definite. He is wrong in formal terms. For our part we did not take the division beyond the point where the separate centres of like-minded partisans had already taken shape.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

5

FIRST SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF BOLSHEVIK TASKS RELATING TO DUMA ACTIVITY

JUNE 12 (25)

Vishnevsky's report is the first positive contribution we have heard here.

As for the failure to send a delegate to the general Party conference, Vishnevsky seems to be making a mistake. Poletayev said that the deputies would arrive if Dan sent a telegram. Dan refused to do so. The conference has suffered greatly because of the absence of the delegate.[280]

You say that the well-informed persons[281] should not be expelled. The way to fight them is through publicity. More information should be given about them. They should be grouped and characterised.

The question of the *Proletary* Editorial Board's secretary attached to the Duma group. The secretary was not equal to his task and wrote in a highly formal manner; Steklov is not the man for this job; there is need for a man to do the spadework. The information should be as circumstantial as possible, otherwise all the promotion groups will be quite useless.

The Paris promotion group[282] is a delicate matter. We shall support Plekhanov's line; the other Mensheviks take a very nervous attitude to this. A rapprochement with the Mensheviks of the Dan type is hard. How is a group to be formed? The Mensheviks will get a crowd in. Nothing except a fight can be the result. Perhaps, in order to avoid a squabble the group should be set up under the C.O.

Nothing can be done in the Duma group without well-informed persons from the Bolsheviks. For this we should legalise two or three men. One suggestion is Vadim, and perhaps Kamenev.

Concerning the participation of local organisations in the activity of the Duma group. Broad leaflet agitation should be started. Definite specimen leaflets about Duma activity should be issued. The revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma will be neither revolutionary nor Social-Democratic without the influence of the organisa-

tions. There is need of *leaflets on the subjects of the Duma speeches*. This kind of thing will involve the organisations in the work and give them an impetus. Up to now, insufficient use has been made of deputies' meetings. They wasted most of their time on debates with the otzovists. There is also need for *leaflets on the party grouping in the Duma* and, finally, *leaflets on the work of the Duma in general*. It is not only the C.C. representatives, but also the organisations that should direct the Duma group. We must have *leaflets on the meaning of this or that speech in the Duma*. Take the question of foreign policy. Our deputies were the only ones to speak. This was not properly assessed. There is need for *leaflets with extracts from speeches*. I see no other way for the organisations' participation except in the form of leaflets. The disorganisation is desperate, the leaflet activity should be pressed forward vigorously. Criticism in foreign newspapers is late. Parliamentary speeches will always say less than everything. The i's will be dotted by the leaflets.

It is sometimes very hard for the organisations to send their representatives.

As for the newspaper, there is only one condition: a majority secured for us, but I do not believe it is possible to realise such a paper.[283]

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

6

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION "ON THE ATTITUDE TO DUMA ACTIVITY AMONG THE OTHER BRANCHES OF PARTY WORK"[284]

Considerably more attention, initiative and effort should be devoted to the use of legal possibilities (a sphere in which some successes have already been scored) than has been done until now.

Written between June 13 and 15 (26 and 28), 1909

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Printed from the original

7
SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF THE PARTY PRESS
JUNE 15 (28)

It is, of course, impossible to destroy *Proletary*. There is need for a popular organ, but the question depends on various other combinations, for instance, finance. It is not right to prohibit assistance for the legal press in such resolute terms as Vlasov has done. I think it would be useful to publish a small magazine, about the size of, say *Dal*,[285] which the Menshevik liquidators are publishing.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

8
SPEECH IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF PUBLISHING PHILOSOPHICAL ARTICLES IN THE CENTRAL ORGAN
JUNE 15 (28)

Since we cannot foresee how the debate on philosophy will develop, the question should not be posed as Comrade Marat has done. Therefore all restrictions on the C.O. in this respect should be lifted. I welcome Comrade Marat's statement on the need of philosophical articles in the legal miscellanies.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

9
PROPOSAL ON THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR A NEWSPAPER OF THE DUMA GROUP[286]
JUNE 16 (29)

In view of the importance of Comrade Meshkovsky's statement, I propose that of the 1,500 rubles earmarked or legal publishing, 1,000 should be used for the Duma newspaper.

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10

SPEECHES AND PROPOSALS IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF REORGANISING THE BOLSHEVIK CENTRE

JUNE 17 (30)

1

I agree with Meshkovsky. A referendum concerns all Party members, and that is impossible to put through. Conferences are desirable, but they should not be made statutory. I believe that the idea of periodical conferences should alone be adopted.

2

It should be written that the Russian members of the Bolshevik Centre constitute a collegium in general, without limiting their number to three.

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Printed from the text of the book verified with the minutes

3

In the absence of a Plenary Meeting, the Executive Commission may replace the *Proletary* editors and members of the Economic Commission in the event of their leaving.

4

The Bolshevik Centre Secretariat Abroad, consisting of two persons, shall be appointed by a Plenary Meeting.

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Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A LECTURE "THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN COPENHAGEN AND ITS IMPORTANCE"

1. International capital, its international organisation, international character of the working-class movement.

"Proletarians of *all* countries, unit"

2. First International
   1864-1872.
3. Second International
   1889—First Congress in Paris[287]
   1910—Eighth Congress in Copenhagen[288]
   [33 nations; almost 1,000 delegates].

4. Importance of international congresses in rallying the working class and determining its line: Amsterdam.

5. The Copenhagen Congress: Czechs and Austrians [nationalism and internationalism, bourgeois and proletarian policy].

6. *Co-operatives*
   (Weapon in the proletarian struggle: standpoint
   (A) proletarian and bourgeois
   (B) importance of co-operatives in implementing socialism: *expropriation*
   (C) behaviour of socialists in co-operatives).

7. *Support of the revolutionary* movement in *Persia*—protest against the *Finnish* campaign.

Written before September 13 (26), 1910

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

1911 – 1914

PLAN FOR A LECTURE IN A COURSE ON "FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY"

LECTURE IV

1. The essence of the capitalist mode of production as compared with the other modes of production historically preceding it.
2. Similarity in the existence of class oppression and distinction in the forms and conditions of the class struggle.
3. The worker's struggle against the capitalist over working hours. Conditions for the sale of the commodity "labour-power". The production of absolute and relative surplus-value.
4. "Normal" conditions for the consumption of the commodity "labour-power" are determined by the worker's struggle against the capitalist.
5. The strike struggle, trade unions and factory legislation in the history of the struggle for shorter working hours.
6. Some results of the half-century of modern history (14th-20th centuries) in the struggle for shorter working hours. Kautsky's "summary".[289] Insignificance of "social progress".

Written before January 27 (February 9), 1911

Published in Paris in 1911 as a duplicated leaflet issued by the Organising Commission of the Social Science Courses

Printed from the leaflet text

MEETING OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS[290]

MAY 28-JUNE 4 (JUNE 10-17), 1911

1

REPORT ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY[291]

Following the C.C. Plenary Meeting in January 1910[292] the Bolsheviks bent every effort to restore the composition of the C.C. and help it to resume its activity. C.C. members Makar and Innokenty contacted local Party organisations and Party members working in the open labour movement, together with them nominated candidates for co-optation to the C.C., etc. But the efforts of the C.C. Bolsheviks ended in the arrest of both. They got no help at all from the *Golos* people in their work in Russia. The representatives of the Mensheviks, elected at the London Congress, Mikhail, Yuri and Roman, who have now gone over to the independent legalists, have not only refused to work in the C.C., but have announced that they consider its very existence harmful to the labour movement.

In 1910, following a break of several months, Comrade Makar, who escaped from exile, and Comrade Vyazemsky once again set up a bureau for convening the C.C.* The Bundist Yudin, a member of the Bureau, took part in their work. Over a period of six months, they once again established contacts with local organisations, nominated candidates for the C.C., dispatched agents, and joined the Duma group in organising the election campaign for the by-elections in Moscow.

Of the representatives of the Mensheviks, they succeeded in contacting only Comrade Kostrov, who once or twice came merely to exercise his right to vote in the event it came to a convocation of the C.C.

After working for six months, the C.C. Bolsheviks were arrested together with several candidates for co-optation to the C.C., the comrade secretary and a number of other

* This provisional bureau was recognised both by non-Russian organisations and by our Party's C.C. Bureau Abroad and C.O.

persons variously connected with the Bureau's activity. In a letter sent from prison after their arrest, the comrades C.C. members stated that the gendarmes had kept them under constant surveillance for a number of months and had been informed of their every step, and that there was no doubt at all about the provocation over the preparations for convening the C.C. in Russia. Following the arrest of two members of the Bureau (Makar and Vyazemsky), the C.C. members still at large—Yudin and Kostrov—displayed *no activity* at all over a period of two and a half months, even failing to send any letters either to the C.C. Bureau Abroad or to the C.O.

As a result of the 18-month effort to restore the C.C. in Russia, the four Bolshevik members (Meshkovsky, Innokenty, Makar and Vyazemsky) are either in exile or in prison. The gendarme inquiries and a whole number of arrests have made it quite clear that the authorities are most thoroughly informed about *all* the London candidates[293] and C.C. members and that their every step is being watched. In view of all these circumstances to make a fresh attempt to convene the C.C. in Russia would be to court certain failure without any hope of success.

The only possible way out of this situation would be to call a Plenary Meeting abroad. Nine persons with the right to take part in the Plenary Meeting are abroad.[294] This will constitute more than one-half of its full membership (15 persons). They juridically can and essentially must declare themselves to be the Plenary Meeting.

The proposal to postpone the constitution of the Plenary Meeting until the convocation of the other members would mean many more months of delay.

With the exception of Mikhail, Yuri and Roman, who have openly announced their break with the C.C. and their sympathies for liquidating the Party, the Mensheviks could "bring together" Kostrov and Pyotr. The Bolsheviks could bring together Meshkovsky, Innokenty, Rozhkov and Sammer. It is hard to say how many months this would take.

In the light of the experience it has had, the real meaning for the Party of this protracted "work of bringing together" formal candidates is nil. It is even worse than nil, for the

game of allocating places in central bodies hides from local organisations and groups the sad reality in respect of which vigorous action must be taken. After eighteen months of unsuccessful attempts to restore the activity of the C.C., to feed the Party with more endless delays would be an affront to the Party. We do not intend to have a hand in any such affront.

At present the *real* position of the Party is such that almost everywhere in the localities there are small Party workers' groups and cells that meet irregularly. They enjoy great prestige among the workers everywhere. Everywhere they are combating liquidator-legalists in the unions, clubs, etc. They are not yet connected with each other. Their supplies of literature are extremely rare. In these groups of workers, there is a rallying together of Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks and some of the *Vperyod* supporters[295] who have not been drawn into the separate *Vperyod* faction set up abroad.

The *Vperyod* group used all the period since the Plenary Meeting to help from abroad in strengthening and separating its faction in organisational terms. Its representatives have withdrawn from the *Diskussionny Listok* Editorial Board[296] and the School Commission under the C.C.[297] The *Vperyod* group has failed to carry out the decisions of the last Plenary Meeting, and has, in fact, done everything to hamper the Social-Democratic general Party work. Preparations for the forthcoming elections have long since been started in the legal and illegal Party literature. Meanwhile, the *Vperyod* group, far from assisting the Party in this extremely important political action, has even failed to state unequivocally whether in general it favours participation in the elections to the Fourth Duma[298] or opposes participation in them. Even in their latest statements in the press, the *Vperyod* group leaders abroad continue to flirt with the otzovists.

A far more serious anti-Party and anti-Social-Democratic force is the faction of the *independent legalists* (*Nasha Zarya*,[299] *Dyelo Zhizni*,[300] and the *Golos* people who, like Dan, Martov & Co., cover them up). It has been proved beyond doubt that they recognise no Central Committee and publicly ridicule Central Committee decisions. *They cannot* and

will not carry out the last Plenary Meeting's decisions ("Not to minimise the role of an illegal party", etc.). They cannot help taking the *opposite* line of action.

No Social-Democrat can doubt that the "independent legalists" can be expected to conduct an election campaign for the Fourth Duma on their own, *apart from and against* the Party.

The task of the Social-Democratic Party members is clear: the Party workers' circles in Russia should be openly and resolutely urged to start preparations for the elections immediately. *Only* committed Party men, only comrades realising the danger of the liquidationist trend should be nominated as Social-Democratic candidates. *Direct* action against independent legalists must not be postponed for a single day; the workers must be warned right away of the danger posed to the Social-Democratic Party by the independent legalists at the elections.

Such is the task of the day for our Party. Any deviation from such an approach to the question, which has been posed by life itself (and by the independent legalists), all delays, or attempts by the legalists to repeat the game of "promises" and "assurances" are fraught with great danger to the Party.

Our practical conclusion: the meeting of the nine must absolutely and immediately issue a manifesto to the Party in which the failure to convene the Central Committee in Russia is truthfully and fully described, and which calls upon local Party circles to display initiative and establish local and regional committees, to set up and support a Central Organising Commission, to set up and support Social-Democratic press organs (where, as in *Zvezda*,[301] which is being published with the participation and support of the Social Democratic Duma group, there should be no place for the liquidators), urging them to conduct a determined and implacable struggle against the independent legalists and to make for closer ties in their work between representatives of the true Party elements, without regard for trend. In the event that not only five of the nine members of the C.C., but a solid majority of the nine agree to regard themselves as a Plenum of the C.C., this meeting of the C.C. must immediately co-opt new members, set up an Organis-

ing Commission for calling a conference and start practical preparations for election to the Fourth Duma. Representatives of pro-Party Mensheviks should be seated on the Organising Commission and the C.C. right away. The C.C. meeting must at once start a resolute struggle against the independent legalist group. It stands to reason that this struggle is incompatible with the participation of independent legalists in central Party bodies, which they have sabotaged, obstructed, weakened and kept in a morbid state for eighteen months.

Written between May 19 and 23 (June 1 and 5), 1911

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Printed from a copy written in F. E. Dzerzhinsky's hand

2

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTING THE MEETING

MAY 28 (JUNE 10)

1[302]

Considering that the Party has been suffering from the postponement of the Plenum for 18 months, the non-Russian organisations should have long since elected their representatives. The Latvian comrade's approach was different from that of the Bundist. He said that although he had not been elected, in view of the conditions of the Plenary Meeting's convocation he deemed it his duty to take part in it, and to submit a subsequent report to the C.C. of the Latvian Territory, with the proviso that the decisions would enter into force in the Latvian Territory only upon their approval by the C.C. of the Latvian Territory.

2

In fact, comrades here are being fooled.[303] We know that Makar and Lindov did something, contacted organisations, appointed agents and contacted the candidate. They were arrested. Since then we have had no news from any of those

who remained. They have even failed to inform either the C.O. or the C.C. Bureau Abroad. No work has been done. It is no longer possible to deceive the Party with a Russia Bureau[304] or a Russia C.C. Convening the C.C. in Russia is a phrase that helps Stolypin.

Ionov's statement says that he will send his invitation to the Bund C.C.[305] When is he going to do so? How much time has elapsed? Why is there no reply? Ionov says that not having the powers he cannot attend a meeting of the C.C. members. Why then is Lieber here? I propose a resolution on Ionov's reply, because it makes clear that an intrigue is being carried on.

3

Let us sum up what has been said about the Bureau. It turns out that the remaining members of the Bureau were meant. About the work it is said that no work has been done. Comrade Adrianov is a prominent Menshevik and the Mensheviks would have been aware of his work if he had done any. Even his closest associates know nothing about it. Any further attempt to play up the existence of a bureau somewhere is to deceive the Party. In view of the arrests, Ber could not contact the Bund C.C. What then is the Party to do? It cannot afford to wait. There must be initiative in this case.

4

Ber is shouting about the law, but at the same time he has been resolutely fighting in the C.C. Bureau Abroad against the law and in favour of the liquidators.[306] This kind of behaviour makes me doubt the sincerity of his statements and expect him to make fresh attempts to break up all-Party institutions.

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3

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF CONVENING A C.C. PLENARY MEETING

MAY 30 (JUNE 12)

1[307]

I state that for six months the lower institution (C.C. Bureau Abroad) has been violating decisions and refusing to convene the higher institution. I am forced to state this in order to give a warning against putting any trust in an institution which for six months now has been trying to close the Party's way to a resumption of its central institution.

2

I point out that as early as the spring of 1910 we had a letter from Inok saying that C.C. members were being shadowed. We fought with every means against the Russian gamble.[308] Makar resumed the business in 1910 and the dispatch of money right away revealed the hopelessness of the attempt. It was quite plain at once that to call the C.C. in Russia meant to send people to gaol. From the spring of 1908 to the 1910 Plenary Meeting the C.C. did not meet in Russia a single time. The history of the convocation in Russia shows that the task is unfeasible. Sending the C.C. to Russia was tantamount to sending it to prison.

3[309]

Over a period of 18 months, four Bolsheviks have been arrested while doing central work. Not a single Menshevik has been arrested because they have been working to set up a Stolypin party. Letters were not written to us and correspondence was suspended for reasons of secrecy. The Mensheviks, far from working to set up the C.C., even refused to attend for co-optation (Mikhail, Roman and Yuri), Pyotr has been nowhere near the Bureau, while Kostrov lived close by. It is an incontrovertible fact that only the Bolsheviks have been working.

Concerning Lyubich we have a letter from Inok indicating his consent to work. Concerning Pyotr we merely have the information that he has been nowhere near the Bureau. A C.C. member has the clear duty of going to work on the C.C. Martynov is an émigré=Bogdanov, Nikita. If he is invited, then they and Victor should be invited too. Mikhail, Yuri and Roman have nothing to do with the C.C. These are men who are building a Stolypin labour party and are engaged in activity which was resolutely condemned by the January Plenary Meeting. We have nothing in common with the architects of a Stolypin labour party or with those who are helping them.

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4

PROPOSAL FOR RESOLUTION ON CONVENING A PARTY CONFERENCE

The Organising Commission[310] has been recruiting for the work of convening a conference representatives of local organisations in Russia and influential comrades engaged in activity among the masses, so that they should, if possible at once, set up a Russian collegium performing all the practical work in convening the conference, under the general control of the Organising Commission—in the sense of fulfilling directives stated in the resolutions and the letter of the Plenary Meeting.

Written on June 1 (14), 1911

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

5

STATEMENT[311]

In voting for the resolution as a whole[312] in order to bring together as closely as possible all the Party elements without exception, we resolutely protest against the permissibility

of inviting to the Organising Commission the *Golos* and the *Vperyod* people abroad, i.e., representatives of anti-Party groups which have developed into special factions abroad and which in the 18 months since the Plenary Meeting have proved themselves capable only of acting *against* the Party, only of *slowing down* its work, only of helping the independent legalist labour party or the otzovists.

N. Lenin

Written on June 1 (14), 1911

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

STATEMENT[313]

In our capacity as members of the meeting we, the undersigned, having learned of the decision of the Technical Commission[314] not to issue any money to the school,[315] declare that we consider this decision downright illegal and motion the following proposal for a vote by the members of the meeting: *Members of the meeting resolve that the amount required for the school (for travelling or living expenses not later than September 1, 1911) should be issued from cash (or the trustee funds)—in accordance with the decision of the Party's School Commission.*

N. Lenin

July 30, 1911

First published in 1961 in Vol. 20 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

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INSERTION FOR L. B. KAMENEV'S PAMPHLET *TWO PARTIES**

A *choice should be made* between the party of the revolutionary proletariat and the party of the independent legalists. Every circle or group of the R.S.D.L.P. must tell the workers as much and practise it.

* Lenin's introduction to L. B. Kamenev's pamphlet *Two Parties*. See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 225-28.—*Ed.*

We know that there are people who, while recognising the need to fight the liquidators, object to a complete break with them and continue (even now!) to speak of "conciliation" or "agreement". Among these people are not only the "loyal servitors" of Trotsky, whom very few people now take seriously. The advocates of conciliation and agreement are making a big mistake: the 18 months have shown *in practice* that the legalists *do not fulfil any* obligations. How can there be an agreement with men who do not carry out their obligations?? Isn't it ridiculous to speak of an agreement, when the speaker is unable to state *either* the terms of the agreement *or* the means to secure fulfilment of any terms whatsoever??

Written after July 20
(August 2), 1911

Published in August 1911 in a pamphlet issued by the *Rabochaya Gazeta* Editorial Board in Paris

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A LECTURE "MANIFESTO OF THE LIBERAL LABOUR PARTY"[316]

1. Why does N. Rozhkov's article in No. 9-10 of *Nasha Zarya* deserve such a name and the most thorough analysis? It affords an opportunity of examining the question of the two lines in the labour movement and the "two parties" outside *any* "conflict" material, *outside* any "squabble".

2. The type of "Social-Democrat of freedom days". Bourgeois democrats in Marxist garb. Rozhkov as a specimen; his article is a *wholesale* substitution of liberalism for Marxism.

3. The role of the serf-owners in modern Russia from the standpoint of the liberals (Rozhkov) and the Marxists. The "December (1908) resolutions" of the R.S.D.L.P.

4. The attitude of democrats to the (Stolypin) solution of the agrarian problem "through a compromise between various groups of the bourgeoisie".

5. Is Russia to have a "triumph of highly moderate bourgeois progressism"?

6. A comparison of modern Russia with her Third Duma and France of the 1860s with her Legislative Corps, and Prussia of 1880s.

7. Have the "old slogans" become a "dead letter"?

8. Why is the Society for the Protection of the Interests of the Working Class, which is being set up by Rozhkov, a society for the *liberal* protection of working-class interests in their *liberal* interpretation?

9. Ratio: Y. Larin is to the labour congress as N. Rozhkov is to the legal liquidationist party.

Written before November 14 (27), 1911

Published in November 1911 in an announcement of the lecture put out by a *Rabochaya Gazeta* circle

Printed from the text of the announcement

PROPOSAL ON RULES FOR THE ORGANISATION ABROAD MOTIONED AT A MEETING OF BOLSHEVIK GROUPS ABROAD[317]

In electing a Committee of the Organisation Abroad[318] to handle the latter's affairs the meeting hands it the draft Rules together with all the remarks, authorising the Committee to poll the groups and give final approval to the Rules through such a poll.

Written on December 16 (29), 1911

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

OUTLINE OF A REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION[319]

Political Situation

1. Crop failure—and the famine. "Food" campaign—Lidvaliad.[320]

2. Stolypin's "agrarian reform": bourgeois wine poured into serf-owning wineskins. They burst.

3. December 1908 about the Stolypin reform[321] and failure of the liquidators and the *Vperyod* people to understand.
4. Commissary trials: stealing.
5. Mismanagement and disorder.
—Cadet and Octobrist press. Flight from St. Petersburg to Moscow, lorry runs, construction of railways, Russian industry in the foreign market, public education and Kasso's "broom"[322] — — — sighs, oh's and ah's, and regrets all over the place.
6. The bourgeoisie craves for the bourgeois system. It wants to "wash the wineskin without dipping it into the water".
7. Revolution is the only way. Fear, hatred, mistrust—against the tide.
8. "Against the tide". For the revolution. The working class and the revolution. For revolution (*n o t* "universal suffrage") is the slogan which sums up the political situation and *determines* the whole content of Party agitation and propaganda (in particular, before the Fourth Duma).

etc.

Crop failure
Commissary trials
Persia
Kasso and rout
The Jews and the "nationalisation of trade".

The Working Class and the Revolution

1. The "revival", of which everyone is talking, is a symptom of the fresh upsurge of the revolution.
2. Attitude to the revolution that was: spite, fear, hatred—cowardice, scepticism, lack of spirit—attitude of the working class ("you'll get another 1905").
3. Tasks of working-class activity in the new conditions
   (α) > consciousness of the masses (δ)
   (β) > development of capitalism (α)

(γ) > hostility of the bourgeoisie (β)
(δ) > alliance of enemies (γ).

4. Character of agitation and propaganda.
No need for an illegal party
" " " propaganda of revolution (not hegemony)
etc., etc. [liquidationism].

Manifestation of bourgeois counter-revolutionary spirit among Social-Democrats.

5. "Bird's-eye view"=Third Duma, Role of (Cadets)

Written at the end of 1911

First published in 1961 in Vol. 21 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the minutes

THE SIXTH (PRAGUE) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[323]

JANUARY 5-17 (18-30), 1911

1

TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION "ON THE RUSSIAN ORGANISING COMMISSION FOR CONVENING THE CONFERENCE"[324]

This *regardless* of gratitude.
This concerning the Credentials Committee.
Instead of "gratitude" I suggest we insert (solemn) *recognition* of the tremendous importance of what has been done, and *elaborate* on the difficult conditions.

Written not later than January 5 (18), 1912

First published in 1941 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

2

OUTLINE OF SPEECH ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFERENCE

1. Break-up and absence of the C.C.
2. Initiative of local organisations in restoring the Party.

Elections to the Fourth Duma.

3. Pressing tasks of practical work have made the task of restoring the Party especially acute.
4. *All* have been invited and only those who refused to help the Party are absent.
5. All organisations operating in Russia are represented.
   — — The constitution of the conference as the Party's supreme body whose duty it is to set up authorised central institutions and help to restore Party organisations and Party work everywhere.

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1) National organisations were invited three or four times.
   — — (1) the fault for the separation from Russian organisations has been stated to fall entirely on the non-Russian organisations;
2) partial support for the downright liquidationist (Bundist) aspirations;
   helpless vacillations on the question of whether the Party is to be or not to be;
3) which would be the greatest abnormality if the Russian organisations carrying the whole burden of the work in the most important centres of the movement rejected the work and the Party's restoration.

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4. (1) none for three years;
   (2) recognised the need and prepared for two and a half years;
   (3) everyone without exception was notified and invited and given a chance to attend;
   (4) twenty Russian organisations have rallied round the R.O.C.[325]

Written not later than January 5 (18), 1912

First published on January 18, 1937 in *Pravda* No. 18

Printed from the original

3

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

JANUARY 7 (20), 1912

The work at the I.S.B. falls into two parts, one routine: correspondence, distribution of members ... etc.; the other—congresses: Copenhagen and Zurich.[326] Following the London Congress one [representative] was [on the I.S.B.] from the Russian Social-Democrats. The Plenary Meeting also elected Plekhanov, but he refused, saying that one man was enough to do the work. At the Copenhagen Congress we drew closer together and spoke in a friendly manner; I was no longer able to talk to the *Golos* people and looked at Trotsky with disapproval, especially over the letter.[327] Towards the end of the sitting, Plekhanov accepted the Plenary Meeting's proposal. He and I have one vote. Until recently we have had no conflicts of any kind. At Copenhagen I worked on the co-operative committee. Of most interest are the extremely aggravated relations among the German Social-Democrats: unity on the surface and two different trends beneath. On behalf of the German Social-Democrats, one half represents the party and the other, the trade unions. The greater the German delegation numerically, the lower seems the hegemony of the German Social-Democrats to decline. At Stuttgart they covered themselves with disgrace by voting for the colonial resolution.... One of their representatives, for instance, says that it is impossible to expropriate the capitalists. It turns out that in this context their programme says nothing at all about expropriation. What they are actually conducting is not a Social-Democratic line. There should be no illusions about this, for as time goes on the struggle is bound to sharpen and grow; of course, the mass of the proletariat will not vacillate. They staged a walk-out at the Magdeburg Congress, but no Social-Democrat will be intimidated by that kind of thing.[328]

There is a split among the Czechs.[329] We were against the split, feeling that the Social-Democrats should not Succumb to any chauvinist or nationalist agitation. In Austria, there are a great many scandals over the language

to be used in the paper work, etc. Plekhanov was the rapporteur on this split, and his resolution was adopted by a large majority. There again, Trotsky tried his reconciliation, saying that the fault lay with Adler, the most "peaceable" and opportunist Social-Democrat.

The German Social-Democrats are undoubtedly approaching a new epoch—the epoch of the socialist revolution. The economic and military crisis and world complications, all tend to bring out the symptoms of the epoch. There has been preparatory work so far. Now it is the epoch of battles against the bourgeoisie. And that is where the distinction between the reformists and the revolutionary Social-Democrats is being realized. A sitting of the I.S.B. was called at Zurich over Morocco. There was also an incident there. Molkenbuhr wrote a letter in his own name suggesting that no sitting should be held. Rosa Luxemburg published the letter, and that sparked things off.[330] The revolutionary Social-Democrats won out at the last congress. Bebel said that he would take action against Rosa Luxemburg. There was an attempt on the part of the French to get the strike written into the resolution as a means of struggle against war. All the revolutionary Social-Democrats spoke against, arguing that we should not let the government know in advance which weapon we shall take up, and which is most suitable and where. The proposal was rejected. Bebel raised the question of non-publication of the documents, hinting at Rosa Luxemburg and demanding a resolution. I stood up for Rosa Luxemburg. To Bebel's great indignation I quoted Quelch. There Bebel acted as a conciliator. The letter published by Rosa Luxemburg has nothing to do with the [other] documents. Action in the party was the most that should be done against her, and that was done; it was unfair to take the whole thing to the I.S.B....

Various trends have grown up within German Social-Democracy and are bursting to get out; inside, the party is seething. Resolute action is imminent there. A conflict between the reformist and the revolutionary Social-Democrats is inevitable.

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Printed from
a record of the
proceedings in
longhand

4

SPEECH ON THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION ON COMBATING THE FAMINE

JANUARY 8 (21) 1912

The Party should intervene actively, and a resolution should be adopted. As we have discovered from our exchange of opinion, the workers are paying a great deal of attention to the famine and are actively intervening and helping the starving. Helping the starving is not philanthropy. It is philanthropy only with the bourgeois approach. But that is not all. The Cadets have really adopted the standpoint of the ministry officials. We should join the committees which are being set up to fight the famine. I mean the non-Party workers' committees. We should not prescribe their establishment but we should take part in them. The money should best be sent to the Social-Democratic group, the workers' unions, clubs and other societies. We should also publish a leaflet, but preferably addressed to the workers and peasants. We should see to the distribution of the speech by Markov II, who said the starving peasants were idlers. It is a fine speech and makes good reading.

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Printed from a record of the proceedings in longhand

5

DRAFT CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S ORGANISATIONAL RULES*

Organisational Rules

§1—idem.

§2—add about permissibility of co-optation as a provisional measure (in accordance with the December 1908 resolution).

§3—idem.

§4—idem.

§5—idem.

§6—idem.

* See present edition, Vol. 17, p. 482.—*Ed.*

§ 7—idem.

§ 8—*out altogether*. More about the C.C.

§ 9—instead of 1,000 electors—put 30 or 50 and (temporarily) abolish proportional representation.

Note. In view of the pressing state of affairs, the 1912 Conference was constituted as the *Party's supreme body* (see resolution on conference).*

Written not later than January 11 (24), 1912

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6

SPEECH ON THE ORGANISATIONAL QUESTION

JANUARY 11 (24) 1912

I should like to deal with another aspect of the question. It is about flexibility.... The resolution was correct.[331] I should like to call attention to which side is important. Let us take a legal society as an example. I can't say this about the whole of Russia, but about 5 towns I can say that ... it is possible. And so what does a legal society give us above all? Lectures of a Marxist character: this seems to be permitted. I see from the press that they are permitted in the big towns. It is said that lecturers are hard to come by.... The workers themselves should bring out the lecturers and pay them. Then there are the library and reading room. I don't know whether they are allowed to take *Zvezda*. Then, legal societies arrange all kinds of entertainment. That is important from the financial side, and, besides, the entertainment makes it a kind of club. Now if this type of society is not a fiction, but a reality, and there is no question about that, we should ask ourselves [whether] we have worked to extend such societies. [Whether] we have given reports about such societies at factories and plants. Have we tried to organise such societies? Further, how are these societies to be used? We are now almost similar in type to the German organisation in the epoch of the anti-Socialist laws, but for us it is both harder and

* This paragraph is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed*.

easier. It is harder because legal possibilities were open to them. The C.C. consisted of members of the parliamentary party group, met legally and invited illegal workers. For our part, we have a great deal of sympathy in the masses and support for Social-Democracy. In every society we should have small Social-Democratic cells closely bound up with the Party, deciding on each matter in the spirit of the Party's resolutions.... These cells should not be as unwieldy as the districts and subdistricts. St. Petersburg and Riga fit the [legal] society type. In Moscow, little was done in this respect. And so we find these cells allowing a different type of Party structure. In the past, in my time, we had to do everything ourselves. Today, the trade unions and organisations handle some of the work. Whenever possible, the political struggle is frequently also conducted by the legal Duma group, and if we had more legal societies built on these lines, the revolution would be invincible. That is the question of the organisations' flexibility. It will be the ideal for rebuilding our organisation. These illegal cells surrounded by a network of legal cells will give us a new basis. All contacts should be reduced to a minimum, as though the organisation is and is not there. Let there be no meetings. Party work has assumed a different form. The new form has already wedged into the old. Let it be less formalised but expanding through work in the legal societies. Every step towards culture should be permeated with the Social-Democratic spirit, with Social-Democratic culture.... This will be a resolute fight against the liquidators.... There is a cell, which is connected with the C.O., contacting it once a year and doing a hundred times more than before. We have not done enough in the legal societies. We must wrest them from the hands of the liberals, we must [wrest] the entire legal movement. The legal societies should be spread out and expanded. Concrete attention should be given to how work is being organised in the legal societies. Everywhere the illegal cells should be surrounded by a network of legal cells.

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7

TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION "ON THE CHARACTER AND ORGANISATIONAL FORMS OF PARTY WORK"*

Insert at the beginning (α) confirmation of the December 1908 resolution or confirmation of its correctness on the strength of the three years' *experience*; (β) recognition that the work of local Social-Democratic forces is creating a type of party here which is *approximating* to the German one of 1878-90.[332] We should go *forward* along this road [this *instead of* § 1].

In thesis 5, throw out *formalisation* and instead of "expansion" say *strengthening*.

§7—reword more cautiously, as in December 1908.

§9—set out to the effect that the regular distribution of a regularly and frequently published illegal Social-Democratic newspaper is of especial importance for political agitation, for directing the revolutionary struggle, *and for linking up all the illegal organisations and illegal cells* in the various societies.

Written on January 11 (24), 1912

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8

MATERIAL FOR THE RESOLUTION ON THE "PETITION CAMPAIGN"**

Resolution on the Petition Campaign

Themes:

1) writers' intention unrelated to the masses, [not] com[ing] from the masses;

2) indifferent signing without clear [slogans], without agitation in the [masses], without interest [on the part of the masses];

* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 479-80.—*Ed.*

** The MS. is partially damaged, and the words in square brackets have been restored according to the meaning and the text of the adopted resolution.—*Ed.*

3) the text and the character of the petition are unsatisfactory;

4) wresting a partial demand, while the circumstances obtrude generally elementary conditions of freedom [for] the whole people;

5) failure: 1,300 signatures. No support in Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, the Caucasus, etc.;

6) the interest in proletarian meetings has shown that the "[wa]ys" to the masses *should be sought not* where the liquidators want to.

Sum total:

Recognise failure as final.

Petition on the concrete conditions [of the epoch]—one of the least [suitable] means of agitation.

Call to agitation for freedom [of coalition] *in connection with* general [political] demands and revolutionary agitation in the masses.

Draft resolution

To recognise:

1) that the [so]-called "petition campaign" was started by a [group of St. Petersburg writers] of the liquidationist trend, without being a product [of mass struggle], without being connected with active initiative ... by workers' organisations or forward-looking workers;

2) that the said [campaign in virtue of the character] of the petition, and in virtue of the general political conditions, has [inevitably degenerated into a purely formal] and indifferent signing of [a paper] which is of no interest to the masses, [without] broad participation by the workers themselves in discussing ... the petition either in the press or at meetings;

3) that the said petition, circulated and commented upon by the liquidators, advanced an isolated demand for political freedom for one class, the [most] advanced and most revolutionary class, making the demand [outside the general] elementary conditions of political freedom for [the whole people], thereby distorting the tasks in the struggle of the proletariat—[the leader] ... of the whole people—against tsarism and dooming the "campaign" to [failure];

4) that the outcome of the [petition campaign] in question has clearly confirmed that [the whole] scheme was

wrong and isolated from [the workers' mass]: the petition collected only 1,300 signatures, [while] in all the Party organisations, including those [in the Caucasus], Yekaterinoslav and Kiev, and even ... sympathising with the liquidators, the petition campaign, clearly not supported by the [masses], [failed to win] any support at all, just as the [campaign] was given no support [by our Social-Democratic group in the Duma].

Written not later than January 17 (30), 1912

First published in 1941 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A LECTURE "REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE OF THE RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT"[333]

1. The Lena events[334] and May Day in Russia. Mass strikes and their role.
2. Revolutionary upsurge quite natural; its forerunners and prospects.
3. Importance of the mass strike in modern revolutions. Experience of 1905.
4. Liberalism and democracy confronted by another revolution.
5. Why did the Cadets declare war on "revolutionary sentiments" and condemn the idea of "the need for another revolution in Russian?
6. A new situation in the current revolutionary upsurge. Political parties, Third Duma, elections. The peasantry and the new democratic intelligentsia.
7. "Freedom of coalition" and slogans in a popular revolution: struggle for a republic, an 8-hour working day, confiscation of all landed estates.

Published before June 13, 1912 in an announcement of the lecture put out by the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad

Printed from the text of the announcement

ROSA LUXEMBURG AND THE POLISH "PARTEI" VORSTAND IN MARTOV'S WAKE[335]

Rosa Luxemburg's statement in *Vorwärts* (on September 14) in defence of the so-called Polish Vorstand and carrying charges against Comrade Radek has forced me to take up the pen despite my great unwillingness to interfere in this matter. I cannot remain silent when the struggle against the liquidators of the Russian Party is being used to vindicate the worst methods of the liquidators.

I have personally witnessed Comrade Radek's vacillation from defence of the extreme Left to defence of the Russian liquidators; I have always fought and will continue to fight politically against all those who defend liquidationism, but that is *precisely why* I must stand up against the disgusting methods used by the so-called Polish Vorstand in the Radek "affair".[336]

What is the principal specific of Martov's "well-known" (bekannt) pamphlet, of which Rosa Luxemburg makes such opportune mention?[337]

It is that Martov, the leader of the liquidators, *after* all the Social-Democrats of Russia, in January 1910, solemnly and unanimously accepted the condemnation of liquidationism and *after peace* in the Party was proclaimed on the basis of this condemnation[338]—a year later, when the liquidators destroyed the Party's C.C. and split away from the Party—Martov put out a pamphlet accusing his opponents of 1,001 dishonest and criminal offences. At the time the Poles called this pamphlet a "stinkbomb", and *even* (sogar, and not selbst) Kautsky called it "abscheulich".*

The very same thing has now been done by the so-called Polish Vorstand with Rosa Luxemburg at its head.

Comrade Radek *was recommended to me personally*, in 1909 and 1910, as a fitting *collaborator for our* Party's *C. O.* and was personally introduced to me, with *the best of references*, at the International Congress at Copenhagen, by the selfsame members of this very Vorstand.

But then, in 1911, Comrade Radek took a political stand against this Vorstand, supporting the Party's Warsaw

* Disgusting, foul.—*Ed.*

Committee, a number of Party members and two of its prominent leaders (Malecki and Hanecki), who exposed the Vorstand for disorganising activity. Comrade Radek helped to establish the truth, namely, that the Polish *Partei*vorstand is a Vorstand *without* a party. In Warsaw, the capital of Poland, this Vorstand *no longer* represents the Warsaw Committee, but its own fictitious little group. The German comrades will soon learn about all this in greater detail. Members of the Russian Social-Democratic Party are aware that there is already a *whole literature* about it, and it is futile on Rosa Luxemburg's part to hush it up (totzuschweigen) before the International!

After Radek took his political stand against the so-called Parteivorstand (*without* a party), this "Partei"vorstand *cooked up* a "trial" against Radek over a "case"—listen to this!—dating back to *1906*!

That is the crux of the matter, and that is what our illustre* Rosa has been trying wegzuschwatzen!**

Rosa Luxemburg and her "Partei"vorstand are currently conducting an unprecedentedly fierce fight against their own party's best workers, stooping so low as to throw out suspicions of their connection with the secret police. Rosa Luxemburg and her "Partei"vorstand have lost their head waging *such* a war against their political opponents.

Is it not now clear why, without going *into the substance* of the "Radek affair", I consider it to be my duty to declare that *the substance* of the case is political revenge by Rosa Luxemburg and her "Partei"vorstand?

Certain methods were described in Russian literature by Turgenev long ago. One old rascal, he wrote, once gave this wise advice: when doing something base, see that you shout loudest about the baseness of the acts you are yourself committing. When robbing the public till, be sure to shout loudest about the vileness of embezzlement....

When the Polish "Partei"vorstand stooped to a repetition of Martov's methods against Comrade Radek—the "Partei"-(v)orstand got Rosa Luxemburg to raise the greatest possible noise in *Vorwärts* about Martov's baseness!... Es ist eine alte

---

* Illustrious.—*Ed.*

** To talk herself out of.—*Ed.*

Geschichte,* but for us Russian émigrés ist sie leider gar nicht "neu"**....

Rosa Luxemburg has been trying to assure her German readers that Comrade Radek "nie die geringste Rolle gespielt hat",*** and so on, and so forth. It is my duty to reply to this elenden Altweiberklatsch**** and state the *precise facts*: in 1909 and 1910, Comrade Radek did a great deal of successful work as a contributor to the Central Organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Russia. I was one of the editors of the Central Organ and I cannot let Rosa Luxemburg's malicious bit of gossip go unanswered.

In order to denigrate Comrade Radek, Rosa Luxemburg praises herself under the name of "polnische Wortführer".***** She puts out a hint that Comrade Radek's "taktischen Ideen"*) are tenuous.

Let me say right away that I consider this tenuousness, this readiness to have "peace" with the Russian liquidators, Comrade Radek's great sin. But I believe it is more excusable in a collaborator who is not responsible for C.O. and C.C. policy than in C.C. and C.O. *members*. It is patent "Intrigenführer",**) like Tyszka, who have always played the prevailing role among the notorious "Polish Wortführern" and it is their *tenuousness* that has done tremendous damage to the whole party.

Let me give two examples to substantiate what I say. The Plenary Meeting of the C.C. of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in January 1910 *unanimously* condemned liquidationism. The only section of the resolution leaving Tür und Thor***) for opportunism (the so-called §1) as carried on Tyszka's initiative. What is Rosa Luxemburg going to say about that? Will she dare stand up for this §1 from the standpoint of the "radikale Richtung"?****)

---

* It is an old story.—*Ed.*

** It is unfortunately not "new" at all.—*Ed.*

*** "Never played the slightest role."—*Ed.*

**** Petty old wives' tale.—*Ed.*

***** "Polish representatives"—*Ed.*

*) Tactical ideas."—*Ed.*

**) "Masters of intrigue."—*Ed.*

***) A loophole.—*Ed.*

****) "Radical trend."—*Ed.*

When in the spring of 1911 the Bolsheviks withdrew from the so-called C.C. Bureau Abroad in view of the destruction of the C.C. by the liquidators, the Poles remained in that institution *for months together* with the Bundists and the Latvians,[339] of whom *even* (sogar) Plekhanov wrote: "Diese Parteiinstitution, die zum Werkzeug in den Händen einer Gruppe von Leuten geworden war, die die Partei liquidieren wollten und die daher der Sache des russischen Proletariats grossen Schaden zuzufügen drohte, konnte diesem nur einen Gefallen erweisen: nämlich das Zeitliche segnen" (Note: "Tagebuch eines S.D." 2 Beilage zu N 15, S. 1, zitiert in der Schrift: "Der Anonymus aus dem *Vorwärts* und die Sachlage in der Soz. Dem. Arb. P. Russlands"; diese Schrift wurde in die Redaktionen aller s.d. Blätter in Deutschland gesandt).*

On the strength of these facts, the reader will judge whether there is a great deal of truth in Rosa Luxemburg's boastful words to the effect that the Poles "mit starker Faust die liquidatorische Richtung in Russland niederzuhalten geholfen haben".**

In actual fact, by their intrigues the Poles did much more to *hinder* the struggle against this "Richtung"***. Up to now, eight months after the *formal* expulsion of a *definite* group of liquidators from the Party (the magazine *Nasha Zarya*),[340] the notorious "polnische Wortführer" have been unable to give a *straightforward* answer as to whether or not they want "peace" with *this* group. It is, of course, not as easy to give a straightforward answer as to plagiarise the anti-liquidators today and the liquidators tomorrow, declar-

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* "This party institution, which became a tool in the hands of gentlemen intent on liquidating the party, and which in consequence threatened to inflict great damage on the cause of Russian Social-Democracy, could do the revolutionary proletariat only one good service: suffer a timely demise" (Note: *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, Second Supplement to No. 15, p. 1, quoted in "Anonymous in *Vorwärts*, and the State of Affairs in the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia"; this article was circulated to the editorial boards of all Social-Democratic newspapers in Germany).—*Ed.*

** "Lent their strong fist to help put down the liquidationist trend in Russia."—*Ed.*

*** Trend.—*Ed.*

ing oneself, on the strength of that, to be "*superior*" to both "factions"!

Rosa Luxemburg takes the occasion of the "Radek case" to assure her German readers that nothing "ausser Trümmern"* is left of the "russische Partei".**

In response to that I must state the actual facts. It is the Polish "Partei"vorstand that is the "Trümmer", because it *has not belonged* to the Party for a whole year. For a whole year, it *has not had* any organisational ties either with the Party C.C., which was elected by the January 1912 Conference,[341] or with the so-called "Organising Committee" of the liquidators.

The Party of the Russian Social-Democratic proletariat, which has divested itself of the liquidators and the intriguers of the Polish "Partei"vorstand, is so far from being Trümmer that it has been developing with especial success since January 1912. Since some—and at times, regrettably, influential—comrades in the German party lend an ear to the frequently biased stories and Klatsch of the Wortführer des polnischen "Partei"vorstandes, who are outside the Party, I shall confine myself to a brief indication of the facts.

Legal Marxist newspapers are the only open *measure* (Maßstab) of the Social-Democrats' influence in Russia and their ties with the workers' masses. *Only* two "trends"—the Party and the liquidators—are represented in Russia. All the rest are a Schwindel.***

In the first half of 1912, the liquidators put out 21 issues of their paper and the anti-liquidators, 100. In the two months of the second half-year (July and August) the former had 4, and the latter—60. In the eight months (from January to August 1912) the former were able to report direct assistance to them from *16* workers' groups, and the latter—from *551*.****

* Except debris.—*Ed.*

** Russian Party.—*Ed.*

*** Swindle.—*Ed.*

**** Vgl. die Schrift "Zur gegenwärtigen Sachlage in der Soz. Dem. A. P. Russlands". Leipzig 1912. Diese Schrift gelangt jetzt in Chemnitz zur Verteilung an die Delegierte der Partei (cf. the article "On the Present Situation in the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia", Leipzig 1912. This article is now available in Chemnitz for distribution to party delegates.—*Ed.*).

Rosa Luxemburg with her stories about "Trümmer" should try to refute these facts!

The stories of the polnische "Partei"vorstand about the Russian Party are even less credible than their stories about Radek.

N. Lenin

Written before September 4 (17), 1912

First published in German in 1964 in the magazine *International Review of Social History*, Volume IX. Part 3

Printed from the original

REPLY TO LIQUIDATORS' ARTICLE IN *LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG*[342]

A note on "a conference of organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" appeared in No. 226 of *Volkszeitung** on September 28, but is regrettably based on one-sided and unverified facts.

We consider it necessary to point out that the said conference was actually in no sense a conference of Russian Party organisations. Russian workers' centres were not represented at the conference at all. St. Petersburg was represented by the liquidators from the so-called promotion group[343] who do not belong to the Social-Democratic Party and have been fighting it fiercely in their magazine and newspaper.[344] Moscow was represented only by a delegate from an insignificant section of the Party organisation, and he had been given an imperative mandate to conduct the political line of the Party Conference held in January 1912. The rest of Russia (Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, the Volga and Ural regions, the Central Industrial Area, the Don district and many others) was not represented at all, apart from Krasnoyarsk and Sevastopol, but it was only from the liquidators' magazines and the report about the "conference" that the Party learned of there being any sort of organisation in either city.

For a long time it has of course been no secret to the

* *Leipziger Volkszeitung.—Ed.*

Party that a group of liquidators has been trying to call a conference with the assistance of the Bund, which has essentially nothing to do with actual *Russian* Social-Democratic activity. (For the information of German readers let us add that when we speak about *Russian* Party work the Bund is not included because its sphere of activity is confined exclusively to the Jewish proletariat.) However, the real character of this attempt was so clear that Comrade Plekhanov replied to the invitation to attend the "conference" that he would not do so not only because he regarded the "conference" as being one-sided, but also because it was not attended either by the "Party elements" or by the "anti-Party elements". That is exactly what was said in the report published by the Organising Committee of the liquidators' conference in September 1912. But these words of the *neutral* Comrade Plekhanov *are not* in the German report carried in No. 226 of *Volkszeitung* on September 28 inst. We put it now to every German comrade whether this report can be considered honest. Even from the groups abroad which gave their formal consent to the convocation of a conference *together* with the liquidators, the former deputy of the Second Duma, Alexinsky, representing the *Vperyod* group, *left it* as a sign of open opposition to the liquidators' party conference, because he did not regard it as a valid party conference.

It is our duty, however briefly, also to point out the following: In the six months (from January 1 to June 30, 1912), the anti-liquidators' newspapers in St. Petersburg, *Zvezda* and *Pravda*, united 550 workers' groups as against the liquidators' 16. Upon its appearance, the latter's new paper, *Luch*,[345] was given a hostile reception by the St. Petersburg workers, who saw it as an attempt to split the Party. The liquidators were roundly defeated in the election of workers' representatives to the Duma (elections to the workers' curia of the Duma) on September 16 (29). Despite its use of all the means of advertising, the group which had called this private conference of liquidators fighting against the Party, failed to mislead the Russian organisations. It is now making spasmodic efforts through the same advertising channels to misinform the German comrades, at least.

We most resolutely protest against this, and point out that the liquidators' anonymous information will continue to mislead the German comrades until they demand that the "informers" should make a public stand under their own names and with proof in their hands.

Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

Written after September 16 (29), 1912

Published on October 9, 1912 in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* No. 235
First published in Russian on April 21, 1963 in *Pravda* No. 111

Printed from the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* text
Translated from the German

RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

TO ALL THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA[346]

Comrades workers and all citizens of Russia!

A war of four powers against Turkey has started in the Balkans.[347] War threatens the whole of Europe. Despite their lying government denials, Russia and Austria are preparing for war. Italy is becoming more brazen in her policy of plundering the Turkish lands. The stock-market panic in Vienna and Berlin, in Paris and London shows that the capitalists of all Europe see no possibility of preserving European peace.

All Europe wants to take part in the events in the Balkans! Everyone favours "reforms" and even "freedom for the Slavs". Actually, Russia wants to snatch a piece of Turkey in Asia and to seize the Bosporus. Austria has designs on Salonika, Italy on Albania, Britain on Arabia, and Germany on Anatolia.

The crisis is mounting. Hundreds of thousands and millions of wage slaves of capital and peasants downtrodden by the serf-owners are going to the slaughter for the dynastic interests of a handful of crowned brigands, for the profits of the bourgeoisie in its drive to plunder foreign lands.

The Balkan crisis is a link in the chain of events which since the turn of the century has everywhere been leading to sharper class and international contradictions, to wars and revolutions. The Russo-Japanese war, the revolution in Russia, a series of revolutions in Asia, mounting rivalry and hostility between the European states, the threat to peace over Morocco, and Italy's plunderous campaign against Tripoli—such has been the preparation of the current crisis.

Wars and all their calamities are produced by capitalism, which keeps millions of working people in bondage, sharpens the struggle between nations, and turns the slaves of capital into cannon fodder. A world-wide socialist army of the revolutionary proletariat is alone capable of putting an end to this oppression and enslavement of the masses and to these massacres of slaves in the interests of the slave-owners.

In Western Europe and America, there is a sharpening struggle by the socialist proletariat against imperialist bourgeois governments, who are increasingly inclined to plunge into desperate escapades as they see the working-class millions inexorably marching to victory. These governments are preparing war but at the same time are afraid of war in the knowledge that world-wide war means world-wide revolution.

In Eastern Europe—the Balkans, Austria and Russia—alongside areas of highly developed capitalism, we find the masses oppressed by feudalism, absolutism and thousands of medieval relics. Like tens of millions of peasants in Central Russia, the peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the Adriatic coast, are still ground down by the landowning serf-masters. The piratical dynasties of the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs support this medieval oppression and try to stoke up hostility between the peoples in an effort to strengthen the power of the monarchy and perpetuate the enslavement of a number of nationalities. In Eastern Europe, the monarchs still share out the peoples between them, exchange and trade in them, putting together different nationalities into patchwork states to promote their own dynastic interests, very much as the landowners under the serf system used to break up and shuffle the families of their subject peasants!

A federal Balkan republic is the rallying cry that our brother socialists in the Balkan countries have issued to the masses in their struggle for self-determination and complete freedom of the peoples, to clear the way for a broad class struggle for socialism.

It is the rallying cry of true democrats and real friends of the working class and we must take it up with especial vigour in face of the Russian tsarist monarchy, one of the most vicious supporters of reaction throughout the world.

The foreign policy of Russian tsarism is an unbroken chain of unprecedented crimes and acts of violence, and the dirtiest and basest intrigues against the freedom of nations, against democracy and against the working class. With the aid of Britain's "liberal" rulers, tsarism is crushing and choking Persia; tsarism has been undermining the republic in China; tsarism is sneaking up to seize the Bosporus and extend "its" own territory at the expense of Turkey in Asia. The tsarist monarchy was the gendarme of Europe in the 19th century, when Russian serf-peasant troops put down the uprising in Hungary. Today, in the 20th century, the tsarist monarchy is the gendarme of both Europe and Asia.

Tsar Nicholas the Bloody, who has dispersed the First and Second Dumas, who has drowned Russia in blood, enslaved Poland and Finland, and is in alliance with out-and-out reactionaries conducting a policy of stifling the Jews and all "aliens", the tsar whose loyal friends shot down the workers on the Lena and ruined the peasants to the point of starvation all over Russia—that tsar pretends to be the champion of Slav independence and freedom!

Since 1877, the Russian people have learned a thing or two, and they are now aware that worse than all the Turks are our "*internal Turks*"—the tsar and his servants.

But the landowners and the bourgeoisie, the Nationalists and the Octobrists give their utmost support to this vile and provocative lie about a freedom-loving tsarism. Such papers as *Golos Moskvy*[348] and *Novoye Vremya* are at the head of a whole army of government newspapers brazenly baiting and badgering Austria, as though Russian tsarism was not a hundred times more sullied in dirt and blood than the Hapsburg monarchy.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

And it is not only the Right-wing parties, but even the opposition, liberal bourgeoisie that has been strident in its chauvinistic imperialist propaganda, scarcely covered up with diplomatically evasive and hypocritical phrases. Not only the non-party liberal *Russkoye Slovo*,[349] but even *Rech*, the official organ of the Party of "Constitutional-Democrats" (actually counter-revolutionary liberals), has been zealous in attacking the tsarist Minister Sazonov for his alleged "tractability", for his "concessions" to Austria and for inadequate "protection" of Russia's "great power" interests. The Cadets have been blaming the wildest nationalist reactionaries not for their imperialism, but on the contrary for minimising the weight and the importance of the "great" idea of the tsarist conquest of Constantinople!!

For the sake of the vital interests of all the working people, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party raises its voice in resolute protest against this base chauvinism and brands it as a betrayal of the cause of freedom. A country with 30 million starving peasants and with the wildest arbitrary rule by the authorities, including the shooting of workers in their hundreds a country where tens of thousands of fighters for freedom are being tormented and tortured through hard labour—what such a country needs above all is liberation from tsarist oppression. The Russian peasant must think about emancipating himself from the landowning serf-masters and from the tsarist monarchy, and not allow himself to be diverted from this vital cause by the false speeches of landowners and merchants about Russia's "Slavonic tasks".

Imperialist liberalism, desirous of tolerating tsarism, may insist on "peaceful constitutional" action, promising the people both external victories and constitutional reforms under a preserved tsarist monarchy, but the Social Democratic proletariat indignantly rejects this fraud. The only thing that can ensure free development for Russia and the whole of Eastern Europe is the revolutionary overthrow of tsarism. Only the victory of a federal republic in the Balkans, together with the victory of a republic in Russia, can release hundreds of millions of people from the calamities of war and the torments of oppression and exploitation in the so-called "time of peace".

In the first five months of 1912, more than 500,000 workers in Russia rose to political strikes, restoring their strength after the most trying years of the counter-revolution. In some places, sailors and soldiers rose up in revolt against tsarism. Our call is for revolutionary mass struggle, for more steadfast, stable and extensive preparation for resolute joint action by the workers, peasants and the best section of the army! That is the only salvation for Russia, which has been oppressed and ruined by tsarism.

The socialists of the Balkan countries have come out with a sharp condemnation of the war. The socialists of Italy and Austria and the whole of Western Europe have given them unanimous support. Let us join in their protest and unfold our agitation against the tsarist monarchy.

Down with the tsarist monarchy! Long live the democratic republic of Russia!

Long live the federal republic of the Balkans!

Down with war! Down with capitalism!

Long live socialism, long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee

Written before October 10 (23), 1912

Published in October 1912 as a separate leaflet

Printed from the text of the leaflet

ON POLITICAL SPINELESSNESS

(LETTER TO THE EDITOR)

As a regular reader of *Pravda*,[350] I feel bound to express my deep indignation over the behaviour of the elector P. Sudakov

The elections take place on October 5. Sudakov is not on *Pravda*'s list. None the less, Sudakov is returned by the votes of its supporters—as the results of the elections show. It is also evident that apart from the votes of *Pravda*'s supporters (27-31 out of 50) Sudakov also receives a dozen or so votes from someone else, possibly vacillating voters.

And so Sudakov himself starts vacillating. The day after the election, October 6, *Pravda* carries his report which says, in black and white, the following: "All those elected,

with the exception of Comrade Petrov, belong to the supporters of *Pravda* and *Zvezda*."

That's clear, isn't it?

But within 24 hours, Sudakov puts in an appearance in *Luch*! Sudakov admits that he has been to *Pravda*'s editorial office but, he says, "only as the editorial office of a Social-Democratic newspaper"!! I wonder if this Sudakov isn't a babe-in-arms. Who is going to believe him that he knew nothing about the two Social-Democratic papers? That he did not know about the liquidators, when he himself understands the liquidators?

"If I did say," Sudakov writes in the liquidationist *Luch*, "that I read *Pravda* and side with it" (please note Sudakov declaring that he sides with *Pravda*!), "it was only in the sense" (sic) "that I do in general" (sic) "side" (is that all?) "with the Social-Democrats."

What is one to make of all this! Here is a man who is aware of the existence of the two papers, admitting that he did say that he "sided with *Pravda*", and who the next day takes a "senatorial explanation" to the liquidationist newspaper, merely in the sense that he allegedly sides with the Social-Democrats in general!!

We are not aware of a more crying instance of spinelessness and vacillation.

There have always been "Tushino turncoats"[351]—deserters from one trend to another—but turncoats have never had the respect of the workers.

Pravda No. 145, October 17, 1912
Signed: *Regular reader of "Pravda"*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU, "ELECTIONS TO THE FOURTH DUMA"[352]

The coup of June 3 (16), 1907, opened the epoch of counter-revolution in Russia. Everyone knows about the judicial and administrative lawlessness, the persecutions and tortures of those condemned to penal servitude that crowned this triumph of tsarism.

The upper sections of the bourgeoisie, terrified by the revolution, supported the counter-revolutionary gentry.

Tsarism was sure that it would find support and assistance among the counter-revolutionary elements of the bourgeoisie and landowners.

The electoral law of June 3 (16), 1907, is a specimen of barefaced rigging. Here are some data characterising it:

The population is divided into "curias": landowners, first- and second-category urban dwellers, peasants, Cossacks and workers. Electors, elected separately by curias (sometimes not directly, but through representatives), are grouped by the government into gubernia electoral assemblies, and the latter elect the deputies to the Duma.

The law distributes the electors in such a way that in the electoral assemblies of 28 gubernias (out of 50) only the landowners are assured of a majority in advance, and in the rest—the electors of the first urban curia (big capitalists).

Here is the overall picture: 200,000 gentry have 2,594 electors in the electoral assemblies of 53 gubernias, that is, 49.4 per cent of the total number of electors; 500,000 or so capitalists of the first urban curia have 788 electors (15 per cent); almost 8 million townsfolk of the second urban curia have 590 electors (11.2 per cent); nearly 70 million peasants and Cossacks have 1,168 electors (22.2 per cent); and nearly 12 million workers—112 electors (2.1 per cent).

No wonder this electoral law has produced a "black" counter-revolutionary Duma—a real "Chambre introuvable".[353] What is surprising is that not only bourgeois liberals, but even Social-Democrats have managed to get their representatives into such a Duma.

In the workers' curia, all electors are Social-Democrats. The ultra-reactionary gentry, with a majority in the gubernia electoral assemblies, have been forced to let in the Social-Democrats (in six gubernias, the law stipulates the election of one deputy from the workers; in other gubernias, the Social-Democrats obtain mandates through agreements with the liberals).

The Third Duma was dominated by the Octobrist Party—a party of the reactionary gentry and big capitalists subservient to tsarism. But even these "slaves" failed to satisfy the Nicholas II camarilla, this black band of brigands organising pogroms and attempts on the life of opposition deputies.

The government, which rigged the elections to get the Octobrists into the Third Duma, has now falsified the elections to get the more "loyal" parties—the "Nationalists" and "extreme Rightists"—into the Fourth Duma.

The pressure has been unprecedented. The priests have been ordered to take massive part in the elections and get the Rightists in; the arrests of the opposition candidates, the fines imposed on the press, the closure of newspapers, the dropping of suspects from the electoral rolls—all that was applied, with such cynicism that even the Rightists and even the gentry were impelled to protest.

As a result, we have an even "blacker" and even more Rightist Duma, but it is the Octobrists that today turn out to be the defeated party. The liberal opposition and revolutionary democracy (Social-Democratic workers and peasant bourgeois democrats) have almost managed to retain the status quo.

The latest data on 438 (out of 442) deputies up for election to the Fourth Duma warrant the following comparison:

	Third Duma	Fourth Duma	
Democracy			
Social-Democrats . . .	13	14	
Trudoviks	14	11	25
Liberals			
Cadets	52	61	
Progressists	36	33	
Poles	18	14	
Moslems	9	5	113
Rightists			
Octobrists	131	79	
Nationalists	91	74	
Extreme Rightists . .	46	140	293
Non-party	27	7	
Total	437	438	

Let us add a few words to explain the names and groupings of the parties:

Social-Democrats: the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Trudoviks: peasant democrats, i.e., revolutionary

bourgeois democrats, whose programme includes the expropriation of the gentry. Cadets: the Constitutional-Democratic Party, actually a counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeois party. Progressists[354]: the same liberals, but slightly more moderate. Poles and Moslems—the same thing, but on national lines. Altogether the opposition consists of 25 democrats and 113 liberals, or 138 deputies (142 in the Third Duma).

Government parties: the Octobrists speak of the constitution rarely and under their breath; the Nationalists never speak of the constitution. The Rightists openly favour a return to autocracy and oppose the constitution. Not only the Octobrists, but even a section of the Nationalists have been impelled towards the opposition by the election rigging.

As for the Social-Democrats, the following have been elected by this time:

Six deputies from the workers' curia are Social-Democrats: Badayev from St. Petersburg; Malinovsky from Moscow; Samoilov from Vladimir; Shagov from Kostroma; Muranov from Kharkov; and Petrovsky from Yekaterinoslav. All six are workers. Then Social-Democrats have also been returned in three gubernias through agreement between democrats (socialists and Trudoviks) and liberals against the Rightists. Returned in this manner were: Khaustov from Ufa; Buryanov from Taurida Gubernia; Tulyakov from the Don Region. Then three Social-Democrats were returned from the Caucasus: Chkheidze, Chkhenkeli and Skobelev, the latter being elected by the Russian population of the Caucasus.

Two Social-Democrats were returned from Siberia: Rusanov and, from the Amur Region, Ryslev.

Let us add, too, that the election of one Social-Democrat from Irkutsk Gubernia (Siberia) was virtually assured (11 electors out of 20 were Social-Democrats). However, the governor has declared the election of six Social-Democrats in the city of Irkutsk invalid. The elections have not yet been held.

It is also necessary to add that in Warsaw, as a result of a bloc between the Bund and the P.P.S., Jagiello, a member of the Polish Socialist Party,[355] was elected deputy.

All these data are preliminary. The full composition of all the groups of the Fourth Duma, including the Social-Democratic group, will become known after the Duma opens on November 15 (28).

Cracow, November 11, 1912

The newspaper *Le Peuple* No. 325,
November 20, 1912
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Printed from
the text of the
book *Correspondance entre Lénine et Camille Huysmans. 1905-1914*, Paris
Translated from the
French

MORE ABOUT THE PEASANT DEPUTIES IN THE FOURTH DUMA

Novoye Vremya recently reported the final organisation of a separate peasant group in the Fourth Duma. The report says that it consists of 40 men. The group's bureau consists of Yevseyev, Karaulov, Ichas, Firsov and Mershchy.

"Karaulov (a Cossack)," wrote *Novoye Vremya*, "is said to be one of the most vigorous men in the new group; he drew public attention by his original definition of party affiliation in the form which members of the Duma are asked to fill in by the magistrate office. In the 'party affiliation' column Karaulov wrote: 'I do not belong to any party or faction. I am what every man who truly loves his country must be: I am a monarchist-democrat.'"

Can we accept that such a definition of party affiliation is "original"? Yes and no. Yes, considering that Karaulov has frankly expressed what many are afraid to say. No, because in point of fact Deputy Karaulov's opinion is notoriously shared by a very considerable number of peasants and Cossacks.

Incidentally, Deputy Karaulov believes that "every man who truly loves his country" *must* be a democrat. Deputy Karaulov is clearly mistaken. Let him look at all the Right-wing half or even the Right-wing two-thirds of the Duma: can he truly say that among all these "Rightists"—from "Nationalists" to Octobrists—there is *no one* "who truly loves his country"? Karaulov must concede that there probably is.

But it is *quite obvious* that the Rightists, and the Nationalists, and the Octobrists (and, honestly speaking, the Cadets as well) are *not* "democrats".

They are all monarchists, that is beyond question, but they are *not* democrats. They either do not at all favour a democratic electoral law, democratic laws on the press, on association and assembly, democratic distribution of landed property, or talk their way out of the serious problems of democracy.

What then is to be done? Is it not clear that the landowners, for instance, take a *different* view of "true love for the country" than the peasants, although both may be monarchists?

The work of the Fourth Duma will surely make Karaulov and men like him give serious thought to this.

Written on November 27-28 (December 10-11), 1912

First published in 1961 in Vol. 22 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

RESOLUTION OF THE CRACOW MEETING OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITH PARTY FUNCTIONARIES[356]

ON THE REORGANISATION AND WORK OF THE *PRAVDA* EDITORIAL BOARD

1. The Editorial Board lacks consistency of Party principle. The Editorial Board is strongly advised to see to the stricter observance and implementation of all Party decisions. Its proceedings must be conducted on legal lines.

The C.C. is taking steps to reorganise the Editorial Board.

2. The Editorial Board has failed to provide the necessary response to Party life among Social-Democratic workers in St. Petersburg. Reports or mention of Party resolutions must be unconditionally legal in form.

3. The Editorial Board must give more attention to explaining the error and harm of liquidationism in general and of the sermons of *Luck* in particular.

4. The Editorial Board must give more attention to campaigning for subscriptions and collections among the workers.

5. The Bolshevik section of the deputies must take part in the paper's broad editorial collegium and organise systematic and persistent participation in the literary and economic side of the business.

6. The Editorial Board must be especially circumspect in its attitude to its *Vperyod* contributors to avoid hampering the rapprochement that has begun and to prevent the adoption of an erroneous principled line.

7. Every effort must be made to reduce publishing costs and to set up a small governing collegium (running the whole business) on which there must be at least one representative of the Six.[357]

There is need for a similar governing collegium (economic commission) on which one of the Six must be seated, to handle the economic side of the business.

8. Articles which the C.C. considers obligatory for insertion must be carried immediately (under a code name).[358]

9. While strictly maintaining the newspaper's legal character, it is necessary to recruit for active participation both in literary work on the newspaper and in its distribution workers' societies, leagues, committees, groups and individuals in St. Petersburg and in the provinces.

10. Support should be given to the initiative of the group of St. Petersburg Social-Democrats in the publication of a general trade union organ of anti-liquidationist orientation, carefully verifying what is being done on the spot.

11. Measures must be taken to bring the literary and the economic side of the newspaper and the magazine[359] closer together.

12. The starting of a daily workers' newspaper in Moscow as a branch of the St. Petersburg paper must be vigorously pursued. With this end in view, organisational connections should be established between the Moscow group and the three deputies of the Moscow Region.

First published in 1956
in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii*
No. 11

Printed from
a copy written in
N. K. Krupskaya's
hand

LETTER TO THE EXECUTIVE OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY[360]

Dear Comrades!

On the proposal of the Central Committee, the conference of representatives of the C.C. and local workers in Russia operating in various branches of Social-Democratic activity, has discussed your letter of December 28, 1912, stating your desire to "call a conference and direct debates".

While expressing gratitude for your attention to our Party affairs, the conference has unanimously decided to *reject* your proposal.

We Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats have very great respect for the party of the German revolutionary proletariat. We want the most fraternal relations to exist between the Russian and the German Social-Democratic parties. Being unwilling, therefore, to leave any misunderstanding, we shall try to make a frank statement to you, dear comrades, of the motives by which we were guided in rejecting your proposal.

Let us start, for instance, with the *aim* of your projected conference.

You believe that it should have the aim "to work out a common party programme and organisational rules," and invite us to inform you of our draft for the one and the other.

But our Party has had a Party programme for a long time. Back in 1903, i.e., ten years ago, our programme was approved by our Party's Second Congress. Since then hundreds of thousands, and in the revolutionary years, millions of proletarians in Russia have proved their loyalty to this programme by fighting under our Party's standard. We remain true to this programme today. We believe its revision to be *quite* superfluous.

For your information we wish to tell you that up to now not *even* the liquidators have demanded any revision of the Party programme—at any rate they have not done so openly.

Efforts to reach agreement by different groups and groupings concerning a new programme imply the *absence of a party*. But the R.S.D.L.P. *is there*, and the working class

of Russia continues to struggle under its standard. Our Party has faced and partially still faces some very hard times. But it has not ceased to exist for a single minute—contrary to the liquidators' assertions. Only the latter (i.e., men outside the Party) will find acceptable any negotiations on working out some new Party programme—apparently for some new party. (What has been said applies, with slight modifications, to the working out of a new set of Party rules.)

Furthermore, we are divided from the liquidators by profound differences of principle—above all on the question of another revolution in Russia. Our Party (including the *pro-Party* Mensheviks, with G. V. Plekhanov at their head) takes the stand that the working class of Russia and its Party must work for a new revolution in Russia which alone could bring our country true political freedom. That is precisely what the liquidators deny. All their tactics are based on the assumption that development in Russia will take a more or less peaceful constitutional way.

You will easily understand, dear comrades, that from *these* cardinal differences inevitably flows a series of contradictions on all questions of Party work. The liquidators repudiate our present R.S.D.L.P., which can now exist only illegally (although it is capable of conducting and *does conduct* legal Social-Democratic work in many branches). The liquidators have been trying to wreck our present organisation in the hope of establishing a legal labour party in present-day Russia. (Let us note here that even the liberal Cadets have been unable to secure legal status for their party.) Hence the split, which is entirely and exclusively the work of the liquidators.

Very naturally these disputes, these cardinal differences can be resolved *only* by the conscious Russian workers themselves, only by our own Russian Social-Democratic organisations and *no one else*.

In fact, the Russian workers have already taken a long step in that direction.

The recent election to the Fourth Duma has shown that the Russian proletariat is overwhelmingly behind the standpoint taken by our old Party with its revolutionary programme and tactics.

All six deputies elected under the law from the workers' curia are Bolsheviks.

These six deputies represent nine-tenths of working-class Russia and they have openly declared themselves to be opposed to the liquidators.

Russia's *first* working-class Social-Democratic daily (the St. Petersburg *Pravda*) was founded and is kept going by the workers themselves, on the pennies of the workers, namely, workers belonging to the same (Bolshevik) trend. Consequently, the unity of the vast *majority* of workers is being created in action, at the grass roots, in the depths of the working mass. That is the *only* unity that is vital, and it alone will lead to the complete cohesion of the workers' forces.

We shall not conceal from you, comrades, that in the given circumstances we regard mediation by the German Parteivorstand* as being altogether unacceptable. Either for lack of information or for some other reason, the Vorstand has not displayed impartiality in respect of the liquidators and us. Let us recall at least these two facts.

1) The Central Organ of the fraternal German Party (*Vorwärts*)[361] gets aside whole columns for gross attacks by the liquidators on our January 1912 Party Conference, whereas we are being denied the opportunity of inserting even a purely factual refutation, which is a violation of the most elementary duties in respect of us.

2) During the election campaign, the Vorstand, despite our protests, gave cash assistance to the liquidators, but denied it to the Central Committee. The Vorstand gave a subsidy to the Bund, to the Caucasian Regional Committee[362] and the Latvians, *i.e.*, the liquidator O.C.,[363] because everyone knows that it is these three organisations that mainly constitute the liquidator O.C. And the liquidators used the German workers' money to start their publication of a Konkurrenzorgan** *Luch* in St. Petersburg, whose first issue appeared *on the very day of the election* and helped to aggravate the split.

To give cash assistance to one side against the other during a split is a step absolutely unheard of throughout the Inter-

* Party Executive.—*Ed.*
** Rival organ.—*Ed.*

national. Having taken such a step, the Vorstand issued a challenge to the supporters of the January Conference and showed that it was unable to remain impartial.

It is with deep regret that we must frankly tell you, comrades, that the German comrades' supply of information concerning Russian affairs is thoroughly *defective*. This also explains your various proposals, such as a conference of 12 "trends" (small semi-student groups abroad), ignoring the organisations in Russia, or the plan to call together five organisations, etc. This also explains the barefaced attempts on the part of the liquidators simply to deceive you: for example, their attempt to obtain money from you on the strength of the allegation that in the summer of 1912 the Bolsheviks of Kharkov and Moscow united with the liquidators. Actually, however, it is in Kharkov and Moscow that Bolsheviks, implacable opponents of liquidationism (deputies Muranov and Malinovsky), were elected, and they were elected *in the struggle* with the latter. This also explains why during the elections you gave cash aid to the groups (the Bund, P.P.S., P.S.D.[364]) which clashed sharpest at the election and which produced from their midst Jagiello, *the only* deputy not to be accepted as a full-fledged member of the Social-Democratic group, and who was admitted by the slimmest majority of 7 votes to 6.

It is high time, comrades, to put an end to all this. Instead of listening to incompetent informants, you must open the pages of your organs for an objective explanation of the state of affairs in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and for its illumination in the light of principle, namely, for articles signed by responsible spokesmen of the several Party groups.

If you want to know about our affairs, you must draw your information about them from documents and literature, as you do, for instance, in following the struggle of various trends in Italy, Britain, etc. Otherwise, you will unwittingly take steps which may frequently be seen by Russian workers as a quite undeserved affront.

Written on March 2 (15), 1913

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Printed from
a typewritten copy
Translated from the
German

PRAVDA'S ANNIVERSARY

(WORKERS' SUPPORT FOR THE WORKING-CLASS NEWSPAPER)

A year has passed since the appearance of *Pravda*'s first issue. It originated as a *workers*' newspaper, created by the celebrated upswing of the working-class movement in Russia in April and May 1912.

Pravda has withstood incredible hardships and harassments and has consolidated its positions (insofar as a workers' newspaper can be "consolidated" in modern Russia) through the support of the working class. *Pravda* has been more than a *workers*' newspaper *in name*: any newspaper can adopt a name. *Pravda* has been a workers' newspaper *in fact*, in its orientation, in its range of readers from the working mass, and in its content in general, notably the mass of; reports from the workers (1,783 workers' reports in the first 99 issues; a total of *almost 5,000*), and, finally, *in the support* "*Pravda*" has been given by workers in general and by workers' groups in particular.

Earlier on we pointed out in *Pravda* (see Nos. 80 and 103 for 1912)* the exceptional importance of the data on support for *Pravda* through cash contributions by workers' groups. Their importance goes well beyond the framework of financial assistance, although workers' financial assistance is extremely important and necessary to improve the newspaper at all times.

But contributions from workers' groups are equally, if not more, important in their moral, educational and organisational significance for all class-conscious workers and for the working class of Russia as a whole.

By developing the habit of giving *regular* support for *their own* working-class newspaper not only through subscriptions and distribution but also through regular contributions, the workers are rallied even closer around a newspaper of *their own* trend, the workers are *organised* into something ideologically coherent, the workers verify the progress

* See present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 187-202 and 299-301.—*Ed.*

of their awakening as they read reports about the contributions at a neighbouring factory or one they know of. It is, therefore, impossible to over-emphasise the need to extend and develop in every possible way the custom of *regular* (it is better to have them small but *regular*) contributions and collections by groups of workers for the workers' newspaper.

The published reports showed that before *Pravda* came out over 4,000 rubles had been collected and sent in through the newspaper *Zvezda* by 500 workers' groups. From the day of our paper's first issue up to April 10, contributions totalling 3,932 rubles 42 kopeks were received, only according to reports published in *Pravda*. Of them, 79.9 per cent came from proletarians of various categories, 20 per cent from various groups of intellectuals, and 0.1 per cent from the peasants. By districts the total is distributed as follows: St. Petersburg—66.3 per cent (2,605 rubles 81 kopeks), of which only 10 per cent falls to the intelligentsia; Moscow, Vladimir and Kostroma—4.6 per cent, of which contributions from the intelligentsia occur only in Moscow District (Let us explain at this point that apart from other reasons, these three districts showed small participation in collections for *Pravda* because they also made collections for the Moscow paper.[365] The money sent only through our newspaper comes to more than 2,000 rubles, of which 70 per cent falls to these three districts and 25 per cent to St. Petersburg District. Once again the St. Petersburg workers showed their political maturity: they also took an active part in setting up the Moscow newspaper); the Urals, Siberia, the Baltic Area and Poland—10.3 per cent; Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav districts—4.4 per cent; elsewhere (Finland, Western Europe, etc.)—14.5 per cent.

These figures are sufficiently eloquent evidence of who is the owner of the newspaper, who has kept *Pravda* going and how intimately it is connected with the workers' masses.

In this context, *Pravda*'s successes in the first year were *very* great. To avoid tiring our readers with a lot of figures, we shall not give the monthly but the quarterly (that is, three-month) figures for workers' group collections for *Pravda*.

Years	Number of workers' group collections	
	Pravda	Moscow workers newspapers
1912, first quarter	108	—
” second quarter	396	—
” third quarter	81	—
” fourth quarter	35	5
1913, first quarter	309	129
1913, first 10 days of April	93	43
Total	1,022	177

And so we find that in its first year, *Pravda* met with support from *more than 1,000 groups of workers* and laid the foundation for the *workers*' paper of Russia's *main* industrial area, namely, the Moscow Central Area.

It goes without saying that *financial* support for *Pravda* from a thousand workers' groups implies *all kinds* of support from a much greater number of workers' groups; it means that *tens of thousands* of workers have rallied and united round *Pravda*. There is no doubt at all that the number of groups making cash contributions is only a small fraction of the groups of *Pravda* readers and friends, who helped it by their letters and reports, who helped to circulate the paper, to introduce it among new workers, new sections of the working people, etc.

The working class has advanced a whole vanguard of "front-rankers" who have given a start in the capital to *their own*, Marxist workers' newspaper which is hostile to liberal vacillation, and have inaugurated a *second* workers' newspaper in the heart of industrial Russia. What the advanced, class-conscious workers have done for *Pravda* and for the Moscow workers' newspaper enables us to pass unerring judgement on the sum total of the great work done by the workers for the enlightenment and the organisation of their class. For, after all, *Pravda* and the Moscow newspaper are only a *part*, even if an important one, of this great cause.

Encouraged by the success of the first year of the workers' newspaper, the advanced workers will join forces in untiring,

persistent effort to continue the great cause of enlightening and rallying ever broader masses of the proletariat round the ideas of Marxism!

Pravda No. 92
April 23, 1913

Printed from
the *Pravda* text

THE STRUGGLE OF PARTIES IN CHINA

The Chinese people have succeeded in overthrowing the old medieval system and the government supporting it. A republic has been established in China, and the *first parliament* of that great Asian country, which had long gladdened the hearts of the reactionaries of all nationalities by its immobility and stagnation—the first Chinese Parliament has been elected, convened and has been sitting for several weeks.

In the Lower of the two chambers of the Chinese Parliament, a small majority belongs to the supporters of Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang Party, the "Nationalists"—to express this party's essence in the context of Russian conditions, it should be called a radical-Narodnik republican party, a party of democracy. In the Upper Chamber it has a more considerable majority.

This party is opposed by smaller moderate or conservative parties with all sorts of names like "Radicals", and so on. Actually, *all* these parties are parties of *reactionaries*, namely, bureaucrats, landowners and reactionary bourgeoisie. They all gravitate to the Chinese Cadet Yüan Shih-k'ai, the provisional President of the Republic, who has been acting more and more like a dictator. As a Cadet he has been running true to form: yesterday he was a monarchist; now that revolutionary democracy has won out, he is a republican; tomorrow he intends to be the head of state, again a monarchist state, that is, to betray the Republic.

Sun Yat-sen's party is based on the *south* of China, which is the most advanced, the most developed industrially and commercially, and where the influence of Europe has been greatest.

Yüan Shih-k'ai's parties are based on the backward *north* of China.

The early clashes have so far ended in a victory for Yüan Shih-k'ai: he has united all the "moderate" (i.e., reactionary) parties, split off a section of the "Nationalists", got *his* man to fill the post of President of the Lower Chamber of Parliament, and *contrary to* the will of Parliament, secured a *loan* from "Europe", i.e., Europe's swindling billionaires. The terms of the loan are hard, downright usurious, with the salt gabelle as security. The loan will put China in pawn to the most reactionary and plunderous European bourgeoisie, which is prepared to stamp out the freedom of any nation once profits are involved. The European capitalists will reap tremendous profits on this loan of almost 250 million rubles.

This turns out to be an alliance between reactionary fear of the European proletariat on the part of the European bourgeoisie and the reactionary classes and sections of China.

For Sun Yat-sen's party the struggle against this alliance is a very hard one.

What is this party's weakness? It lies in the fact that it has *not* yet been able *sufficiently* to involve *broad masses* of the Chinese people in the revolution. The proletariat in China is still very weak—there is therefore no leading class capable of waging a resolute and conscious struggle to carry the democratic revolution to its end. The peasantry, lacking a leader in the person of the proletariat, is terribly downtrodden, passive, ignorant and indifferent to politics. Despite the revolutionary overthrow of the old and thoroughly corrupt monarchy, despite the victory of the republic, China has *no* universal suffrage! The elections to Parliament had a qualification: only those who had property valued at about 500 rubles were entitled to vote! This also shows how *little* of the really broad popular mass has yet been drawn into active support of the Chinese Republic. But without such *massive* support, without an organised and steadfast leading class, the Republic *cannot be* stable.

Still, despite its leader Sun Yat-sen's major shortcomings (pensiveness and indecision, which are due to his lack of proletarian support), revolutionary democracy in China has done a great deal to awaken the people and to win freedom and consistently democratic institutions. By

drawing ever broader masses of the Chinese peasantry into the movement and into politics, Sun Yat-sen's party is becoming (to the extent to which this process is taking place) a great factor of progress in Asia and of mankind's progress. Whatever defeats it may suffer from political rogues, adventurers and dictators, who rely on the country's reactionary forces, this party's efforts will not have been in vain.

Written on April 28 (May 11), 1913

Published on May 3, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 100

Printed from the *Pravda* text

CONCERNING THE EDITORIAL IN THE NEWSPAPER *LUCH* No. 189

...* The phrase about a struggle waged by "every available means" does not commit anyone to anything. That is pretty clear. On the contrary, the phrase seems to have been deliberately chosen to justify the evasiveness of the liberals. What are "available" means? Is the leader writer in *Luch* so childishly naive, is he such a political simpleton that he is not aware that *villainous* means are "available" to Russian liberalism?? He is aware, but he says nothing, thereby putting a nice make-up on liberalism.

The liberal millionaire, the industrialist Konovalov, who got into the Duma through a gross fraud on democracy (a fine villainous means!), has obtained permission to set up a *Russkaya Molva* society, with a capital of *half a million rubles*, with the aim of coupling the Cadets with the Octobrists in the "Progressist" newspaper *Russkaya Molva*.[366]

That is a fact, and *Luch* is aware of it. But together with these Konovalovs and their hack writers *Luch* signs a resolution on a "struggle by every available means". I put this to any worker and any thinking peasant: Isn't it clear that this resolution *cheats the people* by deliberately using vague words about "availability", while the Konovalovs are *notoriously* known to regard as "available" only those means which cannot seriously inconvenience Messrs. Purishkevich & Co.?

* The beginning of the article has not been discovered.—*Ed.*

That much is clear. All the activity of Messrs. Konovalovs—and, of course, not the Konovalovs alone, but all the liberals—has provided ample proof that the only means they regard as *available* are those which *do not undermine* the foundations of the welfare and the foundations of the privileges of Messrs. Purishkevich & Co.

There was need to attend the conference to expose for the thousandth time (we shall never tire of doing this) the fraud and to explain to the naive, or ignorant, or slow-witted democrats the "gist" (or, if you want the straight truth, the *dirt* and the *lie*) of the word "availability".

This is the basest, the most loathsome, the most corrupt word in the Russian political vocabulary. From the standpoint of grammar it is ridiculous to say: "I recognise only available means", for who does not know that the *unavailable* is not available? But the whole point is that the question is not a grammatical, but a political one. The workers do *not* regard as available the same things as Konovalov, Milyukov & Co. do.

Let me take a negative example. The workers consider *un*available "means" like declaring Rodzyanko's speech "constitutional" today, and tomorrow railing about the infamy of the Octobrists (who have remained true to themselves and to the Purishkeviches from October 17 or even earlier).

The workers, a fact I am quite sure of, consider that means and that method "unavailable" villainy. The KonovaIovs and the Milyukovs consider it "available" "constitutional tactics".

Let me now take a positive example.... On second thoughts ... Article 129.... Now, gentlemen, after all you must allow me *not* to take any positive example in this article, in this newspaper or in this magazine! On the other hand, if I had been at the conference, and if the Konovalovs and the Milyukovs at the conference had promised not to inform on me, I would have cited a positive historical and statistical example that would be fine, excellent, vivid and most convincing!... Upon my word, it is a temptation to describe what is considered available in the sphere of action in general and in the sphere of the *purse*, in particular, by the workers on the one hand, and by the Konovalovs and the Milyukovs on the other.... But I shall refrain....

One should have attended the conference. It could have offered more freedom of speech than "certain other places". There the democrats should have been invited to speak out on the harm of reformism—this would have been opportune from the standpoint of the question that has been raised. There would have been *two* resolutions: the democratic and the liberal, one "unavailable" to the liberals (but available to the workers and the class-conscious petty bourgeois, or at least to a section of them) and the other "available" to the Konovalovs. The public would have read both resolutions or would have heard about both of them and would have *given them thought*. It would have thoroughly scrutinised them. It would have used its brains. People would have started to make comparisons.

And surely within a short while, the democracy which believes liberal villainy "unavailable" and regards something quite different as available would have started to *split away* from the section of democracy which is captivated by liberal catchwords and empty phrases. That, *too*, would have been "joint action"—but not in the spirit of common talk with the liberals concerning the limits of what is "available" to liberalism.

Yes, indeed, the newspaper *Luch* is being run by loathsome liberals, but if it carries a few more useful leaders like the one in No. 189, the workers will finally find out these "evil pastors". Carry on, gentlemen, and Godspeed!

Written not earlier than May 10 (23), 1913
Signed: *Postoronny*

First published in 1961 in Vol. 23 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

LANDOWNERS ON THE MIGRATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR

Novoye Vremya, a newspaper of the Black-Hundred landowners, reports some interesting discussions among landowners in Poland and in the frontier areas of Russia in general over the migration of agricultural workers to Germany and other European countries in search of employment.

This migration has been rapidly growing. In 1901, some 218,000 persons a year were estimated to have migrated. In 1911, the figure was set at 740,000, more than three times the 1901 figure. In 1912, as many as 800,000 must have left.

Let us note that apart from Polish peasants and workers, Russian workers from the centre of Russia have been also leaving for Germany. "Now one very often meets men from Tula, Orel and Ryazan on the border and beyond." The issue of *free* ten-month foreign passports for workers going to do agricultural work has intensified this movement.

What is the cause? It is that the Russian peasants are being increasingly ruined and it is ever harder to earn a living in Russia, because of the general stagnation of economic life, which is depressed by the serf-owners and lawlessness. Wages in Russia are being kept down at the low serf level.

In Russia, the annual agricultural wage averages 62 rubles; add to this 46 rubles' worth of food a year and you get wages totalling 108 rubles a year. In Germany, however, wages average *180 rubles* a year, i.e., just under *twice as much!!* (In Britain, let us note in parenthesis, agricultural labourer's wages come to 300 rubles a year, and in America, to 500 rubles.)

It is natural, therefore, that *hundreds of thousands* of workers are fleeing from lawless, starving and impoverished Russia to find employment in Germany, and even beyond it—in Denmark, Switzerland and France. There the workers find out about a higher level of culture, much better cultivation of the soil, incomparably higher crop yields and, what is most important, political freedom, freedom for the labour press and labour organisations.

And so, we find the landowning gentlemen debating between themselves: some say that the landowner will benefit from this massive training of our workers in better methods of agriculture. Others wax indignant over the fact that the migration of workers tends to raise wages in the places which they leave.

In Russia, generally speaking—and in Russian legislation in particular—the opinion of *the latter* prevails, and they would like to see the peasants "settled" (i.e., tied to the land), submissive (without any prospect of moving), down-

trodden and barbaric (to prevent them from seeing how to improve their living conditions and how much better off workers in other countries are).

Fortunately, these landowning serf-masters, however hard they may try to break and distort Russian life, no longer have the power to stem the tide of world-wide capitalism, which is uprooting the Russian muzhik as well from his godforsaken hole.

Written on May 10 (23), 1913
Published on May 18, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 113 Signed: *D.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

WORKING-CLASS PARTY AND LIBERAL RIDERS

(ON POTRESOV)

...* Mr. Potresov quotes (rather distorts) G. V. Plekhanov's article which appeared in August of 1905. At the time, there was a complete and formal split between the Bolsheviks, who united at the Third Congress of the Social-Democratic Party (London, May 1905), and the Mensheviks, (a "conference" at Geneva at the same time).[367] The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks had their own separate press organs both in 1905 and in the spring of 1906.

These are all generally known historical facts, and the rider, Mr. Potresov, speculates on their being forgotten.

He has to *keep silent* about them because they expose the rider's impudence!

Neither of the then existing *two* Social-Democratic parties (and at the time Plekhanov was out of touch with both of them) had *any party* decision concerning the non-Party significance of (G. V. Plekhanov's article, or its liquidationism, its destruction or denial of the Party!

That tells the whole story, Mr. Dodging and Hiding Liberal Rider.

Liquidationism is a *trend* condemned by formal *Party* decisions in December 1908 and again in January 1910 (*unanimously* by all trends).

* The first page of the MS. has not been found.—*Ed.*

No conference (or any other institution) of the Party *ever* "read" any liquidationism into Plekhanov's article. *That tells the whole story.* Mr. A. N. Potresov clutches at an old article and presents a sheaf of quotations in order to *hush up* the fact that the *whole Party* condemned him, Potresov, his liquidationist *trend*.

Riders from among the liberal intelligentsia, like Mr. Potresov, are full of a grand, aristocratic contempt for *working-class party* decisions. These riders ignore *party* decisions!

And the working-class party ignores the liberal *Luch* and the liberal Mr. Potresov, who "reads" liquidationism into Plekhanov's old articles, as Mr. V. Chernov used to "read" Narodism into Liebknecht.

Mr. Potresov is pathetic and ridiculous in his vain efforts to talk his way out of the fact that liquidationism has been condemned by the Party.

It is only idle talk on the part of Mr. Potresov and *Luch* about taking Plekhanov to *court*, it is only an effort to fool the reader. They are well aware that everyone will *b l a m e* them and will laugh at their vain efforts to accuse Plekhanov.

Written on May 27 (June 9), 1913

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CAPITALISTS AND ARMAMENTS

The British labour press is continuing its interesting and instructive campaign of exposure revealing how the syndicates of internationally associated capitalists are pushing the nations into war.

Take Nobel's *dynamite trust* (or syndicate). Its capital comes to the tidy sum of 30 million rubles. Last year, it had a net profit of 3.3 million rubles. Eleven per cent in net profit, not bad, eh?

In their annual report, the noble dealers in destructive materials modestly explain their success in this short phrase: "This year there was a high demand for military supplies."

Is it surprising? The capitalist press and the political leaders serving the capitalists have been shouting about war, and clamouring for more armaments—that is so profitable for the industrialists manufacturing military supplies!

But who are they, these industrialists?

They are the associated capitalists of *all* nations, the brothers of ministers, members of parliament and so on!

Among the shareholders of the "dynamite" trust (which is a shareholder, if not an owner, of *four* dynamite plants in Germany) we come across the following names:

German army: General von Mühlburg, Major Baron von Fritsch, etc.;

British army: General J. Donald, Colonel Noel Findlay, etc.;

French army: Colonel François Laffargue;

Lord Glenconner, brother of Mrs. Asquith, the *British Prime Minister's* wife, Sir North, a minister, Harold Tennant, M. P., Deutsche Bank, Hannover Bank, *etc.*

The leaders of the *national* parties in various parliaments who shout about the "might of the state" and about "patriotism" (vide the motion formulas of the Cadets, Progressists and Octobrists in the Fourth Duma![368]) realise this patriotism by arming France against Germany, Germany against Britain, etc. They are all such ardent patriots. They are all so concerned, oh, so concerned about the "might of the state"—their own, of course—against the enemy.

And so they sit alongside these "enemies" on the boards and at the meetings of shareholders of the dynamite and other trusts (syndicates), raking in millions of rubles in net profits and pushing—each one his "own" nation—into war against other nations.

Pravda No. 133, June 12, 1913

Printed from the *Pravda* text

CHEAP MEAT FOR THE "PEOPLE"

What a sensation! A most vital need of the workers is being satisfied! Cheap meat for the people—where? what? how?

Russkoye Slovo reports that the city slaughter-house in Moscow has opened a "Freibank", i.e., a shop for the sale

of cheap meat which has been rendered harmless and certified as relatively fit for use.

Cheap meat is a good thing. But what is the meaning of "rendered harmless", "*relatively* fit for use" (consequently, there would be equal reason to say "*relatively unfit for use*"!)? Here is what it means:

When animals are put up for sale, they are examined by veterinary inspectors. Sick ones are rejected. No permission is given to slaughter them, because their use for food threatens to infect humans with various diseases. Most rejected animals are tubercular and measly (worm-infected).

Of the total of about 450,000 head of cattle going through the Moscow slaughter-house almost 30,000 are rejected as *suspect*.

And so this suspect measly and tubercular cattle is rendered harmless by boiling in a special chamber under the supervision of a veterinary surgeon for about three hours. This boiling kills off the worms and the tubercular bacilli.

Well, apparently all, or almost all, die off or nearly die off! This yields cheap boiled meat that has been rendered harmless.

The people say, according to a comment in *Russkoye Slovo*, that "this meat won't kill you, but it may give you TB or stomach trouble, because, after all, the brutes were ailing."

The demand for this meat is heavy. Workers from the city itself go there and queue up for a long time. The morning queues consist mostly of women, housewives; the day queues, of workers, mainly builders.

The boiled meat that has been rendered harmless and that won't kill you but will give you stomach trouble is just right for the people. The people cannot afford real meat.

It is said that the more painstaking the veterinary supervision, the more meat is rejected. "So", *Russkoye Slovo* concludes, "the population have a twofold interest in thorough supervision: the middle classes want sound meat delivered from the slaughter-house; the poor, more cattle rejected and the Freibank kept well supplied with meat."

We certainly live in very civilised and philanthropic times: we have learned to make the population take a "twofold interest". And the "freedom" for cheap meat

is remarkable: after all, "Freibank" in German means "free shop".

Civilisation, freedom, cheap products, revival of trade—everything is for the people! Whenever you see an advertisement: "People's Quarters Society"—you can be sure that the cellar or garret will be cheap and under medical supervision: it won't kill you of course, but you will get TB.

Whenever you see a signboard: "People's Dining-Hall"—don't hesitate to go in. You will be served cheap boiled meat which has gone through the slaughter-house under supervision, and which has not gone through the slaughter-house without supervision.

Whenever you see a signboard: "People's Library"—you can afford to exult. There you will find cheap or even free pamphlets issued by the Union of the Russian People or the All-Russia Nationalist Club, under the medical supervision of the spiritual censorship.

It is being said that a "Freibank" is soon to be opened for the sale of "people's bread"—made of grass, which is boiled, rendered harmless and baked under veterinary, sorry, I mean medical supervision.

Civilisation, freedom, cheap products, revival of trade—everything is for the people! And the population will find itself with a growing twofold interest: the rich, to have their meat sound, and the poor, to have the "Freibank" well stocked with meat relatively fit for use.

Written on June 8 (21), 1913

Published on June 16, 1913 in *Pravda* No. 137 Signed: *V.*

Printed from the *Pravda* text

DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE R.S.D.L.P. C.C. AND THE PRIBOI GROUP ON ITS RECOGNITION AS THE R.S.D.L.P. C.C. PUBLISHERS[369]

Introduction X)) merits and important role.

I. In view of the advance of the business and the need for official recognition, it should be correctly constituted *as the C.C. Publishers* on the following principles:

a) the group shall autonomously conduct the administrative and organisational sector;

b) all books and material which are not urgent shall be submitted to the C.C. for preliminary review, and the urgent ones shall be published without such submission, but with the C.C. representative having the right of veto.

In the event of differences and the impossibility of agreement, the question shall be referred to the full C.C. collegium for the final decision.

The same full collegium shall decide the question of publishing pamphlets in the event of any differences between the C.C. representative and the Priboi collegium on the question of pamphlets coming in through the C.C. representative.

c) The C.C. appoints Comrade X to take charge of the financial side of its publishers.

August 7, 1913

First published in 1962 in the magazine *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 1

Printed from the original

THE OCTOBRISTS AND THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The current political situation in Russia is of especial interest. The negotiations between the Cadets, the Progressists and the Octobrists on common "opposition" tactics in the Duma, on the one hand, and the working-class movement, on the other, testify not only to a "revival", but to something else as well.

One of the highly instructive documents of our interesting period is the appeal issued by the Central Committee of the Union of October Seventeen to party members, urging them (according to *Rech*) to "discard their apathy and set about working with vigour".

According to the Octobrist C.C., "now that the revolutionary forces are once again coming into motion, evidence of which is incidentally provided by the strikes, all high-

minded citizens sincerely desirous of the state's progressive development should join the Union of October Seventeen, thereby increasing its membership and enhancing its prestige".

The work of the Octobrists, their C.C. believes, should "paralyse the influence of the destructive elements who are again raising their voice in importunate and vociferous calls for another revolution in Russia's political and social system. The Central Committee gives a reminder of the sacrifices the state and society will have to suffer, if high-minded men now sit back and shun social activity. The Central Committee is sure that millions of loyal Russian citizens will not allow a handful of revolutionaries to ruin Russia".

That is how *Rech* (No. 275) reports the contents of the interesting appeal from the Octobrist C.C., without apparently finding any departures in it from normal Octobrist policy.

Let us examine the appeal of the Octobrist C.C. as a document characterising the history of our time. The Octobrists are invited to "discard apathy". This means that there has been apathy up to now, doesn't it? When the forces of reaction were triumphant, the Octobrists were apathetic. When *it looked* as if the forces of reaction would be adequate to maintain "order"—the Octobrists were satisfied and saw no need to "set about working". When the forces of reaction have proved to be inadequate (the forces opposed to the reactionaries "are once again coming into motion")—then ... then the Octobrists vigorously set about the business of *helping reaction*.

Indeed, is it not helping reaction for an influential Duma group to start bashing the "importunate and vociferous" Left-wingers, their desire to "ruin Russia"? Just think: a "handful" only, and they threaten to "ruin Russia"! The Left-wingers, whose newspapers (numbering at least a dozen all over Russia) are being confiscated almost daily, are remarkable, please note, for their "importunity and vociferousness"! And that, you will note, is a word-for-word repetition of the truly importunate and vociferous phrases which the reader will find any day in the Black-Hundred government press.

This gives us a picture of what the preaching of "progressive" ideas "in the spirit of the October 17 Manifesto" has

actually come to. As soon as the working-class movement gained in strength and brought about a general revival in social life, our bourgeois "Progressists" at once bared their teeth, *not* against reaction, but against the working-class movement.

Russia is again facing a balance of forces, similar to the one in evidence eight or nine years ago, but on an extended scale, over a wider field. At that time, the Octobrists, the Progressists and the Cadets were still undifferentiated and existed together as a united and ostensibly "leading society". It would appear that we now have *three* developed political parties of the bourgeoisie—the Octobrists, the Progressists and the Cadets—who have gone through and tried themselves out in three Dumas and in the eventful years from 1906 to 1912. There is an *ideal* division of labour between them: the Octobrists declare outright war on the Lefts and do so in the resolute Black-Hundred spirit; the Progressists *were in agreement* with the Octobrists yesterday, and today are doing the same thing, promising to pursue this respectable occupation for a long time; the Cadets, for their part, have also long been in "agreement" with the Progressists, friends of the Octobrists, assuring the people of their democratism, you will pardon the expression.

If the working-class movement eight years ago ignored all the Octobrist and the Cadet overt and covert betrayals and vacillations, there is good reason to believe that the workers have *not* grown more stupid since then.

Za Pravdu No. 10, October 15, 1913
Signed: *K - p o v*

Printed from the *Za Pravdu* text

ON THE "JUBILEE OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA"

The 50th anniversary of Moscow's liberal newspaper has evoked torrents of laudatory speeches from Russian liberals of every stripe. That is natural, legitimate and consistent. Liberals can be expected to celebrate the jubilee of the liberal newspaper. *Russkiye Vedomosti*[370] has been no worse than other liberal newspapers, and in some respects (as in

the abundance of *scientific* material) it has certainly been above the liberal average.

But when the rhetoricians of liberalism, Messrs. Kovalevsky, Milyukov, Manuilov, Bunin and their like, praise "*Russkiye Vedomosti*" *on behalf of democracy* and from an ostensibly democratic standpoint, that is a flagrant lie and it cannot be allowed to go unchallenged.

Distinguished and notable liberals! You all swear that you stand for political freedom. But you refuse to understand one simple fact, namely, that a liberal society in Russia which allows counter-revolutionary statements by liberals to go unchallenged, does not deserve political freedom and will never get it.

You are celebrating the 50th anniversary of *Russkiye Vedomosti*, aren't you? That's fine. In that case, do not hide *the truth*, do not forget that *Russkiye Vedomosti* was one of the first liberal newspapers to trip up the first serious and deep-going mass movement in Russia, whose aim was to attain political freedom.

That was in the *summer* of 1905. The leading light of liberal science and liberal publicism, Mr. Professor Vinogradov the historian, then contributed to *Russkiye Vedomosti* a remarkable, unforgettable, and memorable "historic" article. His main idea was as follows: let's hope our movement does not go beyond the German one of 1848-49, otherwise the Prussian watchman will have to restore order over here.

That's the kind of thing *Russkiye Vedomosti*, organ of the liberals, printed in the summer of 1905!!

Let everyone in Russia who wants to gain a reputation for being a democrat ponder this historical fact. History has proved—and its proof is irrefutable—that the movement in the *autumn* of 1905 was weak and inadequate, while a famous liberal found it much too strong in the *summer* of 1905, and put spokes in its wheels.

The fact is there. It is incontrovertible. This liberal and all his fellows, all his—you will pardon me the expression—fellow-politicians among the liberals *bear* the moral and political *blame* for the Jewish pogroms in the autumn of 1905. For, incidentally, the pogromists drew for strength and impudence on precisely this "Vinogradov"-type mood of liberal society.

The "Vinogradov"-type liberals have the government they *fully* deserve. The "Vinogradov" liberal writing in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, and Purishkevich, the collective Purishkevich, are only two sides of the same medal, they are interconnected and interdependent phenomena.

There *can* be *no* political freedom in Russia until she has (or because she lacks) mass democracy with a clear understanding of the total short-sightedness, absurdity and vileness of the "Vinogradov"-type liberalism of *Russkiye Vedomosti*.

Za Pravdu No. 10,
October 15, 1913

Printed from the
Za Pravdu text

DRAFT RESOLUTION BY WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS ON THE SLANDEROUS LIQUIDATORS' CHARGE AGAINST INSURANCE WORKER X[371]

Having examined the liquidators' charge in their *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* against insurance worker X, and having obtained all the testimonials from the Editorial Board of the liquidators' newspaper and from the Editorial Board of *Za Pravdu*, which on October 17 published the decision of a commission from *five* Marxist institutions, we, the board of such and such a league or society, find this decision correct and the liquidators' campaign slanderous.

We urge workers, in order to safeguard their organisation from ruin, to boycott the slanderers, unless they make a firm and public retraction of their slanders.

Written not earlier than October 19
(November 1), 1913

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RUSSIAN WORKERS' ASSESSMENT OF THE SPLIT IN THE DUMA SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP

Both Social-Democratic newspapers in St. Petersburg, which express the views of the liquidators and the pro-Party men, carry statements by workers' groups from all

over Russia. In these statements, the workers define their attitude to the two Social-Democratic Duma groups: 1) the Social-Democratic group (7 deputies + Jagiello), and 2) the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group—6 Social-Democratic workers' deputies.

We are now in a position to sum up the exact results of the workers' decisions, according to the data in both newspapers, for a whole month, from October 20 to November 20, old style.

The most exact workers' statements, never once questioned by either side, are the resolutions with a definite number of *signatures*. The overall result, for the whole of Russia (not only the Caucasus, but also the Bund and the Latvians have a special representation on the International Socialist Bureau), is: **4,850** for the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group (6 deputies) and **2,539** for the Social-Democratic group (7 deputies + Jagiello).

Trade unions, as represented by their boards (for police reasons the names of the trade unions in Russia are not published) = 9 unions with 13,500 members, for the 6 deputies; and one union with an unspecified membership, for the 7 deputies.

Written between November 20 and December 1 (December 3 and 14), 1913

First published in 1961 in Vol. 24 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

OUTLINE OF A REPORT TO LOCAL ORGANISATIONS ON THE PORONIN JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. C.C. AND PARTY FUNCTIONARIES (1913)[372]

Outline of a Report to Local Organisations

December 12

General theme—events of the strike movement and Party life since the summer of 1913. Conference resolutions. In particular, the following points are brought out:

1. A general strike on January 9, 1914. Conference decision. Necessity of the strike. Its slogans (democratic republic.

8-hour working day, confiscation of landed estates). Intensified preparations for the strike.

2. *Insurance campaign*. More extensive circulation of the magazine *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*.[373]—Formation of Party cells inside *all* societies and *all* boards. Getting our own, Party, majority on the boards (also in trade unions, clubs, etc., etc.).

3. *The Six* and *the Seven*. The main reasons for the split: (a) liquidationism=destruction of the Party. Struggle *over that*. The Seven *incline* to liquidationism; (b) the Seven *do not recognise* Party decisions; (c) the *majority of the Party* has been proved to back the Six. Main figures from *Pravda*. Issues with *material* on the question of the split should be on hand. (Resolutions for the Six should be *p r e s s e d* forward.)

4. Party congress. Necessity of it. Participation in it of *all* illegal Party cells. Its preparation: *m o n e y* is the main thing. Collection of *fund* for congress (mainly through the deputies). The task for each group or union of groups is by the spring to collect *double the amount* of expenses (expenses per delegate—150 rubles. Each group or union of adjacent groups must collect 300 rubles).

5. The need to develop ties—to strengthen them (teaching correspondence with the St. Petersburg Bureau and the Bureau Abroad). The correspondence is weak: *that is why transport* is poor. There must be agents everywhere.

6. A review of the main points from the resolutions of the conference. For instance, on the national question: (a) struggle against every brand of nationalism, even the refined one (cultural-national autonomy); (b) unity of workers of *all* nationalities; (c) struggle against *Great-Russian* Black-Hundred nationalism. (Idem briefly about the other resolutions.)

7. Legal and illegal press. Increase collections. The legal press will inevitably *go down*: concentrate efforts on creating an illegal one (see "Announcement", pp. 9-10 especially).

Written on November 29
(December 12), 1913

First published in 1923 in the book
Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy"
(*1911-1914*) (From the *Zvezda* and
Pravda Period), Part III

Printed from
a copy written
in N. K. Krupskaya's
hand

ON THE QUESTION OF THE BUREAU'S NEXT STEPS

A number of groups abroad, big, small and tiny, are making a lot of noise over the forthcoming sitting of the International Socialist Bureau on December 1 (14).[374] By the time Tuesday's edition is out there will perhaps be some news, by cable, of the Bureau's decision. I believe it to be my duty, therefore, to describe the state of affairs so as to prevent any false rumours and to make it possible to adopt the right tone at once.

The small and tiny groups abroad, who have no support in Russia (like Rosa Luxemburg and the Tyszka people, or Charles Rappoport, who recently wrote in a small French paper in the same spirit, or Alexinsky and the *Vperyod* group in Paris, etc., etc.), all these little groups are straining hard to have the Bureau take a vote for "unity".

Of course, we too want unity!! The efforts of the little groups are a pathetic move to protect the liquidators. This move of theirs will fail: they will make a fuss and that's as far as it will go.

What decision will the Bureau take? That is, of course, something we don't know. But we were told by a *very prominent* member (or even a group of members) that *for formal reasons* the idea is to admit the liquidator O.C., *instead of* Plekhanov, and from the Duma group, *only* the Seven, or rather the Eight. These formal reasons are as follows: the parliamentary groups in every country do *not* represent the parties, but *only themselves*, let us say there are eight Socialist-Revolutionaries and seven Social-Democrats—then *only* the eight S.R.s. are sent in. Since that is so (that will be verified), nothing can, of course, be done *for the time being*. Let the liquidators throw out Plekhanov—we shall see *whether this is going to do them any good*!!! I am sure that it will *not*.

That is why I strongly suggest that there should be no nervousness or excitement, either over the rumours being spread by the liquidators, or over any possible Bureau decisions. We have taken steps to have the reports on *Russian* affairs from London written *through us* (about non-Russian affairs directly to you)—*calmly* wait for them and you

will find that there was no need for any trip and that neither the barking nor the Bureau will rescue the "drowning men" (the liquidators).

There is *private* information that Plekhanov is not going.

This should not be printed just yet. I repeat: calmly wait for reports from *your own* correspondent.

Written not later than
December 1 (14), 1913

First published in 1961
in Vol. 24 of the Fifth Russian
edition of the *Collected Works*

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THE POVERTY OF THE PEOPLE'S TEACHERS[375]

In view of the All-Russia Congress on Public Education to be held in December, it is appropriate that we should turn our attention to an old question which is perpetually new: the poverty of the people's teachers.

We have before us Volume I of the *One-Day Census of Primary Schools in the Empire*. The volume has been published by the Ministry of Public—what you might call—Education. It is signed by the well-known statistician Mr. V. I. Pokrovsky.

The bureaucratic character of this official work—bureaucratic and official in the worst sense of the words—instantly leaps to the eye. The census was taken on January 18, 1911. It took all of two years to publish its first volume dealing only with the gubernias of the St. Petersburg academic district! The only thing we seem to be able to do in our country without tedious, agonising red tape is to pass laws, like the law against the press.

As is the practice, the census programme was repeatedly discussed throughout 1910 by a host of official cabinets and conferences, each of which did something to spoil it. As a result, for instance, there is only one head, "Russian Language", on the question of the pupils' mother tongue; it is clearly prohibited to make the subdivision into Byelorussian, Little Russian (Ukrainian) and Great Russian. As a result, the census of the schools of the Empire *does not*

include a number of schools, such as the urban schools set up under the 1872 statute, private first- and second-category schools, etc.

It is prohibited to collect full data. It is prohibited to know the truth about the language spoken by the pupils at home. It is prohibited to make a comparison between public and private schools.

The man who compiled these statistics, Mr. Pokrovsky, much vaunted by the liberals, has done his bit to *spoil* the census returns. Thus, material has been separately collected on each teacher relative to the size of salary. It is, naturally, important to know the truth on such a burning question as the poverty of the people's teachers. It is important to know just *how many* masters and mistresses are receiving the desperately low, the very lowest, the very low and the low salaries in general.

The material on this has been collected. The information on it *is there*. But our liberal statistician "processes" it in such a way as *to cover up the unsavoury truth*.

Our statistician merely informs us of the *average* salaries of masters and mistresses by gubernia and the different categories of schools. The official classifications are scrupulously observed. But anyone who wants to know the truth is not interested in which gubernia and in which category of schools the teachers starve, but *how many* teachers are starving and living in poverty. It was quite possible to determine from the returns of the census *how many* teachers are being paid starvation salaries (say, under 360 rubles, from 360 to 400 rubles, etc.), and this should unquestionably have been done. But it has not been done. It has been buried in the hundreds of thousands of cards at the archives.

What the public has been informed of is only the officially purged and officially embellished averages of salaries by category and gubernia.... Need we say, too, that the liberal statisticians made a point of concealing from the public what percentage of the starving teachers have families.

These "average" figures show that a schoolmistress (in the St. Petersburg academic district) receives 433 rubles a year, and a schoolmaster, 376. But most of the teachers are in the countryside. There "average" salaries are 347 rubles for the schoolmistress, and 367 rubles for the schoolmaster. (Let us

note that the overall number of schoolmistresses is double that of schoolmasters).

Most of the teachers of the St. Petersburg district are *outside* St. Petersburg Gubernia. The salaries of schoolmistresses are: Olonets Gubernia—375 rubles; Novgorod Gubernia—358 rubles; Vologda Gubernia—320 rubles; Archangel Gubernia—319 rubles; and Pskov Gubernia—312 rubles.

Even these figures, which put a gloss on reality, make it clear that the *majority* of schoolmistresses are paid a starvation salary. With the present high cost of living the *26-30 rubles* a month for schoolmistresses, of whom (on average again) 11.5 per cent are married and 4.4 per cent are widows, is undoubtedly a beggarly salary which condemns teachers to starvation and indigence.

From the "category" data we find that 2,180 schoolmistresses worked in parish one-class schools (in the St. Petersburg academic district, with a total of 7,693 schoolmistresses). Consequently, we have here a "category" with a highly impressive number of teachers. What then are they paid?

An average of 302 rubles in the towns, and 301 rubles in the villages.

The Russian state spends hundreds of millions of rubles on the maintenance of its civil service, the police, the army, etc., while dooming teachers in the people's schools to starvation. The bourgeoisie "sympathises" with public education—with the proviso, however, that the teachers live in worse conditions than the servants in the manor-houses and the houses of the rich....

Za Pravdu No. 51,
December 4, 1913

Printed from the
Za Pravdu text

RUSSIAN WORKERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL

In this issue of our newspaper comrades workers will find a detailed account of the recent sitting of the International Socialist Bureau in London, and also its resolution on the question of unity of the Social-Democratic forces in Russia.

Class-conscious workers throughout Russia must discuss this resolution with the utmost attention.

A class-conscious worker feels and realises himself to be not only a member of the *Russian* Marxist family—he is aware that he is also a member of the *international* family of Marxists. He also has duties to the workers' International. He must take account of the opinions and wishes of the latter. He must not lose touch with the international workers' army for a single moment.

Russian Marxist workers will welcome the fact that the workers' International has shown a desire to make a serious study of the principled discussions which have such a prominent part to play in our Russian working-class movement. The accursed conditions of Russian social and political life have led to a state where our comrades know much less about our movement than about the movement in any other country. This lack of knowledge about the real state of affairs in Russia is such that just recently German Social-Democratic spokesmen proposed the convocation of all circles of Russian Social-Democrats abroad (12 "trends" abroad) to work out a new programme for the Party.* But, after all, everyone knows that the Russian proletariat worked out such a programme back in 1903....

This period is, fortunately, about to end. By its great and heroic struggle, the Russian proletariat has made itself a talking point throughout the civilised world. The working class of Russia has by rights taken up its place in the workers' International, and it is safe to say that with every passing year its role in the international arena will be ever bigger and more important.

The decision of the International Bureau gives Russian workers their first chance to acquaint our West-European comrades with the basic substance of our discussions. The Bureau has put the question like this: 1) it has offered its good offices to bring about unity; 2) it believes the actual differences must be brought out; 3) therefore it has authorised its Executive Committee to contact and arrange an exchange of opinion with all Social-Democrats accepting the Social-Democratic programme and also those whose programme is close to the Social-Democratic.

Russian Marxists find all this quite acceptable.

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* See this volume, pp. 274-77.—*Ed.*

It is indeed extremely desirable to *bring out* the differences. And even not only those between the Marxists and the liquidators, but also those between the Marxists and the Narodniks, and the Zionist Socialists (whom we regard as being not much worse than the Bund and the P.P.S.), etc. It would be a considerable success if the International Bureau managed to secure clear cut and precise formulations and to establish the actual basis of the political differences.

But to clear up the differences does not at all mean to eliminate them. The differences stem from the absolutely divergent views of the present epoch in Russia. They constitute *two* tactics, *two* systems of policy—the proletarian and the liberal. Nothing will eliminate this divergence.

But even there it is extremely desirable to have a precise and definite elucidation of *the terms* for unity put forward by each of the sides.

Marxist workers are faced with this important task: they must have a thorough discussion of the International Bureau's proposal and give it every possible attention, outlining their own terms of unity.

These terms are clear. They flow from the whole course of the working-class movement. The liquidators must *in fact* recognise the Marxist whole, they must recognise that the main slogans for agitation among the masses are the three old and basic demands; they must withdraw their amendments to the programme (cultural-national autonomy); they must refrain from shouting about the "strike itch"; condemn the Bundists' separatist strivings and demand local mergers; condemn the malicious personal attacks which poison the ideological struggle, etc. In the sphere of Duma activity, the Seven must unconditionally recognise their subordination to the Marxist whole and retract their anti-Party decisions (Jagiello, abolition of the programme, etc.). Even Comrade Plekhanov, who disagrees with us on many points, says in his letter to the International Bureau that "our Duma group is divided in consequence of certain regrettable decisions adopted by our comrades liquidators, who find themselves in a majority of seven to six".

It has not yet been cleared up whom it would be useful for the International Bureau to contact for arranging the general exchange of opinion. It is clear that there are two possible ways: either invitations should go out to representatives of the two principal trends: Marxists and liquidators, or to "all Social-Democrats", and all who regard themselves as being close to the Social-Democrats, in which case it would mean the party of deputy Jagiello (P.P.S.) and various Jewish socialist groups, and those of the Narodniks who consider their stand close to the Social-Democratic programme.

Every class-conscious worker should take an interest in the question raised by the International Bureau. We urge all workers to raise this question at their meetings, circles, talks, rallies, etc., to discuss it, to adopt their resolutions and to publish their opinion in our newspaper.

It is wrong to think that this business is remote and has nothing to do with us. If the question is raised at the international congress in Vienna[376] (something Marxists would very gladly welcome), the International must know the opinion of the Russian workers, of the proletarian organisations operating in Russia, and not only of the isolated circles abroad.

Comrades! Discuss this important question, adopt your decisions and communicate them to your newspaper, *Proletarskaya Pravda*. The class conscious workers of all countries will listen to what you say.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 2,
December 8, 1913

Printed from the
Proletarskaya Pravda text

HOW THE LIQUIDATORS ARE CHEATING THE WORKERS

The International Socialist Bureau has decided to take steps to clarify the differences between Russian socialists and to offer its good offices to unite their forces.

What have the liquidators made of this decision?

They have right away made use of it to *cheat* the Russian workers.

A solemn editorial article in No. 97 of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*[377] says:

> "By rejecting the demand of the 'Six' for special representation in the interparliamentary section, the International Bureau not only unequivocally condemned their break-away from the Social-Democratic group, but also gave a proper assessment of one of the main demands, whose rejection the six deputies tried to use as an explanation and justification of their walk-out."

That is *not true* from start to finish.

We noted this in No. 1 of our newspaper.[378]

The liquidators, caught red-handed, are trying to mislead the workers by continuing their lies.

We repeat that the International Bureau did not reject the demand of the Six. It did not condemn their "break-away". It did not even go into an examination of the dispute between the six and the seven deputies.

This is nothing but a liquidationist trick.

The liquidator gentlemen resorted to the same criminal method last year after the sitting of the International Bureau, when Mr. Martov attributed to the German Social-Democrat Haase words he had never said against the Bolsheviks, for which he was subsequently exposed in Haase's published statement.

Here is how the question of deputy representation stood in the Bureau. The representative of the Marxists merely said that the delegate of the Seven was elected only by the Seven and that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group does not recognise him as its delegate. Comrade Huysmans, Secretary of the International Bureau, gave the following explanation. There are special rules on the interparliamentary section. According to the rules, where there are several separate socialist groups in a given parliament, representation is given only to the group which has more deputies; the rules take no account of which party the given parliamentary group belongs to and how many workers there are behind it. The point to note is that parties have their own special representation .

Under these rules, if there were, say, two groups in the Duma, six Social-Democrats and seven Narodniks, *only* the Narodniks would be given the vote in the interparliamentary representation.

Here is another example: Bulgaria. There, 19 Shiroki Socialists (opportunists) and 18 Marxists were elected to Parliament. The two constitute separate parties and have two separate groups in Parliament. Both parties also have separate representatives on the Bureau. But *according to the rules*, the parliamentary representation can go only to the Shiroki group of 19. That does not mean, in any sense, that the Bureau "condemned" the 18 Marxist deputies.

That was the formal side of the matter. Any view can be taken of the rules. But just now that's what they are. In these conditions, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group could not even present its demand.

What should the Seven have done if they wished to be honest? They should have waived the formalities themselves. It has now been proved and recognised by everyone that several times more organised Social-Democratic workers are backing the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group than the Seven. The implication is clear. Those who wish to reckon with the voice of the workers, those who talk so much about unity, should in that case have done more than take the strictly formal approach.

However, the Seven capitalised on their "luck" under the rules. They have once again issued a challenge to the Russian workers. What is more, the liquidator gentlemen also began to tell lies about the International allegedly "condemning" the Six, etc.

That was the first response on the part of the liquidator gentlemen to the resolution of the International Socialist Bureau.

Marxist workers will respond to this liquidator fraud by publicly branding these gentlemen.

Comrades, you must continue your serious and thorough discussion of the Bureau's decision, voice your opinion and give the liquidators the response they deserve for their attempts to cheat the Russian workers.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 3,
December 10, 1913

Printed from the
Proletarskaya Pravda text

RESOLUTION ON THE SOCIALIST BUREAU'S DECISION

We warmly welcome the decision of the workers' International concerning the need for full and final clarification of the substantial and basic differences existing in Russia between the political trends participating in the working-class movement.

In response to the International's proposal we believe it necessary, for our part, to outline the basic differences which, in our opinion, divide the Marxists and the liquidators into two irreconcilable camps.

We declare, first of all, that for any class-conscious worker it is not a matter of setting up some new entity, but merely of strengthening and fully restoring the old organisation as it took shape more than 15 years ago—with its old programme and its most important tactical decisions. The liquidators have split away from this Marxist organisation. These are the necessary conditions for restoring unity with them in the sphere of work *outside the Duma*:

1) Full and unconditional recognition (in fact) of "the underground", unconditional subordination to the decisions of its cells and an undertaking not to allow, in any circumstances, any kind of attacks against it in the press.

2) Full and unconditional recognition of the fact that the main task of the epoch consists of the three principal demands put forward by the working class of Russia, performance of work in that spirit, and repudiation of the liberal-reformist preachings calling for abdication of the old tasks.

3) Retraction of all attempts to change the programme of the Marxists (cultural-national autonomy) and unconditional acceptance of the programme worked out in 1903.

4) Full subordination on questions connected with the strike movement to the decisions of workers organised on Marxist lines, and repudiation of the struggle against the so-called "strike itch".

5) Recognition in fact of the proletariat's *independent* tactics, and refusal to play down the tasks of the working class for the sake of blocs with the liberals.

6) Recognition that in the matter of work in the trade unions guidance should be taken from the decisions of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart and the London Congress of Russian Marxists.

7) Repudiation of the principle of establishing workers' organisations on the national basis. Establishment of *united* organisations in Poland and the North-Western Territory. Fulfilment by the Bund of the decision on local mergers which has been repeatedly reiterated by Russian Marxists as a whole.

These are the terms for unity in the sphere of *Duma* activity:

I. Recognition that the group is an organ unconditionally subordinated to the organised will of the Marxist whole.

II. Retraction of all the violations of the programme (cultural-national autonomy, acceptance of Jagiello, etc.).

III. Condemnation of the splitting acts of the Seven, which have also been condemned by G. V. Plekhanov in his letter to the International Socialist Bureau.

As for the groups which it would be useful for the international Bureau to contact for arranging a general exchange of opinion, we demand, above all, that participation in it should be *confined exclusively* to representatives of workers' organisations existing in Russia, and should in no instance include any of the circles abroad which are not connected with work in Russia.

We furthermore believe that: 1) either invitations should go out *only* to the representatives of the *two* principal trends struggling in Russia, i.e., the Marxists and the liquidators, 2) or, if there is a desire to clarify all differences in general between the Russian Social-Democrats and those who regard themselves as Social-Democrats, invitations should go out without exception, to all workers' organisations operating in Russia and regarding themselves as being close to the Social-Democrats. In that case, there is no reason to exclude some of the Left-wing Narodniks, or the Jewish groups who regard themselves as socialists and who compete with the Bund, etc.

Finally, we feel sure that in order to throw a true light on the differences among Russian Social-Democrats, the foreign socialist press will make its pages available to res-

ponsible representatives of Russian organisations who—in contrast to émigré circles and irresponsible persons—could give the foreign comrades a precise idea of the ideological and political basis of the differences in the Russian working-class movement.

A group of organised Marxists

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 9, December 17, 1913

Printed from the *Proletarskaya Pravda* text

ABOUT OUR SCHOOLS

The all-Russia school census of January 18, 1911, makes it possible—despite the extremely bad processing of the data—slightly to lift the veil of official secrecy.

The only data available so far are those on the St. Petersburg academic district, separately for the towns and villages. Let us see on the basis of these data what our *parish* schools are like.

In the towns, there were 329 city one-class schools, 139 private third-category and 177 parish one-class schools. Let us compare the schoolmistresses' average salaries (the number of schoolmasters is quite small): city schools—924 rubles a year, private—609, parish—*302*.

Poor, starving schoolmistresses—that is what our parish schools are.

Let us see what the percentage of teachers with higher and secondary lay general education is. In the city schools—76 per cent, private—67 per cent, and parish—18 per cent!

Uneducated schoolmistresses (we say nothing as yet about the teachers of catechism)—that is what our parish schools are.

In the villages we have 3,545 Zemstvo one-class schools and 2,506 parish one-class schools. In the former, the average salary of schoolmistresses is 374 rubles a year, in the latter—*301 rubles*.

In the former, educated teachers (teachers in general) come to 20 per cent, *in the latter*—2.5 per cent—once again without the teachers of catechism.

These data give an idea of the plight of the parish schools!

The census has also collected data on the average number of square arshins* of floor-space and cubic arshins of air-space per pupil—i.e., the crowding of schools.

The Zemstvo schools have 2.6 sq. arshins of floor-space and 10.1 cu. arshins of air; the parish schools, 2.4 sq. arshins and 9.6 cu. arshins, respectively.

The floor-space should be six times the light area of the windows. Actually, it is nine times greater, i.e., the schools are not only crowded, but also *dark*.

These data are, of course, extremely meagre. The Ministry tried very hard to *prevent* the collection of detailed, precise and full data on the beggarly condition of our schools.

Even so, the beggarly condition of the parish schools stands out in these incomplete, officially curtailed and poorly processed data.

One of the vital tasks before the representatives of workers' cultural and educational and trade union organisations at the forthcoming All-Russia Congress on Public Education is to make a comprehensive presentation of the question and to shed every possible light on the condition of our schools and schoolteachers.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 10, December 18, 1913

Printed from the *Proletarskaya Pravda* text

THE DUMA GROUP AND THE MAJORITY OUTSIDE

Lomtatidze's letter on the struggle between the Six and the Seven in the Duma group was curiously run in the liquidators' newspaper alongside the calculation that 3,701 persons came out in favour of the liquidators (No. 75, p. 2). We leave the verification of this figure for another article, merely noting that *three days* earlier *Za Pravdu* (No. 26) reported the figure of 5,000, which has not been refuted by our opponents.

The Seven have been clearly shown *again and again* to represent a minority of the workers.

* Arshin = 28 inches.—*Ed.*

That is why Lomtatidze's "tough words" make an especially awkward impression. It is a sign of extreme weakness and impotent irritation to call names, to give a reminder of various episodes of the old and most embittered struggle, and to shout: "This is impudent, absurd, cynical", etc., etc.

It remains an unrefuted and incontrovertible fact that 1) the majority of class-conscious workers are backing the Six; and that 2) the Seven *refuse to recognise* the will and the decisions of the majority, and also refuse to recognise the governing institution accepted by the majority.

One feels a sense of embarrassment and shame for the irritated Lomtatidze, when he says:

"Have they (the Six) indicated a single instance in which the political actions in the Duma have run counter to the interests of our cause, our slogans and our traditions?"

Lomtatidze's lofty tone makes a false impression, once we are aware that not only the Six, but the highest governing institution, which they recognise, have long since *indicated* officially and in formal terms the *violation of the programme* by the Seven, to cite an instance!

With his clumsy irritation and his irrelevant questions, Lomtatidze merely underscores the really profound *essence* of the entire conflict—the fight of *non-party men* against the *Party principle*. That is the essence. Nor is it a joke or a trifle but the most serious and painful question.

Not everyone who says: "Lord! Lord!" will enter the kingdom of heaven! Not everyone who beats his breast and shouts "unity, unity" is actually working for unity.

What is working-class unity?

It is above all and chiefly unity of its political organisation, of its entity. *That* is the only kind of unity that can ensure real unity of the Duma group and of all the action and struggle of the working class in general.

That is the unity the liquidationist trend has violated, as the Party's official resolutions have repeatedly recognised since 1908. That is the crux of the matter. In evading it, Lomtatidze merely reveals his error.

The Seven are entirely to blame for the split, because *they* have violated the programme, *they* have come out in defence of the liquidators, who were destroying the Party, *they* have ignored the formal decisions of the majority, and

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

they have been violating the will of the organised workers. There is no other way out for them but to recognise their fault, accept the Six as representatives of the majority and start systematically moving closer to them through an agreement.

Proletarskaya Pravda No. 17,
December 29, 1913
Signed: *I.*

Printed from the
Proletarskaya
Pravda text

THESES FOR A LECTURE ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION[379]

National Question

(Theses from Memory)

A) Importance of the national question at the present time.
B) Place of national movements in history (resp. historical approach to the national question).
C) Two theories on the national question.
D) Self-determination of nations.
E) Equality and guarantee of minority rights. Autonomy.
F) Cultural-national autonomy.
G) National principle in Party organisation.

A. Introduction.

Importance of the National Question at the Current Historical Moment

1. Government's nationalism. All counter-revolution is dyed in nationalistic colours.
2. Idem—bourgeois liberalism (Struve & Co.).
3. With incredible, unprecedented oppression of non-Russian nations (57 per cent of the population of Russia)—nationalism in oppressed nations (pan-European fight).
4. Breach of R.S.D.L.P. programme (distortion of self-determination+cultural-national autonomy).
5. Split of Jewish separatism. National isolation.

B. 6. National question must be viewed historically and economically. National question is a *world-wide* phenomenon.

7. Epoch of national movements—end of Middle Ages and start of new period, epoch of *bourgeois-democratic* revolutions. At the time, national movements ***everywhere.***
8. Economic foundations? Capitalism demands consolidation of domestic market. The market is the centre of commercial relations. *Language* is the chief instrument of human commercial relations.
9. Consolidation of national areas (restoration of language, national awakening, etc.) and establishment of *national state*. Economic necessity of it.
10. Political superstructure over the economy. Democracy, sovereignty of nation. *Hence*, "*national state*"....
11. National state is *the rule throughout the world* (K. Kautsky in I, 18*, pp. *23* and *23-25*, *Internationalität*), while "*state of nationalities is the exception*".[380]

    K. Kautsky about O. Bauer: Bauer *underestimates* the urge for national state.

    ("the strength of the Drang") NB

    In brackets: some people believe that the national state means *greater* nationalism than cultural-national autonomy. That is a naive and ridiculous delusion! The national state is the rule in the record of world history. Cultural-national autonomy is an invention of rather poor intellectuals which has not been realised anywhere.

12. Epoch of national (bourgeois-democratic) revolutions of the nineteenth century (Italy, Germany). It is over in Western Europe. *It has just started in the East and in Asia*....

C. Two theories of Marxism on the national question.

13. Emergence of proletarian parties in national states.

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* Reference to p. 18 of the first notebook on the national question.—*Ed.*

Backward East. "*Theories*" of national question. (Little attention given to *theoretical* basis. K. Kautsky+O. Bauer.)

14. *O. Bauer*. Nation=Kulturgemeinschaft*. "National culture" slogan ((red thread)). The main thing is the national character. (Mass of reservations, but that is not important.)

    (Kautsky's assessment: Kulturgemeinschaft=O. Bauer's main mistake.)

15. "Socialism will put more emphasis on the principle of nationality" (O. Bauer I, 5**—p. *532 of his book*).
16. Bauer's basic mistake is refined nationalism, a nationalism which is clean, without exploitation and without fighting.

NB ||| Proudhon used to clean up, idealise and embellish capitalism, O. Bauer does the same to nationalism.

17. The policy of the ruling classes is "conservative-national", ours is "evolutionary-national" (O. Bauer).
18. "We are not satisfied with the old internationalism" (O. Bauer)
    (O. Bauer I, 6).
19. ΣΣ of O. Bauer
    (α) idealistic theory of nation
    (β) national culture slogan (=bourgeois)
    (γ) nationalism purified, refined, absolute, right up to socialism
    (δ) internationalism completely forgotten.

    Σ=*national opportunism* (Pannekoek).
20. Confused O. Bauer, exposed by *K. Kautsky*.
    (α) Eigentümlich und hinfällig*** in that O. Bauer keeps talking about national culture. (I, 17) (p. 15, *Internationalität*)
    (β) "Nie ist eine rein nationale Kultur weniger möglich gewesen" (ibidem, 15, *Internationalität*)****

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* Cultural community.—*Ed.*

** Here and below the reference is to pages 5, 6 and 17 of the first notebook on the national question.—*Ed.*

*** Peculiarity and weak spot.—*Ed.*

**** "Never before has a purely national culture been less possible" (ibidem, 15, *Internationality*).—*Ed.*

displacement:

		Br.	Fr.	Ger.	
— Example:	1800:	20	—30	—30	(Σ= 80)
	1900:	125	—40	—70	(Σ =235)

((English, or perhaps + Russian, may be a world language))

NB (γ) "Our internationalism is not a special type of nationalism, differing from bourgeois by non-aggressiveness, equality, etc., but an economically and culturally united social organism" (ibidem, p. 17).

NB In O. Bauer this view has disappeared behind the "Betonung der nationalen Kultur".*

(δ) The nation is not Kultur-, not Schicksal-, but Sprachgemeinschaft.**

(ε) What O. Bauer has is "*more emphasis on the national aspect*"....

NB (ζ) ΣΣ (in K. Kautsky)—gewaltige Ueberschätzung des nationalen ... Momentes (**35**, *Internationalität*). Völlige Vernachlässigung internationalen.***

21. K. Kautsky has Sprache und Territorium**** historico-economic theory

then **national state**

—and in bourgeois-**democratic movement**

now **internationalism at present.**

NB

D. § 9 of the programme=political self-determination.

22. What it means in principle and as used by the whole of international democracy since 1848=political separation, formation of national state.

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* "Emphasis on national culture."—*Ed.*

** Not a community of culture, of destiny, but a community of language.—*Ed.*

*** Enormous exaggeration of the national ... aspect (85, Internationality). Complete neglect of the International aspect.—*Ed.*

**** Language and territory.—*Ed.*

23. What it means from the standpoint of the *history* of national movements throughout the world = establishment of national state.

24. Funny attempts to give this paragraph a different interpretation (ridiculous!)!! The *democratic principle* in the national question

(α) (α) is *indissolubly* bound up with the *historico-economic* conditions of national movements.

25. Departure from the democratic principle is betraying and forgetting the *whole* of history.

Bourgeois revolution incomplete.

(β) (β) Russia = national state at bottom, at base. the centre

Pskov— Rostov-on-Don

Outlying areas—non-Russian.

Extreme oppression.

Incompleteness of bourgeois-democratic revolution, which is *impossible* without a national movement and the urge to set up *national* states in general.

26. Russia's international position: next to it is Austria

(γ) (γ) (with an unfinished bourgeois revolution in respect of the national question) and an awakened Asia (republican China).

Tsarism is the most reactionary state system. Hence the particular inevitability of the national movement, and the demand that the Great Russians recognise the right to self-determination.

27. Concrete example. Norway (six centuries under Denmark). At the beginning of the nineteenth century | epoch of Napoleonic wars | *handed over to Sweden* (under a treaty between Sweden, Britain and Russia). Taken through a *war* between the Swedes and the Norwegians.

Annexed by Sweden. Retained *complete* autonomy (parliament, army, taxes, duties, etc.). Decades of friction and fighting.

1905. Start of the great revolution in the east of

Europe—close by an *unfinished bourgeois-democratic revolution* in a neighbouring, West-European, very free state. Result? **Norwegian revolution of 1905.**

August revolution in Norway. Decision of the parliament (August 17, 1905). Agitation by priests and landowners in Sweden.

Referendum	5 million Swedes. and 2 million Norwegians.

Treaty with neighbouring state. Peace and full completion.

Swedish worker's duty? Stand not only for freedom in general, not only for autonomy, but without fail, for the **right** to secede.

28. 1905. Finland and Poland.

Deals between the national bourgeoisie and the Russian bourgeoisie. Tasks of the class parties: struggle against nationalistic deals, for an *alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in Russia.*

29. Result: (α) Importance of §9 from the entire history of national movement.
(β) National oppression in Russia under the national state at the base and national oppression in the border areas.
(γ) Unfinished bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.
(δ) Russia's international position.
(ε) Independent decision on the question of secession, but there must be propaganda.

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30. Special stand of P.S.D.

Development of capitalism has bound up Poland and Russia closely together. Lodz factories working for the Russian market. It is not our business to set up a new class state. Is that all?

(α) Failure to say: is the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia and in the *East* completed? *No.*

(β) The whole point is not Poland or her secession, but the *Russian muzhik.*
1863
November 1905
Rebuttal of the nationalism of the Russian muzhik is more than the demand for the non-oppression of nations, more than autonomy, it is, without fail, the **right to secede.**

> To deny or weaken this is absurd and reactionary.

To deny the *right* to secede is to help tsarism and to *indulge* the Russian muzhik's nationalism. NB

(γ) Example: Marx's attitude to Poland (Lopatin) and to Ireland...[381]

Marx on Ireland. *No nation oppressing the freedom of another nation can be free.* NB

Whence the P.S.D.'s absurdity?
Inside-out nationalism.
Scared by the Papuans.
Cracow—an example.
Along the wrong line.
The history of the P.S.D.'s promotion of its absurd and reactionary idea.
1895: K. Kautsky
(α) Materialismus *einseitig**
(β) are you afraid of indulging the nationalism of the petty bourgeoisie? *You are helping the Russian reactionaries!*
1903. Second Congress committee vs. Warski.[382]

E. *Equality of nations and minority rights....*

31. No privileges for any nation or language.
That is necessary from the standpoint of elementary democracy and working-class solidarity.

* Materialism *one-sided.—Ed.*

32. State language. Why it is not necessary.
    43 per cent Great Russians
    17 per cent Little Russians
    6 per cent White Russians
    66
    6 per cent Poles
    72 per cent Slavs.
33. Example of Switzerland. Separate sheet.
    (α) Three languages (70-22-7 per cent).
    (β) Graubünden 100,000 inhabitants
    < 30,000 Romanics [1%] *
    to (γ) Minority rights and *fundamental law*.
    (δ) Specimen solutions for national question in *bourgeois* society.
    (Belgium, *Finland*, etc.) [Not inventions]
34. Regional autonomy and local self-government = general principle of democratic system. Borders? National + economic + traditional, etc.
35. Is it feasible? *Fortunatov versus Medem.*
    National centres should be assessed by territorial minimum, not maximum.
    [Standpoint of Medem's "ungratified": absolute nationalism of petty national islets!!!]
36. "If the economic bonds are to be broken" (Medem).
37. Guarantee of minority rights. Fundamental law of the state (cf. Brünn § 4).
38. Medem's objections I, 2** NB))
39. Necessity for such a general, central law (cf. Switzerland).
40. The only guarantee is a generally democratic and *centralised* democratic system.

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* See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 20-21.—*Ed.*

** Reference to p. 2 of the first notebook on the national question.—*Ed.*

F. *Cultural-national autonomy.*

Terms:

{ extraterritorial
personal
national }

41. What is the plan? (1) Cadastre
(2) Sejm
(3) Compulsory taxation.

42. Austria's experience (Brünn).

Programme for cultural-national autonomy.
Failure. Clericalism. Unfeasible.

Half-way programme adopted. *Absurdity* stands out *at once*.

43. Principles behind the plan.

(0) Absolute, purified nationalism. Brought to completion.

(α) *National culture* slogan. Reactionary bourgeois slogan versus working-class movement and internationalism.

National culture and international culture:

isolation	— unity
union with the bourgeoisie, clericals, etc.	— union with democracy and socialists of other nations.

N.B.:
National museum in Lvov = "national culture"!!

(β) "Exemption from competence." Utopia! Its petty-bourgeois basis. Invention of poor intellectual.

"No seizure, no victimisation, no struggle" (Medem). Cf. *K. Kautsky*.

(γ) National curias in education. Harm. Negroes in America.

(δ) Objective logic: "not instead, but together" with centralised democracy. Austria versus Switzerland.

(ε) Uneven class content of different nations.
Not division, but separation.

{muzhik nations
and towns }

(ζ) Jews—mainly traders.

Sophism of Bundists: we isolate for *pure* class struggle.

44. National autonomy for the Jews?
O. Bauer and K. Kautsky. "Caste."
Jewish contribution to world culture and *two* trends among the Jews.

45. In Russia Jews isolated as a caste.
Way out? (1) freezing isolation in one way or another
(2) bringing them closer to the *democratic* and *socialist* movement of the Diaspora countries.[383]

"Expelling the Jews from the ranks of nations"....

46. 10.5 million throughout the world. Two halves

Asher about Vienna—150,000.

47. *All* bourgeois parties of the Jews have adopted cultural-national autonomy in Russia
{+ petty-bourgeois democracy 1907
+ Bund? (*section*)}

What sort of grist has Bauer's (petty-bourgeois, opportunist) invention become?

G. National principle in the organisation of socialist parties.

Austria. Only since Wimberg (1907). (Otto Bauer. I, 7. **1907.**)
Otto Bauer I, 7 about her opponents
idem I, 8.*

Split and *collapse*. Czech separatists (1910 Copenhagen Congress) and their sympathies for the **Bund.**

* Reference to pp. 7 and 8 of the first notebook on the national question.—*Ed.*

Russia

"Federation of the worst type"[384]

1889-1903. Bund's withdrawal from the Party.
1903-1906.
1907-11. Medem separate sheet

Integration (Caucasus, Riga, Vilna).
Unity from below.

Language*:

1) Cf. spread of languages.

Liége: February 2, 1914
Rabinovich: National question = "invention".

Written between January 10 and 20 (January 23 and February 2), 1914

First published in 1937 in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

Printed from the original

INSERTION FOR N. K. KRUPSKAYA'S ARTICLE "ON THE QUESTION OF THE POLICY OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION"

There are hardly any illiterates in the civilised countries. An effort is made to get the people into the schools. Everything is done to set up libraries. Over here, the Ministry of Public, what you might call, "Education" resorts to the most desperate efforts, to the most ignominious police measures to *hamper* the cause of education and to *prevent* the people from acquiring knowledge! Over here, the Ministry has *destroyed* school libraries!! No civilised country in the world still has any special rules *against* libraries, or such a foul institution as the *censorship*. But over here, apart from the persecution of the press in general, apart from the wild measures *against* libraries in general, rules which are a hundred times more restrictive are being issued *against*

* From here on the entry is in pencil on the back cover of the notebook. There is also this address: "Parvis St.-Grilles. Maison du Peuple. No. 15 10.00 ".—*Ed.*

the public libraries! This is an outrageous policy of *benighting* the people, an outrageous policy of the landowners, who want the country to become *barbaric*. Some rich men, like Pavlenkov, have donated money for public libraries. Now, the wild landowners' government has destroyed the libraries. Isn't it about time for those who want to *help* education in Russia to understand that the money should be donated not for the libraries which are under the Ministry and are due to be destroyed, but for the struggle for political freedom, without which Russia is suffocating in barbarism.

Written in January 1914

First published in 1961 in Vol. 24 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

THE FOURTH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS OF THE LATVIAN TERRITORY[385]

JANUARY 13-26 (JANUARY 26-FEBRUARY 8), 1914

1

REPORT OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT THE FOURTH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS OF THE LATVIAN TERRITORY

L e n i n (representative of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party). Comrade Braun said that there was no need to rummage in scrap paper, in old documents. That is right. Still, one must base oneself on documents and other evidence. A closer study of the R.S.D.L.P. activity over the last two years shows up the existence of liquidationism, which has hampered the re-establishment of the Party. Unless we make a study of the political causes of the Party split, we shall be unable to understand the present disarray. Erroneous trends were already pointed out at the 1908 Conference and later at the 1910 Plenary Meeting. On the one hand, there is otzovism, which has failed to understand the new conditions in Russia, and on the other, liquidationism, which either rejects the

Party or minimises the importance of the illegal Party. These trends arose under the influence of the bourgeoisie. Liquidationism is a broad phenomenon. As early as 1906, there appeared men among the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Narodniks) who tried to legalise the Party. That is a policy of adaptation we see the Cadets pursuing. The same spirit of time-serving prevails among the Social-Democrat liquidators. A strong party can be set up only in the struggle against this liquidationism. That was already clearly stated by the 1908 Conference. After the Plenary Meeting the Party split up. The Central Committee Bureau Abroad, failing to call a Plenary Meeting, was itself subsequently wound up. The Party had to be re-established in struggle against the liquidators, and that was done by the January Conference. It adopted a decision to the effect that the liquidators had to be fought in the workers' curia, but Comrade Braun called the decision Asiatic. However, such a decision is merely a more consistent conclusion from the resolution adopted by the Plenary Meeting. The January Conference was censured on every hand.

But what was the actual situation over this January Conference? If it had in fact been nothing but a conference of splitters, the whole Party should have rallied to prove that the Conference did not represent the Party. But that did not happen. Comrade Braun said: the broad masses are not following Lenin. But serious-minded persons do not decide matters in that way; the facts must be examined to their full extent. And what do the facts indicate? The data on the results of the elections in the workers' curia were published: at the elections to the Second Duma the Bolsheviks received 47 per cent of the votes, at the elections to the Third Duma, 50 per cent, and at the elections to the Fourth Duma, 67 per cent. These facts are incontrovertible, and prove that the decisions of the January Conference were correct. What the Conference decided was realised at the elections. The majority of class-conscious workers in Russia are following the Bolsheviks, and this proves that the struggle against the liquidators was necessary. Even the legal press now admits that the majority of the class-conscious workers are backing the Bolsheviks.

According to Comrade Braun, the August conference[386] adopted the demands he put forward: the democratic republic slogan and the need for an illegal party. Why, in that case, does Comrade Braun want to leave the Organising Committee set up by the conference? That is not evidence of political wisdom or steadfastness in political activity. Comrade Braun said that there were now only a few odd liquidators among the writers but that liquidationism as such no longer existed. But what then is the meaning of *Luch* attacking the illegal Party and fighting against the pro-Party men? The liquidators have failed to keep their promises to Comrade Braun: they did not support the democratic republic slogan and the need for an illegal party. The Latvians want to withdraw from the Organising Committee. That, too, shows that the August bloc was nothing but a fiction. It is ridiculous or even demagogic to talk of unity with the liquidators, until they abandon their present views and adopt views that are diametrically (completely) opposed to their present ones. There can be no unity so long as liquidationism remains what it is. Those who stand for a legal party will not unite with those who stand for an illegal one. There are now two parties, one real, the other fictitious. This fictitious party consists of a group of intellectuals whose attacks on the illegal Party merely disorganise the workers. *Luch* itself does not unite all the writers of the August bloc, but only the liquidators. The only thing to do about the liquidators is to fight them.

"Demagogy", "unity", "splitters", are only loud words and nothing more; even a parrot can mouth them. But let us look at the facts. In the course of a year, *Pravda* united almost 2,000 workers' groups, and *Luch*, only 550. The organ which stands for the illegal Party mustered four times more supporters than the "all trend" paper. The facts show that they, the Bolsheviks, united the majority of the Russian workers. This point was also made by the conference convened in summer.

Lenin is being rebuked for splitting the group. But, for a whole year, six deputies fought against liquidationism in the group. The majority is for the Bolsheviks, the Party is behind them. The group must submit to the Party majori-

ty and must act together with the Party. By failing to do so they place themselves outside the Party, by the side of the Party. It is everywhere established that the group must submit to the decisions of the party. We must have the same thing in Russia as well. The deputies of the Duma are not just Social-Democratic chatterboxes, but Party workers who must submit to the Party.

Everything that is behind the liquidators is fiction, phrase-mongering, name-calling. What has actually happened since the group split up? The six deputies have got 6,000 signatures, the seven, 2,000. Anyone can read about this in the press. Martov said that behind the Seven were Marxist institutions, but these are institutions which do not represent the mass of Party members, but are only a fiction.

The Bolsheviks stand for unity. But who are those people who are unable to join the illegal Party? The illegal Party must be united. It must be united from below. Fighting is the only thing that can be done against those who attack the illegal Party and belittle the importance of such a party. Let's have a guarantee that the illegal Party will remain intact, that the democratic republic slogan will not be stained—only then is unity possible at the top and at the bottom. I do not know about Asia, but in Europe splitters are those who refuse to recognise the majority. Splitters are a minority who refuse to submit to majority decisions.

First published on May 14, 1915
in Latvian in the newspaper
Strahdneeks No. 37 (Boston)

Printed from the
newspaper text
Translated from
the Latvian

2

SUMMING-UP SPEECH AT THE FOURTH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS OF THE LATVIAN TERRITORY

L e n i n. I am being attacked for "demagogic methods", for splitting, etc. But what have our opponents been doing? They have always thrown dirt at the Bolsheviks. You have an example in Martov's unseemly pamphlet.—I merely

expressed my opinion that the Bolsheviks would attend the conference of the International Bureau. But the decision is still up to the Central Committee, on which the workers are sitting. It is they and not Lenin that will decide this question. Those who say that there is no liquidationism, show little respect for the Congress. What liquidationism is has already been clearly stated in Party decisions since 1908. These decisions have not been revoked and they must be reckoned with. Liquidationist ideas are now being preached in the newspapers of the "August bloc". Supporters of the Organising Committee here insist that they are not opposing the Party, but what has their paper been saying? Such examples are numerous. The conciliator An wanted to come out against the no-Party agitation, but the Editorial Board refused to change its view. There can be no union with those who stand up for the views of the newspaper *Luch*. It is liquidationism to work for an "open labour party".—The conference which is being called should not be attended for the purpose of uniting with the liquidators, but for exposing them and proving that the August bloc is a fiction.—The liquidationist press has been narrowing down the slogans and curbing the revolutionary tactics. The liquidators have no illegal literature of any sort; only the Bolsheviks have such literature. The existence of Bolshevik organisations in Russia is evident from the last issue (31). The elections to the Fourth Duma have also shown that the overwhelming majority of the workers are behind the Bolsheviks. These are facts which everyone can verify. This is also evidenced by the financial support to the newspapers.—Cries about unity are not important in themselves. The ability to unite must be there. The Bolsheviks in Russia have united a majority, while the August conference; by contrast, has united nothing. Braun is pulling away from it, Trotsky is doing the same—the "August bloc" is falling apart. Buryanov, too, has not remained among the seven deputies.—To make union possible the liquidators must be condemned.

First published on July 24, 1915
in Latvian in the newspaper
Strahdneeks No. 63 (Boston)

Printed from the
newspaper text
Translated from
the Latvian

3

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS OF THE LATVIAN TERRITORY TO THE R.S.D.L.P.

Ziemelis's Resolution

1. There is an overriding need to unite all truly Social-Democratic forces and have strict Party unity in Russia, especially now that the working-class struggle has been steadily expanding. Such unity is possible only between Social-Democrats who in their activity recognise that:

a) at the present time the R.S.D.L.P. can exist only illegally and that all Social-Democrats must join the illegal Party organisation;

b) Russian Social-Democracy must conduct agitation among the masses in the spirit of the revolutionary demands of 1905, urging the workers to march in the van of the entire emancipation movement and to work for another revolution.

The Congress recognises that every town must have a *united Social-Democratic organisation* to include workers of all nationalities and to conduct work in all the languages spoken by the local proletariat. The Congress invites Social-Democrats of all nationalities to work vigorously for real proletarian unity, a unity which is truly solid and which is organised by the workers themselves from below.

2. For the last five years, the *liquidationist trend* has been the central question of the internal Party struggle. As early as the All-Russia Conference of 1908, before any splits had occurred, the Party resolved that it regarded liquidationism as an attempt by a section of the Party intelligentsia to liquidate the existing R.S.D.L.P. organisation and to substitute for it an amorphous association within a legal framework, regardless of anything, even if the price to be paid were patent repudiation of the Party's programme, tactics and traditions.

At the Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee in January 1910, at which all directions and trends in the Party were represented, liquidationism was once

again *unanimously* condemned by the whole Party as a "manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat", which was expressed in the rejection of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, the belittling of its role and importance, the attempts to curtail the programme and tactical tasks and slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, and so on.

The attempt on the part of the conciliators to unite with the liquidators at any price (the August 1912 conference) proved to be useless, and the uniters found themselves ideologically and politically dependent on the liquidators.

The Fourth Social-Democratic Congress of the Latvian Territory definitely condemns the liquidationist trend and resolves to recall its representative from the Organising Committee, which has failed to dissociate itself from the liquidators.

3. In order to conduct broad political campaigns, the Congress authorises the Central Committee to contact organisations whose political line coincides with the resolutions adopted at the Congress.

4. The Congress welcomes the initiative of the International Socialist Bureau in raising the question of unification in Russian Social-Democracy, and authorises the Central Committee to promote this through all relevant steps, while standing up for the views expressed in this resolution.

First published in 1957 (in part) in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3

Printed from the original

RESOLUTION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON SETTING UP AN ORGANISATIONAL SECTION OF THE C.C. TO DIRECT ILLEGAL WORK[387]

In view of the conditions of secrecy, a special section of the C.C. shall be set up to provide direct guidance in illegal organisational work.

General meetings of the C.C. sections shall be held only in case of emergency, with special precautions of secrecy and only by agreement between the representatives of both sections. Ordinary relations shall be conducted through individual authorised persons.

The organisational section of the C.C. shall use the cover name of Workers' Co-operative Commission.

This section shall 1) direct the work of the St. Petersburg Committee, systematically helping it and restoring it in the event of arrests; 2) see that the work of all legal organisations is connected on Party lines; 3) find especially strict forms of secrecy to cover up illegal ties and undertakings; 4) unite work on the all-Russia scale, with regular contacts and visiting rounds; 5) take charge mainly of preparing a party congress for August 1914.[388]

The organisational section shall be appointed by the Russian collegium of the C.C. and shall consist of 3-5 persons with an equal or double number of candidates.

Written on April 2-4 (15-17), 1914

First published in 1957 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3

Printed from the original

REVIEW[389]

I. M. Kozminykh-Lanin. *Overtime at Factories and Plants in Moscow Gubernia.*
Moscow, 1914. Price 1.00 ruble.

The recently published new statistical pamphlet by Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin examines the question of overtime, which is of exceptional importance for the Russian workers.

Let us note that the statistical data given by Kozminykh-Lanin relate to the year of 1908 only and apply exclusively to workers of Moscow Gubernia. Moreover, the 1908 figures must now be largely out of date, especially in view of the fact that 1908 was a year of industrial stagnation, and that it was followed by a year of industrial upswing, and a parallel and intensified demand for manpower. This,

for its part, was bound to lead to greater use of overtime in a number of industries.

The data given by Kozminykh-Lanin (a factory inspector in Moscow Gubernia) are undoubtedly of a semi-official character, they were collected through an inquiry among the employers, so that they should be taken with a grain of salt but must none the less be given the most serious attention. For one thing, the literature on the question is so scarce in Russia that every work must be made use of, quite apart from the fact that even these semi-official statistics yield a great deal that is highly interesting.

Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin carried out his inquiry among a total of 112,380 workers in 152 enterprises of Moscow Gubernia, mainly large-scale ones, with the textile industry being prevalent in the inquiry.

The figures given in the pamphlet indicate that overtime is not widely practised in the textile industry of the Moscow area. Thus, of the 59,000 workers engaged in the processing of cotton, covered by the inquiry, only 767 did overtime on holidays. Considerably greater numbers did overtime on weekdays (1,717), but even there the figure fluctuates between 1 and 2 per cent of the total. That is understandable, because technical requirements in the textile industry are such that at every given moment there must be a definite number of hands specified more or less in advance; and the main thing is that 1908 was less than favourable for the textile industry. Employers were frequently concerned in cutting back production, rather than in increasing the productivity of their enterprises through overtime.

The metalworking industry, another leading branch, presents a different picture. There overtime is widely practised, Sometimes involving up to 20 per cent of the total number of workers.

As for the duration of overtime, according to Kozminykh-Lanin's data, it generally fluctuates both for metalworkers and textile workers between 25 and 35 hours per worker doing overtime (counting work on both weekdays and holidays). This is a very high figure. The 30 hours of free time on average taken up by overtime earning naturally add up entirely to so much harm done to the worker's cultural and mental development.

Let us see what workers are paid for the plunder of their labour-in terms of brains, muscles and nerves.... Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin gives a very detailed calculation of the per-hour remuneration of workers for overtime in the several branches. We find that this work earns textile workers an average of only 15-16 kopeks an hour, rarely more than that. These rates are slightly increased towards April and September, and then decline again to 13 kopeks in December-February. The earnings are especially small at wool-weaving mills; thus, the average per-hour wage for March came to only 6.75 kopeks for Sunday and holiday work. If those are overtime rates, how low the ordinary ones must be!

The tables show that the labour of metalworkers is not much better paid than that of textile workers; the average per-hour overtime earnings fluctuate from 13 to 20 kopeks. In general, the level and change of rates for the overtime work of Moscow metalworkers clearly show that the working conditions there are highly unfavourable even in comparison with, say, St. Petersburg.

For all their overtime, Moscow workers are paid next to nothing.

Thus, average monthly earnings for overtime were:

Textile workers		(kopeks)
Sundays and holidays . .	compulsory	408
	optional	221
Weekdays	compulsory	353
	optional	235
Metalworkers		
Sundays and holidays . .	compulsory	337
	optional	184
Weekdays	compulsory	325
	optional	231

Let us emphasise in conclusion that Mr. Kozminykh-Lanin's inquiry dealt little, if at all, with the main sphere of overtime—small-scale industry (only 1.45 per cent of the workers covered by the inquiry were engaged in undertakings employing less than 100 persons). Yet, we feel

sure that the examination of working conditions in small-scale industry would have produced some astounding results.

Prosveshcheniye No. 5, May 1914
Signed: *I. V.*

Printed from the *Prosveshcheniye* text

DECISION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The C.C. expresses its gratitude to the C.C. delegation at the Brussels conference[390] for its skilful and vigorous pursuit of the Party's line. The C.C. requests the collegium of delegates to elect one representative to report at a congress or a conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1914.

Written on July 5 or 6 (18 or 19), 1914

First published in 1958 in the magazine *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 6

Printed from the original

POLISH OPPOSITION AT THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE[391]

At the Brussels conference the Polish opposition headed by Malecki went over to the liquidators. With these men deeds do not match words. Let us wait for the results of their July 3 bloc with Alexinsky, Plekhanov and the liquidators. Practice is the best test.

Written after July 5 (18), 1914

First published in 1961 in Vol. 25 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

PLANS FOR AN ARTICLE "REVOLUTION AND WAR"[392]

Revolution and War

1

I. α) July days in 1914 vs. January 1905
   1. gonfalons—barricades
   2. Gapon—illegal Social-Democratic organisation
   3. current slogan—three pillars
   4. naive attitude—persistent struggle
   5. organised finale
      with definite slogan. { *Kievskaya Mysl*[393] / *Russkoye Slovo.* }

II. Strike and armed uprising slogan
   (the fool L. V. in Plekhanov's newspaper).

III. War of Austria and Serbia vs.
   European war.

IV. Militarism, imperialism.
   Guns go off themselves.
      Struggle against war
         resolution of Jaurès vs. Guesde
         experience of workers in Russia.
         Best war against war: revolution.

2

1. July days vs. January 9.
2. Political crisis { October / April 22 / Rasputin / famine. }
3. Growth of movement and spread of slogans.
4. Discarded liquidationism and little groups abroad.
5. War of Austria and Serbia.

6. Imperialism and militarism.
7. War against war.
8. World situation and tasks of proletariat in Russia.

Written between July 15 and 18 (28 and 31), 1914

First published in 1961 in Vol. 25 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

1914 – 1917

ON THE SLOGAN TO TRANSFORM THE IMPERIALIST WAR INTO A CIVIL WAR[394]

The only correct proletarian slogan is to transform the present imperialist war into a civil war. This transformation flows from all the objective conditions of the current military disaster, and only by systematically propagandising and agitating in *t h a t* direction can the workers' parties fulfil the obligations they undertook at Basle.[395]

That is the only kind of tactics that will be truly revolutionary working-class tactics, corresponding to the conditions of the new historical epoch.

Written not earlier than September 1914

First published in 1961 in Vol. 26 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR A PAMPHLET *THE EUROPEAN WAR AND EUROPEAN SOCIALISM*[396]

The European War and European Socialism

1. Character of war: imperialism (as the main thing). Imperialism as the *final* stage in the development of capitalism.

2. National wars at the start of the bourgeois epoch vs. ⟶ *National* war: to consolidate the national territory as a base for the development of capitalism, to sweep away the pre-capitalist remnants.

imperialist wars at the end of it. { *Imperialist* war: everyone already finds the sinking capitalist ship overcrowded, and tries to push the others aside and delay the end of capitalism.

3. Long-standing (30-40 years) diplomatic preparation of the war: its "natural" and "expected" character (and "weaned their thoughts from": Adler at the last sitting of the International Bureau[397]).
4. National war (Serbia) as a by-product of present-day war.
5. Bourgeoisie's use of national war tradition: "*La patrie*",* *Luzzatti*.
6. "Country." Quotation from the *Communist Manifesto*. Its analysis.
7. (α) The working men have no country.
   (β) *Initially* within the framework of the nation ⟶ cf. the wars of 1790-1814, 1859, 1866, 1870.

   India's present war or one between China and Japan ((eventuell**))

   (γ) and even then *not* in the bourgeois sense.
   (δ) Emancipation is impossible without the joint efforts of the proletarians.
   (ε) Collapse of national partitions.
8. Attitude to this truth: opportunists' defence of nationalism (Jaurès in *L'Armée nouvelle*)....[398]
   (H. Wendel in *Neue Zeit*, 1914, **N 19**, S. *843*; *for* Jaurès).[399]
9. Vacillation in the International: defensive and offensive war or "standpoint of proletarian interest"?

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* "Fatherland."—*Ed.*
** Hypothetically.—*Ed.*

10. Quotations from old statements by Bebel and others, and silence about the 1912 resolution.
11. Basle Manifesto (α) quotations from Stuttgart
(β) threat of civil war (1871 and 1905)
(γ) "crime".
12. "Calamities of invasion" = sophism (Kautsky)....
"Tolstoyism" = idem.
"Practical question: victory or defeat for *one's own* country" = sophism.[400]
All this boils down to the question of two camps.
Yes, but which two camps? Nations or classes?
What do the workers lose with their country? The "eternal" in country.
Country as a bourgeois state and its boundaries—country as language, territory, etc.
13. Practical attitude of socialists towards the present war:
Before the war: H. Wendel in *Neue Zeit*, 1914, **N 18.**[401]
id. *Vorwärts*
Leipziger Volkszeitung on war with "tsarism"
id. *Vorwärts*.[402]
14. After the war: Serb socialists [invasion? conquest?] p. 10 of extracts
15. Russian Social-Democrats (walk-out from hall is not influence, cf. Fischer[403]).

To 15.
Russians in Paris "volunteering"??
(1) Declaration by Russian socialists.
(2) Declaration by Leder & Co.[404]
Golos No. 9.[405]
Plekhanov's stand
||| "*Sovremennoye Slovo*" *extracts*.[406]
||| "*Golos*" *No. 3* (September 15).[407]
Smirnov (Y.) and P. Maslov.[408]
16. French and Belgian socialists.
Being strangulated? So ... be a bourgeois minister??
Vandervelde. Guesde. (Authorities?)
Voting credits?

What is to be done? Preach and prepare civil war. Instead of becoming ministers, join the illegal propagandists!!

The *chauvinism* of Vaillant & Co. in *L'Humanité*.[409]

Compère-Morel about 1792[410] and...

... the Russians in Poland.

The despicable G. Hervé and the anarcho-syndicalists.[411]

"Democracy"—and what about the alliance with the tsar??

17. British socialists

Hyndman and the pre-war attitude to him on the part of the German Social-Democratic press.[412]

Keir Hardie and MacDonald.

Struggle against chauvinism *at home*. Prussian militarism, but what about Egypt? and women in irons? Participation in recruitment.

18. German Social-Democrats. The main force. Hegemony in the International. "Of whom much will be asked"....

Haase's speech.... Justification of war.[413]

Voting credits = betrayal!

"Tsarism." Sophism and falsehood!!

Bourgeois lies!!

Bernstein in *Vorwärts* about Engels (1859)....[414]

Engels 1890[415] (contra *Mehring*)[416]

Hamburger Echo vs. *Vorwärts*.[417]

19. Bestial chauvinism vs. boring and hypocritical chauvinism.

20. R. Fischer and reply to him.[418]

(Defence of violation of Belgium's neutrality.)

Sozialistische Monatshefte: moral justification of violation of Belgium's neutrality.[419]

21. Two trends in German socialism.

Karl Liebknecht (*Golos* No. 12[420] and the British newspapers).

Bremer Bürger-Zeitung[421]—Mehring—Halle[422]
(timid protests)....

22. Collapse of the International { *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*[423], Mehring, Swiss newspapers } *On the collapse of the International*
Volksrecht[424]

Polemics between the French and the Germans
Manifesto of the French and the Belgians
(International Bureau?).[425]
"Government's standpoint among the French"
(and among the Germans??)

"An International restored and freed from turncoats."

"An International freed from turncoats" (*Golos* No. 12).[426]

23. Putting the collapse of the International in a *better light*.
Vandervelde and Kautsky
"Cuckoo and cock."[427]
"Both right"
"kleinmütige Freunde"??*

NB
Südekum's trip.[428]
The interests of the French and the German bourgeoisie.

24. Causes of the collapse of the International: opportunism.
Stuttgart 1907.
Left-wing conference in Copenhagen in 1910.[429]

25. Opportunists' ideas and current behaviour { from Danish resolution on opportunism.[430] }

26. The whole International?
Not!! The Serbs
Keir Hardie
Reply to Fischer.

* "Faint-hearted friends."—*Ed.*

Elements of the Third International.
Authorities: Kautsky, *Guesde*, Vandervelde??
(attitude to authorities)....

27. Opportunism vs. Centre in the International.
Sozialistische Monatshefte.
Majority of Social-Democratic papers.
Methods used by *Vorwärts*
Kautsky.
(Hypocrisy or embellishment.)

28. Peace against war or civil war against national war? (A peace of opportunists united with the bourgeoisie.)

"Kindly peace"—slogan of petty-bourgeois radicals, petty bourgeoisie (cf. Trevelyan & Co. in Britain[431]).
cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, extracts.[432]

29. Transforming national war into civil war
1871
1905

[Historical character of this transformation.]

"*Weg zur Macht*"* and "*striving for overthrow.*"

The rapidity of this transformation is one thing, the direction towards it, another.

30. Legality and illegality of organisation.

Riga and St. Petersburg Committee in Russia (comment in *Russkoye Znamya*)[433]

Contra K. Kautsky & Co. on "patriotism" of workers in Russia.

Comparison with army

Golos No. 18, column 1 and No. 18, column 4.[434]

30 bis. *Vorwärts* and the *class struggle.*

("W. C. Modell 70")[435]

[one should not renounce legal organisation, but should not confine oneself to it]

* Way to power."—*Ed.*

31. *Volkskrieg*.* Yes!
But the conclusions
from this are different.

militia not at all
merely for defence.
Glory to war and
42-centimetre!![436]

32. Frank and "Opfertod"**
..."from the Social-Democratic standpoint"....

32 bis. The war has revealed every weakness both of the governments and of the socialist parties.

33. The calamities of war and its consequences. Revolutionary movement—and collapse of the miserable diplomacy of the Centre.

33 bis. The reactionary aims of the war *Kreuz-Zeitung*[437] and *Novoye Vremya*.
MacDonald's "pessimism"?[438]
Growth of nationalism.
Last war?

Y. Smirnov in *Russkiye Vedomosti* No. 202.
Nationalism in *Russia*.
P.S.D. and S.R.s
"Volunteering": see §15.

34. Direction of work: voting credits= bugler at the front.

(1) No voting of credits. That is betrayal.
(2) Against the chauvinists *at home*.
(3) No stopping at legal organisation.
(4) No forgetting of the Basle Manifesto on the threat of civil war.

35. Perhaps, there is another half a century of oppression before the socialist revolution, but what will *our* epoch leave, what will

* People's War.—*Ed*.
** Sacrificing one's life."—*Ed*.

be our own contribution? Scorn for the opportunists and traitors or *preparation* of civil war??
Martov in *Golos* No. 21
too early for Commune slogan: isolation from the broad popular masses!!?[439]

Written in September-October 1914

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*

Printed from the original

TO THE AUTHOR OF *THE SONG OF THE FALCON*

Every class-conscious worker will feel a pang when he sees Gorky's signature alongside that of P. Struve under the chauvinistic-clerical protest against German barbarity.[440]

In a talk we once had about Chaliapin's genuflections, Gorky said: "You can't judge him too strictly; we artists have a different mentality." In other words, the artist frequently acts under the influence of his emotion, which attains such a force that it suppresses all other considerations.

Let that be so. Let us say that Chaliapin must not be strictly judged. He is an artist, and nothing more. He is a stranger to the cause of the proletariat: today, he is a friend of the workers, tomorrow, a reactionary, moved by his emotion.

But the workers have grown accustomed to regard Gorky as their own. They have always believed that his heart beats as warmly as theirs for the cause of the proletariat, and that he has dedicated his talent to the service of this cause.

That is why they keep sending messages of greetings to Gorky, and that is why his name is so dear to them. It is this trust on the part of the class-conscious workers that imposes on Gorky a certain *duty*—to cherish his good name and to refrain from putting his signature to all sorts of cheap chauvinist protests which could well confuse the workers who lack political consciousness. They are still unable to find their bearings in many situations, and could be led astray by Gorky's name. Struve's name will not confuse any worker, but Gorky's may.

Therefore, the class-conscious workers, who well realise the falsehood and the vulgarity of this hypocritical protest against the "German barbarians", must feel that they have to rebuke the author of *The Song of the Falcon*. They will-tell him: "At this hard and responsible moment through which the proletariat of Russia is going, we expected you to go hand in hand with its leading fighters and not with Mr. Struve & Co.!"

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 34,
December 5, 1914

Printed from the
Sotsial-Demokrat

EDITORIAL NOTE TO THE ARTICLE "THE UKRAINE AND THE WAR"

From the Editors

The above article has been written by a prominent supporter of the *Dzvin* trend.[441] Just recently, we have had to engage in some sharp polemics with that trend. We still have some differences with its writers. We do not regard as correct the concessions they have made to nationalism; we believe the idea of "cultural-national autonomy" to be bourgeois nationalism; we do not think that the best way to organise the proletariat is to break it up into national curias, and we do not share their views of the distinctions between "anational", national and international. Being advocates of consistent *internationalism*, we entertain the hope that the author of this article and his friends will learn the necessary lessons from the events of the European war.

At any rate, we are happy to note that precisely at this hard moment the said group of Ukrainian leaders are most aware of their propinquity with *Sotsial-Demokrat*. It is to their credit that they have succeeded in separating themselves from the notorious "Alliance for the Liberation of the Ukraine",[442] whose activity has nothing in common with Social-Democracy.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 38,
February 12, 1915

Printed from the
Sotsial-Demokrat
text

DRAFT POINT THREE OF THE RESOLUTION "THE C.O. AND THE NEW PAPER", ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. SECTIONS ABROAD[443]

3. Expressing full sympathy with the idea of further increasing the frequency of the C.O.'s publication, and establishing a popular daily under the C.O. Editorial Board, the conference considers it possible to start the new publication after the main task—the correct organisation of the C.O.—has been secured.

The conference urges all comrades abroad to start working vigorously at once in that direction, calling especially for more systematic support of the C.O. with literary material in connection with the organisation of contributors' conferences, etc.

Written between February 14 and 19 (February 27 and March 4), 1915

Published in 1915 in a hectographed leaflet, "Konferentsia zagranichnykh organizaysii R.S.D.R.P." (Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad)

Printed from the original

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST WOMEN'S CONFERENCE[444]

Resolution Motioned by the C.C. Delegation

The current world war, which is the cause of so much distress wherever it has broken out, which has devastated and ruined Belgium and Galicia, and which has ruined the lives of thousands upon thousands of workers—this war is an imperialist one, caused by the struggle between the ruling classes of various countries for a division of the colonies and domination of the world market, and by dynastic interests. It is a natural continuation of the policy conducted by the class of capitalists and the governments of all count-

ries; and that is why the question of who struck out first is altogether irrelevant from the socialist standpoint.

This war, far from serving any interests of the workers, is in fact a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for disrupting the international solidarity of the workers and weakening their movement and class struggle in each country. Similarly, the "defend your country" watchword, put forward by the bourgeoisie and supported by the opportunists, is nothing but a bait to which the bourgeoisie hopes the proletariat will rise and be induced to give their life and blood for its interests.

In view of all this, the Extraordinary International Socialist Women's Conference, on the strength of the Stuttgart resolution, which recommends the use of the economic and political crisis, brought about by the war, for rousing the people to accelerate the collapse of the capitalist system, on the strength of the Copenhagen resolution, which says that it is the duty of deputies to vote against war credits, and of the Basle resolution, which says that the workers consider it a crime to shoot down each other—declares that the representatives of most of the socialist parties of the belligerent countries acted in complete discord with these resolutions and, succumbing to the pressure of circumstances, committed a real betrayal in respect of socialism, supplanting it with nationalism; it insists that the proletarians of all countries have no enemy other than their class enemy—the class of capitalists.

The horrible suffering caused by this war awakens in all women, especially proletarian women, a growing desire for peace. Declaring *war on all imperialist* war, the conference at the same time believes that if this desire for peace is to be transformed into a *conscious political force*, *working women must well realise that the propertied classes are striving for nothing* but annexations, conquest and domination, that in the epoch of imperialism wars are inevitable, and that imperialism threatens the world with a series of wars, unless the *proletariat musters enough strength to put an end to the capitalist system by the final overthrow of capitalism*. Every working woman who wants to shorten the period of suffering connected with the epoch of imperialist wars, must strive to have her urge for peace develop into *indig-*

nation and struggle for socialism. The working woman will attain her aim in this struggle *only through a revolutionary mass movement, and a strengthening and sharpening of the socialist struggle.* Consequently, her first duty is to support the trade union and socialist organisations and break the civil peace by fighting against the war credits, against entry into bourgeois ministries, by supporting and spreading the idea of soldiers' fraternisation in the trenches on the field of battle, by setting up illegal organisations wherever the government has abolished the constitutional freedoms, and finally, by drawing the mass into manifestations and revolutionary movements.

The International Socialist Women's Conference calls on the working women of all countries to start this struggle right away, organising it on an international scale, and closely tying in their work with that of the socialists of all countries who, like Liebknecht, are fighting against nationalism and waging a revolutionary socialist struggle.

At the same time, the conference gives working women a reminder that in the most advanced countries of Europe the objective conditions for socialist production are already there, that the whole movement is entering a new phase, that the current world war imposes fresh and serious duties upon them, and that their movement may be the forerunner of a general mass action which could give fresh scope to the whole socialist movement and advance the hour of final emancipation. By taking the initiative in staging demonstrations and revolutionary manifestations, working women, marching hand in hand with the proletarians, could usher in a new era of proletarian struggle in the course of which the proletariat will win socialism in the more advanced countries, and a democratic republic in the more backward ones.

Supplement to *Sotsial-Democrat*
No. 42, June 1, 1915

Printed from the
text of the
Supplement

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE AT ZIMMERWALD[445]

AUGUST 23-26 (SEPTEMBER 5-8), 1915

1

VARIANT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF LEFT-WING SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS FOR THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

Draft

The present war springs from imperialism, i.e., the highest stage of capitalism, when the development of the productive forces and the growth of capital have gone beyond the narrow framework of separate national states, and induce the "great" powers to try to enslave other nations and seize colonies as sources of raw materials and areas for the export of capital.

The objective conditions are quite ripe for socialism and the great powers are fighting the current war in an effort artificially to delay the collapse of capitalism, by preserving and intensifying the dependence of colonies, by seizing privileges on the world market, and by splitting and suppressing the international revolutionary struggle of the workers.

Social-Democrats fully recognise the necessity of freedom for all nations. In the epoch of struggle against feudalism, absolutism and foreign national oppression, they recognised defence of one's country—today they recognise as just the war waged by the oppressed nations (especially colonies) against their oppressors, the "great" powers.

But the current war between the great powers is a war between slave-owners to intensify and consolidate slavery, for a redivision of the colonies, for the "right" to oppress other nations, for the privileges of great-power capital and for the reactionary suppression of the working-class movement. That is why talk about "defence of one's country" on the part of both belligerent groups of powers is a bourgeois swindle of the people. Neither the victory by any of the present governments, nor the status quo ante bellum

can safeguard the freedom of nations from the imperialist great powers, nor can it give the possibility of a decent life to the working class, which is being increasingly weighed down by the high cost of living, the trusts, militarism and its attendant political reaction, even in the freest countries.

The real meaning of the "defend your country" slogan in this war is defence of the great-power privileges and advantages, defence of the "right" of the given bourgeoisie to oppress other nations, it is a national-liberal labour policy, an alliance between a small section of the workers and their "own" national bourgeoisie against the mass of proletarians and the exploited. Socialists conducting such a policy are in fact chauvinists—social-chauvinists. The policy of voting for war credits, entering ministries, Burgfrieden,* etc., is a policy of opportunism and betrayal of socialism. The working class cannot attain its great aim of labour emancipation, without carrying on a resolute struggle against opportunism and social-chauvinism.

The Basle Manifesto of 1912, adopted unanimously in anticipation of precisely the kind of war between the great powers which has in fact come about, definitely recognised the reactionary and imperialist character of the war, and clearly announced the approach of a *proletarian revolution* in connection with such a war. In effect, the war has created a revolutionary situation, and has generated revolutionary sentiments and discontent. It is the task of Social-Democrats to maintain and develop these, help to clear the revolutionary awareness of the masses and purge their minds of the falsehood of bourgeois and socialist chauvinism, promote every effort at revolutionary mass struggle against imperialism, for socialism, and to work to transform the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism.

To intensify their revolutionary agitation, Social-Democrats must make use of the growing massive desire for peace, which expresses the disappointment of the masses and the clearing of their revolutionary consciousness. But in so doing, Social-Democrats should not deceive the people by holding out hopes for any kind of stable democratic

* Peace at home.—*Ed.*

peace, that would rule out the oppression of nations, and that would come soon and without the revolutionary overthrow of the present governments.

Written before July 13 (26), 1915

First published in 1937 in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

Printed from the original

2

THESES FOR A REPORT AT A MEETING OF LEFT-WING SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS[446]

Theses:

1. Fact of the war and the consequences. Overall picture.
2. Imperialist character
   1) colonial plunder
   2) oppression of nations
   3) division of the world.
3. Bringing out the aim.
4. Falsification of its character
   a) emancipation of peoples—oppression
   b) democracy —despotism (reaction?)
   c) culture —barbarous war
   d) welfare —social reforms
   e) capitalist income —high cost of living!
5. Capitalism (Trotsky).
   (Break-up of the bourgeois world)....
6. At the height of the crisis of capitalism; *which* (crisis) dooms the proletariat to the greatest sacrifices it is urged to defend capitalism, there are demands for civil peace.
7. Struggle against war....
8. Decisions of congresses....
9. Official parties—against these decisions
   { voting credits / entry into ministries / for bloc } *Defence of one's country.*
10. Struggle of minorities (and parties) against the war.
11. Return of the working class to its task.
12. I.S.B.
13. Meeting at Berne.[447] (**Links** created.)

14. Banner of class struggle.
15. a) action by belligerent countries....
    b) action by neutral countries....
16. International scale.
17. Terms of peace.
18. Appeal.

Written between August 19 and 23 (September 1 and 5), 1915

First published in 1962 in Vol. 27 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original
Translated from the French and the German

3

PLAN FOR A SPEECH AT THE ZIMMERWALD CONFERENCE

1) *Imperialism* and plunder
2) Diverting the attention of the revolutionary proletariat and weakening its movement...
3) Exposure of bourgeois sophisms —one group
   —another
4) Devoir socialiste...*

5)	Quote	bottom 5. page 5 top— 7. page 5 top 1
6)	German Social-Democrats cannot plead struggle against tsarism	
7)	Our press has been rebuking us over the German leaders' behaviour	
8)	Quote, p. 8, end from the word Même	½ page
9)	Russian S.D. remplit son devoir** by its vote and *illegal proclamation*	
10)	It is harmful to cover up the bankruptcy of the Second Interna-	

* Socialist duty.—*Ed.*
** Has done its duty.—*Ed.*

tional; the Centre is especially harmful
11) This bankruptcy is the bankruptcy of opportunism — page 11 [1]
12) Chauvinism in Russia, including a section of the Social-Democrats
13) Defeat of tsarism—the lesser evil
14) Illegal organisation and agitation

quote (end of 15 and 16) [1]

Written between August 23 and 26 (September 5 and 8), 1915

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Printed from the original

4

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE MANIFESTO AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE WAR AND THE TASKS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

AUGUST 25 (SEPTEMBER 7)

1

It was inevitable that things here should have come to a struggle of opinion between Ledebour and us.[448] However, I must protest against the method used here by Ledebour in attacking Radek. The assertion that our manifesto has been signed only by men who are safe is inadmissible. It has also been signed by the Latvian delegates and Borchardt. Another old and hackneyed argument is saying that one should not call the masses to revolutionary action unless one is able to take a direct part in it oneself. Furthermore, I deny that there should be no mention of the means of struggle. That has occurred in all revolutionary periods The means should be made known to the masses so that they could be explained and discussed. We in Russia have always acted in this way; in fact, the interpretation of the means of struggle had been the subject of arguments between Plekhanov and myself even in the pro-revolutionary years. When the objective historical situation of 1847 confronted

Germany with revolution, Marx and Engels sent out an appeal from London calling for violence.[449] The German movement is faced with a decision. If we are indeed on the threshold of a revolutionary epoch in which the masses will go over to revolutionary struggle, we must also make mention of the means necessary for this struggle. According to the revisionist view taken by David and others, that is naturally something quite useless: after all, they do not believe that we are on the eve of a revolutionary epoch. We who believe this must act otherwise. You cannot make revolution without explaining revolutionary tactics. It was precisely the worst feature of the Second International that it constantly avoided explanations; and it is that which the Dutch *Tribune*-Marxists[450] quite correctly called the German Centre is "passive revolutionary attitude".

Now on the question of persecutions. You in Germany should in general do more than legal work, if you want real action. You must combine legal and illegal activity. The old methods are no longer adequate to the new situation. You yourselves have said: we are going forward to an epoch of great class battles. In that case, you must also have the means for this. And it is not at all necessary for the manifesto to be signed, it could well be issued without signatures. At any rate, you should not act semi-legally, like Clara Zetkin, for instance. That calls for too much sacrifice.

Here is how things stand: either a truly revolutionary struggle or mere empty talk which will help no one but the deserters, against whom Liebknecht speaks out so sharply in this letter.[451] Coming out for peace does not mean much in itself. David also writes: we are not for the war, but only against defeat. Everyone wants peace. Taking account of the new situation, we should use new and specific means of struggle which should not be similar in any way to the old German or Russian methods.

2

I do not agree with Serrati that the resolution will appear either too early or too late.[452] After this war, other, mainly colonial, wars will be waged. Unless the proletariat turns off the social-imperialist way, proletarian solidarity will

be completely destroyed; that is why we must determine common tactics. If we adopt only a manifesto, Vandervelde, *L'Humanité* and others will once again start deceiving the masses; they will keep saying that they, too, oppose war and want peace. The old vagueness will remain.

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Printed from
the minutes of the
conference
Translated from the
French and the German

5

ADDENDA TO THE STATEMENT BY THE ZIMMERWALD LEFT[453]

No. 1. noch die wichtigste Frage des Opportunismus berührt, noch die besonders schädliche Rolle des s.-d. Zentrums aufdeckt.*

No. 2. We vote for, in particular, because two French comrades have put forward an important consideration. It is they who have pointed to the exceptionally oppressed condition of the workers in France, their extreme corruption by revolutionary phrase-mongering, and the need for a slow and cautious transition to resolute tactics. But in Europe as a whole it is opportunism that is the enemy of the working-class movement.

Written on August 26
(September 8), 1915

First published in 1930 in
Lenin Miscellany XIV

Printed from
the original

GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION[454]

German Social-Democracy was the strongest and most influential party of the Second International. That is why, on the one hand, it bears the greatest responsibility for its

* Neither touches on the highly important question of opportunism, nor exposes the exceptionally harmful role of the S.D. Centre.—*Ed.*

collapse, and on the other, its example and experience are *most important* for studying the reasons of this collapse and for analysing the measures, ways and means for fighting the opportunism which has strangulated that party.

The opportunism which has strangulated the Social-Democratic Party of Germany and has transformed that party into a national-liberal labour party, has crystallised as social-chauvinism in the 1914-15 war.

Written in 1915

First published in 1937 in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

Printed from the original

AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE APPEAL "TO ALL AFFILIATED PARTIES AND GROUPS", ADOPTED BY A CONFERENCE OF THE ENLARGED INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST COMMISSION

*Änderungsvorschläge**:

1. Give a more precise and definite statement of the *political-class significance* and the *basic* incorrectness of the tactics of the "official parties" and "the Second International" . . .
   - (a) defence of country = defence of imperialist bourgeoisie, its plunder and oppression of nations
   - (b) connection with opportunism
   - (c) alliance with the bourgeoisie at home against the international proletariat.
2. Definition of "Bruch des Burgfriedens".**

   Non-participation in any institution directly or indirectly supporting the war.

αβ + Unterjochung der Nationen.*** Delete the end about "In der Aera"....****	+ Greetings to Liebknecht and Rühle.

* Proposals on amendments.—*Ed.*

** "Breakdown of civil peace."—*Ed.*

*** Subjugation of nations.—*Ed.*

**** "In the course of the era"....—*Ed.*

3. Nicht nur "geeignete", sondern illegale Literatur, das heisst *freie*, nicht der Zensur unterordnete*.

γ	ohne zu sagen, dass die Niederwerfung dieser Regierung dazu nötig**

+

4. Strikes (economic and political) and demonstrations.
5. + bis zur Revolution.***
6. + Quotes not only from the Stuttgart resolution, but also from the Basle resolution: it is a crime to shoot the Commune, 1905.

Written between January 23 and 27 (February 5 and 9), 1916

First published in 1962 in Vol. 27 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

* Not only "adapted", but also illegal literature, i.e., *free* literature, not subjected to censorship.—*Ed.*

** Without saying that it calls for the overthrow of this government.—*Ed.*

*** All the way to the revolution.—*Ed.*

PLAN FOR A LECTURE ON

2 Internationals

rpt.

1. Subject: not an assessment of the war (>1 year ago and outdated), but (two) *basic lines* in the development of the working-class movement and socialism.

   Alias: not an *assessment* of the war or tactical *principles*, but an assessment of the course the working-class movement has taken.
   Accordingly, the main thing: facts (on a broad scale) of the working-class movement and socialism, and *comparison* of various countries.

2. *Introduction*. Huysmans in Arnhem and in Rotterdam vs. Wijnkoop et *Henriette Roland-Holst* in *Berner Tagwacht*.[456]

   ?+cf. *Avanti!* (February 12, 1916)?[457]

   *Vorwärts**

2a. *Etwa*:

1. Russia: Patriots (Plekhanov & Co.)	—O.C. and Trotsky (*Nashe Slovo*)	—
2. Germany: Majority	—K. Kautsky & Co.	—
3. France: Majority	—Longuet & Co.	—
4. Britain: Majority	(Fabian Society, Labour Party,[459]	

* The word *Vorwärts* appears to have been pencilled in later.—*Ed.*

"TWO INTERNATIONALS"[455]

Subject:

You might say the world working-class and socialist movement as the touchstone of theory.

NB:

In the *O. C.*: (1) blaming the workers; (2) forgetting the ties with the liquidators.

—C. C.

—minority. I. S. D.* —(*Rühle*)—*Winnig*

—Bourderon & Co. || Bourderon's resolution || *Reports in "Labour Leader"*[458]

Hyndman)—Askew (?)—*Forward*.[460]

Glasgow NB: "Merthyr"[461] NB

Socialist[462]

{Ornatsky in *Nashe Slovo*[463]} (break with the Labour Party) [*Letters* in *Labour Leader*]

— — — — — —

* Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands.—*Ed*.

5. Italy: Minority (Bissolati)—
6. *Austria*: Majority (Pernerstorfer)

7. America: Russel —(Hillquit)
8. Australia. Majority (government party)

3. *Russia*. Elections to *War Industries* Committees. *First* elections to C. C. (+the vacillating) + *defencist bloc* (Larin). Indignation of the bourgeoisie and the government. Gvozdev's denunciation. *Second* elections. Victory of chauvinists.

Nashe Dyelo[466] + *Nash Golos*[467] + *Rabocheye Utro*[468]
O. C.

Trotsky and *Nashe Slovo* (Chkheidze group?)
C. C.

Martov's evolution: from "*Vorwärts* is dead" and "we will not go into the International"—*to* defence of alliance with *Nashe Dyelo* (Boretsky).

This may well be brilliant "diplomacy", but there is ***not a bit*** of *socialism* in it.

Result: two lines in the working-class movement in Russia.
Only two (the rest has passed away).

Their *class basis*:
(α) in alliance with domestic bourgeoisie =
(β) in alliance with international proletariat =
Their *ideas*: for "defence" ("defence of country");
("defencists");
against "defence of country"...
(cf. Zimmerwald Manifesto)*

4. *Germany*.
Struggle within group: Liebknecht und *Rühle* 2 and *20* (their inconsistency).[471]

* Points 2 and 3 are crossed out in pencil in the MS.—*Ed*.

Italian official party. (*Avanti!* Feb. 12, 1916)
— Adler — minority. (report in *Berner Tagwacht*[464])
— — — Debs (*Debs's* articles[465]) ("bombs and dollars")
— ? — — socialists.

["... Not for defence, but for organisation ...."]

Social-chauvinist mockery of Martov (Boretsky in *Nashe Slovo*).

NB: Stolypin
"*Khvostov labour party*,[469]

= for strengthening "domestic" bourgeoisie (= *for* war)
= for international proletarian revolution.

[+ "Europa und die Revolution" in here?[470]

{ *Fall Liebknecht** pamphlet
"regeneration" }
"national-liberal party".

* The Liebknecht Case.—*Ed.*

Borchardt and *Lichtstrahlen*[472]
Winnig.
Rühle and reply of *Vorwärts* (Analysis).[473]
{ (α) Circulation of illegal literature and illegal organisation.
(β) Helping the government. }

5. *France*.
(1) Vaillant in *L'Humanité* (letters?)[475] ("stopped their ears with blood-soaked cotton wool", "doctrinaires", etc., etc.)
{{ (2) Merrheim's words at Zimmerwald: "le parti, le gouvernement et les Jouhaux ne sont que trois têtes sous un bonnet".* }}
(3) Bourderon's resolution ((analysis of its text)).
(4) Report in *Labour Leader* **on the split.**

6. *Britain*.
Majority (participation in ministry)
defence.
The New Statesman[477] (and its attitude)
(Labour Party+Fabian Society).
[contra—*B. S. P.*, where 3/7 are internationalists]
Glasgow Socialist ((statement at Zimmerwald[478]))
Letters in *Labour Leader*.
Article on *betrayal*.
***Merthyr*.**

7. *Italy*.
Bissolati—party
(Treves and his speech[480])
{ *Italy*: Bissolati and the labour party
Bulgaria: Tesnyaki[481] and Shiroki
Sweden: Branting and Höglund
Holland: Troelstra and *Tribune*.[482] }**

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* "The party, the government and the Jouhaux are nothing but three heads under one cap."—*Ed*.
** Point 7 is crossed out in pencil in the MS.—*Ed*.

Demonstration in Brunswick.[474]
(Strike in Hannover.)

Saumoneau's leaflet.[476]

(Brizon & Co. at Kienthal).*

Lloyd George in *Glasgow* and workers' reply.

British Socialist Party
(Hyndman's walk-out[479])**.

* The text from the word "regeneration" to the words "(Brizon & Co. at Kienthal)" is in pencil and appears to have been written later.—*Ed.*

** The text was apparently pencilled in later.—*Ed.*

8. *Austria.*
Pernerstorfer in *Neue Zeit*[483]
—V. Adler—***internationalists***...
{idem: resolution of V. Adler and "15".*

9. *United States of North America.*
("Wait and see"....)
Russel (V. Berger & Co.) for "preparedness". "Jingo"
Hillquit = diplomat**
Debs and his articles.

10. *Australia.*
Report in ***Berner Tagwacht***.[484]
Article in *New Statesman*
(I. K.[485])***

11. *Results.*
{{K. Kautsky in a letter to Bukvoyed.... {"There are no two directions"}
id. in *Neue Zeit* many times.
Falsehood and lies.
K. Kautsky in Breitscheid report ("either the old International or half a dozen").
Two and only two.
Throughout the world.

(Montagne and Gironde (Plekhanov in *Iskra* No. 2, 1901, "On the Threshold of the 20th Century").
("Boys with $2" and with capitalist "brains" in *Appeal to Reason*.[486]
Not diplomatic cover-up ("St. Petersburg slush"—Kautskian Vaut mieux dire****).
but explanation to the masses.
Inevitability of split.

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* Apparently pencilled in later.—*Ed.*

** The text from the word "Jingo" to the word "diplomat" is crossed out in pencil.—*Ed.*

*** The text from the word "article" to "(I. K.)" was apparently pencilled in later.—*Ed.*

**** Better to say.—*Ed.*

Diplomacy—**hypocrisy**—**vacillation**—**delusion**?

It is not the word that matters.

Axelrod and Martov	in Russia	one type
K. Kautsky and Haase	in Germany	
Longuet et Pressemane	in France	
Hillquit in America		
Askew and others in Britain		

ΣΣ = ***Huysmans***.*

* The text from the word "diplomacy" to the word "Huysmans" is crossed out in pencil.—*Ed*.

Revolution (cf. *L'information* +Europa *und die* Revolution)*
Iskra No. 2 (1901): Montagne and Gironde.
Struggle against opportunism { Bernstein. Millerandism and Jaurèsism. British liberal labour policy. Split in a number of countries. }
The war has accelerated
the development — — of the
break-up both ways.
Quid est Kienthal?**

Written between January 30 and February 4 (February 12 and 17), 1916

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NOTE TO THE THESES "SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION"

There is some similarity between the way mankind should arrive at the abolition of classes and the way it should subsequently arrive at the fusion of nations. Thus, only a transition stage of dictatorship by the oppressed class leads to the abolition of classes, only the liberation of the oppressed nations and real eradication of national oppression leads to the fusion of nations, and the political criterion of the feasibility of this lies precisely in the freedom to secede. Freedom to secede is the best and the only *political* means against the idiotic system of petty states and national isolation which, to mankind's good fortune, is being inexorably destroyed by the whole course of capitalist development.

Written in January-February 1916

First published in 1937 in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

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Translated from the German

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* The text from the word "boys" to the word "revolution" is crossed out in pencil.—*Ed.*

** What is Kienthal? The text from the words "*Iskra* No. 2" to the end appears to have been pencilled in later.—*Ed.*

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO TERMINATE PUBLICATION OF THE JOURNAL *KOMMUNIST*[487]

Not for the press:

Taking into consideration

(1) that *Kommunist* was founded—temporarily and as an experiment—by a federated editorial board, when there had been no sign of *any* difference on any substantial question between the C.O. Editorial Board and the rest of the Editorial Board as a whole;

(2) that after No. 1-2 of "*Kommunist*" *three* members of the Editorial Board put forward such differences in their signed theses on the question of self-determination;

(3) that an exchange of opinion on this question revealed deep divergence over the assessment of the role of democratic demands and the minimum programme in general;—

—the C.C. resolves: to recognise the continuation of the journal *Kommunist* as impossible and to declare that *this publication is hereby terminated*.—

Furthermore. With a view to *extending* the discussion on the controversial questions and to having them clarified before a broader circle of leading comrades, the C.C. resolves:

> to request the three comrades who have signed the theses to draw up a *motivated statement* of their differences with the C.O. Editorial Board.

This statement together with a reply by the C.O. Editorial Board shall be communicated to a broader circle of leading Party workers for a *final* decision on whether it is desirable and necessary to open a debate in the press.[488]

I very much regret that *you* are dragging out this "terribly boring" business. *I repeat*—I, too, am terribly bored with having to repeat—that I *must decline* to take part in *Kommunist*.

Your plan lacks principle and tends to *confound* the confusion. *If there are no* profound differences of principle, the submission to the C.C. is either slander or intrigue, and you will be exposed by every worker in Russia.

If there are, *as much* must be said: after No. 1-2 people have begun to confuse things outrageously; *we*

decline responsibility; we believe it to be our duty *not* to encourage but to expose. *As a concession* we invite (see leaflet) them to have another discussion before an "enlarged circle" (so as not to shame them in the press; *not to kill* them outright by polemics).

{That is the only reason.}

For *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*[489] we have, apart from a number of our articles,* Varin + Alexander + reports + indictment (I have not yet received it) + Safarov + Latvian + Kollontai (probably).

The Japanese[490] should be invited only to be shamed; Bukharin—only *order material* on the economic question.

Radek should *not* be invited (his article is *legal* and is *not at all important* in this shape). We shall have to *fight* against *his* theses.

Here is my opinion. *Kommunist* is a *corpse* and I am not taking part in reviving it.

Alexander (and the Russian workers in the Bureau) should confront them with this question *of principle*: we *do not take* on the Editorial Board people who confuse things outrageously and refuse to learn, who do not even wish to make an effort to set forth their opinion. They want to *play us off* against the P.S.D., that much is clear, while they themselves are safe on the sidelines.

Kommunist met the task of *that* period: to rally everyone *against* social-chauvinism and Kautskyism.

The task now is **different**: we are faced with a *struggle* against "imperialist *Economism*".

Salut,
Lenin

P.S. Why did you not reply *whether or not Sukhanov was sent to Geneva*? I send you material for Grimm.

No *luck* with translation of the theses.

Written after March 28
(April 10), 1916

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* There will be enough "writers" for *two* collections!

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE AT KIENTHAL[491]

APRIL 11-17 (24-30), 1916

1

INITIAL VARIANT OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE PROPOSAL

Proposal from the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. to the Second Socialist Conference Called by the I.S.C. (Berne)*[492]

(Theses on Points 5, 6, 7a and 7b and 8 of the Agenda)

In announcing the convocation of the Second International Socialist Conference, the I.S.C. published the following key points of the agenda:

5. "struggle to end the war"
6. "problem of peace"
7a. parliamentary "action" } "agitation and propaganda" }}
7b. mass "action" } "agitation and propaganda" }}
8. International Socialist Bureau.

The I.S.C. has invited the organisations to discuss these questions and to send in their proposals. Here is the reply of our Party C.C. to the invitation:

1. Just as all war is but a continuation by violent means of the politics which the belligerent states and their ruling classes had been conducting for many years, sometimes for decades, before the outbreak of the war, so the peace that ends any war can be nothing but a consideration and a record of the actual changes brought about in the relations of forces as a result of the given war.

2. It is therefore the greatest absurdity and stupidity, from the standpoint of theory, and from the standpoint of socialist doctrine, and the greatest fraud on the working class in practice, to engage in talk about assessing the present war on the strength of "simple" concepts of defence and attack and about assessing the future peace on the strength of "simple" pious wishes for a stable, democratic, honourable, etc., peace.

3. This war is an imperialist war, i.e., a war resulting

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 169-79.—*Ed.*

from contradictions on the basis of a highly developed monopoly capitalism which is ripe for transition to socialism. This war is being fought for world hegemony, i.e., for fresh oppression of the weak nations, for another division of the world, for a division of the colonies, spheres of influence, etc.—a division under which the old plundering powers, Britain, France and Russia, would give up a share of their booty to Germany, a young and stronger plundering power.

4. That is why, unless the proletarian revolution overthrows the present governments and the present ruling classes of the belligerent "great" powers, there is *absolutely no chance of any* peace *other* than a more or less short-term armistice between the imperialist powers, a peace accompanied by a *growth* of reaction within the states, a *growth* of national oppression and enslavement of the weak nations, a *growth* of inflammable material preparatory for new wars, etc. For the fact is that from the objective content of the politics which has been bred by the entire epoch of imperialism and which the bourgeoisie of *all* the belligerent "great" powers had conducted before *this* war and is conducting *during it*, inevitably flows a peace resting on a new and even worse oppression of nations, etc.

5. To arouse in the masses of people ideas or hopes of the possibility of a stable or democratic, etc., peace between the present governments and the present ruling classes (i.e., the bourgeoisie allied with the landowners), as most of the official socialist parties are doing, is not only shamelessly to cheat the people but to lull them and distract them from the revolutionary struggle, which is already starting in the form of the strike and demonstration movement.

6. It is precisely this kind of cheating the people and distracting the proletariat from the revolutionary struggle that characterises the "peace programme" which is now being "unanimously" put forward both by the official spokesman of the Second International Huysmans at the Congress of the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei of Holland at Arnhem, and by Kautsky, the most influential theorist of the Second International and the most influential advocate of the social-patriots and social-chauvinists in all countries. Their programme consists in hypocritical

lip service to some democratic pious wishes: repudiation of annexations and indemnities, self-determination of nations, democratisation of foreign policy, arbitration courts to settle conflicts between states, disarmament, a United States of Europe, etc.

7. The best evidence that this "peace programme" is downright hypocrisy is, on the one hand, the lip service paid to it by a number of bourgeois pacifists and demagogic ministers of the belligerent countries, and, on the other, its duplication by notorious (notorisch) chauvinists at the conferences of "socialists" of one group of belligerent powers in London (February 1915)[493] and of the other in Vienna (April 1915).[494] It is the "socialists" who have entered the bourgeois ministries carrying on the plunderous war, who have voted for the war credits, who have helped the war by participating in various organisations and institutions, etc., it is they who are *actually* conducting the policy of safeguarding the old and new annexations, colonial oppression, etc., that have proclaimed to the world their "peace programme", consisting in a repudiation of annexations, etc.

8. Kautsky, the leading authority of the Second International, declared to the whole world on May 21, 1915 (*Neue Zeit*) that this accord and "unanimity" of "socialists" in London* and in Vienna over the principle of "independence" or self-determination of nations is proof of the "unanimity" and "viability" of the Second International in the "peace programme". This defence and sanction of the most crying and most brazen hypocrisy and deception of the workers is not in any sense a coincidence, but a systematic policy which is being conducted in a number of countries by men who pretend to be internationalists but are actually making the imperialist war more attractive by applying to it the idea of "defence of one's country" and consolidating the domination of the working-class movement by the social-chauvinists, who have betrayed socialism, by preaching "unity" with them. This policy, which is the most harmful and dangerous one for the working class, is being conducted by Kautsky, Haase and others in Germany,

* An inadvertent mistake in the MS., which says "Copenhagen".—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Longuet, Pressemane and others in France, most of the leaders in Britain, Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze & Co. in Russia, Trèves and others in Italy (see the threat of the Central Organ of the Italian Party, *Avanti!*, on March 5, 1916, to expose Trèves and other reformist-possibilists[495] as to "who resorted to every means to prevent the Party Executive and Oddino Morgari from taking action to secure unity at Zimmerwald and to create a new International"). This world-wide policy, which is of the utmost danger to the working class, could be called a *Kautskian* policy, after its most authoritative spokesman.

9. Socialists cannot refuse to fight for reform. They must vote everywhere, including the parliaments, by the way, for all, even the slightest, improvements in the condition of the masses, such as increased relief for the inhabitants of the devastated areas, lessening of national oppression, etc. But on the basis of the *present* war and the peace flowing *from it*, this kind of reformist activity to improve the condition of the masses is apparently possible only on a miniature scale. It would be a crying deception of the masses to suggest to them, whether directly or indirectly, the idea that the questions raised by the *present* war could have a reformist solution. For *this* war has created a revolutionary situation in Europe, bringing to the fore the *most fundamental* problems of imperialism, which will inevitably have an imperialist solution, except where the present governments and ruling classes of Europe are overthrown through revolution. That is why the principal and fundamental talk of socialists in the struggle for stable and democratic peace must be: first, to explain to the masses the need for *revolutionary mass struggle*, to spread the idea of it systematically, and to set up the necessary organisations; second, to expose the *hypocrisy* and *falsehood* both of the bourgeois pacifist and of the socialist, notably Kautskian, talk about peace and the "unanimity" of the Second International on the "peace programme". Such talk is doubly hypocritical on the part of "socialists" who follow the bourgeoisie in denying the possibility of transforming the present imperialist war into a civil war for socialism, and who oppose any revolutionary work in that direction.

10. The central point of the currently prevalent hypocri-

sy concerning the "peace programme" is the allegedly unanimous recognition of the struggle against *old* and *new annexations*. But those who talk of annexations and the struggle against them either cannot or will not for the most part give thought to *what annexation is*. Clearly, annexation will not be the right word for every appropriation of "foreign" territory, for, generally speaking, socialists favour the abolition of frontiers between nations, their getting closer together and integration, and the formation of larger states. Clearly, not every disturbance of the status quo can be described as annexation, for this would be extremely reactionary and a mockery of the fundamental concepts of the science of history. Clearly, annexation does not apply to every kind of integration by force of arms, for socialists cannot repudiate violence in the interests of the majority of the population and in the interests of human progress. Annexation can and must clearly apply only to the appropriation of a territory *against the will* of the population of that territory. In other words, the concept of annexation is inseparably bound up with the concept of *self-determination of nations*.

11. The *present* war—precisely because it is an imperialist war insofar as *both* groups of belligerent "great" powers are concerned—inevitably had to and did give rise to the phenomenon of the bourgeoisie and the social-chauvinists "*fighting*" violently against "annexations" *whenever* this is done by an *enemy* state. Südekum and his Austro-German friends and defenders, including Haase and Kautsky, are silent about Germany's annexations in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, Denmark, Poland, etc., but very frequently "struggle against the annexations" carried out by Russia in respect of Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc., by Britain in respect of India, etc. On the other band, the British, French, Italian and Russian Südekums, viz., Hyndman, Guesde, Vandervelde, Renaudel, Trèves, Plekhanov, Axelrod, Chkheidze & Co., are silent about Britain's annexations in respect of India, France's in respect of Nice or Morocco, Italy's in respect of Tripoli or Albania, Russia's in respect of Poland, the Ukraine, etc., but then *for the most part* "struggle against the annexations" carried out by Germany.

This kind of "struggle against annexations" on the part of the social-chauvinists and the Kautskians is clearly downright hypocritical, and the bourgeoisie is promoting their struggle both directly, by allocating millions upon millions for chauvinist propaganda, and indirectly, by giving the social-chauvinists and the Kautskians a monopoly on legality.

The French "socialists", who justify war over Alsace-Lorraine, and the German "socialists", who fail to demand freedom for Alsace-Lorraine to secede from Germany, are clearly both annexationists, no matter how much they swear to the contrary. The Russian "socialists", who talk or write against the "disintegration of Russia" or now, directly or indirectly, justify the war over who is to enslave Poland, in the name of the "peace without annexations" slogan, are clearly annexationists as well, etc., etc.

12. If the "struggle against annexations" is not to become an empty phrase or a revolting hypocrisy, socialists must: *first*, explain to the masses that it is necessary to wage revolutionary struggle for the proletariat's winning of political power and for a socialist revolution which stems from all the conditions of the imperialist epoch and the present imperialist war and which alone can fully secure the self-determination of nations everywhere, i.e., liberate the oppressed nations, bring the nations closer together and effect their fusion not on the basis of violence, but on the basis of equality and accord between the proletariat and the working people of all nations; *second*, they must immediately start the most extensive propaganda and agitation against the veiled chauvinism and annexationism of the official socialist parties, especially of those of the "great" powers. Socialists must explain to the masses that a socialist and an internationalist only in name but a chauvinist and an annexationist in fact is the English socialist who fails at once to struggle for freedom to secede for Ireland, India, etc.—the French socialist who fails to struggle for the freedom of the French colonies, against the war to annex Alsace and Lorraine, etc.—the German socialist who fails to struggle for freedom to secede for Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes, the Poles, the Belgians, the Serbs, etc.—the Russian socialist who fails to struggle for freedom

to secede for the Ukraine, Finland, etc., against the war over Poland—the Italian socialist who fails to struggle for freedom to secede for Tripoli, Albania, etc.—the Dutch socialist who fails to struggle for freedom to secede and independence for the Dutch East Indies—the Polish socialist who fails to struggle for the full freedom and equality of the Jews and the Ukrainians oppressed by the Poles, etc.

13. From the Zimmerwald Manifesto and the I.S.C. circular of February 10, 1916 (*Bulletin* No. 3)[496] inevitably flows the proposition that all "war against war" and "struggle for peace" is *hypocrisy* unless it is indissolubly bound up with immediate *revolutionary mass struggle*, and with its propaganda and preparation. But this conclusion must be stated straightforwardly and explicitly. We must, first, explain to the masses where the development of revolutionary mass struggle in the conditions of a European war can and *must* (muß) lead. It leads inevitably to the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism. A *hint* of this is given in all the speeches saying that the workers should die for their own cause rather than an alien one. But hints are not enough. The great, even if perhaps not very near, goal must be clearly set before the masses. They must know where to go and why. Second, if we call on the masses to fight against their governments, "regardless of the military position of the given country", we thereby not only repudiate the admissibility of "defending the country", as a principle, in the *present* war, but admit the *desirability* of defeat for every *bourgeois* government in order to transform its defeat into revolution. That, too, must be squarely put: revolutionary mass struggle cannot become an international one unless its conscious representatives unite openly for the purpose of defeating and overthrowing *all* bourgeois governments. Third—and this is the most important thing—it is *impossible* to conduct any revolutionary mass struggle without setting up everywhere, not only at the top, but also among the masses, an illegal organisation for its propaganda and preparation, and discussion of its course and conditions. Since there have been street demonstrations in Germany, since there have been a number of letters from the front-lines in France urging *against* subscription to the war loan, since there

have been mass strikes in Britain, to say nothing of Russia, then, to promote this struggle, to help consolidate it on an international scale, it is absolutely necessary to shed light on *every* step along that road in a *free*, i.e., *illegal*, press, to verify the successes, to weigh their conditions, to strengthen and develop the struggle. Without an illegal organisation and an illegal press, recognition of "mass action" will remain (as it has remained in Switzerland) an empty phrase.*

14. On the question of the socialists' parliamentary action, it must be borne in mind that the Zimmerwald resolution not only expresses sympathy for the five Social-Democratic deputies of the Duma, who belong to our Party, and who have been sentenced to exile in Siberia, but also *expresses its solidarity* with their tactics. It is impossible to recognise the revolutionary struggle of the masses while being content with *exclusively* legal, *exclusively* reformist activity of socialists in parliament; this can only arouse legitimate dissatisfaction among the workers and cause them to desert Social-Democracy for anti-parliamentary anarchism or syndicalism. It must be stated clearly and publicly that Social-Democratic members of parliament must use their position *not only* to make speeches in parliament, but also to render all possible aid *outside parliament* to the underground organisation and the revolutionary struggle of the workers, and that the *masses* themselves, through their illegal organisation, must *supervise* the activity of their leaders.

15. The question of calling the International Socialist Bureau, placed on the agenda of the Second International Socialist Conference, which is being convened, inevitably raises a more fundamental question of principle, as to whether the old parties and the Second International can be united. The more extensive the mass sympathy for the Zimmerwald association, the more incomprehensible to the masses, the more harmful for the development of their struggle become the inconsistency and timidity of the stand which essentially identifies the old parties and the Second International with the bourgeois policy in the working-class movement (see the Zimmerwald Manifesto and the I.S.C.

* Points 12 and 13 are crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

circular of February 10, 1916), while fearing a split with them and promising to dissolve the I.S.C. as soon as the old International Socialist Bureau meets.

Such a promise *was never* voted on and was not discussed even at Zimmerwald.

The six months since Zimmerwald have made it even clearer that a split is inevitable, that the work which the Zimmerwald Manifesto recommends cannot be conducted in unity with the old parties, and that fear of a split is a brake on every step along that way. In Germany it is not only the I.S.D. group that has condemned the fear of a split and has openly come out against the hypocrisy of the apostles of unity, but also Otto Rühle, a *member of the Reichstagsfraktion** and Karl Liebknecht's closest friend, who has openly come out for a split. Nor was *Vorwärts* capable of putting forward against Rühle a single serious or honest argument. In France, member of the Socialist Party Bourderon spoke against a split, but in fact motioned a resolution at the Congress which "désapprouve (disavows) the C.A.P (Comité Administratif Permanent=the party C.C.) and the G.P." (Groupe Parlementaire=the parliamentary group). Adoption of such a resolution would clearly signify an immediate and unconditional split in the party. In Britain even T. Russel Williams, writing in the moderate *Labour Leader*, repeatedly and openly admitted the inevitability of a split, and received support from a number of party members. In America, where the Socialist Party is formally united, some of its members have come out for militarism and war (so-called preparedness), and others, including Eugene Debs, a former presidential candidate from the Socialist Party, openly preach civil war for socialism *in connection* with the coming war.

Actually, *there is* already a split throughout the world, and ignoring this fact would merely harm the Zimmerwaldists, making them ridiculous in the eyes of the masses, who are very well aware that every step of *their work* in the Zimmerwald spirit means a continuation and deepening of the split.

We must have the courage openly to recognise the inev-

* Parliamentary group.—*Ed.*

itable and the actual, to abandon any harmful illusions about the possibility of unity with the "defenders of their country" in the present war, and to help the masses escape the influence of the leaders who "are misleading them" (see the I.S.C. circular of February 10, 1916) or are hatching a "plot" (Pakt) *against* socialism through an "amnesty".

That is our proposal on the item of the agenda concerning the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau at The Hague.

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Reformist phrases are the main means of deceiving the people at a time when the objective situation has placed on the agenda of history the greatest world crisis, which, regardless of the will of the various parties, can either be deferred and postponed until the next imperialist war or resolved through socialist revolution. It is neither chance nor the ill will of the several governments or the capitalists of some country but the entire development of bourgeois relations that has led to imperialism and the present imperialist war. Similarly, it is neither chance nor the result of any demagogy or agitation but the objective conditions of the crisis brought about by the war and the sharpening of class contradictions that now generate strikes, demonstrations and other similar manifestations of mass revolutionary struggle in a number of belligerent countries.

Objectively, the question can only be put like this: are we to help this, still weak but intrinsically powerful and deep-going discontent and movement of the masses, which may develop into a socialist revolution, *or* are we to conduct a policy of helping the bourgeois governments (Durchhaltspolitik, politique jusquauboutiste*)? The real meaning of the sweet talk about democratic peace consists exclusively in *help* to the governments through the hypocritical stunning and fooling of the masses.

* *
*

This war has brought to the fore the basic problems of imperialism, i.e., of the very existence of capitalist society,

* The policy of continuing the war to a victorious end.—*Ed.*

and it would be quackery to suggest to the people, directly or indirectly, that these problems can have a reformist solution. It is a question of a redivision of the world corresponding to the new balance of power between the capitalist states, which in the last few decades have been developing not only very fast, but also—and this is especially important—very unevenly. On the basis of capitalist social relations, this new redivision of the world is impossible otherwise than through wars and violence. The objective state of things rules out any reformist solution for the ripe contradictions, it rules out any other way out except a series of imperialist wars or a socialist revolution of the proletariat, the conditions for whose success have already been created precisely by this epoch of imperialism. Real political activity in the given circumstances is possible only as this alternative: either to help your "own" national bourgeoisie plunder other countries or to help the beginning....*

Written in late February-March 1916

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2

SPEECHES IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON CONVENING THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU[497]

APRIL 15 (28)

1

The Lugano conference was held in September 1914.[498] If Messrs. Huysmans & Co. wished to convene the Bureau, they could have done so long ago. But they have failed to do it. You deny the split between the sections of the old International, but the split is a fact. Today, we virtually have a crisis of all the socialist parties of the world. On the one hand, you treat Thomas & Co. as abject characters and traitors, and on the other hand, you say today: Oh, we

* Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

want to meet them, to discuss things and re-establish the International! What you say is empty talk: it is empty talk because it comes today, 16 months after Lugano. The men with whom you want to re-establish the International are dead, they no longer exist, not literally, but politically.

2

If Grimm thinks that everyone should not vote separately, we are quite willing to have the voting by groups. The last thing we want to do is to impose our will, but we want the voting to take place; after that we shall willingly take part in the work of the committees.

3

The question would have been solved long ago, if a vote had been taken. It is highly unfair that after many days of work together we have to forego the vote. After all, the vote would take no more than 5 minutes! Martov's proposal is acceptable without objections.[499]

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Printed from the minutes of the conference Translated from the German

ON THE DECLARATION BY THE POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AT THE ZIMMERWALD CONFERENCE[500]

This P.S.D. declaration at Zimmerwald shows that in opposing the right of nations to self-determination, the Polish Social-Democrats wish to say something quite different from what they are actually saying. They want to say that not every movement for national independence deserves Social-Democratic support. That is unquestionable both because any democratic demand is subordinate to the common interests of the proletariat's class struggle, without being at all absolute, and because in the epoch of imperi-

alist rivalries to dominate the nations there may well be open and secret alliances between the bourgeoisie of an oppressed country and an oppressor country.

Written in July 1916

First published in 1962 in Vol. 30 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

PLAN FOR AN ARTICLE "ON THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE"[501]

On the Question of the Role of the State
Communist or Social-Democrat?
Socialism and communism. (Complete community of the articles of consumption or, at least, of the *necessities*.)
Democracy is also a state. Absterben.... "Withering away" of the state.
Why not Abschaffung* or Sprengung**?
"Allmähliches Einschlafen"*** of one function after another.
Without democracy = without administration of men.
"The state is rooted in the souls of the workers"?
Opportunism and revolutionary Social-Democracy.
Dictatorship of the proletariat.

Use of the state against the bourgeoisie.
Resistance to its attempts at restoration.
Revolutionary wars.
Introduction and defence of democracy.

The role of democracy:

Education of the masses
Their transition to the new system
Form of socialist revolution: *alliances* of 1905.

Imperialism: the state and the economic organisations of the capitalists. "State-capitalist trusts"....
Democratic reforms of the imperialists and socialist revolution.

* Destruction.—*Ed.*
** Explosion.—*Ed.*
*** "Gradual somnolence."—*Ed.*

Marx in 1844 (*Nachlass*, II. Band, S. 50,* end of last but one paragraph).[502]

> Nothing except an antithesis between socialism and politics. Against Ruge's purely political radicalism. Until 1847!

Engels ("Dell' Autorità"**) on revolution... (+)
on organisation....[503] (+)

Marx (ebenda***) ((*Neue Zeit*, 32, I, 1913-1914)) on political influence and struggle for **concessions**—on the revolutionary use of the state power....[504]

Two directions in *politics* (politics is participation in the affairs of *state*, direction of the state, definition of the forms, tasks and content of state activity), opportunist and revolutionary, or two trends in the attitude to the "state"?

The democracy of the reformists and the democracy of the revolution. Two different contents: minority and the mass. Appeasing the mass? Helping the mass *struggle*? Subordination of the mass to the authority of the leaders? Revolt against the leaders? Engels's "lower mass" *versus* "mass" *behind* opportunist leaders. Boils down to revolution versus opportunism.

Written not earlier than November 18 (December 1) 1916

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

THESES ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SWISS SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO THE WAR****[505]

Practical Section

(1) Complete repudiation of defence of country both from the military and the political standpoint, and ruthless exposure of the bourgeois lies behind this slogan.

* *Legacy*, Vol. II, p. 50.—*Ed.*
** "On Authority."—*Ed.*
*** Ibidem.—*Ed.*
**** See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 149-51.—*Ed.*

(2) Unconditional rejection of all war credits and demands both in time of peace and of war, and with a motivation of principle. Impose the duty of doing this on the party's representatives in parliament and in all other state institutions.

(3) Struggle in all the party's propaganda and agitation—above all in practical activity—against all military establishments, and repudiation of all military duties to the bourgeois class state.

(4) Systematic transition by the party to revolutionary struggle and revolutionary tactics all along the line, instead of being confined to reformism in practical activity.

(5) Adoption of the work and activity of Karl Liebknecht and the whole Spartacus group in Germany[506] as a model of the only international activity, of real struggle against the war and all wars, and emulation of their example.

(6) Struggle by means of propaganda, agitation and organisation against the social-patriots (i.e., "defenders of their country") and reformists (i.e., opponents of the immediate application of revolutionary means of struggle) within the Swiss Socialist Party.

(7) Explaining to the masses that all solemn declarations against militarism and war inevitably come to empty talk without a complete change in the party's structure and activity and without control by the resolute opponents of social-patriotism and reformism of all the posts in the socialist-political and also trade union, consumer and all other working-class organisations.

(8) Propaganda and preparation of a vigorous revolutionary mass struggle (demonstrations, strikes *and so on*, depending on the growth of the overall revolutionary struggle) for the purposes of the proletarian revolution as the only means of doing away with wars.

(9) Explaining to the masses that in case of necessity they must themselves set up from below special organisations for such struggle adapted to the hard conditions of wartime.

(10) Making sure that the party's revolutionary tasks in the struggle against the high cost of living, war, etc., are known and clear to every section of the exploited people outside the party.

(11) Systematic propaganda in this context among young people of pre-conscription age, and also in the army, etc.

Written in German in late November-early December 1916

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*

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Translated from the German

REMARKS ON AN ARTICLE ABOUT MAXIMALISM[507]

Page 6 (Paragraph 2). Here there should be an insertion saying that Potresov has now *in fact* disavowed these propositions (of Kautsky + Hilferding, etc.) containing a repudiation of reformism in principle. Potresov has become a reformist.

(It is not right to confine oneself to the statement: "we have never had the intention of proving"; this should be put forward as *p r o v e d*, and Potresov should be challenged: you and especially Maslov & Co. of *Dyelo*[508] have in fact, but tacitly, like cowards, altogether gone over from *this position* to reformism.)

Page 7 (end of § I) "mass action"?? It would be better to put this otherwise, without using this word which has the fault that, being *largely* caused by the *G e r m a n* censorship (a pseudonym for *revolution*), it tends to obscure the concept of *revolution*. (There will have to be a reckoning on this later with Pannekoek + Radek & Co.!! Here is an example: there is no German censorship in Switzerland and here the term "mass action" has *a l r e a d y* brought about confusion which the reformists find useful.)

But that is not the main thing. The main point is in your idea, which is *basically incorrect*, that "those of its (minimum programme) demands ... add up to a *transition* to a basically different social system" (page 7, § II, *e t a l.*) (idem, p. *9*).

That is quite wrong!! *N e v e r* is a "transition to a basically different social system" achieved *e i t h e r* by the definite demands of the minimum programme ("those of its demands") *o r t h e s u m t o t a l* of the minimum-

programme demands. To think so is to move over to the reformist position in principle and to abandon the standpoint of the socialist revolution.

The minimum programme is one which is in principle *compatible* with capitalism and *does not go beyond* its framework.

You may have wanted to say that where society is objectively mature for socialism, the implementation of the *sum total* of the minimum-programme demands *would produce* socialism. But even that is not so. The only thing that can be said is that *it is most probable* in practice that out of any serious struggle for the *major* minimum-programme demands *there will flare up* a struggle for socialism and that *we*, at any rate, are working in that direction.

Another thing should not be forgotten, and this is something Pannekoek + Radek do forget, namely, that imperialism is the exploitation of hundreds of millions in the dependent nations by a handful of very rich nations. Hence, the *possibility* of full democracy inside the richest nation *with its continued* domination over dependent nations. That was the state of things in ancient Greece on the basis of slavery. That is how things now stand with New Zealand and Britain.

(By the way: page 8 is not good. That's *not* the way to put it. For instance, in the epoch of imperialism and the high cost of living "bread" is precisely the thing you will not get through reform *alone*.

Page 8—defence against Potresov's charge. The thing to do is not to defend yourself, but to attack: *you confine yourself* to reforms, as the liberals did in Russia in 1904.)

Page 10—in 1905, the liberals *confined themselves* to reforms; we demanded, preached, prepared, etc., the revolution. Here it is not a question of "concreteness", but of the basic principle (essence) of any revolution: displacement of the old class and winning of "*all power*" (*der* Macht) *by the new* class.

(Page 10 bottom—you deal with the proletarian "reform" in a terribly clumsy and imprudent way, although you do want to say: "revolution"!! What you should say is perhaps: "As in Russia in 1904 it is not reforms but a *reform*.")

Page 11 is all quite wrong. *Imperialism* will produce both the 8-hour working day and the "arming of the people"

against the socialist revolution. That is precisely the point over which the struggle will *not* unfold. And, in general, it will not be over the minimum programme.

Imperialism will produce "Bulygin Dumas" and reforms *against* the revolution. We shall be for the revolution.

"The most important questions of the present day" will *n o t* be and are *n o t* those you name, but the high cost of living (1) + (2) imperialist wars.

Reforms are powerless against the high cost of living (in the presence of the trusts, etc.), as they were against the autocracy in Russia in 1904-05.

You have incorrectly put the question of reform, and of the minimum programme, and of democracy.

> I very strongly recommend rewriting it, confining yourself, *for the time being* (for a small article in *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*), to the antithesis: You, Mr. Potresov, are a full-fledged **reformist**, you confine yourself to "reforms", you *h a v e f o r g o t t e n* the ⁂ significance and meaning of the "formula": "not reforms, but a reform", the significance and meaning of the quoted statements by Kautsky + Hilferding + + Bauer, etc. *Dyelo* = ideologically quite mature organ of *reformism*, of the bourgeois labour party.

The "three pillars"[509] *before* the revolution were an extension of the struggle for reform. And that is exactly how the question is formulated in the Manifesto of the Zimmerwald Left: all struggle for reform must be channeled and transformed *into struggle* for revolution.

I do not think self-determination of nations should be set out as the "most important" in general: in so doing you go miles beyond what we have been saying until now. By coming out in this way you would force me to join up against you with—oh, horrible thought!—Bukharin!!!

Isn't it better to leave this question aside for the time being, rewriting the article à la ⁂ —and to work out something in the form of theses, let us say, on the attitude to the minimum programme, etc., for dispatch to the Bureau, etc.?

⁂ Phrases about "maximalism" are nothing but attacks by a *reformist* on the *revolutionaries* ("opponents of reformism

in principle" for the censorship). In general, it is an exceptionally difficult thing and heikle sehr heikle Sache!!* to treat of *such* a question in the censored press.

Written after December 7 (20), 1916

First published in 1962 in Vol. 30 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

PLANS FOR A PAMPHLET *STATISTICS AND SOCIOLOGY***

Statistics and **Sociology**

1

A) Historical conditions of national movements.
B) Some theoretical questions relating to national movements.
C) Right of nations to self-determination and Rosa Luxemburg.
D) Cultural-national autonomy.

A) Historical conditions of national movements....	**A.** *Historical background to national movements* (p. 2***)
succession of epochs; types of countries as historical stages in this succession....	Chapter 1. Some statistics *p. 4.* I and II p. 8****
	2. Three "types" of countries.... (Types—historical stages.)
B) Some theoretical questions [Some unsettled ques-	"State of nationalities?" [stage of completed national

* A ticklish, a very ticklish matter!!—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 271-77.—*Ed.*
*** A reference to page. 2 of the pamphlet MS. (see ibid., pp. 271-73).—*Ed.*
**** Ibid., pp. 273-76, 276-77.—*Ed.*

tions?] relating to national movements.

(1)

B. [On the concept of feasibility]

1. "Feasibility" of self-determination.

movements....]
3. Imperialism and division of the world....
(diagram?)
4. Rule: oppressor and oppressed nations....
5. "System of states...."
{{system of national states / system of imperialist states}}

(2) 2 **bis:** "Dualism" and monism....

2. National wars in the "epoch" of imperialism.
{Hilferding.[510] Concept of "epoch". / Patouillet. / Junius.[511]}
to A.⟶6.

(3)

[Annexations and colonies]

3. Annexations and self-determination.
4. Colonies and self-determination.

7. Concurrence of imperialist and national wars....
America 1783—the "possible" and the real.

(4)

[Lensch's arguments]

{5. Lensch vs. Struve. Lensch's "arguments....[512]
6. Engels on the 1866 treaty (separate sheet)....}

(5) {7. Imperialist Economism and "ultra-imperialism"....}

(6) {8. The state and state construction.
9. Democracy and socialism.}
10. Minimum and maximum.

(7)

[11. Social-chauvinism vs. Kautskyism on the question of self-determination and imperialism.]

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

(8) United States of Europe: ...

Patouillet (Wilhelm II)....
Colonies.

(9) Social-pacifism as embellishment of imperialism (K. Kautsky. Dec. 1916).[513]

2

Distinction between the oppress*or* and the oppress*ed* countries

+ Marx on Ireland *1869* (from "Beiträge zur Biographie"[514])	European states and colonies in 18*76* and 19*16*. "It wasn't worth while emancipating the Negroes" (Wirth). Marx on the state: "*der heutige* Staat"* ?? (NB)
+ Engels about the 1866 treaty and its abrogation (separate sheet).	"Law" of state concentration????
+ Lensch's "arguments" (his 2 articles)....	National specifics of oppressed nations (Wirth on Ireland). Engels on Ireland in the event of war between America and Britain. *Neue Zeit* 1915-16?
	..."Imperialist Economism".... "Ultra-imperialism".... } Two absurdities }
"Era of national wars" (Patouillet and Junius)	"There can be no national wars" in the imperialist "epoch". (To make it stronger!) Concept of "epoch"....

* "The modern state."—*Ed.*

3

Old and new studies of the national question:

To **A:**

1. Three "types" of countries.
2. "Types"=historical stages.
3. Uneven development.

{{ "State of nationalities." Incompleteness of this concept. }}

To **B**
- Furtherance of reforms: Bismarck vs. 1848
- Imperialist war of 1914-17 vs. 1848 (!!!)
- Imperialism and division of the world
- Imperialist wars on the basis of slavery, etc.
- Concurrence of imperialist and national wars.

Historical conditions of national movements

Etwa
- *A.* Some statistics. (Facts are stubborn things.*)
- *B.* Theoretical mistakes in the reasoning of some Marxists on the national question.
- *C.* Right of nations to self-determination and Rosa Luxemburg.
- *D.* Cultural-national autonomy.

} old studies....

To **B:**

Imperialism and the national question.
"*Feasibility*" of national self-determination.
Annexations and national self-determination.
Colonies and national self-determination.
The state and state construction.
"Dualism" and "monism" in the national question.
Diversity of movements towards a single goal.
"Get out of the colonies"??
Socialism and colonies (Engels 1882).
Jewry—nation?
Integration of nations?

Written in January 1917
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*

Printed from the original

* The last three words are in English in the original—*Ed.*

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CENTRE AS A TREND IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY[515]

In Grimm:

Characteristics of the Centre
as a trend in international Social-Democracy:

+ 1. No rupture with the social-patriots of *one's own* country either on basic principles, or in organisation; hence 2.
+ 2. Against split.
(+—) 3. Evasiveness on the question of defence of country.
+ 4. Recognition of Zimmerwald and Kienthal—without a split with the I.S.B. and international social-patriotism .
+ 5. No break with reformism: only verbal criticism of it ("passiver Radikalismus"*).
+ 6. Adoption of a *wait-and-see* attitude (*not* active, *not* with initiative as the Left) on the coming revolution (in *connection* with *the present* war).
+ (ΣΣ)
(?=§1) 7. ΣΣ=prettifying (and defending) social-patriotism in varying measure and by diverse means, such is the *essence* (wesen) of the Centre....
+ 8. No reconstruction of the present Social-Democratic parties and trade unions, nothing like Liebknecht's "regeneration from top to bottom". Deferring this question.
(—) 9. Social-pacifism as programme and tactics.
+ 10. No systematic propaganda of revolution in connection with the present war.
+ 11. No preparation of organisations, etc., for such a revolution.
—α) *Avanti!* March 6, 1916
β) Morgari in Swiss newspaper
γ) social-pacifism
+αα) social-patriots exclusively
ββ) the young.

* "Passive radicalism."—*Ed.*

In putting Liebknecht and the Italian Socialist Party side by side, Grimm tends to confuse the Centre and the Left.

Grimm wants to solve a revolutionary problem (struggle against war) by reformist means ("schwächenn, erschweren, etc.*).

Indirect tax, November 4-5, 1916.

Reformist struggle against high cost of living (August 6, 1916).

Polemics against** ("Sozialismus tut not"***).

Idem reformism — Hushing up of social-patriotism in the Swiss Socialist Party. Absence of struggle against it.

Idem in trade union movement (Schneeberger & Dürr).

NB — Question of the *moment* of revolutionary action *is confused* with that of systematic propaganda and agitational and organisational preparation for possibility of revolutionary action in general.

Lying, dishonest dodges with Entwaffnung**** (cf. his own "theses"). Idem Diensterweigerung.*****

Dodges on the question of was heisst "*verweigern*" die *Leipziger Volkszeitung*? Verzerrung der Frage *seitens* Grütli-Verein.*)

NB: Paying *lip service* to Zimmerwald + Kienthal and *carrying on as before* in fact!!

Page 13. From the standpoint of the Centre in general it would be *consistent* in Switzerland to stand *for* defence of the country!!!**)

Written in January 1917

First published in full in 1962 in Vol. 30 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from the original

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* Weakening, complication, etc.—*Ed.*

** The next word is illegible.—*Ed.*

*** "Socialism is necessary."—*Ed.*

**** Disarmament.—*Ed.*

***** Refusal to do military service.—*Ed.*

*) What does *Leipziger Volkszeitung* call "*refusal*"? Distortion of the question *on the part* of Grütli-Verein.—*Ed.*

**) Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

PLAN FOR AN ARTICLE "THE LESSONS OF THE WAR"[516]

The Lessons of the War

Etwa:

1. Definition of imperialism.
2. The imperialist character of the war has been exposed.
3. Advance of monopoly capitalism towards state capitalism.
4. "Necessity" teaches. Famine, etc.
5. Female labour. "Arbeitszwang", etc. "Kriegssozialismus"?*
6. Social-patriotism or social-chauvinism. International significance.
7. Kautskyism or Centrism or social-pacifism.
8. The Left.

8 *bis*. Basle Manifesto. *Refuted*?

9. Socio-economic approach. "Not kennt kein Gebot."** Either socialism or famine (idem Neutrale***).
10. Wie's gemacht wird? "Wumba."****
11. Political tasks: resolution.
12. Civil war. Waffen umkehren. ("Entwaffnung der Arbeiter"?)*****
13. "Break up the old state" machine (Kautsky gegen Pannekoek).
14. "Dictatorship of the proletariat." 1871 and 1905.
15. The old, "ready-made" state power or a *new* one?
16. "Soviets of Workers' Deputies." Is that parliamentarism?
17. The role of *new* democracy and its withering away.

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* "Forced labour", etc. "War socialism"?—*Ed.*

** "Necessity knows no laws."—*Ed.*

*** Neutral.—*Ed.*

**** How is it done? "Wumba" (Department for the Supply of Arms and Munitions).—*Ed.*

***** Turn weapons. ("Disarmament of workers"?)—*Ed.*

17 bis. "New" democracy ("neue Schöpfung"*)= one which is working, socialist, proletarian and *communist.*

18. Moments, elements, indications of a turn towards revolution.

M. Capy, urb. Gohier
R. Rolland

The North American Review.
The Atlantic Monthly?

Subjects: **A.** Imperialism and imperialist war (1-2).
B. Three trends in international socialism (6-8).
C. Development of the economy (3-5).
D. "Feasibility" and urgency of socialism.
E. Political revolution (11-17).
F. "Der Sturm naht"** (18).

Written in February 1917

First published in 1939 in the magazine *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the original

OUTLINE OF FIFTH "LETTER FROM AFAR"[517]

The old programme *will not do* for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. It should be altered:

1) add about imperialism as the final stage of capitalism
2) about the imperialist war, imperialist wars and "defence of one's country"

+2 *bis*: about the struggle and the split with the social-chauvinists

NB 3) add about the *state*, the kind we need, and about the *withering away* of the state.

* "New creativity."—*Ed.*
** "The storm approaches."—*Ed.*

4) Change
two last paragraphs *before* the political programme (against the monarchy in general and measures to restore it)
5) add to § 3 of the political section:
no officials from *the top*
(cf. *Engels* in his criticism of 1891[518])
+ salaries to *all* officials: not higher than workers' wages
+ right to recall *all* deputies and officials at any time
+ 5 bis) correct § 9 on self-determination
+ international character of socialist revolution in *detail*
6) correct and *raise* many things in minimum programme.
7) In agrarian programme:
(α) nationalisation instead of municipalisation (I shall send my MS. on this, which was burnt in 1909,[519] to St. Petersburg)
(β) model farms on landed estates.
8) "Universal labour service" (Zivildienstpflicht)
9) cross out support for "*every opposition*" movement (a revolutionary one is a different matter).
10) Change name, because
(α) it is wrong
(β) it has been fouled by the social-chauvinists
(γ) it will confuse the people at the elections, because the Social-Democrats = Chkheidze, *Potresov* & Co.

This is an outline of "letter No. 5". Please return **at once.** Do you happen to have any outlines or notes for changing the practical section of the minimum programme? ((Do you remember us discussing this *many times*?))
This work should be started **right away.**

Written between March 7 and 12 (20 and 25), 1917

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

REPLIES TO A CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEWSPAPER *POLITIKEN*[520] MARCH 31 (APRIL 13), 1917

Our friends did not wish to give any interviews. Instead of an interview, the arrivals have handed through *Politiken* a communiqué on the trip to the press and the public.

The most important thing for us is to arrive in Russia *as soon as possible*, Lenin said warmly. Every day counts. The governments have done everything to hamper this trip.

Did you meet any of the comrades from the German party?

No. Wilhelm Jansson from Berlin tried to meet us at Lingen on the Swiss border. But Platten refused permission, giving a friendly hint that he wished to spare Jansson the unpleasantness of such a meeting.

Politiken No, 85, April 14, 1917

Printed from the *Politiken* text
Translated from the Swedish

REPLY TO F. STRÖM, A SPOKESMAN OF THE LEFT-WING SWEDISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS MARCH 31 (APRIL 13), 1917

It is a downright invention to say that Frederik Ström, allegedly contrary to the wishes of the Russians, had prevented a representative of *Socialdemokraten*[521] from attending the conference. To Ström's question, Lenin replied:

We have absolutely no trust in Mr. Branting. If *you* have trust in him, you are free to invite his representative.

Politiken No, 86, April 15, 1917

Printed from the *Politiken* text
Translated from the Swedish

RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARIES' TRIP ACROSS GERMANY

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GROUP[522]

The Russian revolutionaries who arrived in Stockholm on Friday morning handed to *Politiken* for publication the following official communiqué concerning their trip:

Britain, which officially welcomed the Russian revolution with "joy in her heart", at once did everything to nullify *one* of the results of the revolution—the *political amnesty*. The British Government does not allow transit to Russia for Russian revolutionaries who live abroad and who oppose the war. When this had been proved beyond doubt—this fact has been confirmed by numerous documents which will be made public in the very near future, and Russian socialists of *all* trends have stated as much in a unanimous resolution—a section of the Russian Party comrades decided to try to return from Switzerland to Russia via Germany and Sweden. *Fritz Platten*, Secretary of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party and the leader of its Left Wing, a well-known internationalist and anti-militarist, conducted negotiations with the German Government. For their trip the Russian Party comrades demanded the *right of extraterritoriality* (no inspection of passports or luggage; no officials allowed into their car). The group of those who travelled could include anyone, regardless of political views, provided the Russians themselves approved of his candidature. The Russian Party comrades declared that in return they would demand the release of Austrian and German civilians interned in Russia.

The German Government accepted the terms, and 30 Russian Party comrades, men and women, left Gottmadingen on April 9, including *Lenin* and *Zinoviev*, editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of Russian Social-Democracy; *Mikha Tskhakaya*, editor of *Nachalo*[523] in Paris and a founder of the Caucasian Social-Democratic organisation, who had earlier brought Chkheidze into the party, and also several members of the Jewish Workers' Union. *Fritz Platten* was in charge of the trip and he alone conducted all the necessary negotiations with the representatives of the German Government who accompanied the train.

During the three-day crossing of Germany, the Russian Party comrades did not leave their car. The agreement was strictly honoured by the German authorities. On the 12th instant, the Russians arrived in Sweden.

Before their departure from Switzerland, a record was made of all the preparations for the trip. Having studied this document, *Henri Guilbeaux*, representing the French Social-Democratic group "Vie Ouvrière" and editor of *Demain*[524]; a leader of the radical French opposition in Paris, whose name cannot now be divulged[525]; *Paul Hartstein*, a member of the radical German opposition; *M. Bronski*, representing Russian-Polish Social-Democracy, and *Fritz Platten* signed a statement voicing their full approval of the way in which the Russian Party comrades had acted.

Written on March 31 (April 13),
Published on April 14, 1917
in the newspaper *Politiken* No. 85

Published in Russian in part
on April 5 (18), 1917 in the
newspapers *Dyen* No. 25 and
Rech No. 78

Printed from the
Politiken text
Translated from
the Swedish

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE WITH LEFT-WING SWEDISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS MARCH 31 (APRIL 13), 1917[526]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

On behalf of the Russian comrades, *Lenin* voiced his thanks for the welcome and said that a congress of the Russian Socialist Party due to be called shortly would put forward an international proposal. Close ties would be maintained with the Swedish comrades, especially with *Politiken*.

Politiken No, 86,
April 15, 1917

Printed from the
Politiken text
Translated from
the Swedish

SPEECH IN THE FINLAND STATION SQUARE TO WORKERS, SOLDIERS AND SAILORS APRIL 3 (16), 1917

NEWSPAPER REPORT

In the street, standing on top of an armoured car, Comrade Lenin greeted the revolutionary Russian proletariat and the revolutionary Russian army, who had succeeded not only in liberating Russia from tsarist despotism, but in starting a social revolution on an international scale, and added that the proletariat of the whole world looked with hope to the Russian proletariat's bold steps.

The whole crowd walked in a body behind the car to the Kshesinskaya mansion, where the meeting continued.

Pravda No. 24, April 5, 1917

Printed from the *Pravda* text

"LIBERTY LOAN"[527]

(DRAFT RESOLUTION WORKED OUT BY THE BOLSHEVIK GROUP OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' DEPUTIES)

Resolution of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies Concerning the 4th "Liberty Loan"

In virtue of the fact that the present war is a predatory imperialist war, that its character has not changed at all since power in Russia passed to the capitalist Provisional Government, and that the secret treaties of the allied powers, which determine the true aims of the war, remain in force—the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies protests most vigorously against the so-called "liberty loan" and refuses to support the Provisional Government in its intentions to drag out the war, which benefits no one but the imperialist bourgeoisie.

If the workers of all countries of the world vote for the loans issued by their bourgeois governments to wage the imperialist war, it will be impossible to find a way out of the horrors of the war, and all talk about the fraternal

solidarity of the proletariat of the world, about internationalism, etc., will come to nothing but hypocrisy.

The coupling of votes for the loan with wishes, statements, declarations, etc., in favour of peace without annexations is especially clear evidence of the disastrous discrepancy between word and deed, which has destroyed the Second International.

Until political and economic power has passed into the hands of the proletariat and the poor sections of the peasantry, and while the aim of the war is determined by the interests of capital, the workers reject any new loans aimed not for but against Russia's revolutionary freedom.

Recognising at the same time that the supply of the army with all necessities calls for resources, and not wishing to leave their brothers without bread for a single hour, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies believes that the cost of the capitalist war should be borne by the capitalists who have reaped and continue to reap billions of rubles in profits on this war, and insists that the necessary money should come exclusively from the pockets of the bourgeoisie and the landowners.

Written on April 11 (24), 1917

Published on April 13, 1917 in *Pravda* No. 31

Printed from the *Pravda* text

PETROGRAD CITY R.S.D.L.P.(B.) CONFERENCE[528]

APRIL 14-22 (APRIL, 27-MAY 5), 1917

1

REPORT OF THE PRE SENT SITUATION AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROVISIONAL, GOVERNMENT APRIL 14 (27)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The old traditional formulas (dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry) no longer meet the changed conditions. A revolutionary-democratic dictatorship has been

established but not in the form we envisaged: it is interlocked with the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The imperialist war has confused everything, turning the rabid opponents of the revolution—the Anglo-French capitalists—into supporters of the revolution for victory (the same applies to the top army command and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie).

It is this unique historical concurrence of circumstances that has brought about a dual dictatorship: the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of revolutionary democracy. In organisational terms, the people have never managed to keep abreast of the bourgeoisie; in Russia the people have set up their own organised power without having achieved political independence. Hence, the dual power, the unconsciously trusting attitude on the part of the petty-bourgeois majority of the soldier masses and a section of the workers to the Provisional Government, and the voluntary submission of revolutionary democracy to the bourgeois dictatorship. The specific feature of the present situation is that lack of political awareness on the part of the masses is preventing the establishment of a stable and conscious majority on the side of the proletarian policy (all other political trends have gone over entirely to the petty-bourgeois position). The revolutionary democracy is an assembly of the most diverse elements (in terms of class *status* and *interests*, which is not the same thing at all!). Their stratification: in the countryside—the well-to-do peasants, who have been strengthened by the November 9 law, and the poor, one-horse and horseless peasants, and in the towns—the sections close to the working class and the petty proprietors; the separation of the proletarians and the *semi*-proletarians from the petty bourgeoisie is inevitable, but the consolidation of the propertied elements in the revolutionary bloc may well advance to a point where it will prevail over the organisation of the masses rallying round the proletarian slogans. It is quite possible, therefore, that power will remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie, and that there will be no transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The conclusion: we are not faced with the task of overthrowing the Provisional Government—it rests on the *confidence* of the petty-bourgeois and

a section of the workers' masses—but with that of painstaking explanation of the class tasks and organisation.

Pravda No. 40,
May 8 (April 25), 1917

Printed from the
Pravda text

2

SPEECH IN MOVING A RESOLUTION ON THE WAR
APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

The resolution on the war was drafted in the committee, but the final version is yet to be worked out. I think that in its final wording the resolution will be put before the general Party conference, and I now move that it be read out in its present form.

The resolution consists of three parts: 1) objective causes of the war, 2) revolutionary defencism, and 3) how to end the war.

First published in 1925 in the book
Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya i Vserossiiskaya konferentsii R.S.D.R.P.(B.) v aprele 1917 goda
(Petrograd City and All-Russia Conferences of the R.S.D.L.P.[B.], April 1917)

Printed from
a typewritten
copy of the
minutes

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF SOLDIERS OF AN ARMOURED BATTALION IN MIKHAILOVSKY MANÈGE
APRIL 15 (28), 1917

NEWSPAPER REPORT

We Social-Democrats who take the standpoint of international socialism, are being accused of having returned to Russia via Germany, of having been bribed by the Germans and of being traitors to the national cause, the cause of freedom.

Who is saying all this? Who is spreading these lies and slander?

Soldiers and workers who read the working-class newspapers are aware that a decision of the Soviet which was taken after a hearing of the report by Comrade Zinoviev

and Comrade Zurabov on how we managed to make our way across Germany, was published in *Izvestia Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatovs*[529] No. 32, of April 5, 1917.

Did the Soviet reprimand us? No. What did the Soviet say? It replied that it wanted the Provisional Government to take urgent measures for the unhampered passage to Russia of all Russian political exiles living abroad.

Comrade Lenin then stated that until now the Provisional Government has failed to take any measures and that our socialist comrades living abroad could not return to Russia. Why? Simply because Britain, who has a stake in this fratricidal slaughter, has refused to allow passage for our socialist comrades, socialists who have declared war against war and demand peace. The British are keeping in prison one of their own British socialists,[530] and have also arrested and imprisoned our Comrade Trotsky, who was Chairman of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in 1905.

But that is precisely what has been done by all the capitalist and landowner governments favouring this war: the French, the German and the Italian governments have thrown all anti-war socialists into prison and are keeping them there.

Was it possible in the circumstances to travel via Britain? No. That is why we had to apply to the Swiss socialist Platten, who also favours peace.

What was the upshot of this?

Lenin and those who travelled with him were let through, but our witness, Comrade Platten, who could testify that we had had no contacts with the Germans, was not allowed to come to Russia.

What is the point of all this?

It is that this war, which is now taking hundreds of thousands of lives a month, is being waged by the capitalists—they stand to gain from the war, they are profiting from it, and that is why all those who want peace and work for it are being imprisoned by the capitalists of all countries, including the brigand and plunderer Wilhelm, who spread lies and slander about the socialists.

Comrade Lenin then went on to give a detailed explanation of the causes of the war and its aims. He showed that

the working class and the poor peasants have never wanted and do not want this or any other war. He also spoke in detail about the nature of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the Provisional Government, on which the industrialist Guchkov and the landowners have seats.

Support and help should not go to the Provisional Government, but to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which is the only legitimate government and which alone expresses the people's interests.

Soldatskaya Pravda No. 2
April 18 (May 1), 1917

Printed from the
Soldatskaya Pravda
text

MEETING OF THE SOLDIERS' SECTION OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

APRIL 17 (30), 1917 [531]

1

SPEECH ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE SOVIET OF SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES

Lenin says that he has read the resolution of the Executive Commission and the Committee on his activity and has decided to insert his article on this resolution in *Pravda*; just now he wishes to reply briefly to the charges being levelled against him. He finds that there are four questions to which he wants to reply: 1) formal question, 2) question of land, 3) of the government, 4) of the war.

On the first question he welcomes the silence of the resolution on his trip across Germany, as it shows that the Commission has taken the standpoint of both sections of the Committee, which say nothing about it. He reads an extract from the resolution: "...considers the propaganda of so-called Leninists, etc." and declares that he assumes full responsibility for the Leninists' propaganda. To reply to this charge in the resolution, the three above-mentioned questions must be examined. He goes on to explain these

questions. On the question of land—he favours the transfer of all land to the use of the working masses without redemption; he speaks about the transfer by decision of peasant committees, and refers to Shingaryov's telegram, which says that the taking away of land is an arbitrary act. That is wrong because it has been done by decision of the village committees, which makes the seizure legal. It is naive to think that the peasants can be influenced by sermons from Petrograd; that is impossible. The question of land will be decided on the spot. The land should be taken over right away, in view of the looming famine. Voluntary agreement with the landowners is an absurdity, you cannot have an agreement between 300 peasant families and one landowner, which is the ratio we now have in European Russia.

(*A proposal is motioned to limit the speaker's time. Statements are made for and against; by a vote the time is limited to 30 minutes.*)

Lenin says that if the meeting wishes it, he could alter the time of the explanations, but could also be through within 20 minutes.

On the state structure and administration he says that we need a people's republic, and not one with officials, capitalists and troops. Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Farm Labourers' Deputies, from top to bottom, that is the ideal of administration. The people must have the power. On the question of the war he says that he has never spoken about the draft reinforcements and knows nothing of the question at all.[532] That is why he speaks only about the war. Our government consists only of capitalists, the war is being waged to benefit the capitalists, and the war can be ended only through a revolution by the workers' masses. The obligations undertaken by our allies are predatory, they deal only with a sharing of the spoils; annexation is connected with capital, and cannot be repudiated until capital is taken over. He holds the capitalists in Germany to be the same as our own capitalists, and says that Wilhelm is a bloodsucker and, of course, there can be no question of a separate peace with him—that is absurd. The capitalists started the war and cannot end it—there is need for a workers' revolution to end the war. The Leninists are

against any separate peace. They said as much back in 1915. They said that the proletariat, once it takes power, and publishes all the treaties, must offer peace to the whole world.* If anyone rejects such peace, the proletariat will start a revolutionary war. Only a revolution by workers in several countries can put an end to the war. Universal peace can be achieved only through a workers' revolution, The practical method of ending the war is fraternisation at the front, and strengthening the power of the Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Farm Labourers' Deputies. That is the only way to bring about the workers' revolution and universal peace.

2

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS

1) The reconquest of Kurland is annexation, because in that case Germany is entitled to reconquer her colonies. The people must be left to decide for themselves how they want to live. In the capitalist world the sharing out is according to strength—the stronger get more. It is not worth while fighting over Kurland, but it is worth while fighting for Kurland's freedom to decide whom she wants to join.

2) On the seizure of banks and money. He urges that the seizures should not be arbitrary but by decision of the majority. (*Shouts from the audience*: "Your doctrine leads to a primitive state".)—No! (*Question*: "What is to be done if other countries want peace?")—Advance of the workers' revolution and fraternisation at the front.

Tactics—we must see how life goes forward. The experience of life is the best thing. We must develop the Russian revolution in such a way that the workers', peasants' and farm labourers' deputies have the power. (*Another question*: "Is that what you preached in Germany? We, that is, Zinoviev and I, published a pamphlet[533] abroad, in which we said precisely what we are saying now; we published it in German and the German socialists circulated it in Germany.

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Printed from a typewritten copy of the minutes

* See present edition, Vol. 21, p. 403.—*Ed.*

THE ATTENTION OF COMRADES!

Comrades Lashevich, Krymov and Mavrin, authorised by the Bolshevik group of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, request us to declare that the overwhelming majority of the workers who took part in the manifestations on April 20 and 21 and carried "Down with the Provisional Government!" placards, understood this slogan to mean exclusively that all power should be transferred to the Soviets and that the workers want to take over only after winning a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The present composition of the Soviet does not quite express the will of the majority of the workers' and soldiers' masses. That is why the Bolshevik group believes that the C.C. resolution of April 22 does not give a precise characteristic of the present state of affairs.

From the Editors. It goes without saying that the C.C. resolution is in no sense aimed against the organisers of the mass demonstrations, and that such an interpretation of the slogan rules out any idea of thoughtlessness or adventurism. At any rate, the peaceful and impressively massive character of these manifestations is to the great credit of these comrades as representing the organisers of the manifestations. They alone organised a fitting rebuff to the bourgeoisie, which was demonstrating in favour of *its own* Provisional Government.

Written on April 22 (May 5), 1917

Published on May 6 (April 23), 1917 in *Pravda* No. 39

Printed from the *Pravda* text

POGROM AGITATION IN MINISTERIAL NEWSPAPER

The ministerial gentlemen, having secured a fresh expression of confidence on the part of the majority of the Soviet leaders, have started a fresh offensive against *Pravda* and against our Party.

Rech, the ministerial newspaper, has adopted the worst methods of *Russkaya Volya*.[534]

In today's two editorials, the ministerial newspaper, rehearsing the *Russkaya Volya* elements, does enough lying for two papers.

"The whole" (sic) "of Petrograd has awakened; it has gone out into the street and has loudly and solemnly proclaimed its confidence in the Provisional Government."

"*The whole*" of Petrograd!— the ministerial paper will have nothing less.... If from the "whole" of Petrograd we subtract all the *workers*, who demonstrated *against* the Provisional Government, if we subtract the vast majority of the soldiers who went out into the street and demonstrated *against* the Provisional Government, if we subtract the hundreds of thousands of people who simply stayed at home, if the "whole" of Petrograd is taken to mean an insignificant minority of the bourgeoisie, a small section of the students, and a section of the senior army officers—then the ministerial paper is right: the "whole" of Petrograd has come out for the Guchkovs and the Milyukovs....

Relying on the "whole" of Petrograd (remember the Potemkin villages![535]), the ministerial newspaper launches directly into pogrom baiting against us.

"...These shots by some armed men, these killings of soldiers, in connection with the unprecedentedly brazen flying of the defeatist flags from the German embassy.... Yesterday's bloody outrages by the Leninists have worn thin everyone's tolerance and have dealt an irreparable blow to this anti-national treasonable propaganda. Let us hope that this propaganda will never again dare to rear its head."

Let the reader judge where the brazenness lies. Every word there is lies and slander. Our comrades did not fly any flags at all from the German embassy. Our comrades are not to blame for the killings of the soldiers. Responsibility for yesterday's acts of violence falls on the Provisional Government and no one else.

Let the reader judge whose propaganda is really treasonable.

Written on April 22 (May 5), 1917

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THE SEVENTH (APRIL) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)[536]

APRIL 24-29 (MAY 7-12), 1917

1

SPEECH ON THE PLAN TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE[537] APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

1

VARIANT OF MINUTES

I do not agree with the previous speaker.

In Borgbjerg's proposal we have a political fact of exceptional importance which imposes on us the duty of exposing the social-chauvinists and launching a political campaign. The British and French "socialists" have rejected Borgbjerg's proposal. The British and French Plekhanovs are not coming to this conference. Borgbjerg's proposals are a farce. Through Borgbjerg, the German social-chauvinists are offering their terms for peace. They are doing this through a socialist in order to cover up their social-chauvinist intrigue. This must be exposed, to discourage them from ever again applying to the socialist parties.

There can be no doubt at all that this is a proposal coming from the German Government, which is acting through its own social-chauvinists. It is the one that is arranging this congress.... It cannot do so openly, and is therefore doing it through its own Plekhanovs. By this diplomatic step the German Government sheds all responsibility while propounding through them its secret hopes. Let me read you a report in a foreign paper about Borgbjerg: "Through a Danish social-chauvinist, the German Kaiser wants to call a peace conference in his own interests." Borgbjerg's proposal is clearly nothing but a fraud and a swindle. Then we have a report from *Rabochaya Gazeta*.[538] (*Reads out the report from "Rabochaya Gazeta" of April 25, 1917.*) It is beyond doubt, therefore? that this is a proposal from the German Government. That is how such things are done. It is our task to expose the inner workings of this to the

world, i.e., pass a detailed resolution, translate it into several languages and publish it in all the papers. I move a draft resolution.

It is a curious fact that the capitalist newspapers are maintaining a diplomatic silence. They know the rule, that speech is silvern and silence is golden. The bourgeois newspapers know what the whole thing is about. Newspapers like *Rabochaya Gazeta* are at a loss. *Yedinstvo*[539] alone has said that Borgbjerg is an agent of the German Government. But by saying in the next breath that neither the British nor the French social-chauvinists, nor the Russian Plekhanovs will attend this conference under any circumstances, it exposes the British, French and Russian governments, who, being aware of the really difficult condition of Germany, hope to fill their appetites at her expense. We must expose this comedy of masques. We must tell how such things are done: Bethmann-Hollweg goes to Wilhelm, Wilhelm summons Scheidemann, Scheidemann goes to Denmark, and as a result, Borgbjerg goes to Russia with the peace terms. (*Reads out the resolution.*)

Trier is a Danish Marxist. Denmark is a petty-bourgeois country. Her bourgeoisie has battened on the war and hates the workers. The leaders of the Danish Social-Democratic majority are among the most opportunist in Europe. They have clearly exposed themselves as real social-chauvinists. We, for our part, must be fair and say about Borgbjerg what we have said about Plekhanov. If we hear fine phrases shouted to us about Alsace-Lorraine, we must remember that the whole thing boils down to money. In fact, it is a question of unusually rich ores. It is a question of profit, a peaceful sharing out of the booty between the German and the French capitalists. The Danish internationalists have rejected this. I forgot to say that the Kautskyites have agreed to attend the conference, and this must be exposed. The proposal coming via Borgbjerg says that the German capitalists are bargaining, because they are incapable of holding on to what they have seized. Germany's position is desperate, she is on the brink of ruin. But the German capitalists still hope to retain a bit. The diplomatists have strong bonds with each other, they know everything, everything is clear to them. The people alone are not told

such things. The Anglo-French chauvinists have refused to attend the conference because they are very well aware of the real state of affairs. There was good reason for their taking ministerial office. It is now a matter of strangulating and plundering Germany, for she is no longer capable of conducting a policy of aggrandizement. Borgbjerg is an agent of German imperialism. If the soldiers receive this resolution they will understand that it is now a question of squeezing the last breath out of Germany. Congresses are farces attended by social-chauvinist diplomatists. There is the congress, and in the next room they will be sharing out Alsace-Lorraine. The truth about congresses must be told once and for all, to open the people's eyes. If we adopt this manifesto and have it printed, translated into foreign languages and circulated among the workers and soldiers, they will understand the real state of affairs. This will be a very genuine campaign, it will be a clarification of the proletarian line.

First published in 1958 in the book *Sedmaya (Aprelskaya) Vserossiiskaya konferentsia R.S.D.R.P.(B.). Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya konferentsia R.S.D.R.P.(B.). Aprel 1917 goda. Protokoly* (The Seventh [April] All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.[B.]. The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.[B.], April 1917. Minutes).

Printed from the text of the book

2

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The invitation to attend the conference is addressed to all the socialist parties of Russia and consequently to our own as well, and so we cannot simply ignore this fact of international importance. The social-chauvinists of all the belligerent countries are acting as unofficial representatives of their governments and ruling classes, Comrade Lenin said.

The German Government, under the pressure of internal discontent, is prepared to give up *some* of its annexations, and Borgbjerg is its diplomatic representative. He (a representative of Stauning's party, from which a group of Marxists, headed by Comrade Trier, withdrew following

Stauning's entry into the bourgeois ministry) has nothing in common either with the German or the Scandinavian workers. A conference of social-patriotic majorities appears to the German ruling circles to be a convenient occasion for trying to come to terms with the brigands on the other side.

The social-patriots, who have taken part in this ignominious war, as Comrade Nogin put it, want to have a hand in its ignominious end as well. On the other hand, the rebuff administered to this proposal by the imperialists of the Triple Entente lays quite bare their schemes of conquest. That is what revolutionary Social-Democracy must use in its own interests, by exposing the fraud on both sides. The Party, which unites more than 70,000 workers, must issue a warning against this fraud to the internationalist workers of all countries.

Pravda No. 41
May 9 (April 26), 1917

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2

PROPOSAL FOR LINES OF DEBATE ON V. P. NOGIN'S REPORT ON "ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES"

APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

It is proposed that speakers concentrate on replies to specific questions for working out a general Party platform. Questions: 1) militia, 2) working hours, 3) wages, 4) increase and decrease of production, 5) have there been any removals of management? how and from whom is it organised? 6) single or dual power, 7) elements reducing revolutionary élan, 8) disarmament of the bourgeoisie, 9) food supplies, 10)....*

Additional: 1) are the Soviets being transformed into Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies? 2) their role in connection with the state-wide Soviet.

First published in 1934 in the book *Sedmaya (Aprelskaya) Vserossiiskaya i Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya konferentsii R.S.D.R.P.(B.). Aprel 1917 goda*

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* Hiatus in the minutes.—*Ed.*

3
SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

1
MINUTES

The materials submitted by comrades on the activity of the Soviets, while being incomplete, are remarkably interesting. This may be the most important information material produced by the conference, material which makes it possible to verify our slogans against the actual course of life. The picture we now have disposes us to optimistic conclusions. The movement started out in the centres; initially all the energy of the proletariat there was concentrated on the struggle. A mass of energy was spent on the struggle against tsarism. This struggle in Petrograd has eliminated the central state power. A gigantic task has been done. But if that has led to the seizure of power by the bourgeoisie it does not warrant any pessimistic conclusions, it is not right to regard the workers' failure to take power as a mistake. It would be utopian to suppose that after a few days of struggle the masses could have taken power into their hands. That could not have been done in the presence of the bourgeoisie, which was very well prepared for taking over.

From the centre, the revolution is moving into the localities. That is what happened in France—the revolution is becoming a municipal one. The movement in the localities shows that there the majority is for the peasants, for the workers, that there has been the least leadership from the bourgeoisie; that there the masses did not lose their head. The more data we collect, the more they show us that the greater the proletarian section of the population and the fewer the intermediate elements, the better the revolution advances in the localities. The Kazan comrades have gone over directly to the tasks of the socialist revolution. We find that even where the proletariat's organisations are insignificant, the practical requirements have given the proletariat an absolutely correct definition of its tasks. Without such elements as, for instance, statistics, etc., the proletarian

revolution cannot be carried out. For the proletarian revolution to be carried out, it is necessary that the engineers, technicians, etc., should be under the practical control of the revolutionary proletariat. The revolution in the localities has gone forward easily. There is always the danger of anarchy in a revolution. Over here anarchy is not....*

The bourgeois revolution is unmindful of production, but here the workers are giving it thought. The workers are interested in seeing that production does not dwindle. The revolution in the localities is going forward in gigantic strides. Reports from the localities have shown that the sharper the class contradictions, the more correctly the revolution advances, the surer the dictatorship of the proletariat is realised. While the dictatorship of the proletariat is being implemented in the small localities, the centres turn out to be the least suitable for the revolution's advance.

There is absolutely no ground for any pessimism. It is a fact that collaboration with the bourgeoisie is beginning in the centres. Through its better organisation, the bourgeoisie is trying to turn the proletariat into a servitor, to make the workers temporary participants in what the bourgeoisie is building. It is ridiculous to think that the Russian people are drawing their guiding principles from pamphlets. Not at all, it is from the immediate practice that the experience of the masses flows....* The people can work it out by participating in a mass movement. The people themselves have started to accumulate mass experience....* In Penza Gubernia, the power took shape under the dictatorship of the peasantry. The Penza representative showed the resolutions of the peasants who had taken over the implements of production and land. Marx's words are being confirmed....* The programme of the revolution is being carried out in the localities—in order to have grain ...* to establish relations themselves. This revolution produces men of practice. The revolution can go forward only under the control of practical experience in the localities. And we are very greatly encouraged by the course of the revolution throughout the whole of Russia, where the gigantic majority are peasants.

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* Hiatus in the minutes.—*Ed.*

After there proved to be insufficient strength to take over production in the centre, this is being done in the provinces, where it is easily done. In the provinces, the revolution is a municipal one, and it is giving impetus to the centre; the latter is picking up their experience.

The comrade coal-miner said that their first task when...* was to go for grain.... It is wrong to think that this experience can go to waste. Without this experience, the centres have nowhere to get an impetus from for a fresh revolution. The new revolution is mounting. The course of events, the dislocation of life, the famine—that is what is propelling the revolution. Hence the struggle against the elements supporting the bourgeoisie. Things are moving towards a collapse which the bourgeoisie will not cope with. We are preparing a new multimillion army which could show its mettle in the Soviets, in the Constituent Assembly—just how, we do not as yet know. Over here in the centre we do not have enough strength. There is a tremendous preponderance in the provinces. On our side is the development of the revolution in the localities, which is going forward and overtaking us.

The people are not setting themselves any communist plans. The revolutionary class throughout Russia is mustering its forces, and it is our task to accumulate this experience and take a step as these forces are mustered. We must not allow ourselves to be intimidated by the fact that they (Narodniks, Mensheviks) are in such an overwhelming majority.

On the strength of the experience, we can now state in the resolution....* In the localities, the production has to be taken over, otherwise the collapse is inevitable. The peasants will not give the grain. To obtain the grain, the measures must be revolutionary, which can be put through by the revolutionary class, relying on the masses in their millions.

I asked comrades from the localities about the state of production there.

The 8-hour day has been introduced in Nizhny Novgorod

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* Hiatus in the minutes.—*Ed.*

Gubernia, and production has increased. That is the earnest. There is no other way of escaping the ruin. It will take a vast amount of work. We are separating ourselves from the petty-bourgeois line. Life is on our side. The crisis cannot be resolved by petty-bourgeois-democratic methods, because they stop short of revolutionary measures (Shingaryov, Milyukov). The general course of the revolution shows that things are moving forward.

We do not differ from the petty bourgeoisie in that it says "caution", and we say "speed"; we say "even more caution". There must be a relentless struggle against this state game....* Better later than earlier—and the centre will win out. (*Applause.*)

First published in 1934 in the book *Sedmaya (Aprelskaya) Vserossiiskaya i Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya konferentsii R.S.D.R.P.(B.). Aprel 1917 goda*

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2

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin pointed out that the French revolution passed through a phase of municipal revolution, that it drew its strength from the local organs of self-government, which became its mainstay. In the Russian revolution we observe a certain bureaucracy in the centres, and a greater exercise of power wielded by the Soviets locally, in the provinces. In the capital cities the Soviets are politically more dependent on the bourgeois central authorities than those in the provinces. In the centres it is not so easy to take control of production, in the provinces this has already been carried out to some extent. The inference is: to strengthen the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Progress in this respect is possible, coming primarily from the provinces.

Pravda No. 42
May 10 (April 27), 1917

Printed from the *Pravda* text

* Hiatus in the minutes.—*Ed.*

4
SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE WAR
APRIL 27 (MAY 10)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin, speaking in substantiation of the first resolution, pointed out the need for dividing the resolution into three parts: first, giving a class analysis of the war; second, dealing with so-called "revolutionary defencism", and third, answering the question of how to end the war. The first part of the resolution exposes the mainsprings of the imperialist war, establishes their connection with a definite period in the development of capitalism and brings out the annexationist strivings of the ruling classes of all countries. The second part gives a characteristic of the peculiar trend. The third part outlines the way to end the war—the way of revolutionary class struggle for power—refuting the absurd slander about a "separate" peace.

Pravda No. 44
May 12 (April 29), 1917

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Pravda text

5
REMARKS IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE WAR
APRIL 27 (MAY 10)

1

Gelman motions that the words "Menshevik opportunist Social-Democratic Party" should be replaced by the words "the Party's opportunist wing", arguing that not all the Mensheviks belong to the defencist trend, and that the Left wing does not share the defencist standpoint.

Lenin opposes the amendment: we are speaking about the majority, about the Menshevik Party as a whole, which is why the characteristic should not be changed.

2

Vedernikov proposes that the names "Chkheidze, Tsereteli and others" should be struck out.... If we delete them the resolution will not lose in any way.

Ovsyanikov ... proposes that the words "Chkheidze, Tsereteli, the O.C." should be deleted.

Lenin comes out against both amendments. One of two things—either the names or the O.C.—unless both are retained. The first comrade proposes to leave the O.C. in and throw out the names. But is the Organising Committee sufficiently well known to the masses, or must the well-known names of Tsereteli and Chkheidze be used to clarify the state of affairs for the masses?

3

Sokolnikov proposes the deletion of the word "completely" in the phrase: "Steps designed to make them completely harmless politically", because only by undermining their economic domination can the capitalists be rendered politically harmless....

Lenin speaks out against the deletion of the word "completely" and proposes the wording: "Steps undermining the economic domination of the capitalists, and steps designed to make them completely...."

First published in 1925 in the book *Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya i Vserossiiskaya konferentsii R.S.D.R.P.(B.). v aprele 1917 goda*

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6

PRELIMINARY DRAFT ALTERATIONS IN THE R.S.D.L.P. PARTY PROGRAMME[540]

At the end of the preamble (after the words "the standpoint of the proletariat") insert:

World capitalism has at the present time, i.e., since about the beginning of the twentieth century, reached the stage of imperialism. Imperialism, or the epoch of finance capital, is a high stage of development of the capitalist economic system, one in which monopolist associations of capitalists—syndicates, cartels and trusts—have assumed decisive importance: in which enormously concentrated banking capital has fused with industrial capital; in which the export of capital to foreign countries has assumed vast proportions: in which the whole world has been divided up

territorially among the richer countries, and the economic carve-up of the world among international trusts has begun.

Imperialist wars, i.e., wars for world domination, for markets for banking capital and for the subjugation of small and weaker nations, are inevitable under such a state of affairs. The first great imperialist war, the war of 1914-17, is precisely such a war.

The extremely high level of development which world capitalism in general has attained, the replacement of free competition by monopoly capitalism, the fact that the banks and the capitalist associations have prepared the machinery for the social regulation of the process of production and distribution of products, the horrors, misery, ruin, and brutalisation caused by the imperialist war—all these factors transform the present stage of capitalist development into an era of proletarian socialist revolution.

That era has dawned.

Only a proletarian socialist revolution can lead humanity out of the impasse which imperialism and imperialist wars have created. Whatever difficulties the revolution may have to encounter, whatever possible temporary setbacks or waves of counter-revolution it may have to contend with, the final victory of the proletariat is inevitable.

Objective conditions make it the urgent task of the day to prepare the proletariat in every way for the revolution and resolutely break with the bourgeois perversion of socialism, which has taken the upper hand in the official Social-Democratic parties in the form of a social-chauvinist trend (that is, socialism in words, chauvinism in fact, or the use of the "defend your country" slogan to cover up defence of capitalist interests in imperialist wars), and also in the form of a Centre trend (i.e., unprincipled, helpless vacillation between social-chauvinism and revolutionary internationalist-proletarian struggle)* for the conquest of political power in order to carry out the economic and political measures which are the sum and substance of the socialist revolution.

* *
*

* The text from "for the revolution..." to "proletarian struggle)" is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

TRANSLATED TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The fulfilment of this task, which calls for the fullest trust, the closest fraternal ties, and direct unity of revolutionary action on the part of the working class in all the advanced countries, is impossible without an immediate break in principle with the bourgeois perversion of socialism, which has gained the upper hand among the leadership of the great majority of the official Social-Democratic parties. Such a perversion is, on the one hand, the social-chauvinist trend, socialism in word and chauvinism in deed, the defence of the predatory interests of "one's own" national bourgeoisie under the guise of "defence of one's country"; and, on the other hand, the equally wide international trend of the so-called Centre, which stands for unity with the social-chauvinists and for the preservation or correction of the bankrupt Second International, and which vacillates between social-chauvinism and the internationalist revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the achievement of a socialist system.

* *
*

The experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, which created the Soviets of Workers' Deputies and a number of similar organisations, thereby confirmed the experience of the Paris Commune, which consisted in the fact that the proletariat must have a state for the period of transition to socialism, but this state* must not be a conventional type of state, but the immediate, massive and wholesale organisation of the armed workers to substitute for the old instruments of administration: the standing army, the police and the civil service. Explanation to the proletariat of the tasks of such a state—capable both of consolidating the gains of the revolution in general and of ensuring the most peaceful and balanced transition to socialism—

* The text from "The experience of the Russian revolutions..." to "but this state" is crossed out in the MS. The end of the paragraph was left standing inadvertently; it was written on a separate sheet, at the bottom of which there is a note in an unknown hand: "Add: Apparatus for the regulation of production is ready in the form of trusts and concentration of banks" (see Lenin's insertion in the "Proposed Amendments to the Doctrinal, Political and Other Sections of the Programme", present edition, Vol. 24, p. 459).—*Ed.*

must constitute one of the principal tasks of the proletarian party alongside its struggle against the representatives of the bankrupt Second (1889-1914) International, who have distorted Marxism and betrayed socialism on the dictatorship of the proletariat question.

Monopoly capitalism, which has been developing into state-monopoly capitalism in a number of advanced countries with especial rapidity during the war, means gigantic socialisation of production and, consequently, complete preparation of the objective conditions for the establishment of a socialist society.*

* *
*

In the minimum programme, the whole beginning (from the words "On the path" down to §1) should be crossed out, and replaced by the following:

In Russia at the present moment, when the Provisional Government, which is part and parcel of the landowner and capitalist class and enjoys the confidence—necessarily unstable—of the broad mass of the petty-bourgeois population, has undertaken to convene a Constituent Assembly, the immediate duty of the party of the proletariat is to fight for a political system which will best guarantee economic progress and the rights of the people in general, and make possible the least painful transition to socialism in particular.

The party is fighting and helping the masses to wage an immediate struggle for a democratic republic, starting the implementation of the freedoms by the masses' organisation on their own, from below, and working for the establishment not of a bourgeois parliamentary republic, with its special guarantees both for the domination of the capitalists and for the possibility of using force against the masses through the retention of the old organs of mass oppression: the police, the standing army and the civil service, but of a more democratic proletarian-peasant republic in which the retention of these organs of oppression is impossible and inadmissible, and where the state power belongs directly to the workers and peasants who are armed to a man.

* The text from "Monopoly Capitalism..." to "socialist society" is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

§1. Supreme power in the state must be vested entirely in the people's representatives, who shall be elected by the people and be subject to recall at any time, and who shall constitute a single popular assembly, a single chamber.

§2. Add:

Proportional representation at all elections; all delegates and elected officials, without exception, to be subject to recall at any time upon the decision of a majority of their electors.

§3. Add:

No supervision or control from above over the decisions and acts of regional and local self-governments.

§9 to read:

The right of all member nations of the state to freely secede and form independent states. The republic of the Russian nation must attract other nations or nationalities not by force, but exclusively by voluntary agreement on the question of forming a common state. The unity and fraternal alliance of the workers of all countries are incompatible with the use of force, direct or indirect, against other nationalities.

§11 to read:

Judges and all other officials, both civil and military, to be elected by the people with the right to recall any of them at any time by decision of a majority of their electors. Salaries to all officials to be not above the wages of a skilled worker, 300-500 rubles, depending on the number of family members and their earnings; unconditional prohibition for officials to supplement their salaries with income from other sources.

§12 to read:

The police and standing army to be replaced by the universally armed people; workers and other employees to receive regular wages from the capitalists for the time devoted to public service in the people's militia.

* *
*

§14 of the political section, §5 and others of the economic section should be, *like the whole of the economic section*, specially re-examined by commissions consisting of trade union workers and teachers.

After the fiscal clause of the programme (following the words "on incomes and inheritances") insert:

The high level of development of capitalism already achieved in banking and in the trustified branches of industry, on the one hand, and the economic disruption caused by the imperialist war, everywhere evoking a demand for state and public control of the production and distribution of all staple products, on the other, induce the party to demand the nationalisation of the banks, syndicates (trusts), etc.

* *
*

The agrarian programme should be replaced by an agrarian resolution (see its text separately)* or rewritten in accordance with it.**

* *
*

The concluding part of the programme (the last two paragraphs from the words: "In the endeavour to achieve") to be entirely deleted.

FOR THE PROGRAMME
BETTER VARIANT***

The party of the proletariat cannot rest content with a bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic, which throughout the world preserves and strives to perpetuate the monarchist instruments for the oppression of the masses, namely, the police, the standing army, and the privileged bureaucracy.

The party fights for a more democratic workers' and peasants' republic, in which the police and the standing army will be abolished and replaced by the universally armed people, by a people's militia; all officials will be not only elective, but also subject to recall at any time upon the

* See "Resolution on the Agrarian Question", present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 290-93).—*Ed.*

** See "Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme", ibid., p. 463.—*Ed.*

*** This variant is included in the "Proposed Amendments to the Doctrinal, Political and Other Sections of the Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 24, p. 461).—*Ed.*

demand of a majority of the electors; all officials, without exception, will be paid at a rate not exceeding the average wage of a competent worker; parliamentary representative institutions will be gradually replaced by Soviets of people's representatives (from various classes and professions, or from various localities), functioning as both legislative and executive bodies.

Written not later than April 28 (May 11), 1917

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

7

REPORT ON THE QUESTION REVISING THE PARTY PROGRAMME APRIL 28 (MAY 11)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

The commission has proposed the adoption of a resolution on the *direction* in which the Party programme should be changed: 1) evaluation of imperialism in connection with the approaching social revolution; 2) amending the paragraphs on the state—the state without a standing army, a police, or a privileged bureaucracy; 3) elimination of what is out of date in the political programme (about tsarism, etc.); 4) altering the minimum programme; 5) rewriting the economic section of the programme, which is obviously out of date, and the school section of the programme; 6-7) inserting demands flowing from the changing structure of capitalist society (nationalisation of the syndicated branches of industry, etc.); 8) adding an analysis of the trends in socialism.

Pravda No. 45 May 13 (April 30), 1917

Printed from the *Pravda* text

8

REPORT ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION APRIL 28 (MAY 11)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin pointed to the landed estates, and the incredible jumble of arable fields brought about by the haphazard administration on the peasant land, first of the

bailiffs, then of the 1861 magistrates and finally of the Stolypin officials,[541] as the principal cause of the enslaving feudal relations remaining in the countryside.

Hence, the natural desire on the part of the peasants to "clear the land", to have *all* the land re-allotted, a desire which is expressed in the saying that "all the land is God's". The peasant-holder cannot be reconciled with the obstacles which, in the new conditions of capitalist trade, he finds intolerable. That is proved by the bill submitted by the 104 peasant deputies in the First and Second Dumas.[542]

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have themselves admitted that in that Bill the "petty-economy ideology" prevails over the "principles of equalisation". The peasant wants to own his land, but wants it allotted in accordance with the new demands of the commodity economy. Even where some peasants appear to accept the principle of egalitarian land tenure, their view of it is different from that of the S.R. intellectuals. The statistical result of the distribution of the landowner and peasant holdings in Russia comes to the following figures: 300 peasant families hold 2,000 dessiatines, and *one* landowner holds *as much*. Their demand for "equalisation" clearly contains the idea of equalising the rights of the 300 and the one.

The necessity of land nationalisation, as a fully bourgeois and highly progressive measure, has been prepared by the preceding development of the land economy in Russia and the development of the world market. The war has sharpened every contradiction. Just now, the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants is a demand powerfully dictated by the needs of wartime. Shingaryov & Co. actually intensify the crisis by inviting the peasants to *wait* for a Constituent Assembly (whereas the sowing must be done *right away*), thereby threatening to turn the grain shortage into a real famine. They are trying to force on the peasants a bourgeois-bureaucratic solution of the agrarian question. Meanwhile, there is no time to wait for the legalisation of landownership, because the crisis is approaching in gigantic strides. The peasants have already displayed a revolutionary initiative—in Penza Gubernia they have been taking over the landowners' live and dead stock for common use. It goes without saying that our

Party stands only for the *organised* take-over of lands and implements because that is necessary for *increasing* production, while any damage to implements inflicts harm above all on the peasants and workers themselves.

On the other hand, we stand for the separate organisation of agricultural workers.

Pravda No. 45
May 13 (April 30), 1917

Printed from the *Pravda* text

9

REMARK IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION APRIL 28 (MAY 11)

Solovyov believes that the most essential should be stated at the head of the resolution: that the Party demands the nationalisation of the land.

This amendment is not very essential. I put nationalisation in third place, because initiative and revolutionary action must come first, while nationalisation is a law expressing the people's will. I motion against.

First published in 1925 in the book *Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya i Vserossiiskaya konferentsii R.S.D.R.P.(B.). v aprele 1917 goda*

Printed from a typewritten copy of the minutes

10

SPEECH ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin recalled that the Polish Social-Democrats were against the right to national self-determination in 1903, when the question was not raised in the prospect of a socialist revolution. The specific character of their stand on the national question is due to their peculiar position in Poland; the tsarist oppression fed the nationalistic passions of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sections of Poland. The Polish Social-Democrats had to go through a desperate struggle against the "socialists" (P.P.S) who were even prepared to have a European war for the sake of Poland's liberation, and only they, the Polish Social-Democrats,

spreading the feelings of international solidarity among the Polish workers, led them closer to the workers of Russia. However, their attempt to impose a rejection of the right to self-determination on the socialists of the *oppressor* nations is extremely erroneous and in the event of success could result in nothing more than the adoption of a chauvinistic stand by the Russian Social-Democrats. By rejecting the oppressed nations' right to self-determination, the socialists of the oppressor nations become chauvinists, giving support to their own bourgeoisie. Russian socialists must work to secure *freedom to secede* for the oppressed nations, while the socialists of the oppressed nations must maintain freedom to integrate, both taking formally different (essentially the same) ways towards the same goal: the international organisation of the proletariat. Those who say that the national question has been solved within the bourgeois system tend to forget that it has been solved (but not in every case) only in the west of Europe, where the purity of the population is sometimes as high as 90 per cent, but not in the east, where the purity of the population is limited to only 43 per cent. Finland's example shows that the national question is in practice on the order of the day and that the alternative is support for the imperialist bourgeoisie or the duty of international solidarity, which does not allow of any violation of the will of the oppressed nations. The Mensheviks, who invited the Finnish Social-Democrats to "wait" until the Constituent Assembly and settle the question of autonomy *together* with it, actually spoke out in the spirit of the Russian imperialists.

Pravda No. 46
May 15 (2), 1917

Printed from the
Pravda text

11
SPEECH ON THE SITUATION WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE TASKS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)
APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin motioned the proposal for a declaration that the R.S.D.L.P. remained within the Zimmerwald bloc only for the purpose of information, and is, consequently,

withdrawing from it. Experience has shown, he said, that it is useless to remain in the bloc. In many countries, Zimmerwald has even become a drag on the forward movement. The social-chauvinists are using it as a cover.

Pravda No. 46
May 15 (2), 1917

Printed from the
Pravda text

12

REMARKS IN THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION APRIL 29 (MAY 12)

1

Question from the floor. Does control over the syndicates and banks imply measures recommended only on a state-wide scale or are such measures as control over private enterprises, etc., also included?

No, that is not here, because this living practice has been given expression in another resolution where it is in a better perspective.* This particular resolution deals with another subject—the steps to be taken towards socialism.

2

Solovyov motions an amendment: a few words about the characteristic of the state in this transition period—that is very essential, because it determines the overall direction of the activities of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies....

Lenin objects to Comrade Solovyov's amendment:

In some resolutions we keep coming up against concrete definitions. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies can operate without the police, because they have their armed soldiers. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are institutions which can substitute for the old civil service.

The old agrarian programme ...** has not been realised, but we should say: "The Party demands a peasant-proletari-

* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 295.—*Ed.*
** One word is illegible in the minutes.—*Ed.*

an republic without a police, a standing army or a civil service." Consequently, the conference has predetermined this issue,* so all we have to do now is to formulate.

First published in 1925 in the book *Petrogradskaya obshchegorodskaya i Vserossiiskaya konferentsii R.S.D.R.P.(B.). v aprele 1917 goda*

Printed from a typewritten copy of the minutes

OUTLINE OF UNIDENTIFIED SPEECH AT A MEETING

The revolution has been carried out by the Petrograd workers.

The revolution has not stopped, it is just starting.

Petrograd has awakened Russia. Petrograd has liberated her. The great cause of the Petrograd workers.

The Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies will subsequently take power and do away with war and the rule of capital!

What the Petrograd workers have started, the soldiers' fraternisation at the front will continue.

Fraternal alliance of workers of all countries.

Revolutionary alliance.

Long live the Russian revolution!

Long live the world socialist revolution!

N. Lenin

April 25, 1917**

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from notes in an unknown hand, revised and enlarged by Lenin

TOO GROSS A LIE

The sage *Rabochaya Gazeta* has assured its readers that Plekhanov and Lenin are allies because both oppose the Stockholm conference of the social-chauvinists. *Rabochaya Gazeta* confines itself to issuing a few shouts, saying not a word about our arguments in substance, and keeping

* See present edition, Vol. 24, p. 280.—*Ed.*

** The last two sentences, the date and the signature are in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

silent about the fact that this conference is a *screen* for capitalist diplomats!

This is a cheap trick!

Marxists must tell the people the truth and expose the tricks of the diplomats operating *through* the social-chauvinists.

No Marxist will allow himself, as *Rabochaya Gazeta* does, to keep silent about the fact that the refusal of the French social-chauvinists *means* a desire on the part of the Anglo-French and Russian bourgeoisie to drag out the war until Germany's total defeat.

Pravda No. 43
May 11 (April 28), 1917

Printed from the *Pravda* text

AN UNFINISHED AUTOBIOGRAPHY[543]

Comrades! The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has transmitted to me your letter of April 24, 1917. In it you ask about my origin, where I had been, whether I had been exiled and what for. In what manner I returned to Russia and what is my activity at the present time, i.e., whether it (this activity) is doing you good or harm.

I reply to all these questions, except the last one, because it is for you to judge whether or not my activity is doing you any good.

My name is Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov.

I was born in Simbirsk on April 10, 1870. In the spring of 1887, my elder brother Alexander was executed by Alexander III for an attempt on his life (March 1, 1887). In December 1887, I was arrested for the first time and expelled from Kazan University for students' disturbances; I was then banished from Kazan.

In December 1895, I was arrested for the second time for Social-Democratic propaganda among the workers of St. Petersburg....*

Written not earlier than May 4 (17), 1917

First published on April 16, 1927 in *Pravda* No. 86

Printed from the original

* Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SEVENTH (APRIL) ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) AT A MEETING OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANISATION MAY 8 (21), 1917[544]

Comrade Lenin begins by saying that the conference met at an extraordinary time: there is now a revolution in Russia and an unprecedented war all over the world.

Consequently, if we are to understand the decisions of our conference we must first of all understand the kind of war we are waging and who began it, what kind of revolution we have carried out and the kind of revolution that lies ahead of us.

The war was not started by the workers and peasants: neither the Russian, the German, the French, the Italian, the Belgian, nor the British workers and peasants started this war. The war was started and is being continued by the capitalists of the world: the British capitalists and their friends, the French, the Russian and the Italian capitalists, against the German capitalists and their friends, the Austrian capitalists.

What is this war being fought for?

Is it being fought for the emancipation or for the interests of the workers and peasants? No, it is not.

The purpose of the war is plunder and a division of foreign lands—that is what makes the capitalists shout about the war to a victorious end.

Tsar Nicholas, as big a brigand as Wilhelm, concluded secret predatory treaties with the British and French capitalists; these treaties are not being published as otherwise the whole people would realise the fraud, and the war would quickly be over. That is why our resolution on the war flatly calls this war a predatory *imperialist* war.

How, then, can an end be put to this world-wide slaughter? Can it be ended by someone pulling out of it?

No, it cannot. It cannot because the war is being fought not by two states but by many, and because the capitalists can end the war only for a time in order to prepare for a new one. That is the kind of peace no worker or peasant wants,

whoever he may be, a German, a Frenchman or a Russian.

Who, then, can end the war?

The war can be ended only by the workers and peasants, not of Russia alone, but of the whole world. The workers and peasants of the world have the same interests: struggle against the capitalists and the landowners. That is why, only by uniting, the workers and peasants of the world can put an end to this war. That is why we Bolsheviks are against a separate peace, i.e., against a peace only between Russia and Germany. A separate peace is a stupidity, because it fails to settle the basic issue, the struggle against the capitalists and the landowners.

How, then, are the workers and peasants of the whole world to unite? The war is in their way.

The Russian revolution has toppled the autocracy and has given the Russian people unprecedented freedom, which is unmatched among any people of the world. But has it settled the basic question of Russian life, the question of land? No, because the land is still in the hands of the landowners. Why is that so? Because the people who overthrew the tsar handed over power not only into the hands of their elected representatives—peasants and workers, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, but also into the hands of the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government, let us note, consists of capitalists, landowners and those who sincerely or hypocritically say that Russia can be saved only hand in hand with the landowners.

But the landowners refuse to give land to the peasants, the capitalists refuse to give up their profits from the war and the plunder of foreign lands.

That is why we Bolsheviks do not support the Provisional Government, and do not advise socialists to take ministerial office.

Socialist ministers can do no more than lend their names to cover up plunder and conquest. And they are already doing so. They have entered the government and have joined the capitalists in saying: this war is not only a defensive, but also an offensive one, and the peasants will not get their land now, but after the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

That is why we are against the Provisional Government and recognise only *our own* government: the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. There is no better government, the people have not yet created one, and you can't invent one.

Why, in that case, has this government of ours decided to give support to the Provisional Government consisting of capitalists, landowners and socialists, who do not want to give land to the people now and preach an offensive? Because we now have in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies a majority of peasant-soldiers who do not understand what each of the parties wants *in practice*.

Hence, our task is patiently to explain to the workers and peasants that everything—the end of the war, land for the peasants, and real struggle against the capitalists, not in words, but in deeds—will be secured only when the whole people comes to realise not from books, but from its own experience that only full power for the workers and peasants, only the power of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies can help to start a resolute struggle for peace, for land and for socialism.

You cannot disregard the people. Only dreamers and plotters believed that a minority could impose their will on a majority. That was what the French revolutionary Blanqui thought, and he was wrong. When the majority of the people refuse, because they do not yet understand, to take power into their own hands, the minority, however revolutionary and clever, cannot impose their desire on the majority of the people.

From this flow our actions.

We Bolsheviks must patiently and perseveringly explain our views to the workers and peasants. Each of us must forget our old view of our work, each, without waiting for the arrival of an agitator, a propagandist, a more knowledgeable comrade who will explain everything—each of us must become all in one: agitator, propagandist and Party organiser.

That is the only way we can get the people to understand our doctrine, to think over their experience and really take power into their own hands.

First published in 1927
in *Zapiski Instituta Lenina*
(Transactions of the Lenin
Institute), Vol. I

Printed from the
Zapiski text

PLAN OF RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC MEASURES FOR COMBATING THE DISLOCATION

1. A collapse is imminent.
2. Neither a bureaucratic nor a bourgeois *solution* is possible.
3. Workers' control must be, first, really *working-class* (three-quarters of the *votes* of workers).
4. " " " " developed into *regulation*.
5. " " " " extended to all financial operations and the financial side of the business in general.
6. Salvation from the collapse unquestionably demands that the revolutionary measures should be *started* with the **expropriation** of the biggest and big capital.
7. This is to be continued by revolutionary measures: the organisation of **universal labour service** *through the workers' militia* ... (free workers' service in the militia over and above their 8 hours of work).
8. Switch of manpower to the production of coal and raw materials and to transport....

+ 6 *bis* Organisation of exchange of grain for implements, footwear, clothes....

+ *9*. Switch of manpower from bombs to useful products.

+ **Economy of resources....**

+ Universal labour service must yield the utmost and the strictest economy of resources and manpower.

Written before May 25 (June 7), 1917

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

INSERTION FOR N. K. KRUPSKAYA'S ARTICLE "A PAGE FROM THE HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY"[545]

On Tuesday, May 9, more than 200 émigrés, travelling across Germany, arrived from Switzerland. Among them were the Menshevik leader Martov, the Socialist-Revolutionary leader Natanson and others. This transit has provided fresh evidence that there is no other reliable way from Switzerland, except via Germany. *Izvestia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (No. 32 of April 5) carries a report by Lenin and Zinoviev about their trip across Germany, giving the names of the socialists of two neutral countries (Switzerland and Sweden) who certified by their signatures that the trip across Germany was undertaken of necessity and that it did not involve relations with the German Government which were in any way reprehensible.

Soldatskaya Pravda No. 21
May 26 (13), 1917

Printed from the original

STATEMENT OF FACT CONCERNING THE COMMISSION OF THE NEWSPAPER *VPERYOD* AT A MEETING OF THE ST. PETERSBURG R.S.D.L.P.(B.) COMMITTEE MAY 30 (JUNE 12), 1917

Concerning Comrade Tomsky's reference to the 1906 workers press commission and its complete failure, I state that this reference is factually incorrect and that the commission of the newspaper *Vperyod*[546] (headed by A. A. Bogdanov and others) was undoubtedly useful.

First published in 1927 in the book *Pervy legalny Peterburgsky komitet bolshevikov v 1917 godu* (First Legal Petersburg Committee of Bolsheviks in 1917)

Printed from a typewritten copy of the minutes

SPEECH AT A SITTING OF THE BOLSHEVIK GROUP OF THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES MAY 31 (JUNE 13), 1917

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

On behalf of the Central Committee, Lenin greets all internationalist Social-Democrats without distinction of group affiliation.

The speaker goes on to the question of how the European war can be eliminated. It then turns out that he does not see the settlement of the European crisis in such optimistic colours as A. Lunacharsky.[547] He says that the "without annexations" formula does not at all mean any desire to return Europe to the "status quo ante". We believe that "without annexations" also means without the seizures carried out before the war. We take this formula to mean giving the peoples complete freedom to secede from one state and join another. But it is impossible to implement this formula without a socialist revolution, which is why there is no way out of the European war except a world-wide revolution.

Referring to fraternisation, Lenin says: the spontaneous fraternisation will not settle the question of peace, but we regard it as the cornerstone of our revolutionary work. Fraternisation does not in itself solve the question, but then no other measure alone decides the revolution until it leads to one. What is a strike or a demonstration? They are after all only a link in the entire chain of the revolutionary struggle. We are being told that this fraternisation has worsened the situation on the other fronts. That is not true. It has created a virtual armistice on our front and has caused small changes on the Western front. But in whose favour? In favour of Britain and France. On the other hand, Britain has scored a great success in Asia: she has gobbled up Baghdad. The suspension of the fighting on our front has been brought about by revolutionary fraternisation, against which Kerensky is waging a war, and against which an offensive signed by the Mensheviks has been announced.

We must make fraternisation conscious, we must see that it is transformed into an exchange of ideas, that it is carried over to the other fronts, that it kindles a revolution on the other side of the trenches.

On the question of regulating industry, the speaker says: since February 28, the government has done nothing to cut down the industrialists' profits. The other day we read about the establishment of a commission consisting of several ministers led by Skobelev to work out control measures. But we had commissions under the tsar, they are nothing but a swindle. The speaker says there is need immediately to take over the landed estates, and ends his speech by stating that the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies must either take all the power or die an inglorious death.

Notes are being passed to the speaker from every side. Within a short time they number 20. The first of them asks whether the draft reinforcements should be sent to the front. Replying to the question, Lenin says: under the tsarist power we had to go into the army and work there. Liebknecht put on a uniform to conduct agitation against the war. It is naive to think that the war can be abolished by separate anarchic action.

Novaya Zhizn No. 37,
June 1 (14), 1917

Printed from the
Novaya Zhizn text

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF DISTRICT COMMITTEES AND ARMY UNITS OF PETROGRAD TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE C.C. AND THE P.C. JUNE 10 (23), 1917

Having studied the resolutions of the Congress of Soviets and other organisations, carried today in *Izvestia Petrogradskogo Sovieta*, and also the C.C. resolution published in *Pravda*, concerning the observance of the ban on demonstrations for three days—

— having studied these resolutions and discussed the state of affairs,

resolves:

In view of the fact that the Congress of Soviets and the Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Peasants' Deputies have made their straightforward statement in their appeal:

"We know that concealed forces of the counter-revolution want to take advantage of your demonstration"

— in view of this it is necessary to admit that we have imagined the counter-revolution to be much weaker, for we have no knowledge as yet of what the Congress of Soviets knows;

— that, consequently, the struggle against the counter-revolution is an even more urgent item on the order of the day;

— that the C.C. resolution on abiding by the direct ban on demonstrations for three days is correct;

— that it is necessary....*

Written on June 10 (23), 1917

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

ON THE GRIMM AFFAIR

We are being asked in what sense we saw Grimm's behaviour as being "ambiguous". We reply—for readers who have not had the opportunity of securing the issue of the newspaper *Volya Naroda*,[548] which was precisely indicated—that the protocol we signed (we would have willingly reprinted it, but for the lack of space in *Pravda*) speaks *only* of Grimm's attitude to *Hoffmann*, the bourgeois minister of *the same* neutral country (Switzerland).

Pravda No. 75
June 20 (7), 1917

Printed from the *Pravda* text

* Here the MS. breaks off.—*Ed.*

SHAME!

Here is what Mr. Stan. Volsky, a leader writer of *Novaya Zhizn*,[549] has talked himself into today:

"...While denying the right of the big nations to enslave the small nationalities, socialism has never recommended the opposite course of action: enslavement of the big nations by the small nationalities. But it is precisely to this kind of violence against the will of the all-Russia democracy, to a denial of joint revolutionary democratic work, a substitution of national hostility for the class struggle, that the programme, or at any rate the tactics, of the Ukrainian Rada boils down...."

There you see where the swings of the Novaya Zhizn petty-bourgeois chatterboxes are taking them—straight to the Black-Hundred reaction! It is after all only the Menshikovs yesterday and the Katkovs the day before yesterday who could say that the Ukrainians' desire to have their own sejm, their own ministers, their own army, their own finances and other things was "enslavement" of the Russian people!

A foul Great-Russian chauvinism, touched up with sweet quasi-Marxist words, such is the sermon of Minister V. Chernov, Mr. Volsky and *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

Pravda No. 83
June 29 (16), 1917

Printed from the
Pravda text

REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF FRONT AND REAR MILITARY ORGANISATIONS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) JUNE 20 (JULY 3), 1917[550]

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

At the morning sitting, Lenin gave a report on the current situation. He noted the difference between the situation today and that during the Party's April Conference. At that time, the stand of the various socialist parties had still hardly crystallised. Only now, in the present conditions, and in the light of the events that have just taken place, has the real political face of the Mensheviks and the S.R.s been revealed. But the petty bourgeoisie, without being

socialist, may turn out to be really democratically minded. Viewing the S.R. and Menshevik masses from that standpoint, we must give them credit for consistent democratism. But that cannot be said of their leaders, which is why we find that there is a yawning gulf between the S.R. and the Menshevik masses, on the one hand, and their leaders, on the other. The leaders of these masses have been gradually shedding not only their socialism, but their democratism as well. This will be seen in the attitude of the socialist ministers to the three vital issues of the moment.

On the question of land, the socialist section of the government has clearly diverged from the views of the peasantry, and is helping the landowners to keep their lands at their disposal. The second touchstone of the socialist ministers' democratism is their attitude to local self-government. It is an elementary democratic proposition that the local power must be elected by the people themselves, but on this point there have been numerous conflicts between the Provisional Government and the local organs of self-government, and the socialist section of the ministry has been an active fighter against these truly democratic principles. Finally, the third question is the offensive. The socialist Kerensky has managed to secure what the patent imperialist Guchkov had been unable to do.

We revolutionary Social-Democrats must direct our activity towards raising the class consciousness of the democratic masses. That is why we must relentlessly expose these former leaders of petty-bourgeois democracy, pointing out to democracy the only way along which the revolutionary proletariat will march ahead of it.

Novaya Zhizn No. 54,
June 21 (July 4), 1917

Printed from the
Novaya Zhizn text

THE POLITICAL SITUATION[551]

(FOUR THESES)

1. The counter-revolution has become organised and consolidated, and has actually taken state power into its hands.[552]

The complete organisation and consolidation of the counter-revolution consists in a combination of its three

main forces, a combination excellently conceived and already put into practice: (1) The Constitutional-Democratic Party, i.e., the real leader of the organised bourgeoisie, has, by withdrawing from the Cabinet, confronted it with an ultimatum, thus clearing the way for the Cabinet's overthrow by the counter-revolution; (2) The General Staff and the military leaders, with the deliberate or semi-deliberate assistance of Kerensky, whom even the most prominent Socialist-Revolutionaries now call a Cavaignac, have seized actual state power and have proceeded to shoot down revolutionary units at the front, disarm the revolutionary troops and workers in Petrograd and Moscow, suppress unrest in Nizhny Novgorod, arrest Bolsheviks and ban their papers, not only without trial, but even without a government order. At present, basic state power in Russia is virtually a military dictatorship. This fact is still obscured by a number of institutions that are revolutionary in words but powerless in deeds. Yet it is so obvious and fundamental a fact that, without understanding it, one cannot understand anything about the political situation. (3) The Black-Hundred-monarchist and bourgeois press, which has switched from hounding Bolsheviks to hounding the Soviets, the "incendiary" Chernov, etc., has indicated with the utmost clarity that the true meaning of the policy of military dictatorship, which now reigns supreme and is supported by the Cadets and monarchists, is preparation for disbanding the Soviets. Many of the leaders of the S.R.s and Mensheviks, i.e., the present majority in the Soviets, have admitted and expressed this during the past few days, but true to their petty-bourgeois nature, they shrug off this formidable reality with meaningless high-sounding phrases.

2. The leaders of the Soviets and of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, headed by Tsereteli and Chernov, have completely betrayed the cause of the revolution by putting it in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries and by turning themselves, their parties and the Soviets into mere fig-leaves of the counter-revolution.

Proof of this is that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have betrayed the Bolsheviks and have tacitly agreed to close down their papers without daring to tell

the people plainly and openly that they are doing so and why. By sanctioning the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary regiments, they have deprived themselves of all real power. They have turned into the most loud-mouthed ranters who help the reaction to "divert" the people's attention until it is finally ready to disband the Soviets. It is impossible to understand anything at all about the present political situation without realising this complete and final bankruptcy of the S.R.s and Mensheviks and the present majority in the Soviets and without realising that their "Directory" and other masquerades are an absolute sham.

3. All hopes for a peaceful development of the Russian revolution have vanished for good. This is the objective situation: either complete victory for the military dictatorship, or victory for the workers' armed uprising; the latter victory is only possible when it coincides with a deep mass upheaval against the government and the bourgeoisie caused by economic disruption and the prolongation of the war.

The slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was a slogan for peaceful development of the revolution which was possible in April, May, June, and up to July 5-9, i.e., up to the time when actual power passed into the hands of the military dictatorship. This slogan is no longer correct, for it does not take into account that power has changed hands and that the revolution has in fact been completely betrayed by the S.R.s and Mensheviks. Reckless actions, revolts, partial resistance, or hopeless hit-and-run attempts to oppose reaction will not help. What will help is a clear understanding of the situation, endurance and determination of the workers' vanguard, preparation of forces for the armed uprising, for the victory of which conditions at present are extremely difficult, but still possible if the facts and trends mentioned in the thesis coincide. Let us have no constitutional or republican illusions of any kind, no more illusions about a peaceful path, no sporadic actions, no yielding *now* to provocation from the Black Hundreds and Cossacks. Let us muster our forces, reorganise them and resolutely prepare for the armed uprising, if the course of the crisis permits it on a really mass, country-wide scale. The transfer of land to the peasants is impossible at pres-

ent without an armed uprising, since the counter-revolutionaries, having taken power, have completely united with the landowners as a class.

The aim of the insurrection can only be to transfer power to the proletariat, supported by the poor peasants, with a view to putting our Party programme into effect.

4. The party of the working class, without abandoning legal activity but never for a moment overrating it, must *combine* legal with illegal work, as it did in 1912-14.

Don't let a single hour of legal work slip by. But don't cherish any constitutional or "peaceful" illusions. Form illegal organisations or cells everywhere and at once for the publication of leaflets, etc. Reorganise immediately, consistently, resolutely, all along the line.

Act as we did in 1912-14, when we could speak about overthrowing tsarism by a revolution and an armed uprising, without at the same time losing our legal base in the Duma, the insurance societies, the trade unions, etc.

Written on July 10 (23), 1917

Published on August 2 (July 20), 1917 in *Proletarskoye Dyelo* No. 6
Signed: *W.*

Printed from the original

LETTER OVER THE PUBLICATION OF "LEAFLET ON THE CAPTURE OF RIGA"[553]

This leaflet cannot, of course, be published legally, but everything must be done to have it published illegally. It would be extremely stupid of us to jeopardise our legal newspapers (which are so terribly important for us, and which it has taken such a great effort to keep going) and fail to do what we had managed to do in 1912-14: to use our legal possibilities. We should neither print the article (leaflet) legally nor spoil it by rewriting it for legal publication.

It would be not only stupid but base on our part to *confine* ourselves to the legal word, when its freedom has so drastically been curtailed by the government and is being further curtailed from day to day.

I am aware that the sluggishness of our Bolsheviks is

great and that it will take a great deal of effort to secure the publication of illegal leaflets. But I shall go on insisting because those are the demands of life, the demands of the movement.

We must issue illegally free leaflets and handbills which are not curtailed and which speak out at the top of their voice. They should be signed: "A group of persecuted Bolsheviks". We can confine ourselves to that signature or add below in small type: "The group of persecuted Bolsheviks consists of those Bolsheviks whom the government's persecution has forced to work illegally." Or: "The group of persecuted Bolsheviks consists of Bolsheviks whom the government's persecution and withdrawal of press freedom have forced to publish free leaflets illegally, and to act outside the framework of the legal Bolshevik Party."

LEAFLET ON THE CAPTURE OF RIGA

Workers, soldiers and all working people!

The enemy troops have taken Riga. We have suffered another heavy defeat. The incredible calamities inflicted on the people by the war are being aggravated and dragged out.

Why is the war being dragged out? The reason is still a division of the spoils between the capitalist brigands, the point at issue is still whether the German capitalist predators will retain Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Riga, etc., whether the British capitalist predators will retain Baghdad and the German colonies they have seized, whether the Russian capitalist predators will retain Armenia, etc. The Kerensky government, with the participation and support of the Mensheviks and the S.R.s, has been brazenly cheating the people, lulling them with empty talk about their desire for peace, talk which is not binding in any way, while actually dragging out the predatory war, and refusing to publish the secret treaties which the tsar concluded with the British and French capitalists for the enrichment of the Russian capitalists who had been promised Constantinople, Galicia and Armenia.

Even under the Republic, the Russian people are shedding their blood for the fulfilment of the secret treaties, the predatory treaties between the capitalists.

For months, the "republicans", Kerensky, Skobelev, Chernov & Co., have been cheating the Russian workers and peasants, instead of abrogating the secret predatory treaties, instead of offering precise, clear-cut and fair peace terms to all the belligerent nations.

Kerensky together with the Mensheviks and the S.R.s has cheated the people. Only a workers' government can save the country, and safeguard it from the losses of the war and the plunder of the capitalist marauders.

In connection with the Riga defeat, the bourgeoisie is already anticipating the introduction of new harsh laws and strict disciplinary measures against soldiers, workers and peasants. Already the peasants are being deprived of their grain, while, through the blocking of workers' control, the capitalists are allowed to retain their outrageously high profits and to safeguard their sacrosanct "commercial secrets", which shield the bankers and millionaires from exposure.

Meanwhile, the Mensheviks and the S.R.s, disgracefully crawling to the bourgeoisie, continue to give it their support and shout about the need to "leave off" "all party strife", which means leaving full power in the hands of the capitalists, and the country's continued plunder by them, and leaving them the "freedom" to protract the war....

Tens and hundreds of thousands of people have died in the offensive, which the Kerensky, Menshevik, and S.R. government started in June. Tens and hundreds of thousands will die in the protracted war, so long as the people continue to tolerate such a government.

Only a workers' government can save the country. It alone will not cheat the people, but will immediately offer to all countries precise, clear-cut and fair peace terms.

The bourgeoisie has been trying to intimidate the people and create a panic, in an effort to get the ignorant people to believe that peace cannot be offered right away, as this would mean "losing Riga" and so on. That is cheating the people.

Even if peace were to be negotiated by the governments, i.e., the governments safeguarding the sacred rights of the capitalists to their plundered wealth and seizures of foreign lands (annexations), even then the offer of peace would not mean abandonment of Riga. Riga is the booty of the German capitalist brigands. Armenia is the booty of the Russian capitalist brigands. When brigands negotiate on peace they either each keep their own booty or swap pieces of it. That is how all wars have ended and will end, so long as power remains in the hands of the capitalists.

But we speak of a *workers'* government which alone can offer just peace terms right away, and this has been stated hundreds of times by workers and peasants throughout Russia in their countless mandates and resolutions. These terms are: peace without annexations, i.e., without the seizure of foreign lands. This means: neither the Germans nor the Russians will be able forcibly, without the voluntary consent of the Poles, to integrate Poland or the Latvian Territory; neither the Turks nor the Russians will be able to seize Armenia, and so on.

These just peace terms will at once be offered by a workers' government to all the belligerent countries without exception. Until this has been done, until precise, clear-cut, formal proposals of peace have been made, until there has been an overthrow of the total power of the marauding capitalists, who are making hundreds of millions on war contracts, and so long as the secret predatory treaties remain intact—all talk of peace comes to nothing but gross and utterly shameless deception of the people.

All the capitalist governments, including the Kerensky, S.R. and Menshevik government, have been practising this deception

of the people. They have all been mouthing phrases of peace, which are not binding in any way, no one has been offering any precise peace terms, no one has abrogated the secret treaties, and in fact everyone has continued to drag out the criminal predatory war over the capitalists' profits, which is ruining the peoples.

Down with the war! Down with the Kerensky, Menshevik and S.R. government, which is cheating the people, protracting the war, safeguarding the predatory interests of the capitalists, putting off the elections to the Constituent Assembly!

Only a workers' government supported by the poor peasants will offer peace, putting an end to the capitalist plunder, and give the working people bread and freedom. Let every worker and soldier explain to the people the need to overthrow the Kerensky government and set up a workers' government.

Written after August 22
(September 4), 1917

First published in 1962 in Vol. 34
of the Fifth Russian edition
of the *Collected Works*

Printed from
a typewritten
copy

FROM THE THESES FOR A REPORT AT THE OCTOBER 8 CONFERENCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION, AND ALSO FOR A RESOLUTION AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THOSE ELECTED TO THE PARTY CONGRESS[554]

ON THE LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[555]

The list of candidates published by the Central Committee has been compiled in an inadmissible manner and calls for the sharpest protest. The point is that there must be four or five times more workers in a peasant Constituent Assembly, because they alone are capable of establishing close and intimate ties with the peasant deputies. It is absolutely inadmissible also to have an excessive number of candidates from among people who have but recently joined our Party and have not yet been tested (like Larin). In filling the list with such candidates who should first have worked in the Party for months and months, the C.C. has thrown wide open the door for careerists who scramble for seats in the Constituent Assembly. There is need for an urgent review and correction of the list.

NOTE TO THESIS "ON THE LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY"

It goes without saying that from among the mezhraiontsi[556] who have been hardly tested in proletarian work in our Party's *spirit*, no one would contest the candidature of, say, Trotsky, for, first, upon his arrival, Trotsky at once took up an internationalist stand; second, he worked among the mezhraiontsi for a merger; third, in the difficult July days he proved himself equal to the task and a loyal supporter of the party of the revolutionary proletariat. Clearly, as much cannot be said about many of the new Party members entered on the list.

Larin's nomination is especially scandalous (apart from his being placed ahead of Petrovsky, Krylenko and others...). During the war, Larin *helped the chauvinists*, spoke *on their behalf* at the Swedish congress, and helped to print lies against the St. Petersburg workers and their boycott of the War Industries Committees. During the war, before the revolution, Larin did not once show himself to be a *fighter* for internationalism. Upon his return to Russia, Larin long helped the Mensheviks and even came out in the press with indecent attacks against our Party, in the Alexinsky spirit. Larin is well known for his "swings": let us recall his pamphlet on the labour congress and on a merger with the S.R.s.

Of course, there would be no need to recall all this, if Larin entered the Party with a desire to reform. But to get him into the Constituent Assembly within a week or so of his entry into the Party is *in fact* to transform the Party into the same kind of dirty stall for careerists as most of the European parties are.*

The serious work in the Constituent Assembly will consist in establishing close, intimate *ties* with the peasants. Only workers who are in touch with peasant life are fit for this. To pack the Constituent Assembly with orators and

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* What about M. N. Pokrovsky's candidature? In 1907, he moved away from the Bolsheviks and remained on the sidelines for years. It would be a good thing if he came back for good. But this has first to be proved by long effort.

writers is to take the beaten track of opportunism and chauvinism. That is unworthy of the "Third International".

Written between September 29 and October 4 (October 2 and 17), 1917

First published in full in 1962 in Vol. 34 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*

Printed from a typewritten copy

"THE LANDOWNERS HAVE HIT IT OFF WITH THE CADETS"

That is not our expression. It was used by the newspaper *Dyelo Naroda*[557] No. 170 of October 3, quoting the words of "a provincial worker" who described what had happened in Russia in the summer and autumn of 1917. *Dyelo Naroda* is known to be the chief official organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Former Minister Chernov is on its Editorial Board.

The admission of such a paper is especially valuable. Here it is:

"The landowners have hit it off with the Cadets, according to a provincial worker. In plainer language, this means that the landowners have found sympathy and support among some elements of the government in the centre and in the localities, that they have recovered from the first shock and have started to organise.... Attacks on the land committees have started and have been growing from day to day, first in the form of a cornucopia of complaints and wails about 'robberies', 'arbitrary acts', and 'pogroms'.... The complaints were followed by restrictive circulars from above and judicial prosecution of the land committees, and in the localities close to the front, also by interference from the military authorities in the form of orders issued by General Kornilov. Even here, in Petrograd, the Ministry of Justice has also threatened to institute criminal proceedings against the Chief Land Committee.

"The cancellation of pre-revolutionary leasehold contracts is the most frequent pretext for the commission for trial and the filing of civil suits. The landowners and all those who are with them have been saying in one voice: the law on contracts has not been rescinded, which means that all the contracts are still valid, and 'no committees or private persons' have the right to cancel them.... So the 'unwary' committees are being massively struck down by the old justice for cancelling the contracts and reducing the leasehold prices. The fact is, however, that such reductions are absolutely inevitable and hardly any contract has remained intact anywhere."

(The paper goes on to give the evidence of a "most moderate Professor Kablukov" who says that the short-term peasant tenant is sometimes "*worse off than the serf....*")

"In these circumstances, cancellation of the shackling leasehold contracts, concluded before the revolution, far from being a crime, was a direct duty of the organs of power.... The effort to keep a section of the peasant tenants 'worse off than the serfs' at any price was a downright provocation to riot, a provocation which was the more criminal in that it was carried out exclusively in the interests of the class of feudal-minded landowners, and at a time when the republic and the whole people are suffering the greatest calamities.... It is no accident, after all, that pogroms have broken out and the 'nests' of the gentry are in flames precisely in Tambov Gubernia, where the number of committees put on trial is great...."

That is what is said in the newspaper *Dyelo Naroda*, the official organ of the ministerial party of S.R.s.

These lines should be reprinted everywhere, issued as leaflets, and circulated in millions of copies among the peasants, because they contain proof, given by the S.R.s (Socialist-Revolutionaries) themselves and quoted by V. Chernov's own paper, proof that the S.R.s have *betrayed* the peasants to the landowners, that the S.R. Party has *betrayed* the peasantry, and that if it has not *also* "hit it off" with the landowners, it has at any rate *surrendered* to them.

The people must be given the chance to read and reread these lines. Every class-conscious peasant, soldier and worker must give thought to the meaning of these admissions.

Seven months of the revolution have passed. Countless times the people have expressed their confidence in the S.R.s, have given them majorities at elections, and said to the S.R. Party: lead on, we entrust you with the leadership! Since March 1917, the S.R. Party in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies has been operating in a bloc (alliance) with the *Mensheviks*, and has had a *majority* for months and months! Since May 6, members of the Party of S.R.s and Mensheviks have been *and still are* ministers and deputy ministers *together* with the "despicable Cadets", *alongside* the "despicable Cadets", *in alliance* with the "despicable Cadets"!!

Dyelo Naroda has itself admitted the results of this coalition (alliance, agreement) with the despicable Cadets *and the landowners*.

Seven months of the revolution, seven months of the democratic republic, seven months of S.R. and Menshevik domination in the Soviets have resulted in a "vast" number of members of the land committees *put on trial*—trial under the *old justice*, by the old courts, by the tsarist-landowner courts; they have resulted in peasant *revolts* in Tambov and other gubernias!

That is the result of the peasants' trusting the S.R. Party. Meanwhile, the new draft land bill of the S.R. Minister S. L. Maslov shows again and again how the S.R.s have betrayed the peasants (see article by this author: "Socialist-Revolutionary Party Cheats the Peasants Once Again"*).

Written after October 20 (November 2), 1917

First published on October 24 (November 6), 1917 in the newspaper *Derevenskaya Byednota* No. 11

Printed from the *Derevenskaya Byednota* text

LETTER TO Y. M. SVERDLOV

To Comrade Sverdlov.

I learnt only last night that Zinoviev had issued a *written* denial of his participation in Kamenev's statement in *Novaya Zhizn*.

Why then have you not sent me anything???

I sent all the letters about Kamenev and Zinoviev to C.C. members *only*.—You know this; is it not strange then that you seem to doubt it?

It looks as if I will not be able to attend the Plenary Meeting, because "they are looking for me". If *you* (+ Stalin, Sokolnikov and Dzerzhinsky) demand a compromise on the Zinoviev and Kamenev affair,[558] enter a proposal *against* me, to have the case referred to a Party court (the facts are clear that Zinoviev was also *thwarting* it deliberately); this will be a postponement.

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* See present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 228-33.—*Ed.*

"Kamenev's resignation has been accepted"? From the C.C.? Please let me have the text of his statement.

Cancellation of the Cossacks' demonstration is a great *victory*.[559] Hurrah! If we *attack* with *all our strength*, we shall fully win out in a few days! Best regards! Yours.

Written on October 22 or 23
(November 4 or 5), 1917

First published in 1957 in the book *Oktyabrskoye vooruzhonnoye vosstaniye v Petrograd* (October Armed Uprising in Petrograd), Moscow, U.S.S.R. Academy of Science Publishers

Printed from the original

NOTES

[1] *The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class* was organised by Lenin in the autumn of 1895. It united about twenty Marxist workers' circles in St. Petersburg. The work of the League was based on the principles of centralism and strict discipline. It was headed by a Central Group, which included V. I. Lenin, A. A. Vaneyev, P. K. Zaporozhets, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. K. Krupskaya, L. Martov (Y. O. Tsederbaum), M. A. Silvin, and V. V. Starkov. Immediate guidance on every aspect of the work came from five members of this group led by Lenin. The organisation was subdivided into district groups connected with factories and plants through forward-looking, class-conscious workers (like I. V. Babushkin and V. A. Shelgunov). At the plants there were organisers for the collection of information and distribution of literature, and workers' circles were set up at the major enterprises.

The League was the first in Russia to bring together socialism and the working-class movement, going forward from the propaganda of Marxism among a small number of leading workers in circles to political agitation among broad masses of the proletariat. It guided the working-class movement, tying in the workers' struggle for economic demands with the political struggle against tsarism. The influence of the League spread well beyond St. Petersburg. On its initiative, the workers' circles in Moscow, Kiev Yekaterinoslav and other cities and regions of Russia united into similar leagues.

In December 1895, the tsarist government dealt the League a heavy blow: on the night of the 8th (20th), many of its leaders, including Lenin, were arrested. In response to the arrest, a leaflet was issued, formulating political demands and proclaiming the existence of the League.

While in prison, Lenin continued to direct the League's activities, sending out coded letters and leaflets, and wrote a pamphlet *On Strikes* (which is yet to be discovered) and "Draft and Explanation of the Social-Democratic Party Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 93-121).

The importance of the League lay in the fact that, as Lenin said, it was the first important embryo of a revolutionary party relying on the working-class movement and directing the proletariats' class struggle.

"*Communication on behalf of the 'Stariki' to the Members of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class*" was written by Lenin in prison in 1896 as a warning

to the League members at liberty against the provocateur N. Mikhailov. It was written between the lines of page 240 of N. I. Tezyakov's book, *Agricultural Workers and the Organisation of Sanitary Supervision over Them in Kherson Gubernia* (1896), which Lenin was reading for his work *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*.

Apparently for reasons of secrecy, the manuscript contains a great number of abbreviations and is written in a very fine hand with a plain lead pencil poorly visible in places, which is why some of it has not been deciphered. p. 33

[2] The student organisation bearing the name of "*corporation*" was set up in St. Petersburg University at the end of 1891 from students' self-education circles. It united revolutionary-minded young people, but had no specified political programme and broke up within a few months. Its members were betrayed to the police by N. Mikhailov, who was one of its organisers but was connected with the secret police. p. 33

[3] *The Strike at the Voronin factory* (a cotton-weaving manufactory owned by the merchant I. A. Voronin) was staged at the end of January 1894 and was caused by a cut in rates which led to a drop in wages. It continued for three days and ended in a victory for the workers: the rates were increased. Several workers, accused of being instigators, were arrested and deported from St. Petersburg. p. 33

[4] *Narodovoltsi*—members of the Narodnaya Volya (the People's Will), a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists which arose in August 1879 as a result of the split within the Narodnik organisation known as Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom). The Narodnaya Volya was headed by an Executive Committee consisting, among others, of A. I. Zhelyabov, A. D. Mikhailov, M. F. Frolenko, N. A. Morozov, V. N. Figner, S. L. Perovskaya and A. A. Kvyatkovsky. The Narodovoltsi, remaining utopian socialists, took the path of political struggle, and regarded as their main task the overthrow of the autocracy and the gaining of political freedom. Their programme provided for the organisation of a "permanent people's representation" elected on the basis of universal suffrage, proclamation of democratic freedoms, transfer of the land to the people and the working out of measures for the transfer of factories and plants to the workers. Lenin wrote: "The Narodnaya Volya members made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism" (present edition, Vol. 8, p. 72).

The Narodovoltsi waged a heroic struggle against the tsarist autocracy. But proceeding from their erroneous theory of active "heroes" and the passive "crowd", they expected to achieve the reconstruction of society without the people's participation, through their own efforts, and by individual acts of terrorism to intimidate and disorganise the government. Following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II on March 1, 1881, the government crushed the

Narodnaya Volya by provocations, fierce reprisals and executions.

Lenin, while criticising the erroneous and utopian programme of the Narodovoltsi, spoke with great respect about their selfless struggle against tsarism and put a high value on their conspiratorial techniques and strictly centralised organisation. p. 34

5 The draft agreement with P. B. Struve was worked out as a result of the talks held by V. I. Lenin, V. I. Zasulich and A. N. Potresov with Struve, which had been started on Potresov's initiative on December 29, 1900 (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 380-82). The "legal Marxists" (mentioned in the document as the Svoboda [Freedom] democratic opposition group) Struve and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky wanted the establishment of an illegal organ abroad (suggesting the name of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* [Contemporary Review]) to be published parallel with *Iskra* and *Zarya*, but not openly connected with the Social-Democrats. The Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* agreed to participate in the publication, hoping to obtain political material and reports for *Iskra* through Struve, but stipulated that the new organ should appear not more often than *Zarya* and as a supplement to it. The Editorial Board was to consist, on an equal footing, of the *Iskra* Editorial Board, and Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky.

The talks revealed that Struve intended to use the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya* to cater for *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* and was trying to turn it into an organ competing with *Iskra* in volume, content and frequency of publication. When the draft agreement was being worked out, Struve rejected Clause 7, which had been proposed by the *Iskra* and *Zarya* group and which gave the *Iskra* Editorial Board a completely free hand in making use of all the political material received by *Sovremennoye Obozreniye*. Lenin set out the content of the talks with Struve in a letter to G. V. Plekhanov on January 30, 1901, and came out strongly for breaking off the talks (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 55-57). The subsequent talks ended in a complete break. p. 34

6 *Zarya* (Dawn)—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901 and 1902 by the *Iskra* Editorial Board. Altogether four issues (three books) of *Zarya* made their appearance: No. 1 in April 1901 (actually March 23, new style), No. 2-3 in December 1901, and No. 4 in August 1902.

Zarya's tasks were defined in a draft declaration by the *Iskra* and *Zarya* Editorial Board, written by Lenin in Russia (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 320-30). In view of the fact that during the discussion of the publication of these organs abroad, jointly with the Emancipation of Labour group, it had been decided to publish *Zarya* legally and *Iskra* illegally, the declaration of the *Iskra* Editorial Board in October 1900 no longer made mention of *Zarya*.

The journal *Zarya* criticised international and Russian revisionism and came out in defence of the theoretical principles of Marxism. Some of Lenin's works, including "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" and "The

Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", were published in *Zarya*. p. 35

[7] A reference to Minister of Finance S. Y. Witte's confidential minute, "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo" (1899), with an introduction and notes by R.N.S. (P. B. Struve), published by the Zarya Publishers in 1901. p. 35

[8] *The Zemstvos* were introduced in the central gubernias of Russia in 1864 and were local organs of self-government led by the gentry. Their writ was confined to local economic matters (hospitals, highways, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activity was entirely under the control of the governors and the tsarist Ministry of the Interior, who could suspend any decisions the government did not like. p. 36

[9] A reference to the newspaper *Iskra*, the first all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900, which played a decisive part in organising the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* dated December 1900 appeared in Leipzig; subsequent issues appeared in Munich; from July 1902, in London; and from the spring of 1903, in Geneva. German Social-Democrats, Clara Zetkin, Adolf Braun and others, the Polish revolutionary Julian Marchlewski who was living in Munich at the time, and Harry Quelch, a leader of the British Social-Democratic Federation, rendered great assistance in starting the newspaper (organising a secret printing-press, buying Russian type, etc.).

On *Iskra*'s Editorial Board were V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich. Its secretary was I. G. Smidovich-Lehmann, and from the spring of 1901, N. K. Krupskaya, who was also in charge of *Iskra*'s correspondence with Social-Democratic organisations in Russia. Lenin was the virtual editor-in-chief and head of *Iskra*; he wrote articles on all the cardinal aspects of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia

Iskra became the centre round which the Party forces rallied and which gathered and trained the Party cadres. R.S.D.L.P. groups and committees, supporting the views put forward by Lenin's *Iskra*, were set up in a number of cities in Russia (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara, etc.) and the *Iskra* organisation in Russia was set up at a congress of *Iskra* followers in Samara in January 1902.

On Lenin's initiative and with his direct participation, the *Iskra* Editorial Board worked out a draft Party programme (published in *Iskra* No. 21) and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In a special resolution, the Congress noted the exceptional role played by *Iskra* in the struggle for the Party and proclaimed it the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

Soon after the Second Congress of the Party, the Mensheviks, with Plekhanov's support, took over control of *Iskra*. From its No. 52 *Iskra* ceased to be an organ of revolutionary Marxism. p. 36

[10] Lenin's remarks on the article by D. B. Ryazanov "Two Truths", written in the summer of 1901 for the magazine *Zarya*. The article was rejected by the editors and was not published in the magazine.

The pages indicated by Lenin are those of Ryazanov's MS., which he submitted to the *Zarya* Editorial Board. p. 36

[11] See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, "Letter to the Editorial Board of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, November 1877", Moscow, 1965, pp. 311-13. p. 36

[12] *Noumena and phenomena*—opposite concepts in Kant's idealistic philosophy.

Kant held a noumenon to be an incognisable thing in itself, which existed independently of man's consciousness and was beyond his grasp. A phenomenon exited only in the mind and was an object of cognition.

This antithesis between noumena and phenomena, which is one of the main propositions of Kant's subjective idealist epistemology, is used by the ideologists of imperialism and revisionists in their fight against materialism.

Dialectical materialism rejected this antithesis and proved that Kant's theory is wrong. p. 38

[13] The Party Programme adopted by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903 was worked out by the Editorial Board of Lenin's *Iskra* at the end of 1901 and the first half of 1902. Lenin played an outstanding part in working out the draft. The preparatory material dates from January-February 1902; it is a reflection of key moments in the working out of the draft programme by the *Iskra* Editorial Board: Lenin's study of the first draft of Plekhanov's programme; his work on his own draft of the theoretical section of the programme and his participation in writing the collective draft of the practical section of the programme. All materials are printed from the originals, with variants of paragraphs or parts of paragraphs printed side by side to facilitate comparison. For the preparatory material for the R.S.D.L.P. Programme see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 15-76. p. 38

[14] *Cut-off lands*—lands cut off from peasants' allotments in favour of landowners during the Peasant Reform in Russia in 1861. As a rule, the peasants were deprived of their best lands, which is why the cut-off lands were a means used by landowners to enslave the peasants, and slowed down the elimination of feudal relations in land tenure. p. 39

[15] *Royal demesnes* are lands which belonged to the royal family. p. 48

[16] G. V. Plekhanov's and P. B. Axelrod's remarks on Lenin's article "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy" were written on the back of the original between April 20 and May 1 (May 3 and 14), 1902. Lenin's replies were also written on the back of the original on May 1 (14), 1902, at the same time as his letter to Plekhanov (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 103); the concluding part of Lenin's replies (pp. 68-69) was written on

separate sheets appended to the original of the article. Each of the replies was preceded by an extract from the article to which the remarks referred. Lenin used thin lines to underscore Plekhanov's text. p. 53

[17] A reference to Karl Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 13-48) and Engels's "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (Criticism of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891) (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, Bd. 22, S. 272-91). p. 56

[18] *The Valuyev Commission*—a commission set up to inquire into the state of agriculture in Russia and headed by tsarist Minister P. A. Valuyev. In 1872 and 1873, it collected extensive material on the state of agriculture in Russia following the 1861 Reform, and this was published in a book entitled *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Present State of Agriculture and Agricultural Productivity in Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1873. p. 57

[19] A general strike in support of the demand for universal suffrage put forward in Parliament by representatives of the Labour, Liberal and Democratic parties. The strike involved over 300,000 workers, who staged demonstrations throughout the country. However, when Parliament rejected the Bill and troops fired on the demonstrators, the opportunist leadership of the Labour Party (Vandervelde and others) capitulated and, under the pressure of their "allies" from the camp of the liberal bourgeoisie, called off the general strike. The defeat of the working class in Belgium in April 1902 was a lesson for the working-class movement of the world. p. 61

[20] *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii. Sotsialno-politicheskoye obozreniye* (Herald of the Russian Revolution. Socio-Political Review)—an illegal magazine published in Paris and Geneva from 1901 to 1905. Four issues appeared. From No. 2 on it was a theoretical organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 62

[21] A reference to the following remark by L. Martov at the Zurich conference of the *Iskra* Editorial Board on April 2 (15), 1902: "We should emphasise and bring out the reactionary character of the demand for the nationalisation of the land in Russia at the present moment."

After the Zurich conference, Lenin made several changes in Chapter VII, which deals with the demand for the nationalisation of the land (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 137-40). p. 63

[22] A reference to the following remark by L. Martov: "It must be said instead that we accept the nationalisation of the land only as an immediate prelude to the socialisation of all the means of production." p. 64

[23] A reference to rewards given by the government of Charles X to former émigrés whose lands were confiscated and sold as national property during the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the

eighteenth century. The law on compensation adopted on March 27, 1825, provided for pecuniary rewards totalling 1,091,360,000 francs (the "émigré billion"). Members of the royal retinue got the biggest rewards. To obtain this vast sum of money, the government increased taxes and converted the 5 per cent state rent to 3 per cent. p. 66

[24] A reference to Plekhanov's remark on the following part of the article: "But why confine oneself to this source? Why not try, in addition, to return to the people at least part of the tribute which yesterday's slave-owners extracted, and are still extracting, from the peasants with the assistance of the police state?" (See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 142.) Plekhanov wrote: "That is the only thing that should be proposed, and not charity. Only those who received the amounts can be expected to return them: *the gentry*." p. 66

[25] A reference to the following remark by L. Martov: "This proposition is wrong. Freedom to demand a separate plot flows *precisely* from the freedom to dispose of the land. It is enough to point out instead that the transformation of the power of the commune over the individual into the power of an association over the member who joins on his own accord is not ruled out by our demands."

After the Zurich conference, Lenin crossed out both sentences in the original and wrote instead: "This objection would be groundless" ending with "put up for sale by a fellow member" (p. 67). p. 67

[26] The leaflet of the Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. "To the Citizens of Russia", issued on May 9 (22), 1902, was circulated among workers in a total of 2,000 copies. It said that the blood of Balmashev, who had been sentenced to death by a military tribunal for the assassination of Minister Sipyagin, "will wash the eyes of the blinded philistines and make them see the indescribable horror of the autocracy in Russia. Let them see that our struggle against it is growing and spreading. Masses of peasants are already coming to the assistance of the workers and a handful of unhypocritical intellectuals. The first signs are already in evidence: in Tula the soldiers have refused to shoot at the strikers; a peasant uprising has broken out in Poltava and Kharkov gubernias. For centuries the muzhik there had been working for the benefit of his lord, for centuries he had suffered oppression and privation, and his patience has finally come to an end." The tsarist government hastened to the rescue of the landowners and started fierce reprisals. The leaflet went on: "We have had enough of this slavish and ignominious forbearance, we have had enough of sacrifice.... Citizens! Stem the endless tide of this horrible bloodletting! Overthrow the autocracy!" p. 69

[27] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (*S.R.s*)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia which originated at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 from the merger of various Narodnik groups and circles (the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.). The views of the S.R.s were a jumble of Narodnik and revisionist ideas; they tried, as Lenin put it,

to "patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). During the First World War, most of the S.R.s took a social-chauvinist stand.

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, the S.R.s and the Mensheviks were the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois and landowner Provisional Government, while the party's leaders (Avksentyev, Kerensky and Chernov) were in the government.

At the end of November 1917, the Left wing of the S.R.s formed an independent party of Left S.R.s. In an effort to retain their influence among the peasants, the Left S.R.s gave nominal recognition to the Soviet power and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon began to fight against the Soviets.

During the foreign armed intervention and the Civil War, the S.R.s were engaged in counter-revolutionary subversive activity, giving active support to the interventionists and whiteguards, taking part in counter-revolutionary plots and organising terroristic acts against the leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. After the Civil War, the S.R.s continued their hostile activity inside the country and among the whiteguard émigrés. p. 69

[28] The leaflet "*To the Citizens of All Russia*" was issued by the Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1902 in connection with the strike in Rostov from November 2 to 25 (November 15-December 8).

It refuted the official report in *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* (Government Herald) about the Rostov events, which described the workers as an "unruly crowd" with crude demands allegedly of an exclusively economic character. The leaflet gave a true picture of the strike, which was expressly political, and described the fierce reprisals of the tsarist troops against the workers and their families. It called on the workers to respond with revolutionary action to the violence of the tsarist government. The leaflet ended with these words:

"Let the fire that has flared up on the Don spread in a terrible conflagration, let the rifle salvoes be echoed by mighty demonstrations, let the groans of the victims be amplified by thunderous protest, let citizens everywhere, as unanimously as in Rostov, pass the death sentence on the autocracy, which is oppressing the country!

"Down with the autocracy!

"Long live the coming revolution!"

The leaflet was published in *Iskra* No. 31 on January 1, 1903, with an editorial introduction by Lenin, and was also issued in a special reprint.

On the copy of the leaflet received by the *Iskra* Editorial Board, there is also the following in Lenin's hand: "Set up *in brevier right away* and issue in a special reprint: *Special impression from No. 31 of 'Iskra'*", together with a calculation of the number of letters and instructions to the type-setters. p. 70

[29] The pamphlet was never written. p. 70

[30] *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly)—a magazine, the chief organ of the German opportunists and one of the organs of international opportunism. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During the First World War (1914-18) it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 71

[31] *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia)—an illegal S.R. newspaper published in Russia from the end of 1900 by the Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries (No. 1, dated 1900, actually came out in January 1901). From January 1902 to December 1905 it was published in Geneva as the official organ of the S.R. Party. p. 72

[32] A reference to the programme appeal, "From the Peasant Union of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries to All the Workers of Revolutionary Socialism in Russia", published in the newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 8 on June 25, 1902. There is another reference to the appeal in point 3 of section C. p. 72

[33] *Economism*—an opportunist trend within Russian Social-Democracy at the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international opportunism. The Economists' organs were the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought) (1897-1902) and the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause) (1899-1902). The so-called Credo, written by Y. D. Kuskova in 1899, was the programme document of the Economists whom Lenin called Russian Bernsteinians.

The views of the Economists were subjected to comprehensive criticism in Lenin's works: "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats" (aimed against their Credo and written in 1899 when Lenin was exiled in Siberia; it was signed by seventeen exiled Marxists), "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", "Apropos of the Profession de foi" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82, 255-85, 286-96) and "A Talk with Defenders of Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 313-20). Lenin completed the ideological defeat of Economism in his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). Lenin's *Iskra* played a great part in the struggle against Economism. p. 73

[34] A reference to A. N. Potresov's article "Modern Vestal Virgin (From Sketches of Modern Journalism)", signed "St." and published in the magazine *Zarya* No. 2-3, December 1901. p. 73

[35] *Narodnoye Dyelo* (People's Cause)—a popular organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party published in the form of collections (No. 1 was issued as a newspaper) in Geneva from 1902 to 1904; a total of five issues appeared. p. 75

[36] A reference to the article "Concerning *Iskra*'s Polemics"; which appeared in No. 11 of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* in September 1902. p. 76

[37] A reference to an article which had no title and was signed "S.R." It appeared in a hectographed periodical *Vperyod* No. 5

on September 15, 1902, which was issued in St. Petersburg by *Vperyod*, a circle of Narodnik orientation. p. 76

[38] A quotation from "The Element of Terrorism in Our Programme", an article carried by *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 7 in June 1902. p. 76

[39] A reference to the article "How Are We To Respond to the Government's Brutalities?", which appeared in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 12 in October 1902. p. 76

[40] *The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held from July 17 (30) to August 10 (23), 1903. The first 13 sittings were held in Brussels, after which, because of police persecution, the Congress moved to London.

It was prepared by *Iskra*, which under Lenin's guidance put in a tremendous effort to unite Social-Democrats in Russia round the principles of revolutionary Marxism. *Iskra*'s Editorial Board worked out and proposed for discussion at the Congress a draft Party programme (published in *Iskra* No. 21 on June 1, 1902). Several documents for the Congress were written by Lenin: draft Rules of the R.S.D.L.P., several draft resolutions and a plan for the report on *Iskra*'s activity. Lenin also worked out in detail the agenda and the standing orders of the Congress. The draft Rules and the draft agenda of the Congress were communicated beforehand to the members of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board and then to the delegates.

The Congress was attended by 43 delegates with vote, representing 26 organisations. Some delegates had two votes each so that the total of votes at the Congress came to 51. The composition of the Congress was not homogeneous. It was attended not only by supporters of *Iskra*, but also by its opponents, and by unstable and wavering elements. There were 20 items on the agenda of the Congress.

Lenin delivered the report on the Party Rules and spoke in the debate on most of the items of the agenda.

Approval of the Programme and the Rules of the Party and the election of the Party governing centres were the most important questions before the Congress. Lenin and his supporters launched a resolute struggle against the opportunists. The Congress gave a rebuff to the opportunists and approved the Party Programme almost unanimously (with one abstention). It contained a formulation of the immediate tasks of the proletariat in the coming bourgeois-democratic revolution (minimum programme) and the tasks designed for the victory of the socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat (maximum programme). For the first time in the international labour movement since the death of Marx and Engels, a revolutionary programme was adopted, which stated, on Lenin's insistence, that the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat was the principal task of the working-class party.

In the debate on the Party Rules there was an acute struggle over the Party's organisational principles. Lenin and his support-

ers wanted to set up a militant revolutionary party of the working class, which is why the wording of the first paragraph of the Rules proposed by Lenin stated that a member must not only accept the Party's Programme and give it financial support, but personally participate in the work of one of its organisations. Martov motioned his own wording of the first paragraph, which stated that a member need only accept the Programme and give the Party financial support, and also give regular personal assistance to the Party under the guidance of one of its organisations. Martov's wording, which facilitated access to the Party for unstable elements, was adopted by a small majority. Otherwise the Congress approved the Rules as worked out by Lenin. The Congress also adopted a number of resolutions on tactical questions.

At the Congress, a split developed between those who consistently supported Lenin's *Iskra* and the "soft" Iskrists, the supporters of Martov. The former received a majority in the election to the Party's central bodies and accordingly took the name of Bolsheviks, while the latter, the opportunists, received a minority and were called Mensheviks.

The Congress was of tremendous importance for the development of the working-class movement in Russia Lenin wrote: "As a current of political thought and as a political party, Bolshevism has existed since 1903" (see present edition, Vol. 31, p. 24). The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was a turning-point in the international working-class movement, because it set up a new type of proletarian party, which became a model for revolutionary Marxists throughout the world. For more information about the Second Congress see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 465-507. p. 78

[41] This is a detailed elaboration of the standing orders and agenda for the Congress. Section A was taken as a basis for the standing orders adopted by the Congress. Section B was the draft agenda (*Tagesordnung*) supplied with the commentaries, which, Lenin said, "was known *to all the "Iskra"-ists long before the Congress* and *to all the delegates* at the Congress" (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 31).

The initial text of the document was supplemented by Lenin on the strength of remarks received from Martov and possibly other *Iskra* supporters as well who had studied it. The text is here given in full with subsequent addenda and amendments. p. 78

[42] *The Organising Committee* (*O.C.*) *for the Convocation of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was set up at a conference in Pskov on November 2-3 (15-16), 1902.

The first attempt to set up an Organising Committee was made at the Belostok conference of the R.S.D.L.P. committees and organisations (March 23-28 [April 5-10], 1902), which was called on the initiative of the Economists and Bundists. The Organising Committee elected at the conference consisted of representatives of *Iskra*, the Union of Southern Committees and Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Bund Central Committee; it was

unable to start work because two of its members were arrested soon after the conference.

A conference of *Iskra* supporters, led by Lenin, met in London on August 2 (15), 1902, to set up the nucleus of the Russian O.C. It was decided to invite representatives from the Bund and the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group which at the time showed signs of moving closer to *Iskra*, and also to give the O.C. the right to co-opt members.

A conference of Social-Democratic organisations at which the O.C. was constituted was held in Pskov on November 2-3 (15-16). The conference adopted the text of an "Announcement of the Formation of an Organising Committee", which was published as a leaflet in Russia in December 1902.

In early February 1903, the second O.C. conference was held in Orel. It worked out and adopted draft regulations of the Congress and the list of organisations entitled to attend it. The regulations were circulated among the local committees which were then toured by the members of the O.C. They were adopted and approved by the local organisations, and served as the basis for the Organising Committee's further work in preparing for the Party's Second Congress.

The O.C.'s successful activity, which culminated in the convocation of the Congress, was made possible only by the tremendous work in uniting Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats carried out by *Iskra*'s Editorial Board and the *Iskra* organisation under Lenin's direction. In his book, *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, Lenin wrote: "The Organising Committee was mainly a commission set up to convene the Congress, a commission deliberately composed of representatives of different shades, including even the Bundists; while the real work of *creating* the organised unity of the Party was done entirely by the *Iskra* organisation" (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 277). p. 78

43 *Polish Social-Democrats*—members of the revolutionary party of the Polish working class, which emerged in 1893, first as the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland, and from August 1900, following the congress of Social-Democratic organisations of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, where the Polish and a section of the Lithuanian Social-Democrats were merged, it was known as the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P. and L.). The fact that the party directed the Polish working-class movement towards alliance with the Russian working-class movement and fought against nationalism was to its credit. At the same time, it made a number of mistakes; it failed to understand Lenin's theory of socialist revolution, or the leading role of the party in the democratic revolution; it underestimated the role of the peasantry as an ally of the working class and the importance of the national liberation movement. While criticising the party's erroneous views, Lenin emphasised its services to the Polish revolutionary movement. He noted that Polish Social-Democrats had created "for the first time a purely proletarian party in Poland and proclaimed the extremely impor-

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tant principle that the Polish and the Russian workers must maintain the closest alliance in their class struggle" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 434). The Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. admitted the S.D.K.P. and L. into the R.S.D.L.P. as a territorial organisation.

The S.D.K.P. and L. welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution and launched a struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Poland. At the Unity Congress of the S.D.K.P. and L. and the P.P.S.-Lewica in December 1918, the two parties merged to form the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. p. 78

[44] *The Bund* (General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia) consisted mainly of semi-proletarian elements among Jewish artisans in Russia's western areas. Within the R.S.D.L.P., the Bundists constantly supported its opportunist wing (Economists, Mensheviks and liquidators) and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. p. 80

[45] *The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held at Minsk from March 1 to 3 (13-15), 1898. It was attended by nine delegates from six organisations: the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Yekaterinoslav and Kiev organisations of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, from the group of the Kiev *Rabochaya Gazeta* and from the Bund. The Congress elected the Party's Central Committee, confirmed *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the Party's official organ, issued a Manifesto and designated the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad as the Party's representative abroad (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee), Part I, 1954, pp. 11-15).

The importance of the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. lay in the fact that its decisions and Manifesto proclaimed the establishment of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, thereby playing a great revolutionary and propagandist part. But the Congress did not adopt a Programme or work out any Party Rules; the Central Committee elected at the Congress was arrested and the Rabochaya Gazeta printing-press was seized, which is why the Congress failed to unite and merge together separate Marxist circles and organisations. The local organisations were not guided from a single centre and there was no single line in their work. p. 80

[46] *Borba* (Struggle)—a Social-Democratic group abroad which included D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov (Nevzorov) and E. L. Gurevich (V. Danevich). It was formed in Paris in the summer of 1900 and in May the following year took the name of *Borba*. Its publications ("Materials for the Working out of a Party Programme", parts I-III, "Leaflet of the *Borba* Group", etc.) distorted revolutionary Marxist theory, giving it a doctrinaire and scholastic interpretation and taking a hostile attitude to Lenin's principles of Party organisation. In view of its departures from Social-Democratic ideas and tactics, its disorganising activity and lack of connection with Social-Democratic organisations

in Russia, it was not allowed to attend the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which adopted a decision to dissolve it (see *Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.* [The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.], 1959, p. 438). p. 81

[47] *Zhizn* (Life)—a literary, scientific and political magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901. Among its contributors were "legal Marxists' (M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, P. B. Struve and others) and leading writers and critics (A. M. Gorky, A. P. Chekhov, V. V. Veresayev, S. G. Skitalets, I. A. Bunin and Y. A. Solovyov [Andreyevich]). The magazine published Marx's *Wages*, *Price and Profit* and Lenin's articles "Capitalism in Agriculture (Kautsky's Book and Mr. Bulgakov's Article)" and "Reply to Mr. P. Nezhdanov" (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 105-59, 160-65).

Zhizni was closed down by the government in June 1901 and was resumed abroad in April 1902 by the *Zhizn* Social-Democratic group. There were six issues of the magazine, twelve issues of the *Listok Zhizni* (*Zhizni* Handbill) and several publications in the *Biblioteka Zhizni* (*Zhizni* Library) series. The *Zhizn* group had some deviations from Social-Democratic views and tactics, inclining towards Christian socialism and anarchism. It ceased to exist in December 1902 and the publishing business was wound up. p. 81

[48] *Volya* (Will)—a group abroad which called itself a "revolutionary Social-Democratic organisation". In February 1903, it issued a leaflet, "To Revolutionaries from the Revolutionary Social-Democratic Organisation *Volya*", which put forward the task of conducting political agitation among all strata of the population and of uniting Social-Democrats with Socialist-Revolutionaries. The *Volya* group was not a part of the R.S.D.L.P. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a resolution "On the Kuklin Publishers Group and the *Volya* Group", which said: "The Congress states that neither of these organisations is within the Party, and that they have nothing in common with organised Social-Democracy in Russia. The question of future relations between these groups and the Party is for the Party's Central Committee to decide in the event these groups apply to it" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 439). Soon after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the group announced its dissolution and the entry of its members into the R.S.D.L.P.; an announcement to that effect was inserted in *Iskra* No. 52 on November 7, 1903. p. 82

[49] *The Emancipation of Labour group*—the first Russian Marxist group formed by G. V. Plekhanov in Switzerland in 1883. Among its members were P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, V. I. Zasulich and V. N. Ignatov. It did much to spread Marxism in Russia and dealt a serious blow at Narodism, which was the main ideological obstacle to the spread of Marxism and to the development of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. Written by Plekhanov and published by the Emancipation of Labour group, the two draft programmes of the Russian Social-Democrats (1883 and

1885) were an important step in preparing and creating a Social-Democratic party in Russia. Lenin said that the group "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 278). Members of the group also made serious mistakes: they overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie and underestimated the revolutionary role of the peasantry as a reserve of the proletarian revolution. These mistakes were the germ of the subsequent Menshevik views held by Plekhanov and other members of the group.

In 1894, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was formed on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group. Members of the group and their followers left the Union in 1900 and set up a revolutionary organisation, *Sotsial-Demokrat*. G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and V. I. Zasulich were on the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., in August 1903, the Emancipation of Labour group announced its dissolution. p. 82

50 *Iskra's organisation in Russia* united *Iskra* supporters operating inside Russia. During the preparation for publishing *Iskra* and in the first year of its publication (December 1900-December 1901) a network of *Iskra* agents was set up in various towns of Russia. Among them were P. N. Lepeshinsky and O. B. Lepeshinskaya, P. A. Krasikov, A. M. Stopani, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and Z. P. Krzhizhanovskaya, S. I. Radchenko and L. N. Radchenko, A. D. Tsyurupa, N. E. Bauman and I. V. Babushkin. *Iskra* promotion groups were set up in a number of cities, including St. Petersburg, Pskov, Samara and Poltava.

The growth of the revolutionary movement and the increasing volume of practical work insistently urged the need to unite the *Iskra* forces and place their work on a planned and organised basis, which would help to solve the main task, that of overcoming the amateurish methods introduced by the Economists and winning over the Social-Democratic committees. In this connection, Lenin put forward a plan for an all-Russia *Iskra* organisation, which was to prepare the unification of Social-Democratic organisations in the country into an integrated, centralised Marxist party. This plan was initially set out by Lenin in his article "Where To Begin?" (May 1901) and then elaborated in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* (autumn of 1901-February 1902) (see present edition Vol. 5, pp. 13-24, 347-529).

In implementing the plan for the establishment of an integrated *Iskra* organisation in Russia, Lenin and his supporters had to overcome narrow local (regional) tendencies among some *Iskra* practitioners.

A congress of *Iskra* workers was held in Samara in January 1902 and was attended by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and Z. P. Krzhizhanovskaya, F. V. Lengnik, M. A. Silvin, V. P. Artsybushev, D. I. Ulyanov, M. I. Ulyanova and others. The congress set up a Bureau of the *Iskra* organisation in Russia.

Armed with Lenin's book *What Is To Be Done?*, *Iskra* workers vigorously set about spreading and realising Lenin's plan for the establishment of the party. The *Iskra* organisation in Russia achieved a great deal in actually uniting party organisations on the principles of revolutionary Marxism. By the end of 1902, almost all the major Social-Democratic committees had announced their solidarity with *Iskra*.

The Organising Committee for Convening the Party's Second Congress, to which the *Iskra* organisations handed over all their connections, was set up at a conference in Pskov on November 2-3 (15-16), 1902, with the most active participation of *Iskra* workers. The *Iskra* organisation in Russia operated until the Second Congress and played an important part in preparing and convoking the Congress, which set up the revolutionary Marxist party in Russia.

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[51] *The "Yuzhny Rabochy" group*—a Social-Democratic group formed in the south of Russia by the autumn of 1900 round a newspaper of the same name. The newspaper *Yuzhny Rabochy* (Southern Worker) was published illegally from 1900 to 1903. Twelve numbers were issued, the first in January 1900 by the Yekaterinoslav Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. At various times, I. Kh. Lalayants, A. Vilensky, O. A. Kogan (Yermansky), B. S. Tseitlin, Y. Y. Levin and Y. S. Levina, V. N. Rozanov and others were members of the group and the Editorial Board.

In contrast to the Economists, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group believed that the main task of the proletariat was to carry on political struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy. It opposed terrorism, upheld the idea of launching a mass revolutionary movement and carried out considerable revolutionary work in the south of Russia. But the group tended to overrate the role of the liberal bourgeoisie and attached no importance to the peasant movement. In opposition to the *Iskra* plan for creating a centralised Marxist party through the unification of the revolutionary Social-Democrats round *Iskra*, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group put forward a plan for restoring the R.S.D.L.P. by setting up regional Social-Democratic associatlons. In his *One Step Forward*, *Two Steps Back*, Lenin said the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group was one of those organisations "which, while verbally recognising *Iskra* as the leading organ, actually pursued plans of their own and were unstable in matters of principle" (present edition, Vol. 7, p. 209). At the Second Congress of the Party, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* delegates took a Centrist position (Lenin called them "middling opportunists").

The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. decided to dissolve the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, like all other separate Social-Democratic groups and organisations (see *Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 439).

p. 82

[52] *P.P.S.* (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna—Polish Socialist Party*)—a reformist nationalist Party set up in 1892. It had a programme based on the struggle for an independent Poland, and under the leadership of Pilsudski and his followers it carried on separatist

nationalistic propaganda among the Polish workers in an effort to draw them away from joint struggle with the Russian workers against the autocracy and capitalism

In 1906 it split up into the P.P.S.-Lewica (Left-wing) and the Right-wing, chauvinist P.P.S., known as the "revolutionary faction".

Under the influence of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and of the S.D.K.P and L. (the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), the P.P.S. Lewica gradually went over to consistent revolutionary positions.

During the First World War, most of its members took an internationalist stand and in December 1918 merged with the S.D.K.P. and L. These two parties constituted the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (as the Communist Party of Poland was called until 1925).

During the First World War, the Right-wing P.P.S. continued to conduct its national-chauvinist policy. When the bourgeois Polish state was formed, the Right-wing P.P.S. in 1919 united with sections of the P.P.S. on the territory of Poland earlier occupied by Germany and Austria and once again took the name of P.P.S. With the government in its hands, it helped the Polish bourgeoisie to take over power and then launched a systematic anti-communist campaign, supporting the policy of aggression against the Soviet state, and the policy of occupying and oppressing Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Some groups in the P.P.S. which disagreed with this policy went over to the Communist Party of Poland.

Following the fascist coup staged by Pilsudski in May 1926, the P.P.S. was nominally in opposition in Parliament, but actually conducted no active struggle against the fascist regime and continued its anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. In this period, Left-wing elements in the P.P.S. co-operated with the Polish Communists and supported the united-front tactics in a number of campaigns

During the Second World War, the P.P.S. split up once again. Its reactionary and chauvinist section, which called itself "Wolność, Równość, Niepodległość" (Freedom, Equality, Independence), took part in the reactionary Polish government in exile (London). The Left-wing section of the P.P.S., which called itself the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists (W.P.P.S.), under the influence of the Polish Workers' Party (P.W.P.), set up in 1942, joined the popular front of struggle against the nazi invaders, fought for the liberation of Poland from the fascist enslavement and favoured friendship with the U.S.S.R.

In 1944, following the liberation of the eastern part of Poland from the German occupation and the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the W.P.P.S. once again took the name of P.P.S. and together with the P.W.P. set about building up a democratic people's Poland. In December 1948, the P.W.P. and the P.P.S. merged into the Polish United Workers' Party (P.U.W.P.). p. 83

[53] *The Amsterdam International Socialist Congress of the Second International* was held from August 14 to 20, 1904. It dealt with the following questions: 1) international rules of socialist tactics; 2) colonial policy; 3) general strike; 4) social policy and workers' insurance; 5) trusts and unemployment, and other questions.

The attitude to bourgeois parties was expressed in a resolution called "International Rules of Socialist Tactics", which prohibited socialists from taking part in bourgeois governments and censured "any urge to gloss over existing class contradictions with a view to facilitating a rapprochement with bourgeois parties". The Congress decisions, while being a step forward, went only a part of the way and were a further concession to opportunism. The Congress failed to raise the question of the mass strike developing into an armed uprising or to give a rebuff to Right-wing opportunists who were inclined to justify the colonial policy of the imperialist powers. While saying that it condemned revisionism, the Congress failed to declare a break with it, and said nothing about the proletarian revolution or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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[54] *The Party Council* (1903-05) was set up under the Party Rules adopted by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. as the highest Party institution designed to co-ordinate and unify the activity of the Central Committee and the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and to restore the C.C. and the Editorial Board of the C.O. in the event the entire membership of either of these bodies was gone, and also to represent the Party in relations with other parties. The Council had the task of convening Party congresses within the period laid down by the Rules or before the due date, upon the demand of Party organisations which together commanded one-half of the congress votes. The Party Council consisted of five members, one of whom was appointed by the Party congress and the others by the Central Committee and the C.O. Editorial Board, which had two members each on the Council. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. elected G. V. Plekhanov as the fifth member of the Council. Lenin was elected a member of the Council from the C.O. Editorial Board, and from the C.C. when he left *Iskra*. Following Plekhanov's orientation towards opportunism and the Mensheviks' seizure of the Editorial Board, the Party Council became an instrument of the Mensheviks' struggle against the Bolsheviks. Lenin waged a consistent struggle in the Council to unite the Party, exposing the disorganising and splitting activity of the Mensheviks. Under the Rules adopted by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Council was abolished.

p. 84

[55] The first speech is in reply to M. I. Lieber's question: "How are we to understand the point about the national question? Why is it separated out from the point about the draft programme? What is the meaning of the national question being a question of tactics? Why is this question not regarded as a cardinal one?"

The second speech is in reply to another of Lieber's questions:

"How are we to understand the point about national organisations? This question appears to be raised independently of the question of the Bund's status in the Party" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, pp. 17-18).

The first point, mentioned by Lenin, in the list of questions subject to debate at the Congress ("On the Bund's Status in the R.S.D.L.P.") was second on the agenda adopted by the Congress, and point six ("Regional and National Organisations") was seventh.

p. 85

[56] Lenin spoke twice on the question of the Organising Committee's actions in calling the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. For his first speech see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 482 and Note 136. The Congress adopted the following resolution:

"With the election of the committee, whose task is to determine the composition of the Congress, the Organising Committee has lost its right as a collegium to exert an influence on the composition of the Congress, and its activity, as a collegium, is deemed to have ceased on this point" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, pp. 37-38).

p. 85

[57] The question of the representatives of the S.D.K.P. and L. attending the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was first raised on the initiative of the *Iskra* Editorial Board in a letter sent by the Organising Committee for the Convocation of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to the S.D.K.P. and L. Committee Abroad on February 7, 1903.

The terms on which the Polish Social-Democrats could be united with the R.S.D.L.P. were discussed at the Fourth Congress of the S.D.K.P. and L. which was held from July 11 to 16 (24-29), 1903. The Congress formulated a number of terms for a possible merger, one of them being the demand for a change in the formulation of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Programme clause on the right of nations to self-determination.

When the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. opened, its delegates had no knowledge of this decision. The committee to determine the composition of the Congress and verify mandates, in its report to the Congress on July 18 (31), read out a letter from the Polish Social-Democrat A. Warski (A. S. Warszawski), which it had at its disposal. But the letter did not clarify the relations the Polish Social-Democrats wanted to establish with the R.S.D.L.P. The committee decided to invite the Polish Social-Democrats to attend the Congress with voice only. A. Warski and J. Hanecki arrived at the Congress on July 22 (August 4) and Warski announced the decision of the Fourth Congress of the S.D.K.P. and L. concerning the terms for unification with the R.S.D.L.P. A special committee was elected to examine these terms.

The point on the right of nations to self-determination, raised by the Polish Social-Democrats, was discussed in the Programme Committee. No minutes were taken, but the notes made at the third sitting of the committee by Lenin (see Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 423-24) show that the

Polish Social-Democrats objected to the point on the right of nations to self-determination and proposed that the programme should contain a demand for the establishment of institutions guaranteeing complete freedom of cultural development for all nations within a state. As Lenin later pointed out: "*instead of* self-determination they practically proposed the notorious 'cultural-national autonomy', only under another name" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 444). The committee rejected the proposals of the Polish Social-Democrats. Realising that they would be unable to maintain these proposals at the Congress, they left it after making a statement setting out their standpoint. Their statement was read out at the Congress on July 29 (August 11). On August 6 (19), in connection with the report by the committee, which had examined the terms for a merger of the S.D.K.P. and L. with the R.S.D.L.P. as proposed by the Polish Social-Democrats the Congress adopted a resolution expressing regret over the fact that the withdrawal of the Polish Social-Democrats from the Congress deprived it of the possibility of completing the discussion of the S.D.K.P. and L.'s joining the R.S.D.L.P., and instructed the Central Committee to continue the negotiations.

The speech reported here is Lenin's second. The first was given in Vol. 6 of the present edition, p. 483. p. 86

[58] A reference to an amendment to the paragraph of the general section of the draft programme which said: "But as all these contradictions, which are inherent in bourgeois society, increase and develop, the discontent among the labouring and exploited masses with the existing state of things grows, the number and the solidarity of proletarians increase, and their struggle against their exploiters becomes sharper." When this paragraph was discussed by the Programme Committee (a sitting Lenin did not attend) the word "consciousness" was inserted after the words "the number and the solidarity".

The amendment was rejected by the Congress, with a majority voting for the original wording. p. 86

[59] The point at issue is §1 of the general political demands of the draft Party programme, which was given the following wording by the Programme Committee: "The sovereignty of the people, that is, concentration of all the supreme state power in the hands of a legislative assembly constituting a single chamber and made up of representatives of the people" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 179). K. M. Takhtarev (Strakhov) proposed that the words "sovereignty of the people" should be substituted by the words "supremacy of the people". His amendment was rejected by the Congress. p. 86

[60] A reference to §3 of the general political demands of the draft Party programme tabled by the Programme Committee and containing a demand for broad local and regional self-government. p. 87

[61] A reference to §9 of the general political demands of the draft

programme (§8 of the *Iskra* draft), which said: "The granting to every citizen of the right to institute judicial proceedings against any person in office without lodging a complaint with his superiors". V. N. Krokhmal (Fomin) proposed that the word "citizen" should be followed by "and to every foreigner". The Congress rejected the proposal. p. 87

[62] In the discussion of §12 of the general political demands of the draft programme (§9 of the *Iskra* draft), which said that the standing army should be substituted by the "universal arming of the people", Lieber proposed that the word "militia" should be used instead of the "universal arming of the people". Lieber's proposal was rejected by the Congress. p. 87

[63] The draft proposals here published were tabled by Lenin at a sitting of the Programme Committee during the second discussion of the wording of §7 of the general political demands of the Party Programme (§6 of the *Iskra* draft).

In the *Iskra* draft programme this paragraph contained a demand for the abolition of the social estates and full equality of rights for all citizens, regardless of sex, creed or race. During the initial discussion, the end of the paragraph had been reworded as follows: "Creed, race, nationality and language", and was so tabled at the 16th sitting of the Congress on July 30 (August 12). During its discussion at the Congress, the Bundists demanded the inclusion in the Party Programme of a special point on the "equality of languages". They succeeded in winning over a section of the vacillating *Iskra* supporters and there was a split when the proposal was put to the vote.

The wording of §7 was again referred to the Programme Committee. Lenin's proposals with slight stylistic changes were adopted by the committee and on its behalf tabled at the 21st sitting of the Congress on August 1 (14). The Congress rejected the first point of the proposals and adopted the second with some amendments (§8 in the Programme adopted by the Congress); point three was adopted without alteration.

Paragraph 11, of which Lenin spoke in point 3 of his proposals, had the following wording in the *Iskra* draft: "Free and compulsory general and vocational education for all children of either sex up to the age of 16. Provision of poor children with food, clothing and study aids at the expense of the state." The Programme Committee initially adopted this paragraph without amendment (§14), but during its discussion at the 18th sitting of the Congress on July 31 (August 13) the following addendum was adopted: "Instruction in the native language, on the demand of the population" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 198). This addendum became superfluous with the adoption of a separate point on the question of language. p. 87

[64] The point at issue is §2 of the section of the draft programme dealing with labour protection, which contained a demand for a statutory weekly period of rest running continuously for at least 36 hours, for wage-workers of either sex in all branches of

the national economy. Lyadov proposed that the period should run for 42 hours; Lieber remarked that the programme said nothing about supervision in small-scale production. Lyadov's proposal was adopted by the Congress, and Lieber's amendment was rejected. p. 88

[65] The point at issue is §12 of the section of the draft programme dealing with labour protection (§11 of the *Iskra* draft), which contained a demand for "supervision by the organs of local self-government, with the participation of workers' delegates, over the sanitary state of the living quarters provided for workers by their employers, and also over the internal regulations on these premises and the terms of their lease, to safeguard wage-workers against intervention by employers in their life and activity as private persons and citizens". Lyadov motioned the following addenda to this paragraph:

1) agrarian inspection to be established for supervision over all agricultural enterprises employing wage labour; 2) points 1-13 of the section of the programme dealing with labour protection to be extended to all agriculture with wage labour; 3) tenants holding land as sharecroppers, or indentured to cultivate the landowner's land, to be regarded as wage-workers falling within the province of the agrarian inspection. The Congress rejected the first two addenda and Lyadov withdrew the third. p. 88

[66] The amendment was motioned by Lenin during the discussion of the preamble of the draft programme on the agrarian question, which said: "For the purpose, however, of eliminating the survivals of the serf system, which are a heavy burden on the peasants, and in the interests of the free development of the class struggle in the countryside, the Party will work for...." The Congress adopted the amendment. p. 88

[67] The point at issue is §1 of the draft programme on the agrarian question, which contained a demand for the "abolition of land redemption and quit-rent payments and all other services now borne by the peasants as a poll-tax paying estate". Lyadov proposed the addition: "or other rural inhabitants, as poll-tax paying estates". The amendment was rejected by the Congress. p. 89

[68] During the debate on §2 of the draft programme on the agrarian question, which spoke of the need to abolish collective liability and all other laws hampering the peasant in his disposal of the land, Martynov asked this question: "How are we to understand the words: 'his land'?" He believed that two interpretations of this point were possible: "1) every peasant has the right of redemption; in that case the interests of the commune are not infringed; 2) every peasant has the right to appropriate the land without redemption." Following Lenin's explanation, Martynov spoke again and said that he was not thinking about particulars but about the general principle: who was the owner of the land—the commune or the peasant? He went on: "If it is the commune then regarding it as a constraint on economic development, we

stand for the right of redemption. If it is the peasant, there is no need for redemption" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 235). p. 89

[69] Paragraph 4 of the draft programme on the agrarian question contained a demand for the "establishment of peasants' committees: a) for the restitution to the village communes (by expropriation or, when the land has changed hands, by redemption by the state at the expense of gentry-owned large landed estates) of the land cut off from the peasants when serfdom was abolished and now used by the landlords as a means of keeping the peasants in bondage, b) for the elimination of the survivals of serf relations, which have been preserved in the Urals, in the Altai, in the Western territory and in other regions of the state...".

N. N. Jordania (Kostrov) motioned the following addendum to this point: "for the transfer into the ownership of the peasants in the Caucasus of the lands of which they have the use as temporarily bound, khizani, etc." (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 243). The second proposal was motioned by B. M. Knunyants (Rusov) and M. N. Lyadov, who believed that it was possible for the programme to confine itself to a general statement of the need for eliminating the survivals of serf relations all over Russia.

The amendment of D. A. Toputidze (Karsky), mentioned by Lenin in his speech, was not entered in the minutes of the Congress.

The Congress adopted Jordania's addendum.

Khizani—the name given to the peasants of Georgia who settled on the lands of the landowners on specially agreed terms. The khizani were not officially regarded as serfs, and enjoyed personal freedom, but remained perpetual tenants without any rights. The 1861 Peasant Reform did not apply to them and they continued to be completely dependent on the landowners, who began to increase khizani services and confiscate the land they held. The khizani system was abolished after the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Temporarily bound peasants—the name given to those former serf peasants who were compelled to perform certain services (quit-rent or corvée) for the use of their land even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and until they started paying redemption money to the landowner for their allotments. From the moment the redemption contract was concluded, the peasants ceased to be "temporarily bound" and became "peasant property-owners". p. 90

[70] Paragraph 5 of the draft programme on the agrarian question spoke of the need to empower the courts to reduce excessive rents and declare invalid transactions of an enslaving character. §16 of the section of the draft programme dealing with labour protection contained the demand for the establishment of industrial courts consisting of an equal number of workers' and employers' representatives in every branch of the national economy. p. 90

[71] Lenin's objection is against Lieber's proposal to introduce into §5 of the draft programme on the agrarian question the demand to empower the courts to establish land-lease prices. p. 90

[72] During the debate on the first clause of §4 of the draft Rules—the order governing the appointment of members of the Party Council and the replacement of outgoing Council members—the Rules Committee failed to reach agreement and three formulations were put before the Congress.

The first, motioned by L. Martov and V. A. Noskov (Glebov), said: "The Party Council shall be appointed by the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee, each of whom shall delegate two members to the Council; these four members of the Council shall invite the fifth; outgoing members of the Council shall be replaced by the institutions appointing them."

The second, tabled by V. I. Lenin and V. N. Rozanov (Popov), said: "The Party Council shall be appointed by the Congress from among the members of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the Central Committee and shall consist of five persons, with at least two of them from each of these collegiums. The Council itself shall replace the outgoing members of the Council."

The third, motioned by Y. Y. Levin (Yegorov), said: "The Congress shall elect two members of the C.C. and two of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ to the Council of the Party. These four elected members shall unanimously elect the fifth; outgoing members of the Council shall be replaced by the organisations to which they belong, with the exception of the fifth, who shall be replaced in the manner specified above."

As a result of the discussion of this question, the Congress adopted the following formulations:

"4. The Congress shall appoint the fifth member of the Council, the Central Committee and the Editorial Board of the Central Organ.

"5. The Council of the Party shall be appointed by the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the C.C., each of whom shall delegate two members to the Council; outgoing members of the Council shall be replaced by the institutions appointing them, the fifth shall be replaced by the Council itself" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 426). p. 91

[73] In the discussion of the first clause of §4 of the draft rules, Vera Zasulich said: "The objection that the four members of the Council will be unable to elect the fifth is groundless: if an institution like the Council is unable to elect a fifth member, it means that it is altogether incapable of operating" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 296). p. 91

[74] The point at issue is §10 of the draft Rules, which says: "Every member of the Party and every person having any dealings with the Party shall have the right to demand that his statement, in its original form, is communicated to the Central Committee or to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, or to the Party congress" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 426). Lenin spoke against Martov's proposal to remove the words "and every person having any dealings with the Party". Martov's proposal was rejected. p. 91

[75] The speech relates to §12 of the draft Party Rules dealing with the co-optation to the Party's collegiate institutions, including the C.C. and the C.O. In his book *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* Lenin wrote: "Greater strictness as regards the majority required for adoption of members (four-fifths instead of two-thirds), the requirement of unanimity for co-optation, mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies—all this we began to advocate *when we found ourselves in the minority on the question of the personal composition of the central bodies*" (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 296). Martov came out against the proposal that the demand for the unanimity and mutual control of the C.C. and the C.O. in matters of co-optation should be written into the Rules. p. 91

[76] Y. Y. Levin (Yegorov) objected to any qualification (two-thirds or four-fifths) of the majority necessary for co-optation to the Party's collegiate institutions, believing that in the absence of any motivated protest the question could be decided by a simple majority. p. 91

[77] Y. Y. Levin (Yegorov) said in his speech that the draft Rules were "lame" because they contained no point empowering the Party Council to decide on the question of co-optation to the Party central bodies. p. 92

[78] A reference to the speeches of Trotsky and Martov objecting to Lenin's proposal that §12 of the Party Rules should state that the C.C. and the C.O. Editorial Board could co-opt members only with the consent of all the members of the Party Council. p. 92

[79] A reference to Martov's proposal during the debate on §12 of the draft Rules: "In the event no unanimity is reached in co-opting new members to the C.C. or to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, the question of the member's admission may be referred to the Council, and in the event it annuls the decision of the collegium in question, the latter shall take a final decision by a simple majority" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 311). p. 93

[80] A reference to Martov's words: "I propose that a majority dissatisfied with a minority decision should be entitled to appeal to the Council for a decision" (*Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 311). Martov's amendment was adopted by the Congress by 24 votes to 23. p. 93

[81] *The League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was founded in October 1901 on Lenin's initiative. Affiliated to the League were the *Iskra* organisation abroad and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* revolutionary organisation which included the Emancipation of Labour group. The task of the League was to spread the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy and to help create a militant Social-Democratic organisation. Under its Rules, the League was the *Iskra* organisation abroad. It recruited *Iskra* supporters from among Russian Social-Democrats abroad, gave *Iskra* material assistance, organised the delivery of the newspaper to Russia and published popular Marxist literature. The Second Congress

of the R.S.D.L.P. confirmed the League as the only Party organisation abroad with the status of a committee, authorising it to work under the guidance and control of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee.

After the Second Congress, the Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the League and launched a struggle against Lenin and the Bolsheviks. At the League's Second Congress in October 1903, the Mensheviks secured the adoption of new Rules aimed against the Party Rules, as approved by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. From then on the League became a Menshevik stronghold. It operated until 1905. p. 93

82 In his speech Lenin replies to V. A. Noskov (Glebov) and L. G. Deutsch, who proposed that §13 (on the recognition of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad as the only R.S.D.L.P. organisation abroad, and on its tasks) should not be included in the Rules, but referred for discussion to the Central Committee (Glebov) or to the Party Council (Deutsch). §13 of the Rules was adopted by 31 votes to 12, with 6 abstentions. p. 93

83 Following the approval by the Congress of §13 of the Rules, recognising the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad as the R.S.D.L.P. only organisation abroad, delegates of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, Martynov and Akimov, informed the Bureau of the Congress that they would not take part in the voting and would attend the Congress only to hear the minutes of earlier sittings and to discuss the manner of their publication. Their statement was read out at the 27th sitting of the Congress on August 5 (18). The Congress invited Akimov and Martynov to withdraw their statement, but they rejected the proposal and walked out.

Lenin did not move the draft resolution at the Congress. In the original the draft is crossed out. The reason may have been that the Bureau of the Congress had decided to refer the question for discussion at the Congress. p. 93

84 *The Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was founded in 1894 on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group, on the understanding that all its members accept the programme of the group.

The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. recognised the Union as the Party's representative abroad. Subsequently opportunist elements—Economists (the so-called "young")—gained the upper hand in the Union. The opportunist majority of the First Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, held at Zurich in November 1898, refuged to voice solidarity with the Manifesto of the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. In view of this, the Emancipation of Labour group announced at the Congress its refusal to edit publications of the Union, with the exception of No. 5-6 of *Rabotnik* which had been prepared for the press, and Lenin's pamphlets, *The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats* and *The New*

Factory Law. In April 1899, the Union started to publish the magazine *Rabocheye Dyelo* on whose Editorial Board were the Economists B. N. Krichevsky, V. P. Ivanshin and P. F. Teplov. The Union voiced its sympathy with E. Bernstein, the Millerandists, etc.

The struggle within the Union continued until its Second Congress in April 1900 and at the Congress. The Emancipation of Labour group and its followers walked out from the Congress and formed an independent organisation called *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., representatives of the Union (*Rabocheye Dyelo* supporters) adopted an extremely opportunist stand and walked out when the Congress recognised the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad as the Party's only organisation abroad. The Union was dissolved by a decision of the Second Congress (see *Vtoroi syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, 1959, p. 438). p. 94

[85] A reference to the *Iskra* majority, which took final shape at the Congress by the time of the election to the C.C., when the "soft" *Iskra* followers had split away and the Bund delegates and the two *Rabocheye Dyelo* supporters walked out. p. 95

[86] B. M. Knunyants (Rusov) motioned a proposal to start elections to the Party Central Committee. p. 95

[87] The Congress adopted two resolutions on the question of the attitude to the liberals: the first was motioned by Potresov (Starover), the second, by Lenin, Plekhanov and 13 other delegates (for Plekhanov's draft with Lenin's amendment see *Lenin Miscellany VI*, pp. 177-78).

Lenin subsequently wrote: "The views of the old *Iskra* were much better expressed in Plekhanov's resolution, which emphasised the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian character of the liberal *Osvobozhdeniye*, than in the confused resolution tabled by Starover, which, on the one hand, aimed (quite inopportunely) at an 'agreement' with the liberals, and, on the other, stipulated for it conditions that were manifestly unreal, being altogether impossible for the liberals to fulfil" (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 498). p. 96

[88] *Osvobozhdeniye* (Emancipation)—a fortnightly journal published abroad from June 18 (July 1), 1902 to October 5 (18), 1905, under the editorship of P. B. Struve. It was the organ of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and expounded the ideas of moderate-monarchist liberalism. In 1903 the *Osvobozhdeniye* League formed round the journal (officially it came into existence in January 1904). The League existed until October 1905. The followers of *Osvobozhdeniye* and the Zemstvo constitutionalists made up the core of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party—the principal bourgeois party in Russia, which was formed in October 1905. p. 96

[89] *The State Council*—one of the higher state bodies in pre-revolutionary Russia. Set up in 1810 on a proposal by M. M. Speransky as a consultative and legislative institution whose members were

appointed and confirmed by the tsar. It was reorganised by the law of February 20 (March 5), 1906, and was given the right to approve or reject bills after the debate in the Duma, but the tsar retained the power to amend the fundamental laws and issue some of the more important ones.

From 1906, one half of the State Council consisted of elected representatives of the gentry, the clergy and the big bourgeoisie, and the other from the senior civil servants appointed by the tsar. This made it a highly reactionary institution which rejected even the moderate bills adopted by the Duma. p. 98

90 *The Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was held at Geneva from October 13 to 18 (26-31), 1903. It was called at the insistence of the Mensheviks who wanted to oppose it to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin objected to its convocation and wrote: "A League Congress *now* will generate more heat than light, i.e., it will contribute nothing to the work abroad" (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 176).

The congress of the League was attended by 15 supporters of the majority led by Lenin (14 from the second sitting), who had 18 votes, and by 18 Mensheviks (19 from the second sitting) with 22 votes. The congress discussed the following questions: 1) report by the administration of the League Abroad; 2) report by the League's delegate at the Second Party Congress; 3) the League's Rules; 4) elections of the administration.

The central question of the agenda was a report by Lenin, who had been the League's delegate at the Party Congress. He described the work of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and exposed the opportunism of the Mensheviks, showing their unprincipled behaviour at the Congress. (For Lenin's report and speeches see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 69-85.) Taking advantage of their majority at the League congress, the opposition decided to have Martov as a co-rapporteur. Martov spoke out in defence of the Mensheviks' behaviour at the R.S.D.L.P. Second Congress and made slanderous accusations against the Bolsheviks. Realising that it was futile and impossible to continue the polemic against the opposition, Lenin and the supporters of the majority left the congress and refused to take part in any further debates on this question. The Menshevik majority at the congress, in an effort to secure the Party's central bodies, adopted three resolutions on the second item of the agenda, in which it opposed Lenin's approach to organisational questions and called for sustained struggle against the Bolsheviks.

The congress also adopted the League's Rules, some of which were aimed against the Party Rules (such as publication of general Party literature under the League's auspices, relations between the League's administration and other organisations, bypassing the C.C. and the C.O.); the Mensheviks also contested the right of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee to approve the League's Rules. F. V. Lengnik, the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee who attended the congress, demanded on behalf of the Central Committee that the League's Rules should be brought

into line with the Party Rules, and when the opposition refused to do so, declared the assembly invalid and walked out. The Party Council approved of his action (see p. 107 of this volume).

Lenin said that the congress of the League was the "climax of the opposition's campaign against the central bodies" (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 122). After the League's Second-Congress, the Mensheviks turned it into a stronghold in their fight against the Party.

The "Preparatory Material" section in Vol. 41 of the Fifth Russian edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* contains two relevant documents: an outline-plan of Lenin's report on the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. at the League congress, and Lenin's notes at the first sitting of the League congress. p. 104

[91] This is in reply to L. G. Deutsch's proposal on item 3 of the agenda substitute "amendment of the Rules" for "working out the Rules". The working out of a *new* set of rules for the League was a question of principle. The League's old Rules (1901), drawn up at a time when the Party was not yet a single whole, no longer met the new demands. The Party Rules adopted at the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress gave the League the same rights as the Party committees, with the exception, however, that it could support the Russian revolutionary movement only through persons and groups specially appointed by the Central Committee (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, Part I, 1954, p. 47). In his consistent efforts to have the decisions of the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress implemented, Lenin demanded the working out of a new set of rules for the League in accordance with the Party Rules. p. 104

[92] A reference to L. Martov's proposal that he should be allowed to give a co-report on the Party's Second Congress. p. 105

[93] L. Martov's pamphlet, *The Struggle Against the "State of Siege" in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, was issued at Geneva in 1904. p. 106

[94] A reference to Trotsky's efforts, with the aid of various sophisms and arbitrary interpretations of the Party Rules, to show that the League Abroad was empowered to approve the draft of the League's Rules the congress was debating, independently of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. p. 106

[95] A reference to §6 of the R.S.D.L.P. Rules adopted by the Party's Second Congress (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, Part I, 1954, p. 46). p. 106

[96] The resolution motioned by L. Y. Galperin (Konyagin), which the Bolsheviks supported, said that the League Rules would enter into force upon their approval by the Central Committee. This resolution was drawn up in accordance with the R.S.D.L.P. Rules and safeguarded the principles of democratic centralism in the Party.

Martov's resolution, adopted by the opportunist majority of the League congress, was based on the assumption that the League had the right to adopt its own Rules without preliminary approval by the Party Central Committee. p. 107

[97] A reference to F. V. Lengnik. See Note 90. p. 107

[98] *The R.S.D.L.P. Council*, which met at Geneva from January 15 (28) to 17 (30), 1904, was "called on the initiative of the C.O. representatives for the purpose of discussing measures to co-ordinate the activity of the C.C. and the C.O. in the publication of Party literature" (*Lenin Miscellany X*, p. 181—minutes of the Council's sittings). The Council's sittings were attended by V. I. Lenin, F. V. Lengnik, G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and L. Martov.

On a motion by Lenin, the Party Council decided to include in the agenda and to discuss first the question of measures to restore peace in the Party. On behalf of the Central Committee, Lenin motioned a draft resolution on the question on January 15 (28) (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 145-47). When the debate showed the Mensheviks' negative attitude to the resolution, Lenin and Lengnik motioned another draft resolution on restoring peace in the Party on January 16 (29) (see p. 109), which was adopted by the Council by three votes (Lenin, Lengnik and Plekhanov) to two (Martov and Axelrod). But instead of proceeding to a concrete discussion of the question of restoring peace in the Party, the Council, over Lenin's protest, went to vote Plekhanov's resolution demanding the co-optation of the Mensheviks to the Central Committee. The resolution was adopted by the votes of Plekhanov, Martov and Axelrod. Accordingly, the C.C. representatives (Lenin and Lengnik) entered a minority opinion on January 17 (30) censuring Plekhanov's resolution which ignored the will of the majority at the Party's Second Congress. The minority opinion was written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 148-51).

When the Mensheviks had frustrated every effort to establish peace in the Party, Lenin motioned a draft resolution on the convocation of the Party's Third Congress as the only way out of the situation (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 152). By the votes of Plekhanov, Martov and Axelrod, this resolution was rejected and one by Martov against the convocation of the Party congress adopted.

Nor was any agreement reached between the representatives of the C.C. and the Mensheviks on the publication of Party literature. The Party Council rejected the resolutions on this question motioned by Lenin and adopted the resolutions approving of the factional and disorganising activity of the Editorial Board of the Menshevik *Iskra*.

The Council's January sitting showed that with Plekhanov's switch to the Mensheviks' side, the R.S.D.L.P. Council became an instrument in the Menshevik fight against the Party. p. 108

[99] A reference to the draft resolution on measures to restore peace in the Party. Lenin insisted that his resolution should be put

to the vote before Plekhanov's, who was proposing the co-optation of Mensheviks to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. p. 108

[100] A reference to Martov's speech on the voting of the resolutions motioned by Lenin and by Plekhanov. While admitting that Lenin had the legitimate right to demand that his resolution should be voted on first, Martov nevertheless proposed the following change in the approach to the question: 1) Is it necessary to issue a call to all the members of the Party? 2) Plekhanov's concrete proposal. p. 108

[101] Martov's resolution was aimed against the minority opinion entered on January 17 (30), 1904, by the C.C. representatives Lenin and Lengnik over the Party Council's resolution motioned by Plekhanov on the co-optation of Mensheviks to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 148-51). In his resolution Martov proposed that Lenin and Lengnik should be censured for entering their minority opinion. In the course of the debate that followed, Martov was forced to withdraw his resolution and to adhere to Plekhanov's resolution, which was somewhat different in form, and which was adopted by the Menshevik votes. p. 110

[102] This was written by Lenin in connection with the decision by the "Group of Founders" to set up a library and archives of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee at Geneva. Together with the appeal of the "Group of Founders" for assistance in organising the Party library and archives, it was published in a leaflet "To One and All" (put out by the Party printing-press in Geneva).

On February 7 (20), 1904, Lenin, as a member of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, signed the "Regulations of the Library and Archives of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee" (the document is written in V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich's hand).

Later Lenin wrote the "Statement by the Group of Founders of the R.S.D.L.P. Library at Geneva" on the transfer of the R.S.D.L.P. library to the Majority Committees' Bureau (see p. 136). The next sitting of the M.C.B., on Lenin's motion, confirmed the members of the earlier "Group of Founders" as the supervisory committee of the library and archives of the R.S.D.L.P. A report on this committee's activity was submitted to the Party Congress (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P. Protokoly*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 533-37). The library was in existence for 13 years, until the February 1917 revolution. At present, the collections of the library and the archives of the R.S.D.L.P. are at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 111

[103] This was written by Lenin a week after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and was circulated to the Party committees in a number of cities in Russia with instructions to have it immediately reprinted and spread. N. K. Krupskaya informed I. Kh. Lalayants, L. B. Krasin and L. M. Knipovich about the dispatch of the leaflet in her letters on February 3 (16) and 4 (17), 1904 (Archives of the

Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and *Lenin Miscellany X*, pp. 323, 324). On February 16 (29), 1904, she wrote to R. S. Zemlyachka and L. Y. Galperin: "Starik (V. I. Lenin.—*Ed.*) has written a leaflet about the war; it was not distributed here, and was sent for reprinting in Tomsk, Moscow, Odessa, St. Petersburg, Samara, Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod and Yekaterinoslav" (Central State Historical Archives in Moscow). At the library of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism there are many copies of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee's leaflet "To the Russian Proletariat": there are copies bearing the seal of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the seals of the Moscow and Yekaterinoslav committees of the R.S.D.L.P.; the leaflet was reprinted and distributed by the Nizhny Novgorod (7,700 copies), Tver and Saratov committees, and by students in Kiev. In addition, it was reprinted in *Iskra* No. 61 on March 5 (18), 1904. p. 111

[104] Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki forced China to cede the Liaotung Peninsula and the islands of Penghuletao (Pescadores) and Taiwan to Japan, to undertake to pay an indemnity of 200 million liang (subsequently increased to 230 million liang) and to grant Japan a number of economic privileges. Fearful of Japan's growing strength, Russia, France and Germany issued a protest over the Treaty of Shimonoseki and this forced Japan to abandon the idea of annexing the Liaotung Peninsula. p. 113

[105] These outlines were the basis of a report on the Paris Commune given by Lenin at Geneva on March 9 (22), 1904. They were written after a thorough study of Karl Marx's *The Civil War in France* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 473-545). All of Lenin's references are to the Berlin edition of 1891. He also makes use of Lissagaray's *History of the Commune of 1871* and Weill's *History of the Social Movement in France* (*1852-1902*).

On the basis of these outlines Lenin wrote a "Plan of a Lecture on the Commune" in 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 206-08). Here turned again and again to the Paris Commune (see, for instance, the articles "Lessons of the Commune" and "In Memory of the Commune", and Chapter III of the book *The State and Revolution*—present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 475-78, Vol. 17, pp. 139-43, Vol. 25, pp. 418-37). p. 113

[106] Engels's "Introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France*" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 475). p. 114

[107] *I.A.A.* (*Internationale Arbeiter Association*)—the International Working Men's Association (First International)—the first international mass organisation of the proletariat set up at an international workers' meeting in London called by British and French workers in 1864. Karl Marx was the organiser and leader of the First International, and wrote its Inaugural Address, Rules and other programme and tactical documents. The establishment of the First International was the result of long and persistent efforts

by Marx and Engels to organise a working-class revolutionary party, Lenin said that the First International "laid the foundation of an international organisation of the workers for the preparation of their revolutionary attack on capital" and "laid the foundation of the proletarian international struggle for socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 306, 307).

The central governing body of the First International was its General Council, of which Karl Marx was a member throughout. He did a great deal to overcome the petty-bourgeois influences and sectarian tendencies which then prevailed in the labour movement (trade unionism in Britain, Proudhonism and anarchism in Romance countries and Lassalleanism in Germany) and rallied the advanced workers in Europe and America round the principles of scientific socialism. The First International directed the economic and political struggle of workers in various countries and strengthened their international solidarity. It also played a great part in spreading Marxism and introducing socialism into the working-class movement.

After the defeat of the Paris Commune, the working class was faced with the task of setting up mass national parties on the basis of the principles put forward by the First International. In 1873 Marx wrote: "As I view European conditions it is quite useful to let the formal organisation of the International recede into the background for the time being" (see Marx's letter to F. A. Sorge, September 27, 1873) (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 286). The First International was officially dissolved at the Philadelphia Conference in 1876. p. 114

[108] The world industrial exposition where a delegation of French workers met British workers. p. 114

[109] *Proudhonism*—an unscientific, anti-Marxist trend of petty-bourgeois socialism named after the French anarchist Proudhon. Marx and Engels waged a consistent struggle against Proudhon's attempts to impose his views on the First International. Proudhonism was subjected to withering criticism by Marx in *The Poverty of Philosophy*. The resolute struggle conducted by Marx, Engels and their supporters against Proudhonism within the First International ended in the full triumph of Marxism over Proudhonism.

Lenin said Proudhonism was the "stupidity of the petty bourgeois and the philistine", incapable of accepting the working-class standpoint. Proudhonist ideas have been widely used by bourgeois "theorists" to advocate class collaboration. p. 114

[110] *Blanquism*—a trend in the French socialist movement led by the outstanding revolutionary and prominent French utopian Communist, Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881).

Lenin wrote that the Blanquists hoped "that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals" (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 392). They substituted action by a secret group of plotters for the activity of a revolutionary party, failed to take account of the concrete situa-

tion in which an uprising could be victorious, and neglected to maintain ties with the masses. p. 114

[111] Engels's "Introduction to Marx's *Civil War in France*" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 475-76). p. 114

[112] *La débâcle* (1892)—Émile Zola's novel describing the Franco-Prussian War. p. 115

[113] A reference to the manifesto issued by the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany on September 5, 1870. p. 115

[114] Marx, "Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 491-98). p. 115

[115] Marx, *The Civil War in France* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 473-545). p. 115

[116] Alphonse-Simon Guiod, commander of the Paris army artillery, wrote to artillery division General Susane that he could take his protégé on his staff where he would be bored by the inaction, or he could send him to Mont Valérien where only a pretence was made of firing off the guns. This letter, published by the Commune in No. 115 of *Journal Officiel de la République Française* (Official Journal of the French Republic) on April 25, 1871, showed that the "government of national defence" merely pretended that it was defending Paris. Also see Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 500-01). p. 115

[117] A reference to Leo Frankel, a jeweller, who was one of the leaders of the German workers' alliance in France, a prominent leader of the Hungarian and international working-class movement and the founder of the first Hungarian Socialist Labour Party. p. 117

[118] The expression "ticket-of-leave men" was used by Marx in *The Civil War in France* where he says the following about Thiers' ministers: "These men, then, could find, in the ruins of Paris only, their tickets-of-leave: they were the very men Bismarck wanted.... In England common criminals are often discharged on parole after serving the greater part of their term, and are placed under police surveillance. On such discharge they receive a certificate called ticket-of-leave, their possessors being referred to as ticket-of-leave men" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 502). p. 121

[119] *The letters of Dupont*, corresponding secretary of the General Council of the First International, are given in Weill's *History of the Social Movement in France (1852-1902)*. In his "Plan of a Lecture on the Commune" Lenin mentions Dupont's letter of September 7, 1870 (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 207) p. 121

[120] The figures on the number of Communards convicted by courts are taken from Lissagaray's *History of the Commune of 1871*. p. 122

[121] *The R.S.D.L.P. Council* met at Geneva on May 31 and June 5 (June 13 and 18), 1904, with V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov (Chairman), Y. A. Noskov, P. B. Axelrod and L. Martov present. At its first sitting it discussed the questions of calling an inter-party conference of revolutionary and opposition organisations of Russia, and of the forthcoming international congress at Amsterdam. The second sitting was devoted to a discussion of internal Party questions: 1) the right of the Party's central bodies (C.C. and C.O.) to recall their representatives from the Party Council; 2) co-optation to the committees and the Central Committee's right to seat new members on them; 3) procedure governing the voting by Party organisations on the convocation of the Party's Third Congress; 4) publication of the minutes of Council sittings, etc.

In view of the fact that three of the five Council members (Plekhanov, Axelrod and Martov) represented the Menshevik opposition, while Noskov took a conciliatory stand, the Party Council adopted Menshevik decisions on the most important internal Party matters (for Lenin's speeches at the R.S.D.L.P. Council see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 433-42). p. 122

[122] *The Inter-Party Conference of Opposition and Revolutionary Organisations of Russia*, called on the initiative of the Finnish Party of Active Resistance, was held at the end of 1904. The representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. and several other Social-Democratic parties and organisations of Russia met at Amsterdam in August 1904, before the International Socialist Congress opened, and decided not to attend the inter-Party conference. For the R.S.D.L.P., this decision was approved by the Party Council sitting on August 21 (September 3), 1904. p. 122

[123] *The Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation of the Baltic Area* was set up in April 1902 through the merger of several Social-Democratic organisations. On its basis, the First Congress of Latvian Social-Democratic Organisations, held from June 7 to 9 (20-22), 1904, set up the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party which joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the Fourth (Unity) Congress in 1906.

The Latvian Social-Democratic Union, set up in the autumn of 1900 abroad, was akin in its demands to the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and was largely permeated with nationalistic tendencies. In 1905, the Union gained some temporary influence among a section of the peasants, but was soon ousted by the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Union subsequently played no noticeable role of any kind. p. 122

[124] A reference to the *Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation* (Specifics), which was set up by Armenian national-federalist elements soon after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Like the Bundists, the Specifics wanted the Party organised on the

federal principle, which implied a division of the proletariat on national lines, and declared themselves to be the sole representatives of the Armenian proletariat. They tried to justify their nationalism by referring to the "specific conditions of each nation". In a letter to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee over the conference of Social-Democratic organisations in Russia called for September 1905, Lenin wrote: "I strongly warn you against the Armenian Social-Democratic Federation. If you have agreed to its participation in the conference, you have made a *fatal* mistake, which must be rectified *at all costs*. It is represented in Geneva by a couple of disrupters who publish sheer trivia here and have no *serious* connections with the Caucasus. It is a *Bund creatura*, nothing more, specially invented to cultivate Caucasian Bundism.... All the Caucasian comrades are against this gang of disruptive writers..." (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 337). p. 122

[125] A reference to Martov's proposal at the first sitting of the Party Council calling for the adoption of a resolution to have all decisions involving principle, at the inter-party conference, adopted only unanimously. p. 122

[126] A remark Lenin made in connection with Martov's resolution inviting all Party organisations to send to the Party Council their mandates for the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International, and also to submit reports on local activity for the drawing up of a general report. Martov was followed by Plekhanov who said there was no time to wait for local reports and proposed that someone should be asked to draw up a report right away. p. 123

[127] A reference to the newspaper *Veratsnutyun* (Renascence), organ of the Gnchak, the Armenian petty-bourgeois nationalist party. It was published in Rusčuk, Bulgaria, in 1903 and 1904. p. 124

[128] A reference to Martov's assertion that the minority of the Moscow Committee had proposed the co-optation not of one but of two of their members. p. 124

[129] Under the Party Rules adopted by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., only those organisations which had been confirmed not less than a year before the congress enjoyed the right of representation on it. On the strength of this, V. A. Noskov (Glebov) said at the second sitting of the Party Council that the votes of the Tver and Riga committees were invalid in deciding on the convocation of the Party's Third Congress. p. 125

[130] *The Caucasian League of the R.S.D.L.P.* was set up at the First Congress of Caucasian Social-Democratic Organisations at Tiflis in March 1903, on the initiative of the Tiflis and the Baku committees of the R.S.D.L.P. It was attended by 15 delegates from the Tiflis, Baku, Batum, Kutais and other Social-Democratic organisations in Transcaucasia. It elected the League's 9-man governing body, the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., and approved the political line of the Leninist *Iskra*; it adopted as

a basis for activity by Social-Democratic organisations in Transcaucasia the draft Party programme worked out by *Iskra* and *Zarya*.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., there were three delegates from the Caucasian League, who had been instructed to defend the programme, organisational and tactical principles of the Leninist *Iskra*. From the outset, the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. established close ties with Lenin and provided firm support for the Bolsheviks in their struggle against the Menshevik opposition. The League took an active part in preparing the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and its representatives were on the Majority Committees' Bureau, which made the practical preparations for the Third Congress. The League played an important part in organising the labour movement in Transcaucasia before and during the first revolution in Russia. It did a great service in educating the workers of the multi-national Caucasus in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. In February 1906, the League was dissolved in view of the establishment of united committees of the Bolshevik and the Menshevik factions. p. 125

[131] A reference to Martov's proposal at the second sitting of the Party Council to give the Samara, Smolensk, Bryansk and Astrakhan committees the same status as that accorded to those which had attended the Congress, that is, the right to vote in deciding on the convocation of a Party congress. p. 125

[132] Martov proposed that the Caucasian League should be given the right to vote for a congress, as of September 1903, when its Rules had been approved. p. 126

[133] A reference to the decision taken by the January 1904 sitting of the Party Council to publish the Council's minutes. p. 126

[134] On June 5 (18), 1904, the Party Council—by the votes of the Mensheviks G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov and P. B. Axelrod, and the conciliator V. A. Noskov (Glebov)—decided against publishing the Council's minutes. p. 127

[135] A reference to the appeal "To the Party", adopted by a conference of 22 Bolsheviks and published as a separate leaflet by the Riga Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1904 (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 452-59). p. 127

[136] A reference to the *Central Committee's* "*July Declaration*", a resolution adopted by the conciliator members of the Central Committee—L. B. Krasin, V. A. Noskov and L. Y. Galperin—in July 1904. It consisted of 26 points, nine of which were published in *Iskra* No. 72 of August 25 (September 7), 1904, under the title "Declaration of the Central Committee". The resolution was adopted illegally, without the knowledge of two C.C. members: V. I. Lenin, who was in Switzerland, and R. S. Zemlyachka. They were thereby deprived of the possibility of standing up for the Party majority's view in the Central Committee. In this reso-

lution, the conciliators voiced their recognition of the Menshevik Editorial Board of the new *Iskra*, whom Plekhanov had co-opted. Three more conciliators were co-opted to the Central Commlttee: A. I. Lyubimov, L. Y. Karpov, and I. F. Dubrovinsky. The conciliators came out against convening the Third Party Congress and dissolved the Central Committee's Southern Bureau, which had been campaigning for the Congress. They stripped Lenin of his rights as the Party Central Committee representative abroad, and prohibited the publication of his works without the permission of the C.C. collegium. The adoption of the "July Declaration" marked a complete betrayal of the decisions of the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress by the conciliator members of the Central Committee and their open switch to the Menshevik side.

Lenin issued a sharp protest against the "July Declaration". In his letter "To Five Members of the Central Committee" and his pamphlet *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party*, Lenin esposed the illegal acts of the three members of the Central Committee (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 460-61, 527-33). Lenin was supported by the Party's local committees—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Baku, Tiflis, Imeretia and Mingrelia, Nikolayev, Odessa, and Yekaterinoslav—which resolutely condemned the "July Declaration". p. 128

[137] A reference to the Menshevik *Iskra*. The Editorial Board of the Party's Central Organ, consisting of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov and L. Martov, was approved at the Second Party Congress. But contrary to the Congress decision, the Menshevik Martov refused to sit on the Board without the old Menshevik editors (P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich), who had not been elected by the Second Congress; so *Iskra*'s Nos. 46 to 51 came out under the editorship of Lenin and Plekhanov. The latter subsequently switched to the Menshevik stand and demanded the inclusion on the Board of the old Menshevik editors who had been rejected by the Congress. Lenin could not accept this and withdrew from the *Iskra* Editorial Board on October 19 (November 1), 1903; he was co-opted to the Central Committee and from there started a struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. *Iskra*'s No. 52 was issued under the editorship of Plekhanov alone, and on November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov rode roughshod over the will of the Second Congress by co-opting Axelrod, Potresov and Zasulich. From its No. 52, *Iskra* ceased to be a militant organ of the revolutionary Marxists. The Mensheviks turned it into an organ for fighting Marxism and the Party, and a mouthpiece of opportunism. p. 128

[138] *The Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin Publishing House of Social-Democratic Party Literature* was set up by the Bolsheviks at the end of the summer of 1904, when *Iskra*'s Menshevik Board refused to publish statements by Party organisations and members in support of the decisions of the Second Party Congress and in favour of convening the Third Party Congress. The Publishers were given assistance by local Majority Committees. p. 128

[139] There is no information about Lenin's having either written the work or given a lecture on the subject. The date has been approximated from the fact that the MS. is on the reverse of the MS. of Lenin's remarks to Rosa Luxemburg's article "The Organisational Questions of Russian Social-Democracy", which was published in No. 69 of *Iskra* on July 10, 1904.

The material on the study of the works by authors whom Lenin mentions in the two plans is published in *Lenin Miscellany XXXII*. This material was also used by Lenin for his lectures on "Marxist Views of the Agrarian Question in Europe and Russia", which he gave at the Russian Higher School of Social Sciences in Paris from February 10 to 13 (23 to 26), 1903 (see *Lenin Miscellany XIX*, pp. 225-48). p. 129

[140] Engels criticised the agrarian programmes of the French and German Social-Democratic parties in his work *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 420-40). p. 130

[141] In the autumn of 1904, the Geneva group of Bolsheviks set up, on Lenin's initiative, a propagandists' circle which was largely made up of grass-root Party workers—working-men and young people without theoretical knowledge. The aim was to train men for work in Russia, and the studies were in the form of reports and lectures. Lenin was the head of the circle, and conducted the studies on the Party Programme. Classes were soon stopped when some of the comrades went back to Russia in view of the outbreak of the revolution. A number of documents characterising the work of the circle are at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin's notes, plans of talks and records of the debates on the lectures are published in *Lenin Miscellany XV*, pp. 283-85, 287. p. 131

[142] The meeting was held in the port of London on August 14, 1889, in connection with the start of the dock-workers' strike for higher per-hour wages and at least four hours of work a day. Ten thousand workers (including some unemployed) were involved in the strike. They set up a strike committee, whose secretary was Eleanor Marx-Aveling, Karl Marx's daughter. The strikers had the support of workers in Britain, Australia and a number of European ports. During the strike, the first dock-workers' union was set up, with branches in all the major British ports. The strike continued for five weeks and ended when all the workers' demands were met. It gave an impetus to the development of trade unions and was a turning-point in the British labour movement. p. 132

[143] This is the initial variant and the final text of the "Note by the *Vperyod* Editorial Board to the Letter of Their St. Petersburg Correspondent", which has not been found. It was apparently to have gone into the newspaper's issue No. 4 or No. 5, but the January 9, 1905 events must have crowded out the other reports, and then the letter was too old to print.

Vperyod—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905 Eighteen issues appeared, with the printing of 7,000 to 10,000 copies. It was organised and run by Lenin, who had also proposed the newspaper's name. On its Editorial Board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky. The paper's correspondence with local committees in Russia and its reporters was handled by N. K. Krupskaya. Lenin defined the content of the paper as follows: "The line of *Vperyod* is *the line of the old* '*Iskra*'. In the name of the old *Iskra*, *Vperyod* resolutely combats the new *Iskra*" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 130). Lenin not only wrote the leading articles but also a great number of notes, and edited many reports. He wrote some of the articles together with other members of the Board (Vorovsky, Olminsky and others). The MS.s of various authors which have been preserved show the heavy editing and extensive insertions made by Lenin, who always read the page proofs. Even when he was engrossed in the work of the Third Congress in London, he found the time to read the page proofs of No. 17. Issue No. 18 appears not to have been read by him in view of his departure from London to Geneva. More than 60 articles and notes by Lenin were carried in *Vperyod*, and some of its issues—such as Nos. 4 and 5, dealing with the January 9 events and the start of the revolution in Russia—were almost entirely done up by Lenin

The Third Congress passed a special resolution with a vote of thanks, noting the outstanding part played by *Vperyod* in the struggle against the Mensheviks, for the restoration of the Party principle, in the raising and elucidating of the tactical questions brought out by the revolutionary movement, and in the struggle for the convocation of the Congress. Under a decision of the Third Congress, *Proletary* was published as the Central Organ of the Party and a direct successor of *Vperyod*. p. 133

[144] This was written some time in January 1905 as a proposed reply to Plekhanov's article "On Our Tactics Towards the Struggle of the Liberal Bourgeoisie Against Tsarism", which criticised Lenin's pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and Iskra's Plan*. Lenin's article did not appear in the press, and does not seem to have been written. p. 134

[145] In his article "On Our Tactics Towards the Struggle of the Liberal Bourgeoisie Against Tsarism", Plekhanov alleged there was a contradiction between Lenin's old (*What Is To Be Done?*) and his new (*The Zemstvo Campaign and Iskra's Plan*) attitude to the Zemstvo liberal movement. p. 135

[146] A reference to the acts of the Chairman of the Zemstvo Assembly in Tambov Gubernia, who on December 14 and 15, 1904, requested police protection for his Assembly against the "public". Plekhanov's "On Our Tactics Towards the Struggle of the Liberal Bourgeoisie Against Tsarism" says: "By the way, about the panic. The recent Tambov events may perhaps put some

of the opponents of absolutism in mind of the idea that *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* was quite right in threatening the liberals with a popular uprising *against* constitutionalism" (G. V. Plekhanov, *Works*, Vol. XIII, p. 178). p. 135

[147] *The Majority Committees' Bureau* (*M.C.B.*)—the Bolsheviks' organisational centre for preparing the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., set up on Lenin's initiative at the end of 1904. In that period, the Party was in a profound crisis. The Mensheviks had seized the Party centres and were engaged in disorganising and splitting the Party organisations in the localities, and disrupting the unity of working-class action. Meanwhile, the revolutionary situation in the country demanded cohesion of the Party's forces and militant unity of the proletariat. This dictated the need for an early convocation of the Third Party Congress, which was frustrated in every possible way by the central bodies, which were in the hands of the Mensheviks. Under Lenin's leadership, the Bolsheviks launched a campaign for convening the Congress. A great part was played by the conference of 22 Bolsheviks called on Lenin's initiative in Geneva in August 1904. It adopted an appeal "To the Party", written by Lenin, which became a programme for Bolshevik struggle for the convocation of the Third Congress. Three regional conferences of Bolshevik committees—Southern, Caucasian and Northern—were held in Russia from September to December 1904. They set up the Majority Committees' Bureau, which included V. I. Lenin, R. S. Zemlyachka, S. I. Gusev, M. N. Lyadov and M. M. Litvinov. Guided by Lenin, the M.C.B. carried out the practical work in preparing the Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress. p. 136

[148] The article was not written. p. 137

[149] *Narodnoye Pravo* (People's Right)—an illegal party of Russian democratic-minded intellectuals, founded in the summer of 1893 with the participation of former members of the Narodnaya Volya, 0. V. Aptekman, A. I. Bogdanovich, A. V. Gedeonovsky, M. A. Natanson, N. S. Tyutchev and others. Members of the Narodnoye Pravo Party set themselves the task of uniting all opposition forces to fight for political reform. The party put out two programme documents: "Manifesto" and "Vital Question". In the spring of 1894 it was broken up by the tsarist government. Lenin gave an assessment of the Narodnoye Pravo Party as a political organisation in his *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* and *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 129-332 and Vol. 2, pp. 323-51). Most of the members of the Narodnoye Pravo Party subsequently joined the Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 137

[150] This plan is close in content to Lenin's article "A Militant Agreement for the Uprising" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 158-66) and was apparently written after the article, because it raises the question of a combat committee, which the article does not. p. 138

[151] *The Geneva Party Majority Club* was formed at a conference of R.S.D.L.P. promotion groups abroad on January 13, 1905, and had four sections for elaborating questions of Party life: 1) organisation, 2) propaganda, 3) agitation, and 4) technical matters.

A sitting of the organisation section on March 5, 1905, discussed a report by A. M. Essen (Stepanov) on how to organise work mainly among the non-proletarian sections of the population (students, soldiers and peasants). Lenin spoke thrice: first, after the report, then after a speech by Robert (unidentified), and again in connection with a speech by Olga (S. N. Ravich), who proposed that Lenin should be invited to take part in drawing up a "questionnaire" in view of his wide experience of practical work in Russia.

When Lenin says: "I did draw up a questionnaire, but it was much too general", he means his "Questionnaire" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 200-01). p. 139

[152] In a resolution carried by No. 14 of *Vperyod* on April 12 (March 30), 1905, the workers condemned the split in the Party and demanded immediate unity. p. 141

[153] A reference to the resolutions of the Menshevik Kharkov Committee, on the election of a delegate to the Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress, and of the Kharkov Bolshevik group, on the need to unite the Party "on the basis of a common, strictly principled tactics and centralised organisation". Both were published in No. 14 of *Vperyod*. p. 141

[154] A reference to the agreement between the M.C.B. and the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee on the convocation of the Third Party Congress. The principles of the agreement were set out in the appeal "To the Party" on behalf of the Central Committee and the M.C.B. on March 12 (25), 1905, which was published in No. 13 of *Vperyod* on April 5 (March 23), 1905, in Lenin's article "The Second Step". The agreement said that "further work in connection with convening the Congress is to be carried jointly by the M.C.B. and the C.C., which form an Organising Committee". Lenin gave an assessment of the agreement in his articles "The Second Step" and "The Council Is Caught Out" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 262-66, 330-34). p. 141

[155] *The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London from April 12 to 27 (April 25 to May 10), 1905. It had been prepared by the Bolsheviks and was directed by Lenin. The Mensheviks refused to attend it and met for a conference at Geneva.

The Congress was attended by 38 delegates: 24 with vote, and 14 with voice only. Delegates from twenty-one R.S.D.L.P. committees had votes. Lenin was a delegate from the Odessa Committee. Among the delegates were V. V. Vorovsky, R. S. Zemlyachka, N. K. Krupskaya, A. A. Bogdanov, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. M. Litvinov and M. G. Tskhakaya. Lenin was elected chairman of the Congress.

The Congress examined the basic questions of the unfolding revolution in Russia and determined the tasks of the proletariat

and its party. Lenin wrote the draft resolutions on all the main questions debated by the Congress. He gave reports on Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government and on the resolution concerning support for the peasant movement; he spoke on the armed uprising, the attitude to the government's tactics on the eve of the revolution, the relations between the workers and intellectuals in Social-Democratic organisations, the Party Rules, the report on the Central Committee's activity and other questions (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 359-424). The Congress laid out the Party's strategic plan for the bourgeois-democratic revolution and defined the Party's tactical line. The Congress set out the organisation of an armed uprising as the Party's most important and pressing task. The Congress said that the victory of the armed popular uprising should lead to the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government, whose task would be to suppress the resistance of the counter-revolution, carry out the R.S.D.L.P. minimum programme, and prepare the conditions for the transition to a socialist revolution.

The Congress reviewed the Party Rules: it adopted Lenin's formulation of Paragraph One, which deals with Party membership; eliminated the duocentric system (the C.C. and the C.O.) in the Party, and set up a single governing Party centre—the Central Committee; it gave a precise definition to the C.C.'s powers and its relations with the local committees.

The Congress condemned the acts of the Mensheviks and their opportunism in organisational and tactical questions. In view of the fact that *Iskra* had fallen into Menshevik hands and was conducting an opportunist line, the Congress authorised the Central Committee to set up a new Central Organ, *Proletary*. A Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee on April 27 (May 10), 1905, appointed Lenin editor of the newspaper.

The Third Congress was of tremendous historical importance. It was the first Bolshevik congress, which gave the Party and the working class a militant programme of struggle for the victory of the democratic revolution. For the work and importance of the Congress see Lenin's article "The Third Congress" (present edition Vol. 8, pp. 442-49). The Congress decisions were substantiated in Lenin's book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140). p. 142

[156] These resolutions, written by Lenin, were adopted at the last sitting of the Organising Committee for Convening the Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress on April 11 (24), 1905, and announced in the O.C. report at the first sitting of the Congress on April 12 (25), 1905, by L. B. Krasin, member of the O.C. from the Central Committee (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, *Protokoly*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 30-31). p. 142

[157] This is a draft of point five of the resolution adopted by the Organising Committee for Convening the Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress on April 11 (24), 1905 (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, pp. 31-32). The basic propositions of this document were also

included in the resolution on the constitution of the Congress motioned by P. A. Krasikov (Belsky), M. S. Leshchinsky (Zharkov) and M. M. Litvinov (Kuznetsov) at the third sitting of the Congress on April 13 (26), and adopted at its fifth sitting on April 14 (27), 1905 (ibid., p. 96). p. 144

[158] No Kazan Committee delegate attended the Congress until the eighteenth sitting, in view of the fact that the Organising Committee had been unable to contact the Kazan Committee in good time. V. V. Adoratsky, a member of the Kazan Committee, was abroad at the time. To ensure the attendance of the Kazan organisation, Lenin wrote to the Credentials Committee, suggesting that Adoratsky should be invited to attend the Congress with voice but no vote as a member of the Kazan Committee. The Credentials Committee proposed that Adoratsky should be invited "simply as a member of the Party", and it is this formula that Lenin found strange.

The Congress, by a majority, with two against, decided to invite Adoratsky "as a member of the committee". It proved to be impossible to inform Adoratsky of this decision, and he did not attend the Congress. Only by the eighteenth sitting did a delegate from the Kazan Committee arrive. He was I. A. Sammer (Savich), who was allowed voice but no vote. p. 145

[159] N. A. Alexeyev (Andreyev) motioned this resolution: "The O.C. report shall be discussed in factual terms, and not in terms of principle or morality". In the debate on this question, Andreyev adhered to the resolution motioned by Lenin (see p. 147), which was adopted by the Congress. p. 146

[160] The draft agenda was discussed at the third, afternoon, sitting on April 13 (26), 1905.

Variants of the draft agenda are published in the "Preparatory Material" section of Vol. 9 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works* (pp. 375-78).

This draft was circulated among the delegates for comments, and then with slight changes in the wording was read out at the Congress as the draft signed by Lenin, M. M. Litvinov (Kuznetsov) and A. A. Bogdanov (Maximov). p. 147

[161] The proposal put forward by D. S. Postolovsky (Mikhailov) A. V. Lunacharsky (Voinov) and L. B. Krasin (Zimin) was that the Congress agenda should be drawn up under four heads: organisational questions, tactical questions, attitude to other parties and delegates' reports. This proposal was adopted. In the subsequent discussion and amendment, the agenda was adopted with these main heads: 1) tactical questions; 2) organisational questions; 3) attitude to other parties; 4) work within the Party; 5) delegates' reports; 6) elections. p. 148

[162] The draft motioned by Ivanov (A. A. Bogdanov), which Lenin mentions, was the new draft Rules of the R.S.D.L.P. submitted to the Congress by the Majority Committees' Bureau. It was published in No. 13 of *Vperyod* on April 5 (March 23), 1905, under the

title "Organisational Question". The draft, with some amendments outlined at preliminary meetings of delegates, was read out by Bogdanov (Maximov) at the fifteenth, afternoon, sitting of the Congress on April 20 (May 3). Following a discussion and the introduction of a number of amendments, the Rules were adopted at the seventeenth, afternoon, sitting on April 21 (May 4).

The remarks of N. F. (E. E. Essen) on Ivanov's draft were published under the title "Concerning the Draft Party Rules" in the Supplement to No. 15 of *Vperyod* on April 20 (7), 1905. p. 149

[163] Lenin erroneously calls V. V. Adoratsky, Arnatsky. p. 150

[164] During the discussion of this question at the fourth sitting of the Congress on April 14 (27), 1905, Lenin said that he had not proposed an invitation for V. V. Filatov (NN), but had merely handed his written request to the Congress (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 80).

The proposal to invite Filatov to the Congress with voice was rejected. p. 151

[165] At the fourth sitting of the Congress (on the morning of April 14 [27]), Lenin spoke twice (for the second speech, see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 365-67): After the report of the Credentials Committee, there was a debate on the granting of votes to the Bolshevik organisations which had existed and worked parallel to the Menshevik committees (the Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav groups and the Committee of the Organisation Abroad) and also to the Archangel Committee, which had not been confirmed.

V. M. Obukhov (Kamsky) said that the granting of votes to the "C.O.A. and the parallel groups is a coup d'état in form and in substance".

Under a Congress decision, all these organisations were given voice but no vote. p. 151

[166] Under the Party Rules adopted by the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress, only organisations confirmed not less than one year before the Congress had the right of representation at the Congress. Under the Rules, the Kazan and Kuban committees were not regarded as fully empowered at the Third Congress, because they were not on the list of full-fledged committees in the minutes of the Party Council prior to September 1, 1904. At the fifth sitting of the Third Party Congress on April 14 (27), V. V. Vorovsky (Orlovsky) motioned a draft resolution written by Lenin on confirming these committees as full-fledged forthwith. The resolution was adopted at the same sitting. p. 151

[167] At the fifth sitting of the Congress on April 14 (27), as it was confirming the Kazan and Kuban committees as being full-fledged forthwith, some delegates said that it was undesirable for delegates with voice only to take part in the voting, as this could have an effect on the results of this crucial decision.

In this connection, Lenin wrote the draft resolution on the procedure governing the voting of questions at the Congress which was adopted at the same sitting. p. 151

[168] A reference to the speech by A. I. Rykov (Sergeyev) at the thirteenth sitting of the Congress against the draft resolution motioned by V. I. Lenin and P. P. Rumyantsev (Filippov). Rykov said that "the resolution does not apply to the agenda" and that its points "could be referred to the question of the liberals and agitation"; he proposed that they should be examined during the discussion of the corresponding items on the agenda. The Congress rejected Rykov's proposal, and adopted the draft resolution. p. 155

[169] When the thirteenth sitting of the Congress discussed the draft resolution on the attitude towards the government's tactics on the eve of a revolution, there was a great debate on point "c" of the resolutive section, which read: "To organise the proletariat for the immediate introduction, in a revolutionary way, of an 8-hour working day and for the implementation of all the main demands of our minimum programme." P. A. Krasikov (Belsky) objected to the words "revolutionary way", and proposed their substitution by the words "actual gain".

As a result of the debate, the point was adopted in the following wording: "To organise the proletariat for the immediate implementation, in a revolutionary way, of an 8-hour working day and the impending demands of the working class" (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 222). p. 155

[170] During the discussion at the fifteenth sitting on April 20 (May 3) of the report and draft resolution of A. A. Bogdanov (Maximov) on the relations between workers and intellectuals in Social-Democratic organisations, some delegates asserted that there was no such problem in the Party, and that there was no need to adopt any resolution on it.

The Congress resolved to defer the matter until the adoption of the Party Rules.

At the nineteenth sitting on April 22 (May 5), the Congress resumed its discussion of the question. A number of resolutions were motioned. Lenin's draft (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 407-08), which he motioned jointly with A. A. Bogdanov, was adopted as a basis for the discussion. Lenin spoke several times (see ibid., pp. 411, 412). By a roll-call vote the Congress decided not to adopt any special resolution on the question. Lenin's proposals were taken into account in the resolution on propaganda and agitation. p. 157

[171] The speeches were not taken down in shorthand, and in accordance with the standing orders, every speaker had to submit a summary of his speech to the Congress Bureau within two hours of the sitting (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 11). p. 157

[172] During the debate on the draft Party Rules, the Congress substantially reworked the Party's organisational principles, chiefly on three main questions: 1) amendment of §1 of the Rules; 2) precise definition of the powers of the Central Committee and an extension of the autonomy of local committees; 3) establishment of a single centre. The Congress adopted §1 as worded by Lenin. By a

majority, the Congress abandoned the dual centre arrangement, in the form of the C.C. and the C.O., which the Second Congress had set up. One centre—the Central Committee—was retained. The Third Congress devoted a great deal of attention to the demarcation of the powers of the Central Committee and those of the local committees, and to the relations between the committees and the periphery, which was granted more powers. By a majority, the Congress decided to expunge §8 from the draft Rules and adopt a special resolution on the question Lenin voted for retaining §8 in the Rules. The nineteenth sitting on April 22 (May 5) adopted a resolution motioned by V. V. Vorovsky (Orlovsky) on the duty of the centres to inform the periphery about Party affairs and to reckon with their voice, the resolution which replaced §8 of the Rules (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, pp. 325, 327-28).

To prevent the committees from abusing their autonomy, and to make it possible to replace the committees which do not justify themselves, §9 of the new Rules said: "A local committee must be dissolved by the C.C. if two-thirds of the C.C. and two-thirds of the local workers, belonging to the Party organisations declare for such dissolution". For two of Lenin's speeches during the debate on the Party Rules on April 21 (May 4) see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 413-15. p. 158

[173] §6 of the draft Rules published in No. 13 of *Vperyod* on April 5 (March 23), 1905, said: "All organisations within the Party shall autonomously manage all matters relating specially and exclusively to that sphere of Party activity for the dealing with which they have been set up." The Third Congress adopted §6 in a different wording (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 461). p. 158

[174] Under §7 of the draft Party Rules, every Party organisation with the right of vote at the Congress had the right to publish Party literature at its own expense and on its own behalf. O. A. Kvitkin (Petrov) came out for §7 with the amendment of A. A. Bogdanov (Maximov) to the effect that "all periodical Party publications shall publish all the C.C. statements at its request". P. A. Krasikov (Belsky) proposed that permission to publish Party literature should be given only when the practical slogans contained in it were in complete accord with the decisions of international Social-Democratic congresses and Party congresses. §7 of the Party Rules was adopted in the wording proposed by D. S. Postolovsky (Mikhailov) with the amendment by A. A. Bogdanov (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 461). P. A. Krasikov's amendment was rejected. p. 159

[175] During the debate on §11 of the draft Party Rules, which said that "Every Party organisation shall place before both the C.C. and the C.O. Editorial Board all the means for making a study of all its activity and all its members", A. M. Essen (Kitayev) motioned the following addendum: "submitting detailed reports to the C.C. on its activity, at least twice a month". After Lenin's speech, this addendum was adopted. p. 159

[176] A reference to §12 of the draft Rules, which said that "Co-optation of members to the C.C. shall be unanimous". The unanimity proposal was adopted. p. 159

[177] §13 of the draft Rules said: "The Committee of Party Organisations Abroad has the aim of conducting propaganda and agitation abroad and also of promoting the movement in Russia. It shall provide support to the movement in Russia only through persons and groups specially designated by the C.C."

The resolution of P. A. Krasikov (Belsky) said: "The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. authorises the C.C. to examine and approve the Rules of the Organisation Abroad with the rights of a full-fledged Party committee conducting propaganda and agitation abroad, with the proviso that the Committee of Organisations Abroad shall give assistance and support to the movement in Russia only through persons and groups specially designated by the C.C."

The Congress deleted §13 from the Rules and adopted P. A. Krasikov's resolution. p. 159

[178] The draft resolution of A. A. Bogdanov (Maximov) on general meetings of the C.C. said: "The Congress makes it binding on the C.C. to have periodical meetings—at least once in three months—of both its parts", i.e., of the C.C. sections in Russia and abroad.

The resolution was adopted with an amendment stating that these meetings were to be held "at least once in four months" (*Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 466). p. 159

[179] At the eighteenth sitting of the Congress on April 22 (May 5), the question of the Kazan Committee's representation came up once again with the arrival of its delegate I. A. Sammer (Savich). The Credentials Committee proposed that the Congress "should abide by its earlier decision and admit the Kazan Committee delegate with voice but no vote" (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 314).

Sammer asked the Congress to allow his committee a vote. After a debate, the Congress rejected a resolution motioned by B. V. Avilov (Tigrov) on granting a vote to the Kazan Committee and confirmed the Credentials Committee's resolution. p. 160

[180] The draft resolution said: "Recognising the unification of Party work to be an urgent demand of Party life, recognising that such unification is best achieved in the process of work and in joint discussion of general Party slogans by as many Party workers as possible—the Third Party Congress recognises it as desirable that the C.C. should, for these purposes, organise conferences of representatives of local committees."

Lenin motioned amendments to the resolution and supported L. B. Krasin (Zimin) and D. S. Postolovsky (Mikhailov), who opposed the addenda motioned by G. L. Shklovsky (Dedushkin) and A. I. Rykov (Sergeyev) (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 342). Lenin's amendments were adopted. p. 161

[181] The draft resolution is in Lenin's hand. It was motioned at the twentieth sitting by A. M. Essen (Kitayev) and R. S. Zemlyachka

(Osipov). It was adopted by the Congress as not subject to publication. p. 161

[182] A draft resolution motioned by P. P. Rumyantsev (Filippov) said that there should be no agitation on the periphery and in the workers' masses against whole Menshevik organisations or against individuals refusing to accept the Congress decisions, and that dissolution of Menshevik committees and establishment of Bolshevik committees where parallel organisations exist should be carried out in a most cautious manner, only when it was quite clear that a majority of the local committee members had refused to accept the decisions of the Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress. After a debate, the first part of the resolution was rejected, and the second adopted in the wording of Lenin and Bogdanov (Maximov) as not subject to publication (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 363). p. 162

[183] The twenty-first sitting on April 23 (May 6) discussed a draft resolution on the attitude towards non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations motioned by V. V. Vorovsky (Orlovsky). It said: "...The Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress, reaffirming the attitude of the Second Congress on the question of federalism, authorises both the C.C. and the local committees to do their utmost to reach agreement with the national Social-Democratic organisations for the purpose of co-ordinating local work, thereby paving the way for a possible unification of all Social-Democratic parties into a single R.S.D.L.P." (*Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 365).

D. S. Postolovsky (Mikhailov) proposed the following text: "authorises the C.C., as well as the local organisations, to make *joint* efforts" (ibid.). He argued that agreement could be reached only "when it was arranged not only by the C.C. but by the local committees as well" (ibid., p. 371). This amendment was opposed by Lenin and rejected by the Congress. p. 162

[184] In addition to what A. V. Lunacharsky (Voinov) said, Lenin quoted a Moscow report which appeared in *The Times* No. 37700 on May 6, 1905, under the title "Zemstvo Congress at Moscow. Purposes and Prospects".

On the Zemstvo congress in Moscow see Lenin's article "The Advice of the Conservative Bourgeoisie" (present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 457-60).

The Times—a daily founded in London in 1785; one of the leading conservative papers of the British bourgeoisie. p. 163

[185] The twenty-third sitting heard and discussed the C.C. report given by L. B. Krasin (Zimin). Some speakers noted that the report failed to describe the political activity of the Central Committee and demanded that the C.C. representative tell the Congress why the C.C. had not succeeded in guiding the Party as its political leader. Those were the statements Lenin had in mind when he spoke of the "trial" in his second speech on the C.C. report. p. 163

[186] The resolution was adopted unanimously. p. 164

[187] The draft resolution on propaganda and agitation was discussed and adopted at the twenty-second sitting on April 25 (May 8). Lenin's amendments and addenda were adopted and written into the resolution (see *Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 457).

The amendment to point "a" was written by Lenin and tabled by A. A. Aristarkhov (Osetrov) and V. M. Obukhov (Kamsky). p. 165

[188] Point "c" of the draft resolution read as follows: "take measures to organise in all the main areas of Russia travelling agitation groups under the direction of responsible district agitators, to assist the local centres". Lenin's amendment replaced this text. p. 165

[189] O. A. Kvitkin (Petrov) proposed the words "armed force" at the end of the draft resolution on the events in the Caucasus to be replaced by the words "all the means at their disposal" (*Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P.*, p. 442). Kvitkin's amendment was adopted. p. 166

[190] Lenin gave the lecture on the subject in Geneva on May 19 or 20 (June 1 or 2), and soon after that in Paris. In a letter to L. A. Fotieva, who was in Paris, Lenin wrote on June 1 or 2 that he intended to go to Paris and asked her to organise his report on "The Third Congress and its Decisions". The content of the report was, Lenin wrote, "a parallel analysis of our decisions and those of the Mensheviks. They have just issued an announcement about their conference, and I will analyse it" (see present edition, Vol. 36, p. 148). By announcement he meant the Menshevik pamphlet *First All-Russia Conference of Party Workers*, issued as a supplement to No. 100 of *Iskra* on May 15, 1905. In his plan Lenin refers to pages in this pamphlet.

Lenin elaborated on some points of his plan in the article "A Third Step Back", which was published later (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54). p. 166

[191] See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 461-81. p. 168

[192] See "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 106-17). p. 168

[193] This sets out the milestones in the struggle between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends in Russian Social-Democracy. There is no article written to this plan.

Lenin characterised the stages of the internal Party struggle prior to the Third R.S.D.L.P. Congress in his "A Brief Outline of the Split in the R.S.D.L.P. A Letter to Greulich", which he wrote in February 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 125-31). Roughly the same stages as in the present article are given in his plan written in August 1905 and entitled "Plekhanov and the new *Iskra*" (see *Lenin Miscellany V*, 1926, pp. 360-66). p. 168

[194] A reference to the resolutions of the "Unity" Congress of R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad, held in September 1901. It was attended by six members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation abroad (among them V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya and L. Martov), eight members of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation (including three members of the Emancipation of Labour group: G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod and V. I. Zasulich), 16 members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats (including five members of the Bund Committee Abroad) and three members of the *Borba* group. At the Congress Lenin who attended under the name of Frey, spoke about the Union's opportunist actions. When the Union tabled its opportunist amendments and addenda to a resolution condemning opportunism and recognising the need for the unity of all Social-Democratic forces in Russia on the basis of *Iskra*'s revolutionary principles the revolutionary section of the Congress (members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations) issued a statement on the impossibility of unification and left the Congress. On Lenin's initiative, these organisations in October 1901 united into the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 168

[195] A reference to the grouping of votes at the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress, which was held from July 17 (30) to August 10 (23) 1903. The Congress was attended by 43 delegates with 51 votes. Of them 24 votes belonged to the *Iskra* majority, 9 to the *Iskra* minority, 10 to the "Marsh", and 8 to the anti-*Iskra* group (3 *Rabocheye Dyelo* members and 5 Bundists). For details of the struggle at the Congress see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 332-47. p. 168

[196] The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. ended on August 10 (23), 1903, and on August 15 (28) *Iskra*'s No. 46, in the editing of which Lenin and Plekhanov took part, was issued. The exact meaning of Lenin's reference to August 13 (26) has not been established. On November 13 (26) Plekhanov co-opted the Mensheviks Axelrod, Martov, Zasulich and Potresov to the *Iskra* Editorial Board. p. 168

[197] A reference to Martov's words at the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, which took place from October 13 (26) to 18 (31), 1903, to the effect that he Martov, would refuse to work with Martynov on the same Editorial Board. p. 168

[198] A possible reference to the letter sent on September 25-26 (October 8-9), 1903, by *Iskra*'s former editors to Lenin and Plekhanov, in which they refused to collaborate on *Iskra* (see present edition, Vol. 7, p. 353). p. 168

[199] A reference to the conference of 22 Bolsheviks and the Declaration of 19 Bolsheviks. The conference was held in the first half of August 1904.

Declaration of the Twenty-Two—an appeal "To the Party" written by Lenin and adopted at the Bolshevik conference in Geneva, in the first half of August 1904 (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 452-59). The conference was attended by 19 persons, among them V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya, M. S. Olminsky, M. N. Lyadov and P. N. Lepeshinsky. Three other Bolsheviks soon adhered to their decisions and the appeal "To the Party" was issued on behalf of the 22. This was published in a special leaflet in August 1904 and became the Bolshevik programme in the struggle for convening the Third Party Congress.

The Declaration of the nineteen was issued by the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in October 1904 under the title "Appeal to Members of the R.S.D.L.P." (see *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov "Trety syezd R.S.D.R.P."* [Collection of Documents and Material "Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P."], Moscow, 1955, pp. 99-106). p. 169

[200] These dates denote the period from the conference of 22 Bolsheviks (first half of August 1904) to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held from April 12 (25) to April 27 (May 10), 1905. p. 169

[201] A reference to the mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin*, which broke out on June 14 (27), 1905. The ship entered Odessa, just then in the grip of a general strike, but no use was made of the favourable conditions for joint action by the workers and sailors. The Bolshevik organisation in Odessa had been weakened by arrests, and was not united. The Mensheviks were opposed to an armed uprising and tried to restrain the workers and sailors from offensive operations. The tsarist government sent the whole of its Black Sea Fleet to crush the *Potemkin* mutiny, but the sailors refused to fire at the insurgent ship, and their commanders were forced to withdraw the fleet. After sailing the seas for eleven days, the *Potemkin*, short of food and coal, made for Rumania and there surrendered to the Rumanian authorities. Most of its sailors remained abroad. Those of them who returned were arrested and committed for trial.

The *Potemkin* mutiny failed but the fact that the crew of a major warship had gone over to the revolution was an important advance in the struggle against the autocracy. Lenin said the uprising was an "attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*" (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 562). p. 169

[202] It has not been established whether Lenin did write and publish the leaflet (proclamation). p. 171

[203] *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* (Moscow Recorder)—one of the oldest Russian newspapers published by Moscow University from 1756 (initially as a small bulletin). From 1863 to 1887, the ultra-reactionary and chauvinist M. N. Katkov was its publisher and editor, turning it into a monarchist and nationalist mouthpiece for the most reactionary sections of the landowners and the clergy; from

1905, the paper was one of the main organs of the Black Hundreds. It was published until the October Socialist Revolution. p. 173

[204] *Vestnik Yevropy* (European Messenger)—a historical, political and literary monthly of a liberal bourgeois trend published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. It carried articles against the revolutionary Marxists. p. 173

[205] *Rus* (Russia)—a liberal bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from December 1903. Its publisher and editor was A. A. Suvorin. During the 1905 revolution, the paper was close to the Cadets, but took a more moderate stand. It was closed down on December 2 (15), 1905, and subsequently appeared at intervals under various names: *Rus*, *Molva* (Tidings), *XX vek* (Twentieth Century), *Oko* (Eye) and *Novaya Rus* (New Russia). p. 173

[206] *Proletary* (Proletarian)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., set up under a resolution of the Third Party Congress. Lenin was appointed its editor-in-chief by a decision of the Central Committee's Plenary Meeting on April 27 (May 10), 1905. It was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25), 1905. There were 26 issues. The paper continued the line of the old, Leninist *Iskra* and retained full continuity with the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*.

Lenin wrote about 90 articles and notes for the newspaper. Among those who constantly took part in the work of its Editorial Board were V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky. N. K. Krupskaya, V. M. Velichkina and V. A. Karpinsky did a great deal of work for the Editorial Board. The paper was closely allied with the working-class movement in Russia and carried articles and notes from workers taking a direct part in the revolutionary movement. Local reports were collected and sent on to Geneva by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, S. I. Gusev and A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova. N. K. Krupskaya and L. A. Fotieva carried on the correspondence with local Party organisations and readers.

Proletary instantly responded to all the important events in the Russian and international labour movement and waged a relentless struggle against the Mensheviks and other opportunist and revisionist elements. The paper carried out a great deal of work for the propaganda of the Third Party Congress decisions and played an important part in the Bolsheviks' organisational and ideological unity.

Soon after Lenin's departure for Russia in early November 1905 the paper ceased publication. The last two issues (Nos. 25 and 26) were edited by V. V. Vorovsky, but they also contained several articles by Lenin, which were published after his departure from Geneva. p. 173

[207] For the criticism on this question of the Menshevik *Iskra* and the Bund, see Lenin's article "The Theory of Spontaneous Generation" (present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 246-51). p. 173

[208] The article was not written. p. 174

[209] *The Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the leading party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia. It was set up in October 1905 and consisted of members of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo leaders from among the landowners, and bourgeois intellectuals. Among its prominent leaders were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. To deceive the working people, the Cadets called themselves "the party of people's freedom", but actually went no further in their demands than a constitutional monarchy. After the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets operated as bitter enemies of the Soviet power and took part in all the armed counter-revolutionary action and campaigns of the interventionists. After the defeat of the interventionists and the whiteguards, the Cadets emigrated and continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity. p. 174

[210] *Nasha Zhizn* (Our Life)—A liberal daily published in St. Petersburg, with interruptions, from November 6 (19), 1904, to July 11 (24), 1906. p. 174

[211] *Birzheviye Vedomosti* (Stock-Exchange Recorder)—a bourgeois newspaper founded in 1880. It was published in St. Petersburg, first thrice a week, then four times a week, and then daily. From November 1902 it had two editions: morning and afternoon. Its name became a byword for adaptation, corruption and lack of principle. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee at the end of October 1917. p. 174

[212] A reference to Karl Marx's statements about Ledru-Rollin in his work *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 118-242). p. 174

[213] This is a critique of the tactical line followed by the bourgeois liberals who, in the magazine *Osvobozhdeniye* (Emancipation) and other periodicals, sharply opposed the idea of an armed uprising, rejected the idea of boycotting the Bulygin Duma and called for participation in it.

Lenin criticised Kautsky's stand on the provisional revolutionary government (point 3 of the "Note") in his article "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 108-09).

The question of making use of "elderly" workers (point 5 of the "Note" was elaborated in Lenin's letter to S. I. Gusev of September 30 (October 13), 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 358-59).

Lenin elaborated the question of the Social-Democratic attitude to parliament (point 6 of the "Note") in his letter to A. V. Lunacharsky of September 28 (October 11), 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 352-53). p. 175

[214] A quotation from N. A. Nekrasov's poem *Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia*; the whole stanza says:

Mother Rus!
You are wretched,
You are rich,
You are powerful,
You are powerless! p. 175

[215] *The Economist*—a British economic and political weekly published in London since 1843; an organ of the big industrial bourgeoisie. p. 176

[216] No. 25 of *Proletary* on November 16 (3), 1905, carried V. A. Karpinsky's article "The Peasant Congress", signed V. Kalinin. Lenin edited the article and made two insertions. p. 177

[217] *General redistribution*—a slogan expressing the peasants' striving for a general redistribution of the land and the elimination of landed estates.

In his article "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy", Lenin said that the demand for a general redistribution, together with the reactionary utopian idea of perpetuating small-scale peasant production, also had its revolutionary side, namely, "the desire to sweep away by means of a peasant revolt all the remnants of the serf-owning system" (present edition, Vol. 6, p. 137).

Later, at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Lenin said: "We are told that the peasants will not be satisfied with our programme and will go further. But we are not afraid of that; we have our socialist programme for that eventuality, and consequently are not afraid even of a redistribution of the land" (present edition, Vol. 6, p. 495). p. 177

[218] *The St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was called by the St. Petersburg Committee on February 11 (24), 1906, to decide on the attitude to the Duma. The conference was guided by Lenin and was attended by 65 delegates with vote. Elections to the conference were held after discussion and voting on the tactical platforms of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with one delegate from thirty voting Party members. The Bolsheviks won a substantial majority. The Mensheviks demanded the invalidation of the votes of the district R.S.D.L.P. organisation, which was almost entirely Bolshevik. Lenin made speeches and remarks during the debate on the question of the district R.S.D.L.P. organisation (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 123-25). The conference confirmed the representation of the district organisation. It heard a report from the St. Petersburg Committee and adopted Lenin's resolution recognising the representation at the conference valid, the conference effective and its decisions binding. Lenin gave the report on the attitude to the Duma (there is no record of it in the minutes). At the end of his report Lenin read out a resolution on the tactics of active boycott. The Menshevik

resolution was read out by Martov. By 36 votes to 29, the conference came out in favour of the active boycott, but had no time to adopt a resolution giving detailed motivation of the tactic.

To discuss this and give it final approval, a second city conference of the St. Petersburg organisation was called at the end of February and the beginning of March. It was attended by 62 delegates and discussed draft resolutions tabled by Lenin, Martov and an additional one by the Mensheviks of Okhta District. After a long and bitter struggle, the conference adopted Lenin's resolution by 35 to 24 with one abstention. It set up a committee, which included Lenin, to give the final wording to the resolution. The Mensheviks refused to take part in the committee and walked out. p. 178

[219] A reference to the proposal of I. A. Konovalov (Nikolai) at the St. Petersburg City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. on February 11 (24), 1906, to close the debate on the district and Vyborg organisations; to recognise the vote as correct and the representation as valid, and proceed with the agenda of the conference. p. 179

[220] *The Fourth* (*Unity*) *Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held at Stockholm from April 10 to 25 (April 23 to May 8), 1906.

It was attended by 112 delegates with vote, representing 57 local organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., and 22 delegates with voice only. National organisations were also represented: the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund, the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Finnish Labour Party. There was also a representative of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

Among the Bolshevik delegates were V. I. Lenin, M. V. Frunze, M. I. Kalinin, N. K. Krupskaya, A. V. Lunacharsky, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), S. G. Shahumyan, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, J. V. Stalin, V. V. Vorovsky, K. Y. Voroshilov and Y. M. Yaroslavsky.

The Mensheviks had a majority at the Congress because many Bolshevik Party organisations, which had led the armed action by the masses, were broken up and could not send their delegates. The Central Area, the Urals, Siberia and the North—Bolshevik bulwarks—were represented by a small number of delegates. By contrast, the Mensheviks, who had the more numerous organisations in the country's non-industrial areas, where there had been no mass revolutionary action, were in a position to send more delegates.

There was a bitter struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks on every point of the Congress agenda. Lenin gave reports on the agrarian question, the assessment of the current situation and the class tasks of the proletariat, on the attitude to the Duma, the armed uprising and other questions, and took part in the committee drafting the Party Rules (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 277-309). The character of the decisions was determined by the numerical superiority of the Mensheviks. After

a stubborn struggle, the Congress approved the Menshevik resolutions on the Duma and the armed uprising, and adopted their agrarian programme.

On the attitude to bourgeois parties, the Congress confined itself to endorsing the resolution of the International Congress at Amsterdam. Without debate, it adopted the compromise resolution on the trade unions and the resolution on the attitude to the peasant movement.

At the same time, on the demand of the Party masses, the Congress adopted Paragraph One of the Rules in Lenin's wording, rejecting Martov's opportunist formula. The Bolshevik proposition on democratic centralism was included in the Rules for the first time.

The Congress decided on the question of uniting with the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which joined the R.S.D.L.P. as territorial organisations working among proletarians of all nationalities in their territories.

The Central Committee elected by the Congress included three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks. The Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ, consisted of Mensheviks only.

The Congress is known as the "Unity" Congress, but it marked only the formal unification of the R.S.D.L.P. Actually, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks had their own views, their own platforms on the key revolutionary questions, and in fact remained two distinct parties. Lenin analysed the work of the Congress in his pamphlet *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* (*A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers*) (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 317-82). p. 179

[221] At the second sitting of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., there was a discussion of the Congress standing orders under a draft put forward by the United Central Committee. A debate ensued on the question of the roll-call vote on the written statements submitted to the Congress Bureau. Two proposals were motioned: one by the Bolshevik P. P. Rumyantsev (Schmidt) and the other by the Menshevik M. A. Lurye (Larin). The former's was adopted. See *Chetvyorty* (*Obyedinitelny*) *syezd R.S.D.R.P. Aprel* (*aprel-mai*) *1906 goda. Protokoly* (Proceedings of the Fourth [Unity] Congress. April [April-May] 1906), Moscow, 1959, pp. 11-16. p. 179

[222] During the debate on the agenda at the third sitting of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the Menshevik F. I. Dan objected to the question of the current situation being put on the agenda. p. 180

[223] A reference to point two of the draft resolution of the Bolsheviks, "The Class Tasks of the Proletariat at the Present Moment of the Democratic Revolution", for the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 181

[224] The twenty-fourth sitting of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. decided on the question of uniting the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania with the R.S.D.L.P. p. 181

[225] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily, the Central Organ of the Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906, under the editorship of P. N. Milyukov and I. V. Hessen, and with close collaboration from M. M. Vinaver, P. D. Dolgorukov, P. B. Struve and others. The newspaper was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917, but continued to appear until August 1918 under the names of *Nasha Rech* (Our Speech), *Svobodnaya Rech* (Free Speech), *Vek* (Age), *Novaya Rech* (New Speech), *Nash Vek* (This Age). p. 181

[226] *First Duma* (the so-called Witte Duma) was convened on April 27 (May 10), 1906, under an ordinance worked out by Chairman of the Council of Ministers S. Y. Witte.

Elected to the Duma were 478 deputies, over one-third of whom belonged to the Cadet Party. It was dissolved on July 8 (21), 1906.

Trudoviks—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in Russian Dumas consisting of peasants and Narodnik-minded intellectuals. The Trudovik group was formed in April 1906 from the peasant deputies of the First Duma.

In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, which was due to the class character of the peasant petty proprietors. In view of the fact that the Trudoviks represented the peasant masses, the Bolsheviks in the Duma pursued the tactic of reaching agreement with them on various questions for conducting a common struggle against the tsarist autocracy and the Cadets. In 1917, the Trudovik group merged with the Popular Socialist Party and gave active support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution. p. 182

[227] *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—a daily published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917 by various publishers, repeatedly changing its political orientation. Moderately liberal at first, it became an organ of reactionary landowner and official bureaucratic circles in 1876, when A. S. Suvorin took over as publisher. From 1905—an organ of the Black Hundreds. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, the paper gave total support to the counter-revolutionary policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government and fiercely attacked the Bolsheviks. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 184

[228] *Mysl* (Thought)—a political and literary daily, the legal organ of the S.R. Party, published in St. Petersburg from June 20 (July 3) to July 6 (19), 1906, in place of *Golos* (Voice), which had been closed down. Fifteen issues were published. p. 185

[229] *The Second (First All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held at Tammerfors from November 3 to 7 (16-20), 1906. It was attended by 32 delegates with vote: 11 from the Mensheviks, 7 from the Bund, 6 from the Bolsheviks, 5 from the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and 3 from the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory. Members of the Central Committee and the Central Organ Editorial Board attended with voice only.

The Conference adopted the following agenda: 1. Electoral campaign. 2. Party Congress. 3. Labour Congress. 4. Struggle against the Black Hundreds and the pogroms. 5. Partisan activity.

The Menshevik C.C. secured a majority for the Mensheviks by bringing in a number of fictitious organisations, which enabled them to impose Menshevik resolutions on some questions. By 18 votes (Mensheviks and Bundists) to 14, the Conference adopted the Menshevik resolution "On the R.S.D.L.P.'s Tactics in the Electoral Campaign", which allowed blocs with the Cadets. To counter this opportunist resolution, Lenin motioned, on behalf of 14 delegates, a "Minority Opinion", the Bolshevik platform for the electoral campaign, which emphasised the need for the working-class Party to be organisationally and ideologically independent. It allowed for the possibility of temporary agreements only with the Trudoviks and the S.R.s as representing petty-bourgeois democracy (pp. 188-91) . Lenin criticised the Menshevik draft electoral platform, which the C.C. submitted for approval by the Conference, and motioned a number of amendments. Under Bolshevik pressure, the Conference adopted a resolution introducing the amendments.

The Conference adopted a resolution "On Unity in the Electoral Campaign in the Localities" with Lenin's amendment, which put a curb on the Menshevik C.C. in practising the tactics of setting up bloc with the Cadets in the localities (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 322-23).

Lenin insisted on the need for an emergency Party congress. The Conference decided to call the next congress not later than March 15 (28), 1907. Although the Bolsheviks demanded a discussion of the question of a "labour congress", believing agitation for it to be a violation of Party discipline, the Conference did not discuss the question, confining itself to a compromise resolution, "On the Limits of the Agitation for a Labour Congress".

There was no time to discuss the questions of fighting the Black Hundreds and the pogroms, or the partisan activity. The Conference authorised the C.C. to issue a brief report on the Conference, containing all the draft resolutions and minority opinions. But the Menshevik C.C., in its organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published only the Conference resolutions, without the Bolsheviks' "Minority Opinions".

Lenin analysed and criticised the work of the Conference in his "Blocs with the Cadets" and "Party Discipline and the Fight Against the Pro-Cadet Social-Democrats" (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 307-19 and 320-23). p. 186

[230] Lenin's report was based on the Bolshevik resolution, later presented at the Conference as a "Minority Opinion" on behalf of the delegates of the Social-Democracy of Poland, the Latvian Territory, St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Volga area (pp. 188-91).

The Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory—until 1906, the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party—was set up in June 1904 at the party's First Congress. At the Second L.S.D.L.P. Congress in June 1905, the party adopted its programme. From 1905 to 1907, the L.S.D.L.P. guided the revolutionary action by the workers. Lenin said that "during the revolution the Lettish proletariat and the Lettish Social-Democratic Party occupied one of the first and most important places in the struggle against the autocracy and all the forces of the old order" (see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 260).

At the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906, the L.S.D.L.P. entered the R.S.D.L.P. as a territorial organisation, and after the Congress was called the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory. p. 186

[231] A reference to the Bolshevik draft declaration by the Duma Social-Democratic group, which was written by Lenin. Slightly abridged, it is quoted by Lenin in his article "The Declaration of Our Group in the Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 32-37). p. 187

[232] A reference to the resolution "On Tactics" adopted by the Bund's Seventh Congress, which was held at the end of August and beginning of September 1906. p. 189

[233] *The Second Duma* met on February 20 (March 5) 1907. The elections to the Duma were indirect and unequal, and were held in an atmosphere of reprisals and trials by military tribunals. Still, the Second Duma turned out to be more Leftist than the First, the reason being the more distinct demarcation between the parties than in the First Duma period, the growing class consciousness of the masses and the participation of the Bolsheviks in the elections.

The Bolsheviks used the Duma as a rostrum for exposing tsarism and the treacherous role of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, for proclaiming and propagandising the Party's revolutionary programme, for releasing the peasantry from the influence of the liberals and creating a revolutionary bloc in the Duma of representatives of the working class and the peasantry. This was an entirely new, revolutionary Marxist line of behaviour for proletarian delegates to take in a parliamentary institution. Meanwhile, the Mensheviks pursued the opportunist line of supporting the Cadets.

By mid-1907, when it became obvious that the workers and peasants lacked the strength to defeat tsarism, the tsarist government decided to disperse the Duma. On the night of June 2 (15), 1907, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma was arrested, and the Duma itself dissolved by the tsar's decree the following day. p. 189

[234] *Zionist socialists*—members of the Zionist Socialist Labour Party, a petty-bourgeois Jewish nationalist organisation formed in 1904. They believed the main task of the Jewish proletariat to be a struggle for obtaining their own territory and establishing a national state. They preached class co-operation with the Jewish bourgeoisie, strove to isolate Jewish workers from the revolutionary movement of the Russian and international proletariat, and tried to sow hostile feelings among the workers of different nationalities. The nationalistic activity of the Zionist socialists served to obscure the class consciousness of the Jewish workers and did great harm to the working-class movement.

After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Zionist Socialist Labour Party merged with the Socialist Jewish Labour Party (S.J.L.P.) to form the United Jewish Socialist Labour Party. p. 191

[235] *Popular Socialists* (*P.S.*)—members of the petty-bourgeois Trudovik Popular Socialist Party which in 1906 split away from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (S.R.s). The Popular Socialists favoured a bloc with the Cadets. Lenin used to call them "Social-Cadets", "philistine opportunists", "S.R. Mensheviks", vacillating between the Cadets and the S.R.s, and emphasised that the party "differs very little from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both republicanism and the demand for all the land" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 228). It was headed by A. V. Peshekhonov, N. F. Annensky, V. A. Myakotin and others. p. 191

[236] A reference to Lenin's article "The Crisis of Menshevism" published in No. 9 of *Proletary* on December 7 (20), 1906 (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 341-64).

Proletary (Proletarian)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper published from August 21 (September 3), 1906, to November 28 (December 11), 1909, under the editorship of Lenin. Fifty issues appeared. Among those who took an active part in the editorial work were M. F. Vladimirsky, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and I. F. Dubrovinsky; technical matters were handled by A. G. Shlikhter and Y. S. Shlikhter, among others. The first twenty issues were prepared for the press and set in Vyborg. In view of the sharp worsening of conditions for the publication of an illegal organ in Russia, the *Proletary* Editorial Board transferred the paper's publication abroad, in accordance with a decision of the St. Petersburg and Moscow committees of the R.S.D.L.P. (Nos. 21-40 were published in Geneva, and Nos. 41-50, in Paris).

Proletary was in fact the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. Lenin carried out all the main work on its Board. More than 100 articles and notes by Lenin on the most important questions of the working-class revolutionary struggle were published in the paper, which had close contact with local Party organisations.

During the years of the Stolypin reaction, *Proletary* played an outstanding role in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik

organisations and in fighting the liquidators, the otzovists-ultimatumists and the god-builders.

The paper ceased publication in accordance with the decisions of the January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. p. 191

[237] A reference to the C.C. appeal "To All Party Organisations and All Social-Democratic Workers" on the convocation of the Fourth R.S.D.L.P. Congress. It was adopted on Lenin's proposal and published in No. 9 of the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* on November 10 (23), 1905 (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh*.... Part I, 1954, pp. 96-98).

Novaya Zhizn (New Life)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper published daily in St. Petersburg from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16), 1905. Its official publisher and editor was the poet N. M. Minsky, and the publisher, M. F. Andreyeva. When Lenin returned to St. Petersburg from abroad in early November, the paper was edited by him. There was a change in the Editorial Board and contributors. *Novaya Zhizn* was in fact the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. Among those who were most closely connected with the newspaper were M. S. Olminsky, V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich. Maxim Gorky took an active part in the paper and also gave it large financial assistance. Among its foreign contributors were Rosa Luxemburg Karl Liebknecht, Marcel Cachin and Paul Lafargue. Fourteen of Lenin's articles appeared in the paper. In these articles, he defined the Party's tasks and tactics in the first Russian revolution.

Novaya Zhizn was a champion of all the decisions and measures of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee and played a great part in the political enlightenment and organisation of the masses mobilising them for the armed uprising.

In October 1905, Lenin wrote about *Novaya Zhizn*: "*Today* the broadest tribuna for our influence on the proletariat is a *daily* newspaper in St. Petersburg" (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 365).

Novaya Zhizn was subjected to numerous reprisals. It was closed down by the tsarist government after its No. 27 on December 2. The last issue, No. 28, was published illegally. p. 192

[238] A reference to the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held at Tammerfors (Finland) from December 12 to 17 (25-30), 1905. It was attended by representatives of 26 organisations. Lenin was elected chairman of the Conference. Among the participants were V. Y. Fridolin, L. M. Knipovich, L. B. Krasin, N. K. Krupskaya, P. F. Kudelli, S. A. Lozovsky, P. N. Mostovenko, V. I. Nevsky, V. A. Radus-Zenkovich, J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Yaroslavsky The Mensheviks were represented by E. L. Gurevich (V. Danevich).

The Conference had the following agenda: 1) Reports from the localities. 2) Report on the current situation. 3) Organisational report of the C.C. 4) On the merger of both parts of the R.S.D.L.P. 5) On Reorganising the Party. 6) The agrarian question. 7) On the Duma.

Lenin gave reports on the current situation and the agrarian question. The Conference came out for restoring Party unity and merging the practical centres of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and their Central Organs on a basis of equality, and also for mergers of parallel organisations in the localities, authorising the united C.C. to call a unity congress. In its resolution on "Party Reorganisation", the Conference recommended the practice of a broad electoral principle and the principle of democratic centralism. Departures from the latter were recognised as admissible only in the event of insuperable practical obstacles. In the "Agrarian Resolution" (on Lenin's report) the Conference, elaborating the decisions of the Third Congress, proposed that the point in the Party's agrarian programme dealing with "cut-off lands" should be replaced by the demand for the confiscation of all landed estates and state and church lands. The Conference adopted a resolution on an active boycott of the First Duma. In view of the fact that an armed uprising had already started in Moscow, the Conference, on Lenin's proposal, hastily wound up its work, and the delegates went home to take part in the uprising. p. 192

[239] *L'Humanité*—a daily founded in 1904 by Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. In 1905, the paper welcomed the revolution which had started in Russia, voicing the French people's solidarity with "the Russian nation creating its own 1789". The newspaper organised a collection of funds in aid of the Russian revolution. During the First World War (1914-18) the paper was in the hands of the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party and took a chauvinist stand.

In 1918, Marcel Cachin, the outstanding leader of the French and international working-class movement, became the paper's political director. From 1918 to 1920, the paper opposed the imperialist policy of the French Government, which had sent its troops to fight against the Soviet Republic. From December 1920, following the split in the French Socialist Party and the formation of the Communist Party of France, the paper became the latter's Central Organ. p. 192

[240] *La Tribune Russe*—a bulletin of the S.R. Party published in Paris in French from January 1904 to December 1909 and from October 1912 to July 1913; in 1904 it was published fortnightly and then monthly. p. 192

[241] *The City and Gubernia Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.* met at Terioki on January 6 (19), 1907. It was attended by 70 delegates with vote (42 Bolsheviks and 28 Mensheviks). Four representatives of the Menshevik C.C. and C.O., one representative each from the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and from the Editorial Board of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*, and others attended with voice only. When the credentials were verified, it turned out that in some subdistricts, mainly represented by the Mensheviks, there had been breaches of the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee requiring

that elections of delegates to the Conference should be held only after discussions by Party members of the question of whether agreements with the Cadets ought to be concluded. The Conference regarded such credentials as invalid. It rejected the proposal motioned by the representative of the C.C. that the Conference should be divided into two sections (the city and the gubernia) in accordance with the existing electoral districts, for the proposal was aimed at giving the Mensheviks an artificial superiority at the Conference. The Mensheviks used this decision as a pretext for breaking with the revolutionary Social-Democrats and making a deal with the Cadets; they walked out, splitting the St. Petersburg organisation on the eve of the election.

The other delegates decided to continue the Conference. Lenin gave the report on Duma-electoral agreements, and after a debate the Conference affirmed the "Minority Opinion" entered by the Bolsheviks at the Second (First All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (pp. 188-91). The Conference rejected the idea of forming a bloc with the Cadets and decided to propose to the S.R.s and the Trudoviks an agreement for the election period, provided they repudiated the idea of any alliance with the Cadets.

The Conference was described in detail in Lenin's "The Social-Democrats and the Duma Elections", "'When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool' ... (From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist)", "The Workers' Party Election Campaign in St. Petersburg", "The Social-Democratic Election Campaign in St. Petersburg", "The Protest of the Thirty-One Mensheviks" et al. (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 431-55, 456-74, 426-30; Vol. 12, pp. 15-23, 29-32). p. 193

[242] The note was published in the "Press Review" section in No. 7 of the newspaper *Novy Luch* (New Ray) on February 27, 1907, in reply to Martov's feuilleton "This Is the Limit", which appeared in No. 48 of *Russkaya Zhizn* on February 25 (March 10), 1907. p. 196

[243] *Russkaya Zhizn* (Russian Life)—a legal Left Cadet daily published in St. Petersburg from January 1 (14), 1907. From its No. 38 of February 14 (27), the paper passed into the hands of the Mensheviks. Among those who wrote for it were P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, V. I. Zasulich, L. Martov and G. V. Plekhanov. It was closed down on March 2 (15). p. 196

[244] *The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London from April 30 to May 19 (May 13 to June 1), 1907. It was attended by 336 delegates representing more than 147,000 members: 105 Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 57 Bundists, 44 Polish Social-Democrats, 29 members of the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory, and 4 "non-faction" delegates. The large industrial centres were represented by Bolsheviks. The St. Petersburg Party organisation sent 12 Bolsheviks of its 17 delegates; the Moscow City and Moscow District, 16 out of 19; the Urals, 19; Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Vladimir, Kostroma District, Bryansk, Kazan and Krasnoyarsk, Bolsheviks only. Lenin was a delegate to the Congress from the Upper

Kama organisation. At the Congress there was a well-knit group of Bolsheviks led by Lenin, among them A. S. Bubnov, I. F. Dubrovinsky, M. N. Lyadov, V. P. Nogin, M. N. Pokrovsky, K. N. Samoilova, S. G. Shahumyan, J. V. Stalin, A. M. Stopani, I. A. Teodorovich, M. G. Tskhakaya, K. Y. Voroshilov, and Y. M. Yaroslavsky. Maxim Gorky attended the Congress with voice only. Following a long and sharp debate the Congress adopted this agenda: 1) Report of the Central Committee. 2) Report of the Duma group and its set-up. 3) Attitude to the bourgeois parties. 4) The Duma. 5) "Labour congress" and non-Party labour organisations. 6) Trade unions and the Party. 7) Partisan action. 8) Unemployment, economic crisis and lockouts. 9) Organisational questions. 10) International Congress at Stuttgart (May Day, militarism). 11) Work in the army. 12) Miscellaneous. In view of the work of the Congress being protracted, the questions of unemployment, of the economic crisis and the lockouts, and the International Congress at Stuttgart were taken off the agenda.

Lenin was elected to the presidium of the Congress and chaired the 6th, 7th, 14th, 15th, 27th, 34th and 35th sittings; he gave the report and delivered the summing-up speech on the key item of the agenda—the attitude to the bourgeois parties; he also spoke on the C.C. report on its work, the report on the Duma group activity, for inclusion in the agenda of the general theoretical questions of the principles underlying the Party's tactics in the bourgeois revolution, against the Mensheviks, the Bundists and Trotsky (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 437-88).

At the Congress the Bolsheviks were supported by the delegates of the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Territory. Having rallied them on a revolutionary platform, the Bolsheviks secured a majority and a victory for the revolutionary Marxist line. The Congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions on all major questions. It amended the Party Rules, eliminating the two-centre arrangement (election of the C.C. and the C.O by the congress). Under the amended Rules, only the C.C was elected, while the C.O. was to be appointed by the C.C. and was to work under its control. The Rules provided for periodical Party conferences to discuss the most important aspects of Party life.

To the Central Committee were elected five Bolsheviks, four Mensheviks, two Polish Social-Democrats and one Latvian Social-Democrat; ten Bolsheviks, seven Mensheviks, three Polish and two Latvian Social-Democrats were elected alternate members. Among the Bolsheviks elected to the C.C as full and alternate members were V. I. Lenin, I. F. Dubrovinsky, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, L. B. Krasin, J. Marchlewski, V. P. Nogin and L. Tyszka. Three more persons were subsequently nominated for the C.C.: two from the Bund and one from the Latvian Social-Democrats.

As the C.C. leadership could not be reliable, for it consisted of representatives of different trends (those of the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations frequently vacillated between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks), a Bolshevik Centre headed

by Lenin was elected at a sitting of the Bolshevik group towards the end of the Congress. It included the Editorial Board of the newspaper *Proletary*.

The Fifth Congress marked a triumph for Bolshevism in the working-class movement of Russia. Its decisions summed up the victory of Bolshevism over the opportunist, Menshevik wing of the Party during the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolshevik tactics was approved as the common one for the whole Party. p. 197

[245] Lenin spoke at the third sitting. Following the adoption of the first two items of the agenda, 1. Report of the Central Committee, and 2. Report of the Duma group and its set-up, the Bundist Zeltser (B. N. Grosser) joined Lieber in motioning that there should be no debate on the general theoretical questions of principle, motioned for inclusion in the agenda (items 3, 4 and 5 of the Bolshevik draft agenda—the aggravation of the economic struggle and the current situation, the class tasks of the proletariat at the present stage, and the attitude to the bourgeois parties). The Bundist Vinitsky (V. D. Medem) who was in the chair motioned a closure of the debate.

After Lenin's speech at the following, fourth, sitting, the debate on the inclusion of the general theoretical questions in the agenda was continued. At the fifth sitting on May 2 (15), the item "On the Attitude to the Bourgeois Parties" was included in the agenda. p. 197

[246] Point 4 of the regulations adopted by the Congress provided for a name-ticket vote only when at least 20 delegates demanded one. Lenin spoke in connection with the fact that a proposal had been made to the presidium of the Congress to have the roll-call vote without tickets. By 3 votes to 2 the presidium came out against the tickets, but in view of the differences that arose, the question was referred to the Congress. A majority (144) were in favour of the name-ticket vote. p. 197

[247] Lieber's amendment opened the attack by the Menshevik-Bundist opportunist section of the Congress against the Bolshevik resolution on the attitude to the bourgeois parties, which had been adopted as a basis. Lieber motioned the deletion of the first part of the theoretical resolution: "At present, Social-Democracy is most insistently faced with the task of determining the class content of the various non-proletarian parties, of taking account of the present interrelation of classes and accordingly of defining its attitude to the other parties". Lieber's amendment was rejected by the Congress. For the amendments to the resolution on "The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties", see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 500-05. p. 198

[248] Lenin is replying to F. I. Dan, who objected to designating the Congress as the Fifth, as the Bolsheviks had proposed, on the plea that it was an effort to fix the factional dissensions. Actually, however, the Mensheviks and the Bundists had ignored the Third,

Bolshevik, Congress. The Congress adopted the proposal of the Bundist Shanin (L. G. Shapiro) to designate it as the "London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." p. 199

249 The draft resolution of the Second Congress of the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory, "*On the Tasks of the Proletariat of the Current State of the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution*", written by Lenin, was annexed, without debate, to the minutes of the Congress and published in No. 78 of the newspaper *Zihņa* on July 7, 1907. The minutes of the Congress have not been preserved.

The Second Congress of the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory was held in London from May 21 to 25 (June 3 to 7), 1907, just after the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. By then there were almost 13,000 organised Party members. The Congress was attended by 26 delegates with vote and 10 with voice only. The agenda was: 1) Reports of the Central Committee, of the Auditing Committee and local organisations. 2) Crises, lockouts and unemployment. 3) On the tasks of the proletariat at the present moment of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. 4) On agitation in the army. 5) On the trade unions. 6) On propaganda and agitation. 7) Organisational questions, etc. The agrarian question had been removed from the agenda, evidence of the erroneous attitude of the Latvian Social-Democrats.

At the Congress there was a sharp struggle between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists, especially on the C.C. report.

Lenin took an active part in the work of the Congress. At the afternoon sitting on May 24 (June 6), 1907, he gave a report on the tasks of the proletariat at the present moment of the bourgeois-democratic revolution (there is a very bad record of the report—a retranslation from the Latvian into Russian made at the Police Department). The Congress showed that Bolshevism had won strong positions in Latvia: it adopted Bolshevik decisions on the question of the trade unions, unemployment, and democratic and military organisations.

The Congress elected a new Central Committee, consisting in the main of revolutionary Social-Democrats, and authorised the C.C. to publish a manifesto "To the Latvian Proletariat", drawn up in the Bolshevik spirit.

Zihņa (*Ciņa*) (Struggle)—the Central Organ of the Latvian Social-Democrats, founded in March 1904. It was published illegally in Riga at big intervals until August 1909, and then abroad. On the occasion of its hundredth issue in 1910, it carried an article by Lenin, "The Jubilee Number of *Zihņa*", giving a high appraisal of the revolutionary activity of the Latvian Social-Democrats (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 260-64). The paper also carried a number of Party documents written by Lenin. Among its constant and active contributors were P. I. Stučka, one of the organisers of the Communist Party of Latvia, and the popular poet J. Rainis.

From April 1917, the newspaper was published legally in Petrograd, Riga and elsewhere, and from August 1919, when the

counter-revolution temporarily won out in Latvia, it was again published illegally in Riga. After the establishment of the Soviet power in June 1940, the paper became the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia and the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic. p. 199

250 *The International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart* (the Seventh Congress of the Second International) was held from August 18 to 24, 1907.

The Congress was attended by 886 delegates representing socialist parties and trade unions. The German delegation was especially numerous (289 persons), most of them trade union officials, a fact which had a strong effect on the stand of the German Social-Democratic Party in the discussion and adoption of the Congress resolutions.

The delegation from Russia consisted of 37 Social-Democrats, 21 S.R.s and 7 trade unionists. On the Bolshevik delegation were V. I. Lenin, A. A. Bogdanov, I. P. Goldenberg (Meshkovsky), B. A. Knunyants, M. M. Litvinov, A. V. Lunacharsky, N. A. Semashko and M. Tskhakaya.

The Congress examined the following questions: 1) Militarism and international conflicts. 2) Relations between political parties and trade unions. 3) Colonial question. 4) Immigration and emigration of workers. 5) Women's suffrage.

Lenin held several conferences of Bolshevik delegates to define their line in the Social-Democratic section, in the Russia delegation and at the Congress; he took part in the meetings of the Social-Democratic section, where he fought the opportunist line of the Mensheviks, and in the meetings of the Russia delegation, where he defended the R.S.D.L.P. stand against the S.R.s.

During the Congress, Lenin carried out a great deal of work in uniting the Left-wing forces in international Social-Democracy, resolutely fighting the opportunists and revisionists. The conferences he organised with Left-wingers (Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Tyszka, Georg Ledebour and others) were the first step in rallying the revolutionary Marxists.

The work of the Congress was concentrated in the committees, which drafted the resolutions for the Plenary Meetings. Lenin took part in the work of the committee on "Militarism and International Conflicts". In the discussion of the draft resolution motioned by August Bebel, Lenin proposed amendments, which were supported by the Polish Social-Democrats, and secured a basic change in the draft in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism.

There was an acute struggle on the colonial question. The opportunist majority of the committee, headed by the Dutch "socialist" Van Kol, motioned an opportunist draft resolution which was supported by a majority of the German delegation. The resolution on the colonial question adopted by the Congress denounced all colonial policy straightforwardly and without reservations.

The Congress adopted a resolution on the immigration and emigration of workers, which met the demands of the revolutionary

Social-Democrats, and of the internationalist education of workers in all countries.

Lenin attached great importance to the adoption by the Congress of a resolution on the relations between the trade unions and the political party of the working class. In the committee Lenin's line on the partisanship of the trade unions was supported by A. V. Lunacharsky. On this question, contrary to the efforts of the Right wing, the Congress adopted a resolution confirming the principle of partisanship of the trade unions.

For Lenin's articles on the Stuttgart Congress see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 75-93. p. 200

[251] At the Stuttgart Congress, Lenin first met and got to know Clara Zetkin, who, together with other Left-wing German Social-Democrats, stood up for the tactics of revolutionary Marxism, and opposed the opportunists and revisionists.

A translation of Clara Zetkin's article "International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" was edited by Lenin, who also supplied the notes, explaining the questions on which there had been a struggle against the opportunist section of the Congress delegates.

Clara Zetkin's article was published in the Bolshevik miscellany *Zarnitsy* (Summer Lightning). p. 201

[252] *Die Gleichheit* (Equality)—a Social-Democratic fortnightly, an organ of the women's labour movement in Germany, and then of the international women's movement; published at Stuttgart from 1890 to 1925; from 1892 to 1917 it was edited by Clara Zetkin. p. 201

[253] *Tovarishch* (Comrade)—a bourgeois daily published in St. Petersburg from March 15 (28), 1906, to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908). The paper was nominally independent, but was in fact an organ of the Left-wing Cadets. Among those who worked closely with the paper were S. N. Prokopovich and Y. D. Kuskova. Mensheviks also contributed to the paper. p. 202

[254] *Znamya Truda* (Banner of Labour)—the Central Organ of the S. R. Party published in Paris from July 1907 to April 1914. p. 207

[255] *The International Socialist Bureau* (I.S.B.)—the standing executive and information organ of the Second International; the decision to set up the I.S.B., consisting of representatives of the socialist parties of all countries, was adopted at the Paris Congress of the Second International in September 1900. G. V. Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky were the Russian Social-Democrats elected to the I.S.B. From 1905, Lenin was the R.S.D.L.P. representative on the I.S.B. In the I.S.B., Lenin carried on a resolute struggle against the opportunist leaders of the Second International. The I.S.B. wound up its activities in 1914. p. 207

[256] *Khlestakov*—a liar and boaster in Nikolai Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*. p. 208

[257] *French Radicals and Radical-Socialists*—a bourgeois party in

France, formalised, in 1901, actually existing since the 1880s. Until the First World War (1914-18), it mainly represented the interests of the petty and middle bourgeoisie; in the inter-war period, the influence of the big bourgeoisie increased in the party whose leaders have repeatedly headed the French Government. p. 209

258 *The Third Duma* held five sessions from November 1 (14), 1907, to June 9 (22), 1912. Elected on the basis of the June 3 electoral law the Third Duma was dominated by the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists, and was a pliant tool of the tsarist government in its counter-revolutionary policy of violence and repression against the revolutionary forces of Russia.

At the opening of the first session there were 11 parties and groups, including: Right-wing (extreme Right-wing, nationalist and moderate Right-wing)—147 deputies; Octobrists—154; Polish-Lithuanian-Byelorussian group—7; Polish kolo—11; Progressive group—28; Moslem group—8; Cadets—54; Trudovik group—14; and Social-Democrats—19.

The Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, despite the very difficult conditions, the small size of the group and some initial mistakes, did a great deal, thanks to the presence of the Bolshevik deputies, in exposing the anti-popular policy of the Third Duma, and in the political education of the proletariat and peasantry of Russia, through speeches in the Duma and work outside it. p. 209

259 *The Electoral Law of December 11 (24), 1905*, on the convocation of a "legislative" Duma was issued by the tsarist government at the height of the Moscow armed uprising. It assured the landowners and capitalists of overriding domination in the Duma. The First Duma, elected under the law, was a Cadet one. p. 209

260 *Octobrists*—members of the Octobrist Party (or the Union of October Seventeen) formed in Russia after the issue of the tsar's manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party representing and fighting for the interests of the big bourgeoisie and landowners engaged in capitalist operations; it was headed by the well-known Moscow industrialist and real-estate man A. I. Guchkov and the big landowner M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists gave full support to the tsarist government's domestic and foreign policy. p. 209

261 *Union of the Russian People*—an ultra-reactionary, diehard organisation of monarchists, formed in St. Petersburg in October 1905 to fight the revolutionary movement. It had branches in many towns of Russia.

The Union wanted to preserve the autocracy, semi-feudal landed estates and privileges for the gentry. "Orthodoxy, Autocracy National Character", the nationalistic slogan of the serf period, was its programme slogan. Its chief methods of fighting the revolution were pogroms and assassinations.

After the dispersal of the Second Duma, the Union broke up into two organisations: the Chamber of St. Michael the Archan-

gel, led by Purishkevich, which called for the use of the Third Duma for counter-revolutionary ends, and the Union of the Russian People itself, led by Dubrovin, which continued the tactics of open terrorism. Both outfits were liquidated during the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. After the October Socialist Revolution, former members of these outfits took an active part in counter-revolutionary revolts and plots against the Soviet power. p. 212

262 *A Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee* was held at Geneva from August 11 to 13 (24 to 26), 1908, and was attended by 12 persons, five Bolsheviks (V. I. Lenin, I. F. Dubrovinsky and V. K. Taratuta among them), three Mensheviks, one Latvian Social-Democrat, one Polish Social-Democrat and two Bundists. On the agenda were these questions: 1) report on the convocation of the Plenary Meeting; 2) all-Russia conference; 3) Central Bureau Abroad and promotion groups; 4) organisation of the Central Committee; 5) financial matters; 6) report of the C.C. to the Stuttgart Congress; and 7) current business.

At the Plenary Meeting the Bolsheviks administered a resolute rebuff to the Menshevik efforts to do away with the Party's Central Committee and to frustrate the convocation of a Party conference. The Plenary Meeting adopted decisions on the main items of the agenda as motioned by the Bolsheviks. On Lenin's proposal, it was decided to start work right away on the convocation of a conference, whose agenda was outlined. The Plenary Meeting adopted Bolshevik resolutions on the organisation of the Central Committee and on the establishment of a Central Bureau Abroad, the latter being based on Lenin's "Draft Resolution on the Organisation of the Central Bureau Abroad" (pp. 217-18). Lenin was elected to the C.O. Editorial Board from the Bolsheviks.

The report on the convocation of the Plenary Meeting was discussed together with the question of organising the Central Committee, for it was learned during the debate that the Mensheviks had been in correspondence with the Bund and that they had actually proposed to liquidate the C.C. as the Party's governing body under the pretext of "reorganising" it. At the Plenary Meeting itself, the Mensheviks and the Bundists tried hard to cover up the fact. It was in this connection that Lenin handed in his special "Statement on the Convocation of the C.C. Plenary Meeting" and motioned the "Draft Resolution on the Incident over the Convocation of the C.C. Plenary Meeting" which the Plenary Meeting adopted (pp. 216, 217).

After the Plenary Meeting, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, started a broad campaign in preparation for an all-Russia Party conference. p. 216

263 *The R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau Abroad* (*C.C.B.A.*) was set up by the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Plenary Meeting in August 1908 as a three-man body representing the Party abroad under the Central Committee's Bureau in Russia. Its duty was to maintain contacts with the Central Committee in Russia

and its members working abroad, supervise the activity of R.S.D.L.P. promotion groups abroad and their Central Bureau, collect dues for the C.C. fund from organisations abroad and organise the collection of money for the Central Committee. In order to unite all the promotion groups abroad and to subordinate them to a single general Party leadership the August 1908 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee authorised the C.C.B.A. to hold a special congress of these groups, which it failed to do in 1909 because of stubborn resistance from the Central Bureau of the promotion groups abroad, where the Menshevik liquidators were in control. The January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee reorganised the C.C.B.A. and limited its role in directing the Party's general affairs, correspondingly increasing that of the Central Committee Bureau in Russia. The C.C.B.A. was to have five members, three of them representing the Central Committees of non-Russian national organisations. A stable liquidationist majority was formed in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, and it did everything to disrupt the work of the central Party bodies. Its anti-Party stand was most clearly revealed in the systematic obstruction to the calling of a C.C. Plenary Meeting, which the Bolsheviks were trying to secure in view of the liquidators' failure to fulfill the decisions of the C.C.'s January Plenary Meeting. The C.C.B.A.'s liquidationist tactics made the Bolshevik representative Semashko resign from the C.C.B.A. in May 1911.

The meeting of R.S.D.L.P. C.C. members called in Paris in June 1911 adopted a decision condemning the C.C.B.A.'s political line and referred the question of its continued existence to the next Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee.

In November 1911, the Polish Social-Democratic representative was recalled from the C.C.B.A., and he was followed by the Latvian Social-Democrat. The C.C.B.A. dissolved itself in January 1912. p. 217

264 *The Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Paris from December 21 to 27, 1908 (January 3 to 9, 1909). It was attended by 16 delegates with vote, among them five Bolsheviks, three Mensheviks, five Polish Social-Democrats and three Bundists. On the agenda were the following questions: 1) Reports of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Polish Social-Democrats, the Bund Central Committee, the St. Petersburg organisation, the Moscow, Central Industrial Region, Urals and Caucasian organisations. 2) The present political situation and the Party's tasks. 3) The Social-Democratic Duma group. 4) Organisational questions in connection with the changed political conditions. 5) Local mergers with non-Russian organisations. 6) Affairs abroad. On every question, the Bolsheviks conducted a relentless struggle against the Menshevik liquidators and their supporters. The Conference resolution "On the Reports" sharply condemned liquidationism as an opportunist trend and called for the most resolute ideological and organisational struggle against any attempts to liquidate the Party.

The work of the Conference was centred on Lenin's report "On the Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party". The Mensheviks

tried in vain to get the item on the agenda. The Conference adopted the resolution motioned by Lenin with slight amendments (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 321-24).

The resolution "On the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma", motioned by the Bolsheviks, criticised the activity of the group and stated its concrete tasks. The Mensheviks objected to any indication of the Duma group's mistakes in the Conference decisions and opposed the Central Committee's right of veto in respect of the group. The otzovists also came out against the Leninist line in respect of the Duma group. The Conference adopted the Bolshevik resolution, whose text included a part of Lenin's second variant of "Practical Instructions on Voting for the Budget by the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" and all of his "Addendum to the Resolution on 'The Social-Democratic Group in the Duma'" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 326-27, 328). During the discussion of the organisational question, the Bolsheviks proposed a draft resolution stating that the Party should devote special attention to the establishment and strengthening of illegal Party organisations, making use of an extensive network of diverse legal societies for work among the masses. The Mensheviks were actually trying to liquidate the illegal Party and stop all revolutionary work. In his speech on the organisational question, Lenin sharply criticised the resolution of the Menshevik liquidators and their attempts to justify those who had deserted from the Party in the years of reaction. The Conference adopted Lenin's "Directives for the Committee on Questions of Organisation" (see present edition Vol. 15, p. 355) and set up a committee to draft a resolution. The committee, and then the Conference itself, adopted the Bolshevik draft resolution. The Conference's resolution on the local merger of national organisations resolutely rejected the principle of federalism, which the Bundists supported, as they wanted workers in the Party to be compartmentalised on national lines. During the discussion of the Central Committee's work, the Mensheviks proposed that its seat should be transferred to Russia and that the C.C. Bureau Abroad should be eliminated. The liquidationist draft resolutions were rejected. The Conference adopted a resolution recognising "the existence abroad of a general Party representative body in the form of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad as being useful and necessary". A Bolshevik resolution was adopted on the Central Organ; the Conference rejected the Menshevik proposal to have the publication of the C.O. transferred to Russia.

The Bolsheviks won a great victory at the Conference in their struggle against the Menshevik liquidators. The Conference decisions also dealt a blow at the otzovists. In the years of reaction, the Party was guided by the decisions of this Conference. Lenin said that the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. "has led the Party out on to the road, and evidently marks a turning-point in the development of the Russian working-class movement after the victory of the counter-revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 15, p. 345). p. 218

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[265] On the strength of the short record of Lenin's speech, it is impossible to say how fully his speech on the organisational question on December 24, 1908 (January 6, 1909) reflected all the questions listed in the outline, but these suggest that it may have been written during the debate on the organisational question. p. 218

[266] A reference to the Party's twelve-man Central Committee elected at the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the five meaning its narrow group working in Russia. Lenin's ironical quip about the "angelic order" of the five seems to refer to the draft resolution of the Menshevik liquidators proposing to eliminate the C.C. Bureau Abroad and concentrate all Party guidance in the hands of the five in Russia. p. 218

[267] Lenin made the statement at the Conference on December 24 1908 (January 6, 1909), after the slanderous statement by a member of the Caucasian delegation, the Menshevik N. Ramishvili (Pyotr). It became known at the Central Committee Plenary Meeting in August 1908 that the Menshevik liquidators had tried, even before the Plenary Meeting, to have the C.C. eliminated as the governing body of the Party and its activity confined to the functions of information. The plan to eliminate the C.C. was set out in a letter addressed in June 1908 by B. Gorev, a member of the C C., and A. Martynov a member of the *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* Editorial Board, "To All Menshevik Organisations". At the Plenary Meeting itself the Mensheviks tried hard to cover up their intention to liquidate the C.C. (pp. 216-17). The Bolsheviks exposed the disorganising, anti-Party activity of the liquidators. The C.C. Plenary Meeting adopted Bolshevik draft resolutions on all the main items of the agenda. At the Fifth All-Russia Conference members of the *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* Editorial Board Dan and Axelrod and C.C. member N. Ramishvili, who had credentials from the Caucasian organisation, took a common, extreme liquidationist stand. p. 219

[268] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (The Voice of the Social-Democrat)—the Menshevik organ abroad, first published in Geneva and then in Paris from February 1908 to December 1911. Its editors were P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov, A. Martynov and G. V. Plekhanov. From its first issue, the paper stood up for the liquidators, justifying their anti-Party activity. Following Plekhanov's withdrawal from the Editorial Board over the paper's liquidationist stand, it crystallised as the ideological centre of liquidationism. p. 219

[269] Lenin entered his statement of fact at the last, ninth, sitting of the Conference on December 26, 1908 (January 8, 1909). The minutes show that the sitting continued its discussion of the resolution on the Social-Democratic Duma group. During the discussion of the point on budget voting, Lenin motioned his wording of this part of the resolution (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 326-27). In the minutes there is an amendment by M. N. Lyadov proposing that the end of the resolution "and trade union organisations"

should be worded as "after exchange of opinion with representatives of the trade unions". Lyadov said this was necessary because the draft resolution under discussion tended to narrow down the Central Committee's powers. Lenin opposed Lyadov's amendment, saying that the C.C. had the right of veto in respect of the Social-Democratic Duma group. Lyadov's amendment was rejected. The decision on the C.C.'s right of veto in respect of the Duma group was adopted at the same sitting. It said that in view of its responsibility for the work of the group the C.C. must use its right of veto unhesitatingly "where the group's decisions threaten to harm the Party". p. 220

[270] Lenin motioned the statement at the Conference on December 26, 1908 (January 8, 1909) during the discussion of the resolution on the Central Committee's work. The Menshevik liquidators had tried to liquidate the Central Committee as the Party's governing body even before the Central Committee's Plenary Meeting in August 1908. Accordingly, Lenin motioned his "Statement on the Convocation of the C.C. Plenary Meeting" at the Plenary Meeting on August 12 (25), 1908 (p. 216). The resolution "On the Incident over the Convocation of the C.C. Plenary Meeting" was adopted the following day on Lenin's motion (p. 217). p. 220

[271] The plan was written in 1908 or 1909, but the Institute of Marxism-Leninism has no direct information on those lectures. Those who were there recall that Lenin read some lectures on philosophy in the Bolshevik circle in Paris in early 1909. Mention of industry in 1907 is an indication that the plan was written later than 1907, since the statistical data for that year could not have been available before the beginning of the following one.

The reference to "present-day opportunists (Bogdanov)" in point 6 of the section "Philosophical Materialism" implies that the plan was written not earlier than the second half of March 1908, just when (not later than April 3 [16]) Lenin had sent to the press his article "Marxism and Revisionism", in which he made his first press attack on Bogdanov for his opportunist, revisionist views in philosophy. Almost all the points of the section "Philosophical Materialism" are reflected in his book "*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*"; some points of the section "The Agrarian Question" are dealt with in his works on the agrarian question written in 1908. p. 221

[272] The Conference was called on Lenin's initiative, and was held in Paris from June 8 to 17 (21 to 30), 1909. It was attended by nine members of the Bolshevik Centre, the supreme body of the Bolshevik group, elected by the Bolshevik delegates at the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.; representatives of the St. Petersburg, Moscow Region and Urals organisations were also there. It was held under Lenin's guidance, and his speeches on all the main items of the agenda determined the character of its work. The otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders were represented by A. Bogdanov (Maximov) and

V. L. Shantser (Marat), who were supported by V. M. Shulyatikov (Donat), representing the Moscow Region organisation. On several questions G. Y. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, A. I. Rykov and M. P. Tomsky took a conciliatory stand.

The Conference discussed the following questions: otzovism and ultimatumism; god-building tendencies among Social-Democrats; attitude to the activity in the Duma among the other branches of Party work; the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party; the Party school being set up on Capri; unity of the group; the agitation for a Bolshevik Congress or a Bolshevik conference separate from the Party; the split-away of A. Bogdanov, and other questions. Lenin gave detailed information on the state of affairs in the Party and the Bolshevik group. His propositions became the basis of decisions adopted by the Conference.

The Conference resolutely condemned otzovism-ultimatumism as a harmful and dangerous trend within the working-class movement; it sharply criticised the philosophical views of the otzovists-ultimatumists, which were especially strikingly revealed in the idea of god-building. Bogdanov, the leader and ideologist of the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders, who had made an attempt on the unity of the Bolshevik group and had taken the way of revising Marxism and substituting for it an idealist, reactionary philosophy, was expelled from the Bolshevik group.

The Conference decisions were of great importance for the whole Party. Lenin said that they gave great harmony and completeness to the political line which had been worked out by the Party in the years of reaction. For details about the Conference see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 425-51. p. 222

[273] The resolution motioned by Stanislav ("Yer", S. Volsky—A. V. Sokolov) in the Moscow Committee expressed no confidence in the Editorial Board of *Proletary* and called for a Bolshevik conference to elect a new ideological centre. The Moscow Committee rejected the resolution "by every vote except his own" (see present edition Vol. 16, p. 53). The text of the resolution has not been discovered. p. 223

[274] *Otzovists*—representatives of an opportunist trend among the Bolsheviks. Behind a screen of revolutionary talk, the otzovists (A. Bogdanov, G. A. Alexinsky, A. V. Sokolov [S. Volsky], A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Lyadov and others) demanded the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the Third Duma and an end to work in legal organisations. They held that in the conditions of reaction the Party should conduct illegal activity only, and refused to participate in the Duma, in the workers' trade unions, co-operatives and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations. Ultimatumism was a variety of otzovism. The ultimatumists differed from the otzovists only in form. They proposed presenting the Social-Democratic Duma group with an ultimatum that it should implicitly submit to the Party Central Committee's decisions and should be recalled from the Duma in the event of noncompliance. Ultimatumism was in fact a camouflaged

otzovism, and Lenin said the ultimatumists were "bashful otzovists".

The otzovists were doing the Party a great deal of harm. Their policy could lead to the Party's separation from the masses and its transformation into a sectarian organisation incapable of mustering forces for another revolutionary upsurge. Lenin exposed the otzovists as "liquidators inside out", and declared a relentless fight against them. He wrote: "Otzovism is *not* Bolshevism but the worst political travesty of Bolshevism its worst political enemy could invent" (see present edition, Vol. 15, p. 357). p. 223

[275] *The Third* (*Second All-Russia*) *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held at Kotka, Finland, from July 21 to 23 (August 3 to 5), 1907. It was attended by 26 delegates, nine of them Bolsheviks, five Mensheviks, five Polish Social-Democrats, five Bundists and two Latvian Social-Democrats. Among the delegates were V. I. Lenin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and Rosa Luxemburg. The Conference was also attended by members and alternate members of the Party Central Committee elected at the Fifth (London) Congress. The need to call an urgent conference (two months after the Fifth Congress) was due to the changed political situation in view of the Third of June counter-revolutionary coup and the elections to the Third Duma. On the agenda of the Conference were the following questions: participation in the elections to the Third Duma, electoral agreements with other parties, electoral platform and the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions.

On the first question, the Conference heard three reports: Lenin's (against a boycott) and A. Bogdanov's (for a boycott) from the Bolsheviks, and F. Dan's, from the Mensheviks and the Bund. The Conference adopted as a basis Lenin's draft resolution calling on the Party to take part in the electoral campaign and to struggle both against the Rightist parties and against the Cadets (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, pp. 173-74). When their resolution was rejected, the Bolsheviks favouring a boycott voted for Lenin's resolution.

The Conference decided that at the first stage of the elections, the Social-Democrats should not enter into any agreements with other parties, agreements being allowed on second and subsequent ballots with all parties left of the Cadets. At the second and subsequent stages of the elections, agreements could be reached with all revolutionary and opposition parties to fight the Rightists. But in the workers' curia, the Social-Democrats were not to enter into agreements with other parties, with the exception of national Social-Democratic parties outside the R.S.D.L.P., and also the P.P.S. The Conference invited the Central Committee to draw up the electoral platform on the basis of its resolution on participation in the elections to the Third Duma. The Conference heard two reports on the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions: one for the principle of the partisanship of the trade unions, and another, for the trade unions remaining neutral. There were four draft resolutions on the reports (a Bolshevik, a Menshevik, and two compromise resolutions). The Conference decided to refer them

to the R.S.D.L P. Central Committee. The Bolshevik draft resolution was based on the draft proposed by Lenin (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, p. 180).

The importance of the Third Conference lies in the fact that it marked out the principles of the Party's tactics in the new historical situation—the period of the Stolypin reaction. p. 223

[276] *Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.* (*C.O.*)— the illegal newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* published from February 1908 to January 1917. The first issue prepared by the Bolsheviks and partly printed by a private printer at Vilno was confiscated by the tsarist secret police. Soon another attempt was made to publish the newspaper in St. Petersburg. The bulk of the printing likewise fell into the hands of the gendarmes. Subsequently, the paper was published abroad: Nos. 2-32 (February 1909-December 1913) in Paris; Nos. 33-58 (November 1914-January 1917) in Geneva. There were altogether 58 issues, of which five had supplements. Lenin was the actual editor of the paper, and his articles were the centrepieces of the newspaper. More than 80 articles and items by Lenin appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 224

[277] *The pro-Party Mensheviks*, headed by G. V. Plekhanov, opposed the liquidators in the years of reaction. While retaining their Menshevik positions, the Plekhanovites wanted the illegal Party organisation preserved and strengthened, and on that point favoured a bloc with the Bolsheviks. Lenin urged the Bolsheviks to move nearer to the pro-Party Mensheviks, saying that there could be an agreement with them on the basis of a struggle for the Party, and against the liquidators, "...without any ideological compromises, without any glossing over of tactical and other differences of opinion *within the limits* of the Party line" (see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 101). The pro-Party Mensheviks joined the Bolsheviks in working in the local Party committees, and contributed to Bolshevik publications. At the end of 1911, Plekhanov broke up the bloc with the Bolsheviks. On the pretext of fighting the "factionalism" and the split within the R.S.D.L.P., he tried to reconcile the Bolsheviks and the opportunists. In 1912, the Plekhanovites joined the Trotskyites, Bundists and liquidators in opposing the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 224

[278] A reference to A. Bogdanov's speech in the debate on the report on otzovism and ultimatumism, which said that Rosa Luxemburg had sharply condemned both. In an effort to cast doubt on her criticism, Bogdanov recalled that in 1904 and 1905 Rosa Luxemburg had opposed the Bolsheviks. p. 225

[279] The school was set up in 1909 on the isle of Capri, Italy, by the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders. The conference of the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* exposed the factional anti-Bolshevik character of the school, stating that its organisers were pursuing "not aims common to the Bolshevik wing as a whole, as an ideological trend in the Party, but the private aims of a group with a separate ideology and policy". The school was reso-

lutely condemned as a "new centre being formed for a faction breaking away from the Bolsheviks" (see present edition, Vol. 15, p. 450).

It was opened in August. Lectures were given by A. Bogdanov, G. Alexinsky, A. Lunacharsky, Maxim Gorky, M. N. Lyadov M. N. Pokrovsky and V. A. Desnitsky. Lenin rejected a formal invitation to go and lecture at the school. In a letter to its students, who were insisting that he read them a series of lectures, Lenin said that he could not do so because the school had been "*deliberately hidden away from the Party*" in a "remote foreign spot" and was of a factional character. He invited the students to come to Paris "to study Social-Democracy", instead of the "*separatist* factional '*science*'" of the otzovists and god-builders (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 472-78).

For a detailed history of the school and its characteristic, see Lenin's articles "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" and "A Shameful Fiasco" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 29-61, 85-86). p. 225

[280] A reference to the failure to attend the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (All-Russia Conference of 1908) by the representative of the Duma Social-Democratic group. The rapporteur Vishnevsky (I. P. Goldenberg) said it was accidental. p. 227

[281] A group of intellectuals acting as advisers to the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, most of them liquidators and revisionists—A. N. Potresov, S. N. Prokopovich, etc. Making use of the fact that the leaders of the Bolshevik Party were in hiding and unable to work legally with the Duma group, these persons tried to direct the group's activity along anti-Party lines, and this gave rise to the question of doing without their services. p. 227

[282] A reference to the establishment of a promotion committee for the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma. The Conference decided to set up a promotion committee, and Lenin, who was elected to the committee, was very active on it. In particular he wrote his "Explanatory Note on the Draft of the Main Grounds of the Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day" (see present edition Vol. 16, pp. 110-16). p. 227

[283] A reference to the paper which was to be published by the R.S.D.L.P. group in the Duma. Subsequently, from 1910 to 1912 the legal Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda* (The Star) was published with the participation of the Duma group. p. 228

[284] This addendum was incorporated in point three of the first section of the resolution (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, p. 223). p. 228

[285] *Dal* (Horizon)—a literary and socio-political magazine published by the liquidators in St. Petersburg. Three issues were put out: the first in 1908, the second and third in 1909. p. 229

[286] Lenin's proposal was incorporated in the resolution "On Legal Publishing" (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, p. 232). p. 229

[287] *The First World Socialist Congress of the Second International* was held in Paris in July 1889. Ideological guidance was provided by Frederick Engels. There was acute political struggle between the Marxists and the anarchists, who repudiated political struggle. The Congress decided on the need to strengthen the mass working-class movement and set up socialist parties for political struggle and the winning of power by the proletariat. The Congress said that the ultimate aim of the labour movement was socialism and, despite anarchist protests, resolved to struggle for an eight-hour working day, higher wages, abolition of payments in kind, etc. It also adopted the historic decision of celebrating May Day by staging demonstrations as a mark of proletarian solidarity. p. 231

[288] *The International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen* (Eighth Congress of the Second International) was held from August 28 to September 3, 1910. It was attended by 896 delegates representing countries in Europe, North and South America, South Africa and Australia. Russia like Austria, Britain, France and Germany, had 20 votes, of which the Social-Democrats (including the Lithuanian and Armenian Social-Democrats) had 10; the S.R.s—7; the trade unions—3. Among those who represented the R.S.D.L.P. were V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, A. M. Kollontai and A. V. Lunacharsky.

Five committees were set up for preliminary discussion and drafting of resolutions on various questions: co-operatives, trade unions, international solidarity, and unity of the trade union movement in Austria, the struggle against war; labour legislation and unemployment; miscellaneous, including socialist unity, capital punishment, Finland, Argentina, Persia, etc.

Lenin was on the co-operative committee, one of the most important ones.

The resolution on the struggle against war—"Arbitration Courts and Disarmament"—confirmed the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 on "Militarism and International Conflicts", which included; the amendments motioned by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, calling on the socialists of all countries to make use of the economic and political crisis caused by war to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The resolution of the Copenhagen Congress also bound the socialist parties and their representatives in parliaments to demand that their governments reduce armaments, and settle conflicts between states through arbitration courts, and urged the workers of all countries to stage protests against the threat of war.

Lenin held a conference of Left-wing Social-Democrats attending the Congress to rally the revolutionary Marxists in the international arena. p. 231

[289] Data on the limitation of working hours in various countries are given in the works of Karl Kautsky, *Marx's ökonomische Lehren* (*The Economic Doctrine of Marx*) and *Der Arbeitershutzgezetzgebung und der Achtstundentag* (*Legislative Labour Protection and the 8-hour Working Day*). p. 232

[290] *Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee members living abroad* was held in Paris from May 28 to June 4 (June 10 to 17), 1911. It was prepared and called under Lenin's direction apart from the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, whose liquidationist majority had repeatedly thwarted the convocation of a C.C. Plenary Meeting. Preparations for the meeting began in April 1911. It was to take measures to call a Plenary meeting of the Central Committee and eliminate the grave crisis in which the Party found itself, being virtually without central governing bodies. The meeting was attended by Bolsheviks, Polish and Latvian Social-Democrats one *Golos* man and one Bundist. The Latvian Social-Democrat M. V. Ozolin announced that in accordance with a decision of his Central Committee he would attend the meeting with voice only. The Bundist Lieber said that he had not been authorised by the Bund C.C. to represent it at the meeting.

In view of the forthcoming elections to the Fourth Duma, the meeting outlined measures to elaborate the Party's tactics in the election campaign and draft an electoral platform. The main item on the agenda was the calling of a Party conference. Because it was impossible to call a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee right away, the meeting undertook to call a conference, and set up an Organising Commission to prepare the conference. The meeting adopted Lenin's proposal to set up a Russian collegium for practical work in preparing the conference (see p. 240). The meeting decisions provided for invitations to Party organisations abroad to work together on the Organising Commission. Lenin, who voted for the resolution as a whole, lodged a protest against the invitation to the Organising Commission of representatives of anti-Party groups—the *Golos* and *Vperyod* followers (pp. 240-41).

The meeting condemned the anti-Party, factional policy of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, and decided to refer the question of its existence to the C.C. Plenary Meeting. In the voting on the last section of the resolution, Lenin abstained, because he insisted on an immediate reorganisation of the C.C.B.A. To handle technical matters (Party publishing, transportation, etc.). the meeting set up a Technical Commission which was to be responsible to the group of members and alternate members of the Central Committee attending the meeting.

A special bulletin issued after the meeting—"Announcement"—set out the circumstances in which the meeting had been called, its composition and purposes. It also contained the resolutions of the meeting.

This meeting was an important step in mustering the Party forces, in uniting them for the struggle against the *Golos* liquidators, the *Vperyod* followers and the Trotskyites, and for strengthening the Party. Its decisions helped to rally and strengthen local Party organisations. To prepare a general Party conference, Lenin sent to Russia experienced Party workers—the Bolsheviks G. K. Orjonikidze (Sergo), B. A. Breslav (Zakhar) and I. I. Shvarts (Semyon). By September 1911, the meeting decisions were approved by the committees and the Social-Democratic organisations

of a number of towns in Russia. In September 1911, there was formed the Russian Organising Commission, consisting of representatives of a number of Social-Democratic organisations. The Commission prepared the convocation in January 1912 of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. For the material on the meeting see also present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 195-205. p. 233

[291] The document is printed from a copy in F. E. Dzerzhinsky's hand. The original written by Lenin has not been found.

The minutes of the June meeting of the C.C. members contain no indication that Lenin made the report at the meeting. It might have been given to the conferees before the meeting opened. p. 233

[292] *The Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee*, known as the "unity" meeting, was held in Paris from January 2 to 23 (January 15 to February 5), 1910.

It was attended by representatives of all factions and groups and of non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations. The conciliators had a majority at the meeting. Lenin conducted a persistent struggle against the opportunists and conciliators to secure the condemnation of liquidationism and otzovism and to bring the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks closer together. On the agenda were these questions: 1) Report by the Russian Bureau of the C.C. 2) Report by the C.C. Bureau Abroad. 3) Report by the Editorial Board of the Central Organ. 4) Reports by the Central Committees of the non-Russian Social-Democratic Parties. 5) State of affairs in the Party. 6) Convocation of a regular Party conference. 7) Rules of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, etc.

On Lenin's insistence, the Plenary Meeting adopted the resolution "On the State of Affairs in the Party", which condemned liquidationism and otzovism, recognised the danger of these trends and urged the need to fight them. Lenin said that the January Plenary Meeting finally determined the Party's tactical line during the counter-revolutionary period, deciding, in pursuance of the resolutions of the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (1908), that liquidationism and otzovism were manifestations of bourgeois influence on the proletariat. The Plenary Meeting also connected the question of the need to have real Party unity, with the Party's ideological and political tasks in the current historical period. At the same time, Lenin sharply condemned the Plenary Meeting's conciliatory decisions.

For details about the Plenary Meeting see Lenin's "Notes of a Publicist," (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 195-259). p. 233

[293] A reference to the members and alternate members of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee elected at the Fifth (London) Congress, which was held from April 30 to May 19 (May 13 to June 1), 1907. p. 234

[294] The Rules of the Central Committee, adopted at the January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, said: "Plenary Meetings (of 15 members) shall be attended by

1) members of the collegium operating in Russia; 2) members of the C.C. Bureau Abroad, with the exception of those who are not members of the C.C.; 3) if these do not add up to the figure of 15, the other candidates shall attend the Plenary Meeting in the following order: a) candidates of the London Congress doing any Party work in Russia; b) members of the C.C. and alternate members living abroad and engaged in work assigned to them by the Central Committee" (*K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, p. 239). p. 234

[295] *The Vperyod group*—an anti-Party group of otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders, organised on the initiative of A. Bogdanov and G. A. Alexinsky in December 1909, following the break-up of the otzovist-ultimatumist factional centre, the Capri school; it had a periodical of the same name.

The group, without any support in the working-class movement, broke up in 1913 and 1914, but was formally dissolved after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. p. 235

[296] *Diskussionny Listok* (Discussion Bulletin)—a supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.; it was published in Paris under a decision of the January Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee from March 6 (19), 1910, to April 29 (May 12), 1911. There were three issues. On its Editorial Board were representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, ultimatumists, Bundists, Plekhanovites, Polish Social-Democrats and Latvian Social-Democrats. It carried Lenin's articles "Notes of a Publicist", "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" and "A Conversation Between a Legalist and an Opponent of Liquidationism" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 195-259, 374-92, and Vol. 17, pp. 179-88). p. 235

[297] A reference to the School Commission (Committee) set up by the January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, to organise a Party school abroad. It consisted of nine persons: two Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks, two *Vperyod* supporters, and one each from the national organisations—the Bund, the Latvian and the Polish Social-Democrats. p. 235

[298] *The Fourth Duma* opened on November 15 (28), 1912. Elections were held in the autumn of 1912 under the reactionary electoral law of June 3 (16), 1907, and were accompanied by a series of government measures designed to create a Black-Hundred majority in the Duma. Lenin described the election campaign and assessed the class and party composition of the Duma in his article "Results of the Elections" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 493-518).

The Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma included six Bolsheviks—A. Y. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov, N. R. Shagov and R. V. Malinovsky (who later was exposed as a provocateur), seven Mensheviks and one member who did not enjoy full rights (the Warsaw deputy, E. J. Jagiello), and who sided with the Mensheviks. Making use of their slight numerical superiority, the Mensheviks hampered the work of the group

and blocked the passage of a number of measures proposed by the Bolsheviks. In October 1913, the Bolshevik deputies, on instructions from the Central Committee, withdrew from the united Social-Democratic group and formed their own. Lenin gave day-to-day guidance to the Bolshevik deputies and taught them to make revolutionary use of the Duma rostrum.

The Duma proved to be incapable of settling any major questions which the country's objective development brought up, and its work increasingly boiled down to wordy debate. Its legislative activity was largely designed to strengthen such pillars of the autocracy as the courts, the church and the police.

The Duma approved Russia's entry into the First World War. The Mensheviks and the S.R.s took a defencist stand. Only the Bolshevik Party resolutely opposed the war. The Bolshevik group refused to vote the war credits and started revolutionary propaganda in the masses. In November 1914, the Bolshevik deputies were arrested and committed for trial.

In August 1915, the bourgeois and landowner groups set up a "Progressive bloc", consisting of more than one-half of the deputies. Lenin said it was "the liberal-Octobrist bloc for the purpose of reaching an understanding with the tsar on a programme of reforms and mobilising industry for the victory over Germany" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 378).

On February 26 (March 11) 1917, the tsar announced the dissolution of the Fourth Duma, but, while not daring to protest openly the deputies decided to continue their sittings unofficially. On February 27 (March 12) they formed a Provisional Committee of the Duma to fight the revolution and save the monarchy. By agreement with the S.R. and Menshevik representatives of the Petrograd Soviet, the Committee decided to set up a bourgeois Provisional Government. The Committee's members were rabid enemies of the revolution, and at their private meetings demanded the establishment of a military dictatorship and the abolition of the Soviets. On October 6 (19), 1917, under the pressure of the revolutionary masses, the bourgeois Provisional Government was forced to decree the dissolution of the Duma. p. 235

[299] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal monthly of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg from January 1910 to September 1914. It was edited by A. N. Potresov, and among its contributors were F. I. Dan and S. O. Tsederbaum (V. Yezhov). It was the liquidationist centre in Russia. A resolution of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (1912) said that "a section of the Social-Democrats, grouped round the journals *Nasha Zarya* and *Dyelo Zhizni*, have openly come out in defence of a trend which the whole Party has recognised as a product of bourgeois influence on the proletariat" (*K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, p. 283). p. 235

[300] *Dyelo Zhizni* (Life Cause)—a legal journal, an organ of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from January to October 1911. There were nine issues. p. 235

[301] *Zvezda* (The Star)—a legal Bolshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from December 16 (29), 1910, to April 22 (May 5), 1912. It was initially published as a weekly, twice a week from January 21 (February 3), 1912, and three times a week from March 8 (21), 1912.

Lenin gave ideological guidance to the newspaper: he carried on a correspondence with the members of the Editorial Board, directing their work, criticising their mistakes, especially in the initial period of its publication, struggling for the paper's consistent Marxist approach. A great deal of editorial and organisational work was done by N. N. Baturin, N. G. Poletayev, K. S. Yeremeyev and M. S. Olminsky. Among those who took an active part in the paper were V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich and Demyan Bedny. It carried a number of articles by G. V. Plekhanov. Lenin got Maxim Gorky to write for it. *Zvezda* enjoyed great prestige among the working people of Russia. p. 236

[302] The attendant circumstances were as follows: the *Golos* Menshevik B. I. Gorev (Goldman) came out against the presence at the meeting of the representatives of non-Russian organisations, M. I. Lieber of the Bund and M. V. Ozolin of the Latvian Social-Democrats, without mandates from their Central Committees. Lieber said they had had no time to contact their centres and that he was not representing the Bund. p. 237

[303] A reference to the speeches by Gorev (Goldman) and Lieber, who said that there were members of the Russia Bureau in Russia who should be contacted before the C.C. Plenary Meeting is called abroad. p. 237

[304] *The Central Committee Bureau in Russia* was elected at a general meeting of the Collegium of C.C. members, which was active in Russia from 1908. The Bureau was in charge of all the affairs of the Russian Collegium in between general meetings of the C.C. In 1910 and 1911, after the January 1910 Plenary Meeting of the C.C., the Bureau in Russia consisted of the following members and alternate members of the Central Committee: the Bolsheviks I. P. Goldenberg (Meshkovsky) and I. F. Dubrovinsky (Innokenty), and after their arrest, V. P. Nogin (Makar) and G. D. Leiteisen (Lindov). The Menshevik liquidators, members and alternate members of the C.C., kept aloof from its work, while I. A. Isuv (Mikhail), P. A. Bronstein (Yuri) and K. M. Yermolayev (Roman) not only refused to participate but declared that they considered the very existence of the C.C. to be harmful. All the efforts of the Bureau to call the Russian Collegium failed.

In March 1911, following the arrest of Nogin and Leiteisen, the Central Committee Bureau in Russia ceased to exist. Lenin gave a positive evaluation of the Russia Bureau's efforts to organise work in Russia and call the C.C.'s Russian Collegium, but sharply criticised the members' conciliatory stand.

At the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., the Bureau in Russia was re-established. It consisted of C.C. mem-

bers: G. K. Orjonikidze, S. S. Spandaryan, J. V. Stalin and Y. M. Sverdlov, and alternate C.C. members: M. I. Kalinin, Y. D. Stasova and others. In view of frequent arrests of Party workers in Russia, the composition of the Bureau was subsequently changed many times, new members being co-opted in place of the old ones. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, the Bureau in Russia ceased to operate. p. 238

[305] A statement by the Bundist Ionov (F. M. Koigen) said that not having any powers from the Bund's C.C., he was unable to attend the meeting and that he would send on his invitation to the Bund's C.C. at the earliest opportunity. p. 238

[306] A reference to the speech by Lieber (Ber) to the effect that there was no need to decide on the question of a C.C. Plenary Meeting by having an urgent meeting of C.C. members, but that a "legal way out" should be sought through the C.C.B.A. p. 238

[307] The speech was in reply to Lieber's statement that the majority of the C.C.B.A. wanted a Plenary Meeting called and were prepared to adopt an official resolution on this question. p. 239

[308] A reference to the proposal by the liquidationist majority of the C.C.B.A. to call a C.C. Plenary Meeting in Russia. p. 239

[309] This speech, like the next one, is connected with the discussion of the persons entitled to attend a C.C. Plenary Meeting. p. 239

[310] *The Organising Commission* (*Organising Commission Abroad*, *O.C.A.*) for convening a general Party conference was set up by the C.C. members' meeting on June 1 (14), 1911, and consisted of Bolsheviks, conciliators and Polish Social-Democrats. Other organisations and groups abroad invited to take part in the commission did not send their representatives. The O.C. sent G. K. Orjonikidze as its agent to Russia to work for the preparation of a general Party conference, and issued an appeal "To All Social-Democratic Party Organisations, Groups and Circles", urging them to start elections to the Russian Organising Commission.

As a result of the work carried out by the Bolsheviks, the R.O.C. was setup. At the end of October, the O.C.A. discussed the R.O.C.'s "Announcement" of its constitution and resolutions stating that it assumed full powers in calling the conference and that the Organising and Technical Commissions Abroad were to be subordinate to the R.O.C. When the conciliatory majority of the O.C.A. refused to abide by these decisions, the Bolsheviks left the O.C.A. On October 30 (November 12), Orjonikidze, who had arrived in Paris, gave a report in the O.C.A. on the activity of the R.O.C. after which the O.C.A. was forced to recognise the governing role of the R.O.C. But soon the O.C.A. started an open struggle against the R.O.C. On November 20 (December 3) it issued a leaflet, "Open Letter to the Russian Organising Commission", accusing the latter of factional activity. The O.C.A.'s anti-Party activity was exposed by Orjonikidze in his "Letter to the Editorial Board" carried in No. 25 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* on December 8 (21), 1911.

All the work of calling the general Party conference, held in January 1912, was carried out by the R.O.C. which rallied together the illegal Party organisations in Russia. p. 240

[311] The statement also bears the signature of G. Y. Zinoviev. p. 240

[312] A reference to the resolution of the June meeting of the C.C. members "On Convening a Party Conference". p. 240

[313] The statement also bears the signature of G. Y. Zinoviev. p. 241

[314] *The Technical Commission* (*Technical Commission Abroad*, *T.C.A.*) was set up by the June meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. members at their sitting of June 1 (14), 1911, to perform the technical work in connection with Party publishing, transportation, etc. As a temporary organ, pending a C.C. Plenary Meeting, the T.C.A. was subordinate to the group of C.C. members who took part in the June meeting. It consisted of one representative each from the Bolsheviks, the conciliators and the Polish Social-Democrats. The conciliatory majority of the T.C.A.—M. K. Vladimirov and Y. L. Leder, who supported him—held up the issue of money for the O.C.A., which was to go into a fund for the convocation of the Party conference, as well as appropriations for publishing the Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda*, it also tried to hold up the publication of the Party's Central Organ, the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. In its press organ—*Informatsionny Bulleten* (Information Bulletin)—the T.C.A. attacked Lenin and the Bolsheviks. During the discussion of the "Announcement" and the resolution of the R.O.C. at the T.C.A.'s sitting of October 19 (November 1), the Bolshevik M. F. Vladimirsky motioned that the T.C.A. abide by the decisions of the R.O.C. The motion was rejected. Vladimirsky withdrew, and the Bolsheviks severed all ties with the T.C.A. p. 241

[315] A reference to the *Party school at Longjumeau*, a few kilometres from Paris, set up by the Bolsheviks under Lenin's guidance in the spring of 1911 for the workers of Party organisations of the major proletarian centres in Russia. There were 13 students representing Moscow, St. Petersburg, Baku, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nikolayev, Tiflis, Sormovo, Yekaterinoslav Gubernia, Dabrowa District (Poland) and 5 external students. Among them were I. S. Belostotsky, B. A. Breslav, I. D. Chugurin, A. I. Dogadov, A. I. Ivanova, G. K. Orjonikidze, I. V. Prisyagin, E. Prukhnyak, I. I. Shvarts and Y. D. Zevin. Most of them were Bolsheviks, but there were some pro-Party Mensheviks and one *Vperyod* man. The lecturers were chosen by the School Committee together with the students. Invitations to lecture were sent out to representatives of various trends in the R.S.D.L.P. The Mensheviks L. Martov, F. I. Dan and others declined, and most of the lecturers were Bolsheviks.

Lenin was the school's ideological guide and its principal lecturer. When two-thirds of the students had arrived, Lenin held classes on the *Communist Manifesto* by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Lenin read 29 lectures (43 hours) on political econ-

omy and 12 lectures (18 hours) on the agrarian question. Under the initial plan, the lectures on philosophy were to be given by G. V. Plekhanov. When it turned out that he was not coming after all, the students asked Lenin to give the lectures, and he read three on the materialist view of history. Also at the students' request, Lenin spoke on the present situation and the state of affairs in the Party.

After completing the course on August 17 (30), the students went back for illegal work in Russia. They took an active part in preparing and holding the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Many of those who graduated from the school subsequently became leading Party and Soviet Government workers. p. 241

[316] This plan was the basis of a lecture, "Manifesto of the Liberal Labour Party", which Lenin read in Paris on November 14 (27), 1911.

A reference to an article by N. A. Rozhkov, "The Present State of Russia and the Main Task of the Labour Movement at the Present Moment", published in the journal *Nasha Zarya* No. 9-10 in 1911. p. 242

[317] The proposal was motioned by Lenin at a meeting of Bolshevik groups abroad held in Paris on December 16 (29), 1911, when it was examining the question of whether there should be a detailed discussion of the draft Rules of the Organisation Abroad at the meeting itself, or whether they should be referred to the Committee of the Organisation Abroad for co-ordination with the groups and final approval. Lenin's proposal was adopted by eight votes to one.

The meeting was held in Paris from December 14 to 17 (27 to 30), 1911, under Lenin's direction. It was called on the initiative of the Paris circle for the promotion of the Bolshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and was aimed at uniting the Bolshevik forces abroad and promoting the convocation of an all-Russia Party conference. It was attended by 11 delegates with vote from the Bolshevik groups of Paris, Nancy, Zurich, Davos, Geneva, Liége, Berne, Bremen and Berlin. The Bolsheviks of Toulouse, Lausanne, London, Brussels, Antwerp, Copenhagen, Nice and other cities were unable to send their representatives for technical and financial reasons. Some Bolshevik groups managed to send in detailed reports. On the agenda were these items: 1) reports of the Organising Bureau and delegates from the localities; 2) the state of affairs in the Party; 3) the state of affairs abroad and attitude to the various trends; 4) organisational matters; 5) the tasks of work abroad; 6) attitude to the conference; 7) other matters.

The meeting declared the final break-away of the *Golos* and *Vperyod* supporters from the Party, their complete bankruptcy, and approved the measures of the June meeting of the C.C. members on convening a Party conference. The meeting adopted the resolution motioned by Lenin on support for the Russian Organising Commission and the conference it was trying to call, and resolved to set up the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad (with local sections) on the basis of conducting a true Party line, without allowing any

agreements with the liquidators; it also elected the Committee of the Organisation Abroad.

The meeting united the Bolshevik groups abroad into a single organisation, approved the formation of the R.O.C. and declared that "it is the duty of every Party member to support it to the utmost". p. 243

[318] *The Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad* (*C.O.A.*) was elected at a meeting of the Bolshevik groups abroad held in Paris in December 1911. It included N. A. Semashko, M. F. Vladimirsky, Inessa Armand and others. The work of the C.O.A. was directed by Lenin. It played an important part in rallying the Party forces and in the struggle against the Menshevik liquidators, the conciliators, the Trotskyites and other opportunists. The C.O.A. responded to all the major events in Russia and measures in directing Party work and the Russian revolutionary movement, and also helped the C.C. to publish Party literature abroad. It ceased functioning in 1917. p. 243

[319] The exact date and the circumstances in which Lenin gave this report on the political situation have not been established. p. 243

[320] *Lidvaliad*—the case of the big swindler and speculator E. Lidval and V. I. Gurko, Deputy Minister for the Interior. With Gurko's help, Lidval concluded a deal with the government to supply 10 million poods of rye to the famine-stricken gubernias of Russia from October to December 1906. Having received a sizable advance through Gurko from the treasury, Lidval brought up less than 10 per cent of the total quantity of grain to the railway lines by mid-December 1906. This embezzlement and speculation on the famine were exposed and widely reported, forcing the tsarist government to institute legal proceedings. But apart from being removed from his post, Gurko was not punished in any way. p. 243

[321] A reference to the resolution of the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (All-Russia Conference of 1908), "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party" (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, pp. 195-97). p. 244

[322] A reference to the explanations by Minister of Public Education L. A. Kasso in the Fourth Duma in connection with the question entered by 44 deputies on December 14 (27), 1912, over the arrest of 34 pupils of secondary schools in St. Petersburg at a meeting in Vitmer's private school. The pupils were suspected by the secret police of belonging to an illegal circle. The question was discussed at the 12th 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th sittings of the Duma. On February 6 (19), 1913, a majority adopted a formula to proceed with the business of the Duma, recognising the Minister's explanations as being unsatisfactory. p. 244

[323] *The Sixth* (*Prague*) *All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held from January 5 to 17 (18 to 30), 1912. It had the actual importance of a congress and was directed by Lenin. He gave reports

on the present situation and the Party's tasks, on the work of the International Socialist Bureau, and also spoke on other questions. Lenin drafted resolutions on all the important items of the agenda.

Of tremendous theoretical and practical importance were the Conference resolutions on "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators" and "The Party Organisation Abroad". The Conference declared that by their behaviour the liquidators had finally placed themselves outside the Party, and expelled them from the R.S.D.L.P. The Conference condemned the activity of anti-Party groups abroad: the Mensheviks supporting *Golos*, the *Vperyod* group and the Trotskyites. It recognised as absolutely necessary the existence of a single Party organisation abroad working under the supervision and direction of the Central Committee to promote the Party, and said that the groups abroad which "refuse to submit to the Russian centre of Social-Democratic work, i.e., the Central Committee, and introduce disorganisation because of their separate contacts with Russia in obviation of the Central Committee, have no right to use the name of the R.S.D.L.P." The Conference adopted a resolution on "The Character and Organisational Forms of Party Work", approved Lenin's draft organisational Rules of the Party, endorsed the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P., elected the Central Committee and set up the C.C. Bureau in Russia.

The Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. played an outstanding part in building up the Bolshevik Party, a new type of party, and in strengthening its unity. It summed up the results of a whole historical period of the Bolshevik struggle against the Mensheviks, and by expelling the Menshevik liquidators from the Party, consolidated the Bolshevik victory; the Conference laid down the Party's political line and tactics in the conditions of the fresh revolutionary upsurge.

The Prague Conference was of great international importance. It showed the revolutionary elements of the parties in the Second International an example of resolute struggle against opportunism, taking the struggle to a complete break with the opportunists. For details about the Prague Conference see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 451-86. p. 245

[324] Lenin made the remark in connection with the proposal of a vote of thanks to the R.O.C. for the work it had done in rallying all the Party organisations in Russia and calling the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., and to let its representative attend the Conference with vote (see present edition, Vol. 17, p. 462). p. 245

[325] *The Russian Organising Commission* (*R.O.C.*) was set up by the June 1911 meeting of the C.C. members to convene an all-Russia Party conference. It was constituted at a meeting of representatives of local Party organisations at the end of September and functioned until the opening of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 246

[326] A reference to the sitting of the International Socialist Bureau in Zurich on September 23 and 24, 1911. p. 247

[327] During the work of the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen, members of the Russian delegation, V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov and Adolf Warski (A. S. Warszawski), representing the Polish Social-Democrats, sent a protest to the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party over the publication in *Vorwärts*, its Central Organ, of L. Trotsky's article containing slanderous attacks on the R.S.D.L.P. (for the protest, see Lenin, Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 47, pp. 296-98).

Lenin also came out against Trotsky's slanderous campaign, in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 17 of September 25 (October 8), 1910, in an article entitled "How Certain Social-Democrats Inform the International About the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P.", and in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 3 of April 29 (May 12), 1911, in his article "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 284-86, 374-92). p. 247

[328] A reference to the walk-out from the Magdeburg Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party, held from September 18 to 24, 1910, of the Social-Democratic deputies of the Baden Landtag. The Social-Democratic group of the Baden Landtag voted for the government budget despite the decisions of earlier party congresses which prohibited Social-Democratic deputies from voting for the bourgeois government's budget. By an overwhelming majority of 289 votes to 80, the Magdeburg Congress condemned the opportunist tactics of the Baden Social-Democrats. The latter then announced that they would reserve the right not to submit to Congress decisions. In response, the majority of the Congress adopted a special resolution immediately expelling from the Party anyone violating the Congress decision on budget voting. Before the resolution was adopted, the Baden deputies staged a walk-out.

For details about the Magdeburg Congress see Lenin's article "Two Worlds" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 305-13). p. 247

[329] A reference to the differences between the Czech and Austrian Social-Democrats over trade union unity. At the Extraordinary Congress of Austrian Trade Unions in December 1905, the Czech Social-Democrats demanded the establishment of national trade unions with jurisdiction extending over the whole of Austria. The proposal was rejected by a vast majority, but the Czechs refused to submit to the Congress decision. In 1910, the Austrian Social-Democrats took the matter to the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen, which rejected the separatist Czech proposal and came out unanimously for trade union unity. p. 247

[330] A reference to the letter sent by the opportunist Molkenbuhr to the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party proposing that no criticism should be made of the German Government's colonial policy in view of the impending elections to the Reichstag. Rosa Luxemburg published the letter. p. 248

[331] A reference to the resolution on the organisational question adopted by the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in Paris from December 21 to 27, 1908 (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, pp. 201-03). p. 250

[332] A reference to the illegal Social-Democratic Party of Germany during the period of the Anti-Socialist Law introduced by the Bismarck government in 1878 to fight the working-class and socialist movement. The law banned all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, mass workers' organisations and the labour press; socialist literature was confiscated, the Social-Democrats were harassed and exiled. But the Social-Democratic Party prevailed in the face of these persecutions, and reorganised its activity to meet the illegal conditions; its Central Organ, the newspaper *Sozial-Demokrat*, was published abroad and party congresses met regularly (1880, 1883 and 1887) outside the country; in the underground in Germany, the Social-Democratic organisations and groups were being rapidly revived under the leadership of an illegal C.C. At the same time, the party made wide use of legal opportunities to strengthen its ties with the masses, and its influence continued to grow: the number of votes it won at the Reichstag elections in 1890 was more than three times greater than in 1878. The German Social-Democrats received great assistance from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. In 1890, the Anti-Socialist Law was abolished under pressure from the massive and ever growing working-class movement. p. 252.

[333] The plan was printed in the text of an announcement issued by the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad. It said:

Comrade Lenin
will give a lecture on the
"**Revolutionary Upsurge of the Russian Proletariat**"
at Alcazar Hall
190 Avenue de Choisy
on Thursday, June 13, 1912.

The questions listed in the plan are dealt with in a number of Lenin's works written in 1912, especially in his article "Revolutionary Upswing" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 102-09).

The text of the announcement was reproduced in the journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* (Historical Archives) No. 2 in 1955. p. 254

[334] A reference to the fusillade of unarmed workers at the Lena gold mines in Siberia on April 4 (17), 1912. News of the tragedy aroused the working class of Russia, and the country was swept by demonstrations, meetings and protest strikes. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma tabled a question to the tsarist government over the Lena fusillade. The tsarist Minister Maklakov have this brazen reply: "That's how it was, and that's how it will be in the future!" This intensified the indignation of the workers. Up to 300,000 workers took part in the protest strikes against the Lena fusillade, and they merged with the May Day strikes involving

up to 400,000 workers. Lenin wrote: "The Lena shootings led to the revolutionary temper of the masses developing into a revolutionary upswing of the masses" (see present edition, Vol. 18, p. 103). p. 254

[335] The article, written in September 1912, dealt with the state of affairs in the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which was split. One section consisted of those who supported the Party's Chief Executive headed by Rosa Luxemburg and J. Tyszka—the so-called "Zarzadists". On the whole, the Chief Executive took an internationalist stand and waged a struggle in Poland against nationalism and reformism, but followed an erroneous line on the struggle within the R.S.D.L.P., taking a conciliatory attitude to the Menshevik liquidators; it tended to detach itself from the general Party life and weakened contacts with the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, despite the fact that the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania was an autonomous organisation within the R.S.D.L.P. In the struggle against the mistakes of the Chief Executive, there took shape an opposition represented by the so-called "Rozlamists", who relied on the Party's Warsaw organisation headed by former members of the Chief Executive J. Hanecki, A. Malecki and others. Rozlamists were in close contact with the Bolsheviks and supported their action. Lenin said that in that period the Warsaw organisation was the strongest and most consistently revolutionary of all the organisations of the Polish Social-Democrats (see Lenin's article "The Split Among the Polish Social-Democrats", Vol. 18, pp. 479-83).

The article was aimed against the erroneous line of the Chief Executive, which objectively inflicted grave harm on the unity of the working-class movement in Russia as a whole and played into the hands of the anti-Bolshevik trends in the R.S.D.L.P. While criticising the grave errors of Rosa Luxemburg and J. Tyszka, Lenin put a great value on their activity and tried to help them to take a correct stand. Lenin was known to regard Rosa Luxemburg as an outstanding leader of the Polish, German and the entire international working-class movement. He wrote later that for all her mistakes, Rosa Luxemburg was "an eagle" and that "Communists all over the world cherish her memory" (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 210).

The article was written for the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* which was under the influence of the Left-wing Social-Democrats; it was translated into German by Malecki (see Lenin, Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 48, Document 72). The article was not published. p. 255

[336] A reference to the charge against Karl Radek that he had committed a number of unethical acts. This was levelled by a Party court set up by the Chief Executive of the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. By a decision of the court Radek was expelled from the ranks of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania.

A commission to review the court's decision was set up in Paris in early September 1913 on the initiative of the Bureau of the sections of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania abroad (Rozlamists). Lenin supported the review of the Radek case, for he believed that the charge against Radek was the outcome of the sharp struggle which the Chief Executive was waging against the Rozlamists. The commission worked for five months and arrived at the conclusion that there had been no ground for committing Radek to trial by a Party court and expelling him from the Party. It proposed that Radek should be considered a member of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania and of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 255

[337] A reference to Martov's libellous pamphlet *Saviours or Abolitionists?* (*Who Destroyed the R.S.D.L.P. and How*) published by *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Paris, 1911. p. 255

[338] A reference to the resolution "The State of Affairs in the Party" adopted by the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. Plenary Meeting in January 1910 (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh...*, Part I, pp. 234-33). p. 255

[339] A reference to the members of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad J. Tyszka, from the Polish Social-Democrats, M. Lieber, from the Bund, and Shvarts (Y. Elias), from the Latvian Social-Democrats. p. 258

[340] A reference to the resolution "Liquidationism and the Group of Liquidators" adopted by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 480-81). p. 258

[341] A reference to the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held from January 5 to 17 (18 to 30), 1912. See Note 323. p. 259

[342] This is a reply to the article published in the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Leipziger Volkszeitung* on September 28, 1912, on the liquidators' conference held in Vienna in August 1912, which formalised the anti-Party (so-called August) bloc. The article tended to mislead the German Social-Democrats, distorted the true character of the conference and championed the liquidators.

The article written by Lenin and signed by the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. was printed in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* No. 235 of October 9, 1912, and was soon sent by Lenin to the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau Camille Huysmans. The article, Lenin wrote, "will give you an idea of this ostensibly Social-Democratic conference" (see Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 48, Document 76).

Leipziger Volkszeitung—a Social-Democratic daily published from 1894 to 1933; for a number of years it was edited by Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg, and was an organ of the Left-wing Social-Democrats. From 1917 to 1922, it was the organ of the

German "Independents"; after 1922, the organ of the Right-wing Social-Democrats. p. 260

[343] Promotion groups of Social-Democratic functionaries of the open working-class movement were set up by the Menshevik liquidators from the end of 1910 to counteract the illegal Party organisations. These were small groups of intellectuals which had no ties with the working class. p. 260

[344] A reference to the legal organs of the Menshevik liquidators: the journal *Nasha Zarya* published in St. Petersburg from 1910 to 1916, and the newspaper *Nevsky Golos* published from May to August 1912. p. 260

[345] *Luch* (Ray)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg from September 16 (29), 1912, to July 5 (18), 1913. Altogether 237 issues were put out. The newspaper was mainly run on the contributions of liberals. Its ideological leaders were P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan, L. Martov and A. S. Martynov. On the pages of the paper, the liquidators attacked the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks, preached the opportunist slogan of setting up a so-called "open party", opposed revolutionary mass strikes by workers and tried to revise the key propositions of the Party Programme. Lenin wrote that *Luch* was enslaved by liberal policy and said it was an organ of the renegades. p. 261

[346] The manifesto was written by Lenin in early October 1912 and was published by the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. as a separate leaflet. On October 10 (23), Lenin sent the manifesto to the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, Camille Huysmans, asking him to convey the text of the document to the secretaries of the Social-Democratic parties and the press. It was soon published in German in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* and *Vorwärts*, in French in the Belgian newspaper *Le Peuple*, and in French, German and English in the *Bulletin* of the International Socialist Bureau. It was also published by the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad and as a special supplement to No. 28-29 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* of November 5 (18), 1912. p. 262

[347] *The First Balkan War* (*October 1912-May 1913*) was fought between Turkey and the countries of the Balkan alliance—Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. It ended in the defeat of Turkey, which under the London Peace Treaty lost almost all her Balkan possessions. The Slav regions, Macedonia and Thrace, were liberated; the Albanian people won national independence. The First Balkan War, despite the fact that the monarchy and the bourgeoisie of the Balkan countries pursued their own dynastic and plunderous aims, was on the whole progressive—it marked the liberation of the Balkan people from the Turkish yoke and dealt a blow at the survivals of the serf system. Lenin said it was "one link in the chain of world events marking the collapse of the medieval state of affairs in Asia and Eastern Europe" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 39). p. 262

[348] *Golos Moskvy* (Voice of Moscow)—a daily, organ of the Octobrists, published in Moscow from 1906 to 1915. p. 264

[349] *Russkoye Slovo* (Russian Word)—a daily published in Moscow from 1895 (the first, pilot issue appeared in 1894); its publisher was I. D. Sytin. Nominally independent, the paper upheld the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie from a moderate liberal stand. It had good news coverage and was Russia's first paper to send its own correspondents to all the major cities of Russia and many world capitals.

In November 1917, the paper was closed down for running slanderous anti-Soviet reports. From January 1918 it was published under the name of *Novoye Slovo* (New Word) and *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word), and was finally closed down in July 1918. p. 265

[350] *Pravda* (The Truth)—a legal Bolshevik daily; the first issue was published in St. Petersburg on April 22 (May 5), 1912. The decision to start a mass working-class daily was adopted by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

It appeared at the time of the fresh revolutionary upsurge, when the country was swept by a wave of mass political strikes over the Lena fusillade. The paper was run on funds collected by the workers. It had a circulation of up to 40,000 copies, with some issues having a printing of 60,000. Lenin said the starting of the workers' daily was a great historic undertaking carried out by the St. Petersburg workers. Lenin provided the ideological direction, almost daily wrote for it, and gave instructions to its editors. Among its editors and contributors at various periods were N. N. Baturin, Demyan Bedny, M. I. Kalinin, N. K. Krupskaya, S. V. Malyshev, L. R. and V. R. Menzhinsky, V. M. Molotov, V. I. Nevsky, M. S. Olminsky, N. I. Podvoisky, N. G. Poletayev, M. A. Savelyev, K. N. Samoilova, Y. M. Sverdlov, N. A. Skrypnik, J. V. Stalin, P. I. Stučka, A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, and K. S. Yeremeyev. The Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma took an active part in the paper. Some of Maxim Gorky's writings were published in *Pravda*.

The paper was constantly harassed by the police; it was closed down by the tsarist government eight times, but continued to appear under other names: *Rabochaya Pravda*, *Severnaya Pravda*, *Pravda Truda*, *Za Pravdu*, *Proletarskaya Pravda*, *Put Pravdy*, *Rabochy* and *Trudovaya Pravda*. In these difficult conditions, the Bolsheviks managed to put out 636 issues in the course of over two years. On July 8 (21), 1914, the paper was closed down.

It was resumed only after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. From March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* was published as the organ of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Two days after Lenin's return from abroad, on April 5 (18), 1917, he became a member of the Editorial Board and took over the direction of the paper. Between July and October 1917, *Pravda* was harassed by the counter-revolutionary bourgeois Provisional Government and had repeatedly to change its name. It was published as *Listok Pravdy*, *Proletary*, *Rabochy* and

Rabochy Put. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, in October 27 (November 9), 1917, the Party's Central Organ resumed publication under its old name. p. 266

[351] In 1608 Russia was invaded by interventionist troops under Dmitry II the Impostor. The invaders drew near Moscow and camped in the village of Tushino where the Impostor formed a government with its own Court. Some of the Russian boyars deserted alternately to the Moscow and Tushino governments in an effort to safeguard themselves in the event of the victory of either side. It was those deserters that were nicknamed "Tushino turncoat". p. 267

[352] The report was published in *Le Peuple* No. 325 of November 20, 1912, and was introduced with this editorial note: "Citizen Lenin, a delegate of the I.S.B., has sent to the Secretariat [of the I.S.B.—*Ed*.] the following report about the results of the latest Russian elections already to hand."

In 1963, Lenin's report was reprinted in the book *Correspondance entre Lénine et Camille Huysmans*, *1905-1914*. Paris. p. 267

[353] The name given by Louis XVIII to the counter-revolutionary, extremely reactionary French Chamber of Deputies elected after the Bourbon restoration in August 1815. p. 268

[354] *Progressists*—a political grouping of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie which at the elections to the Dumas and in them tried to rally elements from the various bourgeois-landowner parties and groups under the banner of "independents".

In November 1912, they formed an independent political party with the following programme: a moderate constitution with restricted suffrage, petty reforms, a responsible ministry, i.e., government responsible to the Duma, suppression of the revolutionary movement. During the First World War, the Progressists stepped up their activity, demanding a change of military command, mobilisation of industry for the needs of the front, and a "responsible ministry" with the participation of representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, some of the party's leaders took part in the bourgeois Provisional Government. Following the October Socialist Revolution, the party carried on active struggle against the Soviets. Among the leaders of the Progressists were the well-known Moscow industrialists P. P. Ryabushinsky and A. I. Konovalov, and the landowner I. N. Yefremov. At various times, the party published its political organs: the journal *Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik* (Moscow Weekly) and the newspapers *Slovo* (Word), *Russkaya Molva* (Russian Tidings), and *Utro Rossii* (Morning of Russia). p. 270

[355] *E. J. Jagiello*—a member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.); was elected deputy to the Fourth Duma from Warsaw. The Bolsheviks strongly opposed his admission into the Social-Democratic Duma group because he had been elected with the support of the

bourgeoisie and the P.P.S. and Bund bloc. At the first vote, the group split up: six deputies (Mensheviks) voted for his admission, and six (Bolsheviks) against. With the arrival of the Irkutsk deputy the Right-wing Menshevik I. N. Mankov, the Mensheviks obtained the majority, and Jagiello was admitted to the Social-Democratic Duma group. But under the pressure of the Bolshevik deputies, his rights within the group were limited: on all internal Party matters, he had voice but no vote. p. 270

[356] The meeting was held in Cracow from December 26, 1912, to January 1, 1913 (January 8 to 14, 1913). It was attended by V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya, J. V. Stalin and the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma, A. Y. Badayev, G. I. Petrovsky, N. R. Shagov, among others. The meeting was also attended by representatives of illegal Party organisations in St. Petersburg, Moscow Region, the South, the Urals and the Caucasus. It was chaired by Lenin, who gave the reports on "The Revolutionary Upswing, the Strikes and the Tasks of the Party" and "On the Attitude to Liquidationism and on Unity" (the text of the reports has not been preserved), and drafted and edited all the resolutions. He also wrote the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee's "Notification" about the meeting (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 449-55).

The meeting adopted decisions on the most important aspects of the labour movement: the Party's tasks in connection with the new revolutionary upsurge and the growth of the strike movement, the build-up of the illegal organisation, the work of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, the insurance campaign, the Party press, the national Social-Democratic organisations, the struggle against liquidationism, and the unity of the proletarian party (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 456-66). The decisions were very important in consolidating the Party and its unity, in extending and strengthening the Party's ties with the broad masses of working people and in working out new forms of Party work in the conditions of a mounting working-class movement. The resolutions of the Cracow meeting were approved by the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. p. 272

[357] A reference to the six Bolsheviks in the Fourth Duma (see Note 208). p. 273

[358] KKK was the code name used to mark articles for obligatory insertion in *Pravda*. In December 1913, the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee reaffirmed the decision: "The resolution to the effect that articles marked with the three agreed letters shall be inserted at once and without change remains in force" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4, 1959, p. 42). p. 273

[359] A reference to the legal theoretical Bolshevik monthly *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment) published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. It was set up on Lenin's initiative in place of the Bolshevik journal *Mysl* (Thought), which had been closed down by the tsarist government. The printing reached 5,000 copies. Lenin directed its publication from Paris, and then from

Cracow and Poronin. On the eve of the First World War, it was closed down by the tsarist government. In the autumn of 1917 its publication was resumed, but only one (double) issue appeared. p. 273

[360] The letter was written on March 2 (15), 1913, on assignment from the Cracow meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee with Party functionaries, in a period of sharp struggle waged by the Bolsheviks against the liquidators. It is in reply to the proposal of the German Social-Democratic leaders to call joint conferences of Bolsheviks and liquidators for the purpose of their unification. p. 274

[361] *Vorwärts*—a daily, the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Berlin from 1891 under a decision of the party's Halle Congress as a continuation of *Berliner Volksblatt*, which had been published from 1884, under the name of *Vorwärts. Berliner Volksblatt*. On its pages, Frederick Engels carried on a struggle against every sign of opportunism. From the latter half of the 1890s, after Engels's death, the paper fell into the hands of the party's Right wing and regularly carried articles by opportunists. It gave a biased view of the struggle against opportunism and revisionism in the R.S.D.L.P. and supported the Economists, and, after the Party split up, the Mensheviks. During the years of reaction, the paper carried Trotsky's slanderous articles, while refusing Lenin and other Bolsheviks the opportunity of issuing refutations and giving an objective assessment of the state of affairs in the Party. During the First World War, it took a social-chauvinist stand; after the October Socialist Revolution it conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. Published in Berlin until 1933. p. 276

[362] *The Transcaucasian* (*Caucasian*) *Regional Committee*—the factional centre of the Caucasian Menshevik liquidators. The Committee was elected at the Fifth Congress of Social-Democratic Organisations of the Transcaucasus in February 1908, which was attended by fifteen Mensheviks and one Bolshevik. The Regional Committee carried on treacherous anti-Party work. Without holding any elections and disregarding the will of the Party organisations, it appointed P. B. Axelrod, F. I. Dan and N. V. Ramishvili as delegates to the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908. This liquidationist outfit, which claimed to be representative of the workers, was in fact the mainstay of the liquidators Centre Abroad and of Trotsky. In 1812, it joined the anti-Party August bloc set up by Trotsky. p. 276

[363] *O.C.* (*Organising Committee*)—the governing centre of the Mensheviks set up at the August conference of the liquidators in 1912, it operated until the elections to the Menshevik Party's Central Committee in August 1917. p. 276

[364] *P.P.S.—Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* (Polish Socialist Party). *P.S.D.*—Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (see Notes 52 and 43). p. 277

[365] A reference to the newspaper *Nash Put* (Our Path) published from August 25 (September 7) to September 12 (25), 1913. Lenin took an active part in the paper, sending in his articles simultaneously to *Pravda* and *Nash Put*. Among the articles by Lenin published in *Nash Put* are: "The Russian Bourgeoisie and Russian Reformism", "The Role of Social Estates and Classes in the Liberation Movement", "Class War in Dublin", "A Week after the Dublin Massacre", "Questions of Principle in Politics", and "Harry Quelch".

Among those who contributed to *Nash Put* were Maxim Gorky, Demyan Bedny, M. S. Olminsky, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, J. V. Stalin and the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma, A. Y. Badayev, F. N. Samoilov and N. R. Shagov. The paper enjoyed wide popularity among the workers; 395 workers' groups made contributions to run the paper. p. 279

[366] *Russkaya Molva* (Russian Tidings)—a daily of the bourgeois-landowner party of Progressists published in St. Petersburg from December 9 (22), 1912, to August 20 (September 2), 1913. p. 283

[367] *The Geneva conference of Mensheviks* was held simultaneously with the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in April 1905. In view of the small number of participants (only delegates from nine committees) the Mensheviks declared it to be a conference of Party functionaries.

Its decisions showed that the Mensheviks did not set themselves the task of carrying forward the revolution. They denied the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and the policy of alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. They believed the liberal bourgeoisie to be the leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was to take over after the revolution won out. The Mensheviks denied the need for a provisional revolutionary government and participation of Social-Democrats in it. In its decisions on an armed uprising, the conference failed to set out the practical tasks facing the proletariat. The Mensheviks believed that the proletarian party should not take part in preparing the uprising for fear of scaring off the bourgeoisie. The conference came out against Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government. It did not set the task of organising revolutionary peasant committees to seize the landed estates, leaving the solution of the agrarian problem to a future Constituent Assembly. The conference decisions on the organisational question, expressed in the "organisational Rules", dragged the Party back from the Second Congress to organisational fragmentation and clannishness. Lenin exposed the opportunist character of these decisions and subjected them to withering criticism in his article "A Third Step Back", his work *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, and in the "Preface to the Pamphlet *Workers on the Split in the Party*" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140 and 163-68). p. 287

[368] A reference to the nationalist and chauvinist stand taken by the Octobrists, Progressists and Cadets during the debate in the Fourth

Duma in May 1913 of the estimates for the Ministry of the Interior. For details, see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 249-50, 251-52. p. 289

[369] The legal Bolshevik Priboi Publishers was set up in St. Petersburg in early 1913 and operated under the direction of the Party's Central Committee. It responded to various questions of the working-class movement. Emerging during the "insurance campaign" it issued many publications on workers' social insurance. Subsequently, on instructions from the Party's C.C., it devoted much attention to the issue of popular agitation and propaganda pamphlets on socio-political and Party questions. In view of the intensified persecution of the workers' press by the tsarist government at the start of the First World War, Priboi had to cease its activity and resumed it only in March 1917. In 1918, it was integrated with Kommunist Publishers, which had been set up as a merger of several publishing houses (Volna, Zhizn i Znaniye, etc.). p. 291

[370] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Recorder)—a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863, expressing the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia. In the 1880s and 1880s, contributors to the paper included writers from the democratic camp (V. G. Korolenko, M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin and G. I. Uspensky, among others); it also carried the works of the liberal Narodniks. From 1905, the paper was the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party. Lenin said that the paper was a unique combination of "*Right* Cadetism and Narodnik overtones" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 135). In 1918, the newspaper was closed down along with the other counter-revolutionary newspapers. p. 294

[371] A reference to B. G. Dansky (K. A. Komarovsky). He joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1911, contributed articles to *Zvezda* and *Pravda* and took part in the insurance movement; in 1913 and 1914, he was on the Editorial Board of the Bolshevik journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*. In order to discredit the Bolsheviks, the liquidators accused Dansky of writing for the bourgeois press. A Party commission consisting of representatives of the Editorial Boards of the newspaper *Za Pravdu* and the journals *Prosveshcheniye* and *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma, and Priboi Publishers examined the facts and established that after joining the Bolshevik Party Dansky had ceased writing for the bourgeois press; accordingly, it declared him to be an honest Party member, and the liquidators' charges, libellous. Lenin also wrote about the case later, in the report of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee at the Brussels Conference (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 524). p. 296

[372] For reasons of secrecy this was called a summer conference but actually it was held from September 23 to October 1 (October 6 to 14), 1913, in the village of Poronin, near Cracow, where Lenin then lived. On its agenda were the following questions: 1) reports from the localities, report on the work of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, report on the work of the C.C. elected

at the Prague Conference; 2) the tasks of agitation at the present moment; 3) organisational question and the Party congress; 4) strike movement; 5) Party press; 6) Social-Democratic work in the Duma; 7) Social-Democratic Duma group; 8) work in legal societies; 9) national question; 10) Narodniks; 11) the forthcoming International Socialist Congress (in Vienna). Lenin directed the Conference. He delivered the opening speech, gave the report on the work of the Central Committee, the report on the national question, and on the forthcoming International Socialist Congress in Vienna. He also spoke on almost all the questions of the agenda, kept a record of speeches by delegates from local Party organisations, motioned proposals, drafted and edited resolutions. The text of the report on the work of the C.C. has not been discovered. A brief summary of some points from the report is given in A. Y. Badayev's reminiscences.

Two resolutions, written by Lenin, were adopted on the C.C. report and the reports from the localities: "The Tasks of Agitation in the Present Situation" and "On the Organisational Question and on the Party Congress", which determined the Party's tasks and the main forms of Party work in the new historical conditions. One of the main questions at the Conference was the national question, which at the time was among the most prominent in Russia's social life. In his report on the national question, Lenin emphasised that the struggle against national oppression was indissolubly bound up with the struggle against tsarism, for freedom and democracy. The Conference, on the strength of the Party Programme, resolutely rejected the opportunist demand of the Mensheviks and the Bundists for "cultural-national autonomy" and adopted the propositions on the national question worked out by Lenin. He regarded the resolution on the national question as a declaration of the Party Programme on this issue. The Conference decided to include the quotation of a national programme on the agenda of the next Party congress.

In its resolution on the Social-Democratic Duma group, the Conference demanded equality for the Bolshevik and the Menshevik sections and resolutely condemned the actions of the Menshevik section, which made use of its chance majority of one vote and was violating the elementary rights of the Bolshevik deputies, who represented the vast majority of Russia's workers. On instructions from Lenin and the C.C. of the Bolshevik Party, the Bolshevik deputies left the joint Social-Democratic group in the Duma in October 1913 and set up their own Bolshevik group (the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group).

In his report on the International Socialist Congress, which was to be held in Vienna in 1914, Lenin proposed that as many delegates as possible should be sent from the illegal and legal organisations, for it was intended to hold a Party congress simultaneously with the International Socialist Congress.

Lenin delivered the summing-up speech. In view of the importance of the questions discussed and the decisions adopted, the Poronin Conference had the significance of a Party conference.

The minutes of the Conference have not been found. The announcement of the Conference and the resolutions it adopted were published in a separate pamphlet abroad as a Central Committee publication (*Izveshcheniye i rezolutsii letnego 1913 goda soveshchaniya Tsentralnogo Komiteta R.S.D.R.P. s partiinymi rabotnikami*) (Announcement and Resolutions of the Conference held by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party functionaries in the Summer of 1913). For reasons of secrecy, some of the resolutions were published in part: point 6 of the resolution on the strike movement and points 1-5 on the Party press were omitted. The full text of the resolutions was printed in an illegal hectographed publication. There are police department records of the Conference, of which the details were supplied by the provocateurs Malinovsky and Lobov. About the Conference see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 417-31.

Lenin sent an outline of the report to be made in the localities to St. Petersburg on November 29 (December 12), 1913. The outline was drawn up for the Bolshevik deputies of the Fourth Duma, as a guide for their reports about the Conference to be made to local Party workers during the Christmas recess. p. 297

[373] *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* (Problems of Insurance)—a legal Bolshevik journal Published in St. Petersburg from October 1913 to March 1918 with interruptions. It waged a struggle not only for workers' insurance but also for Bolshevik "uncurtailed slogans"—an eight-hour working day, confiscation of landed estates and a democratic republic. Among those who took part in the journal were prominent leaders of the insurance campaign, the Bolsheviks N. A. Skrypnik, P. I. Stučka, A. N. Vinokurov and N. M. Shvernik. p. 298

[374] *The December session of the International Socialist Bureau* was held in London on December 13 and 14, 1913, and discussed the unification of the British socialist and labour parties, the Vienna Congress, Russian affairs, etc. The question of uniting the Social-Democratic Party in Russia was brought up for debate just before the session closed. In view of the late hour, the question was not discussed in detail, and the Bureau confined itself to adopting a resolution motioned by Kautsky on behalf of the German delegation. It authorised the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. to call a conference of representatives of "all the factions of the working-class movement in Russia, including Russian Poland, who accept the Party Programme or whose programmes are in accord with the Social-Democratic Programme, for an exchange of opinion (Aussprache) over the issues on which they are divided". Motivating the resolution, Kautsky said on December 1 (14) that the old Social-Democratic Party in Russia was dead. It was necessary to revive it, relying on the Russian workers' desire for unity. In his article "A Good Resolution and a Bad Speech", Lenin analysed the content of the resolution and said Kautsky's speech was a monstrous one (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 528-30). Writing to Inessa Armand of the issue of *Vorwärts* which carried

Kautsky's statement, Lenin said: "You should get hold of it ... and organise a protest campaign. We are *for* an exchange of opinion, *for* the resolution of the I.S.B.—**this NB**—but we are absolutely against Kautsky's **scoundrelly** phrase. He should be beaten unmercifully for this" (present edition, Vol. 35, p. 130). In a letter to the Bolshevik section in Paris, Lenin wrote: "It is most desirable that the *section* should adopt a *slashing* resolution against Kautsky (calling his statement about the Party's death *shameless*, *brazen*, *monstrous*, *ignorant*)" (Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 48, p. 254).

The same sitting of the I.S.B. on December 1 (14) heard Plekhanov's letter saying that the split in the Duma group, which had taken place through the fault of the liquidators, was a blow at the unity of the labour movement and led him to resign as the representative of the whole Party in the I.S.B. His place on the I.S.B. was taken by P. B. Axelrod, a representative of the liquidationist Organising Committee.

At the conference held in Brussels in July 1914, under the I.S.B. decision, the leaders of the Second International, on the pretext of "reconciling" the Bolsheviks and the liquidators, demanded that the Bolsheviks should stop criticising the latter. The Bolsheviks refused to do so and continued their relentless struggle against the liquidators, who were enemies of the labour movement. p. 299

[375] Lenin wrote the article in connection with the All-Russia Congress on Public Education which was to be held in St. Petersburg during the winter holidays at the end of December 1913. The Bolsheviks wanted to use the Congress as a legal opportunity for spreading Bolshevik ideas and revolutionary demands. The article is closely connected with Lenin's "The Question of Ministry of Education Policy" (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 137-46). p. 300

[376] The question of the Vienna congress was discussed by the International Socialist Bureau in December 1913. It was decided to call the Congress in August 1914, timing it to coincide with the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the First International. The following questions were entered on its agenda: 1) high cost of living; 2) imperialism and the struggle against militarism, which included as subquestions: a) the Eastern question; b) compulsory courts of arbitration between nations and c) United States of Europe; 3) alcoholism; 4) unemployment; 5) condition of political prisoners and exiles in Russia; and 6) miscellaneous. No country was to have a delegation numbering more than six times the number of its votes; hence, Russia, with 20 votes, could have no more than 120 delegates for both subsections of the Social-Democrats and the Left Narodniks and the trade unions together.

The question of the International Socialist Congress in Vienna was discussed at the Poronin Conference of the C.C. with Party functionaries. Lenin, reporting on the question, proposed that all measures should be taken to have Social-Democratic workers in a majority as delegates to the Vienna Congress. By the end of July 1914, the elections to the International Socialist Congress

were almost completed, but the outbreak of the world war prevented the Congress from being held. p. 305

[377] *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (New Workers' Newspaper)—a daily of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg in place of *Zhivaya Zhizn* (Living Life) from August 8 (21), 1913, to January 23 (February 5), 1914. Lenin repeatedly called it "New Liquidators' Newspaper". p. 306

[378] A reference to the article by I. Vetrov (M. A. Savelyev), "The International and the Question of Unity", published in No. 1 of the newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda* (Proletarian Truth) of December 7 (20), 1913, which said: "In conclusion, we feel bound to point out the lie of the liquidators, who insist that in denying the Six special representation, the Bureau allegedly condemned the principle of 'federation', put forward by the six workers' deputies in the Social-Democratic group. The demand for special representation for the Six was not at all presented to the Bureau for purely formal reasons; this shows that N.R.G.'s statements to the effect that the Bureau had issued a condemnation of the Six is part of the dishonest lying of the liquidators in their continued efforts to dim the consciousness of the working class." p. 306

[379] The theses were apparently written by Lenin after his lecture in Paris on January 10 (23), 1914 (see *Lenin Miscellany XXX*, pp. 51-57). The inscription on the cover of the "National Question III" notebook is an indication that Lenin repeated his Paris lecture at Liége on February 2, 1914. p. 313

[380] Lenin analyses Kautsky's pamphlet *Nationalität und Internationalität* (Nationality and Internationality) in his work *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 397-99). p. 314

[381] See Lenin's extract from the book *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Fr. Engels u. K. Marx*, Bd. IV, Stuttgart, 1913, S. 292, in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*, p. 291 (cf. Marx's letter to Engels, written on July 5, 1870). p. 319

[382] At the third sitting of the Programme Committee of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., the delegate of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania motioned the adoption of the item on guarantees for "freedom of cultural development of all nations making up the state" (see Lenin's note of it in *Lenin Miscellany VI*, p. 105). p. 319

[383] *Diaspora* (Gk. for dispersal)—the Jews living outside Judea. In the early 6th century B.C., there were Jewish communities in Egypt, Babylon and other countries of the Mediterranean. From the 3rd century B.C., the Diaspora grew rapidly, so that in the 1st century B.C., their number came to 4.5 million. In the Roman Empire, the Jews lived in communities, sometimes forming public-law corporations (as in Alexandria), or private religious societies (as in Rome). On the one hand, the Jews of the Diaspora successfully conducted the propaganda of Judaism, and on the other, they

were gradually losing their national traits and language. p. 322

[384] "*Federation of the worst type*" was the term used in the decisions of the Prague Party Conference of 1912 to characterise the relations with non-Russian national Social-Democratic organisations in the R.S.D.L.P. after the Fourth (Unity) Congress, when the "non-Russians" worked "in total isolation from Russian organisations", which had an extremely negative effect on the whole work of the R.S.D.L.P. While the Social-Democratic organisations of Poland and Lithuania, the Latvian Territory and the Bund were formally part of the R.S.D.L.P., the actually held themselves aloof. Their representatives did not take part in the direction of Party work throughout Russia, and promoted, directly or indirectly, the anti-Party activity of the liquidators (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 464-65, and Vol. 18, pp. 411-12). p. 323

[385] *The Fourth Social-Democratic Congress of the Latvian Territory* was held in Brussels from January 13 to 26 (January 26 to February 8), 1914.

Lenin took an active part in preparing and holding the Congress. He gave a report on the attitude of the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory to the R.S.D.L.P. and to the split in the Duma group, and took part in conferences of Bolshevik delegates, helping them to draft resolutions. On the eve of the Congress, January 12 (25), Lenin gave a lecture for the delegates on the national question, setting out the relevant Bolshevik theory and tactics. Lenin urged the Marxists of Latvia to strengthen the Party's real—instead of imaginary—unity and keep its ranks clean of vacillators and liquidators, who were patent traitors to the working-class cause. He made wide we of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress to fight the liquidators and Trotskyites. See his articles "The Lettish Workers and the Split in the Social-Democratic Group in the Duma", "The 'August' Fiction Exposed", "The Liquidators and the Lettish Working-Class Movement" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 177-81, 182-85, 239-41) and others. Thanks to the persistent struggle against the conciliatory tendencies conducted by Lenin and the Latvian Bolsheviks at the Congress, the Latvian Social-Democrats withdrew from the August bloc, and this, Lenin said, was a "death blow" at the Trotskyite association.

The minutes of the Congress have not been discovered, but it is known that they were prepared for publication by Janson-Braun and were left in Brussels. At the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, there are, in the Poronin-Cracow material, Lenin's writings relating to the Congress and characterising the struggle waged by him and the Bolshevik section of the Congress against the liquidators. Among the documents is a record of the agenda in Lenin's hand, notes on the sittings and speeches, and also a draft resolution on the attitude of the Latvian Social-Democrats to the R.S.D.L.P., an outline of the report and the summing-up speech. Of great interest are Lenin's notes on the speeches and his commentaries. There is, for instance, a note on Braun's speech

on January 15 (28), 1914. Where Braun says, in justification of his conciliatory stand, that it is "a very fine point", Lenin writes: "*That's where it's liable to break*!" p. 324

386 A reference to the liquidators' conference held in Vienna in August 1912; it formalised the anti-Party August bloc, which was organised by Trotsky. It was attended by representatives of the Bund, the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory and groups of liquidators, Trotskyites and otzovists abroad (the Editorial Boards of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda*, and the *Vperyod* group). Delegates from Russia were sent by the St. Petersburg and Moscow "initiating groups" of liquidators, the Krasnoyarsk organisation, the Sebastopol Social-Democratic Military Organisation, the Editorial Boards of the liquidators' publications, *Nasha Zarya* and *Nevsky Golos*; it was also attended by a representative of the Spilka Committee Abroad. The overwhelming majority were resident abroad, were out of touch with the working class in Russia, and not connected directly with local Party work in Russia.

The conference adopted anti-Party, liquidationist decisions on all questions of Social-Democratic tactics and came out against the existence of the illegal Party. The liquidators' attempt to set up their own, Centrist party in Russia was not supported by the workers. The liquidators failed to elect a Central Committee and confined themselves to setting up an Organising Committee. The anti-Bolshevik bloc, consisting of diverse elements, which it was the main task of the conference to set up, began to fall apart before the conference was over. See Lenin's articles "The Break-up of the 'August' Bloc", "The 'August' Fiction Exposed", "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 158-61, 182-85, 325-47). p. 326

387 The Resolution on Setting up an Organisational Section of the Central Committee to direct illegal Work was adopted by the C.C. at its sittings held in Cracow from April 2 to 4 (15 to 17), 1914, under Lenin's direction and with the participation of G. I. Petrovsky, representing the Bolshevik Duma group, who had arrived from Russia. The C.C. examined the questions of preparing for the convocation of the next R.S.D.L.P. congress, marking Workers' Press Day, work among the peasants, work in the Duma and report of the Bolshevik Duma group, the International Women's Conference, the Vienna Congress of the Second International, preparation of leaflets for May Day, etc.

In connection with the discussion of the question of setting up the Organisational Section of the Central Committee to direct illegal Work and the adoption of a resolution on this question, Lenin proposed that prominent Party workers—among them M. I. Kalinin and A. S. Kiselyov—and workers who took an active part in the insurance movement should be included in the Section. Apart from the resolution published here, there is also an outline of the agenda of the C.C. sittings worked out by Lenin. On the

question of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. report to the Vienna Congress of the Second International, the C.C. decided to "instruct the C.C. members abroad to engage in drawing up the report". This was done by Lenin. In April-May 1914, he wrote his "Plan and Outline for a Report of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. to the Vienna Congress of the Second International" (see Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 441-44). p. 330

[388] The *Party congress* was to be timed to coincide with the International Socialist Congress in Vienna, set for August 1914. An Organising Commission was set up under the Russian Collegium of the C.C. to prepare for the congress. It was also decided to set up commissions in Moscow, the Caucasus, the South and the Urals. The congress was to be preceded by organisational tours of local Party organisations by C.C. agents, and also by trips to the localities of the Bolshevik deputies to the Duma. The preparations for the congress were especially intensive in the spring and summer of 1914. The agenda and even the composition of the congress were determined. It was to discuss the following questions: reports of the C.C. and reports from the localities, the political situation, the Party's organisational tasks, the tasks of the strike movement, the tactics of the insurance movement, some addenda to the minimum programme, the national question, the liquidators in connection with the conference under the I.S.B., participation in the bourgeois press and other urgent problems of the time. By the end of July 1914, preparations for the congress and elections to the International Socialist Congress were almost complete. Most of the delegates were elected, the instructions drawn up and the mandates collected. The technical side—secret meeting places, routes and passports—was also ready. But the outbreak of war and the wild reaction that followed worked a sharp change in the situation in the country. The closure of the frontiers cut off communications with all other countries. The congress was postponed until a more favourable moment. Nor was the International Congress able to meet in these circumstances. Although the Party congress did not take place, preparation for it had a great part to play in strengthening and consolidating the Party organisations. p. 331

[389] The statistical studies by I. M. Kozminykh-Lanin repeatedly drew Lenin's attention. In August 1912, Lenin wrote two reviews on his *Working Day and Working Year in Moscow Gubernia*, entitled "The Working Day in the Factories of Moscow Gubernia" and "The Working Day and Working Year in Moscow Gubernia". The first was published in *Pravda*, the second in *Nevskaya Zvezda* in August 1912 (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 260-61, 262-69). Lenin used the author's statistical data in his article "The Language of Figures", published in September 1913 in the Moscow newspaper *Nash Put* (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 358-63). In the first of the above-mentioned reviews Lenin wrote that the statistician had prepared a special work on overtime at Moscow Gubernia factories, and the article given here is a review of this latter work, which was published in 1914. p. 331

[390] The conference, called by the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. in accordance with the decision of the December 1913 session of the I.S.B., was held from July 16 to 18, 1914. It was attended by representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) Central Committee; the Organising Committee (Mensheviks) with its affiliated organisations (Caucasian Regional Committee and the *Borba* group [Trotskyites]); the Social-Democratic Duma group (Mensheviks); Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* group; the *Vperyod* group; the Bund, the Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory; the Social-Democracy of Lithuania; the Polish Social-Democrats; the Polish Social-Democratic Opposition, and the P.P.S.-Lewica. The delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. consisted of Inessa Armand (Petrova), M. F. Vladimirsky (Kamsky) and I. F. Popov (Pavlov). Lenin thoroughly prepared the delegation for the conference: he wrote a report and detailed instructions for it, provided it with the necessary material, documents and factual data which exposed the true face of Russia's opportunists and their sponsors.

From the outset there was a sharp struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Russian and international opportunists. On Kautsky's motion, the conference approved the following agenda: 1) Programme differences. 2) Tactical differences. 3) Organisational question. Despite the fact that the conference was to be limited to an exchange of opinion, Vandervelde warned that it would adopt decisions on all three items of the agenda. The C.C. delegation, guided by Lenin's instructions, motioned that the conference should hear the delegations' reports and suggestions concerning the concrete conditions which each considered necessary to ensure unity. Thanks to the insistence of the Bolsheviks it was decided to depart from the adopted agenda and to go on to reports on the controversial questions and to the formulations of the concrete conditions for unity.

At the centre of the conference's work was a report of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C., prepared by Lenin and read out by Inessa Armand in French at the morning sitting of July 17. The leaders of the I.S.B. did not allow her to read out the entire report, so she had to summarise a part of it and then go on to stating the terms for unity. Intent on defending the liquidators, the I.S.B. leaders were greatly irritated at the concrete proposals of the Bolsheviks on the terms for unity. On behalf of the I.S.B., Kautsky motioned a resolution which asserted that there were no essential differences among the Russian Social-Democrats hindering their unity. He was supported by the O.C. and Plekhanov, who made fierce attacks against the C.C. delegation and Lenin. An erroneous stand was taken by Rosa Luxemburg, who joined Plekhanov, Vandervelde, Kautsky and others in urging a union of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Since the motioning of the resolution was outside the powers of the conference, the Bolsheviks and the Latvian Social-Democrats refused to participate in the vote on it. But a majority adopted the resolution. The Polish opposition, although it supported the Bolsheviks and the Latvian Social-Democrats at the conference, voted for the I.S.B. resolution.

(See Lenin's article "The Polish Social-Democratic Opposition at the Parting of the Ways", present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 556-57.)

The Bolsheviks, guided by Lenin, refused to abide by the decisions of the Brussels conference. The attempt on the part of the opportunist leaders of the Second International to liquidate the Bolshevik Party was a failure. In the face of the international proletariat, Lenin and the Bolsheviks exposed the true aims of the leaders of the International parading as peace-makers.

At a private conference of liquidators, Trotskyites, *Vperyod* supporters, Plekhanovites, Bundists and representatives of the Caucasian Regional Organisation, held after the Brussels conference, these groups set up a bloc against the Bolsheviks. The Brussels (July Third) bloc was a hypocritical cover-up for the politically rotten positions of all its participants; the bloc's break-up soon after showed the falsity of the policy propounded by the Russian and West-European "unifiers" of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 334

[391] The item was intended for the newspaper *Trudovaya Pravda*. In the margin of the page on which it is written, Lenin made a note for the editors: "Set this thing in brevier, and do not print any replies to their letters, nothing at all: let them all go to their new 'brothers by bloc'".

The item was not published as the newspaper was closed down on July 8 (21), 1914. p. 334

[392] These plans reveal the content of the article "Revolution and War" which Lenin planned to write for No. 33 of the Party's C.O., the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The plans were written in July 1914 after the outbreak of war between Austria and Serbia.

The revolutionary crisis coming to a head in Russia on the eve of the war was most evident in July 1914, a period Lenin compared with January 1905, pointing to the growth of a massive revolutionary movement, led by the illegal proletarian party, the growth of slogans providing ideological unity for the Party's propaganda and agitation. The revolutionary struggle was conducted under the slogans for an eight-hour working day, confiscation of landed estates and a democratic republic.

The plans show that the powerful growth of the revolutionary movement in Russia was seen by Lenin in the content of the international situation, and that in his article "Revolution and War" he intended to deal with the tasks facing the proletariat of Russia in connection with the world situation. p. 335

[393] *Kievskaya Mysl* (Kiev Thought)—a bourgeois-democratic daily published in Kiev from 1906 to 1918. Until 1915, it had illustrated weekly supplements; from 1917, it had morning and evening editions. p. 335

[394] This is written on a separate page and is marked as an insertion, but there is no indication which particular article it belongs to. It may well be a variant of the insertion to the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. manifesto "The War and the Social-Democracy of Russia", or to a Bolshevik resolution on the war. p. 337

[395] A reference to the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress held at Basle on November 24 and 25, 1912. It was called to decide on the question of fighting the looming danger of an imperialist world war, a danger; that was intensified by the outbreak of the First Balkan War. The Congress was attended by 555 delegates. The R.S.D.L.P. C.C. sent 6 delegates. On the opening day, there was a massive anti-war demonstration and an international rally against war.

On November 25, the Congress unanimously adopted a Manifesto on war. It warned the nations against the threat of an impending world war, exposed the plunderous aims of the war being prepared by the imperialists, urged workers in all countries to wage a resolute struggle for peace, against the threat of war, and to "confront capitalist imperialism with the might of the international solidarity of the proletariat". In the event of an imperialist war, the Manifesto advised socialists to use the economic and political crisis caused by the war to struggle for a socialist revolution.

The leaders of the Second International (Kautsky, Vandervelde and others) voted for the Manifesto, but with the outbreak of the world war they forgot all about the Basle Manifesto and the other decisions of international socialist congresses on the struggle against war, and sided with their imperialist governments. p. 337

[396] Lenin began work on the pamphlet soon after his arrival in Berne. He collected extensive material but the pamphlet was not written. He used some of the preparatory material in his lectures, articles published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*. This is the fullest plan of the pamphlet, all the preparatory material being given in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, pp. 14-123. p. 337

[397] A reference to Victor Adler's speech in the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels on July 29, 1914. Lenin deals with it in his "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 94-101). p. 338

[398] A reference to the book by Jean Jaurès, *L'organisation socialiste de la France. L'Armée nouvelle* (Socialist Organisation in France. New Arm), published in Paris in 1911. p. 338

[399] A reference to Hermann Wendel's article "Jaurès" published in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 19 of August 21, 1914. p. 338

[400] A quotation from Karl Kautsky's article "Die Sozialdemokratie im Krieg" (Social-Democracy in Wartime) published in No. 1 of *Die Neue Zeit* of October 2, 1914. Lenin criticised the article in "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism" (see present edition Vol. 21, pp. 94-101). p. 339

[401] A reference to Hermann Wendel's article "Europa in Feuersgefahr" (Europe Threatened with Conflagration), carried in No. 18 of *Die Neue Zeit* of July 31, 1914. There are extracts from the article with Lenin's remarks in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, pp. 47-49. p. 339

[402] A reference to the article "Ultimatum" published in No. 200

of *Vorwärts* on July 25, 1914; the note "Verdechtige Tiranentöter!" (Suspicious Tyrant Killers!) published in the supplement to No. 174 of *Leipziger Volkszeitung* on July 31, 1914, and the article "Der Kampf gegen den Zarismus" (The Struggle Against Tsarism) published in No. 209 of *Vorwärts* on August 3, 1914. p. 339

[403] A reference to R. Fischer's article "Vandalen" (Vandals) published in No. 206 of *Volksrecht* on September 5, 1914. Lenin's extracts from the article are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 61. p. 339

[404] Upon the outbreak of war, some members of the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad, which had its seat in Paris, and some members of the Bolshevik section in Paris—N. I. Sapozhkov (Kuznetsov) and A. V. Britman (Antonov), among others—joined the Mensheviks and S.R.s in adopting a declaration on behalf of "Russian republicans", which they published in the French press, and went to the front. *L'Humanité* also carried a statement by Polish Social-Democratic volunteers. p. 339

[405] No. 9 of *Golos* on September 22, 1914, carried the text of a social-chauvinist declaration by Polish socialists signed by Leder, Kon, Sehnenbaum and others. p. 339

[406] *Sovremennoye Slovo* (Contemporary Word)—a daily published by the Cadets in St. Petersburg from 1907 to 1918. The reference here is to Lenin's extracts from the item "G. V. Plekhanov about the War" in No. 2374 of *Sovremennoye Slovo* on August 23 (September 5), 1914 (see *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 114). p. 339

[407] A reference to the "Press Review" section in No. 3 of *Golos* on September 15, 1914, containing an extract from Ghesquière's social-chauvinist article "Notre devoir" (Our Duty) published in No. 3802 of *L'Humanité* on September 14, 1914. It tried to justify the social-chauvinist policy of the leadership of the French Socialist Party in the imperialist war and its abandonment of the class struggle, and stated that the French socialists would do their socialist duty when the war was over. The *Golos* editors appended an editorial note confirming that *Vorwärts* and G. V. Plekhanov took the same attitude. p. 339

[408] A reference to the article by Y. Smirnov (Gurevich), "The War and European Democracy", published in No. 202 of *Russkiye Vedomosti* on September 3 (16), 1914, and P. Maslov's letter to the editor of the paper, published under the caption "The War and Trade Agreements" in No. 207 of the paper on September 10 (23), 1914. p. 339

[409] A reference to Edouard Vaillant's article "Formalistes doctrinaires" (Doctrinaire Formalists), written in reply to the letters he received from socialists criticising his social-chauvinist stand. It was run as an editorial in No. 3827 of *L'Humanité* on October 9, 1914. Lenin's extracts from it are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 97. p. 340

[410] A reference to Compère-Morel's article "Les commissaires à la

nation" (People's Commissars) published in No. 3788 of *L'Humanité* on August 31, 1914. Lenin's extracts from the article are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 67. p. 340

[411] A reference to Gustave Hervé's articles vindicating the alliance between republican France and tsarist Russia. He said that France could not do without an alliance with the tsar in the War, and that tsarism was allegedly improving under the influence of democratic Britain and democratic Italy. p. 340

[412] H. M. Hyndman had come out in open defence of imperialism even before the war, and had been sharply criticised by the German Social-Democrats and their organ *Die Neue Zeit*. p. 340

[413] A reference to the social-chauvinist declaration issued by the Social-Democratic group and read out by the Socialist H. Haase in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, during the voting of the war credits. p. 340

[414] A reference to Eduard Bernstein's article "Abrechnung mit Russland" (Squaring Accounts with Russia) published in No. 232 of *Vorwärts* on August 26, 1914. Quoting Engels's *Savoyen, Nizza und der Rhein* (Savoy, Nice and the Rhine), which spoke of the threat of a Franco-Russian alliance for Germany, out of context, Bernstein tried to justify the opportunist policy of the German Social-Democratic leaders in the imperialist war. Lenin's extracts from Engels's work are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, pp. 41-43. p. 340

[415] A reference to Engels's "Der Sozialismus in Deutschland" (Socialism in Germany) published in No. 19 of *Die Neue Zeit*, Vol. 1, 1891-92, which the German social-chauvinists tried to use to vindicate their opportunist stand in the imperialist war. p. 340

[416] A reference to Franz Mehring's protest, which exposed the attempts on the part of German social-chauvinists to justify their opportunist policy in the imperialist war by references to Engels. p. 340

[417] No. 211 of *Hamburger Echo* on September 10, 1914, carried an article "Eine notwendige Erklärung" (A Necessary Explanation), which distorted Engels's article "Der Sozialismus in Deutschland" in order to justify the social-chauvinist stand of the German Social-Democratic leadership. For Lenin's extracts from the newspaper see *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 67.

No. 249 of *Vorwärts* on September 12, 1914, carried an article "Die Auffassung der italienischen Sozialisten" (The Standpoint of the Italian Socialists). p. 340

[418] A reference to the article by the German social-chauvinist R. Fischer, "Vandalen" (Vandals), which was published in No. 206 of *Volksrecht* on September 5, 1914, and the reply to him—"Letter from a German Socialist", which was apparently intended for publication in *Berner Tagwacht*. There are extracts from the letter made by Lenin, with this note in the margin: "((pp. 1-7)) (typewritten, to the editors of *Berner Tagwacht*)" (see *Lenin Miscellany XIV*,

pp. 61-63). But the letter was not published in the newspaper. Extracts from it were published in a leading article "Die Sozialdemokratie und der Krieg" (Social-Democracy and the War) in *Grütlianer* Nos. 213 and 214 on September 13 and 14, 1914. p. 340

[419] A quotation from an article by Joseph Bloch, "Der Krieg und Sozialdemokratie" (The War and Social-Democracy), which was published in No. 16 of *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. p. 340

[420] No. 12 of *Golos* on September 25, 1914, carried an item "Press Review" containing a summary of Karl Liebknecht's letter, which was published in *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* and dealt with the Social-Democratic voting of the war credits in the Reichstag. p. 340

[421] A reference to the protest issued by the Left-wing Social-Democrats and published in No. 214 of the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* on September 14, 1914, and to the article "Parteipflichten" (Party Duties) published in the Social-Democratic paper *Volksblatt* No. 220 of September 19, 1914. They voiced protests against the social-chauvinist policy of the German Social-Democratic leadership, declared that not all Social-Democrats shared the leadership's opinion, and emphasised a desire for international solidarity.

Bremer Bürger-Zeitung—a Social-Democratic daily published in Bremen from 1890 to 1919; until 1916 it was under the influence of Bremen Left-wing Social-Democrats, but then passed into the hands of social-chauvinists. p. 341

[422] A reference to the stand taken by the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Volksblatt*, which was published in Halle. It criticised the social-chauvinist stand of the German Social-Democratic leadership and urged international solidarity. p. 341

[423] A reference to the article "Die Zertrümmerte Internationale" (Destroyed International) published in No. 211 of *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* on September 10, 1914. Lenin's extracts from the newspaper are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 83. p. 341

[424] *Volksrecht*—a daily, the organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland, published in Zurich since 1898. During the First World War (1914-18), the paper carried articles by Left-wing Social-Democrats. It published Lenin's articles: "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland", "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Russian Revolution", "Tricks of the Republican Chauvinists" and others.

Lenin is referring to the article "Zwei Internationalen" (Two Internationals) published in No. 211 of *Volksrecht* on September 11, 1914. Lenin's extracts from the article are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 58. p. 341

[425] A reference to the manifesto issued by the French and Belgian delegations in the I.S.B. to the German people. It was carried in No. 3794 of *L'Humanité* on September 6, 1914, and accused the German Government of aggressive designs, and the German soldiers, of atrocities on occupied territory. The Executive of the

German Social-Democratic Party published a protest against the manifesto in No. 247 of *Vorwärts* on September 10. There followed a press polemic between the French and German social-chauvinists, with both sides trying to justify their government's part in the war and putting the blame on the other governments. p. 341

[426] A reference to L. Martov's letter to G. Hervé, which was published in No. 12 of *Golos* on September 25, 1914. p. 341

[427] A reference to Ivan Krylov's fable of the same name, which describes a cuckoo and a cock singing each other's praises. p. 341

[428] A reference to the trip by a leader of the German Social-Democratic Party, the rabid social-chauvinist A. Südekum, to Italy, on assignment from the Party's Executive. A record of his talk with the Italian socialists was printed in *Avanti!*, and then reprinted in various socialist newspapers. In Russian, it appeared in the Menshevik *Nasha Zarya* Nos. 7-8-9 for 1914. p. 341

[429] A reference to the conference of Left-wing Social-Democrats held on Lenin's initiative during the Copenhagen Congress. In his plan for the pamphlet *The European War and European Socialism*, Lenin gives a list of those who attended: Jules Guesde and Charles Rappoport from France; Louis de Brouckère from Belgium; Rosa Luxemburg and Emanuel Wurm from Germany; Julian Marchlewski (Karski) from Poland; Pablo Iglesias from Spain; Adolf Braun from Austria; Lenin, Plekhanov and others from Russia (see *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 22). p. 341

[430] The resolution "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War", adopted on Lenin's report on the attitude to the war made at a Bolshevik conference in Berne on September 6, 1914. It is known as "Theses on War", and was the first document to define the attitude of the Bolshevik Party and international revolutionary Social-Democracy to the imperialist world war.

Lenin's theses were discussed in detail and adopted at the resolution of the conference. Signed "Group of Social-Democrats, Members of the R.S.D.L.P.", they were circulated to various Bolshevik sections abroad. For reasons of secrecy, Lenin made the following inscription on a copy in Krupskaya's hand: "Copy of the manifesto issued in Denmark". p. 341

[431] Charles Philips Trevelyan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education, said in an open letter to his electors that in the imperialist war the interests of one's nation were paramount and that these interests demanded peace. p. 342

[432] No. 254 of *Frankfurter Zeitung* on September 13, 1914, carried an article by Frank Oppenheimer, "Neue Rom und neue Karfageno" (The New Rome and the New Carthage). Lenin's extracts from the article are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 85.

Frankfurter Zeitung—a daily, organ of big German stockbrokers, published in Frankfort on the Main from 1856 to 1943; resumed publication in 1949 under the name *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; a mouthpiece of the West-German monopolists. p. 342

[433] *Russkoye Znamya* (Russian Banner)—a Black-Hundred newspaper, organ of the Union of the Russian People, published in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1917.

Here Lenin refers to an editorial in its No. 105 of August 30, 1914, which spoke of the leaflets of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 342

[434] A reference to Karl Kautsky's article "Prospects for Peace", extracts from which were published in *Golos* Nos. 18 and 19 on October 2 and 3, 1914. p. 342

[435] A reference to an item "W. C. Modell 70" carried in No. 227 of *Vorwärts* on August 21, 1914. p. 342

[436] A possible reference to the 42-cm. guns made in Germany by Krupp and first used in the war of 1914-18. p. 343

[437] *Kreuz-Zeitung*—a popular name for an ultra-reactionary German daily, *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, which had a cross on its masthead. The paper was the organ of German conservatives and was published in Berlin from 1848 to 1939. From 1911 on it was called *Neue Preussische* (*Kreuz*) *Zeitung*, and from 1932—*Kreuz-Zeitung*. p. 343

[438] A reference to "Press Review" in No. 14 of *Golos* on September 27, 1914, which commented on the stand of the English socialists and gave extracts from articles by Keir Hardie and MacDonald. It said that MacDonald "revealed too much pessimism in assessing the consequences of the current war". p. 343

[439] A reference to the article "Silence, Eunuchs!" published as an editorial in No. 21 of *Golos* on October 6, 1914, which said that the German Social-Democrats would have compromised themselves if, in the conditions of Germany pressed by the Russian troops, they were to "issue a call for a revolutionary Commune", and that this would have isolated them from the broad masses. p. 344

[440] A reference to the appeal "From Writers, Artists and Actors" written in the spirit of bourgeois patriotism and justification of tsarist Russia's war against Germany. It was signed by the honorary Academicians and well-known artists A. Vasnetsov, V. Vasnetsov and K. Korovin, the sculptor S. Merkurov, F. Chaliapin and other prominent actors of Moscow theatres, the writers Maxim Gorky A. Serafimovich, Skitalets and others, the editors of magazines P. Struve, N. Mikhailov, D. Tikhomirov, etc.

The appeal was published in No. 223 of *Russkoye Slovo* on September 28 (October 11), 1914. p. 344

[441] *Dzvin* (The Bell)—a legal nationalist monthly of Menshevik make-up, published in Ukrainian in Kiev from January 1913 to mid-1914. There were 18 issues. Among those who took part in the magazine were V. Vinnichenko, L. Yurkevich (Rybalka), S. Petlyura G. Alexinsky, P. Axelrod and L. Trotsky. The magazine ceased publication at the beginning of the First World War.

The article "The Ukraine and the War" was written by V. Levinsky. p. 345

[442] *Alliance for the Liberation of the Ukraine*—a bourgeois nationalist organisation set up by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in 1914, after the start of the First World War. Expecting the defeat of tsarist Russia in the war, the alliance set itself the task of securing Ukraine's secession from Russia and establishing a bourgeois and landowner autocratic Ukrainian state under the German protectorate. p. 345

[443] The item was raised at the conference of the R.S.D.L.P. sections abroad, at Berne, in connection with the attempt on the part of some R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad (the Baugy group, the Paris section) to start publication of local newspapers separately from the Central Organ. In the conditions of wartime and in view of the great scarcity of funds and literary forces, the need for closer contacts between Bolsheviks and joint discussion of important questions, Lenin considered it inappropriate to publish small local papers, and motioned an amendment to point 3 of the draft resolution on the question, which was put up for debate at the conference. Lenin's motion was carried and the conference adopted point 3 in his wording (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, p. 331). p. 346

[444] *The International Socialist Women's Conference* was held at Berne from March 26 to 28, 1915. It was called on the initiative of the magazine *Rabotnitsa*'s organisation abroad with the close participation of Clara Zetkin, who was at the time Chairman of the International Socialist Women's Bureau. All the preparatory work for the conference was carried out by I. F. Armand, N. K. Krupskaya and others under Lenin's direction. The conference was attended by 29 delegates from women's organisations of Britain, Germany Holland, France, Poland, Russia and Switzerland. The seven delegates from Russia included four from the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee (Armand, Krupskaya and others) and three from the O.C. Most of the delegates to the conference were under the influence of the Centrists, which is why instead of discussing general socialist tasks in connection with the war, the conference confined its work to discussing Clara Zetkin's report "On Socialist Women's International Action for Peace". The resolution on this question was worked out by Clara Zetkin with the participation of delegates from Britain and Holland and was of a Centrist character. The representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee motioned a draft resolution written by Lenin, which indicated to the socialist women the revolutionary way of fighting against the war and international opportunism. Inessa Armand spoke for the draft at the conference, which however adopted the resolution drawn up by Clara Zetkin.

Lenin assessed the conference as an attempt to restore international ties and tried to use it for the purpose of rallying the internationalist elements on a revolutionary platform. But, as he pointed out later, this and other conferences of internationalists held at the time, while being inspired by the best intentions, did not lay down a militant internationalist line..., "they confined themselves

to repeating the old resolutions" and "at best were *marking time*" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 325).

The material on the International Socialist Women's Conference was published in a Supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 42, on June 1, 1915. p. 346

445 *The First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald* (Switzerland) was held from September 5 to 8, 1915.

It was attended by 38 delegates from 11 European countries. Most delegates took a Centrist stand. It discussed the following questions: 1) reports by representatives of the various countries; 2) joint declaration by representatives of Germany and France; 3) proposal by the Zimmerwald Left on the adoption of a resolution of principle; 4) adoption of a manifesto; 5) elections to the International Socialist Committee; 6) adoption of a resolution voicing sympathy for the victims of the war and the persecuted.

Lenin took an active part in the work of the Conference: he made speeches, sent notes to delegates during the sittings and spoke to them during the recesses. Before the Conference, he carried out extensive preparatory work in rallying the Left wing against the social-chauvinists and the Centrists. On the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference, between September 2 and 4, there was a meeting of Russian and Polish delegates to discuss a "Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Wing at Zimmerwald" which was written by Lenin, and a draft resolution motioned by Karl Radek which Lenin had criticised before the meeting. After the discussion it was decided to motion at the Zimmerwald Conference Radek's draft corrected on the basis of Lenin's remarks. The draft resolution and the draft manifesto written by Lenin condemned social-chauvinism and Centrism, raised the question of rejecting the slogans: "defend your country" in the imperialist war and a "civil peace", and pointed to the need for the propaganda of revolutionary action.

A majority at the Conference rejected the draft resolution on the war and the tasks of Social-Democrats and the draft manifesto motioned by the Left wing. However, the appeal "To the Proletarians of Europe" adopted by the Conference contained, thanks to Lenin's insistence, a number of basic propositions of revolutionary Marxism.

Lenin's "Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Wing at Zimmerwald", his articles "The First Step" and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference of September 5-8, 1915", in which Lenin assesses the Zimmerwald Conference, are published in Vol. 21 of the present edition, pp. 345-48, 383-88, 389-93.

The proceeding of the Zimmerwald and the Kienthal conferences from which Lenin's speeches published in this volume have been taken, were received by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee from the International Institute of Social History at Amsterdam in 1964. Some minor remarks by Lenin are not included in the volume. p. 349

[446] These are theses for a report on the character of the First World War and the tactics of revolutionary internationalists, which Lenin gave at a private meeting of Left-wing Social-Democratic delegates at the Zimmerwald Conference on September 4, 1915, before the Conference opened. It was also attended by some other delegates. The meeting adopted the draft manifesto and the draft resolution motioned by the Left wing at the Zimmerwald Conference. p. 351

[447] A reference to the Vorkonferenz, a preliminary conference, on the question of convening an international socialist conference, held at Berne on July 11, 1915. It was called on the initiative of the Italian and Swiss socialists, and was attended by representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the Regional Executive of the Polish Social-Democratic Party, the P.P.S.-Lewica and the O.C. of the Mensheviks. Most of those attending were Centrists. The main question was the composition of the forthcoming First International Socialist Conference. The Kautskian majority of the Vorkonferenz tried to get the Centrists led by Kautsky and even avowed social-chauvinists, Troelstra and Branting, to attend the conference. The representative of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee motioned a proposal that invitation to attend the next preliminary conference should be sent out to representatives of real Left-wingers in the international working-class movement, who had by then separated themselves from the official parties in most countries (the Dutch Left, the Bulgarian Tesnyaki, the Left-wing opposition in the Swedish and the Norwegian Social-Democratic parties, the group of German Left-wingers—International Socialists of Germany, the Polish Social-Democrats [opposition] and the Latvian Social-Democrats). But the Kautskian majority at the conference rejected the proposal. The preliminary conference adopted a decision to call the second Vorkonferenz which was to take the final decision on the conference. But it was not held, the Zimmerwald Conference being convened instead. p. 351

[448] In the discussion of the draft manifesto and the draft resolution on the war and the tasks of Social-Democrats, motioned on behalf of the Zimmerwald Left by Karl Radek, a sharp struggle flared up at the Conference between the revolutionary internationalists led by Lenin and the Kautskian majority led by the German Social-Democrat G. Ledebour. Opposing these documents, Ledebour and the Swiss Social-Democrat R. Grimm declared that, in putting forward concrete demands for revolutionary action, the draft manifesto and resolution motioned by the Left gave away the tactical measures of revolutionary Social-Democracy to the enemy. They said that people who signed these documents and spread their ideas in the belligerent countries could be subjected to reprisals. p. 353

[449] An apparent reference to the *Communist Manifesto* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 21-65). p. 354

[450] *The Tribunists*—members of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, whose organ was the newspaper *De Tribune*. Their leaders were D. Wijnkoop, H. Gorter, A. Pannekoek and Henriette Roland-Holst. They were not consistent revolutionaries but represented the Left wing of the labour movement in Holland, and during the First World War mainly took an internationalist stand. In 1918, they set up the Communist Party of Holland. p. 354

[451] A reference to Karl Liebknecht's letter of September 2, 1915, to the International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald. He could not take part in the Conference, because he had been drafted into the German army in early 1915. In his letter he opposed "civil peace" and called for a civil war against the bourgeoisie, for the international solidarity of socialists of all the belligerent countries, for a struggle against the imperialist war and a break with the social-chauvinists. p. 354

[452] In his speech, the Italian Socialist Party delegate G. Serrati declared that the resolution on the war and the tasks of Social-Democrats, motioned by the Left, was either premature or belated, because the war was already on and it had been impossible to prevent its outbreak. p. 354

[453] The addenda were not included in the final text of the statement read out at the Conference in which the Zimmerwald Left motivated its voting for the official manifesto. p. 355

[454] This is apparently the beginning of an unfinished article. p. 355

[455] Lenin gave a lecture on the subject of "Two Internationals" in Zurich on February 4 (17), 1916. He gave the same lecture under a slightly changed name, "Two Trends in the International Working-Class Movement", in Lausanne between May 19 and 21 (June 1 and 3) and in Geneva on May 20 (June 2).

The manuscript of the plan for the lecture, which is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, also reflects Lenin's preparation for the second lecture in Lausanne and Geneva. In connection with the new data available after the Second International Socialist Conference at Kienthal, Lenin made additions, crossed out some points and changed their numeration. All the changes made by Lenin in the plan are indicated in the footnotes. p. 359

[456] A reference to the report by Henriette Roland-Holst in "Beilage zur *Berner Tagwacht*" (Supplement to the *Berne Sentinel*) No. 18 of January 22, 1916, concerning the speech by the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, C. Huysmans, at the Extraordinary Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland on January 8-9; Huysmans also spoke at Rotterdam on February 2. He was opposed by the Left internationalist D. Wijnkoop, who said that since Huysmans had voted for the war credits, socialists could no longer regard him as Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau. "We shall set up another International," said Wijnkoop.

At the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee there is a cutting from "Beilage zur *Berner Tagwacht*" No. 18 of January 22, 1916, with Lenin's markings; on Huysmans's speech at Rotterdam, Lenin made an extract from *L'Humanité* of February 9, 1916. Both documents were published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*.

Berner Tagwacht (Berne Sentinel)—an organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland, published in Berne since 1893. From 1909 to 1918, it was edited by R. Grimm. At the beginning of the First World War, it carried articles by K. Liebknecht, F. Mehring and other Left-wing Social-Democrats. From 1917 on, the newspaper openly supported the social-chauvinists. At the present time, the paper takes the same stand on the main domestic and foreign policy issues as the bourgeois press. p. 358

457 A reference to the editorial article in No. 43 of *Avanti!* of February 12, 1916, "Intorno all'organizzazione socialista internazionale" (Around the Socialist International). The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee has Lenin's extracts from this article with his remarks.

Avanti! (Forward!)— a daily, the Central Organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in Rome in December 1896. During the First World War, the paper took an inconsistent internationalist stand without breaking up with the reformists. In 1926, it was closed down by Mussolini's fascist government, but continued irregular publications abroad; resumed publication in Italy in 1943. p. 358

458 A possible reference to reports from Paris about the Congress of the French Socialist Party of December 25-29, 1915, published in No. 52 of *The Labour Leader* on December 30, 1915, and in Nos. 2 and 4 on January 13 and 27, 1916.

The Labour Leader—a weekly published since 1891. From 1893, organ of the Independent Labour Party of Britain. From 1922, it was published under the name of *New Leader*; and since 1946, carries the name of *Socialist Leader*. p. 359

459 *The Labour Party* of Britain was founded in 1900 as an association of trade unions, socialist organisations and groups to seat labour representatives in Parliament (the Labour Representation Committee). In 1906, the Committee took the name of Labour Party. Trade union members are automatically members of the Labour Party provided they pay party dues. The Labour Party is headed by an Executive Committee which together with the General Trades Union Council and the Executive of the Co-operative Party makes up the National Labour Council. Closely allied to the Labour Party are the Co-operative Party, which is a collective member, and the Independent Labour Party.

The Labour Party, which was initially a party of workers (many members of the petty bourgeoisie joined the party later), is opportunist in ideology and tactics. During the First World War its leaders took a social-chauvinist stand.

The Labourites have repeatedly formed governments (1924, 1929, 1945 and 1950), which conducted the policy of British imperialism. The dissatisfaction of the British working people with the reactionary policy of the Labour Party leadership has resulted in the formation of a Left-wing trend in the party aimed against the official policy of its leadership. p. 358

[460] *Forward*—a newspaper published in Glasgow since 1906. During the First World War it supported the policy of the Independent Labour Party of Britain. It was banned by the authorities after it carried a report on the so-called 1915 "Christmas events" in Glasgow (the centre on the Clyde area and of the shop stewards' movement), when Lloyd George, at the time Minister of Munitions, was shouted down by workers, who then staged an impressive demonstration in the heart of the city carrying anti-war and anti-government slogans.

They threatened to strike and the ban on the paper was lifted. p. 359

[461] *Merthyr*—a district in Southern Wales. Lenin apparently refers to the by-elections in the district, when the representative of the British Socialist Party mustered the votes of the Liberals and the Conservatives against the candidate of the Independent Labour Party. No. 46 of *The Labour Leader* of November 18, 1915, carried a report on the electoral struggle in Merthyr. p. 359

[462] An apparent reference to the newspaper *The Socialist* the official organ of the Socialist Labour Party of Britain, published in Glasgow in 1904, 1909-10, 1916, 1918-23. p. 359

[463] *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word)—a Menshevik-Trotskyite newspaper published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916, in place of *Golos*. p. 359

[464] A possible reference to the report in the form of an appeal, "Die Internationalen in Oesterreich an die Internationalen aller Länder" (The Internationalists of Austria to the Internationalists of All Countries), carried in "Beilage zur *Berner Tagwacht*" Nos. 283 and 284 on December 3 and 4, 1915. p. 361

[465] A reference to Eugene Debs's articles "When I Shall Fight", "'Preparedness' I Favour", "The Only War I Will Fight in" and "Never Be a Soldier", published in the newspaper *Appeal to Reason* on August 25, September 11, December 11 and 25, 1915 (Nos. 1032, 1045 and 1047).

Cuttings from *Appeal to Reason* with Lenin's markings are at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 361

[466] *Nashe Dyelo* (Our Cause)—a Menshevik liquidator monthly first published in January 1915 in place of *Nasha Zarya*, which was closed down in October 1914. *Nashe Dyelo* was the main organ of the social-chauvinists in Russia, and had contributions from Y. Mayevsky, P. P. Maslov, A. N. Potresov and N. Cherevanin, among others. There were six issues. p. 360

[467] *Nash Golos* (Our Voice)—a legal Menshevik newspaper published in Samara in 1915-16; it took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 360

[468] *Rabocheye Utro* (The Workers' Morning)—a legal Menshevik paper published in Petrograd from October to December 1915 in succession to *Utro* which appeared in August 1915. The newspaper used internationalist phrases to cover up its social-chauvinism and defencism. p. 360

[469] "*Khvostov labour party*"—named after A. N. Khvostov, Minister for the Interior and Chief of the special gendarme corps in 1915 and 1916. In the manuscript Lenin wrote the word "Stolypin" over the word "Khvostov". p. 361

[470] "*Europa und die Revolution*" (Europe and Revolution)—the title of an editorial item carried in No. 35 of *Volksrecht* on February 11, 1916, in connection with an article signed I. S. in the Lucerne chauvinist newspaper *Vaterland*, whose author said that the continuation of the war could cause revolution which was more dangerous "for the throne and the altar" than the war itself. An extract made by Lenin from *Volksrecht* with his remarks is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 361

[471] Lenin is comparing the voting against the war credits by the 20 Social-Democratic deputies of the German Reichstag on December 21, 1915, and the voting on March 20, 1915, when only two (Karl Liebknecht and Otto Rühle) voted against the war credits. The voting of 20 deputies against the war credits testified to growing pressure from the masses on the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany and its Reichstag group. However, the majority of the C.C. (Vorstand) and of the Reichstag group censured the December 21 vote as a breach of party discipline.

Speaking of the inconsistency of the 20, Lenin is referring to a statement made by F. Geyer on behalf of the members of the Social-Democratic group who had voted against the war credits on December 21, which gave no characteristic of the war as imperialist, made no mention of proletarian internationalism, and assumed that German plans of conquest were of a very recent development. p. 360

[472] *Lichtstrahlen* (Rays of Light)—a monthly, organ of the group of Left-wing Social-Democrats of Germany (Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands), published under the editorship of J. Borchardt. It was published in Berlin with interruptions from 1913 to 1921. Among those who took part in the magazine were A. Pannekoek and A. Balabanova. p. 362

[473] No. 11 of *Vorwärts* of January 12, 1916, carried a statement by Otto Rühle, "Zur Parteispaltung" (On the Party Split), in which he said a split in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany was inevitable. The editors of *Vorwärts* said in the editorial that although the article was being published verbatim, they believed

that the controversial questions raised in it were not only premature, but altogether irrelevant. p. 362

474 A reference to the May Day demonstration and a strike by the young workers of Brunswick in early May 1916. The strike was staged in protest against the government's deduction of part of the young workers' wages for a war loan. More than 1,500 men took part in the strike and the demonstration. Following a stubborn struggle, the government was forced to rescind its order on deductions on May 5, 1916. p. 363

475 A reference to E. Vaillant's editorial article "Formalistes doctrinaires" (Doctrinaire Formalists) in *L'Humanité* No. 3827 on October 9, 1914, in which Vaillant, who went over to social-chauvinist positions at the very beginning of the war, was forced to admit that he was receiving letters from French socialists protesting against the policy of the French Socialist Party leadership. Lenin's extracts from Vaillant's article are in *Lenin Miscellany XIV*, p. 97. p. 362

476 A reference to the appeal "To the Women of the Proletariat", signed by Louise Saumoneau on behalf of the French Socialist Women's Action Committee calling for the struggle for peace and against chauvinism. A copy of the appeal with Lenin's markings is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 363

477 *The New Statesman*—a weekly of the Fabian Society, founded in London in 1913. Since 1931, it has been published under the name of *The New Statesman and Nation*. At present, it expresses the views of the Labour Party's Left wing. p. 362

478 A possible reference to the approval of the Zimmerwald Manifesto by the Executive Committee of the British Socialist Party. At the end of 1915, it decided to poll local organisations about adhering to Zimmerwald; an overwhelming majority of local party organisations came out in favour of adherence. A report on the poll was published in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 3 of February 29, 1916. p. 362

479 A reference to the walk-out of H. Hyndman and his supporters from the annual conference of the British Socialist Party held at Salford on April 23 and 24, 1916. The conference marked the break-away of the British Socialist Party from the social-chauvinists. The conference adopted a number of anti-war resolutions of a general democratic character and a resolution urging the use of the party's full influence to put an end to the war. By an overwhelming majority, the conference adopted a resolution saying that the socialists recognise only a class war. In early June 1916, Hyndman set up the National Socialist Party which in 1918 took the name of the Social-Democratic Federation. p. 363

480 A reference to the speech of C. Trèves in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on December 2, 1915. A report on the speech was published in *Avant!* No. 335 on December 3, 1915. p. 362

[481] *Tesnyaki*—a revolutionary trend in the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party, which took shape in 1903 as an independent Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The founder and leader of the Tesnyaki was D. Blagoev. He was succeeded by his followers G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov and others. From 1914 to 1918, the Tesnyaki opposed the imperialist war. In 1919, they joined the Communist International and set up the Communist Party of Bulgaria. p. 362

[482] *Tribune*, *De Tribune*—a newspaper founded in 1907 by the Left wing of the Dutch Social-Democratic Labour Party. In 1909, following the expulsion of the Left-wingers from the party and their establishment of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, it became the organ of the latter. From 1918, it was the organ of the Dutch Communist Party, published under the name until 1937. p. 362

[483] A possible reference to the items by E. Pernerstorfer, "Russland und wir" (Russia and We) and "Nochmals Russland und wir" (Once again Russia and We), published in Nos. 13 and 20 of *Die Neue Zeit* on December 24, 1915, and February 11, 1916. p. 364

[484] A reference to the article "Die Stellung der Sozialdemokraten Australiens zum Krieg" (The Attitude of Australian Social-Democrats to the War) published under the initials J. K. in "Beilage zur *Berner Tagwacht*" Nos. 32 and 34 of February 8 and 10, 1916. p. 364

[485] "*I.K.*", "*Internationale Korrespondenz*" (International Correspondence)—a weekly of the German social-chauvinists dealing with international affairs and the labour movement. It was published in Berlin from the end of September 1914 to October 1, 1918. An apparent reference to the article "Hughes und die australischen Gewerksschaften" (Hughes and the Australian Trade Unions) published in *Internationale Korrespondenz* No. 15 on May 23, 1916. A copy of this magazine with Lenin's markings on the article is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 364

[486] *Appeal to Reason*—the newspaper of the American socialists, founded at Girard, Kansas, in 1895. It was not officially connected with the Socialist Party of America, but conducted propaganda of socialist ideas and was very popular among the workers. The paper had contributions from the American Socialist Eugene Debs. p. 364

[487] *Kommunist* was organised by Lenin and was published by the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* together with G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh, who financed the publication. N. I. Bukharin was also on the Editorial Board. One (double) issue was published. It carried, apart from the article "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist", two other articles by Lenin: "The Collapse of the Second International" and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy".

The plan for the publication of the journal was worked out by Lenin in the spring of 1915. He directed the organisational meeting of the Editorial Board. Lenin hoped to make it an international organ of Left-wing Social-Democrats. However, there soon appeared serious differences between the Editorial Board and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh, which were aggravated after the issue of No. 1-2. The Bukharin-Pyatakov-Bosh group took an incorrect attitude on many basic questions of the Programme and tactics of the Party—the right of nations to self-determination, the role of democratic demands and the minimum programme in general, etc.—and tried to use the journal for their factional aims. On the Editorial Board, Lenin conducted a struggle against the Bukharin-Pyatakov-Bosh group, exposing their anti-Bolshevik views and factionaI acts, and sharply criticising the conciliatory attitude of G. Y. Zinoviev and A. G. Shlyapnikov towards the group.

In view of the anti-Party behaviour of this group, the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, on Lenin's proposal, declared that it considered the further publication of the journal impossible. The C.C. Bureau in Russia, having heard a report on the differences on the *Kommunist* Editorial Board, declared its full solidarity with the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and expressed the wish that "all C.C. publications should be edited in a strictly consistent tenor, in full conformity with the line of the C.C., which it had adopted at the beginning of the war". p. 367

488 The following text is an addition to the draft resolution, addressed to G. Y. Zinoviev. p. 367

489 *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Sotsial-Demokrat* Collection) was founded by Lenin and published by the Editorial Board of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. There were two issues: No. 1 in October and No. 2 in December 1916. Material was prepared for No. 3 which was to include Lenin's article "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", but the publication was discontinued for lack of funds. p. 368

490 The name given to G. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh because they had emigrated from Russia to Switzerland via Japan. p. 368

491 *The Second International Socialist Conference* was held at Kienthal, Switzerland, from April 24 to 30, 1916. It was attended by 43 delegates from 10 countries and discussed the following questions: 1) the struggle to end the war; 2) attitude of the proletariat to questions of peace; 3) agitation and propaganda; 4) parliamentary activity; 5) mass struggle, and 6) convocation of the International Socialist Bureau.

As a result of the work done by Lenin and the Bolsheviks before the Conference, the Left wing at the Conference was stronger than at Zimmerwald. The Zimmerwald Left worked out and motioned at the Conference a draft resolution on peace, which contained Lenin's basic propositions. Although the Kienthal Conference failed to adopt the Bolshevik slogans—to transform the imperial-

ist war into a civil war, to work for the defeat in the war of one's own imperialist government and to set up the Third International—it nevertheless helped to bring out and rally the internationalist elements. Lenin said the Kienthal Conference was a step forward.

Lenin wrote: "Draft Resolution on the Convocation of the Second Socialist Conference", "For the Conference To Be Held on April 24, 1916. Proposal of the Delegation" and "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 121, 122, 169-79).

p. 369

492 *The International Socialist Commission* (*I.S.C.*) in Berne—the executive organ of the Zimmerwald association, set up by the Zimmerwald Conference held on September 5-8, 1915. The I.S.C. included the Centrists R. Grimm, O. Morgari, Ch. Naine, and A. Balabanova as interpreter. The official report of the Conference published in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 1 of September 21, 1915, said: "This secretariat should in no sense substitute for the now existing International Socialist Bureau, and should be dissolved as soon as the latter can fully answer its purpose." On a copy of the report, now at the Central Party Archives, Lenin underlined these words and wrote in the margin: "Kein Beschluss darüber" (There was no decision about this), that is, the decision was adopted not by the Zimmerwald association, but after the Conference. p. 369

493 *The London conference of the socialists of the Triple Entente countries* was held on February 14, 1915. It was attended by representatives of the social-chauvinists and pacifist groups of Britain, France, Belgium and Russia: the Independent Labour Party, the British Socialist Party, the Labour Party, the Fabian Society, the French Socialist Party, the General Confederation of Labour, the Belgian Socialist Party, the S.R.s and the Mensheviks. On its agenda were these questions: 1) the rights of nations; 2) colonies; 3) guarantees for a future peace.

The Bolsheviks were not invited to the conference. However on Lenin's instructions, M. M. Litvinov went to the conference to read out a declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. It was based on a draft written by Lenin. The declaration contained a demand for the withdrawal of the socialists from the bourgeois governments, a complete break with the imperialists a repudiation of collaboration with them, resolute struggle against the imperialist governments and condemnation of the voting of war credits. As he was reading out the declaration, Litvinov was interrupted and not allowed to continue. He handed in the text of the declaration to the presidium and left the conference. On the London conference see Lenin's articles "The London Conference" and "On the London Conference" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 132-34, 178-80).

p. 371

494 A reference to the conference of socialists from Germany and Austria held in Vienna in April 1915. It was a sort of response to the London conference of the socialists of the Triple Entente countries. Its

resolution endorsed the social-chauvinist "defend your country" slogan in the imperialist war. p. 371

[495] *Possibilists*—a petty-bourgeois reformist trend in the French socialist movement. Their idea was that the workers should confine their struggle to the "possible". p. 372

[496] *The circular*—the appeal "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups"—was adopted unanimously at the meeting of the enlarged I.S.C. held at Berne from February 5 to 9, 1916. The delegation of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C., led by Lenin, entered a statement saying that the appeal was a step forward from the decisions of the First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald, but that it did not find it satisfactory on every point. The appeal was published in No. 3 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin* on February 29, 1916, and in No. 52 of *Sozial-Demokrat* on March 25, 1916. p. 375

[497] The question of attitude to convening the International Socialist Bureau was the subject of acute polemics at the Kienthal Conference on April 27 and 28, 1916. The Kautskian section of the Conferencs motioned several draft resolutions containing the common demand for recognising the need to call the I.S.B. Supporters of the Zimmerwald Left, headed by Lenin, opposed the idea. Under the pressure of the Left, the Right-wing delegates had to support the draft compromise resolution worked out by the committee. The resolution sharply criticised the I.S.B. and demanded the replacement of the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. and expulsion of the socialist ministers from their parties. However, it did not urge an immediate break with the I.S.B. or the establishment of a new International, but, on the contrary, authorised the national sections within the Zimmerwald association to demand the convocation of the I.S.B. p. 379

[498] The joint conference of Italian and Swiss socialists held at Lugano (Switzerland) on September 27, 1914. This was the first wartime effort to restore international ties. p. 379

[499] In his speech, L. Martov proposed that the draft resolutions on convening the I.S.B. should be referred to the committee to work out a compromise resolution. p. 380

[500] This was a protest against the oppressive policy of the tsarist autocracy, and the German and the Austrian governments, who, "depriving the Polish people of the possibility of deciding its own future, regard the Polish regions as a pledge in the forthcoming game of compensations...." "This is an especially gross expression of the essence of the policy of the capitalist governments, who, while sending masses of people into the slaughter, arbitrarily determine the future of the peoples for whole generations." The Polish Social-Democrats expressed the conviction that only the participation in the imminent struggle of the revolutionary international proletariat for socialism, "a struggle that would break the chains of national oppression and abolish all forms of alien domination, will assure the Polish people as well the possibi-

lity of an all-round development as an equal member of the union of nations".

The document published here was written by Lenin on a separate sheet and is apparently a variant of the corresponding passage from his article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (see present edition, Vol. 22, p. 348). p. 380

[501] The plan was drawn up not earlier than November 18 (December 1), 1916, when Lenin was working on the material concerning the Marxist attitude to the state. The sheet containing the plan was inserted in the notebook "Marxism on the State". That Lenin intended to write a work on the state is evident from his note "The Youth International" published in December 1916. Analysing and criticising N. I. Bukharin's article "The Imperialist Predatory State", Lenin wrote: "We hope to return to this very important subject in a separate article" (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 166). A comparison of the present plan with Bukharin's articles "Concerning the Theory of the Imperialist State" and "The Imperialist Predatory State" shows that this is precisely the plan for an article aimed against Bukharin's anti-Marxist, semi-anarchist views of the state.

In a letter to A. M. Kollontai on February 4 (17), 1917, Lenin wrote: "I am preparing (have got the material ready) an article on the question of the attitude of Marxism to the state" (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 286). The article was intended for No. 4 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, but was apparently not written. The material collected by Lenin for the article made up his notebook, "Marxism on the State" (see Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 123-307) and was used by Lenin in his book *The State and Revolution* (see present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 385-497). p. 381

[502] See Marx, "Critical Remarks on 'Prussian's' Article, 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform'". Lenin quotes the article from the book *Aus dem literarischen Nachlaß, von K. Marx, F. Engels und F. Lassalle*. Hrsg. von F. Mehring. Bd. 2. Gesammelte Schriften von K. Marx und F. Engels. Von Juli 1844 bis November 1847. Stuttgart, 1902. p. 382

[503] Engels, "On Authority" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 636-39). p. 382

[504] See Marx, "Der politischen Indifferentismus" (Political Indifferentism) (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd, 18, S. 299-304, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962). p. 382

[505] *The Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland* (in French and Italian cantons the party is called the Swiss Socialist Party) was set up in the 1870s and was a member of the First International. It was re-established in 1888. Strong influence in the party was enjoyed by the opportunists, who in the First World War took a social-chauvinist stand. In the autumn of 1916, the Right wing split away from the Party and set up its own organisation. The party majority headed by B. Grimm took a Centrist, social-pacifist

stand. The Left wing of the party took an internationalist stand. Under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the Left wing of the party gained in strength. In December 1920, the Left withdrew from the party and in 1921 united with the Communist Party of Switzerland (now the Swiss Party of Labour), which was formed in 1919. p. 382

506 *The Spartacus group*—a revolutionary organisation of German Left-wing Social-Democrats, formed at the beginning of the First World War by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, J. Marchlewski, L. Jogiches (Tyszka) and W. Pieck. In April 1915 Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring founded the magazine *Die Internationale*, which rallied the main forces of German Left-wing Social-Democrats. On January 1, 1916, an All-German Conference of Left-wing Social-Democrats was held in Berlin where the group was formalised and decided to call itself the *Internationale* group. As its platform, the conference adopted "Leitsätze" (Basic Propositions) worked out by Rosa Luxemburg with the participation of Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin. In 1916, the *Internationale* group, apart from political leaflets which it published from 1915, began illegal publication and circulation of "Political Letters" signed Spartacus (published regularly until October 1918); then it also began to call itself the Spartacus group.

The Spartacists conducted revolutionary propaganda in the masses, organised mass anti-war manifestations, directed strikes and exposed the imperialist character of the world war and the betrayal of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders. However they made serious mistakes in theory and policy: they denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the epoch of imperialism failed to take a consistent stand on the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war, underestimated the role of the proletarian party as the vanguard of the working class and feared a resolute break with the opportunists.

In April 1917, the group joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, retaining its organisational independence. In November 1918, during the revolution in Germany, the Spartacus group broke away from the "Independents" and set up the Spartacus Union, publishing its own programme on December 14, 1918. At their inaugural congress (December 30, 1918-January 1, 1919) they set up the Communist Party of Germany. Lenin repeatedly criticised the mistakes of the German Left-wing Social-Democrats and pointed to the inconsistency of their stand. At the same time, he put a high value on their revolutionary activity. He wrote: "The work of the German Spartacus group, which has carried on systematic revolutionary propaganda in the most difficult conditions, has really saved the honour of German socialism and the German proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 369). p. 383

507 These are Lenin's remarks to an article by G. Y. Zinoviev on maximalism intended for publication in the journal *Kommunist* or the

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newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. The article did not appear in the press. p. 384

[508] *Dyelo* (The Cause)—a fortnightly Menshevik journal, published in Moscow from August 1916 to January 1917 under the editorship of A. N. Potresov, P. P. Maslov and L. I. Axelrod (Orthodox). In 1916, there were ten issues (three of them double issues), and in 1917—one. The journal took a chauvinist attitude. p. 384

[509] *Three pillars*—the accepted designation in the legal Bolshevik press and at open, legal meetings of the three basic ("uncurtailed") revolutionary slogans: democratic republic, 8-hour working day and confiscation of all landed estates. p. 386

[510] A reference to R. Hilferding's book *Finance Capital. The Recent Phase in the Development of Capitalism*. Authorised translation from the German by I. Stepanov, Moscow, 1912. p. 388

[511] Joseph Patouillet, *L'impérialiste américain* (American Imperialism), Dijon, 1904. Junius—Rosa Luxemburg's pseudonym; her book *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie* (Crisis of Social-Democracy) was published in 1916. For Lenin's extracts from this work see present edition, Vol. 39, pp. 209-12. p. 388

[512] A reference to two articles of the German chauvinist Paul Lensch, carried in the magazine *Die Glocke* (The Bell): "Die Selbstbestimmungsflause" (Bragging about Self-Determination) in No. 8, 1915, and "Sozialismus und Annexionen in der Vergangenheit" (Socialism and Annexations in the Past) in No. 9, 1916. Lenin's extracts from these articles are in *Lenin Miscellany XXX*, pp. 118-27. p. 388

[513] An apparent reference to the following five articles by Kautsky: 1) "Sozialdemokratische Anschauungen über den Krieg vor dem jetzigen Krieg" (Social-Democratic Views on War Before the Present War)—*Die Neue Zeit* No. 13, December 29, 1916; 2) "Neue Sozialdemokratischen Auffassungen vom Krieg" (New Social-Democratic View on War)—*Die Neue Zeit* No. 14, January 5, 1917; 3) "Friedensbedingungen" (Terms of Peace—*Leipziger Volkszeitung*, December 13, 1916; 4) "Die Aufnahme des Friedensangebots" (Acceptance of Peace Proposal)—*Leipziger Volkszeitung*, December 21, 1916; 5) "Der Heiland der Welt" (Saviour of the World)—*Leipziger Volkszeitung* No. 289, December 24, 1916. p. 389

[514] *Neue Beiträge zur Biographie von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels* (New Material for a Biography of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels) published by Franz Mehring in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXV. Jahrgang, 11. Bd. 1907. p. 389

[515] This was written in connection with an article by R. Grimm, "The Majority and the Minority on the War Question", in *Berner Tagwacht* Nos. 19-23 of January 23-27 and in the magazine *Neues Leben* in January 1917, which defended the Centrist attitude of the majority of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. p. 391

[516] The article was not written. Many propositions formulated in the plan were elaborated by Lenin in his "Letters from Afar" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 295-342). p. 393

[517] This deals with the question of reworking the Party Programme. Lenin first intended to devote the fourth and then the fifth letter to this subject. But both the fourth and the unfinished fifth letter deal with other subjects. The manuscript of the plan included in this volume shows that Lenin subsequently added new points to it (2 bis, 5 bis and points marked with a +).

The plan became the basis for his work on the Party Programme upon his arrival in Russia (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 459-63, 466-79).

V. A. Karpinsky said the note in the margin was addressed to him. p. 394

[518] See Engels, "Zur Kritik des socialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" (Criticism of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891) (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 22, S. 240-43, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962). p. 395

[519] The book burnt by the tsarist censorship was Lenin's *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907*, which he wrote at the end of 1907 (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). In 1908 the book was printed in St. Petersburg, but was confiscated by the police at the printers' and destroyed. By 1917, only one copy remained. It was first published in 1917. p. 395

[520] *Politiken* (Politics)—a newspaper of the Swedish Left-wing Social-Democrats who in 1917 set up the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden; it was published in Stockholm from April 27, 1916. From November 1917, it was published under the name *Folkets Dagblad Politiken* (People's Political Daily). From 1916 to 1918 it was edited by Ture Nerman. Among its contributors were the Left Zimmerwaldists of Germany, Russia, France and other countries. In 1921, after the Left Social-Democratic Party joined the Comintern and took the name of Communist Party, the newspaper became its organ. Following a split in the Communist Party in October 1929, the paper passed into the hands of the Right wing. Its publication was discontinued in May 1945. p. 396

[521] *Socialdemokraten* (Social-Democrat)—organ of the Right, social-chauvinist wing of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party, led by K. H. Branting. p. 396

[522] The communiqué was handed by Lenin to the Editorial Board of the Swedish Left-wing Social-Democratic newspaper, *Politiken*, and through it to the representatives of the press and public, upon his arrival in Stockholm on March 31 (April 13). The newspapers *Rech* and *Den*, having received the text of the communiqué through the Petrograd telegraph agency, published it on April 5 (18) without the last paragraph which contained the testimony of

the representatives of international Social-Democracy concerning the organisation of the trip across Germany. p. 397

[523] *Nachalo* (The Beginning)—a newspaper published in Paris from September 1916 to March 1917 in place of *Nashe Slovo*. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917 the paper was published under the title *Novaya Epokha* (New Epoch). p. 397

[524] *Demain* (Tomorrow)—a literary, publicistic and political monthly founded by the French internationalist, writer and journalist H. Guilbeaux; it was published first in Geneva and then in Moscow from January 1916 to 1919 (with a break from January to April 1917). p. 398

[525] A reference to F. Loriot. p. 398

[526] The conference was held on the morning of March 31 (April 13) at the Regina Hotel in the presence of a group of Russian émigrés led by Lenin and Swedish Left-wing Social-Democrats C. Lindhagen, F. Ström, C. N. Carleson, K. Kilbom and Ture Nerman. The burgomaster of Stockholm C. Lindhagen and Lenin presided at the conference. C. Lindhagen spoke on the subject of "Light from the East"; Lenin gave a short report on the trip; a protocol on the circumstances of the trip across Germany was read out, after which the Swedish Social-Democrats expressed their readiness to testify their full solidarity with the step of the Russian revolutionaries. On behalf of the Swedes the conference was also addressed by C. N. Carleson, who expressed the hope that the revolution in Russia would grow into an international one. In conclusion, the Swedes gave an enthusiastic reception to the Russians and the organiser of the trip, Fritz Platten. p. 398

[527] The Bolshevik group of the Soviet discussed the attitude to the "liberty loan" for two days, April 10 and 11 (23 and 24), 1917. The draft resolution for the Plenary Meeting of the Soviet was worked out with Lenin's active participation. A resolution refusing support for the loan was motioned by the committee headed by A. M. Kollontai, after which Lenin and Zinoviev proposed a second resolution supplementing the first. The two resolutions were consolidated and were adopted unanimously on April 11 (24). The report of the group's sitting was published in *Pravda* No. 31 of April 13 (26).

In his report on the present situation at the April Conference, Lenin said that the question of war "actually united us when we came out against the loan" (present edition, Vol. 24, p. 232).

At the Soviet's Plenary Meeting, 2,000 deputies voted for the loan and 123 against. p. 399

[528] *The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)* was called by decision of the St. Petersburg Committee of April 6 (19) and was held from April 14 to 22 (April 27-May 5), 1917. It was attended by 57 delegates, including delegates from the Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Polish and Lithuanian organisations, representatives of the Military Organisation, and also two mezhraiontsi (see Note 556). On the agenda were the following questions: current

tasks—present situation; attitude to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the question of its reorganisation; structure of Party organisation; attitude to the other Social-Democratic trends; municipal elections; harassment of *Pravda*.

Lenin was elected honorary Chairman of the Conference. He gave the main political report on "Current Tasks—Present Situation", and was on the committee to work out the resolutions: "On the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government" and "On the War"; he motioned the resolutions "On the Municipal Elections" and "On the Attitude Towards the Parties of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Menshevik Social-Democrats, 'non-factional' Social-Democrats and other kindred political trends".

Kamenev's attempt in his speech and amendments to Lenin's resolution on the attitude to the Provisional Government to put through the demand of control over it, was exposed by Lenin as conciliatory, as the policy of Chkheidze and Steklov.

By an overwhelming majority, the Conference adopted Lenin's resolution on the attitude to the Provisional Government. At the first sitting it adopted Lenin's appeal "Against the Riot-mongers. To the Workers, Soldiers and the Whole Population of Petrograd."

On April 10 (May 2) the sittings were interrupted in view of the massive protest movement in response to the Provisional Government's note to the allied powers on April 18 (May 1) expressing its readiness to continue the imperialist war. The Conference decided to urge the workers and soldiers to give organised expression to their solidarity with the basic propositions of the Party Central Committee resolution of April 20 (May 3) on the crisis in connection with the said note of the Provisional Government (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 184-85). The delegates took part in explanatory work carried on by the Central Committee in the masses. In view of this, subsequent sittings were not fully attended.

The decisions of the Petrograd City Conference testified to the cohesion of the Petrograd Bolsheviks round Lenin's "April Theses"; Lenin's tactics were given approval by the Party organisation of the capital, the largest in the country. The resolutions of the Petrograd Conference largely formed the basis of the resolutions of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 139-66). p. 400

[529] *Izvestia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (Bulletin of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies)—a daily; the first issue appeared on February 28 (March 13), 1917, under the title *Izvestia Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov* (Bulletin of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies); from No. 3 of March 2 (15) the paper became the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

With the formation, at the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets, of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the paper became its organ and from August 1 (14) (No. 132) was published under the name *Izvestia Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i Petrogradskogo Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (Bulletin of the Central Execu-

tive Committee and of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies). The paper's political line was determined by the representatives of the S.R.-Menshevik bloc who conducted the conciliatory policy of supporting the bourgeois Provisional Government and who opposed the revolutionary action of the proletariat.

After the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, its Editorial Board was changed and the newspaper became the official organ of the Soviet Government. It carried the first important documents of the Soviet Government and Lenin's articles and speeches. In March 1918, its publication was transferred to Moscow.

After the formation of the U.S.S.R. in December 1922, the paper became the organ of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Under a decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on January 24, 1938, the paper was reorganised and since January 26, 1938, until the present day it has been published under the name of *Izvestia Sovietov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya* (Bulletin of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies). p. 403

[530] A reference to J. Maclean. p. 403

[531] Arriving at a meeting of the soldiers' section of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on April 17 (30), Lenin requested the floor to make an urgent statement over the publication in the newspapers on April 16 (29) of the resolution of the Executive Commission of the soldiers' section which condemned the "propaganda of the Leninists" as being just as harmful as "any other counter-revolutionary propaganda from the right" (see present edition, Vol. 24, p. 172). As he was speaking the Menshevik-S.R. majority, against the protests of the minority, got his time limited to 30 minutes. When Lenin finished speaking, he replied to questions from the meeting and then to those of the soldiers who surrounded him in a room at the exit of the Taurida Palace.

After Lenin's speech and objections to it from the Menshevik Lieber, the soldiers' section decided to proceed with its business, without making any statement on the substance of the question.

Lenin's speech was published in a distorted version in *Rech* and *Yedinstvo*. It is here published in accordance with the minutes now at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 404

[532] A reference to the dispatch to the front of units from the Petrograd garrison, against which workers and soldiers protested, seeing this as the Provisional Government's attempt to weaken the revolutionary population of the capital and violate the condition put forward by the Executive Committee when the Provisional Government was formed on the night of March 1 (14), that the garrison units which had taken part in overthrowing the autocracy were not to be withdrawn from Petrograd. p. 405

[533] A reference to the work *Socialism and War* (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338). p. 406

[534] *Russkaya Volya* (Russian Will)—a bourgeois daily founded by the tsarist Minister for the Interior, A. D. Protopopov, which was financed by the big banks; it was published in Petrograd from December 1916. After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, it carried on a slander campaign against the Bolsheviks. Lenin called it "one of the most infamous bourgeois newspapers" (see present edition, Vol. 25, p. 302). It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee on October 25, 1917. p. 407

[535] Show-window villages erected for the benefit of Empress Catherine by her favourite Potemkin. p. 408

[536] *The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)* was called by decision of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Central Committee, taken between April 4 and 8 (17 and 21), and was held in Petrograd from April 24 to 29 (May 7-12), 1917. It was the Party's first conference in legal conditions. It was attended by 131 delegates with vote and 18 with voice from 78 Party organisations (including Petrograd and its environments, Moscow and Moscow District, the Central Industrial Area, the Urals, the Donbas, the Volga area and the Caucasus) and also by representatives of front and rear military organisations, the national organisations of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Estonia. On the strength of its representation and the political and organisational tasks it dealt with, the Conference could perform and did perform the work of a Party congress: it worked out the political line for the whole Party and set up the Party governing centres.

At 2 p.m. on the day before it opened, there was a meeting of more than a hundred delegates at which new items were added to the agenda and the standing orders of the Conference were approved. A report on the April 21-22 events was given by Lenin who was met with warm applause. On the agenda of the Conference were the following questions: the current situation (the war and the Provisional Government, etc.), a peace conference, attitude to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, revision of the Party Programme, the situation within the International and the Party's tasks; unification of the internationalist Social-Democratic organisations, agrarian question, national question, Constituent Assembly, organisational question, reports by regions and elections to the Central Committee.

Lenin opened the Conference with a brief speech of welcome and was elected to the presidium. He directed all the work of the Conference.

The Conference exposed and rejected the Right-wing capitulatory line of L. B. Kamenev, who gave a co-report on the present situation as the representative of an anti-Leninist group. L. B. Kamenev and A. I. Rykov tried to oppose the Leninist line towards the socialist revolution by the opportunist assessment of the 1917 revolution and the prospects of its development. Denying the possibility and need for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to develop into a socialist revolution, Kamenev proposed that the

Conference should confine itself to accepting control over the bourgeois Provisional Government on the part of the Menshevik-S.R. Soviets. The Conference rejected the capitulatory stand of Kamenev and his small group of supporters, who denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in Russia.

In his report on the revision of the Party Programme, Lenin determined the direction in which the Programme Committee set up by the Conference was to rewrite the Programme of 1903.

During the debate on the national question, G. L. Pyatakov spoke against Lenin's slogan of the right of nations to self-determination including secession and the formation of an independent state. In support of his resolution on the national question, Lenin said that this right alone ensured complete solidarity of workers and all working people of different nationalities, while the expediency of secession was to be decided by the proletarian party "in each particular case, having regard to the interests of social development as a whole and the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 302-03).

Lenin's thesis on the break with the Zimmerwald Centrist majority and the establishment of the Third, Communist International was opposed by G. Y. Zinoviev. The Conference made a mistake by voting for the Bolsheviks' participation in the Third Zimmerwald Conference, which was predominantly Centrist in composition, thereby delaying preparations for the establishment of the Third, Communist International. Life itself very soon corrected this mistake (see present edition, Vol. 24, p. 388, and the unfinished article "The Tasks of Our Party in the International", Vol. 26, pp. 220-22).

The Conference elected the Central Committee headed by Lenin.

The historic importance of the Seventh (April) Conference lay in the fact that it adopted Lenin's programme for transition to the second stage of the revolution in Russia, mapped out the struggle for the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution and put forward the demand for the transfer of all power to the Soviets. Under this slogan, the Bolsheviks prepared the masses for the proletarian revolution. p. 409

[537] The question of calling an international conference of socialists from the belligerent and neutral countries was repeatedly discussed by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet in April 1917, the Executive Committee proposing to take the initiative in convening such a conference. In the second half of April, the Danish Social-Democrat Borgbjerg, who was connected with the social-chauvinists of Germany, came to Petrograd and on behalf of the United Committee of the Labour Parties of Denmark, Norway and Sweden (the social-patriotic majority of these parties) proposed that the socialist parties of Russia should take part in a peace conference to be called at Stockholm in May 1917.

On April 23 (May 6), Borgbjerg gave a report at a sitting of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, frankly declaring

that the German Government would agree to the peace terms the German Social-Democrats would put forward at the socialist conference. On April 25 (May 8), the Executive Committee heard statements by the Party groups on this question. The Bolsheviks read out the resolution of the April Conference adopted that day, "On Borgbjerg's Proposal"; they were joined by representatives of the Polish and the Latvian Social-Democrats. Lenin believed that participation in the proposed conference would be a complete betrayal of internationalism. The April Conference came out resolutely against participation, exposing Borgbjerg as an agent of German imperialism. The Trudoviks, Bundists and Mensheviks favoured participation. The Executive Committee adopted a Menshevik resolution declaring that it took upon itself the initiative in calling the conference and was setting up a special commission for the purpose. This decision was confirmed by the Plenary Meeting of the Soviet.

British, French and Belgian socialists of the majority refused to participate in the conference, for the British and the French governments wanted to defeat Germany. The Centrists agreed to take part: the group of J. Longuet from France, and the Independent Social-Democratic Party, with K. Kautsky, H. Haase and G. Ledebour at the head, from Germany.

The Spartacus group, which had affiliated to the party of "Independents" while retaining its organisational independence, refused to take part in the conference with the social-imperialists. Franz Mehring made a statement about this on his own behalf and on behalf of K. Liebknecht and R. Luxemburg who were in prison.

The conference did not take place because some of the delegates were not issued passports by their governments, and others refused to meet with representatives of the countries in a state of war with their own. p. 409

[538] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Newspaper)—a Menshevik daily published in Petrograd from March 7 (20) to November 30 (December 13), 1917. From August 30 (September 12) it was an organ of the (United) R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee. The newspaper took a defencist stand and supported the bourgeois Provisional Government, fighting against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. It gave a hostile reception to the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet power. p. 409

[539] *Yedinstvo* (Unity)—a newspaper published in Petrograd, the organ of the extreme Right group of Menshevik defencists led by G. V. Plekhanov. Four issues appeared in May and June 1914. From March to November 1917, It was published daily. Starting from December 1917 to January 1918, it appeared under the name of *Nashe Yedinstvo*. It gave support to the Provisional Government, favoured the coalition with the bourgeoisie and "firm power", and fought against the Bolsheviks, frequently resorting to the methods of the gutter press. Lenin noted that its line was "aiding and abetting the dark forces which threaten violence, bombs,

and riots" and called the paper an "abusive publication" (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 129, 199).

It gave a hostile reception to the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet power. p. 410

[540] This was written by Lenin for the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (see Note 536). It became the basis for "Proposed Amendments to the Doctrinal, Political and Other Sections of the Programme" which was published in Lenin's pamphlet *Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme* (see present edition, Vol. 24, pp. 459-63). p. 418

[541] *Magistrates*—an administrative office introduced by the tsarist government during the Peasant Reform in 1861. They were appointed from the local gentry and were empowered to decide disputes between landowners and peasants arising from the Reform. They confirmed officials elected from among the peasants and the decisions of peasants' meetings; they also had powers to inflict punishment (arrest, fine) on peasants.

Stolypin, P. A.—Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for the Interior in tsarist Russia from 1906 to 1911. His name is connected with a period of fierce political reaction. He issued a number of agrarian laws designed to create strong kulak farms in the countryside as a social bulwark for the tsarist autocracy. p. 425

[542] *The Agrarian Programme of the 104*—the agrarian bill signed by 104 members of the First Duma and tabled by the Trudoviks at the thirteenth sitting on May 23 (June 5), 1906. The bill said the aim of agrarian legislation was "to strive to establish an order under which all land with its minerals and waters would belong to the whole people, with the land required for agriculture being given for use only to those who would cultivate it by their labour" (*Gosudarstvennaya duma v Rossii v dokumentakh i materialakh* [The State Duma in Russia in Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1957, p. 172). The Trudoviks demanded the establishment of a "nation-wide land fund" which was to include all the state, crown, cabinet, monastery and church lands; there was also to be a forcible alienation into the fund of landed estates and other privately owned lands where the size of possessions was in excess of the labour norm established for the given area. Some compensation was to be paid for the alienated privately owned lands. Allotments and small privately owned tracts were to be retained by their owners for some time; the bill provided for a subsequent gradual transfer of these lands as well to the nation-wide fund. The agrarian reform was to be carried out by local committees elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot. p. 425

[543] This is an unfinished reply to the letter of the soldiers' committee of the 8th Horse Artillery Battery (army in the field) sent to the Petrograd Soviet. It was dated April 24 (May 7), 1917, that is, the period when the bourgeois and after it the petty-bourgeois press

started a slander campaign against Lenin and the other members of the Bolshevik Party who had returned to Russia from Switzerland via Germany.

The soldiers' letter said: "In view of the fact that there is much friction over Lenin among the soldiers of the battery, please let us have the earliest possible reply. What is his origin? Where had he been? If he had been exiled, what for? How did he return to Russia and what is he doing at present, that is, are his acts doing us good or harm? In short, we should like to be convinced by your letter, so as to stop our arguments, lose no more time and be able to prove our point to other comrades as well" (*Pravda* No. 86 of April 16, 1927).

The letter was passed on to Lenin. p. 430

[544] This is a short record of Lenin's report about the results of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) at a city meeting of the Petrograd Party organisation held at the Naval Cadet Corps building and attended by 5,000-6,000 Party members. It was made by V. I. Nevsky and was to be published in the papers, but was not. The report was first published in 1927 in the first book of *Zapiski Instituta Lenina* (Transactions of the Lenin Institute). p. 431

[545] Krupskaya wrote the article in connection with the slander campaign started by the bourgeois and S.R. and Menshevik press against Lenin and other Bolsheviks who had returned to Russia via Germany. Lenin made the insertion as he was editing the article. It was published in *Soldatskaya Pravda* No. 21 on May 13 (26), 1917. p. 435

[546] *Vperyod* (Forward)—a mass workers' newspaper of the Bolshevik trend, directed by Lenin; it was published illegally in Vyborg by the Editorial Board of *Proletary* from September 10 (23), 1906, to January 19 (February 1), 1908. There were 20 issues.

It carried a number of articles by Lenin. p. 435

[547] A. V. Lunacharsky, who spoke before Lenin, proposed an ultimatum to the governments of France and Britain to make them accept the formula of peace without annexations and indemnities, and the announcing of a ceasefire on all fronts. At the same time, said Lunacharsky, we must appeal to the peoples of the Allied countries and also of Germany and Austria, urging them to exert pressure on their governments with all means at their disposal. If the German Government should insist on continuing the war under this unconditional formula, the falsity of its assertion that it was waging a defensive war would be exposed. p. 436

[548] *Volya Naroda* (People's Will)—a daily, the organ of the Right wing of the S.R. Party. It was published in Petrograd from April 29, 1917, and closed down in November 1917. Later it appeared under other names and was closed down for good in February 1918. p. 438

[549] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—a daily published in Petrograd from April 18 (May 1), 1917, to July 1918. It was started by a group of Menshevik internationalists and writers connected with the journal *Letopis*. Characterising this group, Lenin said that "intellectual scepticism, which conceals and expresses lack of principle, is the dominant mood" in their midst (see present edition, Vol. 25, pp. 274-75), and ironically called them "would-be internationalists" and "pseudo-Marxists".

The newspaper took a hostile attitude to the Socialist Revolution in October 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet power. From June 1, 1918, it had two editions: one in Petrograd, another in Moscow. Both were closed down in July 1918. p. 439

[550] Lenin's report, which was central in the work of the All-Russia Conference of Front and Rear Military Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), has been preserved in two variants: as recorded by a correspondent of *Novaya Zhizn*, which published it the following day, June 21 (July 4), 1917, and by M. S. Kedrov (see his reminiscences "The All-Russia Conference of Military Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)" in the book *Velikaya Oktyabrskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Revolutsia. Sbornik vospominany uchastnikov revolutsii v Petrograde i Moskve* [The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Collection of Reminiscences by Participants in the Revolution in Petrograd and Moscow], Moscow, 1957, pp. 77-79).

The All-Russia Conference of Front and Rear Military Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was held in Petrograd from June 16 to 23 (June 29 to July 6), 1917. It was attended by 107 delegates from 43 front and 17 rear military Bolshevik organisations uniting almost 26,000 members of the Party. It was called by the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee Military Organisation. On its agenda were these questions: reports from the localities; attitude to the resolutions of the Seventh (April) Conference; the present situation; organisation of power and the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; the war, the peace and the offensive; the agrarian question and others.

Lenin gave reports on the present situation and on the agrarian question. The conference recognised the need to replace the standing army by armed workers' battalions of the Red Guard placed at the disposal of the elected workers' organisations, and to replace the police by the people's militia (see *K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiyakh...*, Part I, pp. 354-67). The conference decided to regard the newspaper *Soldatskaya Pravda* as the Central Organ of the military organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), approved the draft Rules for the Military Organisation and elected the All-Russia Central Bureau of Military Organisations consisting of M. S. Kedrov, N. V. Krylenko, V. I. Nevsky, N. I. Podvoisky and others. The conference was of great importance in strengthening the ties between the proletariat and the soldier mass and helped to extend the work of the Bolsheviks among the soldiers. p. 439

[551] The theses were written by Lenin on July 10 (23), 1917, and defined the new tactical line of the Bolshevik Party in connection with

the changed political situation following the fusillade of the workers' and soldiers' demonstration on July 4 (17) and the transfer of all power into the hands of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. The theses were discussed at an Enlarged Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) together with representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee, the Military Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Central Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau, the Moscow Committee and the Moscow District Committee, held on July 13 and 14 (26-27), 1917.

The theses were published in the form of an article under the title "Political Mood" on August 2 (July 20), 1917, in the newspaper *Proletarskoye Dyelo*. It was the organ of the Bolshevik group of the Kronstadt Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and was published in place of the Bolshevik newspaper *Golos Pravdy*, closed down in July by the Provisional Government. When the manuscript was being prepared for the press, the subtitle "Four Theses" and points 1, 2, 3, 4, the words "in the thesis" and also the end of the article (beginning with the words "Form illegal organisations...) were deleted; the words "armed uprising" were replaced by the words "resolute struggle".

The manuscript heading also contained the word "latest" in front of the words "Political Situation", which was also crossed out, but there is no certainty that it was done in connection with the publication of the document in the legal press since in that case the word "situation" would have been replaced by the word "mood". It should also be borne in mind that Lenin himself later mentioned in his "Aide memoire" (see Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, pp. 443-44) his theses on "the political situation" (and not "the latest political situation"). Finally, this document, since its first publication as belonging to Lenin (1925), has gone down in the Party history and is known to everyone precisely as "The Political Situation". Accordingly, the word "latest" has not been restored in Vol. 34 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*. p. 440

552 Full power passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government after the events of July 3-5, which were an expression of the most profound political crisis gripping the country. The failure of the Russian offensive at the front started by Kerensky on June 18 (31), the fresh sacrifices made for the benefit of the imperialists, the growth of unemployment in view of the closure of enterprises by the capitalists, the growing cost of living and the acute shortage of the foodstuffs caused an explosion of indignation among the broad masses of workers and soldiers over the counter-revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government. On July 3 (16) spontaneous demonstrations developed and threatened to grow into an armed uprising against the Provisional Government.

At the moment, the Bolshevik Party was against any armed action, for it believed that the revolutionary crisis had not yet matured, and that the army and the provinces were not yet ready

to support the uprising in the capital. A meeting of the Central Committee held on July 3 (16) together with the St. Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Central Committee, decided to refrain from taking any action. A similar decision was also taken by the Second Petrograd City Conference of the Bolsheviks then in session. The delegates went to the districts to restrain the masses from taking action. But it had already begun and it proved impossible to stop it.

In view of the mood of the masses, the Central Committee, together with the St. Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation, late at night on July 3 (16), decided to participate in the demonstration on July 4 (17) so as to lend it a peaceful and organised character. At the time, Lenin was away: he was ill due to overwork and had gone to the countryside for a few days' rest. When he was informed of the events, he returned to Petrograd on the morning of July 4 (17) and took over direction of the events.

More than 500,000 took part in the demonstration on July 4 (17). It was stared under Bolshevik slogans: "All power to the Soviets!" and others. The demonstrators nominated 90 representatives, who handed to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets a demand for the transfer of all the power to the Soviets. However, the S.R. and Menshevik leaders refused to take over.

With the knowledge and consent of the Menshevik-S.R. Central Executive Committee, the Provisional Government decided to suppress the demonstration by armed force. Military cadet and counter-revolutionary Cossack regiments were thrown against the peaceable demonstration of workers and soldiers. They opened fire on the demonstrators. Reactionary-minded military units were summoned from the front.

The conference of members of the C.C. and the St. Petersburg Committee, held under Lenin's direction on the night of July 4 (17), decided to stop the demonstration in an organised manner. This was a correct step taken by the Party, which succeeded in retreating at a right time and preserving the main forces of the revolution from being routed.

After the dispersal of the demonstration, the bourgeois Provisional Government continued its reprisals. It attacked the Bolshevik Party with special ferocity. The Bolshevik newspapers *Pravda*, *Soldatskaya Pravda* and others were closed down. Workers were disarmed, and arrests, searches and pogroms followed. The revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison which had taken part in the demonstration were disbanded and sent to the front. The Mensheviks and S.R.s were accomplices of the counter-revolutionary butchers. p. 440

[553] The letter was written after the text of the leaflet, and judging by its content was intended for the Party Central Committee. The leaflet was not published. Lenin may have been the author of the leaflet. p. 443

[554] The theses were first published in full in Vol. 34 of the Fifth Russian edition of the *Collected Works*. The First edition of the

Collected Works (Vol. 14, Part II), and the Fourth edition of the *Collected Works* (Vol. 26), did not contain the section "On the List of Candidates for the Constituent Assembly" and the note to it. In Vol. 21 of the Second and Third editions of the *Collected Works* it was published in part.

The Third Petrograd City Conference was held from October 7 to 11 (20 to 24), 1917. It was attended by 92 delegates with vote and 40 delegates with voice only. Lenin was elected honorary chairman. Lenin's theses were the basis of the Conference decisions. In a resolution on the present situation, the Conference declared the need to replace the Kerensky government by a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government, for only such a government could give land to the peasants and take the country out of the war and the ruin. The Conference adopted resolutions "On the Red Guard" and "On the Hunger Strike by Political Prisoners in the Case of July 3 (16)-5 (18)". Its decisions emphasised that the country was on the eve of a massive proletarian uprising and expressed the firm conviction that the uprising would be victorious. The Conference discussed the question of elections to the Constituent Assembly, Lenin being among the first candidates nominated from Petrograd. The sitting on October 11 (24) heard Lenin's "Letter to the Petrograd City Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 145-48). The Conference played a very important part in the preparation of the Great October Socialist Revolution. p. 446

[555] The Provisional Government announced the convocation of the Constituent Assembly in its Declaration of March 2 (15), 1917. On June 14 (27), the Provisional Government adopted a decision appointing the elections to the Constituent Assembly on September 17 (30). But in August it postponed the elections until November 12 (25).

The elections were held after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, on the appointed day. Polling took place by lists drawn up before the October Revolution and under the statute approved by the Provisional Government. A considerable section of the people had not yet had time to grasp the full significance of the socialist revolution, which was used by the Right-wing S.R.s, who managed to win majorities in gubernias and regions, far away from the capital and industrial centres. The Constituent Assembly was convened by the Soviet Government and opened in Petrograd on January 5 (18), 1918. The counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly rejected the "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People" which was placed before it by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, and refused to recognise the Soviet power. The bourgeois Constituent Assembly was dissolved by a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on January 6 (19). p. 446

[556] *Mezhraiontsi*—members of the Inter-District Organisation of the United Social-Democrats which arose in St. Petersburg in November 1913 with the idea of working for R.S.D.L.P. unity. Behind

the slogan of unity, and in an effort to merge the Bolshevik and the Menshevik organisations in St. Petersburg, the mezhraiontsi actually set up their own factional organisation, which included Trotskyite Mensheviks and also a section of former Bolsheviks who took a conciliatory attitude towards the opportunists.

During the First World War, the mezhraiontsi adopted a Centrist stand; they recognised the war as imperialist and opposed social-chauvinism, but did not agree to a full break-away from the Mensheviks. In 1917, the mezhraiontsi organisation, which included A. Joffe, A. Lunacharsky, D. Manuilsky, L. Trotsky, M. Uritsky, V. Volodarsky and I. Yurenev, announced its agreement with the Bolshevik Party line. At the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) the mezhraiontsi organisation (almost 4,000 members) broke away from the Menshevik defencists and was admitted to the Bolshevik Party. Subsequent events showed that some mezhraiontsi (including Lunacharsky, Manuilsky, Volodarsky and Uritsky) did in fact break with their Centrist past and became prominent members of the Bolshevik Party. But Trotsky, even after he entered the Bolshevik Party, did not become a Bolshevik and carried on a secret and open struggle against Leninism and the Party's policy. He became the bitterest enemy of Leninism, the Soviet state and the entire international communist movement.

The mezhraiontsi published their own periodical—the journal *Vperyod* (one issue appeared in 1915 illegally). Its publication was resumed in 1917: from June to August it was published legally as the organ of the St. Petersburg Inter-District Committee of the United Social-Democrats (internationalists); there were 8 issues. After the Sixth Party Congress, the Editorial Board was changed and No. 9 appeared as an organ of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Central Committee. In September its publication was discontinued under a Central Committee decision. p. 447

[557] *Dyelo Naroda* (The People's Cause)—a daily, the organ of the S.R. Party, published in Petrograd from March 1917 to July 1918, repeatedly under different names. It took a defencist and conciliatory stand, and supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. Its publication was resumed in Samara in October 1918 (four issues) and in Moscow in March 1919 (ten issues). The paper was closed down for its counter-revolutionary activity. p. 448

[558] A reference to the speeches of Y. M. Sverdlov, J. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky and G. Y. Sokolnikov at the Central Committee's sitting on October 20 (November 2), 1917, during the discussion of Lenin's letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 191-94) in connection with the publication in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* of an item entitled "Y. Kamenev on the 'Uprising'", in which Kamenev, on behalf of Zinoviev and himself, opposed the armed uprising. See *Protokoly Tsentralnogo Komiteta R.S.D.R.P.(B.). Avgust 1917-fevral 1918* (Minutes of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.[B.]. August 1917-February 1918), 1958, pp. 106-08. p. 450

[559] The Cossack demonstration, or the Cossack "religious procession", in Petrograd was set for October 22 (November 4), 1917, and was regarded by the counter-revolutionaries as a show of force in their struggle against the mounting revolution. The Bolsheviks carried on extensive agitation among the Cossacks urging them to refrain from taking part in the demonstration. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies issued an appeal to the Cossacks. Representatives of the Cossack regiments were invited to a conference of regimental committees held by the Petrograd Soviet in Smolny on October 21 (November 3). At the conference, the Cossacks declared that they would not act against the workers and soldiers. The night before the demonstration, the Provisional Government was forced to call it off. p. 451

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 41

На английскот языке

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PREFACE

Volume Forty-Two contains items written after the October Revolution, which were first published in the Complete Russian Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* or which were published in *Lenin Miscellanies*, magazines and newspapers. These documents form an important supplement to the works included in the various volumes of this edition.

The first group of documents dates to the period from November 1917 to July 1918—the period of continued development of the socialist revolution and consolidation of Soviet power. Mention should be made first of all of "Theses on the Tasks of the Party + the Present Situation", the article "Plekhanov on Terror", the "Draft Resolution for the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Concerning the Expulsion from the Party of S. A. Lozovsky", the "Outline of a Programme of Economic Measures" and a number of chapters of the original version of the article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government". These deal with the tasks that faced the working class after the conquest of power, stress the necessity for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and suppressing the resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes, and sharply criticise the Right-opportunist elements within the Party.

Several documents relate to Lenin's fight to get Russia out of the war, to conclude the Brest peace treaty ("Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Bolshevik and Left S.R. Groups in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, February 19, 1918", "Speech to the Lettish Riflemen, February 20, 1918" and others). The numerous decisions for the Council of People's Commissars drafted by Lenin reflect the first steps of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the field of political, economic and cultural activities.

A large part of the materials relate to the period of foreign military intervention and the civil war, among them: notes on "The Tasks and Organisation of the Work of the Council of Defence", "Notes at a Meeting of the Commission on Cartridges", "Draft Resolution for the C.C R.C.P.(B.) on Sending Groups of Workers Out on Food Transportation Jobs", "Draft Decision for the Council of Defence on the Mobilisation of Soviet Employees", "Draft Decisions for the C.C. Politbureau on Measures to Fight Mamontov", "Proposals on Military Questions", "Decisions of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front" and Lenin's speeches: "Speech to Ivanovo-Voznesensk Communist Workers Leaving for the Front, October 24, 1919", "Speech at the Eleventh Issue of Red Commanders of the First Moscow Machine-Gunners Training Courses, May 12, 1920", "Report on the Internal and External Position of the Republic at a Meeting of Activists of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), October 9, 1920". These and many other documents strikingly illustrate the gigantic activities of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government, headed by Lenin, in organising the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards.

A considerable part of the volume is made up of items and documents written after the war, when the problems of economic rehabilitation and socialist construction bulked large. Industry, agriculture, science and technology, public education, improvement of the machinery of state, the national question, foreign policy—all these problems were dealt with daily by Lenin, who directed the activities of the Party and the Government

The items included in this volume contain important supplementary material showing how Lenin worked on the plan of socialist construction.

Of great significance are the chapters of the original version of "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (the end of Chapter IV, chapters V-IX and the beginning of Chapter X) which were first published in 1962. In these chapters Lenin sets forth in greater detail than in the final text a number of questions relating to the task of starting construction of a new society and reveals the importance

of solving economic problems and the need for proper management of the national economy during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. In interviews given to Lincoln Eyre, correspondent of the American newspaper *The World*, and to the correspondent of the Japanese newspaper *Osaka Asahi* and in his "Notes on Electrification" Lenin characterises the role of electrification in building the economic foundation of socialism and developing the productive forces. Questions of the New Economic Policy are dealt with in the "Reply to the Debate on the Report on Concessions" at the meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on April 11, 1921, in speeches made at the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) during the debate on the resolution on questions of the New Economic Policy, and in a letter "To the Russian Colony in North America".

Consistent application of democratic centralism in running the economy, scientific planning, rational and efficient management, proper organisation of labour, the introduction of cost accounting, the running of enterprises on a paying basis, and the use of moral and material incentives for developing production were considered by Lenin to be the most vital principles and methods of socialist management. Mention can here be made of such documents as the "Speech at a Meeting of the Presidium of the S.E.C., April 1, 1918", "Comments on the Draft 'Regulations for the Management of the Nationalised Enterprises'", "Salaries for Specialists", "Addendum to the Draft Regulations on Subbotniks", "Draft of the Main Point of the C.L.D. Decision on the General Planning Commission", "Plan of an Article 'Commercial Organisation'", "Motion to the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on Bonuses for Enterprises" and others. Defining the tasks of economic construction in his "Plan of a Speech at the Trade Union Congress", Lenin wrote: "Work discipline, higher labour productivity, work organisation, increased output, relentless fight against slipshod work and red tape. By this sign shall ye conquer" (p. 308). Materials such as: "Addendum to the Draft Decision for the C.P.C. 'On the Distribution of Agricultural Machines'", "Draft Decision for the C.L.D. on Fowler Ploughs", the draft decision on "Measures for Improving the Organisation

of State Farms" and others show Lenin's concern for the revival of agriculture, for the supply of the peasants with machines, for the development of the state farms, for support of the co-operatives on the part of the state and for the creation of conditions for the socialist transformation of the village.

A number of materials deal with questions of cultural development: the draft decision for the C.P.C. on "Library Organisation", "Instructions for Compiling a Reading Book for Workers and Peasants", "Draft Decision for the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Chief Committee for Political Education", "Rough Draft of a Resolution on Proletarian Culture", "Addendum to the Draft Decision for the C.P.C. on an Obligatory Science Minimum in the Higher Schools", "Draft Decision for the Plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Education", "Directives on the Film Business". These and other documents contain important propositions regarding the substance and ways of effecting a cultural revolution, the communist education of the working people, the political enlightenment of the masses.

Of exceptionally great significance is the letter "On the Establishment of the U.S.S.R." in which Lenin put forward the idea of creating a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a single multinational socialist state based on a voluntary association of equal and sovereign Soviet Republics. Questions concerning the national policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are dealt with also in the "Notes at a Meeting of Delegates to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East", "Draft Decision for the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tasks of the R.C.P.(B.) in Turkestan", "Draft Decision for the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tasks of the R.C.P.(B.) in Localities Inhabited by Eastern Peoples" and other items, in which Lenin urges the need for unity and fraternal co-operation among all the nationalities of the Soviet land and for waging a vigorous fight against chauvinism and nationalism.

The speech winding up the debate on the report on concessions at the meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets contains Lenin's important thesis on

Soviet patriotism: "The patriotism of a person who is prepared to go hungry for three years rather than surrender Russia to foreigners is genuine patriotism, without which we could not hold out for three years. Without this patriotism we would not have succeeded in defending the Soviet Republic, in doing away with private property.... This is the finest revolutionary patriotism" (p. 245).

In his note "The Democratism and Socialist Nature of Soviet Power" and his "Speech at a Meeting in Presnya District, July 26, 1918", Lenin characterises the Soviets and reveals the genuine democratism of the Soviet Constitution.

Many documents reflect Lenin's efforts to improve the working of the machinery of state, and strengthen state, Party and public control: "Proposals for the Distribution of Functions Between the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D.", "Proposals Concerning the Work Routine of the Deputy Chairmen and the Chairman of the C.P.C.", "Letter to L. B. Kamenev, A. I. Rykov and A. D. Tsyurupa on the Distribution of Work Between the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D.", "Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Directives on a Workers' Inspection", "Materials to the Article 'How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection'", etc. A number of documents are devoted to the strengthening of socialist legality: "Rough Theses of a Decision on the Strict Observance of the Laws", "Proposals Concerning the Work of the Vecheka", "Speech at the Fourth Conference of Gubernia Extraordinary Commissions, February 6, 1920" and others.

Lenin regarded the Communist Party as the guiding and directing force of Soviet society. He never relaxed his efforts to strengthen the ideological and organisational unity of the Party, he urged the need for doing everything to develop inner-Party democracy, to rigidly adhere to the principle of collective leadership and to strengthen the Party's ties with the masses. These questions are dealt with in many documents included in this volume: "Speech on the Immediate Tasks of Party Development" at the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), draft resolution and proposals for the resolution on this question, speech to the R.C.P.(B.) group at the Eighth Congress of

Soviets during the debate on the report of the All-Russia C.E.C. and C.P.C. concerning home and foreign policies, "Speech at a Meeting of Moscow Party Activists, February 24, 1921", "Draft of a Letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Attitude to Non-Party Workers", "Outline of a Speech at a Meeting of Supporters of the 'Platform of Ten'"—delegates to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), "Remarks Concerning the Work Plan of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)".

Lenin's draft resolution for the Politbureau of the C.C. concerning Maxim Gorky's articles in the magazine *Communist International* is a striking illustration of his high-principled attitude, his intolerance towards the cult of personality.

Of great importance is the series of documents dealing with the Soviet state's foreign policy: the interviews with foreign correspondents, the "Draft Directives to the Deputy Chairman and All Members of the Genoa Delegation", "Draft Directives of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) for the Soviet Delegation to the Genoa Conference", "Draft Decision for the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tasks of the Soviet Delegation at Genoa", "Amendments and Remarks to the Draft Declaration of the Soviet Delegation at the Genoa Conference" and others, which formulate the fundamental principles of the Soviet Republic's foreign policy and the aims and methods of Soviet diplomacy.

These documents show how consistently the Soviet Government, headed by Lenin, pursued its policy of peace and establishment of business relations with the capitalist countries. In his interview given to an American correspondent, Lenin said: "I know of no reason why a socialistic commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalistic countries" (p. 177). At the same time the Soviet Government strongly rebuffed all attempts of the imperialist powers to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic or to impose upon it fettering terms of an economic agreement. Lenin said: "We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for peace.... But we do not propose to be strangled to death for the sake of peace" (ibid.).

Notable items in this volume are the documents which reveal the friendly fraternal relations between the Soviet state and the countries where the people had come to power. This volume contains the draft decisions for the C.P.C.

concerning a treaty with the Socialist Workers' Republic of Finland. This was the first treaty in history to be signed between two socialist republics, and represented a new type of international relations between equal sovereign states. The text of Lenin's "Talk With a Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic" contains important guidelines on the paths of development towards socialism for countries with a pre-capitalist social system, and on the specific features of the tactics which the revolutionary parties in these countries should adopt.

The writings included in this volume are a valuable supplement to the well-known works of Lenin dealing with the international labour and communist movements. Mention should first of all be made of Lenin's letter to Chicherin (at the end of December 1918) outlining the basic ideological platform and organisational principles of the Communist International. Of considerable interest are the materials relating to the Second Congress of the Comintern—the "Plan of a Resolution Concerning the Meaning of the Concept 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' and the Fight Against the 'Fashionable' Distortion of This Slogan", "Remarks on the Report of A. Sultan-Zade Concerning the Prospects of a Social Revolution in the East" and others. A number of documents deal with the Third Congress of the Comintern and show what a tremendous job Lenin performed in preparing the basic decisions of the Congress and guiding its proceedings. These include: "Letter to O. W. Kuusinen and Remarks on the Draft 'Theses on the Organisational Activities of the Communist Parties, on the Methods and Contant of Their Work'", "Remarks on the Draft Theses on Tactics for the Third Congress of the Communist International", "Speeches at a Meeting of Members of the German Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Italian Delegations".

These documents reflect the irreconcilable struggle which Lenin carried on against Right-wing opportunism, reformism and revisionism, and at the same time against Leftism, adventurism, dogmatism and sectarianism in the international communist movement. They contain very important guidelines on questions of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement. The Communist Parties, Lenin emphasised, should focus their attention on the task

of winning over the majority of the working class, the bulk of the working masses, and prepare them for the socialist revolution. In a number of documents—"Draft Decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tactics of the United Front", "Letter to Members of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) with Remarks to the Draft Resolution for the First Extended Plenary Meeting of the Comintern Executive on Participation in a Conference of the Three Internationals", "Proposal to the Draft Resolution for the Eleventh Party Congress on the Report of the R.C.P.(B.) Delegation in the Comintern"—Lenin argues the case for the tactics of a united front, the adoption of a united action by the working class.

The Appendix to the volume contains questionnaires filled in by Lenin in the capacity of delegate to Communist Party congresses and conferences, in the course of reregistration of members of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P. and under the All-Russia census of the R.C.P. members.

Of considerable interest are the records of Lenin's official orders and instructions, reception of visitors and other facts entered in the Journal of Lenin's Duty Secretaries. This document reveals how manfully Lenin fought his illness, giving all his strength to the cause of the Party, the cause of the working class.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.

October 1917-July 1918

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS NOVEMBER 3 (16), 1917

Comrade Lenin objects to any agreement whatsoever with Vikzhel,[1] which tomorrow will be overthrown in a revolutionary manner, from below. Moscow must be given creative, organising, revolutionary reinforcements from Petrograd—the sailor element, to be exact. The food problem: we are getting supplies from the north. After winning Moscow and overthrowing Vikzhel from below we shall be getting food supplies from the Volga.

First published November 6-7, 1927 in *Pravda* No. 255, in an article by N. Gorbunov "How the Working Staff of the Council of People's Commissars Was Created During the October Days"

Printed from the handwritten copy of the minutes

ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE REQUISITION OF ARTICLES OF WARM CLOTHING FOR THE SOLDIERS AT THE FRONT

The following to be added:

Heading: +... *and on the requisition of flats of the rich to relieve the needs of the poor....*

§1. ... plus one article of warm clothing in addition to a blanket (overcoat, winter coat, jacket, felt boots, etc.).

§ 2. ... The term rich flat applies to any flat in which the number of rooms equals or exceeds the number of permanent occupants.

The owners of rich flats are obliged immediately, under threat of confiscation of all their property, to draw up in duplicate a statement listing the articles of warm clothing they have and of those supplied by them to the front, one copy of which is to be handed to the House Committee, the other to the district Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The owners of rich flats, under similar threat, are obliged immediately to submit in duplicate to the same institutions a statement to the effect that they are vacating one of two rich flats for the needs of the poor population of the capital (that is, two rich families having two rich flats are obliged to move into one of their flats during the winter, giving the other up to the use of the poor population in view of the extreme need created by the war).

The house committees shall immediately draw up lists of rich flats subject to requisition, and the district Soviets of Workers' Deputies shall endorse these lists and define the conditions and order in which families of the poor population are to move into these flats.[2]

Written in November,
prior to 8th (21st), 1917

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW GIVEN TO GREGORI YARROS, CORRESPONDENT OF THE *ASSOCIATED PRESS AGENCY*

NOVEMBER 15 (28), 1917

In connection with the results of the elections in Petrograd in which the Bolsheviks won six seats,[3] the *Associated Press* correspondent interviewed Lenin, the President of the Council of National Commissioners, who was elated over the great victory of his party.

"What do you think of the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly?" the correspondent asked.

"I think that these elections have proved a great victory for the Bolshevik Party. The number of votes cast for it in the elections in May, August and in September is constantly growing.[4] To get six seats out of twelve in a city in which the bourgeoisie (Cadets[5]) are strongest, means to win in Russia."

"Do you suppose that the Constituent Assembly of such composition as the results of the elections in Petrograd indicate will sanction all the measures of the Government of National Commissioners?"

"Yes, it will sanction, because there will be no majority, according to your supposition, against us, and together with the left social revolutionists[6] we shall constitute a majority in Petrograd (seven out of twelve)."

"What parties will enter into the new Council of National Commissioners?"

"I do not know positively, but I think that only the left social revolutionists, besides the Bolsheviks."

First published in part
in 1962
in the journal *Istoria SSSR*
(*History of the USSR*) No. 2

First published in full in 1965
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the typewritten copy
of the English original

THE SALARIES OF HIGH-RANKING OFFICE EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS

DRAFT DECREE FOR THE C.P.C.[7]

Recognising the need for energetic measures to reduce the salaries of high-ranking office employees and officials in all state, public and private institutions and enterprises, the Council of People's Commissars decrees:

1) that the salary limit for people's commissars be fixed at 500 rubles a month where there are no children, and 100 rubles extra for each child; housing to be at the

rate of not more than 1 room for each member of the family; 2) that all local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies be asked to prepare and carry out revolutionary measures to impose special taxes on high-ranking employees; 3) that the Ministry for Finance be instructed to draft a general law concerning this reduction; 4) that the Ministry for Finance and all the respective commissars be instructed to immediately study the estimates of the ministries and cut all excessively high salaries and pensions.

Written November 18
(December 1), 1917

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE QUESTION OF THE WAR MINISTRY[8]

In view of the fact that General Manikovsky has issued a counter-revolutionary order to the Moscow Military District not to have appointed commanders replaced by elected ones,

in view of the fact that General Marushevsky has been conducting negotiations with Dukhonin aimed against the Council and has made a criminal attempt at sabotage during the organisation of a delegation for conducting armistice negotiations,*

1) Manikovsky and Marushevsky are to be arrested immediately and not released without the permission of the Council of People's Commissars[9];

2) a thorough screening of the War Ministry personnel to be started immediately and all unreliable elements among the high command to be discharged;

3) reliable elements from among the commanders of the Lettish rifle regiments to be ordered out at once to Petrograd;

* The first two paragraphs are in Trotsky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

4) one Lettish rifle regiment to be ordered out to Petrograd at once[10];

5) fulfilment of the above measures to be reported daily to the C.P.C.

This decision is not to be published.

Written November 19
(December 2), 1917

First published in 1965
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

THESES FOR A LAW ON THE CONFISCATION OF APARTMENT AND TENEMENT HOUSES[11]

1) *All* land (urban) shall become the property of the nation.

2) Houses which are *systematically* let to tenants shall be confiscated and become the property of the nation.

3) Owners of houses that are *not* let to tenants shall, pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly, remain in possession without any change in their rights of ownership.

4) Several-months compensation (2 to 3 months) to owners of confiscated houses who can prove their ...*

5) Rent shall be collected by (whom?) the *Soviets* (paid into the current accounts of the Soviets).

6) Building committees (the trade unions + building offices) shall take charge also of house supplies (fuel, etc.).

7) Rent payment to come in force immediately.

8) The building and house committees shall come into force gradually as and when they are set up by the trade unions and the Soviets.

9) The heating of the houses and their normal upkeep shall be the duty of the house committees and other institutions (trade unions, Soviets, fuel departments of the town council, etc.).

Written November 20
(December 3), 1917

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

* The sentence is unfinished.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE QUESTION OF FOLLOWING A SOCIALIST POLICY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD[12]

1) Two or three engineers shall be sent to the Special Defence Council for the purposes of control and the drafting of a general plan of industrial demobilisation (Kozmin to be charged with forming this group);[13]

2) A 3-5-man commission of C.P.C. members (and non-members) shall be set up to discuss the major problems of the Government's economic policy (Pyatakov and Bukharin to be charged with forming this commission);

3) A conference of food-supply men shall be organised to discuss practical measures for combating marauding and improving the condition of the most needy sections of the population (Shlyapnikov + Manuilsky to be charged with organising this conference).

Written November 27 (December 10), 1917

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

OUTLINE OF A PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC MEASURES

Nationalisation of banks

Drawing money back into the treasury

New money for large denominations

Revolutionary measures for switching factories to useful production

Centralisation of consumption by compulsory association in consumers' societies

State monopoly of foreign trade

Nationalisation of industry

State loans.

Written not before
November 27
(December 10), 1917

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DEMONSTRATION SLOGANS[14]

To the demonstration slogans published on 28.XI., I advise adding:

Shame to the Right S.R.s and Chernovites[15] who have broken away from the peasant congress!

Long live the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasant Deputies, which has sided with the Soviet power!

The working people demand that the Constituent Assembly recognise Soviet power and the Soviet Government!

Long live the nationalisation of the banks!

Down with the saboteurs and striking officials! Boycott them, use revolutionary terrorism against them!

Lenin

Written November 28
(December 11), 1917

First published in 1957
in the journal
Voprosi Istorii KPSS No. 3

Printed from the manuscript

LIABILITY FOR UNFOUNDED ACCUSATIONS

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.)[16]

The C.C. establishes the principle:

that in all squabbles and personal accusations, the person who makes such accusations without bringing specific charges before a court shall be considered a slanderer;

that those who consider themselves affected by such accusations shall be invited to take legal action.

Written November 29
(December 12), 1917

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

THE CONVERSION OF MUNITION WORKS TO ECONOMICALLY USEFUL WORK

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

Comrade Raskolnikov is instructed to immediately contact the Commissariat for Trade and Industry, as well as the Commissariat for Food (Machine Supply Department), for the purpose of immediately arranging for orders to be placed with the works engaged in naval installations and repairs. Especially urgent is the production of farm implements and machines, and the building and repair of locomotives. Primary attention to be paid to the St. Petersburg Metalworks, which is well stocked with fuel and metal.

The Chief Naval Economic Board is instructed to immediately revise the estimates of the Ministry for Marine for 1917 with a view to stopping all expenditure on the naval construction programme and all unproductive expenditure in general, and reallocating the corresponding sums to useful national economic work. Comrade I. E. Gukovsky is delegated to take part in this work in the capacity of plenipotentiary commissar in charge of the revision of the estimates of all departments.

Daily reports to the Council of People's Commissars on the fulfilment of this order shall be made by Comrade Raskolnikov and the person authorised by the Chief Naval Economic Board (or by Comrade Gukovsky), as well as by the authorised agent of the Commissariat for Trade and Industry.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written November 29
(December 12), 1917

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

THESES ON THE TASKS OF THE PARTY + THE PRESENT SITUATION

(α) Recognition of the revolution of 25.X. as a socialist revolution.
(β) Rejection of all limitations to this in the spirit of reversion to the bourgeois-democratic revolution (gradual transition; "stage" of the bloc with the petty bourgeoisie, etc.).
(γ) Dictatorship of the proletariat, its special features as compared with "general", formal (bourgeois) democracy, its tactics.
(δ) Soviet power and the power of the Bolsheviks.
(ε) Agreement with the petty bourgeoisie not in the sense of a bloc for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, not in the sense of restricting the tasks of the socialist revolution, but exclusively in the sense of the *forms* of transition to socialism on the part of *different* sections of the petty bourgeoisie.
(ι) Bourgeois liberties versus suppression of the exploiters.
(χ) Saboteurs and capitalists; capitalists and "public opinion" of the bourgeoisie.
(ζ) The Constituent Assembly and its subordination to the Soviet power, to the interests and conditions of the civil war.
(η) Top organisations (Vikzhel, Peasants' Central Executive Committee, etc.) and the struggle against them.
(ϑ) Struggle against reformism in its *modern* presentation:
  (1) the proletariat's hands tied by fellow-travellers from among the petty bourgeoisie
  (2) restricted scope of the revolutionary struggle of the rank and file
  (3) rejection of terrorism.

Written November 1917

First published in 1957 in the journal *Voprosi Istorii KPSS* No. 1

Printed from the manuscript

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS PUT BY A WORKERS' DELEGATION OF ALEXANDRO-GRUSHEVSKY DISTRICT[17]

1) Re the sequestration of mines and works in the Alexandro-Grushevsky District.

Mines and works may be confiscated only after the district is liberated from Kaledin's troops and influence.

2) Should the workers now quit the mines and go away to Central Russia?

They should not quit but go on working as long as possible. Resolution on this question by the Council of People's Commissars: the workers of the Alexandro-Grushevsky District to be instructed to contact Kharkov for the arming of the Red Guard. The comrades to be asked to hold out to the last, as long as they can, and not throw up their work.

3) On sending guards to the mines.

Our troops are moving in the direction of Kaledin's troops in sufficient numbers.

4) Re a subsidy of 3,000,000 rubles to carry on the work.

The question of Monotop[18] will be settled on the arrival of Comrade Artyom from Kharkov.

5) Are the bank-notes issued by Kaledin's government to be considered valid?

The bank-notes are to be considered invalid.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written December 11 (24), 1917
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the typed copy

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON STAFF SALARIES IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES[19]

The Council of People's Commissars decrees that the rates of pay recognised by the Government Office Staffs Commission and accepted by the All-Russia Convention of Junior Employees of Government Institutions shall be recognised as a norm to be guided by.

Written December 13 (26), 1917

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

THE ORGANISATION OF A COMMISSION OF PRACTITIONERS

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[20]

The Council of People's Commissars directs the Supreme Economic Council to organise immediately a Commission of Practitioners to be charged with collecting orders for useful products from all departments, institutions and organisations, passing these orders on to factories that are at a standstill or are being closed down, and checking to what extent these orders are being passed on and carried out. The Commission, guided by the general economic plan of the Supreme Economic Council, is to submit to the Council of People's Commissars revolutionary measures for the immediate fulfilment of its task and report on its activities twice a week.

Written December 15 (28), 1917

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURE FOR TABLING QUESTIONS IN THE C.P.C.

Every commissar tabling a question in the Council of People's Commissars shall be required to submit a *written* statement specifying:

a) what the question is (briefly) [this statement cannot be confined to a mere reference to the subject, but must *set forth the gist* of the matter].

b) what exactly the Council of People's Commissars is being asked to do (give money; adopt *such-and-such* a resolution, etc. The person introducing the question must state clearly *what* he wants)

c) whether the question involves departments under other commissars. If so, exactly which; whether they have given their findings in writing.[21]

Lenin

Written December 16 (29), 1917

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR C.P.C. ON THE IRREGULAR ACTIONS OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR JUSTICE I. Z. STEINBERG AND MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR JUSTICE V. A. KARELIN[22]

The Council of People's Commissars considers that no changes in the decisions of the Dzerzhinsky Commission or any other commission appointed by the Soviets[23] are permissible other than by way of appeal to the Council of People's Commissars, and on no account by way of personal order of the Commissar for Justice.

The Council of People's Commissars considers further that the act of comrades Steinberg and Karelin, who released the arrested men on the night of 18.XII was illegal both in form and substance, since it contravened not only the

privileges of the Dzerzhinsky Commission but the direct decision of the Council of People's Commissars adopted on the evening of 18.XII which ordered the arrested men to be detained for identification.

*Lenin**

Written December 19, 1917
(January 1, 1918)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

PLEKHANOV ON TERROR

There was a time when Plekhanov was a socialist, a prominent exponent of revolutionary socialism.

At that time—now, alas, in the limbo of forgotten things—Plekhanov expressed his opinion on a subject which happens to have vital significance in the present period.

It happened in 1903, when the Russian Social-Democrats were framing their programme at the Second Party Congress.

The minutes of this Congress contain the following very informative entry, that might have been written specially for the present day:

"*Posadovsky*. The statements made here for and against the amendments strike me as being not a dispute over details but a serious difference of opinion; without a doubt we disagree on the following fundamental question: *should our future policy be governed by certain basic democratic principles*, *admitted to have absolute value*, *or are all democratic principles to be governed exclusively by what is profitable for our party*? I definitely declare for the latter. There is no democratic principle that we could not make subservient to the *interests of our party*. (*Interjection*: "Even inviolability of the person?") Yes! Inviolability of the person as well! As a revolutionary party striving towards its ultimate goal—that of a social revolution—we must regard democratic principles exclusively from the point of view of the speediest possible achievement of that goal, from the point of view of our party's interests. If one or another demand does not turn out to our advantage we shall not use it.

"Therefore I oppose any amendments that are likely in future to narrow our freedom of action."

"*Plekhanov. I fully support what Comrade Posadovsky has said. Every given democratic principle should be examined not on its own*

* This document was also signed by J. V. Stalin.—*Ed*.

merits in the abstract, but in its bearing on what may be called the basic principle of democracy, namely, on the principle that says: salus populi suprema lex. Translated into the language of the revolutionary, this means that the success of the revolution is the highest law. If it were necessary for the success of the revolution to restrict the effect of one or another democratic principle, it would be criminal to stop at such a restriction. As my own personal opinion I would say that even the principle of universal suffrage should be regarded from the point of view of this basic principle of democracy I have just mentioned. Hypothetically it is conceivable that we, Social-Democrats, may have occasion to come out against universal suffrage. The bourgeoisie of the Italian republics once deprived persons belonging to the nobility of political rights. The revolutionary proletariat could restrict the political rights of the upper classes the way these classes once restricted the political rights of the proletariat. The fitness of such a measure could only be judged by the rule: salus revolutionis suprema lex. The same point of view should be adopted by us on the question of the duration of parliaments. If, on an impulse of revolutionary enthusiasm, the people were to elect a very good parliament, a sort of Chambre Introuvable, we should try and make it a long parliament; and if the elections turned out to be unfavourable we should try and dismiss it not in two years' time, but if possible in two weeks*" (Minutes of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., pp. 168-69).

The enemies of socialism may be deprived for a time not only of inviolability of the person, and not only of freedom of the press, but of universal suffrage as well. A bad parliament should be "dismissed" in two weeks. The good of the revolution, the good of the working class, is the highest law. That was how Plekhanov spoke when he was a socialist. That was how the great majority of the present-day Mensheviks spoke, those same Mensheviks who are now screaming about "Bolshevik terror".

The "good of the revolution" now demands a grim fight against saboteurs, organisers of military cadet insurrections, and newspapers run by bankers. When the Soviet authorities embark upon such struggle, the so-called socialists from the camp of the Mensheviks and S.R.s shout from all the housetops against civil war and terror.

When that Kerensky[24] of yours reintroduced capital punishment at the front, that was not terror, gentlemen, was it?

When your coalition cabinet, with the hands of the Kornilovs,[25] machine-gunned whole regiments for showing

* The welfare of the people is the highest law.—*Ed.*

insufficient enthusiasm for the war, that was not civil war, gentlemen, was it?

When those Kerenskys and Avksentyevs[26] of yours threw 3,000 soldiers into a single prison in Minsk for "harmful agitation", that was not terror, gentlemen, was it?

When you suppressed the *workers*' newspapers, that was not terror, gentlemen, was it?

The only difference is that the Kerenskys, Avksentyevs and Lieberdans,[27] hand in glove with the Kornilovs and Savinkovs,[28] have practised terror *against the workers, soldiers and peasants* in the interests of a handful of landowners and bankers, while the Soviet government is taking strong measures against the landowners, marauders and their underlings—*in the interests of the workers, soldiers and peasants*.

Pravda, No. 221, January 4, 1918 (December 22, 1917) and *Izvestia* No. 259, December 23, 1917

Printed from *Pravda* text collated with that of *Izvestia*

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) CONCERNING THE EXPULSION FROM THE PARTY OF S. A. LOZOVSKY

Resolution of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(Bolsheviks)

Taking into consideration

1) that Comrade Lozovsky, from the very beginning of the October Revolution, has expressed opinions which radically diverge from those of the Party and of the revolutionary proletariat in general, but coincide on all major points with the petty-bourgeois negation of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an essential phase in the transition to socialism;

2) that by his statement of November...* in the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*,[29] which has gone over to the bourgeoisie, Comrade Lozovsky has aroused general indignation not

* Lenin has left a space in the manuscript for the date.—*Ed.*

only among all Party people, but among the class-conscious workers at large,[30] and that the resolution of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. concerning Comrade Lozovsky's expulsion from the Party, passed soon after this statement had been made, was not announced and carried out only because of the hopes expressed by some comrades that the vacillations of Comrade Lozovsky were of a temporary nature caused by his inability to quickly grasp the significance of the historic upheaval that was taking place with such extraordinary speed;

3) that the expectations of the comrades who wished to give Comrade Lozovsky time to fully grasp the significance of the revolution that took place, have not been justified and that Comrade Lozovsky's entire political conduct and especially his articles in Nos. 7 and 8 of *Professionalny Vestnik*[31] point to this comrade's complete divergence from the cardinal principles of socialism in his approach to the role of the proletariat in the socialist revolution;

4) that membership of the Party by a person who holds an important post in the trade union movement and is debauching that movement with shoddy bourgeois ideas, not only compromises the Party and demoralises all organisational work among the proletariat, but causes enormous practical harm to the urgent task of organising socialist production by the trade unions;

5) that joint work in the ranks of a single Party is impossible with a person who does not understand the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is recognised by our Party Programme, who does not understand that without such a dictatorship, that is, without a systematic, ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, which sticks at no bourgeois-democratic formulas, one cannot conceive of any consistently democratic, leave alone socialist, revolution, nor of any serious measures for coping with the crisis and economic chaos caused by the war;

6) that joint work in the ranks of a single Party is impossible with a person who repudiates the socialist tasks of the proletariat, which has won political power; with a person who refuses to accept the idea that it is the duty of the trade unions to take upon themselves state functions and carry through with the greatest vigour and determination

the socialist reorganisation of production and distribution on a nation-wide scale,

the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves: that Comrade Lozovsky be expelled from the R.S.D.L.Party (Bolsheviks) and this resolution be published without delay.

Written December 30, 1917
(January 12, 1918)

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON THE FIGHT AGAINST KALEDIN[32]

1

DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

The Council of People's Commissars approves Comrade Antonov's[33] vigorous measures against the Kaledinites and their accomplices, and at the same time rules that the Commander-in-Chief has the right to take repressive measures, including sentences of forced labour in the mines, against capitalist saboteurs who threaten to cause unemployment and famine.

2

ADDENDUM TO THE DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

As soon as it becomes possible to set up revolutionary tribunals they will immediately examine each case of forced labour assignment, and will either fix the term of such labour or release the persons from custody.

Written:
the Decision—December 30, 1917
(January 12, 1918); the Addendum—
January 1 (14), 1918

First published:
the Decision—in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
the Addendum—in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

RATES OF PAY FOR HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[34]

Re Comrade Shlyapnikov's inquiry concerning rates of pay for high ranking officials, the C.P.C.

1) confirms that the decree establishing 500-ruble monthly salaries for members of the Council of People's Commissars is to be interpreted as an *approximate* norm for top salaries and contains no prohibition to pay specialists more;

2) calls attention once more to the fact that the decree of the C.P.C. contains a demand for revolutionary measures to be taken to reduce excessively high salaries;[35]

3) directs all People's Commissars immediately to report what has been done in fulfilment of this decree;

4) directs the Commissar for Finance to submit a report as to whether resolute measures have been taken to collect income tax and eliminate evasions in the payment of this tax;

5) directs the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies to take more energetic measures to collect the special tax on excessively high incomes.

Written January 2 (15), 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE FOOD SITUATION

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[36]

Having decided to postpone publication of the decrees concerning the Food Council pending the food congress, and while persistently urging all food supply workers not to leave their posts and to avoid partial conflicts,

The Council of People's Commissars directs the All-Russia Food Council and the Commissariat for Food to send out more and numerically larger armed detachments as well as commissars to take the most revolutionary measures

to expedite shipments, collect and store grain, etc., as well as to wage a ruthless struggle against profiteers, even to the extent of calling on the local Soviets to shoot convicted profiteers and saboteurs on the spot.

The Council of People's Commissars decrees that rations shall not be increased and that the dispatch of through goods-trains shall be stepped up and their progress carefully controlled.

Urgent steps shall be taken to clear the Petrograd railway junction, the All-Russia Food Council to be made responsible for this work.

The All-Russia Food Council shall report daily to the C.P.C. on the progress of food supply work and to submit a plan of food operations.

Written January 14 (27), 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

INQUIRY OF THE C.P.C. TO THE C.C. OF THE LEFT S.R. PARTY[37]

Following the decision of the Council of People's Commissars dated 14.I (night)—extract from the journal is herewith enclosed—we ask the C.C. of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party to answer the following questions:

1) When did the Petrograd Committee of the Left S.R.s pass its resolution refusing to have any members on the staff of the Committee of Inquiry so long as Kozlovsky was on it?

2) What is the text of that resolution?

3) Was the C.C. of the Left S.R. Party aware of this resolution and was it commented on in the C.C. of the Left S.R.s?

4) When and by whom (of the Left S.R.s) in the Petrograd Soviet or its Executive Committee was it reported that the Left S.R.s would not join the Committee of Inquiry so long as Kozlovsky was on it?

5) Did the Left S.R.s carry out the decision of the Petrograd Soviet, which asked them to present evidence against Kozlovsky within a definite period?

Written January 15 (28), 1918
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*
Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ORDER OF SUBORDINATION OF THE BALTIC AND BLACK SEA FLEETS[38]

Considering the wording of the note to § 51 to be inexact or based on a misunderstanding, since the text, if taken literally, implies a refusal to recognise the supremacy of the Soviet state authority,[39] the C.P.C. asks the Navy's legislative organ to revise the wording of this note.

The C.P.C. takes into consideration the statement by representatives of the Navy that the note in question in no way signifies any repudiation of the central Soviet authorities, and instructs comrades Proshyan and Lunacharsky to draw up on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars a well-reasoned memorandum to the legislative organ of the Navy clarifying the point of view of the Council of People's Commissars.

Written January 15 (28), 1918
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

ON SALARIES

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[40]

The Council of People's Commissars endorses the estimates of the Commissariat for Post and Telegraph temporarily, for two months, in order that immediate steps be taken in the meantime to revise and adjust the rates of pay and salaries for all professions and all areas in the country.

This revision to be made by the Commissariat for Labour by arrangement with all the other commissariats and workers' organisations.

Written January 16 (29), 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ORGANISATION OF FOOD SUPPLY[41]

The Council of People's Commissars asks the Food Congress immediately, not later than tomorrow morning, to appoint at least three of the most experienced food supply workers to take part at once in the work of the existing top food supply bodies and in the discussion of the most vigorous and revolutionary steps for coping with the famine.

The Council of People's Commissars asks the Food Congress to elect a committee to receive reports from all the groups, institutions and workers in the food business who are now in conflict, and to forward the committee's findings to the C.P.C.

Written January 16 (29), 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY UNDER THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

Meeting of 21.I.1918

Having heard the report of the commission investigating the Committee of Inquiry, the C.P.C. resolves:

That two extra members be added to the commission, one of them Comrade Algasov, the other a Bolshevik recommended by Sverdlov.

That the commission be given the right to make searches, seizures and arrests without preliminary arrangements with any other institutions.

That the commission be given technical facilities and the right to draw on funds provided by the Commissariat for Justice.

That the commission be asked to work faster and more energetically in order to single out more quickly those whose innocence, in view of the slanderous nature of the accusations against them, is now obvious.[42]

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

THE CONVERSION OF MUNITION WORKS TO ECONOMICALLY USEFUL WORK

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

Expressing its extreme regret that the proper commissariats are extremely slow in taking practical steps towards switching over the metalworks to useful work, the C.P.C. asks the Petrograd Metalworkers Trade Union, in co-operation with the Commissariat for Labour, the Petrograd Soviet and the Supreme Economic Council, to start immediately converting the metalworks to repair work on and production of railway equipment as well as to the production of goods suitable for exchange for grain, etc.

All military orders to be suspended.

Written January 23 (February 5), 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT OF THE "FUNDAMENTAL LAW ON THE SOCIALISATION OF THE LAND"[43]

When the land is to be used for purposes other than farming (building, cultural and educational purposes, special industries and crafts, etc.), the size of the allotment is

determined by the local Soviets in conformity with the requirements of the persons or institutions applying for permission, depending on the social necessity of the purpose for which the land is required.

Written January, prior to the 27th (February 9), 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE INSTITUTION OF AN ALL-RUSSIA INTER-DEPARTMENTAL EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION FOR GUARDING THE RAILWAYS[44]

A special duty of the guard is ruthlessly to combat profiteering and the illicit transportation of food.

Written January 30 (February 12), 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE FOOD SITUATION IN PETROGRAD

The Council of People's Commissars directs the Commissariat for Railways immediately to draw up and submit to it a draft decree banning free travelling on the railways except one trip home for every soldier returning from his place of service after demobilisation.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

The C.P.C. instructs the Manager of the State Bank to dispatch to the South immediately and without fail 200 million rubles at the disposal of Yakubov's expedition

for supplying grain to the needy areas as directed by the People's Commissariat for Food.

The Food Commissariat is to urgently make arrangements with the Military Commissariat for enlisting the services of the road units operating at the front. These units are to be sent to the grain-producing areas in the greatest possible numbers to take urgent measures for laying down rails and other means of improving and expediting the transportation, collection and storing of grain.

Written January 30
(February 12),

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF SABOTEURS[45]

The Council of People's Commissars resolves that no negotiations whatever are to be carried on with saboteurs.

The respective People's Commissariats may employ, as individuals, such saboteurs whose services are considered essential for the various departments provided that they fully submit to Soviet power and support it.

Written January 31
(February 13), 1918

Published February 14 (1), 1918
in *Pravda* No. 25

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A JOINT MEETING OF THE BOLSHEVIK AND LEFT S.R. GROUPS IN THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 19, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

In a long speech lasting two hours, Lenin propounded the theses that there was no way out for Russia, that it was necessary immediately to conclude a separate peace,

since the Germans were advancing all along the front en masse and we were powerless to offer any resistance to this million-strong pressure. Having concluded peace, we would be able to start putting things in order at home and deepening the socialist revolution, and we would succeed in completing the radical reforms that would bring us nearer to the introduction in Russia of a socialist system.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 28
February 20 (7), 1918

Printed from the text
of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*

SPEECH TO THE LETTISH RIFLEMEN FEBRUARY 20, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin made a long speech in which he called on the Letts to support Soviet power on the question of peace. The worn-out Russian people had to be given peace at all costs. In doing so we would strengthen the revolution and start building a new young Russia. In any case, the surrendered territories would not remain occupied, because the Russian revolution in the near future would spread not only to Germany, but to the other belligerent powers. The impact of the world social revolution would compel German imperialism to give up all its conquests.

Novaya Zhizn No. 30,
February 21 (8), 1918

Printed from the text
of *Novaya Zhizn*

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE AND TO ALL DISTRICT COMMITTEES OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY[46]

21(8).II.1918. 12.20 p.m.

In accordance with decisions of the Petrograd Soviet to be passed this evening, we advise you, without losing an hour, to rally all the workers in order to organise tens

of thousands of workers and get all the bourgeoisie, everyone of them to a man, under the control of these workers, to dig trenches outside the city. This is the only hope for the revolution. The revolution is in danger. The line of trenches will be marked out by the military. Prepare the implements, most important of all organise and mobilise one and all.

Lenin

First published in 1962
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 35

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE GERMAN PEACE TERMS[47]

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies at 4.30 a.m. on February 24, the Council of People's Commissars has resolved that the terms of peace proposed by the German Government be accepted and a delegation sent to Brest-Litovsk.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written February 24, 1918
Published February 25 (12), 1918
in the evening edition
of *Pravda* No. 35,
and in the special evening edition
of *Izvestia* No. 33

Printed from the manuscript

TREATY WITH THE FINNISH SOCIALIST WORKERS' REPUBLIC[48]

1

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

The Council of People's Commissars resolves:

To acknowledge in principle the justice of the Finnish comrades' desire that part of the territory mentioned in the Finnish addendum to §6 of the draft treaty be handed over to the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic.

The Conciliation Board is instructed to work out ways for the practical implementation of this transfer.[49]

Written February 25, 1918

2

DIRECTIVE OF THE C.P.C. TO THE RUSSO-FINNISH CONCILIATION BOARD

The Council of People's Commissars gives the following directive to the Board:

That it be fair and necessary to ensure full political rights for the citizens of both republics residing in the other republic.

Written February 25, 1918

3

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

Taking into consideration

first, that next to Finland there is a great city with an extremely high percentage of the bourgeois population;

second, that Finland usually has about thirty thousand Finnish workers living in Petrograd:

third, that the bourgeoisie of Petrograd usually has about two hundred thousand bourgeois living in Finland;

fourth, that therefore formal equality among Finnish and Russian citizens (in the matter of enjoying political rights abroad) would in practice be an obvious privilege for the Russian bourgeoisie,

the C.P.C. recommends the Russo-Finnish Conciliation Board to alter § 13 of the draft to read as follows:

either have § 13 refer, not to citizens, but only to workers and to peasants who do not exploit other people's labour;

or add to the former wording of § 13 a reservation to the effect that Russian citizens coming to Finland who are unable to prove that they belong to the two above-mentioned categories of working people, shall not enjoy political rights in Finland.[50]

Written February 27, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY UNDER THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

In view of the statement by Comrade Schroeder that he was firmly convinced, despite the commission's opinion, that Comrade Mitzgendler was guilty of bribery, the C.P.C. considers Comrade Schroeder in duty bound, first, to repeat this statement in writing, and secondly, to bring his accusation against Mitzgendler before a court of law immediately in his own name.[51]

Written February 26, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECHES AT THE MEETING OF THE C.P.C. MARCH 4, 1918[52]

1

I fully agree with Comrade Trutovsky that the tendencies and attempts of which we have heard here are completely at variance with the aims of the workers' and peasants' government and have nothing in common with socialism.[53] The aim of socialism is to turn all the means of production into the property of the whole people, and that does not at all mean that the ships become the property of the ship workers or the banks the property of the bank clerks. If people take such paltry things seriously, then we must do away with nationalisation,[54] because the whole thing is preposterous. The task, the aim of socialism, as we see it, is to convert the land and the industrial enterprises into the property of the Soviet Republic. The peasant receives land on condition that he works it properly. If the river transport workers receive ships, it is on condition that they take a proprietary interest in them: they must submit their estimates if only in order to have income and expenditure endorsed, and they must take proper care of the ships. If they cannot do this, we shall remove them. Seeing that they have been arguing for three weeks, I would propose removing all of them from the management, because this shows an utter inaptitude for organisation, a complete failure to grasp the vital tasks facing the Soviet Republic. It is chaos, disorganisation, even worse—it borders on sabotage. They have started a sort of organised crusade in the Union and come complaining. Meanwhile, the boats on the Volga stand unrepaired. What is this? What is it—a madhouse? I am perfectly sure that they realise that if we go on existing in this chaos we shall bring still greater calamities down on our heads. The chief condition with us is discipline and the organised transfer of all property to the people, the transfer of all sources of wealth to the Soviet Republic, and their strictly disciplined disposal. So when we are told that the river transport workers will be private managing proprietors, we obviously cannot agree to it. Soviet power

is to do the managing. But you organise a sort of debate preventing unity among all organisations....* If they are dissatisfied, they could have asked for the order to be rescinded. But they are proposing again that it should be decided first whom the ships belong to, so that the ship workers should demand a 140 per cent rise.

2

I fully agree with many things, but as to the make-up of the Board, I think the proposal of the river transport comrades is absolutely unacceptable. For one thing, that is not the question we are dealing with. The question at issue is that the men are not receiving their money. That's simply scandalous, of course. What are we allocating money for? For it to remain on paper? We have heard a thousand complaints, that unless the money is sent, our transport will collapse. If the money was assigned on February 21, and on the 22nd it was not received, then they should have come on the 23rd complaining. We are suffering from a money famine, we are short of currency notes, the treasury cannot print all we need. If we assign money and you unassign it, then actually nothing is sent. You should have come here on February 23, and not March 3. We demanded that these tens of millions should be given. I don't know who is more to blame. I believe the representatives of the Economic Council. We cannot satisfy everybody. While we are supplying Petrograd, Moscow is hungering for currency notes...** If people only wrote assignments and did not take any measures, they should have come here, or called me to the phone or somebody else, and complained about it. It is a rare week when I do not receive a complaint about money not being paid out, but from you I never received a single complaint. The people in charge should be made to answer for it, at least reprimanded. Under the ruling of February 21 the congress of river transport workers is obliged to submit the estimates. As regards the composition of the Management

* Part of the shorthand report has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*
** Part of the shorthand report has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

Board. I think we should have corrected our decree rather in the vein Comrade Shlyapnikov suggested. Paragraph 3 provides for a Board of seven members. Why this wasn't inserted is incomprehensible. A number of trade union representatives could be included in it. I propose that resolute measures be taken to have this money forwarded immediately by through goods trains. Then notification should be sent in the usual way saying the money has been dispatched. As regards the second point I believe the only Board possible in this instance and most acceptable for everyone, for the Council of People's Commissars—the only possible Board is the one appointed yesterday by the Council of People's Commissars. There are no grounds for changing this. I believe we should put this through. And if it's really true about the 200 rubles salary, which was adopted as definite and made a condition for the nationalisation of transport—if that's a fact, and if demands are made for levelling up with other organisations, then I personally raise the question of cancelling nationalisation. There may come a time shortly when there will be no money at all. We had a single guarantee on the basis of which we wanted to carry out nationalisation, and this is being taken away from us. If that's the case, this measure should be revoked. Unless this is done we shall be taking on another responsibility incurring enormous losses.

3

I find the appointment of a commissar inconvenient in many respects. We have no indisputable candidate for this post. Therefore we shall not satisfy all requirements, inasmuch as both sides will be dissatisfied. The appointment of a commissar will mean setting aside the Union, and that form is undemocratic. We shall pass a decision for them to submit a proposal by the morning. If the Board is too unwieldy it could elect an executive committee. We can implement that organisationally tomorrow or the day after and have the thing put through organisationally at once within a fixed period. In appointing an executive committee, certain people could perhaps be appointed to it. This would

be correct, as we would not be setting aside the river transport workers. They can have no objection to co-operation by the trade unions. If this doesn't go through, we can then go ahead with the appointment of a commissar. The members of this Council know that the question of a candidate is, of course, a difficult one, and to decide now on appointing a commissar is to decide nothing, as we quite often waste a whole week over it. It is best to use this method. There remains one proposal—to revoke points 5, 6 and 7. Adopted. Under Paragraph 3 six Board members will be replaced by temporary representatives from the trade unions.

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Printed from the shorthand record

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE SETTING UP OF A WATER TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT BOARDS[55]

That comrades Milyutin, Shlyapnikov and Aprelev be charged with organising, not later than tomorrow, a Board in pursuance of § 3[56], each special function to be handled by a specially authorised agent answerable to the Board as a whole and to the C.P.C.

That in pursuance of § 3 any six Board members at the choice of the Supreme Economic Council and representatives of the regional councils be replaced by representatives of the all-Russia trade unions.

That two comrades, one from the Water Transport Union and one from the S.E.C., shall be appointed immediately and report not later than tomorrow to Spunde in order to have the currency notes dispatched without delay.[57]

Written March 4, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH ARTHUR RANSOME, CORRESPONDENT OF THE *DAILY NEWS*[58]

One of the weakest spots in Balfour's speech is the statement that the Japanese are going to help the Russians.[59] *Which Russians?*

In Russia today there is one power, which by its nature is destined to wage a life and death struggle against the attacks of international imperialism—that is the Power of the Soviets. The first step, however, of those Russians, whom the Japanese intend to "help", as soon as they heard rumours of the advance of the latter, was to demand the abolition of the Soviet Power. Should the Japanese move into Siberia, these same "Russians" whom the Japanese are going to "help", will demand the abolition of the Soviets throughout the whole of Siberia. What can take the place of the Soviet Power?

The only power that can take its place is a bourgeois government. But the bourgeoisie in Russia has proved clearly enough that it can only remain in power with foreign help. If a bourgeois government, supported by outside help, should establish itself in power in Siberia, and Eastern Russia become lost to the Soviet, then in Western Russia the Soviet Power would become weakened to such an extent that it could hardly hold out for long; it would be followed by a bourgeois government, which would also need foreign help. The Power to give this help would, of course, not be England. It is easy to understand what avenues are opened up by this possibility.

I confirm that I really said this in a conversation with Ransome, and I give permission for it to be printed.

Lenin

Moscow 23.III.1918

First published in 1932 in Russian (as an illustration) and in English in the book: R. H. Bruce Lockhart *Memoirs of a British Agent*, London

Printed from the typewritten text with a postscript in Lenin's own hand

RE DRAFT DECREE CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE CONTROL OVER ALL FORMS OF INSURANCE[60]

The composition of the Insurance Council to be changed in the direction of increasing the number of representatives of the working classes to approximately two-thirds of the total number of members.

The Chief Commissariat for Insurance Affairs to maintain contact with the C.P.C. by its chief Commissar attending the meetings of the C.P.C. with a consultative voice.

Add*

Written March 23, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE ARTICLE "THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT"[61]

CHAPTER IV

...**

Today this task—which is, of course, not yet sufficiently completed and can never be fully accomplished—no longer stands first among the tasks facing the Soviet government. The recent congresses of the Soviets, notably the All-Russia Congress held in Moscow, have shown that the overwhelming majority of the labouring classes have firmly and consciously sided with the Soviet power in general and with the Bolshevik Party in particular. It goes without saying that for any government that is at all democratic the task of convincing the masses can never be wholly overshadowed—on the contrary, it will always be among the important tasks of government. As a key issue, however, it will only have significance for parties of the opposition or for parties that

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

** The beginning of the shorthand record has not been found.—*Ed.*

are fighting for ideals of the future. After the Bolsheviks, first under tsarism and then under Kerensky, had succeeded in winning over to their side the majority of the class-conscious active elements of the working masses, our Party was faced with the task of conquering power and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters. The task that came to the fore was that of winning, instead of convincing, Russia. From the end of October 1917 approximately up to February 1918 the militant or military task held first place, as it naturally should for any political party making a bid for power in conditions of sharp and extremely bitter struggle. Obviously, for the Party of the proletariat, the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters becomes a crucial issue, because the working masses who side with the proletariat are opposed here by the united members of the propertied classes armed both with the power of capital, the power of knowledge and the long-standing, if not age-old, habit and practice of government. Owing to the special conditions that were created in Russia under the influence of the unforgotten lessons of the revolution of 1905 and the influence of the far more painful and harsher lessons of the present war—owing to these conditions the Bolsheviks succeeded with comparative ease in solving the problem of winning power both in the capital and in the chief industrial centres of Russia. But in the provinces, in places far removed from the centre, and especially in districts known to have the greatest concentration of a comparatively backward population rooted in the traditions of the monarchy and medievalism—the Cossack regions, for instance—Soviet power had to contend with a resistance that took on military forms and is only now, more than four months after the October Revolution, coming to an end. At the present time the task of overcoming and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters in Russia is, in the main, completed. Russia has been won by the Bolsheviks chiefly because—as that prominent leader of the counter-revolutionary Don Cossacks, Bogayevsky himself, recently admitted—the overwhelming majority of the people even among the Cossacks have consciously, firmly and definitely sided with the Bolsheviks. But the special conditions in which the propertied classes are placed economically enable them naturally to organise not only

passive resistance (sabotage), but to repeat the attempt at military resistance to Soviet power. For that reason the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters cannot be regarded as having been finally completed. At any rate, it has now obviously been dealt with in its main aspects and is retreating into the background. The Soviet government will never for a moment allow itself to forget about this task and will under no circumstances let itself be diverted from it by any political or so-called socialist names or declamations. We have to speak about this because both the Mensheviks and the Right S.R.s act as the most mobile, sometimes even as the most brazen-faced counter-revolutionaries, who wage a sharper struggle against the Soviet government than the one they had allowed themselves to wage against the reactionary and landowner governments, and rely on their party's label and designation to protect them. Naturally, the Soviet government will never falter in its task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters, no matter what party banners or what popular and specious names this resistance may be covered up with. However, at the present time the task of suppressing resistance has, in the main, been completed, and the task now confronting us is that of administering the state.

This transition from what was once the priority task of convincing the masses, a transition from the task of winning power and crushing the resistance of the exploiters by military force to what is now the primary task of administering the state—this transition is the main feature of the present moment. The difficulty which the Soviet government is experiencing is that of bringing home the essentials of this transition to all the class-conscious elements of the working masses as well as the people's political leaders. For it is self-understood that the transition to the peaceful tasks of governing the whole population irrespective of classes, a transition that is taking place in conditions when the civil war is still going on in some places, when grave military dangers are threatening the Soviet Republic from both the West and the East, and when the war has caused untold havoc throughout the country—it is self-understood that such a transition is beset with tremendous difficulties.

CHAPTER V

The task of administering the state, which now confronts the Soviet government, has this special feature, that, probably for the first time in the modern history of civilised nations, it deals pre-eminently with economics rather than with politics. Usually the word "administration" is associated chiefly, if not solely, with political activity. However, the very basis and essence of Soviet power, like that of the transition itself from capitalist to socialist society, lie in the fact that political tasks occupy a subordinate position to economic tasks. And now, especially after the practical experience of over four months of Soviet government in Russia, it should be quite clear to us that the task of administering the state is primarily a purely economic task—that of healing the country's wounds inflicted by the war, restoring its productive forces, organising accountancy in and control over production and distribution, raising the productivity of labour—in short, it boils down to the task of economic reorganisation.

This task can be said to fall under two main headings: 1) accounting and control over production and distribution in the broadest, most widespread and universal forms of such accounting and control, and 2) raising the productivity of labour. These tasks can be handled by any form of collective effort or any form of state passing over to socialism only on condition that the basic economic, social, cultural and political preconditions for this have been created in a sufficient degree by capitalism. Without large-scale machine production, without a more or less developed network of railways, postal and telegraph communications, without a more or less developed network of public educational institutions, neither of these tasks can be carried out in a systematic way on a national scale. Russia is in a position when quite a number of these initial preconditions for such a transition actually exist. On the other hand, quite a number of these preconditions are absent in our country, but can be borrowed by it fairly easily from the experience of the neighbouring, far more advanced countries, whom history and international intercourse have long since placed in close contact with Russia.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

CHAPTER VI

The basic aim of every society going over to a socialist system consists in the victory of the ruling class—or rather the class that is growing up to be the ruling class—namely, the proletariat, over the bourgeoisie as described above. And this task is set before us in a substantially new way, quite unlike the way it stood in the course of many decades of the proletariat's world-wide experience of struggle against the bourgeoisie. Now, after the gains of the October Revolution, after our successes in the civil war, victory over the bourgeoisie should stand for something much bigger, albeit more peaceful in form: namely, victory over the bourgeoisie, now that it has been secured politically and made good militarily, should now be achieved in the sphere of organisation of the national economy, in the sphere of organisation of production, in the sphere of country-wide accounting and control. The problem of accounting and control over production was dealt with by the bourgeoisie all the more effectively in proportion as production expanded and the network of national economic institutions embracing tens and hundreds of millions of the population of a large modern state became more ramified. We must handle this task now in a new way, backed by the predominating position of the proletariat, supported by the bulk of the working and exploited masses, making use of those elements of organising talent and technical knowledge which have been accumulated by the preceding society, and nine-tenths, perhaps even ninety-nine hundredths of which belong to a class hostile and opposed to the socialist revolution.

CHAPTER VII

German imperialism, which has made the greatest advance not only in military power and military techniques, but in big industrial organisations within the framework of capitalism, has incidentally given proof of its economic progressiveness by bring the first country to introduce labour conscription. Naturally, in the conditions of capitalist

society in general and particularly when the monarchist states are waging an imperialist war, labour conscription is nothing more than a military convict prison for the workers, a new means of enslaving the working and exploited masses, a new system of measures for suppressing all protest on' the part of these masses. Nevertheless, there is no question that it is only because of the economic preconditions created by big capitalism that such a reform could be put forward and effected. And now we, amid conditions of appalling post-war economic disorganisation, are obliged to consider the urgency of a similar reform. Naturally, Soviet power, which is passing from a capitalist to a socialist organisation of society, must tackle this problem of labour conscription from the other end, opposite to that of German imperialism. For the capitalists and imperialists of Germany labour conscription meant enslavement of the workers. For the workers and peasant poor in Russia labour conscription should mean, first and foremost, recruitment of the rich and propertied classes for the discharge of their social duties. We should start labour conscription with the rich.

This is necessitated, generally speaking, not only by the fact that the Soviet Republic is a socialist republic. The necessity arises also from the fact that it was precisely the wealthy and propertied classes who, by their resistance, both military and passive (sabotage), mostly prevented Russia from healing the wounds inflicted upon her by the war, hampered the country's economic rehabilitation and progress. That is why accounting and control, which should be now considered a problem of paramount importance in the whole business of state administration, must be applied first of all to the wealthy and propertied classes. It was the members of these classes who enjoyed the tribute they collected from the working people, especially during the war; it was they who used this tribute to evade a task which is the duty of every citizen, namely, that of lending a hand in healing the country's wounds and putting it on its feet again; it was they who used the plundered tribute to retire and entrench themselves behind impregnable walls and offer every possible resistance to the victory of the socialist principle over the capitalist principle of society's organisation. One of the chief weapons of such struggle against the Soviets and against socialism

on the part of the wealthy and propertied classes was their possession of considerable hoards of currency notes. The propertied classes in capitalist society derived most of their wealth from the land and other means of production, such as factories, mills, etc., which they owned. The Soviet government had no difficulty, thanks to the support of the workers and the great majority of the peasants, in abolishing the right of the landowners and the bourgeoisie to these basic items of the country's wealth. It was not difficult to decree the abolition of private property in land. It was not difficult to nationalise most of the factories and mills. There is no doubt that the nationalisation of other big industrial enterprises and transport facilities is a problem that will easily be dealt with in the very near future.

Capitalist society, however, has created another form of wealth, which is by no means so easy for the Soviet government to deal with. This is wealth in the form of money, or rather, currency notes. Currency notes during the war were issued in very great numbers. Russia was cut off by a wall of military operations from commerce with a number of countries who had been her largest importers and exporters. The amassment of currency notes in the hands of the wealthy and propertied classes, practically all of whom, directly or indirectly, had speculated on the high prices for military contracts and supplies, is one of the chief means by which the propertied classes amassed wealth and accumulated power over the working people. Today the economic position of Russia, as probably of every capitalist country that has gone through three years of war, is characterised by the fact that enormous amounts of paper money are concentrated in the hands of and hoarded by a comparatively small minority, the bourgeoisie and propertied classes, and this paper money, though greatly depreciated through massive emission, still represents a claim to levy tribute on the working population.

During the transition from capitalist to socialist society it is absolutely impossible to do without currency notes or to replace them with new ones in a short space of time. The Soviet government is now confronted with a difficult task, which nevertheless has to be dealt with at all costs—the task of combating the resistance of the wealthy, a resistance

that takes the form of hoarding and concealing the proofs of their claim to levy tribute on the working people. These proofs are currency notes. Naturally, while these currency notes previously gave the right to acquire and purchase the means of production, such as land, factories, mills, etc., their significance today has diminished and even been reduced to naught. The purchase of land has become impossible in Russia after promulgation of the law on the socialisation of the land, while the purchase of factories and mills and similar large-scale means of production and transport has become practically impossible owing to the rapid process of nationalisation and confiscation of all such large enterprises. And so, it becomes more and more difficult and almost impossible for members of the bourgeoisie and propertied classes (including the peasant bourgeoisie) to acquire money for the purchase of the means of production. But in defending their old privileges and trying to retard and obstruct as much as they can the business of socialist reforms within the country, the bourgeoisie are hoarding and concealing the proofs of their claim to a share in the social wealth, their claim to levy tribute on the working people, hoarding and concealing currency notes in order to have a chance, however slender, of maintaining their position and recovering their old privileges in the event of difficulties or crises of a military or commercial nature that might yet beset Russia.

As regards consumer goods, the possibility of buying them with the sums of paper money they have accumulated through speculations during the war remains almost fully with the bourgeoisie and propertied classes, since the problem of proper rationing and distribution of these goods in a country like Russia, with her huge population of small peasants, petty artisans or handicraftsmen, presents tremendous difficulties, and in the prevailing state of economic chaos caused by the war this problem still remains practically unsolved. Thus, the Soviet government is obliged to start the business of accounting and control over production and distribution by an organised struggle against the wealthy and propertied classes who are hoarding vast sums in currency notes and evading state control.

It is estimated that currency notes to the value of about thirty thousand million rubles have been issued in Russia

to date. Of this sum probably no less than twenty thousand million, or maybe considerably more, are excess hoards unneeded for trade turnover, which are kept hidden away by members of the bourgeoisie and propertied classes for motives of self-interest—or class self-interest.

The Soviet government will have to combine the introduction of labour conscription with the registration, in the first place, of people belonging to the bourgeoisie and propertied classes; it will have to demand truthful statements (declarations) concerning the amount of currency notes available; it will have to take a number of measures to make sure that this demand will not remain on paper; it will have to consider transitional measures for concentrating all stocks of currency notes in the State Bank or its branches. Unless these measures are taken, the business of accounting and control over production and distribution cannot be effectively carried through.

CHAPTER VIII

The introduction of labour conscription, however, cannot be confined to accounting and control over the sums of currency notes concentrated in the hands of the propertied classes. The Soviet government will have to apply the principles of labour conscription also to the direct activities of the bourgeoisie and propertied classes in the sphere of factory management and the servicing of enterprises by all kinds of subsidiary labour such as book-keeping, accountancy, clerical work, technical, administrative and other jobs. In this respect, too, the task of the Soviet government is now shifting from the sphere of direct struggle against sabotage to the sphere of business organisation in the new conditions, since after the victories won by the Soviets in the civil war, beginning with October and ending February, a breach has virtually been made in the passive forms of resistance, namely, in the sabotage by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals. It is no accident that at the present time we are witnessing a sweeping, one might say widespread, change of sentiment and political behaviour in the camp of the former saboteurs, i.e., the capitalists and bourgeois intellectuals. In all spheres of economic and political life

we now find a great number of bourgeois intellectuals and capitalist businessmen offering their services to the Soviet power. And it is up to the Soviet power now to make use of these services, which are definitely necessary for the transition to socialism, especially in a peasant country like Russia, and should be utilised on condition that the Soviet government has complete ascendancy, direction and control over its new assistants and co-operators (who had often acted in defiance of this same Soviet power in the secret hope of protesting it).

To show how necessary it is for the Soviet government to make use of the services of bourgeois intellectuals for the transition to socialism, we venture to use an expression that may at first glance seem paradoxical: we must to a considerable extent, take a lesson in socialism from the trust managers, we must take a lesson in socialism from capitalism's big organisers. That this is no paradox anyone can easily see who realises that it is the big factories, big machine industry, which developed exploitation of the working people to an unheard-of degree, that it is precisely the big factories that are the centres of concentration of that class which alone has been able to destroy the rule of capital and begin the transition to socialism. It is not surprising, therefore, that in order to solve the practical problems of socialism, when the organisational aspects of it are pushed to the fore, we must enlist to the service of the Soviet power a great number of bourgeois intellectuals, especially from among those who were engaged in the practical work of organising large-scale capitalist production, that is to say, first and foremost, those engaged in organising syndicates, cartels and trusts. Tackling this problem will require of the Soviet government an exertion of energy and initiative by the working masses in all fields of the national economy, since the old position held by the so-called captains of industry—the old position of the masters and exploiters—this old position the Soviet government will never let them have. The former captains of industry, the former masters and exploiters, must be employed as technical experts, managers, consultants, advisers. A new, difficult, but extremely gratifying problem must be solved, that of combining all the experience and knowledge which these

members of the exploiting classes have accumulated, with the initiative, energy and work of the broad masses of the working people. For only by this combination is it possible to build the bridge leading from the old capitalist to the new socialist society.

If the socialist revolution had won simultaneously throughout the world or, at least, in a number of advanced countries, then the task of enlisting the services of the best technician specialists from among the leaders of old capitalism to the process of the new organisation of production would have been made considerably easier. Backward Russia would not have to wrestle with this problem on her own, as the advanced workers of the West-European countries would have come to her help and relieved her of most of the complexities involved in that most difficult of all tasks arising in the period of transition to socialism known as the organisational task. In the present situation, when the socialist revolution in the West is slow and late in coming, and Russia has to speed up measures for her reorganisation, if only in order to save the population from starvation and afterwards the whole country from a possible foreign military invasion—in the present situation we have to borrow from the advanced countries, not their help in socialist organisation and the support of the workers, but the help of their bourgeoisie and capitalist intellectuals.

Things have so shaped themselves that we are able to get this help by organising the assistance of the bourgeois intellectuals in solving the new organisational problems of the Soviet power. This assistance can be secured by paying high salaries to the best specialists in every field of knowledge, both to the citizens of this country and to those invited from abroad. Naturally, in a developed socialist society it would appear quite unfair and incorrect for members of the bourgeois intelligentsia to receive considerably higher pay than that received by the best sections of the working class. Under the conditions of practical reality, however...* we must solve this pressing problem by means of this (unfair) remuneration for bourgeois specialists at much higher rates.

* Part of the sentence illegible and has been omitted.—*Ed.*

If, for example, we found that in order to organise production in Russia on new lines, in order to raise the productivity of labour and train our people in the art of working in better conditions—if we had to employ for this purpose, say two thousand big specialists in different fields of knowledge, specialists from among Russian and still more from among foreign, let us say, American sources—if we had to pay them fifty or a hundred million rubles a year, such an expense, from the point of view of the interests of the national economy, and generally from the point of view of abandoning out-worn methods of production for newer and more up-to-date methods, would be fully warranted. Such a sum is worth paying to have our people trained in better methods and techniques of production, and we shall have to pay it because, short of the victory of the socialist revolution in other countries, there is no other possibility of getting this leadership.

Of course, employment of the labour and guidance of the bourgeois intellectuals in combination with proper control by the democratic organisations of the working people and the Soviets, will create a number of new problems, but these problems will be quite solvable. No difficulties can stop us from solving these problems, as we have no other way out towards a higher organisation of production under the present situation.

I shall go further. Big capitalism has created systems of work organisation, which, under the prevailing conditions of exploitation of the masses, represent the harshest form of enslavement by which the minority, the propertied classes, wring out of the working people surplus amounts of labour, strength, blood and nerves. At the same time they are the last word in the scientific organisation of production, and as such, have to be adopted by the Socialist Soviet Republic and readjusted to serve the interests of our accounting and control over production on the one hand, and raising the productivity of labour, on the other. For instance, the famous Taylor system, which is so widespread in America, is famous precisely because it is the last word in reckless capitalist exploitation. One can understand why this system met with such an intense hatred and protest on the part of the workers. At the same time, we must not for a moment

forget that the Taylor system represents the tremendous progress of science, which systematically analyses the process of production and points the way towards an immense increase in the efficiency of human labour. The scientific researches which the introduction of the Taylor system started in America, notably that of motion study, as the Americans call it, yielded important data allowing the working population to be trained in incomparably higher methods of labour in general and of work organisation in particular.

The negative aspect of Taylorism was that it was applied in conditions of capitalist slavery and served as a means of squeezing double and triple the amount of labour out of the workers at the old rates of pay regardless of whether the hired workers were capable of giving this double and triple amount of labour in the same number of working hours without detriment to the human organism. The Socialist Soviet Republic is faced with a task which can be briefly formulated thus: we must introduce the Taylor system and scientific American efficiency of labour throughout Russia by combining this system with a reduction in working time, with the application of new methods of production and work organisation undetrimental to the labour power of the working population. On the contrary, the Taylor system, properly controlled and intelligently applied by the working people themselves, will serve as a reliable means of further greatly reducing the obligatory working day for the entire working population, will serve as an effective means of dealing, in a fairly short space of time, with a task that could roughly be expressed as follows: six hours of physical work daily for every adult citizen and four hours of work in running the state.

The adoption of such a system would call for very many new skills and new organisational bodies. Without doubt, this will create for us many difficulties, and the posing of such a task will even evoke perplexity if not resistance among certain sections of the working people themselves. We may be sure, however, that the progressive elements among the working class will understand the need for such a transition, and that the appalling extent of the economic chaos witnessed in the towns and villages by millions of men returning from the front who had been torn away from it all

and now saw the full extent of the ravages caused by the war—all this, without doubt, has prepared the ground for shaping public opinion in this direction, and we may be sure that the transition which we have roughly outlined above will be accepted as a practical task by all elements among the working classes who have now consciously sided with the Soviet government.

CHAPTER IX

An economic transition of the above nature calls also for a corresponding change in the functions of Soviet leadership. It is quite natural, in a situation under which the main task was to convince the majority of the nation or to win power and crush the resistance of the exploiters, that among the leaders, too, those who came to the fore should have been agitators in regard to the masses, with whom Soviet power was more closely connected than any other democratic form of government in the past. Naturally, winning over the majority of the population or drawing it into a hard and difficult armed struggle against the exploiters called above all for agitators of ability. Conversely, the tasks outlined above and aimed at establishing accounting and control over production and distribution, advance to the fore practical managers and organisers. Accordingly, a certain reappraisal of leaders, certain shifts among them, should be effected in cases where they are unable to adapt themselves to the new conditions and the new task. Naturally, the leadership of a past period accustomed chiefly to agitators' tasks, would find such a transition very difficult. Naturally, a number of mistakes because of this was unavoidable. Both the leaders and the Soviet electorate at large, that is, the working and exploited masses, must now be made to see the necessity for this change.

Among the working and exploited masses there is far more talent and ability as organisers than as agitators, for the entire work milieu of these classes demanded of them to a much greater extent the ability to organise joint work and a system of accounting and control over production and distribution. Their former conditions of life, on the contrary,

provided far less grounds for advancing from their midst leaders possessing the gift of agitators or propagandists. Perhaps that is why we so often see now agitators and propagandists by vocation or calling who are compelled to assume the tasks of organisers, and who have it brought home to them at every step that they are not quite fit for the job and that the workers and peasants are disappointed and dissatisfied with them. These mistakes and failures of the Soviet government often provoke malicious glee among classes that are hostile to the idea of a socialist remodelling of society, among members of the bourgeois parties or those who call themselves socialist parties but who actually serve the bourgeoisie with zeal—people like the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. Clear as the historical inevitability of these mistakes is, it is equally clear that the shortcomings in this respect are merely the growing pains of the new socialist society. There can be no doubt that the representatives of Soviet power all over Russia can and will requalify without great difficulty, that the practical agitators will learn to occupy a befitting leading place. This, however, will take time, and only practical experience by trial and error is capable of bringing a clear realisation of the need for change, capable of bringing to the fore a number of people, or even a whole cross-section, fit to deal with the new tasks. There is probably more organising talent among the workers and peasants than the bourgeoisie imagine. The trouble is that these talents have no chance to develop, make good and win a place for themselves in the conditions of capitalist economy.

On the other hand, if we clearly recognise today the need for enlisting new organising talent on a broad scale to the business of running the state, if we—guided by the principles of Soviet power—start systematically promoting to leading positions people who have practical experience in this business, we shall succeed in a short time in building up a new stratum of practical organisers of production, who, on the basis of the principles evolved by Soviet power, principles cast among the masses and carried into practice by the masses under the control of Soviet bodies representing the mass membership, will win a position for themselves befitting their role of leadership.

CHAPTER X

Soviet government will have to pass over, or rather it will simultaneously have to deal with, the problem of applying corresponding principles to the bulk of the workers and peasants. Here the task of introducing labour conscription presents its other side to us. We must approach this problem differently and highlight different things to those that have to be applied in the case of the wealthy classes. We see no essential need for registering all the working people, for keeping an eye on their stocks of currency notes or their consumption, since all the conditions of life compel the vast majority of these sections of the population to work for their living and give them no chance to hoard anything but the most meagre stocks. Therefore, the task of introducing labour conscription in this field resolves itself into the task of establishing labour discipline and self-discipline.

In the old capitalist society discipline over the working people was enforced by capital through the constant threat of starvation. This threat being combined with excessively heavy toil and the workers' awareness that they were working, not for themselves, but for somebody else's benefit, the conditions of labour became a constant struggle of the great majority of the working people against the organisers of production. This inevitably created a psychology in which public opinion among the working people not only did not frown on poor work or shirkers, but, on the contrary, saw in this an inevitable and legitimate protest against or means of resistance to the excessive demands of the exploiters. If the bourgeois press and its echoers are now shouting so much about anarchy among the workers, about their lack of discipline and excessive demands, the vicious nature of this criticism is so obvious that it is not worth dwelling on. It is only natural that in a country like Russia, where the bulk of the population for the last three years has endured such appalling hunger and privations, there should have been a number of cases of utter despondency and a break-down of organisation. To demand a quick change in this connection or to expect such changes to be achieved by several decrees, would be as absurd as resorting to appeals in an attempt to restore good cheer and energy into a man who had been

beaten within an inch of his life. Only the Soviet government, created by the working people themselves, and taking into consideration the growing signs of recovery among them, is in a position to carry out radical changes in this respect.

The need for working out systematic measures to improve self-discipline among the working people has now been fully brought home to the representatives of Soviet power and its supporters—the political-minded trade union leaders, for instance. There is no doubt that in the environment of capitalist society in general, and still more, in the atmosphere of frenzied, unbridled speculation created by the war, there has seeped in among the working class an element of demoralisation that will seriously need coping with. All the more that, owing to the war, the composition of the working-class vanguard itself has not changed for the better either. Therefore, the maintenance of discipline among the working people, the organisation of control over the measure of labour and the intensity of labour, the introduction of special industrial courts for establishing the measure of labour, for prosecuting those guilty of flagrant violations of this measure, and for exercising systematic influence on the majority with the object of raising this measure—all this has now been brought to the fore as one of the most urgent tasks of the Soviet government.

The only thing is to bear in mind that in bourgeois society one of the principal instruments of social education, namely, the press, completely failed to discharge its task in this respect. And to this day our Soviet press, too, is still largely under the influence of the old habits and old traditions of bourgeois society. This is evidenced, among other things, by the fact that our press, like the old bourgeois press, continues to devote too much space and attention to political trivia, to those personal questions of political leadership by which the capitalists of all countries have striven to draw the attention of the masses away from the really important, profound and cardinal questions of their life.

Dictated between March 23 and 28, 1918

Printed from the shorthand record

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THE STATE OF INLAND WATER TRANSPORT

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[62]

Having heard the report concerning the disastrous state of the inland water transport and acquainted itself with the draft decree drawn up by the Supreme Economic Council in agreement with the Central Committee of the Water Transport Workers' Union and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Volga Fleet,

the C.P.C. endorses this draft as a temporary measure;

—urgently asks the Nizhni-Novgorod Congress of Water Transport Employees to put this draft into effect immediately and without any deviations;

—should the congress consider it necessary in future to make any amendments to the decree, the C.P.C. asks the congress to send its authorised delegation to the C.P.C. to discuss and finally settle the question of such amendments.

The C.P.C. impresses upon the congress that the disastrous state of inland water transport precludes any possibility of delays and makes it absolutely necessary to strictly and conscientiously carry out all the orders of Kavomar.[63] Only on this condition will the C.P.C. be able to justify the allocation of immense sums on the national fleet in the eyes of the country.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written March 26, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CONTROL OF S.E.C. EXPENDITURE[64]

The C.P.C. instructs the representatives, one from the State Control and one from the Commissariat for Finance, to form a commission which, not later than tomorrow, shall start an inspection of the books of the accounting office

under the Fuel Department of the S.E.C. and also other accounting offices of the S.E.C.

Comrade Bogolepov is charged with summoning the commission.

The same commission is charged with: first, specially examining the question of forms of accountancy; second, demanding precise statements in writing signed by all the persons concerned certifying their participation in the allocation of money and the conduct of business operations of the various departments of the S.E.C.

The commission shall furthermore demand of the people in charge that they present in the near future the appropriate documents from all subordinate institutions and persons through whom expenditure of S.E.C. sums is effected.

The C.P.C. reprimands the S.E.C. and especially its Fuel Department for the extremely irregular manner in which they conduct business.

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Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE S.E.C. APRIL 1, 1918

The question under discussion is a draft resolution concerning labour discipline drawn up by the All-Russia Council of Trade Unions. Comrade Lenin moves a number of amendments and more definite wordings of different points in the draft, which he suggests should be concretised. Piece wages should be fixed for all industries without exception, and in the case of trades where that is not possible, a system of bonuses should be introduced. To keep account of productivity and maintain discipline it is necessary to set up industrial courts, to form groups of controllers of various trades, not at the enterprise, but from outside,

and enlisting the co-operation of engineers, book-keepers and peasants. The decree should definitely provide for the introduction of the Taylor system, in other words, every use should be made of the scientific methods of work suggested by this system. Without it, productivity cannot be raised, without it we shall not be able to introduce socialism. In the application of this system American engineers are to be enlisted. Naturally, in introducing it, due consideration should be given to the poor nutrition. The rates of output, therefore, should make allowance for a low diet. Furthermore, it is necessary to organise output...* in the transition to socialism may enable us to reduce the working day. The decree should mention accountancy and the printing of reports concerning the productivity of the various enterprises. As to penal measures for breaches of labour discipline, these are to be stricter. Punishment should go to the length of imprisonment. Dismissal, too, may be applied, but this will be of an entirely different nature. Under the capitalist system dismissal was a breach of a civic agreement. Now, a breach of discipline, especially with the introduction of compulsory labour service, will be a criminal offence subject to a definite punishment.

First published (in part) in 1940 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the typewritten copy of the minutes

ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE PROCEDURE FOR SENDING COMMISSARS OUT TO THE PROVINCES[65]

3) The Soviets shall give every assistance to commissars invested with proper authority, within the limits of such authority.

4) The Soviets shall render unconditional assistance to all commissars extraordinary and other commissars who are

* An omission in the minutes.—*Ed.*

appointed by the Council of People's Commissars. Execution of the orders of these commissars is obligatory for all local and regional Soviets.

Written April 5, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A JOINT MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE METALWORKERS' UNION AND THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL APRIL 11, 1918[66]

FROM A NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin urged the complete nationalisation of all trustified enterprises, with the group of capitalists who sponsored the project being enlisted in the service of the state.

Izvestia No. 72
April 12, 1918

Printed from the newspaper text

TO THE PRESIDING COMMITTEE OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE DON REPUBLIC[67]

Rostov-on-Don

With all my heart I greet the first Congress of Soviets of the Don Republic.

In particular I heartily subscribe to the words of the resolution concerning the necessity for carrying through to

victory the mounting struggle against the kulak elements of Cossackdom in the Don region. These words contain an accurate definition of the tasks of the revolution. This is the kind of struggle that now faces us throughout Russia.

Lenin

Written April 13, 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE REGISTRATION OF SHARES, BONDS AND OTHER INTEREST-BEARING SECURITIES[68]

The ban on the alienation of shares as set forth in the law of 29.XII.1917 shall remain in force pending the promulgation of a law introducing a permissive system for the alienation of shares. Only shareholders who have properly and timely registered their shares shall be entitled to receive compensation in the event of the enterprises being nationalised, the amount and conditions of such compensation to be determined by the law on nationalisation.

Similarly, only such shareholders shall be entitled to receive dividends when payment of same, suspended by the law of 29.XII.1917, will be permitted.

Written April 16, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON THE FINANCING OF SUGAR-BEET SOWING CAMPAIGN[69]

Twenty million rubles is allocated to the Supreme Economic Council to be advanced to the peasants for sugar-beet sowing, the S.E.C. to take all the necessary steps

ensuring the proper expenditure of these sums and their timely repayment.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written April 17, 1918
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECREE ON THE INSTITUTION OF AN ALL-RUSSIA EVACUATION COMMISSION[70]

An All-Russia Evacuation Commission shall be instituted to effect the speediest and planned evacuation of military and other freights to new points of destination (the general object of evacuation being the demobilisation of industry and satisfaction of the needs of the reorganised national economy, and by no means only military requirements).

The commission shall work according to a plan approved, amended and supplemented by the Council of People's Commissars. This plan determines the destination of the main classes of freight and the comparative urgency of their evacuation.

The commission shall be headed by an agent extraordinary invested with dictatorial powers. The members of the commission shall have a consultative voice and the right to introduce questions in the C.P.C. (if voted for by no less than one-third of the membership).

The members of the commission are: the deputy agent extraordinary with the post of chairman, and representatives of the Military, Naval, Railway, Food and Labour Commissariats and the Supreme Economic Council.

Written April, not
later than 19, 1918
First published in 1959
in the book
Decrees of the Soviet Government,
Vol. II

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE FOR THE C.P.C. ON SUPPLYING AGRICULTURE WITH IMPLEMENTS AND METALS[71]

The basic principle to be applied in the distribution of agricultural machines, etc., should be, on the one hand and in the first place, due concern for agricultural production, for cultivation of all the land and for raising the productivity of agriculture, and, on the other, the supply of agricultural machines, etc., first of all to the working and poor sections of the rural population, with the common object of providing a proper and sufficient supply of breadstuff for the whole population.

Written April 23, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE FOR THE C.P.C. ON A DEPARTMENT FOR ORGANISING THE CULTIVATED AREA[72]

The Commissariats for Agriculture and for Food are directed to take urgent measures to reduce spring crop undersowing to a minimum, to develop market gardening, and to make preparations for winter crop sowing both on peasant lands and by means of organising crop cultivation by the state.

Written May 2, 1918

Published (in part) May 10, 1918 in *Izvetia* No. 91

First published in full in 1959 in the book *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE ON THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE[73]

The preliminary conference (on questions raised by Comrades Spiridonova and Karelin) of members of the Agricultural Board, Comrades Sereda and Meshcheryakov, and Lenin, have come to the conclusion that the questions raised must be regarded as serious political issues and should therefore be dealt with by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

The conference considers it necessary that these questions be put before the C.C. urgently and without delay.

Written May 3, 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DECREE ON THE FOOD DICTATORSHIP

All owners of breadstuff who have surpluses and do not deliver them to the collecting stations, as well as those who use grain stocks wastefully for the distilling of illicit spirit, are to be proclaimed enemies of the people, put on trial before the Revolutionary Court and sentenced to not less than ten years imprisonment, and are to have all their property confiscated and they themselves to be banished for all time from their community, while the illicit distillers, in addition, are to be sentenced to compulsory social labour.

Written May 9, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

MOBILISATION OF THE WORKERS TO COMBAT FAMINE

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[74]

The Commissariat for Labour is authorised to take extraordinary measures in order, by agreement with the trade unions and under the indisputable control of the Commissariat for Food, to mobilise the greatest possible number of public-spirited, organised and class-conscious workers to help the rural poor in their struggle against the rich kulaks and to mercilessly suppress profiteering in grain and attempts to infringe the grain monopoly.

Written May 9, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON FUEL[75]

The C.P.C. instructs the reporters to draft immediately detailed and concrete practical rules aimed at:

1) increasing fuel output,
2) economy in its consumption,
3) rational distribution of technical personnel in the fuel producing areas,
4) popular agitation and propaganda concerning the importance of saving fuel.

Written May 24, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON MOTOR TRANSPORT[76]

The drafts of the S.E.C. and Autocentre to be considered again by a commission of the S.E.C., the Military Department, the Railway, State Control, Labour and Food Commissariats and Autocentre.

The commission to be given five days.

All departments, within the same period, to submit accurate information as to the number of motor lorries already handed over to the Commissariat for Food and the number that will be handed over in the immediate future (out of the total number of lorries).

Composition of the Motor Section of the S.E.C. to be ascertained in detail.

Written May 25, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON PRIVATE PURVEYANCE OF FOOD[77]

All the various bodies serving the food organisations of different trades, such as Prodput or Prodvod, etc., are asked to combine their efforts, their staffs, their agents and detachments with the main forces of the Commissariat for Food. Refusal to co-operate signifies or would signify a refusal to support the Soviet authorities, a refusal to assist in the fight against famine by all the workers and all the peasants. The only way to combat famine is to join forces.

Written May 29, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

MEASURES TO COMBAT FAMINE

1. To hoard surpluses of grain and other food products at a time when the people in Petrograd, in Moscow, and in dozens of non-agricultural uyezds are not only suffering from a shortage of bread, but are cruelly starving, is an enormous crime deserving the most ruthless punishment.

2. The task of fighting famine does not only consist in pumping grain out of the grain-producing areas, but in having all grain surpluses, as well as all foodstuffs in general, delivered to and collected by the state. Unless this is done, there can be no question of any socialist reforms or of our being able to wage an effective defensive war.

3. ...*

Written late in May
or early June 1918

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE S.E.C. AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY ON THE CONDITIONS OF BARTER BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Agreement with the S.E.C. and the Commissariat for Trade and Industry

Commodities shall be delivered, not to individuals, but to the volost, village or other associations of peasants strictly on condition that the peasant poor preponderate in those associations.

Commodities shall be delivered in exchange for grain on condition that 25 per cent of the sum is paid in goods and that grain is delivered to the full amount of the surplus over local consumption.

Assessment: 1 million households, 1000 rubles per household	Organisation of the peasant poor for the systematic and rigid levying of a high tax on money hoarded by the peasant bourgeoisie.

Military detachments shall be sent to the villages to collect the said taxes and break down the resistance of the rural bourgeoisie.

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

Take from commissary stores: [Available]

Publish at least preliminary results of the Ministry for Food up to 25.X.1917.

Apparatus: food agents congress? Moscow regional apparatus...

(25 people with us; 2000 with them).

Written May or June 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT "REGULATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONALISED ENTERPRISES"[78]

Communism requires and presupposes the greatest possible centralisation of large-scale production throughout the country. The all-Russia centre, therefore, should definitely be given the right of direct control over all the enterprises of the given branch of industry. The regional centres define their functions depending on local conditions of life, etc., in accordance with the general production directions and decisions of the centre.

To deprive the all-Russia centre of the right of direct control over all the enterprises of the given industry throughout the country, as follows from the commission's draft, would be regional anarcho-syndicalism, and not communism.

Written June 2, 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

LIBRARY ORGANISATION

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[79]

The Council of People's Commissars reprimands the Commissariat for Public Education for its insufficient attention to library organisation in Russia, and directs

the Commissariat to take immediate and energetic measures, first, to centralise the library business in Russia, second, to introduce the Swiss-American system.

The Commissariat for Public Education is instructed to report to the C.P.C. twice a month on its practical steps in this field.

Written June 7, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECREE ON THE ORGANISATION AND SUPPLY OF THE VILLAGE POOR[80]

For the purpose of general guidance in the formation, composition and activities of the Committees of Poor Peasants a permanent council is instituted consisting of two representatives from the Commissariat for Food and one representative from the Commissariat for Agriculture.

All local Soviets, food supply agencies and Committees of Poor Peasants, as well as all other Soviet bodies obey the orders of this council on pertinent matters.

...shall be enjoyed by all without restriction, both by local villagers and newcomers, who do not have surpluses of grain or other food products, do not possess trade, industrial or other establishments and do not employ farmhands or day-labourers.[81]

Detailed rules on the relations between the Committees of Poor Peasants and the local Soviets and on the distribution of departmental functions between the two will be issued specially.

Written June 8, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WORKS[82]

The C.P.C. instructs Comrade Rykov, or the Board of the S.E.C., to publish the fundamental principles of our policy in regard to enlisting the services of engineers both for work in the commissions of specialists and for administrative posts, the conditions of publicity, criticism on the part of the workers' organisations, and so on.

Written June 10, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

REHABILITATION OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[83]

Following an exchange of views on the question of rehabilitating railway transport the Council of People's Commissars resolves: that Comrade Nevsky be instructed, on consultation with colleagues who strictly pursue a Soviet, truly socialist, and not syndicalist, policy, to submit to the C.P.C. in the near future practical proposals of measures for combating syndicalism and indiscipline, measures for disclosing and prosecuting those who contravene Soviet policies, measures defining the exact responsibility of every official in the effective discharge of his duties, and measures for enlisting the services of comrades capable of carrying out administrative work.

The appointment of a Board in the Commissariat for Railways to be postponed in view of non-publication of the decree.[84]

Written June 14, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON ADVANCING MONEY TO CENTROTEXTIL[85]

1) An advance of 50 million rubles shall be made to the Flax Department of Centrotextil.

2) The Commissariat for Food and the Military Commissariat shall be obliged within 3 days to submit precise information concerning their debt to Centrotextil.

3) The Flax Department shall be obliged, within the same period, to present its accounts to all the commissariats which are indebted to it. From these accounts currency notes shall be issued as and when calls are received from Centrotextil for the purchase of raw material.

4) A commission shall be appointed to urgently examine the estimates, figures and office organisation of the Flax Department of Centrotextil and submit a report to the C.P.C.

One representative each from the Commissariats for Finance, State Control and Food shall be appointed to the commission, the meeting of which is to be called by Comrade Lander. Deadline 3 days, as from Monday 17.VI.

Written June 15, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE FINANCING OF THE CHIEF COMMITTEE FOR THE TANNING INDUSTRY[86]

Ten million rubles shall be advanced immediately to the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry pending final endorsement by the C.P.C. of the whole financial plan or the whole estimates for 37 million rubles.

A commission shall be appointed to immediately study this plan and these estimates consisting of

representatives of the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry
the Commissariat for Food Supply
" " " Finance
" " " Control.

The meeting of the commission shall be called by Comrade Turkestanov, Chairman of the Board of the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry, and the commission shall be required to finish its work within 5 days.

Written June 15, 1918
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

THE DEMOCRATISM AND SOCIALIST NATURE OF SOVIET POWER

The democratism of Soviet power and its socialist nature are expressed in the fact

that the supreme state authority is vested in the Soviets, which are made up of representatives of the working people (workers, soldiers and peasants), freely elected and removable at any time by the masses hitherto oppressed by capital;

that the local Soviets freely amalgamate on a basis of democratic centralism into a single federal union as represented by the Soviet state power of the Russian Soviet Republic;

that the Soviets concentrate in their hands not only the legislative power and supervision of law enforcement, but direct enforcement of the laws through all the members of the Soviets with a view to a gradual transition to the performance of legislative functions and state administration by the whole working population.

Taking, further, into consideration,

that any direct or indirect legalisation of the rights of ownership of the workers of any given factory or any given trade on their particular production, or of their right to weaken or impede the orders of the state authority, is

a flagrant distortion of the basic principles of Soviet power and a complete rejection of socialism....*

Written in the first half of 1918
First published April 22, 1957 in *Pravda* No. 112

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW GIVEN TO THE CORRESPONDENT OF *FOLKETS DAGBLAD POLITIKEN* JULY 1, 1918[87]

Your correspondent talked today with Lenin concerning the situation in Russia and the general situation in Europe. Lenin emphasised that a revolution is always born in travail. A country making a revolution on its own will always find itself in a serious position. But the situation is difficult everywhere, not only in Russia. There is said to be anarchy in Russia, but that is the fruit of four years of war, and not of the Bolshevik regime. The few remaining weeks until the new harvest will be the most difficult. The harvest promises to be a good one. The counter-revolution is trying its hardest to take advantage of the present situation. The counter-revolution consists of rich peasants and officers, but without foreign support they are powerless. In the towns where the counter-revolutionaries had won, they remained in power only a few days, if not a few hours. The assassination of Volodarsky, organised by the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, really reveals the weakness of the counter-revolutionaries. The history of the Russian revolution shows that a party always resorts to individual terror when it does not enjoy the support of the masses.

* * *

Opposition within the Bolshevik Party against the peace of Brest has subsided, says Lenin. Bukharin, Radek and the rest are taking part in the work again. Peace is necessary

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

in order to prevent the Germans from seizing the whole of Russia and strangling the revolution. As regards the measures taken against the anarchists, these are due to the fact that the anarchists had been arming and some of them had been joining up with patently bandit elements. The anarchists who are dedicated to an ideal have already been released and their big daily *Anarkhia* is coming out as usual.[88]

Amid all these difficulties, industry is being organised. The owners of the enterprises are still sabotaging on a broad scale, but the workers are taking the management of the enterprises into their own hands.

Referring to the Czechoslovak revolt, Lenin expressed confidence that it would be suppressed by the Soviet troops, although it was dragging out.

* * *

The Germans in the Ukraine are in a very difficult plight. They are receiving no grain whatever from the peasants. The peasants are arming and attacking the German soldiers in large groups wherever they are met with. This movement is spreading. Owing to the German occupation Bolshevism in the Ukraine has become a sort of national movement. It is rallying around it people who would not hear of Bolshevism before that. If the Germans occupied Russia, the result would be the same. The Germans need peace. It is significant that in the Ukraine the Germans want peace more than the Ukrainians themselves do. The same applies to Turkey. The Germans have concluded an advantageous agreement with the Ukrainian Rada despite the fact that people in the Ukraine have always criticised the peace of Brest. Now the Germans are helping to fight the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus.

* * *

We in Russia now have to wait for the revolutionary movement to develop in Europe. The war party in Germany today is so strong that it speaks with contempt of the government in Berlin. Resistance to imperialism, however, is growing even in bourgeois circles. Sooner or later things

everywhere will lead to political and social collapse. The present situation is unstable, but a better order of things cannot be created merely with the aid of war and bloodshed.

Published in Swedish July 4, 1918
in *Folkets Dagblad Politiken*
No. 152

First published in Russian in 1962
in the journal
Voprosi Istorii KPSS No. 2

Printed from the translated
newspaper text

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON SUPPLYING THE PEASANTS WITH AGRICULTURAL MACHINES[89]

A commission to be set up of representatives of the Commissariat for Agriculture, the Agricultural Machine Department of the S.E.C. and the Commissariat for Food (Comrade Kozmin to be invited with a consultative voice) to consider measures of practical assistance to the peasants in the matter of supplying them with agricultural machines. The commission is to meet tomorrow morning (July 3) and the same day it is to get in touch with the delegates arriving to the Fifth Congress.[90] Comrade Kharlov is charged with calling the commission and reporting to the Council of People's Commissars. Comrade Sereda to check fulfilment.

Written July 2, 1918

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the typewritten copy
of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON NON-FULFILMENT OF THE "DECREE ON MONUMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC"[91]

The Council of People's Commissars draws the attention of the Commissariats for Public Education and State Properties, as well as of the Presidium of the Moscow

City Soviet to their impermissible inertness in the matter of carrying out the Decree of 14.IV.1918 (No. 416,* Collection of Statutes, No. 31) and orders them not later than tomorrow, 9.VII.1918, to arrange for a responsible person to exercise energetic supervision over the fulfilment and immediate enforcement of the decree and report progress to the Chairman of the C.P.C. twice a week.

Written July 8, 1918
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT OF ARTICLE 20, SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE R.S.F.S.R.[92]

The R.S.F.S.R. acknowledges that foreigners engaged in productive work on the territory of the Republic shall enjoy full equality of civil and political rights with Russian citizens.

Written in July, prior to 10th, 1918
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN PRESNYA DISTRICT JULY 26, 1918[93]

(*Lenin's appearance was greeted with a prolonged standing ovation. The "Internationale" was sung.*) In his speech Lenin, in a clear and popular form, explained the essential features and basic points of the Soviet Constitution. The Soviets were the highest form of democratic government by the people. The Soviets were not something invented out of one's head, they were the product of living reality. They

* Meaning Article 416.—*Ed.*

appeared and developed for the first time in history in our backward country, but objectively they should become the form of government by the working people all over the world.

All constitutions that had existed till now safeguarded the interests of the ruling classes. The Soviet Constitution was the only one that served and would constantly serve the working people and was a powerful weapon in the fight for socialism. Comrade Lenin very aptly pointed out the differences between the demands for "freedom of the press and assembly" in bourgeois constitutions and in the Soviet Constitution. There, freedom of the press and assembly was an exclusive monopoly of the bourgeoisie; there the bourgeoisie met in their saloons, issued their big dailies financed by the banks with the aim of sowing lies and slander and poisoning the minds of the masses; there the workers' press was strangled, not allowed to say what it thought about the predatory war; there, those opposed to the war were hounded and their meetings banned. Here in Soviet Russia, however, the workers' press existed and served the working people. In Russia we were taking the sumptuous houses and palaces away from the bourgeoisie and turning them over to the workers to be used by them as clubs, and that was freedom of assembly in practice. Religion was a private concern. Everyone could believe in what he wants or believe in nothing. The Soviet Republic united the working people of all nations and defended the interests of the working people without national discrimination. The Soviet Republic knew no religious distinctions. It stood above all religion and strove to separate religion from the Soviet state. Lenin went on to describe the Soviet Republic's difficult position, surrounded as it was on all sides by imperialist predators. Comrade Lenin expressed his confidence that the Red Army men would defend our Soviet Republic with all their might against all encroachments by international imperialism and would keep it safe until our ally—the international proletariat—came to our aid. (*Comrade Lenin's speech was greeted with prolonged and tumultuous applause. The "Internationale" was sung.*)

First published in 1957
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

August 1918—October 1920

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON POTATO PRICES[94]

1) Introduction of fixed prices for potatoes to be postponed until 1. X.

2) The Central Statistical Board to be directed:

to immediately mobilise the entire statistical personnel for (α) taking stock of the potato harvest;

(β) taking stock of and registering the medium and big growers of potatoes

first in the chief potato-growing gubernias around Moscow;

then in the remaining potato-growing gubernias.

The Head of the Central Statistical Board to be required not later than tomorrow, Friday, and subsequently twice a week, to report what measures have been taken.

3) The Commissariat for Food (in co-operation with the Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Moscow Soviet) to urgently consider introducing a demand for signed vouchers (from the owner of the potatoes who has sold them) as a condition for the free transportation of the potatoes by cartage, railway and waterway.

4) The Commissariat for Food to be directed immediately to mobilise all forces for organising by 25.VIII the urgent and mass purchase of not less than 40 million poods of potatoes at market prices and their delivery to government warehouses in the capital and to military bases.

5) Workers to be enlisted for this purpose *en masse* through the trade unions and the Soviets of the industrial gubernias.

6) A report on the progress of this operation and on the measures for its preparation (as well as recorded information

on it) to be made tomorrow, Friday, and subsequently twice a week, by the Commissariat for Food.

7) Five hundred million rubles to be assigned to the Commissariat for Food for the potato purchasing operation.

8) Point 1 of this decision to be published not later than tomorrow.[95]

Written August 22, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

CONFISCATION OF SEEDS FROM THE KULAKS BY THE POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES

Ought we not add?

let the Committees of Poor Peasants *confiscate* seed grain from the kulaks, and in any case, if confiscation is now impossible, the rich farmers should subsequently be made to supply the seeds that will temporarily be taken for the poor out of the grain stocks of the former landed estates.[96]

Written in August 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

RE THE DECREE ON THE IMPOSITION OF A TAX IN KIND ON FARMERS[97]

1

MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE

The draft to be revised in 4 days as follows:

1) A popular preamble

(α) surpluses and equalisation

(articles 17, 12 and others of the law on the socialisation of the land[98])

(β) complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie

NB ||| (γ) the rich peasant **not** to be expropriated, but *taxed* equitably, heavily

(δ) middle peasants to be taxed lightly

(ε) poor peasants—not at all.

2) The division into poor (no taxes whatever), middle (very light taxes) and rich peasants to be incorporated in the law itself.

3) % of poor to be fixed roughly at < 40%, middle peasants at < 20%.

4) Taxes on middle peasants to be reduced *considerably*.

5) Regional Soviet organisations shall be entitled to raise the question of changing the rates of taxation for the rich.

6) The poor to have the right to receive part of the collected grain (for food and seed).

FROM MARX TO MAO

2

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT DECREE

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

NB

(1) Not all the 2 million are kulaks.

(2) A rich peasant may be very prosperous, but not an exploiter, etc.

(3) We expropriate and confiscate in the case of the capitalists, but *not* in the case of the rich peasant.

(4) Confiscation to be applied to kulaks who revolt and offer resistance.

Written September 21, 1918

First published:
Main provisions in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*;
Remarks in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR THE UPKEEP OF THE POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES

$$2 \times 6\frac{1}{2} = 13$$

Within a week.

Temporarily and tentatively pending amalgamation with the Soviets or delimitation of jurisdiction.

Instructions on whom to be given to and on what conditions.

Fix the liability of the recipient and under no circumstances issue further sums unless the first is accounted for.

Payment through the Commissariat for Food.[99]

Written October 15, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON LOGGING

Check delivery figures and results for 1917 and 1918.

What part of the logging organisations are united?

Exact information on the structure of the Logging Department in relation to other institutions.

Practical measures for combating profiteering.

Requisition of all stocks of firewood en route and in Moscow.

Effective measures to have grain* carted to the railway stations.[100]

Written October 15, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

* Obviously a slip of the pen. The decision adopted by the C.P.C. dealt only with firewood transportation.—*Ed.*

ROUGH THESES OF A DECISION ON THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE LAWS

I. Legality must be raised (or rigorously observed), since the basis of laws in the R.S.F.S.R. has been established.

II. Emergency measures of *warfare* against counter-revolution should not be restricted by the laws, provided:

(α) that an exact and formal statement be made by the appropriate Soviet body or official to the effect that the special conditions of civil war and the fight against counter-revolution require that the limits of the law be exceeded;

(β) that such a statement in writing be forwarded immediately to the C.P.C. and copies sent to the local authorities concerned.

III. In all conflicts, friction, misunderstandings or disputes as to the limits of jurisdiction, etc., between officials or Soviet government bodies—all such persons and bodies are obliged immediately to draw up the briefest of reports giving the date, place, and names of the officials or bodies and the bare gist of the matter (without details). A copy of the report must be handed to the other party.

IV. Similar brief reports shall be drawn up by every official or Soviet body in the event of any citizen of the Republic complaining against any measure (or red tape, etc.) on the part of the said official or body. A copy must be sent to the citizen lodging the complaint, and another to the body higher up.

V. Anyone making patently groundless statements in the report tantamount to gross abuse shall be liable to prosecution.

VI. Refusal to hand over a report with the clearly written name of the official is a criminal breach of trust.

I propose that the C.C. approve *in principle* and instruct the People's Commissariat for Justice to word this as a decree.[101]

2/XI.1918

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CHILDREN'S HOMES[102]

1) The draft decree of the Commissariat for Social Security shall be rejected.

2) The Commissariats for Social Security and Education shall be directed, in accordance with § 3 of the Decree of 5.VI.1918 (Article 507 of the Collection of Statutes, No. 39), to make arrangements as to the order and date of the turnover.[103]

3) The two Commissariats shall be directed to collect and present to the C.P.C. within two months information concerning actual conditions at the orphanages and similar institutions, their number, and so on.

Written November 19, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE ORGANISATION OF SUPPLY FOR THE POPULATION

e) Co-operative warehouses and shops are not subject to municipalisation.*

* The text of the adopted decree reads "nationalisation".—*Ed.*

In places where co-operatives were nationalised or municipalised and stocks of goods in co-operative stores requisitioned or confiscated by the local Soviet authorities before publication of this decree, all such co-operatives shall be re-established, their stocks returned to them, the missing goods accounted for and no further obstructions raised to their legitimate activities.

Note:

In restoring the co-operatives measures must be taken to prevent counter-revolutionary or kulak distortion of their activities and to have strict and absolute control over them exercised by the Poor Peasants' Committees and the local Soviets.[104]

Written November 21, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

THE TASKS AND ORGANISATION OF THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCES[105]

First Meeting of the **Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence**

1

1.XII.1918

1. *General review of tasks.*
2. *Add from trade unions.*
3. Standing order

Subjects *of general review*:

I

1. Food problem
2. Railway problem
3. Military supply

4. Mobilisation of intelligentsia
5. " " technical personnel
6. Fuel
7. **State Control** & Supreme Military Inspection.

2

I. Task for the Food Commissariat—within 4 days present plan for speeding up and increasing purveyance, forward to *Council of Defence* { Militarisation

Set up in the Food Commissariat a Department for improving *distribution* of foodstuffs, for improving the *distributing apparatus*.

Merge Chief Economic Administration with the Food Commissariat [+ Prodput]. Instruct Food Commissariat to work up the question (a) of delivering foodstuffs to the 3rd shift of the Tula Cartridge Factory [+ Simbirsk Cartridge Factory]

(b) of introducing Red Army rations for peat and coal workers near Moscow—*also those on firewood jobs.*

II. Bonuses Commission. Collective Liability Commission. On question II **3** *commissions* set up

State Control. Flying inspection.

III.

IV. & V. Krasin
Krasin + Nevsky + Gorbunov[106]

VI. Fuel Commission: Lenin,
Rykov,
Volkovsky,
Nevsky,
Radchenko[107]

Question of agents vs contractors.

VII. *Supreme Military Inspection.*

3

1) order the Food Commissariat in shortest possible time to submit a plan for greatly intensifying grain purveyance as well as fodder;

2) when increasing the number of trios, local food supply workers to be appointed to them;
3) direct Comrade Krasin to carry out an urgent investigation into the question of utilising the stocks of boots in Petrograd;
   (Khodinsky warehouse ober Food Commissariat*)
4) brief demands or irregularities to be immediately reported to the chairman.

Written December 1, 1918
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE DEFENCE COUNCIL'S FUEL COMMISSION[108]

1) Radchenko, as chairman of the 5-man Fuel Commission, devotes no more than 2 hours a day to the Peat Commission.
2) With regard to the red tape in issuing money[109] the Timber Board is to be ordered to lodge a formal complaint this very day.

1) The Timber Board to be directed within 2 days to make arrangements with the Military Department
   a) for a law granting deferment of military service to woodcutters and wood transporters
   b) for a law mobilising the population for logging work.
2) The Commissariat for Agriculture to be ordered immediately to carry out the instructions of the S.E.C. and, under the control of the Timber Board, to issue not later than tomorrow, 3.XII, regulations governing the assignment of cutting areas and the issue of felling licences.
3) The Central Forest Department of the Commissariat for Agriculture to be warned that in the event of further red tape or a single further complaint on the part of the Timber Board, the personnel of the Department will be arrested and prosecuted.

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* This refers to the warehouse belonging directly to the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R.—*Ed.*

4) The Timber Board to be given the right to inspect the stores of all departments for saws and axes (i.e., to be allowed to examine books and warehouses).

2/XII. *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

Written December 2, 1918
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE VECHEKA[110]

To be headed by Party members who have been in the Party for not less than two years.[111]

Regulations on the Railways Cheka[112] to be revised.

Confirm the right of *trade union* and Party organisations *to act as guarantors.*

Stricter measures and capital punishment to be applied to informers giving false information.

The right to act as guarantors to be given to People's Commissars against the signatures of two Board members.

The right to take part in investigations to be granted[113] etc.

In introducing the registration of technical personnel and of the intelligentsia in general, a warning should be issued that those who do not register lose the right to receive a certificate of guarantee.

The Vecheka department dealing with complaints and requests to expedite cases should be expanded immediately.

Written December 3, 1918
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR INTENSIFYING AND INCREASING FOOD PURVEYANCE[114]

1) food-armymen to be replaced
2) special commissars to be assigned to backward areas and other *organisers with special tasks and bonuses....*

3) Food Commissariat staff, reform and "shake up" of staff.
4) *workers' inspection....*

Drafting of concrete detailed tasks for various local economic councils, challenging to emulation....

Oblige local military authorities to give the food organisations *such-and-such* (define which) military units for "food-army" work.

Written December 4, 1918
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*
Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT "REGULATIONS OF THE ORGANISATION OF A WORKERS' FOOD INSPECTION"[115]

1

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

Systematically
1) check concrete cases of urgent execution of definite, clearly defined tasks of the Food Commissariat and food organisations;
2) establish contact with workers and working masses and systematically enlist their co-operation in the work of delivering and distributing foodstuffs, first as witnesses, then as members of the inspection;
3) oblige *all* bodies of the workers' inspection to give weekly reports of their activities to the local and central trade union bodies;
4) a consultative voice....*

2

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT "REGULATIONS"

This draft to be revised in the direction of (1) making it the fixed definite task of the Workers' Food Inspection not only to examine the business correspondence of the food

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

supply organisations, but chiefly to verify concrete instances of their activities in connection with the purveyance, delivery and distribution of food products;

—further (2) obliging the Workers' Food Inspection to establish contact between the food policy and the workers and working masses and enlist their services, one and all (through the participation of witnesses as a first step), to the business of food administration.

(3)—making it the duty of the Workers' Food Inspection to report weekly to the broad mass of the working class and the working population primarily through the trade unions.

Written December 5, 1918
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*
Printed from the manuscript

NOTES AT A MEETING OF THE COMMISSION ON CARTRIDGES[116]

First meeting of the Commission on Cartridges December 5, 1918

Tula Cartridge Factory.

Measures for increasing output:
New management.
Bonuses.
Third shift (+2000 people).
Emancipation from the (Tula) labour exchange.
Extra equipment (from remaining stocks in Petrograd).
Production records and statistics: weekly.
Foreign samples.
How to muster in Russia highly skilled workers?
Inviting specialists from abroad.
Task to the Science and Technical Department
Keeping proper weekly records of production.

Cartridges per worker a day:
1916 : 240
1918 : 225

Factory's output

maximum 1916 : 35 million

1918: months XII — 16 — 18 — 20
perhaps 25-27) million
1919: I — 16 — 20
II — 18 — 25
III — 20 — 27
IV — 22 — 29
V — 25 — 31
VI — 28 — 33
VII — 35

Within a month or two months introduce three shifts.

Written December 5, 1918
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON AN ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF BANK EMPLOYEES

Immediate (within ten days) congress of bank employees (of both unions) with committees on a parity basis for convening the congress.[117]

Similar parity committees to verify, discover and expose sabotage.

Groups of leading members of Banktrud to be charged immediately with precise defined practical tasks in the field of bank nationalisation, with a short period set for their fulfilment.

Written in December, not later than 6th, 1918
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCING CENTROTEXTIL[118]

Weekly account of the number of *cash-*

1) People's Bank controls deposits and payments—integrated cash-office.

offices (departments or enterprises) integrated.

Weekly account of amount of produce shipped from each Board and from each big factory, and distributed among the population.

2) "Barter" control of produce shipped and delivered to consumer.
3) Personal responsibility of former capitalists or former owners of the enterprises in all boards and centres (under threat of imprisonment, execution of former capitalists, arrest of their families).[119]
4) Instruct the Food Commissariat, in the field of distribution, which is the weakest field, to give definite *practical* assignments to the *union* of Commercial and Industrial Employees under the collective responsibility of the whole union.

Written December 14, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the manuscript

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[120]

Comrade Chicherin,

We must *urgently* (to be endorsed in the C.C. before departure of the Spartacist[121]) prepare an international socialist conference for founding the Third International. (in Berlin (openly) or in Holland **(secretly)**, *say*, *for 1.II.1919*)

[generally *very* soon]

For this we must

(a) formulate platform *principles* (I think we could
  (α) take the theory and practice of *Bolshevism*—have *Bukharin* set this forth in theses, as briefly as possible.

Talk it over with Bukharin—perhaps *take part of them* from my draft programme*

(β) then take "*Was will der Spartacusbund?*"). α + β give sufficiently clear *platform principles*;

(b) define the *basis* (organisational) of the *Third International* (nothing in common with the social-patriots);

(c) give a list of parties, roughly under three headings

αα) parties and groups we have good reason to consider as *already* sharing the platform of the Third International and as being sufficiently unanimous on the question of *formally* founding the Third International:

ββ) parties *close* to this, from whom we *expect* alignment and affiliation;

γγ) *groups* and currents *within* the social-patriotic parties more or less close to *Bolshevism*.

I am offering' a tentative list (p. 4)**; additions should be made **with care**.

Who are we *inviting* to our conference? Only αα+ββ +γγ and only those (1) who resolutely stand for a break with the social-patriots (i.e., the people who, directly or indirectly, supported the bourgeois governments during the imperialist war of 1914-18); 2) who are *for* a socialist revolution *now* and *for* the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) who are *in principle* for "Soviet power" and against *limitation* of our work by bourgeois parliamentarism, against *subordination* to it, and who recognise the fact that the Soviet *type* of government is *higher* and *closer* to *socialism*.

Perhaps we should add that we do not suggest that the *whole* of the Third International immediately start calling itself "communist", but we **do place** *on the order of the day* (*for discussion*) the *question* of resolutely rejecting the names of "Social-Democratic" and "socialist" parties, and adopting that of "communist" parties.

Arguments	*theoretical*	Engels and Marx
	historical	breakdown of the Second International
		disgrace of social-patriotism

* Lenin is referring to the material for the draft of the Party's new programme (see Vol. 24, pp. 455-79 and Vol. 27, pp. 152-58 of this edition).—*Ed.*

** The list is given at the end of this letter.—*Ed.*

practical already accepted by
- Russia
- Finland
- German Austria
- Holland
- Hungary

Please tackle this job *urgently*, and together with Bukharin draw up a *draft* on all these points. *Answer me at once*, *if only briefly*.

Greetings! *Lenin*

On no account must the Zimmerwaldists be taken as a gauge.

(αα) *Spartacusbund* (Germany)

The Communist Party of Finland
" " German Austria
" " Hungary
" " Holland
" " Russia
" " Ukraine
" " Estonia
" " Latvia

Social-Democrats αα of Poland and Lithuania

ββ The Tesnyaki of Bulgaria
Rumanian Party?

γγ the Lefts and the young in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party
ββ The Socialist Party of Scotland
αα the Left S.D. of Sweden
ββ the Norwegian S.D. Party
ββ the Danish S.D. group (Marie Nielsen)
and the syndicalists, close to Bolshevism
γγ Loriot's group in France
ββ the "League" in the United States (or followers of Debs?)

We count on closer alignment and affiliation with
- the British Socialist Party... ββ
- the Italian Socialist Party...[122] ββ

Written December 27 or 28, 1918

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 50

Printed from the manuscript

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPILING A READING BOOK FOR WORKERS AND PEASANTS

Assignment: a reading book for workers and peasants to be compiled within a fortnight.

The book to consist of separate, complete, independent leaflets of two to four printed pages

Wording must be very popular, designed for the ignorant peasant. Number of leaflets from 50 to 200; for the first issue—50.

Subjects: organisation of Soviet power, its home and foreign policies. For example: What is Soviet power? How to run the country. The law on land. The economic councils Nationalisation of the factories. Labour discipline. Imperial ism. The imperialist war. Secret treaties. How we offered peace. What we are fighting for now. What is communism? Separation of the church from the state. And so on.

Good old texts can and should be used, and old articles rewritten.

The reading book should provide material for public readings and home reading, for reprinting of separate texts and for translation (with slight additions) into other languages.

Written December 1918

First published June 1, 1936 in *Pravda* No. 149

Printed from the typewritten copy

NOTES ON HELP TO KHARKOV[123]

1) Send maximum amount of money to Kharkov.

2) The S.E.C. to send textiles, etc., there in the most urgent manner....

3) Set up a Centre in Kharkov....

Send people

organisers, at least a few, familiar with food supply business.[124]

Written between January 3 and 17, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE CO-OPERATIVES[125]

I. Collect information on the actual implementation by the co-operatives of the basic line of Soviet policy, namely:

(1) not only co-operative organisation of the whole population, but the predominant role of the proletarian and semi-proletarian population in co-operative activities.

(2) such a system of supply and distribution as would really enable the poor (= proletarians + semi-proletarians) to derive benefit (goods, etc.) from the delivery of *all* surpluses of grain to the state.

ad 1 direct the Co-operative Department of the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat for Food, together with the Central Statistical Board to collect this information. Report in a fortnight.

II. Direct the Food Commissariat to draw up instructions concerning Soviet agents in the co-operatives and develop propaganda and organising work to this end.

III. Direct the workers' co-operatives to elect a majority of their own representatives to the Board of Centrosoyuz and make it possible to introduce *Communists* there experienced in practical work.

IV. Krestinsky—draft decree on consumers' communes.

Written January 28, 1919

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the manuscript

THE STATE OF LIBRARY SERVICE

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[126]

Direct the Library Department of the *People's Commissariat for Education* to publish monthly and forward to the C.P.C. brief factual information as to the implementation

of the C.P.C.'s decisions of 7.VI.1918 and 14.I.1919 and the actual increase in the number of libraries and reading-rooms, and the growth of book distribution among the population.

Written January 30, 1919
First published February 1, 1919 in *Izvestia* No. 23

Printed from the manuscript

A CONCESSION ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY[127]

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

1) The C.P.C. finds the direction of the railway and its general plan acceptable;

2) considers a concession to representatives of foreign capital generally, as a matter of principle, permissible in the interests of developing the country's productive forces;

3) considers the present concession to be desirable and its implementation a practical necessity;

4) to speed up a practical and final decision on this question, its sponsors to be asked to produce evidence of their declared contacts with solid capitalist firms capable of handling this job and shipping the materials;

5) an ad hoc commission to be directed to submit a final draft contract within a fortnight;

6) the Military Commissariat to be instructed within a fortnight to give its findings from the strategic and military point of view.

Written February 4, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE QUESTION OF ALLOTTING FARMS TO INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES

The final decision on this question to be postponed until Tuesday.

The Commissariat for Agriculture to be asked to supply information on the following points by Saturday:

1) the number of state farms,

2) their organisation, and what has been done in this direction,

3) the number of agronomists,

4) actual sowing preparations,

5) the quantity of seeds actually available for sowing,

6) the number of agricultural machines.

The S.E.C. to be instructed to supply information 1) on the number of applications for land made by workers, 2) on the workers' experience in the organisation of agriculture.*

Written February 13, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the typewritten text supplemented by Lenin

RE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE FOOD SURPLUS-APPROPRIATION SYSTEM IN THE UKRAINE[128]

In issuing this directive, the C.C., R.C.P. proposes that the following established principle be adhered to: from the poor peasants—nothing, the middle peasants—moderately, the rich peasants—heavily.

* Points 5 and 6 of the original from which this document is published are in Lenin's handwriting. Points 1, 3 and 4, as well as Points 1 and 2 of the last paragraph were written by Lenin on the agenda of the C.P.C. meeting of February 13, 1919; they were incorporated without alteration into the text of the decision.—*Ed.*

We advise fixing the maximum surplus, *for example*, 500 million poods for the whole of the Ukraine, of which one-fifth or one-tenth share be assessed for requisitioning.

Written February 19, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*
Printed from the manuscript

ON THE APPEAL OF THE GERMAN INDEPENDENTS[129]

We seldom have a chance now of receiving foreign newspapers in Russia: the blockade with which the "democratic capitalists" of the Entente have surrounded us is apparently operating effectively. They are afraid to acquaint the educated workers of America, Britain and France with ignorant and uncivilised Bolshevism, they are afraid lest people in this land of uncivilised Bolshevism get to know of its successes in the West.

But despite the zealous efforts of the gendarmery of the new Holy Alliance to suppress it, the truth will out!

The other day I happened to see several numbers of the Berlin newspaper *Die Freiheit*, the organ of the so-called "independent" German Social-Democrats. The front page of No. 74 (for 11.II.1919) carried a lengthy appeal "To the Revolutionary Proletariat of Germany" signed by the Central Committee of the party and its parliamentary group. The ideas, or rather the lack of ideas, underlying this appeal are so characteristic of not only the German, but of the world's labour movement, that they deserve to be dwelt upon.

But first I should like to make a digression connected with personal reminiscences. Among the signatures of the parliamentary group of Independents I came across the names of Seger and Laukant, and they reminded me of what happened three years ago. I had occasion to meet Laukant at a meeting of the Zimmerwaldists in Berne.[130] This seemingly influential Berlin worker produced a dual impression: on the one hand, serious revolutionary work among the masses, on the other, an astonishing lack of

theoretical* and appalling short-sightedness. Laukant did not like my sharp attacks on Kautsky (the ideological "leader" of the Independents, or rather leader of their non-ideology), but he did not refuse to help me when, doubtful of my unreliable German, I showed him the text of a short speech in German I had written,** in which I quoted the statement of the "American Bebel", Eugene Debs, to the effect that he would rather be shot than agree to vote for imperialist war loans, and that he would agree to fight only in a war of the workers against the capitalists. On the other hand, when, with furious indignation, I showed Laukant the passage from Kautsky's article in which that gentleman denounced the workers' street demonstrations as adventurism[131] (and that under Wilhelm II) Laukant shrugged his shoulders and answered with exasperating coolness: "Our workers don't read this as attentively as all that! I'm not obliged to agree with every line of Kautsky's, am I?"

Written in the second half of February 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VECHEKA, THE RAILWAY CHEKA AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR RAILWAYS AND A LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE

Decision of the Council of Defence

28.II.1919

In order to regulate relations between the Vecheka, the Railway Cheka and the Commissariat for Railways the following provisions are laid down:

* Apparently the word "interests" or "knowledge" has been omitted in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

** See Vol. 22 of this edition, pp. 125-26.—*Ed.*

Comrade Belyakov, from the Commissariat for Railways, to be delegated to the Transport Department of the Vecheka for permanent liaison and work.

The Commissariat for Railways to issue orders down the line that all complaints against the Cheka be addressed *exclusively* to C.R. Board member Belyakov.

The Cheka to be charged with supervising timely unloading of freights by the organisations and bodies concerned, and in the event of unloading work not being fulfilled in the time set by the Cheka, the guilty parties are to be called to account.

Local sections of the Railway Cheka to be given the right to use the railway telegraph (for payment) and made to bear strict responsibility for using it without need. Detailed instructions on the use of the telegraph and method of payment to be issued by the People's Commissar for Railways and the Chairman of the Vecheka by agreement.

The former premises of the railway police to be turned over to the Railway Cheka, and a special order to this effect to be issued by the C.R. Comrades Dzerzhinsky and Sklyansky to issue joint instructions concerning the eviction of military guards from these premises.

Food rations to be issued in the usual way to the Railway Cheka from the supplies of the railway food organisations.

So long as martial law introduced on the railways by the Council of Defence continues, the district transport departments of the Cheka are to be given the right to apply capital punishment to persons found guilty of bribery, theft of freights and railway material, and systematic abuse on the part of officials.

To Members of the Council of Defence

28.II.1919

The points I propose have been approved at a meeting I had with Comrades Nevsky and Dzerzhinsky on 28/II.

Please have them signed by all the members of the Council of Defence, so that this *extremely important* agreement may be put into effect immediately.

In the event of serious differences please send me *the text of amendments* at once by phoned telegram.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT AGITATORS' COURSES OF THE MOTHER AND CHILD PROTECTION DEPARTMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

MARCH 8, 1919

Comrade Lenin began his speech by quoting the closing passage of the women students' letter and said that they should keep their word and create a strong army of the home front.[132] It was only with the help of the woman, her thoughtfulness and social awareness, that the new society could be consolidated. It was the lack of this social awareness among the mass of the women, he said, that had acted as a brake in previous revolutions.

Published in 1919
in the booklet (in Russian)
People's Commissariat for Social Security. Report of the Mother and Child Protection Department May 1, 1918 to May 1, 1919

Printed from the booklet text

ROUGH DRAFT FOR A C.P.C. DECISION ON THE PRINTING INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT OF S.E.C.

1) Commission for amalgamation and centralisation, and, in case of need, for drawing up a draft decree.

2) Statistical information, comparing printing-works
   (1) nationalised, in charge of the Printing Industry Department

(2) nationalised, in charge of various departments
(3) private enterprises
3) Assignment: increase threefold, term?
4) Report within a month?
5) Work discipline
6) Piece work
7) Factory Committees' attitude to managements.[133]

Written March 15, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON CO-OPERATION

Should not §1 be thrown out?
Notes to §2 and §3 to be removed.
Not less than two-thirds of the membership of every co-operative should belong to the proletariat or semi-proletariat (i.e., to persons living solely or to the extent of not less than 50 per cent by the sale of their labour power).
Agencies of the workers' co-operatives send commissars to the co-operatives having over ten per cent of their members belonging to the propertied classes. The commissars have the right of supervision and control, as well as the right of veto, decisions thus vetoed being submitted for final settlement to the agencies of the S.E.C

What form of expression may practical co-operation of the commercial and industrial employees' unions take?

What about introducing a number of substantial bonuses and benefits for co-operatives that have embraced the whole population?

Municipalities uniting the whole population around municipal shops.

Written March, not later than 16, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON SENDING GROUPS OF WORKERS OUT ON FOOD TRANSPORTATION JOBS

In view of the extreme danger threatening the Republic as a result of the aggravation of the food and transport crises, the C.C., R.C.P. resolves:

to charge Comrades Kamenev
Zinoviev
and Stalin

with organising groups of influential workers and forming trains by arrangement with the People's Commissariats for Food and Railways as well as with the Central Executive Committee, and sending them out on food transportation jobs.[134]

Lenin

Written in the second half of March, not later than 28, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON SUPPLYING BREADSTUFFS TO THE RAILWAYMEN

The Commissariat for Railways makes known to the workers that receipt of 25 pounds, according to exact calculations, is fully guaranteed in the event of six million poods a month being transported. Much more than this can be transported. A strong effort must be made to increase the number of locomotives repaired. Over and above this *bonuses* will be issued for increased labour productivity in accordance with norms laid down by the All-Russia Trade Union Council.

Written March 31, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

ON THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANTS

Re *plan* of urgent measures in favour of the middle peasant:

1) Special tax on *middle peasants* to be relaxed at once.
2) Party people to be sent out (3 from each gubernia committee) specially to work for *the middle peasants*.
3) Commissions to be set up in the centre (a number of them) and sent out to the local areas *to defend* the middle peasant.
4) Draw up and endorse plan for Kalinin's tours. Publish dates, places, reception of visitors, etc.
5) Participation in these tours (Points 4 and 5) by the People's Commissariats for *Justice*, *Internal Affairs*, *Agriculture*, and others.
6) Press campaign.
7) "Manifesto" in defence of the middle peasant.
8) Verification (and cancellation) of *coercive* measures for joining the communes.
9) Verification of *food* measures in the direction of relaxing requisitions, exactions, etc., from the *middle peasants*.
10) Amnesty.
11) "Identification of the kulak."
12) Surplus appropriation of grain and fodder.
13) Handicraftsmen and artisans recognised.

Written late March-early April, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SITUATION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AT THE EXTRAORDINARY PLENARY MEETING OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES APRIL 3, 1919[135]

This meeting of representatives of the working class and peasantry of the R.S.F.S.R. declares that the Soviet Republic has entered its most difficult month. The Allies are making their last desperate effort to crush us by force of arms. The food situation in the spring is the most difficult. The transport system is utterly disrupted.

Only the greatest effort can save us. Victory is possible. The revolution in Hungary has proved conclusively that the Soviet movement in Western Europe is growing and its victory is not far off. We have many allies all over the world, more than we imagine. We must hold on for another four or five difficult months in order to beat our enemies.

This meeting harshly condemns the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries,* the Mensheviks and the Right S.R.s who, while paying lip-service to Soviet power or protesting in word against the armed intervention of the Allies, are *in fact helping the whiteguards* when they agitate for strikes or for cessation of the civil war (although we offered peace to all![136]) or for concessions to freedom of trade, and so on.

This meeting declares that all those Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who are prepared to help us in our difficult struggle shall be ensured full liberty as citizens of the Soviet Republic.

This meeting, however, declares relentless war upon those Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who, like the literary and political groups *Vsegda Vperyod!*[137] and

* The first sheet of the manuscript is missing. The text up to the words "Left Socialist-Revolutionaries" is printed from the typewritten copy.—*Ed.*

Dyelo Naroda,[138] are *actually* impeding our struggle, actually *assisting* the whiteguards.

This meeting calls upon all workers, all workers' organisations and all working peasants to exert every effort to repel the enemies of Soviet power, to defend that power and improve the food supply and transport systems.

1. To enlist members of the middle section—i.e., people who are less experienced than the advanced workers and peasants—to replace the overworked advanced section.

2. To send more and more contingents of the advanced and rank-and-file workers out on food supply, transport and army work.

3. To enlist the largest possible number of politically conscious workers and peasants for work at the People's Commissariat for Railways and the State Control, in order to improve the functioning of these bodies and to eliminate bureaucracy and red tape.

4. To transfer as many people as possible from the starving cities to agricultural work, to vegetable gardening, to the rural districts, to the Ukraine, to the Don region, and so forth, in order to increase grain production.

All efforts to be exerted to assist the middle peasants, to put a stop to the abuses from which they so often suffer, and to render them comradely help. Those Soviet officials who refuse to carry out this policy—which is the only correct one—or who fail to understand it, must be immediately dismissed.

5. To combat all signs of weariness, faint-heartedness and vacillation, to enhearten in every way those who show such signs, strengthen their spirit, consciousness and comradely discipline. The working class and the peasantry of Russia have borne incredible burdens. The last few months have been incredibly difficult. But this meeting declares that the workers have not lost heart, that the working class remains at its post, that it will overcome all difficulties and maintain at all costs the victory of the Soviet Socialist Republic in Russia and throughout the world.

Written in April,
not later than 3rd, 1919

First published in 1963
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 38

Printed from the manuscript
collated with the typewritten
copy

MOTION TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) CONTAINING DIRECTIVES FOR THE C.C. OF THE C.P.(B.) OF THE UKRAINE

I propose that the signatures of the C.C. Politbureau members be collected and these directives to the Ukrainian Communist Party and its C.C. for the Ukraine be endorsed. *Extremely urgent.*[139]

8/IV. *Lenin*

To the C.C. *Orgbureau.* Forward urgently to the Ukrainian *C.C.**

Written April 8, 1919

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

RE DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON STEPPING UP WORK IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY DEFENCE[140]

Suspend for 3 months or substantially cut down those departments in the central and local commissariats that are not absolutely essential and that may provide useful workers for the army and the home front for the conduct of war, for food collection, agitation and so on.

Written in April, not later than 21, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

POSTSCRIPT TO THE APPEAL TO HUNGARIAN INTERNATIONALISTS[141]

I fully subscribe to the text of the appeal and believe that the Hungarian proletarians at the fronts will bear in mind that another few months of struggle for the interests

* Marginal note added to the draft, apparently after it was endorsed.—*Ed.*

of the international proletariat will bring us victory—a victory that will be decisive and real.

Lenin

Written April 23, 1919

First published in 1960 in the book A. Kladt and V. Kondratyev *Brothers-in-Arms* Moscow

Printed from the text of leaflet Russian translation from the Hungarian

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.'S ECONOMIC COMMISSION ON ALLEVIATING THE POSITION OF THE WORKERS[142]

1) More aid in kind to be rendered to workers' children.

2) Definite warehouses to be earmarked for *quick* registration and distribution of goods at a *moderate* price to the most needy workers *who do not receive* the minimum in money payment.

3) Ditto as regards rent.

Written May 2, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

SALARIES FOR SPECIALISTS

DRAFT DECISION

May 23, 1919

Decisions Adopted by the C.P.C. Commission at Its Meeting on 23.V.1919:

1. Salaries over 3,000 rubles shall be appointed by the Board of each Commissariat, reported to the People's Commissariats for Labour and for State Control, and submitted to the Council of People's Commissars for endorsement.

2. Each People's Commissariat is obliged within a week to present a list of all employees who receive over 3,000 rubles a month.

3. Each Commissariat is obliged within a week to present a list of leading specialists and outstanding organisers who have to be paid over 3,000 rubles.

The Board of each Commissariat must declare in the case of each person 1) its assurance that he is an outstanding specialist in such-and-such a field; 2) exactly what outstanding organising job he is doing or is capable of doing.

4. On June 15 only those whose salaries have been endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars shall receive pay at the rate of 3,000 rubles and more.

5. The term within which salaries shall be endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars is to be fixed at not more than one week from the date of presentation.

6. Reports to be delivered by Lenin and Krasin.

7. Avanesov is directed not later than tomorrow, May 24, to submit theses or principles concerning salaries of over 3,000 rubles to non-outstanding specialists.

Please type *6—7* copies.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE MOBILISATION OF SOVIET EMPLOYEES[143]

§1. All male employees of Soviet institutions between the ages of *18* and *45* [better more, as some will be exempted] to be mobilised for 4 months (from 15.VI to 15.X) and to be replaced by women or part of the work to be temporarily reduced.

Note to §1. Only people who are ill or absolutely indispensable, but not more than 10 per cent, shall be exempted with the permission of a special commission.

§ 2. The mobilised men to be placed at the disposal of the military authorities. To present themselves (date).

§ 3. The mobilised men to answer for each other by collective liability and their families to be considered hostages in the event of their deserting to the enemy or failing to carry out assignments, etc.

§ 4. The mobilised men to form small groups, preferably of different professions, so that each group may take upon itself, in the rear and at the front, various tasks in connection with troop formation, ferrying, maintenance and so on.

§ 5. Each mobilised person is obliged to form for himself out of supplies received from C.E.C. and other stores a small collection of the most needful propaganda booklets and leaflets, with which he is duty bound to familiarise the soldiers and population and report every week on how he performs these duties.

§ 6. Each mobilised person, immediately on being mobilised, but not later than within ... days, is obliged to give detailed information as to his education, previous employment or occupation, places of former residence, knowledge of foreign languages, etc., in accordance with a programme to be specially drawn up.

Written not later
than May 31, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEFENCE ON CALLING UP FOR MILITARY SERVICE TRADE, INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSPORT WORKERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES

The call-up, by way of extra mobilisation, is announced for trade, industrial and transport workers and other employees. The order and date of the call-up as well as the number of persons to be drafted for military service are to be fixed

by arrangement between the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the Board of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.*

Written May 31, 1919
Published June 15, 1919 in *Izvestia* No. 128

Printed from the manuscript

ORDER TO THE C.P.C. SECRETARIAT

19.VII.1919

The delay in endorsing the instructions concerning food parcels from the army[144] is an outrageous and intolerable piece of red tape.

It is necessary to ascertain who the culprits are and generally have this case investigated, first, in order to establish responsibility, second—and most important of all—in order to work out *practical* measures to make a repetition of this impossible.

I therefore order the institutions listed below, who were to have taken care of the speedy enforcement of the law on food parcels,

to immediately, rigorously and carefully investigate the cause of this red tape by collecting *all* relevant documents and questioning all persons concerned

and *submit to the C.P.C.* on Tuesday their reports together with their proposal of *practical* measures for eliminating red tape.

The institutions are:

Secretariat of the C.P.C. and Council of Defence
Central Committee of the Food Army
Food Commissariat
Military Commissariat
Commissariat for Post and Telegraph.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

* The top of the typed text of the decree signed by Lenin bears a note by him: "Off the record".—*Ed.*

DIRECTIVES TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE RE MODIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS

The instructions of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture* are to be modified and effective control is to be exercised through all Soviet agencies in the spirit of the following propositions:

1) Landowners or estate managers to be positively prohibited from occupying posts in state farms of the same or neighbouring uyezds in which these persons resided during the rule of the landowners.

2) Lists to be kept of estate managers and employees at state farms and surveillance to be kept over them as strictly as over military experts in respect of their counter-revolutionary bent.

3) The number of representatives of uyezd and gubernia land departments in state farms to be increased and greater control exercised over them by these departments.

4) Greater attention to the workers' committees and their activities to be demanded of the trade union council.

5) Metayage and similar work in the state farms to be prohibited.

6) All state farm personnel to be prosecuted immediately in the event of their being unable to prove fulfilment by them of Article 59 of the Statute on Socialist Land Settlement, providing for *assistance* to be rendered to the local peasantry.

7) Forms of reporting and informing the local peasant population to be worked out for the state farms and workers' committees.

8) Monthly reports to the C.P.C. on fulfilment of the present rules to be demanded of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the workers' committee in addition to those of 1 or 2 gubernia land departments of the most important gubernias.

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* Here the following text was inserted in the manuscript by Lydia Fotieva, Secretary of the C.P.C.: "concerning the organisation and activities of the gubernia and district state farm administrations."—*Ed.*

9) The Central Statistical Board to extend its monographic description of the state farms by the inclusion of questions necessary for checking fulfilment of the above points.

10) Allocation of land to the state farms to be rechecked for possible excessive allotment of land or its seizure by non-proletarian organisations.

11) Nomination of candidates to the state farms by the gubernia and uyezd land departments to be made a general rule.

12) Instructions and measures to be submitted to the C.P.C. after preliminary consideration by a commission* Sereda, Sapronov, Vladimirsky, Tsyurupa, Milyutin and Golubev.**

Written in August
not later than 5, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE C.C. POLITBUREAU ON MEASURES TO FIGHT MAMONTOV

1

Draft Resolution of the C.C. Politbureau

Attaching serious importance to Mamontov's[145] operations and considering the speedy destruction of his detachment an *urgent* matter, the Politbureau of the C.C. resolves;

1) once more to draw the attention of the People's Commissars for Post and Telegraph and for Railways to the necessity of exerting every effort to *improve post and telegraph connections in the area of Mamontov's* operations and *speed up the transportation of troops* in that area.

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* Following this are the words "composed of" written in the manuscript by L. A. Fotieva.—*Ed.*

** Here the following text is inserted in the manuscript in Fotieva's handwriting: "The commission to be given a week. Its summoning and report to be entrusted to Sereda."—*Ed.*

2) Comrade Trotsky to be charged with
(a) drawing up a draft appeal by telegraph to the Party organisations of the given area with *a repeat appeal* for more energetic actions;
(b) taking part together with Comrade Lashevich (Lashevich retaining personal command) in all operations for routing Mamontov, to the extent of his complete liquidation, in order that the authority of the C.C. and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic may be displayed in all these operations with greater speed and determination[146];
(c) calling in volunteers against Mamontov from the gubernias of Tver, Kostroma. Yaroslavl and Ivanovo-Voznesensk.

2

Draft directives of the C.C. Politbureau to be drawn up at once.

It is considered politically essential

1) to speed up transportation of the Belebei Bashkir Division to Petrograd and effect this movement as energetically as possible;

2) Tula and the defence of the north generally against Mamontov being sufficiently covered, the 21st Division, in its known and greater part, is to be transferred to the Southern Front with the double objective of catching Mamontov from the south and taking part in the fighting on the Southern Front.

3

I propose the following addenda to the decision of the Politbureau (measures against Mamontov):

1) appointment of *chiefs of every section* (10 to 30 versts, etc.) in case of encirclement, of whom 1-2 to be Communists.

2) those refusing to leave the railway cars to be shot on the spot;

3) further draconian measures to tighten discipline.

The right of decision to *introduce* these measures to be given to *Lashevich + Trotsky*.

((Redirect before reaching Moscow.))

+3) *Speed up* dispatch of *each troop train* of the 21st Division to go into immediate action against Mamontov with the addition (*if necessary*) of Communists.

Written at the end
of August 1919

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

INTRODUCTION OF ONE-MAN MANAGEMENT IN LIEU OF BOARD MANAGEMENT IN CENTROTEXTIL

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[147]

1) The S.E.C. to be instructed to gradually reduce the number of Board members, and in particular to study the experience of one-man management either by Communists or by specialists with Communist commissars attached to them.

2) Side by side with Board discussion and decision, steps to be taken to gradually introduce personal responsibility for the performance of both definite kinds of work and separate operations.

3) The S.E.C. and other commissariats having industrial enterprises to report within 2 months on the actual fulfilment of these tasks (especially as regards the number of workers who are being taught practical management and their record of experience in this connection).

Written September 4, 1919

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON RELATIONS WITH THE ENTENTE COUNTRIES

Comrade Chicherin,

I am sending you the decision of the Politbureau.[148]

Yours,
Lenin

(1) **Certainly.**
(2) *Not* in the name of the Government.
(3) Hasten Litvinov's departure.
(4) Confine ourselves to Gorky's letter, *but not* allow him to use the argument about the struggle being turned into annihilation.

Members of the Politbureau: *Lenin**

Written in September, not before 26, 1919

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE S.E.C. AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR STATE CONTROL[149]

The C.P.C. considers:

1) that the State Control should have recommended the S.E.C. to close its legal departments, but should not have applied a proscriptive order;

2) that the Board of the S.E.C. should immediately take energetic measures to close its legal departments,

* The decision was signed also by Kamenev, Trotsky and Krestinsky (the latter with the stipulation "I agree, reservedly").—*Ed.*

most of which are parasitical, and to prohibit members of these departments from being hidden away in other departments. Fulfilment to be reported to the Narrow C.P.C.[150] within a week;

3) the Commissariat for Justice to take legal action against members of the legal departments of the Food Commissariat and the S.E.C. for red tape. Fulfilment to be reported to the Narrow Council within a week.

Written in September 30, 1919

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

SUGGESTIONS ON THE QUESTION OF CO-OPERATION[151]

Suggestions

1) that Soltz should devote himself entirely to non-commercial activities (literary, instructor's work, and so forth) in the co-operatives,

2) that if this cannot be published as a separate edition, it should be published, i.e., printed, in *Izvestia*, *Pravda* and **Bednota**,[152]

3) that *factual* information *be* **quickly** collected, from at least small districts, concerning the **extent** to which the decree[153] is being carried out in general (in all its parts) and particularly concerning the methods of purveyance and distribution (bodies, forms, conditions, exceptions to the rule and so on), and the transformation, or beginning of the transformation, of bourgeois co-operation into communist co-operation, etc.

Written October 9, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMMAD WALI-KHAN AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY OF AFGHANISTAN OCTOBER 14, 1919[154]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin met the Ambassador in his private office with the words, "I am very glad to see in the red capital of the worker and peasant government the representative of the friendly Afghan people, who are suffering and fighting against imperialist oppression." To which the Ambassador replied: "I proffer you a friendly hand and hope that you will help the whole of the East to free itself from the yoke of European imperialism." During the talk that followed, Lenin said that Soviet power, the power of the working people and the oppressed, was striving towards the very goal the Afghan Ambassador Extraordinary had spoken about, but that it was necessary that the Moslem East should realise this and help Soviet Russia in her great war of liberation. To this the Ambassador replied that he could assert that the Moslem East realised this and the hour was not far off when the world would see that there was no room for European imperialism in the East.

Afterwards the Ambassador stood up and with the words: "I have the honour of presenting my Sovereign's letter to the Head of the free Russian proletarian Government and hope that the Soviet Government will give due consideration to what the Afghan Government is writing about," he handed Lenin the Amir's letter. Comrade Lenin answered that he accepted the letter with the greatest pleasure and promised shortly to give a reply to all the questions Afghanistan was interested in.[155]

Pravda No. 232 and *Izvestia* No. 232, October 17, 1919

Printed from the *Pravda* text

SPEECH TO IVANOVO-VOZNESENSK COMMUNIST WORKERS LEAVING FOR THE FRONT OCTOBER 24, 1919[156]

REPORTER'S NOTES

In his speech Comrade Lenin described the general situation at our fronts and pointed out that it was the duty of every intelligent worker to render the greatest possible assistance to our fronts in the matter of proper supply of munitions, food, clothing, etc.

He expressed his conviction that the communist workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk would be able to exercise a beneficial influence on the peasants in the front-line area and be a great help in conducting political work among the Cossacks.

Pravda No. 232 and October 25, 1919

Printed from the *Pravda* text

SPEECH TO ADULT-EDUCATION COURSE STUDENTS LEAVING FOR THE FRONT OCTOBER 28, 1919

The conference opened with a speech by Lenin. He greeted the students of the courses, who had resolved to go out to the front to help the Red Army, and gave a vivid description of the present situation on all the fronts and in the enemy's rear.

The bourgeoisie, both of Russia and the West, had begun to celebrate victory prematurely. The Red troops were driving Kolchak before them. Denikin was retreating from Orel. There was demoralisation among the White troops. In Denikin's rear there were uninterrupted uprisings. Today even the prosperous Cossacks were going against him.

Yudenich had scant forces, consisting mainly of Englishmen. Britain had given him a large fleet. Yudenich's offensive was intended to save Denikin, draw our forces off, but his plan failed—the workers of Petrograd had displayed

examples of heroism. Europe was tensely watching the outcome of the struggle. The workers of France and Britain had already registered their protest against the attack upon Russia. Bolshevism in these countries was gaining ground. The elections in France were very significant in this respect.[157] Our chief attention was now directed to the Southern Front, where indescribably furious and sanguinary battles were raging, and where the fate of the revolution in the West as well as in Russia was being decided....

Danikin's officer corps was well armed. In view of the uprisings in their rear, they were putting up a desperate fight. But the worker and peasant masses were beginning to see things clearer and there was a strong upsurge among them. Our weakness was that we had too few knowledgeable organisers among the peasants and workers. That was why we had so many old officials, saboteurs, etc., in our institutions. It was necessary to advance the best workers from among the people, and give them knowledge....

It was important to have social-minded people capable of talking to the peasants, people who would raise the morale of the army, and therefore everyone going to the front should show an example of bravery and selfless dedication. Victory then will be ours. We shall put transport in order and bring in grain....

First published in 1960 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 3

Printed from the handwritten copy of the minutes

MOTION ON THE QUESTION OF A SINGLE FORESTRY BODY[158]

(1) Mutual control of institutions*
(2) speed up assignment of lots
(3) employing the labour force of forestry specialists
(4) other measures to expedite and increase fuel supply
(5) should they be merged?**

Written November 11, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

* Implying forestry institutions.—*Ed.*

** This refers to the setting up of a single forestry body.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON POTATO PURCHASES[159]

The draft of the Food Commissariat and §4 of the S.E.C. draft[160] shall be accepted as a basis.

A commission to be set up to work out the whole draft in detail in order to establish with absolute accuracy both the separate districts (in Food Commissariat's §§) and the concrete measures to reinforce the Food Army at definite centres, enlist the co-operation of the workers, determine the amount of necessary and possible deliveries of spirit and starch, and so on.

The commission shall precisely formulate the Food Commissariat's responsibility for fulfilment of all emergency measures and their enforcement in a revolutionary manner so that this responsibility can be taken into account in the C.P.C.'s future policy.

The commission to consist of Scheinman (+2 F.C.*)
Rykov
Schmidt
Kamenev
Avanesov (or a Vecheka man)
Markov

The commission to be given 2 days and the C.P.C. to meet on Friday.[161]

Written November 18, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

* Meaning two representatives from the Food Commissariat.—*Ed.*

NOTES AT A MEETING OF DELEGATES TO THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST[162]

Meeting 21/XI.1919

A) Basic tasks: fundamental significance of the communist organisations and parties of the East.

B) Party-organisational questions.

Combine territorial principle with exterritorial

+ Exterritoriality?

C) State-administrative questions.

D) *Concrete questions of each nation*, according to the extent of its development, its special features, etc.

+ Closest alliance with the Russian *working* masses.

E) Methods and measures of contact *with the poor*, *with the working people*, *with the exploited of every* nation against its bureaucrats, feudalists, bourgeoisie.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM

Decision of C.C. (29.XI.1919)

Most Urgent

Chicherin to draw up detailed theses for a brief report to the Congress of Soviets on peace and the text of a declaration by the congress.[163] This text to contain a direct proposal of peace and peace negotiations without mention-

ing terms (such a variant to be submitted as will confirm all previous peace proposals, but without committing us).

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[164]

1) Do not include all the People's Commissars (as well as the Chairman of the C.P.C.) and deputy commissars.
2) Reduce the number of intellectuals and Soviet officials of the centre.
3) Considerably increase the number of workers and working peasants who are definitely in close touch with the non-Party mass of workers and peasants.
6) Keep strictly in line with the decision of the Party congress.[165]

Written November 29, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

ON IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[166]

The C.P.C. directs the Commissariat for Railways to draw up within a week a detailed decree (or instructions) concerning the participation of workers and workers' organisations, especially the trade unions, in the management of the railways, in training workers for management, etc.

Written December 2, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON DRAFT REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE BUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS[167]

1) Both Comrade Tomsky and the whole Bureau of the All-Russia C.C.T.U. group (this Bureau must be endorsed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.) are to be invited without fail to the meetings of the Organising Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P. when any question concerning the trade union movement is under discussion.
2) The bureau of the A.C.C.T.U. group works out a detailed charter of its relationships with the Orgbureau of the C.C. This charter to be endorsed by the Orgbureau.
3) The "Regulations on the R.C.P. Group of the A.C.C.T.U." to be amended as follows
   in §1 the word "guiding" to be thrown out[168]
   in §§3[169] and? the word "C.C." (of the unions) to be inserted.

Revise everything relating to the wording of the different paragraphs*
revise in the above order, accepting the draft as a basis, and making only editorial corrections.

Written December,
not before 4, 1919

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THE WORK OF THE FOOD SUPPLY AGENCIES

DRAFT RESOLUTION

A commission to be elected to consider the question.

The chief and most pressing task to be dealt with is, first, renewal and reorganisation of the staffs of the food

* The text from the word "amended" was crossed out in the manuscript by Lenin.—*Ed.*

supply agencies; second, injecting a spirit of initiative into the work of these organisations.

Practical steps for carrying out these tasks to be outlined as follows:

enlisting the participation of the workers' co-operatives on the broadest basis;

ditto the bourgeois co-operatives, though on a narrower basis;

developing the workers' food inspection more rapidly into an organisation of workers' co-operation in all fields of food supply work;

introducing a bonus system for different groups of office employees, workers and specially recommended persons from among all groups of the population, whose participation in the work should be permitted and encouraged. The commission is not to be limited to these tasks, which are to be accepted by it as an approximate definition of its general line of work.

Non-food-supply staff workers
to be elected to the commission.

I suggest for the commission
Kamenev
V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich
Schmidt

Enlist without fail, not as a member of the commission	*Orlov*, author of the book *The Food Supply Work of the Soviet Government*.

Yakovleva
Sosnovsky.

Written December 6, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT FOR THE C.P.C. DECISION ON MOSCOW'S FOOD SUPPLY[170]

("Statement of facts")

1) Agreement to be formally signed[171]
2) Daily reports to be reintroduced[172]
3) Workers to be mobilised on transport

Labour rations?

exact information re grain-collecting places and state of transport

task to be entrusted to Moscow Trade Union Councils + Commissariat for Railways

4) Specially urgent: consider measures for transporting potatoes and controlling deliveries
5) Emergency issue (meat?) to be approved.

Written December 6, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT C.P.C. DECISION ON GRAIN CONSIGNMENTS TO MOSCOW BY THROUGH TRAINS[173]

1) The Food Commissariat shall be found guilty of gross negligence in the performance of an extremely important assignment.

2) A complaint against the Commissariat for Post and Telegraph shall be formally lodged with the Chairman of the C.P.C. *within an hour* of complete failure to obtain a direct line and an answer by it.[174]

3) Inquiries shall be instituted into the conduct of the gubernia food commissars for non-fulfilment of or failure

through bad organisation to fulfil the order of the People's Commissariat for Food.[175]

4) An official to be attached to the Food Commissariat to take proper charge of lines.

5) The C.P.C. to meet on Saturday* to check fulfilment and discuss a decision on delivery orders.

6) An explanation in writing to be demanded of the Post and Telegraph Commissariat in regard to the delay in delivering Food Commissariat telegrams, and an indication of measures or law amendments necessary to ensure the urgent transmission of the Food Commissariat's orders.

Written December 23, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO P. I. POPOV

(RE CONSUMPTION BY THE POPULATION OF THE R.S.F.S.R. BEFORE AND AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION)[176]

1

Comrade Popov,

Will you please—if it is not too much trouble to you—return the enclosed table to me with your remarks:

on the basis of statistical science and its modern data on Russia

(aa) could such a table be drawn up or not (on the strength, at least, of insufficient data)?

(bb) if it could, what would be the chief corrections?

(cc) would any of your specialists undertake to draw up such a table (even if with a wider amplitude of fluctuations)?

Yours,

Lenin

2

Assuming (in a round figure, for the sake of simplification and easy memorising) that the population of the R.S.F.S.R. = 50 million

* December 27, 1919.—*Ed.*

How do they eat?	% of the population (today)	How did they eat before the war (before 1914-1917)? on the average, say, for 10 or 15 years before the war
a) 10 mill. workers = 50-60% of norm	20%	70-80% of norm
b) 20 mill. poor peasants = 70-80% of norm	40%	50-60% of norm
c) 15 mill. middle peasants = 90-100% of norm	30%	60-70% of norm or 90%
d) 4 mill. rich peasants = = 120-150% of norm	8%	100% of norm or 110-120%?
e) 1 mill. former landowners, capitalists, high officials, etc. = 60-70% of norm	2%	150-200% of norm
	100%	

{ The norm to be considered the amount of bread, meat, milk, eggs, and so on, a person needs according to science, i.e., the norm is not the amount of calories, but the amount of food of a definite quality.

By workers is to be understood industrial workers, the non-worker urban population coming under the corresponding groups **c** and **d.**

Social types:
a) proletarian and semi-proletarian urban population
b) ditto—rural
c) middle peasantry and generally petty-bourgeois population nearest to it
d) rich peasants and urban middle bourgeoisie
e) higher classes.

Written late December 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE QUESTION OF SUPPLYING THE WORKERS WITH CLOTHES AND FOOTWEAR[177]

The Narrow Council to be instructed immediately, but not later than Saturday,* to revise its decision, leaving its basic and general parts intact, but changing the figures of issue to the workers in accordance with the new military plans of army increase. Comrade Rykov to issue an exactly worded mandate to his representative and only he is to be admitted.[178]

Written December 30, 1919
First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING PURVEYANCE OF RAW MATERIALS[179]

The Board of the S.E.C. to be directed, not later than Saturday,* to revise the instructions in such a manner as to ensure that the decision of the Seventh Congress of the Soviets will be fully carried out, in particular

1) on the question of the right of objection,[180]
2) the surplus-appropriation principle to be more fully and strictly applied;
3) rights and conditions for the display of local initiative and its stimulation: to be worked out in detail;
4) methods for combating red tape to be worked out.

The full draft instructions mentioned in the decision of the Seventh Congress of the Soviets to be presented within a week.[181]

Written December 30, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

* January 3, 1920.—*Ed.*

RE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT OF VECHEKA

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE[182]

16.I.1920

The Vecheka is to issue within three weeks detailed instructions not only governing the activities of the Transport Dept. of the Vecheka, but establishing strict responsibility of the Department's agents for oversight and failure to report cases of sabotage or profiteering.

In particular the agents of the T.D. of the Vecheka must be in contact with the communist and trade union cells of the truly proletarian section of the railwaymen who do not abuse their position for the purpose of systematic black-marketing.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is to adopt a policy of extreme restraint and mistrust towards the Azerbaijan Government in view of the latter's refusal to accept our offer of joint military operations against Denikin and the services it is rendering to the military forces of Britain operating against us in the Caspian Sea. While emphatically stressing our undeviating recognition of the right of the working masses of every nation to self-determination, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should vigorously protest against such conduct on the part of the Azerbaijan Government.[183]

Written in January, not before 17, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) IN CONNECTION WITH THE ENTENTE'S ATTEMPT TO START TRADE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA THROUGH THE RUSSIAN CO-OPERATIVES

In view of the Entente's intention to effect an exchange of commodities through the co-operatives with the patent design of using the co-operatives as an instrument for restoring capitalism, the C.C. instructs the Chairman of Centrosoyuz, the People's Commissariat for Food, the Chairman of the S.E.C. and the People's Commissariat for Trade to consider the question of the co-operatives very carefully from this angle and immediately work out measures ensuring full control on our part of the co-operative machinery primarily at all the points where such trade may be arranged (the Ukraine, the Soviet Far East).

Written January 17 or 18, 1920

First published in 1963 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 40

Printed from the typewritten copy of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S PROTEST CONCERNING THE ORDER TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TURKESTAN FRONT[184]

1) The order by Lenin and Trotsky given by telegram is found to be correct.
2) Exception taken to the form of this order is considered a case of undesirable military bureaucratism.
3) The Commander-in-Chief is to be notified that his verbal protest made through Comrade Smilga has been considered

and found incorrect. When an opinion is asked for, it should be given.

Written January 17 or 18, 1920

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) DIRECTIVES ON A WORKERS' INSPECTION[185]

The Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the State Control Commissariat to be asked to be guided by the following directives of the C.C., R.C.P.:

1. No new bodies to be set up in any field of state administration, and the existing commissariats to be improved.
2. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to be developed, strengthened and extended in every way, all work being directed towards ensuring complete numerical predominance of workers and peasants in State Control.
3. No skilled workers, only unskilled workers, mainly women, to be enlisted in the Workers' Inspection.
4. A new draft of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection under the State Control Commissariat to be drawn up immediately with the co-operation of Avanesov and submitted to the Politbureau not later than 28.I.1920.

Written January 23, 1920

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE PROPAGANDA-INSTRUCTOR TRAINS AND STEAMERS[186]

1. Specifically:

1) Step up economic and practical aspects of the work of the trains and steamers by including agronomists and technicians in their political departments, by selecting technical literature, films on appropriate subjects, etc.

2) Production films (showing various branches of production), agricultural, industrial, anti-religious and scientific films to be made through the Film Committee, the film material to be ordered immediately from abroad through Comrade Litvinov. Telegraphic order to be given over Lenin's signature.

3) A large-scale volost map to be drawn up demonstrating all the work done and indicating the districts. This map to be exhibited to the public in open places.

4) Material received during trips to be worked up and diagrams, charts, etc., to be published.

5) Attention to be given to the need for a careful selection of films with due consideration of the effect of every film on the population during its demonstration.

6) The work of the trains and steamers to be extended beyond range of the tracks and riverbanks by making wider use of auxiliary forms of transport (motorcycles, motor-cars, bicycles) carried in the trains and steamers, as well by the use of local conveyances.

7) Agencies to be organised abroad for purchasing and shipping films, camera film and all kinds of photographic supplies.

8) Attention to be paid to the staffing of the trains and steamers.

9) Comrade Burov to be given the right in urgent cases where the activities of the All-Russia C.E.C.'s instructor trains and steamers are concerned to apply to Comrade Lenin directly and in less urgent cases to apply to Comrade Lenin through his secretary.

2. Generally:

1) A meeting of representatives of the All-Russia C.E.C., the C.C., the People's Commissariats and the political workers on the trains and steamers to be called immediately through the C.C. of the Party. This meeting is to consider the results of the work done by the trains and steamers and draw up regulations governing trips on behalf of the All-Russia C.E.C., the C.C. and the C.P.C.

2) These regulations to be put through the C.C. and the C.P.C. by Comrade Lenin.

3) A Special Standing Commission under the C.P.C. is to be summoned to take charge of trips in accordance with the drafted regulations.

Written January 25, 1920

Published in part in 1920 in the symposium Agittrains and Steamers of All-Russia C.E.C. *Their History, Apparatus, Methods and Forms*, Moscow

First published in full in 1932 in the book: N. K. Krupskaya, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, "Political Educational Work"

Printed from the text of the book

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON UNLOADING POTATOES AND SNOW CLEARING OF MOSCOW'S STREETS AND RAILWAY TRACKS[187]

1. The People's Commissariat for Food to be instructed within three days to draft a decision for resumption of the potato campaign and submit it to the C.P.C.[188]

2. Burdukov + Kamenev, Dzerzhinsky and Kursky to be instructed to present information concerning the number of adult and healthy men, their off-work hours and their possible employment for urgent jobs in the city, and a draft decision on their employment.

3. The Vecheka to be instructed to appoint a responsible and experienced investigator belonging to the Party to study the material relating to the unsatisfactory state of labour service organisation in Moscow both among the workers and office staffs.

Report to the C.P.C. to be made by Dzerzhinsky or his deputy within four days.

4. The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to be instructed to take more energetic steps to implement snow-clearing compulsory service and to report on this to the C.P.C. within three days.[189]

Written January 27, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES CONCERNING THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON BONUSES FOR WORKERS AND OFFICE EMPLOYEES

1.II.1920

Regarding bonuses, I have strong doubts.

§ 4—absolutely arbitrary fixing of the standard (50%—exactly 50%—from "the best", i.e., given the best machines, etc. This is quite arbitrary. Can't we have it more exact? Publish standards for control? Or collect them for the scientific-technical department, etc., and publish in a bulletin?).

Account of results: top limit of bonuses. Accounts on this not provided for. Will this not virtually legalise gross abuses?

Consumers should be enlisted for standard control. Are there any examples of this? Among the co-operatives? and so on.

The draft is too sweeping, abstract, unbusiness-like; promises everything, verifies nothing.[190]

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF CHAIRMEN OF GUBERNIA AND UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES FEBRUARY 1, 1920

At a meeting of executive committee chairmen preceding the opening of the session,[191] Lenin said, in dealing with the current situation:

In so far as the international situation stays as it is, and the whole course of events points to its stability, the tasks of economic activities should be advanced by us to the fore. As regards transport, we not only have to bring

this to the fore, but simply drag this transport out by the ears, save it from imminent disaster. Trains carrying grain are stopping, we have more grain than we can transport. Military operations are often impeded through lack of transport. February is the most difficult month for transport, and we are simply heading for disaster.

We are threatened by a danger of transport dislocation more serious than in October, when Yudenich and Denikin were winning their biggest victories. More energy must be applied to save transport. We must carry out mobilisations here again and again. We shall have to rob a number of institutions of their workers and keep on robbing them to combat the chaos in transport.

The whole art of government and policy-making consists in being able to assess and know in good time where to concentrate your main forces and attention. We must now extricate transport in the course of two months. Unless we work the same miracle in two months with transport as we have done with Kolchak, disaster threatens us.

A number of vigorous and revolutionary measures are needed. This is a military and combat task and calls for combat action in military style.

Krasnaya Gazeta (Petrograd)
No. 24, February 3, 1920

Printed from the newspaper text

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE STATE OF TRANSPORT

Meeting of 2/II.1920[192]

(1) 50 → 100% express goods trains.
(2) Kazan Railway.
(3) Samara-Zlatoust-Chelyabinsk
?
{speed up food trains.
(4) Step up loading of food in Chelyabinsk district.
(5) Send top-level men out to the repair shops (of Petrograd and Moscow).

(6) Bonuses in the form of clothing outfits.
(7) Repair trains at the Western Front.
+ (8) Sending Arzhanov out.
+ (9) Military aides for railway superintendents.
— (10) 1 railway to be given to the army.
(11) Vecheka workers to be transferred to transport jobs.
(12) Repair works to be placed on same footing as transport works
(13) Chuso* stocks handed over to the Food Commissariat are to be given to the transport workmen.

(14) Railway specialists from the C.P.W.** and other departments of S.E.C. and other bodies to be transferred to transport jobs.	mobilisation

(15) Military forces to fight snowdrifts to be increased (40,000)
(16) ad *5* + members of the All-Russia C.E.C.
(17) Step up repair subbotniks.
(18) Martial law 30-50 versts.
(19) More personnel in volosts near the railway lines.
(20) Specially step up fuel work.
(21) Ask Orgbureau of C.C. to issue a Party circular and step up work in this direction.
(22) Revise rail freightage plan for increased food and fuel freights.
(23) Close some factories and switch them over for repairs.
(24) Prepare spades and mittens.
(25) Snowploughs and their distribution.
(26) Briefing of track maintenance agents.

POSTSCRIPT TO DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE STATE OF TRANSPORT

I draw the particular attention of all leading Soviet workers to these decisions. The state of transport is

* Chuso (Chusosnabarm)—Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Army Supply.—*Ed.*
** C.P.W.—Committee of Public Works.—*Ed.*

desperate. Truly heroic and revolutionary measures are needed to save it.

2/II.1920 *Lenin*

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

PRIVILEGES FOR LOCOMOTIVE REPAIR WORKERS

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.[193]

1) Publish reports about goods trains as a reward for repairs.

2) Instruct the Commissariat for Railways to draw up such a plan of rewards as would provide only for essential repairs being made on goods trains, and not special repairs.

3) All data concerning goods train repairs to be collected and supplemented, and passed on to the Central Statistical Board to be worked up.

4) The A.C.C.T.U. and the Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanovo and Tver trade union councils to be charged with working up the question of using the best workshops for repairs all 24 hours of the day.[194]

Written February 5, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF GUBERNIA EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSIONS[195] FEBRUARY 6, 1920

Comrades, you will now have to carry on your work under conditions when Soviet Russia is passing to a new phase of activities. You all know, of course, that these conditions of the transition period are due both to international and internal conditions, or rather to the changed

situation both on the international and home fronts that has taken place recently.

The fundamental change is that the main forces of the whiteguard counter-revolution have been smashed after the defeat of Yudenich and Kolchak and after the victory over Denikin. We have to be cautious, though, since a hitch has recently occurred near Rostov and at Novocherkassk, and there is a danger that Denikin may recover. Nevertheless, the main victories create a new situation. Obviously, the bourgeoisie cannot seriously count on things taking a turn in their favour, all the more as the international situation, too, has changed greatly, changed to such an extent that the Entente has been obliged to lift the blockade. We have been able to conclude peace with Estonia. In this respect we have achieved a basic success which has greatly strengthened our position, and we shall probably secure peace with all the other border states, and then an invasion by the Entente will practically be ruled out.

Thus, the first acute moment of our struggle with the counter-revolution, with the whiteguard armed force, both overt and covert—this first acute period is apparently passing. It is more than likely, however, that attempts at one or another counter-revolutionary movement and revolt will be repeated, and, besides, the experience of the Russian revolutionary movement shows that attempts of a purely terrorist nature are often accompanied by a mass armed struggle, and therefore it is natural to expect that the counter-revolutionary armed officer force—an element probably most accustomed to handling and using arms—will not miss a chance to make use of these arms for their own ends.

So though the death sentence, after the capture of Rostov, has been abolished on Comrade Dzerzhinsky's initiative, a reservation was made at the very beginning that we do not by any means close our eyes to the possibility of restoring capital punishment. With us this is a matter of expediency. It goes without saying that the Soviet government will not keep the death penalty longer than is absolutely necessary, and by doing away with it, has taken a step that no democratic government of any bourgeois republic has ever taken.

You are aware that the great majority of the workers and peasants in all the outlying districts, who were under the yoke of the whiteguards, have come over to our side. The longer they were under that yoke the more strongly have they sided with us. And so we know that all the attempts of the bourgeoisie are doomed to failure. But that these attempts are possible, we know only too well from the two years' experience of Soviet power. We have seen tens of thousands of officers, landowner elements, stopping at no crimes, concluding agreements with the agents of imperialist foreign powers to blow up bridges. And we say that attempts like these will go on. With due consideration for the new general position of the state, we must nevertheless remain alert and remember that though the period of armed struggle on a big historical scale is coming to end, we must on no account exclude the possibility of our having to keep in a state of preparedness.

The problem set before the agencies of suppression of the counter-revolution, before the agencies of the Cheka, and still facing them today, is a complex and difficult one. On the one hand, they must realise and make allowance for the transition from war to peace, and, on the other, they must be on guard all the time, since we do not know how long it will take to secure a lasting peace; we must take into account what effect this new approach will have on the bourgeois sections of the population, we must bear in mind, test in practice what these changes will yield, and only after all this has been taken into consideration, introduce one or another modification on the basis of such practical experience.

In a word, we must continue to keep fighting fit to be able to repulse the enemy. There may possibly be attempts at invasion, Denikin may possibly fortify his position to continue the civil war, there may possibly be attempts at terror on the part of groups of counter-revolutionaries, and it is our duty to be always in fighting trim. While keeping in fighting trim, keeping the apparatus for suppressing the resistance of the exploiters alerted, we must take into account the new transition from war to peace and gradually change our tactics, change the nature of repressive measures.

This question, I believe, played no small part in your discussions, and you, of course, have much more to go on than I have in the matter of practical concrete decisions. I have no doubt that you will try to study this material in a concrete, practical way. You must work out in what direction the agencies for suppressing the counter-revolution are to modify their activities in the recently liberated parts of Russia, in Siberia and the Ukraine, how, in keeping with this, we are to change our activities. I shall not go into details or enlarge on this, because I have not had a chance to study the factual material, but I repeat—the important thing is to take into account the concrete facts that have come to light in the work of every Cheka. Moreover, the aim of such conferences is to enable you to discuss the factual material in greatest possible detail, so that local workers should not shut themselves up in their own narrow circle, but should be able, as a result of such an exchange of opinions, to devise more durable and lasting tactics.

I should like in particular to draw attention to a question that now confronts the agencies of suppression of the counter-revolution, the agencies combating espionage and profiteering, namely, to the bloodless front of labour, a question that is now becoming a key issue in the building up of Soviet power, in the strengthening of the workers' and peasants' rule and the revival of the ruined economy.

You know that the task of fighting Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin, who have been supported by the Entente, the task of fighting the counter-revolutionary landowners and capitalists who were convinced up till now that their victory was secure, since the wealthiest Powers in the world were on their side—this task called for an exertion of all the country's strength, because the very existence of the Soviet Republic was at stake.

During these two years Soviet power can be said to have accomplished what is nothing short of a miracle, for in the struggle against international capital we have succeeded in winning such an incredible, such an amazing victory as the world has never known. This has happened because all our forces were closely united, because we had a real dictatorship of the proletariat in action in the sense that the vanguard, the best advance guard of the working class

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

during these two years of Soviet government displayed unheard-of heroism and determination, while all the vacillating elements among the less developed section of the working class and the peasantry, who went through a long range of fluctuations, found themselves leaning more and more to our side. The more trials they went through, the sooner did they side with us.

To achieve such a concentration of forces we had to resort to measures of coercion in face of all the lamentations, regrets and complaints. Both before and after the October Revolution we held the view that the birth of a new order was impossible without revolutionary coercion, that all the regrets and complaints that we hear from non-Party petty-bourgeois intellectuals are simply reactionary. History, which is propelled by a fierce class struggle, has shown that when the landowners and capitalists felt that it was a question of the last decisive fight, they stopped at nothing.

History has shown that without revolutionary coercion victory cannot be achieved. Without revolutionary coercion directed against the avowed enemies of the workers and peasants, it is impossible to break down the resistance of these exploiters. On the other hand, revolutionary coercion is bound to be employed towards the wavering and unstable elements among the masses themselves.

Today we are witnessing the tremendous victory of the Red Army, but if we look back over the last two years of Soviet government and think of how we advanced towards these victories, we are bound to remember that the October Revolution started when the army was completely demoralised and there was a complete absence of any military organisation. We had no army, and were obliged to scrape one together, to weld, muster and build this army up anew by long hard work. And in building up this new disciplined Red Army we had to resort to revolutionary coercion. And this revolutionary coercion was quite rightly applied to self-seeking elements. At a time when the advanced section of the population were giving all their strength to the fight against the counter-revolution, at a time when thousands of them, with the greatest self-sacrifice, were laying down their lives on the fields of battle, the backward elements among the peasantry who had received land, and the

backward elements among the workers, were working only for themselves. At that time the advanced elements had to build up and strengthen the new discipline, which was maintained by revolutionary coercion and which could be so maintained only because the public-spirited section of the workers and peasants, of all the working masses, sympathised with this coercion, realised that without this iron discipline we could not have built up the Red Army, could not have held our own in the two years of struggle and generally could not have stood up against organised and united capital. In this respect, the tasks of cultivating discipline, maintaining discipline and rallying our forces to face the coming struggle—these tasks are now gradually being modified. At first we gave all our forces to the war, all the forces of the ruined country. This condemned the country to still greater ruin.

No one believed two years ago that Russia, a country ravaged by four years of imperialist war, could withstand another two years of civil war. In fact, if we were asked at the end of October 1917 whether we would survive two years of civil war against the world's bourgeoisie, I doubt whether many of us would have answered in the affirmative. Events, however, have shown that the energy which the worker and peasant masses developed proved to be greater than the people who had made the October Revolution believed. As a result, we have received—and the home fronts have shown us—a source of new strength considerably greater than anything we had counted on. At the same time this source has shown that the Red Army, which is capable of winning victories on the war fronts, is meeting with new obstacles on the home fronts—this is particularly the case in transport. Of course, things are bad with us as regards food, too, cold and hunger are worse than ever now, but with the liberation of the richest grain-producing gubernias the food situation is improving, and our chief crisis now is transport. It should be said that the same crisis exists in all the richest countries, who have never experienced such a long war. Even these countries are suffering from a shortage of railway cars. So you can imagine what is happening with us in Russia, who has been at war six years and had had her bridges and locomotives deliberately destroyed.

Our position, in this respect, is a very difficult one, of course, and the task of the Cheka's transport departments, of their whole organism, the efforts of all the revolutionary social-minded masses, are aimed at helping the country to extricate itself from this critical plight, which without exaggeration can be said to verge on catastrophe. Another thing to be borne in mind is that the state of the railways in February, what with the winter snowdrifts, is always worse, even during ordinary times, than at any other season. At present our transport crisis has reached a stage when the railways are threatened with a complete stoppage. Lately, Moscow has had only a three-day supply of bread, while dozens of trains have been held up through lack of fuel.

We are well aware of the methods for coping with this disastrous situation, which we have been using during two years of war. These methods are—raising the social consciousness of the masses and appealing directly to them. In every such crisis we deemed it our duty to appeal to the worker and peasant masses and describe to them the difficult situation that had arisen. We appealed to them and pointed out on whom the salvation of Soviet Russia depended and what effort was needed to concentrate on a single definite task. These tasks often changed while Soviet power was engaged in fighting its enemies, and a proper understanding of the state's position depends upon the ability to grasp what tasks have to be tackled in order to cope with the economic chaos and pass on to the normal work of economic organisation. Now, too, you know that most attention was given to explaining the critical position of the railways to the workers and peasants. A tremendous effort is needed here on the part of the proletariat and the peasantry. Such a thing as the delivery of fuel is a difficult problem, which cannot possibly be coped with unless the worker and peasant population give themselves to the task with enthusiasm, unless there is a spurt of collective mass effort such as we witnessed during the best period of the Red Army's victories. Today, for example, the delivery of fuel and the clearing of railway tracks meet with difficulties arising from the fact that the peasants were given a number of promises to compensate them for their food products. Naturally,

deliveries require draft horses, and the peasants out there are unable to provide these, they are very unwilling and unfriendly, as they do not receive compensation in the way of a definite amount of goods; and we, owing to the almost complete stoppage of transport, are not in a position to give them any commodities worth speaking of. We say that the peasants should do this as a loan to their workers' and peasants' state in order to save the starving workers and put industry on its feet. The peasants should give this loan, because, for instance, in some places the peasantry are suffering terribly from a shortage of salt, while we have enormous stocks of this salt which we are unable to deliver since the railways do not cope with the task of transporting the absolutely essential amount of breadstuffs.

We have here a situation that calls for still greater discipline, for propaganda and agitation to educate and unite all the workers and peasants. The use of revolutionary coercion turns this discipline into something real and definite, showing that the class-conscious working class has set itself a definite practical task, which we shall see through to its conclusion. Just as in the period of our most difficult struggle against Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin, when we advanced Communists, leading workers, to the front ranks, made great sacrifices, giving the lives of our best fighters and at the same time building up discipline and punishing self-seekers—we achieved the maximum exertion of the people's energy, and we won; so today, too, we must set ourselves the same aim and achieve it at all costs by the same methods if we are to save transport.

We have grain, salt, we have sufficient quantities of raw materials and fuel, we can put industry back on its feet, but this will take months of hard efforts, and in these efforts the agencies of the Cheka must become an instrument for carrying out the centralised will of the proletariat, an instrument of discipline such as we succeeded in creating in the Red Army.

And I am sure that after this meeting, in the practical work of your agencies, and here, too, you will come to an understanding of the role the uyezd transport departments of the Cheka are to play, of the way they should organise their work, how they should advance new people from their

midst in order to fight the profiteers and saboteurs, who are more numerous among the railwaymen than anywhere else. This is a task of your practical experience, a task you will have to carry out by way of an exchange of opinions. The railways are notable in that we have there a majority of workers on a working-class level and a minority who engage in profiteering, and here it is the task of the Transport Cheka to secure a correct division of labour, responsibility for economising labour power, and secure all this through the efforts of the communist elements among the railwaymen. Only by relying on these best masses shall we be able to create a force that will cope with profiteers and gain the upper hand over these elements, recruited during the worst days of tsarism. To overcome this force inherited by us from capitalism we have one means—that of tightening discipline and developing revolutionary energy to the utmost. The Cheka should rely on the communist groups, on the trade unions—combine its work with propaganda and agitation, evoke among the bulk of the railwaymen a conscious attitude towards this struggle.

And I am sure that by strict organisation and with our previous experience to go on, we shall achieve in our work results as good as those we achieved in the armed struggle. (*Loud, continuous applause.*)

First published in 1957
in the magazine *Kommunist* No. 5

Printed from the shorthand
report

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE UKRAINIAN BOROTBIST PARTY[196]

The Borotbists shall be qualified as a party, which, by its propaganda aimed at splitting the military forces and supporting banditism, is violating the basic principles of communism, thereby playing directly into the hands of the Whites and of international imperialism.

Also opposed to the interests of the proletariat is their struggle against the slogan calling for a close alliance with the R.S.F.S.R.

The whole policy must be systematically and steadily aimed at the dissolution of the Borotbists in the near future. To this end, not a single misdeed on the part of the Borotbists should be allowed to pass without being immediately and strictly punished. In particular, information should be collected concerning the non-proletarian and most disloyal nature of the majority of their party members.

The moment for their dissolution shall be determined within a short time by the Politbureau and communicated to the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee.[197]

Written February 6, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH LINCOLN EYRE, CORRESPONDENT OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER *THE WORLD*[198]

ALLIES PLAYING "CHESS GAME"

Of the Allies' reported decision to lift the blockade Lenin said:

"It is hard to see sincerity behind so vague a proposal, coupled as it seems to be with preparations to attack us. afresh through Poland. At first glance the Supreme Council's proposition looks plausible enough—the resumption of commercial relations through the medium of the Russian co-operatives. But the co-operatives do not any longer exist, having been assimilated into our Soviet distribution organs. Therefore what is meant when the Allies talk of dealing with the co-operatives? Certainly it is not clear.

"Therefore I say that closer examination convinces us that this Paris decision is simply a move in the Allied chess game the motives of which are still obscure."

Lenin paused a moment, then added with a broad grin:

"Far obscurer, for instance, than Marshal Foch's intended visit to Warsaw."

I asked if he deemed the probability of a Polish offensive serious (it must be recalled that in Russia the talk was of a drive by the Poles against the Bolsheviki, not vice versa).

"Beyond doubt," Lenin replied, "Clemenceau and Foch are very, very serious gentlemen, and the one originated and the other is going to carry out this offensive scheme. It is a grave menace, of course, but we have faced graver ones. It does not cause us fear so much as disappointment that the Allies should still pursue the impossible. For a Polish offensive can no more settle the Russian problem for them than did Kolchak's and Denikin's. Poland has many troubles of her own, remember. And it is obvious that she can get no help from any of her neighbours, including Roumania."

"Yet peace seems nearer than before," I suggested.

"Yes, that's true. If peace is a corollary of trade with us, the Allies cannot avoid it much longer. I have heard that Millerand, Clemenceau's successor, expresses willingness to envisage commercial relations with the Russian people. Perhaps this heralds a change of front among the French capitalists. But Churchill is still strong in England, and Lloyd George, who probably wants to do business with us, dare not risk an open rupture with the political and financial interests supporting the Churchill policy."

UNITED STATES OPPRESSES SOCIALISTS

"And America?"

"It is hard to see clearly what is going on there. Your bankers seem to fear us more than ever. At any rate, your Government is instituting more violently repressive measures not only against the socialists but against the working class in general than any other government, even the reactionary French. Apparently it is persecuting foreigners. And yet, what would America be without her foreign workers? They are an absolute necessity to your economic development .

"Still, some American manufacturers appear to have begun to realise that making money in Russia is wiser than making war against Russia, which is a good sign. We shall need American manufactures—locomotives, automobiles, etc.—more than those of any other country."

"And your peace terms?"

"It is idle to talk further about them," Lenin returned emphatically. "All the world knows that we are prepared to make peace on terms the fairness of which even the most imperialistic capitalists could not dispute. We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for peace, our need for peace and our readiness to give foreign capital the most generous concessions and guarantees. But we do not propose to be strangled to death for the sake of peace.

"I know of no reason why a socialistic commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalistic countries. We don't mind taking their capitalistic locomotives and farming machinery, so why should they mind taking our socialistic wheat, flax and platinum. Socialistic corn tastes the same as any other corn, does it not? Of course, they will have to have business relations with the dreadful Bolsheviks—that is, the Soviet Government. But it should not be harder for American steel manufacturers, for instance, to deal with the Soviets than it was for them to deal with Entente governments in their war-time munition deals."

EUROPE DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA

"That is why this talk of reopening trade with Russia through co-operatives seems to us insincere, or at least, obscure—a move in a game of chess rather than a frank, straightforward proposition that would be immediately grasped and acted upon. Moreover, if the Supreme Council really means to lift the blockade, why doesn't it tell us of its intentions? We are without official word from Paris. What little we know is derived from newspaper despatches picked up by our wireless.

"The statesmen of the Entente and the United States do not seem to understand that Russia's present economic distress is simply a part of the world's economic distress. Until the economic problem is faced from a world standpoint and not merely from the standpoint of certain nations or group of nations, a solution is impossible. Without Russia, Europe cannot get on her feet. And with Europe prostrate, America's position becomes critical. What good is America's wealth if she cannot buy with it that which she needs?

America cannot eat or wear the gold she has accumulated, can she? She can't trade profitably, that is, on a basis that will be of real value to her, with Europe until Europe is able to give her the things she wants in exchange for that which she has to give. And Europe cannot give her those things until she is on her feet economically."

WORLD NEEDS RUSSIAN GOODS

"In Russia we have wheat, flax, platinum, potash and many minerals of which the whole world stands in desperate need. The world must come to us for them in the end, Bolshevism or no Bolshevism. There are signs that a realisation of this truth is gradually awakening. But meanwhile not only Russia but all Europe is going to pieces, and the Supreme Council still indulges in tergiversation. Russia can be saved from utter ruin and Europe too, but it must be done soon and quickly. And the Supreme Council is so slow, so very slow. In fact, it has already been dissolved, I believe, in favour of a Council of Ambassadors, leaving nothing settled and with only a League of Nations which is nonexistent, still-born, to take its place. How can the League of Nations possibly come to life without the United States to give it backbone!"

I inquired as to whether the Soviet Government was satisfied with the military situation.

"Very much so," Lenin replied promptly. "The only symptoms of further military aggression against us are those I spoke of in Poland. If Poland embarks on such an adventure there will be more suffering on both sides, more lives needlessly sacrificed. But even Foch could not give the Poles a victory. They could not defeat our Red Army even if Churchill himself fought with them."

Here Lenin threw back his head and laughed grimly. Then he went on in a graver vein:

"We can be crushed, of course, by any one of the big Allied Powers if they can send their own armies against us. But that they dare not do. The extraordinary paradox is that weak as Russia is compared with the Allies' boundless

resources she has not only been able to shatter every armed force, including British, American and French troops that they have managed to send against her, but to win diplomatic and moral victories as well over the cordon sanitaire countries. Finland refused to fight against us. We have peace with Estonia, and peace with Serbia* and Lithuania[199] is at hand. Despite material inducements offered to and sinister threats made against these small countries by the Entente, they preferred to establish pacific relations with us."

INTERNAL SITUATION HOPEFUL

"This assuredly demonstrates the tremendous moral force we hold. The Baltic states, our nearest neighbours, appreciate that we alone have no designs against their independence and well-being."

"And Russia's internal situation?"

"It is critical but hopeful. With spring the food shortage will be overcome to the extent at least of saving the cities from famine. There will be sufficient fuel then too. The reconstruction period is under way, thanks to the Red Army's stupendous performances. Now parts of that army are transformed into armies of labour, an extraordinary phenomenon only possible in a country struggling toward a high ideal. Certainly it could not be done in capitalist countries. We have sacrificed everything to victory over our armed antagonists in the past; and now we shall turn all our strength to economic rehabilitation. It will take years, but we shall win out in the end."

"When do you think Communism will be complete in Russia?" The question was a poser, I thought, but Lenin replied immediately:

"We mean to electrify our entire industrial system through power stations in the Urals and elsewhere. Our engineers tell us it will take ten years. When the electrification is accomplished it will be the first important stage on the road to the communistic administration of public

* This is a mistake on the part of the newspaper. Serbia was not at war with Soviet Russia. This obviously refers to Latvia.—*Ed.*

economic life. All our industries will receive their motive power from a common source, capable of supplying them all adequately. This will eliminate wasteful competition in the quest of fuel, and place manufacturing enterprise on a sound economic footing, without which we cannot hope to achieve a full measure of interchange of essential products in accordance with Communist principles.

"Incidentally, in three years we expect to have 50,000,000 incandescent lamps burning in Russia. There are 70,000,000 in the United States, I believe, but in a land where electricity is in its infancy more than two-thirds of that number is a very high figure to achieve. Electrification is to my mind the most momentous of the great tasks that confront us."

SCORES SOCIALIST LEADERS

At the close of our talk Lenin delivered himself, not for publication, however, of some cutting criticism of certain Socialist leaders in Europe and America which revealed his lack of faith in the ability or even desire of these gentry to promote world revolution effectively. He evidently feels that Bolshevism will come to pass in spite of, rather than because of, the "official" chieftains of Socialism.

Published in English
February 21, 1920
in the newspaper
The World No. 21368

First published in Russian
in 1957
in the journal *Kommunist* No. 15

Printed from the original
newspaper text

REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ON THE BOROTBISTS

1) I strongly urge that the Borotbists be accused not of nationalism, but of counter-revolutionary and petty-bourgeois tendencies.

2) An accusation should be definitely added that they do not treat their Spilka schoolteachers (do not wage an

implacable struggle against them) the way we do our petty-bourgeois A.T.U.[200]

22.II. *Lenin*

Written February 22, 1920
First published in 1933 in the book: N. N. Popov *Outline of the History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine*, Kiev

Printed from the typewritten copy

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON STOCKS OF COMMODITIES[201]

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade shall be instructed to make arrangements with the People's Commissariat for State Control and the Vecheka for combating hoarders of stocks and goods likely to serve, among other things, as exportable merchandise.

Written March 2, 1920
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON TROTSKY'S DRAFT THESES "THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT"

Remarks on the Draft

Re §1

a) Point 1 to be headed: *On Labour Enthusiasm*.[202] The words "raising the will to work" in the second line to be replaced by the words "*labour enthusiasm*".

b) Add

the principle establishing the strict responsibility of every staff worker (board member, manager, director, etc.) for the performance of a definite operation or job or task,

a principle generally recognised and endorsed by many economic council and other meetings, should be persistently applied in practice without fail. Up till now this is not by any means being sufficiently practised.

c) The consumers—through the consumers' societies, etc.—should be systematically enlisted for control over production.

d) The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be encouraged to greater participation in control over production and distribution.

e) The fight against profiteering and red tape, as well as against bureaucratism, should be highlighted.

f) Every effort must be made to organise competition. Measures aimed at improving discipline and raising labour efficiency should include cuts in rations for offenders, etc.

g) The end of § 4 of Trotsky's text (nine last lines) should be removed or toned down, or worded in a more general form.

(These are my rough preliminary remarks.)

Lenin

3/III.

Written March 3, 1920

First published in 1934 in the book: *The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) March-April 1920*

Printed from the manuscript

THE PROSECUTION OF MINORS[203]

NOTES AND AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT DECREE

1) The theory of delimitation is *no good*.

2) Courts and prisons are *corrupting*.

3) *Who* knows the psychology of children? The judges or expert opinion?

4) Special establishments?

5) Profiteers, etc.? *Recidive?*

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1) Instruct the Commissariat for Justice by arrangement with the Commissariat for Public Health, the Commissariat

for Education and the Central Statistical Board to draw up forms of report for each case of juvenile delinquency.

2) Instruct the Commissariat for Education and the Commissariat for Public Health to step up activities in the organisation of medical and educational institutions for defective juveniles.

Instruct the Commissariat for Justice to exercise stricter supervision over the membership of the juvenile commissions and the way they fulfil their duties.

Written March 4, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE ORGANISATION OF STATE FARMS[204]

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

All work to improve the organisation and management of the state farms should be centred on strongly combating, first, the patently landowner-type abuses that have come to light in the application of money rent, métayage, and so on; secondly, the extremely low labour discipline and extremely low productivity of labour.

Exact information to be demanded of the gubernia land departments and state farms as to what measures they have taken in this direction and what practical results they have achieved. Responsible persons to be appointed answerable before a court of law for the carrying out of this decision and the elimination of abuses. If need be, the entire managing personnel of the worst farms should be replaced. Certain farms should be selected as specialised model farms of a producing or purely consuming type and data concerning the state of these farms to be recorded separately.

Written March 9, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

RESOLUTIONS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) CONCERNING BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE BY MEMBERS OF THE A.C.C.T.U. PARTY GROUP[205]

The Politbureau, composed of Bukharin, Krestinsky and Lenin, discussed on 17.III.1920 the statement of the A.C.C.T.U. Party group signed by Tomsky and Lutovinov and found in their presence 1) that Comrade Krestinsky, in private conversations with Comrades Ishchenko, Glebov, Tomsky and Lutovinov, did not voice his misgivings about the awkwardness of the existing relations (namely, the sponsoring by members of the Party at non-Party congresses—and not at their communist groups—of resolutions that differ from the resolution of the C.C. of the Party) in respect of the decision passed by the C.C.

2) that Comrade Krestinsky had suggested that this question should not be dealt with by the Party group before its forthcoming discussion the next day at the Politbureau in the presence of members of the Party group's bureau;

3) that during these conversations Comrade Krestinsky had been rather hasty;

on the other hand,

that under the circumstances the discussion of this question at the Party group was highly out of place and bound to aggravate the conflict needlessly, or rather turn the difference of opinion between the C.C. and the Party group into a real conflict;

that the statement mentioned above is, in the eyes of every Party man, not only hastiness, but squabbling of a decidedly unsavoury nature;

therefore the Politbureau resolves that the members of the A.C.C.T.U. Party group bureau be asked

to have the Party group cancel its resolution and consider the incident closed.

The Politbureau, composed of comrades Bukharin, Lenin and Krestinsky, discussed on 17.III.1920 the abnormal

situation arising from the fact that Party members sponsor resolutions at non-Party congresses which run counter to the decisions of the Party's C.C.

The Politbureau resolves that from the point of view of Party discipline this is decidedly wrong and impermissible.

Considering the quite exceptional circumstances, however (namely, the very early date of the forthcoming Party congress, the publication of Comrade Tomsky's theses, and the comparatively minor importance of the still moot question of collective management with or without one-man management in separate cases) it is recognised as a politically lesser evil that members of the A.C.C.T.U. Party group be permitted, pending the decision of the Party congress, to sponsor the resolution of that group at current congresses of the various trade unions.

Written March 17, 1920

First published in 1963 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 40

Printed from the manuscript

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION OF THE PAMPHLET *THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND KAUTSKY THE RENEGADE*[206]

Preface to the English Edition

The comrades who intend to publish my pamphlet against Kautsky in English, which has also been published in German,[207] have asked me to write a preface to the English edition.

I would prefer, in lieu of a short preface, to give a detailed analysis of one of the writings of J. Ramsay Macdonald, who, as far as I know, is one of the most influential and widely read of English writers of practically the same Kautskyan trend. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain Macdonald's book *Parliament and Revolution*[208] which has short chapters on Soviet democracy and Soviet suffrage,

but the author's Kautskyan point of view is quite clear from his article "Socialist Review Outlook" published in *The Socialist Review*, October-December 1919, of which he is the editor. Macdonald is not a Marxist, and the Marxist-tinted opportunism characteristic of Kautsky is not typical of England.

As I have no time just now to give a detailed analysis of Macdonald's views, I shall confine myself to an attempt at briefly describing his views as known to us from his political activities, from the newspaper of his party (the "Independent" Labour Party—independent in word and fully dependent on bourgeois prejudices in deed), from his magazine and in particular from the article just mentioned.

I shall first quote some of the most characteristic passages from this article:

Describing the general political situation, Macdonald writes: "...Never was honest service and labour held in lower esteem" (p. 306). "...Our ships of war continuing the starvation of women and children. We are in every mean and wicked conspiracy to subvert democracy in Europe. Though the State is tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, a Minister to gratify his personal vanity, and a small class of financiers to secure personal profit in the future, can add what will probably amount to £100,000,000 further burden upon the British taxpayer, for a Russian venture ..." (p. 307). "The storm in the teacup inside the Parliamentary Labour Party, because Mr. Neil MacLean remained seated during a theatrical display when the Prime Minister was being welcomed for bringing in his pocket from Paris one of the worst instruments that ever terminated a war, shows this same proneness ?
in the Party to be stampeded by trivial fears." "The Labour Party has to save itself from chastisement; it cannot allow handbills to be issued against its candidates, headed: 'The Labour Party condones an insult to our Gracious Sovereign.'" "Such a state of things," declares brave Mr. Macdonald, "is not healthy; it contains no promise of great reform...."*

Written not later than March 1920

First published in 1958 in the journal *Voprosi Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON SUBBOTNIKS[209]

I. AIMS AND PURPOSE OF SUBBOTNIKS

1) Subbotniks are a form of propaganda of the ideas of compulsory labour service and self-organisation of the working class.
2) Subbotniks should be a laboratory of forms of communist labour.
3) Subbotniks must be started primarily for important and urgent jobs.
4) Subbotniks should yield results not below established output rates, but participants should try to exceed these rates.

+a) Higher labour productivity
b) " work discipline
c) implementation of dictatorship of the proletariat
d) leadership of the peasantry
e) combating famine and economic chaos

Written not before the end of March 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

To Members of the Politbureau:

Please read this. *Interesting*.
I am *for seeking* a compromise with them.[210]

Lenin

Written between April 19 and May 6, 1920

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES CONCERNING THE DECREE ON WORK RATIONS[211]

1

1) Title to be changed.
2) General public norm to be abolished.
3) The *work* ration, i.e., *for number of days worked*, to be made the basic ration.
4) The work ration to be divided into categories according to the lightness or heaviness of the work.
5) 1st category: mental and office work
6) 2nd " manual work
7) 3rd " heavy work, etc.
8) "Shock groups" (i.e., trades and enterprises of special importance for production) transferable, by decision of the C.P.C. (sometimes by special rules) and the Council of Defence, to categories 2, 3, and so on.
9) A special low norm to be fixed for non-working people, unemployed, traders, etc. *Exemptions*.
10) Special exemptions for children and the sick.

2

Title suggestions:

"Decree on Greater Uniformity of Food Rations and Work Rations As the Basis of the Whole Food System".

What was formerly called "general public norm" to be *changed* to

"norm for unemployed and small proprietors" or: self-employed citizens, people not working, etc. (or "small proprietors"), "people not working in Soviet enterprises or offices".

Advantage: (1) simplifies things tremendously in capital cities and all non-farming, industrial towns (as the *bulk* there work in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices).

(2) In *non-industrial* towns we *clearly* set apart the population that is not working in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices, *and this population should gradually be taken off rations* (either start a vegetable garden *of your own* or go to work in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices).

> We *shall not* feed those who do not work in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices.

Figure out under what system there will be *less food coupons* and the system itself more simple.

27/IV. 1920 *Lenin*

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE STONE-LAYING CEREMONY FOR A MONUMENT TO KARL MARX MAY 1, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

V. I. Lenin delivered a short but impressive speech on the significance of Karl Marx as a socialist leader.

"The working people were enslaved, despite political liberties. Now they are moving towards the workers' revolution, which will create a socialist society without landowners and capitalists. To Russia has fallen the great honour and joy of helping to establish this socialist society and a world Soviet Republic. Today, on this international festival of labour, when we wish to prove to everybody that we shall succeed in coping with the task of organising a socialist society of the working people, we honour the memory of Karl Marx. And I am confident that the laying of this monument to our great teacher will serve as a call impelling us to give all our attention to the need for working hard and long to create a society in which there will be no room for exploitation."

Izvestia No. 94 May 4, 1920

Printed from the newspaper text

SPEECH AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE ZAGORSKY WORKERS' PALACE MAY 1, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin devoted his short speech to reminiscences of Comrade Zagorsky, whom he had met abroad, where the deceased had lived as a political emigrant in 1907 and when Lenin visited the workers' circles of comrades living abroad and circles of Russian emigrants to read lectures and reports. Already in those days Comrade Zagorsky, who was secretary of the Geneva group of Bolsheviks, impressed one as being an energetic, clever man and a good organiser devoted heart and soul to the cause of the Party. When Zagorsky returned to Moscow in 1918 he threw himself into Party work and was shortly elected secretary of the Moscow organisation, at which honourable post he died during the explosion in Leontievsky Pereulok.[212]

Izvestia No. 94, May 4, 1920 and *Pravda* No. 95, May 5, 1920

Printed from the text of the newspaper *Pravda*

SPEECH AT THE ELEVENTH ISSUE OF RED COMMANDERS OF THE FIRST MOSCOW MACHINE-GUNNERS TRAINING COURSES MAY 12, 1920

CHRONICLER'S RECORD

In a speech to the newly promoted Red commanders Lenin spoke about the things a Red commander should know when going out to the Western Front. A Red commander should remember that we were fighting, not the Polish workers and peasants, but the Polish bourgeoisie and landowners, as well as the capitalists of the Entente who

stood behind them and controlled the Polish landed gentry. You know, Comrade Lenin said, that this war has been forced on us against our desire, but we are not going to let ourselves be crushed: better death than defeat.

K Novoi Armii
(To a New Army)
No. 6
June 1, 1920

Printed from the text
of the magazine *K Novoi Armii*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE PURVEYANCE OF RAW MATERIALS[213]

A commission to be set up, which shall, within a fortnight:

1) Devise measures for unifying all grain and raw material purveyance under a single department or by a sufficiently secure and expedient unification for this purpose of the respective departments. Use must be made of the co-operative machinery.

2) The commission, in particular, must examine the question of employing the Food Army and the internal security units for the purveyance of all kinds of raw materials; following this, the conditions and concrete dimensions for applying bonuses and exchange of commodities (as a rule, on a collective basis), in particular, returning to the peasants in the form of processed goods part of the raw materials delivered by them.

3) The application everywhere of the surplus-appropriation system in the purveyance of raw materials, as well as of fixed prices, is obligatory.

Written May 25, 1920

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT DECREE ON MEASURES FOR PROPER DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSING AMONG THE WORKING POPULATION[214]

In my opinion §9 is unsuitable. People's Courts are weak.

The local sanitary departments (+labour commissariat) should be made:

(a) to issue obligatory rules

(b) *to punish*, without trial, by arrest up to 1 month and *compulsory labour* up to 2 months for uncleanliness, etc.

(c) to organise *mass* control of cleanliness (through special *squads* of Soviet Deputies).

Lenin

Written May 25, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON GRAIN RESOURCES[215]

26.V.1920

1) Express satisfaction at increased purveyance
2) monthly figures to be demanded
3) station deliveries to be kept separate from purveyances
4) help purveyors (§4)
5) step up deliveries (§5)
6) **vegetable garden?**

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH M. NAKAHIRA, CORRESPONDENT OF THE JAPANESE NEWSPAPER *OSAKA ASAHI*[216]

He did not wait for our question, but started to speak of the relations between Japan and Russia—to the effect that it is regrettable that Japan does not seem willing to adopt an attitude of willingness to meet the Soviet Government's attitude of peace. The Soviet Government stands for peace, and therefore it recognises the neutral zone government.[217]

He then asked: "Is there a powerful landowning class in Japan? Does the Japanese farmer own land freely? Do the Japanese people live on food produced in their own country, or do they import much food from foreign countries?" He asked many other questions, showing his deep interest in living conditions in Japan.

Mr. Lenin next asked whether Japanese parents beat their children, and said he had read of this in a book. "Tell me whether it is true or not," said he, "it is a very interesting subject." I answered that there may be exceptions, but as a rule parents do not beat their children in Japan. On hearing my answer he expressed satisfaction and said that the policy of the Soviet Government is to abolish this condition. After that we asked about the revolution and subsequent developments.

In giving a résumé of Russian revolutionary history, he said: "Before the revolution, the working and peasant classes of Russia were extremely oppressed—in fact, their oppression was without parallel in past history. As a result of this most severe oppression, the revolutionary spirit of the poorer class gradually increased until it broke out in the revolution. But the organising capacity of the lower strata of Russia is comparatively weak and the degree of education lower than in any other countries. In spite of all this they could not be suppressed. But now, after two and a half years of experience, the Russian working and peasant masses have obtained a great deal of political and social discipline. The experience of this two and a half years can truly be compared with the development of several centuries."

At this point we asked why the Soviet Republic, in spite of its having repudiated the national debts of czarism, had promised to give Esthonia vast amounts of gold, when concluding peace. Smiling, Mr. Lenin said: "Esthonia has shown her good will toward the Soviet Government and therefore the Soviet Government has promised to pay her this gold. Moreover," he continued, "to deal with the propertied class is really a very difficult matter. The propertied class cares for nothing but its own material interests. For instance, look at America. America proposed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia. When we examined the treaty, we could not accept it because it was based on exploitation. So we rejected it. Of course we do not consider ourselves incapable. The Allied nations, rejecting recognition, attempt to interfere with Russia. There is reason to think that if the intervention of the Allies should continue, it will be profitable to the Bolsheviki.

"All in all, considering the prospects of Russia's industries, the situation is promising. If our electrical programme is attained entire industries can be electrified. The creative capacity of communism will be increased and will exert the greatest influence in solving these problems, and the development will be equal to that of several decades."

Transmitted by telegraph June 6, 1920
Published in Japanese June 13, 1920
in *Osaka Asahi* No. 13841,
June 15, 1920
in *Tokyo Asahi* No. 12211,
and in English in the magazine
Soviet Russia No. 6
August 7, 1920

First published in Russian
(translated from the English)
April 16, 1963 in *Izvestia* No. 91

Printed from the text in
Osaka Asahi
Translated from the Japanese

INTERVIEW WITH K. FUSSE, CORRESPONDENT OF THE JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS *OSAKA MAINICHI* AND *TOKYO NICHI-NICHI*

Lenin said on meeting Fusse that he was very glad to see him and that despite everything that had taken place in recent years between Russia and Japan and the fact that

some people in Japan still took an uncompromising attitude towards Soviet Russia, he nevertheless took an optimistic view of future relations between the two countries. The Soviet Government had recognised the independence of the buffer state and "this, I hope," said Lenin, "would help restore peace in the Far East in the very near future."

Fusse started the interview by asking Lenin: "Last autumn you said the difficulties were over. Don't you foresee big difficulties ahead?"

I meant that our greatest difficulties were over; but, of course, there are still many difficulties confronting us.

Fusse: "You said it took capitalism many years to accomplish the transition from feudalism, therefore it would also take socialism many years to accomplish the transition from capitalism. Approximately how long do you think this will take?"

Generally, it is hard to fix dates; to overthrow the old order doesn't require much time, but you can't create the new order in a short time. We have launched our plan for the electrification of industry and agriculture; without electrification the communist order is impracticable, and our plan of electrification is designed for a period of ten years under the most favourable conditions. That's the shortest time we set for building up our new order.

Lenin then asked Fusse a number of questions concerning agrarian and class relations in Japan.

What kind of landowners does Japan have? What is the position of the landless peasant in Japan? Are there any peasant organisations? and so on. Lenin also showed an interest in the state of electrification and public education in Japan and how children were treated in Japan. When Fusse said that Japan took better care of her children than the West, Lenin remarked: "That's very important, in view of the fact that the practice of beating children in the schools has not yet been entirely eliminated in the so-called civilised countries of Europe, not even in a country like Switzerland."

After this Fusse again asked Lenin a number of political questions.
Fusse: "How do you visualise good-neighbourly relations between socialist and capitalist states?"

Our terms of coexistence with capitalist countries were set forth at length in the draft treaty which the American

representative, Mr. Bullitt, recently published in Washington. These terms wore most unfavourable to us, and it was this that led the Allied governments to believe that our willingness to make concessions was a sign of weakness, and they started their intervention, as a result of which they suffered complete defeat. We routed Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin.

Fusse: "Where does communism have more chance of success—in the West or in the East?"

So far, real communism can succeed only in the West, but it must be remembered that the West lives at the expense of the East; the imperialist powers of Europe grow rich chiefly at the expense of the eastern colonies, but at the same time they are arming their colonies and teaching them to fight, and by so doing the West is digging its own grave in the East.

Fusse: "What are the immediate tasks of the Soviet Government?"

First, to beat the Polish landowners, second, to secure a lasting peace, and then, third, to develop our economic life.

Transmitted by telegraph
June 5, 1920

Published in Japanese
June 10, 1920, in the newspaper
Tokyo Nichi-Nichi No. 15686

First published in Russian
in 1924 in a collection
of articles *Lenin i Vostok*
(Lenin and the East), Moscow

Printed from the text of the book
collated with the typewritten
copy of *K. Fusse*'s telegraphed
report

DECISION IMPOSING A PENALTY ON E. Y. VEVER, MANAGER OF "GORKI" SANATORIUM

In a statement signed by Comrades Belenky, Ivanichev and Gabalin it has been established that by order of the Manager of the Sanatorium, Comrade Vever, a perfectly sound fir-tree was cut down in the sanatorium's park on June 14, 1920.

For causing damage to Soviet property I order Comrade Vever, Manager of the Sanatorium at the Soviet Gorki Estate, to be placed under arrest for 1 month.

Sentence to be executed by the Podolsk Uyezd Executive Committee on the understanding that

(1) should it be discovered that Comrade Vever had had no penalties previously imposed upon him, his sentence shall be suspended after a week's detention and he shall be warned that in the event of wrongful felling in the park, walks or woods or any other damage to Soviet property being allowed, he will be liable to further punishment over and above 3 weeks' arrest and to dismissal.

(2) The date on which sentence is to be carried out shall be determined by the Uyezd Executive Committee by arrangement with the Uyezd Land Department or the Management of the State Farms to ensure that farm work will not suffer in any way.

I instruct Comrade Belenky to bring this decision to the notice of Comrade Vever and his assistants, who are to sign that it has been announced to them and that any further similar offence will incur punishment for all workers and office staff, and not the manager alone.

I instruct the Uyezd Executive Committee to report to me what date they have fixed for the arrest and how the sentence has been carried out.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

14.VI.1920

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL JUNE 19, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin put the question this way: what, in effect, does it mean to recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat. It means every day, in propaganda, agitation,

speeches and articles, to prepare the proletariat for the conquest of power, for the suppression of the exploiters, the suppression of all the proletariat's opponents. Comrade Lenin, on the basis of various documents and newspapers, showed what a *gulf* existed between the Third International and the entire policy of the French Party.[218] He revealed all the rottenness of the Turatian wing of the Italian Party, which was preventing the party from adopting a correct line.

Pravda No. 133,
June 20, 1920
Izvestia No. 134,
June 22, 1920

Printed from the *Pravda* text

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TASKS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) IN TURKESTAN[219]

The theses and draft to be endorsed as a whole, but both to be amended in the direction of

(1) equalising land tenure of Russians and newcomers with that of local people;

(2) overcoming, ousting and subordinating Russian kulaks in the most energetic manner;

(3) not giving the Turkestan Commission[220] the right to alter decrees without obtaining the consent of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee and the Turkestan Council of People's Commissars and without consulting the centre;

(4) systematically considering, preparing and carrying out the transfer of power—gradually but steadily—to the local *Soviets of working people*, under the control of reliable Communists;

(5) the question of dividing the Republic into 3 parts not to be decided beforehand;

(6) the general task to be, not communism, but the overthrow of feudalism.

Written June 22, 1920

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

MATERIAL FOR THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[221]

1

PLAN OF A RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE "FASHIONABLE" DISTORTION OF THIS SLOGAN[222]

1. Precisely the revolutionary, and only the revolutionary part of the proletariat, to be organised into the party, and a similar part of the *party* promoted to its *leading* centres.

2. Systematic exposure to the masses of reformism and opportunism in the party and the labour movement.

3. Replacement of opportunist leaders in the party's sections, in the trade unions, in the co-operatives, in clubs, in cultural and educational and *all* other organisations of the proletariat by revolutionary leaders.

4. Formation of communist cells in all and every form of workers' and small-peasant organisations for systematic leadership of the entire labour movement (and part of the small-peasant movement) by the party.

=3? 5. Obligatory appointment of definitely revolutionary workers who are entirely free from traditions, habits and prejudices of peaceful work, parliamentarism and legalism, and who, even if extremely inexperienced, are (1) capable of fighting reformism and opportunism (2) and are in close touch with the rank and file of the proletariat and with its most revolutionary section—

—their appointment to top posts in the party in sufficient numbers, especially in the Party's C.C. and the *parliamentary group*, and in all the most important (for the Party) bodies.

6. Especially detailed subordination of the parliamentary group to the Party's Central Committee and the latter's strict supervision over it.

7. The people who are to be considered collaborationists, advocates of a bloc between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie

and proprietors, are not only those who put this idea into practice directly, who stand for a bloc in the government, etc., but also those who put it into practice *indirectly*, for instance, those who stand for equality between the working class and the class of petty proprietors, for equality in their points of view, etc.

8. Press organs of the reformists (or conciliation with reformism)...* *L'Humanite*,[223] should be closed down. The party should have 1 *central* organ of a definitely revolutionary trend—*not* like that of *Populaire*[224] or *Freiheit*.[225] The party's whole press is to be a single thought, a single trend, *preparation* for dictatorship.

9. Deeper into the masses. Not for the labour aristocracy, but for the untrained masses. Not only for the towns, but for the country. Agitation among the masses, not only propaganda (contra British Socialist Party).[226]

Free distribution of leaflets for the backward workers covered by contributions from the advanced.

Proletarians to go to the masses, to assist strikers and farm labourers.

10. Open analysis before the masses of mistakes and betrayals of the opportunist leaders (the strike of 20-21/VII. 1919, *etc.*).

Analysis in the press of *all* opportunist mistakes and weak speeches of parliamentarians, etc.

11. Systematic work on all occasions and in all respects in application to all spheres of life;

clarify *concrete* tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, viz.:

(a) suppression of the resistance of the exploiters (including the kulaks and saboteurs among the intellectuals);

(b) confiscation, since redemption payment now, after 1914-18, is impossible;

(c) special supervision over the exploiters and bourgeois intellectuals;

(d) immediate revolutionary improvement of life for the workers

* A word in the manuscript illegible.—*Ed.*

for all the exploited masses
for the small farmers
at the expense of the exploiters;
(e) neutralisation of the small proprietors
{ the middle peasants
artisans
small manufacturers
part of the bourgeois intelligentsia }
i.e., with a view to preventing them going over to the Whites;
(f) determination, capability, skill, special organisation for suppressing resistance.

[1.] ΣΣ = (α) break down
(β) enthuse
(γ) neutralise.
12. Epuration...*
13. "Freedom of the press"?—"assembly"?—"the person"?

Party = the vanguard
(αα) (1) revolutionary part
(ββ) (2) linked with the *masses*.
Immediate preparation (2. 3. 4. 5. 6 (+ 13). 7. αα
8. 9. 10. ββ
Chief danger: Rights, i.e., undisplaced leaders.
3 parties (+ American Socialist Party[227]) (+ Swiss Socialist Party[228]). Immediate affiliation *impossible*.
Lefts. Their mistakes. Immediate affiliation *possible*.
Reformism in the Italian Party (maybe, + B.S.P.?)

NB
Committee on the French Party and press:
Lozovsky
+ Bukharin
+ Guilbeaux
Serrati
Deslinières
+
Sadoul

Written in July, not later than 4, 1920

First published August 1, 1935 in the journal *The Communist International* No. 22

Printed from the manuscript

* Purge.—*Ed.*

2

RE JACK TANNER'S SPEECH AT THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN[229]

Tanner's speech (Shop Stewards[230]) has made it quite clear that:

1) a place should be made *within* the Third International for *sympathisers*;
2) a *special* reservation should be made for Britain and America to the effect that in spite of our contradictions on parliamentarism we propose that

   (a) the mass movement in the form of the I.W.W. and the Shop Stewards should remain *affiliated* to the Third International; and

   (b) the question should be threshed out once more and a practical *test* made to *improve* the socialist parties which had agitated among the masses *insufficiently* and *failed* to establish ties with them.

Lenin

Written July 23, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

3

REMARKS ON THE REPORT OF A. SULTAN-ZADE CONCERNING THE PROSPECTS OF A SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN THE EAST[231]

1) Disintegration of the propertied exploiter classes
2) a large part of the population are *peasants* under *medieval exploitation*
3) *small* artisans—in industry
4) deduction: *adjust* both Soviet institutions and the Communist Party (its membership, special tasks) to the level of the *peasant* countries of the colonial East.

This is the crux of the matter. This needs' thinking about and *seeking* **concrete** answers.

Written between July 24 and 29, 1920

First published in 1963 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 41

Printed from the manuscript

4

NOTES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTIONS

The use of *medieval particularism*? Too dangerous; not Marxist.

Modern national movements should be distinguished from "movements" (so-called *movements*) of a medieval nature.

Written in French in July not later than 28, 1920

Facsimile of the MS first published in 1923 in the book: *H. Guilbeaux Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin Ein treues Bild seines Wesens*, Berlin

First published in Russian in 1963 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 41

Printed from the facsimile
Translated from the French

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PETROGRAD COMMUNE AND THE PETROGRAD SOVIET[232]

1) Badayev for M.C.S.*
2) *Badayev to be rehabilitated* (*through the Orgbureau*).
3) A number of Petrograd food workers to be transferred to Moscow.
4) Petrograd to be placed under very strict supervision.**
5) Petrograd, Moscow and all other food points to be put on an equal footing in the distribution of bread and norms of issue.[233]

Written July 16, 1920

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

* Moscow Consumers' Society.—*Ed.*

** Points 2 and 4 in the manuscript are crossed out. Point 4 was not included in the adopted decision.—*Ed.*

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS BY A. M. KRASNOSHCHOKOV, FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FAR-EASTERN REPUBLIC[234]

1) Where to convene the congress?	Anywhere.
2) Principles of elections (is the "four-pointer" permissible)?[235]	It is.
3) Principles of constitution and economic policy?	Democracy permissible with slight privileges for Communists.[236]
4) Definition of official relations between Soviet Russia and the F.-E. Republic?	Friendship.
5) In view of non-compliance with C.C. directives by certain regions and the convocation in a few days' time of a preliminary conference, it is necessary to have a new exact formulation of the foundations of the Far-Eastern Republic and a definition of its authority.	Obey the C.C., otherwise we'll sack you.

Written in July, not before 17, 1920

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A STONE-LAYING CEREMONY FOR A MONUMENT TO KARL LIEBKNECHT AND ROSA LUXEMBURG HELD IN PETROGRAD, JULY 19, 1920[237]

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, in all countries communist leaders are suffering unimaginable sacrifices. They are dying by the thousand in Finland and Hungary and other countries. But no persecutions can arrest the growth of communism.

and the heroism of fighters like Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg gives us courage and faith in the complete victory of communism. (*Comrade Lenin's speech was drowned in thunderous cheers. The "Internationale" was sung.*)

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 159
July 21, 1920

Printed from the newspaper text

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON MAXIM GORKY'S ARTICLES IN THE JOURNAL *THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL*[238]

I move the following resolution by a *collection of signatures* in the Politbureau:

The Politbureau of the C.C. considers the publication in No. 12 of *the Communist International* of Gorky's *articles* extremely inappropriate, especially the editorial, as there is not only *nothing* communist about these articles, but a good deal that is *anti*-communist in them. In future *such* articles must *on no account* be published in *the Communist International*.

*Lenin**

Written July 31, 1920

First published in 1965
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON MILITARY QUESTIONS[239]

It having been certified that there remain (with Budyonny) not < 10,000,

1) I vote for taking the 6th Cavalry Division from Budyonny for the Wrangel front;

* The draft is signed also by L. D. Trotsky, N. N. Krestinsky and M. I. Kalinin.—*Ed.*

2) for reinforcing Budyonny's Mounted Army with those 3-4 thousand sabres which the Commander-in-Chief promises the South (*urgent*);
+4) more horses to be taken from the Byelorussian peasants to reinforce Budyonny's cavalry;
5) for replacing Gittis by Comrade Frunze *immediately* (see opinion of Commander-in-Chief and Tukhachevsky).

Lenin

Written in August,
not before 20, 1920

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DECISIONS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE ORDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT[240]

The Politbureau rules that the action of Comrades Tukhachevsky and Smilga be severely censured. They had no right to issue their worse than tactless order, which undermines the policy of the Party and the Government.*

The Politbureau directs the R.M.C. of the Republic to immediately rescind the order of the R.M.C. of the Western Front and to reprimand the latter for their irregular action.**[241]

Written between August 20
and 24, 1920

First published in 1965
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

* By a note written at the top of the document Lenin instructed his secretary to have this decision telegraphed to the R.M.C. of the Western Front: "Brichkina, send this off by wire." Under the text of the decision he wrote: "Copies for Comrades Chicherin and Danishevsky."—*Ed.*

** This test was marked off by Lenin with a pencil and a note added: "Sklyansky has already been told."—*Ed.*

THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

SEPTEMBER 22-25, 1920[242]

1

SPEECH ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT SEPTEMBER 24

Comrades, I think that certain statements made during the debates and even certain speeches are worth mentioning if only because they obviously express not just overstrain, but overstrain bordering on hysteria and therefore giving a misplaced emphasis. I would not call it demagogy. It is physical overstrain to the point of hysteria. This applies mainly to the speeches by Lutovinov and Bubnov, in which there was less of demagogy than of overstrain. To some extent I think there were signs of overstrain in Medvedev's statement too. He said: "Now you have all started speaking about unhealthy symptoms, but before you used to deny it, you weren't telling the truth." I think this explanation is not quite correct, in fact it is quite incorrect. That the unhealthy symptoms we are talking about really exist—was hardly a secret. Without a doubt, the general situation was so grave that we couldn't find time till now for the Party, we had no chance to raise this question specially in the Party. Even now we raise it with difficulty, because the chance we are discussing here in our political talk—the chance of our being able to avoid a winter campaign—is extremely slender. The general situation of the Republic, as I mentioned, has improved to such an extent that we are now able to discuss things more calmly: there is no longer any question of suspending the conference the way we did several times when Kolchak and Denikin were advancing. There were Party congresses from which a number of leading workers went straight off to the front without waiting for them to end. Mind you, we seldom convene congresses, we seldom have a chance of discussing important issues at congresses—yet before we couldn't even see a congress through to the end, rarely though it was convened.

Today at any rate we can and ought to thresh things out without restricting ourselves. I should also like to say a word about Kalinin's attempts to present the case in a Marxist way. It seems to me that his arguments were a long step away from Marxism, and the correct Marxist view I think was given in the resolution of the Moscow Committee—which you have all, of course, read and which has been put out in a small pamphlet and printed in *Pravda*—and the letter of the Central Committee.

I should like to read out several lines, which I would offer to the committee (if it be decided to set one up), not in lieu of the Moscow resolution and the C.C.'s letter, but as supplementary material to them.* The resolution of the Moscow Committee I think—and all are agreed on this—deals with the question correctly. Allow me to quote those few words and dwell on them briefly. Here is the addendum: "The indescribably grave position of the Soviet Republic in the early years of its existence, extreme devastation and grave military danger, made it necessary to designate special "shock" (and therefore virtually privileged) departments and groups of workers. This was unavoidable, since the ruined country could not be saved unless resources and energies were concentrated on such departments and such groups of workers, without the strengthening of which the imperialists of the whole world would have certainly crushed us and prevented the Soviet Republic from even starting on economic construction...."

As regards the old specialists we have heard some very heated attacks here. The truth came out in Comrade Kutuzov's speech when he said that the proletariat saw no improvement of its position from Soviet Russia—if anything, it was often worse. That's true. But one must sort out the facts—for instance, that in Vienna, where there is no Soviet government, you have the same deterioration, to which you can add a moral humiliation a hundred times worse. But the rank and file cannot get this straight. Understandably, we are asked: What did we get in the course of these two years? And obviously, dissatisfaction with the old

* See pp. 212-13 of this volume.—*Ed.*

specialists is widespread. Naturally, the question whether we need specialists or not was a salient issue. We shouldn't forget, however, that without them we would not have had our army. We would have found ourselves in the same position as Hungary and the Finnish workers. That is how the matter stands. Without these specialists—I spoke about this in my political report—we would not have been able to take those elementary steps that helped us rise to a definite level. If we had failed to cope with this specialist business, we would not have had this, we would not have been able to make further progress. But now, when we have taken them in hand and harnessed them, when we know that they will not run away from us, but, on the contrary, are all running to join us, we shall now be sure that democratisation in the Party and the army will rise. I shall read further (*reads the resolution*)....

Point one (*reads*).* Here there is an addition. Comrade Tomsky said, referring to what we have often spoken about ourselves, that the rank and file should be brought to the fore, the leaders are tired, give the rank and file a chance. This could not be done at once, but it will be after another, maybe the twentieth, attempt. Failing this, Soviet Russia's cause would be hopeless. But we know that it is not hopeless, because we have new elements that are growing up. If the first attempts failed, we shall try and try again.

Point two (*reads*).* Here a rather sarcastic question was asked as to whether freedom of criticism would correspond to freedom to eat peaches.[243] I have one measure as a possible guarantee, on the basis of the proposals made by the committee. At moments when the country is in danger, when Kolchak reached the Volga and Denikin Orel, there can be no freedoms. There are other things than this to be regretted. But the military situation is bad now, too, we see how fickle the fortunes of war are. We must put this question on the order of the day. But we cannot, we must not, promise that at moments of military danger we shall not act differently. We shall have to make a tremendous

* See p. 213 of this volume.—*Ed.*

effort again and no arguing about it, we shall have to stand firm, strain every nerve. We do not renounce this at all, and until we have an Italian victory we must not renounce it. And that's my reply to the peaches.

Point three (*reads*).* Here Comrade Preobrazhensky raised a question which Zinoviev raised too: Is regulation appropriate here and what is to be understood by it? I shall leave this question open, as it will be detailed in the committee. We shall see whether regulation is to be understood as detailed points or as the setting up of special bodies.

Point four (*reads*).* The speaker here said that this question had been raised by the committee but was rejected by its majority. I believe I am putting this forward only in my own name—I believe that it should not be rejected, and if not accepted at once, at least it should first be considered. It has been pointed out here that 500 complaints have accumulated in the Orgbureau of the C.C. The Orgbureau has to distribute tens of thousands of people. Besides, there is not a single member of the Orgbureau who is not swamped with work, doing several jabs. Under these conditions one has to work with unknown quantities, and under such conditions you can only decide questions by intuition, a thing only experienced people can do, and even they often make mistakes. Taking into consideration these conditions, we want to find people with a length of Party membership of not less than fifteen years, who enjoy the Party's trust, who are unbiassed, and who would help in this business, while at the same time standing above the Orgbureau as regards independence, as they would be elected by the congress. I believe this step could be taken. To hamper the C.C.'s work or hold up the decision is impossible. There is no special provision for it, and we cannot offer it. There used to be a control commission in the German Workers' Party. How far that will be possible in our war situation—one cannot say. In any case we are in a position to take such a step, and the C.C. has taken that course.

The C.C.'s letter says: "Special Party commissions to handle relevant complaints should be organised at all

* See p. 213 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Gubernia Party Committees and made up of the most dispassionate comrades enjoying the general trust of the organisation." It speaks here of dispassionate comrades. For real militant activities—military, economic and organisational—passionate people are very often absolutely necessary, because without high passion they will not be able to work at high pressure, they will not solve the urgent problem facing the exhausted country. On the contrary, what we need here are people, who though they may not possess conspicuous administrative abilities, have a good knowledge of life. I doubt whether we shall be able to find enough of them for the whole of Russia, for all gubernias, and if the commissions which are now going to be set up and which you will set up under the Gubernia Party Committees prove to be unsuccessful, don't draw the conclusion that the whole enterprise is a failure. We may not find a sufficient number of comrades in the gubernias capable of holding out from congress to congress. If we don't find them in the gubernias, we shall find staunch comrades with a knowledge of life in the centre. I think we should not give up the idea of forming these bodies.

It may be said: Where is the guarantee that these bodies can exist? We are in a state of desperate civil war, where, generally speaking, there can be no question of any freedom of broad criticism and so forth. We have other things to think of, we must strain every effort to end the war. If the conditions of war were not what they are, the position would be different. Under the present conditions we cannot provide for a good many things; and we say straight out that in order to settle this question in a practical manner we cannot rely on the C.C., because it is swamped with work as it is. I doubt whether you will find a single C.C. member—I judge from my own experience—who doesn't feel over head and heels in debt as regards unfinished or skimped jobs. I can imagine no more effective guarantee of this plan being carried out than the creation of this commission, of a group of comrades capable of concentrating wholly on this job with the assurance that it will be entirely independent, handling affairs which no single member of the C.C., the Orgbureau, or the Politbureau is in a position to go into with any thoroughness. We may have a practical grasp of things, seeing

that we are making some progress, that we have increased our grain collections from 60 to 260 million poods—but this proved insufficient to give us a Red Army that was not overexhausted, to give us workers who did not say, "What good has the Red Army done us, we are starving", and to give us a leadership that was not utterly worn out and does not stand in need of help from the rank and file. Nevertheless, we did make that progress, and that means that even in such a mass state of extreme fatigue the scale of this fatigue is beginning to diminish and we are entering a period when we can stop discussing the crust-of-bread question and pass on to weightier problems confronting us, which we all shall most certainly tackle.

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in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 41

Printed from the shorthand record

2

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Not in lieu of, but as supplementary *material* to the C.C.'s letter and the Moscow Committee's resolution:

The indescribably grave position of the Soviet Republic in the early years of its existence, extreme devastation and grave military danger, made it necessary to designate "shock" (and therefore virtually privileged) departments and groups of workers. This was unavoidable, since the ruined country could not be saved unless resources and energies were concentrated on such departments and groups of workers, without the strengthening of which the imperialists of the whole world would have certainly crushed us and prevented the Soviet Republic from even starting on economic construction.

This circumstance, coupled with the heritage of capitalist and proprietary habits and attitudes, which are so difficult to get rid of, explain the necessity for directing

the Party's attention again and again to the struggle for implementing ...*

... the need for practical guarantees that the decisions of the Party, which is unanimous on the above-mentioned questions of principle, should not remain on paper. The conference therefore directs the Central Committee immediately to resolve, carry out and furthermore propose to the next congress of the Party that it endorse the following:

(1) the absolute obligatoriness of more frequent and wider meetings of Party members parallel with other measures for developing activity among the Party membership;

(2) literary organs to be set up, capable of carrying out a more systematic and wider criticism of the Party's mistakes and generally of criticism within the Party (discussion leaflets, etc.);

(3) precise practical rules to be drawn up on measures for eliminating the existing inequality (in the conditions of life, size of salaries, and so forth) between specialists and executives, on the one hand, and the rank and file, on the other—an inequality that violates democracy, is a source of demoralisation within the Party and lowers the prestige of Communists;

(4) it shall be found necessary to set up a Control Commission parallel with the Central Committee consisting of the most experienced, unbiassed comrades having the longest Party training and capable of carrying out strict Party control. The Control Commission elected by the congress of the Party should have the right to receive all kinds of complaints and examine them by arrangement with the Central Committee and if necessary by holding joint meetings with it or by submitting the question to the Party congress.

Lenin

24.IX.1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

* One page of the manuscript is missing.—*Ed.*

3

PROPOSALS FOR THE RESOLUTION ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT[244]

Re the composition of the Control Commission.
Adopt resolution of the C.C.:

that we nominate C.C. members to the Control Commission *only* at the desire of the Party conferences, considering it generally incorrect that these C.C. members are *not bound* by the decisions of the C.C. in their work within the Control Commission;

that C.C. members of the Control Commission do not vote in the latter when the matter specially concerns *their* departments or field of work.

As regards *transference*, add:
without detriment to those being transferred familiarising themselves with the matter in hand and without detriment to the work, i.e., only in such a manner as ensures that the management of affairs remains *always* in the hands of fully competent workers who guarantee success.

Lenin

Written September 29, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

REPORT ON THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC AT A MEETING OF ACTIVISTS OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.) OCTOBER 9, 1920

There is no need to speak of our internal position at this meeting, since all the comrades are sufficiently informed about this from our press and from work in the local areas. Food collections are much bigger than they were last year so are fuel collections, and these are the foundations of our work. We are worse off as regards supply, though. Some

of the big factories can now be started, and the temper of the workers in them cannot be as hopeless as it was when the factories were at a standstill. Considering our economic situation, we can expect a change of heart.

I find it necessary to dwell on our external position, on the news of foreign .policy. Poland is in the grip of a tremendous crisis: economically, Poland has suffered worse destruction than we have; politically, things have reached a point when even an opportunist party like the P.P.S.,[245] which has always conducted a vicious smear campaign against the Bolsheviks, protests against the brutal manner in which the government deals with the workers. In the territory which we are ceding to them under the peace treaty Poland will be able to rule only by violence. Among the worker and peasant masses of Poland there is a tremendous desire for peace. In offering Poland peace and making tremendous concessions we shall make the political parties realise that we were right, make them realise that we did not want war with Poland. By taking indemnities from us, Poland gains nothing. She will not receive the money—France will take it. Up till now this fact has been concealed in Poland, but the position is gradually being brought home to the workers, and we must see to it that it is brought home to them still more clearly. Therefore it is necessary that we now conclude peace. Besides, we shall win time and use it to strengthen our army.

On the Wrangel front the odds are in our favour, but at one time there was a grave danger to the Donets coal-field. Wrangel is frustrating our plan of a general offensive by dealing separate blows in various directions.

An, at first glance insignificant, incident is characteristic politically. Germany has allowed entry to Comrades Zinoviev and Bukharin to attend the forthcoming congress of the Independent Party in Germany. Maybe this is sheer provocation, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that Zinoviev's arrival will speed up and deepen the split that had already started among the "Independents". Part of the breakaway "Independents" and up to a million members of the Communist Party of Germany will constitute an imposing revolutionary force. What is more, it will serve as immense propaganda material for all Europe.

The crux of the matter is that the imperialist policy of France now stands revealed—of France, who has always upset our peace talks and is now putting spokes in our wheel again. We must make use of every hour of the armistice to strengthen ourselves. We must step up our supply activities, achieve quick successes on the Wrangel front, and then we can hope to tear the web of diplomatic intrigues against us.

The situation in the Far East is such that Japan is bound to withdraw, since she cannot possibly face a winter campaign. This strengthens us. At the present time there is an American multi-millionaire in Moscow, who is negotiating a concession on Kamchatka. By granting this concession we shall aggravate relations between Japan and America.

In Turkestan and the Caucasus the situation is more complicated. Recently the Turks have started to move on Armenia with the aim of seizing Batum, and afterwards, perhaps, Baku. Obviously we must show the greatest caution in this matter. So far we have no information about military complications.

However great the disagreements between France and Britain, we cannot work on them now so long as we are having defeat instead of victory. Apparently, disagreements do exist. Britain wants to trade with us and we are trying to achieve this.

As to how our army is equipped with weapons I cannot say in any detail. There was a shortage of cartridges until recently, but the difficulties now have lessened. The work is on a strong foundation, it only has to be intensified still more. The Party organisations must help in this by working in the Party cells and through the trade unions.

As to what the chances are for victory, I cannot say just now, as the general feeling is hard to define at the moment. The disappointment is too great; six weeks have already passed since we started to retreat and we are still retreating. The thing is we are late with winter supplies; this has coincided with the defeat. Without doubt, we must make use of every moment of the armistice to strengthen ourselves.

We cannot set the tone for agitation until we know something definite. This meeting is already setting the tone.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

According to Comrade Trotsky the question of Makhno has been very seriously discussed in military circles and it has been ascertained that we can expect nothing but a winning hand here. The reason is that the elements grouped around Makhno have already had experience of Wrangel's regime, and were not satisfied with what he could give them. Our agreement with Makhno is hedged around with guarantees that he will not go against us. We have the same picture here as with Denikin and Kolchak: as soon as they infringed upon the interests of the kulaks and the peasantry as a whole, the latter sided with us.

Unquestionably, the Poles, too, will use the armistice to strengthen themselves; maybe they will bring up munitions during that period, but that does not mean that we should not do the same.

So long as there is war, secret diplomacy must exist as a means of warfare. We cannot renounce it. An assessment of this diplomacy depends on a general assessment of the war.

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Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT OF A RESOLUTION ON PROLETARIAN CULTURE[246]

1. Not special ideas, but Marxism.
2. Not the *invention* of a new proletarian culture, but the *development* of the best models, traditions and results of the *existing* culture, *from the point of view* of the Marxist world outlook and the conditions of life and struggle of the proletariat in the period of its dictatorship.
3. Not apart from the People's Commissariat for Education, but as part of it, since the R.C.P; + Commissariat for Education = Σ Proletcult.
4. Proletcult's close link with and subordination to the Commissariat for Education.
5. No...*

Written October 9, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TASKS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) IN LOCALITIES INHABITED BY EASTERN PEOPLES[247]

Having discussed the reports and communications made at a meeting of the Politbureau of the Central Committee with 27 delegates from the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East,[248] on 13.X.1920, the Politbureau of the C.C. has decided:

1. To extend the work of the Council of Nationalities under the People's Commissariat for Nationalities; a report on this work to be made at the next meeting of the Council of People's Commissars.

2. To institute the strictest investigations' into abuses and acts of violence committed by the local Russian population towards the Eastern peoples (especially the Kalmyks, Buryat-Mongols and so on) and to punish the offenders.

3. To issue in the name of the supreme Soviet authority a manifesto confirming the principles of the R.S.F.S.R.'s national policy and establishing more effective control over its full application.

4. To consider it necessary to carry out autonomy, in forms appropriate to the concrete conditions, for those Eastern nationalities which do not yet possess autonomous institutions, first and foremost for the Kalmyks and Buryat-Mongols. The Commissariat for Nationalities to be charged with this task.

5. On the agrarian question, to consider it necessary to restore to the mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus the lands they were deprived of by the Great Russians, at the expense of the kulak elements of the Cossack population, and to direct the C.P.C. immediately to prepare appropriate decrees.

6. To draw up instructions for all agents of the C.C. and the central Soviet authorities sent from Moscow to regions inhabited by Eastern peoples. The weight of emphasis

in these instructions to be made on clarifying the duty of the agents to act only through the local bodies consisting of representatives of the local working population, and to consider their chief task to be to fight against the bourgeois and pseudo-communist groups among the local population while at the same time giving support to the really communist groups and elements.

Written October 13 or 14, 1920

First published in 1958
in the journal
Voprosi Istorii KPSS No. 2

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY

Principal questions after the termination of the war with Wrangel (and for the Party congress of 1921):

1) A drive against bureaucracy and red tape in Soviet institutions; checking real successes of this campaign;

2) Strengthening the socialist foundation: seven million trade union members. Equality in place of shock work.

Developing initiative on the part of seven million trade union members;

3) Links between the trade unions (A.C.C.T.U.) and the working, non-exploiting, non-profiteering peasantry. Forms and methods.

Strengthening connections between Soviet power and the peasantry.

Tractors and collective farms.

19.X.1920

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE ON THE QUESTION OF RESTORATION OF THE BALTIC FLEET[249]

The Petrograd Soviet and specifically the Petrograd Council of Defence in the person of its chairman Comrade Zinoviev to be directed to give special attention to accelerating restoration work on the Baltic Fleet and co-ordinating the activities of all institutions capable of assisting in this matter, while at the same time eliminating all red tape and establishing effective control over the speedy progress of this work.

The report of the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet and of Comrade Raskolnikov on the measures taken by them and the method of work adopted to be submitted within a fortnight by Raskolnikov and Sudakov (this may be done in writing).

Written October 23, 1920

First published in part February 23, 1938 in *Pravda* No. 53

Published in full in 1963 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 41

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE WORK AND FOOD RATIONS FOR SOVIET EMPLOYEES[250]

Direct a commission of comrades

Avanesov +
Nogin Holtzmann
Khalatov
Gindin
Fin

a) to collect information on the food supply of Soviet office employees of different departments compared with that of the workers (including unlawful supply):

b) to discuss measures for establishing greater uniformity and order in this field;

c) to submit a draft of personnel and regulations governing a commission for determining staffs of various institutions and studying work norms of Soviet office employees, their numbers, the results of their work, and so forth.

Written October 23, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[251]

1. A very comprehensive and solemn printed statement concerning the Control Commission[252] to be issued within two days. Fulfilment by Bukharin and Dzerzhinsky.

2. Ask Dzerzhinsky and Preobrazhensky to work in the Control Commission not less than three hours a day in order to make it a really effective organ of Party and proletarian conscience.

3. "Discussion Leaflet" to be started immediately and given particular attention. Bukharin and Preobrazhensky to take special charge.

4. The Control Commission be recommended, as a special task, to adopt a careful and individualised attitude, often even in the form of a downright cure, towards representatives of the so-called opposition who have suffered a psychological crisis due to failures in their administrative or Party careers. We should try to calm them, explain things to them in a comradely manner, find them (without using the command method) suitable jobs congenial to their psychological nature, give them advice on this score, the directives of the C.C.'s Orgbureau, etc.

Written October 26, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

November 1920—March 1923

ESTABLISHING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC COMMISSARIATS

1

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[253]

A preliminary conference to be summoned to consider the question of linking the activities of all the economic commissariats.

All the economic commissariats, particularly the Commissariat for Food, the Supreme Economic Council, the Commissariat for Railways and the Commissariat for Agriculture, to be directed to submit to this conference by Monday, November 1, information concerning all existing interdepartmental economic commissions and a brief description of their work.

Written October 26, 1920

2

ROUGH DRAFT PROPOSALS

1) Direct the same trio (Avanesov + Larin + Popov)[254] to make a more accurate study of all the commissions as to their composition, nature of their work, etc., to classify them and formulate conclusions as to their necessary unification and simplification, and report to us on Saturday, November 6.

2) Direct (1) the Central Production Commission
(2) the State Commission for Electrification
(3) the Utilisation Commission
(4) and the Commissariat for Agriculture

to prepare a report to our commission concerning the *nature* and *results* of their work *from the point of view of the general economic plan* of the whole R.S.F.S.R. and supply information at the *next sitting* (November 6) on the following points:

(a) by what date the report will be ready

(b) what are the main subjects' (or the chief contents) of their report as far as the general economic plan of the R.S.F.S.R. is concerned (if possible, written theses of the report to be given).

Written November 1, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE CHIEF COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION[255]

The exact wording of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee speaks of "unification of *all work of political* education in the R.S.F.S.R".[256]

While definitely recognising the need for such unification, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) establishes, first of all, that this unification can only be understood in the sense of preserving, strengthening and extending not only the independence of the Party organisation but its leading, guiding and preponderant position in regard to all fields of work without exception under the auspices of the People's Commissariat for Education.

The implementation of the C.E.C.'s resolution should be divided into two parts: a motion should be tabled immediately in the Council of People's Commissars for the unification of the institutions exactly enumerated in the resolution of the C.E.C.

This motion to be drafted not later than tomorrow, 29.X., by two members of the C.C.—Bukharin and Preobrazhensky.

The latter part of the task will cover: further unification of all parallel bodies of an educational nature in all the people's commissariats and elaboration of the organisational relations between the agitation and propaganda bodies of the R.C.P. and the educational bodies of the Commissariat for Education which are subordinate to them.

A report on this latter part, giving an accurate list of all parallel bodies in all the commissariats, is to be submitted to the Politbureau by Comrades Preobrazhensky and Bukharin.

Written October 28, 1920
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

6/XI.1920

To Members of the C.C., R.C.P.

Please consider and carry through at the plenum on 8.XI. a resolution that the report at the Congress of Soviets on 20/XII.20 on the second item of the agenda, namely, "The Basic Tasks of Economic Rehabilitation" be made by the Chairman of GOELRO (the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia), G. M. Krzhizhanovsky.[257]

We shall achieve effective implementation of the *general plan* of economic rehabilitation, which plan, without electrification, is nothing, and talk about "basic tasks" unrelated to this plan would not be serious.

For your preliminary information I enclose:

1) A copy of Krzhizhanovsky's memorandum "*Results of the Work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia*".
2) The booklet *Basis of Northern Region Electrification Project*, of which 3 copies for Trotsky, Rykov and Bukharin I can obtain tomorrow; the rest of the C.C. members should call up the switchboard, 2nd floor, if they wish to have copies.

3) Some electrification maps.

4) Proofs of the article: "Volga Area Electrification Plan" — 1 copy to Comrade Trotsky to be handed to Comrade Rykov and then to the remaining C.C. members

5) Stunkel's theses.
6) Krug's theses.
7) List of GOELRO material (over 200 works).

The sum of these documents shows clearly that we are fully able (by timely correction of the theses and plan of Krzhizhanovsky's report submitted on behalf of the C.C.) to get at the Congress of Soviets exactly what the Party and the country need, namely, a report on the "Basic Tasks of Economic Rehabilitation", which is both business-like and which sets forth the plan of work in a broad and attractive manner.

V. Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the typewritten copy

SPEECH AT AN ANNIVERSARY PLENARY MEETING OF THE SOKOLNIKI DISTRICT SOVIET HELD JOINTLY WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENTS OF MOSCOW NOVEMBER 7, 1920

Comrade Lenin said in his speech that the victory we had won was the most important of all. The international bourgeoisie had prevented us from engaging in productive labour, and all our energies in the course of three years had been engaged in war with them. Now we must win a victory on the home front. The bourgeoisie had diverted us from this work. Comrade Lenin spoke about the questions to be dealt with at the coming congress of Soviets—the

questions of transport, agriculture, and so on. He said that all enthusiasm and discipline were to be switched over to the work of peaceful construction and the participation of the rank and file in this job was to be secured.

In addition, red tape and officialism had to be combated. Here, too, we had to win a victory, and there was only one way of doing that—by developing the consciousness and activity of the working masses themselves. In conclusion Comrade Lenin expressed the conviction that we would win a victory over cold and hunger.

Brief newspaper report
published November 9, 1920
in *Pravda* No. 251

First published in full in 1957
in the journal
Voprosi Istorii KPSS No. 1

Printed from the typed copy
of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON PROLETCULT[258]

Confirming the resolution of the Politbureau, the C.C. approves in the main of the draft instructions drawn up in pursuance thereof by the Chief Committee for Political Education[259] and directs the Politbureau to edit it for a more exact expression of the main idea that the work of Proletcult in the field of scientific and political education merges with that of the People's Commissariat for Education and the Gubernia Education Departments, while in the artistic field (music, the theatre, fine arts and literature) it remains autonomous, and the leading role of the commissariat's organs, carefully screened by the R.C.P., is to be retained only for combating patently bourgeois deviations.

Written November 10, 1920

First published in 1958
in the journal
Voprosi Istorii KPSS No. 1

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[260]

Zinoviev to be instructed to draw up detailed directives to Kopp and other comrades from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and to the comrades working in Germany.

Mention to be made that we accept and highly appreciate the assistance of the rank-and-file workers in the execution of orders for Russia, including those workers who belong to the most reactionary of the trade unions.

At the same time we should expose the Legiens & Co., who want to make money out of this for themselves or their party, and give no money.

The text to be submitted to the Politbureau.

Written November 10, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CONCESSIONS[261]

A commission composed of Comrades Lenin, Milyutin, Kursky, Lezhava and Sereda to be directed within a week* to revise and edit that part of the draft on concessions which is suitable for publication abroad, namely, first, the general decision, as a matter of principle, to grant concessions; second, a brief outline of the general economic and legal conditions for concessions; third, a list of concession objects with a sufficiently clear description of the economic significance of each object.[262]

Written November 16, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

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* The text from the word "composed" to the word "week" is in the handwriting of L. A. Fotieva.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[263]

The Commissariat for Food to be directed, as a most important political and economic task, to regularly supply Baku with food to the extent of one hundred per cent of its requirements.

The food policy in Azerbaijan to be relaxed, namely, no grain at all to be taken from the peasants of Azerbaijan outside Mugan, and in Mugan itself with great care.

Frumkin to be directed immediately to report strict and punctilious execution of these directives twice a month to the Central Committee and the Council of Defence.[264]

A policy of utmost conciliation to be adopted towards Georgia, Armenia, Turkey and Persia, i.e., one directed most of all towards avoiding war.

We must not set ourselves the task of conducting any campaign against Georgia, or Armenia, or Persia.

The main task is to be that of guarding Azerbaijan and securing possession of the whole Caspian.

For this purpose the transference to Azerbaijan of no less than 7 divisions is to be speeded up in every possible way.

Propaganda, agitation, the development of the Committees of Poor Peasants,[265] and general Soviet activities in Azerbaijan to be stepped up in every way; for this purpose Comrade Stalin to be directed through the Orgbureau to dig up from everywhere he can the greatest possible number of Moslem Communists for work in Azerbaijan.

The Commissariat for Railways and the S.C.T.[266] to be directed to find means of transporting no less than 8 troop trains daily to Baku without affecting the supply of food to Russia.

Written November 27, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

RE THESES OF A REPORT AT THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON IMPROVING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN COMBATING BUREAUCRATISM[267]

Theses to be revised rather radically, on all points, in the direction of a very big reduction in the pledges, which are extremely vague, obscure and excessive

and the weight of emphasis to be placed on concrete, practical proposals realisable in a short time.

Supplementary to the theses, a draft resolution for the Eighth Congress of Soviets to be drawn up within a week.

Written November 27, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU

(ON CHICHERIN'S MOTION THAT KRASIN BE TEMPORARILY RECALLED AND KRASIN'S INVITED OPINION)

In regard to the proposal of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Krasin's Mission be temporarily recalled from Britain[268] as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the British Government, the Politbureau makes no immediate decision on this matter and invites Krasin to give his opinion urgently. There is no question of a break with Britain, but merely that of pressure, for it is clear that Churchill, Curzon & Co. are dragging their feet and deceiving us, therefore, a temporary departure may prove very useful and intensify agitation by the Councils of Action.[269]

Written November 29, 1920

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON DIRECT TAXES[270]

§ 1. 1) A commission to be instructed, within one week, to further examine the question of

first, the possibility of repealing *local* monetary taxes and collecting accurate data both for the Petrograd and Moscow gubernias and, if possible, for other gubernias;

second, the necessity of preparing and carrying out simultaneously both the repeal of monetary taxes and the changeover from the surplus-appropriation system to the tax in kind.

§ 2. 2) The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to be directed to apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee requesting the latter to collect from all local executive committees information and material on all questions mentioned in § 1 for the Congress of Soviets.

§ 3. 3) The People's Commissariat for Finance to be instructed to submit to the Council of People's Commissars a draft decision on questions listed in § 1 depending on the decision of the commission.

Written November 30, 1920

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DRAFT DECISION FOR THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE C.P.C.[271]

Considering it necessary, in view of the improvement in the internal and external position of the R.S.F.S.R., to focus the activities of the Council of Labour and Defence more than hitherto on the problems of economic development,

the C.P.C. asks the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to enact the following measures:

a) 1. To add a new member to the Council of Labour and Defence in the person of the People's Commissar for Agriculture.

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2. To direct the Council of Labour and Defence to discuss the idea of dividing its meetings into ordinary and special economic ones.*

c) 3. To extend the jurisdiction of the C.L.D. by including the following functions:

1) (a) co-ordination of all the work of the economic commissariats;

2) (b) endorsement and realisation of an integrated economic plan of the R.S.F.S.R.;

3) (c) directing the work of the economic commissariats in conformity with this plan, as well as establishing exemptions from this plan in case of need.

A subcommission to be directed to elaborate § 6 of its draft (in its final wording) and draw up an exact schedule of existing commissions which cover the work of the economic commissariats, showing their relations with and bearing on all the "special commissions" provided for in § 6.

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RE THE DRAFTING OF A DECREE ON MEASURES FOR CONSOLIDATING AND DEVELOPING PEASANT FARMING

NOTES TO THE COMMISSION MEMBERS

1) Number of representatives from the Peasant Assistance Committees to be increased....

2) The **Agriculture Commissariat's** wording of §6 to be taken as a basis in determining the participation of the Peasant Assistance Committees.

3) The rights of the Sowing Committees to issue compulsory regulations are to be restricted and such issue is to be made subject to a preliminary discussion of intended measures by conferences of Peasant Assistance Committees both at uyezd, gubernia and regional levels.

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* Point 2 in the manuscript is crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

4) The paragraph concerning the requisitioning of seeds to be thrown out, the local bodies to be set the task of devising a form of protection of seed funds.

5) Section VII concerning penalties to be thrown out....

6) The major part of the draft to be transferred to instructions.

Written December 4, 1920

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DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN[272]

The Politbureau approves the proposal of Comrade Chicherin on the question of the trade agreement with Britain and particularly emphasises:

that Krasin, without the special and explicit consent of the Central Committee, should on no account go beyond the text and letter of our Note of 29.VI on the questions of propaganda and debts[273];

all details to be dealt with at special talks on a peace treaty.

In motivation, reference to be made to their aid to Wrangel.[274]

Written December 4, 1920

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REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON CONCESSIONS AT A MEETING OF ACTIVISTS OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.) DECEMBER 6, 1920

Comrades, so many notes have been sent up that I cannot possibly answer them all. On the other hand, most of the arguments have already been refuted in the debate, so

I shall first comment on the booklet *On Concessions*.[275] I shall deal with this in greater detail. Comrade Lomov's one-and-a-half page preface deals with the subject all too briefly. Then there is the decree itself of November 23, which sets forth the idea of the interests of world economy. "The process of restoring the productive forces of Russia, and at the same time, of world economy as a whole, can be accelerated many times over by enlisting the co-operation of foreign state and municipal institutions, private enterprises, joint-stock companies, co-operative societies and workers' organisations of other countries in the extraction and processing of Russia's natural resources." Of course, this is merely of propaganda value, but it is economically indisputable. World economy has got to be restored. Capitalism acts in such and such a way, and we have our own proposals, but so far world economy remains capitalist.

We wanted to attract foreigners. Therefore the end of the decree lists these conditions:

Point One: "The concessionaire is to receive reward in the form of a share of the produce stipulated in the agreement with the right of exporting it abroad." Without this they won't go. The share is not specified. There will be a fight over this, we shall bargain and each of us will try to get the best of it. Comrades here said we shall have to keep our eyes skinned, and that's quite right.

Point Two: "In the event of special technical improvements being employed on a large scale the concessionaire will be granted trade priorities "such as the purchase of machinery, special agreements on large orders, etc.)." What do trade priorities mean? They mean we shall give this or that firm a priority agreement to the exclusion of another firm. And if the firm takes concessions, we can buy them out, we may pay them extra on the price. The main thing is that we shall be given machines. I think this consideration is clear enough, and here again we shall maintain elements of propaganda.

Point Three: "Depending on the nature and conditions of the concession prolonged concession terms will be granted to ensure full compensation for the concessionaire's risk and technical facilities invested in the concession." Here we have the duration of the concessions. It is quite an

indefinite period, and we couldn't give Kamchatka on any other conditions, and Comrades Fedotov and Skvortsov are right about this being a special concession, which we are granting for important political reasons. In granting them under such conditions we are willingly giving away what we do not need ourselves, and we shall be no worse off for the loss of it neither economically nor politically.

Point Four: "The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. guarantees that the concessionaire's property invested in the enterprise shall not be subject to nationalisation, confiscation or requisition." Haven't you forgotten that we still have the law court? This is a well-considered phrase with which we were deeply concerned. We wanted to mention it at first, then thought better of it and decided to say nothing. Speech is silver but silence is gold. There won't be confiscation or requisition, but there remains the law court, and that court is ours, and if I am not mistaken it is composed of people elected by the Soviets. Personally, I hold anything but a gloomy view about our court being a poor one. So we shall make use of it.

Point Five: "The concessionaire shall have the right to hire workers and other employees for his enterprises in the R.S.F.S.R. with due observance of the code of labour laws or a special agreement guaranteeing workers definite conditions of work that protect their lives and health." There is nothing cautious here. If the workers go on strike and that strike is a reasonable one, we shall then be able secretly to support the strikers. What threat do the capitalists use? "We'll throw you out into the street and you will starve." But here they may find themselves getting a ration from somewhere or other, it all depends on us. We can and shall give it to them. And if the strike is a silly one, unreasonable, we'll have them up on the Soviet carpet and tell them off good and proper. It speaks here of a special agreement, but it is worded very carefully. By way of exception, however, it will have to be applied to Kamchatka, as we are not in a position to set up any Soviet bodies there. This is where Vanderlip was to demand a special agreement. We haven't even started yet to apply our own laws to Kamchatka.

Point Six: "The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. guarantees the concessionaire against any unilateral change in the

terms of the concession agreement by any order or decree of the Government." We undertake not to change the terms of the agreement unilaterally, otherwise no one will sign it. This means there must be some go-betweens. Who? The neutral states are all capitalist states. Workers' organisations? We may have to invite Menshevik workers' organisations. In Western Europe they are in a majority. Maybe the Mensheviks will decide in turn—even number for the Bolsheviks, odd number for the capitalists. But if we don't come to terms, the agreement may be broken. That danger remains, but if it is a property agreement there is no harm in that. According to the basic principles of international law this is a private agreement, and you can break it, paying compensation, of course. If you broke it you've got to pay. There have been cases in the practice of international law when the ship of another country has been sunk by mistake during the war. It was taken for an enemy ship, but proved to be a neutral vessel. What is to be done? Pay up. The same here, as a last resort you buy yourself off. There still remains withdrawal from the war, though. War, of course, in the final analysis, is the ultimate argument. Of course, so long as there are capitalists in the world you must be prepared for war, once you have a socialist state. Further, we here are worrying now, but no one has taken a concession yet. When certain comrades say, "Ah well, this is the end, they'll all come crowding in now," I repeat, it's possible that no one will care to take it at all.

Section One: "Timber concessions in Western Siberia." The Northern Sea Passage is open for shipping, but we have no merchant fleet. A comrade says representatives have arrived, wishing to receive 6000 dessiatines in checkered order. The northern booklet says that if we take the extra electric stations of Petrograd we could use them for taking timber out of the northern districts and develop a production that would give us foreign currency to the value of five hundred thousand gold rubles a year. And total electrification, according to the estimate of the State Commission, will cost over a thousand million. It is a question whether we shall be able to do it. Concessions, however, will make this task easier. You don't go about offering concessions because you find life good, and when that life is a hungry

one, when you have to wangle things so as to give the people a respite, you have to argue differently.

Section Three: "Mining concessions in Siberia." Siberia is fabulously rich in copper. Copper has an extremely high value in world economy and is one of the principal metals used in electrification. We are offering a concession but do not know who will take it. America or the Germans. America will think that if she doesn't take it, Germany will.

When we carry through electrification we shall be a hundred times stronger economically. We shall then speak a different language. We shall speak about redemption. They know that the socialist society is not only quick at creating a Red Army, but can be quick in other things as well.

Further, separate concessions. Three million dessiatines in the European part of Russia alone. Of these, over 800,000 dessiatines in the former Don Cossack Region. There are no state farms or livestock. Whole stanitsas along the river Ural are ruined, splendid virgin lands are lying idle. Even if we give away three quarters of the wheat crop raised there, we shall receive one quarter. We must strengthen our transport and we can stipulate that tractors be delivered cheaper.

If we cannot put three million dessiatines of magnificent land to the plough, which will yield us 100 poods of wheat per dessiatine—then what sort of farming is it? What sort of policy is it?

The Italians are interested in this, and Italy is on the eve of a revolution. In Italy the main argument against a revolution is "We won't be able to feed ourselves, the capitalist powers won't give us any food". But the socialist power says, "I have three million dessiatines of land, I have oil and benzine". You must realise that you can agitate on various planes about capitalism being a dead thing, and that it must be strangled. We have seen a good deal. The European is living in the same conditions as the Russian did when he went towards revolution from the agonies of war. With them the war is over, they are living by robbing other peoples. All the more weight does this argument carry. They are unable to restore their economy, and we offer them to start restoring it now. We have here combined a political argument and socialist agitation, but

in a different form. You must learn to carry on agitation, otherwise your economic plans will come to nothing. And we are not only agitators, we are a Socialist Republic standing up to all the capitalist states in the world. You can't run your economy, but we can. There is a possibility of comparison here.

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record

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE REORGANISATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR EDUCATION[276]

1. The post of Assistant People's Commissar to be instituted at the Commissariat for Education with all administrative functions concentrated in his hands.

3. General reorganisation of the Commissariat for Education is considered essential, but it should be more thoroughly prepared, particularly it should be discussed at a number of meetings in connection with the Congress of Soviets. Exact distribution of functions between the central and local bodies of the Commissariat for Education to be discussed and settled there.

4. It is considered necessary in principle to merge the secondary schools (or their higher forms) with technical vocational training under two indispensable conditions: 1) that general education subjects and communism in the technical vocational schools be extended; 2) that practical steps be taken immediately to pass over to polytechnical education, for which purpose use is to be made of every available electric station and suitable factory.

The implementation of this reform is to be deferred pending the general reorganisation.

5. Comrade Litkens to be appointed Assistant People's Commissar and made to devote no less than half his work

hours to the Chief Committee for Political Education until such time as this Committee is properly staffed.

6. The Orgbureau to be directed to speed up the staffing of the Chief Committee for Political Education and see to it that it is fully provided for in this respect.[277]

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DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON PRODUCTION PROPAGANDA

1) An All-Russia Bureau of Production Propaganda shall be set up under the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions,

on which the Commissariat for Education is to be more widely represented; the latter's apparatus is not to be transferred, but brought entirely to joint subordination with the All-Russia Bureau of Production Propaganda.[278]

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ADDENDA TO DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM CONCERNING THE ORGANISATION OF A SPECIAL PRODUCTION ORGAN[279]

1) Directives to be given to *Izvestia* and *Pravda* to become more of a *production* than a political organ and to teach *all* newspapers of the R.S.F.S.R. to do the same;

2) *Bednota* to be turned into a production newspaper featuring *concrete* material and aimed at bringing the peasants and workers, agriculture and industry, closer together.

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THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

DECEMBER 22-29, 1920[280]

1
REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON CONCESSIONS DELIVERED TO THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 21

Comrades, I have received quite a few notes and shall briefly answer those to which no replies have yet been given. But first let me read to you a note of an informative nature, which I think is characteristic:

> At the Arzamas uyezd congress, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, a non-Party peasant declared the following concerning concessions, which we communicate to you as a characteristic sign: "Comrades, we are delegating you to the All-Russia Congress and declare that we, peasants, are prepared to endure hunger and cold and do our duty for another three years but don't sell Mother-Russia in the form of concessions!"

I think it would be very useful to quote this note in the official report to the Congress,* and it ought to be done because it shows a side of the question which the capitalists overlook, and in connection with which we have no need whatever to conceal the fact that there is a danger here, and we have to be on our guard against it. I have already mentioned that these reminders sharpen the attention of the workers and peasants. The fact that such reminders are coming from the midst of the illiterate peasantry is of special importance, as it stresses a task which is of excep-

* See Vol. 31 of this edition, p. 493.—*Ed.*

tional importance at the present time—I mean about your having to examine the bills tabled in the Council of People's Commissars for rendering assistance to peasant farming. We must learn to convince the non-Party peasants, win them over to our side and make them self-dependent. A note like this shows that we have every chance of achieving tremendous success here, and we shall achieve it.

Here is another note:

> Won't the capitalist concessionaires set the proletarian masses against the Soviet government? seeing that the economic crisis and chaos we are living through make it impossible for us to satisfy the needs of the workers the way the capitalists can?

I have said already that in the advanced countries, in most of them, the workers are better provided for than ours, yet the Russian workers in all the advanced countries are all eagerness to come to Soviet Russia, although they are well aware of the hardships the workers have to bear.

> Won't the Russian Ryabushinskys and the rest of the pack put in an appearance together with the English and American capitalists?

This has a bearing on the note which asks whether the concessionaires will be exterritorial. Of course not, we shall never grant them exterritoriality. This is granted only to ambassadors, and even then on definite conditions. If Ryabushinsky banks on hiding himself from the proper authorities, I think he is mistaken.

Next, comrades, I want to tell you that Comrade Lezhava reports: "Vanderlip has presented a mandate from about a dozen big syndicates. This has been verified by our special authorities here. It has already been corroborated by Krasin in London, who has checked up on the seriousness of the groups for whom Vanderlip is acting."

For the benefit of those comrades who ask why the agreement has not been published, I repeat that its publication is not to our advantage, because the capitalists, who are fighting among themselves, think there are far worse things in that agreement. The hullabaloo about it in the press bears this out. Let them go on believing it, we have no intention whatever of disillusioning them. Those who wish to familiarise themselves with this agreement have every possibility of doing so. Besides, I mentioned that the agreement

will come into force after the new president of the United States of America has been sworn in. Our Party congress will be held in February.[281] Consequently, the Party will have every opportunity of controlling and deciding things.

Please explain, if you can, for how long Kamchatka has been let (or is proposed to be let) and is there an economic, apart from a political, advantage in this for the R.S.F.S.R. and in what form?

Kamchatka has not been let and cannot be let until March. The economic gain is that according to the draft agreement they are obliged to give us a share of the mineral wealth which they will extract.

In granting concessions do we not thereby admit the durability of the capitalist states and do we not consider our thesis concerning the earliness of a world revolution to be incorrect?

Bukharin has replied to this. It is not a question of our admitting their durability; the point is that gigantic forces are driving them to the brink. Our existence and speedy release from the critical situation and famine are a gigantic force and a factor of revolution more powerful than those farthings—a mere crumb from the point of view of world economy—which they will get from us. An extra hundred or thousand machines and locomotives are of tremendous importance to us, for it will mean that transport repairs, which Trotsky planned over a period of four and a half years and reduced to three and a half, will be reduced by another year. Reducing the economic chaos and famine by a year is of colossal importance to us.

What if Japan, to prevent us letting Kamchatka to America, goes and occupies it with her troops and declares it her own?

As a matter of fact she is in possession of Kamchatka right now, and if she could she would do it, but she can't because she is afraid of America.

Where will the capitalist get his labour force? Will he bring it with him? Hardly. If he is going to employ Russian workers, not only will these be under the thumb of the capitalist, but it will upset our labour market, and this, in turn, will upset our integrated economic plan.

I can't see how our economic plan will be upset by our workers going there to work. They won't be able to go there

apart from the trade unions, apart from our economic organisations and our Party. The workers at the advanced capitalist enterprises will train our workers in the best methods of production. In submitting to capitalist conditions of work, our workers will subordinate them to our code of labour laws or to special restrictive agreements, and will not hesitate to quit if the conditions are bad, If the conditions are unfavourable, the workers will quit. Some comrades are afraid that the conditions will be good, others, that they will be bad. We shall look out, just like our workers and peasants, and take proper measures.

In granting concessions, when the concessionaires start working, will the activities of the R.C.P. in organising communist cells among those employed on the concession territory be open or only illegal?

Here is a wrong idea of concessions and concessionaires. The concessionaire is not an authority. He does not get any territory other than that to be used for economic exploitation. All government bodies and all courts of law remain only in the hands of the R.S.F.S.R.

Should unemployment in America force a revolution, won't our concessions be helping America to cope with this crisis, that is, hold up the revolution.

That argument has been disproved by Comrade Bukharin.

If the international bourgeoisie gets to know of the Soviet government's tactics in concessions, what will the position of the Soviet government be? Won't this be bad for us?

On the contrary, everyone in Europe has heard about the concessions, and the hullabaloo about it there only goes to show that the bourgeoisie is worried. They are anxious not to be late. All those capitalists who do not want to risk having dealings with Russia are now beginning to realise that they are lagging behind while the more enterprising people are getting in. And we are taking advantage of the contradictions among the capitalists.

Are there any plans or projects for concessions on large industrial enterprises in Moscow and in the centre generally? There is talk about three such concessions in Moscow, Yaroslavl and Lubertsi.

I know nothing about such concessions. There is an American factory in Lubertsi which has not been nationalised

and never was, but there is no concession there. The only concession in the centre, which the S.E.C. comrades have spoken of as being possible, is a concession to the German chemists for developing dye works and letting one factory to them. In the Council of People's Commissars all were agreed it was possible, but this talk has had no practical consequences.

Germany is so far ahead of our country that during the imperialist war even the advanced countries found themselves in difficulties when the German chemical industry stopped supplying them. To get our chemical industry going we must be prepared to pay the German chemists well. The best way to learn is to grant the Germans a concession on one of our factories. No schools or lectures will help as much as practical work at a factory, where the workers can be trained in six months and then made to build another factory like it next door. To fear that the Germans of a single factory will do something to us, considering their international situation, is ridiculous. There were no differences of opinion in the C.P.C. In point of principle it is acceptable. Unfortunately, this question has not had practical results. I must stress the fact that we talk a great deal about concessions, but so far we have not succeeded in granting a single one. We shall consider it a great success if we manage to grant at least one, and you will see the concrete conditions of the concession.

Further.

What countries can be granted concessions? Can we give a concession to Poland?

We believe they can be granted to all countries, Poland included.

Couldn't the capitalists use the concessions to avert crises at home and thus stave off a social revolution?

If the capitalists could avert crises at home, then capitalism would be everlasting. They are decidedly blind pawns in the general mechanism—the imperialist war has shown that. Every month proves that the crisis of capitalism is deepening, disintegration throughout the world is spreading farther and farther, and Russia is the only country where

an upswing towards a durable and serious improvement has started.

To sow dissension among the workers the concessionaires may place their workers in better conditions.

This won't increase dissension among our people, we have grown much stronger.

Will trade union groups be organised on the concessionaire's territory?

The concessionaires get economic exploitation, the authorities and laws remain Soviet ones.

Can you outline the conditions guaranteeing us against the danger of the Soviet state system being distorted and a capitalist set-up being introduced?

These conditions are the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. If a contracting party breaks them we have the right to cancel the agreement.

What is the gist of the tentative draft agreement with the American imperialists covering a concession on Kamchatka?

I said that the term of the concession is 50-60 years. We get a share of the produce, they the right to set up a military and naval base at the inlet near which there is an oil deposit.

You say that granting concessions to the capitalists of oppressed countries like Germany is more important than for other countries. But if the capitalists of oppressed countries use the concessions to improve their country's economic position, don't you think this will stave off the revolution in that country?

The international situation as regards revolution revolves around Soviet Russia's struggle against the rest of the world, the capitalist countries. To strengthen Soviet Russia and make her invincible—that is what matters most as far as the struggle of the oppressed and colonial countries is concerned.

What role in concessions does Turkestan cotton play?

So far there is no question of granting a concession on Turkestan cotton. This question was not discussed.

Will concessions be granted for the rehabilitation of industrial enterprises and for taking over railways?

Such exigencies are ruled out. The railways are a single integrated enterprise.

Has there been any question of concessions on slaughter-houses?

Not that I have heard of.

The protests against concessions in the local areas stand clearly revealed, not as healthy sentiments at all, but as patriotic feeling among a strong petty-bourgeois section of the countryside and among the urban middle classes.

The patriotism of a person who is prepared to go hungry for three years rather than surrender Russia to foreigners is genuine patriotism, without which we could not hold out for three years. Without this patriotism we would not have succeeded in defending the Soviet Republic, in doing away with private property and now getting as much as 300 million poods by means of the food surplus-appropriation system. This is the finest revolutionary patriotism. As for the kulaks being prepared to go hungry for three years to keep out the foreign capitalists, from whom they have something to gain—that is untrue. It is not the kulaks who are concerned, it is the non-Party middle peasant.

Isn't there a risk that in view of a possible war between America and Japan there is a likelihood of a serious attack on Soviet Russia by Japan? What shall we do then? Shall we fight off Japan in alliance with imperialist America, using her assistance as a real force?

Of course we shall—we have often said that an alliance with one imperialist state against another to consolidate the socialist republic is not objectionable in point of principle. An attack by Japan on Soviet Russia is much more difficult now than it was a year ago.

Please explain the Allies' policy towards Turkey and our relationships.

It is rather awkward, of course, to deal openly with this question in an official speech, as relations here are extremely confused. Everything here depends on the intricate play of relations in bourgeois Georgia, which is on the verge of catastrophe. The comrades who are interested in this will, I am sure, derive great benefit from the report by Comrade Meshcheryakov, Editor of *Pravda*, who has returned from Georgia, where he spent several weeks, if not

months, and has collected highly interesting material on this Menshevik realm. Georgia is on the verge of disaster. The Turkish attack was planned against us. The Allies were making a pitfall for us, but fell into it themselves, because we have received Soviet Armenia.

The men at the top in Turkey are Cadets, Octobrists, Nationalists, who are prepared to sell us to the Allies. But that is an extremely difficult thing to do, because feeling among the Turkish people against the savage oppression by the Allies is running very high, and sympathy towards Soviet Russia is growing in proportion as we help the independent Azerbaijan Republic to carry out proper liberation of the Moslem peasants, who have driven out the landowners, but are afraid to take the land, and will shortly stop being afraid; when they do take the land the Turkish landowner won't last long.

We personally have been and will be peaceful in the extreme in the Caucasus, and for the information of our Caucasian comrades, we shall be very careful to avoid anything that may involve us in war. Our peaceful policy so far has been so felicitous, that the Allies are getting nervous, have started taking decisive steps against us? but are only getting them against themselves.

What is going to happen next to Georgia?

Even the Mohammedan Allah doesn't know that, but if we show self-restraint we have something to gain without running any risk.

We are asked whether there were any other concession objects besides Kamchatka. There have been no other concessions with Vanderlip.

Regarding press hand-outs. We can't do that, first because the printing-works are busy, and secondly so as not to make this material available to people abroad, where there is a desire to torpedo this undertaking of ours. So far we haven't got a single concession, a single agreement, and we must first get an agreement before speaking about dangers. We have nothing so far and are acting semi-legally.

How will things stand with concessions and with works and buildings erected by concessionaires in the event of a) their violating the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. b) war breaking out with a country of which the concessionaire is a subject, and c) with others?

In the event of an agreement being violated the concessionaire will be prosecuted under the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. In the event of war the concession agreement is broken and the property passes into the possession of the R.S.F.S.R. in accordance with military procedure.

The Russian bourgeoisie, who have escaped abroad, will be able to take part in the exploitation of concessions with their capital. Won't this lead to the old bosses coming back under the guise of foreign capital?

If an old boss takes a ride through the northern forests of European Russia under the guise of foreign capital we have nothing to fear. You will find many an old boss in the centre of Moscow. We have a thousand times less reason to fear a situation in which we shall have a list of all visiting foreigners, than those bosses who are operating at our enterprises and who, unfortunately, have not been registered yet.

You have pointed out and underlined the political significance of concessions. That is understandable. But what the provinces are most worried about is this: with concessions there will be trade relations. What threats and dangers to the Republic does this imply in the sense of disintegration and the blowing up of the Soviet system from within (perhaps increased profiteering, etc.) and what precautions can we take against it?

I have already spoken about that. We had a tremendous threat of profiteering in the shape of Sukharevka,[282] with which we waged a constant struggle. We understand, of course, that with the abolition of Sukharevka profiteering still remains, it remains wherever there is a small proprietor, and we have tens of millions of such proprietors. That is where the real danger lies, and not in big capital, which will be hedged around on all sides with special supervisions. It should not be forgotten that we shall have an agreement which we can always cancel at the risk—our greatest danger—of having to pay damages.

What is the position with regard to tsarist debts? Will the Allies agree to any transactions unless these debts are paid?

England already agrees not to demand the debts from us, since we have proposed the draft of a trade agreement to them. Under that draft trade deals are now starting and under it we are not obliged to repay debts. I say, England agrees, but France does not. And so we tell France that in

principle we do not refuse. The exact amounts of payments will be discussed at a conference, at which we intend to say: you, too, are responsible for the losses you have caused us by your intervention. An ad hoc commission is working on this question, and an initial estimate puts the figure at ten thousand million in gold.

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record

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SPEECH TO THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DURING THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS CONCERNING HOME AND FOREIGN POLICIES DECEMBER 22

Comrades, allow me to begin by touching on certain remarks made by speakers and answering notes, at least the more important ones. From Comrade Korzinov's criticism I have picked out the idea concerning engineers and agronomists. We must push forward with the training of engineers and agronomists from among the workers and peasants. This is beyond all question, and the Soviet government is taking steps in this direction, but we cannot count on very quick results; it may not take as long as electrification, but it will take at least several years; so it is wrong of Comrade Korzinov to suggest that all other matters be set aside until we have our own agronomists. Right now we have got to find and get the best agronomists, call them to our meetings, demand from them an account and thus single out the industrious and educated men from the rest.

Comrade Korzinov has landed in the opposition for opposition's sake when he says that the decree on concessions should have been published earlier. But our work at the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence is such that we have to react at once, and the

position with us is such that, given no differences of opinion in the C.C. and C.P.C., decisions are taken at once. If the decree on concessions is wrong,[283] then we should propose its repeal, because the chief concession with Vanderlip will not become a formal agreement until next March.

At the time we published this decree our main purpose was, and still remains, to conclude a trade agreement as quickly as possible and offer the bait of concessions to the capitalists. I dealt with this political aspect of the case in my report to the R.C.P. group and heard no objections at the time. I was therefore surprised when Comrade Ignatov, bent on being opposition-minded, said that we had slipped up on Vanderlip, that we hadn't found out who he was. I read the statement by the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade that all inquiries concerning the group Vanderlip represented had been made, had been confirmed abroad and remained unrefuted. Vanderlip himself had pointed out that no agreement could be concluded until after the presidential elections, when the Republican candidate would take office, since such an agreement would have to be sanctioned by the American Government.

This is an agreement under which the American Government is to receive a naval base. Consequently, even if this Washington Vanderlip, about whom Comrade Ryazanov went into such irrelevant details—as often happens with him—even if he did represent nobody and was just a swindler and the proposed agreement was to provide for the Government of the United States receiving a naval base aimed against Japan, there could be no question of our being swindled, as the President of the United States would really be a member of the Republican Party. After Vanderlip we shall be in a position to form a conclusive opinion about this trade agreement. Ignatov's entire criticism falls to the ground; he simply did not pay attention to what was said at our meeting.

Comrade Korzinov said that in the matter of Poland we should have given warning earlier. We have here an extremely difficult situation, and there was a moment when our troops were on the move and the Central Committee had reason to believe that despite the complicated situation we could achieve much by launching an offensive.

At such a time when, after Curzon's Note of July 11,[284] we had to give a reply within a few days, how could we be expected to call Party meetings to discuss the matter? Besides, every comrade knows that if we could have passed over to an offensive war at the right moment we would have done so without hesitation. And there would never have been any opposition to it anywhere. What we did see was an opposition in reverse, when we were accused of not pursuing a sufficiently active foreign policy. That there have been mistakes here, there is no doubt, but neither is there any doubt that arguing about them would be a sheer waste of time, as we have other things to think of besides our old activities. When time has receded, when all the documents and material will have been collected, we shall be able to fully appreciate our mistake. Therefore, I see nothing, absolutely nothing, in Comrade Korzinov's speech other than a desire to seek opposition. At another time, when we are in more favourable conditions, we shall make the same use of our successes. And so long as the Party does not forbid it, we shall always assume the offensive. I don't think that the Party or any of its members will propose a reverse policy at any meeting.

In regard to Comrade Gusev's remark, I must say that I made a mistake in introducing polemics in an official report, and therefore I have already suggested that this part of the report be deleted from the official text and greetings to Soviet Armenia added—through an unforgivable oversight on my part this was omitted in the report.

Comrade Gusev is wrong in saying that I boasted of my modesty—the point is that in passing over to a more serious practical integration of the economic commissariats and the implementation of a single economic plan, the thing we had to be afraid of was project-mongering.

Comrade Gusev says that I did not criticise his booklet[285] as a whole. But that is the central point: Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Rykov are invited to drop the departments and join the Council of Defence, which, not being a departmental body, will set up a new apparatus of its own I cannot understand how, after three years of Soviet rule, one can raise and support such a question here. I am at a loss for words to express my perplexity. It is so ill-advised, it

means knocking down the department in one place and setting it up in another. It means failure to understand what our apparatus is. I don't know whether Comrade Popov has managed to print the leaflet he gave me. It contains an extract from the 1920 census results. You know that this census has been satisfactorily carried out and has yielded a mass of valuable information concerning the number of Soviet office employees in Moscow. We took a similar census before this in 1919, but now we have a fuller one. It shows that we have no less than 230,000 office employees, of which 30,000, or even more, are in the most important commissariats, and 70,000 in the Moscow Soviet.[286] Try to imagine these figures, ponder over them, and then you will say to yourself—well, if you take an influential man, one who enjoys the greatest authority and has created a certain style of work in his department, take him out of that department and put him in charge of several united departments, you can expect nothing but chaos. Is that the way to fight bureaucratism? It is simply a frivolous attitude towards the work, absolutely unrealistic. I understand what a serious thing bureaucratism is, but no provision for its abolition is made in the Party Programme. It is not a problem for a congress, it is a problem for a whole epoch, and you have a special report devoted to this question.

Does anyone really believe that by a mere stroke of the pen, by taking comrades, who have created the best form of organisation in one or another of the most important departments, and transferring them to the Council of Labour and Defence, you will be getting a new department with indefinite powers that will not perform economically unifying functions. When the practical question arose in the Council of Labour and Defence as to what was economic and what was not, not only the Foreign Trade Commissariat, but the Finance Commissariat as well claimed that it was an economic commissariat. And can you conduct any economic work without the Commissariat for Public Health. Of course, when we shall have made big progress in economic reconstruction the relation of economic commissariats to non-economic ones may become different after we have achieved important successes in the work of changing our economic foundations. At present we have nothing of

the kind. Therefore, to treat the departmental question as lightly as Gusev does—in other parts of the booklet, by the way, he repeats some of the excellent ideas expressed in his previous booklet[287]—is absolutely wrong.

I shall say nothing about Ryazanov's speech, which has been sufficiently refuted by Kamenev. I shall merely mention that both Ryazanov and Gusev, who has followed his bad example, have been talking about having heard, perhaps from me in the Council of People's Commissars, that I wanted to, one said drown myself, the other said shoot myself. If comrades are going to take a man at his angry word, uttered when he is very tired, and make him speak about it before an audience of a thousand, I don't think these people can expect their speeches to be taken seriously. (*Applause.*)

It's quite possible that we have a lot of vermicelli affairs in the Council of People's Commissars—that's true. If Maximovsky has made this an object on which to display his oppositionist bent and made a special point of it, I must say there is not and cannot be any government institution which does not have to deal with vermicelli affairs. You omitted to mention that the C.C. dealt with questions involving policy. So long as the ruling Party governs, so long as this Party has to decide all questions concerned with various appointments, you will not allow important state appointments to be made by anyone but the ruling party. When all is said and done, the question of who is to make this or that policy is of secondary importance. Hasn't the C.C. vermicelli affairs? Plenty of them. Aren't there agendas, on completing which and running through a dozen items of business, you would not only say you'd be glad to drown yourself, but something worse still. I repeat, to catch me at this sort of statement is not very difficult, but to come out here and make it an object for an oppositionist stand and speak against vermicellism is frivolous.

If, in a body which in general establishes only principles, we attempted to set up a separate body to deal with petty, practical, vermicelli affairs, we would only make things worse. Because we would be tearing generalisation away from the facts of life, and such a break would be sheer day-dreaming and frivolity. Questions in the Central Committee

cannot be divided into questions of principle and trivial questions, because in every trifle a principle may be involved. It is not a question of Ivan or Sidor. It is not a question of putting Sidor in Ivan's place or vice versa. What if they refuse? What if this Ivan and Sidor are both people's commissars—what's to be done then? The C.C. has a Secretariat, an Orgbureau, a Politbureau, finally, plenums of the Central Committee are held, and very often questions come before the Central Committee Plenum that are as trivial and tedious as anything, and some that you sit over for several hours until you feel like drowning yourself. But to draw a line between trivial questions and questions of principle is to undermine the very foundation of democratic centralism. At the same time it cannot be said that the Central Committee dumps its vermicelli onto other institutions. So far we have not been able to alter the Constitution and have been working autonomously. The fact that on some questions we have arrived at an agreement and on others there have been debates is only natural and inevitable, considering the apparatus we have. The fact that the C.C. is becoming an organ of control, and that in the general distribution of work it has fallen to Comrade Kalinin to supervise agitation and verification, and that he is required to give his personal impressions obtained during his trips and at work—this gives no grounds for shouting about the Council of People's Commissars referring all questions to the C.C and vice versa. It means introducing further confusion and turmoil while things remain essentially unchanged. The higher bodies are needed for the purpose of control and for turning down certain questions.

People here have spoken and complained about the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee being swamped with business, and though it is our highest body, it is swamped with purely vermicelli affairs. But I would ask all those present here, how many of you have read a dozen reports of our proceedings? Who has read them from beginning to end? Probably no one, because they are dull, you can't wade through them. I must say that every member of our Party and every citizen of the Republic has a right to bring any question, any circumstance, however trivial, before the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. This

question will go through the whole ladder, through the bureau, etc. till it gets to the C.E.C. Presidium, where it will be examined. And so it will be until the complete communist re-education of the working people, which will come within several decades after electrification has been finally completed. In this respect we are not afraid of changes.

I shall now deal with some of the notes. Comrade Minkin writes:

> Did Comrade Shlyapnikov inform the Council of People's Commissars of the disgraceful goings on at the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, or was this being kept for announcement at the Congress? If he did make such a statement, what has been done to eliminate them?

To answer this question I consulted Comrade Serebryakov who is better informed than I am. He was appointed by the Central Committee to the commission, the other members of which were Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky and Lezhava, set up to take steps towards improving the relations between the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, since our representatives abroad had information that these relations were anything but satisfactory. At my request Serebryakov gives the following answer to the note of delegate Minkin: "Comrade Minkin states..." (*reads*).

After this commission a subcommission was set up. It is very easy to play at opposition, since there are disgraceful goings on with us in every commissariat, and the infelicitous mention of guarantees and 30,000 employees in the commissariat's technical publishing house is very characteristic in the sense that you can always find scandalously disgraceful things here. You will find the same thing in any division of the Red Army. Nevertheless our Red Army has been winning victories all the time.

The thing is to apply in good time to the institution that has to remedy matters, and not talk about it here, where we cannot collect accurate information about what Comrade Ryazanov has heard of this or that person and has not checked it or discovered the true facts. Is that democratic centralism? It is not at all democratic, and not at all centralism, but disorder and the introduction of chaos. Complaints should be lodged with Party bodies. If that

body does not fulfil its duty it should be made to give a strict account of itself.

Among the notes that have been sent up there is the question of reducing the army. On this subject Comrade Trotsky will make a special statement, and you will decide whether this question should be dealt with today or at the next special meeting of the R.C.P. group. I can tell you that after an ad hoc commission on demobilisation headed by Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky was set up, the C.C. decided to start demobilisation, and this is now going on. It is being dealt with by the military department, and you will receive an exact report.

Is the Council of Labour and Defence regarded as an interim body called upon to unite the economic commissariats and then to be abolished, or is it the basis of a future integrated economic plan? Also, on what apparatus does the Council rely locally?

This question has not been settled, and we believe that to raise it now would be a waste of time. The order of the day now is a check-up of the organisation of the commissariats. The Council of People's Commissars has set up an organisational body which is to revise the apparatus of the People's Commissariats with a view to the tasks confronting them, and in this connection, to examine the question of staffs. To busy ourselves at the present time with setting up another apparatus in place of the Council of Labour and Defence is impossible until the question of electrification is settled. Various material on electrification will soon be handed out to you, and the Council of Labour and Defence will have to reckon with what the verification of this material and the reports will have to say. We now have an organ that we need, and, good or bad, we have in any case been working with it and coping with the tasks confronting us. We have no intention of embarking on reforms until we have practically tested how the integrated economic plan will be carried out. This is definitely a case of look before you leap.

Who is going to conclude concession contracts in the Far East we or the buffer state, in either case—why?

This, comrades, is a delicate question. Buffer state[288]—it is such an embarrassing definition when we are asked:

You or the buffer? On the one hand we have the buffer, on the other, the corresponding Party Bureau of the R.C.P. The buffer's a buffer, it's to enable us to win time and then beat the Japanese. I don't know whom Kamchatka belongs to. Actually the Japanese are in possession, and they do not relish the idea of our giving it away to the Americans. We are consulted, our directives are complied with, and nobody has protested against our negotiations with Vanderlip, no single group of Party comrades has considered the question important enough to demand its being discussed at the plenum of the Central Executive Committee and examined in the Control Commission. This is the right of every Party member, and no one has used this right. The person who has learned the facts which led to the postponement of an agreement till March will not try to make use of this right.

What is your view of the trade unions at the present moment in connection with the concessions? Is it true that you stand for the organisation of a trade union of peasants?

I must say that the Party's Programme mentions the necessity of seeking new forms of trade unions that would unite the poor sections of the peasantry.[289] This task has been posed in the Party's Programme and I have often pointed out that although we are not in a position at present to solve this problem, we must not give it up. We must not confine ourselves to the work of Vserabotzem,[290] which is so weak, and which cannot give us outstanding workers. So long as we have a levelling process taking place among the peasantry, a levelling and unification of the working peasants, the non-kulak section of the peasantry, this problem cannot be removed from the order of the day of socialist construction. To strengthen the work of the trade unions we must extend them not only to the rural proletariat, but to all the working peasantry. How this is to be done we do not know yet. We have set this task in the Party's Programme, we shall return to it many times and get it settled in a practical manner from different aspects. That is all I can say now on this question.

With the granting of concessions, the trade unions, naturally, will have important tasks imposed upon them—those

of checking, supervising, and maintaining contact with the workers who will be employed in these concessions. How this task will be handled in practice, I cannot say at the moment. To raise this question at the present time would be inadvisable, as the trade unions have more important tasks facing them.

In our fight against bureaucratism we certainly need the help of the trade unions. We must rely on them. This is basically provided for in the Party's Programme.[291] This shows what a long struggle is needed and what systematic work faces us. When we shall have data that in such-and-such a workmen's settlement the business of supervision is organised in such-and-such a way and definite results have been achieved, while in such-and-such a block, uyezd, etc. things are different—then we shall be able to weigh things, get them moving, and there will not only be talk about the "agitpotato" but we shall be in a position to check what steps have been taken in practice and on this ground apply practical measures that have already yielded results.

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FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

3

SPEECH ON ADDENDA TO THE BILL OF THE C.P.C. "ON MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP PEASANT FARMING" DELIVERED TO THE R.C.P. GROUP OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 27

Comrades, the Central Committee today has examined the decision adopted by the group concerning the deletion of the words "individual householders" from the point of the resolution on agriculture which deals with improvement and premiums. The C.C. has passed the following resolution and authorised me to defend it.[292] (*Reads*.) There, comrades, you have the text of the C.C.'s decision. Allow me now to

give the reasons why we simply could not agree with the group's decision. We had no doubts, and this was particularly stressed at the C.C. meeting, that the principal reasons the group was guided by in its decision to reject the idea of premiums for individual householders were the fear that we would give premiums to the kulak, and the desire to give priority to the village commune, the volost, the collective unit—to common labour, not the individual. With this we are in perfect agreement. We consider, however, that it would be wrong to let ourselves reject altogether the idea of premiums for individual farmers for reasons, which in themselves are quite correct, fundamentally indisputable to any Marxist and especially valuable from the point of view of the peasantry.

Allow me to give you some information from the history of the origin of this bill. I have been following its progress through the Council of People's Commissars fairly closely and must say that in the first draft, tabled by the Food Commissariat, the main accent, generally speaking, was on the hardworking farmer. The gist of Comrade Sereda's proposals was that it would be wrong to stake on the hardworking farmer, and that we should stake on the village commune, the collective body. The Council's attitude on this question—at least, mine—was that we had to weigh all the pros and cons and consult the local people. Indeed, it seemed wrong to me to reject premiums for individual farmers, but that the village commune had to be given priority—this might be all right if the local people with practical experience confirmed that it could and should be done. From this conflict of two points of view there emerged the formulation that was adopted for the bill of the Council of People's Commissars, namely, that both be retained and a ratio established between the two kinds of premiums. The details, as defined in the Council, were to be covered by instructions. In fact the decision of the Council says that the instructions are to be drawn up within a definite stated period by the Commissariat for Agriculture, co-ordinated with the Commissariat for Food and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars. As an exception to the general procedure, when instructions are endorsed by a single order of the People's Commissar concerned,

we arranged not only for verification—the participation of two People's Commissars—but specially added that the Council of People's Commissars demanded that the instructions be submitted to it for endorsement. Obviously, a great deal depended on the instructions.

After certain explanations given by comrades your decision not to give premiums to individual farms became clear to us. The Central Committee saw the point. The point is fear of unfair premiums, the giving of premiums to kulaks. Obviously, the best-run farms are those of the well-to-do peasants and the kulaks, and there are still plenty of these in the villages, on that score we haven't the slightest doubt. If we, in paying a premium for an efficient farm, did not take care to find out how that efficiency was achieved, then, naturally, the kulak would prove to have the best-run farm. And if we ignore the question as to how, at what price, economic improvement is achieved, we shall find the kulak receiving unfair privileges. If we reward him with the means of production, that is, with things that make for farm expansion, we shall find ourselves indirectly, and perhaps even not quite indirectly, boosting the kulaks, because, in rewarding an industrious farmer without considering whether or not he achieved his good results by kulak practices, and what is more, rewarding him with things like the means of production, that is to say, things he can use to strengthen his influence with, we shall, of course, be running counter to the basic provisions of not only the agrarian, but of all Soviet policy, and infringing the basic principle—that of supporting the interests of the working people against those of the kulaks. In doing so we shall really be seriously undermining the principles and foundations of all Soviet policy in general, and not only of agrarian policy.

But if we are to draw from this the conclusion that individual farmers should not be rewarded, then take the following example: we give bonuses to individual workers at factories and mills, where collective, socialised, labour has reached an incomparably higher level than in agriculture. What is to be done about the peasantry then? In a peasant country, where individual peasant labour predominates to the extent of nine-tenths, probably ninety-nine per cent, where

we have twenty million peasant farms, we want to promote these farms and we must do so come what may. We know that their efficiency can be raised only after several long years of radical technical reform. We have learned something in our three years of practical work. We know how to build up the foundations of communism in agriculture—this can be done at the cost of a tremendous technical evolution. We clearly visualise that elaborated plan with located electric stations, we know the minimum-programme, the programme for the next ten years, but in this book on electrification we also have a maximum-programme, in which gigantic work is planned for years ahead. But now we have twenty million separate farms, which are run separately and cannot be run in any other way; and if we don't encourage them to raise productivity this would be grossly wrong, it would be clearly overdoing it, it means a refusal to see facts of reality that strike the eye, facts that we have to reckon with and be guided by. It would be desirable, of course, to have these farms rise through collectivism, by whole volosts, communes, etc. But how far that is possible at present is a thing we have to reckon with. If you, working in the local areas, support progress in this direction and raise a whole commune or a whole volost—all the better; in that case give them all that is best in premium payments. But are you sure that you will manage it, that it is not sheer fantasy, which in the practical work will lead to the greatest blunders?

That is why we propose to you the last part of the C.C's resolution reworded or amended as the practical workers may deem fit for inclusion in the resolution of the Congress of Soviets, so that this question should be decided by you and you should say here: premiums and rewards for individual farmers are acceptable under three known conditions. First, premiums for rural communes first and foremost, with householders coming second and receiving what remains—to this we agree. The second point says individual farmers who have achieved economic success by kulak practices should not be rewarded; it should not be a case of—you have made a go of it economically, you are to be rewarded. If anyone has achieved economic success, but employed a kulak method in doing so, whether in the form

of a loan, the hiring of labourers, or profiteering—kulak practices sometimes dodge the law—if anyone has employed the slightest kulak method to achieve success, he is to forfeit reward of any kind. This is the second restriction which goes still further to meet your principled point of view as to combating the kulaks and supporting the Working middle peasants and poor peasants. The third restriction—what is to be issued as premiums. They may be given in the form of means of production—things like implements and machines that serve to expand and improve the farm; articles of consumption may be issued, household articles of adornment, things that make the home brighter and life more beautiful. We say: "Give the individual farmers only consumer and household goods, and, of course, medals." You have already accepted the Order of the Red Banner.[293] As to the means of production, these may be given to individual farmers, but of such a type and on such conditions that they should not be usable for kulak purposes. No machines should be given, not even to the most hardworking farmer, not even if he has achieved success without the least resort to kulak practices. Machines should not be given, because by the very nature of their employment they require collective labour, and a farmer who receives a machine will not be able to use it by himself.

These are the considerations the C.C. was guided by and on the basis of which we have asked you to reconsider your decision, exchange opinions, and alter your decision if you deem it possible so as to allow individual farmers to be rewarded on the three conditions set forth above. If we do not accept this, we may not achieve needed results, since farm improvements cannot be carried out in a tired and ruined country without a special effort, and the hardworking farmers have to be rewarded. All hard work that contains no element of kulak practices should be rewarded. That is why we think that on considering these reasons you will agree to premiums subject to the three restrictive conditions mentioned above, which we think are really necessary in the interests of our economic development.

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4
REPLY TO QUESTIONS AT THE MEETING OF THE R.C.P. GROUP OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 27

Before answering the notes it must be stated definitely whether a formal difference of opinion exists between the congress group and the Central Committee. Dealing with what the first speakers have said here: we adopted a definite decision, intending to fight the kulaks, but at that time you did not have the methods of struggle outlined by us in the three addenda. What did the comrades who opposed these addenda say here? As a matter of fact they said nothing. The peasant Red Armyman who spoke here[294] said that the kulaks exist and they are growing, but we say definitely: if they are kulaks they will receive no reward. You are being asked to make that a law. Moreover, if the middle peasant achieves betterment individually, but may use it to become a kulak, he is not to receive a premium. What argument, then, has been advanced here against our reasons? None at all. It is reiterated that the kulak should not be rewarded. But we agree to that.

I shall deal now with the notes that have been sent up. The first one:

1) What will be the criterion for a "hardworking kulak" and a "hardworking middle peasant"?

2) If we do find that criterion here and work out a plan, how are we going to carry it out locally, all the more in places where the kulaks are still playing the leading role?

3) Where is the line to be drawn between rewarding a whole collective body and an individual farmer, or are both of them to be rewarded?

For one thing, the peasants know this better than we do. If the law bans any reward for people employing kulak practices, then this is broader than the notion of the kulak. The kulak is a man who generally uses kulak methods, and one or another kulak method is used by almost every middle peasant. That means we not only forbid premiums being given to kulaks but to any middle peasant as well, if he uses kulak methods, and these methods are endless

in their variety. That crude method by which an extra horse was bought for five poods is not the only one.[295] Would a premium be given to a kulak like that? What makes you think that people in the country will close their eyes to this? As to the criterion for a hardworking kulak and a hardworking middle peasant, the local people know this perfectly well. We have no intention of writing a law about this, as it would mean writing a whole volume describing kulak practices, and people locally know this perfectly well.

Secondly, haven't we got uyezd committees of the Party, won't this thing be handled by the rural commune, by the volost land departments, by the Party cell? How can we speak about fighting the kulaks in the local areas if there are no fighting cells there? This argument is beyond me.

Thirdly, the law says that priority is given to the collective body with the individual farmer coming second. The differentiation will be made in greater detail by the Uyezd Party Committee and all the other bodies that exist locally.

The second note:

> In introducing its amendment does the C.C. regard it as a political act, an incentive to the "hardworking peasants" to improve farming and industry in general so as to make it easier in the course of time to introduce collective cultivation? Will you please answer this?

In the first place, here is proof that there is nothing specially political in this question, something that should be kept from the non-Party peasants. Therefore I consider it quite right and think it should be made a custom to invite non-Party people to our group meetings on such questions. They will have no right of decision at the group meetings, but why not consult them? Our economic practice has shown that it is advisable to go over from individual to collective labour, but having experienced what this going means, we should not try to take it in our stride, but try to understand the need for doing it, the slower the going the better.

The third note:

> I think the advocates of commune premiums ought to be asked whether they have enough ploughs and other implements to reward the commune with or not. If not, it's not worth talking about.

This argument is incorrect. Generally speaking, we have few articles usable as premiums, and so few ploughs that,

as means of production, we shall not give them to individuals, but only to whole communes. But why should we not, if we can, give a plough to a peasant who has worked hard to raise productivity? And who is to decide whether he is a kulak element or not? We must lend an ear to what people say lower down.

The next note:

Will you please, if possible, answer the following question right now on the back of this note. The Svyatiye Kresty Uyezd, Stavropol Gubernia, where I work, has had 10,000,000 poods of grain imposed on it for delivery by December 1, 1920. We have delivered 3,200,000 poods. Owing to poor fulfilment we are widely practising confiscation of property from kulak elements, and so l ask you again, will you please tell us what we are to do? Should we carry out confiscation, or do it only as a last resort, so as not to ruin the farm?

This has no relation to the law we are discussing. Go on acting the way you have been doing. In strict conformity with the decree of the Soviet government and your own communist conscience go on freely acting the way you have been doing till now.

The next note:

How is the "hardworking kulak" to be distinguished from the concept of "hardworking peasant"?

Our bill covers all that, and your asking this is an abuse of question time.

Next we are asked:

Who can define a hardworking peasant and how, say in any village? If this is to be done by elected or authorised persons in the village, it will mean an abuse of elected and authorised persons.

I have already said that we must make use of our Party. We have the Committees of Poor Peasants, and in the Ukraine we have their counterpart.

1) Please consider this. Peasant farmers were given a premium for delivering hemp in 1920. They received 100 arshins of textiles each, but the village poor haven't received an arshin yet for 1920.

2) Is the fact taken into consideration that the system of premiums to individual farmers is an obstacle in the way of setting up collective farms and partly bolsters up the shaken foundations of capitalism in agriculture?

Comrades, you know that individual peasant farms with us are the foundations of capitalism, in a manner of speaking.

There is no doubt about that, and I pointed this out in my report, when I said straight out that the "Sukharevka" we had to fear was not the one that existed on Sukharevka Square or existed secretly on any other square, but the one that sits in the breast of every individual peasant farmer.* Can we get away from this in a year or two years? We cannot. But farming has to be improved right now. You are guided by excellent communist motives, but you want to jump from this floor to that top, and we say—it won't work, act more carefully and gradually

Further:

Why don't the Food Commissariat and other institutions give food products for bonuses to workers of Group 3?

I don't know why, but I should imagine it's because we have terribly little food products available for bonus payments.

Will you kindly answer this question: What does the C.C. of the R.C.P. think of the idea of rewarding the more well-to-do peasants, i.e., those who have large allotments which they work themselves? And at the same time, how do the land-poor peasants stand who have no chance of giving a good account of themselves because they have so little land?

Why does he have a large allotment? If it is unfair, why does the commune or the Land Department let him keep it? Because others are not able to cultivate it. So why punish him, if he works hard on it? If he uses kulak methods, don't let him do it, if he holds the allotment unfairly, take it away from him and give it to others, to those who will work it, but don't blame a man for having a lot of land. In Russia there is no private property, the land is distributed by you yourselves and by the commune. In Russia there are people who have large amounts of land. If the Party committee and the Soviet bodies see this and do nothing about it, they should be given the sack, but people should not be deprived of their premiums.

Two more notes. The first:

Will this point of the bill apply to the Ukraine?

---

* See p. 247 of this volume.—*Ed.*

I think it will, and I very much regret that not a single one of the comrades working in the Ukrainian Poor Peasants' Committees has spoken here. I think the premature closing of the debate a great mistake.

The second one:

If the R.C.P. congress group rejects the resolution of the C.C. shall we be worthy members of the R.C.P. or just showing our obstinacy?

My answer to this note is a document called "Rules of the Russian Communist Party". In Clause 62 of this document we read: "On matters relating to its inner life and current work the group is autonomous."[296] This means that all members of the group have the right and are bound to vote according to their conscience and not on the instructions of the C.C. If, in voting according to your conscience, you pass a second decision against the C.C's proposal, we are obliged, on the basis of Clause 62, to summon the Central Committee, and we shall do so at once, and you will send your representatives to attend its meeting. A serious question like this were best discussed two or three times to iron out serious differences of opinion between us. That is how matters stand, that is how we have to act. You have to vote now, not because the higher Party body has issued directives, but because you have either been persuaded or you have not.

Comrades here were wrong to say that things must have been in a poor way if Lenin has been sent to speak up for them. This is not true. The Party Rules define your rights exactly. That's one thing. Secondly, it isn't true because there was not a single difference of opinion on this question in the Central Committee, which said outright: We have been carried away by our struggle against the kulaks and have forgotten measure. Let us remind people about measure.

The C.C. appointed two comrades because these two members of the C.C. had occasion, during the discussion of the bill, to take a more active part in it than others and spoke in the debates: I handled all the drafts, and so did Preobrazhensky. That's why the two of us were appointed.

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record

5

ADDENDA TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

Premiums to individual householders should,

first, come second compared with premiums to whole communes and collective bodies generally:

second, individual householders should be given premiums and generally rewarded only on the strict condition that the individual farmers have achieved their economic successes without the slightest use of kulak methods;

third, that individual householders receive premiums in the shape of medals, consumer goods, household goods, and so on; premiums in the shape of means of production are permissible for individual householders strictly on condition that only such means of production are issued as could under no circumstance be instrumental in turning the farmer into a kulak.[297]

Written December 27, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Comrade Krestinsky

I propose:

1) that Kamenev and his commission (+ Stalin)[298] be given a *formal* assignment from the Politbureau, this *to be entered in the minutes*.

2) that Chervyakov be instructed to *urgently* draft a *detailed* letter of the C.C., R.C.P. on Byelorussia and a *decree* of the C.P.C. on the same subject (confidential).[299]

Lenin

Written December 30 or 31, 1920

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE[300]

Comrade Osinsky shall be authorised, together with the entire Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, to draft and submit to the Council of People's Commissars and the next session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee regulations governing both the commissariat in general and providing specially for broader and more systematic co-operation in the work by agricultural experts.[301]

Written January 4, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON GEORGIA[302]

To Point 3

1) The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to be directed to defer a break with Georgia, to systematically collect material concerning her violations of the agreement and to press our demands for transit of supplies to Armenia.

2) The Caucasian Front to be asked for information as to the state of preparedness of our available armed forces in the event of an immediate or imminent war with Georgia, this inquiry, mentioning Georgia's growing insolence, to be drafted by a committee consisting of Comrades Trotsky, Chicherin and Stalin.

3) Directives to be issued to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Caucasian Front to be prepared for an emergency involving war with Georgia. The S.C.R.F.* to report as soon as possible to the Council

* The Supreme Council for Rail Freightage under the C.P.C.—*Ed.*

of Labour and Defence on the possibility of increasing troop transportation to and within the Caucasus.[303]

Written January 26, 1921

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

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DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE LETTER OF TSEKTRAN OFFICIALS[304]

The question being quite clear, I propose that we confine ourselves to questioning of members of the C.C. I move the following resolution:

> "That at such short notice on the eve of the congress (both the congress of Tsektran and the congress of the R.C.P.) it is absolutely impossible and inadmissible to release anyone from work. The slightest instance of any "persecution", i.e., any polemics detrimental to the work of transport, which *develop* into attacks *destructive of discipline* will be severely punished by the C.C, which asks that all such instances be brought to its notice."

31.I *Lenin*

Written January 31, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.P.C. ON OIL CONCESSIONS

1) To be approved in principle (*both* in Grozny *and* Baku) and negotiations to be started....

2) A highly competent commission to be sent to Baku and Grozny and report back at the earliest moment.

1) Gubkin

2) Tikhvinsky[305]

Written February 1, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CHECKING FULFILMENT BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS OF THE DECISIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF THE C.L.D. AND THE C.P.C.

The Narrow Council to be directed to give greater attention to checking fulfilment by the People's Commissariats of the decisions and assignments of the C.L.D. and the C.P.C. in order that questions of special importance in point of practice and principle be referred to the Large Council.[306]

Written February 16, 1921
First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

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AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DECISION OF THE C.L.D. ON COPING WITH THE FUEL CRISIS[307]

(1) *interim* commission
(2) speed up and co-ordinate work
(3) relieve all members of this commission of all non-fuel work
(4) Form of brief accounts to be established in 2 days and submitted for endorsement to the Chairman of the C.L.D. on Monday,* the information in them to answer the following questions:

α) felling out-turn
β) haulage
γ) floatage
δ) loading
ε) receipts

Written February 11, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

* Monday, February 14, 1921.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE IMPORT PLAN[308]

1) The C.P.C. does not endorse the plan of imports submitted to it, as this plan is exaggerated at least fivefold.*

2) The C.P.C. directs the Council of Labour and Defence immediately to set up a General Planning Commission with the participation of experts and charge it (or its subcommission) with cutting down this plan and revising it with an eye to the practical use to which the purchases can be put under our present economic conditions. Final approval of the plan by the C.L.D.

3) Pending revision of this plan the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade must restrict itself to one-fifth of this plan on each of the 71 main orders; to one-tenth in the case of the military department; with the indispensable condition that priority be given to the requirements of the fuel extracting and metallurgical industries. Exceptions with the permission of the C.L.D.

Written February 15, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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DRAFT OF THE MAIN POINT OF THE C.L.D. DECISION ON THE GENERAL PLANNING COMMISSION[309]

Personally to the Members of the C.L.D. from Comrade Lenin

As I am submitting to the C.L.D. tomorrow (18/II.) a draft decision concerning a General Planning Commission, I herewith present to you, for your information, a draft of the main point of this decision and a preliminary list of members

* Lenin crossed out Point 1 in the manuscript and wrote over it "Krasin's".—*Ed.*

(drawn up after consultation with Comrades Rykov and Krzhizhanovsky).* Please prepare your amendments or counter-proposals for the meeting of the C.L.D. on 18/II.

A General Planning Commission is being set up under the C.L.D. to work out an integrated state economic plan on the basis of the electrification plan approved by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and to effect general supervision of this plan's realisation.

The primary economic tasks, especially those which have to be carried out in the near future, in the course of 1921, are to be elaborated by the General Planning Commission or its subcommission in the greatest possible detail, full account being taken of prevailing economic conditions.

Written February 17, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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SPEECH AT A MEETING OF MOSCOW PARTY ACTIVISTS FEBRUARY 24, 1921[310]

I am rather surprised at the nature of today's talk. I don't think this is the right political moment for it. We have to cope with the present situation, which has deteriorated both internally and internationally. Peace with Poland has not yet been concluded, and at home we have a growth of banditism and kulak revolts. As for food and fuel, things have gone from bad to worse. Last year we consumed 15 million poods of grain during the first half-year and 8 million in the second; this year we have used 25 million poods in the first half-year and are now obliged to cut the bread rations and are not even sure we shall be able to issue them regularly. Obviously our mistake was that we wrongly distributed the grain in the first half-year; we should not have increased its consumption to 25 million poods. There are no deliveries from Siberia now, because the kulak rebels have cut off the railway. Our Siberian comrades spoke of the possibility of

* See *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 24.—*Ed.*

a kulak uprising, but it is very difficult to determine the extent of it. It is not a war, in which one can weigh the forces engaged in it. The Siberian peasantry are not yet used to privations, although they are bearing less than the peasantry of European Russia, and there is now a break off in communications with Siberia and stoppage of deliveries. Between March 1 and 10, approximately, there will be no improvement in the food situation. We have left ourselves no stocks. The thing now is to hold out, to bear the present situation with the greatest possible firmness. There is a certain improvement in deliveries from the Caucasus, but there is a likelihood that things may get worse. Apparently the uprising in Armenia will quieten down,[311] but deliveries from the Caucasus can in no way compensate us for non-deliveries from Siberia, although pressure is being put on the South-Eastern Railway to make up the losses. This is sad news, but it can't be helped.

In the banditism one feels the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Their main forces are abroad; every spring they dream of overthrowing Soviet power. Chernov wrote about this recently in a Russian newspaper abroad. The S.R.s are connected with the local instigators. This connection is to be seen in the fact that the uprisings take place in the very districts from which we take grain. The surplus-appropriation system here met with tremendous difficulties. The same system is being applied in Siberia, but there they still have stocks left over from previous years.

The deterioration has spread to fuel as well. We have no exact figures, so no clear deductions can be made, nor can we determine the causes of the fuel crisis.

We have come to the conclusion that there exists discontent of a general nature. This discontent has to be caught from below, directly through the Party apparatus if it cannot be caught quickly through the administrative apparatus.

In addition to signs of bureaucratism, there are mistakes in the plan. The plan should be checked when it is drawn up by being discussed in the press and at meetings. We are obliged to stop enterprises and thereby upset the work of factories which do have fuel. What is the matter? Clearly, besides mistakes, the plan contains material for legal proceedings. Proletarian elements should be sent into the offices.

Undoubtedly, until the floating season is over, we shall not emerge from the fuel crisis. We must make the best possible use of sleighing and floating. The fuel crisis has affected the textile mills, too, and they are unable to fulfil even a minimum programme.

There are the difficulties arising from banditism and interrupted communication with Siberia. Smirnov's[312] report says they are coping with banditism out there but cannot promise an improvement in grain deliveries. Therefore, we should not disperse our attention in talk about the general situation, but concentrate our efforts on finding a way out of this situation.

A word or two about the situation in the Moscow organisation. Some comrades try to shift the blame for the squabbling on the majority of the Moscow Committee. If the minority are dissatisfied they can appeal against the conference decision to the Central Committee. I don't know how the C.C. will decide the question, but my own opinion is that the minority is to blame. The resolution of the All-Russia Conference says that the opinion of the minority is to be reckoned with and that a discussion and debate is necessary within the Party.[313] At the gubernia conference in November elections to the Moscow Committee took place on this platform.[314] A two-room system was applied, and that is already a rift; such a state of affairs, though, can no longer be tolerated. We permitted criticism not for the sake of criticism, but to get a correct decision passed. Moscow has broken the record in discussions. In November there was talk about the Moscow Committee's wrong line, and 120 votes were given for it. During the discussion, when everyone put forward his own platform, the votes against the Moscow Committee were already less. What democracy is it, if a conference cannot elect the M.C.? After a three-month discussion the blame for the squabbling falls on those who are dissatisfied. Of course, there is the formal right to appeal against a decision, but it is the duty of revolutionaries to rally more closely at difficult moments and not abuse the formal right of appeal.

Sixty-seven Russian newspapers abroad tell us that the S.R.s and others count on setting us at odds in the spring at non-Party conferences. And at such a moment people talk

about appealing against the decision of the conference. You have got to understand what you can appeal for, when and to what extent. We gave everyone a chance to have his say, we held a discussion—and the congress will decide, but now we are at our fighting posts. We have to rally and realise that one more step in the discussion and we are no longer a Party. While not for a moment denying the right to appeal, I say that we performed our duty even without the discussion and should do our duty now. We must send Communists to all the non-Party organisations and explain this difficult situation to them.

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copy of the minutes

NOTES ON THE QUESTION OF MOBILISING RAW MATERIAL RESOURCES[315]

Meeting 26.II.1921

Raw Materials

	Previously	*1920*	*Yield was*	
Fibre				
cotton	725 thous. dessiatines	100 thous. dessiatines	12 m. poods	up to 22
flax	1.1 ”	0.3 ”	25.6 ”	
hemp	485 ”	238 ”	20 ”	
wool			6 ”	(5)

	1920	Yield 1920
fibre		
cotton	1.5 m. poods	0.9 m. poods
flax	2.9 ”	2.0 ”
hemp	4.5 ”	1.3 ”
wool	2.5 ”	1.5 ”

Hides	don’t know....	28.5 m. poods	1920-21 assessment
	there was?	8.8 (30%)	collected up to 1.II.1921

Furs 40 m. pelts — 17.5 assessment
(70% from Siberia (quota)
incl. 30% nomads) — 0.6 collected
(=4%)

Turned over to the Food Commissariat in IX.1920, but it is messing up the business, unable to organise an exchange of goods with the nomads.

	Needed:
cotton	20-24 m. poods
wool	5 " "
flax	12 " "
hemp	15 " "
	Σ=56 m. p. of all textile raw materials
	Σ=56 m. p.

our crops can cover 21% of requirements

Stocks 14.8 m. poods in warehouses (now II.1921)

*Measures (remedies)**

1) freedom of local exchange of grain for flax, etc.;
2) principle of assessment stimulating the cultivator to increase his crops;
3) prohibit textile seeds from being processed for oil (now banned);
4) procure seeds from the population to increase cultivation {they are to be guaranteed a certain part of the yield;
5) premiums for improved processing;
6) ((organisational measure))
secure widest possible co-operation of the population in improving raw material (artels, associations, etc.);
7) stimulation for small processing factories.
wool:
8) premiums to Kirghizes, at least 1 arshin of textiles per pood of wool
{1.X.1920 it was handed over to Food Commissariat, which messed it up}**

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* The English word "remedies" is used by Lenin.—*Ed.*

** Lenin's pencilled note in the margin says: "Re raw material show it to me at the C.P.C. when the question comes up."—*Ed.*

DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE ON IMPROVING THE SUPPLY OF THE WORKERS[316]

28.II.1921

The Council of Labour and Defence resolves to take immediate and urgent steps to improve the supply of the needy workers in food and other necessaries, allocate funds for this purpose to the amount of up to *ten* million *gold* rubles and send a delegation abroad to purchase the necessary articles at once—the delegation to include representatives of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

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PLAN OF A LETTER TO THE BAKU COMRADES[317]

Confidential

A Letter to the Baku Comrades

(On the question of concessions)

Preliminary plan:

1. Differences are beginning to arise on an extremely important question. (*Decision of the C.P.C.* 1921, its text.)
2. Concessions in Baku? example and crux of all differences, their "focus".

3-8. Counter-arguments (*A 1—a 6*).
+ *8 bis.*
9. Examine and refute them.
10. Economic crux of the matter.
11. Gigantic political mistake.
12. Issue of principle.
13. Suggested agreement.
14. Conclusion.

NB

{{ a I Chief phases of chief
II "arguments" (and chief
III errors) of opponent }}

{{ IV opponent's retreat
V "line of trenches behind
VI which prejudice is trying to hide" }}

3. (a I) "Will not want to work for the capitalists when others next door are working for themselves."
4. (a II) "Krasin is backed by Bogdatyan."

{ Krasin: What, in point of principle, is the gist of the disputes concerning Krasin's personality?
Simply "a bourgeois specialist"! }

Specialists' deceit
(question of the significance of specialists and the attitude towards them)

4 a. Bourgeois specialist"? Out with him!
We must learn to use the "bourgeois specialist", learn to demand of him, to understand where his strength" lies.

4 b. "Well-behaved communist musicians", who, may be a bit out of tune, but don't touch a drop.[318]

5. (a III) "Private capitalism is a predator, only state power (nationalisation) is *capable* of running things rationally."
6. (a IV) "It isn't proved that we shall not be able to obtain equipment ourselves."
(= we'll cope ourselves).
7. (a V) Won't be able to control foreigners.
8. (a VI) *Our* specialists say: "problematical" (what exactly is problematical and what must we *be able* to demand of the specialist).

8 bis (a VII) { *Baku*: catastrophe.
Grozny: Variant. }

¼ of *oil wells*, gear, etc.—the "**rear**" of advanced capitalism.

10. Economic question: is advanced capitalism superior to us now in techniques and organisation?

10 a. Can we now set ourselves the task of coping on our own, or is this Left-wing childishness, or stupid doctrinairism?

10 *b.* Should the problem necessarily be put this way: in view of the gigantic danger of Soviet power's breakdown as a result of economic chaos and backwardness, the danger of *falling behind*, *not catching up*, the problem must be put only this way—*to catch up* by means of an alliance with foreign capital?

"If we give up ¼ and keep up with two-quarters—that is the *ideal*, which we shall not attain in a year, and if we do it in five years it will be a great victory."

This is a business-like, not infantile, way of putting the question.

11. Why does Σ mean a gigantic *political* error? Wrong evaluation of perspectives, *relations of classes* both in Russia (proletariat, peasantry, bourgeoisie) and **throughout the world.**

12. Economic significance = (α) bloc with *advanced state* capitalism against *petty-bourgeois* and *backward* element = (β) bloc with one *imperialist* trust against another.

"Won't be able to control?" Who? Tsarist and bourgeois officials? We.

Give up ¼? Training ideal. Give up ¼, catch up with two-quarters (three-quarters unattainable ideal). Then in 30 years (average concession term) we shall have a peaceful victory, and in 15 probably buy it back.

Etwa:

13. § 1. Observation of up-to-date engineering rules.

§ 2. Import of breadstuff, clothes, and other consumer goods (for the workers of "their" enterprises).

§ 3. Import of machinery.

§ 4. All imports from abroad (§ 2 and § 3) give us one-quarter—one-third of the same product. (One "case" out of three falls to our lot.)

§ 5. We give a minimum (timber, for example) and for special payment.

§ 6. Our laws are compulsory.
§ 7. We give "him" 50-75% of oil.
§ 8. We feed up our workers and specialists in relays.
§ 9. We learn in earnest, and don't shout about "winning an easy victory".

14. Should we **try** to find such concessionaires on such conditions?
This is the only right way of putting the question.

Written late February 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON ELECTRIFICATION

1

Significance of Electrification

1. Modern technics.
2. Restoration of productive forces. Increasing them.
3. Centralisation—maximum.
4. Communism = Soviet power + electrification.
5. General integrated plan: focussing the people's attention and energies.
6. Raising culture (of the working people).
6. Not simple literacy.

2

Towards Electrification

1) Decree endorsing the plan....
2) Mobilisation of technical forces.
   - Assembling both electrical engineering and labour forces.
   - Utilisation of stations.
   - Agitation and propaganda.
   - Teaching of theoretical and practical knowledge about electricity.
3) Decree on GOELRO.

4) Decree on Engineering Department....
5) Decree on All-Russia Electrical Engineering Congress.
6) Petrograd. Coal from abroad via Murmansk.

Written in February 1921
First published: 1—in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*; 2—in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON AN OBLIGATORY SCIENCE MINIMUM IN THE HIGHER SCHOOLS[319]

The following should be added, on the basis of the resolution of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets,

electrification plan,
its economic foundations,
the economic geography of Russia,
significance of and conditions for the plan's implementation.

Lenin

Written March 5, 1921
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

MARCH 8-16, 1921[320]

1

OUTLINE OF A SPEECH AT A MEETING OF SUPPORTERS OF THE "PLATFORM OF TEN"[321]

1) Top strata (bureaucratic) in the Workers' Opposition....
2) bottom strata, actually linked with the rank and file, really proletarian...

3) most resolute ideological struggle against the syndicalist and Makhayev deviation (at the top) of the Workers' Opposition
4) congress decision condemning in principle the syndicalist, anarchist, Makhayev deviation of the Workers' Opposition
5) congress decision (by roll-call vote) against leaving any faction or trace of factionalism
6) threat of expulsion from the Party and transference from the C.C. to alternate membership ((by decision of C.C.+Control Commission+all alternate members + two-thirds??))[322]
7) take really proletarian elements into the C.C.
8) **penetrate**, study, investigate, explore...
9) a number of speakers (at the congress) to put this line through should be elected **immediately**
10) *elect* a bureau of the "platform of Ten"...
11) resolution on the report of the C.C. (α) on greater unity and discipline generally, and in the C.C.; (β) on less bureaucratism in the Orgbureau
12) next meeting on the day of (or day after) arrival of the Petrograders (and Zinoviev)
+13) congress decision on press *reporting* of the Party congress: tone down factional disputes, demonstrate unity.

Written in March,
not later than 9, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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2

REMARK ON THE AMENDMENT OF RAFAIL (R. B. FARBMAN) TO THE RESOLUTION ON PARTY UNITY MARCH 16[323]

I don't think this amendment ought to be adopted. When this discussion started we did not keep to the division in *Pravda*—political articles got mixed up with discussion

articles. We say here in an emphasised but not ultimatum form that these should not be dragged into the press.

First published in 1921
in the book *The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Verbatim Report* (*March 8-16, 1921*), Moscow

Printed from the text of the book, collated with the shorthand report

3

REMARK ON KISELYOV'S SPEECH CONCERNING THE RESOLUTION ON PARTY UNITY MARCH 16[324]

Comrades, I am very sorry that I used the word "machine-gun" and hereby give a solemn promise never to use such words again even figuratively, for they only scare people and afterwards you can't make out what they want. (*Applause.*) Nobody intends to shoot at anybody with a machine-gun and we are sure that neither Comrade Kiselyov nor anybody else will have cause to do so.

First published in 1933
in the book *The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) March 1921*, Moscow

Printed from the text of the book, collated with the shorthand report

4

REMARK ON MARCHENKO'S AMENDMENT TO THE RESOLUTION ON THE ANARCHIST AND SYNDICALIST DEVIATION MARCH 16[325]

To say this in the name of the congress is far too prohibitive. I move that this amendment should not be adopted, without, of course, depriving the C.C. of the right to recommend, and in case of need, to concentrate all this in C.C.

publications: but I think it would be too much to have a congress ban on the issue of such publications locally.

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Printed from the text of the book, collated with the shorthand report

MOTION AT THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) CONCERNING THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE ABOLITION OF MONETARY TAXES

I move that this be *withdrawn* (in view of the *introduction* of a tax in kind *and preparations* for a silver currency).[326]

16/III. *Lenin*

Written March 16, 1921

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DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON PURVEYANCE IN TAMBOV GUBERNIA

19/III.

To be referred to members of the **Politbureau**

In reversal of the C.C.'s decision to suspend all purveyance in Tambov Gubernia, it is herewith resolved:

to allow purveyance in Tambov Gubernia only of bulky feed and only for the needs of the military forces operating there against the local bandits.[327]

Lenin

Written March 16, 1921

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MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS

APRIL 11, 1921[328]

1

REJOINDER DURING THE DEBATE

We have just heard exceedingly diplomatic speeches on the part of Comrade Shlyapnikov and Comrade Ryazanov, who although they are now protesting very loudly, are nevertheless protesting so diplomatically that they would make highly satisfactory negotiators with concessionaires and with bourgeois states. We have come to a meeting at which I report on the disagreements that arose in the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. The same disagreements will emerge here during the discussion.... These differences were resolved by the decision of the Tenth Congress, which says: "The decree of the C.P.C. shall be approved and a concession shall be granted in Baku and Grozny." We want to discuss this question here, that is why I asked that Shlyapnikov's and Ryazanov's proposal should be rejected, and they should have their inquisitiveness, not to say curiosity, gratified by the results of the ensuing debate.

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2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON CONCESSIONS

Comrades, the question was raised here from the very outset whether our differences in regard to concessions were serious or not, and the desire was expressed, incidentally, by Comrade Shlyapnikov that more systematic information be given on each agreement. I'm afraid this is impracticable, if only for technical reasons. For instance, take the case

of peace treaties with different countries. After the general directives, which at first were drafted in great detail, it so fell out that a certain type of treaty with bourgeois countries was adopted by tacit consent, the mass of details being left to the representatives authorised to sign the treaty. And most of these details are probably unknown to the majority of the members of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee. The same here: we were dealing with a question of principle and we thought there was a danger of disagreements arising. Therefore the Party congress had to step in, and therefore the present meeting, in which only members of the Party are taking part, was a meeting called for the purpose of mutual information. We have read out to you what the Council of People's Commissars has adopted.[329]

The C.P.C.'s decision was adopted in spite of the motion by two very prominent trade unionists. What other method of information do the majority of the communist group members have if not through such a meeting as this one? It works out that there were less disagreements than we thought. This is the most desirable thing for us. No minutes of this meeting are being kept and we do not intend to have a press discussion on it. Our purpose has been achieved.

In informing you of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, we are letting you know how we have accepted the decision of the Party congress. The remaining differences of opinion do not exceed those which arise from day to day on various questions and are decided by a simple vote, without becoming a hindrance to the work. Submission to the majority in that case is not only a matter of form, but an act that does not hinder further work. I think we have achieved here a result in that no serious differences have come to light, and partial differences will be ironed out in the course of the work itself.

Comrade Ryazanov, characteristically, has tried to drag in disagreements with the Workers' Opposition. He specially chose a formulation that was intended to be a teaser, but he failed in this, and none of the speakers fell for it.

One comrade sent in a note saying that we here are concluding a second Treaty of Brest. The first one had turned out well, as to the second one, he has his doubts. This is partly true, but the present agreement, in the field of economy

is something between the Brest Treaty and an agreement with any bourgeois state. We have already signed several such agreements, including a trade agreement with Britain. The one on concessions will be something between the Brest Treaty and such agreements with bourgeois states.

Comrade Ryazanov then passed a remark, quite correctly, which I should like to underline at the very outset. He said that if we want to grant a concession it was not meant to improve the position of the workers, but to raise the productive forces. Quite right! As to improving the position of the workers, we always stand by this. I have here a draft agreement with a Swedish corporation of ball-bearing plants written by the staff of the Supreme Economic Council[330] (*reads*).

This agreement does not stipulate any improvement in the condition of the workers. True, it is so worded that the Russian Government undertakes to supply the workers with everything they need, and if it fails to do this, the capitalists have the right to bring in workers from abroad. As to the ability of the Russian Government to fulfil everything the plan calls for as far as the workers are concerned, I think that neither we, nor the Supreme Economic Council, nor the Swedes can have any illusions on this score. At any rate, in this Comrade Ryazanov is quite right, for the main thing in concessions is not improvement of the workers' condition, but the raising of the productive forces and such a transaction under which we are making great sacrifices in order to increase output. But what are these sacrifices? I have been told that I gloss over these sacrifices, play them down. Comrade Ryazanov even tried to crack a joke On this score. I did not play down the sacrifices, I only said that we may have to give the capitalists not only hundreds, but thousands of per cent in profits. That's the whole gist of it!

If, as I assumed, on the basis of calculations by our specialists, we take 30-40 per cent of the oil, for instance, for ourselves, if the capitalist, out of every 100 million poods of oil which he produces, takes 50-60 million poods for himself, and possessing the transport, sells them at a profit of perhaps 1000 per cent, or maybe more, then the position is clear. And when I tried to find out from Krasin the terms of his agreement on the basis of his preliminary talks with

the businessmen and tycoons, I asked: "Can one conceive of a type of agreement under which we stipulate a definite percentage of profit for the capitalist, say up to 80 per cent." He said: "It is not a question of the size of the profits, because these robbers now make as much as 1000 per cent, not 80."

To my mind, the sacrifices will be very heavy. We shall probably have to make great sacrifices if we are going to give concessions on ores or timber, if we are going to give away raw materials which they are so desperately in need of abroad, such as manganese ore, for example. Georgia has now become Soviet. The thing is to unite the Caucasian Republics into a single economic centre: the Georgian, Azerbaijan and Armenian Republics. Azerbaijan produces oil; it has to be transported via Batum through Georgian territory, so there will be a single economic centre.

According to one report, the Georgian Menshevik government had concluded a concession agreement, which, on the whole, is acceptable to us. Preliminarily, I could only get in touch with Georgian comrades and ascertain from a talk with Comrade Yenukidze, the Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, who is himself a Georgian, that he had been there and concluded an agreement—true, not a concession agreement—with the Menshevik Georgian government granting us without resistance one-sixth of Georgia while retaining a guarantee of inviolability.[331]

After this agreement, to the signing of which Comrade Yenukidze was a party, they preferred nevertheless, despite the guarantee of inviolability, to quit Batum for Constantinople, so that we have gained by this in two ways, positively and negatively—in that we have acquired territory, not for Russia, but for Soviet Georgia—Batum and its environs—and in that we have lost a good many Mensheviks, who have left for Constantinople.

It appears that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee is inclined to confirm the concession on unworked coal-mines, which it considers a very important one. Two representatives of foreign powers were in Georgia and did not leave at the time of the Soviet coup—the Italian and the German—a most important circumstance, as it is desirable to develop relations with these countries, by means, among others, of concessions. Italy even had a concession agreement with

Georgia, while in Germany the situation is that some German capitalists own a tremendous per cent of the Chiatura manganese mines. The thing is to transfer the right of ownership to a lease or a concession, that is, to grant on lease to the German capitalists the very mines which they owned as property. Owing to the change in the political situation in the Caucasus, the circumstances are favourable for concession relations. The important thing for us is to force windows open one after another. The agreement with Britain[332] was that of a Socialist Republic with a bourgeois state, an agreement that imposed upon us a certain burden.

To the first state with whom we concluded an agreement we gave a much greater part of our gold fund than we have given to others. But the consequences have shown that thanks to this agreement we have forced open a window of sorts. It is from this point of view that we should judge every concession.

Germany and Italy, owing to their economic position, are obliged to seek an alliance with Russia. For Russia, an alliance with Germany opens up vast economic prospects, irrespective of whether or not the German revolution will soon win a victory there. We can come to terms even with a bourgeois government in Germany, because the Versailles Treaty has made Germany's position impossible, whereas an alliance with Russia opens up entirely different possibilities. Since Italy has no fuel resources of her own, they have taken a coal-mining concession in the Caucasus at coal-fields that have never been worked before. I should not be surprised to see the Germans hankering after oil concessions, as Germany has no fuel at all.

One of the comrades here said that the Kamchatka concession would not improve the condition of the workers. That is absolutely wrong. And Comrade Ryazanov was quite wrong when he tried to crack a joke about our dealings with Vanderlip turning out to be a Vander-slip. True, we made one mistake—our telegram to Harding. But since we have had no agreements or relations with America till now, there was no mistake on our part, and we only found out that Vanderlip had been boasting of his connections with the American Administration. Now it is quite possible that in sending our representatives to Canada, where we are to buy

locomotives, that through this side door we may gain some access to the American market.

Negotiations for Kamchatka concessions are beginning to stir now, and it is quite wrong to say that these concessions will not improve the condition of the workers. If these concessions materialise, there will be an undoubted improvement in the condition of the workers, because we shall be receiving a certain deduction share, 2 per cent I believe, and when we have nothing at all, even 2 per cent is something. If we get 20,000 out of one million and use it for an exchange with the peasants, this will give us some of the products the workers need.

Further I wanted to point out that some of the remarks you have made here show that there are disagreements among the trade unionists, or rather perplexities, which are the only real danger and which we, among ourselves, perhaps by further discussions among the Party members, have to eliminate. For example, Comrade Marshev spoke about payment having to be made in cash, and not by coupons. As to the Amsterdamists[333] and whether they will attack us, we must come to an arrangement about this.

I recently re-read my pamphlet written in May 1918.* I quoted in it the Menshevik newspaper *Vperyod*[334] in which the Menshevik Isuv accused the Soviet government of agreeing to concessions, of having deals with bourgeois states. It is an old trick of the Mensheviks to blame us for granting concessions. Quite a few groups have already taken shape in this connection in Western Europe. The Communists understand that concessions are a treaty of Brest, which we are obliged to put up with because of the ruined state of a country with a predominantly peasant population. Everyone understands that regeneration of the country without a big industry is unthinkable.

The Communists of Germany understand why we have to give ground, but the Scheidemanns and the II½ International say that these concessions are proof of our complete failure, and I remember at a meeting last year I mentioned the American chauvinist Spargo,** who specialised in

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* See Vol. 27 of this edition, pp. 323-54.—*Ed.*

** See Vol. 31 of this edition, pp. 414, 430.—*Ed.*

writing a heap of books about the Bolsheviks in the vein of our Alexinsky, and in connection with the concessions he all but performed a dance of triumph. I mentioned at the time that this was an utter distortion. Yesterday international capital was out to strangle us, and today we have a number of agreements with this international capital.

We are making sacrifices in giving away to foreign capital millions' worth of valuable materials from which they can make profits running into hundreds of per cent. These are sacrifices which we are making deliberately and consciously. But at the same time we should note that while allowing them to make any profit they like, we are receiving the advantages we need ourselves, i.e., increased output, and as far as possible an improvement in the condition of our workers, both those employed at the concession enterprises and those not so employed.

Comrade Shlyapnikov said here that it would be a good thing to grant a concession to Russian workers. The idea is absurd. We would then have to guarantee fuel, etc., a thing which we can't guarantee even to our most essential enterprises. We are bad off for fuel. The idea of a concession agreement with Russian workers, generally speaking, is permissible in principle, but such a solution of the problem for our big industry is not serious, since we cannot guarantee them anything, whereas foreign concessionaires can bring in supplies from abroad. That is what distinguishes the agreement with foreign capitalists. They have the world market, we have no secure economic base and would have to spend ten years creating it. This is what we must soberly take into account. All our people engaged in this problem have proved this situation.

We know that the electrification plan is the most economical one. We cannot lease our big factories to the Russian workers. We must stake here on small industry, develop it and not rail at our tax-in-kind measures the way Comrade Ryazanov does, or the author of that pamphlet which says that we are putting through anarcho-syndicalist laws.

As regards the development of small industry, we must take several steps, as we can get something out of it right now without state guarantees, and since we cannot guarantee

even our most essential factories, we must do everything we can to develop small industry, which will give us a certain amount of produce which the peasants need.

On the question of cash or coupons I would say this: it would be something to fear if the capitalists had the power, but we have nothing to fear, since all the factories and enterprises are in our hands, and we haven't leased a tenth part of them to the capitalists. I repeat, we have nothing to fear from coupons, as the capitalists will be obliged to stock the goods we tell them to, not just salted fish, as was mentioned here, but such-and-such products. Since we are taking the norm of a foreign worker, we know that under this norm he gets even more and better products than the Russian worker does.

Comrade Shlyapnikov here said: "We have seen concessions." Both Comrade Shlyapnikov and many practical workers make this mistake. I have heard people say: "Your idea of concessions is schematic. The capitalist has always tricked the most experienced Russian lawyers." To be sure he did, when state power was in the capitalist's hands and he was all-powerful. What was that state power? A committee for the affairs of the propertied master class—that's what it was. A committee for the affairs of the landowners and capitalists—that was what the capitalist government was. But if we, having in our hands most of the factories, mills and railways, with our Party standing at the head—with communist cells below and Communists on top—if we do not hold our own in such conditions, then we might as well commit suicide. And that is panic!

We are not that bad though, I think, to allow ourselves to be tricked, and if we have already concluded several agreements in which the governments in France and Britain had the services of first-class bourgeois diplomats, and if even under these conditions we have not once been tricked, then why should we panic at the idea of being tricked by coupons? Let me remind you of the treaty of Brest. In what way was this treaty difficult? What were the difficulties of defence? When I was asked whether I had any hopes of our being able to fool the Germans, I was obliged, in my official capacity, to say that I did not. But now the treaty of Brest is past history.

I don't know whether the pamphlet Comrade Kamenev was preparing has come out (it deals there with Ludendorf), but I do know that Ludendorf has written a brilliant volume of memoirs in which ten pages are devoted to the Brest negotiations. When Kamenev and I read that chapter we said: "This is the best justification of the Brest Treaty." He tells how Trotsky and the others had driven them into a corner during the talks, how they were outwitted, and so on. We decided there and then that these pages had to be translated and published with a short preface by Comrade Kamenev, and the fact that this hasn't been done yet is a specimen of Soviet ineptitude. Or take a fact like this. We know that Comrade Joffe, our Ambassador to the German Government, was expelled from Germany on the eve of the revolution there. After this, don't try to guess who is going to trick whom. Don't let us lay down how many days will pass between the conclusion of the first concession agreement and the first big European revolution. That is why, on the question of agreements, I maintain that the comrades are absolutely wrong. There's nothing to worry about.

The agreements will say what goods they are to have and at what price. We can agree to any coupons or ration books. If they break the agreement we have the right to cancel it immediately. The agreement is a civil contract. I haven't gone into the question of what arbitration there is to be and who is to settle disputes, but I shall run through the initial draft of the agreement with the Swedish corporation. It says here: "Differences are settled...."

People here have brought academicians into play, and these will try to bring the lawyers into play. I remember Bebel saying that lawyers were the most reactionary and at the same time bourgeois, people. Of course, we can mend this somehow, but there is nothing at all to worry about. If the concessionaires were to lay down this condition we could accept it. Once the agreement stipulates precisely that there are to be such-and-such goods and payment on the ration book is to be made in such-and-such a way, we can agree to this, and the Socialist Republic has nothing to fear from coupons or ration books. It was further stated that Point 9 was bad because we would be drawing away from the international T.U.C.[335] Lozovsky threatened that the

Amsterdam people would slam us, but they will slam us all the same on all other points, and end up, as always, with slamming themselves.

You remember how the Mensheviks intended slamming us for having made the slightest concessions to the capitalists. When we wanted to overthrow capitalism, they said we would overthrow it only for a few days, but when we have overthrown it for a few years, they are trying to set another trap for us. They are trying to lure the enemy into a spot where he is sure to be beaten.

First they called us utopians, then invited us to jump from the fifth floor. We know that we have many small businesses. Petty proprietors are our opponents. The petty-bourgeois element is our most dangerous enemy. Brokers and leaseholders are the lesser enemy. Bureaucracy, too, and bureaucratic abuses are our enemy.

In regard to the point Comrade Lozovsky spoke about, I will say this—listen to it carefully. It says: "The trade unions shall not have the right to demand application of Russian pay rates or of Russian rules of employment to that category of workers." It speaks here of the Russian trade unions, and I am told about the international unions. Naturally, when the capitalists see the Russian terms, they say they are communist terms, ridiculous terms, and that the Russian trade unions have no right to demand Russian terms of employment, which are likely to be pretty stiff and far-fetched, but they do have a full right to apply international trade union agreements. This is good enough. Nothing is mentioned here about strikes, about their being banned. The thing is to be able not to mention everything before its time.

As to improving the condition of the Russian worker, Comrade Marshev and Tartakovsky have made an attack here, saying you won't be able to cope with the workers, you won't be able to make them work, because if you provide for one-fifth of them, the other four-fifths won't want to work under worse conditions. Do you mean to say we are dealing with workers who are so foolish, uncultivated and undisciplined? If so, then the only thing is to panic and commit suicide. If a hundred workers are underfed and we tell them that we can feed twenty, and no more, do you mean to say they

will refuse it? So far we have not come up against anything like it. We have managed somehow to feed workers in certain branches of industry, but not all of them, yet the workers didn't all run away from these enterprises, whereas they all did from other enterprises. Can the Russian worker be so spoilt by the mistakes of Soviet power that he cannot figure out that it were better to feed at least 20 people than to make the whole hundred go hungry? There is a good deal here that ought not to be spoken about before its time. Why can't it be arranged for people to take turns in working for the capitalists? The workers would work six months, get working clothes, then give others a chance to feed up. Of course, we shall have to break down prejudices here.

When concessionaires come here, we must restrain our trade unions from making excessive demands. You know that the usual term of an agreement is a short one. In Europe there are no long-term agreements. The usual term is six months. In this way the workers will be able to feed up, get boots and clothes, then quit and make way for others.

Is it so impossible to arrange things so that a man works six months, feeds up, gets American boots and clothes, and makes room for the next man? It will be difficult, of course. It will demand a higher degree of organisation and discipline than we have, but it is not impossible. If we have contrived to keep a hold on the workers against an invasion of foreign capital during three years of terrible famine, do you mean to say we won't manage it this time? I realise only too well what difficulties confront us here. And therefore I say that concessions do not signify the advent of peace among the classes. Concessions are a continuation of the war among the classes.

If previously the war could be expressed in—I'll get you through starvation and you'll get nothing, now I say that I want to give the workers a pair of boots each, but I want them to work six months. And we'll fight for all the workers getting boots. We do not reject strikes, all this remains in our hands, if only we are reasonable and try to put the accent now on what we can do to attract the capitalists.

People here have talked about what a great danger this is, saying that the capitalist will come and trick us, but I assert that there is no danger, and that in the interests of raising

productivity it is desirable that he should come, because he has a splendidly organised base and splendidly equipped factories, where we can order the necessary parts without having to buy them on the open market, where there is only junk. The first-class factories have their orders booked up for several years ahead. Even if we paid in gold we would not receive anything, whereas a member of the syndicate would get everything he wanted. We wouldn't mind paying him extra if it meant improving the condition of at least a small section of the workers and peasants, because each extra product will go to the peasants in exchange for grain, and that will create stable relations between the working class and the peasantry.

Winding up, I would ask the trade unionists to waive questions of principle and disputes. All these are idle disputes, sheer scholasticism. They should be dropped. Attention should be wholly directed to those practical terms of concession agreements from which we, if we are sensible, may derive benefit for ourselves. The trade unionists and Party leaders should display here their inventiveness and practical knowledge of conditions, of which we cannot and shall not speak about in the press, because the Russian press is being followed by the capitalists, just as during the Brest talks we did not speak about the instructions that had been given to Comrade Joffe. We shall give practical attention to the practical methods by which we can derive benefit in the way of improving the condition of the workers and peasants. Every such improvement is of tremendous importance to us. This is where the trade unionists should give their attention. All trace of friction and prejudice should be eliminated. It is a difficult business. So far no one has been willing to conclude a concession agreement with us. They are all expecting us to present impracticable demands.

We, therefore, on our part must use every effort to conclude several such agreements. Of course, we shall make a number of mistakes. It is a new business. So far no socialist republic has ever granted concessions to capitalists. But we want the trade unionists to help us. There is vast scope here for interpretations and pressure, including strikes, which remain in our hands.

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APPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN TRADE ORDERS

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.P.C.[336]

The State Planning Commission shall be directed to revise both the applications for orders to the amount of 38.9 million gold rubles and the remaining applications for foreign trade orders to allow only for such purchases in 1921-22 as are necessary for purveyance of essential minimum quantities of food and fuel based on the assumption of a worst possible harvest and worst possible conditions of fuel supply.

Written April 12, 1921

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DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE ON "ALGEMBA"[337]

Set up a Commission of

2 State Planning Commission	2 oilmen or fuel men
2 Chief Oil Board	2 railway engineers

ascertain within 2 weeks

1) what part of the Algemba railway work has been carried out;
2) ditto the pipeline;
3) in particular, present provision of rails and pipes, and the prospects of full provision;
4) the possibility of supplying fresh water to the Emba oilfields and other conditions for ensuring work on the Emba;
5) check comparative cost of delivering oil to the centre via Rakushi-Astrakhan by waterway and via Saratov by railway and pipeline;
6) possible and probable terminal date of Algemba railway and pipeline construction;
7) possibility, probability and cost of acquiring and delivering extra river and sea craft for the transportation of oil from the Emba via Rakushi-Astrakhan;
8) go into other aspects of the problem.

Written April 15, 1921

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ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. "ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINES"[338]

No agricultural machines or implements are to be supplied unless there is effective control on the part of the Food Commissariat over receipt by the state of farm produce in exchange for such machines and implements.

The forms of control are to be laid down in special instructions by arrangement between the Agriculture and Food Commissariats.

The Agriculture and Food Commissariats shall be directed to consider and submit a plan for the most simple and economical way of delivering machines to the consumers.*

Written April 26, 1921

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DRAFT OF A LETTER OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE ATTITUDE TO NON-PARTY WORKERS[339]

A circular to the gubernia committees to be drawn up and forwarded in cipher.

Contents:

the experience of non-Party conferences has fully proved that they have become an arena for agitation** by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries;

therefore, the greatest care must be taken in organising non-Party conferences, by no means allowing them to be held without thorough preparation at each respective factory. The Gubernia Party Committees should be answerable to the Party for the success of every non-Party conference.

Every Gubernia Party Committee is obliged to report to the Central Committee not only on the success of every non-

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* The last paragraph is in the handwriting of L. A. Fotieva, apparently from Lenin's dictation.—*Ed.*

** The word "organisation" is written above the word "agitation" in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

Party conference, but prior to every non-Party conference, setting forth its conditions and preparedness.

At the same time it is absolutely essential to step up the work of preserving and developing the Communists' ties with the non-Party masses. For this purpose it is necessary:

not only to regularly hold general meetings for the rank-and-file workers and peasants, but arrange business reports to the rank-and-file workers and peasants by officials holding key posts. Such reports must be delivered at least once a month in order that the non-Party rank-and-file be given an opportunity to criticise the Soviet institutions and their work. Reports are to be made not only by Communists, but by all officials in top posts, first and foremost those of the food supply and economic council agencies.

Every gubernia committee is obliged to forward exact information monthly to the Central Committee about the number and progress of all these reports, as well as the demands made by the non-Party people at these meetings.

The C.C. will draw up more detailed instructions on the organisation of such reports, on the measures for checking ties with the masses, on the progress of the work for improving their condition, and on fighting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are acting under the guise of non-Party people, etc.[340]

Written in April
not later than 27, 1921

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SPEECH AT A MEETING OF COMMUNISTS AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) OF THE KREMLIN AREA MAY 9, 1921

(FROM THE MINUTES)

Comrade Lenin said in his report: You, as members of the Party, should read my pamphlet concerning the tax in kind,* which has now come off the press and is being dis-

* See Vol. 32 of this edition, pp. 329-65.—*Ed.*

tributed. He also pointed out that every member of the Party should not lose touch with the non-Party masses, as often happens with us. Each one of us, therefore, must keep closer to the non-Party masses and carry on more propaganda. In conclusion he said: All of you, who often read the newspapers and attend meetings and lectures, being more developed people, should do more work among the peasants, carry on agitation among them to explain the significance of the tax in kind. We shall then achieve better results.

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Printed from the typed copy
of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[341]

The C.C. of the R.C.P., having discussed Svanidze's telegram to Stalin No. 2031 dated 8/V, finds that the Georgian comrades are making a serious political mistake in not using an iron hand to put a stop to requisitions, confiscations, thefts and evictions of foreigners from their houses.

The C.C. resolves:

1) that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee be directed to issue immediately an order strictly prohibiting all such acts on pain of arrest and prosecution. A copy of this order to be sent to the C.C.

2) that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee immediately institute investigations, first, into the breaking open of the Germano-Caucasian Bank's store-room and the removal of documents. The guilty parties to be arrested. Documents to be returned. Secondly, ditto in regard to the goods of the Italo-Caucasian Bank. Thirdly, ditto in regard to the carload of textiles seized at Kutaisi.

3) that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, by arrangement with the Command of the Caucasian Front, shall without delay appoint two of the most energetic, firm and resourceful Communists, one from the Caucasian Front, and one from the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, to supervise the cessation of requisitions, thefts, confiscations and evictions in regard to foreigners. The names of the

appointed men to be communicated to us by telegraph. The C.C. places responsibility for the enforcement of these measures upon Makharadze and Gittis. The two controllers to be invested with special powers and the right to make arrests for the slightest infringements. The two controllers to wire brief reports here weekly.

The C.C. draws the attention of the Georgian comrades to the extremely important significance of Georgia and her trade with Italy and Germany for the whole R.S.F.S.R., especially in view of America's, and France's attempts to obstruct all our trade relations with foreign countries. Negligence in carrying out these directives will be regarded by the C.C. as a crime against Soviet power.

Written May 9, or 10, 1921

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Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON MEASURES FOR ACHIEVING CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION[342]

1) The C.C. of the Metalworkers' Union and the All-Russia C.C.T.U. shall be directed to pay special attention to the swift implementation of the plan for closing down the greatest possible number of inefficient establishments with the aim of concentrating production in a small number of better organised enterprises.

The report on the exact plan, the closing down schedule
and actual fulfilment to be made by Shlyapnikov and Medvedev or their deputies
by Kubyako
and by Holtzmann
by Andreyev
to the Council of Labour and Defence
within a month

2) Shlyapnikov shall be directed to elaborate more concretely the most important and quickly realisable proposals of his draft.

Written May 11, 1921

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PLAN OF A SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE FOURTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS[343]

PLAN OF A SPEECH 18/V

1. Rules of the R.C.P.: the Party and groups.
2. C.C. resolution—and its **CONCEALMENT**.
3. Ryazanov and his role. (Ryazanov's anti-Party resolution.)...
4. Tomsky and his mistake or crime?... ((*Composition of the Four.*))
5. The workers' extremely nervy, wrought up state, discontent:

{{ Burden on the workers.
1920 surplus appropriation—on the peasants.
Alleviation for the peasants: still depends on the harvest.
For the workers: profound resentment at the spectacle of "lighters",[344] theft, and so on. }}

Written May 18, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM ON CLAUSE 13 OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME[345]

Yaroslavsky and Bukharin to be instructed to revise the draft so as not to over-emphasise the question of combating religion (by throwing out § 7, for instance[346]) and to allow,

under definite restrictive conditions, for religious, but honest and devoted Communists, to remain in the Party.

The fight against religion to be put on a more scientific footing.

(§ 10—out.[347])

Get it endorsed by the Politbureau.

Start the campaign after thorough preparation.

Written May 18, 1921

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

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DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.L.D. ON LOCAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCES, ON REPORTING AND ON COMPLYING WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE C.L.D.

1. Gubernia and uyezd economic conferences are to be organised everywhere, standing in the same relation to the gubernia and uyezd executive committees as the Council of Labour and Defence to the Council of People's Commissars. Managing offices or secretariats must be common ones. All the work is to be done through the apparatus of the corresponding departments without creating a special apparatus.

2. The village committees and village Soviets are to act as the local, lower bodies of the C.L.D., and in factory and urban communities these functions are to be assumed by the district Soviets, the district economic conferences and the factory committees. The volost executive committees either completely fulfil the duties of volost economic conference or assign several of their members to form the volost economic conferences.

3. It is the obligatory duty of all the economic conferences to report on their activities to the C.L.D., such activities to be guided by the Instructions of the C.L.D. which are to be issued simultaneously with this decision.

The reports of the regional economic conferences, the gubernia and uyezd economic conferences must be printed in

no less than 100 copies (three of which are to be sent to the C.L.D., one copy each to the leading public libraries, the Rumyantsev Library in Moscow and the Public Library in Petrograd, and one copy to the library of each gubernia economic conference). Reports are to be submitted every two months (three or four months?).

The reports of the lower bodies are to be in writing, one copy for the gubernia economic conference and one for the C.L.D.; to be submitted not less than twice a year.

The report to the C.L.D. must be accompanied by systematically selected issues of the local newspapers or cuttings from them devoted to questions of local economic life, as well as all publications on these questions.

The co-operation of the local staff of the Central Statistical Board and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be enlisted in compiling these reports.

Each local body is obliged immediately to appoint and communicate to the C.L.D. the names of persons responsible for the timely drawing up of the report in each of its sub-sections and general collation, as well as the names of their deputies.

4. The newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*[348] is to become the organ of the C.L.D.

Following the same Instructions, it should regularly publish summaries of local economic work alongside its present coverage. The recording and study of practical experience in all economic work in the R.S.F.S.R. and the working out of general guidelines on the basis of such experience must become the chief task of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*.

The editors must select and widen the circle of local correspondents, both Party and non-Party, for the purpose of information on the work done in the local areas.

It shall be the duty of the Central Distributing Agency to accurately deliver two copies of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* to every gubernia, uyezd and volost library, and the duty of these libraries to keep newspaper files of both copies available for the whole population.

Written May 19-20, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[349]

Decision of the C.C. (Politbureau) 22/V. 1921 on the Decisions of the R.C.P. Group of the Trade Union Congress

The Central Committee approves Comrade Chubar's theses (adopted by the group's bureau) and rejects Comrade Holtzmann's theses in view of the fact that the former far more correctly take into consideration the actual state of our resources, capabilities and means, which entail the necessity of planning slower realisation of our immediate aims.

The latter theses, those of Comrade Holtzmann, on the other hand, verge on the fantastic in many ways, they are out of touch with reality, which is also one of the failings of Comrade Larin, who zealously supports these theses.

The only important similarity between the two theses, practically speaking, is the idea expressed in the note to Point 3 of Chubar's theses* and in Point 6** of Holtzmann's theses, both comrades confirming here, and not disputing, the decision passed by the C.C. on 10.V.1921 in connection with the motion of Comrade Larin and the A.C.C.T.U.***

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* Here is the text of this note:

"The whole above-mentioned system of distribution should be effected by way of experiment at several enterprises, where, in place of individual rationing issues, a system of collective supply should be introduced for the personnel of the enterprises on condition that they raise labour productivity."

** Here is the text of this 6th Point:

"Pending the formation of a wages food fund, the afore-mentioned system of distribution should be applied by way of experiment at several enterprises, where, in place of individual rationing issues a system of collective supply should be introduced for the workers of the enterprises, on condition that they raise labour productivity."

*** Here is the text of this decision.[350]

"The motion of Comrade Larin and the A.C.C.T.U. in the part relating to tariff policy shall be rejected and its authors asked to go into the matter more thoroughly with an eye, especially, to the possibility of ensuring a minimum of real food supply to a minimum of workers. Upon revision, the motion is to be submitted to the C.P.C. for the purpose of introducing at several enterprises, by way of experiment and in place of individual rationing issues, a system of collective supply on condition that labour productivity is raised."

The R.C.P. group of the Trade Union Congress, despite the recommendations of the Party's C.C., approved Holtzmann's theses by *567* votes, and rejected Chubar's theses, which collected *317* votes.

Not wishing to revoke the decision of the group on all issue that does not immediately affect the Government's policy—since this policy is predetermined by the decision of the C.C. of 10.V.1921, which, as pointed out above, is approved, and not disputed, by both Comrade Holtzmann and Comrade Chubar—the Central Committee in this particular case waives its right of interference in the proceedings and decisions of the congress.

The C.C. confines itself to prescribing that this decision be announced at the group meeting and that the attention of the delegates be strongly drawn to the obligation they are taking upon themselves in adopting Holtzmann's resolution, namely, to display not only extraordinary heroism, but a degree of persistence, firmness and pertinacity in the fight against all habits, customs and conditions of life among the working-class masses far in excess of what is customary even in revolutionary times. It is now incumbent on the trade unions, on the strength of the decision they have made, to achieve an unusually rapid reduction in the number of enterprises and workers by concentrating the latter in a minimum of the best and biggest enterprises.

Written between May 17 and 22, 1921

Published in part in August 1921 in *Izvestia C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* No. 32

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS CONCERNING THE WORK PLAN OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[351]

It should be made the chief task of the All-Russia Conference[352] in May to prepare and collect material on the question of

1) closer contact between the Party organisations and the non-Party masses.

2) drawing non-Party employees into the work more widely and systematically.
3) reorganising the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for combating bureaucratism and red tape, improving the condition of the workers and peasants and drawing non-Party people into Soviet work.

On all these points the conference should not only collect and study all the material of practical experience, but work out practical proposals for the C.C.

Reports at the plenary meeting

(α) 2-3 reports on the present (actual) **work** of the *C.C.* and the Party

(β) ditto on the plan of its reorganisation to meet the new tasks.

Written May 24, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the manuscript

PLAN OF A SPEECH AT THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS[353]

1. Passing examination from 3rd to 4th course.
2. From Narodnaya Volya[354] to Social-Democracy in Russia, from the Second to the Third International in the world.
3. 1st course: 1886-1903. ((17))
4. 2nd course: 1903-1917. ((14))
5. 3rd course: 1917-1921. ((4))
6. 4th course: 1921-? (1931)
7. "Not" our last and decisive fight. But ... near (years).
8. Victory on world scale difficult (bis. ter), but a dead certainty.
9. For capitalism, the capitalists—checkmate.
10. *Alias**: the cause of communism in Russia will be *secure*.
11. Discord-arising from *private* property. Labour united against property.
12. India "does not count" Doch!
13. "Treaty of Versailles"?[355]

* —Otherwise—*Ed.*

13. *bis*. International trade.
14. Difficulties *on economic front*.
15. Proletariat becoming declassed? Yes! Inferences? Ideology of small property owners.
16. Large-scale production and machines—proletariat's material and *psychological* base. Inde* *declassing*.
17. Politics plus, economics minus.
18. Self-discipline, partyism.
19. Economic front.
    Passing examinations: grain, fuel. 1917
    (tax in kind) 1918
    1919
    1920
    versus 1921
20. We already have economic experience—go on building systematically, steadily, firmly.
21. Work discipline, higher labour productivity, work organisation, increased output, relentless fight against slipshod work and red tape.
22. By this sign shall ye conquer.

Written in May
not later than 25, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE MINER COMRADES OF THE PETROVSKOYE INDUSTRIAL GROUP[356]

Comrade Mezhlauk has told me of the great success in your work during April 1921: 294 poods per hewer compared with 291 poods in 1914. I congratulate our miner comrades on this outstanding success and send my best greetings. At this rate we shall overcome all difficulties and electrify the Donbas and Krivoi-Rog district, and that means everything.

With communist greetings,
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written May 25, 1921

First published July 1921
in the journal
Vestnik Rabochego Pravlenia
No. 9-10

Printed from the journal text

* —Hence.—*Ed.*

TENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[357]

MAY 26-28, 1921

1

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE AGENDA
MAY 26

Comrades, as I have already told you, we intended to have a single item on the agenda in keeping with the nature of this conference, namely, the question of economic policy. The remaining reports were to be informational, so I did not prepare a political report, but I think this report will have to be dealt with on an economic plane. Therefore, in order to satisfy everybody, I suggest that supplementary questions be put to me after the report and I shall answer them in my summing-up speech. I repeat, I have made no preparations whatever on this question and cannot imagine what I would speak about if I had to apart from the question of the tax in kind.

First published in 1963
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 43

Printed from the shorthand
record

2

SPEECHES DURING THE DEBATE OF THE MOTION ON QUESTIONS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
MAY 28

1

I believe this amendment[358] should not be adopted, because an explanation to the amendment would then be needed. Naturally, if there is a revolution in Europe we shall change our policy. Civil war, which such a revolution always involves, as you know, may in fact render our position even worse. Of course, this will be a short time, it is difficult, of course, to determine how long civil war in other republics

will last, but when it is over and won we shall change our policy in the sense that we may say: we shall take nothing in taxes, and only by commodity exchange. This has to be made clear to the peasants, otherwise they will think: what's this, back again to the surplus-appropriation system? I believe, therefore, that it were best not to add anything of this kind. Long years of revolution in Europe and civil war will lead to commodity exchange without any tax at all. This is stated in the resolution before the congress, which says that the tax will gradually be reduced. This is the point the forthcoming victorious revolution applies to, a revolution which a long period of years turns into a short one.

FROM MARX TO MAO

2[359]

Comrades, it was on this point that we had discussions in the committee, where opinion was divided. At first Milyutin objected to the words "anarchic commodity exchange to be combated" on the grounds that this would be construed as cavilling, and freedom to trade would, in practice, be done away with. When this point was drawn up in its present wording, which said: "anarchic commodity exchange to be combated" since "it eludes all control and supervision"—by this is meant the black-market "bagmen", and you know that illicit trade is punishable in all countries where there is freedom of trading, even in capitalist countries; on this point we see eye to eye. In what way is it to be combated? By having commodity exchange concentrated chiefly in the hands of the co-operatives, to which is added: "without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations." When this wording was adopted the committee unanimously agreed that there was still a danger of free market operations being restricted. This is a delicate matter, of course. We don't want this ruling to restrict freedom to trade, but we can't do without measures against illicit trade, specifically against black-market bagmen and transport dislocation. The committee thought of using a milder word than "combating", but then agreed that the target was only anarchic commodity exchange that eluded all control on the part of the state, all the more as this was qualified by the added

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

proviso, saying "without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations". With this addition, the word "combat" is not too strong an expression. The amendment which the comrade here proposes is risky in the sense that we shall be defeating our own purpose. He throws out the words "without, however, any restrictions on regular market operations...."

3[360]

I think the state farms are not equal to this, they are still very weak. Let them improve a bit for another year, and the next year we shall see whether we can expand their initiative or not.

4

The last amendment is an unhappy one,[361] since the question of material resources is covered by Point 5: "Revision of (certain sections of) production programmes for large-scale industry with a view to increasing the manufacture of consumer goods and peasant household articles.

"Extension of the independence and initiative of each large establishment in the matter of disposing of financial and material resources. A precise decision to that effect to be submitted for approval to the Council of People's Commissars." Therefore, we shall not repeat this here. The question of material distribution, that of food, for example, is stated here quite definitely, without prejudice, of course, to the centre, because without it being gathered in the centre there can be no question of industry. As regards the first remark of the comrade who said that it was inappropriate just now to consider the question of the local economic conferences settled, as these might upset things—I have not heard anything about this. On the contrary, there have been demands to introduce economic conferences everywhere, acting as commissions of the C.P.C. Every member of the C.P.C., every representative of the C.L.D. has the right of appeal to the C.P.C. Because we select the members of the C.L.D. from among the members of the C.P.C. itself, and locally, too, there are to be no special staffs, no special

bodies, but the same offices and departments. The gubernia economic conference is a perfectly suitable form, which does not hamper, but facilitates the conference. As the Instructions say: "with leeway in modifying the main type, that is, the executive committees may assume all the functions and duties of the economic conferences..." (*reads*), so that there is no ruling prescribing an absolutely hard-and-fast and single course of action. Besides, the resolution proposed by the commission says: "Adopt in principle." The commission[362] is meeting and functioning, its Chairman Osinsky tells us they have reviewed quite a number of points and already submitted them in writing. The work is of a difficult nature, and it will require another special commission. The fear that we shall be tying our hands by declaring that it is adopted in principle is therefore groundless.

5[363]

We have no objection; judging by the subject, however, it does not belong here, but to Point 6.[364] I propose that it be adopted in principle and placed under Point 6.

6[365]

These are mere details. The question should be raised at the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and discussed with the people concerned. There can be no objection in principle, but generally speaking this is a detail.

7[366]

This fear is excessive here.

Point 7 of our resolution says "The need to maintain and enforce the apparatus for the full and expeditious collection of the tax in kind". Naturally, the tax in kind will be collected not by persuasion, it can be collected only by compulsion, and that is what the apparatus stands for. Today several important decisions and instructions have

been signed, all aimed at preserving and strengthening the apparatus, from which we shall demand expeditious collection of the tax in kind. It is pointed out that we say here: "commodity exchange is brought to the fore" and the fear is expressed that the peasants will understand this as priority for commodity exchange. In that case we shall write: "holds a specially important place."

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record

TO ALL PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND TO THE CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD

Copies to the Chairman and Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

28/V.1921

All People's Commissars should have printed copies of the circulated and distributed

Draft Instructions
of the Council of Labour and Defence

signed by Lenin and Chairman of the C.L.D Commission Comrade Obolensky (Osinsky).

This draft is being submitted to the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee opening at 1 p.m. on 30.V.1921.

All People's Commissars are obliged

1) by 2 p.m. on Monday, 30.V.1921, to prepare in writing their amendments and addenda to the Instructions on all points, items and subitems directly or indirectly applying to the commissariats concerned;

2) within the same time, to prepare an initial draft of items (for reporting) and subitems (i.e., a more detailed list of particular questions to be reported on). This applies to all commissariats without exception, to each People's Commissar on behalf of his respective commissariat.

This is obligatory, since the All-Russia C.E.C. will endorse the general Instructions consisting of two parts: a) the Instructions of the C.L.D. covering reports by the economic commissariats; b) Instructions of the C.P.C. covering reports of all commissariats without exception, economic and non-economic.

The latter reports will form the last, additional "Fifth Group of Questions". Each commissariat is to draw up a list of the most important questions for the report on the same pattern as the questions Nos. 1 to 27 contained in the draft Instructions of the C.L.D.

The reports will be printed in about 1000 copies by each Gubernia Executive Committee and each Uyezd Executive Committee (the technical possibilities of printing no less than 1 sheet a month by each uyezd have been ascertained by me and arranged with the Paper Industry Board. Printing and presentation of reports are planned for from 6 to 4 times a year, to be finally decided upon by the All-Russia C.E.C. simultaneously with the endorsement of these Instructions.

Each People's Commissar is obliged, by the above date (by 2 p.m. on 30.V.1921), to submit in writing, in 3-5 copies a short list of the most important questions to be included in the report of the respective commissariat.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

To be communicated immediately, in writing or by telephone, with the commissar's signature of receipt, and in his absence, with that of his deputy, reporter or Board member.

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Printed from the manuscript

BRIEF MONTHLY EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS

1. Current reports, which are to be practised in all departments, institutions, central boards, enterprises (including non-state enterprises), are to be submitted at least once a month.

2. These reports must be forwarded regularly and in good time to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, the *State Planning Commission* and the *Central Statistical Board* (apart from the higher administrative bodies, whose demands are to be met in any case).
3. Brief extracts from the reports (volume of output; number of workers; number of enterprises and similar essential information) are to be forwarded to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, the *Central Statistical Board* and the *State Planning Commission* (one copy to each).
4. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* is to publish them immediately.
5. An analysis of these reports by essential industries is to be made by members of the editorial board of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (each member handling one industry), and by the S.P.C. and the C.S.B. (according to §6 at present).
6. Periodical summarised reviews to be published by *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* at periods to be fixed by the editors, but not less than twice a year.
7. Simple diagrams to be made up monthly by the *C.S.B.*, the form to be worked out within a week. These diagrams according to the approved forms to be made up within a week of the forms' approval.

Written late May or early June 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON A CHECK-UP AND PURGE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) MEMBERSHIP[367]

The chief group responsible for registration should be made up of old Party members (not less than 5-7 years in the Party), necessarily workers.

All members of the R.C.P. who are in any way dubious, unreliable, or who have failed to prove their stability, should be removed from the Party, with the right of re-admission upon further verification and test.

1) People who joined from other parties after X.1917; 2) members from among officials and functionaries who had

held office under the old governments; 3) people who had held posts involving any privileges; 4) state employees—these categories should all be subject to a thorough check-up, and workers, both Party and non-Party, who have had contact with the given member of the R.C.P. at his work, should be questioned.

Recommending members should be required to give an accurate written testimonial and should have among them several workers with a length of Party membership of 5-7 years.

Formalities should be reduced to a minimum in the case of real workers, actually working at their factory, and in the case of peasants engaged on their allotments, such people should not be troubled with reregistration.

Written in June,
not later than 21, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

JUNE 22-JULY 12, 1921[368]

1

LETTER TO O. W. KUUSINEN AND REMARKS ON THE DRAFT "THESES ON THE ORGANISATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES, ON THE METHODS AND CONTENT OF THEIR WORK"

To Comrade *Kuusinen*

Urgent.

Address: from Finnish comrades
or at the Comintern.

10/VI.

Comrade Kuusinen,

I have read your article (3 chapters) and the theses with great pleasure.

I enclose my remarks in connection with the theses.

I advise you to immediately find a *German* comrade (a real German) to *improve* the German text (of the article and the theses). Perhaps this comrade, on your behalf, would read your article *as a report* at the Third Congress (it would be much more convenient for the German delegates to hear a *German*.[369]

My advice is—cross out the end (of the theses).

Re propaganda and agitation—much greater detail—especially on the press, but also on verbal propaganda.

I think you should definitely *take upon yourself* the report at *this* congress I shall write to Zinoviev about this today.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Theses

(Thesis 6 or) §6, 2nd par., last sentence should read:

"... will inevitably inherit this tendency to a certain extent from ... environment...."

And the next sentence should read:

"... the Communist Party *should overcome* this tendency by systematic and persistent organisational work and *repeated* improvements and corrections...."

(Thesis 7 or) §7:

It should be stated at greater length that this is exactly what is lacking in most of the legal parties of the West. There is no *everyday* work (*revolutionary* work) by *every* member of the Party.

This is the chief drawback.

To change this is the most difficult job of all.

But this is the most important.

§10.

This needs amplifying.

More details.

Examples.

The role of the newspaper.

"Our" newspaper compared with the *usual* capitalist newspaper.

Work for "our" newspaper.

Example: Russian newspapers of 1912-13.

The fight against the bourgeois papers. Exposure of their venality, their lies, etc.

Distribution of leaflets.

Home agitation.

Sunday outings, etc.

Far more details.

§11—far more details here too.

§13. Presenting reports and *discussion* of reports in the "cells".

Reports on hostile and *especially on petty-bourgeois* organisations (the Labour Party, the Socialist parties, etc.).

Greater detail about duties *among the mass* of the unorganised proletariat and of the proletariat organised in the yellow trade unions (including the II and II½ Internationals) *and the non-proletarian* sections of the *working people.*

§§26 and 27.

This is irrelevant.

This is not an "organisational question".

This subject had better be dealt with in a special article for the *Communist International*, say: "Organisational Questions in Revolutionary Periods" and so forth.

Or: "On the Question of Mounting Revolution and Our Corresponding Tasks" (on the basis of Russian and Finnish experience).

Written June 10, 1921

First published in 1958 in the journal *Problemi Mira i Sotsializma* No. 3

Printed from the manuscript
Translated from the German

2

LETTER TO O. W. KUUSINEN AND W. KOENEN[370]

To Comrades Kuusinen and Koenen

9/VII.1921

Dear Comrades,

I read your draft theses on the organisational question with great pleasure. I think you have done a very good job. May I suggest just two addenda:

1) advice—control commissions consisting of the best, tried and experienced workers to be formed in all parties;

2) re spies—a special point in connection with the question of illegal work. Contents roughly as follows: the bourgeoisie is bound to infiltrate spies and provocateurs into the illegal organisations. A thoroughgoing and unremitting struggle should be waged against this, and a method of struggle to be specially recommended is a skilful combination of *legal* work with illegal, verification (of fitness for illegal work) *by means* of prolonged *legal* work.[371]

With communist greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

First published in 1958
in the journal
Problemi Mira i Sotsializma No. 3

Printed from the manuscript
Translated from the German

3

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT THESES ON TACTICS FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

LETTER TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV[372]

The crux of the matter is that Levi in very many respects is *right politically*. Unfortunately, he is guilty of a number of breaches of discipline for which the Party has expelled him.

Thalheimer's and Béla Kun's theses are politically utterly fallacious. Mere phrases and playing at Leftism.

Radek is vacillating and has spoilt his original draft by a number of concessions to "Leftist" silliness. His first "concession" is highly characteristic: in §1 of his theses "*Umgrenzung der Fragen*" he first had "winning the majority of the working class (*to the principles of communism*)" (mark this). Amended (verballhornt) to: "winning the *socially decisive sections* of the working class."

A gem! To weaken here, in such a context, the necessity of winning precisely the *majority* of the working class "to the principles of communism," is the height of absurdity.

To win power, you need, *under certain conditions* (even when the *majority* of the working class have already been won over *to the principles of communism*) *a blow* dealt at the decisive place by the majority of the socially decisive sections of the working class.

To modify, verballhornen, this truth in such a way that §1 of the general tasks of the Communist International about winning the working class *to the principles of communism weakens* the idea about the necessity of winning the *majority* of the working class, is a classic example of Béla Kun's and Thalheimer's ineptitude (it looks all right, dammit, but it's all damn'd wrong) and of Radek's ... *hasty complaisance*.

Radek's theses were much too long and boneless, and lacked a political central point. And Radek diluted them *still* more, spoilt them hopelessly.

What's to be done? I don't know. So much time and effort wasted.

If you don't want an open fight at the congress, then propose:

1) that Thalheimer's and B. Kun's theses be rejected by exact voting this very day (since Bukharin assures me that the basic points have to be settled not later than today: they were better postponed) as being basically erroneous. Have this recorded. You will spoil everything if you don't do this and show indulgence.

2) that Radek's first draft, "unimproved" by any corrections, one specimen of which I have quoted, should be adopted as a basis.

3) that 1-3 persons be entrusted with cutting down the text and improving it so that it is no longer boneless (if that is possible!) and clearly, precisely and unequivocally puts into focus as the central ideas the following:

None of the Communist Parties anywhere have yet won the majority (of the working class), not only as regards organisational leadership, but to the principles of communism as well. This is the basis of everything. To "weaken" this foundation of the only reasonable tactic is *criminal irresponsibility*.

Hence: revolutionary explosions are possible nevertheless very soon considering the abundance of inflammable material

in Europe; an easy victory of the working class—in exceptionable cases—is also possible. But it would be absurd now to base the tactics of the Communist International on this possibility; it is absurd and harmful to write and think that the propaganda period has ended and the period of action has started.

The tactics of the Communist International should be based on a steady and systematic drive to win the *majority of the working class*, first and foremost *within the* **old** *trade unions*. Then we shall win for certain, whatever the course of events. As for "winning" for a short time in an exceptionally happy turn of events—any fool can do that.

Hence: the tactic of the Open Letter[373] should definitely be applied everywhere. This should be said straight out, clearly and exactly, because waverings in regard to the "Open Letter" are extremely harmful, extremely shameful and **extremely widespread**. We may as well admit this. All those who have failed to grasp the necessity of the Open Letter tactic should be *expelled* from the Communist International within a month after its Third Congress. I clearly see my mistake in voting for the admission of KAPD.[374] It will have to be rectified as quickly and fully as possible.

Instead of spinning a long yarn like Radek, we had better have the whole text of the Open Letter translated (and in German quoted in full), its significance properly brought home and adopted as a model.

I would confine the *general* resolution on tactics to this.

Only then will the *tone* be set. The central idea will be clear. There will be no woolliness. No possibility of everyone reading his own meaning into it (like in Radek's).

Radek's original draft would then be cut down to a quarter, at least.

It is time we stopped writing and voting *brochures* instead of theses. Under this system partial mistakes are inevitable with any of us, even when the matter is indisputable. And when we have something boneless and disputable we are bound to make *b i g* mistakes and spoil the whole thing.

And then, if you have the itch for it, you can add a supplement: on the basis of such a tactic, specifically by way of example, precisely as an example and not as a principle, we add so-and-so and so-and-so.

Further.

To generalise Serrati and Levi into the same "opportunism" is stupid. Serrati is guilty; of what? It should be said clearly and precisely—on the *Italian* question, and not on the question of general tactics. Of having split with the Communists and not having expelled the reformists, Turati & Co. Until you have carried this out, Italian comrades, you are *outside* the Communist International. We are expelling you.[375]

And to the Italian Communists—serious advice and the *demand*: so long as you have not been able by persistence, patience and skill to **convince** and win over the majority of the Serratian *workers*, don't swagger, don't play at Leftism. "Fall Levi"* is not in general tactics, but in the appraisal of Märzaktion,** on the German question. Brandler says: there was a defensive. The government provoked it.

Assuming this is true, that it is a fact.

What deduction is to be drawn from this?

1) That all the shouting about an offensive—and there was any amount of it—was erroneous and absurd;

2) that it was a tactical *error* to call for a *general* strike once there was provocation on the part of the government, who *wanted* to draw the *small fortress* of communism into the struggle (the district in the centre where the Communists already had a majority).

3) Mistakes like this must be avoided in future, as the situation in *Germany* is a special one after the killing of 20,000 workers in the civil war through the skilful manoeuvres of the Right.

4) To call the defensive of hundreds of thousands of workers (Brandler says *a million*. Isn't he mistaken? Isn't he *exaggerating*? Why are there no figures by regions and cities???) a "putsch", and a "Bakuninist putsch" at that, is worse than a mistake, it is a breach of revolutionary discipline. Since Levi added to this a number of other breaches (list them very carefully and exactly) he deserves his punishment and has earned his expulsion.

The *term* of expulsion should be fixed, say, at six months at least. He should then be *permitted* to seek readmission

* The Levi case.—*Ed.*

** The March action.—*Ed.*

to the Party, and the Communist International advises that he be readmitted *provided* he has acted loyally during that time.

I have not yet read anything, apart from Brandler's pamphlet, and am writing this on the basis of Levi's and Brandler's pamphlets. Brandler has proved one thing—if he has proved anything—that the Märzaktion was not a "Bakuninist putsch" [for such *abusive language* Levi ought to be expelled] but a heroic defence by revolutionary workers, hundreds of thousands of them; but however heroic it was, *in future* such a challenge, provoked by the government, which, since I.1919, has already killed by provocations 20,000 workers *should not* be accepted until the Communists have the majority behind them all over the country, and not just in one small district.

((The July days of 1917 were not a Bakuninist putsch. For such an appraisal we would have expelled a person from the Party. The July days were an heroic *offensive*. And the deduction we drew was that we would not launch the next heroic offensive *prematurely*. Premature acceptance of a general battle—that is what the Märzaktion really was. Not a putsch, but a *mistake*, mitigated by the heroism of a defensive by hundreds of thousands.))

Concerning Šmeral. Can't we have at least 2 or 3 *documents*?

There would be no harm in having at least **2** documents (2-4 pages each) on each country printed for the Comintern.

What are the facts about Šmeral? about Strasser?

Do not forget one of the chief things—to delete from Radek's first theses everything relating to the "waiting party", to its censure. It must all come out.[376]

Regarding Bulgaria, Serbia (Yugoslavia?) and Czechoslovakia, the question of *these* countries must be put concretely, specially, clearly, and precisely.

If opinion is divided on this, I suggest convening the Politbureau.

10/VI.1921 *Lenin*

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of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 52

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4

MOTION ON THE DRAFT THESES ON TACTICS

1) That Šmeral's designation and the whole end of the paragraph be crossed out;

2) That a Committee (or the Executive) be directed to draw up a detailed *letter* to the Czech Party containing a practical, lucid and *documented* criticism of what is *incorrect* in Šmeral's stand and what the editors of the Reichenberger *Vorwärts*[377] have to be more careful of.

Written in July,
not later than 9, 1921

First published in 1958
in the journal
Problemi Mira i Sotsializma No. 3

Printed from the manuscript

5

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN, POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK, HUNGARIAN AND ITALIAN DELEGATIONS JULY 11

1

I read certain reports yesterday in *Pravda* which have persuaded me that the moment for an offensive is perhaps nearer than we thought at the congress, and for which the young comrades attacked us. I shall deal with these reports later, however. Just now I want to say that the nearer the general offensive is, the more "opportunistically" must we act. You will now all return home and tell the workers that we have become more reasonable than we were before the Third Congress. You should not be put out by this; you will say that we made mistakes and now wish to act more carefully; by doing so we shall win the masses over from the Social-Democratic and Independent Social-Democratic parties, masses, who, objectively, by the whole course of events, are being pushed towards us, but who are afraid of us. I want

to cite our own example to show you that we must act more carefully.

At the beginning of the war we Bolsheviks adhered to a single slogan—that of civil war, and a ruthless one at that. We branded as a traitor everyone who did not support the idea of civil war. But when we came back to Russia in March 1917 we changed our position entirely. When we returned to Russia and spoke to the peasants and workers, we saw that they all stood for defence of the homeland, of course in quite a different sense from the Mensheviks, and we could not call these ordinary workers and peasants scoundrels and traitors. We described this as "honest defencism". I intend to write a big article about this and publish all the material. On April 7 I published my theses, in which I called for caution and patience.* Our original stand at the beginning of the war was correct: it was important then to form a definite and resolute core. Our subsequent stand was correct too. It proceeded from the assumption that the masses had to be won over. At that time we already rejected the idea of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. I wrote: "It should be overthrown, for it is an oligarchic, and not a people's government, and is unable to provide peace or bread. But it cannot be overthrown just now, for it is being kept in power by the workers' Soviets and so far enjoys the confidence of the workers. We are not Blanquists, we do not want to rule with a minority of the working class against the majority."** The Cadets, who are shrewd politicians, immediately noticed the contradiction between our former position and the new one, and called us hypocrites. But as, in the same breath, they had called us spies, traitors, scoundrels and German agents, the former appellation made no impression. The first crisis occurred on April 20. Milyukov's Note on the Dardanelles showed the government up for what it was—an imperialist government. After this the armed masses of the soldiery moved against the building of the government and overthrew Milyukov. They were led by a non-Party man named Linde. This movement had not been organised

* See Vol. 24 of this edition, pp. 19-26.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., p. 40.—*Ed.*

by the Party. We characterised that movement at the time as follows: something more than an armed demonstration, and something less than an armed uprising. At our conference on April 22 the Left trend demanded the immediate overthrow of the Government. The Central Committee, on the contrary, declared against the slogan of civil war, and we instructed all agitators in the provinces to deny the outrageous lie about the Bolsheviks wanting civil war. On April 22 I wrote that the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government" was incorrect, since if we did not have the majority of the people behind us this slogan would be either an empty phrase or adventurism.*

We did not hesitate in face of our enemies to call our Leftists "adventurists". The Mensheviks crowed over this and talked about our bankruptcy. But we said that any attempt to be slightly, if only a wee bit, left of the C.C. was folly, and those who stood left of the C.C. had lost ordinary common sense. We refuse to be intimidated by the fact that our enemies rejoice at our slips.

Our sole strategy now is to become stronger, hence cleverer, more sensible, more "opportunistic", and that is what we must tell the masses. But after we shall have won over the masses by our reasonableness, we shall use the tactic of offensive in the strictest sense of that word.

Now about the three reports:

1) The strike of Berlin's municipal workers. Municipal workers are mostly conservative people, who belong to the Social-Democrats of the majority and to the Independent Social-Democratic Party; they are well off, but are compelled to strike.[378]

2) The strike of the textile workers in Lille.[379]

3) The third fact is the most important. A meeting was held in Rome to organise the struggle against the fascists, in which 50,000 workers took part—representing all parties—Communists, socialists and also republicans. Five thousand ex-servicemen came to the meeting in their uniforms and not a single fascist dared to appear on the street.[380] This shows that there is more inflammable material in Europe than we thought. Lazzari praised our resolution on tactics. It is an

* See Vol. 24 of this edition, pp. 210-11.—*Ed.*

important achievement of our congress. If Lazzari admits it, then the thousands of workers who back him are bound to come to us, and their leaders will not be able to scare them away from us. "Il faut reculer, pour mieux sauter" (you have to step back to make a better jump). This jump is inevitable, since the situation, objectively, is becoming insufferable.

So we are beginning to apply our new tactic. We mustn't get nervy, we cannot be late, rather we may start too early, and when you ask whether Russia will be able to hold out so long, we answer that we are now fighting a war with the petty bourgeoisie, with the peasantry, an economic war, which is much more dangerous for us than the last war. But as Clausewitz said, the element of war is a danger and we have never been out of that danger for a moment. I am sure that if we act more cautiously, if we make concessions in time, we shall win this war too, even if it lasts over three years.

Summing up:

1) All of us, unanimously throughout Europe, shall say that we are applying the new tactic, and in this way we shall win the masses.

2) Co-ordination of the offensive in the most important countries: Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy. We need here preparation, constant co-ordination. Europe is pregnant with revolution, but it is impossible to make up a calendar of revolution beforehand. We in Russia will hold out, not only five years, but more. The only correct strategy is the one we have adopted. I am confident that we shall win positions for the revolution which the Entente will have nothing to put up against, and that will be the beginning of victory on a world scale.

2

Šmeral seemed to be pleased with my speech, but he interprets it one-sidedly. I said in the committee that in order to find the correct line Šmeral had to make three steps to the left, and Kreibich one step to the right. Šmeral, unfortunately, said nothing about taking these steps. Nor did he say anything about his views on the situation. Concerning the

difficulties, Šmeral merely repeated the old arguments and said nothing new. Šmeral said that I had dispelled his fears. In the spring he was afraid that the communist leadership would demand of him untimely action, but events dispelled these fears. But what worries us now is this: will things really come to the stage of preparation for the offensive in Czechoslovakia, or will they be confined merely to talk about difficulties. The Left mistake is simply a mistake, it isn't big and is easily rectified. But if the mistake pertains to the resolution to act, then this is by no means a small mistake, it is a betrayal. These mistakes do not bear comparison. The theory that we shall make a revolution, but only after others have acted first, is utterly fallacious.

3

The retreat made at this congress can, I think, be compared with our actions in 1917 in Russia, and therefore prove that this retreat must serve as preparation for the offensive. Our opponents will say that we are not saying today what we said before. It will do them little good, but the working-class masses will understand us if we tell them in what sense the March action is to be considered a success and why we criticise its mistakes and say that we should make better preparations in future. I agree with Terracini when he says that the interpretations of Šmeral and Burian are wrong. If co-ordination is to be understood as our having to wait until another country has started, a country that is richer and has a bigger population, then this is not a communist interpretation, but downright deception. Co-ordination should consist in comrades from other countries knowing exactly what moments are significant. The really important interpretation of co-ordination is this: the best and quickest imitation of a good example. That of the workers of Rome is a good example.

First published in 1958:
first speech in full,
second and third
in abridge form in the journal
Voprosi Istorii KPSS No. 5

Printed from the shorthand record
Translated from the German

ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON COLLECTIVE PAY FOR EMPLOYEES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS[381]

POINT "A"

A five-man commission to be charged with collecting the fullest possible material for an estimation of both payments in kind and actual money payments, embracing all and every form of such payment without exception, including cab fares, etc., which are now being applied in Moscow's central institutions.

POINT "D"

Collective supply both for workers and office employees is to be introduced subject to the following rules:

1) each enterprise where collective supply is introduced concludes a special agreement with the Government;

2) under this agreement, the enterprise (in the person of its management and specially elected representatives) undertakes to steadily reduce the number of workers and office employees and raise their productivity, as well as work discipline to a normal level. An enterprise in industry corresponds to a department or subdepartment, etc., for state employees;

3) non-fulfilment of the agreement entails a penalty, including total loss of supply.

Written June 28, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the manuscript

MOTION TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON BONUSES FOR ENTERPRISES[382]

I propose to the Politbureau

Bonuses of up to 10,000 gold rubles be paid for the efficient organisation on commercial lines of a group of enterprises, departments and institutions.

8.VII.1921

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON MEASURES FOR COMBATING FAMINE AND STEPPING UP ECONOMIC WORK[383]

If an area affected by crop failure and famine embraces a territory with a population of twenty-five million, should we not, by a number of revolutionary measures, take young men into the army from *this* particular area to the number of about 500,000 (or even perhaps up to 1 million?).

Purpose: to help out the famine-stricken population to some extent, as we shall feed some of them and perhaps help others by means of parcels which the men will send home. That is one thing. Secondly: locate these half a million in the Ukraine, where they can help to step up food supply work, in which they are deeply concerned, keenly aware as they are of the injustice of the gluttony practised by the rich peasants in the Ukraine.

The harvest in the Ukraine is estimated roughly (Rakovsky) at 550-650 million poods. Deducting *150* million poods for sowing and *300* (15 × 20 = 300) for feeding the family and the farm animals, we get a balance (550 — 450 = *100*; 650 — 450 = *200*) at an average of about *150 million* poods. If we post an army from the famine-stricken gubernias in the Ukraine this balance (tax + barter + special requisitions from the rich to help the starving) could be collected *in full*.

Measures should immediately be stepped up in the famine-stricken gubernias to collect raw materials (hides, hoofs, horns, bristles, etc., etc.) and it should be made a rule, incidentally, that not a pood of relief should be rendered either for seed or food unless payment is made in one or another form of raw materials or fallen wood fuel or similar stuff.*

To revive the work of the gubernia, uyezd and district economic conferences of Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and a few principal industrial centres not far from the two capital cities, could not 2-4 top-level workers of the

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* In the manuscript this paragraph has been crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

central departments be assigned to each of these economic conferences? These groups of, say, four people, could work together as a team, being selected from among the staff of one and the same central institution or being well acquainted with each other, and they could do regular work in these economic councils, say, an hour a day each, making 3-4 hours a day together?

The complete or partial transfer of workers of the non-economic commissariats to economic work could be arranged in this way: their work at the commissariat could be shifted to the extent of three-fourths or nine-tenths to third-rate assistants, whom they could supervise.

In Moscow (and afterwards in other places) *all* top-level Party workers should be mobilised for *economic* work in this way:

every top-level Party worker of a *non*-economic commissariat takes a *low-level economic* job, for which purpose he joins some factory committee (or house or block committee)—*no* organisation *higher* than that (in order to work at low-level)—and undertakes to devote no less than two hours a day to this work. Priority is to be given to the work of distributing foodstuffs, raising the level of the economic branch concerned, and fuel supply.

It is important that *each* worker's assignment should be precisely defined.

Should we not, simultaneously with the registration of top-level Party workers on 1.VII.1921, organise the registration of all members of the R.C.P. in Moscow (and perhaps in Petrograd as well?)? Enlist for this the services of the Gubernia Statistical Bureau. Obtain exact figures on the Party.*

Written in July,
not later than 9, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

* This paragraph in the manuscript has been crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

RE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ORGANISATION OF COMMODITY EXCHANGE BY CENTROSOYUZ[384]

1) The next report to be made in a month's time.

2) The form of accountancy and its proper distribution to the local bodies, as well as fulfilment by the latter of their duties in making up these accounts, to be verified through the agent of the *Central Statistical Board*.

Term: 1 week.

3) Charge Centrosoyuz with submitting to the C.P.C. a number of decisions for more energetic action against anarchic commodity exchange.

Term: 1 week.

4) In the matter of equivalents, Centrosoyuz and its local agencies down to the rural commodity exchange stations should be allowed to conduct the business with greater freedom and introduce a system of high premiums for the amount and rate of turnover.

Term: 1 week for submitting to the Narrow C.P.C.

Written July 15, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the manuscript

MOTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[385]

I move:

1) that the matter be temporarily decided (today, 28/VII.) in favour of the Siberian Bureau;

2) that a resolution of censure be passed on the Siberian Bureau for patent breach of Party duty in not simultaneously forwarding the text of the motions tabled by the two other trends: the Siberian Bureau should have asked the two other trends officially and in good time for the texts of their proposals for submission to the C.C.;

3) that Omsk be asked to wire a brief formulation of the motions of the two trends by their spokesmen;

4) that the Party conference be postponed till 15/8;

5) that a C.C. member be found to sit in on the conference on 15/8.

28/7.

Written July 28, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE STATE OF TRANSPORT[386]

§ 1. Greater attention to be paid to devising measures, etc.
2—4 The Orgbureau in co-operation with Comrade Rudzutak to deal with these questions urgently.
5— Elaborate and carry out administratively.
6— Measures for improving transport and ensuring closer contact between the Party apparatus and the railways.

Written August 8, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY

Type 6 copies and send to
1) Radek
2) me
3) Trotsky
4) Kamenev
5) Stalin
6) extra copy

To Comrade Zinoviev

13/VIII-1921

Obviously, we cannot properly organise in Russia a bureau for properly summarising and selecting information on the international labour movement. We haven't the people for it, nor the libraries, etc.

I suggest that such a bureau be set up in Germany. Employ one manager (a non-work-fit Communist, better still a *non*-Communist) plus 2 assistants (+ 2—3 typists).

A definite monthly sum should be earmarked for this purpose. We should try to arrange *legally*, under some trade name, something like *Zeitungskorrespondenz*, a supply of articles and copy to the newspapers.

Three Germans (knowing English, French, Italian and Czech—enough to start with) could of course be found. Radek, if I am not mistaken, even had someone in mind.

This bureau, if we could find efficient men to run it under contract (intellectuals in Germany are hard up, and we could select a good staff), would carry on systematic research work for us in *collecting* literary and special newspaper material and *working it up* on two cardinal and main points:

A) *international imperialism*;
B) *the international labour movement*.

We could (with Radek and with his help) probably find 2-3 dozen Communists doing journalistic work in all countries to act as contributors (and writer-consultants) to this bureau.

Such a bureau would work for a start in German (for the continent of Europe now undoubtedly the most international language); and at the first opportunity it would add to its publications translations into French and English. Russian translations could easily be arranged: we would simply give the job through official state channels to 2-3 bourgeois professors, so as not to divert communist forces on purely technical work.

On both these questions (*A* and *B*) the bureau should systematically keep abreast of the international literature, especially newspaper literature, and compile *lists of valuable books and newspaper articles* on these questions.

The most important thing here would be to detail and arrange these questions correctly—to compile a *rational* and classified *list* of these questions and supplement it in good time according to the needs of the moment.

And then—commentaries of not more than 3-10 lines on books and on very rare and specially important newspaper articles (1 out of 100, or maybe 1 out of 500), so that you can tell at once what to look for and what the respective book or article deals with.

The writer-consultants could write these commentaries (or rather a statement of the contents) easily, if the German centre organised this work and paid them for it.

Further, the bureau should run

a summary of important items of information from the newspapers and press-cuttings (at least 3-4 sets to begin with: one for the files, one for Moscow, and one extra set to meet any contingency).

With the help of *consultants* and Radek at their head, we could make up a list of subjects, for example:

— — shadings and controversial issues within communism:
— — " " " and on the *fringe* of communism (II½* and anarchists);
— — " " " also within the trade union movement;
—— elections and their statistics (or results) to judge the strength of the trends in the labour movement;
—— the history of outstanding strikes and "incidents" (demonstrations, actions, etc.) and so on.

I believe that, properly organised, this bureau would bring in a certain income, as its bulletins would be purchased by certain newspapers and libraries as important information material.

But this income, of course, would at best cover only a small part of the expenses. We can and should bear these expenses. All the material, as far as we are concerned, will serve the cause of public education and the work of propaganda and agitation.

Such a bureau can and should be organised. It can be very useful. Without it we have no eyes, ears or hands for participation in the international movement—and we do it casually always *dependent* (for information) on someone who is closer near at hand, who has happened to read about it, who has just dropped in, happened to mention it, and so on.

I propose that the Politbureau discuss this plan and set up a small commission for its *preliminary* drafting, say:

Radek
Trotsky
+ ?

* Meaning the Centrist II½ International.—*Ed.*

Perhaps only two would be better to start with. They *can enlist* the co-operation of Steklov and Béla Kun (and many others), *invite* to Moscow a candidate for the post of *bureau manager*, and then be able to make up *an estimate* and submit the whole *elaborated* plan to the Politbureau for consideration.[387]

16/VIII. *Lenin*

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 53

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON AN INSPECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE[388]

I move that the Politbureau resolve:

1) That the report be made.

2) That Unschlicht be appointed to make it.

3) That the report's *conclusions* serve as the Politbureau's decisions on its findings.

4) That the secret part be dealt with separately at a closed meeting.

23/VIII. *Lenin*

Written August 23, 1921

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

MOTION TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON BRINGING UNGERN TO TRIAL[389]

I advise that greater attention be given to this case and the gravity of the charges be checked, and in the event of their being incontrovertibly proved, of which there seems to be no doubt, a public trial should be held with the greatest speed and the death penalty imposed.

Dictated over the telephone August 26, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the typed copy

A NOTE TO E. VARGA AND THESES ON THE ORGANISATION OF AN INFORMATION INSTITUTE ON QUESTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MOVEMENT

Dear Comrade Varga,

I enclose my remarks. If you think it necessary, we can talk things over on the telephone.

Best regards,
Lenin
31/8

Tentative Amendments or Theses

To Comrade E. Varga's Project
for the Organisation of an Information Institute

1. Absolute and strict legality of the Institute for Berlin or Vienna conditions and for the whole of Western Europe, Britain and America.
2. Headquarters of the Institute—Berlin or Vienna or Copenhagen or Christiania.
3. No more than 20% of the Institute's working time and publications should be devoted to economic and social questions (both together 20%). 80% to political questions.
4. As far as political questions are concerned, the task of the Institute is only to collect objective data on questions that are legal and open to discussion.
5. The Institute must be completely independent of the respective Communist Parties.
6. The official name of the Institute should be, tentatively: Institute for the Study of Forms of Social Movement.
7. Instructions of a principle nature are to be given to the head (or to three heads, not more) of the Institute.
8. On the basis of verbal instructions of a principle nature the head is to work out detailed and absolutely legal instructions and submit them here in Moscow for endorsement by the Comintern Executive.

9. Reports to be submitted weekly or twice a week. Socio-economic appendixes monthly or tri-monthly.

10. The Institute must have no contacts whatever with the Russian embassies.

11. The Institute must begin in a small way. For the German-speaking countries, Scandinavia and the Slav countries—only the German language.

Activities may be extended to Anglo-Saxon and Romance countries only on the basis of a special agreement with a representative of each group of these countries. Agreement only here in Moscow.

12. The reports, or rather, publications, or correspondence of the Institute should be paid for by subscribers (newspapers libraries, etc.).

The basic principle should be—such an organisation of the Institute and such operation as would *compel all* labour newspapers of *all* trends to subscribe to the Institute's publications and pay for them. If this does not happen, it will be proof that the Institute is worthless.

13. Comrade Varga's project[390] should serve as initial draft instructions. In particular, two basic amendments to this project are needed: 1) § 3—*up*; 2) the political part should be considerably elaborated.

Some remarks to this Point 2:

(Appendix B.) §§ 3 and 4: Correspondence from factories?

+ money collected by the workers themselves?

+ questions of the *trade union movement* should be specially dealt with in detail from the political angle. Winning the trade unions is one of the most important political issues.

+ workers' co-operatives: *ditto* (to Section II, b)

+ all *transitional* political *formations* (like the workers' and farmers' party in the United States) are *especially* important.

+ Leaflets? Distribution? Circulation?

+ **attitude** to the 1914-18 war? *Extremely important.*

Section **II, § a** "revolutionary" (??) workers' parties like the Communist Workers' Party of Germany.

Name is wrong. They are *not* revolutionary. They should be called: semi-anarchist, anarchist or near-anarchist.

It is necessary to add: a split of anarchism all over the world in patriotic and internationalist questions; *for* the Soviet system; *against* the Soviet system.

(§ b). Parties of the II and II½ Internationals—**much more** *detailed*.

+ attitude to *own* colonies—and to *imperialism* in *practical* politics—*much*, *much more detailed*.

+ all pacifist and petty-bourgeois-democratic groups and trends—*much more detailed*.

And so on.

31/8.1921. *Lenin*

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Printed from the manuscript Translated from the German

TO E. VARGA

Dear Comrade Varga,

I consider it incorrect to put the question that way (supplying information to the Comintern Executive *or* to the labour press *or* to both?).

We need *full* and *truthful* information. And the truth should not depend upon whom it has to serve.

We can accept only the division into *unofficial* information (for the *Comintern Executive* only) and *official* information (for everybody).

The former already exists and must exist *separately*; it must be improved.

The latter, to become good, requires good organisation in the *selection of facts* without a declaration that "we" are Communists.

If the *selection of facts* is full, exact and good, then the yellow labour press, too (especially the local and trade union newspapers) will certainly *buy* and pay for our material. If that does not happen it will be evidence of our *poor* legal work.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

1/IX.1921

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript Translated from the German

DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON KEEPING A RECORD OF WORKERS' DONATIONS IN EUROPE[391]

SEPTEMBER 2, 1921

a) The Russian members of the Executive shall be instructed to obtain a decision of the Comintern for organising accurate current statistics of workers' donations in Europe for sufferers of the famine in Russia and regularly publishing reports of such donations.

b) The Central Committee draws special attention to the need for stepping up agitation among the workers in Europe for contributing one-day's pay, as one of the most expedient forms of relief for the famine-stricken.

c) The Russian members of the Comintern shall be asked to submit a report on the progress of this propaganda to the Politbureau within a fortnight.

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the typed copy of the minutes

A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV AND A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON NOULENS' NOTE

Comrade Molotov,

Noulens is insolent to a degree. On the back of this sheet I propose a draft decision. If there is no agreement on this among us I demand that the whole Politbureau be convened tomorrow; I shall come down then. There can be no question of yielding here.

Lenin

4/IX.

I propose
this text of a Politbureau decision:

"Chicherin shall be instructed to draw up in reply to Noulens a sharply worded note of refusal in the form of a proclamation against the bourgeoisie and imperialism with

special emphasis on the counter-revolutionary role of Noulens himself, with special mention of the cynically insolent nature of the proposal, before any agreement is reached, to send a commission of spies under the name of a commission of experts, specially ridiculing the idea of sending the commission question forms regarding winter crops by 4.IX., which we have already done ourselves on time, and specially ridiculing the 7 points and declaring that we shall either have dealings with governments à la Germany, or with persons—not those of the Noulens type, of course—on the basis of previous and clearly defined agreements. Special stress is to be laid on the fact that we cannot for a moment believe in the desire to help on the part of Messrs. Noulens *in view of such an approach to the matter as theirs.*[392]

Written September 4, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON DIRECTIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD[393]

Add:

(1) reduction of the number of recipient enterprises (receiving bread from the state);

(2) bread rationing not to be increased without special permission of the C.C.

Written September 5 or 6, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON SPENDINGS FROM THE GOLD FUND[394]

I move that the Politbureau resolve:

To ask the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee:

1) To revoke the decision of the C.P.C. assigning 5¼ millions for orders to the firm of Armstrong.

2) To suspend the 10.9 million order for tank-cars, and instruct Kursky within a week to check this expenditure for conformity with all previous decisions of the Politbureau pertaining to the gold fund.

3) To instruct Kursky to carry out a similar check in regard to all allocations from the gold fund as from August 1921.

4) To instruct Alsky to devise a proper form of special accountancy covering spendings from the gold fund and special verification of each item of expenditure from the point of view of the decisions of the Politbureau (in co-operation with Molotov).

5) To instruct Kursky to personally ascertain from the documents whether allocations for Armstrong orders have been started, and if they have, what the legal position will be in connection with the annulment of the C.P.C.'s decision and the suspension of their fulfilment.

Lenin

Written September 7, 1921

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the typed copy

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE FREE SALE OF BOOKS FROM MOSCOW WAREHOUSE STOCKS[395]

1) Stock-taking of books in Moscow warehouses to be carried out jointly by the Moscow Soviet and the Chief Committee for Political Education;

2) The C.C.P.E. to be allowed to take such books from store as are needed for libraries, Moscow's interests being fully observed in the distribution of these books; to ensure that these interests are duly observed, the C.C.P.E. is obliged to satisfy the requirements of the Moscow Gubernia Committee for Political Education, which has the right to appeal against its decisions in the course of three days.

3) Pornography and books on religious subjects shall not be released for free sale, and shall be turned over to the *Paper Industry Board* as wastepaper.

4) The sale of foreign books shall be freely permitted.

Written September 13, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[396]

Comrade Bogdanov shall be directed immediately to form a state trust of Ridder and Ekibastuz works and mines and all others economically linked with them, based on the utmost financial and economic autonomy and independence of local, Siberian, Kirghiz and other authorities, and direct subordination to the Supreme Economic Council.

Written September 14, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV WITH A MOTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Comrade Molotov,

From all sides I hear that recommendations (in connection with the Party purge[397]) are being given right and left as a favour.

I propose that a circular be published by the C.C. (by arrangement with and over the signatures of the Central Control Commission and the Verification Commission):

"Recommendations may be given only by those who have personally observed the work of the person recommended for at least one year, and have worked together with him in one or another Party organisation."[398]

15/IX. *Lenin*

Written September 15, 1921
First published in 1939 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO V. V. KUIBYSHEV AND A DRAFT ENGAGEMENT FOR WORKERS GOING TO RUSSIA FROM AMERICA[399]

Comrade Kuibyshev,

I am sending you the draft of an undertaking which Rutgers and *all* his people down to each individual worker have to give (*in the event of* an agreement being signed).

If you are agreeable, put it to them.

Find a reliable *interpreter* (for all negotiations) who knows *both* languages *well*.

An agreement is essential, and it must be very precisely worded.

We must get *our own lawyer* (a Communist) to draw it up.

I suggest it be called an agreement for *handing over the management* of a number of factories, etc.

The technical examination results should be signed by *Stunkel* and several other experts *of repute*.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Do the leaders and organisers of the enterprise agree to sign the following engagement and obtain the signatures of all the other people going to Russia from America:

1. We undertake to see to it and *collectively* answer for it that only such people shall go to Russia as are capable and willing to face a number of severe hardships involved in the rehabilitation of industry in a very backward and utterly ruined country.

2. Those going to Russia undertake to work their hardest and with the greatest efficiency and discipline exceeding those of capitalist standards, as otherwise Russia will not be able to outstrip capitalism or even catch up with it.

3. We undertake, in the event of any conflicts whatsoever to submit them for settlement to the supreme Soviet authority of Russia and faithfully abide by its decisions.

4. We undertake not to forget the extremely nervous state of the starving and exhausted Russian workers and peasants involved in our business and to render them every assistance with a view to establishing friendly relations and overcoming any distrust or envy.

Written September 22, 1921

First published January 20, 1929 in *Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta* No. 17

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF THE FAR-EASTERN REPUBLIC

I move that we agree with Chicherin and authorise him to draw up *precise* and brief directives concerning the Far-Eastern Republic in the form of a *draft resolution*.[400]

Lenin

Written October 7 or 8, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM

Work up the question of studying the composition of communist executives with a view to determining their suitability for work of various scope and scale, if only in the city of Moscow and one of the gubernias to begin with.[401]

Written October 8, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DIRECTIVES FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE ALLOTMENT OF LANDS FOR SUGAR-BEET CULTIVATION IN THE UKRAINE[402]

Directives

of the Politbureau on the allotment of lands in the Ukraine to the refineries for sugar-beet cultivation and on the compliance of the peasants on the lands adjoining the sugar refineries with compulsory crop rotation and fixed norms of culture.

1. This reform is to be carried out with the greatest care, no single step to be taken without practical verification that the business of beet cultivation is adequately provided for by a rational system of farming and by the peasant's own personal interest in the matter.

2. 400,000 dessiatines to be allotted to the refineries, this figure to be checked as to whether it is really necessary for ensuring properly organised large-scale factory farming.

The refineries to be made responsible for all the land allotted to them being rationally cultivated and utilised for the plants.

3. Compulsory crop rotation to be introduced on the peasant lands and obligatory norms of culture to be applied

to them only in those cases where beet crops have long been cultivated on these lands.

4. Strict care should be taken that the relations between the sugar refineries and the beet-cultivating peasants are based on a really voluntary agreement within the limits of an obligatory fixed beet-sowing area.

Written October 10, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON SOCIAL INSURANCE[403]

The Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, jointly with the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariats for Health and Social Security, shall be charged with working up the question of insurance for workers in connection with the new economic policy.

Written October 10, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON YUGOSTAL[404]

Number of workers at these **3** works (both mining and metallurgical) minimum (in summer) 21,000 (roughly).

1. X. about	*30,000* |||	
Communists about	*500* |||	
Monthly pay-roll now:		216,000	
	+	200,000	coal
	+	200,000	overtime
per month (12...*)	=	616,000	rubles

* Undeciphered.—*Ed.*

Hewer = from 900,000 to 1½ million
specialist (maximum) = 2½ to 3 million
+ stealing or tips up to 10 million.

1 gold ruble	= 40,000
75 gold rubles	= 3 mill. Soviet rubles

Raise spec. pay by 1.I.1922:
maximum *40* million
= 1000 gold rubles a month.
"Commercial director" =
at *Head Office* of 3 works
(Yugostal)
= assistant manager...
(big businessman)
((status of the highest,
top-level specialist))
Marketing = his chief task.

Written in October,
after the 11th, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV WITH A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE RUTGERS GROUP[405]

12.X.1921

Comrade Molotov,

I enclose material on the Rutgers business.

It is for the *Council of Labour and Defence* to decide.

I suggest that it *first* be decided in the C.C.— it is a political question. And the Politbureau *must* have its say, as it is a *gold* spending.

Please get the secretary to telephone *all* the members of the Politbureau who will each arrange for *one hour* in the course of which he will be able to familiarise himself with the material before Friday. Each one must look through it so that it can be settled on Friday.

Let the secretary make up a time-table and send the material round to each member of the Politbureau.

A difficult question:

for: *if* the Americans keep their word, it will be of tremendous benefit. In that case we shall not grudge *600,000* gold rubles.

against: will they keep their word? *Heywood* is half-anarchist. More sentimental than business-like. *Rutgers* may succumb to Leftism. *Calvert* is highly garrulous. We have no business guarantees whatever. Enthusiastic people, in an atmosphere of unemployment, may recruit a group of "adventurous spirits" who will end up in squabbles. We may then lose *part* of our 600,000 gold rubles (they will, of course, spoil and waste some of the property) and risk losing *up to 1 million gold rubles* **more**, because under § 8 (the end of it) we undertake

"to reimburse the equivalent of expenditures on machines and tools brought in by the said emigrant".

No small risk.

For: Smirnov I. N. and Maximov (of the Urals) are local people, and they are for it.

Against: Martens should know the Americans well, and he is against.

Lenin

Please arrange for all the members of the S.E.C. Presidium to be on phone call with the secretary of the C.C. on Friday from 12 to 4 p.m. in case they are called out to the C.C.

P.S. Please also send copies of this letter to all the members of the Politbureau.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO POLITBUREAU MEMBERS WITH A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) AND THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE ON THE QUESTION OF RUTGERS' PROPOSALS

In my opinion, Rutgers' proposals cannot be accepted now in their present form. But I should like to try a thing like this: to make him *modify the group* (Rutgers + Heywood + Calvert). And modify the financial terms, too. We could decide this way:

> while rejecting the proposals of Comrade Rutgers in their present form, i.e., the motion of Comrade Bogdanov and the members of the S.E.C. Presidium who voted with him,
>
> the C.C. (and then the *C.L.D.* in administrative order) expresses an earnest wish that Comrade Rutgers' group should not regard this refusal as a final one and should revise their proposals on the following lines: α) modification of the group, the main group of sponsors, by adding to it 5-8 prominent representatives of the American labour union movement or other labour organisations; β) reducing our Government's expenses to the sum of $300,000 maximum; γ) cutting and specifying our expenses in the event of the agreement being cancelled.[406]

Written between October 12 and 15, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON ASSIGNING A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV TO FOOD SUPPLY WORK[407]

Confirm the decision of the Orgbureau; point out once more the absolutely wrong behaviour of Comrade Shlyapnikov, who declared in the Orgbureau that he would not

comply; inquire of the Central Verification Commission and the Central Control Commission for how long they consider it possible to release Comrade Shlyapnikov for food supply work without detriment to the work of the Central Verification Commission.

Written October 14, 1921

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[408]

1) Guseinov and Akhundov to be called out *immediately*.
2) It be strictly demanded that factional strife in Baku and Azerbaijan cease completely.
3) It be confirmed that those engaging in factional strife will be expelled from the Party.
4) The comrades sent to Azerbaijan from the R.S.F.S.R. shall be directed to check fulfilment.
5) Stalin shall be instructed to draw up by Monday draft directives on the implementation of the Communist Party's national policy in Azerbaijan.
6) In regard to Persia the strictest confirmation to be made at once.

Written October 15, 1921

First published in the journal *Voprosi Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE SETTING UP OF A SINGLE COMMISSION ON CONCESSIONS

In view of offers from capitalists of neutral countries for concessions on some of the factories and branches of industry of the R.S.F.S.R., a committee of Comrades Trotsky, Bogdanov and Tsiperovich (with the right of the

Petrograd Gubernia Committee of the Party to replace him by another comrade) shall be directed to prepare a decision for the Politbureau abolishing all previous commissions on this matter and setting up a single directing commission to deal with these affairs in all their aspects.[409]

Written October 17, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV WITH A DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE RUTGERS GROUP[410]

19.X.

Comrade Mikhailov,

I enclose the reply of the Rutgers group to the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence (i.e., the decision of the Central Committee).

I believe this is tantamount to an *acceptance* of our terms.

I am therefore enclosing a draft *decision for the C.C.* which please *circulate as quickly as possible* among the members of the Politbureau. *Very urgent.*

With communist greetings,
Lenin

In view of the fact that the group of sponsors (Comrades Rutgers, Heywood and Calvert) have accepted the terms proposed in the decision of *the C.L.D.* of 17.X., the Central Committee resolves and directs the C.L.D. to resolve:

The C.L.D. resolves:

1) that the agreement with the group be considered concluded;

2) that Comrade Bogdanov be directed to immediately draw up and submit to the chairman of the C.L.D. for signature telegrams giving the most urgent orders for laying in stocks of wood, timber, etc.;

3) that the Presidium of the S.E.C. be directed within two days to draw up the final text of a modified agreement for endorsement by the C.L.D. on Friday, 21.X.1921;

4) that $5,000 be issued to Comrade Rutgers on Saturday, 22.X., according to the agreement, immediately after its endorsement by the C.L.D. on 21.X.

Further, without this being recorded as a decision of the C.L.D., the C.C. instructs Comrade Bogdanov, the Kuibyshev Commission, and the C.L.D. to modify the agreement in such a way that (1) *the C.L.D.* shall have the right to take part in the selection of extra candidates for the "Organising Committee" *before* and *for* the purpose of the final endorsement of this list; (2) the *total* sum of *all* the Soviet government's expenses *shall not exceed* $300,000; (3) in the event of the agreement being cancelled the Soviet authorities *shall not* incur any financial liabilities (or only such as shall be recognised as lawful by a court of the R.S.F.S.R. or *by the Central Executive Committee* of the R.S.F.S.R.).

Lenin

Written October 19, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS TO THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH THE A.R.A. ON THE ORGANISATION OF FOOD PARCELS TO RUSSIA[411]

I agree. 19/X Lenin

(even if the aim is *trade*, we *should* make this experiment, as we are given a clear profit for the famine-stricken and the right of control; and the right of cancellation at 3 months' notice. Hence we should *not* charge for carriage and storage). A controller of ours (confirmed by the Politbureau) shall be appointed to the *A.R.A.* who combines reliability with an ability to control the *whole* operation.

Written October 19, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO THE POLISH COMMUNISTS

19.X.1921

Dear Comrades,

Judging by the scrappy information concerning the growth of the communist movement in Poland that reaches our newspapers, and judging (still more) by the reports of some very prominent Polish comrades, the revolution in Poland is coming to a head.

A workers' revolution is brewing: the complete collapse of the P.P.S.* (in Russian—S.R.s and Mensheviks; in European—the II and II½ Internationals). The trade unions, one after another, are joining the Communists. The growth of demonstrations, and so on. Imminent and inevitable financial collapse. The gigantic failure of bourgeois democracy (and of the petty bourgeoisie) in Poland with the agrarian reform, a failure that is foredoomed, inevitable, and bound to push the majority of the rural population—the whole poor section of the peasantry—towards the Communists.

Financial collapse and shameless plunder of Poland by Entente capital (France and other countries) are bringing with them a practical exposure of national and Great Power illusions, an exposure that is strikingly clear and tangible to the *masses*, to the rank-and-file worker, to the rank-and-file peasant.

If this is so, then the revolution (Soviet revolution) in Poland is bound to win, and win soon. That being the case, the Government and the bourgeoisie must be prevented from strangling the revolution by bloody suppression of a *premature* uprising. You must not be provoked. You must wait for the tide to rise to its highest: it will sweep everything away and give victory to the Communists.

If the bourgeoisie kills 100-300 people, this will not ruin the cause. But if it is able to provoke a massacre, to kill 10-30 *thousand* workers, this *may* delay the revolution *even for several years*.

If it is important for the Government to hold elections to the Seim, then an effort should be made for the *Seim to*

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* P.P.S.—the Polish Socialist Party.—*Ed.*

be won by the wave of the workers' revolution and the peasants' discontent.

Do not yield to provocation.

The revolution must be allowed to *grow to full* ripening of the fruit. The victory of Soviet power *from within* Poland will be a gigantic *international* victory. If Soviet power has, in my opinion, now won an international victory to the extent of 20-30 per cent, then with the victory of Soviet power *from within* Poland, we shall have a 40-50, perhaps even 51 per cent *international* victory of the communist revolution. For Poland is next door to Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a Soviet Poland will undermine the *whole* regime built up on the peace of Versailles.

That is why the Polish Communists bear a responsibility before the whole world—that of keeping a firm grip on the helm of their ship and steering clear of provocations.

Is it worth while retaliating for the beating up of Dabął by Daszynski & Co.? Retaliation, if any, should be by beating up Daszynski, just like that, without any shooting or wounding. It may be worth while if it has the effect of teaching an insolent fellow a lesson at the hands of the workers, and stiffening the workers' spirit at the cost of a sacrifice of 5-10 of them (by imprisonment or execution). But maybe it is not worth while: would not the fact that *our* Dąbal had been brutally beaten up be *more useful* for the purpose of agitation among the *peasants*? Would it not be *more effective* in turning the sympathy of the *backward* peasants towards us than the thrashing of Daszynski? This should be weighed more carefully.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published April 22, 1962 in *Pravda* No. 112

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[412]

Re §4:

The People's Commissariat for Finance and the Finance Commission, as well as all comrades handling questions of home trade, shall be directed to select within the shortest

possible time a group of people with long practical experience in capitalist trade for the purpose of consultation on currency questions. These comrades shall be asked, within two days, to report in writing whether they can fulfil this assignment and in what period of time.

Written October 20, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR C.L.D. ON FOWLER PLOUGHS[413]

1. Comrade Martens, Manager of the Metal Department of the S.E.C. shall be made personally responsible for fulfilment of the decisions of the *C.L.D.* on Fowler ploughs.
2. Comrade Martens shall be directed, within a week to submit to the *C.L.D.* a written proposal containing a plan of work and concrete measures for its effective implementation.
3. The special three-man commission shall be liquidated, made to hand over all business to Comrade Martens within a week and submit a written report on its work.
4. The People's Commissariat for Justice shall be instructed to investigate, within a week, the red tape, mismanagement and wrong attitude to this business on the part of the Metal Department, also, especially, on the part of the three-man commission and other institutions. Its report to be presented to the *C.L.D.*

Written October 21, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.L.D. ON THE QUESTION OF REPORTS AND DIAGRAMS FOR THE C.L.D.[414]

OCTOBER 21, 1921

A commission consisting of comrades Gorbunov, Smolyaninov, Avanesov (with the right of replacement) and Krumin and with the co-operation of the Central Statistical

Board, the State Planning Commission and the appropriate departments, shall be directed

to submit to the C.L.D. within one week the draft of a decision calling for all departments to present statistical data and diagrams monthly to the C.L.D. pertaining especially to economic activities, their analysis, working up and formulation of practical conclusions.

Comrade Gorbunov or Smolyaninov to be charged with summoning the commission and reporting to the C.L.D.[415]

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY[416]

Comrade Bogdanov jointly with Comrade Kamenev shall be charged with revising both drafts with a view to eliminating the red tape in both of them and establishing a system of efficient management on really commercial lines.

The two texts of the proposals to be juxtaposed and circulated among the members of the Politbureau.

Written October 27, 1921

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

PLAN OF AN ARTICLE "COMMERCIAL ORGANISATION"[417]

Plan of an Article "Commercial Organisation"

Will this do for a slogan?
"Commerce"? = capitalism.
(α) "State capitalism". Its advantages.
(β) War conditions excluded "commerce".

(γ) The transition to "communism" was very often (both for war reasons and owing to almost absolute poverty and to mistakes, a number of mistakes) made without the intervening stages of socialism (communism vs socialism)

(δ) "Accounting and control"?

(ε) *Should pay for itself.*

$$\left\langle \begin{array}{l} c + v + s \\ \quad s \ — \ \text{accumulation} \\ \quad\quad — \ \text{maintenance of the state} \end{array} \right\rangle \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Allgemein} \\ \text{Theoreti-} \\ \text{sches*} \end{array} \right\}$$

"War" = dictatorship of the proletariat.

variety of forms
- (α) Politics 25.X.1917—5.I.1918
- (β) Weltpolitik. Brester Frieden.**
- (γ) Civil war.
- (δ) Fighting "economic crisis", *i.e.*, the petty-bourgeois elements? post-war indiscipline? disintegration? inefficiency?

Condition for victory in war: supreme effort.

Commercial organisation =
= supreme effort
= reducing enterprises to a minimum, their concentration
= checking results
= "thrift".

Either—or:

aut 100,000 + 500,000
16...¼ lb. for a peasant?***

aut supreme effort, reduction, "pressure" (?)
Had enough of indolence, slovenliness, petty profiteering, thieving, laxity.

Why not "thrift"? — freedom of trade
— state capitalism
— currency system.

Written in October or November, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

* General theoretical propositions.—*Ed.*

** World politics. The peace of Brest.—*Ed.*

*** These figures have not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE FINANCIAL PLAN AND PLAN OF EMISSION FOR 1922

1

1) The Finance Commission shall be directed to submit by Tuesday, 15.XI., an estimate in gold rubles covering all and every form of revenue, including the tax in kind, fuel, etc., etc.,

— to submit a calculation in gold rubles showing distribution of expenditure by commissariats (absolute figures)—in comparison with similar figures before the war (average for 5 or 10 years) and with approximate figures for 1919 and 1920.

2) To submit 2 variants: 240 and 300 million gold ruble volume of emission.

3) To compare quota distribution of the general budget (both material and monetary) with the distribution of rations under the food plan of the *C.L.D.*

4) Drawing up of the budget on the basis of the given plan (with an emission variant of 240 million gold rubles) to be started at once.

5) Assignment for the State Planning Commission? The Central Statistical Board? or an enlarged commission?

6) Time limit—20.XII.

7) Could we not publish some of the Finance Commission's *findings*?

especially calculation (in goods) of the pre-war ruble, and so on.[418]

Written November 5, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

2

1) The Finance Commission and the State Planning Commission shall be directed to complete the estimate of revenue and expenditure on the broad terms at present accepted by the Finance Commission, as well as the comparison ordered by the C.P.C. in its decision of November 5.

2) These calculations to be presented in the form of summarised statements viewed as preliminary data for shaping the state budget for the year 1922.[419]

Written November 18, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

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TALK WITH A DELEGATION OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC[420]

NOVEMBER 5, 1921

1st question of the Mongolian delegation: "Comrade Lenin, what do you think about the establishment of a People's Revolutionary Party in our country and what is most important for us?"

Comrade Lenin outlined to our delegation our country's international situation and pointed out that owing to the M.P.R.'s geographical position the imperialist powers, in case of war, would try to seize our country and use it as a jumping-off ground for military operations against another country. Therefore, Lenin said, the only right way for every working person in your country was to fight for state and economic independence in alliance with the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia. This fight could not be carried on isolatedly, therefore the establishment of a party of Mongolian arats was a pledge of success in their struggle.

The Mongolian delegation's second question: "Will the national liberation struggle be victorious?"

Comrade Lenin's answer:

"I have been in the revolutionary movement myself for thirty years and I know by experience how difficult it is for any people to liberate themselves from their external and internal enslavers. Although Mongolia is a cattle-breeding country and the bulk of her population are nomad herdsmen, she has achieved great progress in her revolution, and most important of all, has made good these successes by creating a People's Revolutionary Party of her own, whose aim is to become a mass party uncluttered by alien elements."

The Mongolian delegation's third question: "Ought not the People's Revolutionary Party be transformed into a Communist Party?"

Comrade Lenin's reply:

"I should not recommend it, because one party cannot be 'transformed' into another." Comrade Lenin explained the essence of a Communist Party as a party of the proletariat, and said: "The revolutionaries will have to put in a good deal of work in developing state, economic and cultural activities before the herdsman elements become a proletarian mass, which may eventually help to 'transform' the People's Revolutionary Party into a Communist Party. A mere change of signboards is harmful and dangerous."

Comrade Lenin elaborated on the idea that it was possible and necessary for the M.P.R. to follow a non-capitalist path of development, the main condition for which was hard work on the part of the People's Revolutionary Party and the Government, so that this work and the increased influence of the Party and the authorities would result in a growth of the number of co-operatives, in the introduction of new forms of economic activity and national culture, and would rally the arats behind the Party and the Government in the interests of the country's economic and cultural development. It was only from the islets of the new economic way of life created by the efforts of the Party and the Government that the new non-capitalist economic system of arat Mongolia would take shape.

First published in 1934
in the book *The Ninth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party*
(September 28-October 5, 1934)
Ulan-Bator, *Modern Mongolia* Publishing House

Printed from the text of the book

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

It shall be recognised that the resolution of the First All-Russia Conference on the cultural and educational work of the trade unions is at variance with the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on the Chief Committee for Political Education and its relations with the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions (§ 2).[421]

The resolution of the Congress of Gubernia Political Education Departments[422] shall be confirmed as a whole and the Chief Committee for Political Education shall be directed, within a month and in agreement with the A.C.C.T.U. to draw up detailed practical instructions giving concrete definitions of the forms of "joint" work by both institutions and the forms in which the trade unions and their bodies are to "use" the "apparatus and staff" of the Chief Committee for Political Education.[423]

Written November 8, 1921

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV WITH DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[424]

Comrade *Mikhailov*,

Please have this sent round to the members of the Politbureau.

My personal opinion is that the whole of V. Milyutin's plan should be *rejected* as being worthless and absolutely unconsidered.

I propose it be *rejected*.

Lenin

9/XI.

Written November 9, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV WITH DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON FOOD SUPPLY WORK IN THE UKRAINE[425]

9/XI.

Comrade Mikhailov,

Please send this round to the members of the Politbureau and return to me.

I propose this decision for the Politbureau.

The Politbureau impresses upon the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine that full, 100%, food collections in the Ukraine are of absolutely paramount importance to the R.S.F.S.R. Similarly the delivery to us of 57 million poods. Immediate and energetic measures are to be worked out for achieving this aim and all decisions are to be reported.

Brief fortnightly reports by telephone are to be made on the progress of food collection and delivery to the R.S.F.S.R.

Lenin

Written November 9, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECREE "ON PENALTIES FOR FALSE DENUNCIATIONS"[426]

I propose an addendum raising the penalty

α) to not less than so many years

β) for deliberately false evidence or a reply *in writing* (or evasion of a question under certain conditions) after the pattern of Meineid* in Germany, but without the Eid.**

Lenin

Written between November 14 and 24, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT DECREE "ON THE INTRODUCTION OF PAYMENT FOR NEWSPAPERS"

Addendum necessary either in the form of a number of §§ on control (*strictest*) of circulation free of charge,

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* —perjury.—*Ed.*

** —oath.—*Ed.*

or make this obligatory by special instructions (one § on this).[427]

15/XI. *Lenin*

Written November 15, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV WITH A MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Viva voce voting

26.XI.1921

Comrade Molotov,

Could you try to settle two questions in the Politbureau by telephone:

1) That Sokolnikov be appointed member of the Board of the People s Commissariat for Finance and member of the Finance Commission *on condition* that he remains *Chairman of the Turkestan Bureau* and is obliged to *travel* to Turkestan when necessary until things there have been fully put in order. (If this does not get a majority, I shall have to put the matter for consideration to the whole Politbureau)

2) Today we rejected my motion offhand[428] and I agreed to withdraw it. But I now see that I was too hasty and I renew it:

That 1) Pyatakov; 2) Rukhimovich; 3) Bogdanov (or his deputy Smilga) be directed to submit to the Politbureau within two weeks a plan (or regulations or theses) of relations between the gubernia economic conferences and the large enterprises located in the given gubernia and subordinated directly to the centre in Moscow.[429]

[We ourselves cannot draft it. It is a *universal* question *All* the commissariats will have to be questioned. It must be worked up quickly. Start with the Donets Gubernia Economic Conference.]

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO A. D. TSYURUPA WITH A DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND A NOTE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

28/XI.

Comrade Tsyurupa,

My plan has matured:

In addition to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence held by Rykov (with the right of casting vote in the Council of People's Commissars) the post of second deputy chairman of the C.L.D. is instituted on equal terms. Tsyurupa is appointed to this post and released from the Food Commissariat.

The rights of these deputies: a casting vote in the C.P.C. and the *C.L.D.*; the chairing of the meetings in the absence of the chairman. *All* the rights of C.P.C. chairman as far as participation in all boards and institutions is concerned, and (inter alia) the right to give instructions in regard to the practical work (subject to immediate execution) to People's Commissars and to members of their boards, etc. (with the knowledge and consent of the commissars of the government departments concerned) *on questions pertaining to the integration and direction* of the economic commissariats' activities.

That is how I conceive the official decision of the *All-Russia Central Executive Committee.*[430]

The task is to integrate and improve the *economic work* AS A WHOLE, especially *in connection with and through the State Bank* (trade) and the *State Planning Commission.*

To make a *first-hand* study of the specific features and work of all the economic commissariats and an acquaintance with *all the members* of their boards and a number (10-100) of local and regional top workers in this field.

To *personally* attend *important* board meetings of the respective commissariats, the State Planning Commission, the State Bank, Centrosoyuz, *etc.* and check *personally*,

at the choice of the Deputy Chairmen of the C.L.D., those functions which are considered *most vital* or of special topicality.

For how long these posts will be, "we shall see": perhaps 3-4 years, perhaps 30 years.

One of the objects is to develop a highly trained type of instructor-inspector to check and *organise* all economic work at all economic institutions centrally and locally.

The deputy chairmen conduct their work *through the apparatus* of the existing commissariats, having only the *Managing Department of the C.L.D.* as *their own* body (4-5 C.L.D. business managers with 1-2 assistants and 1-2 secretaries to each assistant).

The business manager of the C.L.D., his assistants and secretaries form the *sole* single staff of the *C.L.D.* as a whole and of both its deputy chairmen.

Let me have your reply not later than **WEDNESDAY**. *Return this*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

To members of the Politbureau: I have received A. D. Tsyurupa's consent to this *tentative* plan and ask all the members of the Politbureau to read it. I want to put it before the Politbureau tomorrow, 1.XII.

30.XI. *Lenin*

Written November 28 and 30, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT OF A DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE VECHEKA

1st: jurisdiction to be narrowed
2nd: right to arrest still narrower
3rd: term < 1 month

4th: more weight to courts or only through the courts
5th: name
6th: pass > radical relaxations[431] through the *All-Russia Central Executive Committee*.

Written December 1, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TACTICS OF THE UNITED FRONT

a) That the line of joint action with the workers of the Second International proposed by a number of Communist Parties of the Communist International and introduced by Zinoviev, Radek and Bukharin be approved. The latter to be directed within two days to set forth this line clearly in a draft resolution to be circulated among the members of the Politbureau.
b) That Comrade Bukharin be directed to write and show the Politbureau an article summing up the experience of the R.C.P. in the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks and the blocs between them.[432]

Written December 1, 1921
First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44
Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.L.D. ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE UTILISATION OF MATERIAL RESOURCES[433]

a) The draft of the State Planning Commission shall be adopted as a basis and the latter directed within a week to submit a revised draft with amendments to §§2 and 3, as well as results of the work called for in §5.

Written December 2, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[434]

The Food Commissariat shall be directed to preserve the main group of specialists (as indicated by the S.E.C.) in the flour mill administration and carry out the maintenance programme for large flour mills under the control of the S.E.C.

Written December 5, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS TO THE THESES ON A UNITED FRONT

Comrade Zinoviev,

I have read the rough draft of the theses and have no objections.

The paragraph on the history of Bolshevism should be amplified and partly modified. It is incorrect to say there was a split only in 1910. It should be stated that the formal splits with the Mensheviks in the spring of 1905 and in January 1912 alternated with the semi-unity and unity of 1906 and 1907 followed by that of 1910 not only because of the vicissitudes of the struggle but also under pressure from the rank and file, who demanded check tests through their own experience.

I think this should be stated more explicitly and concretely on one page.[435]

6/XII. *Lenin*

Written December 6, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the typewritten copy

LETTER TO THE PROPAGANDA AND ACTION COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST[436]

Dear Comrades,

I heartily welcome your forthcoming publication. I am very sorry that ill-health prevents me from contributing an article. I hope that the business of attracting the best representatives of the working people of the East will make faster and wider progress thanks to your newspaper. The destiny of all Western civilisation now largely depends on drawing the working masses of the East into political activities.

With best wishes and greetings,

Lenin

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R.

Dictated by telephone not before December 17, 1921

First published April 22, 1957 in *Pravda* No. 112

Printed from the secretary notes

COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) ON THE PARTY PURGE

With regard to Zalutsky's draft resolution on the Party purge I would like to make two remarks.

1) In section 3 §a Zalutsky proposes that enrolment into the Party be suspended for 6 months. I think this is wrong. I would propose, on my part, not to suspend enrolment, but to lay down stricter conditions, namely: a long term of probation. If an eighteen-month term for real workers is considered too long, it can be reduced, say, to nine, or even six months, as Trotsky proposes. In the case of such short terms, however, I think we should require a qualified

majority in the bodies making enrolment decisions, for instance, that it should require a majority of not less than four-fifths to have the term of enrolment reduced, this four-fifths majority to be demanded not only from one Party body (the local cell making the admission), but from several bodies for the sake of mutual control (for example, from the Gubernia Party Committee in addition to the local cell, and so on). I would have nothing whatever against admission into the Party being made easier for genuine workers, but unless very strict conditions are laid down for determining who is to be considered a worker of large industry, we shall immediately find a mass of riff-raff crawling through the hole again. As regards Red Armymen, I think we should have stricter conditions, since, for one thing, most of them are not workers, but peasants, and secondly, these people are too young and need testing.

2) In Section 4 §a Zalutsky proposes a revision of the plans of work among the Young Communist League. I believe stricter conditions should be laid down on this point to make sure that the members of the Y.C.L. admitted to membership of the Party have, first, really studied seriously and learnt something, and secondly, that they have a long record of serious practical work (economic, cultural, etc.).[437]

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
December 22, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the secretary
notes (typed copy)

SPEECHES AT A MEETING OF NON-PARTY DELEGATES TO THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 26, 1921[438]

1

Comrades, having decided to continue our talk—I think we have no doubts on this score—I just want to say that it is now about half past eight and we can sit on till half past nine or even later. We must pick a question which we

are most interested in. If, as one comrade said here, it is the agrarian question, then I say—let us distribute our time on those questions which are most important for you. My business here, as I understand it, is mainly to listen and make notes. What I wanted to tell you I have already told you at the congress. I am trying to take down notes as to what gubernia, what uyezd the complaints come from and what most of them are about. I think the time should be distributed in such a way that after the question of compulsory carting tax has been dealt with, we should figure out what questions seem most important so that delegates from different gubernias can have time to have their say on them. My business here is to make as detailed notes as possible in order to know what the non-Party delegates have spoken about. In any case, it will be very difficult for me to answer some of the questions that will be put here, as I have no information at hand and cannot give an immediate reply. That is why I suggest choosing questions which are considered the most important and on which delegates will speak from the floor, the way the carting tax question has been raised, and I shall write down every statement made by local people.

FROM MAO TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

2

Comrades, it is very difficult for me to say even a few words on this question, because all the questions that have been put here I am writing down with a note of what gubernia they come from, but without exact information from the institution concerned I am unable straight off to answer the questions that have been put here. The comrade from the Commissariat for Labour who has just spoken, found it much easier because he has before his eyes a published law and an explanation of what mitigations the enforcement of that law will yield. Without information from the commissariats concerned I can give no definite answers to some of the questions that have been put here.

A number of notes have been sent up. One of them is from a Ukrainian comrade from Kiev, who asks why I have never visited the Ukraine. It is a long journey to the Ukraine, and a difficult one to undertake.

One comrade asks, who is going to pay for the horses killed in the carting service. I have made a note of that question. The comrade has already answered in a general way.

Two notes have been handed up on the question of the tax in kind and about it being impossible for the needy peasant to buy textile goods. Naturally, the peasants in all gubernias these days have many difficulties like these to bear. Without information from the institution concerned I am unable to answer this sort of question just now.

Can we help and to what extent can we help? I repeat, that at the moment I can give no reply. It seems to me that the most important thing that has been said here on the question of carting service is—as far as I can gather from a glance at my notes (and I have written down briefly what each of the comrades has said here)—the most important thing, to my mind, are the instances of abuse and irregularities on the part of the Zheleskoms.[439] Most of the complaints have been about the stints assigned by the Zheleskoms being heavy, about the hard time peasants are having, about there being far too many irregularities in the distribution and assignment of jobs, especially at a time when they are simply harmful to the peasants' farm work. I have made notes of all these remarks, and a note that when the last three-week campaign was held, all comrades from the centre were sent out to the local areas. I asked for exact information on all irregularities connected with fuel work, and on all abuses, as well as a number of reports to be collected. I have already begun to receive letters about this, but recently, owing to ill-health, which made me confine myself only to a general report at the congress, I have not been able to deal with these letters myself. This will be entrusted to another comrade, who is temporarily taking my place, but we shall definitely collect all the information that has come in during the last three-week campaign. The complaints about the irregularities and abuses of the Zheleskoms I consider, on the whole, undoubtedly correct. One of the principal reasons why it was decided to introduce the carting tax which the comrade from the Labour Commissariat has spoken about here is that, unless the amount of work to be done is properly determined (this attempt is being

made by the fixing of a six-day period of work in the law), unless this is properly determined in the law, abuses by the gubernia logging committees and the Zheleskoms are bound to take place and will be very difficult to combat. But when the law definitely declares, as it now does, how many work days are required and there will be a known set task fixing how much work is to be done in the given number of days, the abuses will be much easier to combat. Naturally, the fight against abuses by these bodies in the gubernias and uyezds is no easy job, especially when, as a comrade here pointed out, many of the old employees, the former landowners and former timber contractors have wormed their way into these bodies. A stricter eye must be kept on this in the local areas and we must have more comrades from among the non-Party peasants in the Central Executive Committee, who could be applied to in the event of a complaint failing to reach its destination, and who would raise the question at a sitting of the C.E.C. and demand an investigation into the abuses. These measures will be put through at this congress in any case. The number of C.E.C. members from among the non-Party peasants, as comrades taking part in the congress have told me, will definitely be increased. By this means it will be possible to keep an eye on abuses by the Zheleskoms and easier to combat them when there will be more non-Party peasant members in the C.E.C. I repeat, I am making a note of all the remarks that are made here and shall write to the appropriate commissariat or economic council about each of them in order to have proper measures taken. I cannot of course give a reply offhand to each particular question without getting the information from the commissariat concerned.

3

I have asked Comrade Kalinin for two minutes to clear up any misunderstanding that his words may have caused.[440] I am sure he did not intend to impute to me the idea that I ever suggested burning prayer-books. Needless to say, I never suggested such a thing and never could. You know that according to our Constitution, the fundamental law

of our Republic, freedom of conscience in respect of religion is fully guaranteed to every person.

Another word to the comrade who spoke about the very difficult situation in some of the uyezds of Vyatka Gubernia. These uyezds are in the famine-stricken area. Our main hope now will be in the agreement which the American Government has offered us. We shall conclude it within the next few days. Under this agreement the American Government offers twenty million dollars. We shall give ten million, making thirty million dollars altogether—that is, sixty million gold rubles. This is a sizable sum. Most of the spring crop area, if not all of it, will be sown. In addition we are sending men to Canada. I think we shall be able to spend an extra sum from the gold fund to buy a little more seed. The main problem now, of course, is the famine, the dearth of fodder. The sowing of spring crops must be done as fully as possible. Every effort in this direction will be made. (*Applause.*)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the shorthand
record

DRAFT THESES ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE UNIONS UNDER THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY[441]

The Plenum of the C.C., R.C.P. on 28.XII.1921 considered the question of the role and functions of the trade unions under the New Economic Policy. The plenum heard the reports of Comrades Rudzutak, Andreyev and Shlyapnikov (the planned report by Comrade Lutovinov was not made owing to failure to call the reporter out in time). After an exchange of opinions it was decided to submit the original draft theses of Comrades Rudzutak and Andreyev to a committee of these two comrades with the addition of Lenin and to charge this committee with drafting theses for endorsement by the Politbureau.

(Several lines will be added to this *after* approval of the draft by the committee and then the Politbureau.)

DRAFT

1. THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The New Economic Policy introduces a number of important changes in the position of the proletariat and, consequently, in that of the trade unions. These changes are due to the fact that in their entire policy of transition from capitalism to socialism the Communist Party and the Soviet government are now adopting special methods to implement this transition and in many respects are operating differently from the way they operated before: they are capturing a number of positions by a "new flanking movement", so to speak; they are drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive against capitalism. In particular, a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control, are now being permitted and are developing; on the other hand, the state enterprises are being put on what is called a profit basis, i.e., they are in effect being largely reorganised on commercial and capitalist lines.

2. STATE CAPITALISM IN THE PROLETARIAN STATE AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The proletarian state may, without changing its own nature, permit freedom of trade and the development of capitalism only within certain bounds, and only on the condition that the state regulates (supervises, controls, determines the forms and methods of, etc.) private trade and private capitalism. The success of such regulation will depend not only on the state authorities, but also, and to a larger extent, on the degree of maturity of the proletariat and of the masses of the working people generally, on their cultural level, etc. But even if this regulation is completely successful, the antagonism of class interests between labour and capital will certainly remain. Consequently, one of the main tasks that will henceforth confront the trade unions is to protect in every way the class interests of the proletariat in its struggle against capital. This task should be openly put in the forefront, and the machinery

of the trade unions must be reorganised, modified or supplemented accordingly; strike funds, and so on should be formed, or rather, built up.

3. THE STATE ENTERPRISES THAT ARE BEING PUT ON A PROFIT BASIS AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The conversion of state enterprises to what is called the profit basis is inevitably and inseparably connected with the New Economic Policy; in the near future this is bound to become the predominant, if not the sole, form of state enterprise. Actually, this means that with the free market now permitted and developing, the state enterprises, will to a large extent be put on a commercial, capitalist basis. This circumstance, in view of the urgent need to increase the productivity of labour and make every state enterprise pay its way and show a profit, and in view of the inevitable rise of narrow departmental interests and excessive departmental zeal, is bound to create a certain conflict of interests between the masses of workers and the directors and managers of the state enterprises, or the government departments in charge of them. Therefore, it is undoubtedly the duty of the trade unions, in regard to the state enterprises as well, to protect the class interests of the proletariat and the working masses against their employers.

4. THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A STATE WHICH RECOGNISES PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND, FACTORIES, ETC., AND WHERE POLITICAL POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS, AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A STATE WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNISE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND AND THE MAJORITY OF THE LARGE ENTERPRISES AND WHERE POLITICAL POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE PROLETARIAT

As long as classes exist, the class struggle is inevitable. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the existence of classes is inevitable; and the Programme of the

Russian Communist Party definitely states that we are taking only the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must frankly admit the existence of a class struggle and its inevitability until the electrification of industry and agriculture is completed—at least in the main—and until small production and the supremacy of the market are thereby cut off at the roots. It follows from this that at the present moment we can under no circumstances abandon the idea of the strike struggle, we cannot, as a matter of principle, conceive the possibility of a law that makes compulsory state mediation take the place of strikes.

On the other hand, it is obvious that under capitalism the ultimate object of the strike struggle is to break up the state machine and to overthrow the given class state power. Under the transitional type of proletarian state such as ours, however, the ultimate object of the strike struggle can only be to fortify the proletarian state and the state power of the proletarian class by combating the bureaucratic distortions, mistakes and flaws in this state, and by curbing the class appetites of the capitalists who try to evade its control, etc. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must never forget and must never conceal from the workers and the mass of the working people that the strike struggle in a state where the proletariat holds political power can be explained and justified only by the bureaucratic distortions of the proletarian state and by all sorts of survivals of the old capitalist system in the government offices on the one hand, and by the political immaturity and cultural backwardness of the mass of the working people on the other. When the law courts and all other organs of the state are built on a class basis, by the working people themselves, with the bourgeoisie excluded from the electorate, the normal method of settling conflicts between labour and capital, between employed and employers, will more and more often find expression in the working people turning directly to the state authorities.

5. REVERSION TO VOLUNTARY TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

The compulsory wholesale signing up of all workers for membership in the trade unions is no longer consistent with the present degree of socialisation achieved in industry or with the level of development of the masses. Compulsory membership has moreover introduced a certain degree of bureaucratic distortion into the trade unions themselves. It is absolutely essential to revert for a fairly considerable length of time to the practice of voluntary membership in the trade unions. Under no circumstances must trade union members be required to subscribe to any specific political views; in this respect, as well as in respect of religion, the trade unions must be non-partisan. All that must be required of trade union members in the proletarian state is that they should understand comradely discipline and the necessity of uniting the workers' forces for the purpose of protecting the interests of the working people, and that they should keep faith with the working people's government, i.e., the Soviet government. The proletarian state must encourage the workers to organise in trade unions both for legal and material reasons; but the trade unions can have no rights without duties.

6. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY

Following its seizure of political power, the principal and fundamental interest of the proletariat lies in securing an increase in output, an enormous increase in the productive forces of society. This task, which is clearly formulated in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party, is particularly urgent in our country today owing to post-war ruin, famine and economic dislocation. Hence, the speediest and most enduring success in restoring large-scale industry is a condition without which no success can be achieved in the general cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital and securing the victory of socialism. To achieve

this success in Russia, in the conditions at present obtaining in that country, it is absolutely essential that all authority in the factories be concentrated in the hands of the management. The factory management, usually built up on the principle of one-man responsibility, must have authority independently to fix and pay out wages, and also distribute rations, working clothes, and all other supplies; it must enjoy the utmost freedom to manoeuvre, exercise strict control of the actual successes achieved in increasing production, in making the factory pay its way and show a profit, and carefully select the most talented and capable administrative personnel, etc.

Under these circumstances, any direct interference by the trade unions in the management of the factories must be regarded as positively harmful and impermissible.

It would be absolutely wrong, however, to interpret this indisputable axiom to mean that the trade unions must play no part in the socialist organisation of industry and in the management of state industry. Their participation in this is necessary in the following strictly defined forms.

7. THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE BUSINESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATIONS OF THE PROLETARIAN STATE

The proletariat is the class foundation of the state making the transition from capitalism to socialism. In a country where the small peasantry is overwhelmingly predominant the proletariat can successfully fulfil this function if it very skilfully, cautiously and gradually establishes an alliance with the vast majority of the peasantry. The trade unions must collaborate closely and constantly with the government, all the political and economic activities of which are guided by the class-conscious vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party. Being a school of communism in general, the trade unions must, in particular, be a school for training the whole mass of workers, and eventually all working people, in the art of managing socialist industry (and gradually also agriculture).

Proceeding from these principles, the trade unions' part in the activities connected with the business and administrative organisations of the proletarian state should take the following main forms:

(1) The trade unions should help staff all the business and administrative bodies connected with economics by nominating their candidates for them and casting a consultative vote; the trade unions take part in these bodies too, not directly, but through the members of the higher state bodies, the members of business boards, members of the factory managements (where collegiate management is practised), managers, their assistants, etc., nominated by them and endorsed by the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

(2) One of the most important functions of the trade unions is to promote and train factory managers from among the workers and the masses of the working people generally. At the present time we have scores of such factory managers who are quite satisfactory, and hundreds who are more or less satisfactory, but very soon, however, we must have hundreds of the former and thousands of the latter. The trade unions must much more carefully and persistently than hitherto keep a systematic register of all workers and peasants capable of holding posts of this kind, and thoroughly, efficiently and from every aspect verify the progress they make in learning the art of management.

(3) No less important is the participation of the trade unions in all the planning bodies of the proletarian state. In addition to participating in all cultural and educational activities and in production propaganda, the trade unions must also, on an increasing scale, enlist the working class and the masses of the working people generally for all branches of the work of building up the state economy; they must make them familiar with all aspects of economic life and with all details of industrial operations—from the procurement of raw materials to the marketing of the product; give them a more and more concrete understanding of the single state plan of socialist economy and the worker's and peasant's practical interest in its implementation.

(4) The drawing up of wage rates and scales of supplies, etc., is one of the essential functions of the trade unions in the building of socialism and in their participation in the management of industry. In particular, disciplinary courts should steadily improve labour discipline and proper ways of promoting it and achieving increased productivity; but they must not interfere with the functions of the People's Courts in general or with the functions of factory managements.

This list of the major functions of the trade unions in the work of building up socialist economy, should, of course, be drawn up in greater detail by the competent trade union and government bodies. The most important thing is that the trade unions should consciously and resolutely avoid direct, inexpert, incompetent and irresponsible interference in administrative matters, which has caused no little harm, and should start persistent, practical activities calculated to extend over a long period of years and designed to give the workers and all the working people generally *practical training* in the art of *managing* the economy of the whole country.

8. CONTACT WITH THE MASSES— THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITION FOR ALL TRADE UNION ACTIVITY

Contact with the masses, i.e., with the overwhelming majority of the workers (and eventually of all the working people), is the most important and most fundamental condition for the success of all trade union activity. In all the trade union organisations and their machinery, from bottom up, there should be instituted, and tested in practice over a period of many years, a system of responsible comrades—who must not all be Communists—who should live right among the workers, study their lives in every detail, and be able unerringly, on any question, and at any time, to judge the mood, the real needs, aspirations, and thoughts of the masses. They must be able without a shadow of false idealisation to define the degree of their class-consciousness and the extent to which they are influenced by various prejudices and survivals of the past; and they must be able

to win the boundless confidence of the masses by a comradely attitude and concern for their needs. One of the greatest and most serious dangers that confront the numerically small Communist Party, which, as the vanguard of the working class, is guiding a vast country in the process of transition to socialism (for the time being without the direct support of the more advanced countries), is isolation from the masses, the danger that the vanguard may run too far ahead and fail to "straighten out the line", fail to maintain firm contact with the whole army of labour, i.e., with the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants. Just as the very best factory, with the very best motors and first-class machines, will be forced to remain idle if the transmission-belts from the motors to the machines are damaged, so our work of socialist construction must meet with inevitable disaster if the trade unions—the transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses—are badly fitted or function badly. It is not sufficient to explain, to reiterate and corroborate this truth; it must be backed up organisationally by the whole structure of the trade unions and by their everyday activities.

9. THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE STATUS OF THE TRADE UNIONS UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

From all the foregoing it is evident that there are a number of contradictions in the various functions of the trade unions. On the one hand, their principal method of operation is that of persuasion and education; on the other hand, as participants in the exercise of state power they cannot refuse to share in coercion. On the one hand, their main function is to protect the interests of the masses of the working people in the most direct and immediate sense of the term; on the other hand, as participants in the exercise of state power and builders of the economy as a whole they cannot refuse to resort to pressure. On the one hand, they must operate in military fashion, for the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fiercest, most dogged and most desperate class war; on the other hand, specifically military methods of operation

are least of all applicable to the trade unions. On the one hand; they must be able to adapt themselves to the masses, to their level; on the other hand, they must never pander to the prejudices and backwardness of the masses, but steadily raise them to a higher and higher level, etc., etc.

These contradictions are no accident, and they will persist for several decades. For one thing, these contradictions are inherent in every school. And the trade unions are a school of communism. We cannot count, until the lapse of several decades, on the majority of the workers achieving the highest level of development and discarding all traces and memories of the "school" for adults. Secondly, as long as survivals of capitalism and small production remain, contradictions between them and the young shoots of socialism are inevitable throughout the social system.

Two practical conclusions must be drawn from this. First, for the successful conduct of trade union activities it is not enough to understand their functions correctly, it is not enough to organise them properly. In addition, special tact is required, ability to approach the masses in a special way in each individual case for the purpose of raising these masses to a higher cultural, economic and political stage with the minimum of friction.

Second, the aforementioned contradictions will inevitably give rise to disputes, disagreements, friction, etc. A higher body is required with sufficient authority to settle these at once. This higher body is the Communist Party and the international federation of the Communist Parties of all countries—the Communist International.

10. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE SPECIALISTS

The main principles on this question are set forth in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party; but these will remain paper principles unless constant attention is paid to the facts which indicate the degree to which they are put into practice. Recent facts of this kind are: first, cases of the murder of engineers by workers in socialised mines not only in the Urals, but also in the Donets Basin;

second, the suicide of V. V. Oldenborger, chief engineer of the Moscow Waterworks.*

The Communist Party and the Soviet government as a whole bear a far greater share of the blame for cases of this kind than the trade unions. It is not a question now of establishing the degree of political guilt, but of drawing certain political conclusions. Unless our leading bodies, i.e., the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions, guard as the apple of their eye every specialist who does his work conscientiously and knows and loves it—even though the ideas of communism are totally alien to him—it will be useless to expect any serious progress in socialist construction. We may not be able to achieve it soon, but we must at all costs achieve a situation in which specialists—as a separate social stratum, which will persist until we have reached the highest stage of development of communist society—can enjoy better conditions of life under socialism than they enjoyed under capitalism insofar as concerns their material and legal status, comradely collaboration with the workers and peasants, and in the intellectual plane, i.e., finding satisfaction in their work, realising that it is socially useful and independent of the sordid interests of the capitalist class. Nobody will regard a government department as being tolerably well organised if it does not take systematic measures to provide for all the needs of the specialists, to reward the best of them, to safeguard and protect their interests, etc., and does not secure practical results in this. The trade unions must conduct all the activities of the type indicated (or systematically collaborate in the activities of all the government departments concerned) not from the point of view of the interests of the given department, but from the point of view of the interests of labour and of the economy as a whole. With regard to the specialists, on the trade unions devolves the very arduous duty of daily exercising influence on the broad masses of the working people in order to create proper relations between them and the specialists. Only such activities can produce really important practical results.

* Here is the report about this in *Pravda* for 3.1. 1922. ((quote the full text on p. 4)).[442]

11. THE TRADE UNIONS AND PETTY-BOURGEOIS INFLUENCES ON THE WORKING CLASS

Trade unions are really effective only when they unite very broad strata of the non-Party workers. This must give rise—particularly in a country in which the peasantry largely predominates—to relative stability, specifically among the trade unions, of those political influences that serve as the superstructure over the remnants of capitalism and over small production. These influences are petty-bourgeois, i.e., Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik (the Russian variety of the parties of the II and II½ Internationals) on the one hand, and anarchist on the other. Only among these trends has any considerable number of people remained who defend capitalism ideologically and not from selfish class motives, and continue to believe in the non-class nature of the "democracy", "equality" and "liberty" in general that they preach.

It is to this socio-economic cause and not to the role of individual groups, still less of individual persons, that we must attribute the survivals (sometimes even the revival) in our country of such petty-bourgeois ideas among the trade unions. The Communist Party, the Soviet bodies that conduct cultural and educational activities and all Communist members of trade unions must therefore devote far more attention to the ideological struggle against petty-bourgeois influences, trends and deviations among the trade unions, especially because the New Economic Policy is bound to lead to a certain strengthening of capitalism. It is urgently necessary to counteract this by intensifying the struggle against petty-bourgeois influences upon the working class.

The End

Discuss together with the theses.

Give this to Comrade Molotov **without rewriting**.

This is the end of the publishable theses; i.e., the draft of them that is being submitted to the commission and then the Politbureau.

I suggest that the resolution contained in Comrade Rudzutak's draft be adopted by a special decision of the Politbureau in the following wording:

The Politbureau directs the Orgbureau to set up under the Orgbureau of the Central Committee a special commission to check and replace some of the leading officials (and if possible all communist functionaries) in the trade union movement for the purpose of intensifying the struggle against petty-bourgeois, S.R., Menshevik and anarchist influences and deviations. This commission to complete its work (or most of it) by the next, Eleventh, congress of the R.C.P. and submit its report to the Party congress.[443]	Not for publication

4.1.1922 *Lenin*

Written December 30, 1921—January 4, 1922

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Printed from the manuscript

MEMO TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH DRAFT DECISIONS

To *Comrade Molotov* for the **Politbureau**

In view of the utter inadequacy (or reticence?) of the report in *Pravda* on 3.I.1922 concerning the suicide of *Oldenborger* and the investigations into this case

I propose the following decision for the Politbureau:

1) that the Moscow Soviet be asked to apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in order to have all those persons mentioned in the commission's findings brought to *trial*;

2) that the Presidium of the A.C.E.C. be asked to grant this request immediately and

3) —to give this wide publicity in the *whole* Soviet press;

4) that the People's Commissariat for Justice be directed (under the personal responsibility of Comrade Kursky and an appointed public prosecutor) to handle this case skilfully, impressively and with special care;

5) that the Orgbureau be directed to set up a special Party Court to try the whole *communist group* of the Waterworks. (Some to be expelled from the Party for good or for a time, some to be severely reprimanded, depending on the measure of their guilt.) The trial to be held in an impressive public manner.

+ 6) that *Izvestia* and *Pravda* be instructed to highlight this outrageous affair in a number of strong articles.

4.I.1922 *Lenin*

Another draft resolution:

All cases of the murder of engineers (and specialists) at Soviet enterprises shall be reported to the Politbureau together with the results of the investigations ((the Supreme Economic Council, the A.C.C.T.U., etc., through the *C.L.D.*)).[444]

P.S. This is scandalous: we should ring the tocsin.

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MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD RADIO LABORATORY

(Re the request of Dovgalevsky for 50,000 gold rubles to be allocated to the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory)

I support the request and ask Comrade Molotov to put this to the vote of the Politbureau. I ask the Politbureau members to bear in mind the exceptional importance of

the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory, the tremendous services it has already rendered and the great use it can be to us in the near future both in military matters and in propaganda work.[445]

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
January 12, 1922

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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(typewritten copy)

DIRECTIVES ON THE FILM BUSINESS

The People's Commissariat for Education should organise the supervision of all film showings and systematise this business. All films shown in the R.S.F.S.R. should be registered and numbered at the Commissariat for Education. A definite proportion should be fixed for every film-showing programme:

a) entertainment films, specially for advertisement or income (of course, without obscenity and counter-revolution) and

b) under the heading "From the life of peoples of all countries"—pictures with a special propaganda message, such as: Britain's colonial policy in India, the work of the League of Nations, the starving Berliners, etc., etc. Besides films, photographs of propaganda interest should be shown with appropriate subtitles. The privately owned cinemas should be made to yield a sufficient return to the state in the form of rent, the owners to be allowed to increase the number of films and present new ones subject to censorship by the Commissariat for Education and provided the proper proportion is maintained between entertainment films and propaganda films coming under the heading of films "From the life of peoples of all countries", in order that film-makers should have an incentive for producing new pictures. They should be allowed wide initiative within these limits. Pictures of a propaganda and educative nature should be checked by old Marxists and writers, to avoid a repetition of the many sad instances when propaganda

with us defeated its own purpose. Special attention should be given to organising film showings in the villages and in the East, where they are novelties and where our propaganda, therefore, will be all the more effective.[446]

Dictated January 17, 1922
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in the magazine *Kinonedelya*
No. 4

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N. P. Gorbunov
(typewritten copy)

MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON M. I. KALININ'S TRIP TO THE UKRAINE[447]

To Comrade Molotov for all the members
of the Politbureau

Please put to the vote of the Politbureau the following motion: that Comrade Kalinin be directed immediately to make a round of the richer grain gubernias of the Ukraine to collect aid for the victims of the famine. The expedition to be fitted out with great thoroughness to enable it to carry out effective agitation for relief collections by means of photographs, films, demonstration of witnesses and sufferers from the famine-stricken areas, etc. Personal responsibility for the practical organisation of the expedition to be imposed upon

1. Kalinin for the political side of the business
2. a specially appointed practical worker endorsed by the Politbureau who would really be capable of putting through and organising the business properly.

Kalinin together with the whole expedition shall leave within 3 days.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
January 27, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the secretary's
notes

MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

To Comrade Molotov for All Members of the Politbureau

I think that "Bespartiiny" in today's *Pravda* is proposing a perfectly correct and timely plan.[448]

I move that a commission be set up to elaborate it immediately and put it into effect as quickly as possible, this commission to consist of Molotov (replaceable by somebody appointed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee or the Orgbureau), Yakovenko, Teodorovich and the "Bespartiiny" in question.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
January 27, 1922

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Printed from the secretary's notes

DRAFT DIRECTIVES TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE GENOA DELEGATION[449]

1.II.1922

To Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

I propose that the following directives to the deputy chairman and all members of the Genoa delegation be endorsed:

1. All members of the delegation should be posted in a general way on all political and financial questions that are likely to be brought up at the conference. Moreover, every member of the delegation should make a special and thorough study of one of the most important diplomatic and one of the most important financial questions.

Chicherin and Litvinov are to be charged with drawing up an assignment of these questions among all the members

of the delegation (with the exception of sick members like Rudzutak, etc.).

2. Every member of the delegation must prepare for the meeting on 22.II (with the Politbureau of the C.C.) the briefest (maximum 2-3 pages telegraphic style) of summaries of his programme of views and policies on all cardinal questions, both diplomatic and financial.

3. Chicherin and Litvinov are to see to it that the appropriate literature in different languages is collected and handed out to the members of the delegation together with a systematic collection of documents in the Russian language.

4. In view of the special importance and special difficulty of financial questions, Chicherin and Litvinov, by arrangement with the People's Commissariat for Finance, the State Planning Commission and A. D. Tsyurupa, are to draw up a list of financial experts and a plan of work distribution among them; this to be done within 1 week.

5. All members of the delegation must be *perfectly familiar* with Keynes's book (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*) and with similar bourgeois and bourgeois-pacifist books and *parts of books* (Lansing on the "imperialist" nature of the war and the peace of 1918, and so on). Preparations should be on these lines: speeches and statements should give the *communist* point of view in a nutshell, set forth in such a way as to intimate that although we are Communists and hold such-and-such communist views we wish to cite non-Communists to this audience and to pose the question of annulling all debts and so forth from the bourgeois standpoint (see 6 and 7).

6. All speeches and statements by our delegates at the conference should be calculated in advance in such a way that whatever the course or the outcome of the conference (even in the event of its speedy failure, which we, of course, should try to prevent), there would be, as a result, a brief but clear statement of the sum total of communist views (on questions of international relations and economics) and a detailed statement of bourgeois and bourgeois pacifist views on the irreconcilable contradictions of the imperialist world (and the imperialist peace).

7. It is highly probable, almost certain, that all the bourgeois delegates at the conference will immediately form a silent but strong bloc for attacking us on account of Georgia and with all the usual accusations of petty-bourgeois and big bourgeois diplomacy and democracy. We should be prepared for this in advance and make sure that we are the first to attack (apart from our main object of dividing the different countries and setting them by the ears). The initiative in taking the offensive should be done mostly in a veiled form, for example by "hinting" (or by bourgeois quotations from relevant works) at the most painful and shameful points of imperialist relations (Korea; Amritsar; public flogging of revolutionaries in India; Lloyd George's speech against Briand at Cannes concerning "assassinations" and so on and so forth).

8. In view of the repeatedly proven desire on the part of our specialists in general and the Menshevik-minded ones in particular to fool us (very often successfully) by turning their foreign trips into a holiday and a means of strengthening whiteguard ties, the Central Committee proposes to limit ourselves in this case to an absolute minimum of fully reliable experts, each of whom is to present a guarantee in writing from the People's Commissar concerned and from several Communists. Forty-five is the top limit. The list of experts and of all members to be submitted for approval to the C.C. within 1½ weeks. This § to be taken charge of by Comrades Litvinov, Joffe and Chicherin. They are also to choose a business manager who will not permit night work and such-like scandalous practices.

I move the following addendum to the draft theses of *directives* for the Genoa delegation:

9. Our delegates should cite §1 of the Cannes terms in their speeches and statements as often as possible, this citing to be done, first, exclusively in the wording of *Petit Parisien*, i.e., using the words "system of property" and not just "system"; secondly, these words and this § to be given an extended meaning as if implying recognition of the inevitability of the capitalist system of property being replaced by the communist system of property, as if the only point at issue "between us" now remains the question of when this replacement will be effected and in

what manner, i.e., by the Russian method of 1917-20 or by the Lloyd George method of "truncated revolution" of the 1921 Irish type or the 1922 Egyptian type.[450]

Lenin

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LETTER TO N. I. BUKHARIN AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV

To Comrades Bukharin and Zinoviev

We must consider beforehand what people, preferably those with a ready tongue, are going to represent the Comintern at the conference with the II and II½ Internationals.[451] We must also consider beforehand the basic questions of tactics and strategy to be employed at this meeting.

The list of questions to be dealt with at the meeting. should be considered beforehand and drawn up in agreement with each of the parties attending the meeting. On our part we should include in this list only questions that have a direct bearing on practical joint action by the working masses and touching on matters that are recognised as indisputable in the official press statement of each of the three participants. We must explain at length the reasons why we confine ourselves to such questions in the interests of a united front. In the event of the yellow-fraternity raising mooted questions of policy, such as our attitude to the Mensheviks, the question of Georgia, etc., we should adopt these tactics: 1) declare that the list of questions can be drawn up only by a unanimous decision of all three participants; 2) declare that in drawing up our list of questions we were guided exclusively by the desire for unity of action by the working masses, which unity could be achieved immediately even under existing deep-seated political differences; 3) declare that we fully agree to questions such as our attitude to the Mensheviks, the question of Georgia and any other questions being raised by the II and II½ Internationals, provided that they

agree to the following questions being raised: 1) the renegade attitude of the II and II½ Internationals to the Basle Manifesto; 2) complicity of these same parties in the murder of Luxemburg, Liebknecht and other Communists of Germany through the bourgeois governments which those parties support; 3) a similar attitude of these parties to the murder of revolutionaries in the colonies by the bourgeois parties which the II and II½ Internationals support, etc., etc. We should prepare a list of these and similar questions beforehand and also prepare beforehand theses and speakers on various important questions of this nature.

We must find occasion to declare officially that we regard the II and II½ Internationals only as inconsistent and vacillating participants of a bloc with the counter-revolutionary world bourgeoisie, and that we agree to attend a meeting on the united front for the sake of achieving possible practical unity of direct action on the part of the masses and in order to expose the political error of the II and II½ Internationals' entire position, just as the latter (the II and II½ Internationals) have agreed to attend a meeting with us for the sake of achieving practical unity of direct action by the masses and in order to expose the political error of our position.

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DRAFT DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) IN CONNECTION WITH THE GENOA CONFERENCE

To Comrade Molotov (for the members of the Politbureau)

I draw attention to the article "The Genoa Conference" by Y. Klyuchnikov in No. 13 of *Smena Vekh*,[452] and propose:

1. That the question of enlisting Klyuchnikov's services as an expert be discussed jointly with the members of the delegation.

2. That it be made incumbent upon the whole delegation to see to it that several articles on the same subject as that dealt with in Klyuchnikov's article are published in our press, only at greater length and in fuller detail so as to cover the ground thoroughly.

3. That every person who wishes to go as an expert from Russia or who has been nominated for this post be made within 10 days to prepare an article dealing in detail with Russia's relations with foreign countries in his selected field. Those articles (or such parts of them) which contain no confidential matter should immediately be published in our press.

4. That Chicherin and Litvinov be made responsible for reporting the distribution of subjects for the articles and the names of the writers under Points 1 and 2 to the Politbureau within one week.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 4, 1922

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ON THE PUBLICATION OF A TELEGRAM REPORTING THE PAMPHLET BY PARVUS[453]

1

To Comrade Molotov
(for members of the Politbureau)

I propose that an inquiry be made as to who was responsible for publishing in our newspapers the other day a telegram giving a summary of Parvus's writings.

When the guilty party has been ascertained, I propose that the ROSTA* manager of that department be severely reprimanded and the journalist directly responsible should be dismissed, for only a perfect fool or a whiteguard could use our newspapers for advertising such a scoundrel as Parvus.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 4, 1922

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

* ROSTA—Russian Telegraph Agency.—*Ed.*

2

DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
MARCH 11, 1922

The Politbureau recognises that the publication of such a telegram was improper, as it gave the impression of advertising Parvus, and the editors of Party and Soviet newspapers are directed to refrain from publishing such telegrams in future.

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Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

DRAFT DIRECTIVES OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE GENOA CONFERENCE[454]

I propose the following draft of C.C. directives:

Without endorsing the list of experts, the C.C. directs the candidates nominated in it to submit within a week a précis of *programme* and *tactics* (on questions that come within the terms of reference of the given expert) for *the whole* Genoa Conference. All People's Commissars are obliged within 2 days to give *written* testimonials and guarantees for their candidates nominated as experts. Should the experts disgrace themselves in Europe they and the People's Commissars will be held responsible.

In furtherance of the directives concerning the Genoa Conference *I propose the following*:

1. Without pre-determining in what form and at what time the speeches of our delegation should be made, the C.C. considers that the delegation is definitely obliged to develop a full, independent and integral programme on all cardinal issues.

2. This programme should be a bourgeois-pacifist programme with the reservation, timely and clearly expressed

by our delegation, that we do not put forward here a communist programme—the only one that is in keeping with our views—(set it forth briefly) because we wish to put before the other delegations, who hold fundamentally different views, a number of palliatives and measures of a reformist type which have already been proposed in parts in Britain and other capitalist countries by people who share bourgeois views. Under certain conditions this programme of palliatives could serve to mitigate the present difficult situation (the only real way out of which is possible given a final break with all the principles of capitalist property).

3. A tentative list of the main points of this programme:

(1) annulment of all debts;

(2) application of the "Irish" solution to all colonies and dependent countries and nations;

(3) radical revision of the Versailles Treaty;

(4) the granting of loans on favourable terms to the countries most ruined by the war and too weak to recover their own feet, while being most important for world economy as eventual suppliers of vast quantities of food and raw materials;

(5) establishment of a unified international gold unit for the currency systems of a number of countries and measures to introduce this unit;

(6) an agreement among a number of countries on measures to combat inflation and depreciation of money (enumerate some of these measures);

(7) agreement among a number of countries on measures for coping with the fuel crisis and on measures for the most rational and economical use of power resources on the basis of unified planned electrification;

(8) the same in regard to the most urgent measures for reorganising and improving international transport to handle deliveries of raw materials and food.

And so on.

4. Such a programme should be elaborated in speeches, and if this is impossible, printed in 3-4 European languages and handed out to the delegates and the press (if only in the form of a précis). (In any case it should be printed.)

5. Only such people should be admitted as experts who are capable of developing, and making out a case for such

a programme (in one or another part of it) and who have *proved this capability*. The experts will have to have their programmes and plans printed *for Europe over their own signatures*. ((Such a programme will evoke comment in the press of the Third International, whose articles will say: this attempt "to convince" will do no harm, but practically it is useless, because what is *needed* is a *revolution*; and in the press of the II and II½ Internationals—we shall see what they have to say.))

Written February 6, 1922
First published in part
April 24, 1962
in *Pravda* No. 114
First published in 1964
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

MEMO TO V. M. MOLOTOV WITH A MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Comrade Molotov,

Please put two proposals for the Politbureau to the vote by telephone:

1) Not to publish the decision of the Politbureau on the figure of a single grain tax pending a new decision after the State Planning Commission has completed and submitted its calculations.

(Krzhizhanovsky yesterday complained to me bitterly that they had been doing a big job on these calculations, but it was broken off without him having even been given a hearing. Please give him another 3-4 days and do not publish until then.)

2) The newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* to be closed down. Arrangements to be made with *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for using the material.[455]

Lenin

Written February 11, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

MARKS ON N. L. MESHCHERYAKOV'S LETTER AND A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

...Now as regards the newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo*.

?? 1) The Board of Centrosoyuz, which consists only of Communists, says that the newspaper is necessary if the co-operatives are to fulfil their difficult and new organising work and carry out the trade tasks imposed upon them.

2) The paper's editorial board consists only of Communists: I, Sarabyanov, Shvetsov, Kutuzov-Ilimsky, etc.

?? 3) A delegation of Western co-operators is coming to Russia. The closing of the newspaper will be taken advantage of by the old co-operators and will make co-operative work difficult.

4) The closing of the newspaper will be exploited at the Genoa Conference.

ha—ha!! 5) So far there has been nothing hostile to Soviet power or communism in the paper...

February 11, 1922 *N. Meshcheryakov*

To Comrade Molotov for the *Politbureau*:

in view of the obvious flimsiness of Comrade Meshcheryakov's arguments, I propose:

1) that the Board of Centrosoyuz be directed to replace the daily newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* with a *weekly*;

2) the personnel and funds thus released should be used wholly for improving the activities of headquarters in supervising and helping to develop proper trade by the co-operatives locally;

3) reports on the fulfilment of § 2 to be made monthly to the Politbureau;

4) more contributions to be made to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*.

14/II *Lenin*

Written February 14, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH REMARKS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE FIRST EXTENDED PLENARY MEETING OF THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE ON PARTICIPATION IN A CONFERENCE OF THE THREE INTERNATIONALS[456]

To Comrade Molotov
(for members of the Politbureau)

I move the following amendments to the draft resolution sent in by Zinoviev concerning the Comintern's participation in the planned conference of all the workers' parties of the world. After the words: "unity of action among the working class masses which could be achieved immediately, despite fundamental political differences," the phrases following this should be deleted up to the words: "that the working-class masses demand unity of action". The phrase beginning with these last words should be recast as follows: "the class-conscious workers, who are perfectly well aware of these political differences, nevertheless, together with the vast majority of the workers, desire and demand unity of action on practical issues most urgent and close to the interests of the workers. There can be no doubt about this now in the mind of any conscientious person" and so on.

My second amendment is that the phrase beginning with the words: "all controversial issues to be avoided and questions that are not open to argument to be brought into focus" should be amended as follows: "and while postponing for a time the more controversial questions and bringing into focus the less controversial, both sides, or rather all three international organisations taking part in the conference, will naturally count on the ultimate victory of their points of view."

My chief amendment is aimed at deleting the passage which calls the leaders of the II and II½ Internationals accomplices of the world bourgeoisie. You might as well call a man a "jackass". It is absolutely unreasonable to

risk wrecking an affair of tremendous practical importance for the sake of giving oneself the extra pleasure of scolding scoundrels, whom we shall be scolding a thousand times at another place and time. If there are still people at the enlarged meeting of the Executive who have not grasped the fact that the tactic of the united front will help us to overthrow the leaders of the II and II½ Internationals, these people should have an extra number of popular lectures and talks read to them. It may be necessary to have a specially popular pamphlet written for them and published in French, say, if the Frenchmen have not yet grasped Marxist tactics. Finally, it were better to adopt this resolution, not unanimously, but by a majority (those who voted against we would afterwards put through a special, thorough and popular course of enlightenment) than run the risk of spoiling a practical affair for the sake of a few political youngsters who tomorrow will be cured of their infantile disorder.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 23, 1922

First published in 1964
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the secretary notes
(typewritten copy)

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TASKS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT GENOA

Only for circulation among members of the Politbureau

Draft decision for the C.C.

1. The C.C. recognises as correct the appraisal of the situation and the tasks (of our delegation at Genoa) as given in the theses of Comrade Litvinov.
2. The C.C. fully empowers Vice Chairman Chicherin to act as chairman of the delegation.
3. In the event of Comrade Chicherin's illness or departure his powers shall be vested in turn in one of the two trios:

a) Litvinov, Krasin, Rakovsky; b) Litvinov, Joffe, Vorovsky.

4. Our delegation should try to evade the question of acceptance of the Cannes terms. Failing this, and in the event of our being presented with a direct ultimatum, we should try to work Krasin's formula: "All countries recognise their state debts and undertake to compensate damage and losses caused by the acts of their governments."

If this does not work either, we should make for a break, declaring definitely that we are prepared to recognise private debts, but that, not wishing to play hide-and-seek, we point out that we consider them covered, together with the whole sum of our obligations, by our counter-claims. We accept no chief umpire between us and all the bourgeois countries, since the dispute is between two systems of property.

If we have to break, we should make it perfectly clear that the main and sole reason for the break is the greed of a handful of private capitalists, Urquhart, etc., whom the governments serve.

As a maximum concession these capitalists can be offered: a preferential right to concessions (i.e., if we grant X a concession on their former property wholly or in part on such-and-such terms, we undertake to give it to its former owner on the same terms).

5. In view of the possibility of the bourgeois trying to prevent us from developing our programme, we should make every effort in the very first speech to set forth, if not develop, this programme, or at least outline it (and immediately publish it in greater detail).

6. In our programme we should, without concealing our communist views, confine ourselves to a brief and passing mention of them (for instance, in a subordinate clause), and to a forthright statement to the effect that we do not consider this the right place to preach our views, since we have come for trade agreements and for an attempt to reach an agreement with the pacifist section of the other (bourgeois) camp.

By the pacifist section of that camp (or some other well-chosen polite expression) we should make it clear that we mean the petty-bourgeois, pacifist and semi-pacifist

democrats of the II and II½ International type, and the Keynes type, etc.

One of our main, if not principal, political tasks at Genoa is to single out this wing of the bourgeois camp from the rest of the camp, try to flatter that wing, make it known that we consider possible and desirable not only a trade, but a political agreement with them (as one of the few chances of capitalism's peaceful evolution towards the new order, which we, Communists, do not greatly believe in, but which we agree and consider our duty to help try out, as representatives of one power in face of a hostile majority of other powers).

Everything possible and even impossible should be done to strengthen the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie and increase if only slightly its chances of success at the elections. This first and foremost. Secondly, to disunite the bourgeois countries that will be united against us at Genoa—such is our dual political task at Genoa, and not at all the development of communist views.

7. Every attempt should be made to develop at length and publicise as widely as possible (in print, if not in speeches) the plan for the rehabilitation of the national economy in Russia and in Europe—in the spirit of the State Planning Commission's researches and on the basis of these researches.

8. If the bourgeois camp in Genoa presents an ultimatum to us not to touch on questions of pacifism, but to speak only on narrow trade subjects, we should express our regret, but comply with this ultimatum, saying that we had two aims at this conference—a pacifist aim and a trade aim. This will leave only one.

9. The C.C. leaves it to the delegation to elaborate the pacifist programme, confining itself to the general directive that they should try to develop it as broadly as possible in order to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp.

10. On the question of trade and concessions (including the question of loans), the forests of the North, etc., should be put forward as the principal guarantee. We agree to no derogation of the rights of our state. No agreements

are to be signed without the special consent, by telegraph, of the Central Committee.[457]

Written February 24, 1922

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

MEMO TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH A DRAFT DECISION ON THE NOTE TO ITALY

Comrade Molotov for Members of the Politbureau

I think the question of Genoa is clear after the memos of Chicherin, Joffe, Krasin and Litvinov.

I propose a draft decision.

Plan: all members of the Politbureau attempt to come to an agreement *in writing*. Failing this, all meet and sit for 1 hour *alone* (and without a secretary).

Then 1 or 2 hours with the delegation and finis.

24.II. *Lenin*

I move: That the Politbureau direct Comrade Chicherin to send a Note to Italy, a longish, meticulously courteous Note, but with plenty of digs in it hinting that it is not we who are violating one of the first "conditions", the 8.III convocation, that we propose 1) confirming 8.III; but if (2) the majority are against, we protest and propose 15.III.[458]

Lenin

Written February 24, 1922

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 44

Printed from the manuscript

AMENDMENTS AND REMARKS TO THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON THE NARROW C.P.C.[459]

this is un-Russian

This is the wrong word, *clerical* or *pertaining to clerical*—would be *better*

.....

10. All decisive resolutions of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars, viz., those deciding a question in substance, other than those mentioned in Article 5, are referred to the C.P.C. All particular decisions of an incidental nature, such as: sundry investigations, collection of necessary material, forwarding papers to the departments concerned all kinds of answers to inquiries from government departments addressed to the Narrow Council, as well as management and business affairs of the C.P.C. are passed finally by the Narrow Council in its own name and are not referred to the Large Council.

+ I advise the addition of: a representative of the Moscow Soviet must always be called in on all questions that concern him.

+*all* the People's Commissariats concerned must always be called in.

Written in February 1922

First published in 1945 Printed from the manuscript in Lenin Miscellany XXXV

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE SWEDISH LOAN[460]

I move: that in principle it be approved and that the Foreign Trade Commissariat be directed to continue negotiations *on the understanding*, *however*, that (1) no final decision is made without the Politbureau (which should retain

the right of *refusal*); (2) an attempt is made to contract a *similar loan* on better terms with another (Italian) *offerer*.

13/III. *Lenin**

Written March 13, 1922
First published in 1965
in the Fifth Russian Edition
or the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH PROPOSALS ON THE DRAFT DIRECTIVES OF THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE FOR THE COMINTERN DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE THREE INTERNATIONALS[461]

Zinoviev
Stalin
Kamenev and other members of the Politbureau:

I propose

p. 11 (2nd part) (re changing attitude towards the Mensheviks) should be thrown out.

We cannot speak of this even provisionally just now.

In my opinion the directives should be amended this way:

AA) If you wish to raise the most controversial questions, i.e., those that evoke the greatest hostility of the III International towards the II and II½ Internationals, then we agree on condition
  (a) that the list of questions be arranged with us
  (b) ... and the most detailed rules of procedure in discussing the rights of the III International; these rights to be safeguarded in greatest detail, etc., etc.

---

* The draft was signed also by Kamenev and Stalin; Trotsky abstained.—*Ed.*

BB) We, on our part, propose raising *only* the least controversial questions with the aim of attempting partial, but joint **action** by the rank and file of the working class.

If they accept *AA*, we shall insert: a **general** appraisal by us of the II and II½ Internationals, the *sum* of our accusations against them, etc., etc.

Further: on 25.III, i.e., at the preliminary meeting, our delegates should be extremely discreet, *so long as* there is still hope of achieving our purpose, **i.e.,** enticing all 3 Internationals ((the II and the II½)) into a general conference.

We should not make a break at once because of its *composition*, and in any case we should not break without getting in touch with Moscow, unless it is something **glaringly** mean, *absolutely* intolerable.

Lenin

Written March 14 or 15, 1922

First published in part in 1958 in the book *O Deyatelnosty V. I. Lenina v 1917—1922 g.* (*Lenin's Activities in 1917-1922*), Moscow

Published in full in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH A DRAFT OF DIRECTIVES TO COMRADES TRAVELLING ABROAD

Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

In view of Comrade Radek's trip abroad, and *Comrade Sosnovsky*'s, *too*, *I hear*,

—in view of the fact that a *flair for diplomacy is not one of the strong points* of these most valuable and important workers, I propose that the following directive be issued by the Politbureau:

"The Politbureau impresses upon all comrades travelling abroad that the present moment calls, on the one hand, for

the greatest restraint in utterances and talks about the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and, on the other hand, for a relentless struggle against and the greatest distrust towards them (as the most dangerous *de facto* accomplices of the whiteguards)".

17/III. *Lenin*

P.S. Please get this *voted by telephone*.[462]

Written March 17, 1922
First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition or the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[463]

Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

This is not the first time that the Moscow Committee (and Comrade Zelensky too) is showing *indulgence* towards communist criminals, who deserve to be hanged.

This is done "by mistake". The danger of this "mistake", however, is enormous. *I move*:

1. That Comrade Divilkovsky's proposal *be adopted*.
2. That the Moscow Committee be severely reprimanded for being *indulgent* to Communists (the form of indulgence —a special commission).
3. That it be confirmed to all Gubernia Party Committees that for the slightest attempt to "influence" the courts in the sense of "mitigating" the responsibility of Communists, the C.C. will *expel* such persons *from the Party*.
4. That a circular be issued notifying the People's Commissariat for Justice (copies to the Gubernia Party Committees) to the effect that the courts are obliged to punish Communists *more severely* than non-Communists.

People's judges and members of the Board of the Commissariat for Justice who fail to observe this are to be *dismissed from office*.

5. That the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee be asked to *inflict* a reprimand on the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet in the press.

Lenin

18. III.

P.S. It is a crying shame, disgraceful—the ruling Party defends "its own" scoundrels!!

Written March 18, 1922

First published November 20, 1962 in *Pravda* No. 324

Printed from the manuscript

NOTE TO N. P. GORBUNOV AND PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVES[464]

Comrade Gorbunov,

Read this, make a note of it for yourself and forward it *immediately* to Comrade Molotov for the members of the *Politbureau*, then for *Tsyurupa* and *Rykov*.

In my opinion, the co-operatives are not the trade unions.

The co-operatives should remain obligatory as regards membership.

Contributions should be voluntary. If our co-operatives will carry on trade (and not play at publishing dailies in which idle chatter-mongers engage in political twaddle, which everyone is fed up with), then trading should yield an income. Those who make contributions will receive an income.

Everybody should be a member of the co-operatives. We need this for the future. I don't see how this interferes with anything.

Shares are voluntary. Those who have paid their contributions should receive a share of the profit.

Conclusion: I think the matter should be postponed; it should not be raised at this session.

Lenin

18. III.

Written March 18, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

AMENDMENTS AND REMARKS TO THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE GENOA CONFERENCE[465]

Comrade Molotov

With reference to Comrade Chicherin's motion entitled "Elements of a first speech at the Conference" I propose the following amendments:

1) Lines 7 and 8 down on the first page—I propose that we speak about "systems of property" and not just politico-economic systems.[466]

2) On the same page, lines 8 and 9 up—all mention of "inevitable forcible revolution and the use of sanguinary struggle" must definitely be thrown out; instead we should speak only of the fact that we Communists do not share the views of the pacifists—a fact which is sufficiently well known from communist literature—but having come here as merchants, we positively consider it our duty to give our fullest support to any attempts at a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems.

3) On the same page, 2nd and 3rd lines up—the words stating that our "historic conception includes the use of forcible measures" should definitely be deleted.

4) Page 2, 2nd and 3rd lines down—the words about our historic conception being definitely based on the inevitability of new world wars should be definitely deleted.

Under no circumstance should such frightful words be used, as this would mean playing into the hands of our opponents. We should confine ourselves only to mentioning that the views of the Communists do not coincide with the views of such pacifists as the states we are beginning negotiations with, such statesmen as Henderson, Keynes, etc., but that we consider it our duty, in order to achieve the economic agreement we are desirous of concluding, to do everything in our power for the broadest possible fulfilment of at least a certain part of this pacifist programme.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
March 23, 1922

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notes (typewritten copy)

ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

MARCH 27-APRIL 2, 1922[467]

1

PROPOSAL TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE R.C.P.(B.) DELEGATION IN THE COMINTERN

The purpose and sense of the tactics of the united front consist in drawing more and more masses of the workers into the struggle against capital, even if it means making repeated offers to the leaders of the II and II½ Internationals to wage this struggle together. When the majority of the workers have already established their class, i.e., their Soviet, and not "general national" (i.e., in common with the bourgeoisie) representation, and have overthrown the political domination of the bourgeoisie, then the tactics of the united front, of course, cannot require co-operation with parties such as that of the Mensheviks (the "R.S.D.L.P.") and the S.R.s (the "Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries") for these have turned out to be opponents of Soviet power. Influence upon the working-class masses under Soviet rule has to be extended *not* by seeking co-operation with the *Mensheviks and S.R.*s, but in the manner mentioned above.[468]

Written between March 29 and April 2, 1922

Published in full in 1959 in the journal *Voprosi Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Printed from the manuscript

2

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF PRINTING ADVERTISEMENTS IN PRAVDA APRIL 2[469]

Comrades, an almost fatal mistake has occurred here. I have risen to a point of order (as the chairman made clear) and not to make a closing speech. I have taken the floor to ask the congress to waive standing orders and

procedure. There is a rule that after a decision has been passed there can be no interference on that question. I ask the congress to give me 4 or 5 minutes in order to oppose the decision that has been wrongly passed here.

When I heard that the congress had passed this decision and when I heard that Comrade Ryazanov had defended it ... (*Ryazanov*: "That is not so.") All the better—at least one absurd decision has by-passed Ryazanov. If we were dealing here with an innocent young lady of some twelve summers, who had learned only yesterday that there was such a thing in the world as communism, and she would have put on a frilly white frock with red ribbons and said that Communists were just pure tradesmen—that would be funny, and we could enjoy a hearty laugh over it, but seriously, what are we doing? Where will *Pravda* get the money to make up for the advertisements we have deprived it of? I ask—how much money does *Pravda* need to keep up with *Izvestia*? You don't know? Nor do I!

First published in 1931
in the Second and Third editions
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII

Printed from the shorthand
record

3

NOTES AT THE CONGRESS MEETING
APRIL 2

Sedoi:

α) ... Contradictions, abnormality, inconsistency....
β) "*greatest trust*" and!!?

---

1) Groundlessness of the accusation that the C.C. is persecuting the former *Workers' Opposition*
2) refusal to do positive work
3) concentration on playing at opposition
4) behaviour at metalworkers' congress
5) ditto after the congress
6) is there such a division within the former *Workers' Opposition*, which makes the Party draw a line between the majority who are working loyally in the Party, despite

difference in views, and the minority (perhaps even an insignificant one) who are behaving in a definitely unloyal manner.

Written April 2, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON ORGANISING THE WORK OF THE SECRETARIAT

The C.C. directs the Secretariat to strictly fix and adhere to the schedule of official reception hours and to publish it; the secretaries are to make it a rule not to personally undertake any work other than major tasks of a principled nature, and to turn such work over to their assistants and technical secretaries.

Comrade Stalin is directed to immediately find himself deputies and assistants relieving him of work (other than general management and guidance of a principled nature) in government offices.

The C.C. directs the Orgbureau and the Politbureau to submit within a fortnight a list of candidates for members of the Board and deputy commissars of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.[470]

Written April 3, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH DRAFT DECISIONS

1

Comrade Molotov, please put this article and my following proposals to the vote of the Politbureau by sending them round to the members.

1. That there is no objection to having this article of Lenin's published in *Izvestia* and *Pravda* on Tuesday.

2. That directives be given to the Soviet and Party press to appraise the Berlin agreement from this angle, and to dwell at special length on the factual existing links between the S.R.s and Mensheviks, the Right wing of both these parties, and the international bourgeoisie.

3. That the publication for the said purpose in all European languages of Savinkov's pamphlet *Fighting the Bolsheviks* and of S. Ivanovich's pamphlet *The Twilight of Russian Social-Democracy* should be speeded up and a detailed account given of how these pamphlets prove the real ties that exist between the Right-wing Mensheviks and S.R.s and international reaction.

4. That Comrade Trotsky be directed to see to it that these and similar materials are published in all languages with appropriate comments as quickly as possible.

5. That Comrade Radek be asked by wire to return to Moscow as soon as possible with the full minutes of the Berlin Conference.

6. That Comrade Bukharin shall be forbidden to return to Russia until he has completed his cure.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 9, 1922

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in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

2

Comrade Stalin
for the Politbureau

In view of Comrade Zinoviev's proposal, I now vote for not having Radek called back, but asking instead for all the detailed minutes of the Berlin Conference to be forwarded through the diplomatic mail.

I object most emphatically to Bukharin's coming here, as this will needlessly interfere with his medical treatment.[471]

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 9, 1922

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notes (typewritten copy)

REMARKS AND PROPOSALS TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE OF THE THREE INTERNATIONALS[472]

LETTERS TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1

On Point 1 I propose the addendum: dwell at greater length 1) on the real links between our Mensheviks and S.R.s and the common front of the landowners and bourgeoisie against the Soviet government, special attention being given for this purpose to Savinkov's pamphlet *Fighting the Bolsheviks* (Warsaw, 1920) and S. Ivanovich's pamphlet *The Twilight of Russian Social-Democracy*, as these booklets very clearly reveal what is known, of course, from a number of other documents—namely, that Right-wing Mensheviks and S.R.s take refuge behind the name of a common party, as a matter of form, while in fact they act quite independently; 2) pay special attention to showing up the identity of our Mensheviks and S.R.s with the leaders of the II and II½ Internationals, the highly pernicious nature of Otto Bauer's recent pamphlet, which virtually proposes and preaches panic retreat in the face of capitalism. Such preaching we regard as tantamount to preaching panic flight at the front during war.

Point 2, I accept.

Re Point 3:

I have my doubts about this, as I believe that a precisely worded ruling calling for unanimity should save us from making mistakes, while general appeals on subjects clarifying the points endorsed at the Berlin Conference (defence of Soviet Russia, etc.) will be extremely useful to us, as we shall repeatedly make use of them in future to expose the muddle our opponents have got themselves into.

Re Point 4—I definitely support this.

Re Point 5—I have no objection.

Re Point 6:

The purport of this point is not clear to me. I believe that the Berlin agreement should be ratified immediately upon receipt of the official text of the adopted decisions, or, better still perhaps, it should be ratified at once with the reservation that the text being ratified was the one that was published in *Pravda* on 9/IV.

I would particularly ask you to arrange for the full text of the minutes of the Berlin Conference to be dispatched as quickly as possible by special courier and to check whether these minutes have been signed by the official representatives of each of the three Internationals.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 11, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

2

Comrade Zinoviev,

The following should be added to those points of the Comintern Executive's decision on which we exchanged notes this morning:

Criticism of the policy of the II and II½ Internationals should now be given a somewhat different character, namely, this criticism (especially at meetings attended by workers who support the II and II½ Internationals, and in special leaflets and articles written for them) should tend to be of a clarifying nature, made with particular patience and thoroughness, so as not to scare away these workers with harsh words, and bring home to them the irreconcilable contradictions between the slogans their representatives have adopted in Berlin (for example, the fight against capital, the eight-hour day, defence of Soviet Russia, aid to the famine-stricken) and the entire reformist policy.

Perhaps, before publishing this, we ought to verify whether the Berlin decisions have been ratified by the II and II½ Internationals.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 11, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF *THE NEW YORK HERALD*[473]

In his talk with the correspondent of the American newspaper *The New York Herald* on the subject of the Genoa Conference, Lenin stated:

This Conference should be guided only by one economic principle. Russia is well aware of what she can expect from the bourgeois states. The present state of affairs cannot continue any longer. It is disastrous both for Russia and for the whole world.

Russia stands in need of trade with the bourgeois states. On the other hand, the bourgeois governments are well aware that the economic life of Europe cannot be adjusted without Russia.

However, those who intend to offer humiliating terms to the Russian delegation at Genoa are deeply mistaken. Russia will not allow herself to be treated as a vanquished country. If the bourgeois governments try to adopt such a tone towards Russia they will be committing the greatest folly.

Krasnaya Gazeta (Petrograd)
No. 84, April 14, 1922

Printed from the newspaper text

DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE WORKS OF G. V. PLEKHANOV

APRIL 27, 1922[474]

Comrade Kamenev shall be directed to talk over with Comrade Ter and make arrangements for the publication of Plekhanov's revolutionary works in one volume.

First published in 1964
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the typewritten copy of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON PRESENTATION TO THE C.C. OF SUMMARISED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TAX IN KIND

1) The Commissariat for Food
2) The Commissariat for Agriculture
3) The Central Statistical Board
4) The State Planning Commission agricultural section

shall be directed to present to the C.C. within four days a summary of information on the tax in kind, length not more than ***1** page*, containing a clear and precise summary of the amount of the tax in kind collected in 1921-1922 and that expected in 1922-1923 as mentioned in the press.[475]

Written May 11, 1922

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the manuscript

NOTE TO J. V. STALIN WITH A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF THE FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY[476]

Comrade Stalin,

In view of this, please get a directive passed through the Politbureau by *collecting the votes* of members that "The C.C. reaffirms the monopoly of foreign trade and resolves that a stop be put everywhere to the working up of the question of merging the Supreme Economic Council with the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. All People's Commissars to sign confidentially" and return the original to Stalin. No copies to be made.

15/V. *Lenin*

Written May 15, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT PREAMBLE TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R. AND A LETTER TO D. I. KURSKY[477]

Draft

PREAMBLE TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R.

... 5. Pending the establishment of conditions guaranteeing Soviet power against counter-revolutionary encroachments upon it, the revolutionary tribunals shall be given the right to apply capital punishment for crimes under Articles 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, × 63+64..... of the Criminal Code).

×) Add also Articles *64* and *65* and *66* and *67* and *68* and *69*.

××) Add the right, by decision of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, to commute the death sentence to deportation (for a term or for life).

×××) Add: death penalty for illicit return from abroad.

Comrade Kursky,

I think the application of the death sentence should be extended (commutable to deportation). See *1st line down*—to all forms of activity by the Mensheviks, *S.R.s and so on*;

to be formulated so as to identify these acts **with those** of the *international bourgeoisie* and their struggle against us (bribing the press and agents, working for war and so on).

Please return urgently with your comments.

15/V. *Lenin*

Written May 15, 1922

First published in part in 1937 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 2

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF REDUCING THE RED ARMY[478]

I think it should be put on the agenda and a reduction by one-fourth announced, the reason given being that a real, if only small and not very reliable, step towards a truce has been made at Genoa.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
May 20, 1922

First published in 1959
Lenin Miscellany XXXVI

Printed from the secretary's notes
(typewritten copy)

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH A DRAFT DECISION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C.

Comrade Stalin for the *Politbureau*:

The session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee has shown how wrongly the A.C.E.C. is constituted. The great majority of its members are officials.

I propose that the Politbureau pass a decision:

> "To recognise as essential that no less than 60 per cent of the members of the A.C.E.C. should be workers and peasants not occupying any official posts in government bodies; that no less than 67 per cent of the A.C.E.C.'s members should be Communists; a three-man commission consisting of Comrades Kalinin, Yenukidze and Kamenev, be directed to work up this question for the next plenum of the C.C. To be passed first through the Politbureau, then to the Plenum of the C.C. for enactment by the next All-Russia Congress of Soviets.[479]

23/V.1922

Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE FIRST CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN OF TRANSCAUCASIA[480]

I greet the First Congress of working women of Transcaucasia. Thank you for electing me. I cannot attend owing to illness.

Lenin

Written in May, not later than 26th, 1922

Published on May 29, 1922 in the newspaper *Bakinsky Rabochy* (Baku Worker) No. 117

Printed from the newspaper text

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

LETTER TO L. B. KAMENEV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU[481]

26.IX

Comrade Kamenev, Stalin has probably already sent you the resolution of his commission on the entry of the independent republics into the R.S.F.S.R.

If he has not, please take it from the secretary at once, and read it. I spoke about it with Sokolnikov yesterday, and with Stalin today. Tomorrow I shall see Mdivani (the Georgian Communist suspected of "independent" sentiments).

In my opinion the matter is of utmost importance. Stalin tends to be somewhat hasty. Give the matter good thought (you once intended to deal with it, and even had a bit to do with it); Zinoviev too.

Stalin has already consented to make one concession: in Clause 1, instead of "entry" into the R.S.F.S.R., to put:

> "Formal unification with the R.S.F.S.R. in a Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

I hope the purport of this concession is clear: we consider ourselves, the Ukrainian S.S.R. and others, equal, and enter with them, on an equal basis, into a new union, a new

federation, the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.

Clause 2 needs to be amended as well. What is needed besides the sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. is a

> "Federal All-Union Central Executive Committee of the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

If the former should hold sessions once a week, and the latter once a week (or once a fortnight even), this may be easily arranged.

The important thing is not to provide material for the "pro-independence" people, not to destroy their *independence*, but to create another *new storey*, a federation of *equal* republics.

The second part of Clause 2 could stand: the dissatisfied will appeal (against decisions of the *Council of Labour and Defence*, and the *Council of People's Commissars*) to the Federal All-Union Central Executive Committee, *without thereby suspending* implementation (just as in the R.S.F.S.R.).

Clause 3 could stand, but its wording should be: "amalgamate in *federal* People's Commissariats whose seat shall be in Moscow, with the proviso that the respective People's Commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R. have their authorised representatives with a small staff in all the Republics *that have joined the Union of Republics of Europe and Asia*."

Part 2 of Clause 3 remains; perhaps it could be said to emphasise equality: "by agreement of the *Central Executive Committees* of the member republics of the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

Let's think about Part 3: perhaps we had better substitute "*mandatory*" for "desirable"? Or perhaps insert *conditionally* mandatory at least in the form of a *request for instructions* and the authority to decide without such instructions solely in cases of "specially urgent importance"?

Clause 4 could perhaps also be "amalgamate by agreement of the Central Executive Committees"?

Perhaps add to Clause 5: "with the establishment of joint (or general) conferences and congresses of a *purely consultative* nature (or perhaps of a *solely* consultative nature)?

Appropriate alterations in the 1st and 2nd comments.

Stalin has agreed to delay submission of the resolution to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee until my return. I shall arrive on Monday, October 2. I should like to see you and Rykov for about two hours in the morning, say 12 noon to 2 p.m., and, if necessary, in the evening, say 5-7 or 6-8.

That is my tentative draft. I shall add or amend on the strength of talks with Mdivani and other comrades. I beg you to do the same, and to reply to me.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Send copies to *all* members of the Political Bureau.

Written September 26, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE CONGRESS OF TEXTILE WORKERS[482]

10.X.1922

Dear Comrades,

I apologise for having had to let you down. I had the toothache, which not only kept me from my work just when I had started it, but kept me fretting for a whole week. All meetings (at congresses) have to be cancelled again for a week.

I am very sorry that I cannot meet you at your congress. I hope that Comrade Kutuzov will tell you everything in detail and convey to you my best greetings and wishes.

Yours,
Lenin

Published in 1922 in the book *Report of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Textile Workers' Trade Union. October 6-11, 1922*, Moscow

Printed from the facsimile in the Special Edition of the newspaper *Golos Tekstilei* (Voice of the Textile Workers) January 25, 1924

ADDENDA TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH L. URQUHART[483]

1) Further: the territory of the concession should be reduced, definitely ensuring to the R.S.F.S.R. a part of Ekibastuz that will be sufficient for the Urals (not less than one-fourth or one-sixth);

2) most important: the sums payable to Urquhart should be cut so that our receipts should not be deferred until 1934 (?).

Lenin

3) What are these amendments for? For *approximate* directives to our agents?

For.
Lenin

Written not before
October 25, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

THESES ON THE CO-OPERATIVE BANK[484]

1) Premiums for size of transactions and uyezd coverage;
2) ditto—deposits;
3) participation in the bank of leading agricultural communist co-operators for purposes of control and drive;
4) stimulation of the Co-operative Bank by the State Bank by way of reduced %;
5) allocation of a certain sum by the State Bank.

Written November 2, 1922

First published in 1964
in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE TEXTILE WORKERS OF PETROGRAD[485]

3.XI.1922

Dear Comrades,

I thank you sincerely for the woollen blanket you have sent me. I find it excellent. I am very sorry I was unable to see Shorov.

My best greetings,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the manuscript

MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMY

Comrade Stalin

Please obtain today a viva voca vote of the Politbureau members on this motion of mine:

that Comrade Trotsky's plan for submitting to the Government a proposal for reducing the army by 200,000 men in the course of January be endorsed;

that Comrade Trotsky be asked to state what period he considers possible for such a question to be introduced to the C.P.C. in the form of a completed draft.[486]

13/XI.1922

Lenin

First published in 1964 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 45

Printed from the typewritten copy

TO THE RUSSIAN COLONY IN NORTH AMERICA[487]

Comrade Reichel, a representative of the American Society for Technical Aid for Soviet Russia, told me about the incorrect view on the New Economic Policy prevalent

among some members of the Russian colony in North America.

This incorrect view could, I believe, be the result of deliberate misinterpretation of this policy by the capitalist press and the ridiculous tales spread by the embittered whiteguards, who have been driven out of Soviet Russia, as well as by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In Europe these tales about us and especially about our New Economic Policy are falling into disuse. The New Economic Policy has changed nothing radically in the social system of Soviet Russia, nor can it change anything so long as the power is in the hands of the workers—and that Soviet power has come to stay, no one now, I think, can have any doubt. The malignity of the capitalist press and the influx of Russian whiteguards in America merely prove our strength.

The state capitalism, which is one of the principal aspects of the New Economic Policy, is, under Soviet power, a form of capitalism that is deliberately permitted and restricted by the working class. Our state capitalism differs essentially from the state capitalism in countries that have bourgeois governments in that the state with us is represented not by the bourgeoisie, but by the proletariat, who has succeeded in winning the full confidence of the peasantry.

Unfortunately, the introduction of state capitalism with us is not proceeding as quickly as we would like it. For example, so far we have not had a single important concession, and without foreign capital to help develop our economy, the latter's quick rehabilitation is inconceivable.

Those to whom the question of our New Economic Policy—the only correct policy—is not quite clear, I would refer to the speeches of Comrade Trotsky and my own speech at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International* devoted to this question.

Comrade Reichel has told me about the preparatory work which the Society for Technical Aid is doing to organise American agricultural and other producers' communes who wish to come out to work in Russia and intend to bring with them new instruments of production, tractors, seeds of improved cultures, and so on.

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* See Vol. 33 of this edition, pp. 418-32.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

I have already expressed my gratitude to the American comrades in my letters to the Society for Technical Aid and the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia in connection with the very successful work of their agricultural communes and units in Russia in the summer of 1922.*

I take this opportunity to thank you once more on behalf of the Soviet Government and to stress the fact that of all the forms of aid *the aid* to our agriculture and improvement of its technical methods is the most important and valuable for us.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written November 14, 1922

Published January 10, 1923 in the newspaper *Russky Golos* No. 2046, New York

Printed from the typewritten copy collated with the newspaper text

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN ON THE QUESTION OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL[488]

Proposals adopted at a meeting of the C.C. Five
(Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, Bukharin)
November 20, 1922

1. All the programmes are handed to the Executive of the Comintern or to a committee appointed by it for detailed working up and study.

The Executive of the Comintern is obliged within the shortest possible time to publish all the draft programmes forwarded to it.

2. The congress confirms that all the national parties which do not yet have their own national programmes must immediately start drafting them so that they may be submitted to the Executive not later than within three months of the next congress, which shall endorse them.

* Ibid., pp. 380, 381.—*Ed.*

3. The necessity of fighting for transition demands subject to appropriate reservations making these demands dependent on concrete conditions of place and time should be stated explicitly and categorically in the national programmes.

4. The theoretical basis for all such transition or limited demands should be definitely stated in the general programme, the Fourth Congress declaring that the Comintern emphatically condemns both the attempts to represent the inclusion of limited demands in the programme as opportunism, and all and any attempts to use limited demands to obscure and side-track the basic revolutionary task.

5. The general programme should clearly state the basic historical types of transition demands of the national parties depending on cardinal differences of economic structure, as for example, Britain and India, and such-like.[489]

First published in 1965 in the Fifth Russian Edition of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

Printed from the typewritten copy

PROPOSALS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE C.P.C. AND THE C.L.D.[490]

Distribution of functions between the Deputy Chairmen:

1. One deputy takes the *C.L.D.*, the other two the *C.P.C.* monthly.
2. They divide the People's Commissariats between them according (or similar) to the spring list of 1922.
3. Work already started (for example, the trusts—the Trust Commission; account of expenditure on heavy industry) is to be continued by Comrade Kamenev.
4. Each deputy chairman undertakes a check of staffs;—a certain part weekly or fortnightly (to be calculated and scheduled in such a way that each check is devoted in turn to one or another People's Commissariat;—now top,

now bottom;—that each check is documented by a detailed statement in writing; those parts of the unchecked commissariats which do not carry out similar reductions and improvements ordered for other commissariats shall incur a penalty, including arrest and dismissal).

4/XII.1922 *Lenin*

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE REPORT OF THE STATE SUPPLIES COMMISSION

All schools, including teachers and pupils, to have their requirements in bread fully provided for over and above the given calculations, and Comrades Kamenev, Tsyurupa and Yakovleva to figure out exactly what amount of bread should be earmarked for this purpose, with the addition of a minimum, specially verified, quantity for office employees.

Another 1 million gold rubles to be added for school expenses.[491]

Lenin

Written December 6 or 7, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the typed copy
signed by Lenin

PROPOSAL FOR THE PLENUM REGARDING THE POLITBUREAU STANDING ORDER

1. The Politbureau meets on Thursdays from 11 to 2 (not later).

2. If any questions remain outstanding, they are to be dealt with either on Friday or on Monday during the same hours.

3. The agenda of the Politbureau should be forwarded to members not later than 12 o'clock on Wednesday. Material (in written form) pertaining to the agenda should be sent in within the same period.

4. Additional questions may be introduced on the day of the meeting only on the following conditions:

a) in cases of absolute urgency (especially diplomatic questions),

b) only in writing,

c) only in cases where no objection is raised by any single member of the Politbureau.

The latter condition regarding non-objection to new questions being introduced in the agenda may be waived only in the case of diplomatic questions which brook no delay.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
December 8, 1922

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE WORK ROUTINE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE C.P.C.

Work Routine of the Deputy Chairmen and the Chairman of the C.P.C.

1. Working hours: 11-2, 6-9; together with the C.P.C. chairman on *Monday and Tuesday*, *Thursday and Friday*.

2. Special meetings of all the deputies and the chairman of the C.L.D. (minus the Politbureau, C.P.C. and C.L.D.) on these days and at these hours whenever there is need, but *generally not less than* twice a week for one hour. This hour to be fixed on the eve not later than 9 p.m.

3. All the work of the deputies is divided into:

(a) close supervision over the work of the Narrow C.P.C.;

(b) similar supervision over the work of the business meetings of the *C.L.D.*

(it is necessary to resume the business meetings of the *C.L.D.* in order to disengage the deputies for other more important work. The business meetings are *not* chaired by the deputies but *their* signatures *alone* endorse the decisions of these meetings);

(c) chairmanship at those parts of the *C.P.C.* and *C.L.D.* meetings where the chairman of the *C.P.C.* does not preside;

(d) participation in the Financial Committee (plus Sokolnikov and his deputy and the chairman of the Narrow C.P.C.; the latter need not attend all meetings of the Financial Committee).

(Perhaps arrange a meeting of the Financial Committee once a week for one hour chaired by the *C.P.C.* chairman? Think this over.);

(e) determining the agenda of all bodies, including the Narrow C.P.C., and the order of priority, the most important questions being chosen by all four under the chairmanship of the C.P.C. chairman;

(f) close supervision of the various People's Commissariats and their apparatus both by means of instructions to the People's Commissars and their deputies personally and by means of studying their apparatus top and bottom;

(g) the commissariats, for this purpose (Point *f*), are allocated among the deputies, such allocation to be endorsed by the chairman of the *C.P.C.*

4. All the above-mentioned work is distributed among the deputies in such a way that each of the three (and if need be their assistants from among the business managers) handles a definite job *for two months* and afterwards *changes it* for another.

This is necessary in order that all the deputies may acquaint themselves with the *entire* apparatus and in order to achieve real unity of management.)

5. The draft of such a distribution among the three deputies is to be drawn up by them immediately and approved by all four.

6. Since the work of improving and correcting the whole apparatus is far more important than the work of chairmanship and the chatting with Deputy People's Commissars and

People's Commissars, which has up till now fully occupied all the deputies' time, it is necessary to arrange and strictly carry out a practice under which each deputy, *for not less than two hours* a week, "goes down to the bottom", makes a personal study of all the various parts of the apparatus top and bottom, and the most unexpected ones at that. The official record of such a study, made, confirmed and communicated (in certain cases) to *all* government departments, should lead to a *reduction* in staff and tighten up discipline throughout our state machinery.

Lenin

Written December 9, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the secretary's notes (typewritten copy)

LETTER TO L. B. KAMENEV, A. I. RYKOV AND A. D. TSYURUPA ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORK BETWEEN THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE C.P.C. AND THE C.L.D.

Comrades Kamenev, Rykov and Tsyurupa

Owing to a recurrence of my illness I must wind up all political work and take a holiday again.[492] Therefore our disagreements with you lose their practical significance. I must say, however, that I utterly disagree with Rykov's practical addendum, and I move the exact opposite against it—namely, that reception should be quite free, unlimited and even extended.[493] I am leaving the details until a personal meeting.

To a considerable extent I disagree also with the distribution of the commissariats. I think this distribution should be more closely adjusted to the ability for purely administrative work on the part of the various deputies; in my opinion, the chief fault of your yesterday's distribution consists in the lack of such adjustment.[494] The functions of chairmanship and supervision of the proper legal wording

of both legislative acts and decisions of the Financial Committee and so forth should be far more strictly separated from the functions of checking and improving the administrative apparatus. Comrade Kamenev is more suitable for the former functions (i.e., chairmanship, supervision of proper wording, etc.) whereas the purely administrative functions are more in Tsyurupa's and Rykov's line.

For the general reason mentioned above I must defer this question until my return from leave. But please bear in mind that I give my consent to your proposed distribution, not for three months (as you suggest), but pending my return to work, should this take place earlier than within three months.

I see that your distribution has overlooked such an important organ as *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, which needs someone to keep a special eye on it. I think this could best be done by Rykov.

Lenin

13. XII.1922

Dictated over
the telephone

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

MATERIALS TO THE ARTICLE "HOW WE SHOULD REORGANISE THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION"*

1

PLAN OF AN ARTICLE "WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?"

1. — Our state apparatus as a whole is most closely tied, most imbued with the old spirit.

In this way we may better renovate it.

* See Vol. 33 of this edition, pp. 481-86.—*Ed.*

2. — Such a type of apparatus as that directly connected with the Central Committee makes for the greatest mobility.

3. — It enjoys greatest authority.

4. — Won't that make for too many C.C. members?

5. — The conference nature of the C.C. plenums has already grown out of our previous Party building.

6. — A ruling is possible limiting attendance of C.C. members at meetings of higher government bodies (the C.P.C., C.L.D., All-Russia Central Executive Committee, etc.).

7. — It is possible to arrange their taking turns in attending these meetings.

8. — It is possible to arrange their taking turns at the meetings of the Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

9. — Possible objections to this plan: too many inspectors, too much supervision, too many chiefs having the right to demand an immediate reply and tearing the staff away from their direct duties, etc.

10. — Answer: we propose an unusual type of personnel for the W.P.I.

11. — How account for the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has a better type of staff? And what are the conditions for making a similar renovated apparatus out of the W.P.I.?

12. — The W.P.I. should start right away organising the work on new lines, guided by five years experience.

13. — New organisation of work on the part of the C.C. Secretariat (training new members of the C.C. in all the details of administration).

14. — Better organisation of Politbureau meetings will come about in the course of the work itself.

15. — Important gain from increasing the number of C.C. members—lessening of the personal and casual element in its decisions, etc.

Dictated not later than
January 9, 1923

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

2

WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?

Without a doubt, the W.P.I. is an enormous difficulty for us. So far nothing has come of it, and the question of its organisation and even its expediency remains a question.

I think that those who doubt whether there is any need for it are wrong. At the same time, however, I do not deny that the problem presented by our state machinery and the task of improving it is very difficult and far from being solved.

With the exception of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, our state apparatus is largely a survival of the past, and least of all affected by any drastic change. It has only been slightly touched up on the surface. In all other respects, in order to get it to work properly, it has always been necessary for the workers' and peasants' state—a state built entirely on new lines—to concentrate members of the Party in it throughout the hierarchical framework.

It is worth remembering how we acted in the critical moments of the civil war, how we concentrated our best Party forces in the Red Army, how we resorted to the mobilisation of the advanced workers from among the Party ranks—in order to confirm what has been said.

And so, I believe, as a result of all our attempts to reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection there emerges the conclusion that we have not made one more attempt. Namely, we have not tried to put this matter into the hands of our workers and peasants, by placing them at the head of our Party as members of the Central Committee.

I visualise this reform of the W.P.I. in the following manner: some 50 to 75 workers and peasants, fully tried and trusted as to conscientiousness and devotion, are elected to the C.C. of the Party in addition to the other C.C. members. At the same time, the staff of the W.P.I. should be reduced at last (at long last!) to several hundred, consisting, on the one hand, of persons with most experience in W.P.I. work in general, i.e., persons who are most familiar with the general supervision of our apparatus of highly skilled specialists and who have a knowledge of

both our apparatus and of the principles and problems of office work organisation, methods of verification and investigation—and, on the other hand, of persons of the purely secretarial, auxiliary staff.

The task of the new members of the C.C, who have fully equal rights with the other members of the C.C., is, by long hard work, to make a study of and improve our state machinery. All the other members of the W.P.I. staff are to help them in this, some as persons most familiar with this machinery and with the work of the W.P.I., others as employees of the secretarial type.

At the same time the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection could remain the same commissariat it has been up till now. The new members of the C.C. could be considered temporarily attached to it. The People's Commissar of the W.P.I. could retain his present rank, position and rights along with the members of his Board.

What do we stand to gain from such an organisation? First of all, we would drop once and for all the practice of new reorganisations undertaken on the basis of an inadequate study of our apparatus. Secondly, we would enhance the authority of this commissariat both by means of enlisting members of the C.C. to it and by reducing its staff to a few hundred members. From the present position, under which the members of the People's Commissariat of the W.P.I. as a general rule live on sops from the inspected institutions, we would pass immediately to a position under which the maximum independence of the W.P.I. employees would be guaranteed either by a very high salary (this could be achieved by reducing the number of the staff to a few hundred very highly skilled and tested top-level workers), or by those assistants of a purely secretarial type, who would be under the constant control and supervision of both the above-mentioned members of the C.C. and of the few specialists left by us after careful screening of the commissariat's staff

The new members of the Central Committee would be assigned the task of making a closer and more careful study of our machinery of state in all its ramifications, including, incidentally, the state trusts.

This job cannot be done quickly. No definite time limit, therefore, would be set for them. On the other hand, they could reckon on several years work by alternating members of the C.C. working on the same assignment, i.e., by a decision of a Party congress we would guarantee to members of the C.C. the possibility of working at this job for several years and then returning to their former jobs.

Lenin

January 9, 1923

Taken down by M. V.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?

(continuation)

I foresee that this plan will evoke no end of objections, most of which will be prompted by the vicious howl of the worst of the old elements in our state apparatus, who have remained really old, that is, pre-revolutionary. They will say that this will lead to nothing but complete chaos in the work that the C.C. members, not knowing what to do, will loiter about the commissariats and government offices, interfering everywhere with the work, demanding explanations, etc., etc.

I think that the nature of these objections clearly betrays the source they come from, and are hardly worth answering. Obviously, if we had in mind an ordinary type of staff, some of these objections might be warranted. But the thing is, we do not have in mind the usual type of staff for this commissariat, but single out for it the best workers, who, on verification by the Party congress, deserve to be elected to the C.C. In this way, I believe, we guarantee that the staff of the People's Commissariat of the W.P.I. will be as good as the best of our commissariats, namely, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. How do we account for the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs having the best staff of employees? In the first place, because diplomats of the old stamp could not remain there to any noticeable degree; secondly, because we selected people there anew, selected them by entirely new standards, by their fitness for the new tasks; thirdly, because there, in the Foreign Commissariat, we do not have, as in other commissariats, that plethora

of haphazardly selected employees who, practically speaking, have inherited all the old qualities of officialdom; and fourthly, because the Foreign Commissariat is working under the direct guidance of our Central Committee. This, as a matter of fact, is the only one of our commissariats that has been fully renovated and that is really working for the workers' and peasants' government and in the spirit of that government, and not merely giving the impression of working for it, while actually, in the main, working against it or in the wrong spirit.

Now what conditions are we faced with in our attempt to make a truly renovated apparatus out of the W.P.I.? The first condition—conscientiousness, will be fully ensured by selection; the second condition is the high qualities of the staff members as regards their devotion to the cause and their abilities; the third condition is their closeness to the highest Party body and their equal rights with those who lead our Party, and, through it, the whole of our state apparatus.

It may be said that no amount of conscientiousness or Party authoritativeness can make up for what, in this case, is the most important thing, namely, knowledge of one's business, knowledge of our state apparatus, and knowledge of the way it should be remodelled.

My reply to this is that one of the essential conditions of my proposal is that we are not to expect quick results in the work of the new commissariat and anticipate that this work will go on for many years. The question then boils down to organising the work of the new commissariat.

And here I feel justified in presuming that both our Party workers and the people now in charge of the W.P.I. have accumulated sufficient experience, sufficient knowledge, sufficient ability and other qualities to properly organise the training of the new C.C. members, and a practical training at that, i.e., by combining their familiarisation with all the details of our state apparatus with a study of what modern science has achieved in the bourgeois states as regards efficient organisation of every kind of staff work.

Lenin

January 13, 1923

Taken down by L. F.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?

(continuation 2)

I assume that it goes without saying that the W.P.I. will start at once, on the basis of five years experience, organising the work on new lines; that it will divide the new workers into a number of groups and assign the work among these groups systematically; that it will divide these groups into: periodically employed people making a practical study of foreign experience; into people engaged in theoretical work and studying the results of modern science in the field of organisation of labour generally and managerial work in particular. It will arrange for all the W.P.I. workers to go through the jobs assigned to them, systematically working from the bottom upwards, performing varied functions in varied fields of administration, in varied localities, in varied conditions of work as regards nationalities, and so on.

In short, I assume that the comrades in the W.P.I. have learned something during these five years and will be able to apply the knowledge they have gained to the new organisation of the commissariat. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that we have, I believe, three scientific institutions carrying out research into problems of work organisation (the Central Institute of Labour, a special group under the W.P.I. and a group under the Military Commissariat). A meeting of these three groups was held recently,[495] and it is to be hoped that their work will now proceed in a more efficient manner and in a better team spirit than heretofore.

What is the new work organisation that I propose on the part of the Secretariat of our C.C.? Naturally, the increased number of C.C. members will require a new organisation of the work. I must point out, however, that actually we have already passed to a form of organisation of our C.C. plenums after the type of highest conferences. The thing now is to organise the training of these new C.C. members in all Central Committee work and familiarise them with the work of the leading state institutions. If we are late with this, we shall not be fulfilling one of our main duties, namely, that of taking advantage of our being in power in order

to teach the best elements of the working people all the details of administration. Such measures as making better arrangements for the meetings of our Politbureau, holding them twice a week and reducing the length of sittings, better preparation of all the documents for these meetings and arranging for these documents to be at the disposal of all the members of the C.C. in good time. These measures now follow from the entire course of the work and are essential, so much so that any kind of objection to this is hardly conceivable. Naturally, this will call for an increase in expenditure on secretarial type personnel, but to grudge the money for these expenses would be most unwise.

Besides, frankly speaking, an important advantage in increasing the number of C.C. members I consider to be the diminished chances of a personal, incidental element being introduced in its decisions; these decisions will be better prepared, the endorsements made at such meetings will be more thoroughly verified, and as a result there will be greater stability in our C.C.. both as regards the continuity of its work and its power to resist splits that might arise from insufficient contact of this body with the masses.

Lenin

January 13, 1923

Taken down by L. F.

Dictated January 9 and 12, 1923

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

1. Name in full: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin)

2. No. of delegate's card $\frac{\text{voting}}{\text{debating*}}$: 381

3. What organisation do you belong to (Uyezd, Gubernia): Moscow

4. Membership of your organisation: 35,000

5. How were you elected (at gubernia conference, uyezd conference, general meeting, etc.) and when: Moscow city conference

6. Number of Party members represented at the gubernia conference, uyezd conference, or general meeting, at which you were elected to the congress: 35,000

7. Age: 50

8. Education: university

9. Former profession (state definitely), or what professions do you know: former: barrister's assistant publicist

10. Nationality: Russian

11. Family status: married

Party work.

12. When did you become a member of the R.C.P. (year, month): in 1893

---

* The word "debating" is crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

13. What All-Russia Party congresses did you attend:
Practically all, I believe

14. What Party work have you done, when and where:
member of the C.C. and editor
of the Central Organ

15. How long have you been doing illegal Party work:
1893-1917

16. What Party work are you doing now:
member of the C.C.
Chairman of the C.P.C. and the Council of Defence

17. Did you belong to any other party before joining the R.C.P., when and how long: no

Soviet administrative work.

18. What Soviet administrative work have you done, when, where:
Chairman of the C.P.C. and the Council of Defence

19. What Soviet administrative work are you doing now: the same

20. What trade unions did you belong to, and when, and what t.u. do you belong to now: none

21. Were you persecuted for doing Party work, when and on what occasions:
was arrested in 1887, 1894 and 1900

22. Where were you at the beginning of the February revolution (in exile, penal servitude, prison, abroad, in military service, factory employment, etc.):
in emigration (in Zurich)

23. How long were you in prison: 14 months plus several days
" " " " in exile: 3 years
" " " " penal servitude: I was not
" " " " in emigration: 1900-1905 and 1908-1917

Signed: *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)
29th of March, 1920

First published in 1934 in the book *The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)* Moscow (facsimile)

Printed from the form filled in by Lenin

REGISTRATION FORM FOR MEMBERS OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

1) Name in full: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov

2) Age: 50 years

3) Place of birth (gubernia, town, uyezd, volost, village):

town of Simbirsk

4) Parents' profession and their address: dead

5) Members of your family (by age) and number of dependents:

wife 51
brother 45
sister 44

6) Do you own immovable property (land allotment, house) or means of production and where: no

7) Nationality: } Russian
8) Mother-tongue: }

9) In what languages, besides Russian, do you speak, read, write (underline):

French, German, English; all 3 poorly

10) Basic profession: litterateur

11) What education did you receive and where:

a) General { High School
b) Special { Passed university extern examinations in 1891 at law faculty

12) Have you been abroad, when and where:

1895; 1900-1905; 1907-1917 in emigration (Switzerland, France, England, Germany, Galicia)

13) What localities of Russia do you know well:

I lived only on the Volga and in the capital cities

14) Were you in military service in the old army (rank, unit and how long): no

15) Did you take part in fighting and were you wounded (where and when):

no

16) In what enterprise or office are you working at the present time (its address and telephone No.), in what post:

C.P.C.

17) What salary do you get and are you doing any by-work:

13½ thousand (13,500)[496]

by-work—literary

18) How long have you been a member of the R.C.P.:

since its foundation and earlier (1893)

19) Did you join during Party Week: —no—

20) What organisation originally admitted you to membership of the R.C.P.:

see § 18

21) Did you attend lectures on socio-political questions, where when and did you take a course in the rudiments of political knowledge and what grade:

— —

22) What Party cell do you belong to:

Kremlin subdistrict

23) Were you on party trial, when and what for:

by the Mensheviks in the R.S.D.L.P. during splits

24) Did you belong to any other party, what party and when and in what capacity: no

25) What documents or certificates do you have testifying that you were in our illegal Party organisation:

history of the Party—document

26) Chief places of previous work:

1. Before the February revolution:
   a) civil work:
   b) Party work:
2. Before the October Revolution:
   a) civil work:
   b) Party work:

} abroad and Petrograd

27) What was your part in the February revolution:

apart from general Party work, none (in emigration)

28) Ditto in October Revolution: member of the C.C.

29) Were you subject to repressive measures for political crimes, where and when, and what sentence did you serve:

arrest 1887 (several days)
" 1895-1897 (14 months and 3 years exile in Eastern Siberia)
" 1900 (several days)

30) What trade union did you belong to, where and when:

none

31) What trade union do you belong to at present (give No. of membership card): none

32) Did you hold elective office after the February revolution and where:

a) Administrative: Chairman of the C.P.C.
b) Trade Union: no
c) Party: member of the C.C.
d) Factory:
e) Army units:
f) Others:

} no

33) Did you undergo military training (army rank) and are you registered in the Special Detachment, if so in what company and what number: no

34) Were you mobilised in the Red Army, when, by what organisation and under what arrangement (general mobilisation or Party mobilisation), how long were you at the front and where (indicate exactly), what duties did you perform, did you take part in the fighting, were you wounded, when and where: no

35) Were you mobilised for transport work, when and by what organisation: no

36) What Party and administrative work can you do (organiser, administrator, lecturer, propagandist, culture worker, etc.):

— —

37) Did you ever address big meetings and preside at them:

yes

38) What Party work are you doing at the present time:

member of the C.C.

39) What further information do you wish to give:

— —

40) Your address and telephone No:

Kremlin. Upper switchboard

41) What works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky and Plekhanov have you read:

practically all works (of underlined authors)

42) On what subjects did you have occasion to address the workers and peasants or read lectures:

mostly political

43) Do you write articles for the newspapers, where and on what subjects:

seldom, on political subjects

44) Can you write leaflets and appeals, and what have you written in this field:

Yes. Rather too numerous to list

45) In what field of knowledge do you feel strongest and on what subjects can you read lectures or conduct lessons:

mostly on political questions

(Signed:) *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

17/IX.1920

First published in 1926
in the book: "*Personal File*"
R.C.P. B. Member V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Moskovsky Rabochy Publishing House
Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the form filled in by Lenin

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)

1. Name in full: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov

2. No. of delegate's card $\frac{\text{debating}}{\text{voting}}$ not yet received

3. By what organisation delegated: Central Committee

4. Age: 50 years

5. Education: university

6. Former profession (state definitely) or what professions do you know:

litterateur

7. Nationality: Russian

8. When did you join the R.C.P. (year, month):

1893, formally 1898

9. What Party work are you doing at the present time:

Member of the C.C.

10. What administrative work are you doing at the present time:

Chairman of the C.P.C. and Chairman of the Council of Defence

11. What trade unions do you belong to:

none

12. Did you belong to any other party before joining the R.C.P. when and for how long: no

Signed: *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

20.I X. 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the form filled in by Lenin

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE TENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.

1. Surname:	Ulyanov (Lenin)
2. First name and patronymic:	Vladimir Ilyich
3. What Party organisation do you belong to (gubernia, town, uyezd army, division):	C.C., R.C.P. Moscow
4. No. of delegate's card $\frac{\text{voting}}{\text{debating}}$	No. 21. debating[497]
5. How were you elected (at gubernia conference, uyezd conference, army conference, division conference, general meeting, etc.) and when:	from the C.C. debating delegate
6. Number of Party members represented—at gubernia, uyezd, army, division conferences at which you were elected to the congress:	C.C. of 19 people
7. What All-Russia Party congresses did you attend:	all except that of July 1917 (or August?)
8. Date of birth:	1870

9. State of health or disablement:	in good health
10. Family status (number of members of the family and dependents):	wife and sister live together with me
11. Nationality:	Russian
12. Mother-tongue:	Russian
13. What other languages do you know and how well	English, German, French poorly; Italian very poorly
14. What localities of Russia do you know well and how long did you live there:	best of all the Volga district where I was born and lived till 17
15. Were you abroad (when, where and how long):	in a number of countries of Western Europe 1895; 1900-1905; 1908-1917
16. Military training:	none
17. Education (at what educational establishments did you study; did you graduate, if not how many classes or courses did you complete):	graduated Petrograd University (passed extern examinations), law faculty in 1891

18. Basic occupation up to 1917:	litterateur
19. What trades do you know:	none
20. What occupations were you engaged in after 1917 apart from Party, administrative, trade union and other similar work:	apart from those listed only literary work
21. What trade union do you belong to at the present time:	Journalists' Union

22. What work have you been doing since 1917—administrative, military, trade union, business (apart from Party) work:

When (date from/to, indicate month/year)	Where (gub., uyezd, town army div.)	In what agency	In what post
since X 1917 to III. 1921	Moscow	C.P.C. and C.L.D.	chairman

23. What work—administrative, military, business, trade union are you doing at the time of filling in this form (apart from Party work):

When (date from/to, indicate month/year)	Where (gub., uyezd, town army div.)	In what agency	In what post
since X 1917	Moscow	C.P.C. and C.L.D.	chairman

24. How long have you been a member of the R.C.P.(Bolsheviks):	since 1894
25. Did you belong to any other parties, if so, to which, when and for how long:	no

26. Did you take part in the revolutionary movement before 1917:

When (date from/to)	Where (gub., uyezd, town)	In what organisation	What work
1892-1893	Samara		
1894-1895	St. Petersburg		
1895-1897	prison	illegal S.D. circles, and after the founding of the R.S.D.L.P. its member	
1898-1900	Siberia (Yenisei Gubernia)		
1900-1905	abroad		
1905-1907	St. Petersburg		
1908-1917	abroad		

27. Were you subject to repressive measures for revolutionary activities (when, on what occasions):	1887 arrest; 1895-1897 arrest; 1898-1900 Siberia; 1900 arrest
28. How long were you in:	
prison	several days + 14 months
penal servitude	I was not
exile	three years
emigration	9-10 years

29. What Party work have you been doing since 1917:

When (date from/to, indicate month/year)	Where (gub., uyezd, town army div., etc.)	In what agency	In what post
since X 1917 to III. 1921	Moscow	C.C.	member C.C.

30. What Party work are you doing at the time of filling in this form:

When (from what date)	Where (gub., uyezd, town army div.)	In what agency	In what post
since X 1917 to III. 1921	Moscow	C.C.	member C.C.

31. Were you on trial before a Court of Law of the RSFSR or a Party court (when, where, on what charge):	no
7th of March 1921	Delegate's signature: *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

First published in part
January 21, 1926
in the newspaper *Na Smenu*
(Sverdlovsk) No. 5

Published in full in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the form filled in
by Lenin

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE ELEVENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(BOLSHEVIKS)

1. Name in full: Ulyanov (Lenin) Vladimir Ilyich

2. With what voice (voting or debating) are you attending?

3. Delegate's card: No. 1

4. What organisation delegated you: C.C., R.C.P.

5. What All-Russia Party conferences and congresses did you attend as a voting delegate:

congresses: all, except those of 1898 and the summer of 1917

conferences: practically all

6. Year of birth: 1870

7. Nationality: Russian

8. Education (elementary, secondary, higher)

9. a) Basic profession and speciality up to 1917:

   litterateur

   b) How many years have you worked at this profession:

   from 1894 to 1917, i.e., 23 years

10. a) Principal means of livelihood before 1914:

literary earnings and salary from the Party

b) during 1914-1917: ditto

c) during 1917-1921: ditto up to 25.X. 1917. After 25/X salary from the Soviet Government

11. What administrative work are you doing at present:

Chairman of the C.P.C. and C.L.D.

12. What part are you taking at present:

a) in co-operative work
b) in trade union work } I am not taking any actual part

13. What Party work are you doing at the present time:

member of the C.C., R.C.P.

14. When did you join the R.C.P.: in 1895

15. Did you previously belong to any other parties, if so when and to which: no

16. Were you subject to repressive measures for revolutionary activity (when):

arrest and exile in 1887; arrest and exile to Eastern Siberia 1895 (XII)—1900

How long were you:

1) in prison: for several days in 1887 and 1900; 14 months 1895-1897

2) in penal servitude: not at all

3) in exile: three years (Yenisei Gubernia, Minusinsk Uyezd)

4) in emigration: 1900-1905 and 1908-1917

Signed: *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)

14th of December 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the form filled in by Lenin

ALL-RUSSIA CENSUS FORM FOR MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

February 13, 1922

C.C., R.C.P. STATISTICAL DEPT. Form "A" No. 38	ALL-RUSSIA CENSUS OF MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) 1922	*Workers of the World, Unite!*

1. Location of Party cell: town/vil. Moscow uyezd/volost Zam-district gub./region Kremlin area No. 1

2. Name of enterprise (office, army unit) at which the cell is organised: C.P.C., Party card 224,332

3. Name of Party organisation which issued the card: Zam-district committee

4. Surname: Ulyanov (Lenin)

5. First name and patronymic: Vladimir Ilyich

6. Sex: M. 7. Date of birth: born in 1870; age: 52 years

8. Spoken language: Russian 9. What other languages can you freely speak: I can freely speak in none

10. a) Do you hold any religious beliefs (convictions)? (yes, no) specify which: No

b) If you are an atheist, state since what age: 16

11. Number of members of the family (excluding the signer):
dependents: two
working: two

12. Education: a) can you read and write (yes, no): Yes
b) if you studied or are studying, state: —

Table III. Educational Qualification

Type of school (2-class rural zemstvo, 6-class town school; technical vocational school; evening motor classes; aviation classes, high school); university; Party school). Out-of-school education to be indicated by the words "self-taught", "home-taught"	How many years did you study	Did you finish school (yes, no, finished such-and-such a class, still studying
13	14	15
a. Finished classic school in 1887 b. and passed university finals c. at extern law faculty in 1891	8 years (in classic school)	Finished classic school. Passed extern university finals

16. If you have a desire to study, what would you take up (reading and writing, the sciences, arts, trades—specify which):—

Table II. Social and National Origin

Relation to the signer	Basic profession or occupation, post, rank	Trade status (employer; self-employed, wage-worker, professional man, houseowner, housewife	Nationality
17	18	19	20
1. Grandfather (on father's side)	I don't know		
2. Father	Director of elementary schools		
3. Mother	—		

21. At what age did you start earning your own living: at 27 (approximately); as employee or self-employed: litterateur

22. a) Basic profession and speciality before 1917: litterateur
b) How many years have you worked at this profession: about 20 (1897-1917)

23. Principal source of income before 1914: literary work and salary from the Party.
in 1914-1917: Ditto

Table III. Record of Employment from 1917 to Date

Work period	Place of work		Kind of occupation	Employed, elected, appointed	Length of employment			
	Name of enterprise (office, army unit) where you have worked no less than 3 months and where you are working at present	Town or gubernia			Period from/to		Total employment	
					Month year	Month year	Year	Month
24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
A. From 1917 to time of entering present employment	a.	. . . . .	. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. .	. .	. .
	b.	. . . . .	. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. .	. .	. .
	c.	. . . . .	. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. .	. .	. .
	d.	. . . . .	. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. .	. .	. .
	e.	. . . . .	. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. .	. .	. .
B. At time of filling in this form:	a. from X. 1917 Chairman C.P.C.	Moscow		By appointment	from 25. X. 1917		4	3
	b.	. . . . .	. .	. . . . .	. . . . .	. .	. .	. .

33. Last monthly pay: (monetary): wage category 17, basic rate . . . . . rubles, total pay 4,700,000 rubles

Table IV. Length of Party Membership

Name of Party and Group	Status in the organisation ("professional", committee member, Committee Secretary, organiser, agitator, propagandist; combat-squad member, technical worker, rank-and-file member)	Place of work (town, gubernia)	Period of Party membership		
			Joined (year, month)	Quitted (year, month)	Total length of Party membership (in years and months)
34	35	36	37	38	39
R.C.P.(B.)	professional, C.C. member	Moscow	1895 (actually)	—	about 27 years

Table V. Revolutionary Record

Participation	Number of occasions
40	41
1. In economic strikes	—
2. In political "	—
Total	
3. In street political demonstrations	—
4. In students' movements	(1887)
5. In illegal circles	many
6. In illegal mass rallies and meetings	many
7. In May Day rallies	
8. In armed uprisings and partisan actions	—
9. In Party conferences	In practically all
10. In Party congresses	

42. Prison record: a) length of imprisonment: years 1 months 2; in administrative exile: years 3 months—; deportation years—months—; political emigration: years about 10 months——; number of escapes:—

43. a) What newspapers and magazines did you read in 1921 (name them): various

    b) Regularly, occasionally, never: irregularly

    c) If you never read, state why (no newspapers, no time, no interest)—

    d) If you do read state where (at home, at work, at a library, reading-room, on paper stands: at home

44. a) How long have you been a member of a trade union: from 19____

    b) Do you take part at the present time in trade union work (yes, no): no

    c) If you do, specify what:

Table VI. Military Record as Serviceman and Political Commissar

			Length of service				Number or occasions of				
			Date from/to		Total service		Participation		Wounds		
In what army	Arm of service and specialty (infantry, calvary, artillery, sappers, engineers)	Military rank (private, company commander)	Month, year	Month, year	Years	Months	In skirmishes	In hand-to-hand fighting	Firearm	Cold steel	Military awards
45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
1. In tsarist army 2. In White army 3. In Green army 4. In Red army	No										

57. If you were not in military service, did you undergo General Military Training (yes, no): No

58. When were you demobilised month of, year 19 ____

59. a) If you are a town dweller or a worker do you maintain any contacts with the village (yes, no)
    b) If so, specify (I have a farm, a market garden, a bee-garden, etc., of my own or in partnership with other persons) ____
    c) What is your part in this business (personal labour, financial support)

Notes:

Town of *Moscow* . . . . . February 13, 1922

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in part (facsimile of the first page) in 1924 in the magazine *Ogonyok* No. 7

First published in full (facsimile) in 1926 in the book: I. G. Lazyan "*Personal File*" *of R.C.P.*(*B.*) *Member V. I. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*), Moskovsky Rabochy Publishing House, Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the form filled in by Lenin

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(BOLSHEVIKS)

1. Name in full: . . . . Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov*
2. Are you attending as debating or voting delegate:
3. Delegate's card No.:
4. What organisation have you been delegated by: . . . . Moscow
5. Age: . . . . 52 years
6. Nationality: . . . . Russian
7. Education: . . . . university
8. What social group do you belong to (worker, peasant, office employee):
9. How long have you worked at your profession: 28 years as litterateur
10. What Party work are you doing at the present time:
    member of the C.C., R.C.P.
11. What administrative work are you doing at the present time:
    Chairman of the C.P.C. and C.L.D.
12. What part are you taking at the present time:
    a) in the co-operative movement } no part
    b) in the trade union movement }
13. When did you join the R.C.P. . . . . at its foundation (1895)
14. Did you previously belong to any other parties, when, which:
    No

Signed: *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

27th of March 1922

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the form filled in part by Lenin

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*The answers printed in small type are in the handwriting of Lenin's sister Maria.—*Ed.*

JOURNAL
OF LENIN'S
DUTY SECRETARIES[498]

November 21, 1922-March 6, 1923

November 21, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

In the morning Vladimir Ilyich received Gorbunov.[499] After 11.30 Kamenev; meeting at 6 o'clock.[500] There have been no orders. Lydia Alexandrovna [Fotieva] has a paper[501] for voting* which Vladimir Ilyich asked to be reminded of from 5-6 p.m. in order to have a talk with Stalin. But Lydia Alexandrovna kept it and said that the explanations he wished to receive from Stalin she would give him herself, so there was no need to remind him, but Lydia Alexandrovna would remind him. Kamenev 10.15-10.45.

November 21, evening.

Haskell—11.30 }
Stalin—12.30 } appointment for November 22**

Re Haskell and Lers (interpreter), orders given to the commandant's office.

November 22, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

I. Morning no orders. Appointments kept.

[For] the evening—Kivdilo and Brodovsky at 6 o'clock (workers of the porcelain works),*** will be received in the following order: at 6 they will arrive at Gorbunov's office and he will interview them and inform us, and then Vladimir Ilyich will drop in for a minute.

An order has to be given concerning the pass (through the Troitsky Gate).

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Voted. Passed on to the Politbureau. Chicherin and Stalin informed. Volodicheva.

** Haskell[502]—through Kamenev. Lers—interpreter. Stalin—carried out. Both received.

*** Kivdilo and Brodovsky have been notified through Zax,[503] all information about them can be got from Zax.

II. Vladimir Ilyich has given a letter, strictly confidential, concerning Haskell's proposal, to be sent round to all the members of the Politbureau and Chicherin. Eight copies have been sent to Nazaretyans[504] to be circulated for voting.* Check with Burakova[505]—received.

III. Gorbunov's papers addressed to the presiding committee of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Soviet Employees Trade Union[506] to be given to Vladimir Ilyich to sign (to be returned to Gorbunov after signing).

November 23, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

At 11 in the morning Vladimir Ilyich has a meeting of the Politbureau up to 2.30.[507] So far no orders have been given.

If Vladimir Ilyich asks about the letter to Hoover he is to be told that Chicherin is seeing to that himself. Haskell is leaving today at 7.20. The letter will be handed to him through Lander (as Vladimir Ilyich asked). No reception for the evening so far.

November 23, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

At 5.40 Vladimir Ilyich was in his office. Asked for the packet from Sklyansky[508] and when the Politbureau minutes would be ready and how this was being handled technically. I got in touch with Sklyansky, who promised to deliver the packet in the morning of November 24.

6.45 packet to Sokolnikov.[509]

8.05 Vladimir Ilyich wanted to talk with Stalin, who proved to be engaged at a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat. Vladimir Ilyich said: "either in the evening or the morning, there's no need to bother him now." At 8.30 he left.

Vladimir Ilyich looked through all the new books. I gave Vladimir Ilyich the packet from Zinoviev[510] and the material from Zax. Vladimir Ilyich asked for the agenda of the meeting of the Large Council of People's Commissars and gave a letter to be translated from Russian into English. At 10.05 Vladimir Ilyich left.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Forwarded 15/20 min. No. 8565.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

November 24, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich wanted to receive Meisner (of the Fishing Industry Board), he may possibly receive him today—so far it is unknown.

Possibly this evening or tomorrow in the daytime Vladimir Ilyich will receive Sklyansky and Pantsendjansky on the question of the ship-repair programme.*[511]

Vladimir Ilyich asked that Earsman and Gardens[512]—delegates of the Australian Party, should be kept on phone call this evening from 5 to 9, they will be waiting in the "Luxe" 294, can be called through the commandant's office.

Burakova phoned, asked that Chicherin's proposal concerning Vorovsky's wire about the Straits be given to Vladimir Ilyich for voting.**[513]

November 24, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Before the meeting Vladimir Ilyich received Kamenev. From 6 to 7.30 Vladimir Ilyich was at the meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence.[514] The question of the composition of the commission in connection with the statement by the C.C. of Georgia was handed to Vladimir Ilyich from the Politbureau for voting.[515] Vladimir Ilyich did not vote.

Passed on the voting on the Straits to be forwarded to the Politbureau. 7.30-8.30 Sklyansky, and then Krzhizhanovsky—at the flat.

November 25, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich is unwell,[516] he stayed only five minutes in his office, dictated three letters over the phone,[517] to which he wanted inquiries made later for answers.

Maria Ilyinichna [Ulyanova] said that he should not be bothered in any way—if he asked about the answers himself, then inquiries should be made in the proper quarters. No reception, no orders so far. There are two packets from Stalin and Zinoviev[518]—but this to be kept under the hat until special instructions and permission are given.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Sklyansky was received.

** Forwarded to Politbureau in the evening.

November 25, evening.

Came at 6 o'clock. Spoke on the telephone for several minutes. A. D. Tsyurupa was with him from 6.30 to 7.30. Afterwards, left immediately, asking that all Kamenev's papers on his desk in two folders should be sent to Tsyurupa,[519] and the articles on the Urquhart concession to Chicherin.[520] This has been done. (But part of the materials is with Nikolai Petrovich [Gorbunov] or in the files.)

Chicherin asked Vladimir Ilyich to be told that he would like to receive personal instructions concerning the Urquhart concession. He (Chicherin) is leaving tomorrow evening. This has to be reported first thing In the morning on Sunday. (Not yet reported.)

8.30 to 8.45 telephone conversation. Gorbunov asked for all the materials concerning the trusts, questions of financing and information from Kamenev's secretariat to be passed on to him, as Vladimir Ilyich had asked him to show them to Tsyurupa. I have already sent Tsyurupa the opinions on the trusts and the information from Kamenev—Tsyurupa has received them and asked they should be left with him for a time to study. Apparently, Nikolai Petrovich has given him some other materials.

I have not shown the packets. But they are all apparently very important. Lydia Alexandrovna ought to be consulted about this.

November 26, Sunday, morning (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived at 12, spoke on the telephone, sorted out the books, took several with him. Left at 1.30, taking V. Milyutin's report[521] and other papers.

November 26, Sunday, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich came at 6.50, spoke on the telephone. At 7.30 Tsyurupa arrived. At 8.30 Tsyurupa left, and so did Vladimir Ilyich.

November 27, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich was in his office round about 12, asked for no one and shortly went away. Through Nadezhda

Konstantinovna asked for all the materials on foreign trade. All sent to his flat. No orders so far, no reception. No packets either.

November 27, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Gorbunov asked, if possible, that the paper from Zinoviev in connection with Münzenberg[522] be given to Vladimir Ilyich to sign (if received) and the materials on foreign trade to be passed on to him (Gorbunov), since Vladimir Ilyich had asked him to show them to Tsyurupa. But today Vladimir Ilyich has not given them. They are at his flat. No orders from Vladimir Ilyich. A little after 6 I gave orders to the commandant's office to admit Kramer[523] to the flat.

Quite a few packets. Among them the mail from Berlin.

November 28, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not come to his office, spoke twice on the phone with Lydia Alexandrovna.* Asked for Sorokin's article in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for November 26[525] concerning 159 directives**—then gave orders to Lydia Alexandrovna; no orders for the evening so far. I am not leaving the packets either.

November 28, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

At 7.45 Vladimir Ilyich asked to get hold of Avanesov[526] and ask him whether he could phone him. Phoned a second time and gave his number. I told Vladimir Ilyich that Avanesov was at a board conference of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. "Then don't trouble, I'll ring you in the morning." There was a paper for Vladimir Ilyich to sign from Gorbunov to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, copies to Bogdanov[527] and Fomin[528] on the question of the All-Russia C.E.C. revising the decision to transfer the creosoting works from the Supreme Economic Council to the People's Commissariat for Railways.[529] Vladimir Ilyich signed it (at his flat and passed it on to the Secretariat).

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* See supplementary card.[524]

** Article cut out, pasted and sent to his flat.

November 29, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich was in his office at 12.20, sent for Stalin, who sat till 13.40. No orders for the evening. No packets either so far.

November 29, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Notice from the Politbureau (8812) that the question of the Union Republics will be discussed at the Politbureau tomorrow (sent not for information, but for consideration).[530]

Vladimir Ilyich phoned from 5.30 till 6. Asked whether the paper on the ship-repair programme had been received from Stalin. Talked for several minutes on the phone with Kamenev. Dictated over the phone his views on the ship-repair programme which he asked to be sent to Stalin and Kamenev (this has been done).[531]

Asked whether a telegram had been sent to Haskell in London. The duty secretary in Chicherin's office answered in the affirmative.* He will send confirmation in writing tomorrow morning. Vladimir Ilyich has been informed.

Avanesov was from 7.50 to 8.55. They talked in Vladimir Ilyich's office. Left at 9. During the talk with Avanesov inquired what date the plenum of the Central Committee was fixed for. Tomorrow this question is on the order of the day of the Politbureau (together with the agenda), and at the last plenum of the C.C. it was decided to time the plenum to the Congress of Soviets. This has been reported to Vladimir Ilyich.[532]

November 30, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 1.10, phoned and asked for No. 763 of *Posledniye Novosti* [Latest News] for October 13. He was interested in Peshekhonov's article there.[533] I found it and took it to his flat. Vladimir Ilyich was in his office exactly five minutes and went home at once. No orders. No packets either. Lydia Alexandrovna asked to make a note—just for information—that Haskell's and Chicherin's packets addressed to Vladimir Ilyich had been handed to Kamenev.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Copy of the telegram mailed to Haskell over Litvinov's signature. Received November 30.

November 30, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 6.45, asked what news there was and when the Politbureau meeting ended. I told Vladimir Ilyich that there were some new books. He asked to bring them to him. Returned the newspaper *Posledniye Novosti* for October 13.

At 7.55 Adoratsky[534] came to see Vladimir Ilyich, sat till 8.40. Vladimir Ilyich spoke on the telephone. Asked for the minutes of the Politbureau. I gave them to him. Vladimir Ilyich asked that the Politbureau minutes be put away. He asked that special care be taken of Engels's book "Political Testament".[535] Handed over the new books he had looked through. Vladimir Ilyich left at 9.

December 1, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned Lydia Alexandrovna at 11.20, asked to see Molotov at 12.*

Molotov and Syrtsov[536] called, were together from 12 till 1.30. No orders for the evening so far. No packets either.

December 1, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived at 5.30, and at 5.45 Tsyurupa came.

Earsman, Garden and interpreter Voitinsky came at 7 o'clock and left at 8.40. Vladimir Ilyich left at 8.45.

December 2, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived at 12.30, stayed only 10 minutes, sent for Lydia Alexandrovna. Asked her to collect the materials on the Fishing Board for his interview with Knipovich,[537] which he asked to arrange for 7 p.m. The materials are with Gorbunov, see to it that they should all be here by 6 o'clock. Orders have to be given at all posts for Knipovich to be let through, as he has no pass.

The doctor was with Vladimir Ilyich in the morning and told him that once or even twice in two months Vladimir Ilyich had to go away for several days for a rest. On Tuesday he did not permit him to preside, but would permit him

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Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Molotov's appointment made for 12. He kept it.

on Thursday, but not for long—and after Thursday he was to go away positively for several days.

Gorbunov phoned and asked that Vladimir Ilyich be told at the first opportunity that Rykov had left Tiflis on December 1 by express train. Vladimir Ilyich has to be told this as he is very interested in it.

Vladimir Ilyich asked for Kamenev to see him at 8 p.m. (he phoned at 14.05).

Lydia Alexandrovna has to be reminded to find out from Vladimir Ilyich exactly what article of Kin's[538] he spoke to Tsyurupa about, as the latter can't find it.

December 2, evening.

From 6.30 in his office; from 7 to 8—Knipovich; from 8 to 9.15—Kamenev.

Gave English letter and asked to find out when Earsman was leaving. Inquiries made of "Luxe" commandant Kaizer, who said that Earsman would probably not be leaving today and that tomorrow he would report the exact day of his departure.* This, should then be reported to Vladimir Ilyich and the letter given to him.

Signed the letter to Münzenberg**[539] with the reservation that he does not agree to the beginning of the letter which is incorrectly worded in German. Asked for a copy to be left with him (No. 8579) in the Secretariat.

He has a letter to Svidersky to be signed, we have a copy. If he signs it, it is to be forwarded to destination.[540]

Gorbunov has handed in press cuttings***; one folder with fresh material, the other older. These are materials for Vladimir Ilyich's speech at the Congress of Soviets, which he asked to be collected. I think Lydia Alexandrovna should be asked whether it can be handed to him on Sunday.

Vladimir Ilyich asked that inquiries should be made of Belenky[541] as to when (exactly) Rykov and Dzerzhinsky

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Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Kaizer reported: Earsman does not know himself when he is going away, but will spend a long time here, possibly even a few months.

** The letter has been delivered to Münzenberg through Gorbunov. M. Volodicheva.

*** Put on Vladimir Ilyich's desk.

are arriving.* He is very interested in this. I have not made inquiries of Belenky.

Vladimir Ilyich has been told that Frumkin is preparing the material and will send it in on Monday morning or Sunday evening.[542]

Vladimir Ilyich asked Gorbunov several times for Mikhailovsky's memo on the financial question. Nadya [Alliluyeva] must have it. He asked that both memos, Mikhailovsky's and Krasnoshchokov's[543], should be returned to him when finished with. Left at 9.30.

December 3, morning (entry by S. A. Flakserman).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 2 p.m. Asked for the stenographer. Volodicheva was not at home, and Vladimir Ilyich said we shouldn't trouble to look for her as he did not have much writing to do and would do it by hand. Reported to Vladimir Ilyich: Belenky's information about the arrival of Rykov and Dzerzhinsky, also Kaizer's report on when Earsman is leaving. Vladimir Ilyich asked to find out through Voitinsky of the Comintern, who knows English, when Earsman wants the memo.

Vladimir Ilyich stayed in his office 20 m. and left.

December 3, Sunday evening (entry by S. A. Flakserman).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 6 p.m.

Belenky reported that according to the information received from the People's Commissariat for Railways Rykov left Baku on December 3 and was expected at Rostov on December 5. A wire has been sent to Dzerzhinsky for checking. I did not tell Vladimir Ilyich.

6.45. Vladimir Ilyich asked to tell Avanesov that he received his letter, read it and would like to talk with him first over the phone.[544] Pass message on tomorrow morning.

At 7 p.m. Vladimir Ilyich left his office.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Belenky reported that Dzerzhinsky was leaving Tiflis round about December 8, would stop on the way for inspections and be in Moscow round about December 13. Rykov left Tiflis on December 2 and will be here on December 4 in the morning. (As regards Rykov, he will check again and phone). Belenky phoned again and said that Rykov would be here at 6 p.m. today, said he would check it again and phone up. He has made inquiries down the line.

December 4, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 11.05. Asked to get exact information on Rykov's arrival.* At 10.40 Vladimir Ilyich phoned to ask that Avanesov be invited at 11 a.m. Avanesov arrived at 11.15, left at 12.10. Talk was on the question of foreign trade. At 12.30 Vladimir Ilyich went to Gorbunov's office,[545] then came back and began to dictate to Volodicheva over the telephone, went home at 2. At 6 p.m. Vladimir Ilyich will be seeing Kolegayev[546] (telephone 174—14 or through Trotsky's switchboard).

When Rykov arrives (if Vladimir Ilyich is in the country by that time, he is leaving on Thursday) he is to be put through to Vladimir Ilyich.** At 5.50 Zhukov[547] is to be with Lenin for 10 minutes. From 7 to 8 Frumkin, from 8.15 to 9 Tsyurupa (tentatively, if this time is inconvenient to Vladimir Ilyich, then tomorrow at 11 or 12.30 a.m.).

December 4, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

At 5.30 Vladimir Ilyich dictated to Volodicheva a letter to Litvinov and greetings to the Third Congress of the Young Communist International.[548] Dialled and asked me what I have for the day, told him the schedule of reception. At 5.50 Kolegayev went in, on the closing of the theatres, up to 6.10. Soon after Zhukov went in with Holtzmann[549] and Lavrentyev, up to 6.50, talked about electrical industry. After them Frumkin went in at 6.50 till 7.25 on the question of foreign trade. At 7.30 Vladimir Ilyich left his office, at 8 o'clock he came into his office. Vladimir Ilyich asked about Litvinov's answer. Asked for Haskell's wire. Handed over the book by the Spaniard Cesar Reyes, asked that the inscription and contents of the book be translated.[550] The commission made up of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Bukharin met on December 4 (today) in the evening, to whom was sent a copy of Vladimir Ilyich's notes (addressed to

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Notes in the "Execution" column:

* I phoned Belenky, asked him again to find out exactly. Promised to answer this evening.

** Watch this.

Bukharin) on the question of the tasks of our delegation at the Hague.[551]

At 9 o'clock Vladimir Ilyich left his office.

December 5, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Litvinov reported that there was confirmation of receipt of the telegram by Haskell through our mission. Tell Vladimir Ilyich.

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 10.45, asked whether the Bukharin-Zinoviev-Trotsky commission had met. I told him it had that night; he left at 1.40.

At 6 o'clock Vladimir Ilyich is to receive the Czechoslovak workers (see list).[552] Orders have to be given to all posts to let them through; they have passes to the Kremlin (for 15 m.). They have been notified.

Popov[553] is coming at 7 for half an hour (notified). There should be a written report from Litvinov concerning receipt of the telegram by Haskell.

December 5, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

From 6 to 6.45 the Czechoslovaks: Josef Hans, Hamosta, Fráněk, Richtěr, Chapěra, with Antselovich.[554]

From 7 to 8 Popov (on the census). Several minutes break (went home). At 8.20 Tsyurupa in his office. Left at 9.25.

December 6, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office a little after 11. He asked Lydia Alexandrovna to write several letters on his behalf (to Yakovleva, Kamenev, Tsyurupa[555]). Asked to be put through to Stalin, made arrangements to see him. At 12.40 Stalin came, sat with him till 2.20. Asked to invite Eiduk at 7.30, Dovgalevsky[556] at 6, Bogdanov at 7. After Stalin he wanted to talk with Meshcheryakov.*[557]

At 2.25 Vladimir Ilyich went home, Kamenev phoned, said he was sending a packet addressed to Comrade Lenin, has to be handed to him directly.**

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* He did not, as he was kept late.

** Received at a quarter to five and put on the desk. Volodicheva.

December 6, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Kamenev's letter read by Vladimir Ilyich at 6 o'clock.

From 6.05 to 6.30 Bogdanov; from 6.55 to 7.20 Eiduk; from 7.25 to—Dovgalevsky.

For 15-20 minutes dictated his reminiscences of N. Y. Fedoseyev.[558] Left a little after 9. Reminiscences at his request forwarded to Anna Ilyinicha [Yelizarova] (see copy of forwarding note).

December 7, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 10.35; at 11 the Politbureau meeting started with Kamenev in the chair. Vladimir Ilyich attended.[559] Vladimir Ilyich left the meeting to go home at 2.20.

December 7, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich came to the office at 5.30, talked with Stalin and others over the phone, gave various orders for the Politbureau[560] and Yakovleva.[561] Left for Gorki at 6.15, taking with him cur
rent papers.[562]

December 8, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

At 12.10 Vladimir Ilyich phoned Lydia Alexandrovna, talked with her about yesterday's decisions of the Politbureau.

At 12.15 the following were sent to Vladimir Ilyich with Belenky: 1) minutes of the Politbureau No. 39[563] and 2) list of key-post executives of all-Russia and district level (from Syrtsov). Vladimir Ilyich wanted to phone a little later and dictate something.

December 8, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned at 5.35, dictated to Volodicheva[564]; at 5.50 Lydia Alexandrovna spoke with Vladimir Ilyich, who voted on three Politbureau questions: the wire from Vorovsky, Mdivani, Chicherin dated December 7, 1922,[565] the composition of the commission to examine the resolutions for the Tenth Congress of Soviets, and greetings to the All-Ukraine Congress.[566] Dictated standing order for the Politbureau.[567] Agrees to putting off the plenum.[568] Finished speaking at 6.20. Medicine from Berlin sent.

December 9, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

No orders left in the evening. Maria Ilyinichna phoned, saying that Vladimir Ilyich was going to dictate something at 5.45, and at 6 he was to talk with Rykov—the latter has arrived and is sitting at home. No orders. Some packets have come in.

December 9, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned at 6.05, gave instructions. His letters concerning the work of the deputies[569] sent off to Rykov, Stalin, Tsyurupa and Kamenev.

Belenky is to bring a packet for Vladimir Ilyich from Kamenev.

Vladimir Ilyich's letter in French will be returned by Souvarine this evening.[570]

Vladimir Ilyich is being sent: 1) his letter on the work of the deputies (original, copy and copy of the old decree[571]), letter from Zetkin and medicine.

December 10, morning.

Nothing from Vladimir Ilyich.

December 10, evening.

Phoned a little after 6, asked to be put through to Stalin. Voted on the telegram from Kirov, Vasilyev and Poluyan concerning the S.R.s.[572]

Send by hand, at first opportunity, Vladimir Ilyich's letter to Lazzari in French, corrected by Souvarine; it has been left at the gate; at 8.45 Vladimir Ilyich asked to send Frumkin his letter asking for his comments on Avanesov's theses. Sent. Find out tomorrow morning from Frumkin when he is sending his comments.[573]

Also make inquiries of Gorbunov first thing in the morning (see copies Nos. 8605 and 8606).[574]

The letter to Lazzari should not be sent specially. To be sent only by hand. Vladimir Ilyich said so.

December 11, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

No orders given. Vladimir Ilyich did not phone once. Check the temperature in his office, to be no less than 14 degreees. (R.)

December 11, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

There have been no orders. Vladimir Ilyich did not phons once.

December 12, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived in Moscow at 11, came to his office at 11.15, stayed there a short time and went home before 12. At 12 he was to see Rykov, Kamenev and Tsyurupa.*

Vladimir Ilyich left his office at 2 o'clock. Rykov, Kamenev and Tsyurupa sat with him till 2.

For the evening so far nothing.

December 12, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich in his office at 5.30. Spoke on the phone for several minutes. Gave a letter to the Italian Lazzari to be sent off and asked to see to it that the person taking it was a trustworthy comrade. Dzerzhinsky from 6 to 6.45.[575]

Stomonyakov[576]—(question of the foreign trade monopoly)—7.45

Left at 8.15.

Vladimir Ilyich's letter to Lazzari forwarded to Souvarine ("Luxe", 23). He will make arrangements with reliable comrades and let us know about it tomorrow morning, or better still will phone him**.

December 13, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Doctors came at 11. Ordered complete rest, he was to leave town.[577]

Round about 12 sent for Fotieva for winding up affairs. Dictated letters: to the Central Committee concerning Rozhkov,[578] to Frumkin, Stomonyakov and Trotsky concerning foreign trade,[579] and to his deputies concerning distribution of functions.[580] At 12.30 Stalin came, left at 2.35.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Saw them.

** Check carefully at Vladimir Ilyich's request. Souvarine signed for the letter, his personal signature received.

December 13, evening (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

At 5.55 sent for Fotieva. Told of Frumkin's and Trotsky's answers. Arranged to see Krzhizhanovsky at 12 on December 14. Dictated, from 7.30 to 8.25, a letter to the plenum of the Central Committee on the question of foreign trade.[581] Wanted to see Frumkin, but cancelled the engagement. Fairly good humour, joked. Only worried about the winding up of affairs.

December 14, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Phoned at 11, spoke with Fotieva about yesterday's letter on foreign trade, asked not to give it to anybody, as he had an addition to make. Inquired whether Krzhizhanovsky was coming. Phoned again at 11.10.

At 1.10 asked to be put through to Yaroslavsky.[582] As Yaroslavsky could not be found, put off his talk or interview with him for the evening. At 2.25 sent for Fotieva, gave her a note for Avanesov to be sent to him together with the letter on foreign trade.[583] Gave orders for the letter, when returned, to be sent to Frumkin, whom he would probably receive in the evening. Was very pleased to hear of the Politbureau's decision concerning Rozhkov, laughed and said that this was very good news.[584] Outwardly in good humour, jokes and laughs.

December 14, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned at a quarter to six. Asked about the Politbureau minutes. Said he intended to dictate. Asked to be put through to Yaroslavsky. (Yaroslavsky was with him). At 7 o'clock, the doctor. Frumkin came, but did not see Vladimir Ilyich. At a little past eight Vladimir Ilyich inquired whether he was there. Asked Lydia Alexandrovna to remind him about Frumkin tomorrow at 12, when Frumkin would be seeing Tsyurupa. Asked to find out whether all the materials concerning the foreign trade monopoly had been sent to Trotsky and handed over those he had been keeping. They have to be shown to Lydia Alexandrovna. Vladimir Ilyich's letter concerning Bukharin's letter has been sent to Stalin and Trotsky at Vladimir Ilyich's request.*[585] The addition, as he said, he would write separately.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Does it have to be sent to Frumkin?

Before 8 told Lydia Alexandrovna that he would dictate: 1) a letter to Zinoviev concerning Rozhkov in Pskov; 2) to Kamenev concerning the Union of Socialist Republics; 3) an addition to the letter on foreign trade.

Repeated round about 9 o'clock that he reserved the right to phone up to 10 o'clock. Round about 10 Maria Ilyinichna phoned and said that Vladimir Ilyich would not dictate today.

December 15, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Phoned at 11.50. Asked for copies of yesterday's letters. Sent for Fotieva and gave a letter he had written to Trotsky, telling Fotieva to type it herself and send it off, keeping a copy in a sealed envelope in the secret files.[586] He found it very difficult to write, asked that the original be destroyed but it is preserved in the secret file together with the copy.

Gave instructions about his books. Technical, medical and other books to be separated and sent back, books on agriculture to be turned over to Maria Ilyinichna, those on production propaganda, labour organisation and pedagogics to Nadezhda Konstantinovna, fiction to be kept until claimed, and publicist, political books, memoirs, etc., to be kept for him.

He also gave orders that all the minutes of the Finance Committee be turned over to him with a memo of the secretary, not too long, but neither too short, from which he could get a clear idea of the work of the Finance Committee. Not very cheerful, said he was feeling worse, had not slept that night.

December 15, evening (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Phoned at 8.30. Dictated (first over the telephone, then invited me over to his flat) letters to Stalin and Trotsky. To Stalin concerning his possible speech at the Congress of Soviets.[587] To Trotsky on a categorical protest against the question of foreign trade being removed from the agenda of the plenum, should that be contemplated.[588] He finished round about 9.

December 16, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

At 11-11.45 doctors called (Kramer and Kozhevnikov[589]). Nadezhda Konstantinovna sent down the letter to the deputies

which she had taken down, apparently, yesterday evening or today before the doctors came.[590] Pakaln[591] says that Vladimir Ilyich has no wish to go to Gorki, saying that the journey by aero-sleigh was tiring and you could not go down by car. Pakaln tells that every day at 9.30 a dog (Aidu) is brought to him with whom he plays and is very fond of. A telegram has arrived from Foerster[592] confirming that before addressing the congress he should have no less than 7 days complete rest. Vladimir Ilyich did not phone once and has given no orders.

December 16, evening (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Nadezhda Konstantinovna phoned asking that Stalin be told in Vladimir Ilyich's name that he would not address the Congress of Soviets. On being asked how Vladimir Ilyich was feeling, she said middling, he looked all right, but then it was difficult to say. She also asked, on his instructions, to phone Yarovslavsky secretly and ask him to make notes of the speeches of Bukharin and Pyatakov, and if possible others at the plenum, on the question of foreign trade.

December 18, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

A meeting of the Central Committee plenum is on. Vladimir Ilyich is not attending, he is ill—no orders or instructions.

December 18, evening.

The plenum is in session. Vladimir Ilyich is not attending. With the evening session the plenum is closed.[593]

December 23 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

A little after 8 Vladimir Ilyich called me to his flat. In the course of 4 minutes he dictated. Felt bad. Doctors called.[594] Before starting to dictate, he said: "I want to dictate to you a letter to the congress. Take it down".[595] Dictated quickly, but his sick condition was obvious. Towards the end he asked what the date was. Why was I so pale, why wasn't I at the congress,[596] was sorry that he was taking up the time that I could have spent there. I received no more orders.

December 24 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Next day (December 24) between 6 and 8 Vladimir Ilyich called me in again. Warned me that what he had dictated yesterday (December 23) and today (December 24) was strictly confidential. He emphasised this again and again. Demanded that everything he was dictating should be kept in a special place under special responsibility and to be considered categorically secret. He then added another order.[597]

Sukhanov's "Notes on the Revolution", Volumes III and IV, were taken for Vladimir Ilyich.

December 29

Through Nadezhda Konstantinovna Vladimir Ilyich asked that lists of the new books be made up. The doctors have allowed him to read. Vladimir Ilyich is reading Sukhanov's "Notes on the Revolution" (Volumes III and IV). Vladimir Ilyich is not interested in fiction. He asked that the lists be made up by sections.

January 5, 1923.

Vladimir Ilyich asked for lists of new books as from January 3 and Titlinov's book "The New Church".[598]

January 17 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in for half an hour between 6 and 7. He read and made corrections to his notes on Sukhanov's book on the revolution. In the course of 10-15 minutes dictated a continuation on the same subject.[599]

Was pleased with the new stand that made it easier for him to read books and his own manuscripts.

When dictating the sentence "Our Sukhanovs ..." he paused at the words "... never even dream ..." and while pondering the continuation, jokingly remarked: "What a memory! I have completely forgotten what I was going to say! Dash it! Extraordinary forgetfulness!" He asked me to type the notes at once and give them to him.

Watching him during dictation for several days running I noticed that he did not like to be interrupted in the middle of a sentence, as he lost the thread of his thoughts.

January 18 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not send for me.

January 19 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me round about 7 and a little after 8. Dictated his second variant about the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection ("How We Should Reorganise the W.P.I."[600]) for about 30 minutes. Said he wished to get it finished as quickly as possible.

January 20.

Vladimir Ilyich called me in today between 12 and 1 o'clock. Read his article "How We Should Reorganise the W.P.I." Made amendments and additions to it.

Said that Nadezhda Konstantinovna would give him information relating to one part of his article, and asked Lydia Alexandrovna to find out the same thing: what and how many bodies there were dealing with the scientific organisation of labour, how many congresses had been held on the subject and what groups had been represented at them. Was there any material in Petrograd? (Khloplyankin[601] had sent the same material as Nadezhda Konstantinovna had, a little more detailed.)

Asked for a full list of books.[602] I was with him for about 30 minutes.

January 21 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not send for me.

January 22 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in for 25 minutes (from 12 to 12.25). Made corrections in the 2nd variant of the W.P.I. article. Finally chose this variant. As his time was limited he was in a great hurry. Asked me to put the article in order, retype it and give it to him by the evening. Nadezhda Konstantinovna, when letting me in, said he had stolen several minutes to look through the article. Nadezhda Konstantinovna told me that the nurse (on duty) had not wanted to let me in to him. After I had left, Nadezhda Konstantinovna came into the secretariat to tell me Vladimir Ilyich's request "to leave a space in the places, if any, which I had not

managed to take down". She said that Vladimir Ilyich, being in a hurry, imagined that I had difficulty in following him. I asked him to be told that I had taken it all down, and if I had any doubts I would do as he had asked.

January 23, (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me between 12 and 1 o'clock. Once more glanced through the article mentioned above and made slight changes. Asked me to insert them in his copy and ours and give one to Maria Ilyinichna for *Pravda*. Article corrected and handed to Maria Ilyinichna before 3 o'clock. He asked whether Lydia Alexandrovna had come back and whether our holidays were over?

January 30 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

On January 24 Vladimir Ilyich sent for Fotieva and gave instructions to ask Dzerzhinsky or Stalin for the materials of the commission on the Georgian question and to make a detailed study of them. This assignment was given to Fotieva, Glyasser and Gorbunov. Object—report to Vladimir Ilyich, who wanted this for the Party congress. Apparently, he did not know the question was up at the Politbureau.[603] He said: "Just before I got ill Dzerzhinsky told me about the work of the commission and about the 'incident', and this had a very painful effect upon me."

On Thursday, January 25, he asked whether the materials had been received. I answered that Dzerzhinsky would not be arriving until Saturday. Therefore I had not yet been able to ask him.

On Saturday I asked Dzerzhinsky, he said Stalin had the materials. I sent Stalin a letter, but he was out of town. Yesterday, January 29, Stalin phoned saying he could not give the materials without the Politbureau. Asked whether I had not been telling Vladimir Ilyich things he was not to be told—how was it he was posted about current affairs? For instance, his article about the W.P.I. showed that certain circumstances were known to him. I answered that I had not been telling anything and had no reason to believe he was posted about affairs. Today Vladimir Ilyich sent for me to learn the answer and said that he would fight to get the materials.

On January 26 Vladimir Ilyich gave instructions for Tsyurupa, Svidersky and Avanesov to be told that if they agree with his article, they should arrange a number of conferences and discuss by way of preparation for the congress whether or not a plan should be drawn up, a synopsis of textbooks (apparently on the normalisation of labour). Do they know the books by Kerzhentsev and Yermansky?[604] There is a plan of scientific organisation of labour, there is a normalisation department at the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

Today he asked what answer Tsyurupa had given, whether he, Svidersky, Avanesov, and Reske[605] agreed with the article. And other members of the Board? I said I did not know this. He asked, wasn't Tsyurupa dilly-dallying, procrastinating, was he frank with me. I said I had not had a chance to speak to him yet, I had only given him the instructions, which he said would be duly carried out.

On January 24 Vladimir Ilyich said: "First of all, about this 'secret' job of ours—I know that you are deceiving me." To my assurances to the contrary, he answered: "I have my own opinion about that."

Today, January 30, Vladimir Ilyich said that yesterday, on asking whether he could address the congress on March 30, the doctor had answered in the negative, but had promised that he would be up by that time and within a month would be allowed newspapers. Reverting to the question of the Georgian commission, he said, laughingly: "That is not newspapers, so I can read it now." Apparently not in a bad humour. No compress on his head.

February 1 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Today Vladimir Ilyich sent for me (at 6.30 p.m.). I told him the Politbureau had permitted the materials to be given out.[606] He gave instructions what to pay attention to and generally how to use them.[607] Vladimir Ilyich said: "If I were at large (at first he made a slip, then repeated, laughing: if I were at large) I would easily do all this myself." It had been estimated that their study would take 4 weeks.

He asked what the attitude of Tsyurupa and the others was towards his article. I answered, according to the direc-

tions of Tsyurupa and Svidersky, that Svidersky was fully in agreement. Tsyurupa approved it in the part referring to the enlistment of Central Committee members, and doubted whether it was possible for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to discharge all its present functions with a staff reduced to 300-400 people. I do not know Avanesov's point of view. Tomorrow there is to be a meeting of the whole Board.

He asked whether the question of the article had been up before the Central Committee. I answered that I did not know this. Vladimir Ilyich was satisfied with these reports.

February 2, (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me at 11.45. Dictated article "Better Fewer, But Better".[608] Finished at 12.30.

Asked Lydia Alexandrovna to come every other day. When asked, "At what time", he said that he was now a free man. Casually mentioned that the only time that was ruled out was from 2 to 5; said 6 might do, or to arrange it with his sister.

I had not seen him since January 23. Outwardly, a considerable change for the better: fresh, cheerful looking. Dictates, as always, excellently: without halts, seldom at a loss for words, speaks, gesticulating, rather than dictates.[609] No compress on his head.

February 3 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me at 7 o'clock for a few minutes. Asked whether we had looked through the materials. I answered that only externally and that they were less than we had expected. Asked whether this question had been up before the Politbureau. I answered that I had no right to talk about it. Asked: "Have you been forbidden to speak precisely and particularly about this?" "No, I have no right generally to talk about current business." "So this is current business?" I realised that I had made a slip. I repeated that I had no right to talk. He said: "I heard about this business from Dzerzhinsky before I got ill. Has the commission reported to the Politbureau?" "Yes, it has. The Politbureau has endorsed its decision as far as I remember." He said:

"Well, I think you will make your report in about three weeks, and then I'll send them a letter." I answered: "We may not manage it in three weeks." The doctors came (Foerster, who had just arrived, Kozhevnikov and Kramer) and I went away. Looked cheerful and buoyant, perhaps somewhat excited at Foerster's visit—Foerster had not seen him for some time.

February 4, (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me today round about 6 o'clock. Asked whether I did not mind him calling me on holidays. ("You must take a rest, too, sometimes, mustn't you?")

Dictated continuation of his article "Better Fewer, But Better" for over half an hour. Looked fresh, voice cheerful. No compress. Ended with the words: "Well, that'll do for the time being. I'm a bit tired." Asked me to type it out and phone him when I had finished, as he would probably continue the article that day; said it was an old habit of his to write with the manuscript in front of him, otherwise he found it difficult to write.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna told me that the German doctor (Foerster) had seen him, had told him a lot of pleasant things, allowed him to do gymnastic exercises and allowed him extra time for dictating articles, and that Vladimir Ilyich was very pleased.

At 8 o'clock he sent for me again. He did not dictate, however, but looked through what he had written and made amendments. When he had finished he said that before sending the article to the press he wanted to show it to Tsyurupa and perhaps some other members of his board and intended to make certain additions to these thoughts of his. Dictated more slowly than usual. Compress on his head. Face went pale. Obviously tired.

February 5, (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Today Vladimir Ilyich called me in at 12 o'clock. I was with him three-quarters of an hour. Dictated slowly. In one place, finding difficulty to express himself, he said: "It doesn't go smoothly with me today somehow, <u>not briskly</u>" (he stressed the word). Asked for his article "How We Should

Reorganise the W.P.I." Read it for 3 or 4 minutes in silence. Then he continued a little longer and decided to stop, saying he would call me in today at 4 or 5, maybe 6 o'clock.

February 5, evening (entry by M. I. Glyasser).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for Lydia Alexandrovna at 7 o'clock (ten to 7), but as she was indisposed he sent for me.

Asked whether we had started sorting out the materials of the Georgian commission and by what date we planned to finish this work. I answered that we had distributed the materials and begun to read them, and as for the date, we expected to keep the deadline he had given us, that is, three weeks. He asked how we intended to read the materials. I said we had come to the conclusion that it was necessary for each of us to read everything. "Is that your unanimous decision?" "Yes." Vladimir Ilyich began to figure out how much time was left until the congress. When I said a month and 25 days, he said that this term was probably sufficient, but if extra information was required, it might prove too little, all the more considering that it would take still longer to go to the Caucasus. He asked how much each of us was working, and said that in case of need we could use Volodicheva and Shushanika Manucharyants. Then he asked whether the decision for all to read everything had been formally adopted. I answered that we had no record of this decision in writing and asked whether he had anything against it maybe. He said that he would like us all to read everything, of course, but the tasks of our commission were very indefinite. On the one hand, he would not like to give us too much trouble, but on the other, we have to reckon with the need for widening these tasks as the work progresses It may be necessary to obtain additional material. He asked where the materials were being kept, how we use them, whether we would make a brief summary of all the materials and whether we would have it typed ("wouldn't it be too much trouble?"). Finally, Vladimir Ilyich decided that in the course of the next week we would decide how much time we needed and in what form we would handle these materials, and in handling them we would be guided by the necessity of drawing up a general survey of all the data on the points which the commission had mapped out as well

as on those questions which he would put to us in the course of the work.

Then Vladimir Ilyich ordered inquiries to be made of Popov as to how things stood with the working up of the census materials of the Central Statistical Board in Petrograd, Moscow and Kharkov (if a census in the last-named city was carried out), and by what date he intends to have them worked up and whether they would be published.[610] Vladimir Ilyich would like to see them in print before the Party congress; he considers that in view of the special importance of this census the materials ought to be published even though those of previous censuses had not been published and Popov had only sent Vladimir Ilyich the tables. Popov, therefore, had to be got moving. An official inquiry should be sent to him about this, following a preliminary talk.

I was with Vladimir Ilyich altogether 20 minutes. I was seeing him for the first time since his illness. I thought he looked well and cheerful, only slightly paler than before. Speaks slowly, gesticulating with his left hand and stirring the fingers of his right. No compress on his head.

February 6, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in between 7 and 9. I was there for about an hour and a half. First he began to read his article "Better Fewer, But Better". The corrections, made in red ink, put Vladimir Ilyich in a good humour (not the corrections themselves, but the way they were inserted!). The article at his request had not been retyped, and the first deciphered copy had had the corrections added to it which Vladimir Ilyich had made during his reading. The corrections having been made not in proof-reader style, but in the ordinary secretarial way, Vladimir Ilyich, on second reading, found this inconvenient. He asked that the next time the whole thing should be retyped anew. Running through the article, Vladimir Ilyich made passing remarks, spoke about his old habit of writing and not dictating; that he understood now why stenographers do not satisfy him ("did not satisfy him," he said); that he was accustomed to seeing his manuscript in front of him, stopping, pausing to think over difficult passages, passages in which he had

"got stuck", walking up and down the room, even running away to take a walk somewhere; that even now he often felt like seizing a pencil and writing or introducing corrections himself.

He recollected how he tried to dictate an article of his to Trotsky's stenographer back in 1918, and how, when he felt himself getting "stuck", he "plunged" on in confusion with "incredible" speed, and how this led to his having had to burn the whole manuscript, after which he sat down to write himself and wrote "The Renegade Kautsky",[611] with which he was pleased.

Vladimir Ilyich talked about all this very gaily, laughing his infectious laugh. I had never seen him in such a mood. He went on dictating part of this article. Dictation lasted 15-20 minutes. He stopped the dictation himself.

February 7 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me. Spoke on 3 questions.

1) On the results of the census (asked to be shown the proofs of the census book. I said there would have to be Stalin's permission for this).

2) On the Georgian commission. Asked how the work was getting on, when we would finish reading, when we would get together, and so on.

3) On the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Did the Board now intend to make any decision, "to take a step of state importance" or was it putting things off until the congress. Said he was writing an article, but was not getting on with it at all, nevertheless he was thinking of revising it and giving it to Tsyurupa to read before sending it to the press. Gave instructions to ask Tsyurupa whether he was to hurry up with this article or not.

Today Kozhevnikov said that there was a tremendous improvement in Vladimir Ilyich's health. He was now moving his arm and had begun to believe himself that he would regain the use of it.

February 7, morning (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

I was with Vladimir Ilyich at about 12.30. Said that he would dictate on any subjects and arrange the material

at some future time. Dictated on the subject of 1) how Party and administrative bodies could be merged, and 2) whether it was convenient to combine educational activities with official activities.

At the words "And the more abrupt the revolution ..." he stopped, repeated them several times, obviously struggling with them; asked me to help him, re-read the preceding passages, laughed and said "Here I've got completely stuck, I'm afraid, make a note of that—stuck on this very spot!"

To my remark that I was his unavoidable evil for a short space of time, as he would soon be able to write himself, he said: "Oh, that won't be so soon!" His voice sounded weary, with a hint of pain in it.

February 7, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me between 7 and 9. Was with him for about an hour and a half. Completed the sentence at which he had stopped yesterday. Said: "I shall now try to develop the next subject." There and then asked about the subjects he had already noted previously[612]; when these were read out, he remarked that one of them he had forgotten (on the correlation between the Central Board for Vocational Education and the general educational work among the people). Dictated the general part of his article "Better Fewer, But Better". Dictated fast and freely, without difficulty, gesticulating.

On finishing, said he would try later to fit this part in with his article as a whole. Tired. In the evening I learned from Nadezhda Konstantinovna that Vladimir Ilyich would not dictate tomorrow; he intended to read.

February 9 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

In the morning Vladimir Ilyich sent for me. Confirmed that he would move the question of the Workers' and Peasant's Inspection at the congress. As for the census, he was worried whether the tables would be printed the way they should be. Agreed to my suggestion that instructions for having this checked should be put through Kamenev or Tsyurupa. The assignment to be given to Krzhizhanovsky or Svidersky. Mood and appearance excellent. Said that Foerster was inclined to allow him to receive visitors rather

than newspapers, On my remarking that this really would seem to be the best from the medical point of view, he said very gravely after a thoughtful pause that in his opinion it would be worse precisely from the medical point of view, because printed matter could be read and done with, whereas visits evoke an exchange

February 9, morning (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in a little after 12. Said the retyped stuff pleased him better. Read the part of the article he had dictated yesterday, made practically no corrections. On finishing, said: "I think I've made a good job of it." I had the impression that he was very pleased with that part of his article. Asked me to take down the end: "That is how I link up ...", etc. I stayed for about an hour.

February 9, evening.

Vladimir Ilyich sent for Lydia Alexandrovna. Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked her to be given the general part of the article, as Vladimir Ilyich wanted her to read it.

February 10 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Called me in a little past 6. Asked that the article "Better Fewer, But Better" be given to Tsyurupa to read, if possible within 2 days.

Asked for listed books.[613] Looks tired, speaks with great difficulty, losing the thread of his thoughts and confusing words. Compress on his head.

February 12 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich is worse. Bad headache. Called me in for several minutes. According to Maria Ilyinichna, the doctors had upset him so much that his lips quivered. Foerster the day before had said that he was emphatically prohibited newspapers, visitors and political information. Asked what he meant by the latter, Foerster replied: "Well, this, for example. You are interested in the census of Soviet employees." The fact that the doctors knew about this upset Vladimir Ilyich. Apparently, furthermore, Vladimir Ilyich had the impression that it was not the doctors who gave

instructions to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee that gave instructions to the doctors.

Talked with me about the same 3 subjects, pleaded a headache. I said jokingly that I would treat him by suggestion and in two days he would have no more headaches.

February 14 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me a little after 12. No headache. Said that he was quite well. That his was a nervous illness, that sometimes he felt quite well, i.e., his head quite clear, but sometimes he felt worse. Therefore we had to hurry with his requests, as he wanted to put some things through without fail in time for the congress and hoped that he would manage it. But if we dragged it out and thus ruined the business, he would be very very annoyed. The doctors came and we had to break off.

February 14, evening.

Called me in again. Impediment in speech, obviously tired. Spoke again on the three points of his instructions. In special detail on the subject that agitated him most of all, namely, the Georgian question. Asked to hurry things up. Gave certain instructions.[614]

March 5 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not send for me until round about 12. Asked me to take down two letters: one to Trotsky,[615] the other to Stalin[616]; the first letter to be telephoned personally to Trotsky and the answer given to him as soon as possible. As to the second letter, he asked it to be put off, saying that he was not very good at it that day. He wasn't feeling too good.

March 6 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Asked about a reply to the first letter (reply over the telephone was taken down in shorthand). Read the second letter (to Stalin) and asked it to be handed to him personally and receive the answer from his own hands. Dictated a letter to the Mdivani group.[617] Felt bad. Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked that this letter to Stalin should not be sent, and it was held up throughout the 6th. On the 7th I said I had to

carry out Vladimir Ilyich's instructions. She spoke to Kamenev, and the letter was handed to Stalin and Kamenev, and afterwards to Zinoviev when he got back from Petrograd. Stalin's answer was received immediately on receipt of Vladimir Ilyich's letter (the letter was handed to Stalin personally by me and his answer to Vladimir Ilyich dictated to me). The letter has not yet been handed to Vladimir Ilyich, as he has fallen ill.[618]

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NOTES

[1] *Vikzhel*—the All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Trade Union, which was set up at the First All-Russia Inaugural Congress of the Railwaymen held in Moscow in July-August 1917. The Executive was controlled by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. After the victory of the armed uprising in Petrograd this Executive Committee became a bulwark of the counter-revolution. Taking refuge behind statements declaring its neutrality and calling for cessation of the civil war, Vikzhel hindered the dispatch of revolutionary troops from Petrograd to Moscow, where fighting was still going on for the establishment of Soviet power, and threatened to stop railway traffic. On October 29 (November 11), 1917, Vikzhel adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a new, "homogeneous socialist government" to include representatives of all the parties "from the Bolsheviks to the Popular Socialists". Vikzhel's counter-revolutionary policy and actions were strongly disapproved by the rank and file. At the All-Russia Emergency Congress of the Railwaymen held in January 1918 Vikzhel was dismissed, and a new governing body of the Railwaymen's Union, Vikzhedor, was elected in which the Bolsheviks formed the preponderant majority. p. 35

[2] The Draft Decree on the Requisition of Articles of Warm Clothing for the Soldiers at the Front was discussed and approved at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on November 8 (21), 1917. Lenin's addenda in regard to the requisitioning of articles of warm clothing were taken into consideration in the final wording of the decree (see *Pravda* No. 184, November 22 [9], 1917). On the question of "the requisition of flats of the rich to relieve the needs of the poor". Lenin's amendment formed the basis of a Draft Decree on Installing the Families of Red Armymen and Unemployed Workers in the Flats of the Bourgeoisie and on the Normalisation of Housing which was approved at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on March 1, 1918 (see *Izvestia* No. 38, March 2, 1918). p. 36

[3] This refers to the elections to the Constituent Assembly in the Petrograd Electoral Area held between November 12 (25) and 14 (27), 1917. These elections, the preliminary results of which became known on November 15 (28) and the final results the next

day, gave the Bolshevik Party 424,000 votes and 6 seats in the Constituent Assembly (out of the twelve assigned to Petrograd); the Cadets received 247,000 votes (4 seats); the Socialist-Revolutionaries 152,000 votes (2 seats, one of them won by the Left S.R.s).

The terms "President of the Council of National Commissioners" and "Social Revolutionists" used by the correspondent are better known as "Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars" and "Socialist-Revolutionaries". p. 36

4 At the elections to the district councils of Petrograd held at the end of May and beginning of June 1917 the Bolshevik tickets received 20 per cent of the votes. At the elections to the City Council of Petrograd on August 20 (September 2) the Bolsheviks received 33 per cent of all the votes. In speaking of the September elections Lenin was probably referring to the elections to the district councils of Moscow (held on September 24 [October 7], 1917) at which the Bolsheviks received 51 per cent of all the votes. This voting, Lenin pointed out, "is in general one of the most striking symptoms of the profound change which has taken place in the mood of the whole nation" (see present edition, Vol. 26, p. 80). p. 37

5 *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the big bourgeoisie in Russia. Founded in October 1905. p. 37

6 *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party formed in Russia at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902. After the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 the S.R.s, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, were the mainstay of the bourgeois Provisional Government.

At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the party founded a separate Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Left S.R.s formally recognised the Soviet Government and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but very soon turned against Soviet power. p. 37

7 This draft was written at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars during the discussion of the question of salaries for People's Commissars and was adopted with slight amendments. It was published as a decree of the C.P.C. "Remuneration for People's Commissars and High-Ranking Office Employees and Officials" on November 23 (December 6), 1917, in *Gazeta Vremennogo Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* (Newspaper of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government) No. 16.

The question of remuneration for specialists was subsequently revised by the Party and the Soviet Government. The decree of the C.P.C. of January 2 (15), 1918, on "Rates of Pay for High-Ranking Officials" (see p. 52 of this volume) specified that the restriction in salaries for People's Commissars did not imply a ban on higher rates of pay for specialists. The need for making this

change in the general system of remuneration was recognised in a decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee dated April 29, 1918. p. 37

[8] This draft was adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on November 19 (December 2), 1917. p. 38

[9] After the arrest of General Manikovsky, the general management of the War Department was taken over by N. I. Podvoisky, People's Commissar for Military Affairs, and members of the Commissariat's Board B. V. Legran, K. A. Mekhonoshin and E. M. Sklyansky

On November 30 (December 13) the C.P.C. passed a decision to release Manikovsky and Marushevsky on parole. p. 38

[10] On November 25 (December 8), 1917 the 6th Tukum Regiment of Lettish riflemen posted in Valka was ordered to Petrograd, and on November 28 (December 11) it was doing garrison duty in the vicinity of the Smolny and the Taurida Palace. p. 39

[11] These theses were written by Lenin in connection with the drafting of a decree for the nationalisation of urban real estate. The draft was endorsed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on November 23 (December 6), 1917, and published on November 25 (December 8) in *Gazeta Vremennogo Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* No. 18 under the heading "Draft Decree Abolishing Private Ownership of Urban Real Estate (Adopted by the Council of People's Commissars)". The decree was endorsed on August 20, 1918 at a meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and published in *Izvestia* No. 182 on August 24. p. 39

[12] This draft was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on November 27 (December 10), 1917 of his proposal for organising "a special commission to carry out a socialist policy in the financial and economic fields". The draft was adopted with slightly altered wording. p. 40

[13] The Special Defence Council was formed on August 17 (30), 1915 "to discuss and co-ordinate measures to defend the state and ensure a supply of munitions and other materials for the Army and Navy" (Osobiye soveshchaniya i komitety voennogo vremeni [Special Councils and War-time Committees], Petrograd, 1917, p. 7).

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars dated December 11 (24), 1917 the Special Defence Council was charged with "the annulment of defence orders or their reduction to a normal peace-time level, and, in connection therewith, the demobilisation of the factories and their switch over to peace-time production" (*Dekrety Sovietskoi Vlasti* [*Decrees of the Soviet Government*], Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 214). p. 40

[14] Lenin's notes "Demonstration Slogans" are an amendment to the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet "To the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd" which was published on November 28 (December 11), 1917, in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. The Cadets had arranged a demonstration for that day with the intention of forcing the opening of the Constituent Assembly and carrying out a counter-revolutionary coup.

The attempt of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, under the leadership of the Cadets, to seize power was frustrated by the measures taken by the Council of People's Commissars and the Petrograd Soviet. p. 41

[15] *Chernov*, *V. M.* (1876-1952)—one of the leaders of the S.R. Party. In 1917 he was Minister of Agriculture in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution he was one of the organisers of anti-Soviet revolts. p. 41

[16] This draft was written by Lenin following an anonymous accusation to the effect that Y. S. Hanecki had been in the employ of a German commercial firm. For Lenin's letter on this question to the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) see *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 50, pp. 14-16. p. 41

[17] The question of Alexandro-Grushevsky Mining District was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 9 (22), 1917. p. 44

[18] *Monotop*—Russian abbreviation for Donets Fuel Monopoly Trade Council, which was set up by the Provisional Government in 1917. After the October Revolution Monotop pursued a policy of sabotage in the matter of supplying fuel to the railways and industrial enterprises in the central part of Soviet Russia. p. 44

[19] This draft was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion at a meeting of the C.P.C. held on December 13 (26), 1917, of a report on the work of the Conciliation Board set up by the C.P.C. on December 11 (24) to examine the question of rates of pay for employees of government offices; the draft was endorsed with a slightly modified wording. On the strength of this decree the C.P.C. circulated an order to all the People's Commissariats establishing as from November 1 (14), 1917, new increased rates of pay for these employees; the People's Commissars were directed to introduce immediately the necessary changes in the salary estimates for 1918. p. 45

[20] This draft was submitted by Lenin and adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 15 (28), 1917 during the discussion of the question of work stoppage at the Putilov Works; it was published as a decree of the C.P.C. in the *Gazeta Vremennogo Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* No. 35, under the heading "The Organisation of a Commission of Practitioners". p. 45

[21] Lenin's motion was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 18 (31), 1917, and a ruling adopted: "To endorse Lenin's instructions and Gorbunov's proposal to close the agenda half an hour before the appointed meeting and to oblige the People's Commissars to fulfil this under a written engagement" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 46

[22] This draft was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion of a statement by F. E. Dzerzhinsky, Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission (Vecheka), at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 19, 1917 (January 1, 1918). Dzerzhinsky protested against the action of I. Z. Steinberg, People's Commissar for Justice, and V. A. Karelin, member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Justice, both of them Left S.R.s.

The evening before, at a meeting of the C.P.C., Lenin received a report that the Vecheka had arrested a group of members of the counter-revolutionary Constituent Assembly Defence Union on the premises of the Free Economic Society, during an illegal attempt on their part, made in defiance of the decree of the C.P.C., to open a "session" of the Constituent Assembly. The C.P.C. had decided to detain the arrested men in custody until their identity was established. Steinberg and Karelin visited the scene, but instead of carrying out the decision of the C.P.C. they released all the arrested persons without even notifying the Vecheka. Their action ran counter to the agreement between the Central Committees of the Bolsheviks and the Left S.R.s for conducting a common line in the C.P.C. and was a violation of the obligation to pursue a Soviet policy which the Left S.R.s had taken upon themselves when joining the C.P.C.

The C.P.C. endorsed the draft resolution written by Lenin. p. 46

[23] The Dzerzhinsky Commission (Vecheka)—the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage; the other commissions referred to were: the Committee of Inquiry of the Petrograd Soviet, the Naval Committee of Inquiry and the Committee for Combating Drunken Riots. p. 46

[24] *Kerensky*, *A. F.* (born 1881)—a Socialist-Revolutionary; after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 was minister, then head of the bourgeois Provisional Government and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. After the October Socialist Revolution he fought against the Soviets; escaped abroad in 1918. p. 48

[25] *Kornilov*, *L. G.* (1870-1918)—a general of the tsarist army. In July-August 1917 Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In August 1917 headed a counter-revolutionary revolt aimed at restoring the monarchy. He was one of the organisers, and subsequently commander of the whiteguard Volunteer Army on the Don. p. 48

[26] *Avksentyev*, *N. D.* (1878-1943)—one of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. After the February revolution of

1917 he was Minister of the Interior in Kerensky's government, and later chairman of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Council of the Russian Republic (Pre-parliament). p. 49

[27] *Lieberdans*—an ironical nickname attached to the Menshevik leaders Lieber and Dan and their followers after Demyan Bedny, the satirical poet, had written a satire on them in 1917 entitled "Lieberdan". p. 49

[28] *Savinkov, B. V.* (1879-1925)—an S.R.; after the February Revolution Deputy Minister of War; then Military Governor-General of Petrograd. After the October revolution he organised a number of counter-revolutionary uprisings. p. 49

[29] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—a daily newspaper, published in Petrograd from April 18 (May 1), 1917 to July 1918; sponsored by Menshevik internationalists and writers grouped around the magazine *Letopis* (Chronicle). The paper adopted a hostile attitude to the October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power. From June 1, 1918, appeared in two editions—in Petrograd and Moscow. Both were closed down in July 1918. p. 49

[30] This refers to the statement by S. A. Lozovsky, then Secretary of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, addressed to the Bolshevik group in the Central Executive Committee. It was published in the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* No. 172 for November 4 (17), 1917. In December 1917 S. A. Lozovsky was expelled from the Bolshevik Party. He was reinstated in December 1919. p. 50

[31] Lenin is referring to S. A. Lozovsky's articles "The All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions" and "The Trade Unions and Soviet Power" published in *Professionalny Vestnik*, Nos. 7 and 8, 1917.
Professionalny Vestnik (Trade Union Herald)—a journal, organ of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions; appeared from September 1917 to March 1919 in Petrograd. p. 50

[32] *Kaledin, A. M.* (1861-1918)—a general of the tsarist army, Don Cossack chieftain. Active participant in the Kornilov revolt in August 1917. After the October Revolution he was one of the leaders of the Cossack counter-revolution on the Don. p. 51

[33] *Antonov-Ovseyenko, V. A.* (1884-1939)—commanded the Soviet troops against Kaledin and the Central Ukrainian Rada at the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918. p. 51

[34] This motion of Lenin's was adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on January 2 (15), 1918, during the discussion of an inquiry by A. G. Shlyapnikov, People's Commissar for Labour, concerning the rates of pay for high officials of the factory managements. p. 52

[35] Lenin is referring to the decree of the C.P.C. of November 18 (December 1), 1917, on "Remuneration for People's Commissars and High-Ranking Office Employees and Officials". The draft of the decree was written by Lenin (see p. 37 of this volume, and Note No. 7). p. 52

[36] This motion was adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on January 14 (27), 1918. The decree was an attempt to enlist the co-operation of the All-Russia Food Council, which set itself against the People's Commissariat for Food and sabotaged the measures of the Soviet authorities. The first Soviet Food Congress, which opened in Petrograd on January 14 (27) and was attended by delegates to the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets, abolished the Food Council and other organisations handling the food business, and concentrated this business in the hands of the Soviet authorities. p. 52

[37] On January 11 (24), 1918, the C.P.C., on the motion of I. Z. Steinberg, People's Commissar for Justice, instituted an investigation into the activities of the Committee of Inquiry under the Petrograd Soviet, and suspended this Committee pending the results of the investigation. On January 14 (27) the C.P.C. examined the statement of the chairmen of the Committee of Inquiry M. Y. Kozlovsky and P. A. Krasikov asking the C.P.C. to reconsider its decision, and ordered the Inspection Commission set up by it to submit the results of its investigation within forty-eight hours. It also passed a decision to send an inquiry to the C.C. of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party concerning the resolution of the Petrograd Committee of the Left S.R.s to the effect that it would not be represented on the Committee of Inquiry. It was in connection with this resolution that Lenin wrote his inquiry. The findings of the commission investigating the activities of the Committee of Inquiry were discussed at meetings of the C.P.C. On January 21 (February 3) the C.P.C. adopted the draft decree written by Lenin (see pp. 55-56 of this volume), on February 26 the C.P.C. found that "all accusations of bribery and other crimes or improper conduct against the leading members of the Committee of Inquiry are without foundation" and considered the investigation into the activities of the Committee of Inquiry to be closed, and its leading members Krasikov, Kozlovsky, Lindeman, Mitzgendler and Rozin to be reinstated in their posts (*Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, p. 499; see also p. 62 of this volume). p. 53

[38] This draft, written by Lenin, was endorsed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on January 15 (28), 1918. p. 54

[39] This refers to §51 of the "Regulations for the Democratisation of the Navy" endorsed by an order of the Supreme Naval Board on January 8 (21), 1918. It stated that "all orders of the central bodies, both those of the naval department and the state authorities, as well as the orders of any committees whatso-

ever ... shall be fulfilled in the fleet or sea flotillas only if confirmed by the Central Committee of the Navy..." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 54

[40] The question of salaries for post and telegraph employees was examined at a meeting of the C.P.C. on January 16 (29), 1918. Lenin's draft decree on this subject was adopted by the C.P.C. p. 54

[41] These draft decisions were written by Lenin during the discussion at the meeting of the C.P.C. of the report of the presidium of the first Soviet All-Russia Food Congress, which opened in Petrograd on January 14 (27), dealing with the organisation of a single centre for handling the food problem. The resolution of the congress testified to the important progress achieved in rallying the food supply workers behind the Soviet government. At the same time the C.P.C. was informed of disagreements between the People's Commissar for Food A. G. Schlichter, on the one hand, and the presidium of the food congress, the All-Russia Food Council (elected in November 1917 at the food congress in Moscow) and the Food Department of the Supreme Economic Council, on the other. It was in this connection that Lenin wrote his second draft. The first was adopted by the C.P.C., but the second was not included in the minutes of the meeting (see pp. 52-53 of this volume). p. 55

[42] This document bears Lenin's note: "Adopted unanimously". The decision of the C.P.C. in a slightly different wording was published in *Izvestia* No. 17 on January 23 (February 5), 1918. p. 56

[43] The original draft was drawn up by the Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and then submitted for editing to a committee of the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Lenin who was a member of this committee, put in a good deal of work in editing this draft. His addendum, in a slightly modified wording, was incorporated in the law as Article 26, constituting Section V headed: "Establishment of Norms of Land Tenure in Allotting Land Plots for Building, for Agricultural Industries, for Cultural-Educational Purposes, etc." (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, p. 414). p. 56

[44] This addendum was written by Lenin during the discussion at the meeting of the C.P.C. on January 30 (February 12), 1918, of the draft decree concerning the setting up of an inter-departmental extraordinary commission for guarding the railways—"in order to ensure a regular supply of food and articles of prime necessity to the population". Lenin's addendum was incorporated in the adopted decree as §5 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, pp. 453-54)

On the report of the above commission the C.P.C. also passed a decision based on Lenin's proposals published below (see pp. 57-58 of this volume). p. 57

[45] This decision was passed by the C.P.C. at its meeting on January 31 (February 13), 1918, on the report of Y. M. Sverdlov concerning the elimination of sabotage by former government officials. p. 58

[46] This telephone message, printed from Lenin's manuscript, found its way into the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. in 1948. p. 59

[47] The decision of the C.P.C. was communicated to the German Government in Berlin at 7 a.m. on February 24. Nevertheless in reply to the radio-telegram of N. V. Krylenko, Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops, proposing that the armistice, previously concluded, should be considered in force, the German command stated that it was no longer valid. The German troops continued to advance right up to March 3, when the peace treaty was signed. p. 60

[48] On January 14 127), 1918, a revolution started in Finland and power passed into the hands of the proletariat. In February, on the initiative of the workers' government of Finland—the Council of People's Representatives—negotiations were commenced for signing a peace treaty between the Russian and Finnish socialist Republics. The draft treaty drawn up by the Russo-Finnish Conciliation Board was discussed at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars held on February 25, 27 and 28. The treaty was signed by representatives of the contracting parties on March 1.

Lenin took an active part in drawing up the treaty. He talked with the delegates of the Finnish workers' government, who had been authorised to sign the treaty, and he edited the draft (see *Lenin Miscellany XXI*, pp. 241-43).

This was the first treaty in history between two socialist republics, an example of a new type of international relationships—fraternal, friendly relationships between equal sovereign states where the working class had come to power. p. 61

[49] Lenin's draft was endorsed at the meeting of the C.P.C. held on February 25, 1918. p. 61

[50] Lenin's motion was adopted at the meeting of the C.P.C. on February 27, 1918.

§13 of the "Treaty Between the Russian and Finnish Socialist Republics" stated that "The Russian Federative Soviet Republic grants all the political rights of Russian citizens to Finnish citizens residing in Russia who belong to the working class or to the peasants who do not employ other people's labour, if they live on the territory of Russia for the purpose of engaging in labour occupations.

The Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, for its part, undertakes to give citizens of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic in Finland every facility to enjoy political rights, special consideration being given to the interests of the working popula-

tion who have no permanent domicile" (*Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, p. 508). p. 62

[51] This draft was written by Lenin and adopted by the C.P.C. at its meeting on February 26, 1918, as an amendment to the decision of the C.P.C. concerning investigations into the activities of the Committee of Inquiry under the Petrograd Soviet. p. 62

[52] The shorthand record of the C.P.C. meeting from which these speeches are printed is kept in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. It was read back in 1962 for the Fifth Russian Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works*. p. 63

[53] This refers to the proposal made by representatives of the C.C. of the Water Transport Workers Trade Union that the management of water transport be concentrated in the hands of the Trade Union.

At the meeting of the C.P.C. on March 4, 1918, the question of setting up a water transport management board was discussed. According to the decision of the C.P.C. the management of water transport was entrusted to the Supreme Economic Council, under which a Waterways Department was being set up; the Board of this Department was to consist of representatives of the S.E.C., the C.P.C., the Water Transport Workers Trade Union and the regional economic councils.

The C.P.C. rejected the anarcho-syndicalist demands of the water transport workers. On Lenin's motion the C.P.C. decided to immediately set up a Board on the basis of §3 of the C.P.C.'s decision of February 27, to temporarily increase the number of trade union representatives on the Board, and take steps to immediately dispatch currency notes to pay the wages of the workers on the Volga and the Mariinsk system. The chief points of this decision of the C.P.C. were drafted by Lenin (see p. 66 of this volume). p. 63

[54] Lenin is referring to the Decree of the C.P.C. on the Nationalisation of the Merchant Fleet adopted on January 23 (February 5), 1918. The decree was published on January 26 (February 8) in *Gazeta Vremennogo Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva* No. 18. p. 63

[55] This draft was written by Lenin and endorsed at the meeting of the C.P.C. on March 4, 1918, following a discussion of the question of organising a Water Transport Management Board. (For Lenin's speeches at this meeting see pp. 63-66 of this volume.) p. 66

[56] The reference is to § 3 of the Decree Concerning the Administration of the Merchant Marine and Inland Water Transport adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on February 27, 1918 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, pp. 501-02). p. 66

[57] This refers to the allocation of funds for repair work on the Volga and Mariinsk system. p. 66

[58] A photo copy of the typewritten text of this interview with a postscript in Lenin's own handwriting (as well as an English translation of it) was published in 1932 in the book: R. H. Bruce Lockhart, *Memoirs of a British Agent*. The copy of the typewritten text of the interview bears the following note by Lenin: "23/III given to Ransome" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.)

Daily News a bourgeois newspaper published in London from 1846 to 1928. p. 67

[59] Lenin is referring to the speech of A. Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, in the House of Commons on March 14, 1918, in which the latter tried to cover up the true aims of the Japanese intervention by hypocritically alleging that in occupying Siberia with the consent of the Allies, and seizing the Siberian railway, Japan would be preventing a German invasion of northern Asia. p. 67

[60] The draft decree instituting state control over all forms of insurance was discussed at the meeting of the C.P.C. on March 23, 1918. The decree was adopted with amendments. Lenin's proposals formed the basis of § V of the decree. In addition Lenin clarified the heading of the decree as follows: Decree on the Establishment of State Control Over All Forms of Insurance *Other Than Social* (*viz.*, *Compulsory State*) *Insurance* (the italicised words were added by Lenin). The decree was published on April 2; 1918, in *Izvestia* (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 5-11). p. 68

[61] This was dictated to a stenographer by Lenin on March 23-28, 1918. His work on the article was apparently connected with the forthcoming discussion in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) of the plan for developing socialist construction. In his opening speech at the plenary meeting of the C.C. held on April 7 Lenin stressed that the revolution was living through a "new period". The Central Committee instructed Lenin "to draw up theses concerning the present situation and submit them to the C.C." In connection with this decision Lenin wrote his "Theses on the Tasks of the Soviet Government in the Present Situation" (this was the heading given in the manuscript of Lenin's work *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government*; see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 236-77).

For chapters X (end), XI, XII and XIII see Vol. 27 of this edition, pp. 203-18. Part of Chapter IV and chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and the beginning of Ch. X of the original version of the article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" were first published in Vol. 36 of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition. Chapters I, II, III and the beginning of Ch. IV have not yet been found.

[62] This draft was proposed by Lenin at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on March 26, 1918, at which A. G. Shlyap-

nikov reported on the All-Russia Congress of Inland Water Transport Workers held in Moscow on February 14-26, and at which the Draft Decree on the Management of Water Transport on the Volga presented by Y. Larin was discussed. Lenin's motion was adopted by the C.P.C.

The Nizhni-Novgorod Congress of Water Transport Employees mentioned in the decision was held in March 25-April 10, 1918. p. 85

[63] *Kavomar*—the Board of Management of the Caspian-Volga-Mariinsk System—was organised under the Decree on the Management of Water Transport on the Volga for administering the nationalised fleet and all freight and passenger traffic. By a decision of the C.P.C. dated May 18, 1918, providing for the reorganisation of the water transport management bodies, Kavomar was abolished and its functions transferred to Glavvod—Chief Water Board. p. 85

[64] This draft, proposed by Lenin during the discussion of the question of "The Organisation of Control Over Expenditure by all Departments of the Supreme Economic Council", was adopted at the C.P.C. meeting on March 23, 1918. p. 85

[65] The Draft Decree on the Procedure To Be Followed by the Various Commissariats in Sending Their Commissars and Agents Out to the Provinces submitted by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was discussed at the meeting of the C.P.C. on April 1, 1918. The C.P.C. asked all the commissariats to consider the draft and give their comments. On April 5 the decree was endorsed with Lenin's addenda and on April 11, 1918, it was published in *Izvestia* (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 58-59). p. 87

[66] The joint meeting was held to discuss the project for setting up a trust ("The National Company") proposed by a group of capitalists headed by A. P. Meshchersky, Managing-Director of the "Sormovo-Kolomna" Industrial Association. The Board of the Supreme Economic Council passed a decision on April 14, 1918, to break off negotiations with Meshchersky, on April 18, the Council of People's Commissars turned down Meshchersky's project and decided to carry out the nationalisation of the works. A resolution in favour of nationalisation was passed also by the conference of delegates of the machine-building works held May 12-18, 1918 (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 388-89). p. 88

[67] *The First Congress of Soviets of the Don Republic*, which proclaimed itself the supreme Soviet authority on the Don, was held on April 9-12, 1918. It was attended by 750 delegates. Lenin was elected honorary chairman. The resolution referred to by Lenin was adopted on April 12 by an overwhelming majority, the Mensheviks' motion receiving only 2 votes. The congress approved the Soviet Government's peaceful policy and stressed in the reso-

lution that it regarded the Don Republic as part of the R.S.F.S.R. and considered it its chief task to work for the rehabilitation of the national economy and the creation of a Red Army. The congress declared the working Cossacks' readiness to defend Soviet power. p. 88

[68] This document was incorporated in the Decree on the Registration of Shares, Bonds and Other Interest-Bearing Securities, the draft of which was edited, supplemented and supplied with a heading by Lenin and endorsed after discussion by the C.P.C. on April 18; it was published on April 20 in *Izvestia* No. 78 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 130-38). p. 89

[69] The question of providing funds for financing the sugar-beet sowing campaign was raised by the Chief Sugar Committee, this request was supported by the Congress of Sugar Industry Workers, which was held jointly with representatives of the land committees. The C.P.C. on April 17, 1918, discussed the application tabled by the Supreme Economic Council for twenty million rubles to be allocated to the Chief Sugar Committee and endorsed Lenin's draft decision in this connection. p. 89

[70] This text, with slight amendments, was incorporated in the Decree on the Institution of an All-Russia Evacuation Commission adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on April 19, 1918. The decree was published in the newspapers *Znamya Truda* and *Izvestia* on April 23 and 24, 1918 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 140-42). p. 90

[71] The draft decree was on the agenda of the C.P.C. sitting of April 22, 1918, but its consideration was postponed until the next meeting. The addendum to it was introduced by Lenin after he had examined the draft. On April 23 the C.P.C. adopted the decree in toto with Lenin's addendum and the next day finally endorsed it with certain amendments (a new clause was inserted). Therefore Lenin's addendum in the text published in *Izvestia* No. 84 for April 27, 1918, applies to §7 of the Decree on Supplying Agriculture With Implements and Metals (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 169-72). p. 91

[72] The draft decree was considered at a meeting of the C.P.C. Commission on April 25, 1918. The commission approved the decree on May 2, 1918, and on the same day it was endorsed by the C.P.C. with this addendum of Lenin's and published on May 10 in *Izvestia* No. 91 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 212-16). p. 91

[73] This document was written by Lenin in connection with the question, raised by the leaders of the Left S.R.s M. A. Spiridonova and V. A. Karelin, that control of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture be handed over completely to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, with the Bolsheviks retaining merely political

representation. See also Lenin's memorandum on this subject to the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) (*Collected Works*, Vol. 50, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 133).

On May 3, 1918, the C.C. of the Russian Communist Party rejected the claims of the Left S.R.s. p. 92

[74] This draft decision was adopted by the C.P.C. on May 9, 1918, during the discussion of a decree granting extraordinary powers to the People's Commissariat for Food. p. 93

[75] The fuel question was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on May 24, 1918, the reporters being N. I. Solovyov on behalf of the Fuel Department of the Supreme Economic Council and S. S. Dikansky on behalf of Moskvotop. p. 93

[76] This draft of Lenin's was adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on May 25, 1918, which discussed the question of transferring motor transport to the Motor Section of the Transport Department of the S.E.C. p. 93

[77] This document was adopted by the C.P.C. without amendment and incorporated in its decision on the private purveyance of food supplies which was published on June 1 in *Izvestia* No. 110 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 344-48).

Prodput—Central Food Bureau of the People's Commissariat for Railways.

Prodvod—Central Food Bureau of the Chief Water Board (of the People's Commissariat for Railways). p. 94

[78] The draft "Regulations for the Management of the Nationalised Enterprises" drawn up by the Supreme Economic Council were discussed on May 28 and 30, 1918, at a meeting of the Organisation of Production Section of the First All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils. After a lengthy discussion, the section, under pressure from the "Left" Communists, adopted the Regulations, which ran counter to the policy of the Party and the Government. On learning of the speeches of the "Left" Communists on the question of management of the nationalised enterprises (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 50, Fifth Russian edition, p. 84) and reading the Regulations drafted by the section, Lenin proposed that they be examined at the Conciliation Board specially set up on June 2 and at which the C.P.C. was represented by V. I. Lenin and the S.E.C. by A. I. Rykov and G. D. Veinberg. The Conciliation Board revised the Regulations on the basis of Lenin's comments published here. Despite the "Left" Communists, the congress, by a majority, adopted the draft of the Conciliation Board. p. 96

[79] This draft decision was adopted the same day it was written.

Lenin's letters, speeches, articles and notes, as well as his draft decisions for the C.P.C. and other documents relating to

library organisation, have boen collected in N. K. Krupskaya's book, *Chto pisal i govoril Lenin o bibliotekakh* (What Lenin Wrote and Said About Libraries), Moscow, 1956. p. 96

[80] These proposals of Lenin's were written apparently at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on June 8, 1918, when the draft was under consideration. The draft decree was adopted with substantial amendments. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee endorsed the decree on June 11 and *Izvestia* published it on June 16, 1918 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 412-19). The Committees of Poor Peasants were instituted by this decree. An appraisal of them was given by Lenin in his speech at the First All-Russia Congress of Land Departments, Poor Peasants' Committees and Communes on December 11, 1918 (see present edition, Vol. 28, p. 338). p. 97

[81] This formulation applies to §2 of the draft decree. In conformity with Lenin's proposal, it was worded as follows: "The right to elect and be elected to the volost and village Committees of Poor Peasants shall be enjoyed by all without restriction, both by local villagers and newcomers, with the exception of avowed kulaks and rich farmers having surpluses of grain or other food products, having trade or industrial establishments, and employing farm-hands or hired labour, etc.

"*Note*: Those employing hired labour for farm work not exceeding the subsistence norm may elect and be elected to the Committees of Poor Peasants" (*Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 416-17.) p. 97

[82] On June 10, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars heard the reports of M. P. Pavlovich and A. I. Rykov concerning endorsement by the presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the composition of the Committee of Public Works (instituted by Decree of the C.P.C. of May 9, 1918). The present text constituted §2 of the C.P.C. decision on this question. p. 98

[83] This draft was adopted the same day by the C.P.C. following the report of Deputy People's Commissar for Railways V. I. Nevsky. On June 18 the C.P.C. endorsed a 9-man Board consisting of 4 Bolsheviks, 2 internationalist Mensheviks and 3 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 98

[84] Lenin here refers to the Statute on the Management of Railway Communications in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on June 8, 1918, and published in *Izvestia* No. 122 on June 16 (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1959, pp. 365-67). p. 98

[85] This draft was adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on June 15, 1918, on the question of advancing money to the Central

Committee of the Textile Industry under the Supreme Economic Council (Centrotextil) for the purchase of flax (see also pp. 118-19 of this volume). p. 99

[86] Lenin's draft on the question of issuing funds to the Supreme Economic Council for the purchase of raw materials by the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry was adopted by the C.P.C. on June 15, 1918. p. 99

[87] The interview with Lenin was reported to the newspaper the same day by a special telegram, but for technical reasons it was received late and was not published until July 4, 1918. Following this, a summary of the interview was published on July 6 in *Leipziger Volkszeitung* No. 155.

Folkets Dagblad Politiken—newspaper of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats, was published in Stockholm from April 1916 (up to November 1917 it was called *Politiken*). In 1921 it became the organ of the Communist Party of Sweden, after the split in the party in October 1929 the newspaper passed into the hands of the party's Right wing. Publication ceased in May 1945. p. 101

[88] This refers to the disarming of the anarchists by the security forces in Moscow on the night of April 12, 1918. This measure was necessitated by the fact that the various groups of anarchists served as a screen for counter-revolutionary and criminal elements who terrorised the population by their raids and robberies and took refuge in the villas which the anarchists had seized. The anarchists in Petrograd, who failed to comply with the demand for the surrender of firearms, were disarmed on April 23, 1918.

Anarkhia (Anarchy)—an anarchist literary and socio-economic newspaper published in Moscow from September 1917 to July 1918; by order of the Vecheka it was closed down on April 13; publication was resumed on April 21, 1918. p. 102

[89] On July 2, 1918, the C.P.C. heard an out-of-order statement by Lenin concerning "the need for meeting the peasants' requirements in agricultural machines" and adopted this draft decision in this connection (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 103

[90] This refers to the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (held in Moscow July 4-10, 1918). p. 103

[91] This draft decision was adopted by the C.P.C. on July 8, 1918, in connection (as recorded in the minutes) with the inquiry of "The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars to Comrade Lunacharsky and Comrade Malinovsky concerning the reasons for non-fulfilment by them of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars expressed in the 'Decree on the Removal of Monuments Erected to the Tsars and Their Servants and the Projecting of Monuments of the Russian Socialist Revolution'"

(Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

On this question see also present edition Vol. 35, p. 360, and Vol. 50, Documents 131, 140, 189, of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition. p. 103

[92] This document was embodied in Article 20, Section 2 of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. adopted on July 10, 1918, at the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 103

[93] Lenin addressed a meeting in the large hall of the Racing Society at Khodynka on the evening of July 26, 1918. The hall was crowded to overflowing with workers and Red Armymen. A soldier made a speech on behalf of the First Reserve Artillery Brigade in which he said that in the person of Lenin they greeted the Council of People s Commissars and were ready to defend the workers and peasants government at the Council's first call. The resolution Proposed after Lenin's speech was adopted unanimously with one abstention. In conclusion Znamensky briefly acquainted the audience with Lenin's biography. p. 104

[94] This draft decision was adopted with slight amendments at the meeting of the C.P.C. on August 22, 1918. p. 106

[95] Point 1 of this decision of the C.P.C. was published in *Izvestia* on August 23, 1918. p. 107

[96] It has not been possible to establish what document this proposal refers to. p. 107

[97] The question of introducing a tax in kind was raised by Lenin in his Theses on the Food Question written on August 2, 1918 (see present edition Vol. 28, pp. 45-47). The draft decree for imposing a tax in kind on the farmers was first introduced at a meeting of the C.P.C. on September 4. It was discussed again at a meeting of the C.P.C. on September 21. It was probably during these meetings of the Council that Lenin jotted down his "Main Provisions of the Decree and his remarks on the draft. (For Lenin's documents connected with the drafting of the decree at this and other meetings of the Council of People's Commissars—notes calculations plan of a speech at the Council meeting—see also *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, pp. 148-50.) The decree in its final form was adopted by the C.P.C. on October 26 endorsed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on October 30 and published in *Izvestia* on November 14, 1918. The extension of foreign military intervention and the civil war prevented this measure from being implemented.

Lenin's principles for an income tax in kind drafted in 1918 were elaborated and embodied in the food tax in the spring of 1921 which marked the post-war transition to peaceful economic construction on the basis of the New Economic Policy. The

decree on the tax in kind adopted in October 1918 was mentioned by Lenin in his report on the political work of the C.C. at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), when dealing with the question of replacing the surplus-appropriation system by a food tax (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 187). p. 107

[98] Article 12 of the "Basic Law on the Socialisation of the Land" endorsed by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets on January 18 (31), 1918, and adopted at the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on January 27 (February 9) runs as follows: "The distribution of land among the working people shall be carried out on an equalised labour basis in such a manner that the subsistence and labour norm adapted in the given area to the historically established system of land tenure should not exceed the available manpower on each individual farm and at the same time should allow the farmer's family to make a fairly comfortable living." Article 17 of the Law says: "The surplus income derived from naturally fertile superior plots as well as from their more advantageous location for marketing, shall be placed at the disposal of the Soviet authorities to be used for public needs" (*Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, pp. 408-09). p. 108

[99] At a meeting of the C.P.C. on October 15, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food tabled a proposal that 40 million rubles be allocated for the upkeep of the Poor Peasants' Committees, apparently for a period of six months at the rate of 6.5 million rubles per month. In view of the impending amalgamation of these committees with the local Soviets, Lenin proposed a 2-month allocation of funds ("$2 \times 6\frac{1}{2}=13$"). The C.P.C. adopted Lenin's proposal for the allocation of 13 million rubles; the other proposals of Lenin's were also included in the decision of the C.P.C. (see *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1964, pp. 593-95). p. 109

[100] This was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion by the C.P.C. of the report of the Board of Three on logging under the Supreme Economic Council. All Lenin's proposals were incorporated in the decision adopted by the C.P.C. on this question. The latter allocated 100 million rubles for logging operations, demanded an account of their expenditure within a week and ordered the Board of Three, within the same period to submit more concrete information on the questions formulated by Lenin. p. 109

[101] On November 8, 1918, the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, on the report of People's Commissar for Justice D. I. Kursky, passed a decision on revolutionary legality based on Lenin's theses, which were approved by the Party's Central Committee. The decision was published in *Pravda* on November 10. p. 111

[102] On June 5, 1918, *Izvestia* published a decree of the C.P.C. placing the educational institutions and establishments of all departments under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat for Education. On November 19, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Social Security submitted to the C.P.C. (the question was reported by A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova) a draft decree leaving the children's homes under the jurisdiction of this commissariat. It was in connection with this discussion that Lenin wrote his draft decision, which was adopted with slight changes. p. 111

[103] § 3 of the C.P.C.'s Decree of June 5, 1918, ordered the People's Commissariat for Education to form special commissions of representatives of the departments concerned and of the Commissariat for Education to make arrangements for the turnover of the educational institutions and establishments, including the institutions of pre-school education. p. 111

[104] The draft decree on the organisation of supply for the population was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on November 12, 1918, and finally endorsed by the C.P.C. on November 21. Lenin's addenda were included in the adopted text of the decree, which was published in *Izvestia* on November 24.

The question of the co-operatives' participation in the organisation of supply for the population as dealt with in the draft decree with Lenin's addenda to it, was misunderstood by some of the leading food supply workers. Lenin clarified this question in a speech delivered at a meeting of delegates from the Moscow Central Workers' Co-operative on November 26, 1918, in a report on the attitude of the proletariat to petty-bourgeois democrats made at a Moscow Party workers' meeting on November 27, and in his reply to the discussion (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 196-200, 213-16, 221-24).

See also present edition, Vol. 35, p. 376, and Vol. 50, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 378. p. 112

[105] *The Council of Defence* (Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence) was set up by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on November 30, 1918, as a special organ of the Soviet state vested with full powers in the matter of mobilising the country's forces and resources in the interests of defence. Lenin was appointed Chairman of the Council of Defence.

The documents published here were written by Lenin at the first meeting of the Council of Defence on December 1, 1918. First Lenin outlined the immediate tasks of the Council and the agenda for its first sitting (Document 1). Then he jotted down a number of proposals for elaborating these questions, formulating more detailed proposals on the food question (Documents 2 and 3). Lenin's proposals were reflected in the decisions of the Council of Defence adopted at its sitting (see *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, pp. 243-45). p. 112

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[106] On Point 4 of the agenda ("On the Mobilisation of Intellectuals") L. B Krasin was instructed to draw up a draft decision for the mobilisation of technical personnel; L. B. Krasin, V. I. Nevsky and N. P. Gorbunov were instructed to draw up draft regulations on questionnaires to be submitted to the C.P.C. p. 113

[107] The Council of Defence passed a decision for the fuel question to be considered by a special five-man commission, which was to be summoned by Lenin. The commission met on December 2, 1918 (see the next document). p. 113

[108] This draft was written by Lenin apparently at a meeting of the Fuel Commission set up by the Council of Defence (see previous Note). It took into account the opinions expressed by the commission members. Lenin's draft was adopted by the commission and included in its minutes. In the Minutes of the Fuel Commission points 1, 2, 3, 4 are given under a special heading "Decisions of the Commission Having the Force of Defence Council Decisions". Lenin's draft, endorsed as a decision, was signed also by Defence Council members J. V. Stalin and V. I. Nevsky. p. 114

[109] The State Bank held up the issue of currency notes from the special fund reserved to the Chief Timber Board. p. 114

[110] In the course of a discussion of the work of the railways at a meeting of the Council of Defence on December 1, 1918, a commission was set up to deal with questions relating to the activities of the transport department of the Vecheka. The commission, chaired by Lenin, held its first meeting on December 3. This rough draft was probably made by Lenin during the meeting. All points of these proposals with the exception of the two last paragraphs were later crossed out by Lenin. The commission's decisions were formulated on the basis of Lenin's proposals. p. 115

[111] This refers to the leadership of the boards of the gubernia and railway Chekas. p. 115

[112] On the basis of Lenin's proposals the commission decided to instruct the People's Commissariat for Railways together with a representative of the Vecheka to revise the regulations governing the Transport Department of the Vecheka in respect of non-interference by the Vecheka in the commissariat's technical and management functions. On the question of the relationships between the Vecheka the Railway Cheka (Transport Department of the Vecheka) and the Commissariat for Railways see the draft decision of the Council of Defence (pp. 127-29 of this volume). p. 115

[113] By decision of the commission the right to participate in judicial investigations through their delegates was granted to the People's Commissariats and the Party Committees of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 115

[114] This rough draft was made by Lenin in connection with the discussion by the Council of Defence of N. P. Bryukhanov's report concerning the speeding up and increase of food purveyance. Lenin's proposals were incorporated in the Council's decision on this question (see *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, pp. 246-47).
p. 115

[115] The draft Regulations introduced by N. P. Bryukhanov were discussed at the meeting of the C.P.C. on December 5, 1918. Lenin's draft decision and remarks in this connection were apparently jotted down during the discussion, but were then crossed out by him. However, the amendments adopted at the meeting and incorporated in the draft Regulations coincide with his drafts.
p. 116

[116] On December 4, 1918, during the discussion of the question of introducing a third shift at the Tula cartridge and small arms factories, the Council of Defence set up a special commission to deal with this matter. The commission on cartridges met on December 5 and was attended by V. I. Lenin, L. B. Krasin (Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission on Red Army Supply), E. M. Sklyansky (Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic), Commander-in-Chief I. I. Vatsetis, and representatives of the Chief Artillery Board, the Tula Cartridge Factory and others—altogether 17 people. The commission passed decisions having the force of Defence Council decisions; they were based on the measures outlined by Lenin in his notes (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, pp. 55-57).
p. 117

[117] This refers to the setting up of committees on a parity basis for convening a congress of bank employees, which was to form a single union of bank employees in place of the two existing trade unions—the All-Russia Credit Business Workers Trade Union (Banktrud) and the R.S.F.S.R. People's Bank Workers Union (Bankosotrud). On December 2, 1918, the question of the relationships between the two unions was discussed at a special conference presided over by Lenin. The Congress of Bank Employees was held in the beginning of January 1919. p. 118

[118] This document was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion of V. P. Milyutin's report concerning the financing of Centrotextil (Central Committee of the Textile Industry under the S.E.C.) at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 14, 1918. Lenin's proposals were reflected in the decision which the C.P.C. adopted in this connection. p. 118

[119] Points 1 and 3 were crossed out by Lenin. A comparison with the text of the decision as recorded in the minutes gives grounds for presuming that Lenin did not cross out the points which were accepted by the C.P.C. p. 119

[120] Lenin's letter to Chicherin was written in connection with the preparations for the first congress of the Comintern.

Already at the beginning of the first world war, when the collapse of the Second International occurred as a result of most of the leaders of the socialist parties in the West adopting a social-chauvinist stand, Lenin put forward the idea of founding a new, truly revolutionary International and pressed forward with a campaign to unite the Left socialist forces in the international labour movement. The victory of the October Socialist Revolution and its growing impact upon the international revolutionary movement, and the emergence of Communist Parties or groups in a number of capitalist countries made this task more urgent than ever and created favourable conditions for its solution.

The urgent need for uniting the Communists was further dictated by the fact that the opportunist, social-chauvinist leaders had made an attempt to revive the Second International. The leadership of the British Labour Party had addressed a proposal to the socialists of all countries to convene in Lausanne on January 6, 1919, an international socialist conference to rehabilitate the Second International. In reply to this proposal the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) circulated on December 24, 1918, a radio-telegram calling on all revolutionary internationalist elements to refuse to take part "in conferences of enemies of the working class wearing the mask of socialism" (*Pravda* No. 281, December 25, 1918). At the same time Lenin, as his letter to Chicherin shows, raised the question of convening without delay an international conference of Communists and Left Social-Democrats with the aim of founding the Third International. p. 119

[121] This refers to E. Fuchs, a member of the Central Council of the *Spartakusbund*. He arrived in Moscow from Berlin at the end of December 1918 to inform Lenin of the situation in Germany. p. 119

[122] A report was drawn up for Lenin on December 31 characterising the parties and organisations mentioned in his list. In addition to those given by Lenin the report gave the names of eight more organisations. It also suggested inviting representatives of the Chinese, Korean and Persian revolutionary workers to the conference in the capacity of guests.

The same day Lenin received the draft of an appeal "To the First Congress of the Communist International" written at his request and in keeping with his proposals. Lenin made a number of important amendments to the draft.

In January 1919 the draft appeal "To the First Congress of the Communist International" was submitted by Lenin at a meeting of representatives of a number of communist and socialist parties and organisations. After a discussion, the meeting adopted the draft. The appeal was published in the press on January 24, 1918.

The First Congress of the Communist International was held on March 2-6, 1919 (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 453-77). p. 121

[123] These notes were written at a time when the Soviets were being restored in Kharkov. The city, which had been occupied by Petlyura, was liberated by the Soviet troops on January 3, 1919. p. 122

[124] The question of sending people to Kharkov was discussed at a meeting of the Council of Defence on January 17 and 27, 1919. p. 122

[125] This draft was introduced by Lenin and adopted with slight amendments at a meeting of the C.P.C. on January 28, 1919.

The draft decree on consumers' communes mentioned in Point 4 was adopted by the C.P.C. on March 16 and published in *Izvestia* No. 60 on March 20.

Lenin's addendum to Point 1 was written in the margin probably after the writing of the draft decision as a whole. The beginning of Point 1 of the C.P.C.'s decision of January 28 was worded as follows: "Direct the Co-operative Department of the S.E.C. and the People's Commissariat for Food together with the Central Statistical Board to collect within the shortest possible time information concerning the actual implementation by the co-operatives of the basic line of Soviet policy". p. 123

[126] This draft was adopted at a meeting of the C.P.C. on January 30, 1919, and published on February 1 in *Izvestia* No. 23. p. 123

[127] The question of granting a concession to build the Great Northern Railway was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on February 4, 1919. The Council adopted Lenin's motion with certain amendments.

According to the project of the concession's sponsors the new line was to link the Ob with Petrograd and Murmansk via Kotlas. No contract for this railway was concluded. p. 124

[128] This document was incorporated almost *in toto* in the resolution of the C.C. of the Russian Communist Party adopted on February 19, 1919.

On March 11, 1919, the C.C. adopted a new detailed resolution on the food policy in the Ukraine. On one of the pages of the typewritten text of this resolution, which is kept in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Lenin had written: "Endorsed 11. III. at the Bureau of the C.C. of the R.C.P. as a directive for the Ukrainian R.C.P. and the Ukrainian Soviet Government. 11. III. 1919. Lenin". p. 125

[129] Lenin's unfinished article "On the Appeal of the German Independents" was written in the latter part of February 1919. The appeal is criticised in § 21 of Lenin's theses on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat (see present edition, Vol. 28, p. 467). p. 126

[130] Lenin is referring to the meeting of the enlarged International Socialist Commission (*Internationale Sozialistische Kommission*) held in Berne on February 5-9, 1916. It was attended by 22 delegates from the internationalists of a number of countries: Germany, Russia, Italy, Norway, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Bulgaria and Rumania. Lenin took an active part in the proceedings. The meeting adopted an appeal "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups" denouncing the participation of socialists in bourgeois governments, the slogan of "Defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war, and voting for war loans; it pointed to the necessity of supporting the labour movement and preparing mass revolutionary action against the imperialist war. The appeal, however, suffered from inconsistency in that it failed to demand a break with social-chauvinism and opportunism. In voting for the text of the appeal, the members of the Zimmerwald Left declared at the meeting that although they did not consider all its points satisfactory, they were voting for it because they regarded it as a step forward in comparison with the decisions of the First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald. The meeting fixed the date for convening a second international socialist conference. p. 126

[131] The reference is to Kautsky's article "*Fraktion und Partei*" published in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 9 for November 26, 1915. p. 127

[132] The women attending the courses wrote a letter to Lenin asking him to address their meeting. They concluded their letter with a pledge to take the places of their husbands, brothers and sons who had joined the Red Army. p. 129

[133] This draft was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion of the question of the Printing Industry Department of the S.E.C. at a meeting of the C.P.C. on March 15, 1919. The Council" decision was formulated on the basis of Lenin's proposals. For the text of this decision see *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 24. p. 130

[134] The need for sending the best workers out on food and transportation jobs had been dealt with by Lenin in his speech at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and the All-Russia Trade Union Congress on January 17, 1919 (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 403-04).

Lenin's draft was adopted by the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.); it was signed also by C.C. members L. B. Kamenev, G. Y. Zinoviev, J. V. Stalin, Y. D. Stasova, N. N. Krestinsky, M. F. Vladimirsky, N. I. Bukharin, V. V. Schmidt and F. E. Dzerzhinsky. p. 131

[135] *The Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of April 3, 1919*, was held jointly with representatives of the district Soviets, factory committees and trade union executives in connection with the aggravation of the food situation in Moscow and the

consequent agitation carried on among the railwaymen by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The latter called upon the railwaymen to strike and sabotage work in the railway repair shops. This counter-revolutionary agitation led to a strike in the shops of the Alexandrovsky Railway as a result of which the central workshops were closed on March 31 by order of the People's Commissariat for Railways and work in them was not resumed until April 3, after the kulak elements had been dismissed.

Lenin made a report at the meeting on the domestic and foreign situation of the Soviet Republic. A report on the state of railway transport was made by L. B. Krasin, and on the food policy by A. I. Svidersky. Speakers in the debate denounced the counter-revolutionary agitation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. In winding up the debate, A. V. Lunacharsky moved the resolution on the domestic and foreign situation of the Soviet Republic drafted by Lenin. This volume contains the original version of this draft resolution. The meeting of the Moscow Soviet also adopted a special resolution branding the counter-revolutionary agitation and approving the measures taken by the Commissariat for Railways in regard to the Alexandrovsky railway shops.

For Lenin's report and resolution see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 255-74. p. 133

[136] In January 1919 the Soviet Government made two offers of peace (on the 12th and 17th). On February 4 it notified the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the U.S.A. by radio that it was ready to attend the proposed peace conference on Princes Islands. p. 133

[137] *Vsegda Vperyod!* (Ever Forward!)—a Menshevik newspaper published in Moscow; in 1918 one issue appeared, and in 1919 it was published from January 22 to February 25. p. 133

[138] *Dyelo Naroda* (People's Cause)—organ of the S.R. Party, published in Petrograd, then at intervals in Samara and Moscow under different names from March 1917 to March 1919. After the October Socialist Revolution the paper adopted an anti-Soviet attitude. It was closed down for counter-revolutionary activities. p. 134

[139] Lenin's proposal was written on the draft resolution of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.). The draft, with Lenin's corrections, is signed by V. I. Lenin, N. N. Krestinsky, and J. V. Stalin. The resolution states: "An essential condition for success in the conduct of the war is unconditional unity of action on all fronts, which, in turn, demands unity of Red Army command on all fronts, unity of Red Army supply on all fronts and unity of transport management of all railways, since transport is of primary importance in the conduct of war." The resolution stresses the need for the strictest directives being given to the Commissariats for the Army and the Navy as well as to the supply agencies of the Soviet Republics—

"in order that these independent commissariats work exclusively in strict conformity with the directives given by the appropriate Commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R., since only in this way can the necessary unity, dispatch and accuracy be achieved in the fulfilment of all orders and operations."

The resolution goes on to say that "the most urgent task in the Ukraine is to make maximum use of fuel, metals, existing factories and workshops, and also stocks of food". Pointing out that the whole industry of the Ukraine was concentrated in the eastern part of the republic and that the transfer of the Economic Council from Kharkov to Kiev had adversely affected the rehabilitation of transport and of the mining and manufacturing industries of the Ukraine, the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) recognised the need for the Economic Council as well as the Special Commission for Army Supplies of the Ukraine being located in Kharkov or having competent agencies in Kharkov authorised to deal directly with Moscow and to receive money appropriations directly from Moscow. The C.C. of the Party emphasised that "the Ukrainian railways are an inseparable part of the Russian railway network and are managed by the People's Commissariat for Railways from Moscow." The resolution also states that "the People's Commissariat for State Control of the R.S.F.S.R. should cover all institutions in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

This resolution of the Party's Central Committee was an important step towards strengthening unity in military affairs among the Soviet Republics. On April 24, 1919, in connection with Commander-in-Chief I. I. Vatsetis's memorandum on the military situation in the R.S.F.S.R., urging the need for uniting the armed forces of the Soviet Republics and subordinating them to a single command, Lenin wrote to E. M. Sklyansky asking him to urgently "draft the *text* of the C.C. directive to all "nationals" concerning military *unity* (unification)" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 50, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 528). For "Draft C.C. Directive on Army Unity" see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 404-05. The military union of the Soviet Republics was officially implemented on June 1, 1919, by a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee "On the Unification of the Soviet Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia for Fighting World Imperialism". p. 135

[140] On April 21, 1919, Lenin made a report "On Stepping Up Work in the Field of Military Defence" at a meeting of the Council of Defence. The document printed here is apparently a rough draft of the concluding part of the resolution on this question. p. 135

[141] This postscript was written to Béla Kun's appeal on behalf of the Soviet Government of Hungary to the Hungarian soldiers serving in the Red Army. "You, Hungarian internationalists,"

the appeal stated, "who are fighting on Russian soil against the bands of Kolchak and counter-revolution, are also fighting for the Hungarian Soviet Republic just as your comrades are doing in Hungary, for Hungary and Russia today form a single whole." This appeal was issued in April 1919 in Hungarian and promulgated on the civil war fronts.

The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. have the text of the postscript in Russian in the handwriting of L. M. Karakhan. It runs: "I whole-heartedly support the appeal of our Magyar comrades. I hope the interests of the international cause will come first with our Magyar comrades. We must hold out another few months and victory will be assured. Lenin". p. 135

[142] This draft was written at the second meeting of the Economic Commission of the C.P.C. on May 2, 1919, in connection with the discussion of measures to alleviate the position of the workers. p. 136

[143] On May 31, 1919, the Council of Defence considered questions relating to mobilisation. The Council endorsed the decree drafted by Lenin (see pp. 138-39 of this volume) and decisions directing the People's Commissariat for Food to provide the mobilised men with food and ordering the conscription status of employees in all departments and institutions to be checked with the object of placing at the disposal of the military command all such persons who were liable for service in the armed forces and who could be replaced without great detriment to the work by persons who were not liable or by women. p. 137

[144] The Council of Defence on May 24, 1919, passed a decision allowing Red Armymen of frontline units operating in the rich grain-producing districts to send food parcels to their families in the famine-stricken areas. The Council ordered the Central Committee of the Food Army to submit not later than June 1 a draft of detailed instructions for the implementation of this decision. The draft was endorsed by the Council of Defence on July 23, 1919. p. 139

[145] Mamontov's mounted corps was launched by Denikin for attacks behind the lines of the Soviet troops on the Southern Front. On August 10, 1919, Mamontov's cavalry broke through the front in the vicinity of Novokhopersk and raided several towns and villages. This cavalry raid created a threat to the Soviet troops, made offensive operations difficult and interfered with army control and supply in a number of places. The Party and the Government took emergency measures to fight Mamontov's cavalry. On August 23 the Council of Defence declared martial law in Ryazan, Tula, Orel, Voronezh, Tambov and Penza gubernias, on the territory of which all power was vested in the Revolutionary Committees. These were responsible for organising defence against whiteguard attacks and suppressing counter-revolutionary

actions. Lenin attached great importance to the organisation of Mamontov's defeat. The latter's corps was routed in October-November 1919. p. 141

[146] Lenin had repeatedly demanded that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, headed by Trotsky, take drastic measures to fight Mamontov's troops. On September 16, 1919, Lenin wrote: "Inaction against Mamontov. Evidently, there has been one delay after another. The troops marching on Voronezh from the North were late. We were late in transferring the 21st Division to the South. We were late with the armoured cars. Late with communications.... Apparently our R.M.C.R. 'gives orders', without being interested in or able to follow up *fulfilment*. This may be our common vice but in military affairs it simply means destruction" (see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 420-21). p. 142

[147] The draft decision was adopted by the C.P.C. at its meeting on September 4, 1919. p. 143

[148] The decision of the Politbureau accompanying Lenin's note was adopted in connection with Chicherin's letter to Lenin dated September 26, 1919, in which Chicherin asked for instructions on the following points: 1) could an appeal be made without the decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) to the workers of the Entente countries to bring pressure to bear on their Governments not to interfere in the Soviet state's negotiations with the Baltic states for concluding peace treaties? 2) Should we make new peace proposals to the Entente countries in the name of the Soviet Government? "This," wrote Chicherin, "would be construed as a sign of weakness.... On the other hand, it would give an opening to the opponents of intervention, especially to the trade unions"; 3) Could we take advantage of Litvinov's proposed trip to a neutral country to negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war with the English representatives in order to "throw out a feeler on the question of peace"? 4) In the event of Litvinov's mission being a failure would it be worth while asking A. M. Gorky, who intended to make an appeal for peace, to mention in his letter "our invariable desire for peace and to point out to the Governments of the Entente the risk of the struggle being turned into annihilation"? (underlined by Lenin). "However," wrote Chicherin, "we should much prefer an official peace proposal..." (Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). On this question see also V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 51, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 85. p. 144

[149] The conflict arose through an order of the People's Commissariat for State Control to do away with nine legal departments of the S.E.C. The latter lodged a complaint against the State Control with the Narrow Council of People's Commissars. The C.P.C. endorsed the decision of the Narrow Council in this connection on September 30, 1919, and adopted Lenin's motion with

slight amendments, namely: Point 3 was added, reading: "The same to be demanded of all committees within a fortnight", while Point 3 of Lenin's draft was endorsed as Point 4 of the decision worded as follows: "The Commissariat for Justice to institute investigations with the object of taking legal action against members of the S.E.C.'s legal departments for red tape. Fulfilment to be reported to the Narrow Council within a week (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 144

[150] The Narrow C.P.C. was set up in December 1917 to relieve the agenda of the C.P.C. of minor questions; it had the status of a C.P.C. commission. All the decisions unanimously adopted by the Narrow Council were signed by Lenin and acquired the force of C.P.C. decisions; in cases of disagreement the business was referred to the C.P.C. p. 145

[151] The *suggestions* were written in connection with a meeting of the communist groups of Centrosoyuz and the Food Commissariat arranged by the C.P.C. and chaired by Lenin on October 9, 1919. p. 145

[152] *Bednota* (The Poor)—a peasant daily, published in Moscow from March 27, 1918 to January 31, 1931. The newspaper was founded by decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) in lieu of the newspapers *Derevenskaya Bednota* (The Rural Poor), *Derevenskaya Pravda* (Rural Truth) and *Soldatskaya Pravda* (Soldiers' Truth). The newspaper carried on an active campaign to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to organise and rally the mass of the poor and middle peasants behind the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. *Bednota* played an important role in promoting the political education and raising the cultural level of the labouring peasantry, in advancing public-spirited activists from among the rural poor and the middle peasantry, and training a numerous army of rural correspondents. On February 1, 1931, *Bednota* merged with the newspaper *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (Socialist Agriculture). p. 145

[153] The reference is to the Decree "On Consumers' Communes" passed by the Council of People's Commissars on March 16, 1919. p. 145

[154] The Afghan Embassy Extraordinary headed by the Ambassador Extraordinary Mohammad Wali-Khan arrived in Moscow on October 10, 1919. On October 12 the Ambassador, accompanied by Chief Judge of the Afghan Army Saifurrahman-Khan and the Secretary of the Embassy visited the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He was received by the Board of the Commissariat in full attendance. On October 14 Lenin received the embassy in the presence of representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The talk between the Ambassador and Lenin lasted over half an hour. p. 146

[155] Replies to the questions raised in the letter of Amir Amanullah Khan were given in the Soviet Government's letter dated November 27, 1919, signed by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. I. Lenin. p. 146

[156] The speech was made at Trade Union House in Moscow to communist workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk who were on their way to the front. On October 3 a town Party meeting had been held in Ivanovo-Voznesensk at which every Party member was called upon to spare no effort to defeat Denikin's army, and the Party organisations were called upon to start mobilising Communists for the front. On October 9 the Bureau of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Committee passed a decision to announce a general Party mobilisation. In a short period about 350 men were mobilised. The first group was seen off on October 22 and arrived in Moscow on October 24. In a letter to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front Lenin wrote: "I heartily recommend the bearer, Comrade Stepan Nazarov, a Bolshevik whom I have known personally for a long time.

"Together with other Ivanovo-Voznesensk comrades they formed a *well-planned organised* group (of from 300 to 500 men) for giving all-round service to and raising the morale of a whole army.

"I heartily recommend the comrades and request you earnestly to take all steps not to lose sight of them, but make proper and careful use of them" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 51, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 121). p. 147

[157] Referring to the Chamber of Deputies election campaign, which started in October 1919. p. 148

[158] At its meeting on November 11, 1919, the C.P.C. discussed a draft decree for the establishment of a single forestry body. The Council rejected the draft and set up a commission consisting of representatives of Glavleskom (Chief Timber Committee), the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, with instructions to put into effect Lenin's proposals as here set forth. The decree was endorsed by the C.P.C. on November 21, 1919, and published in *Izvestia* on November 29, 1919. p. 148

[159] This draft decision was adopted by the C.P.C. on November 18, 1919. p. 149

[160] Simultaneously with the draft of the Food Commissariat the C.P.C. discussed the draft of the Supreme Economic Council on the same question. Point 4 of the S.E.C. draft read: "The starch and treacle factories shall be allowed to make contracts with the peasants for the delivery of potatoes, and to issue 1 pound of produce for every processed pood" (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 140). p. 149

[161] The decree on potato purchases drafted by the commission was endorsed by the C.P.C. on Saturday, November 22, 1919, with amendments proposed at its meeting. p. 149

[162] This congress, convened by the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East under the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), was held in Moscow from November 22 to December 3, 1919. On the eve of the congress, November 21, a preliminary meeting of Central Committee members with a group of delegates was held with Lenin presiding. The congress was attended by 71 voting delegates and 11 delegates with a consultative voice. On the opening day of the congress Lenin delivered a report on the current situation (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 151-62). The resolution adopted on his report was submitted to the presidium "for concretisation and drafting of the chief theses that should serve as a basis for work in the East". The congress heard the report on the work of the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, reports from the local areas, the report of the Central Moslem Military Collegium and others. The congress outlined the tasks in the field of Party and Soviet work in the East and elected a new Central Bureau. p. 150

[163] G. V. Chicherin's report on the international situation was delivered to the Eighth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). The conference adopted the resolution on the international situation drafted by Lenin. In his report on the activities of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets Lenin proposed this resolution as a draft resolution of the congress (see present edition, Vol. 30, p. 231). It was unanimously adopted by the congress as a peace proposal to the countries of the Entente. p. 150

[164] This document formed the basis of the resolution adopted by the Plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on November 29, 1919, on the composition of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, which was to be elected at the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 151

[165] Lenin is referring to the decision of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on the question of organisation. The section dealing with Soviet construction stated that the composition of the All-Russia C.E.C. should be changed and its membership should consist largely of people from the local areas who conduct regular work among the peasants and workers (see *The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 1919.* Minutes, Moscow, 1959, p. 427). p. 151

[166] The draft decree on improving railway transport in connection with military freightages was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 2, 1919. During this discussion Lenin introduced his motion, which was incorporated in §10 of the

decree. With this addendum and other amendments the decree was adopted by the C.P.C. and published in part in *Izvestia* No. 281 for December 14, 1919. p. 151

[167] Lenin's remarks were used as a basis for the decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) which discussed the Draft Regulations at its meeting on December 27, 1919. p. 152

[168] §1 of the Draft Regulations stated that the R.C.P. group at the A.C.C.T.U. was the guiding Party organisation of the entire Russian trade union movement. p. 152

[169] §3 of the Draft Regulations read as follows: "With a view to co-ordinating the actions of all the all-Russia industrial unions and carrying out the line of the Communist Party in the trade union movement in a more effective and organised manner, all existing and newly created Party groups in the all-Russia industrial unions shall be directly subordinated to the Party Group at the A.C.C.T.U." p. 152

[170] The question of Moscow's food supply was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 6, 1919. The Council's decision on this question was formulated on the basis of Lenin's rough draft. p. 154

[171] This refers to the agreement between the Commissariat for Railways and the Food Commissariat on the question of the transportation of grain from the producing to the consuming areas. "The agreement," stated the Council's decision, "should ensure regular deliveries to Moscow of such a quantity of breadstuffs as was necessary for its class ration distribution" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 154

[172] This refers to the daily reports to the C.P.C. concerning the supply of breadstuffs to Moscow and the movement of potato freights for Moscow. p. 154

[173] Lenin wrote this draft in connection with the discussion, at a meeting of the C.P.C. on December 23, 1919, of the question of the Kazan, Simbirsk and Samara gubernia food commissars' failure to carry out the order of the Food Commissariat concerning train consignments to Moscow by through trains. The draft was adopted by the Council with certain amendments. p. 154

[174] From the reports of speakers it transpired that one of the principal reasons for non-fulfilment of the order was the delay on the part of the Commissariat for Post and Telegraph in giving the Food Commissariat a direct line for communicating with the local areas. This point was adopted by the Council in the following wording: "In all cases of non-receipt of a direct line the guilty party shall be that commissariat, which, not having received

the line in the course of an hour for carrying out an important assignment, shall have failed to complain about it to the Chairman of the C.P.C." (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 147). p. 154

[175] This point was adopted by the C.P.C. in the following wording: "The Commissariat for Justice is instructed to institute investigations to determine the culpability of the gubernia food commissars and other officials guilty of non-fulfilment of the Food Commissariat's order for through trains with grain to be consigned to Moscow or of failure to fulfil same through bad organisation" (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 147). p. 155

[176] The data given by the Central Statistical Board were used by Lenin in the Central Committee's report to the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (see present edition, Vol. 30, p. 460). p. 155

[177] On December 23, 1919, the Narrow Council of People's Commissars examined the question of supplying the workers with clothes and footwear. It decided to use for this purpose part of the stocks reserved for the Red Army, but in a manner that would not be detrimental to the army. At the end of December the Central Army Supply Administration was to have issued to the Food Commissariat from army stores 30,000 pairs of leather boots, while the S.E.C. undertook to deliver to the Food Commissariat every fortnight 20 per cent of all the boots manufactured in the country.

Apparently this decision of the Narrow Council met with objection on the part of the Presidium of the S.E.C., as a result of which the C.P.C. passed a decision based on this draft of Lenin's. p. 157

[178] This motion was adopted by the C.P.C. in the following wording: "Comrade Rykov shall give an exact mandate to his representative for all meetings on the question of working clothes and delegate only him."

The question was examined a second time by the Narrow Council on January 3, 1920, this time in the presence of Chairman of the S.E.C. A. R Rykov, who was ordered to supply monthly to the Food Commissariat's agencies, as from January 1, 1920, not less than 40,000 pairs of men's working boots, not counting clogs, bast sandals and felt boots. p. 157

[179] The draft instructions were discussed and adopted by the C.P.C. the same day they were written. p. 157

[180] This alludes to the decision of the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets on state organising activities, with special reference to the commissariats' right of objection to managers of Soviet Executive Committee sections. p. 157

[181] Under a resolution of the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets the S.E.C. was to frame instructions defining the rights and

duties of the central and local bodies of the S.E.C. in respect of state factories of special importance, trustified enterprises, etc. p. 157

[182] This motion was adopted by the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence at its meeting on January 16, 1920, after discussion of a report "On the Reorganisation of the Special Committee for Imposing Martial Law on the Railways and the Transport Department of the Vecheka". p. 158

[183] On January 2, 1920, the Soviet Government proposed to the Mussavatist Government of Azerbaijan an agreement for joint action against Denikin. This offer was turned down.

Following a report by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin on the possibility of peace negotiations with Azerbaijan made at a meeting of the Politbureau on January 17 and 18, 1920, the latter adopted Lenin's motion on this question. p. 158

[184] This draft decision was adopted by the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on January 17-18, 1920, in connection with the protest of the Commander-in-Chief concerning the telegram with Lenin's postscript which the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic L. D. Trotsky sent to M. V. Frunze, Commander of the Turkestan Front and G. K. Voskanov, Commander of the 4th Army, on January 17, 1920. The telegram asked for energetic steps to be taken to build the Emba Railway and rebuild the Krasny Kut-Alexandrov Gai railway to a wide gauge (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 51, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 207). p. 159

[185] The question of reorganising the State Control Commissariat into a Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was raised at the end of 1919 and discussed at the Seventh All-Russia Congress of Soviets. A commission consisting of representatives of the State Control, the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the All-Russia C.E.C. was set up to draft regulations governing the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Opinion in the commission being divided, the question was referred to the Politbureau, which passed its decision on January 23, 1920, on the basis of the directives moved by Lenin. p. 160

[186] These directions were written by Lenin on Y. I. Burov's report summarising the work of the propaganda-instructor trains and steamers of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The latter's Propaganda-Instructor Trains and Steamers Department reported on February 3, 1920, that in accordance with the directions the Department had established contact with the Film Committee and set up a preliminary commission to draft the regulations governing propaganda trips on the trains and steamers of the All-Russia C.E.C. p. 160

[187] This draft was written at a meeting of the C.P.C. during the discussion of the report by A. A. Burdukov, Chief of Moscow Military District and the Moscow City Garrison, concerning the unloading of potatoes at the Moscow Railway Junction and snow clearing on Moscow's streets and railway tracks. Lenin's draft was endorsed by the C.P.C. p. 162

[188] The following decision was adopted at the meeting of the C.P.C. on January 31, 1920: "Resumption of the potato campaign shall be postponed until the spring when, simultaneously with the seed campaign, the People's Commissariat for Food shall undertake in the course of April and May 1920 to satisfy the requirements of Moscow in food potatoes to the amount of 560,000 poods" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.). p. 162

[189] The report on measures taken by the Commissariat for Internal Affairs to implement compulsory service in connection with snow clearing was made to the C.P.C. on January 31, 1920. The Council passed a decision to set up a commission under the chairmanship of F. E. Dzerzhinsky which was to be made responsible for the conduct of this business. p. 162

[190] Point 4 of the draft regulations on bonuses for workers and office employees, about which Lenin had his doubts, was worded as follows. "§ 4. Standard output shall be established on the basis of technically possible output under the best technical conditions of production, provided the means and implements of production are in a normal condition. In view, however, of the general conditions prevailing in industry, a deduction should be made from this technically possible standard, but in no case more than 50 per cent, after which the actual standard of productivity, varying with the different trades, enterprises and groups, shall be fixed."

At its meeting on February 1, 1920, the Narrow C.P.C. resolved that the draft decision on bonuses shall be returned to the People's Commissariat for Labour for revision in accordance with Comrade Lenin's directions".

A decision "On the Procedure for Endorsing Bonus Projects" was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on June 8 and published in *Izvestia* on June 10, 1920. p. 163

[191] This refers to the *first session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee*, *seventh convocation*, held in Moscow on February 2-7, 1920. On February 2 Lenin delivered his report at the session on the work of the A.C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 315-36). p. 163

[192] This draft was incorporated *in toto* in the decisions of the Council of Defence dated February 2, 1920, which, over Lenin's signature, were circulated to all government departments with Lenin's

postscript (see pp. 165-66 of this volume). The C.D. decisions were published in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, pp. 64-67. p. 164

[193] This draft was moved by Lenin at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on February 5, 1920, in connection with L. B. Krasin's report on the question of granting privileges to workers engaged on locomotive repairs and the production of spare parts for transport.

The following resolution was adopted on the report: "The S.E.C., the Commissariat for Food and the Commissariat for Railways are instructed to examine in detail the question of all privileges applying to workers engaged in locomotive repairs and the production of spare parts for transport, and to present a list of factories to the C.P.C." p. 166

[194] The question of "*using the best workshops for repairs all 24 hours of the day*" was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on March 16, 1920. The question of intensive and uninterrupted work on the repair of locomotives was raised by Lenin in connection with the catastrophic state of railway transport, and this led to a number of other questions being discussed at the same Council meeting, namely: the possibility of placing an order abroad for locomotives and spare parts for repairing railway transport, and an inspection of factories and works engaged in the repair of goods train cars and engines. p. 166

[195] *The Speech at the Fourth Conference of Gubernia Extraordinary Commissions* was delivered by Lenin at the morning plenary session on February 6, 1920. The conference was called at a time when the Soviet Republic, having defeated Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich, had gained a temporary respite and was in a position to tackle its economic problems.

The conference was attended by 69 voting delegates and 7 delegates with a consultative voice. All the delegates were Communists, the majority of the 69 voting delegates having joined the Party long before the revolution. Most of the delegates were workers. p. 166

[196] *Borotbists*—members of a petty-bourgeois nationalist party, Borotba, formed in May 1918 after a split in the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. So called from the name of the Party's central organ *Borotba* (Struggle). In March 1919 assumed the name of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party of Communist Borotbists, and in August that of the Ukrainian Communist Party of Borotbists. Its leaders, among others, were V. Blakitny, G. Grinko and A. Shumsky. There were a good many counter-revolutionary followers of Petlyura in the ranks of the party, who, under cover of revolutionary phrases and declarations to the effect that they stood on the communist platform, came out against the dictatorship of the proletariat and pursued a policy aimed at splitting the united revolutionary front of the working

peoples of the Ukraine and Russia. For Lenin's appraisal of the Borotba Party see pp. 180-181 of this volume.

The Borotbists twice applied to the Executive of the Communist International asking to be admitted to membership of the Comintern and to be recognised as the main communist party in the Ukraine. The Comintern passed a special decision on this question on February 26, 1920, proposing to the Borotbists that they dissolve their party and merge with the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine. The resolution said that the Executive of the Communist International could only regard the desire to found a second parallel party as an attempt to split the ranks of the working people.

The growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the peasantry and the successes of the Soviet government in the Ukraine forced the Borotbists to decide on voluntary dissolution.

The Fourth Conference of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, held March 17-23, 1920, agreed to admit the Borotbists into its ranks, all the newly enrolled members being reregistered. Eventually, however, many Borotbists resumed their anti-Soviet activities and headed the struggle of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Ukraine. p. 174

[197] The manuscript further contains a note by Lenin reading: "Trotsky and Rakovsky are instructed, not later than tomorrow, to word this resolution more accurately and transmit it tomorrow by coded telegraph to the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee." p. 175

[198] This interview was given by Lenin in the middle of February 1920 at a time when Soviet Russia, having gained a peaceful respite, was planning the country's economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, and when the Soviet Government embarked on a broad programme for establishing diplomatic and commercial relations with the capitalist countries. Lincoln Eyre of *The World* was sent to Russia to obtain an interview from Lenin, and was received by him in the company of cameraman Victor Kubes. The interview was conducted in English, first in Lenin's private office, then at his rooms in the Kremlin. It lasted an hour and touched on questions of topical interest. Lenin's interview was published in *The World* and reprinted by many newspapers in Western Europe and America. p. 175

[199] The *Peace Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R.* and Lithuania was signed in Moscow on July 12, 1920. The Peace Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and Latvia was signed at Riga on August 11, 1920. p. 179

[200] In referring to the Ukrainian Spilka teachers Lenin has in mind the Schoolteachers' Union of the Ukraine, which was controlled by Petlyura elements.

Spilka—Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union.

ATU—All-Russia Schoolteachers' Union. p. 181

[201] This draft was adopted at the meeting of the C.P.C. on March 2, 1920, during the discussion of Krasin's report on the question of foreign trade. It is connected with Point 17 of the theses on foreign trade, reading: "A commission consisting of representatives from the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, State Control and the Vecheka shall be set up to ascertain and reserve the Republic's stocks of commodities suitable for foreign trade" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. C.P.S.U.). p. 181

[202] Point 1 of Trotsky's draft theses was headed "The Will to Work" (see *The Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March-April 1920. Minutes*. Moscow, 1960, p. 533). p. 181

[203] The draft decree on the prosecution of minors introduced by the Commissariat for Education was discussed and endorsed with Lenin's Amendments at the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on March 4, 1920. The decree was published in *Izvestia* No. 51 for March 6 under the heading: "Cases of Juveniles Accused of Socially Dangerous Acts". p. 182

[204] Lenin proposed this draft at a meeting of the C.P.C. during a discussion of the question of the state farms. The Council instructed S. P. Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture, "to submit the exact text of all decisions on this question and the draft decision drawn up in this connection". The Draft Decision on Measures for State Farm Organisation drawn up by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture was endorsed by the C.P.C. on April 15, 1920. p. 183

[205] At a joint meeting of the Party groups of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and the Moscow C.T.U. on March 15, 1920, N. N. Krestinsky, Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), declared that since the stand taken by the A.C.C.T.U.'s Party Group and its responsible leaders on the question of collective and one-man management differed sharply from that of the Party's Central Committee, he proposed in the name of the Party's C.C. that none of the group's members should deliver reports at trade union congresses in favour of collective management.

Members of the group's bureau, at a closed meeting, emphatically protested against such interpretations and methods of enforcing Party discipline and applied to the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) asking to be allowed to move resolutions at trade union congresses on behalf of the A.C.C.T.U.'s Party Group. Their statement was discussed at a meeting of the C.C.'s Politbureau, which adopted Lenin's draft resolutions. p. 184

[206] Lenin did not finish his preface. The pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade* came out in English at the end of March 1920 without a preface. p. 185

[207] The German pamphlet N. Lenin. *Die Diktatur des Proletariats und der Renegat Karl Kautsky* came out at the end of December 1919. p. 185

[208] Lenin received Macdonald's book later. It stands in his private library with his marginal notes. Lenin specially marked those passages in the book in which Macdonald tried to play down the class contradictions of capitalist society. These marginal notes were published in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, pp. 253-85. p. 185

[209] The "Regulations on Subbotniks" were drafted by A. N. Sokolov, a member of the staff of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). They were prepared, apparently, for the first anniversary of the launching of the subbotniks (anniversary date May 10, 1920). p. 187

[210] Lenin's note was written in connection with the decisions of the Twelfth Conference of the Bund held April 12-19, 1920. The resolutions of this conference with Lenin's marks are to be found in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U. In the resolution "On the Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party" Lenin marked off the following passage: "14. Summing up the experience of the last year, the Twelfth Conference of the Bund finds: 1) that the Bund, in principle, had adopted the communist platform since the Eleventh Conference, 2) that the Programme of the Communist Party, which is also the programme of the Soviet government, corresponds with the fundamental platform of the Bund, 3) that a 'united socialist front' with principled opponents of Soviet power, who draw a line between the proletariat and its government, is impossible, 4) that the moment has come when the Bund can relinquish its official oppositional stand and take upon itself responsibility for the Soviet government's policy."

At the same time, the resolution on organisational questions stated that "<u>the logical consequence of the political stand adopted by the Bund is the latter's entry into the R.C.P. on the same basis as the Bund's membership of the R.S.D.L.P.</u>" (underlined by Lenin). The conference authorised the C.C. of the Bund to see to it, as an essential condition, that the Bund preserve within the R.C.P. the status of "an autonomous organisation of the Jewish proletariat" (marked off by Lenin).

On May 6, 1920, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) discussed the question of "The Conditions for the Bund's Admission to Membership of the R.C.P." and resolved: "that Kamenev, Stalin and Preobrazhensky be authorised to receive the representatives of the Bund and hear their proposals" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.).

At its Thirteenth Conference in 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and part of its membership joined the R.C.P.(B. on the basis of the rules of admission. p. 187

[211] The *Decree on the Introduction of Work Rations* was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on April 30, 1920 and published on May 4 in *Izvestia* No. 94. p. 188

[212] This refers to a bomb explosion in the building of the Moscow Committee of the Party in Leontievsky Pereulok. The bomb was thrown by Left Socialist-Revolutionaries on September 25, 1919. p. 190

[213] This draft was adopted at the meeting of the C.P.C. on May 25, 1920. p. 191

[214] The text of the decree, amended in accordance with Lenin's remarks, was adopted at the meeting of the C.P.C. on May 25, 1820 and published in *Izvestia* on June 4, 1920. p. 192

[215] Lenin's proposals outlined in this rough draft were incorporated in the Decision of the Council of People's Commissars of May 27, 1920. p. 192

[216] This interview took place in Lenin's private office in the Kremlin on June 3, 1920. Writing from Moscow, Nakahira reported: "I interviewed Mr. Lenin at his office in the Kremlin. Contrary to my expectation, the decoration of the room is very simple. Mr. Lenin's manner is very simple and kind—as if he were greeting an old friend. In spite of the fact that he holds the highest position, there is not the slightest trace of condescension in his manner." (*Osaka Asahi* No. 13814 for June 13, 1920.) The next day, as Nakahira mentions in his later reminiscences, he brought the text of his interview to Lenin, who read it carefully and made several corrections.

Lenin's interview given to another Japanese correspondent, K. Fusse, and printed lower down, took place on June 3 or 4. Possibly both correspondents were received by Lenin together. Fusse says the interview lasted about twenty minutes. A. N. Voznesensky, Chief of the Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was present at the interview.

Fusse's interview with Lenin was reported on June 26, 1920, in the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper *Volya* published in Vladivostok. The text of the interview given in this volume was first published in Russian in 1924 in the collection of articles *Lenin i Vostok* (Lenin and the East) and afterwards in the First Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (Vol. XX, Part II). It was not included in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th (Russian) editions of the *Collected Works*. p. 193

[217] This refers to the *Far-Eastern Republic* set up in April 1920 on the territory of the Trans-Baikal, Amur, Maritime and Kamchatka regions and Northern Sakhalin. In form a bourgeois-democratic state, in essence it pursued a Soviet policy in keeping with the interests of Soviet Russia, which needed a prolonged respite on her Eastern Front and wanted to stave off war with

Japan. At the same time, the creation of a buffer state in the Far East was made necessary by force of circumstances. As Lenin pointed out, "circumstances made necessary the creation of a buffer state, the Far-Eastern Republic. We are well aware of the unbelievable sufferings that the Siberian peasants are enduring at the hands of the Japanese imperialists and the atrocities the Japanese have committed in Siberia" (present edition, Vol. 31, p. 465).

After the interventionists and whiteguards were driven out of the Soviet Far East (except Northern Sakhalin), the People's Assembly of the Far-Eastern Republic voted for entry into the R.S.F.S.R. on November 14, 1922. p. 193

[218] The reference is to the *French Socialist Party*.

At the outbreak of the imperialist world war the Party's reformist leadership adopted a social-chauvinist stand of open support of the imperialist war and participation in the bourgeois government. There was a Centrist trend in the Party headed by Jean Longuet, which took a social-pacifist stand and pursued a policy of conciliation with the social-chauvinists. There was also a Left, revolutionary wing in the Party which took an internationalist stand and was represented chiefly by its rank and file.

After the October Socialist Revolution a sharp struggle developed within the Party between the open reformists and Centrists on the one hand, and the Left, revolutionary wing, on the other—the latter strengthened by rank-and-file workers who joined the Party en masse. At the Party's congress in Tours in December 1920 the revolutionary wing received a majority. The congress adopted a decision for the Party to join the Communist International and founded the Communist Party of France. The majority of reformist and Centrists broke away from the Party and formed a separate party, retaining the old name of French Socialist Party. p. 198

[219] Lenin's draft was adopted with slight amendments at a meeting of the Politbureau of the C.C. on June 22, 1920, at which the theses and draft resolution on the Turkestan Republic drawn up by a special commission were discussed. For this commission's draft with Lenin's remarks see Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 433-36. p. 198

[220] The Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. was set up on October 8, 1919. Its members were G. I. Boky, F. I. Goloshchokin, V. V. Kuibyshev, Y. E. Rudzutak, M. V. Frunze and S. I. Eliava. The commission was vested with the powers of a Government and Party body and was sent to Turkestan to give all possible aid to the local Communists and the working people of Turkestan in overcoming that country's political, economic and cultural backwardness, con-

solidating Soviet power and strengthening the union between the people of Turkestan and Soviet Russia. One of the commissions tasks was to correct mistakes made during the implementation of the national policy in Turkestan.

The Turkestan Commission carried out a number of measures for strengthening the local Party organisations and combating dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism. Important issues were those concerning the principles of Turkestan autonomy, relations with the federal bodies, and the forms and methods of Party organisation. p. 198

221 *The Second Congress of the Communist International*, which laid the foundations of the Comintern's programme, tactics and organisation was held from July 19 to August 7, 1920, in Soviet Russia. The opening session was held in Petrograd and the subsequent sessions, beginning with July 23, in Moscow. The congress was attended by 169 voting delegates and 49 delegates with a consultative voice representing 67 workers' organisations of 37 countries. Apart from delegates representing the Communist Parties and organisations of 31 countries, there were delegates from the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the socialist parties of Italy and France, Industrial Workers of the World (Australia, Britain and Ireland), the National Confederation of Labour of Spain and other organisations. The R.C.P.(B.) was represented at the congress by 64 delegates.

All the preparatory work for convening the congress was directed by Lenin, who attached great importance to this international congress of communist and workers' organisations. An important role in defining the tasks and working out the political line of the Comintern was played by Lenin's book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, written for the opening of the Second Congress. Lenin wrote the "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)", "Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)", "Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International" and "The Terms of Admission into the Communist International" (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 144-51, 152-64, 184-201, 206-11).

The congress adopted the following agenda: 1) The International Situation and the Fundamental Tasks of the Communist International; 2) The Role and Composition of the Communist Parties Before and After the Conquest of Power by the Proletariat; 3) The Trade Unions and the Factory Committees; 4) the Question of Parliamentarism; 5) The National and Colonial Questions; 6) The Agrarian Question; 7) The Attitude to the New "Centrist" Trends and Terms of Admission Into the Communist International; 8) The Charter of the Communist International; 9) Organisational questions (legal and illegal organisations, women's organisations, etc.); 10) The Communist youth movement; 11) Elections; 12) Miscellaneous.

At the opening session of the congress Lenin delivered a report on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 215-34).

Lenin took an active part in the work of most of the committees—those on the national and colonial questions, on the agrarian question, on terms of admission into the Communist International, and on the international situation and the tasks of the Comintern.

Lenin also made a speech at the congress on the role of the Communist Party, delivered a report of the Committee on the National and Colonial Questions, speeches on the terms of admission into the Communist International, on parliamentarianism and on affiliation to the British Labour Party (ibid., pp. 235-63).

The congress adopted Lenin's theses as a resolution, passed a resolution "On the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution", in the formulation of which Lenin took an active part, and adopted other resolutions, the "Terms of Admission Into the Communist International" and the Charter of the Comintern. The congress also adopted the Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Communist International. In addition it published a number of appeals: "The Third International to the Trade Unions of All Countries", "To the Workers of Petrograd", "To the Red Army and Red Navy of the R.S.F.S.R.", "Against the Executioners of Hungary", "To the Proletarian Men and Women of All Countries", and others.

The Second Congress of the Comintern played a tremendous role in the development of the international communist movement. After the congress Lenin pointed out that "communism has become central to the working-class movement as a whole" (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 180). p. 199

[222] This is one of Lenin's rough drafts for his "Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International". p. 199

[223] *L'Humanité*—a daily newspaper, founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. During the First World War it was controlled by the extreme Right wing of the party.

From December 1920, after the split in the French Socialist Party, the paper became the central organ of the French Communist Party. p. 200

[224] *Le Populaire*—a newspaper founded by the French Centrists; published from 1916 in Limoges and from July 1917 in Paris. In 1921 it became the organ of the French Socialist Party. It is now controlled by the Right socialists. p. 200

[225] *Die Freiheit*—a daily, organ of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published in Berlin from November 15, 1918 to September 30, 1922. p. 200

[226] *The British Socialist Party* was founded in 1911, in Manchester, as a result of the amalgamation of the Social-Democratic Party with other socialist groups. Its small membership and its poor links with the masses gave the B.S.P. a somewhat sectarian character. During the First World War a sharp struggle developed within the Party between the internationalists (William Gallacher, Albert Inkpin, John Maclean, Theodore Rothstein and others) and the social-chauvinists headed by Hyndman. Within the internationalist trend there were inconsistent elements who took a Centrist stand on a number of issues. In February 1916 a group of B.S.P. leaders founded the newspaper *The Call*, which played an important part in uniting the internationalists. The annual conference of the B.S.P., held in Salford in April 1916, condemned the social-chauvinist stand of Hyndman and his supporters, who then left the Party.

The British Socialist Party welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution. Its members played an important part in the "Hands off Russia" movement. In 1919 the overwhelming majority of its organisations (98 against 4) declared for affiliation to the Communist International. The British Socialist Party, together with the Communist Unity Group, formed the core of the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the First (Unity) Congress, held in 1920, the great majority of the B.S.P. local organisations entered the Communist Party. p. 200

[227] *The American Socialist Party* was formed in July 1901 at a congress held in Indianapolis as a result of the amalgamation of groups that had broken away from the Socialist Workers' Party and the Social-Democratic Party of the U.S.A.; one of the organisers of the latter was Eugene Debs, a popular figure in the U.S. labour movement. He was also one of the founders of the new party. The party had a socially mixed membership made up of native-born and immigrant workers, as well as small farmers and people of petty-bourgeois origin. The party's Centrist and Right-wing opportunist leaders (Victor Berger, Morris Hillquit and others) denied the necessity of the proletarian dictatorship, renounced revolutionary methods of struggle, and reduced all party activities mainly to participation in election campaigns. During the First World War (1914-18) three trends appeared in the Socialist Party: the social-chauvinists, who supported the imperialist policy of the Administration; the Centrists, who opposed the imperialist war only in word; and the revolutionary minority, who took an internationalist stand and carried on a struggle against the war.

The Party's Left wing, headed by Charles Ruthenberg, William Foster, William Heywood and others, relying on the proletarian elements, waged a struggle against the party's opportunist leadership, for independent proletarian political action and the formation of industrial trade unions based on the principles of the class struggle. In 1919 a split took place in the Socialist Party. The breakaway Left wing founded the Communist Party of

the U.S.A., of which it formed the core. The Socialist Party today is a small sectarian organisation. p. 201

[228] *The Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland* (known as the *Swiss Socialist Party*) was formed in the seventies of the last century and was affiliated to the First International. The party was re-formed in 1888. The opportunists were very influential in the party, and during the First World War took a social-chauvinist stand. In the autumn of 1916 the party's Right wing broke away to form their own organisation. The majority, headed by Robert Grimm, took a Centrist social-pacifist stand, while the Left wing took an internationalist stand. The October Revolution in Russia influenced and strengthened the Left wing, which in December 1920 broke away and in 1921 joined the Communist Party of Switzerland. p. 201

[229] Lenin dealt at length with Tanner's speech in his own speech on the role of the Communist Party (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 235-39). p. 202

[230] *Shop Stewards* (or *Shop Stewards Committees*)—elected workers' organisations which existed in Britain in a number of industries and became widespread during the First World War. After the October Revolution in Russia the Shop Stewards Committees came out actively in support of the Soviet Republic against foreign military intervention. p. 202

[231] Lenin wrote his remarks on the typewritten copy of a report (in German) prepared by A. Sultan-Zade, apparently for the Committee on the National and Colonial Questions. Sultan-Zade's report on the prospects of a social revolution in the East was delivered at the plenary meeting of the Second Congress of the Communist International on July 28, 1920. p. 202

[232] The conflict between the Petrograd United Consumers' Commune and the Petrograd Soviet was this. In the summer of 1920 a number of functionaries of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet headed by G. Zinoviev and the Petrograd Trade Union Council raised the question of issuing bread rations to workers not only for actual work days but also for holidays and non-working days. The Board of the Petrograd Commune (A. Y. Badayev and others) were opposed to this on the grounds that such an extra issue would violate the very principle on which the work ration was based and that, besides, the necessary supplies for this were lacking; in general, it might upset the regular issue of the work ration and shake the workers' trust in the food supply system. The Petrograd Soviet, however, ignored the opinion of the Petrograd Commune Board and announced the issue of rations for holidays. Badayev refused to carry out this order and declared that the Board of the Petrograd Commune could not work under such conditions. On July 5, 1920, the Petrograd Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), having discussed "Com-

rade Badayev's refusal to accept the decision of the Large Presidium of June 23 providing for an increase in the bread ration, the issue of 5 lb. advance and the issue of rations to workers during holidays" resolved: "1. That all district bureaus and all functionaries of the Petrograd Commune shall be ordered to remain at work and discharge their duties without the slightest hitch until further notice from the Petrograd Party Committee and the Executive Committee. 2. That it be deemed necessary to radically change the personnel of the Petrograd Commune Board and instruct the Bureau of the Gubernia Committee together with the Presidium of the Executive Committee to appoint new comrades through the medium of the Control Council of the Petrograd Commune and to get in touch with Moscow on this question pending the convocation of a city conference of factory committees and unions" (Party Archives of the Party History Institute of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.). p. 203

[233] The conflict between the Petrograd Commune and the Petrograd Soviet was discussed at a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on July 16, 1920, at which Lenin wrote his draft decision. Lenin's motion was adopted. Taking into consideration that the existing relations between the functionaries of the Petrograd Commune and the Petrograd Soviet were likely to lead to further conflicts, the C.C. resolved to have A. Badayev and a number of other Petrograd Commune workers transferred to Moscow. Badayev was appointed Chairman of the Moscow Consumers' Society. p. 203

[234] Lenin wrote these answers on a telegram dated July 17, 1920, from A. M. Krasnoshchokov, Foreign Minister of the Far-Eastern Republic and member of the Far-Eastern Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) in which he reported the signing of an armistice agreement with Japan on July 15. A special protocol signed by the representatives of the F.-E.R. and Japan stated that the best way of establishing peace in the Far East was the creation of a buffer state based on democratic principles, under a single government to be formed at a conference attended by representatives from all the regions of the territory. It was in connection with this conference that Krasnoshchokov asked Lenin for urgent replies to the questions raised in his telegram. p. 204

[235] *The four-pointer*—abbreviated name for the democratic four-point electoral system, namely: universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. p. 204

[236] This probably means securing a majority for Communists in democratic state institutions. p. 204

[237] This speech was delivered at a meeting of thousands of people on Uritsky Square (formerly Palace Square) on the evening of July 19, after the termination of the first sitting of the Second Congress of the Communist International. p. 204

[238] This refers to Maxim Gorky's article "Vladimir Ilyich Lenin" published as an editorial in the journal *The Communist International* No. 12, 1920, and Gorky's letter to H. G. Wells published in the same issue.

Both the article and the letter, though inspired by genuine affection for Lenin and admiration for his activities, were written from erroneous positions of the personality cult and contained a number of politically harmful theses. Gorky gave extremely subjective and virtually idealist appraisals of the role of Lenin and the Russian people, and the nature of the revolution in Russia. He overlooked the leading role of the Communist Party, the decisive role of the working class and the peasantry in the revolution.

Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on July 31, 1920.

The Communist International, organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, was published in Russian, German, French, English, Spanish and Chinese. The first issue appeared on May 1, 1919.

The journal published theoretical articles and documents of the Comintern and a number of articles by Lenin ("The Third International and Its Place in History", "The Tasks of the Third International", "Ramsay MacDonald on the Third International", "Greetings to Italian, French and German Communists", "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", "Notes of a Publicist" and others). All member Parties of the Comintern were represented on the journal's editorial board. The journal dealt with the fundamental questions of Marxist-Leninist theory bearing on the problems of the international labour and communist movements and the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. It also waged a struggle against various anti-Leninist tendencies. Publication ceased in June 1943 following the decision by the Presidium of the Comintern's Executive on May 15, 1943, dissolving the Communist International. p. 205

[239] The situation on the Polish and Wrangel fronts was discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau on August 19, 1920. The Wrangel front was found to be the main front, and the Politbureau outlined a number of measures aimed at strengthening it, specifically, it passed a decision to transfer the 6th Division of the First Mounted Army to the Wrangel front.

On August 20, 1920 the Commander-in-Chief forwarded a memorandum to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic objecting to this transfer on the grounds that the 6th Division formed the core of the First Mounted Army and in quality was equal to the three remaining divisions. The memorandum bears J. V. Stalin's superscription: "This information is *incorrect*: the remaining three divisions have *no less than* 10,000 sabres, and the 4th Cavalry Division remaining in the Mounted Army is older and more indigenous than the 6th".

On reading this memorandum Lenin wrote his proposals. Lenin made the following notes, apparently during the discussion of these proposals: under points 1 and 2 "Krestinsky against", under point 4 "Krestinsky abstained", and under point 5 "Krestinsky is *for*". The numeration of the points has been retained as given in the manuscript. p. 205

[240] This refers to Order No. 1847 dated August 20, 1920, of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, which stated that the Polish peace delegation consisted entirely of spies and secret service agents and that peace could only be concluded "on the ruins of White Poland". p. 206

[241] On August 23, 1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic rescinded the order of the R.M.C. of the Western Front and reprimanded the latter for their irregular action. Simultaneously K. Danishevsky, head of the Soviet delegation conducting negotiations with Poland, was directed, in the event of the Polish delegation not feeling satisfied with the explanation already given to the delegation at its meeting, to bring to the notice of this delegation the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic countermanding that of the R.M.C. of the Western Front. p. 206

[242] *The Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* held in Moscow from September 22 to 25, 1920, was attended by 241 delegates (116 of them voting delegates and 125 with a consultative voice) representing 700,000 Party members. There were delegates from the gubernia organisations of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine, from the C.C. of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Red Army was represented by 34 delegates. The agenda consisted of the following items: 1) Report by the delegate from the Polish Communists; 2) Political report of the C.C.; 3) Organisational report of the C.C.; 4) The immediate tasks of Party development; 5) Report of the Party History Studies Committee; 6) Report on the Second Congress of the Communist International.

Lenin opened the conference with the Central Committee's political report (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 275-79), which dealt mainly with two questions—that of concluding peace with Poland and organising Wrangel's defeat.

Lenin's report was followed by heated debates, especially on the causes of the Soviet troops' setback near Warsaw. Winding up the debate, Lenin pointed out that the speeches of the delegates provided rich material for drawing necessary lessons and deductions. The conference unanimously passed a resolution on the terms of peace with Poland, and approved the statement by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee concerning the specific peace terms drawn up under Lenin's direction and edited by him (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 123-26).

A highlight of the Ninth Conference was the discussion of the question of the immediate tasks of Party development. The

anti-Party group of "Democratic Centralism" put forward T. V. Sapronov as co-reporter to air their views on this question. They came out against Party discipline and the Party's guiding role in the Soviets and the trade unions. The conference, like the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), strongly rebuffed the "Democratic Centralism" group.

The conference adopted a resolution on "The Immediate Tasks of Party Development" drafted and moved by Lenin (see pp. 212-13 of this volume), who also wrote the "Proposals for the Resolution on the Immediate Tasks of Party Development" (see p. 214 of this volume). The conference called attention to the need for drawing the rank-and-file Communists into wider active participation in the work of gubernia conferences and Gubernia Party Committee plenums. Measures were outlined for eliminating red tape in the work of Government and economic bodies. To combat various abuses and examine complaints received from Communists, the conference deemed it necessary to set up a Control Commission, and under the gubernia committees—special Party commissions.

On the C.C.'s organisational report the conference adopted a resolution to step up the work of the C.C.'s Secretariat with a view to achieving greater familiarity with local activities and a pooling of experience, and to pay more attention to the work of the Agitation and Propaganda Department; it also urged the necessity of improving the C.C.'s direct guidance of the organisational work of the Red Army and Navy Party organisations and not allowing the work of these organisations to become detached from public life. p. 207

[243] Lenin is referring to the demagogic statement by A. M. Kollontai alleging persecution for criticism. She said that criticisers were sometimes offered to go "to nice torrid climes to eat peaches". p. 209

[244] Lenin's proposals concerning the composition of the Control Commission were, with certain amendments, incorporated In the resolution of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Development" (see *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts.K.* [The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, Part I, 1954, pp. 506-12).

The last paragraph from the words "As regards transference" was crossed out by Lenin and omitted from the resolution. p. 214

[245] *P.P.S.—Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* (The Polish Socialist Party)—a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. Throughout the party's history Left-wing groups kept springing up within it as a result of pressure from the rank-and-file workers. Some of these groups eventually joined the revolutionary wing of the Polish working-class movement.

In 1906 the party split up into the P.P.S. Left wing and the Right, chauvinist wing (the so-called "revolutionary faction").

Under the influence of the Bolshevik Party and the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Left wing gradually adopted a consistent revolutionary stand.

During the First World War a large part of the P.P.S. Left wing adopted an internationalist stand. In December 1918 it united with the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania to form the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (as the Communist Party of Poland was known up to 1925).

During the First World War the P.P.S. Right wing continued the policy of national chauvinism, organising Polish legions on the territory of Galicia to fight on the side of Austro-German imperialism. With the formation of the Polish bourgeois state the Right P.P.S. in 1919 united with the P.P.S. organisations on Polish territories formerly seized by Germany and Austria, and resumed the name of the P.P.S. On becoming the ruling party, it helped transfer power to the Polish bourgeoisie, systematically carried on anti-communist propaganda, and supported a policy of aggression against the Soviet Union, a policy of conquest and oppression against Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. Various groups in the P.P.S. who disagreed with this policy joined the Communist Party of Poland.

After Pilsudski's fascist coup (May 1926) the P.P.S. was nominally a parliamentary opposition, but actually it carried on no active fight against the fascist regime, and continued its anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. During that period the Left-wing elements of the P.P.S. collaborated with the Polish Communists and supported united front tactics in a number of campaigns.

During the Second World War the P.P.S. again split up. Its reactionary and chauvinist faction, which assumed the name *Wolność*, *Równość*, *Niepodległość* (Liberty, Equality, Independence), joined the reactionary Polish émigré "government" in London. The Left faction, which called itself the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists, under the influence of the Polish Workers' Party, which was founded in 1942, joined the popular front against the Nazi invaders, fought for Poland's liberation, and pursued a policy of friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

In 1944, after the liberation of Poland's eastern territories and the formation of a Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists resumed the name of P.P.S. and together with the P.W.P. participated in the building up of a people's democratic Poland. In December 1948 the P.W.P and the P.P.S. amalgamated and formed the Polish United Workers' Party. p. 215

[246] Lenin wrote this at a meeting of the Politbureau on October 9, 1920, when the question of drafting a resolution for the Proletcult congress was discussed. Lenin's rough draft contains the main theses of his draft resolution on proletarian culture written on the eve, October 8 (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 316-17).

Proletcult (Proletarian Culture)—a cultural and educational organisation which arose in September 1917 as an independent workers' organisation. Proletcult continued to uphold its "independence" after the October Revolution, thus setting itself in opposition to the proletarian state. It shunned the leadership of the Communist Party and insisted on keeping its bodies independent from the Soviet authorities, notably the People's Commissariat for Education. Its members virtually denied the cultural legacy of the past, shirked the tasks of cultural and educational work among the masses, and, by isolating themselves from life, aimed at creating a special "proletarian culture" by "laboratory methods". Bogdanov, Proletcult's chief ideologist, paid lip-service to Marxism, but actually expounded subjective idealism, Machism. Proletcult had a mixed membership. In addition to bourgeois intellectuals, who held leading positions in many of its organisations, the membership included young workers who sincerely wished to promote cultural progress in the Soviet state.

The Communist Party came out strongly against the separatist tendencies of Proletcult. In October 1920 Lenin raised the question of Proletcult before the Politbureau of the Central Committee. Following the latter's decision based on Lenin's draft, the Chief Committee for Political Education drafted instructions governing the relations between Proletcult and the Commissariat for Education. These instructions were endorsed by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee on November 10, 1920.

In 1932 Proletcult ceased to exist. p. 217

[247] Lenin's draft, with amendments, was adopted by the Politbureau at its meeting on October 14, 1920. p. 218

[248] *The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East* (the First Congress of the Peoples of the East) was held in Baku between September 1 and 7, 1920. It was attended by 1,891 delegates representing 37 nationalities (of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Korea, Syria, Turkey and other countries). Two-thirds of the delegates (1,273) were Communists.

The congress discussed the following questions: 1) The international situation and the tasks of the working peoples of the East; 2) the national and colonial question; 3) the agrarian question; 4) the Soviets in the East; 5) the organisational question and others. Four sections were formed to prepare the material for the congress: the agrarian, the national and colonial, the Soviet activities, and the organisational sections.

The congress supported the decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International and drew up a number of resolutions based on these decisions. To implement these decisions the congress organised a Council of Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East as a permanent body under the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Speaking of the Second Congress of the Communist International and the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, Lenin pointed out: "These were international congresses which united the Communists and showed that in all civilised countries and in all the backward countries of the East, the banner of Bolshevism, the programme of Bolshevism, the line of Bolshevik action are an emblem of salvation, an emblem of struggle to the workers of all civilised countries and the peasants of all the backward colonial countries. They showed that, during the past three years, Soviet Russia not only beat off those who fell upon her in order to throttle her, but won the sympathy of the working people of the whole world..." (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 329-30). p. 218

[249] Lenin's draft decision on the question of restoring the Baltic Fleet was adopted at a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence on October 23, 1920. p. 220

[250] The question of work and food rations for Soviet office employees was discussed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on October 23, 1920. Lenin's proposals were incorporated *in toto* in the decision adopted on this matter. The C.P.C. directed the commission set up for this purpose to make its report on October 26, 1920. p. 220

[251] The draft decision with amendments was adopted at a meeting of the Politbureau of the C.C. on October 26, 1920, devoted to the question of "Inner-Party Moods". p. 221

[252] The statement concerning the Control Commission set up in accordance with the decision of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) was published on October 28, 1920, on the front page of *Pravda*. p. 221

[253] This document is part of a decision of the C.P.C. adopted on October 26, 1920, following a discussion of the question of establishing contacts between the economic commissariats.

This question was raised in April 1920 at the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), whose corresponding resolution read: "The Congress directs the C.C. to devise in the immediate future a system of organisational connections between the Supreme Economic Council and other commissariats directly engaged in economic affairs (the commissariats for food, railways, and agriculture) in their everyday work with the aim of securing complete unity in the fulfilment of the economic plan approved by the Congress of the Party" (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 490). In pursuance of the congress decision, Lenin, at the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on October 26, 1920, made a report "On

Unifying the Work of the Economic Commissariats in Framing an Integrated Economic Plan" and tabled his draft resolution. p. 222

[254] This trio was appointed by the Council of People's Commissars on October 26, 1920, to collect information regarding the inter-departmental commissions. p. 222

[255] Lenin's draft was incorporated *in toto* in the decision on the Chief Committee for Political Education which was adopted at the meeting of the Politbureau on October 28, 1920.

The *Chief Committee for Political Education* was established under the People's Commissariat for Education by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars signed by Lenin on November 12, 1920. Administratively and organisationally part of the Commissariat for Education, it was subordinated directly to the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) on matters dealing with the ideological content of its work. The C.C.P.E. was in charge of all activities in the field of political education, agitation and propaganda, directed the mass communist education of adults (the anti-illiteracy movement, schools, clubs, libraries and village reading-rooms) and also Party education (the communist universities and Party schools). Until reorganised (in June 1930) into the Mass Work Sector of the People's Commissariat for Education, the C.C.P.E. was headed by N. K. Krupskaya. p. 223

[256] This refers to the resolution of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee "On Measures for Stepping Up the Activities of the People's Commissariat for Education". It was published in *Izvestia* No. 226 for October 10, 1920. p. 223

[257] At the plenary meeting of the C.C. on November 9, 1920, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky was instructed to prepare for the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets a report "On the Electrification of Russia". At the Congress of Soviets held in Moscow from December 22 to 29, 1920, this report, on the proposal of the presiding committee, was included in the agenda of the congress. p. 224

[258] Lenin's draft was adopted by the C.C. plenum on November 10, 1920, practically without amendments. p. 226

[259] See Note 255. p. 226

[260] This draft was adopted by the plenum of the C.C. at its evening session, November 10, 1920, on the report of Comrade Artyom (F. A. Sergeyev) "On Enlisting the Co-operation of Legien Unions to Control Execution of Our Orders". p. 227

[261] In the interests of the country's speedy economic rehabilitation and in order to establish peaceful business relations with the capitalist countries the Soviet Government considered it possible to grant concessions to foreign companies. On October 30, 1920,

the Council of People's Commissars set up a special commission to draft a decree on concessions. In a note to Kalinin dated November 12 Lenin wrote his remarks concerning the submitted draft (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 52, Document 11). On November 16 the draft decree on concessions submitted by the commission was examined at a meeting of the C.P.C. In this connection Lenin wrote this draft decision, which was adopted by the Council. p. 227

[262] The Decree on Concessions was endorsed by the C.P.C. on November 23, 1920. Shortly afterwards a booklet appeared entitled *O kontsessiyakh. Dekret S.N.K. ot 23 noyabrya 1920 g. Tekst dekreta. Obyekty kontsessii. Karty. (On Concessions. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 23, 1920. Text of the Decree. Concession Objects. Maps.)* The decree, maps of the concessions and articles by leading Soviet specialists were published in the journal *Russische Korrespondenz* No. 1-2.

For concessions see also present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 438-59 and 463-86. p. 227

[263] This draft, with slight amendments, was adopted at the meeting of the Politbureau on November 27, 1920. p. 228

[264] This refers to the Council of Labour and Defence.

The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was reorganised at the beginning of April 1920 and renamed the Council of Labour and Defence. Under a decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1920 the Council began to operate as a C.P.C. commission responsible for co-ordinating the work of all economic departments. It was abolished in 1937. p. 228

[265] The *Committees of Poor Peasants* came into being in the Azerbaijan countryside after the proclamation of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The decision calling for their organisation was adopted by the Politbureau of the C.C. of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in August 1920. p. 228

[266] S.C.T.—Supreme Council for Transport. p. 228

[267] On November 27, 1920, the Politbureau examined Zinoviev's theses of a report "On Improving the Activities of the Soviet Local and Central Authorities and on Combating Bureaucratism" for the forthcoming Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The Politbureau endorsed Lenin's draft and set up a commission which was authorised to revise the theses. These, in their final wording, were published on December 14, 1920, in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. p. 229

[268] L. B. Krasin headed the Soviet delegation sent to negotiate a trade agreement with the British Government. p. 229

[269] *Councils of Action* were set up in August 1920 by the British workers to prevent Britain making war on Soviet Russia. The Communist Party of Great Britain was largely instrumental in getting these councils organised. The councils campaigned for Britain's recognition of Soviet Russia and the establishment of normal relations between the two countries.

The Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) adopted Lenin's motion.

See also pp. 232-33 of this volume. p. 229

[270] Lenin's draft was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on November 30, 1920. p. 230

[271] *The Economic Commission* for co-ordinating the work of all the economic commissariats under the chairmanship of Lenin was set up on November 26, 1920. The commission drafted a plan for the reorganisation of the Council of Labour and Defence with a view to focussing its work on problems of economic development.

The document published here formed the basis of the Draft Decision on the Council of Labour and Defence submitted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to the Eighth Congress of Soviets and endorsed by the congress on December 29, 1920. p. 230

[272] This draft was adopted at a meeting of the Politbureau on December 4, 1920. See also *Collected Works*, Vol. 52, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Document 22. p. 232

[273] This refers to the Memorandum dated June 29, 1920, which the Soviet Government sent to the British Government (see *Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR* [U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy Documents], Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 593-98). p. 232

[274] The last sentence in the manuscript is crossed out.

With reference to negotiations with Britain for the conclusion of a trade agreement see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 492-93. p. 232

[275] Lenin has in view the booklet *On Concessions. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 23, 1920. Text of the Decree. Concession Objects. Maps.* Moscow, 1920. p. 233

[276] The question of reorganising the work of the People's Commissariat for Education was raised by Lenin in November 1920 (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 42, p. 376). This reorganisation was necessitated by the fact that the activities and structure of the Commissariat did not meet the new tasks in the field of public education arising from the transition to peaceful socialist construction. In his letter to Lunacharsky dated November 29, 1920 Lenin set forth his preliminary views on this question (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition,

Vol. 52, Document 37). Lenin's motion calling for the reorganisation of the Commissariat for Education was adopted by the C.C. plenum on December 8, 1920, with the addition of Point 2, which reads: "The work of the People's Commissariat for Education in the sphere of organisation and administrative management on a wide national scale as well as within the apparatus of the Commissariat itself is to be directed by the People's Commissar only through his assistant." p. 237

[277] On January 26, 1921, the C.C. plenum set up a commission headed by Lenin to work out a scheme for the general reorganisation of the Commissariat for Education. On January 28, in a letter to the members of the Board of the Commissariat for Education Lenin asked for urgent information concerning all types of schools together with the text of existing laws governing them (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 52, Document 99). On Lenin's proposal the Politbureau of the C.C. on February 2 authorised the commission to issue directives to the Board of the Commissariat for Education in the name of the C.C. of the Party. On February 5 *Pravda* (No. 25) published "Instructions of the Central Committee to Communists Working in the People's Commissariat for Education" signed by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 120-22).

On February 11 the Council of People's Commissars endorsed the Regulations on the People's Commissariat for Education drawn up by members of the commission and signed by Lenin. They were published in *Izvestia* No. 33 for February 15, and in the course of 1921 served as a basis for the reorganisation of the Commissariat for Education. p. 238

[278] This document formed Point 1 of the Decision On Production Propaganda adopted by the plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on December 8, 1920.

See also Lenin's "Theses on Production Propaganda" (Vol. 31, of this edition, pp. 404-06). p. 238

[279] These addenda were included in the text of the decision on the question of setting up a special production organ of the press adopted by the plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on December 20, 1920. p. 238

[280] *The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Red Army and Cossack Deputies* was held in Moscow from December 22 to 29, 1920. There was a record attendance of 2,537 delegates, of whom 1,728 had a vote and 809 a consultative voice. Of the total number of delegates 91.7 per cent were Communists, 2.7 per cent sympathisers, 3.9 per cent non-Party people, 0.3 per cent Mensheviks, 0.3 per cent Bundists, 0.15 per cent Left S.R.s, 0.15 per cent anarchists, and 0.8 per cent from other parties. The questions on the agenda were: Report on the Work of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's

Commissars; Electrification of Russia; Rehabilitation of Industry and Transport; Development of Agricultural Production and Assistance to Peasant Farming; Improving the Work of Soviet Agencies and Combating Bureaucratism. The principal questions on the agenda were discussed beforehand at meetings of the R.C.P. group. The congress set up three sections, on industry, agriculture and state organisation, to thrash out these problems.

At the Plenary sessions of the congress Lenin delivered a report on December 22 on the work of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, and a speech on December 23 winding up the debate on this question. He also took the floor six times at meetings of the Communist group of the congress (December 21, 22, 24 and 27) on the question of concessions and during the debate of the bill on measures to strengthen and develop peasant farming. See also present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 463-534. p. 239

[281] By a decision of the plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) dated December 8, 1920, the Tenth Congress of the Party was to be convened in February 1921. In January, at the request of local organisations, the C.C. decided to postpone the convocation of the Congress till March. p. 241

[282] *Sukharevka*—a market-place in Moscow. During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war it was a centre and symbol of black marketeering. It was closed down in 1932. p. 247

[283] Lenin is referring to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on Concessions dated November 23, 1920. It was published in *Izvestia* No. 265 (1112) on November 25, 1920. p. 249

[284] *Curzon's Note* was a result of the successes of the Red Army, which had ousted the White Polish invaders from the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the summer of 1920. To hold up the advance of the Red Army and prevent a possible collapse of bourgeois Poland and defeat of Wrangel, the British Government sent a Note to Soviet Russia on July 11, 1920, signed by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon. The Note in the form of an ultimatum demanded that the advance of the Red Army be stopped, that an armistice be concluded with Poland, and that the war with Wrangel should be terminated. The British Government offered to act as mediator and on behalf of the Allies' Supreme Council threatened, in the event of the ultimatum being rejected, to assist Poland "with all the means at its disposal".

In its reply, based on Lenin's proposals, the Soviet Government firmly rejected Curzon's mediation and insisted on direct negotiations with Poland. The Soviet Government protested against Britain's attempt to annex the Crimea and agreed to guarantee the personal safety of Wrangel and his troops only on condition that they surrender immediately and completely. p. 250

[285] This refers to the booklet *Yediny khozyaistvenny plan i yediny khozyaistvenny apparat* (An Integrated Economic Plan and an Integrated Economic Apparatus) by S. I. Gusev, published in 1920 with a view to the forthcoming Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 250

[286] This figure gives the number of employees in all administrative, economic and cultural institutions, which were then run by the Moscow Soviet. p. 251

[287] Lenin is referring to Gusev's booklet *Ocheredniye voprosy khozyaistvennogo stroitelstva* (Immediate Problems of Economic Development. (*On C.C., R.C.P. Theses.*) *Materials for the Ninth Party Congress* published in 1920. p. 252

[288] This refers to the Far-Eastern Republic. See Note 217.

In the autumn of 1920 Washington Vanderlip, representing the U.S. Vanderlip Syndicate, conducted negotiations in Moscow for a concession on fishing and the prospecting and extraction of oil and coal in Kamchatka and other parts of Siberia east of the 160th meridian. At the end of October an agreement was drafted under which the Syndicate was to receive a concession for a term of sixty years. On the expiry of 35 years the Soviet Government was entitled to buy out all concession enterprises, and on the expiry of the agreed term the enterprises with their equipment in full running order were to be made over without compensation to the R.S.F.S.R. The Syndicate, however, did not receive the support of the U.S. Administration and financial tycoons and the agreement was never signed. p. 255

[289] Lenin apparently has in mind the following section of the Programme of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks): "In all its work in the countryside the R.C.P. continues to rely on the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements, organises them first of all into an independent force by creating Party cells in the countryside, organisations of the poor peasants, a special type of trade unions with a membership of rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, and so on, bringing them as close together as possible to the urban proletariat and tearing them away from under the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and petty proprietary interests" (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I 1954, p. 425). p. 256

[290] The full name is Vserabotzemles, standing for Farm and Forest Workers' Trade Union. p. 256

[291] Lenin is referring to the section of the Bolshevik Party Programme which says: "The participation of the trade unions in running the economy and drawing the broad masses into this activity is at the same time a chief means of struggle against the

bureaucratisation of the economic apparatus of Soviet power and makes for a truly popular control over the results of production" (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 422). p. 257

[292] During the discussion of the draft resolution of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets "On Measures to Consolidate and Develop Peasant Farming" the Communist group at the congress declared for the elimination of the points concerning personal premiums for individual farmers. On December 27, 1920, the C.C. at a plenary meeting, examined this question, pointed out that the congress group had adopted an erroneous decision and suggested that it be revised. The plenum adopted Lenin's motion defining the conditions and principles for rewarding individual farmers (see pp. 266-67 of this volume). The plenum authorised Lenin to deliver a report on this question before the congress group. After Lenin's speech the group withdrew its former decision. p. 257

[293] The *Order of the Red Banner* was instituted by a decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets as an award to groups of working people and individual citizens who displayed conspicuous devotion, initiative, industry and self-discipline in tackling economic problems. p. 261

[294] The person referred to was Yeryomin, a delegate to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 262

[295] Lenin's speech at the congress group meeting (see pp. 257-61 of this volume) was followed by debates, in which Red Armyman Yeryomin, a middle peasant, tried to prove that the kulaks would be able all the same to take the poor peasants' farming implements and horses away from them. He cited an example of Kozlov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, where the starving peasant poor were compelled to sell their horses to the kulaks for five poods of grain. p. 263

[296] See *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 468. p. 266

[297] The points concerning premiums for individual farmers were adopted by the C.C. plenum on November 27, 1920, and were incorporated in the resolution of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets "On Measures to Consolidate and Develop Peasant Farming". p. 267

[298] This refers to what is known as the Federal Commission headed by L. B. Kamenev. The commission was engaged in preparing questions involving state relations among the Soviet Republics. p. 267

[299] These proposals were written on Chicherin's letter to the Politbureau dated December 30, 1920. Chicherin reported that A. G. Chervyakov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Byelorussia, pointed out the extremely abnormal situation that existed as a result of the unsettled state relations between Byelorussia and the R.S.F.S.R., which made co-operation between the Republics difficult. Chicherin expressed the opinion that an agreement should be concluded with Byelorussia similar to that concluded with the Ukraine.

The question of an agreement on alliance between Soviet Byelorussia and the R.S.F.S.R. was raised by the Byelorussian Party and administrative bodies in the autumn of 1920. Following the negotiations at the end of December 1920 and the beginning of January 1921, an agreement on workers' and peasants' alliance between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Byelorussia was signed on January 16, and endorsed by the Central Executive Committee of Byelorussia on January 21, 1921. p. 267

[300] Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on January 4, 1921. p. 268

[301] At the Second Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Eighth Convocation (March 19-20, 1921) the question of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture was not discussed. The session dealt with the question of regulations governing the people's commissariats. In the decision on this question the ultimate date was fixed for submitting to the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. for approval regulations governing the people's commissariats and their agencies. p. 268

[302] On January 26, 1921, the C.C. plenum examined the question of Georgia (this question stood third on the agenda, hence Lenin's heading "To Point 3"). The discussion of this question followed hostile acts against the Soviet Republic by the Menshevik Government of Georgia. In violation of her agreement with the R.S.F.S.R. of May 7, 1920, Georgia put a ban on the transit of goods from the R.S.F.S.R. through her territory, among them food supplies for the famine-stricken population of Armenia. She refused to return the R.S.F.S.R. the more valuable of the Russian ships formerly held by Wrangel, which put in at Georgian ports after his defeat. She took repressive measures against members of the Russian embassy staff, insulted the national flag of the R.S.F.S.R. and provoked and encouraged counter-revolutionary acts against the Soviet authorities in the Northern Caucasus. In connection with these violations of the agreement representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. lodged repeated official protests, but the Georgian Government ignored them. p. 268

[303] Lenin's draft was incorporated without amendment in the resolution of the plenum, where it figures as Point "a". Point "b" read: "The Caucasian Front to be directed to examine the question

of any real guarantees (a control commission, etc.) that we could demand from the Georgian Government through diplomatic channels as a safeguard against assistance being given by Georgia to insurgents in Daghestan and Chechen" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 269

[304] *Tsektran*—Central Committee of the Joint Trade Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers.

On January 26, 1921, thirteen members of Tsektran wrote to the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) asking to be relieved of their duties as members of the Union's Central Committee. One of the reasons given was that criticism of Tsektran's methods of work during the trade union controversy allegedly created an impression among railwaymen and water transport workers that the Central Committee of the Party censured the whole past and present activities of Tsektran. The signatories described criticism of the work of Tsektran as persecution on the part of a group of water transport workers as well as of some members of the Party's C.C. and of the Presidium of the A.C.C.T.U.

Lenin's motion in connection with the letter was adopted by the Politbureau on January 31. p. 269

[305] This refers to the negotiations with Royal Dutch for granting it the right to export oil products from Baku and Grozny districts.

On the question of oil concessions the C.P.C. adopted a decision on February 1, 1921, the first two points of which were formulated on the basis of Lenin's proposals: "a) Approve in principle the granting of oil concessions in Grozny and Baku and other operative oilfields and start and speed up negotiations. b) The Supreme Economic Council to be directed to send a highly competent commission of first-class oil-industry experts to Baku and Grozny to investigate the question of ensuring oil extraction and ascertaining the causes of a possible disaster under present methods of exploitation. The S.E.C. is to present a list of commission members to the C.P.C. for endorsement" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

For further information on concessions see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 134-36; pp. 277-80 of this volume; and *Collected Works*, Vol. 52, Fifth Russian Edition, Documents 83 and 90. p. 269

[306] This draft was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars at its meeting on February 1, 1921. p. 270

[307] On February 9, 1921, the Council of Labour and Defence heard the report of V. A. Avanesov on the fuel situation and set up a commission (F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. A. Andreyev, D. I. Kursky, A. I. Rykov and V. V. Fomin) with instructions to submit a draft decision at the next meeting of the C.L.D. On February 11 Dzerzhinsky submitted a draft decision to the C.L.D., which was

endorsed with amendments and addenda proposed by Lenin. The members of the interim commission mentioned in Lenin's text were Avanesov, Bergauz, Krylenko, Lomov and Messing.
p. 270

[308] Lenin's draft was incorporated completely in the decision of the C.P.C. passed on February 15, 1921, in connection with the report of the Import Plan Revision Commission (points "2" and "3"). p. 271

[309] The Trotskyists and other oppositionists came out against the GOELRO (the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia) being transformed into a General Planning Commission. At the meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence on February 18 no decision on setting up such a commission was passed. A shorthand record of the meeting was not kept. Only Lenin's brief notes of the debate and his notes for a winding-up speech have come down to us (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 20-22). Judging by these notes and the article "Integrated Economic Plan" (see Vol. 32 of this edition, pp. 137-45) the speakers against a planning commission were Y. Larin, V. P. Milyutin, N. Osinsky and A. I. Rykov. This question was referred to the Council of People's Commissars.

The present draft written by Lenin was incorporated completely in the "Regulations on the State Planning Commission" which were endorsed by the C.P.C. on February 22, 1921, together with a list of commission members drawn up by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p 24). The State Planning Commission was set up on the basis of the GOELRO and headed by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky. p. 271

[310] The meeting of Party activists was called by the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) at an extremely difficult period, when economic dislocation in the country was at its worst.

The purpose of the meeting was to inform the Party activists of the measures taken to improve the supply of Moscow's working people. The meeting decided to have a report on Soviet Russia's international and domestic situation included in the agenda of the plenary session of the Moscow Soviet. p. 272

[311] This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt of the Dashnaks in Armenia, which started on February 13, 1921. The Dashnaks received aid in arms and money from the imperialist Governments of Britain, the U.S.A., France, Menshevik Georgia and Turkey. They established a regime of terror and tyranny in the areas which they had seized, burning and razing to the ground villages and towns. The working people of Armenia under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and with the support of units of the 11th Army of Soviet troops quelled the revolt, liberated the capital of Armenia, Yerevan, on April 4, 1921 and drove out the Dashnaks. p. 273

[312] I. N. Smirnov was the Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee. p. 274

[313] This refers to Point 9 of the resolution of the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) "On the Immediate Tasks of Party Organisation" (see *The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 509). p. 274

[314] See present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 408-26. p. 274

[315] The mobilisation of raw material resources was one of the main targets of the Soviet Republic's economic policy in connection with the plan for rehabilitating industry. This question was discussed on February 18, 1921, at a meeting of the C.P.C.'s Economic Commission chaired by Lenin. The commission set up a special body which was to have dealt in detail with the question of collecting raw materials. The notes published here were apparently made by Lenin during a meeting of the Raw Materials Commission on February 26, 1921.

The question of raw material was further discussed at the C.P.C. on March 1, 1921, and at a meeting of a special parity commission of the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat for Food. The draft decision concerning the collection of raw materials was endorsed by the C.P.C. on April 7, 1921. p. 275

[316] The decision of the C.L.D. for improving the supply of the workers was published in *Pravda* No. 45 on March 1, 1921. p. 277

[317] The main part of this document (from the words "will not want to work..." to the end) is in the form of notes made during a discussion of oil concessions, probably at a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on February 24, 1921. Lenin later rearranged the notes, numbered them (points 3-14) and used the free upper margin for a preliminary plan of his letter (points 1-14). Lenin's letter written according to this plan is not in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. The chief questions outlined in the plan were dealt with in Lenin's letter to A. P. Serebrovsky, Chairman of Azneftekom, Baku, dated April 2, 1921 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 52, Fifth Russian Edition, Document 219).

Lower down the page mention is made of the decision of the C.P.C. on oil concessions passed on February 1, 1921. The Council adopted Lenin's draft and approved in principle the granting of concessions on certain oil districts of Baku and Grozny and other oilfields. For oil concessions see also *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 334-36, and Vol. 52, Documents 143 and 205). p. 277

[318] Lenin here quotes from Krylov's fable "Musicians". In this fable a landowner boasts of his serf choir to his neighbour. The singers

had neither ear nor voice, but the landowner did not think this mattered, as the thing he most appreciated in people was sobriety and good behaviour. p. 278

[319] This addendum was included in the decision of the C.P.C. on March 4, 1921, "On the Establishment of an Obligatory General Science Minimum at All Higher Schools in the R.S.F.S.R." p. 281

[320] *The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)* was held in Moscow on March 8-16, 1921. It was attended, according to the report of the Mandate Commission, by 694 voting delegates and 296 delegates with a voice but no vote, representing 732,521 Party membes. The items on the agenda were: 1) Report of the Central Committee; 2) Report of the Control Commission; 3) The trade unions and their role in the country's economic life; 4) The Socialist Republic in a capitalist encirclement, foreign trade, concessions, etc.; 5) Food supply, the surplus-appropriation system, the tax in kind and the fuel crisis; 6) Questions of Party organisation; 7) The Party's current tasks in the national question; 8) Reorganisation of the army and the militia question; 9) The Chief Committee for Political Education and the Party's propaganda and agitation work; 10) Report of the R.C.P.'s representative in the Comintern and its current tasks; 11) Report of the R.C.P.'s representative in the International Trade Union Council; 12) Elections to the Central Committee, the Control Commission and the Auditing Commission

The congress passed decisions on cardinal issues pertaining to the country's political and economic life. The work of the congress was guided by Lenin, who delivered the opening and closing speeches and made reports on the political activities of the C.C., the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus-grain appropriation system, Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, the trade unions, and the fuel question. Lenin drafted the major resolutions for the congress. See also present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 165-271. p. 281

[321] The meeting of the supporters of the "Platform of Ten" referred to here apparently took place on the eve of the congress or early in its proceedings—on March 8 or 9, 1921. p. 281

[322] This point was elaborated by Lenin in Point 7 of his preliminary draft resolution on Party unity adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 241-44). p. 282

[323] The amendment of Rafail (R. B. Farbman) to Point 4 of the resolution on Party unity proposed adding that moot points "be discussed at general meetings and in the press". The amendment was rejected. p. 282

[324] A. S. Kiselyov came out against Point 7 of the resolution on Party unity, in which the Central Committee was authorised to

resort to the extreme measure of expulsion from the Party in the case of C.C. members guilty of factional activities. In his speech Kiselyov stated that Lenin, in describing the significance of this point, had used the expression "mounting machine-guns". p. 283

[325] The amendment of K. I. Marchenko applied to Point 6 of the resolution "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party" (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 248). Marchenko proposed to include in the resolution that discussion publications be issued only by the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) or by the Regional Bureaux of the C.C. The amendment was rejected. p. 283

[326] Lenin's motion was adopted at the meeting of the Politbureau on March 16, 1921. p. 284

[327] This draft decision was endorsed by the Politbureau on March 19, 1921. p. 284

[328] The meeting of the Communist group of the A.C.C.T.U. discussed the question of concessions and the condition of the workers at the concession enterprises. The meeting was called because some trade union functionaries vacillated on this subject, while A. G. Shlyapnikov and D. B. Ryazanov carried on demagogic propaganda against the idea of concessions.

Lenin made a report on this issue (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 300-15), argued against Shlyapnikov's and Ryazanov's statements in the debate, and made notes of the debate, which he used in his reply to the debate. p. 285

[329] This refers to the decision on "The Basic Principles of Concessions Agreements" passed by the C.P.C. on March 29, 1921, on the basis of Lenin's draft. This decision was read out by Lenin in his report on concessions made at a meeting of the Communist group of the A.C.C.T.U. (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 302-13). In saying that the C.P.C. passed its decision "in spite of the motion by two very prominent trade unionists", Lenin apparently had in view M. P. Tomsky and A. Z. Holtzmann. p. 286

[330] Lenin is referring to the draft of a concession agreement with the AB Svenska Kullager Fabriken in Göteborg (AB SKF). The agreement was signed in April 1923. p. 287

[331] This refers to the agreement signed at Kutaisi between the Georgian Revolutionary Committee and representatives of the Georgian Menshevik Government following negotiations held on March 17 and 18, 1921. p. 288

[332] Lenin is referring to the trade agreement between Soviet Russia and Britain signed on March 16, 1921. p. 289

[333] This refers to the leaders of the Amsterdam International of Trade Unions—the centre of the international association of

reformist trade unions (founded at the congress in Amsterdam called in July 1919; existed up to December 1945). p. 290

[334] *Vperyod* (Forward)—a Menshevik daily, launched in March 1917 in Moscow as the organ of the Moscow organisation of the Mensheviks, and subsequently as the organ of the R.S.D.L.P. (Menshevik) committees of the Moscow organisation and the Central Region. On April 2, 1918, it became the organ also of the Mensheviks' Central Committee. On May 10, 1918, by an order of the Vecheka the newspaper was closed down owing to its counter-revolutionary activities, and the men in charge were prosecuted. The newspaper resumed publication on May 14 under the name *Vsegda Vperyod!* (Ever Forward!) The paper was closed own for good in February 1919 by decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. p. 290

[335] Lenin is referring to the International Council of Trade Unions organised in July 1920 on the initiative of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions to serve as the centre of the world revolutionary trade union movement. At the first international congress of trade unions held in July 1921 it was renamed the Red International of Trade Unions (the Profintern). p. 293

[336] This draft, with certain corrections in the wording, was adopted by the C.P.C. on April 12, 1921. This question was referred to the State Planning Commission for detailed examination, in which connection Lenin wrote two letters to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky (see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 486-88). p. 297

[337] *Algemba*—Russian abbreviated name of the Alexandrov-Gai—Emba branch line and oil pipeline construction project, which was to connect the Emba oilfields with the Urals and Saratov. This draft decision was endorsed by the C.L.D. on April 15, 1921. On April 29 the C.L.D. passed a decision suspending construction of the pipeline in view of the fact that its remoteness entailed heavy expenditure on the delivery of materials, machinery and food, and on May 6 decided to switch the Alexandrov-Gai—Emba railway construction from accelerated to ordinary tempo. p. 297

[338] The draft decision was considered at a meeting of the C.P.C. on April 26, and after the insertion of a number of addenda, was referred to the Narrow C.P.C. for revision. The document published here, formulated by Lenin as Point 5 of the draft decision, was accepted as a basis at the same meeting of the Council. The final decision concerning the distribution of agricultural machines was endorsed by the C.P.C. on May 17, 1921. p. 298

[339] This document formed the basis of the draft letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) dated May 1 "On the Attitude to Non-Party Workers"

to which Lenin made a number of amendments and wrote an addendum (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 390-92).

On May 4 the C.C. endorsed the draft letter with Lenin's amendments and addendum, and on May 7 it was published in *Pravda* No. 97 as a circular to all Gubernia and Uyezd Party Committees, communist groups and trade unions. p. 298

[340] Lenin added in pencil at the end of the manuscript: "(pamphlet on the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. On the rights...)." The last word is illegible. Apparently Lenin meant the rights of general meetings. p. 299

[341] This draft was adopted by the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) at its meeting on May 10, 1921, devoted to the question of "Directives to the Georgian Comrades". p. 300

[342] This decision was passed by the Politbureau of the C.C. with slight amendments on May 11, 1921. p. 301

[343] The meeting of the Communist group of the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions to discuss the activities of the A.C.C.T.U. was held on May 18, 1921. The congress Steering Commission set up by the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) drafted a resolution on the activities of the A.C.C.T.U. which was to be used as a basis for the resolution of the T.U. Congress, and directed commission member M. P. Tomsky, Chairman of the A.C.C.T.U., to put this draft down for discussion by the Communist group. Tomsky, however, did not do this. The group's meeting adopted a resolution tabled by D. B. Ryazanov, which ran counter to the Party decisions concerning the relations between the Party and the trade unions. The plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on May 18 condemned Ryazanov's resolution, decided to remove Tomsky from the commission and relieve him of his post in the A.C.C.T.U., and to remove Ryazanov from trade union work.

On behalf of the Central Committee Lenin took the floor at a group meeting and revealed the anarcho-syndicalist nature of Ryazanov's motion. The group, by an overwhelming majority, rejected Ryazanov's resolution and adopted that of the Central Committee. There is no record of Lenin's speech in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. p. 302

[344] During the years of industrial breakdown and disorganisation following the First World War and the civil war some of the industrial workers became declassed. It was said of such people that they did not do their jobs at the factories, but made "cigarette lighters" there, that is, they took advantage of the slackening of labour discipline to make articles of domestic use for the black market. p. 302

[345] This document was written by Lenin in connection with the discussion on May 18, 1921, by the C.C. plenum of the question

of implementing Clause 13 of the Party Programme dealing with measures in the sphere of religious relations.

Lenin's motion was adopted by the plenum. p. 302

[346] Point 7 of the plenum's original draft resolution required that the question of the Party's attitude to religion "be put before all Party cells and committees. The Agitation and Propaganda Department shall draft and send out preliminary theses of a report. The minutes of meetings and generally all material dealing with this question are to be collected locally, forwarded to the Central Committee, and worked up for a report to the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P." (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 302

[347] Point 10 of the original draft resolution spoke of the necessity of the Party conducting a most decisive struggle against attempts on the part of "some of the clergy to set up a new church organisation" accommodated to the state organisation. p. 303

[348] *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (Economic Life)—a daily newspaper, started coming out in November 1918 as the organ of the Supreme Economic Council and the economic commissariats. It continued publication till November 1937, latterly as the organ of the Commissariat for Finance of the U.S S.R., the State Bank and other financial organisations of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the Bank Employees' Trade Union. p. 304

[349] The draft resolution for the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) on the question of the decisions of the R.C.P. group at the Fourth Congress of Trade Unions was written by Lenin in connection with the group's adoption of A. Z. Holtzmann's theses on the question of wage rates, which ran counter to the C.C.'s directives. This draft was adopted by the Politbureau on May 22, 1921. The congress group, on the motion of delegations from a number of industrial trade unions (the metalworkers, textile workers and miners) as well as delegations from the leading proletarian centres (Moscow, Petrograd and Ivanovo-Voznesensk), revised its decision and by a majority vote adopted as a basis the theses of V. Y. Chubar, which were approved by the C.C. The theses adopted by the group were approved by the Fourth Trade Union Congress on May 24. p. 305

[350] The draft decision for the C.C. was written by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 142). p. 305

[351] Lenin's remarks were made to Points 8 and 7 of the Central Committee's work plan, drafted for the Tenth All-Russia Party Conference. On May 28, 1921, the conference approved the C.C.'s plan of work (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, pp. 57-77). p. 306

[352] Lenin is referring to the All-Russia Conference of Managers of Organising and Instructor Departments Under the Gubernia Party Committees which was to be convened in May 1921 to discuss the immediate tasks of the Party's organisational work. The conference did not take place. p. 306

[353] Lenin prepared this plan of a speech for the Fourth All-Russia Trade Union Congress held from May 17 to 25, 1921. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. however, has no information of Lenin having delivered this speech at the congress. p. 307

[354] *Narodnaya Volya*—a secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists, came into being in August 1879. While subscribing to views of the Narodnik utopian socialism, its members engaged in political struggle, and considered the most important goal to be the overthrow of the autocracy and the winning of political freedom. They figured on achieving a reorganisation of society without the participation of the people, by means of individual terrorism. "The Narodnaya Volya members," wrote Lenin, "made a step forward when they took up the political struggle but they failed to connect it with socialism." (see present edition, Vol. 8, p. 72). The organisation was smashed up by the tsarist government after the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. p. 307

[355] *The Peace Treaty of Versailles* was drawn up at the Paris Conference in 1919 at the end of the imperialist world war of 1914-18 between Germany and her adversaries—the U.S.A., the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and other Allied powers.

Describing this treaty in a speech on October 15, 1920, Lenin said, "It is an unparalleled and predatory peace, which has made slaves of tens of millions of people, including the most civilised" (see present edition, Vol. 31, p. 326). The Versailles Peace Treaty was designed to perpetuate the repartition of the capitalist world in favour of the victor countries, and to establish a system of relationships between countries aimed at strangling Soviet Russia and suppressing the revolutionary movement throughout the world. p. 308

[356] This letter was written during the visit of I. I. Mezhlauk, then Director of the Petrovskoye Metallurgical Works, and was read at a meeting of the workers. It created a fresh upsurge of labour activity among the miners of the Donbas. p. 308

[357] The *Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.)* was held in Moscow from May 26 to 28, 1921. It was attended by 239 delegates from Party and Soviet organisations. It was a special conference. The following questions were on the agenda: 1) economic policy: a) the tax in kind; b) co-operatives; c) financial reform; d) small industry; 2) the role of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the present situation; 3) the Third Congress

of the Comintern; 4) information on the Fourth Trade Union Congress; 5) organisational question.

The highlight of the conference was the question of implementing the New Economic Policy, on which people in the local areas were not yet quite clear.

Lenin guided the work of the conference. He delivered the opening speech, spoke on the agenda, made a report on the tax in kind and wound up the debate on this question, and took the floor many times during the discussion of the resolution "On Economic Policy". The conference heard supplementary information by Lenin to the main report on the work of the Fourth Trade Union Congress. Lenin also made a closing speech. See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 399-437. p. 309

[358] Lenin is referring to the amendment to Point 1 of the draft resolution (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 433). The mover of this amendment proposed to add the words: "inasmuch as the conditions for a world revolution have not changed". This amendment was rejected by a majority vote. p. 309

[359] Lenin took the floor in connection with a proposed amendment to Point 3 of the draft resolution. The end of this point read: "Anarchic commodity exchange (that is, exchange which eludes all control and state supervision) to be combated by concentration of exchange chiefly in the hands of the co-operatives, without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations." The mover of the amendment proposed that the end of the sentence from the words "without, however" be replaced by the words: "administration by mere injunction in the case of such exchange to be eliminated". The amendment was rejected. p. 310

[360] Lenin took the floor in connection with a proposed amendment to Point 5 of the draft resolution calling for an extension of the independence and initiative of each large establishment in the matter of disposing of financial and material resources. The mover of the amendment proposed that this point should apply to the state farms as well. The amendment was rejected. p. 311

[361] This refers to the amendment to Point 9 of the resolution proposing the following addendum: "special attention being paid to factual and material initiative and independence of the local areas". The amendment was rejected. p. 311

[362] This refers to the commission set up for drafting the Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence to local Soviet bodies. It was set up by the Council on May 20, 1921. p. 312

[363] This refers to the amendment to Point 10 of the draft resolution calling for the establishment of "special responsibility on the part of the central agencies for any hampering of local initiative and insufficient support of it" (see present edition, Vol. 32,

p. 435). The mover of the amendment proposed the following addendum: "stronger punitive measures to be taken against mismanagement and misappropriation of state property and wasteful use of labour." The amendment was adopted to Point 6 of the resolution. p. 312

[364] Point 6 of the draft resolution concerned the regulation of workers' wages. p. 312

[365] Lenin here took the floor in connection with Kiselyov's proposal that a point be included in the resolution calling for the introduction of a system of collective testimonials (by up to 3 people) for persons handling state property, and listing the penalties incurred by the giver of such a testimonial. The motion was rejected by a majority of votes. p. 312

[366] Lenin took the floor here in connection with the proposed amendment to Point 2 of the resolution (see present edition, Vol. 32 p. 433). The mover of the amendment proposed that the resolution should state that the tax in kind is brought to the fore in economic activities. The amendment was rejected. p. 312

[367] Lenin's proposals were adopted at a meeting of the Politbureau on June 21, 1921, as directives for the Party Purge Commission. They were included, with certain amendments, in the decision of the Politbureau of June 25 concerning the check-up, revision and purge of the Party. In connection with the drafting of this decision Lenin jotted down notes concerning the conditions of admission to the Party (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 43, p. 362). Lenin's remarks were also taken into consideration in the decision adopted by the Central Committee. p. 315

[368] *The Third Congress of the Communist International* was held in Moscow from June 22 to July 12, 1921. It was attended by 605 delegates (291 voting delegates and 314 with a consultative voice) representing 103 organisations from 52 countries, namely: 48 Communist Parties, 8 Socialist Parties, 28 Youth Leagues 4 syndicalist organisations, 2 opposition Communist Parties (the Communist Workers' Party of Germany and the Workers' Communist Party of Spain) and 13 other organisations. The 72 delegates from the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were headed by Lenin.

The congress discussed the world economic crisis and the new tasks of the Communist International; the report on the activity of the Executive Committee of the Communist International; the Communist Workers' Party of Germany; the Italian question; the tactics of the Communist International; the attitude of the Red International Council of Trade Unions to the Communist International; the struggle against the Amsterdam International; the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.); the Communist International and the Communist youth movement; the women's

movement; the United Communist Party of Germany, and other questions.

All the work of preparing for the congress and conducting its activities was directed by Lenin. He wrote the "Theses for a Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P.(B.)" which were adopted by the congress; he spoke on the Italian question; in defence of the tactics of the Communist International; delivered a report on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.); took a leading part in drafting all the key resolutions; spoke in the committees and at the enlarged sittings of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and at the delegates' meetings. See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 451-96.

The "Theses on the Organisational Activities of the Communist Parties, on the Methods and Content of Their Work" for the Third Congress of the Communist International were drafted by O. W. Kuusinen. On June 6, 1921, he sent Lenin part of the article he had written on the organisational question and the theses on which the article was based. In accordance with Lenin's remarks Kuusinen redrafted the theses and sent them again to Lenin on June 17 (without points 25-29 dealing with the Party press); on June 21 the rest of the theses were sent (points 25-29). Apparently Lenin read this variant of the theses again. On June 27 Kuusinen sent Lenin a third variant of the theses on the organisational question revised on the basis of Lenin's instructions. The theses were revised also with the co-operation of the German Communist Wilhelm Koenen. On July 9 Lenin approved the theses and gave his final remarks and addenda to them. (see pp. 318-19 of this volume). After discussion in the Committee the theses, with slight amendments, were adopted on July 12 by the Third Congress of the Communist International (see *The Communist International in Documents. Decisions, Theses and Appeals of the Congresses of the Comintern and Plenary Meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. 1919-1932.* Moscow, 1933, pp. 201-25). p. 316

[369] The report on the organisational question at the Third Congress of the Communist International on July 10, 1921 was read by the German Communist W. Koenen. p. 317

[370] See also the previous document in this connection. p. 318

[371] Lenin's remarks were taken into consideration by O. W. Kuusinen and W. Koenen (see *The Communist International in Documents. Decisions, Theses and Appeals of the Congresses of the Comintern and Plenary Meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. 1919-1932.* Moscow, 1933, pp. 221 and 223-24.) p. 319

[372] This document was written in connection with the drafting of the theses on tactics for the Third Congress of the Communist International. The work of drafting the theses was entrusted to the Russian delegation to the congress.

On June 1, 1921, K. B. Radek sent Lenin a draft of the theses containing amendments proposed by A. Thalheimer and Béla Kun and their own draft. On the envelope containing these materials Lenin jotted down his initial remarks on the draft theses on tactics (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 44, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 435) and then wrote out his remarks in full as printed lower down.

In accordance with Lenin's directions the draft theses on tactics were revised, discussed at preliminary meetings with a number of delegations and tabled at the Third Congress in the name of the Russian delegation. On July 1, Lenin delivered a speech at the congress in defence of the tactics of the Comintern (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 468-77). On July 12, the theses were unanimously adopted by the congress (see *The Communist International in Documents*, *etc*. Moscow, 1933, pp. 180-201). p. 319

[373] The Open Letter (*Offener Brief*) of the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany to the Socialist Party of Germany, the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Communist Workers' Party of Germany and all trade unions was published in *Die Rote Fahne* on January 8, 1921. The U.C.P.G. called on all workers, trade unions and socialist organisations to unite their forces in combating the growing reaction and the capitalists' attack upon the working people's vital rights. Their programme of joint action included demands for higher pensions for disabled war veterans; elimination of unemployment; improvement of the country's finances at the expense of the monopolies; introduction of factory committee control over all stocks of food, raw materials and fuel; restarting of all closed enterprises; control over sowing, harvesting and marketing of all farm produce by the Peasants' Councils together with the agricultural labourers' organisations; immediate disarming and disbanding of all bourgeois militarised organisations; establishment of workers' self-defence; amnesty for all political prisoners; immediate resumption of trade and diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Lenin commented very favourably on the Open Letter (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 221).

The Right-wing leaders of the organisations to which the Open Letter was addressed rejected the proposal for joint action with the Communists, despite the fact that the workers came out for a united front of the proletariat. p. 321

[374] *KAPD* (*Kommunistische Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands*)—Communist Workers' Party of Germany, was formed in April 1920 by "Left" Communists, who had been expelled from the Communist Party of Germany at the Heidelberg Congress in 1919. In November 1920, in order to facilitate the unification of all German communist forces and meet the wishes of the best proletarian elements within it, the C.W.P.G. was temporarily admitted into the Comintern with the rights of a sympathising member. The Executive Committee of the Comintern, however, still regarded

the United Communist Party of Germany as the only fully-authorised section of the Comintern. C.W.P.G.'s representatives were admitted into the Comintern on the condition that they merged with the United Communist Party of Germany and supported all its activities. The Third Congress of the Comintern, in order to win over the workers who still followed the lead of the C.W.P.G., decided to give the latter two to three months to call a congress and settle the question of amalgamation. The Executive Committee, on behalf of the Third Congress, adopted an appeal "To the Members of the Communist Workers' Party of Germany" setting forth the decision of the congress and urging the C.W.P.G. to abandon its sectarian policy and unite with the U.C.P.G. The C.W.P.G. leadership failed to comply with the decision of the Third Congress and continued their splitting activities: The Executive of the Comintern was compelled to break off relations with the party. The C.W.P.G. thus found itself outside the Communist International. Eventually the C.W.P.G. degenerated into a small sectarian group having no support among, and hostile to, the working class of Germany. p. 321

[375] *The Italian question* was referred to the Third Congress of the Comintern following the protest of the Italian Socialist Party against the decision of the Comintern's Executive to exclude it from the Communist International and recognise the Communist Party of Italy as the only section of the Comintern in Italy.

The Third Congress of the Communist International adopted the following decision on thee I.S.P. on June 29, 1921: "The Italian Socialist Party cannot belong to the Communist International so long as the participants of the reformists' conference at Reggio-Emilia and their supporters have not been expelled from the party.

"In the event of this preliminary condition being fulfilled the Third World Congress will authorise its Executive to take the necessary steps to bring about a union between the Italian Socialist Party, after it has cleared its ranks of all reformist and Centrist elements, and the Communist Party of Italy, and transform both organisations into a unified section of the Communist International" (*The Communist International in Documents. Decisions, Theses and Appeals of the Congresses of the Comintern and Plenary Meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. 1919-1932*. Moscow, 1933, p. 164). The Italian Socialist Party, however, failed to carry out this decision of the Third Congress.

A Left faction of "Third-Internationalists" (G. M. Serrati, F. Maffi and others) was formed within the Italian Socialist Party in the spring of 1923, which was for amalgamation with the Communist Party of Italy. In August 1924 the Third Internationalists merged with the Communist Party of Italy. p. 322

[376] Lenin is apparently referring to the following text of the initial draft theses on the question of the tactics of the Communist

International submitted by K. B. Radek: "Seeing that the Communist International wishes to create only truly revolutionary mass parties, they [what Radek calls Centrist groups in the Communist Parties of a number of countries.—*Ed.*] are making a big noise about the Comintern falling into sectarianism. This is what the Levi group in Germany, the Šmeral group in Czechoslovakia, etc., are doing. The nature of these groups is quite clear. They are Centrist groups, who cloak the policy of passive waiting for the revolution with communist phrases and theories. The Šmeral group put off the organisation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia at a time when the majority of the Czechoslovak workers had taken a communist stand" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 323

[377] B. Šmeral's report at the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was published in abridged form in the newspaper *Vorwärts*, around which were grouped the Czechoslovak Lefts headed by K. Kreibich.

Lenin's motion was adopted by the Tactics Committee. The section of the theses on tactics dealing with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was worded in accordance with his proposal. p. 324

[378] At the beginning of July 1921 the employees of Berlin's municipal services decided to call a strike for higher pay. The strike was decided on by a majority of the workers (about 80,000). The reformists, however, succeeded in preventing the strike. Following negotiations between the representatives of the employees and the Berlin Municipal Council, on which sat Social-Democrats, the employees' pay was slightly raised. p. 326

[379] Early in July 1921 the cotton-mill workers of Lille (France) went on strike against wage cuts by the mill-owners. The strike spread to a number of departments. Early in September the workers of the Northern district of France declared a general strike. Although the workers staunchly carried on the fight for two months, the strike failed as a result of the reformist tactics of the trade union leadership and unfavourable economic conditions. p. 326

[380] The mass meeting of the workers in Rome, which was held on July 8, 1921, was fully reported in *Pravda* No. 149 on July 10, 1921. p. 326

[381] *The draft decision on collective pay for employees of state institutions* was discussed in the C.P.C. on June 14, 21, 24 and 28 and July 8, 1921. The system of collective supply was designed to replace that of individual supply by ration coupons and lists as well as bonuses paid in kind. The workers and office employees received remuneration exclusively in the form of wages and salaries, the amount of which was fixed for each enterprise as

a whole, i.e., collectively for all the workers and office staffs. On June 24 the C.P.C. passed a decision adopting the system of collective pay for employees of state institutions in Moscow and Petrograd as from July 1 and in the remaining districts of the Republic not earlier than September 1, and set up a commission to complete "the draft in order to determine, on the basis of at least limited approximate data, what the number of Soviet employees will be after the reduction and what their pay is in money and in kind". On June 28, 1921, the C.P.C., following reports by A. B. Khalatov and L. I. Ginsburg, passed its decision on collective pay for employees in state institutions with amendments to Point "A" proposed by Lenin and with his wording of Point "D". The final text of the Council's decision was adopted on July 8, 1921. p. 329

[382] Lenin's motion was made in connection with the decision of the Politbureau, adopted on the report of A. S. Kiselyov on July 7, 1921, "On Speeding Up the Transition of Enterprises and Institutions to a Self-Supporting System of Operation". The decision stated: "Soviet institutions shall be directed to take more energetic steps towards switching over both separate enterprises and Soviet institutions to a self-supporting system of operation." p. 329

[383] In view of the famine that attacked the Volga region and south Ukraine in 1921, the Politbureau on July 9, 1921, passed a decision for the transfer of a maximum number of Communists to food supply work.

Lenin's "*Notes*" were written apparently in preparation for the discussion of this question at the meeting of the Politbureau. p. 330

[384] The question of Centrosoyuz was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on July 15, 1921 which heard reports by L. M. Khinchuk "On the Organisation of Commodity Exchange and the Need for Speeding Up and Expanding Work in This Direction" and N. P. Bryukhanov "On Supervision Over Centrosoyuz in Pursuance of the Decision of the Council of People's Commissars of June 14, 1921, With a View to Obtaining the Maximum Amount of Grain Through Commodity Exchange". A single resolution was adopted on both reports incorporating Lenin's proposals. p. 332

[385] This motion was drafted in connection with the theses of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Siberian Revolutionary Committee "On the Forms of Organisation of Siberian Soviet Institutions and Siberian Party Bodies". The theses put the case for the necessity of having in Siberia a regional Soviet centre with corresponding economic and military departments, an agency of the Vecheka and a regional Party centre. Both these centres, in the view of the Siberian Bureau and Siberian Revolutionary Committee, were to be built on the principle of appointment.

The covering memorandum stated that the question would be discussed at the forthcoming Fourth Siberian Regional Party Conference at which spokesmen of two trends were expected to state their views: one, which denied the need for Siberian regional centres, and the other, which recognised the need for their creation on the elective principle. The theses of the Siberian Bureau were endorsed as a whole by the Orgbureau of the C.C. on July 29, 1921.

Points 4 and 5 in the manuscript were crossed out by Lenin.

p. 332

[386] The Central Committee plenum considered the question of the state of transport on August 8, 1921, and endorsed the conclusions of F. E. Dzerzhinsky with the amendments proposed by Lenin.

Point 1 of the conclusions referred to the need for all Party and administrative bodies to devise measures for improving and assisting transport.

Points 2-4 called for reinforcement of the apparatus of the Commissariat for Railways with top-level executives, the issue of a circular to all Gubernia Committees of the R.C.P.(B.) concerning the state of transport, and the organisation of a transport subdepartment in the C.C.'s Organisation and Instruction Department to take charge of Party work on the railways.

Point 5 of the conclusions called for all transport servicing enterprises being turned over to the People's Commissariat for Railways.

p. 333

[387] The question of setting up an information bureau abroad to collect material on the international labour movement was discussed at the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on August 17, 1921. Lenin's proposal was adopted.

Shortly afterwards E. Varga sent Lenin his project for the "Organisation of Information in the Comintern Executive". This called for the establishment of an Information Institute which would supply the Comintern Executive with the necessary material. The project suggested methods of work for the Institute and outlined instructions for compiling socio-economic reports and political information.

On August 31, 1921, Lenin sent Varga his remarks on the project—"Tentative Amendments or Theses" (see pp. 337-39 of this volume).

Lenin's letter of September 1, 1921 (see p. 339 of this volume) was a reply to Varga's letter dated August 31, 1921, on the subject of Lenin's theses on the organisation of an Information Institute, in which Varga reported that there were "deep-going basic differences in regard to the *aims* of such an Institute". Trotsky, Zinoviev and Radek, wrote Varga, considered that this Institute was designed primarily to supply information for the internal use of the Comintern Executive. "In your theses, on the other hand, *the weight of emphasis seems to be on press information on the labour movement* in Central Europe, whereas information for

the Comintern Executive is relegated to the background. This change of aim affects all other changes (legality, complete independence of the Comintern)". "Consequently, it would be necessary to decide in principle: is the aim of the Institute to be: a) information for the Comintern Executive? b) influencing the labour press by its publications? c) linking both aims? All questions of organisation depend, it seems to me, on the solution of this question" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.). The plan for setting up an Information Institute did not materialise. p. 336

[388] This draft was written on the letter of I. S. Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman of the Vecheka, to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), which stated: "At the recent session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee it was decided at the September sitting to hear the report of the commission set up to inspect the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Please give me your instructions on the following: 1) should such a report be made at all; 2) if it should, then in what direction" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.).

Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau at its meeting on August 25, 1921. p. 336

[389] This motion was written in connection with a telegram from the Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee I. N. Smirnov dated August 26, 1921, reporting the arrest of Baron Ungern. The Politbureau adopted Lenin's motion.

The trial of Baron Ungern took place on September 15. During the hearing a long list of atrocities committed by Ungern and his underlings was revealed. On capturing Urgu (now Ulan-Bator) he ordered all the employees of Centrosoyuz and the Town Council to be shot. On his orders the peaceful inhabitants were robbed and killed and the town was burnt down. The trial brought to light Baron Ungern's ties with the Chinese militarists (Chang Tso-lin) and Japanese interventionists. Baron Ungern was sentenced to death. p. 336

[390] E. Varga's project for the "Organisation of Information in the Comintern Executive" contained two appendixes:
"Appendix A—Instructions on Compiling Socio-Economic Reports" and "Appendix B—Instructions on Compiling Reports on the Political Situation Within the Country". The instructions under Appendix A covered:

1. The purpose of the reports, which was to give a dynamic picture of the development of the revolutionary movement in the country and its analysis.

2. Four factors conditioning revolutionary development:

a) the Communist Party—the motive force of the revolutionary movement;

b) the proletariat—the revolutionary masses;

c) the ruling classes—the enemy;

d) the petty-bourgeois middle strata.

The report must show the alignment of forces.

3. The starting-point should be an account of the economic situation, the social position of the proletariat and the middle strata.

4. The report should consist of a brief review (5-10 pages) with a detailed appendix to it.

The instructions under Appendix B contained the following sections: 1) Communist Parties; II) non-communist proletarian parties; III) bourgeois parties; IV) organisation of the armed forces.

Lenin refers to §§ 3 and 4 of Section I ("Communist Parties") of Varga's instructions (Appendix B) which deal with legal and illegal Party cells, the promulgation of Party literature, appeals, pamphlets and books and the issue of illegal Party literature. p. 338

[391] Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on September 2, 1921. The next day, September 3, Lenin wrote to the Secretary of the Comintern Executive asking him to arrange for the collection of information about workers' donations in Europe for the relief of the famine-stricken areas in Russia (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 53, Document 270). For Soviet press reports on moneys collected among the international proletariat see Document 345 of the same volume. p. 340

[392] Under the pretence of rendering relief to the famine-stricken areas in Russia the imperialists organised an "International Commission" headed by Noulens, the former French Ambassador to Russia and one of the chief organisers of counter-revolutionary plots and military intervention against Soviet Russia. The commission was made up of former French, English, and Belgian diplomats and big foreign owners of enterprises that had been nationalised in Russia. On September 4, 1921, the Noulens Commission sent a telegram to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs demanding that thirty experts be admitted into Soviet Russia for on-the-spot investigations under a special programme providing for the collection of information of an intelligence nature.

On September 6 the Politbureau approved, with slight amendments, the text of a Note to Noulens drafted in accordance with Lenin's proposals. The answering Note of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, published in *Izvestia* on September 8, stated that "Mr. Noulens' Commission, in lieu of relief for the famine-stricken areas, planned to collect information on the internal position of Soviet Russia ... and this was to be done under the guidance of people who had already engaged in such a study with the undisguised aim of engineering revolts and facilitating the advance of foreign armies on the territory of the U.S.S.R." (*U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy Documents*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1960). The Soviet Government emphatically refused to permit entry of the Noulens Commission into the Soviet Republic. p. 341

[393] Owing to food difficulties, the crop failure and the need for rendering relief to the famine-stricken areas, the Politbureau on September 6, 1921, adopted a decision on directives to the Food Commissariat with Lenin's amendments. The directives provided for a reduction in the number of recipients of state food supplies as from October 1921, and the establishment of a grain fund. p. 341

[394] The motion concerning spendings from the gold fund was adopted by the Politbureau on September 14, 1921. p. 342

[395] Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on September 13, 1921. Point 4 was crossed out by Lenin and not included in the decision of the Politbureau.

The question of book sales was re-examined by the Politbureau at its meeting on October 15, at which it confirmed its decision of September 13 and outlined concrete practical measures for its implementation; special attention was given to measures for preventing all kinds of anti-Soviet literature from getting into the book trade. p. 342

[396] This motion was adopted by the Politbureau on September 14, 1921. p. 343

[397] The Party purge was carried out in compliance with the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) "On Problems of Party Development". It was preceded by long and careful preparation. On June 21, 1921, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission adopted a Decision on Checking, Revising and Purging the Party (see *Pravda* No. 146 for June 30, 1921), which fixed the date for the purge to be carried out (from August 1 to October 1, 1921), stipulated that working people, both Communists and non-Party, were to be questioned concerning members of the Party who were being checked, and defined the procedure for setting up local verification commissions. During the period of the purge admission into the Party was suspended, an exception being made in the case of workers and peasants who did not exploit outside labour. On July 7 the Politbureau endorsed a Central Verification Commission for checking the Party membership and local verification commissions. The Central Committee of the Party addressed a letter "To All Party Organisations. On the Purging of the Party" (see *Pravda* No. 163 for July 27, 1921) setting forth the aims and methods of the purge. The C.C. recommended the following guidelines: a more indulgent attitude towards workers in the matter of presenting documents, testimonials, etc. As regards peasants, a clear line should be drawn between kulak and proprietary elements and honest working peasants. A stricter approach to "commissarified" elements, to those holding posts which involve any privileges. An especially strict check to be applied to former government officials and bourgeois intellectuals. And strictest of all to former members of other parties, particularly the Mensheviks

and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The start of the purge was put off until August 15.

As a result of the purge, which continued up till the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) about 25 per cent of the membership were expelled from the Party. This improved the Party's social composition, strengthened discipline, gave the Party greater prestige among the non-Party worker and peasant masses and freed the Party from elements who discredited it. The Party's ideological and organisational unity was enhanced. p. 343

398 This directive of Lenin's was incorporated in the C.C.'s decisions. The "Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P." for September 1921 states that the C.C. passed two decisions concerning the procedure for recommending members of the R.C.P. during the purge. One stated: "Only those comrades have the right to recommend who have known the recommended person not less than one year and have worked with him or observed his work in one or another Party organisation". The other decision spoke about the responsibility of the recommenders for the recommended (see *Izvestia of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* No. 35, December 1, 1921). p. 344

399 In 1921 various groups of American workers united around the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia expressed a desire to go to Soviet Russia to lend a hand in economic construction. Most of these workers were Russian emigrants who had gone to America before the October Revolution.

On June 22, 1921, the Council of Labour and Defence discussed the question of enlisting the services of members of the industrial emigrant community, and recognised the desirability of "developing individual industrial enterprises or groups of enterprises by handing them over to groups of American workers and industrially developed farmers on a contract basis ensuring them a definite degree of economic autonomy" (*Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 202). The Council also considered it necessary to regulate industrial immigration of workers from foreign countries. On August 11, 1921, a telegram signed by Lenin was sent to the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia, stating, among other things: "You must bear in mind the hardships existing in Russia, the difficulties in connection with the food supply problem, and other obstacles which would have to be faced. Persons going to Russia should be prepared to meet these conditions.... It would be best to send delegates first for an on-the-spot inspection of settlement land lots, wood lots, mines, factories, etc. to be leased" (*U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy Documents*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, p. 261).

In the latter part of 1921 a group of American workers headed by S. Rutgers, a Dutch engineer and Communist, W. D. Heywood, a prominent leader of the American labour movement and G. S. Calvert, an American worker, carried on negotiations with the Soviet Government for exploitation by this group of

a part of the Kuznetsk coal-field in Siberia and the organisation there of an industrial colony. Lenin received delegates of the American workers' colony on September 19 and had a talk with them. A record of this talk, made by Lenin, is given in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 39. Lenin's draft engagement was written in connection with this talk. For details concerning the agreement with the sponsor group of the American workers (Rutgers group) see pp. 348-50 of this volume. p. 344

[400] In a letter to the Politbureau dated October 7, 1921, G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote that the Government of the Far-Eastern Republic wished to be briefed by the Politbureau on the following points: 1) Is recognition of the F.-E.R. by Japan and America desirable in the absence of simultaneous recognition by them of the R.S.F.S.R.; 2) Should the offer by foreigners to grant state loans to the F.-E.R. be accepted; 3) Is the F.-E.R. independent of the R.S.F.S.R. in fact as well as in form. In the opinion of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs these questions were to be answered in the following manner: 1) Recognition of the F.-E.R. is desirable, but without the structure of the F.-E.R. being specified in the agreement; 2) Foreign loans are useful provided the sovereign rights of the F.-E.R. are preserved; 3) The F.-E.R. is to be considered independent of the R.S.F.S.R. only in form.

Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on October 8, 1921.

The draft directives to the F.-E.R. proposed by Chicherin were endorsed by the Politbureau on October 10, 1921. p. 345

[401] Lenin's proposal was included in the decision of the C.C. plenum on October 8, 1921, passed in connection with Molotov's report concerning the registration of executives and the order in which they were to be distributed. p. 346

[402] Lenin's draft directives were adopted by the Politbureau on October 10, 1921, following the report of C. G. Rakovsky. V. Y. Chubar and G. I. Petrovsky. "On this question a general orientation was given," stated the C.C. Report for October-November 1921, "in the sense of a more careful and attentive attitude being shown towards the needs of the peasants and securing their co-operation with the state" (*Izvestia of the Central Committee*, *R.C.P.(B.)* No. 36 for December 15, 1921). p. 346

[403] This motion was adopted by the Politbureau on October 10, 1921. On November 15 the C.P.C. endorsed the Decree on Social Insurance of Employed Persons (see the newspaper *Izvestia* No. 263, November 23, 1921). p. 347

[404] *Yugostal*—a mining metallurgical trust founded in September 1921. It played an important part in rehabilitating the country's iron and steel industry.

These notes were written by Lenin in the margin of the newspaper *Yuzhni Metallurg* (the town of Yenakievo) No. 1 for October 11, 1921. A note by Lenin in the top left-hand corner of the paper reads: "Part to Yuzovka and part to Debaltsevo." p. 347

[405] This draft was written in preparation for the meeting of the Politbureau on the question of an agreement with the group of American workers and engineers headed by S. Rutgers, who had arrived in Russia (see Note 399).

On September 23, 1921, the C.L.D. discussed the proposal of the Rutgers group for the Nadezhdinsk Works and a number of enterprises of the Kuznetsk coal-field to be turned over to them for exploitation, and found it desirable to conclude an agreement, the final terms of which were to be drafted by a commission consisting of representatives of the S.E.C., the Commissariat for Labour and the Commissariat for Agriculture. Lenin took part in the negotiations with the Rutgers group and made a number of proposals in connection with the terms of the agreement (see pp. 348-50, 352-53 of this volume, and *Collected Works*, Vol. 53, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 260-61, 302-03).

The agreement with the sponsor group (the Rutgers group) of the American workers, which was signed on October 20, was endorsed by the C.L.D. on October 21 and by the C.P.C. on October 25. In November the Soviet Government signed a contract with this group, under which the American workers were to bring with them a definite quantity of tools, materials and foodstuffs, while the Soviet Government assigned a sum of $300,000 for the purchase abroad of machines and equipment. Under the terms of this contract an Autonomous Industrial Colony directly subordinated to the C.L.D. was set up in part of the territory of the Kuznetsk coal-field. p. 348

[406] Lenin's proposals formed the basis of the Politbureau's decision of October 15, 1921, concerning the proposals of S. Rutgers, and the Council of Labour and Defence decision of October 17, 1921, "On the Terms of an Agreement with the Rutgers Group". p. 350

[407] Lenin's draft was adopted at the meeting of the Politbureau on October 14, 1921. After hearing the opinion of the Central Control Commission and the Central Verification Commission on the question of assigning Shlyapnikov to food supply work, the Politbureau ruled on October 27: "The period of Comrade Shlyapnikov's work on food supply should be fixed at two months, counting from the date of his departure" (Central Party Archives Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

The *Central Verification Commission*, consisting of five members, was set up for the period of the Party purge to direct the work of the local verification commissions (see *Pravda* No. 146, June 30, 1921). p. 350

[408] There having been certain differences of opinion among leading members of the Baku Party organisation and the central organi-

sations of Azerbaijan in applying the national policy, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) issued instructions for the greatest discretion to be shown by Party workers in Azerbaijan towards the mode of life and way of thinking among the Moslem population. All functionaries of the Azerbaijan Communist Party were directed to take this into consideration in all their activities and strive towards teamwork and co-operation and not allow any factions to be formed within the Party organisation. Lenin's proposals were included in the decision of the C.C.'s Politbureau adopted October 15, 1921.

The directives on the implementation of the Communist Party's national policy in Azerbaijan drafted by J. V. Stalin were endorsed by the Politbureau on October 17.

Point 6 refers to the decision of the Politbureau of October 3, 1921, aimed at preventing any violation by Baku Party workers of the Soviet Government's policy towards Persia (Iran). p. 351

[409] Lenin's draft was adopted by the Politbureau on October 17, 1921. p. 352

[410] Lenin's draft was adopted by the Politbureau on October 20, 1921. His proposals were incorporated into the agreement concluded with the Rutgers group. p. 352

[411] The *A.R.A.* (*American Relief Administration*)—was formed in 1919 to render relief to the population who had suffered from the First World War. The President of the A.R.A. was Herbert Hoover, a big capitalist, who had had close links with Russian capital before 1917. Some of the A.R.A. staff engaged in charitable work with all sincerity and conscientiousness, but the A.R.A. as a whole served as an instrument for spreading the influence of American imperialism and dumping old stocks.

On October 18, 1921, the draft of an agreement with the A.R.A on the organisation of food parcels to Russia was circulated for voting among members of the Politbureau. The covering letter has the signatures of Politbureau members and a proposal by Stalin that a charge be made for transportation of the parcels from the frontier to the distributing warehouses, and for their storage, since, in his opinion, this was a commercial operation, not charity. Lenin's bracketed remark was made in connection with this proposal. The draft agreement with the A.R.A. was endorsed by the Politbureau on October 19, 1921.

The Soviet Government accepted A.R.A. assistance in connection with famine on the Volga and in south Ukraine in 1921 but repelled its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic and established control over its activities. As subsequent events proved, the A.R.A. personnel, consisting chiefly of American army officers, engaged in espionage and supported counter-revolutionary elements. The A.R.A. ceased its activities in the U.S.S.R. in June 1923. p. 353

[412] This draft was written by Lenin for the meeting of the Politbureau of October 20, 1921, which had before it the request of the People's Commissariat for Finance that representatives of the Commissariat be included in the C.L.D. and the regional and gubernia economic conferences with a right to vote. The Politbureau rejected this request and adopted Lenin's motion. The last sentence in the manuscript is crossed out and was not included in the decision.

A *Finance Commission of the Central Committee, R.C.P.(B.) and the Council of People's Commissars* was set up on Lenin's proposal soon after the Tenth Congress of the Party for dealing with questions of financial policy in the light of the New Economic Policy. p. 355

[413] The question of manufacturing Fowler-type motor ploughs was considered repeatedly by the Council of Labour and Defence. The Metal Department of the Supreme Economic Council, which had been charged with the manufacture of these ploughs in May 1920, drew up a production plan without taking into account available metal and fuel resources. The Special Three-Man Commission set up to combine all production of ploughs did not inform the C.L.D. or the C.P.C. as to the actual state of affairs.

This draft decision was adopted at the meeting of the C.L.D. on October 21, 1921. The case of red tape was brought before the Moscow Military Tribunal, which found a number of members of the staffs of the S.E.C. and the Commissariat for Agriculture guilty of negligence. Considering these men's services in the matter of economic reconstruction, however, the Tribunal decided not to punish them. At the suggestion of the Moscow Military Tribunal the C.L.D. reprimanded the Presidium of the S.E.C. and the Board of the Commissariat for Agriculture for giving insufficient attention to the production of Fowler ploughs. See Lenin's letter to P. A. Bogdanov dated December 23, 1921 (present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 556-58). p. 356

[414] Following the endorsement by the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on June 30, 1921, of the "Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence to Local Soviet Bodies" (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 375-98) Lenin wrote a letter to the editors of *Izvestia*, *Pravda*, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* and other newspapers on July 21 pointing out the importance of "explaining in detail the significance which the local economic conferences and the publication of reports for general information has for both the application of the New Economic Policy in general and for proper economic construction" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 53, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 52).

When reports started coming in from the local areas, Lenin raised the question of studying and utilising these reports. On October 21, 1921, Lenin made a report at the C.L.D. on the subject of reports and diagrams for the C.L.D. and tabled the draft decision as given here. p. 356

[415] V. A. Smolyaninov, in his reminiscences, says that the work of the commission dragged out. "Vladimir Ilyich showed a great interest in the results of our commission's work. On his advice and suggestion a draft decision was drawn up, which was endorsed by the Council of Labour and Defence on November 21, 1921. This decision took into account all Lenin's remarks. He attached special importance to having people appointed in the various commissariats and other institutions who were really interested in and understood the importance of studying the local reports" (*Vospominaniya o Vladimire Ilyiche Lenine* [Reminiscences of Lenin], Part 3, Moscow, 1961, p. 367). Lenin's private library contains several dozen reports of gubernia economic conferences. p. 357

[416] The Politbureau (on the report of P. A. Bogdanov, N. I. Lebedev, G. N. Melnichansky and I. I. Kutuzov) considered the draft regulations on the management of the cotton industry at its meeting on October 27, 1921, and adopted Lenin's motion. The amended instructions were afterwards endorsed by the Politbureau at its meeting on November 3. p. 357

[417] The article under this title was not written. p. 357

[418] The draft of a financial plan and of a plan of emission for 1922 was down for discussion at the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on November 5, 1921. Lenin's motion formed the basis of the decision passed by the Council on this question. Points 2, 4, 5 and 6 are crossed out in the manuscript and were not included in the decision. p. 359

[419] Lenin's draft was incorporated in the text of the Council's decision on this question adopted on November 18, 1921. The Council endorsed "tentatively the budgetary appropriations and their distribution among the commissariats as submitted by the Finance Commission" and directed the commissariats "to speed up the work of making up estimates, which should be completed by December 1". The Finance Commission and the State Planning Commission were charged with "completing the calculation of revenues, both monetary and material, within one week" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). p. 360

[420] The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic arrived in Moscow on November 2, 1921. Its members were: Danzan, head of the delegation, Minister for Finance and Chairman of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party; Sukhe-Bator, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army and War Minister; B. Tserendorzh, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Djon-Van-Shirnin-Dandin, representative of religious circles, unofficial member of the delegation; Batukhan, adviser and head interpreter. The object of the nego-

tiations was to conclude an agreement between the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. and the People's Government of Mongolia. The draft agreement was considered and approved by the Narrow Council of People's Commissars on November 3, 1921 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 53, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 324). On November 5, 1921, an agreement was signed by representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. and the M.P.R. under which both parties engaged not to allow groups hostile to the other party to stay or be formed on their territories, and made arrangements for the appointment of diplomatic and consular representatives, the fixing of state boundaries, and customs arrangements. The Soviet Government handed over to the Government of the M.P.R. telegraph installations in Mongolia belonging to the R.S.F.S.R.

Lenin's talk with the delegation took place in the Kremlin. A report of the talk was first published in the minutes of the Ninth Congress of the M.P.R.P., which was held from September 28 to October 5, 1934. The publication was reproduced from the reminiscences of B. Shumyatsky and B. Tserendorzh. The latter wrote in his recollections: "Lenin spoke for a long time with the members of the delegation. He lent an attentive ear to our stories, showed a lively interest in the most varied aspects of life in people's Mongolia, and gave some useful advice. In particular, he drew our attention to the need for raising the level of education and culture among the Mongolian people, while at the same time stressing the need for developing the country's economy to the utmost with a view to meeting all the requirements of the people." p. 360

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421 *The First All-Russia Conference on Trade Union Cultural and Educational Work* was held in Moscow from September 26 to October 1, 1921. It was attended by 173 delegates (122 voting delegates and 51 with a consultative voice), of whom 119 were Communists, 51 non-Party people, 1 Menshevik, 1 Socialist-Revolutionary and 1 inter-party socialist. There were 13 items on the agenda of the conference, which included reports of the A.C.C.T.U.'s Culture Department, the Peoples' Commissariat for Education and its chief administrations, and Proletcult; reports from the local areas (Donbas, Petrograd, Baku); the New Economic Policy and education; the trade union's work of political education; cultural work among the youth, and other items. The conference mapped out ways for improving the trade unions' work of political education, and new forms and methods under the New Economic Policy (cultural work at private and leased enterprises, and so on).

The conference adopted a wrong stand on the question of relations with the Chief Committee for Political Education. Its resolution ("Role and Aims of the Trade Unions' Cultural Work") contained a demand that the trade unions' cultural work should be freed from the influence of the Chief Committee for Political Education. This ran counter to the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. "On the Chief Committee for Political Educa-

tion and the Agitation and Propaganda Tasks of the Party" (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 550). p. 361

[422] Lenin is referring to the resolution of the Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Departments (held from October 17 to 22, 1921) "On the Reports of the Chief Committee for Political Education", which defined the relations between the political education departments and the trade unions' culture departments centrally and locally. "The trade unions," ran this resolution, "constantly lapse into the entirely erroneous view that educational work in all forms should be the business of the trade unions, that the trade unions would be better able to conduct the business of education than the educational authorities.

"Their point of view is erroneous and stems from misinterpretation of the tasks of the trade unions. Adherence to such a point of view would induce the conclusion that all state functions, the work of all the commissariats, should be turned over to the trade unions" (*Second All-Russia Congress of Political Education Departments. Congress Bulletin* No. 7, October 24, 1921).

The resolution of the congress mapped out concrete measures for the joint ideological, political, cultural and educational work of the Chief Committee for Political Education and the Culture Department of the A.C.C.T.U. p. 362

[423] The Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) decided on November 8 1921, to adopt as a basis Lenin's resolution. In accordance with this decision regulations were drafted for the joint political education work of the A.C.C.T.U.'s Culture Department and the Chief Committee for Political Education. p. 362

[424] This note was written on Chicherin's letter to the Politbureau in which he reported that the question of denationalising Soviet Russia's foreign trade was raised at the Baltic Economic Conference (held at Riga, from October 28 to 31, 1921). V. P. Milyutin, the head of the R.S.F.S.R. delegation at the conference, submitted a paper on this question which was sent to the Politbureau. Milyutin's plan boiled down to abolishing the monopoly of foreign trade. On November 10 the Politbureau, on Lenin's motion, rejected Milyutin's proposal (see also *Collected Works*, Vol. 44, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 427-30; present edition Vol. 33, pp. 375-78 and pp. 455-59). p. 362

[425] Lenin's motion on food work in the Ukraine was adopted by the Politbureau on November 10, 1921. p. 362

[426] This document was written in connection with the drafting of a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On Penalties for False Denunciations". The decree was signed by Lenin on

November 24, and published in *Izvestia* on December 1, 1921. Lenin's addenda were included in the text of this decree (see *Collection of Statutes and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government*", 1921, No, 77, p. 787). p. 363

[427] The decree introducing payment for newspapers was endorsed by the C.P.C. on November 28, 1921. Under this decree all individuals, public institutions and organisations, and state institutions and enterprises without exception were to be charged for newspapers. Lenin's motion formed the basis of Point 8 of the Decree, which directed the People's Commissariat for Education to draw up within a fortnight and publish instructions covering control over the proper distribution of newspapers to the network of educational institutions and the supply of newspapers to the population (see *Izvestia* No. 275, December 7, 1921). p. 364

[428] Lenin is referring to his motion on the question of the disagreements between the leading Party functionaries in the Donbas which was discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau. p. 364

[429] Lenin's motion on the first and second questions was adopted by the Politbureau on November 27, 1921. p. 364

[430] This part of Lenin's letter was a draft for the Politbureau. The latter's decision, adopted on December 1, 1921, on Lenin's report, stated that "Comrade Tsyurupa shall be relieved of the post of People's Commissar for Food and appointed Second Deputy Chairman of the C.L.D. with a casting vote in the C.L.D. and the C.P.C., the appointment to be endorsed by the Presidium of the A.C.E.C." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). A similar wording was used in the decision of the A.C.E.C. confirming the appointment of A. D. Tsyurupa to the post of Second Deputy Chairman of the C.L.D. (see *Izvestia* No. 272, December 3, 1921). p. 365

[431] In view of the country's transition to peaceful economic construction, Lenin proposed the reorganisation of the Vecheka. On December 1, 1921, the Politbureau set up a commission consisting of L. B. Kamenev, D. I. Kursky and F. E. Dzerzhinsky to go into this question within five days with a view to: "a) narrowing the jurisdiction of the Vecheka; b) narrowing its right of arrest; c) fixing a term of one month for the whole process of the law; d) giving more weight to the courts of law; e) considering the question of a change of name; f) preparing and passing through the All-Russia C.E.C. general regulations covering changes in the direction of radical relaxations" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

Lenin's ideas were embodied also in the Resolution on the Vecheka passed by the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on December 27, 1921. The congress directed the Presidium

of the All-Russia C.E.C. "to revise the Regulations on the Vecheka and its agencies in the direction of its reorganisation, the narrowing of its jurisdiction and the strengthening of the principles of revolutionary legality" (*The Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Verbatim Report*, 1922, p. 300). On January 23, 1922, the Politbureau examined the question of reorganising the Vecheka into the State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye—G.P.U.) under the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and defined the basic tasks and functions of the G.P.U. On February 6 the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. passed a decision for the reorganisation of the Vecheka (see *Izvestia* No. 30, February 8, 1922).

Point 3 of Lenin's draft refers to the period in which the reorganisation was to be carried out. p. 367

[432] This draft was written in connection with the discussion by the Politbureau on December 1, 1921, of the question of the tactics of a united workers' front. Lenin's proposals were adopted. They formed the basis of the Comintern Executive's theses "On the United Workers' Front and the Attitude to the Workers Belonging to the II, II½ and Amsterdam Internationals, as Well as the Workers Who Support the Anarcho-Syndicalist Organisations". Lenin's remarks on the theses (see p. 368 of this volume) were also taken into consideration. The theses were published in the journal *The Communist International* No. 20 for 1921. The Eleventh All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) (December 19-21, 1921) subscribed to these theses. They were discussed and endorsed by the first enlarged plenary meeting of the Comintern Executive (February 21-March 4 1922) and by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern.

Lenin's "Notes on the History of the R.C.P." (see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 552-54) were made in connection with the proposal that Bukharin should write an article summing up the experience of the R.C.P.(B.) p. 367

[433] This refers to the State Planning Commission's draft decision for the C.L.D. concerning the liquidation of the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources under the C.L.D.

§§ 2 and 3 of the State Planning Commission's draft stated that the planning of distribution of the goods produced by the state industrial enterprises and the distribution of food resources was to be carried out respectively by the planning commissions of the Supreme Economic Council and the Food Commissariat while the State Planning Commission was to integrate these plans into a general plan of distribution of material resources and submit it to the C.L.D. § 5 laid down the terminal date and order of liquidation of the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources.

Lenin's motion was adopted at the meeting of the C.L.D. on December 2, 1921. The State Planning Commission's revised draft decision on the C.U.M.R. was endorsed by the C.L.D. on December 16. p. 367

[434] Lenin's draft was written in connection with the discussion by the Politbureau at its meeting on December 5, 1921, of the S.E.C.'s complaint against the decision of the C.L.D. withdrawing the flour-mills from the jurisdiction of the S.E.C. and placing them in charge of the Commissariat for Food. The Politbureau confirmed the decision of the C.L.D. and directed the Narrow Council of People's Commissars to pass a supplementary decision as proposed by Lenin. p. 368

[435] Cf. Note 432. p. 368

[436] *The Propaganda and Action Council of the Peoples of the East* was elected at the First Congress of the Peoples of the East held in Baku in September 1920. The Council set itself the task of supporting and uniting the liberation movement of the peoples of the East. p. 369

[437] Lenin's remarks on the draft resolution for the Eleventh Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Party purge were taken into consideration by the drafting committee.

The conference discussed the results of the Party purge and adopted a resolution "On the Question of Strengthening the Party as a Result of the Verification of Its Membership", which was drafted in its final version at a meeting of regional committees, regional bureaux and Gubernia Committees of the R.C.P. and endorsed by the Central Committee and the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, pp. 597-98). p. 370

[438] *The Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets* sat in Moscow on December 23-28, 1921. It was attended by 1,993 delegates, of whom 1,631 were voting delegates and 362 had a consultative voice. 1,850 delegates were Communists, 139 non-Party people, and one delegate each with a consultative voice from the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Anarcho-Universalists, the Jewish Social-Democratic Labour Party Poale Zion and the Molokan communities.

The congress discussed the reports and passed the following decisions: 1) Resolution on the report of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the C.P.C. on the Republic's home and foreign policies; 2) Declaration on the international position of the R.S.F.S.R.; 3) Resolution on the building up of the Red Army and Navy; 4) Resolution on relief to the famine-stricken areas; 5) Appeal for collection of the tax in kind; 6) Instructions on questions of economic activities; 7) Resolution on the preliminary results of the New Economic Policy and on the Republic's industry; 8) Resolution on measures for strengthening and developing agriculture; 9) Resolution on agricultural co-operation; 10) Resolution on finances and the budget; 11) Resolution of the C.P.C. on electrification endorsed by the Ninth Congress of Soviets;

12) Resolution on Soviet administrative activities; 13) Resolution on the Vecheka.

Lenin put in a great deal of work in preparing for the congress and directing its proceedings (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 141-81).

The Meeting of Non-Party Delegates held on the evening of December 26, 1921, discussed two questions: that of the compulsory carting tax (reporter Lemberg, representative of the Commissariat for Labour), and the agrarian question. The meeting was chaired by M. I. Kalinin.

The first two speeches were delivered by Lenin during the discussion of the carting tax question, the second speech following a request by one of the congress delegates asking Lenin to say a few words "about the servicing of Soviet institutions".

Lenin's third speech was delivered during the discussion of the agrarian question following a speech by Kalinin. Lenin made brief notes of the speeches at the meeting (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 292-94, 297-98). p. 370

[439] *Zheleskoms*—Russian abbreviated name for Railway Logging Committees supervising felling operations and the carting of wood to the railway stations for the needs of industry and transport. p. 372

[440] Pointing out that twenty instead of five non-Party peasants would now be elected to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Kalinin said: "Some comrades say that we elect men by their beards. Excuse me, Comrades, but a beard means a lot to a peasant. It stands for his way of life, his thinking, and the best example is the peasant Petrushkin sitting here next to me. If Comrade Lenin says, 'I'll go and burn all the prayer-books', I'd like to know the opinion of a non-Party man, and I'll ask Petrushkin what the peasants will think of my wanting to burn the prayer-books. He'll say, 'Who cares, let them burn'. He's a young man, but if I ask a bearded man he'll say we ought to wait a bit. This means a lot to us" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* [Historical Archives], No. 2, 1962, p. 76). p. 373

[441] Lenin started writing the *Draft Theses on the Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy* soon after the plenum of the C.C, R.C.P.(B.) on December 28, 1921. The draft theses were discussed by members of the commission (A. A. Andreyev and Y. E. Rudzutak) and members of the Politbureau; in the course of the discussion amendments and addenda were introduced. On January 12, 1922, the draft was discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau, which resolved that "the text of the theses proposed by Lenin be adopted as a basis.... The theses with all the amendments to be referred to an editorial committee consisting of Comrades Lenin, Zinoviev, Andreyev and Bukharin for final endorsement and publication in the name of the Central Committee with mention that the theses are

supported by the Bureau of the Party group at the A.C.C.T.U. (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism).

The final text of the theses was published on January 17, 1922, in *Pravda* as a decision of the Central Committee, R.C.P., representing the C.C.'s draft theses on the question of the trade unions for the Eleventh Congress of the Party. The congress adopted the C.C.'s theses as a basis; during their discussion in the committee several amendments were Introduced (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, pp. 603-12).

Volume 33 of this edition gives the final text of the Central Committee's decision on "The Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy". The present volume gives Lenin's draft of the theses. p. 374

442 *Pravda* for January 3, 1922, published a news-item reporting the "Suicide of Engineer Oldenborger" which stated: "The Moscow Soviet, in agreement with the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P., appointed a special commission to investigate the causes of the suicide of V. V. Oldenborger, Chief Engineer of the Moscow Municipal Waterworks. The Commission found that the deceased was not only a highly skilled employee, but a man utterly devoted to his work. The cause of suicide were the difficult conditions, which interfered with the daily routine of Oldenborger's work. Some of the members of the Waterworks Special Trio, instead of trying to improve things at Moscow's Waterworks, made them more difficult and complicated than ever; Engineer Semyonov, Chief Inspector of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, who is a member of this Trio, was rude, cavilling and bureaucratic in his relations with Oldenborger; Makarov-Zemlyansky, Chief Inspector of the same commissariat and a former clerk at the Waterworks, carried on a ceaseless persecution of Oldenborger; and Yelagin and Merkulov, workers of the Alexeyevsk Pump-House, accused Oldenborger groundlessly of technical disorganisation of the Waterworks and of an attitude of disrespect towards the communist group on the part of the employees. All this was bound to have its effect on the emotional state of the deceased. The commission considers the continued employment of Makarov-Zemlyansky impermissible not only in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, but in Soviet service generally, as being a person who is alien to the spirit of Soviet service, an intrigant who has earned among the employees of the Waterworks the reputation of being a dishonest man. The commission also found that engineer Semyonov of the W.P.I. should not be allowed to continue work at the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection or to have anything to do with the Moscow Municipal Waterworks, and likewise considers it necessary that Yelagin and Merkulov should be dismissed from the Waterworks and transferred to some other enterprise."

See also pp. 386-87 of this volume. p. 384

[443] Lenin's proposal that a commission be set up to check and replace some of the leading personnel in the trade unions was based on the fact that the trade unions were honeycombed with former Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and that it was necessary to fix a longer record of Communist Party membership for leading trade union officials in keeping with the resolution of the Eleventh All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P. "On the Question of Strengthening the Party as a Result of the Verification of Its Membership" (see "*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*", Part I, 1954, p. 596).

Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau. On January 20 1922, a commission was set up consisting of M. P. Tomsky A. A. Andreyev and S. I. Syrtsov. The commission reported its findings to the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (see *The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) Verbatim Report*, 1961, pp. 246-52). p. 386

[444] Lenin's draft decisions were adopted by the Politbureau at its meeting on January 5, 1922.

The Oldenborger suicide case was examined by the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russia C.E.C. on March 8-14, 1922, and the guilty parties were sentenced to various punishments. p. 387

[445] The question of increased financing for radio developments was examined by the Politbureau at its meeting on January 20, 1922. The Politbureau agreed with Lenin's motion and approved the decision of the Commissariat for Finance on this question. p. 388

[446] The Managing Department of the C.P.C. forwarded this document to the Commissariat for Education on January 27, 1922, with the following covering letter: "I am sending you for guidance Vladimir Ilyich's directives on the film business." The Commissariat for Education was instructed: "1) On the basis of these directives to draw up a programme of action and forward it immediately to the Managing Department of the C.P.C. for report to Vladimir Ilyich. 2) To submit to the Managing Department of the C.P.C. within one month a report on what has actually been done in pursuance of these directives and what results have been achieved. 3) To immediately report what functions have been retained by the Commissariat for Education after the promulgation of the last decision of the Council of Labour and Defence on the film business and who is directly in charge of the performance of these functions" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

In a conversation, with A. V. Lunacharsky in February 1922 Lenin "once more stressed the necessity of establishing a definite proportion between entertainment films and scientific films". Vladimir Ilyich, Lunacharsky writes in his reminiscences, said that the production of new films imbued with communist ideas and reflecting Soviet realities should be started with newsreel,

since, in his opinion, the time had not yet come for the production of such films. "If you have a good newsreel, serious and enlightening pictures, it doesn't really matter if you show some worthless film with them of a more or less usual type to attract the public. A censorship, of course, will be needed. Counter-revolutionary and immoral films should be barred." To this Lenin added: "As you find your feet, what with proper handling of the business, and receive certain loans to carry on, depending on the general improvement in the country's position, you will have to expand production, and particularly make headway with useful films among the masses in the cities, and still more in the countryside.... You must remember always that of all the arts the most important for us is the cinema" (*Sovietskoye Kino* No. 1-2, 1933, p. 10). p. 389

447 Lenin's proposal on Kalinin's trip to the Ukraine was adopted by the Politbureau on January 28. Kalinin made the trip on February 7-18 and March 5-18, 1922, with the agittrain "October Revolution" along the route: Poltava—Mirgorod—Kiev—Belaya Tserkov—Kremenchug—Odessa—Zhmerinka—Kamenets Podolsk—Vinnitsa—Berdichev—Zhitomir. p. 389

448 This refers to an article entitled "The Ninth Congress of Soviets and the Peasantry" published in *Pravda* on January 27, 1922, over the signature Bespartiiny (Non-Party-Man). The writer propounded a plan for popularising among the peasantry the decisions of the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on peasant questions. Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on January 28, 1922. p. 390

449 The idea of an international conference to deal with all questions concerning the establishment of peace and economic co-operation in Europe, and also the question of Russian debts, was put forward by the Soviet Government, who addressed Notes to this effect to Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and the U.S.A. (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 44, pp. 185-88). The decision to convene an international economic and financial conference was taken by the Supreme Allied Council at a conference in Cannes on January 6, 1922. The Allies invited Soviet Russia to the conference in the hope of forcing from her a number of political and economic concessions while at the same time establishing economic relations with her.

The Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference was elected at an emergency session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on January 27. Lenin was appointed head of the delegation with Chicherin as his deputy "vested with all the rights as chairman in the event of circumstances preventing Comrade Lenin from attending the conference". Among the other members of the delegation were L. B. Krasin, M. M. Litvinov, N. N. Narimanov, V. V. Vorovsky and Y. E. Rudzutak. The question of Lenin going to Genoa was widely discussed by the people of the Soviet Republics. Numerous letters were received expressing

apprehension for his life and safety and declaring against his going to the conference. The Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) passed a special decision on this question, under which Lenin resigned his commission to Chicherin as head of the delegation.

Lenin directed the work of the delegation, drew up the C.C.'s directives for it, and other important documents bearing on Soviet Russia's participation in the Genoa Conference (see pp. 394-95, 396-98, 401-04, 410 of this volume, and volumes 44 and 45 of the Fifth Russian Edition).

The Genoa Conference sat from April 10 to May 19, 1922. It was attended by representatives from 29 countries. The declaration by the Soviet delegation, which was approved by Lenin and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars, stated: "While remaining true to the principles of communism, the Russian delegation recognises that in the present epoch, which makes the parallel existence of the old and the emergent new social system possible, economic co-operation between states representing the two systems of property is imperatively necessary for universal economic reconstruction" (*Materialy Genuezskoi konferentsii*. [Materials of the Genoa Conference.] Verbatim Report. Moscow, 1922, p. 78).

The Genoa Conference failed to settle the problems confronting it. The Soviet delegation vigorously repelled the attempts of the imperialist powers to impose a colonial status upon Soviet Russia (the establishment of control over Soviet finances, etc.). By proposing talks on a general reduction of armaments and the banning of the most barbarous methods of warfare (poison gases, military aircraft), the Soviet delegation demonstrated to the world the peace-loving nature of Soviet Russia's Leninist foreign policy. p. 390

450 Lenin here alludes to the policy of partial concessions which the British Government of Lloyd George carried out in the early twenties in order to suppress the revolutionary movement for national liberation in Ireland and Egypt.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed on December 6, 1920, following a long and hard struggle for national independence by the Irish people. The Treaty provided for the establishment of a dominion "Irish Free State" within the British Empire. Six north-eastern counties (Ulster), the most industrially developed part of Ireland, were alienated to Great Britain.

After crushing the rebellion of the Egyptian people against British rule in December 1921, the British Government was compelled in February 1922 to terminate its protectorate and proclaim Egypt an "independent kingdom". Egypt, however, became only nominally "independent", since all her territory remained occupied by Britain, who controlled the Suez Canal zone, ruled Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, etc. p. 393

451 The reference is to the forthcoming conference of the three Internationals (the II, II½ and III Communist International). The

Communist International's active fight for the creation of a united workers' front against the onset of the bourgeoisie and the leaning towards unity of action on the part of the working masses compelled the leadership of the II½ International on January 19, 1922, to send a proposal to the Comintern Executive for convening an international conference in the spring of 1922 to consider the problems of Europe's economic position and action by the working class against the onset of reaction. p. 393

452 *Smena Vekh* (Change of Landmarks) a weekly journal published in Paris from October 1921 to March 1922 by a group of White émigré intellectuals. The same group published a collection of articles under this title in Prague in July 1921. A socio-political trend formed around this journal and the collection, which became known as *Smenovekhism* (its ideologists were N. V. Ustryalov, Y. V. Klyuchnikov, S. S. Lukyanov, A. V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, S. S. Chakhotin, Y. N. Potekhin and others).

A slight revival of capitalist elements in Soviet Russia following the introduction of the New Economic Policy served as the social foundation for this trend. The Smena Vekhists regarded the N.E.P. as an evolution of Soviet rule towards the restoration of capitalism. They stood for co-operation with the Soviet government in the hope of the Soviet state evolving back into a bourgeois state. Some of them were prepared loyally to co-operate with the Soviet government and contribute to the country's economic revival. The Twelfth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) (August 4-7, 1922), in its Resolution on Anti-Soviet Parties and Trends, pointed out: "The so-called Smena Vekh trend has so far played and may still play an objectively progressive role. It is rallying those groups of émigrés and Russian intellectuals who have "reconciled" themselves to the Soviet government and are prepared to work with it for reviving the country. *To this extent* the Smena Vekh trend merits a favourable attitude towards it. At the same time it should never for a moment be forgotten that there are strong tendencies towards bourgeois restoration among its adherents, who share with the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries the hope that economic concessions will be followed by political concessions towards a bourgeois democracy, etc." (*The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, p. 671). Eventually, most of the Smena Vekh people sided openly with the counter-revolution. A comment on this trend is given by Lenin in his report to the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P. (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 285-86). p. 394

453 Lenin's note to the Politbureau followed the publication on February 2, 1922, in *Izvestia* of a telegram from Warsaw reporting the gist of Parvus's pamphlet *Der wirtschaftliche Rettungsweg* in which its author justified the annexationist plans of German imperialism in the East, plans for colonial enslavement of the

peoples of Soviet Russia. There, in Eastern Europe, Parvus wrote, "the way is open for German expansion, for German might, for German thrift".

Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on February 8. After investigations into this matter the Politbureau passed a decision on March 11, 1922 (see the next document). p. 395

[454] The addenda to the directives of the C.C. contained in this document were adopted by the Politbureau on February 8, 1922. p. 396

[455] *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* (Co-operative Business)—a socio-economic, co-operative and trade daily, organ of Centrosoyuz. The Editor-in-Chief was N. L. Meshcheryakov. Publication started on February 1, 1922.

Lenin's motion (see the next document) was put before the Politbureau at its meeting on February 15, 1922. A decision was passed "To require the editorial board of *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* to submit to the Politbureau within three days an explanation in writing concerning the newspaper's publication, its character, the composition of its editorial board, staff and contributors" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.). The question was dealt with a second time on February 22, when it was decided to postpone the closing down of the newspaper for a fortnight. A final decision was reached in May, the newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* being converted into a weekly. p. 398

[456] The first extended plenary meeting of the Comintern Executive was held in Moscow from February 21 to March 4, 1922. It was attended by 105 delegates from 36 countries. The highlight of the meeting was the question of the tactics of the united front. In addition, the meeting heard a report on the situation within the various sections of the Comintern, and other questions. The meeting adopted the theses on the struggle against war and the war menace, the theses on the New Economic Policy, a decision on the tactics of the united front, a resolution on the participation of the Comintern in the proposed conference of the three Internationals, and a number of other documents.

Lenin did not sit in at the meeting owing to ill-health, but he took an active part in preparing the meeting and elaborated the tactics for the Comintern delegation to the conference of the three Internationals (see pp. 393-94, 406, etc. of this volume).

Lenin's proposed amendments to the draft resolution on participation in the conference of the three Internationals were adopted by the Politbureau of the C.C. on February 23, 1922.

A resolution on this point was adopted by the first plenary meeting of the Comintern Executive on March 4, 1922. p. 400

[457] Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on February 28, 1922, with the following amendments moved by Stalin: "1. The question regarding *recognition of the Soviet government* should

be raised not at the beginning but at the close of the conference (after attempts had been made to reach an economic agreement), and no ultimatum should be made of it; 2. *Centrosoyuz, the agricultural co-operative*, etc., should not be put forward at the conference in the capacity of subjects (contracting parties) (as Krasin suggests), and only a single subject—the Russian state should be taken into consideration" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.). p. 404

[458] The same day the Politbureau adopted Lenin's proposal, and Chicherin sent a radio-telegram to the Italian Foreign Minister on the question of the date for convening the Genoa Conference (see *Izvestia* No. 47, February 28, 1922). p. 404

[459] The new regulations governing the Narrow Council of People's Commissars were endorsed by the C.P.C. on October 31, 1922. p. 405

[460] Negotiations for a loan were being conducted with the Swedish Government and Swedish business circles by representatives of Soviet Russia since the autumn of 1921. Lenin wrote his proposal after reading the terms of the loan and the views of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and of the People's Commissar for Finance N. N. Krestinsky on the matter. p. 405

[461] This letter was written in connection with the drafting by the Comintern Executive of directives for the Comintern's delegation to the conference of the three Internationals. It is a comment on the directives which G. Y. Zinoviev drafted and sent to Lenin on March 14, 1922, with a request to express his opinion on them before the draft was submitted to the Comintern Executive.

These directives, amended in accordance with Lenin's remarks and proposals, were approved by the Politbureau, and unanimously endorsed by the Comintern Executive on March 17. p. 406

[462] The Politbureau adopted Lenin's proposal on March 18, 1922. p. 408

[463] Lenin's letter was written in connection with the following incident. Following numerous complaints of abuses practised in the Central Housing Department of the Moscow Soviet, an inspection of this department was undertaken. Similar complaints having been received addressed to Lenin, the inspection was carried out with the close co-operation of the C.P.C.'s Business Manager (A. A. Divilkovsky). The inspection revealed abuses practised by a number of top members of the staff of the Central Housing Department with the connivance of the Department Chief of the Moscow Communal Services Sovetnikov, a member of the Party. The Bureau of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), at a joint meeting with the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet on March 14, declared the findings of the inspection commission to be unfounded and decided to refer the matter to a new,

Party commission for revision. In his letter to N. P. Gorbunov dated March 15, copies of which were forwarded to all members of the Politbureau for their information, Divilkovsky stressed that this decision ran counter to Lenin's instructions that "bureaucratic banditism, especially when practised by suspicious elements who have wormed their way into the Party" should be relentlessly prosecuted, and he asked that this decision be reversed and the guilty parties put on trial (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.).

When sending his letter to Molotov for members of the Politbureau, Lenin wrote on it: "Gorbunov, forward **immediately**, *show to Tsyurupa and Rykov.*" p. 408

464 This document was written in connection with L. M. Khinchuk's letter dated March 17, 1922, asking Lenin for instructions whether or not the question of voluntary principle of membership of the co-operatives should be raised at the forthcoming Fifth Session of the Delegates' Council of Centrosoyuz. Lenin's proposals were incorporated in the decision of the Politbureau of May 12, 1922, "On Compulsory Membership, Voluntary Contributions and Unity of Consumers' Co-operatives". p. 409

465 All Lenin's amendments and remarks to the draft declaration for the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference submitted by Chicherin were taken into consideration. This declaration was read out by Chicherin at the first plenary session of the Genoa Conference on April 10, 1922. p. 410

466 Lenin is referring to the following draft speech submitted by Chicherin: "We attach the greatest importance to Point One of the Cannes resolution concerning mutual recognition of the political and economic systems in both camps of the present-day world" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.). This text in Chicherin's draft is marked off by Lenin in the margin. The words in Chicherin's draft referred to in points 2, 3 and 4 of Lenin's remarks are underlined by Lenin. p. 410

467 *The Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.* (*B.*) was held in Moscow from March 27 to April 2, 1922. It was attended by 522 voting delegates and 164 delegates with a consultative voice.

The items on the agenda were: 1) The political report of the Central Committee; 2) The organisational report of the Central Committee; 3) The report of the Auditing Commission; 4) The report of the Central Control Commission; 5) The report of the R.C.P. delegation in the Comintern; 6) The trade unions; 7) The Red Army; 8) Financial policy; 9) Results of the Party purge and the strengthening of the Party's ranks; co-reports on work with young people and on the press and propaganda; 10) Elections to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. In addition, the congress set up a commission to prepare the

question of Party work in the countryside for discussion in the Agrarian Section of the Party Congress and for drafting a resolution.

Considerable preparatory work for the congress was carried out by the C.C. under Lenin's direction. The most important documents of the congress were drafted by Lenin or with Lenin's help. Lenin opened the congress, delivered the political report of the C.C., wound up the debate on the report, spoke about the printing of advertisement in *Pravda*, and made the closing speech at the congress.

See also present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 259-326. p. 411

[468] Lenin's wording was incorporated wholly in the resolution of the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) "On the Report of the R.C.P. Delegation in the Comintern" adopted on April 2, 1922 (see *The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Part I, 1954, pp. 601-03). p. 411

[469] During the discussion of the resolution "On the Press and Propaganda" at the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), D. B. Ryazanov moved an addendum, proposing that advertisements should not be printed in the Party press. The congress adopted the motion with the amendment that advertisements were to be forbidden not in the Party press as a whole, but only in *Pravda*. Lenin was not in attendance at the moment. Upon hearing of the congress decision he wrote the following note to L. B. Kamenev who had chaired that session: "Comrade Kamenev, I hear that the congress has placed a ban on advertisements in *Pravda*? Cannot this be mended, it's an obvious mistake?" (*Lenin Miscellany XIII*, 1930, p. 29). Kamenev did not think the decision could be altered, and suggested that other ways be found for supporting *Pravda*. However, after the list of members of the C.C. and the Central Control Commission elected by the congress had been announced, Lenin took the floor and proposed that this decision be reversed on the grounds that under the New Economic Policy it would be incorrect to depend upon appropriations for the press being made from the gold fund or revenue receipts. His motion was adopted.

Since Lenin's speech was taken down in shorthand only partially and inadequately at that, the version printed in this volume is incomplete. p. 411

[470] The C.C. plenum on April 3, 1922, adopted this draft with the following addendum: "...in order that Comrade Stalin may be completely released from work in the Worker' and Peasants' Inspection." Following the plenum's decision to appoint Stalin General Secretary of the C.C. of the R.C.P., he was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection under a decision of the Council of People's Commissars dated April 25, 1922. p. 413

[471] The Politbureau adopted Lenin's motion on April 12, 1922. p. 414

[472] *The Conference of the Three Internationals* was held in Berlin from April 2 to 5, 1922.

A sharp struggle developed at the conference between the representatives of the II and II½ Internationals on the one hand, and the Communist International on the other. The Comintern delegation put forward a proposal that a world congress should be convened, in which the trade unions and other organisations of the workers would participate, to discuss questions concerning the fight against the onset of capital, against reaction, and against preparations for new imperialist wars, concerning aid for the rehabilitation of Soviet Russia, the Treaty of Versailles, and the rehabilitation of the devastated areas. The representatives of the II International, supported by the delegation of the II½ International, tried to impose unacceptable terms on the Comintern delegation, namely: the separation of Georgia from the Soviet state, renunciation of communist cells in the mass workers' organisations and the release of political criminals. The Comintern delegation (Bukharin, Radek, and C. Zetkin), while rejecting these terms, nevertheless agreed to the condition that the Soviet authorities would not apply the death penalty in the case of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and would allow representatives of the II and II½ Internationals to attend the trial. In his article "We Have Paid Too Much", Lenin severely criticised these concessions on the part of the Comintern delegation at the Berlin Conference, which he considered erroneous (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 330-34).

A general declaration was adopted at the conference recognising the possibility of holding joint meetings and issuing joint statements on concrete issues. The declaration called upon all the working people to hold mass demonstrations during the Genoa Conference with slogans to fight for an eight-hour day, against unemployment, against the onset of capital upon the working class, in defence of the Russian revolution, in aid of Russia's famine-stricken areas, for the resumption by all states of political and economic relations with Soviet Russia, for the establishment of a united proletarian front in all countries on a national and international scale. The conference went on record for the speedy convocation of a world congress and set up a steering committee of nine members (three from each International) to prepare further conferences and a congress.

However, the reformist leadership of the II and II½ Internationals who accepted this agreement under pressure from the broad masses of the working people, torpedoed and sabotaged the united struggle of the working class. On May 21, 1922, a number of parties of the II and II½ Internationals passed a decision to call a world congress at the Hague without the Communists. By this means the reformist leaders blocked the effort to create a united front of the workers. In view of this the Comintern delegation at the meeting of the steering committee on May 23,

1922, in Berlin, announced its withdrawal from the Committee of Nine.

Lenin's remarks and proposals were made to the following draft decision for the Presidium of the Comintern Executive in connection with the Berlin Conference of the Three Internationals: "1) To step up the campaign against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries throughout the international communist press. 2) To start making systematic use of the material of the Berlin Conference for attacking every weak spot of the opponent. 3) The general appeals of the Nine not to be issued for the time being. 4) In agitation during the demonstration on April 20, to be free-spoken in criticising our opponents. 5) The various sections act according to the concrete conditions. 6) Any new steps by the delegation to be postponed until the question of ratifying the Berlin results is dealt with" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.).

Zinoviev sent this draft to Lenin with a request that he give his opinion on it the same day before the Presidium of the Comintern Executive met. p. 415

[473] *The New York Herald*—an American daily, organ of the Republican Party. Published in New York from 1835 to 1924. p. 417

[474] The question of publishing the works of G. V. Plekhanov was tabled in the Politbureau on Lenin's proposal. The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. contain a copy of the agenda of the Politbureau meeting on April 27, 1922, listing 19 items, to which was added in Lenin's hand: "*Plekhanov's Works*". p. 417

[475] Lenin's motion was adopted by the Politbureau on May 11, 1922.

Following the decision of the Politbureau a joint meeting of representatives of the Central Statistical Board, the State Planning Commission, the Food Commissariat and the Commissariat for Agriculture was held on May 16 at which the form for supplying information on the amount of the tax in kind collected in 1921-22 and expected in 1922-23 was endorsed. p. 418

[476] This document was written in connection with the discussion of the question of the foreign trade monopoly which was taking place in leading Party circles at the end of 1921 and during 1922.

The monopoly of foreign trade, established by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 22, 1918, was repeatedly reconfirmed in decisions of the Soviet Government. The adoption of the New Economic Policy and expansion of trade relations with foreign countries necessitated legislative amendments in the sphere of foreign trade. The Theses on Foreign Trade, which A. M. Lezhava, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, drafted at Lenin's request, stressed the need for strengthening

the monopoly of foreign trade and determined the conditions for the export and import of goods under the new conditions. Lenin approved the Theses, which were accepted on January 4, 1922, by the Supreme Economic Commission of the C.P.C. G. Y. Sokolnikov, N. I. Bukharin and G. L. Pyatakov were against retaining the monopoly of foreign trade. Sokolnikov proposed that it be abolished and replaced by a system of trade concessions. J. V. Stalin, G. Y. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev stood for a relaxation of the monopoly of foreign trade. The Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P. approved the Theses on March 4, 1922, with certain amendments. The final version of the Theses was endorsed on March 10. On the basis of these Theses the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on March 13, 1922, passed its decision "On Foreign Trade" (published in *Izvestia*. No. 60, March 15, 1922).

Despite the decision of the Politbureau, Sokolnikov continued to press his point of view and proposed a plan under which the state corporations, co-operatives, etc. were to be allowed to buy food abroad; M. I. Frumkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, also stood for a relaxation of the foreign trade monopoly and proposed leaving only 4 or 5 items of wholesale trade in the hands of the state on the basis of a firm monopoly.

Following the receipt of documents from N. N. Krestinsky the R.S.F.S.R. Ambassador in Germany, testifying to the adverse influence which the Party controversy on the foreign trade monopoly was having on the business negotiations with foreign capitalists, Lenin on May 15 wrote the draft decision printed here, together with a letter to Stalin and Frumkin in which he pointed out that "*a formal ban should be put* on all talk and negotiations and commissions, etc. concerning the relaxation of the foreign trade monopoly" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 260). Stalin wrote on Lenin's letter: "I have no objections to a 'formal ban' on measures to *mitigate* the foreign trade monopoly at the *present* stage. All the same, I think that *mitigation* is becoming indispensable" (Lenin. *A Biography*, Moscow, 1966, p. 517).

Lenin's draft decision was endorsed by the Politbureau on May 22. See also present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 455-59; Vol. 45, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 33-39. p. 418

[477] These documents were written by Lenin in connection with the drafting of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. by the People's Commissriat for Justice and its discussion at the Third Session of the Ninth Convocation of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, which took place from May 12 to 26, 1922. The addenda and the first letter were written by Lenin to the draft "Preamble to the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R." sent him by D. I. Kursky, People's Commissar for Justice. After a talk with Kursky on this question, Lenin wrote his second letter with the rough draft of an additional Article to the Criminal Code.

Lenin's proposals were taken into consideration during the later drafting of the section of the Criminal Code dealing with "Counter-Revolutionary Crimes".

The Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. was endorsed by the Third Session of the All-Russia C.E.C. and put in force on June 1, 1922 (see *Collection of Statutes and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government* (Russ. ed.), Moscow, 1922, No. 15, June 1, Article 153, pp. 202-39). p. 419

[478] Lenin's letter was a reply to the inquiry of the Secretariat of the C.C., R.C.P., asking whether or not the question of reducing the size of the Red Army should be raised at the Third Session of the All-Russia C.E.C. of the Ninth Convocation. A plan for reducing the size of the Red Army was being drafted by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in connection with the question of a possible general reduction in armaments which had been raised by the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference. This question was included in the agenda of the Third Session in a tentative form, depending on the results of the Genoa Conference. On May 24, 1822, the All-Russia C.E.C. passed a resolution which stated: "Thanks to the line pursued by our delegation, the Genoa Conference gives ground for hoping that a serious reduction of the army is possible." The resolution went on to say: "The Genoa Conference, however, has provided no solution to the most pressing problems concerning the relations between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states, leaving fundamental issues to be dealt with at the Hague...." In view of this the question of reducing the army was removed from the agenda of the Third Session. The session asked the Government and the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs to table a pertinent motion when the results of the Hague Conference had been ascertained (see *Third Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Ninth Convocation. Bulletin No. 10* (Russ. ed.), May 26, 1922, pp. 18-19). p. 420

[479] The Politbureau discussed Lenin's motion at its meeting on May 26, 1922, and decided to pass it on as material to the commission set up by the C.C. to steer the work of the Third Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Ninth Convocation. p. 420

[480] *The First Congress of Working Women of Transcaucasia* opened in Baku on May 26, 1922. The following reports were made at the congress: development of the women's movement in Soviet Russia and throughout the world and the tasks of the International Women's Secretariat; the working women of Transcaucasia and the Third International; the present situation, and others. The congress closed on May 30.

Lenin's greetings to the congress were written in reply to a massage from the working women of Georgia, Armenia and

Azerbaijan notifying him that he had been elected delegate to the congress of working women of Transcaucasia.

The greetings were read out at the opening meeting of the congress. p. 421

481 On August 10, 1922, the Politbureau directed the Orgbureau to set up a commission to go into the question of relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the independent national Soviet Republics in preparation for the next plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee. This commission, set up on August 11, consisted of J. V. Stalin, V. V. Kuibyshev, G. K. Orjonikidze, K. G. Rakovsky, G. Y. Sokolnikov and representatives of the national republics—S. A. Agamali-ogly (Azerbaijan), A. F. Myasnikov (Armenia), P. G. Mdivani (Georgia), G. I. Petrovsky (Ukraine), A. G. Chervyakov (Byelorussia) and others.

Stalin drafted the commission's resolution "On the Relations Between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Independent Republics", which provided for the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia entering the Russian Federation as autonomous republics. Stalin's draft was forwarded for discussion to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet national republics. It was supported by the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The C.C. of the Georgian Communist Party was against the draft resolution. At its meeting on September 15, 1922, it passed the following decision by a majority vote: "The union in the form of autonomisation of the independent republics proposed on the basis of Stalin's theses is premature. A union of economic efforts and a common policy are necessary, but all attributes of independence should be preserved." The C.C. of the Byelorussian Communist Party went on record for the preservation of treaty relations between the independent republics. The C.C. of the Ukrainian C.P. did not discuss the draft.

The commission met on September 23 and 24, 1922, with V. M. Molotov in the chair. It approved Stalin's draft (with one abstention—the representative from Georgia). In a special point the commission rejected the resolution of the C.C. of the Georgian Communist Party. Stalin's draft was gone over point by point and approved by a majority with certain minor amendments and addenda. Point 2 stating that the decisions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence of the R.S.F.S.R. were binding upon the corresponding bodies of the national republics was carried by an 8 to 1 majority (Mdivani voting against and Petrovsky abstaining).

The final wording of the commission's resolution, which Lenin deals with in his letter to the members of the Politbureau, was as follows:

"1. It is considered advisable that treaties be concluded between the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and the R.S.F.S.R. for their formal entry

into the R.S.F.S.R., the question of Bokhara, Kharezm and the Far-Eastern Republic being left open and confined to agreements with them on customs arrangements, foreign trade, foreign and military affairs, and so on.

"Note: Corresponding changes in the constitutions of the Republics mentioned in Point 1 and of the R.S.F.S.R. to be made after enactment by Soviet procedure.

"2. In accordance with this the decisions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. shall be considered binding upon the central bodies of the republics mentioned in Point 1, while the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence of the R.S.F.S.R. shall be binding upon the unified commissariats of these republics.

"Note: These republics are to be represented on the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. of the R.S.F.S.R.

"3. External affairs (foreign affairs and foreign trade), military affairs, ways of communication (with the exception of local transport) and Potel (the People's Commissariat for Post and Telegraph—*Ed.*) of the republics mentioned in Point 1 shall be merged with those of the R.S.F.S.R., the corresponding commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R. having their agents and a small staff in the republics.

"The agents are appointed by the People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. by arrangement with the Central Executive Committees of the republics.

"It is considered advisable that the republics concerned be represented on the corresponding foreign agencies of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

"4. The Commissariats for Finance, Food, Labour and National Economy of the republics shall be formally subject to the directives of the corresponding R.S.F.S.R. commissariats.

"5. The remaining commissariats of the republics mentioned in Point 1, namely, the Commissariats for Justice, Education, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Public Health and Social Security, shall be considered independent.

"Note 1: The agencies fighting counter-revolution in the aforementioned republics shall be subject to the directives of the G.P.U. of the R.S.F.S.R.

"Note 2: The Central Executive Committees of the republics shall be granted the right of amnesty only in civil cases.

"6. This decision, if approved by the C.C. of the R.C.P., shall not be published, but shall be passed on to the national Central Committees as a circular directive to be enacted through the Central Executive Committee or the Congress of Soviets of the aforementioned republics pending the convocation of an All-Russia Congress of Soviets, at which it is to be declared as the desire of these republics" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.).

On September 25 the commission's materials (Stalin's draft, the resolution and minutes of the commission's meetings, and the resolutions of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) were sent to Lenin at Gorki. Simultaneously, without waiting for Lenin s instructions and without the question being considered in the Politbureau, the Secretariat of the C.C. sent the commission's resolution to all the members and alternate members of the C.C. in preparation for the latter's plenary meeting fixed for October 5.

After studying the Commission's material Lenin wrote his letter to the members of the Politbureau which is published in this volume. The letter is dated September 27, apparently this is a slip of the pen, since the Registration Book of Lenin's Letters, Notes and Instructions bears an entry stating that this letter was forwarded to the members of the Politbureau on September 26; moreover, Lenin's conversation with Stalin, to which reference is made in the letter, took place on September 26; it can be inferred from this that Lenin's letter was written on September 26.

In his letter to the members of the Politbureau Lenin came out against Stalin's idea of "autonomisation" of the independent national Soviet Republics and suggested a fundamentally different way of uniting them by creating a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see also Lenin's letter "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 605-11).

In accordance with Lenin's proposals the resolution drafted by the C.C.'s Commission was revised.

The new resolution was worded as follows:

"1. It is considered necessary that a treaty be concluded between the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics and the R.S.F.S.R. for their amalgamation in a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, each reserving the right to freely secede from membership of the Union.

"2. The supreme body of the Union shall be the Union Central Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the central executive committees of the R.S.F.S.R., the Transcaucasian Federation, the Ukraine and Byelorussia pro rata to the population they represent.

"3. The executive organ of the Union C.E.C. shall be the Union Council of People's Commissars appointed by the Union C.E.C.

"4. The People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Military Affairs, Railways and Post and Telegraph of the republics and federations comprising the Union shall be merged with those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the corresponding commissariats of the Union of Republics having in the republics and federations their agents and a small staff appointed by the People's Commissars of the Union by arrangement with the Central Executive Committees of the federations and republics.

"Note: It is considered necessary for the republics concerned to be represented on the corresponding foreign agencies of the

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

"5. The People's Commissariats for Finance, Food, National Economy, Labour and Inspection of the republics and federations comprising the Union of Republics, also the central agencies for fighting counter-revolution shall be subject to the directives of the corresponding People's Commissariats and to the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence of the Union of Republics.

"6. The remaining people's commissariats comprising the Union of Republics, namely, the Commissariats for Justice, Education, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Public Health and Social Security shall be considered independent" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

On October 6, 1922, the day on which the question of the relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the independent republics was discussed at the plenary meeting of the C.C., Lenin, who was unable to attend the meeting, wrote a note to Kamenev urging the need for combating dominant-nation chauvinism and proposing an addendum to the resolution saying that representatives of all the uniting republics should take their turn in presiding at the Union Central Executive Committee (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 45, p. 214).

The C.C. plenum fully supported Lenin, adopted a resolution in the form of C.C. directives based on his proposals, and instructed a new commission to draft a bill on the formation of the U.S.S.R. for submission to the Congress of Soviets. The members of the C.C. in their speeches strongly denounced all manifestations of dominant-nation chauvinism. At the same time the plenum rebuffed Mdivani, who at first objected to the formation of the U.S.S.R. and then insisted on Georgia joining the U.S.S.R. directly, and not through the Transcaucasian Federation.

Guided by Lenin's instructions, the Central Committee of the Party directed all the subsequent work of uniting the republics.

On December 30, 1922, the First All-Union Congress of Soviets met to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. p. 421

482 *The Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Textile Workers Trade Union* was held in Moscow from October 6 to 11, 1922. It was attended by 350 voting delegates and 117 delegates with voice but no vote. The congress discussed the report of the Trade Unions Central Committee, and reports on the state of the textile industry, on the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions, on the organisational question, on the conditions of labour, on cultural work and the international labour movement among the textile workers.

At the opening meeting the delegates elected Lenin honorary chairman of the congress and sent him greetings. On October 9, 1922, they invited Lenin to the congress, and he accepted the invitation. He was unable to attend it, however, as his health had taken a turn for the worse.

Lenin's message of greeting was read out at the morning session on October 10. The platform committee, on behalf of the delegates, sent him a letter in reply to his greetings. p. 423

[483] This document is written on Stalin's note to the members of the Politbureau proposing addenda to the terms of the concession agreement with L. Urquhart. p. 424

[484] The question of the Co-operative Bank was discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau attended by Lenin on November 2, 1922. The Politbureau passed the following decision: "The following theses of Comrade Lenin should be referred as a basis to a committee, which is directed to submit to the Politbureau a written report on fulfilment."

The document published in this volume contains Lenin's note: "**Keep** for my talk with *Khinchuk*" (*L. M. Khinchuk* was Chairman of the Board of Centrosoyuz.—*Ed.*). p. 424

[485] Lenin wrote this letter in reply to the greetings and present received from the Petrograd textile workers, who wrote him:

"*Dear and deeply respected Vladimir Ilyich.*

"On the occasion of its anniversary the Petrograd Textile Trust sends you its ardent greetings and begs you to accept a woollen blanket made at one of its mills.

"We, Petrograd textile workers, should like the warmth of our modest present to bring you the warmth of our hearts and also to show you that in spite of the extremely worn-out condition of our equipment, in spite of the devastation, the shortages and crises, we are working no worse than before the war, which proves that we can achieve whatever we set out to do.

"We wish you, dear Comrade Lenin, good health." p. 425

[486] On November 16, 1922, the Politbureau passed a decision to reduce the army in the course of January 1923 from 800,000 to 600,000 men. The plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) held on December 18, 1922, confirmed this decision and urged the need for compensating this reduction by improving military equipment, for which purpose the C.P.C. was instructed to find means of quickly normalising the work of the munition factories. The plenum recommended that an appeal be issued in the name of the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets to all nations, emphasising once more the striving of the R.S.F.S.R. towards general disarmament and calling upon the peoples to overcome the resistance which this proposal of the Soviet Republic was meeting on the part of other states.

The Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, on behalf of the millions of the working people, once more solemnly confirmed their desire for peace and peaceful labour.

"Working people of the world!" ran the appeal of the congress. "All who desire peaceful labour, join your efforts to the efforts

of Soviet Russia in order to secure peace, and safeguard mankind from monstrous and destructive wars!...

"The Tenth Congress of Soviets solemnly confirms its line of peaceful policy and calls upon everyone to support this line. Let all the peoples demand peace of their governments. The cause of peace is in the hands of the peoples themselves. To avert the danger of future wars the working people of all the world must unite their efforts. Worn-out, suffering, ruined and starving mankind must have peace secured to them at all cost."

p. 425

487 *The Russian Colony in the U.S.A.* was estimated at about three million people in the twenties, most of whom were immigrants who had left Russia before the revolution for political, economic or religious motives. The members of the bourgeoisie, nobility and intelligentsia, who had escaped from Russia after the October Socialist Revolution, were an insignificant minority. The different social and economic status of these groups and their different attitudes towards Soviet Russia led to the division of the Russian colony into two hostile camps. One camp was made up of the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia (Russian section), the Society for Technical Aid for Soviet Russia, the Russian sections of the U. S. trade unions, the joint conference of various Russian mutual benefit societies and other progressive workers' organisations, around which were united the majority of colonists. The other camp was an alliance of various Russian petty-bourgeois and monarchist organisations united around the anti-Soviet newspaper *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (The New Russian Word).

Lenin's letter was addressed to that part of the Russian colony in the U.S.A. which was grouped around the organisations that stood for friendly relations with Soviet Russia. p. 425

488 The agenda of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, which was held from November 5 to December 5, 1922, contained the question of the programme of the Communist International. The Congress had before it the programme drafted by Bukharin and tabled in his own name, and also the draft programmes of the Communist Parties of Bulgaria and Germany and the "Programme of Action of the Italian Communist Party". On November 13, in his report "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution" Lenin suggested holding simply a general discussion on all the programmes, "to make the first reading, so to speak" and to get them printed in order to study and prepare the programme more profoundly and thoroughly (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 418-32). During the discussion of these drafts, lively debates revolved around the question of transition and limited demands, as a means of preparing the masses for the socialist revolution, for the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Bukharin was opposed to the more general transition and limited demands being theoretically substantiated in the programme of the Comintern, and

even accused of opportunism those who urged the inclusion of these propositions. Bukharin's point of view was criticised by the congress delegates. The delegation of the R.C.P. asked the platform committee of the congress to be allowed to discuss the question of the programme within the delegation before the congress passed any decision on it; this request was granted by the congress (see *Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International* No. 14-15, p. 31).

A meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) delegation Bureau was held on November 20, 1922, at which the proposals printed in this book were drawn up as a draft resolution for the congress. According to available information, the very important points 4 and 5 were dictated by Lenin almost word for word. p. 427

[489] The Bureau of the R.C.P. delegation, at its meeting on November 20, 1922, also drew up the following "Statement of the Russian Delegation": "In view of the fact that the dispute on how the transition demands should be worded and in what part of the programme they should be treated created the wrong impression that the divergence of opinion was on a matter of principle, the Russian delegation lays down unanimously that the inclusion of the transition demands into the programmes of the national sections, their general wording and theoretical substantiation in the general part of the programme cannot be considered as opportunism." This statement was read at the congress meeting on November 21, after which the presiding committee of the congress submitted to the delegates for consideration the proposals drafted by the Bureau of the R.C.P. delegation, to which slight editorial changes had been made. The congress adopted the proposals as a resolution of the congress (see *Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International* No. 18, pp. 7-8). p. 428

[490] See also present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 247-48, and 335-43; and pp. 431-33 of this volume.

The list referred to lower down is the one given in the Draft Decree on the Functions of the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 342-43). p. 428

[491] Lenin's proposal was included in the decision of the Politbureau on December 7, 1922, on the report of the State Supplies Commission. The C.P.C. was directed to allocate to the People's Commissariat for Education two million gold rubles out of the money economised on the ship-repair programme (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Edition, Vol. 45, pp. 311-12). p. 429

[492] On the morning of December 13 Lenin had two attacks of illness. The doctors ordered him a complete rest. "The doctors," his sister Maria (M. I. Ulyanova) wrote later, "had great difficulty in persuading Vladimir Ilyich to drop work altogether and go out into the country. Meanwhile he was to lie down for as long as

possible and not go for walks. In the end Vladimir Ilyich agreed to leave town and said "I'll start winding up my affairs this very day'."

From then on Lenin spent several days at home, dictating letters and giving various instructions, anxious to wind up his affairs, to which he attached great importance. p. 432

[493] This refers to Rykov's suggestion that the reception of visitors by Lenin should, as a general rule, take place after preliminary selection by the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. or by the Secretary of the Central Committee, R.C.P. p. 432

[494] This letter deals with the distribution of functions between Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. Tsyurupa, Kameney and Rykov as planned on December 12. See pp. 428-29 and 430-32 of this volume for Lenin's proposals on this subject. p. 432

[495] This apparently refers to the conference on management normalisation held in September 1922 in Moscow. p. 439

[496] Here allowance should be made for the scale of prices that existed in 1920. Owing to the continuous growth of emission during the early years of Soviet government, paper money was rapidly depreciating. According to the data of the Currency Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance of the U.S.S.R., the value of the gold ruble (taking as equivalent the gold coins of pre-revolutionary times) averaged 1,633 paper rubles in the first half-year of 1920, rising to 4,083 rubles in the second half-year (see *Nashe Denezhnoye Obrashcheniye. Sbornik materialov po istorii denezhnogo obrashcheniya v 1914-1925 gg.* (Our Currency Circulation. A Collection of Materials on the History of Currency Circulation During 1914-1925.) Moscow, 1926, p. 16). p. 446

[497] Lenin was elected to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. as a voting delegate by the Fourteenth Petrograd Gubernia Party Conference from the supporters of the "Platform of the Ten". The delegation was unable to attend the congress in its elected form owing to the critical situation in the city and the counter-revolutionary mutiny at Kronstadt which had just started. Apparently it was in the absence of minutes recording the election of the Petrograd delegation that Lenin wrote in the questionnaire that he had a debating voice. Nevertheless he took part in the voting of all the resolutions and figured in the list of delegates to the Tenth Party Congress as a voting delegate (see *Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 8-16, 1921. Verbatim Report.* Moscow, 1963, p. 729). p. 450

[498] *The Journal of Lenin's Duty Secretaries* contains records of Lenin's orders and instructions, reception of visitors and other facts from November 21, 1922 to March 6, 1923.

The entries in the Journal wore made by Secretary of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. L. A. Fotieva, Assistant Secretary of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. M. A. Volodicheva, secretaries N. S. Alliluyeva, M. I. Glyasser, and S. A. Flakserman, and Lenin's librarian S. M. Manucharyants.

The office book for registering outgoing mail was used for the Journal. Four columns were ruled off in it: date, who was on duty, orders and instructions, and notes on execution. The title page had the inscription: "Please write in this book all orders and instructions and all happenings during duty hours with a note regarding execution of orders. 21/XI—22." p. 463

[499] *Gorbunov, N. P.*—Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars. p. 465

[500] This refers to the meeting of the C.P.C. at which Lenin presided. p. 465

[501] On November 21 the members of the Politbureau voted on the proposal made by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin that the Envoy Plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. in Italy V. V. Vorovsky be included in the delegation to the Lausanne Conference. p. 465

[502] *Haskell*—colonel, Chief of the A.R.A. p. 465

[503] *Zax, B. G.*—Assistant Business Manager of the C.P.C. p. 465

[504] *Nazaretyan, A. M.*—Assistant Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P. p. 466

[505] *Burakova, M. N.*—technical secretary of the Politbureau. p. 466

[506] See present edition, Vol. 33, p. 444. p. 466

[507] Twenty-one questions were dealt with at this meeting of the Politbureau, among them: the Moscow conference of the R.S.F.S.R., Poland, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania; reduction of armaments; the trusts; a joint society for the sale of platinum; agricultural loans; and questions relating to the People's Commissariat for Education. p. 466

[508] *Sklyansky, E. M.*—Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. p. 466

[509] *Sokolnikov, G. Y.*—Deputy People's Commissar for Finance. p. 466

[510] Lenin was sent a draft resolution for the Fourth Congress of the Comintern "A Rough Draft of an Agrarian Programme of Action" drawn up by E. Varga and a note from the Comintern

Executive asking for his opinion on the draft. Lenin sent his remarks on the morning of November 25. p. 466

[511] For Lenin's correspondence with Stalin on the ship-repair programme see *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 311-13. p. 467

[512] *Earsman, and Garden, John S.*—delegates to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern from the Communist Party of Australia. p. 467

[513] The members of the Politbureau voted on Chicherin's proposal that the Soviet Government send a note to the sponsors of the Lausanne Conference concerning the participation of the Soviet delegation in the conference proceedings and of Soviet representatives in the deliberations of the Commission on the Straits. p. 467

[514] At the meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence chaired by Lenin thirteen questions were examined, among them: draft regulations on the Committee for Internal Trade, report of the C.L.D. Commission on the preparation of materials for the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, importation of grain to Turkestan to support the cotton industry. p. 467

[515] The voting was on the decision of the Secretariat of the C.C., R.C.P. dated November 24 appointing a commission composed of F. E. Dzerzhinsky (chairman), D. Z. Manuilsky and V. S. Mitskevich-Kapsukas to urgently examine the statement by members of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Georgia, who had handed in their resignations on October 22, and to propose measures for establishing a durable peace in the C.C. of the Georgian Communist Party. Lenin abstained from voting. p. 467

[516] That day the doctors ordered Lenin a week of complete rest. p. 467

[517] Lenin dictated a letter to Stalin on the ship-repair programme (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 311-52); a letter to Trotsky (copies to Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, Stalin and Kamenev) about a letter to the Italian delegates to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern and about Trotsky's theses on N.E.P. (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 314); a letter to Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek criticising the "Rough Draft of an Agrarian Programme of Action" (ibid., p. 313). The same day Lenin also ordered his signature to be put to a letter of greetings to the Fourth All-Russia Congress of the Educational Workers' Union (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 445). p. 467

[518] This apparently refers to the Comintern Executive's letter to Lenin asking him to receive a number of delegations to the

Fourth Congress of the Comintern and Stalin's letter concerning measures for combating the illicit trade in platinum. The same day Lenin instructed Gorbunov to circulate among all members of the Politbureau a draft decision on measures for combating the illicit trade in platinum. See also the interview with Lenin by Michael Farbman, correspondent of the *Observer* and *Manchester Guardian* (present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 388-89). p. 467

[519] Lenin asked his C.P.C. and C.L.D. deputy Tsyurupa to take part in the work of the Politbureau commission appointed to draw up draft regulations on the trusts. On November 27 the Politbureau included Tsyurupa in the commission. p. 468

[520] Apparently this refers to the articles published in Pravda on February 2, 1923, in connection with the Soviet Government's refusal to conclude a concession agreement with Urquhart, the English industrialist. p. 468

[521] The report of V. P. Milyutin, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, on questions of trade, finance and industry was sent to Lenin as material for his report to the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 468

[522] *Münzenberg*, *W.*—Secretary General, Foreign Committee for the Organisation of International Workers' Aid to the famine-stricken people of Soviet Russia. p. 469

[523] *Kramer*, *V. V.*—professor, neuropathologist attending Lenin. p. 469

[524] The supplementary card said: "Supplementary to the materials on the question of foreign trade monopoly, asked for the minutes of the meeting presided over by Lezhava and others—list of automatic telephone numbers. All taken to his flat. Gave Lydia Alexandrovna instructions for Frumkin, Lezhava and Tsyurupa in connection with the materials on foreign trade monopoly. Talked on the phone with Frumkin, Gorbunov and others. Looked through the C.L.D. agenda." The same day Lenin was sent the minutes of the meeting of the C.L.D. Commission on Internal Trade held on October 13. p. 469

[525] M. Sorokin, "*Nash promyshlenny Komsostav*" ("Our Industrial Captains") (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, November 26, 1922). The entry wrongly gives the date as November 27. p. 469

[526] Apparently Lenin was interested in the proposals and conclusions of the C.P.C. Commission on the inspection of R.S.F.S.R. trade agencies abroad. V. A. Avanesov, vice chairman of this commission, sent Lenin these materials on December 3 (see entry for December 3, evening). p. 469

[527] *Bogdanov*, *P. A.*—Chairman, Supreme Economic Council. p. 469

[528] *Fomin*, *V. V.*—Deputy People's Commissar for Railways. p. 469

[529] See *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 314-15. p. 469

[530] At its meeting on November 30 the Politbureau heard the report of the Commission of the C.C. plenum on the "Union of Republics" and adopted the basic principles of the U.S.S.R. Constitution. p. 470

[531] See *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 312-13. p. 470

[532] On November 30 the Politbureau endorsed the decision of the C.C.'s Orgbureau of November 20 to convene the plenum of the C.C. on December 15. p. 470

[533] This refers to the article "A Talk with Peshekhonov". p. 471

[534] *Adoratsky*, *V. V.*—a scholar, prominent propagandist of Marxism. At Lenin's request, prepared a volume of selected letters of K. Marx and F. Engels. p. 471

[535] F. Engels, *Political Testament* (Unpublished Letters). Moscow, 1923. The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism has a copy of this book that belonged to Lenin with his note to the librarian: "Keep on the shelf. 30/XI. 1922. *Lenin*" (see *Biblioteka Lenina v Kremle* [Lenin's Library in the Kremlin], Moscow, 1961 , p. 56). p. 471

[536] *Syrtsov*, *S. I.*—member of the staff of the C.C, R.C.P.(B.) p. 471

[537] *Knipovich*, *N. M.*—professor, head of the Azov Expedition, whose main object was to make a general survey of the Azov-Black Sea Basin for fish industry revival. p. 471

[538] Apparently Lenin is referring to the article by F. Kin (Frumkin) "Specialists (An Essay at Statistical Survey)" published September 3, 1922 in *Pravda* No. 197. p. 472

[539] See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 559-60. p. 472

[540] The letter to A I. Svidersky, Member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, was signed by Lenin on December 5. p. 472

[541] *Belenky*, *A. Y.*—member of the staff of the State political Administration (G.P.U.). p. 472

[542] On Lenin's instructions M. I. Frumkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Trade and Industry, drew up a report "Brief

Materials on the State of Foreign Trade", which he sent in on December 4. p. 473

[543] This refers to A. G. Mikhailovsky's memorandum on the country's financial and economic position and the theses by A. M. Krasnoshchokov, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance, on the financing of industry. p. 473

[544] V. A. Avanesov had sent the findings of the C.P.C. Commission on the State Monopoly of Foreign Trade. Lenin read them carefully, made corrections, marginal notes and marks. p. 473

[545] On December 4 Gorbunov wrote in the book of orders: "Be posted on Kyshtym Works affair, prepare basic figures concerning the financing of the metallurgical industry, ditto the Donbas and Azneft, study the system of working up census data" (apparently the census of Soviet employees in Moscow and Petrograd, carried out in October-November 1922.—*Ed.*) (see *Istoricheski Archiv*, 1961, No. 5, p. 61).

On returning to his office Lenin dictated a letter to I. I. Khodorovsky asking for information concerning patronage by urban cells of the R.C.P. over village cells and vice versa (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 315-16). Lenin intended to mention this in his report to the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (see present edition, Vol. 36, p. 589). He dealt with this in his article "Pages From a Diary" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 465-66). p. 474

[546] A. L. Kolegayev visited Lenin in connection with fulfilment of the decision of the C.P.C. of November 16, 1922, on the question of subsidies to state theatres. p. 474

[547] *Zhukov*, *I. P.*—a power engineer. p. 474

[548] See Vol. 33 of this edition, p. 446, and Vol. 54 of the Fifth Russian Edition, p. 316. p. 474

[549] *Holizmann*, *A. Z.*—Chief of Central Electricity Board of the Supreme Economic Council. *Lavrentyev*, *P. F.*—his deputy. p. 474

[550] G. Reyes. *Nuevas y viéjas rutas*. Buenos Aires, 1922 (New and Old Ways). The book was sent to Lenin from the Secretariat of the Comintern Executive, and returned on December 7 for translation (see *Biblioteka Lenina v Kremle* [Lenin's Library in the Kremlin] Moscow, 1961, p. 665). p. 474

[551] See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 447-51. p. 475

[552] The list contains the following members of the delegation: J. Hans, Chairman of the Trade Unions Association of Czechoslovakia, Hamosta, Chairman of the Municipal Workers Trade

Union, Fráněk, member of the Building Workers Trade Union, Richtěr, member of the Transport Workers Trade Union, Chapěra, representative of the Gas and Electrical Industry Workers Trade Union. The delegation conveyed to Lenin greetings from the Czechoslovak workers. p. 475

[553] *Popov, P. I.*—Superintendent of the Central Statistical Board. p. 475

[554] *Antselovich, N. M.*—an official of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade unions. p. 475

[555] L. A. Fotieva sent letters to member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Education V. N. Yakovleva and to L. B. Kamenev on the question of providing the pupils and teachers of all the schools with bread, and the following letter to Lenin's deputies: "To Kamenev and Tsyurupa. Vladimir Ilyich requests you by Monday (December 9.—*Ed.*) to look through all the materials on the 'Vishnevsky-Popov' question in order to arrange a conference on Monday with Vladimir Ilyich and Rykov to decide our policy in regard to the Central Statistical Board." p. 475

[556] *Eiduk, A. V.*—chairman of the Commission on Agricultural and Industrial Immigration. *Dovgalevsky, V. S.*—People's Commissar for Post and Telegraph. p. 475

[557] Lenin wanted to see Board Member N. L. Meshcheryakov of the People's Commissariat for Education about a flat for Professor N. I. Averbach, the eye specialist. p. 475

[558] See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 452-53. p. 476

[559] Eighteen questions were examined at the meeting of the Politbureau: the Note on the Straits, the proceedings of the Moscow conference on disarmament, the report of the State Supplies Commission, grain exports, agricultural loans, the wage fund for December 1922, the reports at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, the question of N. A. Rozhkov, member of the C.C. of the Menshevik party, and other questions. p. 476

[560] Fotieva sent the following note to A. M. Nazaretyan: "Vladimir Ilyich suggests that Unschlicht's four proposals on the question of issuing credentials to deportees should be adopted." I. S. Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman of the G.P.U., proposed that the People's Commissariats should be prohibited from issuing credentials to persons subject to administrative deportation. p. 476

[561] Lenin asked Yakovleva to keep him informed about the work of the commission appointed on his motion by the Politbureau in the morning of December 7 to prepare the calculations for fully providing the pupils and teachers of all the schools with bread (see p. 429 of this volume). p. 476

[562] Before leaving for Gorki, Lenin also left written orders to Gorbunov and Fotieva on the manner in which he was to be informed of any documents coming in from the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 318). Lenin instructed his secretaries to send Tsyurupa and Rykov his proposals of December 4 concerning distribution of functions among the deputy chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. (see pp. 428-29 of this volume). p. 476

[563] The minutes of the Politbureau meeting on December 7 were sent to Lenin after his talk with Fotieva, who informed him of the decisions the Politbureau had adopted after his departure. p. 476

[564] Lenin dictated to Volodicheva a letter to Stalin protesting against the decision of the Politbureau concerning Rozhkov and proposing that this question be referred to the plenum of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.). The letter also dealt with the work of S. A. Lozovsky in the Profintern (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 320-21). p. 476

[565] The telegram referred to asked permission for the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference to declare that the Soviet Government agreed to a conference of Black Sea states on the question of ensuring safety of navigation in the Black Sea. p. 476

[566] See present edition, Vol. 33, p. 454. p. 476

[567] See pp. 429-30 of this volume. p. 476

[568] The C.C., R.C.P.(B.) plenum, scheduled for December 15, was put off to December 17. p. 476

[569] This evidently refers to Lenin's proposals concerning the distribution of functions among the deputy chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C. L. D. (see pp. 430-32 of this volume) and his letter concerning the routine work of the deputies and chairman of the C.P.C. (ibid., pp. 430-32). p. 477

[570] This refers to Lenin's letter to Lazzari (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 322-23). Boris Souvarine—delegate to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern; Lenin, in this instance, used his services as a translator. p. 477

[571] See Vol. 33 of this edition, pp. 335-43. p. 477

[572] The voting was on the Politbureau's decision (on the telegram of December 7) concerning the sentence in the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Baku. Lenin voted "for". The Politbureau decided on December 14 not to object. p. 477

[573] Frumkin's comments on the theses of the C.P.C. Commission concerning the inspection of R.S.F.S.R. trade agencies abroad were received on December 11 and reported to Lenin on December 13. p. 477

[574] The mail registration book had down Lenin's letter to Frumkin under No. 8605. Under No. 8606 were instructions to Gorbunov to prepare for Lenin by Tuesday (December 12) the proofs of the book *Na Novikh Putyakh. Itogi novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki 1921-1922. Trudi pod redaktsiei komissii STO* (On a New Path. Results of the New Economic Policy for 1921-1922. Papers edited by the C.L.D. Commission). Moscow, C.L.D. Publishing House, 1923 (Instalment II, Finances, Instalment III, Industry). p. 477

[575] Dzerzhinsky informed Lenin of the results of the Politbureau Commission's trip to Georgia to investigate the conflict between the Transcaucasian Committee and the Mdivani group. Lenin recalled this talk on January 24, 1923 (see p. 484 of this volume). p. 478

[576] *Stomonyakov, B. S.*—Trade Representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Germany. p. 478

[577] See Note 492 in this volume. p. 478

[578] In this letter Lenin once more protested against the Politbureau's decision of December 7 by which the Menshevik Rozhkov was allowed to live in Moscow. See also Note 584 in this volume. p. 478

[579] Lenin stated in his letters that he was unable to attend the forthcoming plenum of the C.C. He expressed his views on how his stand on the question of the foreign trade monopoly should be defended at the plenum and emphasised that vacillation on this question was inadmissible. p. 478

[580] See pp. 432-33 of this volume. p. 478

[581] See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 455-59. p. 479

[582] *Yaroslavsky, Y. M.*—Chairman of the C.P.C. Commission on the inspection of all R.S.F.S.R. trade agencies abroad. p. 479

[583] Lenin asked Avanesov to read his letter to the plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the question of the foreign trade monopoly and send his suggestions (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 325). p. 479

[584] On December 14, the Politbureau revoked its decision of December 7 and resolved to banish Rozhkov to Pskov, warning him that at his first anti-Soviet act he would be sent out of the country. p. 479

[585] This refers to Lenin's letter to the plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), concerning the monopoly of foreign trade (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 455-59). p. 479

[586] In this letter Lenin expressed the hope that the plenum would adopt a decision confirming the unalterable principle of the foreign trade monopoly, since some of those who had voted against the monopoly at the October plenum had adopted a correct stand (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 325-26). p. 480

[587] See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 460-61. p. 480

[588] In his letter Lenin stressed the need for having the question of the foreign trade monopoly discussed at the plenum of the C.C. and having it raised at the next congress of the Party (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 325-26). p. 480

[589] On the night of December 16 Lenin's health took a sharp turn for the worse. Paralysis of the right arm and right leg set in. Then he began gradually to recover the use of his arm and leg.
Kozhevnikov, *A. M.*—Neuropathologist in attendance on Lenin. p. 480

[590] In this letter Lenin expressed his views on the distribution of duties among the deputy chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D., and on the need for making brief notes during the reception of visitors; he also suggested that a meeting of deputies be held without him on the question of the Central Statistical Board (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 327). p. 481

[591] *Pakaln*, *P. P.*—chief of Lenin's bodyguard at Gorki. p. 481

[592] *Foerster*, *O. R.*—German neuropathologist, Professor; consulted the physicians attending Lenin. p. 481

[593] The plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) held on December 18, supported Lenin's proposals and confirmed the unalterable principle of foreign trade monopoly. The plenum adopted a special decision for him to be informed, by arrangement with his doctors, of the plenum's resolution and report. p. 481

[594] On the night of December 23 paralysis of the right arm and right leg set in. p. 481

[595] Lenin dictated his Letter to the Congress of the Party on December 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 1922 and January 4, 1923 (see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 593-97, 603-04). The letter dictated on December 23 was forwarded to Stalin by the secretariat the same day. p. 481

[596] At this time the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets was being held (from December 23 to 27, 1922). p. 481

[597] "All the articles and documents," Volodicheva wrote later, in 1929, "which Lenin dictated between December 1922 (the 20th) and the beginning of March 1923 were typed at his request in five copies, one of which he asked to leave for him, three copies to be given to Nadezhda Konstantinovna, and one to his secretariat (strictly secret). The copy to be sent to *Pravda* retyped fair with all his final corrections and changes was looked through by Lenin, after which it was passed on to Maria Ilyinichna. The three copies that Nadezhda Konstantinovna had received were also corrected. The rough copies were burnt by me. He asked that the sealed envelopes in which the copies of the documents were kept should be marked to the effect that they could only be opened by V. I. Lenin, and after his death by Nadezhda Konstantinovna. I did not write the words 'and after his death' on the envelopes. Lenin's copies were kept in a file and corded for more convenient use." p. 482

[598] B. V. Titlinov, *Novaya Tserkov* (The New Church), Petrograd, Moscow, 1923. After the corresponding entry in the "Books Issued Journal", librarian Manucharyants wrote the following note: "In January Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked for literature for Vladimir Ilyich on the co-operatives. Khinchuk sent the following: 1) Meshcheryakov. *Co-operation and Socialism.* 2) Chayanov, *Basic Ideas and Forms of Organisation of Peasant Co-operation.* 3) Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Social Foundations of Co-operation.* 4) Prokopovich, *The Co-operative Movement in Russia, Its Theory and Practice.*" and some other books. p. 482

[599] This refers to Lenin's article "Our Revolution (Apropos of N. Sukhanov's Notes)" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 476-79). p. 482

[600] See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 481-86. First variant—pp. 433-40 of this volume. p. 483

[601] *Khloplyankin, M. I.*—Board member of the People's Commissariat for Labour. p. 483

[602] The next day (January 21) Volodicheva asked for the following magazines to be sent to Lenin: *Sotsialisticheski Vestnik* No. 1, *Sovremenniye Zapiski*, v. XIII and *Zarya* Nos. 9-10. p. 483

[603] The report of the Dzerzhinsky commission was discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau on January 25, 1923. The commission's proposals were endorsed. p. 484

[604] Lenin is referring to the books: P. M. Kerzhentsev. *Printsipi Organizatsii* (Principles of Organisation), Petrograd, 1922; O. A. Yermansky. *Nauchnaya Organizatsia Truda i Systema*

Taylora (The Scientific Organisation of Labour and the Taylor System), Moscow, 1922. These books are mentioned in Lenin's article "Better Fewer, But Better" (see Vol. 33 of this edition, pp. 487-502). On Yermansky's book see also Lenin's unfinished review "A Fly in the Ointment" (present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 368-69). p. 485

605 *Reske, N. A.*—Board member of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. p. 485

606 On February 1 the Politbureau allowed the materials of the Dzerzhinsky Commission on the Georgian question to be given out. p. 485

607 Fotieva wrote down the following instructions of Lenin: "1) Why was the old C.C. of the C.P. of Georgia accused of deviationism. 2) What breach of Party discipline were they blamed for. 3) Why the Transcaucasian Committee is accused of suppressing the C.C. of the C.P. of Georgia. 4) The physical means of suppression ('biomechanics'). 5) The line of the C.C. (of the R.C.P.(B.)—*Ed.*) in Vladimir Ilyich's absence and in his presence. 6) Attitude of the Commission. Did it examine only the accusations against the C.C. of the C.P. of Georgia or also against the Transcaucasian Committee? Did it examine the 'biomechanics' incident? 7) The present situation (the election campaign, the Mensheviks, suppression, national discord)" (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.). p. 485

608 See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 487-502. p. 486

609 On February 2, through Krupskaya, Lenin asked for the following books to be obtained for him from M. P. Pavlovich: A. Y. Khodorov. *Mirovoi imperializm i Kitai* (*Opit Polit.-ekonom. issledovaniya*) (World Imperialism and China. An Essay at Politico-Economic Research). Shanghai, 1922, and M. P. Pavlovich. *Sovietskaya Rossia i imperialisticheskaya Yaponia* (Soviet Russia and Imperialist Japan). These books were delivered to Lenin in the evening together with A. M. Khinchuk's book *Tsentrosoyuz v usloviakh novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki* (Centrosoyuz Under the New Economic Policy), Moscow, 1922. p. 486

610 This refers to the census of Soviet employees carried out in Moscow and Petrograd in October-November 1922. p. 489

611 This refers to Lenin's "*The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*". p. 490

612 Apparently, on December 27 or 28 Lenin dictated his note on the subjects of his future work:

"Memo:

"The letter about increasing the number of Central Committee members omits mention of the ratio of the members of the enlarged Central Committee to the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

"Subjects to be dealt with:

"1. Centrosoyuz and its significance in the light of the NEP.

"2. Correlation between Chief Board for Vocational Education and general educational work among the people.

"3. The national question and internationalism (in the light of the recent conflict in the Georgian party).

"4. The new book of public education statistics published in 1922." p. 491

[613] Lenin asked, among others, for the following books (in Russian—*Ed.*): V. S. Rozhitsin. *Modern Science and Marxism*. Kharkov, 1922; S. Y. Semkovsky. *Marxism as a Teaching Subject. Report at the All-Ukraine Pedagogical Conference* (*July 1922*). Kharkov, 1922; M. Alsky. *Our Finances During the Civil War and NEP*. Moscow, 1923; S. N. Faulkner. *Turning-Point in the Crisis of World Industry*. Moscow, 1922; G. Tsiperovich. *By Ourselves!* (*Results of 5 Years of Economic Development*). Petrograd, 1922; L. Axelrod (Orthodox). *Against Idealism. A Criticism of Certain Idealistic Trends in Philosophical Thought. Collection of Articles*. Moscow-Petrograd, 1922; Arthur Drews, *Die Christusmythe*. Moscow, 1923; P. G. Kurlov. *The End of Russian Tsarism. Reminiscences of an ex-commander of the gendarmery*. Moscow-Petrograd, 1920; S. I. Kanatchikov. *Topics of the Day* (*Pages of Proletarian Ideology*). Petrograd, 1923; I. A. Modzalevsky. *Proletarian Mythmaking* (*On Ideological Deviations in Modern Proletarian Poetry*). Semipalatinsk, 1922. p. 492

[614] Fotieva wrote down the following: "Vladimir Ilyich's instructions that a hint be given to Soltz (A. A. Soltz, member of the presidium of the Central Control Commission, R.C.P.(B.)—*Ed.*) that he (Lenin) was on the side of the injured party. Some one or other of the injured party was to be given to understand he was on their side.

"3 moments: 1. One should not fight. 2. Concessions should be made. 3. One cannot compare a large state with a small one.

"Did Stalin know? Why didn't he react?

"The name 'deviationist' for a deviation towards chauvinism and Menshevism proves the same deviation with the dominant-national chauvinists.

"Collect printed matter for Vladimir Ilyich."

Between February 15 and March 4 no entries were made in the Journal. p. 493

[615] Lenin asked Trotsky to uphold the "Georgian case" at the plenum of the C.C. Trotsky, pleading illness, said he could not take upon himself such an obligation (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 329). p. 493

[616] This refers to Lenin's letter to Stalin, copies of which were sent to Kamenev and Zinoviev (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, pp. 329-30). p. 493

[617] Lenin stated in this letter that he was preparing a memorandum and speech on the Georgian question (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 54, Fifth Russian Edition, p. 330). p. 493

[618] At this point the entries break off.

The text beginning with the words: "Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked..." is written in the Journal in shorthand; this was deciphered by Volodicheva on July 14, 1956. p. 494

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PREFACE

Volume 43 contains letters, notes and telegrams written from 1893 to the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917 and published in volumes 46, 47, 48 and 49 of the Fifth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*. They are an essential complement to the correspondence published in volumes 34, 35 and 36 of the present edition.

Noteworthy are Lenin's letters to P. P. Maslov relating to the beginnings of the working-class movement and the early spread of Marxism in Russia. They reveal his keen interest in the economic situation in Russia and contain a scientific critique of the economic views of the liberal Narodniks (V. Y. Postnikov, V. P. Vorontsov, and others).

Included in the present volume are many documents from the period of struggle for the creation of a Marxist party in Russia. Uncompromising struggle against Right opportunism (Economism and, later, Menshevism) and the anarchistic petty-bourgeois revolutionariness of the Left Narodniks, on the one hand, and against bourgeois liberalism, which sought to subordinate the working-class and democratic movement to its ends, on the other, is the main theme of the letters written in this period.

Stressing the need to build an independent proletarian Marxist party of a new type, Lenin underscored the importance of open political struggle against opportunists of all shades, for the political independence and unity of the working-class movement in Russia. "Of course," he wrote, "struggle in the press will cause more ill feeling and give us a good many hard knocks, but we are not so thin-skinned as to fear knocks! To wish for struggle without knocks, differences without struggle, would be the height of naïveté,

and if the struggle is waged *openly* it ... will lead, I repeat, a hundred times faster to lasting *unity*" (p. 48).

The letters throw light on the vast effort Lenin invested into founding *Iskra*, the first all-Russia political newspaper, and the journal *Zarya*, which played an exceptional role in the establishment of a Marxist party of the new type. All of Lenin's editorial and organisational work, which ranged from laying down the ideological guidelines, selecting the authors and discussing and reviewing the materials submitted for publication to the transportation and circulation of the paper in Russia, is vividly reflected in these letters.

A number of letters written after the Second Congress of the Party have been included in this volume. They do much to round out the picture of the struggle waged by the Bolsheviks against the Menshevik splitters, showing how, at a time when the Menshevik leaders sought to break up the united party that had just taken shape, Lenin passionately fought for its unity, to prevent the division of local Party organisations. Of particular interest are the letters to Yelena Stasova, F. V. Lengnik, V. P. Nogin, and I. I. Radchenko, and to the Moscow and other local Party committees.

Stressing the revolutionary services rendered by the old *Iskra* and exposing the Mensheviks, including Trotsky, who denied in a slanderous pamphlet the importance of both *Iskra* and the Second Party Congress, Lenin wrote: "Reading a pamphlet of this kind you can see clearly that the 'Minority' has indulged in so much lying and falsehood that it will be incapable of producing anything viable, and one wants to fight, here there is something worth fighting for" (p. 129).

The letters show what colossal effort Lenin devoted to restoring the central institutions of the Party, launching the Bolsheviks' Central Organ, the newspaper *Vperyod*, and preparing for the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P

This volume also contains a number of letters relating to the period of the first Russian revolution, shedding light on the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. For instance, the letter to *l'Humanité* correspondent Etienne Avenard demonstrates the importance of

the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the correctness of the Bolshevik tactical line and the need for the alliance of the proletariat and the democratic peasantry against the "baseness and treachery of the bourgeoisie, who are day by day becoming more and more counter-revolutionary" (p. 174).

A considerable number of letters relate to the period of reaction, among them many to Camille Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International, with whom Lenin corresponded in the capacity of representative of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. There are also letters to other leaders of the international working-class movement testifying to the broad connections Lenin and the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. had with this movement. They illustrate the unflagging struggle Lenin waged against opportunism, for revolutionary tactics in the working-class movement, for unity in the ranks of the revolutionary Marxists and for the fraternal solidarity of the working people the world over.

A notable place among the letters of this period is occupied by correspondence bearing on the struggle against the Mensheviks and Trotsky, who impeded and sabotaged the work of the Party's central institutions, and also against the *Vperyod* group, the otzovists and ultimatumists, whose "Left" phraseology and adventuristic policy threatened to isolate the Party from the working class, to divorce it from the masses, and virtually to liquidate it. Lenin exposed the organisation by the otzovists of a Party school on Capri as a factional scheme and worked for a long time to organise a real Party school for revolutionary workers.

The letters written in the period of the new revolutionary upswing deal with the consolidation of the underground proletarian party and with the struggle against liquidationism. Liquidationism, which first asserted itself among the Mensheviks in the period of reaction, continued to cause great harm to the working class and its Party even after a new upsurge had begun in the revolutionary movement. Combating the liquidators, who underrated illegal work and urged renouncing underground methods, Lenin

focussed the attention of Party cadres on combining illegal and legal forms of activity—utilisation of the Duma rostrum, participation in workers' funds and other legal societies, etc. This volume includes several documents exposing the conference called by the liquidators, who set up the short-lived August anti-Party bloc.

A number of letters are directed against the conciliators. "You cannot sit between two stools," Lenin wrote, "either you are with the liquidators or against them" (p. 271). These letters afford an idea of the difference between the tactics used to combat the anti-Party trends and the approach to those who sought reconciliation with these trends. While calling for uncompromising struggle against the liquidators on the main issues of principle, Lenin counselled taking a different line towards the conciliators, explaining things to them in order to win them over. In a letter to L. B. Kamenev commenting on the latter's pamphlet *Two Tactics*, he wrote: "We must not call for a break *with the conciliators*. This is quite uncalled for and incorrect. A 'persuasive' tone should be adopted towards them, by no means should they be antagonised" (p. 279).

The irreconcilable struggle waged by the Bolsheviks against the liquidators ended in the expulsion of the latter from the Party at the Sixth (Prague) Conference.

The volume includes a large number of letters to the editorial boards of the legal Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda*, *Nevskaya Zvezda*, and especially *Pravda*. The advice contained in these letters (as well as his articles) determined the political and ideological orientation of *Pravda*, its uncompromising stand towards the liquidators and their newspaper *Luch*. In the spring of 1913 *Pravda* was reorganised, its contents greatly improved and its size increased in accordance with Lenin's instructions. Congratulating the editors and staff on the improvement of content, Lenin set the task of *fighting* "*to win 100,000* readers.... The *great* (and sole) danger for *Pravda* now is the loss of the *broad* readership, loss of a position to fight for it" (p. 350).

A prominent place is occupied by documents written in connection with the preparations for and the convocation of many Party conferences and meetings. These include letters in which Lenin gives his assessment of the Cracow and

Poronin meetings of the C.C. with Party functionaries, the Fourth Congress of the Latvian Social-Democrats, etc. Speaking of the Cracow meeting held in January 1913, Lenin wrote: "It's going wonderfully. It will be no less significant than the 1912 January Conference. There will be resolutions on *all* important issues, unity *included*" (p. 327).

The volume includes many letters written to Inessa Armand in connection with the convocation of the Brussels "unity" conference by the International Socialist Bureau in July 1914. Guided by Lenin's instructions, the delegation of the Central Committee exposed at this conference the harm caused by liquidationism and called for unity of the working-class movement from below. The liquidators did not achieve their ends, the support given them by international opportunism did not yield the results they had expected. "The liquidators' *last* card is the help of the foreign organisations, but that card, too, will be beaten," Lenin wrote (p. 424).

The large number of letters written during the imperialist world war (1914-17) afford an idea of the tremendous theoretical and practical work Lenin accomplished in elaborating and propagating the Bolshevik tactics of struggle against imperialist war, and of his uncompromising attitude towards social-chauvinism and Kautskyism. The letters to V. A. Karpinsky, Sophia Ravich, G. L. Shklovsky, M. N. Pokrovsky and others throw light on the circumstances in which some of Lenin's most important articles and books were written and published—*Socialism and War*, *Imperialism*, *the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, etc. The letters are a complement to such works as "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "The Junius Pamphlet", "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" and others, and offer a model of the creative approach to the revolutionary theory of Marxism. In them Lenin, through profound study and generalisation of the historical experience of proletarian class struggle, outlines the tasks of international Social-Democracy and the working-class movement at the time of the imperialist world war, and develops the fundamental Marxist propositions concerning just and unjust wars and

the defence of the country. The volume also contains letters criticising the anti-Marxist views of N. I. Bukharin, G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh. Firmly and consistently upholding the basic principles of Marxism, Lenin combated at the same time the conciliatory position taken by G. Y. Zinoviev.

The letters to V. A. Karpinsky reflect the tremendous practical work done by Lenin in connection with the resumption of publication of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the Party. Transporting the paper to Russia, arrangements with contributors and many other things all the way to minor details (type and paper) claimed his attention. For instance, in a letter to Karpinsky dated November 22, 1914, he wrote: "Write and let us know *for how many issues* you have thin paper. If there is plenty (we shall probably get some more from Paris) and **if** it is not too bad for local use, we shall increase the % of thin paper" (p. 436).

Despite the difficulty of establishing contacts with the local Party organisations, the Central Committee headed by Lenin arranged for the circulation in Russia of Bolshevik literature exposing the imperialist character of the war, educating the workers, soldiers and peasants politically and teaching them how to combat the war, and calling on them to rise against their own exploiters. The Central Committee maintained contact with the Party organisations in Russia through Stockholm and later through Oslo, where A. G. Shlyapnikov was representative of the Central Committee and the Petersburg Committee at the time. Some of the letters to Shlyapnikov may therefore be regarded as letters to the Central Committee Bureau in Russia. Contact with Russia was maintained also through M. M. Litvinov, Alexandra Kollontai, and others.

Lenin attached prime importance to rallying the forces of the Left Social-Democrats in the various countries of Europe and America. Included in the present volume are his letters to Left Social-Democrats in Holland, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and other countries. He arranged for the circulation of the Central Organ, Bolshevik publications, resolutions of the Conference of R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad, etc., among the revolutionary

Social-Democrats of many countries, and established personal contacts with them. In a letter to H. Gorter he supported the idea of founding an international journal of the Left Social-Democrats to counter the social-chauvinists' mean way of "defending opportunism of the worst brand by means of sophisms" (p. 453). In a letter to David Wijnkoop Lenin pointed out: "What we need is not the solemn declarations of leaders ... but a consistent revolutionary declaration of principles to help the workers find the correct path" (p. 478).

From the beginning of the war, when the Second International collapsed ideologically and politically and in effect broke up, with the various Social-Democratic parties at loggerheads with one another, Lenin advocated the establishment of a Third International to include the Left, genuinely revolutionary internationalists. Writing to G. Y. Zinoviev, he said: "I am sending Wijnkoop's letter. *Return it immediately*.... I shall snatch at *this* 'little kernel' of a Left International with both hands. We must work *as hard as we can* to get closer together with them" (p. 461).

A number of letters deal with the preparations for the Zimmerwald and Kienthal International Socialist Conferences and also the popularisation of their decisions. In the course of the preparatory work for the Kienthal Conference Lenin advised the Dutch internationalists to contact the minority of the British Socialist Party and urge them to send "either a representative, or at least a declaration. If, as a result of this conference, we receive ... a Left Marxist international declaration of principles, it will be a very useful thing" (p. 482).

Of particular interest are the letters written in early 1917 and in the last days spent by Lenin abroad, when it became known that the February bourgeois-democratic revolution had been successful. They constitute a valuable addition to other Lenin documents containing an analysis of the revolutionary developments in Russia and the new tasks he set before the proletarian party, the workers, peasants and soldiers. Several letters relate to arrangements for Lenin's return, together with other Party workers, from Switzerland to Russia.

The volume closes with a note to Margarita Fofanova written late at night on October 24 (November 6), 1917: "I am going where you did not want me to go. Good-bye. Ilyich" (p. 638). Lenin had left for the Smolny, the headquarters of the revolution, to lead the October armed uprising.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.

1893

1
TO P. P. MASLOV

I received your letter* the day before yesterday, and yesterday I wrote to inform you that the articles on the peasant reform[1] had been sent to you. Let me know whether you have the article on Postnikov.** If you have it, send it as soon as you can to N. Y. with the request that it be forwarded to me immediately after it has been read; I need it.

I am very sorry you did not find me in Samara.*** Are you planning a trip to the capitals for the holidays? If you are, we could meet.

I am expecting from you a critical analysis in as minute detail as possible of the article on Postnikov: I trust you have noticed that I am drawing far more important and far-reaching conclusions from the premises set forth in it than are to be found in the article itself. The disintegration of our small producers (the peasants and handicraftsmen) appears to me to be the basic and principal fact explaining our urban and large-scale capitalism, dispelling the myth that the peasant economy represents some special structure (it is the same bourgeois structure with the sole difference that it is still shackled to a far greater extent by feudal fetters), and making it patent that what are called "workers" are not a handful of specially circumstanced

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* You could have found out my address from the Bar Council here.

** See V. I. Lenin, "New Economic Developments in Peasant Life" (present edition, Vol 1, pp. 11-73).—*Ed.*

*** And did not meet my friends there.

people but simply the outer layers of the vast mass of peasants who already derive their livelihood more from the sale of their labour power than from their own husbandry. I value Postnikov's book so highly just because it contains data for a precise examination of the situation, provides factual proof of the absurdity of the current notions concerning our "communal" village, and shows that, essentially, the pattern in our country does not differ from that of Western Europe.

I offered the article to *Russkaya Mysl*[2] but it did not choose to publish it. I have been wondering whether it would be better to enlarge and revise the article somewhat and publish it in pamphlet form.

It would be very interesting to hear your opinion on this; I think this could be done by correspondence.

The basic premise in my comments on the works about the reform was that this reform stemmed from the development of commodity economy and that its entire meaning and purpose was the destruction of the fetters retarding and restricting the development of this system. We shall discuss this in greater detail some other time—perhaps I shall be able to forward to you the comments I sent to the author; this would be simplest and most convenient.

Let me have your reply as soon as possible, indeed at once, otherwise the letter may not find me here.

Written in the second half
of December 1893
Sent from St. Petersburg to Samara

First published in 1940
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*

Printed from the original

1894

2
TO P. P. MASLOV

30.V. 94

Received your letter the day before yesterday. I indeed had almost forgotten about our correspondence and about the review, but I am of course very pleased to resume correspondence on the questions raised by it, as well as on other questions.

One thing surprises me—why did you have to "search" for me? Didn't N. M. A.* see you on his return to Tiflis from St. Petersburg and inform you (as I asked him to) that I have a permanent address—for the winter at least—namely: Bar Council, Advocate N. N.

Concerning your comments,** I should like to say this. First, as regards the conclusions being too cautious, it should be borne in mind that this shortcoming [I fully agree that this is really a shortcoming] is due to my intention to have the article published in a liberal journal. I actually was naïve enough to send it to *Russkaya Mysl*, which of course turned it down: I fully understood why when I read in *Russkaya Mysl* No. 2 an article about Postnikov by "our well-known" liberal vulgariser, Mr. V. V. It takes some artistry to mutilate splendid material so thoroughly and to bury the facts in sheer verbiage!

The fact is that I draw from these data some major conclusions. Namely, that the data, in my opinion, point to the bourgeois nature of the economic relationships existing among the peasantry. They strikingly reveal the existence

* The person referred to has not been identified.—*Ed.*

** See previous letter.—*Ed.*

of antagonistic *classes* in this "communal" peasantry; moreover, of classes that are characteristic only of capitalist organisation of the social economy. This is the cardinal conclusion, and one fully applicable to the rest of the Russian peasantry. Another conclusion is that already now a huge proportion (probably no less than half and most likely more) of peasant-grown grain goes to the market, and that the principal producer of this grain is the top group of the present-day village—the peasant bourgeoisie.*

Further, I attach much importance to the fact established by Postnikov that as a rule throughout Russia the productivity of labour is 2-2½ times higher in the upper groups of the peasantry. This is of enormous importance from the theoretical standpoint, as is the ascertaining of the *commercial* farm area (a point so dangerous for the Russian exceptionalists that I fully appreciate Mr. V. V.'s careful avoidance of the question).

As for your second remark—concerning the norm of natural economy—I must admit that I do not quite understand you.

The question of a "norm", to my mind, is meaningful only in this sense: it is important to know how big an area the average peasant must cultivate to meet all his needs (both production and personal) and manage without outside earnings.

This is important to know since all peasant farms below this level fall into the category of those selling labour power, and the size of the farm is a fairly accurate indicator to what extent it depends on this source of income. Households in the higher groups are petty-bourgeois pure and simple.

As regards the share of "natural" economy, I believe it is invariably the greatest in the middle group of peasants, but there too commodity economy is bound to account for a substantial proportion (probably some 40 per cent of the

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* Hourwich is therefore mistaken when he says that Russia will in the *future* become a country of the peasant bourgeoisie. It is that already.

A very good book: Hourwich, *The Economics of the Russian Village*, 1892. New York.

total budget must be in monetary form). Farms of the lower and top groups will always be more of a commodity type, for the first sells labour power and the second, surpluses of grain.

The analysis of the groups given in the article on Postnikov is along these lines.

You speak of the "norm of natural economy" and the "norm of commodity economy" as of two separate things. If I understood you right, the latter is my average norm [17-18 dessiatines of crop area according to Postnikov's figures] in which, of course, *it is important to separate and calculate exactly the natural and money components*. I do not see that there is any self-contained "norm of natural economy"; our contemporary peasant economy cannot be a pure natural economy whatever its dimensions.

However, here it is better to wait for a more detailed explanation from you.

As regards the criticism of N. K. Mikhailovsky, I also believe that no publication will print it, not so much because of considerations of censorship (rumour has it that the censors are exorcising Russian Marxism following the commotion raised by *Russkoye Bogatstvo*[3]) as of disagreement with you and fear of an impudent and conceited "big wig". I've had some experience in this respect. [Nor do I think it *possible* or worth while to reply to him in our press.] It would give me pleasure to read your reply.

I shall probably be here until June 12, and perhaps longer. I shall let you know my new address when I leave. In the meantime you can write (after the 12th) through M. H. H.; it will be quicker to forward mail from there.

Sent from St. Petersburg to Samara

First published in 1940 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIII*

Printed from the original

3

TO P. P. MASLOV

31.V. 94

Just received your second letter and am hurrying to reply; if you write at once your answer may still find me here (I'll probably be here until June 12).

Your suggestion appeals to me very much *in principle*. On particulars, however, I cannot pass judgement, not having seen your article. As for my own article,* strictly speaking, I do not think it is worth printing in its present form (the form of a simple review of V. Y. Postnikov's book).**

(In regard to the cost of publication, I think something not very long would be much cheaper.)

All in all it seems that the matter will have to be put off until autumn,*** for even if you managed to send the article here it would still take quite some time before it could be published. We shall have to discuss this thoroughly in detail by letter. Still better would it be to meet in person****; if you have the means (and the desire) to publish and want to write, and if we see eye to eye, it should be possible to arrange....*****

Sent from St. Petersburg to Samara

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

4

TO L. F. MILOVIDOVA[4]

I received *The Housing******* and got down to work. The point is that you left things unfinished. In reading the

* See "New Economic Developments in Peasant Life" (present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 11-73).—*Ed.*

** We shall discuss this in greater detail.

*** And this is not a long time.

**** For experience shows that mail makes very slow haste.

***** The manuscript breaks off here.—*Ed.*

****** The reference is to Frederick Engels's *The Housing Question*.—*Ed.*

final copy a heap of mistakes was discovered (the drawings too, I found, caused much confusion). After reading it, our common acquaintances said the work was very poor. Therefore I had to sit down to revise it, sick and tired though I was of the job. The result was that the clean copy turned out to be a rough draft.

Can you send me ...* by Engels with the 1894 afterword. *You can forward it the usual way*. The address will be the same roughly until August 15, after which the winter address should be used.

You did not fully distinguish between the Germans and the German** in your letter. The lack of "theoretical interest" on the part of the former is understandable to me (though regrettable), but can the same be said about the latter? When giving an interpretation of a question one should not avoid analysing it. True, I recently came across an instance of inability to see what was at issue and why it was important, but I should not like to believe that the same sort of thing can be expected there.

Written July 21, 1894
Sent from Nizhni-Novgorod to Switzerland

First published in 1961 in the journal *Istoria SSSR* No. 2

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

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* Omission in the typewritten copy.—*Ed.*
** G. V. Plekhanov.—*Ed.*

1900

5
TO Y. M. STEKLOV

To Nakhamkis

To answer your questions: 1) In referring to "us" and "the editors" I had in mind the article on the programme of *Rabocheye Dyelo*[5] and nothing else.* 2) The collocutors in Bellerive were we *two*: Potresov and myself, your new acquaintances. 3) If I previously told you that you were not right and then wrote and stressed that you were right, this means that my views had changed and approximated to yours.

We hope to be able in the not very distant future to inform you and Goldendakh (we place great hopes on the closest co-operation with you both) of the final form of the relationships (on the editorial plane) between us (the two collocutors in Bellerive+one in Russia) and the Emancipation of Labour group.[6]

Thanks for the article "The Historical Preparation of Russian Social-Democracy": we are very happy to print it and believe that our journal[7] would gain much if such articles appeared in it more frequently. The article will also be sent to the Emancipation of Labour group, so please do not be annoyed by a possible delay.

My colleague has one point to make: the credit for establishing the first contacts with the workers belongs not to the groups you mention, but to the Chaikovsky group.[8]

Written September 25, 1900
Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 29-31.—*Ed.*

6

TO D. B. RYAZANOV

To Goldendakh

We are happy to hear that you can let us have the article so soon. Your answers to our comments were completely satisfactory, for they showed that we fully agree on all the essentials and fortified our hopes that we shall be able to establish closer relations with you, and that you will be a regular contributor.

With best regards and comradely greetings from Potresov and myself.

Petrov

Written September 25, 1900
Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

7

TO V. P. NOGIN

10/X. 00

Dear Vasily Petrovich,

I received your address and the resolution of the twenty-three[9] against the "*Credo*" from P. B. (Axelrod) only yesterday. Alexei wrote long ago that you would be abroad, but I was unable to locate you (foolish of him not to give you my postal address!). Please get in touch with me and let me know in detail how you are getting on: how long you have been in London, what you are doing, what the people are like in London, what your plans are, and when you intend to leave. Why did you choose London?

There are no passwords; instead of a password (for you do not know me, do you? How did Alexei refer to me when you spoke with him? Did he give you a good enough idea of what we are doing?) I shall give you the initials of the addressee through whom I am to write to Alexei. Alexei writes me: if you cannot make out the address, ask

Novosyolov. The initials are: K. A. G. G.*—insert the missing letters and we shall have made "contact".

All the best,
Petrov

Reply to this address:
Herrn Philipp Rögner, Cigarrenhandlung, Neue Gasse, *Nürnberg*.
Enclose second envelope addressed to Petrov.

P.S. Please let me have two or three addresses of fully reliable people (outsiders, not revolutionaries) to whom one could go in Poltava and find out about Alexei.

Sent from Munich to London

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

8
TO Y. M. STEKLOV**

1) *Nakhamkis*. For the paper, about the international congress+the national French congress, some 6,000 characters.
2) *For the journal*: To separate Nakhamkis and Gurevich.
Delivery point?
When will they take it (the package)?
Address for handing in here.
Let them inform us more definitely whether it is a warehouse they need. (Do they already have one?)[10]
We hope to find people in Russia—though not too close to the border. (Could it be received in Riga or Pskov?)

* The person referred to has not been identified.—*Ed*.
** Draft of a letter jotted down in pencil on a clean page of a letter from Y. M. Steklov; on top of Steklov's letter is an entry in an unknown hand: "received October 10, answered October 10, and draft returned."—*Ed*.

If things are *fully arranged*, we shall give them *definite* assignments in Russia.

The article should be returned.

Written October 10, 1900

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

9

TO APOLLINARIA YAKUBOVA*

I clearly see two trends also in your letter to a friend: one quite legitimately lays the stress on the need for economic struggle, the need to be able to make use of the workers' legal societies as well, "to respond in diverse ways to the day-to-day vital needs of the workers", and so on. All this is legitimate and correct. You are mistaken if you think that the revolutionaries "are opposed to legal societies", that such societies are "hateful" to them, that they "turn their backs on society", and so on. The revolutionaries too recognise the necessity of economic struggle, of responding also to the day-to-day vital needs, and of learning to make use of legal societies as well. Not only have the revolutionaries never and nowhere *advised* to turn one's back on society, but on the contrary have stressed that it is essential for Social-Democracy to *take the lead* in the social movement and to unite under the leadership of the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party all the democratic elements. However, it is imperative to take care that the legal societies and purely economic organisations should *not separate* the workers' movement from Social-Democracy and revolutionary political struggle, but that they should, on the contrary, *link them as closely and indissolubly as possible*. But in your letter there is also that tendency (a harmful and, in my opinion, thoroughly reactionary one), the tendency to *separate* the workers' movement from Social-Democracy and revolutionary political struggle—to put off the political tasks, to replace the

* A variant of part of the letter (see present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 51-54).—*Ed.*

concept "political struggle" with the concept "struggle for legal rights", and so on.

How to draw the line between the sound and useful tendency and the harmful one? I believe there is no need for me to persuade you who have already had a taste of "meetings abroad" that we must not confine ourselves to mere talk. And would it not be ridiculous to fear examination of the question in print since it has already been discussed for a long time in letters and debates. Why should debates at meetings and writing letters be considered permissible and elucidation of controversial issues in the press a "most harmful thing capable only (???) of amusing our enemies"? This I cannot understand. Only polemics in the press can precisely establish the dividing line I am referring to, for some people are often bound to go to extremes. Of course struggle in the press will cause more ill feeling and give us a good many hard knocks, but we are not so thin-skinned as to fear knocks! To wish for struggle without knocks, differences without struggle, would be the height of naïveté, and if the struggle is waged *openly* it will be a hundred times better than foreign and Russian "Gubarevism", and will lead, I repeat, a hundred times faster to lasting *unity*.

Written October 26, 1900

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

10

TO P. B. AXELROD

7/XII. 00

Dear P. B.,

Forgive me for not replying to you in my letter to Bainova; ill health interfered. But having consulted with V. I. I can see now that the situation is very serious: we need the foreign news items, the first sheet of the paper is already being printed, and the second is ready except for the news items.[11] The length of the news column should be some

26,000 characters.* At a pinch we can throw out something else.

In view of this, please send *at once* whatever you can. I shall eagerly await your answer.

Address:

Herrn Georg Rittmeyer.
Kaiserstraße 53. o.
München (enclosure: für Meyer).

With best regards,

Yours,

Petroff

You must excuse my insistence. But what else can I do? I hope that you will see to this as you did with the article on Liebknecht.

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

* Rakovsky's article of some 10,000 characters included.

1901

11
TO D. B. RYAZANOV

5/II. 01

Dear Comrade,

We have already read the proofs of your article and it probably has been printed, so that it is impossible to make any changes now. As for the deletion, we did it. We of course would not presume to make any changes affecting the essential ideas of the author without asking his permission first. The given deletion, however, was prompted by purely technical considerations. No editorial office can relinquish the right to make cuts of this order. We were quite certain that you would see yourself that the deletions we have made in no way alter the author's train of thought or detract from the weightiness of his arguments. We hope very much that you will not take this in bad part and that you will continue your co-operation which we value so highly.

The agreement with the liberals which we hinted at in the previous letter* has been concluded.[12] We undertake the publication of a separate general political supplement to *Zarya* which will also carry part of our current materials. We trust that your group[13] will lend a hand with this supplement too. We shall shortly send you the announcement of its publication.

Have you heard anything about the Kiev developments[14]?

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* See present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 67-68.—*Ed.*

They say that 18 were killed there. Please let us know what information you have.

Best regards,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

12
TO V. P. NOGIN

5/II. 01

Thanks for the letter and the detailed analysis of *Iskra*. Thorough and well-argumented appraisals pointing out slips (inevitable in such a difficult job as this) are so rare that one appreciates them doubly. Your interest in *Iskra* reinforces my hope that we shall work together for it.

I fully agree with you that the review of home developments is skimpy. In the second issue it is better, but skimpy nonetheless. It is one of the most difficult sections, and only gradually can it be put on a satisfactory footing.

As regards contributions from correspondents, you are not quite right, in my opinion. The coincidence with *Rabochaya Mysl*[15] No. 10 [incidentally, I have not seen the issue; please send it to me] does not bother me.

It shows that we too have contacts with the St. Petersburg League,[16] and that is a very good thing.

Your interpretation of the advice "to be careful" contained in the item about the crisis[17] is in my view erroneous and far-fetched. It is clear from the context that the warning is *only* against *strikes*, and since next to this it is pointed out that strikes are not the only means of struggle, that it is necessary in these difficult times to use other methods of struggle: propaganda ("to explain") and agitation ("to prepare for more resolute—N.B.—struggle"), I categorically protest against comparing the call "to be careful" with the *Rabochaya Mysl* kind of thinking. The advice "to be careful" when it comes to strikes and to

prepare for more resolute struggle is the exact opposite of the *Rabochaya Mysl* position. Your point about demonstrations is fully justified, but, first, this enters precisely into the broader concept of "more resolute struggle"; second, it would be out of place to make this call more concrete and definite since there is no direct occasion for such action and it is impossible to assess the overall situation in detail. In issue No. 2, in a commentary on one particular strike and an item in *Yuzhny Rabochy*,[18] an attempt is made to be more definite on this score.

I cannot agree that the demand for state unemployment insurance could serve to stir the workers into action. I doubt whether this is right in principle: in a class state unemployment insurance can hardly amount to more than a deception. From the standpoint of tactics, it is especially out of place in Russia, since our state is *fond* of experiments in "etatisation", loves to advertise them as being for the "common good", and we should resolutely oppose any extension of the functions of the *present* state and work for more freedom for public initiative. Aid and benefits for the unemployed are all right, but "state insurance"—?

Your point that the article about Zubatov is not quite rounded out is perhaps justified.[19]

As for the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Decembrists—this really was an omission.[20]

If you wish, I can get you a Bulgarian passport. *Write me if you need it*, and if so, let me have the particulars for identification.

The transport situation has improved and we may be able to manage without the help of new people.

Please send me "Rabochaya Mysl", and also *Byloye*[21] and *other London publications*. I would also like to have a catalogue of publications put out by the Fabian Society and other socialist firms. Which British newspaper would you recommend? Can you send me a couple of issues as samples? I subscribed to *Justice*[22] but was not satisfied with it.

I haven't got four copies of *Iskra* at the moment. We shall get them soon. Why, incidentally, must you have

them? Do not forget that *under no circumstances* can it be circulated abroad. The copy sent you is only for you and your friend*; in general, for the time being, it must remain strictly a secret.

With best regards,
Petrov

I am sending you our pamphlet as well.** So far also *only* for you, *confidentially*.

Please let us know your opinion.

When are you planning to go to Russia? Before you go, we must see each other. Couldn't you come over for a week or so?[23] How are you off for earnings and finances in general?

Once more, best regards,
Yours,
Petroff

Sent from Munich to London

First published in 1958 in the journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3

Printed from the original

13

TO V. P. NOGIN

21/II. 01

Thanks for the newspapers. Within the next few days I shall send you *Iskra* No. 2—also *strictly* in secret.

Could you make an inquiry at the *Nakanune*[24] office. A sum of money and three postage stamps were sent there (in the name of Dr. K. Lehmann) as far back as *October* 31 to pay for the mailing of the paper. But not a word has been heard from them since then!

Please send me a copy of the protest against the drafting of students for military service. It would be interesting to

* The reference evidently is to S. V. Andropov.—*Ed.*

** Probably the pamphlet *May Days in Kharkov*, with a preface by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 357-65).—*Ed.*

compare it with the article on the subject in *Iskra* No. 2.*

Alexei promises to come soon.

Yours,
Petrov

Excuse the brevity of this letter: I've a heap of petty things to attend to.

Sent from Munich to London

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

14
TO P. B. AXELROD

11/III. 01

Dear P. B.,

I received your letter today (together with a copy of the over-laudatory opinion of the Parisians[25]) and am hurrying to send you another copy of No. 2.** How could I not have noticed that the copy sent you was so poor? As a matter of fact, I had absolutely no *choice* then.

Leiteisen's article, in my opinion, is not quite ... but it evidently will nevertheless do. Others seem to have found it better than I did.

I haven't the slightest idea of Shouer. I shall ask others.

I am sending you the copies of *Weltpolitik*[26] I happen to have. If you need all the issues, you probably will have to get in touch with the author himself who again was obliging enough to give his address.

The last sheet of *Zarya* has been proof-read. Soon now....

Alexei wanted to write about the twentieth anniversa-

* See V. I. Lenin, "The Drafting of 183 Students into the Army" (present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19).—*Ed.*

** Of *Iskra*.—*Ed.*

ry of March 1. I don't know whether he did. I am expecting him shortly.

With best regards,

Yours,

Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

15

TO V. P. NOGIN

23/III. 01

I am sending you 5 copies of *Iskra* No. 2 for distribution and sale. If you can use them to collect some money we will be very much obliged to you. We need money badly. Perhaps you could also take steps through London to promote circulation and collection of funds?

I am expecting Alexei any day now. He received his passport and was to have left at the end of last week.

Zarya should be sent to you in a few days from Stuttgart.

Best regards,

Yours....

Sent from Munich to London

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

16

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV*

I received the collection *At the Post of Honour*[27] dedicated to Mikhailovsky. It must be picked to pieces in the second issue of *Zarya*; I'll attend to Chernov, who handles Kautsky à la Bulgakov. It would be a good thing if you

* This letter is a postscript to Martov's letter.—*Ed.*

were to tackle Rafailov, Yuzhakov and the other "sociologists". This will be an act of revenge against Mikhailovsky.

Yours,
Petrov

Written April 15, 1901
Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published September 7, 1956 in the newspaper *Smena* (Leningrad) No. 210

Printed from the original

17

TO M. G. VECHESLOV*

To Yuriev

April 22

Since the red-print leaflets are to be forwarded to St. Petersburg the valise containing them should be sent in that direction (to Pskov, not to Smolensk or Poltava).

We are sending 100 marks as a *loan* to the Berlin group.[28] It would be desirable to collect the money needed for delivering the valises on the spot and to relieve *Iskra* of this expense. Do everything you can to raise the money, for we are very short of funds.

As regards your leaving the neutral group, you know best what to do. It might perhaps be better to wait, since you might be able to win others to our side.

The stamp has been ordered. Let us have the Vienna address again, the one you sent looks queer.

As regards sending consignments through the Polish Social-Democrat, you should accept his offer and do your best to give him a pood or two of literature at the earliest possible date for trial shipment. How much literature do you have on hand? We shall send you the balance—*Zarya* and (after May 1) *Iskra* No. 3.

You did not let us know how much open literature you have received. Send us a detailed account.

Written April 22, 1901
Sent from Munich to Berlin

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

* Written together with Nadezhda Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

18

TO THE *BORBA* GROUP[29]

12/V. 01

Dear Comrades,

Being, as before, supporters of unity in principle, we repeat our agreement to resume unity talks and gratefully accept the offer made by the *Borba* group to take the initiative and mediate in the preliminary phase of the talks. We agree to the holding of a preliminary conference of the Social-Democratic organisations you name.

We believe it is in place to add that we cannot of course end the polemics over issues of principle which we started with *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

Respectfully, on behalf of the *Iskra* group....

We would ask you to let us know as soon as possible whether all concerned have agreed to the idea of the conference.[30] We can definitely promise to take part in May, but a later date would involve some difficulty for us.

Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from a copy in Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova's handwriting

19

TO M. G. VECHESLOV

Draft of letter dated 18.V.01

We of course agree with your plan to begin publication of bulletins[31] at once. Only it is necessary to work out the organisational aspects of the scheme, that is, to settle some inevitable preliminary questions. For instance, will the entire *Iskra* promotion group in Berlin be involved in publishing and editing the bulletins (if I am not mistaken, the idea was not to inform the whole group of our organisational plan as yet), or just a part of it, or a few individuals? Will the title of the bulletins indicate their relation-

ship to *Iskra* or not? It would also be desirable that the programme of the bulletins should accord with the programme put forward in our draft and that the editors should see to it that the departments (translations of Polish, Finnish and other literature) are distributed among *Iskra* sympathisers and supporters. Lastly, it is essential definitely to decide (the decision of course should not be published) that the group publishing and editing the bulletins undertake the task provisionally with a view to turning it over to an elected Literary Commission when the *Iskra* organisation abroad which we have proposed has been openly constituted. There are also other matters which you of course will see for yourself and settle when you get down to working out your plan organisationally in its final form.

We on our part shall select some material we have on hand and send it to you. Let us know when you plan to put out the first issue. Will the bulletins you propose to publish be the same as the earlier ones (as regards format) or different?

Sent from Munich to Berlin

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

20

TO THE PRINTING SHOP OF *ISKRA*

We shall have to change the order of the articles.

Set up the material as long as you have type, and *save the set-up type*.

We hope to be able to send the articles tomorrow or the day after.

I am sending you:

1) Proofs
2) Kharkov
3) Kovno, etc.
4) Samara
5) Sedition, etc.

6) 2 poems
7) Nizhni-Novgorod.*

Send us printer's ink, we do not know how to get it.

Yours,
Lenin

Written between May 22 and June 1, 1901, in Munich and mailed to a local address

First published May 5, 1931, in *Pravda* No. 122

Printed from the original

21
TO G. D. LEITEISEN

24.V. 01

Dear Leiteisen,

As regards Muzykant, we believe that since he se met à notre disposition** and is an enterprising man, it is of course necessary to try and send him at once to the *very* frontier to take direct charge of the consignments, and not only to take charge but to attend personally to conveying them across (respective: to cross the frontier with a smuggler).

Since he agrees, he should be given 200 frs. (that is, the 100+100 you wrote about) and probably sent *to us*. We were wondering whether he should come here or just go to Berlin to talk things over there with our representative, but have arrived at the conclusion that he will have to take a trip here; we have a number of more or less certain contacts at the frontier and near it, and without thorough consultation with the person who is to go there we cannot decide exactly where he should go and what "pretext" to choose.

We are now short of money and have to be very thrifty; we cannot afford to spend on anything but transportation. But if Muzykant gets there on these 200 frs. and lives on

* Some of the listed materials were published in *Iskra* No. 5.—*Ed.*
** Places himself at our disposal.—*Ed.*

them for some time he will probably be able with the help of our contacts to begin deliveries at once.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Ryazanov is here and we have been discussing the plan for our organisation with him. At first he rejected our plan categorically and "resentfully", but then, after the proviso was inserted that all this was *temporary*, for one year, he agreed *conditionally* on his own behalf but assured us that Nevzorov would not agree *on any account* (?). There is also—just in case—another plan: a federation of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, *Zarya* and *Borba*, with the last-mentioned putting out only pamphlets (not a paper), participating in an *advisory* capacity in the work of *Zarya* and *Iskra*, contributing, like the other members, its share to the federation's treasury, raising funds independently by arranging socials, etc. What do you think of this latter project? To me it seems unfair—it grants too much to *Borba*—and I doubt whether it would be acceptable to all.

Generally speaking we believe that an understanding can be reached with *Borba* too; they also seem to be ready to make concessions seeing that we have no intention of giving up our position.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

22

TO R. E. KLASSON*

The group publishing and editing *Iskra* and *Zarya* turns to you as one who took part together with us in one of the

* This letter is an enclosure to a letter of May 28, 1901 (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 70).—*Ed.*

first Marxist publishing undertakings,[32] and who has always sympathised with the political activity of Social-Democracy, with a request for financial assistance. The future of the entire business now *largely* depends on such assistance, for the initial funds have been used up in getting started and it will take at least a year of full-scale work for the enterprise to begin paying for itself. In the spring of last year (1900) one of us had a talk with your friend (whom you probably now often see) who also expressed confidence that you would not refuse to help. We hoped that with your connections you would be able to collect a substantial lump sum, though our organisation is of course in need of periodical contributions as well.

Written May 28, 1901
Sent from Munich to Baku

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

23

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

12.VI. 01

A few words, dear G. V., to let you know that the article by Orthodox against Berdayev was sent to the printers today. We propose to run it *second*, after your editorial. *Let us have a headline* for it *as soon as possible*, for it is now quite "headless".

We had a bit of an argument over it with Arsenyev and Velika.... They found the sallies against Kistyakovsky (2×2=5) and the end concerning the "bourgeoisness" of Berdayev to be plump....*

All the best,
Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Geneva

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

* Clumsy (German).—*Ed.*

24
TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ADDRESSEE*

18/VII.

We received your letter. Let us know the exact date when you can go yourself or send someone for the valise (to Königsberg or Berlin). When the literature has been picked up it should be taken to X at the following address: ....** Do you know any German, for you will have to deal with a German. Figure out how much each trip to Königsberg will cost, and let us know how often it is possible to go there. In case there is an opportunity to pick up the valise in Berlin, the address (and password) are enclosed. It is necessary to take things along to fill the valise.

Written July 18, 1901

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

25
TO P. B. AXELROD

30/VII. 01

Dear P. B.,

I received "Liebknecht" and *Vorbote*.[33] Many, many thanks! First a few words about a special matter. We have decided to arrange a meeting with the author of "The Rebirth of Revolutionism in Russia",*** but under no circumstances in Munich. We chose Zurich, so that our delegate (it is proposed that I should go) could also meet you on the same trip. The meeting is planned for August *8-10* (before the 12th), new style.

Please let us know whether you can allow us to use your flat for the meeting and whether you can be in Zurich at the time so that we could meet (or, rather, whether I can take a trip to see you, for why should you do any travel-

* Written together with Krupskaya.—*Ed.*
** Blank space for address.—*Ed.*
*** L. Nadezhdin.—*Ed.*

ling since you are under medical care? For me, needless to say, it is no trouble at all).

The gentleman in question will come to your flat (we shall instruct him accordingly through Alexei's sister in Geneva, unless you think otherwise), introduce himself as *Sokolovsky* and ask you (or your wife) for the *Iskra* representative. Alexei's sister will wire me when he will leave, and I shall come to Zurich in good time, concealing from him (we fear to trust him too much) my whereabouts.

We have seen the Narodnaya Volya journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii*[34] (Ryazanov showed us a copy) but have not received it ourselves, promises notwithstanding. I glanced through only the editorial and a review of *Iskra* (favourable, but *for* terrorism). We should be getting it soon, and so should you.

We received the foreword by Kautsky. Your remarks concerning my article* in the letter my sister received today made your attitude much clearer to me. I hope we shall still have a chance to talk about this, and—au revoir!

Yours,
Petroff

G. V. writes that you will see him. When do you intend to go? We can hasten the trip to Zurich to meet Sokolovsky if you plan to leave soon.

Sent from Munich to Niedelbad
(Switzerland)

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

26
TO L. Y. GALPERIN**

We sent you a telegram—the meaning was quite clear—agreement. But bear in mind that communication by

* See "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism" (present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 35-80).—*Ed.*

** Written together with Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

wire is very dangerous, for they take copies of telegrams. Try confining yourself to the post. There is no need to come over to discuss details. All that can be arranged by letter. Do you happen to have an experienced printer? If so, mats, which are easy to send (in journals, etc.), can be used. The advantages of this method are: 1) no type is needed, 1a) it is far quicker, 2) less people, which means greater safety in underground work, 3) the paper will have a foreign look, which too is a big advantage from the standpoint of secrecy. By way of experiment we shall send you shortly matrices enclosed in book binding, addressed to K....* Open them carefully, try them out and let us know the results as soon as you can. A universal stereotyper for making type-casts from matrices costs about 300 marks, but whether one can be freely obtained in Russia we do not know. Let us know what the size of your machine is. Can it print sheets the size of our *Iskra*? In general, send us at the earliest date some sample of your work.

If you have the technical facilities, try to put out as soon as possible at least one complete issue of *Iskra* (if you find it difficult to print an 8-page paper, such as No. 6, at least put out No. 5—it's four pages). It would be extremely important for us to have a copy of the Russian edition of *Iskra* in time for the conference[35] here, that is, within a month (at most a month and a half).

Since when are we 800 rubles in debt? Our funds are now low and the debt can be covered only if your printing facilities actually turn out at least three to five thousand copies of *Iskra* (4-8 pages) a month. If you manage to do that there will of course be a net income.

Where did you send the packages you received? Why send 5 poods to Yekaterinoslav? We do not risk sending more than a pood or two as a first try; it doesn't matter if it costs more. Can consignments to Yekaterinoslav be marked "Bücher"**? How long does delivery take? This is

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* Identity not established.—*Ed.*

** Books.—*Ed.*

very important. When writing addresses, separate the words, otherwise you can't tell the name apart from the town and street.

Written between July 31
and August 12, 1901
Sent from Munich to Baku

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

27

TO L. I. GOLDMAN

To Akim

Dear Comrade,

We were very glad indeed to receive your parcel. A magnificent job; even Tsvetov says so. You misunderstood us. We were not at all against the publication of *Iskra* in Russia. On the contrary, we are fully aware that the business will benefit greatly by it, and always wanted this to be done, but we confess we had little faith in the success of the undertaking. Now you have given us that faith. We are sending you an article by X intended for *Zarya* No. 2, but in our opinion it would be very useful to put it out as a pamphlet. You will probably agree with us when you read it. Print 1,000 copies of it. There will be no more delays with material. Let us know when you want the copy for the next pamphlet. Later on we shall send material for the paper.* We repeat, we are very glad indeed.

There will be an item in No. 7 about the Veto myth—it's all sheer nonsense.

You are quite right when you write that *Iskra* should organise. But you are wrong in saying an organisation should have been *left behind* in Russia.

To do this, so to speak, in advance was out of the question; only when things get under way will it be possible to tell how the organisation should shape. Now—and here you are right—there is chaos (partly due to the method of delivery), most of our representatives write to us about this. We are thinking of sending the project we have drawn up for an organisation to two or three people in Russia for consideration, and working out the rules for the organisation with their help. We have not received the Odessa leaflets. Please send them.

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* It would be extremely important for us to have a Russian edition of *Iskra* as soon as possible. If you are not quite up to it, put out separate articles from the paper.

[Your new acquaintance whom you met here sends on his own behalf three cheers to you on this success!!!] *

Written between July 31 and August 12, 1901
Sent from Munich to Kishinev

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

28
TO P. B. AXELROD

4/VIII. 01

Dear P. B.,

We received your letter of the 30th and, today, your letter from Niedelbad informing us that the meeting can be arranged at your place. I am very glad. I hope we shall see each other this week and have a good talk, and therefore shall confine myself to a brief note on "business".

I wrote today *via Stuttgart* to a man named Finn in Zurich—it was a letter of recommendation to you. My wife and sister knew this Finn (*slightly*) in Russia (*before his arrest*). He created the impression of a superficial person, but there were no grounds to doubt his honesty. He was picked up in the Moscow affair[36] together with the notorious traitor *Ruma* and was exiled to Astrakhan. Other Astrakhan exiles (well known to us) likewise did not question his honesty, all the more so since Finn was *one of the first* to identify Ruma as a traitor.

Going abroad after exile, Finn stayed for a time in Berlin where our representatives evidently were friendly with him at first, but then parted company with him, and *yesterday* I got an unexpected letter from a Berliner saying that Finn "does not observe Party ethics", that "he makes a repulsive impression", that he "knew of Ruma's relations with Zubatov", that although they do not think Finn is a spy they recommend caution.

Astounded by this letter, we carried caution so far that

* Postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

I did *not even see* Finn* (Alexei, without revealing that he was in on things, merely told him where the rendezvous was to take place), instead my wife saw him and told him that I was *living* in *Stuttgart* and was there at the moment.

Because of this I wrote to him through Stuttgart, and would ask you to keep up the fiction.

Finn is a writer of sorts. I believe that Alexei and I made a mistake in not seeing him and going into the affair personally. Apparently Finn parted company with the Berliners because he would not agree to their demand: to give *Iskra* the *full story* of the Ruma affair. This aroused their suspicion. Finn told my wife that he could not do it because Ruma would then have direct evidence of his, Finn's, connections with the illegal press. Instead Finn gave my wife a note of a few lines saying that there is *no doubt about Ruma's dealings with Zubatov.*

To get to the bottom of all this, I shall write at once to my sister, who knew Finn before his arrest and met him in Moscow. I shall ask her to reply both to me *and directly to you*. You, on your part, please talk to Finn and sound him out, and besides, if it is not inconvenient, detain him in Zurich for a couple of extra days so that I could also see him (it will be much more convenient there than here) and try to correct the mistake I made because of the shocking letter from Berlin.

Finn proposes to go on to G. V. Give him a brief note to G. V. and at the same time send this letter to G. V. so that he should be informed.

Once again au revoir,

Yours,

Petrov

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

* (I never knew Finn and never even saw him).

29
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

18/IX. 01

Dear G. V.,

I have just made the inserts you wanted in your article against Bernstein, and also broken it up into sections. I am very much afraid that the division is not too successful (and the same applies to the insertion of the note about Kautsky). But you can easily correct this *in the proofs*.

I also wish to draw your attention to my insertions on p. 77 of the manuscript (reverse side) and (on p. 78) in place of the deletion. Perhaps all this should be smoothed out in general.

Your article against Bernstein is already being set up. We shall send you the manuscript together with the proofs so that you can see the insertions I made.

I am enclosing a letter for Rachinsky.

Nothing has been heard from you for quite some time. Are you well? Are you planning to visit Pavel Borisovich, and when?

I am working rather hard on my "agrarian" article,* which is growing terribly long.

All the best,
Yours,
Petrov

Sent from Munich to Geneva
First published in 1926
in the collection
The Emancipation of Labour Group No. 4

Printed from the original

* See "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" (present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 103-222).—*Ed.*

30

TO LYUBOV AXELROD

Dear L. I.,

Please get someone *immediately* to copy the main documents of our conference and send them at once to the following address:

Herrn Dr. Med.
Carl Lehmann
Gabelsbergerstraße 20a
München.

We need these documents badly *at once* to show to friends who will be leaving in a few days for Russia. Therefore please get as soon as you can two or three girls to copy the following documents:

1) The Geneva resolutions.
2) The two questions submitted in Frey's speech.
3) The Union's statement concerning the Bund, and our reply recognising the Bund but "not touching upon" anything else.
4) The Union's amendments to the Geneva resolutions.
5) Statement of the *Borba* group.
6) *Our declaration on withdrawal from the conference.*[37]

In short, all the papers submitted to the bureau.

Please reply as soon as possible to Munich (we are leaving just now).

Best regards,
Frey

Written October 5 or 6, 1901, in Zurich and mailed to a local address

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

31

TO THE *ISKRA* GROUP IN ST. PETERSBURG*

Let us know without fail and keep us regularly informed on what trends there are and to what extent they are repre-

* This letter is a postscript to Martov's letter.—*Ed.*

sented in the St. Petersburg League generally and its centre in particular, whether there are active and authoritative people, etc. It is imperative for us to be always fully informed on the St. Petersburg League.[38]

Written in October, after 15th, 1901
Sent from Munich

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

32
TO LYUBOV AXELROD

22/X. 01

Dear L. I.,

Forgive me for not replying at once and for being very brief: I've again caught something like influenza and my head is absolutely no good. In my opinion, if no account of the conference can be compiled we should do the following: all the documents and statements submitted at the conference to the bureau (the Geneva* resolutions, the amendments to them, the statement of the Union and our statement on the Bund, our declaration on withdrawal, etc.) should be printed consecutively, *none* of the speeches need be given (not even mentioned, to say nothing of a detailed account), just *link* the documents with a couple of words. It seems to me that the documents are so eloquent and speak for themselves so clearly that it is enough to print them (merely indicating how, in what order and on what issues they were submitted or read out) for all sensible people fully to understand why we walked out.[39]

If you do not have the questions submitted by Frey, ask Leiteisen and Dan; they may have them.

Try to confine yourself to such a comparison of documents and send the result as soon as possible to Geneva;

* In the manuscript: "London", by mistake.—*Ed.*

they will print them there and perhaps make some minor amendments if such are needed.

Best regards,
Yours....

Sent from Munich to Berne
First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

33
TO G. D. LEITEISEN

10.XI. 01

Dear Leiteisen,

I saw the gentleman* to whom you revealed a League[40] secret and who is now raising a fuss.

I must say that you made a rather big mistake.

First, why did you speak about this gentleman to Leibov and Wasserberg, who are *not* members of the League?? He complains particularly bitterly about this. And he is right. The attitude of the League towards third persons should be known *only* to League members. I think you ought to tell Leibov and Wasserberg off properly and not trust them so much in the future: if you found it possible to tell them, they should have kept silent without fail.

Second, why didn't you put an end to the affair at once, thereby *preventing* the gentleman from making the trip to see G. V. and us?? After all, you are an official functionary, a member of the administration. You should have therefore *accepted* from the gentleman whatever statement he wanted to submit, and after discussing it with others, given him a proper collective answer. You should have told him that he could contact the League *only* through you and that hence he was *obliged* to submit to you *whatever* complaints he had against the League in general or one of its members in particular and had no right to take the matter up with the wrong people (G. V. or us).

As I see it, you departed from the rules (according to

* A reference to A. Y. Finn-Yenotayevsky.—*Ed.*

which all complaints are to be dealt with by the administration) and are guilty, besides indiscretion, of failure to exercise your authority.

Well, so much for that. Do not be offended by my frankness. Now l'incident est clos.* We, needless to say, told the gentleman this: we do not advise you to turn to the League concerning yourself (i.e., to ask whether the League trusts you, etc.). There is no point in doing that. The League is not obliged to reply. What you ought to do is this: do *everything* you can to throw light on the Ruma affair (in *all its* aspects), collect *all* the evidence and ask the League to review the case and publish the findings (i.e., the accusation against Ruma and, eventuellement,** the exoneration of others).

He agreed that this was the only way to go about it and set to work putting down *his* own testimony. If you know of any other witnesses, take steps yourself to get their evidence.

And so our tactics now are: within the League, a *reserved* attitude towards the "gentleman" for the time being. *But not a word* about it outside the League, *or even* to the more aloof members of the League. N'est ce pas?***

Yours,
Frey

Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

34
TO G. D. LEITEISEN

14.XI. 01

Dear Leiteisen,

I hasten to reply at once to your letter which I just received.

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* The incident is closed.—*Ed.*
** Eventually.—*Ed.*
*** Agreed?—*Ed*

Really, you are not being quite ... objective about the "incident". Since you did disclose a secret to a not too discreet person, some measure of indiscretion there evidently was. Of course, this can happen to anyone, and please do not think that I am repeating this for any other reason than to close the incident once and for all. But you must admit that we had some *very unpleasant* moments and explanations to face not through any fault of our own, for it was not we who told Leib... things that could not but make the "gentleman" blow up.

And now as to the substance of the matter. Once the "gentleman" learned (in whatever way) that the League had decided against him (or that a League member had voiced the opinion that it was necessary to take a reserved attitude toward him, that is, the "gentleman",* which amounts to the same thing), the *League was involved* in the affair. This is something that cannot be undone, any more than you can recapture a word that has been spoken.

And for heaven's sake do not add another mistake to the first: do not say *now* that "the League has nothing to do with it"!

The League is already involved, and the *only* question now is how to disentangle it.

The "gentleman" wanted to apply to the League concerning *himself* (you evidently did not quite understand me on this score), i.e., concerning the grounds on which League members had cast aspersions on him.

We persuaded him that nobody had cast any "aspersions", and as regards its reservations, the League is not accountable to anyone.

This finishes the *personal* question concerning the "gentleman". But there still remains the public question of the Ruma affair, about which we have long been receiving letters urging that it be cleared up.

The reservations in relation to the "gentleman" were as a matter of fact due to his "involvement" in this affair.

Therefore, the "gentleman" had to be advised to undertake an "inquest and investigation" of all aspects of the Ruma affair.

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* See previous document.—*Ed.*

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Since he agreed to do so, it is up to us to help him; first, because it is unquestionably in the interests of the *movement* to throw full light on the methods used and the web woven by the provocateur Ruma; secondly, because we League members are a little bit to blame for the fact that the League caused the "gentleman" so much trouble, *which he may not have fully deserved*.

You must agree that it is our right and duty to have reservations as regards X, Y and Z, but X, Y and Z should not be told about them. Once the "sin" has been committed there is nothing for it, you know, but to own up.

We should not add one mistake to another by saying that it is "none of our business" *now*, after we ourselves brought things out into the open....

Yours,
Frey

P.S. Greetings to Yefron. Is he pleased with the outcome of the conference and the establishment of the League?

Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

35
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

19.XI. 01

I'm afraid, dear G. V., that I'm giving you no peace with my letters. I seem to be bombarding you *every day*.

I sent you the article "The Present Industrial Crisis".* I believe it isn't bad and could go into *Zarya* No. 4 with some slight changes. Please read it *as soon* as you have a free moment and give your opinion. If you approve of it, we shall have it set up in type *very soon* (in a week and a half or so) so that Dietz's printery should not stand idle. Perhaps Koltsov would agree to help edit the article if necessary?

* The article, by A. Y. Finn-Yenotayevsky, was never published. —*Ed*.

As regards printing the documents of the conference the majority has already declared *for* immediate publication (Vel. Dm., Blumenfeld, two Berlin members, and myself, i.e., five out of the nine—the six editors and three administrators). In other words, that question is decided. Let B. Abr. hurry as much as possible.

Do you happen to have an extra copy of the Russian edition of "What Next?" We haven't a single one. Please send it.

Yours,
Frey

Sent from Munich to Geneva
First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

36
TO LYUBOV AXELROD

17/XII. 01

Dear L. I.,

Received three letters from you and am replying to them all. I definitely cannot come[41]: the whole paper now rests on me and the administrative end has been complicated by transport hitches and mix-ups in Russia, and my pamphlet is pressing on me.* I am devilishly late! And I am altogether unprepared; I even asked Berg to write the item for *Iskra* No. 13, for I have read nothing on the history of our revolutionary movement for a very long time. I think you are mistaken in assuming that you will not do because of public sentiment. The Plekhanov anniversary is so *specific* a celebration that it most likely will be attended only by people of very definite trend and sentiment.

Address for letters to Tsvetov (Blumenfeld):

Herrn Dittrich Buchbinder.
Schwanthalerstraße 44.
München.

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* A reference to *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529).—*Ed.*

I give you this address because if you write through me your letters to him may be delayed for two *whole* days. He lives at the other end of town and we see each other rarely.

The "strange" letter with the inquiry concerning Mrs. D. should have been sent not to Blumenfeld but to the address enclosed in the same letter.

Best regards,

Yours,

Frey

Sent from Munich to Berne

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

37

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

20/XII. 01

Dear G. V.,

I forgot to ask you to do the following: please look among your papers for a *letter* my wife sent you *concerning the article "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry"** (three or four close-written sheets of letter paper, without heading or signature).

You haven't given your opinion as regards printing it in *Zarya*. I would like to remind you of it, so that you should not forget to send it to us *without fail before leaving*[42] (or to bring it along).

Please write when you plan to leave and expect to arrive here.

Berg is said to have scored a success in Paris. But the Union crowd in Russia have achieved absolutely nothing! This is the very time to crush them.

I am writing a pamphlet** against them, and I get an-

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* See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

** See *What Is To Be Done?* (present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529).—*Ed.*

grier and angrier as I go on. The only trouble is that my pamphlet is getting too fat!

Yours,
Frey

Sent from Munich to Geneva
First published in 1926 in the collection *The Emancipation of Labour Group* No. 4

Printed from the original

38
TO P. B. AXELROD

23.XII. 01

Dear P. B.,

The letter was sent not registered to your address a couple of weeks ago.* If possible, put in an inquiry at the post office, perhaps enclosing an envelope addressed in my handwriting, in case this might help.

Of course it would be better for G. V. to call on the way back. I sent him money for the fare. You must have received *Zarya*, of course.

Could you now look through my pamphlet (or book?) against the Economists? If you can, I'll send you half of it in a day or two or early next week, for I would like to have your advice. Drop me a line.

Hoping to see you soon,
Yours,
Frey

Sent from Munich to Zurich
First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

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* Lenin wrote about the same letter to P. B. Axelrod on December 19, 1901 (see present edition, Vol. 36, p. 104).—*Ed.*

1902

39
TO V. N. KROKHMAL

3/1.

We have received a letter from Kiev criticising the actions of the committee. It says that (1) the committee is insufficiently informed (there were arrests on the night of December 1, but the committee is unable to ascertain who were arrested and why), and that it is slow in taking action. (2) A leaflet addressed to the workers should have been put out reporting the student unrest and indicating a course of action to the workers. The committee agreed that such a leaflet was needed, but did not issue it on time. We propose to print the letter in our issue No. 14, which comes out in 10 days' time. In view of this, reply *at once* whether you have any objections on either score, or send in your own account of the circumstances connected with these facts. In general the letter is an interesting one, but we would not wish to publish criticism of the actions of a friendly committee without hearing its opinion. *Please* answer promptly.*

Written January 3, 1902
Sent from Munich to Kiev

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

40
TO P. B. AXELROD

3/III. 02

Dear P. B.,

Berg is sending you a communication of a business nature we have read collectively here. I need only add that I am making the following amendments to my draft** (amend-

* Postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*
** See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 25-31.—*Ed.*

ments along the lines of G. V.):—see next sheet.* From these amendments you will see that there can hardly be any question of differences of "principle".

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Munich to Zurich

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

41

TO G. D. LEITEISEN

Once again zur Frage (on the question) of Krichevsky. G. V. says that in the Paris colony it was *stubbornly maintained* that this Boris Krichevsky had received a letter of *thanks* from Millerand (for his contributions to *Vorwärts*[43]) and that he had at one time even *boasted* about it. So now that a polemic has started between *Vorwärts* and *Zarya*[44] and the question has been put point-blank, it is necessary to exert *at once every* effort to make a most thorough investigation (trial "by ordeal") of the affair. Please tackle the matter at once. Collect evidence from all witnesses, both those who saw something *and those* who *heard* about it, and having done so, write us giving the names of all these witnesses and their testimony. As a last resort you should turn to Petit, though it would be better not to "scare the quarry" but to catch them before they suspect attack.

And so, to work! With full force!

Awaiting your reply,

Yours,

Frey

Written prior to March 23, 1902
Sent from Munich to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

* See "Three Amendments to the Draft Programme" (present edition, Vol. 6, p. 32).—*Ed.*

42
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

17.IV. 02

Dear G. V.,

I have another request to make of you. Please drop a line to Quelch asking his assistance in a matter on which he has already been approached by a friend of mine (with a letter from Velika Dm.) and today by myself: ask him to do everything he possibly can and tell him it is very important. You may write to him in French. Such a letter would help me very much with the arrangements, which are well under way and need only to be completed.

Here, in case you need it, is his address: Mr. *H. Quelch*.

37 A. Clerkenwell Green.
London E. C.

In the meantime you can write to me at Alexeyev's address, he lives two steps away. I hope to be finally settled in a week.

Best regards,
Yours....

P.S. Vel. Dm. is perfectly right: at first glance this London makes a foul impression!!

Is your compositor ready to come over here?

Where are Berg and Vel. Dm., and do you happen to know when the former is leaving?

I sent you the agrarian books with Vel. Dmitr. Did you get them?

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

43
TO P. B. AXELROD

18.IV. 02

Dear P. B.,

I take this opportunity to write a couple of words to you: the letters for B. N—ch just received should be passed on to him as soon as possible. If he is not there, please forward them to him.

If Berg is there, ask him to write me a few words about his plans: when and where he is going, and for how many days. And the main thing: did he receive the two letters I posted to him on Saturday morning (the 12th)?

We are busy getting settled—there is plenty to do. In the meantime write to Alexeyev's address—I shall get it at once (Mr. Alexejeff. 14. Frederick Str. 14. Gray's Inn Road. London W. C.). You got my letter from Cologne, didn't you?*

And what about your article?

Best regards,

Yours....

(First impression of London: vile. And everything is quite expensive!)

Sent from London to Zurich

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

44
TO P. B. AXELROD

23.IV. 02

Dear P. B.,

Here's my new address (which I would earnestly request you not to give to anyone, not even League members, with

* The reference is to "Remarks on the Committee's Draft Programme" (present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 59-71). The "Remarks" were written in part in Cologne, where Lenin stopped over on his way from Munich to London.—*Ed.*

the exception of those who stand closest to us, such as L. Gr. or B. N.; let the others write to the Alexeyev address as before, and outsiders to the Dietz address. If possible, when talking with people try systematically to speak of Munich instead of London and the people in Munich instead of Londoners).

Mr. Jacob *Richter* (Holford)
30. Holford Square. Pentonville. *London W. C.*

Berg has probably already left; I got a letter from him today saying that he was leaving on Thursday. If he is still there, tell him that if he does not find Alexeyev at home he can go to Richter—it's only two steps away.

If the "former Economist" (the lady you liked so much) is there, ask her, or, rather, interrogate her closely, *whether she mailed* the registered letters she was given to send off on April 11, 1902, in Munich. If she did, let her send us the receipts at once. If not, give her a good calling down and ask her where the letters are—better still, let her write us (at the Alexeyev address).

I am sending today by book-post (not registered) something very interesting for L. Gr.; let him give it his closest attention.

Has G. V. written the editorial he promised for *Iskra* No. 20? If so, has it been sent to the printers? Have you sent anything else to the printers? If not, *what are we going to do* about an editorial? Is it possible that you all have left the question open? Berg writes nothing about this!?!?

Best regards,
Yours....

Sent from London to Zurich

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany III*

Printed from the original

45

TO A. I. KREMER

To Alexander

4.V. 02

Dear Comrade,

We have good reason to fear that our delegate (to the conference) was arrested soon after the conference, before he had time to hand over his office.[45] We therefore ask you to let us know: 1) who besides our delegate was elected to the preparatory (or organising, etc.) committee? and 2) how can we contact these people (address, key, password, etc.)?

You might write your communication in invisible ink in code, if necessary, giving the key to the bearer of this letter personally. In general it is most convenient to maintain contact through the bearer, who can send a wire in emergencies and, if something particularly urgent and pressing happens, take a decision himself.

Sent from London to Paris

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

46

TO THE UNION OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS ABROAD

To the Union

4.V. 02

Owing to completely unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, we received your letter only yesterday and therefore could not reply earlier. We have heard nothing from our delegate about the "agreed place". It would therefore be more expedient for you to take steps directly to deliver the leaflet to the committees.[46] Evidently one of our people has been taken. So far we are not printing anything about the Belostok arrest. To speed up things in *important* matters we would earnestly ask you to pass on all information

through the comrade in Paris (Leiteisen), sending us (to the address: Herrn Philipp Rögner. Cigarrenhandlung. Neue Gasse. 44. Nürnberg) either a copy of the statements handed to the Paris comrade, or a brief summary.

For the Editors of *Iskra*,
Frey

Sent from London to Paris
First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

47
TO P. N. LEPESHINSKY AND I. I. RADCHENKO*

Received the statistics. Very many thanks. Send also materials on the evaluation of land in Vladimir Gubernia, Vol. V, Part III, 1901 (Gorokhovaya st.), as well as other volumes.

Written May 5, 1902
Sent from London to Pskov
First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

48
TO LYUBOV AXELROD

23.VI. 02

Dear L. I.,

I greatly regret that I just cannot comply with your request and come to Berne. My health is very bad, and I really do not know whether I shall be able to deliver the lecture in Paris properly; did not manage to prepare it, almost complete Arbeitsunfähigkeit,** nerves no good at all. If I could, I would get out of going to Paris too, but it would be a shame to let them down.[47] If I don't disgrace myself in Paris and if I rest a little afterwards, I shall do

* Written as a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*
** Incapacitation.—*Ed.*

my best to come over without fail (perhaps in the autumn), but now I simply cannot do it.

With best regards and many thanks for letting us hear from you.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. My wife would like to know whether the letter for L. Gr., and also her letter concerning the money (with the request that the money be returned or transferred to Richter), have been received.

Sent from London to Berne

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

49

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

12.VII. 02

Dear G. V.,

Your article received.* Many thanks for revising it. I have sent it to London just now. As regards Berg's article, V. I. believes it could very well go next to yours, but in my opinion it would be better to hold it up until later. We shall ask Berg.

Write to me in London, for I don't know how long I shall be here. Still, I'll be staying here at least a week, and in case you write within this time, here's the address:

M-me Leguen (pour M. Olinoff)
Loguivy (par Ploubazlanec).
Côtes du Nord.
France.

Why didn't your trip to Brussels come off?[48] Is the conference not going to take place? At any rate I hope to see you in London. I don't think much of L. Gr.'s plan to

* The reference is to the article "Criticism of Our Critics", published later in *Zarya* No. 4.—*Ed.*

substitute for the London meeting a trip by Berg and myself to Switzerland for 10-12 days (sic!) to see some new arrivals from Russia. Really, how can anything worth while be accomplished in 10-12 days? For we have to get to know the arrivals thoroughly and individually, and besides we have much to talk over among ourselves. And we cannot afford to stay long in Switzerland (there's work to be done). Lastly, the newcomers must (if they are *Iskra* supporters) make a study of all (or part) of our correspondence with Russia, and this can be done only in London. Without such a study of our correspondence the meeting would be pointless and all but useless. Because of all these reasons I am strongly for a meeting in London.

Best regards,
Yours....

P.S. In my opinion, unity with the Union crowd is out of the question now: they are insolent and were very offensive towards Berg in Paris.[49] Perhaps he will forward to you my letter setting forth in detail why it is necessary to be firm and extremely cautious with them. Our affairs in Russia are now very much on the upgrade, and here are the Union people threatening to display independence! God forbid....

Somehow *Zarya* is still stuck. Dietz jokes that it isn't fated to come out!

Sent from Loguivy (Côtes du Nord)
to Geneva

First published in 1925
in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

50
TO V. G. SHKLYAREVICH

29.VII. 02

Your communication concerning the "inheritance" received.[50] We too feel there is much that is "strange and incomprehensible" about this, especially the suggestion that

Fyokla* should look for a lawyer. How could Fyokla do it? And why shouldn't the heir himself do it? Of course, nothing ventured, nothing gained, and an attempt might be made, but it has to be nevertheless thoroughly considered. Otherwise we might make a laughing-stock of ourselves by chasing soap-bubbles. So, do everything possible to investigate the matter and let us know how "the heir can be placed at our disposal". Send him abroad, or what? Describe him in *detail* for us. Further, why didn't "your" heir apply to the lawyers acting for the co-heirs? (Needless to say, we cannot afford to spend any money on this.)

It would be very important for us to have good contact *directly* with *the Southern workers' organisation*.[51] Please attend to this and send us as detailed an account of it as possible.**

Sent from London to Koreiz

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

51

TO KARTAVTSEV***

4/VIII.

1) I received two more letters from you but could not make them out. Your invisible ink is not concentrated enough. Try it out each time before writing. It is terribly annoying to get a letter and not be able to read it.

2) Did you get our letter asking you to send us some 300 rubles out of our money?

3) What have you heard from prison?

4) Illg's address. You have it wrong, it should be:****

5) Let us know what's doing in the committee. It is said that a certain "Leonty" (Potyomkin)***** has arrived in Berlin. He is supposed to have told a Berlin comrade of ours that a) the Kiev Committee is stripping the "Stariki's supporters" of all authority, b) that it is indignant about the *Iskra* letter and will oppose the recognition of *Iskra* as the Party organ, c) that the committee had instructed him to contact *Zhizn*, which the Kiev people want to make the Party

* Code name for the Editorial Board of *Iskra*.—*Ed.*

** This paragraph is crossed out in the original.—*Ed.*

*** Identity not established.—*Ed.*

**** Address not given in the original.—*Ed.*

***** Identity not established.—*Ed.*

organ, d) that the committee is powerless to counteract the Socialist-Revolutionaries, does not venture to come out against terrorism and merely seeks to oppose the circulation of literature such as *The Ways People Live* and the like. There is probably something wrong here and we have asked word to be passed on to Leonty that he should write us and give us a detailed account of what is happening. But he has not written. Let us know how things stand.

We earnestly beg you to contact us *directly* on all matters of any importance, for passing on information through *Berlin*, *etc.*, always confuses things terribly. We believe that in this case too there has been some mix-up. When giving assignments to people going abroad they must be told not to confine themselves to seeing one or another League member but to contact the Editorial Board *without fail* either in person or by writing *themselves* (i.e., not leaving it to some League member to do)—registered letters from abroad to the Dietz and other addresses are *quite* safe. This is necessary because the members of the League and even members of its administration are scattered all over Europe and do not know much about contacts with Russia.*

We still haven't got the address for contacting you. It was probably in one of the letters we could not make out, but there's nothing we can do about it. We are waiting for your reply.

Please put us in touch with Vakar.

Written August 4, 1902
Sent from London to Kiev

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

52

TO I. I. RADCHENKO

6) We are very much afraid for Arkady, let him take care of himself and not stint money, better not send any to Fyokla.

About Point 6. Since they are on his trail, Arkady should leave St. Petersburg without fail. He could leave now,

* Insertion in a letter written by Krupskaya—*Ed.*

since we shall be seeing Kolya[52] here. Let Arkady bear in mind that he is now practically the only one we have, and that he must take care to avoid arrest *at all costs*.*

Written August 7, 1902
Sent from London to St. Petersburg

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

53
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

8.VIII. 02

Dear G. V.,

The comrade** we had been waiting for, and whom the old friend[53] who brought you the money knows, arrived here yesterday. First of all please tell this old friend to come here: he will be needed for joint talks, and the newly-arrived comrade will be here no more than a week and a half or two.

Further, about the new arrival seeing you. He himself wants to meet you—and it would of course be very useful to the cause if he did. The only question is whether you should try to come here earlier so as to be sure to find him, or, on the contrary, whether you should wait for him in Geneva, *where he is going from here*. Yesterday, before he knew that you too would be here soon, he asked me for a letter to you.

Take this too into consideration: practically all the *Rabocheye Dyelo* people (Martynov, Akimov, Olkhin, Krichevsky, who is going there, *and others*) have gathered in Switzerland (in Montreux, if I'm not mistaken) and our visitor is going there to *see them*. The first impression is that he is an *Iskra* supporter, and Russian friends recommend him as one. But ... just the same.... Mightn't the Union crowd (the *Rabocheye Dyelo* people) feed him a pack of lies? How will it be if he sees them *last* and is unable perhaps to stand

* Postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*
** V. P. Krasnukha.—*Ed.*

up to some new gossip, or the like? Therefore we think it might be better if he made your acquaintance and saw you more than once in Geneva. You could then perhaps talk things over with him both during his meetings with the Union people and after. Then perhaps whatever new gossip there may be could be squashed at once, etc.

Talk this over (with our old friend), *decide* where to meet the new arrival, and let us have an answer as soon as possible. The worst thing that could happen would be for you to miss each other.

If you decide to see him over there (but our old friend should come here under all circumstances), we shall write you a detailed letter giving all the information we have about him.

Is your mail address absolutely safe? Are you certain your letters will not be read?

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

54

TO I. I. RADCHENKO

12.VIII. 02

Just received your letter of July 25 and read it together with Grazhdanin. We are surprised that you, as a member of the Organising Commission,[54] are not carrying out the earlier intention to co-opt new members from among workers outside Manya.* Grazhdanin believes this measure is the only way to reorganise Manya from top to bottom, and it should be done as soon as possible.

You must see to it that nothing happens to Arkady: we hold you responsible for him, and shall take action against you if you do not get him out of Petersburg before

* Code name for the St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation.—*Ed.*

he is arrested. Let him not be carried away by live work and forget that the gendarmes are also alive. We badly need someone in the South (in Kharkov or Kiev!). Couldn't Arkady be sent there?

Sent from London to St. Petersburg
First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

55
TO G. D. LEITEISEN

Dear Leiteisen,

Y.* passed on to me your resolution for the conference on the formulation. I was quite satisfied with the "Confidential Communication", but the verdict should in my opinion be more emphatic, more categorical. In particular, I would suggest:

Run par. 3 into par. 4, since in itself par. 3 is unfinished and pointless.

Add to par. 1: "A thorough examination of all the data relating to Gurovich's character has convinced the commission that as regards his moral qualities he has nothing in common with a sincere and honest revolutionary."

To par. 2. "Consequently, Gurovich did not tell the truth or had to conceal much about his means of livelihood."

Par. 3. See above (and par. 4).

Par. 5. The commission finds that even if in any one of these instances it could be assumed that the gendarmes learned the facts in some other, chance, and unknown manner, a comparison of all these instances absolutely rules out such an assumption and allows of no doubt as to Gurovich's treachery.

Par. 6 should precede par. 5.

Par. 7. Insert "unanimously and insistently". Add: "The commission finds that this opinion is fully borne out by many of the particulars communicated to it which cannot be made public for reasons of secrecy. However, the commission

* Identity not established.—*Ed.*

is informing the revolutionary organisations of some of these facts in a confidential circular letter."

"Taking into account" should be shifted from the introduction to the conclusion, for many of the points are not connected and, taken separately, not too weighty.

Taking into account the aforegoing, the commission holds that the accused Gurovich's plea that there is no absolutely definite evidence and unquestionable proof in no way can serve to exonerate him. A crime such as secret service in the political police, generally speaking, with the exception of a few isolated cases, cannot be proved by absolutely definite evidence and facts concrete enough to be verified by outsiders. Having examined all the evidence in its entirety and thoroughly verified numerous depositions by revolutionaries, the commission has arrived at the firm conviction that (in detail) Mikhail Ivanovich Gurovich (calling,* etc., in detail) was an *agent of the secret political police* and operated in St. Petersburg revolutionary organisations as a *provocateur*.

The commission therefore urges all honest Russian citizens strictly to boycott Gurovich and to treat him consistently as a traitor and spy.

Those are my comments, dear L. Please bear in mind that I did not have time to give much thought to the formulation (for Y. wants the manuscript back at once) and that I have only given a rough idea of the lines along which I think it should be amended. It should make as formidable an impression as possible**; I would then be in favour of publishing the sentence as a separate leaflet, with a photograph and an introduction from *Iskra* on the need to wage a systematic struggle against provocateurs and spies, to set up groups to expose, shadow and harass them, and so on.

If the "fighter"*** tries to wriggle out of it, try to get him to enter his dissenting opinion, or something of the

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* Here could be added age, distinguishing features, etc., and the suggestion made to publish his photograph.

** Like a court decision, the sentence should be drawn up in great detail *without any fear of repetition*.

*** Identity not established.—*Ed*.

sort, in the minutes, so that a record should remain of his shilly-shallying.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written in October, prior to 5th, 1902
Sent from London to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

56
TO LYUBOV AXELROD

Tuesday, Geneva

Dear L. I.,

As regards my lecture, I think that it should be arranged *for Saturday*. Yesterday I spoke in Lausanne, today here, and the discussion here is planned for the day after tomorrow.[55] *Please* try to do everything you can to make arrangements for *no later* than Saturday; I first thought of having the talk on Friday, but they say Saturday is better. It is most important for me to have it over and done with as soon as possible, and if there is to be discussion I think it should be on Sunday, no later. I still have to go to Zurich to speak there.

I am thinking of leaving at 12.45 on Friday which would get me to you after 4. I shall come from the station to your place. Please reply at once whether the lecture has really been arranged for Saturday.

Best regards,
Yours,
Frey

Written November 11, 1902
Sent from London to Berne

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

57
TO LYUBOV AXELROD

28.XI. 02

Dear L. I.,

Thanks for your letter and for the money which was received today.

I received *Krasnoye Znamya*[56] but haven't read it yet.

I was quite tired after the trip, but now I'm beginning "to come to", although I still have to repeat the lecture here tomorrow.

Boring! I do not know yet whether I shall write the pamphlet against the S.R.s.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent from London to Berne

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

58
TO FIT*

16/XII.

Your letter of November 15 received.

I. It was written in a code unknown to us, but we deciphered it all with the exception of the addresses. (Code only by complete sentences, otherwise the key is very easy to discover.) Repeat the addresses....

III. The committee should be joined without fail and agitation conducted within it to persuade it to affiliate with the all-Russia organisation. At the same time the Southern League should be influenced in the same direction. The existence of two organisations in the same city is not normal,[57] and they should eventually merge and form an *Iskra* committee; how to do it is, of course, up to you.

(It goes without saying that the merger should take place only if our victory is assured. Otherwise it is better to wait,

* Identity not established.—*Ed.*

preserving the organisation which supports *Iskra* and undermining the other from within.*)

IV. Re the Organising Committee.

V. We have been informed that some consignment of *Iskra* was intercepted in Odessa. What happened?

Written December 26, 1902
Sent from London to Odessa

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

59
TO LYUBOV AXELROD

18.XII. 02

Dear L. I.,

Just received your letter and am hastening to reply in order to congratulate you on such a tremendous acquisition as Stavsky. His name was mentioned in letters we received from Rostov-on-Don, but I deleted it, for fear of compromising him.** I am enclosing *Iskra* No. 29 for you and *for him*, to let him see without delay our account of the events. I also enclose a letter to him with a request concerning a pamphlet on the Rostov developments.

Further, as regards "Misha the Compositor". The pseudonym is unknown to me, but I know and worked with Vas. Andr. Shelgunov whom he mentions. Since Shelgunov spoke to him about me, please convey to him greetings from me personally and ask him to write us in detail about everything, i.e., about the work and about himself, *who* he is and what his plans are at present, how long he will be abroad, and so on. You will have to devote some attention to these people: it is very important to win them over completely. If you haven't the time to spare, send them to our people in Zurich or Geneva. We may soon be able to send a young

* Insertion in a letter written by Krupskaya. Point III was crossed out later.—*Ed.*

** See Lenin's "New Events and Old Questions" (present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 276-81).—*Ed.*

and very energetic and capable comrade from here (pseudonym: "Pero") to help you.

By the way, "Misha" is mistaken about Odessa: we have letters from the "scene of action" there. There are the S.R.L. (Southern Revolutionary League of Social-Democrats) and the Committee. The latter supports *Borba* and opposes *Iskra*. The former is closer to *Iskra*, but not yet *altogether*, "ours". The Odessa Committee has put out No. 3 of *Rabocheye Slovo* (a printed paper). The S.R.L. issues leaflets. To which "group" did "Misha" belong? The S.R.L., the Odessa Committee, or some other?

My wife will attend to the Petersburg and Moscow messages, that is, she will write to the proper people.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent from London to Berne
First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

60
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

19.XII. 02

Dear G. V.,

I received your letter and hasten to reply. So you are writing the pamphlet. I am very glad to hear it. It would be a very good thing to publish in the feuilleton of *Iskra* some of the chapters from the pamphlet, including the one you mention. I expect it *next week*; otherwise it won't get into No. 30. It would be desirable to get it in so as to keep on attacking the S.R.s without let-up.

Aren't you really going to reply to Tarasov (reprint from No. 3)? Please do not give up the idea. He needs a good lesson.

Drop me a couple of lines to let me know whether you are writing something, and if so, what and when do you expect to finish, so that I may know what should go into the issue.

I cannot tell whether it is necessary to go to Brussels, for I have no idea of what will be discussed at the conference.[58] We have money now (America has sent 5,000 frs.), which means that if necessary it is possible to go. Ginsburg, in my opinion, could take your place only *as an exception*, *for this once*, but under no circumstances permanently, for it is very likely that decisive steps will have to be taken there too.

If you decide to go, write or wire about the money.

Levinson is threatening to leave because Lalayants was made manager of the printery and he has quarreled with him. I wrote Lalayants asking him to "smooth" things out. Perhaps you too could help to calm down Levinson and impress it on Lalayants to handle him "with care".

I am sending to the printers (to Lalayants) the beginning of the translation of Kautsky and a popular pamphlet on army life. Please look through it at least in proofs.

In Petersburg our *workers have been arrested*, and our intellectuals too. And so the Economists have managed to incite part of the workers. Inde* Nadezhdin's glee. He should be taken to task for his demagogy. The scoundrel!

Lepeshinsky is in the fortress; he was transferred there until "ready to submit to interrogation". The threat of a High Court trial (which means hard labour) hangs over him. They took from him a letter concerning the Organising Committee.[59]

Stavsky, the worker-orator from Rostov, is now in Berne. L. I. has contacted him: he is an *Iskra* supporter. He should be drawn closer to us.

The Tomsk people have reprinted our draft programme with an introduction which is a hymn of praise to *Iskra-Zarya* and all its work.

We shall soon have more information on the progress made by the Organising Committee.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

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* Hence.—*Ed.*

Things are schwach with transport, altogether schwach! A real calamity!!

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

61

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

25.XII. 02

Dear G. V.,

Just received a letter from you and A. N. (how it came to be delivered on a holiday I don't understand!). Well, this looks like forced moves, as chessplayers say. Under the circumstances Bonch of course should be won over to our side, and in all likelihood, everybody will approve of your step (going to Bonch-Bruyevich and "inviting" him to join the League).

But the question is what to do next. In my opinion, if your talks with Bonch-Bruyevich will be (or were) successful, it is necessary first of all (having assured him that you will sponsor his candidacy in the League and are quite certain of success) to insist on a *formal step* on his part as well. In other words, he should officially and publicly announce that there has been a *split* in *Zhizn* and that *he* wishes to go over to *Iskra*.

Without such a step, I think, his candidacy *should not* be *formally* put forward in the League, since Bonch-Bruyevich officially has not yet left *Zhizn* and it would be ridiculous to accept a person belonging to another organisation. Moreover, if Bonch-Bruyevich is still only *warring* with Posse, still only "*dividing up*" things with him, defending our interests, there is as yet no guarantee of a favourable outcome!! *This should not be forgotten*. And if "Bonch is most determined to come over to us", as A. N. writes, insistence on your part will in no way be objectionable to him, he will admit himself that so long as he has not officially left *Zhizn* and made a statement, we, the *League*, cannot vote for him. If the split in *Zhizn* has been *finally* decided

on and is *absolutely* inevitable, it is in Bonch's own interests and his duty to announce this publicly at the *earliest date*, if only in a letter* to *Iskra*. We would publish the letter at once in No. 30 and thereby forestall our opponents and "bind Bonch" (and ourselves by printing the letter**). Indeed, this would be the best way, and the safest, for otherwise we might get into trouble....

And so my opinion is this: I also consider "all kinds of overtures" to Bonch (which A. N. writes about and which you are making) necessary, but if he, Bonch, does not take the formal step, and until he takes it, we should confine ourselves to these overtures which do not officially commit the League, and nothing more.

As to what will happen later, no more hitches can be expected. When Bonch-Bruyevich has left *Zhizn* and made a public statement, and when his transport group has given its support to this statement, it can easily obtain printed matter from our administration and begin transporting it. If it becomes necessary to admit this group as well (as you, G. V., assume), we shall then find out all about it from Bonch and discuss whom to accept and how.

You, G. V., write that "we are awaiting instructions for the negotiations with the transport group". Let the group first *set forth its position in detail*, for who can tell what it represents?

You have not yet replied, G. V., about your feuilleton for *Iskra*, or the article about Tarasov. Why?

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Please send or pass on this letter to A. N.

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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* A letter to the effect that there has been a split in *Zhizn*, *for such-and-such reasons*, that he and company are *leaving* it and *would like* to work for *Iskra* and *Zarya* inasmuch as they share or stand closest of all to....

** The letter was not published in *Iskra*.—*Ed*.

62

TO A. N. POTRESOV

26.XII. 02

I am sending you No. 29 and "Urgent Issue".* The two other pamphlets have *not yet* been found; the "library" here is a *sorry spectacle* and being in the commune has been affected by the disorder of the den.[60]

I wrote to G. V. yesterday about *Zhizn* and asked him to pass the letter on to you.**

You ought to meet Sanin (through G. V. or Lalayants). He is something of a misanthrope, and has fallen behind in every respect, but I believe he could write. It would be very useful to influence him, get him interested, and draw him into the work. Now he is translating Kautsky (*Die soziale Revolution*) for us.

Best regards....

I am also sending a manuscript, "A Page from the Life of a *Young* Revolutionary". Please send it back *yourself* (only show it to G. V., to make sure it will not be lost) and let us know your opinion and vote.

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

63

TO THE BUREAU OF THE *ISKRA* ORGANISATION IN RUSSIA[61]

The main task now is to strengthen the O.C., to give battle, on the basis of recognition of this O.C., to all who are opposed, and then prepare for convening the congress as soon as possible. Please do everything you can to ensure that everybody understands this task correctly and that it

* Article by A. I. Bogdanovich.—*Ed.*
** See previous letter.—*Ed.*

is energetically carried out. It is time for Brutus to enter the stage! Publicity should be given the O.C. as soon as possible.*

Written December 28, 1902
Sent from London to Samara

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

* Postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

1903

64
TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

1.I. 03

Dear Comrade,

Your letter of December 21st and all 19 manuscripts received.[62] I am thinking of giving some of these letters (in particular about sectarians) in early issues of *Iskra*, perhaps even in No. 31, which will come out in a couple of weeks.

The one thing not quite clear to me is whether to indicate that these are "from the materials of *Zhizn*". On the one hand, it would be the most natural thing to do, that's how it's usually done, and nobody in Russia would be puzzled—especially if we also carried an item (or your letter to the editor) about *Zhizn* ceasing publication.

On the other hand, it appears from your letter that the *Zhizn* organisation did not want to pass the materials on to *Iskra* and that you have done so on your own initiative. If that is so, do you wish the materials printed *without any comment or indication of the source*?

Kindly let me know how things stand and also your opinion on how best to present the material. Please reply to the following address, which I would ask you not to give to anyone else so that it should be used by you only: Mr. Jacob Richter.

30. Holford Square 30. Pentonville. London W. C.

Wishing you all the best,

Lenin

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1928 in the journal *Oktyabr* No. 8

Printed from the original

65

TO A. N. POTRESOV

1/I. 03

We do not have the rest of the pamphlets (of those you asked for), could not find them.

Return the "Young Revolutionary" manuscript after showing it to Plekhanov (or even without showing it to him).

Could you write a paragraph, article or feuilleton for *Iskra* on the 25th anniversary of the death of Nekrasov? It would be a good thing to print something. Write whether you will do it.

As regards Bonch, the letter and the 19 manuscripts from *Zhizn* he has sent here largely meet my wishes. It was just this kind of formal move and by no means a "renunciation" ("renunciation" of what??) that I suggested we should *strive for* without considering it a conditio sine qua.

(But Posse's intriguing should have been brought out into the open, and it was precisely against Posse and not against Bonch that I advised persuading Bonch to take a direct step while *provoking* Posse to do likewise.)

Best regards....

I have no faith in the transport channels of *Zhizn*. We *need* money *badly*, of course, and *if* it were possible to get a large sum, *many concessions* (not to speak of promises) could be made **for the sake of this.** But precisely "for the sake of this" and "*for* it".

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

66

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

10/I. 03

Dear G. V.,

Please pass on the enclosed letter to Lyubov Isakovna; she gave me your address. The letter is very urgent and

important, and if she is not there, send it on *at once*, but read it first yourself. The point is that there has been a delay with materials about the Rostov strike, and we must hurry with the pamphlet. If the people from Rostov are in Geneva, *please help to hurry them up*.

The feuilleton for No. 31 has been set up in type and the proofs sent to you. If you have *important* corrections, send them in *immediately*.

How is the pamphlet coming along?* How long will it be approximately and when do you expect to finish it? We should have at least a rough idea so as to know what to do about the printing.

And what about the continuation of the article "The Proletariat and the Peasantry"? Will you finish it with one more feuilleton? Can you send it in for No. 32? (If not, we shall probably have to print "The Problems of the Day" sent by Julius, also against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, specifically concerning the editorial in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* No. 14, and likewise scheduled for several issues. Because of this it would be very much in place to finish your article first.) *Reply as soon as you can*.

How was your lecture on the seventh? How are things with *Zhizn*? Bonch-Bruyevich sent me the materials—some of them were chosen for No. 31. He also wrote about transport: in this respect, just as I thought, they have *practically nothing*. As regards the **money and the printing shop**, we ought to try to get from them some concrete tokens of their abstract goodwill towards us. Incidentally, did you write L. G—ch (he is in Paris now) about the vote for the Bonches in the League?

Best regards,

Yours....

P.S. I should like to have your advice about my lectures (on the agrarian question) in the higher school in Paris. They have invited me and I have given my consent, but ... the crowd there (Chernov, Filippov, Tugan). On the other hand, "ours" write me from Paris: the "crowd" is not your concern,

* See present edition, Vol. 34, p. 123.—*Ed.*

and that as a counterweight it is extremely important to speak there too. What do you think?

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV* — Printed from the original

67

TO THE EDITORS OF *YUZHNY RABOCHY**

Once again we earnestly and insistently implore and beg Zhenya[63] to write us more often and in greater detail, and in particular, to be sure to acknowledge immediately by return of post, if only by a few lines, receipt of our previous letters, and write about Boris's reply and about the plan as regards the "announcement". We are still waiting for that announcement—simply scandalous! And lastly: we earnestly advise you to publish the announcement as soon as possible. If Boris remains adamant, then do without him. Impatiently awaiting your reply.

Written January 10, 1903
Sent from London to Kharkov

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII* — Printed from the original

68

TO LYUBOV AXELROD

15.I. 03

Dear L. I.,

Received the material from the Rostov comrades (or rather it is still only a semblance of material!) and a letter from three of them. Too late for No. 31. And if you want my opinion, it ought not to be published: there is something not quite right about three men who have fled abroad proclaiming their solidarity![64]

Why shouldn't they write to Rostov-on-Don instead, so that the *Don Committee* (which knows them after all and

* Postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

trusts them of course) should 1) send in a statement of solidarity and 2) *officially* ask us to publish a pamphlet on Rostov? Wouldn't it be better to wait a while for a statement of *that kind* than to print a private letter?

Or perhaps the addresses in Rostov don't function? If they do not, let them give detailed instructions and we shall try to send someone to restore contact.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent from London to Berne

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

69
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

28.I. 03

Dear G. V.,

I am sending you the O.C. announcement (it went into No. 32) and an article by Pero for No. 32[65]; please return both *as soon as you can*: the O.C. announcement must be preserved without fail (as a very important document) and you will have to decide about Pero's article in view of the abundance of articles against the S.R.s. The Rostov people are writing a protest. That's one thing. Pero is No. 2. A. N. has already written, most likely (he wrote that he was finishing it), about the S.R.s.[66] That's three. Your editorial "Pseudo-Friends of the Proletariat" is four. This has to be discussed to avoid des Guten zuviel.* It had better be discussed by you since the Rostov comrades are close at hand, and so is A. N. with whom you can talk things over. In my opinion the editorial (an *annihilating* one) in any case should be written by you and no one else because you have debated this in public and have seen the Rostov comrades. The Rostov protest should also be published in No. 33, but it

* Too much of a good thing.—*Ed.*

should be as *brief* and sachlich* as possible. Pero's article (it isn't long) should also go in, I think, for it is a sensible reply to a foolish move. A. N.'s article could perhaps be held over, for it is not a reply nor does it deal with a topical issue but is about moderate fathers and S.R. sons "in general".

Think all this over and let us know your decision as soon as possible.

The article about Nekrasov will go into No. 33.

Already several days ago I received the Armenian *Proletariat*[67] (with *Russ.* S.D.L.P. on the masthead) as well as a piece of copy (an item about it); I shall try to get it into No. 33.

I am sending you *Proletariat* as well. Please ask Lalayants or somebody else *to translate in full everything* in it about nationalism and *federalism* and send it to me *as soon as possible*. An item on this should be published without fail (the piece sent in needs editing and for this we must have the text).

What do you think of Bonch!? Our "net gain" was just the two of them—not very much! There is the liquidator (see *Zhizn* No. 6) Mr. Kuklin. Make his acquaintance through Bonch. Couldn't we squeeze something out of him? I believe you met him before, didn't you? At least for the Russian congress, for the O.C. (one of its members is abroad and he could be sent to see Kuklin if need be)? After all, Kuklin can't eat up the printing office, can he? We should levy a contribution of 10,000 on him for our not having come down on *Zhizn* (it is not for nothing that I defended it by pleading its light-mindedness!) or for not doing so in the future....

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Have you seen Rudin's pamphlet (S.R., "On the Peasant Question")? The shameless scoundrels! My fingers are itching *terribly* to get at Rudin and at No. 15 on socialisation! *Please* let me know whether you are writing your pamphlet, how big it will be, and when you expect to finish it. *Iskra* should not be filled with that material; a pamphlet

* Businesslike.—*Ed.*

examining *all aspects* would be far better, and now that the transport channels are working *we could* **knock them out** with a businesslike and principled examination of the substance of the matter. Should I write a criticism of Rudin? What do you think? The idea occurred to me to write an article criticising Rudin[68] and to publish separately "articles against the S.R.s" together with "Revolutionary Adventurism".

What do you think of this?

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

70

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

5/II. 03

Dear G. V.,

I received your article and letter. In what issue the article will be printed I cannot tell as yet. I will let you know in a few days—though it also depends on your reply about the article on Nekrasov.

To speed up the answer to the Union, I have done the following. V. I., L. Gr. and I agreed upon a draft reply and sent it to Julius (it is important to discuss it there also with P. And.). Julius is to send you the reply *at once* together with my letter.

If you approve of the reply, pass it on to Olkhin (and arrange for him to keep in touch either *through you* or else give him the Richter address. Better through you).

If you do not agree with the answer, put precisely formulated amendments (or a new text) to the vote at once, and tell Olkhin that things are being held up somewhat because of the voting in a "scattered" board.

I am very glad that you are writing an editorial on the "Pseudo-Friends of the Proletariat" and in the introduction to Thun are giving a trouncing to Tarasov (page from the history of socialist thought). The introduction to Thun is of course the proper place for this.

The breakdown of *Iskra*'s Austrian channel is nonsense. So far everything has been going well there with *three* channels functioning. Dementyev is doing a fine job and writes regularly.

(It would be a good thing if you would summon also A. N. to cast his vote on the letter to the Union, on the tactics of the O.C. generally, and on the election of members from us to the O.C. Section Abroad.[69])

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. So I can expect the editorial in a few days? N'est ce pas?

P.P.S. Write *what* you agreed upon with Olkhin. *Were any steps toward unity proposed and what exactly?* Was there any talk of *Borba*, *Svoboda*, *Krasnoye Znamya*?

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

71

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

8.II. 03

Dear Comrade,

All the material received. Thanks. About the fiction, I don't know yet whether it will go in. I am thinking of running the item about the sectarians in the army in No. 33. About the strike in Galicia I can't say anything yet: far too long.

As regards the collection of money (for popular literature) the person to apply to (as on all administrative questions) is Mr. Leo Alleman 26. Granville Square 26. Kings Cross Road. London W. C. I saw him the other day and he seemed to agree with me that new subscription lists would be superfluous. The League already has subscription lists: they

should be circulated more widely. As for the *Iskra* library, that of course depends on the whole Editorial Board. Take it up with Plekhanov. I confess I would not be in favour at present. In order to start a "library" one must have a special person to edit it (whom we do not have) or a special staff (which we do not have). One should have a *selection* of books and pamphlets of like nature (which we do not have). To stick Kautsky, Thun, etc., into the library would in my view be artificial in the extreme.

What need is there for a "library"? If there are good pamphlets we can publish them without a library. In the meantime there are few pamphlets, and *no good translators*. (I am having a hard time *redoing* translations)—why make loud *promises* of a "library"??

If you manage to find *good* translators and select good material for translation, the undertaking would be *very* useful and bound to succeed.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1928
in the journal *Oktyabr* No. 8

Printed from the original

72
TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

2.III. 03

I am submitting to all members of the Editorial Board a proposal to co-opt "Pero" as a full member of the Board. (I believe that for co-optation not a majority but a *unanimous* decision is needed.)

We are *very much in need* of a seventh member both because it would simplify voting (six being an even number) and reinforce the Board.

"Pero" has been writing in every issue for several months now. In general he is working for *Iskra* most energetically, delivering lectures (and with tremendous success), etc.

For our department of topical articles and items he will be not only very useful but quite indispensable.

He is unquestionably a man of more than average ability, convinced, energetic, and promising. And he could do a good deal in the sphere of translation and popular literature.

We must draw in young forces: this will encourage them and prompt them to regard themselves as professional writers. And that we have too few of such is clear—witness 1) the difficulty of finding editors of translations; 2) the shortage of articles reviewing the internal situation, and 3) the shortage of popular literature. It is in the sphere of popular literature that "Pero" would like to try his hand.

Possible arguments against: 1) his youth; 2) his early (*perhaps*) return to Russia; 3) a pen (without quotation marks)* with traces of feuilleton style, too pretentious, etc.

Ad 1) "Pero" is suggested not for an independent post, but for the Board. In it he will gain experience. He undoubtedly has the "intuition" of a Party man, a man of our trend; as for knowledge and experience these can be acquired. That he is hardworking is likewise unquestionable. It is necessary to co-opt him so as finally to draw him in and encourage him.

Ad 2) If "Pero" is initiated in all aspects of our work he may not leave so soon. And if he goes, organisational links with the Board and subordination to it are not a minus but a tremendous plus.

Ad 3) Stylistic shortcomings are not a serious defect. They will be ironed out. At present he accepts "corrections" in silence (and not too readily). In the Board there will be debates, things will be put to the vote, and the "instructions" will acquire a more definitive and imperative form.

Therefore, I propose

1) that all six members of the Editorial Board vote on co-opting "Pero" as a *full* member;

2) if he is accepted, to tackle the final settlement of relationships and voting procedures in the Editorial Board, and to draft precise rules. *This is necessary for us* and important for the congress.

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* "Pero" (meaning Pen) was the pseudonym used by Trotsky.—*Ed.*

P.S. I consider it *extremely inconvenient* and awkward to *put off* the co-opting, for I can see that "Pero" is already *quite* annoyed (he has not of course openly said so) with being left hanging "in the air" and treated, so it seems to him, as a "youngster".

If we do not accept "Pero" at once and he leaves in, say, a month for Russia, *I am certain* he will take it as a sign that we *simply do not want* him on the editorial staff. We might lose him, and that would be very bad.

Sent from Paris to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

73

TO G. V. PLEKHANOV

10/IV. 03

Dear G. V.,

I have been unwell again these days and that is why I did not answer you. The Breshkovskaya item received, but too late to go in the current issue. It will go in the next.

Are you writing about collective liability? (I have asked that *S.-Peterburgskiye Vedomosti*[70] be sent to you.) It would be a good thing to have an article on the subject for the next issue. The visitor has left. I do not know whether it will be possible to settle the affair. At any rate I got him to agree to mediation by the O.C.

Best regards,

Yours....

P.S. You don't say anything about my pamphlet.* Please send it to the printers as soon as possible: it is most important not to hold it up. It can be read later in the proofs, if anyone else is interested, not in the manuscript.

Sent from London to Geneva

First published in 1925 in *Lenin Miscellany IV*

Printed from the original

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* *To the Rural Poor* (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 359-430).—*Ed.*

74

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Private from Lenin.

Dear Friend,

I am greatly distressed by your long silence. I can understand very well why you have no desire to take up the pen, how difficult, if not impossible, it is to write about all sorts of petty matters, but you mustn't forget after all that these (often absurd) petty matters beset us from other sources. You really must write a few lines, to give at least a general idea of your attitude, otherwise you put us too in an awkward position. We hear from all sides *about discord in the O.C.*, about the quarrel with Yuri, the quarrel about Liza, and so on. Of course I listen very unwillingly to all this and shall never (as far as I am concerned) allow any action to be taken until I hear from you or see you, but how much pleasanter to have a line from you. For months there has been nothing! So, I shall await news, and as for myself, let me say this: it seems to me (I cannot be sure of course) that you have been carried away a little in the matter of Liza (an inefficient person that Liza, rushes about for no good reason instead of attending to her business), that the charges against Yuri are exaggerated, that the most, the very most important thing is to *hurry with the congress*, to hurry by all possible means.

How is Kurz? I learned about his state of health recently and realised I had no grounds whatever for being dissatisfied with him (please convey this to him, if you can, but let me add that he too is to blame for his silence). How are you getting on with Jacques and Kostya? What nonsense Jacques preaches against the two centres! Can't you prevail upon that by no means stupid but slow-thinking lad? How's Medvezhonok? What advice did you give him? Very best regards.

Yours....

Written May 24, 1903
Sent from Geneva to Samara

First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

75

TO KARL KAUTSKY

29/VI. 03

Dear Comrade,

I am enclosing a copy of the Russian translation of your pamphlet (*The Social Revolution*). I have made *only one* remark on pages 129-30, where on the basis of Russian industrial statistics I have shown how much Russia too could economise by organising bigger enterprises (100 and more workers) working two or three shifts, and by closing down small ones.

The Russian translation of the pamphlet has been printed in 5,000 copies.[71]

With best regards,

Lenin

Wl. Ulianoff
Chemin du Foyer. 10.
Sécheron—Gèneve

Sent from London to Berlin

First published in 1964 in German in the journal *International Review of Social History*, Vol. IX, Part 2

First published in Russian in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

76

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

16/VII. 03

Dear V. D.,

G. V. told me that you can get from one of your acquaintances a Brockhaus and Efron encyclopaedia. If so, I would kindly ask you to get me the volumes containing the articles:

Peasantry,
Serfdom,
Serf economy,
Corvée,
Quit-rent.

I am greatly in need of the reference material in these volumes for an article I am writing in a hurry.* Please let me know if you can get them.

Yours,
Lenin

Just received the pamphlet by Engels[72] and am sending it on to you. Ask V. M. to translate *all* the Vorbemerkung** and return the pamphlet to me without delay.
When could she return it?

Just received your report.[73] Thanks!

Written in Geneva
and mailed to a local address

First published in 1928
in the journal *Oktyabr* No. 12

Printed from the original

77
TO Y. O. MARTOV

My statement to Martov
(reconstructed, approximately, from memory)

I fully concur with Comrade Martov's wish, expressed through Comrade Hans, to eliminate the personal aspect of our conflict[74] by an exchange of statements, and, for my part, I submit the following statement.

I did not and do not question the integrity and sincerity of Martov. Once Martov states, after acquainting himself with my project for the election of two triumvirates and approving that project, that he personally had always considered it essential to extend the original editorial triumvirate, I myself do not question or allow anyone else to question Mar-

* Lenin was working at the time on the article "Reply to Criticism of Our Draft Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 436-51).—*Ed.*

** Prefatory notes.—*Ed.*

tov's sincerity. I would be very glad to learn that the accusations he levelled against me were the result of a misunderstanding.

November 29, 1903 *N. Lenin*

Written in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1904 in the book by V. V. Vorovsky, *Commentary on the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad*, Geneva

Printed from the original

78
TO VERA ZASULICH

3/XII.

Dear Comrade,

I have forgotten to inform you that I would like to have all my articles signed N. Lenin, and not "Contributor".

If either the letter to the editor *or* the agrarian article *must* be held up, please publish the "letter" in No. 53 and hold up the agrarian article.*

With S.D. greetings,
Lenin

Written December 3, 1903, in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany X*

Printed from the original

* Lenin also wrote about this to G. V. Plekhanov on November 18, 1903 (see present edition, Vol. 34, p. 199).—*Ed.*

79

TO Y. O. MARTOV

Sent 19.XII. 03

Dear Comrade,

The C.C. leaves it to the editors of the Central Organ to issue instructions to Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich as regards both the text of the statement "From the Editors" in his paper[75] and the nature of the literary supervision to be exercised. Both questions in our opinion are within the competence of the C.O. and we cannot undertake to issue instructions on them to Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich.

The editors should have taken up the mediocrity of the articles and Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich's inexperience not with the C.C. but with Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich himself.

The C. C. will of course receive the proofs and will do its best to advise in particularly important matters. We do not think the question of the text of the statement is very important, but "special supervision" by the C.O. over a publication like Bonch-Bruyevich's paper would, in our opinion, be useful.

We shall consider the question of most convenient type.

We have left it to Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich himself to hand in the copy to the printers if the editors of the C.O. have no objections to this.

Written in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

1904

80

TO THE EDITORS OF *ISKRA*

Dear Comrades,

Iskra No. 61 carried, probably by mistake, an announcement that not only letters but *also money intended for Iskra* and *Zarya* should be sent to Axelrod's address.

The public might interpret this as meaning that a special fund was being established to finance the publication of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, whereas actually *all* funds for the purpose come *exclusively* from the Central Party treasury administered *exclusively* by the C.C.

We ask you to correct this mistake as soon as possible.

Acting Representative Abroad of the C.C.

P.S. Please be sure to reply to this letter.

Written March 18, 1904,
in Geneva and mailed to a
local address

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

81

TO THE EDITORS OF *ISKRA*

20.VI. 1904

TO THE R.S.D.L.P CENTRAL ORGAN

Dear Comrades,

The representatives of the C.C abroad have appointed as Treasurer of the Central Committee Comrade Lyadov

(address of the forwarding office). Please pay all money to him and ask him for receipts.

Members of the C.C. *N. Lenin*
B. Glebov

Written in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the text in an unknown handwriting and signed by Lenin

82
TO M. N. LYADOV

To throw light on the matter[76] I wish to add: 1) that the claim that Osipov "resigned at the previous meeting" is an *obvious lie*, since Glebov, *who was present at this meeting*, himself *signed* the agreement of May 1904 referring to... members of the C.C., including Osipov.

2) I was *never* officially informed of Travinsky's resignation.

Written September 1, 1904, in Switzerland
Sent to Geneva

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in an unknown handwriting

83
TO THE COMPOSITORS OF THE PARTY PRINTING SHOP

Dear Comrades,

I hope you will comply with Comrade Galyorka's[77] request without delay. The question of his right to his

pamphlet is so indisputable and so remote from the present conflict that to dwell further on this seems to me unnecessary.

Member of the C.C. *N. Lenin*

Written September 2 or 3, 1904,
in Switzerland
Sent to Geneva

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

84

TO I. S. VILENSKY

To Comrade Ilya, manager of the Party printing shop, and Party compositors

Irrespective of the legitimacy of Comrade Glebov's claims (I have handed over all materials relating to the matter to Comrades Olin, Bonch-Bruyevich and Lyadov), I consider it necessary to state that *under all circumstances* the manager and compositors are obliged to turn over the Ryadovoi and Galyorka pamphlet* to the authors for the following reasons:

1) the printing of the pamphlet is paid for in full by the authors and hence it is their exclusive property;

2) authorisation to set up and print it in the Party printing shop was given by agents of the C.C. long before Comrade Glebov appeared on the scene with his "reforms". Subsequent decisions, even if they were taken by properly constituted meetings of the C.C., in no way invalidate legitimate authorisation given by persons acting as agents of the C.C;

3) the authors do not insist that it be indicated in the pamphlet that it was printed in the Party printing shop.

* See previous document.—*Ed.*

I would consider refusal to turn over the pamphlet at once to the authors to be nothing but direct seizure of other people's property.

Member of the C.C. *N. Lenin*

Written between September 5 and 13, 1904, in Switzerland
Sent to Geneva

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

85

TO M. S. MAKADZYUB*

Private, to Anton

Dear Comrade,

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter if only in a couple of words. I am not certain that your address is still good but Zemlyachka has asked to write her through you. Besides, it would be desirable to start regular correspondence. This is extremely important. To make sure that your letters do not accidentally get into the wrong hands, write on top "Private, to L." or "Private, to N. K." Could you let us know the whereabouts of Tomich (=Emmanuel=Emma)? We have lost touch with him. We sent him several letters but do not know whether they reached him. If you happen to know his address. please let us have it.

The Declaration of the C.C. has evidently not been too kindly received by the Majority committees.** In the Caucasus it caused an outburst of indignation, in Odessa, Nikolayev and Yekaterinoslav it met with strong disapproval, and our old comrades have been sending in indignant resolutions from prisons.... The "conciliators" have succeeded in deceiving some people by their fables about peace prevailing in the Party. Tula, Saratov and Astrakhan, for instance,

* Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*

** A reference to the "July Declaration" of the C.C. (see present volume, Document 92).—*Ed.*

are said to have withdrawn their resolutions on the congress, but as soon as they learn what the real state of affairs is they will of course again insist on its convocation. Incidentally, I do not know how much truth there is to the rumours that the above-mentioned committees have withdrawn their resolutions. The "conciliators" do not always accurately enough pass on information, and the Editorial Board, on the pretext of preserving peace, does not print resolutions on the congress adopted by the committees (St. Petersburg, Yekaterinoslav). Besides the ten points there are several more which are in no way secret but which the "collegium" (taking advantage of the arrest of some of its staunchest members and unlawfully expelling one member who does not share its views*) has decided to conceal from the members of the Party to avoid unnecessary fuss. These include the decision to dissolve the Southern Bureau[78] and not to publish Council minutes unfavourable to the Minority, and the prohibition of the printing of Lenin's writings in the Party printery without permission from an agent specially appointed by the "collegium".... The Majority has decided not to permit the opinion of the Party to be misrepresented or to allow itself to be silenced; it is sponsoring the publication of Majority writings; the publishing has been undertaken by Bonch-Bruyevich. We shall not be short of literary forces, the only hitch may be finances. Galyorka's pamphlet *Down with Bonapartism!* (concerning the C.C. Declaration) and a collection of articles by Galyorka and Ryadovoi have come out, and a popular pamphlet on socialism by Ryadovoi and many other things are ready for the press.

Pass all this on to Zemlyachka if you know her address, and also inform her that both of her letters have been received.

Acknowledge receipt of this letter without delay.

Lenin

P.S. Is your address for contacts still valid?

Are the Pedder and Dilon addresses good? Has Tsensky

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* A reference to F. V. Lengnik, Maria Essen and Rozalia Zemlyachka.—*Ed.*

been to see you? Did you receive our letter? Let Zemlyachka know that her relatives are worried about her and are sure she is ill. Acknowledge receipt of this letter at once, and we shall send you our new address forthwith.

Written September 16, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

86

TO M. LEIBOVICH*

Private, to Yevsei (Malyutkin) from *Lenin*

20/IX.

Dear Comrade,

Your letter written in the Gritsko code received; we deciphered it with much difficulty since you went by another edition. We are using the same code.

The conciliators here are engaged in liquidating the Majority. When it informed the committees of the peace restored in the Party, the C.C. forgot to add that it had itself gone over to the Minority and begun to hound the Majority. Besides the points made public in C.C. resolutions, there are also some which are not to be publicised, not because of any considerations of secrecy, but just to avoid temptation. The C.C. has decided: to dissolve the Southern Bureau for agitation in favour of the congress, to disband the forwarding office, to apologise to the book-stitchers, not to publish the minutes of the Council [for they discredit the Minority and show that before beginning agitation for the congress the Majority (firm) proposed honest peace and insisted on the boycott being ended on both sides while the Central Organ replied to this proposal with ridicule], to institute a special censorship of writings by the Majority—a special censor has been named from among the conciliators to decide whether one or another piece written by Lenin can be printed, and Lenin has been deprived of

* Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*

all the rights of a representative abroad. More, the C.C. is arranging a conference with the Minority, completely ignoring the Majority. The Minority of course is rejoicing and lauding the C.C. *The composition of the C.C. has changed, two members have been arrested, two have resigned, and one member has been expelled* completely unlawfully. The C.C., which in April took the Majority viewpoint, now finds that the C.O. is up to the mark. Yet, if in the beginning there were no differences of principle, now there are plenty. To justify itself, the Minority is smearing the old *Iskra*. It claims (Dan's report to the international congress, and Trotsky's pamphlet) that the old *Iskra* was not so much a Social-Democratic as a democratic organ, that it was concerned not with organising the working class but with organising the intelligentsia, that Axelrod did not take part in it because it was not really a Social-Democratic organ. Only the new *Iskra* has put forward the slogan "to the masses", and so on and so forth. It is difficult to recount all the nonsense they are now spouting, speculating on the ignorance of the public, on its lack of knowledge of the history of the movement. The C.C. is not in the least perturbed by all this and is vastly tickled at having won the forgiveness of the C.O. by its declaration*.... On the pretext of preserving the peace in the Party the C.O. does not print resolutions passed by committees in favour of the congress, for example, the Yekaterinoslav, Petersburg, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod and Kazan resolutions.

Of the 20 committees in Russia (those with a vote), 12 (the St. Petersburg, Tver, Tula, Moscow, Siberian, Tiflis, Baku, Batum, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolayev, Odessa and Nizhni-Novgorod committees) have already declared for the congress, besides which the Riga and Kazan committees are for it. But the new C.C. has announced that the Samara, Orel-Bryansk and Smolensk committees are now also included among those with a vote. These committees take a conciliatory stand and conduct negligible work....

In view of the aforesaid, the Majority has decided not to allow itself to be silenced and is printing its writings independently, the publishing having been undertaken by

* A reference to the Central Committee's "July Declaration".—*Ed.*

Bonch-Bruyevich.[79] The Council, which said nothing when Ryazanov and Akimov were putting out their pamphlets, has made a fuss and is insisting that the line "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party" should not figure on the pamphlets. Bonch-Bruyevich editions of the pamphlet *Down with Bonapartism!* by Galyorka and a collection of articles by Galyorka and Ryadovoi, *Our Misunderstandings*, have already come out. The pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress*, containing resolutions adopted by the committees, including the Riga resolution, will be published shortly. The Riga people say that they want to see the Party institutions in the hands of the Majority as the Congress decided, and will press for this at the coming congress too, but that they find it necessary that certain rights be guaranteed to the Minority. The Riga resolution has already been subscribed by the Petersburg and Moscow committees. That's how things stand.

Bear in mind that we have already been dissolved,[80] and therefore if you want your letters to reach the right address, write on top: private, for Sharko. I am sending you new postal addresses.

We hope you will give every support to the Majority publications. It would be a good thing if a special resolution were adopted on this question. Send us letters and materials of all kinds.

Your previous letter still remains undeciphered. Let us know what key you used, for although it is old by now, it interests us nevertheless. Do you know what is happening in Yekaterinoslav and Odessa? The Minority is spreading a rumour that the Odessa Committee has withdrawn its resolution on the congress. We haven't heard from the spot for a long time, but the report does not ring true. Let us know how things are with Gritsko. Greetings.

P.S. We shall send you all new publications shortly.

Written September 20, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Nikolayev

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

87

TO V. P. NOGIN

21/IX.

Lenin to Makar

Baron wrote us that the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee had adopted a resolution on the congress, but for some reason he did not send the resolution itself. Send it as soon as you can to the following address: √———.* This address is good also for letters to Lenin. A young woman who wants to work has gone your way, she is not too well versed in Party affairs, has never done any such work before. If you can give her some work to do, you can find her at the following address.* The continuation is a personal letter to Olga Ivanovna *Chachina*.

Written September 21, 1904,
Sent from Geneva to
Nizhni-Novgoro

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in
Krupskaya's
handwriting

88

TO YELENA STASOVA, F. V. LENGNIK, AND OTHERS**

Dear Friends,

We were overjoyed to receive your letter, which emanates so much spirit that it has imbued us all with new energy.[81] You must carry out your plan by all means. It is an excellent plan and will have tremendous significance. It is also urgently necessary to write to the German. We are eagerly waiting to hear from you. Your advice as regards a publishing business has already been half-realised. The writers we have, and a mass of ready material. In general we are all in excellent spirits now, there are plenty of plans, Starik

* Address not given in the manuscript.—*Ed.*
** Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's Instructions.—*Ed.*

too has buckled down to work, correspondence with Russia and abroad has livened up, and now, I hope, people will soon begin to grouping. The Minority is now flirting with the conciliators, the Central Organ is undertaking the publication of a popular paper, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* people have been given a big bite. Particulars about the publishing business of the Majority will be passed on to you by our common acquaintances, to whom we shall write about this in detail. **Kol's wife and child are well, they live in Yekaterinoslav.** Repeat **the names of people whom it is desirable to enlist in literary work. Brodyaga has arrived,** the Minority is wooing him, he has not yet taken a definite stand. Josephine is here, physically she is very poorly. The forwarding office has been turned over to the C.C. Well, I suppose that's all. We embrace you warmly, dear friends, wish you health and strength.

Starik & Co.

Written September 23, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Moscow

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

89

TO KARL KAUTSKY

Geneva, October 10, 1904

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you by book-post my article which should serve as a reply to Comrade Rosa Luxemburg's attacks.* I am aware that the sympathies of the editors of *Neue Zeit*[82] are with my opponents, but I believe it would be only fair to grant me the right to correct some of the inaccuracies in Rosa Luxemburg's articles. My article has been translated by Comrade Lidin. You have already printed one of his articles, hence you can judge of his knowledge of the

* See "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. Reply by N. Lenin to Rosa Luxemburg" (present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 472-83).—*Ed.*

German language. I myself cannot write in German. I have made my article very brief; I wanted it to take up less space than Rosa Luxemburg's, and not to be too lengthy for *Neue Zeit*. If nevertheless you find it too long, I am prepared to cut it again to the desired length. At the same time I must insist that no cuts be made without my consent.

Kindly let me know if the Editorial Board accepts the article or not.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin

My address:
Vl. Oulianoff
3. Rue David Dufour. 3.
Genf. Genève, Suisse.

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1964 in German in the journal *International Review of Social History*, Vol. IX, Part 2

First published in Russian in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

90

TO YELENA STASOVA, F. V. LENGNIK, AND OTHERS*

14/X.

Our very dear Friends,

We sent you some three weeks ago a letter through **Irina.**** **We heartily endorse your plan.** Write if you have a chance. Bonch and Lenin have undertaken the publishing end. *Down with Bonapartism!*, *Our Misunderstandings* and *To the Party* have already appeared, and *On the New Road*, *The Fight for a Congress* and *On Socialism* are coming out shortly. According to our estimates 14 committees, 11 of them with full voting rights, have already declared for the congress. All the attempts of the C.O., the C.C. and the Council to hold up the agitation for the congress have proved fruitless. The C.C. saw that the Majority also has to be reckoned with and is evidently ready to make concessions

* Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*
** See present volume, Document 88.—*Ed.*

With the Minority too they haven't been able to achieve full unity. In a word, they have got into a mess.

Formerly the C.O. played the committees off against the C.C. and baited the C.C., now it is playing the periphery off against the committees and trying to prove that the opinion of the committees is not the opinion of the Party, and that strictly speaking there is no Party. They have done everything they could to split the Party and now they shout that the Party does not exist.

The position of the C.C. has untied our hands and life now is far easier than before. Of course there is some had news, for example, **Brodyaga has gone with the Minority, so has Samsonov,** but that can't be helped. We shall go on working and upholding our views, and time will tell. A new pamphlet by Trotsky came out recently, under the editorship of *Iskra*, as was announced. This makes it the "Credo" as it were of the new *Iskra*. The pamphlet is a pack of brazen lies, a distortion of the facts. And this is done under the editorship of the C.O. The work of the *Iskra* group is vilified in every way, the Economists, it is alleged, did far more, the *Iskra* group displayed no initiative, they gave no thought to the proletariat, were more concerned with the bourgeois intelligentsia, introduced a deadly bureaucracy everywhere —their work was reduced to carrying out the programme of the famous "Credo". The Second Congress was, in his words, a reactionary attempt to consolidate sectarian methods of organisation, etc. The pamphlet is a slap in the face both for the present Editorial Board of the C.O. and for all Party workers. Reading a pamphlet of this kind you can see clearly that the "Minority" has indulged in so much lying and falsehood that it will be incapable of producing anything viable, and one wants to fight, here there is something worth fighting for.

Kol's wife is well, she is in Yekaterinoslav.

Warm greetings to all of you.

Staril & Co.

Written October 14, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Moscow

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

91
TO KARL KAUTSKY

26/X. 04.

Dear Comrade,

Two weeks ago I sent my article (reply to Rosa Luxemburg) and a letter to you at the editorial office of *Neue Zeit*.* Please let me know whether the article has been accepted or not. If it has, I must make a few small additions (about the new Russian resolutions) and corrections. If not, I shall be compelled to look for other ways of acquainting the German Social-Democrats with the inaccuracies in Rosa Luxemburg's article.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Berlin

First published in 1964 in German in the journal *International Review of Social History*, Vol. IX, Part 2

First published in Russian in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

92
TO I. I. RADCHENKO**

From Lenin, private, to Arkady, *the Urals*

28/X.

Dear Comrade,

Your letter received. Please send us the resolution adopted by the Urals Committee. The Minority maintains that the Urals Committee came out against the congress, and *Iskra* has reported that it declared for peace in the Party, voicing support for the actions of the Central Committee. Everybody wants peace in the Party, and what is at issue now is how to resolve the crisis experienced by the Party,

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* See this volume, Document 89.—*Ed.*

** Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*

through the Party, i.e., by convening the congress, or through a private deal with the Minority. The Central Committee came out in its declaration in favour of the latter. Consequently, the *Iskra* statement can be understood only in the sense that the Urals Committee has decided against the congress.

Use invisible ink, and address your letters "To Lenin, private".

Your letter shows that you are completely uninformed about the state of affairs in the Party. I shall give you a brief outline. (See also letter to the Siberian League.) So far the following committees have declared for the congress: Siberian, Caucasian Union Committee (after the resolution given in the supplement to Nos. 73-74), Tiflis, Baku, Mingrelia-Imeretia, Odessa, Nikolayev, Yekaterinoslav, Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Northern Committee (after the C.C. declaration), Nizhni-Novgorod, Kazan, Riga, and Tula (13 organisations with full rights)—formerly this would have been enough, but the Council has given the right of vote to another five committees (Smolensk (?), Orel-Bryansk (?), Samara, Astrakhan, and one more, evidently Kremenchug). All these are committees which we know in advance will declare against the congress. Moreover, the Council recognises only those committees as having come out for the congress whose resolutions it has received (the resolutions of the Nikolayev, Northern and Nizhni-Novgorod committees have probably gone astray). Further, confirmation of the resolutions is required every two months, which the committees, owing to irregular receipt of *Iskra* and absence of regular correspondence, may not know. The resolutions must be signed by the members of the committees so that no one might vote twice for the congress (only Council members may vote three times against the congress: in the Council, in the Editorial Board, and in the League). In view of the stand taken by the Council, the C.C. and the Central Organ (to hound those conducting agitation for the congress), the demand for signatures has a very definite purpose. The object of all this is to hamper agitation for the congress. But since the committees are taking a very definite stand, the Minority has now launched an attack against them. Everything is being done to undermine the

prestige of the committees in the eyes of the local communities and the workers, who are being literally incited against the committees. Special efforts are being made to influence the periphery. How this disorganises work is easy to imagine. The Minority is now laying siege to Petersburg. Such is the situation in the Party. Not a very happy one, needless to say. Send us a secret address for contacts, people often go from here and may also go to the Urals.

With comradely greetings,
L.

P.S. Ask the C.C. for Majority publications.

Written October 28, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

93
TO A. A. BOGDANOV*

November 2

Your letter of October 9 (22) received. The undeciphered letter has been repeated. Not a word about the light-minded Minonosets. To what address was the money sent? Lidin, Alexeyev, Afanasyeva have left, no news from Popova.

Now for some semi-foreign, semi-Russian news.

The Bonch Bruyevich and Lenin Publishers are very slow, pamphlets are coming out in driblets. The long-promised pamphlet *The Fight for a Congress* has only just come out. The hitch there is partly due to the printery, but mainly to lack of money. In general the money question is most desperate, for sending people to Russia (the demand is enormous) and transport cost a great deal. Every effort should be made to obtain a big sum. This is now the only hitch, everything else we have. Without a big sum we are doomed to the intolerable,

* Written jointly with Krupskaya. Passages by Krupskaya are in brevier.—*Ed.*

depressing vegetable existence we are leading here. We must get that money if it kills us. For Russia is organising and expects decisive steps from us! The Riga Committee has adopted a resolution supporting this publishing business, and so have the Odessa, Nikolayev and Yekaterinoslav committees. Many people are asking why the Majority did not ask permission, but they completely ignore the actual situation and forget that Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin acted as private individuals and not in the name of a group, though in Russia this was not understood and a resolution was adopted in support of the group headed by Bonch-Bruyevich and Lenin, which is absurd. The C.C. refused to transport Majority literature on the grounds that it was not Party literature.

There is virtually a complete split in the Party. The Minority and the C.C. have already made a deal and they are pursuing a common line consisting in machinations against the congress and liquidating the committees "from below". This is done by sending into the militant Majority committees Minority groups which lay siege to the committee, carry on agitation in order to undermine confidence in it among the public, among the workers, and especially in the periphery. Then, after the ground has been prepared with the aid of the periphery, they kick up a row in the committee demanding its surrender. This is what is happening now, with the benevolent participation of the C.C., in Petersburg. The C.C. is pursuing a hypocritical policy towards the Majority committees, assuring them that if there is no reconciliation with the Minority, which, they say, is quite possible (there's hypocrisy for you!), the C.C. will call the congress, that the C.C. is not against the congress and has not changed its views, that it considers it possible to make a deal with the Editorial Board of the Central Organ since they do not consider it the organ of the Party but of a group. Although it is a Majority C.C., the fact is that at the Congress and after it, the only consideration in the elections to the C.C. was whether X or Y was a good practical worker; the Congress gave the C.C. no ligne de conduite,* and hence it can lay down its own line and is not obliged to adhere to the Majority stand. In a word, they talk any amount of nonsense.

In Russia there is strong resentment against them. The Nikolayev Odessa and Yekaterinoslav committees called a conference and adopted a resolution.... The Majority participants answered them as follows.... It is proposed to elect candidates from a few of our own committees, then announce the formation of a Bureau of the Majority Committees, and after that make the rounds of the rest of the committees inviting them to join in and add one or two of their own candidates to the list.

Where is Boroda? Arrange for a password with Gorky. When are you coming?

Do everything you can to make the light-minded Minonosets move faster. The procrastination is inexplicable and

* Line of conduct.—*Ed.*

terribly harmful. Reply at once and in greater detail, and more definitely.

So far the Bureau nominees are Demon, Felix, Baron, Lidin, Alexeyev, Gusev, Pavlovich.

Written November 2, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

94
TO I. P. GOLDENBERG

To Meshkovsky

2/XI.

Dear Comrade,

We have learned that our letter has reached you, the same letter was sent to Maria Petrovna's address. Please ask her to acknowledge receipt. We are impatiently awaiting your reply, do not put it off too long, it is most important now to keep up a regular correspondence. I repeat the postal addresses. All letters and leaflets can be sent to these addresses. In our next letter we shall send you one more address. *Iskra* No. 75 reports that the Saratov Committee has declared for peace in the Party and "voiced support for the actions of the C.C." Everybody wants peace in the Party, the only question being whether it is permissible for the C.C. to make a deal with the Minority on the basis of an understanding that the C.C. will work against the congress in every way. The decisions of the Council published in the supplement to Nos. 73-74 afford an idea of what this deal has led to. *Iskra* no longer prints resolutions of Majority committees or else gives them space in the supplement, which is not even put on sale (after No. 74 resolutions on the congress were received from the Caucasus: from the Caucasian Union Committee, and the Tiflis, Baku and Mingrelia-Imeretia committees), and there are also resolutions from the Odessa (37 signatures) and Moscow prisons. *Iskra* has started a column in favour of Party peace where resolutions *against* the congress are printed.

It is somehow unbelievable that the Saratov Committee should have come out against the congress and for the C.C. declaration. Please send *as soon as possible* all the resolutions of the Saratov Committee, and let us know what sort of an organ *Svobodnoye Slovo* is, the Minority says it is in possession of all the contacts. Please send us all the committee's publications for recent months, or at least a list of them, and let us know how the work is going, how it has been organised, whether they have literature, and whether there are contacts with the peasants. Send us material for publication, make a special effort to get people in the periphery to write; after all there is plenty to write about.

Can you connect us with Astrakhan and the Urals?

All the best.

Written on Lenin's instructions.

Written November 2, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in
Krupskaya's
handwriting

95

TO I. A. PYATNITSKY

To Pyatnitsa. To "Pyatnitsa", private, from Lenin

Dear Comrade,

Our mutual friend* has told me about the letters you have at your disposal[83] (letters from a C.C. member abroad to C.C. members in Russia where it is stated that the Minority abroad has become high-handed and that the resolution of the 22** unquestionably reflects the real will of the Party). I think you ought to send these letters to me here at once.

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* Meaning Rozalia Zemlyachka.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 452-59.—*Ed.*

In the first place, I am a member of the C.C. and therefore have every right to be informed of the correspondence between a C.C. member abroad and members in Russia, all the more since this correspondence deals with the stand taken by the Minority, a question which concerns the whole Party. Surely you will not help C.C. members who have defected to the Minority to conceal from the Party (and even from other C.C. members) the real state of affairs?

Secondly, the letters show that some members of the C.C. (Glebov, Konyagin and Nikitich) are simply not telling the truth when they speak in their letter to the Russian committees of the conciliatory attitude of the Minority abroad. Once we have declared open war on this Bonapartism, this deception of the Party (Galyorka in his pamphlet declared this war on behalf of all of us), it is our direct duty to expose before the Party any deception on the part of C.C. members. If, having in our possession proof of such deception, we failed to bring this proof to the attention of the Party, we would not he doing our duty to the Party. If we speak of Bonapartism in the press and from the public platform and at the same time miss the opportunity to offer documentary proof of that Bonapartism, we will be simply windbags. After all, we use the word Bonapartism not as invective, as Martov and Plekhanov have used it.

It is sometimes said that private letters should not be used in political struggle. This is not so. When private letters reveal abuses by Party functionaries, such letters should by all means be used. Plekhanov used private letters in his Vademecum* not even in relation to functionaries. Besides, the letters in question are not private letters at all, they are the correspondence of C.C. members on C.C. business. And I, as a member of the C.C., and you, as an agent of the C.C., are in duty bound to foil this attempt to conceal the truth from the Party.

For all these reasons I consider it imperative that you at once send me these letters or, at any rate, complete copies of them. Of course, parts of them are confidential, and we shall never make these public. But that which concerns

* Handbook.—*Ed.*

the interests of the entire Party and contains nothing confidential must be divulged. How to do this and when, is something we shall think about here.

Reply to this letter *without fail* and as soon as possible. It doesn't matter how badly you write Russian. You can even write in Yiddish if you wish. But let it be immediately.

If you do not agree with me about sending the letters, we shall all have to ask you to come here as soon as possible, *within a few days*. This is such an important matter that it must be discussed and decided at all costs.

Best regards,

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. Be sure to tell *Nik. I—ch*,* the "*Jacobin*" and *Zhitomirsky* that they should send me their addresses *at once*. It is a downright disgrace that everyone should drift around on his own without keeping in touch with one another.

Written in November prior to 16th, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Odessa

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

96

TO THE TVER COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.**

26/XI.

Dear Comrade,

Both copies of your resolution received. They were not turned over to the Central Organ because recently the following happened. The Nikolayev Committee sent a resolution to be forwarded to *Iskra*, which was done. The resolution was returned by Martov accompanied by gross abuse. The C.C. and the Central Organ, he said, knew for certain

* Identity not established.—*Ed.*
** Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*

that there was no committee in Nikolayev and that the resolution had therefore obviously been written by some frauds and impostors. Since the resolution bore no signatures, no date, and no indication of the attitude of the periphery to it, it was meaningless, he said, and he, Martov, even refused to forward it to the Central Organ, declaring he was sick and tired of all this fabrication of false resolutions. The same fate evidently awaits the Tver resolution. We shall print it in a Majority leaflet.

Please let us know how things are going.

Did you receive the *Iskra* letter to the Party organisations concerning the Zemstvo campaign? In it, the editors in their striving for a "new and higher type" talked a lot of nonsense, including the absurdity that the workers should not frighten away the liberals but act so as not to cause panic among them. The letter has caused a heated debate. Lenin replied to it in his pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan*.*

Please let us have addresses to which we can send literature. The addresses you sent the resolution to are quite alright. A certain Rogova will come to you from Perm. She is said to be a good worker. We do not know her personally but perhaps she will be of use to you. Her status is illegal, please help her to get settled.

The key for communicating with Bolshak is Gambetta: South American states 34b., й in the middle. Bolshak asks that a passport and small files be sewn into the soles of a pair of boots and passed on to him through Nekrasova or relatives.

Please acknowledge receipt of our letters at once. Greetings.

Lenin

Written November 26, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in
Krupskaya's
handwriting

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516.—*Ed.*

97

TO THE IMERETIA-MINGRELIA COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.*

To Mingrelia-Imeretia Committee

28/XI.

Dear Comrades,

Both your letters, of the 23rd and the 28th, received; the first (with the statistics and addresses) got into the hands of the Minority and was delivered to us only today. We have made out the addresses, the address for literature will be used at once. Your resolution in favour of the congress was received and forwarded to the Central Organ. We have not heard of any recount of votes, and there hardly will be one.

The resolution of the Nikolayev Committee was received recently and forwarded to the Central Organ. Martov returned it with gross abuse, saying that the Central Organ and the C.C. knew for certain that there was no committee in Nikolayev (a downright lie, for the C.C. went with its declaration to the Nikolayev Committee and knows very well that the persons who signed the resolution are in the Nikolayev Committee), that the resolution had been sent by some impostors and frauds who had forged it.... The resolution of the Caucasian Union Committee in favour of the congress was not printed, but another ... against the congress was printed. *Iskra* said that the Saratov, Samara, Urals and Astrakhan committees had endorsed the C.C. policy (the resolutions were not given), but the very same day the issue came out we received a letter from the Urals saying they had not heard from the C.C. for several months and that they did not know in general whether the Party existed at all. Plekhanov is openly saying that there is not going to be any congress.... As for the C.C., it hypocritically declares that now it is not against the congress, but that it is necessary to make sure that the congress will really represent the opinion of the Party.... The C.C. is pigeon-

* Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*

holing the committees' resolutions, and in its letter to Party comrades it says: "now that the Party has declared for us"....

The committees have asked the C.C. for Majority literature but the C.C. has refused to ship it, claiming firstly that it is not Party literature, and secondly, that it cannot contribute in any way to developing the class-consciousness of the proletariat. What hypocrisy! I suppose Trotsky's new pamphlet issued by the new *Iskra* and therefore to some extent representing its "Credo" does contribute a great deal to the development of the class-consciousness of the proletariat.... The pamphlet declares that there is a wide gulf between the old and the new *Iskra*, that the Congress was a reactionary attempt to perpetuate sectarian methods of struggle, that the old *Iskra* did not care about the proletariat, that the *Iskra* supporters call the proletariat blockheads, etc., etc. No wonder Struve praised the Minority tendencies as vital... (see Lenin's leaflet "An Obliging Liberal"*). Did you get the *Iskra* letter to all Party organisations on the Zemstvo campaign? In its striving for a new, "higher" type of propaganda and agitation, *Iskra* talks a lot of nonsense, going so far as to say that demonstrations should be organised with caution so as not to cause a panic among the Zemstvo people. Lenin has replied to this letter in his pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan.*"**

Now that the C.C. has made a deal with the Central Organ not to allow the congress to be held, it will be postponed indefinitely. Nevertheless the Majority has resolved to fight for it, but it can succeed only if it is fully united and properly organised.

Well, that's all for the time being.

All the best,
Lenin

Written November 23, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

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* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 484-87.—*Ed.*
** Ibid., pp. 495-516.—*Ed.*

98

TO THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Moscow, 29/XI.

Dear Comrades,

Your resolution received. Thanks for the promised support.[84] Please let us know how things stand in the committee. Will this address do for letters? We are not sure, and hence are writing briefly although there is much to write about.[85] Acknowledge receipt of this, at once.

With comradely greetings,
Lenin

Written November 29, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published April 21, 1963, in the newspaper *Moskovskaya Pravda* No. 95

Printed from a copy in Krupskaya's handwriting

99

TO THE BAKU COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.*

Baku, 29/XI.

Dear Friends,

We are complying with your request, and are sending a trial consignment of half a pood of our own literature for the time being, so as not to have to buy any. If the trial proves successful we shall send you what you ask for. In addition, we have arranged to send parcels to the address given by Raisa.** We were very glad to hear about Lenochka. Why does she not write? The others are none too punctual either. Did you receive our letter of November 10?***

* Written by Krupskaya on Lenin's instructions.—*Ed.*
** Identity not established.—*Ed*
*** See present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 264-65.—*Ed*

It is increasingly clear that the Council will not allow the congress to be held on any account. Plekhanov says so quite openly: no congress! At best the Central Organ throws the committees' resolutions into the waste-paper basket or returns them with gross abuse, as was done in the case of the Nikolayev Committee, which sent in a resolution in favour of the congress, but not in the form prescribed by the Council, for which the authors of the resolution were branded as frauds, impostors, forgers of resolutions.... To *compel* the Council to call the congress, the Majority must organise properly, as Lenin wrote in his last letter. Did you get the *Iskra* letter to Party members about the Zemstvo campaign? (See letter to the Mingrelia-Imeretia Committee.)*

Well, that's all for now. Send material for publication The Majority is thinking of publishing its own organ. The hypocritical behaviour of the Party institutions is impelling it more and more to take this step.

We have received a letter from the Caucasian Union Committee (through the Editorial Board of the Central Organ) and shall reply shortly.

Greetings,
Lenin

P.S. What is happening in Batum? What is the mood there?

Written November 29, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original
in Krupskaya's
handwriting

100

TO THE CAUCASIAN UNION COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

5/XII.

Dear Comrade,

We have received: 1) the statement of the elected representatives of the class-conscious workers in the Baku

* See this volume, Document 97.—*Ed.*

R.S.D.L.P. Committee concerning the reorganisation of the committee; 2) the Balakhany and Bibi-Eibat workers' leaflet of October 20; 3) the Baku Committee's leaflet "The New Fox-Tail Policy"; 4) the necessary explanation, and 5) the statement of November 9. We do not have the resolution of the Baku Committee or the resolution of the conference of Caucasian committees which we have been told was sent to us.

As regards the "statement" the following must be said. Some time ago (in the summer) a detailed letter was received from the C.C. representative in the Caucasus concerning the Minority affair. The letter was immediately forwarded to the Central Organ, which means that the Council was well aware of his opinion, as was C.C. member Glebov, who took part in investigating the matter.

The Majority is putting out a pamphlet, *The Council Against the Party*, which will examine the matter in detail on the basis of the opinion of the C.C. representative in the Caucasus.[86]

Please let us know what size parcels sent from Sosnowice should be. Reply as soon as possible.

A violent controversy is now under way between the editors of *Iskra* and the Majority on the question of the Zemstvo campaign. The editors circulated an absurd letter "for Party members only" in which they thoroughly confused the issue of the attitude towards the Zemstvo people. Lenin replied with the pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan*.* There is nothing confidential about the question, and it is important enough to warrant open discussion.

Therefore demand that the Editorial Board's letter on the Zemstvo be reprinted for everybody to read. For it is disgraceful to say one thing in *Iskra* and another in a letter to Party members. This is a matter of concern for all. Parvus sent in a letter supporting Lenin's viewpoint and opposing that of the Minority. We have sent you the pamphlet *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan*.

Tell Lenochka that her letter has been received; it got into the hands of the Minority and was passed on to us

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* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 495-516.—*Ed.*

opened. I shall write her in a few days. She's much too pessimistic....

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

Written December 5, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in Krupskaya's handwriting

101

TO G. D. LEITEISEN

12/XII. 04

Dear Leiteisen,

Today we finally, and *practically*, settled the question of the organ. We propose to begin publishing as of January 1-10; the size will be half the old *Iskra* (something like *Osvobozhdeniye*)—100,000 characters, or roughly four pages of the old *Iskra*. It should come out fortnightly, and still better, weekly.[87]

The cost will be about 400 frs. an issue. For *one* issue we have the money, and for the rest—*promises*.... This is on the short side, and the initial period is especially hard going. Because of this, remembering your offer, I turn to you: consider the question thoroughly and write how much you could give to help; we shall count on you in an emergency (besides promises of a "big sum" from Russia, we have some "prospects" of getting a few hundred francs here, and then, apart from this, so far in the past three or four months there has always been a thousand or two francs available for pamphlets). It would be good to know the maximum we can be sure of getting from you *in an emergency*, when we are unable to raise money anywhere and the paper is threatened with death.

Now about writing for us. We count on having you as our permanent correspondent covering the French movement. We should carry 8,000-12,000 characters once in two weeks about French socialism and working-class movement, etc. *Let us have something without fail by January 1.*

Further. Since you are au courant as regards French political life (as you told me yourself) and are in a position to follow the latest literature, sometimes better than from Paris, perhaps you could keep us posted on, and at times obtain and forward to us, or review, etc., interesting new books, articles and items published in journals, and the like. The foreign press now writes a *great deal* about Russia. There is much that never comes to our knowledge; you see far more newspapers, journals, books. For instance, I recently happened to read about the book *Rouble et roublards* by a French correspondent who fled from Russia after the outbreak of the war. It would be extremely important for the paper to keep abreast of such new books and to *carry articles* about them. Please give this serious thought and render us *all-round* literary assistance. Draw our attention to interesting new publications and send us items and extracts from *socialist* newspapers and journals which we could translate for the paper, etc. For you probably follow practically the entire French (*and Belgian*?*) socialist press, don't you?

Bear in mind, then, that we are *seriously* counting on you.

You must come here on Christmas. It is most important to talk things over, at leisure, thoroughly, concretely.

Did you write Plekhanov about the "Zemstvo" views of the new *Iskra*? Their letter is stupid, isn't it?[88] And Starover in No. 78 is simply delightful.

Yours,
N. Lenin

By the way. Could you send me material to refute Starover's reference to Clemenceau? For it is incorrect.[89] Please get the material and send it to me. It would be edifying to refute him factually.

Sent from Geneva

First published April 21, 1963, in the newspaper *Moskovskiye Pravda* No. 95

Printed from the original

* We have no correspondent in Belgium. Can you undertake the job or suggest somebody?

102
TO ROZALIA ZEMLYACHKA

Reply

13.XII.

Your second letter received. The first did not reach us. Congratulations on the successful start of the raid on Bukva, which we would ask you to carry to the end. The paper has been launched, we expect to put it out in January. (**Money is desperately needed.** Please do everything you can at once to send at least 1,000-2,000 rubles, otherwise we shall be in the air and everything will be left to chance.) Let us know at once: 1) when will you see Bukva and when do you hope to clear up the matter, 2) exactly how much has Bukva promised to give per month? 3) did you speak to Bukva about **Sysoika** and what did you say? 4) what was the nature of the meeting between Bukva and **Charushnikov** to have been (concerning a talk with Sysoika? general acquaintance? or the handing over of the money?)? Did the meeting take place and when will you know the results?

Written December 13, 1904
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

103
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Via Caucasian Union Council
To Yuri

Dear Comrade,

Many thanks for your letter and the *beginning* (the end has not yet reached us) of the article "*Iskra*'s Military Campaign". I was especially happy to receive your letter since we hear so rarely from Russia, so rarely do people write us not "in duty bound" but to exchange ideas. Please write more often and collaborate more closely with our new organ, which we shall begin publishing in the near future

(we are sending a detailed letter about the paper to the Caucasian League with a request that it be passed on to you too*; ask for it and bring it to the attention of as many comrades sharing the Majority views as you possibly can). I would say that your article is unquestionable evidence of your literary ability, and I ask you not to give up writing. It is quite possible that even this article could be adapted and revised for publication (in its present form, as you remarked yourself, it is somewhat out of date). Try to answer this letter as soon as possible and to establish *direct* contact with us by letter, to correspond regularly. This is of utmost importance considering the scanty flow of literary contributions from Russia. Write also about local affairs, and what Majority literature you have seen.

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

Written December 14, 1904
Sent from Geneva to the Caucasus

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

104

TO THE TVER COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

20/XII.

Dear Comrades,

Your letter received. Nadson's poem *The Songs of Mephistopheles*.** We have sent only two letters direct to you, yet you acknowledge receipt of three.... Why don't you reply as regards the Zemstvo campaign and write anything about local affairs? The conciliators claim the Tver Committee tends to side with them, and cite as proof your contribution printed in *Iskra* No. 79 and signed "Tver Committee". We sent you a letter through a comrade announcing the publication of the new Majority paper *Vperyod*. In it we

* See V. I. Lenin, "A Letter to the Comrades" (present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 521-26).—*Ed.*

** Key for deciphering the letter.—*Ed.*

explain in detail what compelled us to start the paper, what its tasks are, and so on. Let us know whether you have received this detailed letter and what you think of it. For God's sake write us about the state of affairs, about local work. We know nothing about work in Tver at present, whether you have literature and technical facilities, whether leaflets are published and what kind, how extensive the committee's contacts are, how the Zemstvo campaign is being conducted, and so on and so forth. Repeat about 1) Rogova, 2) Bolshak, 3) Dedushka.—

Lenin

Written December 20, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in
Krupskaya's
handwriting

105

TO MARIA GOLUBEVA

To Yasneva, private, from Lenin

I wrote to you in Saratov, but have received no reply.* Let me know what this means: whether you did not get the letter, or whether we have parted ways. If the first, your silence is nevertheless inexcusable: we have been trying to find contacts in Saratov for almost a year. Let us hear from you at last!

Written between December 23, 1904
and January 4, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Saratov

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XV*

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 36, p. 139.—*Ed.*

106

TO THE CAUCASIAN BUREAU OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the Caucasian Bureau

Dear Comrades,

Your statement received. We do not know what the bureau wrote. We shall communicate what we know. Some time ago we forwarded to you the resolutions of the conference of Southern committees and the reply of the participants in the conference of the 22. A slight correction has to be made in your assertion that the Southern committees proposed that the group of 22 appoint a Bureau of the Majority Committees from among *its* members. It was proposed that the participants in the conference of the 22 name the comrades they thought best suited for the bureau. From the reply of the participants in the conference of the 22 it can be seen that they in no way considered themselves empowered to "appoint" anyone; instead they put forward a list of nominees and asked the committees to introduce changes or additions in it as they saw fit. You have received that letter, haven't you? The Southern comrades also took the same view, and, not agreeing with the list proposed, nominated **Ryadovoi** and **Zemlyachka** for the Bureau (a minor point: all the nominees are in Russia with the exception of two, and of these one has just come from Russia and is going there again). So far as we know, their nomination coincided with the choice of the Caucasian Bureau. But these persons did not feel they had the right to take any steps before the conference of the Northern committees, which has already taken place. Here's its resolution.* Thus 13 committees (4 Caucasian+3 Southern+6 Northern) have declared for the congress and the establishment of the Bureau of the Majority Committees. As you can see, everything is being done to enable the committees in Russia to come to an agreement. Other committees besides the thirteen have also declared for the congress; the Central Committee itself admits that 16 have already declared for the

* The text of the resolution is not given.—*Ed.*

congress, but it now maintains that 19 are needed (this is what the Odessa Committee was told).

In any case the Majority committees should hurry up and organise. In a few days you will receive documents from which you will see how the C.C. negotiations with the Minority began and how they ended: with the retention by the Minority of the autonomy of the technical institutions and the co-opting (so far unofficial) into the C.C. of three of the most ardent Mensheviks whose inclusion in the C.C. the Minority had insisted on from the very beginning. The Mensheviks have begun to run things their own way. The Petersburg business is proof of this. The workers were eager for a demonstration, the committee set the date for the 28th, but in many districts the organisers were Mensheviks (the Petersburg Committee considered it impossible to exclude the Mensheviks from the work) and they conducted vigorous agitation throughout against the committee. The C.C. did not supply the committee with literature; the Mensheviks had the literature but of course did not give it to the committee, and in their districts they did not prepare for the demonstration. Three days before the demonstration the Mensheviks disrupted a meeting of the committee and, taking advantage of the absence of three Bolsheviks, called off the demonstration; 15,000 leaflets were burnt, and when the Bolsheviks, horrified, got another meeting together it was already too late, nothing could be done any more, and hardly any workers showed up for the demonstration. There is seething indignation against the committee, and the Mensheviks who caused all this mess are breaking away, carrying with them nearly all districts, and are receiving support in the form of literature, contacts and money. Now there are two committees in Petersburg. Undoubtedly the same will happen in other cities. The Mensheviks have no scruples and, having seized the C.C., the Central Organ and the Council, will pursue a line which will leave the Majority completely out of the picture. This is no battle of principles. It is the most outrageous mockery of the Party and principles. This is why we began to publish our own organ. There is a complete split in the Party and there must be no procrastination if we do not wish to reconcile ourselves to the sacrifice of Party principle to clannishness, to absence of

principle prevailing in the Party for a long time to come, or its being thrown back to Economism and the *Rabocheye Dyelo* approach.

Written in December, not earlier than 25th, 1904
Sent from Geneva

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from a copy in Krupskaya's handwriting

107

TO A. Y. ISAYENKO

Yesterday we heard about the split in Petersburg. Well, well! They're a cunning lot, you can see they stop at nothing....

Maybe this at least will shake up the Bolsheviks and make them realise that one has to fight actively or these scoundrels will split all the committees.*

Written December 26, 1904
Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original

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* Postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

1905

108

TO V. A. NOSKOV, L. B. KRASIN AND L. Y. GALPERIN, MEMBERS OF THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.*

To Members of the C.C. Glebov
Nikitich
Valentin

Geneva, 13.I. 05

Dear Sirs,

Enclosed you will find my statement in reply to your, in *Iskra* No. 77.[90] My representatives in the arbitration are Comrades Schwarz and Voinov. Address for communication with them: forwarding office of the newspaper *Vperyod*, for so-and-so.

N. Lenin

Sent in two envelopes to the address: Mr. P. Axelrod. 4. Bd. Pont d'Arve. 4.

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

109

TO A CORRESPONDENT OF *VPERYOD*

Dear Comrade,

Your article "What Are We To Do?" is not suitable for publication. You *are creating* a *non-existent* difference. We

* The letter has the word "*Copy*" on it in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

have so many serious differences that we must refrain from breeding new ones. Who has spoken, and where, *specially* about breaking up anything by force?[91] Nobody, I believe. It was merely conceded as an *inevitable* result *irrespective of* our wishes. We urged people to go to the meetings *even* if they had to *force* their way in in order to propagate *our* slogans. I grant that the presentation of ideas was at times clumsy, but to cavil at this would be to repeat the foul methods of the new *Iskra*. You of course do not wish to cavil, that is unquestionable. But you do not in any way prove that there has been "tactlessness". And to say that "all tactics should consist in tact" and the like, why, that's altogether "off the mark".

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

Written in January 1905
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1924
in the book "*Vperyod*" *and* "*Proletary*". *The First Bolshevik Papers of 1905*, Krasnaya Nov Publishers, Moscow

Printed from the original

110

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR REPRESENTATION COMMITTEE[92]

27.II. 05

Dear Sir,

I thank you for your letter of February 24. Of course I agree, on behalf of my organisation (the paper *Vperyod* and the Russian Bureau of the Committees of the Majority of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia), to accept your conditions and promise to carry them out. The receipt for the sums of £60 and £20, with indica-

tion of their destination, will be printed in our paper *Vperyod*.

I must apologise for my bad English.

Yours very sincerely,
Vl. Oulianoff

Sent from Geneva to London

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original
Written in English

111

TO THE ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The Labour Representation Committee (secretary *MacDonald*), a British proletarian organisation, has sent *60 pounds sterling* (1,506 francs)* through the editors of *Vperyod* in aid of the widows and orphans of workers who fell on January 9 (22) in St. Petersburg. The editors of *Vperyod* have forwarded this money to the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party with the request that the donation be brought without fail to the attention of all workers' organisations of our Party without exception (district committees, meetings of organisers, factory groups, etc.) which could themselves help properly to distribute the funds. It would be desirable that the workers themselves acknowledge the receipt of the money to their British comrades.

Besides the 60 pounds sterling for the victims, the Labour Representation Committee at the same time sent another 20 pounds sterling to *Vperyod* to be used for the needs of the uprising.

Now, March 13 (February 28), the editors of *Vperyod* have received from the same Committee another 90 pounds sterling (about 900 rubles) of which 50 pounds (about 500 rubles) is for aid to the orphans and widows of the workers

* About 600 rubles.

who fell in the fight for freedom. We shall collect this money in a few days and send it on to Petersburg.

Since some workers have friends in London the exact address of this Committee might come in handy. Here it is: Labour Representation Committee, Victoria Mansions, 28, Victoria Street. London. S.W. Secretary J. Ramsay MacDonald.

Reply to this letter without fail.

Written March 13, 1905,
in Geneva

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

112

TO I. I. SCHWARZ

To Yekaterinoslav

Dear Comrade,

We shall reply in detail to your letter in a few days. This is merely a hurried note to let you know the following: If there are organisers who side with the Majority, do one of two things *at once*: 1) send in *their* name a *letter* to the congress protesting against the committee and expressing a desire to take part in the congress; 2) if you find 50 rubles and someone to send, then send a delegate to us (to our address in Geneva) without delay, supplying him with a credential written in our cipher.

Good-bye for the present. Shall write more in a few days. Now please don't delay and try to comply with our request at once, better the second than the first.

Written in 1905, not earlier than
March 31, in Geneva

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

113

TO G. D. LEITEISEN

1914. 05

Dear L.,

It is impossible to get an Organising Committee credential for you to deliver greetings to the congress.[93] I thought at first that our congress would open by April 22 and that it would issue you a credential, but that did not work out; our congress is being delayed.* You can say you are speaking for the Editorial Board of *Vperyod* and deliver greetings to the congress in its name, and *through it*, in the name of the R.S.D.L.P. That will be the best.

The item about Martov's lies is going in.[94] Write from the congress.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. In *Neue Zeit* No. 29 Kautsky again told a pack of lies about *Vperyod* and *Iskra*![95] It would be a good thing for you to "correct" him in your speech *at the congress*.

Sent from Geneva to Paris

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

114

TO A. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY

Dear Comrade,

We received your letter and were very glad to hear from you. Congratulations on overcoming the obstacles raised by the notorious agents appointed to conceal the truth.[96] Do everything possible to keep in touch with us regularly by letter. This is urgently necessary. As soon as correspondence is arranged, we shall give you some interesting assignments.

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* The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. opened on April 12 (25), 1905.—*Ed.*

At present we are looking forward to the congress. It is to open in a few days. The C.C. and Plekhanov still have not made their position quite clear. It looks as if a split is inevitable. Reply at once if you want to be informed about the congress sooner and more accurately than anyone else.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin,

your former village neighbour.[97] Is that peasant radical* you used to bring to me still alive? What is his stand now? Why don't you find us contacts with the peasants?

Written in April, prior to 21st, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Samara

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

115

DRAFT OF A LETTER TO THE LEAGUE OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY ABROAD

To the League

Dear Comrades,

We are sending you a communication about the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Please let us know your attitude to the Third Congress and to the Party Centre it set up.

With S.D. greetings,

C.C.

P.S. We would kindly ask you to reply within two weeks. In the event that we do not hear from you we shall be com-

* D. Y. Kislikov.—*Ed.*

pelled to assume that the League does not recognise the Third Congress.* Of course, the above time limit can be extended if need be.

Written between May 23 and 26, 1905, in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1926 in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

116

TO Y. M. STEKLOV**

Dear Comrade,

Comrade Vas. Vas., a member of our Editorial Board, has informed me that on the whole you share the stand of *Proletary*[98] in the present disputes on tactics and organisation among the Social-Democrats. This was very good news for all of us members of the Editorial Board of *Proletary*. It is our firm conviction that the old conflicts of the circle period should under no circumstances impede joint work on the basis of common principles and strictly Party relationships. We therefore consider it our duty to invite you to work with us in *Proletary*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. We would be extremely happy if we could thus pave the way to uniting by truly Party bonds as many influential representatives of Social-Democracy as possible.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

N. Lenin

Written after May 27, 1905, in Geneva

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

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* This is followed by an insertion in an unidentified handwriting: "—the signature of your representative on the letter to the delegates of the Third Congress leads to this assumption".—*Ed.*

** According to M. S. Olminsky, this letter was never sent.—*Ed.*

117

TO ALEXANDRE-MARIE BRACKE-DESROUSSEAUX

47 Bd. Port Royal 47. M. *Desrousseaux*

Dear Comrade,

You told Comrade Belsky that there was a speech by Paul Lafargue concerning Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government. We would be very much obliged if you could send us the pamphlet with this speech as soon as possible, or if you could give us a detailed account of this speech....[99]

Forgive my poor French.

Written in 1905, not earlier than June 11
Sent from Geneva to Paris

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

118

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Geneva, July 3, 1905

Dear Citizen,

We have received your letter informing us that you have sent 5,049 frs. 23 to Mr. Plekhanov. The head of our forwarding office has written him that we expect half of this sum to be sent to our address.

I should like to let you know, dear citizen, that it was a mistake on your part to have sent the money to Mr. Plekhanov. We have already had the honour to inform you that since the Third Congress of our Party *Iskra* has ceased to be the organ of the Party and that Mr. Plekhanov is no longer the representative of the Party in the International Bureau. We have also had the honour to inform you that the Central Committee of our Party has not yet delegated a special representative to the International Bureau and that in all cases you should get in touch with Mr. Ulyanov.

You advise us to come to an agreement with Mr. Plekhanov. You should be aware that no agreement of any kind is possible between our Party and Mr. Plekhanov until his relations with the Party have been officially settled. I am therefore obliged to ask you to inform Mr. Plekhanov that half of the sum should be forwarded to the Central Committee of our Party (to Mr. Ulyanov).

Accept, dear citizen, our fraternal greetings.

On behalf of the Central Committee
of the Russian Social-Democratic Party
Vl. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original
Translated from the
French

119

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Geneva, July 8, 1905

Dear Citizens,

We have received half of the sum you sent to the Russian Social-Democrats, that is, 2,524 frs. 61½ centimes. But it was a mistake to send it to Comrade Plekhanov. We have already had the honour of informing you that Comrade Plekhanov is no longer the representative of our Party and that on all questions concerning our Party you should get in touch only with the Central Committee of our Party, that is, with Mr. Oulianoff, 3 rue de la Colline, Genève.

Accept, dear citizens, our fraternal greetings.

On behalf of the Central Committee
of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party
N. Lenin (*Vl. Ulyanov*)

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French
in the journal *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian)
Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the text of
the journal
Translated from the
French

120

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Dear Vl. Dm.,

I am sending you the "paper".*

Your appointment to the Economic Commission turned out to be inexpedient for the time being: it would not have lessened but rather aggravated the friction.

If need be always get in touch with me. I do not think there is any reason to fear friction. But of course one must be tactful and cautious whatever turn things may take.

I hear there is no paper for the next issue!

Greetings to V. M. Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written July 31, 1905, in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

121

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Dear An. V.,

I am sending you a new pamphlet by Plekhanov. How petty are his sallies and "digs" at the Machists! For me this is all the more disappointing since essentially Plekhanov's criticism of Mach is, I believe, correct.

I am thinking of writing a short article entitled "G. Plekhanov's Latest Contribution".[100]

Prepare the introduction to your pamphlet *Sketches on the History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the West-European Proletariat*.[101] We shall put out a special one about the February revolution.[102]

We have C.C. letters from Russia looking forward to writings by you.[103] It is very difficult for us without your

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47, p. 308.—*Ed.*

regular, close collaboration. The paper, true, comes out, but it is somewhat monotonous as well. That's one thing. Secondly, there are no pamphlets, especially popular ones. You ought to continue in the vein of *How the Petersburg Workers Went To Petition the Tsar*.

My pamphlet will come out this week.* I shall send it to you.

The Congress minutes will probably come out in August.

Vas. Vas. is swamped with routine work and does not write, which is a great pity.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written August 1, 1905
Sent from Geneva to Viareggio
(Italy)

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

122

TO THE CENTRAL AND ST. PETERSBURG COMMITTEES OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To Absolut's address

To the Members of the C.C. and the St. Petersburg Committee from Lenin

14.VIII.

Dear Comrades,

I have received a letter and a "statement" from Comrade Konstantin Sergeyevich, and consider it my duty to give the following reply, which I would ask *all* members of the St. Petersburg Committee to read. Needless to say, the conflict should be examined, in accordance with the Rules of the Party, by the Central Committee, and I am far from presuming to pass judgement from here. But in

* A reference to *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140).—*Ed.*

view of the reference to the "Lushin letter" as emanating from abroad, I must express my opinion. Lushin is a despicable defector from the Majority to the Minority, offended for not having been invited to the Third Congress. The "Lushin letter" was published by the author (in the press) earlier, before the Third Congress, and contained the absurd charge that the Majority had shown *insufficient resolution* (!) in fighting the Minority. Comrade Konstantin Sergeyevich made a mistake in signing the letter, but to hold it against him would be the height of unreasonableness. It was a forgivable mistake for a man unfamiliar with the "mores" (or rather lack of mores) of the émigrés. Konstantin Sergeyevich himself dissociated himself at once from this Lushin person. Having known Konstantin Sergeyevich first as a *splendid*, one of the most valuable correspondents, and then having *met him personally* in Geneva, I must commend him as a worker, and resolutely object to the "Lushin letter" being used against him.[104]

Written August 14, 1905
Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

123

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

From Lenin to the C.C.

30.IX. 05

Dear Friends,

1) I am sending you a draft contract with Malykh for approval by the entire C.C.[105] I advise approval, since there are a lot of people here who have nothing else to live on, and the Party cannot support them (including editors and contributors of *Proletary*). This is a serious question, which I would beg you not to decide offhand; otherwise there is liable to be a desperate crisis.

2) I advise raising the 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Malykh ought to agree.

3) Be sure to get an undertaking from her at once to submit to ideological *guidance* (and not only control) by a person to be agreed upon between herself and the C.C. This is quite possible, she will agree; this point is enormously important in principle, and its practical significance for the future will also be very great.

4) You are placing me and especially yourselves in an impossible position vis-à-vis the International Bureau by not appointing a representative to the conference and not sending C.C. members here as promised.[106] For heaven's sake can't you see that in this way you are setting the entire international Social-Democracy against you. I already have an inquiry from the International Bureau concerning the strange silence of the C.C. (I replied that you agree in principle to a conference without arbitration, that you will soon send delegates, and that talks are now going on in Russia between the Organising Commission and the C.C.).

It is necessary to give the International Bureau a precise and clear official answer, otherwise you will seriously compromise yourselves, it will look as if you were evading the issue.[107]

5) I have lost all hope of your coming. Why didn't you write a word about the end of Sysoika? Let me know whether you have definitely given up the idea of coming. In general there has been no news from you about anyone for over a month.

6) As regards Plekhanov, I can pass on some local rumours for your information. He is obviously angry with us for having exposed him in the eyes of the International Bureau. He swears like a stevedore in No. 2 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*.[108] There is talk of his putting out his own paper, or returning to *Iskra*. The conclusion: he should be regarded with growing distrust.

Best regards. Let me have at least some sort of a reply.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

124

TO THE KHERSON BOLSHEVIKS

Dear Comrades,

We have received your postal address from a comrade who visited you, and hasten to make use of it to contact you direct. We attach much importance to direct contacts and exchange of ideas, and that is why we are trying to get in touch with you. Write us at this address: Mr. Albert Milde, Marienstrasse, 13[II], Leipzig.

N. Lenin

Written October 10, 1905, in Geneva

First published in 1934 in the journal *Krasny Arkhiv* No. 1

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

125

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the C.C.

16.X. 05

Dear Comrades,

I have talked to Ivan Vasilich's messenger and yesterday sent a telegram giving my consent. I authorise Ivan Vasilich or Sergei Vasilich to make the necessary cuts in the *Poor*,[109] if it is taken away from Petrov. I agree to its being taken from Petrov, but only on condition that this will not mean a break with Petrov, or a sheer deception of Petrov on my part, since *I gave Petrov permission* to try to arrange this thing. This means it is necessary 1) at least to compensate Petrov for expenses already incurred (Ivan Vasilich's messenger agreed to this); 2) to get Petrov's consent to submit to the decision of the higher body (i.e., I permitted Petrov to make a try, while the C.C. decided to hand it over to Belov—so that Petrov should not have reason to consider me an unreliable business partner). If Petrov has already succeeded in arranging things, I would strongly

advise against taking it away from him, for I do not see how Belov is better than Petrov; 3) please get in touch with my sister* on this matter (she can easily be communicated with), since she might have already made some arrangements in my name.

As for Petrov, I shall inform everybody here that 1) the C.C. did not endorse the contract; 2) we are within our rights in negotiating with Petrov on each separate instance since no monopoly has been established; 3) it is advisable to deal with the C.C. publishers as more advantageous and closer to the Party.

That seems to be all. Write and let me know whether I have understood you correctly.

Your agreement with Nolin is good, but I am afraid it might be fictitious. An "editorial committee" = 7—4—1 = 2!! And these two are burdened with other things!! This is a fiction, not an editorial committee. Besides, after signing an agreement with Nolin you all give heaps of work (Radin, Kamenev, Werner, Schmidt, Lyadov, Bazarov, Fedorovich, etc., etc.—unless Belov has deceived me?) to Belov. What does this mean? Nolin for the soul and Belov for the body, is that it? If our meeting does not take place, you will be kind enough to explain to me thoroughly by letter what is the matter. It is altogether out of the question for people in the underground or members of the R.S.D.L.P. to engage in the complex and bothersome business of publishing. That is why Belov (and Petrov no less than Belov) is getting ahead of us. And I seriously warn you that that is how it will be, for Belov has enterprising people who give themselves *wholly* to the business, while Nolin's "editorial committee" (you can be sure) will not be able to devote even one-hundredth of its energies to *this* work. We shall keep on talking, arguing, bargaining, holding meetings (we have been engaged in this laudable occupation ever since summer, *for six months*), while Belov and Petrov will do business. I am not blaming anybody, for it would be absurd to do that—it is inevitable under the circumstances. This will change 1) if freedom is won—and then everything will change; or 2) if Pyatnitsky goes about it

* Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova.—*Ed.*

like Belov and Petrov, which he cannot do since he is occupied with a host of other things.

P.S. Received *Rabochy* No. 2. I shall write you about the feuilleton in detail. The author should not have tackled such subjects: the result is a sort of "sentimental" socialism, which is very dangerous.[110]

Sent from Geneva to St. Petersburg

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

126

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH*

17.X. 05

Dear Comrade,

The Scholtz affair has taken such a turn that the Party is likely to suffer a serious loss through the fault of the manager of the printing shop:[111]

Besides, fulfilment by the Party printery of Demos orders also involves losses for the Party since things are not properly handled.

In view of this and considering that the affairs of Demos, supervision over which has been entrusted to me by the Central Committee, *cannot* require your presence in London later than October 21 (new style), I *urgently* request you, on agreement with Iv. P., to give up the trip to Berlin and to leave *at once* for Geneva to settle the matters entrusted to you by the C.C.

N. Lenin

P.S. I draw your attention to the fact that to refer to Demos business in justification of your continued absence would not be right on your part, for I have communicated with I.P. and learned that Demos business equally requires your *immediate* return.

* This letter bears the note by Lenin: "Sent 17/X.05".—*Ed.*

P.P.S. Scholtz filed a suit (for 2,031 frs. 25) on October 17. Payment falls due on October 27. We need a few days (a minimum of five) for legal consultation.

Sent from Geneva to London

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

127

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrades,

The International Socialist Bureau has forwarded me a letter from Vaillant setting forth the proposal of the Socialist Workers' Party of France. The Bureau has asked me to submit this proposal for discussion by the central body of my Party and to reply at the earliest date. Vaillant's letter is as follows:

"The question raised in my letter which you circulated was to introduce a definite proposal. Today I am sending you this proposal. I could not do so earlier, for to give it sufficient freight it was necessary that it should come from the party as a whole, from the Socialist Party (French section of the International Workers' Party), which has adopted it unanimously through its delegates at an assembly of the National Council on Sunday, September 24 (September 11), in Paris. The following is the proposal on which a decision is to be taken after discussion by the International Socialist Bureau: 'As soon as developments, overt or covert, give cause to fear a conflict between governments and make war possible, the socialist parties of the countries concerned should at once, on invitation from the I.S.B. contact each other direct with the object of determining and concentrating the actions of the combined forces of the workers and socialists to avert and prevent war.

"'At the same time the parties of other countries would be invited by the I.S.B. to a meeting to be held at the earliest possible date in order to determine what action on the part of the entire International and the organised workers is most suitable to avert and prevent war.'

"Jaurès joins me in asking you to send at once a new circular letter to all parties. You will understand, as will the socialists of all countries if they agree with us, how important, in view of the possible developments, it is not to put off discussion of this question to a distant meeting of the Bureau, but to inform the Bureau directly of their agreement; thus, if the proposal is adopted, as we hope it will be, it could be implemented promptly in the event of a conflict."

I for my part should like to add that, in my view, this proposal is somewhat naïve, since the only thing that can have an effect in the event of a conflict between governments is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Written October 18, 1905,
Sent from Geneva to Russia

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from a copy in an unknown handwriting, with corrections by Lenin

128

TO THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.

At the comrades' request I give here information concerning the Economic Commission in as precise a form as possible.[112]

The Economic Commission consists of comrades specially appointed by the C.C. representative abroad.

At the present time (October 20, 1905) it includes Comrades Bonch-Bruyevich (manager of the printing shop), Kruchinina (treasurer and manager of the forwarding office), Ilyin, Lenina (secretary of the C.C.), Abramov,* Knol, Vetchinkin, Ladyzhnikov and Nik. Vasilich.

Generally speaking, the function of the Economic Commission is to handle the business jobs of the Central Committee abroad, and to help the Central Committee in all its work abroad. This applies to the technical end (printing, forwarding, and so forth), finances, transport, sending people to Russia, measures relating to arms, and so on, co-ordinating the work of all C.C. agents, controlling the work of each individual agent, and so on, right up to special assignments from the Central Committee.

The Economic Commission elects its chairman or secretary, etc., and distributes work among its members, with

* See Avramov R. P.—*Ed.*

the exception of the appointment of permanent functionaries (in charge of forwarding, the treasury, the secretariat, printing shop, transport, and so on), which depends on the Central Committee.

Decisions of the Economic Commission may be revoked by the Central Committee or its representative abroad, but are not subject to endorsement by the C.C. unless this is asked for by some member of the Economic Commission or unless objections are raised by anyone.

For the purpose of control over the activities of individual agents of the C.C. (the treasurer, secretary, manager of printing shop, etc.), the Economic Commission appoints comrades from among its members to make a thorough examination of the whole work of the given agent and to report to the Commission on measures to improve his work, and also to check up on the progress of his work from time to time. The only exceptions are special activities or spheres of activity exempted for one or another reason by the Central Committee from control by the Economic Commission. The carrying out of all ordinary and current work undertaken by the C.C. is to be systematically controlled by the Economic Commission.

The Economic Commission helps the Central Committee to direct the activity of the Committee of the Organisations Abroad,[113] not in the form of directives to the latter, since it is an autonomous organisation, but by studying its reports, discussing its work, examining the organisation of its activities and searching for ways of improving it.

If the comrades who asked for a more explicit definition of the functions of the Economic Commission consider it necessary to draw up a detailed statute, the Economic Commission as a whole should discuss this statute, after which it would be endorsed by the C.C.

Written October 20, 1905,
in Geneva and mailed to a local
address

First published in 1926
in *Lenin Miscellany V*

Printed from the original

129

TO G. D. LEITEISEN

Geneva, October 23, 1905

Dear L.,

I have just been informed by Bracke of the French Parti Socialiste that their party congress will take place in Châlon-sur-Sâone from October 27-30 to November 1. Le meilleur accord est réservé aux délégués de l'Étranger.*

Will you be there? *Be sure to drop me a line*. If you will, represent us and deliver without fail an *exhaustive* speech with greetings from the *revolutionary* Social-Democracy of Russia.

If not, let me know *at once*. In that case we shall send a detailed message of greetings from here.[114]

So be sure to reply!

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent to Paris

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

130

TO G. D. LEITEISEN

Dear L.,

Please do take the trouble to write a short article or even a paragraph about your interview with Guesde, Lafargue and Bracke concerning the provisional revolutionary government and our participation in it. We need it for *Proletary* (or for *Novaya Zhizn*,[115] depending on the circumstances). You must write, if only a few lines, and as soon as possible![116]

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in early November 1905
Sent from Geneva to Paris

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVI*

Printed from the original

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* Foreign delegates will be accorded the warmest welcome.—*Ed.*

131

TO N. F. NASIMOVICH

Comrade Dirks,

Please tell Vl. Dm. Bonch-Bruyevich that the Party Programme must be published *at once* as a *separate* pamphlet with cover, list of publications, address of the forwarding office, etc., and *matrixed*.

I would earnestly ask that first *both* of you go over it *carefully* once more to make sure there is not the slightest misprint. Check it against the minutes of the Second Congress.

The price of the pamphlet should be fixed both for single copies and *bundle orders* (per 100 copies, 1,000 copies).

Written in November, prior to 9th, 1905

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

1906

132
TO G. A. KUKLIN

A Mr. G. Koukline 15. Rue de Candolle. Genève.

Dear Comrade,

I am extremely worried about the fate of a certain packet of documents of historical significance.[117] It was among the papers left in your keeping about which the editor of an historical journal spoke to you this summer.

I would be very much obliged to you if you would drop me a line letting me know whether the packet can be located and sent here; where the suitcase or box is and whether the packet can be easily found there.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

V. Ulyanov

Address: St. Petersburg.
Railway Administration, Fontanka, at Obukhov Bridge. Ivan Nikolayevich Chebotaryov.

Written September 14, 1906
Sent from Kuokkala (Finland)
to Geneva

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

1907

133
TO ETIENNE AVENARD[118]

March 1(14), 1907

Dear M. Avenard,

Thank you for your letter.

I would ask you to make the following corrections:

(1) Page 6 (No. 1). You quote me as saying: "not to work for the bourgeois revolution which would dupe the working class".

This is most inaccurate. We Social-Democratic revolutionaries *must* not only work for the bourgeois revolution but we must lead it, direct it, *together with the peasantry*, against tsarism and *against the liberals*.

Perhaps it would be better to say: "... in joint work, not with the liberal bourgeoisie, who want to put an end to the revolution, but with the democratic peasantry, against the baseness and treachery of the bourgeoisie, who are day by day becoming more and more counter-revolutionary".

We Bolsheviks *also* stand for the participation of the proletariat in the *bourgeois* revolution. But we believe, with Karl Kautsky, that it is precisely together with the peasants and by no means with the liberals that the proletariat can carry the bourgeois revolution to a victorious conclusion.

(2) Pages 3-4.

Stolypin's article in *Novoye Vremya*[119] appeared on January 4 (old style) and not on January 6.

(3) It is necessary to add that Milyukov visited Stolypin on *January 15*.

(4) The last words of your article: "... countless masses of peasant *proletarians*."

Not "peasant proletarians" but "democratic peasants".

In the social (socialist) revolution we can count only on the proletarians of the cities and the proletarians of the countryside. At the present time, however, we have not a social revolution in Russia, but a *bourgeois* revolution. And it is only the proletariat together with the peasants, together with the democratic peasantry, together with the broad masses of the peasantry, who can bring *such* a revolution to victory.

Yours,
N. Lenin

P.S. I received your letter very late. I have only a few minutes to spare. Forgive this hurried reply.

Sent from Kuokkala
to St. Petersburg

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

134

TO G. A. ALEXINSKY

For Pyotr

Dear P.,

I don't know whether your letter was written before you met our local friend or after. At any rate I am answering your questions.

N. K. has spoken about the money question *many* times. She will mention it again and so shall I.

I have not written to *R*. because I myself recently saw (when I happened to be in those parts) two comrades from there and took up all matters concerning you with them.[120]

You ask what I think about your work there.

It is rather difficult to answer this question in a few words. When you have looked around you will see for yourself what material, information, etc., can be sent from

there, but this is a relatively minor problem and can be easily solved. The general conditions of work there is another matter. I doubt whether you have ever seen such foul conditions as those in which the emigrants find themselves abroad. You must be *extremely* cautious there. Not that I am advising against waging war with the opportunists. On the contrary, it is very necessary to fight there, and much fighting will have to be done. But it is an ugly kind of war. You must always be prepared for malicious underhand attacks, outright "provocations" on the part of the Mensheviks (they will systematically provoke you), and very little *effective* sympathy. For over there you are frightfully out of touch with Russia, and idleness and the state of mind that goes with it, a nervous, hysterical, hissing and spitting mentality, predominate. The difficulties you will encounter there have *nothing in common* with the difficulties encountered in Russia: though there is practically full "freedom", there is no *live* work or an environment for live work to speak of.

In my opinion the chief thing is for you to have work, your own work. *R*. may provide it.... More important still is it for you to maintain contact with the *organisation* in Russia: in that case you won't feel rootless there. And, finally, most important of all, we all, both there and here, should work *in unison*, march in step, exchange views more often (if not all views are clearly expressed in the press). Only by working abroad *in contact* with the *organisation* in Russia can one protect oneself against being sucked down into the slough of despond, squabbles, the viciousness of overwrought nerves, etc. My own memory of that "abroad" is only too fresh, and I speak from no little experience.

It would be very good if you would work together with Knunyants and Trotsky. It would be much easier for you with them.

Anyway, you will see all this for yourself in time.

The address you have written to here should *not be used* on any account. Besides, I shall be leaving here soon. For the time being write me at this address: Herrn Kakko *Paavo*, Terijoki, and inside the envelope (and *only* inside) for L—n. Let me have your address there as soon as possible.

Best regards. Warm greetings to *all the Knipoviches*.

Yours,

....*

Address: I. Ladyschnikoff, Uhlandstrasse N 145. *Berlin*.

Entrance *through courtyard*. This is a private address. Abramoff lives in the same place, one floor higher. Opposite, at Uhlandstrasse, 52, is the office where they can be found in the mornings. I give it just in case, though you probably know this by now.

Written in late September-early October 1907 in Kuokkala

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

135

TO KARL HJALMAR BRANTING

Dear Comrade,

The bearer of this letter is our Party comrade.[121] I would kindly ask you to give her your advice and assistance. In particular, she has instructions to look for our Social-Democratic books and documents in Stockholm and if need be to send them on. These books, etc., are partly in the basement of the Stockholm People's House (in crates), and partly, perhaps, with Comrades Börjeßon or Björck (Bokhandel Björck & Börjeßon, Drottninggatan. 62).

I trust that with your help the bearer of this letter will be able to carry out her assignment, which I consider extremely important.

With best regards,

N. Lenin

Written in early October 1907 in Kuokkala

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

* Signature illegible.—*Ed.*

136

TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ADDRESSEE[122]

28.XII. 07

Dear Comrade,

I have made arrangements with Mr. Börjeßon, but unfortunately he is not able to ensure the delivery to us of all letters and parcels. You must forgive me if I therefore once again ask you to find *one more* member of the Party who could receive letters and parcels of books in Stockholm *weekly* and send them on (to Finland and back to Geneva).

I intend to leave for Berlin on Tuesday.*

With best regards,

Yours,

I. Frey

Malmstens Hotell
Mastersamuelsgatan 63

P.S. I shall visit you 4 p.m. Monday. If this is inconvenient for you, please telephone to the Malmsten Hotel.

Written in Stockholm
and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original
Translated from the
German

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* December 31, 1907.—*Ed.*

1908

137
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

13.I. 08

Dear An. Vas.,

For several days now my wife and I have been in Geneva.... It is devilishly sad to have to return to this accursed Geneva again, but there's no other way out! After the disaster in Finland there was no alternative but to transfer *Proletary*[123] abroad. That's what the Editorial Board decided. The only question is whether to Geneva or some other place. So far we are making inquiries, but I personally believe that Geneva and London are the only places that are free. But London is expensive.

I read your pamphlet about Stuttgart to the end; the third supplement came very late, I barely managed to read it before leaving. I think you made a good job of it, and all the comrades were very pleased with the pamphlet.* We all thought it unnecessary to "correct" it; it would have been a pity to mar your vivid and lively style. And there is no syndicalism in it; what it does contain, in my opinion, is a number of major indiscretions "for use by" Plekhanov and Co. Did you see his carping and base cavilling in *Obrazovaniye* or *Sovremenny Mir*?[124] We shall always have opponents of this kind and must be triply cautious. Moreover, you also forgot about the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who have for quite some

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* See present edition, Vol. 34, pp. 370-71.—*Ed.*

time now been attacking the German Social-Democrats, making use of the criticism of the syndicalists and *distorting* this criticism into *vituperation* against Marxism.

I don't know whether our people will now manage to put out your pamphlet. Publishing has become difficult.

Did you get my first volume?

How are you getting on? How's the heir? I hear you had a good trip with Gorky.

Write and let us know what you are working on. We count on you both as a contributor to *Proletary* and as a lecturer. You will not let us down, will you?

Where is Gorky? I wrote to him in Capri (Villa Blaesus). I wonder whether it will reach him.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Address: Mr. Vl. *Oulianoff.*
17. Rue des deux Ponts. 17.
(chez Küpfer). *Genève.*

Sent to Italy

First published in 1934
in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

138

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

14.I. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am no longer in Finland, but, regrettably, in Geneva: Vl. Oulianoff, rue des Ponts 17 (chez Küpfer), Genève....*

* Two lines illegible. The sheet is torn here and the end is missing. The following lines are written on the reverse side.—*Ed.*

...during the latest hounding in Finland part of the minutes of our last Congress in London [was lost]. If I am not mistaken, I was told that the materials and documents of this Congress were sent to the International Socialist Bureau.[125] Is this true? I should be very much [obliged] if you could....

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original verified against the text of the journal
Translated from the French

139

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

To Anatoly Vasilyevich

Dear An. Vas.,

Drop a line to let me know whether you have settled down and are work fit. We are counting on you to write for *Proletary* 1) letters from Italy twice (roughly) a month, 8,000-12,000 characters. The first in about three weeks' time. 2) Political feuilletons from time to time. Do you see the Russian papers (Gorky gets a lot of them)?

Write.

Best regards,

Yours,

Starik

Written between January 14 and February 13, 1908
Sent from Geneva to Capri (Italy)

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

140

TO MAGNUS NILSSEN

27.I. 08

Dear Comrade,

Camille Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels, has passed your inquiry on to me. As representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the International Socialist Bureau, I can inform you that the Estonian Social-Democrats (if I am not mistaken, they call themselves the Union of Estonian Social-Democrats) are part of our Party. There is indeed in Revel a Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party consisting mostly of Estonians. As regards citizens M. Jurisson and J. H. Seppin, these names are unknown to me. This in no way militates against them; the organisations of our Party function in secret and I know none of the Estonian comrades personally. I shall write to the Central Committee of our Party in Russia and make inquiries about these citizens (and, to make sure, also to the Revel Committee), but we cannot expect a quick answer.

With S.D. greetings,

Vl. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

Address: Vl. *Oulianoff*. 17. Rue des deux Ponts. 17. (chez Küpfer). *Genf. Genève.*

Sent to Christiania (now Oslo)

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

141

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

27.I. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I have received your letter of January 24, 1908, and have written to Comrade Magnus Nilssen in Christiania*

* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

that the Revel Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. *does indeed exist* and that the Estonian Social-Democrats belong to [our Party].* As for citizens [Jurisson] and Seppin, I do not know them, [and in general] I do not know a single Estonian Social-Democrat personally; it should not be forgotten that the organisations of our Party are secret. I shall write to Russia and ask for particulars about these citizens, but no immediate reply can be expected.

With fraternal greetings,

Vl. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

142

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

29.I. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am told that the third volume of the reports of the various parties to the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress is to come out in a few days and that the report of our Party is not yet ready....*

Will it be possible to publish our Party's report in the third volume or not? What is the time limit for submitting it?** The hounding in Finland has most likely prevented our comrades from completing the report, for when I was in Finland two months ago I heard myself that the Central Committee [had assigned the job] to a comrade,

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

** As regards the time limit for submitting the report see letter to Camille Huysmans of February 2, 1908 (*Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 47, p. 131).—*Ed.*

who was working energetically [to complete] the report.
[Accept, dear] comrade, [my fraternal greetings].

Vl. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

143

TO THE EDITORS OF *BERNER TAGWACHT*[126]

Statement. Berner Tagwacht No. 24 (Thursday, January 30) carries a statement by L. Martov in regard to the case of Dr. Semashko, a Russian comrade arrested in Geneva.[127] In this statement Martov for some strange reason refers to Semashko only as a journalist who had been present at the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart; at the same time he calls himself a "delegate of Russian Social-Democracy at the Stuttgart Congress".

The Swiss workers will unquestionably interpret this statement of Martov's to mean that Semashko has nothing to do with the Russian Social-Democratic Party.

In order that Martov's utterly inaccurate mode of expression should not mislead anyone, I, as representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Party in the International Socialist Bureau, hereby declare that Dr. Semashko is an old member of our Party and that he was at the International Congress both as a member of the Party and as a journalist working for the Party press.

I feel this explanation to be necessary inasmuch as our Swiss comrades are clearly evincing considerable interest in Semashko's arrest. All the Russian comrades who know him are firmly convinced that he is in no way implicated in the Tiflis "expropriation" nor could he have been. And not only because the last (London) Congress of our Party categorically rejected this "method of struggle", but also because Dr. Semashko has lived uninterruptedly since Feb-

ruary 1907 in Geneva, where he has engaged in literary activity.

We are firmly convinced that the international Social-Democratic press will very soon be able to welcome the release of the comrade arrested in Geneva with the same justified joy as *Vorwärts* (in Berlin) and *l'Humanité* (in Paris) at one time welcomed the release of the comrades unjustly arrested in Paris.

N. Lenin,

Representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the International Socialist Bureau

Written between January 30 and February 2, 1908
Sent from Geneva to Berne

Published February 5, 1908, in German in the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht* No. 29

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the newspaper text
Translated from the German

144

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

27.II. 08

Dear Anatoly Vasilyevich,

I remind you again and again about Ferri. If you haven't sent it yet, it's too bad!

Besides we would very much like to ask you to write an article about the *Paris Commune*[128] for *Proletary* No. 3 (23) (the anniversary issue). Perhaps you have the new book by Jaurès and Dubreuil—although these gentlemen could hardly give a correct appraisal of the Commune. Marx's letters to Kugelmann which we have frequently discussed should of course be mentioned again and quoted for the edification of the opportunists.

The size of this anniversary article—15,000 characters maximum. Deadline, *next Wednesday* (March 4). Please reply *at once* whether you will send it.

Please send it!

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Capri

First published in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVI*

Printed from the original

145

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

1.III. 08

Dear Comrade,

My friends write me from Brussels that I am expected there shortly for the session of the International Socialist Bureau.

I should be very much obliged if you could let me know whether this is so or not. Could you [tell me]* exactly (or at any rate [approximately]), when the next session of the Bureau is to take place. I shall soon have to go for a few weeks to Italy, and therefore it is very important for me to know whether I will be needed in Brussels.

Accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

Vl. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original Translated from the French

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

146
TO LEON TYSZKA

18.III. 08

Dear Comrade,

Yesterday Kon paid me a visit and showed me your telegram to him, and complained angrily, irritably about its impermissibly sharp, "police" tone, which he said he could least of all forgive you who are well versed in the nuances of the German language. I believe I should give you an account of this characteristic talk with Kon. I replied of course that I did not know what the neue Wendung* was, but that I was certain that you would not have sent such a telegram without good reason, and that to accuse Alexinsky, and the more so yourself, of wishing to entgegenarbeiten** the investigation was more than ludicrous.[129]

Kon told me—in confidence (not from you, of course)—that there is serious evidence against Litvinov, that he, Kon, knows Litvinov well and would not wish to make life hell for him or to take steps that would have very serious consequences for him; no, but that he, Kon, merely considers it absolutely necessary to show Europe (and especially the German Social-Democrats) that trial by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is not a fiction and that the Party can vindicate itself. "Surely a way can be found to do this without making life hell for anyone!" Kon exclaimed. I, of course, said that in my opinion this could be done and that there was no need for him to worry. There would be a hearing under all circumstances, the Party would see to that, so why worry? It would be a scandal, said Kon, if Alexinsky were to prevent a hearing. Nonsense, I said. Alexinsky *does not want* to prevent a hearing *nor can he*. There already *is* a scandal, and it is the *Mensheviks* who are making it: see the article "Time To Stop" in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1-2, I said.[130] *Kon hadn't read it!!* Think of it: while the investigation *is still going on*, while Litvinov's lips are sealed, while the documents of the

* New turn.—*Ed.*

** To work against.—*Ed.*

investigation *cannot* yet be published, the newspaper pours out abuse anonymously! Think of Litvinov's position!! Yet this newspaper is *actually the organ* of the Central Bureau Abroad,[131] nourished by it. And these are the judges??! That is how I explained Alexinsky's behaviour to Kon. To avoid any misunderstanding and false rumours I consider it necessary to pass this on to you. For however surprised I was that Kon should have come *to me*, the fact remains that he did. And I am afraid that as a representative of the *German* party in the Central Bureau Abroad he might misquote me. I do not think we can rely on *this sort* of a reporter to speak on Russian affairs before the Vorstand* of the German party. It is essential that you personally as a member of the supreme collegium should speak with the Vorstand and *without fail* translate them the article in No. 1-2 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Otherwise such absurdities offensive to me as Kon's coming to "complain" to me that Alexinsky is working against the hearing are bound to occur. There is a limit to everything....

Best regards,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. Be sure to reply *at once* as to whether you will permit the article** I sent you to be printed in Russian in *Proletary* (with the reservation that it was written for *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*) and *when*. We are *frightfully short* of copy for *Proletary*, and I am impatiently awaiting your reply.[132]

P.P.S. After coming to me, Kon saw Ryadovoi, and, I believe; hinted to him that he had after all privately shown his friends the Mensheviks the record which you forbade to be shown.[133] What the devil is this!

Sent from Geneva to Berlin

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

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* Executive Committee.—*Ed.*

** A reference to the article "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 50-62).—*Ed.*

147

TO A. A. BOGDANOV

Talked yesterday to Tyszka, who will be at your place today. In our opinion he does not know anything yet about the *aggravation* of our philosophical differences and it would be very important (for our success in the C.C.) that he should not know of it.

Best regards,
Lenin

Written in late March 1908 in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

148

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am very sorry not to have found you in the People's House.[134] My friend Romanov, a former deputy of the Second Duma, came with me, to ask your advice. I have been told that there are 200 [francs]* in the International Socialist Bureau [intended] for the Duma deputies. The Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party....

...does not answer us. I presume that under the present [circum]stances I have the right to ask that fifty francs be paid on my [voucher] to Deputy Romanov, who has been several months without work.

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as suggested by the context and the remaining legible letters.—*Ed.*

Be so kind as to reply to this address:
Mr. Georges Salomon. Rue Goppart. Bruxelles.....

Vl. Ulyanov

My address: ....

Written May 16, 1908, in Brussels and mailed to a local address

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

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Translated from the French

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TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Geneva, June 30, 1908

Dear Comrade,

I wrote you that members of our Central Committee had been arrested in Russia. Now my friend informs me [that one member]* of the Central Committee is free. He [writes] that the [first] half of the *report* [of our Party] has [been sent] to you ... the report for ... Stuttgart.

Within a month, my friend [writes], we shall be able to send the other half of the report, [if] Comrade Huysmans [confirms] that our report will be published.

Be so kind, dear comrade, as to answer this letter... and I shall immediately forward [your reply to Paris].

With fraternal [greetings],

N. Lenin

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as suggested by the context and the remaining legible letters.—*Ed.*

150

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

8.7. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Many thanks for your kind letter. I shall pass on your reply to our comrades in Russia, and I hope that they will soon send you the remainder of our report. As for the payment of 1,600 frs., I may assure you that the Central Committee of our Party will pay this sum, most likely [not later] than within a few....*

[The plenary meeting of the Central Committee] has been called,** and I am obliged to await its decision. The money will assuredly be paid without delay.

Accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

N. Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the text of the journal
Translated from the French

151

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Aug. 18. 08

Dear Sir, Mikhail Nikolayevich,

I take the liberty of applying to you as former editor of the *History of Russia*.[135] The secretary told me recently about the various plans concerning an article dealing with the history of factory industry. Although we fully agreed on everything I should like to have your opinion: is it all right for me to undertake it in view of Tugan-Baranovsky's refusal?

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* One word illegible.—*Ed.*

** A reference to the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., held in Geneva on August 11-13 (24-26), 1908.—*Ed.*

Please write a few words in reply on receipt of this letter. Besides the subject mentioned here, there are a great many more which our common acquaintances would like to discuss with you. But I am not sure whether the address may be used or whether it is all right to correspond. I am waiting for *detailed* instructions on this score.

Best regards,
V. Ulyanov

Vl. Oulianoff.
61. Rue des Maraîchers. 61.
Genève, Suisse.

Sent to Russia

First published in part in 1962 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 4

Published in full in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

152
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

21, Tavistock Place. London W.C.

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Comrade Isetsky (Salomon, Rue Goppart 78, Bruxelles) has probably informed you that three Russian comrades, members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Sarah Ravich, Khojamiryan and Bogdasaryan, arrested several months ago in Munich,[136] are being kept in conditions extremely....*

... that they have gone on hunger strike (Hungerstreike in German, [don't know] what the equivalent is in French).

Their lawyer, the German Socialist Bernheim, writes us that it is absolutely essential to prove that the arrested people are members of the Social-Democratic Party. I have sent him *my official statement* certifying that the arrested

* Here and further several words are illegible.—*Ed.*

persons are members of our Party. But he considers that my statement is not enough and that it is necessary to have the fact confirmed by the International Socialist Bureau.

I hope, dear comrade, that you....

...that the deposition testifying that the three arrested in Munich are members of the Social-Democratic Labour Party is signed by a representative or else the secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, and that the signature is witnessed by a notary public. Comrade Isetsky (Salomon) will forward the deposition to Geneva....

Accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

Vl. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

Written August 19, 1908
Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the text of the journal
Translated from the French

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TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

8.IX. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Thank you for your letter of August 31st. I was away for three days and that is why I did not reply earlier.[137] (...)* as for the report we have [now] arranged that matter. (...)**

... [that the Central Committee of our Party was able to hold (after several months] "rest" in prisons) a plenary meeting. The member of the Committee who started to write the report was also arrested; he was only released two weeks ago. Now he is here too. We have decided that it is [impos]sible to continue the preparation of the report

* An illegible word.—*Ed.*
** An illegible line.—*Ed.*

in Russia and [we have] entrusted this [task] to a comrade [in Geneva] (...)* ... that the report will be finished in two months. I deeply regret, dear comrade, that we caused you a good deal of trouble and inconvenience, but you cannot imagine what a large number of militants we have lost and to what extent (...)**
... the crisis of (...)***
... the *Courrier International* (...)****
... I do not know any internationalist of the old guard in Geneva. You have probably written to London and to the committees of the Swiss socialist (...)***** about this matter: if the socialist newspapers in London, Geneva, Zurich, etc.... will print an announcement that the International Socialist Bureau (...)******
... of this *Courrier* (...)*******
My address: Vl. Oulianoff, 61, rue des Maraîchers, Genève.

Vl. Oulianoff

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

Printed from the text of the journal
Translated from the French

154
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

25.IX. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am enclosing 600 francs[138] for the International Socialist Bureau.

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* Two illegible lines.—*Ed.*
** Four illegible words.—*Ed.*
*** Three illegible lines.—*Ed.*
**** Three illegible words.—*Ed.*
**** An illegible word.—*Ed.*
****** An illegible line.—*Ed.*
******* Five illegible lines.—*Ed.*

I hope that our Party will soon be able to pay the remainder as well.

Yours,
Vl. Ulyanov

Sent from Geneva to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

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TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Genève, Rue des Maraîchers, 61
26.X. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

The official proceedings of the conference of the International Socialist Bureau held on October 11, 1908, will probably be published. All the socialist papers which carried a report on this meeting of the Bureau (*Le Peuple*[139] in Brussels, *Vorwärts* in Berlin, *Justice* in London, *l'Humanité* in Paris, and so on) did not quite understand, and in some cases even completely distorted, the meaning of my amendment to the Kautsky resolution. Although I submitted the text of my amendment to the Bureau, it does not figure anywhere. I therefore fear that the same inaccuracies may be repeated in the official report. Will you be so kind, dear comrade, as to see to it that the *original text* of my amendment is printed in the official proceedings. This text ought to be among your papers, for I remember very well that I handed in to the Bureau the text I had written. In the event that this text has been lost, I am enclosing an *exact copy of my amendment* and a translation of it into French (hoping that if the translation is poor you will be kind enough to correct it).

I shall be very much obliged, dear comrade, if you will drop me a couple of lines on this question.[140]

Please accept my fraternal greetings.

N. Lenin

Vl. Oulianoff.
Rue des Maraîchers, 61. Genève.

Kautsky's resolution (translation given in the Brussels *Le Peuple*, October 12, 1908):

"In view of the previous decisions of international congresses to admit all organisations which stand for proletarian class struggle and recognise political struggle,

"the International Bureau declares that the British Labour Party shall be admitted to international socialist congresses inasmuch as, while it does not directly recognise proletarian class struggle, it nevertheless wages it in practice, and, by virtue of its very organisation, which is independent of the bourgeois parties, stands for this struggle, and, consequently, shares the viewpoint of international socialism.

Lenin's amendment:

The last paragraph, beginning with the words "inasmuch as, while it does not directly recognise", etc., should be worded as follows:

"inasmuch as this party represents the first step on the part of truly proletarian organisations in Britain towards a conscious class policy and a *socialist* workers' party".

Sent to Brussels

First published April 22, 1960, in the journal *Novoye Vremya* No. 17

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

156

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

November 7, 1908

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Enclosed you will find a *statement* by the Bureau [Abroad]* of the Central Committee of our Party.** We shall

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

** What statement is referred to has not been established.—*Ed.*

be very much obliged to you, dear comrade, if you will circulate this *letter* on behalf of the International Socialist Bureau among all the national parties represented in the Bureau.

Thank you very much for your letter [informing me] that the text of my amendment [will be given accurately].

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

[Vl.] Oulianoff.
[Rue] des Maraîchers. 61. Genève.

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

157
TO V. K. TARATUTA

1.XII. 08

Dear Comrade,

In reply to your query with Comrade Tyszka's telegram enclosed I regret to inform you that I must refuse to *pose the question* as Comrade Tyszka would wish, for I believe that such a *presentation* of the question is absolutely incorrect.

The representative of our group in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad, Comrade Victor, informed Comrade Tyszka that our group *could not* agree to the appointment of both a Bolshevik and a Menshevik as *representatives* of the C.C.[141]

Now Comrade Tyszka is appealing from Comrade Victor to me *personally*: "if Lenin *himself* objects to Igor," the telegram says, "we shall give up Igor"!! This is tantamount to appealing *to me personally against a decision of our group*.

I shall not reply to this "if" of Comrade Tyszka's. In my opinion, Comrade Tyszka should *himself* withdraw his motion to appoint Igor.

With comradely greetings,
N. Lenin

Written in Geneva and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a handwritten copy of the original

158
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

13.XII. 08

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Thanks for your letter. As regards the S.D. deputies to the Third Duma, I have done *everything in my power*. I hope to be able to meet some of the deputies personally and then I shall try to repeat once again what I have already written them several times.[142]

As regards the report and the payment of 300 francs, I shall let you know in a few days. Tomorrow I am leaving for Paris where I intend to settle. It is for this reason that I am unable to answer you at the moment. Within three or four days you will receive my address. If you need to communicate with me urgently, write to M-lle Oulianoff (pour N. Lénine), 27, Boulevard [St.-Marcel]. Paris.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Geneva to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

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1909

159
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

19.I. 09

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I hope you will forgive me for delaying my reply so long. I just haven't had a spare moment. Our entire organisation is at present (at last!) in Paris.

I am enclosing 300 francs. This is the sum the Party owes the International Socialist Bureau for 1908.

As regards the report, yesterday I saw the comrade who has been instructed to draw it up. He promised to do everything in his power to prepare the remainder of the report as soon as possible.

My present address: Mr. Wl. Oulianoff.
24. Rue Beaunier, 24. Paris (XIV)

Please accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

N. Lenin

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

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Translated from the French

160
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

February 25, 1909

Dear Comrade,

The tanners of Vilna have sent Comrade *Marzeli* abroad to collect money for the strikers. Comrade Marzeli saw

Comrade Legien, but Comrade Legien treated him with distrust because Marzeli had no identification papers.

I know Comrade Marzeli, and he asks that the International Bureau inform Comrade Legien that Comrade Marzeli has really been authorised by the tanners of Vilna and that the money collected for the strikers be sent to the address Comrade Marzeli indicated to Comrade Legien.

The tanners' union of Vilna will send Comrade Legien in addition a special authorisation. I am enclosing the stamp of this union.

With best wishes,

Yours,

N. Lenin

24. Rue Beaunier.
Wl. Oulianoff. Paris.

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1960 in the journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

161

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

9.III. 1909

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Many thanks for sending my letter to Comrade Legien. Now that business is finally settled.*

As regards the report, I am happy to inform you that it is not only complete, but that Comrade Roussel (you met her in Brussels at the last session of the International Socialist Bureau which she attended as a delegate from the French section) has already begun to translate it. Please

* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

be so kind as to send me the part you have and I shall then send you the complete report as soon as Comrade Roussel finishes the translation.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Wl. Oulianoff. 24. Rue Beaunier. *Paris*

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

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162

TO THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

To the Moscow Committee

In reference to the M.C.'s reply to the "Open Letter" on the "Party school"[143] signed NN, the Editorial Board of *Proletary* (enlarged) expresses its full solidarity with the view of the M.C. that a local organisation cannot and should not take the responsibility for any such undertaking. Considering the character of the future school and the range of its activities as planned by its sponsors, and its extreme remoteness from the areas of local activity, effective supervision over such a school could be exercised only by the Party centres.

Further, the editors of *Proletary* consider it necessary to amplify one of the statements contained in the "Open Letter" you have received.

Among other things it says that the matter of "supplying the school with literary and practical workers" (teaching personnel) is "well in hand and proceeding successfully"; that "all the prominent Party theoreticians, mainly Bolsheviks, will take part" in the school.

The addition that should be made to these statements is that both the Editorial Board of *Proletary* and the theoreticians and practical workers of our group who are members of the narrow and enlarged Editorial Board and also of the C.C. of the Party, first learned of the said school from the Moscow Committee, while having had no intimation of it up till now from the organisers and the participants in the school. In the given instance, the Editorial Board cannot but regard the course of isolated action chosen by the organisers of this undertaking as inevitably stemming from deep ideological roots. Here it will suffice to call attention to the open criticism by *Proletary* (see No. 42) of "god-building" and other distortions of Marxism associated with it.

In these organisational conditions and in view of the obvious exceptionally close connection of the future school with elements preaching "god-building" or supporting that preachment, the Editorial Board of *Proletary* considers itself in duty bound to declare that it cannot vouch for the character of the school being either Bolshevik or Marxist in general.

For all that the Editorial Board assumes that the legal right of the projected school to exist within the framework of the Party is at the present time indisputable. The group should not involve itself in an enterprise the Bolshevik and Marxist character of which is not ensured; however, the Party as a whole in its present state, when in some of its very important institutions (e.g., in the collegium of advisers to the Duma group) there are even extreme opportunists of the type of Prokopovich or Kuskova, cannot deny it the right to exist. The Editorial Board therefore considers that the Bolsheviks in the C.C., to which the initiators should apply for endorsement of the school project, should vote *in favour of endorsement.*

Written in April, prior to 11th, 1909, in Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a copy in Krupskaya's handwriting

163
TO I. F. DUBROVINSKY

23/IV. 09

Dear Friend,

Pokrovsky is staying with us. A philistine of the first water. "Of course otzovism is stupid, of course it's syndicalism, but for moral considerations I and probably Stepanov too shall be for Maximov." All sorts of wicked people, don't you see, are bullying the crystal-pure scoundrels! These "moral" philistines begin to show how "moral" they are as soon as you start speaking in their presence about the historical task of uniting the *Marxist* elements in the group to save the group and the Social-Democratic Party!

It was the opposition that invited this sorry moraliser—we didn't invite him, knowing that the general meeting was being postponed.*

The news from Lindov and Orlovsky is so far not encouraging: the former is supposed to be ill, the latter can come only to Petersburg. But my letters addressed direct to them have not yet been answered. We shall wait for their reply.

It looks as if Vlasov is now deciding the future: if he goes with the stupids, the philistines and Machists, then, evidently, there will be a split and a *stubborn* struggle. If he goes with us, then perhaps it will be possible to confine things to the *dropping out* of a couple of philistines who are nil in the Party.

That blackguard Nikitich has gone to the *S.R.s* with a lot of gossip and made mischief! Just like those "moral" parasites: to go to another party to complain and lie about one's own. At the "*trial*" the S.R.s, obviously informed by Nikitich, are behaving insolently, they say.[144] We'll hold this against Nikitich, we won't forget it!

I know nothing about the "Yuri-Nikitich" incident.[145] I thought you would be able to tell me about it. In my opinion, you *yourself* right now ought to *write* to Yuri,

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* A reference to a meeting of the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary*.—*Ed*.

respective* *invite* him to come to you, and obtain guarantees from him, or better still have the remainder transferred to a safe place.

Domov+Bogdanov+Marat are now pressing on the B.C. to set the date of the plenary meeting for the end of May or the beginning of June. Actually it can only be held later.

Take your cure seriously, obey the doctors in everything, so as to be a little better by the time of the plenum at least. *Please* give up the idea of running away from the sanatorium: we are terribly short of people, and if you don't recover your health (and have no illusions, that is not easy, it will require curing yourself *seriously*!), we may go under.

Try to start and *keep up* the most regular correspondence with Lyubich: *this is imperative* for we may have to call him out in an emergency. Be sure to arrange *direct* correspondence with him.

Best regards,

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Davos

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

164

LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*

To B.C. Members, Comrades Maximov, Marat and Domov

...with regard to your proposal to convene the B.C. now, we consider it necessary to state the following:

1) A number of previous meetings of the B.C. have shown that of the more or less important questions raised at these meetings there is a whole group that is obviously connected with the questions of a more general nature which the meeting of the enlarged B.C. is now being called to settle. Deciding this group of questions before the general issue of

* Or.—*Ed.*

the course the entire fundamental and practical policy of the B.C. as the leading organ of the Bolshevik group should take, is under these circumstances either impossible or in effect develops into a squabble and heightens its elements. With the attitude to the decisions of the B.C. which we observe on the part of the "opposition", comradely discussion is reduced to a series of sallies by these comrades against individual members of the B.C., to unwarranted repetition of gossip and slander.

2) In view of this, the B.C., noting that some members of the B.C. have embarked on the path of division, has already resolved to allow decisions on urgent *practical* questions to be taken by means of a *questionnaire* circulated among B.C. members before the plenary meeting. We therefore see no need at present to convene a meeting of the members of the B.C. now in Paris, all the more as the question of the date of the enlarged meeting—the immediate purpose of the proposed meeting—can only be settled by obtaining the opinions of *all* members of the B.C., mainly of those now in Russia. Corresponding inquiries have been sent to all of them and we are now awaiting the replies, of which you will be informed by the secretary.

The question of inviting representatives from the regions does not require special discussion, since their presence is obligatory at enlarged meetings of the B.C.

Comrade N.'s statement concerning the date suitable for him would, of course, have been given the most careful consideration even if he had handed it in himself and not through three other members.

With comradely greetings,

Y. Kamenev
N. Lenin
Grigory
Victor

Written in April, not later than 26th, 1909, in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a copy in an unknown handwriting

165
TO I. F. DUBROVINSKY

29.IV. 09

Dear Friend,

I received your letter today. On no account leave the sanatorium. *On no account* move to a hotel. You must improve your health *radically* before the plenary meeting, and this cannot be done except in the sanatorium. We here have found the struggle against this stupid, petty, underhand, disgusting squabble utterly nerve-racking; refused to go to the B.C. meeting (for things are becoming intolerable), thus evoking triple hysterics on the part of Marat and Domov! No matter! But we need you in perfect health by the time the meeting is due, and so take your cure seriously and *by no means leave* the sanatorium.

I suppose everything is settled now with Y. through the trip, though belated.

Things in Russia are bad: the *whole* Urals organisation has been arrested, the whole conference. Shchur has evidently been taken as well: otherwise his silence is inexplicable. Of Vlasov there is no sign.

Have you read Volsky?[146] Let me know your opinion, and if you don't need the book, send it here.

As regards Rosa I know nothing. Hadn't you better write to her direct?

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to Davos

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

166
TO I. F. DUBROVINSKY

4/V. 09

Dear Friend,

I received your letter and I protest vehemently. Granted we made a mistake with regard to Pokrovsky (I am pre-

pared to admit it and to take the blame wholly upon myself, for it was I who persuaded Grigory), but for you to leave because of that would be the height of absurdity. The Pokrovsky affair cannot be helped now. There's no point in calling out Meshkovsky before Vlasov and the regional delegates (Shchur is safe and he vouches that from Moscow no otzovist will get in, Lyadov and Alexinsky...* —he's on Capri at the present time—won't get in either. From Petrograd, they say, there will be an anti-otzovist). *Now* the thing to do is to wait for the B.C. plenary meeting. Otherwise the squabble will grow—and after all we have *stopped* it. There is no doubt that at a meeting with Pokrovsky present Bogdanov would have produced a dozen *new* grievances and involved Pokrovsky in them, now there has been only one. And this was inevitable: don't exaggerate, please! The "resentment" of Nikitich and Lyadov and Pokrovsky, yesterday's neutrals, is not accidental, it is *inevitable*; the thing has been festering, and now the boil is beginning to burst, and it is not always possible to keep one's temper with this stinking squabble going on all around.

But for you to go would be madness. We will endure it here for another month, without making matters worse, you may rest assured. For you to wear out your nerves (and Paris is extremely nerve-racking) *before the meeting* would be the height of absurdity.

I protest a thousand times; you must stay in the sanatorium *until* the plenary meeting. To economise 200-300 francs is foolish. If you stay in the *sanatorium* we shall have at least one man at the plenary meeting with strong nerves, one man not involved in *petty* squabbles (here *you will be dragged in*, even if you were a Solomon). If you leave, you will augment the number of those with frayed nerves, *without benefit* to the cause.

I protest most vigorously: on no account leave, be sure to stay in the sanatorium *right until* the plenary meeting.

No news from Vlasov yet. Must be patient. There was a letter from Lindov: he agrees in principle to come within one or two months. That will be just right. Orlovsky hasn't

* One word illegible.—*Ed.*

replied. In exactly a month from now we shall all be assembled and then we shall see. In the meantime get well *properly* and you, at least, keep calm, for heaven's sake.

Received a letter today, dated April 18, saying that my book is ready.* At last! The delay irritated me more than anything else. By April 25-26, old style, they promise to deliver it here.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to Davos

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

167

TO I. F. DUBROVINSKY

5/V. 09

[Dear Friend,]**

Marat arrived yesterday (wholly with the opposition), and also Vlasov (with us). Vlasov *promised to go* to you in a few days. So, stay where you are and on no account *move*, otherwise you may miss him. Vlasov shares your sentiments: is with us in principle, but chides us for being hasty, for Pokrovsky's victory, etc. So you need not *be afraid*: from now on Vlasov will be in charge, and we shan't commit a single misdemeanour.

Vlasov reproaches us with being unable to get along with people (here he is right). So here too you have nothing to fear. From now on Vlasov will smooth everything out nicely.

Meshkovsky and the regional delegates are coming. So we shall get everything done. [So] do not worry, *see to*

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* *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see present edition, Vol. 14). —*Ed.*

** Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

your health seriously. Under no circumstances must you leave the sanatorium.

If you are not completely recovered in three weeks' time (or thereabouts, for one cannot tell exactly as yet) it will be a disaster for us. Do not stint a few hundred francs—it's absurd. Attend to your health, do a lot of walking, sleeping, eating [this is obligatory], for the [Party] needs healthy property.

The Paris group met today. The Geneva group announced its break with the B.C. and urged the Paris one to follow suit. Marat spoke for Geneva, and Vlasov opposed him. This is good: Geneva *started* the split and Marat incited the group against the B.C. without the B.C.'s knowledge, without raising the question in it.

They start things themselves, and get themselves into a mess.

All [the best]. See to your health, and don't worry!

Yours,
[*Lenin*]

Sent from Paris to Davos

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Printed from the original

168

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Paris, May 26, 1909

Dear Comrade,

The press reports that the tsar is going on a trip and intends to visit Sweden, Italy, Britain and France.*

The Swedish socialists have already found it necessary to take action on this score, and our comrade Branting,

* See Lenin's article "The Tsar Visits Europe and Members of the Black-Hundred Duma Visit England" (present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 461-66).—*Ed.*

on their behalf, has voiced in the Swedish parliament—in the form of an interpellation to the government—a strong protest permeated with the spirit of international socialist solidarity.

We are confident that our comrades in other countries share Branting's view that the tsar's visit cannot be regarded as an ordinary official diplomatic act and will on their part protest as the circumstances demand.

It is important, however, to urge them to act without delay. Clearly, the Russian section cannot do so directly. We also believe that the Executive Committee and the Inter-Parliamentary Commission could take the initiative and issue an appeal to affiliated parties and also to their parliamentary groups pointing to the role played by Tsar Nicholas II in the outrages committed by the regime, of which he is not only a representative, but an active and criminal instigator.

The attention of our comrades in the other sections should be especially drawn to the brutality practised in the Russian political prisons, where tens of thousands of our comrades are paying for their striving for freedom and for having fought for the workers' cause and socialism. These facts were the subject of an interpellation made recently by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and we are sending you a translation of this interpellation[147] and would ask you to take note of it in drawing up your appeal and if necessary to forward it to the sections with the request that they print it in the press.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin
I. Rubanovich

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1960 in the journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin
Translated from the French

169

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

July 20, 1909

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Please forgive me the delay in replying. A number of circumstances prevented me from writing to you earlier.

The translation of the Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party which you sent me is, in my opinion, far from perfect. However, my own knowledge of French is so inadequate that I cannot venture to undertake to correct the translation. Comrade Charles Rappoport (of the journal *Le Socialisme*[148]) has kindly agreed to do this work. He will edit the translation and I hope to be able to send it to you soon.

As regards the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau, I vote for November.

My new address: Mr. Wl. Oulianoff
4. Rue Marie Rose. 4.
Paris (XIV).

Accept, dear comrade, my most friendly greetings.

N. Lenin

Sent to Brussels

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Translated from the French

170

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

29/VII—09

Dear Comrade,

Here is the list of Social-Democratic deputies to the Third Duma:

Priedkalns
Gegechkori
Kuznetsov
Poletayev
Zakharov
Yegorov
Surkov
Chkheidze
Pokrovsky 2 (There are two deputies of this name in the Duma)
Voiloshnikov
Putyatin
Belousov
Voronin
Shurkanov
Astrakhantsev

As for the deputies' addresses, now that the Duma has recessed I can only give this: "Gosoudarstvennaja Douma. Tavricheskij Dvoretz. *St.-Pétersbourg*. To deputy so-and-so."

Accept, dear comrade, my most friendly greetings.

Vl. Ulyanov

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4. Rue Marie Rose. 4.
Paris (XIV).

Sent to Brussels

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Translated from the French

171

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

30/VII.09

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Allow me to recommend to you the bearer of this letter, Comrade Bogdasaryan, a member of our Party. The rela-

tives of this comrade, who has been released from prison, have refused to support him, and he is unable to continue his studies at the University. He knows French well, and I hope it will not be too much to ask you to find him some intellectual work.

Thanking you in advance.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

Written in Paris

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Translated from the French

172

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

August 26, 1909

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

Your letter of August 23 received, and I thank you very much for the copy of the letter from Gertsik, which you forwarded to me.

This gentleman has long pestered me with his letters; he has even wished to speak to me, but, needless to say, I have refused, for there is a ruling by a revolutionary tribunal consisting of representatives of *all parties* according to which Mr. Gertsik cannot be a member of a *revolutionary party*. This ruling has not been rescinded, and Mr. Gertsik is definitely lying when he avoids mentioning the essential point of that ruling in his letter to you.[149]

He wants the ruling revised? There he is perfectly within his rights. But the gentleman cannot but know that there is a lawful and honest way of going about it, and if he avoids taking this way, if he prefers to turn to the I.S.B., this is further proof (it seems to me) of *his dishonesty*.

The lawful and honest way to ask for a re-examination would be to address the request to the central committees

of the parties whose representatives took part in the tribunal in Geneva. Why doesn't Mr. Gertsik appeal to these committees? Why does he cite the private opinion of Mr. Burtsev instead of applying to the *Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party* of which Burtsev is a member? Why does he turn to the I.S.B. with insinuations against the Bolsheviks, claiming that they are acting "dishonestly", instead of appealing to the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party? The Bolsheviks belong to this Party. They have only five members in the Central Committee, which consists of fifteen members.

You can judge for yourself who it is that is acting dishonestly in this matter.

I never was a member of the Bolshevik group in Geneva which investigated the Gertsik affair. If Mr. Gertsik feels that the members of this investigating commission acted unlawfully, etc., it is his right (and his duty) to appeal to the Central Committee of the Party.

In my opinion, the International Socialist Bureau cannot accept complaints and requests that have not been first examined by the central committees of the parties affiliated with the International. I fully realise that Mr. Gertsik, like any other citizen, has the right to complain to the I.S.B. against a *decision* of the central committees of the parties belonging to the International. But if he does not wish to turn to the central committees of member parties of the International, he has no right, in my opinion, to appeal to the I.S.B. either.

I believe that the only answer the I.S.B. can give to Mr. Gertsik is this: apply to the central committees of *all* the parties whose representatives took part in the tribunal, that is, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Bund, *and so on*. If these committees give no answer or turn down the request, only then can you turn to the I.S.B. with a request or complaint against one or another decision, against one or another central committee of a party affiliated with the International. This is my opinion, of which, as a member of the I.S.B., as a Bolshevik, and as a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, I am informing you. (There is a special *bureau* of

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in Paris, and Mr. Gertsik knows very well that he should have applied to this bureau. I myself am not a member of this body.)

I am very sorry, dear Huysmans, that I cannot be in Paris on August 30 and 31, 1909, and therefore will not be able to discuss this matter with you. I hope you will forgive me for tormenting you with the bad French of this letter, which really has stretched out too long.

I am now holidaying out of town (Mr. Wl. Oulianoff. Chez M-me Lecreux. *Bombon*, Seine-et-Marne). I shall return to Paris by September 15.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent to Brussels

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Translated from the French

173

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I received both letters and the article. In my opinion the latter should be shortened. I shall try to make the cuts, though I don't know how successful they will be.

I shall wait for the article on international solidarity of the proletariat (I have a circular letter of the International Socialist Bureau on the subject; I am not sending it, for it is already late). Let Grigory know about it.

What is this that the papers have been saying about Sokolov? It is of great interest to me, for I was going to write about the elections in St. Petersburg. I read in *Rech*[150] that the Social-Democrats are nominating Sokolov. Write in detail what "fables" you have read about, and send the issues over.

I read the reviews in *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Sovremenny Mir*.[151]

About returning to Paris Grigory writes that he will arrive by September 4. I will not be back before September 15. As regards your question whether you should go, I can only say this: if you have had a *proper* rest, it would be good to go, start a *Proletary* club at once, deliver two lectures (popular ones) to workers on Potresov's liquidationism and another about the "Lefts" to Bolsheviks, and then arrange for a lecture tour to groups abroad in late September (roughly). This you must do.

It will be interesting to discuss the Mensheviks and Prokopovich and Kuskova when we meet. It is necessary to hit as hard as possible at Potresov's liquidationism both in articles and lectures. We are a bit late with this.

All the best.

P.S. People write from Russia that things are not so good there. Davydov has been arrested. It will be necessary to push on here with agitation abroad.

Written August 27, 1909
Sent from Bombon to Arcachon
(France)

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

174

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Dear Gr.,

I am sending you *Vorwärts*[152] and Kamenev's article. I believe it *must* be printed and *without delay*, for we are terribly late as it is with this article which is in all respects absolutely necessary for *Proletary*. It will have to be divided into two feuilletons. The first (pp. 1-33) I have marked off and edited. Perhaps you will be able to shorten it a little more? I will try to cut it some more in the proofs; send it immediately to the printers and have them send

me the proofs *at once*. The article is an important one and we should go over it as carefully as possible.

It is a pity that Kamenev works carelessly. The subject is a most rewarding one, but he rambles on and on, beating about the bush, unable to get to the heart of the matter properly.

Perhaps we should send the second half back to him for rewriting from this angle? I think it would be a good thing. Write him on behalf of us both and ask him to *write* the second part *over again* **(saving the first variant as well)**, to revise it along the lines indicated—tell him that this would make it an excellent article, etc.—and send him the second part. I have no great hopes that he will redo it, but we must keep insisting.

He also promised an editorial for *Proletary* shortly. We shall see.

I shall write the articles for *Proletary* and send them straight to the printers* since you want to be in Paris on September 4.

I do not intend to return before September 15.

There is no point in your keeping Kamenev in Arcachon. If he has had a rest, let him return, and *under all circumstances he must be sent out to lecture.*

All the best,

N. Lenin

I shall not undertake to write about the Bund people. But it is *necessary* to hit at their No. 2. You should do it. We'll put out a big, fighting issue. Write an article against No. 2.[153]

Written August 27, 1909
Sent from Bombon to Arcachon

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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* A reference to Lenin's articles for *Proletary* No. 47-48 entitled: "The Liquidators Exposed", "On the Open Letter of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Regional Committee", "The Election in St. Petersburg", and an article in the supplement to the issue, "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 15-61).—*Ed.*

175
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

11.9. 09

Dear Huysmans,

I am very much surprised that Comrade Charles Rappoport, who promised me that he would translate the Programme and Rules of our Party, has not written to you. He promised to do so several weeks ago.

I shall be in Paris in two or three days and shall ask him about it at once and let you know.

As regards the affair concerning Mr. Gertsik, it is a very good thing that you have retracted the more than unfair accusation against our Party.

You ask for the address of the comrade "to whom Gertsik should apply". I repeat: he must apply to the *committees* of the parties whose representatives participated in the hearing of the Gertsik case. The address of the Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is the following: Mr. D. Kotlyarenko (for the Bureau, etc.), 110. Rue d'Orleans 110. Paris. XIV. This address is regularly given in our papers. I also wish to say again that I shall never reply to Gertsik since the scoundrel allows himself to level extremely insulting insinuations at the Russian Social-Democrats. It is as simple as this. If he has the temerity to say that the Russian Social-Democrats are "biased" judges, why does he not apply to the committees of the other parties that passed judgement on him?

Yours,
N. Lenin

Wl. Oulianoff
4. Rue Marie Rose. 4
Paris. XIV.

Sent from Bombon
to Brussels

First published in 1962 in
French in *Cahiers du Monde
Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian)
Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photo-
copy of the original
Translated from the
French

176

TO A. I. LYUBIMOV

Dear Mark,

Being busy with an article yesterday I overlooked by mistake in Grigory's draft (reply to the Capri group on behalf of the E.C.*) the point about *inviting a representative*. This nonsense must absolutely be deleted; it is *students* that should be invited to Paris to study, not a representative. Some rabid otzovist, and even Lyadov or Alexinsky, might be elected representative, in which case we would find ourselves the dupes. No, there can be no question of inviting a *representative*.[154]

I still haven't got Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*. I earnestly ask you to arrange for the forwarding office to send it to me at once. Without it I cannot do an article I have been asked to write.**

All the best,

N. Lenin

We sent you a cheque yesterday by registered mail. I trust you have received it.

Written in the first half of September 1909
Sent from Bombon to Paris

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

177

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

In view of the circulation among Social-Democratic groups abroad of a printed leaflet signed "Sasha" (the leaflet is enclosed) containing charges against the Editorial Board

* Executive Commission of the Bolshevik Centre.—*Ed.*

** See "The Liquidators Exposed" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 15-22).—*Ed.*

of *Proletary*,[155] and, further, in view of the fact that some of the opponents of *Proletary* from among both the Bolsheviks "removed" after the recent conference and the Mensheviks are using this leaflet to involve the groups in a discussion of a "sensational affair" which in no way comes within the competence of any local Party groups or is subject to examination by them, the Editorial Board of *Proletary* requests the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to investigate the charges made by "Sasha", to examine the substance of these charges and to hand down an official decision of the Party's highest body.

Written September 17, 1909, in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

178

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

17.9. 09

My dear Huysmans,

I received your letter of September 15, 1909, on my arrival in Paris. I have seen the secretary of the Bureau of our Committee. He informed me that he had recently received a letter from Gertsik and the Bund committee showing that Gertsik had at last applied to the committees of the other parties, which he should have done earlier. The Bund is for reviewing the case. The Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party will examine the request for a revision. This, I hope, closes the "Gertsik incident".

As regards Rappoport, he asks you to let him know the *exact date* when you absolutely must have the translation of the Programme and Rules. Kindly write what the *final* date is either to me or to Rappoport, 39 Boulevard Port Royal, 39. Paris. XIII.

Comrade Rappoport says that his position as a literary proletarian compels him to ask to be paid for the translation, at your discretion. He definitely promised me that

he would have the translation ready by the date you set.

As for the historical survey, I have found a Russian comrade who will do it in a few days.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

179
TO M. P. TOMSKY

Dear Comrade,

Just got back to our capital here and read your letter on how things are coming along. As regards the school, you are mistaken if you think "we are in a bad way". Nothing of the kind. That workers, once they are given the money, should agree to go down to the glorious South is natural—there is nothing to complain about in this. Only it is necessary to have resolutions adopted that on the way *back* these workers are to come here* for a month—this is the crux of the matter. Unless they drop in here all talk about "supervision", "direction", etc., is sheer "blague"** or hypocrisy. To come here means to learn something more than Alexinsky's whining and Lunacharsky's "socialism". And believe me, this *way****—by bamboozling 20-50 workers with *their* learning—they will not get very far. Oh no, it's good enough for making a noise, for bragging about

* That is, to Paris, where the Bolshevik Centre was located.—*Ed.*

** Humbug.—*Ed.*

*** A reference to the factional, splitting activities of the organisers of the Capri school.—*Ed.*

Kautsky's letter,[156] for putting on a show abroad, but there is nothing serious about this underhand indoctrination. Make no mistake, this is not a "school", but a new Yerogin hostel[157] abroad for surreptitiously filling the heads of dozens of workers with otzovist nonsense. Maximov and Co. will merely make a noise for a while and end up with a fiasco.

The Trotsky business, regrettably, will not work out. We offered him ideal conditions, *sincerely* wishing to enter into a bloc with him: a salary, payment of the *Pravda* deficit, equal rights on the Editorial Board, transfer here; he does not agree, but wants a *majority* on the Editorial Board (two Trotskyites and one Bolshevik!). Clearly we cannot maintain in another city a Trotskyite, not a Party, paper. What Trotsky wants is not to build the Party together with the Bolsheviks, but to create *his own* faction. Very well, let him try! By means of "his" faction he will win over some people from the Mensheviks, a few from us, and in the long run will inevitably lead the workers to Bolshevism.

As for the "slight revision of the agrarian question", as you ironically put it, in the given case, if it is a matter of the role of the peasantry in the revolution, it is necessary to be more cautious. The *beginning* should be made with a discussion in the general Party or general Bolshevik press. I especially wish to warn against hasty rejection of Bolshevism and exaggerated faith in the success of the Stolypin agrarian policy. It unquestionably posed new problems which must be *studied and studied again*; it *opened* the possibility of a non-revolutionary way out, but this is still as remote from complete success as the stars in the heavens.

Lenin

Written in September, prior to 20th, 1909
Sent from Paris to Moscow

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a
handwritten
copy found in police
records

180

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

30/9. 09

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am sending you today the translation of the Programme and Rules of our Party (by registered book-post). Be so kind as to send me the proof-sheets.

As for the survey, I shall send it to you in a few days.

I have made arrangements for payment to the translator (Rappoport). The expense will be defrayed by our Central Committee.

This is the first time I hear that there is a representative of the parliamentary group in the Bureau. There has been one meeting of the Bureau since Stuttgart and I heard no mention there of any representative of the parliamentary group being in the Bureau. On receipt of your letter I at once wrote to a representative of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma and informed him of this. We cannot expect an answer soon since the deputies are not in St. Petersburg between Duma sessions.

As regards our Party's report to the Copenhagen Congress, I shall do everything I can to see that we are not left without one this time. I have already taken the necessary steps. As for the David plan, I think it is no more than a matter of "good intentions".* Has the *Bureau* approved the plan? Does the "single model" exist as a reality and not as a project?

Yours,

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original Translated from the French

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* What the plan of Eduard David was has not been ascertained.—*Ed.*

181
TO A. I. LYUBIMOV

Dear Mark,

There is indeed beginning to be quite a to-do over the school and you are right when you say that we must give thorough thought to the reply.* I am offering a draft and in the event that it takes time to contact all members of the E.C. (Executive Commission of the Bolshevik Centre)—this I believe should be done through one person, i.e., through you—I would advise the secretary of the B.C. to reply to the "School Council" that the letter has been received and *forwarded* to the members of the Executive Commission and it will take some time before they can answer and take a decision, since they are all away. The reply, however, should be rather caustic: to the effect that I am aware that Gr., Inok and Lenin have already replied on their own behalf to the *Executive Commission* of the school, but that the *School Council* will have to be answered by the entire collegium.

I have a request to make of you. Send me a *letter to the Editorial Board* of *Proletary* signed Mark or any other pseudonym of yours. Contents *approximately* as follows: "In view of Comrade Domov's statement in the press accusing the Editorial Board of *Proletary* of splitting activities, of not putting out popular pamphlets, of betraying Bolshevism, of drawing closer to Plekhanov, of 'Dumaism', and so on and so forth, I deem it advisable to acquaint Party comrades with Comrade Domov's *present* views. In the presence of Comrades Maximov and Lyadov and myself he said: 'There are now two pernicious misconceptions: first—that we have a party, and second, that a revolution is imminent in Russia.' I made this public in a lecture to Paris Bolsheviks in the presence of Comrade Maximov, who could not deny the fact. The comrades should know who it is that is now campaigning against *Proletary*."[158]

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* See next document.—*Ed.*

It is indeed high time to expose this crew! We'll print your letter and answer them *properly*.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written in October, not earlier than 2nd, 1909, in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

182

DRAFT REPLY TO A LETTER FROM THE COUNCIL OF THE CAPRI SCHOOL

I suggest the following answer:

"Dear Comrades,

"In view of the obviously insulting nature of your letter of September 28, 1909, in reply to our proposal 'to entrust the *actual organisation* and guidance of a propagandists' school abroad to the Central Committee of the Party or the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary*', we do not consider it necessary to reply to it and can only suggest one thing: publish your letter."[159]

Written in October, not earlier than 2nd, 1909, in Paris

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

183

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear K.,

Please let us know what you have decided to do with the library.[160] Is it true that the talks with the students' society are not yet over?

Or is it true that you have finally decided *not* to go?

Was it Victor who dissuaded you? I am a little angry with him for going away alone, depriving us here of the assistance of a most useful administrator, which I consider him to be. He is now "for Geneva". I believe this is a mistake: we shall not go to Geneva.

Do you have a catalogue of the *Bolshevik* (Bonch) library?[161] If so, kindly send it to us.

I am awaiting more definite news about your moving. There is talk here in the Editorial Board about transferring only the Bonch library. We must know *definitely*, and as soon as possible.

Regards to Olga, Nik. Iv. and other friends.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written in the first half of October 1909
Sent from Paris to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

184

TO THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE BOLSHEVIK CENTRE

In order to conduct our business affairs *systematically* and to be able just as systematically to cut down expenses, it is necessary

1) to draw up monthly accounts under *comparable* headings *separating* the most essential items least subject to change from the more incidental and more easily reducible items (publishing the paper from aid; premises of the forwarding office and print-shop expenses from the cost of paper, typesetters' wages, etc.);

2) to try to draw up a *rational* summary account for a considerable period of time (e.g., half a year) indicating average expenditure on each item. (Allowances to Party workers separately; aid separately; incidental and travelling expenses should not be lumped together; expenditure on the newspaper itemised: typesetters—paper—premises—forwarder's wa-

	1909. Months (O. S.)				Σ	Monthly average (roughly) 1/4Σ
	VI	VII	VIII	IX		
a Allowances to Party workers	2,560	1,055	1,930	1,505	7,050	1,762
b Aid to comrades	$359._{2}$	$553._{70}$	$208._{35}$	$653._{35}$	$1,774._{60}$	444
c National organisations . . .	400	475	600	600	2,075	519
d Transport . .	730	$1,064._{65}$	1,615	1,760	$5,169._{65}$	1,292
e Inheritance . .	300	265	$\boxed{21,000}$	1,135	22,740	5,675
a Mailing . . .	1,501	2,705	800	$1,080._{90}$	$6,086._{90}$	1,522
a Honorarium .	$454._{5}$	$66._{50}$	$77._{30}$	$103._{50}$	$701._{80}$	175
a Incidental . .	207	$169._{75}$	$185._{10}$	380	$941._{85}$	235
a Secretary and postage . . .	$26._{7}$	$47._{70}$	$118._{15}$	$136._{20}$	$328._{75}$	82
f Illegal publications (minutes)	1,725	1,545	—	—	3,270	817
g Conference . .	2,258	—	—	—	2,258	566
h To Russia . .	$5,947._{55}$	$4,648._{75}$	$933._{40}$	$6,562._{70}$	$18,092._{40}$	4,523
e Payments on old debts . .	—	$4,012._{40}$	—	300	$4,312._{40}$	1,078
i Miscellaneous	—	—	1,000	—	1,000	250
Total	$16,468._{95}$	$16,608._{45}$	$28,467._{30}$	$14,216._{65}$	$75,761._{35}$	18,940

$$\begin{array}{r|l} -\begin{array}{r}240\\216\end{array} & 36 \\ \hline 24 & 6.66\ldots. \end{array}$$

ges—printing shop, etc.) After that it is necessary to consider carefully cuts on each item, not approximately, not by rule of thumb, but on the basis of exact estimates (reduce such-and-such an item by so-and-so much; buy cheaper paper or rent cheaper premises, etc., etc.; reduce expenses on "messengers" and travel, etc.).

	Approximately: possible reductions				
	minimum	*maximum*		? *minimum*	
	in thousands				
a) Expenses for organisations abroad and for paper . .	3,776	$2._6$	$-3._0$	$2._5$	
b) Aid to comrades	444	$0._3$	$0._5$	$0._2$	
c) National organisations . .	519	$0._2$	$-0._3$	$0._1$	(Latvians only)
d) Transport	1.292	$0._6$	$-0._8$	$0._5$	
e) Expenses on obtaining Σ and debts	6,753	—	—	—	
f) Illegal Party publications .	817	$0._3$	$-0._5$	—	
g) Conferences	566	$0._6$	$-0._6$	$0._5$	
h) To Russia	4,523	$2._5$	$-3._5$	$2._5$	(C.C. only, excluding local)
i) Miscellaneous	250	$0._1$	$-0._2$	—	
	18,940	$7._1$	$-9._4$	$6._3$	

18,940
—6,753
12,187

Written in 1909, not earlier than October, in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

185

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN

Dear Comrade,

Please print in the next issue of the C.O. my resolution rejected by two votes against two with one abstention and my notice of resignation from the Editorial Board of the

C.O.,[162] and also send me copies of my resolution, Martov's and the one adopted, with the results of the voting.

With S.D. greetings,
N. Lenin

Paris, November 4, 1909

P.S. I would also ask the Editorial Board of the C.O. to let me know whether it will accept for publication in the next issue my discussion article on the methods of consolidating our Party and its unity.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

186

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The undersigned members of the Central Committee, Bolsheviks, consider it necessary to state that, in their opinion, a plenary meeting of the C.C. should be convened at the earliest date.

Casting our vote for the earliest possible holding of the plenary meeting, we for our part will do our best to ensure that the meeting takes place in the nearest future.

We ask the C.C. Bureau Abroad to bring this statement to the attention of all the members of the C.C. in Russia and abroad.

November 14 (new style), 1909,
Paris.

Members of the C.C.: *Innokentiev*
Grigory
Lenin
V. Sergeyev

First published in 1926 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 11

Printed from the original in G. Y. Zinoviev's handwriting and signed by Lenin

187

REQUEST TO STATISTICIANS OF ZEMSTVO, CITY AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

V. Ilyin, who is working on the continuation of his study on the agrarian question in general and agricultural capitalism in Russia in particular, earnestly requests the statisticians of Zemstvo, city and government institutions to send him statistical data, etc.

Paris. 9/XII *V. Ulyanov*

Written December 9, 1909
Sent to Moscow

First published in 1929
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 11

Printed from the text in
an unknown handwriting

1910

188
TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ADDRESSEE

22/I. 1910

Dear Sir,

I am very well aware of the scientific character of the dictionary and would gladly give you all the information you wish concerning the history of Social-Democracy in Russia. But at the moment, unfortunately, I could not possibly write a brief essay on the history of Social-Democracy.[163]

There is some good information up to 1904 in the report to the Amsterdam International Congress of 1904—Lidin, [M.] *Explanatory Material Bearing on the Crisis in Russian Social-Democracy* (Geneva) [1904] and several articles by different authors in *Neue Zeit*.

In August 1910 an international congress will be held in Copenhagen. Presumably the official report of our Party (Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia) will appear within a few months.

There have been two major trends in the S.D. movement in 1903-09—"Mensheviks" and "Bolsheviks". In *Neue Zeit* you will find articles by representatives of both trends.

Bibliography: Cherevanin (Menshevik), reviews in *Vorwärts* and *Leipziger Volkszeitung*.[164] Trotsky, middle position (Vermittlerstellung) (*Russland in Revolution*, 1910).

I myself belong to the "Bolshevik" trend.

[There are] articles by Trotsky in German also in *Kampf* (Austrian S.D. review).[165]

Please excuse me for not being able to give you a systematic essay.

Respectfully yours,
Vl. Ulyanov
*Lenin**

4. Rue Marie Rose. 4. Paris. XIV.

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

189

MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO AUGUST BEBEL

To Comrade August Bebel

On behalf of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, on behalf of all the workers of Russia who are waging a bitter struggle against oppression by tsarism and the bourgeoisie joined in counter-revolution, we send you, vanguard fighter of international and leader of German Social-Democracy, hearty greetings on the occasion of your 70th birthday.

You began your activity in the working-class movement almost half a century ago as a young turner, first a patriot, then a democrat who worked devotedly in workers' educational societies—and the path you have traversed reflects the stride forward which the entire international proletariat has made in that period. At the beginning of that period most class-conscious workers either followed the bourgeois parties or at best sought their own class road to socialism by switching from one socialist or anarchist sect to another. Now the vast majority of class-conscious workers in the civilised world are Social-Democrats, and it is precisely in Germany that the theoretical principles of Marxism have taken deepest root and spread most widely among the masses of the proletariat, illumining with radiant light their struggle for the complete overthrow of capitalism.

* The word "Lenin" was added later in pencil.—*Ed.*

In your person we honour a working-class leader who has shown by his example that the emancipation of the workers must be accomplished by the workers themselves. Drawing on the theory of Marxism, the German class-conscious workers, more than the workers of other countries, have been able to safeguard their movement against the mistakes of opportunism and anarchism, they have succeeded in building up powerful mass trade union and political organisations and uniting in a single class force. And at all crucial moments in history—when waves of national chauvinism rose high, or when rampant feudal-monarchist and clerical reaction declared a war of annihilation on socialist organisations—this class force was able to find the right road, to uphold its revolutionary world outlook, its confidence in the inevitability of the coming great socialist revolution, and carry it ever more broadly and deeply into the masses.

In the half-century of your activity the workers of Russia see a guarantee that in the coming decisive battle, the dawn of which is clearly visible in Germany and other advanced countries, the Social-Democratic proletariat will not only fight with the same selfless energy and faith in its strength with which it won many a victory in the epoch of bourgeois revolutions, but will be able also to win and to smash for ever the entire edifice of capitalist exploitation.

Members of the Editorial Board
of the Central Organ
of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party
L. Martov
N. Lenin
*Y. Kamenev**

Written February 22, 1910
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the text
in an unknown
handwriting and signed
by Lenin

* The message was signed also by members of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. —*Ed*.

190
TO A. EKK

23/II. 10

Dear Comrade,

I have read your letter. I recall our joint work in London. I recall that at that time (or a little later) I heard with one ear about the commission on your case.[166]

That such an affair should drag out for nearly three years is in my opinion really outrageous, and I quite appreciate your indignation. What is to be done? As far as I can judge, it is necessary to apply officially to the *C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.* and specifically to its organ abroad, the Bureau Abroad of the C.C. (address the same; inside—for the *Bureau Abroad* of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.). I think the best thing would be for me to forward your letter to them. If you agree, I can do it.

If you would like first to try to push the matter through members of the Chief Executive, you had best apply to Yuzef (for you do not suspect *him* of any partiality). And that should be done *at once*. Send him a letter (by registered post) addressed **both** to the Chief Executive and to the Polish Social-Democrat member of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ (also care of Kotlyarenko; inside: for member of the Editorial Board of the C.O. from the *P.S.D.*). If this is done *quickly*, I believe you ought to be able to get an answer and advice from Yuzef.

The permanent organ abroad of the C.C., i.e., the C.C. Bureau Abroad, can (and should) put an end to the affair. The Russian C.C. would in my view be physically unable to do so. How the Polish Chief Executive could have dragged it out so long and disobeyed its own Congress is more than I can understand!

With S.D. greetings,

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to London

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

191

TO L. B. KAMENEV

21.III. 10

Dear L. B.,

The article about Koltsov received, read and passed on...*; I liked it very much, I think it turned out quite well[167]..., no doubt it will cause a grand row? but there is a *constant* row there as it is!! The composition of the C.O. has deteriorated[168]—a year before the plenum *not a single* row. Now *not a single issue* [without] some document of protest, threats and hysterics from Martov....

[How do matters stand] with the report?

Don't give me away, for the love of Christ!

I am again being "harried"—that is to say, reminded—by the International Bureau. Write, write that [report] as quickly as possible [for the sake] of all that's holy.... As soon as the report is ready we shall [tackle] a legal Bolshevik [journal].[169]

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Rather scurvy behaviour of Trotsky's in No. 10 of *Pravda*,[170] I must say!

Sent from Paris to Vienna

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original

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TO THE BUREAU ABROAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrades,

Our inquiry as to *how* you understand your competence in matters concerning conflicts in the Central Organ has

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as suggested by the context and the remaining legible letters.—*Ed.*

not yet been answered. Nevertheless we consider it necessary to offer you some explanation with regard to a number of conflicts that have occurred in the new Editorial Board of the C.O. since the plenum—as we propose to do in the near future for the information of the *whole* Party and *all* Social-Democrats.

We shall begin with the last statement of Comrades Dan and Martov of March 29.

1. It is not true that we decided to publish the article from Tiflis "containing violent attacks on the Caucasian Regional Committee", for it had been decided to omit that section of the article and leave only the polemics on points of principle with the Georgian newspaper which the author, a local functionary, charges with liquidationism. The authors of the statement, moreover, conceal from you the fact that the manuscript of this polemical article was sent to the author of the Georgian article in order to give him an opportunity to reply in the same issue of the C.O. (Later on, at the last meeting of the Editorial Board, we decided to turn over the whole polemic together with the reply to *Diskussionny Listok*.*)

2. The authors of the statement conceal from you why we rejected Comrade Dan's article on the tasks of the Party with regard to the persecution of the trade unions. We rejected it because the "tasks of the Party in this article are reduced to exchanging the struggle to overthrow the autocracy for the petty cash of Cadet 'struggle for legality'".

3. Comrades Dan and Martov consider it "unnatural" for us to have conferred separately on how to rebuff the base attacks on the C.O. and on the unity of the Party, while considering it "perfectly natural" that they themselves, two editors of the C.O., should have met with other editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in order to *launch* a foul attack on the C.O.[171] A conference of like-minded people within a collegium and joint discussion of an article

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* A reference to an article by J. V. Stalin, "Letter from the Caucasus".—*Ed.*

before laying it on the editorial desk for final judgement (moreover, in a case such as the given one), they consider to be a violation of the law. But to be a member of the Editorial Board of the C.O., entrusted by the C.C., among other things, with the task of "explaining the danger of deviations" towards *liquidationism* and otzovism, and at the same time a member of the Editorial Board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which shields, encourages and defends liquidationism and with regard to which the C.C. has spoken of the need to terminate its existence—this they do *not* consider incompatible with political integrity. This habit of stabbing the Central Organ and Party unity in the back while at the same time demanding "collegiality" in drafting a reply to the back-stabbing they themselves have dealt, a habit characteristic of underground manipulators, we leave to the authors of the statement. To discuss with them their own attacks against the Central Organ would have been an undignified farce on our part. The only thing we could do was to lay the article on the editorial desk in order to give them a chance to acquaint themselves with its contents and to hear their objections. That is what was done.

4. The authors of the statement write that we "directly deceived" them, for "no mention was made of any intention to publish—and with shocking distortion of the truth to boot—part of the correspondence between members of the C.C. and the C.C. Bureau Abroad". Not only did we not mention this to them, we made no mention of the contents of the article in general, *for the simple reason that we gave the article to them*. Comrade Dan actually looked through the manuscript. This is indeed deception on the part of Dan and Martov, who expected that you would not notice that a few lines earlier they write that *we gave them the article to read in the manuscript*, in other words, had no intention to conceal anything from them. In order to show what our "shocking distortion of the truth" consists in, we are printing in No. 12 of the Central Organ *all* relevant excerpts from the C.C. letter. The reader will be able to judge for himself.

5. The authors of the statement write about the "secrecy aspect of the matter". But they forget to tell you that we

did *not* disclose in the press the place occupied in the Party organisation by the three liquidators, that Dan and Martov themselves published not only their names but also those of other liquidators in Nos. 19-20 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. As for us, we can only reply to this in the words of Plekhanov that the only thing that "threatens" liquidators of the Party is "an order of merit round the neck".

6. The authors of the statement write that Bolsheviks too refuse to go into the C.C.* But they deliberately forget to tell you that it is not a matter of who wants or does not want to enter the C.C. but of who considers the C.C. and the Party unnecessary and harmful.

7. The authors of the statement complain that their articles have been rejected. But all these complaints have only one object: artificially to create the grounds for the existence of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. For this reason the authors of the statement are *boycotting* "*Diskussionny Listok*", in which their articles could be freely printed. They are deliberately wrecking this Party publication, too, whose purpose it is to obviate the need for factional organs, to enable all trends in the Party freely to express themselves whenever their views differ from those of the Central Organ. For example, we suggested that Comrade Martov's article "On the Right Path" be printed either in the Central Organ *with* an editorial *comment* (since the article challenges C.C. decisions) or in *Diskussionny Listok*. The first of these alternatives was called giving the article a "*gendarme*" escort, and the second, "exiling" it. And we were literally told: "now we shall open hostilities against you."

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* Here the authors of the statement indignantly say that the "readers of the article are likewise not told that the *Polish Social-Democrats to this day have not been able to find anybody who would agree to represent them in the C.C.*" More, they have the temerity to underline these words. This is just as *foul a lie* as the other allegations in the statement. Just as the Polish Social-Democrats had their representative in the C.C. before the plenary meeting, so they have one now, after it, who is waiting for word when to attend the C.C. meeting. Already a week ago the Polish C.C. member received a letter from his colleague in Moscow to the effect that he still has to wait, for the C.C. cannot be convened as yet.

8. The authors of the statement complain that we printed an article about the conference which they allege "completely distorts the decisions of the plenary meeting on this question". What lies behind this complaint is this: the article in question *wholly agrees with the C.C. letter* on the conference,[172] and the anti-liquidationist letter of the C.C. about the conference is not to the taste of the extreme liquidator Dan. The article was written by the comrade who wrote the C.C. letter. And Comrade Martov *signed* the C.C. letter. *It was adopted unanimously*. When he sent the proofs to the author of the letter, Comrade Martov wrote: "*I have no objections* to your text of the letter about the conference." But now, before the liquidationist cock has had time to crow thrice, L. Martov hastens (together with Dan) to disavow the letter *he himself accepted*. The statement of ... written by Dan and signed also by Martov naïvely reveals the real cause of the dissatisfaction of the *Golos* people with the C.C. letter on the conference and with our article on the same subject: the plenary meeting, it appears, allegedly decided to "reconcile" the Party with the "so-called liquidationism" and to "fill in the gulf" between the liquidators and the Party. But the Central Organ is not carrying out this task. We confess that we are doing the exact opposite. What is surprising is only this: why did the authors of the statement complaining about the rejection of articles *themselves reject* in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* an article signed among others by Comrade Martov, namely, the "Letter of the C.C." concerning the conference? Why did they not reprint it *either in full or at least in part*? Probably because the C.C. letter "completely distorts the decisions" of the Central Committee.

9. The authors of the statement have the audacity to turn to you, the *Central Committee* Bureau Abroad, with a demand for "satisfaction" for the unpleasantness caused them by the exposure of the three practical liquidators. They evidently believe that you might agree not to bring into the light of day the monstrous outrage against our Party committed by their associates Mikhail, Roman and Yuri. They evidently ascribe to you the intention of *concealing from the Party* the conspiracy against the Party

which we exposed and *which a member of the C.C. in his letter from Russia asked you to make public*. We of course leave it to you to give all appropriate reply to such an insult to your Party conscience. We on our part believe that no Party body will venture to side with the Romans, Yuris, Mikhails and their accomplices to any extent or in any way, not even indirectly. Such individuals and bodies should be pilloried *without delay* and *openly* in the name of the entire Party. We in the Central Organ of our Party, where we have been placed by the will of the plenum, shall *unswervingly pursue this line*. The same fate will befall anyone who throws in his lot with those who would destroy the Party—*whoever he may be*.

10. The authors end their statement by threatening you that if you do not do as they wish they will set about exposing cases that were closed by the plenary meeting of the C.C. And this they promise to do despite the C.C. decision. But this threat is no longer an instance of the usual fraktioneller Dreck,* as the representative of Latvian Social-Democracy put it at the plenary meeting of the C.C. referring to the way the *Golos* people had seized on these issues for the sake of factional muck; it is downright factional *blackmail* with regard to the C.C. Bureau Abroad. And, of course, we leave it to you, comrades, to deal worthily with these *blackmailers* operating with *factional muck*.

But we refuse to go into all the falsifications, distortions of facts and downright lies amassed against US in the statements, complaints and protests of Martov and Dan. You yourselves, comrades, will unquestionably be able to get to the bottom of all this factional muck, although we do not doubt that it will evoke in you the same natural feeling of revulsion it has aroused in us. Nevertheless we would like in conclusion to draw your attention to two things.

First. We should like to remind you that the present attempt of the *Golos* people to disrupt the C.C. is *not the first*. As far back as the summer of 1908, when the Bolshevik members of the C.C. were arrested, the *Golos* people made

* Factional muck.—*Ed*.

a valiant attempt of this kind which was exposed at the plenary meeting of the C.C. (in August 1908). At that time the *Golos* people proposed to the Bund comrades to join in a conspiracy to disrupt the C.C. But a member of the C.C. of the Bund (Comrade E.) informed of this a Bolshevik member of the C.C. (Comrade G.) who had just been released from prison, and the conspiracy failed. We still have on file the letter from the member of the Bund C.C. in which he writes that the *Golos* leaders deny the C.C. its very "Existenzrecht" (right to exist) and propose replacing it with some sort of information bureau.[173] The fact that the proposal to betray the Party was made by the *Golos* people in the C.C. to the Bund C.C. was confirmed also by other comrades from the Bund at the December (1908) conference (see the minutes of the conference). Add to this the recent exposures by the Menshevik comrades Alexei Moskovsky and G. V. Plekhanov, and also the fact that *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* has not once come out against the liquidators, but, on the contrary, constantly defends them, demanding that they now be recognised on a par with the Party, and even takes up the cudgels for Roman, Mikhail and Yuri, and you will have a pretty clear picture of the prolonged, indefatigable, stubborn and most insidious attempts of all kinds by which the liquidators are seeking to achieve their purpose—to wreck the Party. At the same time the danger of the liquidationist trend and the need to fight it most vigorously will become obvious even to the blind. In view of this we believe that now is the time to publish also the letter of the Bund C.C. member Comrade E. and in general *all the facts* relative to the attempts to liquidate the Party.

Second. If the two *Golos* men—our colleagues on the Central Organ—write you that "a minimum of respect for the Party should have obliged" us "to relinquish our responsible Party positions", we believe that common political decency and a minimum of self-respect should have induced them to abandon the false position they adopt in the Party and in the Central Organ by coming out simultaneously in defence of the liquidators. Incidentally, as distinct from them, we are not at all inclined to ascribe

evil intentions to them as individuals. The lies, the blackmail threats and all their other virtues spring not from their ill will, but from their false position which compels them to breed falsehood at every step. Es ist der Fluch der bösen Tat, *dass sie immer Böses muss gebähren*.* And the curse of their misdeed consists precisely in that they simultaneously occupy seats in the Party organ and in the organ which is out to liquidate the Party, with the result that they assume the contradictory mission of standing both for the Party and against it. For this reason they do not even have the "courage" of the Romans, the Yuris and the Mikhails. This position of theirs is compatible neither with common political decency nor with a minimum of self-respect. This is what creates that false position, that, so to speak, *peculiar brand of Azefism*[174] for liquidationist purposes, which impels them, with the best of intentions, toward the most unworthy actions.

Members of the Editorial Board
of the Central Organ *A. Var*
G. Zinoviev
N. Lenin

April 5, 1910

P.S. For the time being, we are sending a copy of this statement at once only to the Russian collegium of the C.C., the "national" C.C.s and our Party press.

Written in Paris and mailed
to a local address

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
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* The worst thing about evil is *that it inevitably breeds evil* (Schiller, *Wallenstein*. "Die Piccolomini", Act V, Scene 1).—*Ed*.

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TO L. B. KAMENEV

6.IV. 10

Dear K.,

I received your letter (*at last!* I was about to *kick up a row*). It is too late to send an express message or a wire.

We are in too "great haste", you write. I don't know....* How could Dan and Co. have been allowed to get away with it? And what else ... wait for. But it is a great pity you were not in "greater haste" to write us at once about the "formal doubts" entertained by the *Pravda* liquidators. The proofs were sent to you ten days ago: if you had made haste to reply *at once* that you are not clear on this or that point, you would have had complete copies of the letters from Russia already a *week* ago. Now the C.O., which came out late last night, gives more quotations from the letters.[175]

Is your withdrawal from *Pravda* essential for us?[176] You seem almost ready to say yes—again being "in haste" to write after the very *first* conflict with Trotsky.

I personally do not think that your withdrawal from *Pravda* is essential [to us], *so long* as *Pravda* [is] run so colourlessly. After reading ... [your] item in No. 11, I thought ([and] Grigory also said): this is toothless, colourless, [inconsequential], verbose....

What is the purpose of our policy *now*, at this precise moment? To build the *Party* core not on the cheap *phrases* of Trotsky and Co. but on *genuine* ideological rapprochement between the Plekhanovites and the Bolsheviks. Whether this will *work out* I do not know. If it doesn't, then back to the Bolshevik Centre. If it does, it will be a substantial step forward.

We shall write to the Russian C.C. (insisting that Makar call it together without waiting for the Menshevik scoundrels) that Dan (and Martov) should be *expelled* from

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further on several words are illegible. Words in square brackets have been inserted as suggested by the context and the remaining legible letters.—*Ed.*

the C.O. and Igor from the C.C. Bureau Abroad and replaced with Plekhanovites. The Plekhanovites printed ... [in an issue] of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (you [ought to receive it] within a few days[177]).

... [53] for the *Golos* people ... against ... 10 .... For the Plekhanovites 11 .. but it isn't so much a matter of numbers as of the *beginning of a break*. The first step is always the hardest.

In a few days the Mensheviks will publish Martynov's reply to Plekhanov and, evidently, a reply to the C.O. Although Plekhanov does *wish* to keep open the possibility of "returning" to the *Golos* people, nothing so far seems to be coming of it.

Your withdrawal from *Pravda*—if it is inevitable—should in my view be arranged with the utmost care (write an article against the liquidators and against *Golos*, let Trotsky turn it down!) with a view to reporting to the C.O. and *drafting* a decision on the publication of a popular newspaper by the Central Organ. Either that, or back to....

The Vienna group will say nothing.

About the report, I am not satisfied. To remind a person does not mean to harass him. *Send the beginning*. The whole thing by May 1 will be too late.

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Paris to Vienna

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Printed from the original

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TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF POLISH SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

Dear Comrades,

Yesterday's exchange of views with your representatives in the general Party institution* showed us that your

* A reference evidently to a meeting of the C.C. Bureau Abroad.—*Ed.*

delegates are hesitant about waging a resolute struggle for the Party and against the liquidators, embarking on the path of "conciliation" which objectively does a service *only* to the liquidators.

Hesitation at such a crucial moment in Party life is, we are deeply convinced, of advantage only to the enemies of the Party.

We shall be compelled to pursue a policy upholding the Party principle *without* your delegates, or, perhaps, even *against* them. We hereby inform you of this in brief. We shall give you a more detailed explanation within the next few days, in all probability, in the press.

We trust that you will understand why we are turning first of all to you, an organisation so close to us ideologically and politically.

With comradely greetings,

Bolshevik members of the Editorial Board
of the Central Organ *Lenin*
Grigory

10/IV.10

Written in Paris

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original
in G. Y. Zinoviev's
handwriting and signed
by Lenin

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TO A. I. LYUBIMOV

To Comrade Mark

April 10, 1910

Dear Comrade,

Yesterday's conference convinced us finally of something about which we had little doubt even before it, namely, that you in no way represent the Bolshevik trend which you claim to represent in the C.C. Bureau Abroad.

Having every ground for considering ourselves representatives of the Bolshevik trend, on the strength of letters

from like-minded comrades in Russia and of the policy pursued by the Bolsheviks living abroad, we declare that your wavering policy, your willingness to tolerate the presence in the C.C. Bureau Abroad of Igor, a liquidator and plotter against the Party, to cover up the disruption by him of Party unity[178] (instead of exposing Igor, of presenting an ultimatum to the C.C. demanding his removal and resolutely combating the liquidators and upholding the alliance of the Bolsheviks and the *pro-Party* Mensheviks, an alliance which alone could *perhaps* save the cause of unity)—this behaviour of yours convinces us that you, willingly or unwillingly, are a pawn in the hands of the liquidators.

We reserve the right to bring our statement to the attention of the Bolsheviks and, if need be, the entire Party and press.

Bolshevik members of the Central Organ *Lenin**

Written in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

196

TO A. I. LYUBIMOV

To Comrade Mark

Dear Comrade,

We retract our letter and regret having unjustly accused you of supporting liquidationism in the C.C. Bureau Abroad.**

10/IV. 10

*Lenin****

Written in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original in G. Y. Zinoviev's handwriting and signed by Lenin

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* The letter was also signed by G. Y. Zinoviev.—*Ed.*

** See previous letter.—*Ed.*

*** The letter was also signed by G. Y. Zinoviev.—*Ed.*

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TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

6. VI. 10

Dear Comrade,

I enclose herewith two appeals concerning the May Day demonstrations published by our Party, one abroad, the other in Russia; the latter was printed in an underground printery. I shall try to get other publications of this kind for you, although this is extremely difficult considering the position of our Party.

Regarding the proposals, resolutions and the report of our Party, I deeply regret to have to inform you that our Central Committee has not yet drafted the resolutions and that the report, unfortunately, is not yet ready.[179]

Accept, dear comrade, my cordial greetings.

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a photocopy of the original
Translated from the French

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TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

15. VI. 10

Dear Comrade,

I am very sorry to say that I have been unable to find for you either the documents or information about the Tiflis and Munich affairs.[180] However, as soon as I received your letter I handed it over to a comrade who may be able to find the documents or the information you require. I am sure he will do everything possible, although it will

be extremely difficult to meet your request by Thursday or even Friday.

Accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

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Translated from the French

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TO D. M. KOTLYARENKO

Private, to Comrade *Kotlyarenko*

1. 8. 10

Dear Comrade,

I. Be so kind as to order the following books for the editorial office:

1) *Report of the People's Freedom Group at the Third Session of the Duma* (Pravo bookshop, St. Petersburg, or V. A. Kharlamov, 7. Potyomkinskaya. St. Petersburg, apply to them). Price 50 k.

2) *In Memory of N. G. Chernyshevsky*. Reports and speeches by Annensky, Antonovich, Tugan-Baranovsky, etc. Price 50 k. (Obshchestvennaya Polza, St. Petersburg, 40 Nevsky, Flat 43.)

II. Further. With regard to the report You were *extremely* careless not to have sent it registered. I have given the post office here Rappoport's address. But this is not enough. Send *at once* notifications to the Administration des postes in *Pornic*, asking them as the sender that the package be readdressed to Rappoport, and attach an addressed postcard for their reply.

III. As regards the *Public Movement*—Britman is said to have brought it and left it at the forwarding office for me. If not, I shall send an inquiry to Grigory, and you ask him about it too when you *have a chance*.

IV. As regards *guests* at the Copenhagen Congress I cannot say anything.[181] As far as I know it is customary for people to be admitted freely to the gallery. Take a leaflet from my parcel to the C.C. Bureau Abroad (which I am sending by book-post)—you will find there a printed leaflet with the address of the chairman of the local organizing committee[182]: he is the one to apply to if you want to find out *for sure* in advance.

V. I am enclosing a letter for the C.C. Bureau Abroad.* Please hand it over *as soon as possible*.

VI. What about the report? I beg of you to speed up its publication.

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Pornic (France) to Paris

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO A. I. LYUBIMOV

Dear M.,

Be so kind as to forward the enclosed letter by express to Pyatnitsa.

I have received a letter from the secretary of the C.C. Bureau Abroad quoting Schwarz as saying that Huysmans has forbidden the reports to be more than four pages long. Kindly inform that secretary that if he wishes he can get in touch with Huysmans direct. I only know one thing—*we are printing* the report *ourselves*; who can forbid us to make it long? The important thing is to see to it that the report is ready *in time for the congress*, and *we* shall circulate it among the *delegates ourselves*. That the report is supposed to be printed in three languages I have known for

* The letter has not been found.—*Ed.*

some time, but what if we haven't the money? Will they "forbid" its publication in one language?

I enclose a letter from the bank presenting me with a statement of account and *demanding from me* (as always) a written reply signed by me certifying the correctness of the figures. I am enclosing my written reply,* i.e., a form with my signature (and dated in my handwriting August *4*, so, N.B., don't send it before that). Please check the account and, if correct, send my letter.

With best wishes and regards to O.A.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. About Copenhagen, yesterday I sent a letter to the C.C. Bureau Abroad asking them to notify the Bund C.C. and the Latvians. Did you take into account the expenses for the trip to Copenhagen? They say it will cost 250-300 francs per delegate, of whom there will be eight at the maximum. Will you have enough for that *out of the 75,000*?

Exp. par. Vl. Oulianoff. R. Mon Désir. V. les Roses. *Pornic*.**

Written August 2, 1910
Sent to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

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TO M. V. KOBETSKY

August 8 (N.S.), 1910

Dear Comrade,

I have a small personal favour to ask of you. I should like to make use of the opportunity provided by the congress in Copenhagen to work in a Copenhagen library. I should be much obliged if you could inform me:

* Enclosed in two envelopes with the printed address: Comptoir National, etc.

** Return address written on envelope.—*Ed.*

1) Whether the Copenhagen library is open all the time in September (the National or the University, I do not know which is better. I need data on agriculture in Denmark).

2) How much a furnished room in Copenhagen would cost by the week or month, and whether you could help me to find a room, provided *this would not take you away from your work*.

My address until August 23
Mr. Wl. Oulianoff.
Rue Mon Desir. Villa les Roses.
Pornic (Loire-Inférieure).
France.

Forgive me for troubling you. Thanking you in advance and with best regards.

N. Lenin

Sent to Copenhagen

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO M. V. KOBETSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am very grateful to you for the information and for your kind offer of assistance. If it is not too much trouble, rent me a simple, inexpensive, small room from the *26th*.

I shall be in Copenhagen by the morning of the 26th (for the Bureau meeting). I shall try to drop in and see you the same morning (I don't know when the train comes in, I shall probably go through Hamburg-Korsör). If you go out, leave a letter for me with the landlady (für Herrn Ulianoff). I shall take the room by the week or for a month, depending on what is more customary in Copenhagen.

I shall be in Copenhagen about ten days from August 26, then *perhaps* I shall go away for a week on personal business[183] and then return to Copenhagen again. Therefore

a cheap room for a month (if you, renting for a longer period, pay 12 kr., I would probably have to pay about 15-18 kr. for a similar room) would be more convenient. *If you have no time*, do not bother, I shall be able to find something myself on August 26 or 27, since the Bureau meeting will only take up the morning.

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written between August 12 and 23, 1910
Sent from Pornic to Copenhagen

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO MARIA ANDREYEVA

14.VIII. 10

Dear M. F.,

I hasten to inform you that I have received at last the reply concerning Tria's report. The secretary of the Editorial Board writes that "Tria's report has been put to the vote, translated and almost all set up, and will go as a supplement" (i.e., a supplement to the general report of the Party). And so, everything has turned out well.[184]

I have no news to report. On August 23 I am going to Copenhagen. What news have you? What did you learn from that large assembly of people, that "houseful of guests" you wrote about?

Best wishes, from Nadya as well. Greetings to A. M. and all the Capri crowd.

Yours,

V. U.

Sent from Pornic to Capri

First published in 1958 in the journal *Teatr* No. 4

Printed from the original

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TO THE EXECUTIVE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY

Copenhagen, September* 2, 1910

Dear Comrades,

The August 28 issue of *Vorwärts* carried an utterly outrageous anonymous article about the state of affairs in the Russian Party.[185] At the height of the work of the International Congress, when everyone is moved by the desire to preserve socialist unity, to discuss with the utmost caution the internal disputes in the parties of the different countries, to avoid if possible interfering in these disputes, to demonstrate the strength, the grandeur and moral prestige of Social-Democracy in all countries—at this very time the Central Organ of the German Party suddenly, without any reason, without the slightest apparent need, prints an article containing incredible attacks on Russian Social-Democracy. The above-mentioned article shamelessly criticises the entire Social-Democratic movement in Russia; it strives to represent Russian Social-Democracy to the foreign public in the darkest colours, as being in a state of decline, impotence and degeneration. Further, it assails and slanders all the existing groups and trends in the Party without exception, from top to bottom; and, finally, it contains crude attacks on official central bodies of the Party—the Central Committee and the Central Organ—accusing them of factional prejudice, etc.; individual members of these central bodies too are slandered in the most outrageous manner.

Such an article in the Central Organ of the German Party, the anonymous author of which was prompted solely by a desire for revenge for some petty personal grievance, will damage the interests of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia; it constitutes an unexampled violation of international solidarity and brotherhood in relation to Russian Social-Democracy. And if the Russian Party, which has many well-known writers, has for several years

* In the original "August", obviously a slip of the pen.—*Ed.*

avoided parading its internal affairs on the pages of the German Party press, that is only because it does not consider the foreign press to be a suitable battlefield for settling its disputes. The building of the unity of the Social-Democratic Party of Russia is and remains the paramount and most difficult task for all the comrades in Russia, and primarily for the central bodies of the Party. Clearly, it is essential, in the interests of preserving unity, to avoid anything that is prejudicial to the resolving of internal differences. No one of course should object to the problems of Russian Party life being treated in a calm, objective manner. But we are most emphatically opposed to malevolent, petty and treacherous attacks on the movement, the Party and its central bodies, such as that contained in the above-mentioned article, the more so since the anonymous author who poses as an omniscient outsider is introduced as a correspondent of the Central Organ, the newspaper *Vorwärts*, which lends the article an official editorial character.

Delegates of the Central Organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party *Sotsial-Demokrat*
G. Plekhanov
A. Warski

Delegate of the Central Committee, member of the International Socialist Bureau
N. Lenin (*Vl. Ulyanov*)

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 46

Printed from the original in A. Warski's handwriting and signed by Lenin
Translated from the German

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TO M. V. KOBETSKY

16. IX. 10

Dear Comrade,

I shall be here until September 25. On the morning of the 26th of September (Monday) I intend to be in Copenha-

gen and would like to spend as little time there as possible. *If* you think it *worth* arranging a public or Party lecture on the Copenhagen Congress, please arrange it for Monday (in the evening, of course, since it is a workday).* I could then leave on Tuesday, for it is time for me to be in Paris, and I must now make haste. Regarding the room, please find out whether I could spend the night there on the 26th. If not, I shall return the keys when and where you say (I have taken them with me). By the way, I left a book on the table (reports and the main report for the Copenhagen Congress in French, in a folder). If the former lodger occupies the room on the morning of the 26th of September I would kindly ask you to go there and pick up the book so that I could get it from you.

My address: Herrn Wl. Ulianoff. Adr. Frk. W. Berg. 17. I. Kaptensgatan. 17. I. Stockholm. Drop me a line when you find out and decide about the lecture.

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent to Copenhagen

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO I. P. POKROVSKY

Dear Comrade,

Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau Camille Huysmans has asked for a list of the Social-Democratic deputies to the Duma who joined the Commission interparlementaire and reminds us about the annual dues of 15 fr. to be paid by each deputy. Please get in touch with them. Give him the address of the secretary of the group.

I wrote you some two weeks ago, but have had no reply. Bad, very bad.

Written October 5, 1910
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

* Lenin lectured in Copenhagen on September 26, 1910.—*Ed.*

207
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

17. X. 10

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I have notified the treasurer of the Central Committee of our Party that the dues must be paid. I hope we shall soon pay them. The secretary or the treasurer of the Bureau of the Central Committee will let you know.

As for the dues to be paid by the Duma deputies belonging to the Inter-Parliamentary Commission, I shall write to them and ask once more that the secretary of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma notify you of his address.

Respectfully yours,
N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

208
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

6. XI. 10

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

One of my friends, Comrade Petrov, will call on you tomorrow or the day after. Be so kind as to give him one copy each of the reports of the different parties to the Copenhagen Congress. It is extremely difficult for the Russian socialists to obtain these reports. That is why it is

most important for us to "utilise" the travels of private individuals to circulate a few copies of the reports in Russia.

Accept, dear comrade,
my fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962
in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*
No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 47

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

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TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MEETING OF THE C.O. EDITORIAL BOARD[186]

Dear Comrade,

Having walked out of today's meeting I consider it my duty to explain to you, in case of any Party (and quasi-Party) rumours and gossip, the significance of my action. I consider it not only my right but my duty to refuse to participate in a so-called "discussion" which serves as a pretext for the liquidationist section of the Editorial Board to indulge in the worst kind of rumours circulated by the worst kind of anti-Party elements. When Martov, for example, refers to the otzovists as a section of the Party, and at the same time openly repeats the gossip noised by the most blackguard elements of the otzovists abroad, alleging that the case of Comrade Victor was closed or hushed up *as a result of bribery*,[187] and at the same time demands that they, Martov and Dan, be protected from such suspicions on the part of "a section of the Party", then anyone can see quite clearly that under cover of "*protection*" from otzovist blackmail we are being offered nothing more nor less than *liquidationist abetting* of otzovist sallies of the worst kind.

Considering it beneath my dignity to participate in a "*discussion*" in which such things are brought up, I declare

that in future too I shall try to walk out of any meeting where there is such a "discussion".

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

7.XI.10

Written in Paris and mailed to a local address

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Dear V. D.,

I received today more news about the new literary child[188] but, surprisingly, not a word from you. What does this mean? I am extremely worried about the fate of the child. They write, for instance, that they fear the material sent is out of date. This worries me greatly. I insist most categorically that everything sent in should be published (with corrections owing to "unforeseen circumstances" if need be). This is after all a matter of principle, a matter of policy. We have no information as yet on this question, we are depending on you, and you are silent. This is impossible. A few lines from you once or twice a week is the minimum necessary to maintain contact and to feel closer to things. To make matters worse, there are letters from the "discontented" (I received a long letter today from one of them—I daresay you can guess from whom). And so I beg you: write, write more often and in greater detail.

Warmest regards to V. M.

Yours,

Starik

Written November 3, 1910
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

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TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Dear V. D.,

I wrote you the other day.* Am writing again today because I have received some extremely disturbing news, which seems to indicate some dissention at your end. Dissention over what, I cannot understand. What the trouble is I do not know.[189] You really must not leave us here without information—afterwards we are blamed for holding up things. Why shouldn't like-minded people be able to work together on a newspaper, once there is agreement on the main thing, namely, not to allow the Potresovs and similar riffraff from *Nasha Zarya* to come anywhere near it?[190] And such agreement does exist. We shall notify them today of our opinion that a third be included (there was a clear understanding, after all, that the third place belonged to us).[191] I am informing you in order that there should be no misunderstanding. The third has one-third of the decisive say—is that so much? Are you against that? I hope not. I would be very glad if this business could be settled without friction. It is time, high time, to get started on the paper and the journal too. As regards the journal, we are not asking for much: find us an executive secretary and a couple of applicants for permission to publish.[192] Surely that is not so difficult to arrange? Well, I shall wait for word from you.

I hope that the matter of the discontented will now be settled. After all, there is nothing to quarrel about.

Written November 10, 1910
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

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TO N. G. POLETAYEV

Dear Colleague,

We sent a few things off today: 1) a postscript to the article about Muromtsev (it would be wrong not to react, even now), 2) about the reasons and significance of rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks (the title can be changed), 3) about the political differences in the working-class movement,* 4) about the Octobrists, 5) the industrial congress and the workers, 6) the trade union trend.

Please try to insert them and reply as soon as possible.

Please turn them over to our editor** without delay, urgently. Let me know whether all the friction has been eliminated.

Yours,
Lenin

Written December 4, 1910
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

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TO THE BUREAU ABROAD OF THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

To the C.C. Bureau Abroad

5.XII. 10

Dear Comrades,

We have been approached by a member of the S.D. Duma group*** who has stated categorically that without another

* See "Differences in the European Labour Movement" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 347-52).—*Ed.*

** V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich.—*Ed.*

*** N. G. Poletayev.—*Ed.*

thousand the paper cannot be launched.[193] We therefore most insistently urge you to send the other thousand *at once.*

*N. Lenin**

Written in Paris

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Dear V. D.,

I received a letter from you some time ago but unfortunately I could not obtain any idea from it concerning the matter of the remittance we are interested in. I have heard you are very displeased about something. What? How? Why? Have things been settled? I don't know anything. It is very, very depressing. And we must make *utmost* haste, for the hostile elements are threatening us from the rear. We have done what we could here to secure what was lacking. A benefactor turned up. We are sending it. Please see to it that we are not left without information. You must let us know at least once a week about the receipt of remittances, etc. For all we hear now are some rumours about dissatisfaction, and nothing else. Some people seem to have invented some sort of distinction between liquidationism and the liquidators. What sophistry! We want neither the one nor the other. But of course you yourselves will give them a rebuff. Greetings to V. M. My wife sends you her very best regards.

Starik

Written December 9, 1910
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

* The letter was also signed by G. Y. Zinoviev.—*Ed.*

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TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT*[194]

I propose:

1) printing in the Central Organ a translation of this letter at once (perhaps with some slight cuts);

2) approaching the *trade unions* (and also *trade union committees* in the different towns) of transport workers, shipbuilders, workers employed at factories making fire-arms, ammunition, guns, military supplies, etc. (and where there are no trade unions, *groups* of workers), and asking them to send the Central Organ written contributions, information, *descriptions of past strikes*, etc.;

3) publishing *at once* in brief our opinion (α) that what is in question is not an isolated act of "preventing war" (averting), but revolutionary pressure by the *masses* of the proletariat in general, and (β) that with the present state of affairs in Russia we attach the greatest importance to studying the course and conditions of the strikes *of 1905*.

Written December 17, 1910
in Paris

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

1911

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TO KARL KAUTSKY

31.I. 11

Dear Comrade,

You have probably not forgotten that you promised an article for our journal *Mysl*. The first issue of *Mysl* has already come out (in Moscow) and it has not been confiscated. It contains, among other things, articles by Plekhanov on Tolstoy and on Italian opportunism (compared with our liquidators), my article on statistics on strikes during the Russian revolution,* Rozhkov's article on the new agrarian policy of the Russian counter-revolutionaries, etc. Issue No. 2 will be out shortly. We would be extremely grateful to you if you could write something for us—about neutrality, for instance, and against trade union neutrality. This question has again been coming up for discussion here now and perhaps you will like to dwell in somewhat greater detail on what you wrote about Legien in *Neue Zeit*. Needless to say, we shall be happy to receive any article from you on any subject.[195]

I am sending you by book-post my article against Martov and Trotsky, not for publication, but to ask your advice. Karski has already replied to Martov. You wanted to leave it to me to write the article against Trotsky. But you will see from my article that it is very difficult for me to criticise Trotsky without touching Martov. Perhaps you could advise me how to make the article suitable for *Neue Zeit*.**

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* See "Strike Statistics in Russia" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 393-421).—*Ed*.

** See "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 374-92).—*Ed*.

I should like to offer the editors of *Neue Zeit* two more articles: 1) on Russian strike statistics for 1905-07. This is probably the first time we have statistics on mass strikes (economic and political separately) for the entire period of the revolution. The opportunists (=Menshevik liquidators) are constantly accusing us Russian Bolsheviks of "romanticism" and "Blanquism". The best answer to this perhaps is dry statistics which might be not without interest for the German comrades as well. If you agree in principle, I shall send you either a detailed excerpt from my article or else the complete translation. I am only afraid that my article will be too long for *Neue Zeit*.

2) I have prepared for a Russian journal a summary of German agricultural production statistics for 1907 (the three volumes already out).* I don't know yet whether it will be printed in Russia or not. As can be seen from the German Social-Democratic press, this subject has already been discussed, but regrettably (for instance in *Vorwärts*) solely on the basis of a bourgeois treatment of the material. I have come to the conclusion that the 1907 census bears out the Marxist theory and refutes the bourgeois (including David's theory). The data on female and child labour (employed more by *peasants* owning 5-10 hectares of land than by the capitalists or by proletarian farms), for instance, seem particularly interesting to me. Here the number of working members of the family and of hired workers is given for the first time. It turns out that in the group of owners with 10-20 hectares of land the number of hired workers amounts on the average to 1.7 per farm, and the number of working members of the family, to 3.4. These are already big peasants who cannot do without wage labour.

Extremely instructive, too, is the classification of farms according to total number of workers (I break them up

* See the article "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture" and preparatory notes for it, "German Agrarian Statistics (1907)" and "Plan for Processing the Data of the German Agricultural Census of June 12, 1907" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 423-46, and Vol. 40, pp. 297-371, 372-75).—*Ed.*

into three main groups: 1-3, 4-5, 6 and more workers, including hired labour).

Do you think such a treatment would be of interest to German readers? If so, I would gladly write on this subject for *Neue Zeit*—only the work I have prepared is *far too* voluminous!

If the "peasant farms" (5-10, 10-20 hectares) specially prospered in the period 1895-1907, this, in my opinion, is no evidence of the success of "small-scale production". It merely testifies to the success of intensive capitalist farming and *livestock raising* in particular. The reduction in the area of the farms signifies expansion of capitalist and big-peasant livestock farming.

I trust that you are now quite well and that you will answer Quessel and Maslov yourself.

With best wishes,
Yours,
N. Lenin

P.S. I am very grateful to your wife for writing to me during your illness. I wanted to write her myself but thought that instead of giving my opinion about Trotsky's article in a letter, it would be better to send my article. I am sending it not only for you, but also for your wife, as an answer to her letter.

My address: Mr. Vl. Oulianoff
4. Rue Marie Rose. 4
Paris. XIV.

Sent to Berlin

First published in part
December 31, 1928, in the
newspaper *Der Abend*

Published in full in 1964
in German in the journal
International Review of Social History, Vol. IX, Part 2

First published in Russian in 1965
in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian)
Ed., Vol. 54

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Translated from the
German

217
TO A. I. RYKOV

For Comrade *Vlasov* (and also, *if he* wishes, for the Poles)

Dear Friends,

After giving thought to the *whole* agreement (resp. the formulation of a common base and line of action for all of us) arrived at in the Bureau between the P.S.D.* and both Bolshevik trends, I cannot but point to the *weakness*, the *shortcomings* of that base.[196]

The essence of the agreement is (a) to lay down a precise, clear-cut anti-*Golos* and anti-*Vperyod* line of principle, i.e., to reiterate and reaffirm struggle against both liquidationism and otzovism in absolutely concrete terms ruling out any misrepresentations and evasions (from which the Party has suffered so much);

(b) a practical "reform", i.e., such a change in the composition of *all centres* (or rather in the "factions" or "trends" represented in them) as would *guarantee* the pursuance of this line of principle.

How does this work out? Both the theoretical "line" and the practical activities are determined by the Central Committee. And its composition? In the event of a simple "ultimatum" (and a cheap, very cheap one to boot) from notorious dodgers, prevaricators, scoundrels and unprincipled bargainers (like the Bund), etc., you are "*prepared*" to set the number of members at 8. And this 8 is equivalent (as is now obvious) to *two* groups of four.

The result: neutralisation, i.e., the *complete* impotence of the C.C.!!

This is exactly what the liquidators want.

No reforms in *our* sense (i.e., as we have *all* agreed) could be *carried out* with such a composition.

It is an absurd situation: we *agree* to give the Party

* Polish Social-Democracy.—*Ed.*

the money, *Rabochaya Gazeta*[197] and all our energies *conditionally*. On what conditions? The line of principle and the reform. Who carries out the one and the other? The C.C. And what is the guarantee that they will be carried out by the C.C.? A chance *ultimatum* presented by the enemies of Social-Democracy (such as the liquidators from the Bundist intelligentsia)!!

An agreement to *do* what the C.C. *cannot* possibly do with eight members.

That is the result.

That result is a *repetition* of the mistake made by the plenary meeting[198]: good wishes, nice words, excellent ideas—but no power to carry them into effect. Castigation of the liquidators in words and *captivity* to the liquidators in reality.

It is for you practical workers to carry out the "agreement"—you are the ones who introduced the clause concerning the eight. It is my duty, after studying the agreement carefully, to *warn* you: the liquidators will again make fools of you!

It is easy to "call oneself" a Plekhanovite (Adrianov and his ilk would *doubtless* call themselves the devil and satan if only to get *some small concession*: a title is a word, but a concession is reality).

In reality you will be getting with your eight an impotent institution shackled by the liquidators. That is the danger of which I consider it my duty specially to warn you.

If you, as practical workers, *undertake* to establish a C.C. (or rather, an *eight*) capable both of condemning the *Golos* and *Vperyod* people, and of carrying out the reform—*that is up to you*. Heartily desiring peace and accord with you, I am pledged to help you to carry out *your* plan.

But to help does not mean lulling you with "the enchantment of fine words". To help means to point to the *real* dangers which one *must* be able to avoid.

The plenary meeting of January 1910 held up the practical work of the centres *for a year* by *tying* their hands, letting them be *shackled* by the liquidators. In the spring of 1910 Inok *did not succeed* in escaping from that

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

bondage. In the beginning of 1911 you will *not be able* to either, unless you take urgent measures to carry out the agreement.

Best wishes,

N. Lenin

Written February 11, 1911
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

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TO A. I. RYKOV

Dear Al.,

We are sending you some novelties:

1) Igor's statement (copy) submitted by him today to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad.*[199]

2) The resolution of the San Remo "group" (read Plekhanov "and his household").

Today Lieber told the C.C. Bureau Abroad that Adrianov is near Moscow and that according to his, Lieber's, information the question of whether to call the C.C. in Russia or abroad is being discussed.

In our opinion Mikhail Mironych must be sent to the Samovars** (we are trying to send him to you tomorrow, i.e., to get him to leave tomorrow. I spoke to him today and he agreed). He has a reason for finding it inconvenient to go to Russia just now, but the reason is *unimportant* and he has agreed to go to Russia also. Here is what you should do: send him *at once* with two assignments: (1) to *send* Lyubich abroad immediately; (2) to see the Samovars and persuade them to decide for abroad and leave.

It is unreasonable, absurd, mad to risk failure when in the enclosed *official* paper Igor expresses himself in favour of abroad and even promises to get *not* only Adrianov abroad, but also the "London candidates"[200] (i.e., Roman+

* Return at once *after reading* (and making a copy).

** Samovars—V. P. Nogin and G. D. Leiteisen (Lindov), members of the Russia Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee residing at the time in Tula.—*Ed.*

Adrianov, in any case two: hence the obvious and **imperative** need for Lyubich, otherwise our three will not make the majority).

Tomorrow we are sending the theses for the declaration on the liquidators and otzovists.

With best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written February 17, 1911
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

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TO N. G. POLETAYEV

Dear Colleague,

I received your letter of February 10 about the betrayal of the person you call—Y.—.

You ask me to "announce this" to the 58 Mensheviks.[201] You must forgive me but I cannot comply with the request. I do not intend to announce anything or to have anything to do with such individuals. If you do not understand why, I shall tell you once again.

You close your letter with the words: "Don't you people in Paris realise how your squabbles affect us?"

The liquidators in Paris understand full well what they are doing. It is a pity that among you in St. Petersburg there are people who *do not understand* what they are doing and what they read. A great pity! Such people are fated always to be led by the nose. The liquidators here, i.e., the *Golos* people, put out leaflets, such as the leaflet of the 58, specially to provoke squabbles and confuse the struggle over issues of principle. We have declared (in every issue of the Central Organ and every issue of other publications* known to you and *closer* to you spatially) that we shall not tolerate the group of Mr. *Potresov*

* The newspaper *Zvezda* and the journal *Mysl*.—*Ed*.

and Co., the ideas of *Nasha Zarya*, etc., that we cannot tolerate them, but are fighting them and shall continue to fight them unrelentingly. This is a company of liquidators, enemies of Social-Democracy, and their ideas are the ideas of traitors.

The *Golos* people are unable to wage a principled struggle against this and hence the *Martovs*, *Dans*, *Axelrods* and *Martynovs* reply with scandals and blackmail. Is the leaflet of the 58 not an instance of blackmail? The leaflet of the 58 contains *false* accusations (insinuations)...,* for instance, although the Bolsheviks *absolutely* loyally liquidated after the January 1910 plenary meeting ... *everything* connected with them. Why make these accusations in the form of dark hints? The answer is: a leaflet, also printed, also put out in Paris, also originating in the *Golos* camp, only signed not by the 58 but by the "Editorial Board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*". What is the content of this leaflet? It amounts to this: equality in the Editorial Board of the C.O. and there will be peace.[202]

One comrade writes: is this not despicable? To level criminal charges today and to write tomorrow: "Let in one more man into the Editorial Board and there will be peace." Why, that is *blackmail*!

Can people with any political experience fail to see dozens of such examples everywhere (especially in the Third Duma)? Has not the history of Menshevism given a mass of examples of such blackmail? How often "crimes" have been charged and then *forgotten* after equality or the *majority* has been gained.

As for me, I called the blackmailers blackmailers in print in May 1910 and in *Diskussionny Listok*.** If there were some who did not heed the warning, *so much the worse for them*.

—Y.— called the paper "foul".—Y.— was right. I do not know—Y.—. I do not know what sort of retraction in press he seeks, I have no idea of his views, his understanding, what he is doing. To sum up: until you learn to fight

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* Here and further, blank spaces in the text.—*Ed*.

** See "Notes of a Publicist" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 195-259). —*Ed*.

the blackmailers they will continue to frustrate your efforts with scandals, to spit in your face. If you do not like it, learn to fight and not complain.

Needless to say, we answered the blackmailers properly and will not agree to any equality with them. We completely exposed the Potresov gang for the *liquidators* they are. More, this gang is now flirting with the group that violated *after* the January 1910 plenary meeting the resolution on....* The *Golos* people are covering up ... who are "against" *Lenin-Plekhanov*. This too *we will expose*, I can assure you.

You cannot sit between two stools—either you are with the liquidators or against them. I reserve the right to publish this letter. How are things in the Editorial Board?** You must see to it that we should be represented, by yourself, if there is no one else. At any rate you are obliged to find us a representative. Why don't you return rejected articles? *Rappoport* has sent two articles but has received no reply.

A young man, short, thick-set (Jewish), with a recommendation from me, will shortly come to see you. Help him in any way you can.

As for the paper, in my opinion, you should join it yourself for the time being, so that our trend should not be left without a representative, for that would be disgraceful. For we hope they will not give up under the first pressure but will try to carry on despite the closures. All the more necessary, then, is it for you to be there. Send us *at once* the text of the platform worked out by the group for the Moscow elections.[203] Will you come here to see us at Easter? There is much to talk about. Do you know what has happened to Os. Petr.?

Written March 7 or 8, 1911

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

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* A reference evidently to the resolution adopted by the plenary meeting, "On Factional Centres" (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* [The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee], Part I, 1954, pp. 241-43).—*Ed.*

** Editorial Board of the newspaper *Zvezda*.—*Ed.*

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TO A. I. RYKOV

10/III. 11

Dear Vlasov,

We are sending you (and Grigory) a copy of a letter written today by Semashko (a member of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad) to Grigory.

From this letter you will see of course that the crisis is coming to a head. The Bundists have shown their hand[204] (whether it was Makar who made them do so or the arrests in Petersburg[205] that are to blame, God only knows).

It is perfectly clear that the Bundists have understood full well the simple truth that now *everything* depends on the votes: whether the Poles+the Bundists will have one vote more or not.

The Bundists are fighting desperately to have that extra vote in the Central Committee.

So much is clear. The Bundists are *stopping at nothing* to gain that extra vote in the Central Committee by hook or by crook.

Of the *Golos* Mensheviks there already are two that are certain, the Londoners Kostrov and *Pyotr*, who was recently released (we have been informed to that effect).

The enemies, then, have fully united. The only way to save the day is to get Makar, Lindov, **Lyubich** (and if possible Vadim) out of the country at all costs, and without delay.

Somebody must be sent over for this purpose. For God's sake can't you see that by delaying the dispatch of a person you are risking *every day* the arrest of Makar, the failure of *everything*. Send Mikhail Mironych (and if he refuses, Chasovnikov from Liége, or Pyatnitsa's wife, she has the proper papers and already went once) to both Lyubich and Makar at once, without fail.

If you don't do this, you are risking throwing away the *last* chance of convening a plenary meeting and restoring the C.C. in general.

If Yudin is at loggerheads with Makar, it is possible that Makar too has seen through the manoeuvres and trickery

of the Bundists; but to see is not enough, one must know how to fight.

If Lindov *cannot* travel abroad, let Makar come *alone* (after obtaining authorisation to act for the Bureau); with Makar here we shall find a way out of the situation together with him.

Reply at once.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

221
TO A. I. RYKOV

Dear Vlasov,

It is a strange thing you are suggesting! *Such* a telegram *must not* be sent, we cannot take the risk. If you want to chance it, you could send it from Leipzig, but we do not advise you to do so.

Can money really be the hitch? Could they not have borrowed enough for a ticket to Berlin??

The delay is obviously not because of money.

The Bundist scoundrel and liquidator (Lieber) goes around saying here that he knows of some sort of hitch and some sort of trip to the Caucasus(!!?).[206]

Some more news: Kostrov and *Pyotr* have been released. Both call themselves Plekhanovites.

But we know *for certain from the plenary meeting* that both are liquidators.

You made a colossal mistake by not getting a proxy from the Samovars and now are making things worse by not sending anybody to them. Don't you see what's happening? Time is running out (the *Pravda* crowd are already electing delegates in Moscow for the conference[207]—a split is imminent). You're losing your patience. A sheer comedy.

Clearly, what we insisted on should have been done: somebody should have been sent *at once* to the Samovars.

Do so without delay, otherwise an absurd situation will develop.

After all that has happened and after what you have said we too cannot trust the Samovars and *wait*, wait for months and months. We will be *compelled* by such procrastination to break off everything, to tell the Germans *that there is no C.C.* and demand the money back *at once*.

There is nothing else left to do, and your passivity ("maybe the Samovar will budge") is to blame for everything.

All the best,
Lenin

Written in the first half of March 1911
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

222
TO A. I. RYKOV

Received your letter with the news about the call sent to M. M.

You are doing right in sending it. So far the *non*-conciliators have sent 4 (if not 6). This makes a big difference. That's one thing. Secondly, it is time to issue an ultimatum; you yourself are aware of this when you say: "one must lose all respect for the Party to drag things out endlessly." True! Right! Correct!

Only there must be no threat to withdraw from the C.C., as you propose. That would be a mistake. Don't do that.* Threaten to protest publicly against the Bureau and to show them up for a nil or even worse if they, after having placed their confidence in you and offered you their authorisation, do not go abroad *at once*.

---

* If you withdraw from the C.C., it will he tantamount to deserting the field of battle, betrayal of Bolshevism at a difficult moment. You must not withdraw but send an ultimatum to Makar and, if he does not show up and yield, *fight as a member of the C.C. to get* the money *returned*.

You should invite Lyubich. It will be a mistake not to. It is ridiculous to grudge 200-300 extra rubles when it is a matter of the *finale* of the entire C.C. Lyubich is needed *precisely* so as not to be dependent on a "philistine and coward".[208] Only from your letter did I see how *base* this "philistine and coward" is. People like that should be pinned to the wall, and if they don't submit, trampled in the mud. I shall do that publicly by printing the record of our relations with the Bureau when my patience has been exhausted.

There is full clarity now. Line-up against line-up. It's either ½+1 for us and the P.S.D.*[209] or a Menshevik victory in the C.C., our withdrawal and a disgraceful split. But even if only Makar and Lyubich are brought over the situation could be saved: Plekhanov and the group *will be* for us, and we can nip the Menshevik split *in the bud*. The scoundrels would not dare in that case.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I received from a worker in Bologna. He *understood* the *Vperyod* "platform"!! But look at those *Golos* scoundrels: *Golos* agent *Volontyor*, a member of the *Party* School Commission, goes *against its* decision and carries on *agitation* against it *among the ex-ists*!![210] Now I'll expose them in the *press*.

Semashko was sent from the School Commission to Bologna. The blackguards have been caught red-handed, they won't wriggle out of it!

Return the copy of the letter.

I am enclosing a letter from Finikov (return *immediately* after reading). Tell me, am I not right in saying that a Bolshevik like this is *stronger* than a hundred "conciliators", for he has *understood* the situation whereas the latter do not want to understand it?

With a few such we shall defeat hundreds of "conciliators".

Greetings!

N. Lenin

Written in March 1911
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

* It is impossible to win in the seven. Therefore, it is necessary to hold a plenary meeting abroad; call over Makar and Lyubich and explain things to them.

223
TO NN*

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you two letters.** The first from Poletayev, the second from Negorev (Jordansky).

They are the actual editors of *Zvezda*.

They must be helped.

There is only one source—the Germans. Apply to the Vorstand*** through Pfannkuch. Ask for 5,000 marks (they'll give you 3,000). Tyszka once received money from them for *Trybuna*[211] and now is asking for the *second* time—which means he probably considers you a "competitor". Bear this in mind, try to find a *fully* reliable interpreter (we have some we know, but they are very "colonial" people) and do not fail to get some money from the Vorstand for *Zvezda*.

Tyszka goes about it this way: he asks the Vorstand through Karski. The Vorstand sends an inquiry to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad and issues the money if there are no objections. If you do not wish the Bureau Abroad to know that you are in Berlin, you must take some steps.

I am enclosing a "credential",**** in case you need it.

All the best,
Lenin

Did you get the letter with Alexandrov's letter enclosed about Lieber's report in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad?[212]

Reply as soon as you can. The matter must be cleared up finally.

Written in March 1911
Sent from Paris to Berlin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

* This letter was evidently addressed to A. I. Rykov.—*Ed.*

** Save these letters and return them to me without *fail as soon as* you are through with them.

*** Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party.—*Ed.*

**** for the Germans; I certify that you are a member of the C.C.

224

TO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE THIRD DUMA

Comrade Poletayev has forwarded to us through Lenin the plan for the publication of the report of the Social-Democratic group which the group discussed before Poletayev's departure for Berlin.

We on our part are fully in favour of the group's plan and suggest agreement on the following final terms.

We shall set up an Editorial Committee to publish the report consisting of Steklov+Semashko+Zinoviev (or Kamenev).

The committee shall undertake (1) to draft a plan for the report and to negotiate with the group for its approval; (2) to apply to the Party for money, with the group contributing *no less* than 500 rubles; (3) to do the final editing of the report (20 signatures) by (such-and-such) time.

The answer to this suggestion should come from the group as a whole.

(Signatures of Pokrovsky+Gegechkori)[213]

Written prior to April 19, 1911
Sent from Paris to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

225

TO THE R.S.D.L.P. CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUREAU ABROAD

Dear Comrade,

The enclosed letter* is the formal result of the talks with Poletayev which I began in Berlin, on instructions from the Duma group.

With the agreement of the group, I have formed an Editorial Committee consisting of Comrades Grigory (alter-

* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

nate—Kamenev), Steklov and Alexandrov to publish the report.

Since the group has undertaken to contribute *no less than 500* rubles to cover the expenses, and the total cost of publishing the report has been estimated by us to run to 2,100-2,200 rubles, we propose that the remaining 1,600 rubles be issued from the Party ("trust") funds[214] (and placed at the disposal of the Editorial Committee), to which representatives of the Bolshevik trend are agreed.

Lenin

April 30, 1911

Written in Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from a handwritten copy

226

TO A. I. LYUBIMOV AND M. K. VLADIMIROV

Dear Comrades,

Your speeches in the Second Group on July 1, 1911, which we have already qualified as the worst repetition of the worst speeches of the Economists,[215] and your "bloc" with the Poles (the worst of the Poles) with a view to a new "*play of intrigue*", and with the *Golos* group (Leder's "withdrawal"),[216] and with Trotsky ("ten invitations"), and with the *Vperyod* group, and with the liquidators (violation of the agreement which was accepted even by Igorev) —all this has made it fully and finally clear to us that *no political and moral unity* is possible between us. Since we have hitherto consulted with you on all cardinal steps, we consider it our duty to inform you of this.

At the last meeting Mark saw fit to say: "We 'conciliators' shall withdraw from the Technical Commission and the Organising Commission if you Bolsheviks persist in pursuing a 'factional' policy."

We declare that *we shall withdraw* from the T.C. and the O.C. if you continue your policy, which we consider extremely harmful for the Party.

We shall wait for your reply—if such is necessary—until 11 a.m. on Wednesday, July 5, 1911, at Kamenev's, after which we will submit our statement to the T.C. and the O.C. and will come out against you before the Party.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

*N. Lenin**

Written July 3, 1911
in Paris

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

227

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you the proof-sheets.**

In § "Two Parties" (especially in the end, page 86 in fine***—see separate sheet) changes are *necessary*. (1) We must not call for a break *with the conciliators*. This is quite uncalled for and incorrect. A "persuasive" tone should be adopted towards them, by no means should they be antagonised. (2) The split should be discussed with *more tact*, *always* choosing formulations to the effect that the liquidators have broken away, created and proclaimed a "complete break", and that the Party ought not to tolerate them ("and the conciliators ought not to confuse issues"), and so on.

That's how you put it mostly. But not always. Look through § "Two Parties" once again.

We shall tone down the reply to the Germans. You are right in saying it sounds rather sharp.

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* The letter was also signed by G. Y. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, N. Alexandrov (N. A. Semashko) and Kamsky (M. F. Vladimirsky).—*Ed.*

** A reference to L. B. Kamenev's pamphlet *Two Parties*. For Lenin's introduction to it see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 225-28.—*Ed.*

*** At the end.—*Ed.*

Do not fail to send in the proofs of the § on the conciliators.

All the best,

Yours,

N. Lenin

Written prior to August 2, 1911, in Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

228

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS*

September 5, 1911

Dear Comrade,

I am enclosing the table showing the composition of the Duma. I have corrected it according to the official Year Book (reference book) issued by the Duma (1910, Part 2).

With fraternal greetings, dear comrade.

V. Ulyanov

Composition of the Duma (1910)

Rights		**51
Nationalists	99	**89
Octobrists		135
Group of Poles, Lithuanians, etc.		7
Polish group (Kolo)	18	**11
Progressists		39
Mohammedans		9
Constitutional-Democrats (known as Cadets)		52

* Answer to a letter from Camille Huysmans asking Lenin to correct the table showing the composition of the Third Duma.—*Ed.*

** Figure crossed out in the original.—Ed.

Trudovik group (Trudoviks)	15	*14
Social-Democrats	14	*15
Non-partisan		18
	Total	440 members

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original Translated from the French

229

TO I. FRIMOU

Dear Comrade,

Two political emigrants, Nikita Pashev and Ivan Demidovsky, worked at an airdrome in Kitil for a Mr. Cherkez. Mr. Cherkez dismissed his workers without paying them the money due them. But with Nikita Pashev things proved more complicated since he had been working on contract. Cherkez wanted to get rid of N. Pashev, knowing that Nikita and Ivan, being political emigrants, had to remain silent. He trumped up charges against Nikita Pashev, claiming that he had removed some bolts from an airplane. Nikita was detained, and Ivan probably as well. I know very well that both (Nikita Pashev and Ivan Demidovsky), being political emigrants, are incapable of anything of the kind. I would therefore ask you, dear comrade, to intercede in the case, which may lead to the extradition of our comrades. Please accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

N. Lenin (*Vl. Ulyanov*),
Representative of Russian Social-Democracy
in the International Socialist Bureau

Written November 4, 1911
Sent from Paris to Bucharest

First published in 1924 in the journal *Kommunist* (Odessa) No. 33

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

* Figure crossed out in the original.—*Ed.*

230

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Mr. Vl. Oulianoff. 6.
Oakley Square. London. N. W.

Cher camarade,

I am sitting in the British Museum and reading with interest Schweitzer's pamphlets of the 60s; it is wonderful how they bear out the opinion of him as an opportunist in the question of ways to unity!

I obviously will *not have the time* to do everything needed to write about this. I would therefore ask you to go (or send a *reliable* person) to the Bibliothèque Nationale without a day's delay to find out what socialist literature of the 60s they have there. The way to go about it is this: write down *all* the most important titles (exact dates and places of publication are *important*) and let them tell you what they haven't got.

Add to the enclosed list (from Bebel and Mehring and Gust. Mayer) and reply **as soon as possible.**

Yours,
N. Lenin

J. B. von Schweitzer: *Der Zeitgeist und das Christentum*. Leipzig, 1861.

Same author: *Die österreichische Spitze*. Leipzig, 1863.

Same author: *Der einzige Weg zur Einheit*. Frankfurt a/M., 1860.

Same author: *Zur deutschen Frage*. Frkf. a/M., 1862.

Written November 10, 1911
Sent to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

231

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

7/XII. 11

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am enclosing a telegram which I received today.[217] We shall publish the news in our Central Organ. I hope you will do everything possible to bring the contents of this telegram to the notice of all the parties affiliated with the International.

Yours faithfully,

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in part in 1961 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

First published in 1962 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 4

First published in full in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

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1912

232
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am enclosing a letter concerning the conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.*

I shall be very grateful to you if you print this letter in your next circular so as to inform all the parties about our conference. I hope nothing will prevent you from doing so, all the more as the circular has not carried any official information about Russia for a long time now. I shall be much obliged if you let me know when the circular is due to come out.

The Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has elected me representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the International Socialist Bureau.

Yours,
N. Lenin

I am enclosing a copy of an official publication of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.**

Written in March, prior to 10th, 1912
Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1963
in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from a typewritten copy
Translated from the French

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* See V. I. Lenin, "Report to the International Socialist Bureau on the All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P." (present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 503-05).—*Ed.*

** The pamphlet *All-Russia Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*, *1912*, C.C. Publication, Paris.—*Ed.*

233

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

5.4. 12

Dear Citizen,

I have received your Circular No. 5. I am enclosing an official communication* which I would ask you to forward to the secretaries of all the parties duly affiliated with the International Association.

I also have, dear citizen, a request to make in regard to your introduction to Circular No. 5: would you be so kind as to explain to me a point on which I am not quite clear. The thing is this. In the second sentence of your introduction you put forward what I think is a fine principle; you say that the secretariat is duty bound to pass on (to all organisations) documents *submitted by organisations duly affiliated with the International Association*, and by members of the Bureau.... This is perfectly correct. But, dear citizen, do you not think that the first sentence of your introduction, in which you say that you are communicating to the parties affiliated with the Association a protest resolution sent, as you so kindly informed me, by Citizen Babin, clearly contradicts this principle? Does Babin represent an organisation duly affiliated with the Association, and if so, what organisation? Or perhaps Babin is a member of the Bureau? If he is, what organisation does he represent? And what organisation affiliated with the Association is responsible to the Bureau for the Paris resolution? I shall be boundlessly grateful to you, dear citizen, if you dispel my doubts.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from a typewritten copy Translated from the French

* See "A Letter to Huysmans, Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau" (present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 547-50).—*Ed.*

234
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Citizen Huysmans,

I fully agree with you, and, like yourself, believe that the Bureau cannot act as a go-between in polemics. I also believe that the best and only way to prevent this is to circulate only those documents which you receive from the highest bodies of the parties represented in the Bureau and which concern these parties. I was bound to inform you of the decisions of our Party conference which reconstituted the Central Committee, which our Party did not have at the moment, and I would not of course have protested against the passing on of information emanating from another Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, but I considered it my duty to protest against the circulation of polemics between groups abroad.

You also ask what I think of your draft appeal urging the convocation of a joint conference. In my view this would not be advisable at the moment, and since I do not pretend to be impartial, I take the liberty to cite the opinion of the Poles (see *Vorwärts*). The Poles refused to take part in our conference, but they also refused to participate in the conference the Bund wants to call, declaring that it would be a conference of liquidators. It is better to wait; let us see whether the liquidators' conference will take place and what it will do.

I shall send you shortly some rather interesting documents which will give you a better idea of the state of affairs in the Russian S.D.L.P.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in April, prior to 19th, 1912
Sent from Paris to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from a typewritten copy
Translated from the French

235

TO V. A. TER-IOANNISYAN

5/V. 12

Werte Genossin,

I do not know whether you have heard the sad news about our mutual friend who introduced me to you in Berlin—Suren Spandaryan. He has been arrested in Baku. His wife has written to his father that there is nobody to help him; she says he has nothing, not even bedding. Nobody to take him milk, etc. The father told me that he has many acquaintances in Baku and that he had written to *one* of them. Why only to one, I do not know.

Spandaryan's father lives here (Hotel Nicole, 19. Rue Pierre Nicole, 19. Paris). He looks very sick and old. His son had promised to do his best to send money to him from Baku—but couldn't do it because of the arrest. The father is now penniless and is threatened with eviction. His situation is most grievous, I would say desperate.

We helped him with a small loan. But I nevertheless decided to write to you. You probably know some of Spandaryan's friends and acquaintances in Baku and Paris. His father has on more than one occasion forgotten to address letters he has mailed. Because of this I am very much afraid that his letters will not reach Baku. Do you know anybody in Baku whom one could write to about Suren and ask to take care of him?

Furthermore, if you have mutual friends, it would be very necessary to take care of the father as well. I have heard it said that he has a rich son in Yekaterinodar. It would be a good thing if you were to write and *impress* on him that he should send enough money to enable the old man to pay his debts and leave from here.

I hope you will do whatever you can for both Spandaryans and drop me a line about it.

How are you getting on? I have been hoping to hear from you. Have you managed to look into Social-Democratic

literature? Have you become a Social-Democrat and a Bolshevik?

I wish you everything of the best.

Yours,
Lenin

Vl. Oulianoff.
4. Rue Marie Rose. *Paris*. XIV.

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

236
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

...* I am surprised not to have had a single letter from you. It is essential for us to correspond more regularly and especially for you to write more often. "Paris will run to seed," everybody used to say. This is now your responsibility, in other words, you must not allow that to happen. Get the people together at least once a week, talk to them, organise them, see Alexei daily and put some spirit into the group through him. You cannot "abandon your own" to the mercy of fate. It will not do to disorganise what has been (so far) the main centre. Remember, then, this is your responsibility!! Convene the Committee of the Organisations Abroad, instil new energy into it; while in Leipzig I heard complaints that the C.O.A. (unlike the C.B.G.A.**) was doing nothing. And it is expected to supply leaflets (*all* those put out in Paris), bulletins, letters.... Attend to this....

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written in June, prior to 28th, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed*.

** Central Bureau of Groups Abroad.—*Ed*.

237

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*[218]

Dear Colleague,

Received your parcel with files of *Pravda* and *Nevskaya Zvezda*.* Will you please follow it up with the issues of the old *Zvezda* which I am missing (you should have a list of these issues). If you do not have the list of missing issues, let me know, and I shall send it at once.

I also received your detailed letter* concerning our co-operation. We shall try to carry out as much as we can of this extremely broad programme. But it must be underscored once again that it is absolutely impossible to carry on without:

(1) money. The office already owes 200 rubles, of which 100 rubles should have been sent by June 1, old style, and 100 rubles by June 15. The debt must be paid without delay and the money sent punctually by the stipulated dates, as agreed;

(2) it is necessary to send new *books*, works of reference, etc. Without new books it is *impossible* to carry out even one-tenth of your co-operation programme. In my previous letter I gave you a list of books and would ask you to let me know whether you can send them all.

Further, you ask in your letter "what other newspapers we should send". The list was sent you with the previous letter and I can only repeat my request that you inform me by telegram: "papers ordered"; otherwise there will be an *interruption* in the sending of articles.

We are making inquiries about Sinclair's novel in Leipzig. But that is a translation of the English. Or do you want to translate from the German *translation*?

At your service,

V. Ulyanov

---

* Your letter was postmarked June 18. But we have *not yet* received *Nevskaya Zvezda* for June *17*!! Please see to it that the papers are mailed **regularly**.

P.S. As regards the *agrarian question* in particular, we especially need *current* publications—*government* and *Zemstvo*. Print a notice without fail in the next issue that the paper would like to receive *all* publications of the kind, *promising* to publish a list of them as well as *reviews* of the most important ones.

Vl. Ulijanow. Zwierzyniec. L. 218. Oesterreich.
Krakau.

P.S. The newspaper *Nevsky Golos*[219] is also badly needed (we do not have *No. 4* or *later issues*), as are *all* trade union publications. Otherwise the section you want about the struggle between labour and capital *cannot* be started.

P.P.S. I cannot but draw your attention to some most unpleasant misprints in the articles. I have just received (not from the editorial office or from St. Petersburg at all) *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 13. In the article by a "Non-Liberal Sceptic"* the word "ispolzovat"** became "ispovedovat"***!!

Yet the handwriting of the author of the article is by no means difficult to make out. More, it cannot but be familiar to the compositors and the proof-reader. Lastly, the proof-reader should have easily caught the mistake from the meaning.

It is desirable to see to it that there should be fewer errors of *this kind*.

Pravda No. 43 has just been received in five copies as promised. But I haven't got *Nos. 41* and 42. Please send five copies of each.

Written in July, not later than 6th, 1912
Sent to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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* See V. I. Lenin, "Capitalism and 'Parliament'" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 129-31).—*Ed.*

** Use.—*Ed.*

*** Confess.—*Ed.*

238

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

We sent you *Nevskaya Zvezda* No. 16 yesterday.

We too were exasperated in the extreme by No. 6 of *Nevsky Golos* and have already sent a letter of protest to *Pravda*. We are writing some more today for No. 17 of *Nevskaya Zvezda*....*

"Party candidates" *must not* be mentioned in the legal press; we can speak about them in C.C. leaflets and *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

Moving here has given us *so far*: 1) a gain of one day (closer); 2) the arrival of Abramchik (this is a secret). He is already here. It seems he will help us at the frontier. And perhaps (this is still open to question) *also* with the St. Petersburg elections; 3) the hope of arranging a *number* of meetings. For this *two*** are already on their way. If they are not arrested, this will be useful. But everything moves slowly and with one arrest after another.

As for the newspaper, this is what should be done: subscribe to *Russkiye Vedomosti*[220] for yourself (you take the *R.V.* anyway) and send it to us 4-5 days later, a couple of times a week. We shall pay for it. You can't get more out of *Pravda*, for its circulation, they say, has fallen to 30,000 and things are hard....

Send by post ... the *Vperyod* [leaflet] (I haven't got it) and all those put out in Paris. You must arrange without fail for the publication of the [C.O.A.] bulletins (modest ones for the time being) listing the Paris [leaflets] and giving a brief review of each.

You promised to get something from Yuri about Plekhanov's party report. Nothing has been received so far. Send it!!

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

** A reference evidently to Inessa Armand and G. I. Safarov.—*Ed.*

And what did Plekhanov have to say about T. and Ger—n?

Yours,
Lenin

Written July 24, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

239

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleague,

I am sending you the article "Some Results of Six Months' Work".* You will see from the contents *why* I have sent this huge article to *Pravda*. You could run it in four successive feuilletons set up in small type. Each of the four articles could have a separate heading (for example: I. Workers' collections for the newspaper by months in 1912. II. Workers' collections for the newspaper by districts. III. Workers' collections for liquidationist and *non*-liquidationist newspapers. IV. The worker's kopek for the workers' newspaper).

I would very much like these articles, which are written exclusively for *Pravda* and **addressed to its readers,** to be published in *Pravda*. I don't think there could be any censorship trouble. I agree of course to make changes required by the censors, *but not to omit Chapter III*.

If by any chance you should reject the article for *Pravda*, and if your colleagues reject it for *Nevskaya Zvezda* (for which it is far less suited), I shall get it published in one of the journals, however much I should dislike to. At any rate, please reply as soon as possible or send the article back to me here.

Gylka sent me a letter the other day *refusing* to contribute to *Zvezda* and *Pravda* in view of the "harmful", if you please, tendencies he discerned in No. 6 of *Nevsky Golos* and Plekhanov's "withdrawal". This is not the first

* See V. I. Lenin, "The Results of Six Months' Work" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 187-202).—*Ed.*

time that this Gylka is switching over. If he should take it into his head to raise a fuss about the publication of his article (although I couldn't very well wire you his refusal!!), don't bother to answer him.

Many thanks for the separate issues of "Right" newspapers. It is extremely important for us to get such separate packages of interesting papers, which we are altogether unable to obtain except through you.

I was very glad to see in *Pravda* Y. K.'s item about *Sovremennik*.[221] You ask for a greater variety of subjects. In this respect Y. K. is valuable. The paper has no literary criticism—reviews, essays or small paragraphs. In my opinion every contributor should be valued for his own specific subject matter. Given a slightly more attentive attitude on your part, Y. K. could no doubt contribute a bigger variety of items which would greatly enliven the workers' newspaper.

Why did you kill my article on the Italian congress?* In general it wouldn't be a bad thing to inform authors about rejected articles. This is not an excessive request. To write "for the waste-paper basket", i.e., articles to be thrown out, is not very pleasant. Unpublished articles should be returned. *Any* contributor, even to a bourgeois newspaper, would demand this.

With comradely greetings,

Vl. Ulyanov

Please write *Wiener "Arbeiter-Zeitung"*[222] to send the exchange copy to *me* (give them my address). You wouldn't be allowed to get it anyhow. Don't forget to write!!

Written July 28 or 29, 1912
Sent from Salvator (near Cracow)
to St. Petersburg

First published in part in 1930
in *Collected Works*, Second and Third
(Russian) Ed., Vol. XVI

Published in full in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* See V. I. Lenin, "The Italian Socialist Congress" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 170-72).—*Ed.*

240
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

First of all hearty greetings to all friends, thanks for the telegram and heaps of best wishes! (Never mind the blot.) Salut, salut à vous.. Ah, I'd give a lot to hear Montégus now.

But I've gone off the "serious" key.

And there's "business" to discuss.

(1) I am enclosing our reply to the German Vorstand.* Show it to a narrow circle+the Committee of the Organisations Abroad and return.

(2) A letter from Zaks *for you*. Read it, *go into it*, reply and *return*....

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Morozov is talking nonsense....** A young man without allegiances, at loose ends.

Ryazanov in Vienna snaps and sulks—found himself looking foolish after Plekhanov's article in *Pravda*. (I wrote a long, heart-melting letter to *Kiselyov*. I don't think anything will come of it.)

Lunacharsky writes in *Kievskaya Mysl*[223] about "scientific mysticism". Get hold of it and give him a public fatherly trouncing.

Why don't you write something *for Prosveshcheniye*?[224]

Written July 30, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* Reply "To the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party" (see present edition, Vol. 18, p. 204).—*Ed.*

** Manuscript partly damaged. Here several words are illegible.—*Ed.*

241
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you a letter from Vera. You will see from it why we decided to *print* the reply to the Germans for Chemnitz and to print it in Leipzig.[225] The Paris order must therefore be cancelled. I hope work on it has not yet been started and the cancellation will not cause any great inconvenience.

You must get *without fail* to Chemnitz a day *or two* in advance. We shall give a credential from *Rabochaya Gazeta* to a Bolshevik here who will go there from Zakopane. He speaks German.

See plan

There's a serious war ahead of you in Chemnitz.

We shall move to a new flat on September 2. The new address: Ulica Lubomirskiego. 47, au premier, à gauche. (Grigory is at No. 35 in the same street.)



Write whether you are *sure* to be in Chemnitz on the 12th or 13th of September. The reply to the Germans will have to be sent to your name postlagernd* in Chemnitz.

Best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

Peuple (Brussels) reprints from *Russkoye Slovo*[226] that a conference will soon take place *in Vienna* (sic!) of Social-Democratic organisations + the Bund + the Letts + the Poles, etc.!!!

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* Poste restante.—*Ed.*

[Drop in at the Paris group a couple of times and give them a talk. For they have been *left to their own devices*....]

P.S. If an announcement of the liquidators' conference comes out, send it over *express*.

Written in August, prior to 25th, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

242

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I received today from Trotsky an invitation to "their" conference (on August 25).[227]

So they have organised it after all!

We, of course, are not going.

We want to have the Central Organ two-thirds ready, so as to issue a reply ...* *as soon as* their announcement comes out.

We shall begin sending in copy to the C.O. tomorrow.

See to it that the material is set up quickly and proofs corrected properly.

Why doesn't Antonov (Britman) answer me? Is he in Paris? In good health?

Write when you propose to set out for Chemnitz. A paper should be prepared for the Germans in advance.

Why do you return the letters ... and don't give us an answer about the Pannekoek article....

Yours,
Lenin

Written in August, prior to 25th, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed*.

243

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

Can you get *Neue Zeit*, the latest issues, with the Pannekoek and Kautsky articles? If not, write, and we'll send them over. It is necessary to read them before going to Chemnitz and there to look up Pannekoek and make closer contact with him: Kautsky replied to him on some cardinal issues in an extremely *opportunist* way. It is very desirable to make closer contact with the Left (especially Pannekoek, who now lends a hand in the cheap "game" played by Tyszka) and to carry on agitation among them for a *principled* rebuff to Kautsky. It'll be disgraceful if they do not revolt against *such* opportunism! Unfortunately they are short of people: Radek is practically a luminary among them....*

You ought to write *popular* articles (in the tone of *Rabochaya Gazeta*), literary criticism, for *Pravda*. If you write in the *Rabochaya Gazeta* tone ... they'll print them. Otherwise ... a bad job! Dnevnitsky has left and we are now without a literary criticism section in *Zvezda*!! and *Pravda* also needs one.

Have you got *Zavety*?[228] Can you send me Ropshin for a time? I should like to write about him for the C.O.

Are you writing for *Prosveshcheniye*? Make haste!

(I read in a German paper that there is a housing shortage in Chemnitz and that one has to apply in advance to the Wohnungsausschuß**—(Faites attention!***).)

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. And so, *after* Chemnitz, you must come to us. C'est entendu,**** *unless* ... circumstances compel us to invite

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed.*

** Housing board.—*Ed.*

*** Take notice!—*Ed.*

**** It is decided.—*Ed.*

you here before Chemnitz. Let us know in advance whether you are going to Switzerland, when, where, and for how long.

P.P.S. I am sending Gorky's letter, part of which is of general interest. *Return it.*

Written prior to September 6, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

244

A NOTE TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE C.O.

For your information. The report of a Lettish delegate passed on by a Lett, a student in the Lettish group. The general impression, it appears, *even* of all the conciliators, is—a complete *fiasco* for the liquidators.

Write whether you received the pamphlet and what the *beginning* of the congress was like.

Yours,
Lenin

Written after September 6, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

245

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you a copy of our reply to Müller (Albert will send the reply from Leipzig tomorrow).

Albert will also send you our reply in the form of a printed leaflet. (Postskriptum to the pamphlet *Zur gegenwärtigen Sachlage*, etc.*) *Circulate* this leaflet, as well as the

* See V. I. Lenin, "Postscript to the Pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.*" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 219-20).—*Ed.*

pamphlet, as widely as possible. It must be impressed upon the Germans that *before* any materials (of the liquidators' conference) appear in the press and *before verification* in *open* discussion in the press, *not a single word* can be believed.

We hear from Berlin that the liquidators have met with a *fiasco*. Incidentally, Alexinsky *left* their conference and threatens *exposures*.

Write as soon as possible how things are going.

Yours,
Lenin

Postskriptum zu der Schrift
Zur gegenwärtigen Sachlage, etc.

Vertraulich ...* *an die Delegierte des ... zum Chemnitzer Parteitag.***

Today, September 15, we received through Paris the following letter from the Vorstand which shows the German comrades most strikingly how right we were in protesting against private, unauthorised "informants" who *fear to come out openly*. The Vorstand writes on September 10:

. . . . . .

We replied to the Vorstand.

It goes without saying that the Vorstand's information is false, that it is a sheer invention by the liquidators.

We can say with certainty that this fable was given to the Vorstand by the Letts, Bundists or the Trotzky-Leute who recently held "their own" conference, which they call a Party conference, but which in reality was a conference of liquidators.

So as not to make unsubstantiated statements, so as not to quote our organisational correspondence, we shall

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed.*

** Confidentially ... to the delegates ... to the Chemnitz Party Congress.—*Ed.*

confine ourselves to adducing only one printed document openly published in St. Petersburg. (The Vorstand would do well to cease once and for all to take things on faith.)

The St. Petersburg Marxist daily *Pravda* printed in its issue No. 102, August 28 (September 10, new style), a letter from one of the biggest factories in Kharkov specifically about the elections. The letter states clearly and plainly that the "liquidator candidates" were "not announced" and that they, the liquidators, "*deny the need for a workers' party*" (*Pravda* No. 102, p. 4, col. 1).

From this alone the German comrades can see how shamelessly the Letts, the Bund, Trotsky and sundry private "informants" are deceiving them.

It is clearly a matter of enabling the same Trotsky, the Bund, the Letts or the Caucasians to lay hands on the money on behalf of angeblichen* "organisations", whose existence neither the Vorstand nor anyone else can prove or verify.

Surely the German party with its 90 Social-Democratic newspapers can—if it does not want to put itself in an awkward position by blundering in serious matters—open a discussion on the question of the Social-Democratic Party in Russia and induce all the ... informants to come out into the open with documents bearing their signature. Russia is after all not central Africa, and the German Social-Democratic workers would be able without much difficulty to grasp the truth and at the same time certain members of the Vorstand would be relieved of the necessity of listening to private and *unverifiable* tales.

Im Auftrage des Zentralkomitees,**

Lenin

Written September 15, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Chemnitz

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* Fictitious.—*Ed.*

** On behalf of the Central Committee.—*Ed.*

246

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

Congratulations on your speech.*

Dash it all, it's disgusting: the Vorstand will give *permission* to "circulate"....**

I am sending the article I wrote for *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* with Malecki's translation.[229] I decided to send it to you when I learned that you had met Pannekoek. It would be best if you *personally* gave him the article and discussed it with him. I give you the right to make cuts and changes but bear in mind that *I do not agree to being simply "for Radek"*.[230] If they do not want to hear out my whole statement (against Rosa and *for our Party*), then to hell with them.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Write details about Axelrod and all the rest. (We published in Leipzig a leaflet with our answer to the Vorstand. Wire or telephone Albert to let you have it all immediately if you haven't received it yet.)

The Vorstand of course will forbid it. Arrange it privately and circulate it without fail.

Written after September 17, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* Kamenev's speech at the German Social-Democratic Party Congress in Chemnitz on September 16, 1912.—*Ed.*

** Manuscript partly damaged. Several words illegible.—*Ed.*

247

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am enclosing a short article from *Leipziger Volkszeitung** No. 235 (9. X. 1912) concerning the *liquidators*' conference.

This brief article written by the Central Committee of our Party will give you an idea of that pseudo-Social-Democratic conference.

With fraternal greetings,

V. Ulyanov

Written after October 9, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Brussels

First published April 21, 1963, in *Pravda* No. 111

Printed from a typewritten copy
Translated from the French

248

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am enclosing the German translation of the manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party (Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) against war.** Be so kind as to convey the text of this manifesto to the secretaries of the parties represented in the Bureau and to the socialist press.

Accept, dear comrade, my fraternal greetings.

N. Lenin

Written in October, prior to 23rd, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

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* See "Reply to the Article of the Liquidators in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*" (*Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 54, pp. 366-68). —*Ed.*

** Appeal of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. "To All the Citizens of Russia" (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 22, pp. 135-39). The German translation of this document has not been found.—*Ed.*

249

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am enclosing a communication from the Warsaw Committee of the Polish Social-Democratic Party. This committee has asked me to forward to you the communication which conclusively proves that the charges against the Warsaw Committee lodged with the International Socialist Bureau by the Central Committee of the Polish Social-Democratic Party are completely false.

I would be very grateful, dear comrade, if you would bring this important document to the attention of the secretaries of all the parties represented in the Bureau.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

Written in October prior to 24th, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from a typewritten copy
Translated from the French

250

TO N. G. POLETAYEV

Dear Colleague,

I was very happy to receive one of your rare letters. Many, many thanks for the subscriptions to the journals. I can send you the book by Litvinov whenever you want it. I do not recall a book by Chistyakov. What is it about, what sort of a book is it?[231] Your hopes that I am sufficiently well informed are, alas, entirely unfounded. In fact, to me it sounds almost like mockery.... Of course I quite understand your reference to the "hurry-scurry", but a political hurry-scurry, you know, seldom takes the form of silence or reserve. As a contributor to *Pravda* on political questions I too experience the "hurry-scurry" and that is why I can-

not remain silent even when the circumstances are not at all conducive to conversation (owing to the silence of the interlocutor). In my view it would be extremely important before the elections on October 17[232] to set forth still more clearly and resolutely the basic principles of the anti-liquidationist platform, to print our own list once more in full, to warn against vacillation à la Sudakov[233] (strange, very strange that you say nothing on this score). I am sending article after article about this. Knock and it shall be opened unto you.... Is this applicable to your newspaper? It would be advisable to put out an extra sheet on these questions on Wednesday. It would cost some 100-200 rubles—but even that sum would be repaid tenfold by the success of the election campaign, for what we need are reliable and lasting friends, do not forget that. Don't stint 100-200 rubles at the decisive moment, you will economise far more in the long run.... As regards the technicalities, it is important to give some attention to curbing the chairman of the congress of representatives. I would advise consulting lawyers by telephone and writing an article about the rights of members of the congress of representatives vis-à-vis the chairman. I do not have the law at the moment (Legal Code, Vol. II, 1892 edition, articles 179-91, general gubernia institutions), in any case the lawyers ought to know and will give clear practical advice on how to file complaints against the chairman and secure one's rights. Don't grudge the expense of wiring me the election results.

N. L.

Written October 25, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a
typewritten copy
found in police records

251

TO MAXIM GORKY[234]

I had hardly posted my previous letter when I received yours about the library. The plan to collect material on the history of the revolution is magnificent. I welcome it with all my heart and wish it success.

As for Bebutov, he told me when I met him in May in Berlin that he had given the library to the Vorstand (the C.C. of the German Social-Democrats) *in such a way* that *he could not take it back*. I have his letter saying that this library was to be donated to the Social-Democratic Party when it was united, etc. I'm afraid that means there's nothing to be done. But all the same *you* ought to try to get in touch with Bebutov.

Vl. Ilyin

Written in the second half of October 1912
Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published April 21, 1960, in the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* No. 95

Printed from a typewritten copy certified by Maxim Gorky

252

TO L. B. KAMENEV

To Kamenev

Friday

Dear L. B.,

Please *hurry up* and put out the C.O.

We are annoyed with you for your silence. You didn't write from Vienna. You didn't convey a message of greetings to the Austrian congress.[235] That's no good. You didn't write from Zurich!!

In Warsaw Jagiello got in.[236] We don't know yet about Moscow.

All the best,

Yours,

*Lenin**

. . . . . .

Written November 8, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* Manuscript partly damaged. Several words illegible.—*Ed.*

253

TO L. B. KAMENEV

10. XI.

Dear L. B.,

I have just learned that the congress in Basle will take place, *in all probability*, on *November* 24.[237] For the resolutions committee we are appointing one delegate (+one each from France, Germany, Austria and Britain+Chairman Vandervelde, 4. Rue...* XIV. Bruxelles). Keep the address.

It is possible that I shall not go and that **we shall appoint you.** So begin to prepare *at once*: collect *all* the manifestos against war, get the last issue of *Neue Zeit* (No. 6, 8. XI) where Kautsky advances purely opportunistic arguments; etc. ...[238]

Leave on receipt *of a wire* (to be in Basle one or two days before the congress opens, i.e., on 22 or 23. XI).

Put out the C.O. (8 pages) **at once**.

Write what and how much is left for the next issue (4 pages) which we shall put out *shortly*. Malinovsky got in in Moscow Gubernia.

Saluts et félicitations!

Bien à vous,

Vl. Lenin

. . . . . .

Written November 10, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

10. XI.

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

I am very grateful to you for your communication.[239] We shall try to take steps to appoint delegates to the Basle Congress.

* Manuscript partly damaged. Several words illegible.—*Ed.*

Our Party's representative in the committee to edit the draft resolution will be named at the earliest possible date.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

P.S. I must submit to the C.C. of our Party a report on the last session of the Bureau. To draw up the report I need some information. I know very well that you are extremely busy, dear comrade, and would ask you to give five or ten minutes of your time to Comrade Popov, who will call on you. The French and German newspapers (*Le Peuple*, Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*, *Leipziger Volkszeitung* and *Vorwärts*) published very contradictory information on the last session of the I.S.B.[240]

P.P.S. I received the news of the election of deputies to the Fourth Duma from Moscow Gubernia only today. I can now report that *all the deputies* from the workers' curia (Arbeiterkurie) are *Social-Democrats*! Twelve Social-Democrats have already been elected despite the most outrageous rigging of the elections.

With fraternal greetings,

N. Lenin

Written November 10, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1963
in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian
in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
verified against the text
of the journal
Translated from the French

255

TO L. B. KAMENEV

The committee has been appointed for Saturday, 26.XI at 10 a.m. in the Burgvogtenhalle. Be there at 9.45 so as to see *Huysmans* and *Plekhanov* (I *have written* to both about

you*). No later! Better earlier so as to arrange everything.

You are the national secretary. No one but *you and Plekhanov has the right* to receive admission cards.

Since I wrote about you to Huysmans (I gave him your official name—*Kameneff*—and also your address and real name), there is no need to show your mandate.

Get Malecki at least to come as your suppléant,** but let him not take the floor *when you are there* and speak *only* on Polish questions. Mention this only to Huysmans.

I am sending two mandates for the delegation—take your choice.

A detailed letter on the tasks of the delegation, votes, and the rest has been sent to Troyanovsky for forwarding to Yuri (Bekzadian. Bolleystraße. 4. Zurich).

We cursed you roundly for your silence, but now peace!

Ask Rubanovich when you have a chance whether Plekhanov spoke about uniting with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Yours,
Lenin

For the trip: 40 frs. per lecture+50. The Committee of the Organisations Abroad is defraying the expense.

Written November
17 in 23, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

256

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

...*** Two of our latest documents are to be sent to you in Basle from Brussels (by Popov) [and from Leipzig] (by Zagorsky): my Rapport [to the I.S.B.] on the elections

* For letter to G. V. Plekhanov (see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 202-03).—*Ed.*

** *Aide.—Ed.*

*** Manuscript badly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

to the Fourth Duma and "Russian Workers Against War"*... strikes and the resolution of the representatives. All this should be *circulated* in [the I.S.B. This] is important....

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. ...Prepare *in a businesslike way*. This makes an ... on all of them. Say that the *whole world* measures the strength of Social-Democracy by three tokens: 1) the number ... of votants** (in Russia, *not*; a couple of words against the legalists); 2) the socialist press; 3) socialist deputies. [Should we go by the] legal press?

How many times stronger have we (*Pravda*) been than *Luch*[241] *throughout 1912* (ten months, January-October)? (*Ad. 3*. Begin with the Third Duma) "Der Anonymus aus dem *Vorwärts*" u.s.w.*** The **worker curia** in the Fourth Duma (two words about it) is ours.

Written prior to November 20, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

257

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am furious with you for your carelessness: you did not arrange for letters from the congress!! But of that another time. You made Koba lose *most* precious time.

---

* Lenin's report, "Elections to the Fourth Duma", to the International Socialist Bureau, previously believed to be missing, was published in *Le Peuple* No. 325 on November 20, 1912. It was reprinted in 1963 in *Correspondance entre Lénine et Camille Huysmans. 1905-1914*, Paris.

"Russian Workers Against War"—evidently the appeal "To All the Citizens of Russia" issued by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 22, pp. 135-39).—*Ed.*

** Voters.—*Ed.*

*** A reference to Lenin's "The Anonymous Writer in *Vorwärts* and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 533-46).—*Ed.*

Now to the point. In my opinion you handled things in Basle—under the circumstances—superbly. It couldn't have been done better. There couldn't have been a *better* occasion to unmask the liquidators. (I gathered—for you "haven't finished" your letter yet!—that the I.S.B. *did not* examine *at all* the division of votes). The outcome was a tie, and this was the *best* outcome with the present balance of strength....* The question of the "nationals" was, in my opinion, *in place*, like all the three questions. In a word, as regards the main thing—félicitations les plus chaleureuses!

Why was Muranov's signature missing? For the telegram was **on Sunday!!**[242]

So far we have seen two of the six: Malinovsky and Muranov. Impression excellent.... The soil is rich, but a *great deal* of work is needed....

P.S. In my opinion, parity can be agreed to, but you must put forward one condition: *rejection* of Haase because of bias and insulting behaviour in the Bureau.

It is our legitimate right and moral duty to reject his candidacy. And politically it is clear ... hatching a malicious intrigue against us....

Written after November 25, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

258

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

Shame—shame—shame!

Not a word for *Pravda* about Basle!! What's the matter??

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed.*

You had five aides and not a single letter *from* Basle to us!!—not a single dispatch to *Pravda*!!

And why didn't you give *mandates* to the "girls" (all those who were in Basle) when you had my blank mandate?

Yours,
Lenin

Written after December 3, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

259
TO DEMYAN BEDNY

Dear Comrade,

I hasten to inform you that I received your letter of November 15, 1912. The address evidently functions well—you can continue to use it. We were greatly upset by your temporary withdrawal from *Pravda* and are very glad that you have returned. Communication with *Pravda* staff has been very unsatisfactory lately, especially after the unfortunate developments of the past few days.[243] This is very painful. We would be very pleased if, now that you have tested the address and seen that your letter has reached us, you would write more about yourself, about the present Editorial Board of *Pravda*, about how *Pravda* is run, about its opponents, about *Luch*, and so on.

What is the need for confirmation through the Editorial Board of *Pravda*? I do not understand.

Greetings and best wishes from myself and my colleague.

V. Ilyin

Written December 5, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960 in the
journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

260
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I shall reply point by point.

1) About Haase's letter to Ryazanov. This "document" is private. We do not have it. We *cannot* refer to it. For *us* to ask Haase (if only through the I.S.B.) for an "explanation" is awkward, very awkward.

Your question whether "he (Haase) was given (by whom?) an opportunity to 'explain things'" is irrelevant.

He always had and *still has* an opportunity. He has even been *told* as much by Ryazanov. Ergo, he does not want to. And to the devil with him! But we will corner him and *all the Germans*, because now we have a document stating that the Vorstand gave money to the Letts+the Bund+the Caucasian region.

2) Your question if we "have someone better in view" is, forgive me, very strange. And stranger still: "he (Haase) at least knows something"(??) (le préjugé est plus éloigné de la vérité que l'ignorance!*) and "he is capable (?) of understanding (??) the price (???) of ideological (????) differences".... Really, this is strange. He *cannot* understand who does not *want to*. And the German Vorstand (with Haase, its head) has *demonstrated* that it does not want to.

We are not looking for anyone "better", we cannot and are not obliged to look. That is not the point. It is only necessary to reject what is deliberately "partial". The rest does not matter.

3) What is this about the "endorsement of the mandates of the opposition" in Basle? Aren't you ashamed of yourself for not having written a word about this *to this day*??

Who "endorsed"? The Russians? The Social-Democrats +the Socialist-Revolutionaries?? Who permitted them to interfere? How could the Russians interfere *without* getting the *whole* Polish delegation to cast its vote as laid down in the rules of the International? Did the *whole* Polish delegation vote or not? If it did, we *need* at any rate (be-

* Prejudice is farther from the truth than ignorance!—*Ed.*

sides your account) a *document* signed by *all* the delegates who did the "endorsing". How could you, who have been here and know how acute the problem of the opposition is, have failed to realise the importance of such a document in a matter of this kind in general, and that for us in Cracow it is doubly important??

4) If Muranov's signature was there, drop a line [please]* to Huysmans saying that there was a misprint or an omission in the reports and that you kindly ask him to make a correction in the official report, to insert Muranov, that you are referring to such-and-such a document, reminding him, etc.

5) You are going to write for the C.O. on the elections and on Basle, aren't you? As regards the elections, read Steklov's vile article in *Neue Zeit* and bear it in mind, without, of course, replying to him.

Hand in the article about Basle to the printers as quickly as you can and send us the proofs as soon as possible; for we *have to discuss the matter*: there are a number of important questions (how to write about Plekhanov? and about the Polish opposition?). In my opinion, you should make it sharply-worded. But there is no collective decision on this as yet, nor can there be without our article.

6) Honestly, L. B., I simply cannot understand you—although we have been working together so long—when you now begin making "domestic scenes" about (a) the trip to Basle, (b) delegating you (as was proposed) to the meeting.

Why such a tone!? How can you take such an attitude?? Aren't you ashamed to raise questions?

What was so bad *for the cause* about your trip to Basle? Explain, for God's sake!

How *you* can repeat the pointless whining of Yuri and the Kiev people is in-com-pre-hensible!

What was so bad *for you*? Explain!

Now, about the meeting. I must (a) drop my *daily* work for *Pravda*; (b) spend twice or three times as much time as you would; (c) spend twice or three times as much money

* Manuscript partly damaged. The word in square brackets has been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

—*and there is no money*; (d) walk into the trap prepared by our enemies who want to make the most of my *maximum* (how else could it be the way the war is going) *irritation*??

Tell me, for God's sake, what's come over you?? Why, if *you* wrote the pamphlet, should *I* have to go??

..."It will at once make the whole thing look ridiculous"!? What does this mean?? Why did Martynov's being with you in Basle *not* make things "look *ridiculous*"?? Why do you *allow* yourself to be taken in by the old wives' tales of the Paris scandalmongers??

..."It will at once tip the scales in favour of the O.C." ...Now, really, that is being a little too naïve. *Since* the Germans are against us (and that is a fact) the "scales" have *already* tipped in favour of the O.C. How can you fail to see this?? My presence would only make things *ten times* worse, for I am *incapable* of talking peaceably (like you) either with Haase or about Haase. You know this perfectly well!

The point however is that it is *not* these "scales", i.e., in the Bureau, at the meeting, that are **seriously** decisive, it is the *real* alignment of forces that counts. We **have** 6 curia workers in the Social-Democratic Duma group on the Jagiello question—6 and 6; Malinovsky writes me today: "we have 6 curia deputies+4 liquidators+2 wavering. The Siberians have *not yet* arrived."

We shall mobilise the six representing the *proletariat of Petersburg*, *Moscow* and *the South* and *fight* the gossip and intrigues of Tyszka+Rosa+Ryazanov and others.... There you have the *serious* "scales"! And you know it! Why stage these "domestic scenes" when the fight is hard enough as it is??

"The Germans will take offence ... get angry".... This has *already* happened. And we shall *send* a protest about the Germans giving the money to the O.C. Let them get angry. They are already *involved*. We *must* inevitably fight with the Germans and *began* to do so with (a) the "Anonymus" +(b) Chemnitz. *Haase* "replied" in Chemnitz. The war *is on*, and you wax naïve: they'll get angry, they'll take offence. I don't understand you!

I am thinking of replying to the Bureau's proposals thus: (a) we shall *turn down* all the Germans for handing

the money to the Bund and the Caucasus; (b) we shall *go* to the meeting only with the expelled group of liquidators *without* the nationals; (c) preliminary condition—formal disavowal by them of the vile slander in *Luch* about the provocation in Warsaw. The motives are clear. Your opinion?

Reply more precisely, more directly, more resolutely. I shall go *nowhere*; if you carry the "scenes" to the point of refusal, I shall get Semashko delegated or....* Is *that* what you want? Once again: were you right with your "apprehensions" about Basle? or was I right that no harm was done to the *cause*, but that both the *cause* and the pocket benefited?

7) The money crisis is *serious*. We had a meeting of the C.C. with Koba.[244] It was decided to warn you *urgently*: *look* for earnings! You can count on 100 frs. monthly for about three months+from *Pravda* for what you write, but after that nothing.

Think this over and let us have your answer as soon as possible.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. From *Pravda* they write us: Alexinsky and Co. (sic!) have offered articles on condition that their articles the editors do not agree with be published.

They replied: we would be glad to have your contributions, but cannot accept such a condition, for our task now is to concentrate the forces of the anti-liquidators to combat the liquidators.

A splendid answer and perfectly correct, in my opinion.

Bear this in mind! What do Alexinsky and Co. want? (What Co.? Lunacharsky alone, or someone *else*? And who?) Is it *just* an intrigue, as I think (*Luch*, you see, is kinder, while *Pravda* turned me down, etc.), or an overture, as Grigory believes? You meet ... or see..., check up, find out what you can, and write.

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* One word illegible.—*Ed.*

About the Duma group: there is a letter (not to us, but a reliable letter) saying that the voting on cultural-national autonomy *went against* the liquidators+Chkheidze. This is the only *fact* we know of pointing to the emergence of our majority among the 12. That is all we know *so far*. As soon as we know more we shall write.

Written December 8, 1912
Sent from Cracow to Paris

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Printed from the original

261

TO J. V. STALIN

To Vasilyev

14/XII.

Dear Friend,

We learned today that the board of the co-operative[245] is to be dissolved within a week. There is therefore very little time left. We earnestly ask you to take all steps to: 1) transfer *Dyen*[246] in good time to No. 5,[247] or at any rate make certain, concretely and with full guarantees, that the funds are in his hands. The financial crisis is terribly acute. Subscription money is now all we have. To leave this in unreliable hands would be a crime! 2) It is necessary at once to prepare (or to take those already prepared by us and sent long ago) articles and statements by the six co-operators for *Dyen* and publish them without delay. If we do not launch an energetic campaign for subscriptions, for donations, for support, we are lost. 3) Get Misha's collegium[248] to pass a resolution against No. 16,* to counteract the liquidators' resolutions. 4) See to it that the gathering of all (without exception) which has been finally decided upon is held—this is now trebly important. We are dragging Spitsa in too. 5) Get Vasilyev out as soon as possible, otherwise you won't be able to save him, and he is needed and has already accomplished the main thing.

* No. 16—Y. I. Jagiello.—*Ed.*

Please reply to this letter as soon as possible and especially about *Pravda*.* You wrote that "it smacks of a criminal act".[249] We shall be finished if we do not turn over the whole business (i.e., the publishing and the funds) to No. 5.

Best regards,

Yours,**

P.S. The trip is possible only if undertaken immediately, if passports are obtained for everybody at once, without delay, if you see to it that there should be action, not promises. If it is postponed, they will all scatter and nothing will come of it. It is extremely important to get everyone to take part simultaneously, for otherwise again there will be no decisions, no organisation, only promises, only talk.

P.P.S. You must do your best to put off the question of No. 16 until 1913, many after all do not know the *Party* documents, and without them it would be wrong for people to decide such a question.

Written December 14, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960 in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from a copy in Krupskaya's handwriting

262

TO J. V. STALIN[250]

To Vasilyev

16/XII.

Dear Friend,

We received all your letters (the last about the "tractability" of your compatriot*** regarding No. 16.... Questionable, though!) and are replying. Is it possible that our letters go astray?

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* This word is crossed out in the original and replaced with *Luch* for reasons of secrecy.—*Ed.*

** Signature illegible.—*Ed.*

*** A reference to N. S. Chkheidze.—*Ed.*

1) For goodness' sake, take the most energetic steps to get W.* away from Krass and turn it over legally to Muranov, No. 5, and particularly to take the funds and the subscription money. Without this we are lost. Besides to allow the abuses to go on would be criminal.

2) Arrange a meeting over there of all six before they have time to scatter. There is plenty of time now; they will manage to do everything after the meeting as well.

3) Be sure to get the six to publish a statement in W. (even the five, at a pinch; we cannot delay any longer and wait).

4) Impress it finally and seriously upon Shibayev** and all his colleagues that they must write here twice a week and correspond conscientiously. Without this *it is impossible* to work together.

5) The same applies to Vetrov. He has not written once, and he could easily have sent even the text of the liquidators' declaration. This is inexcusable.

6) Did you get the draft resolutions for Misha's collegium? Do your level best to get them adopted.

The letters were sent mainly to the bank address. The draft leaflet, to the other, Shibayev address. Reply at once, if only in a few words, to acknowledge receipt of this letter.

Greetings

P.S. Just learned of the defeat.

You must get Misha's collegium to adopt a resolution *against* (the one No. 3 had), with the addition that the decision of the Duma group is a decision of seven semi-Party people, and circulate it in the districts. If even the base resolution of the 7 Mensheviks for Jagiello (and for the Bund) does not finally impel No. 6 to join us, the five must speak out in W. and speak out very *sharply*.

If the resolution about Jagiello was adopted under such circumstances as Rusanov's not yet having arrived or there

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* A reference to *Pravda*.—*Ed*.

** Evidently a reference to A. Y. Badayev.—*Ed*.

being no certainty about his not being a Social-Democrat, then the 7 simply fooled the 6, picked their pockets. In Rusanov's place, on arriving later, I would not have joined the Social-Democratic Duma group and would have raised a terrific row.

But if it was known that Rusanov was not a Social-Democrat, then it was wrong to accept the base resolution without a protest.

At *any rate* I would advise the Petersburg Committee to adopt a resolution on approximately these lines (repeat the resolution which No. 3 has):

The Petersburg Committee strongly condemns the resolution of the 7 members of the Duma group who: a) did not obtain exact information about the Social-Democratic workers in Warsaw; b) made no mention in the resolution of the *protest* of all the Polish Social-Democrats against Jagiello; c) made no mention of the two (out of three) electors from the Warsaw workers; d) represented the bourgeois vote for the P.P.S. as evidence of "the growth of political consciousness among the bourgeoisie", whereas it could only be a matter of an honest man gaining by two thieves falling out; e) deduced Jagiello's Social-Democratism from his "statement" and from the bloc of a section of the Social-Democrats with a *non*-Social-Democratic party *against* the Polish Social-Democrats; f) and what is most important —drew an *incredible distinction* between "questions of the internal life of Social-Democracy" and "questions of political activity in the Duma, thereby *encouraging* the *separation* of the latter from the former".

The Petersburg Committee condemns those who have taken such an anti-Party step and thereby divorced themselves from the "internal life of Russian Social-Democracy".

Written December 16, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960 in
Istorichesky Arkhiv No. 2

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Printed from a
copy in Krupskaya's
handwriting

263

TO THE BOLSHEVIK DEPUTIES OF THE FOURTH DUMA*

17/XII.

Dear Friends,

We are distressed not so much by the defeat over No. 16 as by the inexcusable silence of friends (of the six or at least the five) on the matter, and the light-hearted attitude to things. For this means killing the cause, ruining everything. There is no declaration yet from the five or the six, because they have not yet broken away from the grip of dishonest people. (No. 3 says himself: it smacks of a criminal act!) Remember, for heaven's sake, that we shall all be responsible if this terrible assumption proves correct. But the cheque must, at all costs, be made out in the name of No. 3 or No. 5, the funds placed in charge of our own man** at once, or No. 5 should take over control.** A subscription campaign should be launched immediately everywhere and letters from the co-operators printed every day about this.

We still have no Duma materials, neither statistical reports (1), nor (2) the Duma bulletins, nor (3) the Cadet interpellation, (4) nor Kokovtsov's memorandum, (5) nor the Cadet or any other bills. Please exert every effort to obtain this before the Duma adjourns and send it to us as soon as possible.

Reply if only in a few words, but without delay.

Written December 17, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

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* This letter was addressed to N. I. Podvoisky.—*Ed.*

** There is an omission in the typewritten copy after this word and a note: "Words illegible."—*Ed.*

264

TO THE BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P., IN RUSSIA

19/XII.

Dear Friends,

The news of the inclusion by the liquidators of the point about "cultural-national autonomy" filled us with indignation! There are limits to everything! The people who have broken up the Party now want completely to destroy the Programme as well. Even where the arch-conciliator Plekhanov draws the line, they do not. This is impossible. It cannot be tolerated, and....* Resistance and protest must be organised at all costs. We must present an ultimatum: let us speak up, [let] *them* read out this bilge, this cultural-national autonomy, etc.! Exert every effort to do this, if only through the five (better five with the Party policy than six wavering between the Party and its liquidators).

The base resolution about No. 16, the vile insertion of the cultural-national autonomy point, and the pretensions to "poke" into the newspaper question clearly show that there can be no illusions about "peace" with such people.[251] They *started* the war by these moves. It is necessary to give considered thought to this war and to wage it energetically. For this, besides the above, two steps are essential: (1) to submit written protests signed by the five threatening to appeal to the Party organisations—on all the above-mentioned and similar questions; (2) arrange a meeting here of the live or the six (this is imperative!) and finally decide on a line of action.

Approximate text...: "We, the undersigned, hereby declare that the decision of the Duma group regarding Jagiello, the resolution about him, the decision to insert the cultural-national [autonomy] point, run counter to *all* the resolutions of Party congresses to such an extent that we disclaim responsibility for these decisions, declare them

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

to be anti-Party, reserve the right to appeal to the Party organisations, and warn that by taking decisions such as these the Duma group is departing completely from the Party road."

It is clear that the seven will pursue the liquidationist path *further*.

We must make haste with the organisation; write in detail about *Dyen*. How are the finances? What about the editorial end? We wrote specially asking No. 1 or No. 3 (or both, which would be best) to bring us the books listed.

We earnestly beg you to do this. We shall cover the expenses ... pass on Falinsky's book, and we are being scolded.

2. Did No. 3 receive the money from Vienna? It is for Vetrov.

3. Is it possible somehow to find out whether Vetrov received our letters? We have written him many times at the editorial office, but have had no reply. Is it really impossible to obtain addresses for letters?

P.S. I am asked to add this: you have the right to take books from the library.... For two weeks.

Written December 19, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

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copy in Krupskaya's
handwriting

265

TO THE BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P., IN RUSSIA

For Vasilyev and No. 3. Dear friends, we received your news today that the majority of the co-operative has again restored the national-cultural autonomy clause to please the Jewish nationalists and the rest of that company. What is this—a mockery of the six? Do these gentry not understand that by interpreting the Programme to please this company they are thereby releasing the minority from

submission? Why, it is a public disgrace that they should gain the upper hand by making use of one chance vote of a muddled Menshevik, or perhaps relying in this case on No. 16. We do not know what the six have done on this question

But how can we silently submit, how can No. 3 agree to read such bilge publicly (and thereby assume responsibility), how could the six (or at any rate No. 3 alone) not come out at once with a statement in *Dyen* that these gentry are making a mockery of the Programme and heading for a split—this we cannot possibly understand. For if nothing is said, the Jewish Marxists* will walk all over us tomorrow. After all, there must be some limit. And if these gentlemen think that the minority is obliged to submit even when the Programme is obviously being torn to bits, they are badly mistaken.

We sent in one general article on cultural-national autonomy before your letter came (we quoted Plekhanov: the Caucasians and the Bund are adapting socialism to nationalism). Today we are sending articles directly against the co-operative. We would ask you to see that they are printed as soon as possible, and we believe that if it is not too late you should take resolute measures to prevent changes in the Programme. It is necessary to fight, since the others are taking such steps. As regards the merging of *Vechernaya Pochta*** and *Dyen* you will all doubtless adopt the resolution, with the exception of the pro-liquidators. This of course was trickery on their part, and we shall not agree to join them in anything. Why are only four coming? We earnestly beg you to get all six to come. This is extremely important.

Written December 20, 1912
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1923 in the book *Iz epokhi "Zvezdy" i "Pravdy" (1911-1914)*, Vol. III

Printed from a typewritten copy found in police records

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* The Bund.—*Ed.*

** Code name for *Luch*.—*Ed.*

266

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Cracow, December 22, 1912

Dear Citizen,

I could not understand your letter of 5. XII. 1912.[252] Either there is some misunderstanding or else there exists a resolution of the Bureau unknown to me.

Le Peuple (Brussels) wrote: "As regards representation of the Russian socialist parties in the Bureau, the situation remains unchanged" (*Le Peuple*, 30. XI. 1912). Is there *another* resolution of the Bureau? If so, I trust you will be kind enough to inform me of it.

If not, the Central Committee of our Party has the right to appoint its own representative.

Why is this "only temporary"? Of course a *new* decision of the Bureau is always possible, but in this sense *any* representation is "temporary".

Is there a Bureau resolution to the effect that both Russian Social-Democratic "factions" (?) (the January and August conferences of 1912?) are requested to come to an agreement *on the question of representation in the Bureau*?

I shall be much obliged if you would inform me of that resolution and the documents (if any) received from the "Organising Committee" of the liquidators.

With fraternal greetings,

*N. Lenin**

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

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* The original contains the following crossed-out test, written by Lenin and addressed, evidently, to I. F. Popov:

"Return after reading (and give me your opinion; incidentally, the Frenchman will perhaps correct the language) *as soon as possible* and be sure to return Huysmans's letter.

"H—s wants to arrange everything *informally*. We shall not permit him to do it."—*Ed.*

1913

267
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I received your letter and will *try* to fulfil your requests, although I can promise no success as yet.

The people are practically all here....*

The first impression (sous toutes rèserves) is *most* favourable. No "mincing" whatever. We are starting to confer today and hope to make good progress. When we have finished I shall write to you again.

They have brought a letter from Alexinsky. I am enclosing it. When you have read it (and made a copy for yourself) *be sure to return it* without delay.

Yesterday an extremely friendly letter arrived from Gorky, who appears to be utterly "charmed" at the *Vperyod* people joining *Pravda*.

He writes that he and Tikhonov will take the literary section of *Pravda*, ... and that "Machism, god-building and all that nonsense have faded out for good". Splendid!

It was a mistake of yours to undertake to write a review on Steklov. It won't ring true....

They promise to put out *Prosveshcheniye* in the middle of January.

Plekhanov wrote to *Pravda* (through Dnevnitsky), offering to write an answer to Mayevsky, "provided there is no double censorship". They replied consenting. They are await-

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed*.

ing the article. Buryanov has come to see Plekhanov. Plekhanov wrote him opposing Jagiello's admission.

An invitation has been received from the Vorstand to a Unity conference: C.C.+O.C.+Plekhanov+Duma group+P.S.D. We'll send them to the devil. Entre nous!

I'm in a hurry. Must wind up. Everyone sends you best regards, especially Malinovsky and Koba. We are terribly sorry you are not here. On the whole things seem to be *on the upgrade*. Financially *Pravda* is hard up, but we pin our hopes now on Gorky.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written January 8, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

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Printed from the original

268
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am taking advantage of a free minute to drop you a line in answer to your letter. The meeting here is in full swing—11 people are sitting in.[253] Things are going better. If I can manage it, I shall enclose the first resolution adopted today. Meanwhile, of course, show it to no one....* Party workers ... not bad: 3—St. Petersburg, 2—Moscow, 2—the South, a number of prominent legal functionaries, and so on. It is working out well. There have been conciliatory vacillations in the six, but *so far* we are coming to terms better and better with the chief conciliator among them Petrovsky. The main issue will be that of "unification". We shall settle it *probably* this way: workers from below—welcome; to the group of liquidators in *Luch*—

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed*.

war. At least, as regards revolutionary strikes, *such* a resolution has been adopted (unanimously).

The German Vorstand has sent in a paper....

The position is this: they make an *experiment* in the *legal* field. We're glad. But we are *extremely* cautious. *No* unification *whatever* with the group: **enter** the organisations and we shall *make an experiment*. For God's sake, keep the organisation abroad from taking *any* steps. Read the letter (better relate this part of it) to 2-3 *silent* and *serious* people: to Kamsky, Nik. Vas., but *not to everybody*, *not widely*. For God's sake hurry with the C.O. and send at least the proofs immediately!

Yours,
Lenin

Written January 10, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

269

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am writing at the meeting. It's going wonderfully. It will be no less significant than the 1912 January Conference. There will be resolutions on *all* important issues, unity *included*.

We are all terribly sorry you are not here and have not been able to come.

I am sending the 1st resolution. *For the time being* keep it a secret; only get the backing ...* some of the Bolsheviks, who can *hold their tongues*.

A happy New Year,
Yours,
Lenin

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed*.

All the resolutions are being adopted *unanimously*....
Gigantic success!
We shall be through in 2-3 days.

Written January 12, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

270
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you the remaining resolutions....

It has been strictly resolved that they be kept *secret* until published in the press....*

Your letter has been handed to Malinovsky.

The answer you sent to Huysmans is excellent.

Our general impression of the meeting is an excellent one. I hope yours will be the same. Let *intimates* into this, for the time being *confidentially* (Kamsky, Albert...).

Petrovsky is now ours completely—so are the six—a couple of good non-legalists have returned to Russia. A single "cloud" (*a black one*)—there is still *no* money. Complete bankruptcy.

A thousand greetings,

Yours,
Lenin

The telegram of the 30 Bolsheviks has been received. A thousand greetings and best wishes for the New Year!! From myself and from all our friends here.

Yours,
Lenin

Written not earlier than
January 14, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible.—*Ed.*

271
TO I. A. PYATNITSKY

Dear Comrade Albert,

I would like to have a talk with you about the resolution of the meeting on the non-Russian organisations.* You regard it as "diplomacy"—and that is a great mistake.

In what do you see diplomacy?

First of all in the fact that we raise a hue and cry against the Executive of the P.S.D.—"and all information comes from the members of the opposition".

This is glaringly incorrect!

That *Tyszka* in the Executive evokes opposition and discontent among the P.S.D. we have known *for years*. *Everyone* who has worked with the Executive knows this.

The development of this opposition since 1910 has been in plain sight.

In the spring of 1912 Tyszka and Co. dismiss the Warsaw Committee, which they announce to be dependent on the secret political police, and set up a committee of "their own".

In the autumn elections take place. And what happens? *All* the worker-electors of Warsaw belonging to the Social-Democratic Party are found to be on the side of the *opposition*!

I checked this fact.

The names of the electors are Zalewski and Bronowski. Malinovsky saw them and verified the fact himself.

Isn't this proof enough??

On the side of the opposition we find also both the *organisations abroad* and *Lodz*.

Tyszka's policy of manoeuvring has long been heading for a fall. It is inevitable. The 1912 *January* Conference (which did not touch at all on the subject of Tyszka's (=the Executive's) split with the opposition) had pointed

* A reference to the resolution of the Cracow meeting on the "Non-Russian Social-Democratic Organisations" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 465-66).—*Ed*.

to this course of events which it appraised *in principle*.

The *federation of the worst type*[254] is breaking up.

A comeback (to 1907-11) is *impossible*.

This has got to be understood.

There was a similar period in Austria: a separate C.C. of the nationals; no separate C.C. of the Germans.

In Austria this did not last: from here the road leads *either* to complete federation, *or* to complete unity.

With us, too, semi-federation (1907-11) *cannot last*; no effort must be spared to make the Party workers grasp this thoroughly.

We are out for *complete* unity—*from below*—in the national question as well.

This is possible. We had and have it in the Caucasus (4 nations). We had it in 1907 in Riga (the Letts, Lithuanians and Russians) and in Vilna (Lithuanians, Letts, Poles, [Russians],* Jews)—in both *these* cities *against* the separatism of the Bund.

In Austria federation ended in separatism and breakdown of the united party.[255] With us *it would be criminal* to countenance *separatism* of the Bund and cover it up.

You see "diplomacy" (2°) in the fact that we blame the Bund and "grant almost an amnesty to the Lettish C.C., which is following the Bund".

No. You are mistaken. This is not diplomacy. The Lettish Social-Democratic workers have *always* stood for unity from below, have *always* been for *territorial* autonomy, i.e., have taken an anti-separatist, anti-nationalist stand.

This is a fact.

You cannot deny it.

The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this is: the Lettish C.C. is a *deviation* from the *true* path on the part of one of the bodies of the revolutionary proletariat among the Lettish Social-Democrats.

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* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

In the Bund, on the other hand, there is no such true path, there is no proletariat, no mass organisations—nothing but a circle of intellectuals (Lieber+Movich+Vinitsky—out-and-out opportunists and *long-standing* "bosses" of the Bund) and circles of artisans.

It would be a glaring untruth to confuse the Bund with the Letts.

The "national" question in the R.S.D.L.P. has *come up for discussion*. [This is inescapable.] The breakup of the non-Russian organisations is *no* accident. And we should exert *every* effort towards explaining the matter, towards renewing the struggle of the old *Iskra*.

We are against federation in principle. We are for utilising the deplorable experience of semi-federation (1907-11). We are in favour of a campaign for unity *from below*.

The comrades who used to work among the Jewish Social-Democratic workers of Russia or who are generally familiar with the conditions, should collect [information on] the harm of Bund separatism. The Bund *wrecked* the Stockholm [resolution] (1906).[256] It united *nowhere* locally itself (the Letts never did anything like it).

Does anyone really believe that we shall forget this and allow ourselves again to be fed with empty promises??

Never! Unite in Warsaw, Lodz, Vilna, and so on, gentlemen "uniters" of the Bund!

[I would be glad] if you would show this letter to the Bolsheviks interested [in the national question and if] *work* could be started everywhere on a serious study of the question and the collection of material (*Russia*'s experience) against the Bund "separatists".

Beste Grüße,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after January 14, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

272

TO THE EDITOR OF *BREMER BÜRGER-ZEITUNG*

Dear Comrade,

I would be much obliged if you could send me the two issues of *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* in which you published a review on Rosa Luxemburg's book.* I enclose a reply coupon for 20 pfennigs.

I am very pleased to see that on the main point you come to the same conclusion as I did in the polemic with Tugan-Baranovsky and *Volkstümler* 14 years ago, namely, that the realisation of surplus-value is possible also in a "*purely* capitalist" society.** I have not yet seen Rosa Luxemburg's book, but *theoretically* you are quite correct on this point. It seems to me, though, that you have placed insufficient emphasis on a very important passage in Marx (*Capital*, Vol. II, p. 442),[257] namely, where Marx says that in analysing annually produced value, foreign trade should be entirely *discarded* (I am quoting from the Russian translation). The "dialectics" of Luxemburg seem to me (judging also from the article in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*) to be *eclecticism*. Has any other organ of the press reviewed Rosa Luxemburg's book? *Hamburger Echo*?[258] Bourgeois organs?

One more question. *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* (1912, No. 256) incorrectly reported the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in October. Either the Luxemburg clique, or a liquidator, or a scoundrel sympathising with the liquidators, misled the editors and attributed to Haase the words: "Lenin has simply misled the International."

The liquidators, naturally, repeated this lie in their newspaper (*Luch* in St. Petersburg) and added a vicious comment. The Central Committee of our Party (the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia) wrote to Haase. Haase

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* A reference to Rosa Luxemburg's book *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus*, Berlin, 1913.—*Ed.*

** See V. I. Lenin, "A Note on the Question of Market Theory (Apropos of the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)" (present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 55-64).—*Ed.*

replied that his statement was misinterpreted. Haase's letter has now been published in our newspaper (*Pravda* in St. Petersburg).*

At the moment I would like to know whether the editors of *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* intend to withdraw or rectify the erroneous statement they have published. In this case I could send you a copy of *Haase*'s letter.

With Party greetings,
N. Lenin

My address is: Wl. Ulijanow. *47. Lubomirskiego*. Krakau.

Written in the first half of January 1913
Sent to Bremen (Germany)

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

273

TO MAXIM GORKY

21/I. 13

Dear A. M.,

The comrade who will forward this letter on to you is Troyanovsky, who now lives in Vienna. He and his wife have now energetically taken in hand *Prosveshcheniye*. He has raised a little money, and we hope that thanks to their energy and assistance we shall succeed in putting up a small Marxist journal against the renegade liquidators. I think you, too, will not refuse help for *Prosveshcheniye*.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I hope you received my long letter concerning the *Vperyod* people.** How on earth did you get yourself into

* See Lenin's article "Better Late Than Never" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 469-70).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 69-72.—*Ed.*

Luch??? Not in the wake of the deputies, surely? But they simply got caught in the trap and will probably soon leave it.

Sent from Cracow to Capri

First published in 1924 in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

274

TO G. M. VYAZMENSKY

Dear Comrade,

I shall try to fulfil your request and send you the Russian sheets.[259] This is rather difficult now, though, and one cannot count on too much: publishing in Russia is very poor and they are *very reluctant* to send us publications from there, although we always ask for them. There were 2-3 sheets in St. Petersburg before 9. I. 1913.

As regards Polish literature, you are mistaken in thinking that I am well placed. I have no means of approach to the P.P.S. Get them through the O.C. and the liquidators. I have no contacts with the Social-Democratic "Zarzadists"* (Rosa and Tyszka) either.

Please send me for a week or so *Izvestia* of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., 1907, both numbers—I need them badly.[260] I shall return them in due time.

I enclose the letter to Comrade Kuznetsov which you asked for.[261]

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

Written after January 22, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Berlin

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

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* Supporters of the Executive of the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania.—*Ed.*

275

TO THE BOLSHEVIK DEPUTIES OF THE FOURTH DUMA*

We have received a stupid and insolent letter from the editors. We are not replying. They should be kicked out.

We have not received *Luch* No. 4. Will you please send it!![262]

The absence of news about the plan for reorganising the Editorial Board is causing us great concern. What has been done for this reorganisation?[263] Why don't Vera, Fram, Andrei or Alexei write a single word? We earnestly ask them to write as quickly as possible. Reorganisation, or better still the complete expulsion of all the old ones, is absolutely essential. Absurdly conducted. They lavish praise on the Bund and *Zeit*: it's simply disgusting. They can't take the right line against *Luch*. Disgraceful the way they handle articles. Sheer stupidity about *Rabochy Golos*.[264] Simply exasperating.... We are waiting impatiently for news about all this....

What has been done about the control of funds? Who has received the subscription money? In whose hands is it? How much is it?

Written after January 25, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1924 in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 1

Printed from the original

276

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am returning the proofs. Further proofs, i.e., the resolutions, need not be sent. Issue *immediately* in the cheapest possible form (no money), i.e., *in three columns*, of a

* This letter was added to that of G. Y. Zinoviev and was addressed to N. I. Podvoisky.—*Ed.*

newspaper page size (½ or ¾ of a page), printed *on both sides*, without margins.

Title: "Meeting of the C.C. [with] ...* Party [Functionaries]"...** *to avoid a single day's delay.*

Print *3,000* copies. Ask Miron to see to it personally that the proofs be *corrected in actual practice* (they usually don't do it, and leave them uncorrected!) and generally see that it is put out quickly.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written in early February 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

277
TO N. OSINSKY***

Dear Comrade,

I was very glad to get your letter of 21/I. These days there is no end of disarray and organisational chaos. All the more pleasant is it to get in touch with a comrade-in-idea. Please don't give up your intention of sending in an article in February, and in general, be sure to write from time to time. I hope you see from our newspapers and journals the general line we now have to take—against the enemy and (probably still more) against those who are vacillating. Your contributions, seeing that we share the same views, are doubly valuable in that you are close to the capitals. Please try to obtain the local manuals of

* Manuscript partly damaged. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests. Several words illegible.—*Ed.*

** See *KPSS v rezolutstyakh* ..., Part I, 1954, pp. 288-300.—*Ed.*

*** This letter is a postscript to that of Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

Zemstvo and factory statistics and similar publications. We are extremely badly off for these.

All the best....

Written February 13, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1960
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy
found in police records

278

TO N. G. POLETAYEV

For Krass

Dear Friend,

I was very glad to get your letter of February 2 and exceedingly regret that we have so far not been able to establish regular correspondence, despite a number of attempts on our part. The lack of such a correspondence gives rise to misunderstandings. I welcome your criticism of the withdrawal from *Luch*, as I welcome all criticism from Russia: the absence of criticism makes a dead thing of it all. In this case, however, your criticism is incorrect, and I simply don't know from what side to start dealing with it.[265] I shall wait until the next letter. As regards "reforms" in a certain newspaper, I must say that your absence is very regrettable. Frankly, I consider the organisation of this business by you to be a historic service, and your closing down of the "big sister"* and your "semi-absence" in the summer to be a great mistake.[266] But the past is gone and done with. We must make use of its lessons for the future. The plan for a big newspaper is excellent. I am convinced that two newspapers are needed—a big one for 5 kopeks and a small one for 1 kopek, and the present paper should be worked into "a small one". Publication of pamphlets and books of 5-10 sheets is another good idea. We are taking this up, too, energetically. We would be very, very glad if you would take this in hand and we could succeed in co-operating more systematically and effectively

* *Nevskaya Zvezda.—Ed.*

than in the spring and summer of 1912. An indispensable condition for this is a personal meeting and regular correspondence. Gorky has now started very energetically to assist *Prosveshcheniye* and turn it into a big magazine. The publication of a big newspaper and books has every chance of becoming a tremendous job of tremendous importance and usefulness. All the more important is it to have proper organisation from the outset. Experience has convinced us most fully that any attempt to reach an agreement (as you suggest) with Plekhanov, Rozhkov, etc., is hopeless. We are beginning at the other end. And we are getting better results. You know, of course, that Alexinsky and Dnevnitsky came without any agreement with us. Given correct and firm tactics, this will hold true still more in the case of a big newspaper and the publication of books. We are fully convinced of this. Firm tactics—keeping the leadership by the former group—enlistment not by contract, but as contributors—all these conditions are categorical for us. We shall find quite enough contributors, I am sure, both for a big newspaper and for books and for a big magazine. As for Bogdanov, for instance, even co-operation with him is impossible: this is clear from his new writings.[267] With Alexinsky and Dnevnitsky (Plekhanov) it is possible, and remuneration will widen this circle of contributors fivefold. I await an immediate reply: 1) whether you agree to the above or not; 2) if not, what your plan is; 3) how much money is needed; 4) how much you can raise; 5) how you define or plan your participation in the business as regards sphere of competence, etc. Answer as precisely as possible. We must act quickly. Time presses. The Moscow paper too....* A good friend of mine will call on you—you know him too. Talk things over in a businesslike, precise manner.

Written February 25, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

* This refers to the newspaper *Nash Put*.—*Ed.*

279

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

Hanecki is with me just now. He is arranging for a general protest in regard to the Basle delegation.[268]

Sign it (you and **all** the Basle *delegates*) and send it to

1) Schklowsky. Falkenweg. 9. *Bern*

2) Yuri—Bekzadian. Bolleystr. 4. Zürich

3) the Troyanovskys, and have him sign all the papers and return them here.

Yours,

Lenin

All the delegates should sign.

Written March 8, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in part in 1960 in the journal *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoria* No. 3

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

280

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you the proofs. Question marks *galore*: I have forgotten a great deal (not surprising in ten odd years). Take this into consideration and write a *very careful* and very tactful editorial note.

You *should not* have asked Plekhanov's and Martov's consent for disclosing the names of the anonymous writers. If they refuse to give it (which they certainly will), you will be in a fix, yet *we are entitled* and **obliged** to disclose the names of the anonymous writers in the old *Iskra*; this should be done at all costs. It *should have been done* without asking consent.

Grigory and I agree to have the names disclosed in *Proletary* and *Sotsial-Demokrat*.[269]

I am sending you a page of remarks.

And so, we shall be seeing each other in the summer. Welcome. We have rented a summer place at Zakopane (4-6 hours from Cracow, Poronin station) from 1. V to 1.X; there is a room for you. The Zinovievs are near neighbours.

Bring as many books as you can, especially magazines, of which we have none here. I am enclosing a *list of what is needed*. We shall arrange by further letters for you to bring from Paris *whatever* you can manage to lay hands on.

Au revoir,

Yours,

L.

P.S.... Get together the whole polemic between Alexinsky and Lunacharsky ...* and bring it with you. What do you think about the possibility of inviting Alexinsky to the "school"**? Gr. is for, I am against. Think it over. Could you arrange a *tactful* tête-à-tête with Alexinsky for a *general* talk, *without mentioning the school for the time being*? Let us know what Lozovsky has hatched up about the strikes.

Sovremenny Mir
with Plekhanov's article on Ropshin's novel
" " " on Bogucharsky (book [on] hist. of N. Volya)
" Lyubov Axelrod's review ...
on V. Ilyin's book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and other interesting articles....

Articles on the system of land tenure and the Stolypin agrarian policy.

in *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for 1910-**1911**-1912
in *Sovremenny Mir*
in *Zavety*
Severniye Zapiski[270] } for the same years.

Written April 17, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* Manuscript partly damaged. Here and further several words illegible. The word in square brackets has been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

** A reference to the Party school which the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. planned to organise at Poronin.—*Ed.*

281

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending you the *set* of *Proletary* (Nos. 1-20) which you asked for.

I have reread some of them. Do not forget to insert a whole chapter on the Popular Socialist liquidators (from *Two Parties*)[271] in your legal pamphlet. (*Peshekhonov*, Nos. 7 and 8 of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1906—cf. *Proletary* No. 4, "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks".*)

People now have forgotten *everything*. The novices know *nothing*.

Begin at the *beginning* and tell all about liquidationism (and the "**legal party**") among the Popular Socialists.

Yours,
Lenin

Written April 17, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

282

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am sending a cheque. Once it's repayable, it can't be helped, no matter how badly off we are. Arrange the lectures *immediately*, old chap, on your way down here. I got back from Leipzig today[272]: *64 marks* is money, after all! Several cities will make it much more.

Today I shall send you the Duma materials. The deputies (6) have got to be helped to *write their speeches*. Definitely. Sit down to it yourself (the Duma is opening 24.IV, *O.S.*, you must *hurry*) and put *Alexinsky* on the job. A good excuse for you—write him pneu**, as to a *Pravda*

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 197-206.—*Ed.*
** By pneumatic post.—*Ed.*

contributor, and arrange to meet. It is desirable (but *not obligatory*) that the speeches be sent via Cracow.

I am sending the subjects.

See to this as *quickly* and energetically as possible. Get in touch with Alexinsky....

A thousand greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Written April 26, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

283

TO I. E. HERMAN

Dear Comrade,

We shall be living at *Poronin* till October 1 (Galizien, address: Herrn Ulianow), 4-6 hours from Cracow by the Zakopane line. Write to the new address.

Thanks for the leaflet of your C.C. which you sent me.[273] Discuss as quickly as you can and when decided let me know whether, for the purpose of *general agitation before* the congress, you wish to issue a *platform* of the Lettish Bolsheviks (or *partyists*, or *anti-liquidators*).

I think it ought to be done. If you haven't the money, it could be hectographed.

I think that special emphasis in the platform should be made on three points:

(1) The liquidators' renunciation of *revolutionary* tactics. Their appraisal of the moment is a (veiled) liberal one. This should be made clear.

(2) About the liquidators; reprint (or quote in detail *Luch* No. 101, editorial) and tell the Lettish workers the truth.

(3) The national question. Separatism and federalism of the Bundists, which have "won" the liquidators. The harm of cultural-national autonomy.

Would it not be better if your group moved *resolutions* on these questions? Or would it be better to write a *platform*? What would be more convenient for pre-congress agitation and for the election of congress delegates?

Write your opinion (and that of your friends). If a resolution or a platform is needed we could help write it. What is the time limit? When is the congress?[274]

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written prior to May 6, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Berlin

First published in 1935
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 5

Printed from the original

284

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Sh.,

Please note my change of address. We have come out here into the country near Zakopane for a mountain air cure (we are at a height of about 700 metres) for Nad. Konst.'s goitre. I had been warned: if you neglect it it will be irreparable; take her *at once* to see Kocher in Berne, he's first-class, a celebrity.... On the one hand Kocher's a surgeon. Surgeons like to use the knife, and an operation here, I daresay, is extremely dangerous and extremely doubtful.... On the other hand people are treated with mountain air and *rest*. A "rest" is hardly practicable with us, owing to the nervous lives we lead. And this illness is caused by nerves. We tried an electricity cure for 3 weeks. Results—nil. Nothing has changed—the same bulging eyes, and swollen neck, and palpitations of the heart—all the symptoms of goitre.

Could you make inquiries concerning Kocher? I don't know *how* to go about it, and I want advice. Couldn't you go with somebody, a student or a doctor, to consult Kocher? Or do you think he would not want to talk without

seeing the patient? Or could one have a talk with him on presentation of a letter from the doctor in attendance here (that is, in Cracow)? If inquiries of a serious nature can be made at all in Berne *concerning* Kocher or *with* Kocher personally (the latter would be best of all, of course) I would be much obliged to you. Should inquiries point to the *need* of a journey to Berne, drop me a line as to Kocher's reception arrangements, when he goes away for the summer, and how we are to fix up in Berne, in some hospital (is it very expensive?) or otherwise.

All the best, and thanking you in advance for the trouble you are taking.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Absender: Wl. Ulianow. *Poronin* (Galizien).

Written May 8, 1913
Sent to Berne

First published in 1925
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 8

Printed from the original

285
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I am forwarding you Troyanovsky's letter.[275]

In my opinion, that scoundrel Semkovsky (Grigory is sending you *Kampf*) deserves an answer in a full voice *only*, *not like that* given to Steklov in *Neue Zeit*.

Write briefly but firmly and strongly about the traitors to both socialism and democracy, about the blacklegging newspaper *Luch*, about the bulk of the workers who are following the lead of *Pravda*. If the opportunist Austrians refuse to print it, we shall publish it in the report to the Vienna congress of 1914.[276] I am strongly against any writing "keyed to the meanness" of the opportunists of *Neue Zeit* or *Kampf*.

What is your opinion?

Yours,
Lenin

I am for writing to *Kampf apart from* Ryazanov. That "honest broker" will mess the thing up, complicate it by outward courtesy and inward meanness. Better go direct and get a direct reply. If Ryazanov wants to "help" (h'm, h'm), let him do so on the side....*

Written prior to May 20, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

286

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Comrade Huysmans,

For some time now Muranov has been treasurer of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. He publishes accounts of the moneys received by the group in the Social-Democratic newspapers of St. Petersburg. According to the newspapers the Russian workers, since the beginning of the general strike in Belgium, have been making collections "for the Belgian workers".[277] For instance, Nos. 101, 102, 109 and 116 of *Pravda* publish accounts over the signature of Muranov, who has received about 500 rubles for the Belgian workers collected among Russian workers all over Russia. I have no doubt that the 800+700 francs received by you were donated by the Russian workers for the Belgian workers. I shall write to Muranov, and if these sums are of a different designation (which is most unlikely) I shall let you know.

[Variant of the letter**]

Most likely the 1,500 francs referred to were collected by the Russian workers *for the Belgian workers*. Such collections have been made since the beginning of the general strike in Belgium. The lists are published in our Social-

* Manuscript partly damaged. Several words illegible.—*Ed.*

** The text printed below was written in the margin of the letter.—*Ed.*

Democratic newspapers over the signature of *Muranov*, who is at present treasurer of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. I shall write to Muranov and ask him to clear up this point.

[*Record of donations for the Belgian workers**]

Collections for the Belgians.

1.500 frs.=about 600 rubles.

Pravda	No. 116	36.30	42.10
		5.80	
	No. 109	24.60	136.99
		18	
		1.60	
		16.45	
		53.24	
		1.40	
		7.25	
		6.30	
		8.15	
	No. 102	132.16	291.99
	(Sat. 4.V.1913) No. 101	159.83	
			471.08

Written after June 4, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Brussels

First published in 1960 in the journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

287

TO I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS

Dear Comrade,

I sent the draft platform to Herman in Berlin yesterday.**

The extract from Berzin's article,[278] which you have sent me, shows that he is a very stupid conciliator. You must rally around you people who are steadfast and who

* This is written in Russian on the back of the letter.—*Ed.*

** See V. I. Lenin, "Draft Platform for the Fourth Congress of Social-Democrats of the Latvian Area" (present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 110-18).—*Ed.*

understand what's what, but men like Berzin *virtually* help *the liquidators*. They are servants of the liquidators.

Send me a translation (into Russian or German, whichever you find easiest) of Berzin's *whole* article.

Berzin should be given a *detailed* and *sharp* reply.

Regards!

Yours,

Lenin

Having only a short excerpt from you, all I can say against Berzin for the time being is this:

Berzin tries to present the matter as if the "Bolsheviks", or rather the 1912 January Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., are effecting a split by ignoring the Stockholm decision. Berzin shows by this that he is simply an *ignoramus*. He *does not know* what the Stockholm decision is about.

The Stockholm Congress did *not* accept federation. It accepted *an agreement* with the non-Russians (that is, the Poles, Letts and the Bund).[279]

That agreement called for union of non-Russians locally. Why does Berzin side-step this? Through ignorance or to cover up the liquidators?

Proof—the decision of the *Party* at the *1908* December Conference (i.e., two and a half years after Stockholm).

This decision reads (see p. 46 of the pamphlet *All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. of December 1908*):

(§1) "The Conference directs the C.C. to take steps towards effecting union of the *local* organisations ... wherever this, *despite the decision of the Stockholm Congress*, has not yet been done",

(§2) "amalgamation should be based on the principle of *unity*". The Conference "*strongly* declares *against* amalgamation being based on the principle of *federalism*".[280]

And Berzin, after this, has the impudence to assure us that the Stockholm Congress accepted federation!!

Berzin is distorting the facts!

It is the Bundists who did *not* carry out the decision of the Congress and the Party, since they *did not effect unity*, but effected federation *against the decision of the Party*.

The January Conference condemns the Bundists and con-

demns federation.[281] If the Lettish C.C. did not attend the January Conference (*against* the will of the Conference that *invited* it) it is *its own* fault.

Berzin defends liquidator splitters and Bundists, he defends *federation* **against the Party.**

Written prior to June 7, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1935
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 5

Printed from the original

288
TO I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS

7/VI. 1913

Dear Comrade,

I have received and read the translation of Berzin's *whole* article.

It is a *good* article. The only bad thing about it is that passage that roused my ire. But I asked you *right away* to send me the *whole* article, thus showing that I considered it necessary to read it *as a whole*. While scolding Berzin for part of his article, I asked you to send me the *whole* article. It follows from this that you were rather *hasty* in forwarding to Berzin my angry comment on this part of his article.

Berzin has written me a letter in which he says that I was probably ill-informed. (Naturally, one *cannot* be well informed of a *whole* article from just *one* part of it!)

Berzin's whole article convinces me that *he cannot be put on a par with Braun*. Berzin's article, I repeat, is a *good* article; it leads one to think that the difference of opinion between us (concerning appraisal of the Stockholm decision, etc.) does not involve any basic principles. It is hardly worth beginning an immediate discussion of this difference in the press. It looks as if Berzin is coming with us.

If you have already sent a reply (for the press) to Berzin, I would advise you to *hold it up* and send it to me: we shall talk it over.

Let me know as soon as you can what you have done with my draft of a platform.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1935 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

289

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

I forgot to add that I have not written and am not writing to *Prosveshcheniye* about the meeting with the liberals.

Write something on this subject. Play it up properly. Something well-documented, with a slogan. Try your best!

Yours,
V. U.

Written June 8, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

290

TO THE GROUP OF BOLSHEVIK MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE METALWORKERS' TRADE UNION

Dear Friends,

We received both letters, thanks. We shall gladly give whatever help we can. It is not worth writing special instructions. In a day or two we shall publish a series of articles on this subject by Gr. Try and get it reprinted in *Metallist*. We shall write for *Metallist*, too, as and when

we can: You must get them to pay author's fees—we shall then widen the circle of contributors at once. Apparently, in a day or two, there will be another decisive meeting. We learn from letters from our people that the liquidators are gathering all their forces to give decisive battle; our people, of course, are not dawdling and are leaving nothing to chance. The matter is extremely important and grave. You must fight hard to keep all you have won. We are with you in this struggle heart and soul. Why did you allow a liquidator to get in as secretary?[282] And what's that affair about the insurance committee? We await your letters. Let us know always what we have to write about there. Keep us informed. We earnestly wish you success.

Written June 16, 1913
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

291

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleagues,

I received the issues of the enlarged *Pravda* only today, 16.VI. 1913, and hasten to congratulate the editorial staff and contributors. I wish you every success. The important thing now, in my opinion, is not to forget that we must *fight to win 100,000* readers. For this we must (1) have a small, one-kopek, extremely popular Sunday supplement. Write without fail, giving your opinion on this, and also *information* on the estimates: i.e., how much extra money the enlarged format has *taken*. And what the monthly expenses *now* are, *how much* more than previously. The *great* (and sole) danger for *Pravda* now is the loss of the *broad* readership, loss of a position to fight for it.

This is the first business point, and I would ask you earnestly to acquaint the publisher with *all* the business points and kindly let me have your answer.

(2) On the question of the 7-hour day for postal employees, etc., the editors have made an obvious mistake. We

are all prone to make mistakes, and there is nothing particularly wrong in that. But, *in persisting* in their mistake, the editors, for a *long time to come*, if not for always, are "leaving a thorn", marring their reputation and position both in Russia and in Europe. I was very pleased to see from the secretary's letter that *not* all the members of the Editorial Board stood by the mistake. I earnestly advise you to re-examine the question and take a different stand *in print* (by publishing article by G. Z. unsigned, *in the name of the editors*). Two lines would suffice: "Having re-examined the matter, the editors have come to this conclusion"—followed by G. Z.'s article. Or: "Having re-examined the matter at a fuller meeting of the Editorial Board and contributors". This is worse *than simply* "**having re-examined**".[283]

Let the liars from *Luch* dance a cancan for *once* over this rectification—only *false* shame can prevent it being made. It would be 1,000 times worse if *Luch* were *forever* able to point to this error. An error rectified is an error no more. Unrectified it becomes a festering sore. In such cases one must have the courage to have it operated on at once. It won't be very pleasant, failing this, to have a number of *Pravda* friends—both individual writers and *organs of the press*—dissociating themselves from *Pravda*'s stand.

Will you please discuss all this and drop me a line without delay.

(3) As regards Y. K. I have already written once. His article on Alexeyenko is excellent. The author, of course, can give such articles regularly. But you do not pay him—it's a disgrace!! He writes me that he is going to stop writing. You couldn't imagine, I trust, that the enlarged format would involve *extra* expenses on paper and printing *alone*. Naturally, you calculated on an unavoidable increase of expenditure *on the literary side* too. Y. K. should top the list. He has nothing else to live on now. We *cannot afford* to lose such a contributor to both *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*. I therefore advise you most strongly to immediately adopt a decision to pay Y. K—v 75 (seventy-five) rubles a month. This is the minimum for a regular contributor to both newspaper and journal; don't forget the literary criticism section, too, which always

leaves much to be desired and without which a "big" newspaper is impossible.

Will you please give me your reply on this immediately. I have a letter from Y. K. in the tone of an ultimatum, and I consider it my duty to warn the editors and publisher of *Pravda* that to run an enlarged paper without the services of such a contributor is a thing I don't know who can think of.

(4) Vitimsky's article in No. 123 is a very felicitous one in my opinion. I congratulate the author. As for *Stal*, I think it ought to be reprinted: it's good![284]

[I am enclosing a reply to Vitimsky,* which, I think, you ought to read (I am not sure whether Vitimsky's letter is a *personal* one; I don't think it is).]

(5) Alexinsky's letter concerning "Controversial Issues"** has been lying in the editorial office for a *month*, we have been told. I cannot understand this attitude!! The editors, apparently, *do not know* the position, *do not know* the history of the *Vperyod* group, and have fallen *into an error* with Mr. *Bogdanov* (about this separately). Why could not Alexinsky's letter have been forwarded to us here?? This is necessary in order to discuss the *one and only* Vperyodist who had the sense to revolt against the vile empirio-monism and similar abominations which disgrace the proletarian party. In publishing Bogdanov's mendacious letters,[285] the editors have *made it difficult* to arrange a general discussion regarding Alexinsky: his letter, too, may be worthless, but we *have to talk it over*. For that purpose we ask you to send his letter on to us as quickly as possible, and generally send such things to us.

(6) In regard to the Bogdanov incident I am sending a separate letter to the editors and publisher of *Pravda*.*** This question is extremely serious. I am loath to come out against the editors of *Pravda* in print—we have worked together too long—but for me to support otzovism is a sin *a 100* times worse than supporting liquidationism—not

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* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 170-72.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., pp. 147-69.—*Ed.*

*** See V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Mr. Bogdanov and the *Vperyod* Group (For the Editors of *Pravda*)" (present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 173-74).—*Ed.*

only worse, but more dishonest. Frankly, I would be obliged to come out in print too against such support, which has become clear through publication of Mr. Bogdanov's letter. If this is a slip, let's rectify it. If it is not, we shall fight.

Send us Alexinsky's letter. Very important. Alexinsky is talking friendly, and you ... respond with Bogdanov!!

(7) I have received the money for April. That for *May* should be sent. Please do not delay it. (I need money badly for my wife's treatment, for an operation.)

At your service,
V. I.

I am very much afraid that you may have alienated Plekhanov!! Potresov lies and flings mud. To silence Plekhanov?? This would be an irretrievable error.[286]

Thanks very much for the promise to send the missing Nos. of *Pravda* and *Luch*. Only you mistakenly mentioned once a different number instead of *No. 8* (number eight) for 1912 (nineteen twelve). Will you please send me this No. 8. It was *returned* from under arrest to the editorial office in 180 copies.

Written June 16, 1913
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

292
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear L. B.,

Before we quarrel (which I hope we shall not)———I am joking—over "a special and unpleasant" cause, let us chat about something else.

I am enclosing a letter from the I.S.B. Will the C.O.A. undertake it or not? If they do, let them inform me in a *formal way*. If not, return the letter.

Tell the C.O.A.: a gendarmes' report has been stolen (or otherwise obtained), saying that a man named *Polonsky*, who left Russia legally, is to be arrested on his return.

If possible, let the C.O.A. notify everybody and try to find Polonsky. I know nothing more.

I wrote to *Pravda* about Alexinsky and asked them to send me his letter.* In regard to Bogdanov's lie, I wrote a furious letter with an ultimatum that it be published. We shall see. Otherwise I shall go to *Prosveshcheniye*. ((I wrote to *Prosveshcheniye* about your article too: *I am wholly for it*—re the meeting of liberals and *Pravda* with *Luch*.))

With regard to Alexinsky I advise putting the question straightforwardly and honestly, in a comradely way. You are going to consult *against* Lunacharsky? Bon! Mais alors de deux choses une**: *either* you revolt in print **both** against the philosophical (c'est déjà fait***) and the **otzovist** wing of *Vperyod* and you declare that there were both a philosophically reactionary and a politically *anarchistic* tendency in this group. I (Alexinsky) am glad to be rid of both.

In that case we can accept an honest bloc. With old squabbles forgotten, we shall *welcome* a contributor (a 100 times *less* valuable than Plekhanov) to both *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*.

Or you are shuffling? In that case go alone. You will be a *casual* contributor, and we wash our hands.

No diplomacy. Speak straight out. That is essential.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Some time after the 20th I am going to *Berne* with N. K. I shall be there on 27.VI. There will probably be an operation.

P.S. Huysmans named the Polish delegates of the opposition without mentioning that they were Poles!!! And

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* See previous letter.—*Ed*.

** Good! But then either the one or the other.—*Ed*.

*** That has already been done.—*Ed*.

he has listed you (+me+Plekhanov!!) as representatives on the I.S.B. (The latest *Bulletin*![287])

P.P.S. I had already written to *Pravda* about your fee.* Today I am writing about the 75 rubles, as per Grigory's letter.

Written June 16, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

293
TO MAXIM GORKY

Dear A. M.,

I wrote you from Cracow ever so long ago, but no reply.

A letter has arrived today from Russia, from Odessa, saying that *Stark* (?) (from Capri) is surprised I did not tell the man from Odessa what I had learned from Stark and *from you* (!) about the Odessa Bolshevik newspaper!!

What is this misunderstanding, where does it come from?? I told the man from Odessa that *you* had been writing me about a Bolshevik Odessa paper of which I knew *nothing*.** I still know nothing. The man from Odessa writes that "Malyantovich junior" is a participant there. This is the first I hear of it. What Malyantovich is that? Nikitich's?[288] (personally I don't know a single Malyantovich). The lawyer in Moscow or somebody else?

Write what you know about it. This misunderstanding has to be cleared up.

I have moved to *Poronin* (near Zakopane) for the summer for my wife's health. I am going to Berne with her round about 27.VI. 1913 for an operation. My address is: *Poronin* (Galizien). Austria.

I shall be in Berne for 2-3 weeks. You can address your letters to me there: Herrn Schklowsky. 9. Falkenweg. 9. *Bern* (for Lenin).

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* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

** The name of the newspaper has not been established.—*Ed.*

How are you getting on? Has your health improved since the spring? I wish you with all my heart to get better and have a good rest.

Yours,
Lenin

Written prior to June 22, 1913
Sent to Capri

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany I*

Printed from the original

294

TO THE EDITORS OF *PRAVDA*

Dear Colleagues,

Will you please send me here, to Berne, my fee for May (also for June) (100 r.) to the following address:

Herrn *Ulianow*. 4. Gesellschaftsstraße. 4. *Switzerland*. *Bern*. Schweiz.

I shall have to stay here for about a month, as my wife is going to have an operation. I need the money badly.

I hope in a few days to arrange contributions to *Pravda* from here too.

As regards my article against Bogdanov, I am very much surprised that the editors evade the *real* issue: Bogdanov has misled *them*, and through them, 40,000 readers! How can one put up with this?? I agree to throw out the word "mister", and leave *simply* "Bogdanov".* This ought to satisfy you.

Regards,
V. Ilyin

Written in June, not earlier than 25th, 1913
Sent to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 173-74.—*Ed.*

295

TO L. B. KAMENEV

29/VI. 1913

Dear L. B.,

I received the C.O. and letter. Thanks very much.

Kocher is a great bother—capricious. He still hasn't received us. We shall have to wait.

Redouble your efforts in regard to *Pravda* if possible. *Miron has been taken. We're short-handed.* I cannot write now.

Good news from St. Petersburg about the P.C. and the Metalworkers' Union, also about prospects for the school: *promised* by the six. Samoilov is due in Zakopane in 10 days. Plekhanov is in Paris, they say. See him if you can, it's extremely important. I wrote to him (in strictest secrecy—*only* to him personally) about the school and invited him to come.* He keeps silent, the slyboots, Ignatius Loyola, the master shuffler. All the worse for him. We shall have a school. Gorky has as good as consented.

Au revoir!

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Best regards is to all our Paris friends.

P.S. We pin great hopes on Tulyakov. Less on the others (of his group). They thirst for "learning" and demand Plekhanov. He'd be a fool not to go.

There are rumours here that Plekhanov is going to Beatenberg round about the 10th of July. Have you heard anything about this in Paris?

There's *no need* to tell Alexinsky about the school for the time being. We still have time to do that *if* need be. It will not be until August.

Sent from Berne to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 103-04.—*Ed.*

296

TO LYDIA KNIPOVICH

Dear Lydia Mikhailovna,

I am sending you a postcard I have bought for you with a plan of Berne and a note of the necessary addresses.

I strongly advise you to go to Berne: you must receive treatment, and *Kocher is the only one* who can cure you. I have made inquiries of every kind, looked up medical literature (a big book by the son, Albert Kocher, on goitre), consulted physicians in Berne, and I speak from experience.

Write to Professor Kocher in September asking him to make a definite appointment (and mentioning that you dispose *only* of such-and-such a sum, otherwise you'll have to face the unpleasant prospect of haggling with the tight-fisted Frau Professor). He will answer, fixing a *date* when he can receive you. Then you can start out. Life in Berne is cheap. We'll give you introductions to Shklovsky and Shenderovich—they will help you. In a few months you will forget that you were an invalid.

All the best. We shall be seeing you soon.

Yours,
V. I.

Written between August 5 and 7, 1913
Sent from Munich to Simferopol

First published in 1960 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Printed from the original

297

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Comrade,

You have written the wrong thing to Shklovsky. What was needed was **how** to find the person, and not a biography. And you did not give Shklovsky your address. In executing an important assignment you should be more care-

ful, otherwise you will be a 100 times to blame for failure to find an important person to assist the cause.

Please rectify the mistake *at once*.[289]

Yours,
Lenin

Written August 21, 1913
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

298

TO THE EDITORS OF *SEVERNAYA PRAVDA*[290]

Dear Colleagues,

Yesterday I sent to *Prosveshcheniye* a long article "How Vera Zasulich Demolishes Liquidationism".* If *Severnaya Pravda* is still coming out I suggest publishing this article in six feuilletons, one section per feuilleton, the manuscript, however, to be preserved and returned immediately to *Prosveshcheniye*.

I repeat, I cannot work without seeing the newspapers. A thousand requests—and still you do not send either *Rabochaya Pravda*[291] and *Zhivaya Zhizn*[292] (sets), or *Severnaya Pravda* and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*.[293] This used to be done before.

Why publish daily, I don't understand. I advise changing over to a weekly issue. What is the daily loss? What is the circulation?

Greetings and best wishes!

Yours,
Lenin

The promised and *long-earned* fee from *Pravda* has *not* been received! This is becoming insulting!!

Written after August 21, 1913
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

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* See present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 394-416.—*Ed.*

299

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Comrade,

Please send me *immediately all* the issues of *Severnaya Pravda* (except No. 1) and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*.

I have not seen *anything*!!!

Ask Avel to send them to me daily by book-post from St. Petersburg, wrapped up in a couple of bourgeois newspapers of a discreetly moderate and exceedingly quiet trend. Pending a reply from Avel, send me, *please* (when done with), *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* and *Severnaya Pravda*, and *Nash Put*, Moscow issue.[294]

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. A slight misunderstanding: you have not given Shklovsky *your* address for corresponding with you and getting information from you.

Abs.: Ulianow. Poronin (Galizien).

Sent to Stuttgart

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

300

TO JOHANN DIETZ

Poronin (Galizien), October 3, 1913

Dear Comrade,

As a member of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*, which, ten years ago, you rendered such valuable service, and as a representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which will never forget the fraternal assistance you gave it during this vital period of its upbuilding, I hasten to congratulate you most heartily on my own behalf and on behalf of the Central Committee of the

Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, on the occasion of your seventieth birthday.

I wish you long years of work for the benefit of international Marxism.

With Party greetings,

N. Lenin (*Vl. Ulyanov*)

Wl. Ulianow. Poronin (Galizien).

Sent to Stuttgart

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

301

TO THE EDITORS OF *ZA PRAVDA*[295]

Dear Colleagues,

I have just read No. 8 and cannot help expressing my surprise at your publishing *such* an article as "A Meeting of Marxists",[296] etc.!! To my mind this was extremely unwise, and if the author, for obvious reasons, was "carried away", you, on the spot, should have realised the impossibility of printing this article. For God's sake avoid such carelessness: in this way you are giving the *very devil* of assistance to all our enemies.

It is *necessary to reprint* (gradually) from No. 8 the articles of Petrovsky and of the former conciliator.[297]

Best regards,

V. I.

I earnestly request you to change my address: I have written and asked, but it doesn't help!!

Ulianow. 51. Ulica Lubomirskiego. *Kraków*.

Written in October, not earlier than 27th, 1913
Sent to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

302

TO THE EDITORS OF *ZA PRAVDU*

A letter to the Editors

Dear Comrade Editors,

Allow me, in the columns of your newspaper, to announce our reply to the many people from the Far North, the West, East and other places, who have written to us for information about the liquidators' "campaign" against the "insurance" expert, Comrade **X**.

The liquidators accused him of duplicity, of serving both the employers and the workers.[298]

What does the *organisation* do in the case of such accusations?

It calls together representatives of different bodies serving the labour movement and authorises them to investigate the matter. That is what it did. The *findings* of the committee of representatives from *five* bodies (1. the Editorial Board of *Pravda*; 2. the Editorial Board of *Prosveshcheniye*; 3. the Editorial Board of the Polish Marxist organ; 4. the six Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma; 5. the Chairman of the Metalworkers' Union) were published in No. 12 of *Za Pravdu* for October 17.*

The committee found.

— — that *the allegation of the liquidators "is untrue"*;

— — that X., *having given up working for the employers*, thereby fulfilled his duty.

In the previous issue (No. 11 of *Za Pravdu* for October 16) A. Vitimsky made it amply clear that X. was "guilty" only of leaving the employers to serve the labour movement. Vitimsky added that he had communicated to the secretary of *Za Pravdu* the *names of the liquidators* working as *secretaries of employers' bodies*.**

And what did the liquidators reply? They made no attempt to deny either Vitimsky's statement or the fact that X. had given up working for the employers.

Nor did they attempt to form any kind of committee

* This refers to the article (unsigned) "Liars!"—*Ed.*

** This refers to the article "On 'Criminals'" by A. Vitimsky (M. S. Olminsky).—*Ed.*

from among "*their own*" seven deputies, or from any trade union, or from any "leading body" of Letts, Jews or Caucasians.

They did nothing of the kind!

People devoted to the organisation set up a committee, investigate the matter and adopt a decision.

The liberal hacks of *Novaya Rabochaya*(??) *Gazeta*, who are independent of the workers' organisations, are continuing their campaign of vicious lies and slander!! They are trying to fool simpletons and ignoramuses by accusing X. of "duplicity" on the grounds that he secretly *began*, under a pseudonym, to help the workers, though he *had not yet given up* his job for the employers!!*

Clearly! the workers are turning away with disgust from these contemptible anonymous slanderers from the liquidators' rag of a newspaper, which is supported by the bourgeoisie.

But that is not enough. Turning away is not enough. A shameless smear campaign against a person is an *old* device of the liquidators, who are out to *destroy* the organisations of the workers.

No organisation *is possible* without an *organisational* rebuff to such a method of political "struggle". What should such an organisational rebuff consist in?

Every worker must demand that the liquidators, from whom Marxists have turned away with contempt, should set up a committee of "their own" from "their" seven members, their "own" "leading body" of Jews, Letts, Caucasians, *etc*. Let them try to arrive at "their own" decision and communicate it to the International. Then we shall brand these slanderous rascals before the whole world.

While these scoundrels, these dirty characters, are hiding behind anonymous articles in the liquidators' newspaper, let *every union* of workers charge its executive with the investigation of this matter, by collecting all documents and information from everywhere, by *checking* the decision of the *Marxist committee* of *five bodies* and adopting a decision *of their own*.

Universal condemnation of the slanderers, a universal

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* Articles in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*: "Call Them to Account" (in Nos. 55 and 56) and "To the Pillory!" (in No. 60).—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

demand: "Retract your base slander, or we shall not let you enter a single organisation"—that should be the reply of the working class, the organisational reply to the wreckers of the organisation.

*V. Ilyin**

This question of principle should be raised in the Duma.

P.S. If *Za Pravdu* is closed down, you *must* tone down *fivefold*, become more legal and tamer. This can and should be done. Write the way they do in *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*[299] and establish *your own* censorship. For God's sake, do this, otherwise you will just ruin the business.

Written not earlier than
November 1, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

303

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Dear Citizen Huysmans,

You remember, of course, that the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., after the conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912, which restored our Party, appointed me the Party's representative on the I.S.B.

Owing to my departure from Paris, I was obliged to ask Comrade Kamenev, who lives in Paris, to take my place. Cracow is too far away from Brussels, and I would ask you to enter Kamenev's name and the official address of our Bureau in Paris in the *Bulletin*. Mr. Kouznetzoff (pour Kameneff). 102. Rue Bobillot. 102. Paris. XIII. Kamenev will spend some time here, but I would ask you not to indicate his address in Cracow. It would be imprudent for secrecy reasons.

In urgent cases I would ask you to write to my present address.

* This letter was signed also by L. B. Kamenev and G. Y. Zinoviev. —*Ed.*

It being All Saints' Day, your letter was delivered a little late.

Written November 3, 1913
Sent from Cracow to Brussels

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

304

TO THE EDITORS OF *ZA PRAVDU* *

P.S. Rodzyanko is demanding of M. a new name for the Duma group? Wonderful! Here are four to choose from, in the order of desirability: 1) the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Group; 2) the Russian S.D. Group; 3) the Group of the Russian Workers' Social-Democracy; 4) the Group of Russian Social-Democracy. Let me know which you have chosen: I recommend No. 1.

Greetings and best wishes.

Written between November 11 and 28, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Printed from the original

305

TO THE EDITORS OF *ZA PRAVDU*

What should have been written is: "Mr. Koltsov, you are a blackmailer, like Gamma is. I am not answering you." I am angry, almost furious at the "conversation" with Koltsov!! Fancy calling such a scoundrel "dear comrade". What is this? What do you call it??[300]

Written December 8 or 9, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1962 in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 1

Printed from the original

* This letter is a postscript to an unidentified article.—*Ed.*

306

TO THE EDITORS OF *ZA PRAVDU*

...* Our representative's telegram, which I received yesterday, says on this question only: "unification entrusted to executive."

And so the question is not clear.[301]

Just in case, and subject to the extremely important reservation that there should be no haste in publishing it, I suggest the following text of an editorial statement (seeing that the "storm" has already been raised in the dirty tea-cup of the Burenin-Gamma newspaper).

The decision of the International Socialist Bureau to call a conference of Russia's Social-Democrats—those working in Russia, of course, and not the shadows of them abroad—fully meets with our approval. Such a conference will help most clearly to expose the treachery to the Party on the part of the liquidator gentry and the Burenin methods of fellows like Gamma, of whom it is high time that Social-Democracy rid itself.

Tomorrow (or the day after, at the latest) I shall probably receive a detailed report from London. I shall then write to you immediately again, and if it is *necessary* not to publish the statement I am sending you (i.e., the one on the preceding page 3**) I *shall wire* hold it up. This will mean, consequently, that page 3 is not to be published.

Written December 16, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in part in 1961
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* The beginning of the letter is missing.—*Ed.*
** This refers to the previous paragraph.—*Ed.*

307

TELEGRAM TO THE EDITORS OF *ZA PRAVDU*

Six presented no demand whatever owing to rules. Bureau voted no condemnation whatever. Repudiate barefaced lie of liquidators.[302]

Ilyin

Written December 18, 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1962 in the book *V. I. Lenin i "Pravda". 1912-1962*

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

308

TO V. S. VOITINSKY

20/XII. 1913

Re the article *you recommended* for publication.

Dear Colleague,

I received the article "For a Common Banner"* and in all honesty I must say that it is no good at all. Frankness and candour above all—don't you agree?

The author has absolutely failed to understand the state of affairs in Russia and has let himself be carried away—to put it more mildly—by a spirit of, let us say, excessive amicability towards the Gothamite Mensheviks.

Russia is going through a process of restoration and consolidation of the Marxist workers' party. The discussions and resolutions, which raise in the author such a short-sighted sneer, are of tremendous educative and organisational significance. The author's ironical reference to the "Hurray shouting" is sheer *liberal* irony, the irony of an intellectual who is completely out of touch with the working-class movement. How is it that in no other opposition

* This article was sent in by Voitinsky for publication in the journal *Prosveshcheniye*.—*Ed*.

party in Russia do the local groups of party members openly discuss the party's internal differences?? Eh??

The author adheres to a sort of sentimentally hysterical point of view. The resolutions represent an all-important process of consolidation of the *workers*' party, for no one in the world can *make* the workers *choose* between two hurrahs (that of the partyists and that of the liquidators) other than *conscious* sympathy and a sorting out of trends. To allow the somewhat rude form of proletarian "brawl" to screen the tremendous ideological and organisational significance of the working class's struggle over two trends, is phenomenal blindness. I can think of no better explanation of this blindness than the fact that the author is completely out of touch and has "fallen under the spell" of the vile Menshevik gang.

The author has absolutely failed to understand the reference to the worker curia. 47%-50%-67% in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Dumas.* Is that a fact or *not*?? What has the "reactionary nature of the curias" (about which the crooks and the Burenins shout from the columns of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, drawing a red herring across the path) got to do with it?? Did not the same reactionary law, meaning the same curia law, apply in all three cases? Even an infant would understand that the reactionary nature of the curias has nothing to do with it. The fact remains that the intelligentsia have cleared off (and good riddance to the whores) and the workers have found their own feet against the liquidators. A new historical period. A new epoch. Yet the author invents a "middle line"—it would be funny were it not so sad. The author has not understood one-hundredth of the depth of the struggle against the liquidators. The Party *cannot* be restored unless it is restored *against* the liquidators. The workers have grasped this now themselves.

For a month, from 20.X to 2.XI—4,800 *signatures* (N.B.) for the six and 2,500 for **the seven** (including 1,000 Bundist signatures. N.B.! N.B.!). Is that a fact or not?? This is a fact, sir, and not intellectualist whining! It is not a party, if you please, since they have no "common" organ-

* Consecutive growth in the number of Bolsheviks in the worker curias in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Dumas.—*Ed.*

isation, no "congress"!!! Ha-ha!! *Nor will there be* anything in common with the liquidators and Bundists—it is time to understand this instead of contemplating the old that is gone and done with. A congress is extremely difficult to call (hence the *wreckers* of the Party refer things "to a congress", sort of ad kalendas graecas!). These *signatures*, as it happens, represent the *new* form of the old party. Fancy not being able to understand this!

The old national "federation of the worst type" *has gone for good*. This is another thing the author does not understand.

The author has a wrong idea of equality between the 6 and 7 (he is wrong to talk about the 8, since the Party *does not* recognise the eighth as a Social-Democrat*). Why shouldn't the Party grant equality to the *near-Party group in the Duma*??** The author has not understood the serious significance of the conception "near-Party people".

Our journal is not a literary miscellany, but a militant organ. There can be no question, therefore, of publishing the article. I would be very glad, however, to see the author's retort to my criticism, as I would generally welcome any exchange of opinions with old friends. If I have come it too strong with this criticism and expressed myself sometimes none too politely, I beg his pardon. I can assure him I had no intention of being offensive, but simply, for old friendship's sake, unburdened myself and said what I thought with open-hearted candour.

How splendidly the campaign for the six against the seven is going! What a wonderful rallying and education of the workers against the liberal labour politicians! What an excellent example, the first in Russia, of the workers' party actually *deciding* the fate of *its own* representation in the Duma! This is no longer a crowd "who have done a little reading", but an organised force. The conference decided—the six acted—the organised thousands approved by discussing and signing—that is called a *party* against that rag of a paper, the new edition of the old *Tovarishch*,

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* This refers to Y. I. Jagiello.—*Ed.*

** This does not bind the Party in any way; and it *can* educate the near-Party people.

Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta, which is fouling and poisoning the working-class movement with its intellectualist muck. And how splendidly the workers' Duma group has developed its activities! Right away a step forward not only in name, but in all its work! What an excellent speech, that of Badayev's, on the freedom of coalition, compared with the iteration of shoddy liberal ideas by Tulyakov!

Au revoir, dear comrade. Spit on the Mensheviks more often, study the *facts* of the present-day labour movement, weigh their significance, and your—begging your pardon—moping mood will pass; instead of searching for a "middle line", you will help to rally the workers against the gang of traitors.

Yours,
V. I.

Sent from Cracow to Irkutsk

First published in 1938 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 2

Printed from the original

309

A NOTE TO THE EDITORS OF *PROLETARSKAYA PRAVDA**

This article is marked with three Ks (KKK).[303] The boycott slogan should be given everywhere, but precisely in such a form, and only in such a form, without using the word boycott.

For the sake of all the gods that be, don't be drawn into giving "scathing" answers to such gentlemen!

Written in the second half of December 1913
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1962 in the book *V. I. Lenin i "Pravda". 1912-1962*

Printed from the original

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* *Proletarskaya Pravda*—one of the names of *Pravda*.—*Ed.*

1914

310
TO I. E. HERMAN

2/I. 1914

Dear Comrade,

The brevity of your letter surprises us greatly.

Where ("farther"?) did the delegate go?[304]

To Hamburg? To Brussels? To Copenhagen?

Who is this delegate? A true Bolshevik? Or a liquidator? Or a vacillator? What did he tell? How many delegates are there *altogether*? How many delegates from Riga? From the villages? From Libau? From other towns?

Did you arrange to correspond with this delegate? *This is the most important thing of all*: he must write to you *every day* in the most precise and detailed manner. Did he give you any address?

Wire to us immediately you learn anything: address—Uljanow. 51. Lubomirskiego. Krakau.

Code words:

First—Brussels
Second—Hamburg
Third—Copenhagen

opening date of congress: day (month of January)+10 (i.e., if 11.I—then **21**)

and so on.

or: "indefinite"
or: "postponed"
plus=Bolsheviks certainly preponderate
minus=liquidators " "
X=unknown.

Write after each meeting with delegates or after each letter. (Are most of the delegates travelling by sea?)

Today we received a letter from Brussels (dated 29/XII) saying that we are invited to the congress due to be held in 10-12 days; place and time, it said, will be communicated later.

And that is all!! Very little!

So write and wire!

Yours,
V. U.

If the delegate is in Brussels and if you can write to him absolutely confidentially, give him the address: Jean *Popoff*. Rue du Beffroi. *2. A. Bruxelles*.

This is our representative, through whom you can find out everything and with whom you can talk. Absolutely trustworthy.

If Tyszka ("Executive" of the Polish S.D.) is invited, then the "opposition"=Warsaw and Lodz committees should be invited too. Write to Karlson about this.

Write to Karlson in Brussels (if he is our man) that he should notify both Popov and us by both telegram and letter.

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1935 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

311

TO I. E. HERMAN AND I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS

7/I. 1914

Dear Comrades,

I have just received information from our representative in Brussels, Popov (Jean *Popoff*, rue du Beffroi. 2. A. Bruxelles), that the congress will be held there (*or near there*) "not later than within a week" (written 4 or 5.I).

The task now is to try and rally the Bolsheviks. You have committed a *gigantic* mistake in not making arrange-

ments for correspondence (this can be safely done abroad) with your travelling Bolshevik. *Try immediately* to rectify this mistake by sending a letter *at once* to this Bolshevik—in two envelopes, addressed to Popov, with the inner envelope inscribed in Lettish: *personal*, *for so-and-so*.

Popov will find him and hand over the letter personally.

In this letter you should (1) fully recommend Popov (I vouch for him) (and give (*N.B.*) Popov's Brussels (*N.B.*) address) and (2) ask that the Lettish Bolshevik should **immediately** give you a detailed account of everything (directly or through Popov), particularly of the make-up (1. How many liquidators? 2. How many Bolsheviks? 3. How many Braunists,* **etc.**, and of the plans of every group in detail).

I enclose a note for Popov, to whom you will write in Russian.

Give me the *exact* name of the pub, the *street* and house *number* and the exact *hour* of the rendezvous.

P.S. Am I to wire you or Herman or both of you?

I have learned the timetable. It will be most convenient for me to leave here early in the morning. I shall be in Berlin at 4.40 Nachmittag and leave at 9.34 Abends from Friedrichstraßenbahnhof. Make an appointment at once for us to meet (I *must* meet both you and Herman), giving the *hour* (7-8-8½ p.m.) and the *pub* **near** Friedrichstraßenbahnhof. I shall wire you the day of my departure and we shall meet at the pub.[305]

Awaiting an early reply,

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. You can invent a *personal* excuse to start corresponding with this Lettish Bolshevik.

Sent from Cracow to Berlin

First published in 1935 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

* Meaning the followers of J. Janson-Braun, the conciliators.—*Ed.*

312
TO I. F. POPOV

7/I. 1914

Mr. Jean Popoff.
Rue du Beffroi. 2. A. Bruxelles

Dear Comrade,

Please try to meet the request of the Lettish comrades who are writing to you. They are our best friends.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written in Cracow

First published in 1935 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

313
TO I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS OR I. E. HERMAN

11/I.

Dear Comrade,

As regards the arrangement for a rendezvous, you have done well.

But as regards the delegate, I scold you severely. Apparently, he is either a fool or an old woman, who falls for the gossip and slander of the liquidator riffraff. Popov has been sent a formal power of attorney from the C.C., and he has spoken only *to Sauer* (an official of the Bureau Abroad!!). Obviously, the liquidators are slandering Popov.

But that delegate of yours! A fine fellow indeed, if he believes the liquidators. With warriors like these it would be ridiculous to start a war against the liquidators. Such "warriors" only deserve to lick the boots of the liquidators all their lives.

And what made you, knowing how unreliable this delegate was, write to him that *I* needed the information??!

The idea was that *you* ask him for the information. Now that delegate will use your letter *against me*: that would be the limit!

I am terribly angry.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Written January 11, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Berlin

First published in 1935
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 5

Printed from the original

314

TO INESSA ARMAND

...* I received the C.O. Page 8 is disgraceful. Why the devil didn't they let us know? We could have found some more material!! And it should have been dated not 28/XII, but earlier, for there is not a word about the International Bureau.

Many people are worrying over the decisions of the Bureau. It's *silly*!

An "exchange of opinions" is quite acceptable, and a resolution like that should not have been turned down.

That about the six being rejected is a *lie*. The six *did not even present* a demand! According to the Rules *they couldn't*: if there are 7 S.R.s in the Duma+6 S.D.s, then 1 *S.R.* only has a voice in the Inter-Parliamentary Commission.

The I.S. Bureau can only offer us bons offices for talks, for an "exchange of opinions" with other parties, groups, etc. This is all it does. Only this! The calling of a conference, etc., is a stupid Versimpelung of affairs by the liquidationist and philistine riffraff. These liquidator people are just muck. And if we "exchange opinions" they'll be pleased!

Who wrote the article in the C.O. on the Beilis case?

Why weren't the proofs sent to us?? It should have been

* The beginning of the letter is missing.—*Ed.*

said that the bourgeois should form a *republican* party if they are *really* against the Beilis case.

Written not earlier than
January 11, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

315
TO V. P. MILYUTIN

Dear Colleague,

I have received your letter and hasten to reply that articles against Bogdanov's platitudes in philosophy ... and *Tectology* are badly needed. Please send your article to me direct, best of all by registered book-post.[306] Articles on similar subjects are also needed; I shall be very glad if you map them out and let me know.

Greetings,
V. Ilyin

Written January 14, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Vologda

First published in 1924 in
the journal *Sever* (Vologda)
No. 1

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

316
TO INESSA ARMAND*

P.P.S.

It has only just dawned on me, after rereading Kuznetsov's telegram, that it is evidently not a question of a report, but a meeting commemorating 9.I! Announcing Malinovsky for such a meeting is *altogether impossible* (for I have already written about *absolute* legality, and I ask again and again that it be strictly *adhered to*: *neither* the

* This is a postscript to a letter of Lenin's to Armand that has not been traced.—*Ed.*

Party, *nor* groups, *nor* revolution, *nor* Social-Democracy should ever be *mentioned*). As for me, you can put me down on the list of speakers on January 9 if it is useful for your success (financially), *but with my right to let you down* (*privately*, I declare that even if I'm in Paris I *won't go* to the 9.I meeting together with such a bunch of assorted animals as the S.R.s, and Leder & Co.).[307]

Written prior to January 22, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

317

TO INESSA ARMAND

25/I.

Dear Friend,

I am writing you briefly on business: Victory!! Hurrah! The majority are for us. I shall stay here about a week, and shall probably have a lot of work to do.

I am delighted that we have won.[308]

Sincerely yours,
V. I.

Oulianoff, rue de la Tulipe. 11.
Bruxelles (Ixelles)

Written January 25, 1914
Sent to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Written in English

318

TO INESSA ARMAND

No. 2.

...* Just now (at 2 p.m.) I received further mail by extra post. Again nothing from you....

I received a letter from Bukharin in Vienna. He has

* The beginning and end of this letter are missing.—*Ed.*

seen Buryanov, who was on his way from Plekhanov. Apparently, the Plekhanovites and other non-factionists intend to undertake some sort of joint "action": I believe Plekhanov wants to publish a newspaper. Trotsky and the local crowd are very shortly putting out a journal of their own, *Borba*. They have effected a reconciliation with *Luch*; a correspondence was conducted on this subject. The "pure" liquidators will remain in *Nasha Zarya*—that's what that crowd "hopes" for.

That is what Bukharin writes. This news is very important. There's no smoke without fire, and we are probably witnessing a new wave of idiotic conciliationist activity, which the I.S.B. is sure to take advantage of to stage a comic act in the spirit of the 1910 January plenary session. Well, we're standing on our own legs now and we'll show up this riffraff.

We must try our *hardest* (extremely tactfully, of course) to collect and keep collecting all the information we can in Paris. That fool Antonov cannot collect gossip from Steklov, but Steklov can get money out of him. And we haven't a penny. Kamenev and his family are living *on nothing*. See to it, therefore, that the C.O.A. does not give *a single* kopek away to *anybody* but us. We shall *shortly* be in desperate need of money for putting out the C.O., a special pamphlet and one *very important* publication (absolument entre nous: *we will publish a special bulletin of the Central Committee*[309]*—for Russia we've got a special transport possibility**).

The conciliators of all shades are out to "catch" us! Bon! We'll catch those scoundrels, those ridiculous mountebanks. They're getting stuck in the mud of blocs with the liquidators? Bon! Our tactic is: if the enemy makes a false move, give him time to sink deeper into the mud. That's where we shall catch the scoundrels. Meantime, we've got to gather strength and money—we've got to exercise restraint (to the utmost!)—to learn as much as we can. Paris is a convenient centre for finding out things and for "diversions". It is most desirable that the *section*

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* The text in italics after the colon is written in English in the original.—*Ed*.

adopt a *sledge-hammer* resolution against Kautsky (calling his statement about the death of the Party *shameless*, *insolent*, *monstrous*, *ignorant*). As for the few "near-conciliators" of our section, let them get information from the Plekhanovites, the conciliators (Makar, Lyova, Lozovsky *& Co.*) and the Trotskyites—as well as the Bundists and the Letts.

Raise the question of lambasting Kautsky in the C.O.A. and vote it: if the majority turn it down, I'll come and give that majority a leathering they'll remember for a long time. But I must know **who** that majority is going to be, and *who* I have to deal with. So go full ahead!

Nik. Vas. may receive at his address communications of great importance to us (from the I.S.B. or from the Letts). It is very important that he should hand them to you **immediately**—you may open them in order to wire their contents to me briefly: *if it is not embarrassing*, arrange this, because just these days (while Malinovsky is here) a delay of a day or two (=difference between a letter and a telegram) may be of extremely vital significance. I think *you could* mention N. K., but decide yourself, you know best.

Let the C.O.A. consider who, in Paris, could help the six to write their speeches. The need is great since the arrest of Krylenko. We shall send the list of speeches. Assistance from *all* the vacillating elements of the different groups is more convenient and more possible here.

Written prior to January 26, 1914
Sent to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

319

TO INESSA ARMAND

26/I.

Dear Friend,

I was terribly glad to receive your nice, friendly, warm, charming letter. I am inexpressibly grateful to you for it.

Things here have gone worse. One has already deserted to the conciliators—so now we have no majority, and the conciliators will have it all their own rotten way.

I am leaving here on Tuesday or Wednesday next and will soon (except for a lecture in Leipzig) be in Cracow.

They write me from there that things are in a bad way with *Pravda*—there's no money. The circulation has dropped. A deficit. Bad job.

My new address: Oulianoff, rue Souveraine. 18.
(Ixelles) Bruxelles.

From the enclosed letter to Nik. Vas. you will find an answer to your question whether I am angry on account of the unsuccessful lecture. I should think I am! That idiot Antonov!! And the inability *apart from* him to arrange practical matters.

I received the express mail and have handed everything to Malinovsky. He is here and will stay another 2-3 days.

Take care of the kopeks in the C.O.A. and don't allow Antonov to indulge his harebrained schemes.

My very, very, very best regards, my dear friend. Excuse the haste and brevity. I have no time.

Yours,
V. U.

The bulletin is the most important job of all. *I beg you* to keep an eye on it yourself or get it going **without** Antonov.

Written January 26, 1914
Sent to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

319

TO N. V. KUZNETSOV

Dear Friend,

I shall not be in Paris any more.

The plan for Publishing a lecture on the national question—nothing doing.

I repeat: not a kopek *for anything* except the bulletins of the C.C. They are to be done at *Riskin's printing shop* (*not* Stepan's). He is to be told to observe the strictest secrecy. *You yourself* or Inessa—**but not Antonov**—should get back **all** the MSS. and **all** the proof-sheets.

Tomorrow I am sending material for the bulletin. Format = sheet of 9.I.1914. *Four* such pages. Type—large for propaganda material (page 1); small for *pages 2 and 3*.

Do the job *neatly*, not à la Antonov and without Antonov. It is ridiculous and shameful to handle *practical* affairs through that daydreamer. What is needed is a *committee* of **practical men** and not a daydreamer (he is a nice, charming man, but a preposterous dreamer).

All the rest of the literature (the C.O., Programme, Rules, Kamenev's pamphlet, the London minutes,* etc., *all*) send *without delay* to Leipzig. Herrn Koiransky. Sophienstraße: 30[I] rechts. Leipzig. (Indicate expéditeur.) Notify me *immediately what* has been sent and *when*, at the address: Mr. Wladimir Oulianoff. Rue Souveraine. 18. Bruxelles (Ixelles).

All the best,
Yours,
V. Lenin

Written January 26, 1914
Sent to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

321

TO INESSA ARMAND

...** There is an important job to be done in Paris—the reorganisation of the C.O.A. It is more important now than ever.

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* This refers to the minutes of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—*Ed.*

** The beginning of this letter is missing. The manuscript is available only from p. 3.—*Ed.*

We have *started* a new splendid transportation arrangement. A new method, wonderful job, already tested (I had a letter yesterday). Cheap. We are all delighted. They take 2 poods a month.[310]

We must publish. But we have *neither* money nor any printing facilities outside of Paris. Therefore it is of *primary* importance for the Party to *arrange* publication in Paris. I beg you to *do* this both as a duty and a favour.

Yesterday I sent N. V—ch the MSS. for No. 1 of the *Bulletin*. I also sent instructions point by point.

Read them. See that they are followed *implicitly*. Assure the people over there that we shall give the C.O.A. the sack—no, really—and appoint in its stead a committee of our own (on behalf of the C.C.)—really, I am not joking—unless the business of publishing and dispatching the *Bulletin* (a matter of *primary* importance to the whole Party) is organised with meticulous care, not à la Antonov.

I demand *literally* strict execution of my instructions concerning the *Bulletin*. That's one thing. Secondly, the C.O.A. must set up a businesslike *committee*, so that Antonov (a nice man and good comrade, but a *good-for-nothing* daydreamer and preposterous *fumble-fist*) should have *nothing* to do with the practical side of the business.

Publication and printing should be done *at a printing house*. The C.O.A. (+the committee) should exercise *special* and **daily** control. Copy out the instructions and *follow them implicitly*.

Put this through the C.O.A. and *get the committee going*. I repeat, this is a matter of primary importance. Answer me *quickly* whether everything has been done. I am still here, in Brussels, *waiting* for the proofs.

I am enclosing a letter for Vl. Khr. Read it, give it to N. V. to read and *hand it over*.

Have the adjuvant committee appointed *before* I leave here (I shall be here another week, until Tuesday or Wednesday).

You will appreciate the importance of this business and spare no efforts, I am sure.

Yours,
V. U.

[N.B. We haven't *a penny*. The C.O.A. must pay for everything.]

P.S. Edisherov is dead timber. So is Kamsky. If you go away, who remains?

2 or 3 efficient *hustlers* should be put on the job to do all the footwork, to visit the printing shop 2 or 3 times a day, to see to it that the *Bulletin* is issued on time and keep in close touch with us. As for the C.O.A., let it exercise "control" from above.

Written January 28, 1914
Sent from Brussels to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

322

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

My dear Huysmans,

I thank you for your kind letter.[311] I am very sorry that you were not at the Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats the first day, as everyone expected, but on Wednesday, just when you were not expected and when I had to absent myself on business. I regret it all the more since I missed the opportunity of hearing your very interesting speech.

As regards the request of the Executive Committee that "I make up in my own name" a brief report concerning the differences, I very much regret that I am unable to meet your request.

A report of this kind cannot be submitted "in my own name", as I have no right to do it. I am sure, moreover, that the important thing for the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. is not "my personal" opinion, but the opinion of the Central Committee. As soon as I arrive in Cracow, however, and get in touch with all the members of the C.C., the report which the Executive Committee asks for

will be drawn up, endorsed by the Central Committee and forwarded to you.*

I cannot close this letter without thanking you for your kind invitation. Unfortunately, I am engaged today with the Chairman of our Party's Duma group at a congress sitting which happens to be discussing this very question of unity in the Russian S.D.L. Party. I would therefore like to put off our meeting (the Chairman of the Russian S.D.L. group would also be glad to talk with you) and arrange it for tomorrow, 4 p. m., at the Maison du Peuple.

Will you please wire me whether this is convenient for you, at the address: Oulianoff. 18. Rue Souveraine. 18. Ixelles-Bruxelles.

Yours,
Lenin

Written January 29, 1914
Sent to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

323

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

Brussels, February 2, 1914**

Dear Huysmans,

I have just finished the report and before leaving Brussels I want to let you know that Comrade Popov has undertaken to translate it and forward it to you.

Yours,
N. Lenin

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from a typewritten copy
Translated from the French

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* See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 74-81 and 233-36.—*Ed.*

** The letter is erroneously dated February 3, 1914. In his letter to Camille Huysmans dated March 7, 1914 (see Document 330 in this volume) Lenin mentions that he wrote this letter on February 2.—*Ed.*

324

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Comrade,

Your silence surprises and depresses me extremely. We cannot work without *Vorwärts*.

I have been receiving *Vorwärts* free of charge for the last 3-4 years, right up to *February* 1914. Suddenly ... it has stopped!!

What's the matter? I am not writing myself as I am afraid (if this is an intrigue of the liquidators) to get a rude reply.

But maybe it is simply an oversight?

Will you *please* go to the **forwarding office** (on no account to the editorial office) and find out what it's all about and let me know *immediately*.[312] Nadya wrote to you about this some time ago, but there has been no reply. What is the matter? Are you ill? Please respond!

Yours,
Lenin

I am enclosing a printed address for *Vorwärts*.

N.B. I repeat, I have been receiving it for 3-4 years for *Sotsial-Demokrat*, *Rabochaya Gazeta*, *Pravda* in St. Petersburg, etc.

Written after February 11, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Berlin

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

325

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Dear Friend,

1st.* Bogdanov's departure is said to have caused displeasure (among the intellectualist riffraff, apparently). That "good soul" of ours, Galyorka, is moping, I believe. The Priboi people[313] voted for Bogdanov.

* Erroneously given as "2nd" in the typewritten copy.—*Ed.*

They argue (an old trick of these intellectualist mischief-makers) that there are workers supporting *Vperyod* everywhere (why weren't they seen anywhere?...). That's all bosh, of course. The story of the *Vperyod* group's adventurism will have to be given in *Prosveshcheniye*. But now it is necessary that you should (1) take action. The thing has to be explained, the stupid defenders of Vperyodism and Bogdanov (Dansky is one of them, apparently) must be challenged and warned. (2) You must get your letter about *An Introduction to Political Economy*[314] published for certain. Write immediately. If yours doesn't go, I'll send in mine.

2nd. How about the collection of articles? Drop me a line (*Marxism and Liquidationism*).[315]

3rd. What a scandal in the committees of the Literary society (the campaign against the Press Bill)[316].... Bloc of the liberals+liquidators (Kheisin, Stiva Novich, Guliko). And N. D. Sokolov there too.... Take action. Kick him out. Most important of all—launch a campaign against the liquidators for this. Let me know.

4th. What about the speeches? The budget will be before the Duma only on 20.III, old style. Am I right? Drop me a line about this.

Written February 27, 1914
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv*
No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

326

TO THE EDITORS OF *PROSVESHCHENIYE*

To Andrei Nikolayevich,* private

Dear Colleague,

I sent you today another article, Bukharin's. All for No. 2.** I hope this will keep you going for the time being.

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* Anna Yelizarova-Ulyanova.—*Ed.*

** Of the journal *Prosveshcheniye*.—*Ed.*

Re Bogdanov's departure, there is apparently a quite erroneous opinion, which must be combated.

1. Who has gone because of him? No one. Consequently, it looks as if we have antagonised somebody; this lie must be disproved.

2. He is himself a minus (and not an 0). I am surprised that they vote for Bogdanov in Priboi without defending his false platitudes, without defending his platitudes in *An Introduction to Political Economy*. This is uncollegiate. You have forgotten. Write. Explain. Argue. Fancy voting without a collegiate exchange of opinions! Cowardly. Crazy. Vulgar. Harmful. Let them explain art. G. G.,* why they drag rot propaganda into the workers' midst.

3. There is a decision for the *Vperyod* group. This is not true. Where is it? Give me their letters to *Pravda*.... There aren't any. These are fairy-tales of the soft-hearted muddleheads from among the intelligentsia....

I am sending only articles approved by the Editorial Board. Including Pavlov's article. It is suitable. Bogdanov is a nonentity, whom it is ridiculous to give much attention to.

Written February 27, 1914
Sent from Cracow to
St. Petersburg

First published in 1960 in
Istorichesky Arkhiv No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy found
in police records

327

TO F. N. SAMOILOV

Dear Fyodor Nikitich,

I received your letter and am very glad that you are fixed up.

Now—quiet, sunshine, sleep, *food*. Take care of all this. Do they give you enough to eat?

You should drink more milk. Do you?

You should weigh yourself once a week and make a note of it each time.

* The meaning of this has not been deciphered.—*Ed*.

You should go and see a local doctor at least once in 10 days, so that he can check the progress of your cure. Have you the doctor's address? If you haven't, write to me and I shall find it out for you.

The main thing is sleep (*how many* [*hours*]* *do you sleep*?), sun and [food], especially *milk*.

Write to me about this *in detail*.

Nadya sends her regards. All the best, and wishing you a good rest.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. You don't feel too lonely, do you? If you do, I can arrange for friends from Geneva and Lausanne to visit you. Wouldn't visitors tire you? Write!

Is there a bath in your pension?

Written in February 1914
Sent from Cracow to
Montreux (Switzerland)

First published in 1960 in
Voprosy Istorii KPSS No. 2

Printed from the original

328
TO INESSA ARMAND

2/III. 1914

Dear Friend,

We are still having hard times—no newspaper. One senses a sharp change in the whole system of work after Kamenev's departure, and *where* the new line is leading and *how* it will shape, no one can tell.

From St. Petersburg we have had news 1) from Mikh. Step. (Olminsky), who complains that we called Bogdanov names and drove him out, that the people over there are lamenting, etc. My, what a snivelling milksop that dear M. St. of ours is!

2) There has been a letter from the St. Petersburg Committee or rather about the St. Petersburg Committee. It is alive and working well. This is very pleasant news.

* The edges of the manuscript are torn. Words in square brackets have been inserted as context suggests.—*Ed.*

3) A letter from a C.C. man, who is "making a comeback" in Siberia after an interval of 2 years (prison and exile).

Before I forget—do you know what's the matter with Popov in Brussels? He hasn't answered my *urgent* and *important* letters **2-3 weeks** (!!). And I need him! Is he ill? Or has that *love-story** of his done something to him, driven him out of Brussels, etc.? If you know nothing, will you please do this: wait a couple of days; if, during that time, you do not hear anything new from me, write to him in Brussels *through other friends* and also ask them about him, so that I know *definitely* what it's all about. Must be something incredible and impossible!

If you know anything about him, drop me a line at once.

All the best,

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. Samoilov writes that he feels rather lonely in Montreux. I am anxious to find a good doctor to look after him there (nervous complaint). Does Kamsky know anyone?

Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

329

TO THE BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P., IN RUSSIA

For Y.**

Dear Friends,

I have had no news from you for a long time. Things are none too good. Strictly speaking, during the last few months following the arrests, you have no ... no collegium for organisational work. This is simply an impossible situation. I think you should co-opt 3-4 St. Petersburg workers

* This word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** Yelena Rozmirovich.—*Ed.*

(including a shop-assistant) as has been rightly pointed out.... You won't be able to get things moving otherwise. The co-opted men should be kept strictly separate and apart from the co-operative board and the legal enterprises. Answer quickly. We have asked for someone to be sent here, but so far there is no reply.

Further—we earnestly ask you to put us in touch directly with the P. C. This is extremely important. Then, as regards the "transporter". Has No. 1 of the *Bulletin* been received? What's happened to the man, why doesn't he write? Things have been at a standstill for close on a month. It's unpardonable. Make inquiries, find out—is he safe, alive? Kostya should know what his name is.

Finally, about money, too, we would ask you to answer: 1) What definitely have you learned about Pryanik? Find out and hurry them up. Has a round been made of the rich to collect money? Write about this....[317] We are absolutely moneyless, and haven't a penny for organisational trips and all organisational work. There are people who could be utilised ... but owing to the lack of funds we cannot do anything so far. Write whether you are satisfied with Volkov, whether things have been put right, particularly the speeches.

Regards to everybody,

Frey

Written March 4, 1914
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

First published in 1960
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv*
No. 2

Printed from a
typewritten copy
found in police records

330

TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

To Citizen Huysmans

Cracow, March 7, 1914

Dear Huysmans,

First of all, leaving aside the altogether objectionable tone of your letter,[318] I will state the facts in regard to my report.

On February 2, 1914 I left Brussels; as promised, my report *had already been written*. A quarter of an hour before my departure *I wrote you a letter* (in the presence of Comrade Popov) at a café near the Northern Railway Station; in that letter I informed you *that my report was already prepared* (20 small pages and the resolution of the Lettish Congress*) and that Comrade Popov had undertaken to translate it *and deliver it to you*.**

The address of the café was printed on the envelope of this letter, and if the letter has not been delivered to you I shall lodge a protest with the Brussels Post Office.

If you did receive this letter, I am greatly astonished that you do not mention it.

If Comrade Popov has not yet forwarded you a translation of my report, then I am completely at a loss. I wrote to him several times, believing him to have fallen ill, since he has not written to me for several weeks now.

Today I am sending him another registered letter, Recorded Delivery, in order to get to the bottom of this strange affair. I am also writing to Comrade Karlson (256. Rue Grau. Bruxelles) asking him to call on Popov personally.

Secondly, the expressions you use in your letter ("tergiversation", "policy of procrastination", etc.) are insulting and you have no right to employ them towards a comrade. I must ask you therefore to take back these expressions without reserve. Unless you do so, this letter to you will be my last.

Yours,
N. Lenin

Sent to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

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* See V. I. Lenin, "Draft Resolution on the Attitude of the Social-Democrats of the Latvian Territory to the R.S.D.L.P." (present edition, Vol. 41, pp. 329-30).—*Ed.*

** See Document 323 in this volume.—*Ed.*

331

TO I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS

Dear Comrade Rudis,

I am very much surprised at your writing: "I cannot understand Lenin's attitude in this matter" (i.e., my attitude towards the conciliator resolutions of the Lettish Congress[319]).

Didn't Herman tell you that I fought tooth and nail? The conciliators won, however. We must fight on now, but fight with sense.

The arrests don't surprise me, since the Congress was arranged by the liquidators with an *outrageous* lack of secrecy. The whole of Brussels knew about it! The whole of Paris!

This will be a lesson—beware of the liquidators!

Show this letter to Herman. I am waiting for news as to when the resolutions are to be published. *Pravda* should do this **before anybody else.**[320]

N. K. sends her regards.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written after March 12, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Berlin

First published in 1935 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

332

TO THE SECRETARY, EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GRANAT BROS. ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY

Cracow, March 15, 1914

Dear Sir,

I accept the Editorial Board's offer to write an article on Marx for the Dictionary.* Please let me know whether

* See V. I. Lenin, "Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 43-91).

a bibliography is required at the end of the article. I thank you very much for the prospectus and the cuttings from the Dictionary.

Very truly yours,
V. Ilyin

My address is: Herrn Wl. Ulianow.
51. Ulica Lubomirskiego. *Krakau*.
(And from May 1914: Poronin (Galizien). Austria.)

Sent to St. Petersburg

First published in 1959 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

333
TO CAMILLE HUYSMANS

15/III. 1914

Dear Huysmans,

I received at last Popov's explanation and his statement that the report had at last been sent. As you are "merely the secretary (and a good fellow)" and not a "grandissime seigneur", I can say that had the letter you sent to Popov on March 10, 1914 been sent a week or two earlier, this incident would never have occurred.

On receiving your witty and friendly letter,[321] however, I have no wish to raise any question and am particularly pleased to consider the incident definitely closed.

Yours,
V. L.

Sent from Cracow to Brussels

First published in 1963 in French in *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* No. 1-2

First published in Russian in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

For Lenin's work on the article see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 153, 154, and this volume, Document 345.—*Ed.*

334

TO INESSA ARMAND

...*It *would be good* now to have a Ukrainian Social-Democratic group of *our own*, however small. Write whether you could make contacts and do something in this direction.

What a magnificent victory at the Insurance Council elections![322] Delightful! Try and lancer** a report about this in the French socialist (or trade union) press. And how much better-looking *Pravda* has become under *brother****—it's getting to be a real beauty! It does you good to look at it. *For the first time* we see the hand of a cultured, knowledgeable editor on the spot.

What impression did le geste de M-me Caillaux[323] make on you? Frankly, I can't get rid of a certain feeling of sympathy. I thought *only* venality, cowardice and meanness were rife in these circles. And suddenly this plucky woman goes and delivers a resolute leçon!! I wonder what the jury will have to say and what the *political* consequences *will be*. Will Caillaux resign? Will the Radicals be overthrown?

All the very best,

Yours,

V. U.

Written after March 15, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

334

TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

24/III. 1914

Dear Colleague,

I think you overdid the secrecy line a bit, and for a long time you had me guessing who you were.

* The beginning of this letter is missing. The manuscript is available from p. 3.—*Ed.*

** Insert.—*Ed.*

*** This word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

I thank you very much for your communication.* It is very important. I believe that on the terms you mention, your participation was quite correct and useful for the cause. Your request (to state in case of need that you played no game behind the backs of like-minded comrades) I shall gladly comply with, in the expectation, naturally, of receiving *detailed* information from you. I repeat, this is a very important matter, regarded as a symptom; your remarks concerning "the great interest of observing the process of a new stir-up" are perfectly correct. It is vitally essential that we be informed about this process.

The only mistake on your part is, to my mind, the invitation of "a big man", etc., "with strong leanings towards the Mensheviks and punctiliously correct", etc. "In case of need," you write, "he will state how I bore myself at the meetings." I believe these gentlemen's idea of correctness differs essentially from our own. That's one thing. They are incapable of understanding what it means to betray the workers to the bourgeoisie. Further, you will *never* need a defence by such a fellow. The very assumption of the idea of such a defence is a confession (a needless confession) of the weakness and instability of your position, etc. It perverts the purpose and meaning of your participation in the meetings. A person capable of directly informing the centre of the organised force gathers information as to the attitude of mind of the vacillating elements and even of the enemies. There's nothing wrong in this at all. But to invite (thus turning into a "force"!!) a trashy intellectual, who is incapable of distinguishing the bourgeoisie from its antipode, was a mistake. It is this that will probably lead to idle talk, gossip and squabbles.

But this mistake is unimportant. The business itself (your and our information) is far more important.

Please write more often and establish proper contacts for this purpose. Answer as quickly as possible. Couldn't we get some money from the "type"?** It's badly needed. It's not worth taking less than 10,000 rubles. Answer. Also

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* See Skvortsov-Stepanov's letter to Lenin (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2, 1959, pp. 14-17).—*Ed.*

** This apparently refers to A. I. Konovalov.—*Ed.*

let me know how frankly you can talk: a) with the "type", b) with his various friends, acquaintances, etc., c) with all the participants of the "meetings". I think you should single out those one can talk with openly and openly put to them questions such as: aa) We are going to the limit of such-and-such methods of struggle; can we know what your limits are? Unofficially, privately!! bb) We are contributing so-and-so in the way of forces, means and so on; can we know what your contribution to the struggle "outside the Duma" is likely to be? You say that the "type" considers that "the liberals changed front too early in 1905"—well then, get to know whether everybody thinks this and *for what length of time approximately they intend to put off the change of front* (this, of course, can be expressed not in terms of time, but in terms of political changes).

cc) Are they capable of giving money?

dd) " " " " creating an illegal organ?

and so on.

Our aim is to inform ourselves and spur them on to give every possible active assistance to the revolution, with the question concerning the revolution being put as frankly and bluntly as possible (to **a** or to **b** or even to **c** as you know best). If possible, it would be a good idea for you to deliver a report, on the theses of which I would gladly give my opinion, if need be.

Sent from Cracow to Moscow

First published in 1959 in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 2

Printed from the original

336

TO INESSA ARMAND

...* In regard to the opportunism of the German opportunists, Grigory and I are of one mind, I believe, and I have met no differences in the appraisal of their *infamy*. (I did not read the article on "The New Currents".)

* The beginning of this letter is missing. The manuscript is available only from p. 5.—*Ed*.

The Germans virtually have *2 parties*, and this has to be borne in mind without trying to shield the opportunists (*the way Neue Zeit and Kautsky are now doing*).

But it is incorrect to say that the German *party* is the most opportunist party in Europe. It is nonetheless the best party, and our task is to adopt from the Germans *all* that is most valuable (the mass of newspapers, the large party membership, the mass membership of the trade unions, the systematic subscription to the newspapers, strict control over the parliamentarians—all the same the Germans are *better* at this control than the French and Italians, not to mention Britain—and so on), adopt all this *without* playing up to the opportunists.

We should not cover up the opportunists from *Sozialistische Monatshefte*[324] (they have *heaps* of leaders there)—the way *Neue Zeit* and Kautsky and the German *Vorstand* are doing—*but hound them with all our might*. This is what Grigory always does in his articles about the Germans. I am now reading Legien (the trade union **leader**) on his visit to America and intend to pitch into that mean opportunist good and proper.*

All the very best,

Yours,

V. U.

Samoilov will probably change his address in a day or two. I shall write you as soon as I know it.**

Written in April, prior to 8th, 1914
Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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* See V. I. Lenin, "What Should Not Be Copied from the German Labour Movement" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 254-58).—*Ed.*

** In a letter dated April 9, 1914, G. L. Shklovsky informed Lenin that he had placed F. N. Samoilov in the town sanatorium in Berne.—*Ed.*

337

TO INESSA ARMAND

Saturday, 11/IV. 1914

Dear Friend,

I still do not know whether you received my letters in which I wrote about the loss of the letter concerning Rakhmetov, and what you have done in this connection.

The package (containing the first part of the collection *The Beginning*[325]) has been received by you, *but very late*. If you still have the wrapper with the postmarks on it, I would advise you to lodge a complaint with the ministry, enclosing the wrapper. The loss of the letter concerning Rakhmetov is simply exasperating, and I consider complaints, protests, etc., absolutely necessary. I have a strong suspicion that the letters of the Russian emigrants are stolen in Paris (and taken by the police to be read before delivery to the addressees). The dates on which letters are received should be kept track of.

I hope you have finished with Alexinsky? The *only* remedy in such cases (I speak from my own *long*, over 15 years, experience) is an absolute boycott by the *entire* section (but I suppose there are a lot of snivellers in it, who won't apply a boycott and so will have themselves to blame for the "squabbles").[326]

I am awfully glad that your children are coming to see you and that you will soon go off to spend the summer with them.

All the very, very best,

Yours,

V. U.

P.S. I apologise for today's brief letter. I am in a great hurry.

I have not yet received the collection (*The Beginning*). Is it the post again!??

Sent from Cracow to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

338

TELEGRAM TO THE EDITORS OF *PUT PRAVDY* ON THE OCCASION OF ITS SECOND ANNIVERSARY[327]

From Contributors

Dear Comrades,

I heartily congratulate *Put Pravdy* on its anniversary and wish further success to the workers' press. I am enclosing a donation of 6 rubles 68 kopeks, the one-day earnings of two Pravdists and 2 rubles as a special donation by Pravdist Hanecki over and above his one-day earnings.

With comradely greetings,

V. Ilyin

Written prior to May 5, 1914
Sent from Cracow to St. Petersburg

Published April 22 (O.S.), 1914, in the newspaper *Put Pravdy* No. 67

Printed from the newspaper text

339

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY*

Dear G. L.,

Why don't you answer about Samoilov (you must fix him up with some manual work—find some farmer in the environs or a market-gardener through the socialists[328]—and about Zgr.**?)

Regards,

Yours,

V. I.

Written May 12, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1925 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 8

Printed from the original

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* This is a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*

** Zgragen.—*Ed.*

340
TO INESSA ARMAND

...* and not in 1912, but in 1911) we in the editorial office of *Sotsial-Demokrat* received Vinnichenko's pamphlet in Russian devoted to a defence against the accusations levelled at him by the Social-Democrats, for "Honesty to Oneself". Vinnichenko asked for an answer in writing and in print. I remember being impressed by the pamphlet, and I wanted to write about it, but was, prevented by all kinds of petty affairs (oh, those "petty affairs", those apologies, for business, imitation products of business, a hindrance to business, how I hate fuss and bustle and petty affairs, and how tied I am to them inseparably and for all time!! *That's a sign more that I am lazy and tired and badly humoured. Generally I like my profession and now I often almost hate it***). By the way, I mislaid that pamphlet (published in Lvov) and have forgotten its title. Find it if you can, read it and send it to me.

I thought Vinnichenko sincere and naïve when he puts the question: "Does a Social-Democrat have the right (!! sic!!) to visit a brothel?" and keeps harping on this question, but all the time *individually*. He is sort of half-anarchist or total anarchist, and the Vperyodists must bamboozle him. He once read a lecture in Paris on "Honesty to Oneself" with Lunacharsky in the chair, did he not? Or are things in such a way that Lunacharsky is *for* Vinnichenko, while Alexinsky is against? *I would like to know some more details about it.***

*Before leaving Paris you must*** discuss with Nik. Vas., Kamsky and Ludmila the question of the delegation to the Vienna congress. It is most desirable to have as many delegates as possible. The difficulty is *money* (expenses for the trip+15 frs. for a ticket to the congress). The task is: 1) to search in advance for people fit to be delegates

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* The beginning of this letter is missing. The manuscript is available only from p. 3.—*Ed.*

** The passages, in italics, marked with two asterisks, are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

and able to travel at their own expense; 2) to raise more money; 3) to find out *how much* NN, MM, etc., are short of.

All the very best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written in the first half of May 1914
Sent from Poronin to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

341

TO I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS

Dear Friend,

I received your letter of 15/V. Regarding the Lettish supplement to *Pravda*, I have my doubts. Isn't it too early? And generally is it proper for Russians to interfere in Lettish affairs in this form?

Send me, if possible, a translation (1) of your unpublished articles, (2) of the worst of the "conciliator" articles in *Zihņa*[329] and the present legal Lettish newspaper.

The C.O. will soon come out. Send in an article on the Lettish Congress.

I congratulate you on the successful May Day rally, especially in Riga and St. Petersburg!

My regards to you and Herman (don't tell me you have quarrelled with him!).

Yours,
Lenin

Written between May 12 and 31, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1935 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 5

Printed from the original

342
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

19/V. 1914

Dear Friend,

I have a favour to ask of you. Is Volume *One* of Rubakin's *Among Books* available in your library or can you get it for me in Switzerland?

By the way, wasn't it you who sent me Volume One?[330] If it was, then I did not refund your postal expenses!! and you didn't remind me. Drop me a line, please, and I'll send you the money for both volumes. (I need Volume I for only a short time.)

Do you always get *Put Pravdy*?

What has happened to that young Bolshevik, the Wittmarist, that nervous vegetarian I met at your place a year ago?*

Could any of your acquaintances travel to Vienna as delegates *at their own expense* (we have no money, alas!)[331] Look around, find out. We must make up a delegation.

All the very best. Regards to Comrade Olga. N. K. also sends you both her regards.

Yours,
Lenin

Wl. Uljanow.
Poronin (Galizien), Autriche.

Sent to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

343
TO INESSA ARMAND

25/V. 1914

Dear Friend,**

The Malinovsky affair is warming up. He is not here. It looks like "flight".[332] Naturally, this gives food for the worst thoughts. Alexei wires from Paris that the Russian

* A reference to A. F. Ilyin-Zhenevsky.—*Ed.*
** These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

newspapers are wiring Burtsev that Malinovsky is accused of being a provocateur.

You can imagine what it means!! Very improbable but we are obliged to control all "ouï-dire". Wiring does not cease between Poronin,*** St. Petersburg, et Paris. Petrovsky wires today that "slanderous rumours dispelled. Liquidators conducting vicious campaign".

Russkoye Slovo wires Burtsev that the suspicions have been largely dispelled, but "other papers(???) (liquidators'???) are continuing their accusations".

*You can easily imagine how much I am worried.***

Yours,
V. I.

Sent from Poronin to Lovran (Austria-Hungary, now Yugoslavia)

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

344

TO G. I. PETROVSKY

My dear G. I.,

We have just received from you your literary debt. Thanks. We are surprised at the absence of news and letters.

Regards and best wishes,
V. Lenin

A wish—that you bear the irresponsible departure of Malinovsky more firmly, and stop worrying. No need to expel him. He has removed himself. Condemned. Political suicide. What other punishment can there be? Of what use? Do not worry. Speeches excellent. Boldly forward. The liquidators are not branded *enough* for their mud-slinging and dirt. That's what they should daily be called—garbage news-

* Rumours.—*Ed.*

** The words in italics marked with two asterisks are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

paper, garbage writers. Their job is to fling mud. Ours is to do the work. We have done with Malinovsky. He has gone under. Suicide. Why chew the rag, why waste time over it? To work, down with garbage writers!

Written after May 25, 1914
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published in 1962 in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 1

Printed from the original

345

TO THE SECRETARY, EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GRANAT BROS. ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY

Secretary, Granat Bros. Publications

Dear Colleague,

I received your letter dated 24. V. Will you kindly let me know what size and by what date you wish to have the autobiographical information.

Incidentally, please let me know the *deadline* for the article on Marx.

Yours very truly,
V. Ilyin

Address: Uljanow. Poronin (Galizien) Austria.

Written between June 6 and July 21, 1914
Sent to St. Petersburg

First published in 1959 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

346

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO THE EDITORS OF *TRUDOVAYA PRAVDA*

... Is it true that there are conciliationist tendencies among prominent Pravdist workers, that one of them—by the name of Malinin or Dolinin—had a long talk about this with a contributor to the newspaper, the writer M. N.? It is very important to know whether this is a trend—if so, what sort

of trend, what it stands for, what its terms of unity are—or just an individual and a casual fantasy.

As regards Plekhanov in his *Yedinstvo*,[333] you should adopt straightaway a tone to the effect that this distinguished theoretician, who has great services to his credit in the struggle against opportunism, Bernstein and the philosophers of anti-Marxism—a man whose mistakes in tactics during 1903-07 did not prevent him during the hard times of 1908-12 from singing the praises of the "underground" and exposing its enemies and opponents, that this man now, unfortunately, is again revealing his weak side. The utter vagueness of his ideas is due, perhaps, partly to his being totally uninformed: it is not clear whom he wants unity with—with the Narodniks (see *Sovremennik*, in which the Himmers are already parading his name) or with the liquidators of *Nasha Zarya* and Mr. Potresov, and on what conditions? And, having put these questions, you should calmly state that the reader will hardly get a clear answer to these natural questions, since we know from the literature that it is *these very* questions Plekhanov is *vague* about.

Again my greetings and congratulations on your huge success (but the business side, the business!!!) and my best wishes.

Contributor to Put Pravdy

The tone of the newspaper, pending the Vienna congress, should be altered. We are in for a period of struggle. We must pull no punches at the insolent beggars of the different little groups, we must nip in the bud their attempts at disorganisation. They dare to split the four-fifths!!* Drop me a line whether you agree, and when you are issuing.

You should hit out at the liquidators and the little groups at once and as hard as possible: the 40,000 must know exactly where we stand. It is our duty to make a laughingstock of the adventurists....

Written in June, after 18th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published April 22, 1962 in *Pravda* No. 112

Printed from the original

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* Meaning four-fifths of the advanced workers united around the Bolshevik *Pravda*.—*Ed*.

347
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,*

Information has been received today that the Executive Committee of the I.S.B. is calling what is known as the Unity Conference in Brussels on July 16, 17 and 18.**

A delegation must be formed. It is doubtful whether we shall go. Grigory maybe, but even he won't, as likely as not.

On behalf of the C.C. I want to ask you to consent to be a member of the delegation. We shall pay the expenses of the journey.

We shall work out the tactics in minute detail.

If you have the slightest chance to fix up the children for 6-7 days (or even less, since the conference will last 3 days), *I* would ask you to agree. You are well up in the business, you speak French perfectly, and you read *Pravda*. We also have in mind Popov, Kamsky and Yuri. Letters have been sent to all of them.

So answer at once, without an hour's delay. Consent!

Very truly,*
V. I.

We haven't decided yet about the delegation and haven't formed it. We are *searching*. It's all at the stage of preliminary talks so far. But time is short.

We must make **great** haste!!

Consent, do! It will make a good change for you and you will help the cause!!

Grigory's wife is ill. I don't want to go "on principle". Apparently the Germans (the resentful Kautsky & Co.) are out to annoy us. Soit! We shall calmly (I am no good for that), on behalf of the eight-tenths majority, propose our conditions in the most polite (I am no good for that either)

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* The words marked with an asterisk are in English in the original.—*Ed*.

** See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 495-535.—*Ed*.

French. You are more sure of yourself now, you have been reading lectures, and could carry this through splendidly! If the *dear* comrades want unity, then here are the conditions of the *majority* of class-conscious workers in Russia. They can either take them or leave them!!

"They" are out to give "battle" (decisive battle) to us in Vienna. An empty threat!! They *can't* do anything!!

Written in July, prior to 4th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

348

TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Dear Comrade,

On behalf of the Central Committee I must inform you that our C.C., by a special resolution, has recognised it quite impossible to attend the Brussels conference of July 16-18 unless the Polish opposition is invited on equal terms with the other participants of the meeting.[334] The discussion of even Russian affairs, let alone Polish, is simply impossible for us without the participation of the only real national organisation of the Social-Democratic workers in Russian Poland.

I would be greatly obliged, dear comrade, if you would answer this letter by wire. I trust there can be no obstacles to inviting the above-mentioned organisation.

We should very much like to know exactly what organisations and individuals you have invited.

Written not earlier than July 4, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Brussels

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I have yesterday made a walk in the mountains (the weather is good after weeks of rain), & therefore could not answer yesterday your letter. I'm *extremely* glad that you all are well, no illness, & that you are busy.

For the congress I'd like to beg you to prepare the most important citations (quotations) & documents against liquidateurs. Paris & I would help you. *Stockholm minutes—quotations about the underground* (*No. 3 of Nasha Zarya*,[335] *etc.*)*—our C.O. and major articles against the liquidators.** It is possible that you will be obliged to be member of the "conference" (of all "fractions") & to act publicly as accusator of liquid. & as a partisan (more than this: as a representative) of the C.C.

About "thrashing" of Alex. I've written not a word to Parisians & will not write. But... have you seen the cutting I've sent you?** Nik. Vas. was wrong: he has *helped* Ax-ky, who will now play a role of a "victim". It is clear. Boycott & common resolution. That's good. Thrashing is bad: now **all** *outsiders** will be *against* Nik. Vas. And the "moeurs" ill the emigration would get quite hooligan, if thrashing would get common.... Resolutions, boycott—that is the *single* convenient measures....

Nothing new here. Guests not yet arrived. The wife of Grigory still ill in hospital.

Yours truly, truly,

V. I.

Wishing you all good & best....

Written in July, prior to 6th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Written in English

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* Words in italics marked with an asterisk are in Russian in the original.—*Ed.*

** This refers to Alexinsky's open letter published in *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 41 for June 21, 1914.—*Ed.*

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,*

I am terribly afraid that you will refuse to go to Brussels, and thus place us in an *absolutely impossible* position. And so I have thought up another "compromise", which you will simply be unable to refuse.

Nadya believes your elder children have arrived already, and you could easily leave them for 3 days (or take Andrei with you).

In the event of the elder children not having arrived and it being *absolutely* impossible for you to leave the children for 3 days, I suggest that you go *for one day* (the 16th, **even** *for half a day*, to read the report), either leaving the children for the day, or even sending for K—vich for that day at an extremity. (We shall pay the expenses.)

You see, it's *extremely* important that the main report, at least should be read *really* **effectively**. And for that purpose *excellent* French is definitely needed, otherwise the effect will be nil—*French*, because otherwise nine-tenths will be lost in translation for the very Executive Committee *for whom the effect is primarily intended* (the Germans are *hopeless*, and they *may* not be there).

Besides excellent French, of course, an *understanding of essentials* and proper tact are needed. You are the *only suitable person*. So please—I beg you most earnestly—consent, if only for one day (you will read the report and apologise, pleading illness in the family, and go away, handing things over to Popov). If you have already refused by letter, wire (Uljanow. Poronin—10 words cost 60 heller): "agree one day", "agree 16 only", etc.

All the very best. Always sincerely yours,

V. I.

We shall write the C.C.'s report.** Your job will be to

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** See V. I. Lenin, "Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference and Instructions to the C.C. Delegation" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 495-535).—*Ed.*

translate it and read it *with commentaries*, which we shall agree on.

P.S. *The new chairman is not here but must come very soon.**

Kamsky, Popov, you. Safarov only as secretary—that's how I plan the delegation.

*I hope you will not now decline my demand. A good "lecture" in French, in good French will help our party extremely.**

I am worried very much about Brussels. *Only you* could carry it off wonderfully. Grigory will hardly be able to go—Zina is still in hospital (a bad "phlegmon") and his nerves have gone to pieces. *I am no good here*. Besides, Grigory speaks only German (and a poor German at that), and for us not to have a French speaker is tantamount to losing nine-tenths.

Written in July, prior to 6th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in part in 1959 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

351

TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

Dear Suren,

I am surprised that you have not answered (or not noticed) the important point of the Bill. *How* to determine the proportionate share of expenditure on the education of different nations? (if this share is required to be not lower than the share of the given nation in the population).

You should consider this. Collect data. Go through the literature. Go into details. Give examples in figures from the life of the Caucasus.

Yet not a word from you about this!

* The italicised words marked with an asterisk are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

To include autonomy in self-determination is *wrong*. It is a downright error. See my articles in *Prosveshcheniye*.* You are vacillating and "searching" for something. It's wrong. You should *understand* the Programme and stand for it.

Write me a criticism of my articles in *Prosveshcheniye*, and we'll talk it over.

It is shameful to stand for an official language. It is a police-regime idea. But there is not a shadow of police-regime practice in *advocating* Russian for small nations. Don't you understand the difference between the truncheon and the advocacy of a free man? Amazing!

"I exaggerate the danger of Great-Russian nationalism"!!! Now that's really funny! Do the 160 millions in Russia suffer from *Armenian* or *Polish* nationalism? Is it not a shame for a *Russian* Marxist to adopt the point of view of an Armenian hen-coop? Is it Great-Russian nationalism that oppresses and shapes the *policy* of Russia's ruling classes, or is it Armenian, Polish?? "Armenian" blindness makes you a Handlanger of the Purishkeviches and *their* nationalism!

To change the subject. Collect immediately and send me exact information: 1) on the time and frequency of publication in the Caucasus of Social-Democratic newspapers in Georgian, Armenian and other languages (from such-and-such a date to...). So many issues. *Liquidators'* and *ours*. 2) Circulation of each of them. 3) The number of workers' groups which have made donations. 4) Other information. **Hurry**. It is *facts* that Vienna needs, not phrases. Answer immediately.

Yours,
V. I.

Written prior to 6 July, 1914,
at Poronin

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

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* See "Critical Remarks on the National Question" and "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 17-51 and 393-454).—*Ed*.

352
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,*

Re a joint or different delegations with the liquidators, I would advise you not to decide that now, i.e., not to mention it. "The delegates will decide themselves"[336]

(and we, of course, will make it two different ones: according to the Rules of the International, we should first try a joint one, and if *no agreement* is reached, then the issue is decided by the distribution of votes in the Bureau).

Re Kollontai's report, I agree with you: Let her remain, but not from Russia. In the debates you will take the floor first or second.

Best wishes, *Yours truly*,*
V. I.

I was expecting a reply from you today. Nothing yet. Letters take longer than to Brussels!

We received the parcel . *Many thanks. I've got your despatch. Many, many thanks! Mr. chairman is not yet here!! And I do not yet know, if my proposition (to send you) will be voted (if not, Gregory will go himself). More thanks!!**

Written in July, prior to 9th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

353
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I have just settled with Grigory that he is not going (Zina is still ill!) (I am not going either)—and that *you and Popov*

* The words in italics marked with an asterisk are in English in the original.—*Ed*.

(and probably+Kamsky+**Safarov** only as secretary) have been *endorsed by the Central Committee*.

Tomorrow I shall send you the beginning and the end of the report. I am also preparing for you heaps of advice: I am sure you will wipe the floor with both Plekhanov (he is going!!) and Kautsky (going too). We shall teach them a good lesson.... Splendid!

Yours,
V. U.

Written in July, prior to 9th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,*

I have just sent a letter off to Papasha (Mr. Harrison. 35. Mornington Crescent. 35. London. N. W.)—he is a member of the I.S.B.—asking him to send Popov (Popoff, rue du Beffroi. 2. A. Bruxelles) a mandate for 5 persons.

Petrova (=Inessa; it is not advisable to let the liquidators know the name!)
Popov
Vladimirsky
Yuriev
Volodin** (Safarov).

The latter two will *probably not go*.

Forgive me please this disjointed letter. *We have many guests and I am extremely nervous, almost ill.**

I am sending the C.C. report by registered post. Please translate it, i.e., start translating it at once (making it as *polite as possible* and *toning down* the too sharply worded passages and name-calling)—and send the Russian text to *Popov* as the translation progresses.

* The words in italics marked with an asterisk are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

** The names Yuriev and Volodin are crossed out in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

(I have left myself my rough copy in order to send amendments and addenda and so that *I could take a counsel of Mr. Chairman who is not yet here but must come soon.**)

I advise you to translate for your speech, and not for the press or for the Bureau (Popov will afterwards make a fair copy from your rough one and submit it to the Bureau)—try to make it sound as if you were making a speech and referring to your notes. (Take the Russian text with you, but **don't give it** to the liquidators; say you didn't bring it along, and that you only have the translation.)

Start translating from Section IV ("Conditions"). This is most important of all, and it should be sent as soon as possible to Popov (who is to study it and prepare himself, and **talk** it over with Berzin).

N.B. [In making the rough copy of the report in French leave room for amendments and addenda.

Better be in Brussels on the 15th. But if you can't, then let it be 16th. Get in touch with Popov.

N.B. [The figures in pencil stand for the pages of my rough copy here in case of amendments and addenda.

Please keep me informed **more often** (if only by the briefest of letters) of the progress of your preparations, of any points that need clearing up, etc.

*Yours very truly,**

V. I.

P.S. I advise you to ask for the floor to make your report first, on the plea, if necessary, that your children are ill and you may have to go home at once in the event of a telegram arriving.

I am writing to Kamsky asking him to collect **all** the ma-

* The words in italics marked with an asterisk are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

terial. I shall send the *packages* to you and Popov from here tomorrow and the day after.

Read the other side, it will come in useful—I wrote to Popov by mistake on the back of my letter to you!!*

Written in July, prior to 10th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

355

TO I. F. POPOV

Take good care of all the documents which you will receive from Paris, *St. Petersburg* and elsewhere for your work at the conference, and then *return them to me with care*.

If St. Petersburg sends you *Stoikaya Mysl*[337] No. 18 and bourgeois newspapers for 4.IV and 5.IV. 1914, these should be added as material to the *C.C. report* (on the question of the liquidators' attitude to the demonstration of 4.IV[338]). The report is being sent to Inessa.

Your and Vladimirsky's chief duty (Inessa is the French speaker) is to write down as accurately as possible everything that goes on, especially the speeches of the Germans, *and especially of Kautsky*—and send in a report on this to the C.C.

Demand a translation of everything into French and do not accept the German language (in this sense).

Written in July, prior to 10th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Brussels

First published in part in 1959 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* See next letter.—*Ed.*

356
TO THE PRIBOI PUBLISHERS

Dear Colleague,

I thank you very much for sending me the last part of the book *Marxism and Liquidationism* I have another very important request to make of you. Will you please send immediately all the printed sheets of this book (i.e., the whole book) to the following address: rue du Beffroi. 2. A. Bruxelles. Mr. Jean *Popoff*. This is an extremely important matter which does not brook a moment's delay. Please send it express, hire a messenger and mail it specially from the Warsaw Station. I shall pay all the expenses promptly by special remittance if need be.

If at all possible, I would ask you (on a matter of such great importance as occurs only once in two years) to collect supplementary material (sets of *Pravda* and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*[339] for 2 weeks, *Nasha Zarya* and the *gems* of liquidationist literature—consult the editor of *Trudovaya Pravda*[340]). In the same package. I trust you will meet my request. The articles of Bulkin and Martov in No. 3 of *Nasha Zarya*, Axelrod's articles on party reform—that is to say, revolution, *Stoikaya Mysl* No. 18, St. Petersburg bourgeois newspapers for the *evening* of 4.IV.1914 and *morning* of 5.IV.1914, articles on the bloc between the Narodniks and liquidators in the insurance campaign. Whatever you can *manage*, to catch the mail train (evening train, I believe) of the Warsaw Line.

Written July 11, 1914
Sent from Poronin to St. Petersburg

First published in 1959
in *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4

Printed from a
typewritten copy
found in police records

357
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Today (Sunday) two working men are arrived, very good people from our capital. The present chairman* of our

* G. I. Petrovsky.—*Ed.*

members of parliament group will come tomorrow or very soon.

News good. Extremely important now your presence on the "unification" conference at Brussels. You can make it very, very soon, arrive 16th in the morning, leave Br. 18th in the evening. D, accord, is not it?

Please, give your agreement.

Yours,
W. I.

P.S. I shall write you often now in order to inform you.

Written July 12, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Written in English

358
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am extremely grateful to you for giving your agreement. I am positive you will carry off your important role with flying colours and give a fitting answer to Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg and Kautsky and Rubanovich (the insolent fellow!) who are going to Brussels in the hope of staging a demonstration against us generally and against myself in particular.

You are sufficiently familiar with the business, you speak well, and I am sure you will now have enough "cheek". Please don't take my desire to give you occasional advice in "a bad sense". It is meant to make your difficult task easier. Plekhanov likes to "disconcert" comrades of the "female sex" with "sudden" gallantries (in French, and so on). You must be prepared to meet this with quick repartees—I am delighted, Comrade Plekhanov, you are quite an old spark (or a gallant cavalier)—or something like that to politely *take him down a peg*. You should know that everybody will be very angry (I'm very glad!) at my not

being present, and will probably want to take it out on you. But I am sure you will show them your "nails" in the best possible way. I am tickled in advance at the thought of the cold, calm and somewhat scornful snub they will be publicly inviting.

Plekhanov likes to heckle and bully his victim. My advice is—cut him short immediately, saying: you have a right, as has every member of this conference, to ask questions, but I am not answering you personally, I am answering the whole conference, so will you please not interrupt me—and by this means promptly turn his heckling into an *attack* upon him. You should be on the offensive all the time. Or, say: I shall *take the floor* when my turn comes, in lieu of an answer and for an answer (I prefer it *that way*), and you will be quite satisfied. In my experience this is the best way to deal with insolent fellows. They are cowards and will sing small at once.

They don't like it when we quote resolutions. But that is the best answer: I have come here chiefly to convey the *officially documented* decisions of our workers' party. For those who are interested in these decisions I shall tell about one of them.

Especially nota bene and look through beforehand:

1) The resolution of the 1912 January Conference on the constitution of the Conference.* This is on the question of the *validity* of the January Conference of 1912 (Rosa Luxemburg will probably raise the question of validity and so will others). (By the way, I am glad that ... the Germans will hardly understand you, if they understand at all—sit closer to the Executive Committee and speak *for them*. At the same time you yourself have a *full* right to ask Huysmans after every German speech—the translation, please!)

2) The resolutions of 1912 and 1913 on **flexible** forms** (for Kautsky: this fool cannot grasp the difference between recognition of the *underground* and the search for *new* forms of **screening** this underground and organising it).

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* See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 453-54.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., pp. 472-73 and Vol. 18, pp. 458-59.—*Ed.*

3) The resolutions of II.1913 on *unity from below** ("You exclude 670 groups of workers??" Nonsense! We *invite them*. "The majority has no right to exclude the minority." Except in cases when the minority flouts the will of the majority and does not bow to formal decisions. This is our case).

Yours,
V. U.

I advise you not to forget the *official* definition of the aim of the conference (take the French text of the resolution of the I.S.B. of XII.1913 from Popov or Huysmans), which is:

To exchange opinions
on moot points!!

Just that! To exchange opinions—that is what you are doing.

Another important subject for *popular* elucidation (you have to be extremely popular with the French) is that of the illegal organisation, of the complete trust, secrecy, etc., which *it* calls for. It is all very well for you Europeans: you have an open, legal party, you have lists of party members, you have open control and verification!! *Everything*'s easy then!!

With us, however, an accurate and open recording of party membership in the illegal organisation is *impossible*, as is also open control. Therefore, the maximum trust is needed in order to maintain discipline and good teamwork, whereas the liquidators, in rejecting the idea of an underground, are destroying the very possibility of joint work.

The opinion that it is impossible today in Russia to determine the *strength* of the trends, to say *whose lead* the majority follows, is erroneous, however.

Thanks to the newspaper, *to the contributions from the workers' groups*, etc., this *can* be determined quite reliably and unmistakably.

(I sent Popov a number of statistical tables and documents to have the headings translated and submitted to the Bureau.)

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* Ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 463-65.—*Ed.*

In Grigory's opinion we should not walk out because of a refusal to take minutes and publish them; but a written statement should be submitted. The *Executive Committee* is an **intermediary**. This should be kept firmly in mind (this is stated in the official resolution of the International Socialist Bureau of XII. 1913). Not an arbiter, but an *intermediary*. In case of anything, this is what you should declare: we thank you for your mediation, we accepted it willingly, and quote the resolution of the I.S.B. (of XII.1913). The word is "mediation", but we ask of the mediator that he pass on to the opponent: 1) our *conditions*, and 2) *objective information*. And that is all!!

N.B. We are an *autonomous* party. Keep this firmly in mind. **No one** has a right to impose anybody's will upon us, and the International Socialist Bureau *has no right* either. If there are *threats*, this is **a mere phrase**.

Tomorrow I shall send the end of the report. You will have your work cut out for you now, a lot of work to do and little time to do it in! Thanking you in advance.

Sincerely yours,
V. I.

Written in July, prior to 13th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in part in 1959 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 5

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

359

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

We are now sitting here in special session with the new chairman & other working men.[341] The situation is excellent. I am extremely glad and thankful for you that you have freed me (*relieved me**) from the duty to be in Brussels (Martov is in Brussels. Your task is very heavy but

* These words are in Russian in the original.—*Ed.*

very important). Thank you many many times for your work so unpleasant & so important.

Our congress will have place (aura lieu) in August. Almost all necessary money is already in our hands.

Please *talk over with Berzin*.* What is his opinion & his plan? *Who of them can attend*? *Their C.C.*? *Or not*? *Or even their delegates from the local areas*?* Our congress will be good. *Have a frank talk with him, and we shall discuss the rest by letter*.*

Wire us the results, etc., Saturday night for certain and in fullest detail. On Sunday our telegraph office is open only from 8 to 10 in the morning.*

Our chairman is here till Sunday. He must know the results.

If you are asked at the conference whether we (that is, our C.C.) will invite the national organisations to the congress, answer: Yes.*

Yours very truly,
W. I.

Written not later than
July 16, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Brussels

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

360
TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear Friend,

You no doubt know how the Brussels conference ended? The Polish opposition went over to the liquidators!

We are now in for a period of betrayals, but it will not alter anything.

Obviously, we shall not mess about with a "joint congress"—the liquidators+Rosa+the Alexinskys+the Plekhanovs.[342]

How is Samoilov's health? Is he really on the mend? Will he be well for Vienna? (By the way, are you preparing

* The passages in italics marked with an asterisk are in Russian in the original.—*Ed*.

for Vienna? Answer me at length.) Write me about Samoilov in greatest possible detail.

How did they find his stomach?

Regards to the family,

Yours,

Lenin

Written after July 18, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

361

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Friend,

Will you please take it upon yourself to keep us informed *during the revolutionary days in Russia.*[343]

We have no newspapers.

Will you please

1) send us daily (by ordinary book-post) *Berlin* newspapers giving the *fullest* news from Russia (*Vorwärts*, better still, say, *Berliner Tageblatt*[344]; choose which has **most reports** from Russia);

2) ditto Russian newspapers from **St. Petersburg and Moscow** (we have only *Kievskaya Mysl*)—*Rech*, *Novoye Vremya* (*since the beginning of the July days*)...

3) telegrams concerning *special*, exceptionally important events, if any, such as revolts among the troops, etc.

My address for everything (including telegrams)—*Ulianow* (only two words). *Poronin*.

We shall pay expenses. Write a postcard **immediately** whether you undertake to do this (I hope you won't refuse) and how much money we should send.

(The rates for mail and telegrams here are the same as those *inside* Germany.)

Awaiting your reply,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Please send us also cuttings from *Vorwärts* about everything relating to the Brussels conference of 16-18.VII. 1914 and the "bloc" there (Rosa+Plekhanov+Alexinsky+ liquidators, etc.).

Written after July 18, 1914
Sent to Berlin

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

362

TO INESSA ARMAND

Huysmans and Vandervelde have unleashed *all* threats. Wretched diplomats! They thought they could frighten us (or you). Of course, they have failed.

Grigory and I agreed it would have been wiser not to go at all. But the Russian workers would not have understood this; now they have a living example to *teach them*.

You handled the thing better than I could have done. Language apart, I would probably have *gone up in the air*. I would not have been able to stand the hypocrisy and would have called them scoundrels. *And that's what they were waiting for*—that's what they were trying to provoke.

But you and the others carried it off calmly and firmly. *Extremely thankful & greeting you.**

I am surprised that today (Sunday) I have no wire concerning the *closing* of the conference. It must have closed at 4 o'clock on Saturday. Did you (the three delegates—you, the Letts+the Polish opposition) submit a written statement?

Awaiting your impressions,

Yours,

V. U.

Written July 19, 1914, at Poronin

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

* This sentence is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

363
TO INESSA ARMAND

Sunday. 19/VII.

My dear & dearest friend,

Today at first I've got a report (very very good!)—evidently written by Kamski. I greet you thousand times!! Your task was heavy & .... Huysmans had done all against you & our delegation, but you have dejoné ses *his sallies** in the best manner. You have rendered a very great service to our party! I am especially thankful because you have replaced me. *The telegram* (*yesterday*) *says* "*you* (*we*) *and the Letts*" *participated in the voting of an omnibus resolution on tactics and organisation* (*there are no more tactical differences, etc.*). *I'm sure this is a slip of the pen. You and the Letts did not participate (in the programme either).*

*The liquidators' last card is the help of the foreign organisations, but that card, too, will be beaten.**

I've sent your son 150 frs. Probably it is too small sum? Pray, let me know at once *how much more you have spent. I shall send it immediately.**

Our congress must take place here about 20-25 August new style. You must be delegate

1) of the C.O.A.
2) of the Brussels delegation.

*It would be better if you came earlier. There's tons of work. Let's settle this in advance by letter.**

Yours,
V. U.

P.S. *And Vandervelde and Kautsky in the role of gossips spreading the tale that Lenin is "hiding in Brussels"!! How do you like that! Oh, those vile scandalmongers—they know only one method of struggle.*

You and Popov told Huysmans off properly. Serves him

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* The italicised passages marked with an asterisk are in Russian in the original.—*Ed.*

*right. Write—are you very tired, very angry? Are you wild with me for persuading you to go?**

Written July 19, 1914, at Poronin

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original

364

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Today I've got your letter & a letter from Popoff. Your divergence I cannot understand precisely & think it is not important. Important was *only* the vote & you were right of participating in it. That's all.

Why it is "extremely unpleasant" for you to write about you being delegated from the delegation—I do not understand. Your quarrel with Popoff is a bagatelle. Why are you against being delegated??? Write frankly, please!!

Thank you for details about conference! The comrade from the Lettish party is here. We shall speak with him precisely about their participation in our congress.

It'd be very good if you commence an exchanging of letters with Kautsky (he is a mean creature, totally without character, under private influences, always changing position according secret influence and angry against me because of "money story": it is especially mean to act as "impartial" or to play the role of "impartial", being partial & *angry* especially against me personally because of private quarrel with me because of money. *Mean!**). If he begged you to write him & if you can undertake the work of translating in French all report and to sending him it (*especially about 4.IV.1914*) it would be very good. But, naturally, it is a very hard work & what concerns me I do not ask you to make it. If **you** like—faites! (My personal opinion: it is good to inform Kautsky & especially *develop* in *very great detail** the question of 4.IV.1914 &

* The italicised words marked with an asterisk are in Russian in the original.—*Ed.*

the statistics of groups: this statistics is partly published in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* v. 21.VII.1914. If you like, I send you it & if you like *I shall help you privately to prepare a letter for Kautsky*. But the play of mean intrigues is hard to paralyse now & Kautsky is a victim of intrigues of Rosa L., Plekh. & Co. Plekh. is *a mean turncoat, as always. Did you see my blows at him in Rabochy*[345] *No. 7 and in Prosveshcheniye No. 6*?).

The address of *Neue Zeit* I cannot find now. If you like you can write an den Verlag der "Neuen Zeit", *Stuttgart*, Furtbachstraße. 12 *für* Genossen Karl Kautsky

The idiots and intrigants with the aid of Kautsky will get a resolution *against* us at the Vienna congress. Soit!! We cannot hinder it. But we remain quiet. This last "atout'; of the opportunists will be beaten also.

Your behaviour at the conference was right and was great service to the party. Popoff writes me you were ill, your voice was feeble. What is this illness? Please write me more details!! I cannot be quiet otherwise.

Many kind regards & best wishes: be healthy and quiet.

Yours truly,
W. I.

Written in July, prior to 24th, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Lovran

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original
Written in English

365

TO JANSSON OR STIETZ

Poronin, July 25, 1914 (Galizien)

Dear Comrade,

Please excuse me for taking the liberty of asking a favour of you without knowing you personally. The latest revolutionary events in Russia compel me to it.

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* This passage in italics is in Russian in the original. See "Adventurism" and "The Bourgeois Intelligentsia's Methods of Struggle Against the Workers" (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 356-59 and 455-86).—*Ed.*

I found your address and the address of K. W. Jansson in *Vorwärts* (Berlin), 1913, No. 33 (8.II.1913) ("Aus der Partei": "Die in Stockholm lebenden deutschen Parteigenossen"). Our contact with St. Petersburg the usual way (via Warsaw) has now become impossible.

I would therefore ask you to supply us with several good secret addresses or one good secret address in Stockholm. The address should be that of a reliable and *very punctual* comrade. It would be desirable to receive a *permanent* address. We can communicate in German, French or English.

This comrade would have to affix Swedish stamps to letters received from us and send them to Finland (or to St. Petersburg). Also to send letters (*in their envelopes*) received from Finland (or Russia) to our address: Ulianow. *Poronin*, (Galizien). If telegrams are received—to wire them to us.

If you will be so kind as to arrange this, I shall send you immediately the necessary sum of money for postal and telegraph expenses (as well as envelopes, etc.).

I enclose an international reply coupon.

As to my identity, I would inform you that from 1907 to 1911 I represented the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the International Socialist Bureau. My Party pseudonym is Lenin, my real name Ulyanov. My former address, given in many published documents of the International Socialist Bureau, is: Oulianoff. 4. Rue Marie Rose. Paris. (XIV).

Since taking up residence in the country in Galicia I resigned this post. Our representative on the International Socialist Bureau now is Comrade Harrison (35. Mornington Crescent. London. N. W.).

Comrade Branting, leader of the Swedish party, knows me. You can telephone him. In the event of his not being in Stockholm, I am enclosing, in proof of my identity, some wrappers of socialist newspapers which I am receiving.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,
With Party greetings, thanking you in advance,
N. Lenin
(*Vl. Ulvanov*)

P.S. Will you please send the enclosed letter to Finland.

Wl. Uljanow.

Poronin (Galizien).

Sent to Stockholm

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 48

Printed from the original Translated from the German

366

TO I. RUDIS-GIPSLIS[346]

Dear Comrade Rudis,

I recently met a highly respected and valuable Lettish Social-Democrat,* who told me about the "Left opposition" in the Lettish party. He said you belonged to it.

I do not know to what extent the opposition which you and your friends are raising to the Lettish C.C. is a really "Left opposition". I am sure, at any rate, that if you are doing so, you are acting in good faith.

In any case, the leftward shift on the part of the Lettish C.C. is an obvious fact. Proof of this is provided by the resolution in No. 32 of *Trudovaya Pravda* and the refusal to vote in Brussels for the tainted, absurd resolution covering up the liquidators. The Polish opposition voted *for*; in my opinion this is either treachery or a dirty "game" or diplomacy of the worst kind.

The 4th District in Riga is said to stand for closer relations with our C.C.?

Is that true?

Are the majority of Lettish workers for it or not?

I think it would be important to acquaint the Lettish workers with our "14 conditions". I sent them to Herman I don't think he would refuse to let you have them for a short time to read.

---

* A reference to E. Zvirbulis.—*Ed.*

Further, it would be important to make clear our attitude in principle towards federation. We are *against* it *in principle*. We are for democratic centralism. In that case, why preserve the old rotten "agreement" of 1906 with the Lettish Social-Democrats, which retains the *federative* clauses, such as that providing for a *delegation* from the Lettish C.C. to the general C.C.?? Even the Poles in Stockholm (1906) rejected this *federalist* clause in principle.

I do not believe that the class-conscious Lettish workers stand for this clause—it facilitates manoeuvring, diplomacy, clannishness. It is harmful to the work.

Further. Is it true that there is vacillation among the class-conscious Lettish workers on the question of the need for combating the separatism of the Bund and cultural-national autonomy?? It would be very deplorable!

Has the resolution of our summer (1913) meeting OD the national question been translated into Lettish and published?[347]

The Polish opposition in Brussels adopted the liquidators' stand and "Tyszka's" play at diplomacy: a backheel for the Pravdists, a blow at them from behind, and separation from them "in the face of Europe". They now want, in the Tyszka way, to uphold the federalist clauses in agreements and "cover up" the nationalism of the Bund (cultural-national autonomy), defend the rotten (for the liquidators useful) "lawfulness" of the Party **up to 1912** (i.e., prior to the Party's re-establishment *against* the liquidators).

I hope the Letts will not follow this path. I would like to know your opinion and that of your Riga friends, of the 4th District and others.

All the best. My regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written July 26, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1935
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 5

Printed from the original

367

TO V. M. KASPAROV

Dear Comrade,

I am not getting *Vorwärts*, yet (judging from extracts in some socialist newspapers) there are important things in it now—for instance, comments (and correspondence) on the St. Petersburg workers' movement, on the street demonstrations, etc.

We need it badly (both for the C.O. and for other work).

Could you make up and send us a set of cuttings from *Vorwärts* on these questions (indicating the date of the newspaper) and do that regularly?

If you can I shall send you the money to cover expenses (let me know how much).

If you are busy or cannot do it generally, let me know.

I trust you follow *Vorwärts*? Was there a translation in it of Plekhanov's article from *Za Partiyu*?[348]

I will be greatly obliged if you could collect also cuttings from bourgeois newspapers concerning the present stormy events in St. Petersburg.

Hurry!

Awaiting your reply,

Yours,

Lenin

Written in the second half of July 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

368

TELEGRAM TO THE CHIEF OF CRACOW CITY POLICE[349]

The local police suspect me of espionage. I lived in Cracow for two years, in Zwiezsynice and 51 Ul. Lubomirskiego. I personally gave information about myself to the commissary of police in Zwiezsynice. I am an emigrant, a So-

cial-Democrat. Please wire Poronin and mayor of Nowy Targ to avoid misunderstanding.

Ulyanov

Written August 7, 1914
Sent from Poronin to Berlin

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the telegraph form written in an unknown hand
Translated from the German

369

TO THE SECRETARY, EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE GRANAT PUBLISHING HOUSE

Berne, le 15 sept. 1914

Dear Sir,

I wish to notify you of my change of address. Just released from short captivity in Austria, I shall now live in Berne. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and let me know by what date I have to send in the article (the war, I hope, is a sufficiently good reason for a postponement).* If urgent—by wire, where one word (day of the month, old style) will stand for the deadline. I am not quite sure yet whether the manuscripts reach you in good time.

At your service,

V. Ilyin

Written September 15, 1914
Sent to Moscow

First published in 1959
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

* This refers to the article "Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 43-91).—*Ed.*

370

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

*Hugeous regards from all of us to Abram. Let him visit friends in Lausanne. He will find interesting documents there** and I will address a demand to you to translate these documents in French & send to *Sentinelle* (and to me send also with an occasion).[350] (What party? Where published? Is it a decent organ? Please send me one copy of the most characteristic issues of this paper.)

I am extremely anxious & angry with the position of the European socialists in the present war. My conviction is that all—& the German socialists first of all & chief of all—got "chauvinists". It is quite insupportable to read German and French (*l'Humanité*!!) socialist papers!! Extreme "chauvinism"! I am afraid that many, too many socialists, have lost their head (if I dare say so) in the present crisis, and that in the last end it is the opportunism which is responsible for this extreme "infamie" of the European socialism. I am told Martynov (liquid.) in Zurich has had a conference (private, I suppose) and firstly attacked German socialists—but later on (the second day of discussion) a changé d'avis (sous l'influence funeste d'Axelrod) et a denie tout ce qu'il avait dit plus abord!!!** Shame!! We must in that or other manner tell our opinion—but it is extremely difficult, very difficult in such times.... Please let Abram go to Lausanne and bring you news.

*Grigory has arrived with his family. We are remaining in Berne. A dull little town, but ... better than Galicia and the best there is!! Never mind. We shall adjust ourselves. I am poking around the libraries—I have missed them.** Very very kind regards and hearty shakehands. Please write more about yourself.

Yours truly,

W. I.

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* The italicised passages marked with an asterisk are in Russian in the original.—*Ed.*

** He changed his opinion (under the pernicious influence of Axelrod) and denied everything he had said before.—*Ed.*

I hope we shall soon meet? Do you think so?

P. S. What is weather in Les Avants? Do you make walks? Do you feed better now? Have you books? papers?

*Arrangements should be made in Lausanne to collect all Swiss newspapers in French containing socialist comments on the war, on the German and French socialists, etc. Let Abram tackle this. No effort should be spared in collecting documents!!**

Written prior to September 28, 1914
Sent from Berne to Les Avants (Switzerland)

First published in 1960 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original
Written in English

371

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending you the rest of the articles. All to be set in brevier.

Take the *old* format of the C.O.

48 thousand letters desirable.

Order: 1) statement of the C.C.**
2) reply of Russian S.D.s
3) *against the current*
4) article on the International***
5) the International and defence of the fatherland
6) *St. Ptsb.* Letter from St. Ptsb.
7) R. V. Malinovsky.

Be sure to send the *made-up* issue before printing.

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* This paragraph is in Russian in the original.—*Ed.*

** This refers to the Manifesto of the C.C., R.S.D.L P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 25-34).—*Ed.*

*** This refers to Lenin's article "The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International" (see present edition, Vol 21, pp. 35-41).—*Ed.*

On Monday I am lecturing at Montreux: shall I drop in? Or will it be ready earlier?

Send in your paragraph; it will hardly suit the character of No. *1*. Shouldn't it wait for No. 2?

Yours,
Lenin

Written October 20, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

372

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

Please forgive me for not having answered you so long: I have been busy with the urgent article for Granat. I can gladden you with pleasant news—the C.O. has been delivered to a point near the frontier and apparently will soon be sent across. Congratulations! Again I thank you heartily for all the trouble you are taking with the newspaper! We are planning to put out the next issue soon. The first is having a good sale. (I am afraid your article on the Swiss elections is unsuitable *in character*; I have given it to a colleague for discussion.) I shall send you in a day or two No. 265 (for 13.XI.1914) de *La Sentinelle*, published in La Chaux-de-Fonds. It carries a condensed report of the Manifesto from the C.O. It would be a good thing to get it published also in the Geneva paper!!

Best regards from Nadezhda Konstantinovna and all our friends here.

Yours,
V. U.

Written November 14, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

373

TO V. A. KARPINSKY AND SOPHIA RAVICH*

Dear Friends,

Have you still got the type-setting?** It appears that not enough copies have been printed. If it has *not yet* been distributed, let us know (immediately); we shall then decide what to do.

Yours,
Lenin

Written November 18, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

374

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

Please have another 1,000 copies printed. Then have the type distributed immediately and let us know when you can start on the next issue.*** Half the copy for it is ready.

Salut!
Yours,
Lenin

Written November 20, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* This is a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*

** This refers to the type-setting of No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* which carried the Manifesto of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy".—*Ed.*

*** This refers to No. 34 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.—*Ed.*

375

TO V. A. KARPINSKY AND SOPHIA RAVICH*

We have just received your letter. Who's the pig, Sigg or Plekhanov? Or both of them? More details, please. In view of Plekhanov's vile nationalist agitation I *earnestly* ask you to push on *hard* with arrangements for Inessa's lecture in *French*: "Diverse Trends Among Russian Socialists in Regard to the War".

Yours,
Lenin

Written November 21, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

376

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I don't know how much thin paper you have (which does not cost us anything, by the way). Print half on thin paper. Write and let us know *for how many issues* you have thin paper. If there is plenty (we shall probably get some more from Paris) and if it is not too bad for local use, we shall increase the % of thin paper.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

We shall send the material tomorrow. All the same, the type distribution will take time.

Did you receive *La Sentinelle*? Will you have room?

Written November 22, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* This letter is a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*

377

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

We are sending part of the copy for No. 34 (about 25 thousand out of the 45). The rest tomorrow or the day after.

(We're bulging with material: we are thinking of putting out No. 35 immediately.)

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written November 25, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

378

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

25/XI.

Dear Friend,

Yesterday evening we read about the arrest of 11 people (including 5 members of the R.S.D.L. Duma group)[351] near St. Petersburg and today we sent a telegram to Branting for you to find out (le cas échéant through the Finns) whether the 5 members of the Duma group have been arrested or not.

It's a bad job if they have!

All the more inadmissible is your departure for Oenmark. Generally, I strongly protest against such a removal. Now of all times you have to be in Stockholm in order to organise contacts more properly, frequently and widely. This is a difficult job that requires an experienced man, knowing at least one foreign language. It *simply cannot* be shuffled off onto "somebody".

If you are molested (by the police) in Stockholm, you should hide yourself in a village *outside* Stockholm (this is easy, they have telephones everywhere). I think Kol-

lontai, too, could easily come to Stockholm soon incognito or to some small place outside town.

We shall soon be putting out No. 34 of the C.O., then No. 35.

Please answer quickly. We receive all your letters. The liquidators' document (*their* reply to Vandervelde)[352] has also been received. Thanks.

All the very best. Awaiting your news,

Yours,

Lenin

Written November 25, 1914
Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

379

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you copy for the C.O.

If you can't squeeze it all in, let the compositor say *exactly* how much is left over. We shall throw something out—first and foremost we shall hold up the item concerning Vandervelde (already sent to you).

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written November 26 or 27, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

380

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending you more copy.

We shall put out two issues one after the other. We have material in super-abundance. The article concerning the

arrest of the conference with the R.S.D.L. Duma group is ready and is a must for No. 34, but we are holding it up as we have sent a telegram (we do not know whether the 5 deputies have been arrested or not).

I take your word for it that *there will be enough type for two issues*, so have everything set up, and we shall let you know in a day or two the make-up of No. 34 and No. 35 (if you haven't enough type for both issues, write and tell us *immediately*).

Yours,
Lenin

Send us the proofs.

Written prior to November 28, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

381

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am answering point by point

1) I am enclosing the arrangement of articles for No. 34 and No. 35
2) **Send** the proofs
3) Print *2,000* copies of each
4) On thin paper—250 copies each (till more arrives from Paris)
5) Do *not* send any money.

Write how much we owe.

Write immediately—when *can* Nos. 34 and 35 come out?

Date them at least a week apart.

They should now be put out immediately.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

No. 34	*thous.*	*No. 35*	*thous.*
1) The War & the R.S.D.L. Duma Group (At the Fighting Post). . . .	8	1) Chauvinism and Socialism****	12
2) Password of Revolutionary S.D. . .	15	2) National Pride of Great Russians*****	9
3) German Voice* . .	4	Students on Their Knees	3
4) Jordansky	4	Georgian Resolution[353]	2
5) Gorky**	2	Bottom page feuilleton:	
6) Woman and the War***	5	The International and Defence of the Fatherland"	14
7) St. Ptsb. **News Items** (liquidators' document and appraisal)	5½	St. Ptsb. News Items Letters from St. Ptsb. dated 10 and 11.X.	5½

If you *have* to hold an thing over, let it be the "German Voice" in No. 34 and the "Georgian Resolution" in No. 35. If we have badly miscalculated, write at once.

Written November 28, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* See V. I. Lenin, "A German Voice on the War" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 92-93).—*Ed.*

** See V. I. Lenin, "To the Author of *The Song of the Falcon*" (present edition, Vol. 41, pp. 344-45).—*Ed.*

*** Points 2-6 are written in an unknown hand.—*Ed.*

**** See V. I. Lenin "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism (How the International Can Be Restored)" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 94-101).—*Ed.*

***** See V. I. Lenin "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" (present edition Vol. 21, pp. 102-06).—*Ed.*

382

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending you the text, received today (be sure to **return** it), of the government report concerning the arrest. *It must be inserted* into the editorial (in lieu of what we sent you) and the words about our not knowing whether the deputies were arrested or not, etc., should be thrown out.

Drop a line, if only by postcard (that you have received this).

When you can put out No. 34
and No. 35.

We must make great haste now: we have received *extremely interesting* material concerning a "statement" of the Organising Committee.[354]

For the time being this is a secret.

Delete the Georgian resolution.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written December 1, 1914
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

383

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear Friend,

I received your letter with the news of your departure (on Sunday, today is Friday) for Copenhagen.

Write (1) *whence* your news and the rumours that you have conveyed? From what sources? Who brought them?

(2) Do you *now* have your own sources? At least one address in St. Petersburg? Or not? Is code and invisible ink being used with anybody or with nobody at all just now?

If there are no contacts, *can* you establish them?

If not, let's think *how* and through whom we can do it. Further, did you get in touch with Litvinov in London?

Belenin's speech at the Swedish congress came off *wonderfully*.[355] As for making a speech in Copenhagen (at the January 1915 conference),[356] let us start discussing this by letter straightaway.

Yours,
Lenin

Uljanow. Distelweg. 11. *Berne* (Suisse).

Written December 11, 1914
Sent to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

384
TO M. V. KOBETSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am enclosing a letter for Comrade "Alexander".

If he hasn't called on you yet, write him a letter through the city post (address Fru Alexandra Kollontay. Poste restante. Kjobenhavn) saying you have a letter for *Alexander* and asking him to call on you on *such-and-such a day and hour*.

Why don't you write what *news* there is in the Scandinavian labour movement? *Who* protested against the chauvinism of the socialists and *how*?

Write.

Yours,
Lenin

Written prior to December 16
1914
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

1915

385
TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

3/I. 1915

Dear Friend,

I received your two letters with the news of your departure.

The arguments you have advanced against my supposition (about the possibility of your not going to Copenhagen, not leaving Stockholm) have fully convinced me. I see that I have overlooked a really very important circumstance. If I have offended you, I am prepared to tender my voluble apologies and earnestly ask you to forget it.

The village* is really far more dangerous now (*and inconvenient for the work*) than the town.

Generally speaking, the situation now is such that the fight against tsarism calls for the utmost care—especially as regards the preservation of reserves. To expend still more forces (soon after our *immeasurable* losses) would mean weakening ourselves completely for the moment of more decisive actions against tsarism. Therefore I ask you most earnestly to double and triple secrecy precautions and 1) *either* not go beyond asking for somebody to be sent to Sweden, 2) *or* confine yourself to the briefest of visits. I would ask you earnestly to confine yourself to the former and not make the latter (if there is the slightest possibility of not doing so).

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* Meaning Sweden.—*Ed.*

It would be better not to go to the conference (16/I) of the Scandinavians. Grigory and I have just discussed this for the umpteenth time. The Swiss are not going. That means there is an obvious intrigue of the Germans and Troelstra+Branting. They will try their hardest to muddle things up and *will not allow you to make your Swedish speech*. Unless there is an **absolute** guarantee that you will be allowed to make *such* a speech, you had better not go altogether. We should send (through Litvinov) α) a complete translation of our manifesto, β) a translation of the government's report concerning the arrest of the R.S.D.L. group in the Duma—and all this to be sent not as a rapport, not as an **account** (so that it should not appear as if we *recognise* the conference), but as a *communication*.

Wishing you all the very, very best. The utmost *care* and sans rancune, n'est-ce pas?

Yours,
Lenin

Written January 3, 1915
Sent from Berne to Copenhagen

First published in 1924
in *Lenin Miscellany II*

Printed from the original

386
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you the proofs.

To speed things up, put out the No.* without sending us proofs: the arrangement of the articles has already been given you, hasn't it? If not, write at once.

Will Kuzma manage the weekly C.O.?

When does copy have to be sent for the next No. and how much of it has been set up?

P.S. *Is there an information bureau in Geneva from*

* This refers to No. 36 of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*.—*Ed.*

which one can make inquiries concerning Russian prisoners of war in Germany?

Salut!

Yours,

Lenin

Written between January 3 and 9, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

387

TO D. B. RYAZANOV

Dear Comrade,

We received your article yesterday evening and have not had time yet to read and discuss it.

There is very little time left to write and send you a message by hand. So please excuse me for being so brief. There is no news from Russia. You will see what the state of affairs is from Nos. 35 and 36.*

We do not have *Sovremenny Mir*.

There is only 1 copy of *Nasha Zarya* in Berne, sorry we can't send it.

As regards *Golos*,[357] etc., it seems you are not fully informed. Read the whole of *Golos*.

We are unable to send you a set. We shall try to get the Parisians to do something about it, although it is not easy.

We have not seen Parvus!

Best regards from me, Nadezhda Konstantinovna and the whole Berne crowd.

N. Lenin

P.S. I enclose a letter to your wife.[358]

Written January 9, 1915
Sent from Berne to Vienna

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* Of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.—*Ed.*

388
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you the proofs.

Terrible delay!

Think over what to do. Kuzma must have been setting up for the Bundists.

What has to be done to put it out weekly?

Did you receive *all* the copy for Nos. 36 and 37?

I asked for a *tentative* arrangement of the material. If this is inconvenient to you, we shall do that here, in which case send us a **list** of *all* articles and items.

Salut fraternel!

Yours,

Lenin

We shall send a 4-5 line paragraph concerning the closing down of *Golos*. Let us know the exact *deadline*.

Written after January 17, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

389
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you another article—for No. 38.

I hope you will now have enough for both issues (Nos. 37 and 38).

I asked some time ago whether you had enough copy for both issues. But you are silent.

And Kuzma is impos-sible!!!

Salut!
Yours,
Lenin

Written prior to February 1, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

390
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I have just received No. 37 (please send me 2-3 copies from the printing shop *as soon as* they come out—it is important for the Editorial Board to have them as early as possible).

Why didn't you make a correction in regard to the date of No. 36?[359]

Will you please drop me a line at once

1) on how the setting-up of No. 38 is progressing
2) when it will be finished
3) " " can come out
4) " copy for No. 39 should be sent
5) does the material squeeze in or not?

The thing is that owing to the considerable delay with No. 37 quite a lot has to be inserted.

Send us a *list of the available articles*.

Did you have a talk with the compositor? Have you *fully* ascertained whether it is possible to put out a weekly issue?

I await your reply with impatience.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I enclose "More About Social-Chauvinism" for setting up.

Written February 3, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

391

TO JAKUB HANECKI

Werter Genosse,

I have just written to Skaret (about Haidukiewich). But as you did not give me Haidukiewich's address, I wrote Skaret that Haidukiewich would *call on him*, mentioning my postcard. So please write immediately to Haidukiewich.

I was down with influenza and have not quite recovered yet; that is why I did not answer you myself. I hope you will forgive me.

The London Conference turned out an utterly disgusting thing, as was to be expected.[360] Of course, we could do nothing to prevent it. Beste Grüsse an Ihre Familie und an alle Freunde in Zürich.

Ihr *Lenin*

Written February 17, 1915
Sent from Berne to Zurich

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

392

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

We are terribly worried at the absence of news and proofs from you. Has the compositor taken to the bottle again? Or taken on outside work again?? It is devilishly important now to put the paper out *without delay* (for there

is highly important and urgent material concerning the London Conference*). For God's sake answer quickly. This is one thing. 2) Do your best to speed up the issue. Hurry with the proofs. 3) Call your group together and take all steps jointly to organise the proper issue of the C.O. *once for all*. Really, these delays are impossible: they kill all desire to work!!

Salutations!

Yours,

Lenin

Written February 20, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

393

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending the proofs and **new copy.** This issue *must* carry a report on the *London Conference*.

For God's sake do *everything* you can to speed it up. (If you *cannot* put it out before our meeting[361]), then *be sure* to bring the *proofs* along with you (especially the articles on defence of the fatherland).

N.B. The material on Martov is to be *held up*.**
Don't forget!! i.e., don't put it in.

Au revoir!

Yours,

Lenin

Written February 24, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

** The article "More on Martov" was published in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 41 on May 1, 1915.—*Ed.*

394

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

In my opinion §*3* is no good[362] I think it would be better *instead* to tell in a popular manner *how* the C.O. can be helped by contributions (emphasise that it has no assistance in the way of contributions) and prepared for *still more frequent issue*.

We must leave our hands untied in regard to the Baugy group* and leave ourselves a slight chance for reconciliation with them. In this form it is harmless and left entirely to our discretion.

"*More frequent issue* (right down to a daily)"—isn't that enough?

We shall say *the* one *and* the other: daily issue or even a parallel one.

"Parallelism" is downright harmful: it means helping them to *win* a sister *away* from us.

Written between February 27 and March 4, 1915, in Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

395

TO SOPHIA RAVICH**

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you the resolutions with a brief introduction.*** For God's sake, **hurry up** *with the type-setting*!!

Has the declaration at the London Conference been set up?

Send the proofs as soon as you can.

In a day or two we shall send in an article on the trial

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* The Baugy group—N. I. Bukharin, Yelena Rozmirovich and N. V. Krylenko. The group received its name from the town of Baugy (Switzerland), where it was located.—*Ed.*

** This is a postscript to a letter written by Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

*** This refers to the resolutions of the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64).—*Ed.*

of the R.S.D.L. Duma group.* They bore themselves badly. This should be admitted straight out.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written March 9, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

396
TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Berne, March 12, 1915

Dear Comrade,

The enclosed letter is from Comrade Inessa whom we have authorised to work on bringing the socialist women of the Left closer together.[363] I earnestly request you to find a Dutch woman comrade who shares your point of view and could be delegated to the conference of socialist women from your party (if not in person, at least in writing).

My congratulations on Gorter's pamphlet, which takes such a hard knock at the opportunists and Kautsky.[364]

I shall be greatly obliged if you will answer me as quickly as possible.

With fraternal greetings,
N. Lenin (*Vl. Ulyanov*)

Wl. Uljanow. Distelweg. 11. Berne (Suisse).

Sent to Amsterdam

First published in 1960
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

* This refers to Lenin's article "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the R.S.D.L. Duma Group" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 171-77).—*Ed.*

397
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending the proofs *at once*. Please make the corrections.

Really, it's wrong of you not to take money for copying. For one thing, it is downright uncomradely not to comply with the *agreed* condition: after all, you agreed to send the tariff!

Secondly, you are compelling me now to doing—what? To not sending you anything more?

Think this over in a calmer and less irate mood, and I'm sure you will see that you are wrong. It's too bad, really!

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Written prior to March 23, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

398
TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Dear Comrade Wijnkoop,

I enclose a letter from Comrade Inessa. I heartily greet you and all the comrades of the Marxist party, and would ask you to pass the enclosed letter on to Comrade Gorter.*

With best regards,

Yours,

N. Lenin

Wl. Uljanow. Waldheimstrasse 66. Bern.

Written May 5, 1915
Sent to Zwolle (Holland)

First published in 1960
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

* See next letter.—*Ed.*

399

TO HERMAN GORTER

To Comrade H. Gorter

Dear Comrade Gorter,

Comrade Radek has shown me your letter.

It would certainly be very good if an international Social-Democratic journal could be founded under the editorship of Pannekoek. We must fight *Neue Zeit*'s mean way of defending opportunism of the worst brand by means of sophisms.

The only question is—will we have enough money and literary forces to establish the journal immediately?

If not, we must without fail issue one (or two) pamphlets in German, without waiting until the war is over. The pamphlet should consist of articles by Russian, Dutch, German (Radek), French (perhaps Merrheim) and English (perhaps Rothstein) comrades, who consider it necessary to wage a ruthless fight against the opportunist traitors (including Kautsky).

In my opinion, we should *under no circumstances* lose any time in doing this. It is necessary, *right now*, while the war is still on, to tell the whole truth—naturally, not in Germany, but in Switzerland, so that we can speak freely about the revolutionary struggle, without a censorship.

If a French or English contributor cannot be found at once, we should not wait; better issue the first pamphlet ourselves (i.e., without the French and English). We can make do with a translation of Merrheim's opinion (namely, that to speak about a "war of liberation" is a *deception*).

Radek says that your pamphlet has come out *in English*. I am very glad to hear it—I shall now be able to read and understand it. I understand Dutch to the extent of approximately 30-40%. I congratulate you on your splendid attacks on opportunism and Kautsky. Trotsky's principal mistake is that he does not attack this gang.

Best regards,

Yours,

N. Lenin

My address is: Wl. Uljanow. Waldheimstrasse 66. Bern. Write me a postcard *when* you are coming.

Written May 5, 1915
Sent to Zwolle

First published in 1960
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original
written by D. Wijnkoop
Translated from the
German

400

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,*

I have written to you once or twice, but truth to tell, there is little news here. The news from Russia is not bad, you will read it all yourself soon, I hope, when you come here. You don't mention a word about what length of time your dentist has appointed for your treatment. Even approximately? You should travel either by post-chaise (up to Flühli twice a day, at 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. from Schüpfheim, and to us, to *Sörenberg*, only once a day, at 9 a.m. from Schüpfheim). To catch the morning post (that is, the post-chaise), I *think* you must start out from Berne at 5.30 *a.m.* and wait *1½ hours* at Schüpfheim. But if you leave Berne at 2.05, as we did, the post-chaise will take you only as far as Flühli; from there you will have to hire a horse-drawn vehicle (for that purpose you will have to *telephone* from Schüpfheim—there is a restaurant there opposite the station. The keeper for 10 pfg. will telephone us here, *Hotel Marienthal* in Sörenberg, saying you are coming and asking for a horse-drawn carriage to be sent: in that case they will just manage to get to Flühli from here and bring you down here from Flühli).

The fare by post-chaise is fr. 1.20 to Flühli+2 frs. from Flühli to Sörenberg.

Horse and carriage here costs 4 frs. per person (6 frs. for 2 people) from Flühli to Sörenberg.

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

Your letter for some reason travelled to Lucerne! I wonder why? Is it because you wrote Sörenberg in one line? Or should you not add *via Schüpfheim*?

All the best. See you soon,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I wrote Grigory yesterday about inviting Grimm to *Kommunist*. Today I read Trotsky's answer (to *Kommunist*) in *Nashe Slovo*.[365] We must be *extremely careful*, in inviting Grimm, not to risk a refusal. Tell Grigory this.

Another request: when you see Kasparov, ask him to obtain the *official* address of the Bureau (in Geneva? or in Berne?), which undertakes to forward *money* to Russian prisoners of war in Germany (letters as well as money, but chiefly money). It is very important to have the official address, so that I can apply to them and be sure the money will not get lost.

Another request (tut-tut! Our tons of things and requests will crush you completely, eh?): buy citric acid in crystals (Zitronensäure). It's a bad job—going out into the country *after* everybody else!!

There is still no reply from Neuchâtel.[366]

Would you believe it!

Au revoir,

Yours,

Lenin

When opportunity offers, ask Radek before your departure whether he would like to come. If he does, we shall *invite* him.

Bring 15-20 copies of the Announcement of *Kommunist*.[367]

Written after June 4, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg (Switzerland)
to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

401
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Dear Friend,

I am sending *Neue Zeit*.

I have read *Izvestia*. Lovely! Especially that about *Nashe Slovo*.[368] The C.O. is essential now.

Write me about the plan of distribution of subjects. I should like to take that on "defeat" and on the alliance of Potresov+O.C.+Chkheidze vs. *Nashe Slovo*.

As regards "egoism" you are guilty of ... a slight misstatement. You sent me *what you had*. But I had nothing!! I sent you all the latest titles, but you haven't sent me **a single one** *up till now*.

I have received No. 2 of *Nashe Dyelo*.[369] I shall send it to you when finished with.

What's this about Radek's article? Isn't he cheating? We are negotiating with Alexander. What about you?

Everybody (and not only the ladies) will be extremely grateful for the cherries. Why are you silent about coming out here to climb the Rothorn?

All the best. Salut!

N. Lenin

Written after June 24, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to
Hertenstein (Switzerland)

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

402
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Dear Friend,

I received the article and read it, and am forwarding it to Bukharin.

The passage about the votes within *Kommunist* should now, of course, be thrown out of the item on Trotsky. But

should everything about the Chkheidze Duma group be thrown out too? It is the *crux* of the political situation, and will remain that for a fairly long time to come!

Many thanks for the cherries from *everybody*!

I have **nothing** new in the way of literature, French or other, so it's no use your trying to wriggle out of it.

"Title": *La Chesnais*: "Le groupe socialiste du Reichstag et la déclaration de guerre" (Paris. 1915 *l'Humanité*, fr. 1.50). *I shall ask Grisha to send it.*

I am sending you Radek's letter: I am writing him that *Grimm must write to the C.C.** We should not angle for an invitation. Kautsky & Co.'s volte-face is a lousy trick to *wean* the workers *away from* revolution by means of Left phrases. That's clear.

I wired Y. F. to come here and sent her a letter. No posts should be given, but we should make peace, of course, and we have long been doing that. The best thing would be for you to cycle down here. That can *easily* be done via Schüpfheim (the descent to Flühli is 20 min.!!). Send me your phone number (or that of a nearby telephone): I would then phone you about the time of Y. F.'s arrival here. Our phone is *No. 111* (Hotel Marienthal).

The best time to ring up is 8.30 a.m. If you do *not* send me your phone No. I shall wire you (Kommt such-and-such a day): meaning—come to meet Y. F.

Regards to everyone,

Yours,

N. L.

Written prior to July 5, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 329-31.—*Ed.*

403
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Dear Friend,

I am greatly surprised that you—for no apparent reason—have shirked a meeting!

There was no need to make peace, as the visitors were remarkably peaceable (only one of them wanted Kamenev expelled from the Party). We came to an agreement splendidly (without posts).[370]

The translation of Radek is not very good (Part I is dull) (it is *needed*, though, for the sake of solidity). I have forwarded it to N. I.[371]

Before I forget. The visitors have persuaded me that it is *not worth* airing *in the press* our differences in the Editorial Board of *Kommunist* (about you and me having voted against Trotsky). They are right. *Delete it!!*

As to Chkheidze's group,[372] we must start a *campaign against it*. Therefore (since the passage regarding the voting is to be deleted), I raise *again* the question of inserting my small article "An Instructive Experience" (the talk with the visitors has shown once again that the *whole crux* now is in the Chkheidze group).

N.B. No one from us is writing an answer to Maslov!! Won't Radek write at least a review?[373]

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Radek for some reason is silent!! I shall wait a bit longer.

Did you receive No. 2 of *Nashe Dyelo* and *Izvestia*?

Shouldn't the chapter from Gorter about Kautsky & Co. be translated? I think *it should*!

I am sending Abram's article.[374] *I am for it*. The essential thing is *facts*, not mere "tactics". *He has a useful collection of facts*. I have made corrections here and there. I advise signing it A. B. for secrecy reasons (for the sake of the author's safety).

P.S.

In the event of your coming I add: Schüpfheim—720 metres, Flühli—8 km from it—893 m and Sörenberg within 10 km of Flühli—1,165 m. It is a *drive* road. You can *cycle* uphill *one-third* of the way from Flühli to Sörenberg (descent to Flühli=20 minutes by bicycle).

P.S. How do your talks stand with Yuri about money for transportation? Alexander is getting ready. Write *how much* can be received and *when*.

P.S. What about Karpinsky's contributions? He's *offended*, I believe.

The preceding was written yesterday.

I didn't manage to send it off yesterday. I have received *Vorwärts*+Adler. *Thanks very much!*

N. I. asks for Abram's article.

I am sending N. I.'s article and review (with remarks).[375]

I advise putting the review in *Notes*. Of course, if we *have to* choose, I am for *N. I.*, not for Abram.

I am sending Radek's letter. I think we ought to snatch at the plan of a pamphlet with both hands.[376] *I am writing to Radek.*

I propose that we publish *Attitude of Russian Social-Democracy to the War*: 1) Manifesto; 2) Resolution; 3) A specially written article on slogans, etc.; 4) Ditto on the history of the split in the R.S.D.L.P. and on the *R.S.D.L. Group in the Duma* ((the articles from the C.O. are *quite* unsuitable)). Let us discuss the matter by letter without delay and *divide the subjects*.

Would *Yuri* give money for this pamphlet? *Very important*.

Regards to everybody,

Yours,

Lenin

Have you got *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* Nos. 3 and 4? If not, we shall send them.

Written after July 5, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

404

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

To Grigory

I strongly advise *rewriting* the end of your article (Lemberg), etc. (*dropping here* into pathos *is bad—it strikes a wrong note*).

Add answer to No. 2 (*Izvestia*) by points of reconciliation in the "O.C." between the French social-chauvinists and German social-chauvinists (**especially**), Bund chauvinism (the **crook** Ionov) and the Caucasian crooks (for "*unity*" with An!!) (Note or P.S.).

Nadya is extremely surprised that you do not return her the *needed* (for the C.O.) letter and do not *answer*!??!

I intend to demand that the answer to Trotsky concerning the *Chkheidze group* be voted on the Editorial Board of *Kommunist*.* Let them turn it down!

(Then in *Sotsial-Demokrat*)

Reverting to the trip: from Schüpfheim to Luzern there is also a descent—you can probably make it without *pedalling*!

I am sending 3 things for the C.O. Who is going to get in touch with the printing shop? Write.

Written prior to July 11, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

405

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you the notebook: Inessa asks that it be *returned* when copied.**

* This refers to Lenin's article "Have the Organising Committee and the Chkheidze Group a Policy of Their Own?" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 131-36).—*Ed.*

** What this refers to has not been established.—*Ed.*

I am sending Wijnkoop's letter. *Return it immediately* (if useful, show it to Yuri). I shall snatch at *this* "little kernel" of a Left International with both hands. We must work *as hard as we can* to get closer together with them. I am hurrying Radek to translate the Berne resolutions.*

I am sending the beginning of the pamphlet (*in the rough*) so that we can discuss how to continue the job and turn out a "*whole*" piece by two authors (show it, *if useful*, to Yuri; perhaps they will give some money for *such* a thing? If not, it's not worth while showing the rough copy).**

Send your comments on a *separate* sheet.

Return immediately.

I think that, when edited, it may turn out a popular and important (both for Russia and for Europe) body of arguments and materials.

Regards,
Lenin

Let *Zina* make some more copies of the report on the Vorkonferenz.[377] It has to be circulated!!

Written between July 11 and 30, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

406

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Ludmila is staying with us (she is going to Russia). News from Paris: Trotsky & Co., soon after the international conference of the Leftists, want to hold a conference of the Russians (i.e., apparently the O.C.+C.C.+*Nashe Slovo*). First, at the Leftist conference, to adopt a "general

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64.—*Ed.*

** A reference to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. Towards the War*) (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338).—*Ed.*

Left" resolution, then (having thereby proved the Leftism of *Nashe Slovo* and the O.C., which is expected to vote *for anything*—Mädchen für alle) to offer us ("in front of everybody"?) to join them in a general conference of Russians and to use our refusal against us....

Not a bad intrigue! Make a copy of Radek's draft[378] for yourself *at once* (return the draft to me immediately!) and we shall carefully consider our tactics.

Should we propose *amendments* to Radek right away? (+an *all-out* struggle against the opportunists;+civil war; +a split with the opportunists). Or should we propose our own draft, and after it has been turned down, vote for Radek's? Or both?

A protest in writing to be lodged against the participation of *Nashe Slovo* (two reasons: 1) parties—they are *not* a party—or "sections of a party" are allowed. Let them say they are part of the O.C. 2) double representation: Martov in both the O.C. and *Nashe Slovo*).

This—without fail.*

The C.C. delegation should be got ready. *All* languages needed: Inessa for French and English. And for German? If Kinkel has gone away, perhaps we should take Kharitonov from Zurich? (Ludmila, apparently, would like to go, but....) Expenses? Where will the conference be held? For how long? Let's think this over beforehand.

All the documents concerning Chkheidze & Co. (against them) should be carefully collected. Should the Leftists (Radek+Thalheimer+Wijnkoop+??) *ask* for a private meeting to have a "talk" with *Nashe Slovo*, it may not always be possible to refuse them. (The same applies to all and every document. We shall settle this beforehand by letter.)

Ought we not to start preparing our own draft manifesto, as detailed as Radek's, but with a declaration of war against opportunism? Or should we accept Radek's as a basis?

I have written to Kollontai** and Blagoev. I am writing

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* Or attend with 3 delegates from the C.O.A. (apart from the 3 from the C.C.) and demand a vote *for them*. Aren't they as good as the *Nashe Slovo* group? The same applies to the women's organisation.

** See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 193-94.—*Ed.*

to Wijnkoop: if he doesn't do it, it's his lookout I will have done my duty.

Write to Grimm he should notify *you by wire* if there is to be *another* Vorkonferenz (they may engineer one, for otherwise who, where, and when will determine the composition and so forth?). Perhaps we should also write Grimm that he is *obliged* to notify (just in case) the Norwegian and Swedish Leftists immediately? We should!! (Address: c/o Fru A. Kollontay. Turisthotel. Holmenkollen. *Kristiania*. Norwegen).

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. The conference is likely to be a "packed" meeting of Kautsky and Renaudel for "making peace"?? In that case we'll kick up a row and walk out, after lodging a protest.

Send all my paragraphs (for *Kommunist*) to Yuri. Send me Kamenski. I advise No. 1 (96 pp.), August 1915.[379] No. 2 (September 1915)—also 96 pp. Gorter in No. 2. I stood up for Varin, made him nine-tenths safe: they have to be threatened, then they backtrack. This is for No. 3.

Written after July 11, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1960 in the journal *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoria* No. 2

Printed from the original

407

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Dear Friend,

Did you receive Abram's article (back) and the article for the C.O.?

I am sending some more short articles for *Kommunist*. (I don't think we need worry about the size. *Abram's should be inserted too for certain*. We must have facts. We must have versatility. Better let No. 1 be fuller. In case of anything, a 5% pay rise and employment of a second compositor.)

I am sending copy for the C.O.

Figure out the size (the C.O. will now be smaller, will it not?) and get it done with.

I *don't* think there will now be a conference of Leftists: Kautsky & Co. will call a *general* conference.

Radek is *silent*.

I do not agree with the end of your article (about *Nashe Slovo*). "Peace" as presented by *Nashe Slovo* should be attacked a hundred times more sharply. We should not make excuses ("that is not the point", "we admit") but attack: the *Nashe Slovo* people are engaging in phrase-mongering about "peace", *while seeking peace with the social-chauvinists*. The gist of their peace slogan is *peace with the social-chauvinists*. It should be pointed out (and elaborated) that peace *without terms* is *nonsense*, a mere phrase. Then it should be elaborated that peace for the *ignorant mass* has a different meaning (à la "Gaponade"[380]), but as a slogan of the Party it is charlatanry. We are *for* participation in the Gapon unions, but against the "Gapon" slogans. I advise discussing this further by letter.

Yours,
Lenin

I am sending you Fridolin's letter. I advise *inviting* him; let me know whether you write to him, or want me to write. ((Return *all* the letters of Radek, Fridolin, etc.))

I am not sure that you communicated *all* your latest literary "titles" to me. Eh??

I think we ought to obtain Alexinsky's book *La Russie et la guerre*.

What do you think?

I believe the "Bibliography and Notes" in *Kommunist* were better *un*signed (for the sake of variety and avoiding repitition of the same names).

Vote this proposal. Yuri, *if he likes*, may leave his signature ("Pyotr Kievsky"): I suggest that his article[381] be given in the same section.

Written after July 11, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

408
TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Sörenberg, 15/VII. 1915

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you the report on the Berne preliminary conference by our representative Comrade Zinoviev. Will you please show it to Comrades Pannekoek and Gorter and let us know as soon as possible your opinion and that of your party (or resolution).

I think this preliminary conference was very important and useful only in the sense that it *definitely* showed up the "strange" (to put it mildly) role of certain German "Leftists" (Frau Clara Zetkin in particular). A few months ago I asked one of the German "Leftists" in the presence of Comrade Radek whether, if things came to a split, Clara Zetkin would go with the old or with the new party (that is, the revolutionary, and not the national-liberal party like that of today). "With the old one," *this* "Leftist" answered without hesitation.

Comrade Radek got very angry with this Leftist and assured me that the man was mistaken, and that Clara Zetkin would decidedly and sincerely fight the mean German social-chauvinists.

And now this argument has definitely been settled, but not in favour of Radek. Zetkin wishes to go together *with* Haase-Kautsky, but Haase-Kautsky desire "unity" (with Südekum: we call this in Russian "unity of lackeys, a splitting of revolutionaries", that is, unity with the national bourgeoisie, a splitting of the international working class)!! I am convinced that this "Left" conference *with* Zetkin, *with* Haase, *without Lichtstrahlen* and the *Tribune* people, is sheer hypocrisy: the objective significance of this conference consists merely in strengthening the old disreputable party by means of a *sham struggle* of the "Left" (à la Zetkin) against the "Right" (the Whigs and Tories of present-day Britain!).

We must (together with the Tribunists and *some* of the German Leftists, *not à la Zetkin*—perhaps also with the Lettish party and the Polish Social-Democrats (known as

the Opposition)) do something *very quickly*, if we do not want to miss this very important moment.

Comrade Radek promised to translate our resolutions into German.* You are already familiar with our Manifesto (of the Central Committee)—it has been published, unfortunately in abbreviated form, in your *Tribune*. David in his book quotes this Manifesto *very* conscientiously (almost unbelievably so for an opportunist). We are sending you Radek's translation and would ask you to let us know *as soon as you can* whether you consider it possible and advisable to prepare a joint resolution and come forward with a joint declaration of protest *against* the "Left" conference (Zetkin & Co.). We, I believe, shall do it—in one form or another.

With best regards,
N. Lenin

P.S. Please show this also to Comrade Luteraan, with whom we once came out together against the "Marsh" (the Centre), (naturally, if *you* think it would be useful to show this letter to Comrade Luteraan).

Wl. Uljanow *in Sörenberg* (Kanton Luzern) Schweiz. All this is strictly confidential!

Sent to Zwolle

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

409
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you the proofs.

If the No. is full up (i.e., if there is *quite* enough copy),

* Meaning the resolutions of the Berne Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64).—*Ed.*

put it out at once. (Arrange the articles at your discretion: "Defeat"—editorial.*)

If you have room, insert the enclosed postscript to the article "State of Affairs".**

After this No. we shall immediately issue the next, carrying the article on pacifism (has it been set up?). Write without delay, how much copy you have for this (next) issue and how much you are short of!

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

FROM MARX TO MAO

Written July 21, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

410
TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Sörenberg (Kt. Luzern)
22/VII. 1915

Dear Comrade Wijnkoop,

I am sending you the resolutions of our Party, translated by Comrade Radek.*** It seems to me—after having read your resolutions—that there definitely exists agreement, between us in principle.

Comrade Radek writes me that we ought to jointly draw up theses, and not resolutions (we, meaning—the Dutch Social-Democratic Party, our Party, the Polish Social-

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* A reference to Lenin's article "The Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 275-80).—*Ed.*

** A reference to Lenin's article "The State of Affairs in Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 281-86).—*Ed.*

*** Meaning the resolutions of the Berne Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Groups Abroad (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64).—*Ed.*

Democratic "Opposition", and probably also the Lettish Social-Democrats). I don't think it matters much—theses or resolutions. What matters is that we clearly and popularly formulate the revolutionary tactics, define the imperialist nature of the war and defend Marxism against falsification by Kautsky, Plekhanov & Co.

Unfortunately, Radek has not yet sent me his draft declaration. I hope that you, on reading our resolutions, will answer me *in the shortest possible time* whether you agree with us in principle. Everything should be ready by August 7-10.

If you can say *quite* definitely whether any one of your people could be in Berne between August 7 and 10, then perhaps it would be possible to arrange a small conference in Berne and jointly draw up the theses. If not, we shall have to arrange it by correspondence, and this will take a *long time*.

With best regards,

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. Radek tells me that you are on very good terms with *Charles Kerr*, the *Chicago* publisher. We are publishing in Russian (and eventually in German) a small pamphlet (about 100,000 printer's ems) with our resolutions and explanations. Could you inquire of Charles Kerr whether he would agree (and on what terms) to publish our pamphlet in English?*

P.P.S. I shall try to formulate and send you the draft Your proposal to establish contact with other Leftists (Britain, Sweden, France, etc.) meets with our whole-hearted approval.

Sent to Zwolle

First published in 1960 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original Translated from the German

* This refers to the pamphlet *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. Towards the War*) (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338).—*Ed.*

411

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you Wijnkoop.

Return immediately. What are we to do with them? They are obviously hedging. It's not worth scolding them—better keep silent, I think?

I am sending Kollontai. *Return*. There's a sensible woman for you!

I am sending you an article on the United States. It needn't be returned. *If you don't agree*, *telephone* (yourself or through Zina or Shklovsky) *immediately*.

Do you remember *Koba*'s name?

Regards,
Ulyanov

N.B. Send *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* containing a review of Maslov.[382]

Written after July 23, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

412

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I sent you today a wire asking you to substitute the article on pacifism (Grigory's) for my article "The State of Affairs in S.D."* in the current issue of the C.O. If this is now too late, please have all the other material set up—we shall put out another No. of the C.O. *immediately*.

How about the pamphlet?** Can Kuzma set it up? (About

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* "The State of Affairs in Russian Social-Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 281-86).—*Ed*.

** *Socialism and War* (*The Attitude of the R.S.D.L.P. Towards the War*).—*Ed*.

100,000 ems. Desirably *more cheaply*—in two columns, requiring less paper. Let him give an exact estimate and indicate the date.)

Best regards,
Yours,
N. Lenin

I received the translation from Stepko. Thanks very, very much.

Written July 24, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

413
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

You should have wired Olga, as I requested. It may now be late.

I got back Abramchik's article. I am not sending it, as it is not going in.

I am sending the draft (our condensed resolutions)—draft declaration of the Left.* I have sent it to the Dutch and to Radek, and so on.

I have received the translation of the end of An's article. Will send it.

Ditto—translation of Gorter. Am sending it.

Regards,
Lenin

P.S. I hope the mushrooms reached you in good condition?

I am sending the end of my part of the pamphlet.** Return it as soon as possible.

* See present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 345-48.—*Ed.*
** *Socialism and War.*—*Ed.*

N.B. The following of Inessa's addresses (for *Kommunist*) are *cancelled*
address of K. M. in Genoa
and of Sorokin in Toulouse.

Written after July 24, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

414

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

(Return Wijnkoop: isn't he a fine fellow!)

I shall send the Russian books (the list).

As regards the French, I am uncertain: most could be obtained by asking one of the Berne people to order them from the Geneva and Neuchâtel libraries (lots of rubbish: I have seen some of them in Paris). Money matters—in connection with the following.

Yuri's enclosed letter (return it) is a sample of insolent, stupid kulak mentality. It was *formally decided* here to publish Golay and Varin.[383] The Publishing Committee is *bound* to carry out this decision. It's just stupid wilfulness!! "It's my purse and I do as I like." Clearly, we can't work like this. Let them go, damn 'em. Publishing (if they want) will have to be done here, and with the kulaks out of the way, it *will be easier* for us.

It was *formally* decided here that they give ½ for transport and write us *within a week* about the instalment dates.

Not a word! It's sheer mockery!

Bukharin's letter (return it!) shows that it is *impossible* for us to go under such difficulties (with a strange passport? They will uncover us and arrest us *to oblige* the tsar!).* Money is dwindling: most of the remaining thousand will be spent on two issues of the C.O.+the pamphlet. And the fare? And the high cost of living in Stockholm? And conditions for work there (library) are *worse*.

* A reference to the plan for transferring the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* to Stockholm.—*Ed.*

We must think it over again and again.

Wouldn't it be better to let these kulak-minded stupidheads take an airing?

Send Golay to the C.O. (Golay *must* be published). I don't feel like answering Yuri: that foolish, insolent letter of his is insufferable. Where is the limit? Promises, formal decisions—and "I'm the boss, I'm not going to pay"!! No, there's a limit to everything! This is sheer barefaced lying!

My regards to everybody,

Yours,

Lenin

We haven't got that No. of *Rech*. Maybe Yuri has it?

Written after July 26, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

415

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Re "Bibliography and Notes", I am *for* publishing them. What is an extra 100-200 (less) frs.?

The important thing is to have the issue *all of a piece*.* It is important to have *voices from everywhere* (Golay, Sinclair, *Die Internationale*) against the social-chauvinists.[384]

Are Yuri and the Japanese[385] going? When?

Written after July 26, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* This refers to No. 1 of the journal *Kommunist*.—*Ed*.

416
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending Pannekoek's article.[386] I strongly advise giving it the enclosed editorial tailpiece (which should be forwarded to the author).*

I am sending a rough plan of the pamphlet (return it).** I suggest that we sit down (both of us) immediately, and think over every sentence, reword, condense and—publish it *in Russian* (for the anniversary of the war). And then in *three* other languages.

I think two purposes can be served:

1) A Vademecum for Russian Social-Democrats, agitators and "leading workers". A clear, popular, precise **summary of all** arguments. A clear summing-up: correctness of the expulsion of *Nasha Zarya*, the struggle against it and against the Organising Committee+*Chkheidze* [Vademecum for elections to the Duma].

2) A precise statement for the people abroad: a *political* step for welding the III International more serious than a dozen talks and meetings with a dozen Grimms, Zetkins and suchlike Klatsch-Weiber*** in trousers and skirts.

Answer without delay. If you agree, we shall discuss the *plan in still greater detail*, and then divide the subjects.

3) The O.C. riffraff will be induced to come forward with a platform of "their own", but they have *nothing* of their own!

Could you send me cuttings of *Hamburger Echo gems*? A *gem* in Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung*: a letter from Russia that *Axelrod is making concessions* to the "opportunists".[387] *I shall send it to you.*

APPENDIX TO LETTER

From the editors. We fully agree in all essentials with Comrade A. Pannekoek's excellent article, but find its last lines too pessimistic. We have the rank and file behind

* See the appendix to this letter.—*Ed.*

** *Socialism and War.—Ed.*

*** Gossipy women.—*Ed.*

us: the opportunists, social-chauvinists and Kautskians have a minority, often a negligible minority consisting of officials, aristocracy, petty bourgeois and philistines. Given correct tactics against the opportunists, i.e., if they are expelled and a consistent struggle waged against them, we shall have the support also of the big organisations, of the legal and illegal apparatus of the revolutionary party.

Written prior to July 28, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published: the appendix to the letter —in 1915 in the journal *Kommunist* No. 1-2; the letter— in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed: the letter—from the original; the appendix—from *Kommunist*

417

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

We accept Kuzma's terms. The pamphlet has *already* been written—*the whole of it.** I can send the MS. *even earlier*, if this can speed up the issue. Please wire (or telephone—best of all at 8.30-9 a.m.—Hotel Marienthal in *Sörenberg*, Kanton Luzern) whether the pamphlet could be sent earlier. It is *extremely* important for us to speed it up.

And so we are issuing another number of the C.O. (the article on pacifism is to go as an editorial; I am sending more copy), and immediately afterwards the pamphlet. (It has about 115,000 ems, I believe. But this makes only a slight difference.)

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written July 28, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

* *Socialism and War.—Ed.*

418

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending the pamphlet to Geneva (they agree to do 100,000 ems for 150 frs. and very quickly at that).

I have accepted practically all your amendments.

To your part I have made *negligible* ones: I shall send them to you in the proofs (if you want, we can ask for them earlier).

We must *do all we can to speed up* the issue of the C.O. Your article will have *375* lines!!! No news items (practically). Will you write ½ a column on "War"? I'll write about self-determination and a United States of Europe.* *Golay must go in the C.O.* if the Japanese don't agree to have it in *Kommunist*, for Golay must be boosted *for all he's worth*!**

Answer about the C.O. without delay, *hurry as fast as you can.*

Is it worth while putting in my article on Quarck?***

How could the draft declaration have got lost (it is condensed resolutions)?? It was in an envelope for you!!!

We shall ask Radek for it. [If you find it, *return it* **without delay!!**]

I am enclosing Varin and a letter to Yuri.

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

I have sent *all* my proofs back to *Benteli*.**** If the letter has gone astray, let the proofs be *sent again*.

Written after July 28, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

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* Lenin is probably referring to his articles "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" and "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 407-14 and 339-43).—*Ed.*

** See Lenin's article "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 349-56).—*Ed.*

*** This refers to Lenin's article "The 'Peace' Slogan Appraised" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 287-89).—*Ed.*

**** This refers to the Benteli printing shop.—*Ed.*

419
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Olga writes that we must hurry up *like anything* with the C.O.—otherwise Kuzma will take on other work!

Yet we have little material!! Scandalous!!

I am sending today a small article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" direct to the printing shop (asking them to send the proofs to you)—(written on the lines we discussed. We must be sure to correct the mistake before the pamphlet comes out, and insert in the pamphlet a comment on the Manifesto*). [In the pamphlet I shall add the 1913 resolution on the national question.]

I am sending you an article on the national programme (I would have liked to rewrite it; it's not the thing, I'm afraid; I would have preferred to hold it over).** Olga has 400 lines of copy+125 United States of Europe, and altogether the issue will have *736* lines!!

Send Olga by Monday morning without fail (generally, *by the first post*) some more material. I don't think it's worth giving Quarck*** alongside of your article.

No. 111 of *Nashe Slovo* had it.[388]	Was Braun in *Nashe Slovo*? Nadya made inquiries and says *it was*.

We ought to have an article on Russia, if only a small one.

(I was ill and couldn't work until yesterday.)

Regards to everybody,

Yours,

Lenin

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* See "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe. Editorial Comment by *Sotsial-Demokrat* on the Manifesto on War Issued by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 344).—*Ed.*

** Apparently this refers to Lenin's article "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 407-14).—*Ed.*

*** This refers to Lenin's article "The 'Peace' Slogan Appraised" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 287-89).—*Ed.*

P.S. Thanks for the pamphlets.
If there's nothing else, send Golay to the C.O.

In the pamphlet you forgot to put in the figures of the number of workers in "our" and the liquidators' gubernias. *Send them in.*

Written between July 28
and August 2, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

420

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending an article for No. 44* (the proofs of it please send to both Grigory and me simultaneously (and those on pacifism too), have two impressions made. Grigory's address: Herrn Radomyslski bei Fr. Aschwanden *Hertenstein* in *Kanton Luzern*).

Grigory will send in more copy for No. 44 by Monday.

We must *at all costs* get No. 44 out immediately, without a break in the work (even if it means paying Kuzma for a working day, etc.), and then start on setting up the pamphlet. I repeat, it is lying on my desk fully completed. I shall send it in by the middle of next week, but if issue can be speeded up, I shall send it immediately on receipt of your wire.

No. 43 is got up excellently! Thanks very much.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written between July 28
and August 2, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* The article is "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 339-43).—*Ed.*

421
TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

30/VII. 1915

Dear Comrade,

I received your letter and postcard. I am sending you the complete French translation of our Manifesto; I have already sent you the translation of our Party's resolutions, made by Radek. You now have all the documents (as regards the "United States of Europe", I think we shall adopt Gorter's point of view).

I am very glad that we agree in essentials. What we need is not the solemn declarations of leaders (against which Pannekoek has written so well), but a consistent revolutionary declaration of principles to help the workers find the correct path. This is most essential. I was particularly pleased to hear that you are in touch with the Belgian friends (we could send P. Golay's pamphlet for them, if you haven't already seen it[389]) and wish to talk *personally* with some of the Leftists in another country. If the Belgian anonymous group "Étoile" and another, German, group published a declaration of principles together with your and our party—this would be a good and serious beginning. The Swedish Left with Höglund are on our side: I received a letter today about this. It would be a good thing if you wrote to England and persuaded some group there (if only a small one) to draft a joint declaration.

Sincere regards and wishing you success.

Yours,
N. Lenin

P.S. The second preliminary conference was to be held on August 7, but it will probably be held later.

Sent from Sörenberg
to Amsterdam

First published in 1960
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original
Translated from the
German

422

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am greatly worried about the pamphlet. I hope you have received everything (the whole manuscript and comment on the Manifesto)? How is the type-setting going on and when do you hope to get it out? *I shall be writing for the proof-sheets*. (The headings of the small subsections of the chapters should be set up either in italics or nonpareil but in no case in bold type.)

What about No. 44 of the C.O.? I had no proofs and put this down to your wanting to speed up the issue (as we had agreed). But the United States article went in, didn't it?

Drop me a line.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Did you find the 1913 resolution on the national question?

Written August 11, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

423

TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Dear Comrade,

I enclose herewith the declaration, which we received from the Norwegian Jugendbund. The Bulgarian Social-Democrats ("Tesnyaki") have expressed the same views in principle at the Second Balkan Conference (in July of this year).[390] Consequently, a Left international declaration of principles *is possible*. By August 20 it should be ready.

Looking forward eagerly to your reply and draft.

With best wishes,
(Signature)

Written August 15, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Amsterdam

First published in 1959
in German in the journal
Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung
No. 2

First published in Russian in
1960 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from a copy
found in police records
Translated from the
German

424

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Return *Peuple*. Good about Vandervelde, eh? Such will be the *tactics* of *all* of them.

I haven't a single line from Radek and Karpinsky. It's baffling! I am writing them.

Grimm phoned to say that the *Vorkonferenz* has been put off till 5.IX and that Zetkin has asked him from prison to send her the resolution of the minority at the Berne Conference.* I have sent the Russian text. If you have the German, send it to Grimm.

We shall send Jaurès after we have read it.[391]

I have given "J'accuse" to *Radek*.[392]

Return Kolb.[393]

From the Dutch—*nil*!!

P.S. I advise putting it in (see the text), having the German expressions translated.

I don't see why you should defend the Japanese. Alexander writes *indignant* letters, and he has a right to be indignant. Adopted decisions should be carried out: it was decided (3 weeks ago) *within a week*!! And now **within another month!???**

They're cheats, and I'm not going to wink at their cheat-

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 26, pp. 206-08.—*Ed.*

ing. I have a right to demand and will demand from them statements *in writing* and secretaries' *minutes* of general decisions (so that we can catch the cheats, *who* want to break away and throw the blame onto us!).

Are they leaving? When? Or not? Two fools engaged in counting money could have figured out in 3 months how much 100 rubles is worth in frs. or how much No. 1 costs. These are just *flimsy* excuses—it's simply *ridiculous*. They will be getting 10 frs. a time from Russia, feeding us with promises and fooling the shippers!! Adopting decisions just to fool us!! No, they won't get away with this.

Lenin

N.B. Bukharin *occasionally* (pp. 133, 132, *129* in the subheadings) leaves the old expression social-state trust (corrected in other places to state-capitalist trust).[394]

Is this an oversight or deliberate??

You write that you are keeping notes, "hoping to secure it". Fulfilment of *old decisions*?? By what means?? By "talks"?

I don't agree to such relations.

P.S. Sheets (and leaflets) should be written and sent to Alexander.

Written prior to August 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

425
TO DAVID WIJNKOOP

Dear Comrade Wijnkoop,

Radek writes me he had informed you that the conference (not the Vorkonferenz but the conference itself) was

to be held on 5.IX. You, too, probably are already familiar with Radek's draft. This draft seems to me rather academic (this objection, of course, is unimportant) and—what is far more important—unsatisfactory in regard to the most important point, which is driven home so well, for instance, in Gorter's pamphlet, namely: a decisive struggle against opportunism. If we are silent about this before the workers, we shall be hushing up a circumstance without which *nothing* real can be created.

Will you please let me know your opinion and the opinion of your Central Committee. Also, whether a representative of your party is coming for certain (and if not, would you give Radek a mandate or send a declaration, etc.). If possible, write to England, to the minority of the British Socialist Party; let this minority send either a representative, or at least a declaration. If, as a result of this conference, we receive not only diplomatic conjuring tricks of the leaders (so well ridiculed by Pannekoek), but also a Left Marxist international declaration of principles, it will be a very useful thing.

The group of Belgian internationalists, of whom you know, should also send a declaration or give you a mandate (*sections* of parties will certainly be admitted too). An anti-chauvinist opposition to Vandervelde—however small—would be extremely important. It is the first step that counts!

Awaiting your reply,

With S.D. greetings,

N. Lenin

P.S. I enclose the draft declaration (in French)—I have not yet had time to discuss it with my friends. Tomorrow I shall send this draft to Comrade Radek.

Written after August 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg
to Amsterdam

First published in 1960
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original
Translated from the
German

426

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending 200 frs. Maybe you'll "butter up" Kuzmikha. A grand merci for your trouble. I received Olga's letter. Koba has sent greetings and reports that he is well. Re the pamphlet, inform me now and again by postcard whether there is any "hope" of progress (I shall have time to make certain corrections in the proof-sheets).

Salut!
Yours,
Lenin

Written August 21, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

427

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am for No. 1 (August) and No. 2 (September).* 50 pages for an article is your—pardon—fantasy.

Yuri should not be included in the delegation.[395] He doesn't know any foreign language. No sense in it. To pay court to them is harmful. We have one "lady editor"—do you want another "delegate from the C.C. delegation"? Better not.

I can't write about Russia. Send Bukharin's letter. I *do not see any* newspapers. (I have only *Rech.*)

It's annoying that Radek has not been copied. If corrections, the following should be added:

1) mention of Basle

2) illeg. org., etc. But is it worth sending *him* corrections? (for Trotsky?)

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* This refers to the journal *Kommunist.—Ed.*

Yuri writes that Trotsky will be the *only one* from *Nashe Slovo*. This will make cheating still easier for them.

Will Kamenski be there? *I doubt it!!* Write to him immediately, for *you* have spoken to him.

I remember you saying that Grimm wanted the conference to be *not* in Berne. Are we to return to Berne? If so, 1.IX is *too early*. (Maybe you will go a bit earlier, or do you have special business to see to there?)

Alexander wants to go to Russia. I am writing him, supporting this plan.* A pity there are no C.C. men. He's the man for us, if it were not for Kollontai (she is going to America to lecture and carry on internationalist agitation).

Ludmila has *found herself* (sic!) without money or a passport!! I don't think she will go anywhere.

She has brought French books, which we shall send to you after perusal (and you return Rappoport, *after perusal*: I sent it to you without having had time to read it).

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

What about Karpinsky's article for *Kommunist*?

Re the draft resolution, I sent it to you (=draft of condensed resolution). Did you make a copy? If not, I can send you one. If we are to prepare our own draft we must hurry.

P.S. "300 years" is no good, in my opinion. Must be rewritten for the legal publication.

Written prior to August 23, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 35, p. 204.—*Ed.*

428

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending you a *terribly* important insertion to the pamphlet. Please see that it goes in without mistakes.* If the pamphlet can be put out by Tuesday or Wednesday, send 10-20 copies to Shklovsky by *express* post.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written after August 23, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

429

TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

I am sending you the proof-sheets.

Have you found the 19*13* resolution on the national question? If you have not, I shall send it from here (it hasn't been translated into German yet).

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written after August 23, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* This refers to the beginning of Chapter II of the pamphlet *Socialism and War* headed "Classes and Parties in Russia".—*Ed.*

430
TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

As regards elections, I really don't know what to answer. At the first blush, why shouldn't elections in a republic be held from top to bottom? But beyond this first blush I know nothing: neither the nature of the body to which elections have to be held, nor the correlation of parties within it, nor the history of the question, nor past experience. It is difficult to judge under such conditions, for the "first blush" alone is insufficient, of course.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Did the 200 frs. help to get round Kuzmikha? Keep me informed by postcards: "a bulletin of Kuzmikha's moods and the chances of success". Both you (and we) are fed up with Kuzma, I understand, but what can we do?

Written after August 26, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

431
TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Comrade Olga,

I have a request to make of you: for the translation (German) of our pamphlet we need the text of the comment on the Manifesto (concerning the slogan of a United States of Europe) which I sent you.* Will you please make a clear copy (for the translator) and send it to the following ad-

* See present edition, Vol. 36, p. 339.—*Ed.*

dress: Herrn Lialine (bei Fr. Eicher-Müller) Freie Strasse 15. *Bern* (with a letter that you are sending it at my request for the German translation of the pamphlet).

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written August 27, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

432
TO PAUL GOLAY

28/VIII. 1915

Dear Comrade,

With the greatest of pleasure I learned from your letter that you agree on the whole with my draft. The conference is to take place on September 5. We hope that several French socialists of the Left will attend it. The whole thing is being organised by Grimm and Morgari. Your presence, in my opinion, would be very useful, and I would ask you to write to Grimm immediately.

Sincerely yours

Sent from Sörenberg to Lausanne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

433
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Today—Monday morning—we still have no answer from Radek to the prepaid telegram!! What is it—some intrigues "around Grimm" against the Letts?? Is it possible that they

won't be invited!? If I go tomorrow,* I shall wire you, and you will then come down by the *first* train. Bring *all* the material (don't forget anything: *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* and *Nashe Dyelo* and *Nashe Slovo* and the *Norwegian letter* and everything else).

I have had a postcard from Kollontai. She is going it full tilt.

Salut!

Lenin

Written August 30, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

434

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Answer Meshcheryakov.

I advise getting Shklovsky to tackle Grimm (either if he is going 1.IX) or by telephone. We must get a reply from Grimm.

You to write the report (on Russia)[396] (if need be I will send you *Rech*).

I believe a resolution will suffice (we have a draft: "condensed". It can be corrected). Why make a declaration? If we find a common language with Radek, we can write it there. If not, and if we are on our own, then what need is there for a declaration, who is it for?

My regards to everybody,

Yours,

Lenin

Written August 30 or 31, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* This refers to Lenin's trip to Zimmerwald to attend the First International Socialist Conference.—*Ed.*

435

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

We must start preparing an issue of the C.O. devoted *wholly* to the conference. *Subjects* or *articles*.[397]

Etwa:
1. Vorgeschichte* and correspondingly the III International.
2. Reports (Balkans *apart*).
3. Debates with Ledebour (discussion in general on points of principle). (Three shadings among the Germans.)
4. Significance of the conference (first step to the III International; half-hearted and inconsistent step *towards a split* with opportunism. Possibility of a "relapse").

Comparison with women's

5. Our resolution and our draft Manifesto, our statement on the Manifesto.
6. The Bund and O.C. men+Trotsky (Massenaktionen).
7. Official Manifesto.

Do you agree to my taking Nos. 3 and 4?

Let us make haste with this issue of the C.O.

I am sending Bauer.

Be sure to send me

1) Legien's collection+ ...**
2) the pamphlet on Liebknecht.

Return Radek's letter.

Plan of leaflets is drawn up; will send it tomorrow; detailed.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I have *mislaid* the letter of the Dutch to the C.C.[398]

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* Pre-history.—*Ed.*

** One word in the manuscript illegible.—*Ed.*

Extremely important arguments against participation in the conference.

Written after September 8, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

436
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you Radek's letter and his *report*.[399] Return the latter to him as soon as you can (with criticism: it's weakish. Not a word about our pamphlet,* about defence of *Nasha Zarya* by Axelrod, etc.).

You have a lot of assistants—get them to make a copy of Radek's report.

I am sending you the plan of leaflets: return *as soon as possible*.[400]

Best regards,
Lenin

N.B. Ask Inessa whether she took from me *Journal de Genève*[401] with an article by Romain Rolland! For God's sake, search everything everywhere to find it.

Written September 18 or 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

437
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you Yuri's answer—and an article for the C.O. (I shall rewrite it again). I have written to Olga. I'm

* *Socialism and War.—Ed.*

afraid things there are hopeless. How about Benteli—find out.

I am sending the pamphlet—have just received it.

What about the 2 latest German publications?

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

I am enclosing two letters of Socialist-Revolutionaries.[402]

Characteristic, eh?

Return both, after you have shown them around.

I just can't get the draft resolution from Radek.

Written prior to September 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

438

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

We haven't received the pamphlet yet. We want to put out a double issue of the C.O. with a report on the international conference of the Left in Berne. How about Kuzmikha? Could she be "buttered up" by payment for the pamphlet (you have the money, haven't you?)? Or is it hopeless? And *no prospect* of issuing it in the near future? Drop me a line, please, as to whether we can know where we stand.

I received Yegor's letters and *will answer him in a day or two* through you.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written September 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

439
TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending you *Journal de Genève*. It appears that I put it away somewhere before my departure and forgot about it. I'm awfully glad I have found it and not made myself look quite a pig in your eyes.

Re the C.O., Grigory advises having it published in Berne (this is a double number, 4 pages on the conference of the Left), if there is no hope with regard to Kuzmikha. Drop me a line "to make assurance doubly sure" (as I am already well aware how helpless we all are where Kuzmikha is concerned).

About the lecture. I would like to read it about mid-October on the subject: "The International Socialist Conference of 5-8.IX.1915". *If suitable*, we could organise it *in advance* (perhaps you could print bills *for other towns*, too, leaving a space for the town and the date). Could it bring in anything (I am devilishly hard up), is it opportune, etc.? ***Everyone*** (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *Nashe Slovo* and others) will *publish* something about the conference, but I would go into *details*.

I am writing to Kharitonov in Zurich.*

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I am enclosing a letter for Socialist-Revolutionary "Yegor". Please *read* it and give it to him. If convenient, have a talk with him and let me know your opinion of him and his friends. What sort of people are they?

Written September 19, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929
in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

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* See present edition, Vol. 36, p. 353.—*Ed.*

440
TO ALEXANDROVICH

19/IX. 1915

Dear Comrade,

Comrade Kollontai has forwarded your letter on to me. I have read and reread it attentively. I can understand your passionate protest against the emigrant colony, which apparently did anything but please you. The experience of 1905, however, has proved, in my opinion, that there are emigrants and emigrants. Part of the emigrant body, which prior to 1905 had devised the slogans and tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy, proved in the years 1905-07 to be closely linked with the mass revolutionary movement of the working class in *all* its forms. The same applies today, in my opinion. If the slogans are correct, if the tactics are the right ones, the mass of the working class, at a given stage of development of its revolutionary movement, is bound to *come round* to these slogans. You write that for the people "Plekhanov is merely a name". I cannot agree with this, although, perhaps, the difference between us here is only a seeming one. Plekhanov is the most striking, and in Russia, thanks to the bourgeois and liquidator press, the most *popular* exponent of the extremely widespread "people's" patriotism. In showing up Plekhanov we are, in fact, answering a host of questions, thoughts, doubts, and so on, that arise in the minds of the people. But, of course, it is up to an intelligent propagandist and agitator to *translate* the dispute of a revolutionary internationalist Marxist with Plekhanov into *another* language, to approach the matter in a different way, to make allowance for the specific qualities of the environment, etc., etc.

For that matter, you probably take the same view yourself, since you distinguish only the "*Left* trends" (the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats) and our dispute with Plekhanov & Co. is precisely that of determining and separating trends.

As to the urgency of the problem of sending people to Russia you are quite right. *We do* what we can in this field lately.

The other day I received another letter from a Socialist-Revolutionary, who writes that after the conference of the Trudoviks+Popular Socialists+Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia (a chauvinist conference)[403] he gives the Socialist-Revolutionary Party up as a bad job. I, too, doubt whether it has any viable elements *in it*. At any rate, I consider it a fact that there are now 2 main *revolutionary* trends in Russia: the revolutionary chauvinists (to overthrow the tsar in order to defeat Germany) and the revolutionary proletarian internationalists (to overthrow the tsar *as a means* of assisting the international revolution of the proletariat). Any rapprochement between these trends beyond occasional "joint actions" is, in my opinion, impossible and harmful. The war has linked together the proletariat of *all* the great powers of Europe, the war has placed *on the order of the day* the task of putting into effect proletarian solidarity. A difficult task, to be sure, but one that is posed by life itself and cannot be shelved.

If you are going to work in Russia and should you wish to help the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Left Social-Democrats, I would advise giving help to each of them separately, helping to *link** the respective groups, both in different places among themselves, and with the centres abroad. The Social-Democrats separately, the Socialist-Revolutionaries separately. This will yield definite *benefit* and make for *less* squabbling. Rapprochement, *when possible*, will proceed more normally. There will be greater trust.

I wish you every success and all the best.

With socialist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. You may write to me at the address printed in our Geneva *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

Sent from Sörenberg
to Christiania (Oslo)

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* Literature *will gain* from the establishment of such contacts. It will become more lively, more useful, closer to the people both with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats.

441

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you Axelrod,* *Neue Zeit* (don't lose it and don't give it to anybody) and No. 1 of the *Bulletin*.[404] I am waiting for the German pamphlet.

The letter to the Japanese is no good as it is, in my opinion. The tone is for a break. If there is to be a break, it is not for this reason. Either send this in your own name, or we shall alter it completely (in a tone of friendly exhortation and *discreet* intimation of their error).

I am sending you Radek's letter (return it). He is na-;ve to the point of holiness. Grimm is a scoundrel who has to be closely watched. (To this day I have not been able to get our Resolutionsentwurf!!!)

I am enclosing Kamenev's letter. I have answered him, pointing out that the situation is serious (spoilt) and must be seriously rectified.

Write the editorial for the Central Organ, *but not more than 10,000 ems*. (No room for more!) It must include a slashing criticism of the Organising Committee's leaflet (3.IX.1915, "The Tasks of the Russian Proletariat") with the slogan (liberal) of *Constituent Assembly*. For our *3 pillars*, against the Cadets, against the chauvinist revolutionaries and for the international revolution of the proletariat.**

Wait a day or two (don't write about Russia in the C.O. yet).

Tomorrow I shall send you "The Tasks of the Russian Proletariat" and maybe my own draft.

Best regards,
Lenin

Written September 21, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

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* The idiot! "Internationalisation of tactics"=internationalisation of labour legislation!! This is what Martushka had been driving at in *Nashe Slovo*, but far more cleverly. I should like to show Axelrod up properly in *Kommunist*.

** This paragraph is crossed out in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

442

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV*

I am sending you Grimm's letter[405] and my draft reply.

We must *do our best* and *assert ourselves*.

With the C.O. it's the devil to pay. 75 thousand ems of copy have been sent (altogether 84¾) and I have *forgotten* the declaration of the French+Germans.[406]

This will fill it up.

I suggest devoting this No. *solely* to the conference (and the next one to Russia).

Among the printed supplements to *Zhizn* only the translation of *Bulletin* No. 1. "*Nashe Slovo*" *all blank*.[407]

Best regards,
Lenin

I have answered Bukharin at length.

N.B. || More detailed letters should be sent to him and more often.

If you agree with the answer to Grimm, send it to *Shklovsky* who is to call on Radek and translate it *with him*. If you do not agree, return it.

We are going to Berne on Sunday or Monday.

I am sending the letter from the Japanese. *Return it*. What is to be done about the meeting of the Editorial Board? (It would be good to have 2 articles about the conference in No. 3 of *Kommunist*.)

Written between September 26 and October 5, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* This letter is a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*

443

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I am sending the rest of the copy. Here is the arrangement of the articles. Send the proof-sheets and everything to my *new* address:

Herrn Wl. *Uljanow*

Poste restante Bern.

Send Grigory all the proofs.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Arrangement of the articles for No. 45-46:

1. Manifesto.

(1*a*)	(1*b*)
1. bis: Resolution on + sympathy	**1 ter.** statement (**declaration**) of French and German delegations; *set up this* declaration
N.B.	according to enclosed printed text from *Zhizn*

2. The war and revolutionary crisis in Russia.

3. 1st step.*
4. 1st international conference.
5. Revolutionary Marxists.**
6. Reports.
7. Draft resolution.
8. " manifesto.
9. Our Russian so-called internationalists.
10. Plekhanov and his friends.

Written prior to October 6, 1915
Sent from Sörenberg to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

* "The First Step" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 383-88).—*Ed.*

** "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 389-93).—*Ed.*

444

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. K.,

I am sending you the proof-sheets.

Will Olga please answer my postcard of yesterday in *greatest possible detail*.

Do me a favour—get to know (from Stepko or Mikha, etc.) the name of "*Koba*" (Joseph J.....?? we have forgotten). Very important!!

Would you buy me (out of C.O. expenses) Romain Rolland's pamphlet: *Au dessus de la mêlée*?

Or is it unobtainable in Geneva?

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Thanks for the *Appeal to Reason*[408] you have sent me!! Send it *more often*!

Written prior to November 9, 1915
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

445

TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Dear G. L.,

Please send 500 copies of the pamphlet (indicating Absender and *registered*)* immediately and by the *cheapest possible means* to the following address:

Mr. *L. Lore* (for A. Kollontay)
German Language Federation Socialist Party
Spruce Street. 15. *New York* (N. Y.)
United States of **America.**

* This refers to the pamphlet *Socialism and War*.—*Ed*.

According to your calculation there are orders for 500+500=1,000 (I.S.D.* gratis or at 10 pfg.?)+1,500 Jugend=2,500+500 America=3,000.

It would be good to start on a 2nd edition while the type is set up, *but we have no money*. Couldn't we induce the Jugend,** by giving them now 500 instead of 1,500, to arrange a deal *themselves* with the Berne printing shop for a 2nd edition? (How much will it cost? If not much and if we can be sure that the Jugend will not let us down, perhaps we could borrow the money and publish it ourselves?)

Will you *please* think this over *well* and arrange the whole business.

Best regards,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

P.S. Please hand the enclosed letter to **that Lett** (who took my address from you round about 5-8.IX and called on me in Sörenberg on 10 or 11.IX.1915). Very urgent. Please find him as quickly as possible and hand him the letter.

Do *not* spend a kopek more money. *Don't give it to anybody*.

Written prior to November 9, 1915
Sent from Berne to a local address

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

446

TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Dear Comrade,

I was *very glad* to hear about your speech at Aarau and I heartily congratulate you on the success. It couldn't have been better.[409]

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* I.S.D.—Internationale Sozialisten Deutschlands.—*Ed.*

** Jugendverein—the Swiss Socialist Youth League.—*Ed.*

(If you have a full verbatim report of the congress, please let me have it if only for a short time.)

Radek told me that *he* had advised you not to take the floor first, as this on the part of a Russian would not be "tactful" (*Radek has proved to be entirely* wrong), and it would be better if Platten did it, etc.

You proved to be entirely right!

I don't think it's worth having Gezänk* with Radek over the "pighead", etc. Trifles! A mere nothing! Scandal, which the O.C. people, Dymki, etc., have always gone in for, and Ryazanov now in particular (Radek too says he is furious: funny chap, what made him poke his nose in things he doesn't understand?).

Take no notice of the scandal, spend less time on the Zurich colonial marsh, *give more of it to contacts with Platten* and the business of publishing and circulating *Internationale Flugblätter*[410] (if you spend less time on the O.C. people & Co. you will have more for *Internationale Flugblätter*).

The money for *Internationale Flugblätter* (370 copies?) and the *account* (how many left over? How many given out on credit? Total, etc.) send direct *to me* (Platten's address has been given only for outsiders).

As regards the translation of *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 into Italian, I think our mutual acquaintance will help you.** She and Siefeldt have already found several Italian addresses; she has found an Italian to go through the translation. You too. I think the first thing to do now is to have it translated into Italian and given to an Italian to be vetted. And then (*avoiding Balabanova*, who apparently won't be of any help and is even capable of being an obstacle) it is necessary to start looking out for some newspaper or a league of Italians in Switzerland who would agree to publish it at their own expense: I don't think this is a utopia, as the publication of 2,000 copies will cost 80 frs., and at 10 cts. each it will yield a profit.

If a publisher cannot be found, then we shall try and publish it ourselves, in which case distribution must be

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* A row.—*Ed.*

** The person referred to has not been identified.—*Ed.*

organised with special zeal: our mutual acquaintance, to whom I am writing, will help us in this.

I would ask you to maintain and cultivate *in every way* your "close acquaintance" with Platten: he is *extremely important* just now for publication of *Internationale Flugblätter*.

Does Platten attend the meetings of the party's Executive? Does he have the minutes? Has he a vote or not? Does he agree to *develop* the decision on "*revolutionäre Aktionen*" to keep it from being a dead letter? (In that case we should arrange publications, pamphlets, supplements to Swiss papers concretising the idea of "revolutionäre Aktionen", and smuggle all this into Germany.) Does he agree to help import *Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 into Germany?

How are things going with the sale of the pamphlet *Sozialismus und Krieg*? Write. Drop the Zurich colony and get busy with the affairs der Zimmerwalder Linken!

All the best. My regards to your wife and all our friends.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Write direct to my address:
Wl. Uljanow. Seidenweg. 4-*a*III
(bei *Frau* Schneider) *Bern*.

Written after November 21, 1915
Sent to Zurich

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447

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I think we ought to go to Grimm and ask him to *mark off exactly* (with a red pencil) what passages he "wants deleted"![411]

Polemic?

What about Trotsky and *Vie Ouvrière*?[412]

Is the reference to Longuet-Pressemane *less* polemical

than the reference to Chkheidze? Begründung? The same can be found in Trotsky and *Vie Ouvrière*.

I have my doubts whether it's any use having talks with Grimm. If he confined himself to quite minor amendments, I would be for making concessions. But that is improbable.

In that case there are two alternatives: either we give up the idea of publishing it in the *Bulletin* and issue a leaflet.

Or we publish it in the *Bulletin* the way Grimm wants it, and in addition issue it *complete* as a leaflet *marked*: "Published without censorship".

At any rate the **main** thing now is to get Grimm's *pencil* marks of *what* he wants deleted. That's the main thing. Go about this tactfully—**speak him fair.**

I shall answer the rest this evening or tomorrow. I *haven't had time* to read it all.

Salut!

Lenin

Written prior to November 27, 1915
Sent from Berne to a local address

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448

TO G. Y. BELENKY*

If you have any group of Frenchmen there who adhere *to the position* of the Zimmerwald Left, *be sure* to get this group to send us *immediately* an article, however short (or a statement), for the journal. Hurry!!

We also need correspondence from this group. For God's sake!

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* This letter is a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*

Finally, a *full report* of the speeches by Bourderon and Merrheim (1) at the federation itself
(2) of the whole opposition at the party *congress* of 27. XII.

Written after December 27, 1915
Sent from Berne to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

1916

449
TO INESSA ARMAND

15/I. 1916

Dear Friend,

Today the parcel containing papiers d'affaires, three notebooks sent from Berne by registered mail to Belinsky* in Paris, has been returned. The sender forgot to put the number of the house, and those damned post-office people went and returned it!! I have sent it off today to Belinsky registered.

We have the beginning of "friction" with our Polish friend,** who seems to have "taken offence" over the discussion and wants to keep our theses out of No. 2 of the journal.[413] This looks like *war* with him. From Roland-Holst an extremely friendly letter reporting that her Dutch league on 2.I.1916 had unanimously joined the Zimmerwald Left! Trotsky has lost another ally!! The journal, Dutch-German, is already being set up; contributors from other countries are badly needed, but everything and all contacts should be given only to me or to my young *Russian* friend (by no means to the non-Russian, vous comprenez?).

Now quite another story:

It is a glorious sunny day today, with a light snow. After influenza my wife and I took our first walk along the road to Frauen-Kapellen where the three of us—you remember?—had that lovely stroll one day. I kept thinking of it and was sorry you were not here.

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* This refers to G. Y. Belenky.—*Ed.*

** Meaning K. B. Radek.—*Ed.*

By the way. I'm rather surprised that there is no news from you. Let me confess, while I'm at it, that the thought occurred to me for a moment that you might have "taken offence" at my not having gone to see you off the day you left. I did think that, I must confess, but I dismiss the unworthy thought, I have driven it from my mind.

This is my second postcard to you. Maybe the first one went astray? I repeat the important advice: reread Nos. 5 and 6 of *Nashe Slovo* ever so carefully!! Kollontai sends *good* news from America, she is *publishing Internationale Flugblätter*. From Russia too there is *good* news.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent from Berne to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

450

TO INESSA ARMAND

19/I. 1916

Dear Friend,

This is my third postcard to you. This time in French, to make the work easier for the censors, if they are the cause of this delay with the mail. As a matter of fact I have been worrying for several days now at the absence of any news from you! If you were offended with me, you would probably have written to other friends, but as far as I know you have not written to anybody. If I don't get a letter from you within the next few days I shall write to our friends to find out whether you are ill. I have inquired several times about poste restante mail, but there is nothing.

The conflict with our young Polish friend has been settled satisfactorily; it was just a slight "misunderstanding" (that is his statement of the case). Now everything is going well;

the journal is already being made up; it should be issued in January.*

We have written to "your" editor in one of the towns of Romansh Switzerland.** He simply doesn't answer Strange, is it not? We are all looking forward to your making arrangements about novels and short stories in Paris where you will probably find lots of people, writers, publishers and so on, since you are working in the National Library and are well acquainted with these people.

The weather is fine. Last Sunday we went for a lovely walk up "our" little mountain. The view of the Alps was very beautiful; I was so sorry you were not there with us.

Recently Camille Huysmans delivered a very long "diplomatic" speech at the congress of the Dutch party.[414] I don't know whether you will be able to find the text of it in the French newspapers. If you don't, you will find it here. He touched, "in passing", on the September conference and protested strongly against the "attempts at expropriation" (he doesn't want to be "expropriated", this secretary!) and so on and so forth. A big diplomatist, a politician!... What unworthy means!

How are you getting on? Are you content? Don't you feel lonely? Are you very busy? You are causing me great anxiety by not giving any news about yourself!... Where are you living? Where do you eat? At the "buffet" of the National Library?

Again I ask for letters poste restante.

Sincerely yours,
Basil

P.S. Again nothing! No letters from you.

Sent from Berne to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

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* A reference to the journal *Vorbote*.—*Ed*

** A reference apparently to Paul Golay, editor of the newspaper *Le Grutléen* in Lausanne.—*Ed*.

451

TO INESSA ARMAND

Friday

Dear Friend,

Only today did we receive your long letter; which was most welcome. This is my fourth letter to you: all the first three postcards were poste restante. If you haven't received them, then they either go astray or else there are special rules (or misrules) in regard to poste restante mail. Trotsky has written to our young Polish friend that he is not going to write for the Dutch journal* himself and cannot advise his friends of the nation among whom he is living to do so. It looks like there is no avoiding a fight with Trotsky even on this question!!

We received a postcard today from your brother.** It is good to know that he has received something (either a letter or a No. of our newspaper for the end of March) and writes about "sympathy". There is more sympathy, he says, in his part of the world than he expected.

By the way, I nearly forgot (I am in a great hurry to get this off by the next train). If there are special misrules regarding poste restante mail, maybe that is the reason why *I* do not receive any letters (I have not had a *single one* from you), though you do write? Let me know at once: if you underline the date twice, it will mean that you *do* receive my letters and *write* to me. Write to the same address at which we received your long letter.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Why didn't you give your address before???

Written January 21, 1916
Sent from Berne to Paris

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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* *Vorbote.—Ed.*

** Meaning L. B. Kamenev, the word "brother" being used for reasons of secrecy.—*Ed.*

452
TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Sunday evening

Dear Comrade,

I have just learned that an international conference of the bureaux of the youth leagues is to be held at Zurich on *Wednesday*. The Norwegians and Swedes should be there (their youth leagues, as you know, joined the Zimmerwald Left).

Will you please 1) find out (*tactfully*—all this is *secret*) about this in detail: the date, place, duration, composition; 2) ascertain whether a representative of our Party can attend; try to make this possible and *get in yourself*; 3) make a special attempt to find out, as quickly as you can, who exactly is going to be there from Scandinavia, get in touch with them, see them, and *put them in touch* with us as soon as possible.

Drop me a line that you have received this letter and saying what you hope to do.

Salut!

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Please thank Siefeldt on my behalf for the books and tell him I hope to get *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny* from him *in Zurich*.

P.P.S. I will arrive, probably, before 10th-11th; maybe 7th-9th.

Written January 30, 1916
Sent from Berne to Zurich

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Printed from the original

453
TO KARL RADEK

I personally consider that with the appearance of *Gazeta Robotnicza* (II.1916) our joint struggle in Russian and Polish affairs is *ruled out*. Not because of the "attack" on the "defeatists" (this is only a symptom), but in view of the resolution of the P.S.D. on Russian affairs.[415] If the P.S.D. in February 1916 does not come out openly and definitely for a split in Russia, then this is merely a preparation for another 16.VII.1914.

And so, in my opinion—a struggle in the Russian, Polish and German press—and (I, at least, am for it) joint actions in Switzerland (where the national question is not at all an urgent one, and it should therefore *as far as possible* be kept separate).

As this is my own personal opinion, I am sending *all* your letters to Grigory.

Written after February 1, 1916
Sent from Berne to a local address

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

454
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Liebe Freunde,

Please send me *as quickly as you can. Tagwacht* containing Radek's articles on Gorter and *two* articles about the Australian labour movement. I am also waiting for the proof-sheets (1) of my articles in the C.O. and (2) of the German theses (do *not* print them until you receive my reply: I am considering another little amendment).*

* This refers to the theses "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 143-56).—*Ed.*

I am also waiting for your article for the C.O. and an exact plan of the issue.

Please give my address to Radek and ask him from me to send me the *promised* cutting from *Vorwärts* of 12.I.1916 (Rühle's article on the split and the editors' reply). I am lecturing here on Wednesday, so I have very little time. There is tongue-wagging here about the position of the "5 secretaries"* being desperate (Russia against them) and their only hope is that Chkheidze will lift his voice from the "rostrum", crying: *for* Zimmerwald!!

Beste Grüße!

Ihr *Lenin*

Written February 12, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

455

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I know that you are interested in science, and not in politics. Nevertheless your sympathies, I have no doubt about it, are with France. The split among the German socialists, as one French minister expressed it, is not a matter of indifference to France. Therefore we must help inform the Russians as well as the French about this. Otto Rühle, M.P., plumped in *Vorwärts* for a split. But it should definitely be added: not "only" Otto Rühle, but also the *group* of International Socialists of Germany (*l'Humanité*, too, wrote about it). Please insert this when next writing to Petrograd. And also the following: *only* Otto Rühle and the International Socialists of Germany declared plainly for a split and against the "marsh"; as to the *Internationale* group (the German group of whom also *Homo* wrote in *l'Humanité*: a beauty of a newspaper!)—this group is

* This refers to the Secretariat Abroad of the Mensheviks' O.C.—*Ed.*

wavering: the majority in it are clearly turning back to the marsh. This is obvious from this group's recent "theses"[416] and from the press statements of Ströbel in *Neue Zeit* and from the newspaper *Die Gleichheit*.[417] So don't forget to add this! Science is everything to you, but a little sympathy towards France, *a lot* of sympathy, I should say, you undoubtedly have!

Salutations cordiales!

Lenin

Written February 26, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

456

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I have sent *Self-Defence*.[418]

I agree that No. 52 has to be issued, and I undertake to write an article on the tasks of the conference of 23/IV[419] (or on the "peace programme", etc.—generally on the editorial subject of immediate tasks).*

Nadya has translated the Manifesto.[420] I shall send it to you in a day or two, and you send me the MSS. of the articles and paragraphs you are writing for No. 52. We shall prepare everything in manuscript and then hand it all in to be, set up.

The article reporting the meeting of 5-8.II should be cut and a paragraph inserted about *Orn*. in Nos. 51 and 52 of *Nashe Slovo*[421] and about *Nashe Slovo* generally (I am writing this).

Send a cutting from *Dyen*** about our victory in the insurance councils (*and ask* Kasparov, also Abram and others, to follow *Novoye Vremya* and *other newspapers* and collect everything there is about this).

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* Lenin wrote the article "The Peace Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 161-68).—*Ed.*

** I have *only* the cutting from *Rech*.

It is very important to find out whether Chkheidze spoke about *Zimmerwald* in the Duma. I read his speech *only* as reported in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*: there *isn't a word* there about Zimmerwald. Try, through Radek, to trace Chkheidze's speech in the Social-Democratic press of Germany *as fully as possible* (Martov & Co. speculate on what Chkheidze said or is going to say *for* Zimmerwald).

I am drawing up the theses for our "Antrag" for 23/IV on the "peace programme".

Should we enlist Radek's co-operation for this job? I don't think we should. Radek is behaving so meanly! *I still** haven't got *many* copies of the theses, and I find it *repugnant* to write to Radek, seeing that he is *out for* squabbles.

Why didn't you answer whether you sent my insertion to the theses to be set up? You could have handed it in to the printing shop *yourself* and get the proofs from there (and **order** *many* copies: oh, to hell with him, that Dreckseele von Radek!). We have the *right*, as authors, to order the proofs of the theses.

We must get from Grimm *Bulletin* No. 3,[422] *as many copies as we can*, both French and German, and send them out *everywhere*, including *all* our groups abroad. *Here too*.

You did *not* send me the issue of *Berner Tagwacht* carrying the resolution of the *Bremen* people, and you don't send the paper at all, and I don't get it here.[423]

What does Abramovich write about the publication of the *French Internationale Flugblätter* No. 1 in La Chaux-de-Fonds? What arrangements have been made?

Salut!

Lenin

P.S. Rybalka called on me in Geneva and said that *all* the *Dzvin* people[424] have gone out for patriotism, which will be dealt with in No. 6 of *Borotba*.[425] (Have you Nos. 1-5?) Levinsky, on the other hand, says that Rybalka is simply lying!!??

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* It was promised 10.II.1916!! The work is suffering terribly. It is simply *outrageous*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Send the Lettish material.[426] What is to be done with it? Shall we publish it, and how?

Written between March 2 and 25, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

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457
TO HENRIETTE ROLAND-HOLST

8/III. 1916

Dear Comrade,

Excuse me for not having answered your letter earlier. I have been lecturing in various towns of Switzerland.

I thank you very much for your friendly reply. I shall be very pleased if our collaboration proceeds without any friction.

Frankly speaking, there was never any question about you and Comrade Pannekoek being "decent people", as you term it. What worried us was the sudden change in the *editorial regulations*. Under the first draft we were given editorial rights (Editorial Board = a union between your group (you + Trotsky) *and* the "Zimmerwald Left"; and in the bureau of this Left, as you know, we had two votes out of the three: Radek's, Zinoviev's and my own). With the change in the draft we lost our editorial rights and became mere contributors. Of course, we could not challenge your right to draw up the regulations. But it is only natural—is it not?—that we, as contributors, should nevertheless wish to have certain *guarantees of our rights*.

I trust the matter is now clear and definitely settled.

Immediately on receipt of your letter I gave orders to the forwarding office to send you our organ (*Sotsial-Demokrat—non-periodical*; Nos. 33-51 were issued since the beginning of the war). Are you receiving it?

I take this opportunity to discuss important questions relating to our collaboration.

(1) Our theses (on the right to self-determination)* were sent to you by Radek (please forward them on to Gorter too; I am writing to him about this in detail in connection with his pamphlet). I consider the Dutch-Polish standpoint to be altogether erroneous theoretically and a result of the policy of the small states practically. Cannot our joint struggle against old and new *annexations* (what are annexations?) draw us somewhat closer together? The German, English and Russian standpoint is after all more important (and objectively *more correct*) than the Dutch and Polish! Gorter demands "national independence" for the Dutch East Indies. Very good! But this is *precisely* the right to self-determination!! If Kautsky and the Russian Kautskyites (including Trotsky) present the question wrongly, this is only another argument against the Kautskyites! (If you are interested in this question, ask Gorter to send you my letter. I shall be very pleased to discuss this question more fully with the Dutch Marxists.)

(2) The German group *Die Internationale*. Have you read their theses in No. 3 of Grimm's *Bulletin*?[427]

In my opinion this is a decisive step to the *right* after the first issue of the journal *Die Internationale*. Not a word against the Kautskian Centre—and that is the main thing for the German party. Not a word about the split (Otto Rühle is quite right—and they keep silent about this *after his article*!!). Not a word about *obvious* methods of struggle—about the *illegal* organisation, etc.

And the phrase: "in the era of imperialism there can no longer be national wars"! This is theoretically false. Colonial wars *are* national wars. (India against Britain, etc.) This—practically—is *chauvinism*: we representatives of the Great Powers *forbid* the oppressed peoples to wage national wars!!

My conclusion is this: *Die Internationale* wishes to *come to an agreement* with the Kautskyites. These theses cannot be interpreted in any other way. On top of it all, Ströbel in *Neue Zeit lauds* Bernstein![428] Zetkin in *Gleichheit*

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* See V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (present edition Vol. 22, pp. 143-56). —*Ed*.

is *against* the Zimmerwald Left: diplomatic phrase against "Bolshevik sectarianism" (!!). A phrase worded so diplomatically that no one can understand *where* our "sectarianism" comes in!! Zetkin stands for "aurea mediocritas" between Ledebour and the Zimmerwald Left. But *how* this is to be achieved—of this not a word. What is our mistake? —so far, not a word about it, not a single line in Switzerland, where there is no censorship.

How else can you account for it, other than as a desire to come to an agreement with Kautsky & Co.?

(3) The "draft" (*Bulletin* No. 3) drawn up by you and the S.D.P. strikes me as being a very bad one.[429] Not even Radek could defend this draft. Why this curtailment of the Party's Programme? The programme of socialist revolution? Today there is no need for it—and such a programme lacks a point dealing with the conquest of political power. In such a programme §6 (A) and §5 (B) are very odd; §6 (B), too, sounds queer: it is precisely in the event of a socialist revolution that we shall have need of a militia to *defend* the new order. We are not pacifists, are we? We cannot count on a victory simultaneously all over the world (without civil wars? without wars?)! The colonial programme is absent altogether.

Only in the event of our being *quite sure* that we are right on the threshold of *such* a revolution shall we need such a programme—but even then it would have to be formulated quite differently.

Today, however, we need something quite different: the labour movement needs clear views on the necessity of breaking with the social-chauvinists and Kautskyites, on the illegal organisation, on the means and methods of mass struggle, etc.

(4) We shall soon send you our theses to points 5-8 of the agenda of the second conference.* It would be a very good thing if we could come to an agreement—on some of the points, if not on all of them.

(5) What are our differences with Trotsky? This must-

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* See "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 169-79).—*Ed.*

probably interest you. In brief—he is a Kautskyite, that is, he stands for unity with the Kautskyites in the International and with Chkheidze's parliamentary group in Russia. We are absolutely against such unity. Chkheidze with his phrases (that he is for Zimmerwald: see his recent speech, *Vorwärts* 5/III) *cloaks* the fact that he shares the views of the *Organising Committee* and of the people *taking part in the war committees*.* Trotsky at present is against the Organising Committee (Axelrod and Martov) but for unity with the Chkheidze Duma group!!

We are decidedly against.

With best regards to you, Comrade Pannekoek and the other Dutch comrades!

Yours,
N. Lenin

My address is: Wl. Ulianow
Spiegelgasse. 12.
(Schuhladen Kammerer)
Zürich. I.

P.S. Is there any truth in the newspaper reports about the connections between the *New Review* (New York) and *Vorbote* (see *Internationale Korrespondenz*[430] No. 69)?

Don't you think it would be essential to put out No. 2 of *Vorbote* in March?

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Printed from the original
Translated from the German

458
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am very glad that arrangements have been made with Grimm.

I hope he is also publishing the *Statement Against the Organising Committee Secretariat Abroad*.[431] You say nothing about it! Please answer.

* Meaning the war industries committees.—*Ed.*

I asked you *twice* about *Sukhanov*'s pamphlet, but you do not answer (whether you sent it to Olga).

What about *Vorbote* No. 2? When is it coming out? Will there be criticism of the *Internationale* resolutions?

N.B. || If there will, may I see it in the *manuscript*?

I have not seen the Junius *yet*[432]; couldn't you send it? (I'll try Platten.)

What questions haven't I answered? *I wrote* to Kollontai and will write again.

(If you happen to see the MSS. for *Vorbote* couldn't you send them here for half a day?)

Salut!
Lenin

Written after March 16, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

459
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending copy to be set up. I am finishing the article on the "peace programme", etc. (for the editorial), and will send it in tomorrow.*

The I.S.C.'s "Appeal" should be supplemented by a *brief* notice of the agenda, the terms of admission, etc.[433]

We absolutely cannot disclose the *pseudonym* of "Spartacus".[434] We *absolutely* cannot; it would mean helping *Internationale Korrespondenz* to reprint it *from us*: we would be *helping* the informers.

Our "reservation", statement (5-8. II) we made when voting *for* the circular, must be inserted fully and *without fail*.

* A reference to the article "The Peace Programme" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 161-68).—*Ed.*

"Crooks of the pen" won't do. I suggest amendments (pp. *1*, *2*, *3*).[435] This should be written with a minimum of invective, in an elaborately *explanatory* way. It would be a good thing to enumerate the facts, *collect the references* of the O.C. Secretariat Abroad (No. 2 of the *Bulletin*) (+No. 3 of *Izvestia*) to *Samara*, the *Caucasus*, *Nad*, etc., and **show** that in Russia all the O.C. people are participants. I strongly advise having this article rewritten *another 2 or 3 times*, and *sent to me again*, in order to make it a good and accurate exposition: this is *extremely important*.

Give *Self-Defence* to Shklovsky, Kasparov & Co. for 2-3 days, then return to me *at once*.

I still have no copies (of the German theses on self-determination). When is this going to end???

If Radek is holding up No. 2 of *Vorbote*, this is *foul play* on his part. We must think over **ways** of combating this. Should we not send a collective letter to Roland-Holst? Why not? Why should we stand on ceremony with him? This is a broken promise, we'll say, it's bad for the business, it's bad faith, it's an obstacle to the discussion *for* the April conference, precisely *at* the conference!

Return my theses (on peace, etc.) to me **immediately:** I have to redraft them. You had better **not** show them to Radek *until* they have been redrafted.

Salut!
Lenin

Why don't you send me *Nashe Golos*?[436] I haven't seen it since Martov's "self-determination" articles. Has the promised answer to him appeared there?

What about the Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left? Didn't it have to prepare a report to the April conference?[437] And the theses?? What about it?

Written after March 19, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

460

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending the theses.*

They still have to be corrected—return them *as soon as possible*.

We *must rush things*: when we have finished them, let Zina type them** in 4-5 copies (will she do it?) for immediate dispatch to France, England, Sweden, etc.

Next, they have to be translated immediately into German (perhaps you will do it and I'll show them to Kharitonov and then to Platten) (we shall type them ourselves) and *published*. The same in French (for the Italians and French).

All the Left-wingers and their sympathisers should be able to see and discuss them a few weeks before the conference. The Dutch too.

Give them to Radek, **but for not more than half a day** for copying. Otherwise I absolutely don't agree!!

We shall give them to Grimm for publication in No. 4*** of the *Bulletin*. If he doesn't publish them+the protest (Martov vs. Chkheidze), he *won't get a kopek*.[438]

Chkheidze's speech *has been published*. It is reported in **Vorwärts:** *for* "the Zimmerwald decision and peace without annexations". Apparently *not a word* against Gvozdyovism[439]!!!

In the protest I'll drive this home hard.

Return the postcards.

Salut!

Lenin

Written after March 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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* This refers to "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 169-79).—*Ed*.

** On one side, close spacing no margins.

*** Find out what the *deadline* is—20 or 25.III? Perhaps we should write officially, asking whether we correctly understood it to be before 30.III and that we consider the *space* in *Bulletin* No. 4 engaged?

461
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I forgot to insert a passage in both the *theses* and the *article* on "The Peace Programme", and inserted it must be *without fail*.

Find a place for it (I haven't got the rough copy) and *be sure* to insert it:

> The only unconditional demand which the Social-Democrats can put forward as a programme of peace without playing into the hands of the opportunists is: *repudiation of war debts*. And we put this forward in connection with the revolutionary struggle of the masses.*

Salut!
Lenin

Written March 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

462
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I had a translation of the Dutch "Annullierung der Staatsschulden".** State debts can be used instead of war debts: I don't see any great difference.

How to punish the "concierges"? Their share in the *total* debt is insignificant, and they *could* be assigned a *pension* from the state treasury (if they served a long time as concierges).

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 167 and 176.—*Ed.*

** "Cancellation of State Debts" (the heading to Point 1 of the draft programme of the Revolutionary Socialist League and the Social-Democratic Party of Holland published in the *Bulletin of the I.S.C.* No. 3 for February 29, 1916).—*Ed.*

If you still "have doubts", don't insert it, *or hold up the issue for a couple of days*. I think *this* Dutch point, as an exception, is *suitable* for a "peace programme" (we could add) as it contains the only positive demand *in connection with the revolution* or the mass struggle (did I insert this—I don't remember?)... should be....

It would be awkward if we inserted it *afterwards* and there were **no** mention of it in the C.O.'s article *on this subject*. We had better hold it over for a couple of days and discuss it by letter.

I shall fix things up about the Wiener *Arbeiter-Zeitung* and make inquiries about Tyszka (maybe he is in *Schriften des Vereins für Sozial-Politik*?).

Re arrangements with Alexander (he has gone to Norway, where A. K. is, and *now* we must put the pressure on him *as hard as we can*).

I simply cannot agree to I+II about *Kommunist*.

Your arguments are most inconsistent.

..."Only manoeuvre away"? ... If so, why risk the *business*?

"We're to blame for getting tied up with an old woman".... Of course! But those who are to blame are the first to make amends. What logic is it to say: I am to blame, *therefore* I do *not* make amends!!!

I don't consider myself "to blame": at that time a bloc *was* useful. I made it. *Today* it is *harmful*. I *shall be* to blame if I don't change it.

My *business* reasons you haven't even touched on: squabbles among the staff (on **3** points), complaints to the C. C.; letters to the editors; letters to *Nashe Slovo* (Bronski's, perhaps Radek's, etc.) ΣΣ=squabbles instead of business.

And over what? Over the "name"?? It's ridiculous.

I have received *N. I.*'s answer to the theses: sheer *piggery*, not a single well-thought-out word.

With Alexander the matter must be put as a point of **principle**: *after* No. 1-2 *they* came out with "differences". Equality (or a place) in the Editorial Board *cannot* be granted under *such* differences. It is inadmissible. N. I.'s old waverings on this question (of democracy) should be collected and it should be demanded that they think everything over, digest it, and write giving the reasons for all their *differences* for the C.C. (a small pamphlet). Not for

publication, but for the C.C. We shall examine it and *reject* it, meanwhile on with *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.[440]

Salut.
Answer.

Written March 20 or 21, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

463
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I have just (8 p.m.) received your postcard. I definitely insist on the insertion: "repudiation of *state* debts".

Only today I saw an article in *Berner Tagwacht* standing for this demand. And not a word there about petty proprietors, concierges, etc. Why should we worry about them. Simply say: "for the sake of the revolution and in connection with it—cancellation of payment on *all* state debts"—that is the only serious blow at finance capital, the only guarantee of a "democratic peace". Unattainable without a revolution? Certainly. This is no argument *against* such a point, but an argument *for* revolution.

Certainly. There isn't the shadow of any reason to disagree with the Dutch and *Berner Tagwacht on this score*.

Tomorrow I shall be sending you a long letter.*

They haven't got Tyszka 19*12* here; only 19*14* (Löhne,** etc.), this can be had in Berne, too, in *Schriften des Vereins für Sozial-Politik*. Band 145.

Salut,
Lenin

Written March 21, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

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* This letter has not been traced.—*Ed.*
** Wages.—*Ed.*

464
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending an addition (O. Rühle and Liebknecht)—I think it *must* be squeezed in, to mark the *historical* words of Liebknecht.

I am sending a draft of cuts covering 37 lines. I trust you will find where to make more cuts in order to squeeze in Rühle and Liebknecht.*

"Strekoza" *in any case* must be thrown out, as 1) it is not the thing; 2) we must wait (since it is not only a matter of Trotsky, but plus *La Vie Ouvrière*: for them it may be progress).[441]

3) We had better deal with Trotsky in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*; he has to be dealt with at greater length.

Salut,
Lenin

Be sure to send the theses to Grimm *personally* (it would be a good idea to invite him for a *talk* on this).

I am considering another insertion to the theses. Let me know *in good time* when they are made up.

APPENDIX TO LETTER

Otto Rühle and Karl Liebknecht

Rühle in *Vorwärts* of 12/I. 1916 openly declared for a *split* in the party. Liebknecht, in his speech of 16/III. 1916 in the Prussian Landtag, openly called on "those fighting in the trenches" to "*lower their rifles and turn against the common enemy*", for which he was not allowed to finish his speech. Which Russian Social-Democrats, then, displayed "factionalism"—those who stood for the Bolshevik slogans—the only consistent slogans—of civil war and a split with opportunism? Or those who denied the obvious correctness

* See appendix to letter.—*Ed.*

of these slogans, to which the course of events is leading the internationalists in *all* countries?

Written prior to March 23, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published: the letter—in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49
the appendix—March 25, 1916, in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 52

The letter printed from the original; the appendix printed from the text of *Sotsial-Demokrat*

465
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Pokrovsky's proposal should of course be accepted.[442] I am sitting down to work (the library here is better, especially in latest economic literature. If it is possible to have the proof-sheets of the new catalogue for a couple of days—or at least for Sunday—try and get them for me).

Have Pokrovsky answer *me* and you *officially* that the terms have been *accepted* (N. B. send me his old letters concerning format and so on); re the deadline *let him say nothing* (I daresay I can manage it by V or VI).

I *haven't* seen Rakovsky's speech or the *I.S.D. pamphlet on the 21/XII minority*.[443] Send me *both*.

Send me *25* impressions *as soon as* you can.

I am sending you the proof-sheets of the theses.* Have accepted one of your amendments. Regarding *non-membership of the party*, I *absolutely* disagree. 1) Reread the preceding text, 2) read Austerlitz and K. Kautsky in *Neue Zeit* (3.III.1916) and you will see at once that you are wrong. We, the *Editorial Board*, must declare outright that we do **not** *consider* it compatible with membership of the party—only in this way shall we be drawing a *correct* Trennungslinie** *precisely* with the chauvinists, precisely with *Martov* (+Plekhanov)+*Axelrod* & Co., who *cannot* accept our for-

* The theses of the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*: "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 143-56).—*Ed.*

** Dividing line.—*Ed.*

mulation. As for Bukharin he will think it over *and accept*. A bet?

Salut!

Lenin

N.B. Could you get *Chemnitzer Volksstimme* for at least 2 days? Please try!! If you can't, send me *its* address and the *No*. of the issue (containing this article) and the date; I shall order it.

Written between March 23 and 25, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

466

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

In your version of the "history" of "disagreements" there are factual inaccuracies. For instance, before my departure from Berne, and *not* at our last meeting, we discussed this point, and I not only did not "let it drift past my ears", but answered at length and *repeatedly*, and you did not indicate *by a single word*, neither then nor a whole month later, that this question was still an open one to you, that it was in the form of an ultimatum, etc. But, of course, if you are bent on "squabbles", in one form or another, then you have no interest in the facts, and I am in no position to prevent you. It is left for me to choose one of the two alternatives you propose. I choose the first. Put my signature to it and print (25) impressions as quickly as you can, for it is extremely difficult to get in touch with the Lefts at such short notice. Your "private statement" will be printed, of course, not in the C.O. but in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* simultaneously with the publication of the *Russian* text.

Salut,

Lenin

Written after March 23, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

467
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

We have just received your postcard, and I hasten to answer it, as the P. O. will soon close. You are not very pleased with the "crowd" of Samovarchik's friends,[444] but this young "crowd" is *in raptures* over you: that's what Samovarchik himself writes in *their* own words. I congratulate you heartily on the *success* and wish you still more of it in future. You are not interested in politics, but you do sympathise with France: we have *excellent* information concerning the split among the German socialists and on how things are going with the International Socialists of Germany. This news is *in favour of* France.

I wish you again all the very best. I congratulate you on your success and send my best regards—so does Olga.

Yours,
Lenin

Written March 31, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Paris

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

468
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Although I know your tendency towards swift "changes of mood" and fretfulness, I never thought it could go to *such lengths*.... I never thought you would believe the cock-and-bull story (whose?) about Kaltstellung!!* I answered *all* Alexander's letters; I wrote him *three times* (my 2nd letter must have gone astray in Sweden and the 3rd has probably not reached him yet). It is absurd to speak about

* Cold shoulder.—*Ed.*

Kaltstellung, when you *beg* a man to write and *he* refuses (not a word about the *composition* of the "collegium" he has appointed...) and all he does is either threaten or get angry: "to America"??? What does this dream mean??

Not a word about going to Russia, but he finds his tongue to talk about America?! Naturally, in this mood of his, it would be useful to try and have it out with him, but that would have been timely if he were going to Russia. Now, however, the deed is done.

Did Radek promise you the theses 1) his own on self-determination, and when? 2) His theses of the Leftists were promised for Saturday; today is Tuesday....

What is the deadline for the Russian No. of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, i.e., the one with the article on Chkhenkeli?[445]

Salut,
Lenin

Written April 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

469

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending the theses. *Additions*, see pp. *21* and *22* (they must be inserted in German too).

I don't agree with you about Alexander. Unless we see eye to eye (you and me) *I shall abstain*, and you can resolve by one vote that "we have decided to call him".

(1) To show him at the conference would be his *undoing*. That is clear. In Sweden and Norway the Russian Government has no sleuths, but here the place is alive with them. Martov & Co. will tell the world.

I am absolutely against his appearing at the conference. I do not abstain, I am against.

(2) *Alexander himself is demanding* a man to be sent to Russia (I shall write to Ludmila).

(3) Since *Alexander* is **not** going, we should *wait a bit* and call him *on the eve of his* departure. Otherwise it will all be *to no purpose*.

(4) There is no need to hurry, all the more as *Alexander* will be influenced by *Kievsky*; we must bide our time, exchange letters, etc. (By hastening Alexander's arrival you will be **hastening** his going over to Bukharin & Co., because Alexander is now all worked up. But if we wait a bit, the C.O. will come out, correspondence will be developed with Mme. *Kievsky*, I shall make up a set of documents concerning the vacillations of Bukharin & Co. and *Alexander* will have time to think and see where *Bukharin & Co.* are heading, what mess they are getting themselves into.)

To send for Alexander *now* will mean *fighting* him *now*. What for? Over what? If he is not going, we have **nothing** to fight over. (We shall receive contacts through conciliator James, etc.) (James, of course, is to blame.)

What about Radek's theses?

We must wait a bit with the No. on self-determination, *if Vorbote* No. 2 comes out before the conference. It is *extremely* important to squelch Radek's theses *right away*. Radek's whipping is inevitable, and on his corpore vili we can "*save a good deal*" of the whipping of the Stockholmers.

Find out exactly **when** Kedrov is going.* Is he still in Berne? Is his wife in Lausanne?

I advise **extreme** caution with the Bundist!!! Guardez-vous!

Salut,

Lenin

Written after April 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* This refers to Kedrov's proposed trip to Russia.—*Ed.*

470

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Of course, Dolgolevsky must be sent 100 frs. *immediately*. Do it. Ryazanov had promised to write to Kautsky about Dolgolevsky.

I am also writing to Ryazanov about Greulich.

Please keep a close eye on the issue of the *Bulletin* (so that I get it *immediately*: it is extremely important that I should have it immediately for my *talk* with the *local Lefts*). Try and get the *proofs* of our Stellungnahme* on some excuse and send them to me *as quickly as possible*.

I sent you a large packet today.

Salut,
Lenin

N.B. Answer: did you send Sukhanov to the Karpinskys?

Written April 10, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

471

TO G. L. PYATAKOV, YEVGENIA BOSH, N. I. BUKHARIN[446]

It is no use your trying, in your letter, to ignore the main thing, not daring to deny a fact of which you are only too well aware. Namely, that the organisation was based (provisionally) on the principle of *federation*—this was reiterated by us in every possible way as clear as clear can be. Your long speeches do not alter this a whit. And further, that this

* "Die Stellungnahme des Zentral-Komitees der S.D.A.P. Russlands zu der Tagesordnung der zweiten internationalen sozialistischen Konferenz" (published April 22 1916, in *Bulletin I.S.K.* No. 4; published in Russian on June 10, 1916, in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 54-55 under the heading "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference") (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 169-79).—*Ed.*

principle was abnormal, anti-Party. This, too, was stated. And this is the crux of the matter.

Abnormality was tolerable as a temporary measure in the interests of agreement. After your removal it appears that you came to an agreement, all three, on the "theses",[447] for which we can bear no responsibility either directly or indirectly, not even recognise any proximity to them, leave alone equality, in our Party.

If you wish to persist in them and in such an "agreement" and in federation, we can only regret it.

You ask about contributions—to what journal? *Kommunist* has been suspended owing to breach of the temporary agreement. That means to a new journal? That is, to yours, on the *basis* of the "theses"? We cannot contribute and shall be compelled to fight it, since we find your attitude to the Party's Programme (§ 9) to be not only wrong and harmful, but frivolous. Really, during 8 months of agreement and life together you *three never once* drew a pen on this question, which has a 12-year history within the Party, *never once made a statement* in the Editorial Board of the C.O., *never once attempted* to refer back to Party literature, etc.

Your arguments for a "free" journal (free from the Party Programme? from the central bodies of the Party?) are just as frivolous, if not worse—anti-Party.

If you wish to persist in the theses, we (1) are prepared to publish them and (2) we are *bound* to give our opinion: publish them yourselves (if you do not want us to do it) and furnish them with a discussion pamphlet in which all three of you could make clear to the Party your motives.

P.S. You write that the question of money is "unpleasant". Not always. When money is treated in a true Party manner, it is a pleasant thing to the Party. When money is used as a *weapon against* the Party, it is indeed "unpleasant", even worse than unpleasant.

Written after April 10, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

472
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Today I *sent* you a *parcel*.

(1) I am sending our theses; whole sentences have been *omitted* from them. Please insert them *immediately* (you have the rough copy) and return to me *at once* (for Platten).

(2) Have you another copy? I am afraid Grimm may let us down. That will leave us *without* our theses on the eve of the conference, and *at* the conference!!

(3) I am a bit uncertain whether it is worth while my going to the conference. There is no mandate (from the Letts) and there probably won't be. To attend as a "guest" would be rather awkward, I'm afraid; I may be turned away for all I know (the decision of the 5-8.II. 1916 meeting is not binding on the conference).[448]

What does Radek say to this?

(4) Is Radek "hiding" Fröhlich or not? *A number* of meetings of the Lefts and *formal* conferences are needed.

(5) Fröhlich and others will be *arrested* (I assure you) if they live in Berne. It is our duty to tell Fröhlich and the others: if you *don't* want to be arrested, go to some secluded nook (somewhere *near* the conference; Grimm should tell *them* where it will be); that's the only way to avoid arrest. And a meeting of the *Lefts* could be arranged there.

Talk it over with Radek and Fröhlich (what about the Serb?* You say nothing about him) and let me know.

(6) The Ledebourites, that is the Kautskyites, will probably mess up the *whole* conference!! *Everyone* will be looking at them!!

How many will there be from the I.S.D.? 2 (Fr.+....**)?

And from the *Internationale*?

(7) We must be prepared to *fight* Martov and Axelrod over the mandate. Do you undertake to collect material *point by point* of No. 2 of the *Bulletin* (from *Nash Golos*+ *Self-Defence*+Chkheidze's and Chkhenkeli's speeches and so on?)? If you do, you must start *at once*.

---

* This refers to Katzlerowitch, a representative of the Serbian Social-Democrats.—*Ed.*

** One word in the manuscript is illegible.—*Ed.*

(8) A French translation of our theses ought to be made (Inessa will probably agree), for I don't think Grimm will do it.

Salut,
Lenin

Written after April 18, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

473
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am not sending this by express, as it would only waken you, according to my reckoning, without appreciably saving any time.

I quite agree with you about *inviting* the French and promising 50 frs.

Advise the Brest people to travel *via* George: it is important that he and we should "intercept" them first instead of Grimm (if possible it would be good to do the same with the Parisians[449]).

I haven't had time yet to read the indictment.[450] I shan't be long.

If you like, I'll send you Sukhanov's new pamphlet, if you promise me Junius* (for 1½ day at least. Get it from Radek, but **don't mention** me). Neither Platten nor Nobs have it.

It would be extremely useful *for the cause* for Alexander first to work a little in England. It is *dangerous* at present to go to Russia, we shall be ruining a good man (in Sweden as well as in Russia). Coming here just now is harmful, since he and you will not be able to restrain yourselves, and we shall only be *sullying* a valuable man at the conference. Besides, in a month or two he will be much more

* A reference to the pamphlet by Junius (Luxemburg), *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie*, Zurich, 1916.—*Ed.*

useful in Russia, and by that time many *important* things will be cleared up and revealed.

Salut,
Lenin

P.S. He will have a "rest" only by working in England. Inaction will only wear him out.

N.B.: P.S. If Grimm does not publish the protest, we must find that out *at once* and *publish* it ourselves, *altering the text*.[451]

P.P.S. Where are the other theses of Radek's for the Zimmerwald Left agreement and **when** shall we have them???

Written after April 18, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

474

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

(1) *Vorbote* obviously will not come out before the conference. It is necessary *immediately to order as many* printed copies of our theses as possible. And quickly too.

(2) Have you made the insertions in German?

(3) *I don't know* what material *I* have to collect. You should collect it and write to me what is missing. Otherwise nothing will come of it.

(4) Send me the proofs of the protest against Martov.

(5) I know nothing about the Scandinavians.[452] Two letters have been sent to Kollontai. There is little hope after the events in Stockholm

(6) My personal finances are not altogether hopeless: whence these "false rumours"???

(7) Did you receive the parcel?

(8) Will you send the German theses (the corrected copy) which I have sent you?

(9) I cannot come on Friday. I have a lot of work to do and I am very late with it.

Since Radek has no theses and there are no hopes of coming to an agreement with him (on the question of annexations and the right to self-determination), the "bureau" *for the time being* is useless. It will be useful in the evening on the 2nd day of the conference, when the composition will have become clear.

(10) Can't you give me a more exact address besides the name of the village you have given me?[453]

The collection of material for the war with Martov is very important.

Attend to this carefully and *in good time*, otherwise we shall be late in finding the missing material.

Salut,
Lenin

Written April 18, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

475
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Radek has no grounds whatever for taking offence, and this should be explained to him calmly and at length. You should arrange the meeting with him as quickly as possible (without waiting for me) (in order to reassure him). You can certainly represent the C.C. at this meeting, as you generally represent the C.C. in Berne. We have *long* been corresponding about your conferring with Radek in regard to the theses.

The situation is what it was before Zimmerwald: we have our own "resolutions", but we do not reject a *Left bloc*.

I shall try to come straight to Kienthal (try to find out the name of the hotel—there are only two or three of them there).

I'm terribly angry at not having received Junius!

Salut,
Lenin

Written between April 18 and 24, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

476
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

The S.R.s should be answered with a *refusal*. "We cannot advise unity." Have they given an address for a reply? (Be sure to leave a copy.)

I am writing to Alexander, but, of course, not the way you have "modified" our arrangement, but the way it was: (1) the old agreement is cancelled; (2) the Editorial Board of the C.O. edits *in agreement*, from issue to issue, *with the publishers*; (3) publication in Berne.*

You write the letter to the comrades concerning the conference of 25-29.IV[454]—you have more material (by the way, please send me our resolution, the joint one with Radek which he read out at the plenary meeting: I need it badly).

Use the same letter perhaps to make a draft appeal for the French (as discussed with Inessa). I *can't* get it right.

Did Meyer & Co. propose voting the Leitsätze** at the *Erweiterten Kommission*?[455]

I shall go to Lausanne and Geneva to lecture but *not* on the conference, so this won't interfere with you.[456]

I agree to a No. of the C.O. on the conference.[457] Send me distribution of the articles. A paragraph on Martov's deceit of the *International* must go in.

I did *not* receive Rybalka.

Salut,
Lenin

* A reference to the conditions for continued publication of the journal *Kommunist*.—*Ed.*

** Theses.—*Ed.*

N.B. P.S. Natanson told me that they are considering a rapprochement with *those* of their "defencists" who say: *first* revolution, *then* defence. Ask him (in your reply) *whether he would care to inform us about the results of their talks*.

Written between May 2 and June 2, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

477
TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

16.V. 1916

Dear Alexander,

The conditions in *my* letter* were put forward not for diplomacy and not for bargaining, but as a last attempt. Since these conditions have not been fully accepted, I consider that the agreement has not gone through. This is now final. It is no use talking and writing about this any more. These people confirm my worst suppositions—a desire to hide behind Radek, without working on their own, and to shuffle responsibility off onto me!!

This is the end!

Write me more fully about your trip. Isn't there any work *anywhere* in Scandinavia? Unbelievable!

I shall write you at greater length in a day or two. Nadya has written to the Distributing Committee[458] many times, and they answered her that *everything* has been sent to you.

We are writing again.

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 36, p. 390.—*Ed.*

478

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

It is *absolutely* essential to send the text *itself* to Kamenev *again* and *get* his reply, *also by letter*, and not merely by telegraph.[459] The matter is extremely important, the slightest carelessness is harmful. Better *a bit later*, but more solidly.

The *Kienthal* No. *cannot* be put out without publishing *our* Stellungnahme from the *Bulletin*.

Written prior to May 17, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

479

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

You are 1,000 times wrong about the Japs. Let them publish separately in their *own name*. We can't have them shuffling off the responsibility for this folly *upon us*: let them answer for it themselves. I am *for* a discussion, but not for an agreement with the *Editorial Board* of "imperialist Economists", and I shall have *nothing whatever* to do with such a journal, as I have written many a time.

This must be put an end to. It's no use dragging it out. We must announce *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.

About the Distributing Committee, there can be no question of having it transferred here. We have no one here, while in Berne we have Zina + Inessa (how *could* you allow her to leave?? I'm surprised!!) + Shklovsky + Ilyin + Karpinsky + Kasparov. They must be organised and none of them allowed to leave.

I would like very much to get *Avanti!*, as I see it here only in the library. I have not seen what you write about.

We cannot promise A—der 100-150 frs.[460] You can't throw promises about and then find you haven't got the money ("pressure on the groups" are mere words). A six-month trip can only do good, as he won't be going home

before that in any case, and Norway is only a place for scandal.

The Stellungnahme should be put in, as the Manifesto and all the rest are *all poor*. We must show that we said this before *more exactly* and *fully*. This is more important than the article. How much space do the documents occupy (the Manifesto + theses + resolution on the I.S.B.)?[461] Write more precisely.

I shall send the material in a day or two.

And so, you have sent Sukhanov? At last you have answered, after 20 inquiries. I am so surprised at your punctuality that I am writing specially to Minin about it: hurray![462]

Salut,
Lenin

I have received *Demain* about the conference.[463] Have you got it?

P.S. Minin suggests publishing a collection of decisions of international congresses.[464] We already have 300 copies (on 70 pages) *up to 1904*. Add (paste in) 1904-12 and a preface. To be sold at 50 centimes. It will pay for itself.

I am for it. Answer.

Written May 17, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

480

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear A.,

I received your nervy letter[465] and hasten to answer you immediately. You have obviously been fretting a good deal. You have no reason to. Everything has been sent to you. If you haven't received anything, then one or another censor has not let it through. Zina assures me that she has sent you everything, and if she says she has, she has.

If the censor does not let things through, one must have

patience, patience, and persistence. Expect another letter from N. K.

I have read the material.[466] A lot of splendid stuff. Especially the article on the war industries committees. Altogether, the collector of this material has done a splendid job—my sincerest greetings to him again and again.

I have already written to you about the absolute necessity of terminating *all* talks with the Japs & Co. and I stand by this. *A year* (!!) *has passed* since "the differences", and the people have not been thinking, not been working, only hiding behind others' backs and talking scandal. If they still fail to understand that it is dishonest (to throw the responsibility onto *us*, for I am responsible if I form a bloc with an *Editorial Board* of muddleheaded views), then they are hopeless. And if they want to "publish" and bear the responsibility *themselves*, then let them publish the pamphlet themselves, they have the money; it's no use hiding behind others. Let them give an article to the C.O. *themselves*—we shall put it in!!

We must think *seriously* about Belenin,[467] please think of it, I beg you. The Japs are obviously incapable of doing transport work. Is there anybody else in the town* where Belenin recently was? Couldn't he give this job to some foreigner (they are better than the Russians: more reliable, if slower)? If Belenin is to go away, it shouldn't be for more than ½ year. It would be better though to find work in Copenhagen: I'm sure that's possible. How much does Belenin need a month to live on? *Answer*. Put off all personal cares and think, in the interests of the cause, how best Belenin can fix himself up for ½ year. Frankly, he will only wear his nerves thin among the Japs. They are shallow, mean people, really! I wish you all the best, and beg for two words of immediate reply.

Yours,
Lenin

Written May 19, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* Meaning Christiania.—*Ed.*

481
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I shall send you *Demain*.

I insist on Stellungnahme.*

Re the collection (on international congresses)—I do not agree, as the *Basle* resolution, for instance, is *missing*. That it will pay for itself, I have no doubt. It will be good both for the prisoners of war and for Party officials.

(Zina+ In.** etc.) If Inessa has not left the Distributing Committee, it would be absurd to talk about Berne not being able to handle distribution, simply absurd. Alexander is furious at not getting anything. *He must be sent it again registered* and sent in future registered.

About the Japs, you are entirely wrong. You don't want to understand that they are dodging a discussion, throwing the responsibility onto *me* and meanly hiding behind Radek. If they want a discussion, let them publish the pamphlet (and bear the responsibility *themselves*!!) or give an article for the C.O.—*we'll publish it*! For a year the scoundrels have been hedging, and you vacillate and indulge them. I shall have *nothing* to do with their editorial board or their collection and I repeat my proposal: that we put an end to this claptrap once for all.

About "guaranteeing A. for ½ year", I shall try to find out how much money he needs.*** This can't be decided at a guess. For "trips" and ½ year living it *won't* be enough; *one* trip has shown it. Transport went and will go without him through his agents. And since he is not going home, it will be more useful for him to go to America for ½ year than to sit doing nothing among idle riffraff and fret himself ill.

---

* See Document 479 in this volume.—*Ed.*

** Inessa.—*Ed.*

*** See Document 479 in this volume.—*Ed.*

Scandal-mongers & Co. would drive even a healthy man to distraction, and your plans do not serve the cause, they only do harm.

Salut,
Lenin

Written May 19, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

482
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Yuri's letter has made me very pessimistic ... it's a swindle.[468]

I don't agree with your amendments, and so I have decided for the time being to send my letter to Alexander without them* (for in bargaining one must not start small when dealing with such sordid hucksters).

I'm prepared to make concessions only in the discussion and income.

Change of name is essential, as it is of a *basically* different character (not what *Kommunist* wanted to be); besides, there are vital practical reasons for a change of name.

Alexander should not be put on the Editorial Board: this would mean calling *everything* into question and risking *falling out* with A. This is extremely harmful.

It will work *only* if we *here* have the majority. Otherwise it's of no use.

(If S'il vous plaît were to remove Yuri, that wouldn't be bad; but I doubt it.)

Send me Nash Golos containing the statement of Martov *& Co.*[469]

Salut,
Lenin

* See present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 393-96.—*Ed.*

I'm in a hurry. These few lines for the time being.

No time to go and post it.

Nadya suggests 2 editorial boards: an enlarged one and a narrow one (you and I+Bukharin). But this doesn't work out.

Written May 24, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

483
TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Dear A.,

I am sending you the Japs' draft. Apparently we won't get anywhere with them.

I answer briefly:

I absolutely reject what is crossed out.

I am prepared to make concessions

(1) in regard to 7 on the Editorial Board,

(2) 15% quota for the C.C.,

(3) place of publication,

if we agree on the rest, that is:

(1) 6th and 7th are co-opted by the Editorial Board of the C.O.,

(2) new name for the collection,

(3) agreement for *one* collection.

In regard to transport, etc., I trust you will make up an addendum to the agreement and insert it (they must definitely contribute towards transport, and this must definitely be inserted; without it, *you* can't work, and I would consider it the height of meanness if capitalists were to give "their" money without ensuring the chief organiser a livelihood. This is the height of meanness! I'll never agree to it!).

Nadya has answered your questions (I was away lecturing). I hope everything has been answered. If not, write and let me know!

Be more patient with the kulaks, don't worry more than you need. It's not worth it.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

N.B. Please return this copy of the text of the agreement to me.

Written between June 3 and 6, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

484

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

It's clear that the Japs have not yielded *an inch*. I have written An—der* that I am prepared to make concessions (1) in regard to 7 (7 and not 6); (2) 15%; (3) place of publication, *if* we agree on the rest, that is (1) the Editorial Board of the C.O. co-opts both 6th and 7th (otherwise an obvious swindle; without a majority here on the Editorial Board it is no use starting); (2) new name for the *collection*; (3) agreement for 1 collection.

What is crossed out must stay out: neither 2 nor 3 are to be given the right to decide on a discussion article by a contributor. I insist on this emphatically.

I would ask A. to add a § on transport and so on.

But apparently we won't get anywhere with this kulak riffraff.

Salut,

Lenin

Written June 6, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

485
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Well, now even Alexander seems to have realised[470] that we won't get anywhere with Y.* & Co.

I suggest

(1) that we decide to issue our collection (*Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*)

(2) that we immediately draw up a list of articles;

(3) that we invite Bukh.+Yur.+A. M.**+Saf.+Varin. Type-setting to be started immediately.

Salut,
Lenin

Written between June 17 and 25, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

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Printed from the original

486
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

(1) We shall write to Grisha that he should offer the printer to publish *part* (or an instalment) of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. This would be sensible. We could select for it articles passable by the censor (from the French point of view). I would like you to write him about it too.

Are they preparing a collection of their own?

(2) *No* answer should be given to Radek's question about the cause of the Bruch*** with Bukharin and Lyalin. Must agree on it first. Have you a copy of the C.O. Editorial Board's letter (end of 1915 to Bukharin & Co.)?[471]

To hide behind Yuri on the question of self-determination is downright meanness.

---

* G. L. Pyatakov.—*Ed.*
** Alexandra Kollontai.—*Ed.*
*** Break.—*Ed.*

(3) Letters from Russia (from the C.C. Bureau) say that Bukharin & Co. are trying to establish *their own contacts* with the P.C. over the head of the Bureau.[472] Fine fellows, eh? They not only "inform" Radek, as you write, but do worse things.

(4) A reply has come from *Neue Zeit*: freie Exemplare* are forbidden. I shall subscribe for ¼ year.

N.B. (5) What subjects are you taking for the Russian edition?

(6) I am waiting for your reply as to *exactly* how much material there now is for *Sbornik*.

(7) How strange, Grisha and Varin writing about *Kommunist* and not *Sbornik*!

(8) What is that article "Bruderorgan" in *Berner Tagwacht*?

Please send it!!

Salut,
Lenin

Written after June 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

487
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

At last I have got hold of Platten: he says it's hopeless-Guilbeaux tells Olga (after search attempts) the same thing-Nadya says *none* of her passports are any good. All you can do now is write to Olga, etc., and look out for a Russian.

Regarding the German consulate, a Polish woman told Nadya yesterday that *nobody* now was allowed passage. Very sad!

You forgot to send (1) the resolution of the Committee of the Organisations Abroad concerning the Polish newspaper

* Free copies.—*Ed.*

(*Gazeta Robotnicza**), (2) Grisha's letters on Paris affairs, on Brizon's speech,[473] etc., etc.

Salutations amicales,
Lenin

Written July 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

488
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I was ever so glad to get your plan of the collection.[474] You shouldn't grudge the 2,000 frs., really (it will bring in some money, and the money will be *ours*, not the kulaks'). It's not worth quarreling and upsetting ourselves over such perfectly lousy people. These people will be wiser after the lesson, I assure you.

I quite agree with you that Bukharin (*and* Yuri) should *formally* be asked to immediately give a discussion article on self-determination. We shall publish it. Will you write to them? I'm so furious now with Bukharin that I cannot write. Write at once. To Bukharin in addition: about Höglund and the Norwegian strike.

But we must fix the size as *strictly* as possible both *for ourselves* and for others. Essential!!

I quite agree also that Radek's theses should go in.

I should like to write about self-determination—on Junius—and about defeatism (+"imperialism and opportunism"+on the Chkheidze Duma group).

We must get Varin's article immediately. Ought we not get him to write another one about Ireland? I think we should!

George and *Tinsky* (the latter provisionally) should be commissioned to write something: we must encourage the youth.

---

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 157-60.—*Ed.*

On the *Internationale* preferably 3-4 short articles with a brief *introduction* from the editors.[475]

Let's make exact arrangements as to length.

Best regards,

Lenin

Written July 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

489

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Nadya's passports* are no good at all. (Her health is poor; the weather's bad, we can't go to the mountains.) You ask my advice about Graber. In my opinion, *no* arrangements should be made with him (after the way he let us down in 1915[476]) either about the composition of the Editorial Board or obligatory publication of our articles, as this would mean disgracing ourselves by acting a comedy. Without long, many-months experience at contributions (yours or Abramovich's or both—regularly, one or another occasionally) I don't think any serious agreement is worth talking about. We must look 10 times now "before we leap".

The letters to the prisoners of war concerning the questionnaire *did not* reach them. I wrote to Malinovsky once, suggesting a simple programme: place of residence; trade; occupation; age; attitude to the war, and so on. I got no reply. Obviously the censors don't let it through! Best regards to Popov from me and Nadya. Will you be able to send him dried crusts, etc., direct or through somebody?

All the best!

Lenin

Written July 7, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* This refers to travel documents which Krupskaya had obtained for Armand, who was planning to go to Norway.—*Ed.*

490

TO INESSA ARMAND

To Inessa

Dear Friend,

We shall manage the copying.

As regards Guilbeaux I don't know what to say. I am not clear about the plan: who exactly is on the Editorial Board? (Guilbeaux+??) Guilbeaux is *pretty* feeble and will spoil everything (I'm afraid!)....

What can I have against your article going into the collection?* I am all for it.

All the best!

Lenin

P.S. How strange that Radek does not answer you. I can't make it out.

Mind you, he answers Grigory, doesn't he?

Written July 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

491

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you MSS. with slips of notes concerning your article (it is shockingly lengthy. Im-pos-sible...) and with cuts in Varin's (he *gave* me the right to cut "non-war passages" and generalities. I think it could do with *some more* cuts).

It looks like it's going to be something measureless. It's ghastly. I don't know what to do. Yet something has still to be written about opportunism (I have ½ of it ready),

* This probably refers to Armand's article "Who Is Going To Pay For the War?" The article was not published.—*Ed.*

about defeatism and about Trotskyism (including the Duma group+P.S.D.).[477]

Figure out as quickly and accurately as possible how much we *already* have.

I returned to you the Italian cuttings, as far as I remember. If I didn't, I must have left them in Zurich, and won't get them until I return.

Re Bukharin & Co., we should send round to the groups (+Radek??) a confidential letter by the Editorial Board of the C.O. concerning its refusal (for Bukharin & Co. are obviously "retailing" already). Or should we wait a week or so? As for Radek, if he wants to have "our" version, let him send you theirs.

If Ryabovsky is Stark,[478] then we should wait for James's reply. For there *have been* suspicions both in regard to Stark and Miron. (Miron, as Kamenev and Malinovsky said, all but confessed to an ugly police affair.)

Salut,
Lenin

P.S. You are right not to trust Bukharin.

Is the enclosed "tab" what you want?* **Return it.**

Written after July 23, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

492

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you *Pod Starym Znamenem*.[479] When you have read it (not > 6 days), please send it to the following address:

Herrn Ussievitsch (bei Frau Frey) Nelkenstr. 21.II.
Zürich

(indicating Absender).

Send me your manuscript (of the book). I'll read it.

* The meaning of this has not been ascertained.—*Ed.*

I am writing to Pokrovsky.* I have *200* pages. I can't imagine sending it in a book-binding. I'm puzzled: 1) specially thin paper? 2) special size? 3) write on both sides?

I think the following should be written to Volna:

1) They should be asked to write *everything* in detail (attitude to Priboi, etc.) secretly (by invisible ink in a book) and send it by hand.

2) Y. Kamenev *may* go.[480]

3) N. Sukhanov? We are against (but if it is *necessary* for money or other reasons), then it should first be ascertained whether he is to be allowed as contributor or editor.

4) Is the Editorial Board wholly ours (as regards orientation) or is it a coalition? (If the latter, then with whom and exactly how?)

5) We promise to supply subjects for collections and pamphlets.

6) About my article on self-determination: I agree to offer it in pamphlet form (redrafted); please fix an exact date as quickly as possible.**

Salut,
Lenin

Have you the German pamphlet of the O.C. Secretariat Abroad (with their Kienthal draft and the shamelessly "abbreviated" declaration of Dan & Co.[481])?

N.B. I *need* for my article the issue of *Lichtstrahlen* which carried Radek's article "Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker".[482] Could you send it to me or get it for me?

Written July 24, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

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* See next document.—*Ed.*

** This refers to Lenin's article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 320-60).—*Ed.*

493
TO M. N. POKROVSKY

24/VII. 1916

Dear M. N.,

G. Z. writes me that you received my letter, but not the manuscript (that is, you do not mention it in your letter). It was sent to you simultaneously with a registered letter on July 2, by registered book-post. If you have not received it, what is to be done? I don't suppose you can make inquiries. I can do so through the post office, but it will take an awfully long time. Copy it again? (Maybe in duplicate, sending one copy via Sweden, would be more reliable?) There is *nothing* in it the censor could object to, and I can't make out why and how this could happen. Write to me, please, immediately or wire.

Best regards,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov

Sent from Flums to Sceaux (Seine) (France)

First published in 1958 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

494
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

About the telegram from Yeniseisk*—it is necessary to get a reply by letter. It is impossible to print by guesswork. We must *get* a letter.

I am not sure whether it's worth while publishing the statement (on the Grimm affair). But if we publish it now, the text should be changed to a sharper tone.

I am sending you the German pamphlet of the O.C. Return it.

I am sending my article. Figure out *exactly* how much material you now have *altogether*. We must decide about the

* See Document 478 in this volume.—*Ed.*

rest. (If Yuri sends his in, we shall have to answer him too, worse luck.)

Safarov's article is unsuitable. I think he should be advised to rewrite it in a *legal* vein (this is not *at all* difficult) for Letopis or for Volna. Wouldn't it be better to have this done verbally, if you will be seeing him soon?

How are things to be sent to Volna? Simply direct to their address? Registered book-post? Has a new pseudonym been arranged with them?

Send me the legal pamphlets of Plekhanov and Potresov.[483]

In regard to *Neue Zeit* I have written to the forwarding office.

Written in July,
after 24th, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

495

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

We are sending back the letters of Grisha[484] and the French. The latter shows, to my great satisfaction, that you have had a great influence on the French and have left enduring marks.

As regards Guilbeaux, we shall await events; since "no one invited him to be editor", how did he get there—by crashing the gate?

We shall wait for Graber's reply to you and for your explanations!

Your plan for arranging a French paper *for us* (!?), *apart from Sentinelle* (!?), is anything *but* clear to me.... H'm, h'm....

Get George's article and mine on self-determination and on Junius from Grigory (if you have not already done so).

I wish you all the best and beg you to *take a cure*, so that you may be *quite* fit by winter. Go south, to the sunshine!!

Have you got *La Feuille*, *Ce qu'il faut dire*, *The Call*?[485] I can send them.

Salut,
Lenin

Written July 25, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

496
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending you Engels's article.[486] There is no need to return it *for the time being*.

I am sending an article on the Junius pamphlet.* I am finishing the self-determination article.**

Could you write something for the collection about the meeting of the German and Austrian social-chauvinists? (the minutes that you sent me).

I think a short report is needed.

Why don't you write:

1) About Bukharin (and about your letter to him)?

2) Ditto about Varin.

3) Did you send *Pod Starym Znamenem* to Usiyevich? (*Send me a list of the articles for our collection.*)

4) About *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*.

5) About the Volna collections; Should I write (and what?) or wait?

Have you got *Berner Tagwacht*? I haven't. Could you send me cuttings (Grimm's resignation and so *on and so forth*)?[487]

Salut!
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Ought we not commission Safarov to write something for *Sbornik*?

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* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., pp. 320-60.—*Ed.*

P.P.S How feeble Guilbeaux is in the latest issue of *Demain*![488] Have you seen it?

Written in July,
after 26th, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

497

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I have received the manuscript.

I am sending *Neue Zeit*+2 Austr. books (I shall ask for them again, but later on: will let you know).

We have written to James.*[489]

As regards writing for the legal collection, I'm afraid I won't manage it.

Send me a list of the articles for *our Sbornik*.

You can't invite Guilbeaux to contribute: he's a windbag; we may disgrace ourselves. We had better wait.

Did you send Usiyevich *Pod Starym Znamenem*?

Fru Alexandra Kollontay.

Turisthotel. *Holmenkollen*.

Kristiania.

Did you send a *formal* letter to Bukharin *offering* him to publish a discussion article?[490] It is absolutely necessary to send him a formal letter and keep a *copy* (send it to me). A polite letter, of course, saying that we are replying to Radek's theses in any case (to hint that he can wait until *this* discussion is over if he wants).

Have you a set of *Nashe Slovo*?

Since Konferenz has been substituted for Kriegs-Parteitag—this smacks of a semi-deal with the Kautskyites.

What is this about your being unwell? You must go to

* Anna Yelizarova-Ulyanova—*Ed*.

Sahli *without fail* and *strictly* carry out doctor's orders! Show this to Zina.

Salut,
Lenin

Written not earlier than
July 30, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

498
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Regarding the 30 frs.—I am for *trying it* (not > 3 Nos., not more than 100 frs.), but I should like to see their sheet first; either have them send a set or let Abramovich give us fuller information.

We must go about this more carefully, we must be extremely careful (without mentioning whose, who, no names), as we disgrace ourselves hideously by starting a thing (a leap in the dark), then dropping it.

We disgrace ourselves im-pos-sib-ly!

Salutations amicales,
Yours,
Lenin

Written August 1, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

499
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending the statement. It's a pity you did not send Radek's letter. I am still in the dark about the "defence" of Grimm! (And you didn't send *all* the cuttings.)

The address to which you sent books to Pokrovsky—please, let me have it **immediately**. ||| **N.B.**

I have finished the article on self-determination; it runs into 79 pages

+ "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", which I am writing.

+ "Disarmament or the Arming of the People?" (which I have written in German). About 25 pages.

Where will it go in? What's to be done? Where are the proofs?

I shall write about the Russian collection in a day or two.

I haven't got *Neue Zeit* myself.

Salut,
Lenin

Written between August 2 and 11, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

500

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Dear M. N.,

I received both your postcards. Thanks very much. The terribly sad news about the loss of the MS. has compelled the author of the work written in the Plekhanov vein to resort to the G. Z. method[491] (ah, those Germans! It's they who are to blame for the loss! I wish the French beat them!).

The author hopes you will try to save the five sheets, otherwise it will be a loss of time, labour and oneness, and a good deal more. Sincere regards.

Yours,
Ilyin

Written August 5, 1916
Sent from Flums to Sceaux

First published in 1958 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

501

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Dear Editor,

I am so scared by the ridiculous and incredible loss of an *absolutely innocuous* manuscript that I am afraid even to mention your name.

I am afraid that my letter, too, has been copied. I asked there, that if it was inconvenient to take the usual pseudonym (V. Ilyin), to use N. Lenivtsyn. Now we shall have to use another: V. I. Ivanovsky, let us say.

I advised there (if the word "imperialism" is so "horrifying") to change the title, say, to: "The Peculiarities of Contemporary Capitalism".

Now this will have to be changed again: "Latest Economic Data on Modern Capitalism" or something like that.

The titles (chapter headings) to be deleted (when sent to Russia). Perhaps even the chapter headings should be changed? It could be done.

I would ask you to keep the present format (which is what I was asked to do). No cuts can be made without breaking it up.

(Unless we throw out whole chapters at the end? So that I can use them in another place? This at the very worst of worsts! I am all for no cuts.)

Please leave the notes, they are important (especially No. 101*), and the literature too *should be* indicated, for in Russia you have students and suchlike people who read.

Your editorial changes and improvements, of course, I shall accept with pleasure.

My best regards,

Lenin

Written between August 5 and 31, 1916
Sent from Flums to France

First published in 1958 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

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* See also Lenin's letter of July 2, 1916, to M. N. Pokrovsky (present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 226-27).—*Ed.*

502

TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Dear Comrade,

Nadya is giving you a secret meeting place, password and ways of communicating with us for Marcu.[492]

Let him ask a French- or German-speaking person to come to Petrograd (through the secret address) and tell him in *greatest possible detail* all the foreign news about the movement of the *Lefts*, about *Vorbote* No. *1* and No. *2*, about our disputes on disarmament (I am sending my article*; show it to him—incidentally, write me *where Nobs is*), about the German *Arbeiterpolitik*,[493] about the arrests in Germany, about Longuet and the Longuetists in France, about the arrest of Maclean in England, and generally *all* about the movement of the Lefts and internationalists in Europe and America in greater detail.

Then let him offer his services (there, in Petrograd) to call oh the way at Moscow, Kiev, Odessa (where he is travelling) for the same purpose and for passing on the address for letters to us.

Teach him (*thoroughly*) to write with invisible ink and to *maintain* **the strictest secrecy** in Russia: he must act the part of a soldier who is going to Rumania to fight, and stick to that!

We don't know yet when we shall be back. Probably not before a fortnight.

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

Written at the beginning
of August 1916
Sent from Flums to Zurich

First published in 1958
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

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* Nobs will correct the language *himself*.

503

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I suggest sending Yuri the following answer.*

(He makes his point, I suppose, at the end of § 2: "not to be used". If he wants us not to criticise his article now in the press, he is right.

But afterwards? If their faction builds up and a struggle develops?

If he wants us not to make a copy of his article or show it to members of the Party, we *cannot agree* to this.

We shall not conceal anything from members of the Party.)

I think the answer I propose will suffice for the time being. Let him make himself look ridiculous.

We must have his article in order to show it to Alexander, the Bureau and so on. This is essential.

I approve of your letter to Bukharin. I suggest (*not* in the form of an ultimatum) an addition.[494] I think it best for the time being to send the letter only in your own name: it is not so official and, considering the tone, more convenient. We shall discuss it; it is not so urgent as the reply to Yuri (had we not better get Yuri's answer first, before sending your letter to Bukharin?).

Salut,
Lenin

P. S. If you do not need the *maps* of all the war theatres in *Le Temps* and *The Daily Telegraph*, please cut them out and send them to me.

Written between August 10 and 20, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See next letter.—*Ed.*

504
TO G. L. PYATAKOV

Dear Comrade,

You demand for yourself very strange privileges in the Party. It is unheard-of and, given any sort of Party attitude towards the matter, unthinkable that contributors should dictate terms making the contribution of articles contingent upon the editors inviting third persons, at the choice of the contributor, or "guaranteeing" that the Editorial Board's reply (to an article it does not know of!) will be recognised by the contributor as a "comradely" one and so on.

In the interests of the business, however, we consider it advisable, by way of exception, to accede to your ultimatum, namely:

on Point 1—we invite the comrade named by you* or anybody else you may desire, who belongs to our Party;

on Point 2—all contributors are always guaranteed publication of their articles without alteration, if they so desire, or return of the articles. Your wish here is not a privilege, but a gratuitous demand;

on Point 3—all we can do is to send you the reply of the Editorial Board (or of any other contributor) to your article and leave it to you to decide whether you want both articles published or not.

With Social-Democratic greetings

Written between August 10 and 20, 1916
Sent from Flums to Norway

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* Yevgenia Bosh.—*Ed.*

505

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Lecoin is no good at all. Can't go in.

Broutchoux[495] is a stupid anarchist; he can only be published *with a note from the editors*. (I shall write it in the proofs.)

Women's movement (?)—send the MS. I'm afraid it will have to be held over through lack of space.

I am sending imperialism and disarmament.* Return the latter *immediately*. It must go into the Berne collection without fail, as it will never be passed by the censor and is very urgent (the Young and others have made an appalling muddle here).

If you want us to discuss the differences you point out, send me your article again as quickly as possible and mark off exactly what you disagree with.

The phrases about the "epoch" have become empty phrases—Radek and others have shown this. Did the "epoch" of 1789-1871 *exclude* non-national wars?

To talk about "defence of the fatherland" *in general* is theoretically absurd. For defence of the fatherland=war *in general*. That's the crux of the matter.

Junius** cannot be referred to Paris, as this article is *inseparably* linked with both *self-determination* and disarmament.

Write *what precisely* is being set up.

P.S. I am sending *Neue Zeit* and *The Call for Inessa*.

Salut,

Lenin

Written prior to August 22, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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* See V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism" and "The 'Disarmament' Slogan" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 105-20 and 94-104).—*Ed*.

** See V. I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19).—*Ed*.

506

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1) I am sending Tinsky with additions (something at least should be said in the *anti-S.R.* vein, otherwise it is *not* a Social-Democratic piece of writing. And your "mottoes" are no good besides). (Mottoes, if needed, should be *different*.)

2) I have started to write "about Kautskyism" for Russian collections.[496] I have *already* written you this.

3) I shall try and sit down soon to write a reply to Yuri.[497]

4) 1,500 copies of the collections will be *enough*.

5) Re the 2nd collection, I am *against* deciding right away. Grisha's letter is not clear: 500 frs.+paper? Am writing him. *Let's wait for his reply*. The devil take him!! He isn't clear about it! !

6) Put in Saf—chik on the *Duma group* (as the item on the prisoners of war is already set up and will go *inde*).*

7) Re the article on the women's movement, I have **already** written you about my doubts (send in de Ms,** there is little space). *Instead of answering*, you write: "commissioned", although you know that I did not commission it!! This is an omission. If an article isn't written, one should *first* let one know the subject, plan and details, before advising to write it.

8) Re the national question, I would *very much* like to republish self-determination with an *addition*. Would *Volna* undertake it? *Did you write to them about it?*

9) The Gnevich collection??[498] In Polish or Russian?? You must find this out and also who else is writing and on what subject?? *This must be made clear*. What have you written him?

Best regards,

Lenin

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* After it.—*Ed.*

** de manuscrit.—*Ed.*

10) I propose the enclosed translation from *De Tribune* for inclusion in *Sbornik*.[499]

Written after August 22, 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

507

TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Dear Comrade,

We may possibly take advantage of the trip, but we must first think it over and find out to what extent he is trustworthy generally and also as regards orderliness and secrecy techniques. To ask Grimm is rather *awkward*. Let me know *your* opinion and whether you can find out anything about him in Zurich (discreetly). I can send you the pamphlet on imperialism. I have *no idea* about the "meeting" (Gr.+ Radek+??). Find out everything you can in greatest detail and let me know.

I shall send you the article for *Volksrecht*,* too, as soon as I hear that Nobs is back in Zurich. Nobs wrote me that he had gone away for *Ferien*** not far from me and wanted to let me know, *but fell silent*. I don't know where he is. Do you?

I am sending *Ausland-Politik* containing Semkovsky's article.

Were there articles of Radek's against Entwaffnung*** in *Volksrecht*? If there were, could you send them to me? Who told you that I was to be in Zurich on Sunday?? This is most piquant, *who* could say such a thing!!

Could you obtain in Zurich the Polish and Bundist Warsaw newspapers containing information (detailed information by districts) about the elections in Warsaw? It is very

* This probably refers to the article "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 77-87).—*Ed.*

** Holidays.—*Ed.*

*** Disarmament.—*Ed.*

interesting! I wrote Bronski, but he is silent. All the best, and my regards to your wife and your little girl.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. You have not answered Nadya's request about *Neues Leben*. If you are too busy, couldn't Usiyevich find out? Or is he *particularly* busy these days?

Written August 31, 1916
Sent from Flums to Zurich

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

508

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Dear M. N.,

I agree to your proposals. I am terribly depressed, though, at the thought of the end being cut. Couldn't the end in that case be printed in the journal without alteration? And with a note from the editors to the effect that these are deductions and conclusions from the pamphlet? It would be a great pity to *fragmentise* it!! A great pity!! If you can do something, I shall be very much obliged. I shall write about this myself, but my letter takes a long time and won't get there before several months, if it gets there at all.

My best regards,
Yours,
V. Ulyanov

P.S. I heard say that Potresov has joined the staff of the publishing house!! and the famous novelist* has agreed!! What a shame, what a crying shame, eh?

Written August 31, 1916
Sent from Flums to Sceaux

First published in 1958 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

* Maxim Gorky.—*Ed.*

509

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1) On the question of the "commissioned" article, you are wrong in trying to exonerate yourself. You couldn't help noticing that I was extra-careful to avoid any sharply worded expression of displeasure in my first letter (which you have not answered).

I wrote nothing about bad faith: omission, too, is a mild, and not harsh expression, which includes simple forgetfulness and inattentiveness, and these are far removed from bad faith. Why this exaggeration, this talk about "bad faith"?

Where, in my own hand, have I written about 5 pages? Send it to me, if you are not yet persuaded that you were wrong.

2) About Franz,[500] we quite agree with you (both Nadya and myself): it seems worse at first than afterwards.

3) I am sending you the draft of a letter to N. I.* I shall not object to making it more polite: send corrections and additions, if you consider them necessary.[501]

Best regards,

Lenin

Written in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

510

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I have just read the Swedish and Norwegian articles.

They cannot be separated. They should go in *together* and cannot go in *without our own* article against disarmament. It changes our plans.

I shall sit down and write (rewrite) this article for *Sbornik*, which will necessarily have to be increased within these

* See present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 230-31.—*Ed.*

limits, and the rest cut down *as much as possible*. What nonsense, this disarmament, yet it's beginning to get some people muddled in *our Party* too!

N.B. P.S. Since the question of the Paris collection has not yet been settled, we should *hold up* Strannik's article, for *if* we have to choose, it should certainly be Alexander's.

Written in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

511

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

This is Nadya's draft of the cuts.[502]

I read the article a second time (I read it once before). I am definitely against any cuts. It means spoiling the article. An integral summarising article (with minor details, mentioning the participant or interlocutor) is extremely important.

Honestly, this article cannot be cut.

What's to be done?

As a matter of fact, we can seriously "unload" only by holding over your article. Reasons:

1) It is written *not* for this collection.

2) It is part of a book, for the publication of which we already have an agreement; the chances of its being published, therefore, are real. Double publication is a luxury we can ill afford.

3) The main and important things about the history of the International have already been said by you in your article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

4) The collection must be *limited* (α) to Russian material + (β) to highlights of the controversy, to vexed and mooted questions of the *Party*.

5) And defeatism—where does that come in?

Write and tell me *candidly* what you think of this

proposition: from a businesslike editorial point of view (specifically) or from the point of view of grievance.

{ But our disputes and efforts towards agreement *must* continue *in any case*. }

A 160-page collection, according to my plan, would give *rich*, extremely valuable Russian material + a discussion on self-determination (without Yuri*)

+ defeatism + Trotsky,
+ about the *International* (Chkheidze),
that is, everything that **brooks no** *delay*.

Cost about 2,500 frs. + 400 to Ludmila (= ditto transport) + about 500 for transport = nearly 3,400. We can *just about* manage that, and *no more*.

I agree to put out a No. of the C.O. (+ another 100-200 frs.).

Written in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

512

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Well, now you've said it!! I couldn't help smiling, really. You've written yourself into "court".... In fact, any court in every case would find that to label a proposal to hold over an article as "uncomradely", would make collegiate work impossible.

Luckily for you there is no "court", otherwise you would certainly be "convicted".

We still have to "cut down" though. We have bulged out of the *former* plan of the collection (Russian material + the discussion on self-determination). Find out exactly and officially from Benteli what the cost of a sheet is. We

* As this will mean having to write a reply to Yuri[503] and sending it to him!!

shall then calculate *exactly* how much we can print (for *nobody* prints anything free of charge—remember that!).

Salut,
Lenin

Do I have to return *Hamburger Echo* to you?

I am sending you Alexander's article: I don't undertake to cut it!

The Swedish and Norwegian articles are going in too!![504] What a bother!!

Safarchik *must* go in, though. You are right. *We shall put him in!*

Do you get *Arbeiterpolitik*? I haven't seen No. 5 and No. 7 ff.*

Written in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

513
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

There is no conflict: you are imagining too much, really. Recollect (or reread) my letter: I did not state that I was *voting* against your article, I only wrote: "write and tell me candidly" what you think of such-and-such a plan.** You wrote.

And that's all.

So the article is going in.

Yuri will "reconcile" us still more, I believe,[505] as it is precisely *his* conclusion that "in the *epoch* of imperialism" there can be no "defence of the fatherland".

In fact, "in an *imperialist war*, engendered by the epoch of imperialism, defence of the fatherland is a deception".

* Und folgende—and those following.—*Ed.*
** See Document 511 in this volume.—*Ed.*

These are "two *great* differences".

Best regards,
Lenin

P.S. Isn't it time we sent a joint letter to N. I. B. about the faction? I think it is. And about his article?
I am *for* issuing the C.O. I *agree*!

Written in August 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

514
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1) I am sending you Roland-Holst. I think she ought not to be published either.
2) Reply to Bukharin.* I agree to your changes, but *one thing should be added*, namely: that the **main thing** *for us is the article's shortcomings* **on points of principle.**
Otherwise it looks as if we are hedging.
If you agree to this insertion, then send the letter (working it in logically).
If not, we shall discuss it once more.
3) I *can't* find the sheet you refer to as having my mark there expressing my agreement to have the article commissioned. This is a mistake on your [part].**
4) Franz has left an article. In my opinion a very good and *brief* one. I am for putting it in. I shall send it to you.
5) There is *no* need to hurry with the Paris collection. Let's calculate exactly *what* can go in (5 sheets at 50,000= 250,000 printer's ems *altogether*).

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* This refers to the reply to Bukharin concerning the impossibility of publishing his article "On the Theory of the Imperialist State" in *Sbornik* (see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 230-31).—*Ed.*

** Here part of the manuscript is damaged and the word in square brackets has been inserted as suggested by the context.—*Ed.*

6) I am writing the reply to Yuri. This is a *long* job, though.

Best regards,
Lenin

Written at the end
of August-beginning of
September 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in part in 1932
in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 22

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

515

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1) I am sending George's leaflet-article. In my opinion it's very poor. I don't think it's even worth rewriting.... Vulgar, unreasoned, stilted, and "folksy". An example of how *not* to write popular things....

Perhaps you will talk to him when meeting?

2) About disarmament, I am not quite sure. If we put the Swede+Norwegian in the collection, then we must *include* an article on disarmament. It won't take me long to write, a few alterations to my article.[506] But will there be space for it?

We must decide. Answer.

Let us figure out again how much our collection will bulge—it's bulging enough as it is.

3) Reply to Bukharin. Must decide this too. If you do not wish to say that the *main thing* is differences on points of principle, then I agree to change it, giving *two* reasons (for non-publication): (α) technical and financial
(β) on points of principle.

Send me such a variant (don't forget to connect both parts of the letter in good literary style) and let us decide the matter quickly. Of course, bear in mind that our reply to Bukharin is of *great* significance: it has to be well considered, and a copy must be kept.

4) We must decide about the Paris collection: make-up and size?

If 2,000 5-sheet copies (=10,000 sheets) cost 500 frs., then 1,500 copies (it's all we need) could be issued in 6 2/3 sheets

$$\frac{\times\ 50{,}000}{330 \text{ thous. ems.}}$$

Probably less than 330 thous., round about *300* thous.? Is that right?

N.B. We must also find out whether they take illegal stuff too in Paris? That is, do they print secretly?

This is most important! Yet there is no *full* reply from Grisha!!!

When this is all cleared up, let us draw up a list of copy for Paris.

(I don't think we need count Yuri's article and the reply to him, since 1) the reply has not yet been written; 2) we don't know whether His Merchant Majesty will give his consent to the printing.)

5) I shall sit down to Radek's theses[507] (look through them): I haven't read them yet in the proofs.

6) I am returning Strannik's additions.[508] What are we going to do about him??

Best regards,

Lenin

Written at the end
of August-beginning of
September 1916
Sent from Flums to Hertenstein

First published in part in 1932
in *Bolshevik* No. 22

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

516

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am sending you the manuscript. Please return it, *also registered*: it is the only copy (and I shall be needing it again rather urgently).

I shall send you the article on disarmament in a day or two, I haven't got it just now. We have started to make the acquaintance of the young here, and regret very much that we have no complete knowledge of any one language. Here is where you have interesting and fruitful work! Organisation of the youth is growing throughout Switzerland. All the very best to you.

V. Lenin

Written September 15, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

517

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

We have written to Bukharin.

I am sending you an article; it should go to Berne too, as Paris is silent.

We must calculate more exactly (you have both the MSS. and proofs) *how much* there is for Berne.

Naturally, I can't be "pleased" with your keeping my articles so long in pickle. Send them immediately to the printing shop: you hurried me with them, saying the compositor was hurrying you!!

And where are our theses?* Where are the proofs of them?

The question of *Sotsial-Demokrat* is a difficult one, as *I am afraid* this will *hold up Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*!!

When you have returned "Disarmament"** I shall think it over finally. We shall weigh *more carefully* what can go in there, how long it will hold up *Sbornik*.

I am not writing anything so far for *Voprosy*.*** But for

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* See "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 143-56).—*Ed.*

** See "The 'Disarmament' Slogan" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 94-104).—*Ed.*

*** The journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*.—*Ed.*

the collection (*Pod Starym Znamenem*) I want to write about Kautskyism[509] (incidentally, return the pamphlet on imperialism *as soon as possible*: I need it for quoting).

Salut,
Lenin

P.S. On business matters you answer much less.

Written mid-September 1916
Sent from Zurich to Hertenstein

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth

Printed from the original

518
TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV*

Dear Friend,

Nadya has written in such detail,[510] that I have nothing to add. I wish you all the best, congratulate you on your success in America and ask you to keep closer in touch by letter. If Belenin wants to go there, he must be *thrice* more careful (the danger is great) and thoroughly plan his trips for establishing *contacts*. These are lacking. And where is A. M.? Best regards.

Yours,
Lenin

Written October 3, 1916
Sent from Zurich

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth

Printed from the original

519
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

I am sending your article.[511] Now that's felicitous! Should we not add two things?

(1) that the Germans have their defeatists, of whom his-

* This is a postscript to Krupskaya's letter.—*Ed.*

tory will have its say (remember Seger's story and Bloch);

(2) about the shabby trick played on us by *Gazeta Robotnicza* in regard to defeatism.

As regards the I.S.B., I think it better to wait for an invitation!

I see *Avanti!* but I don't follow it closely. Couldn't George give the *exact* No. and date?

(Wasn't that the meeting of *parliamentarians*, of which, if I am not mistaken, there was talk at Kienthal?)

The parliamentarians are *all* Kautskyites, you know.

Since Alexander has already been set up—we are in a bit of a dilemma. What's to be done?

I just can't cut Strannik! I have read it *twice*!! I can't read it any more.

I shall send you my reply to Yuri in a day or two.*

Should not more explicit arrangements be made with Paris first?

Won't it be a fiasco if we *start* sending and *won't be able* to keep it up regularly?

I am as mad as the devil with Grisha for his unpunctuality and imprecision: I can't make sense out of his letters! Sends silly telegrams!

In Zurich there's absolutely nobody to do the copying.

Best regards,
Lenin

There should be a secret letter from Grisha one of these days? Isn't that so?

Written in October, not later than 5th, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Hertenstein

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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*A reference to "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 22-27).—*Ed.*

520
TO N. I. BUKHARIN[512]

14.X. 1916

Dear N. I.,

As regards the "ill-fated" article, as you call it, you argue very strangely, really, or rather you don't argue at all, but get excited and skip your arguments. Now just look, really—from a distance—what you make of it:

"... I simply have a feeling (!) that it is not a matter (!) of points of accusation (!), but 'generally'...".

This is what you write, word for word!! How can one argue like this? It amounts to stopping the mouth of every person who wants to argue and discuss. The Editorial Board's letter gives *precise* indications and formulations of the differences, but you work yourself up: feeling, accusation, generally....

You read a lecture "On the same subject", and none of the O.C. writers "so much as mentioned anarchism".

But again—is that an argument? There is nothing about anarchism in the Editorial Board's letter either. What exactly you said at the lecture cannot be established. That the O.C. writers are foolish—is a fact. But you add: "I gave it to them hot on other points"....

"Opportunism is fear of what the liquidationist-yellow Maria Alexeyevna[513] [Potresov] will say."

Pretty strong. Yes. But it's wide of the mark! For I maintain that Potresov here is *right* against Bazarov.[514]

(1) Is this correct or not? You do not go into it.—(2) Is it a bad thing for the yellows to be *right* against the errors of our people? You disposed of the issue by the use of strong language. It works out that it is you who "fear" to give thought to the significance of Potresov's being right against Bazarov!

"...You cannot impute to me denial of the struggle for democracy...." I impute to you a number of mistakes on this question and point out exactly which. But you avoid the issue.

You formulate three "statements", alleged to be "absolutely indisputable and orthodoxically Marxist", to which the first chapter "*could be reduced*".

But these statements (1) are so general that they are still a long way off from concreteness; (2nd and most important of all) it is *not what* the article says!!

"Neither Gr. nor you even attempt to tell me where the heresy is."

Pardon me, this is untrue. This is stated *most precisely* in the Editorial Board's letter, but you *do not* answer the things we *said* and *pointed out*. Not a sound in reply to any of our numerous and precise remarks!!

One of our remarks: you break off quotations from Marx and Engels *in a way* that misrenders the sense or makes for inexact conclusions. You answer only on this point, and how do you answer? That "I know the continuation (of the quotations) perfectly well". "But on the points in question they had views which are not liable to misinterpretation."

And that's that!! It would be funny were it not so sad. "Misinterpretation" is just what we write about *precisely*; without examining a single argument or producing a *single* quotation (I compared them *purposely*; I did not write you for nothing; I compared *more than* one quotation!), you dismiss the matter: "not liable to misinterpretation". The blame rests fully upon you—instead of a discussion of differences, you wave the matter away.

No one accused you either of "heresy" or of "anarchism" in this connection, but we wrote: "let it mature". These are "two big differences". You not only do not answer our remarks, but you *read a different meaning* into them. *You can't do that!*

"The article has been lying a long time...." Now this is backdated cavilling. We corresponded with Gr. on this for a long time, as we had other articles to attend to. You had not fixed any dates yet, and no one could know of your possible departure. This is just cavilling.

As for "chucking out" and polemic in a non-break tone, I must say that I have not yet entered into polemic *with you* in the press, but *exchanged letters* with you before any polemic and *in order to avoid* it. That's a fact. *Facts are stubborn things*.* You can't beat facts by gossip. My an-

* This italicised sentence is in English in the original.—*Ed*.

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

swer to P. Kievsky is for the press (not to you, but to P. Kievsky) and we grant him a privilege we have *never* granted *anyone* before: we send the article to him first for his "agreement". (Unfortunately, the copyist fell ill in the middle of the work: that is why we haven't got the article yet, and you probably won't see it before your departure; but *we have the mail with America*, and P. Kievsky will probably forward it on to you. We cannot take it from this copyist and give it to another, because he is in a different town; we have no other one in view; he is hard up, and we *cannot* deprive him of even these tiny earnings promised him beforehand.)

P. Kievsky's article is very bad and he's hopelessly muddled (generally on the question of democracy).*

That we always thought highly of you and spent months, many months, corresponding in detail and pointing out *since the spring* of 1915 that on the question of a minimum programme and democracy you were vacillating—you are aware. I would sincerely be pleased if we had a polemic *only* with P. Kievsky, who started it, and if our differences with you were ironed out. To achieve this, however, it is necessary that you should go into the questions at issue carefully and attentively, and not wave them away.

I am very, very pleased that we both see eye to eye against "disarmament". I was also very glad to make the acquaintance of Franz: he must have had some good work done on him in the way of Bolshevik propaganda; no small credit for this is probably due to you. The man tries to go deep into things and promises well.

I am enclosing the certificate. Correspondence with America can be conducted *only* through Scandinavia: otherwise *everything* gets lost; the French censorship is *brazen*.

Regarding America. I wrote a number of letters there in 1915: *all* were confiscated by the accursed French and British censors.

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* I don't know what Grigory wrote you, and I cannot answer you on this point. You call what he has written you "impertinent nonsense".... H'm.... H'm! Aren't you afraid of this being a "break" tone? I *never push* things that far in my polemic with P. Kievsky.

I would very much like

(1) To have the manifesto of the Zimmerwald Left published there in English.

(2) Ditto—our pamphlet on the war (revised for the new edition).

(3) To arrange, if possible, for the most important publications and pamphlets of the Socialist Party and the Socialist Labour Party (I have *only* the *Appeal to Reason*) to be sent gratis to the C.C.

(4) Cahan, editor of a *Jewish* New York newspaper, visited me in Cracow in 1912 and promised me, among other things, to send publications of official economic statistics of the United States (these publications are given out to newspaper offices free of charge there), saying that his paper had such a huge forwarding office that this would be no trouble. He did *not* keep his promise. If you meet him, put out feelers as to whether it is hopeless or not.

(5) It would be a good thing to form a small group of Russian Bolsheviks and Lettish Bolsheviks capable of following *interesting* literature, sending it, writing about it, *translating and printing* what we send from here, and in general discussing together and "pushing" all kinds of questions about the III International and about the "Left" in the international socialist movement.

If a couple of Bolsheviks were actively linked with a couple of Letts possessing a good knowledge of English, then the thing might work.

(6) Generally, give special attention to the Letts. Try in particular to see *Berzin*. He can probably be traced through Strahdneks.

(7) At the end of 1914 or in 1915 I received from America a leaflet of the Socialist Propaganda League with a profession de foi *in the spirit* of the Zimmerwald Left. I am enclosing their address. I sent them a *long* letter in English. Probably went astray? I shall try and find the copy and send it to you, if you think it worth while on inquiry. I also wrote to the Letts about the League through Strahdneks: must have gone astray too.

(8) There should be a *base* in America for work against the *English* bourgeoisie, which has carried the censorship to crazy lengths. This to §5.

(9) Try and answer us without delay, if only by a couple of lines in a postcard, so that we can make an attempt to establish *proper* contact with America; and give us notice (1-1½ months) *beforehand* of the date of your return.

Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published in 1932 in *Bolshevik* No. 22

Printed from the original

521

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

We received the pamphlet on imperialism and your long letter. Received everything. Thanks very much. We shall send you *The Call*. Grigory will probably send something new from Berne. Nadya is busy with the League congress; she sends her regards. Yesterday she sent you a long letter. *Don't* sit in Sörenberg, you'll freeze and catch a cold.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Maybe you have no money for your fare? Mind you let us know: we can easily get what you need....

Written October 21, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

522

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I sent you *Letopis* No. 7 yesterday.[515] When you have done with it, return it or forward it to Berne to be returned from there *without fail* and without it going any further. Abramovich was here and we talked quite a lot. The chap

is working very well *from below*; independently of Huber, "*agreements*" with whom, of course, are worthless. If you sent me occasionally any *interesting* Nos. of *l'Humanité* containing criticism of the "minoritaires", etc., I would be much obliged.

Friendly greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Written October 28, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

523

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I intend to address the congress of the Swiss party (on Saturday 4.XI) with a message of greetings.* I am enclosing the text. Will you please translate it into French**; in the event of your not being able to make out my scribble, I have copied out two of the most slovenly passages (p. 4).

If, for any reason, you cannot do this, please *wire* Uljanow—Kammerer—Spiegelgasse. *14*).

If you can, please answer *at once* by postcard confirming receipt of this letter and saying *when* you will finish it and when you will send the translation, so that I get it by Friday, as I am afraid to be late: time is short and the mail service with Sörenberg is poor.

I have copied out the translations of the quotations from the pamphlet, but they should be inserted in the *connected* French text of the speech.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written October 30, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 121-24.—*Ed.*

** See also Document 525 in this volume.—*Ed.*

524

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Please insert the following two additions in the text:

After the words:

the use of violence by the oppressed classes

add: "*against their oppressors*".

After the words:

Four years before the revolution we supported the use of violence by the masses

add:

"*against their oppressors*".*

Nadya intends to write to you tomorrow.

Written October 31, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

525

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Thank you very much for the translation. I did not have a chance to read it; I spoke at the very beginning of the congress, when the French delegates had not yet arrived and no French translations were being made. I shall nevertheless try to make use of the translation. I shall send it to Abramovich, etc., and we shall try to get it published somewhere.

I missed the post today: the P.O. closed at 7 p.m., and I was engaged at the congress.

The congress impressed me favourably. For the first time during the war, not only a Left emerged at the Swiss

* This refers to additions to the translated text of Lenin's speech at the congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 121-24).—*Ed.*

congress (in 1914 it did not exist at all, and in 1915 it only began to take shape) but it started to *build up* into an opposition to both the Rights and the Centre (Grimm). No little credit for this is due to Radek; previously, in the summer, he had got things mixed up a bit, for Grigory wrote me positively that Radek had written him boasting that he had "reconciled Grimm with Platten" (a fine service!). But Bronski is following a line that is three times more vacillating and three times more foolish than Radek's.

Radek arrived and we "made it up" (relations had been strained to the verge of a break). On the eve of the congress we managed to arrange a private meeting of the Left delegates (which I had been urging for three weeks, but unsuccessfully until then!). This meeting was attended by *all* the Left leaders, the Young included.* Radek and I easily carried through a resolution of ours, acting in concert and agreeing to acceptable concessions. At the congress the struggle has already begun. The first fight was over an appraisal of the Nationalrat group. The Lefts attacked. The speeches of Naine and Platten were splendid. Greulich's defence of the Right was extremely feeble. Grimm played at Centre again and by aid of "little amendments" obtained a unanimous vote (spoiling the game a bit). He saw that the majority was obviously on the side of Platten. Tomorrow there should be a fight on the question of Kienthal; we have taken a hand here in drafting a Left resolution; it is much better than the one of Nat.-rat. We shall see what will come of it! I'm like an old war horse in battle.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written November 4, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See next letter.—*Ed.*

526
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Instead of "imperialist economism", you write that you don't understand the expression "economic imperialism".

The old "economism" wrongly posed the question of the attitude of capitalism to the political struggle.

The new "economism" wrongly poses the question of the attitude of capitalist imperialism to the political struggle.

I am writing about this at greater length in my article against Yuri (this "merchant" has "consented" to being published—that means, he will go into *Sbornik* No. 3 or No. 4).

The differences with Radek are of *more* than mere theoretical interest *for Russia* (as well as for Germany, Britain, for countries with colonies). For Switzerland—yes.

Grimm is an insolent beggar and a swine: he meanly attacks, not me (as Grigory mistakenly believes, being poorly informed by Zina), but *Radek*. It was like this (entre nous): Friday evening we arranged a meeting of the Lefts (where Radek and I acted fully in concert) and adopted (setting up a committee) a resolution on Kienthal. It was attended by Platten, Nobs, Münzenberg and some others, i.e., *all* the leaders of the Lefts. On *Saturday* afternoon, when the congress was on (it started Saturday morning), a meeting of the "Young" (and also congress delegates) was held *outside* the congress premises. Münzenberg was in the chair. The report on (*our*) resolution was made by *Radek*. I did not speak. The resolution was *adopted*. To this meeting (the door not being locked!) some ladies came *uninvited*—(Genossin Block (Bloch), a lady friend of Grimm's and a gossip), Dimka (another gossip and a lady friend of Martov's) and others. Obviously, they "reported back" to Grimm. And Grimm decided (believing this old wives' silly tittle-tattle) that the "actual mover"=Radek, and wrote in the press that this mover (Urheber) spoke "Vor einem anderen Forum".[516] Kharitonov is publishing a refutation in *Volksrecht*.

I carried on strong agitation with Platten and Nobs for

organising (or rather, rallying) the Lefts.* I am making a report *to them* on this (Platten has *promised* to arrange it). I wonder whether I'll cope with the language and whether anything will come of it.

Radek has *promised* to come out *directly* against Grimm in *Arbeiterpolitik*[517] (I advise you to subscribe to this weekly journal, it costs 15 pfg.=20 cent.).

We'll see whether he does!

Keep well.

(It was me who wrote the article in the C.O.**)

All the best,

Lenin

P.S. I sent my "theses" to Berne for you (to Grigory's address) asking you to translate them into French (for Geneva, Lausanne, La Chaux-de-Fonds, etc.). Did you receive them? What's your opinion of them?

Written November 7, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

527

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Entre nous—privately!—I don't advise you to send *such* a letter.[518] You can talk with *such* straightforwardness only with *absolutely* reliable and absolutely friendly Left-wingers.

Where are they? Who are they?

"We wish to take into our hands"—why, this will get into the press and you will be made a laughingstock!!

My advice: you can write like this *only* to absolute friends (through Radek, for instance, if **he** undertakes

* On November 20 and 30, 1916, Lenin had talks with Left Zimmerwaldists on the theses "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party".—*Ed.*

** What article this refers to has not been established.—*Ed.*

on his responsibility to send it to *friends* and to no one else).

For the S.D. public *at large*, it should be redrafted with the greatest care.

Best regards,

Lenin

Written prior to November 26, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

528

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

About the book by Delaisi, I regret to say that I haven't got it. I must have left it in Berne, or else somebody has "appropriated" it.

About your letter to the women, you have taken offence at my remarks, haven't you? And even stretched their meaning just a wee bit?

I wrote that I would advise deleting the passage which says "we wish to take into our hands" as it would look absurd. If you do *not* agree to deleting it, *then* I advise sending it *only* to closest and most reliable friends in Germany, *for example*, through Radek.

Should you agree to alter the unguarded expressions (the letter, in view of the present postal systems, arrests in Germany and France, etc., may get into *other* hands), then my advice simply falls away. That was what my advice amounted to. That, and nothing more. *Not the slightest* "displeasure" at your letter, *none whatever*.

You asked my opinion; I gave it to you and *merely* suggested *only* slight alterations.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written November 26, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Sörenberg

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

529
TO M. G. BRONSKI

Dear Comrade,

I think it desirable to have the following logical construction of the resolution (based on Platten's resolution[519]) (the phrase in brackets is from Platten *word for word*):

1. "The present world war is an imperialist war."

2. ("The criminal policy of peace"), namely, of Switzerland, which may *also* become involved in the imperialist war, on the one hand as a result of this policy, on the other owing to the imperialist environment.

3. Therefore, "defence of the fatherland" is a "hypocritical phrase" for Switzerland too.

4. Rejection in principle of defence of the fatherland, and "the strongest methods of proletarian class struggle". A fullest possible list of these methods.

Immediate *demobilisation*.

5. "The complete destruction of militarism" *not* in the pacifist sense, but in close bearing on the socialist revolution and as a *result* of it.

In my opinion, this may give us a good five-point resolution.

It goes without saying that I give no formulations here, and merely point out logical sequence and train of thought.

With sincere greetings,

Lenin

Written at the beginning of December 1916
Sent from Zurich

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

530
TO M. N. POKROVSKY

6/XII. 1916

Dear Mikh. Nik.,

I received your postcard and two hundred francs, which I have forwarded to Zinoviev (I received 869 frs. = 500 rubles

from Petrograd), i.e., apparently the whole fee; *unless* part of it is payment for the agrarian work.* It is very, very sad that intrigants are working next to the "boss"** of the publications against publications!!...

My sincere regards,
V. Ulyanov

Sent from Zurich to Sceaux

First published in 1958 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

531
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I have just received your postcard. I sent a postcard to you in Berne, poste restante, a very short one containing a single request for your response, as your silence began to worry me a bit.

I am very keen now on the idea of publishing leaflets on Swiss affairs.

Something in the nature of a circle of Left-wingers has formed here. This term is inaccurate, though: so far just a number of meetings (evoked by my theses). Attended by Nobs, Platten, Münzenberg and several others of the Young. We discuss the war resolution in connection with the tasks of the Lefts. These talks have brought home to me most clearly: 1) how devilishly weak (in *all* respects) the Swiss Lefts are; 2) how poor is the "system" of influence of Bronski and Radek, who have been writing articles about the Lefts *in other* countries! The whole point is that everyone is willingly Left when it comes to *foreign countries*: it's cheap!! But when it comes to Switzerland... nothing doing!

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* This refers to the fee for *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* and *New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture.—Ed.*

** Maxim Gorky.—*Ed.*

Abramovich promises to distribute 1,500 copies of pamphlets and leaflets (*will you undertake to translate them*? Systematically and regularly? Answer!), while Münzenberg, with whom I spoke yesterday, the head of the *organisation* of the Young with *4,000!!* German members, undertakes to distribute a *maximum* of 1,500!!

Guilbeaux, to whom I sent the theses,* writes that he is very pleased with them and will use them as a *basis* for his newly formed Committee of Internationalists. We shall see!

I have read Humbert-Droz's *Plaidoirie*!![520] My God, what a muddle in his head! And this in 1916! A *hopeless* Tolstoyan, I'm afraid.

Grigory writes me that in No. 25 of *Arbeiterpolitik* there is a paragraph on "Three Editors of *Kommunist*"[521] and that "Radek is taking the same line with Y. B.+Bukharin as Tyszka with Lyova".... At last Grigory too has come to see it, although he still hangs back on the grounds that "despite this we ought not to break with Radek". Ha, ha!

I wonder how you are fixed up. It's a cold flat, Maison Vincent, isn't it? Do you go skiing? I strongly recommend it—it's very good for the health. Go skiing in the mountains near Rocher de Naye.

My best regards,
Lenin

P.S. What sort of person is Usiyevich's wife? An energetic woman, I believe? Will he make a Bolshevik of her or she make a neither-this-nor-that of him?

Written December 17, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

* See "Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social-Democratic Party" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 137-48).—*Ed.*

532

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV*

Regarding *Kommunist*, it's not worth arguing any more, seeing that you deny the fact that they insisted to the last on *equality* and *refused* to make any change in the Editorial Board. You can't get away from the facts: (1) equality; (2) Tyszka im Hintergrunde.**

I sent the 200 frs.

The Shklovsky scandal makes me furious and worries me.[522] And you wanted to hand all the funds over to him!! Energetic action is called for: he should be told that the money is needed by the New Year, and you should keep at him until he returns it all! What a damned scandal! A real "financial swindle", and right under our noses.

I agree to your plan for a collective letter to *Arbeiterpolitik*.

Best regards,
Lenin

P.S. What about the letter to Paris? Hasn't Inessa sent it yet? || N.B.

P.S. Re "*Soviet of Workers' Deputies*" and other material on 1905 please **send to me.**

Written after December 20, 1916
Sent from Zurich to Berne

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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* This letter was preceded by "Remarks Concerning the Article on Maximalism" (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 30, pp. 385-88).—*Ed.*

** In the background.—*Ed.*

1917

533
TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Dear M. N.,

I received your postcard and thank you very much for the trouble you have taken to save my pamphlet. Really, you are mistaken in thinking that I blame you in any way. Not at all! I am sure that without your intervention it would have been much worse, as the publisher* evidently gives an ear to "outside" advice from the philistine camp. It can't be helped. One good thing—you have succeeded nevertheless in saving some part of it (and a fairly large part). All the best wishes for a happy New Year.

Yours,
Lenin

Written January 3, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Sceaux

First published April 22, 1958, in the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* No. 95

Printed from the original

534
TO INESSA ARMAND

I'd like to share with you my ideas concerning the following plan.

I have set going my theses on the tasks of the Swiss Lefts, both in German and in French. In this connection I have hit on the plan of founding a small publishing business and issuing sheets, leaflets and *small* pamphlets elaborating these theses.

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* Maxim Gorky.—*Ed.*

I wrote to Abramovich. He answers that he undertakes to distribute 1,500 copies. He has credit in Imprimerie coopérative for six months. A leaflet will cost 50-70 frs. He promises to find out the details and let me know (I asked for details as to the cost of 2, 4 and 8 pages for 2,000 and 5,000 copies; the cost of the matrices; and~ how soon they can be issued). *But so far I have heard nothing from him!*

Told Abramovich in reply that the plan would have to be abandoned *for the time being* owing to difficulties, of which more below. I was compelled, or rather impelled, to answer in this way by the fact that Abramovich appears to be in the blues or something: he sometimes doesn't answer *for weeks*!! He's not used to carrying on correspondence, if you please, and is in the blues!! You can't work like this.

To rely solely on Abramovich in this business seemed to me rather risky.

Further. I wrote to Guilbeaux—he answered: the theses are "excellent". Very well: will you help distribute the leaflets!? How many copies?

No reply to this day! (Obviously, because of the plan for *their own* little journal.)

I went to Münzenberg: will you help? I will. But we can't handle more than *1,500* (this is terribly little!!)—we are overloaded with literature!

I have no German translator. Nobs half-promised, but *obviously* won't do it.

What's more, the party (i.e., the Parteivorstand) is deciding only tomorrow (7.I) whether to postpone the congress or not. A lot depends on this, of course.

Such is the state of affairs that produced my "bold plan" and then its abandonment (for a time).

Would you care to tackle this business?

Tentatively and approximately in the following manner:

You will be publisher of the French pamphlets. I take upon myself the editing (writing and editing). You will also be the translator. You would go to La Chaux-de-Fonds (for a short time, for a few days; I don't think there would be any need to live there) and ascertain the financial and technical details. You would also find out whether you could raise money (or get an advance) for this publishing business (how much?—I don't know. I think from 100 frs. *to seve-*

ral hundred, up to 300-500 frs. depending on the answer of the printing shop and on what scale the business is contemplated).

You could visit several centres of French Switzerland (La Chaux-de-Fonds, Fribourg, Genève, Lausanne, Bern, Neuchâtel and *so on*—this list is given *only as an example*) forming distributing groups, reading lectures, etc., making contacts and arrangements, checking.

I repeat: this is a tentative plan of work at its widest scope (probably only part of it would be practicable). A French publishing business *might* get the Germans moving.

I don't think Abramovich is lying—he will distribute 1,500. We can add a minimum of 500 for Geneva, etc. Total=2,000. We could make matrix-moulds so as not to risk losing money on a large number. The youth leagues to be paid 20% for distribution.

(a) Will it pay? (b) And how long will it take for the money to come back?

Everything depends on these two questions ($a+b$).

If (a) it does not pay at all, then we should not start it, for we have no donors. We can only go in for what can pay for itself. If (b) the money takes a long time in turning over, i.e. (this is most important), if the pamphlets are not paid for punctually and regularly, then the business *either* cannot be started altogether *or else* a large sum must be assigned to put *several* leaflets into circulation (there may always be need for issuing a polemical reply, as our enemies will not keep silent; the enemies have newspapers; to answer them we should have the possibility of issuing an extra pamphlet or leaflet). [The situation in the Party is such that a **furious** struggle may flare up.]

These are the advantages and disadvantages, the bright prospects and difficulties.

If this idea generally does not interest you, or if, for one reason or another, you do not consider it possible or suitable for you to undertake and organise this publishing business, then please drop the thing *without ceremony*. This will remain just a talk of mine with you on the subject of one of my plans (until I am eventually able, perhaps, to find a chance of resuming my plans).

If you *are* interested, then go and see Abramovich, go

into all this in a businesslike manner and drop me a line at once giving the results. We shall then discuss the plan again together most thoroughly and exchange letters.

The leaflets, in my opinion, should be of two kinds: (αα) for the masses and (ββ) for socialists.

Both of them small: *from 2 to 8 printed pages* of small size (small close-set type).

Subjects (tentatively):

(αα)—against defence of the fatherland; against indirect taxation; high cost of living; introduction of socialism as an immediate aim; expropriation of the banks, etc.

(ββ)—poor and sound arguments for rejecting defence of the fatherland; against the social-patriots and the Centre; against the *Grütlianer*[523] people outside and inside the party, etc., etc.

How to prepare for the party congress; a bourgeois-reformist labour party or a socialist party?

The leaflets could all be under a single trade name, Svet, say, or any other name.

Münzenberg told me that they (the "Young") would distribute even without commission charges, but that, I think, is impossible. At 20% (1 c. per every 5 c. of sales price) they would probably distribute *energetically*.

I hope I have made this all clear to you now, that is, I have written everything I know (as regards plans and information) to help you form an opinion of the whole enterprise.

I would consider it extremely important to publish *the same things* in German and Italian. But for that we need (1) translators; (2) more money. So far we have neither. I think that if the French job started, the Germans *would find* translators, maybe.

Possibly, the thing may not work with us simply because we may not be able to take the right tone as far as the French mentalité is concerned!

This worries me *greatly* and scares me *very much*.

Written January 6, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

535
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Thanks awfully for the news from Geneva. I wrote a very excited letter to Olga, which Karpinsky called abusive. I'm afraid she took offence. I shall write her an apology.

It has been hard to bear the fact that Brilliant has won Guilbeaux away from us.

But I see from your letter that this was unavoidable: given Guilbeaux's weakness, *we could not*, of course, make head against the joint influences of Lunacharsky (poet!)+ Brilliant (he has *money*, Grigory writes me)+Naine+ Graber.

We shall wait and see what sort of organ they will have.

If you get *l'Humanité* and have no further need of it after reading, please send me cuttings (the *text* of congress resolutions; articles on the congress; the speeches of Longuet & Co.; *their* resolutions; *interesting* articles, which are generally rare. And so on).[524]

On what a shameful resolution Longuet+Renaudel have found common ground (2,800 against 120!!) and Bourderon +Raffin-Dugens have *gone over* to them!! And Merrheim? Didn't he vote together with Jouhaux for the pacifist resolution of the C.G.T.!!

Disgraceful!

I connect this with Kautsky's 5 articles on peace (the same claptrap)+the Italian Socialist Party and Turati's speech of 17/XII. 1916 (the same claptrap).

The victory of Kautskian pacifism *over* Zimmerwald, which Grimm (appeal of the I.S.C. of 30.XII.1916)[525] paints over with r-r-revolutionary phrases!! Just as in the II International: a revolutionary signboard+reformist essence.

I am starting a campaign (or rather, I wish to start it) to expose this lie.

And what a disgrace in the Swiss party! 10 days ago the War Committee (specially elected by the Central Committee of the party) drew up 2 resolutions: 5 votes against defence of the fatherland and 4 *in favour*.

Up till now **not one** has been published!!

The opportunists (and Grimm!) are trying their hardest to get this question shelved and the congress put off (on the excuse that the workers are not prepared! Actually, it is they, the opportunists, who are *dragging out* the preparations...).

They don't want to conduct the elections to parliament (autumn 1917) under the slogan of non-defence of the fatherland!!

A shame and utter depravity....

All the very very, best. I wish you good cheer and the best of everything in the New Year.

Yours,
Lenin

Written in January, after 6th, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

536
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am sending you the promised No. of *Volksrecht* containing the resolution of the meeting of protest against postponement of the congress.[526] If there are any Swiss Lefts in Clarens and Lausanne, it would be a good thing to translate this resolution and get them to protest too.

Return Kamenevs[527] directly to me when you have read it, as I have not read it yet.

I am sending you the catalogues for 2 days: look through them and write out (the titles and numbers) *what is of interest to you*. I shall be able to send you one book at a time from this library. I also have the *big* main

catalogue: I can send you *this too* if you are interested and if it is not available at the local public library.

All the best,
Yours,
Lenin

Written January 7, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

537
TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Dear M. N.,

I had just sent you a postcard about the pamphlet (in reply to yours) when I started receiving the money and have now received 500 frs. in 2 instalments, for which I thank you very much.

I have also received a formal answer (from the P.O.) that my manuscript on economics,* which I sent you on 2.VII.1916, *saisi l'autorité militaire*!!!**

Simply incredible!! Can anything be done about it, or is it hopeless?

Best regards and best wishes,
Yours,
V. Ulyanov

Written January 8, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Sceaux

First published in 1958
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

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* This refers to the manuscript of the book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304).—*Ed.*

** Confiscated by the military authorities.—*Ed.*

538

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. A.,

You've given me a proper "wigging" over Nicholas II. haven't you?*

As regards *Garton Foundation* I have seen no mention of it and I don't know where and how to look for it. Don't you remember where you have read it? Couldn't you find that No. of the newspaper—I would then be able to trace it in the library here.

I am enclosing *Volksrecht* where, in addition to the declaration of the C.C., take note of the resolution of the Zurich meeting *against postponement of the congress*.[528] Will Olga please move this in the Geneva group of the Zimmerwald Lefts and support it in every way, translate the resolution, get a similar one adopted, and so on (we drafted this resolution here in the circle of Zimmerwald Lefts. It is desirable that we act jointly).

I should *not* like to go to Geneva: (1) I am unwell; bad nerves. I *shy* at lectures; (2) I am engaged here on 22.I, and must prepare for a *German* report. Therefore, I cannot promise to come. (Let me know what's this meeting Guilbeaux proposes, a meeting *of whom*, when? Can I be useful? In what way?)

All the very best to both of you. Kindest regards.

Yours,
Lenin

Written between January 10 and 22, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

* What this alludes to is unknown.—*Ed.*

539
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Yesterday we had a meeting of the Left Germans. Mostly workers, some young people. We haven't got the work running smoothly yet: I have a dual, uncertain impression. He's a nice one, Nobs! A worker sent him a Left article about the mean trick in putting off the congress. Nobs put the article in over the man's signature, and the next day printed another article of a different trend; he *mutilated* the *Left* article, pruned it away, and I discovered this by accident at the meeting, when I criticised the article in *just* those passages which Nobs had mutilated!

And these are "Lefts"!

Incidentally, it emerged at the meeting that there were contacts with the Lefts in Neuchâtel, who had previously come out against the opportunists. It wouldn't be a bad idea to take a trip there with addresses (or letters of introduction, which I could get here) and brief them, read them a lecture, make contacts and so on.

Did I write you that Naine, at a meeting of the Parteivorstand (7.I), had the honesty to speak *against* Grimm to reproach him precisely as "international secretary"?

Olga writes me today that Guilbeaux delivered a report on the French congress, scathingly criticised the Longuetists ("he out-does you", as she writes) and stood for a split. That's good, but he, Guilbeaux, has no *base*, he is a man of moods, he has no foundations, no theory. That is dangerous. He is expecting his wife from Paris, who is carrying on agitation there. Guilbeaux and Brilliant have agreed to adopt a resolution of protest against postponement of the congress. They are having a meeting of delegates on 22.I to vote this resolution.

The day after tomorrow, Sunday, we here are having a meeting of the Bureau of Lefts (Grigory, Radek and I) on the question of a protest against Grimm. We shall see!

I wish you all the very best, and ask you again to make a trip somewhere, if only for a time, if only with lectures or anything else, so as to have a change, to throw yourself

into some absorbing occupation, something useful to new and fresh people. Believe me, work among the French is extremely needful and extremely useful.

I have received the book and catalogues. Merci.

Yours,
Lenin

Written January 13, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

540
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I have received your letter and the cutting from *Russkiye Vedomosti*. Thanks very much.

Dear friend! I know how terribly bad you feel and I am eagerly anxious to help you in any way I can. What- about your trying to live at some place where there are friends and where you could chronically have talks on Party affairs and chronically take part in them?

I received a letter today from Guilbeaux, a short one. He writes that they are preparing a meeting on the question of peace. I have written 4 articles (or chapters) on this for *Novy Mir* (they are said to pay 5 dollars for an article, which would be most welcome, by the way).[529] I am sending them to you. Will you consider the following plan: I could let you have further material and you would prepare a French lecture on this subject, a highly topical one, and make the round of French Switzerland with it? It would be extremely useful to the cause, as there is *no end* of pacifist muddle in everybody's head, and this muddle can be dissipated only by steady, systematic influence. No really, tackle this, draw up the most *detailed* theses for your lecture (we could discuss them together) or else write out the whole lecture. The French workers in Switzerland have *no one* to lecture them on the Marxist attitude to pacifism, and *you* could do that and give the workers plenty of food for thought. Start

preparing little by little right now; the work will *absorb* you. Believe me, absorbing work is most important and soothing for health and mind! I'll send you cuttings from *Bataille*,[530] the texts of resolutions, texts from *Avanti!* (I can obtain back numbers of *Avanti!*—you can *easily* learn to read Italian; that, too, would be **extremely** *important*, as there are very many Italian workers in Switzerland, and they, too, have *no one* to teach them Marxism).

Grimm is calling (this is between ourselves) a conference of socialists of the *Entente* for 23.I (to discuss their conduct at the conference of chauvinist socialists of the Entente). We are preparing a sharp protest against Grimm (even to the extent of demanding his resignation from the I.S.C.) for his despicable behaviour in the matter of congress postponement.* I strongly advise you to look for *Volksrecht* (I shall send you the issue containing the resolution), *Berner Tagwacht* (you can have that sent from Berne, can't you? Especially the issue of 8 or 9.I) and *Grütlianer* (4.I and 9.I). I shall be writing you more about this. The meeting of the Swiss party's Executive (Parteivorstand) of 7.I. 1917 was an *historic* one: they have postponed for an indefinite time a congress devoted precisely to the Militärfrage!! And Grimm took the lead *coming out in favour* of postponement together with the social-patriots!! No, this is a thing we shall make him pay for. We are having a meeting of the Lefts here today. Grigory and I have written to Radek, inviting him and Roland-Holst and others to protest against Grimm. We shall invite Guilbeaux too, but he is right out of his depth on this question, and your lecture (whether a public lecture or a talk in the Geneva group of Lefts to begin with) would be useful in the extreme.

Olga has written me that some Left Frenchman is arriving to see Guilbeaux (and she has put Guilbeaux up to the idea of inviting me to meet him. I feel awkward about it, it's inconvenient; I am not going). But is it a Frenchman arriving for 23.I?? If you could spend some time *around* that date (23.I) in Geneva and read (or prepare) your lecture there, you could probably run into the Frenchman from Paris *by accident* (the accidental part of it is important) and teach

* See next letter.—*Ed.*

him quite a lot. Prepare your lecture or talk for 25.I, will you?? (And if "*they*" are not to return by 25, then, after your talk with Guilbeaux, put it off until their return: in this way you could "catch" both Guilbeaux and the Frenchman, eh??)

You had better wait going to see Abramovich, as he wrote me yesterday that he was *sending* information from the printing shop. We had better wait till it arrives.

All the very very best, and wishing you to come to speedy grips with your lecture (it will come in useful to you later in any case).

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. *Pacifism* now is the question of the day. It is *here*, i.e., on this question, that we must now teach (Guilbeaux and the French in particular) to present it in a Marxist manner. Answer me on this point without delay.

Written January 14, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

541
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Only today, Monday, we finished the conferences on the anti-Grimm protest which we had started yesterday. It was attended also by a German, a member of *Die Internationale* group, fully a "Left".

We adopted such an emphatic statement against Grimm (demanding his removal from the I.S.C.) that Platten called it "political murder".

This is strictly between ourselves for the time being.

It will take a week or two to have this sent to Roland-Holst and the others and get their reply.

I am pretty tired—I have got unused to meetings!

I trust that you are not answering my suggestion about your French lecture trip not because you are absolutely against it, but simply because you are considering this plan with the idea of accepting it. I am not hurrying you, and shall not repeat my persuasions, but I would very much like you to take a change of air, to visit new and old friends, I would dearly love to say a lot of kind words to you to make things easier for you until you get into your stride with work that will engross you completely.

All the very best,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I am expecting this anti-Grimm protest to do a lot of good.

Written January 15, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

542

TO V. A. KARPINSKY AND SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Friends,

I am badly in need of *Diskussionny Listok* issued by the C.O. of the R.S.D.L.P. (*Paris*, 1910 or 1911), containing my article against Martov and Trotsky on the Russian revolution (giving statistics on strikes and % of uyezds with a peasant movement).* Only a few Nos. of *Diskussionny Listok* were issued, and you *should* have them. It would not be difficult to find the article. Please send it to me at once. I

* See "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" (present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 374-92).—*Ed.*

shall return both this and the previous material sent to me very soon.

Best regards,
Lenin

Written January 15, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1925
in German in the collection
Lenin *W. I. Rede über die Revolution von 1905*, Leipzig

First published in Russian
in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

543

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

If Switzerland is drawn into the war, the French will occupy Geneva immediately. To be in Geneva then is to be in France, and from there, to be in touch with Russia. I am therefore thinking of turning over the *Party* funds to you (for you to keep *on your person*, sewed up in a special little bag, as the bank won't let you draw it during the war). I am writing to Grigory about this. These are merely plans, between ourselves for the time being.

I think that we shall remain in Zurich, that war is improbable.

My very best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written January 16, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

544

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Please translate the enclosed resolution into French and *return* it to me (after having a copy made for the Lausanne *German* group).[531]

The resolution has been adopted here by the *Lefts* and is going all round Switzerland.

We must try and get it circulated among all Party *members* and passed through all Party organisations, however small.

Should even a *single* organisation, however small, adopt this resolution, it should be sent *officially* to both the local and central headquarters of the Party (Geschäftsleitung der Soz. Partei. *Zürich*. Volkshaus) with a *demand* that it be published.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I am sending a copy to Olga for Guilbeaux and one to Abramovich.

Written January 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

545

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am enclosing Abramovich's letter (*return it immediately*) and an American leaflet (return when finished with, not urgent).

Abramovich's letter shows that things are going well (here too: yesterday a resolution was adopted against the congress being put off and calling for a referendum on the congress[532]).

This shows that we must make great haste with *our* publishing business (leaflets and sheets). Great haste!! (and start a German publishing business of *our own* through the German groups both in La Chaux-de-Fonds and in Lausanne).

Hurry up with your trip to La Chaux-de-Fonds for a few days, get an exact estimate from the printing shop (not your-

self, but through Abramovich) and write to me as soon as possible. How much money can you raise and how soon: 50 frs.? 100 or 200?

Hurry! Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. About the war, there is *no* danger: general mobilisation is not expected until the spring.

Written January 20, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

546

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I received the translation. Thanks awfully. I have sent it on.*

As regards the censorship to which you have subjected my French article,** I am surprised, really. As you did not send me the original, and I would hardly undertake a French translation myself, I sent it, of course, as you suggested, omitting the passage about Engels.

"The mere thought that I am defending Engels's point of view on war and on the stand the Germans took at the time, makes your blood boil and you cannot translate it .... "

Well, well! I *am* surprised! We, Grigory and I, quoted this passage—more than passage: statement, declaration of Engels—many times, directly and indirectly, in 1914 and 1915.

Engels, it should be remembered, wrote this first for the *French* socialists and it was published in *their Almanach du Parti Ouvrier*.[533] At that time the French did not protest,

* See Document 544 in this volume.—*Ed.*

** See "An Open Letter to Boris Souvarine" (present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 195-204).—*Ed.*

feeling—if not realising clearly—that the war of Boulanger+Alexander III against Germany of those days would be anti-democratic *only* on their part, but on the part of Germany (of whose imperialism there *could be no question* at the time!!) it would really be only "defence", really a war for national existence.

And now, what the French themselves acknowledged in 1891 to be correct, you suddenly cry down, and how! And just before that, at a meeting of the Swiss Lefts, they (semi-pacifists, what can you do?) dismissed my reference to this statement of Engels's with amazing frivolity of their own peculiar brand.

You did not say anything either about my article in reply to Kievsky.

My work with the Swiss Lefts, like my reflections on the absurdities which Radek has talked himself into, convince me more and more that on the vital question of *motives* for rejecting defence of the fatherland our stand is the *only* correct one. Have you seen No. 6 of *Jugend-Internationale*, of which I wrote in *Sb. No. 2* (did you get it?) and *Arbeiterpolitik* No. 25?[534]

I have received a postcard from Kamenev. I shall send it to you. Olga writes that things are looking up with the Lefts, that an organisation of Zimmerwald Lefts, French+Italian (!! I am ever so pleased about this)+Russian, has been founded and that Guilbeaux will write to me about it (I shall forward it on to you, if you like). I try to follow *Avanti!* and am becoming convinced that Souvarine is right: Turati is quite a Kautskyite and he is switching the whole Italian socialist parliamentary group onto these lines. His last speech (17.I) is smart: he's a smart alec of bourgeois pacifism, and not a socialist at all.

I wish you the very, very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written January 22, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

547
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

It was very interesting yesterday at Olten. Non-attendance of the French and Italians enabled Radek+Levi+Grigory+Münzenberg to tell Grimm the whole truth to his face. Radek told me this today, and Grigory will probably write to you about it.

Re *Arbeiterpolitik*, write to Radek—he has already left (Herrn Sobelsohn. Zur Stelle. *Davos-Dorf*).

On what "central point" I did not answer you, I cannot even guess.

Am waiting for you to explain.

I know about Marx's English works; they are special things that I shall have to read in due course (I bought some of them in London and started to read them, but did not finish), but *now I have no time*.

That Grimm "does not want a mass movement", or rather does not want revolutionary work, you are quite right. His article is generally and wholly Kautskian, Centrist, fraudulent.

That Berne Kautskyite and O.C. man Spectator has issued a small pamphlet in Berne on *Vaterlands-Verteidigung** (25 cts) in which he tries to play off Radek and me against each other (I haven't read it all yet. I have only seen this),[535] as Martov tried to do yesterday (defending!!! Grimm). A futile, vain attempt!

All the best,
Lenin

Written February 2, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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*A filthy Kautskian-O.C. thing! Will I answer him! He'll be pleased!

548
TO KARL RADEK

Dear Radek,

Spectator's pamphlet* is so absurd that at first I had doubts whether it was worth answering. But as this petty intrigant is trying, by the most despicable and stupid means, to make capital out of our differences, I presume—especially since he names me, *and only* me, personally—that it is *my* right and *my* duty to answer him. I shall do everything to have this reply published *not only* in Russian.

As regards *our* draft resolution against defence of the fatherland (for Switzerland),** I forgot to tell you the following: my draft (the opening §§ in my theses) satisfied you, that is, I succeeded then in expressing our common point of view. Why not adopt *it* as a basis for our joint draft?

My best regards,
Ulyanov

P.S. I have received from America No. 1 of the new weekly *Internationalist*. They announce in the Manifesto their solidarity with the "Lefts in Europe". The publisher is Pannekoek of *Vorbote*. What should I send you—the English original or the Russian translation?

Written February 3, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Davos

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

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* See previous document.—*Ed.*

** This refers to "Theses on the Attitude of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party Towards the War" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 149-51).—*Ed.*

549

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I haven't had a single line from you for a long time. You promised almost a week ago to write "tomorrow"—and not a sound. Has there been anything special to prevent it? Drop me at least a line, if you aren't in a writing mood, otherwise I feel worried.

Re 1.II, I wrote you briefly, if I am not mistaken.

On 3.II there was a meeting (strictly private) between Grimm and his friends+Nobs and Platten. (Münzenberg and Bronski were invited, but refused to go to these Zentrumsleute, and a good thing too.) Nobs and Platten are weak-willed men (if not worse), and are dead "afraid" of Grimm.

They adopted some amendments to the resolution (of course, Grimm "tricked" Nobs and Platten). I haven't seen these amendments yet. They should be published tomorrow (Thursday).[536] On the whole, the Lefts here, I must say, are super-trash.

Yesterday there was a meeting (meetings tire me; nerves no good at all; headaches; left before the end)—a general meeting. Re-elected the executive of the whole Zurich organisation. Elected Bronski *too*. And would you believe it—the social-patriot scoundrels (with Baumann at the head) got up and walked out.* We don't want to work with Bronski!!

And Nobs+Platten swallowed the pill and put through a postponement!! What a disgrace!! And these are Lefts!! And the Young are "afraid" of Nobs and Platten!!

I hear that Humbert-Droz has lectured already in Geneva and is seducing the young people with his idiotic pacifism. It would be a good thing if you gave him a number of public battles, politely but firmly pointed out to him the

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* See present edition, Vol. 23, p. 285.—*Ed.*

whole infamy of pacifism, its whole staggering banality, and put forward a revolutionary programme!

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written February 7, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

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in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

You are right about the "majority's" corrected resolution (of the Swiss party): it's worse than bad. It's a fully Centrist, Kautskian resolution. Grimm made a mess of it, and Nobs and Platten *backed down*. On Sunday there was a congress of the cantonal Zurich S. D. party; our ("Young") people moved a Left resolution drafted by us, which collected 32 votes. This is a great success.

Abramovich was to have sent you the text of my resolution (the practical part of which was largely included in the resolution tabled at the congress the day before yesterday (you will get it from the newspapers if you haven't learned about it already)).[537]

I think you ought to prepare a lecture (in French) on the three trends in the Swiss party. The material—referendum+ three resolutions (that of the Right, Grimm's and the Left). It's worth it, really.

Humb.-Droz, seeing that he is a Tolstoyan, should be fought *all along* the line. Most definitely!

It isn't true that revolutionary mass action in Switzerland is "impossible". What about the general strike in Zurich in 1912? And we had this action in Geneva and in La Chaux-de-Fonds too. Now, during the war, action by the masses and even a revolution in Switzerland are *still more* possible (this would be of importance for France and Germany).

There is ground in the Swiss party for building up a *Left trend*. This is a fact. It will be rewarding, though not easy, work.

Where did you find the documents on Engels's preface to the class struggle? In *Neue Zeit*? Do you know that the Berlin "leaders" have *struck out* of this preface its revolutionary end?

Re the war (of '91) I am waiting for your remarks on that "central point" on which you say I was silent.

Jaurès, Disc. parlem.* Volume Two *missing*.

Could you get the *Works* of Fourier and find for me what he has to say about the merging of nationalities?

All the very best,
Lenin

P.S. Have you been able to influence *Mrs*. Belousov (*he*'s a fool, you know) and Usiyevich's wife?

Written February 14, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

551

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am sending you a leaflet. Will you please translate it into French and English.[538] The German translation will be made for me in Berne, I hope.

I am greatly interested in the idea of such propaganda, especially of the May Day strike—a strike like this was suggested by one of the Lefts in Switzerland (*Holzarbeiter-Zeitung*, Schweizerische, von 27.I.1917). I'd very much like to send this leaflet to Paris. I hope Grisha will be able to get it published, and it will find its way to Germany, too, afterwards, I think.

* Parliamentary speeches.—*Ed*.

Please translate it in vigorous language, in short sentences. Please write it in duplicate on thin paper as clearly as possible to avoid misprints. If possible let Usiyevich (keeping the thing secret) make a copy from the *Russian* text to be forwarded to Abramovich (together with one copy of the French translation). The two English copies, one French copy and my Russian text return to me *as soon as possible*. We must hurry, because in view of mailing difficulties, there is not much time left until 1.V, and we must start agitation beforehand.

All the very best,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Nadya feels better today, though she is still in bed. She sends you warm regards. Read the enclosed and forward it to Abramovich together with the Russian text and the French translation.

Written between February 19 and 27, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

552

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

If you send me your theses on the war question, I shall be glad to discuss them, of course. As for your coming out against Golay, I don't see why the idea of its being "awkward" should occur to you. In my opinion, on the contrary, it's anything but awkward and extremely useful. We have got to come out as strongly and bluntly as possible against the ridiculous pacifism of the French (achieving socialism without revolution, and so on) and the ridiculous belief in democracy. Golay, in my opinion, should be given a special and public trouncing for recanting the valuable

admissions in his pamphlet *Le Socialisme qui meurt*. I consider this pamphlet excellent material for criticising the weakness and shallow thinking of the French Lefts.

I have received from you a copy of the Russian text of the leaflet (I am very pleased that you liked it). But there is no sign of the French text!! Yet I asked for it to be done in duplicate!!! The thought that we shall be late preys on my mind—there is only 2 months to go until 1.V and the difficulties of communicating with the warring countries are enormous.

As regards Usiyevich, you write yourself that he is "spineless". So I did not scold him for nothing (and I asked for the letter to be shown to you so that we could agree on methods of influencing him).

So please hurry up *as much as you can* with the French and English translations of the leaflet. If for any reason you couldn't do it in duplicate, then at least let me know exactly when you sent the leaflet (French) to Abramovich.

I am ever so pleased to hear that you are coming out more often before the youth. A useful thing! The young are the only people worth working on! Everything must be done to break down their pacifism and disbelief in the mass movement (what about the Zurich strike of 1912? And in Geneva in 1900 or 1902?). It would be a good thing if you could collect material on the big strikes in the history of the labour movement in French Switzerland.

Nadya has recovered.

All the very best,
Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I have read Pannekoek's discussion with Kautsky in *Neue Zeit* (1912). Kautsky is despicably mean, and Pannekoek, but for some *inaccuracies* and slight mistakes, is *almost* right. Kautsky is the acme of opportunism.

Written February 27, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

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in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

553
TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I haven't heard from you for a long time.

Things here in Zurich with the *German* Lefts are as bad as ever. After Nobs and Platten crossed "back to Grimm" the leaders of the Young tagged along after them. Münzenberg *turned down* Radek's articles against Grimm; Bucher and other friends of Münzenberg repeat the same phrases about the danger of a "split"!! It would be funny, were it not so disgusting....

I am urging Grigory to try a German newspaper (he is *being offered* 300 frs. for it?), but it looks as if this last card will be beaten too.

I envy you and Grigory, because you are both able to lecture publicly. After all, when you deliver a public lecture you have *fresh* people in front of you, workers, a crowd, and not just officials or officials-to-be, or a handful of people browbeaten by officials. In a public lecture you speak to the *mass*, you make *direct* contact with it, you see it, meet it and *influence it in your own way*.

Apparently here, in Zurich, the fuss and bother over the German Lefts is *over*. The referendum motivation and the resolution of the Lefts in Töss are the *only* fruits. I don't regret the time wasted, though (I am in a very angry state of mind just now, as I have come in from a meeting of the Lefts *that did not take place*: our people scattered!). I don't regret it because to my theoretical understanding of the rottenness of the European parties has now been added a *practical* understanding of some use.

Public lectures are a good thing, anyway, and they should be used for a direct fight against both the Centre (Grimm & Co.) and the "Lefts" (like Nobs, Platten, Naine, Graber, Droz, etc.).

I suppose you don't feel like working on the translation of the leaflet into English? In that case, drop it: I'll send it as it is to Paris, maybe they'll find some Englishman there.

Abramovich is a good chap, that's where work is going well!

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written March 8, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

554

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Obviously my former explanations of your silence were erroneous.

You did not "take offence", did you, at my writing you about your not having gone over the French text? Incredible! Incredible because Abramovich, too, wrote to me on the same subject. Besides, is it conceivable that anyone can *take offence* at such a thing?? Inconceivable!!

And on the other hand, the complete silence, for instance on the question of the English translation is strange....

Of course, if you don't feel like answering, or even if you do, and have decided not to, I shall not pester you with my questions.

The Lefts in Switzerland have now scattered away from us both here and in Berne. (Things are good only with Abramovich and with you, as you have *direct* means of approach to the *mass* in lectures and Abramovich has them in personal contacts.)

The talks with Yuri & Co. for the publication *by them* of pamphlets endorsed by the C.C. section abroad are finished. *This is welcome news!*

From Russia—nothing, not even letters!! We are making arrangements via Scandinavia.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I am writing Usiyevich today in reply to his letter, in a spirit of "reconciliation".

Written March 13, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

555
TO INESSA ARMAND[539]

Dear Friend,

I am writing to you on my way back from a lecture. Yesterday (Saturday) I lectured on the amnesty.[540] We are all dreaming of leaving. If you are going home drop in to see us first. We'll have a talk. I would very much like you to find out for me in England discreetly whether I would be granted passage.

All the best,
Yours,
V. U.

Written March 18, 1917
Sent from Ambulant (Switzerland) to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am writing you in reply to the letters I received from you today and in connection with the talk we had on the telephone.

I must say I am keenly disappointed. In my opinion everybody these days should have a single thought to rush off. Yet people are "waiting" for something!!...

I am sure that I will be arrested or simply detained in England if I go under my own name, as it was England that not only confiscated a number of my letters to America, but asked (her police) Papasha in 1915 whether he corresponded with me and whether he was in touch with the German socialists through me.

It's a fact! Therefore, I cannot personally make any move unless very "special" measures have been taken.

What about the others? I was certain that you would rush off to England, as only there could you find out how to get through and how great the risk is (they say via Holland, London—Holland—Scandinavia, the risk is slight) and so on.

Yesterday I wrote you a postcard on my way back,* thinking that you were doubtlessly planning and had decided to go to Berne to see the consul. But you write that you are undecided and want to think it over.

My nerves, naturally, are overstrung. No wonder! To have to sit here on tenterhooks....

Probably you have special reasons, your health maybe is bad, and so on.

I shall try to persuade Valya to go (she came running down to see us on Saturday after having kept away for a year!). But the revolution doesn't interest her much.

Oh, yes, I nearly forgot. What you could and should do immediately in Clarens is to start looking out for passports (α) among Russians who would agree to give theirs (without them knowing it's for me) to enable another person to leave the country; (β) among Swiss men or women who would give theirs to a Russian.

Anna Yevg. and Abram should be made *immediately* to go to the embassy to get a pass (if they are refused, to complain *by wire* to Milyukov and Kerensky) and leave, or, if they don't intend to leave, to let us know on the basis of *facts* (and not words) what the procedure is for getting a pass.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

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* See previous letter.—*Ed.*

In Clarens (and the vicinity) there are many wealthy and not-so-wealthy Russian social-patriots, etc. (Troyanovsky, Rubakin, etc.), who should ask the Germans to allow the passage of a railway coach to Copenhagen for various revolutionaries.

Why not?

I cannot do it. I am a "defeatist".

But Troyanovsky and Rubakin+Co. *can*.

Oh, if I could only teach sense to these noodles and riffraff!...

You will say, perhaps, that the Germans *won't* give a coach. I bet you they *will*!

Of course, if they get to know that this idea comes *from me* or from *you*, the thing will be ruined....

Are there any fools in Geneva for this purpose?...

Written March 19, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear Comrade,

I thank you very, very much for the information. I shall not go now either to read the lecture or to the meeting,[541] as I have to write daily for *Pravda* in Petrograd.

My best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Please continue to keep me informed of news and speeches of the different trends.

Written March 21, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO JAKUB HANECKI

22/III. 1917

Dear Friend,

I have just sent off by express post to Christiania (Vidnes, *Social-Demokraten*, for Kollontai) two letters enclosing two articles* for the Petrograd *Pravda*. I hope both letters will find Kollontai in Christiania before her departure (she is leaving 27.III in the morning). If they don't, will you kindly, first, check whether the forwarding machinery in Christiania is working well; secondly, if need be, forward it all *yourself*. I am using only one Petrograd address for the time being: Mr. Vlad. Bonch-Bruyevich, Zhizn i Znaniye Publishing House, 38 Fontanka, Flat 19, Petrograd: This publisher will deliver it at once to *Pravda*.

I hope you will *immediately* start sending me *Pravda* and *everything* else of the same kind. Please wire me immediately on receipt of this letter: "letter received, dispatch arranged."

Greetings and congratulations!

Yours,

Vl. Ulyanov

P.S. I ask you most earnestly to keep me informed.

Sent from Zurich to Christiania

First published January 21, 1928, in *Pravda* No. 18

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

* This refers to "*Letters from Afar*. First Letter. The First Stage of the First Revolution. Second Letter. The New Government and the Proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 295-319).—*Ed.*

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TO THE EDITORS OF THE SWEDISH *SOCIAL-DEMOKRATEN*

To the Editors of *Social-Demokraten*

Dear Comrades,*

You are aware that grave revolutionary events are taking place in Russia. The Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party considers it very important, therefore, that foreign comrades should be correctly informed about this movement. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. recommends to you Comrade *A. Kollontai*, whose information is absolutely trustworthy.

With Social-Democratic greetings,
on behalf of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.

Written March 22, 1917
Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

560

TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I am sending you Kamenev's postcards, to be returned when you have read them.

Have you seen extracts from the C.C.'s Manifesto in *Frankfurter Zeitung* (and in *Volksrecht*)? Good, aren't they!

Congratulations.

My best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Buy *The Times*: the best information.

Valya has been told (at the British embassy) that there is no passage at all through England.

What if *no passage whatever* is allowed *either* by England or by Germany!!! And this is possible!

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* The first two lines are in the hand of Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

P.S. Read the enclosed copies of my articles* at once, give them to Usiyevich to read and send them *immediately* to the Karpinskys in Geneva, who are to return them *immediately*!

N.B. I must have these copies by Monday.

Written March 23, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

I received today from Karpinsky my First Letter, which you apparently managed to send him. Thanks.

There is no Second Letter. You received it, didn't you?? Then where is it?

Letters 3 and 4 for *Pravda* I shall send to you tomorrow, Wednesday. When you have read them and shown them to Usiyevich, please forward them to the Karpinskys. I have a lecture here today.**

It's interesting what you will have to say about Letter No. 3—during our talks.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. I thought you would inform me by postcard that my letter had been forwarded to Karpinsky and yesterday I wrote to Usiyevich, believing that you had gone away.

Written March 27, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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* This refers to *Letters from Afar* (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 295-319).—*Ed.*

** Lenin read a lecture "The Tasks of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Russian Revolution" at a meeting of Swiss workers in the Zurich People's House on March 27, 1917 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 355-61).—*Ed.*

562
TO SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Olga,

Please see that Vyach. Al. does not make a fuss over the typing*—he will receive the manuscript from Grigory tomorrow. *The arrangement* is: payment *no less* than before.

To be typed *in duplicate*, quarto size desirable (not obligatory).

Your marriage plan[542] sounds very reasonable to me, and I shall stand (in the C.C.) for 100 frs. being issued to you: 50 frs. in the fist of a lawyer and 50 frs. to a "convenient old man"** for marrying you!

No, really!! To have the right of entry **both** into Germany and into Russia!

Hurrah! A brilliant idea of yours!

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Please type my letters to *Pravda* on the *thinnest* paper.

Written March 27, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

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TO JAKUB HANECKI[543]

Please let me know in greatest possible detail, first, whether the British Government will allow passage to Russia to me and a number of members of our Party, the R.S.D.L.P. (Central Committee), on the following conditions: (a) The Swiss socialist Fritz Platten receives permission from the British Government to conduct any number of

* This refers to the typing of the MS. of Lenin's book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431).—*Ed.*

** Take Axelrod!

persons through England irrespective of their political allegiances and their views on war and peace; (b) Platten alone answers both for the composition of the conducted groups and for maintaining proper order, and receives a railway coach for travelling through England, which he, Platten, is to keep locked. No one can enter this coach without the consent of Platten. This coach shall have exterritorial rights; (c) From a port in England Platten conveys the group by the steamer of any neutral country, with the right to notify *all* countries of the sailing time of this special ship; (d) Railway fares shall be paid by Platten according to the tariff and the number of seats occupied; (e) The British Government undertakes not to place obstacles to the chartering and sailing of a special steamer with Russian political emigrants and not to detain the steamer in England, enabling the passage to be made in the quickest possible way.

Secondly, in the event of agreement, what guarantees can England give that these conditions will be observed, and whether she has any objection to these conditions being published.

If telegraphic inquiries have to be made in London we agree to bear the expenses of a telegram and a prepaid reply.

Date....

Written prior to March 30, 1917

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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TO INESSA ARMAND

I dashed off the previous sheet the day before yesterday in answer to your letter with questions, but I didn't want to send it without amplifying it.

However I was so busy that I had no time to do it until this evening.

I hope we shall be starting out on Wednesday—together with you, I hope.

Grigory was here. We have arranged to travel together.

I trust you have received the money (100 frs.) sent this morning by express.

We have more money for the journey than I thought, enough for 10-12 persons. The comrades in Stockholm have been a *great* help.

It is quite possible that the *majority* of the workers in Petrograd are now social-patriots.

We shall fight.

The war will agitate **for** us.

A thousand greetings. Au revoir.

Yours,
Lenin

Written between March 31 and April 4, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Clarens

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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TELEGRAM TO JAKUB HANECKI

Earmark two thousand, better three thousand, kronen for our journey. Intend leave Wednesday* minimum ten persons. Wire.

Ulyanov

Written April 1, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Stockholm

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

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TO V. A. KARPINSKY AND SOPHIA RAVICH

Dear Friends,

Things are going well. The plan, of which Comrade Minin knows, is being carried out. Platten takes everything upon himself. Below I am giving you a copy of the conditions which Platten has submitted. Apparently they will be accepted. Otherwise we shall not go. Grimm is still trying

* April 4.—*Ed.*

to persuade the Mensheviks, but we are acting entirely on our own, of course. We think we shall leave on Friday, Wednesday and Saturday. And now this. We want a detailed protocol to be drawn up about everything before we leave. Platten, Levi (of *Berner Tagwacht*, representing the press) and others will be invited to sign it. French participation would be highly desirable. N.B. Talk it over immediately with Guilbeaux, explain the situation to him, show him the terms, and if he sympathises, ask him to *come* at a wire from here (expenses defrayed). This would be very important. It is highly probable that we shall also invite Charles Naine (Platten will talk it over with him on the telephone).

Still more important: if Guilbeaux sympathises, perhaps he could get Romain Rolland too to sign. *Extremely important*: there was a paragraph in *Petit Parisien* that Milyukov has threatened to prosecute everybody who comes in through Germany. Tell Guilbeaux this. French participation, in view of this, is especially important. Answer immediately. Sincerely yours. N.B.

4/IV—1917

We have received a telegram from Perm: "Salut fraternel Ulianow, Zinowieff. Aujourdhui partons Petrograd etc.* Signed: Kamenev, Muranov, Stalin."

Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

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TELEGRAM TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Delay absolutely impossible. Come without papers. Mikha, Brendisten too must leave Berne 10.40 a.m.

Ulyanov

Written April 6, 1917
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the text of the telegraph form
Translated from the German

* "Fraternal greetings to Ulyanov, Zinoviev. We are leaving today for Petrograd."—*Ed.*

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TELEGRAM TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Leaving Berne tomorrow 10.45 a.m. Come immediately.

Ulyanov

Written April 6, 1917
Sent from Berne to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the text of
the telegraph form
Translated from the
German

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TELEGRAM TO JAKUB HANECKI

Twenty people leaving tomorrow. Make sure Lindhagen and Ström meet us in Trelleborg. Gall Belenin, Kamenev out urgently to Finland.

Ulyanov

Written April 7, 1917
Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1924
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 1

Printed from the text of
the telegraph form
Translated from the
German

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TELEGRAM TO JAKUB HANECKI

Final departure date Monday.* Forty people. Make sure Lindhagen, Ström in Trelleborg.

Ulyanov

Written April 7, 1917
Sent from Berne to Stockholm

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the text of
the telegraph form
Translated from the German

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* April 9, 1917.—*Ed.*

571

TELEGRAM TO M. M. KHARITONOV

Platten must get permission to take provisions with him, phone execution 12.11* tomorrow 12 o'clock.

Ulyanov

Written April 7, 1917
Sent from Berne to Zurich

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*, Fifth
(Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the text
of the telegraph form
Translated from the
German

572

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. A.,

I am enclosing a letter for you and *for Guilbeaux*. See to it that a copy is sent to Grimm and a reply received from him. Radek has sent Grimm's letter of protest[544] to Guilbeaux. The Russian text of the farewell letter** will be sent to you by Axelrod (his new address is: Ottikerstr. 37).

Yours,
Lenin

I enclose Platten's letter.[545]

Written April 9, 1917
Sent from Zurich to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

573

TELEGRAM TO M. G. BRONSKI AND KARL RADEK

To Warszawski, Radek. Kluzweg, 8. Zurich

Have all documents translated immediately.[546] Send

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* These figures are a telephone number.—*Ed.*

** "Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 367-73).—*Ed.*

beginning to Guilbeaux today certain, the rest tomorrow.*———Copy Berne.

Written after April 9, 1917
Sent to Zurich en route from
Switzerland to Russia

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original
Translated from the
German

574

TELEGRAM TO JAKUB HANECKI

Arriving Trelleborg today 6 o'clock.

Platten, *Ulyanov*

Written April 12, 1917
Sent to Stockholm
en route from Sassnitz
(Germany) to Trelleborg
(Sweden)

First published in 1924
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 1

Printed from the text of
the telegraph form
Translated from the
German

575

TELEGRAM TO V. A. KARPINSKY

German Government faithfully guarded exterritoriality of our coach. Continuing journey. Publish farewell letter. Greetings.

Ulyanov

Written April 14, 1917
Sent to Geneva en route
to Russia

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the text of
the telegraph form
Translated from the
German

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* Lenin wrote Guilbeaux's address on the back of the manuscript: "Guilbeaux. 15. Rue Merle d'Auligné. 15. *Genève*".—*Ed.*

576

TO V. A. KARPINSKY

Dear V. A.,

I trust you have already received our telegram* (*have forwarded it for publication* to Züricher *Volksrecht*) and have sent the "Farewell Letter" to be set up.

I trust also that you have sent Radek (address: Fürstenberg—inside: for Radek—Birgerjarlsgatan, 8. Stockholm) the missing document for the minutes, namely: the resolution of the meeting of Mensheviks, *Nachalo* people[547] and others against the journey.

Did I give you the address of my people? Maria Ilyinichna Ulyanova (for V. I. U.), Petrograd, 48/9 Shirokaya Ulitsa, Flat 24. Write me a postcard at this address saying whether the Abschiedsbrief** has come out (and in what languages), whether it has been sent to Stockholm and so on.

Don't forget to contact Grisha and get from him the French and English opposition newspapers for Radek.

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

Written April 15, 1917
Sent from Haparanda
(Sweden) to Geneva

First published in 1930
in *Lenin Miscellany XIII*

Printed from the original

577

TO JAKUB HANECKI

Dear Comrade,

Letter No. 1 (dated April 22-23) has been received today 21/IV—old style.

The money from Kozlovsky (2 thous.) has been received. The packets have not arrived yet. Delivery of newspapers from the provinces is terribly irregular, and we have no

* See previous document.—*Ed.*
** Farewell letter.—*Ed.*

sets ourselves, just odd numbers. Altogether about 15 Bolshevik newspapers are issued: in Helsingfors, Kronstadt, Kharkov, Kiev, Krasnoyarsk, Samara, Saratov and other cities. In Moscow a daily appears—*Sotsial-Demokrat*. In Kharkov, Kronstadt and Helsingfors, too, there are dailies. The All-Russia conference starts tomorrow; up to 300 delegates are expected. Petrograd is seething; meetings and demonstrations are going on since yesterday over the government's Note. It is very difficult to get organised in this ferment. Everyone is swamped with work. Arranging messengers is no easy job, but we shall nevertheless take measures. A special man is coming now to organise the whole business, and we hope he will get things moving. Telegrams take a terribly long time, telegraphic communication even inland is difficult. Since a person is going, no telegram confirming receipt of letter No. 1 has been sent. As regards Steinberg, we shall take steps.

We send greetings to Radek. It's such a busy day today that we simply cannot write a detailed letter and resolutions concerning the conference, and so on. You will learn it all from *Pravda*, which we are sending you. Telegrams don't reach destination. The question of organising telegraphic communication therefore remains open. Communication must be arranged some other way. What news have you of Platten? Has he returned and did he arrive safely?

Best regards.

Reports about huge demonstrations, shooting and so on have just come in.

Written April 21 (May 4), 1917
Sent from Petrograd to Stockholm

First published in 1923
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 9

Printed from a
typewritten copy
found in police records

578

GREETINGS TO COMRADE HÖGLUND

On the day of your release from prison, the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. greets in your person a staunch fighter against

the imperialist war and a wholehearted supporter of the Third International.

Central Committee
*Lenin**

First published April 23 (May 6), 1917 in *Pravda* No. 39

Printed from the newspaper text

579

TO THE PRESIDING COMMITTEE OF THE FRONTLINE CONGRESS[548]

To the Presiding Committee of Delegates of the Frontline Congress

Dear Comrades,

I received your invitation and thank you for it with all my heart. I regret that I am absolutely unable to attend your congress today in view of my commitments to the All-Russia conference of our Party.

The conference proceedings have dragged out, there will probably be an all-night sitting, and I cannot get away for a minute. Please forgive me.

With comradely greetings,
N. Lenin

Written not later than April 29 (May 12), 1917

First published in 1958 in the book *Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks). Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks). April 1917. Minutes*, p. 364 Note 175

Printed from the original

* The message of greetings was also signed by Zinoviev.—*Ed.*

580

TO KARL RADEK[549]

To Comrade Radek

29.V. 1917

Dear Friend,

I am writing to you for the first time, letter No. 1, and ask you to let me know whether you have received it. Try and send *Bulletin* No. 1 (*Pravda Bulletin*)[550] as soon as you can—then an answer as to whether you have a reply from Karpinsky in Geneva (I asked him to send me the end—the "conclusion"—of the book on the agrarian question and the two articles: Yuri's, "Pyotr Kievsky's", and my own on self-determination).

I fully agree with you that Zimmerwald has become a hindrance and that the sooner we break with it the better (you know that I disagree with the conference on this point).[551] We must speed up a meeting of the Lefts, an international meeting and *only* of the Lefts. Write what you can do in this direction: we shall send the money (a sum of about 3-4 thous. rubles) soon.

If we could speed up an international meeting of the Lefts, the Third International would be established.

Can we count on the Scandinavian Lefts? Have you enlightened Höglund & Co.? Is there any hope of getting the English and Americans? What about your Stockholm trio publishing **immediately** in the name of our C.C., plus the Poles, plus *Arbeiterpolitik*, plus Höglund & Co., an international appeal for a meeting of *only* Lefts (see our resolution for the list) on an international scale?

Let us know what steps you are taking.

Forgive me for not writing more often: I am devilishly busy. I trust you have been told everything now.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Written May 29 (June 11), 1917
Sent from Petrograd to Stockholm

First published in 1932
in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 5-6

Printed from the original

581

TO THE LEGAL COMMITTEE[552]

With regard to the statement by the Executive of the S.D.P.L.* groups submitted to the Legal Committee, I ask the Committee to take into consideration that the point in this statement "demanding an explanation" from Hanecki is an absolutely impermissible attack on the honour of an absent comrade (absent on *Party* business) and an agent of the C.C. at that.

To "demand an explanation" at the word of an avowed slanderer, Mr. Zaslavsky, who has repeatedly been called a slanderer in the newspaper, is *generally* impermissible, and especially impermissible is it to have this done through the press.

Mr. Zaslavsky acted only as a scandalmonger. A clear legal line should be drawn between the notion of a scandalmonger or slanderer and a denouncer (who demands the establishment of demonstrable facts).

The principle should be established that the *Party* should not answer scandalmongering and slander (if only by repeating that a slanderer is a slanderer) *until* (1) a precise accusation is made in the press over the signature of a definite person who is not an avowed slanderer, (2) an accusation which should allow *both* parties to appear in a court of law, (3) an accusation of a serious nature supported by political organisations.

Failing this, the *comrade* affected, and not the *Party*, should answer the accusation either in a special pamphlet (or leaflet: *with documents*) or merely sweeping aside the scandalmongering.

Especially impermissible is the shadow of any doubt as to the honesty of a Party functionary or the slightest attempt to rummage ("demand an explanation") in his private life without a *preliminary* questioning of witnesses (Rozanov, Chudnovsky, Schter and other Copenhageners) and a study of *documents*.

I request the Legal Committee to consider this statement of mine concerning the absolute impermissibility of such

* Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania.—*Ed.*

publications (the more so when emanating not from the *C.C.* of the Poles) as that of the statement submitted to the Legal Committee.

13.VI. 1917

N. Lenin

Written May 13 (26), 1917

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from the original

582

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUREAU ABROAD

Manifestation of the whole revolution on Sunday. Our slogans: Down with the counter-revolution, the Fourth Duma, the State Council, the imperialists, who are organising the counter-revolution. All power to the Soviets. Long live workers' control over production. The arming of the whole people. No separate peace with Wilhelm, no secret treaties with the British and French governments. Immediate publication by the Soviets of really just terms of peace. Against the policy of offensives. Bread, peace, freedom.

Written May 16 (29), 1917
Sent from Petrograd to Stockholm

First published in 1937 in the book: Lenin, V. I. *Works of 1917* in three volumes, Vol. II

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

583

TO KARL RADEK

17.VI. 1917

Dear Radek,

Owing to illness I was unable to follow reports during the last few days. I therefore have a vague idea of Zimmerwald affairs.

If it's true that that muddled wretched Grimm (no wonder

we never trusted that ministeriable scoundrel!) has handed over all Zimmerwald affairs to the Left Swedes and that the latter are convening a Zimmerwald conference within the next few days, then I—personally (I am writing this only in my own name)—*would strongly warn* against having anything to do with Zimmerwald.

"What a good chance this is to seize the Zimmerwald International now," Grigory said today.

In my opinion, this is super-opportunist and harmful tactics.

"Seize" Zimmerwald? That is, to take *upon ourselves* the dead weight of the Italian party (the Kautskyites and pacifists), the Swiss Greulich & Co., the American S. P. (even worse!), all kinds of Peluso, Longuetists, etc., etc.

This would mean throwing overboard all our principles, forgetting everything we wrote and said against the Centre, getting ourselves muddled up and disgraced.

No, if the Left Swedes have taken Zimmerwald into their own hands and if they want to muddle along, we should put an ultimatum *to them*: *either* they declare Zimmerwald dismissed at the very first Zimmerwald conference and found a Third International, *or* we quit.

In any case, that vile ("Grimm-controlled"—it is Grimm's after all) Zimmerwald should be buried at all costs and a *real* Third International founded of the Lefts *alone* and *against the Kautskyites alone*. Better a small fish than a big beetle.

Read this letter to Orlovsky and Hanecki. My best regards.

Excuse the brevity—I'm ill.

Things here mostly resemble the eve of the June days of 1848. The Mensheviks and S.R.s are surrendering all and everything to the Cadets (=to the Cavaignacs). Qui vivra verra.*

Yours,
Lenin

Written May 17 (30), 1917
Sent from Petrograd to Stockholm

First published November 7, 1932, in *Pravda* No. 309

Printed from the original

* The future will show ("we shall live and see").—*Ed.*

584

TO THE BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[553]

Only just now, at 3.15 p.m., July 7, I learned that a search was made at my flat last night, despite the protests of my wife, by armed men who produced no warrant. I register my protest against this and ask the Bureau of the C.E.C. to investigate this flagrant breach of the law.

At the same time I consider it my duty to confirm officially and in writing what, I am sure, not a single member of the C.E.C. can doubt, namely, that in the event of the government ordering my arrest and this order being endorsed by the C.E.C., I shall present myself for arrest at the place indicated to me by the C.E.C.

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov
(*N. Lenin*)
Member of the C.E.C.

Petrograd, 7/VII.1917

Written July 7 (20), 1917

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 49

Printed from a typewritten copy

585

TO KUSTAA ROVIO

Comrade Rovio,

Will you kindly pass the enclosed letter to Smilga (only personally, *not* by post).*

The comrade handing you this letter will be returning very soon: *send* the remaining newspapers *with him* and *anything else that has been received* for me.

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* See "Letter to I. T. Smilga, Chairman of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland" (present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 69-73).—*Ed.*

Did you forward on to the north what I gave you to be handed over to our Swedish friends?* Please answer through the bearer.

My best regards,

Yours,

K. Ivanov

Written September 27
(October 10), 1917
Sent from Vyborg to Helsingfors

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

586

TO KUSTAA ROVIO

Dear Comrade Rovio,

I am taking this opportunity to find out whether you received my letter enclosing a letter to Smilga** and whether you passed that letter on to him.

The bearer is returning in a couple of days. Will you please pass this letter on to Smilga, as I would like him too to know that I am anxious about whether he received my letter and am waiting for his reply.

Greetings,

Yours,

K. Ivanov

Could you send me a set of (1) *Priboi*[554] and (2) *Sotsialist-Revolutsioner*[555] for the last 1½ weeks?

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* Apparently this refers to Lenin's letter "To the Bureau of the Central Committee Abroad" (see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 318-24). —*Ed.*

** "Letter to I. T. Smilga, Chairman of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland" (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 69-73).—*Ed.*

P.S. Did you send the letter and newspapers through friends to Sweden?

Written after September 27
(October 10), 1917
Sent from Vyborg to Helsingfors

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

587

A NOTE TO MARGARITA FOFANOVA

I am going where you did not want me to go. Good-bye.

Ilyich

Written October 24
(November 6), 1917

First published in 1934
in the book: Krupskaya, N. K.
Reminiscences of Lenin,
Part III, Moscow, Partizdat

Printed from the text
of the book

NOTES

[1] A reference to articles by N. Y. Fedoseyev examining the economic and political situation in Russia and criticising the erroneous views of the Narodniks. Lenin had the manuscripts. p. 37

[2] *Russkaya Mysl* (Russian Thought)—a literary and political monthly published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918. Until 1905 it adhered to a liberal-Narodnik orientation, and in the nineties occasionally published articles by Marxists. p. 38

[3] *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth)—a monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918. In the early nineties it was taken over by the liberal Narodniks headed by N. K. Mikhailovsky. It propounded reconciliation with the tsarist government and waged an implacable struggle against Marxism and the Russian Marxists. p. 41

[4] In this letter Lenin evidently refers to his *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats*, which was proposed to be published abroad (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 129-332). The two works mentioned are Frederick Engels's *The Housing Question* and "Afterword to *On Social Relations in Russia*" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* in two volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, pp. 546-634, and Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, S. 421-35).

In the summer of 1894 Lenin stayed with relatives in the country in Kuzminki, near Moscow, and in August returned to St. Petersburg. p. 42

[5] *Rabocheye Dyelo* (The Workers' Cause)—a journal published by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902. It was edited by B. N. Krichevsky, P. F. Teplov (Sibiryak), V. P. Ivanshin and later also A. S. Martynov. A total of 12 issues (nine books) was put out. The Editorial Board of the journal was the Economists' centre abroad.

Lenin gave a critique of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* viewpoint in his *What Is To Be Done?* (see present edition. Vol. 5, pp. 347-529). p. 44

[6] *The Emancipation of Labour group* was the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov in 1883 and included P. B. Axelrod, L. G. Deutsch, Vera Zasulich and V. N. Ignatov.

The group did much to spread Marxism in Russia, and dealt a serious blow at Narodism. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the group announced its dissolution. p. 44

[7] A reference to the Marxist scientific and political journal *Zarya* (Dawn) published legally in Stuttgart by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* in 1901-02. p. 44

[8] A St. Petersburg group of revolutionary Narodniks named after one of its members—N. V. Chaikovsky. Its aims were self-education and revolutionary propaganda among the youth. It published and circulated works by Karl Marx, N. G. Chernyshevsky, D. I. Pisarev, and N. Flerovsky (V. V. Bervi); it had a printery of its own in Switzerland. Later the group conducted revolutionary work among the workers and peasants, acquainted the workers with the history of the international proletarian movement, and sponsored the study in circles of the first volume of Marx's *Capital*. They failed, however, to understand the historical role of the proletariat, regarding it merely as an intermediary between the revolutionary intelligentsia and the peasantry. The group's activities came to an end with the mass arrests of early 1874. p. 44

[9] The "*resolution of the twenty-three*" evidently was adopted at a meeting of Social-Democrats in exile in Orlov, Vyatka Gubernia (V. V. Vorovsky, N. E. Bauman, A. N. Potresov, and others), as an expression of solidarity with the "protest of the seventeen" ("A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats") written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82). p. 45

[10] A reference to the talks with S. S. Trusevich, a member of the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, on the organisation of the transport of literature through Poland of which Y. M. Steklov had written to Lenin. Transport was not arranged. p. 46

[11] The publication in question is *Iskra* (The Spark), the first all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900. It played the decisive role in the establishment of a revolutionary Marxist party of the working class in Russia.

The editors were Lenin, P. B. Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, Y. O. Martov, G. V. Plekhanov and A. N. Potresov. At first the Secretary of the Editorial Board was Inna Smidovich-Lehmann, and from the spring of 1901, Nadezhda Krupskaya, who also attended to all of *Iskra*'s correspondence with Russian Social-Democratic organisations.

After the Second Congress of the Party, beginning with issue No. 52, the newspaper became the mouthpiece of the Mensheviks. p. 48

[12] A reference to the talks between the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and the liberals concerning the publication of *Sovremennoye Obozreniye* (Contemporary Review) as a supplement to *Zarya*. Announcements on the publication of the supplement were issued by G. V. Plekhanov on behalf of *Iskra* and *Zarya* and by P. B. Struve on behalf of the "democratic opposition" group. The project was never realised, however, since Dietz refused to print the announcements as not conforming to censorship requirements. Further talks between the representatives of *Iskra* and Struve were interrupted and never resumed (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 380-82; Vol. 36, pp. 67, 71; Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 4, pp. 389-90). p. 50

[13] The *Borba* group (D. B. Ryazanov, Y. M. Steklov, E. L. Gurevich) originated in Paris in the summer of 1900 and took shape as an independent group in 1901, after the "Unity" Conference. In its publications it distorted Marxist theory, rejected the revolutionary tactics of *Iskra*, and was opposed to Lenin's principles of Party organisation. Owing to its deviations from Social-Democratic views and tactics, its disruptive actions and lack of contact with Social-Democratic Organisations in Russia, the group was not admitted to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which decided to dissolve it. p. 50

[14] A reference to student demonstrations in protest against the introduction of the provisional rules of July 29, 1899, and the drafting of 183 students of the Kiev University into the army (see present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19). A meeting of the Russian colony in London held on February 6, 1901, adopted a protest against this action by the government, which was published in the journal *Nakanune* No. 26-27 under the title "London Protest". p. 50

[15] *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought)—a newspaper published by the Economists from October 1897 to December 1902. It was edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others. p. 51

[16] A reference to the *Rabocheye Znamya* (Workers' Banner) group, formed in late 1897. The group was opposed to Economism and made it its aim to conduct political propaganda among the workers. It published the newspaper *Rabocheye Znamya* (three issues were put out) and printed several pamphlets and proclamations. Among its leading members were S. V. Andropov, V. P. Nogin and M. B. Smirnov. In January 1901 the St. Petersburg Rabocheye Znamya group merged with the Sotsialist group, but in January-April the leaders of the united group who were in Russia were arrested. Most of the members of the St. Petersburg *Rabocheye Znamya* group came over to the *Iskra* organisation. p. 51

[17] An unsigned item printed in *Iskra* No. 1 in the "Our Public Life" column. It cautioned workers against unorganised strikes in the crisis conditions then prevailing, for the employers seized upon them as a pretext for wholesale dismissals. p. 51

[18] *Yuzhny Rabochy* (Southern Worker)—an illegal Social-Democratic newspaper published by a group of the same name from January 1900 to April 1903. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the delegates from this group took a Centrist position.

The Second Congress dissolved the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group along with all other Social-Democratic groups and organisations which had functioned independently.

The reference is to reports on a strike at the Prokhorov mines (on the Donets) carried by *Iskra* No. 2 (February 1901) and *Yuzhny Rabochy* No. 3 (November 1900). p. 52

[19] V. P. Nogin had suggested that L. Martov's article "New Friends of the Russian Proletariat" should end in a more pointed analogy between the preachments of S. V. Zubatov and the treatment of economic struggle in the programme of *Rabochaya Mysl*. p. 52

[20] V. P. Nogin had pointed out that although *Iskra* had chosen as its motto words first used by the Decembrists, it made no mention of the uprising of December 14, 1825. p. 52

[21] *Byloye* (The Past)—an historical journal devoted mostly to the history of Narodism and earlier social movements, published in 1900-04 and 1906-07, first abroad, then in St. Petersburg. p. 52

[22] *Justice*—a weekly published in London from January 1884 to the beginning of 1925; organ of the Social-Democratic Federation and, from 1911, of the British Socialist Party. From February 1925 to December 1933 it was published under the name of *Social-Democrat*. p. 52

[23] On his way to Russia in May 1901, V. P. Nogin spent a week in Munich where he discussed with Lenin the work to be conducted in Russia. p. 53

[24] *Nakanune* (On the Eve)—a monthly with a Narodnik orientation published in Russian in London from January 1899 to February 1902; edited by Y. A. Serebryakov. A total of 37 issues came out. p. 53

[25] A reference to comments on issue No. 1 of *Iskra* by members of the *Borba* group (see Note 13). p. 54

[26] *Aus Weltpolitik*—a weekly published by Parvus in Munich from 1898 to 1905. p. 54

[27] *At the Post of Honour*—a collection of writings put out by the Narodniks on the fortieth anniversary (1860-1900) of the literary

and public activities of the Narodnik ideologist N. K. Mikhailovsky. The book was not reviewed either in *Iskra* or in *Zarya*. p. 55

[28] The letter refers to the *Iskra* promotion group founded in Berlin in the autumn of 1900. The group played a major role in the organisation of the transport of the paper to Russia and the collection of funds. Similar groups were set up in other European cities (Geneva, Zurich, Paris, etc.) where there were student youth and revolutionary emigrants from Russia. They collected funds for *Iskra*, arranged for the shipment of illegal publications to Russia, obtained passports, established contacts and carried on other work for *Iskra*.

The *neutral group of Social-Democrats in Berlin* formed around V. A. Bazarov in the autumn of 1900. Its aim was to overcome the split between the supporters of the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the Emancipation of Labour group, which developed following the Second Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. Among others, the group included M. G. Vecheslov and I. B. Basovsky. According to Bazarov, the group sent its representatives to Geneva early in 1900 to persuade the *Iskra* and *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations to effect a reconciliation with the Union. The group published three or four proclamations on political topics and existed until the summer of 1901. p. 56

[29] See Note 13. p. 57

[30] A conference of representatives of S.D. organisations abroad was held in Geneva in June 1901. It drew up a resolution recognising the need to consolidate all the Social-Democratic forces of Russia on the basis of the revolutionary principles of *Iskra* and to unite the Social-Democratic organisations abroad, and condemning opportunism of all varieties and shades: Economism, Bernsteinism, Millerandism, etc. (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Tsentralnogo Komiteta* [C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee], Part 1, 1954, pp. 22-24). After the conference the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and its organ, the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo*, intensified their efforts to propagate opportunism, making it impossible for the supporters of *Iskra* to unite with those of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, and thereby predetermined the failure of the "Unity" Conference. p. 57

[31] The Berlin *Iskra* promotion group planned to put out bulletins but the idea was never realised owing to lack of funds and material. p. 57

[32] The reference is to K. E. Klasson's part in putting out the symposium *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development* printed in April 1895. p. 61

[33] *Vorbote* (The Herald)—a monthly journal, Central Organ of the German sections of the First International, published in Geneva from 1866 to 1871. p. 62

[34] *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii. Sotsialno-politicheskoye obozreniye* (Herald of the Russian Revolution. A Socio-Political Review)—an illegal journal published abroad (Paris and Geneva) in 1901-05. Four issues came out. The first was published by the Old Narodovoltsi Group and edited by N. S. Rusanov (K. Tarasov). Beginning with issue No. 2 it became the theoretical organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 63

[35] A reference to the "Unity" Conference of R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad held October 4-5, 1901, in Zurich. It was attended by 6 members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation abroad, 8 members of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation (including 3 members of the Emancipation of Labour group), 16 members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats (including 5 members of the Bund's Committee Abroad), and 3 members of the *Borba* group. On the first item on the agenda "Agreement in Principle and Instructions to Editorial Boards", Lenin delivered an eloquent speech, censuring the opportunist activity of the Union. When the opportunist amendments and addenda to the June resolution adopted by the Third Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats were announced at the conference, the revolutionary section of the conference (members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisations) read out a statement saying that unity was impossible and left the conference. On Lenin's initiative these organisations in October 1901 united into the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 64

[36] A reference to the wholesale arrests of members of the Social-Democratic organisation in Moscow. A. Y. Finn-Yenotayevsky was arrested on November 11, 1896. The provocateur Ruma was instrumental in setting the police on the organisation. p. 66

[37] A reference to the "Unity" Conference of R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad (see Note 35). p. 69

[38] The St. Petersburg *Iskra* group at the time included Y. E. Mandelstam, A. N. Minskaya, and K. M. Rubinchik, who had been sent from Berlin to arrange for the circulation of *Iskra*, and also members of the *Sotsialist* group in St. Petersburg. The group was led by V. P. Nogin until his arrest on October 2, 1901. Contact between the group and the League in St. Petersburg was maintained by S. I. Radchenko. All members of the group were arrested on December 4, 1901. p. 70

[39] A reference to the preparation of the pamphlet *Documents of the "Unity" Conference*. The preface was written by Lenin (see

present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 302-05). The pamphlet was put out in Geneva in the printery of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. The reference to G. D. Leiteisen and F. I. Dan suggests that at the conference they were secretaries from the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation. p. 70

[40] *The League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad* was founded on Lenin's initiative in October 1901 as an organisation uniting revolutionary Marxists abroad. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks gained control in the League and in October 1903, after its Second Congress, the Bolsheviks left it and founded their own organisation abroad. p. 71

[41] Lenin had been invited to speak in Berne on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of G. V. Plekhanov's speech on Kazan Square in St. Petersburg on December 6, 1876. p. 75

[42] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's trip to Brussels to attend a conference of the International Socialist Bureau, to which he had been elected, together with B. N. Krichevsky, at the Paris Congress of the Second International in 1900. The conference opened on December 30, 1901, and Plekhanov's report on its proceedings was published in *Iskra* No. 15 dated January 15, 1902, under the title, "From Brussels. Letter to the Editors of *Iskra*" (see G. V. Plekhanov, *Collected Works*, Russian Ed., Vol. 12, 1924, pp. 193-98). p. 76

[43] *Vorwärts*—a daily, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Berlin since 1891. In the late nineties, after the death of Engels, it fell into the hands of the Right wing of the party and regularly printed articles by opportunists. Giving a tendentious picture of the struggle against opportunism and revisionism in the R.S.D.L.P., it supported the Economists, and later, after the split in the Party, the Mensheviks. p. 79

[44] The polemic referred to was between the editors of *Vorwärts*, Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, Karl Kautsky, and *Zarya* over the article "The Lübeck Parteitag of German Social-Democracy" by Martov (Ignotus) in *Zarya* No. 2-3, December 1901. p. 79

[45] The delegate arrested was F. I. Dan, who represented the Editorial Board of *Iskra* at the Belostok conference of R.S.D.L.P. committees and organisations held March 23-28 (April 5-10), 1902. p. 83

[46] A reference to a May Day leaflet which the Belostok conference of R.S.D.L.P. committees and organisations decided to put out. It was based on a draft drawn up by the Editorial Board of *Iskra* (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part 1, 1954, pp. 28-31). p. 83

[47] On June 27, 1902, Lenin delivered a lecture criticising the Socialist-Revolutionaries at a meeting of Russian political emigrants in Paris. p. 84

[48] Probably a reference to G. V. Plekhanov's trip to attend a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau. p. 85

[49] Y. O. Martov (Berg) conducted talks in Paris with members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats concerning the formation abroad of a section of the Organising Committee to prepare for the convocation of a Party congress, as envisaged in the decision of the Belostok conference. p. 86

[50] A reference to the inheritance left by a Russian who had died abroad. V. G. Shklyarevich had written to Lenin about it in a letter dated June 5, 1902, suggesting that the Editorial Board of *Iskra* find a lawyer to handle the case, for which *Iskra* would have received one-third of the property involved. The Editorial Board turned down the proposition. p. 86

[51] A reference to the Social-Democratic organisation in the Crimea, which V. G. Shklyarevich put in touch with the Editorial Board of *Iskra*. The letters from Simferopol, Feodosia and Yalta published in *Iskra* Nos. 24 and 25 afford an idea of the activities of this organisation. p. 87

[52] *Kolya*—a code name for the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The reference here probably is to V. P. Krasnukha, a member of this committee, who came to see Lenin in London in August 1902. p. 89

[53] The "old friend" evidently was P. A. Krasikov. The 500 rubles brought had been collected for *Iskra* by its representatives in St. Petersburg. p. 89

[54] The commission mentioned here was set up in July 1902 at a joint meeting of representatives of *Iskra*, the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and the Workers' Organisation to reorganise the St. Petersburg Committee. p. 90

[55] Lenin is referring to his lectures in Lausanne and Geneva on November 10 and 11, 1902, on the programme and tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 93

[56] *Krasnoye Znamya* (Red Banner)—an organ of the Economists, published in Geneva by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad from November 1902 to January 1903 as the successor of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. Three issues of the journal came out. p. 94

[57] At the end of 1902 there were two organisations in Odessa—a Social-Democratic committee of an anti-*Iskra* trend and the

Southern Revolutionary League of Social-Democrats, founded in September 1902. In December 1902 the Southern League ceased to exist as an independent organisation. As a result of persistent work on the part of the *Iskra* supporters in Odessa (Rozalia Zemlyachka, K. O. Levitsky and others) to combat the Economists and the *Borba* group, it merged with the *Iskra* organisation in April 1903. Lenin examines the question in a letter to Lyubov Axelrod dated December 18, 1902 (see this volume, Document 59). p. 97

[58] A reference to the session of the International Socialist Bureau held in Brussels on December 29, 1902. G. V. Plekhanov did not attend. p. 97

[59] *The Organising Committee* (O.C.) for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was established on Lenin's initiative at the conference of Social-Democratic committees held in Pskov on November 2-3, 1902. The majority of the new committee were *Iskra* supporters. P. A. Krasikov, F. V. Lengnik, P. N. Lepeshinsky and G. M. Krzhizhanovsky from the *Iskra* organisation in Russia and A. M. Stopani from the Northern League of the R.S.D.L.P. were co-opted to the committee. p. 97

[60] The living room shared by all in the London flat occupied by Vera Zasulich, Y. O. Martov and I. S. Blumenfeld was called the "den" in jest because of the permanent disorder in it. p. 100

[61] The *Iskra organisation in Russia* united all followers of *Iskra* in the country. When the Organising Committee for convening the Party's Second Congress was established at the Pskov conference, the *Iskra* organisations placed all their contacts at its disposal. The *Iskra* organisation in Russia existed up to the Second Congress and played an important part in preparing for and convening this Congress which founded the revolutionary Marxist party in Russia. p. 100

[62] A reference to letters from Russia collected by the editors of the journal *Zhizn* (Life) which V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich passed on to the Editorial Board of *Iskra* after *Zhizn* ceased publication. p. 102

[63] *Zhenya*—a code name for the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group.

The *Announcement* Lenin refers to below was made in December 1902 by the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 305-09). p. 105

[64] The *three Rostov comrades* were I. I. Stavsky, Mochalov and Z. Mikhailov. *Iskra* No. 35 of March 1, 1903, carried a letter from the Don Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. announcing its solidarity with *Iskra* and *Zarya* on all questions relating to programme, tactics and organisation. p. 105

[65] A reference to the "Announcement of the Formation of an Organising Committee", published in *Iskra* No. 32, January 15, 1903, and L. D. Trotsky's article, "High-Mindedness Instead of a Programme and Nervousness Instead of Tactics", in *Iskra* No. 33, February 1, 1903. p. 106

[66] The article "On Two-Faced Democracy", by A. N. Potresov, printed in *Iskra* No. 35, March 1, 1903. p. 106

[67] *Proletariat*—an illegal newspaper in Armenia, organ of the Union of Armenian Social-Democrats. Only one issue was put out in October 1902 in Tiflis (for reasons of secrecy the place of publication was given as Geneva). The publication was founded by S. G. Shahumyan, and B. M. Knunyants helped with the organisational arrangements. p. 107

[68] Lenin never wrote the article criticising A. Rudin. His *Revolutionary Adventurism* (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 184-205) came out as a separate pamphlet without the other articles against the Socialist-Revolutionaries (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 170-73). p. 108

[69] The *Organising Committee Section Abroad* comprised L. G. Deutsch from the Editorial Board of *Iskra*, A. I. Kremer from the Bund, and N. N. Lokhov (Olkhin) from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. p. 109

[70] *S.-Peterburgskiye Vedomosti* (St. Petersburg Recorder)—a newspaper founded in St. Petersburg in 1728 as the successor to the first Russian newspaper *Vedomosti* founded in 1703. Ceased publication at the end of 1917. p. 112

[71] Kautsky's pamphlet *Die soziale Revolution* was published in Geneva in 1903 in the Russian translation by N. Karpov, edited by Lenin. The editors' note on pages 129-30 reads: "To show the reader how great is the concentration of industry in contemporary Russia we shall give two examples. In 1894-95 the number of factories and workshops (i.e., enterprises using mechanical power or employing no less than 16 workers) in European Russia was estimated at 14,578, with 885,555 workers and output totalling 1,345 million rubles. Of these the big factories, i.e., with 100 or more workers, numbered only 1,468, i.e., one-tenth, but they employed 656,000 workers, nearly three-fourths of the total and the value of their output amounted to 955 million rubles i.e., seven-tenths of the total sum. From this one can judge how radically we could raise productivity of labour, increase wages and reduce working hours if we expropriated all the manufacturers, closed down the small enterprises, and left only one and a half thousand big factories working two eight-hour shifts or three five-hour shifts! Another example. In 1890 there were about *nine and a half thousand* handicraft tanneries in European Russia

with 21,000 workers and output totalling 12 million rubles. At the same time 66 steam-powered tanneries with 5½ thousand workers also produced 12 million rubles' worth of output!" p. 114

[72] A reference to Engels's "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* in one volume Moscow, 1968, pp. 633-50). p. 115

[73] The reference is to the report "Division and Sectarianism in Russia" written by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich at the request of Lenin and Plekhanov for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Later the report was published in the Social-Democratic paper for members of religious sects *Rassvet* (Daybreak) No. 6-7 for 1904. The draft resolution on the publication of a periodical for members of religious sects was written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 473). p. 115

[74] This refers to the "*personal conflict*" between Lenin and Martov at the Second Congress of the League. Martov charged that in his report to the congress of the League Lenin had presented him as an intriguer and a liar on the question of the method of organising the Editorial Board of the Central Organ at the Second Congress of the Party, and he challenged Lenin to put the matter to arbitration. Lenin lodged a protest against this method of struggle, accepted Martov's challenge, and in his turn pressed for arbitration. The conflict was settled through the mediation of G. M. Krzhizhanovsky during his stay abroad in the second half of November 1903 by means of a mutual exchange of statements between Lenin and Martov. These statements were published in *Commentary on the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad*, Geneva, 1904. p. 115

[75] A reference to *Rassvet*, a Social-Democratic publication for members of religious sects, put out in Geneva by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich in accordance with a decision of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 117

[76] A reference to the "July Declaration" of the C.C. and the violation of the decisions of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. by the conciliators in the C.C.

The "*July Declaration*" was a resolution adopted by the conciliators in the C.C., L. B. Krasin, V. A. Noskov and L. Y. Galperin, in July 1904 without the knowledge of the two remaining members, Lenin and Rozalia Zemlyachka, who were not given an opportunity to defend in the C.C. the position of the Majority of the Party. In this resolution the conciliators endorsed the Menshevik composition of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* which G. V. Plekhanov had co-opted, and co-opted into the C.C. three other conciliators—A. I. Lyubimov, L. Y. Karpov and I. F. Dubrovinsky. The conciliators opposed the convocation of the

Third Congress of the Party and dissolved the Southern Bureau of the C.C., which was conducting agitation for the congress. They deprived Lenin of the right to represent the C.C. abroad and prohibited the publication of his writings without the collegial permission of the C.C.

Local Party committees—in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga Baku and elsewhere—supported Lenin and strongly condemned the "July Declaration" (see this volume, Document 85). p. 119

77 The pamphlet in question is *Our Misunderstandings* by Galyorka (M. S. Olminsky) and Ryadovoi (A. Bogdanov) which had been sent to the Party printers.

In a letter dated September 12, 1904, V. A. Noskov informed V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich that the pamphlet would be handed over (see *Lenin Miscellany XV*, p. 167). p. 119

78 The *Southern Bureau of the Central Committee* was set up in February 1904 with the direct assistance of Lenin. Among its members were V. V. Vorovsky and I. K. Lalayants. The Bureau, the permanent headquarters of which was in Odessa, waged a consistent struggle against the Mensheviks and the conciliators, and was in favour of the immediate convocation of the Third Party Congress despite the wishes of the central bodies—the C.C., the Central Organ, and the Council of the Party.

In mid-August 1904 the Bureau was dissolved by the improperly adopted "July Declaration" of the C.C., but later in the autumn the first Bolshevik conference of R.S.D.L.P. committees held in the South reconstituted it. Together with the Northern and Caucasian bureaus, it formed the core of the All-Russia Bureau of Committees of the Majority established in December 1904. p. 122

79 The reference is to the V. Bonch-Bruyevich and N. Lenin Publishing House of Social-Democratic Party Literature founded by the Bolsheviks in late March 1904, after the Menshevik editors of *Iskra* refused to print the opinions of Party organisations and members upholding the decisions of the Second Congress and demanding the convocation of the Third Congress of the Party. p. 125

80 The reference is to the dissolution of the executive department of the C.C. as constituted until then, together with its agents abroad, in connection with the appointment of V. A. Noskov to take charge of all its functions. p. 125

81 Lenin is referring to a letter written by F. V. Lengnik on August 22, 1904, in Taganka prison in Moscow (see *Lenin Miscellany XV*, pp. 159-62). p. 126

82 *Die Neue Zeit*—a theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Until October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky and then by Heinrich Cunow. p. 127

LUCIANA MARA IGMAC NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[83] A reference to letters from V. A. Noskov and V. N. Rozanov a Menshevik co-opted to the C.C., which I. A. Pyatnitsky promptly forwarded to Lenin in Geneva. Lenin quotes these letters in his pamphlet *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party* (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 527-33). p. 135

[84] In the resolution referred to, adopted in the autumn of 1904 the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. voiced its full support of Lenin's views and wholly endorsed his work towards the "*creation of a really strong proletarian party*", and promised him every assistance in organising a publishing house of Bolshevik literature. p. 141

[85] Many members of the Moscow Party organisation were arrested in the summer and autumn of 1904. Because of this, Lenin feared that the clandestine address of the Moscow Committee he had might be known to the police and the letter might fall into their hands. p. 141

[86] A reference to the unlawful actions of a Menshevik member of the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. who co-opted Mensheviks into the Committee to replace members who had been arrested. The Chairman of the Caucasian Union Committee and the representative of the C.C. dissolved the Baku Committee, in accordance with the Rules of the Caucasian Union, as having been improperly constituted. For details see the pamphlet *The Council Against the Party* by Orlovsky (V. V. Vorovsky), Geneva, 1904, pp. 24-30. p. 143

[87] A reference to the illegal Bolshevik paper *Vperyod*, published in Geneva under Lenin's guidance from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. p. 144

[88] In a letter from the editors of the Menshevik *Iskra* published in November 1904, the Mensheviks put forward as the Social-Democrats' main task the "organised influencing on the bourgeois opposition" by presenting demands to the government through bourgeois liberals and Zemstvo leaders. p. 145

[89] In an article "Our Misfortunes" published in *Iskra* No. 78, A. N. Potresov (Starover), criticising Lenin, cited the programme of the French Radical Party, of which Georges Clemenceau was leader. p. 145

[90] The statement Lenin sent to the Bolshevik conciliators L. B. Krasin, V. A. Noskov and I. Y. Galperin, members of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., was written in connection with the "July Declaration" of the C.C. (see Note 76).

In July 1904 the three C.C. members passed, without Lenin's knowledge, a resolution recognising as lawful the co-opting by

Plekhanov into the *Iskra* Editorial Board of Mensheviks who had been voted down by the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., and forbidding Lenin to take any important action as C.C. representative abroad unless empowered to do so by the C.C., thereby depriving him of his powers as the Party's representative abroad.

Although Lenin on August 18, 1904, challenged the resolution inasmuch as he had not been invited to the C.C. meeting or even informed that the question would be taken up, the resolution was printed in *Iskra* No. 72 on August 25.

On November 5, *Iskra* No. 77 carried a statement of the C.C. accusing Lenin, who continued to consider himself a member of the C.C. and said so publicly, of doing so allegedly "with the object of disorganising the Party". The C.C. proposed that the conflict be submitted to arbitration by leaders of international Social-Democracy. p. 152

[91] A reference to Zemstvo meetings at which the liberal opposition adopted petitions to the tsar to grant a constitution. Lenin criticised the plan for the Zemstvo campaign in his article "The Zemstvo Campaign and *Iskra*'s Plan" (see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 497-518). p. 153

[92] During the 1904 strikes in Russia, Russian Social-Democratic organisations in London set up a Russian Strike Relief Committee, which appealed to British trade unions for assistance. It was also decided to turn to the Labour Representation Committee, of which Ramsay MacDonald was secretary. The Committee responded, on condition that part of the money be used to help the widows and orphans of the numerous victims of the January 9 (22), 1905, massacre. p. 153

[93] The reference is to the Congress of the French Socialists held April 23-25, 1905, in Paris, at which the followers of Guesde and Jaurès united. p. 156

[94] This refers to Y. O. Martov's article "A Party Congress or a Congress of Groups?" in *Iskra* No. 94, March 25, 1905. In it Martov held up the Guesdists as an example to the "Leninists", falsely asserting that the Guesdists had recourse to mediation by Bebel and the German Social-Democrats. Leiteisen replied to Martov in an item entitled "A Slight Correction!" in *Vperyod* No. 15, April 20 (7). p. 156

[95] Kautsky's article "Die Differenzen unter den russischen Sozialisten", published in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 29, was printed in Russian translation in Iskra No. 97 under the heading "The Differences Between Russian Socialists". The article said: "... there are no revisionists in the Russian party.... He (Lenin.—*Ed.*) stands for strict centralism and dictatorial rights for the Central Committee, while Axelrod and his friends want to give more leeway for the activity of the local committees." p. 156

[96] "Overcoming the obstacles"—not allowing the Mensheviks to take over the Bolshevik underground printing shop in Samara which the Menshevik agents of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. were bent on doing. p. 156

[97] Lenin was a neighbour of A. A. Preobrazhensky's when he spent the summer months of 1889-93 in Alakayevka. Preobrazhensky stayed a few versts away at the Shornel farmstead. p. 157

[98] The illegal Bolshevik weekly *Proletary* was the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. after its Third Congress. On April 27 (May 10), 1905, a plenary meeting of the C.C. appointed Lenin its Editor-in-Chief. The paper was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 12 (25),1905. V. V. Vorovsky, A. V. Lunacharsky and M. S. Olminsky were its regular contributors. A prominent share in the work of the editorial office was taken by Nadezhda Krupskaya, V. A. Karpinsky and Vera Velichkina. p. 158

[99] Paul Lafargue outlined his attitude to the question of the participation of the Russian Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government in an interview given to G. D. Leiteisen during the First Congress of the United Socialist Party of France on October 29 (16), 1905 (see this volume, Document 130 and Note 116). p. 159

[100] A reference to the second edition of Frederick Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach* translated by G. V. Plekhanov and with an introduction by him. Lenin never wrote the article in which he proposed to comment on Plekhanov's introduction. For Lenin's criticism of some of the propositions advanced by Plekhanov, see *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (present edition, Vol. 14, pp. 151-53). p. 161

[101] *Sketches on the History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the European Proletariat* were printed in *Vperyod* and *Proletary* and later published in pamphlet form in Geneva with an afterword by the author. p. 161

[102] A. V. Lunacharsky's article "The February Revolution and Its Consequences", dealing with the events of 1848, was printed in *Proletary* No. 20, October 10 (September 27), 1905. p. 161

[103] A reference to a letter dated May 26, 1905, from D. S. Postolovsky, a member of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., in which he wrote: "It would be most desirable for Voinov to write, under your guidance, at least once a week a political leaflet which could be sent in manuscript form to the organisations for printing." p. 161

[104] "*Lushin letter*"—"Open Letter to the Delegates of the Third Congress". Konstantin Sergeyevich (N. V. Doroshenko) was removed from work in the St. Petersburg Committee for having

signed it. He was reinstated after Lenin had explained the circumstances. p. 163

[105] The contract with the publishing firm of Maria Malykh (Edelman) was drawn up after the latter had approached Lenin with an offer to publish a number of works by him and other Bolshevik writers.

The contract never materialised since, as P. P. Rumyantsev informed Lenin in his reply to the present letter, the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. had simultaneously begun negotiating in St. Petersburg with the Znaniye Publishers, founded by K. P. Pyatnitsky and Maxim Gorky. In his reply, Rumyantsev asked Lenin for permission to sign the contract with Znaniye. On October 2 (15) Lenin cabled his agreement (see Document 125). The contract with Znaniye was signed on October 21 (8), 1905, by L. B. Krasin and P. P. Rumyantsev. p. 163

[106] A reference to a conference proposed by the International Socialist Bureau with a view to uniting the R.S.D.L.P. (see Lenin's letter to the I.S.B. of September 16, 1905, present edition, Vol. 9, p. 252). p. 164

[107] The C.C., R.S.D.L.P. informed Lenin in a letter dated October 3 (16), 1905, that it had appointed as its representatives at the conference Lenin, F. V. Lengnik and P. P. Rumyantsev. Lenin informed the I.S.B. of this on October 14 (27), 1905 (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 390-91). p. 164

[108] *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat) was published in Geneva by G. V. Plekhanov at irregular and lengthy intervals from March 1905 to April 1912, 16 issues in all. *Dnevnik* resumed publication in Petrograd in 1916, but only one issue came out.

No. 2 of the publication (August 1905) carried an article by Plekhanov, "Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends (A Letter to the Editors of *Proletary*)", intended as a reply to Lenin's "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Article One. Plekhanov's Reference to History" (see present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 463-74) and accusing Lenin and the Bolsheviks of Blanquism. p. 164

[109] A reference to preparations for the publication of a legal edition of the pamphlet *To the Rural Poor* (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 359-430).

The names *Petrov*, *Belov* and *Nolin* mentioned in the letter stand, respectively, for the Maria Malykh, Molot, and Znaniye publishers. p. 165

[110] The feuilleton, entitled "Letter to Workers. II", in *Rabochy* No. 2 was signed "Trety" (Third). The name of the author has not been established.

Rabochy (The Worker)—an illegal popular Social-Democratic paper published, in conformity with the decision of the Third Congress of the Party, by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Moscow in August-October 1905. The actual editor was A. A. Bogdanov. p. 167

[111] *The Scholtz affair*—an impending suit for damages filed by the Geneva printer Scholtz against the Social-Democratic Demos Publishers for violation of a contract for the printing of Maxim Gorky's play *The Children of the Sun*. Demos Publishers was founded abroad in September 1905 and its editors were I. P. Ladyzhnikov, Yelena Stasova, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich and R. P. Avramov.

The Party printing shop which was to set up the play in type did not observe the time limits stipulated in the contract with Scholtz's printery owing to a shortage of type, whereupon the latter presented a claim for damages.

According to I. P. Ladyzhnikov, the matter was settled out of court by paying Scholtz a certain sum of money. p. 167

[112] After Lenin's departure for Russia in the beginning of November 1905, the Economic Commission wound up its affairs and sent the library and Party archives to the address of Branting in Stockholm, where they were stored for some time in the People's House (see this volume, Document 135). p. 169

[113] *The Committee of the Organisations Abroad* (C.O.A.) was elected at a meeting of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad in December 1911. The composition of the committee changed several times. At the conference of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad held in Berne from February 27 to March 4, 1915, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Inessa Armand G. L. Shklovsky, and V. M. Kasparov were elected to it. During the war the committee was in Switzerland where it conducted, under the direct guidance of Lenin, extensive work to co-ordinate the activities of the R.S.D.L.P. sections abroad, to combat the social-chauvinists and to unite the internationalist Left of international Social-Democracy. p. 170

[114] G. D. Leiteisen attended the First Congress of the United Socialist Party of France which opened on October 29, 1905, in Châlon. As a token of solidarity with the revolutionary proletariat of Russia he was included in the presidium and was unanimously applauded as he took his place on the platform. A telegram of greetings from *Proletary* was given a warm reception. The congress adopted a resolution moved by Paul Lafargue voicing solidarity with the Russian revolution. p. 171

[115] *Novaya Zhizn* (New Life)—the first legal Bolshevik newspaper published daily from October 27 (November 9) to December 3 (16) 1905, in St. Petersburg. After Lenin's arrival from abroad in the beginning of November it came out under his direct guidance. *Novaya Zhizn* was in effect the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

On December 2, after 27 issues had come out, it was suppressed by the tsarist government. p. 171

[116] During the Châlon Congress of the Socialist Party of France, G. D. Leiteisen interviewed Bracke-Desrousseaux, Paul Lafargue and Jules Guesde. To the main question concerning their attitude towards the participation of the Russian Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government they all answered that they considered such participation obligatory.

The replies were published in full in *Proletary* No. 26, November 25 (12), 1905, under the heading "Guesdists and the Participation of the Russian Social-Democrats in a Provisional Revolutionary Government". p. 171

[117] A reference to papers that had belonged to Lenin's brother, Alexander Ulyanov, among which were photographs taken in prison, shortly before his execution, at the request of his mother, Maria Ulyanova.

The photographs are now in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, C.C., C.P.S.U. p. 173

[118] Etienne Avenard was a correspondent of *l'Humanité* who had interviewed Lenin on February 17 (March 2), 1907, on the subject, "Tactics of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Election Campaign", and sent the text of the interview for Lenin to look over.

As can be seen from the interview as carried by *l'Humanité* all of Lenin's corrections and comments were taken into account by the correspondent see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 145-51).

L'Humanité—a daily founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. During the imperialist world war (1914-18) the newspaper took a social-chauvinist position.

In 1918 Marcel Cachin, the prominent leader of the French and international working-class movement, became its political director. Since December 1920, after the French Socialist Party split and the French Communist Party was formed, the paper has been the Central Organ of the latter. p. 174

[119] *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—a daily published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917. At first moderate liberal, it turned into a mouthpiece of reactionary groupings of the nobility and the bureaucratic officialdom after A. S. Suvorin became its publisher in 1876. From 1905 it was the organ of the Black Hundreds. p. 174

[120] *R.*, *Raduga* (Rainbow)—a literary, scientific and political monthly put out in Geneva from June 1907 to February 1908. Its contributors included Maxim Gorky, N. A. Semashko and M. G. Tskhakaya. The "two comrades" referred to probably were B. M. Knunyants and N. A. Semashko, with whom Lenin may have had talks during the Stuttgart Congress of the Second Interna-

tional. The former was a member of the Bolshevik delegation and the latter attended the Congress in a private capacity. p. 175

[121] The reference is to Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova, who was abroad in October 1907. She had been asked to send to Lenin from Stockholm Bolshevik publications (the complete file of *Iskra* and issues of *Vperyod* and *Proletary* for 1905) containing articles by Lenin needed for the third volume of the first, three-volume collection of his writings he was preparing for the press. p. 177

[122] Probably Karl Hjalmar Branting, who helped the Bolsheviks to communicate with Russia. p. 178

[123] *Proletary* (The Proletarian)—a Bolshevik illegal newspaper published from August 21 (September 3), 1906, to November 28 (December 11), 1909, and edited by Lenin.

The first 20 issues were set up in type in Vyborg and printed from matrices in St. Petersburg. For reasons of secrecy, the place of publication was given as Moscow. Later, when it became extremely difficult to put out a clandestine publication in Russia, the editors, in conformity with a decision taken by the St. Petersburg and Moscow committees of the R.S.D.L.P., moved the paper first to Geneva and then to Paris. p. 179

[124] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's article "A Critique of the Theory and Practice of Syndicalism" published in *Sovremenny Mir* Nos. 11 and 12, 1907, claiming that the neutralist viewpoint on relations between political parties and the trade unions gained the upper hand at the Stuttgart Congress.

Sovremenny Mir (The Modern World)—a literary, scientific and political monthly published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to 1918. The Mensheviks were closely associated with it. During the bloc between the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks, Bolsheviks also contributed to the journal. In 1914 it became the organ of the social-chauvinists. p. 179

[125] A reference to one of the two official copies of the minutes of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which was left abroad and never recovered. p. 181

[126] *Berner Tagwacht*—a newspaper published by the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland. p. 184

[127] The arrests in Geneva were connected with the changing of money expropriated in Tiflis on June 13, 1907. The organiser of the expropriation, Kamo (Ter-Petrosyan), and all the participants in it managed to escape. But the tsarist authorities informed the police abroad of the serial numbers of the 500-ruble banknotes seized in the expropriation; in December 1907, persons changing these banknotes were arrested simultaneously in Berlin, Munich,

Paris, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Geneva. In November 1907 Kamo was betrayed by the provocateur Y. A. Zhitomirsky and arrested in Berlin. The Russian Government, having established Kamo's identity, secured his extradition as a criminal. During the search for the Tiflis expropriators, arrests were made in the Russian Social-Democratic colonies in Berlin, Paris, Munich, Geneva and Stockholm. Protests against the violation of the right of asylum for political emigrants compelled the West-European police to release the arrested shortly after. p. 184

[128] *Proletary* No. 24 was dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. A. V. Lunacharsky informed Lenin that he could not write the article about the Paris Commune. p. 185

[129] A reference to the inquiry undertaken by the Party into the slanderous accusations levelled by the Mensheviks against M. M. Litvinov in connection with the changing abroad of banknotes seized in the Tiflis expropriation organised by Kamo (see Note 127). Leon Tyszka was a member of the investigation commission at the initial stage of the inquiry. Later the investigation was conducted by the Central Bureau Abroad, but owing to the indiscreet behaviour of Bureau members, the matter was taken out of its hands by decision of the August 1908 plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., and handed over to a special C.C. commission of five members, one each from the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and the national organisations. p. 187

[130] An editorial article containing slanderous accusations against the Bolsheviks in connection with the Tiflis expropriation.

Golos Sotsial-Demokrata (Voice of the Social-Democrat)—a Menshevik organ published abroad from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva, then in Paris. In May 1909 it finally crystallised as the ideological centre of the liquidators. p. 187

[131] *Central Bureau Abroad*, the centre of all R.S.D.L.P. promotion groups abroad, was at the time in the hands of the Mensheviks. In August 1908 a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., adopted a general decision on the promotion groups and the functions and organisational status of the Central Bureau Abroad. The Bureau consisted of 10 members appointed by the C.C. (including one C.C. member with veto right), and its activities were confined to attending to the needs of the promotion groups abroad and carrying out general Party assignments given it by the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau Abroad. p. 188

[132] The article "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" was printed in *Proletary* No. 30, May 23 (10), 1908.

Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny (Social-Democratic Review)—a journal published by the Polish Social-Democrats in Cracow in 1902-04 and 1908-10. p. 188

[133] Evidently a reference to the record of M. M. Litvinov's testimony. Litvinov lodged a protest with the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., on March 10, 1908, against the handing of his testimony over to the Central Bureau Abroad. Leon Tyszka, assuming that the C.C. would discuss the protest, had warned F. Kon that the matter was to be kept confidential. p. 188

[134] Lenin evidently stopped over in Brussels on his way to London where he worked on his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in the British Museum. p. 189

[135] The publishers of the Granat Brothers' Encyclopaedia were interested at the time in studies on Russian history. Lenin was invited to contribute in the autumn of 1907, when one of the editors of the Encyclopaedia, A. V. Trupchinsky, made a special trip to Finland to negotiate with him. Lenin agreed to write the essay "The Agrarian System in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century", which was published only in 1918 by the Zhizn i Znaniye Publishers under the title "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century".

Trupchinsky also visited Lenin in Geneva, where he evidently asked him to write an article on the history of factory industry. The article was never written. p. 191

[136] See Note 127. p. 192

[137] Where Lenin went in the beginning of September 1908 has not been established. p. 193

[138] A reference to the annual dues of the R.S.D.L.P. to the International Socialist Bureau. p. 194

[139] *Le Peuple*—a daily newspaper, the Central Organ of the Belgian Labour Party, published since 1885 in Brussels. At present, organ of the Belgian Socialist Party. p. 195

[140] When the proceedings of the International Socialist Bureau session were published as a separate volume (see *Compte-rendu officiel.* Cand, 1909, pp. 44, 61-62) the text of Lenin's amendment to Kautsky's resolution was corrected in accordance with the enclosure to this letter.

The gist of his speeches at the International Socialist Bureau on the admission of the British Labour Party to the Second International Lenin outlined in his article "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau" published in *Proletary* No. 37, October 16 (29), 1908 (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 231-46). p. 196

[141] A reference to the delegates of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., to the Sixth Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, held early in December 1908. p. 197

[142] A reference to arrangements for the membership of the Social-Democratic deputies to the Third Duma in the Inter-Parliamentary Association of the International Socialist Bureau, and payment of their dues. p. 198

[143] A school organised on the Island of Capri by the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders as an attempt to create an ideological and organisational centre for a new anti-Bolshevik faction. For more about the Capri school see the resolutions "The Party School Being Set Up Abroad at X" and "The Breakaway of Comrade Maximov" adopted by a conference of the enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* in June 1909, and Lenin's articles "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" and "A Shameful Fiasco" (present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 450, 451; Vol. 16, pp. 29-61, 85-86). p. 201

[144] Evidently the reference is to the M. M. Litvinov inquiry in which representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party were also involved (see this volume, Document 146). p. 203

[145] What the "Yuri-Nikitich" incident was about has not been established. Yuri was the pseudonym of D. S. Grozhan, who toward the end of 1907, on instructions from L. B. Krasin, arranged a private loan to the Party treasury. The incident may have been connected with delay in payment of the debt. p. 203

[146] A reference to Volsky's book *Philosophy of Struggle*, Moscow, 1909. p. 206

[147] After receiving this letter, which was signed also by I. Rubanovich, the representative of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in the International Socialist Bureau, the Bureau called on all socialist parties to protest against the tsar's projected visit to their countries, and if the visit took place, to demonstrate the European workers' attitude towards it.

The Socialist and Labour groups in the Swedish, British, French, Italian and other parliaments introduced interpellations concerning the visit of the tsar, and in Sweden, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and other countries protest meetings and demonstrations were organised. p. 210

[148] *Le Socialisme*—a journal put out in Paris from 1907 to June 1914. Its publisher and editor was the French Socialist Jules Guesde. p. 211

[149] The inter-party hearing of the charges against B. Gertsik by representatives of the Geneva groups of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks), the Bund, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, representatives of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania and the Zurich group, and Latvian Social-Democracy, found Gertsik unworthy of membership in any revolutionary

organisation. The Geneva Bolshevik group found him to be a provocateur. p. 213

[150] *Rech* (Speech)—a daily, the Central Organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, founded in St. Petersburg on February 23 (March 8), 1906, and closed by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. It continued publication until August 1918 as *Nasha Rech* (Our Speech), *Svobodnaya Rech* (Free Speech), *Vek* (The Age), *Novaya Rech* (New Speech), and *Nash Vek* (Our Age). p. 215

[151] A reference to reviews of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in the journal *Vozrozhdeniye* No. 7-8, May 1909, and *Sovremenny Mir* for July 1909, signed respectively "A—ov" (A. I. Avramov) and "Orthodox" (Lyubov Axelrod).

Vozrozhdeniye (Regeneration)—a journal published legally by the Menshevik liquidators from December 1908 to July 1910 in Moscow. p. 216

[152] *Vorwärts*, the Central Organ of the German Social-Democrats, carried daily in late July and in August 1909 articles and detailed reports on the Barcelona uprising (beginning with No. 174, July 29) and the general strike in Sweden (beginning with No. 178, August 2). Lenin sent the issues to Zinoviev to be used as source material for articles in *Proletary*.

The article by L. B. Kamenev referred to was his "The Liquidation of the Hegemony of the Proletariat in the Menshevik History of the Russian Revolution (How A. Potresov Liquidated G. Plekhanov and *Iskra*)" reviewing the five-volume *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* put out by the Mensheviks, edited by L. Martov, P. Maslov and A. Potresov. The article was printed in *Proletary* Nos. 47-48 and 49, September 5 (18) and October 3 (16), 1909. p. 216

[153] Probably a reference to the September 1909 issue (No. 2) of *Golos Bunda* (Voice of the Bund), organ of the C.C. of the Bund published illegally in Russia. *Proletary* carried nothing on the subject. A news item about *Golos Bunda* No. 2 appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 9, November 13 (October 31). p. 217

[154] No mention of inviting a representative or students from the Capri school to Paris for talks was made in the reply from the editors of *Proletary* "To the Comrades Workers Who Have Arrived at the School at X", published in the Supplement to *Proletary* No. 47-48, September 11 (24), 1909. p. 219

[155] This letter was written in connection with the circulation abroad by some otzovists of a leaflet alleging that the Bolshevik Centre had declined to render assistance to persons suspected of being involved in an expropriation in the Urals.

In the Supplement to *Proletary* No. 47-48 the editors refuted

the allegation and announced that the Editorial Board of *Proletary* had asked the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., to investigate the matter. p. 220

[156] Karl Kautsky's reply of August 20, 1909, to an invitation to lecture at the Capri school was printed as a separate leaflet and later in the Supplement to issue No. 5 of the Vienna *Pravda* of September 20 (October 3), 1909. Kautsky declined to lecture but welcomed the organisation of the school. Observing that "it would be gratifying if the R.S.D. could at last overcome factional division which weakens it so much", Kautsky urged that philosophical differences should not be brought to the fore in either propaganda or the organisational sphere. p. 222

[157] *Yerogin hostel*—a hostel for peasant deputies to the First Duma in St. Petersburg sponsored by Duma deputy Yerogin, a wealthy landowner, where the peasant deputies were indoctrinated in the spirit of loyalty to the autocracy (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 45-46). p. 222

[158] Evidently a reference to the stand taken by M. N. Pokrovsky as reflected in his conditional and partial support of the leaflet "Report of the Members Removed from the Enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* to the Bolshevik Comrades" put out by A. A. Bogdanov and L. B. Krasin. A critique of the leaflet was given by Lenin in his article "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 29-61). p. 224

[159] The letter sent to the Council of the Capri school read as follows: "Dear Comrades! Of the two prospects noted in our letter to you the second has materialised: you do not wish to carry out the decisions of the local organisations but propose to negotiate with the Bolshevik organ only as a separate exclusive group. You know full well that by taking this stand you yourselves are impeding further talks. We can give you only one advice: publish your last letter to us."

However, the School Council published its letter only after the end of the course in "Report of the First Higher Social-Democratic Propaganda and Agitation School for Workers" in Paris late in 1909. p. 225

[160] A reference to the transfer from Geneva to Paris of the Russian Proletarian Library collected by the Social-Democrat G. A. Kuklin, who sided with the Bolsheviks in 1905, and presented by him to the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., in July 1905. A Statement by Kuklin announcing that the library was now the full property of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., was published in *Proletary* No. 7, July 10 (June 27), 1905.

In his reply of October 18, 1909, V. A. Karpinsky, who was in charge of the library, agreed to the transfer to Paris on con-

dition that the library remained independent and would not function under the auspices of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, but would merge with one of the existing libraries in Paris. p. 225

[161] A reference to a Bolshevik library organised by V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich. In July 1905 Lenin presented it with over 400 titles from his own personal library. p. 226

[162] The background of this letter is as follows: The Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* refused to print Lenin's article "On Methods of Consolidating Our Party and Its Unity" as an editorial and suggested that he submit it as a signed article. In reply Lenin submitted the question of methods of consolidating the Party and its unity for discussion by the Editorial Board and proposed a draft resolution on it (see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 77). Lenin and Kamenev voted for the resolution, Martov and Warski were against, and Zinoviev, who in general objected to the adoption of a political resolution on this question, abstained. Since the article and the resolution were rejected, Lenin submitted his resignation from the Editorial Board of the C.O.

The Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Centre drew up a collective statement to the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* from the Bolshevik members of the Board and the representative of the Polish Social-Democrats to the effect that the "incident", being based on a misunderstanding, should be considered closed (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 47, p. 287). p. 229

[163] Who asked Lenin to write an essay on the history of Social-Democracy in Russia has not been established. It may have been the editor of "*Schulthers' Europäischer Geschichts-Kalender*". p. 231

[164] *Leipziger Volkszeitung*—a Social-Democratic daily published from 1894 to 1933. For a number of years it was edited by Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg and was the organ of the Left Social-Democrats. From 1917 to 1922 it was the organ of the German Independents, and after 1922, of the Right-wing Social-Democrats. p. 231

[165] *Der Kampf*—a monthly, organ of the Austrian Social-Democrats, published in Vienna from 1907 to 1934. Its orientation was opportunist, Centrist, camouflaged with Left phraseology. p. 231

[166] A. Ekk (Mukhin) was accused of unseemly behaviour. The case was examined in 1909 by a special commission which found that there was "no grounds for bringing Ekk before a Party court". Ekk was not informed of this decision; in reply to an inquiry addressed to F. E. Dzerzhinsky (Yuzef), he received an answer dated March 9, 1910, that the C.C. of the Party had "endorsed the decision of the commission as it stood". Later, however, the

Ekk case was reopened; the last commission was unable to complete the investigation in view of the outbreak of the First World War. p. 234

[167] A reference to L. B. Kamenev's article "Another 'Critic' of the Proletarian Movement", printed in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 14, June 22 (July 5), 1910. p. 235

[168] The Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. consisted, as decided by the January 1910 plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., of 2 Bolsheviks, 2 Mensheviks, and one representative of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. Its composition was as follows: from the Bolsheviks, Lenin and G. Y. Zinoviev; from the Mensheviks Y. O. Martov and F. I. Dan, and from the Polish Social-Democrats, A. Warski. When Martov and Dan found themselves in the minority on one or another question, they created conflicts and complained to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad about the Bolsheviks and the representative of Polish Social-Democracy. The C.C. Bureau Abroad addressed an inquiry to the C.C. concerning the "extent of the jurisdiction of the C.C. Bureau Abroad in matters relating to conflicts arising in the Editorial Board of the Central Organ". The Bolsheviks proposed to the C.C. that a plenary meeting of the C.C. be called to replace Martov and Dan in the Editorial Board of the Central Organ with pro-Party Mensheviks (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 191-94). p. 235

[169] The journal *Mysl* (Thought), started publication in Moscow in December 1910. It was closed in April 1911, the last issue, No. 5, being confiscated. p. 235

[170] A reference to the Menshevik liquidationist paper *Pravda*, Trotsky's factionalist organ, published in 1908-12. The first issues came out in Lvov and from No. 4 on it was published in Vienna. p. 235

[171] A reference to publication by the Editorial Board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in February 1910 in Paris of a leaflet entitled "Letter to the Comrades" and signed by Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov. The authors of the leaflet charged the paper *Sotsial-Demokrat* with having become an affiliate of *Proletary* and declared their intention to continue publishing *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin analysed this document and gave it a political appraisal in the articles "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party (Reply to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*)" and "Party Unity Abroad" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 156-64 and 185-89). p. 236

[172] *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 12 carried an unsigned article "On the Party Conference". The letter referred to, "To the Party Organisations (on the Coming Party Conference)", was written by

a commission consisting of G. Y. Zinoviev, I. F. Dubrovinsky and Y. O. Martov. p. 239

[173] A reference to a letter from M. M. Rosen (Ezra), a member of the C.C. of the Bund, addressed to G. Y. Zinoviev. p. 241

[174] *Azefism*—a synonym for political betrayal, from the name of E. F. Azef, a Socialist-Revolutionary leader who proved to be a secret police agent. p. 242

[175] A reference to Lenin's article "*Golos* (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party (Reply to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*)" giving documentary proof of the refusal of the Menshevik liquidator members of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., to take part in the work of the C.C. and even in the session held to co-opt new members (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 156-64). p. 243

[176] L. B. Kamenev was delegated to the Editorial Board of Trotsky's *Pravda* after the January 1910 plenary meeting of the Central Committee, which put off the question of making the paper an organ of the C.C. until the next Party conference, but decided to subsidise it and to send its representative to the Editorial Board "as a third editor". After the publication in the paper's issue No. 14 of "Letter from *Pravda* to Thinking Workers" in which Trotsky sided with the liquidators and the otzovists, Kamenev withdrew from the Editorial Board. p. 243

[177] A reference to G. V. Plekhanov's article "The Latest Plenary Meeting of Our Central Committee" published in *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social-Democrat) No. 11 (March 1910) in which he wrote: "... what is *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* for Mensheviks of a certain orientation? It is in effect their factional—and, moreover, irresponsible—centre. By voting for the resolution pledging the closure of *Golos* ... our 'Mensheviks'—members of the C.C.—laid down on the altar of the Party the heart, so to say, of their faction. The skeptic will say that not all promises are carried out. But, I repeat, we have no right to think that the comrades who gave this promise were insincere." p. 244

[178] The disruption of Party unity by C.C. Bureau Abroad member B. Gorev-Goldman (Igor) referred to here consisted in the following. On March 16, 1910, the C.C. Bureau Abroad published as a leaflet the letter "To All Comrades Abroad" urging all groups to abide by the decisions of the January 1910 plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., to take the most vigorous steps to put an end to the organisational division, to follow the example of the Bolsheviks and close factional organs. Together with the representative of the Bund in the C.C. Bureau Abroad, Gorev-Goldman voted against endorsing the letter. This was made public by the Editorial Board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in its "Letter to Comrades". p. 246

[179] A reference to draft resolutions and proposals relating to the agenda of the Eighth International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen, and to the report of the R.S.D.L.P.

The report was published in French in pamphlet form under the title "Rapport du Parti socialiste-démocrate ouvrier de Russie au VIII-e Congrès Socialiste International à Copenhague (28 août-3 septembre 1910)"—(Report of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to the Eighth International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen [August 28-September 3, 1910]). p. 247

[180] See Note 127. p. 247

[181] Lenin obtained guest tickets in Copenhagen. One of them was for Inessa Armand. p. 249

[182] A reference evidently to an announcement issued by the Organising Committee for the convocation of the Copenhagen Congress. p. 249

[183] A reference to Lenin's trip to Stockholm to meet his mother, Maria Ulyanova. He left for Stockholm on September 12 and returned to Copenhagen on September 26, 1910. p. 251

[184] The report by Tria (V. Mgeladze) which was to be appended to the R.S.D.L.P. report to the Copenhagen Congress was printed later in Russian by special decision of the Central Organ (see letter to Maxim Gorky of November 14, 1910, present edition, Vol. 34, p. 433). The Tria report is not among the supplements to the Copenhagen Congress report. p. 252

[185] A reference to the anonymous article "Die russische Sozialdemokratie (Von unserem russischen Korrespondenten)" published in *Vorwärts* No. 201 on the opening day of the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International, August 28, 1910. The author was L. Trotsky. Lenin recalls it in his article "The Anonymous Writer in *Vorwärts* and the State of Affairs in the R.S.D.L.P." written in 1912 (see present edition, Vol. 17, p. 535). p. 253

[186] The chairman of the meeting of the Editorial Board of the C.O. probably was either A. Warski or his deputy V. Leder. p. 257

[187] One of the questions taken up at the January 1910 plenary meeting of the C.C. was the case of V. K. Taratuta (Victor), a member of the Bolshevik Centre, who demanded that the C.C. institute an inquiry concerning the rumours circulated in the Party defaming him. The plenary meeting appointed an investigation commission which after a thorough inquiry unanimously agreed that there were no grounds whatever for accusing Victor of being a provocateur and cleared his name completely. p. 257

[188] A reference to preparations for the publication of the newspaper *Zvezda* (Star) in St. Petersburg. It came out from December 16 (29),

1910, to April 22 (May 5), 1912. Its successor was *Nevskaya Zvezda* (The Neva Star), started because of frequent confiscations of *Zvezda*. The last issue of *Nevskaya Zvezda* came out on October 5 (18), 1912. The Editorial Board of *Zvezda* originally consisted of V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, N. I. Jordansky (a Plekhanovite) and I. P. Pokrovsky (a representative of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, a Bolshevik sympathiser). The publisher was Duma deputy N. G. Poletayev, a Bolshevik. p. 258

[189] A reference to the intention of some Bolsheviks in Russia to make *Zvezda* the organ of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, to which end the Menshevik Duma deputies Gegechkori and Kuznetsov were invited to contribute to it. This led to misunderstandings in the Editorial Board. p. 259

[190] *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal monthly published by the Menshevik liquidators in 1910-14 in St. Petersburg. p. 259

[191] It had been learned from V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich that the misunderstanding was due to I. P. Pokrovsky's opposition to the inclusion in the *Zvezda* Editorial Board of the Bolshevik Turutin, for which Lenin's consent had been obtained beforehand. p. 259

[192] A reference to the journal *Mysl* (See Note 169). p. 259

[193] A reference to money needed to publish *Zvezda*. In his letter to V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich of December 9, 1910 (see this volume, Document 214) Lenin informed him that the money had been sent. p. 261

[194] On December 17, 1910, Lenin received a circular letter dated December 15, 1910, from the International Socialist Bureau to the parties affiliated with the Second International asking them to consider an amendment to the Copenhagen Congress (1910) resolution on arbitration and disarmament which the Congress had referred to the I.S.B. Since the amendment dealt with strikes of war industry workers as an expedient means of preventing the outbreak of war, the I.S.B. proposed that the parties approach the trade unions concerned and report back to the I.S.B. Lenin made marginal notes on the circular (see *Lenin Miscellany XXV*, pp. 260 and 261). He sent it to the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* for publication, together with the present letter. Neither the circular nor Lenin's letter were published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 262

[195] The beginning of Kautsky's "Tactical Trends Among German Social-Democrats" was published in the journal *Mysl* No. 5, April 1911. p. 263

[196] A reference to the "Points of Agreement" drawn up by the Polish Social-Democrats, on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks and the conciliators, on the other, and adopted on February 11, 1911, in

Paris, concerning the composition and the immediate tasks of the central Party bodies, and especially to Point 2 of the agreement, which read as follows: "The C.C. is to consist of 4 Bolsheviks+1 Polish Social-Democrat+2 Plekhanovites (variant: 1 Plekhanovite +1 from *Golos*)+1 from the Bund+1 Latvian." This was followed by the reservation which Lenin criticises as reducing the first part of the point to nought: "Only after the Latvian and Bundist have formally announced on behalf of their organisations that they are withdrawing from the C.C. if it is thus constituted, will we demand as the ultimate minimum: 3 Bolsheviks+1 Polish Social-Democrat+1 from *Golos*+1 Plekhanovite+1 Latvian+1 Bundist." The agreement was signed by Leon Tyszka, A. Rykov, G. Zinoviev, and others. p. 266

[197] *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette)—an illegal popular Bolshevik paper published irregularly in Paris from October 30 (November 12), 1910, to July 30 (August 12), 1912. All told nine issues came out. Launched on Lenin's initiative, it was officially founded in August 1910 by decision of a conference of representatives of the Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and other sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin was the paper's guiding spirit and editor.

The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. commended the paper's vigorous and consistent defence of the Party and Party principle and proclaimed it an official organ of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. p. 267

[198] A reference to the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., known as the "Unity Plenum" held January 2-23 (January 15-February 5), 1910, in Paris. For more detailed information on this meeting see present edition, Vol. 16, Note 76. p. 267

[199] A reference to a statement submitted by B. Gorev (Igor) on February 17, 1911, to the C.C. Bureau Abroad on the question of where to hold the plenary meeting of the C.C. and the candidates put forward by the Mensheviks (see *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*, pp. 16-17). p. 268

[200] According to the rules of the C.C. adopted by the January 1910 plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., alternate members of the C.C. elected by the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and "carrying out Party work of any kind in Russia" could take part in the work of the plenary meeting. The Mensheviks advanced the candidacy of Roman (K. M. Yermolayev), who together with other liquidators had sabotaged the work of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., in Russia for a year and a half. p. 268

[201] The "*58 Mensheviks*" were the members of the "first" (Menshevik) R.S.D.L.P. promotion group in Paris who adopted at a general meeting of the group an appeal "To All Members of the R.S.D.L.P." framed as a resolution on the state of affairs in the Party and later

published as a supplement to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 24, February 1911. p. 269

[202] A reference to the leaflet "Letter to the Comrades" put out in Paris in February 1911 by the Editorial Board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. p. 270

[203] The by-election to the Third Duma held in Moscow on March 20 (April 2), 1911. The Social-Democratic candidate was I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, who had been arrested in February and exiled just about the time of the elections for three years to Astrakhan Gubernia. p. 271

[204] A reference to the protests registered by the Bundists Yudin (member of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., in Russia) and Lieber (Ber) (member of the C.C. Bureau Abroad) against the convocation of a C.C. plenary meeting abroad. p. 272

[205] On February 9 (22), 1911, Lydia Knipovich, Lyubov Radchenko V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich and others were arrested in St. Petersburg. p. 272

[206] A letter from Tyszka to Lenin and Zinoviev dated March 20, 1911 indicated that Nogin's proposal to hold the meeting of the "Russian members" of the C.C. abroad, made at the end of February or the beginning of March 1911 on the insistence of the Bolshevik Centre Abroad, met with opposition from Yudin and Lindov. After a time Yudin went to the Caucasus to fetch the Menshevik Adrianov with a view to holding the meeting in Russia on their return. The meeting did not take place because Nogin, noticing that his movements were being watched, left Tula and went into hiding for a time. p. 273

[207] A reference to a campaign for what was purported to be a Party conference started in issue No. 18-19 for 1911 of *Pravda*, published by Trotsky in Vienna. The campaign later resulted in the convocation in Vienna of an anti-Party conference of liquidators in August 1912. p. 273

[208] A reference to Lindov (G. D. Leiteisen) whom Rykov in one of his letters to Lenin in 1911 called "a philistine and coward". Lindov, then a member of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in Russia, took an indecisive, vacillating position on the question of calling a plenary meeting. p. 275

[209] Out of the eight members of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in Russia, four Bolsheviks and one representative of the Polish Social-Democrats. p. 275

[210] The Party School Commission, established by decision of the January 1910 plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., was to

arrange in 1911 additional lectures in Paris for graduates of the *Vperyod* school.

M. L. Veltman-Pavlovich (Volontyor), one of the lecturers at the *Vperyod* school in Bologne, was a member of the party school commission in March 1911. By giving a one-sided, factionalist picture of the work of the commission, he incited the students against it with the result that studies were disrupted. p. 275

[211] *Trybuna*—organ of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, published in Warsaw in 1910 and 1911. The actual editor of the newspaper was Leon Tyszka. p. 276

[212] In a letter to A. I. Rykov dated March 10, 1911 (see this volume Document 220) Lenin refers to a copy of a letter from N. A. Semashko (Alexandrov) a member of the C.C. Bureau Abroad. Lenin here is evidently asking about the same letter. p. 276

[213] Evidently a suggestion that Pokrovsky and Gegechkori should sign the official reply of the parliamentary group to the present letter. p. 277

[214] *Trust funds*—money belonging to the Bolsheviks held by trustees. At the January 1910 ("Unity") plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., held in Paris, an agreement was reached under which the Bolsheviks dissolved their group and turned over its property (funds, printing shop, etc.) to the Central Committee on condition that the other groups likewise disband and pursue a single Party line directed against liquidationism and otzovism. The funds were held in trust by the German Social-Democrats Karl Kautsky, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin. p. 278

[215] The R.S.D.L.P. Second Promotion Group in Paris formed on November 18 (new style), 1908, separated from the previous Paris group which had included the Mensheviks as well. In 1911 the group included Lenin, Nadezhda Krupskaya, N. A. Semashko, M. F. Vladimirsky, Inessa Armand and other Bolsheviks; A. I. Lyubimov, M. K. Vladimirov and other conciliators, and some *Vperyod* supporters.

A meeting of the group held on July 1 (new style), 1911, discussed the situation in the Party and adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin (see present edition Vol. 17, pp. 216-24) with a majority of 27 votes. Ten votes were cast for a conciliatory resolution submitted by the minority. It is the conciliatory speeches of Lyubimov and Vladimirov at this meeting that Lenin calls "the worst repetition of the worst speeches of the Economists". p. 278

[216] *The "bloc" of the conciliators with the Polish Social-Democrats* (in the present letter the reference is to Tyszka and Leder) was directed against the Bolsheviks. After the June 1911 conference of members of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., abroad at the time, the conciliators Lyubimov and Vladimirov, together with the Polish Social-

Democrat Tyszka, challenged the composition of the Organising Commission Abroad, for the convocation of the Party conference seeking with the support of the Polish Social-Democrats to win the majority in it for the conciliators.

The "*play of intrigue*" on the part of the conciliators and the Polish Social-Democrats with the *Golos* group was expressed in the support they gave to Martov and Dan, who had withdrawn from the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, after the June conference. The fifth member of the Editorial Board, Leder, issued an ultimatum that he would "withdraw" unless two other Mensheviks were brought in. The conciliators sided with the Polish Social-Democrats. p. 278

[217] A reference to a telegram dated December 5, 1911, received by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. from the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Persia protesting against the intervention of Russian tsarism and British imperialism in the internal affairs of the Persian people. p. 283

[218] *Pravda* (The Truth)—a legal Bolshevik daily; first issue appeared in St. Petersburg on April 22 (May 5), 1912.

The decision to put out a daily mass-circulation workers' paper was taken at the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin gave ideological guidance to *Pravda*, wrote for it almost daily, advised its editors. He wanted it to be a militant, revolutionary organ.

The paper was constantly hounded by the police, and on July 8 (21), 1914, it was closed down.

Publication was resumed only after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917. On March 5 (18), 1917, *Pravda* became the Organ of the Central and St. Petersburg Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 289

[219] *Nevsky Golos* (Neva Voice)—a legal Menshevik-liquidationist weekly published in St. Petersburg from May 20 (June 2) to August 31 (September 13), 1912, by D. F. Kostrov in lieu of *Zhivoye Dyelo* (Vital Cause). All told nine issues came out. p. 290

[220] *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Recorder)—a newspaper voicing the views of the moderate liberal intelligentsia, founded in Moscow in 1863. Beginning with 1905 it was the organ of the Right wing of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. The paper was closed down in 1918 together with other counter-revolutionary publications. p. 291

[221] *Sovremennik* (The Contemporary)—a literary and political monthly published in St. Petersburg in 1911-15. It was a rallying centre for Menshevik liquidators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Left Liberals. In 1914 Lenin described the orientation of the journal as a "mixture of Narodism and Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 296). p. 293

[222] *Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung*—a daily, the Central Organ of the Austrian Social-Democrats, founded by Victor Adler in 1889 in Vienna. It was closed down in 1934 and resumed publication in 1945 as the Central Organ of the Socialist Party of Austria. p. 293

[223] *Nevskaya Mysl* (Kiev Thought)—a bourgeois-democratic daily published from 1906 to 1918. p. 294

[224] *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—a legal theoretical Bolshevik monthly published in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. It was founded on Lenin's initiative as a successor to the journal *Mysl*, which had been closed down.

On the eve of the First World War *Prosveshcheniye* was closed down by the tsarist government. Publication was resumed in the autumn of 1917, but only one double issue came out. p. 294

[225] A reference to Lenin's pamphlet *The Present Situation in the R.S.D.L.P.* (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 203-20). The pamphlet was sent to the delegates to the Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany held September 15-21, 1912, in Chemnitz. p. 295

[226] *Russkoye Slovo* (Russian Word)—a daily, founded in 1895 and published in Moscow by I. D. Sytin. Formally independent, it championed the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie from moderate liberal positions.

The newspaper was closed down in November 1917, but it resumed publication in January 1918, first as *Novoye Slovo* (New Word) and then as *Nashe Slovo* (Our Word), until July 1918, when it was finally closed down. p. 295

[227] A reference to the so-called August conference of the liquidators held in Vienna in August 1912. The anti-Party August bloc organised by Trotsky was formed there. For more on the August conference of the liquidators see present edition, Vol. 18, Note 109. p. 296

[228] *Zavety* (Behests)—a legal literary and political monthly of Socialist-Revolutionary orientation, published in St. Petersburg from April 1912 to July 1914. p. 297

[229] *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*—a Social-Democratic daily published from 1890 to 1919. Until 1916 it was under the influence of the Bremen Left Social-Democrats and then was taken over by the social-chauvinists.

The article referred to has not been found. p. 301

[230] A reference to charges of unethical behaviour made against Karl Radek in an inquiry organised by the Chief Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. By decision of the board of inquiry, Radek was expelled from the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania and the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

In early September 1913 a commission was set up in Paris on the initiative of the Bureau of the Sections Abroad of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania (Rozlamists) to review the decision.

Lenin supported the review of the Radek case, believing that the charges laid by the Chief Executive stemmed from the acute struggle it was waging against the Rozlamists.

The commission worked for five months and arrived at the conclusion that there were no grounds for the party trial of Radek and his expulsion from the party, and recommended that Radek be considered a member of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and of the R.S.D.L.P. (see the pamphlet *Sprawozdante komisji badajZce jsprawę czlonka S.D.K.P.i.L. Karola Radka*—Report of the Commission Investigating the Case of S.D.P.K.P.L. Member Karl Radek—published in March 1914 by the Bureau of the Sections Abroad of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania).

For background information on the differences between the Chief Executive and the Rozlamists see Lenin's article "The Split Among the Polish Social-Democrats" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 479-84). p. 301

[231] A reference to V. P. Litvinov-Falinsky's book *New Workers' Insurance Laws*, St. Petersburg, 1912, and I. Chistyakov's Workers' Insurance in Russia. *From the History of Workers' Insurance in Connection with Some Other Welfare Measures*, Moscow, 1912. p. 303

[232] On October 17 (30), 1912, the second congress of delegates from the worker curia of St. Petersburg was held to choose the electors from among whom the worker deputy to the Fourth Duma was to be elected. p. 304

[233] *P. I. Sudakov*, a worker, was elected at the first congress of delegates of the workers of St. Petersburg Gubernia held on October 5 (18), 1912, thanks to the vote of *Pravda* supporters. On October 6 (19) he wrote an item entitled "At the Meeting of Delegates" (*Pravda* No. 136) in which he declared himself a supporter of *Pravda* and *Zvezda*. On the following day, October 7 (20), *Luch* No. 19 carried a letter to the Editor from Sudakov in which he went back on the statement he had made in *Pravda*. For more about the Sudakov incident see Lenin's "On Political Spinelessness (Letter to the Editor)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 266-67. p. 304

[234] A typewritten copy of the present letter verified by Maxim Gorky was preserved among the personal papers of V. A. Desnitsky. It was written in reply to a project sent by Gorky for the collection of material on the history of the revolution. Gorky wrote about this project to V. V. Veresayev on October 8 (New Style) 1912 (Maxim Gorky, *Collected Works*, 30-volume Russian edition, Vol. 29, p. 255).

Gorky proposed to acquire for a museum the library and archives collected by Prince I. D. Bebutov, a Social-Democratic sympathiser. Bebutov had willed the collection to the R.S.D.L.P. and turned it over for safekeeping to the Executive (C.C.) of the German Social-Democratic Party. Through the editor of the St. Petersburg journal *Sovremennik*, Gorky got in touch with Bebutov, who replied that he did not object to his library being transferred to a reliable institution, but the final decision was left until a personal meeting.

What happened afterwards to the Bebutov library is not known. p. 305

[235] A reference to the congress of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Austria held in Vienna on October 31-November 4, 1912. p. 305

[236] *Y. I. Jagiello*, a member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) was elected to the Fourth Duma from Warsaw. The Bolsheviks were strongly against his admission into the Social-Democratic Duma group since he had been elected with the support of the bourgeoisie and the bloc of the P.P.S. and the Bund. By a majority of one vote (the decisive vote was cast by a Menshevik) he was nevertheless admitted, but under pressure from the Bolshevik deputies his rights in the group were limited; on all inner-Party questions he was given voice but no vote. For details see Lenin 's article "The Working Class and Its 'Parliamentary' Representatives", and the resolution of the Cracow conference of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. with Party functionaries, "The Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" (present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 437-38, 460-61). p. 305

[237] A reference to the *Extraordinary Socialist Congress of the Second International* in Basle on November 24-25 (N. S.), 1912, called to examine the question of struggle against the imminent danger of an imperialist world war, which had been further heightened by the outbreak of the first Balkan war. The congress was attended by 555 delegates. The C.C., R.S.D.L.P. sent six delegates.

At its meeting on November 25 the Congress unanimously adopted a manifesto against war.

In the event of an imperialist war, the manifesto recommended socialists to make use of the economic and political crisis caused by the war to fight for the socialist revolution.

When the First World War broke out, the leaders of the Second International ignored the Basle manifesto and sided with their imperialist governments. p. 306

[238] A reference to Karl Kautsky's article "Der Krieg und die Internationale" (War and the International) in *Die Neue Zeit* No. 6, November 8, 1912, pp. 191-92. p. 306

[239] Huysmans had written Lenin on November 7, 1912, letting him know when the Basle congress was to open and asking him to

attend to the appointment of delegates; informing him of the demonstrations expected to take place in the big European cities on November 17, 1912, against the extension of the theatre of hostilities; asking him to agree to speak at a meeting if invited to do so by any of the parties; informing him of the composition of the resolution committee of the congress, and asking that a representative be appointed to the committee. p. 306

[240] A reference to the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau held in Brussels on October 28-29, 1912, which Lenin did not attend. The meeting decided to call an extraordinary socialist congress. Russia was represented by G. Plekhanov and I. Rubanovich. A special closed sitting was held to discuss Russian affairs but no official report of the sitting was published. Lenin learnt of it from L. Martov's article "The International Bureau on Social-Democratic Unity", published in *Luch* No. 37, October 28, 1912. Lenin replied to Martov in his article "Better Late Than Never" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 469-70). p. 307

[241] *Luch* (The Ray)—a legal Menshevik-liquidationist daily published in St. Petersburg from September 16 (29), 1912, to July 5 (18), 1913. All told 237 issues came out. The newspaper was mainly financed by donations from liberals. p. 309

[242] A reference to the signing by M. K. Muranov, a deputy to the Fourth Duma, of a letter from the Social-Democratic Duma group protesting against war. A telegram announcing that Muranov was adding his signature was sent by Lenin to Basle on November 24 (N. S.), 1912. p. 310

[243] A reference to the arrest of *Pravda* editor N. N. Baturin in November 1912. p. 311

[244] The C.C., R.S.D.L.P. met in Cracow on November 12 or 13 (25 or 26), 1912, under Lenin's leadership. p. 315

[245] *Co-operative*—code name of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. p. 316

[246] *Dyen* (The Day)—code name for the newspaper *Pravda*. p. 316

[247] For reasons ot secrecy the Social-Democratic deputies in the Fourth Duma were referred to by numbers. No. 1 was A. Y. Badayev; No. 3, R. V. Malinovsky (who later was exposed as a provocateur); No. 4, N. R. Shagov; No. 5, M. K. Muranov; No. 6, G. I. Petrovsky; and No. 7, F. N. Samoilov. p. 316

[248] *Misha's collegium*—evidently code name for the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 316

[249] At the close of 1912 the business end of *Pravda* had been neg-

lected by the official personnel to such an extent that there was reason to suspect embezzlement and other abuses. p. 317

[250] Letters Nos. 262 and 264 were published in 1960 in the journal Istorichesky Arkhiv (Historical Archives) No. 2 as having been written by Nadezhda Krupskaya.

In preparing Vol. 48 of *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., for the press it was established that they had been written by Lenin but, for reasons of secrecy, had been copied by Krupskaya in invisible ink between the lines of letters sent openly through the mail. p. 317

[251] A reference to a declaration by the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma based on Lenin's theses "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies" (see present edition, Vol. 18, pp. 413-19).

In accordance with Lenin's advice, the declaration included practically all the main points of the minimum programme. However, the Mensheviks succeeded in inserting the demand for cultural-national autonomy. On December 7 (20), 1912, the declaration of the Social-Democratic group was read out in the Duma.

In December 1912 talks were conducted, on the insistence of the liquidators in the Social-Democratic Duma group, on the merging of *Pravda* and *Luch* into a "non-factional workers' newspaper". As a result of the talks, the Bolshevik deputies of the Duma A. Y. Badayev, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Samoilov and N. R. Shagov announced in *Luch* No. 78 on December 18, 1912, that they were joining the staff of *Luch* and the seven liquidator deputies declared they were joining the *Pravda* staff. But on January 30, 1913 the Bolshevik deputies left *Luch* owing to disagreement with the liquidationist line of the paper (see present edition, Vol. 35, p. 84, and Note 98). p. 321

[252] Camille Huysmans wrote Lenin on December 5 (N. S.), 1912 that he considered the replacement of the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. in the I.S.B. a temporary expedient, and that the final decision on representation could be taken after agreement had been reached between Lenin "and the other Social-Democratic faction" (i.e., the liquidators). p. 324

[253] The reference is to the meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers, called, for reasons of secrecy, the "February" meeting. It was held in Cracow from December 26, 1912, to January 1 1913 (January 8 to 14, 1913). p. 326

[254] *Federation of the worst type* is the way the decisions of the 1912 Prague Party Conference describe the relationships with the national (non-Russian) Social Democratic organisations which existed within the R.S.D.L.P. since the Fourth (Unity) Congress, when the "non-Russians" worked "in total isolation from Russian organisations", which had an extremely adverse effect upon the whole

work of the R.S.D.L.P. (for further details see present edition, Vol. 17, p. 464 and Vol. 18, pp. 411-12). p. 330

[255] The Social-Democratic Party of Austria was dissolved as a united party in 1897 at the Wiemberg (Vienna) Congress and a federative union of six national "Social-Democratic groups": the German, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian and Southern Slav, was established in its stead. All these groups were linked merely by a common congress and a common Executive Committee. At the Brünn Congress in 1899 the party's Executive Committee was reorganised into a federative body consisting of executive committees of the national Social-Democratic parties. p. 330

[256] [256] Lenin is referring to the "Draft Conditions of Amalgamation of the Bund with the R.S.D.L.P." adopted at the Fourth (Unity) Congress or the R.S.D.L.P. held in 1906, from April 10 to 25 (April 23 to May 8) (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, 1954, pp. 134-35). p. 331

[257] See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1967, p. 474. p. 332

[258] *Hamburger Echo*—a daily, organ of the Hamburg organisation of the German Social-Democratic Party, founded in 1875 as *Hamburg-Altonaer Volksblatt*. From 1887 to the present day has appeared under the name of *Hamburger Echo*. The paper was closed down by the nazi government in March 1933 and resumed publication in April 1946. p. 332

[259] Lenin's letter is a reply to that of G. M. Vyazmensky, Manager of the Archives of the Russian Social-Democrats in Berlin, who asked Lenin to send Polish illegal literature and all illegal publications of the R.S.D.L.P. to stock the archives; he offered to send *Izvestia* of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. for 1907 which Lenin saw during his first visit to the archives in the summer of 1912 and which he badly needed. p. 334

[260] *Izvestia* of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper published in St. Petersburg from July 16 (29) to October 11 (24), 1907. Three numbers were issued. p. 334

[261] This was a letter or introduction by Lenin to N. V. Kuznetsov (Sapozhkov) sent to Paris, in which Lenin apparently asked that illegal Social-Democratic literature for the socialist archives in Berlin be handed over to Vyazmensky. According to Vyazmensky's report, he visited Paris in January-February 1913 and Kuznetsov handed over to him several valuable numbers of illegal publications by the Bolshevik committees of the Urals. p. 334

[262] What apparently interested Lenin in No. 4 of *Luch* for January 5, 1913, was a paragraph "Representation on the International Bureau" written in reply to a paragraph under the same heading in

Pravda No. 201 for December 23, 1912. The liquidators declared in *Luch* that they considered representation of the R.S.D.L.P. on the I.S.B. (Lenin and Plekhanov) to be one-sided and raised the question of the absence on the I.S.B. of a representative of the Menshevik Organising Committee. p. 335

[263] This refers to the reorganisation of the Editorial Board of *Pravda* on the basis of the decisions of the Cracow meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. with Party functionaries. The absence of news about the beginning of this reorganisation caused Lenin grave concern, since in January 1913 *Pravda* again made a number of mistakes in its work. On January 15 and 23 the newspaper published letters to the editor from deputy Y. I. Jagiello, Polish Socialist Party member, in which he advertised himself as a representative of the Polish working class; on January 17 and 24 *Pravda* published front-page advertisements announcing the current issues of the liquidators' newspaper *Zeit*, the organ of the Bund; *Pravda* displayed indecision in the fight against the liquidators; despite the recommendations of the Cracow meeting, it did not publish certain articles forwarded to it by the C.C. Bureau Abroad, etc.

On January 22 (O.S.) a joint meeting of members of the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., in Russia with *Pravda* editorial staff was held, attended by 12 persons, among them C.C. members Y. M. Sverdlov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. I. Goloshchokin, Secretary of the C.C. Bureau Vera Lobova and others. A report was made at the meeting on the decisions of the C.C. and the Cracow meeting concerning the reorganisation of the Editorial Board; Y. M. Sverdlov was endorsed as editor of the newspaper with the right of veto and censorship of all articles; a member of the St. Petersburg Committee was elected to the Board for the purpose of closer contact with the St. Petersburg Bolshevik organisation, and Konkordia Samoilova was endorsed as secretary of the Editorial Board.

As a result of these measures, the general level of the newspaper rose. From February 10 (O. S.) a Sunday supplement was issued in the form of loose sheets. The paper's circulation increased. In a number of subsequent letters Lenin noted a considerable improvement in the work of the Editorial Board.

Zeit—a weekly, organ of the Bund, published in Yiddish in St. Petersburg from December 20, 1912 (January 2, 1913), to May 5 (18), 1914. p. 335

[264] Lenin is referring apparently to the paragraph "A Quibble" published in *Pravda* No. 6, January 8, 1913, in which *Pravda* denounced the improper conduct of the newspaper *Luch*, but made a mistake in quarrelling with the editors of the journal *Rabochy Golos* over minor questions not involving principles.

The journal *Rabochy Golos* (Worker's Voice), organ of the Textile Workers Trade Union, was being prepared for the press, but did not appear. p. 335

[265] This refers to N. G. Poletayev's incorrect attitude to the withdrawal of Bolshevik deputies of the Duma from the staff of the liquidationist newspaper *Luch*. Poletayev considered that mutual collaboration of Bolsheviks and liquidators in *Pravda* and *Luch* was permissible. This point of view was denounced by Lenin. p. 337

[266] After the appearance of the first number of *Pravda*, Poletayev left St. Petersburg and withdrew from the newspaper. His absence led to the closing down of *Nevskaya Zvezda* ("big sister"). Lenin attached great importance to Poletayev's work in *Pravda*. p. 337

[267] In 1913 A. Bogdanov began to publish his book *The Universal Organisational Science* (*Tectology*), in which he elaborated his empirio-monistic theories. p. 338

[268] This refers to the protest of the R.S.D.L.P. delegation at the Basle Congress against the improper action of the Secretariat of the International Socialist Bureau, who had declared that the delegates of the R.S.D.L.P. had no right to endorse the mandates of the Polish opposition delegates at the Basle Congress and that the five delegates of the Polish opposition sitting in would figure in the Congress report under an "X" sign. p. 339

[269] This refers to the names of the writers of unsigned articles published in the Leninist *Iskra*, *Proletary* and *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 339

[270] *Severniye Zapiski* (Northern Notes)—a literary and political monthly. Appeared in St. Petersburg in 1913-17. p. 340

[271] This apparently refers to L. B. Kamenev's pamphlet *The Essence of Liquidationism* which was to have been put out by the Priboi Publishers. p. 341

[272] On April 13 (26), 1913, Lenin lectured in Leipzig on the subject of "Social Revival in Russia and the Tasks of the Social-Democrats". p. 341

[273] Exactly what leaflet of the C.C. of the Lettish Social-Democrats Lenin is referring to has not been established. Probably it is a notice about the convocation of the Fourth Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats, issued abroad shortly before, and published in the Central Organ *Zihņa* (Struggle) on March 29, 1913.

The leaders of the Lettish Bolsheviks reprinted this notice in their organ *Biletens* (Bulletin) with critical comments concerning the agenda of the congress drawn up by the liquidationist C.C., as it revealed a tendency to evade key issues of principle. They criticised most sharply the point of the C.C. decision which stated the latter's intention of making no preparations for the congress until 3,000 rubles had been paid in to the C.C. account for this purpose. The Lettish Bolsheviks regarded this as a further attempt to put off the congress, the convocation of which was insistently demanded by the bulk of the membership. p. 342

[274] Following Lenin's advice the Lettish Bolsheviks came out at the Fourth Congress of the Lettish Social-Democrats with their own platform and draft resolutions. The draft platform for the congress was written by Lenin in May 1913 and published in August 1913 in the newspaper *Ciņas Biedrs* No. 4 (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 110-18). p. 343

[275] Troyanovsky, in his letter of May 15 (N. S.), 1913, asked Kamenev to write an answer to the article by the Menshevik liquidator S. Semkovsky (S. Y. Bronstein) "Die Wiederbelebung des russischen Proletariats" (The Rebirth of the Russian Proletariat) published in the journal *Der Kampf* No. 8, May 1, 1913. He promised the support of D. B. Ryazanov in getting the article published in *Der Kampf*. p. 344

[276] This refers to the international congress of the Second International which was to have been held in Vienna in August 1914. Owing to the outbreak of the imperialist world war the congress was not held. p. 344

[277] The *general strike in Belgium* began on April 14 (N. S.), 1913, and lasted till the 24th. *Pravda* regularly reported the progress of the strike and published information on donations made by Russian workers for the benefit of the strikers. For further details about this strike see Lenin's article "Lessons of the Belgian Strike" (present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 234-35). p. 345

[278] This refers to the second article of Berzin's series "Notes on Tactics", published in May 1913 in No. 2-3 of *Biletens* of the Bureau of Lettish Social-Democrat Groups Abroad with the sub-heading "Principles of Party Unity". In this article Berzin misinterpreted the decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906) concerning the conditions for amalgamation of the Lettish S.D.L.P. with the R.S.D.L.P. p. 346

[279] This refers to the decisions of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., namely: 1) "Conditions for amalgamation of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania with the R.S.D.L.P."; 2) "Draft conditions for amalgamation of the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party with the R.S.D.L.P."; 3) "Draft conditions for amalgamation of the Bund with the R.S.D.L.P." (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, 1954, pp. 132-35). p. 347

[280] See *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh*..., Part I, 1954, p. 203. p. 347

[281] Lenin is referring to the resolution of the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. "The Absence of Delegates from the Non-Russian National Centres from the General Party Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 464-65). p. 348

[282] This refers to the re-election of the Executive of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union. The meeting, held on August 25 (Sep-

tember 7), 1913, was attended by about three thousand people. Despite the attempts of the liquidators to set the meeting against the Bolshevik Executive, the vast majority, amid applause, adopted a resolution expressing appreciation of the Executive's activities. The liquidators' list collected only some 150 votes. The Bolshevik list, published beforehand in the newspaper *Severnaya Pravda*, was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

Secretary of the Executive of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union up till August 25 (September 7),1913, was the liquidator V. Abrosimov, who was subsequently exposed as an agent provocateur. p. 350

283 On the closing of the debate on the estimates of the post and telegraph department in the Fourth Duma on May 22 (June 4), 1913, voting was held on the motion of the Duma Cadet group calling for a 7-hour day for post and telegraph employees. The Duma Social-Democratic group, on the basis of Point 3 (h) of the resolution on "The Social-Democratic Group in the Duma" adopted at the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908, abstained from voting. As a result the motion for a 7-hour day for post and telegraph employees was rejected. Polemising with *Luch* in its articles "Liberal Failure" (issue No. 117 for May 23) and "*Luch* Against the S. D. Group" (issue No. 119 for May 25, 1913), *Pravda* defended the wrong action of the S. D. group in the Duma.

After Lenin's remark, this error was rectified.

In the resolution of the 1913 Poronin meeting of the C.C. with Party officials on "Social-Democratic Activities in the Duma" Point 3 (h) was revised and endorsed in a new and improved wording. p. 351

284 The article by M. S. Olminsky (Vitimsky), "*Pravda*", devoted to the appearance of the paper in enlarged format was published in No. 123 for May 30, 1913.

In the same issue *Pravda* published the fragment of a poem by the American poet, Horace Traubel, a former workman "Common Men and Women" translated by L. Stal. p. 352

285 Lenin is referring to A. Bogdanov's letter-statement "A Factual Explanation" published in No. 120 of *Pravda*, May 26, 1913, in which Bogdanov tried to refute the fact, pointed out by Lenin in his article "Controversial Issues", that negation of Duma work and of the employment of other legal possibilities derived from "Vperyodism" (see present edition, Vol. 19, p. 154). Together with his letter "The Question of Mr. Bogdanov and the *Vperyod* Group" (ibid., pp. 173-74) Lenin sent in to *Pravda* a paragraph directed against Bogdanov's distortion of the Party's history (this paragraph was not published at the time and has not yet been found). After the writing of his article "Ideology" containing undisguised propaganda of Machist views Bogdanov was struck off the list of *Pravda* contributors. p. 352

[286] In April-June 1913 *Pravda* carried articles by Plekhanov "Under a Hail of Bullets (Passing Notes)". One of them was directed against A. N. Potresov, "Mr. Potresov in the Role of My Accuser" (Nos. 112 and 114 for May 17 and 19, 1913). Following this *Pravda* published no more articles by Plekhanov up to June 7, while Potresov, in his feuilleton "In the Grip of His Past (On Plekhanov)" published in *Luch* Nos. 119, 121 and 122 for May 25, 28 and 29, 1913, continued to "fling mud" at Plekhanov. Criticism of Potresov's attacks on Plekhanov is given in Lenin's article "Working-Class Party and Liberal Riders (On Potresov)" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 287-88). p. 353

[287] *Bulletin périodique du Bureau Socialiste International* was published in French, English and German in Brussels from 1910 to 1914. p. 355

[288] Meaning someone connected with Nikitich (the revolutionary pseudonym of L. B. Krasin). This might refer to the Social-Democrat V. N. Malyantovich, who lived in Odessa in 1901-07. He was the brother of the Moscow lawyer P. N. Malyantovich. p. 355

[289] The person in question was engineer B. N. Smirnov, who lived in Berne at the time. Kasparov was of the opinion that financial support for the Party could be received from Smirnov. p. 359

[290] *Severnaya Pravda* (Northern Truth)—one of the names under which the Bolshevik *Pravda* was issued from August 1 (14) to September 7 (20), 1913. Altogether 31 numbers were issued. p. 359

[291] *Rabochaya Pravda* (Workers' Truth)—one of the names under which the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* was issued from July 13 (20) to August 1 (14), 1913. p. 359

[292] *Zhivaya Zhizn* (Living Life)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from July 11 (24), 1913; it was a successor to the liquidators' newspaper *Luch*. Altogether 19 numbers were issued. The paper was closed down on August 1 (14).

A critical analysis of Vera Zasulich's article "Apropos of a Certain Question" was given by Lenin in his article "How Vera Zasulich Demolishes Liquidationism" (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 394-416). p. 359

[293] *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (New Workers' Gazette—a daily newspaper of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg in lieu of *Zhivaya Zhizn* from August 8 (21), 1913, to January 23 (February 5), 1914. Lenin often called it "New Liquidators' Gazette". p. 359

[294] *Nash Put* (Our Way)—a legal workers' newspaper published in Moscow. The first number appeared on August 25 (September 7), 1913. Lenin took an active part in the newspaper. On September

12 (25), 1913, the paper was closed down; altogether 16 numbers were issued. Moscow's workers retaliated by a strike, but publication was not resumed. p. 360

[295] *Za Pravdu* (For Truth)—one of the names under which the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* was published from October 1 (14) to December 5 (18), 1913. Altogether 52 numbers were issued, of which 21 were confiscated and 2 were fined. p. 361

[296] The article "A Meeting of Marxists" in No. 8 of the newspaper *Za Pravdu* for October 12, 1913, lives a detailed report of the Poronin meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. with Party functionaries held September 23-October 1 (October 6-14), 1913. The writer of this article was M. Chernomazov, who was subsequently found to be an agent of the secret political police. p. 361

[297] This refers to the articles by G. I. Petrovsky, "My Impressions" (concerning his visit to Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and Kherson and Poltava gubernias) and "Foul Play" (concerning the Beilis case), and the article by the "former conciliator" N. Borin (N. Krestinsky), "Two Moral Measures". These articles were not reprinted. p. 361

[298] *X*—K. A. Komarovsky (B. G. Dansky). He joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1911, wrote for *Zvezda* and *Pravda* and took part in the insurance movement; in 1913-14 he was a member of the Editorial Board of the Bolshevik journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*. In order to discredit the Bolsheviks the liquidators accused Dansky of working in the bourgeois press. The Party committee investigating this accusation found that Dansky since joining the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, had ceased working in the bourgeois press, and therefore recognised him as an honest member of the Party and qualified the accusation levelled against him by the liquidators as slander.

The question of Komarovsky was dealt with a second time by a committee consisting of representatives of the newspaper *Za Pravdu* and the journals *Prosveshcheniye* and *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*, 6 worker deputies, in the Duma, members of the staff of the Priboi Publishers and a representative of the "organised Marxist workers". The committee's findings published in No. 32 of the newspaper *Za Pravdu* for November 10, 1913, under the heading "An End to Slander", stated that "the committee sees no obstacles whatever to X's continued contributions to Marxist publications and to his presence in comrades' midst".

The liquidators' smear campaign against Komarovsky was mentioned by Lenin in the Report of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 524). p. 362

[299] *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* (Insurance Questions)—a Bolshevik legal journal, appeared in St. Petersburg at intervals from October 1913 to March 1918. Among its contributors were prominent

organisers of the insurance campaign, such as the Bolsheviks N. A. Skrypnik, P. I. Stučka, A. N. Vinokurov and N. M. Shvernik. p. 364

[300] The reference is to the article by M. Chernomazov (Firin), "An Answer to D. Koltsov", published in *Za Pravdu* No. 42, November 23, 1913. The article was in response to "An Open Letter to M. Firin" by the Menshevik Koltsov (B. Ginsburg) published in *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 87, November 20, 1913. Koltsov, who took part in the smear campaign against the Bolsheviks in connection with the Dansky affair (see Note 298), accused Chernomazov of lying and slander because the latter declared that Koltsov himself, while serving in the Council of the Oil Industrialists' Congress in Baku, had acted in a similar role as Dansky, who was accused of political double-dealing by *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*. In his "An Answer to D. Koltsov", beginning with the address "Dear Comrade", Chernomazov stated that he had read "An Open Letter to M. Firin" with "a feeling of deep pain" and upheld his position in a polemic with Koltsov.

This document is a postscript to L. B. Kamenev's letter addressed to the editors of *Za Pravdu*. p. 365

[301] This letter to the editors of *Za Pravdu* was the second letter written by Lenin on receipt of the first reports concerning the decisions of the December meeting of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International on the question of unity within the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 516-18).

The December meeting of the I.S.B., held in London on December 13 and 14 (N. S.), 1913, adopted a resolution on this point moved by Kautsky on behalf of the German delegation. In a speech on December 14 introducing his resolution Kautsky declared that "the old Social-Democratic party in Russia has disappeared". It was to be restored on the basis of the Russian workers' urge for unity. In his articles "A Good Resolution and a Bad Speech" and "Kautsky's Unpardonable Error" Lenin examined the resolution and qualified Kautsky's speech as monstrous (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 528-30 and 546-47).

At a conference held in July 1914 in Brussels in accordance with a decision of the I.S.B., the leaders of the Second International, under the guise of "reconciling" the Bolsheviks with the liquidators, demanded of the Bolsheviks that they cease their criticism of the liquidators. The Bolsheviks refused to bow to this demand and continued their irreconcilable struggle against the liquidators, the enemies of the labour movement. p. 366

[302] In connection with the December meeting of the I.S.B. the liquidationist *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (No. 97 for December 3, 1913) published a telegram from London reporting that the Bolsheviks' demand that the Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma (the Six) should be represented by one of its members in the Interparliamentary Section of the Second International was rejected by the I.S.B. As a matter of fact this question was not discussed by

the I.S.B. and the Bolsheviks presented no such demand, since according to the Rules of the Inter-Parliamentary Section only one socialist group from each parliament, the one that had most deputies, was to be represented on it. In the case of the Russian Duma this representative was one of the liquidationist "Seven", who had a nominal majority of one. This question was dealt with by Lenin in his article "How the Liquidators Are Deceiving the Workers" (see *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 24, pp. 205-07). p. 367

[303] Apparently this refers to an article by Lenin in connection with the decision of the December meeting of the I.S.B. and the slanderous Campaign which the liquidationist newspapers raised around the resolution of the meeting calling for a "unity" conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

The decision of the Cracow meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. with Party functionaries "On the Reorganisation and the Work of the Editorial Board of the Newspaper *Pravda*" stated that all articles, which the C.C. considers obligatory for publication, should be published immediately (over an agreed signature)" (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth [Russian] Ed., Vol. 22, p. 270). This agreed signature were the letters "KKK". The C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. reaffirmed this decision at its meeting in December 1913: "The former ruling to the effect that articles sent in over the prearranged letters are to be published immediately and without modification remains in force" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4, 1959, p. 42). p. 370

[304] This refers to the journey of a delegate to the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region which was held in Brussels from January 13 to 26 (January 26 to February 8), 1914. The name of the delegate has not been established. p. 371

[305] Lenin's meeting with I. Rudis-Gipslis and I. E. Herman took place in Berlin at Herman's rooms. p. 373

[306] Apparently Lenin asked Milyutin to send him the article "On Certain Aspects of A. Bogdanov's Philosophy". The article was published in February 1914 in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* No. 2 over the signature of Vl. Pavlov (V. P. Milyutin). p. 376

[307] On January 9 (22), 1914, Lenin addressed two meetings of Social-Democrats in Paris devoted to the anniversary of January 9, 1905. p. 377

[308] On the eve of the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region, the evening of January 25 (N. S.), 1914, Lenin delivered a lecture in Brussels for the Congress delegates on the national question, which was listened to with tremendous interest. His meeting with the delegates was exceptionally cordial.

The Congress, which opened the next day, was a turning point in the history of the S. D. Party of the Lettish Region. It adopted

resolutions of a Bolshevik nature on practically all questions, except for certain amendments which the Mensheviks and conciliators contrived to wangle. The Congress's greatest achievement was the election of a Central Committee that took a Bolshevik stand and the passing of the Central Organ *Zihna* into the control of Bolshevik adherents. p. 377

[309] *The Bulletin of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.* was issued in accordance with the decision of the Poronin conference to furnish information on the activities of the Central Committee and the work of the local organisations.

No. 1 of the *Bulletin* appeared in January 1914 in Paris. Owing to lack of funds its publication was discontinued. p. 378

[310] I. F. Popov, during his stay in Brussels in January 1914, made contact, through the local organisations of the Belgian Worker's Party, with Belgian seamen of a merchant vessel plying between Antwerp and Southern Russian ports. Popov asked the seamen to ship illegal Party publications to Russia. His proposal was approved by Lenin. During his visit to Brussels to attend the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region Lenin met two representatives of the Belgian seamen and talked with them about conditions of the revolutionary work in Russia. p. 382

[311] In his letter dated January 29 (N. S.), 1914, Camille Huysmans expressed his regret at not having met Lenin at the Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region and asked Lenin personally to make a brief report on the state of affairs within the R.S.D.L.P. before leaving Brussels. He suggested meeting at 8.30 p.m. in the Maison du peuple, Brussels. p. 383

[312] Lenin received *Vorwärts* in exchange for Bolshevik publications. V. M. Kasparov answered Lenin on March 4 (N. S.), 1914, that he had called at the *Vorwärts* Forwarding Office where he had been told that literature was being sent to Lenin regularly, and it he did not receive it, that meant it was being confiscated. p. 385

[313] *Priboi people*—contributors to and members of the staff of the legal Bolshevik publishing house Priboi. This publishing business was founded in St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1913 and was controlled by the C.C. of the Party. Owing to increased persecution of the labour press by the tsarist government following the outbreak of the war Priboi had to close down and did not resume publishing activities until March 1917. In 1918 Priboi merged with the publishing house Kommunist, which was formed as a result of the merger of various publishing houses (Volna, Zhizni Znaniye and others). p. 385

[314] Kamenev's article on A. Bogdanov's book *An Introduction to*

Political Economy issued by the Priboi Publishing House appeared in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* No. 3 for March 1914. p. 386

[315] *Marxism and Liquidationism. A Symposium of Articles on the Fundamental Issues of the Modern Labour Movement. Part II* was published in July 1914 by Priboi, the Party's publishing house. The collection was to have been in two parts, whose contents were announced in the newspaper *Put Pravdy* No. 42, March 21, 1914.

Part I of the collection did not appear. Several dozen copies of Part II, which the publishers were late in taking delivery of from the printers, were confiscated. The bulk of the edition, however, was distributed. Part II contained fourteen articles by Lenin besides the preface and the conclusion, which were also written by him. p. 386

[316] This refers to a meeting called by the All-Russia Literary Society in January 1916 in connection with the increased persecution of the press and the reactionary bill on the press which the government was preparing. The decisive role at this meeting was played by the representatives of the liberals and liquidators; a liberal resolution was adopted. p. 386

[317] This refers to the raiding of funds for organising a Party congress. An agreement on financial subsidies was reached with certain leaders of the liberal-bourgeois party of Progressists, notably with A. I. Konovalov ("Pryanik") (see *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 6, 1958, pp. 8-13). p. 390

[318] On March 3 (N. S.), 1914, Camille Huysmans sent a letter to Lenin demanding that his report to the International Socialist Bureau be forwarded to him as quickly as possible and telling him that information concerning the situation within the R.S.D.L.P. had been received from the liquidators. p. 390

[319] In his letter of March 12 (N. S.), 1914, I. Rudis-Gipslis criticised the conciliatory nature of some of the resolutions adopted at the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region, and especially the inclusion in the resolution on the attitude to the R.S.D.L.P. of the proposal by the conciliators of J. Janson-Braun, which obliged the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region temporarily, "until the business of unification was on firm ground", to abstain from organisational contacts with either the C.C. or the O.C. He reported that the comrades in the local areas, too, were displeased with the conciliatory resolutions of the congress and believed that the fight against the conciliators would have to go on. p. 392

[320] Articles on the Fourth Congress of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region citing resolutions of the congress were published

in the supplement to No. 50 of *Put Pravdy* for March 30, 1914 under the heading "The Baltic Region". p. 392

[321] In his letter of March 10 (N. S.), 1914, Huysmans asked I. F. Popov to deliver Lenin's report to the International Socialist Bureau as soon as possible.

The same day Huysmans wrote to Lenin apologising for the ironical tone of his previous letter written in an unofficial capacity. p. 393

[322] Elections to the *Insurance Council* in St. Petersburg were held on March 2 (15), 1914. A sharp struggle developed around these elections between the Bolsheviks on the one hand, and the liquidators and Socialist-Revolutionaries on the other. The liquidators suffered complete defeat at these elections, three-fourths of the electors' meeting declaring in favour of the Bolsheviks' electoral platform and rejecting that proposed by the bloc of the liquidators and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The defeat of the liquidators was further demonstrated at the elections to the All-Russia Insurance Agency. Of the 57 delegates 82 per cent were Pravdists. p. 394

[323] *M-me Caillaux*—the wife of Joseph Caillaux, French statesman, Radical, Minister of Finance in 1913. In response to the hounding campaign raised against him by the nationalist Gaston Calmette, editor of *Le Figaro*, M-me Caillaux fired at Calmette in March 1914 and mortally wounded him. Joseph Caillaux was obliged to resign. p. 394

[324] *Sozialistische Monatshefte*—a journal, leading mouthpiece of the German opportunists and one of the organs of international revisionism; appeared in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During World War I (1914-18) it adopted a social-chauvinist stand. p. 397

[325] The collection *The Beginning* was published in Saratov in 1914. The first item in this collection was an article by N. Vladimirov "Encounters and Reflections", describing meetings with G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Lenin, L. Martov, A. N. Potresov and Maxim Gorky. p. 398

[326] This refers to the campaign started against A. V. Antonov (Britman), a member of the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad, by the *Vperyod* group and G. A. Alexinsky, who accused him of betraying, during the interrogation, his comrades charged with him in connection with the case of the Kronstadt organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906. This accusation was quashed as far back as in 1907 by the decision of a committee of ten political convicts (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and non-party people) of whom six were former codefendants in the trial. The committee's decision was communicated the same year to Lenin and the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., who considered Antonov not guilty and did not

restrict his rights as a Party member. Alexinsky raised the "Antonov case" again in 1912-14 with the aim of using it against the Bolsheviks, who, he alleged, had been "shielding a traitor".

On April 18 (N. S.), 1914, the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad adopted a resolution expressing indignation at Alexinsky's behaviour and breaking off all relations with him. On June 10, 1914, the Committee of the Organisations Abroad passed a resolution calling on the socialist organisations in Paris and all Party centres (Russian and national) to vigorously rebuff the provocative tricks of Alexinsky and members of the *Vperyod* group, to deny recognition of the *Vperyod* group as a political organisation and not to enter into any relations with it. On June 20 this resolution was supported by a general meeting of the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad. This fact was mentioned by Lenin in the Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 525). p. 398

[327] This telegram was sent on Workers' Press Day, timed to the second anniversary of the newspaper *Pravda*. p. 399

[328] On May 3 (N. S.), 1914, F. N. Samoilov wrote Lenin that he was in the Berne town sanatorium, and that the doctor—a specialist in nervous diseases—advised him to do a little manual work.

G. L. Shklovsky wrote to Lenin on May 12 that Samoilov had been fixed up with work in the open air. p. 399

[329] *Zhina* (Struggle)—a newspaper, Central Organ of the Lettish Social-Democrats; founded in March 1904. Up to August 1909 it appeared illegally at great intervals in Riga and subsequently abroad. From April 1917 it was published legally in Petrograd as the Central Organ of the Latvian Bolsheviks, and afterwards in Riga and other cities. In August 1919, after the temporary victory of the counter-revolution in Latvia, it began to appear again illegally in Riga. With the victory of Soviet rule in Latvia in June 1940 it became the organ of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Latvia and the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian S.S.R. p. 401

[330] Apparently this refers to Volume II of N. Rubakin's book *Among Books* reviewed by Lenin in the journal *Prosveshcheniye* No. 4 for April 1914 (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 259-61). Lenin, as his letter shows, did not have Vol. I. p. 402

[331] This refers to a trip to attend the international socialist congress which was to be held in Vienna in August 1914. p. 402

[332] In May 1914, Malinovsky, fearing exposure, resigned his office as Duma deputy and left the country. Subsequently it was discovered that Malinovsky had been an agent provocateur. In 1918 he was sentenced to death by the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and shot. p. 402

[333] *Yedinstvo* (Unity)—a legal newspaper published by a group of pro-Party Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov and Bolshevik conciliators in St. Petersburg in May and June 1914. Four numbers were put out. p. 405

[334] On the insistence of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. the "Polish opposition" (J. S. Hanecki, A. M. Malecki and others) received an invitation from the I.S.B. to attend the Brussels "Unity" Conference. p. 407

[335] This refers to the minutes of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in Stockholm in April-May 1906.

The journal *Nasha Zarya* No. 3 for March 1914 published anti-Bolshevik Articles by F. A. Bulkin and L. Martov, which Lenin sharply criticised in his articles "The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class Movement", "Plekhanov, Who Knows Not What He Wants", "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity" and "The Bourgeois Intelligentsia's Methods of Struggle Against the Workers" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 277-80, 309-12, 325-47, 455-86). p. 408

[336] This refers to delegates to the International Socialist Women's Conference in Vienna fixed for August 1914 but, owing to the war, held instead at Berne only on March 26-28, 1915. p. 412

[337] *Stoikaya Mysl* (Staunch Thought)—one of the names under which the Left-Narodnik (Socialist-Revolutionary) newspaper *Trudovoi Golos* (Voice of Labour) was published. It appeared in St. Petersburg in 1914 three times a week. p. 415

[338] On the appeal of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. a demonstration was held in the city on April 4 (17), 1914, in response to the lockout by the St. Petersburg mill owners. The demonstration was timed to coincide with the second anniversary of the Lena shootings. On that day *Put Pravdy* published as an editorial Lenin's article "Forms of the Working-Class Movement (The Lockout and Marxist Tactics)" (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 209-12). In the Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference Lenin devoted a good deal of space to describing the significance of this demonstration and exposing the activities of the liquidators (ibid., pp. 509-12). p. 415

[339] *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (Northern Workers' Gazette)—a Menshevik-liquidator daily, published in St. Petersburg in lieu of *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* from January 30 (February 12) to May 1 (14), 1914. p. 416

[340] *Trudovaya Pravda* (Labour Truth)—one of the names under which the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*, hounded by the tsarist government, was published from May 23 (June 5) to July 8 (21), 1914. Thirty-five numbers were put out. p. 416

[341] Between July 12 and 19 (N. S.), 1914, a meeting of the C.C. of the

R.S.D.L.P. was held at Poronin under the leadership of Lenin, which was attended by G. I. Petrovsky, A. S. Kiselyov, N. P. Glebov-Avilov and A. N. Nikiforova, who had arrived from Russia. The meeting was devoted chiefly to the question of preparations for a Party congress—the date of its convocation, ways of getting delegates out of the country, etc. The outbreak of the imperialist war, however, presented the congress from being convened. p. 420

[342] Lenin is referring to the conference called in 1914 by the O.C., the *Vperyod* and *Yedinstvo* groups, the Bund, the Chief Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, the P.P.S. and others. p. 421

[343] Meaning the strikes and demonstrations held in St. Petersburg, Baku, Riga and other cities in the course of July 1914. p. 422

[344] *Berliner Tageblatt und Handelszeitung*—a German bourgeois newspaper, published from 1872 to 1939. p. 422

[345] *Rabochy* (The Worker)—one of the names under which the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* was published from April 22 (May 5) to July 7 (20), 1914. Nine numbers were put out. p. 426

[346] Replying to Lenin's questions, I. Rudis-Gipslis wrote on July 29, 1914, that the Letts did have a Left opposition to the Lettish C.C.; that he, Gipslis, belonged to it; that in criticising the C.C. the opposition was acting in good faith, and that the Lettish C.C. was shifting to the left. Gipslis wrote that not only Riga's largest 4th District but all class-conscious Lettish workers considered it necessary to establish closer contacts with the Russian C.C., that the Bund had a very negligible influence among the Lettish workers, the majority of whom "will always support the vigorous and implacable struggle of the Russian comrades against the separatists, nationalists and opportunists, no matter who they are". Gipslis wrote that he had received the "14 conditions" formulated by Lenin for the Brussels "Unity" Conference. p. 428

[347] A reference to the "Resolution on the National Question" adopted in the summer of 1913 at the meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. with Party functionaries (see present edition, Vol. 19, pp. 427-29). p. 429

[348] The reference is to Plekhanov's a article "The New Upsurge" published in *Za Partiyu* No. 5—the mouthpiece of the Paris groups of Mensheviks and conciliators. A translation of the first part of this article appeared in *Vorwärts* No. 59 for March 1, 1914. p. 430

[349] Lenin's telegram to the Cracow chief of police followed a search of his house in the village of Poronin on August 7, 1914, made

on the basis of false information accusing him of being a spy. During the search the gendarme officer took away the manuscript of Lenin's book on the agrarian question in the belief that the statistical tables given in it represented a coded message, and ordered Lenin to present himself to the military authorities in the town of Nowy Targ the next morning. On arriving there the next day Lenin was arrested and imprisoned. His arrest evoked active protests on the part of progressive elements among the Polish public. The Polish Social-Democrats Jakub Hanecki and S. Bagocki, the Zakopane doctor and one-time member of Narodnaya Volya Dluski, the well-known Polish writers Jan Kasprowicz, Wladyslaw Orkan and others came out in his defence. At the request of Nadezhda Krupskaya, Austrian M.P.s Victor Adler and Herman Diamand, who knew Lenin as a member of the International Socialist Bureau, interceded with the government on his behalf and offered to act as guarantor for him. The charge of espionage was so absurd that the Cracow police admitted that "there is nothing reprehensible here against Ulyanov" and on August 19 he was released. p. 430

[350] The reference is to the Manifesto of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" and "An Answer to Emile Vandervelde" which Lenin planned to publish in French in the newspaper *La Sentinelle*.

La Sentinelle—organ of the Swiss Social-Democratic Organisation of the Neuchâtel canton (French Switzerland), founded in 1890. During the First World War, the newspaper adopted an internationalist stand. On November 13, 1914, the paper (No. 265) published an abridged version of the Manifesto of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy".

The answer to Vandervelde in connection with his telegram to the R.S.D.L.P. Duma group was published in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 33, November 1, 1914. p. 432

[351] This refers to the arrest of the Bolsheviks who attended the conference at Ozerki, near Petrograd, among whom were members of the R.S.D.L.P. group in the Fourth Duma.

The conference was held from November 2 to 4 (15-17), 1914, and was attended, apart from the Bolshevik Duma deputies, by delegates from the Bolshevik organisations of Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kharkov and Riga.

All the delegates were arrested except the Bolshevik deputies, who enjoyed parliamentary immunity. But they too were arrested a couple of days later, tried and exiled for life to Eastern Siberia (see Lenin's article "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group", present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 171-77). p. 437

[352] The answer given by the St. Petersburg liquidators (P. P. Maslov, A. N. Potresov, N . Cherevanin [F. A. Lipkin] and others) to Vandervelde's telegram appealing to the Russian Social-Democrats

not to oppose the war. In their reply the liquidators justified the Belgian, French and British socialists in joining the bourgeois governments, fully approved the stand adopted by the social-chauvinists and declared that in their activities in Russia they were not opposing the war. The liquidators' reply was published in No. 34 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* with a note from the editors. p. 438

[353] A reference to the resolution "A Reply of the Georgian Social-Democrats, Members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Residing in Geneva and the Vicinity, to a National-Political Organisation Operating in One of the Belligerent States". This organisation made a proposal to the Georgian Bolsheviks to use the war for the purpose of uniting the nations oppressed by tsarism and organising a revolt against Russia under the auspices and with the material support of one of the belligerent powers. In their reply the Georgian Bolsheviks rejected this proposal, which they regarded as a provocation on the part of the imperialists.

The text of the resolution with Lenin's note was published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVII*, pp. 321-22. p. 440

[354] This refers to the speech by Y. Larin, delegate of the Menshevik Organising Committee, at the Congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party, which was held in Stockholm on November 23, 1914. See Lenin's articles "The Kind of 'Unity' Larin Proclaimed at the Swedish Congress" and "What Next? (On the Tasks Confronting the Workers' Parties with Regard to Opportunism and Social-Chauvinism)" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 115-17, 107-14). p. 441

[355] At the Congress of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party (see Note 354) the main item on the agenda dealt with the attitude towards the war. A. G. Shlyapnikov, who brought the Congress a message of greetings from the R.S.D.L.P.'s Central Committee, read a declaration calling for struggle against the imperialist war and branding the treachery of the leaders of the German Social-Democrats and the socialist parties of other countries, who had turned social-chauvinist. The Congress was reported in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36, for January 9, 1915. p. 442

[356] This refers to the projected conference of socialists of the neutral countries sponsored by Pieter Troelstra and Thorvald Stauning. The conference was held in Copenhagen January 17-18, 1915, and was attended by delegates from the socialist parties of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Holland. It adopted a resolution calling upon the Social-Democratic parties of the neutral countries to urge their governments to mediate between the belligerents for the speedy restoration of peace. Some of the Social-Democratic parties submitted to the conference their declarations on the attitude towards the war. From the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. the conference was handed issue No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* containing the Manifesto "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" and a

government report concerning the arrest of the Bolshevik deputies of the Duma. p. 442

[357] *Golos* (Voice)—a Menshevik daily, published in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915, when it was closed down by the French Government. p. 445

[358] This refers to Krupskaya's letter to Mrs. A. L. Ryazanova asking the latter to notify the Austrian women socialists of the proposed convocation of the International Socialist Women's Conference. p. 445

[359] This refers to a correction of the date erroneously given in the heading of No. 36 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* No 39 of the paper carried an erratum reading: "The heading of No. 36 should read 'Geneva, January 9, 1915' (and not December 12, 1914)". p. 447

[360] *The London conference of Socialists of the "Triple Entente" Countries* was held on February 14, 1915. The agenda of the Conference consisted of three items: 1) the right of nations; 2) colonies; 3) guarantees of future peace.

The Bolsheviks were not invited to the Conference. On Lenin's instructions, however, M. M. Litvinov went there to read the declaration of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P., which was based on Lenin's draft. During the reading of the declaration Litvinov was interrupted and not allowed to go on. He handed the declaration over to the presiding committee and left the hall. For further details about the Conference see Lenin's articles "The London Conference" and "On the London Conference" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 132-34, 178-80). p. 448

[361] This refers to the *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Sections Abroad*, held in Berne from February 27 to March 4, 1915. Convened on Lenin's initiative, it was essentially a general conference of the Party. The main item on the agenda was the question of the war and the tasks of the Party, on which Lenin made a report.

All the basic resolutions and preambles to them were drafted by Lenin. They were published in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* and as addenda to Lenin's pamphlet *Socialism and War* published in Russian and German. The resolutions of the Berne Conference were also published as a leaflet in French which was distributed among the delegates of the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference and sent to the Left elements among the International Social-Democrats. For the Conference resolutions see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 158-64. p. 449

[362] The reference is to Point 3 of the draft resolution "The C.O. and the New Newspaper" discussed at the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Sections Abroad held in Berne from February 27 to March 4, 1915. p. 450

[363] The letter was written by Inessa Armand on behalf of the foreign-based section of the journal *Rabotnitsa* giving notice of the convocation of a conference of Left socialist women and inviting the Dutch Social-Democratic Party to send its delegate.

The International Conference of Socialist Women was herd in Berne from March 26 to 28, 1915. It was convened on the initiative of the foreign-based organisation of the journal *Rabotnitsa* and with the close co-operation of Clara Zetkin, then Chairman of the International Bureau of Socialist Women. All the preparations for the Conference were made by Inessa Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaya and others under Lenin's guidance.

Materials relating to the Conference were published in the Supplement to *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 42 for June 1, 1915. p. 451

[364] This refers to the pamphlet by H. Gorter, *Het Imperialisme, de Wereldoorlog en de Social-Democratic* (Imperialism, the World War and Social-Democracy), Amsterdam. p. 451

[365] The invitation to Trotsky to write for *Kommunist* was sent by G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh in spite of Lenin's opinion. By way of answer Trotsky published "An Open Letter to the Editors of *Kommunist*" in *Nashe Slovo* No. 105 for June 4, 1915, refusing to contribute and launching a fierce attack against the. Bolsheviks.

The journal *Kommunist* was organised by Lenin and published by the Editorial Board of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* jointly with G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh, who financed its publication. The Editorial Board included also N. I. Bukharin. One (double) number of the journal was issued.

Lenin planned to make *Kommunist* the mouthpiece of the Left Social-Democrats. Serious disagreements, however, shortly arose between the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* on the one hand and Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh on the other, which came to a head after the appearance of No. 1-2 of the journal.

Nashe Slovo (Our Word)—a Menshevik newspaper, published with Trotsky's close co-operation in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916 in lieu of *Golos*. p. 455

[366] Lenin wrote to the library at Neuchâtel asking for books to be sent to him in Sörenberg. p. 455

[367] This refers to the Announcement concerning publication of the journal *Kommunist* written apparently with Lenin's close co-operation. It was printed as a leaflet dated May 20, 1915, and distributed among the R.S.D.L.P. organisations in Russia and abroad, as well as among Left West-European Social-Democrats. The text of the Announcement under the heading "From the Editors" was published also in the journal *Kommunist*. p. 455

[368] This refers to the article "Demagogy and Cleavage" published in No. 2 of *Bulletin of the R.S.D.L.P. Organising Committee Secretariat Abroad* for June 14, 1915. p. 456

[369] *Nashe Dyelo* (Our Cause)—a monthly organ of the Menshevik liquidators, began to appear in January 1915 in lieu of the journal *Nasha Zarya* which was closed down in October 1914. *Nashe Dyelo* was the mouthpiece of the social-chauvinists in Russia.
No. 2 of the journal figures largely in Lenin's article "Under a False Flag" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 135-57). p. 456

[370] This apparently refers to Yelena Rozmirovich, G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh, who visited Lenin in Sörenberg in July 1915 for talks concerning the journal *Kommunist*. p. 458

[371] Lenin is referring to Radek's article "A Quarter of a Century of Development of Imperialism" (the first part of it was published in the journal *Kommunist* No. 1-2). p. 458

[372] *The Chkheidze group*—the Menshevik group in the Fourth Duma led by N. S. Chkheidze. While taking a Centrist stand, it actually gave full support to the policy of the Russian social-chauvinists. Lenin criticised the opportunist line of the Chkheidze group in his articles "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role", "Have the Organising Committee and the Chkheidze Group a Policy of Their Own?" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 171-74, and Vol. 22, pp. 131-36) and in other works. p. 458

[373] The reference is to P. Maslov's book *Economic Causes of the World War* which appeared in Moscow in 1915.
A review of the book was written by N. I. Bukharin but not published because the journal had stopped coming out. p. 458

[374] This refers to the article "Qui prodest?" by N. V. Krylenko which was to have been published in the journal *Kommunist*. The article did not appear. p. 458

[375] Apparently this refers to N. I. Bukharin's article "World Economy and Imperialism" and his review of P. Maslov's book *Economic Causes of the World War* for the journal *Kommunist*. p. 459

[376] This refers to Radek's letter to Lenin dated July 5, 1915, suggesting that a pamphlet be written giving the views of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. on the attitude towards the war. p. 459

[377] This refers to the letter by the delegate of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. giving a report on the preliminary conference, held on July 11, 1915, in preparation for the first international socialist conference. The letter was circulated among Party organisations (*Lenin Miscellany XIV*, pp. 161-63). p. 461

[378] This refers to Radek's draft resolution of the Left Social-Democrats for the forthcoming first international socialist conference. For a criticism of this draft, see Lenin's letter to Radek (present edition, Vol. 35, p. 202). p. 462

[379] This refers to the following articles that were to have gone into *Kommunist*: Kamenski's "Polish Social-Democracy and the War", Gorter's "Causes of Proletarian Nationalism" and Varin's "Our Base in the Troops". The articles were not published. p. 463

[380] "*Gaponade*"—from the name of the Russian priest Gapon. Acting on instructions from the secret political police aimed at weaning the workers away from the revolutionary struggle, he set up, on the eve of the first Russian revolution, a legal organisation known as the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers. On Gapon's suggestion, a peaceful procession of workers was organised on January 9, 1905, to petition the tsar. The procession was shot down by the tsarist troops, the massacre becoming known as Bloody Sunday. p. 464

[381] This refers to Pyatakov's review of No. 1 of the journal *Internationale* published by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring. p. 494

[382] The review of P. Maslov's book *Economic Causes of the World War* was published in the journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* No. 5 for July 10, 1915, over the signature of "Y. Rus". p. 469

[383] This refers to the publication in the journal *Kommunist* of Lenin's article "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 349-57) and Varin's article "Our Base in the Troops". Owing to lack of space the latter was not published. p. 471

[384] This refers to: 1) Paul Golay's pamphlet *Le Socialisme qui meurt et le Socialisme qut doit renaître*; 2) U. Sinclair's article "A Manifesto Against It" in the pamphlet *Socialism and War* by Upton Sinclair and Richard Blatchford, and 3) the journal *Die Internationale* published by the German Left Social-Democrats in April 1915. p. 472

[385] The nickname "Japanese" was applied to G. L. Pyatakov and Yevgenia Bosh, who emigrated to America via Japan. Here the reference is to their departure for Norway. p. 472

[386] Pannekoek's article "Imperialism and the Tasks of the Proletariat" was published in the journal *Kommunist* No. 1-2 for 1915 with an editorial comment by Lenin. p. 473

[387] Lenin is here referring to the article "Die innere Krise Rußlands" published in No. 186 of *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, July 7, 1915. This article was dealt with in a paragraph printed in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 43, July 26, 1915, under the heading "The Axelrod Group in League with the Social-Chauvinists". p. 473

[388] *Nashe Slovo* No. 111 for June 11, 1915, carried an article "From the Baltic Region" over the signature "Br." (Braun). A continu-

ation of this article was published in Nos. 112 and 113 of *Nashe Slovo* for June 12 and 13, 1915. p. 476

[389] This refers to Golay's pamphlet *Le Socialisme qui meurt et le Socialisme qui doit renaître*, Lausanne, 1915. p. 478

[390] *The Second Balkan Social-Democratic Conference* was held in Bucharest from July 6 to 8, 1915. It was attended by representatives of the labour movement of Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. The Serbian Social-Democratic Party was unable to send its representative, but the leadership of the party sent a message of greetings to the conference. The conference inaugurated the Balkan Workers' Social-Democratic Federation, adopted a Declaration of Principles of the Balkan Workers' Social-Democratic Federation, a resolution on the Balkan Social-Democratic Federation and the International, and a special resolution "Against Provocations, for Peace and Federation!" p. 479

[391] This refers to the book by Charles Rappoport *Jean Jaurès. L'Homme. Le Penseur. Le Socialtiste*, Paris, 1915. p. 480

[392] This refers to Émile Zola's open letter to President of the French Republic François-Félix Faure in connection with the Dreyfus affair. p. 480

[393] A reference to the pamphlet by Wilhelm Kolb, *Die Sozialdemokratie am Scheidewege*, Karlsruhe, 1915. The pamphlet was criticised by Lenin in his article "Wilhelm Kolb and Georgi Plekhanov" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 141-42). p. 480

[394] This refers to Bukharin's article "World Economy and Imperialism". p. 481

[395] The reference is to the composition of the delegation of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. to the First International Socialist Conference. The delegation was made up of Lenin, Zinoviev and Inessa Armand. p. 483

[396] This refers to the Report on the Activities of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. During the War made to the First International Socialist Conference. The report was written by Zinoviev, edited by Lenin and published in No. 2 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin* for November 27, 1915. p. 488

[397] This refers to the *First International Socialist Conference*, *held in Zimmerwald* from September 5 to 8, 1915. A sharp struggle developed at the conference between the revolutionary internationalists led by Lenin and the Kautskyite majority at the conference led by the German Social-Democrat Ledebour.

During the proceedings a Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left was formed headed by Lenin.

The Zimmerwald Left did a great deal towards organising the internationalist elements in Europe and America.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 45-46 published Lenin's articles "The First Step" and "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915" (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 383-88, 389-93). In accordance with Point 2 of the letter, the newspaper published a column of extracts "From Reports Read at the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald" first place in which was given to the Bulgarian M. P. Vasil Kolaroff. In accordance with Point 6 of the letter, the following paragraphs were published in the "News Items" column: "The Bund Has No Time", "All Is Well With the O.C.", "Trotsky 'Does Not Know' What Mass Revolutionary Action Is". p. 489

[398] This refers to Wijnkoop's letter of August 6, 1915, in which two documents were mentioned: 1) the report of the representative of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. concerning the preliminary conference held on July 11, 1915, dealing with the question of convening the international conference, and 2) the draft resolution of the Zimmerwald Left for the First International Socialist Conference written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 345-48).

Wijnkoop wrote "we fully and wholly agree" with the proposals of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. concerning the terms for convening the conference. In speaking of "extremely important arguments" against participation in the conference, Lenin had in mind the following passage in Wijnkoop's letter: "Our Party Committee earnestly requests you to declare ... that your Party, like ours, will not attend *any* conference that does not accept this minimum as a basis for convening the conference, as it will not be possible then to declare that it is a conference of the revolutionary section of the International" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.C., C.P.S.U.). p. 489

[399] Apparently this refers to Radek's report on the First International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald. p. 490

[400] Enclosed with the letter was Zinoviev's plan of leaflets which were to be published by the Bureau Abroad of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. p. 490

[401] *Journal de Genève*—a newspaper of a liberal trend, founded in 1826. p. 490

[402] This refers to the letters of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries Alexandrovich and Polubinov to Lenin. Lenin's answer to Alexandrovich is printed in this volume (see Document 440); Lenin's letter to Polubinov has not been found. p. 491

[403] The Conference of Popular Socialists, Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia, held in July 1915 in Petrograd, passed

a resolution calling upon the masses to "defend the fatherland" in the imperialist war. p. 494

[404] This refers to the *Bulletin* of the International Socialist Commission in Berne, the executive organ of the Zimmerwald organisation. The *Bulletin* appeared from September 1915 to January 1917 in English, French and German. Altogether 6 numbers were issued. The I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 1 published the Manifesto of the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald and the official report on the conference. p. 495

[405] In this letter Grimm proposed on behalf of the I.S.C. that an enlarged I.S.C. should be set up and asked to be notified by whom the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. would be represented on it. For Lenin's reply see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 372-77. p. 496

[406] This refers to the Joint Declaration of the French and German Delegations at the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald, published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 45-46 for October 11, 1915. p. 496

[407] This refers to the materials of the Zimmerwald Conference. The newspaper *Zhizn* No. 15 for September 26, 1915, reprinted the conference materials from No. 1 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin*. In the newspaper *Nashe Slovo* No. 200 for September 25, 1915, all the materials concerning the conference were deleted by the censor. p. 496

[408] *Appeal to Reason*—newspaper of the American socialists founded in Girard, Kansas, in 1895; was not connected officially with the Socialist Party of America, but propagated socialist ideas and enjoyed great popularity among the workers. Eugene Debs, the American socialist, wrote for the paper. p. 498

[409] Lenin is referring to M. M. Kharitonov's speech at the *Aarau Congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party* held November 20-21, 1915. The central issue was the party's attitude to the Zimmerwald internationalist group. The Bolshevik Kharitonov, a voting delegate from one of the party's organisations, moved an amendment to Grimm's Centrist resolution; it called for a mass revolutionary struggle against the war and declared that only a victorious proletarian revolution could put an end to the imperialist war. The amendment of the Left was carried by 258 votes to 141. p. 499

[410] In November 1915 the Zimmerwald Left issued a pamphlet in German entitled *Internationale Flügblätter* No. 1 (*Die Zimmerwalder Linke über die Aufgaben der Arbeiterklasse*) (International Leaflet No. 1—the Zimmerwald Left on the Tasks of the Working Class). p. 500

[411] This refers to the Report on the Activities of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. During the War for the Second International Socialist Confer-

ence which was being prepared for publication in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 2. p. 501

[412] *La Vie Ouvrière*—Journal of the French revolutionary syndicalists, published from 1909 to 1914. p. 501

[413] This refers to the theses of the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* drafted by Lenin and entitled "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination". They were published in No. 2 of *Vorbote* in April 1916 and in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1, October 1916 (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 143-56).

Vorbote—a theoretical journal, organ of the Zimmerwald Left; appeared in German in Berne. Its official publishers were Henriette Roland-Holst and Anton Pannekoek. Lenin took an active part in founding the journal, and after the issue of No. 1 in organising a French translation of it for wider circulation. p. 504

[414] Camille Huysmans delivered a report at the emergency Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland held in Arnhem on January 9, 1916, in which he tried to prove that the Second International had not broken down, and put forward a "democratic programme of peace". Lenin criticised Huysmans's speech in his lecture "'Peace Terms' in Connection with the National Question" (see *Lenin Miscellany XVII*, p. 237). p. 506

[415] No. 25 of the newspaper *Gazeta Robotnicza*, the illegal organ of the opposition Warsaw Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, published the resolutions of the conference of the Editorial Board of June 1-2, 1915. These resolutions were criticised by Lenin in his "Letter from the Committee of the Organisations Abroad to the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 157-60).

Further down Lenin refers to the voting of the Polish Social-Democrats (the opposition) for the resolution of the I.S.B. at the Brussels "Unity" Conference of July 16-18, 1914. p. 509

[416] The theses "On the Tasks of International Social-Democracy" were drafted by Rosa Luxemburg and adopted at the conference of German Lefts held in January 1916 in Berlin. See Lenin's article "The Junius Pamphlet" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19). p. 511

[417] *Die Gleichheit*—a Social-Democratic fortnightly journal, mouthpiece of the women workers' movement in Germany, and eventually of the international women's movement; appeared in Stuttgart from 1890 to 1925. From 1892 to 1917 it was edited by Clara Zetkin. p. 511

[418] A collection of articles by Vera Zasulich, A. Potresov, P. Maslov, An (N. Jordania) and others, published in Petrograd in 1916. p. 511

[419] This refers to a second international socialist conference planned at the time. p. 511

[420] Apparently this refers to the appeal "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups" adopted at the meeting of the enlarged I.S.C. in Berne on February 5-9, 1916. The appeal was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 52 for March 25, 1916. p. 511

[421] This refers to G. V. Chicherin's article "Arguments over the Convocation of the International Socialist Bureau (A Letter from Britain)" published over the signature Orn. (Ornatsky) in *Nashe Slovo* Nos. 51 and 52 for March 1 and 2, 1916. The article is mentioned by Lenin in his item "Split or Decay?" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 180-81). p. 511

[422] The I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 3 for February 29, 1916, carried the appeal "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups". p. 512

[423] This refers to No. 49 of the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht* for February 28, 1916, which published the resolution of a group of Bremen Social-Democrats expressing, among others, a demand that the newspaper *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* consistently adhere to the Left radical stand it had adopted before the war. p. 512

[424] The *Dzvin* people—contributors to and followers of *Dzvin* (Bell)—a legal nationalist journal of a Menshevik trend, published in the Ukrainian language in Kiev from January 1913 to mid-1914. p. 512

[425] *Borotba* (Struggle)—a monthly organ of the Ukrainian S.D.L.P. organisation abroad, published in Geneva from February 3, 1915, to December 1916. Under the flag of Marxism the journal stood for the Ukrainian workers forming a separate S.D. party of their own and came out against the Bolshevik slogan of the right of nations to self-determination. p. 512

[426] Apparently this refers to the article by I. Ziemelis, "Activities of the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region During the War", which was published later in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2 p. 513

[427] The theses of the *Internationale* group were published in No. 3 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin* for February 29, 1916, under the heading "Ein Vorschlag deutscher Genossen" (A Proposal of the German Comrades). p. 515

[428] Ströbel's article "Die Ursachen der sozialistischen Krise" (Causes of the Socialist Crisis) was published in *Neue Zeit* No. 12, December 17, 1915. p. 514

[429] This refers to the joint draft programme of the Revolutionary Socialist League and the Social-Democratic Party of Holland published in No. 3 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin*. p. 515

[430] *Internationale Korrespondenz*—a weekly journal of the German social-chauvinists; appeared from late September 1914 to October 1, 1918, in Berlin. p. 516

[431] This refers to the statement of protest of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. to the I.S.C. challenging the Organising Committee's right to representation at the Second International Socialist Conference. The statement mentioned the fact that all organisations in Russia connected with the O.C. approved of participation in the war industries committees, thereby taking a "social-patriotism stand".

The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, under the C.C., C.P.S.U., contain a proof-sheet of this statement, which fits the size of the *Sotsial-Demokrat* columns. Lenin may have lent a hand in drafting this protest. On June 10, 1916, *Sotsial-Demokrat* carried the announcement: "The C.C.'s statement to the I.S.C. concerning representation of the O.C. will appear in the next issue". The document was not published at the time. p. 516

[432] This refers to Rosa Luxemburg's pamphlet *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie*, for a criticism of which see Lenin's article "The Junius Pamphlet" (present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 305-19). p. 517

[433] This refers to the publication in No. 52 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* of the appeal of the I.S.C. "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups" in connection with the convocation of the Second International Socialist Conference, giving a brief notice of the agenda and the terms of admission to the conference as printed in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 3 for February 29, 1916. p. 517

[434] The letter concerns preparation for the press of the article "The Alternative", which was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 57 on December 30, 1916, with the editor's note: "This article is reprinted from *Spartacus*, No. 1, the illegal organ of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats."

The next paragraph in the letter mentions the statement made at the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. in February 1916 during the discussion of the appeal "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups". In voting for the text of the appeal, the representatives of the Zimmerwald Left declared at the meeting that although they did not consider it satisfactory on all points, they were voting for it because they considered it a step forward compared with the decisions of the First International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald.

[435] This refers to Zinoviev's article "How Liquidationism Turned into Social-Chauvinism" (published in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*). p. 518

[436] *Nash Golos* (Our Voice)—a legal Menshevik newspaper published in Samara from 1915 to 1916; adopted a social-chauvinist stand. p. 518

[437] This refers to the Second International Socialist Conference which was to be held in April 1916. p. 518

[438] This refers to the "Proposals of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee to the Second Socialist Conference" published in No. 4 of the I.S.C. *Bulletin*. The protest against Martov-Chkheidze was not published. p. 519

[439] *Gvozdyovism* (from the name of the Menshevik K. A. Gvozdyov) —a policy of collaboration with the imperialist bourgeoisie. p. 519

[440] *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Sotsial-Demokrat* Collection) was founded by Lenin and published by the Editorial Board of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Two numbers were published in 1916, containing several articles by Lenin. Copy was prepared for No. 3, which was to contain Lenin's article "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", but owing to lack of funds this collection was not put out. p. 522

[441] Probably this refers to an article criticising the draft Manifesto for the Second International Socialist Conference submitted to the I.S.C. on behalf of persons grouped around the journal *La Vie Ouvrière* and the newspaper *Nashe Slovo*. The draft was published on February 29, 1916, in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 3. p. 523

[442] In his letter to Zinoviev Pokrovsky wrote about the proposed publication in Petrograd of a series of pamphlets on imperialism and other issues connected with it. He asked Lenin to write a pamphlet on imperialism. The result was Lenin's book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. p. 524

[443] This refers to Kh. G. Rakovsky's speech at an international public meeting in Berne on February 8, 1916, held in connection with the meeting of the enlarged I.S.C. (the speech was published in Bucharest in pamphlet form).

The group of International Socialists of Germany (I.S.D.) issued a pamphlet *Die Minderheit des 21. Dezember 1915* (The Minority of December 21, 1915) analysing the voting of the minority of the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag against war loans on December 21, 1915. p. 524

[444] Apparently this refers to the young French socialists, friends of G. I. Safarov (Samovarchik), who lived in Paris at the time. p. 526

[445] *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 53 for April 13, 1916, carried an article "Chkheidze and His Group—Cat's-paws of the 'Gvozdyov' Party" criticising the chauvinist speeches of Chkheidze and Chkhenkeli in the Duma. By the "Russian" number of *Sotsial-Demokrat* Lenin meant No. 53, which was wholly devoted to events in Russia. p. 527

[446] This letter was written in reply to that of Pyatakov, Bosh and Bukharin to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* concerning the disagreements on the Editorial Board of the journal *Kommunist*. p. 529

[447] This refers to the removal to Christiania (Oslo) of Pyatakov, Bosh and Bukharin, and to their theses "On the Slogan of the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" sent in to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* in November 1915.

The writers of the "theses" were opposed to Clause 9 of the R.S.D.L.P. Programme dealing with the right of nations to self-determination. p. 530

[448] This refers to the trip to attend the Second International Socialist Conference. At the meeting of the enlarged I.S.C. held in Berne on February 5-9, 1916, it was decided that the Conference in Kienthal could be attended by all those who had participated in the Zimmerwald Conference. Lenin attended the Kienthal Conference as a representative of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. p. 531

[449] This refers to the arrival of the French delegates to the Second International Socialist Conference. Safarov (George) was in Switzerland at the time. Whom Lenin meant by the "Brest people" has not been ascertained. p. 532

[450] Meaning the indictment in the case of the Bolshevik deputies of the Fourth Duma. p. 532

[451] See Note 431. p. 533

[452] Apparently this refers to the delegates of the Left Social-Democratic parties of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway) to the Second International Socialist Conference. p. 533

[453] Meaning the exact address of the place where the Second International Socialist Conference was to be held. p. 534

[454] A letter summing up the Kienthal Conference was sent to the Party organisations in the name of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau Abroad. The text of the letter translated into French by Inessa Armand is in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The letter in Russian was published in 1926 in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 2. p. 535

[455] This refers to the speech by Meyer, a representative of the *Internationale* group, at the enlarged meeting of the I.S.C. on May 2, 1916, at which the final texts of the resolutions passed at the Kienthal Conference were endorsed. p. 535

[456] Lenin read a lecture "Two Trends in the International

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Working-Class Movement" in Lausanne on June 3 and in Geneva on June 2. p. 535

[457] Materials relating to the Second International Socialist Conference held at Kienthal from April 24 to 30, 1916, were published on June 10, 1916, in No. 54-55 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 535

[458] The circulation of Party documents and Bolshevik literature among the various groups of the R.S.D.L.P. was taken care of by a special Distributing Committee of five members in Berne. Inessa Armand was a member of this Committee for a time. Zinaida Lilina (Zina) was secretary of the Committee. p. 536

[459] This refers to the draft of a paragraph for *Sotsial-Demokrat* written by Zinoviev at the request of Kamenev, who was in exile at the time in Yeniseisk Gubernia (Siberia). Zinoviev, in this paragraph, tried to condone Kamenev's behaviour at the trial of the Bolshevik group in the Duma. p. 537

[460] A. Shlyapnikov having raised the question of going to America for several months, Zinoviev asked Lenin not to consent to Shlyapnikov's departure and to promise to remit 100-150 francs to him monthly in the course of the next six months. p. 537

[461] This refers to the "Proposals of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee to the Second Socialist Conference" and the decisions adopted at the Kienthal Conference, namely: the appeal "To the Peoples Who Are Ruined and Slaughtered", the theses on "The Attitude of the Proletariat to the Question of Peace" and the resolution "On the Attitude to the International Socialist Bureau at The Hague". p. 538

[462] The reference is to an article of Sukhanov's "Our Left Parties", which was to have been forwarded to Minin (V. A. Karpinsky). p. 538

[463] Reports on the Kienthal Conference were published in No. 5 of the journal *Demain* which appeared on May 15, 1916. Probably Lenin is referring to the editorial in that issue entitled "Zimmerwald" from the pen of Henri Guilbeaux.

Demain—a journal of the French internationalists, appeared in Geneva from 1916 to 1918. The last issue, No. 31, came out in Moscow in 1919 as the mouthpiece of a group of French Communists. p. 538

[464] A collection of decisions of international congresses of the Second International was to have been published by the War Prisoners Relief Committee under the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Abroad. It was intended for circulation in the P.O.W. camps located in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The collection was not published. p. 538

[465] In his letter of May 13, 1916, Shlyapnikov urgently requested that all materials on the Kienthal Conference should be sent to him, and expressed dissatisfaction at the great delays in receiving the I.S.C. *Bulletin*, the Swiss newspapers and other necessary material. p. 538

[466] This refers to the great body of materials which Shlyapnikov collected during his stay in Russia. Prominent among them were documents relating to the activities of the war industries committees. Some of them were published in the Party's Central Organ—the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*—on April 13, 1916, under the general heading "News from Russia". Shlyapnikov's article "The Workers and the War Industries Committees" was published in the same section. p. 539

[467] For reasons of secrecy Lenin calls Shlyapnikov Belenin. This letter concerns his forthcoming trip to America. Shlyapnikov left for the States on June 25, 1916, and returned to Europe on September 29 the same year. p. 539

[468] This refers to Pyatakov's letter of May 18, 1916, from Christiania (Oslo) addressed to Lenin and Zinoviev, in which he stated the terms on which he considered it possible to continue the talks concerning renewed publication of *Kommunist*. p. 541

[469] This probably refers to L. Martov's article "What Follows from the 'Right to National Self-Determination'" published in the newspaper *Nash Golos* Nos. 3 and 4 for January 17 and 24, 1916. p. 541

[470] This refers to Shlyapnikov's letter reporting that the "Japanese" did not want an enlarged Editorial Board now either and were concealing their purse. p. 544

[471] The Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* sent a letter to Pyatakov, Bosh and Bukharin in the winter of 1915 declaring that they would not participate in *Kommunist* as they could not assume Party responsibility for co-editors who showed an un-Party attitude to the business. p. 544

[472] Pyatakov and Bosh wrote to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad demanding that their group be officially recognised as a special group unsubordinated to the C.C. Bureau Abroad and that it be granted the right of independent contact with the Russian section of the C.C. and the right to publish leaflets and other literature. This being refused, they nevertheless made an attempt to establish contact with the Bureau of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in Russia over the head of the C.C. Bureau Abroad. p. 545

[473] The reference is to G. Y. Belenky's letters concerning the activities of the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. and Pierre Brizon's

speech in the French Chamber of Deputies on June 24, 1916.

Pierre Brizon, who was a delegate to the Kienthal Conference made a declaration on behalf of the three socialist M.P.s. calling upon the deputies to get the government to conclude an immediate peace without annexations. Together with the two other socialist deputies Brizon voted against war loans. He concluded his speech with the words: We vote for peace, for France, for socialism!" p. 546

474 This refers to *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.

Yuri—G. L. Pyatakov—wrote an article "The Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination in the Era of Finance Capital", but owing to its erroneous theses it was not published in the collection.

The *Norwegian strike*, which started on June 6, 1916, was dealt with in Arvid Hansen's article "Certain Features of the Contemporary Labour Movement in Norway" published in No. 2 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.

In this letter Lenin refers to his articles "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" and "The Junius Pamphlet" which were subsequently included in No. 1 of *Sbornik*, and the articles "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism" and "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role" published in No. 2.

Among the articles received by the editors for No. 3 of *Sbornik* and listed on the cover of No. 2 was the article "What Is Happening Among the Troops" by Strannik (Varin). p. 546

475 This refers to articles for *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* concerning the activities of the *Internationale* group in Germany. No. 2 of *Sbornik* carried two articles on this subject: "Illegal Newspapers of the German Left Opposition" and "Current Events of the Revolutionary Struggle in Germany". p. 547

476 At the beginning of the war Graber adopted an internationalist stand and attended the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences yet when Vandervelde arrived in Switzerland in 1915 to campaign for the re-establishment of the Second International, Graber delivered a message of greetings to him on behalf of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland. p. 547

477 The first part of the letter refers to the articles for *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*.

Opportunism was criticised by Lenin in his article "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism"; the Duma group and Trotskyism were criticised in two articles: "Efforts to Whitewash Opportunism" and "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role", which were published in *Sbornik* No. 2. p. 549

478 *P. Ryabovsky*—the pseudonym of L. N. Stark. In his letter of June 12, 1916, to Zinoviev, Ryabovsky wrote that a new publish-

ing house, Volna, had been founded in Petrograd and offered him and Lenin to contribute to the symposiums which it planned to publish.

It afterwards transpired that the pseudonym "Ryabovsky" was used by Stark, who was suspected of being an agent provocateur, and Lenin refused to contribute to these publications. p. 549

[479] *Pod Starym Znamenem* (Under the Old Banner)—a Bolshevik collection published in Saratov in 1916 and re-issued in Petrograd in 1917 with slight cuts. p. 549

[480] This refers to Kamenev's pamphlet *The Collapse of the International*, put out by the Volna Publishers. p. 550

[481] This refers to the pamphlet *Kriegs und Friedensprobleme der Arbeiterklasse*.

The Menshevik declaration on the war, published in Russian in the *Bulletin of the R.S.D.L.P. Organising Committee, Secretariat Abroad* (No. 5) on June 10, 1916, under the heading "The St. Petersburg and Moscow Mensheviks on the War", was printed in this pamphlet as an appendix. The pamphlet omitted a fairly large part of the declaration which appealed for collaboration with the liberal bourgeoisie, for participation in the war industries committees, and so on.

Bulletin of the R.S.D.L.P. Organising Committee, Secretariat Abroad—a Menshevik newspaper, published in Switzerland from February 1915 to March 1917. Ten numbers were put out. The paper adopted a Centrist stand. p. 550

[482] Radek's article "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" published in the journal *Lichtstrahlen* No. 3 for December 5, 1915, was criticised by Lenin in his article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 349-50). p. 550

[483] This may possibly refer to Plekhanov's pamphlet Internationalism and *Defence of the Fatherland* and Potresov's *The War and Questions of International Democratic Socialism* published in Petrograd in 1916. p. 552

[484] *G. Y. Belenky* (Grisha) wrote about the growth of Zimmerwald Left influence on the French labour movement. p. 552

[485] *The Call*—newspaper of the British Socialist Party, published in London from 1916 to 1920. p. 553

[486] This refers to a series of articles by F. Engels, "What Have the Working Classes To Do with Poland?" ("Was hat die Arbeiterklasse mit Polen zu tun?") (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 16, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1962, S. 153-63). p. 553

[487] This refers to Grimm's statement published in *Berner Tagwacht* No. 173 for July 26, 1916, in which he criticised Platten's resolution adopted at a party meeting in Zurich on July 24, 1916, following a discussion of the activities of the Social-Democratic parliamentary group. The resolution condemned the reformist activities both of the Right-wing parliamentary group and of the Centre, headed by Grimm, and contained criticism of the measures being taken by the Bundesrat, which might lead to an infraction of Swiss neutrality. Grimm did not attend the meeting. On reading the resolution he declared his disagreement with its various points and his intention of "laying down his mandate to the party". Grimm asked for his statement to be discussed so that he could hand in his resignation at the next union meeting. p. 553

[488] The July (seventh) issue of the journal *Demain* carried an article by Guilbeaux "Guerre à la guerre". p. 554

[489] This refers to the letter to Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova asking for information about the Volna Publishers and about the identity of P. Ryabovsky, who had offered Lenin and Zinoviev to contribute to the symposiums put out by this publishing house (see Note 478). p. 554

[490] Bukharin wrote an article "A Contribution to the Theory of the Imperialist State" for *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, but owing to its fallacious anti-Marxist propositions on the question of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat the article was rejected by the Editorial Board.

No. 1 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* carried Radek's "Theses on Imperialism and National Oppression" published in the journal *Vorbote* in April 1916 over the signature of the editors of *Gazeta Robotnicza*. Lenin's article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" published in *Sbornik* directly after Radek's theses was a reply to them. p. 554

[491] Lenin refers in this manner to his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* for reasons of secrecy. The "G. Z. method" means sending the manuscript pasted inside the cover of a French book. p. 556

[492] This refers to Valeriu Marcu, a Rumanian Social-Democrat who lived in Switzerland during the war. In 1916 he went to Paris, Moscow and Rumania on Lenin's errand. p. 558

[493] *Arbeiterpolitik*—a weekly devoted to questions of scientific socialism, organ of the Bremen group of Left Radicals headed by Johann Knief and Paul Fröhlich. The group joined the Communist Party of Germany in 1919. The journal was published in Bremen from 1916 to 1919.

After the October Revolution the journal devoted considerable space to information about life in Soviet Russia.

The reference below is to Shlyapnikov's article "Workers' Russia During Twenty Months of War" published later in *Sbornik* No. 1. p. 558

[494] This refers to the draft letter to Bukharin written by Zinoviev criticising the position of Bosh and Pyatakov during the talks concerning resumption of publication of the journal *Kommunist*.

To the words in Zinoviev's hand: "...we wish to work with you despite our disagreements..." Lenin added: "which you apparently treat more carefully, partly perhaps because you have been writing more on economic than on political questions." p. 559

[495] The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism have an article by Broutchoux in French headed: "En France. L'Opposition contre la guerre", marked "For *Sbornik*". The article was not published in the collection.

By the *Berne collection* Lenin meant No. 1 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* which was being set up in Berne. No. 2 was to be set up in Paris. The article "The Junius Pamphlet" was included in the first issue. The article of Zinoviev's to which Lenin refers is "The Second International and the Problem of the War". p. 561

[496] Lenin intended to have the article on Kautskyism published in the symposium *Pod Starym Znamenem*, but its publication was discontinued after the appearance of the first issue. The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism have a plan of the article headed by Lenin, "On Kautskyism" (see *Lenin Miscellany XXX*, pp. 133-34). A special work on Kautsky was written by Lenin in 1918 (see "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 227-325). p. 562

[497] This refers to Lenin's article "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 22-27).

Points 4-7 refer to *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. Point 5 refers to Belenky's proposal that the second issue of *Sbornik* should be published in Paris. Safarov's articles were not published in the collections. The article about the women's movement was that by Zinaida Lilina. p. 562

[498] *Gnevich*—pseudonym of Fabierkiewicz, a leader of the Polish labour movement, who was in Petrograd at the time. Two issues of the journal *Zycie* (Life) in the Polish language were published in 1916 with his co-operation. p. 562

[499] No. 2 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* carried an article by Henriette Roland-Holst "Ambiguous Position", which was a translation of an article published in the newspaper *De Tribune* on August 22, 1916. p. 563

[500] This refers to Franz Koritschoner's article "From the Life of Austrian Social-Democracy" (published in No. 2 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*). p. 565

[501] In the draft letter written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 35, pp. 230-31) Zinoviev introduced a number of corrections and changed the concluding part. For Lenin's attitude to these corrections see documents 514 and 515 in this volume and Vol. 35, pp. 228-29. Lenin's correspondence with Zinoviev and Bukharin concerning Bukharin's article "A Contribution to the Theory of the Imperialist State" was published in 1932 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 22. p. 565

[502] This letter of Lenin's is prefaced by a plan of the cuts, written in Krupskaya's hand, to Zinoviev's article "The Second International and the Problem of the War" which was intended for *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* (it was published in No. 2).

Point 5 of Lenin's letter refers to Zinoviev's article "'Defeatism' Before and Now" (printed in the first issue of the collection).

Lower down Lenin lists his articles for the collection: "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", "Efforts to Whitewash Opportunism" and "The Chkheidze Faction and Its Role". p. 566

[503] In August 1916 G. L. Pyatakov (Yuri) sent in his article "The Proletariat and the 'Right of Nations to Self-Determination' in the Era of Finance Capital" for *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. This article and Lenin's reply to it were to have been published in No. 3 of the collection, which did not come out at the time owing to lack of funds.

Lenin replied to Pyatakov's article in his articles "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)" and "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 22-27 and 28-76). p. 567

[504] This refers to the articles "Swedish Social-Democracy and the World War" by Karl Kilhom and "Certain Features of the Contemporary Labour Movement in Norway" by Arvid Hansen (published in the second issue of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*). p. 568

[505] Lenin's ironical comment stresses the error of and certain uniformity in the wordings of Pyatakov's and Zinoviev's articles concerning "defence" of the fatherland (see *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2, December 1916, p. 27). p. 568

[506] By the article on disarmament Lenin meant "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", which he had written in German and slightly revised for *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, where it was published in No. 2 under the heading "The 'Disarmament' Slogan". p . 570

[507] A reference to "Theses on Imperialism and National Oppression" published in the journal *Vorbote* over the signature *Gazeta Robotnicza* and reprinted in the first issue of *SbornIk Sotsial-Demokrata*. p. 571

[508] This probably refers to the article by Strannik (V. Y. Fridolin) "What Is Happening Among the Troops", which was listed among the copy received by the editors for No. 3 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. p. 571

[509] The second issue of the collection *Pod Starym Znamenem* for which Lenin intended to write his article on Kautskyism did not appear. p. 573

[510] Lenin's note and Krupskaya's letter to Shlyapnikov were in reply to the latter's first letter written upon his return to Europe from America (he returned to Copenhagen on September 29). In his letter Shlyapnikov gave an account of the work he had done in America and wrote that he was planning to go to Russia. In view of this Lenin, for reasons of secrecy, refers to Shlyapnikov as "Bel." in his note. p. 573

[511] Lenin is here commenting on Zinoviev's article "'Defeatism' Before and Now". It was published in the first issue of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's remarks were accepted by Zinoviev only in part.

Point 2 of Lenin's letter refers to the publication in *Gazeta Robotnicza* No. 25 for 1916 of the Resolution of a Meeting of the Editorial Board, held June 1-2, 1915. The resolution attacked the slogan of defeat of the tsarist monarchy which the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. put forward at the beginning of the war, on the grounds that it put "an argument into the hands of the German social-patriots". p. 573

[512] This is a reply to Bukharin's letter received early in October 1916, in which he questioned the critical remarks to his article "A Contribution to the Theory of the Imperialist State". p. 575

[513] The reference is to the closing sentence in Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*: "Goodness me! What will Princess Maria Alexeyevna say!" (Cf. Mrs. Grundy). p. 575

[514] The journal *Letopis* No. 5 for May 1916 published an article by V. Bazarov, "The Present Situation and Perspectives", giving an analysis of the economic crisis in Russia caused by the imperialist war. In this article Bazarov called the division of the Party's Programme into minimum and maximum an "anachronism" and stated that the struggle for democratic reforms was needless.

Potresov in his article "Notes of a Publicist", published in August 1916 in No. 1 of the Menshevik journal *Dyelo*, wrote that "Maximalist optimism" (this was how he characterised Bazarov's views) which does away with "all immediate tasks of democracy" "is the greatest enemy of the democratic movement, its best and most reliable disorganiser".

It is probably this statement in Potresov's article that Lenin has in view. p. 575

[515] *Letopis* (Chronicle)—a literary, scientific and political journal to which former Bolsheviks (the Machists V. A. Bazarov and A. A. Bogdanov) as well as Mensheviks contributed. The journal's literary section was run by Maxim Gorky. The journal appeared from December 1915 to December 1917. p. 579

[516] This refers to the editorial "The Party Congress" published in *Berner Tagwacht* on November 7, 1916. The part of the article in which a very brief account was given of the discussion at the congress of the question of the attitude to the Kienthal Conference, contained malicious hints about an unknown mover of the draft resolution and claimed that the signatures under this draft were invalid.

On November 8, 1916, the newspaper *Volksrecht* No. 262 published a statement by Ernst Nobs who wrote that he "fully shares the views" set forth in the draft resolution moved by the Left Social-Democrats. p. 583

[517] A critical article against Grimm was published as an editorial in *Arbeiterpolitik* on December 2, 1916, under the heading "After the Party Congress of the Swiss Social-Democrats" over the signature of Arnold Struthahn. p. 584

[518] This refers to the draft of a letter to "A Woman Social-Democrat of Germany" (probably Clara Zetkin) in which Armand, on behalf of the editors of the journal *Rabotnitsa*, invited an exchange of views on questions relating to the women's labour movement and suggested calling an unofficial conference of Left women socialists.

The words quoted by Lenin are from the following text of Armand's letter: "It seems to us that during the war this movement (i.e., the women's movement.—*Ed.*) could play a very important role for socialism. When most of the proletariat—the men—are at the fronts, the other part of the proletariat—the women—should take our socialist cause into their own hands." p. 584.

[519] This refers to Platten's draft resolution on the war issue, written with a view to the emergency congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, at which the question of the attitude towards the war was to be discussed.

(For variants of Platten's draft resolution with Lenin's remarks see *Lenin Miscellany XVII*, pp. 57-64.) p. 586

[520] This refers to Humbert-Droz's pamphlet *Guerre à la Guerre. A bas l'Armée. Plaidoirie complète devant le Tribunal Militaire à Neuchâtel le 26 août 1916* (War to the War. Down with the Army. Complete text of a speech for the defence at the Military Tribunal in Neuchâtel on August 26, 1916). Its author was arrested for refusing to answer a call-up notice. p. 588

[521] The newspaper *Arbeiterpolitik* No. 25 for December 9, 1916, published in its "Our Political Diary" section an unsigned paragraph dated December 6, 1916. Touching on the discussion of the question of the right of nations to self-determination in the pages of No. 1 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, the writer stated that Lenin's views on this question were not shared by "three members of the Editorial Board of *Kommunist*, a theoretical review of Russian Left radicals". Such a report could only disorientate the reader, as it did not mention a word either about the theoretical mistakes or the anti-Party factional behaviour of this group after the appearance of *Kommunist*.

The same issue of *Arbeiterpolitik* carried as an editorial a short article by Bukharin entitled "The Imperialist State" with a footnote from the editors commenting favourably on his article. p. 588

[522] In connection with the "Shklovsky scandal" Zinoviev wrote: "...Shklovsky is in some sort of crisis and he—*without telling us a word*—has put all the Party money into circulation! I am sure that he will soon return it. Meanwhile, the situation is such that we haven't *a centime* even for postal expenses...." p. 589

[523] *Grütlianer*—a newspaper, organ of the Swiss bourgeois-reformist Grütli-Verein; founded in Zurich in 1851. During the imperialist world war (1914-18) the paper adopted a social-chauvinist stand. Lenin described it as a newspaper of "the consistent and avowed servants of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement". p. 593

[524] This refers to the voting on the resolutions on peace at the Congress of the French Socialist Party held in Paris December 25-30, 1916, and at the Congress of the General Confederation of Labour, December 24-26, 1916. The results of this voting are given by Lenin in Chapter III ("The Pacifism of the French Socialists and Syndicalists") of his article "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 186-91). p. 594

[525] *The Appeal of the International Socialist Commission "To the Working Class"* was published in the I.S.C. *Bulletin* No. 6 for

January 6, 1917. This appeal is analysed in Chapter IV ("Zimmerwald at the Crossroads") of Lenin's article "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 191-94). p. 594

[526] The newspaper *Volksrecht* No. 5 for January 6, 1917, carried an article on the party meeting held in the Zurich People's House on January 5. One point in the adopted resolution expressed a protest against "the agitation being carried on behind the scenes" for postponing the party congress. p. 595

[527] This probably refers to L. B. Kamenev's pamphlet *The Downfall of the International.* p. 595

[528] The declaration of the C.C. of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party concerning postponement of the party congress was published in No. 7 of *Volksrecht* for January 9, 1917 (see the article "Der ausserordentliche Parteitag verschoben" [The Emergency Party Congress Postponed]), and the resolution of a district party meeting in Zurich containing a demand that the congress be convened not later than in the spring of 1917 was quoted in a paragraph published in the paper's "Vereine und Versammlungen" section, issue No. 8 for January 10, 1917. p. 597

[529] Lenin is referring to his article "Bourgeois Pacifism and Socialist Pacifism" intended for *Novy Mir*, which was published in New York by Russian socialist emigrants. The article did not appear in this paper, however. The first two chapters, rewritten by Lenin, were published in the last issue (No. 58) of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, January 31, 1917, under the heading "A Turn in World Politics" (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 262-70). p. 599

[530] *La Bataille*—a newspaper, organ of the French anarcho-syndicalists; appeared in Paris from 1915 to 1920. Adopted a social-chauvinist stand in the First World War. p. 600

[531] Lenin is referring to the resolution of the Swiss Lefts demanding that a referendum be held on the question of convening the emergency party congress, which was postponed indefinitely by a ruling of the Executive of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. The text of the resolution in German with Lenin's amendments is in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the C.C., C.P.S.U. The resolution of the Lefts formed the basis of the referendum, which was held after the local organisations had gone on record for having the congress convened in the spring. On January 23, 1917, *Volksrecht* (No. 19) published an appeal of the referendum sponsor group under the heading "Das Referendum gegen den Parteivorstandsbeschlüss ergriffen" ("Referendum Against Executive's Decision Has Begun"). p. 603

[532] This refers to the referendum on the question of convening an emergency congress of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party to discuss its attitude towards the war. Despite the fight started by the leaders of the party Robert Grimm, Jacques Schmid, Friedrich Schneider, Herman Greulich and Gustav Müller (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 283-86) against this referendum, the latter met with a warm response among the workers of German and French Switzerland. p. 604

[533] See F. Engels, "Socialism in Germany" ("Der Sozialismus in Deutschland", Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, S. 252-60). p. 605

[534] No. 6 of the journal *Jugend-Internationale*, which came out on December 1, 1916, carried an article by Bukharin (over the signature "Nota Bene") entitled "The Imperialist Robber State". A criticism of this article will he found in Lenin's "The Youth International" published in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 2 (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 163-66).

This article of Bukharin's, slightly abbreviated, was published in *Arbeiterpolitik* No. 25, December 9, 1916, under the heading "The Imperialist State". p. 606

[535] This refers to the pamphlet by Spectator (M. I. Nakhimson) *Vaterlands-Verteidigung und auswärtige Politik der Sozialdemokratie* (Defence of the Fatherland and the Foreign Policy of Social-Democracy). p. 607

[536] This refers to "Abänderungsanträge zu der Resolution der Mehrheit der Militärkommission" (Proposed Amendments to the Resolution by the Majority of the Commission on the War Issue) published in *Volksrecht*, February 9, 1917 (No. 34). This document was signed, among others, by Grimm, Nobs and Platten. The original draft of the majority, rejecting "defence of the fatherland", was published in *Volksrecht*, January 9, 1917 (No. 7) over the signatures of Affolter, Graber, Naine, Nobs and Schmid. p. 609

[537] This refers to the "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue" drafted by Lenin and adopted at the cantonal congress of the Zurich Social-Democratic Organisation in Töss.

This congress was held February 11-12, 1917. The party organ *Volksrecht*, in its issue No. 36 for February 12, 1917, devoted an editorial to it, headed "Der Parteitag in Töss".

The congress had before it two draft resolutions: (1) a social-chauvinist draft submitted by minority members of the Commission on the war issue, and (2) a Centrist draft from the Commission majority. The latter was adopted by 93 votes to 65. The Lefts voted for the resolution in order to prevent the social-chauvinist draft from being adopted, but they moved Lenin's "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue", which

were adopted by the congress (see present edition, Vol. 23, p. 282. p. 610

[538] The reference is to Leaflet No. 1 "Gegen die Lüge der Vaterlandsverteidigung" (Against the Fatherland Defence Lie), afterwards issued over the signature: "A group of Zimmerwald Lefts in Switzerland". Lenin took an active part in the drafting and editing of this leaflet, which incorporated his "Proposed Amendments to the Resolution on the War Issue" and a number of propositions from other articles of his. p. 611

[539] This letter (postcard) to Inessa Armand in Clarens was written by Lenin on his way to Zurich from La Chaux-de-Fonds and posted by him in Ambulant (Switzerland). In La Chaux-de-Fonds —a large working-class centre of Switzerland—Lenin delivered a lecture (in German) at a workers' club on the Paris Commune and the prospects of development of the Russian revolution ("Will the Russian Revolution Follow the Path of the Paris Commune?"). p. 616

[540] Lenin is referring to the declaration of the Provisional Government setting forth its political programme, one point of which provided for a complete and immediate amnesty in political and religious cases (see *Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva* No. 1, March 5, 1917). p. 616

[541] Karpinsky invited Lenin to Geneva to deliver a lecture to Russian emigrants and Swiss socialists on the Party's tasks in the revolution.

The meeting of Russian and Swiss internationalists mentioned in the letter took place on March 9 (22), 1917. Lenin did not attend it. p. 618

[542] Karpinsky wrote in his reminiscences: "One plan for enabling some comrades to make the passage was for them to marry a Swiss citizen. This gave the right to entry both into Germany and Russia. This plan appealed to Vladimir Ilyich, and he advised Comrade Ravich to find 'a convenient old man'. He recommended for this purpose the Menshevik P. B. Axelrod, who was a Swiss citizen." p. 622

[543] In Lenin's manuscript in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism the addressee is not given. Probably this letter was intended for Jakub Hanecki or Inessa Armand. Lenin asked Armand on March 18, 1917, to find out whether he would be allowed legal passage from Switzerland to Russia via England (see Document 555 in this volume). On March 19, however, Lenin learned that she refused to go to England. Therefore, he had no reason for sending this document to Armand. In fact, in his subsequent letters to her Lenin makes no further mention of his request.

The date in Lenin's MS. is missing. Judging by its contents, this letter was probably written after the afore-mentioned letters to Armand. It formulates the conditions for the passage of a group of political emigrants through the mediation of the Swiss Social-Democrat Fritz Platten. These conditions, in a somewhat modified form, were set forth in the document "Basis of Negotiations for the Return of Political Emigrants to Russia" through Germany, signed by Platten April 4, 1917 (see *Lenin Miscellany II*, pp. 382-83).

Jakub Hanecki, in his reminiscences, mentions that "after the first reports of the February revolution" he suggested to Lenin that he travel to Russia through England. This document, therefore, is more likely to have been addressed to Hanecki, a member of the R.S.D.L.P., who took an active part in organising the return of Russian political emigrants from Switzerland to Russia. This volume contains a number of letters and telegrams to Hanecki on this question. p. 622

[544] This refers to Grimm's letter of April 2, 1917, to the Russian Emigrants Repatriation Committee in which he protested against the "Decision of the Collegium Abroad, Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P." (see present edition, Vol. 23, pp. 365-66). p. 627

[545] This refers to the conditions in writing which Platten submitted to the German minister on April 4, 1917, stating that: "I, the undersigned, Fritz Platten, undertake full and constant personal responsibility for the coach with political emigrants and legal persons wishing to travel to Russia through Germany. " p. 627

[546] This refers to the resolutions and protocols connected with the return journey to Russia (see *Lenin Miscellany II*, pp. 385-93). p. 627

[547] *Nachalo* people—adherents of the group formed around the Menshevik-Trotskyite newspaper *Nachalo* (Beginning), published in Paris from September 1916 to March 1917. p. 629

[548] The frontline congress of delegates from the army in the field was held in Petrograd from April 24 to May 4 (May 7-17), 1917. p. 631

[549] Radek was then a member of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. (B.) Bureau Abroad (Stockholm). p. 632

[550] The *Pravda Bulletin* in German appeared in Stockholm from June to November 1917 under the heading *Russische Korrespondenz "Prawda"*. It was published by the agency abroad of the Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.) and carried articles on impor-

tant issues of the revolution in Russia, documents, reviews and news items dealing with the life of the Party and the country. The *Bulletin* was published also in French. p. 632

[551] Lenin is referring to the point in the resolution of the All-Russia April Conference "The Situation Within the International and the Tasks of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)" which said: "Our Party remains in the Zimmerwald bloc, where it sets itself the task of upholding the tactics of the Zimmerwald Left, and directs the Central Committee to take immediate steps towards founding a Third International"—see *The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(Bolsheviks). Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(Bolsheviks). April 1917*. Minutes. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1958, p. 255. In place of this point Lenin proposed the following formulation: "We must remain in Zimmerwald *only* for purposes of information" (see present edition, Vol. 24, p. 82). p. 632

[552] The Executive Committee of the S.D.P.P.L. groups in Russia submitted a statement to the Legal Committee of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in connection with the smear campaign raised against Jakub Hanecki in the bourgeois press. This statement, a copy of which is in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, qualifies the political activities of Hanecki as irreproachable, but contains a point saying that "Hanecki and other comrades abroad familiar with Comrade Hanecki's private life should be asked to give an explanation in connection with the accusations levelled against this aspect of his life".

The Executive of the S.D.P.P.L. intended to publish its statement.

After acquainting himself with this material, Lenin wrote this letter to the Legal Committee.

Hanecki, being a member of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Bureau Abroad, was in Stockholm at the time. p. 633

[553] This letter was written by Lenin to the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russia Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

On the evening of July 7 (20) a meeting of C.C. members and a number of Party officials was held in the home of S. Y. Alliluyev, a veteran Bolshevik workman, where Lenin was in hiding at the time. The meeting was attended, among others, by Lenin, Nogin, Orjonikidze, Stalin and Stasova. It was decided that Lenin was not to appear in the court of the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. On July 13-14 (26-27), 1917, the enlarged meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.), followed by the Sixth Congress of the Party, adopted a resolution against Lenin appearing in court (see *The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Minutes*, Moscow, 1958, p. 270). p. 636

[554] *Priboi* (Surf)—a daily, organ of the Helsingfors Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Published in Helsingfors from July 27 (August 9), 1917 to March 1918 in lieu of the Bolshevik paper *Volna*, which was closed down by the Kerensky government. From No. 57 (October 19) onward it was the organ of the Finnish Regional Bureau and the Helsingfors Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). p. 637

[555] *Sotsialist-Revolutsioner* (Socialist-Revolutionary)—a newspaper, organ of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Finland. Appeared in Helsingfors from July 9, 1917 to the beginning of 1918. p. 637

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cow Gubernia Committee of the Party and the Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee and chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Economic Council. From 1918 onwards in charge of the Women's Department of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)—375-83, 402-03, 406-07, 408-10, 412-14, 416-21, 423-26, 432, 451, 454-55, 460, 471, 490, 504-07, 510-11, 532, 535, 540, 545-48, 552-53, 555, 571-72, 579-85, 587-88, 590-96, 598-607, 609-18, 620-21, 623-24

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Axelrod, *Lyubov Isaakovna* (*Orthodox*) (1868-1946)—philosopher and literary critic, participant in the Social-Democratic movement. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L P. (1903) she first joined the Bolsheviks then followed Plekhanov in siding with the Mensheviks. Retired from the active political scene in 1918—61, 69, 70-71, 75-76, 84-85, 93, 94, 95, 96, 105-06, 340

Axelrod, *N. I.* (d. 1906)—the wife of P. B. Axelrod—63

Axelrod, *Pavel Borisovich* (1850-1928)—a Menshevik leader. After the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution a liquidator. During the First World War adopted a social-chauvinist stand—45, 48-49, 54-55, 62-63, 66-67, 77, 78-79, 81, 82, 118, 124, 152, 301, 416, 432, 473, 490, 495, 524, 531, 627

B

B. Abr.—see *Koltsov*, *D.*

B. N., *B. N.-ch*—see *Noskov*, *V. A.*

Babin—in 1912 a Plekhanovite Menshevik—285

Badayev, *Alexei Yegorovich* (*No. 1*) (1883-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Deputy to the Fourth Duma from the workers of the St. Petersburg gubernia, member of the Bolshevik Duma group, contributed to the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*. In November 1914, together with the other Bolshevik deputies, was arrested for revolutionary activities against the imperialist war, and in 1915 deported to Siberia. After the October Revolution occupied key posts in Party, administrative and business fields—318, 370

Baron—see *Essen*, *E. E.*

Basil—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Basovsky, *Iosif Borisovich* (*Dementyev*) (b. 1876)—joined the Social-Democratic circles in Odessa in 1896; subsequently

one of the organisers of the illegal transportation of *Iskra* into Russia from abroad—109

Bauer, *Otto* (1882-1938)—a leader of the Austrian Social-Democrats and the Second International—489

Baumann, *Rudolf* (b. 1872)—a Swiss Right-wing Social-Democrat—609

Bazarov (*Rudnev*), *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1874-1939)—writer on economics and philosopher; joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1896. In 1905-07 participated in a number of Bolshevik publications; subsequently moved away from Bolshevism, became a Machian revisionist of Marxist philosophy. In 1917 one of the editors of the Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*. From 1921 worked in the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. —166, 575

Bebel, *August* (1840-1913)—a prominent leader of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International. Started political activities in the early sixties; was a member of the First International. In 1869, together with Wilhelm Liebknecht, founded the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany (the "Eisenachers"); came out against reformism and revisionism in the ranks of German Social-Democracy —232-33, 282

Bebutov, *I. D.*, Prince—sympathiser with Social-Democracy; collected documents on the history of the liberation movement in Russia. Bequeathed his library and archives to the R.S.D.L.P.—305

Bedny, *Demyan* (*Pridvorov*, *Yefim Alexeyevich*) (1883-1945)—Soviet poet, member of the Bolshevik Party from 1912. Since 1911 contributed to the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*—311

Beilis, *Mendel Tevievich* (b. 1873). —clerk at a brickyard in Kiev, a Jew; falsely accused in 1911 of the murder of a Christian boy for alleged ritual purposes—375

Bekzadian, *Alexander Artemievich* (*Yuri*) (1881-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. A leader of the Baku Bolshevik organisation. Emigrated in 1906. In 1912 a member of the Bolshevik delegation to the Basle Congress of the Second International. Returned to the Caucasus in 1915—291, 308, 313, 339, 406, 472

Belenin—see *Shlyapnikov*, *A. G.*

Belenky, *Grigory Yakovlevich* (*Belinsky*, *Grisha*) (1885-1938) —joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1914-17 he was secretary of the Paris section of the Bolsheviks. Returned to Russia in May 1917. After the October Revolution engaged in Party work. Adhered to the Trotsky opposition in 1925-27, for which he was expelled from the R.C.P.(B.)—457, 502-03, 504, 544-45, 563, 571, 574, 575, 611, 629

Belinsky—see *Belenky*, *G. Y.*

Belousov, *Terenty Osipovich* (b. 1875)—Menshevik liquidator, deputy to the Third Duma from the Irkutsk gubernia—212

Belousova—611

Belsky—see *Krasikov*, *P. A.*

Benteli—owner of the printing-press in Bümpliz, near Berne, where separate issues of the Party's Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, were printed—475, 491, 567

Berdyaev, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1874-1948)—Russian writer,

reactionary idealist and mystical philosopher. In his earliest writings he adopted the stand of "legal Marxism", and subsequently became an avowed enemy of Marxism—61

Berg—see *Martov, L.*

Bernheim—192

Bernstein, Eduard (1850-1932)—leader of the extreme opportunist wing of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International, theoretician of revisionism and reformism—68, 405, 514

Berzin (*Berzin, Ziemelis*), *Janis Antonovich* (1881-1938)—veteran participant in the revolutionary movement in Latvia. Emigrated in 1908; was a member of the R.S.D.L.P.'s C.C. Bureau Abroad (1910) and of the Bureau of Groups Abroad of the Lettish Social-Democrats. Returned to Petrograd in the summer of 1917; took an active part in the October Revolution—146-47, 414, 421, 578

Blagoev, Dimitr (1856-1924)—an active participant in the revolutionary movement in Russia and Bulgaria. In 1891 the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party was founded under his leadership, and the year 1903 saw the foundation of its revolutionary wing—the Tesnyaki Party. Subsequently Blagoev played an important part in transforming the Tesnyaki Party into the Bulgarian Communist Party (1919)—462

Bloch—participant in the women's movement in Switzerland during the First World War—583

Bloch, Josef (1871-1936)—German Social-Democrat, revisionist, writer. From 1897 to 1933 editor and publisher of the journal *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, mouthpiece of the German opportunists—574

Blumenfeld, I. S. (*Tsvetov*) (b. 1865)—Social-Democrat, active member of the Emancipation of Labour Group and subsequently of the *Iskra* organisation; a compositor by trade. Manager of the printing-press and transport department in the Emancipation of Labour Group and *Iskra*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Mensheviks—65, 75

Bobrovskaya (*Zelikson*), *Cecilia Samoilovna* (*Lenochka*) (1876-1960)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Was an agent of *Iskra* and performed other underground work in various cities of Russia—141, 143

Bogdanov, A. (*Malinovsky, Alerander Alexandrovich, Werner, Maximov, Rakhmetov, Ryadovoi, Sysoika*) (1873-1928)—Social-Democrat, philosopher sociologist, economist, by profession a doctor. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) aligned himself with the Bolsheviks. Afterwards headed the otzovists and was leader of the *Vperyod* anti-Party group. Expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks in 1909. After the October Revolution one of the organisers and leaders of Proletcult. From 1926 Director of the Blood Transfusion Institute founded by him—120, 122, 125, 132-34, 146, 149, 166, 188, 203, 204-05, 207, 222, 224, 352, 353, 356, 385, 387, 388

Bogdasaryan, Tigran—member of the Geneva Bolshevik section, a student (see Note 127)—192, 212

Bogucharsky (*Yakovlev, V. Y.*) (1861-1915)—a liberal-bourgeois

leader and historian of the Narodnik movement in Russia —340

Bolshak (Highway)—see *Skvortsov-Stepanov*, *I. I.*

Bonch-Bruyevich, *Vladimir Dmitrievich* (1873-1955)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1895; joined the revolutionary movement in the eighties; in 1896 emigrated to Switzerland. Participated abroad in the activities of the Emancipation of Labour Group and contributed to *Iskra*. In 1904 manager of the C.C. Forwarding Department, afterwards organised the publication of Bolshevik literature (the V. Bonch-Bruyevich and N. Lenin Publishing House). In later years took an active part in organising Bolshevik newspapers, periodicals and Party publishing houses. After the October Revolution held the post of Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars and other posts —99 102, 103 104, 107 109-10, 114-15, 117, 120, 122 125, 128, 132, 161, 167-68, 159, 172, 258-59, 619

Boris—see *Noskov*, *V. A.*

Boroda (Beard)—see *Desnitsky*, *V. A.*

Bosh, *Yevgenia Bogdanovna* (1879-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. During the First World War shared the anti-Leninist ideas of Bukharin and Pyatakov on the national and other questions. After the October Revolution was a member of the first Soviet Government in the Ukraine, afterwards engaged in Party and administrative work. In 1923 joined the Trotsky opposition—472, 529-30, 539, 543, 560, 588

Boss—see *Gorky*, *Maxim*.

Boulanger, *Georges Ernest* (1837-1891)—French general. War Minister in 1886-87. Aiming at a military dictatorship, he headed a chauvinist movement in France under the motto of a war of revenge against Germany—606

Bourderon Albert—French socialist, a leader of the Left wing in the syndicalist movement. Took part in the Zimmerwald Conference. At the Congress of the French Socialist Party in December 1916 voted for a Centrist resolution, supported the imperialist war; then broke completely with the Zimmerwaldists and sided with the opponents of the revolutionary labour movement—503, 594

Bracke (*Desrousseaux*, *Alexandre-Marie*) (1861-1955)—a leader of the French Socialist Party its Foreign Relations Secretary. From 1900 a contributor to various periodicals of the F.S.P.; was an editor of the newspaper *l'Humanité*; repeatedly elected to the Chamber of Deputies. During the First World War, a social-chauvinist. Came out against affiliation with the Third, Communist International—159, 171

Branting, *Karl Hjalmar* (1860-1925)—leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden and of the Second International. Adopted an opportunist stand. Editor of the party's central organ *Socialdemokraten*, Member of Parliament. In 1920, 1921-23, and 1924-25 headed the Social-Democratic Government of Sweden—177, 209, 210, 437, 444

Braun—see *Janson*.

Brendisten—625

Brilliant—see *Sokolnikov G. Y.*

Britman—see *Popov A. V.*

Brodyaga (Vagabond)—see *Silvin, M. A.*

Bronowski, Julian (1856-1917)—member of the Warsaw organisation of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, from 1912 a member of the "Rozlamist" opposition, which stood closest to the Bolsheviks. In 1912 an elector of the workers' curia from Warsaw—329

Bronski, M. G. (*Warszawski*) (1882-1941)—Polish Social-Democrat, afterwards a Bolshevik. Member of the S.D.P. of Poland and Lithuania from 1902. Represented the Polish Social-Democrats at the Kienthal Conference, ranged himself with the Zimmerwald Left. From June 1917 worked in Petrograd as agitator and propagandist of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the October Revolution held key posts in the Soviet administration, and afterwards worked as teacher and science worker—521, 564, 582, 586, 587, 609, 627

Bronstein, P. A. (*Yuri*) (b. 1881)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. Was editor of the liquidators' journal *Dyelo Zhizni*, and contributed to other Menshevik liquidator organs—240, 241, 242

Broutchoux, Benoit—a French trade union leader, anarcho-syndicalist—561

Brutus—see *Krzhizhanovsky, G. M.*

Bucher, Alfred—a leader of the Swiss Youth League, member of the Kegelklub youth organisation in Zurich during the First World War. Died in the early twenties—614

Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906, worked as propagandist in various districts in Moscow. Emigrated in 1911. In 1915 contributed to the journal *Kommunist*, held non-Marxist views on the question of the state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the right of nations to self-determination, etc. After the October Revolution held various key posts. Repeatedly came out against the Party's Leninist policies. In 1928 headed the Right opposition in the Party. In 1929 was suspended from the Politbureau of the C.C.; in 1937 he was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities—378, 386, 450, 456, 459, 471 481, 483, 496, 521, 525, 528, 529-30, 542, 544, 546, 549, 553 554, 559, 565, 569, 570, 575-79, 588

Bukva (Letter)—see *Gorky, Maxim.*

Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolayevich (1871-1944)—bourgeois economist, idealist philosopher. In the nineties a "legal Marxist"; at the turn of the century he attempted to revise Marx's doctrine on the agrarian question. After the 1905-07 revolution aligned himself with the Cadets and preached philosophical mysticism. From 1918 a priest of the Orthodox Church. Deported from the country in 1922 for counter-revolutionary activities—55

Bulkin (*Semyonov*), *F. A.* (b. 1888)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik—416

Burenin, V. P. (1841-1926)—reactionary publicist and author. From 1876 a member of the editorial staff of *Novoye Vremya*. Lenin often used the name of Burenin to denote dishonest methods of conducting a controversy. (The expression

"Burenin-Gamma" applies to L. Martov)—366, 368

Burtsev, *V. L.* (1862-1936)—participated in the revolutionary movement of the eighties, stood close to the Narodnaya Volya. After his arrest escaped abroad, where he engaged in exposing agent provocateurs, who were being infiltrated into the revolutionary movement by the Russian secret political police. Stood close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, afterwards supported the Cadets—214, 403

Buryanov, *Andrei Faddeyevich* (b. 1880)—Menshevik, deputy to the Fourth Duma from the Taurida gubernia, member of the Social-Democratic Duma group—326, 378

C

Caillaux—the wife of the French Finance Minister Joseph Caillaux. See Note 323—394

Caillaux, *Joseph* (1863-1944)—French statesman, a leader of the French bourgeois Radical Party. Before World War I was Minister of Finance, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Minister of the Interior. In 1911 concluded the Franco-German treaty for the division of spheres of influence in Africa and the admission of German capital on the French stock exchange. Caillaux's pro-German policy evoked opposition against him among anti-German circles in France—394

Cavaignac, *Louis Eugène* (1802-1857)—French general. In June 1848 headed the military dictatorship in France, crushed the June uprising of the Paris workers with exceptional cruelty—635

Chachina, *Olga Ivanovna* (d. 1919)—Bolshevik, joined the Social-Democratic movement in the late nineties. In 1899 was deported to Ufa, where she met N. K. Krupskaya. In 1900-04 secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1905 took part in the December armed uprising at Sormovo—126

Charushnikov, *A. P.* (1852-1913)—Russian publisher—146

Chasovnikov—272

Chebotaryov, *Ivan Nikolayevich* (1861-1934)—a member of the Narodnaya Volya; joined the revolutionary movement in 1886. Arrested in connection with the charge against Lenin's brother, A. I. Ulyanov. A close acquaintance of the Ulyanov family in Simbirsk. In St. Petersburg Lenin used his address to communicate with his family and to forward illegal literature—173

Cherevanin, *N.* (*Lipkin*, *Fyodor Andreyevich*) (1868-1938)—a Menshevik leader. In 1917 one of the editors of *Rabochaya Gazeta*, the Mensheviks' central organ, and a member of the Menshevik Central Committee—231

Cherkez, *M.*—proprietor of an aircraft factory in Kitil (Rumania)—281

Chernomazov, *Miron Yefimovich* (*Miron*) (b. 1882)—an agent provocateur. From May 1913 to February 1914 secretary of *Pravda*'s editorial board. Suspected of being a provocateur, he was suspended from Party work by the Bolshevik C.C. In 1917 he was exposed as an under-

cover man of the St. Petersburg secret political police—336, 357, 549

Chernov, *Viktor Mikhailovich* (1876-1952)—a leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Wrote anti-Marxist articles for *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. In 1902-05 editor of the S.R. newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossia*. In May-August 1917 Minister of Agriculture in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution engineered anti-Soviet revolts—55, 104

Chernyshevsky, *Nikolai Gavrilovich* (1828-1889)—Russian writer, revolutionary democrat, Utopian socialist—248

Chicherin, *Georgi Vasilievich* (*Orn.*, *Ornatsky*, *A.*) (1872-1936)—Soviet statesman, diplomat. From 1904 to 1917 lived abroad, where he joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. Joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. From 1918 to 1930 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs—511

Chkheidze, *Nikolai Semyonovich* (1864-1926)—a leader of the Mensheviks. Deputy to the Third and Fourth Dumas from the Tiflis gubernia, leader of the Menshevik group in the Fourth Duma. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia—the counter-revolutionary Menshevik government—212, 316, 317, 457, 458, 460, 462, 473, 502, 510, 512, 516, 519, 531, 546, 567

Chkhenkeli, *Akaky Ivanovich* (1874-1959)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, deputy to the Fourth Duma. After the February 1917 revolution representative of the bourgeois Provisional Government in Transcaucasia. In 1918-21 Foreign Minister in the Menshevik government of Georgia—527, 531

Chudnovsky, *Grigory Isaakovich* (1894-1918)—Social-Democrat, at first a Menshevik; admitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Congress (1917). Active participant in the October armed uprising in Petrograd in 1917 and in the civil war—633

Clemenceau, *Georges Benjamin* (1841-1929)—French politician and statesman, for many years leader of the Radical Party. From 1906 to 1909 headed the French government. Defended the interests of big capital, pursued a policy of harsh repressions against the working class —145

D

Dan (*Gurvich*), *Fyodor Ivanovich* (1871-1947)—a Menshevik leader, headed the liquidator group abroad, edited the newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. After the October Revolution waged a struggle against the Soviet government. Deported from the country at the beginning of 1922—70, 124, 236-39, 243, 257, 550

Dansky, *B. G.* (*Komarovsky*, *Konstantin Antonovich*, *X.*) (b. 1883)—member of the P.S.P. from 1901. In 1911 joined the R.S.D.L.P., contributed to the newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. In 1913-14 editor of the journal *Voprosy Strakhovania*. After the October Revolution worked in Soviet institutions and in the diplomatic service—362, 363, 386

David, *Eduard* (1863-1930)—a leader of the Right-wing German Social-Democrats. In 1919 a member of the first coalition government of the German Republic, in 1919-20 Minister of the Interior. Supported the revanchist aspirations of German imperialism—223, 466

Davydov, *N. M.* (b. 1890)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. (joined 1906). Carried on Party work in the Yekaterinburg Bolshevik organisation. Arrested in 1909 and exiled to the Archangel gubernia—216

Dedushka (Grandpa)—see *Knipovich*, *L. M.*

Delaisi, *Francis* (b. 1873)—French petty-bourgeois economist—585

Dementyev—see *Basovsky*, *I. B.*

Demidovsky, *Ivan*—political emigrant, worked at the Kitil airfield (Rumania). Apparently a sailor of the Russian battleship *Potemkin*, whose crew mutinied in 1905—281

Demon—see *Zemlyachka*, *R. S.*

Desnitsky, *Vasily Alexeyevich* (*Boroda*) (1878-1958)—Social-Democrat. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. Carried on Party work in Nizhni-Novgorod, Moscow the Urals and the south of Russia—133

Deutsch, *Lev Grigorievich* (*Alleman*, *L. Gr.*, *Leo*) (1855-1941)—Narodnik, later a Social-Democrat. In 1883 one of the founders of the Emancipation of Labour Group, later took part in the publication and distribution of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) an Iskrist of the minority; after the Congress a Menshevik—82, 85, 104, 109

Dietz, *Johann Heinrich Wilhelm* (1843-1922)—German Social-Democrat, Reichstag deputy from 1881 to 1918. Manager of the Social-Democratic Party's publishing house, which issued the works of Marx and Engels; the first issues of *Iskra*, the journal *Zarya* and Lenin's book *What Is To Be Done?* were printed on his presses—74, 82, 86, 88, 360-61

Dilon—122

Dimka—see *Smidovich*, *I. G.*

Dirks—see *Nasimovich*, *N. F.*

Dnevnitsky, *P. N.* (*Tsederbaum*, *F. O.*) (b. 1883)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, publicist. From 1909 lived abroad, contributed to Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* and to the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*—297 325, 338

Dolgolevsky—see *Bukharin*, *N. I.*

Domov—see *Pokrovsky*, *M. N.*

Domski, *Heinrich* (*Kamenski*) (1883-1937)—journalist, member of the S.D. Party of Poland and Lithuania from 1904. In 1906 a member of the party's Warsaw Committee. Contributed to a number of Polish Social-Democratic publications. From 1912 contributed to *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*. In 1915 elected to the party's Regional Executive—463, 483

Doroshenko, *Nikolai Vasilievich* (*Konstantin Sergeyevich*) (1881-1926)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1902, carried on work in St. Petersburg and Tiflis. Wrote for the newspaper *Vperyod* over the pseudonym "Napoleon"—162

Droz—see *Humbert-Droz*, *Jules*

Dubreuil, *Louis* (1862-1924)—socialist, Secretary General of the French Socialist Party and the

French Section of the Second International. Contributor to and editor of a number of socialist newspapers—185

Dubrovinsky, *I. F.* (*Innokentiev*, *Inok*) (1877-1913)—Bolshevik; after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) was co-opted to the C.C. In 1905 one of the organisers and leaders of the armed uprising in Moscow. At the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. elected to the C.C. In 1908 a member of the editorial board of *Proletary*—203-04, 206-09, 224, 230, 267

Dzerzhinsky, *Felix Edmundovich* (*Yuzef*) (1877-1926)—one of the organisers of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania. Carried on party work in Poland and Russia. After the Fourth Congress of the party (1906), a member of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. After the victory of the October Revolution, Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (the Vecheka), and held other key posts—234

E

E.—see *Rosen*, *M. M.*

Edisherov—383

Ekk, *A.*—234

Emma, *Emmanuil*—see *Korenevsky*, *M.*

Engels, *Frederick* (1820-1895)—43, 115, 553, 576, 605, 611

Essen, *Eduard Eduardovich* (*Baron*) (1879-1931)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898, a Bolshevik. In 1903 worked in Yekaterinoslav, took part in organising strikes in the South of Russia. In September 1904 attended the Conference of the Southern Committees of the R.S.D.L.P., which played an important part in uniting the Bolshevik committees in the South of Russia and setting up a Bureau of Majority Committees—126, 134

Essen, *Maria Moiseyevna* (1872-1956)—Social-Democrat, after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. Worked in the St. Petersburg Party Committee; at the end of 1903 co-opted to the C.C. In February 1904 was sent abroad to inform the emigrant leaders of the R.S.D.L.P. about the state of affairs in Russia—122

F

Fabierkiewicz, *Zbigniew* (*Gnevich*) (d. 1919)—a leading figure in the Polish labour movement, member of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, journalist. In 1916 one of the organisers of the party's group in Petrograd and member of the editorial board of its mouthpiece *Trybuna*. Contributed to Russian Bolshevik periodicals—562

Falinsky—see *Litvinov-Falinsky*, *V. P.*

Fedoseyev, *Nikolai Yevgrafovich* (1871-1898)—one of Russia's first Marxists, organiser and leader of Marxist circles. Wrote a number of works in which he analysed the political and economic development of Russia—37

Felix—see *Litvinov*, *M. M.*

Ferri, *Enrico* (1856-1929)—a leader of the Italian Socialist Party. In 1898 and subsequent-

ly in 1904-08 edited the Party's central organ *Avanti!* —185

Filippov, *M. I.* (1858-1903)—Russian scholar, philosopher and writer. Adherent of the "legal Marxists". In 1894 founded the journal *Nauchnoye Obozreniye*, which carried Lenin's articles "A Note on the Question of the Market Theory", "Once More on the Theory of Realisation" and "Uncritical Criticism"—104

Finikov—275

Finn-Yenotayevsky, *Alexander Yulievich* ("*G-n*") (1872-1943)—Social-Democrat, economist and writer. In 1903-14 adhered to the Bolsheviks. Author of a number of works on economics—66-67, 71-75

Fofanova, *Margarita Vasilievna* (b. 1883)—participant in the revolutionary movement, Bolshevik. After the February 1917 revolution deputy of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin used her flat as a hide-out during the last period of the underground —638

Fotieva, *Lydia Alexandrovna* (*Nekrasova*) (b. 1881)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1904-05 worked in the Russian Bolshevik section abroad, assisted N. K. Krupskaya in handling the correspondence with underground organisations in Russia. Participant in the first Russian revolution of 1905-07 and the October 1917 Revolution. From 1918 Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, and simultaneously secretary to Lenin —138

Fourier, *Charles* (1772-1837)—great French Utopian socialist —611

Fram—see *Goloshchokin*, *F. I.*

Franz—see *Koritschoner*, *Franz*

Frey—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Fridolin, *Vladimir Yulievich* (*Varin*, *Strannik*) (1879-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1907-10 retired from political activities. Lived abroad from 1910 to 1917. During the First World War contributed to the Menshevik, Trotskyite newspaper *Nashe Slovo*, wrote articles against the war—463, 464, 471, 475, 544, 545, 546, 548, 553, 566, 571, 574

Frimou, *I.* (1871-1919)—worked for the amalgamation of the workers' circles and the creation of a political party of the working class in Rumania one of the founders of Rumania's trade unions. Elected secretary of the Socialist Association. From 1910 member of the Executive Committee of the Rumanian Socialist Party—281

Fröhlich, *Paul* (1884-1953)—German Social-Democrat, journalist. In 1912-16 editor of *Bremer Bürger Zeitung*, one of the founders of the Bremen weekly *Arbeiterpolitik*. Delegate of the Bremen Lefts at the Kienthal Conference. From 1919 to 1924 member of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Germany; was delegate of the United Communist Party of Germany to the Third Congress of the Comintern. In 1928 he was expelled from the C.P.G. for factional activities—531

Fyodorovich—see *Teodorovich*, *I. A.*

G

G., *Gr.*—see *Zinoviev*, *G. Y.*

G. V.—see *Plekhanov*, *G. V.*

G. Z.—see *Zinoviev, G. Y.*
Galina—see *Rozmirovich, Y. F.*
Galperin, Lev Yefimovich (*Valentin, Konyagin*) (1872-1951)—Social-Democrat, joined the revolutionary movement in 1898. In the capacity of *Iskra* agent was sent to Baku in the spring of 1901, where he worked to build up the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., to organise a secret printery, the transportation of illegal literature from abroad and its distribution in Russia. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Bolshevik; for some time represented the editorial board of the Central Organ on the Party Council, and was later co-opted to the Central Committee. Retired from active political life in 1906—63-65, 152
Galyorka—see *Olminsky, M. S.*
Gamma—see *Martov, L.*
Gegechkori, Yevgeny Petrovich (b. 1879)—Georgian Menshevik. Deputy to the Third Duma, a leader of the Social-Democratic Duma group. From November 1917, chairman of the counter-revolutionary government of Transcaucasia (the Transcaucasian Commissariat), subsequently Foreign Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Menshevik government of Georgia. After the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia in 1921—a white émigré—212, 277
George, Georgik—see *Safarov, G. I.*
Ger-n—292
Gertsik, Boris—agent provocateur, in 1903 served in the Warsaw branch of the secret political police; later on the staff of the department's section abroad —213, 214, 218, 220
Gimmer, N. N.—see *Sukhanov, N.*
Ginsburg, B. A.—see *Koltsov, D.*
Glebov, B.—see *Noskov, V. A.*
"*G-n*" (Mr.)—see *Finn-Yenotayevsky, A. Y.*
Gnevich—see *Fabierkiewicz, Zbigniew.*
Gobi (*Shnitnikova*), *L. Kh.* (*Irina*) (1878-1944)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1901, in 1902-04 clerical secretary of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.; in 1903 agent of the C.C. for contacts with the provinces—128
Golay, Paul—Swiss Social-Democrat, publicist. Editor of the socialist newspaper *Le Grutléen* in Lausanne—472, 475, 478, 487, 506, 612
Goldenberg, Iosif Petrovich (*Meshkovsky*) (1873-1922)—Social-Democrat, Iskrist. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903)—a Bolshevik. During the First World War aligned himself with the defencists, followers of Plekhanov. Readmitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party in 1920—134, 207
Goldendach, D. B.—see *Ryazanov, D. B.*
Goldman, Lev Isaakovich (*Akim*) (1877-1939)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1893. In 1900 went abroad, where he joined the *Iskra* organisation. In May 1901 organised an illegal printery in Kishinev, where *Iskra* and other Social-Democratic publications were printed—65-66
Goloshchokin, F. I. (*Fram*) (1876-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, member of the St. Petersburg and Moscow committees of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1912, at the Sixth (Prague) Con-

ference, elected to the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. After the October Revolution hold Party and administrative posts—335

Golubeva, *Maria Petrovna* (*Maria Petrovna*, *Yasneva*) (1861-1936)—joined the revolutionary movement in the eighties. Became a member of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the Second Congress (1903)—a Bolshevik; was secretary of the Saratov Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.; afterwards worked in St. Petersburg—134, 148

Gorev, *Boris Isaakovich* (*Goldman*, *B. I.*; *Igorev*, *Igor*) (b. 1874)—Social-Democrat. In 1905 a member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., a Bolshevik. In 1907 aligned himself with the Mensheviks—197, 244, 246, 268, 278

Gorky, *Maxim* (*Peshkov*, *Alexei Maximovich*, *A. M.*, *Bukva Boss*) (1868-1936)—Russian author, father of Soviet literature—133, 146, 180, 181, 252, 298, 304-05, 325, 326, 333, 338, 355-56, 440, 587, 590

Gorter, *Herman* (1864-1927)—Dutch Social-Democrat, publicist. During the First World War an internationalist, supporter of the Zimmerwald Left. In 1918-21 a member of the Communist Party of Holland; took part in the work of the Comintern, adopted an ultra-Left, sectarian position. In 1921 he withdrew from the Party and subsequently retired from political activity—451, 452, 458, 463, 470, 478, 482, 509, 514

Gots, *Mikhail Rafailovich* (*Rafailov*, *M.*) (1866-1906)—one of the founders and theoreticians of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party—56

Graber, *Ernest Paul* (b. 1875)—Swiss Social-Democrat. Attended the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. From 1915 to 1925 editor of the Swiss Social-Democratic newspaper *La Sentinelle*. At the beginning of 1917 adopted a Centrist, pacifist stand, and in 1918 sided with the Right wing of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party—547, 552, 594, 614

Grazhdanin (Citizen)—see *Krasnukha*, *V. P.*

Greulich, *Herman* (1842-1925)—one of the founders of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, leader of its Right wing; from 1890 a member of the Zurich Cantonal Council, and from 1902 a Member of Parliament. During the First World War stood in opposition to the Zimmerwald Left—529, 582, 635

Grigory—see *Zinoviev*, *G. Y.*

Grigory's wife—see *Lilina*, *Z. I.*

Grimm, *Robert* (1881-1958)—a leader of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, in 1909-18 was its secretary and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht*. From 1911 a Member of Parliament. Attended the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. Was Chairman of the International Socialist Commission and one of the organisers of the Centrist (II½) International—455, 457, 463, 473, 480, 483, 487, 495, 501, 502, 512, 514, 516, 519, 523, 531, 532, 533, 551, 555, 582, 583, 594, 598, 600, 602, 609, 610, 614, 624, 627, 635

Grisha—see *Belenky*, *G. Y.*

Gritsko—123, 125

Grozhan (*Gvozdev*), *D. S.* (*Yuri*) (b. 1876)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1905-06 orga-

niser of the Technical Combat Group under the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. In November 1906 a delegate to the first conference of military and fighting organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. Retired from active political life in 1910—203

Grumbach, *Solomon* (*Homo*) (1884-1952)—German Right-wine Social Democrat, later joined the French Socialist Party. Member of the Executive Committee of the Second International. During the First World War lived in Switzerland. Contributed to *l'Humanité* and *Berner Tagwacht*—510

Guesde, *Jules* (1845-1922)—one of the organisers and leaders of the French socialist movement and the Second International—171

Guilbeaux, *Henri* (1885-1938)—French socialist, journalist. During the imperialist world war published the journal Demain. Attended the Kienthal Conference in 1916. From the early twenties resided in Germany; correspondent of *l'Humanité*. Subsequently adopted a Trotskyist stand—545, 548, 552, 554, 591, 594, 597, 599, 600, 604, 625, 627

Guliko—386

Gurevich, *Emmanuil Lvovich* (b. 1865)—until 1890 a member of the Narodnaya Volya, then joined the Social-Democrats—46

Gurovich, *M. I.* (1862-1915)—undercover man of the Russian secret political police in the Social-Democratic movement. Exposed as an agent provocateur by the Party's St. Petersburg Committee in 1902, whose findings were confirmed by an *ad hoc* commission consisting of representatives of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the *Borba* group. After this Gurovich openly entered the service of the Department of Police—91-92

Gusev, *Sergei Ivanovich* (*Drabkin*, *Y. D.*) (1874-1933)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. (joined 1896). Delegate to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., an Iskrist of the majority. From December 1904 to May 1905 secretary of the Bureau of Majority Committees and of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party, afterwards a leader of the Odessa Bolshevik organisation—134

Gylka—see *Melenevsky*, *M. I.*

H

Haase, *Hugo* (1863-1919)—a leader of the German Social-Democrats, an opportunist. In 1911 elected chairman of the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party. Reichstag Deputy in 1897-1907 and 1912-18. In April 1917 took part in founding the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. During the November 1918 revolution in Germany, a member of the so-called Council of People's Representatives which pursued a policy of suppression of the revolutionary movement—310, 312, 314, 332-33, 465

Haidukiewicz—448

Halberstadt, *Rozalia Samoilovna* (*Kostya*) (1877-1940)—in 1896 joined Plekhanov's Social-Democratic circle in Geneva. On her return to Russia she worked in the Social-Democratic organisations of Odessa,

Kishinev, Kharkov and Ykaterinoslav, was a member of the *Iskra* organisation. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Menshevik—113

Hanecki (*Fürstenberg*), *Jakub* (1879-1937)—prominent leader in the Polish and Russian revolutionary movement, joined the Social-Democratic Party in 1896, member of the Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania; at its Sixth Congress (1908) quitted the Executive owing to differences on a number of inner-party questions, and after the split in Polish Social-Democracy in 1912 was one of the leaders of the "Rozlamist" opposition, which stood closest to the Bolsheviks. In 1917—a member of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau Abroad—339, 448, 619 622-23, 624, 626, 628, 629

Herman, *I. E.* (1884-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Worked in the Riga Bolshevik organisation. Active participant in the 1905 revolution. Emigrated to Berlin in 1909. Worked for the amalgamation of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Region with the Bolshevik Party. In 1914 a delegate to the Fourth Congress of the S.D.P.L.R. in Brussels, where he was elected to the Central Committee, to the Committee Abroad and to the editorial board of the party's central organ *Zihna*. After the October Revolution held key posts in Party and administrative work—342-43, 346, 371-75, 392, 401

Höglund, *Carl Zeth Konstantin* (1884-1956)—leader of the Left wing of the Social-Democratic movement and of the youth socialist movement in Sweden. At the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference joined the Zimmerwald Left group. In 1917-24 one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Sweden. Expelled from the Party in 1924 for opportunism and open opposition to the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. In 1926 rejoined the Social-Democratic Party—478, 546, 630, 632

Hopfenhaus, *Maria Hermanovna* (*M. H. H.*) (1862-1898)—friend of N. Y. Fedoseyev. Lenin corresponded with the latter through her—41

Hourwich, *I. A.* (1860-1924)—Russian economist. Emigrated to America in 1889—40

Huber, *Johannes* (1879-1948)—Swiss Right-wing Social-Democrat, lawyer and publicist. During the First World War he opposed the Zimmerwald movement. After the war came out against the communist movement—580

Humbert-Droz, *Jules* (b. 1891)—Swiss Social-Democrat, journalist. During the First World War a social-pacifist, prosecuted for refusing to serve in the army—588, 609, 610, 614

Huysmans, *Camille* (1871-1968)—a veteran leader of the Belgian labour movement, professor of philology, journalist. In 1904-19 Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. After the war of 1914-18 a prominent leader of the rehabilitated Second International. A member of the Belgian government on repeated occasions—180-81, 182, 183-84, 186, 189-90, 191, 192-96, 197-201, 211-15, 218, 220, 223, 247-48,

249, 255, 256-57, 280, 283, 284, 285, 286, 302, 303, 304, 306-07, 324, 328, 345-46, 354, 364-65, 383-84, 390, 393, 418, 424, 506

I

I. P., Iv. P.—see *Ladyzhnikov, I. P.*
Igorev, Igor—see *Gorev, B. I.*
Ilya—see *Vilensky, I. S.*
Ilyin, F. F.—one of the sponsors and founders of the library and archives under the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Worked in the C.C.'s Economic Commission and the Forwarding Departments of the C.C. and of the newspaper *Proletary*—169
Ilyin, F. N. (1876-1944)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. In 1907 emigrated to France, then to Switzerland. Took an active part in Party work—537
Ilyin, V.—see *Lenin, V. I.*
Ilyin-Zhenevsky, A. F. (1894-1941)—journalist, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1912. In 1913-14 lived abroad—402
Inessa—see *Armand, I. F.*
Innokentiev, Inok—see *Dubrovinsky, I. F.*
Ionov (*Koigen, Fyodor Markovich*) (1870-1923)—Social-Democrat, a leader of the Bund—460
Iordansky, Nikolai Ivanovich (*Negorev*) (1876-1928)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, litterateur. Joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1921—276, 440
Isayenko, A. Y.—151
Isetsky—see *Solomon, G. A.*
Isuv, Iosif Andreyevich (*Mikhail*) (1878-1920)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. In 1907 represented the Mensheviks on the C.C. Contributed to the journal *Nasha Zarya* and other liquidators' publications—240 241, 242
Ivan Vasilievich—165
Ivanov, K.—see *Lenin, V. I.*
Ivanovsky, V. I.—see *Lenin, V. I.*

J

Jacques—see *Alexandrova, Y. M.*
Jagiello, Y. I. (*No. 16*) (b. 1873)—See Note No. 236—305, 314, 316, 318, 320, 321, 323, 326
James—see *Yelizarova-Ulyanova, A. I.*
Janson (*Braun*) *Janis Ernestovich* (1872-1917)—a leader of the Social-Democratic movement in Latvia, publicist and literary critic. One of the leaders of the revolutionary struggle in Latvia in 1905. Emigrated in 1906. A member of the anti-Party August bloc (1912). In 1911-14 head of the Committee Abroad of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region—348, 373, 476
Jansson, Wilhelm (1887-1923)—participant in the German socialist movement, by nationality a Swede. From 1905 to 1919 an editor of *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands* (Correspondence Sheet of the General Commission of German Trade Unions)—426-27
Japanese—see *Bosh, Y. B., Pyatakov, G. L.*
Jaurès, Jean (1859-1914)—prominent leader of the French and international socialist movement. One of the founders of the French Socialist Party, which amalgamated in 1905 with the Socialist Party of France. In the United French Socialist Party Jaurès led the Right wing. In 1904 he founded the newspaper *l'Humanité*,

which he edited until his death—168, 185, 480, 610

Jordania, *Noi Nikolayevich* (*An*, *Kostrov*) (1870-1953)—Social-Democrat, a leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks. In 1914 contributed to Trotsky's journal *Borba*. In 1918-21 head of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik government of Georgia; from 1921 a white émigré—272, 460, 470

Josephine—see *Vorovsky*, *V. V.*

Jouhaux, *Léon* (1879-1954)—reformist leader of the French and international trade union movement, a Right-wing leader of the Amsterdam Trade Union International—594

Julius—see *Martov*, *L.*

Junius—see *Luxemburg*, *Rosa*.

Jurisson (*Martna*), M. (1860-1934)—journalist, owner of a printing press in Tallinn, Menshevik. During the revolution of 1905-07 took part in the work of the Social-Democratic organisations in Estonia, Finland and St. Petersburg—182

K

K. M.—see *Movshovich*, *M. Y.*

K-vich—see *Konstantinovich*, *A. I.*

Kahan, *A. N.*—editor of the socialist Yiddish newspaper *Vorwärts* published in New York —578

Kamenev (*Rosenfeld*), *Lev Borisovich* (1883-1636)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. Member of the editorial boards of the newspapers *Proletary* and *Pravda*. At the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was elected to the Party Central Committee. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 came out against the Party's Leninist line towards socialist revolution. In October 1917 published in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*, in his own name and in the name of Zinoviev, a statement expressing disagreement with the C.C. resolution on the armed uprising. This was divulgence of a secret Party decision and betrayal of the revolution.

After the October Revolution he was Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and member of the C.C. Politbureau. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy: in November 1917 he supported the idea of setting up a coalition government with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; in 1925 he was one of the organisers of the New Opposition; in 1926 was one of the leaders of the anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. At the Fifteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) in 1927 he was expelled from the Party as an active participant in the Trotskyite opposition; was subsequently twice rehabilitated and re-expelled for anti-Party activities—146-47, 166, 205, 215-16, 233, 235, 277, 278, 279-80, 282, 288, 291-92, 294, 295, 236, 297, 298-301, 305-17, 339, 340, 341, 342, 344-45, 343, 353-54, 357, 377, 381, 386, 458, 495, 537, 549, 550, 595, 606, 620, 625, 626

Kamenski see *Domski*, *Heinrich*

Kamsky—see *Vladimirsky*, *M. P.*

Kantsel, *Lyubov Osipovna* (*Alexei's sister*)—Social-Democrat, sister of L. Martov. Took part in organising the *Iskra* group in Moscow. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903)—a Menshevik—63

Karlson, *K. M.* (*Ogretis*) (d. 1919)—Lettish Social-Democrat, Bolshevik, member of the Bureau of the Groups Abroad of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region. From 1910 to 1914 worked in Brussels as compositor in the printing shop which issued the *Bulletin* of the Bureau of Groups Abroad. *Zihna* and other illegal publications of the S.D.P.L.R.—372, 391

Karpinskys—see *Karpinsky*, *V. A.* and *Ravich*, *S. N.*

Karpinsky, *Vyacheslav Alexeyevich* (*Minin*) (1880-1965)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898; in 1904 emigrated to Geneva, where he met Lenin. From then on worked uninterruptedly in the Party organisations abroad, in the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, and was in charge of the library and archives of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva. In 1914-17 contributed to the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat* and worked for the publication and distribution of Bolshevik literature. In December 1917 he returned to Russia, where he occupied administrative and Party posts—225-26, 402, 433-41, 444-45, 446-51, 459, 466-67, 469-70, 474, 479, 480, 483, 485, 491-92, 497-98, 529, 537, 594, 597, 602-03, 618, 621, 624-25, 626, 627, 628, 629, 632

Karski—see *Marchlewski*, *Julian*

Kasparov, *V. M.* (1883-1917)—member of the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisation Abroad. In 1907-11 member of the Baku Committee, in 1913-14 lived in Berlin, acting as medium through whom the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. carried on secret correspondence with organisations in Russia—358-59, 360, 422-23, 430, 455, 512, 518, 537

Katzlerowich, *Trisha* (1879-1964)—a prominent leader of the Yugoslav and international communist and labour movement, one of the founders of the Social-Democratic Party of Serbia. Delegate to the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, where he took a stand close to Lenin's—531

Kautsky, *Karl* (1854-1938)—a leader of the German Social-Democrats and the Second International; originally a Marxist, later an ideologist of Centrism (Kautskianism). Editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democrats—55, 68 97, 100, 110 114, 127-28, 130, 156, 174, 195, 222, 263-65, 297, 306, 379, 396, 406, 413, 415, 417, 418, 424, 425, 451, 452, 453, 457, 462, 463, 465, 468, 514, 515, 525, 561, 573, 594, 607, 610, 613

Kedrov, *Mikhail Sergeyevich* (1878-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. From 1912 to 1915 lived abroad. From May 1917 a member of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Military Organisation and of the All-Russia Bureau of Bolshevik Organisations, one of the editors of *Soldatskaya Pravda*—528

Kerensky, *Alexander Fyodorovich* (b. 1881)—Socialist-Revolutionary. After the February 1917 revolution Minister of Justice, Minister of the Army and Navy, then Prime Minister of the bourgeois Provisional Government and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. After the October Revolution fought against the Soviet government; escaped abroad in 1918—617

Kerr, *Charles*—American publisher of socialist literature. On

Lenin's instructions, Alexandra Kollontai conducted negotiations with him for the publication in English of Lenin's pamphlet *Socialism and War*—468

Kharitonov, *Moisei Markovich* (1887-1948)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. From 1912 lived in Switzerland, member of the Zurich section of the Bolsheviks and its secretary. Returned to Russia in April 1917. After the October Revolution held Party, business and military posts—462, 492, 499-501 508, 519, 558, 563, 583, 627

Kharlamov, *V. A* .—248

Kheisin, *Minei Leontievich* (1871-1924)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, by profession a physician. Contributed to the journals *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Nasha Zarya*, the newspaper *Luch* and other organs of the Menshevik liquidators—386

Khojamiryan, *Migran Christoforovich* (1882-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902, after the Second Congress (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. From 1905 to 1914 lived abroad. See Note 127—192

Khundadze, *Gabriel Ivanovich* (*Moskovsky*, *Alexei*) (b. 1877) —joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1898, Menshevik. In 1909-13 contributed to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.—241

Kievsky, *Pyotr*—see *Pyatakov*, *G. L.*

Kievskys—see *Bosh*, *Y. B.* and *Pyatakov*, *G. L.*

Kiknadze, *Nikolai Davidovich* (*Stepko*) (1885-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. A political emigrant in Switzerland from 1906 to 1917. After the October Revolution engaged in underground Party work in Georgia. From 1921, after the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, worked in the publishing business—470, 498

Kiselyov, *Alexei Semyonovich* (1879-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. From 1910 did Party work in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1912-13 chairman of the Metal Workers' Union in St. Petersburg—294

Kislikov, *D. I.*—a peasant. In 1905 carried on revolutionary propaganda among the peasants, stood close to the Social-Democrats—157

Kistyakovsky, *Bogdan Alexandrovich* (1868-1920)—a Cadet publicist, by profession a lawyer—61

Klasson, *Robert Eduardovich* (1868-1926)—outstanding power engineer. In the 1890s a "legal Marxist", member of a St. Petersburg Marxist circle. After the October revolution took an active part in the drafting of the GOELRO plan of electrification, was Director of the First Moscow Electric Power Station—60-61

Knipovich, *Lydia Mikhailovna* (*Dedushka*) (1856-1920)—started revolutionary activities in the late 1870s in Narodnaya Volya circles in Helsingfors; in the nineties joined the Social-Democrats. Played a prominent part in establishing contacts between *Iskra* and local organisations in Russia. A delegate to the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. During the latter years of her life was seriously ill and did no active work—148, 358

Knipoviches—close acquaintances of Nadezhda Krupskaya. Lenin and Krupskaya lived in their family in Finland during the summer of 1907—177

Knunyants, *Bogdan Mirzajanovich* (*Radin*) (1878-1911)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik; started revolutionary activities in 1897 in the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a delegate from the Baku Committee. After the congress worked in the Caucasus and in Moscow as an agent of the C.C.—166, 176

Koba—see *Stalin*, *J. V.*

Kobetsky, *Mikhail Veniaminovich* (1881-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1908 emigrated to Denmark, engaged in the transportation into Russia of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* and the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*; organised the forwarding to Lenin of correspondence from Russia. After the (October Revolution, held Party, administrative and diplomatic posts—250-52, 254-55, 442

Kocher, *Albert*—son of the well-known Swiss surgeon Theodore Kocher—358

Kocher, *Theodore* (1841-1917)—Swiss surgeon, Professor of Berne University; devised a number of methods of operative treatment for diseases of the central nervous system and of the thyroid gland, notably goitre—343, 357, 358

Kokovtsov, *Vladimir Nikolayevich* (1853-1943)—a statesman of tsarist Russia. In 1904-14 (with short intervals) Minister of Finance, and from 1911 simultaneously Chairman of the Council of Ministers. During World War I a big banker. After the October Revolution a white émigré—320

Kol (Stake)—see *Lengnik*, *F. V.*

Kollontai, *Alexandra Mikhailovna* (1872-1952)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1915. During World War I helped to rally the Left, internationalist elements among the Social-Democrats in the Scandinavian countries and America. After the October Revolution was People's Commissar of State Charity. In 1919 People's Commissar of Propaganda and Agitation in the Crimean Republic. In 1920, head of the Women's Department of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). Afterwards Secretary of the International Women's Secretariat under the Comintern and in the diplomatic service—412, 438, 442, 462, 469, 483, 488, 493, 498, 517, 533, 554, 619, 620

Koltsov, *D.* (*Ginsburg*, *Boris Abramovich*, *B. Abr.*) (1863-1920)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, contributed to various Menshevik publications—74, 97, 235, 365

Kon, *Felix* (1864-1941)—a prominent leader of the Polish workers' revolutionary movement. From 1907 a political emigrant. In 1917 he came to Russia, and in 1918 joined the Bolshevik Party. Held Party posts in the Ukraine and in Moscow—187-88

Konovalov, *Alexander Ivanovich* (b. 1875)—big manufacturer and landowner, one of the leaders of the bourgeois Progressist Party. Deputy to the Fourth Duma. In 1915-16 Deputy Chairman of the Central War Industries Committee. In 1917 Minister of Trade and Industry in the first two cabinets of the bourgeois Provisional Government and Kerensky's deputy in the last cabinet. After the October Rev-

olution a white émigré—395
Konstantin Sergeyevich—see *Doroshenko, N. V.*
Konstantinovich, Anna Yevgenievna (1866-1939)—sister-in-law of Inessa Armand—409, 617
Konyagin—see *Galperin, L. Y.*
Korenevsky, M. (*Tomich, Emmanuil, Emma*)—Social-Democrat, by profession a doctor; member of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik—121
Koritschoner, Franz (1891-1942)—one of the founders of the Communist Party of Austria in 1918; up to 1927 a member of its Central Committee. Editor of the Party's Central Organ *Die Rote Fahne*—565, 569, 577
Kostrov—see *Jordania, N. N.*
Kostya—see *Halberstadt, R. S.*
Kostya—see *Malinovsky, R. V.*
Kotlyarenko, D. M. (b. 1876)—Social-Democrat, leader of the strike movement on the Kazan Railway in 1905. After the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution emigrated. From 1908 ran the forwarding department of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* and subsequently that of the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*—218, 234, 248-49
Kozlowski, M. J. (1876-1927)—active participant in the English and Russian revolutionary movement. After the February revolution of 1917, a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Central Executive Committee first convocation. After the October Revolution worked in Soviet government institutions—629
Krasikov, Pyotr Ananievich (*Belsky, Muzykant, P. Andr., Pavlovich*) (1870-1939)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1892. Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. After the October Revolution held various key posts—59, 89, 108, 134, 159
Krasin, Leonid Borisovich (*Nikitich*) (1870-1926)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in the nineties. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. In 1918 took part in the negotiations for concluding an economic agreement with Germany, then headed the work of the Extraordinary Commission for Red Army Supply; was a Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. From 1919 in the diplomatic service—136, 152, 203, 207
Krasnukha, V. P. (*Grazhdanin*) (1868-1913)—Social-Democrat from 1899; an Iskrist—89
Krass (*Crassus*)—see *Poletayev, N. G.*
Kremer, A. I. (*Alexander*) (1865-1935)—a founder and leader of the Bund. Bund delegate to the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1898), elected to the Party C.C. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a non-voting delegate from the Bund; after the Congress a Menshevik—83
Krichevsky, Boris Naumovich (1866-1919)—Social-Democrat, a leader of the "Economists". In 1899 editor of the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which propagated Bernsteinian views—79, 89

Krokhmal, *Viktor Nikolayevich* (1873-1933)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. From 1901 agent of *Iskra* in Kiev—78

Kruchinina—see *Mandelshtam*, *L. P.*

Krupskaya, *Nadezhda Konstantinovna* (*Ulyanova*, *N. K. Lenina*, *Nadya*, *Sharko*) (1869-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898, associate and wife of V. I. Lenin. Started revolutionary activities in 1890s in the Marxist students' circles in St. Petersburg, then conducted Social-Democratic propaganda among the workers. In 1895 joined the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In August 1896 was arrested and sentenced to three years' exile. Served her sentence in the village of Shushenskoye then in Ufa. In 1901 emigrated worked as secretary of the editorial board of *Iskra*. Took part in organising the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Was secretary of the editorial board of the Bolshevik papers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. Carried on extensive correspondence abroad with Party organisations in Russia. After the October Revolution worked in Public Education bodies—66, 76, 85, 122, 125, 169, 175, 179, 252, 261, 343, 353, 354, 355, 356, 378, 385, 388, 392, 402, 409, 434, 445, 504, 511, 536, 538, 542, 545-46, 548, 558, 564, 565, 566, 573, 581, 611, 612

Krylenko, *Nikolai Vasilievich* (*Abram*, *Abramchik*) (1885-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Active participant in the October Revolution. Was in the first Soviet Government in the capacity of member of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs, later Supreme Commander-in-Chief. From 1918 held posts in the Department of Justice—291 379, 450, 458, 459, 463, 470

Krzhizhanovsky, *Gleb Maximilianovich* (*Brutus*, *Travinsky*) (1872-1959)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893; one of the organisers, with Lenin, of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Member of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.; elected at the Congress to the C.C. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. After the October Revolution worked on the rehabilitation and development of Moscow's power economy; headed the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). Subsequently held business and scientific posts—101, 113, 119

Kugelmann, *Ludwig* (1830-1902)—German Social-Democrat, friend of Marx, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Germany, member of the First International. From 1862 to 1874 carried on a correspondence with Marx, whom he kept informed of the state of affairs in Germany. Marx's letters to Kugelmann were first published in 1902 in *Die Neue Zeit*; in 1907 they were published in Russian with a preface by Lenin—185

Kuklin, *G. A.* (d. 1907)—Social-Democrat, publisher of Social-Democratic literature. From 1903 published abroad *Biblioteka Russkogo Proletariya*. Joined the Bolsheviks in 1905. Organised a public library of revolutionary litera-

ture in Geneva in 1902. After his death the library and publications passed over to the Bolshevik Party under his will —107, 173

Kurz—see *Lengnik*, *F. V.*

Kuskova, *Yekaterina Dmitrievna* (1869-1958)—bourgeois publicist and public figure. On the eve of the revolution of 1905-07 joined the liberal-monarchist *Osvobozhdeniye* League. In 1906, in co-operation with S. N. Prokopovich, published the semi-Cadet journal *Bez Zaglaviya*, and actively contributed to the Left-Cadet newspaper *Tovarishch*. After the October Revolution came out against the Bolsheviks. Deported abroad in 1922—202, 215

Kuzma—see *Lyakhotsky*, *K.*

Kuzmikha—see *Lyakhotskaya*.

Kuznetsov, *Georgi Sergeyevich* (b. 1881)—a workman, Menshevik. Deputy to the Third Duma from the Yekaterinoslav gubernia, member of the Duma S.D. group. Member of the Commission on the Labour Question—212

Kuznetsov, *N. V.*—see *Sapozhkov*, *N. I.*

L

L.—see *Leiteisen*, *G. D.*

L. B.—see *Kamenev*, *L. B.*

L. Gr., *L. G-ch*—see *Deutsch*, *L. G.*

L. I.—see *Axelrod*, *L. I.*

La Chesnais—French socialist, publicist. Contributor to the newspaper *l'Humanité* since its foundation till 1918—457

Ladyzhnikov, *Ivan Pavlovich* (*I. P.*, *Iv. P.*) (1874-1945)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. Joined the revolutionary movement in the nineties. In August 1905 went abroad, performed important Party assignments; member of the C.C. Economic Commission, manager of Verlag Book Publishers founded in Berlin in 1905 on the instructions of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. for bolstering Party funds—167, 168, 177

Lafargue, *Paul* (1842-1911)—prominent figure in the French and international working-class movement, talented publicist, one of the first adherents of scientific communism in France, close friend and associate of Marx and Engels. Member of the First International. Together with Jules Guesde founded the Workers' Party of France. Was editor of its central organ—the newspaper *l'Egalité*—159, 171

Lalayants, *I. Kh.* (1870-1933)—active participant in the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. Manager of the *Iskra* printing-press in Geneva. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik, agent of the Party Central Committee in Russia—97, 100, 107

Ledebour, *Georg* (1850-1947)—German Social-Democrat, member of the Reichstag from 1900 to 1918. After the split in German Social-Democracy in 1916, belonged to the Social-Democratic Labour Group in the Reichstag which in 1917 formed the core of the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany—489, 515, 531

Leder, *Wladyslaw* (1882-1938)—leader of the Polish labour movement. From 1900 a member of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. From 1910 to 1911 Secretary of the party's Executive and

party representative on the editorial board of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat*. In 1919-20 took an active part in the work of the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. From 1921 held key posts in the Comintern and Profintern, active contributor to the Soviet press—278, 376

Legien, *Karl* (1861-1920)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat. From 1890 Chairman of the General Committee of German Trade Unions. From 1903 Secretary, and from 1913 Chairman, of the International Trade Union Secretariat. In 1919-20 member of the National Assembly of the Weimar Republic—200, 263, 396, 489

Lehmann, *Karl*—Doctor of Medicine, Social-Democrat, member of the Munich organisation of German Social-Democratic Party, rendered assistance to *Iskra* during the editorial board's residence in Munich. The latter used his address for its correspondence—53, 69

Leibov (*Leib*)—71, 73

Leibovich, *M.* (*Yevsei* [*Malyutkin*], *L.*)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. Up to February 1, 1904, manager of the Forwarding Office of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee in Geneva. In the spring of 1904 worked in the Yekaterinoslav Committee, and in the summer of the same year in the Nikolayev Committee of the Party—123-25

Leiteisen, *Gavriil Davidovich* (*L.*, *Lindov*) (1874-1919)—joined the revolutionary movement in the 1890s. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. Contributed to the newspapers *Vperyod*, *Proletary* and other Bolshevik organs of the press. In 1907-14 took part in the work of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau in Russia. After the February 1917 revolution adhered for a time to the internationalist Mensheviks. In 1918 he returned into the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. Killed in January 1919 on the Western Front of the civil war—54, 59-60, 71-72, 79, 84, 91-93, 144-45, 171, 203, 268, 272

Leman, *M. N.* (*Liza*) (1872-1933)—Social-Democrat, Iskrist, Bolshevik. At the end of 1902 proposed a special method of printing *Iskra* from a celluloid cliché, and in January 1903 he went to Russia to apply it in practice—113

Lengnik, *Friedrich* (*Kol*, *Kurz*) (1873-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893. In 1903-04 took an active part in the fight against the Mensheviks abroad. In February 1904 returned to Russia, but shortly afterwards was arrested in connection with the case of the Northern Bureau of the Party's Central Committee. During the latter years of his life he carried on scientific and pedagogic work—113, 122, 126-27, 128-29

Lenin, *V. I.* (*Ulyanov*, *V. I.*, *Basil*, *V. I. Ivanovsky*, *V. Ilyin*, *K. Ivanov*, *N. Lenivtsyn*, *L. Lenin*, *Lenin N.*, *Meyer*, *Petrov*, *Richter J.*, *Starik*, *Frey N. N. Ulyanov*) (1870-1924)—39, 41, 42-43, 46, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 79, 82, 85, 93, 102, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 161, 167, 176, 178, 179-80, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,

193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 205, 206, 208, 209, 215, 217, 218, 221, 222, 223, 225, 229, 233, 245, 250-51, 254-55, 258, 264, 277, 282, 286, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 324, 333, 340, 341, 342, 343, 356, 364, 376, 377, 379, 381-82, 384, 404, 405-06, 409, 411, 413-14, 424, 431, 432, 448, 452, 454, 468, 474, 477, 487, 492, 497, 505, 506, 512, 523, 527, 534, 535, 541, 556, 579, 580, 581, 582, 584, 596, 597, 599, 601, 610, 616, 617, 618, 620, 626, 628, 629, 631, 635, 636, 638

Lenina—see *Krupskaya*, *N. K.*

Lenivtsyn, *N.*—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Lenochka—see *Bobrovskaya*, *C. S.*

Lepeshinsky, *Panteleimon Nikolayevich* (*Olin*) (1868-1944)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in the early nineties. Deported to Siberia in 1897. In exile he met Lenin with whom he became close friends. On the termination of his exile in 1900 he settled in Pskov, where he took an active part in circulating *Iskra*. Exiled to Siberia again in 1902. In 1903 escaped abroad and settled in Switzerland. Took part in the preparations for the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. An active participant in the February and October revolutions—84, 97, 120

Levi (*Hartstein*), *Paul* (1883-1930)—German Social-Democrat, then Communist. Expelled from the German Communist Party in 1921 for gross violation of party discipline—607, 625

Levinsky, *V.* (b. 1880)—a leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats in Galicia. In 1913-14 contributed to the legal bourgeois-nationalist journal *Dzvin*. During the First World War aligned with the internationalists. In the emigrants' colony in Switzerland made the acquaintance of V. I. Lenin—512

Levinson—member of the *Iskra* printing-shop staff. In 1904-05 a member of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Promotion Group in Berlin—97

Lidin—see *Lyadov*, *M. N.*

Lieber (*Goldman*), *Mikhail Isaakovich* (1880-1937)—a leader of the Bund. From 1907 to 1910 a liquidator, in 1912 an active member of the anti-Party August bloc—268, 273, 276, 331

Liebknecht, *Karl* (1871-1919)—outstanding figure in the German and international labour movement, one of the leaders of Left-wing German Social-Democracy. A sponsor and leader of the *Internationale* group, which later became known as the Spartacus group and then the Spartacus League. One of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany and leader of the uprising among the Berlin workers in January 1919. After the suppression of the uprising he was brutally murdered by counter-revolutionaries—489, 523

Liebknecht, *Wilhelm* (1826-1900)—prominent leader of the German and international labour movement, one of the founders and leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party. Took an active part in the First International and in organising the Second International—45, 62

Light-minded—see *Lunacharsky*, *A. V.*

Lilina, *Zlata Ionovna* (*Zina*) (1882-1929)—joined the

R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. Carried on illegal work in Russia, emigrated in 1908. Contributed to the newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*, and to the journal *Rabotnitsa*. In April 1917 she returned to Russia. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts—406, 408, 412, 461, 469, 519, 537, 538, 540, 555, 583

Lindhagen, *Carl* (1860-1946)—Swedish political leader, from 1909 a Social-Democrat. In 1917 one of the organisers of the Left Social-Democratic Party of Sweden, which joined the Comintern in 1919—626

Lindov—see *Leiteisen*, *G. D.*

Litvinov-Falinsky, *V. P.* (*Falinsky*)—engineer, factory inspector, one of the founders of the St. Petersburg Zubatov society. During the First World War a member of the Special Council of Defence, which existed from 1915 to 1917—303, 322

Litvinov, *Maxim Maximovich* (*Harrison*, *Papasha*, *Felix*) (1876-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Emigrated in 1902. Took an active part in promulgating the newspaper *Iskra* and in the publication of the first legal Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*. In 1907 he was a member and secretary of the Russian delegation to the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart. Represented the Bolsheviks on the International Socialist Bureau. After the October Revolution—in the diplomatic service—134, 187-88, 413, 442, 444, 617

Liza—see *Leman*, *M. N.*

Lobova, *V. N.* (*Vera*) (1888-1924)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. In 1911 a member of the Moscow Committee of the Party, at the beginning of 1913 secretary of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau in Russia and secretary of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts—295, 335

Lokhov, *N. N.* (*Olkhin*)—adherent of "Economism"; worked on the newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl* in 1900-02. Member of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. In 1903 represented the Union in the Organising Committee Foreign Section—89, 108-09

Longuet, *Jean* (1876-1938)—a leader of the French Socialist Party and the Second International. During the First World War headed the pacifist Centrist minority of the F.S.P. Came out against the F.S.P. joining the Comintern and against the setting up of the Communist Party of France—501, 558, 594

Lore, *Ludwig* (b. 1815)—German Social-Democrat. From 1903 lived in the United States was secretary of the German Federation of the Socialist Party—498

Lozovsky (*Dridzo*), *Solomon Abramovich* (1878-1952)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. Participant in the first Russian revolution of 1905-07. From 1909 to 1917 a political emigrant, member of the group of Bolshevik conciliators. From 1920 held trade-union and diplomatic posts—340, 379

Lunacharsky, *Anatoly Vasilievich* (*Voinov*, *Light-minded*, *Minonosets*) (1875-1933)—joined the revolutionary movement in the early nineties. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. After the defeat of the revolution of 1905-07 he adhered to the anti-Party *Vperyod* group, stood for a revision of the philosophical principles of Marxism from positions of god-building. At the beginning of 1917 he rejoined the Bolshevik Party. Following the October Revolution and up to 1929 People's Commissar of Education, then Chairman of the Academic Committee under the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—132, 179-80, 181, 185-86, 221, 315, 340, 354, 594

Lushin—see *Shipulinsky*, *F. P.*

Luteraan, *Barend* (b. 1878)—Dutch Social-Democrat, journalist. Member of the Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland from 1911 to 1916. Later a member of the Independent Socialist Party, and then the Communist Workers' Party of the Netherlands —466

Luxemburg, *Rosa* (*Rosa*, *Junius*) (1871-1919)—outstanding figure of the international labour movement, one of the leaders of the Left wing in the Second International. A founder and leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland. From 1897 onwards took an active part in the German Social-Democratic movement; was a participant in the 1905-07 Russian revolution (in Warsaw). In 1912 she same out against the "Rozlamist" opposition in the Polish Social Democratic Party, which stood closest to the Bolsheviks. Was one of the sponsors of the *Internationale* group in Germany, later renamed the Spartacus group, then the Spartacus League. After the November revolution in Germany in 1918 took a leading part in the Inaugural Congress of the German Communist Party. In January 1919 she was arrested and killed by order of the Scheidemann government—127, 130, 206, 297, 314, 332, 334, 417, 418, 421, 423, 517, 532, 535, 546, 552, 553, 561

Lyadov (*Mandelshtam*), *Martyn Nikolayevich* (*Lidin*, *M. N.*, *Mikhail Mironovich*, *Rusalka*) (1872-1947)—at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) an Iskrist of the majority, after the Congress an agent of the C.C. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. In 1907-10 adhered to the otzovists; in 1909 a member of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group and a lecturer at the Capri factional school. After the February Revolution of 1917 took a Menshevik stand. In 1920 was reinstated in membership of the R.C.P.(B.)—118, 119, 120, 127, 132, 134, 165, 166, 207, 219, 224, 231, 268, 273

Lyakhotskaya (*Kuzmikha*)—wife of Lyakhotsky, K.—486, 492

Lyakhotsky, *K.* (*Kuzma*) (died 1917)—an emigrant from the Ukraine. Proprietor of a small Russian type-setting office in Geneva, in which some issues of the Bolshevik Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat* and Lenin's pamphlet *Socialism and War* were set up at the beginning of the First World War—444,

446, 447, 469, 471, 476, 477, 486
Lyalin—see *Pyatakov*, *G. L.*
Lyova—see *Vladimirov*, *M. K.*
Lyubich—see *Sammer*, *I. A.*
Lyubimov, *A. I.* (Mark) (1879-1919)—Social-Democrat, joined the revolutionary movement in 1898. In 1910 a member of the C.C. Bureau Abroad, an advocate of conciliatory tactics towards the Menshevik liquidators—219, 224-25, 245, 246, 249-50, 278-79
Lyubov Isaakovna—see *Axelrod*, *A. I.*
Lyudmila—see *Stal*, *L. N.*

M

M.—see *Mayevsky*, *Y.*
A. F.—see *Andreyeva*, *M. F.*
M. H. H.—see *Hopfenhaus*, *M. H.*
M. M.—see *Lyadov*, *M. N.*
M. N., *Mikh. Nik.*—see *Pokrovsky*, *M. N.*
MacDonald, *James Ramsay* (1866-1937)—British politician, leader of the Labour Party. In 1900 elected Secretary of the Labour Representation Committee, which was reorganised in 1906 into the Labour Party —153-54
Mach, *Ernst* (1838-1916)—Austrian physicist and philosopher, subjective idealist, one of the founders of empirio-criticism—161
Maclean, *John* (1879-1923)—a prominent leader of the British labour movement, by profession a teacher. On the eve of the First World War joined the Left wing of the British Socialist Party and became one of its leaders in Scotland. During the war he carried on revolutionary anti-war propaganda, for which he was persecuted by the British Government. In April 1916 elected to the leadership of the British Socialist Party—558
Makadzyub, *Marko Saulovich* (*Anton*) (b. 1876)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. In 1901-03 worked in Social-Democratic organisations in the south of Russia. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a minority Iskrist—121-23
Makar—see *Nogin*, *V. P.*
Makhlin, *Lazar Davidovich* (*Misha the Compositor*) (1880-1925) —participant in the Social-Democratic movement from 1900. In 1902 agent of *Iskra* in Russia. After the Second Congress (1903) joined the Mensheviks—95 -96
Malecki, *Alexander Mavrikievich* (1879-1837)—Social-Democrat, joined the revolutionary movement in the late nineties. In 1906 elected to the Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. After the split in Polish Social-Democracy in 1912 he was one of the leaders of the "Rozlamist" opposition, which stood closest to the Bolsheviks. Delegate to the Basle Congress of the Second International in 1912 and the Brussels meeting of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1914. From 1921 he worked in the publishing business and as a teacher—301, 308
Malinovsky, *Roman Vatslavovich* (*Kostya*, *No. 3*) (1876-1918)—agent-provocateur in the service of the Moscow Secret Police Department, undercover man in the Bolshevik Party

and its leadership. Was elected to the Fourth Duma from the workers' curia of the Moscow gubernia. In 1914, threatened with exposure, he resigned from the Duma and secretly left the country. In 1918 came to Soviet Russia, where he was tried and sentenced to death by the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—306, 310, 314, 318, 319, 320, 322, 323, 326, 328

Malyantovich, *V. N.*—Social-Democrat, brother of the Moscow lawyer P. N. Malyantovich—355

Malykh, *Maria Alexandrovna* (b. 1879)—publisher of revolutionary literature in tsarist Russia. The publishing house established by her in 1901 issued separate works by Marx, Engels and Lenin—163

Malyutkin—see *Leibovich*, *M.*

Mandelstam, *Lydia Pavlovna* (*Kruchinina*) (1869-1917)—joined the workers' movement in 1395. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) worked in the Forwarding Department of the newspaper *Iskra* and editorial office of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. Member of the Central Committee's Economic Commission—169

Marat—see *Shantser*, *V. L.*

Marceli (*Eidukevičius*), *Pranas Vinco* (1869-1926)—a metal worker, one of the prominent leaders of the Lithuanian revolutionary movement. From 1906 a member of the C.C. of the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party. During the latter years of his life held administrative and business posts in Moscow—199, 200

Marchlewski, *Julian* (*Karski*) (1866-1925)—prominent figure in the revolutionary movement of Poland, Germany and Russia. One of the organisers and leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. From 1909 worked mainly in the German Social-Democratic movement. Came to Soviet Russia in 1918, elected to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—276

Maria Petrovna—see *Golubeva*, *M. P.*

Mark—see *Lyubimov*, *A. I.*

Marshak, *N. S.*—the wife of I. A. Pyatnitsky. Emigrated in 1907, lived in Leipzig, where she took part in the transportation of illegal literature to Russia—272

Martov, *L.* (*Tsederbaum*, *Yuli Osipovich*, *Alexei*, *Berg*, *Gamma*, *Martushka*, *Julius*) (1873-1923)—a leader of the Mensheviks, in 1907-14 a liquidator; edited the newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*; took part in the anti-Party August conference (1912). After the October Revolution came out against the Soviet government. Emigrated to Germany in 1920—45, 46, 54, 67, 75, 80, 81, 82, 85, 104, 108, 115-16, 117, 136, 139, 184, 229, 233, 236-40, 243, 257, 263, 339, 365, 366, 416-20, 449, 512, 516, 518, 519, 524, 527, 531, 533, 535, 541, 583, 602, 607

Martushka—see *Martov*, *L.*

Martynov, *A.* (*Piker*, *Alexander Samoilovich*) (1865-1935)—a Menshevik, one of the leaders of the Economists. In 1907-10 a liquidator, member of the editorial board of the liquidators' mouthpiece *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. After the

October Revolution he broke with the Mensheviks. Admitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party in 1923 at the Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)—89, 244, 314, 432

Marx, *Karl* (1818-1883)—185, 332, 405, 576, 607

Marzeli—sse *Marceli*, *P. V.*

Maslov, *Pyotr Pavlovich* (1867-1946)—economist, Social-Democrat, author of works on the agrarian question, in which he attempted to revive Marxism. From 1903 a Menshevik—37-38, 39-41, 265, 458, 469

Maximov—see *Bogdanov*, *A.*

Mayer, *Gustav* (1871-1948)—German historian, publisher of Lassalle's literary legacy, author of a biography of Engels and a number of works on the history of socialism and the labour movement—282

Mayevsky, *Y.* (*Gutovsky*, *V. A.*) (1879-1918)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. Contributed to the journal *Nasha Zarya*, the newspaper *Luch* and other organs of the Menshevik liquidators—325, 365

Medem, *Vladimir Davidovich* (*Grinberg*, *V. D.*, *Vinitsky*) (1879-1923)—a leader of the Bund. Attended the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., supported the Mensheviks—331

Medvezhonok (Bear Cub)—see *Ulyanova*, *M. I.*

Mehring, *Franz* (1846-1919)—outstanding leader of the German labour movement, one of the leaders and theoreticians of the Left wing of German Social-Democracy. Played a prominent part in founding the Communist Party of Germany—282

Melenevsky, *Maryan Ivanovich* (*Gylka*) (1879-1938)—Ukrainian petty-bourgeois nationalist, Menshevik, a leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic organisation Spilka—292-93

Merrheim, *Alphonse* (1881-1925)—French trade union leader. At the outbreak of the First World War was one of the leaders of the Left wing in the syndicalist movement in France, opposed to the imperialist war. However vacillation and fear of a final break with the social-chauvinists led him at the end of 1916 to take a Centrist pacifist stand, and at the beginning of 1918 an open social-chauvinist and reformist stand—453, 503, 594

Meshcheryakov, *Nikolai Leonidovich* (1865-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. From 1913 to 1917 was in exile in Krasnoyarsk (Siberia)—488

Meshkovsky—see *Goldenberg*, *I. P.*

Meyer—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Meyer, *Ernst* (1887-1930)—a leader of the German and international labour movement. During the First World War represented the *Internationale* group at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. One of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany—535

Mgeladze, *V. D.* (*Tria*) (b. 1868)—Menshevik. In 1918-20 member of the Menshevik counter-revolutionary government of Georgia—252

Mikha—see *Tskhakaya*, *M. G.*

Mikhail—see *Isuv*, *I. A.*

Mikhail Mironovich—see *Lyadov*, *M. N.*

Mikhail Nikolayevich—see *Pokrovsky*, *M. N.*

Mikhailov, *Z.*—member of the Rostov Social-Democratic organisation. After the revolution of 1905-07 an agent provocateur—105

Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstantinovich (1842-1904)—theoretician of liberal Narodism, publicist, exponent of the subjective school in sociology. In 1892 was at the head of the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* journal, in which he waged a fight against Marxism—41, 55

Millerand, Alexandre Etienne (1859-1943)—French politician; in the eighties a petty-bourgeois Radical; in the nineties joined the socialists, headed the opportunist trend in the French socialist movement. In 1899 joined the reactionary bourgeois government of Waldeck-Rousseau, where he collaborated with the hangman of the Paris Commune General Galliffet—79

Milovidova (*Petrova*), *L. F.*—Russian public figure, acquainted with many outstanding leaders of the Social-Democratic movement in St. Petersburg, including Lenin. Lived in Switzerland, tried to get Lenin's book *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* published abroad, but without success—42-43

Milyukov, Pavel Nikolayevich (1859-1943)—leader of the Cadet Party, ideologue of the imperialist bourgeoisie, deputy to the Third and Fourth Dumas. In 1917 Foreign Minister in the first cabinet of the bourgeois Provisional Government—174, 617, 625

Milyutin, Vladimir Pavlovich (*Pavlov*) (1884-1938)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1903, first adhered to the Mensheviks and from 1910 a Bolshevik. Carried on Party work in a number of Russian cities. After the October Revolution held administrative and business posts—376, 387

Minin—see *Karpinsky, V. A.*

Minonosets (Destroyer)—see *Lunacharsky, A. V.*

Miron—see *Chernomazov, M. Y.*

Misha the Compositor—see *Makhlin, L. D.*

Montégus, Brunswick Gaston (d. 1953)—son of a Communard, performer of songs in Paris working-class neighbourhoods—294

Morgari, Oddino (1865-1929)—Italian socialist, journalist. Took part in the foundation of the Italian Socialist Party. During the First World War stood for the resumption of international socialist contacts. Attended the Zimmerwald Conference where he adopted a Centrist stand—487

Morozov, Mikhail Vladimirovich (1868-1938)—Social-Democrat Bolshevik, writer. From 1910 lived in Paris as a political emigrant, was a member of the Bolshevik section headed by Lenin—294

Moskovsky, Alexei—see *Khundadze, G. I.*

Movich—see *Abramovich, R.*

Movshovich, Moisei Izrailevich (*K. M.*) (1876-1931)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1896, from 1903 a Bolshevik. Emigrated to Switzerland in 1911, was secretary of the Lausanne section of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Returned to Russia in May 1917. Held trade union, administrative and Party posts—471

Mr. Chairman—see *Petrovsky, G. I.*

Münzenberg, Wilhelm (1889-1940)—a leader of the Swiss and German labour movement. In 1915-19 secretary of the Social-

ist Youth International. From 1916 member of the Executive of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. On his return to Germany became a member of the Communist Party of Germany. In 1939 was expelled from the Party for serious political mistakes—583, 587, 591, 599, 607, 609, 614

Muranov, *Matvei Konstantinovich* (*No. 5*) (1873-1959)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Deputy to the Fourth Duma from the workers of the Kharkov gubernia, member of the Bolshevik Duma group. From 1917 to 1934 held Party posts—310, 313, 316, 317, 318, 320, 345, 346, 625

Muromtsev, *Sergei Andreyevich* (1850-1910)—prominent leader of the Cadet Party, lawyer, Professor of Moscow University. From 1879 to 1892 editor of the bourgeois liberal journal *Yuridichesky Vestnik*. In 1906 Deputy of the First Duma and its Chairman—260

Muzykant (Musician)—see *Krasikov*, *P. A.*

N

N.—205

N. I., *N. I. B.*—see *Bukharin*, *N. I.*

N. K., *Nadezhda Konstantinovna*, *Nadya*—see *Krupskaya*, *N. K.*

N. V.—see *Sapozhkov*, *N. I.*

N. Y.—see *Fedoseyev*, *N. Y.*

Nad—pseudonym of a writer of articles in Menshevik newspapers—518

Nadezhdin, *L.* (*Zelensky*, *Yevgeny Osipovich*, *Sokolovsky*) (1877-1905)—Narodnik, later a Social-Democrat. Emigrated to Switzerland in 1900 where he organised the *Svoboda* Revolutionary Socialist Group (1901-03). In the journal *Svoboda* and in separately published pamphlets he supported the Economists and at the same time advocated terror as an effective means of "stirring the masses". After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) he contributed to Menshevik publications—63, 97

Nadson, *Semyon Yakovlevich* (1862-1887)—Russian poet—147

Naine, *Charles* (1874-1926)—a leader of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, by profession a lawyer. Attended the Zimmerwald Conference, was a member of the International Socialist Commission. In 1917 he became a Centrist and shortly afterwards joined the Right wing of Swiss Social-Democracy—582, 594, 598, 614, 625

Nakhamkis—see *Steklov*, *Y. M.*

Nakhimson, *Miron Isaakovich* (*Spectator*) (1880-1938)—economist and publicist. From 1899 to 1921 member of the Bund. During the First World War took a Centrist stand—607, 608

Nasimovich, *Nikolai Fyodorovich* (*Dirks*) (1876-1927)—journalist, joined the revolutionary movement in 1896. Wrote for the Bolshevik press—172

Natanson, *Mark Andreyevich* (1850-1919)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1869, a Narodnik, later a Socialist-Revolutionary. In 1917 one of the organisers of the Left S.R. Party—536

Negorev—see *Iordansky*, *N. I.*

Nekrasov, *Nikolai Alexeyevich* (1821-1878)—Russian poet, revolutionary democrat—103, 107, 108

Nekrasova—see *Fotieva*, *L. A.*

Nemets—see *Plekhanov*, *G. V.*

Nevsky, *Vladimir Ivanovich* (*Spitsa*) (1876-1937)—professional revolutionary, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. In 1913 co-opted to the Central Committee of the Party. Took part in the election campaign to the Fourth Duma —316
Nevzorov—see *Steklov*, *Y. M.*
New Acquaintance—see *Potresov*, *A. N.*
New Chairman—see *Petrovsky*, *G. I.*
Nicholas II (*Romanov*) (1868-1918)—the last Russian tsar, reigned from 1894 up to the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution—209, 587
Nik. Iv.—226
Nik. Vas.—see *Sapozhkov*, *N. I.*
Nik. Vasilievich—169
Nikitich—see *Krasin*, *L. B.*
Nilssen, *Magnus* (b. 1871)—Norwegian Social-Democrat, politician. From 1901 to 1918 secretary of the Norwegian Workers' Party. Represented the N.W.P. on the international Socialist Bureau—182
No. 1—see *Badayev*, *A. Y.*
No. 3—see *Malinovsky*, *R. V.*
No. 5—see *Muranov*, *M. K.*
No. 6—see *Petrovsky*, *G. I.*
No. 16—see *Jagiello*, *Y. I.*
Nobs, *Ernst* (1866-1957)—a leader of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. At the beginning of the First World War he adhered to the internationalists but in 1917 adopted a Centrist pacifist stand. In the twenties he sided with the Right wing of Swiss Social-Democracy and came out against the Swiss and international communist movement. In 1949 President of Switzerland—532, 558, 563, 583, 587, 591, 598, 609, 610, 614
Nogin, *Viktor Pavlovich* (*Makar*, *Novoselov*) (1878-1924)—professional revolutionary; Bolshevik, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898, carried on Party work in Russia and abroad. In 1907-10 adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Menshevik liquidators. After the October Revolution occupied government and business posts—45-46, 51-55, 126, 243, 268, 272, 274, 379
Noskov, *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (*B. N.*, *B. N-ch*, *Boris*, *Glebov*, *B.*) (1878-1913)—Social-Democrat. In 1902-03 organised the transportation of illegal Social-Democratic literature to Russia. Took part in preparing the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Majority Iskrist chairman of the Congress committee to work out the Party Rules; elected to the Central Committee. After the Congress adopted a conciliatory stand towards the Mensheviks—81, 105, 119, 120, 136, 152
Novich, *Stiva*—see *Portugets*, *S. I.*
Novoselov—see *Nogin*, *V. P.*

O

O. A.—250
Olga, *Olya*—see *Ravich*, *S. N.*
Olin—see *Lepeshinsky*, *P. N.*
Olkhin—see *Lokhov*, *N. N.*
Olminsky (*Alexandrov*), *Mikhail Stepanovich* (*Galyorka*, *Vas. Vas.*, *A. Vitimsky*) (1863-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898; writer, member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. Took an active part in the October Revolution. Later manager of the Party History Department of

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the Central Committee, R.C.P.(B.), editor of the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*, member of the management of the Lenin Institute—119, 120, 122, 125, 136, 158, 352, 362-63, 385, 388

Orlovsky—see *Vorovsky*, *V. V.*

Orn. (*Ornatsky*, *A.*)—see *Chicherin*, *G. V.*

Orthodox—see *Axelrod*, *L. I.*

Os. Pyotr—271

Osinsky, *N.* (*Obolensky*, *Valerian Valerianovich*) (1887-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. In 1910-14 wrote for the Bolshevik publications *Zvezda*, *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye*. After the October Revolution held government, Party, and business key posts. In 1920-21 an active participant in the anti-Party Democratic Centralism group and in 1923 joined the Trotskyite opposition—336-37

Osipov—see *Zemlyachka*, *R. S.*

P

P. And.—see *Krasikov*, *P. A.*

P. B., *Pavel Borisovich*—see *Axelrod*, *P. B.*

Pannekoek, *Anton* (1873-1960)—Dutch Social-Democrat, Professor of astronomy at Amsterdam University. From 1910 he was closely connected with the German Left Social-Democrats. During the First World War—an internationalist, took part in the publication of the journal *Vorbote*, the theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left. In 1918-21 a member of the Communist Party of Holland, took an active part in the work of the Comintern, adopted an extreme Left, sectarian stand. In 1921 he resigned from the Communist Party and shortly afterwards from active political life—296, 297, 301, 453, 465, 473, 478, 482, 513, 516, 608, 613

Papasha (Grandpa)—see *Litvinov*, *M. M.*

Parvus (*Gelfand*, *Alexander Lazarevich*) (1869-1924)—at the end of the 1890s and the early 1900s took part in the Social-Democratic movement in Russia and Germany. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Menshevik. Parvus propounded the anti-Marxist theory of "permanent revolution", which Trotsky afterwards used as a weapon in his struggle against Leninism. Later Parvus abandoned Social-Democracy. During the First World War he adopted a chauvinist stand, engaged in big speculation and made a fortune on military contracts. From 1915 published the journal *Die Glocke*—143, 445

Pashev, *Nikita*—political emigrant, aviation mechanic at the Kitil airfield (Rumania). Apparently, one of the fugitive sailors of the *Potemkin*—281

Pavlov—see *Milyutin*, *V. P.*

Pavlovich—see *Krasikov*, *P. A.*

Pavlovich, *Mikhail Pavlovich* (*Veltman*, *Mikhail Lazarevich*, *Volontyor*) (1871-1927)—orientalist, Social-Democrat, Menshevik. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar for Education of the Ukraine, member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, then Rector of the Institute of Oriental Studies—275

Pedder—122

Peluso, *Edmondo* (1882-1942)—Italian socialist, emigrant. From 1898 a member of Socialist

and Social-Democratic parties in various countries. In 1916 a delegate of the Socialist Party of Portugal to the Kienthal Conference of socialist internationalists. From 1927 lived in the U.S.S.R. as a political emigrant, worked as a teacher—635

"*Pero*" (*Pen*)—see *Trotsky*, *L. D.*

Peshekhonov, *Alexei Vasilievich* (1867-1933)—bourgeois public figure and publicist. From 1906 one of the leaders of the petty-bourgeois Popular Socialist Party. In 1917 Minister of Food Supply in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After 1922 a white émigré—341

Petrov—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Petrov—256

Petrovsky, *Grigory Ivanovich* (*Mr. Chairman*, *New Chairman*, *No. 6*) (1878-1958)—deputy of the Fourth Duma returned by the workers of the Ekaterinoslav gubernia, member of the Duma Bolshevik group. In November 1914 arrested with the other Bolshevik deputies and deported in 1915 to Siberia. Continued revolutionary work in exile. After the October Revolution held various Party and government posts—318, 361, 403, 410, 412, 414, 416, 420, 421

Platten, *Friedrich* (*Fritz*) (1883-1942)—Swiss Left Social-Democrat, one of the organisers of the Swiss Communist Party. In April 1917 rendered great assistance in arranging Lenin's return journey to Russia from Switzerland. In 1919 took part in founding the Third, Communist International, was a member of the Comintern Bureau. In 1921-23 secretary of the Swiss Communist Party. From 1923 onwards lived in the U.S.S.R.—500, 501, 517, 519, 531, 532, 582, 583, 586, 587, 601, 609, 610, 614, 623, 624, 625, 627, 630

Plekhanov, *Georgi Valentinovich* (*G. V.*, *X.*, *Nemets*) (1856-1918)—an outstanding leader of the Russian and international labour movement, the first propagandist of Marxism in Russia. In 1883 set up in Geneva the first Russian Marxist organisation—the Emancipation of Labour group. In the early 1900s was a member of the editorial board of the newspaper *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya*.

From 1883 to 1903 Plekhanov wrote a number of works which played an important part in the defence and propaganda of the materialist outlook. But already at that time he was guilty of serious errors, which formed the embryo of his future Menshevik views. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Plekhanov adopted a conciliatory stand towards the opportunists, and afterwards joined the Mensheviks. In 1907-14 he came out against the Machist revision of Marxism and against liquidationism, and headed the group of pro-Party Mensheviks. During the First World War adopted a social-chauvinist stand. He disapproved of the October Revolution, but took no part in the struggle against Soviet power—61, 65, 67, 68, 71, 74-75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85-86, 89-90, 96-99, 103-05, 106-09, 110-12, 114, 136, 139, 141, 145, 157, 159-60, 164, 179, 219, 224, 241, 244, 254, 263, 268, 271, 275, 292, 294, 308, 321, 325, 338, 339, 340, 353, 354, 355, 357, 378, 379, 405, 413,

417, 421, 423, 426, 430, 436, 468, 493, 497, 524, 552, 556

Pokrovsky, *Ivan Petrovich* (b. 1872)—Social-Democrat, Deputy of the Third Duma, aligned himself with the Bolshevik section of the Social-Democratic Duma group. In 1910 a member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik legal newspaper *Zvezda*—212, 255, 277

Pokrovsky, *Mikhail Nikolayevich* (*Domov*) (1868-1932)—prominent Soviet statesman and public figure, historian, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. From 1908 to 1917 lived abroad. In 1907-10 adhered to the otzovists and ultimatumists, and afterwards to the anti-Party *Vperyod* group, with which he broke in 1911. During the First World War he contributed to the Centrist newspapers *Golos* and *Nashe Slovo*. In 1917 he returned to Russia. From November 1917 to March 1918 Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, then Deputy People's Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R., Director of the Communist Academy, the History Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the Red Professorate Institute, etc. From 1929, an academician—191-92, 203, 204, 207, 208, 224, 524, 550, 551, 556-57, 564, 590, 596

Poletayev, *Nikolai Gurievich* (*Krass*) (1872-1930)—Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. In 1905 a member of the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Represented the St. Petersburg gubernia in the Third Duma, member of the Bolshevik section of the Duma Social-Democratic group. After the October Revolution held business posts—212, 260, 269-71, 276, 277, 303-04, 318, 337-38

Polonsky, *Iosif Matveyevich* (*Stepan*) (b. 1889)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. In 1909 exiled for life to Siberia. At the end of 1911 escaped to Paris, where he joined the Bolshevik group. After the October Revolution engaged in trade union work, then worked in the Foreign Trade Commissariat—354, 380

Polubinov (*Yegor*)—Socialist-Revolutionary, emigrated from Russia. In September 1915 wrote to Lenin suggesting that the doors of the R.S.D.L.P. be opened to those Left S.R.s who condemned the defence-of-the-fatherland resolution adopted at the conference of the S.R. Party in July 1915—491, 492

Popov, *Anatoly Vladimirovich* (*Britman*, *A. V.*, *Antonov*) (d. 1914)—Social-Democrat. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. Member of the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Committee of Party Organisations Abroad—248, 296, 378, 380, 381, 382, 547

Popov, *Ivan Fyodorovich* (1886-(1957)—Social-Democrat. In 1905-14 a member of the Bolshevik Party. In 1908 emigrated to Belgium, where he arranged contacts between the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the International Socialist Bureau. Contributed to *Pravda*, *Prosveshcheniye*, *Le Peuple* and other periodicals. During the First World War he was taken prisoner by the Germans. In 1918 he returned to Soviet Russia—

307, 308, 372, 373, 374, 384, 406, 409, 413, 415, 416, 419, 424, 425, 426, 547

Portugeis, *S. I.* (*Novich Stiva*)—Menshevik, publicist. In 1907-14 a liquidator; contributed to the newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the journal *Nasha Zarya* and other organs of the Menshevik liquidators. After the October Revolution emigrated—386

Posse, *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1864-1940)—journalist, public figure. Editor of the "legal Marxists'" journals *Novoye Slovo* (1897) and *Zhizn* (1898-1901). The latter being closed down by the tsarist government, he continued to publish it abroad in 1902—99, 103

Postnikov, *V. Y.* (1844-1908)—economist and statistician, employed in the Ministry of Agriculture and State Properties, member of the Free Economic Society—37-38, 39-40, 42

Postolovsky, *D. S.* (*Vadim*) (1876-1948)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1895. At the Third Congress of the Party elected to its Central Committee. Was the official representative of the C.C. R.S.D.L.P. on the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. After the October Revolution worked on the State Commission for Draft Bills under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.—272

Potresov, *Alexander Nikolayevich* (*A. N. Arsenyev*, *New Acquaintance*, *Starover*) (1869-1934)—in the nineties aligned with the Marxists. Took part in founding *Iskra* and *Zarya*. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. he became a leader of the Mensheviks. After the October Revolution emigrated—44, 45, 61, 66, 97-98, 100-01, 103, 106, 109, 215, 259, 270, 353, 405, 466, 552, 564, 575

Predkaln (*Priedkaln*), *Andrei Janovich* (1873-1923)—Lettish Social-Democrat, a physician by profession. In 1907 elected to the Third Duma where he aligned with the Bolshevik section of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. Contributed to the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*—212

Preobrazhensky, *Alexei Andreyevich* (1863-1938)—Narodnik, member of the farming colony at Shornel farm (Samara Gubernia) within several miles of Alakayevka, where the Ulyanovs spent the summers of 1889-93. During that period he often met V. I. Lenin and they had heated arguments together on the peasant question. Later he joined the Social-Democratic movement. In 1905 he worked in Samara—156-57

Prokopovich, *Sergei Nikolayevich* (1871-1955)—bourgeois economist and publicist. In the late nineties a prominent exponent of the Economist trend. Later an active member of the liberal-monarchist *Osvobozhdeniye* League. In 1906 a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party. Editor and publisher of the semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik journal *Bez Zaglavia*. In 1917 Minister of Food Supply in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution deported from the

country for anti-Soviet activity—202, 215

Purishkevich, *Vladimir Mitrofanovich* (1870-1920)—big landowner, one of the sponsors of the Black-Hundred Union of the Russian People. In 1907 he withdrew from it and formed a new monarchist counter-revolutionary organisation known as Chamber of Archangel Michael. Deputy to the Second, Third and Fourth Dumas from the Bessarabia gubernia. Notorious for his anti-semitic pogromist speeches in the Duma—441

Putyatin, *Vasily Petrovich* (b. 1878)—a peasant by birth. Deputy to the Third Duma from the Vyatka gubernia. For a time, member of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma—212

Pyatakov, *Georgi Leonidovich* (*Kievsky*, *Pyotr*, *Yuri*, *Japanese*, *Lialine*) (1890-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910. From 1914 to 1917 lived in Switzerland, then in Sweden as a political emigrant. Contributed to the journal *Kommunist*; came out against Lenin on the question of the right of nations to self-determination. After the October Revolution a member of the Soviet Government of the Ukraine. From 1920 held administrative and business posts. Elected to the Central Committee at the Party's Twelfth, Thirteenth Fourteenth and Sixteenth congresses. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy, for which he was expelled from its ranks—459, 461, 463, 464, 472, 480, 487, 490, 495, 496, 529-30, 537, 539, 541, 543, 544, 546, 552, 559, 560, 562, 567, 570, 571, 574, 577, 583, 606, 615, 632

Pyatnitsa (Friday)—see *Pyatnitsky*, *I. A.*

Pyatnitsa's wife—see *Marshak*, *N. S.*

Pyatnitsky, *Iosif Aronovich* (*Albert*, *Pyatnitsa*) (1882-1939)—a leading member of the Communist Party; joined the revolutionary movement in the nineties. Living abroad as an emigrant, he managed the transportation of illegal literature and the smuggling of Party workers into Russia. Took an active part in convening the First and Third congresses of the R.S.D.L.P. Participant in the first Russian revolution (1905-07). Carried on Party work in Odessa, Moscow, and other cities. During the October days in 1917 a member of the Party's fighting headquarters in Moscow. After the October Revolution held Party posts—135-37, 249, 298, 301

Pyatnitsky, *K. P.* (1864-1938)—one of the founders of the *Znaniye* book publishing house (1898). In 1905 signed an agreement with the Bolshevik Central Committee for the publication of Marxist literature—166

Pyotr—see *Alexinsky*, *G. A.*

Pyotr—see *Ramishvili*, *N. V.*

Q

Quarck, *Max* (1860-1930)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat, lawyer and publicist. During World War I advocated a policy of collaboration between Social-Democracy and the German ruling classes—475, 476

Quelch, *Harry* (1858-1913)—a prominent leader of the British and international labour movement. Delegate to a number of international congresses of the Second International, member of the International Socialist Bureau. Took an active part in the activities of the British trade unions. During the period of publication in London of Lenin's *Iskra* (1902-03) gave assistance in organising the printing of the newspaper—80

Quessel, *Ludwig* (1872-1931)—German Social-Democrat publicist—265

R

Raczýnski, *Zygmunt* (b. 1882)—member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.); worked in Cracow, Warsaw and Lodz. In October 1905 was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years penal servitude in Siberia—68

Radchenko, *Ivan Ivanovich* (*Arkady*) (1874-1942)—a member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class; played an important part in circulating Lenin's *Iskra* in Russia. In 1902 a member of the Organising Committee for convening the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. From 1918 one of the organisers and managers of the Soviet peat industry—83-84, 88-89, 90-91

Radek, *Karl* (1885-1939)—from the beginning of the century took an active part in the Social-Democratic movement in Galicia Poland and Germany, contributed to the publications of the German Left Social-Democrats. During the First World War adopted an internationalist stand, but leaned towards the Centrists. In 1917 joined the Bolshevik Party. From 1923 an active member of the Trotskyite opposition. Expelled from the Party in 1936 for anti-Party activities—297, 301, 453, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 461, 462, 464, 465-66, 468, 470, 475, 478, 480, 481, 482, 483, 487, 488, 489, 491, 495, 500, 504, 509, 510, 512, 513, 514, 515, 518, 519, 521, 527, 528, 531, 534, 535, 537, 540, 545, 546, 548, 549, 550, 554, 555, 561, 563, 571, 583, 585, 587, 598, 600, 607, 608, 614, 627, 629, 630, 632, 634-35

Radin—see *Knunyants*, *B. M.*

Rafailov, *M.*—see *Cots*, *M. R.*

Raffin-Dugens, *Jean Pierre*—French socialist. In 1910-19 member of the Chamber of Deputies. In 1921 joined the French Communist Party—594

Rakhmetov—see *Bogdanov*, *A.*

Rakovsky, *Christian Georgievich* (1873-1941)—from the early nineties took an active part in the Social-Democratic movement in Bulgaria, Rumania, Switzerland and France. Joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts. Expelled from the Party for active participation in the Trotskyite opposition—524

Ramishvili, *Naum Vissarionovich* (*Pyotr*) (b. 1881)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. After the Second Congress (1903) joined the Mensheviks. In 1918-20 Minister of the Interior in the Georgian Menshevik government, stood for Georgia's secession from Russia, fought

against the Soviet government —271, 272

Rappoport, *Charles*—French socialist, revised Marxian philosophy, for which he was sharply criticised by Paul Lafargue. Author of a number of books on philosophy and sociology—211, 218, 220, 223, 248, 484

Ravich, *Sophia* (*Olga*, *Olya*) (1879-1957)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. Did Party work in Kharkov, St. Petersburg and abroad. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts—192, 226, 402, 435, 436, 450, 470, 476, 483, 485-86, 490, 498, 517, 526, 545, 594, 597, 598, 600, 602, 604, 606, 622, 624-25

Renaudel, *Pierre* (1871-1935)—a reformist leader of the French Socialist Party. In 1914-20 editor of *l'Humanité*. In 1914-19 member of the Chamber of Deputies—463, 594

Richter, *J.*—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Riskin—proprietor of a printing-press in Paris—381

Rittmeyer, *Georg*—Social-Democrat, with whom Lenin lived in Munich in 1900-01 under the name of Meyer. Lenin received letters at his address from December 1900 up to the end of July 1901—49

Rodzyanko, *Mikhail Vladimirovich* (1859-1924)—big landowner, one of the leaders of the Octobrist party, a monarchist. From March 1911 Chairman of the Third and then of the Fourth Duma. During the February 1917 revolution organised a counter-revolutionary centre known as the Provisional Committee of the Duma, and then a Private Council of Duma members. After the October Revolution attempted to rally the counter-revolutionary forces to fight the Soviet state. Later he emigrated—365

Rogova—138, 148

Roland-Holst, *Henriette* (1869-1952)—Dutch socialist, writer. Worked to organise women's unions; adhered to the Left-wing Social-Democrats, who formed the Social-Democratic Party of Holland in 1909. Took part in the publication of the journal *Vorbote*, the theoretical mouthpiece of the Zimmerwald Left. In 1918-27 was a member of the Dutch Communist Party and took part in the work of the Comintern—504, 513-16, 518, 569, 600, 601

Rolland, *Romain* (1866-1944)—French author and public figure. In 1914-19 wrote his *Diary of the War Year*, which was later kept in the Lenin State Library in the U.S.S.R. and published in accordance with the author's will in January 1955—498, 625

Roman—see *Yermolayev*, *K. M.*

Romanov, *Ivan Romanovich* (1871-1919)—workman, Bolshevik, deputy to the Second Duma. After the dissolution of the Duma emigrated to Belgium, then lived in France —189

Ropshin, *V.*—see *Savinkov*, *B. V.*

Rosa—see *Luxemburg*, *R.*

Rosen, *M. M. (E.)* (b. 1876)—member of the Bund from 1898. Carried on Party work in Minsk, Warsaw, Odessa, Kiev and Lodz. In 1907-08 a member of the Bund Central Committee and of the editorial board of its central organ—241

Rothstein, *Theodore* (1871-1953) —Social-Democrat. Emigrated to England in 1890 where he joined the Social-Democratic

Federation, adhering to its Left wing. In 1901 Joined the R.S.D.L.P. Contributed to the Russian and foreign socialist press. Took part in founding the Communist Party of Great Britain. Returned to the Soviet Union in 1920—453

Roussel, *Angéle*—French socialist. From 1907 to 1912 a member of the Standing Administrative Committee of the French Socialist Party—200-01

Rovio, *Kustaa* (1887-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. From the end of 1910 onward lived and worked in Finland. A member of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland. In August-September 1917 Lenin lived in his house, where he went into hiding to escape persecution by the bourgeois Provisional Government. Rovio was one of the active participants in the workers' revolution of 1918 in Finland. Later held Party posts in the U.S.S.R. —636-37

Rozanov, *V. N.* (1876-1939)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Menshevik group in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies—633

Rozhkov, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1868-1927)—historian and publicist. Joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the beginning of 1905, aligned himself for a time with the Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution he became one of the ideological leaders of liquidationism—263

Rozmirovich Yelena Fyodorovna (*Troyanovskaya*, *Galina*) (1886-1953)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Living abroad as a political emigrant, fulfilled various assignments of the C.C. Bureau Abroad, was a confidential agent of the C.C. After the Poronin conference (1913) she was sent to Russia as secretary of the Duma Bolshevik group and the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. Was a member of the editorial board of the newspaper *Pravda*, contributed to the journals *Prosveshcheniye*, *Rabotnitsa*, etc. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts—333, 389-90, 450, 457

Rubakin, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1862-1946)—bibliographer and writer, author of numerous works on bibliography the history of book publishing in Russia, and popular science sketches on geography, the natural sciences, etc. Emigrated to Switzerland in 1907 where he lived till the end of his life—402, 608

Rubanovich, *Ilya Adolfovich* (1860-1920)—a leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Member of the International Socialist Bureau—210, 308, 417

Rudin, *A.* (*Potapov*, *Alexander Ivanovich*) (1869-1915)—started political activities as a Narodnik, then joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In 1903-05, a member of its Central Committee. Came out against Marxism in his articles and pamphlets on the agrarian question—107

Rudis-Gipslis, *I.* (*Rude*) (1885-1918)—member of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region from 1905, active participant in the 1905-07 revolution. After the revolution emigrated to Germany, worked in Berlin in a print-shop—348-49, 372-73, 374-75, 392, 401

Rühle, *Otto* (b. 1874)—German Left Social-Democrat. From 1912 Member of Parliament. In 1919 joined the Communist Party of Germany, where he aligned himself with the Left opposition. After the split among the German Communists, at the beginning of 1920, took part in founding the Communist Workers' Party of Germany. Was later expelled from it and went back to the Social-Democratic Party—510-11, 514, 523

Ruma, *L. N.*—agent provocateur worked in the Moscow Workers' Union—67, 72, 74

Rumyantsev, *P. P.* (*Schmidt*) (1870-1925)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1891. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik, member of the Bureau of Majority Committees, delegate to the Party's Third Congress. In June 1905 co-opted to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1905 an editor and contributor to the first legal Bolshevik paper *Novaya Zhizn*. In 1907-10 retired from political activities—166

Rusalka (Mermaid)—see *Lyadov*, *M. N.*

Rusanov, *A. N.* (b. 1881)—member of the Fourth Duma from the Primorye region, non-Party. By profession a schoolteacher—319

Rusanov, *Nikolai Sergeyevich* (*Tarasov*)—publicist, member of the Narodnaya Volya organisation, afterwards a Socialist-Revolutionary. While in emigration he met Engels. Returned to Russia in 1905, edited a number of S.R. newspapers—96, 99, 109

Ryabovsky—see *Stark*, *L. N.*

Ryadovoi (Private)—see *Bogdanov*, *A.*

Ryazanov (*Goldendach*), *David Borisovich* (1870-1938)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in the nineties. Living abroad as an emigrant he took part in founding the opportunist *Borba* group, After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) he aligned himself with the Mensheviks. In 1909 a lecturer at the anti-Party Capri school. At the Sixth Congress (1917) he was admitted to membership of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the October Revolution worked in the trade unions. Expelled from the R.C.P.(B.) in February 1931 for supporting the counter-revolutionary activities of the Mensheviks—44, 45, 50-51, 60, 125, 294, 312, 314, 345, 445, 529

Rybalka—see *Yurkevich*, *L.*

Rykov, *Alexei Ivanovich* (*Vlasov*) (1881-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. In 1907-10 took a conciliatory stand towards the opportunists in the Party. After the February 1917 revolution opposed the Party's line towards a socialist revolution. After the October Revolution held a number of key posts. Came out repeatedly against Lenin's policy. In 1928, one of the leaders of the Right opportunist deviation. Expelled from the Party in 1937 for anti-Party activities—203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 266-268, 272-75

S

Safarchik, *Saf-chik*—see *Safarov*, *G. I.*

Safarov, *G. I.* (*Volodin*, *George*, *Georgik*, *Samovarchik*, *Safarchik*, *Saf-chik*) (1891-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908.

Carried on Party work in St. Petersburg and abroad. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts —291-92, 410, 413, 526, 532, 544, 546, 552, 553, 562, 568, 570, 574

Safarova, *Valentina Sergeyevna* (*Valya*) (b. 1891)—the wife of Safarov, G. I.—617, 620

Sahli, *Hermann*—professor of Berne University, specialist in internal diseases—555

Sammer, *Ivan Adamovich* (*Lyubich*) (1870-1921)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1897, Bolshevik. Took an active part in the revolution of 1905-07. After the October Revolution held business posts—204, 269, 272, 275

Samoilov, *Fyodor Nikitich* (1882-1952)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, deputy to the Fourth Duma from the workers of the Vladimir gubernia, member of the Bolshevik group in the Duma. Arrested together with the other Bolshevik deputies in November 1914 for revolutionary activities against the imperialist war and deported to Siberia in 1915. After the October Revolution worked in the Ukraine and in Moscow—309, 357, 387-88, 389, 397, 399, 421

Samovarchik—see *Safarov*, *G. I.*

Samovars—see *Leiteisen*, *G. D.* and *Nogin*, *V. P.*

Samsonov—see *Valentinov*, *N.*

Sanin, *Alexei Alexeyevich* (b. 1869)—Marxist writer of the nineties, contributor to *Samarsky Vestnik* (1896-97) and the collection *Proletarian Struggle*. He translated Hourwich's book *The Economics of the Russian Village* (1896) to which he gave a voluminous appendix of his own—100

Sapozhkov, *N. I.* (*Kuznetsov*, *N. V.*, *Nik. Vas.*) (1881-1917)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1904. At the end of 1911 emigrated to Paris—326, 334, 376, 379, 380, 382, 400, 408

Sauer—see *Skarre*, *Y.*

Savelyev, *Maximilian Alexandrovich* (*Vetrov*) (1884-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1911-13 editor of the journal *Prosveshcheniye* and simultaneously, from 1912, member of the editorial board of *Pravda*. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts—318, 322

Savinkov, *Boris Viktorovich* (*Ropshin*, *V.*) (1879-1925)—a leader of the Combat Organisation of the S.R. party. After the October Revolution one of the organisers of counter-revolutionary revolts and armed intervention against the Soviet Republic—297, 340

Schmidt—see *Rumyantsev*, *P. P.*

Schter—633

Schwarz—see *Vorovsky*, *V. V.*

Schweitzer, *Johann Baptist* (1833-1875)—German public figure and writer, elected President of the General Association of German Workers in 1867. Pursued Lassallean, opportunist tactics of agreement with the Prussian government. An adherent of the Junker-Prussian way of uniting Germany "from above". Marx and Engels sharply criticised the "royal-Prussian government socialism" of Schweitzer—282

Seger, *Johann Friedrich* (1867-1928)—German Social-Democrat, one of the leaders of the Leipzig S.D. organisation and editor of *Leipziger Volkszeitung*—574

Semashko, Nikolai Alexandrovich (*Alexandrov*) (1874-1949)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893. In 1905 took an active part in the armed uprising in Nizhni-Novgorod, then emigrated. Was secretary and treasurer of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureau Abroad. At the outbreak of the imperialist world war was interned in Bulgaria. Returned to Russia in September 1917. Took an active part in the armed uprising in Moscow in October 1917. After the October Revolution held key posts in the public health service—184, 272, 275, 276, 277, 314

Semkovsky, S. (*Bronstein, Semyon Yulievich*) (b. 1882)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. Member of the editorial board of Trotsky's *Pravda* in Vienna. Contributed to the press organs of the Menshevik liquidators and foreign Social-Democratic parties. During the First World War he was a Centrist. On his return to Russia in 1917 he became a member of the Menshevik Central Committee. In 1920 broke with the Mensheviks. Later professor in Ukrainian colleges, engaged in scientific literary research—344, 563

Seppin, J. H.—182

Sergei Vasilievich—165

Sergeyev, V.—see *Taratuta, V. K.*

Shantser, Virgily Leonovich (*Marat*) (1867-1911)—Social-Democrat. At the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1907) elected to the C.C. Took part in the work of the Fifth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (December 1908), member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary*—201, 205, 208

Sharko—see *Krupskaya, N. R.*

Shahumyan, Stepan Grigorievich (1878-1918)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. In 1904-10 directed Party work in Transcaucasia and was one of the organisers and editors of Bolshevik legal and illegal organs of the press. In 1914 headed the Baku organisation of the Bolsheviks. After the October Revolution, Acting Commissar Extraordinary for Affairs of the Caucasus, Chairman of the Baku Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Member of the Party Central Committee. After the fall of the Baku Commune he was shot with 25 other Baku commissars by the British interventionists on September 20, 1918—410-11

Shchur—see *Skrypnik, N. A.*

Shelgunov, Vasily Andreyevich (1867-1939)—a workman, joined the revolutionary movement in 1886. From 1892 conducted propaganda of Marxism in the workers' circles of St. Petersburg. Was one of the organisers and leaders of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. He was arrested in connection with the prosecution of this League and exiled. In 1910 he took part in founding the newspaper *Zvezda*, and later *Pravda*—95

Shenderovich—358

Shipulinsky, F. P. (*Feofan, Lushin*) (1876-1942)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1898. In 1905 sided with the Mensheviks—162, 163

Shklovsky, Grigory Lvovich (1875-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Emigrated in 1909. Member of the Berne section of

the Bolsheviks. From 1915 member of the Committee of Bolshevik Organisations Abroad. Returned to Russia after the February 1917 revolution. From 1918 to 1925 in the diplomatic service—343-44, 355, 358, 399, 421, 469, 485, 488, 496, 498, 518, 537, 589

Shklyarevich, *V. G.* (1877-1921)—Social-Democrat, Iskrist. Established contact between the Crimean S.D. organisation and the editorial board of *Iskra*—86-87

Shlyapnikov, *Alexander Gavrilovich* (*A.*, *Alexander*, *Belenin*) (1885-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. During the First World War engaged in Party work in Petrograd and abroad; was liaison man between the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Bureaus in Russia and Abroad. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Petrograd Party Committee, member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and Chairman of the Petrograd Metal Workers' Union. After the October Revolution People's Commissar of Labour in the Council of People's Commissars, afterwards held trade union and business posts. In 1920-22 organiser and leader of the anti-Party Workers' Opposition group. During the Party purge in 1933 he was expelled from the R.C.P.(B.)—437, 441, 442, 443-44, 456, 459, 480, 481, 484, 521, 527, 528, 532, 535, 536, 537, 538-39, 540, 542, 559, 566, 568, 573

Shouer, *M. M.*—Social-Democrat, Iskrist, member of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad, at the Second Congress of the League supported the Mensheviks—54

Shurkanov, *Vasily Yegorovich* (b. 1876)—a workman, deputy to the Third Duma from the Kharkov gubernia. Member of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. Subsequently discovered to have been an undercover man of the Russian secret political police from 1913—212

Siefeldt (*Simumyash*), *Arthur Rudolfovich* (1889-1938)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1906. From 1913 lived in Switzerland. Member of the Bolshevik Party from 1915—508

Sigg, *Jean*—a leader of the Geneva organisation of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party, Member of the Federal Parliament—436

Silvin, *Mikhail Alexandrovich* (*Brodyaga*) (1874-1955)—Social-Democrat, joined the revolutionary movement in 1891, member of the central group of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. An agent of *Iskra*. Co-opted to the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Went over to the Mensheviks at the end of 1904, but soon after returned to the Bolsheviks; contributed to a number of Bolshevik newspapers. In 1908 retired from political activities and quitted the Party. After the October Revolution worked in the R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat of Education, from 1923 to 1930 employed in the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. in Britain, and from 1931 a teacher—127, 129

Sinclair, *Upton* (1878-1968)—American author—289, 473

Skaret, *Ferdinand* (1862-1941)—Austrian Social-Democrat.

Held key posts in the leadership of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, which he represented in the Second International. Up to 1930 a regular Member of Parliament—448

Skarre, *V.* (*Sauer*)—from 1908 secretary of the Committee Abroad of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region, a Menshevik—374

Skovno, *Abram Andreyevich* (*Abram*) (1888-1938)—joined the Bolshevik Party in 1903. From 1910 lived in France, member of the Paris section of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1914 went to live in Switzerland. Returned to Russia together with Lenin. After the October Revolution held Party and business posts in Moscow—432, 433, 511, 617

Skrypnik, *Nikolai Alexeyevich* (*Shchur*) (1872-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. Member of *Pravda* editorial board (1914). After the February 1917 revolution secretary of the Central Council of Factory Committees in Petrograd, member of the Central Executive Committee, first convocation. Active participant in the October Revolution, member of the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee. After the revolution held Party and administrative posts—206, 207

Skvortsov-Stepanov, *Ivan Ivanovich* (*Bolshak*) (1870-1928)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1896; from 1904 a Bolshevik; Marxist writer. Active participant in the October Revolution. After the revolution held government and Party posts—138, 148, 203, 394-96

Smidovich, *Inna Germogenovna* (*Dimka*) — Social-Democrat. From the moment *Iskra* was organised and up to the time N. K. Krupskaya arrived in Geneva in April 1901 discharged the duties of secretary of the editorial board, afterwards engaged in the transportation of literature across the frontier. At the Second Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad supported the Mensheviks, was secretary to the League's administration—583

Smilga, *Ivan Tenisovich* (1892-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. In 1914-15 a member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Kronstadt Party Committee, Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland. After the October Revolution authorised agent of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars in Finland, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council—636, 637

Sokolnikov (*Brilliant*), *Grigory Yakovlevich* (1888-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. From 1909 to 1917 lived abroad. During the First World War contributed to the Menshevik liquidator newspaper *Nashe Slovo*. After the October Revolution held administrative, diplomatic and military posts. Expelled from the Party in 1936 for anti-Party activities—594, 598

Sokolov, *Nikolai Dmitrievich* (1870-1928)—Social-Democrat, well-known barrister at political trials. Contributed to the journals *Zhizn*, *Obrazovaniye*

and others. At the by-elections to the Third Duma in St. Petersburg in 1909 he was nominated candidate of the R.S.D.L.P. After the October Revolution worked as legal adviser in various Soviet institutions—215, 386

Sokolovsky—see *Nadezhdin*, *L.*

Solomon, *Georgi Alexandrovich* (*Isetsky*, *Salomon*)— joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1898, carried on agitation and propaganda work. In 1907 emigrated, lived abroad up to 1917—190, 192, 193

Sorokin—471

Spandaryan, *Suren Spandarovich* (1882-1916)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. Member of the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Active participant in the revolution of 1905-07. At the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. elected to the Central Committee and the Bureau of the C.C. in Russia. After the Conference toured the country, making reports to the Bolshevik organisations of the Lettish Region, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tiflis and Baku. Contributed to the newspaper *Zvezda*. Arrested in 1912 and sentenced to exile for life in Siberia. Died in Krasnoyarsk—287

Spectator—see *Nakhimson*, *M. I.*

Spitsa (Spoke)—see *Nevsky*, *V. I.*

Stal, *Ludmila Nikolayevna* (*Ludmila*) (1872-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. In 1905 a member of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., in 1906 a member of the St. Petersburg Committee. In 1907 emigrated. Lived in France, England and Sweden up to 1917. Active participant in the October Revolution. During the civil war carried on political work in the army. From 1921 held Party and administrative posts —461, 462, 484, 567

Stalin (*Jugashvili*), *Joseph Vissarionovich* (*Vasilyev*, *Koba*) (1879-1953)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. since 1898. After the October Revolution was elected to the Council of People's Commissars, where he headed the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. During the foreign intervention and civil war was active on several fronts as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. In 1922 was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B). As of 1941 he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, later also of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) was Chairman of the State Committee for Defence, People's Commissar for Defence, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armed forces.

In the position of General Secretary of the Party C.C., which he held for a long time, Stalin, together with other leading functionaries, exerted great efforts for the building of socialism, and played a major role in smashing various anti-Party trends, especially Trotskyism and Right opportunism.

At the same time, associated with his name are the distortions in the life of Soviet society, which the Communist Party qualified as manifestations of the personality cult alien to Marxism-Leninism. The C.P.S.U. decidedly condemned the personality cult

and took measures to prevent similar mistakes and distortions in future—236, 310, 314, 317-19, 322, 323, 326, 469, 483, 625

Starik (Old Man)—see *Lenin*, *V. I.*

Stark, *L. N.* (*Ryabovsky*) (1889-1943)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. Deported from the country in 1912; lived for a time in Vienna, where he aligned himself with Trotsky's group, then lived on Capri. Contributed to the Bolshevik publications *Zvezda*, *Pravda* and *Prosveshcheniye* and the Menshevik journal *Sovremennik*—355, 549

Starover (Old Believer)—*Potresov*, *A. N.*

Stasova, *Yelena Dmitrievna* (*Absolut*) (1873-1966)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Up to 1905 carried on illegal revolutionary work in St. Petersburg, Kiev, Minsk, Orel, Smolensk, Vilna, and Moscow; was secretary of the St. Petersburg Party Committee, secretary of the Northern Bureau of the C.C. In 1907-12 did Party work in Tiflis. At the Sixth (Prague) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. she was elected alternate member of the C.C. Afterwards carried on Party work in Petrograd and Baku, worked in the Comintern, the International Red Aid and the Central Control Commission, and engaged in public and literary activities—126-27, 128-29, 162

Stavsky, *I. I.* (1877-1957)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898, one of the leaders of the November strike in Rostov-on-Don in 1902. On his arrival abroad wrote a letter together with Z. Mikhailov and Mochalov to the editors of *Iskra* declaring their support for its programme—95, 97, 105

Steinberg, *S.*—Russian emigrant, member of the Emigrants' Committee set up in Stockholm in 1917 after the February revolution in Russia to help political emigrants return to Russia—630

Steklov, *Yuri Mikhailovich* (*Nakhamkis*, *Nevzorov*) (1873-1941)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1893. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. In 1907-14 contributed to the Party's Central Organ—the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, and the Bolshevik papers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. After the October Revolution editor of *Izvestia* and the magazine *Sovetskoye Stroitelstvo* (Soviet Construction); from 1929 Deputy Chairman of the Academic Committee under the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—44, 46-47, 60, 158, 277, 325, 344, 378

Stepan—see *Polonsky*, *I. M.*

Stepanov—see *Skvortsov-Stepanov*, *I. I.*

Stepko—see *Kiknadze*, *N. D.*

Stietz, *Otto*—426-27

Stolypin, *Pyotr Arkadievich* (1862-1911)—Russian statesman, big landowner. In 1906-11 Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior. Implemented an agrarian reform aimed at creating a bulwark of the tsarist autocracy in the countryside in the person of the kulaks. Associated with his name is the period of harsh political reaction that set in in Russia after the suppression of the revolution of 1905-07—174, 222, 340

Strannik (Wanderer)—see *Fridolin*, *V. Y.*

Ströbel, *Heinrich* (1869-1945)—German Social-Democrat. At the outbreak of the First World War came out against the imperialist war, adhered to the *Internationale* group, in which he represented a trend that leaned towards Kautskyism. In 1916 he swung over completely to Kautskyism. In 1917 one of the organisers of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany—511, 514

Ström, *Fredrik* (1880-1948)—Swedish Left Social-Democrat, writer and publicist. In 1911-16 Secretary of the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden. In 1921-24 Secretary of the Swedish Communist Party. Author of the book *J'stormigtid* (Stormy Times) published in Stockholm, 1942, containing a chapter "Lenin in Stockholm" giving reminiscences of Lenin's visit to Stockholm on March 31 (April 13) and an interview with him—626

Struve, *Pyotr Berngardovich* (1870-1944)—bourgeois economist and publicist. In the nineties a leading spokesman of "legal Marxism", who tried to adapt Marxism and the labour movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. With the founding of the Cadet Party in 1905 he became a member of its Central Committee. An ideologue of Russian imperialism. After the October Revolution a white émigré—140

Sukhanov, *N.* (*Gimmer*, *Nikolai Nikolayevich*) (b. 1882)—economist and publicist of a petty-bourgeois trend. Started as a Narodnik, then became a Menshevik. After the October Revolution worked in Soviet economic institutions. Sentenced in 1931 as a leader of an underground Menshevik organisation—405, 517, 529, 532, 538, 550

Surkov, *P. I.* (1876-1946)—Social-Democrat, workman (weaver). Bolshevik Deputy to the Third Duma from the workers of the Kostroma gubernia; contributed to the legal Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda*—212

Sverdlov, *Yakov Mikhailovich* (*Andrei*) (1885-1919)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the Sixth (Prague) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1912 co-opted to the Central Committee of the Party and elected to the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in Russia. Member of the editorial board of *Pravda*. Took an active part in preparing and carrying out the October Revolution. Member of the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee and the Revolutionary Military Centre for leadership of the uprising, which were set up by the Central Committee of the Party. On November 8 (21) elected Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—335

Sysoika—see *Bogdanov*, *A.*

T

T.—292

Tarasov—see *Rusanov*, *N. S.*

Taratuta, *Victor Konstantinovich* (*Victor*, *Sergeyev*, *V.*) (1881-1926)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Delegate to the Fourth and Fifth Congresses of the R.S.D.L.P., member of the Bolshevik Centre—197, 205, 226, 229, 257

Teodorovich, *Ivan Adolfovich* (*Fedorovich*) (1875-1940)—joined the revolutionary

movement in 1895. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. In 1905 member of the editorial board of the Bolsheviks' Central Organ *Proletary*. In 1905-07 member of the St. Petersburg Party Committee—166

Ter-Ioannisyan, *V. A.*—wife of the well-known Armenian writer Muratsan. From 1890 onward lived in Germany. In Berlin, through S. Spandaryan, made the acquaintance of Lenin at the beginning of 1912—287-88

Thalheimer, *August* (1884-1948)—German Social-Democrat, publicist. In 1914-16 editor of the Social-Democratic newspaper *Volksfreund*, member of the *Internationale* group, subsequently renamed the Spartacus group and the Spartacus League. From 1923 one of the leaders of the Right-wing opportunists. Expelled from the Party in 1929—462

Thun, *Alphons* (1853-1885)—German historian, author of the book *History of the Revolutionary Movements in Russia*—108, 110

Tinsky—see *Usievich*, *G. A.*

Tolstoy, *Lev Nikolayevich* (1828-1910)—Russian author—263

Tomich—see *Korenevsky*, *M.*

Tomsky, *Mikhail Pavlovich* (1880-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1905-06 worked in the Reval organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. In 1907 member of the St. Petersburg Party Committee. Member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik paper *Proletary*. After the October Revolution held a number of key posts. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy. In 1928, together with Bukharin and Rykov, headed the Right opportunist deviation in the R.C.P.(B.)—221-22

Travinsky—see *Krzhizhanovsky*, *G. M.*

Tria—see *Mgeladze*, *V. D.*

Troelstra, *Pieter Jelles* (1860-1930)—a leader of the Dutch labour movement, Right-wing socialist. A founder (1894) and leader of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Holland—444

Trotsky (*Bronstein*), *Lev Davidovich* ("*Pero*") (1879-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897, a Menshevik. After the Second Congress (1903) opposed the Bolsheviks on all issues involving the theory and practice of socialist revolution. Returned from emigration in 1917, joined the Mezhraiontsi group with whom he was admitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Congress (1917). After the October Revolution held a number of key posts. Carried on a bitter factional struggle against the Party's general line, against Lenin's programme for building socialism; argued the impossibility of winning socialism in the U.S.S.R. Expelled from the Party in 1927, in 1929 deported from the country for anti-Soviet activities, and deprived of Soviet citizenship in 1932. Living abroad, he continued his struggle against the Soviet state and the Communist Party, against the international communist movement—106, 111, 112, 124, 129, 140, 176, 222, 231, 243, 244, 263, 265, 278, 296, 300, 378, 379, 453, 455, 456, 458, 460, 461, 483, 484, 489, 502, 504, 507, 513, 514, 515, 516, 523, 567, 602

Troyanovsky, Alexander Antonovich (1882-1955)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. Emigrated in 1910. Member of the Central Committee delegation to the Basle Congress of the Second International (1912), attended the Cracow and Poronin meetings of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party functionaries. Returned to Russia in 1917. Was in the diplomatic service and held other posts—308, 333, 339, 344, 618

Troyanovsky's wife—see *Rozmirovich, Y. F.*

Tsensky—122

Tskhakaya, Mikhail Grigorievich (*Mikha*) (1865-1950)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. One of the leaders of the Caucasian Union Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. From 1907 to March 1917 lived abroad. In 1917-20 member of the Tiflis Committee of the Party. After the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia in 1921 held Party and administrative posts—498, 625

Tsvetov—see *Blumenfeld, I. S.*

Tugan-Baranovsky, Mikhail Ivanovich (1865-1919)—Russian economist, in the nineties a prominent spokesman of "legal Marxism". During the revolution of 1905-07 a member of the Cadet Party. After the October Revolution a counter-revolutionary leader in the Ukraine—104, 191, 248, 332

Tulyakov, Ivan Nikitich (b. 1877)—a workman, Social-Democrat, Menshevik, deputy to the Fourth Duma from the Don Cossack Army region—357, 370

Turati, Filippo (1857-1932)—a leader of the Italian labour movement, one of the organisers of the Italian Socialist Party and leader of its Right, reformist wing—594, 606

Tyszka, Jan (*Jogiches, Leon*) (1867-1919)—prominent leader of the Polish and German labour movement. One of the founders of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, member of the Party's Executive. During the imperialist world war participated in the work of the German Social-Democrats, was one of the organisers of the Spartacus League. After the November 1918 revolution in Germany took part in founding the Communist Party of Germany and was elected secretary of its Central Committee—187-88, 197, 276, 297, 314, 329, 334, 372, 429, 521, 522, 588

U

Ulyanova, Maria Ilyinichna (*Medveshonok*). (1878-1937)—Lenin's younger sister, professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. Carried on Party work in Russia and abroad—113, 629

Usievich (*Tinsky*), *Grigory Alexandrovich* (1891-1918)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1908. In 1916 lived in Switzerland. Returned to Russia together with Lenin (April 3, 1917). Took an active part in the October Revolution—546, 549, 553, 554, 562, 564, 588, 612, 613, 616, 621

Usievich, Yelena Felixovna (b. 1893)—wife of G. A. Usievich, daughter of Felix Kon, prominent leader of the international labour movement; joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1915, member of the Bolshevik section in Berne. Returned to Russia in April 1917 together with Lenin—612

V

V. I.—see *Zasulich*, *V. I.*
V. M.—see *Velichkina*, *V. M.*
V. V.—see *Vorontsov*, *V. P.*
Vadim—see *Postolovsky*, *D. S.*
Vaillant, *Edouard Marie* (1840-1915)—French socialist, follower of Blanqui, one of the leaders of the Second International's Left wing. Was one of the founders of the Socialist Party of France (1901). During the First World War adopted a social-chauvinist stand—168
Vakar, *V. V.* (1878-1926)—started revolutionary activities in the early nineties. In 1902 a member of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Bolshevik—88
Valentin—see *Galperin*, *L. Y.*
Valentinov, *N.* (*Volsky*, *Nikolai Vladislavovich*, *Samsonov*) (b. 1879)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1898. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Bolsheviks; went over to the Mensheviks at the end of 1904, edited the legal Menshevik paper *Moskovskaya Gazeta* and contributed to other Menshevik organs—129
Valya—see *Safarova*, *V. S.*
Vandervelde, *Emile* (1866-1938)—leader of the Belgian Workers' Party, Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. Took an extreme opportunist stand. Was a member of the bourgeois government during the First World War—423, 424, 438, 480, 482
Var, *A.*—see *Warski*, *Adolf*.
Varin—see *Fridolin*, *V. Y.*
Vas. Vas.—see *Olminsky*, *M. S.*
Vasilyev—see *Stalin*, *J. V.*
Vasserberg, *E. A.* (b. 1874)—a member of the R.S.D.L.P. promotion group in Paris in 1903—71
Vecheslov, *M. G.* (*Yuriev*) (1869-1934)—a Social-Democrat a doctor by profession. In 1900 headed the *Iskra* promotion group in Berlin; organised transportation of *Iskra* into Russia across the frontier. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Menshevik. Joined the R.C.P.(B.) in June 1918—56, 57-58
Velichkina, *Vera Mikhailovna* (1868-1918)—a professional revolutionary. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), a Bolshevik; contributed to the newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*, translated works of Marx and Engels, organised transportation into Russia of Bolshevik publications—115, 258, 261
Velika, *Vel. Dm.*, *Velika Dmitrievna*—see *Zasulich*, *V. I.*
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Vetchinkin—169
Vetrov—see *Savelyev*, *M. A.*
Victor—see *Taratuta*, *V. R.*
Vilensky Ilya Semyonovich (*Ilya*) (1873-1931)—a Social-Democrat. In 1897 member of the Yekaterinoslav League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1900 arrested and exiled; escaped from exile to Geneva, where he joined the *Iskra* organisation and worked in the printing-press of the Emancipation of Labour Group, later became manager of the Party's printing-press—120-21
Vinitsky—see *Medem*, *V. D.*
Vinnichenko, *Vladimir Kirillovich* (1880-1951)—Ukrainian fiction

writer, a bourgeois nationalist. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party—a Menshevik nationalist organisation. After the February 1917 revolution one of the organisers and leaders of the counter-revolutionary Ukrainian Central Rada (Council); subsequently, together with Petlura, headed the Directory (the nationalist government of the Ukraine in 1918-19). After the establishment of Soviet power in the Ukraine, a white émigré—400

Vitimsky, *A.*—see *Olminsky*, *M. S.*

Vl. Khr.—382

Vladimirov, *Miron Konstantinovich* (*Sheinfinkel*, *M. K.*, *Lyova*) (1879-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1911 drew away from the Bolsheviks; later joined the Paris group of Plekhanovites, who published the newspaper *Za Partiyu*. During the First World War contributed to Trotsky's Paris newspaper *Nashe Slovo*—278-79, 379, 588

Vladimirsky, *Mikhail Fyodorovich* (*Kamsky*) (1874-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1895. In 1905 a participant in the December armed uprising in Moscow. In 1906 emigrated to France, where he worked in the Bolshevik organisations—327, 383, 389, 400, 406, 410, 413, 415

Vlasov—see *Rykov*, *A. I.*

Voinov—see *Lunacharsky*, *A. V.*

Voiloshnikov, *Aviv Adrianovich* (1877-1930)—member of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, aligned with the Bolsheviks. In 1911-12 contributed to the Bolshevik newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*—212

Voitinsky, *V. S.* (b. 1885)—during the revolution of 1905-07 a Bolshevik. In the spring of 1909 he was sentenced by a military tribunal to penal servitude in connection with the case of the Bolshevik Military Organisation. After the February 1917 revolution, a Menshevik. In October 1917 he took part in the Kerensky-Krasnov counter-revolutionary revolt. Later emigrated—367-70

Volkov—390

Volodin—see *Safarov*, *G. I.*

Volontyor (Volunteer)—see *Pavlovich*, *M. P.*

Volsky, *Stanislav* (b. 1880)—Social-Democrat. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. Afterwards became a leader of the otzovists, took part in the organisation and work of the factional schools on Capri and at Bologna (Italy); a member of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group—206

Voronin, *Semyon Alexandrovich* (1880-1915)—a workman, deputy to the Third Duma from the Vladimir gubernia. Member of the Social-Democratic Duma group, aligned with the Bolsheviks. Contributed to the Bolshevik legal newspaper *Zvezda*—212

Vorontsov, *Vasily Pavlovich* (*V. V.*) (1847-1918)—economist and publicist, one of the ideologists of liberal Narodism in the eighties and nineties; advocated reconciliation with the tsarist government, came out against Marxism—39, 40

Vorovsky, *Vatslav Vatslavovich* (*Josephine*, *Orlovsky*, *Schwarz*) (1871-1923)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1894. At the beginning of 1904 organised

the Southern Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. in Odessa, at the end of August went abroad. A member of the editorial board of the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*. After the October Revolution a prominent Soviet diplomat. Was assassinated in Lausanne by white guards—127, 152, 155, 203, 207, 249, 635

Vyach. Al.—see *Karpinsky*, *V. A.*

Vyazmensky, *G. M.*—manager of the archives of Russian Social-Democracy in Berlin—334

W

Warski, *Adolf* (1868-1937)—a veteran leader of the Polish revolutionary movement, took an active part in founding the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. Delegate to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. After the Congress, a member of its C.C. In 1909-10 an editor of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. A founder of the Communist Workers' Party of Poland and member of its C.C.—242, 256,

Warszawski—see *Bronski*, *M. G.*

Werner—see *Bogdanov*, *A.*

Wijnkoop, *David* (1877-1941)—Dutch Social-Democrat, afterwards Communist. In 1909 one of the founders and Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland ("Tribunists"), which assumed the name of Communist Party of Holland in 1918. As a leader of the Communist Party of Holland, he adopted an ultra-Left, sectarian stand—451, 452, 461, 465-66, 467-68, 471, 478, 479-80, 481-82

Y

Y.—269-70

Y. Yur., *Yuri*—see *Pyatakov*, *G. D.*

Y. B.—see *Bosh*, *Y. B.*

Y. F.—see *Rozmirovich*, *Y. F.*

Yakubova, *Apollinaria Alexandrovna* (1870-1917)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1893, adherent of Economism. A member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Emigrated in the summer of 1899. Assisted in the organisation of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) which she attended as a non-voting delegate. After the split in the Party sympathised with the Mensheviks. After 1905 retired from political activities, worked in workers' educational organisations—47-48

Yasneva—see *Golubeva*, *M. P.*

Yefron, *Y. A.* (d. 1917)—a doctor by profession; lived abroad as an emigrant, supported the Emancipation of Labour Group; later a member of the *Iskra* organisation in Paris—74

Yegor—see *Polubinov*.

Yegorov, *Nikolai Maximovich* (b. 1871)—a workman, deputy to the Third Duma from the Perm gubernia electorate. Member of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. Contributed to the Bolshevik legal newspaper *Zvezda*, then joined the Trotskyites—212

Yelizarova-Ulyanova, *Anna Ilyinichna* (*Andrei Nikolayevich*, *James*) (1864-1935)—Lenin's sister; joined the revolutionary movement in 1886. In 1900-05 worked in *Iskra* organisations and Bolshevik illegal newspapers; was a member of the editorial board of *Vperyod*. Took

an active part in the publication of Lenin's writings. In 1912-14 contributed to the Bolshevik organs: *Pravda*, *Prosveshcheniye* and *Rabotnitsa*. In 1917 secretary of *Pravda* editorial board and editor of the journal *Tkach* (Weaver). In 1918-21 worked in the People's Commissariat of Education. Took an active part in the organisation of the Lenin Institute, of whose scientific staff she was a member—67, 166, 177, 386, 528, 549, 554

Yenukidze, *A. S.* (*Avel*) (1877-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. In 1910 worked in the Party's Baku organisation, was a member of the Baku Committee. In 1911 was arrested and kept in prison till July 1912. After his release worked in St. Petersburg up till 1914. After the October Revolution occupied military, administrative and Party posts—360

Yermolayev, *K. M.* (*Roman*) (1884-1919)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. In 1910 was one of the sixteen Mensheviks who signed the "Open Letter" calling for the Party's liquidation. In 1917 elected to the C.C. of the Menshevik Party—240-42, 268

Yevsei—see *Leibovich*, *M.*

Yu. K.—see *Kamenev*, *L. B.*

Yudin—see *Aizenstadt*, *I. L.*

Yuri—see *Bekzadian*, *A. A.*

Yuri—see *Bronstein*, *P. A.*

Yuri—see *Grozhan*, *D. S.*

Yuri—see *Kamenev*, *L. B.*

Yurkevich (*Rybalka*), *Lev* (1885-1918)—Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist. Member of the C.C. of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party. In 1913-14 took an active part in *Dzvin*, the nationalist journal of a Menshevik trend. During the First World War published the monthly paper *Borotba* in Lausanne—512, 535

Yuriev—see *Vecheslov*, *M. G.*

Yuzef—see *Dzerzhinsky*, *F. E.*

Yuzhakov, *Sergei Nikolayevich* (1849-1910)—an ideologue of liberal Narodism, sociologist and publicist. Contributed to the journals *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, *Vestnik Yevropy* and others. One of the leading editors of the journal *Russkoye Bogatstvo*—55

Z

Zagorsky (*Lubotsky*), *Vladimir Mikhailovich* (1883-1919)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. Worked abroad on assignments of the Bolshevik centre. In 1918 elected secretary of the Moscow Party Committee—308

Zakharov, *Mikhail Vasilievich* (b. 1881)—workman, Bolshevik deputy to the Third Duma from the Moscow gubernia, contributor to the Bolshevik legal paper *Zvezda*—212

Zaks, *S. M.* (*Gladnev*, *S. M.*) (1884-1937)—writer, Social-Democrat. From 1911 contributed to the Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda*, and in 1912-13 to *Pravda* and Priboi Publishing House. Took a conciliatory stand towards the liquidators—294

Zalevski, *Kazimir* (1869-1918)—one of the founders of the Social-Democratic organisations in Lithuania and of the Union of Lithuanian Workers in 1895. In 1900 sponsored the Union's amalgamation with the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland, which formed the S.D. Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithu-

ania. From 1917 a member of the R.S.D.L.P. After the October Revolution worked in the newspaper *Izvestia*—329

Zaslavsky, *David Iosifovich* (1880-1965)—journalist, litterateur. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1900. From 1903 a member of the Bund; in 1917 elected to its C.C. In 1917-18 came out against the Bolsheviks. In 1919 supported the Soviet Government; worked in the Soviet press—633

Zasulich, *Vera Ivanovna* (*V. I.*, *Velika*, *Vel. Dm.*, *Velika Dmitrievna*) (1849-1919)—prominent participant in the Narodnik movement, and subsequently in the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. Took part in the foundation and activities of the Emancipation of Labour group. In 1900 a member of the editorial board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) sided with the Iskrist minority. After the Congress became a leader of Menshevism—48, 61, 75, 80, 85, 108, 116, 359

Zemlyachka Rozalia Samoilovna (*Zalkind*, *R. S.*, *Demon*, *Osipov*) (1876-1947)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1893, a member of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., as an *Iskra* agent carried on work in Odessa and Yekaterinoslav. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was co-opted to the C.C. from the Bolsheviks; took an active part in fighting the Mensheviks. In August 1904 elected to the Majority Committees Bureau. Worked as secretary of the St. Petersburg Party organisation and was its delegate to the Third Congress of the Party. During the revolution of 1905-07 was secretary of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. After the October Revolution held Party and administrative posts—119, 122, 133, 146, 149

Zetkin, *Clara* (1857-1933)—outstanding leader of the German and international labour movement, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany. Adherent to the Left wing of German Social-Democracy, Zetkin, together with Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and Karl Liebknecht, took an active part in the fight against Bernstein and other opportunists. During the First World War adopted a revolutionary internationalist stand. In 1916 joined the *Internationale* group, which afterwards assumed the name of the Spartacus League. From 1919 a member of the Communist Party of Germany, member of its Central Committee and of the Comintern Executive Committee. From 1924 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Red Aid—465, 473, 480, 514, 515

Zhitomirsky, *Y. A.* (b. 1880)—agent provocateur, infiltrated into the Social-Democratic movement. Served in the foreign agency of the Russian Department of Police from 1902—137

Zina—see *Lilina*, *Z. I.*

Zinoviev (*Radomyslsky*, *Grigory Yevseyevich*, *G.*, *Gr.*, *G. Z.*, *Grigory*) (1883-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. From 1908 to April 1917 lived abroad as a political emigrant; was a member of the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ *Sotsial-Demokrat* and of the Central Committee. During the

period of preparation and carrying out of the October Revolution he displayed vacillation and came out against the armed uprising. The publication by Kamenev, in his own name and in the name of Zinoviev, in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*, of a statement declaring their disagreement with the C.C.'s resolution on the armed uprising, was divulgence of a secret decision of the Party, a betrayal of the revolution.

After the October Revolution held a number of key posts. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy: in November 1917 advocated the setting up of a coalition government with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; in 1925 one of the sponsors of the New Opposition; in 1926 one of the leaders of the anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. In November 1927 expelled from the Party for factional activity, subsequently twice reinstated and expelled again—205, 207, 215, 216-17, 224, 230, 241, 242, 243, 245, 272, 277, 340, 344, 351, 355, 396, 405, 406, 410, 412, 413, 424, 443, 450, 455, 456-64, 470-74, 475-76, 480-81, 483-84, 487-91, 495-96, 501-02, 509-10, 511-13, 516-29, 531-38, 540-42, 543-45, 548-56, 559, 561-63, 565-71, 572-74, 580, 582, 583, 584, 594, 599, 600, 606, 607, 614, 622, 625, 635

Zubatov, *Sergei Vasilievich* (1864-1917)—colonel of the gendarmes; in 1901-03 organised the police-sponsored workers' unions—the Society of Mutual Aid of Workers in Mechanical Production in Moscow, the Association of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, and others, with the aim of diverting the workers from the revolutionary struggle—52, 67

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LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 44 contains letters, telegrams, notes and other documents written or dictated in the period from October 1917 to November 1920; it supplements the works by Lenin included in volumes 26-31 of this edition.

The documents relating to this period demonstrate Lenin's many-sided activity in building up the new, Soviet machinery of state and ensuring its smooth running, guiding economic and cultural development, and organising the defence of the country.

In these documents Lenin gives directives for defeating counter-revolutionary revolts, ensuring revolutionary order, and defending the world's first proletarian dictatorship. They show Lenin as the organiser and inspirer of the victories over the interventionists and whiteguards. Lenin's instruction to the Red Guard Staff, his letters to the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), to the Supreme Military Council, to the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs, to G. V. Chicherin and M. M. Litvinov, to E. M. Sklyansky, the telegrams to the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern and Southern fronts, to the army commanders, to S. I. Gusev, I. T. Smilga, M. M. Lashevich and G. Y. Sokolnikov, and many other documents, are examples of Lenin's activity in leading the struggle against foreign and domestic counter-revolution and guiding the military activities on the fronts of the Civil War.

Volume 44 publishes a letter of Lenin's to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) dated June 17, 1919, which, like a number of other documents, shows that he regarded the Central Committee of the Party as the body for collective leadership of the country's defence. Lenin set aside Trotsky's objections to the Central Committee's decision to strengthen the General Headquarters, and wrote that this de-

cision contained "what Trotsky overlooked, namely, that the majority of the C.C. is convinced that ... *all is not well* at Headquarters, and *in seeking a serious improvement*, in seeking ways for a *radical change* it has taken a definite *step*" (p. 255 of this volume).

In response to Lenin's call, many of the country's industrial cities sent their best Communists and non-Party workers to the decisive fronts of the Civil War. Lenin constantly followed the progress of mobilisation and the training of reserves for the Red Army. In a letter to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front recommending a group of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Communists Lenin requested that they should be allocated correctly and carefully. "I particularly ask to be informed of the receipt of this letter," he wrote, "and of where and how the comrades are assigned" (p. 302).

Situated as it was in a hostile capitalist encirclement, the Soviet Republic experienced extreme difficulties. The documents in this volume contain much material on Lenin's leadership of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and show his exceptional perspicacity and profound understanding of the alignment of forces in the international arena. It was only thanks to the tremendous efforts of Lenin, in a stubborn struggle of the Party against Trotsky and the oppositional group of "Left Communists" that the peace treaty with Germany was signed at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. Its conclusion was a striking example of the wisdom and flexibility of Lenin's tactics, and his ability to frame the solely correct policy in an extremely complicated situation. The signing of the Brest peace and the struggle against the "Left Communists" are dealt with in the letter to Major-General S. I. Odintsov on November 15 (28), 1917, the note to Karl Radek on January 14 (27), 1918, the radiotelegram to the peace delegation on February 25, 1918, the telegram to Irkutsk on February 27, 1918, and other documents.

The Soviet Government headed by Lenin consistently pursued a policy of peace advocated peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. When the imperialists of the Entente began their anti-Soviet armed intervention, the Soviet state repeatedly addressed proposals for

peace to the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France. In the letter to G. V. Chicherin and L. M. Karakhan on October 10, 1918, Lenin wrote: "Regarding the Note to Wilson, I think it should be sent. Write it in detail, politely, but caustically, saying: in any case we consider it our duty to propose peace—even to governments of capitalists and multimillionaires—in order to try to stop the bloodshed and *to open the eyes of the peoples*" (p. 152). The Soviet Government's readiness to enter into peace negotiations with the leaders of the Entente Powers is also stressed in Lenin's letter of May 6, 1919, to Chicherin and Litvinov. Letters to Krasin, Litvinov, Chicherin, and others are devoted to the establishment of trade and economic relations with the capitalist countries. Among them are letters on the negotiations with W. B. Vanderlip, a representative of American business circles (see pp. 423, 442). In one of the letters, Lenin wrote: "trade agreements with the Soviet Republics are more advantageous to the British bourgeoisie than unprofitable and even ruinous attempts to crush them" (pp. 404-05).

Published in this volume is a considerable number of documents showing Lenin's activity in the most diverse fields of the socialist economy: putting the work of nationalised enterprises on a proper footing, organising financial affairs, the utilisation of the co-operative movement for supplying the population, the development of agriculture, the organisation of communes and artels.

The volume contains Lenin's letters elaborating and clarifying the basic principles of the single economic plan endorsed by the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). A number of letters are devoted to propaganda for the electrification of the country. Lenin was interested in the coal deposits of Bryansk District, the oil of Ukhta, Berchogur and Cheleken, the exploitation of shales, the use of peat as a basis for electrification. He attached very great significance to the development of engineering, to the speediest introduction of up-to-date achievements in the national economy, to making wide use of scientists and experts. There are documents showing Lenin's interest in the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory, which was in fact one of the first scientific research institutes. In the note to N. P.

Gorbunov on October 21, 1918, Lenin wrote: "I earnestly request you to *speed up* as much as possible the Science and Technology Department's findings in regard to the Radio Laboratory. *It is extremely urgent.* Drop me a line when its findings are ready" (p. 156). The telegram to the Porokhovo District Soviet on July 2, 1919, the letters to N. A. Semashko on May 3, 1920, and to A. I. Rykov and I. I. Radchenko on October 28, 1920, and other letters, are indicative of Lenin's attitude to inventions and inventors.

Lenin pointed out that scientists must play a leading part in applying scientific knowledge to the national economy and making use of scientific achievements. The present volume publishes Lenin's letter to Gorky of September 15, 1919, in which he said that the Soviet government highly valued scientists who had resolved to devote their knowledge and labour to the people. He wrote: "To the 'intellectual forces' who want to bring science to the people (and not to act as servants of capital), we pay a salary *above the average*. That is a fact. We take care of them. That is a fact" (p. 285). At the same time he explained to Gorky that the Soviet Government was compelled to take severe measures against those who were involved in counter-revolutionary conspiracies and revolts, which threatened the lives of tens of thousands of workers and peasants.

Lenin repeatedly pointed to the need to put science and ideology at the service of the new socialist order. He sharply criticised the views of the ideologists of Proletcult who oppugned the leading role of the Soviet state and the Party in cultural matters. Everything connected with raising the cultural level of the working people claimed Lenin's attention: the abolition of illiteracy, questions concerning literature, the quality of mass publications, the development of libraries, radio broadcasting, the cinema, etc. One of the main tasks of education during the first years of Soviet rule was the liquidation of illiteracy. "... The struggle against illiteracy is a task *more important than any other*," he wrote in August 1920 (p. 413).

Lenin attached great importance to propaganda and agitation. On receiving a letter from a "group of students interested in communism", he wished them "most speedy success in your study of communism, mastery of it, and

commencement of practical work in the ranks of the Russian Communist Party" (pp. 147-48). Lenin devoted much attention to the realisation of his plan for "monumental propaganda", for decorating the streets of Moscow and Petrograd with revolutionary inscriptions on buildings and with monuments to outstanding leaders of the revolutionary movement and culture.

The Party and government exerted tremendous efforts to rescue the country from the grip of economic chaos and famine. In the letter to A. G. Shlyapnikov on May 28, 1918, Lenin wrote: "The Central Committee has passed a decision *to direct the maximum number* of Party workers to the food front. For *obviously* we shall perish and ruin the *whole* revolution if we do not conquer famine in the next few months" (p. 95). The letter to the Commissariat for Food and to the Food Department of the Supreme Economic Council, the note to the secretary, the telegram to Kharkov and Moscow, the letter to V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko and G. K. Orjonikidze, the telegram to S. V. Malyshev, the telegram to the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 10th and 4th armies, the letter to the Agricultural Section of the Food Department of the Moscow Soviet, and the telegram to the Podolsk Uyezd Food Committee reflect Lenin's activities in the business of supplying food for the Red Army and the population of the industrial centres.

"Petrograd and Moscow are without grain. Heroic measures needed. Wire exact reply immediately," wrote Lenin to V. A. Radus-Zenkovich; Chairman of the Saratov Gubernia Executive Committee, on July 11, 1919 (p. 263). "At all costs provide all workers of the Urals, particularly the Ekaterinburg district, Kizel and other coal-mining districts, with full supplies of essential foodstuffs," was Lenin's instruction to the civil and military authorities of Perm and Ekaterinburg in November 1919 (p. 311). He gave special attention to supplies for children. Supporting the proposals for ensuring food for children, Lenin wrote to Tsyurupa "Perhaps something more could be done for the children? *It should be*" (p. 188).

The letters show how Lenin's principles of Party and state leadership were worked out, and characterise his style of work.

Lenin attached immense importance to collective leadership. As the documents in this volume show, on all important matters he consulted his colleagues and other leading workers and submitted these questions to the Central Committee or the Council of People's Commissars for consideration and decision. "I cannot go against the will and decision of my Council colleagues," he emphasised in a letter to Maria Andreyeva (p. 69). At the same time Lenin considered it essential that collective leadership should be duly combined with the personal responsibility of each worker for the task entrusted to him. On August 26, 1918, he wrote to A. P. Smirnov: "I very much fear that you in Saratov are playing at collegiate methods at a time when the work demands energy and prompt action by responsible executives..." (p. 142). Lenin severely criticised all manifestations of localism, anarchy, indiscipline, or the refusal of one or another staff member to submit to instructions from higher organisations. He taught the executives of administrative and Party bodies to be business-like, quicker on the move in taking decisions, to be able to concentrate attention on the most important task and see each job through to the end.

A number of documents show Lenin's efforts to strengthen revolutionary, socialist legality. In the note to the Commissariat for Justice on April 15, 1918, be stressed the need for codification, for publishing a Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Soviet Government, for expanding propaganda on matters of law among the population, and for drawing the mass of working people into the work of the People's Courts. He pointed to the need for a determined struggle against embezzlement of state property, profiteering and hooliganism; he proposed severe measures of punishment for bribe-takers. Lenin demanded that all Soviet bodies and all the personnel of the state apparatus should strictly observe the laws in force in the Republic. He wrote that the mere suggestion to evade a decree should entail prosecution by the courts. Lenin was quick to react to any information signalising a violation of socialist legality, he issued directives for a deeper study of individual cases, and took vigorous steps to stop responsible workers abusing their official position.

The Communist Party of Soviet Russia acted as a great patriotic and international force. Lenin closely followed the events in Hungary and endeavoured to hearten the Hungarian Communists, who were encountering great difficulties. In a letter to Bela Kun, he wrote: "We are aware of Hungary's grave and dangerous situation and are doing all we can.... Hold on with all your might, victory will be ours" (p. 271). "The communist movement in all countries is growing remarkably. The Soviet system has everywhere become a practical slogan for the working masses. This is a step forward of tremendous world-historic significance." These were the words with which Lenin greeted the Dutch Communists in October 1919 (p. 291). He wrote to Raymond Robins on April 30, 1918: "I am sure the new democracy, that is, the proletarian democracy, is coming in all countries and will crush all obstacles and the imperialist-capitalist system..." (p. 82).

All the documents given in Volume 44 are published in accordance with the Fifth (Russian) Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (volumes 50 and 51).

Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.

1917

1

INSTRUCTION TO THE RED GUARD STAFF[1]

Please take all steps for *immediate* execution.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on October 30 (November 12), 1917

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

2

TO THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

To the P.C.

I earnestly request the Petrograd Committee **immediately** to pass a decision against conciliation and to put it before the C.C.[2]

Lenin

Written on November 2 (15), 1917

First published in part in 1960 in the journal *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50*

Printed from the original

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* All references to the Fifth Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* have in view the Russian edition.—*Ed.*

3

TO Y. M. SVERDLOV

Comrade *Sverdlov*

The bearer has a mandate from the local Soviet.

He wants to work *in Petrograd*.

Makes an excellent impression.

He wants "militant" work among the masses (as agitator, etc.) .

I *strongly* advise you to give him an opportunity at once to prove his worth in work among the masses in Petrograd.[3]

Lenin

Written not earlier than November 8 (21), 1917

First published in 1957 in the journal *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5

Printed from the original

4

TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION OF THE LABOUR PRESS OF AMERICA, FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN[4]

I am ready to reply to your questions if you give me an absolutely formal and precise guarantee, first, that you will inform the *entire* labour press, i.e., also the press organs of an *internationalist trend* (Heywood, the S.L.P. in America, Tom Mann and the British Socialist Party in Britain, Loriot and his friends in France, etc.), and secondly, that my reply will be reproduced *without any alterations*, that is to say, you have the right not to publish my reply, but if you do publish it you have no right to change anything in my text.

Who is the responsible representative of your "International Association" here, in London, New York and Paris?

Lenin

Written in November prior to 10 (23), 1917

First published on January 26, 1960, in French (in facsimile) and Rumanian in the newspaper *Scînteia* No. 4740, Bucharest

First published in Russian on January 27, 1960 in the newspaper *Pravda* No. 27

Printed from the original
Translated from the French

5

TO MAJOR-GENERAL S. I. ODINTSOV

You have proposed to me the organisation of a group of staff officers and generals who have a higher military education and who wish to work out the military and technical problems of an armistice that would permit Russia, without violation of her interests, to secure the suspension of hostilities.

In view of the extreme urgency of this matter, I would earnestly request you to get your group together at once, tomorrow morning, and to send me tomorrow evening at least a brief outline of the main problems, points and provisions of an armistice agreement (demarcation of the front line, stipulation that no troops be moved to other fronts, control measures, etc., etc.), and also to indicate the person or persons who would be fully competent to take part directly in the negotiations.

Please send me a reply by messenger.

Written on November 15 (28), 1917

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

6

TO THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

To the P.C.

Can one of the comrades write and tell me whether a resolution on courts of law was adopted yesterday in the Petrograd Soviet and what has been done *practically*?[5]

Lenin

Written on November 25 (December 8), 1917

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

7

TELEGRAM TO THE ARMY IN THE FIELD

Semennik, Chairman of the Committee of units
not included in the divisions of the 21st Army Corps
The Army in the Field

Landed estates together with live and dead stock shall be handed over to the land committees. They must be strictly safeguarded as the property of the people.

Lenin

Written on November 26
(December 9), 1917

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text
of the telegraph tape

8

TO THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

The Hanecki affair

On the question of Hanecki, the narrow C.C. has passed a decision *not to appoint* him as representative in Stockholm.

That is to say, it *rescinded* the previous decision of the C.C.

I propose that this decision be countermanded on the following grounds.

What are the arguments against Hanecki?

He is known since 1903; a member of the Polish C.C. who worked for many years as a C.C. member; we saw his work in Cracow, his trips to Russia, etc., we saw him at all congresses, etc., etc.

The arguments are merely a campaign of bourgeois slanders, Zaslavsky's outcries.

It would be quite unworthy of a workers' party to show such credulity to intellectualist scandal. Let *someone* prove anything bad about Hanecki first, before we remove him.

"But Hanecki traded with Parvus," they "all" say.

Hanecki earned his living as an *employee* in a commercial firm of which Parvus was a shareholder. That is what Hanecki told me. It has not been refuted.

Is it forbidden to work in capitalist commercial undertakings? Where? By what decision of the Party?

Are there no people among us who work in commercial firms of *Russian*, British and other capitalists?

Or is it permissible to be a technician, a manager or an employee of *Russian* capitalists, but not of *German*, even when living in a neutral country?? And is that to be the decision of an "internationalist" party??

Let it decide frankly, let it pass a general resolution, let it give grounds for the step taken against Hanecki.

When Bukharin wanted to go and work in Parvus's business as a *writer*, we dissuaded him, for after all it is not a commercial firm. But while we *dissuaded* him, we did not denounce the *Mensheviks*[6] in Parvus's employ. We did not denounce Zurabov and a host of others, we did not accuse them.

Who accused them, and where?

Why is it that *up to now* we have not questioned the *Mensheviks* and others who lived in Copenhagen and knew of Hanecki's commercial occupation and who did *not* condemn him? We could and should have done that.

Not a single fact against Hanecki has been established, no ban has been passed on being employed in capitalist commercial firms of all countries, no check has been made on the rumours and slanders of *notorious* slanderers like Zaslavsky—yet the man is to be "removed"?? There is nothing here but "fear" of the slanders of irresponsible slanderers.

It is unworthy of a working-class party to be so credulous of scandal. If the comrades who succumb to scandal are "perturbed", "worried", why shouldn't they *exert themselves* a little? Isn't it better to take some pains to find the truth than to repeat scandal? In Petrograd itself it is possible (if a perturbed comrade wants to go to same trouble and not decide things offhand) to find *witnesses* from Copenhagen, and in Moscow too. Why don't the anonymous accusers of Hanecki in the ranks of our Party do that??

Such treatment of an absent comrade, who has worked for more than ten years, is the height of **injustice.**

Written in November, not later than 29 (December 12), 1917

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

9

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMITTEE FOR ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[7]

Pskov

I remain a deputy of the Baltic Fleet and request you to replace me by the next candidate on the Bolshevik list.*

Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Written on November 30 (December 13), 1917

First published in 1958 in the journal *Sovetsky Moryak* No. 5

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

10

TO THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

8. XII. 1917

To the P.C.

Please send not less than 100 persons, absolutely reliable Party members, to room No. 75, second floor—the Committee to Combat Looting. (For performance of commissar duties.)[8]

The matter is extremely important. The Party is responsible. Approach the districts and factories.

Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 8 (21), 1917

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

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* Similarly worded telegrams were sent to Petrograd and Moscow.—*Ed.*

11

TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Comrade Antonov, who is leaving for Moscow and from there for the south to conduct military operations against Kaledin,[9] is obliged *every day*, by direct line (personally or through an aide), to inform the Council of People's Commissars *whom* precisely he, or other military authorities, appoints as *responsible* persons for directing particular operations, especially as regards movement and mustering of troops and command.

Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 8 (21), 1917

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten text

12

TO G. I. BLAGONRAVOV AND V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

8. XII. 1917

Comrades Blagonravov and Bonch-Bruyevich

The arrests which have to be carried out on the orders of Comrade Peters are of *exceptionally* great importance and must be executed with great energy.* *Special* measures must be taken to prevent destruction of papers, flight, concealment of documents, etc.

Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 8 (21), 1917

First published in part in 1960
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 6

Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

* This refers to the arrest of counter-revolutionaries.—*Ed.*

13
TELEGRAM TO V. V. VOROVSKY

Vorovsky
Stockholm

Urgently find and send here three highly skilled accountants to work on reform of the banks. Knowledge of Russian is not essential. Fix their remuneration yourself in accordance with local conditions.

Lenin

Written in December after 8 (21), 1917

First published on November 6-7, 1927, in the newspaper *Izvestia* No. 256

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

14
TO V. V. OBOLENSKY

18. XII. 1917

Comrade Obolensky,

I recommend to you the bearer, Comrade Solovyov (telephone 265-24), an expert on the oil industry and the author of a plan for nationalisation. He should be used!

V. Ulyanov

I gave his memorandum (on the oil industry) to Shlyapnikov. *There is* a copy *for you too* (Shlyapnikov has it).[10]

Written on December 18 (31), 1917

First published in part in 1958 in the book: *O deyatelnosti V. I. Lenina v 1917-1922* (Activities of V. I. Lenin in 1917-1922), Moscow

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

15
TO P. A. KOZMIN

20. XII. 1917

Comrade Kozmin,

I was expecting you yesterday for a talk about the case of the delegates from the No. 2 Steel Plant at Kamenskaya

stanitsa. They ask that financing should be stopped and the commission withdrawn, since they regard it as reactionary and parasitic. If we do not see each other this evening, please telephone me.[11]

Lenin

Written on December 20, 1917
(January 2, 1918)

First published in November 1927 in the journal *Sovetskoye Mukomolye i Khlebopecheniye* No. 8

Printed from the original

16
TO CHARLES DUMAS[12]

21/XII—1917

Dear Citizen Charles Dumas,

My wife and I recall with great pleasure the time we met you in Paris, rue Bonier. We are very grateful to you for the exchange of ideas and for the very accurate information on the socialist movement in France.

I very much regret that personal relations between us became impossible after such profound political differences divided us. Throughout the war I fought against the "national defence" trend, I always stood for a split, being convinced that that tendency was ruining socialism completely.

It goes without saying that I am writing this letter not as a member of the government but as a private individual.

Please accept our greetings, dear citizen, and best wishes from my wife and myself.

Lenin

Written on December 21, 1917
(January 3, 1918)

First published on March 6, 1959, in French in *The Times Literary Supplement* (London) No. 2975

First published in Russian on April 14-20, 1963, in *Nedelya*, Sunday Supplement of *Izvestia*, No. 16

Printed from the text
Translated from the French

17

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

The Council of People's Commissars is confident that Comrade Antonov will continue as before to act in close contact with the central Ukrainian Soviet authorities who were greeted by the Council of People's Commissars, and with the Commissar Extraordinary appointed by the C.P.C.[13]

Written on December 30, 1917
(January 12, 1918)

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

1918

18
TELEGRAM TO L. M. KARAKHAN*

Karakhan
Russian Peace Delegation
Brest-Litovsk
Copy to Supreme Commander-in-Chief Krylenko

I received your telegram concerning the report from the members of the Revolutionary Committee of the 8th Army —Kuzmin and Reizon.[14] I am passing this telegram on to the Commander-in-Chief with my advice: not to give way to the provocation of the Kiev Rada, not to trust it, and to act in an armed, organised and most resolute way against the Rumanian counter-revolutionary command, against the Kaledinites and their accomplices in the Kiev Rada.

Lenin

Written on January 3 (16), 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

19
INSTRUCTION

The soldier and sailor comrades on guard duty within the precincts of the Taurida Palace are instructed not to allow any violence towards the counter-revolutionary part

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

of the Constituent Assembly and, while permitting all to freely leave the Taurida Palace, not to let anyone in without special orders.[15]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on the night of January 5 (18), 1918
Published on January 12 (25), in the newspaper *Russkiye Vedomosti* No. 5

Printed from the original

20

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR JUSTICE

I have just received a report that last night sailors entered the Mariinskaya hospital and killed Shingaryov and Kokoshkin. I order you immediately: first, to begin a rigorous investigation; secondly, to arrest the sailors guilty of this murder.[16]

Lenin

Written on January 7 (20), 1918
Published on January 8 (21), 1918, in *Pravda* (evening edition) No. 6

Printed from the typewritten copy

21

TO K. A. MEKHONOSHIN

7. I. 1918

Comrade Mekhonoshin

The bearer, Comrade Rahja, is an old Party functionary, personally known to me and absolutely trustworthy. It is *extremely* important to help him (for the Finnish proletar-

* The document was signed also by M. S. Uritsky, Commissar of the All-Russia Committee for Elections to the Constituent Assembly and member of the Extraordinary Commission for the Defence of Petrograd.—*Ed.*

iat) by supplying weapons: some 10,000 rifles with cartridges and 10 three-inch guns with shells.

Please fulfil this without reducing the figures.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on January 7 (20), 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

22

INSTRUCTION TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Instruction

Notify the sailors of the Guards Depot (taking signed statements from them that they have been so informed) that they are answerable for the lives of the arrested officers and that they, the sailors, will be deprived of food rations, arrested and prosecuted.

Take urgent measures: (1) for sending a well-armed guard to the building; (2) for recording as many as possible of the names of the Guards Depot sailors.[17]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written in January, not earlier than 8 (21), 1918

First published in 1930 in the book: Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, *Na boyevykh postakh Fevralskoi i Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii* (At the Fighting Posts of the February and October Revolutions), Moscow

Printed from the original

23

TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD AND THE FOOD DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL[18]

13. I. 1918

The bearers, Comrades Suvorov and Antropov, are delegates of the Regional Committee of the Urals Soviets.

It is necessary to authorise them to adopt the most revolutionary measures to ensure the movement to Petrograd of railway trucks with grain from Siberia.

Lenin

Written on January 13 (26), 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

24
NOTE TO THE SECRETARY

To be given to Schlichter and Nevsky with the request that they assist *with the utmost energy* these people, who make an excellent impression, for only such contingents (40-60 persons from the locality) are able to save us from famine.

Lenin

Written on January 13 (26), 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

25
TELEGRAM TO KHARKOV AND MOSCOW

Orjonikidze, People's Secretariat, Antonov's Staff,
Kharkov
Commander-in-Chief Muralov
Presidium of the Soviet of Deputies
Moscow

We have received news of a traffic jam between Orel and Kursk preventing the passage of trains with coal and grain. Any hold-up threatens famine and stoppage of industry. We suspect sabotage by railwaymen in this locality for there have been several cases of sabotage there. We urgently ask you to take the most ruthless revolutionary measures. We ask you to send out a detachment

of absolutely reliable persons. Use all means to ensure the movement of trucks with grain to Petrograd, otherwise there is a threat of famine. Place several sailors or Red Guards on each of the locomotives. Remember that it depends on you to save Petrograd from famine.

Lenin

Written on January 13 (26), 1918
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the text
in Gorbunov's handwriting

26

TO KARL RADEK

14. I. 1918

Dear Radek,

Trotsky or Kamenev will inform you of my point of view. I fundamentally and radically disagree with you. You are falling into the trap which the imperialists of both groups are setting the Republic of Soviets.[19]

With best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written on January 14 (27), 1918
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original
Translated
from the German

27

TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO AND G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

15. I. 1918

Antonov and Sergo
Kharkov

For God's sake, take the *most* energetic and *revolutionary* measures to send *grain*, *grain* and *more grain*!!! Otherwise Petrograd may perish. Special trains and detachments.

Grain collection and delivery. Have the trains convoyed. Report daily.

For God's sake!

Lenin

Written on January 15 (28), 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

28

TO N. I. PODVOISKY AND N. V. KRYLENKO*

15. I. 1918

Comrade Podvoisky and Comrade Krylenko

I received the enclosed letter today from the Dutch comrade *Luteraan*, a member of the Left "Tribunist" Party.[20] I made his acquaintance in 1915 in Berne.

Luteraan asks to be given money for his journey and to be enrolled in Russia's Red Guard.

On grounds of principle I would request you to do what he asks. Perhaps he could be enrolled temporarily among the Letts or Estonians who speak German, until he has learnt Russian.[21]

Lenin

Written on January 15 (28), 1918

First published in part in 1957 in the book: Y. Yerykalov, *Krasnaya Gvardia v borbe za vlast Sovetov* (The Red Guard in the Struggle for Soviet Power), Moscow

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

29

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS

17. I. 1918

Please issue to the Commissar of the Finlandskaya Railway 25,000 rifles and 30 machine-guns, required for the

* Lenin made the following note on the document: "B. Luteraan. Oostenburgermiddenstraat 59III, Amsterdam. Holland."—*Ed.*

protection of Russian soldiers in Finland against the atrocities of whiteguard bourgeois detachments.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 17 (30), 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

30

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Antonov
Kharkov

I congratulate you on your victory.[22] I shall immediately transmit your demand to Moscow. Direct all efforts towards sending grain and more grain to Petrograd.

Lenin

Written on January 17 (30), 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
of the telegraph tape

31

TELEGRAM TO KULLERVO MANNER AND KARL VIIK

Urgent. Governmental

Prime Minister Manner
and Karl Viik
Helsingfors

Radio transmissions in Swedish and telegrams on behalf of the unions of Swedish workers in Finland should be sent to Sweden as frequently and in as great detail as possible in order to refute the extremely mendacious reports of the Swedish bourgeois press about the events in Fin-

land.[23] Please let me know whether you are taking all measures.

Lenin

Written on January 24
(February 6, 1918)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

32

TELEGRAM TO ARTHUR HENDERSON[24]

The Russian Socialist Government regrets inability to participate in the Allied Socialist Conference as being contrary to the principles of Internationalism. We object to division of the working class according to Imperialist grouping. If British Labour agrees to Russian peace aims, which are already accepted by the Socialist parties of the Central Powers, such division is still more unwarranted.

Written on January 24
(February 6, 1918)
Sent to London

Published on February 14,
1918, in English in the newspaper
The Call No. 97

First published in Russian
in 1965 in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from
the newspaper text
Written in English

33

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF*

Use all methods available to you to cancel today's telegram on peace and general demobilisation of the armies on all fronts. By order of Lenin.[25]

Written on January 29
(February 11, 1918)

First published in 1964
in the book: A. L. Fraiman,
Revolyutsionnaya zashchita Petrograda v fevrale-marte 1918
(The Revolutionary Defence
of Petrograd in February-March
1918), Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the text
of the telegraph tape

* Transmitted by direct line by Lenin's secretary.—*Ed.*

34

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF*

Notify all army commissars and Bonch-Bruyevich that all telegrams signed by Trotsky and Krylenko on demobilisation of the army are to be held up. We cannot give you the peace terms, since peace really has not yet been concluded. Please hold up all telegrams reporting peace until you receive special permission.

Written on January 30
(February 12, 1918)

First published in 1964
in the book: A. L. Fraiman,
Revolyutsionnaya zashchita Petrograda v fevrale-marte 1918,
Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the text
of the telegraph tape

35

TO A. L. KOLEGAYEV

30. I. 1918

Comrade Kolegayev,

Please help the bearers (the First Russian Society of Communist Agricultural Workers) with advice and directives as to how and *where* to obtain land. Their initiative is excellent; support it in every way.[26]

Lenin

Written on January 30
(February 12, 1918)

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

36

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

30. I. 1918

Comrade Zinoviev,

Please send on *Sunday* at two o'clock a suitable comrade from the Petrograd Soviet to the meeting of the Obukhov

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* Transmitted by direct line. The text of this telegram is reproduced in the telegram of the Main Naval Headquarters to Centrobalt (the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet).—*Ed.*

workers, who have formed the First Russian Society of Communist Agricultural Workers, to give directives, advice and help.

It would be good to select an *experienced* practical organiser.

Lenin

Written on January 30
(February 12, 1918)

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

37

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Commander-in-Chief Antonov
Nikitovka

Petrol shortage threatens to bring the mines to a standstill; it will be impossible to pump out the water. We urgently ask you, if there is the slightest military possibility, to send all petrol to the mines, at the disposal of the Kharkov Regional Economic Council, 27 Sumskaya.

Lenin

Written on January 30
(February 12, 1918)

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

38

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Commander-in-Chief Antonov
Nikitovka*

We have nothing against the appointment of Kozhevnikov. Make contact with Obolensky and the All-Ukraine

* The address and sentences: "We have nothing against" and "Do not act without agreement with Obolensky and the C.E.C." were written in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

C.E.C. Do not act without agreement with Obolensky and the C.E.C.; if there are no objections on their part, we agree to the appointment of Kozhevnikov as Commissar Extraordinary of the Donets Basin.

Lenin

Written on January 30 (February 12, 1918)

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text written by Lenin and Stalin and signed by Lenin

39

INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY

Give this telegram to Chicherin and request him urgently to send an inquiry and protest to the Swedish Ambassador.[27]

Lenin

Written on February 14, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

40

TELEGRAM TO KULLERVO MANNER

Urgent

Manner
People's Government of Finland
Helsingfors

Governmental. *Secret*

I request you immediately to obtain information from Centrobalt regarding the arrival of Swedish cruisers at Öland and the landing of troops by the Swedes. Be so kind as to let me know by telegraph as quickly as possible what information the Finnish Workers' Government has about

this and what its attitude is to this whole matter and to the intervention of Swedish armed forces.[28]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 14, 1918
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

41

RADIO-TELEGRAM TO CENTROBALT

Can the report really be true that Swedish warships came to Öland Island, landed a detachment and forced our men to retreat? What military measures of defence and counter-action has Centrobalt taken? What warships has it sent to Öland, and when precisely?

Reply immediately. We are extremely concerned. We refuse to believe that Centrobalt and our revolutionary fleet have been inactive. I await a reply.

Lenin

Written on the night of February 14, 1918
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

42

TELEGRAM TO E. V. LUGANOVSKY, PEOPLE'S SECRETARY OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

People's Secretary Luganovsky
Kharkov

Today Podvoisky, People's Commissar for Military Affairs, sent the following telegram to Kudinsky:

"In accordance with the plenary powers given to you, you are to carry out the following: on the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Re-

public your activities must be exactly co-ordinated with those of the Ukrainian Soviet authorities, hence your extraordinary plenary powers as regards the subordination of particular organs of power apply exclusively to the gubernias of Bryansk, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Orel, Voronezh and Tula."

I hope that you will be satisfied with this and that Kudinsky will comply.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 15, 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

43

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THE DON REGION

Governmental. **Secret**

Chairman of the Regional M.R.C. of the Don Region
Voronezh

Have received your telegram of 31/I* concerning the capture of Shakhtnaya and Kamenolomni. I congratulate the Soviet troops on their success. I particularly thank you for the news of the dispatch of 60 waggons of coal through Tsaritsyn and earnestly request you to inform us by telegraph of the numbers of trains with coal and grain and the precise days and hours of dispatch. It is extremely important. Send more grain. The letter of Alexeyev's spy has not yet been received. Send it by hand through a very reliable person, after taking a photograph of it.[29]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 16, 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* February 13, 1918, new style.—*Ed.*

44

TELEGRAM TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO

Governmental

Commander-in-Chief Antonov
Nikitovka

I have received the telegram concerning the appointment of Falkovsky by you. I insistently ask you to act only in full agreement with Luganovsky and in compliance with his directives as People's Secretary of the sovereign Ukrainian Republic. If disagreement with him arises, settle it through Skrypnik, Zatonsky, Bosh, in the last resort wire me, but never gainsay Luganovsky. The rich stores of the Rumanian Government must be very strictly guarded so that they can be turned over intact to the Rumanian people after the overthrow of the Rumanian counter-revolution.

Lenin

Written on February 17, 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

45

TO A. I. RYKOV

Rykov

1st, are there inventory data
(1) where (*addresses*) are the goods?
(2) *who precisely* (names and addresses) has all these goods?
2nd, where (by whom, when?) was the order made for their safeguarding?
Who is responsible for their safekeeping?
3rd, *who* is responsible for their proper (rationed, *by cards*) distribution?

4th, *what* has been done (*by whom?*) for the *free distribution* to the poor of part of these and the whole amount of confiscated products?[30]

Written in February, after 18, 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

46

NOTE TO V. N. PODBELSKY IN MOSCOW BY DIRECT LINE, FEBRUARY 22, 1918[31]

I have no new verified information apart from the report that the Germans, generally speaking, are steadily advancing because they do not encounter resistance. I consider the situation extremely grave and the slightest delay on our part is impermissible. As regards the report about Austria-Hungary not taking part in the war, I personally, unlike Trotsky, do not consider it verified; they say the radio has been intercepted and there were telegrams about this from Stockholm, but I have not seen such documents.

Lenin

Izvestia of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of Moscow City and Moscow Region No. 31, February 23 (10), 1918

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

47

TO THE C.C. OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.)

Please include my vote *in favour of* getting potatoes and arms from the bandits of Anglo-French imperialism.[32]

Lenin

Written on February 22, 1918

First published in 1922 in *Collected Works* of N. Lenin (V. Ulyanov), Vol. XV

Printed from the original

48

RADIO-TELEGRAM TO THE PEACE DELEGATION

Chicherin, Joffe, Karakhan, Sokolnikov
Novoselye Railway Station
Peace Delegation

We do not quite understand your telegram. If you are wavering, it is impermissible.[33] Send envoys and try to reach the Germans quickly.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 25, 1918
First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

49

TELEGRAM TO IRKUTSK

Peace has not yet been signed, but a delegation has gone to Brest-Litovsk to sign the peace terms accepted by the C.E.C. and the C.P.C. Your resolution received. The German whiteguards and composite units of their regular army have joined with our whiteguards and are advancing on Petrograd with brazen audacity. A movement of large German forces in the wake of the advance detachments has been reported. Most of our troops are in flight.* The socialist fatherland is in danger. Dvinsk, Reval, Venden, Volmar, Minsk, Pskov have been taken. Our morale is good. Masses of workers have sprung to the defence of the Soviet Republic. The C.C. of the Bolsheviks is in favour of signing peace. The C.C. of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries[34] is in favour of a holy war.

As for gold, we recommend that the workers at the mines be paid at cost prices. There has been no special decree by the C.P.C. on gold.

Lenin

Written on February 27, 1918
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Gorbunov's hand with an addition by Lenin

* The two preceding sentences are in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

50
TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

4/III (19/II). 1918

Comrade Dzerzhinsky,

The bearer, Sidorenko, was my personal secretary for some days. I was quite satisfied with him. He was dismissed on account of an incident when, being drunk, he shouted, as I have been informed, that he was "Lenin's secretary".

Sidorenko tells me that he deeply regrets it. And personally I am inclined to believe him; the lad is young and, in my opinion, very good. One must be lenient to youth.

On the basis of all these facts, judge for yourself, and see what place you can find for him.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

51
TO MARIA ANDREYEVA

Maria Fyodorovna,

Unfortunately, my colleagues (in the Council) consider it impossible for me to permit a meeting (bypassing the investigating commission), all the more so since medical aid (in case of illness) is available.

I cannot go against the will and decision of my Council colleagues.

Just now it is absolutely impossible for me to have a talk with you, as I *cannot* tear myself away. I will write you about the case of the "provocateur and black-

mailer" (*obviously* he was a **blackmailer**: Kartashov has long been *in prison*, I have made inquiries).

I beg you to excuse me.

All the best,
Lenin

Written after March 12, 1918
but prior to September 1919

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

52
TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Comrade Sergo,

I beg you to pay serious attention to the Crimea and the Donets Basin with a view to creating a united fighting front against invasion from the West. Impress upon the Crimean comrades that the course of events makes defence imperative for them and that they must defend themselves irrespective of ratification of the peace treaty. Make them realise that the position of the north is substantially different from that of the south, and in view of the war, the actual war of the Germans against the Ukraine, help on the part of the Crimea, which (the Crimea) the Germans can gobble up in passing, is not only an act of neighbourly duty, but a requirement for self-defence and self-preservation. It is possible that Slutsky, failing to grasp the complexity of the present situation, has taken some other, simplified line of his own—in which case he must be put in his place in my name. Immediate evacuation of grain and metals to the east, organisation of demolition groups, the creation of a united front of defence from the Crimea to Great Russia, drawing in the peasants, a decisive and unqualified transformation Ukrainian-wise of our units in the Ukraine—these are the present tasks. Antonov should be forbidden to call himself Antonov-Ovseyenko—he must call himself simply Ovseyenko. The same applies to Muravyov (if he remains in his post) and others.

As regards the Donets Republic, tell Comrades Vasil-

chenko, Zhakov and others that however much they may contrive to keep their region apart from the Ukraine, it—judging from the geography of Vinnichenko—will all the same be included in the Ukraine and the Germans will proceed to conquer it. In view of this, it is quite absurd for the Donets Republic to refuse a united defence front with the rest of the Ukraine. Mezhlauk was in Petrograd and he agreed to recognise the Donets Basin as an autonomous part of the Ukraine; Artyom has also agreed to this; therefore the obstinacy of some comrades from the Donets Basin takes on the appearance of an entirely inexplicable and harmful whim which is absolutely impermissible in our Party midst.

Bring this home to the comrades of the Crimea and Donbas, Comrade Sergo, and get a united defence front set up.

Lenin

14 (1). III. 1918

As regards money, arrange to issue what is essential for defence, but be extremely cautious; give it only into the most reliable hands and under the strictest control, as there are lots of people these days who are eager to grab or to throw money away.*

First published in part in 1957 in the book: *Istoria grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR. 1917-1922* (The History of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1922), Vol. 3

Published in full in 1960 in the book: *Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 1

Printed from the text in Stalin's hand with an addition by Lenin

53

TO THE POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS BOARD

26. III. 1918

Please inform me:

(1) Is there a work-time schedule operating in the telegraph department under which a person does 24 hours' duty and then gets three days off?

* The signature, date and last sentence are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

(2) If so, when was this introduced and by whose order or decision? Please send in the full text and the names of those responsible for it.

(3) What measures, and when and by whom, have been taken to abolish such an obviously incorrect and impermissible work schedule.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

54

TELEGRAM TO THE SOVNARKOM OF THE PETROGRAD LABOUR COMMUNE[35]

Governmental
Urgent
Report receipt

28. III. 1918

Sovnarkom of the Petrograd Labour Commune
Smolny, Petrograd
Copies to Shlyapnikov, Chairman of the Evacuation Commission, and to Gorbunov, Secretary of the C.P.C.

I have received Gorbunov's memorandum. I strongly protest against the delay in the evacuation of industry.[36] Larin and Milyutin have no right to alter the decision. If anyone is dissatisfied with my order, let him complain to the C.P.C. or C.E.C., but until my order is cancelled its fulfilment is obligatory. I am particularly indignant at the milliards' worth of stores on Gutuyev Island being left untouched. That is disgraceful. The evacuation of these stores must be begun at all costs and carried out in the speediest manner.[37] The Sovnarkom to send in twice weekly precise reports on what has actually been done for the evacuation and how many truck-loads have been evacuated.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

55

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

There are evidently persons sitting here who have been invited for a *different* question.

They need not be sent away.

But I reprimand you and the other secretaries; you have been told a hundred times that people are to be invited *only* for the question that concerns them.

Written in March-April 1918

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

56

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA

You have not been "bullied", but, on the contrary, treated too leniently.

1) Have all the secretaries sign a notice that *during sessions* of the C.P.C. **only** notes may be handed up, but talk is forbidden.

2) Post up a similar notice in the Secretariat.

Written not earlier than March 1918 and not later than September 1919

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

57

TELEGRAM TO THE SOVNARKOM OF THE PETROGRAD LABOUR COMMUNE

Chairman of the Sovnarkom
of the Petrograd Labour Commune

In accordance with your statement by telephone we expect the immediate and formal withdrawal of the Red Guard detachments, which, though few in number, entered

Finland against the wishes of the Soviet authorities. We insist that a formal decision to this effect should be passed by the Sovnarkom of the Petrograd Commune. We urgently request to be informed immediately of the full text of this decision.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 1, 1918
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

58

CONVERSATION WITH V. V. KUIBYSHEV BY DIRECT LINE

Kuibyshev, Chairman of the Soviet of Deputies, on the line in Samara

Comrade Lenin, Dutov's forces have again become active in Orenburg; a report has been received that Cossack detachments are advancing within twenty versts of Orenburg. Iletsk is encircled by Cossacks. The Cossacks are mobilising all the villages; they are committing terrible atrocities, three members of the Executive Committee, and Zakharov, Chairman of the Cossack Section of the Soviet, have been killed. The bourgeoisie of Orenburg is actively participating. Orenburg requests the Council of People's Commissars to help uproot this Dutov adventure, otherwise there will again be a blockage, which will cause the death through famine of 12,000,000 inhabitants of Turkestan. One detachment sent from Orenburg to Iletsk was surrounded and wiped out to a man; government commissar Tsvilling is believed to have been killed. Samara will strain all efforts to help Orenburg, but the local forces are insufficient to liquidate Dutov's bands completely; help from the centre is essential. I have finished and await a reply.

I shall take all steps immediately to notify the military authorities and give you assistance.

Lenin

Written in April, not earlier than 2 and not later than 4, 1918
First published on January 26, 1935, in *Pravda* No. 25

Printed from the original

59

TELEGRAM TO THE C.E.C. OF THE SOVIETS OF SIBERIA

I fully approve the resolution of Centrosibir.[38] I advise you to prepare stores of foodstuffs and other products even if by requisitioning, in order to build up a serious defence. Our talks with the ambassadors should begin today.[39] It is clear now that no trust can be put in assurances and the only serious guarantee lies in solid military preparations on our part.

Lenin

Written on April 5, 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

60

TO THE C.E.C. OF THE SOVIETS OF SIBERIA

I have received Yakovlev's memorandum.[40] I approve the plans of preparation and mobilisation. If they advance, offer resistance. I have passed it on to the Commissariat for Military Affairs. We shall try to help by sending money although our difficulties are extremely great.

Please send information more frequently.

Lenin

Written on April 6, 1918
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

61

TO Y. M. SVERDLOV AND S. P. SEREDA

8. IV. 1918

Comrade Sverdlov
and Comrade Sereda

The bearer, Comrade Kharlov, who has been working for eleven months in the peasant Soviets of Pskov Gubernia,

is an agronomist by speciality with five years' practical experience. A member of the Bolshevik Party since 1905 (he has been on the books in Petrograd, Vasilyevsky Island, since March 1917). Please have a talk with him about work in the Commissariat for Agriculture and his possible participation in it.

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

62

TO D. P. BOGOLEPOV AND A. D. TSYURUPA

10. IV. 1918

Comrade Bogolepov
(Deputy Commissar for Finance)
Comrade Tsyurupa
(or Comrade Bryukhanov)

The bearers of this note, representatives of the *Pskov* Gubernia Soviet, have so far been unable to obtain the food and financial assistance they are so badly in need of. The situation in Pskov Gubernia (especially owing to the German invasion; *about one-ninth of the gubernia* has been occupied) is desperate. I ask you most earnestly to consider what extraordinary measures you can adopt to help them, and to telephone me to talk it over.

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

63

TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR JUSTICE

I request the members of the Board of the Commissariat for Justice (preferably *all of them*) to visit me (we can agree on the day and time) for a talk about the following:

1) what precisely has been done for publishing a Collection of Laws and Decrees,

2)—for codification,

3)—for ensuring speedier and more ruthless court action against the bourgeoisie, embezzlers of state property, etc.,

4)—for juridical propaganda among the population, among the workers and poor peasants

(a) in printed form;

(b) by lectures (or classes, and so on),

5)—for drawing the poor into the work of court proceedings (jurors) and investigation,

6)—for using Shreider's personnel and others.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on April 15, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

64

TO THE SOVIET AND WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS OF RYBINSK[41]

Comrade Dyrenkov's account of the measures taken by him in Rybinsk to tighten work discipline and of the support for them on the part of the workers has shown me that the Rybinsk comrades are correctly tackling the most important and most urgent tasks of the day, and I ask the representatives of Soviet power and workers' organisations in the city of Rybinsk to accept my wishes for still more energetic efforts and the achievement of the greatest successes in this field.

Vladimir Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written in April, not earlier than 15, 1918

Published on May 16 (29), 1918 in *Izvestia* of the Rybinsk Soviet of Workers' Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies No. 105

Printed from the newspaper text

65

TO D. P. BOGOLEPOV AND I. E. GUKOVSKY

16. IV. 1918

Comrades Bogolepov and Gukovsky

I send you the draft of a law on shares. *I want you urgently* and *without fail* to

1) discuss it,

2) make *your* corrections,

3) *immediately* invite to the discussion specialists known to you (ask them for their opinion—preferably in writing); from the professors you can *order* a commentary,

4) all this needs to be completed *by tomorrow*, for tomorrow, 17. IV, we have to *endorse* the decree in the C.P.C.[42]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

66

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD SOVIET

Chairman of the Soviet
Nizhni-Novgorod

According to a statement of the Commissar for Finance, obstacles are being put in the way of a complete inspection of the State Bank appointed by him and the control bodies. I direct that every facility be afforded for a complete and thoroughgoing inspection of the State Bank and assistance given to the inspectors. Please let me know by telegram that the inspectors have been given full opportunity to discharge their duties.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 17, 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original Gorbunov's handwriting, added to and signed by Lenin

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* The text from the words "Please let me know" is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

67

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SIMBIRSK SOVIET*

Chairman of the Soviet
Simbirsk

Inform me by telegram of the circumstances and conditions of election of heads of Chuvash teachers' seminaries for men and women. I am interested in the fate of Inspector Ivan Yakovlevich Yakovlev, who has worked for fifty years for the advance of the Chuvash people and suffered persecution from tsarism. I think Yakovlev should not be torn away from his life's work.[43]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 20, 1918

First published on January 19, 1928, in the newspaper *Proletarsky Put* (Ulyanovsk) No. 16

Printed from the original

68

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[44]

21. IV. 1918

The Narrow Council

In the affair concerning the reorganisation of the Red Cross, which has become known to me through V. M. Bonch-Bruyevich, I strongly advise:

1) that *written* explanations be demanded
   (a) from all members of the committee (§ 3, section I),
   (b) from all departments, which *should* have sent representatives—

* At the top of the document Lenin wrote: "Please send the bill for this telegram to me *personally*."—*Ed.*

—explanations as to when the committee met, where its minutes are, etc.

It is necessary not only to admonish, *but to prosecute* a number of persons (they must be found) for non-fulfilment of the decree.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

69

TELEGRAM TO P. F. VINOGRADOV

Vinogradov, Gubernia Executive Committee
Archangel

People's Commissar Tsyurupa has shown me your telegram to him of 21. IV. No. 1192, in which you refer to an order of the central Soviet authorities as being absurd.

I officially reprimand you for this and state that if you do not withdraw such an impermissible expression, I shall raise the question of your being brought before the court, for if we are conscientious in teaching discipline to workers and peasants, we are obliged to begin with ourselves.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written in April, not earlier than 21, 1918

First published in part in 1940 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 3

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

70

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin

Couldn't we, having in view Mirbach's arrival, "prepare" an interpretation of our constitution under which

ambassadors present their letters of credence to the Chairman of the C.E.C.?

Lenin

Written in April, prior to 23, 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

71

TO A. I. RYKOV

Push hard in the Supreme Economic Council for a discussion on replacing the old paper currency by new; Gukovsky jibs at it, but I think it should be pushed forward.[45] Your opinion?

Written on April 23, 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

72

TO THE PRESS BUREAU OF THE C.P.C.

27. IV. 1918

To the Press Bureau

Comrade Axelrod,

Will you please help the bearer, Comrade Gomberg, to collect all (printed) materials concerning our revolution. This is a matter of great social importance, for on it depends the information of America and of the world at large.

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

73

TO RAYMOND ROBINS[46]

30. IV. 1918

Dear Mr. Robins,

I thank you very much for your letter. I am sure the new democracy, that is, the proletarian democracy, is coming in all countries and will crush all obstacles and the imperialist-capitalist system in the new and the old world.

With kindly regards and thanks,

Yours truly,

Lenin

First published in Russian in 1957 in the book: *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.), Vol. I

Printed from the original
Written in English

74

A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade *Tsyurupa*

Sapronov from the Moscow *Gubernia* Soviet describes the catastrophic food situation in Moscow Gubernia and insists on the need to increase the delivery orders for grain. At least a minimum quota should be fixed. The amount given to the peasants must be increased, otherwise *they will eat up all the seed* and *won't sow*.

What can be done? What has been done?

Lenin

Written not earlier than April 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

75

TO P. P. MALINOVSKY[47]

Why is it that, contrary to the decision of the C.P.C. and in spite of unemployment (and in spite of May Day), work has not been begun in Moscow

1) on a *proper* removal of tsarist monuments?
2) on the removal of tsarist eagles?
3) on preparing *hundreds* of inscriptions (revolutionary and socialist) on *all* public buildings?
4) on setting up *busts* (if only temporary ones) of various great revolutionaries?

Written between May 1 and 13, 1918

First published on April 20, 1963, in the newspaper *Sovetskaya Kultura* No. 49

Printed from the original

76

TELEGRAM TO V. N. ANDRONNIKOV, REGIONAL BOARD OF NATIONALISED ENTERPRISES OF THE URALS

Andronnikov
Regional Board
Ekaterinburg

Rumours about the denationalisation of the Bogoslovsk district are stupid nonsense.[48]

Lenin

Written on May 2, 1918

First published in 1927 in the book: *Rabochii klass Urala v gody voiny i revolyutsii* (The Working Class of the Urals in the Years of War and Revolution), Vol. III, Sverdlovsk

Printed from the original

77

TO THE C.C. OF THE R.C.P.(B.)[49]

1) The proposal of Comrades Spiridonova and Karelin is that the Bolsheviks should surrender to the Left S.R.s absolute control of the Commissariat for Agriculture, with the Bolsheviks retaining only political representation.

2) The grounds for this proposal are that, in the opinion of Comrades Spiridonova and Karelin, the Commissariat for Agriculture is going to pieces, work is becoming impossible for the Left S.R.s, they will all be compelled to leave, because—it is alleged—they are being "ousted", etc.

3) The meeting (of Lenin with the Bolsheviks from the Agriculture Board) refers the question raised by the S.R.s to the C.C. of the Party for decision. For its part, the meeting considers the arguments of the S.R.s groundless and their proposal unacceptable.*

Written on May 3, 1918
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

78

DRAFT OF A RADIO-TELEGRAM TO THE PEACE DELEGATION IN KURSK

In the Ukraine there has been a coup d'etat.[50]

Bourgeois-landowner rule completely restored.

Rostov-on-Don taken by the Germans.[51]

British threaten with a British and Japanese offensive.

Germans demand the seizure of Ino by the Finns and the Murmansk railway to fight the British.[52]

We are holding emergency meeting of C.C. of the Party on all this.[53]

Your policy is to exert all efforts to hasten the conclusion of an armistice and peace, at the price, of course, of new annexations.

Written on May 6, 1918
First published in 1929 in *Lenin Miscellany XI*

Printed from the original

* The text of point 3 is in the handwriting of V. N. Meshcheryakov. The document is signed by V. N. Meshcheryakov, S. P. Sereda, and N. M. Petrovsky.—*Ed.*

79

TO A. D. TSYURUPA[54]

You *should have* drawn up a statement of the case concerning the refusal to admit the inspectors and asked me to *take legal action* against the guilty parties.

Written on May 7 and 8, 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

80

TELEGRAM TO THE C.E.C. OF THE SOVIETS OF SIBERIA

Centrosibir
Irkutsk
Copy to Prokopiev

Prokopiev and others are flooding Larin with telegrams, asking for money.

I state that I have not received a reply to my telegram of 23. IV giving exact figures.* I state that such an attitude to the matter, when no reply is given as to what use has been made of hundreds of millions, and why an extra sum above the quota is needed and how much, is impermissible.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 8, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 122.—*Ed.*

81

TO A. D. TSYURUPA[55]

Comrade *Tsyurupa*,
People's Commissar for Food

The bearer—Andrei Vasilievich *Ivanov*—is a Putilov factory worker (who is well known to Shlyapnikov and has old *Party* certificates dating from tsarist times).

I told him about yesterday's decree and the decision that the Commissariat for Labour was to urgently mobilise workers. I gave him my opinion as follows:

Unless the *best* workers of Petrograd build *by selection* a reliable workers' army of 20,000 people for a disciplined and ruthless *military* crusade against the rural bourgeoisie and against bribe-takers, famine and the ruin of the revolution are inevitable.

Please confirm this to the bearer and give him a brief statement that you will grant such detachments the fullest plenary powers on precisely such conditions.

Please give him such a statement to be *read in Petrograd*, and return this letter to the bearer.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 10, 1918

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

82

TO M. G. BRONSKY

Comrade Bronsky,

And so, it is *precisely* agreed between us that

(1) at tomorrow's meeting with the Germans *you* will be **the first** to speak (*none* of the Russians before you),[56]

(2) you will first read the theses (afterwards make a speech, or a report, or a commentary),

(3) you will show me the theses *tomorrow* before the meeting (i.e., in the morning *before 2 o'clock*; I shall be leaving after that).

This is extremely important. It is a directive of the C.C. and the C.P.C. It is obligatory!

Lenin

Written on May 14, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

83
TO RAYMOND ROBINS

May 14, 1918

To Colonel Robins

Dear Mr. Robins,

I enclose the preliminary plan of our economic relations with America. This preliminary plan was elaborated in the Council of Export Trade in our highest Council of National Economy.[57]

I hope this preliminary can be useful for you in your conversation with the American Foreign Office and American Export Specialists.

With best thanks,

Yours truly,

Lenin

First published in 1920
in English in the book:
Russian-American Relations. March 1917-March 1920. Documents and Papers, New York

First published in Russian
in 1957 in the book:
Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR
Vol. I

Printed from
the English text

84
TO THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

May 16, 1918

Chairman of the Supreme Military Council

The Supreme Military Council is directed to send envoys—through the appropriate military authorities at the front

—for the purpose of signing a truce and establishing a demarcation line on the South-Eastern (Don) Front. In order that appropriate instructions may be given to the military authorities, we inform you that our envoys are in Kharkov at the present moment, headed by Sytin, military commander of the Bryansk General Staff units, who has been given instructions to secure a general truce on the Voronezh and South-Eastern fronts. A truce, especially on the South-Eastern (Don) Front, must be secured as quickly as possible, in the last resort agreeing even to accepting as a basis the present disposition of military forces.

Sytin has been instructed to try to secure through the medium of the German Command direct contact with our Command on the South-Eastern Front for co-ordinated action.

With the same aim in view, the Supreme Military Council, by all the means available to it, should maintain constant contact both with Sytin and with our Command on the South-Eastern Front.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

85

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[58]

Chicherin:

In my opinion, the Brest treaty cannot forbid us to combat pirate-insurgents (armed merchant vessels), and it is necessary to *find a form* for our naval forces to give an armed rebuff to the rebels.

Lenin

Written on May 16, 1918

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

86

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH A. D. TSYURUPA

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

1) Has your draft (on the organisation of supply commissariats) been communicated to *all* departments?

2) Take the floor today on a point of order about submitting it for discussion tomorrow.

3) Is there not too much bureaucratic formality in your draft? Should not a point be inserted in the decree providing for the *participation* of 20-50 *workers* (with very strict recommendations) in *each* of the supply commissariats in the *grain-producing* gubernias?[59]

A. D. TSYURUPA'S REPLY

1) The draft has been discussed with regional officials, and approved by Rykov and the Supreme Economic Council in the section concerning the establishment of a Commissariat for Supply (central).

2) I will rise to a point of order.

3) The draft provides for the setting up of supply commissariats under the Soviets, the supply commissariats must not be unwieldy. A point about the participation of 20-50 workers in each commissariat of the grain-producing gubernias may be inserted, but it should be for their participation in the technical apparatus as cadres to be sent out to the volosts.

The introduction of such a number of workers in the composition of the commissariats will evoke protests in the local areas.

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Not in the *composition* of the commissariats, of course, but as cadres of

1) agitators
2) controllers
3) executors.

Written on May 20, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

87
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

A Food Commissariat circular—or better still, perhaps a decree of the C.P.C.—should be drawn up, making it amply clear:

—that the delegatkoms* should be allowed to work *jointly* with the gubernia food committees and *under their control*;

—that the separate existence and separate operation of the delegatkoms is impermissible;

—that such a thing invariably leads to the infiltration of profiteers;

—that especially desirable is the assistance of the delegatkoms and their participation in agitation against the kulaks and profiteers under the guidance of agitators' detachments of the gubernia food committees, etc.

All this should be set out *and published* in greatest detail and in an *extremely popular manner*.

Written on May 20, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

88
TO A. A. JOFFE AND V. R. MENZHINSKY

24/V. 1918

Comrades Joffe and Menzhinsky

Dear Comrades,

I have received your pessimistic and angry letters (that of 20. V, I received today, 24. V). Some of your accusations levelled against Chicherin fall on me. For example, I insisted that the theses on concessions should be sent *through*

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* Delegatkoms—delegate committees under the gubernia food committees, consisting of delegates from army units, representatives of the consuming districts and others.—*Ed*.

the Germans, in order to show them how seriously we desire business-like economic relations. (The theses were drawn up by common consent with the participation of Radek and other "Left stupids".) The terms of our concessions are such that nothing but benefit for us will result if the Germans accept these terms.

I fully approve your policy, set out in especial detail in Comrade Joffe's letters,

Your dissatisfaction with Chicherin is, in my opinion, exaggerated. But *in any case* I agree to help you and I ask you to direct your efforts to *practical* ways of improving matters. For this, I would suggest that you *precisely* formulate *concrete* proposals (send me copies of telegrams and letters, *parts* that are **strictly** practical and brief, for I simply have no time to read everything). In that case I promise to try to secure their fulfilment and to check whether they have been fulfilled.

You must think over how to shift the centre of things to Berlin *to a greater extent* (I agree to help in this), and propose for this purpose *very tactful* (N.B.) and *concretely practical* measures. I shall accept all *feasible* measures and endeavour to have them carried out.

If anything can be done to secure peace with Finland, the Ukraine and Turkey (this is the crux of the matter), we must always work for this (of course, it cannot be secured without *certain* further annexations and tribute payments). I would give *much* to *hasten* such a peace.

You, too, should keep your nerve. Putting diplomacy to rights (and creating a new diplomacy) is no easy task. Festina lente.

With best greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S.

28/V. I missed the messenger.

Chicherin has given me the text of a Note which Joffe sent to the German Government *on his own account*, agreeing to surrender the ships of the Black Sea Fleet (i.e., to their removal from Novorossiisk to Sevastopol)[60] on condition

merely of peace with the Ukraine. However, our government in a clearly worded Note (communicated by radio to Joffe as well) considered it possible to agree to the removal of the ships to Sevastopol on *different* conditions, viz.: 1) *peace on all* **three** fronts, i.e., with the Ukraine and Finland and **Turkey**; 2) no annexation of Sevastopol.

How could Joffe make such a mistake? How could he make such a "bad bargain"? How in general he could send a Note on such an important question *on his own account*, I fail to understand....

N.B. Send us *Arbeiterpolitik*, the Stuttgart *Sozialdemokrat*[61] and **similar** publications, all, *complete*, 5-10 copies of each.

Have you begun some *legal* publication in German? What precisely? What is the plan of publication and when will it appear?

Greetings,
Lenin

Sent to Berlin
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

89

INSTRUCTION ON THE REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF MAIN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS

In view of the hopelessness of the situation as certified by the supreme military authorities, the fleet must be destroyed forthwith.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on May 24, 1918
First published in 1938
in the journal *Morskoi Sbornik*
No. 6

Printed from the original

90

TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

Moscow, May 24, 1918

Dear Comrade Shahumyan,

I take the opportunity to send you once again a few words (I sent you a letter by hand recently; did you receive it?[62]).

The Baku situation is a difficult one internationally. I would advise you therefore to attempt a bloc with Jordania. If that is impossible, you must manoeuvre and *postpone* a decision until you are stronger militarily. A sober estimate and diplomacy for a postponement—remember that.

Get the radio going and send me letters through Astrakhan.

All the best,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent to Baku

Bulletins of the Dictatorship of the C. C. of the Caspian Flotilla and of the Presidium of the Provisional Executive Committee
No. 33, September 8, 1918

Printed from the text of Bulletins

91

TELEGRAM TO THE KINESHMA SOVIET[63]

Soviet of Deputies
Kineshma

To all workers of the Kineshma district. Comrade workers, the rich in the villages of the producing gubernias are hoarding huge stocks of grain and not giving them up for the starving workers. The rich prefer to sell grain at exorbitant speculative prices, which only the city bourgeoisie can pay, but not the poor, starving population. While speculating in grain, the rich seek to speculate also in the goods they receive in exchange for grain. The city bourgeoisie is agitating for the abolition of the grain monopoly and fixed prices, and for freedom to trade in grain. The bourgeoisie is passing from agitation to provocation; it is skil-

fully and surreptitiously inciting the starving workers to demonstrations, disturbances and disorders, while endeavouring to seize power in its own hands. The Council of People's Commissars is exerting every effort in the struggle to uphold the grain monopoly, in the absence of which only the bourgeoisie will prosper while the poor will be left without any grain at all. Comrade workers, do not give way to the provocation of the dark forces, do not play into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionaries who want to make cat's-paws of you and destroy all the gains of the revolution. Do not disorganise the hard work of obtaining grain for you by thoughtless actions on your part and independent exchange of goods. The Council of People's Commissars is now exchanging goods for grain on a vast scale; it has begun requisitioning grain stocks from the village bourgeoisie by means of armed detachments. If you want to help, to co-operate with your workers' and peasants' government, act in an organised way: select from among you those who are most familiar with the food business for work in the Soviet food supply bodies, recruit fighting detachments of honest, incorruptible, steadfast revolutionaries, true champions of the interests of the workers and peasants. Immediately detain provocators and agents of the counter-revolution and deliver them to Moscow. Bear firmly in mind: either we extricate ourselves from all our unprecedented difficulties in an organised way, and with honour, or everything is inevitably doomed to complete ruin. There is no other alternative. In the expectation of speedy results from these measures, the Council of People's Commissars asks you, comrade workers, to display revolutionary self-discipline and political alertness in order to save the gains of the revolution and ensure the triumph of the proletarian dictatorship.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on May 24, 1918

Published on May 29, 1918, in the newspaper *Rabochy i Krestyanin* No. 50

Printed from the typewritten text

* The telegram was signed also by A. D. Tsyurupa, People's Commissar for Food.—*Ed.*

92

TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Shlyapnikov

The Central Committee has passed a decision *to direct the maximum number* of Party workers to the food front.

For *obviously* we shall perish and ruin the *whole* revolution if we do not conquer famine in the next few months.

It is essential that you be *temporarily* employed on food supply (while retaining the rank of People's Commissar for Labour). I am confident that you will carry out the directive of the C.C.

I think that you ought to go to the Kuban to help pump grain out from there.

You must decide today and make immediate arrangements with Tsyurupa.

Written on May 28, 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

93

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH A. D. TSYURUPA

V. I.,

How has the question about using the army in the struggle for requisitioning grain been decided? If it has been decided affirmatively, how will the thing be arranged officially—× by way of an agreement with the Commissariat for Military Affairs or by the issue of a decree?*

It is very important to know this, for today Kudinsky has been arrested (apparently by Comrade Dzerzhinsky's Commission), our work threatens to come to a complete stop.

A. Tsyurupa

× Precisely along these lines. Telephone Trotsky *today* (from my box), so that he gets *everything* moving tomorrow.

* Underlined by Lenin.—*Ed.*

I have just written to Shlyapnikov about his going to the Kuban. He should make arrangements with you *today*. I advise you right now, *today*, to appoint him from the C.P.C.

Stalin has agreed to go to the Northern Caucasus. Send him. He knows the local conditions. Shlyapnikov will find it better with him too.

A. Ts.

I fully agree. See them both off *today*.

Written on May 28, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

94

TO THE EDITORS OF *IZVESTIA*

30. V. 1918

The Editors of *Izvestia*

The bearers are representatives of the Yelets Soviet. Will you please publish an interview with them in the newspaper. It is a model uyezd as regards good order, registration of *cultivated estates* and their economy, and as regards *suppression* of the bourgeoisie.

With comradely greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

95

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

31. V. 1918

Comrade Zinoviev,

The bearer, Comrade Bach, has a mandate from Centrotransport of Siberia. He asks to hasten the issue and dispatch to Siberia of 137 automobiles which the Motor

Section (of Petrograd) (the Petrograd Commune) requested the Motor Centre to remove from Petrograd as useless. We have passed a decision to have *all* lorries handed over to the food department.[64]

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

96

TELEGRAM TO THE VYKSA WORKERS[65]

Vedernikov
Vyksa
Kulebaki, Kazan-Moscow Railway

I very much hope that the worker comrades of Vyksa, in carrying out their excellent plan of a mass movement with machine-guns to obtain grain, will act as genuine revolutionaries, that is, they will staff the detachment with selected reliable people who will not behave like robbers, and who will work to the schedules and in full agreement with Tsyurupa for the common cause of saving from famine all the starving people, and not merely for themselves.

Lenin

Written on May 31, 1918
First published in part on June 2, 1918, in *Izvestia* No. 111
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

97

TO THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISTS[66]

Through the American comrade Albert R. Williams I send my greetings to the American socialist internationalists. I firmly believe that in the long run the social

revolution will be victorious in all civilised countries. When it begins in America it will far surpass the Russian revolution.

Written in May 1918

First published in 1925 in the magazine *Ogonyok* No. 4 (95)

Published in 1960 in the book: Albert Rhys Williams, *O Lenine i Oktyabrskoi Revolyutsii* (On Lenin and the October Revolution), Moscow

Printed from the text of the book

98

TO A. A. JOFFE

2/VI. 1918

Comrade Joffe,

Sokolnikov and Bukharin are to make a trip to you, and Larin, too, I believe.[67] I take this opportunity to give you a little warning. I am sitting at a meeting with the "travellers" (without Larin). I hear talk about "Joffe transferring the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Berlin".

The friction between you and Chicherin is sometimes used—unconsciously rather than consciously—as a means towards intensifying this friction.

I am confident that you will be on your guard and will not allow this friction to grow. I have read attentively your letters and I am absolutely convinced that this friction is unimportant (there is chaos everywhere, carelessness everywhere—in all commissariats—and this evil is slow to cure). Given patience and persistence the friction will be smoothed over. Chicherin is a splendid worker. Your line is quite faithful to the Brest treaty, you are *already* successful, I think—and hence it follows that we shall easily smooth away the friction.

If the German traders will accept economic advantages, realising that *nothing* is to be got from us by war, for we shall burn *everything*—then your policy will continue to be successful. We can give the Germans raw materials. In important cases, send me copies of your exact demands. Arrange for a direct line *as quickly as possible.*

Bukharin acts in good faith, but he is up to the neck in "Left stupidness". Sokolnikov has gone astray again.

Larin is a floundering intellectual, a first-class bungler. Therefore be extremely on your guard with all these most charming, most admirable delegates. Sokolnikov is a very valuable worker, but sometimes (as just now) something "comes over him" and he "breaks china" because of paradoxes. If you do not take precautions, he will break china there with you. And Bukharin—triply so. Prenez garde!

I hope that Krasin and Hanecki, being business-like people, will help you and the whole matter will be smoothed out.

Thank you for the "supplement" to your letter. I await some more.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S.

N.B.: Among the Russian Bolsheviks taken prisoner by Germany (Zivilgefangene) was *Popov* of Brussels, taken in Belgium. Could you find him and take him into our service?

P.P.S. Try to send this enclosure to Switzerland by messenger—but not by post.[68]

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

99

TELEGRAM TO V. L. PANYUSHKIN

Gubernia Soviet
Tula
Forward to Panyushkin

Surprised at absence of news. Inform urgently how much grain collected, how many trucks sent, how many speculators and kulaks arrested.

Lenin

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 3, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

100

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH A. D. TSYURUPA[69]

Tsyurupa:

In view of the furious agitation of enemies and "waverers" and its influence on the *workers* in Petrograd, Moscow, etc.,

I think you ought to publish (and distribute as a leaflet *at the factories*) something in the nature of a letter to the workers, saying:

they are trying to scare you—

the waverers are sowing panic—

they are talking of "independent procurements"—

they criticise the "centre", throwing the blame on others—

and so forth.

But you, workers, should not believe the whiners, sowers of panic and fault-finders,

but set to work: let *every* factory send to our aid trustworthy people *with a guarantee*, *with a surety*, we shall show them where the obstacle lies, what the difficulty is, and *they will help us*.

Would you be able to place such people?

A. D. TSYURUPA'S REPLY

Yes, we can arrange it. Your proposal will be implemented. A small group of workers has already had a number of reports on the food question read to them (something like lectures) and this group will shortly be going to the area of Tambov and Voronezh gubernias with our representative. We have asked all Soviets,× * Bolshevik committees and trade unions to give us reliable people.

Tsyurupa:

× Are the *factory* committees, at least those of the **big** plants, included here? This is important.

Written on June 7, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

* Underlined by Lenin.—*Ed.*

101
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

7. VI. 1918

Comrade Tsyurupa or his deputy

Comrade Tsyurupa,

I am sending to you representatives of the Vyshny Volochok Soviet.

The famine there is appalling. It is urgently necessary to help by every means and to give at least something immediately

I have already talked with these comrades about forming detachments and on the tasks of the food work, but you, too, should have a talk with them.

Lenin

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

102
TO A. P. SMIRNOV

Comrade Smirnov,

The bearers are interested in the question of elections to the Soviets. I have told them that they always have the right to recall their representatives.

Tell them of your experience and give them directives.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

103
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

10. VI. 191

Comrade Tsyurupa or his deputy

The bearers are comrades from the Maltsev factories (about 20,000 workers, about 100,000 in their district). The food situation is catastrophic.

Please hear them out and

(1) take urgent measures to help them at once, at least to a minimum extent, but help immediately;

(2) draw representatives of the Maltsev district into the Narrow Food Council;

(3) make efforts to organise detachments of the Maltsev workers.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

104
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

11. VI. 1918

Comrade Tsyurupa or his deputy

Comrade Tsyurupa,

The bearers are representatives of a Bryansk factory. Since yesterday you (or Comrade Svidersky) arrived at a good understanding with the Maltsev workers, I am sure you will do so, too, with those from Bryansk. I ask you most earnestly to receive them at once and do everything possible.

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

105
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I do not remember giving permission for contacts with Omsk.

I shall make inquiries of Podbelsky.

I advise you to make no transactions, direct or indirect, with the Omsk counter-revolutionaries.[70]

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

106

ADDITION TO THE TELEGRAM TO A. S. YAKUBOV, J. V. STALIN AND A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

Top priority
Telegram on food

1) Yakubov
2) Stalin
3) Shlyapnikov
Extraordinary Regional Food Committee
Tsaritsyn

In view of the events in Samara and Omsk, the interruption of railway traffic between Perm and Vyatka and the complete uncertainty as to the transport situation on the Perm-Ekaterinburg-Tyumen line, which have completely cut off Siberia, without waiting for your consent I am sending by water route the technical workers from Vyatka and Ufa gubernias about whom I informed you in telegram 363. Please receive them and put them to work immediately by distributing them among the places of grain procurement and, if necessary, among the places along the routes for dispatching and forwarding grain. Among those being sent are top-level people absolutely suitable for technical work in the centre and in the Extraordinary Regional Food Committee, and efficient organisers for grain collecting in the localities. To use these people, for whose honesty I am ready to vouch, is essential and inevitable, since no greater and better technical forces are to be found. Offer them to fix the rate of their remuneration themselves and, although I am sure of their being sufficiently modest, I recommend you not to stint payment for their work. Telegraph me.

Tsyurupa
People's Commissar for Food

I urgently advise you to receive the people sent by Tsyurupa and put them to work, since he vouches for them.

It is extremely important to make use of experienced, honest practical workers.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 11, 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

107
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

11. VI. 1918

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I urgently advise you to take advantage of the present moment to step up dispatch of the greatest possible number of detachments to the Urals via Vyatka. Tsyurupa agrees. There are arms in Vologda.

Lenin

Transmit *at once* to Petrograd and inform me *when* received in Petrograd.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

108
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I hope you received my request to send more detachments to the Urals. I add that it is extremely important to send there more workers for agitation and guidance of the backward. Reply immediately.

Lenin

Written on June 14, 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

109

TO THE COMMISSARIATS FOR EDUCATION AND PROPERTIES OF THE REPUBLIC

You are directed to submit information without delay as to what exactly has been done to implement the decree of 13. IV. 1918, particularly in regard to 1) the removal of old monuments, 2) their replacement by new monuments, at least temporary ones, and 3) the replacement of old inscriptions on public buildings by new ones (§ 5 of the decree).[71]

The two months' procrastination in carrying out the decree—important both as propaganda and as providing work to the unemployed—is unpardonable.

Chairman, C.P.C.*

Written on June 15, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

110

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

1

Tsyurupa

I very much fear that we underestimate the "Penza" danger both as regards food and in a general political respect, and that in fact we shall not be able to send "agitators".

Should we not adopt urgent measures to take a good food detachment (of Petrograd workers or the like) and get it moving *at once*, impressing upon them the task: for the first few weeks you will act as agitators.

* There is a typewritten text of this document on C.P.C. notepaper, signed by Lenin, which was sent to the People's Commissariat for Education.—*Ed.*

2

Tsyurupa

I think it necessary that you most urgently get in touch

1) with Petrograd
2) with Sverdlov

concerning the dispatch to Penza and Penza Gubernia of some 50 people (agitators) from among Petrograd and Moscow workers.

Written on June 17, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

111

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Gorbunov

Tell Minkin that Syzran has been taken by the Czechs.[72] But we must not give way to panic. Our forces are preparing to hit back. The Penza people, too, should prepare firmly and energetically. Our success is assured if we do not remain inactive.

Written on June 18, 1918

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

112

TO A. A. JOFFE

18/VI.

Comrade Joffe,

I am extremely astonished and angry at the absence of news from Switzerland. I am told that couriers travel there weekly. Yet not a word!

What are Berzin and Shklovsky doing?

Please forward this letter to them and take measures to receive a reply.

It is *urgently* necessary to have sent here from Switzerland

Junius's pamphlet,

Karl Liebknecht's pamphlet,

a set of cuttings from *Berner Tagwacht* and other publications (all *documents* on the movement of the *Lefts* in Germany and Austria).[73]

This must be republished immediately in book form (separate issues) in Switzerland.

Commission someone in Germany (in Berlin) to do the *same* job, using the materials of the Partei-Archiv or of any library having complete sets of newspapers for the war years (Rühle's article on the split in *Vorwärts*, 12. I. 1915 or 1916,[74] etc.).

Referenten-Material from Niederbarnim (quoted in Legien's pamphlet: *Warum müssen die Gewerkschaftsführer, u.s.w.*)[75] and *everything of this kind* to be collected immediately.

It's really scandalous that *nothing* is being done in this field.

For this work two Germans (Borchardt would be suitable) and two Swiss can (and should) be *hired*, and it should be published immediately in German, French and English.

Lenin

Regarding the ships in Novorossiisk the matter has not yet been fully cleared up. But we have taken *all* measures and I hope the order will be carried out.[76]

Written on June 18, 1918
Sent to Berlin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

113

TELEGRAM TO S. G. SHAHUMYAN

Shahumyan
Baku

Via Astrakhan and Kushka, to be transmitted by radio-telegraph

So far there has been no decree on nationalisation of the oil industry.[77] We intend decreeing nationalisation of

the oil industry towards the close of the navigational season. For the time being we are organising a state monopoly of trade in oil products. Take all measures for the speediest shipment of oil products to the Volga. Report daily to the Chief Oil Committee on the position of the oil industry.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 18, 1918
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the text
of the telegraph
form signed by Lenin

114
TO I. E. GUKOVSKY

We have decided to rob all the commissariats in order urgently to strengthen the *Commissariat for Food*, at least for 2 or 3 months, as otherwise we may starve to death.

From you we want to take *Zax*.

Written on June 22, 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

115
TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE C.P.C.

1

1) Find the decision passed a long time ago (in Petrograd) on how to put questions on the agenda.

2) The compiler of the agenda, the secretary (Gorbunov is the secretary, isn't he? what a mishmash we have here), should sign at the bottom: compiled by secretary so-and-so (and I give warning that *I shall dismiss* secretaries who are unwilling to observe the rules).

2

Reminder

to all secretaries, that they should not put questions on the agenda without first demanding from the reporter (or from the person introducing the question) a *signed statement*

1) whether inquiries have been made of the finance department (Commissariat for Finance+Control), if it is a matter of expenditure or allocations;

2) whether inquiries have been made of the departments *concerned* in the given question.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

All secretaries must sign
here that they have read this.

Written on June 26, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

116

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH A. D. TSYURUPA

Tsyurupa

1) Who and when are you sending to the local areas (Schlichter, Bryukhanov, who else? and where to?)?

2) We've had a talk with Pravdin (he arrived today from Tula, *Yelets*, Orel).

There is grain.
exemplary order,
power in the hands of the poor peasants.

3) Who are you sending to Tambov and with what detachments? Should not Bryukhanov be sent there? The *most* energetic person is needed there.

(Today I had a talk with people from Tambov; the harvest is unprecedented; there is also *old* grain; the kulaks can be brought to heel, but there is a lack of *organisers* and *detachments*.)

4) Are we going to put up with the absence of a (food) dictatorship in Moscow? It's a scandal! A disgrace!

Schlichter is going to Yefremov Uyezd, Tula Gubernia. I sent a comrade to Zinoviev in Petrograd for workers for his detachment. Urgent loading of goods is in progress at present. In about 5 days' time he will set out.*

A. Ts.

Tsyurupa

Five days for an exchange of telegrams with Zinoviev (who long ago was asking where to send detachments) and for loading the goods (1 day??).

This is *monstrous* red tape. Appoint ten officials—scoundrels from the Food Commissariat—and demand that everything be done *in 1 day or in 2 days*, otherwise dismissal and prosecution.

Written on June 26, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

117

TO A. P. SMIRNOV, G. I. PETROVSKY AND I. E. GUKOVSKY

28/VI. 1918

Comrade Smirnov
or Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, and Comrade Gukovsky, People's Commissar for Finance

I strongly recommend the bearer, Comrade Semyon Ivanovich Lebedev, Chairman of the Temnikov Soviet, Tambov Gubernia.

He asks for *a loan of 1½ million*. From his account it is evident that affairs in the uyezd are exemplary. A most instructive example of a model uyezd where the kulaks have in actual fact been ousted from *all* the Soviets. In my opinion, such an uyezd should be given priority assistance.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

* Underlined by Lenin.—*Ed.*

118
TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Secret

People's Commissar Stalin
Tsaritsyn

Today, June 30, information was received from Joffe in Berlin that Kühlmann had a preliminary conversation with Joffe. From this conversation it is evident that the Germans agree to compel the Turks to cease hostilities beyond the Brest frontier, having established a precise demarcation line for us. They promise not to allow the Turks into Baku, but they want to receive oil. Joffe has replied that we shall adhere strictly to Brest, but quite agree with the principle of give and take. Pay the greatest attention to this information and try to pass it on as soon as possible to Shahumyan, for now there are very serious chances of holding on to Baku. Some oil, of course, we shall give.

Lenin

Written on June 30, 1918
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

119
TELEGRAM TO V. L. PANYUSHKIN

Panyushkin, Military Commissar Extraordinary
Novosil

I shall pass your request on to the Extraordinary Commission, but ask you to act firmly after first strictly calculating and weighing up the forces, for the matter must be carried through from start to finish.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written at the end of June-not later than July 2, 1918
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

120
TO A. A. JOFFE

1 VII. 1918

Dear Comrade Joffe,

I am, to tell the truth, extremely angry with you. We are short-handed, everyone is devilishly overworked, yet you go and do a thing like this: you write a lot on *business matters* in a *personal* letter to me (the last one, in pencil) and insert a number of *personal* thrusts, attacks, pinpricks and so on against Chicherin ("not a real" m-r* and so on). To Chicherin, on the other hand, you write: "prospects in the letter to Lenin".

Damn it, it's the frozen limit!

Chicherin, naturally, asks me for the letter, and I can't show it, because I don't want to be an instrument of squabble. The result is that the work suffers and relations suffer.

Chicherin is a splendid worker, most conscientious, shrewd, knowledgeable. Such people should be highly appreciated. That his failing is lack of "commandership" does not matter. There are plenty of people in this world who have the opposite failing!

Chicherin is a man you can work with, he is easy to work with, but the work can be spoiled even with him.

You find fault with him, but the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has a right to complain of you, too, because you do not reckon with him, and *without* the knowledge and permission of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, ambassadors are not, of course, entitled to take decisive steps.

I hope you will take all measures to eliminate these Mißstände.**

That you have got Krasin "on the move" is very good. Keep on at Shklovsky with all your might; he is a lazybones; demand reports and more reports, use threats.

All the best,

Lenin

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

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* Apparently "minister".—*Ed.*

** Shortcomings.—*Ed.*

121
TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN

Secret

Personal from Lenin to Krasin
Russian Embassy, Berlin

I fully appreciate Joffe's work and certainly approve it, but I emphatically demand that Joffe should behave as an ambassador whose superior is the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and should observe the decencies, not abusing and not slighting other people, and consulting the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on all important matters. Only then can I and will I support Ambassador Joffe. I rely on your tact to impress this upon Ambassador Joffe, and await a reply.

Lenin

Written on July 3, 1918
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

122
TELEGRAM TO D. Y. IVASHCHENKO

Ivashchenko, Commissar of Orsha Station
Orsha

Thank you for letting through 36 waggons to Germany: they are for our needy prisoners of war. Please refute all the foul slanders and remember that we should do all we can to help our prisoners of war.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 4, 1918
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

123

REPLY BY DIRECT LINE TO K. A. MEKHONOSHIN[78]

Lenin replies:

Kolegayev told me personally as well as Zinoviev and many others, that he, Kolegayev, is opposed to the present policy of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. I do not doubt that the crazily hysterical and provocative adventure culminating in the murder of Mirbach and revolt of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Soviet power will lose them not only the majority of their workers and peasants, but also many intellectuals. The revolt was suppressed completely in a single day. Hundreds of people have been arrested.

Put on record Muravyov's declaration of his withdrawal from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and continue to keep him under vigilant control. I am confident that if these conditions are observed we shall fully succeed in utilising his excellent fighting qualities. The struggle against the Czechoslovaks and Cossacks must be waged with treble energy.

Lenin

Written on July 7, 1918
Transmitted to Kazan

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

124

TELEGRAM TO S. P. NATSARENUS

Natsarenus, Commissar Extraordinary
Petrozavodsk

You are charged with the following duties:

1. To take all measures for the thorough destruction of the railway line over the greatest possible distance.

2. Foreigners directly or indirectly assisting the predatory campaign of the Anglo-French imperialists to be arrested, in case of resistance—to be shot.

3. Citizens of the Soviet Republic directly or indirectly assisting in imperialist plunder—to be shot.

Two million rubles are being remitted and put at your disposal. You will be informed separately about the military aid to be sent to you.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 7, 1918
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in an unknown hand, added to and signed by Lenin

125
TO I. E. GUKOVSKY[79]

1

Gukovsky

There are several complaints that you (your Commissariat) have still *not given* the assignments:

{ 1) full text,
{ 2) inscriptions in all languages, etc. }

Regarding the design of the new money.

I have already ordered this from Zax. *It is a mere trifle, really.*

Do it or have it done *tomorrow morning*.

2

You are *sabotaging*, really! Now, what is so important here? After all, it is *not* final. It is ridiculous to consider this important.

Written on July 11, 1918
First published: the first document in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, the second in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

* The last sentence of the telegram is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

126

TO I. E. GUKOVSKY

1

There are complaints that you have still not given the text for the new money, thus making it difficult to prepare the models and test them. Give it immediately, retaining the old text about being exchangeable for gold (the exchange will be suspended by separate decrees).

2

Make a *Soviet* inscription.

3

1) Give available models to the best experts.
2) Order counterfeit.
3) Order designs (of all denominations) from the Board of the People's Commissariat for Education.
4) Have Popovitsky draw up an estimate:
(a) how many such bank-notes can be produced in one month with the usual, i.e., the normal, assortment of denominations
(a_1) on the Orlov machines,
(a_2) on the ordinary flat-bed machines,
(a_3) high denomination notes (i.e., notes of high value) on Orlov machines, low denomination notes on ordinary flat-bed machines?
(b) what is the value of the new bank-notes compared with the old?
(c) when precisely will it be possible to make the clichés (that is, how many days after the design is endorsed) and how long before beginning to produce the new bank-notes?
(d) will the new method require new materials and auxiliary substances, etc., as compared with the old?
What will be the cost of forms (for all official papers of Soviet authorities)?

Written in the first half of July 1918

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

127

TELEGRAM TO THE VORONEZH GUBERNIA MILITARY COMMISSAR

Gubernia Military Commissar
Voronezh

I read your note to Trotsky. He and I fully agree that the telegram from Saratov is trustworthy and should be promulgated, for it comes from people who sincerely condemn the adventure of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.[80]

Lenin

Written on July 12, 1918
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

128

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR NAVAL AFFAIRS

Will you please take all measures to speed up delivery to the Caspian Sea of naval vessels of all suitable types.[81]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on July 13, 1918
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

129

TO N. I. PODVOISKY

Podvoisky

Why have you not sent from Kursk 4 regiments + Asarkh's regiment (?)
+ Sluvis's division?

Delay is disastrous for us on the Czechoslovak front, and you are late![82]

Written on July 16, 1918
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

130
TELEGRAM TO THE PERM SOVIET

17. VII. 1918

Soviet of Deputies
Perm
Copy to Smilga, C.C. member

I have received a complaint from Stanislaw Palinski, an old Polish revolutionary who is recommended by Steklov. Palinski has been arrested at the Berezniki soda works, Verkhstiya post-station, Perm Gubernia, on a charge of counter-revolutionary activity and sympathy for the Czechoslovaks.

Palinski writes that the Legal Commission of the Usolye Uyezd Soviet found nothing criminal in his actions.

I urgently request you to carry out a strict check and impartial examination of the matter, and allow Palinski passage to Poland.

Telegraph execution.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*
Printed from the original

131
TELEGRAM TO F. I. KOLESOV

17. VII. 1918

Kolesov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Republic
Tashkent

We are taking all possible steps to assist you. We are sending a regiment.

We are taking energetic measures against the Czechoslovaks and do not doubt that we shall crush them. Do not despair, try your utmost to make permanent and stable contact with Krasnovodsk and Baku.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Volzhsky Den (Samara)
No. 29, July 20, 1918

Printed from the original

132
TO N. I. PODVOISKY

Podvoisky

I did not reply to the second telegram because such an appointment does not depend on me, and in general it is hardly possible, as it upsets the *whole* order of things.[83]

The Czechoslovak (and kulak) danger is so grave that I think you ought to make (and Trotsky will probably agree) a tour of the Western and Southern (German) fronts, etc., to **speed up** the transference of troops from there to the Czechoslovak front.

Written on July 19, 1918
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

133
TO S. P. SEREDA

19. VII. 1918

Comrade Sereda,*

The bearers are members of the Land Department of the Moscow Gubernia Soviet. Please receive them—the matter

* At the top of the document Lenin wrote: "(also for Comrade Bryukhanov)".—*Ed.*

is an important one. I think the "state farms" and the communes should be merged. Practical measures for assistance and control should be discussed. Try to help with tractors.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. Discuss whether a decree of the C.P.C. is needed for Moscow Gubernia. Please make haste.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

134
TELEGRAM TO S. P. NATSARENUS

Natsarenus, Military Commissar Extraordinary
Petrozavodsk

I am passing your telegram on to the Commissariat for Food. The food situation now is as bad as it can be. We shall hardly be able to help. Everything that is best and most reliable has to be organised for sending detachments to the Czechoslovak front. Without victory over the Czechoslovaks there will be no grain.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 24, 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

135
TO Y. LARIN

Comrade Larin,

It is necessary to write a short pamphlet (30-40 small-sized pages) on the *composition* and *activities* of the Supreme Economic Council.

This is of extreme importance both for Europe and for the *peasants*.

Describe clearly and simply, giving facts:

(α) the participation of *workers*' organisations,

(β) the communist (Marxist), not syndicalist, nature of the structure (i.e., of the new socialist system, order),

(γ) subjection (i.e., smashing the resistance) of the capitalists,

(δ) the successes achieved in practice (we have taken stock of *all* textiles: figures), 5-10 of the *best* examples, etc.

(ε) What still remains to be done?

(η) The *new* role of the trade unions:

(αα) their growth,

(ββ) their membership *at the present time*,

(γγ) their role: they **run** production.

(θ) The number of nationalised enterprises, etc.[84]

Lenin

Written at the end of July-beginning of August 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

136

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa,

You look ill. Without loss of time, take two months' holiday. If you do not promise this definitely, I shall complain to the Central Committee.

Lenin

Written in July 1918

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

137

TO P. A. KOBOZEV, K. KH. DANISHEVSKY, K. A. MEKHONOSHIN, F. F. RASKOLNIKOV*

1. VIII. 1918

Comrades Kobozev, Danishevsky, Mekhonoshin and Raskolnikov

Comrades,

I take this opportunity to send you a few words by messenger.

Are the army commanders and Vatsetis working vigorously enough? Is the commissars' control over them good enough?

What are the opinions about Blokhin? Is it true that he is splendid? If so, is he being given enough scope?

Of course, I am judging from a distance and can easily be mistaken. But I am afraid lest the "staffs" should smother the live work below, the work of the masses? Is there sufficient contact in the military field with the masses of poor peasants?

Is **everything** being done to rouse *them* and draw *them* into the work?

Now the **entire** fate of the revolution rests on *one* card: swift victory over the Czechoslovaks on the Kazan-Urals-Samara front.

Everything depends on this.

Is the command sufficiently energetic? Is the offensive sufficiently vigorous?

Please reply, if only in a few words, both by telegraph and by messenger.

Regards,
Lenin

First published in 1934 in the journal *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

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* On the envelope of the letter Lenin wrote: "Comrades Kobozev, Danishevsky, Mekhonoshin and Raskolnikov. Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief in Kazan (From Lenin)."—*Ed.*

138

TO A. A. JOFFE

3. VIII. 1918

Comrade Joffe

Everything you write in your recent letters is the height of absurdity.

To pursue the "former" policy of not breaking with the Entente after the Onega events is ludicrous.[85] You can't restore chastity to a dame with a baby.

It is also absurd to apply the term intervention or aid to the fact that we are continuing to manoeuvre, allowing the Germans to take what the Entente *has already taken*, thereby making more difficult and delaying the Anglo-American-Japanese throttling of Russia.

Without knowing the facts and without reflecting on them, you have fallen into error with the memorandum and the rest. If you wish to insist on it, hand in your resignation to the C.C. Until you do so, until the C.C. has accepted your resignation, until a substitute has been sent to you, and until his arrival, you, of course, as a Party member (as you yourself write) will do your duty.

Gruss,
Lenin

Written on August 3, 1918
Sent to Berlin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

139

TO J. A. BERZIN

3. VIII. 1918

Comrade Berzin,

The bearers are Italian prisoners of war, who have presented to us a recommendation from the Chairman of the Ufa Soviet. I have seen them twice and have received a very pleasant impression from my talk with them. It is

necessary to exercise the maximum caution and help them in every way to organise work **and publications** among Italians, in the Italian language.

Thanks for the letters.

You are evidently working hard. Greetings!

For God's sake, **do not grudge** money for publications (in German, French, Italian and English) and be quick, be quick.

It is a critical moment here: the struggle against the British and Czechoslovaks, and the kulaks. The fate of the revolution is being decided.

Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Berne

First published in part on January 21, 1925, in *Pravda* No. 17

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

140

TO A. D. TSYURUPA AND V. L. PANYUSHKIN

Comrades Tsyurupa and Panyushkin

From Panyushkin's report it is evident that he is working splendidly, but is incredibly squandering his energies, taking on a hundred things at once.

This is impermissible.

Panyushkin must be given a strictly defined, precise *assignment*, laid down in writing

(1) to *seize* and requisition *all* grain surpluses from the kulaks and the rich of the whole Tula Gubernia;

(2) to *dispatch* all this grain *immediately* to Moscow;

(3) *no other job whatsoever to be undertaken* until *this assignment has been completely fulfilled.*

For carrying out the work use as many motor-lorries as possible.

Written in the summer, prior to August 5, 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

141

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Tsyurupa

Every effort must be made now so that *in actual fact* both decrees (on harvesting detachments and on collective trains)

are merged *in practice* and provide us with *our* detachments.[86]

What is being done in this direction?

1) Instruction: in the collective trains *a certain proportion in each* (1 in 5, for example) should be from the trade unions,

2) § 7 of the decree on collective trains should be developed and strengthened,

3) their correlation (in effect=*help*) with the requisitioning detachments....

4) Assign them **all** to a maximum of 2 uyezds (from among the *best*) and **sweep** these clean.

Written on August 8, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

142

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE FOOD COMMISSARIAT

Bryukhanov and other members of the Board of the Food Commissariat

I gather from your note that the Food Commissariat understands and applies the decrees incorrectly.

"No special desire is noticeable among the workers ..." (to join harvesting detachments).

Where are the proofs? Where is the appeal of the Food Commissariat? What is the date of it?

In which factories was it distributed? When and in how many copies?

I am afraid the Food Commissariat did none of these things (judging by Comrade Bryukhanov's silence), but occupied itself with the devil knows what bureaucratic

red tape. For without the help of the workers the Food Commissariat is nil.

Nothing bad is to be seen from the quotation (from Nevsky's telegram of 8. VIII), for it does *not* touch on the question of % of trade union members, or of the leading organisation, or of participation and harvesting (§ 7 of the decree on collective trains), i.e., the *business* questions are not dealt with.

What's bad about Nevsky's telegram besides the good? Nevsky calls on the workers: go out and help (he says nothing about conditions, but *we* indicated *these conditions* and indicated good ones). But the Food Commissariat cavils at a *word* (when there's nothing to cavil at) ... and itself does nothing!

Either we rouse the mass of the workers to join in a serious movement for grain (and *for* crushing the kulaks)—this the Food Commissariat does not do

—or else, no Food Commissariat at all is needed.

Written in August,
after 8, 1918

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

143

TELEGRAM TO A. D. METELEV[87]

9/VIII.

Metelev
Gubernia Executive Committee
Vologda
Copy to Sammer and Eliava

There is no need to come to Moscow to report. You must remain in Vologda and strain all efforts for immediate, relentless reprisals against the whiteguards, who are clearly planning treachery in Vologda, and for preparations for defence.

Refute the lie about Archangel by letter.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 9, 1918

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

144

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

10/VIII—18

1

Tsyurupa:

(1) It is a great scandal, an outrageous scandal, that there is grain in Saratov and we cannot get it away!! What about having one or two food officials sent to each railway junction? What more can be done?

(2) Draft of a decree—25-30 *hostages* from among the *rich* in each grain-producing volost, answering with their *lives* for the collection and delivery of **all** surpluses.

(3) Instruct Popov **urgently** to make up delivery orders by volosts. That is, how much *surplus* grain there *should be* in each volost. How much should each give?

2

Tsyurupa

1) You have not replied about "hostages".

2) When will Popov *finish* his work? (He must be given a *short* time limit.)

3

I propose that "hostages" should not be *taken* but *designated* by name for each *volost*.

The purpose of designating them: it is the rich peasants who, in the same way as they answer for contribution, will *answer with their lives* for the prompt collection and delivery of grain surpluses.

An instruction to this effect (to designate "hostages") to be given

(α) to the Poor Peasants' Committees,
(β) to all food detachments.

Force? Just now *in the front-line* area, **there will be a force.**[88]

Written on August 10, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

145

TO THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

Top secret
August 10, 1918

M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, personal

I consider it essential to reinforce the Eastern Front to the utmost. I direct the Supreme Military Council to draw up a plan for the withdrawal of the *greatest* possible number of units from the Western Front. This plan should be carried out in the shortest possible time. All battle-worthy units should go. The railways will receive orders to let through without delay all units already going to the front, and will make every preparation for handling new ones.

I direct the Supreme Military Council to supervise the accuracy and speed with which the railways fulfil the orders. The Chairman of the Supreme Military Council to report to me about delays.

I place responsibility for the speediest fulfilment of the plan on the Supreme Military Council.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published (in facsimile) in 1930 in the book: *Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921* (The Civil War 1918-1921), Vol. III

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting and signed by Lenin

146

TELEGRAM TO S. P. NATSARENUS

11. VIII. 1918

Natsarenus, Military Commissar Extraordinary
Petrozavodsk

I am very glad that you are energetically dispelling the doubts of Trotsky and myself, caused by the wholesale departures from the fronts.* Send by a very reliable per-

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 252.—*Ed.*

son detailed information on the number, disposition and morale of the troops.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

147

TELEGRAM TO THE VOLOGDA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

11. VIII. 1918

Gubernia Executive Committee
Vologda
Copy to Kedrov

It is essential immediately to mobilise the bourgeoisie for trench digging, and in general to push forward fortification work with the maximum energy. Telegraph fulfilment. Send by a very reliable person detailed information and reports on the progress of this urgent work.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published (in facsimile) in 1930 in *Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

148

TELEGRAM TO A. Y. MINKIN

Minkin
Gubernia Executive Committee
Penza

I received your telegram on the suppression of the kulak revolt. One must strike while the iron is hot, and for this purpose utilise the suppression of the kulaks for ruthlessly

suppressing grain-profiteers everywhere, for confiscating grain from the big rich, and for mass mobilisation of the poor peasants who are being provided with grain. Telegraph fulfilment. The power of the poor peasants in the front-line area must be reinforced and made good.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 12, 1918
First published (in facsimile) in 1930 in *Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

149
TELEGRAM TO D. T. PETRUCHUK[89]

Orsha

In case of need you will be given permission to use the direct line. My advice is: gradually take steps towards disarming and expelling demoralised units and hooligan elements. For this highly important work, take members of the local Executive Committee and Regional Committee to assist you, for this is a matter of paramount state importance. Inform local Executive Committees and Party Committees of this telegram.

Written on August 15, 1918
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

150
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Can it be arranged for detachments to go out for grain (to *procure* and transport by express goods train) according to alternative instructions, namely:

either for one time (to one volost, etc., for threshing in a uyezd, etc.)—then the bonus will be less,

or undertaking to work for a lengthy period (*not* one time, but for 3 or 4 months, etc., or *once more* when called upon by the Commissariat for Food, etc.)—and then the bonus will be higher.

(In both cases make it a condition that they are obliged *not only* to procure but also to thresh, and to *carry* the grain into barns, and to erect barns or half-sheds, etc.)

Written in the first half of August 1918

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

151

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Top secret
16. VIII. 1918

Comrade Sklyansky

I am enclosing herewith Comrade Vorovsky's letter, with documents attached to it (registered in the Managing Department of the C.P.C. 16. VIII. 1918 as No. 2509), and I ask you to pay the most serious attention to the abuse and crime revealed here.[90]

It is necessary to appoint a very limited number of the most reliable and experienced comrades (if possible, not more than two or three), including one from the Extraordinary Commission, to carry out through such a secret commission of inquiry the *strictest investigation*, at first in absolute secrecy, in order (1) to discover the usual manner in which business is conducted in the institution concerned, (2) *to trace the connections* of the counter-revolutionary criminals and (3) to arrest all of them, allowing none to escape.

Report to me regularly on fulfilment.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

152

TELEGRAM TO S. P. SEREDA

16. VIII. 1918

Sereda, People's Commissar
Yelets

It is extremely important to organise things in such a way that all grain surpluses without exception are collected and dispatched in one volost after another. Do not grudge machines and bonuses for exemplary volosts. Inform us of the total amount of surpluses and which volost will prove to be the first to collect all surpluses in full.

Lenin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

153

TELEGRAM TO S. V. MALYSHEV [91]

17. VIII. 1918

Sergei Malyshev
Ekaterinograd (Ekaterinenstadt), Samara Gubernia

Congratulations on success. Telegraph urgently and regularly how much has been collected and delivered to Saratov, and when. It is particularly important not to attempt too many things at once, but to collect in full all grain surpluses first from one volost and to give it a huge bonus. Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Published in part on
September 18, 1918, in
Saratovskaya Krasnaya Gazeta
No. 164

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

154

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO N. I. MURALOV

Sereda urgently demands 200 poods of petrol for delivery of grain in Yelets Uyezd. Do not forget that grain is the chief and vital problem. Everything must be done. Reply immediately when precisely you will send the 200 poods of petrol to Sereda (Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture, Yelets).

Lenin

Written not earlier than August 17 and not later than August 19, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

155

TELEGRAM TO F. E. RASKOLNIKOV

Gubernia Executive Committee for Raskolnikov
Nizhni-Novgorod

Pay thrice-heightened attention to ensuring supplies for the Kazan Front, to accelerated dispatch there of reserves, and see to it that the struggle against the whiteguards in Nizhni-Novgorod is begun without delay and carried out with absolute firmness. See especially to the safeguarding of artillery property, telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1918

First published in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

156

TELEGRAM TO S. P. SEREDA

19. VIII. 1918

Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture
Yelets

A 500-pood tank-car of petrol is being dispatched to you today, but why do you evade the very important ques-

tions: how much grain has been collected, how much delivered? Further, it is absolutely essential to sweep clean of all grain surpluses first one volost, and to give that volost a big bonus. We shall not grudge money to help the poor and middle peasants, if they are helping the hungry.

Lenin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

157
TELEGRAM TO A. Y. MINKIN[92]

Minkin

It is stupid to ask whether a People's Commissar for Finance, and one of a single region at that, can countermand my order. If that order is not carried out, I shall have the guilty persons prosecuted. Leave the company of Letts in Penza for the time being until the suppression in, Chembar. Tell all members of the Executive Committee and all Communists that it is their duty ruthlessly to suppress the kulaks and to confiscate all the grain of the insurgents. Your inactivity and weakness is exasperating. I demand detailed reports on the fulfilment of all my orders and especially on the measures of suppression and confiscation.*

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1918
Sent to Penza

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

158

TELEGRAM TO THE PENZA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

19. VIII. 1918

Gubernia Executive Committee
Penza
Copy to the Gubernia Committee of the Communists

I am extremely indignant that there has been absolutely nothing definite from you as to what serious measures have at last been carried out by you for ruthless suppression of the kulaks of five volosts and confiscation of their grain. Your inactivity is criminal. All efforts should be concentrated on a single volost which should be swept clean of all grain surpluses. Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

159

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Secret

Trotsky
Sviyazhsk
Copy to Vatsetis

Regarding your military proposals about forming detachments of instructors, let the military themselves decide this, I am no judge. I only know of the special need of having our own instructors for the workers' army in view of the complete unreliability of the officers. As regards a monetary award, I agree and will support and put through your decision.[93] It should not be made public.

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

160
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

19. VIII. 1918

Comrade Chicherin,

The bearer, Comrade Latukka, is a Finnish Social-Democrat, who was a great help to us when we were in hiding in Finland.[94] He should now be given *every possible* assistance. He would like to go to Switzerland.

Please have a talk with him and help him in realising his wish and find a place for him at the Embassy. He is a journalist.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

161
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

19. VIII. 1918

Comrade Chicherin,

The bearer is la camarade Jeanne Labourbe of whom I spoke with you.

Please receive her and have a detailed talk with her.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

162
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Gorbunov

It is superfluous and silly of you, after going through the papers, to write "for attention of V. I." (!??) ((that is obvious anyway)) or "I would propose such and such".

You should give the gist of the matter in three lines. Otherwise there is no sense in your going through them.

Written in 1918,
prior to August 20

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

163

TELEGRAM TO THE TAMBOV GUBERNIA FOOD COMMITTEE

20. VIII. 1918

Gubernia Food Committee
Tambov

In Usman Uyezd, landowners' grain has been harvested from 7,000 dessiatines of sown area in Safonovo, Baryatino and Novo-Nikolskoye volosts, and has been delivered to the elevator. Telegraph immediately how many poods of grain there are in this elevator, whether the guard is reliable, why you are slow in dispatching grain to Moscow, who is to blame for the scandalous delay, whether there are Poor Peasants' Committees[95] in Usman Uyezd and are they reliable.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

164

TELEGRAM TO V. N. KHARLOV

21. VIII. 1918

People's Commissar Comrade Kharlov
Saratov

The amount of surpluses mentioned by you is clearly underestimated. Collect more accurate information. Exemplary villages and volosts, i.e., those with the best organisa-

tion of the poor, should be singled out in order, first, to determine without concealment the amount of grain surpluses and, second, to award a big bonus to the volosts which have cleaned out and delivered all grain surpluses without exception. Pass this on to all food officials and telegraph reply. Push on grain shipments.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

165

TO MEDVEDEV, POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE 1st ARMY*

21. VIII. 1918

Comrade Medvedev,

Comrade Bosh told me about your meeting at the front, about the state of affairs at the front and about your doubts. She said that you were sure Syzran could and should be captured, *but did not want to write here about it*.

If this is so, you are in the wrong. That's what a commissar is for—to complain. Be sure to write (and telegraph) to me *about everything* and more frequently.

There has not once been a line from you.

That's too bad. It is not Party behaviour and is a failure to fulfil your duty to the state! It's too bad, really.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* On the envelope of the letter Lenin wrote: "To Comrade *Medvedev* (*Political Commissar*) (From Lenin)."—*Ed.*

166

TO THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

21. VIII. 1918

The bearers are representatives of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee. They are asking for a detachment of 100-200 men to be sent against Krasnovodsk (from Astrakhan). Please discuss their request and help them in every way, and telephone me the decision of the Supreme Military Council.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in part in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

167

TELEGRAMS TO A. K. PAIKES*

1

Paikes
Saratov

I shall speak right away by telephone with the military about all your requests.[96] For the time being I advise appointing your own chiefs and shooting conspirators and waverers without asking anybody and without allowing any idiotic red tape. As regards receiving a reply from me, either wait at the telegraph office, or have people take their turn of duty, or appoint a time in an hour or two. Reply.

Lenin

2

Paikes
Saratov

I have just spoken to Aralov. According to what he says, everything is already being done to send you shells.

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

Loading begins today, so in two or three days it should be finished, Act more vigorously against the kulaks.

Lenin

Written on August 22, 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

168

TELEGRAM TO THE PENZA GUBERNIA COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

22. VIII. 1918

Turlo
Gubernia Committee
Penza
Copy to Minkin

I do not understand how Minkin could refuse to carry out decisions of the majority of the Gubernia Committee.[97] I hope this is only a misunderstanding. I insist that at a critical time of war all should work together harmoniously with the greatest determination, submitting to the majority, and that conflicts should be referred to the Central Committee without interrupting the work.

Lenin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

169

TELEGRAM TO F. I. KOLESOV

Kolesov
Tashkent

We know little about the Caucasus and Baku. Information is unverified. Soviet power exists in the Northern Caucasus. Its troops are cut off from Tsaritsyn, which is besieged from the south by the Cossacks. The British have landed in Baku and the situation there is unstable. The Germans have agreed to guarantee there will be no offensive against Baku if we drive out the British from there. How

matters will turn out there is not known. As regards the military aid, we do not know where it is. We think it is held up near Tsaritsyn.*

As regards ambassadors and consuls, we advise a waiting attitude, keeping them under threefold surveillance and arresting suspicious individuals who are in contact with them.

We are considering and preparing some assistance for you, but cannot promise anything for certain, for everything depends on whether we shall be successful in driving the British out of Baku or whether they succeed in capturing a part of the Caspian coast.

Written on August 23, 1918

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

170

TELEGRAM TO A. G. SCHLICHTER

Schlichter
Vyatka

I have spoken on the telephone with the Commissariat for Food and they agree with me that it would be extremely important now for you to remain in Vyatka: first, for assistance and control in organising the most energetic defence of Kotlas and the preparation of explosives for the complete demolition, if need be, of the Kotlas-Vyatka railway. Second, and most important of all, for the most energetic food operations in connection with the successful progress being made in suppressing kulak revolts south of Vyatka, with a view to ruthless elimination of the kulaks, confiscation of all their grain and its transportation via Vologda and Nizhni-Novgorod, as well as for consolidating the organisation of the poor peasants.

Lenin

Written on August 23, 1918

First published on January 22, 1930, in the newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* No. 19

Printed from the original

* See this volume, Document 131.—*Ed.*

171
TELEGRAM TO S. P. SEREDA

Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture
Yelets

Take fullest advantage of the fine weather. Demand a food or harvesting detachment for each volost. Do not forget we need grain quickly and all grain surpluses should be swept up from at least one exemplary volost.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 26, 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

172
TELEGRAM TO A. P. SMIRNOV

26. VIII. 1918

Smirnov, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs
Saratov
(if he is away, forward to Urbach)

I insist that you definitely come to an agreement with Paikes, who is working splendidly and is rightly demanding independence for the two uyezds. I very much fear that you in Saratov are playing at collegiate methods at a time when the work demands energy and prompt action by responsible executives on the spot in the countryside and not in the towns.

Telegraph me after your talk with Paikes.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

173

TELEGRAM TO S. P. SEREDA

27. VIII. 1918

Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture
Yelets

If threshing on a mass scale is being held up, as you telegraph, by the sowing and harvesting of oats, then it should help matters to send out a large number of threshing detachments. It would be extremely important to speed up the business of supply by enlisting Moscow workers, Organise this immediately without fail. We must show the workers of Moscow clearly from their own mass experience that only their participation makes for rapid progress in food supply. Do this at once.

Lenin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

174

TELEGRAM TO THE PENZA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

28. VIII. 1918

Gubernia Executive Committee
Penza
Copy to the Gubernia Communist Organisation

Internal conflicts among Communists are extremely deplorable. It will be a disgrace if they are not done away with. Elect a commission at once to settle the matter in two days, for example, by dividing the uyezds among the most prominent functionaries so as to separate those who are quarrelling. Telegraph the decision of the commission.

Lenin

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

175
TO V. M. ALTFATER

1

Comrade *Altfater*

How do matters stand as regards sending submarines to the Volga and the Caspian Sea?

Is it true that we can send *only* old submarines?

How many of them are there?

When was the order given for them to be sent? *What in general has been done?*

Lenin

Written on August 28, 1918

2

Comrade Altfater

You cannot confine yourself to such vagueness—"we are searching" (*for your own property??* The *names* of the "searchers", the *date* they started searching, etc., should be given to me *by tomorrow*).

"Clearing up whether dispatch is possible"—this too is *vague* in the extreme.

Who gave the "clear up" orders, and *when*? Please let me know this tomorrow (30/8) precisely, officially.

The business of sending submarines brooks not a minute's delay.

Lenin

Written on August 29, 1918

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

176

TELEGRAM TO V. N. KHARLOV

29. VIII. 1918

Kharlov, People's Commissar for Agriculture
Petrovsk, Saratov Gubernia

If all forces in your uyezd have been mobilised, then obviously you must ask for threshing detachments of workers from here, for the harvesting of grain must be speeded up many times over. Telegraph daily how many waggons are being sent off, under what markings and where from. Announce a big bonus for the volost that is the first to sweep up all grain surpluses. Draw up lists by volosts of the richest peasants, who are answerable with their lives for the proper progress of the work to supply grain to the starving capital cities.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

177

TO A. D. TSYURUPA[98]

Tsyurupa

I do not advise putting it that way *just now* (it's something in between an ultimatum—resignation of all—and vacillation of *all* in the face of the resoluteness of *one*). Better *concentrate all efforts* on Yelets+Petrovsk+the best of the other uyezds.

Send out some two thousand workers as threshers, say.

And a few days later, after receiving *at least* news that so many hundred trucks are **en route**, raise the question more firmly.

Written on August 29, 1918

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

178

TO S. P. SEREDA

Comrade Sereda,

I'm very sorry you did not drop in. You should not have listened to the "overzealous" doctors.[99]

Why aren't things *working out* in Yelets Uyezd? This worries me very much, and still more your "side-stepping" on this question. Clearly, things do not work out. From 19 volosts with Poor Peasants' Committees, **not one** clear, precise report!

Not one Σ,* how many trucks, in what period of time?!!

In not one single volost (though there should be in 19) have 3-5 intelligent workers from Petrograd (with 15-50 assistants from Moscow) been brought in. *Nowhere* are there any indications that work is *proceeding apace*!

What is wrong? Please do reply. Appoint correspondents for me in *each* volost, give them this letter of mine, and let them *all* reply to me.

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

Written on September 6, 1918
First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

179

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Secret
Ciphered
(Original to be returned to me)
(A copy of the cipher to
be sent to me)

Trotsky
Sviyazhsk

I am surprised and worried at the slowing down of operations against Kazan, especially if it is true, as I have

* Total.—*Ed.*

been informed, that you have every opportunity of destroying the enemy by artillery. In my opinion, one must not spare the city and put things off any longer, for ruthless annihilation is essential once Kazan is said to be in an iron ring.[100]

Lenin

Written on September 10, 1918
First published (in facsimile) in 1930 in *Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921*, Vol. III

Printed from the original

180

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Top secret

Trotsky
Kazan or Sviyazhsk

Congratulations on the capture of Simbirsk.[101] I think the maximum effort must be made to clear Siberia as quickly as possible. Do not grudge money for bonuses. Telegraph whether Kazan's valuable objects have been saved and how many of them. Tomorrow I shall be back at work again.

Lenin

Written on September 12, 1918
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

181

TO GRIGORY NAUMOVICH, FOR THE GROUP OF STUDENTS INTERESTED IN COMMUNISM

16. IX. 1918

Dear Comrades,

I was very glad to receive your letter. From my heart I wish you the most speedy success in your study of com-

munism, mastery of it, and commencement of practical work in the ranks of the Russian Communist Party.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published on April 21, 1962, in *Izvestia* No. 96

Printed from the typewritten copy

182

TELEGRAM TO THE POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES OF YELETS UYEZD

17. IX. 1918

To all volost Poor Peasants' Committees of Yelets Uyezd
Yelets

By circular

Your telegrams received.[102]

It is impossible to confine oneself to general and vague expressions, which too often conceal the complete failure of the work. Accurate weekly figures are essential: first, exactly what part of the grain surpluses has been collected and delivered by which volosts; second, exactly how many poods of grain have been delivered, and to which elevators and granaries.

Without such data, all the rest is mere verbosity. Reply more exactly.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in part on January 21, 1927, in *Krasnaya Zvezda* No. 17

Published in full in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

183

TO THE EDITORS OF *PRAVDA*

18. IX. 1918

The bearer, Comrade Mikhail Nikolayevich *Sanayev*,* Chairman of the Sergach Uyezd Party Committee (and member of the E.C.), has very interesting things to tell about the class struggle in the countryside and the Poor Peasants' Committees.

It is extremely important that such *factual* material from the local areas should appear in the newspaper (there is far too much of "generalities"). Will you please take down what the comrade says and publish it.

With comradely greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

184

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Kamenev

Dear L. B.,

Get well quickly.

About "the fine theory of manoeuvring".

All theories are good *if* they correspond to objective reality.

But our reality has changed, for if Germany is defeated, it becomes impossible to manoeuvre, for there are no longer the two belligerents, *between whom we were manoeuvring*!!

Attention.** Britain would gobble us up, were it not for ... the Red Army.

---

* Evidently a slip of the pen: the person concerned was Mikhail Ivanovich Sanayev.—*Ed.*

** This word is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

I don't think we should start talks about revision of Brest, as that now would be running ahead.... We must *wait and see*.

Get well!

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Written between the end of September and October 1918

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

185

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH[103]

1/X. 1918

Dear Vladimir Dmitrievich,

Only this morning I heard the awful news. I cannot travel to Moscow, but I should like, if only in a letter, to grip your hand hard, very hard, to express my love and the love of all of us for Vera Mikhailovna, and to give you at least a little support, insofar as anyone can do so, in your terrible grief. Take good care of your daughter's health. Once more, a strong, firm handshake.

Yours,

V. Lenin

First published in 1958 in the book: *Slavniye Bolshevichki* (Outstanding Bolshevik Women) Moscow

Printed from the original

185

TELEGRAM TO A. A. JOFFE

Comrade Joffe
Berlin

We do not agree to sign the Turkish protocol until the hand-over of Baku to our authorities is accepted, for with-

out this clause there is every ground for suspecting secret agreements with the Entente for handing Baku over to them. We shall publish just that.[104]

Sverdlov, *Lenin*

Written on October 7, 1918
First published in 1957 in *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. I

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

187

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA AND L. B. KRASIN

Lyd. Al. (and Krasin)

I am signing the telegram about oil, ships, etc., with pleasure.

But I don't agree to sign that about Mukhin.[105]

(1) Krasin writes that Mukhin *concealed money from Stalin*. This he had *no right* to do, even if "on the instructions of **his** (!!??) chiefs", for Stalin too is a chief, and a higher one, too, though not "his".

(2) It is wrong formally and impermissible generally to decide this *without asking Stalin* (and Stalin is in Moscow!!).

Greetings,
Lenin

Written on October 9, 1918
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

188

NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN OR L. M. KARAKHAN AND A LETTER TO A. A. JOFFE, J. A. BERZIN AND V. V. VOROVSKY

Comrades Chicherin or Karakhan

Will you please send to Berlin tomorrow, Friday, 12 copies of my article against Kautsky from *Pravda*[106] for

Joffe, Berzin and Vorovsky, and the following brief letter from me to them:

Dear Comrades,

I am very well aware of the shortcomings of my too brief article against Kautsky. Nevertheless, it is necessary for us, *as quickly as possible*, to take a stand, to express our opinion. Will you please have it translated and published as a leaflet.

Lenin

10/X. 1918

First published in 1957 in the journal *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoria* No. 4

Printed from the original

189

TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND L. M. KARAKHAN

Comrades Chicherin and Karakhan

Regarding the Note to Wilson, I think it should be sent.

Write it in detail, politely, but caustically, saying: in any case we consider it our duty to propose peace—even to governments of capitalists and multimillionaires—in order to try to stop the bloodshed and *to open the eyes of the peoples*.

The fall of Kazan, Simbirsk, Syzran and Samara has obviously exploded such-and-such rumours....

Do the capitalists want some of the forests in the north, part of Siberia, interest on 17 thousand millions?[107] If so, then surely they won't make a secret of it. We propose to you: state outright, **how much***? Regarding the Brest peace—Germany will agree to withdraw her troops. What's the matter then? Do you want to replace the German troops with *your own troops*?

And so on.

I suggest that you immediately draft such a Note, and we shall discuss it together.[108]

* The words "how much" are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

Pravda wanted to publish my article against Kautsky Friday morning. Did you receive from Sverdlov my note asking for 12 copies to be sent to Joffe *for Berzin and Vorovsky*, for them to publish as a leaflet? and to have these dispatched Friday evening? N.B.

What news is there from Litvinov?[109]

What has been done about publishing *Japanese* leaflets?

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. We *can* talk things over on the telephone.

Written on October 10, 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

190

TO J. A. BERZIN

15/X. 1918

Comrade Berzin

Dear Comrade,

I have received from you odd copies, as always, of foreign newspapers (can't you have someone make *cuttings* of (a) *everything* about Russia; (b) everything about the socialist parties of all countries).

I see from them, incidentally, that Graber and Grimm have stupidly and basely attacked Guilbeaux. How could you see something had in his taking the money? *I don't understand*.

You can't censure a valuable comrade without *formally* going into the matter!? Who of the *Party members* (appointed by you) went into it? No one! Yet from Guilbeaux's information and from the decision of the Geneva Commission it is as clear as clear can be that the case is *in favour of* Guilbeaux.

N.B. Send me: Longuet, *La politique internationale du marxisme. Karl Mart et la France*. Vandervelde, *L'Etat et le socialisme** and *all* similar pamphlets in French, German, English and Italian, *all*, *all*, **all!** Also: *La Russie socialiste* (*socialistes-révolutionnaires de gauche*), see *La Feuille* (Genève),[110] 3. X. 1918.** Pierre Loti, *Quelques aspects du vertige mondial*, Paris (Flammarion). Leon-Frapie, *Les contes de la guerre* (ibid.).

I have just received from Sverdlov a set of your publications (it would do no harm if you sent this set to me as well).

Too little! Too little!! Too little!!!

Engage a group of translators and publish 10 times as much. **Peluso** can (and should) write three small pamphlets a week (on all subjects, compilations from our newspapers—you provide the **themes** and a list of the articles suitable for *compilation*). His article in *Droit du Peuple**** ("Counter-Revolutionaries") is *good*. Pay him well *and publish* **10 times** *as much*. (Translators must be engaged, in order to publish in *4* languages: *French*, *German*, *English* and **Italian.** You have *nothing* in the last two. Scandalous! Scandalous!!)

You have *plenty* of money. (Send without fail an *account* of the sums you have spent.) We shall give *more and still more*, *in plenty*. Write how much.

A 100 times more must be published, in 4 languages, pamphlets of 4-8-16-32 pages. *Engage* people for this.

N.B. Collect a set of Spartakusbund (I have seen No. 11, IX. 1918)[112] and republish the entire set *in 4 languages*. Also Junius and Liebknecht. Commission a *history* of the struggle against social-chauvinism in Britain, France, Germany,

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* Apparently this refers to E. Vandervelde's pamphlet *Le Socialisme contre l'Etat*, Paris, 1918.—*Ed.*

** I think the Left S.R.s have here lied terribly. It is necessary at once to commission someone (Leiteisen even) to make a compilation from *Pravda* and *Izvestia* against the lies of the Left S.R.s (and also from *Znamya Trudovoi Kommuny* and from *Volya Truda*[111]).

*** *Droit du Peuple*—a weekly, organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland, and of the party branches in the canton of Vaud and the city of Lausanne.—*Ed.*

Italy. Form groups for this purpose (Gorter, Balabanova+? +??, etc.).

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. What is your optimism about revolutions in the countries de l'Entente based on? Facts? Considerations? If necessary, send in code, but write more precisely.

If you are ill, undergo treatment *seriously* and *do not leave* the sanatorium. Keep in touch by telephone, and send your deputy for visits. *N.B.*

Sent to Berne

First published in part on January 21, 1925, in *Pravda* No. 17

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

191

TO A. A. JOFFE

18. X. 1918

Comrade Joffe,

Send me, please, the issue of *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik* which had Martov's article on dictatorship.[113]

Such things should be sent immediately.

Ditto—newspaper *cuttings* (instead of the unreadable summaries)—*everything* relating to the split with the social-chauvinists and Kautskyites (with a translation into German from the Dutch and Scandinavian languages).

We ought to act as a bureau for ideological work of an international character, but we are doing nothing!!

A hundred times more must be published. We have the money. Engage translators. But we are doing nothing! It is scandalous....

Please send this letter also to Vorovsky, and forward the enclosure, please, to the proper quarter.[114]

Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

192
TO A. A. JOFFE

18/X. 1918

Dear Comrade Joffe,

I received your letter of 13. X *after* sending off a letter to you.

I am not against continuing the "diplomatising". But its importance has diminished. The whole point is whether the Entente manages to land in force in the Black Sea. I have long been talking to everyone everywhere about this danger, and have said it clearly in the letter to the Central Executive Committee.[115] The radical difference from II. 1918 is that at that time we *had* a chance to win time by giving away territory. Now there is *no* such chance.

Mit besten Grüssen,
Ihr *Lenin*

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

193
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

21. X. 1918

Comrade Gorbunov,

I earnestly request you to *speed up* as much as possible the Science and Technology Department's findings in regard to the Radio Laboratory. *It is extremely urgent*. Drop me a line when its findings are ready.[116]

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

194

APPLICATION TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIET JOURNALISTS' TRADE UNION

Please enrol me as a member of the Soviet Journalists' Trade Union.

Vl. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written in October, not later than 22, 1918
Published on October 24, 1918, in *Pravda* No. 230

Printed from the newspaper text

195

TELEGRAM TO P. P. SYTIN

3 addresses: Sytin, Kozlov
Trotsky, Tsaritsyn
Voroshilov, Tsaritsyn

We are receiving desperate telegrams from Voroshilov about non-receipt of shells and cartridges despite his repeated demands and insistence.

Have this checked immediately, take the most urgent measures to meet his demands and notify us what has been done. Give names of persons responsible for fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on October 24, 1918,
First published in 1936 in the journal *Partrabotnik* (Stalingrad) No. 16-17

Printed from the original

* The document is signed also by Y. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. He wrote the sentence "Give names of persons responsible for fulfilment".—*Ed.*

196
TO J. A. BERZIN

25. X. 1918

Comrade Berzin

Dear Comrade B.,

What's this story about Herzog's expulsion?*

I think we should speak *in his favour*. Don't forget, the people who have expelled him are scoundrels, opportunists.

Write about this.

I hope you have wound up the Guilbeaux "affair" in the sense of having fully recognised him as rehabilitated. Give him my regards. Where is he?

When will the French edition of *The State and Revolution* appear?[117] Have I time to write a preface against Vandervelde?

Send me: Vandervelde, *Le Socialisme contre l'Etat*; *La Belgique envahie et le Socialisme international*; *Trois aspects de la révolution russe*. All three are published by Berger-Levrault, Paris, 5-7, rue des Beaux-Arts.

Please collect all pamphlets of this kind (English, French, Italian, German).

Send information about France more often. What goes on there? How are things there?

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent to Berne

First published on January 21, 1925, in *Pravda* No. 17

Printed from the original

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* The expulsion of Jakob Herzog from the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland.—*Ed.*

197

TELEGRAM TO THE URALS ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Urals Economic Council, Perm
Copies to Executive Committee, Usolye
Berezniki Works Management, Usolye

I direct the Berezniki works to immediately start organising a radium factory in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Economic Council.[118] The necessary funds have been allocated by the Council of People's Commissars. The work should be carried out under the direction and on the responsibility of chemical engineer Bogoyavlensky, who is to be given the fullest assistance by you.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on October 28, 1918

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
the typewritten text
signed by Lenin

198

TO THE BOARD OF PROPERTIES OF MOSCOW'S PEOPLE'S PALACES[119]

I earnestly request the Board of Properties of Moscow's People's Palaces to gratify the request of the Children's Homes Department of the People's Commissariat for Social Security.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

1/XI. 1918

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

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* The telegram was signed also by L. Y. Karpov, head of the Chemical Department of the Supreme Economic Council, and N. P. Gorbunov, head of the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council.—*Ed.*

199
TO J. A. BERZIN

1/XI.

Dear Berzin,

I have received a lot of books from you. Many thanks.

I hear that all are at loggerheads over there. We shall take Shklovsky and Zalkind.

In case of anything, write; I shall sign your *orders* (to your subordinates), so that they will not dare quarrel and will strictly carry out your orders.

Stay in bed and follow the treatment *strictly*; you ought to be living *not* in Berne, but in the mountains in the sunshine, in some place where there is a telephone and a railway, and you should send a secretary to Berne and people should travel *to* you.

In the German translation of *The State and Revolution* an unfortunate error has crept in: the postscript is *not* dated. Yet the *whole* point is to show that the *postscript* was written *after* the October Revolution. Namely: 30. XI. 1917. Could not a correction slip be pasted in?

Some capable comrades are on their way to you. *Do not grudge money*, particularly through them, for propaganda in France.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

N.B. Prepare **everything** for the eventuality that the Entente will force Switzerland to deport you. *Bereit sein!!*[120]

P.S. If the French translation of *The State and Revolution* is ready, put it out *at once*, but in the publisher's preface criticise *both* Kautsky and *Vandervelde* (*Le Socialisme contre l'Etat*), because Vandervelde *slurred over*, concealed, distorted *everything of importance* about the state.

I am sending about half a pamphlet against Kautsky. Will you please have it translated *as quickly as possible* and let me know by telegram: *Antikautsky* is being trans-

lated into German, French or Italian. Otherwise I'll have it done here.

I hope you sent *Staat und Revolution* to Berlin? **The more the better!**

Written on November 1, 1918
Sent to Berne

First published in part on January 21, 1925, in *Pravda* No. 17

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

200

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 2nd ARMY

I greet the valiant Red Army troops who captured Izhevsk. Congratulations on the anniversary of the revolution. Long live the socialist Red Army![121]

Lenin

Written on November 7, 1918
Sent to Vyatskiye Polyany

First published in 1928 in *Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921*, Vol. I

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

201

TO R. I. BERZIN

Comrade Berzin

I take this opportunity to send greetings through you to the troops of the 3rd Army and wishes for every success.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written in November between 9 and 23, 1918

Published on November 23, 1918, in the newspaper *Krasny Nabat* (Perm) No. 60

Printed from the newspaper text

202

TO B. S. WEISSBROT

Comrade Weissbrot,

You happen to be in Vienna....* I hope you will do everything you can to find the *Lefts*. Perhaps Strasser (Josef Strasser) will help find them, although he himself, probably, is *not* ...* to help them.

Write *more often*, with every courier.

If possible (if you have good connections, etc.) try to rescue my library from *Poronin* (Galizien)**: I left it there at the dacha with my things in 1914, I had to pay a balance of 50 kronen; now I would give 100,000,000 to have the library rescued. But that ...* is a personal matter.[122]

The important thing is to find the *Lefts* in Vienna and to *help* them in every way. I'm afraid you won't succeed in this owing to the lack of connections, but try to do everything possible.

Write.

Regards,

Yours,

Lenin

11/XI. 1918

Sent to Vienna

First published in part in 1940 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 4

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

203

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

13/XI—18

Comrade Bryukhanov,

Will you please assist the bearers, Comrades Sadkov and Renqvist, representatives of the Finnish Communist Club

---

* The manuscript is partly damaged.—*Ed.*

** Lenin made an insertion here in the manuscript, the legible part of which reads: "...I lived in *Poronin* under my own name...." —*Ed.*

and the Finnish railwaymen. Cannot they be given the 9,000 poods they need from the Moscow warehouses or, if that is absolutely impossible, from the Tambov grain collection depots? *It is essential* to help them.[123]

Regards,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the typewritten copy

204

TELEGRAM TO I. I. VATSETIS

Urgent
Top priority
15. XI. 1918

Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis
Serpukhov
Copy to Trotsky

I request you to decide in favour of the plan of the Central Bureau of the occupied countries* for forming Polish and Lithuanian shock battalions, in particular a Western brigade on the Southern Front. I am reminding Trotsky of our decision.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

205

TO THE MANAGER OF THE PEOPLE'S BANK[124]

I think there has been enough celebrating. *It is ludicrous!*

---

* This refers to the Central Bureau of Communist Organisations in the occupied regions.—*Ed.*

We shall "celebrate" 14. XII by a nice, correct, skilful, rapid *merger* of the Co-operative Bank with the State Bank.

Lenin

19. XI. 1918

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

206

TELEGRAM TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF THE NORTHERN AREA

21. XI. 1918

Technical Committee
Northern Economic Council
Petrograd

I severely reprimand you for procrastination and non-fulfilment of the directive of the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council for the delivery of materials to the Central Science and Technology Laboratory of the Military Department. I demand that the materials be issued immediately and that every assistance be given in accelerating the experiments. Report fulfilment.[125]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

207

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

21. XI. 1918

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

Today I severely reprimanded the Technical Committee of the Northern Economic Council for procrastination. Explain to the Economic Council of the Northern Area that

its duty is to expedite experiments and ensure speedy fulfilment of the assignments of the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council. If the document from the Technical Committee dated November 13, No. 646, is not merely a case of procrastination and stupidity, but malicious sabotage, then I demand an investigation and the arrest of those guilty.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

208
TELEGRAM TO V. M. GITTIS

23. XI. 1918

Army Commander Gittis
Vologda

I am entirely in sympathy with your plan to release prisoners of war, but only a few at a time and exclusively those who have really been won over by our propaganda. Telegraph me at once, if necessary in code, how many prisoners you have, of what nationality, and how many of them have been propagandised.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

209
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[126]

A *very* detailed and *caustic* reply must be drawn up. Do we recognise the German Government? *Is it recognised by all* the Councils of Deputies in Germany? If it is, then we, too, recognise it.

"Not to influence"? By word of mouth, by the press?

From the viewpoint of democracy or dictatorship? Please clarify, but we declare that if they demand in the form of an *ultimatum* that we *do not carry on agitation*, we shall *not* break with them on that account.

Written on November 23, 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

210

TO THE BUSINESS MANAGER OF THE C.P.C.

I am *for* using this palace as a museum. Get Sverdlov's *written* consent.[127]

Lenin

26/XI.

Written on November 26, 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

211

CONVERSATION BY DIRECT LINE WITH B. M. VOLIN NOVEMBER 29, 1918

Comrade Volin, Chairman of the Orel Gubernia Executive Committee and Gubernia Party Committee, on the line:

I have just received a telegram from Surazh as follows: "On November 29, a congress of German Councils in the Ukraine is taking place at Gomel. It is essential to send representatives. We have sent the head of the Information Department, and others. We are conducting talks with a big German Council in the Ukraine and are enlisting in the Red Army volunteers from the German army. Send directives for talks to our representatives in the Ukraine. Our representatives have been guaranteed safety, they are under German protection. The temper of the German army is thoroughly Bolshevik." I decided today to send to Gomel a Communist, Chairman of the Soviet, and a German, the Communist Meyer, from the International Detachment. Should the Chairman of the Orel Soviet only make a speech of greetings or can he take upon himself a political mission? I am asking you for a directive. If you know of this congress and have sent your representatives, then perhaps our delegation is not necessary.

Lenin: I know nothing about this congress. I advise you to get in touch immediately with the Ukrainian Communists and with their Central Committee via Kursk. The reports about the majority of the German Councils being on the side of the Bolsheviks must be carefully verified. If this is not the case, then it is necessary at the congress to deliver a detailed, well-substantiated, principled speech about Bolshevism and its tasks. If, however, the German soldiers are already Bolsheviks or Spartacists, then we must propose to them an immediate alliance with us for the speediest restoration of Soviet power in the Ukraine and for the arrest not only of whiteguards, but also of the supporters of the Rada. In any case people must be sent to the congress who are capable of accurately reporting back all the discussions and resolutions.

If it is already too late to send new representatives to the congress, then try to wire my note through to the people you have already sent. I await a reply.

Volin: Vladimir Ilyich, I informed you that I decided to send the Chairman of the Soviet to Gomel. He is leaving tonight. That was why I asked for your directive. Simultaneously with this I shall try to get in touch with Kursk.

Lenin: I am very glad that you are sending the chairman to the congress. I hope you are satisfied with my suggestions. Arrange for me to get information about each day of the congress.[128]

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten copy

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

212

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

30. XI. 1918

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd
Copy to Strievsky

Volkov, representative of Petrosoyuz,* and Misyursky, a delegate from the conference of workers' co-operatives of

* Petrograd Co-operative Union.—*Ed.*

the Northern Region, declare that there was not and could not be any shadow of assistance to counter-revolutionaries in paying salaries and wages to office staff and workers one month in advance. They promise to dispel the misunderstanding that has arisen, and express a desire to work with complete loyalty on the basis of the new decree.[129] Khinchuk confirms their assurances.

Please go into the matter closely and give the co-operators an opportunity to work.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

213

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

3. XII. 1918

Copy to the Chairman
of the *Petrograd* Section of the *Vecheka**

Comrade Zinoviev,

Comrade Karl Moor, a Swiss, has sent me a long letter asking for *Palchinsky* to be set free on the grounds that he is a prominent technician and organiser, author of Many books, etc. I have heard and read about Palchinsky as having been a speculator, etc., *during Kerensky's time*.

But I do not know whether there is now any evidence against Palchinsky? Of what kind? Is it serious? Why has the amnesty law not been applied to him?[130]

If he is a scientist, a writer, could he not—if there are serious charges against him—be given special treatment (for example, house arrest, a laboratory, etc.).

Please reply to me *immediately in writing*.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

* All-Russia Extraordinary Commission.—*Ed.*

214

TELEGRAM TO THE TAMBOV GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

7. XII. 1918

Gubernia Executive Committee
Tambov
Copy to Uyezd Executive Committee
Borisoglebsk

Received a complaint from Ivan Bogdanov about the arrest for sabotage of his 17-year-old son, Vladimir, who is suffering from bronchitis. Re-examine the case, check as to the illness, inexperience, youth of the arrested person, and particularly investigate whether the real saboteurs were not the 30 officials of the Commissariat for Agriculture who had refused to do the work and shifted it on to Bogdanov. Telegraph the result of the check.[131]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

215

TO L. B. KAMENEV[132]

If you go deeper into the matter you will see that this manoeuvring is precisely a **concession to an alien element**, namely, the "free trader".

Written on December 10, 1918

First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

216

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

11. XII. 1918

Dear V. D.,

I am sending you a pamphlet on the implementation of laws Think of a *title* that would be most clear, striking and resounding.

And publish it **as quickly as possible.**[133]

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

217
TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

12. XII. 1918

Trotsky
Voronezh
or present whereabouts

Astrakhan wires re necessity of stepping up work by the flotilla* in view of the uprising of the Bolsheviks in Georgia and the highly dangerous menace of a British advance. Would you not find it useful if Raskolnikov, who for some reason is hanging around in Moscow, were sent to Astrakhan?

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

218
TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

12. XII. 1918

Dear Comrade Shlyapnikov,

I am taking this opportunity to send you greetings and materials for the investigation.[134] Think it over thoroughly in advance and discuss it with 2 or 3 of **the most reliable** members of the Cheka, and catch the scoundrels named here **without fail.** Spare no effort to catch and shoot the

* The Astrakhan-Caspian naval flotilla.—*Ed.*

Astrakhan profiteers and bribe-takers. This riffraff must be dealt with in such a way that everyone will remember it *for years to come*.

The materials, I have been told, come from an *honest* tradesman who has remained here.

Regarding your requests and commissions, I have phoned, asked and repeated them.* I hope that part—and the most substantial part—will be met. The whole, of course, is beyond our resources.

Telegraph what items among those outstanding are most urgently required.

Do your utmost to carry out repairs and increase the carrying capacity of the Astrakhan railway line.

What success has been achieved at sea? With our fleet? With the base near Kizlyar?[135]

Write!

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Astrakhan

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Published in full in 1956 in the book: V. I. Lenin, *Voyennaya perepiska* (War Correspondence), Moscow

Printed from the original

219

TELEGRAMS TO L. D. TROTSKY

1

Trotsky at his present whereabouts

Perm is in a dangerous plight.[136] I consider it essential to send reinforcements. Petrograd can provide regiments

* This refers to the speeding up of deliveries of arms and munitions to Astrakhan.—*Ed.*

of Soviet poor peasants, there are two of them there, or others, at the direction of the Revolutionary Military Council. We propose that you give the appropriate directives as quickly as possible. We propose that you point out to the Revolutionary Military Council* the tremendous importance of Kizel District of Perm which supplies coal to the factories and the entire railway. The loss of Kizel will halt traffic.

*Lenin***

Written on December 12, 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
of the telegraph tape

2

All coded
13. XII. 191

Trotsky
Voronezh
or present whereabouts

News from around Perm is extremely alarming. Danger threatens it. I am afraid we forgot about the Urals. Bring pressure to bear on Vatsetis without fail and check whether he is sufficiently energetically providing reinforcements for Perm and the Urals. Lashevich told Zinoviev that only blooded units should be sent.

Lenin

First published in part on
February 23, 1938, in *Pravda*
No. 53
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

---

* The Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front.—*Ed.*

** The telegram was signed also by Sverdlov.—*Ed.*

220

TO G. I. PETROVSKY[137]

Petrovsky

I demand *immediate* institution of the *strictest* investigation and a report to me on its institution and the *result.*

Lenin

16/XII.

Written on December 16, 1918
First published in 1931 in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*
Printed from the original

221

TO Y. M. SVERDLOV

Sverdlov,
for your information

Yesterday, 15/XII, Bukharin told me that, as testified by Yem. Yaroslavsky, Spiridonova is conducting *party* propaganda.[138]

Written on December 16, 1918
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50
Printed from the original

222

TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

21. XII. 1918

To the Vecheka

Comrade Dzerzhinsky,

I enclose a complaint.

Please find out without fail who is responsible for this red tape (*no* reply from 3.XII to 20.XII!! Yet the decree *is dated 21. XI!!!*) and prosecute.[139] Such a disgraceful thing

must not he allowed to go unpunished. Apparently there are saboteurs in the office.

Further, you must appoint a person to *take charge* of the speedy, immediate transfer of the warehouses.

Report what you have done.

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

223
TO D. A. BULATOV

25. XII. 1918

Bulatov, Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee
Tver

I authorise you to investigate the enclosed complaint and report the result to me as soon as possible.

Report essentials by telegraph ("re the case of the schoolteacher Ivanova").

Particularly important: check the statement that in the Poor Peasants' Committee there are former and present *elements of the Black Hundreds*: Teterin, Skvortsov, Kozlov, Baskakov.

Start the check discreetly to prevent premature publicity and be able to catch them red-handed and expose them completely.

Should the accusation prove to be true, these Black Hundreders must be kicked out publicly and a leaflet about the affair *promulgated* throughout the volost and uyezd, for the population *must* be taught that well-founded complaints are of great significance and lead to important results.

Telegraph me: "Letter received, directive will be carried out", and then about the *progress* of the investigation.

Send the results by letter, the exact findings of the investigation and the *measures taken*.

I think that as Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee you need no special mandate from me for such a simple case. If need be, I will send it.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

N.B. Enclosed herewith is V. S. Ivanova's complaint.[140]

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXI*

Printed from the original

224

TELEGRAM TO S. A. BANK[141]

Bank, Chairman of the Uyezd Economic Council
Vyshny Volochok

Army stores are at the disposal of the military authorities. Hand over army stocks to the military department; unseal all stores; distribute property among the departments; carry out stocktaking without interrupting current work.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written on December 25, 1918
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

225

TELEGRAM TO THE RODNIKI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[142]

Rodniki Executive Committee
Rodniki, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia
Copy to the Cheka

Immediately unseal the store-room and living-room of Pyotr Ilyich Surkov in Kutilovo village. Report the names

of those who did the sealing and the explanation of their action, why they are requisitioning books. Wire execution.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

226

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC

27. XII. 1918

Revolutionary Military Council
Serpukhov

I fully agree with Trotsky's telegram on fraternisation.[143] Please urgently draft an instruction on fraternisation and especially encourage it on the Northern Front.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

227

TELEGRAM TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE YUZHSK FACTORY

28. XII. 1918

Management of the Yuzhsk nationalised factory
Vyazniki

Two days ago the Food Commissariat issued an urgent order for grain to be delivered from Nizhni-Novgorod for the Vyazniki distribution centre. I advise going to Nizhni. I authorise you to make a check and urge speed. Complain to me if there is any red tape.[144]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1931
in *Lenin Miscellany XVIII*

Printed from the original

228

TELEGRAM TO THE RODNIKI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

28. XII. 1918

Executive Committee
Rodniki, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia

Mail all your decisions on libraries. Surkov agrees to hand over his library to the local workers' reading-room, and this seems to me fair.[145]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

229

TO THE LIBRARY SECTION OF THE COMMISSARIAT FOR EDUCATION[146]

30. XII. 1918

Please receive the bearer, Comrade Prokofiev. His request for the requisitioning of Surkov's library for a district of 40,000 people is, in my opinion, correct. Surkov, perhaps, should retain certain rights to use it? Please send me a copy of your decision on this question, and help the Rodniki comrades to expand their library. Can they not be sent one of the libraries requisitioned from the landowners? Please inform me about this as well.[147]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

230

TO S. P. SEREDA

1) When will the pamphlet *Issue VI. Materials on Land Reform* be published?

2) The remaining issues should be speeded up.[148]

(This publication is *extremely* important.)

3) I think at least *half a page* should be added *clearly* setting forth the *policy* of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture (otherwise, there is the danger that the pamphlet, "in going among the people", will muddle them up).

Written at the end of 1918

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

231

NOTE ON THE PUBLICATION OF LEAFLETS

I agree.

More and more such leaflets (with translations into *French*, *Italian* and Ukrainian) should be sent *at once also to the south*, to the Ukraine, to meet the British.[149]

Lenin

Written at the end of 1918

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

1919

232
TO V. I. NEVSKY[150]

What has been done to *speed up* train traffic?

When was the order given for this traffic to be run at *passenger service* speed? Obtain for me information on *traffic speed*.

Written on January 1, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

233
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1. I. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I have given orders for trucks to be dispatched to Petrograd from Moscow and from Nizhni-Novgorod by passenger trains. See to it. If you were caught napping during the hold-up a month ago and failed to lodge a complaint in time, then you can blame yourself also for not having taken steps to verify the speed of trucks after our telephone conversation on Friday.*

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

* December 27, 1918.—*Ed.*

234

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

January 1, 1919

Greetings and New Year salutations to the Communist group. With all my heart I wish that in the new year we shall all commit fewer stupidities than in the old and that the building up of Soviet power, to which the comrades of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs in particular are devoting their labours, will be carried to a successful conclusion.

Lenin

Pravda No. 3, January 4, 1919

Printed from the typewritten copy, collated with the newspaper text

235

TO A. N. PROKOFIEV

3. I. 1919

Comrade Prokofiev,

I am sending you Bryusov's letter.[151] Please return it to me with information as to how you settled the question of Surkov's library.

I hope, nevertheless, you will do everything possible to give Surkov *some* satisfaction: for example, the right to use it, *and so forth*.

It appears you should have approached the *Library Section of the Extra-Mural Department*. I will ask them to take care of you.[152]

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*N. Lenin*)

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

236

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

To be coded
3. I. 1919

Trotsky
Voronezh
or present whereabouts

Am very uneasy about whether you are not giving too much attention to the Ukraine to the detriment of the general strategic task, on which Vatsetis insists and which consists in a speedy, determined and general offensive against Krasnov. I am very much afraid that we are being late with this and that the recent successes of the Krasnovites near Tsaritsyn will again lead to the postponement of our offensive and to our missing the right moment. The initiative for serious operations is escaping from us, both at Astrakhan and on the Caspian Sea, as well as at Tsaritsyn and in the east. Vatsetis is for a speedy general offensive against Krasnov, but Vatsetis, apparently, is not able to cope with red tape and the separatism of the Ukrainians and other regionalists. Should you not concentrate wholly on hastening and carrying through a general offensive against Krasnov?

Lenin

First published in part in *Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921*, Vol. III
Published in full in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

237

TO THE VESYEGONSK UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE TVER GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

3. I. 1919

Please discuss the question of helping the Vasyutino Committee of the R.C.P. with timber, a financial loan and a library for the restoration of the People's House de-

stroyed by fire. If help is required from the centre, notify me simultaneously with applications to the appropriate People's Commissariats.[153]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Izvestia of the Vesyegonsk Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies No. 2 (30), January 18, 1919

Printed from the newspaper text

238

TELEGRAM TO RYABININ[154]

5. I. 1919

Ryabinin, Chairman, general meeting of workers
Gorkino, Northern Railway

The delegates may come whenever they like. I shall try to see them personally, but if I cannot, then it will be through the secretary.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

239

TELEGRAM TO THE SIMBIRSK GUBERNIA FOOD COMMISSAR

A committee from 42 organisations of starving Petrograd and Moscow workers is complaining about your inefficiency. I demand the maximum effort on your part, an end to a formal attitude to the work and the utmost assistance to the starving workers. In the event of failure, I shall be compelled to arrest the entire staff of your institutions and have them prosecuted. I have given urgent orders to

increase the number of locomotives and trucks. You should immediately load the available two trains of 30 trucks each. Telegraph fulfilment.

You are obliged to receive grain from the peasants day and night. If it is confirmed that you have not been accepting grain after 4 p.m. and compelling the peasants to wait until the morning, you will be shot.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 6, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

240

TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV FOR THE UFA REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

Gusev
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Arzamas

Inform the Revolutionary Committee in Ufa for their guidance that negotiations must be begun immediately with the Socialist-Revolutionaries who are proposing negotiations, after taking all precautions against attempts at provocations and for safeguarding the front, while at the same time guaranteeing absolute personal immunity to the envoys from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. At the talks it is to be stated clearly straight away that there can be no question of any change in the Soviet Constitution, because Soviet power, being the power of the exploited classes for suppressing the exploiters, has definitely proved its necessity for securing victory over the bourgeoisie, and the Soviet movement is now spreading to all countries of the world.

Continually report directly to us on the whole course of the negotiations, and on the participants of both sides.[155]

*Lenin, Sverdlov**

Written on January 6, 1919

First published in 1960 in the book: Y. M. Sverdlov, *Izbranniye proizvedeniya v trekh tomakh* (Selected Works in three volumes), Vol. 3**

Printed from the original

241

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE CASPIAN-CAUCASIAN FRONT, THE ASTRAKHAN GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND GUBERNIA COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

Shlyapnikov, Gubernia Executive Committee
Gubernia Committee of the Party of Communists
*Astrakhan****

A conflict with the Party Committee is inadmissible. Take all steps to ensure proper teamwork. All Party members, irrespective of the post they occupy, must belong to the local organisation. The Party Committee should not interfere in the work of institutions directly subordinated to the centre. It has the right only to put its views before the Central Committee. All local work is directed by the Party centre. Intervention is possible from within or if there is a special instruction of the C.C. on some concrete question. Similar relations should be established with the Gubernia Executive Committee. Only in the event of non-fulfilment of decrees or of work against the decisions of the central authority is direct intervention possible. Great tact is essential, then conflicts will be impossible. General talk about the need for a radical purge in military institutions is of no

* The last sentence of the telegram and the signatures are in Sverdlov's handwriting.—*Ed.*

** In this publication it is erroneously indicated that the telegram was written by Sverdlov.—*Ed.*

*** The word "Astrakhan" is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

value. We shall take note of concrete references to particular facts or persons.

*Lenin**

Written on January 7 or 8, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sverdlov's handwriting and signed by Lenin

242

DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF[156]

We append three signatures of C.C. members to the demand of the two C.C. members, and forward this demand, as a demand of the Central Committee, to the military authorities for fulfilment.

Members of the C.C., R.C.P.

Moscow, 8. I. 1919

*Lenin***

First published (in facsimile) in 1939 in *Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal* No. 5

Printed from the original

243

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

9. I. 1919

Front Headquarters
Astrakhan
for transmission by radio to Orjonikidze
Vladikavkaz

Received your first telegram. I thank you and send greetings. Please report more frequently.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* This is followed by the signature of Sverdlov in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

** There follow the signatures of Sverdlov and Smilga.—*Ed.*

244
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

10. I. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

From my talks with Ravich and Kalinin, and from Shadurskaya's telegram I gather that nine-tenths of the top machinery of government in Petrograd are engaged in doing nothing. I advise you to think over and urgently carry out a reorganisation, by transferring tens, if not hundreds, of the best people to actual control of transport, with you yourself heading the actual control of the food trains. Otherwise there is no salvation.

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

245
TELEGRAM TO THE RYAZAN GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

12. I. 1919

Gubernia Executive Committee
Ryazan

What steps have been taken in connection with the large-scale profiteering discovered by the State Control in public dining-rooms?[157]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

246

TELEGRAM TO THE SUZDAL UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[158]

12. I. 1919

Uyezd Executive Committee
Suzdal, Vladimir Gubernia
Copy to *Gubernia Executive Committee*
Vladimir

Check very strictly the behaviour of the anti-profiteer detachments and the Extraordinary Commission in Gavrilov Posad. Are receipts being issued for the requisitioned grain, are accounts properly kept, what is being done with the requisitioned grain? Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

247

INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY[159]

The first intelligent report. Find out who *Pashkov* is, write to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs that I welcome this *first intelligent report*, I thank Pashkov, and demand *the same* from others.

Written on January 13, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

248

TELEGRAM TO A. P. KUDRYAVTSEV

Kudryavtsev, Head of Library Section, Commissariat for Education
Petrograd

Guard Struve's library, deposited at the Polytechnical Institute, from being looted. Hand over the most valuable

items to the Public Library, the remainder to the Polytechnical Institute. The portrait of Gerd by Yaroshenko should be handed to Nina Alexandrovna Struve through the Director of the Polytechnical Institute.

Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 13, 1919
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

249
TO A. D. TSYURUPA[160]

Tsyurupa:

In any case we must *prepare for*, announce and hold Starving Children's Week.

Perhaps it should be combined with *grain requisitioning* and a *special* mobilisation of the Poor Peasants' Committees.

Perhaps something more could be done for the children? *It should be.*

I enclose this *about meat*: please return it to me as quickly as possible with the Food Commissariat's *brief* comment.[161]

Written in January, not earlier than 14, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50
Printed from the original

250
TO THE BUSINESS MANAGER OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

18. I. 1919

I direct you to report to me immediately all complaints received by the Managing Department of the Council of People's Commissars against all government offices and persons; complaints in writing must be reported to me

within twenty-four hours, oral ones—within forty-eight hours.

The Managing Department should introduce a special registration of these complaints, the person in charge of the office of the Managing Department being responsible for careful supervision over the fulfilment of my instructions written on these complaints.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the
typewritten
text signed by Lenin

251
TO L. D. TROTSKY[162]

Comrade Trotsky,

Return this to me, please, after writing your opinion.

I think it is *an absolute scandal* that Vatsetis assigned the three regiments to Narva. *Cancel it!!*

Lenin

21/I.

Written on January 21, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

252
TO M. K. VLADIMIROV

22. I. 1919

Comrade Vladimirov,

Your letter received.[163] Many thanks. I shall try to have the draft adopted immediately, even before the meeting of the Council of Defence—by viva voce.

It would be good if you were to give for the press (if only occasionally) *appeals* addressed to the workers.

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

253
TO K. I. LANDER

23. I. 1919

Comrade Lander,

I draw your attention to the decision adopted today in the C.P.C.: you are directed to check *before Saturday* (by the Saturday sitting of the C.P.C.) fulfilment by *Prodfaztop** for other bodies of the Food Commissariat) of the decree of the C.P.C. dated January 18, 1919;

—to ascertain the reasons for procrastination;

—to discover the people who are to blame.[164]

Appoint an *intelligent Communist* inspector, be sure to add to him a *worker*, and *make haste*, so that they begin work *Friday morning* (if no worker is available, *start without him* and let him join in later).

I consider the matter important; they should supply information *the same day*. It is necessary to check the business correspondence of Prodfaztop, the office routine in regard to telegrams (whether they are in order, whether they are easy to find, whether the time of reply is checked, and so on).

Please do this as quickly and as strictly as possible.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* A department of the People's Commissariat for Food in charge of food supplies for workers of factories, mills and fuel organisations.—*Ed.*

254

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Secret

Trotsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council
Kozlov, or present whereabouts

Wilson is proposing a truce and is calling all the governments of Russia to a conference. I am afraid he wants to secure for himself Siberia and part of the south, having no hope otherwise of keeping anything. In the light of the capture of Orenburg, Lugansk and Chertkov this circumstance compels us, in my opinion, to exert every effort to capture Rostov, Chelyabinsk and Omsk within a month. This last is in accordance with our talk. Make a special check of Vatsetis's strategy after the capture of Orenburg and give your opinion. I think you will have to go to Wilson.[165]

Lenin

Written on January 24, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten copy

255

TELEGRAM TO THE SAMARA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[166]

27. I. 1919

Gubernia Executive Committee
Samara

Send immediately to Moscow all the material against the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Alexander Mikhailovich Smirnov, report the reasons for his arrest, verify his statement about wishing to work with Soviet power against Kolchak, meanwhile give Smirnov most favourable treatment while under arrest.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

256
TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

30. I. 1919

Sklyansky

From Z. P. Krzhizhanovskaya via a woman delegate to the Extra-Mural Education Con-

A group of eight airmen in the army in the field, Tsaritsyn Front, Red Air Fleet (23rd Aeronautical Detachment)—headed by chauffeur *Baranov* (previously of the 8th unit of the Special Aeronautical Division)—request that inspectors be sent there, they report that the air detachments exist *only on paper* and that the state of affairs threatens *catastrophe*.[167]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

257
TO L. B. KRASIN

Hand it immediately to Chicherin and *see to it* (or instruct someone else to see to it) that this policy is *vigorously* and *incessantly* pursued.[168]

Written during
January-February 1919

First published in 1960
in the journal
Voprosy Istorii No. 7

Printed from the original

258

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY AND V. N. PODBELSKY

1

Sklyansky:

Forbid this playing at telegrams.[169]

Written on February 10, 1919

2

Sklyansky and Podbelsky:

Can't you issue a circular putting a stop to these stupid telegrams to 100 addresses?[170]

Written on February 11, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

259

TELEGRAM TO A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

12. II. 1919

Shlyapnikov
Astrakhan

Your telegram about Baku affairs[171] received. I hope you understand the tremendous importance of the question and will take the most energetic steps to make use of the feeling among the Baku people for swift and decisive action. Guarantee safety for those who come over to us. Telegraph more details.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

260

TO G. I. PETROVSKY[172]

Comrade Petrovsky,

I am told that the author is an honest man and a Party member. Please institute an investigation by *dependable* people. Notify me *whom* you have appointed.

Lenin

13/II.

Written on February 13, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

261

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE EASTERN FRONT

The retreat of the 2nd Army causes me great concern. I have spoken to Vatsetis, who will soon go to Vyatka. Please let me know what measures you are taking and what is the position regarding the hundred companies sent to join you. Second. I hope that you will do the maximum possible for food supply and give good army forces to Tsekomprodarm.* The main thing is to avoid friction with them. Report whether harmonious work has been arranged. Third. How do matters stand with regard to that secret business Gusev sent me a letter about by special messenger?

Lenin

February 14

Written on February 14, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

---

* Central Commission for Food Supply of the Red Army.—*Ed.*

262

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

18. II. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I have just heard something about the district Soviet having evicted Vera Ivanovna Zasulich and other prominent revolutionaries from the Writers' House. Why, this is a disgrace! Can it be true?[173]

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

263

TELEGRAM TO THE YELATMA UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[174]

18. II. 1919

Uyezd Executive Committee
Yelatma

Mikhail Mitrofanovich Fedoseyev of Azeyevo complains that you have nationalised his printing-press, refusing on February 6, reference No. 455, both repayment for the printing-press and compensation for removing from work his two girl apprentices and the woman binder Report immediately whether these facts are true, whether it is true that the printing-press is standing idle at Sasovo in a shed. Please discuss whether Fedoseyev can be put to typographical work or allowed to set up an association of workers and conduct controlled management of his former printing-press in full subordination to the Soviet.[175]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

264
TELEGRAM TO P. I. STUČKA AND J. A. BERZIN

19. II. 1919

Stučka, Berzin
Soviet Government of Latvia
Riga

I welcome the decision of the German workers in Riga to publish in serial form the collected works of Liebknecht and Luxemburg. I hope you will give them every assistance and expedite it, and send me a copy.

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

265
TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV

19. II. 1919

Gusev
Front Headquarters
Arzamas

Reply to coded message received, but not a word in it about food and your measures to eliminate friction and step up transport. Reply.

As for the Bashkirs, you are right to demand either disarming or immediate operations against Kolchak.[176]

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

266
TO L. B. KAMENEV

21. II. 1919

Comrade Kamenev,

The bearer is the Chairman of the Samara Gubernia Executive Committee.* He has very interesting diagrams and data about food.

---

* This refers to A. P. Galaktionov.—*Ed.*

I advise getting him to *report* for a large number of Moscow workers. There is plenty of grain. That's a fact. *It will do them good to hear it.*

Yours,
Lenin

First published on December 29, 1957, in the newspaper *Volzhskaya Kommuna* No. 304

Printed from the original

267

TO THE TEACHERS OF TVER GUBERNIA[177]

Comrade Ramensky
Representative of Tver Gubernia

Tell the teachers of Tver Gubernia that the kulaks have their grain and that the task of Soviet power is to turn this grain over to the working people.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

22/II. 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the copy written in an unknown hand

268

CERTIFICATE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DANILOV TEXTILE MILL

24. II. 1919

This is to certify that comrades representing the Danilov Textile Mill visited me on the question of issuing to them a ration in textiles. Since this question has been decided by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, which, under the Constitution, *stands above* the Council of People's Commissars, neither I, as Chairman of the C.P.C.,

nor the Council of People's Commissars have the right to alter this decision.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

269

TELEGRAMS TO M. K. VLADIMIROV

1

Vladimirov

The Council of Defence has decided that if the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic fails, within two days, to present a reasoned decision in favour of the Povorino-Tsaritsyn line, we shall give priority to the Liski-Likhaya line. The Commissariat for Railways plainly states that there cannot be enough materials for restoring the bridges of both lines. I fully agree with this decision of the Council of Defence, but if you can perform a miracle by contriving to repair the Povorino-Tsaritsyn line in addition to the Liski-Likhaya line, you will indeed be a miracle worker.

Lenin

2

I personally agree to leave you if you undertake to restore both lines, as you write. I shall try today to get in touch with Tsyurupa and Sverdlov, and if we arrive at a different decision I shall telegraph you immediately. Probably Nevsky did not know what materials you can get from the south. I shall pass on to him both your memos.

Lenin

Written on February 26, 1919
Sent to Voronezh

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

The first telegram
is printed from
the original, the second
from the text
of the telegraph form

270

TELEGRAM TO S. Y. TSEKHANOVSKY[178]

26. II. 1919

Tsekhanovsky, Chairman of the Executive Committee
Rudnya
Copy to Gubernia Executive Committee, Mogilev

I can receive you, if not personally, then through my secretary. In my opinion the plan of the Communists of Mikulino Volost is not bad, but it is desirable to have at least a brief written opinion from Orsha and Mogilev as to the reasons for their negative attitude.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

271

TO MARIA KOSTELOVSKAYA[179]

I agree, but if the *Military Food Bureau* proves guilty of delaying, *even by one hour*, the work of mobilising workers both for responsible posts and for the **food army**, then all: the members of the Military Food Bureau should be **kicked out**.

Written on February 27, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

272

TO A. I. SVIDERSKY

I think all of you were wasting time "theorising". Rush Schlichter, hurry him out *to the spot*. Things will be clearer *on the spot*.[180]

Written between February and early March 1919

First published in 1925 in the book: A. G. Schlichter, *Ilyich, kakim ya yego znal* (Ilyich as I Knew Him). Kharkov

Printed from the original

273

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA[181]

1

Decrees cannot be *bypassed*: the mere proposal invites prosecution.

An exception, though, can be put *through the Central Executive Committee*, and I advise doing this.

2

One must know the law: I do not remember *through whom exceptions go*.

Written on March 4, 1919
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

274

TO THE C.C. OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

On the basis of § 3 a Note to be sent to the Polish Government with assurances that we fully agree to, and indeed desire, a decision by the vote of the working people; we desire agreement on this basis, and agree to concessions on details, and so on. This to be given as a directive from the C.C.[182]

Lenin

Written between March 4 and 24, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

275

TELEGRAM TO P. P. MYSHKIN

8. III. 1919

Myshkin, Chairman of the Gubernia Extraordinary Commission
Tsaritsyn

You cannot arrest people for disfiguring a portrait. Free

Valentina Pershikova at once, and if she is a counter-revolutionary, keep an eye on her.[183]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

276

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA[184]

I'm sorry if Khryashchova lives a long way off and has to come on foot.

Tell her tactfully when you get a chance that on days when there are no questions of statistics to be discussed she can leave earlier or not come at all.

Written on March 8, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

277

TELEGRAM TO A. L. KOLEGAYEV

10. III. 1919

Kolegayev, Chief of Supply, Southern Front
Kozlov or present whereabouts

How many food trains have been dispatched to Moscow and how many can you dispatch next month? Has everything been done in fulfilment of the Central Committee's directive on measures to collect foodstuffs in Don Region? Exactly how much has been collected and delivered, how is the collecting going? Have you enough workers from the centre for food work? Please reply by telegraph.[185]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

278

TO L. B. KAMENEV[186]

12. III. 1919

Comrade Kamenev,

The bearers are comrades from Sarapul Uyezd, Vyatka Gubernia.

They have brought us and Petrograd 40,000 poods of grain each. This is such a remarkable feat that it fully deserves quite special congratulations. The comrades, by the way, ask to be put in touch with the trade unions. Please arrange as soon as possible for them to make a report in the Soviet. A paragraph about it should also be given to the press. Please phone me when you get this note, and then send the bearers to Schmidt and Tomsky.

Greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

279

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA[187]

Lyd. Al.,

Reply that I have passed his address for decrees on to the Bureau of the Central Committee (and send it there), and that he can write to me directly to the Kremlin, Moscow.

Written in March, after 17, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

280

TO G. I. PETROVSKY

Comrade Petrovsky,

Please send this or a similar telegram, or give orders for an inspection through the Gubernia Executive Committee.[188]

Lenin

Written in March, not later than 22, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

281

TO TELEGRAM TO V. N. KAYUROV[189]

Secret
27. III. 1919

Kayurov
5th Army

Your unaccountably optimistic telegram received; I very much fear that such optimism, which has already done much harm in the east, will do more harm now. Report whether you gave your opinion to Trotsky and what measures you have taken to improve political work, put heart into the reinforcements and inspire them with political consciousness.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1924
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia*
No. 3 (26)

Printed from the original

282

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

2. IV. 1919

Comrade *People's Commissar* for Internal Affairs

Representatives of Putivl Uyezd, Kursk Gubernia, are complaining about the elections. *Re-elections to the Soviets* are required in accordance with the law. Please reply to me what you have done—made an inspection, a check-up, issued an order, of what kind? etc.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

283

TELEGRAM TO G. N. KAMINSKY*

Kaminsky
Tula

I shall at once inform Krasin, and regarding finance—Krestinsky.[190] Take rigorous measures in general; regarding Red Army men's rations I cannot decide just now, I am told they received $1\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. The causes of lowered productivity must be investigated. Report to us more frequently, both you and Orlov.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 4, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

284

TELEGRAM TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 10th ARMY

4. IV. 1919

10th Army Commander
Tsaritsyn
Copy to Divisional Commander Dumenko
Velikoknyazheskaya

Convey my greetings to the hero of the 10th Army, Comrade Dumenko, and his valiant cavalry, who have covered themselves with glory in liberating Velikoknyazheskaya from the fetters of the counter-revolution. I am confident that the crushing of the Krasnov and Denikin counter-revolutionaries will be carried through to the end.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

285

RADIO-TELEGRAM TO BELA KUN

Bela Kun
Budapest

I am sending you a copy of our radio-telegram of today to Pichon on the question of the exchange with France.[191]

Our Red Cross Commission headed by Manuilsky left for France to organise repatriation of our men, but has been held up. We promised to repatriate the French servicemen still with us if repatriation of our men from France is organised and proceeds at full speed. The French Government prevented Manuilsky's Commission from organising this work. Of the 35,000 Russian soldiers in France, Africa and Salonica, France wants to repatriate 900 men now and makes empty promises of repatriating our soldiers later on as opportunity offers, but in exchange for this, France demands that we should immediately let all the Frenchmen go home.

France wants to send Manuilsky's mission back together with the 900 Russian soldiers, although nothing has been done to organise further repatriation. France wants to get everything and give almost nothing and get rid of Manuilsky.

Yet we are aware that our soldiers who remain in France and refuse to join the army are subjected to the most monstrous persecution and that Manuilsky has been forbidden to establish any sort of contact with them.

We refuse, on such conditions, to let the Frenchmen go home. This is the substance of my radio-telegram, a copy of which is being sent to you. The French will shout blue murder, and tell the Americans every sort of disgusting lie. Please hand a copy of our Note to the American representative for his government.

Lenin

Written on April 4, 1919

First published in 1958 in *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II

Printed from the typewritten copy
Translated from the German

286

TO D. I. KURSKY

It is time we endorsed *general* standing orders for the C.P.C.

1. For those making reports—*10* minutes
2. For speakers, the first time *5* minutes, the second time *3* minutes.
3. To speak not more than twice.
4. On a point of order, 1 for and 1 against, each for one minute.
5. Exceptions by *special* rulings of the C.P.C.[192]

Written in April,
not later than 5, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

287

TO THE SARATOV SOVIET BODIES (GUBERNIA FOOD COMMITTEE, GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, CITY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, ETC.)

5. IV. 1919

I fully subscribe to the request of the People's Commissariat for Food that every assistance be given the Saratov *Council for the Protection of the Starving Children of the Red Capitals*. For my part, I earnestly request that every effort be made to assist this Council for the Protection of Children.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

288

REPLY TO PEASANTS OF SKOPIN UYEZD[193]

To impose the extraordinary tax on peasants with below average income is *illegal*. Measures have been taken to lighten the taxation of *middle* peasants. In a few days there will be a decree.[194] Regarding the remaining questions, I shall make immediate inquiries of the People's Commissars and a reply will be sent to you.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

5/IV—1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the typewritten copy

289

TO S. P. SEREDA AND A. D. TSYURUPA[195]

Sereda *and* **Tsyurupa**

Peasant Filipp Ilyich Bodrov (living in Forest School, Sokolniki, Moscow)—formerly a Petrograd worker, over 20 years in the Party—who has a farm in Venev Uyezd, Tula Gubernia (about 20 members of the family living together, undivided, a "*middle peasant*"), assures mc that grain can be *carted* to Moscow over a distance of up to 200 versts (his village is 180 versts from Moscow). We have grain, he says, we also have surpluses.

We have missed the winter period, he says, but *after the sowing* (which ends at about St. Nicholas's Day*) there will be *about a month*'s free time (before dung carting, about a week before St. Peter's Day**). This, he says, should be utilised.

Information should be collected *urgently*, *at once*, and if there is *even a slight chance*, this measure should be carried out, for there will be no consignments from the east.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

7. IV. 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* May 9.—*Ed.*
** June 29.—*Ed.*

290

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO V. L. PANYUSHKIN[196]

Comrade Panyushkin

I direct you to begin entraining the brigade immediately, without loss of time, and to dispatch it urgently to its destination. I order you to go to the front with the brigade. Report fulfilment.

Lenin

Written on April 7, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the typewritten copy

291

RADIO-TELEGRAMS TO BELA KUN[197]

1

April 7, 1.45 p.m.

Lenin asks you to greet the Bavarian Soviet Republic. He requests to be informed urgently and in as great detail as possible. In particular about everything concerned with land socialisation in Bavaria.

Lenin

2

April 8, 2.15 a.m.

Please give us details about the revolution that has taken place in Bavaria. Apart from the brief radio-telegram of the Bavarian Soviet Government we have no information. Please let us know how events are developing there and whether the new order holds full sway. Please give us the information I asked for yesterday about your programme on the national question. What is the position in Bavaria as regards the agrarian programme of the Soviet Government?*

Lenin

Münchner Neueste Nachrichten No. 162, April 9, 1919

First published in Russian in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the newspaper text Translated from the German

* This refers to the Bavarian Soviet Government.—*Ed.*

292

TELEGRAM TO THE KNYAGININ UYEZD LAND DEPARTMENT

Uyezd Land Department
Knyaginin
Copy to Knyaginin Second Zapyansk Society
Ichalki

Compulsory measures of any kind to make the peasants pass over to the communal working of the fields are impermissible. Non-observance of this will be punished with all the severity of revolutionary law.[198]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on April 8, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten text
signed by Lenin

293

TELEGRAM TO N. N. KUZMIN[199]

8. IV. 1919

Kuzmin, Military Commissar of the 6th Army
Vologda or Plesetskaya
or present whereabouts

Your telegrams give me the impression that the British are deceiving us. Therefore, while by no means anticipating the orders your military superior may give you, I, for my part, ask that security and vigilance be strengthened to the utmost, and every effort be made also to step up our offensive.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* The telegram was signed also by S. P. Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture.—*Ed.*

294

TELEGRAM TO THE KAZAN GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

9. IV. 1919

Gubernia Executive Committee
Kazan
Copy to the Military Revolutionary Committee

Citizens Chernyshov, Sorokin, Semyonov and Herman complain from Yadrin that they have been kept in prison for 5 months without being interrogated. Investigate complaint without delay and give me an explanation at once.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

295

TELEGRAM TO S. K. MININ[200]

Thanks for the news. Please consider a number of systematic measures for a stable improvement of the situation in Tula.

Lenin

Written on April 11, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

296

TELEGRAM TO THE OREL GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[201]

12. IV. 1919

Gubernia Executive Committee
Orel
Copy to Uyezd Executive Committee
Maloarkhangelsk

Writer Ivan Volny has been arrested. His friend Gorky earnestly requests the greatest caution and impartiality in

the investigation. Can he be set free under strict surveillance? Wire.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

297
TELEGRAM TO MAXIM GORKY

14. IV. 1919

Gorky
Smolny
Petrograd

Chuzhinov, Chairman of the Orel Investigating Commission, wires me that Ivan Volny has been temporarily released pending investigation of the case.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

298
TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY[202]

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine
Kiev
Copy to the People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the Ukraine

In view of the reorganisation of the health resort system in the Republic and in the interests of providing treatment and rest at health resorts for disabled servicemen and workers, exhausted Red Army men and weakened workers from the north, urgent measures must be taken to protect the southern health resorts won back by the Red Army.

Please give immediate orders to chiefs of army units operating in the south of Russia and on the Taurida Peninsula to take the strictest steps to prevent destruction or looting of medical appliances, buildings, inventory, plantations, materials and supplies at the health resorts of southern Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, Odessa, Golaya Pristan, Berdyansk, Moinaki, Saki, Evpatoria, Sevastopol, Balaklava, Yalta, Alupka, Gurzuf, Alushta, Feodosia, Kerch, and others.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on April 15, 1919
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
the typewritten text
signed by Lenin

299
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

18. IV. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I have received your telegram about the Petrograd workers' enthusiastic response to the mobilisation.[203] Today I had a detailed report from the Commander-in-Chief, and I see clearly that unfaltering exertions and extreme speed are essential. Take advantage of Kalinin's presence to step up and accelerate dispatch of troops from Petrograd. If you can, send more also with Kalinin.

Lenin

First published on February 23,
1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

* The telegram was signed also by N. A. Semashko, People's Commissar for Health.—*Ed.*

300

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

In code

Rakovsky
Kiev

In regard to the S.R.s, I advise giving no more than three and keeping these three pretty thoroughly under surveillance of the Bolsheviks, and if they do not agree—so much the worse for them, we only stand to gain.[204] Regarding military tasks, I remind you again of two of the most important: a break-through at Bukovina and the capture of Rostov. All efforts must be devoted to these two tasks—confirm this to Podvoisky and Antonov. As to Dybenko's plans, I warn you against any adventure—I fear it will end in failure and he will be cut off.[205] Would it not be wiser to have his forces replace Makhno and strike at Taganrog and Rostov? I advise thinking it over thrice; decide yourself, of course.

Lenin

Written on April 18, 1919
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

301

TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY[206]

Comrade Dzerzhinsky,

Will you please institute a *very strict* investigation.

Lenin

18/IV.

Written on April 18, 1919
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

302

TO THE TAMBOV GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

20. IV. 1919

Gubernia Executive Committee
Tambov

I enclose a telegram from Tambov.[207] Please arrange another general meeting of these 252 (it is not clear whether they are *all* the members of the co-operative or only some of them, and if so, out of what total number) and explain the following to them:

"The Council of People's Commissars has passed a decree for the organisation of consumers' communes in the interests of correct distribution of products. It is unjust that the distribution of products essential for the *whole* population should be handled only by *part* of the population, as was the case under capitalism. In all countries the co-operatives under capitalism embrace mainly the upper sections of workers and peasants. It is essential that now not only the upper sections, but *all* working people, every one of them, should take part in the distribution of products.

"There is hardly a single one of the great founders of the world co-operative movement who has not pointed to the conversion of this movement into socialism. Now indeed this time has come, and all the best elements in the co-operatives are in sympathy with the *development* of the co-operative movement as envisaged in the decree on the conversion of the co-operatives into consumers' communes *embracing all the working people without exception.*

"The members of the consumers' communes *retain* the right of fully independent control, as also the right to conduct affairs independently. This is why I am asking the meeting to revise its decision, to recognise the binding nature of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars and not to make the workers' and peasants' government have recourse to undesirable measures of compulsion.

"*V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)
"Chairman, C.P.C."

Read out at the meeting the part in quotation marks, and publish it in the local newspaper. Amplify (*tactfully, without using hard words*) what I have said. Wire fulfilment.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1958
in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 1

Printed from the original

303

TELEGRAM
TO I. I. VATSETIS AND S. I. ARALOV[208]

In code

Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis and
Aralov, member of the R.M.C.R.
Serpukhov

The advance into part of Galicia and Bukovina is essential for contact with Soviet Hungary. This task must be achieved more quickly and surely, but beyond this task no occupation of Galicia and Bukovina is needed, for the Ukrainian army must on no account be distracted from its two main objectives: the first, the most important and most urgent, is to help the Donets Basin. This assistance must be given quickly and on a large scale. The second objective is to establish a secure link by rail with Soviet Hungary. Inform us of your directives to Antonov and measures for checking their fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 21 or 22, 1919

First published in part
on April 21, 1957,
in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* No. 48

Published in full in Ukrainian
in 1958 in the book: *Borotba trudyashchikh Bukovini za sotsialne i natsionolne vizvolennya i vozz'yednannya z Ukrainskoyu R.S.R. 1917-1941*, Chernivtsi

Published in full in Russian in 1961
in the book: *Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 2

Printed from the original

304

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY[209]

Comrade Sklyansky,

This, by the way, is pertinent to what was decided yesterday.

It is necessary **urgently**, *at once*:

1) to draw up the *text* of a directive from the C.C. to all "nationals" on army *unity* (integration)*;

2) to give it *also* to the press for a series of articles;

3) re *universal military training* (100% to be taken and not 75%[210]), prepare *immediately*, today, a draft decree;

4) calculate: 24,000 command personnel. At the ratio of 1 to 10 that means an army of *240,000*.

Verify and take as the norm at once for the Central Board of Supply of both Russia and the Ukraine.

Written on April 24, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

305

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

In code

Sokolnikov

It is necessary at all costs to put down the revolt quickly, once and for all. Beloborodov has been sent from the Central Committee. I fear you are making a mistake in not applying severe measures, but if you are absolutely convinced that there are not enough forces for dealing with it summarily, then wire immediately and in detail. What about promising an amnesty and at that price completely disarming them? Reply at once. We are sending trainees of two more commanders' courses.

Lenin

Written on April 24, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* "Draft C.C. Directives on Army Unity". See present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 404-05.—*Ed.*

306

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

You must: 1) send telegrams *today* to the Revolutionary Military Council of the *Eastern Front and to the army* about urgent measures for aiding Chistopol;

2) speak today *yourself* by direct line with the Eastern Front.

Lenin

Written on April 26, 1919

First published on September 23 1925, in *Pravda* No. 217

Printed from the original

307

TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV

26. IV. 1919

Gusev

Urgent measures must be taken to help Chistopol. Have you given this sufficient thought? Have you exhausted all possibilities? Wire.

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

308

TELEGRAM TO K. A. MEKHONOSHIN

In code

Mekhonoshin
Astrakhan

From the report of 23/4 it is evident that the *Ardahan* and *Kars* passed from Baku to Guriev with impunity. So the Astrakhan people boastfully promise great victories in the future, but at the same time they let the enemy through

to Guriev. This is outrageous and even makes one suspect either treachery or malicious sabotage. We demand from you strictest control, personal checking, careful supervision and utmost vigilance.

Lenin

Written on April 26, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

309

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV[211]

Comrade Zinoviev,

Read this yourself and show it to Comrade Badayev. He must be *strictly* reproved: one more instance of non-fulfilment of directives from the centre—and we shall *prosecute* him. This is no joke.

Get him to sign that he has read this.

Lenin

26/IV.

P.S. *Return* the enclosed material and this letter.

Written on April 26, 1919
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

310

PROTECTION CERTIFICATE FOR V. I. TANEYEV[212]

April 26, 1919

Citizen Vladimir Ivanovich *Taneyev*

Protection Certificate

On the basis of a decision of the Council of People's Commissars dated 25/III. 1919 this Protection Certificate is issued to Citizen Vladimir Ivanovich *Taneyev*, 78 years

of age, who for many years carried on scientific work and, as testified by Karl Marx, showed himself to be a "devoted friend of the people's emancipation".[213]

Citizen Vladimir Ivanovich Taneyev is given the right to visit the library of the Council of People's Commissars, and all other state libraries are directed to give him every assistance in his scientific work and researches. All Soviet authorities are instructed to afford Citizen Vladimir Ivanovich Taneyev assistance in the matter of his own security and that of his family, home and property. In the event of his travelling through the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic all railway and steamship authorities are instructed to afford Citizen Vladimir Ivanovich Taneyev and his family every possible assistance in obtaining train tickets and berths.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
the typewritten text
signed by Lenin

311

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KAMENEV

Kamenev
Kamenev's train
Ekaterinoslav

The directive about the Donets Basin was long ago repeated. Have a factual check carried out as to what exactly arrived, how much, when and where, or where it is along the line. Joffe is needed not in the Crimea, but in the government of the Ukraine in the post which Rakovsky will select for work against the tendency towards separatism. As for the Crimea, we shall find someone else, but not, of course, Dybenko.

Lenin

Written on April 28, 1919

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the decoded
text of the telegraph form

312

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR V. S. MITSKEVICH

29. IV. 1919

I hereby recommend Comrade Valentin Sergeyevich Mitskevich both as a Communist and as an indubitably conscientious worker. I would add that, according to the testimony of absolutely trustworthy comrades who have observed his work, Comrade Mitskevich has the capabilities of an organiser.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

313

TO THE PETROGRAD ORGANISATIONS

I have had a detailed report from Vatsetis and the Chief of Staff. *The conclusion is a sad one*. Strenuous efforts are needed. The present enthusiasm must *not be allowed to subside*, but must be sustained for at least 2 months and *still further intensified*. Otherwise we shall not finish the war, and finished it must be *at all costs*, as signs of weariness among the masses (100,000 deserters) are becoming more frequent.

I have discussed the following measures with Trotsky:

1) Some 3,000 Petrograd workers, *unfit* for war and unarmed, to be sent to the Don. Purpose—to set things going, to weaken the Cossacks, demoralise them *from within*, *settle among them*, set up groups in the villages, etc.

2) All means and resources to be used more and more to get ready a flotilla for the Volga. Especially *repairs*.

3) Ditto as regards artillery (without taking away from the Karelian line). It is necessary *again* and *again* to check with the army men whether it is possible to help the east with artillery.

4) Rifles to be collected, *especially broken ones* (in Tula 800 a day can be repaired; *work is lacking*).

5) Mobilisation of Petrograd workers to be continued both for the Ukraine and for the Don.

I received a telegram today from Zinoviev on the stoppage of several works, big ones, in Petrograd, owing to oil shortage. I could not get Krasin on the phone. When I do I shall tell him. But I don't think any oil is or will be available. I advise moving *every one* of these workers to the Ukraine, to the Don, to the east, for 3 months. It is stupid to starve, to perish in Petrograd, when it is possible to win grain and coal.

6) Mobilisation of Party functionaries to be continued, too, especially for places close to the front line.

It is necessary again and again "to rob Petrograd", that is, to take people from it, otherwise neither Petrograd nor Russia can be saved.

Various branches of administration and of cultural and educational work in Petrograd can and should be *weakened tenfold* for 3 months.

We shall then save both Russia and Petrograd.

We have no other workers to equal the Petrograders.

Greetings,

Lenin

Written in the second half of April 1919

First published in 1932 in the journal *Krasnaya Letopis* No. 5-6 (50-51)

Printed from the typewritten copy

314

TO L. B. KAMENEV[214]

It will not be too late to make rotten concessions in June. Tsyurupa asserts that the Central Food Purchasing Commission procured several *millions* (non-rationed), but "free procurement" killed it and yielded *much less*.

Let us check these figures—*en masse*.

1) How much (in actual fact) did the Central Food Purchasing Commission procure (and transport) in 2 or 3 months?

2) How much did the "free" carriers *transport* in *February+March*?

Written in April 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

315
TO MARIA KOSTELOVSKAYA[215]

It is to be understood for what it is—a decision of the C.C. *This is wartime*. All *must be where things are most difficult*.

Written in April 1919
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

316
TO J. E. RUDZUTAK[216]

Rudzutak: I received this on 2.V!!!!! Give them a *severe* telling-off: a telegram dated 27.IV should have reached me *not later* than 28.IV. (Send me a signed statement from the guilty parties that they have been reprimanded and warned.)

Lenin

2/V.

Written on May 2, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*
Printed from the original

317
TO E. M. SKLYANSKY[217]

Sklyansky: this is **very** important; it is necessary to *leave* them part of the 33rd Division and *immediately* get Vatsetis to send an *absolutely precise* telegram to this effect to Astrakhan.

Lenin

2/V.

Written on May 2, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the original

318

TO A. Y. BADAYEV[218]

Comrade Badayev,

Don't be capricious, you are not a school miss. You were asked not whether you consider "all your actions" "*absolutely* (!!) correct" (that is ludicrous!!), but whether you have carried out *all* orders from the centre. But you are silent about this! Go on working—*we do not accept your resignation*. In future carry out all orders from the centre and do not talk unseemly nonsense about "intrigues".

Greetings,
Lenin

4/V.

Written on May 4, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

319

TELEGRAM
TO V. A. ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO AND N. I. PODVOISKY

Antonov and Podvoisky
Kiev
Copy to Rakovsky

The Central Committee of the Party imposes a stern reprimand on Antonov and Podvoisky for having done absolutely nothing serious to liberate the Donets Basin, despite their promises and repeated insistent demands. The C.C. orders that the most strenuous efforts be made and warns that otherwise it will bring them before a Party court.

On behalf of the Central Committee,
*Lenin**

Sent 5/V. 2.37 hours

Written on May 5, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* Followed by the signatures of Stalin and Krestinsky in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

320
TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND M. M. LITVINOV[219]

Dear Comrades,

I am sending you my comments. In the absence of essential differences of opinion, decide for yourselves. My advice is: use it *for propaganda*, for clearly it can serve *no other* useful purpose. Be extremely polite to Nansen, *extremely insolent* to Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau. This is very useful, the *only* way to speak to them, the right tone.

Lenin

6/V.

I think both replies are quite correct, in proposing a meeting and thanking Nansen. But it seems to me that the *propaganda* side should be *more fully* developed, taking advantage of the fact that the Entente, while easily concealing from everyone all other documents of ours,* will be *unable*, by way of exception, to conceal *precisely this reply*.

I would therefore advise using for propaganda and elaborating *in greater detail* the separation of (α) the *humanitarian* and (β) the *political* aspect.

(α) You mention the humanitarian (it seems, *only* the humanitarian?) nature of the proposal? For this all thanks and compliments to Nansen *personally*. If it's humanitarian aims, then do not *bring* politics *into it*, dear sir, but *just start shipping* (stress this). Just start shipping! We are even ready to *pay* through the nose for it and willingly admit *you* for control and give *you* every guarantee. Dilate on this, rub it in, make it clear. *Appoint a place and time for the talks!*

But if a *truce*, then this is *politics*! You are an educated man, Mr. Nansen, you know perfectly well that *every* war and *every* truce is *politics*. This means **you** have linked the "humanitarian" with the "political". *You* have lumped them together! Explain to him, as you would to a 16-year-old lass, why a truce is *politics*.

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* The reference is to the numerous official peace proposals addressed to the Entente powers (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 191-92).—*Ed.*

(β) Is it a good thing—to mix the "humanitarian" with "politics"? No, it is a bad thing, because it is hypocrisy, for which *you* are not to blame, and it is *not you* we are blaming. For one must talk *frankly* about politics without taking cover behind "humanitarianism".

And once *you* have started talking politics, then, by your leave, we are *obliged* to answer you to the point.

(β[1]) If the truce is *for peace*, then you are perfectly aware that we are *for* it. We agreed (*even!*) to the Princes Islands. [We confirmed this to Bullitt who, unfortunately, proved, like the whole of *American policy*, to be a *captive* of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, for what Bullitt promised us, assuring us that America would make Clemenceau and Lloyd George come to heel, remained *unfulfilled* (it would be useful to "taunt" Wilson about it!).[220]]*

It was *not* we who torpedoed the Princes Islands, but the *monarchists* and *anti-Jew pogromists*, the restorers of *the landowners' estates*. Explain, develop, *prove* these three points, that Denikin and Kolchak 1) are monarchists; 2) pogromist thugs; 3) are restoring the estates of the landowners and introducing redemption payments for the peasants.

We agreed to a truce *for negotiations* about peace, of course, with those who are *really* to blame for the war, i.e., with Great Britain, France, America, and not with pawns. Explain in detail that it is *they* who are waging war, with *their* ships, their *guns*, their cartridges, *their* officers. Reveal **in detail** the *outrageously false* "renunciation of intervention" in the face of *their support* (and egging on) of the Estonians, Finns, Poles.

(β[2]) Further, if the truce is *not for peace*, but for a political game—*we don't want it*. Peace is not a joking matter. *No one* will succeed in fooling us. Develop this point, too.

Wind up with a *résumé*: *if* it is politics, then we proposed a *truce* for peace, we agreed, we did not torpedo the Princes Islands, we are always ready for talks with those *who are really to blame* for the war.

* If all are against, throw it out (probably this refers to the text which Lenin put in square brackets.—*Ed.*). But in my opinion, it is extremely useful *in practice* to set Wilson at variance with them by declaring that Wilson is a *pawn* in the hands of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, in submitting to these *two*, to this "majority"!!

PRIMARY TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

If it is *not* politics, *but* humanitarianism, we say thank-you, we accept, we invite you to come, to control, and will go anywhere you like (time, place) *and will pay* even *three times the price* in timber, ore, ships.

Indeed, we must not miss the opportunity of replying to Nansen in a way that would make *good* propaganda.[221]

Written on May 6, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

321

TELEGRAM TO V. I. MEZHLAUK

Mezhlauk, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs
Kharkov
Copy to Artyom

I have received from Lutovinov yet another confirmation that you are playing at being independent and at local republics, by refusing to send immediately to the Donets Basin all military forces and all the mobilised workers of Kharkov, and by giving as an excuse idiotic prohibitions from Podvoisky. I declare that you will be brought before a Party court and expelled from the Party if you do not give up this game and do not at once send all military forces of Kharkov and all mobilised workers to the relief of the Donets Basin. Reply in code without delay regarding fulfilment, how many you are sending, and when. You will be held responsible for delay.

Lenin

May 7, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the typewritten copy

322

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

10. V. 1919

Please give every assistance and aid to the bearers, Finnish comrades Torniainen, Haapalainen and Wilmi, in

fixing up 500 men disabled in the war against the Whites.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

323

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

Frunze, Commander, Southern Group of the Eastern Front*

Are you aware of the grave position of Orenburg?[222] Today, through railwaymen who had spoken by direct line, I was told of the desperate request of the Orenburgers to be sent 2 regiments of infantry and 2 of cavalry, or at least 1,000 infantrymen and a few squadrons to begin with. Let me know at once what has been done and what your plans are. You will not, of course, regard my telegram as violating army orders.

Lenin

May 12, 1919

First published in part on July 24, 1928, in *Pravda* No. 170
Published in full in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the typewritten copy

324

TELEGRAM TO M. I. KALININ

Kalinin, Chairman of the All-Russia C.E.C.
Simbirsk *or present whereabouts*

Food workers at Atyashevo station are complaining that on your orders, bag-traders' potatoes are being dispatched, prices have shot up, procurements have stopped. We consider it absolutely necessary to refrain from giving

* The words "of the Eastern Front" are in Lenin's handwriting. —*Ed.*

concrete technical directives and orders on food matters which cancel the decrees and violate the general food policy. In general, do not impair departmental and party inter-relations, devote main attention to the peasants.

On behalf of the Political Bureau of the C.C.,
*Lenin**

Written on May 13, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text in Tsyurupa's handwriting, added to and signed by Lenin

325
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

In code

Sokolnikov
Boguchar

We have received from Beloborodov the following telegrams, the first: "The front at Donets has been broken through", etc., and the second: "It is necessary to expel from the Red Army ranks", etc. In addition there is a report on demoralisation in our units and complete lack of energy on the part of the local command. Evidently the liquidation of the revolt is being more and more delayed, yet the threat of the insurgents joining forces with Denikin's troops is growing. Are you keeping a sufficiently attentive eye on the operations? Should not units be added from the reserves of the Southern Front? How many of the 214 Communists Smilga sent to the south in April and May have been used for this purpose? What new effective measures have been taken to put an end to the revolt and when can one expect it to be put down? Are the peasants south of

* The words "Simbirsk *or present whereabouts*" in the address, and the text of the telegram from the words "In general", are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

the revolt being mobilised?* The case of the General Staff member ...** must be investigated. We await a reply.

Lenin
Sklyansky

Written on May 14, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
in Sklyansky's
handwriting

326
TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

15. V. 1919

Trotsky

I am very glad about the energetic measures for suppressing the revolt and particularly about the assignment of the 33rd Division for this purpose. In my opinion, the utmost should be done to make use of the feeling against Grigoriev for maximum and speediest pressure on the Donets Basin. Unless we capture Rostov soon we shall not be able to bear the remaining burdens.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

327
TELEGRAM TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

15. V. 1919

Gubernia Executive Committee
Kostroma
for Lunacharsky

I have asked the Commissariat for Food to report about relief measures.[223] I fear that the revolt in the Ukraine

* From the words "and when" the text is written in an unknown hand.—*Ed.*
** The name is illegible.—*Ed.*

will hinder the administration of relief, as the situation is deteriorating.[224] Push ahead vigorously with mass migration to the Don.[225] Get in touch with Sereda.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

328

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

15. V. 1919

Comrades Serebryakov, Stalin and the other members of the Presidium of the C.E.C.

Tsyurupa receives 2,000 rubles, family of 7, dinners at 12 rubles each (and supper), 84 per day × 30 = 2,520 rubles.

They are underfed! They take *4 dinners*, it is not enough. The children are adolescents, they need *more* than an adult.

Please increase his salary to 4,000 rubles and give, in addition, a grant of 5,000 rubles in a lump sum to the family, which arrived from Ufa *without clothing*.

Please reply.

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

329

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

20. V. 1919

Comrade Sokolnikov

I take this opportunity to discuss the revolt at greater length. Your telegram of the 17th (No. 189) distresses me very much: You speak only of "demoralisation" of "expeditionary troops" and *not a word* about the division (the 34th, I believe), which was landed to suppress the revolt! Not a word!

After the offensive against Petrograd, suppression of the revolt, the most ruthless and immediate suppression *coûte que coûte*, is an absolute necessity. Please do not be diverted from this and send information in code twice weekly—I shall insist on the dispatch to you of what is required, just as I insisted today on an additional telegram about (*what has already been ordered three times*) the dispatch to you of Communists from Voronezh and Tambov gubernias.

Have done with the revolt quickly at all costs!

Yours,
Lenin

We shall push on also with all our might with migration to the Don from non-agricultural places to get the farmsteads occupied, the rear fortified correspondingly, and so on.

We shall send trainees as well: I made arrangements with Sklyansky yesterday.

First published in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

330

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

20/V.

Trotsky

In connection with the coded telegram from the three commanders of the Eastern Front, I propose that Kamenev be appointed commander of the front, that Kostyaev be replaced, and Lashevich appointed instead of Aralov.[226] Reply about the plenum. I'm afraid Stalin and Zinoviev will not be able to attend on the 25th, and to tear you away too is harmful. Therefore I propose that the plenum be postponed and that we come to an agreement by telegram.

Lenin

Written on May 20, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

331

TELEGRAM TO V. I. MEZHLAUK

20. V. 1919

Mezhlauk, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs
Kharkov

Report regularly twice weekly in code what you are doing to liberate the Donets Basin. I fear your energy is already flagging, and yet it is absolutely essential that Kharkov strain every effort in order quickly and resolutely to finish the job.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published on January 20, 1929, in *Krasnaya Zvezda* No. 17

Printed from the original

332

TELEGRAM TO THE NOVGOROD GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Gubernia Executive Committee
Novgorod
Copy to the Extraordinary Commission
Copy to the Gubernia Commissar for Food

Apparently, Bulatov has been arrested for complaining to me. I warn you that I shall have the chairmen of the Gubernia Executive Committee and Extraordinary Commission, and the members of the Executive Committee arrested for this and will insist on their being shot. Why did you not reply at once to my inquiry?[227]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 20, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

333
TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code
22. V. 1919

Trotsky

I have just learned of the break-through of our front at Riga. Riga is evidently lost.[228] Most likely treachery of the Lettish bourgeois officers. Possibly also preparations for a general, determined offensive along the whole Western Front. All this obliges us to increase tenfold the attack on the Donets Basin and at all costs to put down the revolt on the Don immediately. Sklyansky and I will send another thousand trainees there over and above the thousand sent yesterday.* I advise you to devote yourself wholly to liquidating the revolt.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

334
TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

In code

Rakovsky
Kiev

The C.C. of the R.C.P. directs that the C.C. of the C.P. of the Ukraine should not put forward for discussion by the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars such important financial decisions as the issue of new currency notes or the exchange of Ukrainian rubles without a preliminary inquiry of the C.C., R.C.P., since such measures can be taken only on an all-Russia scale.

* The words "over and above the thousand sent yesterday" are in Sklyansky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

Reply in detail whether you consider it possible to put through this directive.*

Lenin, *Krestinsky*, *Kalinin*

Written on May 22, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
in Krestinsky's
handwriting
with additions by Lenin

335

TELEGRAMS TO THE TAMBOV AND VORONEZH GUBERNIA MILITARY COMMISSARS

1

Urgent, *top priority*
24. V. 1919

Gubernia Military Commissar
Tambov
Copy to the Gubernia Executive Committee

You informed me that you have sent Sokolnikov 669 Communists and will send 200 on the 22nd. Yet only three hundred have arrived. Check this and reply at once. Dispatch must be stepped up most energetically.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

2

Urgent
top priority
24/V. 1919

Gubernia Military Commissar
Voronezh
Copy to the Gubernia Executive Committee

Report how many Communists have been sent to Sokol-

* The last sentence is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

nikov. Reply at once. Dispatch must be stepped up with the utmost vigour.[229]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text in an unknown hand

336

TELEGRAM TO THE ODESSA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

24/V—19

Executive Committee
Odessa
Copy to Rakovsky, Council of People's Commissars, Kiev

Allowing foreigners to leave on their own is criminal. To let Russians out under the guise of foreigners is a counter-revolutionary act, tantamount to treason. Foreigners in general should not be allowed out without compensation which can only be ordered by the central government. Citizens of the Entente countries should not be allowed to go, other than by way of exchange carried out by the central government. Not a single Frenchman should be allowed to go out until the return of the soldiers from France, among whom there are many Ukrainians. Those guilty of violating this should be held strictly responsible. Bear in mind that the Finnish Government, obviously at the instigation of the Entente, is hindering the release to Russia of Russian soldiers; therefore do not allow a single bourgeois, a single person, to leave Odessa and the Ukraine. Exceptions—Chinese workers, Persians, by orders from the centre.[230]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

337
TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

Rakovsky

Congratulations on the capture of Alexandria and Znamenka.[231] I emphatically request that the released forces be sent to the Donets Basin.

Lenin

Written on May 24, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

338
TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

In code

Rakovsky
*Kiev**

Directive of the C.C.

Concentrate all forces on the Donets Basin, take all you can from the Western Front, reducing to a minimum all active operations on your Western Front. Send Pyatakov and Bubnov to Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav, for the most complete, energetic mobilisation of workers for the Southern Front on their personal responsibility.[232]

*Lenin***

Written on May 28, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten copy with an addition by Lenin

---

* The words "In code", "Rakovsky, Kiev" are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

** The document was signed also by Krestinsky and Kamenev.—*Ed.*

339

TELEGRAM TO A. A. JOFFE*

In code
29. V. 1919

Rakovsky for Joffe
Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine
Kiev

Read this telegram to Rakovsky, Mezhlauk, Voroshilov, Pyatakov, Bubnov, Kviring and other prominent functionaries.

I consider it criminal on your part to have persuaded Trotsky to leave Podvoisky.

Not a single promise is being fulfilled: the Donets Basin has no reinforcements; the mobilisation of workers is proceeding at a disgracefully sluggish pace. You are personally responsible for the inevitable catastrophe. All prominent functionaries must be taken off their jobs and installed in Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav for the total mobilisation of workers; further, one prominent functionary to be sent to each army unit for its advance to the Donets Basin; and everything set in motion for clearing out uniforms from the stores. The ruin of the entire revolution is absolutely inevitable unless there is a swift victory in the Donets Basin, for which it is essential to abandon routine in the Ukraine, to work in a revolutionary spirit, to rally all and sundry, to keep an eye personally on each army unit, each step in the work, to set aside everything except the Donets Basin, to have three soldiers to one rifle. From you not one factual report.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Published in full in 1956
in the book: V. I. Lenin,
Voyennaya perepiska,
Moscow

Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

340

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Trotsky

I am extremely astonished at your silence at such a time when, according to information, albeit not fully confirmed, the break-through in the Millerovo direction has reached the dimensions of an almost irreparable catastrophe.[233] What measures have been taken to prevent the enemy joining forces with the insurgents?

Lenin

Written on May 30, 1919

First published in 1938 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 2

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting

341

TELEGRAM TO V. I. MEZHLAUK AND K. Y. VOROSHILOV

Comrade Mezhlauk and Comrade Voroshilov
Kharkov

A reply cannot be given before contacting Trotsky, whom Sklyansky is informing by telegraph.

I confirm that reinforcements must be given to the troops of the Southern Front without waiting for uniforms or arms, as our Southern Front will see to that. I have many times pointed out the catastrophic urgency of this matter, but from you I have no exact information on the actual number of reinforcements supplied by you to the Southern Front.

Lenin

Written on May 30, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Published in full in 1956 in the book: V. I. Lenin, *Voyennaya perepiska*, Moscow

Printed from the typewritten copy

342

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE[234]

I am for expulsion from the Party of people who take part in religious ceremonies.

Lenin

30/V.

Written on May 30, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

343

TO THE ALL-RUSSIA GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

31. V. 1919

Comrade Rattel,

The bearer, Comrade Yevgenia Bogdanovna *Bosh*, is a member of the Council of Defence of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Republic.

Rifles and other arms are needed, also military instructors for organising workers' battalions in Minsk.

It is said that the matter is being hindered by red tape and so on.

Please *ascertain as precisely and as quickly as possible* what can and should be given, and telephone Sklyansky and myself.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

344

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH E. M. SKLYANSKY

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Why did we not fire on the destroyer?

E. M. SKLYANSKY'S REPLY

It was out of range.

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Vatsetis must be told by telephone (he will be speaking on the phone today with Zinoviev) and ordered to *tighten things up strongly*.

Written in May or June 1919

First published in part on September 23, 1925, in *Pravda* No. 217

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

345

TELEGRAM TO V. I. MEZHLAUK, K. Y. VOROSHILOV, G. N. MELNICHANSKY, F. A. ARTYOM, G. N. KAMINSKY

In code

Mezhlauk, Voroshilov, Melnichansky,
Artyom, Kaminsky
Kharkov

It is necessary at all costs to put a stop immediately to the habit of holding meetings, to put all work of whatever kind on a war footing, and appoint particular individuals responsible for the performance of precisely defined jobs. There must be military discipline everywhere. The Commander and Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Army should make enquiries about everything of their immediate chief, that is to say, Gittis, and put a stop to all fanciful schemes for forming special groups and similar attempts covertly to restore the Ukrainian Front. There are sufficient uniforms and arms both in the Ukraine and at the disposal of Gittis. If the chaos, the meetings and the disputes about priority are eliminated, then everything can be obtained. Report exactly the facts of the fulfilment of specific orders, that is, about the arrival of army units at their destination, the collection of arms, and so on.

Lenin

Written on June 1, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

346

TELEGRAM
TO V. I. MEZHLAUK AND K. Y. VOROSHILOV

Mezhlauk, Voroshilov
Kharkov
Copy to Melnichansky, Artyom, Kaminsky

The Political Bureau of the Central Committee met on June 1. In full agreement with Trotsky, it firmly rejects the plan of the Ukrainians to unite the 2nd, 8th and 13th armies, and to create a special Donets unity.[235]

We demand that Voroshilov and Mezhlauk fulfil their direct task—that of building a strong Ukrainian army. Tomorrow or the day after, Trotsky will summon you to Izyum and give orders in more detail. Report more exactly, more frequently and in a strictly factual way what you have done and, in particular, how much army property Voroshilov captured from Grigoriev and in other places.

On behalf of the Political Bureau of the C.C.,

Lenin

Written on June 1, 1919

First published in part in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

347

INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY[236]

Telephone:

1) To Rosta,* for them to send me tomorrow a written report that this has been transmitted by them to so many newspapers,
towns.

2) To Chicherin, that this should go out by radio in German, French and English.

Written on June 2, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

* Rosta—Russian Telegraph Agency.—*Ed.*

348

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN[237]

Zinoviev for Stalin
Smolny
Petrograd

Okulov points to the isolation of the 7th Army from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, which causes confusion, relieves front workers of responsibility, and deprives them of energy in their work. Petrograd Military District, subordinated to the Western Front, is giving all its reserves to the 7th Army, not giving them to the front for the remaining armies. Pozern stays in Petrograd all the time, has poor connections with the Council of the front, and sets up parallel supply bodies instead of utilising the front-line bodies already existing. Okulov proposes either the complete subordination of the 7th Army to the command of the front, or giving it a special status of direct subordination to the General Headquarters.

Knowing Petrograd's constant tendency towards independent activity, I think you should help the Revolutionary Military Council of the front to unite all the armies. The other Western armies besides the 7th should be taken care of, too. Report what you have done.

The conflict with Okulov must not be allowed to grow. Think it over well, for it is impossible simply to recall him.

Today I learned of the desertion to the enemy of yet another Petrograd regiment and of the refusal of two regiments to attack. Supervision should be strengthened and more workers added.

Regarding foreigners, I advise not to hurry with deportation. Would not a concentration camp be better, so that they can afterwards be exchanged?*

Lenin

Written on June 3, 1919

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting, added to and signed by Lenin

* The text of the telegram from the words "The conflict with Okulov" is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

349

TELEGRAM
TO S. I. GUSEV, M. M. LASHEVICH, K. K. YURENEV

In code
3. VI. 1919

Gusev, Lashevich, Yurenev
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

Sklyansky has positively promised to give ten thousand rifles in the first half of June. Pay the most serious attention to the Orenburg Cossacks and the Bashkirs, for during the previous offensive we behaved stupidly, missed an opportunity, and did not make use of these forces. Mobilise them urgently, send an intelligent, cool, knowledgeable, experienced man there, pay the greatest attention to this and to unflagging, total mobilisation of the entire front-line area and the collection of rifles from the population.

Lenin

First published in 1934
in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

350

TELEGRAM
TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

Revolutionary Military Council
Southern Front

The Revolutionary Committee of Kotelnikovo District, Don Region, by Order No. 27, abolishes the term "stanitsa" and establishes that of "volost", and accordingly divides Kotelnikovo District into volosts.

In various districts of the region the local authorities forbid the wearing of trouser stripes and abolish the word "Cossack".

In the 9th Army Comrade Rogachov is indiscriminately requisitioning horse harness and carts from the working Cossacks.

In many parts of the region local fairs for selling peasant wares are prohibited. Austrian prisoners of war are being appointed commissars in the stanitsas.

We call attention to the need to be particularly careful in breaking up such trivial features of everyday life, which are of no significance whatsoever in the general policy, so as not to irritate the population. Pursue a firm course on basic questions and be tolerant of the archaic survivals to which the population is accustomed.

Reply by telegram.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 3, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in an unknown handwriting, added to and signed by Lenin

351

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[238]

Comrade Chicherin,

1) What have you done to help this Indian?
—in publishing his article?
—in other respects?

2) We must *push on* with *summaries*, *leaflets*, *maps*
of the partition of the world
" " " " Turkey
" " " " *colonies*
Persia, etc.
{ by Great Britain and France }
etc.

3) What about the radio message concerning the "ultimatum" of the British workers? (*Vecherniye Izvestia*, 3. VI.)[239]

Greetings,
Lenin

Written in June, after 3, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

* The words "Reply by telegram" are in Lenin's handwriting. —*Ed.*

352

TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV AND M. M. LASHEVICH

In code
4. VI. 1919

Gusev, Lashevich
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

I am deeply concerned about the loss of Agryz and especially Glazov. Have you taken urgent measures? Have you found out the reasons? Trotsky was delighted with the 3rd Army; what has happened to it?

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

353

TO M. I. LACIS

4. VI. 1919

Comrade Lacis

Dear Comrade,

I have received your letter and enclosures. Kamenev says—and declares that several *most prominent Cheka men* confirm it—that the Chekas in the Ukraine have brought a host of evils, having been set up *too early* and having allowed a mass of hangers-on to get in.

A most stringent check should be made on personnel—in this, I hope, Dzerzhinsky will assist you from here. It is necessary at all costs to discipline the Cheka men and throw out the alien elements.

When there is an opportunity to send a letter by hand, inform me in greater detail about the screening of the Cheka personnel in the Ukraine, and the results of the work.

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

354
TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

4. VI. 1919

In view of the growing conflict between all the Petrograd C.C. members and Okulov, and considering that the solid unity in Petrograd military work and a speedy victory on this front are absolutely essential, the C.C. Politbureau and Orgbureau decide temporarily to recall Okulov and put him at the disposal of Comrade Trotsky.

On behalf of the Politbureau and Orgbureau of the Central Committee,

*Lenin**

Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

355
TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

In code
4. VI. 1919

Stalin
Smolny
Petrograd

I think it necessary to release Natsarenus for the Ukraine, which is badly in need of workers, while you have a surplus. Further, I request you to visit the Western Front, which has been terribly weakened as regards commissars. It is absolutely essential to support the front as a whole. Would you not find it useful in this connection to have a meeting with Smilga?

---

* Followed by the signatures of L. B. Kamenev (written in Lenin's handwriting), and N. N. Krestinsky, L. P. Serebryakov, and Yelena Stasova, written in N. N. Krestinsky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

I have received the material with your letter, and have begun to examine it.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

356

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV

5. VI. 1919

Stalin, Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

I am referring the question of Natsarenus to the Central Committee. It must be borne in mind that there has been a huge deterioration in the south, threatening catastrophe. They are disastrously understaffed there, while you have enough and to spare.[240] I have informed Chicherin. I have no objection, of course, to your orders to shoot back.[241]

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

357

TELEGRAM TO A. S. BUBNOV

In code
5. VI. 1919

Mezhlauk, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs, for Bubnov
Kharkov

Thanks for the detailed news and energetic effort, but the matter must be carried through to the end. Do not rely on anyone and remain personally until fully trained

units have been brought to their destination or until they have joined the front-line units.*

Lenin

First published in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

358

TELEGRAM TO D. I. YEFREMOV, MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 10th ARMY

In code

Yefremov, Member of R.M.C. 10
Tsaritsyn

It was not at all a question of illegal organisations and by no means of leaving it.** I am surprised that such a strange idea could have entered your head. The question was that of total mobilisation of all Tsaritsyn workers and of using all methods of revolutionary, most energetic war with especially stern purging of the rear. Telegraph precisely what urgent measures you are adopting.

Lenin

Written on June 6, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

359

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

Sokolnikov
Revolutionary Military Council, Southern Front
Kozlov or present whereabouts

Strain every effort to hasten the suppression of the revolt,

---

* At the top of the telegram Lenin wrote: "*Sklyansky*. Bubnov wires on 4/VI that he is leaving for Ekaterinoslav. If you know his address, *readdress this*."—*Ed*.

** Apparently, this refers to Lenin's telegram to D. I. Yefremov dated May 30, 1919 (see present edition, Vol. 35, Document 202). —*Ed*.

otherwise there is a great danger of catastrophe in view of the break-through in the south. Trainees and a battery have been sent to you. Report more frequently.

Lenin

Written on June 6, 1919
First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

360

TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code

Trotsky

Representatives of the Bashkirs have visited me; they ask for their troops to be sent to the east and not to the south. In the east, in their home territory, they say, they can help capture Chelyabinsk quickly, as the Kirghizes, too, will go with them; but in the south they are powerless and fear they will achieve nothing. I very much ask you to weigh these arguments, which in my opinion are serious.

Make Sokolnikov hurry with suppression of the revolt. We are giving Natsarenus to the south. Podbelsky is working well in Tambov Gubernia, where he has roused the Army Procurements Department and is procuring 20,000 pairs of top-boots.

Lenin

Written on June 6, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

361

TELEGRAM TO S. I. GUSEV AND M. M. LASHEVICH

In code

Gusev, Lashevich
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

The situation in the south is so grave that it is unlikely that we shall be able to give you reinforcements. You will have to make a drive on mobilisation, sometimes total,

in the front-line area, on local army procurements and the collection of rifles from the population. Shoot those guilty of concealing rifles. I consider the greatest danger is a possible movement by Kolchak against Vyatka for a break-through to Petrograd. Pay the most serious attention to this, send information more often about the front at Glazov. Sklyansky and I are sending reinforcements there, although Muralov is oddly silent and does not himself ask for reinforcements.

Lenin

Written on June 6, 1919

First published on February 23, 1933, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

362

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

8/VI, 2.30 a.m.

Comrade Sklyansky,

I have just received a telegram from Stalin and Zinoviev. I hope you have already issued orders (it is *essential*! extremity! 1/2 or 2/3, i.e., 2 regiments from the *Archangel* Front, 1 from the *Eastern*) and have *already replied* to Zinoviev. If not, telephone him.

The capture of Izhevsk allows more to be taken from the east (from the *southern* group of the east, of course).

Send me a reply.

More hostages from among the bourgeoisie and officers' families must be taken—in view of the more frequent betrayals. Arrange it with Dzerzhinsky.

Send a telegram to *Melnichansky* (over my signature) that it would be disgraceful to hesitate and not to shoot for non-appearance.

One to *Beloborodov*, too, that it is necessary not to "repel", but to *annihilate* the enemy, and to reply exactly where and how many have been taken, what stanitsas, what has been cleared and how.[242]

Yours,

Lenin

Written on June 8, 1919

First published in 1934 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3

Printed from the original

363

TELEGRAMS TO S. I. GUSEV AND M. M. LASHEVICH

1

In code

Gusev, Lashevich
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

Give particular attention to the revolt in the Irgiz area.*[243] Take prompt action, mobilise the entire neighbourhood, discuss whether the insurgents can be crushed by means of aeroplanes. Immediate and complete suppression is essential. Why doesn't Gusev go out? There must be no delay.

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

2

Gusev, Lashevich
R.M.C., Eastern Front

I again draw your attention that the regiments going to Petrograd must be absolutely reliable—both soldiers and command personnel. Attend to this yourselves. You must take upon yourselves full responsibility for seeing that these regiments do not betray.

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting signed by Lenin

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* In the text of the telegram as sent Sklyansky replaced the words "in the Irgiz area" by the words "in the Orenburg and Ural districts" —*Ed.*

3

In code
11. VI. 1919

Lashevich
R.M.C., Eastern Front
Simbirsk

Though we perfectly understand the difficulty of your position, we are absolutely compelled to take from you more and more. You must therefore exert all efforts to step up your work on raising new units hoth at the place where you are and in your districts. Wire fulfilment.

Lenin

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

364

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

Rakovsky
Council of People's Commissars
Kiev

On June 3, I sent the following telegram to Schlichter: "Earnestly request you not to hold up consignments for the Byelorussian-Lithuanian army and generally for the Food Commissariat, Minsk, and to dispatch them to destination in Minsk. Accelerate this in every way. Further, it is necessary to increase relief for Petrograd. Please wire me fulfilment of both assignments twice weekly. *Lenin*, Chairman, C.P.C."

Please 1) investigate the reasons for non-receipt of this telegram and prosecute the guilty parties; 2) discuss most urgently emergency measures to aid Petrograd with food and to collect what was promised; appoint a comrade

in each volost responsible for fulfilment of this. I await a reply.

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original
and the text
of the telegraph form

365

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin, copy to Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

Code message received. Both your requests have been fulfilled. Two armoured trains and 500 Communists are leaving today. Trotsky is here. Telegraph, first, whether you have received this reply; second, how you appraise the situation, whether you have recovered what was lost, and what measures have been taken; third, whether you consider possible your arrival tomorrow or the day after or quite impossible; fourth, your opinion about the publication of the document you sent, not in full but parts of it. I urge publication. We ourselves will select what can be published. I await a reply.[244]

Lenin

Written on June 13, 1919
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the text
of the telegraph form

366

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin
Smolny
Petrograd

According to information from the sailors who captured Krasnaya Gorka, an English naval force of twenty-three vessels from Libau is expected to reach Kronstadt today,

the 16th. I trust you have taken all measures. Send me a map of the front.[245]

Lenin

Written on June 16, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the decoded text

367

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC

Comrade Gusev
Orgbureau of the C.C.
Comrade Sklyansky

Will you please examine as quickly as possible the proposals of Comrade I. I. Ulyanov so that the *question* can be settled *without* delay.

Ivan Ivanovich Ulyanov, former Chairman of the Urals Revolutionary Committee, a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (since X. 1917), urges the necessity of raising a division from among the Cossack proletarian masses in the area of Saratov and Pokrovsk for operation behind the enemy lines, in the steppes beyond the Urals.

Ulyanov himself, Khaustov (Chairman of the Bureau of the Yaitsk Revolutionary Committee, in Pokrovsk), two brothers of I. I. Ulyanov and a few others, whom he undertakes to select, would like to take up the formation of a special detachment.

Required for this are: 1) special powers;
2) arms and supplies;
3) money.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Defence

16/VI. 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

368

TO THE C.C., R.C.P.

Comrade Trotsky is mistaken: here there are neither whims, nor mischief, nor caprice, nor confusion, nor desperation, nor any "element" of these pleasant qualities (which Trotsky castigates with such terrible irony).[246] What there is, is what Trotsky overlooked, namely, that the majority of the C.C. is convinced that General Headquarters is a "den", that *all is not well* at Headquarters, and *in seeking a serious improvement*, in seeking ways for a *radical change* it has taken a definite *step*. That is all.

Lenin

Moscow, 17/VI. 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50

Printed from the original

369

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[247]

To the Orgbureau of the C.C.: a *general* strike in Tver, then in *Klin*, all this is creating an *extremely menacing* situation. The following measures must be urgently discussed:

when will you discuss?

food

Tver (and **Klin**) especially *railwaymen* and *Red Army men*
to be supplied with food and taken care of.

to help the textile workers *emergency* measures are needed:

1) See that the textile workers (pay attention) are provided with food at *operating* factories.
2) Mobilisation of textile workers ... (10,000) to be *reviewed*.
3) Distribution of newspapers and posters, lectures, step up the work of the People's

The Tver *Military Commissar* is too inexperienced in military matters; he is very *good*, but requires *assistance*.

Commissariat for Education.

4) Tickets (daily) on railways for members of the C.C. of trade union executives.

The ignorance of the textile workers is appalling.

No one takes care of them, they have no newspapers, no posters. Something more must be done to improve the food situation, something like purchases, etc.

N.B.

Written in June, prior to 18, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

370

TELEGRAM TO M. M. LASHEVICH

Lashevich
R.M.C., Eastern Front
Simbirsk

Have learned from Smilga about the revolt in Kustanai and the advance of insurgents on Chelyabinsk.[248] If these are Hungarians and their friends, the crucial moment has come. All efforts must be made to join forces. What are you undertaking? Are you sending an aeroplane? If there is no aviation mixture, probably some could be obtained by putting on extra pressure. Wire me in greater detail.*

Lenin

Written on June 18, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* At the top of the document Lenin added the words "In the special 'Soviet' code, which is known to Sklyansky, Medyantsev, Smilga and Lashevich, but not known to army men in general."—*Ed.*

371

REPLY BY DIRECT LINE TO V. I. NEVSKY AND L. S. SOSNOVSKY[249]

The right to vote must be given only to uyezd delegates in strict accordance with the Constitution. I shall get in touch at once with the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. You should both remain until complete quiet is restored and the whole work is running smoothly.

Lenin

Written on June 20, 1919
Sent to Tver

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

372

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

In code

R.M.C., Southern Front

I have just learned from railwaymen that there has been no railway connection with Tsaritsyn since the 18th. The last station, they say, is Log. Is this true? If it is, why did you conceal it and not report? What measures have been taken to restore the situation? Have you given the 10th Army sufficient reinforcements, cartridges and shells? If insufficient, are you now giving these and by what route? The 10th Army complains of a shortage. I draw your attention again and again to the extremely great importance of Tsaritsyn. Has a directive been given not to surrender Tsaritsyn? Are you keeping to it decidedly, or is there a different opinion? Reply precisely and urgently.

Lenin

Written on June 21, 1919

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
in Sklyansky's
handwriting

373

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

Top priority
With verification of exact time of delivery
21. VI. 1919

Rakovsky, Council of People's Commissars
Kiev
Copies to Schlichter, Podvoisky

For the western army, three train-loads of grain are absolutely necessary in the next few days. I urgently request that the most energetic measures be taken to satisfy the need. It is the last extremity. Telegraph.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

374

TO A. I. SVIDERSKY OR A. D. TSYURUPA

To Svidersky (or Tsyurupa): You must seize at it with both hands. Send the food army there+food supply workers.

Start an agitation among the starving workers: to the Belaya for 5 million poods. Reply what *you are doing*.[250]

Lenin

Written on June 23, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

375

TELEGRAM TO M. M. LASHEVICH AND K. K. YURENEV

In code
27. VI. 1919

Lashevich, Yurenev

The successes of the Cossack insurgents in the Nikolayevsk area are extremely alarming. Give special atten-

tion. Wire what you are doing. Further, discuss whether you can send here about a dozen Siberians who have come over to us from Kolchak and who are wounded and in general unfit for the war but capable of helping here with agitation for the war against Kolchak and Denikin.

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

376

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Sklyansky:

Talk with Vatsetis at once for him to give the greatest attention to Penza and the Saratov-Balashov breach.[251]

*Lenin**

Written at the end of June-beginning of July 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

377

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

Frunze

The development of enemy successes in the area of Nikolayevsk is causing great concern. Report exactly whether you have given sufficient attention to this area. What forces are you concentrating and why are you not speeding up concentration? Urgently report on all the measures you are taking.[252]

Lenin

Written on July 1, 1919

First published in 1940 in *Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal* No. 10

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting

* The document was signed also by Trotsky.—*Ed.*

378

TELEGRAM TO THE POROKHOVO DISTRICT SOVIET

Porokhovo District Soviet
Petrograd
Copy to Berkalov, Naval Firing Range, Petrograd

Impress upon your finance department the impermissibility of levying an extraordinary tax on the special bonus of 50,000 rubles received by Berkalov from the Council of People's Commissars for an outstanding invention.

A decree exempting such rewards from taxation has been adopted by the Council of People's Commissars and is now in print.[253]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 2, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

379

TO MAXIM GORKY

5/VII. 1919

Dear Alexei Maximych,

You seem to stay too long in Petrograd, really. It is not good to stay in one place. It's tiring and boring. Would you care to take a trip? We can arrange it.[254]

Yours,
Lenin

Sent to Petrograd
First published on March 29, 1928, in *Pravda* No. 75 and *Izvestia* No. 75

Printed from the original

380

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

5/VII. 1919

Comrade Sklyansky,

Petrograders say the city has a lot of (1) shells,

(2) guns on old ships (could do with them for the Volga!),
(3) *field* guns, up to 300.

Very strict measures must be taken urgently and a report made to the *Council of Defence* on maximum speeding up of shipments chiefly by water (it's a crime that there have been no shipments till now. We would have saved Tsaritsyn).

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

381

TO THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[255]

8. VII. 1919

To the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Executive Committee for dispatch to the Sormovo military and civil authorities

Please arrange immediately, through reliable Communists known personally, a strict and absolutely impartial

—verification of the enclosed application;

—draw up an *exact*, factual description of how many houses, apartments and rooms are occupied (by what number of persons) by office workers and higher technical personnel;

—what factory building is being requested for a children's home and which one it is possible to give;

—verify exactly who was to have had charge of this, the *names* of the responsible persons, their addresses, as well as of those who will carry out the investigation.

Report fulfilment to me immediately by post or messenger.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

382

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

*Top priority**

R.M.C., Southern Front
Kozlov

The All-Russia General Headquarters has given me exact information, verified by Kursky, that between May 15 and July quotas fulfilled for the Southern Front amounted to 70,000, and between July 1 and 7 to 22,000. If not received, take special measures and notify me at once whether you still insist on a call-up of the 18-year-olds. Would it not be better for the time being to take others?[256]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

July 8, 1919

First published in 1940 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 1

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

383

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

8. VII. 1919

Comrade Sklyansky, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs

Please have the application of Comrade Fyodor Shturmer (or Shturmin)[257] investigated and his request granted if the investigation confirms his claim. Establish precisely what irregularities there were on the part of the local authorities and *inform me* of the result.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

* These words are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

Enclosures:
1) certificate dated 20. VI. 1919,
2) certificate No. 96 dated 29. IV. 1919,
3) F. Shturmer's letter.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

384

TELEGRAM TO V. A. RADUS-ZENKOVICH

Top priority
11. VII. 1919

Zenkovich, Chairman, Gubernia Executive Committee
Saratov
To be shown also to Yaroslavsky, Krylenko, Plaksin and the Gubernia Food Commissar

Please verify at once through absolutely reliable and impartial persons whather it is true that Sergei Malyshev is working excellently in Volsk and Balakovo with a barge-shop, further whether it is true that there is a huge crop on the left bank of the Volga, and that there are not enough people for harvesting work. How many thousands, and when, are needed from the northern gubernias? Petrograd and Moscow are without grain. Heroic measures needed. Wire exact reply immediately.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

385

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY, N. I. PODVOISKY, AND TO ALL UKRAINIAN MILITARY COMMISSARS

Comrades Rakovsky, Podvoisky and all Ukrainian Military Commissars
Kiev
Copy to *Meshcheryakov*
People's Commissariat for Agriculture

According to available information, in state farms of the Ukrainian Republic plundering and destruction of live

and dead stock is being practised by individual military commissars and army units. This is ruining the farms and threatens countless calamities in gathering the rich harvest. On pain of being held strictly answerable, take all measures for immediately putting a stop to such criminal activities; organise effective protection of the state farms, prosecute those guilty. Wire urgently what measures taken and results.

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on July 11, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

386
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Find out what has been done to organise the extraction of oil from the shales of Syzran Uyezd and of Kazan oil.[258]

Written on July, prior to 14, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the text in Gorbunov's handwriting

387
TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin
R.M.C., Western Front

Letter number one received.

Gittis leaves tomorrow, if he has not already done so. Sergo and Sollogub have left. Sergei Medvedev is sick. Smilga has issued instructions for more people to be given. Regarding the Southern Front, we are taking measures.

Kamenev, Smilga, Gusev, Serebryakov are going there today.*

Congratulations on the capture of Ekaterinburg.

Lenin

Written on July 15, 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

388

TO J. HANECKI

1

To Hanecki: draft a reply.[259]

2

To Hanecki: this text will not do. It must be worded thus: you have been promised so many millions within such-and-such a period. We dispatched such-and-such an amount to you on such-and-such a date and will send so much more on such-and-such a date.

Draw up a text on these lines at once.

Written on July 16, 1919

First published on April 22, 1926, in *Izvestia* No. 92

Printed from the originals

389

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

Rakovsky
Council of People's Commissars
Kiev

"Three hundred each have been sent to Kiev and Kharkov; tomorrow one hundred each will be sent for Ekaterinoslav and Odessa. Next week we shall send a total of 500, and afterwards 350 a week.** *Krestinsky*."

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* Lenin marked off the text of the telegram, except the first and last sentences, and wrote in the margin: "In code."—*Ed.*

** This refers to the dispatch of money to the Ukraine, in millions of rubles.—*Ed.*

In informing you of this answer, I ask you to reply to me whether you are satisfied or not, and if not, what precisely you do want.

Lenin

Written on July 16, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

390

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

17. VII. 1919

Stalin
R.M.C., Western Front

Lentsman and Peterson from Rezhitsa request me to put a stop to the renaming of former Lettish regiments. I am sending their request to you.[260]

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

391

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Moscow
18. VII. 1919

Stalin
R.M.C., Western Front

Your request will be discussed by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Sklyansky says that if more is to be taken from the Eastern Front, then it should be for the Southern Front. Tomorrow Smilga and the Commander-in-Chief[261] arrive from the Southern Front.*

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* Lenin marked off the text of the telegram and wrote in the margin: "In code."—*Ed.*

392

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

19. VII. 1919

Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front
Simbirsk

On my behalf please congratulate the 2nd and 5th armies on their victories.[262] Concrete measures against the guerrilla methods should be discussed in detail with political workers and carried out. Report results.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

393

NOTE ON THE INVOICE OF THE SUPPLIES DEPARTMENT OF THE MOSCOW EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

INVOICE

To Vladimir Ilyich

From the Supplies Department of the Moscow Cheka

Quantity	Goods sold or supplied to you	Price		Sum	
		Rubles	Kopeks	Rubles	Kopeks
1 pair	Top-boots				
1 —	Suit				
1 —	Braces				
1 —	Belt				

Totalling one thousand four hundred and seventeen rubles and 75 kopeks.

Manager, Supplies Department

I am forwarding herewith 2,000 (two thousand) rubles, and request—and categorically demand—that this bill be amended as it is obviously undercharged.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

19/VII.

Written on July 19, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

394

TO V. P. MILYUTIN AND P. I. POPOV[263]

Milyutin and *Popov*

Calculate approximately how many thousand million a month we would need, if

(1) grain prices are increased fivefold;
(threefold)

(2) the prices on manufactured goods for the peasants are not fixed, and increased as much as possible to the price limit given by the peasant;

(3) breadstuffs and manufactured goods are sold to workers and office employees at the old prices;

(4) calculations to cover also the Ukraine, the Urals, Trans-Volga area, part of Western Siberia, and the Don;

(5) breadstuff prices are fixed according to districts;

(6) how many thousand million will be required if there is a 10% increase in wages and salaries.

Written on July 22, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

395

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

25. VII. 1919

Frunze
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front

Our failures and the delays south of Buzuluk, at Uralsk and at Tsaryov strike me as very alarming. Please give the

matter greatest attention and inform me more precisely. The restoration of the railway to Uralsk* is vitally essential.[264]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1941 in the book: *M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoi voiny. Sbornik dokumentov* (M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts. A Collection of Documents), Moscow

Printed from the original

396

TELEGRAM TO N. V. KRYLENKO

25. VII. 1919

Krylenko, agent of the All-Russia C.E.C.
Gubernia Executive Committee
Saratov

Delivery quotas must not be violated, for they provide bread for the troops. Send everything above the quotas to the Commissariat for Food in Moscow. Give exact information as to precise amount of grain and where it is.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

397

UNDERLININGS AND AN INSTRUCTION ON A TELEGRAM FROM P. I. VOYEVODIN

... The crops in samara Gubernia are unprecedented for many decades. Lack of necessary work hands threatens to ruin the bumper

* In the text of the telegram Lenin marked off the words: "strike me as very alarming. Please give the matter" and "The restoration of the railway to Uralsk". In the margin he wrote: "In code." —*Ed.*

crop now ready for harvesting in Samara Gubernia, which alone could feed famine-stricken Soviet Russia. All available work hands should be sent immediately to the Volga region; pitch, tar, available implements, must be dispatched to the peasants.

Voyevodin
Political Commissar
of the "October Revolution" train

1) To Svidersky
2) To Glebov
3) To Sereda

All efforts must be exerted. Inform me by telephone during the day tomorrow, 26/7, what has been done.

Written on July 25, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

398

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY*

In code
28. VII. 1919

Trotsky
at his present whereabouts

The Politbureau of the C.C. discussed your telegram No. 277/c. It fully agrees with you about the danger of any kind of waverings in the firm carrying out of the plan once it has been adopted.[265] The Politbureau fully recognises the operational authority of the Commander-in-Chief and asks you to make this clear to all top-level executives. The Politbureau appoints Smilga, Serebryakov and Lashevich as members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front in addition to the former ones.**

First published in part in 1958
in the book N. F. Kuzmin,
V. I. Lenin vo glave oborony Soretskoi strany (1918-1920)
(V. I. Lenin at the Head
of the Defence
(of the Soviet Land (1918-1920)),
Moscow

Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*
** Lenin wrote further: "On behalf of the C.C., *Stasova*."—*Ed.*

399

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Trotsky, Chairman, Revolutionary Military Council

While in the Ukraine, you, of course, ascertained the position there. Please report the state of the troops, their capacity to offer resistance to Denikin, whether, at last, really serious measures have been taken there, whether they are capable of defending themselves, whether they are giving systematic instruction to the workers and peasants about a secret organisation in Denikin-occupied localities, particularly an organisation in his troops, as also mobilisation of Ukrainians, and whether the Ukrainian Communists realise the full gravity of the situation.

Lenin

July 29, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

400

TO BELA KUN[266]

Dear Comrade Bela Kun,

Please do not worry too much and do not give way to despair. Your accusations or suspicions against Chicherin and Rakovsky have absolutely no foundation whatever. We are all working in full accord. We are aware of Hungary's grave and dangerous situation and are doing all we can. But speedy assistance is sometimes physically impossible. Try to hold out as long as you can. Every week is of value. Build up supplies in Budapest, fortify the city. I hope you are adopting the measures I recommended to the Bavarians.* Warmest greetings and a firm handshake. Hold on with all your might, victory will be ours.

Yours,

Lenin

Written at the end of July 1919

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* See "Message of Greetings to the Bavarian Soviet Republic" (present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 325-26).—*Ed.*

401

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[267]

Comrade Chicherin,

I have received your note and the radio message. I don't think it is worth while taking this seriously and hastening to reply. Let us rather wait and have the laugh on them. Today we shall give it to the press *as a joke*, with a directive to the editors to ridicule it thoroughly (hinting: are they not going by the news from Budapest?) and call the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries all the names they deserve. We shall talk it over again when I arrive.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on August 3 or 4, 1919
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

401

INSTRUCTION ON A LETTER FROM THE SIBERIAN AFFAIRS COMMISSION

Council of People's Commissars

In view of the shortage ol available agitational and propagandist literature, which is moreover of little use for Siberia, the Siberian Affairs Commission has formed a special Literary Section which should in the shortest space of time prepare for the press a number of pamphlets, leaflets and posters of an agitational nature....

Comrade Vorovsky,
Please give *all possible* help.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

5/8

Written on August 5, 1919
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

403

TO L. D. TROTSKY

The Politbureau of the Central Committee, having discussed the very serious questions raised by you,[268] orders that the directive of the Commander-in-Chief on these questions, addressed to the Southern Front and to the 12th Army, be carried out. The directive will be forwarded at once.

The Politbureau, for its part, insists that Odessa should be defended to the last.*

On behalf of the Politbureau of the C.C.,

*Lenin***

Written on August 7, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

404

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

7. VIII. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

It has been fully ascertained that only Petrograd can provide workers for the cartridge factories. The Sestroretsk Works and the Pipe Works must be made at all costs to provide the necessary hands at once. Red tape is impermissible, criminal, for without cartridges we are lost. Put on all your pressure and see to fulfilment.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

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* See also present edition, Vol. 35, Document 220.—*Ed.*

** There follows the signature of L. B. Kamenev in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

405

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU, C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

8/VIII.

To the Orgbureau of the C.C.

I have just again received from a *reliable* source information that board members *are starving* (for example, Markov in the Commissariat for Railways, and others). I insist most emphatically that the Central Committee 1) direct the Central Executive Committee to issue to all Commissariat board members (and those of *similar* status) a grant of 5,000 rubles each;

2) put all of them permanently on specialist's *maximum* pay.

It's too bad, really, to have both them and their families starving!!

Some 100-200 people must be helped out.

Written on August 8, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

406

TELEGRAM TO YEVETSKY

Yevetsky, Chief of Supplies, Southern Front

During July you were sent a considerable quantity of uniforms and footwear.

Despite this, in all the armies on the Southern Front some units are without boots or clothing.

On pain of being held personally answerable, I order you to take vigorous measures to immediately distribute what has been received among the needy units.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written on August 8, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

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* At the top of the telegram Lenin wrote: "Comrade Sklyansky, send ciphered or clear, whichever more convenient. 8/VIII. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

407

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA, M. M. LASHEVICH, G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

Smilga, *Lashevich*, *Sokolnikov*
Kozlov

Report immediately whether forces are being redeployed and concentrated with sufficient energy, whether all necessary measures for speeding up have been taken. Will the operation take place as scheduled or will there be delay? When are you starting? The Ukrainian situation causes me great concern. I await an answer from Lashevich to the questions raised in Moscow.

Lenin

13/VIII. 0.30 hours

Written on August 13, 1919
First published in part in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Published in full in 1956 in the book: V. I. Lenin, *Voyennaya perepiska, 1917-1920*, Moscow

Printed from the typewritten copy

408

TO YELENA STASOVA[269]

Yelena Dmitrievna,

This is an old Party worker. A very valuable person. Drop me a line as to where you think you could place her.

Lenin

13/VIII.

Written on August 13, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

409
TO M. K. VLADIMIROV

14/VIII. 1919

Dear Comrade Vladimirov,

Your being relieved of membership of the Revolutionary Military Council does not at all signify even the slightest dissatisfaction with you. Nothing of the kind. The Central Committee was *compelled* to do it in order *in general* to make a start at reorganising the R.M.C. of the Southern Front. I am sure that *nothing* will be altered in your work in closest contact with the R.M.C. Drop me a line, please, saying you have received this letter and how things have adjusted themselves along the new lines. Have there been any impediments to your work, and if so, of what kind?

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

410
TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA

Smilga
and present whereabouts of the Volsk Revolutionary Committee

I sent you a letter and then received yours of the 16th.[270] Trotsky is here and will stay for a week or so, I think. I hope work with him will go smoothly. Would it not be better for you to come here and reach an agreement? Keep your temper, don't overdo things. If you do not come, send news more frequently.

Lenin

Written in August,
not earlier than 16, 1919

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

411

TELEGRAM
TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCILS OF THE 10th AND 4th ARMIES

20. VIII. 1919

Two addresses: R.M.C. 10
R.M.C. 4
Copy to Executive Committee of the German Commune Marxstadt, formerly Ekaterinenstadt

Harvesting of grain by the peasants is of extreme importance for the Republic. Issue strict orders for the peasants to be protected in every way during harvesting, and shoot without mercy for plundering, violence and illegal requisitions on the part of the troops. Report fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

412

TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTION OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET FOOD DEPARTMENT

August 23, 1919

I have received from you samples of fruit from state farms with report No. 4936 (dated 22/8. 1919), and would kindly ask you not to do this in future, not to send fruit, etc., but to supply me with information as to how fruit, etc., from state farms is distributed: *whether it is given to hospitals*, *sanatoria*, *children*, *where precisely it goes and how much of it. How many state farms have you*, *what is the composition of their managements*, *how many send in reports*, *how many have sent and for what period*, etc.?

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

413
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

26. VIII. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

Please collect quickly all the material about subbotniks and send it to me.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

414
TELEGRAM TO N. OSINSKY

26. VIII. 1919

Osinsky
Executive Committee
Tula
Copy to the Commissar of the Arms and Cartridge factories

Do not carry out any compulsory mobilisation, for any kind of work, of workers of the arms and cartridge factories, for arms and cartridges are most important of all. Report fuliilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

415
NOTE TO THE SECRETARY[271]

Notify the *Food Research* Institute tomorrow by special memo that in three months' time they must present *exact*

and *complete* data on *practical* achievements in producing sugar from sawdust.

Written on August 26 or 27, 1919
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*
Printed from the original

416
TELEGRAM TO M. M. LASHEVICH

Lashevich

Extremely disquieted by Mamontov's successes.[272] He may cause us terrible harm by destroying roads and stores. Are all measures being taken? Are they sufficiently energetic and swift? Report more irequently.

Lenin

Written on August 28, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the original

417
TO E. M. SKLYANSKY[273]

30. VIII.

Comrade Sklyansky,

Markov told me today that 7 troop-trains of the 21st Division will now arrive daily, that the whole of it will have come in about 4 days' time (news about it was delayed by the storm which disrupted the telegraph for two days), and then one week more will be required for each division. He is doing everything to speed up things.

Ought we not use the whole 21st, or part of it (the larger), to *utterly annihilate* all "Lashevich's godsons"? Think this over properly. The capture of "Sokolnikov's godson" and complete destruction of "Lashevich's godsons" are of great, *immense* importance.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on August 30, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the original

418

RADIO-TELEGRAM TO THE TASHKENT EXECUTIVE COMMITEE

Executive Committee
Tashkent
Copy to all railwaymen

In view of the forthcoming union of Soviet Russia and Soviet Turkestan, it is essential immediately to strain all efforts for repair of locomotives and rolling-stock. The Council of Defence directs that all forces at depots and repair-shops should be mobilised for this purpose. The victory of the revolution and of the Red Army should be utilised to improve the economic life of Turkestan and Russia. Greetings to Red Turkestan.[274]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written on August 30, 1919
Published on September 2, 1919, in the newspaper *Izvestia* of the C.E.C. or the Turkestan Republic of the Russian Soviet Federation and Tashkent Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies No. 188

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

419

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY AND I. T. SMILGA

Comrade Sklyansky and Comrade Smilga,

I know *perfectly* a certain comrade, who is a man of **absolutely exceptional** loyalty, *bravery* and energy (especially as regards explosions and daring raids).*

I direct:

(1) that he be given an opportunity to learn command practice (all speed-up measures to be taken, particularly for the reading of lectures and the like),

what can be done?

* This refers to Kamo (S. A. Ter-Petrosyan).—*Ed.*

(2) that he be charged with organising a special demolition, etc., squad to operate *behind* the enemy's *lines*.

Written in the summer of 1919
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

420

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin
Headquarters, Western Front

The Politbureau asks you to explain the motives for your decision in regard to Marchlewski. We are surprised that you countermand a decision of the Central Committee all on your own without letting us know.[275]

On behalf of the Politbureau,
Lenin

September 1, 1919

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from
the decoded text

421

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY, L. P. SEREBRYAKOV, M. M. LASEIEVICH[276]

Trotsky
Serebryakov
Lashevich

The Politbureau of the C.C., after discussing the telegram from Trotsky, Serebryakov and Lashevich, endorsed the reply of the Commander-in-Chief and expresses surprise at attempts to revise the adopted basic strategic plan.

On behalf of the Politbureau,
Lenin

Written on September 6, 1919
Sent to Orel

Printed from the original

422

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE BOARDS AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF ALL THE COMMISSARIATS

I enclose the pamphlet *Observe the Laws of the Soviet Republic* and draw attention to the *law* promulgated by the Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, which is reprinted in it.

I remind you of the absolute necessity of rigidly observing this law.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

6/IX. 1919

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

423

MARKINGS ON THE REPORT OF K. F. MARTINOVICH AND A NOTE TO L. D. TROTSKY, F. E. DZERZHINSKY AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

N.B. ... The Revolutionary Military Council failed to pay due attention to the reconnaissance report, and the Southern Front Commander declared it to be a trifle, saying that even if the Cossacks did break through, they would be caught in a trap.

...As a result of all this, about 290 trucks of Clothing and Equinment Depot property were left behind in Kozlov and plundered by the Cossacks and population.

In view of this I consider it necessary to insist on a thoroughly detailed investigalion of the process of evacuation of the institutions of the Southern Front Headquarters, and particularly the Clothing and Equipment Depot, to be carried out by a commission consisting of representatives of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Republic, the Council of Defence. and the People's Commissariat for State Control.

Comrade Trotsky
Comrade Dzerzhinsky
and the Central Committee

I think the investigation should be instituted through the *Vecheka*.[277]

Lenin

12/IX.

Written on September 12, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

424

TO J. V. STALIN AND M. F. VLADIMIRSKY[278]

Comrades Stalin and Vladimirsky,

An *extremely rigid*, **non-local**, speedy Party inspection, with workers, should be carried out in Petrograd, one that will not be susceptible to "influences".

Lenin

12/IX.

Written on September 12, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

425

TO MAXIM GORKY

15/IX.

Dear Alexei Maximych,

I received Tonkov, and even before that and before receiving your letter we had decided in the Central Committee to appoint Kamenev and Bukharin to check on the arrests of bourgeois intellectuals of the near-Cadet type and to release whoever possible.[279] For it is clear to us that there have been mistakes here, too.

It is also clear that in general the measure of arrest ap-

plied to Cadet (and near-Cadet) people has been necessary and correct.

Reading your frank opinion on this matter, I recall a remark of yours, which sank into my mind during our talks (in London, on Capri, and afterwards):

"We artists are irresponsible people."

Exactly! You utter incredibly angry words about what? About a few dozen (or perhaps even a few hundred) Cadet and near-Cadet gentry spending a few days in jail *in order to prevent plots like that of the surrender of Krasnaya Gorka*, plots which threaten the lives of tens of thousands of workers and peasants.

A calamity, indeed! What injustice! A few days, or even weeks, in jail for intellectuals in order to prevent the massacre of tens of thousands of workers and peasants!

"Artists are irresponsible people."

It is wrong to confuse the "intellectual forces" of the people with the "forces" of bourgeois intellectuals. As a sample of the latter I take Korolenko: I recently read the pamphlet *War, the Fatherland and Mankind*, which he wrote in August 1917. Mind you, Korolenko is the best of the "near-Cadets", almost a Menshevik. But what a disgusting, base, vile defence of imperialist war, concealed behind honeyed phrases! A wretched philistine in thrall to bourgeois prejudices! For such gentlemen 10,000,000 killed in an imperialist war is a deed worthy of support (by *deeds*, accompanied by honeyed phrases "against" war), but the death of hundreds of thousands in a *just* civil war against the landowners and capitalists evokes ahs and ohs, sighs, and hysterics.

No. There is no harm in such "talents" being made to spend some weeks or so in prison, if this *has* to be done to *prevent* plots (like Krasnaya Gorka) and the death of tens of thousands. But we exposed these plots of the Cadets and "near-Cadets". And we *know* that the near-Cadet professors quite often *help* the plotters. That's a fact.

The intellectual forces of the workers and peasants are growing and gaining strength in the struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and its henchmen, the intellectual lackeys of capital, who imagine they are the brains of the nation. Actually, they are not the brains, but sh—.

To the "intellectual forces" who want to bring science to the people (and not to act as servants of capital), we pay a salary *above the average*. That is a fact. We take care of them. That is a fact. Tens of thousands of officers are serving in our Red Army and are winning victory, despite the hundreds of traitors. That is a fact.

As for your moods, I can "understand" them all right (since you raise the question whether I shall be able to understand you). Often, both on Capri and afterwards, I told you: You allow yourself to be surrounded by the worst elements of the bourgeois intelligentsia and succumb to their whining. You hear and listen to the howl of hundreds of intellectuals over the "terrible" arrest for a few weeks, but the voice of the masses, the millions, the workers and peasants, whom Denikin, Kolchak, Lianozov, Rodzyanko, the Krasnaya Gorka (and other *Cadet*) plotters are threatening—this voice you do not hear and do not listen to. I quite understand, I quite fully understand, that in this way one can write oneself not only into saying that "the Reds are just as much enemies of the people as the Whites" (the fighters for the overthrow of the capitalists and landowners are just as much enemies of the people as the landowners and capitalists), but also into a belief in the merciful god or our Father the Tsar. I fully understand.

×

No really, you will go under unless you tear yourself out of this environment of bourgeois intellectuals! With all my heart I wish that you do this quickly.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

× For you are not writing anything! And for an artist to waste himself on the whining of rotting intellectuals and not to write—is this not ruin, is it not shameful?

Written on September 15, 1919
Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

426

TO L. D. TROTSKY, L. P. SEREBRYAKOV. M. M. LASHEVICH

Trotsky, Serebryakov, Lashevich

The Politbureau of the C.C. considers it absolutely inadmissible that Selivachov is still without special supervision despite the C.C. decision. We insist on communication being established, if only by aeroplane, and on Serebryakov being sent to him immediately to act as commissar to Selivachov.[280] The behaviour of divisional commanders in the area of the second break-through is extremely suspicious. Take heroic precautionary measures.

The Politbureau directs Comrade Stalin to talk with the Commander-in-Chief and reprove him for the inadequacy of his measures to establish communication with Selivachov and prevent suspicious negligence, if not treachery, in the area of the second break-through;

—further, to reprove the Commander-in-Chief for the extreme passivity of Olderogge and point to the necessity of taking measures either by replacing him by a more energetic commander (discuss the question of Frunze), or by sending highly reliable and energetic commissars, or by both.

Written on September 16, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

427

TO MAXIM GORKY

Alexei Maximych,

Comrade Zinoviev will outline to you a plan of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.[281] We should try it. Will you please draft a letter after talking it over in detail with Zinoviev.

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Written in September, not earlier than 26, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

428

TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

30. IX. 1919

Comrade Lomov
or Milyutin
Deputy Chairmen, S.E.C.

Comrade Lomov,

Please forward to the appropriate department

1) the enclosed document with an instruction to let me know *what precisely has been done* in this sphere,[282]

2) an inquiry as to what has been done to utilise the oil occurring (according to Kalinin) *within 70 versts of Orenburg*.

With comradely greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

429

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Comrade Sklyansky,

The question of reinforcing the division taken from the Eastern Front must be urgently worked up.

Cannot we add to it 20-30% of new recruits? Mobilised workers? Perhaps 5% of Communists, 15% of workers, 10% of peasants? Then it would be augmented by 30%. Perhaps this is technically admissible (without weakening the whole division as regards toughness)?

This must be *urgently* considered and decided.

Further, the dispatch of rilles to the Eastern Front must now *be stepped up*.

Should not the Eastern Front be given the following assignment: to consider and carry out a regrouping of the troops so as to reinforce *all* the divisions by 15-30 per cent

and thereby bring the whole army up to its previous strength?

Lenin

Written in September 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

430

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV*

2. X. 1919

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

Your letter received. Warmly greet you and all Petrograd workers for energetic work. Am confident you will carry out mobilisation to the maximum extent.

Lenin

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 223, October 3, 1919

Printed from the original collated with the newspaper text

431

TO I. T. SMILGA

In code *by direct line*
4. X. 1919

Smilga
Revolutionary Council, South-Eastern Front

Shorin is cheating, keeping Budyonny for himself and in general not showing any energy in assisting the troops of the Southern Front. You will be wholly responsible for putting an end to this scandalous situation, which is tantamount to treachery. Telegraph in detail what actual measures of serious assistance and serious control over their fulfilment you are adopting, and with what success.

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* The telegram bears a note by Lenin: "By direct line to Smolny. Inform me of the time, at what hour delivered to Smolny."—*Ed.*

432

TELEGRAM TO THE ORENBURG GUBERNIA COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) AND GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

8. X. 1919

Gubernia Party Committee
Gubernia Executive Committee
Fortified Area
Orenburg

Do everything to help the Southern Front with saddles, horses, soldiers. Telegraph what you are doing and will do.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933 in the book: V. Trotsky, *1919 god v Sredne-Volzhskom kraye* (*Khronika revolyutsionnykh sobytii*) (The Year 1919 in the mid-Volga Region (Chronicle of Revolutionary Events)), 2nd Edition, Moscow-Samara

Printed from the original

433

TO THE COMRADES OF THE PETROGRAD GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

10. X. 1919

Comrades,

Comrade Yunosov told me about your case. I heard him out attentively and reached the conclusion that the case was decided correctly and in your favour, since the person who uttered those thoughtless and profoundly unjust words had been reprimanded.

That is enough. You are vindicated, he stands accused. I earnestly request and advise you now to put aside all recollection of it and forget the whole matter.

I am sure that all the workers will now make for the front. Denikin is pressing hard, *the danger is serious*.

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

434

REMARKS ON A LETTER FROM G. V. CHICHERIN

Dear Vladimir Ilyich,

Not knowing whether, among the mass of radio messages, you have read about Kautsky's book, I am sending you this excerpt separately. It seems to me, from what I am able to read of our literature, that we have not thrown sufficient light on the role of state capitalism under proletarian political power, a role which has escaped Kautsky. What we have is not yet com-

#

munism, but state capitalism, with inequality of remuneration including piecework payment, with forms of compulsion, sometimes reproducing the old regime, with centralised management even of production and a restricted factory self-administration. We have a Red Army of state capitalism with an apparatus of very strong compulsion, and not an army of communism....

This is not a sign of capitalism.

This is due to the forms of struggle of the enemy and the level of culture and not due. of capitalism.

Unfortunately, there is almost no real centralisation.

This is altogether wrong. ???

#I don't think so. We have the struggle of the first stage of the transition to communism with **peasant** and capitalist attempts to defend (or to revive) commodity production.

Lenin

12/X.

Written on October 12, 1919

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

435

TELEGRAM
TO I. N. SMIRNOV AND M. V. FRUNZE

13. X. 1919

Two addresses
Smirnov, Revolutionary Military Council 5
Frunze, Commander of the Turkestan Front

Directive of the C.C.: all fronts to be robbed in favour of the Southern. Consider extra-urgent measures, for example, speedy mobilisation of local workers and peasants, to replace your units that can be sent to the Southern Front. The situation there is menacing.* Telegraph in detail in code.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

436

TO THE DUTCH COMMUNISTS[283]

14. X. 1919

Dear Friends,

I send you best greetings. Our position is very difficult owing to the offensive of 14 states. We are making the greatest efforts. The communist movement in all countries is growing remarkably. The Soviet system has everywhere become a practical slogan for the working masses. This is a step forward of tremendous world-historic significance.

* Lenin marked off the text of the telegram from the words "all fronts to be robbed" to "The situation there is menacing" and wrote in the margin: "In code."—*Ed.*

The victory of the international proletarian revolution, despite everything, is inevitable.

Yours,
N. Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the handwritten copy
Translated from the
German

437

TO V. A. AVANESOV, E. M. SKLYANSKY, M. I. ROGOV, F. F. SYROMOLOTOV, V. P. MILYUTIN

15. X. 1919

Comrades Avanesov, Sklyansky, Rogov
(Moscow Soviet)
Syromolotov and Milyutin

The Central Committee has instructed a commission consisting of Lenin, Trotsky, Krestinsky, and Kamenev

> "to prepare a report on the search for all kinds of property suitable for military purposes and military supplies, and providing for severe measures of punishment for concealment".

This commission decided to set up a subcommission of the above-named comrades (from the Supreme Economic Council—Syromolotov or Milyutin, or someone from its Transport and Materials Department, etc., by agreement between us and the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council) and instruct it to *draft a decree* by Saturday (to be submitted to the Council of Defence).[284]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Defence

P.S. Concerning the aims of the decree, Trotsky or I can be phoned, if necessary.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

438

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY, N. A. SEMASHKO AND L. B. KAMENEV

15. X. 1919

Comrades Sklyansky
Semashko
L. B. Kamenev

By decision of the C.C., the comrades named are instructed to set up a subcommission to draft a decree on a Committee of Aid for the Wounded, which committee should be under the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.[285]

Submit it to the Political Bureau of the C.C. by Saturday.

The C.C. regards the importance and extreme urgency of such a decree as established and indisputable.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

439

TELEGRAM TO G. N. KAMINSKY

The tardiness shown by you and other executives in the matter of entraining the cavalry is outrageous.

I warn you that the functionaries responsible for military work in Tula are obliged to display the greatest energy and efficiency, which I do not see in practice. Send me at once an explanation of the reasons for the delay. I shall

call the culprits to strict account. I demand that the dispatch be expedited to the utmost of your power.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written on October 16, 1919

First published in part in 1960 in the book: *Tak zakreplyalis zavoyevaniya Oktyabrya* (Thus Were the October Gains Consolidated), Tula

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the text in Kaminsky's handwriting

440
TO L. D. TROTSKY

17/X.

Comrade Trotsky,

Last night in the Council of Defence we adopted a decision of the Council and sent it to you in code (it would be better for you to use your own code, as Karakhan's, used by Zinoviev, causes a delay of several hours).

As you see, your plan has been adopted.

But the withdrawal of the Petrograd workers to the south, of course, is not rejected (it is said that you expanded on this to Krasin and Rykov); to talk about this prematurely would mean diverting attention from the struggle to the last.[286]

The attempt to envelop and cut off Petrograd, of course, will call for corresponding changes, which you will carry out on the spot.

Instruct some reliable person in each department of the Gubernia Executive Committee to *collect* Soviet *papers* and documents in preparation for evacuation.

I enclose the appeal which the Defence Council instructed me to draw up.*

* This refers to the appeal: "To the Workers and Red Army Men of Petrograd" (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 68-69).—*Ed.*

I was in a hurry and it is *none too good.*
Better put my signature beneath your appeal.

Greetings,
Lenin

Written on October 17, 1919 Printed from the original

441

INSTRUCTION ON I. N. SMIRNOV'S TELEGRAM[287]

1) Give 30,000 uniforms.

2) *The entire* 5th Army to be taken to *the south* **at once**, and not after the Ishim (for the river Tobol is much larger and broader than the river Ishim, and the length of the front when transferred to the river Ishim is insignificantly shortened).

3) Turn the offensive in the direction of the Ishim into a demonstration and withdraw (having prepared for this in the **shortest** space of time) to the river Tobol.

Instruct the Commander-in-Chief to discuss my proposals 1-3.

Lenin

Written on October 17, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV* Printed from the original

442

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

In code

Frunze
Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front

Give all your attention, not to Turkestan but to the complete liquidation of the Urals Cossacks, even if you have to use diplomatic means.[288] Make every effort to speed up help for the Southern Front. Could not the Orenburg Cossacks be taken to the front near Petrograd or some other front? Report more frequently in code on actual fulfilment.

Lenin

Written on October 18, 1919
First published on January 21, 1937, in *Pravda* No. 21 and *Izvestia* No. 19 Printed from the original

443
TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code
18/X.

Trotsky

I think that agreement with Estonia against Yudenich is impossible, for she is powerless to do anything even if she wanted to. Moreover, Yudenich's base is probably not in Estonia, but outside it, on the sea coast covered by the British fleet. We have sent you many troops, everything depends on the speed of the offensive against Yudenich and on encircling him. Strain all efforts to hasten matters. The huge revolt in Denikin's rear in the Caucasus[289] and our successes in Siberia raise hopes of complete victory, if we immensely hasten the liquidation of Yudenich.

Lenin

Written on October 18, 1919

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

444
TELEGRAM TO B. I. GOLDBERG

19. X. 1919

Goldberg, Commander of the Reserve Army
Kazan

Have you received enough men for forming military units? Is the work going well? Are all the local functionaries helping you zealously?* Read this telegram to them. Reply yourself and let them reply to me as well.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

* The text of the telegram from the word "men" to "zealously" was marked off by Lenin and he wrote "In code" in the margin.—*Ed.*

445

TELEGRAM TO A. D. NAGLOVSKY

19. X. 1919

Naglovsky, authorised agent of the Council of Defence for introducing martial law on the railways of the Northern Front
Petrograd
Copies to Trotsky, Zinoviev
Ksandrov,
Markov, People's Commissariat for Railways
Dzerzhinsky, Vecheka
Moscow

For the purpose of integrating supervision over the work of the railways of the Petrograd junction in the very near future, I instruct Naglovsky to perform the duties of specially authorised agent of the Council of Defence for introducing martial law on the railways of the Petrograd junction within an area of 100 versts of Petrograd and order him immediately to take over control of this area from Ksandrov. Report fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

446

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV*

Trotsky, Zinoviev
Petrograd

Have measures been taken to establish secure radio Communication between Kharlamov's group and Headquarters of the 7th Army?[290] Is this communication sufficiently

* The document bears a note in Sklyansky's hand: "*In code*. By direct line at once."—*Ed*.

reliable? What about all the other groups? If our help is required, telephone.

Lenin

Written on October 20, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting,

447

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

All in code
21. X. 1919

Smirnov
Revolutionary Military Council 5
Copies to Pozern and Sternberg
Revolutionary Military Council, Eastern Front

Frumkin passed on to me your ideas about the Eastern Front being unnecessary. Repeat more exactly. We are devilishly in need of command personnel. Further, inform me how many troops, considering the offensive you have begun, you can give to the Southern Front, and when.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

448

TELEGRAM TO V. M. GITTIS AND A. I. POTYAEV

All in code
21. X. 1919

Gittis, Potyaev
Revolutionary Military Council, Western Front

There are reports that fraternising has begun between the Polish soldiers and ours.[291] Check on this as accurately as possible and report what measures you are taking* in

* Followed in the manuscript by the words "to step up fraternisation and" which were deleted by Sklyansky.—*Ed.*

order that impostors and enemy ruses shall be rendered completely harmless, and so that thoroughly useful people or commissars take part in the fraternising. Report everything you know about the temper of the Polish soldiers.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

449
TO L. D. TROTSKY

18/X. 1919

Comrade Trotsky,

I was somewhat taken aback by Zinoviev's demand yesterday for more regiments. Is it true about the Estonians?

Nevertheless, I passed it on to Sklyansky, and an order has been given to have them sent from Tula (again from Tula!).

It is not safe, however, to take any more from the reserves of the Southern Front. Would it not be better to search elsewhere?

It is *devilishly* important for us to finish with Yudenich (precisely to finish—to deal a *final* blow). If the offensive has begun, is it not possible to mobilise another 20,000 Petrograd workers and exert really mass pressure on Yudenich?

If there are 5-10 thousand good attacking troops (and you do have them), then surely a city like Petrograd can give about *30* thousand to *follow up*, as an aid *to* them. Rykov says that a great deal of property has been "found" in Petrograd; there is bread, and meat is on the way.

It is necessary to finish with Yudenich *soon*; then we shall turn *everything* against Denikin.

In my opinion it is dangerous to take units from the

* The text from the words "so that" to the end is in Sklyansky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

Southern Front now: they have started an offensive there, and it must be extended.

Greetings,
Lenin

P.S. I have just learned from Sklyansky that 2 regiments intended for Petrograd have reached Kotlas. We shall expedite their movement.*

New information: this is not true.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

450

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky,

In my opinion, Chicherin is right.[292] Has it been verified that the Estonians are fighting? Is there not deception here? Or is it not *only White* Estonians (officers) who have joined Yudenich, people who constitute a minority, and an insignificant one, among the Estonians?

We must think it over ten times, measure the cloth ten times, for there is a mass of information pointing to a desire for peace on the part of the Estonian *peasantry*.

Greetings,
Lenin

22/X.

Written on October 22, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

451

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[293]

To all members of the Politbureau, for signature

I think the request should be granted and a decision taken that either the Commander-in-Chief should be called

* This paragraph is crossed out in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

in personally, or the draft directives sent to him for his *urgent* opinion. The Commander-in-Chief to be informed about this in writing.

Lenin

22/X.

Written on October 22, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

452

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OREL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Chairman of the Executive Committee
Orel
Copy to the Chairman of the Cheka

Send absolutely at once to Council of People's Commissars, Kremlin, Moscow, all manuscripts taken during the search at the home of the writer Ivan Volny.[294] You are personally answerable for their safekeeping. Telegraph fulfilment.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 22, 1919

First published on April 13, 1965, in *Izvestia* No. 88

Printed from the text in V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich's handwriting, added to and signed by Lenin

453

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV**

Trotsky, Zinoviev
Petrograd

The Commander-in-Chief wires rejection of the request for dispatch of a brigade over and above the railway regi-

* The last sentence is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*
** Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

ment and 2 regiments of the 6th Army, of which one is already en route. I think this is correct, because there is nowhere to take them from, and extremely fierce fighting is still in progress in the south near Orel. Far the time being, reinforcements of 1,500 will be sent to you. Measures have been taken to send Letts in addition, if they can be found. It is proposed to give you 600 men from the Soviet School.[295]

Lenin

Written on October 24, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting

454

TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT[296]

25. X. 1919

Comrade Smilga and other members of the R.M.C. of the Front and Armies

I strongly recommend the bearer, Comrade Stepan Nazarov, a Bolshevik, whom I have known personally for a long time.

He and other Ivanovo-Voznesensk comrades have formed an *intelligently organised* group (of from 300 to 500 men) for all-round service to and revitalisation of the whole army.

I warmly recommend the comrades and earnestly request that all measures be taken to ensure they will not be lost, but allocated correctly and carefully. I particularly ask to be informed of the receipt of this letter and of where and how the comrades are assigned.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

455

TELEGRAM TO K. A. PETERSON

Peterson
Latvian Commissar for Military Affairs

Report immediately:

1) Have you already sent the mobilised men to join the reserve battalion of the Lettish division? How many have been sent? Was the mobilisation carried out with sufficient vigour?

2) Have you fulfilled the task of sending reinforcements to the Lettish regiment, to the 7th Army? Both tasks brook no delay.

Lenin

Written on October 25, 1919
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in
Sklyansky's handwriting

456

TELEGRAM TO THE PUGACHEV UYEZD FOOD CONFERENCE[297]

Report at once exactly which villages or volosts have completely fulfilled the surplus-appropriation quotas.

Lenin

Written on October 26, 1919
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

457

TO ALL SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES

27. X. 1919

The bearer, Comrade Boris Solomonovich Weissbrot, a doctor, is personally known to me. He is an old Party

worker. Please treat him with *full* confidence and give him *every* assistance.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

458
TO THEODORE ROTHSTEIN*

18/X. 1919

Comrade Rothstein,

It is unforgivable your keeping us so poorly informed. To have money and not to engage a secretary to collect all socialist literature, pamphlets, and cuttings. To have money and not to arrange for photographing copies in reduced size. All this is inexcusable. All this can and should be arranged. Otherwise communication and information are thoroughly bad. Correct this, and write, if only rarely.

Best greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

459
TO N. A. SEMASHKO[298]

Comrade Semashko,

Discuss this (if need be, with the People's Commissariat for Railways and the Commissariat for Military Affairs) and reply *by telephone* whether you are taking action, *how* and *when*. *Urgent!*

Lenin

27/X.

Written on October 27, 1919

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

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* On the back of the document Lenin wrote: "Please send in code to Rothstein."—*Ed.*

460

TO V. A. KUGUSHEV[299]

28. X. 1919

Comrade Vyacheslav Alexandrovich Kugushev
Ufa
Comrade Kugushev,

I have a favour to ask of you. Lydia Alexandrovna Fotieva, whom I have known well since before 1905 and with whom I have been working for a long time in the C.P.C., is travelling to Ufa.

L. A. Fotieva is quite ill and it is our business to *repair* this "state property" (C.P.C. secretary). Will you please take all steps to help L. A. Fotieva get fixed up, have medical treatment, and be fed *to bursting point*.

Comrade A. D. Tsyurupa has told me that you know L. A. Fotieva and will not refuse to help her.

I thank you in advance; please drop me a line by messenger (military, for example) that you have received this letter.

With comradely greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

461

TELEGRAM
TO D. N. AVROV, J. KH. PETERS, V. G. GROMAN

October 28, 1919

Avrov, Council of the Fortified Area
Peters, Automobile Registration and Distribution Commission
Groman, special agent of the Council of Defence
Petrograd
Copy to Comrade *Markov*, Deputy People's Commissar for Railways, Moscow
Copy to Zinoviev, Smolny*

In a number of decisions, the Council of Defence has

* This phrase is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

instructed its authorised agent, Groman, and the Petrograd Evacuation Commission, to dispatch daily from the Petrograd area 100 truck-loads of valuable freight, in accordance with the plan of the Evacuation Commission of the Council of Defence. You are directed to provide the Petrograd Evacuation Commission with the necessary means of transport by putting ten motor-lorries daily at its disposal as from this day, October 28. Report fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

462
TO Z. P. SOLOVYOV

1. XI. 1919

Deputy People's Commissar for Health

Comrade Solovyov,

1) Look through my remarks and return them, please, with your comments.
2) Are there any statistics as to the **total** number of doctors in Moscow?
3) Have any data on the physician-population ratio been published (where and when)?
4) —ditto: methods of control over doctors (that they are not superfluous, that they are registered)?
5) Ratio (and number) of doctors in Petrograd?
6) —in other towns?
7) Ought we not publish statistics of the number of doctors and ratio for verification? **Briefly**, in the *newspapers*, so that everyone can check?

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

463

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV

In code
by direct line
1. XI. 1919

Trotsky, Zinoviev
Petrograd

The entire military and political situation requires the speedy concentration of very great forces near Petrograd, in order to crush Yudenich once and for all. I advise that this be implemented through the Commander-in-Chief or through the Politbureau.

Lenin

First published in 1941 in the book: *Dokumenty o geroicheskoi oborone Petrograda v 1919 godu* (Documents on the Heroic Defence of Petrograd in 1919)

Printed from the original

464

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

In code
1. XI. 1919

Smirnov
Revolutionary Military Council 5

Report how many divisions can be transferred from you, which, and when. Inquire of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 3rd Army and the front. Reply immediately.

Lenin

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

465
TELEGRAM TO B. I. GOLDBERG

In code
1. XI. 1919

Goldberg, Commander of the Reserve Army
Kazan

Report on the state of your formations, whether the All-Russia General Headquarters has given you everything promised, how matters stand as regards combating typhus and billeting, and whether help by the Party has expanded.

Lenin

First published on February 23, 1938, in *Pravda* No. 53

Printed from the original

466
TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

By direct line
In code

Frunze, copy to Sundukov, Zul

The struggle against the Urals Cossacks is dragging out. I do not see any measures taken to finish with this front quickly, despite the fact that I demanded that you concentrate all your attention on this.* I inform you that the enemy is gaining strength, using the respite you have given him, and trying to end matters by a truce only. Report at once what measures you have taken to rout the enemy.

Lenin

Written on November 2, 1919

First published on July 24, 1928, in *Pravda* No. 170

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting

* See this volume, Document 442.—*Ed.*

467

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Trotsky

I thought Chicherin had informed you that he was notifying the Estonians of our offensive against them if they let Yudenich in. I think we ought to enter Estland if they let Yudenich in, and, if this threat is real, we must speed things up by vehement action.[300] Chicherin is against making this public, for then the Entente would adopt their own measures.

Lenin

Written in November, not later than 6, 1919

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in an unknown handwriting

468

TELEGRAM TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

11. XI. 1919

Bryukhanov, Chairman, Special Food Commission of the Eastern Front

Supplies for the starving workers of the Urals are urgently needed. Report what you have done, how much you have provided, and whether these workers can be sent out to collect grain beyond Kurgan. Your complaints about being short-handed are rather strange.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

469

TO THE CHIEF PEAT COMMITTEE[301]

11. XI. 1919

Re the report submitted for 1919:

1) It is desirable to publish the *results* in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (and send me 1 copy).

2) There are plenty of detailed tables, but *no summary tables*:

—comparison of production in 1918, 1919 and *earlier* (number of days? % of machines in operation? etc.)

—concise map? or distance from railway stations?

—conditions for setting in motion *all* machines?

—comparable data on production in relation to consumption (food and manufactures)?

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

470

TO YEVGENIA POPOVA

20. XI. 1919

Comrade Popova
Manager of the 1st House of Soviets

Please give a room (one, at least, to begin with, later two—for a translator)

to Comrade Keeley, an American engineer, who has come to help the Soviet Republic.

Please give him a room not higher than the 2nd floor and the warmest you have.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

471

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 3rd ARMY, THE PERM GUBERNIA COMMISSAR FOR FOOD, THE COMMISSAR OF THE PERM RAILWAY, AND THE EKATERINBURG GUBERNIA COMMISSAR FOR FOOD[302]

R.M.C. 3
Gubernia Commissar for Food
Perm
Commissar of Perm Railway
Gubernia Commissar for Food
Ekaterinburg
Copy to the Metals Department, Ekaterinburg*

At all costs provide all workers of the Urals, particularly the Ekaterinburg district, Kizel and other coal-mining districts, with full supplies of essential foodstuffs. All army authorities and railway officials are responsible for unconditional fulfilment. Reply at once how many poods have been supplied, and where.**

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written on November 20, 1919
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

472

TO A. S. YENUKIDZE

21. XI. 1919

Comrade Yenukidze,

Will you please give instructions for a *little extra food* to be supplied in general (and that mentioned below in particular) to the following comrades:

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* The words "Copy to the Metals Department, Ekaterinburg" are in Sklyansky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

** The words "how many poods have been supplied, and where" are in Sklyansky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

The first has come to *help* the Soviet government. He is our guest. Assistance is essential.

The second is a founder of Finnish Social-Democracy. An old man. The Finns helped us very considerably before 1905. It is now our duty to help them:

1) *Keeley*, an American engineer, who has come to help the Soviet government
(in particular, *sugar*, *chocolate*, *confectionery*).
Hotel National, No. *321*.
2) *Ursin* (founder of Finnish Social-Democracy).
Hotel Metropole, No. *471*
(in particular, *butter*).

Greetings,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

473

TELEGRAM TO B. S. WEISSBROT*

Weissbrot
Samara

I am passing on your report to Semashko straight away.[303] We shall try to take all steps. We have mobilised dentists as feldschers. I wish you all the best.

Lenin

Written on November 25, 1919

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the text of
the telegraph form

474

TO N. A. SEMASHKO[304]

27. XI. 1919

Comrade Semashko,

(1) Please return the enclosed to me with your comments.

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

(2) Have the facts *verified* (get *responsible persons* to state *these* facts *quickly* and accurately above their signatures).

(3) Weissbrot's plan. Your amendments or counter-plan?

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

475

TO V. P. MILYUTIN

Supreme Economic Council

Comrade Milyutin,

Please discuss the drafting of uniform, brief, but essential questions (or forms) for printing periodic reports in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* on the *results* of work for the development of productive forces (the number of employed workers; production, extraction; productivity per worker, etc.) in all or in the main branches of the economy.

Let me have your opinion.

Lenin

The reports must be divided into 2 parts:

(a) a part which can only be described (plan, conditions, specific features, etc.);

(b) a part which can and should be expressed in figures. *Both* to be published.

In the second part, essentials to be selected (for summaries and comparisons).

(Cf. an example of vagueness—the Chief Shale Committee, report on October 1, 1919.) It is being printed. Where. How often.

(The secret part should be printed in % %; for example: October 1, 1919—100, number of workers; November 1, 1919—120, etc.)

Written on November 27, 1919

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

476

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

I think somebody should be elected *also* from *Kiev* Gubernia.[305]

When there is an All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee (so far there is none), then they will leave. Why should they not be with us so long as there is no Ukrainian C.E.C.?

Lenin

Written in December, not earlier than 5 and not later than 9, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

477

TO YELENA STASOVA[306]

Y. D.,

A code message must be sent that *nobody* anywhere should ever use the nickname Kamo, which should immediately be replaced by another, *a new one*. The town where Kamo is must be mentioned **only** in code.

Lenin

Written in December, after 9, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

478

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

10. XII. 1919

Orgbureau of the C.C.

In my opinion, Frunze asks too much. We must first capture the whole of the Ukraine, Turkestan can wait and make the best of it for a time.[307]

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

479

TELEGRAM TO SH. Z. ELIAVA, J. E. RUDZUTAK, V. V. KUIBYSHEV

In code
11. XII. 1919

Eliava, Rudzutak, Kuibyshev
Tashkent

Your demands for personnel are excessive. It is absurd, or worse than absurd, when you imagine that Turkestan is more important than the centre and the Ukraine. You will not get any more. You must manage with what you have, and not set yourselves unlimited plans, but be modest.

Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

480

UNDERLININGS ON A TELEGRAM FROM A. K. PAIKES AND A NOTE TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

The rapid advance of the army demands the immediate organisation of Soviet institutions locally. The local comrades are unfamiliar with the development and policy of Soviet power and are not capable now of organising them. Contact with the centre being impossible, the absence of suitable leaders in the regions threatens a repetition of stages already passed and an irrational use of Siberia's natural wealth. It is essential to send responsible people immediately to the Siberian Revolutionary Committee for political leadership in the fields of Soviet construction and economy.

Paikes

Orgbureau
(to Stasova)

In my opinion, no more should be given to Siberia: we have none. Siberia will *not* perish. *Everything* to the Ukraine.

Lenin

Written in December, not earlier than 11 and not later than 16, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

481

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

15. XII.

Comrade Zinoviev,

I am sending you the decision of the Politbureau.

Two things:

1) Cannot 2 heavy sledges (Kegress sleigh-cars) and 2 light ones be ordered urgently for the Southern Front? *Urgent*. Reply.

2) Give special attention to the fuel shales near Yamburg. It is of prime importance to exert the utmost efforts.

3) Materials (barbed wire and so on) must *not* be squandered or pilfered.

They will be needed. Attend to it.

Greetings,
Lenin

I am writing the article. If I don't finish it today, don't wait.[308]

Written on December 15, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

482

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

By direct line

Smirnov
Revolutionary Military Council
Omsk

Congratulations on the capture of Novonikolayevsk.

See that the Kuznetsk area and coal are seized intact. Remember, it will be a crime to forge too far ahead in the East, when it is necessary with vigorous energy....*

Inform me of the hour of receipt of this telegram.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

15/XII.

Written on December 15, 1919
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the typewritten copy

483

TO L. B. KRASIN[309]

Send me tomorrow *one copy each* of the instructions and rules, forms of accounting, and other such publications
of the Commissariat for Railways,
of its Political Department,
of its Operational,
Technical,
Maintenance
departments (or boards),
scheme of organisation (if there is such a thing) of the Commissariat for Railways.

Written on December 17, 1919
First published on November 24, 1963, in *Pravda* No. 328

Printed from the original

484

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Orgbureau

I propose either reprimanding the signatories to this paper (their names, 32 persons, can be learned from their previous paper)[310]

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* The rest of the telegram has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

or

reproving them for their gossip about the policy of the C.C., R.C.P., which is a violation of discipline and an obstacle to organised and harmonious work;

—for, without indicating anything concrete, these people are wasting valuable time and diverting attention from speediest departure to the Ukraine for work there.

The C.C. calls on them to cease their gossip and project-mongering and get down to work immediately, strictly carrying out the policy and instructions of the C.C., R.C.P.

Lenin

P.S. The signatories must be kept under supervision and distributed separately among *business-like* personnel. Otherwise there will be squabbling, and not work.

Written in December, not later than 18, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

485

TO SH. Z. ELIAVA

19. XII. 1919

Comrade Eliava,

I recommend to you the bearer, Comrade P. N. Lepeshinsky,[311] whom I know from abroad, from the Geneva of 1902, where we fought together against the Mensheviks.

Comrade Lepeshinsky will undoubtedly assist in just the kind of work that should impress upon the indigenous population the idea and conviction that Soviet people cannot be imperialists, cannot even have imperialist ways of behaviour.

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

486

TELEGRAM TO RYAZAN[312]

Top priority
Telegram to be handed to the duty commissar for immediate delivery. Delivery to be confirmed to Kremlin, Moscow

3 addresses:
Gubernia Party Committee, Gubernia Executive Committee, Gubernia Food Committee
Ryazan

Dear Comrades,

At your conference on December 19 you decided to dispatch 800 truck-loads of potatoes within ten days for Moscow workers and outlined a number of measures for carrying this out. A splendid idea, but the crux of the matter is how successfully and how quickly you will cope with the task you have set yourselves. The working class of Moscow is in the throes of starvation. Saving it means saving the revolution. The working class of Moscow has been bearing the brunt of the struggle against counter-revolution. The Red Army has defeated Kolchak and Yudenich, it is now Denikin's turn. To enable the Red Army, with the least expenditure of time and strength, to cope with this task, which will ensure the possibility of ending the war and beginning peaceful socialist construction, the Moscow worker has had to make yet another sacrifice. He has had to provide for operational needs the transport facilities which were intended for the carriage of food to Moscow. In these conditions, it is natural that localities surrounding the centre of world revolution should come to his aid. All Party and Soviet personnel should be imbued with the idea that the provisioning of Moscow, the salvation of its working class, is their sacred revolutionary duty. On your energy and determination depend the gains of the revolution. All for food procurement, all for work to load and dispatch the trucks. The dispatch and delivery of food trains to Moscow is the care of the People's Commissariat for Railways. Insistently demand fulfilment of this obli-

gation from the local bodies of the Commissariat for Railways. To work, comrades! For speedy, drastic, revolutionary aid to the Moscow workers!

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on December 21, 1919

First published in part in 1953 in the book: *Istoriko-krayevedchesky sbornik* ("*Uchoniye zapiski*" No. 11) (Historical Regional Studies (*Transactions* No. 11)), Ryazan

Published in full in 1957 in the book: *Borba za ustanovleniye i ukrepleniye Sovetskoi vlasti v Ryazanskoi gubernii (1917-1920)* (Struggle for the Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Ryazan Gubernia (1917-1920)), Moscow

Printed from the text of the telegraph tape

487

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[313]

1) A *short* time limit should be set for drafting the instruction.
2) It should be submitted to the Narrow Council, as the circular is badly drafted.
3) A report on the results of taking over churches for schools to be made in 3 months' time.

conditions of taking over and accounting?

Lenin

22/XII.

Written on December 22, 1919

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

488
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

23/XII.

Comrade Zinoviev,

Your letter of 20/XII received.

About Petrograd, arrange everything with Trotsky. It is evidently necessary to preserve and *restore* all defence installations (I hear they are already stealing barbed wire, etc.), and to devise a system of *weekly* mobilisations (either "alerts" or *musters*), in order to keep Petrograd in a state of preparedness. This must be carefully thought out.

Food supply is at a complete standstill because of transport. *Repairs to* **locomotives** *and trucks!!*

About shale, it is splendid that you have already started. But I was surprised at your writing about the transport of shale. Shale does not stand transport (unless it is for *gas*: shale is said to yield more gas than coal does), and electricity should be laid on locally and a distillation plant set up on the spot to obtain oil from shale. That is what I have been told here. And I thought that Petrograd with all its resources could cope both with the task of electrification and of distillation.

Greetings,

Lenin

N.B. Cannot blockhouses be erected for the defence of Petrograd? I am sending you and Trotsky a report on this subject.

Why are there not more sleigh-cars? There are said to be over 100 tracks?

Written on December 23, 1919

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

489
NOTE TO THE SECRETARY[314]

Put on the agenda of the Council of Defence and instruct Krasin (or Lomonosov) to *immediately* draft a decision

(on withdrawals from the army) and reach agreement with Sklyansky.

Written in December,
not earlier than 25, 1919

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

490

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV[315]

26. XII. 1919

Smirnov
Revolutionary Military Council 5
Omsk or present whereabouts

Re your No. 4211: transfer not one hundred, but two hundred trains and locomotives. Rally all forces to expedite coal and relieve the railway, as well as to guard property against pilferage. Report fulfilment more frequently.

Lenin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

491

TELEGRAM TO T. V. SAPRONOV

26. XII. 1919

Sapronov*
Gubernia Executive Committee or Gubernia Revolutionary Committee
Kharkov
Copy to Vladimirov, Chairman of the Special Food Commission of the Southern Front

The transport situation is so grave here that heroic efforts are needed both for deliveries of coal here and even more for stepping up repairs to locomotives. Put the best people on this, check personally, introduce a bonus in grain

* At the top of the manuscript, Lenin wrote: "top priority, by direct line. Inform me of the hour of *delivery to addressees in Kharkov. Lenin.*"—*Ed.*

for every locomotive repaired, restore the best repair-shops, introduce work in two and three shifts. Telegraph fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

492

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

27. XII. 1919

Comrade Chicherin,

Your proposals have been adopted almost entirely by the Politbureau.[316] Regarding the exact text, phone the Secretary of the C.C., Comrade Krestinsky.

Please, never use the expression "Chairman of the C.C.", for *there is no such post.*

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

493

TO THE CENTRAL COLLEGIUM OF AGITATIONAL CENTRES

30. XII. 1919

Central Collegium of Agitational Centres[317]

I recommend the bearer, Comrade Maria Movshovich, whom I have known personally for many years, as a most loyal Party worker, and I earnestly request that she be treated with complete confidence and given every assistance, in particular that she be allowed just now ten days' leave of absence to restore her health.[318]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

1920

494
TO SOPHIA BRICHKINA[319]

Brichkina: that is not the way. It is not enough to send it to Tsyurupa. You must check and *write down* what reply *has been sent* and *when*.

Written early in January 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

495
NOTE TO THE SECRETARY[320]

Send copies

1) to the Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs

2) to the Commissariat for Railways, and inform them by telephone that today in the Council of Defence (2/I. 1920) we shall raise the question of *military* accountancy: let them be prepared.

Lenin

Written on January 2, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

496

TO THE PODOLSK UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Uyezd Executive Committee
Podolsk
Copy to Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee

In the village of Alexandrovo, Podolsk Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia, a certain *Teryokhin*, in the name of the Young Communist League, contrary to the direct instruction of the People's Commissariat for Education, has occupied a lace-making school, arrested a schoolmistress, and removed some of the property. Immediately vacate the school premises, return the articles taken both from the school and the teachers, and make it possible for the teachers to work in peace. Investigate Teryokhin's illegal actions with a view to his prosecution,

Report fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

2/I. 20

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

497

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

4/I. 1920

Comrade Chicherin,

Please forward to Litvinov (and if possible, transmit in abridged form by telegraph in code):

I have received from him a small batch of pamphlets and newspapers and am extremely disappointed. The selection has been utterly casual and careless. Obviously, no one has shown the slightest care in such an important matter as supplying Russia with Western socialist literature.

There are no pamphlets and books by the socialist leaders (although their titles and the names of the authors can be found in the Austrian, German, French, Italian and English newspapers).

The newspapers have been so poorly selected that 9/10 of them is rubbish, while, for example, out of a heap of issues of *Freiheit*,[321] the really important issues (even the *most* important, perhaps the only important ones) have been *left out*, namely, the reports of the Leipzig Congress[322] and the text of the resolutions.

Absolute carelessness, negligence or lack of understanding and unwillingness to understand what is needed.

We must have them (Litvinov and *all* members of the R.C.P. abroad and all "bureaux" and agencies) see to it that people conversant with the literature are *engaged* in *each* country (to begin with, Denmark, Holland, etc., will suffice), their *duty* being to collect 4-5 copies of *every* socialist and anarchist and communist pamphlet and book, *every* resolution, *all reports* and **minutes** of congresses, etc., etc., *in all languages*. All to be delivered to Copenhagen, Stockholm, Vienna, etc. (to Berlin as well). Messengers are available—infrequently, but they are available. The literature must be collected in good time by *employed* persons (Russians are slovenly and will *never* do this meticulously).

N.B. ||| N.B.

It is stupid to grudge money for this.

Ask Litvinov to tell this to

Abramovich
Kopp
Rutgers
Bronsky
Lyubarsky
Reich
Ström
Z. Höglund
Kilbom
Rothstein, etc.

Have 3-5 and more collectors, otherwise we shall never get what is absolutely necessary.

Lenin

P.S. Please send a copy of this (or this letter itself after it has been dealt with) to Klinger.

First published in part in 1961 in the book: *Biblioteka V. I. Lenina v Kremle* (Lenin's Library in the Kremlin)
Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

498

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

4. I. 1920

Dear V. D.,

#

I am paying *personally* for my library.

When you are well again, please pay everything

$$\begin{array}{r} 3{,}200 \\ +\ \ 500\ \text{(Dahl)} \\ \hline 3{,}700,\ \text{etc.} \end{array}$$

and *keep the receipts*.

Yours,
Lenin

I enclose 4,000 rubles.

#

The library of the C.P.C.'s *Managing Department* is another matter.

First published in 1926 in the journal *Ogonyok* No. 13

Printed from the original

499

TO A. I. SVIDERSKY[323]

Comrade Svidersky,

Receive the comrades *without fail* or ask another member of the Board to do so, and *be sure* to inform me of your decision.

Lenin

5/I. 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

500

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[324]

Members of the Politbureau

I voted against this decision of the C.P.C., but I consider it inconvenient to rescind it at once.

I propose, without calling together the Politbureau, to collect the votes of its members. My proposal: to get an immediate decision of the C.P.C. that the State Control is obliged to let the Food Commissariat know about every such case. In a month or so we shall see.

Lenin

Written in January, not earlier than 5 and not later than 23, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

501

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 3rd ARMY[325]

12. I. 1920

R.M.C. of the 3rd Army

I fully approve your proposals. I welcome the initiative. Am submitting the question to the Council of People's Commissars. Start on the job, on condition of the strictest co-ordination with the civil authorities, and devote all energies to the collection of all food surpluses and the restoration of transport.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

502

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

Top priority
By direct line
12. I. 1920

Smirnov
Revolutionary Military Council 5

1) R.M.C. 3 proposes converting the 3rd Army into labour army for economic revival of the Urals, Chelyabinsk and Tobolsk gubernias. I am in full sympathy with this and shall put it before the Council of People's Commissars. tomorrow. Please give your opinion.

2) I am deeply concerned about the delay in delivering here 200 locomotives with food trains. The most urgent revolutionary measures must be taken to hasten this. See to prompt unconditional execution.

Lenin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

503

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE C.P.C.

The question raised by R.M.C. 3 is of the greatest importance. I am putting it before the C.P.C. on 13. I. 1920, and I ask the departments concerned to have their opinions ready by that date.

I think that on 13.I in the C.P.C. we should

first, approve this in principle,

second, give it the widest publicity for encouragement,

third, endorse *the basic principles* of its organisation, or, if this cannot be done at once, elect a workmanlike commission to draft these principles as a matter of urgency.

Lenin

12. I. 1920

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

504

UNDERLININGS AND AN INSTRUCTION ON S. I. SYRTSOV'S TELEGRAM

Lenin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

The position in the Don as regards food organisation is impossible. The Don food agencies have been set up on paper, but the appointed food officials are working in the Tambov and Saratov gubernias, and not where they should be. The district food agencies, set up in amateur fashion and not connected with the Don Executive Committee, are receiving no directives and instructions, and for that reason are not capable of working, and cannot counteract the army food agents who frequently commit outrageous excesses.

Syrtsov
Deputy Chairman, Don Executive Committee

Tsyurupa and Sereda:

Your comments?
N.B. || Seed is badly needed for sowing!![326]

Written in January, not earlier than 13 and not later than 15, 1920
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

505

TO THE CHIEF COAL COMMITTEE[327]

For *urgent* reply: 1) is this known?
2) what exactly is known?
3) is there literature about this coal?
4) *what has been done?*
5) what is being done?

Lenin

14/I.

Written on January 14, 1920
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*
Printed from the original

506

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

15. I. 1920

Deputy People's, Commissar for Education

Please issue orders for our state libraries (the Rumyantsev Museum, the Petrograd Public Library, and others) immediately to begin collecting and keeping *all whiteguard* newspapers (Russian and foreign). Please give me a draft of the order prescribing that all *military* and civil authorities are to collect and hand over these newspapers to the state libraries.[328]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. Perhaps you would find it appropriate in these orders (or better separately?) to order and check on the collection of *complete sets* of our newspapers since 1917.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

507

TO THE CHIEF OIL COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

I enclose a cutting from *Izvestia* No. 8 (855) for 14/I. 20, and ask to be informed whether you are aware of the facts stated in this paragraph,[329] and how far the figures given in it may be regarded as trustworthy. What practical measures are being taken in this connection?*

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 15, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

* This sentence is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

508

TELEGRAM TO K. G. MYASKOV

Myaskov
Gubernia Food Commissar
Samara
Copy to Muss, Co-operative Department
Copy to the Gubernia Committee of the Communist Party

For the amount of friction and misunderstanding with the co-operatives, Samara holds first place. I am surprised that implementation of the decree of March 20 has not yet been arranged. I order strict adherence to the instructions of the People's Commissariat for Food. Report what has been obstructing your work, who instituted the commission which dismissed Chairman Mikhailov and other co-operators and on what grounds it is operating. Instead of fighting individuals, to the annoyance of the co-operative movement, concentrate efforts on political preparation for the new elections.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 15, 1920
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
the typewritten text
signed by Lenin

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

509

POSTSCRIPT TO L. D. TROTSKY'S TELEGRAM[330]

I request Comrade Frunze, in accordance with Trotsky's directives, to develop revolutionary energy for maximum acceleration of the construction of the railway and dispatch of oil. Confirm receipt.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 17, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

510

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY

Please telephone Markov and tell him that **I strongly** support Semashko's request.[331]

Lenin

18/I.

Written on January 18, 1920
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

511

TO L. B. KAMENEV

If that is how the question is put, then dictate to your secretary a protest against the Narrow Council and a draft decree for the Full Council (that the Narrow Council should not interfere in local affairs without special reasons and is **always** obliged to *make inquiries* from local Soviets except in cases of extreme urgency).[332]

Written on January 20, 1920
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

512

TELEGRAM TO H. Y. YUMAGULOV[333]

Yumagulov
Ufa
Copies to Eltsin, Ufa
and to Artyom Sergeyev, Bashkir Revolutionary Committee, Bashkir Regional Committee, Sterlitamak

In stating in the telegram that "The All-Russia Central Executive Committee considers it improbable and quite out of the question that Artyom, Samoilov and Preobrazhensky could carry on agitation against the Bashkir Republic", the All-Russia C.E.C. thereby again confirmed the necessity of their most loyal observance of the Bashkir Constitution.

The telegram of the Central Committee sent later to Comrade Artyom had the same aim. Under these circumstances I am quite sure that Artyom, Preobrazhensky and Samoilov will give no real cause for complications. The members of the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee should act in the same way. Only from your telegram did I learn that Comrades Shamigulov, Izmailov and others were deported from Bashkiria by the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee; the Central Committee thought they were travelling to Moscow on their own initiative to make a report, considered it unnecessary for the five comrades to waste time on the journey and sent them back to Sterlitamak.

Your attempt to deport old Party comrades from Bashkiria, the absurd reference to their Bukharinist orientation, the persistent, though incorrect, application of the epithet "Ukrainians" to Preobrazhensky, Artyom and Samoilov—give me grounds for doubting your objectivity in this matter. Therefore I order you immediately to fulfil the telegram from the All-Russia C.E.C. of 20.I, which is still unfulfilled as regards cancellation of the conspiracy report.

On behalf of the Politbureau of the C.C.,

*Lenin**

Written in January, after 20, 1920

First published in 1959 in the book: *Obrazovaniye Bashkirskoi ASSR* (The Formation of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), Ufa

Printed from the text in Krestinsky's handwriting and signed by Lenin

513

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 5th ARMY

R.M.C. 5

I approve your proposal in regard to a buffer state.[334] Only it is essential to lay down firmly that our represent-

* The words "On behalf of the Politbureau of the C.C., *Lenin*" are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

ative, or preferably two representatives, at the Political Centre should be informed of all decisions and have the right to attend all conferences of the Political Centre.

Second—serious measures of control should be taken over the disarming of the Czechoslovaks.[335]

Third—it will be very difficult for us for transport reasons to move the Czechoslovaks out.

*Lenin**
Chairman, Council of Defence

January 21, 1920

First published in part in 1958 in the book: V. T. Agalakov, *Iz istorii stroitelstva Sovetskoi vlasti v Vostochnoi Sibiri. 1919-1921* (From the History of the building of Soviet Power in Eastern Siberia, 1919-1921)

Published in full in 1960 in the book: *Irkutskaya partiinaya organizatsiya v vosstanovitelny period (1920-1926)* (The Irkutsk Party Organisation of the Restoration Period (1920-1926)

Printed from the typewritten copy

514

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Larin is to be forbidden project-mongering. *Rykov* to be *warned*: curb Larin, otherwise *you* will get it hot.[336]

Written in January, not later than 23, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

* The telegram was signed also by L. D. Trotsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.—*Ed.*

515

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 1st LABOUR ARMY

Revolutionary Council of Labour Army 1, copy to Yermakov, Uposkom, Ekaterinburg*

In reply to Yermakov's telegram No. 25 concerning the existence of a huge number of all kinds of commissions, organisations and authorised agents engaged in organising fuel procurement—of military commissions alone there are as many as twelve plus the Ekaterinburg military district commission, the Ufa front-line commission, etc., newly set up by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic—the Council of Defence decided: to instruct the Revolutionary Council of the Labour Army to settle the questions raised in the telegram in a way which will restore the greatest possible unity and co-ordination in the work of cutting, sawing, transporting and floating firewood, with the gubleskom and zheleskom** retaining the leading role.[337]

Report decisions and measures adopted.***

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written in January 23, 1920

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
the typewritten text,
added to and signed
by Lenin

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* Authorised agent of the Special Committee of the Council of Defence for introducing martial law on the railways and promoting fuel supplies.—*Ed.*

** Gubleskom and zheleskom—Gubernia Timber Committee and Railway Timber Committee.—*Ed.*

*** The last sentence is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

516

TO THE RUSSIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY[338]

Forward it to ROSTA:

1) for information and guidance;

2) investigate who issued the "Zatonsky" idiocy, and impose a measure of punishment on this person;

3) report to me fulfilment, and

4) the measures taken to prevent such "unfortunate" occurrences in future.

Lenin

27/I.

Written in January 27, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

517

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH*

Comrade V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich,

The State Publishers may be offended that I did not and Krzhizhanovsky's pamphlet through them?[339] Perhaps I broke the rules? I was in a great hurry.

If it is inconvenient for you to settle the matter otherwise, would you send this note of mine to Comrade Vorovsky (I ask him to have a paper issued by the State Publishers ordering the speediest, by Sunday 1.II, publication of Krzhizhanovsky's pamphlet at the 17th Print-shop, formerly Kushnerev's, and I apologise for having sent the pamphlet direct to the press because I was in a great hurry).

Perhaps this has already been done? If not, *it must be done*. Give me your reply.

Yours,

Lenin

Written at the end of January 1920

First published in 1930 in the book: Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, *Na boyevykh postakh Fevralskoi i Oktyabrskoi revolyutsii*, Moscow

Printed from the original

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* On the envelope Lenin wrote: "V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich. ((If at home wait for an answer.)) (from Lenin) (to be signed for)."—*Ed.*

518

TELEGRAM
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Chairman, Gubernia E.C.
Nizhni-Novgorod
Copy to the Assistant Manager of the Radio Laboratory

In view of the special importance of the tasks confronting the Radio Laboratory and the important successes it has achieved, give it the most effective assistance and support in facilitating conditions of work and removing obstacles.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 5, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

519

TELEGRAM
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD CHEKA

Chairman of the Cheka
Nizhni-Novgorod
Copy to the Assistant Manager of the Radio Laboratory
Copy to Dzerzhinsky, Vecheka, Moscow

In view of the urgent and particularly important work of the Radio Laboratory, release Shorin immediately on a surety from its collegium and committee, without discontinuing the investigation into Shorin's case.[340]

*Lenin**
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 5, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

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* The words "Copy to Dzerzhinsky, Vecheka, Moscow", "release ... immediately", "without discontinuing the investigation into Shorin's case", and the signature, are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

520

TELEGRAM TO S. T. KOVYLKIN

By direct line
7. II. 1920

Kovylkin
Saratov

Your resignation unacceptable. You must learn to work together with Arzhanov at all costs. This is possible if you won't be obstinate. Report the slightest friction to me. Arzhanov is appointed temporarily.[341]

Lenin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

521

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE LABOUR ARMY

10. II. 1920

R.M.C. of the Labour Army
Ekaterinburg

I am putting your inquiries before the Council of Defence. Trotsky has left to join you. Personally I fear that you are indulging in project-mongering, and that Bumazhny's and Maximov's opposition is a play at departmental game. I advise you not to engage in recriminations but to throw all forces into the main thing, viz.: 1) the restoration of railway transport, 2) the collection and delivery of food, 3) the delivery of firewood, timber and barges to landing-stages. Let me know whether you can carry out this work harmoniously, energetically and rapidly.[342]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

522

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

To be handed to the duty commissar for immediate, priority transmission
Notify Kremlin, Moscow, of delivery

Stalin
Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee
Kharkov

I am still hopeful that after your talks with Tukhachevsky and the removal of Sokolnikov, things will adjust themselves without your transference. Therefore, for the time being, we are not notifying Smilga. Be sure to inform me in good time and in detail by code or by telephone from Kharkov. I consider it most important that the troops disengaged after the capture of Odessa should not be kept on the Dniester, but moved to the Western Front as a safeguard against the Poles. Let me know your opinion.

Lenin

Written on February 10, 1920

First published in part in 1929 in the book: K. Y. Voroshilov, *Stalin i Krasnaya Armia* (Stalin and the Red Army), Moscow-Leningrad

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the decoded text of the telegraph tape

523

TO S. P. SEREDA AND A. D. TSYURUPA

14. II. 1920

Comrades Sereda
and Tsyurupa
Copies to the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions
Commissariat for State Control
Commissariat for Trade
Supreme Economic Council

I draw special attention to the very sensible article "Lose No Time" by Y. Preobrazhensky in *Pravda* of 11.II.

It is essential to adopt his proposal[343] and immediately

1) draft a decree
   a) on the *obligatory* organisation of urban farming (in all towns);
   b) on measures of stimulation and development;
   c) *assignments* (as detailed as possible) to be given in this field for the year 1920, etc.;

2) step up purchases of seed in Denmark and *abroad* in general;

3) step up agitation *and workers' control* over the measures in §1.

Please send me a *brief* summary of what is *already being done* (if possible one that would be suitable also for the press—we shall publish it in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, if it is not possible to do so in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*).

In this connection, it is necessary to begin an intensified and more systematic struggle against suburban bag-trading by drawing urban workers into the business of keeping an account (detailed) of crops, stocks, surpluses, collection of food products in suburban districts, and helping their procurement by the Food Commissariat agencies. I request the Food Commissariat to let me know what measures are being taken.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

524

TELEGRAM
TO I. T. SMILGA AND G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

All in code

Smilga and Orjonikidze

Am deeply concerned about the state of our troops on the Caucasian Front, the complete demoralisation among Budyonny's forces, the weakening of all our troops, the weakness of the general command, the discord between the armies, the strengthening of the enemy.[344] It is essential to exert

all efforts and put through a number of emergency measures with revolutionary energy. Telegraph fully in code what exactly you are undertaking.

Lenin

Written on February 17, 1920
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the original

525

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code

Trotsky
Copy to *Smirnov*, R.M.C. 5
also *in code*

I fully support your reply to Smirnov. We must vehemently denounce the opponents of a buffer state[345] (it seems that Frumkin is such an opponent), threaten to bring them before a Party court, and demand that everyone in Siberia carry out the slogan: "not a step farther east, all-out efforts to hasten the movement of troops and locomotives to the west, to Russia". We would be idiots to allow ourselves to be drawn into a stupid movement into the heart of Siberia, permitting Denikin meanwhile to revive and the Poles to strike. It would be a crime.

Lenin

Written on February 19, 1920
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

526

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[346]

Krestinsky and L. B. Kamenev

To the members of the Politbureau:

I am against summoning Stalin. He is cavilling. The Commander-in-Chief is quite right: first of all we must defeat Denikin, then pass to a state of peace.

I suggest replying to Stalin: "The Politbureau cannot summon you at present, as it considers that the most important and urgent task is to achieve final victory over Denikin, for which you must step up reinforcements to the Caucasian Front with the utmost energy."

Lenin

Written on February 19, 1920
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

527

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN*

Stepping up the movement of reinforcements from the South-Western Front to the Caucasian Front is your concern. It is necessary in general to help in every way and not wrangle about departmental competences.[347]

Lenin

Written on February 19, 1920

Printed from the original

528

TELEGRAM TO D. Z. MANUILSKY

Manuilsky
Headquarters of the South-Western Front
Kharkov

Sapronov is wrong, because before focussing on the middle peasant it is necessary first, before that, to organise the poor peasants. This must definitely be done, and best done not in the form of Poor Peasants' Committees, but in the form of Soviets composed exclusively of poor and middle peasants, with special measures on our part for safeguarding the interests of the poor peasants and for collection of grain. I asked you about transport since the chief task now is to step up the transport of troops

* Transmitted in code by direct line.—*Ed.*

and complete the defeat of Denikin. We must mobilise the workers for this and at all costs bring up large forces quickly and win back Rostov. I ask Stalin to reply to me whether he is taking all measures.

Lenin

Written on February 22, 1920

First published in 1957 in the book: V. I. Lenin, *Ob Ukraine* (On the Ukraine), Kiev

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

529

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

23. II. 1920

Rakovsky, Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine
Kharkov

The decision of the III International* will be finally edited tomorrow evening and sent to you on Wednesday. I have just spoken with Tsyurupa about the three-dessiatine norm, but so far we have failed to convince each other. Tomorrow I hope we shall arrive at a decision.

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

530

INSTRUCTION ON ZALYGIN'S TELEGRAM

Urgent

Comrade Lenin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Moscow

Simakov, Chairman of the Bolkhov Uyezd Party Committee, was married in church to the daughter of a capitalist hostage. At a gener-

* This evidently refers to the resolution of the Comintern Executive Committee on the Borotbists (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 40, p. 159).—*Ed.*

al meeting of the Communists of the Bolkhov organisation I proposed that for undermining Party principles Chairman Simakov should be expelled from the Party. The proposal was adopted and Simakov was expelled from the Party. Some members of the Party Committee adhered to their own opinion and called in Comrade Pakun, representative of the Orel Gubernia Committee. The decision of the meeting was annulled. For putting forward my proposal I was arrested a few days later and am now in prison. I ask for your assistance.

Zalygin
Head of the Uyezd Department
of Education

The arrested man to be released at once. An explanation giving reasons for the arrest to be sent by telegraph and all the case papers to be mailed to the Central Committee.

Written in February,
not earlier than 24, 1920

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

531

TELEGRAM TO THE SAMARA AND SARATOV GUBERNIA PARTY COMMITTEES AND GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES

Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.
Gubernia Executive Committee
Avksentyevsky, Deputy Commander of the Turkestan Front
Samara
Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.
Gubernia Executive Committee
Budassi, builder of the Emba railway
Saratov

Construction of the railway and oil pipeline to the Emba is of the greatest importance. It is necessary to assist it with the utmost energy and expedite the work in every way. Organise agitation, set up a permanent promotion commission, introduce labour conscription; everything by

agreement with Budassi, who is building the railway. Telegraph fulfilment regularly.[348]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 25, 1920
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*
Printed from the original

532

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD

25. II. 1920

The Ukhtomsky (Lyubertsy) Works of Moscow Gubernia, Moscow Uyezd, an agricultural machinery plant, has coal and materials and the workers (1,300 employees) *have not dispersed*. It would be *particularly* important to support such a factory.

Please discuss urgently whether the workers of this factory can be given food assistance as a special measure.

Please telephone your reply to me.[349]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*
Printed from the original

533

TO V. N. LOBOVA, A. Y. MINKIN, Y. M. YAROSLAVSKY[350]

26. II. 1920

Comrades Lobova
Minkin
Y. Yaroslavsky
and if they are not in Perm, then to other members of the Perm Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.

The bearers, Comrades
Fyodor Samsonovich Sannikov,
Grigory Ivanovich Mikhalev,
Platon Pavlovich Moskalyov,
came to me from Kalinin.

They are non-Party people, but create an impression of remarkable conscientiousness.

They are requesting re-registration and checking of the members of the Uyezd Party Committee (they are from Perm Gubernia, Usolye Uyezd, Polovodovo Volost) on the plea that there are many of the *worst* elements in the local Party.

Will you please fulfil their request.

Let me know the results of the check-up.

Give me the names of those members of the Uyezd Party Committee (in Usolye and in the volosts of Usolye Uyezd) who are *personally* known to you and are absolutely reliable.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Sent to Perm

First published (in facsimile) on November 24, 1929, in *Pravda* No. 274

Printed from the original

534

TELEGRAM TO F. F. RASKOLNIKOV

27. II. 1920

Fleet Commander Raskolnikov
Astrakhan
Copy to Kirov, R.M.C. 11
Copy to the Astrakhan Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.

Every effort must be made, without losing a single hour, and taking the maximum precautions, to transport all the oil from Guriev at first open water. Reply immediately whether all measures have been taken, how prepared you are, what are the prospects, whether the best people have been appointed, and who is responsible for ensuring safe transport by sea.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

535

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE FOOD COMMISSARIAT

27. II. 1920

Comrade Vinogradov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Vesyegonsk Teachers' Union, has presented the attached petition.[351]

The crux of the matter is that the Vesyegonsk Uyezd Food Committee be *instructed* to issue to the teachers (about 500 in the uyezd) an increased ration of bread and potatoes plus footwear or leather.

Both from local stocks—the *uyezd has* surpluses.

Please make the necessary inquiries *today* (the comrade has to leave tomorrow) and give me a reply by telephone (in the evening *we shall decide* the matter in the Council of Defence).

Lenin

First published in 1924 in the book: A. Vinogradov, *Iz vospominanii o V. I. Lenine* (From Recollections of V. I. Lenin), Vesyegonsk

Printed from the original

536

TO K. A. ALFEROV

Comrade Alferov,

Lomonosov, before his departure, had told me *everything* had been done for the oil pipeline.

Clearly we have here sabotage or slovenliness, for information is *utterly confusing*.

Send me without fail *not later than 11 a.m. next Tuesday* 1) a short, extremely brief, report on (a) what has been ordered and (b) what has been done.

2) The name, patronymic and surname of *each* responsible person.

Lenin

27.II

(P.S. In reply to your note of 27.II.)[352]

Written on February 27, 1920
First published on April 22, 1926, in *Pravda* No. 92

Printed from the original collated with the typewritten text, signed and added to by Lenin

537
TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

28. II 1920

Zinoviev
Petrograd

Pokrovsky tells me that the library of the former Free Economic Society[353] is being pilfered and books are even being burned. I emphatically request you to verify this, put a stop to the scandal, and let me have the name of the responsible local inspector. Have him send me without delay an official telegram re fulfilment.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

538
TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front

The Central Committee confirms its decision on the need to assign responsible political workers from the armies of the South-Western Front for transport work. The C.C. considers the transfer of responsible workers from the armies to the railways to be the most important guarantee for the salvation of transport. Even the Caucasian Front

has provided the whole apparatus of the 2nd Army and 100 political workers for work on the railways of the South-East. Telegraph the number and duties of those assigned.

Lenin

Written on February 28, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
of the telegraph form
signed by Lenin

539

TO L. B. KAMENEV[354]

I think you should "wear them out" with *practical* assignments:

Dan—*sanitary inspection*,
Martov—control over *dining-rooms*.

Written at the end of February-
beginning of March 1920
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

540

TO L. B. KRASIN

Would it be too much bother to order for me a similar map as of 1.III.1920
showing
railways under construction
+(α) track laid
(β) other stages of commencement (or progress) of construction.

Written in 1920,
not earlier than March 1
First published in part
on April 18, 1963,
in *Izvestia* No. 93
Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

541

FOR LANSBURY

In a conversation with Comrade Lansbury I promised to write about our attitude to religion.[355] Comrade Krasikov has done this much better than I could have done, the more so since Comrade Krasikov is specially in charge of these affairs.

Lenin

2/III

Written on March 2, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

542

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA AND G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

In code
3. III. 1920

Smilga and Orjonikidze
R.M.C., Caucasian Front

It is extremely important for you to work harmoniously with Ksandrov, who has been sent to the Donets Basin with special powers. Regarding coal, telegraph how matters stand. Is the rumour about Peters having been killed by the Denikinites in Rostov true? What in general is the military situation?

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

543

TELEGRAM TO N. N. KUZMIN

In code
By direct line

Comrade Kuzmin, member of R.M.C. 6

Re No. 95.

Exercise the utmost caution and distrust in this matter.[356] Mind you are not fooled by officers who want to infiltrate among us in order to demoralise the army. Make thorough inquiries about everyone wishing to return and if you are convinced that his return will be useful, inform Moscow to obtain permission. Discuss this question with Lomov's commission,[357] which has gone to Archangel. Report the views expressed in the discussion.

Re No. 82.

Chicherin's statement about leaving the country stipulated the surrender of the White government, but it has fled. For the time being, do not permit anyone to go abroad. Employ the arrested officers on work. Use those who have remained at liberty for the same purpose. Sklyansky's telegram No. 49/ш about sending some of them to the centre holds good. Discuss the question with Lomov's commission.

Lenin

Written on March 5, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting

544

TO S. Y. CHUTSKAYEV

5/III.

Comrade Chutskayev,

Especially urgent measures must be adopted to *speed up* the sorting of valuables.[358] If we are too late, they will give nothing for them in Europe and America.

In Moscow, *a thousand* Party members, etc., can (*and should*) be mobilised for this work under special control.

At your end, evidently, the whole business is *dragging woefully*.

Write what **extraordinary** measures you are taking to speed things up.

Lenin

Written on March 5, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

545

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY[359]

*In code**

Trotsky

If grain and timber procurement has risen, special efforts must be devoted to barges and preparations for floating, especially barges for oil, then to building houses for the Chelyabinsk and other coal workers. Cannot the Siberian prisoners of war and officers be moved to the Urals and set to work on coal and timber?

To expedite replies from the centre, obtain direct lines through the military department.

Krestinsky has replied to you. I repeat in brief. The Ishim remains in Tyumen Gubernia. You can keep Brunovsky. About meat, an order to organise salting centres has been given.

Regarding regional centres, it is necessary to tread warily and think it over carefully, so as to avoid regionalism.

If troop formation in Siberia has been overdone you should check yourself what real measures are being taken to combat this, summoning to the direct line anyone you require.

Smirnov must be taken off diplomatic, frontier and military affairs and returned to peace-time work.

Lenin

Written on March 7, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

546

TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

Via the *military*
by army line
In C.C. code

Trotsky

The Poles are advancing further, we have evacuated Rechitsa. Gomel is said to be threatened, therefore, despite Stalin's optimism, I consider essential and urgently necessary all the extraordinary measures you have proposed. In regard to the Commissariat for Railways, the Politbureau has decided to propose making you People's Commissar for Railways, since Krasin will be going abroad in a week, and Lomonosov, after typhus, will have recovered only in six weeks' time.[360] Reply immediately.

Lenin

Written in March, not earlier than 8 and not later than 20, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

547

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV[361]

No terms whatever with Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks: either they submit to us unconditionally or they will be arrested.*

Written on March 9, 1920

First published in 1938 in *Bolshevik* No. 2

Printed from the original

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* In the typewritten copy of the telegram this is followed by the words: "On behalf of the Politbureau, *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

548

TELEGRAM TO A. LOMOV

9. III. 1920

Lomov, member of the Board, Supreme Economic Council
Archangel

Try to search out, or get someone to search out, press materials and reports about the oil-bearing district of the river Ukhta in the museum of the Society for the Study of the Northern Territory and in the Management Board of State Properties.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

549

INSTRUCTION TO PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS[362]

10. III. 1920

In view of the catastrophically serious food position of the workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, please organise for today a meeting of representatives of the

Food Commissariat
Commissariat for Agriculture
Commissariat for Railways
Chief Board of Water Transport
Central Committee of Textile Industry
Commissariat for Labour.

Comrade *Kiselyov*, member of the Presidium of the C.E.C., has agreed to convene the commission.

The commission's terms of reference: to discuss the proposals of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Party Committee dated 6/III and to work out *emergency* relief measures. Report on fulfilment to be given to the C.P.C. by Saturday.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

550

TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[363]

To the *Politbureau* (or Orgbureau): this incident should be **seized** at to make a thoroughgoing investigation, enlisting **Dzerzhinsky's** assistance, find the "sister" the Menshevik writes about, and **purge** Karakhan's office.

Lenin

11/III.

Written on March 11, 1920
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

551

TELEGRAM TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT*

In code
11. III. 1920

Unschlicht
R.M.C., Western Front

Evidently the Poles will fight. We are doing everything possible to strengthen defence. Agitation in the Polish language must also be intensified to the utmost. We shall help you, if necessary, with people, money, and paper.

Lenin

First published (in facsimile)
in 1930 in the book
Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918-1921,
Vol. III

Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

552

TELEGRAM
TO F. F. RASKOLNIKOV AND S. M. KIROV*

In code
14. III. 1920

Raskolnikov and Kirov
Fleet Command
Astrakhan

Your plans are based on deep water shipment, but Babkin proposes that the oil be transported by way of Belinskaya Bank, in shallow water off shore, so that the enemy fleet can neither capture nor sink it. With a draught of from 4 to 5 quarters he names as suitable the steamships *Jambai*, *Ukno*, *Ratmir*, *Lev*, *Neva*, *Lyubimy*, *Kirghiz*, *Alexander*, and the barges *Pluto*, *Apollo*, *Medusa*, *Rusalka*, *Valeria*, *Stephania* and others. Pumping over at Belinskaya Bank. He believes that in this way it is possible to transport 320,000 in one trip and 1,600,000 a month. Report your opinion.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

553

TELEGRAM
TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ALL-UKRAINE CONFERENCE OF BOROTBISTS[364]

16. III. 1920

Rakovsky, Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars,
for Blakitny, Presidium of the All-Ukraine Conference of Borotbists
Kharkov

I thank you for the greetings from the bottom of my heart. Warmest wishes for the success of the conference, particularly for the success of the work that has been begun for merging with the Party of Bolsheviks.

Lenin

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

* At the top of the manuscript Lenin wrote: "After coding return to me. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

554

TO L. B. KRASIN[365]

Why should you not submit a separate decree for calling in *experts* (electricians) from abroad and allocating 500,000 rubles for this purpose? It would be *effective* (and politically *useful*).

Written on March 16, 1920

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

555

TO L. B. KRASIN[366]

You are making a mistake in "*going out*" for "something big" and overlooking the small. Go after the little bird. There are small firms outside the trusts. These firms can make (sometimes sell) spare parts and the like.

Written in March, after 16, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

556

TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ADDRESSEE

There is something we failed to do as regards locomotive repairs.

What about a commission of Central Committee men to hustle things and check up?

Or reports once a week?

Or something else?

Who is keeping an eye on this? Who is pushing things? *No one.*

Who has selected the best repair-shops? What results are there from the 200-pood bonus per locomotive?

What about putting *Rozengolts personally* in charge of this, perhaps plus someone else?

We've passed a decree and gone to sleep....[367]

Written after March 16, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

557

TELEGRAM TO MAXIM GORKY[368]

Gorky
Petrograd

In reply to your letter of 5/III, I quote the text of the telegram which the People's Commissariat for Food sent to Badayev: "Pending final settlement by a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the question of improving the position of scientists, you are instructed to continue supplies according to the plan previously adopted by you, i.e., without making a reduction in keeping with recent orders of the People's Commissariat for Food." Pokrovsky's commission is appealing against the Petrograd list as being unfair. Sapozhnikov was released on 9/III. Manukhin has to present to Semashko, People's Commissar for Health, a description of the method of the proposed research, on the results of the examination of which the decision depends.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 19, 1920

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the text in
Fotieva's handwriting
signed by Lenin

558

TELEGRAM TO B. I. GOLDBERG

Comrade *Goldberg*
Revolutionary Military Council of the Reserve Army

The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence sends comradely thanks on behalf of Soviet power to all the workers, Red Army men, technical and administrative personnel, who worked to restore the bridge over the Kama at Sarapul, finishing it one month ahead of the scheduled time, thereby giving fresh proof of what the proletariat can achieve by organisation, energy and labour discipline, given a class-conscious attitude, so essential at the present time,

towards the common tasks confronting the Russian Soviet Republic in its efforts to cope with the economic dislocation.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 20, 1920

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten text
signed by Lenin

559

TO KARL RADEK[369]

Comrade Radek,

Your opinion? Return this with a line or two. Do you know *exactly* the position of K. Liebknecht's family? Is assistance needed and to what extent?

Lenin

Written in March
not earlier than 23, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

560

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin
Copy to Comrade Rakovsky

In view of the fact that 13 delegates from each trend were elected at the congress., that 105 delegates took no part in the elections to the Central Committee and 8 abstained, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P. has resolved, as a way out of the abnormal situation, to set up a temporary bureau of two representatives each from the old C.C. and the new. Comrade Shumsky, a former Borotbist, to be appointed the fifth member of the bureau.[370]

On behalf of the Politbureau,
Lenin

Written on March 24, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from
the handwritten copy

561

TELEGRAM TO A. Y. SHUMSKY

In code

Shumsky
Kharkov
Copy to the new Central Committee of the C.P.U.
Copy to Rakovsky

In confirmation of the telephone message which Lenin sent to Rakovsky last night, we inform you that, in view of the anomalous situation created by the fact that 105 delegates refused (while 8 abstained) to take part in the elections to the C.C. and protested against these elections as being unlawful, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P. has resolved to set up a temporary body pending the settlement of this conflict. This temporary Central Committee should include Shumsky, a former Borotbist, now a Party member, who took no part in the factional struggle at the Ukrainian conference, along with 2 members of the new C.C. and 2 members of the old.

On behalf of the Politbureau,
Lenin

Written on March 24, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

562

TO THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE[371]

24. III. 1920

The Council of People's Commissars submits to the All-Russia C.E.C. for endorsement a list of enterprises to come under the direct control of the central bodies of the Supreme Economic Council and included in "Group I" in accordance with the instructions of the All-Russia C.E.C.

This list has been unanimously accepted by the commission set up by the C.P.C. and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

563

NOTE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH THE DRAFT OF A TELEGRAM TO SH. Z. ELIAVA AND J. E. RUDZUTAK[372]

To the Members of the Politbureau:

I propose sending a code telegram to Eliava and Rudzutak:

"We insist on the strictest fulfilment of the C.C. decisions on foreign policy. Remove Heller and Broido from office immediately and completely. Hand over all affairs to Golub, Mashitsky and Gopner alone. Fulfil immediately all the other directives of the C.C. and report precise fulfilment. We warn you that further procrastination or evasion on your part from subordination to the Central Committee of the Party will entail penalties."

Lenin

Written on March 24, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

564

TO A. I. SVIDERSKY

Comrade Svidersky,

The following desperate position of factories has been brought to my notice:

Works Management No. 6 of Kaluga Gubernia, the Troitsk-Kondrovo and Polotnyany factories, formerly V. Howard and Goncharov Co.

Howardovo station, Syzran-Vyazma railway, and Polotnyany Zavod station.

Workers approximately . . . 2,500-3,000
Office workers . . . . . 200 persons
Mouths . . . . . 12,000 ”

On February 28 this year militarised.

In December assigned Red Army rations. They are receiving nothing.*

Please think of some kind of special instruction for food to be issued to them and send me your reply.

Lenin

Written in March,
not earlier than 24, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

565

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[373]

Orgbureau of the C.C.

In my opinion, until railway transport is *fully* restored, this is out of the question.

Lenin

Written on March 26, 1920

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

566

TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade Rykov

The seizure of 15 million poods of petrol in Grozny[374] compels us to adopt a number of urgent and important measures, such as:

* Underlined by Lenin.—*Ed.*

1. Especially strict safeguarding of petrol.
   Military measures. Special responsibility of army men.
2. Calculation: how much we need (*maximum*).
   The remainder—abroad for locomotives.
3. Collection of lorries (*from everywhere*, particularly from the army) and their repair *for transporting grain to the railway stations*.
4. Mobilisation of lorries and drivers for this purpose.
5. Transport of petrol to central depots.

Perhaps you will call a conference (of people from the Commissariat for Food and the military department) on this question and submit a proposal from the conference to the Council of Defence?

Please do this *urgently*.

Lenin

28/III.

Written on March 28, 1920
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

567
TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Comrade Krestinsky,

It is necessary to keep to the *law*.

By law the final decision is the decision of the *Orgbureau*, which has already rejected the *protest* of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

This decision of the Orgbureau Yakovlev (and the Ukrainian C.C.) *is obliged* to fulfil **at once.**[375]

I agree to an *opinion poll* without recognising the right of the poll to hold up the decision, for *only* the plenum has that right, and I demand the right of agitation.

Lenin

Written not later than March 1920
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

568

TO YELENA STASOVA

Chicherin is ill. He is not looked after. He refuses treatment and is killing himself.

A *friendly* letter (so as not to hurt his feelings) should be sent to him in the name of the Central Committee with the latter's *decision* that the C.C. demands that state property should not be squandered, that the best doctor should be called in (through Karakhan, say) and *should be obeyed*, and that, if the doctor advises, he must go on leave and *spend the necessary* time *in a sanatorium*.

Lenin

Written in 1920,
not later than March

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*

Printed from the original

569

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa,

It was stated in the Politbureau that army transports from Siberia should be *replaced by food* transports (in view of the victories in the south).

The decision was not put ill writing because Trotsky, who was in full agreement, *had already issued orders*.

The member of the Supreme Council for Transport from the Commissariat for Food should *keep his eyes open*.

Yours,
Lenin

Written in 1920,
not later than March

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

570

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

A number of monasteries outside Petrograd should be taken over to accommodate defective and *homeless* children and adolescents.

Lenin

Written in March 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

571

TO I. I. KHODOROVSKY

In Kazan (working at the University, lecturer or professor, etc.) there is

Adoratsky.

I have known him for more than 10 years. A most reliable man. A well-educated Marxist.

I have asked him to write an outline of the history of the revolution.

Please

1) make full use of him for lectures, etc.
2) assist him with rations (*increased*), both him and his family, and with firewood, etc.
3) wire me his address (and what has been done for him).

Lenin

6/IV. 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

572

TELEGRAM
TO THE SAMARA GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

6. IV. 1920

Gubernia Executive Committee
Samara
Copy to the Revolutionary Military Council

Are you carrying out a sufficiently drastic clean-up of

the town? Please apply yourselves to this and make a frequent check on fulfilment. Are the bourgeois and philistines not dodging labour conscription? It is essential to exert every effort to discipline them.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

573

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE*

By direct line

Orjonikidze, R.M.C., Caucasian Front
Rostov-on-Don

I authorise you to announce to the mountain people that I promise to get financial aid for them passed through the Council of People's Commissars. On account of this give them up to** 200 million. In a few days Narimanov will leave for Petrovsk in accordance with your proposal. You can tell Mr. Uratadze in your name that the government does not object to his coming to Moscow, but I fully agree with you that there should be no hurry with his leaving Rostov for Moscow, in view of which I leave it to your discretion to fix the day of his departure.[376] On the question of land relations you can act independently, reporting, however, on the measures you take in this sphere. Please send information more often. I request you to expedite the transfer of units to the South-Western Front.

Lenin

Written on April 15, 1920

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten text,
added to and signed
by Lenin

---

* At the bottom of the telegram Lenin added the words: "Please transmit this tonight by direct line to Rostov-on-Don. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

** The subheading and the words "I promise ... give them up to" are in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

574

TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

16. IV. 1920

Comrade Dzerzhinsky,

Give instructions, please, for a *very strict* check-up. Cannot impartial people, not Petrograders, be appointed for the check-up?

I have heard also from another source (besides the present letters+Kalmykova) that in this case the local Cheka behaved scandalously.

The matter must be sifted to the bottom, and quickly.

Be so kind, when the case is finished, to return to me the enclosed documents and have your secretary send me a telephone message about the result.[377]

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

575

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

16. IV. 1920

Comrade Vladimir Dmitrievich,

Will you please, *if you have now* recovered (when you are *fully* recovered),

1) make a check through witnesses *without any publicity*;

2) summon Gil and, for a start, only *reprimand* him (*mildly*), and warn him that in view of his good behaviour up to now you are limiting yourself to the smallest measure of punishment, without any entry in his service book, but in the event of a repetition it will be bad for him.[378]

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

First published in 1958 in the book: A. A. Struchkov, *Lenin i narod* (Lenin and the People), Moscow

Printed from the original

576

UNDERLININGS AND AN INSTRUCTION ON A. V. LUNACHARSKY'S LETTER

Comrade V. I. Lenin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

You forwarded me a telegram from Kazan complaining about the lack of currency notes. I have received similar telegrams from Vyatka and Vologda gubernias. In all these places, because of the lack of money, teachers have not received salaries for three months.

Thus, it turns out that in the absolutely starving gubernias teachers go hungry for lack of foodstuffs, while in the producing gubernias such as those of Kazan, Vologda and Vyatka, in which teachers in fact could feed themselves, they are starving through lack of money.

I earnestly request you, Vladimir Ilyich, to issue some sort of directive or to put this before the Council of People's Commissars, so that currency notes issued for the needs of the gubernias will be divided proportionately, i.e.: where there is a 10-20% shortage, this shortage should be spread among all the departments. Otherwise. what happens in practice is that absolutely all, except those engaged in education, receive their salaries....

To the Narrow Council: please put this through. Even more: it is necessary to give *preference* to teachers.

Lenin

17/IV.

Written on April 17, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

577

TELEGRAMS TO G. L. PYATAKOV

1

Pyatakov
Council of Labour Army 1
Ekaterinburg

In confirmation of Comrade Vladimirsky's telegram, the Council of People's Commissars instructs all local institutions of the Cis-Urals to be extremely moderate and cautious as regards the new administrative division of the

gubernias. The Council of Labour Army 1 should also be guided by this directive and, in particular, not set up any special commissions on this question.[379]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

20/IV. 20

2

Pyatakov
Council of Labour Army 1
Ekaterinburg

At its sitting on 20/IV. 20, the Council of People's Commissars decided: to reprimand the Council of Labour Army 1 for its insufficiently serious attitude towards the question of the new division of the gubernias, and to demand in future more thorough preparation of the matter so that there can be no contradictory reports from the localities.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

20/IV. 20

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten texts signed by Lenin

578

TO THE PETROGRAD SOVIET[380]

Comrades,

I earnestly request you, in all cases when Comrade Gorky approaches you on such matters, to afford him *every* assistance; if there are any obstacles, stumbling-blocks or objections of one kind or another, please let me know what they are.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

22/IV. 1920

First published in 1925 in the book: *K godovshchine smerti V. I. Lenina. 1924—21 yanvarya—1925* (On the Anniversary of the Death of V. I. Lenin, 1924-January 21-1925), Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the original

579

INSTRUCTION ON L. B. KRASIN'S NOTE

Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn should be prohibited from printing detailed information about fuel. It is quite possible that the offensive by the Poles is partly due to our laxity in this respect. We are past masters at proving by statistics in our newspapers the inevitability of our own demise for all kinds of reasons.

To Rykov: I think this is true. Your opinion?[381]

Written in April, prior to 18, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

580

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin

Comrade *Chicherin*,

I would ask you and Fineberg (or if you are too busy, then a comrade at your choice who has an excellent knowledge of the British socialist movement) to look through my pamphlet, *or the chapter on Britain*,* and advise me whether I have made any mistakes or errors of tact. If it is no trouble I would particularly ask that the actual corrections be written down separately in pencil.

Yours,
Lenin

Written early in May 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

* See V. I. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* (present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 17-118).—*Ed.*

581
TO N. A. SEMASHKO

3. V. 1920

If Comrade Semashko is absent, then for Comrade *Solovyov*

Comrade Semashko,

Please receive the bearer, Comrade Dmitry Nikitich *Yeroshenkov*, a doctor's assistant. He has been recommended to me by a very reliable comrade. Comrade Yeroshenkov has a few weeks to spare (until the special assignment we are giving him) and during that time would like, on the one hand, to study up on medicine and, on the other, to carry out medical work. Will you please help him.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. The comrade has invented a very *practical disinfecting* chamber. It should be tested and used.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV* — Printed from the original

582
TO F. Y. KON*

Felix Kon
Kiev
Copy to Rakovsky
Kharkov

Regarding Vinnichenko we agree in principle. Reach agreement with Rakovsky on details.[382] Report briefly on the military situation and prospects.

Lenin

Written on May 4, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51 — Printed from the original

* Transmitted by direct line.—*Ed.*

583

TO L. D. TROTSKY[383]

Comrade Trotsky,

I think Chicherin is right: we should reply at once agreeing 1) to the suspension of hostilities (a) in the Crimea and (b) in the Caucasus (every word must be carefully considered) and 2) to negotiations on the conditions for clearing the Crimea *on the principle* (not more) of a general amnesty for the Whites and 3) to participation of a British officer in the negotiations with Wrangel. The text of Chicherin's reply to be discussed in the Politbureau today, so that a reply can be sent tonight.

Lenin

We shall collect votes by telephone.

Written on May 4, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

584

TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[384]

I propose a directive that all articles about Poland and the Polish war be vetted by *editors*-in-chief on their *personal* responsibility. We must not overdo it, i.e., not descend to chauvinism, always draw a line between the Polish landowners and capitalists and the Polish workers and peasants.

Lenin

Written in May, after 5, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

585

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Members of the Orgbureau:

Should we not adopt a decision such as the following: Directive of the C.C., R.C.P. to the Ukrainian C.C.: *double* the number of food workers by **ruthlessly** stripping for this purpose **all** People's Commissariats except that of military affairs.

Lenin

7/V.

Written on May 7, 1920
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

586

TO BASIN

7. V. 1920

Comrade Basin,

Please convey my thanks to the 30th Regiment of Red Communards of the Turkestan Front for the macaroni and flour, which I have handed over to the children of the city of Moscow.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

587

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE[385]

This runs counter to the Central Committee decision. It can have disastrous consequences. On no account is it permitted by the Central Committee. We categorically

demand that implementation be stopped and the decision rescinded.

*Lenin**

Written in May, not earlier than 7 and not later than 12, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the handwritten copy

588

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN

In code

Comrade Krasin

The substance of the Politbureau's decision communicated to you was that all agreements concluded by you in gold currency should first be endorsed by the Politbureau. It is absolutely necessary to economise gold to the utmost. The Politbureau sees no business grounds for rescinding its decision.

On behalf of the Politbureau,

Lenin

May 11, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

589

TO A. Y. BADAYEV

16. V. 1920

Comrade Badayev or his deputy
Petrograd

Please supply the Petrograd group of the State Commission for Electrification (the person in charge is Shatelen) with *50* Red Army men's rear area food rations and *9*

* The telegram is signed also by Trotsky.—*Ed.*

family food rations, without taking away the civilian ration cards.

Please let me know by telephone message exactly how many have been issued and when.

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

590

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA

25. V. 1920

In connection with the C.C. directive for tightening up general discipline, particularly for persons on duty on Sundays and holidays,

I request you immediately to draw up and give me for signature regulations

concerning *responsible* persons (Glyasser, Volodicheva, Kizas and others) on duty in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence specially on *Sundays* and *holidays* (also on weekdays). *Hours* and so on.

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

591

RADIO-TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE

By radio

Eliava for Frunze
Turkestan Commission
Tashkent

What is the position with oil, what are the stocks, are the oil wells intact, what is the volume of production, what measures are being taken to increase it, what amount

is allocated for transportation and what are the requirements of the local railways?*

Lenin

Written on May 25, 1920
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the original

592

TO ALL PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[386]

especially Commissar for Agriculture
Commissar for Food
and Commissar for Labour

26. V. 1920

Please give every possible assistance towards the speediest organisation of the train "Northern Caucasus" and staffing it with efficient political workers and instructors.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*
Printed from the original

593

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA

Add to the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets (in communicating today's decision on market gardens)[387] that we are also expecting them to adopt measures for taking stock of and confiscating surpluses from the suburban market gardeners.**

Written on May 27, 1920
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

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* At the end of the radio-telegram Lenin added the words: "Get the radio station to sign."—*Ed.*

** The document bears a note by Fotieva: "In the minutes or only in the telephone message?" in which V. I. Lenin underlined three times the words "only in the telephone message".—*Ed.*

594

INSTRUCTION ON THE TELEGRAM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE CAUCASIAN FRONT[388]

This to be permitted only on condition:

1) Of the special responsibility of *definite* local comrades.

2) Of *special* measures for disarmament.

3) Of not releasing particularly dangerous individuals (lists through the Vecheka).

Written in May,
not earlier than 27, 1920

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

595

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin,

Be sure to take advantage of Comrade Stalin's presence in Moscow (for 2 or 3 days) to have a talk *personally* with him and to collect (at once and *after* his journey, that is, to have more sent from the front) *all* material concerning British help for Wrangel.

Carefully collect it all and *publish* it within a week or two with a calm (without any abuse) Note of protest, showing that Britain *deviated from the truth*.[389]

Greetings,
Lenin

P.S. I have sent Bukharin (*for you*, too) my letter to the British workers. *Ring up Bukharin*.

Written on May 30, 1920

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

596

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Chairman, Gubernia Executive Committee
Nizhni

According to information received, by a decision of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Executive Committee there was no loading of grain freights on Sunday, May 30. Bearing in mind that supplies for the Western Front, Petrograd and Moscow are almost exclusively water-borne, a stoppage in loading, even if only for one day, is impermissible and criminal. Take measures to prevent any repetition of such facts in future, and urgently report execution to me.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 31 or June 1, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Fotieva's handwriting signed by Lenin

597

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade *Stalin*
Kremenchug

To be handed only personally to *Stalin* for personal decoding

The situation on the Western Front has turned out to be worse than Tukhachevsky and the Commander-in-Chief thought, hence the divisions you asked for must be sent there, but no more can be taken from the Caucasian Front, because there are insurrections there and the position is extremely alarming. Trotsky is arranging to send you reinforcements from the Crimean divisions, which may enable

you to take two or three of them for the Kiev direction. Try to bring up the units and at all costs follow up the offensive with greater vigour. You, of course, will remember that, by a decision of the Politbureau, the offensive against the Crimea has been halted pending a further decision of the Politbureau.[390]

Lenin

Written on June 2, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

598

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY

Please inquire of all the members of the C.P.C. (*and Comrade Kamenev*) by telephone:

whether they agree to include in the "constitution" (confirmed yesterday) of the Narrow Council[391] an addendum that matters can also be submitted to the Narrow Council *on the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars*.

Write all their replies down on it.

Lenin

2/VI.

Agree: *Disagree*:

Written on June 2, 1920
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

599

INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY[392]

Telephone Bryukhanov: if Belenky does not *absolutely* guarantee the delivery, and quickly, then it is obligatory *at once* to permit independent procurements. It is criminal

to lose Baku because of the idiocy or obstinacy of officials of the Food Commissariat.

Lenin

2/6.

Written on June 2, 1920
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

600

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE[393]

Orjonikidze
Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front

I have received your fretful letter. You are wrong to regard the inquiry I am obliged to make as distrust. I hope you will have dropped this misplaced aggrieved tone by the time we meet.

Lenin

Written on June 3, 1920
First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

601

TO L. D. TROTSKY[394]

This is sheer utopia. Won't it cost too many lives? We will be sacrificing a host of our soldiers. We must think this over and weigh it up ten times. I suggest replying to Stalin: "Your proposal for an offensive against the Crimea is so serious that we should make inquiries and give it most careful consideration. Wait for our reply. *Lenin*, *Trotsky*."*

Written on June 3, 1920
First published in part in 1960 in the book: *Istoria grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR. 1917-1922*, Vol. 5
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

* In the typewritten copy there follow the words: "In Lenin's handwriting."—*Ed.*

602
TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Krestinsky. Urgent.

(Enclose the Siberian telegram on the census and Popov's comment.)

I suggest collecting the votes of the Politbureau members today, by telephone, for a decision such as the following:

> the census in Siberia to be definitely carried out simultaneously with Russia; moreover, in place of the dubious local people suspected of supporting the Kolchak regime, workers to be called in from the famine-stricken gubernias of Russia.

If they do not agree, the Politbureau is to be called tomorrow, 5.VI, in the morning. Less than 1,000 workers are needed. They can easily be transported and will be of great use.

Written on June 4, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

603
TO V. V. VOROVSKY AND V. P. MILYUTIN

Comrade Vorovsky (State Publishers)
and Comrade Milyutin (Supreme Economic Council)

The Kirghiz comrades are asking for help in order to acquire

a type foundry,
a print-shop
and paper.

Will you please receive them and give them every assistance.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

4/VI. 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

604

TO L. D. TROTSKY[395]

1

Comrade Trotsky,

The Commander-in-Chief must be informed and asked for his opinion. When you have received it, give me your conclusion at the meeting of the Council of Defence, or let us talk it over (if it does not end too late) by telephone.

Lenin

2

There is some capriciousness here, I dare say. But the matter needs to be discussed urgently. And what extraordinary measures should be taken?

Lenin

Written on June 4, 1920

Printed from the typewritten copy

605

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH K. A. ALFEROV[396]

TO K. A. ALFEROV

Comrade Alferov,

Is Takhtamyshev in your service? *Are you feeding him badly?* Why is he so thin and pale?

K. A. ALFEROV'S REPLY

He is a member of the Supreme Board, lives on the Soviet ration, works unlimited hours. *Alferov*.

TO K. A. ALFEROV

He must be given a *higher* ration, one way or another. Such a situation can't be tolerated. An exception must be made.

Written on June 4, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

606
TO S. I. BOTIN

4/VI. 1920

Comrade Botin,

You told Comrade Belenky that the experiments could be made on Friday (i.e., today).[397] A *special* military-political circumstance has arisen, which may mean our losing *many extra thousands* of Red Army men within the next few days. It is therefore my absolute duty to request insistently that you hasten the experiment and *carry it out today* without fail, if there is the slightest possibility (all the *manual* work, such as regulating the engine, you should assign to *others*, not occupying yourself with trifles).

Will you please answer me at once by the messenger, as fully and exactly as possible. I would not be hurrying you if an *immediate* political-strategic decision of great importance were not called for.

Answer in detail

(1) Can you speed things up to the maximum extent?

(2) When will you carry out the first experiment and when (approximately) will you complete it?

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

607
TO V. A. OBUKH

5/VI. 1920

Dear Vladimir Alexandrovich,

I have just heard from Maria Ilyinichna of the death of your son. We were both stunned by the news! Heart disease, I take it. On behalf of myself, of Nadezhda Konstantinovna, and of Maria Ilyinichna, permit me to press your hand hard and that of your wife, whose acquaintance,

unfortunately, I have not had a chance to make. You need all your strength to help you both bear this blow, worn out as you are by overwork. And bear it you must, for we have so few functionaries. Again, a very firm handshake!

Wholly yours,
Lenin

First published in 1960 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Printed from the original

608

TELEGRAM TO THE IRKUTSK GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OR GUBERNIA REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

10. VI. 1920

1) Gubernia Executive Committee or Gubernia Revolutionary Committee
Irkutsk

2) Copy to Smirnov, Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee
Omsk

Please give every assistance to my comrade in exile in Siberia, Ivan Lukich Prominsky, railway-truck greaser at the Innokentyevskaya Depot. Address: House of Lukyanov No. 195, 4th Torgovaya, Innokentyevskaya. Also convey my greetings to him by telegraph and, finally, please transfer him to a better place on the Altai railway. He is already old. Wire what you have done.

Lenin

First published (facsimile of the copy) in 1924 in *Ogonyok* No. 34

Printed from the original

609
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[398]

This is blatant lying and trickery designed for fools. They have given arms, they are giving coal *and a fleet*—and they make this statement through "Wise" (=Bullitt?).

I advise: 1) Send a coded message to Krasin: "that scoundrel Lloyd George is fooling you in the most vile and shameless manner, don't believe a word, and fool him threefold".

2) To Curzon: a derisive telegram (of course, when you had *already* given arms, **he**, not *you*, started an offensive, and when you had given *coal*, *he*, not you, set the ships in motion, and so on in that strain).

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

610
TO D. I. LESHCHENKO

In view of the extreme importance and topicality of the photographs and documents brought by Comrade Goikhbarg of the court trial of Kolchak's ministers, I order that copies of these photographs and documents, together with Comrade Goikhbarg's brief comments, be prepared *immediately* for making a number of *motion pictures* for the widest distribution.

Report fulfilment to me twice weekly.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on June 12, 1920

First published in 1925 in the book: G. Boltyansky, *Lenin i kino* (Lenin and the Cinema). Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from the text of the book

611

TO THE FUEL DEPARTMENT OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET

16. VI. 1920

Dear Comrades,

I enclose herewith the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence of 11.VI,[399] and *again specially* ask you to give this question *the most serious* attention.

The Moscow population can *and should* be mobilised to a man to haul out of the forests *by hand* a sufficient quantity of firewood (say, one cubic metre per adult man in 3 months—the experts can figure it out more exactly; I mention a figure as an example) to stations on the railways and narrow-gauge lines.

Unless *heroic* measures are taken, I shall personally get a decision put through the Council of Defence and the C.C. not only for the arrest of all the persons responsible but for their execution. Inactivity and negligence cannot be tolerated.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published on September 26, 1942, in *Pravda* No. 269

Printed from the original

612

TO A. M. HELLER[400]

18. VI. 1920

Comrade Heller,

I am sending you *all* the materials (in my possession). Make up an *accurate* list of them at once.

I shall obtain *Avanti!* and send it.

Make a list of the *most important* documents and a translation of those that are *extremely* important, *showing* the deviation of the reformists (especially Turati and Co.) from the discipline and decisions.

(As applying to Serrati, *Comunismo* No. 10, 15-29.II.1920, p. 693:

"Simile opera di epurazione—di '*purificazione*' ha scritto Francesco Misiano nello stesso '*Soviet*'—può essere veramente opportuna ed utile, sopratutto se si tratti di chi risolutamente si opponga alla propaganda per la realizzazione dei principî fissati a Bologna[401] come mèta del nostró movimento."*)

N.B. ×

× **This is the thing to find out, by name and exactly.**

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

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613

TO THE WARDEN OF THE 2nd HOUSE OF SOVIETS

Copy to Comrade Shotman

June 19, 1920

Flat No. 439 at the 2nd House of Soviets occupied by Comrade A. V. Shotman is, during his absence, at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party and cannot be occupied by anyone without special permission from the Council of People's Commissars.

The Finnish comrades, on arrival, are to be given every assistance and placed on the allowance list in the usual way. Better still, though, on the priority list, as guests.

Chairman, C.P.C.

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* Serrati, *Comunismo* No. 10, 15-29.II.1920, p. 693: "Such work of cleansing—of '*purification*'—wrote Francesco Misiano in that same '*Soviet*'—can be truly timely and useful, especially if the matter concerns those who resolutely oppose propaganda for realising the principles, established in Bologna as the aim of our movement" (underlined by Lenin).—*Ed.*

614

MARKINGS ON P. V. BUKHARTSEV'S TELEGRAM CONCERNING THE AGREEMENT WITH THE AMERICAN CORPORATION, AND AN INSTRUCTION TO THE SECRETARY[402]

In the course of the next 36 hours, sanction the agreement with the representative of the American Corporation, which has the backing of America.

... Orders, with delivery within 20 days, for twine, machinery, technical equipment, not later than three months—no less than 200 locomotives with tank-cars, trucks, etc. Principal points of agreement: the Corporation, on orders from the agent, undertakes in exchange for raw materials to supply from abroad miscellaneous commodities, materials, machinery, instruments, medicaments, etc., excepting munitions; perfumery and luxury goods, with delivery at one of the Black Sea ports, as indicated by the agent. Second, for the supply of goods the agent pays the Corporation in raw materials....

... Besides the sums indicated in point 2, the agent pays the Corporation in raw materials also a commission amounting to ten per cent of the value of the goods supplied. Fourth, the raw materials: tobacco, wool, oilcakes, etc., delivered by the agent in exchange for the goods supplied are valued at the prices ruling on the world market at the time of delivery....

too much!

Urgent

1) Telephone Lezhava (and Scheinman, if he is still here) and the members of the Politbureau.

2) In principle I am *for* it: (a) bargain: reduce the commission charges; (b) stipulate precisely: after delivery of their goods, delivery of ours or exchange *at our port*. No other way.

*Lenin**

19/IV.

Written on June 19, 1920
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

* Below, in Lenin's handwriting, is "+Kamenev".—*Ed.*

615
TO A. N. MEREZHIN[403]

Comrade Merezhin

I think an additional point should be formulated (on the basis of the information of Rafes and others) roughly as follows:

The experience of proletarian dictatorship in the Ukraine, especially in those parts of it where there is a mixed population, and also in Byelorussia (and+? +? Hungary?), has shown that national strife not only in the form of pogroms, of which not even the most democratic bourgeois republic is free, but also in the form of petty but all-pervading squabbling is practically disappearing. The reasons for this: 1) the interest, attention, and all the intellectual powers of the workers and working peasants are wholly engrossed in the great struggle with the bourgeoisie, a struggle that unites the working people of all nations; 2) the dictatorship of the proletariat suppresses the "freedom" of action of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia, which freedom signifies the use of their forces, influence and knowledge by the bourgeoisie to inflame the class struggle.

Cannot 2 or more concrete facts be added?

Written between June 21 and July 26, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

HUMMAST TOMAC NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

616
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD

22. VI. 1920

Please see that Citizen *Tyrkov*, one of the last of the Mohicans of the heroic group of Narodovoltsi, involved in the March trial for the assassination of Alexander II—Citizen Tyrkov is now in extreme old age—

is provided with two or three dessiatines of land from his former estate and two cows for his family.

Orders for this to be given urgently by the People's Commissar for Agriculture, Comrade Sereda,

and by the People's Commissar for Food, Comrade Tsyurupa (or his deputy), by agreement, *by telegraph*, with the local gubernia executive committee.*

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

I ask the People's Commissars to sign whether they agree or not.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

617

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PODOLSK UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MOSCOW GUBERNIA

22. VI. 1920

Having once again considered my decision in regard to Comrade Vever[405] following his further explanations, I inform you that my decision stands and has to be fulfilled.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

618

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[406]

Here Comrade Karakhan is to blame.

He does not know *how* things should be done in the Soviet Republic:

1) take an excerpt from the minutes of the Politbureau,
2) on the basis of this, take a *decision* of the Narrow Council (over my signature) or of the appropriate People's Commissar,

---

* At the top of the document Lenin wrote: "Remind me there should be a report on **fulfilment** from the **Commissariat for Agriculture.**"[404]—*Ed.*

3) for non-fulfilment, complain to me formally *after 24* hours,
4) repeat this many times over.

Who does not know this, is naïve.

Lenin

24/VI.

Written on June 24, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

619

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev, Chairman of the Petrograd Executive Committee

The famous physiologist, Pavlov, asks to be allowed to go abroad in view of his straitened circumstances. To have Pavlov leave the country is hardly advisable, since he has previously made statements to the effect that, being a truthful man, he could not, in the event of the subject being brought up in conversations, avoid expressing himself against Soviet power and communism in Russia.

On the other hand, this scientist is such a great cultural asset that his forcible detention in Russia in conditions of material insecurity is unthinkable.

In view of this it would be desirable, by way of esception, to allow him a special ration and in general to ensure more or less comfortable circumstances for him exclusively.

I have heard that in the Petrograd rest homes life is very well ordered for those living there. Something of the kind could be done for Professor Pavlov at his apartment

Comrade Lunacharsky will make the appropriate proposal to Comrade Badayev. I ask you to support him in this respect.[407]

Lenin

25/VI.

Written on June 25, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

620

TO SIBERIAN SOVIET INSTITUTIONS

26. VI. 1920

Please give the bearer,

Comrade Ilya Danilovich *Putintsev*,

every assistance in organising a kindergarten and other similar enterprises in his locality, Semipalatinsk Gubernia, Pavlodar Uyezd.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

621

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY[408]

Check *when* we asked for this.*

Reprimand them for impermissible procrastination. They are obliged to give a brief reply *at once*; we shall give them a postponement (they should say *how many* days they ask for) only for a more detailed report.

Give me the text of the telegram in reply to them,

Written on June 28, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

622

TELEGRAM TO A. Y. BADAYEV AND AN INSTRUCTION TO D. I. KURSKY

Badayev
Executive Committee
Petrograd
Copy to the Gubernia Land Department

In the matter of presenting information concerning the requisitioning of market-garden produce you have displayed

* See next document.—*Ed.*

impermissible procrastination. The first telephone message was transmitted to you on May 28, the second on June 22, and it was only to a telegram of June 26 that your reply was forthcoming, signed by secretary Trilisser. A brief report must be presented by you without delay. Inform us exactly how many days of postponement are required for a more detailed report. In the event of a brief report not being presented immediately, and a more detailed one within a very short period, the persons responsible will be called to strict account.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Copy to Comrade Kursky: prosecute them for procrastination.

Report fulfilment.*

Lenin

Written on June 29, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text
in Fotieva's handwriting
added to and signed by
Lenin

623
TO A. M. NIKOLAYEV

29. VI. 1920

Comrade Nikolayev,

We must *definitively* make use of this protocol and of your inclusion (*at last* our capricious one,[409] too, begins to understand that there has to be an expert!), in order *radically* to reorganise the whole business.

1) Study the protocol carefully and question the mechanic at the electric station;

2) on the basis of this decide for yourself whether it is worth while to *continue* the experiments;

* The text of the telegram from the words "Copy to Comrade Kursky" to the end is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

3) if you think it is, we shall draw up a *written*, precise constitution giving *all* rights to the expert (i.e., to you)—with a guarantee *from me* to the inventor that we shall keep it *secret*.

And then work is to be started in real earnest, i.e., by enlisting experts for a number of auxiliary special assignments, *with the participation of one expert* (you) in **all** secrets.

Greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

624

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET

I enclose an extract from the booklet *Cooking Food Without Fire* (p. 43, No. 1 of "The Housewife's Little Library", published by the Supreme Economic Council, Moscow, 1918) and ask you to let me know the results of the thermos vessel competition announced by the Food Department of the Moscow Soviet.[410]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 29, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

625

TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

through Alliluyeva

All in code and **immediate**

Comrade Orjonikidze

Zinoviev is giving you an important international assignment.[411] In addition, I have gone into the matter and I see that you retain all rights and powers through the front

and through the supreme local Party body. Once more I ask you not to fret and to be patient a little.

Moreover, you are charged with the leadership of the entire foreign and home policy of Azerbaijan and with supervising the fulfilment of the directives of the Central Committee and People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in regard to Persia, Armenia and Georgia.[412]

Answer.

Lenin

Written on June 29 or 30, 1920

First published in part in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

626

INSTRUCTION ON I. N. SMIRNOV'S LETTER

Vladimir Ilyich,

I am sending you absolutely *accurate* information *verified on the spot by our people*, about goods intended for shipment abroad lying at the wharves. All the goods are *packed* and in two weeks' time will go to the mouth of the river Ob.

We have done our part. I fear that the cost of these goods will be 2-3 times in excess of what we shall be getting from Sweden.

Put pressure on the Commissariat for Foreign Trade to make use of this surplus of goods.

Smirnov

Krasin

1) Return it to me *with your comment*.
2) Put on full *pressure*.
3) Give me a copy of the **measures**.[413]

Lenin

Written between July 3 and 13, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

627

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

To be handed to the duty commissar

Zinoviev
Petrograd

Comrade Zinoviev,

I am sending the theses* tomorrow, Monday. Arrange for them to be received without any delay. Kobetsky and Vorovsky must be commissioned to prepare a business-like criticism of the Norwegian Party and the Swedish Left Party in time for the Congress.[414] It is necessary to have accurate and complete material. With regard to translations at the Congress itself, the matter must be organised in advance: all delegates should be seated according to languages, so that there can be simultaneous immediate translations for the Germans, French and English. This will save time. Russian is obviously necessary, for it is clear that people will insist on session in theatres.

Greetings,
Lenin

Written on July 4, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the text of the telegraph form

628

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1

My booklet on *imperialism* ought to be published in German (and in other languages), for it is always a basic issue.**

Your opinion?

If yes, *to whom* should it be entrusted?

---

* This refers to "Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International" (see present edition Vol. 31, pp. 184-201).—*Ed.*

** This refers to Lenin's book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304).—*Ed.*

2

I should like to write a new preface.
What is the *time limit*?

3

Put 1-2 privatdocents on the job of finding sources in the best libraries.
They will find them.[415]

Written in July,
prior to 6, 1920

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

629

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev,

I am sending the preface to *Imperialism*.*
Please have also the *Basle Manifesto* of 1912 reprinted as *an appendix*. (It should not be difficult to find the German text for you surely have Grinberg's "archives", etc.)
I have received your theses on the Soviets and the conditions for their establishment, but have only managed to skim lightly through them. I do not object.

Greetings,
Lenin

7/VII.

What about my speeches and reports at the Congress?[416] Is it necessary to prepare them in German or French? I think the opening speech (and others) should be *in Russian* (for, almost certainly, they will be in theatres with Russian audience). They will be translated. And since there are the theses I propose, while referring to them, to speak extremely briefly. Your opinion? (The agrarian report by

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 189-94.—*Ed.*

Marchlewski; for me the *national* report and the *opening* speech, only?)

Written on July 7, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

630

TO A. M. NIKOLAYEV

Comrade Nikolayev,

I have received your letter of 7/VII.

I am very glad you have now started properly.

I advise you (1) to demand more officially and more insistently that *all* secrets should *at once* be revealed to you.

(2) Set up the installation, if possible, on special wooden supports, so that it can be removed instantaneously from the truck (perhaps better to use a flat-car instead of a truck) and placed on a lorry, *on to the ground*, and so on (for the inventor made a successful experiment, so he says, *not* in a truck).

(3) If you find that "the game is worth the candle", then don't be sparing with money and people for *hastening* the work.

Greetings,

Lenin

Written in July, not earlier than 7, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

631

TO M. M. GRUZENBERG

Comrade Gruzenberg,

Comrade Murphy has told me that the translation of the *theses* contains solecisms.

You must yourself undertake (or immediately organise a *group* to help) good editing of the translation of *all* the theses.

Consult the English comrades about this.

Regarding Wijnkoop: I have sent Radek his statement

(written *by Wijnkoop* in English). Whether the English is good, I do not know. *Take from Radek everything sent by me* (if necessary, forward this letter to him), and check, please, if the English is good. (The content of the statement: the Dutch *Party* is not responsible for "Leftism", the latter is the *work of certain* Dutchmen.)

(Print only this statement and my statement that I am introducing corrections in the text.[417])

Regarding the quality of the English translations, you must take good care and set up a group of *responsible* Englishmen (with their responsibility *in written form*), otherwise we shall be blamed (and so will you).

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

8/VII.

Written on July 8, 1920

First published in part in 1960 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 3

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632

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR HEALTH[418]

According to information in my possession you have in storage film for cinema work that is not being used.

In view of the acute need of the Cinema Department of the People's Commissariat for Education and a series of urgent works in hand of great agitational importance, please turn over at least part of your store to the Cinema Department of the People's Commissariat for Education.*

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 8, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

* Lydia Fotieva added to this document the words: "On the instruction of V. I., please report fulfilment. *L. Fotieva*."—*Ed.*

633

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

To all the members of the Politbureau:

I propose that Krasin and the entire delegation be given the directive:

"Be firmer, don't be afraid of a temporary break of the negotiations."[419]

Lenin

9/VII.

Written on July 9, 1920
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Printed from the original

634

TO L. B. KAMENEV AND G. V. CHICHERIN

Kamenev and Chicherin

Comrade Kamenev's plan is utterly incorrect.[420] Our business with Britain is *purely* commercial. Chicherin is not right. We should send to Britain *only* a "tradesman"; if they ask 2¼ kopeks, beat them down to 1¾ kopeks.

Exposures here are harmful. This is not 1918. We have the Comintern for that. All Kamenev's arguments = arguments *against* his going.

Lenin

10/VII.

P.S. For the time being we shall appoint Krasin, Vorovsky and another 2-3 assistants.[421]

Lenin

Written on July 10, 1920
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635

UNDERLININGS AND AN INSTRUCTION ON I. N. SMIRNOV'S TELEGRAM

Lenin
Kremlin
Moscow
Copy to *Tsyurupa*, People's Commissariat for Food

Omsk, July 9. Half of the Altai and Tomsk gubernias are in the grip of a kulak movement which we are suppressing by force of arms. The cause of the insurrection is lack of commodities. From the insurgent kulaks we are confiscating grain, the whole of which has not been threshed. Work hands should be sent out urgently to thresh and load; unless you send workers we shall not be able to take the grain. A minimum of 7,000 is required at once for the Altai alone. If you are late, the opportunity will be lost. Ascertain the possibility and inform us, if you cannot send them, we shall immediately cancel the order for confiscation, because the kulaks will burn grain that is unthreshed and unguarded.

Smirnov
Chairman of the Siberian
Revolutionary Committee

I insist on all possible help. Directive from the C.C.—make every haste. We are sending people.

Tsyurupa, Schmidt (Commissariat for Labour) and Chief Labour Committee:

Send at once, extremely urgent, exert every effort.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

636

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Comrade Sklyansky,

Please return this[422] to me with your remarks as to *what has already been fulfilled* and what is being fulfilled, and *when*.

Lenin

Written between July 11 and 15, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

637

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Comrade Sklyansky,

The international situation, particularly Curzon's proposal (annexation of the Crimea in exchange for a truce with Poland, the Grodno-Byelostok line),[423] demands a *furious* acceleration of the offensive against Poland.

Is it being done? Everything? Energetically?

Lenin

Written on July 12 or 13, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

638

TO THEODORE ROTHSTEIN

15/VII. 1920

Dear Comrade,

Many thanks for the letters, which always contain extremely valuable information. I enclose a letter from my wife and ask you to give my regards to your wife and family, whom I met at your home in London.

About your journey to Russia, I am in two minds. You are so very important for the work in London. Let them deport you: we shall see if they dare to do so. They would have to catch you on something, otherwise there will be a row. I am not against your coming "to take a look" at Russia, but I am afraid that to quit Britain is harmful for the work.

As to the delegation, we shall discuss this in all aspects in a day or so. The same with the reply to Curzon,[424] who, in my opinion, wants to grossly deceive us. He won't succeed.

About sending you literature, I have taken special measures. You should know that a Russian has to be sworn at 20 times and verified 30 times to have the simplest thing done properly. Keep an eye on it and write more often (even sometimes to me)—then I shall push things on so that you get the missing publications more regularly.

I think that your guiding participation (it is possible by the pen and secretly) in the Anglo-Saxon movement is especially valuable. Here it is highly important to straighten out the line. You will receive my pamphlet against the "Leftists"* and resolutions (drafts) for the Second Congress of the Third International, and I should very much like to know your opinion.

All the very best,

Yours,

Lenin

Sent to London

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

639

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

I refused to sign because it is too sweeping and vague.

I propose that it be redrafted more exactly (what, in concrete terms, does "to take *into the network*" mean?) and submitted a second time *together with* the instructions.[425]

Lenin

15/VII.

Written on July 15, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

640

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO L. B. KAMENEV

Kamenev

1. The utmost attention must be paid to collecting English writings showing that trade agreements with the So-

* This refers to Lenin's "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 17-118).—*Ed.*

viet Republics are more advantageous to the British bourgeoisie than unprofitable and even ruinous attempts to crush them. It is necessary to collect such writings for us, and besides this, to discuss with knowledgeable people whether in addition it would not be expedient to employ some kind of literary bureau or agency for the publication of such pamphlets, for giving lectures, and for their distribution, etc. You, of course, know whom one should consult in the first place about this.

2. It is necessary to organise through special people the regular collection, purchase, without stinting money, and dispatch to us in 5 copies, of books, articles, pamphlets, newspaper cuttings, particularly in English, but also in other languages, on questions of modern economics. As an example, Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace*. This is the sort of publication that should be collected systematically.

3. Do the same, but only through special people, for the collection and dispatch to us in 20 copies of periodical publications of all kinds, and especially pamphlets and minutes of the following four trends: 1—communist, 2—Centrist (for example, the Independent Labour Party in Britain), 3—anarchist or near to it, 4—syndicalist, etc.

4. All this should be properly organised by a legal agreement, through someone who must be a British subject and not a Communist.

5. Please send me personally: 1—good recent reference books and summary statistical publications, geographical, political and economic, particularly in English and French, which are more easily obtainable in London, and 2—two good thermos flasks.

Lenin

Dictated by telephone on
July 17, 1920

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in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

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the typewritten copy

641

TO THE POLISH BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

28. VII. 1920

I recommend the bearer, Comrade Ivan Lukich *Prominsky*, a Polish worker, Social-Democrat since 1894.

I know him well from exile in 1897-1900. Please have confidence in him and give him assistance.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Member of the C.C., R.C.P.

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

642

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE

The peace proposal by the Poles gives us an opportunity for more systematic use of the troops which it was intended to transfer from the Caucasian Front to the Western Front. I propose, therefore, that the Council of Defence draft a decision as follows:

1. The troops of the Caucasian Front to march through the entire Ukraine, the route being so calculated that *each* volost (of the approximately 1,900 volosts of the Ukraine) is passed through *twice*, first by a cavalry unit and then, after an interval, an infantry unit, to fulfil (and then *check* fulfilment of) the following tasks:

(a) the collection of food (according to the quotas to be requisitioned);

(b) the formation locally, i.e., in every village, of a *double* (compared to the quota) stock of food (collected in barns, in houses of priests, landowners, the rich, etc.), this stock to be guarded by the local peasants on their responsibility.

This double stock is to serve as an *exchange* fund; from this stock held by the peasants, grain will be taken *after* the local peasants have been supplied

with *goods*, Russian and *foreign*, *by agreement* with the local peasants;

(c) the compilation (and checking) of a list of "*responsible*" peasants (5-20%, etc., of the householders of each village, depending on its size, to be selected from the local *rich peasants* starting from the top, i.e., according to wealth).

The "responsible" peasants are to be *personally* answerable for the fulfilment of food and other assignments of the authorities.

After the departure of the troops, the special task of the local authorities will be to ensure the proper and safe keeping of this list (for non-fulfilment of this task—*death sentence*);

(d) the disarming of the rich peasants.

Complete collection of arms. Responsibility for undiscovered arms rests on the commander of the army unit; for non-declaration of arms it rests on the person with whom they are found (death sentence), *and on the whole group of* "*responsible*" *peasants* (a fine, not in money, but in grain and articles; confiscation of property, arrest; work in the mines);

(e) assistance in sowing the fields, in repairs to agricultural implements, and other necessary work (guarding stores or checking the guard over them, work on the railways, etc.) (guarding stores of salt, etc.).

2. For the purposes indicated above, a commissar or instructor to be added to each army unit (to its Communist cell) (muster 1,000 people if necessary from the Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers) to control fulfilment of the tasks mentioned.

3. In "stubborn" volosts or villages, the army units either to organise a "third visit" (by troops) or to remain longer *billeted* (up to 2 weeks) for punishment and correction.

4. Part of these decisions to he put through the Defence Council, part through the Council of the Labour Army and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine.

5. A *highly popular* leaflet to be published for the peasants to explain matters in general, and the idea of the *stocks of food for exchange for foreign goods*, in particular.

A commission to be set up at once for publishing such a leaflet, and a series of them, as well as a number of instructions.

For drafting these proposals, a commission to be set up at once consisting of Comrades Bryukhanov and Sklyansky. Comrade Stalin to be asked to be the chairman of the commission.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Defence

Written at the end of July 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

643
TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

In code by direct line

Smirnov, Chairman, Siberian Revolutionary Committee
Omsk

The Commander-in-Chief has asked for cartridges and rifles from Siberia. This demand must be fulfilled immediately, without any delay, and the shipments dispatched so as to arrive with maximum speed. Ascertain whether more of these articles can be given, and if so, give them. Check execution.

Lenin

Written on August 2, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Sklyansky's handwriting

644
TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN[426]

In code

Stalin:

I do not quite understand why you are dissatisfied with the separation of the fronts. Let me know your reasons. It seemed to me to be necessary since the Wrangel danger is increasing. As to a deputy, let me know your opinion

about a candidate. Please inform me also what promises the Commander-in-Chief is late with. Our diplomacy is subordinated to the C.C. and will never disrupt our successes, if the Wrangel danger does not cause vacillations within the Central Committee. From the Kuban area and the Don Region we are getting alarming, even desperate, telegrams about the menacing growth of the insurgent movement. They are insisting on more speed in defeating Wrangel.

Lenin

Written on August 3, 1920
Sent to Lozovaya

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

645

TO I. T. SMILGA AND M. N. TUKHACHEVSKY

In code
by direct line
3. VIII. 1920

Comrade Smilga
and Comrade Tukhachevsky

All measures should be taken to promulgate in Poland on the widest possible scale the Manifesto of the Polish Revolutionary Committee. Use our aircraft for this. Report what you have done.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in
Sklyansky's handwriting

646

TO L. B. KAMENEV

We should say (in regard to the frontier) that we shall give *more* (the line will be *farther to the east*),[427]
but *not* say: "**much**" more, *much* farther to the east.

Written in August,
not later than 5, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

647

TELEGRAM TO J. V. STALIN

Stalin

I apologise for the delay in replying, due to the end of the work of the Comintern. The plenary meeting of the Central Committee did not adopt any decisions* that alter the established policy. Britain is threatening war, she does not want to wait later than Monday, August 9. I don't much believe the threats. Kamenev in London is also standing firm so far, and I am convinced that your successes against Wrangel will help to put an end to the vacillations within the Central Committee. In general, however, much still depends on Warsaw and its fate.**

Lenin

Written on August 7, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

648

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA, F. E. DZERZHINSKY AND J. MARCHLEWSKI

In code

Smilga
Dzerzhinsky
Marchlewski

Your reports are too laconic. Details about the temper of the agricultural labourers and Warsaw workers are essential and urgently needed, as well as about political prospects in general. I earnestly request you to reply today if possible.

Lenin

Written on August 9, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* Lenin marked off the remaining text of the telegram and wrote in the margin: "In code."—*Ed.*

** See also present edition, Vol. 31, p. 266.—*Ed.*

649

TO THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

10. VIII. 1920

Please publish an atlas,
similar to the book

Railways of Russia (publication of the A. Ilyin Cartographical Institute. Petrograd, September 1, 1918),

1) i.e., in a single small-sized book;
2) maps each on 2 pages of .the book, if possible *without folding* the sheets;
3) on each map the *new* boundaries of the gubernias (with the same colour as in Ilyin's for each gubernia). *All* uyezd towns;
4) railways, indicating *every* station;
5) *new* state frontiers;
6) separately: regions and territories which have fallen away from the former Russian Empire (on a separate map);
7) append *some* historical maps indicating the *line of the fronts* (of the Civil War) at various periods from 1917 to 1920.

Lenin

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

650

TELEGRAM TO A. G. BELOBORODOV

In code

10. VIII. 1920

Beloborodov
Council of the Caucasian Labour Army
Rostov-on-Don
or present whereabouts
Armavir, etc.

Please wire how matters stand in regard to the revolts in the Caucasus and on the Kuban, whether they are increasing or weakening, whether all measures have been

taken, whether there has been an appreciable arrival of new troops, whether there are enough of them, and other details.[428]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

651
TELEGRAM TO K. KH. DANISHEVSKY*

Danishevsky

From Chicherin you will learn of our great diplomatic success in Britain in regard to Poland. I hope you will be fully able to take this into account and cleverly include in the terms both Warsaw, as we agreed, and the firmest guarantee of all the rest.

Written on August 11, 1920

First published in part in 1934
in the book: K. Danishevsky,
S. Kamenev, *Vospominaniya o Lenine*
(Recollections of Lenin), Moscow

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

652
TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

11. VIII. 1920

Comrade Krestinsky

Comrade Shapovalov (Alexander Isidorovich) is one of the old Party comrades. A Petrograd worker.

I knew him very well in the Party while still abroad, where he always worked like a cart-horse.

---

* Transmitted by direct line in code.—*Ed.*

Now *he is ill. He is badly in need* of extra nourishment. Cannot it be arranged for him to use the Kremlin dining-room? I earnestly request this and a ration (increased) for him, and help of every kind.

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

653

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY[429]

11. VIII. 1920

Comrade Krestinsky,

Comrade *Lao*, Chairman of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia, needs to confer with you on a number of questions. Will you please give him this possibility.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

654

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[430]

Narrow Council.

Please consider the request (§ b in the Orgbureau *partly*). It should be complied with *to a certain extent*, for the struggle against illiteracy is a task *more important than any other*.

Lenin

Written in August, not earlier than 11, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

655

TO D. I. KURSKY

Comrade Kursky,

Who is it publishes so badly?[431]
Chaos. Even the heading is not clear.
A collection of trivia—and of proclamations.
Who edited it—some stupid person or a saboteur?
The most important legislation *in force* now, 1920, ought to be published in a similar volume.

Lenin

Written in August,
not later than 12, 1920

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

656

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Should not Smilga be told that it is necessary (after the harvesting) to take into the army *absolutely all* adult men?

He should.

With Budyonny moving to the south, it is necessary to *strengthen* the north.

Written on August 12, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

657

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY[432]

Comrade Krestinsky,

Is it not possible somehow to make a check through a *strict* commission? Voznesensky was working effectively.

Is there not some irregularity about his removal? personal? squabbling?

Lenin

12/8. 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

658

TELEGRAM TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Zinoviev
Smolny
Petrograd

Krzhizhanovsky reports that the Chairman of the Housing Committee for the Poor, at No. 15, Alexandrovsky Prospekt, Petrogradskaya Storona, is threatening Professor Heinrich Graftio, who occupies flat No. 3, with house-searches and confiscation of his property.

Graftio is a respected professor, who is on our side. He must be protected against the arbitrary action of the Chairman of the Housing Committee for the Poor. Please report fulfilment.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 13, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the text in Fotieva's handwriting signed by Lenin

659

LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND A TELEGRAM TO L. B. KAMENEV

14. VIII. 1920

Comrade Chicherin,

I hope you will fully inform Kamenev of *all* the facts showing that France and Daszynski *are torpedoing the meeting* in Minsk?[433]

This is essential. Very, very much so.

Danishevsky must be told that he should begin with a **solemn** declaration of

(a) independence and sovereignty
(b) a frontier giving **more** than Curzon's[434]
(c) no indemnities. Isn't that so?

In reply to Kamenev's request I am sending you for coding:

To Kamenev in code

In my opinion, the whole point is that France and Daszynski are torpedoing the actual meeting in Minsk. They will probably also prevent the armistice. I am hoping that Britain will be unable to fight, and without her everything falls to the ground. There is practically no news from Poland. The little there is confirms our decision at the C.C. plenum, namely, extreme vigilance, and we are bound to win this campaign. That we have roused the workers—this is already no small gain. *Lenin*.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

P.S. Britain is trying to prove that *we* are torpedoing the meeting. **All** the documents must be sent urgently to Kamenev.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

660

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

The Commander-in-Chief dare not fret. If the *military* department or the Commander-in-Chief *does not reject* the idea of capturing Warsaw, we must *capture it* (what extra measures for this? tell me).

To talk of *expediting* the armistice when the enemy is *attacking*, is idiocy.

Once the Poles have gone over to an offensive along the *entire* line, one should not whimper (like Danishevsky) for that is ridiculous.

A *counter-move* should be devised: military measures (enveloping, dragging out *all* negotiations, etc.).

Written in August, not earlier than 14, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

661

TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF HEALTH RESORTS AND SANATORIA OF THE CAUCASUS

17. VIII. 1920

Please do everything to help provide the best accommodation and treatment for the bearer,

Comrade Inessa Fyodorovna Armand, with her sick son.

Please afford these Party comrades, who are personally known to me, complete trust and every assistance.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

662

TELEGRAM TO K. KH. DANISHEVSKY

Danishevsky

It is ridiculous to complain of the enemy's perfidy while there is still no armistice. Keep cool and absolutely firm, not yielding one iota, until the Poles show they seriously want peace.

Lenin

Written on August 17, 1920
Sent to Minsk

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

663

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA

In code

Smilga

The offensive of the Poles makes it very important for us to increase our pressure, if only for a few days. Do everything possible. If you consider it useful, issue an order to

the troops telling them that by a tenfold effort now, they will ensure for Russia favourable terms of peace for many years.

Lenin

Written on August 18, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

664

TELEGRAM TO I. T. SMILGA

19/VIII.

Smilga
Minsk

Comrade Trotsky will inform you in detail of the decision of the Politbureau,[435] from which you will learn that we fully share your view. It is essential to strain all efforts so that the Byelorussian workers and peasants, even if in bast shoes and unclothed, but immediately, with revolutionary speed, would give you three and four times as many reinforcements.

Further, agitation from aeroplanes for the Polish workers and peasants, to the effect that their capitalists are preventing peace and are condemning them to needless bloodshed, should be increased tenfold.

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from
the typewritten copy

665

TELEGRAM TO KARL RADEK

Please dispatch **in code**

Smilga *for Radek*

We shall take your considerations into account. Since you are going to see Dzerzhinsky, please insist on ruthless crushing of the landowners and kulaks as quickly and energetically as possible, as also on real help for the peasants

by giving them land and forests of the Polish gentry. Report in more detail, check locally.

Written on August 19, 1920
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51
Printed from the original

666

TELEGRAM TO V. P. ZATONSKY

Please dispatch
to Zatonsky
in code

(Sklyansky knows the address and code)

Let us know in greater detail what you are doing to raise the Galician peasants. Armaments have been sent to you. Are they sufficient? Crush the Polish landowners and the kulaks ruthlessly so that the farm hands, and the mass of the peasants, feel there has been a sharp turn in their favour. Are you using aeroplanes for agitation?[436]

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1920
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51
Printed from the original

667

TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Comrade *Pokrovsky*

1) What is the *legal* status of Proletcult?[437]

2) *What* is the nature of its leading centre and 3) *by whom* was it appointed?

4) How is it financed by the People's Commissariat for Education?

5) Anything else of *importance* about the position, role and results of the work of Proletcult.

Lenin

Written in August, not later than 20, 1920
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

668

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

All in code

Orjonikidze

We have passed a decision through the Politbureau today for you to go without fail to Rostov for closest participation in liquidating the landings in the Kuban and Black Sea area.[438] Strain every effort and push this on, report to me more frequently. Get someone to take your place in Baku. Another request: don't forget you promised me to arrange for treatment for Inessa Armand and her sick son, who left on August 18; they are, probably, already in Rostov.

Lenin

Written on August 20, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

669

TELEGRAM TO KARL RADEK, F. E. DZERZHINSKY AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

In code

Smilga
for Radek, Dzerzhinsky and all members of the Polish C.C.

If in Seidlitz Gubernia land-hungry peasants have begun to seize the landed estates, it is absolutely essential to publish a special decision of the Polish Revolutionary Committee making it obligatory to give part of the landed estates to the peasants and at all costs to ensure concord between the land-hungry peasants and the farm hands. Please reply.

Lenin

Written on August 20, 1920

First published in part in 1938 in the journal *Bolshevik* No. 2

Published in full (in facsimile) in 1951 in the book: *Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky. 1877-1926*, Moscow

Printed from the text

670

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KAMENEV AND A NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Kamenev in code

It is hardly likely that we shall capture Warsaw soon.* The enemy there has built up strength and is attacking. Obviously, Lloyd George is deliberately dividing up the roles with Churchill, using pacifist phrases to conceal the real policy of the French and Churchill and duping the Henderson-and-Co. fools. Do your utmost to bring this home to the British workers; write articles and theses for them yourself, teach Marxism concretely, teach them to make use of the leftward swings of the Hendersons, teach them agitation among the masses—that is your main task. Lloyd George has been duping us with pacifism and has helped Churchill to land assistance for the Poles in Danzig. That is the essence of the matter. Maintain contact with the Rumanian Ambassador.

*Lenin***

Comrade Chicherin,

Send it if you have no objection. If you have, we'll talk it over on the telephone.

Lenin

Written on August 20, 1920
Sent to London

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

671

NOTE TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH DRAFT OF A TELEGRAM TO V. S. MICKIEWICZ-KAPSUKAS[439]

I propose replying:

The present moment is definitely unsuitable, while we are retreating from Warsaw. Send the most detailed and

* The word "soon" is in Chicherin's handwriting.—*Ed.*
** The telegram is signed also by Chicherin.—*Ed.*

exact information about Lithuania over the signature of all the members of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Central Committee and Smilga's opinion. But continue the preparatory work more cautiously and systematically.

There is agreement from three members of the *Political Bureau*.*

Lenin

Written on August 20, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

672

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

20. VIII. 1920

Comrade Zinoviev

For the Committee of the 1st State Cartographical Institute (formerly A. Ilyin's)
5, Pryazhka

Thank you very much for sending another copy of the atlas *Railways of Russia*, and please do not forget that if a new atlas is to be published giving the *new* administrative divisions, it is essential *very carefully* to collect information from the People's Commissariats about the boundaries both of the new gubernias and also of the Tatar, Bashkir and other republics, regions and communes (German, Chuvash), and others.

It is unlikely that this can be done without a commission under the Council of People's Commissars.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

* This sentence, the signature and the words "*on behalf of the Politbureau, Krestinsky*" were written by Lenin after receiving the agreement of the members of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). —*Ed*.

673

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY

Tell Chicherin,

1) In my opinion, Kamenev is right: we must send our reply *through him* (and in the negative).

2) Negotiations with Vanderlip to be begun *through Krasin*, exact *terms* to be ascertained without summoning Vanderlip here.[440]

Written in August, prior to 21, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

674

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Krestinsky
for the *Orgbureau*

I agree with Krestinsky that Preobrazhensky "didn't make a success of it".

It should be more detailed, *more agitational*, with more feeling—and clearer and more business-like.

Let *Zinoviev* write it (he will be *here* tomorrow, 25/8), and the Orgbureau will correct it.[441]

Lenin

Written on August 24, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

675

TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Comrade Sergo,

I am sending you reports delivered to me. Return them, please, with your remarks about the facts: what is true, what is untrue.[442]

I daresay you get into a bad temper, on occasion, don't you?

You ought to get some assistants, perhaps, and direct the work more systematically.

I hope you will not take offence at my remarks and will reply frankly what you think you can straighten out and correct, and how.

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Written in August, prior to 27, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

676

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

27. 8. 1920

Narrow Council

In view of Comrade *Vorovsky's extremely serious* and dangerous illness (typhoid, pneumonia, etc.) please urgently authorise the issue of a large grant for treatment and a nourishing diet.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

677

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY[443]

I agree, with the obligatory addition to this conclusion ("reprimand"): *do not dare* to introduce departmental polemics, do not dare to browbeat the *Supreme Economic Council*, the *Commissariat for Food* and other People's Commissariats.

Lenin

Written on August 27, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

678

TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

Comrade Dzerzhinsky,

I enclose a coded message from Comrade Beloborodov.[444] In my opinion the danger is immense.

I propose:

the adoption of a directive from the Political Bureau asking the Orgbureau, by arrangement with the Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Vecheka, to draw up *emergency* measures to combat the danger of a revolt and to mobilise sufficient army, Cheka and Party forces.

Please hand all this at once to Comrade *Krestinsky* (he will be away for only a few hours today) and for your part adopt *all* measures *at once*.

If we are faced with a revolt on the Kuban, *our whole policy* (which was spoken about in the C.C.) *will crash*. It is necessary, at all costs, to prevent a revolt, and not to grudge people or efforts for this. Should we not send Mantsev there?

Yours,
Lenin

Written in August,
not earlier than 28, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

679

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[445]

Narrow Council:

It is essential to centralise and combine aid, distributing it *correctly*.

Lenin

31/8.

Written on August 31, 1920

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

680

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

2/IX. 1920

Orjonikidze
Revolutionary Council
Caucasian Front

Your telegram received. There is no point in your being indignant. If X's report is false,[446] calmly write ten lines of refutation and send it to me by mail. Please add fullest details about the progress of the fight against banditry and about the arrangements you made in Kislovodsk for the Soviet functionaries of whom I spoke here to you personally.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

681

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Comrade Krestinsky,

I think the persons responsible for this waste of expensive paper and printing facilities should be *prosecuted*, fired, and arrested.[447]

Lenin

Written on September 2, 1920
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

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* See also *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, Document 464, —*Ed*.

682

INSTRUCTION ON NADEZHDA NIKULINA'S LETTER

Dear Vladimir Ilyich,

Only my desperate situation compels me to trouble you with a most humble request. I am 74 years old, for 51 of them I have served my dear Moscow to the best of my strength and ability.... Knowing how crowded are the conditions in which the population is living, I met the authorities halfway and voluntarily gave up several rooms in my little house. All that remains are rooms that I need for myself or cold communicating rooms unsuitable for living in. Now they threaten to take these rooms away as well. I implore you to help me.... A few words, written by your order, will be sufficient guarantee for me.

With sincere respect,
Honoured Artist of the State Maly Theatre,
N. Nikulina

Check and phone that she is to be left in peace.

Written in September,
not earlier than 3, 1920

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

683

TELEGRAM TO THE PODOLSK UYEZD FOOD COMMITTEE

Podolsk Uyezd Food Committee
Copy to Podolsk Uyezd Executive Committee

The following petition[448] has reached me directly;

I can testify that Bogdanovo village (popularly known as Bogdanikha) is very bad off for food. Will you therefore please examine their petition without delay, and alleviate their position as much as you can, i.e., by reducing their requisition quota as far as possible.

Please notify me of your decision both in writing and by telephone message.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

6/IX. 1920

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

684

TO LYDIA FOTIEVA[449]

Lydia Alexandrovna

Read through, send on to the Science and Technology Department and *check* what has been done (a letter to him?).

Lenin

6/IX.

Written on September 6, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

685

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky,

This was received today in reply to my night inquiry about "pseudonym" (he has been summoned to us here, and inquiries have been made of Gusev[450]... .* Gusev does not object.

But his report about a big defeat of the 13th Army is extremely alarming and extremely important.

In my opinion, it is necessary to treat this with the utmost seriousness in view of the whole situation and 1) inquire at once of the Commander-in-Chief, 2) raise this evening in the C.C. ...*

...* whether to appoint Frunze commander of the front against Wrangel and to put Frunze in at once.[451] I have asked Frunze to have a talk with you as soon as possible. Frunze says he has studied the Wrangel front, has prepared himself for that front and knows (from his experience of the Urals Region) the methods of struggle against the Cossacks.

Lenin

Written on September 8, 1920

First published in part in 1960 in the book: *Istoria grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR. 1917-1922*, Vol. 5

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

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* In the typewritten copy the text is missing and the words "(torn out—impossible to establish)" are written in an unknown hand.—*Ed.*

686

TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code
9. IX. 1920

Trotsky

I consider of the utmost importance Yakovlev's proposal concerning the Crimean army which was passed on to you from Gusev. I advise that the proposal be adopted and a special check instituted, and, independently of this, an appeal-manifesto be prepared at once over the signatures of yourself, Kalinin, myself, the Commander-in-Chief, Brusilov and a number of other former generals, with precise proposals and guarantees, and also mentioning the fate of Eastern Galicia and the increasing insolence of the Poles. I request your earliest opinion, or better still your draft of the manifesto.[452]

Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

687

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO A. T. RYKOV AND A. M. LEZHAVA

Rykov
Supreme Economic Council
Lezhava
People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade

The various big timber export deals concluded by our London Trade Delegation are of great political and economic importance. They virtually break the blockade. The most serious attention, therefore, should be given to the precise and careful execution of these contracts, in accordance with the terms agreed on. Please give immediately all the relevant instructions along these lines and establish effective control over their implementation.

At the same time there is obvious need for increasing our export stock to the utmost, primarily by stepping up the procurement of timber for export. In order to make the latter a priority job, please draft and submit to the Council of People's Commissars as soon as possible a decree on the measures that should be adopted, indicating among them the organisation of control over the bodies in charge of the procurement of raw materials for export.[453]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 10, 1920
Published on September 18, 1920 in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 207

Printed from the text in an unknown handwriting signed by Lenin

688
TO I. G. RUDAKOV

Comrade *Rudakov*, Manager of the Fuel Department of the Petrograd Commune
Petrograd
Copy to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet

Please supply firewood to the Commission for Improving Scientists' Living Conditions.

If there is any disagreement as to the amount due to them or any objections, please drop me a line.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on September 10, 1920
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the typewritten copy

689

TELEGRAM TO V. Y. CHUBAR AND V. N. KSANDROV

By direct line

Chubar
Ukrainian Industrial Bureau
and Ksandrov
Central Administration of the Donets Coalfields

On 10/IX, the Council of Defence resolved to pass a strict reprimand on the Ukrainian Industrial Bureau and the Central Administration of the Donets Coalfields for failing to supply information: 1) in reply to the inquiry of the Chief Coal Committee dated 20/VIII, 2) —of the Council of Labour and Defence dated 4/IX, and to warn them that if a satisfactory reply is not given at once, more serious penalties will be meted out to the entire personnel of these institutions.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on September 13 or 14, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Fotieva's handwriting signed by Lenin

690

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE CAUCASIAN FRONT

R.M.C., Caucasian Front

The Council of Labour and Defence has resolved to pass a strict reprimand on the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front for non-fulfilment of the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence dated 25/VI and of the order of the Field Headquarters of the Republic dated 5/VII,[454] and to warn the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front that if they do not

strain all efforts to fulfil the decisions indicated, they will be arrested and prosecuted.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on September 13 or 14, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the text in Glyasser's handwriting signed by Lenin

691
TO V. A. AVANESOV[455]

Order an investigation, with the addition of army Communists, by agreement with Sklyansky, and provide Communists yourself (and drop me a line).

Written on September 14, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the text in the secretary's handwriting

692
TO M. I. KALININ

16. IX. 1920

Comrade Kalinin

Comrade Kalinin,

Comrade Ilyin asks that he and his family should be left in *his old rooms* in the former *Metropole Hotel* until the spring,

because the doctors certify that his wife and children are very ill and require the best possible position and conditions during an operation to be undergone in the winter.

Knowing Comrade Ilyin since before the revolution, from abroad, I earnestly request you to help him arrange this.

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

693

TO A. M. LEZHAVA[456]

Comrade Lezhava

(After conferring with Sklyansky, a decision must be arrived at as quickly as possible and measures taken.)

Lenin

16/IX

P.S. Such documents should be sent *direct* to the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, to avoid loss of time.

Written on September 16, 1920

First published in part on November 24, 1963, in *Pravda* No. 328

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

694

TO A. M. LEZHAVA

Comrade Lezhava 20. IX. 1920

Comrade Lezhava

You should *urgently* see Zimmerman and raise the following in the Politbureau:

Platten through his courier (Zimmerman, a Communist from Switzerland, who is now here and leaves *tomorrow*, 21/IX) asks

for his mandate as trade representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Switzerland to be continued and confirmed, as this

1) will help him, Platten, to be released from prison (he has *already* begun to serve his 6-month sentence) *ahead of time*;

2) will strengthen his position in the communist movement.

Platten must be helped with *money*: he is in dire straits.

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

695

MARKINGS ON S. S. KAMENEV'S REPORT AND A NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN

...

2) The limit of territorial concessions on our part can be the frontier along the river Shara, the Oginsky Canal, the rivers Yaselda and Styr and further along the state frontier between Russia and Eastern Galicia. Shifting our frontier still more to the east would create extremely difficult strategic conditions for us, depriving us of such important railway junctions as Baranovichi, Luninets, Sarny and Rovno. Moreover, the state of our armies and the strategic position in general do not call for such a big sacrifice....

Comrade Chicherin,

This is the frontier—maximum. Adopted in the C.C: It must be repeated exactly.[457]

Lenin

Written on September 23, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

696

TELEGRAM TO A. A. JOFFE

Today in code to Joffe on behalf of the C.C. plenum.

For us, the crux of the matter is: first, that we have an armistice in a short time; second, and this is the main thing, that we have a real guarantee of real peace within 10 days. Your task is to ensure this and check on the reality of the guarantee of actual fulfilment. If you do ensure this, give the maximum concessions up to the line along the river Shara, the Oginsky Canal, the rivers Yaselda and Styr and further along the state frontier between Russia and Eastern Galicia. If, however, in spite of all our efforts and concessions this can in no way be ensured, then your only task is to expose the delay of the Poles and definitely prove to us the inevitability of a winter campaign.

Written on September 23, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

697

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[458]

Comrade Chicherin,

It is necessary:

1) To put before the C.C. another draft of a **precise** decision: the C.C. prohibits acting in such-and-such a way, and demands so-and-so.

2) To lodge a protest against each violation concretely.

3) To put through the C.C. the appointment of a responsible person (not a very "high" one).

Otherwise the result is nothing but grousing.

Lenin

Written in September, not earlier than 24, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

698

TO S. I. GILLERSON

Very urgent

Gillerson
Prague

Publish at once in the press and inform the Congress of the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party[459] that Franz Benes's mention of a talk alleged to have taken place with me on the possibility or impossibility of a proletarian dictatorship in Czechoslovakia is a lie from beginning to end and that not only did I never talk with him but I have never even seen him. It goes without saying that my opinion of Bela Kun and of the Hungarian Revolution, as quoted by Benes, is just as foul a lie.

Lenin

Written on September 25, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten copy

699

TO N. A. SEMASHKO

Comrade Semashko

Please allow Lyubov Isaakovna *Axelrod* (*Orthodox*) to remain in Clinic No. 2 (No. 5, Third Neopalimovsky Pereulok) the whole winter, giving her a comfortable room.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Comrade Semashko,

Drop me a line about how she is fixed up. She must be given assistance.

Yours,
*Lenin**

Written on September 25, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

700

TO THE SIBERIAN REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

Comrade I. N. Smirnov,

I am sending you for consideration the following points.[460] Drop me a line about them.

Yours,
Lenin

1. Attention to be paid to the rural poor of Siberia, who are to be supplied with food from the local requisition quotas.
2. Tar production to be organised in Siberia, enlisting the local Soviets and the population
(local tar production).

---

* The additional text from "Comrade Semashko,..." to the end is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

3. The peasants obtain a pood of wheat and mill it into the finest flour, getting 18-20 pounds. It would be better to mill into simple flour, the peasants will agree to this.

4. Special attention to be paid to the village blacksmiths' shops for repairs to agricultural machinery. Charcoal to be supplied to them.

Is it true that there have been instances in Siberia of butter being used to grease carts (instead of tar)?

Lenin

26. IX. 20

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

701

NOTE TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY AND MARKINGS ON *BULLETIN* No. 5 OF THE STATE COMMISSION FOR THE ELECTRIFICATION OF RUSSIA[461]

Comrade *G. M. Krzhizhanovsky*

Gleb Maximilianovich,

Please return this to me, after reading pp. 20-21, with a couple of words.

Yours,
Lenin

... Undoubtedly, in the early stages we, as is done nowadays in all Europe and America, have to pay particular attention to the rational utilisation of the already existing electro-technical equipment. At the present time, the accelerated setting in full motion of our main existing power stations, the combined work of a group of stations, and the rational use of the electrical networks, may have an importance which it is difficult to overestimate. N.B.

Recently, throughout the provinces, we observe a widespread tendency towards the construction of new small stations, particularly in those cases where it is possible to use some kind of water power. However vital this trend may be, we should not forget that from the point of view of expediency in the matter of electrification only big district power stations are a decisive factor.... N.B.

... At present three-quarters of the work is finished, and in the middle of July we shall start on a final summary for presenting a report on the matter to the Council of People's Commissars. Only when this work is completely finished, will I be able to give you a more concrete account of what we mean when we speak of the electrification of agriculture, industry and transport in Russia, having in view a definite sequence of works embracing, approximately, the period of the next ten years.

G. Krzhizhanovsky

This is where the question arises: up to now, in all five numbers of the *Bulletin*, we have had only *long-term* "schemes" and "plans", but *nothing immediate*.

What exactly (**precisely**) is lacking for "*accelerating the setting in motion of the existing power stations*"?

This is the crux. Yet there is not a word about this.

What is lacking? Workers? Skilled workers? Machinery? Metal? Fuel? Anything else?

A "*plan*" to obtain **everything** that is lacking must be drawn up and published *at once*.

Lenin

26/IX.

Written on September 26, 1920
First published: the note—on January 21, 1927, in *Pravda* No. 17; the markings—in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

702
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

27. IX. 1920

Comrade Bryukhanov,

I am sending you two documents. Will you please read them and return *both to me*:

1) About *Ivanovo-Voznesensk* Gubernia.

We shall raise it in the Council of Defence on 29. IX.[462] It is necessary to pay the most serious attention and to try to meet their requests in the greatest possible degree.

2) About *Tambov* Gubernia.

Pay attention. Is the requisition quota of **11** million poods correct? Should it not be cut down?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

703

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY

Ask for information about the circumstances of the loss of *Pinsk*, including that of staffs and materiel.[463]

Was the danger known beforehand?

Written in September, not earlier than 28, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

704

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Comrade Krestinsky,

I think we should get a decision passed through the Orgbureau, and instruct the Revolutionary Military Council to regularise it, that special agents of the Food Commissariat are *included as members* of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the fronts with the right to vote on questions concerning the Food Commissariat.

Lenin

Written in September, not later than 29, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

705

TO N. I. BUKHARIN[464]

Bogdanov has fooled **you** by disguising (verkleidet) an old dispute and trying to *shift it onto a different plane*. And you are taken in by it!

Written between September and December 1920

First published in 1930 in *Lenin Miscellany XII*

Printed from the original

706
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Secret
1/X. 1920

Comrade Trotsky,

I enclose herewith information from Comrade Sklyansky.[465]

It appears that the offensive against the Crimea has been put off until 27/X!!!

Is there a decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on this???

The Commander-in-Chief boasted to me that by October 10 (or 8) he would have *everything* ready for the offensive. Does this mean he lied?

When was it decided to send Budyonny *there*? Why, *even without him forces three times as large were promised*.

Finally, if the old plan is to be changed *at all*, is it not enough to give 1 division?

It turns out that *all* the calculations of the Commander-in-Chief are not worth a damn and *are changed weekly* like those of an ignoramus! Extremely dangerous vacillations!

Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from
the typewritten copy

707
TO V. M. SVERDLOV

Comrade *Sverdlov*

Alexei Andreyevich Preobrazhensky is an old Party functionary who has worked on the railways for more than 20 years. At the present time he is Chief of the Administrative Service of the Samara-Zlatoust Railway. He is now 57-58 years old. He is extremely overworked and ill and needs

a lengthy rest and treatment. Please give him 3 months' leave with pay and rations.

His address: Samara railway station.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 1, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

708

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky,

I think that both *Kamenev* and *Zinoviev* should be sent *immediately* to the Southern Front (and particularly to the *1st Mounted Army*). The aim—*to inspect political work, step it up and revitalise* it, *to accelerate* the whole tempo. Otherwise we shall not overcome the present mood.

Lenin

2/X.

Written on October 2, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

709

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[466]

Narrow Council:

It should not be given at all, in my opinion, for Headquarters of the R.M.C. of the Western Front *can* (and should) be accommodated *in other buildings*, even if a bit crowded.

Lenin

3/X.

Written on October 3, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

710

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV[467]

4/X.

Comrade Bryukhanov,

1) The description relates to the period of the landing. After it was liquidated the feeling and the state of affairs changed completely as, incidentally, Lander told me yesterday.

2) Lander also tells me that precisely now, after the successful suppression of a number of revolts (connected with the landing), grain collection (chiefly in the Kuban area, where there is plenty of grain) has gone forward and will go forward.

3) In Lander's opinion, we can take there *more than* the estimated requisition quota.

Draw Frumkin's attention to this in a confidential *letter* (not a telegram) to him. We must make the most of this opportunity, not lose time (it will be worse later), and apply our efforts to the Kuban.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 4, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

711

TO A. I. RYKOV[468]

Comrade Rykov,

I think we should try bargaining, but concede in the end (through the C.P.C.). Bargaining point: redemption before expiry, after *30 years*, at a *heightened* valuation of their expenditure and labour.

Lenin

6/X.

You will concede a 50-year period for the concession.

Written on October 6, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

712

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

6. X. 1920

Comrade Krestinsky,

Please raise the question in the Orgbureau. I think more should be issued *for the sick* by way of special diet and a decision adopted to improve it,

by setting up a medical commission.

For scorbutics and other patients, I think, we should at once allow purchases to be made on the free market, subject to certain rules (perhaps also a commission and with the co-operation of the state farms).

Regarding the protest of the Petrograd Central Committee, I propose that votes be collected. I vote for:

1) mobilising Zinoviev;
2) cancelling general mobilisation of men.

Lenin

First published in part in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51
Printed from the original

713

TO THE ORGANISING BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

8. X. 1920

Orgbureau of the Central Committee

In the resolution of the Orgbureau of 7.X (No. 59, point 3),

sub-point *b* reprimands Comrade *Bonch-Bruyevich* for impermissibly approaching me on this and "similar petty questions".

I request that this sub-point be cancelled

for when visiting the Kremlin hospital I *personally* heard the *doctors* mention the shortage of food for the patients and I *myself* asked the *doctors* to give me, through Bonch-Bruyevich, their written proposal

on better feeding of the patients, etc.

Consequently, there was not even an "*approach*" to me here on the part of Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

714

TO TELEGRAM TO L. D. TROTSKY

In code

Trotsky only

In view of the whole situation on the Polish front and in connection with it, particularly following my night conversation with Joffe, who energetically assures us of his own, and our military expert's, conviction that the Poles, in point of fact, will not be able to prevent the armistice (by threatening a break, Joffe compelled the Poles to abandon the demand for a definite amount of gold. Joffe says: the Poles are afraid of a break even more than we are), the Politbureau of the Central Committee instructs the military authorities to incur a certain amount of risk and take some units from the South-Western Front for the speediest and surest liquidation of Wrangel.

On behalf of the Politbureau,
Lenin

Written on October 10, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

715

TO N. I. BUKHARIN[469]

Why *now* dwell on the differences between us (perhaps possible ones), if it suffices to state (and prove) *on behalf of the Central Committee as a whole*:

(1) proletarian culture=communism
(2) is carried out by the R.C.P.
(3) the proletar.-class=R.C.P.=*Soviet power*.

We are all agreed on this, aren't we?

Written on October 11, 1920
First published in 1958 in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 1

Printed from the original

716

TO A. M. HELLER

Comrade Heller,

Obtain for me *without fail* Trèves's speech, quoted here (pagina *3*).[470]

Collect *all* the material and translate *the gist* in order *to prove every* proposition of the Turin programme. *To prove* it.

Greetings,
Lenin

Written between October 11 and November 4, 1920
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

717

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

12. X. 1920

Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich,

Please ask the appropriate institutions and authorities to provide housing (warm) and dinners for Comrade *Teodorovich* and his family, who have arrived from Siberia.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO

718

PROPOSAL TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE SITUATION IN ARMENIA[471]

I propose that the Politbureau endorse all **three** of Chicherin's proposals.

Lenin

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

Written on October 12 or 13, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

719

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY[472]

Krestinsky

I propose that Manuilsky should be *compelled* to see the *best* doctors (send them to him) for diagnosis and *serious* treatment.

Lenin

Written in 1920, after October 12

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

720

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[473]

Members of the Politbureau

I think we should agree with the Commander-in-Chief, adding: until the armistice becomes an actual fact.

Lenin

13/X.

Written on October 13, 1920
First published in 1961
in the book: *Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 3

Printed from the original

721

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

14/X.

Gleb Maximilianovich,

I am sending Nikolayev's reply.

Tomorrow Botin should arrive and I will send him to you.

In view of Nikolayev's doubts and suspicions, things with Botin should be put on a precise and formal basis: i.e., either you say, "it is not worth trying". Then we shall put an end to it all. Or you say, "it is worth while trying again". Then Botin is delegated to you and you give him an *exact* assignment, place him in *exact* working conditions, under *exact control*. (Cannot he be made to write in detail, in great detail, about the Tiflis experiment?)

Yours,
Lenin

Written on October 14, 1920
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

722

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)[474]

Members of the C.C.:

I emphatically disagree with this project. Changing names is a harmful game.

In fulfilment of the decision of the Ninth Congress (I enclose the text of the decision), it is necessary, in my opinion, to set up a *permanent inter-departmental commission* of the Council of Labour and Defence, under my chairmanship (if the comrades do not object). That is quite sufficient.

Lenin

15/X.

Please return to me with indications as to who has read it.

Lenin

15/X.

Written on October 15, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

723

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY[475]

Comrade Sklyansky,

Give the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic an instruction or, rather, a definite order to *achieve rapid and complete liquidation*. Let me know what measures have been taken.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

15/X.

Written on October 15, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

724

TO THE STAFF OF THE CEMENT WORKS AT SHCHUROVO STATION

16. X. 1920

Cement Works
Shchurovo Station

I congratulate the workers and other employees of the works that has been put into operation. I hope that by energetic work you will succeed in restoring and surpassing the former output. I ask the Works Committee and the Communist cell to send me, after a month or two, a report on the progress of the work.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Defence

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

725

TO THE PRINTING AND PUBLISHING DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Copy to the *Pravda Printing-Press*.*

Please inform me how you account for such bad printing of *Pravda* as No. 231 for 16/X, enclosed herewith. Since I shall be raising this question in the Council of People's Commissars, I ask you to supply me urgently with information as to what measures you are taking and what guarantees there are for an improvement of the present position.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 16, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

* This line is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

726

TO S. P. SEREDA

Comrade Sereda,

Please give me your comments.[476]

It is essential, as a matter of the greatest urgency, to prepare *a plan for a tractor campaign*.

1) Purchase abroad
2) Production in Russia
3) Technicians—
workers, etc.

Be sure to let me know in a day or so, when you will present a preliminary memorandum. (Should not a conference be convened at once?)

Lenin

19/X.

Written on October 19, 1920

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

727

TO V. S. KORNEV

Comrade Kornev, Commander of the Internal Security Troops of the Republic
Copy to Comrade Dzerzhinsky

Comrade Schlichter informs me of an increase of the revolt in Tambov Gubernia, and the weakness of our forces, particularly the cavalry.

Speediest (and exemplary) liquidation is absolutely essential.*

Please inform me what measures are being taken. More energy should be displayed and greater forces assigned.

Vl. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 19, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the typewritten copy

* See also this volume, Document 723.—*Ed.*

728

F. E. DZERZHINSKY

Urgent

Comrade Dzerzhinsky

Bandits have seized the *Boldyrev* (Rasskazovo) factories (*Tambov* Gubernia).

It is an absolute scandal.

I propose that the Chekists (and the Gubernia Executive Committee people) of Tambov Gubernia who were caught off their guard

1) be court-martialled,

2) that Kornev be severely reprimanded,

3) that extremely energetic people be sent there at once,

4) that a severe trimming and instructions be given by telegraph.

Lenin

Written in October, after 19, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51

Printed from the original

729

TO A. M. LEZHAVA AND M. N. POKROVSKY

Comrades Lezhava and M. N. Pokrovsky

I insist that this matter be speeded up *to the utmost* and a draft decision be submitted to the C.P.C. on *Tuesday* (26.X):

1) to decide on the sale of these articles abroad as quickly as possible;

2) to require from the People's Commissariat for Education an official reply *before Tuesday*, 26/X, as to whether they have any objection (it is said they have *already* picked out articles for our museums: I agree to let them have only the *strictly* necessary minimum);

3) to send abroad at once a special commission of experts+traders, promising them a *good* bonus for a speedy and profitable sale;

4) as I find the work excessively slow (8 *out of* 33*), I consider it absolutely necessary to *increase* the personnel of the *commission of experts* (Gorky suggests *up to 200* persons) and to give them *rations* on condition that the work is completed quickly.[477]

Lenin

21/X.

Written on October 21, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

730

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

21. X. 1920

Comrade Bryukhanov

The Stavropol peasants (who have brought grain for the children) complain that they are not getting from the co-operatives

wheel-grease (the stores have it),

matches

and other goods.

The herrings were allowed *to go bad*, but they were not given out.

There is terrible discontent. The Gubernia Food Commissar says: nothing will be given until the whole requisition quota is fulfilled.

They insist on the need for goods *to be issued immediately*.

They say that the quota of 27 million poods is excessive, *seed corn* is being taken, and there is bound to be undersowing.

Stavropol Gubernia—average harvest (27).

Kuban—better than Stavropol (37 million poods).

Please examine it **urgently**, especially the first point, and give me your opinion not later than tomorrow.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

* See Note 358.—*Ed.*

Address: Kazan (railway station), goods station, truck No. *506955* on the Krivoi track, *Petrov* from the Gubernia Party Committee.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

731

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[478]

Please go into this matter *as quickly as possible*. It is evident from the enclosed that the instruction of the *Food Commissariat* (of the centre) puts these products *at the disposal of the Commission for Improving Scientists' Living Conditions*. Hence, *without the consent of the centre*, Petrograd has no right to requisition them or take them into account!

Lenin

21/X.

Written on October 21, 1920
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

732

TO THE STATE PUBLISHERS[479]

21/X.1920

1) The first is amateurish. Klein is a good book, more are needed.

2) The second (Brodsky). An unnecessary and untimely undertaking.

A. I. Rykov has been informed of a number of the worst mistakes, etc.

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733

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[480]

Comrade Chicherin,

An *official* Note must *certainly* be sent on this and all similar cases.

Circularise all representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. abroad to this effect.

Lenin

25/X.

Written on October 25, 1920

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734

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO A. M. LEZHAVA, F. F. SYROMOLOTOV AND S. M. FRANKFURT

Comrades Lezhava
Syromolotov
Frankfurt

Please make use of Comrade Frankfurt's presence in Moscow to arrange for a meeting to discuss the situation in the gold-mining industry in Siberia and measures for developing it.

Please give me the conclusions of the meeting for referring the matter to the Council of People's Commissars or deciding it by way of an agreement among the departments, etc.[481]

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

27/X.

Written on October 27, 1920

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735

TO THE VLADIMIR GUBERNIA PARTY COMMITTEE[482]

27. X. 1920

Gubernia Party Committee
Vladimir (gubernia centre)

I certify that Comrades Ratnikov, Rybakov, Romanov and Glazunov visited me on 27. X. 1920 on behalf of the uyezd Party conference (Alexandrov Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia) in regard to a case of flagrant Party and Soviet abuses.

I consider their approach to me quite in order and called for by the circumstances of the case and ask to be informed what general procedure you have established for members of uyezd Party organisations to approach Moscow in general and the C.C., R.C.P. in particular.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

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736

TO THE CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

Comrades Dzerzhinsky, Muranov, Preobrazhensky, and others

I earnestly request you to receive personally Comrades Ratnikov, Rybakov, Romanov and Glazunov from the uyezd Party conference (Alexandrov Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia) about a case of *flagrant*, exceedingly glaring abuses (Soviet and Party) at the Troitsk Equipment Works, and particularly about the difficulties experienced by Party members in taking the case to the centre and getting it speedily examined if even through Party channels. Apparently—this

is my impression—there is something wrong in the Gubernia Party Committee as well. I enclose a copy of the decision of the Orgbureau.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on October 27, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the typewritten text signed by Lenin

737

TO A. I. RYKOV AND I. I. RADCHENKO

28. X. 1920

1) Comrade *Rykov* (or, if he has not yet recovered, Comrade Milyutin)
2) and Comrade *I. I. Radchenko*, *Chief Peat Committee*

Copies to: 3) R. E. Klasson (to be found through Radchenko)
4) Krzhizhanovsky, Chairman of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia
5) Sklyansky (§ 4) and Trotsky
6) Lezhava and Lomonosov
7) the Cinema Department
8) Sosnovsky
9) Shatunovsky (Chief Transport Commission).

On 27. X. 1920, a film before a large Party audience showed the working of a new hydraulic pump (of engineer R. E. Klasson) which mechanises the extraction of peat, as compared with the old method.

In this connection, an exchange of opinions took place between engineer Klasson, Comrades Radchenko and Morozov—representatives of the Chief Peat Committee, Comrade Shatunovsky (from the Chief Transport Commission), and myself.

This exchange of opinions revealed that the heads of the Chief Peat Committee fully agree with the inventor on the great importance of this invention. In all the work for restoring the national economy of the R.S.F.S.R. and for the country's electrification, mechanisation of peat

extraction makes it possible to go ahead immeasurably more rapidly and firmly and on a broader front. It is therefore essential immediately to take a number of measures on a national scale to develop this work.

Please discuss this question immediately and give me without delay your comments (corrections, additions, counter-plans, and so on) on the following proposals arising from yesterday's preliminary exchange of opinions.

1. To regard work on applying the hydraulic method of peat extraction as of prime state importance and therefore especially urgent-To pass a decision to this effect through the Council of People's Commissars on Saturday, 30/X.

2. To instruct all chief committees (and other bodies), on whose support the successful work of the *Commission* (or committee?) *for Hydraulic Peat Extraction* (under the Chief Peat Committee) mainly depends, to delegate their representatives (preferably Communists or, in any case, people known to be conscientious and *particularly energetic*) to take a permanent part in this commission. To make them responsible, in particular, for the *speediest* fulfilment, without any procrastination, of the orders and requests of this commission. To give the Council of People's Commissars the names and addresses of these representatives.

3. The same in regard to some of the most important factories involved. List of these factories to be drawn up.

4. To instruct the *Naval* Department to have its own representative on the commission, one fully acquainted with the stocks of materials and technical facilities of this department.

5. To issue Red Army rations to the group of people on whose work the rapid and complete success of the matter directly depends, increasing at the same time their remuneration so as to enable them to devote themselves wholly and completely to their work. To instruct the Commission for Hydraulic Peat Extraction to send immediately to the People's Commissariat for Food and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions a *list* (exact) of these people, indicating standards of remuneration, *bonuses*, etc.

6. To discuss immediately with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade what orders should be placed at once with Swedish and German factories (perhaps engaging

there one or several prominent chemists) so that by the summer of 1921 we can receive what is necessary for the speediest and widest application of the hydraulic method. In particular, to make use of Comrade Lomonosov who is due to leave for Sweden and Germany within the next few days.

7. To instruct the *Cinema Department* (of the People's Commissariat for Education?) to arrange for the film of the hydraulic method to be shown *on a wide scale* (particularly in Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Moscow and *peat-extraction localities*) with the simultaneous reading, without fail, of a brief and popular leaflet (ask Comrade Sosnovsky to edit it) explaining the gigantic importance of mechanising peat extraction and of electrification.

8. I fix the first report of the *Commission for the Hydraulic Method of Peat Extraction* to the Council of People's Commissars for 30. X. 1920.[483]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. Comrade Rykov, should not the question be raised of using *more* of the materials and technical facilities of the Naval Department for the needs of the production of the means of production? Why should we want new battleships and the like? Aren't they out of place just now? *Shatunovsky* (take notice of him, he is a devoted and valuable man; a *worker*, studied mathematics abroad) says (according to Sosnovsky) that in the Naval Department Trotsky discovered something like *a million poods of first-grade steel* (for battleships) and took it for the Chief Transport Commission. Check this, think it over, perhaps we shall put it before the Council of Defence or the Council of People's Commissars.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in part in 1925 in the book: G. Boltyansky, *Lenin i kino*, Moscow-Leningrad

Published in part (without the postscript) in 1934 in the book: *Lenin na khozyaistvennom fronte. Sbornik vospominanii*, Moscow

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Printed from the original; the postscript—from the text in Glyasser's handwriting

738

TELEGRAM TO M. V. FRUNZE[484]

In code
28. X. 1920

Frunze, Commander of the Southern Front
Copy to Trotsky

In reply to your No. 001/пш. I am indignant at your optimistic tone, when you yourself report that there is only one chance in a hundred that the main task, set long ago, will be successful. If things are so outrageously bad, I ask you to discuss measures of the utmost urgency for bringing up heavy artillery, for constructing lines for its transport, for getting sappers, and so on.

Lenin

First published in 1941
in the book: *M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoi voiny. Sbornik dokumentov*

Printed from the original

739

TO P. I. POPOV[485]

1) The number of Soviet office workers.
2) By separate People's Commissariats.
3) If possible—by departments.
4) If possible—according to the main categories (experts, service personnel, clerical staff, etc.).
5) Other information (sex, etc.) depending on the kind of information in the questionnaire.

Please divide the work into two parts:
1) The briefest information (number, etc.).
   Not more than 4 weeks.
2) Detailed information—how many weeks?
3) The most detailed—how many weeks?

V. Lenin

30/X. 1920

First published in 1945
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740

TO S. I. BOTIN

Comrade Botin,

Please keep a record of all experiments
1) strength of the current or electrical energy,
2) where (how many sazhens off), *and in accordance* with *the plan*, the cartridges are placed, in front of the obstacle and behind it,
3) on the ground, above, below, underground (depth),
4) which ones and when were detonated,
5) the record to be signed by all three, and to be kept *by you* for handing over to me.

For each experiment a separate entry (day, hour, etc.).

Yours,
Lenin

Written in October 1920
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741

INSTRUCTION ON N. A. SEMASHKO'S TELEPHONE MESSAGE

At its sitting on October 4, the Council of People's Commissars decided to ask the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front to vacate the university premises in Smolensk, and direct the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to enforce this decision by telegraph. In pursuance of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade Sklyansky transmitted this instruction to the Revolutionary Military Council for fulfilment. Nevertheless, up to now the university premises have not been vacated by the Western Front Headquarters. In view of the extreme need of the university (of a special faculty) for premises, I am submitting a complaint to you on account of the non-fulfilment of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and ask for categorical orders to be issued to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

Semashko
People's Commissar for Health

Comrade Sklyansky

Carry out without delay. Report on fulfilment and I will take up the question of non-compliance and punishment in the Narrow Council.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

2/XI.

Written on November 2, 1920

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742

TO A. Z. GOLTSMAN

Urgent. Personal
3/XI.1920. 21. 25 hours

Comrade *Goltsman*
Copy to *Eismont*
Copy to the *Chief Clothing Board*

The Chief Clothing Board should submit for consideration by the Bonus Awards Commission the question of bonuses for the production of 20,000 pairs of hunting boots.

The question is of tremendous importance for our victory in the south, and it is most important that the boots be made quickly. I request you to look into this urgently, and to take steps to ensure that the boots are actually made in the time demanded by the Commander-in-Chief, Comrade Kamenev.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

P.S. I direct Comrade Sklyansky to control the fulfilment.*

Lenin

First published in part in 1961 in the book: *Leninskiye idei zhivut i pobezhdayut. Sbornik statei* (Lenin's Ideas Live and Triumph. A Collection of Articles)

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Printed from the typewritten text, added to and signed by Lenin

* The postscript is in Lenin's handwriting.—*Ed.*

NOTES

[1] Lenin's instruction was written on an order to the Red Guard Staff issued by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. The order gave instructions for petrol, four artillery batteries, three motorcars, field telephones and cyclists or motorcyclists to be dispatched to the Pulkovo headquarters at positions near Tsarskoye Selo.

The order called for the dispatch of petrol, a motorcar, two artillery batteries, sappers for trench-digging, motorcycle or bicycle messengers and maps of the locality, to the Staff of the Izmailovo Regiment on the main road to Moscow. The Military Revolutionary Committee proposed also that "a joint staff for the operation as a whole" should be set up and food supplies organised for the Red Guard. p. 43

[2] This refers to a resolution of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) on the question of setting up a "homogeneous socialist government" of representatives from various parties and organisations "from the Bolsheviks to the Popular Socialists". The demand for such a government came from the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who counted on playing the leading role in it. Their proposal had the support of some of the members of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)—L. B. Kamenev, G. Y. Zinoviev, A. I. Rykov and their few adherents. The C.C. of the Bolshevik Party at a sitting held on November 2 (15), 1917, strongly condemned the Right-opportunist, conciliatory attitude of the capitulators (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 277-79). Apparently, this note of Lenin's was written during the sitting of the Central Committee.

The note was read out at a sitting of the Petrograd Committee of the Party. In a resolution on the current situation, the Petrograd Committee stated that the government in the proletarian republic had to be a government of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, that the task of Soviet power was to put into effect the revolutionary programme advanced by the Bolsheviks, and that any departure from it was impermissible. This resolution was sent to the Party Central Committee.

On November 3 (16), the Central Committee presented an ultimatum to the opposition minority demanding complete subor-

dination to the decisions of the Central Committee (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 280-82). The conciliators, however, refused to submit to Party discipline, and resigned from the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. The Central Committee branded them as saboteurs (see present edition, Vol. 26, pp. 302-03). New people, loyal to the cause of the Party, were brought into the government. p. 43

[3] The letter to Y. M. Sverdlov apparently concerns F. F. Obraztsov, who had been received by Lenin as the representative from the peasants of four volosts of Tver Gubernia.

At the top of the letter, Lenin wrote the words: "First floor, room 39." This was the room in Smolny where Y. M. Sverdlov worked after his election on November 8 (21), 1917, as Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. p. 44

[4] Lenin wrote this letter because the representative of the International Association for Information of the Labour Press of America, France and Great Britain, the Rumanian journalist Nicolae Cocea, at that time in Petrograd, had requested him on behalf of the Association to reply to the following six questions: "1) Will the Government of People's Commissars continue with the same vigour its former home policy and its international efforts on behalf of peace? 2) What great reforms are being planned by the present government for establishing a socialist system in Russia? 3) After the Constituent Assembly is convened will the Government of People's Commissars be responsible to it as in constitutional states, or not? 4) Do you think that the peace Russia proposes will put an end to militarism throughout the world? 5) When and how do you intend to begin demobilising the Russians? 6) Do you think that with the present state of Europe the complete realisation of socialism is possible?"

In a letter in reply to Lenin, Nicolae Cocea assured him that his conditions in regard to the publication of his replies would be fully observed. Lenin wrote on Cocea's letter: "Reply given 10/XI. 1917." Lenin's replies to the questions put to him have not been found.

The document published here was discovered in Rumania. In 1960 the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party presented it to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 44

[5] On November 22 (December 5), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on courts of law, which was published the following day in the newspaper *Pravda*. On November 24 (December 7), in connection with this decree, the question of courts of law was discussed at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Soviet passed a resolution approving the decree and indicated practical measures for its implementation. The district Soviets were instructed to immediately begin the election of local judges. p. 45

[6] *Mensheviks*—an opportunist trend among Russian Social-Democrats, one of the varieties of international opportunism. It was

formed at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (in 1903) out of the opponents of the Leninist *Iskra*. At this Congress the election of the Party's central bodies resulted in Lenin's supporters winning a majority (the Russian word for majority is *bolshinstvo*) and they were therefore called Bolsheviks, while the opportunists were left in the minority (in Russian *menshinstvo*) and were given the name Mensheviks.

The Mensheviks came out against the Party's revolutionary programme. They were opposed to the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, and the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and were in favour of an agreement with the liberal bourgeoisie.

After the defeat of the 1905-07 revolution the Mensheviks wanted to liquidate the illegal proletarian revolutionary party. In January 1912, the Sixth All-Russia Party Conference expelled the Menshevik liquidators from the R.S.D.L.P.

In 1917 representatives of the Mensheviks entered the bourgeois Provisional Government, and after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Mensheviks together with the other counter-revolutionary parties waged a struggle against Soviet power. p. 47

[7] Lenin's name was put on the list of candidates to the Constituent Assembly from the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) by five electoral areas: Petrograd—the capital, Petrograd Gubernia, Ufa, the Baltic Fleet and the Northern Front. In addition, Lenin was nominated as the candidate to the Constituent Assembly from Moscow. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on November 12 (25), 1917. On November 27 (December 10) the All-Russia Committee for Elections to the Constituent Assembly requested members of the Constituent Assembly who had been returned by several areas to present a written statement indicating the area for which they accepted election. Having been elected by several areas, Lenin, too, presented such a statement. (See also *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 23.) p. 48

[8] In November and December 1917, counter-revolutionary elements in Petrograd organised the looting of liquor stores and shops.

A state of siege was declared in Petrograd. A committee to combat looting was set up under the Petrograd Soviet. G. I. Blagonravov was appointed Military Commissar Extraordinary of Petrograd to combat drunkenness and looting.

On December 5-6 (18-19), a counter-revolutionary organisation led by Constitutional-Democrats and Black-Hundred elements, which aimed at overthrowing Soviet rule and restoring the monarchy, was discovered. It allocated large sums of money for looting and provocations as one of the means of struggle, organised gangs and issued special leaflets. p. 48

[9] In December 1917, V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko left for the Ukraine to assume command of the Soviet troops fighting against Kaledin's forces. p. 49

[10] In his memorandum addressed to Lenin, A. S. Solovyov drew attention to the Ukhta oilfields and asked that an order be issued to have them inspected and exploited. He enclosed with the memo a detailed description of the qualities of the Ukhta oil based on analyses of it.

Today, the Ukhta district (Komi A.S.S.R.) has a well-developed oil industry, with enterprises for oil extraction and processing. p. 50

[11] P. A. Kozmin was then Deputy Chairman of the Special Defence Council. In his recollections entitled *V. I. Lenin i spetsialisty* (V. I. Lenin and the Experts), Kozmin quoted Lenin's note and wrote that after the discussion of the question raised in it "the commission of saboteurs was removed". p. 51

[12] On his arrival in Petrograd in December 1917, the French socialist Charles Dumas asked Lenin to receive him, mentioning that they were already acquainted. Lenin and Krupskaya met Charles Dumas in Paris, where they lived from December 1908 to June 10 (23), 1912.

During the First World War (1914-18), Dumas held social-chauvinist views, for which Lenin sharply criticised him in his work *The Collapse of the Second International* (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 209-10). p. 51

[13] On December 12 (25), 1917, the First All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets held in Kharkov proclaimed the Ukraine a Soviet Republic and elected the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee of Soviets. In a telegram to the Council of People's Commissars on December 13 (26), the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee proclaimed the unity of interests of the peoples of the Ukraine and Soviet Russia. On December 16 (29), the Council of People's Commissars sent a telegram in reply, greeting the formation of "truly popular Soviet rule in the Ukraine" and promising "the now government of the fraternal republic full support in every way in the struggle for peace and also in the transfer of all land, factories and banks to the working people of the Ukraine".

On December 19, 1917 (January 1, 1918), the C.P.C. appointed G. K. Orjonikidze Acting Commissar Extraordinary of the Ukraine for co-ordinating the activities of Soviet organisations functioning in the Ukraine. p. 52

[14] Kuzmin and Reizon reported provocatory acts by the Ukrainian Central Rada and the counter-revolutionary command of the Rumanian Front aimed at demoralising and disarming the 8th Army.

The Ukrainian Central Rada—a counter-revolutionary bourgeois-nationalist organisation. After the victory of the October Revolution it proclaimed itself the supreme organ of the "Ukrainian People's Republic" and began an open struggle against Soviet power.

At the First All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets held in Kharkov in December 1917, the Ukraine was proclaimed a Soviet Repub-

lic. The Congress declared the power of the Central Rada overthrown. The Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. recognised the Ukrainian Soviet Government as the sole legitimate government of the Ukraine. In January 1918, Soviet troops in the Ukraine launched an offensive and on January 26 (February 8) seized Kiev and deposed the bourgeois Rada.

The Central Rada, routed and driven from the territory of the Soviet Ukraine, and having no support among the working masses, allied itself with the German imperialists in order to overthrow Soviet power and restore the bourgeois regime in the Ukraine. During the peace negotiations between the Soviet Republic and Germany, the Rada sent its delegation to Brest-Litovsk and behind the back of the Soviet delegation concluded a separate peace with Germany, by which it undertook to supply Germany with Ukrainian grain, coal and raw materials in return for military assistance in the struggle against Soviet power. In March 1918 the Rada returned to Kiev with the Austrian and German invaders and became their puppet. At the end of April the interventionists dismissed the Rada, realising that it was incapable of suppressing the revolutionary movement in the Ukraine and ensuring delivery of the required food supplies. p. 53

[15] On January 5 (18), 1918, the Constituent Assembly convened by the Soviet Government opened in the Taurida Palace in Petrograd. After the counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly had refused to recognise the Soviet Government and its decrees, and had rejected the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People proposed by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Bolshevik group led by Lenin walked out. Late the same night the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries also walked out. There remained in the hall only the Constitutional-Democrats, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

By the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of January 6 (19) the bourgeois Constituent Assembly was dissolved. p. 54

[16] A. I. Shingaryov and F. F. Kokoshkin, former ministers in the bourgeois Provisional Government, were arrested after the October Revolution and confined in the Peter and Paul Fortress, whence, owing to the state of their health, they were transferred to the Mariinskaya hospital. On the night of January 6 (19), 1918, they were killed by sailors, among whom were anarchists and criminal elements, who broke into the hospital.

On Lenin's instructions, an investigating commission was immediately appointed. Those guilty of the murder were arrested and tried. p. 54

[17] This refers to some sailors of the Second Guards Naval Depot, who illegally arrested three officers. Under the influence of counter-revolutionary agitation, these sailors defied the laws of the Soviet Government, went on drinking bouts, and carried out illegal searches and arrests. They were disarmed and arrested.

The other, better, part of the men went to the Southern Front, where together with the Red Army units they fought heroically against the interventionists and whiteguards. p. 55

[18] This document and the note to the secretary which follows it were written by Lenin in connection with a memorandum received from the Food and Economic Committee of the Territorial Soviet of Western Siberia and the Urals, which reported that the Omsk railway was sabotaging the dispatch of food consignments to the west, as a result of which over a thousand loaded trucks remained stationary. The committee requested the appointment of an emergency commission of investigation. This memorandum was delivered by delegates from Urals factories, who had arrived with a train-load of grain. p. 55

[19] At the time of the Communist Party's efforts to extricate Soviet Russia from the imperialist war K. Radek's standpoint was that of the "Left Communists". p. 57

[20] *The Tribunists*—members of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland whose press organ was the newspaper *De Tribune*. They constituted the Left wing of the labour movement in Holland and during the imperialist world war (1914-18) their stand was, in the main, internationalist. In 1918 the Tribunists founded the Communist Party of Holland. p. 58

[21] The same day, in accordance with Lenin's directive, orders were issued for money to be given to Luteraan to travel to Russia and join the ranks of the Red Guard. p. 58

[22] On January 16 (29), 1918, Soviet troops liberated the town of Cherkassy and Bakhmach railway junction, and mounted a successful offensive against Kiev, where the main forces of the Ukrainian Centra Rada were concentrated. p. 59

[23] This refers to the reports in the Swedish bourgeois press concerning the revolution that had started in Finland.

On January 27 (new style), 1918, the bourgeois government of Svinhufvud was overthrown and power passed into the hands of the workers. On January 29, a Finnish revolutionary government was set up—the Council of People's Representatives—which included E. Gylling, O. Kuusinen, Y. Sirola, A. Taimi and others. But the proletarian revolution was victorious only in southern Finland. The Svinhufvud government, entrenched in the north, appealed to the government of imperial Germany for assistance. Owing to the intervention of the German armed forces, the workers' revolution in Finland was crushed on May 2, 1918, after a bitter civil war which lasted for three months. A period of white terror set in in Finland and thousands of revolutionary workers and peasants were executed or tortured to death in the prisons. p. 60

[24] This document is the reply to a telegram from Arthur Henderson, who, on behalf of the British Labour Party, proposed to Lenin

that delegates should be sent from the Bolshevik Party to a conference in London of socialists of the Entente countries to be convened on February 20, 1918, with the aim of achieving a common agreement on the problems of the war. p. 60

[25] On January 28 (February 10), 1918, at the Brest-Litovsk peace conference—contrary to Lenin's directive that a peace treaty should be signed if the Germans presented an ultimatum demanding it—Trotsky declared that the Soviet Government refused to sign a peace treaty on the terms put forward by Germany, but that it considered the war at an end and was demobilising the army. The same day, without informing the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Council of People's Commissars, Trotsky sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief what was tantamount to a provocative telegram instructing him to issue an order on the night of the same day ending the state of war with Germany and her allies and demobilising the Russian army. The telegram did not mention that the peace negotiations in Brest had been broken off, the inference from its text being that the conference had culminated in the conclusion of peace. In the early morning on January 29 (February 11), Supreme Commander-in-Chief N. V. Krylenko, on the basis of Trotsky's telegram, issued an order which announced that peace had been concluded and called for the cessation of military operations on all fronts and demobilisation of the army. It was in consequence of Krylenko's order that Lenin sent this telegram and the one following it. p. 60

[26] *The First Russian Society of Communist Agricultural Workers* was organised early in 1918 on the initiative of workers at the Obukhov Factory in Petrograd. Lenin greatly assisted in its organisation. In March 1918, members of the society with their families went to Kazakhstan, where they settled and were given land to cultivate. Civil war prevented the development of the Petrograd workers' initiative. The communards failed to reap even their first harvest. Kulaks and White Cossacks attacked the commune and broke it up. p. 61

[27] The instruction was written by Lenin beneath the text of a telegram received from the Command of the Baltic Fleet. The telegram stated: "A Swedish steamer, a cruiser and a destroyer flying the Swedish naval flag, arrived off the Öland Island, landed 15 Swedish marines, and by threatening to use their arms forced our communications personnel to retreat."

Lenin simultaneously sent a telegram to the Finnish People's Government (see the document that follows). p. 63

[28] The revolutionary People's Government of Finland sent a protest to the Swedish Government in connection with the landing of their troops on the Aland Islands. Sweden shortly withdrew her troops from the islands. In mid-March 1918, German troops were landed there and were used by the German Government to fight against the Finnish revolution. p. 64

[29] This refers to General Alexeyev's letter to the French Mission in Kiev, which was intercepted in Novokhopersk. It was published on February 19, 1918, in *Izvestia* No. 28. In the letter, General Alexeyev asked the French Mission for assistance in the struggle against the Soviet state, since his troops were sustaining heavy defeats and were forced to withdraw from the Don territory. In describing the situation in the Don and Kuban regions, Alexeyev had to admit that he had been mistaken in counting on the Cossacks. "The ideas of Bolshevism," he wrote, "have found supporters among the broad mass of Cossacks." p. 65

[30] Lenin's inquiry was written in connection with the stocktaking of goods in warehouses which was being carried out by the Supreme Economic Council. In reply, Rykov informed Lenin that: 1) lists had been drawn up of goods in private, military, railway and other warehouses; 2) responsibility for guarding the stores lay with the organisations to which they belonged; goods were released from the warehouses on delivery orders issued by the appropriate central bodies (Central Committee of Textile Industry, Central Soap Board, etc.); 3) rationing and distribution by ration cards was being carried out by the town Food Committee through co-operative shops and private firms; 4) there was very little of confiscated products. p. 67

[31] This note is a reply to the following request from V. N. Podbelsky, Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs of Moscow and Moscow Region: "We have just been informed by telephone on behalf of Trotsky that Austria-Hungary is said to have declared its refusal to advance against Russia. Please contact Trotsky or one of the other People's Commissars immediately by telephone, check this information and let us know. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is at present in session here and awaits verification of this report. At the same time obtain the latest news in general, but only authentic news, and inform us immediately. Please do this, comrade, it is very important for us." p. 67

[32] The Party Central Committee, at its meeting on February 22, 1918, discussed the question of procuring from Britain and France arms and food necessary for the defence of the Soviet Republic against the advancing German troops. This was opposed by the "Left Communists", who regarded any agreement with the imperialists as impermissible in principle.

Lenin could not attend the meeting and therefore sent his opinion to the Central Committee.

The Party Central Committee adopted a resolution recognising the need to use every means to arm and equip the Red Army, including that of obtaining armaments and equipment from governments of capitalist countries, while at the same time pursuing a fully independent foreign policy. On the same day a sitting of the Council of People's Commissars also passed a decision in favour of obtaining arms and food supplies from Britain and France (see also present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 36-39). p. 67

[33] On February 25, the Soviet delegation, which had left for Brest-Litovsk to sign the peace treaty, was delayed at Novoselye railway station, where a bridge had been blown up. Unable to get in touch directly with the German Government, the delegation wired the Council of People's Commissars requesting that the German Government be informed of the arrival of the delegation. Lenin's remark about possible waverings on the part of the delegation was apparently due to the fact that two of its members, G. Y. Sokolnikov and A. A. Joffe, had been refusing to join it, and had only set out after a decision of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 68

[34] *The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries*—the Left wing of the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary Party, which was organised as an independent party in November 1917.

In an effort to maintain their influence among the peasants, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks. They pledged themselves to carry out the general policy of the Soviet Government and were given posts in the Council of People's Commissars and on the boards of several People's Commissariats.

But differences with the Bolsheviks on basic issues of the theory and practice of socialist construction soon made themselves felt. In January and February 1918, the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party began a campaign against the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty with Germany. When the treaty had been signed and ratified by the Fourth Congress of Soviets in March 1918, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars. In July 1918 the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries organised the provocative assassination of Mirbach, the German Ambassador in Moscow, and launched an armed revolt against Soviet power. Having lost all support among the masses, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party finally took the path of armed struggle against Soviet rule. p. 68

[35] *The Sovnarkom* (Council of People's Commissars) *of the Petrograd Labour Commune* was set up by a decision of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 11, 1918, owing to the Soviet Government being transferred from Petrograd to Moscow.

At the end of April 1918, the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region established, for military and economic purposes, a Union of Communes of the Northern Region, which included also Petrograd Gubernia. On February 24, 1919, by a decision of the Third Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the Union of Communes of the Northern Region and the Sovnarkom which headed it, were abolished. p. 72

[36] This refers to the evacuation of industrial enterprises from Petrograd. The question was raised in connection with the advance of the German troops on Petrograd. p. 72

[37] The city Customs House was on Gutuyev Island in Petrograd. During April-June 1918, 1,180 truck-loads of various goods were evacuated from the Gutuyev Customs House. p. 72

[38] This refers to a resolution passed by the Central Executive Committee of Siberian Soviets in connection with the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok on the morning of April 5, 1918. It protested against the illegitimate actions of the Japanese Government; a state of war was declared in Siberia and all local Soviets were instructed to immediately step up the organisation of the Red Army.

Centrosibir—the Central Executive Committee of Siberian Soviets; was elected by the First Congress of Siberian Soviets, held in Irkutsk from October 16 (29) to October 24 (November 6), 1917. After the temporary downfall of Soviet power in Siberia (in the summer of 1918) Centrosibir ceased its activity. p. 75

[39] This refers to the Soviet Government's talks with representatives of the U.S.A., Britain and France in connection with the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok; the talks took place on the evening of April 5, 1918.

The Soviet Government's communique on the landing of Japanese troops in Vladivostok, written on April 5 and published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* on April 6, 1918, pointed out that resistance to the Japanese invasion and a relentless struggle against their agents and accomplices within the country was a matter of life and death for the Soviet Republic, for the working people of the whole of Russia. On April 7, 1918, Lenin sent a telegram with directives to the Vladivostok Soviet, warning that the interventionists were sure to advance and demanding that the Communists of the Far East without delay should start preparing to fight the foreign intervention (see present edition, Vol. 27, p. 226). p. 75

[40] N. N. Yakovlev, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Siberian Soviets, informed Lenin of the measures taken to organise resistance to the Japanese interventionists in connection with the landing of their troops in Vladivostok. p. 75

[41] Lenin wrote this message on the instructions which engineer N. I. Dyrenkov, business manager of the Rybinsk Economic Council, received from the Supreme Economic Council.

Dyrenkov came to Moscow to report to the Supreme Economic Council on the work of the Rybinsk Economic Council. This report on the economic situation in Rybinsk was made at a sitting of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council on April 15, 1918; on a proposal by Lenin, it was decided to grant an immediate loan to Rybinsk. Lenin had a talk with Dyrenkov on the economic situation of the Soviet Republic, the state of industry in Rybinsk and the measures taken by the Rybinsk Economic Council. p. 77

[42] This refers to the draft Decree on the Registration of Shares,

Bonds and Other Interest-bearing Securities. The first two drafts were prepared by the Supreme Economic Council. After examining them, Lenin crossed out the first draft, edited the second, and sent it to Bogolepov and Gukovsky at the People's Commissariat for Finance. The draft, after being revised in the People's Commissariat for Finance, was re-edited by Lenin, given a heading and, on April 17, 1918, submitted for consideration to the Council of People's Commissars. The following decision on the draft was adopted: "To be referred to the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Justice for their consideration with the assistance of experts, and the conclusion to be presented to the next sitting of the Council of People's Commissars on April 18." On April 18, the decree was endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars, and on April 20 it was published in *Izvestia* No. 78.
p. 78

[43] I. Y. Yakovlev established the first Chuvash school in the city of Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk), the birthplace of Lenin. He compiled the first Chuvash alphabet and primer, and did a great deal towards educating the Chuvash people.

In reply to his inquiry Lenin received a telegram on May 4, 1918, saying that Yakovlev continued as chairman of the courses and seminary for women. p. 79

[44] Lenin's letter was due to the following circumstance. On January 4 (17), 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the reorganisation of the Red Cross on the basis of the abolished Chief Board of the Red Cross that had existed under the tsarist government, making over its property and funds to the state. The work of reorganising the Red Cross was entrusted (§ 3 of Section 1 of the decree) to a committee of representatives of Soviet, military and public organisations. The committee was instructed to submit to the Council of People's Commissars through the Council of Medical Collegiums a plan for reorganising the Red Cross institutions. However, the committee failed to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it, and this was brought to the notice of Lenin by V. M. Bonch-Bruyevich, a member of the Red Cross committee. p. 79

[45] This refers to preparations for a monetary reform in order to establish a stable Soviet currency and overcome the inflation caused by the war and the economic policy of the tsarist government and the bourgeois Provisional Government. Lenin raised the question of the need for a monetary reform in December 1917 in his "Draft Decree on the Nationalisation of the Banks and on Measures Necessary for Its Implementation" (see present edition, Vol. 26, p. 393). Preparations for the monetary reform were made under the direct guidance of Lenin. He urged more speed in preparing and issuing new, Soviet currency notes, and went into all details of the proposed designs. (See this volume, documents 125 and 126, and also *Lenin Miscellany XXI*, p. 180.)

Owing to the foreign military intervention and the Civil War, and the transition to the policy of War Communism, the mone-

tary reform was not carried out in that period. The first Soviet monetary reform on the basis of Lenin's principles was effected in 1922-24. p. 81

46 This letter is a reply to Raymond Robins, a member of the American Red Cross Mission. It was written in English. At the head of the letter, Lenin wrote: "Reply 30.IV.1918."

On the eve of his departure from Soviet Russia for the United States, R. Robins wrote to Lenin expressing sincere thanks for the assistance given him in his work for the American Red Cross Mission.

A few days later, on May 11, 1918, Lenin wrote a letter addressed "To All Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and Other Soviet Organisations", requesting them "to give every assistance to Colonel Robins and the other members of the American Red Cross Mission for their unhindered and speedy journey from Moscow to Vladivostok". p. 82

47 Lenin wrote this letter to P. P. Malinovsky, Acting People's Commissar for the Properties of the Republic, in connection with the implementation of the decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the Monuments of the Republic", adopted on April 12, 1918, and published on April 14 in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. The decree set the task of removing monuments to the tsars and their servants that were of no historical or artistic value, and of erecting revolutionary monuments. A special commission, consisting of the People's Commissar for Education, the People's Commissar for the Properties of the Republic and the head of the Fine Arts Department of the People's Commissariat for Education, was instructed to determine which monuments in Moscow and Petrograd were to be removed, and advised to enlist the services of artists in designing new, revolutionary monuments. The Council of People's Commissars proposed that by May 1 the commission should have removed the ugliest monuments and submitted the first models of new monuments, and should also hasten arrangements for replacing old inscriptions, emblems and street names by new ones reflecting the ideas and sentiments of revolutionary Russia.

Lenin attached great importance to the implementation of this decree, the progress of which was discussed at the sittings of the Council of People's Commissars on July 8, 17 and 30, 1918. Lenin repeatedly criticised the heads of the People's Commissariats for Education and for the Properties of the Republic, and the heads of the Moscow Soviet, for the unsatisfactory implementation of the decree (see this volume, Document 109, and present edition, Vol. 35, documents 171 and 176, pp. 360, 368). p. 82

48 This telegram is in reply to one from Ekaterinburg dated April 30, 1918, from the Regional Board of Nationalised Enterprises, reporting that rumours were current about the denationalisation of the Bogoslovsk mining district. Lenin attached great importance to the speedy exposure of these false rumours which could

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mislead the working masses. On the telegram from Ekaterinburg, Lenin wrote the following note: "Received 2/V.1918 at *7 p.m.* I demand investigation into the reason for *two days*' delay. *Lenin*." p. 83

[49] This memorandum was adopted at a meeting of Lenin and Bolshevik members of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture in connection with the demand of Maria Spiridonova and V. A. Karelin, leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries be given complete control of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. This demand was put forward because of the appointment of more Bolsheviks (S. P. Sereda, V. N. Meshcheryakov, N. M. Petrovsky and others) to the Commissariat for Agriculture following the resignation of A. L. Kolegayev, as a result of which the position of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Commissariat was considerably weakened.

Lenin wrote also the following draft decision of the meeting: "The preliminary meeting (on the questions raised by Comrades Spiridonova and Karelin) between members of the Board of Agriculture, Comrades Sereda and Meshcheryakov, and Lenin has reached the conclusion that the questions raised should be examined as serious political questions and therefore should certainly be referred to the C.C., R.C.P.

"The meeting considers it essential to refer them to the C.C. urgently and speedily" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 42).

The situation in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture was discussed at a sitting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on May 3, 1918. The Central Committee noted that the claims of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were groundless and approved the decision of the meeting. p. 83

[50] This refers to the dismissal of the Central Rada by the German occupationists and the establishment in the Ukraine of an open dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landowners. On April 29, 1918, at a congress of kulaks and landowners in Kiev convened by the interventionists, General P. P. Skoropadsky, a big Ukrainian landowner and former aide-de-camp to the Tsar, was proclaimed Hetman of the Ukraine. p. 84

[51] On May 6, 1918, German and whiteguard army units broke into Rostov-on-Don and occupied the city. On May 7, it was liberated by Soviet troops, but on May 8 it was re-occupied by German and whiteguard troops. p. 84

[52] *Ino*—a fort on the border with Finland which, with Kronstadt, guarded the approaches to Petrograd. Under a treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, Fort Ino was seceded to the R.S.F.S.R. for the defence of the joint interests of the Socialist Republics. After the defeat of the revolution in Finland, the Finnish bourgeois government with the support of the German imperialists demanded that Fort Ino be handed over to Finland. Before it was abandoned, the main works

of the fort were blown up by order of the Commandant of the Kronstadt fortress. In May 1918, Finnish troops occupied Fort Ino. p. 84

[53] An emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee on May 6, 1918, discussed the international situation of the Soviet Republic in connection with the aggravation of relations with Germany, who demanded that Fort Ino be handed over to bourgeois Finland, and also in connection with the British occupation of Murmansk and the preparations by the interventionist troops to advance into the interior of the country. The Central Committee adopted the decision on the international situation proposed by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 355 and 379-80). p. 84

[54] This note is a reply to A. D. Tsyurupa, who had informed Lenin that the food organisation of the Nikolayevskaya Railway had refused to allow A. I. Svidersky, member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, to carry out an inspection agreed upon between the Food Commissariat, the Commissariat for Railways, and the Supreme Economic Council. Tsyurupa asked Lenin's advice as to what steps should be taken in this case. p. 85

[55] Lenin wrote this letter after a talk with the Chairman of the Purchasing Commission of the Putilov (now Kirov) Works, a plater in the boiler-shop, A. V. Ivanov, who gave a detailed description of the grave state of famine in Petrograd and told of the situation at the works and the mood of the workers.

Lenin informed Ivanov of the decree passed at the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on May 9, 1918, giving the People's Commissar for Food emergency powers in the struggle against the rural bourgeoisie, who were concealing grain and profiteering. Lenin gave Ivanov a copy of the decree so that he could make it known to the Putilov workers.

The meeting between A. V. Ivanov and Lenin is described in the book *Vospominaniya o Vladimire Ilyiche Lenine* (Reminiscences of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin), Part 2, 1957, pp. 283-84. p. 86

[56] This refers to a meeting of the Russo-German Commission held in Moscow on May 15, 1918, to discuss the conditions for resuming economic relations between Russia and Germany. The report at the meeting was made by M. G. Bronsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. The main propositions in his report had been vetted by Lenin. p. 86

[57] In a plan for the development of trade and economic relations with the U.S.A. drafted on Lenin's initiative, the Soviet Government expressed its readiness to pay for goods purchased in the U.S.A. with agricultural produce and products of the mining industry, and also to offer concessions to the U.S.A. on the same terms as to other countries.

The plan, under the heading "Russo-American Trade Relations", was first published in June 1918 in No. 1 of *Vestnik Narod-*

nogo Komissariata torgovli i promyshlennosti (Herald of the People's Commissariat for Trade and Industry). In the U.S.A., the plan was published together with Lenin's letter to Raymond Robins in the book *Russian-American Relations. March 1917-March 1920*, New York, 1920. p. 87

[58] This note to G. V. Chicherin was written following the receipt of a report that troops of the Transcaucasian bourgeois government, supported by a flotilla of armed merchant vessels, were advancing on Sukhum, creating a threat to the entire Black Sea coast. In the draft of a telegram submitted to Lenin, which was addressed to Sablin, Chief of the Naval Forces of the Black Sea Fleet, the latter was instructed to arm a number of Soviet merchant ships and send them for the defence of Sukhum.

On May 20, 1918, the Soviet Government sent a Note to the German Government protesting against the German military authorities conniving at the actions of the armed merchant ships of "the so-called Transcaucasian government, which is recognised by absolutely nobody in Transcaucasia". p. 88

[59] This refers to a draft decree for reorganising the Food Commissariat and the local food bodies. At a meeting of the C.P.C. on May 20, 1918, A. D. Tsyurupa, on Lenin's instructions, moved that the draft decree be submitted for discussion. The draft was discussed at meetings of the C.P.C. on May 22 and 23, and was adopted with amendments. It was decided to refer the decree to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, where it was endorsed on May 27. It was published in *Izvestia* No. 109 on May 31, 1918.

Clause 3 of the decree envisaged the establishment under the local food commissariats of special detachments of workers recommended by Party and trade union organisations, formed mainly in the consuming districts. These detachments were to be at the disposal of the local food bodies and comply with their directives, and were to be employed in propaganda, organising and instructors' work. "The most important task of the workers' detachments," states the decree, "should be to organise the working peasantry against the kulaks" (*Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti* [Decrees of the Soviet Government], Vol. 11, 1959, p. 310). p. 89

[60] In the spring of 1918 the German interventionists occupied the Ukraine, invaded the Crimea and approached Sevastopol, where the Black Sea Fleet was concentrated. On April 29-30, to save the fleet from the invaders, the Soviet Government transferred it to Novorossiisk. Ten days after the fleet's arrival there, the German Command sent an ultimatum demanding its return to Sevastopol, threatening otherwise to continue the offensive along the Black Sea coast. On May 11, the Soviet Government sent a "Protest to the German Government against the Occupation of the Crimea", stating the circumstances of the fleet's transfer and the possible conditions for its return to Sevastopol (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 358-59).

All attempts to reach an agreement with the German Government on this question were abortive. Having no possibility of saving the fleet and to avoid surrendering it to the German imperialists, Lenin issued an order to the Supreme Military Council for its immediate destruction (see the next document). A secret instruction of the Council of People's Commissars ordered the destruction of all the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and merchant steamships in Novorossiisk. On June 18-19, 1918, the order of the government was carried out: most of the ships were sunk off the Novorossiisk coast. p. 91

[61] *Arbeiterpolitik*—a weekly periodical of scientific socialism, the organ of the Bremen group of Left Social-Democrats, which in 1919 joined the Communist Party of Germany. It was published in Bremen from 1916 to 1919.

Der Sozialdemokrat—a daily newspaper, the organ of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Württemberg. It was published in Stuttgart from 1915. In 1921, it became the organ of the United Communist Party of Württemberg and was published under the title *Kommunist*. p. 92

[62] Lenin probably has in mind the letter he sent to S. G. Shahumyan on May 14, 1918 (see present edition, Vol. 35, Document 145).

Lenin's letter of May 24 was delivered to Baku by S. M. Ter-Gabrielyan, one of the leaders of the Baku Commune. p. 93

[63] This document was drawn up in the People's Commissariat for Food. At the top of the document, separated by a line, is the following inscription: ''Telegram of the People's Commissariat for Food." p. 93

[64] This refers to a decision of the Council of People's Commissars on May 8, 1918, to take stock of all available automobiles and lorries and transfer all surplus lorries to the People's Commissariat for Food. p. 97

[65] Lenin sent this telegram to the Vyksa workers in reply to one received from them which stated that they were "absolutely starving", and were going out by steamboats with their detachments and machine-guns in order to obtain grain by force. p. 97

[66] This letter was written in English during a conversation with Albert Rhys Williams, the American journalist, who visited Lenin before leaving for the U.S.A. p. 97

[67] Sokolnikov, Bukharin and Larin went to Berlin as members of the Soviet delegation to negotiate an economic agreement with Germany. p. 98

[68] Evidently this refers to Lenin's letter of June 2, 1918, to J . A. Berzin or G. L. Shklovsky (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 165). p. 99

[69] Lenin's notes to A. D. Tsyurupa were written in connection with the need to explain to the mass of the working people the deci-

sion on independent procurements adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on June 1, 1918. The decision pointed out that independent grain procurements, for which the Council of People's Commissars was being asked by representatives of some organisations and trade unions, could disrupt the whole business of food supply, clear the way for the kulaks and landowners, and ruin the revolution. The decision set the task of organising food detachments, selecting for them the best and most devoted people from among the workers and office personnel "in order to form a general working-class fighting force for establishing order, for assisting with supervision, for collecting all grain surpluses, for complete victory over speculators" (*Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, Vol. II, pp. 379-81).

On this subject see also present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 416-17.

p. 100

[70] After the capture of Omsk by Czech and Russian whiteguards on June 7, 1918, a Siberian whiteguard puppet government was set up there with the assistance of the interventionists. It consisted in the main of Socialist-Revolutionaries, with Mensheviks and Constitutional-Democrats participating. Behind a screen of democratic phrases it pursued a counter-revolutionary policy, paving the way for the transition to an open military dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landowners.

G. Y. Zinoviev's inquiry concerned the purchase of grain in Omsk for Petrograd. p. 103

[71] This refers to the decree "On the Monuments of the Republic", adopted at a sitting of the Council of People's Commissars on April 12, 1918 (see this volume, Document 75 and Note 47).

p. 105

[72] This refers to the capture of Syzran by units of the Czechoslovak Army Corps.

This Corps was formed in Russia before the October Revolution from among Czechs and Slovaks who were taken prisoner as soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army. By the agreement of March 26, 1918, the Soviet Government gave the Corps the opportunity of leaving Russia via Vladivostok on condition that it surrender its weapons and remove its Russian commanders. But on the orders and with the support of the imperialists of the U.S.A., Britain and France, the counter-revolutionary commanders of the Corps engineered an armed revolt by the Corps against the Soviet government at the end of May. Acting in close contact with the whiteguards and kulaks, the White Czechoslovak Corps occupied a considerable part of the Urals, the Volga area and Siberia.

In the districts occupied by the Czechoslovak mutineers, whiteguard governments were formed with the participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Many soldiers in the Corps, seeing how they had been betrayed by their counter-revolutionary command, refused to fight against

Soviet Russia and deserted from the Corps. About 12,000 Czechs and Slovaks fought in the ranks of the Red Army.

The Volga area was liberated by the Red Army in the autumn of 1918. The White Czechoslovak Corps was completely routed simultaneously with the wiping out of Kolchak's forces. p. 106

[73] Lenin is referring to the following writings: the pamphlet by Rosa Luxemburg—Junius, *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie*; the pamphlet circulated in Germany in manuscript form: *Klassenkampf gegen den Kriegl Material zum "Fall" Liebknecht* (Class Struggle Against the War. Material to Liebknecht's "Case"); cuttings from the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht*, organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland. p. 107

[74] The article by the German Left Social-Democrat O. Rühle, "Zur Parteispaltung" (On the Split in the Party), was published on January 12, 1916, in No. 11 of *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 107

[75] *Referenten-Material aus Niederbarnim'a* (Niederbarnim—suburb of Berlin) was quoted in Legien's pamphlet entitled *Warum müssen die Gewerkschaftsfunktionäre sich mehr am inneren Parteileben beteiligen?* (Why Must Trade Union Functionaries Take More Part in the Party's Internal Affairs?). p. 107

[76] This refers to the German Government's demand for the ships of the Black Sea Fleet to be transferred from Novorossiisk to Sevastopol. See this volume, Document 88 and Note 60. p. 107

[77] The Decree on the Nationalisation of the Oil Industry was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on June 20, 1918. p. 107

[78] K. A. Mekhonoshin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, asked by direct line for information concerning the situation resulting from the revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow on July 6, 1918. He asked to be informed what stand the Left Socialist-Revolutionary A. L. Kolegayev had taken. Mekhonoshin also reported that M. A. Muravyov, a Left Socialist-Revolutionary in command of the troops of the Eastern Front, had proclaimed his loyalty to Soviet power and stated that he renounced his membership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party because that party opposed Soviet power.

However, Muravyov made this statement in order to conceal his own treacherous activity. On receiving a telegram from the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party alleging that the Left S.R.s had succeeded in seizing power in Moscow, he went over to the insurgents. According to their plan, Muravyov was to make the troops on the Eastern Front take up arms against Soviet power and, after joining forces with the white Czechs, to march on Moscow. On July 10, on arriving at Simbirsk,

Muravyov announced that he did not recognise the Brest peace and declared war on Germany.

The Soviet Government took urgent measures to liquidate Muravyov's adventure. A government statement of July 11 declared him a traitor and enemy of Soviet power. On the evening of July 11, Muravyov was invited to a sitting of the Simbirsk Executive Committee. When Muravyov's traitorous telegrams on the cessation of military operations against the interventionists and whiteguards were read out at the sitting, the Communists demanded his arrest. Muravyov offered resistance and was killed. and his accomplices were arrested. p. 114

[79] The notes to I. E. Gukovsky refer to preparations for the issue of new Soviet currency. See also this volume, Document 71 and Note 45. p. 115

[80] This evidently refers to the fact that at a meeting convened by the Saratov Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party in connection with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' revolt in Moscow, a decision was adopted condemning the actions of the C.C. of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries tending to undermine Soviet power. The Saratov combat squad of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries at their meeting denounced the treachery of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow and declared that they stood by the platform of defence of Soviet power.

On receipt of a report from Saratov on the decisions adopted by the meeting of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Lenin sent it to *Pravda* with the following introductory words: "Commissar Ivanov, travelling to the Caucasus, reports from Saratov." It was published in *Pravda* with this introduction. p. 117

[81] This was written in connection with a letter sent to the Naval Board by the Bureau of Supply of the North Caucasian Military District, requesting urgently to dispatch to the Caspian Sea and river Kura 8-10 motor vessels, which were to be put at the disposal of the Baku Council of People's Commissars. The letter specified the types of vessels, which were to be equipped with ordnance and machine-guns, and also with spare parts for the engines. p. 117

[82] In reply to Lenin's inquiry, Podvoisky, a member of the Supreme Military Council, reported that the units which were to be sent from Kursk to the Eastern Front were still being raised and that a brigade of three regiments with three batteries would be entrained on July 23. p. 118

[83] Podvoisky had proposed taking upon himself the leadership in suppressing the Czechoslovak revolt and counter-revolutionary actions in the Volga area and the Urals. p. 119

[84] Later, in reply to an inquiry from Lydia Fotieva about this letter of Lenin's, Larin informed her: "The letter from Vladimir Ilyich which you sent (concerning the drafting of a pamphlet about the Supreme Economic Council) was never received by me. Perhaps

it relates to the time when (in 1918) I was sent to Berlin to conduct negotiations with the Germans, and was to be handed to me on my return. At any rate, soon after returning I received a letter from Vladimir Ilyich on a similar subject, only broader in content—to write about the Soviet Republic in general, not merely about the Supreme Economic Council (the letter has not been found.—*Ed.*), so as to acquaint people abroad and our own population with what had been achieved in one year. To this end, Vladimir Ilyich later wrote an order to all government departments to give me all the information I needed (see *Lenin Miscellany XXI*, p. 139.—*Ed.*). But the material sent in by the departments was far from satisfactory and we had to abandon the thought of compiling such a factual report of the government for the first year of our rule, the idea of which had apparently dismissed from Vladimir Ilyich's mind the proposal for a pamphlet about the Supreme Economic Council alone."

Connected with Lenin's instructions mentioned by Larin in his letter to Fotieva is the decision drafted by Lenin and adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on August 29, 1918, calling for written reports to be submitted by the People's Commissariats on their work since October 25 (November 7), 1917, and Lenin's letter to the People's Commissars on this question (see present edition, Vol. 36, p. 493; Vol. 35, Document 168). p. 121

[85] On July 31, 1918, the Entente interventionists landed troops in Onega and seized the town. p. 123

[86] This refers to the following decrees of the Council of People's Commissars drafted on the basis of Lenin's "Theses on the Food Question" written on August 2, 1918 (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 45-47): "On Drawing Workers' Organisations into Grain Procurement" (in Lenin's letter it is called a decree on collective trains) and "On Harvesting and Harvesting-Requisitioning Detachments". The decrees were adopted at the sittings of the Council of People's Commissars on August 3 and 4, 1918, and published in *Izvestia* on August 6.

Clause 7 of the decree "On Drawing Workers' Organisations into Grain Procurement", mentioned lower down in the document, states: "Detachments setting out to procure grain are obliged to assist the local population in bringing in the harvest." p. 125

[87] After the capture of Archangel by the Entente troops on August 2, 1918, a group of functionaries of the Archangel Gubernia Executive Committee went to Vologda to report to M. S. Kedrov on the situation on the Northern Dvina. In Vologda, they learned of L. D. Trotsky's order, which demanded that the functionaries who had left Archangel should be regarded as deserters and tried by the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal. The group of Communists, outraged by this order, since they were not directly to blame for the fall of Archangel, sent a request to Lenin and Sverdlov to be allowed to come to Moscow and report the truth about the events. In reply, Lenin sent the telegram published here. p. 126

[88] Replying to the preceding note from Lenin, Tsyurupa wrote: "Hostages can be taken when there is a real force. But is there? It is doubtful." p. 127

[89] This telegram is the reply to a message by direct line from D. T. Petruchuk, representative of the Moscow Regional Commissariat for Military Affairs, who had been sent to Orsha to expedite the dispatch of Red Army units to the Eastern Front. Petruchuk reported demoralisation in a number of army units and poor work on the part of local Soviet bodies, and he asked to be allowed to use the direct line. p. 130

[90] The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. does not have the letter from Vorovsky, or its enclosures, or any other material that would make it possible to establish the precise nature of the abuses referred to. Since Lenin's letter was addressed to Sklyansky, member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, it may be presumed that the reference is to abuses in one of the military departments. p. 131

[91] Malyshev, in his capacity of authorised agent of the Union of Communes of the Northern Region, headed the expedition along the Volga of mobile trading barges carrying goods for exchange against grain. Lenin's telegram was in reply to Malyshev's report on the successful purchase of grain. See also this volume, Document 384. p. 132

[92] Lenin sent this telegram in reply to A. Y. Minkin, Chairman of the Penza Gubernia Executive Committee, who asked whether it was necessary to comply with the order of A. I. Potyaev, People's Commissar for Finance of the Northern Region, to the Chief of the Stationery Office in Penza that the unloading of the Stationery Office's train should be held up, contrary to Lenin's order dated August 16, 1918.

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries' revolt in Chembar, an uyezd town in Penza Gubernia, mentioned in the telegram, broke out on the night of August 18. On August 20, the revolt was put down by a detachment of Lettish riflemen and Red Army men, who had arrived from Penza. p. 134

[93] This refers to a proposal to reward the first units to enter Kazan and Simbirsk. p. 135

[94] Lenin lived at the house of Latukka in Vyborg from September 17 (30) to October 7 (20), 1917, after the July events, when he went into hiding to avoid persecution by the bourgeois Provisional Government. p. 136

[95] *The Poor Peasants' Committees* were instituted by a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on June 11, 1918. They played a tremendous part in the struggle against the kulaks and in consolidating Soviet power in the countryside. They car-

ried out strict accounting and distribution of grain and agricultural implements. Already by the autumn of 1918 the Poor Peasants' Committees, which played a historic role in the socialist revolution, had successfully solved the tasks entrusted to them. In this connection, and also in connection with the need "to complete Soviet construction by the creation of a uniform organisation of Soviets throughout the territory of the Soviet Republic", the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, held in November 1918, proposed the re-election of all volost and village Soviets, putting direct responsibility for the conduct of the elections on the Poor Peasants' Committees. In accordance with the election instructions published by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 4, 1918, the Poor Peasants' Committees were to wind up their activities after the election campaign and hand over all their funds and functions to the newly-elected Soviets. p. 137

[96] A. K. Paikes, authorised agent of the Food Commissariat, and Zorin, Political Commissar of the 4th Army, reported from Saratov on the bad situation in regard to supplies for the army units and asked that urgent measures be taken for the dispatch of uniforms, equipment and ammunition. p. 139

[97] In a telegram to Lenin received on the night of August 21, 1918, S. S. Turlo, Deputy Chairman of the Penza Gubernia Party Committee, A. M. Buzdes, member of the Gubernia Committee, and secretary F. V. Veselovskaya, reported on a meeting of the Gubernia Committee called in connection with Lenin's telegram of August 19 (see this volume, Document 158). At the meeting, in reply to a decision of members of the Gubernia Committee to send a food official and 50 Lettish Red Army men to suppress the uprising of the kulaks and to confiscate their grain, A. Y. Minkin, Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee, declared that he refused to carry out the decision. p. 140

[98] Lenin's letter was due to the following circumstances. On August 24, 1918, in view of the grave food situation in the city, the Moscow Soviet passed a decision allowing the working people to bring into Moscow freely up to one-and-a-half poods of foodstuffs for their own personal consumption. On August 26, the Council of People's Commissars considered a draft decree on preferential conveyance of grain, the question of the decision of the Moscow Soviet being left open.

While the question was under discussion, the decision of the Moscow Soviet allowing one-and-a-half poods as baggage could not but hinder the organisation of the campaign against the blackmarketeering bag-men and the regulation of the work of the intercepting detachments. On August 29, L. I. Ruzer, member of the Board of the Food Commissariat, who was in charge of this work, asked the Board to relieve him of the work of combating bag-trading. Ruzer wrote in his statement that he could think of "no more wordings for a single order in response to inquiries from

the local areas". Tsyurupa, who was also opposed to the "one-and-a-half poods system", added a postscript: "None of the Board members nor the Board as a whole can think of wordings that Ruzer, too, failed to find. Conclusion: the order of the Moscow Soviet should be rescinded on approximately the following lines: the C.P.C. is to adopt a decision at once and publish it; the decision is to indicate the date on which the order of the Moscow Soviet ceases to be effective—approximately September 15. *A. Tsyurupa*." (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 447.)

At the top of Lenin's note, Tsyurupa wrote: "A reply to Ruzer's statement with my postscript", and then the date: "29/VIII."

By a decision of the C.P.C. dated September 5, 1918, the decision of the Moscow Soviet and a similar decision of the Petrograd Soviet ceased to be effective on October 1, 1918. p. 145

[99] Lenin wrote this letter when he was ill after being seriously wounded on August 30, 1918, by the Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist, Fanny Kaplan.

In spite of the doctors' orders, only a few days after being wounded, Lenin began to occupy himself with affairs of state. On September 16 the doctors allowed him to resume work. From September 23 to mid-October Lenin was recuperating at Gorki near Moscow.

The letter mentions the harvesting of grain in Yelets Uyezd, Orel Gubernia. On this subject see also this volume, Document 182.

The original bears the date "7.IX.1918". But in the files of the Council of People's Commissars there is a copy of this letter on which in an unknown hand is written the date "6/IX" and the time of dispatch "21.10 hours" (Ts. G.A.O.R., USSR). Moreover, on the night of September 6, Tsyurupa informed Zinoviev in Petrograd: "today Vladimir Ilyich ... wrote a letter" (*Petrogradskaya Pravda* No. 194, September 7, 1918). This gives grounds for assuming that the letter was written on September 6, 1918. p. 146

[100] Lenin's telegram was transmitted to Kazan at 6.54 a.m. on September 10, 1918, and by 2 p.m. units of the Red Army had liberated Kazan from the whiteguard and White Czech troops.

For Lenin's greetings to the Red Army men on the capture of Kazan see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 93, 100. p. 147

[101] Simbirsk was liberated on September 12, 1918, by units of the Iron Division led by G. D. Gai. p. 147

[102] Telegrams from the Poor Peasants' Committees of Yelets Uyezd, Orel Gubernia, were sent to Lenin in reply to his letter to Sereda, People's Commissar for Agriculture (see this volume, Document 78). p. 148

[103] This letter to V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich was written in connection with the death on September 30, 1918, of his wife, V. M. Velichkina-Bonch-Bruyevich, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Health. p. 150

[104] This telegram was sent in connection with the proposal of Rifaat Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in Germany, for the signing of a protocol regulating the military situation in the Caucasus. The draft protocol Rifaat Pasha put forward provided for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Caucasus to the borders laid down by the Brest Treaty, but it lacked a clause directly transferring to the Soviet authorities the territories evacuated by the Turks.

The fears expressed in this telegram were justified. On October 30, 1918, the Turkish Government signed the Mudross armistice with the Entente countries, which contained a special clause about Turkey agreeing to the occupation of Baku by the Entente powers. In November 1918, in accordance with this agreement, the Turks withdrew their troops from Baku and the city was occupied by the British. p. 151

[105] Krasin asked Lenin to sign a telegram to the Tsaritsyn Extraordinary Commission for them to set free N. Mukhin, an employee of the Chief Oil Committee, who had been arrested, and allow him to travel freely to Moscow. Krasin proposed sending a copy of the telegram to Stalin in Tsaritsyn. p. 151

[106] This refers to the article "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 105-13). The article was published in *Pravda* on October 11, 1918. p. 151

[107] Lenin is alluding to the debts of the tsarist and bourgeois provisional governments to the imperialists of Britain, France, the U.S.A. and other countries. By a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee dated January 21 (February 3), 1918, all foreign loans of the tsarist and Provisional governments were annulled. p. 152

[108] The Note to Woodrow Wilson, President of the U.S.A., was dispatched on October 24, 1918 (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. I, 1957, pp. 531-39). p. 152

[109] M. M. Litvinov, Plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. in Great Britain, was arrested by the British Government as a hostage for Bruce Lockhart, British Vise-Consul in Moscow, who was arrested on September 3, 1918, for counter-revolutionary activities against the Soviet Republic. In October 1918 Litvinov was exchanged for Lockhart and returned to Soviet Russia. p. 153

[110] On October 3, 1918, the newspaper *La Feuille* reported the publication of the book *La Russie socialiste*, which had been compiled by Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

La Feuille—a daily newspaper published in Geneva from 1917 to 1920. While not formally the organ of any particular party, its views were those of the Second International. p. 154

[111] *Znamya Trudovoi Kommuny* (Banner of the Labour Commune) —a newspaper, published originally, from July 26 to August 18,

1918, under the title *Znamya Borby* (Banner of Struggle) as the organ of a group of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Later, from August 21, it was the organ of the Party of Narodnik Communists, a break-away from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The newspaper ceased publication in November 1918, when an extraordinary congress of the Party of Narodnik Communists passed a resolution dissolving the party and merging it with the R.C.P.(B.).

Volga Truda (The Will of Labour)—a newspaper, the organ of the Party of Revolutionary Communism, which broke away from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party in September 1918. It appeared from September 14 to December 4, 1918. From December 29, 1918, the daily newspaper was replaced by a periodical with the same title; it was published until October 1920, when the Party of Revolutionary Communism merged with the R.C.P.(B.). p. 154

[112] This refers to the illegally published "Letters" of the Spartacus group; twelve such letters were issued between September 1916 and October 1918. p. 154

[113] Martov's article "Marx and the Problem of Proletarian Dictatorship" was published in Nos. 29 and 30 of the journal *Sozialistische Auslandspotitik* for July 18 and 25, 1918. p. 155

[114] What this refers to has not been established. p. 155

[115] This refers to the "Letter to a Joint Session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and Representatives of Factory Committees and Trade Unions, October 3, 1918" (see present edition, Vol. 28, pp. 101-04). The possibility of the Entente countries extending intervention against the Soviet Republic was dealt with by Lenin in greater detail in his report at the joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, factory committees and trade unions on October 22, 1918, and in the speech on the international situation at the Sixth Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1918 (ibid., pp. 114-27, 151-64). p. 156

[116] This refers to the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory, which was founded in 1918 by M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich and V. M. Leshchinsky, and was one of the first scientific research institutes established after the October Revolution. Lenin took a personal interest in the work of the Radio Laboratory and gave it repeated support. p. 156

[117] The French translation of Lenin's *The State and Revolution* was first published in 1919 in Moscow. From 1921 onwards the book was repeatedly published in French in Paris. p. 158

[118] This refers to the "Regulations Concerning the Board for the Organisation and Exploitation of an Experimental Factory for Radium Extraction" adopted by the Supreme Economic Council and published in *Izvestia* on August 16, 1918. p. 159

[119] Written on the letter of head of the Children's Homes Department of the People's Commissariat for Social Security A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova to the Board of Properties of Moscow's People's Palaces asking for pillows, blankets and bed-linen needed for orphanages to be evacuated from Moscow to the grain-growing provinces because of the famine.

Lenin's directive was carried out. p. 159

[120] On November 12, 1918, the Swiss Government, yielding to pressure from the Entente countries, expelled from Switzerland the staff of the Embassy of the R.S.F.S.R. headed by Berzin. p. 160

[121] Lenin attached great importance to the suppression of the white-guard-S.R. revolt in Izhevsk and the liberation of the town. At the beginning of November 1918, in a talk with S. I. Gusev, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Army, he expressed the hope that Izhevsk would be liberated by the first anniversary of the October Revolution, and asked that this message should be transmitted to the Red Army men. On November 7, troops of the division commanded by V. M. Azin stormed and captured the town and the small arms factory.

Lenin's telegram is in reply to the report on the liberation of Izhevsk received from the Eastern Front. It was read out to the Red Army men who took part in the liberation of the town. p. 161

[122] The books preserved from Lenin's library in Poronin as well as archive materials (the Cracow-Poronin archives) were handed over to the Soviet Union after Lenin's death. The first batch of materials was received in 1924, and some of the books belonging to Lenin in 1933. Twelve of Lenin's books kept in the Bydgoszcz library, were handed over to the Soviet Army in 1945 as a token of gratitude for the liberation of the town from the German occupationists. A large batch of materials from the Cracow-Poronin archives, discovered by archivists of the Polish People's Republic, was received in 1951. A particularly large number of valuable documents were handed over to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. by the Polish United Workers' Party in 1954. Altogether, in 1951 and 1954, over a thousand new documents were handed over to the U.S.S.R. from Poland. p. 162

[123] On November 22, 1918, the Procurement and Supplies Department of the People's Commissariat for Food informed the Finnish Communist Club: "...in view of the fact that the organisations are only partially supplied at the present time, 6,000 poods of grain have been allocated to you from the stocks of the Food Commissariat. Enclosed herewith is a copy of Comrade Lenin's letter". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 453.) p. 163

[124] This note is Lenin's reply to an inquiry asking his opinion about the proposal of the Manager of the Northern Regional Branch of the National (State) Bank to celebrate December 14—the anniversary of the promulgation of the decree nationalising private banks. p. 163

[125] This telegram was in response to a complaint Lenin received from N. P. Gorbunov, head of the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council, that the Technical Committee of the Economic Council of the Northern Area was holding up fulfilment of orders from the Central Science and Technology Laboratory of the Military Department. At the top of the document received from Gorbunov, Lenin wrote an instruction to the secretary: "Phone Gorbunov and tell him to send *today* the *exact documents* concerning the half-month's delay and copies of papers from Amosov (head of the Technical Committee of the Economic Council of the Northern Area.—*Ed.*). Without the documents the complaint has no weight. *Lenin.*" On the left-hand side there is an additional note: "Reprimand sent. *Lenin.*" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, pp. 453-54.)

See also the document that follows. p. 164

[126] Lenin wrote this directive to Chicherin in connection with a radio-telegram from the German Government, which was set up on November 10, 1918, and consisted mainly of Right-wing Social-Democrats and Centrists. In its radio-telegram of November 21, 1918, the German Government requested the Soviet Government to issue a statement about its recognition and the obligation "to refrain from exerting any influence on the German population for the purpose of forming a different government".

Lenin's instructions were reflected in the Note to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated November 25, 1918, which was signed by G. V. Chicherin (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. I, 1957, pp. 576-77). p. 165

[127] Lenin wrote this instruction on a memo from the Department of Museums and Protection of Monuments of Art and Antiquity of the People's Commissariat for Education, sent to the Managing Department of the Council of People's Commissars on November 26, 1918, asking that a number of premises of the Grand Palace in the Kremlin be allocated for the requirements of the state museums.

On December 12, 1918, the C.P.C. decreed "that measures be taken to use premises of the Grand Palace for a museum, in particular for presenting a historic picture of the life of the tsars". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 454.) p. 166

[128] Lenin's doubts about the correctness of the reports that most of the Councils of German soldiers in the Ukraine had adopted a Bolshevik stand were fully justified. The All-Ukraine Congress of Councils of German Soldiers, held in Kiev on December 13, 1918, was influenced by German opportunists and did not adopt any political resolution. The Congress decided to come to an agreement with Petlyura's bands and to surrender Kiev to them without a fight in exchange for the free passage of westward-bound German troop trains. p. 167

[129] This refers to the decree "On the Organisation of Supplies" adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on November 21.

1918. Under this decree the co-operatives were assigned a considerable role in the organisation of supplies for the population. p. 168

[130] This refers to the decision of the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets granting an amnesty to certain categories of prisoners, adopted on the proposal of the C.P.C. on November 6, 1918 (see the collection *Syezdy Sovetov RSFSR i avtonomnykh respublik RSFSR*, Vol. I, 1959, pp. 89-90). p. 168

[131] Lenin wrote this telegram following a complaint received from I. V. Bogdanov, a member of the staff of the Unemployment Insurance Office in Borisoglebsk, concerning the arrest of his son who, on the grounds of his inexperience and poor health, refused to take part in the work of the Evacuation Commission to which he was assigned by the Commissariat for Agriculture. p. 169

[132] Lenin's note is a reply to Kamenev, who proposed abstaining for a period of two months from "forcing the pace in handing over the whole business of supply ... to the state". Kamenev wrote to Lenin: "Don't call it a concession, call it manoeuvring, and admit that this is precisely the time to manoeuvre." p. 169

[133] This refers to a pamphlet containing the decree on revolutionary legality adopted by the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1918. In this decree the Congress called on "all citizens of the Republic, all bodies, all officials of the Soviet authorities, to strictly observe the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., and the decisions, regulations and instructions issued by the central authorities". All departures from the laws, caused by the conditions of the struggle against counter-revolution, were to be kept within strictly defined limits. The decree outlined measures for waging a determined fight against bureaucracy and red tape in Soviet offices.

The pamphlet appeared in 1919 under the title *Observe the Laws of the Soviet Republic!* (see also Document 422 of this volume). p. 170

[134] This refers to materials concerning a gang of profiteers and bribe-takers, who had wormed their way into Soviet bodies in Astrakhan and disrupted the work of supplying the Soviet troops. p. 170

[135] This apparently refers to the operation of a squadron of ships of the Astrakhan-Caspian Naval Flotilla for landing troops at Staroterechnaya in the Kizlyar sector of the Caspian-Caucasian Front. p. 171

[136] Towards the end of November 1918 Kolchak's troops, possessing considerable superiority in strength, launched an offensive against the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front with the aim of uniting with the interventionist troops in the north. After heavy defensive battles, the 3rd Army was forced to abandon a considerable terri-

tory. The causes for the defeat were: poor supply of clothing, food and ammunition to the army units, lack of the necessary reserves, contamination of some army units by counter-revolutionary elements owing to the violation of the class principle in the formation of units, shortcomings in the army leadership on the part of the commander, M. M. Lashevich, and the Revolutionary Military Council of the army.

On this subject see also this volume, Document 242. p. 171

[137] The instruction to G. I. Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, was written by Lenin on a telegram he received on December 16, 1918, from peasants of Budilovo village (Yaroslavl Gubernia) complaining against the Chairman of the local Poor Peasants' Committee who had confiscated grain from them although they had no surpluses. They asked protection of Lenin, as "head of the peasant government". p. 173

[138] Lenin's note to Sverdlov was written on a telegram from N. N. Kuzmin, Military Commissar of the 6th Army, who had reported that Left Socialist-Revolutionary agitation was being conducted among the troops of the Northern Front, as a result of which discipline in some units was deteriorating.

As regards Spiridonova, a leader of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Lenin's note probably refers to her speeches at outdoor and indoor meetings, against Soviet power, against the Bolsheviks. On February 24, 1919, the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal examined the case of Maria Spiridonova, who was accused of counter-revolutionary agitation and slander against Soviet power. The charges against Spiridonova were proved at the trial, but in view of the "morbidly hysterical state of the accused", the tribunal decided "to isolate Maria Spiridonova from political and social activity for one year by confining her in a sanatorium and affording her an opportunity for healthy physical and mental labour" (*Pravda* No. 43, February 25, 1919). p. 173

[139] This refers to the transfer to the People's Commissariat for Food of warehouses of industrial and handicraft products, which were at the disposal of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission (Vecheka). The transfer was to have been made in pursuance of the decree on the organisation of supplies for the population adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on November 21, 1918. On December 3, 1918, the Food Commissariat asked the Vecheka to turn over the warehouses to the Chief Board for Distribution of Products, but up to December 20 this request remained without reply. On December 20, the Food Commissariat applied to the Council of Defence concerning this matter. p. 173

[140] D. A. Bulatov wired Lenin on December 26, 1918: "Letter received. Directive will be carried out." In a telegram on December 28, 1918, Bulatov reported that Teterin, a member of the Pervitino Poor Peasants' Committee, had been relieved of his post as being a former gendarme, but the other members of the commit-

tee had been left in their posts since the accusations against them were unproven. On December 31 Bulatov sent Lenin a detailed letter on this matter. p. 175

[141] Lenin's telegram is a reply to the following inquiry dated December 25, 1918, from S. A. Bank, Chairman of the Vyshny Volochok Uyezd Economic Council: "By order of the Council of Defence stores of army property have been sealed, an inventory is being urgently compiled. Owing to the spread of typhus in the town and uyezd, which is assuming menacing proportions, the Board of the Uyezd Economic Council has given permission for hospital property to be issued to the public health department. We ask for your sanction in assuming this great responsibility." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 459.) p. 175

[142] Lenin wrote this telegram in connection with a complaint reaching him from P. I. Surkov, a former member of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, against the decision of the Extraordinary Commission of the town of Rodniki (Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia) to confiscate his library. Surkov reported that while objecting to the transfer of the library to Rodniki, he agreed to hand over the books for teaching young people in his own village. Regarding Surkov's library, see also documents 228, 229 and 235 in this volume. p. 175

[143] In his telegram to Lenin and to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic dated December 26, 1918, Trotsky, commenting on the apprehensions of Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis regarding fraternisation, wrote of its significance, particularly on the Northern Front, where there were American, British and French troops. At the same time, in order to put a stop to enemy agitation among Red Army men and to prevent the weakening of the fighting efficiency of the Red Army units, the telegram proposed that fraternisation should be carried out in an organised manner under the surveillance and control of responsible functionaries, primarily political commissars. p. 176

[144] As a result of the measures taken, the Vyazniki workers received six truck-loads of flour, two of which were for the Yuzhsk factory. p. 176

[145] See Note 142. p. 177

[146] The question of requisitioning Surkov's library was discussed on December 27, 1918, at an enlarged sitting of the Executive Committee, the Extraordinary Commission and the Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) of the town of Rodniki. Its decision noted that "the books in Citizen Surkov's library, which are of social value, are shut away and unread at a time when there is an immense lack of books for the enlightenment of broad masses of workers and peasants", and that since a library was being formed in Rodniki "the requisitioned books will be of tremendous benefit as public property". In order to give Lenin fuller information on this question, the

meeting decided to send A. N. Prokofiev, secretary of the local Cheka, to see him.

Lenin received Prokofiev and after a talk with him wrote his letter to the People's Commissariat for Education. p. 177

[147] In reply to Lenin's letter, V. Y. Bryusov, head of the Library Section of the People's Commissariat for Education, informed him on January 2, 1919, that A. N. Prokofiev had been received and heard out in the Library Section. Bryusov wrote that, according to existing rules, the requisitioning of libraries could be permitted only with the knowledge and consent of the People's Commissariat for Education, in order that, when requisitioning takes place, the interests of the state as a whole should be taken into account—primarily the requirements of the large state libraries: the libraries of the Rumyantsev Museum (now the State Library of the U.S.S.R., named after Lenin), the Historical Museum, the Socialist Academy, the universities, and others. In view of this Prokofiev was asked to submit an inventory of the requisitioned library.

On receipt of Bryusov's memo, Lenin wrote a letter to Prokofiev (see this volume, Document 235). p. 171

[148] This refers to the publication by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of *Materials on the Land Reform of 1918*. Issue VI—*Alienation and Utilisation of Agricultural Inventory*—appeared at the end of 1918. p. 178

[149] This evidently refers to the publication of leaflets and their distribution among the Entente troops and in localities captured by the interventionists and whiteguards. p. 178

[150] Written by Lenin on the back of a report sent him by V. I. Nevsky, People's Commissar for Railways, on the number of freight-loads of food sent to Petrograd from Moscow and on delays in the dispatch of food freights to Petrograd from Nizhni-Novgorod. p. 179

[151] See Note 147. p. 180

[152] Surkov's library came under the control of the Rodniki Department of Education on January 10, 1919, some of the books being returned to the original owner. Lists of the books requisitioned or returned to Surkov were sent to Lenin and to the Library Section of the People's Commissariat for Education on February 3. p. 180

[153] Written by Lenin following a conversation with F. F. Obraztsov, a peasant from Vasyutino village, Lopatinsk Volost, Vesyegonsk Uyezd, Tver Gubernia, who had been sent to Lenin by village Communists to solicit help in building a village People's House to replace one that was destroyed by fire at the end of 1917.

On January 18, 1919, after Obraztsov's return home, the local newspaper, *Izvestia* of the Vesyegonsk Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, published an article about his reception by Lenin under the heading "A Visit to Comrade

Lenin". In it Obraztsov related that his talk with Lenin had dealt chiefly with the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government towards the poor and middle peasantry. In concluding the article, Obraztsov wrote: "Comrade peasants of Vesyegonsk Uyezd! Believe me who saw with my own eyes that there, at the top, our common cause is being administered not by officials or bureaucrats, but by our own, ordinary comrades, who rightly call themselves the Workers' and Peasants' Government. Let us hearken to their voice. They are working for us and our children. Let us help them with all we can in their difficult work. Then we shall all the sooner see a golden age for us. Comrades! I hope that it is together with you all that I say loudly: 'Long live the leader of the proletariat and protector of the poor, our friend and brother Vladimir Ilyich Lenin!!!'" p. 182

[154] Lenin sent this telegram in reply to the following telegram he received from Gorkino station on January 4, 1919: "Lenin, C.P.C., Moscow. We office staff and workers of Gorkino station, Northern Railway, at a general meeting have found it necessary to ask you to allow us to send our delegates to you in order to express our urgent needs. Please notify us whether you agree to receive them, and when. *Ryabinin*, chairman of the general meeting, *Nesterekhin*, secretary" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 51). p. 182

[155] This telegram was sent in reply to an inquiry from the Ufa Revolutionary Committee to whom the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries had made a proposal to begin negotiations for joint action against Kolchak.

The talks with the Ufa Right Socialist-Revolutionaries were held during January-February 1919 in Ufa and Moscow.

At the end of February, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution on the attitude towards the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. In view of the positive results of the talks and the fact that on February 8, 1919, the party conference of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries declared itself opposed to an armed struggle against Soviet power and to foreign intervention in Russia's affairs, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee passed a decision to give to the groups of Right Socialist-Revolutionaries which adopted this stand the right "to participate in Soviet work". (*Izvestia* No. 45, February 27, 1919.) p. 184

[156] On December 25, 1918, Kolchak's troops occupied Perm. Having examined the letter from the Urals Regional Party Committee on the causes of the reverses of the 3rd Army, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) set up a Committee of Inquiry consisting of J. V. Stalin and F. E. Dzerzhinsky, which visited the 3rd Army early in January 1919.

Lenin's directive was written in connection with a letter from Stalin and Dzerzhinsky in which they reported on the opening of the investigation and pointed out that in order to prevent the rapid advance of the enemy, it was essential to send urgently three reliable regiments to reinforce the 3rd Army.

On this subject, see also this volume, Documents 219, 251 and present edition, Vol. 28, p. 390. p. 185

[157] In reply to Lenin's telegram, Kornev, Chairman of the Ryazan Gubernia Executive Committee, reported that at a sitting of the Presidium of the Gubernia Executive Committee and the Presidium of the City Executive Committee on January 15, 1919, it had been decided to urgently organise a Department of Public Catering under the City Executive Committee which was to take charge of all Ryazan's dining-rooms and tea-rooms. p. 186

[158] This telegram was prompted by a telegram that Lenin received on January 12, 1919, at about 7 p.m., from four workers who complained that the Gavrilov Posad Extraordinary Commission had confiscated 16 poods of oats from them, and asked for orders to be given for their return. p. 187

[159] Lenin wrote this instruction to the secretary on a telegram to the Council of Defence from Pashkov, Chief of the Railway Militia of a district in Tula Gubernia, who reported on the progress of snow clearing on the railway, and gave factual data on the number of workers and carts engaged in this work. p. 187

[160] Lenin's directives to Tsyurupa were written on the memorandum of the Education Commissariat's Inter-Departmental Commission for the Purchase of Food for the Children of Moscow and Petrograd. The memorandum outlined measures for the better food provision of the children, specifically, the organisation and holding of a Starving Children's Week for obtaining produce in rural localities in exchange for commodities, and for delivery of this produce to the towns. p. 188

[161] The document referred to has not been found. p. 188

[162] Lenin's instruction to Trotsky was written on the text of a report from Stalin and Dzerzhinsky giving the reasons for the fall of Perm. The report stated that the three regiments intended as reinforcements for the 3rd Army had been reassigned to Narva. p. 189

[163] Lenin probably refers to a letter dated January 19, 1919, from M. K. Vladimirov, Military Commissar Extraordinary of the Railways of the Southern Front, reporting the state of affairs on the railways under his control. Appended to the letter was the draft of an addendum to the decision of the Council of Defence dated December 22, 1918, on the question of combating snowdrifts. p. 189

[164] On January 18, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decision on the fuel and food situation at state engineering works. This decision instructed the Commissariat for Food to furnish exact information on "how many trucks, and when and from what localities, had been ordered for state engineering works and textile mills" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 94). p. 190

[165] This refers to a proposed conference on the Princes Islands (Sea of Marmora) with the participation of representatives of all the governments existing on the territory of Russia to draw up measures for ending the Civil War. The address to the parties to the conference was drafted by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States. The imperialists started this talk about a conference in order to halt the advance of the Red Army and, in the event of the Soviet Government refusing to participate in the conference, to put the blame on it for the continuation of hostilities. The Soviet Government unmasked the imperialists who were posing as "peace-makers"; on February 4, 1919, it issued a radio statement to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan agreeing to participate in the conference, which it intended to use as an international platform to expose the interventionists. But no reply was forthcoming from the Entente imperialists. Denikin, Kolchak and other counter-revolutionary governments still hoped to crush the Soviet Republic by force of arms, and therefore refused to take part in the conference, which was never held. p. 191

[166] Lenin's telegram followed receipt by him of a report from Schwartz, representative of the Council of Defence in Samara, about the arrest of A. M. Smirnov, a Right Socialist-Revolutionary and former mayor of the town under the White Czechs, who gave himself up to the Soviet authorities and declared his intention of working with "Soviet power" for the purpose of fighting against Kolchak. Schwartz reported that Smirnov put forward no conditions for his work in the future and was backed by a group of individuals from his camp who had decided to serve Soviet power.

On the telegram from Samara, Lenin wrote the words: "For handy reference. Wired 27/I." p. 191

[167] On receipt of Lenin's note Sklyansky gave instructions to S. I. Aralov, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, for an immediate investigation. On February 3, 1919, Aralov reported back that a member of the All-Russia Council of the Air Fleet had been sent by the Field Division for Aviation and Aeronautics to the Tsaritsyn Front to carry out an inspection. p. 192

[168] Lenin's note to Krasin, People's Commissar for Trade and Industry, was written in connection with a report by W. Jastrzembski, a former leader of the Polish Socialist Party, who was then in Russia, on the results of his journey to Warsaw undertaken to explore the possibility of establishing trade and cultural relations between the Soviet Republic and Poland. Owing to the resistance of the Right-wing leaders of the Polish Socialist Party, his mission was unsuccessful. Despite this Lenin was in favour of continuing negotiations. p. 192

[169] Written on a telegram from the secretary of N. I. Podvoisky, Ukrainian People's Commissar for Military Affairs, stating that

Podvoisky's train had left Moscow for Kharkov. The telegram was sent to seven different addresses. p. 193

[170] Lenin gave this instruction to Sklyansky and Podbelsky, People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs, after receiving a telegram from the Chief of Communications of Trotsky's train. The telegram stated that this train had left Petrograd for Yamburg and was sent simultaneously to a large number of addresses. p. 193

[171] On February 6, 1919, Shlyapnikov reported to Lenin information he had received from Baku to the effect that the workers of Baku enterprises and the sailors were hostile towards the British occupationists, that the ships, on which there were still Russian sailors, were ready to go over to the side of the Soviets, and that the Baku workers would start an uprising to coincide with the Red Army attack. p. 193

[172] Lenin's instruction to Petrovsky was written on the text of a report on the situation in Kursk Gubernia presented by an official of the Military Inspection. The latter reported dissatisfaction among the working people of Kursk Gubernia caused by abuses on the part of local Soviet and Party functionaries, the poor organisation of agitation and propaganda in the countryside and the weakness of the Party organisations in the gubernia. p. 194

[173] Lenin was informed that the rumour about the eviction of Vera Zasulich and other revolutionaries was without foundation. p. 195

[174] Lenin's telegram followed a letter from M. M. Fedoseyev from the village of Azeyevo, Yelatma Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia. Fedoseyev stated that in October 1918 his printing-press in the town of Yelatma was nationalised and now stood "in a shed, rusting away and idle", at a time when the uyezd town of Yelatma was without a printing-press and orders were being sent to towns in other uyezds. Fedoseyev wrote that he was "not a bourgeois", that for 27 years he had worked as a clerk, secretary, teacher, and book-keeper; that after buying on credit an old, broken-down printing-press, he had put it in order and had himself worked in the print-shop as proofreader and compositor.

On Fedoseyev's letter Lenin wrote the words: "Wired 18.II", "*file away* for *handy* reference". p. 195

[175] In reply to Lenin's telegram, P. Gorbunov, Chairman of the Yelatma Uyezd Executive Committee, reported the same day that the E.C. intended to merge Fedoseyev's printing-press with another nationalised local printing-press (of Meshcheryakov), where both Fedoseyev and Meshcheryakov, as specialists, would be allowed to work. p. 195

[176] A telegram from Headquarters of the Eastern Front on February 19, 1919, reported on talks with representatives of the Bashkir bourgeois-nationalist government for the cessation of this government's anti-Soviet activity and for the Bashkir troops fighting

alongside Red Army units against Kolchak. The opinion was expressed in the telegram that if the Bashkir troops would immediately go over to an offensive against Kolchak they should not be disarmed, but if they were to refuse to do so, then it was essential to disarm them.

Joint operations by Bashkir units and the Red Army against whiteguard troops began at the end of February 1919, and a Bashkir Revolutionary Committee was set up. On March 20, 1919, the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. signed an agreement with the Bashkir Government setting up a Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Republic. p. 196

[177] Written by Lenin on the title page of a copy of his pamphlet *The Struggle for Grain* (Moscow, 1918), which through the medium of A. P. Ramensky (a colleague of I. N. Ulyanov—Lenin's father) he presented to a delegation of teachers from Tver Gubernia. The delegation had come to Moscow to ask for help in the form of food for Tver teachers.

Lenin's pamphlet contained the text of his report on combating the famine delivered at a joint session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet, and the trade unions on June 4, 1918, and his reply to the debate on the report (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 419-43). p. 197

[178] Lenin's telegram is the reply to one dated February 26, 1919, from S. Y. Tsekhanovsky, Chairman of the Rudnya Executive Committee, Mikulino Volost, Orsha Uyezd, Mogilev Gubernia. Tsekhanovsky wrote that the Mikulino Communists had organised a central volost workers' co-operative for the purpose of "uniting workers and peasants on the basis of a communist system of trade, abolishing private trading and pillage, and reconstructing existing kulak-dominated consumer co-operatives"; the Rules of this workers' co-operative had been examined in the Supreme Economic Council. Reporting that leaders of the uyezd and gubernia organisations in Orsha and Mogilev were opposed to the activities of the Mikulino Communists, Tsekhanovsky asked permission to report to Lenin personally "on the state of affairs as the leader of communism and defender of the proletariat". p. 199

[179] Lenin's note to Maria Kostelovskaya was probably written at the C.P.C. meeting of February 27, 1919, which discussed the draft decree on workers' food detachments. The note was a reply to Kostelovskaya's proposal to postpone the discussion of this question. p. 199

[180] Written by Lenin on a note from A. I. Svidersky, member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, apparently at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars. Svidersky wrote that the Food Commissariat had been discussing whether to consider the frontier with the Ukraine open for free transport of all food products or only of those that were unrationed.

The organisation of food supply in the liberated districts of the Ukraine at the beginning of 1919 was a very important mat-

ter. Lenin devoted great attention to this question; in particular, he proposed to hasten Schlichter's departure to the Ukraine, where he was to head the People's Commissariat for Food. On February 25, 1919, Lenin wrote on a telegram from Pyatakov, who reported on food stocks in the Ukraine: "Inform Schlichter, adding that I am extremely dissatisfied at the delay of his journey" (A. Schlichter, *Uchitel i drug trudyashchikhsya* [Teacher and Friend of the Working People], Moscow, 1957, p. 55). On February 19 and March 11, 1919, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) adopted special decisions on food policy in the Ukraine (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 37, pp. 522, 630-31). p. 199

[181] Lydia Fotieva, secretary of the C.P.C., asked Lenin to take on for work in the C.P.C. Secretariat a woman recommended by the Staff Bureau of the C.P.C.'s Managing Department. V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, head of the C.P.C.'s Managing Department, objected to the appointment on the grounds that it contravened the decree forbidding relatives to work together in the same Soviet institutions (the candidate had a sister working in the C.P.C.). Fotieva wrote to Lenin that the woman recommended "is a very valuable worker and it would be in our interests to take her on.... Could not the decree be bypassed?" p. 200

[182] Lenin wrote this on a letter from the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). Point 3 of this letter expressed the desire that the question of frontiers with Poland should be decided on the basis of self-determination of the population living in the disputed territories, primarily in Lithuania and Byelorussia. Lenin's proposal was adopted by the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and was reflected in Chicherin's letter to A. Y. Więckowski, delegate extraordinary of the Polish Government (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, 1958, pp. 105-06). p. 200

[183] Valentina Pershikova, a member of the staff of the Tsaritsyn Housing Department, was arrested for daubing a portrait of Lenin which she had torn out of a pamphlet. Requests for Pershikova's release were sent in telegrams to Lenin from V. S. Usachov, chief of one of the Tsaritsyn militia stations, and from Minin, a Red Army man. On Minin's telegram Lenin wrote the following instruction to his secretary: "Remind me when the reply comes from the Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission (and afterwards hand all the material over to the topical satirists)." (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 172.) p. 201

[184] Apparently written at a meeting of the C.P.C. p. 201

[185] Kolegayev replied by telegram that three trains with foodstuffs had been dispatched to Moscow. The telegram also gave information on the progress of the food collection and pointed out that to expedite procurements it was essential to send additional workers and responsible food supply executives from the centre. p. 201

[186] On January 29, 1919, the Second Congress of Soviets of Sarapul Uyezd, Vyatka Gubernia, adopted a decision to collect grain in all villages of the uyezd as a gift to Moscow and Petrograd. The Congress decided that the gift of 40,000 poods of grain for Moscow "be dispatched and presented personally to our dear and beloved leader, Comrade Lenin". Lenin's note was written following his reception of the delegation of Sarapul peasants who had accompanied the train-load of grain. It was written, apparently, not on March 12 as indicated in the document, but on March 11, 1919. This is borne out by the following circumstances. Already on March 12 *Pravda* No. 55 reported that Kamenev, speaking at a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet on March 11, said: "I received a letter from Comrade Lenin who had been visited by representatives of Sarapul Uyezd, Vyatka Gubernia, who had brought 40,000 poods of grain as a gift to Moscow. These delegates are present at this meeting." The mistake about the date is also evident from the fact that on March 12 Lenin was in Petrograd, where he addressed a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet in the Taurida Palace (see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 19-37). Lenin himself, speaking on March 13, 1919, at a meeting in the People's House in Petrograd, said: "Only a few days ago a delegation of peasants representing five volosts in Sarapul Uyezd came to see me" (ibid., p. 47). p. 202

[187] Y. Nikitin, a peasant from Alexeyevo village, Belsk Uyezd, Smolensk Gubernia, had asked that decrees and other materials needed for conducting a peasants' political circle be sent to him. p. 202

[188] Lenin gave this instruction to Petrovsky after receiving a complaint from peasants of Korbangsk Volost, Kadnikovo Uyezd, Vologda Gubernia, about the incorrect attitude of the Volost Executive Committee towards the middle peasants. Lenin wrote the instruction on the following draft of a telegram in Krupskaya's handwriting: "To the Korbangsk Volost Soviet, Kadnikovo Uyezd Vologda Gubernia. Draw up immediately in all villages lists of electors to the Soviet, excluding only known kulaks and drawing the middle peasants into the elections. After compiling the lists, fix new elections to the Soviet. A check will be carried out. Those guilty of incorrectly compiling the lists will have to answer for it" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 476).

Shortly after this, on learning of the rude behaviour of A. G. Pravdin, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, towards U. P. Mostakova, who had delivered the complaint of the Vologda peasants, Lenin wrote to Petrovsky: "... Pravdin must be hauled over the coals. Don't let him have his own way, and put him under supervision, he has a tendency towards stupid 'order issuing'. This must be put an end to" (ibid). p. 202

[189] This was a reply to a telegram from V. N. Kayurov, head of the Political Department of the 5th Army, who reported the capture of Ufa by whiteguard troops and the grave plight of the 5th Ar-

my. At the same time, Kayurov expressed confidence that if "class-conscious, trained reinforcements" were sent, "the enemy will be routed". p. 203

[190] G. N. Kaminsky, Chairman of the Tula Gubernia Executive Committee, reported by direct line about disturbances at Tula small arms and ammunition factories due to the serious food situation of the workers and the lack of currency for paying wages.

On this subject, see also this volume, Document 295, and *Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, pp. 7 and 9. p. 204

[191] This apparently refers to the radio-telegram on the subject of exchanging prisoners of war, sent on April 4, 1919, on behalf of G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the French Foreign Minister, S. Pichon (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, 1958, pp. 512-15). p. 205

[192] On April 5, 1919, on a report by D. I. Kursky, People's Commissar for Justice, the C.P.C. established standing orders for its meetings, adopting all Lenin's proposals. p. 206

[193] Lenin's reply to the peasants of Skopin Uyezd, Ryazan Gubernia, was written in connection with the mandate of the uyezd consultative congress, in which the peasants raised the questions of reducing the extraordinary revolutionary tax on peasants of average and below-average means, abolishing the mobilisation of draught horses and milch cows, increasing the grain quota to be left for the peasant farms, and others. p. 207

[194] The decree "On Privileges for Middle Peasants in Levying the Extraordinary Revolutionary Tax" was adopted at a session of the All-Russia C.E.C. on April 9, 1919. It was published in *Izvestia* on April 10. p. 207

[195] Lenin's letter was written following a talk with F. I. Bodrov, Chief of the Supply Section of the Sokolniki Forest School. There is a note from Lenin to the Commandant of the Kremlin, written on April 7, 1919: "Please admit the bearer, Comrade Filipp Ilyich Bodrov, to the Kremlin and the Council of People's Commissars. *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*), Chairman, C.P.C." (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 288).

Regarding Bodrov, see also *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 555. p. 207

[196] At the time Panyushkin was at the North-Western Front. In connection with Kolchak's offensive Panyushkin's detachment was sent to the Eastern Front

See also *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 512. p. 208

[197] Lenin's radio-telegrams to Bela Kun were sent in connection with the news of the proclamation of a Soviet Republic in Munich on April 7, 1919. At that time it was not yet known in Moscow that the Soviet Republic in Munich had been proclaimed by leaders

of the German Social-Democrats and of the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, who by this manoeuvre wanted to deceive the workers and to discredit the idea of Soviet power. Conditions in Bavaria not yet being ripe for the proclamation of a Soviet Republic, the Bavarian Communists refused to take part in this provocative act of adventurism.

On April 13, 1919, when the Bavarian counter-revolutionaries made an attempt to seize power, a furious struggle took place on the streets of Munich, ending in the victory of the workers. A Soviet government was set up in Bavaria—the Executive Committee headed by the leader of the Bavarian Communists, Eugene Levin; the government also included Independents. The Government of the Bavarian Soviet Republic set about disarming the bourgeoisie, organising a Red Army, nationalising the banks, establishing workers' control at enterprises, and organising food supply.

On April 27, 1919, Lenin wrote his "Message of Greetings to the Bavarian Soviet Republic", in which he gave the revolutionary government of Bavaria advice in the form of a concrete programme of action for the proletarian party that had come to power (see present edition, Vol. 29, pp. 325-26).

The home and foreign situation of the Bavarian Soviet Republic was a difficult one. At the very first difficulties encountered by the Soviet Republic the representatives of the "Independent Social-Democrats" began to pursue a treacherous policy. Towards the end of April, the Independents succeeded in removing the Communists from leading positions. Taking advantage of this situation the counter-revolutionaries went over to the offensive. On May 1, whiteguard units entered Munich and after three days' hard fighting captured the city. p. 208

198 This telegram was sent in connection with a report from Knyaginin Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, addressed to Lenin at the Council of People's Commissars, stating that the local authorities were forcibly making the peasants join artels and communes.

The telegram was drafted in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture.

On April 10, 1919, the following circular letter, signed by Lenin and Sereda, was published in *Izvestia*:

"To all Gubernia Land Departments.

"Copies to Executive Committees.

"Information has reached the People's Commissariat for Agriculture that for the purpose of organising state farms, communes and other collective associations, the land departments and state farm boards, contrary to the intent of Article 9 of the Regulations on Socialist Organisation of Agriculture, are taking away from the peasants the lands of former landowners' estates which had been made over to them. The impermissibility of such practices is hereby confirmed. Lands being worked by peasants at the time of the publication of the Regulations on Socialist Organisation of Agriculture, and which were put at their disposal on the basis

of decisions or instructions of uyezd or gubernia land departments, may not on any account be forcibly alienated for the purpose of organising state farms, communes or other collective associations. The alienation of lands from the peasants for the sake of the abovementioned organisations is permissible only by voluntary consent by way of land tenure regulation. Measures of coercion to make the peasants practise joint cultivation and join communes and other types of collective farming are impermissible. The transition to collective forms is to be carried out only in strict conformity with the Regulations, without any compulsion on the part of the authorities. Non-fulfilment of the present instruction will be punished in accordance with the laws of the revolutionary period. Inform the population of the present instruction as widely as possible.

"*Lenin*
"Chairman, Council of People's Commissars
"*Sereda*
"People's Commissar for Agriculture

"April 9, 1919." p. 209

[199] This telegram is a reply to those sent by N. N. Kuzmin, Military Commissar of the 6th Army, on April 8, 1919, reporting a proposal by General Ironside for an exchange of prisoners of war. Kuzmin asked to be authorised to conduct negotiations. p. 209

[200] In a telegram by direct line, Minin, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, informed Lenin of the termination of the strike at the Tula arms factories and railway workshops. The telegram mentioned the need for timely and regular supply of food for the workers of the Tula factories through the People's Commissariat for Food, and the speedy delivery by the People's Commissariat for Finance of money for paying wages.

Above the text of Minin's telegram, Lenin wrote: "For the *Orgbureau of the C.C.*" p. 210

[201] Lenin wrote this telegram in connection with the receipt by him on April 12, 1919, of a telegram from Maxim Gorky reporting the arrest of the writer Ivan Volny in Maloarkhangelsk and asking for "an impartial investigation of the reasons for the arrest and his liberation under surveillance". "I have no doubt of his political loyalty," wrote Gorky.

See also this volume, documents 297 and 452. p. 210

[202] This document was apparently drafted in the People's Commissariat for Health since it was typed on the Commissariat's notepaper and signed also by People's Commissar for Health N. A. Semashko. p. 211

[203] On April 11, 1919, *Izvestia* published a decree of the C.P.C. calling up for military service in the Red Army workers and peasants of the central gubernias who did not exploit the labour of others,

and who were born between 1886 and 1890. In his telegram Zinoviev reported that a meeting of Petrograd Communists had decided to mobilise up to 20 per cent of the members of the Party over and above the general mobilisation. p. 212

[204] This refers to the inclusion of Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Ukrainian Government. p. 213

[205] This refers to an offensive by the troops of the Crimean Front, under the command of P. Y. Dybenko, into the interior of the Crimean Peninsula. The offensive was a mistake, since the attacking units could have been cut off in the Perekop Isthmus from the main forces and, moreover, at that time it was essential to concentrate maximum forces for an attack in the chief strategic direction—that of the Donets Basin and Rostov. p. 213

[206] The instruction to Dzerzhinsky was written by Lenin on the copy of a letter forwarded to him by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. The letter was from N. D. Gorelov and P. I. Novikov, representatives of the peasants of Pochep Uyezd, Chernigov Gubernia, who had come to Moscow with a complaint about the abuses practised by the local authorities and had been received by Lenin. They wrote that on their return home they had been subjected to persecution and even arrested. p. 213

[207] This refers to a telegram from the Tambov Consumers' Society to the Council of People's Commissars concerning implementation of the decree of the C.P.C., dated March 16, 1919 on consumers' communes. The decree provided for the amalgamation of all consumers' co-operatives in town and country into consumers' communes with the aim of creating a single distributive apparatus. The telegram from Tambov reported that 252 members of the Tambov Consumers' Society found at their meeting that trade was being conducted properly and "do not want to hand over the Consumers' Society to consumers' communes". p. 214

[208] This is a reply to a telegram received on April 21, 1919, from Commander-in-Chief I. I. Vatsetis and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic S. I. Aralov, inquiring whether an advance into Galicia and Bukovina was permissible politically and what objective it pursued.

Lenin wrote on the telegram from Vatsetis and Aralov: "To Comrade Sklyansky's secretary: please code and send off the attached (this probably refers to Lenin's telegram.—*Ed.*), then pass it on to Comrade Sklyansky for filing." (*Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 2, 1961, p. 382.) p. 215

[209] Lenin's directives to Sklyansky were written on a report from Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis dated April 23, 1919, concerning the military situation of the R.S.F.S.R. Vatsetis argued the necessity to unite the armed forces of the Soviet Republics and place them under a single command; he also proposed that the system of Universal Military Training should be temporarily done away

with and its 24,000 instructors mobilised to strengthen the command of the reserve units on the Eastern Front. p. 216

[210] The report of Vatsetis has a postscript by Aralov, who objected to the total liquidation of the U.M.T. and proposed simply reducing it by 50 to 75 per cent. p. 216

[211] Lenin's instruction to Zinoviev was written on a letter from V. N. Yakovleva, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, replying to an inquiry of Lenin's concerning a request by the Petrograd Co-operative of Ukrainian Citizens for their rationed food products to be turned over to them. The letter stated that, at the request of the Ukrainian Soviet Government, the People's Commissariat for Food, by way of exception, had permitted this co-operative to import from the Ukraine a small amount of rationed food products, but that A. Y. Badayev, Food Commissar of the Petrograd Labour Commune, had prevented it. Yakovleva wrote that this was not the first case of failure on the part of Badayev to comply with the instructions of the People's Commissariat for Food.

On this subject see also this volume, Document 318. p. 218

[212] On May 25, 1919, after examining the question of material assistance for V. I. Taneyev, a Russian revolutionary democrat, public figure and scholar, the Council of People's Commissars decided to assign him a monthly social security pension of 2,000 rubles, and authorised Lenin to sign a Protection Certificate. p. 218

[213] See Karl Marx's letter of January 9, 1877, to M. M. Kovalevsky (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, 2nd Russian Ed., Vol. 34, p. 185). p. 219

[214] Written by Lenin in reply to a note from Kamenev, who proposed "to ease and shut one's eyes to" the free transport of foodstuffs, with the exception of grain, as, in his opinion, in any case "we shall come to this in June". p. 221

[215] Written at a time when Communists were being mobilised for the struggle against Kolchak, this note is a reply to Kostelovskaya, a Party member. She asked how she was to understand her appointment to the Eastern Front as the head of the Political Department of the 2nd Army. p. 222

[216] This instruction to Rudzutak, Chairman of the Chief Board of Water Transport, was written by Lenin on a telegram from Kazan to the Board. The telegram reported failure to take out several vessels with grain, crude oil and paraffin from Chistopol (Eastern Front), which had been occupied by whiteguard troops, owing to the boats coming under fire from whiteguard cavalry. p. 222

[217] This was written on a telegram from K. A. Mekhonoshin, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, who asked that part of the 33rd Division, which was to be trans-

ferred to the Eastern Front, should be left in the Astrakhan area. Mekhonoshin reported that the transfer of the whole 33rd Division and the impossibility of a rapid formation of the 34th Division, owing to the delay in sending promised reinforcements, would compel them to stop the offensive against Kizlyar and give up the idea of capturing Guriev and Rakusha, where there was oil, and would put the fleet, which was threatened with loss of its base, in a hopeless position. "The absence of precise orders from Field Headquarters," wrote Mekhonoshin, "puts the army in an absolutely impossible position and gives grounds for accusing us of inactivity." Lenin made a number of underlinings and markings on Mekhonoshin's telegram (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, pp. 127-28). p. 222

[218] Lenin wrote this note on a statement by A. Y. Badayev to the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies. Badayev tried to justify the various instances of non-fulfilment by him of the orders of the People's Commissariat for Food (see Note 211), claiming that the accusations against him were "intrigues of a definite group in the Centre" and asking to be relieved within five days of his post as Food Commissar of the Petrograd Labour Commune. p. 223

[219] On May 4, 1919, a letter addressed to Lenin was received by radio from Fridtjof Nansen, Norwegian scientist and arctic explorer. The letter was dated April 17, 1919. In it Nansen gave the text of his appeal to the heads of government of the four Entente Powers (U.S.A., France, Great Britain and Italy) proposing the setting up of a committee to organise aid for Russia with food and medical supplies, and their reply. In their reply the heads of the Entente Powers (Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Vittorio Orlando) made this aid conditional on the cessation of military operations on the territory of Russia, but without indicating whether this condition would be binding on the powers who were pursuing a policy of armed intervention against the Soviet Republic. Nansen had obviously failed to see through the manoeuvres of the Entente leaders and expressed his agreement with the conditions they had put forward. On the same day, May 4, Lenin informed Chicherin that this question had been referred to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and asked him to draft a reply to Nansen, emphasising the need to expose the imperialists.

Lenin's letter published here contains his remarks on the draft reply to Nansen. p. 224

[220] William Bullitt, the American diplomat, came to Soviet Russia in March 1919 to ascertain the conditions on which the Soviet Government would agree to conclude peace with the Entente countries as well as with the whiteguard governments on Russian territory. Proposals emanating from the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, and the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, were transmitted through Bullitt. The Soviet Government, striving for the speediest

conclusion of peace, agreed to negotiations on the proposed terms, introducing into them, however, some essential amendments (for the text of the peace proposal drafted by the U.S. government representative, Bullitt, and the Government of the R.S.F.S.R., see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, 1958, pp. 91-95). Shortly after Bullitt's departure from Soviet Russia, Kolchak succeeded in achieving some successes on the Eastern Front, and the imperialist governments, anticipating the collapse of the Soviet state, refused peace negotiations. Wilson forbade publication of the draft agreement brought by Bullitt, and Lloyd George, in a speech in Parliament, declared that he had nothing to do with the negotiations with the Soviet Government. p. 225

[221] Lenin's remarks on the draft replies to Nansen were fully taken into account in the radio-telegram of May 7, 1919 (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, 1958, pp. 154-60). The plan put forward by Nansen came to nothing. p. 226

[222] Under pressure from the White Cossacks, the Soviet troops, which had been on the defensive east of Orenburg, withdrew and occupied positions seven kilometres from the town. p. 227

[223] Lunacharsky, who had been sent to Kostroma as an authorised agent of the All-Russia C.E.C. to combat desertions, reported on the serious food situation in Kostroma and Kostroma Gubernia. p. 229

[224] This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt of Ataman Grigoriev, which broke out at the beginning of May 1919 in the rear of the Soviet troops in the Ekaterinoslav and Kherson gubernias. The revolt directly threatened the flank and rear of the Soviet troops in the Donets Basin and the rear communications of units of the 2nd Ukrainian Army in the Crimea, and also hindered railway transport throughout the Ukraine. In the period from May 11 to 24, by simultaneous blows from the east, north and south, the troops of the Ukrainian armies routed the insurgents. p. 230

[225] On April 24, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars adopted the decree "On Organising Migration to the Producing Gubernias and the Don Region". The migration of peasants and workers of the northern gubernias of the R.S.F.S.R. to the southern areas of the country was carried out in order to ease their plight in the matter of food supply and restore agriculture in localities which had suffered from whiteguard revolts.

On this subject see also the telegram of May 21, 1919, signed by Lenin and S. P. Sereda, sent to the gubernia land departments in Smolensk, Tver, Moscow and Ryazan (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, pp. 144-45). p. 230

[226] In a telegram to the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), S. I. Gusev, M. M. Lashevich and K. K. Yurenev, members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, objected to

S. S. Kamenev being replaced by A. A. Samoilo as commander of the Eastern Front. The telegram stated that F. V. Kostyaev, Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, was making unwarranted replacements of army commanders, and that S. I. Aralov, a member of the R.M.C. of the Republic endorsed these orders of Kostyaev's by his signature. On May 25, 1919, S. S. Kamenev was reappointed commander of the Eastern Front. p. 231

[227] The occasion for Lenin's telegram was the receipt on May 20, 1919, at 7.10 p.m., of a telegram addressed to him, which reported that on their arrival in Novgorod, after having been received by Lenin, the Chairman of the Artel Association, A. A. Bulatov, and the Manager of the Instructors' Department, Lyubimov, had been arrested.

Lenin wrote the following note on the telegram he had received: "File for *handy reference*. Reply sent 20/V."

The inquiry mentioned by Lenin was made on May 13, 1919 (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, Document 567). p. 232

[228] Riga was captured on May 22, 1919, by the German troops under General Goltz and by the Lettish whiteguards. p. 233

[229] On May 26, 1919, Lenin sent another telegram to the Voronezh Gubernia Military Commissar (a copy was sent to the Gubernia Party Committee), stating: "Report immediately how many Communists have been sent to the Southern Front. *Lenin*, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars." (V. I. Lenin, *Voyennaya perepiska*, Moscow, 1957, p. 133.) p. 235

[230] The sentence in the telegram from the words "Bear in mind" to the words "and the Ukraine" was written by Lenin. The first part of the telegram is a typewritten text, apparently written by Chicherin since there is a note by him to the document saying: "To Comrade Lenin. Draft of a telegram; please reply whether you agree to it." He also wrote the last sentence: "Exceptions—Chinese workers, Persians, by orders from the centre." p. 235

[231] Alexandria and Znamenka were centres of the counter-revolutionary revolt of Ataman Grigoriev. On the night of May 21, 1919, Soviet troops fought their way into Alexandria, where Grigoriev had his headquarters. p. 236

[232] On the same day, May 28, 1919, another telegram, signed by Lenin, Krestinsky and Kamenev, was sent by direct line to Rakovsky, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. It contained the full test of the decision adopted by the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) and outlined concrete measures for its fulfilment (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 153). p. 236

[233] Towards the end of May the front of the Soviet troops at Millerovo was broken through, which resulted in the withdrawal of

units of the Southern Front and allowed Denikin's forces to unite with Cossack insurgents in villages of the Upper Don. p. 238

[234] In a letter to the Organising Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) entitled "Pandering to Prejudices", Y. M. Yaroslavsky asked the members of the Bureau whether persons who took part in religious ceremonies could be allowed to remain in the Party. p. 239

[235] This refers to the plan of the Ukraine's army men to set up a Revolutionary Military Council of the Donets Basin Front subordinated to the Southern Front and consisting of the 2nd Ukrainian, the 8th and the 13th armies. The plan was communicated to Lenin from Kharkov on May 31 by a telegram from the authorised agent of the Council of Defence. p. 241

[236] On May 27, 1919, the C.P.C. heard a report by A. I. Svidersky, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food on the state of grain procurements and on plans for the food procurement campaign before the next harvest. The Council decided to publish Svidersky's report in the form of an article and to transmit abroad by radio a short communication about it with statistical data.

Lenin's instruction to the secretary was written on the text of the prepared radio-information, which stressed that, in spite of extremely adverse conditions (lack of commodities, devaluation of the currency, seizure by whiteguards of the main grain-growing regions), procurements of grain in 1919 were proceeding more successfully than in the previous year: the Soviet food supply organisations collected 102 million poods of grain during the nine months (from August 1918 to April 1919) compared with only 28 million poods during the ten months (from November 1917 to August 1918)

Svidersky's article "Immediate Food Prospects" was published in *Izvestia* for June 3 and 4, 1919. p. 241

[237] This telegram concerns the situation on the Western Front and the conflict between A. I. Okulov, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, on the one hand, and J. V. Stalin, G. Y. Zinoviev and the leadership of the 7th Army, on the other. In the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U., there are notes on this question which were exchanged between Lenin and Sklyansky at a meeting. Lenin wrote to Sklyansky: "Stalin demands the recall of Okulov, whom he accuses of intrigues and disorganisation." In answer to a note of Sklyansky's giving a favourable testimonial of Okulov, Lenin gave the following directive to Sklyansky: "Then draft the text of a telegram (a precise statement of what the 7th Army is accused by Okulov) and I will send a code message to Stalin and Zinoviev to keep the conflict within bounds and channel it in the right direction." The draft of the telegram published here was drawn up in accordance with this directive and afterwards supplemented and signed by Lenin.

On the subject of the recall of Okulov, see also this volume, Document 354. p. 242

[228] Lenin's note to Chicherin was written in connection with a letter from M. Barakatullah, an Indian professor, who wrote about the struggle against British imperialism in India, and asked that his article on Bolshevism be published "in order to win the hearts of the Moslems to the support of Bolshevism". p. 244

[239] The ultimatum mentioned in this note was presented to the British Government by a delegation of the British Trades Union Congress. The workers demanded that the government should not interfere in the internal affairs of Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary and threatened a general strike if their demands were not met. p. 244

[240] On June 6, 1919, the Political Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) passed a decision to transfer S. P. Natsarenus to the Ukraine. In this connection the following telegram was sent to Stalin: "Politbureau of C.C. has decided, in view of the extreme necessity of immediately effecting unity of command in the Ukraine, to appoint Natsarenus a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army, formerly the 2nd Ukrainian Army. *Lenin*, *Krestinsky*, *Kamenev*." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 490.) p. 247

[241] This refers to repulsing Finnish whiteguards who were making attacks on the Soviet frontier. p. 247

[242] For Sklyansky's telegram to Melnichansky on June 9, and to Beloborodov on June 10, 1919, see the book: V. I. Lenin, *Voyennaya pereptska*, Moscow, 1957, p. 148. p. 250

[243] While the Southern group of troops of the Eastern Front were conducting decisive offensive operations against Kolchak, White Cossack and kulak revolts flared up in a number of front-line areas (Samara and Orenburg gubernias, the Urals Region). p. 251

[244] On receiving Lenin's telegram, Stalin wrote on it a reply for dispatch to Moscow: "What was lost has not yet been recovered. Heavy crossfire is going on. Everything that could be sent has been sent for operations by land. Obviously it is impossible and inadvisable to leave for Moscow during these days. Postpone the plenum. We have no objection to publication of part of the document...." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 50, p. 490.)

The document mentioned in the telegram has not been found. p. 253

[245] The counter-revolutionary mutiny at Fort Krasnaya Gorka, which broke out during the night of June 12, 1919, was put down during the night of June 13. Fort Seraya Loshad, which had joined the rebels, also fell during the day of June 16. Only a few hours before the mutiny was suppressed, the Soviet command received information that a British naval force of 23 ships had set out from Libau to aid the Krasnaya Gorka mutineers. In view of the

fact, however, that the Soviet fleet dominated the sea approaches to Petrograd, the British command did not venture to begin large scale operations and was compelled to limit the activities of its squadron to isolated actions. p. 254

[246] This refers to the decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), dated June 15, 1919, on General Headquarters. In a statement to the C.C. Trotsky opposed this decision, which he described as containing "whims, mischief", etc. p. 255

[247] Lenin wrote this letter in connection with the strike of workers at a number of enterprises of Tver Gubernia. The strike, which broke out in the middle of June 1919 and lasted several days, was caused by dissatisfaction among the workers over the reduction of the bread ration and food supplies. Counter-revolutionary elements tried to take advantage of the economic difficulties of the Soviet Republic in order to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments.

The question of the food strikes was discussed at joint meetings of the Politbureau and Orgbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on June 18 and 24, 1919. Special measures were taken to improve the position of the workers of the textile district. p. 255

[248] This refers to a revolt in the rear of Kolchak's army.

The Kustanai partisans who broke through to the Soviet forces were formed into a Communist Regiment which fought the enemies of the revolution to the very end of the Civil War. p. 256

[249] In a telegram on June 20, 1919, V. I. Nevsky and L. S. Sosnovsky reported from Tver that the strike was at an end and all enterprises were resuming work. They wrote that, over and above the delegates constitutionally elected by the uyezd congresses for the forthcoming Gubernia Congress of Soviets, the Gubernia Executive Committee had invited an extra delegate from each volost for the purpose of strengthening ties with the countryside. The Gubernia Congress of Soviets decided to ask the C.E.C. to grant the volost delegates the right to vote. Nevsky and Sosnovsky objected to this, stressing that 80 per cent of the volost delegates were non-Party, predominantly kulak elements, and they asked Lenin to reply urgently.

The telegraph form on which Lenin's telegram was written bears a note by him: "*Files*." p. 257

[250] On June 23, 1919, Lenin received a telegram from the River Transport Administration Committee, reporting the existence of large stocks of grain on the Belaya River and the need to expedite its dispatch.

In reply to Lenin's inquiry, Svidersky reported that, in order to expedite grain procurements on the Belaya River and in Ufa Gubernia in general, M. I. Frumkin, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, had gone there from Samara, and that measures would be taken to send food army men to the Belaya. p. 258

[251] This refers to the offensive of General Wrangel's Caucasian army, which was part of Denikin's forces, in the direction of Saratov and Penza. p. 259

[252] In his reply to Lenin on the same day, Frunze wired: "I have devoted and am devoting the most serious attention to the enemy operations on the Urals Front, particularly in the area of Nikolayevsk, in view of the obvious danger of the Kolchak and Denikin fronts linking up on the Volga. Unfortunately, in this sector I have had at my disposal only weak units, completely untrained and often poorly armed forces. All the rest were sent against Kolchak at the time of his offensive against Samara and until now have been engaged in the Ufa direction...." (*Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 2, 1961, p. 234.) Frunze assured Lenin that Uralsk and the entire northern part of the region would be cleared of whiteguards within 10 to 14 days. On July 11, 1919, the Red Army liberated Uralsk. p. 259

[253] On June 16, 1919, the C.P.C. received a telegram from military engineer Y. A. Berkalov stating that the finance department of the Porokhovo District Soviet of Petrograd had imposed an extraordinary tax of 40,000 rubles on the 50,000 rubles granted to Berkalov by a decision of the C.P.C. of November 26, 1918, as a reward for his artillery invention (consisting in the discovery of methods for long-range artillery fire and for increasing the muzzle velocity of the shells)

The decision of the C.P.C. "On Inventions", dated June 30, 1919, which laid down that rewards for inventions were exempt from taxation, was published on July 4 in *Izvestia* No. 144. p. 260

[254] Lenin advised Gorky to "take a trip" on the propaganda steamer *Red Star*, which was making a cruise on the Volga and Kama. Krupskaya took part in this trip along with a group of top-level functionaries of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), the C.E.C., and various People's Commissariats. On July 10, Lenin wired Krupskaya: "I saw Gorky today and tried to persuade him to travel on your steamer, about which I had sent a telegram to Nizhni, but he flatly refused." (See present edition, Vol. 37, p. 545.) p. 260

[255] On July 3, 1919, the Bureau of the Women's Organisation in Sormovo requested N. K. Krupskaya, who had come to Sormovo, to help obtain a building from the Sormovo Works Management for a children's home. Housing belonging to the works could be made over to other institutions only by an order of the Council of Defence; hence the application of the Sormovo Women's Organisation was forwarded to Lenin. Lenin's directive was considered at a meeting of the Presidium of the Sormovo Soviet on July 18. The matter was referred for a final decision to the Presidium of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Executive Committee,

which decided to meet the request of the Sormovo Women's Organisation. p. 261

[256] At the beginning of July the Command of the Southern Front asked Lenin to permit a call-up of 18-year-old working men in districts close to the front. Before putting the matter before the Council of Defence, Lenin asked the All-Russia Chief Headquarters for information about reinforcements sent to the Southern Front. In reply to Lenin's telegram of July 8, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front repeated its request. On July 11, 1919, the Council of Defence decided "to permit the R.M.C. of the Southern Front to carry out mobilisation of 18-year-olds in the above-mentioned areas" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 378). In addition, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was instructed to adopt measures for the immediate dispatch of the trained units to the fronts, primarily the Southern Front. p. 262

[257] F. Shturmin, a Red Army soldier, sent a letter to Lenin asking for orders to be sent to the Nizhni-Novgorod Uyezd Military Commissariat to give him his pay for the period of his illness. Together with the note to Sklyansky, Lenin sent the documents he had received from Shturmin. p. 262

[258] The text of Lenin's directive was quoted by N. P. Gorbunov, head of the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council of the R.S.F.S.R., in the general plan drawn up by him on July 14, 1919, outlining measures for the extraction of oil, coal, sapropel, shales and fuel gases.

In the spring of 1919 a large expedition from the Chief Shale Committee was sent to the Volga to organise the exploitation of fuel shales and bituminous deposits in Undory, Kapshira (near Syzran) and Syukeyevo.

In the second half of July and in August 1919, a number of executives on the staff of the Chief Shale Committee, headed by I. M. Gubkin, went to the Volga to check on the work of the expedition and give it assistance. Included in the group were F. F. Syromolotov, Chairman of the Chief Mining Board of the Supreme Economic Council, and V. P. Nogin, who enlisted the co-operation of local Party and administrative organisations. The results of the expedition's work were reported to Lenin (see I. M. Gubkin's contribution in the book *Vospominaniya o Vladimire Ilyiche Lenine* [Recollections about Vladimir Ilyich Lenin], Part 2, Moscow, 1957, pp. 300-19). p. 264

[259] J. Hanecki, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance, was to draft a reply to Rakovsky's telegram received by Lenin on July 16, 1919, requesting the dispatch of money that had been promised in connection with the acute financial crisis in the Ukraine. Hanecki drew up the following reply: "Today 300 is being sent, of which 50 are assigned for Kaluga. In future, consignments will be made regularly." On Hanecki's reply Lenin

wrote his second note and marked at the top of the document "Reply to Rakovsky". p. 265

[260] In a telegram to the Soviet Government of Latvia on July 17, 1919, Lenin wrote: "Please get in touch with Stalin, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, on the question of the change of name." (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 194.) The renaming of the Lettish Division did not take place; it retained its old name—the Lettish Rifle Division. p. 266

[261] The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic at that time was S. S. Kamenev. p. 266

[262] Lenin is referring to the capture of Zlatoust by the 5th Army (July 13, 1919), and of Ekaterinburg (now Sverdlovsk) by the 2nd Army on July 14, 1919. p. 267

[263] The question of establishing fixed prices for grain and manufactured goods was discussed at a meeting of the C.P.C. on July 22, 1919, and at further meetings of the Council on July 24 and 31. The decision adopted on July 31 laid down that the selling price for workers and office employees would remain as before, and the People's Commissariat for Food and the Board of the Supreme Economic Council were directed not later than September 1, 1919, to sign and publish fixed prices for foodstuffs and manufactured goods. p. 268

[264] In reply (their telegram of July 28, 1919) Frunze and Lashevich informed Lenin that the situation south of Buzuluk and in the Uralsk area gave no cause for alarm; that not later than July 31 the whole right bank of the Ural River would be liberated from the enemy, and that the railway to Uralsk was cleared and rapidly being repaired. The telegram also mentioned that a serious situation had arisen north of Astrakhan. p. 269

[265] This refers to the plan of struggle against Denikin drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief, S. S. Kamenev. According to this plan, the main attack was to be delivered by the left wing of the Southern Front via the Don Region with a secondary attack in the Kharkov direction. The plan was expounded in a directive of the Supreme Command dated July 23, 1919 (see *Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 2, 1961, pp. 499-500). On July 27, 1919, L. D. Trotsky sent a telegram to E. M. Sklyansky, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, in which he reported that "Commander of the Southern Front Yegoriev considers Kamenev's operational plan for the south to be wrong, and in carrying it out does not expect success" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 381). This opinion, Trotsky wrote, was shared by Sokolnikov, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front, and Peremytov, Chief of Operations Division. p. 270

[266] Written in reply to a communication from Bela Kun about the serious situation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, against which

an armed intervention had been started, and to his request for urgent aid from Soviet Russia. p. 271

[267] Lenin, who was resting at Gorki on August 3 and 4, 1919, apparently wrote this note in connection with the fact that at the end of July and beginning of August 1919 strong rumours were current in the West-European press, and were also spread by the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, about an imminent replacement of the Soviet Government in Russia by a coalition government (with the participation of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries). *Pravda* on August 6 and *Izvestia* on August 8 published articles ridiculing these rumours, which reflected the imperialists' hopes for the overthrow of Soviet rule in Russia with the aid of social traitors, as had occurred in Hungary. p. 272

[268] This refers to Trotsky's telegram to Lenin reporting that at a meeting in Kiev on August 6, 1919, attended by L. D. Trotsky, Kh. G. Rakovsky, A. I. Yegorov, S. I. Aralov, N. G. Semyonov and V. P. Zatonsky, it was decided to withdraw the Soviet troops to a new line and to surrender to the enemy the Black Sea coast with Odessa and Nikolayev. p. 273

[269] Written on a letter from C. S. Bobrovskaya, a professional revolutionary and member of the Party since 1898, asking Lenin to help fix her up with a job. p. 275

[270] Lenin is referring to Smilga's letter to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) reporting on the grave situation at the Southern Front. "The chief and basic cause of our reverses," he wrote, "lies in the inability of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to command and control the troops.... The Revolutionary Military Council, as now constituted, is ineffectual. Failure to understand one another is so great that the idea of achieving any harmony in the work is ruled out." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 382.) p. 276

[271] This note was apparently written during a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on August 26, 1919, at which the work of the Food Research Institute was discussed. The C.P.C. decided "that a report by the People's Commissariat for Health and the People's Commissariat for Food on the practical tasks of the Food Research Institute be made within three months. Within the same period, a report by the Food Research Institute to be made on the techniques of producing sugar from sawdust". Fotieva wrote on Lenin's note: "Fulfilled 28.VIII."

Apparently at the same sitting, Krasin wrote a note to Lenin saying that 18 lbs. of sugar could be obtained from one pood of sawdust. Lenin wrote back in reply: "Unbelievable—18 lbs. from one pood!! 45 per cent??? Sugar content? %?" *(Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 29.) Lenin frequently reverted to this subject (see present edition, Vol. 35, Document 230). p. 278

[272] Mamontov's cavalry corps was directed by Denikin to deliver a blow in the rear of the Soviet troops on the Southern Front. On

August 10, 1919, Mamontov's cavalry broke through the front in the vicinity of Novokhopersk and raided a number of towns and villages. This created a threat to the Soviet forces, made offensive operations difficult, and upset the system of command and supply in various places. Lenin considered it an urgent task to organise the rout of Mamontov's corps (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 39, pp. 171-72). Mamontov's corps was routed in October-November 1919. p. 279

[273] The note refers to the 21st Division redirected from the Eastern Front to reinforce the troops of the Southern Front.

"*Lashevich's godsons*"—Mamontov's cavalry corps.

"*Sokolnikov's godson*"—F. K. Mironov, who had raised a Don corps in the Saransk area and on August 23, 1919, organised a revolt against the Soviets. The revolt was quelled by S. M. Budyonny's cavalry corps. p. 279

[274] On September 1, 1919, a general meeting of trade unions was held in Tashkent. After hearing Lenin's telegram, the meeting passed a resolution which stated: "...Red Tashkent, in the name of Red Turkestan, vows to fulfil all the assignments given us by the centre, and the red banner, proudly unfurled over Turkestan, will not falter in the hands of Red Tashkent." (*Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR*, Vol. 2, 1961, p. 737.) p. 280

[275] In his reply to Lenin on September 2, 1919, Stalin wired that on the day of Marchlewski's arrival to conduct negotiations with the Lithuanians, the latter suddenly launched an attack. Obviously, the telegram pointed out, the Lithuanians had used talk about negotiations as a cover in order to lull the vigilance of the Soviet Government. Stalin stated that he had not received any decisions of the Central Committee about conducting negotiations. "Today," he wrote further, "our counter-offensive has begun. We have issued an order to Front Headquarters to heighten vigilance and not allow any envoys to pass the front line without its knowledge and consent." p. 281

[276] Written in reply to a telegram from Trotsky, Serebryakov and Lashevich of September 5, 1919, which in effect proposed altering the previously adopted plan of struggle against Denikin. On September 6, 1919, after discussing the telegram, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) adopted a decision "to endorse the draft reply of the Commander-in-Chief and to wire that the Politbureau is surprised at this question being raised again". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 384.) p. 281

[277] Written on a covering letter dated September 12, 1919, from A. K. Paikes, Deputy People's Commissar for State Control, accompanying the report of K. F. Martinovich, Chief Controller of the Southern Front, concerning the evacuation of Southern Front Headquarters from the town of Kozlov. p. 283

[278] Written in connection with a communication from the Smolny Staff Committee reporting numerous cases of abuses, embezzlement and peculation of money, food products and clothing collected for the Red Army. The Committee requested that an investigating commission be appointed and the guilty persons brought to book. p. 283

[279] On September 11, 1919, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) discussed the arrests of bourgeois intellectuals and directed F. E. Dzerzhinsky, N. I. Bukharin and L. B. Kamenev to have their cases reconsidered. p. 283

[280] At a joint meeting of the Politbureau and Orgbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on September 18, 1919, it was decided to cancel the decision about sending Serebryakov to Selivachov. p. 286

[281] In a letter to Lenin dated September 26, 1919, Chicherin asked that the question of a new peace proposal to the Entente should be discussed in the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). Chicherin wrote that an official proposal from the government could be addressed to the Entente, or Gorky could be asked to write a letter pointing out the Soviet Government's invariable readiness to sign peace. Lenin wrote on Chicherin's letter: "...*Not* in the name of the government.... Confine ourselves to Gorky's letter...." (See present edition, Vol. 42, p. 144.) p. 286

[282] This refers to A. S. Solovyov's memo on "Ukhta Oil" sent to Lenin on September 23, 1919.

On this subject see also this volume, Document 14. p. 287

[283] The letter was written at the request of the Dutch Communist, S. Rutgers, who was sent by the Executive Committee of the Communist International to Holland to organise there the West-European Bureau of the Communist International. p. 291

[284] At a meeting of the Council of Defence on October 17, 1919, Lenin made a report on the subject of reviewing warrants and assignments for military property. The Council of Defence decided to refer this question to a commission consisting of S. D. Markov, A. I. Svidersky, A. I. Rykov and E. M. Sklyansky, with instructions, "if agreement is reached", to present the decision for Lenin's signature by Monday, October 20. The Council of Defence discussed also the question of the search for property suitable for military purposes. On October 31, 1919, the Council of Defence endorsed a decision for the review of warrants and assignments for military property and a decision on the search for property suitable for military purposes. p. 292

[285] On October 15, 1919, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) decided to direct the commission to discuss Regulations on a Committee of Aid for the Wounded and submit them to the C.P.C. on behalf of the Central Committee. On October 28 the draft Regulations "On the Committee of Aid for Wounded and Sick Red Army Men" were examined at a sitting of the C.P.C. On Oc-

tober 29, the Regulations under this title were endorsed by the All-Russia C.E.C. and published in *Izvestia* No. 245, November 1, 1919. p. 293

[286] Lenin is referring to the decision of the Council of Defence dated October 16, 1919. It contained a directive to defend Petrograd to the last drop of blood, without yielding an inch of ground and fighting in the streets. In his proposed plan of struggle against Yudenich's forces, Trotsky also spoke of the need to prepare for street fighting in the city. But, in issuing its main directive for holding Petrograd at all costs until the arrival of reinforcements, the Council of Defence allowed for street fighting only if the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the city, whereas Trotsky's argument was different. He asserted that "for purely military considerations" it would be advantageous to allow the enemy to break into Petrograd which should therefore be converted into "a big trap for the whiteguard troops". p. 294

[287] Written by Lenin on Smirnov's telegram which reported that "the morale in Siberia is a firm, Soviet one. By organising local forces, we shall cope with Kolchak; all that is needed are uniforms and cartridges. Yesterday we went over to the offensive along the whole front, and expect to reach the Ishim in three weeks". Further, mention was made of the desire of the Communists of the 5th Army that the army be transferred to the Southern Front. Smirnov proposed that after the Ishim three divisions of this army should be transferred to the south. "If you provide uniforms for 30,000," he wrote, "we shall immediately mobilise this number of soldiers in Chelyabinsk and the place to which we are going. Send only uniforms; we have and will have all the manpower" (underlinings by Lenin) (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 388).

The document bears a note by Lenin asking that the telegram be returned to him. p. 295

[288] The situation on the Southern Front becoming extremely acute, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and the Soviet Government demanded that the military command should first of all eliminate the whiteguard forces which might co-operate closely with Denikin's army. The Urals White Cossack army of General Tolstov, being adjacent to the right flank of Denikin's front, was in a position to make contact with Denikin's forces. It operated in the North Caspian area and diverted to itself troops of the Turkestan Front as well as part of the forces of the 11th Army of the South-Eastern Front. p. 295

[289] In the spring of 1919 Denikin seized Daghestan, Chechen, Ossetia and other national areas of the Northern Caucasus. The mountain peoples responded with a holy war against the whiteguards. Bourgeois-nationalist elements tried to take the leadership of this insurrectionary movement into their hands. However, they

did not succeed in winning over the main mass of the mountain people. Under the leadership of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), explanatory work was carried out among the insurgents on a large scale and Communist organisations were formed among the partisan forces. The insurrectionary movement rapidly assumed a Bolshevik character. p. 296

[290] In accordance with the directive issued on October 17, 1919, by Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, a striking force under S. D. Kharlamov was organised in the Kolpino-Tosno area. This group was to deliver an attack against the enemy in the Krasnoye Selo-Gatchina direction. At the same time the command of the Western Front planned a general counter-offensive by the 7th and 15th armies. The 7th Army was to continue the attack in the direction of Gatchina-Volosovo-Yamburg, and the 15th Army in the Pskov-Luga area. p. 297

[291] The Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U. contain an extract from a reconnaissance report of November 17, 1919, which states that in the vicinity of Disna fraternisation took place with Polish soldiers and the lower ranks of the Polish officers. The document bears a note by Lenin: "This is very important! Send copies to Comrade Trotsky for all members of the Politbureau." p. 298

[292] In a letter to Lenin dated October 22, 1919, Chicherin objected to Trotsky's proposal for starting a war against Estonia. He wrote that Yudenich would have to be pursued on Estonian territory only if he retreated there. Chicherin pointed out the need to do everything to avoid invading Estonia. p. 300

[293] Written on a report from Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev asking that drafts of governmental directives on operational matters should first be submitted for consideration to the Supreme Command. The document bears the following notes: "I agree. Only notice should be given not in the name of the Central Committee, but in the name of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. *N. Krestinsky*, *L. Kamenev*." "I agree with the request of the Commander-in-Chief. *M. Kalinin*." p. 300

[294] In the autumn of 1919, I. Volny was summoned to Moscow and received by Lenin. During a two-hour conversation, as Bonch-Bruyevich recounted later in his recollections, Lenin showed an interest in the writer's creative plans and questioned him about everything he had seen. p. 301

[295] By a decision of the Central Committee of the Party, more than half the graduating class of Communist students of the Sverdlov University were sent to the front. On October 24, 1919, Lenin delivered a speech to the students of the University who were leaving for the front (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 76-84). p. 302

[296] This letter was written in connection with the departure for the front of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Communists who had been called

up. A meeting of the city Party organisation took place in Ivanovo-Voznesensk on October 3. It called on every member of the Party to devote himself to the cause of routing Denikin's army and instructed the Party organisations to begin mobilising Communists for the front. The first party of mobilised men were seen off to the front on October 22. On October 24, the mobilised Ivanovo-Voznesensk Communists arrived in Moscow. Lenin made a speech to them in the House of Trade Unions (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 39, p. 238). Fifty of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Communists were sent to the Headquarters and the Political Department of the South-Eastern Front and the remainder to the 9th Army. p. 302

[297] In a telegram on October 24, 1919, the Chairman of the Pugachev Uyezd Food Conference reported that the surplus appropriation quota had been fulfilled 50 per cent, and in some volosts 10.0 per cent. The telegram stated that the planned quota would be fulfilled before December 1, 1919. p. 303

[298] Written on a memo addressed to Lenin by the Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars, V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, who pointed out the urgent need for building public baths with disinfection chambers at Moscow's railway stations in order to combat an imminent epidemic of typhus.

The document bears a note by Semashko: "Z. P. Solovyov. A commission should be set up ... to *urgently* consider the matter. Dr. Levenson is instructed to take the initiative in convening a conference." p. 304

[299] Simultaneously Lenin wrote a similar letter to Kotomkin, Food Commissar of Ufa Gubernia, and on December 11, 1919, wired Reske, agent of the Central Executive Committee in Ufa (with copies to Fotieva and Kotomkin): "Fotieva is not to leave before January 1st. Report fulfilment." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 391.) p. 305

[300] On November 6, 1919, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) accepted the idea of the Red Army crossing the Estonian frontier to complete the rout of Yudenich's whiteguard forces. On November 14, however, this decision was rescinded at a meeting of the Politbureau which noted that under pressure from the working population the Estonian Government was agreeing to resume peace negotiations and, apparently, would not support Yudenich.

On December 5, 1919, a peace conference of the R.S.F.S.R. and Estonia opened in the town of Yuriev (Tartu), at which an agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the R.S.F.S.R. and Estonia was signed (December 31, 1919). On February 2, 1920, a peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Estonia was concluded. p. 309

[301] On the back of this letter, I. I. Radchenko, Chairman of the Chief Peat Committee, wrote: "A report on the 1919 peat campaign

was sent to Lenin at 1 p.m. on November 11, 1919. On the same day, at 11 p.m., this comment on it was received." p. 310

[302] This telegram was written by decision of the Council of Defence, which dealt with the question of food supplies for the mining and metallurgical workers of the Urals at its sitting on November 20, 1919. Later, on December 15, Lenin sent another telegram to the same destination: "...regarding the supply of food for the Urals workers, only once has a reply been received—on December 15. Reports (how many poods are delivered) must be sent twice a month" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 245). On January 14, 1920, a telegram signed by Lenin and Rykov was sent to the R.M.C. of the Eastern Front, the Ufa Gubernia Food Commissar, the Commissar of the Samara-Zlatoust railway, and the Special Food Commissar of the 5th Army, pointing out the necessity of supplying food to all workers of the South Urals factories, mines and pits (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 253). p. 311

[303] Lenin is referring to Weissbrot's telegram of November 20, 1919, reporting on the extremely grave situation created in Orenburg by the spread of a typhus epidemic. The absence of firewood and lack of medical personnel made it difficult to combat the epidemic. For the fight against typhus, Weissbrot pointed out, it was necessary to increase the number of hospital beds in Orenburg to five thousand and to transfer an additional two hospitals. p. 312

[304] Written in connection with a report from B. S. Weissbrot dated November 5, 1919, concerning the supply of doctors for the Red Army. Weissbrot pointed out that there was a surplus of doctors in the medical institutions of Moscow and urged the need to call up doctors and send them to the front. Lenin marked off the passage in the report which said that some institutions, for instance, the clinics of the Second Moscow State University, had more doctors exempted than they had altogether before the imperialist war, and wrote "N.B." in the margin and a footnote saying: "Check this fact **carefully** and at once." On another page, where Weissbrot pointed to the existence in Moscow of unnecessary medical establishments, Lenin noted: "how many of them are there?" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 394.) p. 312

[305] Lenin proposed that a representative from Kiev Gubernia be included in the C.E.C. His proposal was adopted. K. Tolkachov was elected as the representative from Kiev Gubernia to the C.E.C. p. 314

[306] This note was written on a letter from S. M. Kirov and I. P. Babkin dated December 9, 1919, concerning the situation in the Caucasus. The letter stated that there was no exact information whether Kamo had arrived in Baku.

In the autumn of 1919, Kamo, at the head of a combat group, was sent secretly from Moscow with arms, munitions and literature to carry out underground work in the Caucasus. Overcoming

all difficulties, the group arrived safely in Baku and joined in the struggle against the Denikinites. p. 314

[307] In a conversation by direct line with members of the Turkestan Commission, Frunze said: "The refusal to send top-level political workers is due to the big demands of the Southern Front and the Ukraine.... By our efforts we have succeeded in getting ... a few people for both the political and the technical jobs." (*M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoi voiny. Sbornik dokumentov*, Moscow, 1941, p. 259.) p. 314

[308] This refers to the article "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (see present edition, Vol. 30, pp. 253-75), which Lenin completed on December 16, 1919. p. 316

[309] This note was apparently written in connection with the discussion at a meeting of the Council of Defence on December 17, 1919, of a report by L. B. Krasin: "On Drawing Up Forms of Accounting Enabling the Work of the Railways To Be Kept Under Review." The final decision on this question was put off until the next meeting; the Council of Defence instructed Y. V. Lomonosov, member of the Board of the Commissariat for Railways, to submit a report on the forms of accounting giving statistical data ("such forms", the decision stipulated, "must be briefer than those presented by Comrade Krasin"). On December 24, the Council of Defence endorsed the programme of measures set forth by Lomonosov, and instructed the People's Commissariat for Railways "to present it tomorrow to Comrade Lenin for signature in the form of a series of decrees" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 396).

The document bears a note in an unknown hand: "Executed 19.XII." p. 317

[310] In the autumn of 1919 a group of "federalists", headed by G. Lapchinsky, P. Popov and Y. Lander, was formed in the Communist Party of the Ukraine. The group took a bourgeois nationalist stand and started factional splitting activities. On December 13, 1919, the federalists called a meeting of 32 of their supporters at which they declared against the policy of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) towards the Ukraine. Popov and Lander signed a statement on behalf of 32 Ukrainian Party functionaries criticising the composition of the Bureau of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine and its methods of work, and protesting against Party and administrative functionaries for the Ukraine being mobilised from Russian gubernias.

On December 18, 1919, the Orgbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) examined the declaration of the Ukrainian Party functionaries and decided "to reprimand them because, instead of doing positive work in accordance with the directive of the All-Ukraine Revolutionary Committee and the Bureau of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine, they are wasting time and energy in gossip and ir-

responsible political chicanery, which is a violation of Party discipline....” p. 317

[311] This refers to the appointment of P. N. Lepeshinsky to Turkestan, where he worked as Deputy People’s Commissar for Education. p. 318

[312] On December 21, 1919, a letter signed by Lenin was sent also to the Party Committee and Executive Committee of Tula Gubernia. It stressed the need for sending not less than 400 truckloads of potatoes to the Moscow working people within the next ten days. “On your achievements, energy and determination,” the letter stated, “depend the salvation of the working class, the consolidation of the gains of the revolution, and its further successes and final triumph.” (*Lenin Miscellany XXIV*, p. 146.) p. 319

[313] This note was apparently written in connection with a sitting of the Narrow Council of People’s Commissars on December 18, 1919, which discussed a request from the Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee for the cancellation of a circular of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs on the use of church buildings for school purposes. The Narrow C.P.C. resolved to reject the request of the Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee, and to direct the People’s Commissariats for Education, Justice and Internal Affairs to draft a relevant instruction and submit it to the Narrow C.P.C. by December 29, 1919. p. 320

[314] Written on a telegram sent from Ruzayevka by J. Kh. Peters, Chairman of the Special Committee for Introducing Martial Law on the Railways. It was received late in the evening on December 25, 1919, and contained a proposal for recalling skilled workers of railway repair-shops and depots from the army, since locomotive repairs had decreased almost everywhere, and in some places dropped to a catastrophic minimum.

At a meeting of the Council of Defence on December 31, after discussion of a draft decision put forward by L. B. Krasin “on withdrawing from the army skilled railway repair-shop men and workers”, it was decided to regard the question as settled, in view of Krasin’s statement that in practice it had already been solved. p. 321

[315] Written in reply to I. N. Smirnov’s telegram addressed to Lenin reporting on the progress of work for dispatching coal from Kolchugino and the Kuznetsk Basin.

Lenin gave directives for the troops of the Red Army to guard the property left by Kolchak’s retreating army at Omsk and along the railway line to Irkutsk. p. 322

[316] This refers to the meeting of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on December 27, 1919, which discussed the following: an inquiry by Chicherin whether he could send the Georgian Government a proposal for joint military operations against Denikin without recognising that government; a report by Chicherin that the Estonians agreed to give the military guarantees asked for on

condition of their being granted the right to construct fortifications on the left bank of the Narova; a statement by Chicherin concerning the Petrograd branch of ROSTA, which had published a communication of a military nature that could be interpreted by the Entente and Finland as an intention on the part of Soviet Russia to launch an attack against Finland, and other questions. p. 323

[317] *The Central Collegium of Agitational Centres* was established by a decision of the Council of Defence on May 13, 1919, for the purpose of organising centres of agitation and education at railway junctions and troop entrainment points. p. 323

[318] On the previous day, December 29, 1919, Lenin received Maria Movshovich in his office in the Kremlin. She had come to Moscow from the front because her husband had fallen ill with typhus and her daughter was left without anyone to look after her. Lenin talked to her about her work in the Red Army and the situation at the front. On the following day he visited her and promised his help in arranging her personal affairs. p. 323

[319] Written on a telegram from V. Yushin of Oshta village, Olonets Gubernia, who complained that the local authorities had requisitioned from him one of his three cows. Yushin pointed out that his family consisted of nine persons and his son was in the Red Army. Brichkina sent a copy of the telegram to Tsyurupa in the People's Commissariat for Food. p. 324

[320] Written on a telegram telephoned to Lenin by V. N. Yakovleva, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, and received by C.P.C. secretary M. I. Glyasser on January 1, 1920, at 4.25 p.m. It concerned information which had arrived on December 30 and 31 about the progress of the loading and dispatch of food trains to Moscow. Yakovleva reported also the absence of information from Kazan and Simbirsk, since the direct line was out of action on both December 30 and 31, and that in Samara the number of empties provided for food was considerably less than what was required.

At a meeting of the Council of Defence on January 2, 1920, Lenin delivered a report on "Military Accountancy of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs and the People's Commissariat for Railways". p. 324

[321] *Die Freiheit*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published in Berlin from November 15, 1918, to September 30, 1922. p. 326

[322] Lenin is referring to the Extraordinary Congress of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, held in Leipzig between November 30 and December 6, 1919. Under pressure from Left-wing members of the party, the Congress adopted a programme of action which supported the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the system of Soviets. At the Congress, the proletarian wing of the party proposed "immediate and uncon-

ditional affiliation to the Third International". (See present edition, Vol. 31, p. 74.) p. 326

[323] The note to Svidersky was written on a letter to Lenin from the workers of the Balashinsk factory, who wrote: "We workers receive food, exclusively bread, at intervals of 5 to 14 days, and no other products. If potatoes are issued from the centre they stand for about a month on the railway line.... Comrade Lenin, we ask you to help us improve our position so that we can do better work for the good and prosperity of our revolutionary Russia." p. 327

[324] On January 5, 1920, Tsyurupa sent a letter to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) in which he pointed out that the decision adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on January 3, 1920, permitting agencies of the Supreme Economic Council to purchase forage at free prices in cases where the State Control found it impossible for agencies of the People's Commissariat for Food to supply forage to S.E.C. enterprises, violated the principles of the Food Commissariat's food policy and did away with the forage procurement monopoly. He requested that the matter be discussed in the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). p. 328

[325] Written in reply to a telegram to Lenin from the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army on January 10, 1920, which proposed that the army be switched over to the work of restoring the national economy. On January 13, 1920, in its decision on Lenin's report concerning the organisation of the 1st Labour Army, the Council of People's Commissars welcomed the proposal of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army. A commission consisting of Lenin, Krasin, Rykov, Tomsky, Trotsky and Tsyurupa was set up to draft proposals for the most expedient ways of utilising the 3rd Army. By its decree of January 15, 1920, the Council of Defence converted the 3rd Army into the 1st Labour Army and set up a Revolutionary Council of the 1st Labour Army from among members of the Revolutionary Military Council, representatives of the People's Commissariats for Food, Agriculture, Railways, and Labour, and representatives of the Supreme Economic Council. On January 17 and 18, the question of using military units on the economic front was discussed in the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). The Politbureau approved the decision of the Council of Defence to convert the 3rd Army into the 1st Labour Army and passed a decision calling for plans to be drawn up for the creation of Kuban-Grozny, Ukrainian, Kazan. and Petrograd Labour Armies. On January 21, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. by agreement with the All-Ukraine Revolutionary Committee passed a decision to form a Ukrainian Labour Army in the area of the South-Western Front. On February 10, the Council of Defence decreed that the 7th Army was to be renamed the Petrograd Revolutionary Army of Labour. At the end of January and beginning of February, the Reserve Army of the Republic and units of the 2nd Army were drawn into the work of economic construction, the troops of the

8th Army in March, and certain other military formations somewhat later. With the outbreak of the war against bourgeois-landowner Poland and Wrangel, the labour armies had to be switched back to battle readiness. p. 328

[326] On January 15, 1920, Tsyurupa communicated Lenin's instruction to M. K. Vladimirov, Chairman of the Special Food Commission of the Southern Front, and asked him to report on the state of food work in the Don Region. p. 330

[327] Written on a report from P. N. Solonko concerning deposits of coal, pyrites and white sand for chinaware in the vicinity of Bryansk. "The area on which coal has been discovered," Solonko stated, "is approximately 40 versts square. With the present means and productivity of labour, the yield of coal could amount to about 3,500,000 poods annually, and if production is well organised ... the yield could be more than 10 million poods." Lenin wrote on the envelope containing Solonko's report: "**From P. N. Solonko** *on coal in the Maltsev area*."

On January 15, 1920, Lenin received from the Chief Coal Committee a memo giving information about the coal deposits near Bryansk. "I am sending you the present information," wrote A. Lomov. "One of our best coal geologists has promised to go to the site" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 403). p. 330

[328] At its meeting on January 17, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars endorsed a decision for the collection of whiteguard literature. The decision was published (in part) in *Pravda* and in *Izvestia* No. 15, January 24, 1920. p. 331

[329] The paragraph in *Izvestia*, entitled "A Wealth of Oil Products", stated that the oil fields near Berchogur, in the neighbourhood of Zhilaya Kosa, had available stocks amounting to 20 million poods of oil, 300,000 poods of paraffin and 200,000 poods of petrol. In addition, oil was gushing from four wells. p. 331

[330] Trotsky's telegram to Frunze, Commander of the Turkestan Front, gave directives for the deployment of the 4th Army, which had been converted into a labour army for the construction of the Alexandrov-Gai-Emba railway line and the reconstruction of the: Krasny Kut-Alexandrov-Gai line to a broad gauge.

On January 19, Frunze signed an order for the construction of the Emba railway line by the 4th Army. p. 332

[331] In a telephone message on January 18, 1920, People's Commissar for Health N. A. Semashko reported that the troop train with B. S. Weissbrot's Sanitary Commission, which was sent to the Southern Front and the Ukraine to combat typhus, was proceeding very slowly. "I request," wrote Semashko, "1) an immediate order for the train to be speeded up, 2) special supervision over it, 3) investigation of the causes of delay and a trial of those to blame by a revolutionary tribunal." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 404.) p. 333

[332] In a note to Lenin, Kamenev protested against the decision of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars to close down the Nikitsky Theatre. Kamenev believed this question came within the competence of the local, and not the central, authorities, in this case the Moscow Department of Education. On January 20, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars discussed the closure of the Nikitsky Theatre. It endorsed the decision of the Narrow Council and instructed it "to call in representatives of the Moscow Soviet in matters concerning Moscow". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 405.) p. 333

[333] Lenin's telegram was written in connection with the attempt by Bashkir bourgeois nationalists to carry out a coup d'état in Bashkiria in January 1920. The bourgeois nationalist A.-Z. A. Validov and a group of his followers who, under pressure from the working people, came over to the side of Soviets in February 1919, had not changed their views or abandoned their aim to secure bourgeois autonomy for Bashkiria.

In the summer of 1919 the Validov group set up a "Provisional Central Bureau of the Communists of Bashkiria" headed by Yumagulov, who was at the same time Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee organised by the Validov group. Validov's "Bureau" tried to assume leadership of the Party organisations of Bashkiria although it had not been endorsed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). In January 1920, on the proposal of Validov's supporter, K. M. Rakai, the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee set up a Foreign Relations Department. When the Party Regional Committee on January 13, 1920, condemned this step and resolved to recall Rakai from the posts he held, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, Yumagulov, tried to carry out a coup d'état. On the night of January 13, 1920, by his order the members of the Party Regional Committee and other Communists were arrested, and a manifesto was issued accusing them of conspiring against the Bashkir Republic.

The telegram of the C.E.C. of January 20, 1920, mentioned by Lenin, stated: "In view of the friction between the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee and the Ufa Gubernia Revolutionary Committee, and your accusation against Comrade Eltsin of deviating from the policy of the central government, the C.E.C. by agreement with the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) sent to Sterlitamak Comrades Artyom (Sergeyev), Preobrazhensky and Samoilov, who have no local Ufa interests and are incapable of pursuing a localist, chauvinist policy. The C.E.C. considers it improbable and quite out of the question that they could carry on agitation against the Bashkir Republic. The C.E.C. therefore orders you immediately, upon Comrade Artyom's directives, to free all the arrested members of the Regional Committee and other Communists, to cancel your report of a conspiracy, and make known to the population and army units that the arrests were due to a misunderstanding." (*Obrazovaniye Bashkirskoi ASSR. Sbornik dokumentov i matertalov*, Ufa, 1959, p. 444.)

Shortly afterwards, Validov, Yumagulov and Rakai were recalled from Bashkiria and expelled from the Party. p. 333

[334] This refers to the stand taken by the Siberian Revolutionary Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army in the talks which took place on January 19, 1920, with a delegation from the "Political Centre", which was formed from representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Zemstvo members and co-operators at an all-Siberia conference of Zemstvos and towns held in Irkutsk on November 12, 1919. When, on January 5, 1920, Irkutsk passed into the hands of the insurgent workers, soldiers and peasants, the "Political Centre" announced that it had assumed power in the city. The real organs of power in Irkutsk, however, were the headquarters of the armed workers' and peasants' detachments and the Military Revolutionary Committee, which acted under the leadership of the Irkutsk Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). The question of doing away with the "Political Centre" was not raised at once, since it was trusted to some extent by a section of the population and had the support of considerable forces of the interventionists in Irkutsk Gubernia and the Trans-Baikal area. The "Political Centre" aimed at the creation of a "democratic" bourgeois state in Eastern Siberia. At the talks with the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, its delegation proposed that the further advance eastward of the 5th Army should be halted and that a buffer state should be set up in Eastern Siberia, but the Siberian Revolutionary Committee insisted on its own conditions, namely, that the Red Army advance to Baikal and a buffer state be organised in the Trans-Baikal area.

Meanwhile the balance of forces in Irkutsk underwent a radical change, one which was not to the advantage of the "Political Centre". On January 21, 1920, all power in Irkutsk passed into the hands of the Revolutionary Committee. p. 334

[335] This refers to the troops of the Czechoslovak Corps, which in 1918-19 were used by the Entente imperialists and the Russian whiteguards as a strike force against the Soviets, and now were retreating under the blows of the Red Army. On January 19, 1920, the Czechoslovak Corps command announced that it was ceasing military operations and was ready to enter into negotiations for a truce with the Soviet army command. Soviet envoys went to Taishet railway station to present the terms for a truce but the White Czechoslovak command refused to negotiate. The truce was not signed until February 7. See also Note 72. p. 335

[336] Written on the back of Krestinsky's note to Lenin concerning the theses of a resolution on finance written by Y. Larin for the Third All-Russia Congress of Economic Councils (January 23-29, 1920). "I regard them as impracticable and politically harmful," wrote Krestinsky.

On January 23, in view of Larin's repeated statements conflicting with the policy of the Party, the Politbureau of the C.C.,

R.C.P.(B.) adopted a decision to remove him from the Board of the Supreme Economic Council. p. 335

[337] The questions raised in Yermakov's telegram were discussed in the Council of Defence on January 16 and 23, 1920. The decision quoted by Lenin was adopted by the Council on January 23. p. 336

[338] Written on a memo from G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, reporting cases of violation of the decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) that all information on matters of foreign policy should first be submitted to censorship. Specific mention was made of an interview given by V. P. Zatonsky (see *Vecherniye Izvestia* No. 450, January 26, 1920). Lenin sent the document to the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) marked: "To be returned." On the same day, P. M. Kerzhentsev, the head of ROSTA, replied to Lenin that measures had been taken for all correspondence concerning foreign affairs to be sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for perusal. On the letter Lenin wrote: "To be kept in the dossier on ROSTA." On February 21, 1920, in connection with a letter from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about the irresponsible statement of a Moscow journalist speaking on the radio on questions of Soviet foreign policy, Lenin again wrote to Kerzhentsev: "Why was this not sent for censorship? Who is responsible?" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 267.) p. 337

[339] This refers to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's pamphlet *The Main Tasks of the Electrification of Russia*. Lenin sent the manuscript of the pamphlet directly to the printers to have it published in time for the first session of the C.E.C., 7th convocation. p. 337

[340] A. F. Shorin, constructor and inventor, who worked in the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory, was arrested owing to a misunderstanding and quickly released. p. 338

[341] S. T. Kovylkin was at that time head of the South-Eastern Railway. M. M. Arzhanov, Chief of the Central Board of Military Communications of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, was sent to Saratov to speed up the movement of troops to the Southern Front. p. 339

[342] In 1920, Y. O. Bumazhny was Secretary of the Urals Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party; K. G. Maximov was Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council's Industrial Bureau in the Urals and authorised agent of the Council of Labour and Defence for the restoration of Urals industry. The friction between the Revolutionary Military Council of the Labour Army and departmental representatives was mainly over the question of the terms of reference of the Revolutionary Military Council. Lenin's telegram was apparently a reply to an inquiry about ways of settling the questions in dispute between the Revolutionary Military Council and the departments. p. 339

[343] The article proposed that in order to improve food supplies for the workers, use should be made of suburban land plots for developing collective market-gardening and livestock breeding, and for organising auxiliary farms. p. 341

[344] In the beginning of February 1920 preparations were made for a new offensive of the Red Army on the Caucasian Front. At the same time there was a lack of co-ordination between the armies of the front. The Mounted Army had been weakened in previous engagements; exhaustion of the troops and shortage of supplies were acutely felt. Owing to a relaxation of political and educational work, instances of infringement of military discipline began to occur in the units.

The Composite Cavalry Corps, which co-operated with the 1st Mounted Army, was seriously affected. Counter-revolutionary elements were active at Corps Headquarters. On the night of February 2, Corps Commissar, V. N. Mikeladze, was murdered by counter-revolutionaries. All these circumstances in conjunction with the extremely complex military situation caused Lenin great anxiety, since they jeopardised the Red Army's offensive in the Northern Caucasus, the aim of which was the final defeat of the enemy. p. 341

[345] This refers to the formation of the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer state. The F.E.R. was established in April 1920 on the territory of the Trans-Baikal, Amur, Primorye, and Kamchatka regions and Northern Sakhalin. The formation of the F.E.R.—a state which, though bourgeois-democratic in form, carried out a Soviet policy—was in the interests of Soviet Russia, which sought to obtain a long respite on the Eastern Front and to avoid war with Japan.

After the territories of the Far East (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin) had been cleared of interventionists and white-guards, the People's Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic on November 14, 1922, passed a decision to unite with the R.S.F.S.R. On November 15, 1922, the All-Russia C.E.C. announced the incorporation of the Far Eastern Republic into the R.S.F.S.R. p. 342

[346] Stalin wired Lenin on February 18, 1920, that he disagreed with the order of the Commander-in-Chief to detach units of the Ukrainian Labour Army for reinforcing the front and asked to be summoned to Moscow to clear the matter up. On February 19, a telegram in reply signed by Lenin was sent to Stalin worded according to the text quoted in the present note. p. 342

[347] Written in reply to Stalin's telegram to Lenin saying: "I am not clear why the Caucasian Front is primarily my concern.... Reinforcement of the Caucasian Front is wholly the concern of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the members of which, according to my information, are in good health, and

not the concern of Stalin, who is overworked as it is." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 409.) p. 343

[348] Lenin's telegram received in Saratov bears the note: "The first report of what has been done was sent to Lenin on 6/III." p. 346

[349] On the back of Lenin's letter is a memo by A. I. Svidersky giving information about the food supplied to the workers of the Lyubertsy factory. Over this Lenin wrote: "We shall verify this tomorrow by telephone and keep it *in the files*." p. 346

[350] Regarding this letter, Yaroslavsky wrote subsequently: "It was addressed to three comrades who were then members of the Perm Gubernia Committee. At that time the situation in Usolye was rather grave. Shortly before this, a new front—the Kai-Cherdyn Front—had been formed there. Remnants of Kolchak's forces and northern interventionists had organised bands in Cherdyn, where they had used the connections of the recently abolished Kolchak regime and exploited the dissatisfaction caused by the stupid bungling of some of the local Party officials who had antagonised the Zyryan people as well. As far as I remember, the Perm Gubernia Committee, on receiving Lenin's letter, sent a man to Usolye to ascertain the state of affairs on the spot, after which a commission was set up which reviewed the composition of the leading bodies and changed it at a specially convened Party conference." (*Pravda* No. 274, November 24, 1929.) p. 346

[351] This refers to the "Mandate to Comrade Vinogradov, delegate from the Second Vesyegonsk Uyezd Congress of workers engaged in education and socialist culture", which dealt with the grave material plight of the school staffs. On February 27, 1920, Vinogradov was received by Lenin. During their talk, which lasted 45 minutes, Lenin wrote the present letter. A favourable decision was reached in regard to improving the material position of the Vesyegonsk teachers. p. 348

[352] In the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U. there is a note of Lenin's to Alferov: "You promised information about the oil pipeline but did not give it!", and a reply from Alferov on the construction of the Emba oil pipeline marked "27.II.Alferov".

The construction of the Emba pipeline was discussed at a meeting of the Council of Defence on March 5, 1920. The Council decided to instruct the Board of the Supreme Economic Council to examine the plan for the construction of the Emba pipeline and submit it to the Council of People's Commissars in final form, and to ascertain whether an inquiry had been made abroad for ordering the pipes required. p. 349

[353] *The Free Economic Society* was founded in 1765, with the object, as laid down in its statutes, "of disseminating within the country information useful for agriculture and industry". The society carried out surveys by questionnaires and expeditions for studying various branches of the economy and regions of the country.

It possessed a large library of some 200,000 volumes. After the October Revolution the library became part of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library in Leningrad. p. 349

[354] Written in connection with the election of the Mensheviks F. I. Dan and L. Martov to the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies.

In the elections to the Moscow Soviet, which were held in the second half of February and early March 1920, 1,566 deputies were returned, including 1,316 Communists (84%), 52 Communist sympathisers (4%), and 46 Mensheviks (3%). p. 350

[355] George Lansbury, editor of the British newspaper *The Daily Herald*, visited Soviet Russia in February 1920. On February 21 he was received by Lenin who had a detailed conversation with him, in particular on the attitude of the Bolsheviks to religion. On returning to England, Lansbury sent Lenin a letter in which he wrote: "Many thanks to you and all your colleagues for the help you have given me in my try to understand your revolution." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 412.) p. 351

[356] N. N. Kuzmin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 6th Army, asked Lenin about the attitude to be adopted towards whiteguard officers who had laid down their arms and declared their readiness to work in Soviet Russia. p. 352

[357] This refers to a commission of the C.P.C. headed by G. I. Oppokov (A. Lomov) which was sent to Archangel to take measures to restore economic and political life in the northern areas of Soviet Russia that had been liberated from the whiteguards and interventionists, and to register and distribute the property seized there. p. 352

[358] This refers to valuable antiques, luxury articles and works of art that had been nationalised. In February 1919, Maxim Gorky set up a committee of experts in Petrograd to select and value these articles. Up to October 1, 1920, this committee, consisting of 80 persons, had selected, as Gorky wrote, "120,000 various articles" (*V. I. Lenin i A. M. Gorky. Pisma, vospominaniya, dokumenty* [V. I. Lenin and A. M. Gorky. Letters, Recollections, Documents], 1961, p. 164). This work, however, progressed extremely slowly. On Gorky's letter, Lenin wrote: "only *8* stores out of *33* have been gone through" (ibid.). p. 352

[359] Written in reply to Trotsky's telegram from Ekaterinburg dated March 5, 1920, in which he reported a considerable increase in food procurements in districts of the Urals and Siberia, complained that the central departments did not even reply to inquiries from the Siberian and Urals organisations, and asserted that only the establishment of regional centres with wide powers could put the work on a proper footing. On the text of the telegram Lenin wrote his remarks about the decision on Ishim Uyezd and the request that Brunovsky be kept for food work, and also about meat procurement in Siberia: "1) Remains in Tyumen Gubernia.

"2) No objection to Brunovsky (for the Food Commissariat)
"3) The Food Commissariat has issued an order to organise salting centres." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 413.)
p. 353

[360] On March 8, 1920, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) discussed the question of the People's Commissar for Railways in view of the fact that Krasin was going abroad. It was decided: "That Comrade Lenin be asked to communicate with Comrade Trotsky" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 413). On March 20, the Politbureau adopted a decision to put through the Presidium of the C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars Trotsky's appointment as Acting People's Commissar for Railways.
p. 354

[361] Written in reply to a telegram from I. N. Smirnov, Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, who reported that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries made it a condition for their participation in the buffer state government (see Note 345) that no territories should be conceded in the Far East. Smirnov wrote: "Communicate your decision directly to Janson in Karakhan's code and to me at the Siberian Revolutionary Committee." On this telegram Lenin wrote the draft of a reply to Smirnov, on which there is a note: "Agreed. *N. Krestinsky*, *L. Kamenev*." At the same time, Lenin sent a telegram to Janson in Irkutsk: "The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries must join the buffer state government without any conditions. If they do not submit to us without any conditions they will be arrested." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 413.) p. 354

[362] On March 10, 1920, Lenin received V. S. Smirnov (Malkov) and M. Z. Manuilsky, representatives of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, and A. S. Kiselyov, a member of the C.E.C. (in the past a leading member of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Party organisation). In accordance with a decision of the Gubernia Party Committee of March 6, they asked Lenin to increase the supply of food to Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, to remove the intercepting detachments in Yuriev-Polsky Uyezd, Vladimir Gubernia, to include it in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia and to provide Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia at first open water with ships and barges for transporting foodstuffs, seed, etc. On the same day the Council of Defence discussed a report by A. B. Khalatov, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, concerning the supply of food for Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers, and the question of joining Yuriev-Polsky Uyezd to Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia. The Council of Defence resolved: "That the Chief Board of Water Transport be instructed to take urgent measures to supply the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Food Committee with tonnage to the amount of 400,000 poods for urgent delivery of seed potatoes from the Simbirsk, Kazan and Yaroslavl gubernias." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 414.) p. 355

[363] Written on a letter from J. Berzin to Lenin of March 11, 1920, reporting that the censorship of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had let through a letter of the Menshevik Abramovich addressed abroad to R. Hilferding, one of the opportunist leaders of German Social-Democracy. Berzin suggested that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should be purged of hostile elements. p. 356

[364] *The Ukrainian petty-bourgeois nationalist Borotba Party* arose in May 1918 after the split in the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. It got its name from the central organ of the party—the newspaper *Borotba* (Struggle). The Borotbists twice applied to the Executive Committee of the Communist International to be allowed to affiliate to the Communist International. On February 26, 1920, the Communist International by a special decision called on the Borotbists to dissolve their party and merge with the C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine.

Owing to the growing influence of the Bolsheviks among the mass of the peasants and the successes of Soviet power in the Ukraine, the Borotbists at their conference in the middle of March 1920 were compelled to pass a decision to dissolve their party. A decision to admit the Borotbists to membership of the Ukrainian C.P.(B.) was adopted at the Fourth All-Ukraine Conference of the C.P.(B.)U., which took place from March 17 to 23, 1920. p. 357

[365] At its meeting on March 16, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars discussed the draft of a decree presented by L. B. Krasin enabling orders to be placed abroad for locomotives and spare parts for railway transport repairs. Three hundred million rubles in gold were earmarked for this purpose. Lenin's note was apparently written at this meeting. p. 358

[366] Lenin wrote this note on Krasin's letter concerning the purchase of locomotives from American trusts. Krasin wrote that there were only three trusts in the U.S.A. from which locomotives could be obtained. It was intended to start an immediate correspondence with them by radio from Scandinavia or London. Erasin, however, expressed the fear that as a result of this publicity a "host" of middlemen would spring up between him and these trusts as the main suppliers, and that this would not only send the price up but also delay delivery. p. 358

[367] Lenin urged the need for intensified and uninterrupted work on locomotive repairs in view of the catastrophic state of railway transport, and this problem was repeatedly discussed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Defence. Thus, on February 5, 1920, the C.P.C. heard a report by Krasin on special privileges for workers engaged in locomotive repairs and the production of spare parts for transport. On February 27, the Council of Defence discussed non-fulfilment by the People's Commissariat for Food of the decree granting bonuses to workers who repaired trains in their spare time. On March 16, following a

report by G. N. Melnichansky (Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Council of Trade Unions), the C.P.C. adopted a decision to organise locomotive repair in the best workshops, where work would be carried on in three shifts round the clock. At the same meeting the Council discussed a number of other measures for improving the state of the railway transport. p. 358

[368] In a letter dated March 5, 1920, Maxim Gorky asked Lenin to keep the 1,800 rations for Petrograd scientists intact, to release from prison as soon as possible the well-known chemist A. V. Sapozhnikov, and to enable the physician I. I. Manukhin to carry out research on a vaccine against typhus (see *V. I. Lenin i A. M. Gorky. Pisma, vospominaniya, dokumenty*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 146-47). p. 359

[369] This note to Radek was written in connection with a report that Karl Liebknecht's wife was in an extremely agitated state, one reason for which was that relatives of hers, engineers living in Rostov, had been transferred to Berlin, about which she had written to Lunacharsky. p. 360

[370] This refers to the elections to the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine at the Fourth Conference of the C.P.(B.)U. held in Kharkov from March 17 to 23, 1920.

The work of the conference was marked by a bitter struggle of the Leninists against an oppositional group of Democratic Centralists headed by T. Sapronov, V. Boguslavsky, Y. Drobnis, M. Farbman (Rafail) and others. During the elections to the Central Committee of the C.P.(B.)U. the Democratic Centralists succeeded by factional devices (voting by lists, etc.) in getting a majority of their supporters into the Central Committee and in sending their delegates to the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).

105 conference delegates who upheld the Leninist line refused to take part in the elections to the C.C. of the C.P.(B.)U. and denounced them as non-valid. Since the Central Committee elected by the conference did not reflect the will of the majority of the Ukrainian Communists, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) decided it should be dissolved and replaced by a provisional C.C. of the C.P.(B.)U. consisting of V. P. Zatonsky, F. Y. Kon, S. V. Kosior. D. Z. Manuilsky, G. I. Petrovsky, F. A. Sergeyev (Artyom), V. Y. Chubar, and others. In order to explain the measures taken to suppress the factional activity of the Democratic Centralists in the Ukraine, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on April 16, 1920, published an open letter addressed to all Party organisations in the Ukraine. This letter was approved by all the Party organisations of the Republic. To strengthen the Ukrainian Party organisations, the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) put a large group of experienced Party workers at the disposal of the C.C., C.P.(B.)U. In May 1920 alone, 674 Communists were sent to the Ukraine. By a decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) of April 5, 1920, a re-registration of members of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was carried out. p. 360

[371] V. P. Milyutin's report on the list of enterprises selected for Group I was made before the Council of People's Commissars on March 23, 1920. On March 24, 1920, the list drawn up by the commission was submitted by the Council of People's Commissars to the All-Russia C.E.C. for endorsement. p. 361

[372] Written by Lenin following the systematic violations by the Turkestan Commission of the decision of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) prescribing that relations with Bukhara, Khiva, Persia and Afghanistan were to be controlled by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. By its decision of September 29, 1919, the Orgbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) had charged the Turkestan Commission with the conduct of foreign relations in accordance with the instructions and under the control of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The Turkestan Commission, however, did not carry out the instructions of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The latter demanded that G. I. Broido should be removed from leadership of the Department of Foreign Relations and that a department be set up consisting of A. N. Golub, A. A. Mashitsky, D. Y. Gopner and a representative of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee endorsed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, but the Turkestan Commission refused to comply and appointed Heller head of the Department of Foreign Relations.

By a decision of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on March 17, 1920, foreign policy functions were taken out of the hands of the Turkestan Commission, and the Department of Foreign Relations was made directly subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. But the Turkestan Commission objected to this. Golub, Mashitsky and Gopner were removed from office and forbidden to communicate with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The inquiries of the Commissariat went unanswered.

The last sentence in the manuscript was deleted and left out in the telegram. p. 362

[373] Written on a letter from V. V. Kosior, Chairman of the All-Ukraine Council of Trade Unions, who reported on the difficulties of work in the Donets Basin and big industrial centres of the south (Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Taganrog, etc.) due to lack of personnel. To strengthen the work he proposed that some of the leading workers of Petrograd and Moscow should be transferred to the Donets Basin for restoring mines, pits, and metallurgical and processing factories. p. 363

[374] The town of Grozny was liberated by the Red Army on March 25, 1920, at the same time as the town of Maikop. The oil wells were intact and in full working order. p. 363

[375] It has not been possible to establish what decision of the Organising Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) this refers to. p. 364

[376] *Uratadze*—a representative of the Georgian Menshevik government, who had arrived in Rostov to go from there to Moscow for

diplomatic talks with the Soviet Government; he was detained in Rostov by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front, about which Lenin was informed by Orjonikidze. p. 367

[377] This refers to the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission's investigation into the case of a bogus co-operative organisation in Petrograd. In 1918, the former owners of a publishing house and print-shop, in order to prevent them from being nationalised, organised a bogus co-operative which obtained orders from various institutions by fraudulent means. The matter was investigated by the Extraordinary Commission in accordance with Lenin's directive. The bogus co-operative was abolished. The print-shop was turned over to the Petrograd Economic Council and the publishing house to the Petrograd Branch of State Publishers. p. 368

[378] The note was written in connection with a breach of labour discipline by Lenin's chauffeur, S. K. Gil. p. 368

[379] Written in reply to a telegram of April 17, 1920, in which the Council of the 1st Labour Army asked that boundary changes should be stopped and that it be allowed to draft maps of the Urals and Cis-Urals gubernias and uyezds. On Lenin's motion this question was discussed by the Council of People's Commissars on April 20, 1920. In accordance with its decision, the present telegram was sent to the Council of the 1st Labour Army.

The same meeting discussed a "Protest of the 1st Labour Army Concerning the New Division of the Tyumen and Chelyabinsk Gubernias". The C.P.C. adopted the decision quoted in the second telegram. p. 370

[380] This note was written on a letter from Professor S. P. Kostychev to Maxim Gorky about the work of the Plant Physiology Laboratory of Petrograd University, which was of great scientific and practical interest. The letter gave a list of the most essential articles and materials, the lack of which was greatly impeding the work of the laboratory. On April 22, 1920, Gorky gave this letter to Lenin and asked him to arrange for Professor Kostychev to be supplied with the necessary materials.

At the bottom of Lenin's note the People's Commissar for Health added the words: "I fully agree with Comrade Lenin's proposal and for my part ask that Comrade Gorky be given every assistance. *N. Semashko*." p. 370

[381] In his reply to Lenin, Rykov wrote that on the following day he would order the newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* to stop printing news about the loading and transportation of fuel, leaving only news of procurements. p. 371

[382] In the manuscript of the telegram, the word "details" has been crossed out and the words "the form of Vinnichenko's co-operation in government activities" have been written in an unknown hand.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

In the spring of 1920, V. K. Vinnichenko, who was then living as an emigrant in Vienna, declared that he was breaking his connections with the Ukrainian Mensheviks and accepting the platform of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Vinnichenko requested the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. to allow him to come to the Ukraine and to give him an opportunity of actively participating in the struggle against the White Poles and Wrangel, as well as in building the Soviet Ukraine.

In view of the fact that Vinnichenko and other nationalist leaders had the backing of a considerable number of Ukrainian émigrés, and in order to win away from them elements belonging to the working people who had been misled, it was decided to draw Vinnichenko into Soviet work. The question was discussed several times in the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and the C.C., C.P.(B.)U.

On September 6, 1920, by a decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., C.P.(B.)U. Vinnichenko was admitted to membership of the Ukrainian Communist Party and appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R. On the same day the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) passed the following decision regarding Vinnichenko: "The Politbureau takes note of Comrade Vinnichenko's variable moods and therefore, while not objecting to his immediate admission into the Party, the Political Bureau proposes that he should not be given any post, and should first be tested in practical work." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 424.)

In October 1920 Vinnichenko again emigrated abroad. p. 372

[383] This note to Trotsky was written on Chicherin's letter to Lenin dated May 4, 1920, informing him about Lord Curzon's radio message. The message suggested a general amnesty and a conciliatory attitude to the defeated whiteguards and spoke of a cessation of military operations in the Crimea and the Caucasus. In Chicherin's opinion, the proposal for direct talks with Wrangel with the participation of a British officer would be found distasteful by every real whiteguard and was a step towards practical recognition of Soviet Russia by Great Britain. Chicherin proposed "agreeing to an amnesty for Wrangel and to halting further penetration into the Caucasus, where we have already captured everything of importance, and we can reply by giving our consent without a moment's delay". p. 373

[384] Written on Y. A. Preobrazhensky's letter to Lenin suggesting that "a stop be put to the disgusting 'patriotism'", and mentioning a speech of Radek's "about a 'national' war" and a chauvinist article by Bergman in Agitrosta. Preobrazhensky asked to be allowed to give appropriate directives to the editors of newspapers, especially provincial ones. To Preobrazhensky's request, Lenin answered: "I am wholly **in favour**", and he proposed the directive reproduced here. p. 373

[385] This was apparently written in reply to a telegram received from Orjonikidze and Kirov on May 7, 1920, reporting that Georgia

was undertaking a number of aggressive measures against Soviet Azerbaijan and that in the peace terms it was absolutely necessary to put forward a demand for the "proclamation of Soviet power in Georgia" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 426). p. 374

[386] The Propaganda Trains Department of the All-Russia C.E.C. sent a copy of this letter of Lenin's to the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on June 12, 1920, with a request that the latter urgently appoint its representatives, the most experienced and leading instructors, for the train "Soviet Caucasus" and the steamship *Red Star*. p. 377

[387] Lenin is referring to the decision of the C.P.C. of May 27, 1920, on food resources, directing the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets "to give special attention to the need to increase the amount of market-garden products obtained from the environs of the capitals this year and to submit to the C.P.C. within a fortnight their proposals for possible measures". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 427.) p. 377

[388] The telegram from the R.M.C. of the Caucasian Front (received by the R.M.C. of the Republic on May 27, 1920) raised the question of releasing captive Cossacks—privates and NCO's of the Kuban White army—from P.O.W. camps and sending them home; the officers, it was proposed, were to be put at the disposal of Front Headquarters. p. 378

[389] On June 11, 1920, G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent a Soviet Government Note to the British Government addressed to the Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, containing facts about the aid given by the British Government to the whiteguard General Wrangel. The Note stated that Wrangel himself, in an army order issued on May 6, "openly and explicitly mentions the diplomatic intervention of Great Britain on his behalf as a means of keeping his hold on the Crimea and mounting a new attack against Soviet Russia". This Note was published on June 13, 1920, in *Izvestia* No. 127. On this subject, see also Lenin's letter to Chicherin of June 11, 1920 (see this volume, Document 609). p. 378

[390] This refers to the decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) of May 4, 1920, suspending military operations in the Crimea and the Caucasus. See also this volume, Document 583. p. 380

[391] Lenin is referring to the "Statute on the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars (the Narrow Council of People's Commissars)" endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars on June 1, 1920. Lenin's addendum relates to the first four points of the "Statute", which state that "the purpose of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars is to work up questions which have to be dealt with by the Council of People's Commissars and require preliminary treatment. The destination of business reaching the Council of People's Commissars is decided by the Nar-

row Council, except for budgetary business, which must be handled by the Narrow Council, and matters coming before the Narrow Council by decision of the Council of People's Commissars". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 428.)

The document bears the following names of C.P.C. members in the secretary's handwriting, who, on being questioned, expressed their agreement with Lenin's addendum: Vladimirsky Avanesov, Kursky, Kamenev, Semashko, Milyutin, Pokrovsky, Nikolayev, Sereda, Krestinsky, Sklyansky. p. 380

[392] Written on a telegram to Lenin dated June 1, 1920, from Z. N. Dosser, Chairman of the Chief Oil Committee, and A. P. Serebrovsky, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Oil Committee. The telegram reported the grave food situation among the workers of the Baku oil industry owing to the fact that A. Y. Belenky, Special Food Commissar failed to fulfil obligations in regard to the dispatch of food from the Northern Caucasus to Baku, while at the same time refusing to allow the oil workers to make their own food procurements in the Northern Caucasus. p. 380

[393] The margin of the typewritten copy of this telegram in the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism contains a note by Orjonikidze: "The telegram was received by me in the summer of 1920. *Orjonikidze*." What Lenin's inquiry referred to has not been established. p. 381

[394] Written on Stalin's telegram to Lenin dated June 3, 1920, proposing either to sign a truce with Wrangel and enable one or two divisions to be taken from the Crimean Front, or to abandon all talks with Wrangel, strike a blow at him and, by routing him, release forces for the Polish front. p. 381

[395] Written on Stalin's telegram from Kremenchug dated June 4, 1920, and apparently received by Lenin during a sitting of the Council of Labour and Defence. The telegram reported General Wrangel's intention to attack with one group of troops in the Alyoshki-Kherson area, and to land another group in the Odessa area so as to envelop it from two sides.

On receiving Trotsky's note saying that Stalin had violated the established rules by addressing himself directly to Lenin (since such information should have been sent to the Commander-in-Chief by A. I. Yegorov, commander of the forces on the South-Western Front), Lenin sent the second note to Trotsky. p. 383

[396] Lenin's exchange of notes with Alferov took place at a meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence on June 4, 1920, at which Takhtamyshev was present. p. 383

[397] Lenin is referring to the experiments of S. I. Botin, who was working on the problem of induced detonation by electromagnetic waves. In October 1921 a commission of experts recommended that the experiments should be discontinued owing to their insufficient preparation. p. 384

[398] Written on a telegram to Chicherin from Krasin, Chairman of the Russian Trade Delegation in London, who reported that on June 10, 1920, he had had a visit from Wise, who stated officially, on behalf of Lloyd George, that the offensive begun by Wrangel was undertaken against the wishes of the British Government.

The Soviet Government's Note in reply to the British Government, which was worded according to Lenin's directive and sent by radio on June 11, stated: "True, at the present time it is Wrangel with his whiteguards, and not a British general, who is attacking Russia anew, but the weapons and ammunition which he uses were supplied to him by the British Government and other Allied Governments- his strategic movements have taken place under the protection of British and other Allied vessels, he has received the coal he needed from Great Britain, and the Allied fleet partly helped him in his landing operations and partly directly participated in them. The Russian Government, therefore, cannot share the point of view of the British Government that the latter bears no responsibility for this new attack on Soviet Russia." (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, 1958, p. 567.) p. 386

[399] On June 11, 1920, after hearing the report of a commission on measures for ensuring the maximum deliveries of fuel, especially for Moscow, the Council of Labour and Defence resolved: "To make the Moscow Fuel Board and the People's Commissariat for Railways responsible for transporting within three weeks all the firewood lying at railway stations within a 30-verst radius of Moscow, to the amount of about 8,000 cubic sazhens." (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 321.) p. 387

[400] This note was written in connection with the preparations for the Second Congress of the Communist International. Heller, who was appointed a representative of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) in the Italian delegation, was directed by the Politbureau of the C.C. "to collect passages in the Italian press against Turati and other reformists, and in general to select all the necessary material" for exposing reformism in the ranks of the Italian Socialist Party (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 431).

Avanti!—a daily newspaper, the central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in Rome in December 1896. During the First World War, the newspaper adopted an inconsistent internationalist position, without breaking its ties with the reformists. In 1926 the paper was closed down by Mussolini's fascist government, but continued to be published abroad; in 1943 its publication was resumed in Italy.

Comunismo—a fortnightly journal of the Italian Socialist Party; it was published in Milan from 1919 to 1922, edited by D. M. Serrati.

Il Soviet—a newspaper of the Italian Socialist Party, published in Naples from 1918 to 1922. From 1920 it was the organ

of the Communist-abstentionist faction of the Italian Socialist Party. p. 387

[401] This refers to the Bologna Congress of the Italian Socialist Party, held in October 1919. The Congress decided for affiliation of the Italian Socialist Party to the Communist International. p. 388

[402] The instruction was written on a telegram dated June 18, 1920, from the North Caucasus Branch of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade setting forth the terms of a draft agreement between the Branch and representatives of the American corporation. On the telegram are markings and underlinings made by Lenin. p. 389

[403] The letter to Merezhin, a member of the Central Bureau of Jewish Sections under the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), was written by Lenin in connection with the preparation of draft theses on the national and colonial questions for the Second Congress of the Communist International.

The "information of Rafes" refers apparently to a letter of M. G. Rafes, "Defence of the rights of national minorities in regions with a mixed population (an assessment of the experience of Ukrainian-Jewish and Polish-Jewish relations)", sent by him to Lenin on June 21, 1920. p. 390

[404] On Lenin's letter there is a note by the People's Commissar for Agriculture: "A corresponding directive has already been sent by me to the Gubernia Land Department. *S. Sereda*." p. 391

[405] On June 14, 1920, Lenin imposed a penalty on E. Y. Vever, Manager of the Gorki Sanatorium—a month's arrest—for cutting down a perfectly sound spruce in the sanatorium park. The Podolsk Uyezd Executive Committee was charged with the carrying out of this sentence (see *Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 41, p. 151). p. 391

[406] Written on a letter from Chicherin dated June 23, 1920, complaining of the non-fulfilment of decisions of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on matters concerning the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Despite repeated decisions of the Party's Central Committee, Chicherin wrote, nothing had been done, either in regard to rations, or to the transfer of a new building to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or to the provision of motorcars for foreign delegations and other needs of the Commissariat. p. 391

[407] Lenin thought highly of the great Russian physiologist, Academician I. P. Pavlov, the founder of the materialist theory of higher nervous activity in animals and man. Lenin took a solicitous interest in his well-being and gave him every possible assistance and support

In view of Pavlov's outstanding scientific services, which were of tremendous importance for the working people of the

world, the Soviet Government, on the initiative of Lenin, in the hard years of economic dislocation and the immense difficulties resulting from the Civil War and foreign armed intervention, passed a special decree creating facilities that would enable Academician Pavlov and his assistants to effectively carry on their scientific work (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 69).

In his well-known letter to Soviet youth written shortly before his death, Pavlov touched on the immense opportunities which the Soviet socialist system offered for the development of culture and science. "Our country," he wrote, "is affording great scope to scientists and—it must be owned—science in our country is being fostered with a generous hand. A most lavish hand!

"What is there to say about the status of our young scientist? Here surely everything is quite clear. Much is given to him, but much is expected from him. For the youth, as for us, it is a point of honour to justify the great trust that our country puts in science." (*Pravda* No. 58, February 28, 1936.) p. 392

408 Written on a telephone message to the Council of People's Commissars from D. A. Trilisser, secretary of the Petrograd Executive Committee, who asked for a postponement in presenting data on the development of suburban farms and on the stocktaking and confiscation of surplus produce from the market gardeners. On Lenin's motion, the Council of People's Commissars on June 29, 1920, censured the Petrograd Soviet for "its impermissible procrastination in this matter". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 434.) p. 393

409 This refers to S. I. Botin and his experiments for discovering a method of induced detonation by means of electromagnetic waves (see Note 397). p. 394

410 The extract mentioned by Lenin stated: "...the Food Department of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies has announced a competition for thermos vessels of large and small dimensions. Three prizes will be awarded: for apparatus of half a *vedro** —10,000 rubles, 5,000 rubles and 3,000 rubles-for blueprints of apparatus of five *vedros*—5,000 rubles and 3,000 rubles. Apparatus and blueprints must be presented by October 20, 1918" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 434).

In a memorandum presented to Lenin on July 16, 1920, the Board of the Moscow Consumers' Society reported that the competition for thermos vessels ended on October 1, 1918. Simultaneously with the work of the Competition Commission, the Food Department began to use thermos vessels made entirely of wood (plywood and shavings). These vessels were very light—about 32 lbs. for vessels of three *vedros*—and enabled food to be kept hot for 18-20 hours. p. 393

*1 *vedro*=21 pints.—*Ed.*

[411] Lenin is referring to a decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) dated June 29, 1920, for convening a congress of peoples of the East in Baku. The decision stated: "Comrade Orjonikidze and Comrade Stasova, together with comrades co-opted by them, are instructed to form a bureau for convening a congress of peoples of the East in Baku. Comrade Zinoviev is to inform Orjonikidze about this today by direct line." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 435.)

In stating that G. K. Orjonikidze retains "all rights and powers", Lenin is referring to the decisions of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) of June 29 and 30, 1920, appointing Orjonikidze a member of the Caucasian Council of the Labour Army from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front. p. 395

[412] Lenin is referring to a decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) dated June 18, 1920, regarding the Northern Caucasus, which stated: "The Orgbureau is instructed to come to an agreement with the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. for selecting from the members of the latter a small, permanently acting collegium... with the area of activities throughout the Caucasus. If Comrade Orjonikidze does not become a member of the small collegium, all questions relating to Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey etc., must be decided in his presence" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 435). p. 396

[413] In reply to Lenin's note, Krasin reported on the measures taken for the speediest shipment of goods intended for foreign trade and on their sale and the use of the foreign currency proceeds for the purchase of goods needed by Soviet Russia. p. 396

[414] This refers to the *Second Congress of the Communist International*, which was held from July 19 to August 7, 1920.

All the preparatory work for convening the Congress was directed by Lenin. He wrote the theses on the national and colonial questions, on the agrarian question, on the fundamental tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International, on the terms of admission into the Communist International, and the plan of theses on the international and economic situation (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 144-64, 184-201, 206-11, 212; Vol. 35, pp. 450-51).

At the Congress, Lenin delivered a report on the international situation and the fundamental tasks of the Communist International, made a speech on the role of the Communist Party, delivered the report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions, and spoke on the terms of admission into the Communist International, on parliamentarism, and on affiliation to the British Labour Party (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 215-63). Lenin's theses were endorsed as decisions of the Congress. p. 397

[415] To Lenin's question in the first note as to whom to entrust the translation of this book, Zinoviev replied that the book had al-

ready been translated into German and French in Petrograd and was being edited.

Lenin wrote the new preface to the book on July 6, 1920, and it was first published in October 1921, under the title "Imperialism and Capitalism", in the journal *The Communist International* No. 18 (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 189-94). In Lenin's lifetime, separate editions of his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* were published in German in 1921, and in French and English (incompletely) in 1923.

Lenin's third note was a reply to a passage in Zinoviev's note saying, "There is some difficulty with the quotations (from German and English publications)" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 437). p. 398

[416] See Note 414. p. 398

[417] In speaking of Wijnkoop's statement, Lenin is referring to the letter from him of June 30, 1920, about the book "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, with which the Dutch delegation became acquainted at the Second Congress of the Communist International before translations of the Russian text had been published. Wijnkoop's letter and Lenin's reply to it were first published in the English translation of the book, issued in Moscow in 1920, and in the Russian text of the book in 1930 in the second edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 117-18). p. 400

[418] Written in connection with a letter from the Cinema Department of the People's Commissariat for Education, which reported that the fulfilment of Lenin's directive—for making a motion picture of "The Trial of the Kolchak Ministers"—was being held up owing to the absence of film.

Lenin sent similar letters to Centrosoyuz, the Moscow Extraordinary Commission, the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Vecheka. On July 9 a reply was received from the Vecheka addressed to the secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, Lydia Fotieva, reading: "Dear Comrade Fotieva, please tell Vladimir Ilyich that there is no cinema film in the Vecheka, other than shot films of a counter-revolutionary nature which cannot be used. Apparently, someone who did not know the facts has misled Ilyich" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, pp. 437-38). p. 400

[419] This refers to the London negotiations between the Russian Trade Delegation, headed by L. B. Krasin, and members of the British Government (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 695-705). p. 401

[420] This refers to Kamenev's letter of July 9, 1920, concerning the nature of the Anglo-Russian talks, in which he wrote that political negotiations should be conducted "on the broadest agitational lines" recounting "widely and publicly the whole history of the intervention, including Kolchak, Denikin, Poland, Wrangel,

Lithuania, Estonia, etc., etc., and touching on and raising all the questions of Eastern policy from Turkey to China". In his postscript to this letter Chicherin supported Kamenev, who in turn again put forward the proposal—"without breaking off the negotiations, and in a mild tone, to present to Lloyd George the history of British plundering on a world scale". When Lenin read the letter, he wrote on it: "I disagree in principle. 10/VII. *Lenin*." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 438.)

Lenin's letter was a reply to these proposals. p. 401

[421] N. N. Krestinsky, Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), informed Lenin on July 11, 1920, that Chicherin was insisting that Kamenev and not Krasin should head the Soviet delegation that was being sent to Great Britain. Lenin wrote on Krestinsky's letter: "I agree to Kamenev as chairman, Krasin—deputy chairman." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 438). p. 401

[422] This refers to a letter from Stalin dated July 11, 1920, informing Lenin of the promise of the Commander-in-Chief, S. S. Kamenev, to strengthen the Crimean direction with a number of military units and formations and combat materiel.

On July 15 E. M. Sklyansky sent Lenin a memorandum on the amount of assistance to the South-Western Front. p. 402

[423] This refers to a Note from Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, sent to the Soviet Government on July 11, 1920, from Spa (Belgium), where a conference of the Entente countries was being held together with representatives of Germany. To the decisions adopted at the Spa conference, Lord Curzon added a proposal that the Soviet Government should conclude an armistice with General Wrangel. p. 403

[424] This refers to the reply to Lord Curzon's Note of July 11, 1920, which was discussed at a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on July 16, 1920. The reply was published in *Izvestia* No. 157, July 18, 1920. p. 403

[425] This note was written on the draft of a decree for centralising libraries in the Republic, adopted by the Narrow Council of People's Commissars on June 22, 1920. To eliminate duplication of work and ensure effective use and proper distribution of all existing book-collections, the draft stipulated that "the libraries of all public organisations and institutions are to be merged in the general library network of the Educational Departments". All libraries newly opened by public organisations were to be included "in the general network of public libraries".

The draft decree also bears a note from Krupskaya to the People's Commissariat for Education: "If you will send me my article on the centralisation of libraries and return this draft, I will try to make a new draft and write an instruction. But perhaps it has already been done? In that case, send it as well." p. 404

[426] This telegram was written in reply to the following telegram from Stalin, sent on August 2, 1920, from Lozovaya: "Fierce

fighting is continuing with growing intensity; today we shall probably lose Alexandrovsk. I received your note concerning the separation of the fronts. The Politbureau ought not to concern itself with trifles. I can go on working at the front for two weeks at the most, I need a rest, find someone to replace me. I do not believe the promises of the Commander-in-Chief for a single minute, by his promises he only lets us down. As regards the sentiments of the Central Committee in favour of peace with Poland, one cannot help remarking that our diplomacy sometimes very successfully torpedoes the results of our military successes" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 441). p. 408

427 This refers to Poland's Eastern frontier, which was arbitrarily fixed by the Supreme Council of the Entente at the end of the 1914-18 imperialist war, on December 8, 1919. This frontier was to run along the line: Grodno—Yalovka—Nemirov—Brest-Litovsk—Dorogusk—Ustilug—Krylov, and was to cut across Galicia between Przemysl and Rava-Russkaya up to the Carpathian Mountains. This line was mentioned also in Lord Curzon's Note of July 11, 1920, and became known as the "Curzon Line".

The Soviet Government, in proposing peace to Poland, was ready to accept as the Polish-Soviet frontier a line east of the "Curzon Line".

The present note is Lenin's directive to the chairman of the Soviet delegation sent to London for negotiations with the British Government. p. 409

428 In a telegram of August 13, 1920, in reply to Lenin, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Caucasian Labour Army, A. G. Beloborodov, wrote: "Your telegram No. 402 received only 13th at 20.00 hours. The Northern Caucasus, with the exception of the Kuban, for the time being gives no cause for anxiety as regards the outbreak of insurrections...." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 444.) p. 412

429 Lenin wrote this note on August 11, 1920, during his reception of Lao Hsiu-chao, a member of the Chinese Socialist Party and Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia. On the back of the note is Krestinsky's reply: "Tomorrow at 3.30." p. 413

430 This note was written on a letter dated August 11, 1920, addressed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V. I. Lenin, from I. Brikhnichev, head of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Abolishing Illiteracy. It asked for cadres to strengthen the commission, premises for the work, means of transport, and food rations. Point "b" of the letter read: "People are needed, some 10-15 skilled and unskilled staff workers. Can be summoned from the localities or mobilised in Moscow." p. 413

431 This refers to a collection of the decrees in force in 1919. In a letter in reply, Kursky reported that this collection was published under the editorship of Kozlovsky and was a reprint of *Sobraniye*

uzakonenii za 1919 god (Collected Legislation of 1919), and that another collection of the most important decrees of the R.S.F.S.R. during the three years, 1917-20, was being prepared for the press. On the envelope of Kursky's letter, Lenin wrote: "For the archives (VIII. 1920). Re publication of laws " (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 444). p. 414

[432] Written in connection with a letter from A. N. Voznesensky, formerly head of the Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who considered that he had been wrongfully dismissed. The matter was discussed on August 19, 1920, at the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), which directed Chicherin to use Voznesensky in one of the subcommissions of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as a specialist on the eastern question having a knowledge of Eastern languages and English. p. 414

[433] This refers to the conference for ending the war and establishing peaceful friendly relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other. Despite all the attempts of the imperialists to prevent it, the peace conference began its work on August 17, 1920, in Minsk, where it continued until September 3. On September 21, the conference resumed its work in Riga. The peace negotiations ended with the signing in Riga on October 12, 1920, of "A Treaty on an Armistice and Preliminary Conditions of Peace" between Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 245-58). p. 415

[434] See Note 427. p. 415

[435] This refers to a decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) dated August 19, 1920, following the reports by Stalin and Trotsky on the military situation on the Polish and Wrangel fronts. In the decision it was recorded: "a) To recognise the Wrangel front as the main front.... b) To convene the Orgbureau tomorrow to decide the question of a further mobilisation of Communists. c) To adopt extra measures to speed up general mobilisation of Byelorussians. d) To transfer the 6th Division of the 1st Mounted Army to the Wrangel front.... e) To send 55 per cent of the mobilised Communists to the Wrangel front, and the remainder to the Western Front." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 446.) p. 418

[436] The summer of 1920 saw the beginning of the liberation of the Western Ukraine by the Red Army. The rule of the bourgeoisie and landowners was abolished in 16 uyezds of Eastern Galicia and Soviet power was established there. A provisional regional Soviet authority in Eastern Galicia—the Galician Revolutionary Committee headed by V. P. Zatonsky—was set up in Ternopol. In the uyezds, local revolutionary committees were formed, which strove to enforce the decrees of the people's government. Lenin warmly welcomed the establishment of Soviet power

in Eastern Galicia and helped the Galician Communists in their Party and Soviet activities. p. 419

[437] *Proletcult*—a cultural and educational organisation which arose in September 1917 as an independent workers' organisation. Its leadership was in the hands of A. A. Bogdanov and his supporters. After the October Revolution, Proletcult continued to uphold its "independence", thus setting itself in opposition to the Soviet state. In consequence, Proletcult was infiltrated by bourgeois intellectuals who began to exert a decisive influence on it. Its members actually denied the importance of the cultural heritage, wanted to shut themselves off from the tasks of cultural and educational work among the masses, and tried to create a special "proletarian culture" by "laboratory methods", in isolation from life. In a draft resolution "On Proletarian Culture" (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 316-17) and in a number of other works, Lenin trenchantly criticised the erroneous principles of Proletcult. In the early 1920s its organisations began to decline and in 1932 it ceased to exist. p. 419

[438] This refers to the landing in the Kuban area in the middle of August 1920 of a whiteguard force, organised by Wrangel with the consent and support of the Entente. The aim of the raid was to cut off from the Soviet Republic one of the most fertile grain areas of the country. As a result of stubborn, fierce battles, the Red Army routed the whiteguard units and in the beginning of September the remnants of the landing force were thrown back into the Crimea. p. 420

[439] Written below the text of the copy of a telegram sent to Lenin from Vilno on August 19, 1920, by V. S. Mickiewicz-Kapsukas, a member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Communist Party. He reported that revolutionary feeling in Lithuania was rising and "by the day of our departure from Vilno, it may end in a mass armed uprising against the Lithuanian whiteguards", and asked: "Do you find it possible for us to prepare for a decisive battle?"

On the same copy Lenin wrote to Trotsky: "Comrade Trotsky, if you agree, send it off or return it to me for coding. *Lenin*." On the document there is also a note by Lenin: "*Stalin* agrees", and Trotsky's mark indicating his agreement. p. 421

[440] In a telegram to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin on July 30, 1920, M. M. Litvinov, plenipotentiary abroad of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars, reported the arrival in Copenhagen of the American industrialist Vanderlip, who wanted to obtain a concession to exploit oil, coal, and the fisheries of Primorye Region and Kamchatka.

In the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U., there is a note written by Lenin on Chicherin's letter dated August 21, 1920, in which Lenin agrees to Vanderlip visiting Moscow.

Vanderlip arrived in Moscow on September 17, 1920, to negotiate an agreement for the concessions. On the same day Chicherin wrote to Lenin suggesting that negotiations with Vanderlip be started at once and setting out his views on the subject. Lenin wrote on this letter: "Comrade Chicherin, I am wholly *in favour of* negotiations. Hasten them. Think over what more should be done for directives to Krasnoshchokov." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 448.)

An inter-departmental commission of representatives of the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, was set up to conduct the negotiations. In agreeing to offer a concession to Vanderlip's syndicate, the Soviet Government aimed not only at establishing mutually profitable co-operation with American business circles, but also at normalising relations between Soviet Russia and the U.S.A. In a letter to the Vanderlip syndicate on November 1, 1920, Chicherin pointed out: "Independently of the signing of a concession agreement, the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic assumes that the agreement will come into force only on the resumption of normal de facto relations between the Government of Russia and the Government of the U.S.A., and on condition that such relations will be established before July 1, 1921." However, this condition was not fulfilled, hence the concession agreement with Vanderlip was not finalised and did not come into effect. p. 423

[441] This refers to the circular letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) drafted by Y. A. Preobrazhensky on the basis of his report dealing with signs of demoralisation in the Party. Commenting on this draft, Krestinsky wrote: "I consider that the reservation contained at the end of point V, which speaks of eliminating inequality in living conditions, 'in so far as they are not due to the requirements of the work', should be elaborated as a separate point or, perhaps, even as a separate section of the circular.

"The point is that the living conditions of gubernia Party and Soviet officials are very hard, especially now that we are carrying out transfers on a mass scale and tearing most comrades away from the places where they had all kinds of family connections and links with the countryside.

"The comrades are suffering hunger, and since, in addition, they are overworked, they very soon become exhausted and put out of action for a long time or permanently. It is essential to get the mass of Party members to recognise the need of establishing somewhat better, less famished conditions of life for the small number of active revolutionary cadres.

"If the above idea is sufficiently emphasised and elaborated in the circular, the last two lines of the draft, which very cautiously and not very intelligibly condemn demagogy on the grounds of inequality, will become superfluous.

"In the discussion in the commission, Comrade Preobrazhen-

sky did not deny the need to include in the circular the idea of a certain inevitable temporary inequality, but he somehow failed to make his point." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 449.)

The Orgbureau's text of the letter from the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), "To All Party Organisations, to All Party Members", signed by Krestinsky, was sent to Lenin for approval. On this letter Lenin wrote that he agreed with the text and proposed the insertion in the letter of "a quotation from the Party programme to the effect that for the present there cannot be equality". This refers to clause 8 of the economic section of the programme. See *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, conferentsii i plenumov TsK* (C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of Its Central Committee), Part I, 1954, p. 423.

The circular letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) was published on September 4, 1920, in *Izvestia* of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) No. 21. p. 423

[442] On August 27, 1920, Orjonikidze received Lenin's letter, to which were appended extracts from a letter by A. S. Serafimovich, who in the summer of 1920 was in the Caucasus. Being misinformed about the political work of Party and administrative functionaries in the Caucasus, Serafimovich in his letter adduced a number of alleged facts casting a slur on the revolutionary activity of Orjonikidze, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front. In returning these extracts to Lenin, Orjonikidze refuted all the accusations against him as being false and groundless.

On receiving this reply, Lenin wrote: "I think Sergo (=Orjonikidze) is incapable of lying." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 450.) p. 423

[443] Written in reply to a letter to Lenin dated August 27, 1920, from N. N. Krestinsky, Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), concerning an article by A. Kolegayev, "The Scalp Hunters", published in the newspaper *Gudok* No. 77. The author of the article attacked the Food Commissariat for requisitioning the grain brought to Moscow by one of the departments of the People's Commissariat for Railways. Krestinsky proposed that the author of the article and the editors of *Gudok* should be censured for such impermissible publications. On September 1, 1920, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) reprimanded Kolegayev and the editors of *Gudok* and warned the editors "on no account to allow publication of articles of a departmental-polemical nature aimed against the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Food or other Commissariats" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 450). p. 424

[444] A. G. Beloborodov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Caucasian Labour Army, reported in his telegram that the counter-

revolutionary whiteguard landing force in the Kuban area would be liquidated in the immediate future (see Note 438). p. 425

[445] Written on a copy of a telegram from V. M. Sverdlov, Deputy People's Commissar for Railways, sent on August 27, 1920, from Saratov, requesting that textiles, footwear and household articles be issued for 345 families of railwaymen, who had been the victims of a fire. Owing to the absence of clothing, wrote Sverdlov, they could not go to work, and this threatened an interruption in railway traffic. p. 425

[446] See Note 442. p. 426

[447] This refers to the publication by Goznak (the Administration of Factories for the Issue of Banknotes) of a pamphlet *On the Construction of a Special State Paper Mill*, Moscow, 1920. The pamphlet was printed on high-grade paper and its 36 pages had 11 insets on art paper. p. 426

[448] According to the reminiscences of Lenin's chauffeur, S. K. Gil, the peasants handed their petition to Lenin on September 5, 1920, during a halt in the village of Bogdanovo when he was out hunting. The peasants complained that the local village Soviet had requisitioned from the poor peasants all their grain and seed corn, grossly distorting the policy of the Party and the government.

Lenin followed up this petition the very next day; an investigation was made and the guilty persons were severely punished. p. 427

[449] The note to Fotieva was written on a letter to Lenin from A. A. Dammi, a naval mechanical engineer, who reported a new method of gold extraction. p. 428

[450] This refers to a code message which Lenin received on September 8, 1920, from S. I. Gusev, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, reporting proposals by "pseudonym", a deserter, the former Lieutenant Yakovlev, who had made his way through the 13th Army to Headquarters of the South-Western Front. The gist of Yakovlev's proposals was this: "A secret organisation of officers has been formed in Wrangel's army aimed at blowing up Wrangel from within and handing over his whole army to the Soviet government. In the organisation there are some thirty General Staff officers. The organisation intends to overthrow Wrangel and proclaim his army the Red Crimean Army under the command of Brusilov. The Russian Government is asked to give real guarantees of a full amnesty for the whole army without exception, and issue a corresponding proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief. As proof of the seriousness of the proposal, Yakovlev is prepared to give away the leaders of Wrangel's organisation operating in Soviet Russia with the aim... of preparing an armed uprising. Temporarily, until the arrival of Brusilov, the command of the Red Crimean Army will be entrusted to General Staff officer Sokolovsky, leader of the conspi-

racy against Wrangel" (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 452). p. 428

[451] M. V. Frunze was appointed commander of the forces of the Southern Front by decision of a plenary meeting of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) held on September 20-21, 1920. p. 428

[452] Regarding Yakovlev's proposals, see Note 450.

The "Appeal to Officers of the Army of Baron Wrangel" signed by Kalinin, Chairman of the All-Russia C.E.C., Lenin Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars; Trotsky, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs; S. S. Kamenev, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic; and Brusilov, Chairman of the Special Council of the Commander-in-Chief, was published on September 12, 1920, in *Pravda* No. 202. The Appeal called on the officers of Wrangel's army to renounce the shameful role of serving the Polish landowners and French usurers, and to lay down their arms aimed against their own people. Those who sincerely and voluntarily came over to the side of Soviet power were guaranteed a full amnesty. p. 429

[453] On September 28, 1920, Lenin signed a decree of the Council of People's Commissars drawn up by Lezhava (People's Commissar for Foreign Trade) and D. I. Kursky (People's Commissar for Justice) on procurement of raw materials for export. p. 430

[454] The decision of the Council of Labour and Defence and the order of the Field Headquarters of the Republic instructed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front to mobilise urgently horses and carts in the Northern Caucasus and Kuban area for ensuring transport of coal to the loading points in the Donets Basin. p. 431

[455] The instruction to Avanesov was written in connection with a memo from Lyubovich on the need to make use of the wireless receivers lying at the factories of the "Radio" Section in Petrograd. p. 432

[456] This note to Lezhava was written on a letter dated September 15, 1920, from Y. M. Dvorkin, Deputy Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Far Eastern Republic, who informed Lenin of Italian and French offers to sell motor lorries and motorcars of various makes to a total value of about 105,000 dollars. p. 433

[457] Lenin's note to Chicherin was written on a report from Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev concerning the strategic importance of the new frontier between Soviet Russia and Poland, about which negotiations were then being conducted between representatives of the two countries at the peace conference in Riga.

See also notes 421 and 433. p. 434

[458] Written on a memorandum from Chicherin, who gave factual data on the violation by editors of Petrograd newspapers of the regula-

tions with regard to the publication of materials about the international situation and foreign policy. p. 435

[459] The reference is to the *Thirteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Workers' Party*, held in Prague from September 25 to 28, 1920. The Congress was preceded by a struggle between the revolutionary wing in the party—the Marxist Left wing—and the Right-wing reformist leadership. The Congress was attended by 321 persons, all supporters of the Left wing. At that time the party had more than 4,800 functioning organisations and almost 500,000 members. The Left wing at the Congress took over the leadership of the party and formed an independent party entitled the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Left). It included most of the members of the former Social-Democratic Party. The Congress condemned the splitting policy of the Right wing, expressed agreement with the conditions for affiliation to the Communist International, and instructed the new Executive Committee to conduct negotiations for joining the Communist International. The reformist leaders took the course of splitting the party and in November 1920 held their own Congress. p. 435

[460] On September 17, 1920, Lenin had a talk with S. I. Poroskun, a member of the Moscow Bureau of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, who had returned from Siberia, and made notes of the measures proposed by Poroskun for helping the Siberian peasantry (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 151). The results of this conversation and the measures proposed by Poroskun are reflected in this letter of Lenin's to the Siberian Revolutionary Committee. p. 436

[461] The note to Krzhizhanovsky was written on p. 21 of the *Bulletin* of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia, No. 5, 1920.

Krzhizhanovsky returned the *Bulletin* to Lenin the same day with a note that the last numbers of the *Bulletin* were to be issued in the very near future "in each of which a plan will be given for small-scale (immediate) and large-scale electrification of the main areas". Simultaneously with drawing up the electrification programme, work had also been started on its implementation. In particular, Krzhizhanovsky reported that in the Central Industrial Region fairly good progress was being made in the repair and socialisation of power stations (especially near Moscow). It was necessary now, he wrote, "to link the operation of these stations with the electrification of local agriculture on a wide scale. In this regard, too, I can inform you of something of *immediate practical* interest".

Markings by Lenin occur also on p. 45 of the *Bulletin*, where he side-lined, underscored and marked "N.B." the sentence "the consumption of fuel by the railways will be 2½-3 times as much with steam traction as it would be with electric traction". (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 455.) p. 437

[462] On October 1, 1920, the Council of Labour and Defence discussed Lenin's report concerning the supply of coal and food to factories of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, belonging to the key group of textile enterprises, and decided: "a) to endorse the agreement of September 28 of this year between the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Food Committee and the People's Commissariat for Food; b) to take note of the statement of the People's Commissariat for Food that 40 railway wagons of food have been sent from Nizhni-Novgorod" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 155). p. 438

[463] The Red Army withdrew from Pinsk on September 28, 1920. p. 439

[464] Written in reply to a note from Bukharin concerning V. I. Nevsky's article "Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Dead Reaction" (see present edition, Vol. 14, p. 21). In his note, Bukharin pointed out that whereas previously Bogdanov had recognised philosophy, he now abolished it and replaced it by "tektology" or "universally organised science" (as Bogdanov called his book published in 1913). "This formulation of the problem is on a *different* plane from that of empirio-monism," wrote Bukharin. "It can be disputed but it is necessary at least to understand it. Nevsky, however, does not have this minimum requirement." p. 439

[465] On the document is written in an unknown handwriting: "Note: Comrade Sklyansky's information has not been found." p. 440

[466] This note was written on a copy of a telegram dated October 2, 1920, from E. M. Sklyansky, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and M. F. Vladimirsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, sent to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front in Minsk, stating that "Smolensk University can be occupied only after the premises offered by the Executive Committee have been utilised".

On this subject see also the present volume, Document 741. p. 441

[467] Written by Lenin in connection with a report from the Terek Regional Food Committee forwarded to him by Bryukhanov, Deputy People's Commissar for Food. The report dealt with the difficult conditions of work in the region as a result of Wrangel's landing in the Kuban area, with the unsatisfactory progress of food procurements, and with the feeling among the population. p. 442

[468] Written in connection with Chicherin's letter to Lenin of October 5, 1920, reporting Rykov's talks with W. B. Vanderlip concerning concessions in the Far East. Rykov was insisting on shortening the term of the concessions and the right to buy them back before their expiry, but Vanderlip would not agree to this.

See also Note 440. p. 442

[469] By a decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on October 11, 1920, N. I. Bukharin was directed to speak at a meeting

of the Communist group at the First All-Russia Congress of Proletcult, which was held in Moscow from October 5 to 12, 1920. The document published here was Lenin's reply to a note from Bukharin, who announced his refusal to speak at the Congress on the grounds that disagreements between him and Lenin were possible on certain questions of proletarian culture, for example, on point 4 of Lenin's draft resolution "On Proletarian Culture" (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 316-17). The Communist group at the First Congress of Proletcult was proposed to adopt an organisational resolution subordinating the central and local Proletcult organisations to the People's Commissariat for Education. This resolution was drawn up on the lines of Lenin's express directives and was unanimously adopted by the Proletcult Congress. p. 445

470 In an article "On the Struggle Within the Italian Socialist Party", written on November 4, 1920, Lenin quotes from a speech by Treves at a congress of the Italian reformists, which opened on October 11, 1920, in Reggio Emilia (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 382-83). p. 445

471 In an effort to pit Turkey against Soviet Russia and to wreck negotiations for establishing friendly relations, the Entente leaders instigated Dashnak Armenia to attack Turkey. Dreaming of creating a "Great Armenia" which would include almost half of Asia Minor, the Dashnak government began military operations against Turkey on September 24, 1920. In this war the Dashnak army suffered defeat after defeat, while the advancing Turkish troops laid waste to the land, chased out the civilian population and organised massacres of Armenians. The war brought Armenia to the brink of complete ruin and total extermination of the population. At the beginning of October 1920, the C.C., C.P.(B.) of Armenia issued a call to the workers and peasants to overthrow the hated Dashnak yoke and establish Soviet power.

In connection with Orjonikidze's report of the probable resignation of the Dashnak government of Armenia and of the possibility of power passing to the Communists, Chicherin proposed: 1) to agree with the opinion of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of Armenia and the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the necessity of decisive action for establishing Soviet power in Armenia, 2) to afford Armenia political help in halting the further advance of the Turks, and 3) to support the new, Soviet government.

On October 14, 1920, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) adopted Chicherin's proposals.

Soviet power in Armenia was established on November 29, 1920, as the result of an armed uprising of the working people. For Lenin's message of greetings to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee of Armenia, see present edition, Vol. 31, p. 437. p. 446

472 This note was written because D. Z. Manuilsky objected to a decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) that he be

sent to Italy. On October 14, 1920, the Politbureau reaffirmed its previous decision and pointed out to Manuilsky that it was due to his ill-health. p. 446

473 Written on a report from Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. He proposed that the armistice with Poland should be utilised for the speediest rout of Wrangel's whiteguard forces. At the end of point 2 of Kamenev's practical proposals—on using part of the forces and resources of the Western Front for military operations in the south of the country "without touching those of the South-Western Front"—Lenin made an insertion mark "$\overset{x}{\surd}$" with a footnote: "Add $\overset{x}{\surd}$ until the armistice becomes an actual fact."

Under Lenin's proposal for approving the report of the Commander-in-Chief is a note by Krestinsky: "Agreed. *N. K.*" and the signatures of Stalin and Bukharin. p. 447

474 Written by Lenin on the minutes of an inter-departmental conference held on October 14, 1920. This conference considered it necessary to transform the Supreme Economic Council into a People's Commissariat for Industry and to set up an extra-departmental body under the Council of Labour and Defence for co-ordinating economic plans for production, transport, supplies, fuel, foreign trade, labour and currency distribution.

Enclosed with Lenin's note was the text of the decision of the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) "On Organisational Links Between the Economic Commissariats". This decision states: "The Congress instructs the Central Committee in the immediate future to work out a system of organisational links between the Supreme Economic Council and other Commissariats (the People's Commissariats for Food, Railways, Agriculture) that are directly linked with the economy in their daily work, with the aim of ensuring complete unity in carrying out the economic plan endorsed by the Party Congress." On the document are the following notes and signatures of those members of the Central Committee who read Lenin's note: "Read. *N. Krestinsky*", "Read and agree with Lenin. *L. Serebryakov*", "Agree with Comrade Lenin's proposal. *F. Dzerzhinsky*", "Read, agree with Vladimir Ilyich. *A. Andreyev*". In the hand of the secretary is written: "Comrade Tomsky has read it. Has telephoned that he fully agrees with Comrade Lenin." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 459.) p. 448

475 The note to Sklyansky was written on a telegram from A. G. Schlichter, Chairman of the Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee and Chairman of the Gubernia Military Council, who requested that reinforcements be sent to the units of the Red Army operating against bandit groups in Tambov Gubernia.

On October 19, Lenin wrote a note to V. S. Kornev, Commander of the Forces of Internal Security, on the need for the speediest

liquidation of the counter-revolutionary outbreak in Tambov Gubernia, and he asked to be informed what measures were being taken (see present volume, Document 727). On October 23 a report was received from Kornev on the measures taken to put down the revolt in Tambov Gubernia. p. 448

[476] This refers to the comments on a memorandum received by the Council of People's Commissars from V. D. Batyushkov, head of the State Agricultural Museum, member of the Council and Chairman of the Board of the All-Russia Chamber of Agriculture and G. Frolov, member of the Chamber, "On the Use of Mechanical Power (Tractors) in Performing Agricultural Work (Ploughing and Harvesting)".

See also Lenin's additions to the draft decree on an integrated tractor service (*Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 164). p. 450

[477] On October 26, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars discussed a draft decision on the sale abroad of antiques and endorsed the following decision: "1) To direct the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to arrange for the collection of antiques selected by the Petrograd Commission of Experts and to fix a bonus for their most rapid and profitable sale abroad. 2) The question of the quantity and standard of rations for the Commission of Experts to be referred to the Workers' Food Supply Commission for decision. If agreement with Comrade Lezhava is not reached, the matter to be submitted to the Council of People's Commissars. 3) To instruct the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to examine urgently the question of setting up a similar commission in Moscow and, if this is found advisable, to organise it." (*Collected Works*, Fifth Ed., Vol. 51, p. 462.)

The Commission of Experts recommended sending the well-known antique expert, M. M. Savostin, and the artist I. N. Rakitsky, a member of the Commission, to European markets for antiques—in Paris, London, Florence and Rome—for establishing connections with the leading antique dealers in the West, ascertaining precise prices of antiques, and arranging auctions. p. 452

[478] Lenin wrote this note to the Narrow Council of People's Commissars on a letter from Maxim Gorky. In view of the fact that the Petrograd Commune was proposing to requisition the products which had been supplied by permission of the People's Commissariat for Food to the Petrograd Commission for Improving Scientists' Living Conditions, Maxim Gorky, Chairman of the Commission, asked the Council of People's Commissars to pass a decision stating: "Products supplied by gubernia food committees, with the permission of the People's Commissariat for Food, to the Petrograd Commission for Improving Scientists' Living Conditions are not to be requisitioned by the Petrograd Commune nor to be counted by the latter as part of the ration quota endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars for Petrograd scientists." p. 453

[479] Written on a letter from Gorky saying that the State Publishing House had ordered. 1) Two books from Remezov in Switzerland: Fabre, *The Life of Insects*, Klein, *Wonders of the World*. Twenty thousand copies of each. 2) Biographies of musicians and artists, and cut-out alphabets from Brodsky in Stockholm. Total value of the contract: 1,200 000 gold rubles. p. 453

[480] Written in connection with a secret agreement between the bourgeois Latvian Government and agents of Wrangel for a joint attack against Soviet Russia. On September 26, 1920, when Count von Palen, a well-known agent of Wrangel's, was crossing the German frontier, letters were taken from him addressed to Savinkov, Wrangel's agent in Warsaw. These letters reported that a secret meeting had taken place in Riga between a representative of Savinkov and representatives of the Latvian Government and Supreme Command of the Latvian army, at which agreement was reached on joint action with Wrangel aimed at overthrowing the Soviet Government and re-establishing a single indivisible Russia, in return for which Wrangel promised independence for Poland and Latvia. The confiscated letters also reported that soldiers for Wrangel's army were being recruited in Latvia, that a recruiting office receiving financial support from Savinkov was operating almost openly in Riga and transporting soldiers on Latvian steamships. p. 454

[481] The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade replied to Lenin that on October 28 and 29 a meeting had been held at the Chief Gold Board with representatives of the Urals and Siberia, at which practical measures were discussed for developing the gold and platinum industry. p. 454

[482] On October 27, 1920, Lenin received a delegation from a Party Conference of Alexandrov Uyezd (Vladimir Gubernia), consisting of Comrades Ratnikov, Rybakov, Romanov and Glazunov, who informed him of abuses at the Troitsk Equipment Works and of the difficulty Party members had bringing the matter to the attention of the centre and obtaining its speedy investigation. The letter to the Vladimir Gubernia Party Committee was the result of Lenin's conversation with this delegation. p. 455

[483] On October 30, 1920, following a report by Lenin and Milyutin, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decision "On the Hydraulic Method of Peat Extraction". Hydraulic peat work, wherever carried out, was acknowledged to be especially urgent and of extremely great state importance. The Board of the Supreme Economic Council was instructed to organise under the Chief Peat Committee a Department for Hydraulic Peat Extraction (Gidrotorf), with R. E. Klasson as responsible director. Concrete measures were endorsed for developing work on hydraulic peat extraction. p. 458

[484] The document is the reply to a telegram from Frunze sent to Lenin on October 26, 1920, from Apostolovo station, in which Frunze reported: "I have just given the final order for a general offensive.

The decisive days will be October 30 and 31 and November 1. I have no doubt about the rout of the enemy's main forces. They will not succeed in withdrawing beyond the isthmuses by the time we strike. I consider that the chance of an immediate capture of the isthmuses is not more than one in a hundred." (*M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoi voiny. Sbornik dokumentov*, Moscow, 1941, p. 415.) p. 459

[485] This document was written in reply to the following inquiry from P. I. Popov, head of the Central Statistical Board: "The 1920 data on Soviet office workers in Moscow could be processed in four weeks' time. Please let me know what questions you wish to obtain answers to."

In the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U. there is a note of Lenin's—an instruction to the secretary—reading: "Make a note of the content of this paper and the date (30/X), and give the original to Popov." On this note there is a remark by the secretary: "Simply make a copy. Give the copy to Lenin for the book."

The note on the typewritten copy reads: "Original given to Popov 30/X." p. 459

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Abramovich, Alexander Yemelyanovich (b. 1888)—joined the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (R.S.D.L.P.) in 1908. After the October Revolution worked in the Comintern.—326

Adoratsky, *Vladimir Viktorovich* (1878-1945)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1918 worked in the Commissariat for Education, afterwards in the University of Kazan. Author of a number of works on Marxist theory of the state and law, philosophy and the history of Marxism.—366

Alexander II (*Romanov*) (1818-1881)—Russian tsar, reigned 1855-81.—390

Alexeyev, *Mikhail Vasilievich* (1857-1918)—general in the tsarist army. During the Civil War commanded the white-guard Volunteer Army organised in the Northern Caucasus. —65

Alferov, *Konstantin Alexeyevich* (b. 1883)—road-building engineer, joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (R.C.P.(B.)) in 1918. From the autumn of 1918 held the post of Assistant Commissar of the Board of Highroads, subsequently worked in the Chief Committee of Public Buildings and Works (1919-21)—348, 383

Alliluyeva, *Nadezhda Sergeyevna* (1901-1932)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. From 1919 worked in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars. During the Civil War she was at the Tsaritsyn Front. Afterwards worked on the staff of the magazine *Revolutsia i Kultura*.—395

Altfater, *Vasily Mikhailovich* (1883-1919)—rear-admiral. After the October Revolution sided with the Soviets. During the Brest peace negotiations acted as naval expert to the Soviet delegation. In February 1918 appointed Assistant Chief of Main Naval Headquarters; in April became a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Naval Affairs, in October a member of the Revolutionary Military Council and Commander of the Naval Forces of the Republic. —144

Andreyeva, *Maria Fyodorovna* (1868-1953)—well-known Russian actress, public figure, the wife of Maxim Gorky. Joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Took part in the revolution of 1905. After the October Revolution took an active part in the country's public life.—69

Andronnikov, *V. N.* (1885-1942) —joined the R.S.D.L.P. in

1905. During the October Revolution Chairman of the Ekaterinburg District Soviet and committee member of the Urals Regional Soviet. At the beginning of 1918 he was Chairman of the Urals Regional Soviet and the Council of Commissars of the Urals. From March 1918 to February 1919 Commissar of Production. Subsequently held Party, government and business posts.—83

Antonov—see *Antonov-Ovseyenko, V. A.*

Antonov-Ovseyenko, Vladimir Alexandrovich (1883-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. At the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets was elected to the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of member of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs. From the end of 1917 to the beginning of 1918 commanded the Soviet troops fighting Kaledin and the Central Rada. From March to May 1918 commanded the Soviet troops in the south of Russia. From January to June 1919 Commander of the Ukrainian Front. From 1922 to 1924 Chief of the Republic's Political Department. Subsequently held various administrative, military and diplomatic posts.—49, 52, 56, 57, 59, 62, 66, 70 213, 215, 223

Aralov, Semyon Ivanovich (b.1880)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. From 1918 to 1920 Chief of the Operations Department, first of the Moscow Military District, then of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs; a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Republic, of the 12th and 14th armies and the South-Western Front.—139 215, 231

Armand, Inessa Fyodorovna (1874-1920)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Professional revolutionary, active participant in the international women's labour and communist movement. Carried on Party work in Moscow, Petersburg and abroad. After the October Revolution a member of the Moscow Gubernia Committee of the Party and the Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee, and Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Economic Council. In 1918 became head of the Women's Department of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).—417, 420

Artyom (*Sergeyev, Fyodor Andreyevich*) (1883-1921)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. In 1911 emigrated to Australia. Took part in the Australian labour movement. After the February 1917 revolution returned to Russia. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Donets-Krivoi Rog Soviet Republic, member of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine. At the Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) was elected to the Central Committee. In 1919 was a member of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine. From 1920 to 1921 Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); from 1921 Chairman of the C.C. of the All-Russia Union of Mining Workers.—71, 226, 240, 333-34

Arzhanov, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1873-1941)—railway engineer. From 1918 onwards held key posts in organisations under the People's Commissariat for

Railways. An active participant in the Civil War in the post of Chief of the Central Board of Military Communications of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. He was a member of the Supreme Council for Transport (1921).—339

Asarkh, *I. Kh.* (d. 1918)—officer in the tsarist army who sided with the Soviets after the October Revolution. Commander of an infantry regiment of the Red Army, afterwards of a detached composite brigade.—117

Avanesov, *Varlaam Alexandrovich* (1884-1930)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. From 1917 to 1919 Secretary and member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, subsequently member of the Board of the State Control Commissariat.—292, 432

Avksentyevsky, *Konstantin Alexeyevich* (1890-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. Took part in the October Revolution and the Civil War. In 1920 commanded the 6th Army of the Southern Front was Assistant Commander of the Southern Front, Deputy Commander of the troops of the Turkestan Front, and in 1921 Deputy Commander of the armed forces of the Ukraine.—345

Avrov, *Dmitry Nikolayevich* (1890-1922)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918; an active participant in the Civil War. In 1919 Commandant of the Petrograd Fortified Area, afterwards Chief of Petrograd's Internal defence. In 1920-21 commanded the troops of the Petrograd Military District. Took part in the suppression of the anti-Soviet Kronstadt mutiny in 1921.—305

Axelrod, *Lyubov Isaakovna* (*Orthodox*) (1868-1946)—philosopher and literary critic, participant in the Social-Democratic movement, a Menshevik. Retired from political activities in 1918 and engaged in teaching at the country's institutions of higher learning.—436

Axelrod, *Tovy L.* (1888-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917, formerly a member of the Bund. From October 1917 to July 1918 was in charge of the Press Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars, and from 1920 to 1921 managed the Press Department of the Comintern. In 1922 started work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Subsequently worked on editorial and publishers' staffs.—81

B

Babkin, *Ivan Petrovich* (1885-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. In 1917 helped to establish Soviet rule on the Don, where he was a member of the Revolutionary Committee and of the Rostov-Nakhichevan Soviet. From 1920 onwards held administrative and business posts.—357

Bach.—96

Badayev, *Alexei Yegorovich* (1883-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Deputy to the Fourth Duma, member of the Bolshevik parliamentary group. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Petrograd Food Board, Food Commissar of Petrograd and the Northern Region, and held other official posts.—218, 223, 359, 375, 392, 393

Balabanova, *Angelica* (b. 1878)—Social-Democrat; after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Menshevik. Later took an active part in the Italian Socialist Party; during the First World War was a member of the Zimmerwald Association. In 1917 joined the Bolshevik Party. Attended the First Congress of the Comintern as a non-voting delegate. In 1924 Balabanova was expelled from the Party for adopting a Menshevik position.—155

Bank (*Libavsky*), *Solomon Aronovich* (1894-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1918 Secretary and member of the Presidium of the Vyshny Volochok Uyezd Executive Committee; from June to December 1918 Chairman of the Uyezd Economic Council.—175

Basin.—374

Belenky, *A. Y.* (1883-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. Emigrated to France in 1904. After the October Revolution worked in the Vecheka and O.G.P.U.; from 1919 to 1924 Chief of Lenin's bodyguard.—380, 384

Beloborodov, *Alexander Georgievich* (1891-1938)—joined the Bolshevik Party in 1907. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Urals Regional Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). In 1919 authorised agent of the Council of Labour and Defence at the Southern Front, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 9th Army. In 1920 Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Caucasian Labour Army. At the Eighth Congress of the Party was elected to the Central Committee.—216, 228, 250 411, 425

Beneš, *František* (b. 1882)—compositor by trade. Came to Russia in August 1916. In May 1917 joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), later a member of the Czechoslovak Section of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and the Section's C.C. In 1918 a member of the staff of the Czechoslovak Department of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. In February 1920 he returned to Czechoslovakia, where he joined the Right wing of the Social-Democratic Party; worked on the newspaper *Duch Času*, which was published in Moravska Ostrava and expressed the views of the Right Social-Democrats.—435

Berkalov, *Yevgeny Alexandrovich* (1878-1952)—professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Member of the Academy of Artillery Sciences, Lieutenant-General of the Engineering Service. Joined the Soviet armed forces at the beginning of the Red Army's organisation.—260

Berzin (*Berzin-Ziemelis*), *Jan Antonovich* (1881-1938)—veteran of the revolutionary movement in Latvia; joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. In 1918 headed the Soviet Mission in Switzerland. In 1919 People's Commissar for Education in Soviet Latvia. Later held diplomatic and government posts.—106, 123, 151, 153, 158, 160, 196

Berzin, *Reingold Iosifovich* (1888-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. In November 1917 commanded the troops of the Northern Group for the suppression of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy at Army Headquarters in Mogilev. In

June 1918 Commander of the Northern-Urals-Siberian Front, and later of the 3rd and 9th armies of the Southern Front. From 1919 to 1920 a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Western, Southern and South-Western fronts. In later years held military and business posts.—161

Blagonravov, *Georgi Ivanovich* (1895-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. After the October Revolution Commissar of the Peter and Paul Fortress. In 1918 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. From October 1918 to 1931 worked in the Vecheka and O.G.P.U.; afterwards Deputy People's Commissar for Railways and held other posts.—49

Blakitny (*Yellansky*), *Vasily Mikhailovich* (1894-1925)—Ukrainian Soviet writer and statesman. Formerly a leader of the Ukrainian Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Borotbists) and editor of its central organ *Borotba*. Joined the Communist Party of the Ukraine early in 1920. A member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 12th Army, member of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—357

Blokhin, *K. N.*—Commander of the 2nd Army of the Eastern Front from June 18 to July 3, 1918.—122

Bogdanov, *A.* (*Malinovsky*, *Alexander Alexandrovich*) (1883-1928)—Social-Democrat, philosopher, sociologist and economist, a doctor by profession. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. Afterwards leader of the anti-Party *Vperyod* group. In June 1909 was expelled from the Bolshevik Party. After the October Revolution one of the organisers and leaders of Proletcult. In 1926 founded the Blood Transfusion Institute, of which he became Director.—439

Bogdanov, *V. I.* (b. 1902)—member of the staff of the Commissariat for Agriculture in Borisoglebsk.—169

Bogolepov, *Dmitry Petrovich* (1885-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. During 1914-15 worked in the Social-Democratic parliamentary group in the Fourth Duma. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance (1918). Subsequently held various financial posts and worked as a teacher.—76, 78

Bogoyavlensky, *L. N.*—chemical engineer, Manager of the Radioactive Metals Section of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1918 Manager of the Berezniki Radium Plant.—159

Bonch-Bruyevich, *Mikhail Dmitrievich* (1870-1956)—one of the first military specialists to side with the Soviets. He was Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, military leader of the Supreme Military Council, and Chief of Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.—128

Bonch-Bruyevich, *Vladimir Dmitrievich* (1873-1955)—professional revolutionary, joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1895. Participant in the October uprising in Petrograd, Commandant of the

Smolny-Tavrichesky District, Chairman of the Commission for Combating Riots, Banditism and Counter-Revolution. During 1917-20 Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars.—49, 55, 61, 150, 169, 301, 327, 337, 368, 443-44, 446

Bonch-Bruyevich, V. M.—see *Velichkina, V. M.*

Borchardt, Julian (1868-1932)—German Social-Democrat, economist and publicist.—107

Bosh, Yevgenia Bogdanovna (1879-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the February 1917 revolution worked in Kiev as Chairman of the Party's Regional Committee; in October 1917 a member of the Kiev Military Revolutionary Committee. After the October Revolution she was a member of the first Soviet Government of the Ukraine, afterwards held military, Party and administrative posts. In 1923 identified herself with the Trotskyite opposition.—66, 138, 239

Botin, Stepan Ivanovich—electrical engineer, worked on the problem of induced detonation by means of radio waves. His experiments were a failure.—384, 447, 460

Brichkina, Sophia Borisovna (1883-1967)—from May 1919 worked as Manager of the General Office of the Council of People's Commissars, afterwards as secretary of the Council, minutes secretary of the C.C. Politbureau and C.C. plenary meetings and Deputy Business Manager of the Party's C.C.—324

Brodsky—member of the staff of the Petrograd Branch of the Vsemirnaya Literatura Publishers. In 1920 represented the State Publishers (Gosizdat) in Stockholm.—453

Broido, Grigory Isaakovich (1885-1956)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918, until then a Menshevik. In 1919 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front, afterwards head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Turkestan Commission. In 1920 the Commission sent him to Khiva with emergency powers.—362

Bronsky, M. G. (1882-1941)—joined the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania in 1902, afterwards a member of the Bolshevik Party. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. In 1920 appointed Envoy Plenipotentiary and Trade Representative in Austria. In 1924 a member of the Boards of the People's Commissariats for Finance and Foreign Trade, afterwards engaged in teaching and research.—86, 326

Brunovsky.—353

Brusilov, Alexei Alexeyevich (1853-1926)—general in the tsarist army. In 1919 entered the service of the Red Army. In 1920 appointed Chairman of the Special Council under the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic's Armed Forces. Later discharged the duties of Inspector of Cavalry.—429

Bryukhanov, Nikolai Pavlovich (1878-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. After the February revolution (1917) a member of the Ufa Joint Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., Chairman of the Ufa Soviet. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for

Food, then Deputy People's Commissar, and in 1921 People's Commissar for Food.—76, 109, 120, 125, 162, 309, 380, 408, 438, 442, 452

Bryusov, *Valery Yakovlevich* (1873-1924)—well-known Russian poet. Joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1919; head of the Library Section of the People's Commissariat for Education.—180

Bubnov, *Andrei Sergeyevich* (1883-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), of the Petersburg Committee and of the C.C. of the Party. Took an active part in the October Revolution as a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and the Military Revolutionary Centre set up by the Party's C.C. for leadership of the armed uprising. In March 1918 became a member of the Ukrainian Soviet Government and of the C.C. of the C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine. In 1919 became a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Ukrainian Front and of the 14th Army. In 1924 head of the Political Department of the Red Army and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. In 1925 Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). From 1929 to 1937 People's Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—237, 247

Budassi, *Alexander Vladimirovich* (d. 1941)—railway engineer. In January 1920 appointed Chief Engineer for the construction of the Alexandrov-Gai-Emba line and conversion of the Krasny Kut-Alexandrov-Gai line to a broad gauge.—345-46

Budyonny, *Semyon Mikhailovich* (1883-1973)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1919. During 1919-21 commanded a cavalry division, then a cavalry corps and the 1st Mounted Army, which played an important part in the defeat of Denikin, the White Poles and Wrangel. Subsequently occupied a number of command posts in the Soviet Army.—288, 341, 414, 440

Bukharin, *Nikolai Ivanovich* (1888-1938)—joined the Bolshevik Party in 1906. After the October Revolution editor of *Pravda*, member of the Politbureau of the C.C., member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Repeatedly came out against the Party's Leninist policy: in 1918 headed the anti-Party group of "Left Communists"; during the trade union discussion within the Party (1920-21) he supported Trotsky's group; in 1928 headed the Right opposition within the C.P.S.U. In 1929 he was removed from the Politbureau of the C.C. In 1937 he was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities.—47, 98, 99, 173, 283, 378, 439, 445

Bukhartsev, *Pyotr Vasilievich* (b. 1886)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. In April 1920 appointed authorised agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in the Northern Caucasus.—389

Bulatov, *A. A.* (b. 1877)—from March to November 1917 Commissar of the bourgeois Provisional Government in Novgorod Gubernia. In 1919 Chairman of the Artel Association in Novgorod.—232

Bulatov, *Dmitry Alexandrovich* (1889-1941)—during 1918-20

Deputy Chairman of the Tver Gubernia Executive Committee, Gubernia Food Commissar then Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee. From 1920 engaged in Party work.—174

Bullitt, *William Christian* (b. 1891)—American journalist and diplomat. In 1919 he was sent to Soviet Russia on a special mission by Wilson and Lloyd George.—225, 386

C

Chicherin, *Georgi Vasilievich* (1872-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. From 1918 to 1930 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Headed the Soviet delegations to the international conferences in Genoa and Lausanne. A member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.—63, 68, 80, 88, 91, 98, 112, 136, 151, 152, 165, 192, 224, 241, 244, 247, 271, 272, 290, 300, 309, 323, 325, 352, 365, 371, 373, 378, 386, 391, 401, 412, 415, 421, 423, 434, 435, 446, 454

Chubar, *Vlas Yakovlevich* (1891-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. From 1918 to 1923 Chairman of the Board of the GOMZ group of engineering works, Chairman of the Chief Metal Committee of the Supreme Economic Council, Chairman of the Economic Council of the Ukraine, Director of the Central Administration of the Donbas Coal Mining Industry.—431

Churchill, *Winston* (1874-1965)—British statesman, Conservative. During 1918-21, as War Minister, he was one of the leading spirits in organising armed intervention against Soviet Russia.—421

Chutskayev, *Sergei Yegorovich* (1876-1946)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. From 1918 to 1921 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance, then Deputy People's Commissar for Finance.—352

Clemenceau, Georges Benjamin (1841-1929)—French politician and statesman. From 1906 to 1909 head of the French Government. In the interests of big capital pursued a policy of brutal repressions against the working class. After the victory of the October Revolution was one of the organisers and sponsors of the blockade and armed intervention against Soviet Russia.—224, 225

Curzon, *George Nathaniel* (1859-1925)—British statesman and diplomat. During 1919-24 Foreign Secretary. One of the chief organisers of foreign military intervention against Soviet Russia. In July 1920, during the Polish-Soviet conflict, sent a Note to the Soviet Government demanding that the advance of the Red Army be halted at the line accepted by the Allied Supreme Council in December 1919 as Poland's eastern frontier, subsequently known as the "Curzon Line".—386, 403, 415

D

Dahl, *Vladimir Ivanovich* (1801-1872)—Russian dialectologist, ethnographer and writer. Author of Dictionary of the Living Great-Russian Language.—327

Dan (*Gurvich*), *Fyodor Ivanovich* (1871-1947)—a leader of the Mensheviks, a doctor by profes-

sion. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee first convocation; supported the bourgeois Provisional Government. In 1920 deputy to the Moscow Soviet. Deported from the country in the beginning of 1922 as an enemy of the Soviet state. —350

Danishevsky, *Karl Khristianovich* (1884-1941)—at the end of 1906 elected to the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. on which he represented the Social-Democrats of the Lettish region. After the October Revolution a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and of the R.M.C. of the Eastern Front, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Republic. In 1920 Chairman of the Soviet peace delegation to the conference in Minsk devoted to the question of ending the war and establishing friendly relations between the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Poland. In 1921 Secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.); subsequently held various business posts.—122, 412, 416, 417

Daszynski, *Ignazi* (1866-1936)—Polish politician. From 1892 to 1919 leader of the Galician Social-Democratic Party, then one of the leaders of the united Polish Socialist Party (Right-wing). From 1919 onwards thrice elected to the Polish Seim in which he was Chairman of the P.S.P. parliamentary group. In 1920 joined the Polish Government of the bourgeoisie and landowners in the capacity of Deputy Prime Minister. Supported the fascist coup and the Pilsudski regime in Poland.—415, 416

Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872-1947)—general in the tsarist army. During the foreign military intervention and Civil War (1918-20) he was Commander-in-Chief of the white-guard armed forces in the south of Russia. After his defeat by the Soviet troops (March 1920) an émigré.—204, 225, 259, 271, 285, 289, 296, 299, 319, 342, 343

Dumas, *Charles* (b. 1883)—journalist and publicist, member of the Socialist Party of France, member of parliament.—51

Dumenko, *B. M.* (1888-1920)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1919. One of the organisers and commanders of the Red Army during the Civil War.—204

Dybenko, *Pavel Yefimovich* (1889-1938)—after the February 1917 revolution Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Baltic Fleet Soviets (Centrobalt). At the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets elected to the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of member of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs. From October 1918 until the end of the Civil War commanded units of the Red Army at the Ukrainian, Southern, Caucasian and other fronts.—213, 219

Dyrenkov, *Nikolai Ivanovich*—engineer; in March 1918 appointed Business Manager of the Rybinsk Economic Council.—7

Dzerzhinsky, *Felix Edmundovich* (1877-1926)—one of the organisers of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania.

Carried on Party work in Poland and Russia. At the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906) was elected to the C.C. During the period of preparations for and carrying out of the October Revolution he was a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and the Military Revolutionary Centre for directing the uprising. After the victory of the Revolution he was Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (the Vecheka). In 1921 appointed People's Commissar for Railways while retaining his posts as Chairman of the Vecheka and People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. In 1924 Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.—69, 95, 173, 213, 245, 250, 282, 283, 297, 338, 356, 368, 410, 420, 425, 450, 451, 455

E

Eismont, *Nikolai Boleslavovich* (b. 1891)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1920 a member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council, then Deputy Chairman of the S.E.C. of the R.S.F.S.R. —461

Eliava, *Shalva Zurabovich* (1883-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In December 1917 Chairman of the Presidium of the Vologda Soviet. In April 1918 Deputy Chairman of the Vologda Gubernia Joint Executive Committee, in November 1918 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Trade and Industry. In 1919 a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern and Turkestan fronts Chairman of the Special Commission for Turkestan Affairs. Subsequently P.C. for Military and Naval Affairs of Georgia and of Transcaucasia, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R.—126, 315, 318, 362, 376

Eltsin, *Boris Mikhailovich* (b. 1875)—during 1919-20 Chairman of the Ufa Gubernia Revolutionary Committee.—333

F

Fedoseyev, *Mikhail Mitrofanovich*—owner of a printing-press in the town of Yelatma, Tambov Gubernia.—195

Fineberg, *Joseph* (1886-1957)—one of the founders of the Communist Party of Great Britain. In 1918 he came to Soviet Russia, carried on propaganda work among the interventionist troops and among the prisoners of war. Took part in convening the First Congress of the Communist International and in the work of the Congress. Worked in the Comintern up to 1935.—371

Fotieva, *Lydia Alexandrovna* (b. 1881)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1918 became secretary of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, simultaneously Lenin's private secretary.—73, 151, 200, 201, 202, 305, 359, 376, 377, 379, 394, 400, 415, 428, 431

Frankfurt, *Sergei Mironovich* (b. 1888;—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. After the October Revolution worked in the Commission for the Implementation of the Brest Treaty, then Dep-

uty Chairman of the Board of the Chief Coal Committee of the Supreme Economic Council (1919), member of the Siberian Bureau of the S.E.C. (1920). From 1921 to 1925 worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.—454

Frumkin, *Moisei Ilyich* (1878-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the Food Commissariat, Deputy People's Commissar for Food (up to March 1922). In 1920 Deputy Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, then authorised agent of the Food Commissariat. Later Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance, and held other posts. —298, 342, 442

Frunze, *Mikhail Vasilievich* (1885-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. During the Civil War Army Commander, Commander of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front, Commander of the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern fronts. After the Civil War Commander of the troops in the Ukraine and the Crimea. In 1925 Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs.—227, 259, 268, 286, 291, 295, 308, 314, 332, 376, 428, 459

G

Galaktionov, *Alexei Petrovich* (1888-1922)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Samara Soviet. After the liberation of Samara from the White Czech troops (October 1918), Chairman of the Samara Gubernia Executive Committee. In 1919 special agent of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for realisation of the harvest in Samara Gubernia.—196-97

Gerd, *Alexander Yakovlevich* (1841-1888)—Russian progressive educationist, author of a number of textbooks on natural science; from 1880 engaged in organising town schools in St. Petersburg.—188

Gil, *Stepan Kazimirovich* (1888-1966)—from 1917 to 1924 Lenin's chauffeur.—368

Gillerson, *Solomon Isidorovich* (b. 1869)—during 1920-21 head of the Soviet Red Cross Mission in Prague engaged in the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war from Czechoslovakia.—435

Gittis, *Vladimir Mikhailovich* (1881-1938)—colonel in the tsarist army. From 1918 served in the Red Army. Commanded the 6th Army of the Northern Front, then the 8th Army and the armies of the Southern Front. From July 1919 to April 1920 Commander of the Western Front, then of the Caucasian Front.—165, 240, 264, 298

Glazunov, *Nikolai Yakovlevich* (b. 1882)—during 1919-20 Commissar at Strunino station, Northern Railway.—455

Glebov (*Avilov*, *Nikolai Pavlovich*) (1887-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs. In May 1918 Commissar of the Black Sea Fleet; subsequently member of the Presidium and Secretary of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, People's Com-

missar for Labour of the Ukraine.—270

Glyasser, *Maria Ignatievna* (1890-1951)—from 1918 to 1924 worked in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars.—376, 458

Goikhbarg, *Alexander Grigorievich* (1883-1962)—held key positions in the People's Commissariat for Justice. Prosecutor at the trial of the Kolchak ministers in Omsk. From 1921 to 1923 Chairman of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars.—386

Goldberg, *Boris Isayevich* (1884-1946)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. From 1919 to 1921 Commander of the Reserve Army of the Republic and the Volga Military District; afterwards Deputy Chairman of the Chief Committee of Public Buildings and Works under the Supreme Economic Council, Assistant Chief of the Republic's Air Force Board and held other posts.—296, 308, 359-60

Goltsman, *A. Z.* (1894-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. From 1917 to 1920 a member of the C.C. of the Metalworkers' Union. From 1920 to 1921 member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.—461

Golub, *Alexander Naumovich* (b. 1885)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. After the October Revolution worked in the People's Commissariat for Labour and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In 1919 a member of the Extraordinary Commission sent to Khiva to conduct peace negotiations; a member of the Board of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Turkestan Republic.—362

Gomberg.—81

Gopner, *David Yulievich* (1884-1925)—during the October days took an active part in establishing Soviet power in Ekaterinoslav. From 1920 occupied key posts in Soviet Central Asia.—362

Gorbunov, *Nikolai Petrovich* (1892-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. After the October Revolution secretary of the Council of People's Commissars. In August 1918 appointed Manager of the Science and Technology Department of the Supreme Economic Council of the R.S.F.S.R. During 1919-20 a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 13th and 14th armies; subsequently Business Manager of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars.—57, 68, 72, 106, 108, 136, 156, 159,

Gorky, *Maxim* (*Peshkov*, *Alexei Maximovich*) (1868-1936)—Russian author, the father of Soviet literature.—211, 260, 283-85, 286, 359, 370, 452

Gorter, *Herman* (1864-1927)—Dutch Social-Democrat, publicist. During 1918-21 a member of the Dutch Communist Party; took part in the work of the Comintern.—155

Graber, *Ernest-Paul* (b. 1875)—Swiss Social-Democrat. In 1918 joined the Right wing of Swiss Social-Democracy. During the First World War an internationalist, supporter of the Zimmerwald Left. In 1918-21 a member of the Communist Party of Holland; took part in the work of the Comintern, adopted an Ultra-Left sectarian position. In 1921 he withdrew

from the Party and subsequently retired from political activity.—153

Graftio, *Heinrich Osipovich* (1869-1949)—Soviet power scientist, Academician, a pioneer of hydropower construction in Russia. From 1918 to 1920 Assistant Chief Engineer, then Chief Engineer of the Volkhov hydropower project. Took part in the work of GOELRO (the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia). Subsequently in charge of the construction of a number of big hydropower stations.—415

Grigoriev, *N. A.* (1878-1919)—officer in the tsarist army. In May 1919 raised a counter-revolutionary revolt in the rear of the Soviet military units in the south of the Ukraine.—229, 241

Grimm, *Robert* (1881-1958)—a leader of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. During 1909-18 Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht* and Secretary of the party. From 1911 a member of the Swiss parliament. Was one of the founders of the Vienna (II½) International.—153

Grinberg.—398

Groman, *Vladimir Gustavovich* (b. 1874)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. From the beginning of the February 1917 revolution was in charge of Petrograd's food supply. In 1918 Chairman of the Northern Food Council. In 1919 special agent of the Council of Defence for the evacuation of Petrograd. In 1920 Chairman of the Commission for Studying the Losses to Russia's National Economy Caused by the Imperialist and Civil Wars.—305-06

Cruzenberg (*Borodin*), *Mikhail Markovich* (1884-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. From 1907 to 1918 lived in America. From 1918 to 1922 worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. and in the Comintern.—399

Guilbeaux, *Henri* (1885-1938)—French socialist, journalist.—153, 158

Gukovsky, *Isidor Emmanuilovich* (1871-1921)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar, then People's Commissar for Finance. In 1919 member of the Board of the Commissariat for State Control. From 1920 onwards in the diplomatic service.—78, 81, 108, 110, 115-16

Gusev, *Sergei Ivanovich* (*Drabkin*, *Y. D.*) (1874-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1896. After the October Revolution carried on political work in the Red Army. Member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 5th and 2nd armies, and of the Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern fronts.—183, 194, 196, 217, 243, 245, 249, 251, 254, 265, 428

H

Haapalainen, *Eero* (1880-1938)—Finnish revolutionary, participant in the workers' revolution in Finland in 1918; was People's Representative for Internal and Military Affairs in the Revolutionary Government of Finland and Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Red Guard. After the defeat of the revolution resided in the U.S.S.R.—226

Hanecki (*Fürstenberg*), *Jakob* (1879-1937)—prominent leader of the Polish and Russian revolutionary movement, joined the Social-Democratic Party in 1896, member of the Chief Executive of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. In 1917 a member of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. Bureau Abroad. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance, Commissar and Manager of the People's Bank.—46, 47, 99, 265

Heller (*Ciarini*), *A. M.* (1891-1935)—born in Russia, emigrated to Italy in 1916, where he took part in the socialist movement. Came to Soviet Russia in 1920, employed in Comintern work.—362, 387, 445

Henderson, *Arthur* (1863-1935)—a leader of the British Labour Party and trade union movement. In 1919 one of the sponsors of the Berne (Second) International.—60, 421

Herzog, *Jakob* (1892-1931)—Swiss Social-Democrat. On October 1, 1918, expelled from the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. Headed the Vorderung (Demand) group of a radical trend, which subsequently became known as the Old Communists group. Attended the Second Congress of the Comintern. From 1921 onwards a member of the Communist Party of Switzerland, formed as a result of the amalgamation of the Old Communists with the Left Social-Democrats.—158

Heywood, *William* (1869-1928)—a leader of the U .S. labour movement, one of the leaders of the Left wing of the Socialist Party. A founder and leader of the I.W.W. (Industrial Workers of the World). Shortly after the founding of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. he joined its ranks. Persecuted for his revolutionary activities, he left the United States. From 1921 onwards he lived in the U.S.S.R .—44

Höglund, *Carl Zeth Konstantin* (1884-1956)—Swedish Social-Democrat, during 1917-24 a leader of the Swedish Communist Party.—326

I

Ilyin, *Fyodor Nikolayevich* (1876-1944)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. From 1907 to 1917 a political emigrant abroad. After the October Revolution returned to Russia; worked in the Moscow Soviet, the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Supreme Court, and the State Planning Commission of the R.S.F.S.R.—432

Ivanov, *Andrei Vasilievich* (1889-1927)—worker of the Putilov Works in Petrograd. In April 1918 elected Chairman of the Works Committee for Purchasing Food Products for the Workers.—86

Ivashchenko, *D. Y.* (1892-1947)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. In 1918 Commissar of Orsha station. From 1920 onwards worked in the Cheka of Byelorussia, the frontier guards, the G.P.U. and the Commissariat for Internal Affairs.—113

Izmailov, *Abdurakhman Yusupovich*—during 1919-20 a member of the Bashkir Regional Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), member of the Board of the Bashkir Cheka.—334

J

Joffe, *Adolph Abramovich* (1883-1927)—joined the Social-Democratic movement at the end of the 1890s. During the October days (1917) a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. In 1918 a "Left Communist". During the Brest peace negotiations was a member of the Soviet delegation. From April to November 1918 Soviet Ambassador in Berlin; continued in the diplomatic service.—68, 90, 91, 98, 106, 111, 112, 123, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 219, 237, 434, 444

Junius—see *Luxemburg*, *Rosa*.

K

Kaledin, *Alexei Maximovich* (1861-1918)—general in the tsarist army, a Don Cossack ataman. After the October Revolution a leader of the Cossack counter-revolution on the Don, helped to form the white-guard Volunteer Army, led the Cossack revolt.—49, 53

Kalinin, *Mikhail Ivanovich* (1875-1946)—worked in the first underground Marxist workers' circles and in the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Active participant in the first Russian revolution. At the Sixth (Prague) Conference in 1912 elected alternate member of the Central Committee, subsequently elected to the Bureau of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in Russia. One of the organisers of the newspaper *Pravda*. During the February revolution (1917) a member of the Executive Commission of the Petersburg Committee. After the October Revolution the Mayor and then Commissar of the Municipal Services of Petrograd. From March 1919 onwards Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. After the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) (1919) C.C. member; from 1926 member of the C.C. Politbureau.—186, 212, 227-28, 234, 287, 346, 429, 432

Kalmykova, *Alexandra Mikhailovna* (1849-1926)—after the October Revolution worked in the Leningrad Department of Education and the Ushinsky Pedagogical Institute.—368

Kamenev (*Rosenfeld*), *Lev Borisovich* (1883-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. Member of the editorial boards of the newspapers *Proletary* and *Pravda*. At the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (1917) elected to the Central Committee. After the February 1917 revolution came out against the Party's line towards the socialist revolution. In October 1917 published in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* in his own name and in the name of Zinoviev a statement announcing their disagreement with the resolution of the C.C. concerning an armed uprising, thus divulging a secret decision of the Party and betraying the revolution. After the October Revolution he was Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and member of the C.C. Politbureau. Repeatedly came out against the Party's Leninist policy. At the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1927 was expelled from the Party as an

active member of the Trotskyite opposition, and subsequently twice reinstated and re-expelled for anti-Party activities.—57, 149, 169, 196, 202, 219, 221, 231, 245, 265, 273, 283, 293, 333, 342, 350, 380, 401, 404-05, 409, 415, 421, 423, 441

Kamenev, *Sergei Sergeyevich* (1881-1936)—colonel in the tsarist army; after the October Revolution sided with the Soviets. In September 1918 appointed Commander of the Eastern Front. From July 1919 to April 1924 Commander-in-Chief of the Republic's Armed Forces. During 1925-26 Chief of Staff, Chief Inspector of the Red Army, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. From 1927 onwards Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs.—266, 270, 273, 281, 286, 295, 300-01, 307, 342, 379, 383, 389, 408, 409, 412, 416, 421, 429, 434, 440, 447, 461

Kaminsky, *Grigory Naumovich* (1895-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1913. In 1917 authorised agent of the Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in Tula. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Tula Gubernia Committee of the Party and the Gubernia Executive Committee. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Army. In 1920 Secretary of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Chairman of the Baku Soviet. From 1922 onwards occupied Party, trade union and administrative posts.—204, 240, 293

Kamo—see *Ter-Petrosyan*, *S. A.*

Karakhan, *Lev Mikhailovich* (1889-1937)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1904. Became a member of the Bolshevik Party in 1917. Secretary and member of the Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. From 1918 onwards a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Deputy People's Commissar.—53, 68, 152-53, 293, 356, 365, 391

Karelin, *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1891-1938)—one of the organisers of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party and member of its C.C. In December 1917 a member of the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of People's Commissar for State Properties. In March 1918 resigned from the Council following the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty. Was one of the leaders of the Left S.R. revolt in July 1918. After its suppression he emigrated.—83, 84

Kartashov, *A. V.* (b. 1875)—in 1917 Senior Procurator of the Synod, Minister of Creeds. Later a member of the white-guard government of Yudenich.—70

Kautsky, *Karl* (1854-1938)—a leader of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International, first a Marxist, later an ideologist of Centrism (Kautskianism). Editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, theoretical journal of the German Social-Democrats.—151, 153, 155, 160, 290

Kayurov, *V. N.* (1876-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. In the summer of 1918 headed a food detachment in Kazan Gubernia; afterwards worked in the Political Department of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front. From 1921 onwards held business posts.—203

Kedrov, *Mikhail Sergeyevich* (1878-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the October Revolution member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, Military Commissar for army demobilisation. In May 1918 he was sent to the north to organise the defence of the region. In March 1919 member of the Board of the Vecheka. From 1924 onwards worked in the Supreme Economic Council, the Commissariat for Health, the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and the State Planning Commission of the R.S.F.S.R.—129

Keeley, *Royal* (b. 1875)—American mechanical engineer. Came to Soviet Russia in September 1919. After survey of factories in Moscow Gubernia and a study of general conditions of life in the R.S.F.S.R. he presented to Lenin a report of his impressions and ideas for rehabilitating the ruined industry. Worked in the Supreme Economic Council as organising engineer.—310, 312

Kerensky, *Alexander Fyodorovich* (b. 1881)—Socialist-Revolutionary. After the February 1917 revolution Minister for Justice, Minister for the Army and Navy, and subsequently Prime Minister of the bourgeois Provisional Government and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. After the October Revolution fought against the Soviet government, and in 1918 fled the country.—168

Keynes, *John Maynard* (1883-1946)—British bourgeois economist.—405

Kharlamov, *S. D.* (b. 1881)—officer in the tsarist army; after the October Revolution served in the Red Army. In 1919 commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front and the Southern Shock Group, and was Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front.—297

Kharlov, *VasiIy Nikolayevich* (b. 1887)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. From 1917 to 1918 a member of the Ostrovsky Uyezd Soviet, Pskov Gubernia; was Chairman of the Pskov Gubernia Zemstvo Committee. During 1918-20 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. In 1918 authorised agent of the Council of People's Commissars for realisation of the harvest in Saratov Gubernia.—75, 137, 145

Khinchuk, *L. M.* (1868-1944)—during 1917-20 a member of the Board of the Moscow Workers' Co-operative Society.—168

Khodorovsky, *I. I.* (1885-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. During 1919-20 Chairman of the Kazan, then Tula Gubernia Executive Committees, Secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee, R.C.P.(B.)—366

Khryashchova, *A. I.* (1868-1934)—statistician. During 1918-26 Manager of the Agricultural Census Department of the Central Statistical Board.—201

Kilbom, *Karl* (b. 1885)—Swedish Social-Democrat, journalist. A member of the Swedish Communist Party, which he joined in 1917 and which he represented on the Executive Committee of the Comintern.—326

Kirov (*Kostrikov*), *Sergei Mironovich* (1886-1934)—joined tbe R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1917 leader of the Bolsheviks in

Vladikavkaz, organiser of the struggle for a socialist revolution in the Northern Caucasus. As a delegate to the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets he took part in the fighting during the October Revolution in Petrograd. In 1919 Chairman of the Provisional Military Revolutionary Committee of the Astrakhan region. At the head of the 11th Army helped to bring about the defeat of Denikin. In 1931 he became Secretary of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of Azerbaijan; in 1921 alternate member of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), and in 1923 member of the C.C. In 1926 Secretary of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Party and of the North-Western Bureau of the C.C., All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Was alternate member, then member of the C.C. Politbureau, member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. In 1934 Secretary of the C.C., of the Communist Party.—347, 357

Kiselyov, Alexei Semyonovich (1879-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. In 1918 elected Chairman of the Central Committee of Textile Industry, then member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1919 Chairman of the Committee of the Council of Labour and Defence set up to inspect the Food Commissariat, and member of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. In 1920 Chairman of the Miners' Union,—355

Kizas, A. P. (1899-1959)—from November 1917 to August 1922 worked in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars.—376

Klasson, Robert Eduardovich (1868-1926)—outstanding power engineer. Took an active part in drafting the GOELRO (electrification) plan; was Director of the 1st Moscow Electric Station.—456-58

Klein, Hermann (1844-1914)—German astronomer, author of popular science books on astronomy.—453

Klinger, G. K. (b. 1876)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917, attended the First, Second and Third Congresses of the Communist International, in 1919 Business Manager of the Comintern. During 1920-24 worked in the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, afterwards Manager of the Department of Nationalities and Manager of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.—326

Kobetsky, Mikhail Veniaminovich (1881-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. During 1920-21 Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. During 1921-23 Department Manager of the Comintern Executive Committee; subsequently in the diplomatic service.—397

Kobozev, Pyotr Alexeyevich (1878-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. From November 1917 to February 1918 Commissar Extraordinary of the Orenburg-Turgai region, afterwards appointed Commissar Extraordinary in Central Asia; was Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. In 1919 a member of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. During 1919-20

member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. During 1922-23 Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Far Eastern Republic.—122

Kokoshkin, *Fyodor Fyodorovich* (1871-1918)—a leader of the Cadet Party. After the February 1917 revolution a Minister in the bourgeois Provisional Government.—54

Kolchak, *Alexander Vasilievich* (1873-1920)—admiral of the tsarist Navy. During 1918-19 one of the chief leaders of the Russian counter-revolution. With the support of the imperialists of the U.S.A., Britain and France, proclaimed himself Supreme Ruler of Russia and headed the military dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landowners in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. The advance of the Red Army and growth of the revolutionary partisan movement led to the downfall of the Kolchak regime. Kolchak himself was captured and on February 7, 1920, by a decision of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee, he was executed.—191, 196, 225, 250, 259, 285, 319, 382, 386

Kolegayev, *Andrei Lukich* (1887-1937)—Left Socialist-Revolutionary. In December 1917 a member of the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of Commissar for Agriculture. In March 1918 resigned from the Council following the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty. After the suppression of the Left S. R. revolt he broke with the S.R. Party and in November 1918 joined the R.C.P.(B.). He was Chief of Supply of the Southern Front and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front.—61, 114, 201

Kolesov, *Fyodor Ivanovich* (1891-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. Active participant in the October Revolution in Turkestan. From November 1917 to November 1918 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan Republic. During 1919-22 held political key posts in the Red Army. Afterwards occupied business posts.—118, 140

Kon, *Felix* (1864-1941)—a veteran leader of the Polish revolutionary labour movement. After the February 1917 revolution he came to Russia and in 1918 joined the R.C.P.(B.). Engaged in Party work in the Ukraine and in Moseow.—372

Kopp, *Viktor Leontievich* (1880-1930)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917; from 1919 to 1930 worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. —326

Kornev, *Vasily Stepanovich* (b. 1889)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. During 1918-19 Chairman of the Ryazan Gubernia Executive Committee, then Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs in charge of the Forces of Internal Security, member of the Board of the Vecheka, Chief of the Militia of the R.S.F.S.R.—450, 451

Korolenko, *Vladimir Galaktionovich* (1853-1921)—Russian author and publicist.—284

Kostelovskaya, *Maria Mikhailovna* (1878-1964)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the February 1917 revolution Secretary of Moscow's Presnya

District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). Active participant in the October armed uprising in Moscow. During the Civil War Chief of the Political Department of the 2nd Army of the Eastern Front.—199, 222

Kostyaev, Fyodor Vasilievich (b. 1878)—officer in the tsarist army; sided with the Soviets after the October Revolution. In 1918 Chief of Staff of the Northern Front- afterwards Chief of Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Later instructor at thc Military Academy of the General Staff.—231

Kovylkin, Stepan Terentievich (1887-1943)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. After the February 1917 revolution Chairman of the Factory Committee of the Railway Workshops in Saratov, then member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet. In 1919 started work on transport: a member of the Board of the Commissariat for Railways, Manager of the Transport Department of the Vecheka, Superintendent of the South-Eastern Railway, authorised agent for combating banditism on the railways and water transport and held other posts.—339

Kozhevnikov, Sergei Nikolayevich (1896-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917; in 1918 Commissar Extraordinary of the Donets Basin, afterwards held political key posts in the Red Army.—62-63

Kozmin, P. A. (1871-1936)—technologist, subsequently Doctor of Technical Sciences, professor. After the October Revolution member of the Board of the Food Commissariat and Commissar for the Supply of Agricultural Machines to the Countryside, afterwards Deputy Chairman of the Special Defence Council. Helped in the drafting of the GOELRO (electrification) plan.—50

Krasikov, Pyotr Ananievich (1870-1939)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1892; Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry for Combating Counter-Revolution, then member of the Board of the U.S.S.R. People's Commissariat for Justice, simultaneously in charge of the Commissariat's Department which handled the drafting and enforcement of decrees and measures aimed at the disestablishment of the Church.—351

Krasin, Leonid Borisovich (1870-1926)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in the 1890s. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. In 1918 took part in the negotiations for the conclusion of an economic agreement with Germany, afterwards headed the work of the Extraordinary Commission for Supply of the Red Army; was a member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council and People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. In 1919 entered the diplomatic service. During 1922-24 People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.—99, 113, 151, 192, 204, 221, 294, 317, 321, 350, 354, 358, 371, 375, 386, 396, 401, 423

Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich (1869-1947)—general in the tsarist army. During 1918-19 com-

manded the whiteguard Cossack army on the Don.—181, 204

Krestinsky, *Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1883-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. During 1918-21 People's Commissar for Finance; from December 1919 to March 1921 Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).—204, 223, 234, 236, 246, 323, 334, 342, 353, 364, 382, 412-13, 414, 422, 423, 424, 439, 443, 446

Krupskaya, *Nadezhda Konstantinovna* (1869-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898, associate and wife of V. I. Lenin. Started revolutionary activities in the 1890s in the Marxist students' circles in St. Petersburg, then conducted Social-Democratic propaganda among the workers. In 1895 joined the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In August 1896 was arrested and sentenced to three years' exile. Served her sentence in the village of Shushenskoye, then in Ufa. In 1901 emigrated worked as secretary of the editorial board of *Iskra*. Took part in organising the Second ˜ongress of the R.S.D.L.P. Was secretary of the editorial board of the Bolshevik papers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. After the October Revolution worked in public education bodies.—51, 384, 403

Krylenko, *Nikolai Vasilievich* (1885-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Was in the first Soviet Government in the capacity of member of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs, later Supreme Commander-in-Chief. From 1918 onwards worked in Soviet justice agencies.—53, 58, 61, 263, 269

Krzhizhanovskaya-Nevzorova, *Zinaida Pavlovna* (1870-1948)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution Deputy Manager of the Extra-Mural Department of the Commissariat for Education.—192

Krzhizhanovsky, *Gleb Maximilianovich* (1872-1959)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893, one of the organisers of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Bolshevik group in the Moscow Soviet. After the October Revolution worked on the rehabilitation and development of Moscow's power economy; in 1920, on Lenin's assignment, he headed the Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO).—337, 415, 437-38, 447, 456

Ksandrov, *V. N.* (1877-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904 After the October Revolution Chairman of lhe Chief Fuel Committee, member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Railways. From 1920 member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council of the Ukraine and then of the U.S.S.R. and of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—297, 351, 431

Kudinsky (d. 1918)—Commissar at General Headquarters.—64

Kugushev, *Vyacheslav Alexandrovich* (1863-1944)—joined the revolutionary movement in the 1880s. In 1919 head of the Procurements Department in Ufa Gubernia. In 1920 engaged in co-operative work. In 1921 back at work in the Food Commissariat, then worked in finance.—305

Kühlmann, *Richard von* (1873-1948)—from August 1917 to July 1918 German Foreign Secretary, headed the German delegation to the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.—111

Kuibyshev, *Valerian Vladimirovich* (1888-1935)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Active participant in the October Revolution, organiser of the armed uprising in Samara. During 1918-19 Commissar and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front, then Deputy Chairman of the Commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. and the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) for Affairs of Turkestan. In 1920 Plenipotentiary of the R.S.D.L.P. with the Government of Bukhara; afterwards member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. In May 1921 became a member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council and appointed Superintendent of the Chief Electricity Board. In April 1922 elected Secretary of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.).—74, 315

Kun, *Bela* (1886-1939)—one of the founders and leaders of the Communist Party of Hungary. In 1919 virtual Head of the Hungarian Soviet Government, in which he held the posts of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.—205, 208, 271, 435

Kursky, *Dmitry Ivanovich* (1874-1932)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. From 1918 to 1928 People's Commissar for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R. During 1919-20 member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Commissar of General and Field Headquarters of the Red Army.—206, 262, 393, 414

Kuzmin.—53

Kuzmin, *N. N.* (1883-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. During 1917-18 Commissar of the South-Western Front. From August 1918 onwards with the Soviet troops in the north, Commissar of the 6th Army member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 3rd and 6th armies, Military Commissar of the Baltic Fleet Commander of the 12th Army, Assistant Commander of the Baltic Fleet.—209, 352

Kviring, *Emanuil Ionnovich* (1888-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1912. After the February 1917 revolution a leader of the Ekaterinoslav organisation of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the Ukraine, then Deputy Chief of the Political Department of the 12th Army. During 1920-21 member of the Soviet delegation to the peace negotiations in Poland. During 1923-25 Secretary of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine. From 1925 onwards Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. and held other posts.—237

L

Labourbe, *Jeanne* (1879-1919)—daughter of a Paris Communard. In 1896 she came to Russia, where she worked as a teacher. In 1917 started to

do Party work in the Moscow organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). In 1918 organised in Moscow a French Communist Group. In February 1919 engaged in underground work in Odessa among the troops of intervention; edited the newspaper *Le Communiste* published for the French soldiers and sailors. In March 1919 arrested by the French intelligence service and shot. —136

Lacis, *Martin* (*Sudrabs*, *Janis*) (1888-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, then member of the Board of the Vecheka. From 1921 onwards held Party, administrative and business posts.—245

Lander, *Karl Ivanovich* (1884-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. In May 1918 People's Commissar for State Control of the R.S.F.S.R.—190, 442

Lansbury, *George* (1859-1940)—a leader of the British Labour Party. Editor of The Daily Herald from 1912 to 1922.—351

Lao Hsiu-chao (*Liu-Tse-fung*) (b. 1892)—Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia; enjoyed extraterritorial rights in the R.S.F.S.R. as authorised representative of Chinese citizens and workers in Russia whose interests he defended. He was a delegate to the First and Second Congresses of the Comintern.—413

Larin, *Y.* (*Lourie*, *Mikhail Alexandrovich*) (1882-1932)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. In August 1917 admitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party. After the October Revolution held administrative and business posts; during 1919-20 represented the Supreme Economic Council on the Supreme Council for Transport.—72, 85, 98-99, 120, 335

Lashevich, *Mikhail Mlkhailovich* (1884-1928)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. From November 1918 to March 1919 Commander of the 3rd Army, then member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern and Southern fronts.—172, 231, 243, 245, 249, 251, 252, 256, 258, 270, 275, 281, 286

Latukka, *Juho* (1884-1925)—Finnish journalist, member of the Finnish Social-Democratic Party, which he joined in 1904; subsequently a Communist. After the defeat of the workers' revolution in Finland (1918) he lived in Leningrad.—136

Lebedev, *Semyon Ivanovich*—Chairman of the Temnikov Soviet, Tambov Gubernia, in 1918.—110

Legien, *Karl* (1861-1920)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat, a trade union leader.—107

Leiteisen, *Moris Gavriovich* (1897-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. Took part in the October Revolution. In 1918 a member of the Soviet Mission in Switzerland, afterwards sent to Stockholm. At the end of 1918, on his way to Moscow, he was arrested in Finland on suspicion of carrying on revolutionary propaganda; released in 1919 on the demand of the Soviet Government. Up to 1923 worked in the People's Commissar-

iat for Foreign Affairs, later engaged in scientific research.—154

Lenin (*Ulyanov*), *Vladimir Ilyich* (1870-1924).—48, 51, 58, 136, 153, 155-56, 162, 197, 276, 283, 285, 292, 326, 351, 371, 378, 397-98, 400, 401, 403, 405, 443

Lentsman, *Jan Davidovich* (1881-1944)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the C.C. and the Riga Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish region and member of the Soviet. In 1919 Deputy Chairman and Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Government of Latvia, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 15th Army then Chief of the Registration Department of the R.M.C. of the Republic.—266

Lepeshinsky, *Panteleimon Nikolayevich* (1868-1944)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in the early nineties. Active participant in the February and October revolutions. After the victory of Soviet power a member of the Board of the R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Education, afterwards Deputy People's Commissar for Education of Turkestan.—318

Leshchenko, *D. I.* (1876-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. Worked on the editorial staffs of the newspapers *Zvezda* and *Pravda*. From 1918 onwards Secretary of the People's Commissariat for Education, Manager of the All-Russia Cinema Committee and held other posts.—386

Lezhava, *Andrei Matveyevich* (1870-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. During 1918-20 Chairman of Centrosoyuz; from 1920 to 1925 Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.—389, 429, 433, 451, 454, 456

Lianozov, *S. G.*—owner of oilfields; after the October Revolution fled the country. Played a prominent part among the White émigrés resident in the Baltic region in 1919. Headed the "Government of the Russian North-Western Region" which was set up in August 1919 by General March head of the British Mission in Estonia, and which existed several months.—285

Liebknecht, *Karl* (1871-1919)—an outstanding leader of the German and international workers' movement; a leader of the Left wing of German Social-Democracy, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany and leader of the uprising of the Berlin workers in January 1919. After the suppression of the uprising he was brutally murdered.—107, 154, 196, 360

Litvinov, *Maxim Maximovich* (1876-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution Soviet representative in Great Britain. In 1918 appointed member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In 1921 became Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. From 1930 to 1939 P.C. for Foreign Affairs; subsequently Deputy P.C. for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador in the U.S.A.—153, 224, 326

Lloyd George, *David* (1863-1945)—British statesman and diplomat, leader of the Liberal Party. From 1916 to 1922

Prime Minister. Engineered military intervention against the Soviet state.—224, 225, 386, 421

Lobova, *V. N.* (1888-1924)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. During 1920-21 engaged in Party work in Moscow, Perm and Samara; afterwards worked in the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Party's Central Committee and in Siberia.—346

Lomonosov, *Yuri Vladimirovich* (b. 1876)—in 1919 a member of the Boards of the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat for Railways, authorised agent of the Council of People's Commissars abroad where he handled Soviet railway orders.—321, 348, 354, 456

Lomov, A. (*Oppokov*, *Georgi Ippolitovich*) (1888-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. From 1918 to 1921 a member of the Board and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council in charge of fuel supply.—287, 352, 355

Longuet, *Jean* (1876-1938)—a leader of the French Socialist Party and the Second International, publicist. Was opposed to the French Socialist Party becoming affiliated to the Comintern and to the establishment of a Communist Party in France.—154

Loriot, *Ferdinand* (1870-1930)—French socialist. From 1920 to 1927 a member of the French Communist Party.—44

Loti, *Pierre* (1850-1923)—French bourgeois writer.—154

Luganovsky (*Portugeis*), *Emmanuil Viktorovich* (1885-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. From December 1917 to May 1918 a member of the Soviet Government of the Ukraine. In October 1918 authorised agent of the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R.; during 1919-21 worked in the Council of Labour and Defence and the Supreme Economic Council.—64

Lunacharsky, *Anatoly Vasilievich* (1875-1933)—joined the revolutionary movement in the early nineties. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik. After the October Revolution up to 1929 People's Commissar for Education. In 1919 authorised agent of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for combating desertion in Kostroma.—229, 366, 369, 392

Luteraan, *Barend* (b. 1878)—Dutch Social-Democrat, journalist. Later a member of the Independent Socialist Party and then the Communist Workers' Party of the Netherlands.—58

Lutovinov, *Yuri Khrisanfovich* (1887-1924)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. After the October Revolution an active participant in the Civil War on the Don and in the Ukraine. In 1918 a member of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine. Later engaged in trade union and administrative work. In 1920 became a member of the C.C. of the Metalworkers' Union and of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.—226

Luxemburg, *Rosa* (*Junius*) (1871-1919)—an outstanding leader of the Polish and German workers' movement, a leader of the Left wing of the Second International. Was one of the sponsors of the Internationale Group in Germany,

which afterwards assumed the name of Spartacus group, then Spartacus League. During the November revolution in Germany in 1918 was one of the leaders of the revolutionary vanguard of the German workers. Took a leading part in the Inaugural Congress of the German Communist Party. In January 1919 she was arrested and brutally murdered.—106, 154, 196

Lyubarsky, Nikolai Markovich (1887-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906. From 1918 to 1923 in the diplomatic service, a member of the Board of the Department of Soviet Propaganda of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.—326

M

Makhno, Nester Ivanovich (1884-1934)—leader of anarchist-kulak detachments in the Ukraine. He and his followers posed as champions of the peasants' interests in order to win over the peasant masses. Makhno accommodated himself to the changing political and military situation, conducting military operations now against the whiteguards, now against the Red Army (in the summer of 1918 he carried on for a time a partisan struggle against the landowners, German occupationists and the Hetman). During the first half of 1919, with the re-establishment of Soviet power in the Ukraine, Makhno took a sharply hostile stand towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the spring of 1921 the Makhno bands were routed by the Soviet troops.—213

Malinovsky, P. P. (1869-1943)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Commission of the Moscow Soviet for the Protection of Monuments of Art and Ancient Buildings, Civil Commissar of the Kremlin. In March 1918 Acting People's Commissar for the Properties of the Republic.—82

Malyshev, Sergei Vasilievich (1877-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. After the October Revolution worked in the People's Commissariat for Labour, the Food Commissariat, Centrosoyuz and other institutions.—132, 263

Mamontov, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1869-1920)—whiteguard general, commander of a cavalry corps in the armies of Krasnov and Denikin. In August 1919 Mamontov's corps was sent by Denikin to operate behind the lines of the Soviet troops on the Southern Front. In the course of October-November 1919 Mamontov was routed.—279

Mann, Tom (1856-1941)—a prominent leader of the British labour movement. In the 1890s one of the organisers and secretary of the Independent Labour Party. One of the sponsors of the Communist Party of Great Britain.—44

Manner, Kullervo (b. 1880)—during 1917-18 Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland. From 1910 to 1918 a member of the Finnish parliament. During the workers' revolution in Finland in 1918 headed the revolutionary government.—59, 63

Mantsev, Vasily Nikolayevich (1888-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1906. From 1918 onwards held Party and administrative posts in Moscow. In 1919 he was sent to work in the Ukraine; member of the Board of the Vecheka, Chief of the Central Board of the Cheka, simultaneously Chief of the Special Department of the South-Western and Southern fronts (Crimea).—425

Manuilsky, Dmitry Zakharovich (1883-1959)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1918, after the signing of the Brest Treaty, took part in the peace talks with the Ukrainian Central Rada. In 1919 headed the Mission of the R.S.F.S.R. Red Cross in France. From 1920 to 1922 People's Commissar for Agriculture of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Secretary of the C.C. C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine.—205 343-44, 446

Manukhin, I. I. (b. 1882)—physician, treated Maxim Gorky. Engaged in research in the field of therapy.—359

Marchlewski, Julian (1866-1925)—a prominent leader of the Polish and international workers' movement. In 1918 he came to Soviet Russia; was elected to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Carried out a number of important diplomatic missions, took part in the negotiations with Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Japan and China.—281, 399, 410

Maria Ilyinichna—see *Ulyanova, M. I.*

Markov, Sergei Dmitrievich (1880-1922)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. At the end of 1918 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Railways; in 1919 became Deputy People's Commissar for Railways. In 1920 Superintendent of the Vladikavkaz Railway, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front.—274, 279, 297, 305, 333

Martinovich, Ksenofont Filippovich (b. 1894)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. Was a member of the Board of the Crimean Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (1918-20); in 1919 Chief Controller of the Southern Front, later worked in the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R.—282

Martov, L. (*Tsederbaum, Yuli Osipovich*) (1873-1923)—a leader of Menshevism. Joined the Social-Democratic movement in the 1890s. In 1895 took part in organising the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) he led the Minority (the Mensheviks), and since then was one of the leaders of the central bodies of the Mensheviks and editor of the Menshevik publications. In 1920 a member of the Moscow Soviet. Subsequently emigrated to Germany.—155, 350

Marx, Karl (1818-1883).—219

Mashitsky, Alexander Alexandrovich—joined the revolutionary movement in 1883, a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1914. Participant in the October Revolution. From 1918 to 1932 assistant authorised agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Byelorussia, Lithuania and the Ukraine; a member of the Board of the Department of

Foreign Relations of the Turkestan Commission; afterwards in the diplomatic service abroad.—362

Maximov, *Konstantin Gordeyevich* (1894-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1914. In 1917 a member of the Moscow Committee of the Party. After the October Revolution head of the Food Department of the Moscow Soviet. Participant in the Civil War as member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. In 1920 became Chairman of the Industrial Bureau of the Supreme Economic Council in the Urals authorised agent of the Council of Labour and Defence for rehabilitating the Urals industry, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the Ukraine, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian S.S.R., member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R., member of the Presidiums of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Ukrainian C.E.C., and the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.—339

Medvedev, *S. P.* (1885-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. After the October Revolution held political posts in the Red Army. During 1920-22 Chairman of the C.C. of the Metalworkers' Union; afterwards worked in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.—138, 264

Medyantsev, *I. F.* (b. 1889)—Secretary for Special Commissions to E. M. Sklyansky Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.—256

Mekhonoshin, *Konstantin Alexandrovich* (1889-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1913. During the October (1917) days a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. In December 1917 appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs. From January 1918 a member of the All-Russia Board for Forming the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, then member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern, Southern and Caspian-Caucasian fronts and of the R.M.C. of the Republic.—54, 114, 122, 217

Melnichansky, *Grigory Natanovich* (1886-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. During the October days (1917) a member of the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Council of Trade Unions. From 1918 to 1920 represented the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence.—240, 250

Menzhinsky, *Vladimir Rudolfovich* (1874-1934)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Finance, then Consul-General of the R.S.F.S.R. in Berlin; in 1919 began work in the Vecheka.—90

Merezhin, *Abram Naumovich* (b. 1880)—from 1905 to 1916 a Menshevik, then a member of the Bund. Joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1919. Was a member of the Central Bureau of Jewish Sections under the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), worked in the People's Commissariat for Nationalities.—390

Meshcheryakov, *V. N.* (1885-1946)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. In 1918 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R., then People's Commissar for Agriculture of the Ukraine; afterwards held posts in the Commissariat for Education, the Chief Department of Political Education and other bodies.—84, 263

Metelev, *Alexander Denisovich* (1893-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1912. From June to August 1918 a member of the Archangel Gubernia Executive Committee, afterwards held a political post in the 6th Army, a member of the Penza Gubernia Executive Committee.—126

Mezhlauk, *Valery Ivanovich* (1893-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. During 1918-20 Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the Ukraine, People's Commissar for Finance of the Donets-Krivoi Rog Republic, Gubernia Military Commissar of Kazan, member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 5th, 10th, 14th and 2nd armies, member of the R.M.C. of the Southern Front, People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the Ukraine. From 1920 to 1924 Commissar of the Moscow-Baltic, Moscow-Kursk and Northern railways, Deputy Chief Commissar for Railways member of the Board of the Commissariat for Railways.—71, 226, 232, 237, 238, 240, 247

Mickiewicz-Kapsukas, *Vikenty Semyonovich* (*Vincas Mickjewichus-Kapsukas*) (1880-1935)—from December 1917 onwards Soviet Government Commissar for Lithuanian Affairs. As a member of the Central Bureau of Lithuanian Sections under the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) took part in organising the Communist Party of Lithuania, was a member of its C.C. At the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919 was head of the first Soviet Government of Lithuania.—421-22

Milyutin, *Vladimir Pavlovich* (1884-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910. During 1918-21 Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.—72, 268, 287, 292, 313, 382, 456

Minin, *S. K.* (1882-1962)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. During the Civil War a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. In 1919, on a special assignment from Lenin, visited Tula, Byelorussia and Lithuania. During 1920-21 a member of the R.M.C. of the First Mounted Army.—210

Minkin, *A. Y.* (1887-1955)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the October Revolution Secretary of the Penza Gubernia Committee of the Party Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee, Commissar of the Goznak factory at Perm, Secretary of the Perm Gubernia Committee of the Party and Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee.—106, 129, 134, 140, 346

Mirbach, *Wilhelm* (1871-1918)—in April 1918 appointed German Ambassador in Moscow. On July 6, 1918, he was assassinated by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries with the aim of provoking war between

Germany and Soviet Russia.—80, 114

Mitskevich, *Valentin Sergeyevich* (1900-1948)—from the autumn of 1918 to May 1919 worked as Lenin's librarian.—220

Moor, *Karl* (b. 1853)—German Social-Democrat. During the First World War gave assistance to political emigrants in Switzerland. After the October Revolution lived in Moscow.—168

Morozov, *Mikhail Vladimirovich* (1868-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the October Revolution worked in the Chief Fuel Committee and peat industry.—456

Movshovich, *Maria* (1874-1953)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1911 emigrated to Switzerland; in 1917 returned to Russia. Fought in the Civil War. From 1919 onwards engaged in Party work in Moscow.—323

Mukhin, *N.*—in 1918 a member of the staff of the Chief Oil Committee.—151

Muralov, *Nikolai Ivanovich* (1877-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. During the October Revolution a member of the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee and of the Revolutionary Headquarters. Afterwards Commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District. During 1919-20 a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Eastern Front and the 3rd and 12th armies.—56, 154, 250

Muranov, *Matvei Konstantinovich* (1873-1959)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. Deputy to the Fourth Duma, a member of the Bolshevik parliamentary group. After the October Revolution Inspector of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and member of the Party's Control Commission.—455

Muravyov, *M. A.* (1880-1918)—officer in the tsarist army. After the October Revolution sided with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. At the beginning of 1918 commanded the troops operating against the Ukrainian Central Rada and against Kaledin. In July 1918, acting as Commander of the troops of the Eastern Front, he betrayed the Soviet government and attempted to raise a revolt among the troops. Offered resistance during his arrest and was killed.—70, 114

Murphy, *John Thomas* (b. 1888)—a leader of the British labour movement, joined the Socialist Party of Scotland in 1917. In 1920 elected delegate of the Shop Stewards Committees to the Second Congress of the Comintern. Took part in organising the Communist Party of Great Britain; from 1921 a member of its Central Committee and one of the organisers of the Profintern Bureau in Britain.—399

Muss, *E. R.*—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1919 Chairman of the Samara Gubernia Food Committee.—332

Myaskov, *Konstantin Gavrilovich* (1881-1958)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1912. After the October Revolution Food Commissar in Samara, then Chairman of the Russian Agricultural Bank, member of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and of the Board of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., member of the staff of the C.C., C.P.S.U.—332

Myshkin, *P. P.* (1887-c.1924)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. During 1917-18 a member of the Tsaritsyn Soviet, then of the Tsaritsyn Executive Committee. In 1919 Chairman of the Tsaritsyn Extraordinary Commission.—200

N

Nadezhda Konstantinovna—see *Krupskaya, N. K.*

Naglovsky, *Alexander Dmitrievich*—in 1919 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Railways, authorised agent of the Council of Defence for introducing martial law on the railways of the Northern Front, Chairman of the Commission for the Evacuation of Property from Petrograd.—297

Nansen, *Fridtjof* (1861-1930)—distinguished Norwegian scientist, arctic explorer, well-known public figure. After the First World War he was High Commissioner of the League of Nations for the repatriation of prisoners of war.—224, 226

Narimanov, *Nariman Kerbalai Najaf-ogly* (1871-1925)—Soviet statesman, author. In 1917 a prominent fighter for Soviet power in Azerbaijan. In 1918 became People's Commissar for Mining in the Baku Council of People's Commissars. In 1919 started work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, then Deputy People's Commissar for Nationalities, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan, then one of the chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—367

Natsarenus, *Sergei Pavlovich* (1883-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1918 Military Commissar Extraordinary of the Murmansk-White Sea Region, then of the Petrograd Military District. Was a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 7th, 14th and 15th armies. In July 1919 appointed Military Commissar of the Kharkov Military District.—114, 120. 128, 246, 247, 249

Nazarov, *Stepan Ivanovich* (1879-1944)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Chief Cotton Committee, member of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Committee of the Party and Gubernia Executive Committee, authorised agent of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 9th Army and Commissar of Army Staff.—302

Nevsky, *Vladimir Ivanovich* (1876-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Railways, Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Rector of the Sverdlov Communist University.—56, 126, 179, 198, 257

Nikolayev, *Akim Maximovich* (1887-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. During 1918-24 a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs, Chairman of the Radio Council.—394, 399, 447

Nikulina, *Nadezhda Alexeyevna* (1845-1923)—well-known comedy actress of the Maly Theatre (Moscow) (1863-1914).—427

O

Obolensky, *V. V.*—see *Osinsky*, *N.*

Obukh, *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1870-1934)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1894; physician, leading worker of the Soviet public health service. During 1919-23 head of the Moscow Health Department. Attended Lenin during his illness.—384-85

Odintsov, *Sergei Ivanovich* (b. 1874)—in April 1917 appointed Commander of the 3rd Caucasian Cossack Division. In 1918 Manager of the General Office of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs.—45

Okulov, *Alexei Ivanovich* (1880-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903; author. During the Civil War a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Southern and Western fronts and of the 10th Army. In December 1918 appointed member of the R.M.C. of the Republic. During 1920-21 Commander of the troops of Eastern Siberia and member of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal.—242, 246

Olderogge, *V. A.* (b. 1873)—general in the tsarist army. Joined the Red Army and in 1919 commanded the Eastern Front; was Chief of the Military Branch of the West-Siberian Military District, then Chief of the Military Branch of the Kiev Military District.—286

Orjonikidze, *Grigory Konstantinovich* (*Sergo*) (1886-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the October Revolution he was Commissar Extraordinary in the Ukraine, then in the south of Russia. During the Civil War a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 16th and 14th armies, and of the Caucasian Front. During 1921-26 Chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. In 1926 became Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. and People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R. In 1930 Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Economic Council, and in 1932 People's Commissar for Heavy Industry of the U.S.S.R.—56, 57, 70, 71, 185, 264, 341, 352, 367, 374-75, 381, 395-96, 420, 423, 426

Orlov (*Yegorov*), *Kirill Nikitovich* (1879-1943)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. During 1917-18 Chairman of the All-Russia Board for Arming the Red Army. From August 1918 to December 1919 Political Commissar Extraordinary of the Tula small arms and cartridge factories and ordnance depot.—204

Osinsky, *N.* (*Obolensky*, *V. V.*) (1887-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. After the October Revolution Manager of the State Bank of the R.S.F.S.R., Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1918 a "Left Communist". In 1920 Chairman of the Tula Gubernia Executive Committee member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food.—50, 62-63, 278

P

Paikes, *A. K.* (1873-1958)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. During 1918-20 worked in Si-

beria as member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for State Control and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Deputy People's Commissar for State Control and member of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee.—139, 142, 315

Palchinsky, *Pyotr Ioakimovich* (d. 1930)—engineer; after the February 1917 revolution Deputy Minister for Trade and Industry in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution organised acts of sabotage in Soviet industry.—168

Palinski, *S.* (1874-1921)—a leader of the Polish workers' movement, member of the Polish Socialist Party. During 1917-18 worked as shop superintendent at the Berezniki Soda Works, then returned to Poland.—118

Panyushkin, *Vasily Lukich* (1888-1960)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. In April 1918 appointed Military Commissar Extraordinary in Tula Gubernia for combating counter-revolution; commanded detachments of armed workers and sailors, was at the Eastern Front, then appointed Military Commissar Extraordinary of the Volga region and the Urals for combating counter-revolution.—99, 111, 124, 208

Parvus (*Gelfand*, *Alexander Lazarevich*) (1869-1924)—at the turn of the century took part in the Social-Democratic movement of Russia and Germany. Afterwards withdrew from the S.D. movement, and during the First World War engaged in speculation and made a fortune on war contracts.—46, 47

Pavlov, *Ivan Petrovich* (1849-1936)—eminent Russian physiologist.—392

Peluso, *Edmondo* (1882-1942)—Italian socialist. During 1918-19 a member of the Spartacus League, later of the Communist Party of Bavaria. In 1921 joined the Italian Communist Party.—154

Pershikova, *V. V.*—member of the staff of the Tsaritsyn Housing Department in 1919.—201

Peters, *Jan Khristoforovich* (1886-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1917 elected to the C.C. of the Lettish Social-Democratic Party. During the October days a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee, then member of the Board of the Vecheka and Deputy Chairman of the Vecheka. From 1919 to 1920 Commandant of the Petrograd and Kiev Fortified Areas and member of the Military Council of the Tula Fortified Area. In 1920 a member of the Turkestan Bureau of the C.C.—49, 305, 351

Peterson, *K. A.* (1877-1926)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. During the October Revolution a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee, then member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and of the Revolutionary Tribunal under the C.E.C., Military Commissar of the Lettish Rifle Division. In December 1918 appointed People's Commissar for Military Affairs in Soviet Latvia.—266, 303

Petrovsky, *Grigory Ivanovich* (1878-1958)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. Deputy to the Fourth Duma, member of the Bolshevik parliamentary

group. During 1917-19 People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. From 1919 to 1938 Chairman of the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee, after the formation of the U.S.S.R., Deputy Chairman of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R., Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.—110, 173, 194, 202

Petruchuk, *Demyan Timofeyevich* (b. 1890)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1918 appointed Commissioner in Orsha of the Moscow District Commissariat for Military Affairs for expediting the dispatch of Red Army units to the Eastern Front. In 1919 appointed Commissar of the Special Moscow Commission for Supplying Horses to the Red Army.—130

Pichon, *Stephen Jean Marie* (1857-1933)—French Foreign Minister during 1917-20.—205

Plaksin, *Kirill Ivanovich* (1881-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. In 1917 a member of the Saratov Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), delegate to the Sixth Congress of the Party. After the October Revolution held Party, administrative and business posts in Saratov and Ivanovo.—263

Platten, *Friedrich* (1883-1942)—Swiss Communist, from 1912 to 1918 Secretary of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. In 1919 took part in organising the Communist International, a member of the Comintern Bureau. Contributed to the journal The Communist International. Was one of the organisers of the Swiss Communist Party.—433

Podbelsky, *Vadim Nikolayevich* (1887-1920)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. In October 1917 Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs of Moscow and Moscow Region. In May 1918 appointed People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs of the R.S.F.S.R.—67, 102, 193, 249

Podvoisky, *Nikolai Ilyich* (1880-1948)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. Preparatory to and during the October armed uprising Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee in Petrograd. After the October Revolution a member of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs, Commander of the Petrograd Military District. In 1919 appointed People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the Ukraine.—58, 64 117, 119, 213, 223, 226, 237, 258, 263-64

Pokrovsky, *Mikhail Nikolayevich* (1868-1932)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905; historian. From November 1917 to March 1918 Chairman of the Moscow Soviet. In 1918 appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—331, 349, 359, 419, 451

Popov, *Pavel Ilyich* (1872-1950)—in 1918 appointed head of the Central Statistical Board.—127, 268, 382, 459

Popova (*Kasparova*), *Yevgenia Minasovna* (1888-1963)—during 1918-22 worked as Manager of the Housing Department of the All-Russia C.E.C.—310

Popovitsky, *N. A.* (b. 1885)—member of the staff of the Supreme Economic Council; up to July 1918 Left Socialist-Revolutionary, then joined the R.C.P.(B.).—116

Potyaev, *A. I.* (b. 1888)—in 1918 Deputy People's Commis-

sar for Finance. During the Civil War member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front (1919).—298

Pozern, *Boris Pavlovich* (1882-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. During 1918-19 Staff Commissar of the Petrograd Military District, then member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the Western and Eastern fronts and of the 5th Army. After the Civil War Chairman of the Chief Textile Committee, Secretary of the South-Eastern Territory Committee of the C.P.S.U., Rector of the Leningrad Communist University Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Party. Member of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee.—242, 298

Pravdin, *Alexander Grigorievich* (1879-1943)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, then Deputy People's Commissar for Railways and held other administrative and Party posts.—109

Preobrazhensky, *Alexei Andreyevich* (1863-1938)—from 1902 onwards worked on the Samara-Zlatoust Railway; in 1918 Manager of the General Office, in 1919 Business Manager and then head of the Administrative Service of the railway. In 1922 appointed Manager of the Gorki State Farm.—440

Preobrazhensky, *Yevgeny Alexeyevich* (1886-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the February 1917 revolution worked in the Urals. From 1918 carried on Party work and political work in the army. In 1920 one of the secretaries of the Party's C.C.—333, 340, 423, 455

Prokofiev, *Andrei Nikitovich* (1886-1949)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1918 Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission in Rodniki, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia.—177, 180

Prokopiev.—85

Prominsky, *Ivan Lukich* (1859-1923)—joined the Polish Social-Democratic movement in the 1880s. In 1894 arrested and in 1897 exiled to the village of Shushenskoye in Eastern Siberia, where he met Lenin and Krupskaya and became close friends with them. After his term of exile he worked on the railway in Siberia. Fought in the Civil War.—385, 406

Putintsev, *Ilya Danilovich*—Bolshevik, a Cossack from Urmorunskaya stanitsa, Pavlodar Uyezd, Semipalatinsk Gubernia.—393

Pyatakov, *Georgi Leonidovich* (1890-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910. Did Party work in the Ukraine and abroad. During 1915-17 took an anti-Leninist stand on the question of the right of nations to self-determination and on other important issues of Party policy. After the February 1917 revolution Chairman of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the October Revolution a member of the Soviet Government of the Ukraine. From 1920 onwards held business and administrative posts. Repeatedly came out against the Party's Leninist policy. Expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities.—237, 369-70

R

Radchenko, *Ivan Ivanovich* (1874-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. One of the organisers of the U.S.S.R. peat industry. In 1920 worked in the Chief Peat Committee.—456

Radek, *Karl Bernhardovich* (1885-1939)—joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917. After the October Revolution worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. From 1923 a leader of the Trotsky opposition. In 1936 expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities. —57, 91, 360, 400, 418-19, 420

Radus-Zenkovich, *Viktor Alexeyevich* (1877-1967)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. During 1918-21 Manager of the Social Insurance and Labour Protection Department, then Deputy People's Commissar for Labour of the R.S.F.S.R., Chairman of the Saratov Gubernia Executive Committee, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Kirghizia.—263

Rafes, *Moisei Grigorievich* (1883-1942)—Bundist. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Afterwards worked in the Ukraine. Headed the Left wing of the Bund. In the summer of 1919 joined the R.C.P.(B.). Was a commissar in the Red Army.—390

Rahja, *Eino A.* (1886-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. Participant in the revolutionary movement in Russia and Finland. During the July days of 1917 helped to arrange Lenin's passage to Finland to escape persecution by the bourgeois Provisional Government, and back again to Russia in October. In 1918 commanded detachments of the Red Guard during the workers' revolution in Finland.—54

Rakovsky, *Khristian Georgievich* (1873-1941)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1918 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, then an active member of the Trotsky opposition; in 1938 expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities.—211-12, 219, 223, 233, 235, 236-37, 252, 258, 263, 265, 271, 344, 357, 361, 372

Raskolnikov, *Fyodor Fyodorovich* (1892-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar for Naval Affairs, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and of the R.M.C. of the Eastern Front, Commander of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla and the Baltic Fleet.—122, 133, 347, 357

Ratnikov, *I. Y.* (b. 1893)—during 1917-20 Secretary of the Karabanovo District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), Alexandrov Uyezd, Vladimir Region. —455

Rattel, *Nikolai Iosifovich* (b. 1875)—general in the tsarist army, who sided with the Soviets after the October Revolution. From November 1917 to 1925 Chief of All-Russia General Headquarters.—239

Ravich, *Sophia* (1879-1957)—in 1917 a member of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (B.). After the October Revolution engaged in Party and administrative work.—186

Reich, *Yakov Samoilovich* (b. 1886)—in 1918 editor of *Russische Nachrichtung*, information bulletin of the Soviet Mission in Berne. In 1919 worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. From the autumn of 1919 to April 1925 Manager of the Comintern publishing office in Berlin.—326

Robins, *Raymond* (b. 1873)—in 1917 a member of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia. —82, 87

Rodzyanko, *Mikhail Vladimirovich* (1859-1924)—big landowner, monarchist, a leader of the Octobrist Party (the Union of October Seventeen). After the October Revolution fled to Denikin; attempted to unite all the counter-revolutionary forces against the Soviet government.—285

Rogachov.—243

Romanov, *Pavel Alexandrovich* (b. 1884)—in 1920 Secretary of the Alexandrov Uyezd Executive Committee, Vladimir Region.—455

Rothstein, *Theodore* (1871-1953)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. In 1890 emigrated from Russia. Took an active part in the British labour movement and in the founding of the Communist Party of Great Britain (1920). Contributed to the Russian and foreign socialist press. In 1920 returned to Russia. From 1921 to 1930 in the diplomatic service.—304, 326, 403

Rozengolts, *Arkady Pavlovich* (1889-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. During the October Revolution a member of the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee. During the Civil War a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of a number of armies and fronts; afterwards held military, diplomatic and administrative posts; in 1922, a member of the Board of the Commissariat for Finance. In 1937 expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities.—358

Rudakov, *Ivan Grigorievich* (1883-1937)—in 1919 a member of the Economic Council of the Northern district. In 1920 Chief of the Petrograd Fuel Department.—430

Rudzutak, *Jan Ernestovich* (1887-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. After the October Revolution engaged in trade union work, then member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1919 member of the Turkestan Commission. In 1920 became member of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.), member of the Presidium and General Secretary of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. During 1921-24 Chairman of the Central Asia Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.). From 1924 to 1930 People's Commissar for Railways. In 1932 appointed Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. and People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R.—222, 315, 362

Rühle, *Otto* (b. 1874)—German Left Social-Democrat, publicist. In 1919 joined the Communist Party of Germany.—107

Rutgers, *Sebald* (1879-1961)—Dutch engineer, Communist. Worked in the Soviet Union at intervals, from 1918 to 1938.—326

Rybakov, *Ivan Yakovlevich* (1891-1938)—joined the

R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1920 Chairman of the Alexandrov Uyezd Executive Committee, Vladimir Region.—455

Rykov, *Alexei Ivanovich* (1881-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, special agent of the C.L.D. for the supply of the Red Army and Navy. Was Chairman of the C.P.C. of the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. and a member of the Politbureau of the C.C. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy. Expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities.—66-67, 81, 89, 294, 299, 335, 363-64, 371, 429, 442, 453, 456-58

S

Samoilov, *Fyodor Nikitich* (1882-1952)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. Deputy to the Fourth Duma from the workers of Vladimir Gubernia, member of the Bolshevik parliamentary group. During 1919-20 authorised agent of the Central Executive Committee on the Bashkir Military Revolutionary Committee, member of the Bashkir Regional Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).—333

Sanayev, *Mikhail Ivanovich* (1894-1938)—from May 1918 to March 1919 Chairman of the Sergach Uyezd Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, and member of the Uyezd Executive Committee.—149

Sapozhnikov, *Alexei V.* (1868-1935)—scientist, chemist.—359

Sapronov, *T. V.* (1887-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1912. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Executive Committee Chairman of the Kharkov Gubernia Revolutionary Committee. Subsequently Secretary of the Urals Bureau of the C.C., Chairman of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars, member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy. In 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities.—82, 322, 343

Scheinman, *Aron Lvovich* (b. 1886)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. Deputy People's Commissar for Home and Foreign Trade, member of the Board of the State Bank of the R.S.F.S.R. and Chairman of the Board of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the U.S.S.R .—389

Schlichter, *Alexander Grigorievich* (1868-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1891. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Agriculture, P.C. for Food of the R.S.F.S.R., Commissar Extraordinary for Food in Siberia, Chairman of the Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee. In 1919 P.C. for Food of the Ukraine. —56, 109, 141, 199, 252, 258, 450

Schmidt, *Vasily Vladimirovich* (1886-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. During 1918-28 Secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, then People's Commissar for Labour.—202, 402

Selivachov, Vladimir Ivanovich (1866-1919)—officer in the tsarist army, afterwards served in the Red Army. In 1919 Assistant Commander of the Southern Front.—286

Semashko, Nikolai Alexandrovich (1874-1949)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1893. After the October Revolution Manager of the Medical and Sanitary Department of the Moscow Soviet. During 1918-30 People's Commissar for Health of the R.S.F.S.R.—212, 293, 304, 312-13, 333, 359, 372, 436, 460-61

Serafimovich (Popov), Alexander Serafimovich (X) (1863-1949)—Soviet writer, joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. After the October Revolution a member of the editorial board of *Izvestia* of the Moscow Soviet, during the Civil War he was a war correspondent of *Pravda*.—426

Serebryakov, Leonid Petrovich (1888-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. After the October Revolution member of the Moscow Regional Committee of the Party, Secretary of the Party's C.C. and Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front.—230, 246, 265, 270, 281, 286

Sereda, Semyon Pafnutievich (1871-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. (1918-21), then member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council and of the State Planning Commission, Deputy Manager and Manager of the Central Statistical Board of the R.S.F.S.R.—75, 84, 119, 132, 133, 142, 143, 146, 178, 207, 230, 270, 330, 340, 391, 450

Sergo—see *Orjonikidze, G. K.*

Serrati, Giacinto Menotti (1872-1926)—a prominent leader of the Italian labour movement and of the Italian Socialist Party. During 1915-23 Director of the party's central organ, the newspaper *Avanti!* Headed the Italian delegation to the Second Congress of the Comintern, was opposed to an unconditional break with the reformists. Eventually joined the Italian Communist Party.—387

Shadurskaya, Z. L. (b. 1873)—journalist. In 1918 worked in the Petrograd Food Committee then in other Soviet institutions and in the Comintern.—186

Shahumyan, Stepan Georgievich (1878-1918)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. At the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (1917) elected to the Central Committee. After the October Revolution Acting Commissar Extraordinary for Affairs of the Caucasus, Chairman of the Baku Council of People's Commissars and simultaneously Commissar for Foreign Affairs. After the fall of the Baku Commune he was among the 26 commissars shot by the British interventionists.—93, 107-08, 111

Shamigulov, Gali Kamaletdinovich (1890-1959)—during 1919-20 a member of the Bashkir Regional Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), Chairman of the C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars of Bashkiria.—334

Shapovalov, Alexander Isidorovich (1871-1942)—veteran of the Russian revolutionary

movement; in 1894 a member of the Narodnaya Volya Party. In 1895 a member of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, took part in the activities of the Bolshevik organisations abroad. In 1917 returned to Russia.—412

Shatelen, *Mikhail Andreyevich* (1866-1957)—electrician, distinguished scientist and engineer. Took part in the drafting of the GOELRO (electrification) plan.—375

Shatunovsky, *Yakov Moiseyevich* (1876-1932)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. A member of the Transport Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence, member of the Industrial Section of the State Planning Commission.—456-58

Shingaryov, *Andrei Ivanovich* (1869-1918)—Cadet. After the February 1917 revolution Minister for Agriculture in the first cabinet and Minister for Finance in the second cabinet of the bourgeois Provisional Government.—54

Shklovsky, *Grigory Lvovich* (1875-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. During 1918-25 Soviet diplomat.—106, 112, 160

Shlyapnikov, *Alexander Gavrilovich* (1885-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. After the October Revolution a member of the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of P.C. for Labour, afterwards P.C. for Trade and Industry. In 1918 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, then Chairman of the R.M.C. of the Caspian-Caucasian Front.—50, 72, 86, 95, 103, 170, 184, 193

Shorin, *Alexander Fyodorovich* (1890-1941)—inventor in the field of radio-engineering, telegraphy and sound cinematography. In 1919 appointed Director of the Tsarskoye Selo radio station; worked at the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory.—338

Shorin, *Vasily Ivanovich* (1870-1938)—officer in the tsarist army, served in the Red Army from 1918. Commanded the 2nd Army of the Eastern Front, the Special Group of the Southern, South-Eastern and Caucasian fronts. During 1920-21 Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Siberia.—288

Shotman, *Alexander Vasilievich* (1880-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. During 1911-12 a member of the Helsingfors Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland. In June 1917 became a member of the Petrograd Regional Committee of the Party. In August 1917 organised Lenin's passage to Finland from Razliv, where he was in hiding to escape persecution by the bourgeois Provisional Government. Took an active part in the October Revolution, after which held various business, administrative and Party posts.—388

Shreider, *A. A.*—Left Socialist-Revolutionary, in 1918 Deputy People's Commissar for Justice. A member of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.—77

Shumsky, *Alexander Yakovlevich* (1890-1946)—from 1909 to 1917 a member of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In 1918 a leader of the Borotbist Party. In 1920 admitted to membership of the R.C.P.(B.). Took part in the peace negotiations with Poland. Was a

member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army, Ambassador in Poland, People's Commissar for Education of the Ukraine (1924-27), Chairman of the C.C. of the Educational Workers' Union, elected to the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. In 1933 expelled from the Party for nationalism. —360-61

Sklyansky, *Efraim Markovich* (1892-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1913. From September 1918 to 1924 Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. —131, 193, 216, 217, 222, 231, 233, 238, 239-40, 243, 248, 249-50, 254, 256, 259, 260, 262, 266, 274, 279, 280, 287, 292-93, 300, 322, 352, 402-03, 406, 408, 414, 416, 419, 432, 433, 440, 448, 456, 460-61

Skrypnik, *Nikolai Alexeyevich* (1872-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R., member of the Presidium of the Ukrainian C.E.C., member of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine, authorised agent of the Ukrainian Council of Defence, People's Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian S.S.R. —66

Slutsky, *Anton Iosifovich* (d. 1918) —joined the revolutionary movement in 1905. At the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets (November 1917) elected to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. In March 1918 became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Republic of Taurida (Crimea).—70

Sluvis, *MikhaiI Vasilievich* (b. 1888)—officer in the tsarist army, sided with the Soviets after the October Revolution. Became a member of the R.C.P.(B.) in November 1918. In 1918 he was commander of a division, in 1919 Commander of the 15th Army, then Commander of the 56th Rifle Division.—117

Smilga, *Ivar Tenisovich* (1892-1838)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907. After the October Revolution authorised agent of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. in Finland, then member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. At the Seventh and Eighth congresses of the Party elected to the C.C.—118, 228, 246, 256, 265, 266, 270, 275, 280, 288, 302, 340, 341-42, 351, 409, 410, 414, 417-18, 420, 422

Smirnov, *Alexander Mikhailovich* (b. 1887)—member of the Militia and Legal commissions of the Samara City Council in 1917-18, on which he represented the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In June 1918 elected Mayor of Samara.—191

Smirnov, *Alexander Petrovich* (1877-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1896. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs; in 1918 authorised agent of the Council of People's Commissars in Saratov Gubernia for the procurement and dispatch of grain and other food freights. During 1919-22 Deputy People's Commissar for Food.—101, 110, 142

Smirnov, *Ivan Nikitich* (1881-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. After the October Revolution a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, then of the 5th Army. In 1919 became Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee.—291, 295, 298, 307, 316-17, 322, 329, 342, 353, 385, 396, 402, 408, 436

Sokolnikov (*Brilliant*), *Grigory Yakovlevich* (1888-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. After the October Revolution filled diplomatic and military posts. Member of the Soviet delegation to the Brest peace negotiations. Later took part in the talks on economic questions with Germany. In December 1918 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front.—67, 98-99, 216, 228-29, 230-31, 234, 248, 249, 275, 340

Sollogub, *Nikolai Vladimirovich* (1883-1937)—colonel in the tsarist army; in 1918 started service in the Red Army. Chief of Staff of the Eastern Front, member of the Supreme Military Inspection, Chief of the Operations Division of Army Headquarters of the Western Front, Commander of the 16th Army. In 1920 Chief of Staff of the Southern Front, and of the armed forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea.—264

Solovyov, *A. S.*—Manager of the Central Accounts Office of the Labour Departments of Moscow and Moscow Region.—50

Solovyov, *Zinovy Petrovich* (1876-1928)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Organiser and theoretician of public health. In 1918 head of various medical bodies, a member of Medical Boards, Deputy People's Commissar for Health, Chairman of the Executive of the R.S.F.S.R. Red Cross, Chief of the Central Military Sanitary Administration of the Red Army (1920).—306, 372

Sosnovsky, *Lev Semyonovich* (1886-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. During 1918-24 editor of the newspaper *Byednota*.—257, 456-58

Spiridonova, *Maria Alexandrovna* (1884-1941)—one of the founders and leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Came out against the signing of the Brest peace, took an active part in the Left S.R. revolt in July 1918, after the suppression of which she continued her hostile anti-Soviet activities.—84, 174

Stalin (*Jugashvili*), *Joseph Vissarionovich* (1879-1953)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution elected to the Council of People's Commissars, where he headed the Commissariat for Nationalities. During the foreign intervention and Civil War a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, worked at various fronts. In 1922 elected General Secreraty of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.). In 1941 became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, then of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R . During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) Chairman of the State Committee of Defence, People's Commissar for Defence and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. In the position of General Secretary of the Party C.C., which he held for a long time, Stalin, together with

other leading functionaries exerted great efforts for the building of socialism, and played a major role in smashing various anti-Party trends, especially Trotskyism and Right opportunism. At the same time, associated with his name are the distortions in the life of Soviet society, which the Communist Party qualified as manifestations of the personality cult alien to Marxism-Leninism. The C.P.S.U. decidedly condemned the personality cult and took measures to prevent similar mistakes and distortions in future.—63, 70, 104, 105, 111, 151, 223, 230, 231, 242-43, 246-47, 250, 252, 253, 264, 265-66, 281, 283, 286, 340, 342, 343, 354, 360, 367, 378, 379, 381, 408, 409, 410

Stasova, *Yelena Dmitrievna* (1873-1966)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. From February 1917 to March 1920 Secretary of the Party's Central Committee.—246, 270, 275, 314, 316, 365

Steklov, *Yuri Mikhailovich* (1873-1941)—joined the Social-Democratic movement in 1893. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) joined the Bolsheviks. After the October Revolution editor of *Izvestia* member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.—118

Sternberg, *Pavel Karlovich* (1865-1920)—astronomer. Participant in the revolutionary movement in Russia. During the October days headed the revolutionary forces of the Zamoskvorechye Revolutionary Committee in Moscow. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Education, member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 2nd Army and the Eastern Front. —298.

Strasser, *Josef* (b. 1871)—Austrian politician, Left Social-Democrat. Joined the Communist Party in 1918.—162

Strievsky, *K. K.* (1884-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. In 1918 Food Commissar of Petrograd. During 1919-21 Chief of Food Supply of the South-Eastern, Western, Petrograd and Caucasian fronts.—167

Ström, *Fredrik* (1880-1948)—Swedish Left Social-Democrat author and publicist. During 1918-20 Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Folkets Dagblad Politiken*.—326

Struve, *Nina Alexandrovna* (1874-1943)—the wife of P. B. Struve and daughter of the pedagogue A. Y. Gerd. After the October Revolution emigrated abroad.—188

Struve, *Pyotr Bernhardovich* (1870-1944)—bourgeois economist and publicist, a leader of the Cadet Party, member of the counter-revolutionary government of Wrangel, a White émigré.—187

Stucka, *Pyotr Ivanovich* (1865-1932)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Justice, during 1918-19 Chairman of the Soviet Government of Latvia, then Deputy People's Commissar for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R.—196

Sundukov, *Fyodor Stepanovich* (b. 1892)—joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918. During 1918-20 fought at the Urals Front in the 25th Chapayev Rifle Division, commanded the 1st Urals Regiment, headed a section of the Urals Fortified Area.—308

Surkov, *Pyotr Ilyich* (1876-1946)—deputy to the Third Duma from the workers of Kostroma Gubernia; member of the Social-Democratic parliamentary group. After the October Revolution worked in various Soviet institutions.—175, 179

Sverdlov, *Veniamin Mikhailovich* (1886-1940)—in 1918 Commissar of the Exploitation Board of the People's Commissariat for Railways. From 1919 to 1920 Deputy People's Commissar for Railways and Chairman of the Supreme Council for Transport. Subsequently member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council worked in the Mining and Science and Technology departments of the Supreme Economic Council.—440-41

Sverdlov, *Yakov Mikhailovich* (1885-1919)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. During 1917-19 head of the Secretariat of the C.C. From November 1917 Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.—44, 72-73, 102, 146 147, 159, 165, 198

Svidersky, *Alexander Ivanovich* (1878-1933)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Food, member of the Board of the Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.—99, 199, 258, 270 327, 362

Syromolotov, *Fyodor Fyodorovich* (b. 1877)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. After the October Revolution member of the Board of the Supreme Economic Council, member of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars and of the Board of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—292, 454

Sytin, *Pavel Pavlovich* (1870-1938)—general in the tsarist army, joined the Soviets after the October Revolution. In 1918 commanded a group of Bryansk detachments, then Commander of the Southern Front, Chief of the Military Administrative Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.—88, 157

T

Taneyev, *Vladimir Ivanovich* (1840-1921)—Russian public figure, socialist, lawyer. From 1866 onwards counsel for the defence in a number of political trials.—218-19

Teodorovich, *Ivan Adolfovich* (1875-1940)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1895 a Bolshevik. During the Civil War fought in partisan detachments against Kolchak. In 1920 started work in the Commissariat for Agriculture.—446

Ter-Petrosyan, *S. A.* (*Kamo*) (1882-1922)—one of the organisers of Bolshevik militant activities under tsarism. After the February 1917 revolution worked in Transcaucasia. In 1919 led a combat group operating behind Denikin's lines. At the beginning of 1920 arrested by the Menshevik Georgian government. After his release carried on underground activities in Baku and took an active part in organising the uprising of the Baku proletariat.—280, 314

Tomsky, *Mikhail Pavlovich* (1880-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. After the October Revolution Chairman

of the Moscow Council of Trade Unions. In 1919 became Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. At the Eight Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) elected to the Party's Central Committee, at the Eleventh Congress elected member of the Politbureau of the C.C. Came out repeatedly against the Party's Leninist policy.—202

Tonkov, *V. N.* (1872-1954)—distinguished Soviet scientist, anatomist. From 1917 to 1925 head of the Military Medical Academy.—283

Torniainen, *Eduard*—Finnish Social-Democrat, journalist. Took part in the workers' revolution in Finland in 1918; after its defeat he resided in the U.S.S.R.—226

Trèves, *Claudio* (1868-1933)—a reformist leader of the Italian Socialist Party. After the split in the I.S.P. (1922) became one of the leaders of the reformist Unitary Socialist Party.—445

Trilisser, *David Abramovich* (1884-1934)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. In 1920 Secretary of the Petrograd Gubernia Executive Committee, then Chairman of the Volodarsky District Soviet in Petrograd.—394

Trotsky (*Bronstein*), *Lev Davidovich* (1879-1940)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897, a Menshevik. From 1902 an émigré; returned to Russia after the February 1917 revolution; at the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) admitted to membership of the Bolshevik Party, elected to its C.C. Trotsky, however, did not accept Bolshevism and waged a covert and overt struggle against Lenin and against the Party's policies. After the October Revolution People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, member of the C.C. Politbureau and of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In 1918 was opposed to the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty; during 1920-21 led the opposition in the trade union discussion; from 1923 conducted a bitter factional struggle against the Party's general line, against the Leninist programme of socialist construction. The Communist Party denounced Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation within the Party and defeated it both ideologically and organisationally. In 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Party, and in 1929 deported from the U.S.S.R. for anti-Soviet activities.—57, 61, 95, 117, 119, 129, 135, 146, 147, 157, 163, 170, 171, 172, 176, 181, 189, 191, 203, 220, 229, 231, 233, 238, 241, 245, 246, 249, 255, 270, 271, 273, 276, 281, 282, 286, 294, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 321, 332, 335, 342, 353, 354, 365, 373, 381, 383, 428, 429, 440, 441, 444, 459

Tsyurupa, *Alexander Dmitrievich* (1870-1928)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution Deputy People's Commissar and from the beginning of 1918 People's Commissar for Food. At the end of 1921 Deputy Chairman or the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence.—76, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 95, 100, 101,

105, 109, 121, 124, 125, 1 2 7 130-31, 145, 188, 207, 221, 258 306, 340, 365, 391, 402

Tukhachevsky, *Mikhail Nikolayevich* (1893-1937)—joined the R.C.P.(B) in 1918. From 1918 to 1919 commanded the 1st 5th and 8th armies. At the beginning of 1920 Commander of the Caucasian, then the Western Front. In 1921 Chief of the Military Academy of the Red Army, in January 1922 appointed Commander of the Western Front, afterwards Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Commander of the Western Military District. In 1931 Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. Marshal of the Soviet Union.—340, 379, 409

Turati, *Filippo* (1857-1932)—a leader of the Italian labour movement, one of the organisers of the Italian Socialist Party, leader of its Right reformist wing. After the split in the I.S.P. (1922) headed the reformist Unitary Socialist Party. —387

Turlo, *Stanislav Stepanovich* (1889-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P in 1905. After the October Revolution Chairman of the Rostov-Nakhichevan Committee, member of the Don Regional Executive Committee; in July 1918 Deputy Chairman of the Penza Gubernia Party Committee and Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee—140

Tyrkov, *Arkady Vladimirovich* (1859-1924)—member of the Narodnaya Volya Party, which he joined in 1879; arrested in 1881 for taking part in the attempted assassination of Alexander II; served his term of imprisonment in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In 1883 exiled to Eastern Siberia.—390

U

Ulyanova, *Maria Ilyinichna* (1878-1937)—Lenin's younger sister; joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. From March 1917 to the spring of 1929 a member of the editorial board and the executive secretary of the newspaper *Pravda*.—384

Unschlicht, *Iosif Stanislavovich* (1879-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. During the October Revolution a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. In 1918 a member of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Lithuania and Byelorussia, People's Commissar for Military Affairs of Lithuania and Byelorussia. In 1919 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 16th Army Western Front, and the R.M.C. of the U.S.S.R., Chief of Red Army Supplies, Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. From 1930 to 1935 held posts in the Supreme Economic Council and the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.; Chief of the Central Administration of the Civil Air Fleet. In 1935 elected Secretary of the Union Council of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—356

Uratadze, *Grigory Illarionovich* (b. 1879)—during Menshevik rule in Georgia one of the leaders of the Menshevik Party; in 1919 a member of the Georgian Constituent Assembly. In May 1920 authorised agent

of the Georgian Menshevik government for signing a peace treaty with the R.S.F.S.R. After the establishment of Soviet rule in Georgia he emigrated.—367

Ursin, *Nils Robert* (1854-1936)—a prominent leader of the Finnish labour movement, took part in the organisation of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Finland (1899) and was one of its leaders. Translated a number of works of Marx and Engels into Finnish. A participant in the workers revolution in Finland in 1918. After its suppression he was deprived of civic rights. From 1918 to 1922 lived abroad as a political emigrant.—312

V

Vanderlip, *Washington B.* (b. 1866)—engineer; came to Soviet Russia in 1920 as a representative of American industrial circles with an offer to sign an agreement for oil and coal concessions in Kamchatka.—423

Vandervelde, *Emile* (1886-1938)—leader of the Belgian Workers' Party, Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. During the First World War a member of the bourgeois government.—155, 158, 160

Vasilchenko, *Semyon Filippovich* (1884-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. In 1917 Chairman of the Rostov-Nakhichevan Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). At the beginning of 1918 a member of the Regional Committee of the Bolsheviks of the Donets-Krivoi Rog Basin, and Commissar for Administrative Affairs in the Government of the Donets-Krivoi Rog Republic. From 1921 engaged in the publishing business in Moscow—70-71

Vatsetis, *Ioakim Ioakimovich* (1873-1938)—colonel in the tsarist army. After the October Revolution sided with the Soviets. Helped to suppress the Left S.R. revolt in Moscow in the capacity of Commander of the Lettish Rifle Division. Subsequently Commander of the Eastern Front. From September 1918 to July 1919 Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the R.S.F.S.R.—122, 135, 163, 172, 181, 189, 191, 194, 215, 220, 222, 240, 259

Vedernikov, *Alexei Stepanovich* (1880-1919)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1897. After the February 1917 revolution a member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. In October 1917 a member of the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee. In 1918 Commissar of the Vyksa and Kulebaki factories in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia.—97

Velichkina (*Bonch-Bruyevich*), *Vera Mikhailovna* (1868-1918)—began revolutionary activities in the 1890s. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) she joined the Bolsheviks. From the very beginning of the October Revolution she worked in the Medical and Sanitary Department of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, in the Council of Medical Collegiums and subsequently headed the School Sanitary Council under the People's Commissariat for Education. In 1918 she became a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Health.—79, 80, 150

Vera Mikhailovna—see *Velichkina, V. M.*

Vever, Ernest Yakovlevich (1882-1937)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917; during the October days a worker Red Guard. From 1918 to 1924 Manager of the Gorki Sanatorium.—391

Viik, Karl Harald (1883-1946)—Finnish Social-Democrat. From 1909 to 1940, with short intervals, member of the Executive, and from 1926 to 1936 Secretary of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland. During the workers' revolution in Finland in 1918 he was a member of the revolutionary government—the Council of People's Representatives.—59

Vinnichenko, Vladimir Kirillovich (1880-1951)—Ukrainian writer, bourgeois nationalist, a leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party—a Menshevik nationalist organisation. After the February 1917 revolution one of the organisers and leaders of the counter-revolutionary Ukrainian Central Rada, afterwards, together with Petlyura, headed the Directory (the nationalist government of the Ukraine in 1918-19). After the establishment of Soviet power in the Ukraine he emigrated.—70, 372

Vinogradov, Alexander Alexandrovich (b. 1883)—teacher, active participant in the struggle to establish Soviet power in Vesyegonsk Uyezd, Tver Gubernia. In 1920 he became Chairman of the Vesyegonsk Uyezd Trade Union of Educational Workers.—348

Vinogradov, Pavlin Fyodorovich (1890-1918)—worker of the Sestroretsk Small Arms Factory. In 1917 took part in the storming of the Winter Palace. In February 1918 he was sent to Archangel to organise food relief for Petrograd; was elected Deputy Chairman of the Archangel Gubernia Executive Committee.—79

Vladimirov (*Sheinfinkel*), *Miron Konstantinovich* (1879-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In 1919 Military Commissar Extraordinary of the Railways and Chairman of the Special Food Commission of the Southern Front; in 1921 People's Commissar for Food of the Ukraine; in 1922 People's Commissar for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R.; in November 1924 appointed Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the U.S.S.R.—189, 198, 276, 322-23

Vladimirsky, Mikhail Fyodorovich (1874-1951)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1895, a Bolshevik. After the October Revolution a member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., Secretary of the C.C., C.P.(B.) of the Ukraine and held other posts.—283, 369

Volin, Boris Mikhailovich (1886-1957)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. During the October 1917 days Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee of Zamoskvorechye District (Moscow). During 1918-21 Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committees in Orel Kostroma and Kharkov, Secretary of the Bryansk Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.—166

Volny, *Ivan* (*Vladimirov*, *I. Y.*) (1885-1931)—Russian writer. Joined the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1903. In 1908, for an attempt on the life of a Mtsensk police officer, he was deported to Siberia, whence he escaped abroad. On the Isle of Capri he met Maxim Gorky, under whose influence he began to draw away from the S.R.s. He returned to Russia in 1917.—210, 301

Volodicheva, *Maria Akimovna* (b. 1881)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. After the October Revolution up to July 1918 Secretary of the Press Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars. From 1918 to 1924 a typist in the Council, assistant secretary of the Council of Labour and Defence and the Council of People's Commissars.—376

Voroshilov, *Kliment Yefremovich* (1881-1969)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. During 1918-19 Commander of the Tsaritsyn Front, Deputy Commander and member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, Commander of the 10th Army. In December 1918 People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukraine, then Commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District, Commander of the 14th Army and the Ukrainian home front. From 1919 to 1921 member of the Revolutionary Military Council and one of the organisers of the 1st Mounted Army. From 1925 People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R.; afterwards People's Commissar for Defence. From 1953 to May 1960 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.—157, 237, 238, 241

Vorovsky, *Vatslav Vatslavovich* (1871-1923)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1894, professional revolutionary. After the October Revolution Ambassador of the Soviet Republic in the Scandinavian countries (1917-19); from 1919 to 1920 Manager of Gosizdat (State Publishers), then on diplomatic work in Italy (1921-23).—50, 131, 151, 155, 272, 337, 382, 397, 402, 424

Voyevodin, *Pyotr Ivanovich* (1884-1964)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1899. In 1919 authorised agent of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) and Political Commissar of the propaganda train "October Revolution". In 1920 Chief Commissar of the Moscow-Windau-Rybinsk Railway.—269-70

Voznesensky, *A. N.*—in 1920 head of the Eastern Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.—414

W

Weissbrot, *Boris Solomonovich* (1874-1942)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904; a surgeon by profession. During 1919-20 Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Epidemics on the Turkestan and South-Western fronts.—162, 303, 312, 313

Wijnkoop, *David* (1877-1941)—Dutch Social-Democrat, afterwards a Communist. In 1909 was one of the founders and Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Holland (the "Tribunists"), which took the name of Communist Party of Holland in 1918. A leader of the party, he occupied an ex-

treme Left, sectarian position.—400

Williams, *Albert Rhys* (1883-1962)—American publicist and journalist. Came to Russia in the summer of 1917; was an eyewitness and participant of the October Revolution, took part in the storming of the Winter Palace. In January 1918 organised an international detachment for the defence of the Soviets, fought on the Civil War fronts. Revisited the U.S.S.R. on numerous occasions—97

Wilmi, *Otto* (1881-1938)—participant in the workers' revolution in Finland in 1918; one of the organisers of the Communist Party of Finland and a member of its Central Committee. After the defeat of the revolution in Finland he lived in the U S.S.R. Joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1918.—226

Wilson, *Woodrow* (1856-1924)—President of the U.S.A. from 1913 to 1920. One of the organisers of military intervention by the imperialist powers against Soviet Russia.—159, 191, 224-25

Wise, *Edward Frank* (1885-1933)—English politician. From 1914 to 1918 worked as Secretary of the Russia Relief Committee and in other relief organisations. During 1919-20 member of the British delegation to the Allied Supreme Economic Council, took part in the talks for establishing Anglo-Soviet trade relations (1920-21)—386

Wrangel, *Pyotr Nikolayevich* (1878-1928)—general in the tsarist army. During the foreign military intervention and Civil War, the henchman of the Anglo-French and American imperialists, one of the leaders of the counter-revolution in the south of Russia. From April to November 1920 Commander-in-Chief of the white-guard "Armed Forces of the South of Russia"; after his defeat at the hands of the Red Army he fled the country.—373, 378, 408, 409, 428, 444

X

X—see *Serafimovich*, *A. S.*

Y

Yakovlev—officer who deserted from Wrangel's army.—428

Yakovlev, *Ivan Yakovlevich* (1848-1930)—distinguished Chuvash teacher and enlightener; author and translator, originator of the Chuvash alphabet.

Yakovlev, *Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1886-1918)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1904. A leader of the struggle to establish Soviet power in Siberia and organiser of the Red Guard in Siberia. In February 1918 Chairman of the C.E.C. of Siberian Soviets (Centrosibir).—75

Yakovlev, (*Epstein*), *Yakov Arkadievich* (1896-1939)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1913. Took part in the October Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine. Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee in Kharkov, Secretary of the Ekaterinoslav and Kiev Gubernia Party Committees, Chief of the Political Department of the 14th Army.—364

Yakubov, *Arshak Stepanovich* (1882-1923)—joined the

R.S.D.L.P. in 1900. After the October Revolution a member of the Board of the R.S.F.S.R. Food Commissariat, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the Ukraine.—103

Yaroslavsky, *Yemelyan* (1878-1943)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. Participant in the October Revolution. After the Revolution engaged in Party work. Author of a number of works on the history of the Communist Party and the revolutionary movement in Russia.—173, 263, 346-47

Yaroshenko, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1846-1898)—noted Russian painter.—188

Yefremov, *D. I.* (*Steiman*, *M. Y.*) (1881-1925)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1902. From May to September 1918 Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the Party; from September 1918 to October 1919 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army.—248

Yenukidze, *Avel Safronovich* (1877-1937)—Soviet statesman; joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1898. After the October Revolution worked in the Military Department of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. In 1918 became Secretary of the All-Russia C.E.C.—312

Yermakov, *V. S.* (b. 1888)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. During the Civil War acted as Commissar on the Southern (1919) and Eastern (1920) fronts, authorised agent of the Special Committee of the Council of Defence for introducing martial law on the railways, and authorised agent for combating banditism in the south (1922).—336

Yudenich, *Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1862-1933)—general in the tsarist army. After the October Revolution a member of the counter-revolutionary "North-Western Government", Commander-in-Chief of the white-guard North-Western Army. In 1919 made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Petrograd. Routed by the Red Army in November 1919.—296, 299, 300, 307, 309, 319

Yumagulov, *Haris Yumagulovich* (1891-1937)—during 1919-20 Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Bashkir Republic.—333

Yunosov, *Konstantin Andreyevich* (b. 1884)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1905. In 1918 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Uyezd Soviet; in 1919 member of the Petrograd Gubernia Executive Committee, then Chairman of the G.E.C.—289

Yurenev, *Konstantin Konstantinovich* (1888-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. In 1919 a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, then of the Western.—243, 258

Z

Zalkind, *I. A.* (1885-1928)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903. In November 1917 worked in the R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. From May to November 1918 a member of the Soviet Mission in Switzerland.—160

Zaslavsky, *David Iosifovich* (1880-1965)—journalist. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1900. In 1903 joined the Bund

and in 1917 was elected to its Central Committee. During 1917-18 came out against the Bolsheviks. In 1919 revised his political opinions and supported the Soviet government. —46, 47

Zasulich, *Vera Ivanovna* (1849-1919)—prominent member of the Narodnik and subsequently Social-Democratic movement in Russia. Took part in the foundation and activities of the Emancipation of Labour group. In 1900 a member of the editorial board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) sided with the Iskrist minority. After the Second Congress became a leader of Menshevism.—195

Zatonsky, *Vladimir Petrovich* (1880-1938)—joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in March 1917. A leader of the October armed uprising in Kiev. In November 1917 Chairman of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). In December 1917 became a member of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. Afterwards Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine. In March 1919 appointed People's Commissar for Education of the Ukraine. During 1919-20 a member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 12th, 13th and 14th armies and of the R.M.C. of the South-Western Front. —66, 337, 419

Zax, *Bernhard Henrichovich* (b. 1886)—in 1918 worked in the People's Commissariat for Finance. During 1921-22 Assistant Business Manager of the Council of Labour and Defence. —108, 115

Zinoviev (*Radomyslsky*), *Grigory Yevseyevich* (1883-1936)—joined the R.S.D.L.P. in 1901. From 1908 to April 1917 a political emigrant; member of the Central Committee and of the editorial board of the Party's central organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*. When the October Revolution was in the making, he vacillated and came out against an armed uprising. A statement published by Kamenev in his own name and that of Zinoviev in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* disagreeing with the resolution of the Central Committee on the armed uprising was divulgence of a secret decision of the Party and a betrayal of the revolution. After the October Revolution he was Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, and member of the C.C. Politbureau, besides holding a number of other posts. Repeatedly came out against the Party's Leninist policy, in 1925 one of the organisers of the New Opposition; in 1926 a leader of the anti-Party Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. Expelled from the Party in November 1927 for factional activities; afterwards twice reinstated and re-expelled.—61-62, 96-97, 102-03, 104, 110, 114, 164-65, 167-68, 172, 179, 186, 195, 212, 218, 221, 231, 240, 242, 247, 250, 253, 273, 278, 286, 288, 294, 297-98, 299, 301-02, 305, 309, 316, 321, 349, 392, 395, 397-99, 415, 422, 441, 443

Zul, *B. G.*—in 1919 head of the Political Department of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front, subsequently member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 4th Army of the Turkestan Front and member of the R.M.C. of the 13th Army.—309

Zurabov, *Arshak Georgievich* (1873-1920)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1892. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903) a Bolshevik, later joined the Mensheviks. After the October Revolution fought against the Mensheviks and Dashnaks in Transcaucasia, for the establishment of Soviet power.—47

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PREFACE

Volume 45 contains letters, notes, telegrams and telephone messages written from November 1920 to March 1923. They are connected with Lenin's works which make up volumes 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 of the present edition, and largely supplement them.

These documents cover the new historical period in the life of the Soviet state which began after the rout of the foreign armed intervention and domestic counter-revolution, a period of peaceful socialist construction.

This had to be carried on in the midst of economic dislocation, a shortage of food and a lack of fuel. The international situation was also complicated. The imperialists did their utmost in hampering the Soviet people's effort to heal the economic wounds and to establish ties with other countries. Faced with these serious internal and external political difficulties, Lenin did a vast amount of work in guiding the Communist Party and the Soviet state, socialist construction and foreign policy, charting the ways of transition from "War Communism" to the New Economic Policy (NEP), and directing the implementation of the measures mapped out by the Party to put NEP through.

A number of letters set out major propositions on the substance and importance of NEP, which, Lenin said, should be viewed in the context of the general tasks and prospects of socialist construction, and in the light of the GOELRO plan, which was designed to lay the economic foundation of the new society. He wrote that the "New Economic Policy *does not change* the single state economic plan, and *does not go beyond* its framework, but alters the *approach* to its realisation" (present edition, Vol. 35, p. 530).

The principal task of NEP was to ensure a strong alliance between the working class and the peasantry, as the highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the basis of the Soviet power. Socialist construction could not be a success unless all the toiling peasantry was involved. Elaborating NEP, Lenin marked out the concrete forms of the link-up between town and country, and the ways of rehabilitating all the branches of the national economy, and laying the foundation of a socialist society.

Lenin tackled this intricate task after making a thorough analysis of the political and economic state of the country, and a deep study of the state of the peasant economy. This volume contains a record of Lenin's talks with the peasants I. A. Chekunov and A. R. Shaposhnikov, and shows his concern for boosting agriculture. Thus, in a letter to I. A. Teodorovich, Lenin says that the combating of the drought was a great task before the whole state (see p. 134 of this volume). It was he who initiated the decree of the Council of Labour and Defence (C.L.D.) recognising the efforts to combat the drought as "an undertaking of primary importance for the country's agricultural life, and measures taken in that direction, as being of great urgency".

The documents contained in this volume shed light on the activity of Lenin, the Party and the Government in rehabilitating industry and transport, normalising the operation of the Donets coal-fields (Donbas), developing metallurgy, etc. They also show Lenin's concern for implementing the GOELRO plan, and his handling of various matters arising from the construction of the Kashira, Volkhov and other electric-power stations. Many of Lenin's telegrams and notes contain instructions for providing these early projects in the Soviet electrification drive with the necessary materials, equipment and foodstuffs.

One of the most complicated tasks in the first year of NEP was establishing normal economic ties and starting an exchange of goods between industry and agriculture. The documents in this volume reveal Lenin's role in solving the tasks of developing domestic and foreign trade, and creating a stable financial and monetary system on that basis. He wrote: "The important, the most important, the basic task is to make a *practical* start on this." It is the only

way to transform NEP into "a *base* for socialism, a base which, this being a peasant country, no power on earth can vanquish" (pp. 446, 477).

Lenin gave concrete instructions on measures to develop trade, called for information on the growth of trade, especially in the countryside, and welcomed the successes- of the co-operative movement. He devoted much attention to matters of financial policy, the need for regular stock-taking of commodities throughout the state, kept an eye on the state of the gold reserve, and urged its sparing use.

The crop failure of 1921 brought about starvation for millions of people in the country, especially in the Volga area. One of the urgent tasks of the Soviet state was to organise famine relief. Documents in this volume reflect the main measures taken by the Party and the Government to muster and correctly distribute the domestic foodstuff resources, create a stock of goods to be exchanged for grain, improve the supply of food from the grain-rich gubernias, and the purchase of foodstuffs abroad.

The Soviet Government resolutely opposed every attempt on the part of world imperialism to make use of the famine to put political pressure to bear on the Soviet Republic, and Lenin's letters show him exposing these imperialist manoeuvres. In a letter to the members of the Political Bureau, he wrote: "This game is an extremely intricate one. There is rank duplicity on the part of America, Hoover and the League of Nations Council" (p. 250).

Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to the working-class movement in the capitalist countries to provide assistance to the starving people of Russia.

A large section of the material deals with efforts to overcome the fuel crisis. Lenin headed the C.L.D.'s fuel commission, which took a number of urgent steps to increase the extraction of coal and oil, and to extend hydraulic peat-digging and firewood cutting.

The transition to NEP called for a restructuring of economic management, strict practice of the principle of democratic centralism, improvement in planning, development of local initiative, extension of the rights of enterprises, introduction of material incentives and economic

accounting, and operation of enterprises at a profit. All these matters are dealt with extensively in Lenin's letters.

The documents testify to Lenin's great emphasis on the organisation and style of work in Party, government and economic establishments, improvement of the state apparatus, reduction of staffs and running costs, and introduction of scientific principles in all its work. Lenin urged that a struggle against bureaucracy and red tape should be conducted "in a business-like manner, according to all the rules of warfare". Lenin insisted that malicious bureaucrats should be subjected to strict administrative penalties, removed from their posts and put on trial. Lenin repeatedly stressed that everything depended not on institutions, but on people and the verification of practical experience.

He called for the strict practice of the principle of collective leadership, observance of Party and state discipline, with personal responsibility for assignments. Lenin himself never adopted any decisions alone on matters which were subject to collective discussion, and took counsel with the members of the Party's Central Committee, the People's Commissars, and other leading workers on all matters of any importance.

Lenin marked out a programme for reconstructing the government and economic apparatus in his "Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence to Local Soviet Bodies". A number of documents show the thoroughness with which Lenin prepared the Instructions, the draft of which was widely discussed.

Lenin devoted exceptional attention to the correct selection and appointment of personnel. This is clearly seen from his letter to Y. M. Yaroslavsky of December 24, 1921, concerning a prospective candidate for the post of People's Commissar for Agriculture. Lenin asked him to obtain answers to the following questions as regards this comrade: "Age? Experience? Respect of peasantry? Knowledge of economics? Strength of mind? Brains? Loyalty to the Soviet power?" (pp. 419-20). Lenin valued vigorous men, who had knowledge and displayed initiative. He sharply condemned "administration by fiat", the ordering of people about, and rudeness to colleagues and subordinates; he fought against

formalism, red tape, lack of punctuality, rashness and undue haste.

The Communist Party was implementing the programme of the country's transformation on socialist lines in sharp struggle against all sorts of oppositionists who were trying to undermine the unity of the Party's ranks. Lenin opposed everyone who tried to distort or to cast doubt on the correctness of the path charted by the Party. He believed it was necessary to give a resolute rebuff to bourgeois ideologists, Right-wing socialists and Mensheviks, who distorted the New Economic Policy of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and to the Left-wing opportunists, who took the wrong view of NEP, notably of the role of "state capitalism" under the dictatorship of the working class. Lenin emphasised that "state capitalism in a state with proletarian power can exist only as limited in time and sphere of extension, and conditions of its application, mode of supervision over it, etc." (p. 444).

An important part of the volume consists of material dealing with the development of culture, science and technology, which Lenin viewed in the context of the country's economic construction tasks. He called attention to the need to co-ordinate the work of inventors throughout the whole country, and proposed regular procedures for examining and recording reported inventions. Of great interest is his letter entitled "To the Inventions Section of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council", which set before this body a number of concrete tasks in organising its work (pp. 50-51). These documents show Lenin's vigorous support for every scientific discovery and technical improvement whose application in practice he believed to be an important factor in raising labour productivity. He attached great importance to the regular flow of information on scientific and technical achievements abroad, and the use in this country of the best foreign technical experience.

A number of letters and notes in this volume deal with improving the work of the People's Commissariat for Education, and secondary and higher schools, the wiping out of illiteracy, and other cultural problems (protection of art values, publication of a dictionary of modern Russian

and a school atlas). Lenin supported the realistic trend in art, and warned artists against being carried away by futurism. In a letter to M. N. Pokrovsky, Lenin wrote: "I request you to help us fight futurism, etc.... Could you find some reliable *anti*-futurists?" (p. 139).

In the NEP period, with some growth of the capitalist elements, the Party's ideological, political and educational work, the propaganda of Marxism and resolute struggle against bourgeois ideology had an especially big role to play. Great importance attaches to Lenin's instructions on developing the social sciences. He proposed collecting all the published works and photostatic copies of documents of the founders of Marxism, and this helped to set up the Marx and Engels Institute; he edited a collection of their selected letters, and made remarks on Béla Kun's pamphlet, *From Revolution to Revolution* (p. 66), which are of fundamental importance to historical science.

Socialist construction is inseparably bound up with the correct solution of the national question. Lenin's correspondence reveals his guidance in the implementation of the national policy. Lenin advised Communists in the non-Russian republics to take account of local conditions and specifics in effecting NEP in the construction of socialism. He said the correct solution of the national question in the Soviet East was of tremendous importance, and wrote: "This is a world-wide question, and that is no exaggeration. There you must be especially strict. It will have an effect on India and the East; it is no joke, it calls for exceptional caution" (p. 298). A number of documents reflect Lenin's concern for all the peoples of the Land of Soviets, for their unity, friendship and cooperation, and his resolute struggle against Great-Power chauvinism and local nationalism.

A major question dealt with in this volume is the foreign policy activity of the Soviet state: the work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, preparations for the Genoa Conference, establishment of relations with various countries, extension of trade between the Soviet Republic and capitalist states, and negotiations on concessions. The documents reflect the Soviet Government's steadfast strug-

gle to implement its peaceable foreign policy, basing itself on the principles of peaceful coexistence, and working to establish business relations with all countries. Some documents show Lenin's resolute defence of the foreign trade monopoly. He warned against the possibility of another armed intervention by the foreign imperialists against the Soviet state. In view of such a danger, he wrote to G. V. Chicherin in October 1921 that "nothing can be done to prevent this except strengthening our defence capacity" (p. 355).

Lenin devoted much attention to the establishment of friendly relations with the countries of the East. The treaties of peace and friendship concluded in 1921 between Soviet Russia, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey offered examples of good interstate relations based on trust and mutual respect.

A number of letters deal with the international communist and working-class movement. The documents show that Lenin was consistent in working to strengthen the Communist Parties, the monolithic unity of their ranks, the unity of the international communist movement, and the practice of the principle of proletarian internationalism. In several letters and notes he makes some important propositions on the activity of the Communist International and the Red International of Trade Unions.

A large part of the documents are biographic; many letters and notes show Lenin's exceptional modesty, his touching concern for his comrades, the health and living conditions of Party and government workers and leaders of the international communist movement.

Volume 45 completes the publication of the additional volumes to the Fourth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works* of V. I. Lenin.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.

November-December 1920

1
TO S. P. SEREDA

6.XI.1920

Comrade Sereda:

I consider the articles by Michelson, which you have sent me, of exceptional importance.[1]

It is necessary:

1) To send them over at once to *Izvestia* and *Pravda* (having corrected the style, put them together into one article and edited).

2) To supply an afterword by *you*: conclusions (*practical conclusions*).

3) To send a concise extract to *ROSTA** for circulation in Russia.

4) To include all this without fail α) in your printed report to the Congress of Soviets on 20.XII, β) in your oral report (the gist and *practical* conclusions).

All this should be prepared in advance, and the specialists must be made to perform all the works preparatory to your report *in good time*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

* Telegraph Agency of Russia.—*Ed.*

2

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

To the Narrow Council:

Bryukhanov does not agree.

It is not right to decree *such* things without Bryukhanov's specific *written* consent in each separate case.[2]

6/XI *Lenin*

Written on November 6, 1920
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

3

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT

Code
Direct line

R.M.C. Southern Front
Copy to Trotsky

I have just learned about your surrender offer to Wrangel.[3] Extremely surprised at the excessively accommodating terms. If the enemy accepts them, make sure of taking over the fleet and not letting out a single ship; if the enemy rejects these terms, I think they must not be repeated, and the enemy dealt with ruthlessly.

Lenin

Written on November 12, 1920
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a text written
in E. M. Sklyansky's hand
and signed by Lenin

4

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV, P. I. POPOV, V. A. AVANESOV AND M. F. VLADIMIRSKY*

Comrades Bryukhanov
Popov
Avanesov
Vladimirsky

* At the top of the letter, Lenin wrote to his secretary: "Have this typed, and return to me for signature."—*Ed.*

Perhaps we could establish the following order concerning the *number* of workers' supply rations:

1) Establish the minimum number of rations in numerical order, say:

ration No. 1 ordinary, minimum
" No. 2 so much higher
" No. 3
. . . . . .

etc., up to No. 10, the highest ration, if the total number of rations could be confined to 10.

2) Determine *monthly* how many consumers (industrial or office workers *plus* members of their families) are receiving *under each ration*.

If we managed to do this, we could first find out exactly how many ration groups there are;

Second, we could easily switch separate groups from one ration to another;

And third, we should always know how much *has actually been issued* and to how many workers.

12/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 12, 1920
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

5

TO M. I. KALININ

Comrade Kalinin:

I am sending you the *draft* resolutions on the Siberian concessions which have been passed by the committee (these drafts will be submitted to the *Council of People's Commissars* for approval possibly next week[4]). One other question, namely, that of *food concessions*, has still to be worked out in sufficient detail.

Will you press forward with this matter on the lines we discussed today.

12/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 12, 1920
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

6

TO THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE LEATHER INDUSTRY UNDER THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

To Glavkozha

Please inform me at once about your conclusion on Baryshnikov's invention of a sole leather substitute, and what you are doing about it if you have found the invention useful.[5]

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 12, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

7

*TO THE INVENTIONS SECTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Please answer the following questions:

1. How many claims to inventions have been examined since the section has been set up, and how many are outstanding at present?
2. How many 1) have been recognised as useful, 2) applied in practice (list the major ones)?
3. What is the order and time allotted to the examination of every invention and the further dispatch of the claim?
4. Is it possible for any institution to put through an invention without the conclusion of the Inventions Section of the Scientific and Technical Department?
5. Does the Inventions Section of the Scientific and Technical Department know about

---

* Here and elsewhere such an asterisk denotes headings given in the original.—*Ed.*

a) the invention of a sole leather substitute made by Baryshnikov; if yes, what has been done about it,

b) the invention*

Who is at the head of the Inventions Section?[6]

Lenin

13/XI-20 Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a typewritten copy

8

TO THE R.C.P.(B.) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

I have accepted almost all of N. K.'s** corrections and suggest another one: an addition on *combining political* and *scientific* educational work. Zinoviev's draft can be adopted with these corrections and additions.[7]

Lenin

Written on November 14, 1920

First published in part in 1958 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 1 (Questions of CPSU History)

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

9

TO A. M. ANIKST

Comrade Anikst

In view of the statement by Comrade Korolyov, Chairman of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Executive Committee, concerning the non-fulfilment of the C.L.D. decision of 5-X-20,[8] and in view of the extreme importance of the uninterrupted running of the textile mills in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, which in six months can produce *2.88* million 60-arshin *piece-goods*, i.e., 172.8 million arshins—I hereby instruct you to organise not later than

* An apparent omission in the typewritten copy.—*Ed.*

** Nadezhda Krupskaya.—*Ed.*

tomorrow, 16-XI-20, under your chairmanship, a conference consisting of Comrade Korolyov and representatives:

on matters relating to each department respectively	from the People's Commissariat for Food Central Fuel Administration Central Oil Administration Central Peat Administration People's Commissariat for Defence People's Commissariat for Finance People's Commissariat for Railways

on the various questions raised by the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Executive Committee, to work out *precise* decisions and to submit them to me for signature or to the C.L.D. at 6.00 p.m. sharp on Wednesday, 17-XI-20.[9]

15.XI.20

Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in 1933 in the book, A. M. Anikst, *Vospominaniya o Vladimire Ilyiche* (Reminiscences of Vladimir Ilyich), Moscow

Printed from a typewritten copy

10

S. P. SEREDA AND N. P. BRYUKEIANOV[10]

16.XI.1920

From Mosalsk Uyezd, Kaluga Gubernia.

1) At first requisition is said to have been in live cattle—this caused extreme dissatisfaction among the peasants. It was even said that they "were being robbed".

Later (in X. 1920) the requisition is said to have been switched from live cattle to meat (13 pounds per cow, 26 pounds per pig, 7 pounds per sheep, etc.). The peasants were highly satisfied with this change.

The requisition is now said to be again in live cattle: there is again dissatisfaction and bitterness among the peasants.

2) The former Baryatinsky estate (later owned by a German, something like Schalart) in Silkovo Volost, probably more than 1,000 dessiatines.

This has been taken over for a state farm, the land is lying waste, millions are said to be taken from the treasury, no more than 5 dessiatines ploughed up in 1920. Ten (out of about 100) horses and 30-40 (out of 200) cows remain. No one is working hard. The furniture has been pilfered, etc.

The peasants in the neighbourhood are *very much* in need of land and are highly disgruntled at not being given either meadow or land.

(Nikolai Semyonovich Bodyakov, *Silkovo* Volost, the village of *Filipkovo*, Mosalsk Uyezd, Kaluga Gubernia.)

I request Comrades Bryukhanov and Sereda to order a report and to let me have it, within *two* days, at the latest.

Can these needs be met? Or is there some obstacle?[11]

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

11

TO V. A. AVANESOV

Comrade Avanesov,

Comrade Chutskayev has agreed, *by way of exception*, to issue here 36 million bank-notes (of those appropriated) for the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs to the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory.*

I request you to give permission, because I believe this is a very important and urgent matter.

If you object, phone me *at once*.

17/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 17, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

12

*TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO A. M. LYUBOVICH

I am extremely surprised and indignant over the fact that, despite our telephone conversation of yesterday, you have failed to place before the Council of Labour and

* See also present edition, Vol. 35, Documents 236, 264; Vol. 44, Documents 519, 520, and the present volume, Document 132.—*Ed.*

Defence, on 17/XI, the question of the Nizhni-Novgorod radio station.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on November 17, 1920
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a text written
in Maria Glyasser's hand
and signed by Lenin

13
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin,

The news from Britain, especially from Krasin (and extracts from the newspapers), and particularly the news that America will at once join (a trade agreement between Russia and Britain) raises the urgent and extremely important issue of a trade agreement with Britain.[12]

If it is a question of peace or war,* it should be tied in with Batum and Georgia.[13]

Then, on the question of debts, we should be *absolutely sure* that we are not made to pay.

If there is a trade agreement *who* will have the right to sign the *final text*? Krasin alone? or the Council of People's Commissars?

This *question* must be urgently worked out *in all its* aspects.

With communist greetings,

19/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 19, 1920
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

14
ASSIGNMENTS TO SECRETARY[14]

1

Request a report from the Supreme Economic Council on the electrification of Yaropolets Volost (or Yaropolets District), Volokolamsk Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia.[15]

---

* In the original the last three words are in English.—*Ed.*

Copper is the main thing.

Engineer *Ringo*, who is in charge of the Moscow Gubernia Electrical Department, favours the starting of local electrical fittings factories (for instance, Vishnyakov's and Shamshin's in Moscow), with the raw materials, incidentally, available at the warehouse in **Raiovo** (artillery depot of Moscow Gubernia, nine versts away from Moscow: millions of poods of copper brought together from various parts, especially Poland during the war).

(Find out about Ringo)

(1) assist electrification

(2) public education

(3) flax growing.

2

Keep *secret*, and give me a reminder when Kirillin from Yaropolets (Volokolamsk Uyezd) comes to see me.

Written: 1st—November 19, 1920,
2nd—November 20, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

15

TO A. M. ANIKST

20/XI-20

Comrade Anikst,

Please arrange for tomorrow a conference with representatives of:

Working-garments supply organisation

Central Coal Administration

and Chuso* and Central Garments Administration to investigate (in accordance with Comrade Trotsky's telegram No. 69/5 of 20/XI-20) the reasons why the Council of Labour and Defence decision on supply to Donbas[16] has not been fulfilled, and to take urgent measures for the earliest fulfilment of the assignment.[17]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

* Chusosnabarm—Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Red Army and Navy Supplies.—*Ed.*

16

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[18]

To the Narrow Council

I think an article (or footnote) should be added:

the rules stated in § 4 must be worked out within a *stated* (brief) period and reported to the Narrow Council.

NB:	NB:
(1) Fundamentals of political knowledge (2) and communist propaganda	must be included in the syllabus. What control.

Lenin

Written in November, not before the 20th, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

17

TO THE STATE PUBLISHERS

Please publish *without fail* by the deadline and notify me *at once*.[19]

26/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 26, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

18

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

The underscored is absolutely intolerable.[20] The People's Commissar is duty bound *precisely* to carry out the C.P.C. *decision winding up* the Groman commission. You failed to protest the decision in the C.C., the decision of 7.IX, and are inventing some kind of "friction" (where? whose? why talk of "friction", when there is a *mandatory* decision?

You yourself are creating it). How the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs can hope to "get it going" contrary to the Council of People's Commissars is inconceivable. This is chaos and disorganisation. You are the one who is impeding the C.P.C decisions, and that is absolutely intolerable.

29/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 29, 1920
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

19

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Copies to Comrades Litkens, Solovyov, Krestinsky

29/XI.

Comrade Lunacharsky:

Comrade Litkens and I had a detailed talk yesterday. I find his and Comrade Solovyov's drafts artificial.[21] Naturally, the C.C. will decide. My own preliminary considerations are as follows:

1) Set up the office of Assistant People's Commissar to handle *all* the administrative side.

2) Turn the "organisational sector" into an "organisational centre" (with a member of the collegium in charge). This centre is to handle the administrative, organisational, supply and other sides of *all* the sectors.

3) Eliminate Glavprofobr*, merging it with the *secondary schools*, *provided*: (α) general knowledge and political subjects are extended in the secondary schools and (β) the switch from trade and technical to polytechnical education is, as far as possible, ensured.

4) Revive the "G.U.S." (State Academic Council) and regulate it as an organ for discussion of all scientific and pedagogical matters.

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* The Central Administration for Vocational Training under the People's Commissariat for Education.—*Ed.*

Composition = all members of the collegium + the best *specialists*, even if bourgeois.

5) Set up the following sectors: (1) pre-school; (2) primary school; (3) secondary school (= Glavprofobr); (4) extra-mural (= Chief Committee for Political Education); (5) higher school; (6) art.

6) Leave the art sector as a single one, appointing "*political commissars*" *from among the Communists* to all central and governing bodies in the sector.

29/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 29, 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

20

TO S. Y. CHUTSKAYEV

Comrade Chutskayev
Commission for Abolishing Cash Taxes[22]

More thought must be given to the conditions of the transition epoch (and the relevant *facts* studied in greater detail).

There is no doubt about switching from money to the exchange of products without money.

To make the switch a success, there must be an *exchange of products* (not *exchange of commodities*).

So long as *we are unable* to carry on the exchange of commodities, i.e., to give the peasants industrial products, the peasantry *has* to make do with the *remnants* of commodity (and consequently of *money*) circulation, with a substitute for it.

It is *economically* wrong to abolish the substitute (money) before the peasantry has been given that which eliminates the need of a substitute.

This must be given *very* serious thought.

30/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 30, 1920

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Vestnik Finansov* No. 1

Printed from a typewritten copy

21
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

30.XI.1920

Comrade Bryukhanov,

Kindly inform me whether you have received the Politbureau resolution on 100 per cent food supplies to Baku and on the changes in the food supply policy in Azerbaijan,[23] and what instructions you have given to Comrade Frumkin in connection with the resolution (please let me have a copy of your telegram to Frumkin).*

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten text
with Lenin's additions
and signature

22
TO A. M. AMOSOV

Comrade Amosov,

After you left last night, I was told that the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council had adopted its decision.[24] My advice is to submit to it, and concentrate entirely on thoughtful execution (swift, firm preparation for the congress).

That is only a piece of advice.

However, if all of you still disagree, there remains one way: appeal the All-Russia Central T.U.C. decision with the Central Committee (the Politbureau or the Plenum).

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on December 12, 1920

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from
a typewritten copy

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* The words "and on the changes in the food supply policy in Azerbaijan", "your", "to Frumkin" are in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

23
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

14.XII.1920

Comrade Tsyurupa:

I have already had occasion to point out in the Council of People's Commissars that the organisation of work at the Distribution Department of the Commissariat for Food is not entirely satisfactory: they have failed to make a serious estimate of *how many* rations we have and how many persons are receiving under each ration.

They must be made to do this.

Of course, there must be no disruption of the special purpose supply. The workers must come first.

Do you think it possible to set up a commission inside the Commissariat for Food to make improvements in this respect? If there is a commission, give it such an assignment. More workers (from the trade unions) who had worked in the Commissariat for Food (or possibly from among those workers who have some experience in food supply work locally) should be recruited to the commission.

Show this letter to Comrade Krestinsky. If he gives his own consent (and that of the other members of the Politbureau) we shall make this a C.C. directive.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

24
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Dear Comrade Tsyurupa:

The Plenary Meeting decision is the result of long and old dissatisfactions with Svidersky.[25]

The workers' statement *and*, *what is important*, *its support by the trade unions*, was the last straw.

I personally could not help admitting that the workers' desire was right and that its satisfaction was an *absolute political necessity*.

I realise that you find this painful. But political interest (and the Party decision) unquestionably calls for subordination. You can very well make use of Svidersky otherwise than as a member of the collegium. We must tackle this business of getting more workers; I realise that, being swamped with work, you have been unable to give all your attention to the question of recruiting more workers. I realise that, with all this work and your illness, you have been unable to keep altogether in touch with the Party political side either.

Is that so surprising?

Don't let your nerves go. You should try to live down the painful feeling. The C.C. decision must be accepted and put through.

I can't come: there is a meeting on.

Yours,

Lenin

Written on December 14, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

25

TO M. I. FRUMKIN

14.XII.1920

Comrade Frumkin,

I am writing you about your exclusion (and Svidersky's) from the collegium. I believe that it was necessary to put through the All-Russia Central Executive Committee's decision on such members in a pedantic manner—and that is how the C.C. has decided.[26] Political conditions demand particular circumspection in this matter, as in the matter of recruiting workers. I hope you will fully understand that the political considerations, which the C.C. has approved, must not and cannot in any sense be interpreted as signifying a lack of personal confidence, an underestimation of personal qualities, etc. (even if there were gossipy attempts to do so).

The new composition of the collegium without yourself must be accepted as a political necessity, and the mistrust

and suspicion (of the unwillingness to "recruit workers", unwillingness to have more democracy, etc.) should be dispelled *by hard work* (I personally am sure that you and Svidersky will do this quite easily, and that this will come about of itself through a continuation of your work). The whole point is to have your *work*, without the official high rank (member of the collegium), refute all the slanders, all the apprehensions of the workers and the trade unions. I repeat I am sure that you and Svidersky will understand this and will easily do it. There and there *alone* lies the gist of the matter.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

26

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

14/XII.

Comrade Chicherin,

Yesterday Ter-Gabrielyan came to see me and he also spoke of the terrible danger of a pogrom.

(1) 600,000 Armenian refugees are said to be in danger of losing their lives.

(2) Without Kars, Baku is said to be threatened.[27]

I think we should separate No. (1) from No. (2) and do *everything* to help in No. (1).

What is your opinion? and what are you doing on No. (1)?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on December 14, 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

27

TELEGRAM TO THE 1ST LABOUR ARMY COUNCIL, URALS REGIONAL BUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C., YEKATERINBURG GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, URALS UNIVERSITY

Yekaterinburg, 1st Labour Army Council, Regional Bureau of R.C.P. C.C., Gubernia Executive, Urals University

I order that you should at once vacate the premises set aside for the Urals University and forthwith refrain from disrupting the work of the University arbitrarily, with the warning that the guilty persons will be brought to trial.

Lenin
17/XII-20 Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

28

TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE BOLSHOI THEATRE[28]

I request you not to hinder or stop the work of artist Rodionov, engineer Smirnov and the electricians who are preparing, on my assignment, maps of electrification on the premises of the Bolshoi Theatre for the Eighth Congress of Soviets.[29] They will be through on Sunday. Do not expel them in any case.*

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 18, 1920

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

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* The last two sentences are in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

29

TO THE MANAGING DEPARTMENT OF THE C.P.C.

Please have this map hung up here and on the premises of the Narrow Council and (the rest- of the copies) distributed *to workers' clubs in Moscow*,[30] but before doing so ask N. P. Gorbunov whether it is possible to have the present boundaries **additionally drawn** *on this map* at least in *green* lines and *green shading*:

(α) Western "front" (Finland, Estland, Latvia, Poland and Rumania)
(β) Crimea
(γ) Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia
(δ) Central Asia, Bukhara
(ε) Far-Eastern Republic
(ζ) boundaries of the Far East
all these as they are at present.

Lenin

Written on December 21, 1920
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

30

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN AND N. K. KLYSHKO

Krasin and Klyshko:

You are strongly requested to buy and bring over here a complete set of British and American popular manuals on practical electrical engineering. I support the request.

*Lenin**

Written on December 31, 1920
Sent to London
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

* Below Lenin made this addition: "Comrade Chicherin, will you please have this telegram sent off today, 31/XII. Yours, *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

31

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV*

31.XII.1920

Comrade Bryukhanov,

Comrade Narimanov has raised the pressing question about the urgent need to issue a certain quantity of piece-goods to Azerbaijan.

Please, call a conference on this *tomorrow* with Comrades Narimanov, Rykov and Stalin.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

32

TO V. D. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Have you received Semashko's order?[31]

I beg you *to do your utmost* and to report to me every week on the actual results, *what has been done*.

Written in December 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

33

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

Legal proceedings should be started (by way of example) against one or two persons for *spreading rumours*.[32]

Written in 1920

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

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* In the upper part of the note, Lenin appears to have made this later addition: "Bryukhanov has agreed with Narimanov."—*Ed.*

34

RE: BÉLA KUN'S PAMPHLET[33]

The good thing in the pamphlet is the author's strength of revolutionary convictions and his unbending faith in the revolution. His remarks about the party as it should be are good. His criticism of Social-Democrats is good.

But a *glaring* shortcoming is the total absence of any facts. This makes the pamphlet weak. I should say that of the 55 pages 40 ought to be filled with precise facts (the history of the Social-Democratic Party and the revolution, and also of the counter-revolution in Hungary), giving a summary of the facts and leaving 15 pages for evaluation.

Unless it is rewritten in this way, the pamphlet is extremely weak and not fit for use.

Written in 1920

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

35

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

The Commander-in-Chief* and Frunze** should be daily goaded and spurred on (whipped and flayed) to get them to *rout* and *catch* Antonov and Makhno.

Written in late 1920-early 1921

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* Commander-in-Chief of the R.S.F.S.R. Armed Forces, S. S. Kamenev.—*Ed.*

** M. V. Frunze, who was appointed commander of the troops in the Ukraine and the Crimea after the rout of Wrangel, was in charge of mopping-up operations against the Makhno and other bandit groups in the Ukraine.—*Ed.*

1921

36
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Once again to Comrade N. P. Gorbunov

Comrade Gorbunov:

Will you contact Semashko and M. N. Pokrovsky. This is a scandalous business. My reply should be drafted by agreement with *both* and sent to me.[34]

2/I.1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

37
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

I think, even 30 is too much. After all, Joffe promised *not to give any gold* but only concessions.

I think we should not give them even *30*.[35]

Lenin

Written in January,
not before the 3rd, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

38

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

Of course, it is all right in principle. But is it worth while? Hardly. It comes to nothing in practice. It is not worth while "offending" Béla Kun and the other comrades for nothing. We shall probably gain by *only* exchanging the hostages for the People's Commissars.[36]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written in January, not before the 4th, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

39

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade *Gorbunov*:

All of this is from the village of Modenovo (p.t.o.). Examine this and *help them*. They are asking for a reduction of their surplus-products deliveries (p.t.o.). Inquire at the People's Commissariat for Food and let me know.[37]

{ The comrade with whom I spoke is a member of the *Volost Labour Committee*, **Pyotr Kozlov*** }

Modenovo

The village of *Modenovo*, Bogorodsk Volost, **Vereya** Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia.

They have fulfilled these surplus-products deliveries:

hay	*2000—200*
straw	200—200
spring straw	110— —

* Lenin wrote the whole note on the envelope of the letter he received. The text that follows is written on the other side of the envelope.—*Ed.*

corn	*244—43*	**Delivered**
oats	540—19	*voluntarily...*
potatoes	115 (circ.)—115	
poultry	in full	
eggs	in full	
meat	78 poods—78 poods	

Request: reduce the obligatory deliveries of hay and corn (fearful of detachments).

Written on January 6, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

40

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade *Gorbunov*:

It is necessary.

1) to have this translated into (*good*) German,

2) find out (from Semashko and M. N. Pokrovsky or *through* them) whether we could add

that Pavlov has not applied to leave (is it true that he would not like to go?),

that he has been given the specified privileges.

Since my letter may be published, the addition of this *is highly desirable*.

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. Please return *all* these documents to me.

Written on January 6, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

41

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

12/I.1921.

Comrade *Gorbunov:*

I *most* earnestly request you to telephone the Electrical Department of the (Moscow) Gubernia Economic Council

at once and to speed up this matter in every possible way, *taking it to the end*, to its completion. Please inform me of any delay.

Lenin

For my part, I enclose an engineer's estimate (at the Gorki state farm) of what is required.

If this is not available at the Moscow Gubernia Economic Council (the Electrical Department), *send them a copy*.

We should check up on whether their request is not excessive.[38]

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

42

TELEPHONE MESSAGE LUNACHARSKY AND Y. A. LITKENS

Please confirm by telephone message that the resolutions of the recent conference of Party workers in education, resolutions relating to the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat, are not being implemented, in conformity with the C.C. decision, pending the examination of these resolutions by the Party C.C.[39]

Lenin

Written on January 14, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a copy in Maria Glyasser's hand

43

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov,

1) Concerning your note on the secretariat. Let's discuss it when we meet. Don't start for the time being.

2) I enclose *Shklovskaya*'s letter. Request: read and telephone the C.C. (secretaries) and the People's Commis-

sariat for Foreign Affairs, saying that *I ask them to meet her* request. I know the family, they *will not survive* in Russia at present.[40]

3) Concerning the electric lighting at Gorki*: I have also received an application from the *village of Siyanovo* (has it been passed on to you?). Let the person concerned have a look at it, although it is far. Are you speeding up the whole business?

4) Please find out, without taking any steps until we meet, whether anything is being done *anywhere* (C.C., Telegraph Agency of Russia, People's Commissariats, etc.)

α) regular press cuttings,

β) pasting up of cuttings for reference system.

If something is being done, have a look and tell me *how*.

If not, let us discuss how to start this business when we meet.

Regards,

Lenin

Written on January 18, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

44

TO DVOSYA SHKLOVSKAYA**

Dear D. Z.:

I quite understand you. When I spoke to your husband, I told him *right away*: wouldn't it be better to go abroad? For I clearly saw that you would *not be able to manage here* (*especially in Moscow*). I was very much surprised that he refused to recognise this obvious fact.

I am not in Moscow at present.[41] I have written to *Gorbunov* (a very good man), asking him on my behalf to talk both with the C.C. and the People's Commissariat for

---

* See Document 41 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** On the envelope Lenin wrote: "Comrade D. Z. *Shklovskaya*, 3/69 Sheremetyevsky pereulok; (please sign for letter) (from Lenin)."—*Ed.*

Foreign Affairs about meeting your request.* If need be, speak to Gorbunov (I enclose his telephone number) *without hesitation*: he is a very good man.

Best regards to the whole family, the children especially.

Lenin

Written on January 18, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

45

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade N. P. Gorbunov:

Please give a closer reading to Comrade Eiduk's material[42] and *have a talk with him*,

to try to formulate the *practical proposals*

together with him.

Tell Comrade Eiduk that I am extremely interested in this most important matter, and very much regret that I am unable just now to take it up personally.

But once the practical proposals are there, I shall tackle it.

2) The Narrow Council business as designated.

Yours,

Lenin

Written on January 18, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

46

TO THE *PRAVDA* EDITORIAL BOARD[43]

I request the Editorial Board to publish Rudzutak's theses, which were adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Conference held from November 2 to 6, 1920; they

* See previous document.—*Ed.*

are extremely necessary as material for discussion. I also append material on the debate which has started in Party circles concerning the origin of these theses.

N. Lenin

Written on January 18, 1921
Published on January 21, 1921
in *Pravda* No. 13

Printed from
the newspaper text

47

*TO THE WORKERS, ARTISANS, OFFICE WORKERS, AND COMMUNIST PARTY CELL OF PROLETARSKAYA STATION, VLADIKAVKAZ RAILWAY

20.I.1921

Dear Comrades:

From the comrades you have sent, Lavrik, Malikov and Bykov, I learned with great satisfaction how you organised the dispatch of a gift to the working people of the city of Moscow. In accordance with the mandate of your general meeting, I received from your delegates Invoice No. 243 covering the cargo you dispatched: 2,002 poods of wheat, 1,869 poods 29 pounds of barley and 35 poods of flour, and also a detailed written report about how you carried out the procurement of salt by doing free overtime work, about your voluntary stints without pay on holidays in general, and about your cultural and educational work.

Instructions have been issued to have the cargo, delayed en route through no fault of the comrades you have sent, delivered to the People's Commissariat for Food, and all the foodstuffs you have sent will be handed over to the workers of the city of Moscow.

I advise you to give more attention to cultural and educational work and the schools. I hope that through a concerted effort you will succeed in eliminating all the difficulties which arise.

I was especially interested in the communist farming you have introduced. One of the most important tasks now facing the Republic is the development and boosting

of agriculture. I was happy to hear your report that this year you will be able to develop 2,200 dessiatines as ploughland, and 25 dessiatines as vegetable garden. You must see to it that your agriculture is organised on the right lines, as agronomic science requires, and I advise you to get a knowledgeable agronomist for that purpose.*

My special request to you is that your work in the commune should be so organised as to *help* peasants in the vicinity and maintain the best relations with them. Without this and without business-like practical economic success I have little faith in the communes, and am even somewhat apprehensive of them.

I send you all my comradely greetings.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

I am very sorry that I was unable to see them personally and had to ask Comrade N. P. Gorbunov to do so.

First published on January 21, 1927 in the newspaper *Molot* No. 1641 (Rostov-on-Don)

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

48

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

A decision was adopted today to have you see to the execution of C.P.C. decisions.[44]

This business must be organised on the correct lines: you must always have a file or list of decisions which have *not been carried out* or require constant supervision (over execution).

25/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 25, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

* The following text is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

49

TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade Rykov:

I propose that the resignation should be rejected, and the "termination of the duties performed" *interdicted*. Larin is no good as chairman. This should be backed up through the C.C. today.[45]

26/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 26, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

50

TO N. P. GORBUNOV[46]

Comrade Gorbunov:

I have known the author for more than 20 years. A most loyal revolutionary. His sister (or two?) are working for us and, everyone says, are doing it selflessly and splendidly. I believe, he has quite deserved our help. I earnestly request you not to be angry over his nervousness (the man is *worn out*) and to **help** him in every possible way.

26/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 26, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

51

TO THE SORMOVO WORKS

The Sormovo Works is making a caterpillar crane for Gidrotorf, but this is being done much too slowly. In view of the need to test the crane in the coming summer season, I request that every effort be made to have the crane all ready in April to make its delivery possible to Electroperedacha Station in early May for all-round trials, so that,

once all the necessary improvements are ascertained, the mass production of cranes could be started on this model.[47]

Lenin

Written on January 26, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

52

TO V. P. MILYUTIN

27.I.21

Comrade Milyutin:

Please let me know what you have done to publish abroad the decree on concessions,[48] when the report was put out, and what exactly has been communicated abroad. In order to complete what has yet to be done in this respect, I propose that you make use of Comrade Kopp, who is now in Moscow.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. Please let me know the exact copies of the telegrams or letters sent abroad and dates of dispatch.

First published in 1959 in the book: *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow Vol. III

Printed from a typewritten copy

53

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

I have just spoken to you on the telephone about this draft. Request: speed up *all* this business, and all the many drafts, so as to have the lot go to the Narrow C.P.C., say, on Saturday.[49]

27.I.1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

54

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

The estate is said to comprise *about* 30 dessiatines of ploughland, and 130 of forest. The Saratov Gubernia Executive Committee is said to be agreeable. I think this should be placed before the Narrow Council right away, and an *inquiry* and on-the-spot study appointed through the Narrow Council.[50]

27.I.1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

55

TO M. N. POKROVSKY, Y. A. LITKENS AND O. Y. SCHMIDT

28.I.1921

To Comrades
1) M. N. Pokrovsky
2) Y. A. Litkens
3) O. Y Schmidt

Please let me have by 8.00 p.m. today:

1) the available *printed* material (in reports, articles, pamphlets, etc.) with the text of the laws *in force* (resolutions, instructions)
on primary schools
and secondary schools
2) ditto—technical schools
3) " trade "
4) on the number of primary and secondary schools and also of higher educational establishments;
5) on the number of schools, open or closed, or not working, and educational establishments of the various levels and types;
6) in addition, if there is no printed material—and if it is impossible to indicate- the issues of newspapers or

magazines carrying such materials—please send me *data* on the questions indicated which *have not been printed*, *if available*.[51]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

56
TO M. A. KRUCHINSKY*

31.I.1921

Comrade Kruchinsky:

I have received your reports on the People's Commissariat for Agriculture.[52] I have read them and reported to the C.C. members.

By appointing Osinsky, we, the Central Committee, have done what we could. Osinsky saw me yesterday and told me that he was getting a number of local comrades, peasants, to join in the work.

Why are you dissatisfied with Osinsky? The whole R.C.P. group of the Eighth Congress of Soviets had a high opinion of him over the seed campaign.

Which Communist workers are dissatisfied with the work and why?

Please let me have concrete instructions and proposals. We in the C.C. believe that we have done everything possible *for the time being*; we are *waiting* to see the results of the work of the new Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and think that they will be good.

With communist greetings,

N. Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

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* On the envelope Lenin wrote: "To Mikh. Kruchinsky, member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (please sign for letter) (from Lenin)."—*Ed.*

57

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

We should make inquiries and find out whether anything can be done in this case to help the mining industry. Take away what can be spared?[53]

31/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 31, 1921

First published on January 21, 1927 in *Pravda* No. 17

Printed from the original

58

TO M. I. FRUMKIN*

1/II-1921.

Comrade Frumkin:

We have been receiving (from inside and outside) more and more information about the absolutely intolerable "independence" of the Ukraine in matters of the People's Commissariat for Food.

You must *dig right down* to the *whole* truth, which is obviously being concealed from us (to some extent probably unwittingly, by conniving at those whose concealment is *deliberate*). This is a serious matter, and we shall not let it go at that; we shall find out the whole truth.

We shall fully expose the role of Peshekhonov (worse than any whiteguard), who had clearly been fooling the Ukrainian C.C. (we do not yet know through whom he had done that, but we shall find out).

But just now, and above all, you are *fully responsible* for finding out and getting at *all the facts*, and must see to it that you *are not* duped by Peshekhonov and those who have been deceived by the Peshekhonovs.[54]

Awaiting your reply,

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

* See Document 62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

59

TO D. B. RYAZANOV

Comrade Ryazanov:

Do you at the library have a *collection* of **all** the letters of Marx and Engels *from the newspapers*? from separate magazines?

For example, about materialism in *Leipzieger Volkszeitung*, 1894?

The one from *Vorwärts* about *Beesley**? (it may not be spelled quite that way: English professor, Comtist, who knew Marx?)

And similar other things.

Is there a *catalogue of all the letters* of Marx and Engels?

Could I have it to go over for about a week, i.e., the *catalogue*?

Yours,
Lenin

Written before February 2, 1921

First published in 1930 in the book *Na boyevom postu. Sbornik k shestidesyatiletiyu D. B. Ryazanova* (Collection for D. B. Ryazanova's Sixtieth Birthday), Moscow

Printed from the original

60

TO D. B. RYAZANOV

Comrade Ryazanov:

I have a great request:

Return the books.[55]

1) Do you, by any chance, know *where* the *underscored passages* in Engels's letters come *from*?

2) Has this ever been published in full and *where*?

3) If it has, can we find and get it?

4) Could we *buy* the letters of Marx and Engels, or photographs of them, from Scheidemann & Co. (you know, this dirty lot will sell anything)?

---

* Edward Spencer Beesly.—*Ed.*

5) Is there any hope of our collecting in Moscow **everything** published by Marx and Engels?

6) Is there a catalogue of *everything already collected here*?

7) Are we collecting the letters of Marx and Engels (or copies of them) or is that impossible?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on February 2, 1921

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

61

TO A. G. GOIKHBARG

Comrade Goikhbarg:

About the reports by the People's Commissars, you (the Narrow Council) should pay particular *attention to the execution* of the most important decisions.[56]

The burning question today is flats in Moscow. Appoint check-ups, *with reports* in the Narrow Council *twice* a week: how many houses, flats, rooms have been *given* (you will recall that 10 houses have to be given).

Also check up on the allocation.

The population of Moscow is being inflated by the growing staffs. This should be verified; perhaps, we should adopt a decision.

A People's Commissariat increasing the number of its staffs without the permission of the Narrow Council should be subjected to various penalties (prohibition to increase even by one person).

Draw up a list of the People's Commissariats which are to reduce the number of their staffs weekly (People's Commissariat for Defence, the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Railways and certain others).

The rest may increase their staffs only with the permission of the Narrow Council.

Lenin

Written on February 2, 1921

First published in part on January 16, 1957 in the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* No. 13

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

62

TO V. N. MANTSEV

Comrade Mantsev:

Outrageous things are happening in the Ukraine.

The Politbureau directive (to have Peshekhonov and the *Peshekhonovites* removed from Kharkov) is being foiled.

Some of the Ukrainian C.C. members are allowing themselves to be deceived by Peshekhonov and the Peshekhonovites.

That is clear. We too shall not allow ourselves to be fooled any longer.

I authorise you, on your *personal* responsibility (on condition of secret and direct and regular communication with the Politbureau in Moscow) to:

(1) keep Peshekhonov under *full* observation;

(2) send the results here;

(3) similarly with all the other Peshekhonovites, a list of them;

(4) secure Peshekhonov's immediate resignation and his dispatch to Moscow.

The Ukrainian C.C. is in *complete* disarray. Let's see if you can do this *properly*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

3/II.1921.

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

63

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

6.II.1921

Comrade Sklyansky:

Let me have the telegram from the Saratov Gubernia military commissar, the "reply" to which from the Commander-in-Chief you sent me today.

The reply is stupid and here and there illiterate.

It is a bureaucratic handout, instead of a *business-like approach*: banditry must be *wiped out*, instead of being formally written about.

Let them give me, twice a week, *brief*, very brief *results of the fight* against banditry.

Also bring home to the field staff that they should work, instead of writing formal notes.

Who is this "field staff military commissar" Ilyushin, what is his record?

Lenin

First published in part in 1938
in the magazine *Bolshevik* No. 2
Published in full in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

64

TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

4.II.1921

Comrade Lunacharsky
Copies to Comrade Pokrovsky
and Comrade Litkens

Please let me have a list of teachers with solid practical experience (a) in general teaching activity generally; (b) in vocational and technical education—briefly indicating literary works and length of Soviet service.

I have already asked for this *many times*. There should be no red tape in this matter.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. In particular, I request information about Sergei Pavlovich, director of the former Tenishevsky College in Petrograd.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

65

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 11TH ARMY[57]

The C.C. is inclined to permit the 11th Army to give active support to the uprising in Georgia and to occupy Tiflis, provided international rules are observed and all members of the 11th Army R.M.C. after a serious examination of all the data, vouch for success.[58] We warn that we have been left without grain because of transport, and will therefore not give a single train or a single car. We are forced to carry only grain and oil from the Caucasus. We demand an immediate reply by direct wire signed by all the 11th Army R.M.C. members and also by Smilga, Gittis, Trifonov and Frumkin. Until our reply to the telegrams from all these persons, do nothing drastic.*

14.II.

Written on February 14, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

66

TELEGRAM TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 11TH ARMY[59]

The C.C. regards the operations of the 11th Army R.M.C. as local protection for insurgents in the neutral zone against their imminent destruction by the whiteguards.[60] Take account of this political character of your operation in

---

* Lenin then added the following: "On behalf of the C.C., Krestinsky." At the bottom of the telegram Lenin added this note, apparently addressed to the secretary: "No, better keep this top-secret for 2-3 months."—*Ed.*

all your public statements. Of course, we expect the 11th Army R.M.C. to take swift and vigorous action, not stopping short of the capture of Tiflis, if, for military considerations, this should be necessary for the actual defence of the neutral zone against a fresh attack. We expect you to reckon most seriously with our warnings. Inform us daily.*

Written on February 15, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

67

TO A. G. GOIKHBARG

Comrade Goikhbarg,
Deputy Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C.

I enclose herewith:

1) Extracts from the minutes of the general meeting of the communist cell of the workers' department at the Moscow Higher Technical College dated 9/II.

2) The report from the commissar of the workers' department at the M.H.T.C. of 10/II.

3) Extracts from the minutes of the joint sitting of the presidiums of the communist cells of the Institute of Railways Engineers, the Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy, and the bureau of the communist cell of the workers' department of the M.H.T.C. of 23/I.

4) A copy of the report from the instructor of the cultural department of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council of 28/I.

I propose that the Narrow C.P.C. should deal specially with the question of the workers' departments, study its every aspect and secure the utmost improvement in the condition of the workers' departments.[61]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 15, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

* Lenin then wrote: "On behalf of the C.C., Krestinsky."—*Ed.*

68

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

Litkens is proposing to the Organising Bureau a list of candidates for the *Academic Centre* (of the People's Commissariat for Education).[62] I request that it be referred to the Politbureau.

15/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 15, 1921
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

69

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY[63]

1

I have not seen the article, but relying on Kamenev (that he would not have recommended anything *harmful*) I cast my vote in favour of *publishing it tomorrow*.

Lenin

2

In that case, we should require

1) the reservation that the author or authors have written it as *private* writers and not as persons in office;

2) the reservation: the article is offered for discussion.

Written on February 16, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52
Printed from the original

70

TO N. I. MURALOV

Comrade Muralov:

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky is highly delighted with *Yesin*, worker and Communist, whom he says you know as well. In

the words of Krzhizhanovsky this is an outstanding worker, an electrician, and extremely useful (turned out to be useful in the work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia). So Krzhizhanovsky strongly recommends him for membership of the *General Planning Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence*.

I think this Commission should, as a general rule, consist of *specialists*, a *worker*, by way of exception.

I have told Osinsky as much and should like to know your opinion. I earnestly request you to send me (*with the same messenger*), in a few lines, your detailed opinion of Yesin, his record, his efficiency, etc.[64]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on February 18, 1921
First published in part
on April 22, 1957
in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* No. 96
Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

71

TO V. R. MENZHINSKY

18.II.1921

Comrade Menzhinsky:

I highly recommend to you the bearer of this, Comrade Eino Rahja, whom I have known since before the October Revolution as a most loyal Finnish Bolshevik. He is now a member of the C.C. of Finland's Communist Party.

He must personally speak to you on a number of the *most secret* matters. Please, trust him fully and give him every possible assistance.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

72

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

I am not soliciting any high posts for Comrade Shklovsky. You know him by his work at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

But I ask you to speed up his departure abroad, because his wife fears that the children will not survive here. I have known the whole family since our stay abroad, and believe these fears to be weighty. This family cannot stand our conditions. They must be sent abroad.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written in February, not before the 21st, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

73

TELEGRAM TO I. N. SMIRNOV

I am passing on to you Sklyansky's communication[65] in reply to your dispatches. Please keep me informed about the gangs, the food supply work, and the grain shipments.

Written on February 21 or 22, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

74

*TO COMRADES I. M. GUBKIN, A. I. TSEVCHINSKY, I. N. STRIZHOV AND N. N. SMIRNOV[66]

23.II.1921

In view of the reports sent in to the Central Oil Administration on the question of the flooding of oil wells and the consequent threat of disaster, please let me have today, if possible, any material you may have at hand (books,

magazines, reports, etc.) on foreign laws or local regulations penalising oil industrialists for leaving wells uncovered, failing to provide cementation, its faulty application, *etc.*

Let me have either the laws themselves, or, if these are not immediately available, references to the corresponding books or magazine articles or handbooks, so that I could get them from the library.

Please reply by telephone today.

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

75

TELEGRAM TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY*

To Rakovsky, **coded**

Rakovsky, *Kharkov*. Re: Your No. 672

In view of the extremely grave food supply situation at the centre, I propose: three-quarters to be brought down here, one-quarter left for the cities and workers of the Ukraine; the peasants must be rewarded at any cost, within the bounds of possibility, and if we have nothing, then by making purchases abroad for gold or oil. If you disagree with this, make another concession to the peasants, but bear in mind that the food crisis over here is desperate and downright dangerous.[67]

Lenin

Written on February 24, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

76

TO N. A. SEMASHKO

28.II.1921

Comrade Semashko
Nikolai Alexandrovich:

I now have with me Comrade Ivan Afanasyevich *Chekunov*, a very interesting toiling peasant, who is propagating communist principles in his own way.[68]

* At the top Lenin wrote and then crossed out: "Comrade Tsyurupa your opinion of my draft reply? 24.II. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

He has lost his spectacles and paid 15,000 rubles for the *trash*! Could you help him to get good spectacles?

I earnestly request you to help and ask your secretary to let me know *whether you have managed to do so.*

Yours,
Lenin

First published in part
on January 30, 1924
in *Leningradskaya Pravda* No. 23
Published in full
on January 21, 1925
in *Izvestia* No. 17

Printed from the original

77
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa:

Your figures show the stocks on 1.II to be 40.3 food+5.4 groats=45.7.[69]

The probable figure for 1.III is about *48.*

By 1.IV, probably, *not less than* 50.

From 1.IV to 1.IX is five months. 50 : 5=10.

This rough estimate shows that for Russia, for the R.S.F.S.R. (without the Ukraine), it is quite possible to abolish the surplus-requisition from 15.III or 1.IV, and *try out the new regime* until 1.IX or 15.VIII.

What do you think?

Written in February 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

78
TO N. OSINSKY

1.III.1921

Comrade Osinsky:

Yesterday I saw Ivan Afanasyevich Chekunov. It turned out that he had already been to see me in 1919 on the question of a congress of toiling peasants. Now he says: it is better to start with *regional* ones.

He sympathises with the Communists, but will not join the Party, because he goes to church and is a Christian (he says he rejects the ritual but is a believer).

He has been improving his farm. He has toured Nizhni-Novgorod and Simbirsk gubernias. He says the peasants have lost confidence in the Soviet power. I asked him whether we could right things with a tax? He thinks we could. In his own uyezd, he has succeeded, with the help of the workers, to substitute a good Soviet authority for the bad one.

That is the kind of people we must *do our utmost* to hold on to, in order to restore the confidence of the peasant *mass*. This is the *main* political task and one which brooks no delay. My earnest request: see that the "apparatus" standpoint does not run away with you, and do not worry too much over it. Devote *more* attention to the political attitude towards the peasantry.

I think we must "capture" Chekunov immediately, i.e., involve him in *our* activity. How are we to do this? This needs thinking about. Perhaps we should set up right away (rather start) a "toiling peasant council" or a "*non-Party peasant council*" (perhaps, the latter name is more guarded for keeping out those whom Chekunov calls the "hissers", i.e., the downright kulaks and enemies of the Soviet power). Chekunov should be appointed right away as the authorised representative of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture to organise (or prepare) such an institution. He should be urgently sent to Simbirsk Gubernia (we need an adviser and a mediator from a gubernia with *surplus* grain, better two mediators) and be given this assignment: to bring us over here from Simbirsk Gubernia (where he knows various people) a **non-Party** Russian peasant, a man advanced in years and a farmer, who *favours the toiling peasants and the workers*, and is not a "hisser". Another one must also be found. Three would be best: Chekunov+the man from Simbirsk+another from a gubernia not growing grain. This trio of "old men" (it would be good for all of them to be *both* non-Party men **and** Christians) we will at once turn either into *non-voting* members of the collegium, or into the nucleus of a "non-Party peasant council", or a similar corporation.

This must be done speedily, at once (he intends to leave the day after tomorrow).

Strike while the iron's hot. Let me have your reply.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

79

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky:

I am sending this for your information.[70] These are very interesting things. I think the Ukrainian Communists are wrong. The conclusion to be drawn from the facts is not against a tax, but for intensified military measures for the *total* annihilation of Makhno, etc.

Lenin

Written on March 3, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten copy

80

TO THE NARROW C.P.C.

I think we should allow *greater* quantities to be transported.[71]

Your fear of speculation is excessive.

Will it be so bad if they exchange individually for grain? The peasants will obtain footwear and clothing. What we should fear is *mass* speculation, and we cannot allow speculation on a *professional basis*. But we should not hamper but encourage *importation* into poverty-stricken Russia.

Please review.

3/III.1921.

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

81

*TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

3.III.1921

In sending over the minutes (No. 55) of the sitting of the bureau of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. group of 3.III.1921, I propose that:

1)) point "**g**" **should be withdrawn** (in view of the Party Congress which is to meet *within a few days*, and the need to discuss this and similar other matters *there*),

2)) on point "**l**"

be it resolved:

"*To be referred to the Party Congress.*"[72]

I think it necessary to decide this *over the telephone*, for it is indisputable that decisions cannot be taken before the Party Congress or without it. We obviously cannot allow panic to be spread for no good reason.

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

82

TO M. N. POKROVSKY[73]

I very much doubt it and think it would be better to refer this to the C.C. Politbureau. (Also find out for which departments or subjects?)

Written in March, not before the 4th, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

83

TO L. B. KAMENEV

5.III.1921

L.B.:

I think there is need for a (secret?) circular from the Moscow Committee on this matter against the slanderers who

refuse to go to the Control Commission, and keep hurling slanderous charges in the guise of "criticism".[74]

Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

84
TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND L. M. KARAKHAN[75]

Comrades Chicherin and Karakhan

Please let me know your opinion and return both documents to me.[76] I draw the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the fact that its *circumvention* of the C.P.C. decision (through a "parallel" apparatus or commission under *another* name or pretext) is *absolutely intolerable*. I have the suspicion that the P.C.F.A. is *actually circumventing* the C.P.C. decision. This is a warning. I request a *most precise* opinion, without evasions or suppression of the facts.

7/III. *Lenin*

Written on March 7, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

85
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa:

We shall probably call our commission tonight,[77] (we shall hardly have any time during the day, after the opening[78], although we shall try).

The question is pivoted on "*turnover*", free economic exchange for the peasantry.

You have not gone into the question deeply enough, since you were arguing against Rakovsky (I had no time for a rejoinder). The whole point is to be able to promote

commerce, exchange (both export abroad from the south and *exchange with the factories*). Otherwise, we shall collapse.

NB ||| *Think about this* and *find a formula* to insert this.

NB ||| 2) Ask for these figures right away: how much *grain* we *gave* in January 1921 and in *February* (if there are no figures for the whole of February, then for one-third or two-thirds of it) 1921. How much imported, and how much altogether.

Lenin

Written on March 8, 1921
First published in part in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

86

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

I am extremely anxious about the Turks' putting off the signing of the agreement on Batum, playing for time while their troops are moving to Batum. We must not allow them such delays. Discuss the following measure: you will adjourn your conference for half an hour to have a talk with me, while Stalin will have a straightforward talk with the Turkish delegation to clear things up and have everything settled not later than today.[79]

Lenin

Written on March 9, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

87

TO L. B. KAMENEV AND J. V. STALIN

Kamenev and Stalin

Please pay attention to Dzerzhinsky's reports on Siberia. There is an extremely great and terrible danger that our men will not be able to get on with the Siberian peasants.

For all his good qualities, Chutskayev is unquestionably weak, has absolutely no military knowledge, and the slightest aggravation may threaten disaster there. I think we should discuss the question of sending Iv. N. Smirnov to Siberia not later than the beginning of the summer. He will, of course, very strongly object, but unless we have another candidate with a knowledge of Siberia and of military science, one who is sure not to lose his head in a difficult situation, I think that it will be absolutely inevitable for us to send Smirnov.[80]

9/III.1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from Lydia Fotieva's notes

88

TO A. I. RYKOV

10.III.1921

Comrade Rykov
Copies to Comrade Tsyurupa and Comrade Rakovsky

I ask you to take advantage of Comrade Rakovsky's presence in Moscow to organise, together with him and Comrade Tsyurupa, a conference on the possibility and ways of getting the peasants, on the one hand, and the handicraftsmen and the factory population, on the other, to take a practical interest in the exchange (organised on state lines, as far as possible) of farm produce for industrial goods. This conference must be organised very urgently.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

89

TO A. G. GOIKHBARG

To the Narrow Council

Comrade Goikhbarg:

Read this letter from the representative of Soviet Georgia, especially what is *underscored* (p. 3).

It is necessary *immediately*

1) to put through an *injunction* on sending (without the permission of the Narrow Council), and to give permission with the *utmost circumspection*,[81]

2) to make *regular* check-ups on execution.

12/III. *Lenin*

Written on March 12, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

90

TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

I *propose*: to approve in principle and authorise the P.C.F.T. to continue negotiations[82] *with the proviso*, *however*, that (1) no final decision is taken without the Politbureau (which must remain free to make a *rejection*); and that (2) an effort is made to secure a *similar loan* on better terms with the other (Italian) *offerer*.

Lenin 13/III.

Written on March 13, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

91

TO N. A. SEMASHKO

Comrade Semashko:

(1) I earnestly request you to appoint a special person (preferably a *well-known* physician, with a knowledge of *foreign countries* and **known abroad** for sending abroad, to Germany (of Tsyurupa, Krestinsky, Osinsky, Kurayev, *Gorky*, *Korolenko* and others). The *utmost skill* should be

employed in inquiring, requesting, persuading, and writing to Germany, to help the *sick*, etc.

Do this *most punctiliously*
(thoroughly).

(2) Send the *best* physician to *give* N. I. Bukharin *a medical examination* (the *heart*, among other things) and let me know the result.

Lenin

Written in March,
not before the 16th, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

92
TO WASHINGTON VANDERLIP

Moscow, March 17, 1921.

Mr. Washington B. Vanderlip

Dear Sir,

I thank you for your kind letter of the 14th, and am very glad to hear of President Harding's favourable views as to our trade with America. You know what value we attach to our future American business relations. We fully recognise the part played in this respect by your syndicate and also the great importance of your personal efforts.[83] Your new proposals are highly interesting and I have asked the Supreme Council of National Economy to report to me at short intervals about the progress of the negotiations. You can be sure that we will treat every reasonable suggestion with the greatest attention and care.* It is on production and trade that our efforts are principally concentrated and your help is to us of the greatest value.

If you have to complain of some officials please send your complaint to the respective People's Commissary who will investigate the matter and report if necessary. I have already ordered special investigation concerning the person you mention in your letter.

---

* See Document 94 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The Congress of the Communist Party has taken so much of my time and forces that I am very tired and ill. Will you kindly excuse me if I am unable to have an interview with you just now. I will beg Comrade Chicherin to speak with you shortly.

Wishing you much success I remain.

Yours truly,

Wl. Oulianoff (*Lenin*)

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original Written in English

93

TO A. A. JOFFE

17.III.1921

Dear Comrade Joffe:

I was highly distressed to read your deeply perturbed letter of 15/III.[84] I see that you have the most legitimate grounds for dissatisfaction and even indignation, but I assure you that you are wrong in seeking the causes of it.

First, you are wrong in saying (repeatedly) that "I am the C.C.". This could have been written only in a state of great nervous irritation and overwork. The old C.C. (1919-1920) defeated me on one of the vastly important questions, as you must know from the discussion.[85] I cannot say how many times I have been in a minority on organisational and personal matters. You must have seen this for yourself on many occasions as a member of the C.C.

You should not allow yourself to be so nervous as to write such an **absolutely impossible**, **absolutely impossible** thing that I am the C.C. This is overwork.

Second, I do not feel the slightest dissatisfaction with you or mistrust of you in any way. *Nor do the members of the C.C.*, as far as I know them, have spoken to them and seen their attitude towards you.

What then is the explanation of the matter? It is that you have been *tossed about by fate*. I have seen this happen to many workers. Take Stalin, as an example. You must know that he would have stood up for himself, in any case. But "fate" did *not* allow him, *a single time* in three and a half years, to be *either* People's Commissar for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, *or* People's Commissar for Nationalities. That is a fact.

You, like rather many other leading workers, have been tossed about by fate. You are one of our first and best diplomatists. Our diplomacy has been working on and off. In the intervals, you have been "tried out" (W.P.I.), *without giving* you time to *finish things*. It is the fault (the misfortune?) of the whole C.C., which has tossed about many people *in this way*. If you give this some cool thought, you will see *that* this is true.

Failure to be elected to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee? Ask anyone, Trotsky, for instance, how often the C.C. has hesitated in its views of the principle and its decisions on this! This has happened many times! We were *forced* to make maximum renewals for considerations of "democracy".

(The new C.C. was constituted only yesterday and will take *some time* to "gear up".[86])

My *personal* opinion, which is quite frank, is: (1) you must have a good rest. It is harmful to fray oneself. We are badly in need of experienced, veteran, tested workers. Have a good rest. Perhaps, you will decide that it is better to go to a sanatorium, abroad. It is bad over here. Your health must be *completely* restored. (2) You have been and remain one of our leading and best diplomatists and politicians. Take Turkey? Turkestan? Can we do without you? Rumania? I'm afraid we cannot. I think we cannot.

Have a rest. Then come to Moscow, we shall have a talk.

With best wishes,

Yours,

Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

94

TO THE R.C.P.(B.) CENTRAL COMMITTEE[87]

Fully in favour.

Lenin

Authorise Chicherin to draw up a draft message and put it through at *this* very session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Lenin

Written on March 18 or 19, 1921

First published in 1961 in the book, *Leninskiye idei zhivut i pobezhdayut* (Lenin's Ideas Are Alive and Triumphant), Moscow

Printed from the original

95

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN*

Code

Krasin

The Party Congress has approved the line I advocated on concessions in Grozny and in Baku.[88] Speed up negotiations on these as on all other concessions. Send information more often.

*Lenin***

Written on March 19, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

96

CERTIFICATE TO A. R. SHAPOSHNIKOV

This is to certify that Alexei Romanovich *Shaposhnikov*, peasant of Beketovo Village, Bulgakovo Volost, Ufa Uyezd, Ufa Gubernia, was summoned by me to Moscow

---

* At the top Lenin added: "Comrade Chicherin: Please send in code, today if possible. 19/III. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

** The telegram is also signed by G. V. Chicherin.—*Ed.*

for discussion of and consultation on an important matter relating to the peasant economy.[89]

In his explanations and replies, citizen *A. R. Shaposhnikov* has been honest and scrupulous.

All Soviet authorities of the R.S.F.S.R. are hereby requested to help citizen *A. R. Shaposhnikov* in every possible way to return to peaceful labour in his domicile.

*V. Ulyanov (Lenin)**
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 22, 1921
First published in 1941 in the magazine *Bolshevik* No. 9

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

97

TO V. N. KAYUROV**

24.III.1921

Dear Comrade Kayurov:

I have received your letter of 1.III.21, concerning the tax.

In the meantime (while your letter was en route), the tax has already been passed by the Tenth Party Congress and by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. You must know about this from the papers.

Write me from time to time of your local impressions. How have the Siberian peasants met the tax? What are their other demands and feelings? How are things with the workers?

Best wishes,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

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* The certificate is also signed by C.P.C. secretary Lydia Fotieva.—*Ed.*

** On the envelope, the following is written in Lenin's hand: "*To Comrade V. Kayurov*. Kolchugino railway project. City of *Tomsk* (from Lenin)."—*Ed.*

98

TO L. B. KAMENEV

24.III.1921

Comrade Kamenev:

Badaich* has earnestly requested me to help them in having the old Yakunchikov estate and the Khodynski farmstead transferred to the M.C.C.**

He argues that they are close to Moscow. This would give Muscovites a vegetable garden and a farm.

He says that the Gubernia Land Department will handle the supplies itself.

Badaich refers to the good experience gained in Petrograd, where a farm was run on model lines.

In principle: the city's interest *should* have an effect on the "diligence". Badayev is right in principle.

Or we could do this: let Badaich have it, and give the Gubernia Land Department a *formal* order: you must *not lag behind* with *your* state farms, and make a comparison in the autumn.

Lenin

P.S. In general, press forward with the vegetable-garden campaign. Should we raise this in the Council of Labour and Defence? To provide the pressure?

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

99

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa:

I have received your note concerning the postponement (membership of the Commission for Utilisation).[90] It is a

* A. Y. Badayev.—*Ed.*

** Moscow Consumers' Commune.—*Ed.*

great pity that you have handed it in *so late* (the day of the sitting). I refuse to lose a week.

The candidates: Kritsman, Smirnov, Holtzmann.

Your candidates, i.e., your list?

Lenin

Written on March 25, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

100

TO A. I. RYKOV

26.III.1921

Comrade Rykov:

This is to remind you of the promise you gave me over the phone yesterday: to ask Glavneft* for a *short* report for me on oil tank cars (the total number of sound tank cars for oil over the entire railway network, *minus* those engaged of necessity on other railways, for instance, from the Volga to Moscow, except the South-Eastern. The difference is the number of tank cars that *can and must* carry oil from Grozny (and Baku) to Moscow. *How many are actually carrying it?*).

It would be good (but not compulsory) to append a draft decision by the C.L.D. concerning the full and correct use of oil tank cars.[91]

When can I have it?

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

101

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa:

By tomorrow noon I need the following data:

1) The quantity of grain (and fodder grain) given to the population

* Central Oil Administration.—*Ed.*

monthly figures 1919-1920
1920-1921

Three columns		
food grain	potatoes	fodder grain

2) The quantity of grain *collected* (by the Commissariat for Food):

net surplus-requisition for grinding 1920-1921 *total* (for the available number of months)

3) The number of gubernias (and assessments for them) which have fulfilled deliveries (1920-1921)

100% for a given month
75% " " "

Tell Senin, or whoever is in charge of this, that I shall have him *arrested* unless I get the figures, *signed by the responsible person*, by noon.

Lenin

P.S. Two other things:

1) Perhaps there have been other collections of grain for "services" apart from the "spade-per-sack" for grinding?

2) Have you any data on the "free" price of *salt* (in terms of *grain*), etc.? (You will recall that I have been asking for this a long time ago.)

Written on March 27, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

102

TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

27.III.1921

Comrade Dzerzhinsky:

Please write for me, or have your secretary write for me, a *short* (10-20 lines) note about the unsuccessful

purchase of 400 (instead of 1,000) poods of accessories for making boots (accessories whose selection was unsatisfactory, wrong).

I need this to issue instructions on what we are to avoid and how. How *similar* mistakes are to be avoided.[92]

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

103
TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY

27/III.

Comrade Preobrazhensky:

The "co-operative" circles, headed by Prokopovich, Kuskova & Co., are said to wish to make this proposal to the government:

> we shall help you to restore the currency, if you allow us to issue bonds secured by our (co-operative) commodity stocks.

This is ridiculous, because it is tantamount to the capitalists' proposal: we shall help you to restore the currency, if you let us have commodity stocks.

But apart from being ridiculous, it emphasises the gist of the matter: we must start *just now*, when the tax in kind and the exchange (for grain) are being introduced, to make systematic preparations to "improve" the currency through the issue of bonds *secured by commodities* (the commodity stocks, the grain stocks, etc.).

There must be no delay over this. This should be thought out, prepared and started, *without waiting* for the settlement of the silver issue.

Have you brought all this up for your commission, and **in** it?[93]

Drop me a couple of lines by 11 a.m. tomorrow (28).

We shall appoint you a member of the Collegium of the *People's Commissariat for Finance*. This will *not* take much time, but *will put you in touch* with the P.C.F.[94]

Give your attention to *Falkner* (him; "her"* brother). Perhaps he will move closer to us and join in the work?

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on March 27, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

104
TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade Rykov:

I have gone over your material on the concession agreement, and am highly indignant.[95]

This is either sabotage or idiocy on the part of Dosser & Co.!

There is a host of useless and ridiculous details (prohibition to light fires, etc.), but *the important things have not been brought out.*

The serious matters have been swamped in bureaucratic litter.

There is no sign of *brains*, thinking *brains*.

What is Lomov doing?

You have wrecked the C.P.C. decision (2/II.1921),[96] requiring the working out of the *main principles within three weeks!!*

These principles must be worked out tomorrow (i.e., 28/III) at all costs, and they should be concise enough to be *telegraphed* to Krasin.

Show them to me *before that.*

I append *my own* draft, a rough and hasty outline: I take the important and the controversial items.[97] I think the rest is less important or indisputable.

Stop the sabotage and do the job *properly*, otherwise I shall fight it out in the C.C.

---

* Maria Smith-Falkner, S. A. Falkner's sister.—*Ed.*

Who is on your "concessions commission"? Its membership: reply before 11 a.m. tomorrow.

Lenin

Written on March 27, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

105

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky:

Have a look at this (it's interesting) and return to me.[98] I am going to speak with Kharkov this very day.

Don't you find the attitudes over the concessions amusing? There's the Baku and Donbas "patriotism".

It is nonetheless highly desirable to let the concessionaires have a quarter of Donbas (+Krivoi Rog).

What do you think?

Lenin

Written on March 28-29, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*
Printed from the original

106

TO A. I. YEMSHANOV*

P.C.R.
The People's Commissar for Railways

29.III.1921

Comrade Yemshanov:

Please let me know who at the P.C.R. is in charge of the allocation of tank cars (for oil) throughout the network and the carriage of oil along the railways.

1) Who is responsible for this?

2) What has the People's Commissariat done precisely in fulfilment of the C.L.D. decision on this matter (15 or 17.XII.1920)?[99]

3) Who adopted and when—and also who cancelled and when—the order attaching oil tank cars to the various railway lines?

4) How are the tank cars distributed throughout the network at this moment?

---

* At the top Lenin wrote: "Type out in three copies, let me sign, and send out."—*Ed.*

If what you say in the last column of the first table ("actually available" *on what date?*) of your "reference-report" (a paper without any date) (received on 29.III) is correct, how do you explain that there are (183+161+22+88+9+493+1,405+194=) *2,555* tank cars on 8 railway lines, although these lines have no "filling targets"?

5) Could I have fuller data on the availability and *operation* of tank cars, with the railway lines under three heads and *totals** for the three groups:

(a) (1) railway lines carrying oil from the Volga

(b) (2) " " " " from the Caucasus (Grozny and Baku)

(c) (3) railway lines *not carrying* oil?

6) Why is the speed of the petroleum trains taken at 6 versts an hour? Are there any *technical* obstacles (which exactly) for reaching the maximum speed (say, of the military trains)? What was our pre-war speed? What is our minimum and maximum speed in actual fact for 1920?

Please let me know which of the foregoing data you can give me right away, and which at the earliest possible date (when exactly?)?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published on January 21, 1931 in the newspaper *Za Industrializatsiyu* No. 21

Printed from the original

107

NOTE TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITH A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

I propose a reply in code by *direct line*

Orjonikidze

We have received a desperate telegram from Narimanov, Buniat-zade and Serebrovsky, stating with good reason that

* How much oil has been carried? monthly figures? number of tank cars?

it is absolutely impossible for the 11th Army to return to stripped and starving Azerbaijan. Take the most vigorous measures to have the Army stay in Georgia, and at all costs speed up the import of grain from abroad in exchange for concessions in Georgia, manganese, etc. Reply at once.

On behalf of Politbureau,
Lenin

Politbureau members voting
for *against*
*Lenin**

Written on March 29, 1921
First published in part in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*
Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

108
TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Code

Orjonikidze

Earnestly request most serious attention to yesterday's question of the Army and concessions in Georgia. The Georgian Menshevik government has concluded a number of concessions. We must try to do our utmost to renew the old concessions and our best to conclude new ones as soon as possible, so as to get foodstuffs in exchange for the concessions. Show this to the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, and let me know their reply quickly.

30/III. *Lenin*

Written on March 30, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

* Others who signed "for" were: M. I. Kalinin, L. B. Kamenev and V. M. Molotov; L. D. Trotsky abstained.—*Ed.*

109

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. I. PETROVSKY AND M. V. FRUNZE

Telephone Message to *Kharkov*
Petrovsky and Frunze

Pyatakov has been strongly requesting my help in getting Sergei Syrtsov from Odessa as a secretary to Donbas. Pyatakov has accused the Ukrainian Communist Party C.C. of unwillingness to let him have Syrtsov only because of factional fears, since Syrtsov is said to be a Trotskyite. Pyatakov declares that both he and Syrtsov promise not to conduct any factional policies. I don't know Syrtsov. Please collect all information and reply to me.

30/III.1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

110

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

I fully agree with you.[100] *Draft* or have someone *draft* such a circular (could it include the whole of Narimanov's speech, or at least its recommendation—this is worse than the whole).

Motion this in the C.C.

It is necessary.

Lenin

Written on March 31, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

111

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN

Code

Krasin

I also fear that we shall spend the whole of our small gold stock on food or on trade, with nothing to show for it.

You are responsible for the economies. It is absolutely necessary to improve the condition of the workers and peasants. We must speedily obtain a definite stock of goods from abroad to exchange for grain; this is a political necessity; work on these lines and keep me informed.

Lenin

Written in March 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

112
TO A. P. SEREBROVSKY

2.IV.1921

Comrade Serebrovsky:

I am sending you some material on the oil concessions. I wanted to send it along with Comrade Kaminsky, but unfortunately, because of his grave illness, he had to be given treatment over here.

It is extremely important for the Baku comrades to adopt the *correct* view of the concessions (a view approved by the Tenth Party Congress, i.e., *binding* on all Party members). It is highly desirable to let the concessionaires have a quarter of Baku (or perhaps two-quarters) (on condition of assistance from abroad both in foodstuffs and equipment, *over and above* the concessionaires' own requirements*). *Only* then is there any hope of using the other three-quarters (or two-quarters) *to catch up with* (and then to forge ahead of) modern advanced capitalism. Any other view boils down to the most harmful attitude of a "walk-over", "we'll manage on our own", and other such-like rubbish which presents an increasingly greater danger the more it is clad in "purely communist" attire.

* I had a telegram from Krasin yesterday in reply to the draft concession terms sent to him: "acceptable in the main." Krasin, let me add, *has a knowledge* of this business not from communist pamphlets!

Write me at once if there are still any traces (even the slightest) of these most harmful views and prejudices in Baku (among the workers and among the intellectuals): do you undertake to dispel these prejudices yourself and secure the *most loyal* implementation of the congress decision (for the concessions) or do you need my help? Make sure that you and everyone else realise that "the concessions are extremely desirable. There is nothing more harmful or fatal for communism than communist boasting—we'll manage on our own".

Now that we have Batum, we must do our utmost to arrange the speediest possible exchange of oil and kerosene for equipment abroad.

For this the Baku district needs some independence. If you do not have it, telegraph precisely, we shall let you have it.[101]

Formulate precise proposals—send them over to the C.L.D. by telegram and letter. There is need for a regional economic centre, responsible for Baku+Batum, etc., and conducting operations independently, swiftly, without red tape.

We cannot help you from over here, we are poor ourselves. You must help us by buying everything necessary from abroad in exchange for oil and oil products.

Awaiting your reply: a short one by telegram ("letter of 2/IV received, prejudices over concessions exist, hard (or easy) to overcome, concerning exchange of goods with foreign countries and the regional centre, will do or are-doing so-and-so") and give details, by mail.

There is an urgent necessity for *correct contacts with the C.L.D.*; that is the main thing.

Another question: is there a correct approach in Baku to the question of oil from the standpoint of co-ordinating the various aspects of the national economy? After all, the territory is very rich: forests, fertile land (given the irrigation), etc. We are pumping water (with oil) but not using the water for irrigation, which would yield great crops of hay, rice, cotton? Not making use of the "north wind" to run windmills? But, of course, foodstuffs and irrigation are the main things. Is it possible to develop

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

the oil industry without developing irrigation and farming around Baku? Is anyone thinking about this and working on it properly? What about the English irrigation plan?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Sent to Baku

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

113

TO V. V. SCHMIDT, L. D. TROTSKY, A. D. TSYURUPA, A. I. RYKOV, M. P. TOMSKY, A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV

2.IV.1921

Comrade Schmidt, People's Commissar for Labour
Trotsky, People's Commissar for Defence
Tsyurupa, People's Commissar for Food
Rykov, Supreme Economic Council
Tomsky, All-Russia Central Trade Union Council
Comrade Shlyapnikov, the initiator of the present proposal

I request you to call a conference of the afore-mentioned People's Commissars (+ Chairman of the All-Russia Central T.U.C.) or persons specially authorised by them to deal with this question of

improving the factories and plants through a reduction in the number of mouths and workers (from among peasants, mobilised armymen, etc.) unproductively listed at the factories; for a definite period, the old quantity of foodstuffs should be made available to each enterprise in order to increase labour productivity.

The conference should end its deliberations as soon as possible, namely: it is desirable to place the matter before the C.C. Politbureau on Tuesday morning (by noon), 5/IV. 1921.

The convocation is up to Comrade Schmidt.[102]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

114
TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

Code

Orjonikidze

Your reply is neither full nor clear.[103] Please find out the details from the Georgian Revolutionary Committee. First, has the Soviet Government of Georgia confirmed the concession on the Tkvarcheli mines to the Italians, when, on what terms, reply briefly by telegram, details by letter? Second, about the Chiatura manganese mines: have the German owners been transferred to the status of lessees or concessionaires, when, on what terms. It is extremely important to have the speediest decisions on these and similar other matters. This is of tremendous importance both for Georgia and for Russia, because the concessions, especially to Italy and Germany, are absolutely necessary, as is the exchange of goods for oil, on a large scale with these countries, and subsequently, with others as well.

Please, keep me informed about the measures taken by the Georgian Revolutionary Committee.

5/IV. 1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

115
TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade Rykov, Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council

Please urgently settle the following Gidrotorf questions:

1. About bonuses in kind for factories making equipment for Gidrotorf (see Gidrotorf letter to the S.E.C. Presidium No. 1252 of 26/III);

2. On granting to Gidrotorf the right to appoint a contractor for preparatory work for Gidrotorf's establishment at the Electroperedacha Station, as has already been

sanctioned by the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence for the Electroperedacha Station (see Gidrotorf letter to the S.E.C. Presidium No. 1329 of 31/III);

3. About Gidrotorf's complaint against the decision by the Commission for supplying foodstuffs to responsible S.E.C. workers of 22/III, under which the 100 rations allowed to Gidrotorf by the People's Commissariat for Food for Gidrotorf's responsible workers were reduced by 27 rations (see Gidrotorf letter to the S.E.C. Presidium No. 1347 of 31/III);

in such a manner that, if required, they could be brought up at the Council of Labour and Defence at its April 6 sitting.[104]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 5, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

116
TO A. I. RYKOV

To Comrade Rykov, Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council
Copy: *People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade*
Copy: *People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs*
Copy: *All-Russia Extraordinary Commission*
Copy: *Central Peat Administration* (*Glavtorf*)

Comrade *Radchenko* requests:

1) arrangements for a trip on behalf of Glavtorf by 10 staff members (with warranties from Comrade *Radchenko* and Comrade *Smilga*) to study peat extraction in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Canada;

2) allocation of the necessary amount of money for this purpose;

3) organisation of the trip in such a way that three persons should leave by May 1, and the rest by June 1.

Please, have this business set in motion urgently, but

put Glavtorf under an obligation to submit a detailed report of the work done, after the trip is over.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. I insist on the need for the utmost speed in this business, and be sure to inform me of the *actual* fulfilment.

*Lenin**

Written on April 6, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

117
TO A. M. LEZHAVA

Comrade *Lezhava*, *People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade*
Copy: *Central Peat Administration*

Reaffirm instructions to our representatives in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Britain to make immediate purchases of the latest** literature on the peat industry, and also all new publications, and to send it through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to Glavtorf addresses only.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 6, 1921

First published on November 24, 1963 in *Pravda* No. 328

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

118
TO D. I. ULYANOV

Dmitry Ilyich Ulyanov:

Gubkin (Glavneft) and Lomov (member of S.E.C. Presidium) ask me to support their request, which I hereby do:

---

* The P.S. is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*
** The word "latest" is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

Help geologist *Mushketov* (Director of the Petrograd Mining Institute) to get his mother back from the Crimea, where she is in great distress.

If necessary, telegraph to me, and I will send another telegram from here, as required.

Greetings,
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on April 6, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten copy

119
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev:

I send this for your information. I have not read it myself.[105]

NB: We have been **too** hasty, hasty to no purpose with the law on bonuses in kind in the form of factory products for exchange.[106] Mark my word: haste is harmful *in this matter*, and will lead to no good.

All possible **delays** and **limitations** of this measure could *still* and *should* be put through.

Otherwise, you will be very sorry (and you yourself, above all, because the workers will curse *you* for the "fraud").

Yours,
Lenin

Written in April, after the 6th, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

120
TELEGRAM TO V. V. VOROVSKY

Code

Vorovsky

I shall have to look into the affairs of the Italian socialists, but I still have no time to read everything. Please have the most important documents, in the original, of

all the parties put together, especially about the Turati people, and let me have them before the middle of May. Verify this personally.

Lenin

Written on April 8, 1921
Sent to Rome

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

121

TELEGRAM
TO THE YAKUTSK CONFERENCE OF THE POOR[107]

Presidium of the Conference of the Poor,
Yakutsk

Comrade Lenin has asked me to convey his greetings to your conference. Comrade Lenin expresses the hope that the **toiling masses** [the poor] of Yakutia liberated from the tsarist oppression, and who are being emancipated from enslavement by the toyons,[108] will awaken, and with the help of the Russian workers and peasants will take the way of [communism] **full consolidation of the power of the working people themselves**.

*Ammosov**
Member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

I agree with the indicated corrections.**

Lenin

Written on April 9 or 10, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the text
in M. K. Ammosov's hand
with Lenin's corrections
and additions

122

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

Unless my memory fails me, I believe the newspapers carried a C.C. letter or circular about May Day, which

* Below that the following had been written by Lydia Fotieva and crossed out by Lenin: "Ammosov requests permission to send this telegram."—*Ed.*

** Lenin's corrections are in heavy Roman type.—*Ed.*

said: *expose the falsehood of religion*, or something to that effect.

That is not right. It is tactless. Just because it is the Easter holiday, we should recommend something *quite different*:

not to expose the falsehood,

but *absolutely to avoid any affront to religion.*

We should issue an additional letter or circular.[109] If the Secretariat does not agree, then in the Politbureau.

Lenin

Written between April 9 or 21, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

123
TO L. B. KAMENEV

14/IV.

Comrade Kamenev:

It is said that within three or four months the workers will demand the lifting of free trading. We do not want, they say, to see the bureaucrats eat buns.

Perhaps, we should take measures in advance:

1) at once press forward to the utmost with holiday homes. Increase their number during the summer and the autumn. Later, we shall also sometimes buy "buns" for the "holiday-makers" by turns;

2) think about other ways of taking *turns* in purchasing gifts for children or those awarded bonuses.

But the first thing is more important. Write me what you think and what is being done.

3) At Ivanovo-Voznesensk we should set up a *Sverdlov University* for 1,000-1,500 persons. Don't forget.

Salut! *Lenin*

Written on April 14, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

124
TO G. L. PYATAKOV

14/IV.

Comrade Pyatakov:

I am sending you (*secretly* and not for the press, by any means) material on the concessions. This is an answer to your questions.

You will see how we are conducting the concessions policy.

Concerning the Donbas we are *awaiting* the results of your work. I took the plus 10 per cent to mean *over and above 600* million, as a programme,[110] and not "over and above"... the earlier figure!

"If I had the grain, I would...." Aren't you ashamed to repeat these clichés? Of course, if someone *gave* it to you....

No, sir, you will have to hustle and get everything *yourself*: the salt, and grain *for the salt*, etc.

We need initiative, drive, local commerce, and not begging: if someone gave it to me.... Shame!

Salut! *Lenin*

Written on April 14, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

125
TO M. F. VLADIMIRSKY

Comrade Vladimirsky,
Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs

I enclose herewith a petition to me from the citizens of the village of Golovniki, Zaborovskaya Volost, Peremyshl Uyezd, Kaluga Gubernia, and the decision of Zaborovskaya Village of the same volost.

I propose that the whole case should be investigated, the situation cleared up on the spot, the guilty persons brought to book, steps taken to remove the worthless persons from office, and real assistance held out to the peasants of the afore-mentioned village.[111]

Inform me of the results through C.P.C. business manager Comrade *Gorbunov*.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 14, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

126

TELEGRAM TO M. I. FRUMKIN AND A. G. BELOBORODOV

Direct Line

Frumkin, Authorised Representative
of the People's Commissariat for Food.
Beloborodov, Labour Army Council
Rostov

Despite your No. 4960/R, the centre continues to receive information from various sources: from Orjonikidze in Tiflis, from Musabekov, Azerbaijan People's Commissar for Food in Baku, concerning inadequacy of the measures taken to supply Baku with foodstuffs, which threatens further complications. Put this question up for special discussion by Labour Army Council. Take resolute measures to supply Baku and simultaneously Georgia and Armenia, and, in accordance with No. 293, keep the centre regularly informed of actual supply measures. Reply immediately by telegram.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

April 15, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

* The last sentence is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

127
TO A. D. TSYURUPA[112]

Comrade Tsyurupa:

I think we should give him a reprimand. This is sheer whimpering and excuses. Before the decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee he should have called up by direct-line (and right away, in March, but not in April). Instead of whimpering, he should have requested the special All-Russia Central Executive Committee decision in good time. He is a silly whimpering old woman.

Lenin

Written on April 15, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

128
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

I have just learned from Rykov that the professors (of Moscow Higher Technical College) *do not yet know* about (yesterday's) decision.[113]

This is outrageous, and monstrously late. I shall raise the question of the C.C. apparatus in the Politbureau. **We can't have that sort of thing,** no indeed.

The draft statement by Lunacharsky *was ready* yesterday.[114] It should have been *made public* the same day.

You must give orders at once for everything to be done, and to *check up* whether it has been.

You must verify and spur things on.

Delay is intolerable.

Lenin

Written on April 15, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

129
TO CLARA ZETKIN AND PAUL LEVI*

16.4.1921.

Comrades Zetkin and Levi:

Thank you very much for your letters, dear Friends. Unfortunately, I have been so busy and so overworked in the last few weeks that I have had practically no opportunity to read the German press. The only thing I have seen is the Open Letter,[115] which I think is *perfectly correct* tactics (I have condemned the contrary opinion of our "Lefts" who were opposed to this letter). As for the recent strike movement and the action in Germany, I have read absolutely nothing about it.[116] I readily believe that the representative of the Executive Committee defended the silly tactics, which were too much to the left—to take immediate action "to help the Russians": this representative is very often too Left.[117] I think that in such cases you should not give in but should protest and immediately bring up this question officially at a plenary meeting of the Executive Bureau.

I consider your tactics in respect of Serrati erroneous. Any defence or even semi-defence of Serrati was a mistake. But to withdraw from the Central Committee!!?? That, in any case, was the biggest mistake! If we tolerate the practice of responsible members of the Central Committee withdrawing from it when they are left in a minority, the Communist Parties will never develop normally or become strong.[118] Instead of withdrawing, it would have been better to discuss the controversial question several times *jointly* with the Executive Committee. Now, Comrade Levi wants to write a pamphlet, i.e., to deepen the contradiction! What is the use of all this?? I am convinced that it is a big mistake.[119]

Why not wait? The congress opens here on June 1.[120] Why not have a private discussion here, *before* the congress?

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* On the copy, Lenin made the following remarks: "This is my reply to Levi and Zetkin, 16/4, 1921", "Keep in the archives. Make another *2* or *3 copies*", "**Return**", "received 17/V—1921".—*Ed.*

Without public polemics, without withdrawals, without pamphlets on differences. We are so short of tried and tested forces that I am really indignant when I hear comrades announcing their withdrawal, etc. There is need to do everything possible and a few things that are impossible to avoid withdrawals and aggravation of differences at all costs .

Our position in February and March was grave. This is a peasant country, with a peasant economy—the vast majority of the population. They vacillate, they are ruined and are disgruntled. But we should not be too pessimistic. We have made some timely concessions. And I am sure that we shall win.

Best regards and wishes.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1958
in the magazine
World Marxist Review No. 2

Printed from a typewritten copy
with Lenin's remarks
Translated from the German

130
TO V. M. MOLOTOV[121]

To Comrade *Molotov*:

Let all members of the Politbureau read this. We must raise it in the Politbureau. I think we should let *them* know the regulations and ask for *their* amendments. This is very important.

17/IV. *Lenin*

Written on April 17, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

131
TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

According to available information, the Georgian State Bank with full staffs of qualified employees and with deposits from foreign missions has remained in Georgia. If

this is true, the Bank should be maintained as a credit apparatus for foreign trade, and it should perhaps be turned into a bank for the whole Transcaucasus in view of the projected economic integration of the Transcaucasian republics.

There is fierce agitation against the R.S.F.S.R. abroad over the Sovietisation of Georgia, especially by Martov, Tsereteli and others. The Georgian Revolutionary Committee must start serious counter-agitation, which should note, first, the R.S.F.S.R.'s peace-making role, second, the active initiative by the Georgian workers, peasants and army masses, who overthrew the Georgian bourgeois government, and, third, the role of the Azerbaijan and Armenian Soviet governments, who gave support to the Armenian, Tatar and Georgian insurgents by way of self-defence against the aggressive steps taken by the Georgian bourgeois government, which set up an Azerbaijan and an Armenian bourgeois government at Tiflis for the purpose of subverting the Soviet regime in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Make thorough collection of material against the Menshevik Georgian government and bring it along to Moscow for the plenary meeting.

Lenin

Written on April 18, 1921
Sent to Erivan

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a copy
in Nadezhda Alliluyeva's hand

132

NOTE TO N. P. GORBUNOV AND REMARKS ON A. M. NIKOLAYEV'S LETTER

Comrade Gorbunov:

Help to improve this, and when it is brought up to ×, let me know.

Lenin

...A new photoelement has been invented which, coupled with an amplifier valve, makes it possible at some distance (20-30 metres) to record the emanation of radio (oscillation) energy. With the action of this photoelement, an amplifying device directed at a (black or white) object will throw its reflection on a screen with the aid of a

receiving radio station. With an improved instrument, the following results could be achieved: 1) with a radio telephone, a moving image of a speaking person could be seen on the screen, 2) an enemy squadron, moving hundreds of versts away, could be reflected on the screen.

...The invention has been made by a *Russian* engineer, Mikhail Alexandrovich Bonch-Bruyevich.

With comradely greetings,

A. Nikolayev

Written on April 18, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

133

TO J. V. STALIN[122]

Comrade Stalin:

I object to Fomin. We mustn't do it the "Russian way". We must do it the "Georgian" way.

We shall take it to the Politbureau.

Lenin

Written on April 18 or 19, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

134

TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY

19/IV.

Comrade Preobrazhensky:

Some of your remarks today show that you think the Politbureau decision on the professors to be a mistake.[123]

I'm afraid there is here some misunderstanding. I'm afraid you have not interpreted the decision precisely.

I quite allow that Kalinnikov (that's his name, isn't it?) is a reactionary. There are also, unquestionably, malicious Cadets[124] among them. But they should be exposed *in a different way*. And exposed they should be on concrete occasions. Give such an assignment to Kozmin (but he is not too clever: watch your step with him): come up with an exposure over a precise fact, act or statement. Then we

can put him in jail for a month, or a year. That will be a lesson to him.

The same applies to a malicious Cadet.

The same, if class enemies have slandered Ignatov (? that's his name, isn't it? I do not know him).

We must prepare the material, verify it, expose the culprits and condemn them *in the full view of all*, and impose exemplary punishment.

The military specialist is caught out on treason. But the military specialists have all been recruited, and are working. Lunacharsky and Pokrovsky don't know how to "*catch out*" their own specialists and, being dissatisfied with themselves, are taking it out of everybody else.

That is Pokrovsky's mistake. In fact, you and I may not have all that many differences.

The worst thing about the People's Commissariat for Education is the lack of system, of self-control. Their communist cells are also shockingly "lax".

The people over at the P.C.E. have still to learn how to work out *methods* of "catching out" their specialists and *punishing* them, and of catching out and training the communist cells.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on April 19, 1921

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

135

TO N. A. SEMASHKO

19.IV.1921

Comrade Semashko or, in his absence, his acting deputy, People's Commissariat for Public Health

Please let me know whether any cases of cholera or other infectious diseases have occurred in Moscow recently (especially in the last few days);

how many (if any);

what increase over earlier figures;

what measures of sanitary city cleaning or other sanitary measures have been decided upon (if any such decisions have been taken), and which have been carried out.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

136
TO Y. YAROSLAVSKY[125]

I think we *must* have both. It will be useful because they will be propounding Marxism (if they start agitating for Menshevism, we shall catch them out: *we must keep an eye on them*).

Both should be recruited for working out a *most detailed programme* (and an *outline* of lectures) on philosophy, and a plan for *publications* on philosophy.

Lenin

Written in April,
not before the 20th, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

137
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE ALL-RUSSIA EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION

P.C.F.A.
All-Russia Cheka

I have been informed that the trip abroad by Grigory Semyonovich *Petrov*, a chemist and an inventor, is being impeded.

Petrov has a mandate from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, signed by Voikov, dated 29/III-1921, No. 1554 (A) 012.

There is a decision by the committee for assessing inventions of 9/II-1921, awarding Petrov a prize of 15 million rubles, etc. (signed by Mikhailovsky).

I request the P.C.F.A. and the All-Russia Cheka to issue instructions to let him go abroad at once. If there are any obstacles to this, please inform me right away.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 22, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from
a typewritten copy

138

TO N. L. SHPEKTOROV, P. L. VOIKOV, A. Z. HOLTZMANN, L. N. KRITSMAN AND V. G. GROMAN

I hereby issue a severe reprimand to the following persons, warning them that if this happens again the offenders will be prosecuted:

Comrades *Shpektorov* (People's Commissariat for Defence), *Voikov* (People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade), *Holtzmann* (All-Russia Central T.U.C.) for failing to attend the sitting of the C.L.D. Commission at 10 a.m. on April 23, a sitting of which they had been notified, personally or by telephone calls from the C.P.C. Secretariat, before 10 p.m. on 22/IV,

and also to Comrade Kritsman, to whom the notification was conveyed through Comrade Holtzmann,

and to *Groman*, Chairman of the Transport and Material Department, for failing to arrange for a duty roster in his Department, by reason of which it had been impossible to notify him of the Commission sitting.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 23, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

139

TO M. F. VLADIMIRSKY, A. M. LEZHAVA AND V. P. MILYUTIN

23.IV.1921

Comrades Vladimirsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs
Lezhava, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade
and Milyutin, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council

Enclosing herewith the two drafts submitted by the Executive Committee of the Karelian Labour Commune, I request you to organise, with the participation of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Karelian Labour Commune, Comrade Gylling, a conference to study and co-ordinate these drafts, summoning representatives of other departments concerned, so as to place the two final drafts before the C.P.C. on Tuesday, 26.IV.1921.

I entirely support both drafts in principle.[126]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

140

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

24/IV.

Comrade Zinoviev:

In view of the extremely unsatisfactory quality of the "specimen copy" of the *Atlas of Russia* (although it has taken many months to prepare), please let me know the names of *all* those responsible for the work, those who had been doing it before and are doing it now. Here is a short list of the defects.

I received a "specimen copy" of the *Atlas of Russia* yesterday. (The First State Cartographic Establishment, former owner Ilyin.)

The *Atlas of Russia* should and must become a school atlas.

But this calls for a number of corrections and additions, because the specimen copy is highly unsatisfactory.

I list the main defects, requiring unconditional correction.

1. There is no text "from the publisher" (there used to be one before). Such a text should be written, saying that on the model of "Railways", the present school atlas has been compiled in accordance with such-and-such a plan.

2. The maps are not numbered, and there are no symbols (they were there before). These should be added. The maps should not be by railways or *not only* by railways, but by *gubernias* as well. The numeration of the maps should contain a list of the gubernias included *in full*. And the gubernias entered in the list should be given on the map *in full*.

Map No. 1 does not contain gubernias in full: Petrograd, Pskov and others. Cherepovets and other gubernias are not designated.

There are similar defects in the other maps. Correct this.

3. The boundaries of the republics (the Ukraine) and the autonomous regions should be specifically shown. This has mostly not been done. Neither for the Ukraine, nor for Byelorussia. (The German Commune? Mari Region? All the Caucasian republics?)

4. The railway lines have not been verified for a given date (say, 1.I.1921). Their indication is incorrect. The finished lines are not specified. The ones under construction are not shown. Correct this.

5. Every map should have a small explanatory text (on the other side or as an inset): state boundaries under such-and-such a treaty (when approved and ratified). Autonomous regions established on *such-and-such* a date. The population of the gubernias and the chief cities, in accordance with the census of August 1920. *Etc*.

6. On account of a ludicrous oversight, the old numeration

of the maps has been taken, i.e., left: No. X—Moscow, No. XII—the Crimea, and others!! There should be a new numeration.

7. Neither the *Tatar* Republic nor the *Bashkirian* Republic are given in full in No. XIV. They should be given in full. The same applies to *all* autonomous regions. The *national* make-up of the autonomous regions should be given according to the latest data (in the explanatory text).

8. Of the old maps these have been omitted:

Saratov and the surrounding gubernias
Simbirsk, Penza and the surrounding gubernias
Rostov-on-Don and the surrounding gubernias
Smolensk and the surrounding gubernias (Byelorussia)
The Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper
The Caucasus (the boundaries of all the new republics must be shown without fail).

The Atlas must be a full one. *All the gubernias* should be there. An incomplete atlas is of no use at all, and the specimen copy is outrageously incomplete.

9. Instead of additions (in bold type) below and in the margin: the distance by rail (this is taken from the old atlas)—there should be short distances *not* only by rail.

10. Add: a map with the plan for electrification (from the book *Plan for Electrification Submitted to the Eighth Congress of Soviets*).

11. Add a map of institutions of higher learning (universities, etc.) and educational establishments by gubernias (at least on the strength of the information already available).

12. Add: a map of radio stations.

13. Historical maps (the two new ones at the end) are no good. Incomplete. They contain mistakes. Instead of these two, there should be:

(a) one of the *same* size: *a historical map of Soviet Russia.*

Front lines by date (for instance: V.1918; XII.1918; V or VI.1919; XI or XII.1919; I and XI. 1920) with these remarks: the names of the fronts on the given date.

The state boundary of the whole of the R.S.F.S.R. and of *all* the neighbouring republics (which had been within the empire).

(b) A map of the *whole* of the R.S.F.S.R. with Siberia, even if of small size, on one map.*

24.IV.1921. *N. Lenin*

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

141
TO I. A. TEODOROVICH[127]

25.IV.1921

Comrade Teodorovich

{Copies: Bryukhanov, People's Commissariat for Food
Milyutin, Supreme Economic Council

In view of the extreme urgency of the question of measures to combat the drought, please at once call a conference of representatives of the People's Commissariats concerned, so as to have a draft decree tabled, in elaborated and agreed form, at the Council of Labour and Defence not later than Wednesday, 27.IV.1921.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

142
TO J. S. HANECKI

25/IV.1921.

Comrade Hanecki:

Two of my secretaries are going to see you in Riga:
1) Anna Petrovna Kizas and
2) Natalya Stepanovna Lepeshinskaya.

I have worked with both for several years. They are remarkably loyal. Working for me has been hard labour.

* On the publication of the school atlas, see also V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, Document 283; Vol. 44, Documents 650, 673; Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 52, Document 410, present volume, Document 223, *Lenin Miscellanies XX*, pp. 321-22, and *XXXVI*, pp. 120-21; 315, 399-400.—*Ed.*

No rest or holiday. They are quite tired out. They must be given a rest. Please, pay them their salary in advance (and give them more) and then don't make them work. Give them a chance to rest, see the doctor and *have some. wholesome food.*

Greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

First published on February 13, 1924 in *Pravda* No. 35

Printed from the original

143

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV, L. N. KRITSMAN, M. P. TOMSKY AND A. I. POTYAEV

26.IV.1921

Comrades Bryukhanov
Kritsman
Tomsky or his deputy (Andreyev?)
Potyaev

In view of the urgent question of promoting the fisheries campaign, I request you to call today, if possible at once, a conference to discuss the proposals of Comrade Potyaev (Glavryba*) and with his participation. The composition of the conference: People's Commissariat for Food, Commission for Utilisation, All-Russia Central T.U.C. and Comrade Potyaev. Report in C.P.C. today.[128]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

144

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

26.IV.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

I must call your attention to the extreme disorder in our office. The attached telephone message shows that it

* Central Administration of the Fishing Industry.—*Ed.*

was sent out on 24/IV (hour?)
and received at 11.25 on 25.IV.
(i.e., the telephone message *took* 11 hours *to arrive*!)
I received it
at 12.00 on 26/IV.
This is most outrageous!

I propose that you should conduct right away a full and thorough investigation to find out who is to blame, and give me the facts. The office routine should be reviewed and renewed.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

145
TO A. M. LEZHAVA

Comrade Lezhava:

Georgia is of exceptional importance as a *cover* for *Russia*'s foreign trade. This is convenient also for Italy, and *Germany*, and *America*.

1) Find a *brainy* fellow to be sent there on behalf of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Do it as fast as you can!

2) Have a more detailed talk about this with Stalin. Do this today.

3) Drop me a couple of lines on the results.

We need a plan (and a fund) for foreign trade via Batum.

You have no foreign trade plan. You are allowing a lot of waste and letting others do the same. I am going to fight you.

Here's your *line*: *not a kopek more* for foodstuffs or for fuel in 1921. Draw up a plan on this line, and do not succumb to "pressures" or "influences".

Lenin

Written in April,
before the 28, 1921

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

146
TO L. D. TROTSKY

30/IV.

Comrade Trotsky:

I have read Shatunovsky's pamphlet, *White Coal and Revolutionary Petrograd*.[129]

Very weak. Nothing but *rhetoric*. Not the *least bit* of sound matter.

The only business-like hint is on page 15:

"Outstanding hydraulics specialists believe it will take no more than eight months to see the real fruits of this great endeavour."

Who is a specialist? We have none (I have asked Krzhizhanovsky: there are none). Shatunovsky has undertaken to write of what he knows nothing about (that's Krzhizhanovsky's assessment). *Apart* from this *unsubstantiated* remark, there's *nil* in the whole pamphlet.

Let Shatunovsky give proof and set out *business* proposals. Otherwise, the idle talk remains what it is.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on April 30, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

147
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV[130]

Comrade Zinoviev:

This shows that Trotsky is in a highly scrappy mood. Shatunovsky's pamphlet is pure twaddle. Return this to me with a note about your *decisions* and plans on this matter.[131]

3/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 3, 1921
Sent to Petrograd
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

148
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev:

I have been informed that

1) Gintsburg, the sculptor working on Plekhanov's bust, is in need of *materials*, clay, etc.;

2) the graves of Plekhanov and Zasulich are neglected.

Could you issue orders on both points to have the things seen to, pressed forward and verified?[132]

Salut!

5/V. Lenin

Written on May 5, 1921
Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

149
TELEGRAM TO K. Y. VOROSHILOV*

Code

Voroshilov

I request you to issue orders to the command personnel of the Mounted Army and check up specially that during the Mounted Army's march all-round assistance should be given to local food supply bodies, in view of the need for urgent and swift assistance in grain to Moscow.[133]

Lenin

Written on May 5, 1921
Sent to Yekaterlnoslav

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

150
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Aren't you ashamed to vote for printing 5,000 copies of Mayakovsky's "150,000,000"?

It is nonsense, stupidity, double-dyed stupidity and affectation.[134]

---

*At the top, Lenin wrote: "Comrade Sklyansky: Please, have this sent in code and returned to me. 5/V. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

I believe such things should be published one in ten, and *not more than 1,500 copies*, for libraries and cranks.

As for Lunacharsky, he should be flogged for his futurism.

6/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 6, 1921
First published in 1957 in *Kommunist* No. 18

Printed from the original

151
TO M. N. POKROVSKY

Comrade Pokrovsky:

Again and again, I request you to help us fight futurism, etc.

1) Lunacharsky has (alas!) got through the collegium the printing of Mayakovsky's "150,000,000".

Can't we stop this? It must be stopped. Let's agree that these futurists are to be published not more than twice a year *and not more than 1,500 copies*.

2) They say that Lunacharsky has once again driven out Kiselis, who is reputed to be a "*realist*" artist, while directly and *indirectly* promoting a futurist.

Could you find some reliable *anti*-futurists?

Lenin

Written on May 6, 1921
First published in 1957 in *Kommunist* No. 18

Printed from the original

152
TO I. G. ALEXANDROV

Find an engineer in Gosplan* who would be not only reliable, but also a *practitioner*, for the commission to carry out an on-the-spot inquiry of Algemba,[135]

so as to make a sound evaluation of *the main points*: *protection of materials* (in different conditions)

* The State Planning Commission.—*Ed.*

α) stop construction,
β) " not at once but by the autumn,
γ) switch from shock to ordinary site,
δ) complete construction, but *do not lay rails*, etc.

Written on May 6, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52
Printed from the original

153
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

I think this should go to the press, *but* **only** with a commentary in any case, which should be very *subtle*, otherwise our editors will make a hash of things. Either write such a *commentary* yourself, or get someone else to do it, but with your supervision.[136]

Lenin

Written between May 6 and 10, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

154
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I should like to draw your attention to Belyakov's article on the Narofominsk Textile Mill[137] (in *Izvestia*? or *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*? the other day). Collect all earlier polemics on this. *Go into it. Study* the facts. Let me know the results.

This seems to be an important business.

Greetings,
Lenin

Written in May, after the 6th, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

155
TO L. B. KRASIN

Comrade Krasin:

Give this your particular attention. I wonder whether Klyshko is talkative? A diplomatist should know how to hold his tongue, and speak in such a way as to say nothing. Does Klyshko know how? Does he understand this?[138]

9/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 9, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

156
TO L. B. KRASIN

You deserve a beating.

1) You are late with the grain order. We are in a pretty horrible position.

2) You have failed to make use of all the sources (Sweden, etc., even if only *for small* quantities).

3) There is no precise information: what can be obtained *nearby*, even at a very high price, and in very small quantities.

Make a *special* point of putting all this right at the People's Commissariat.[139]

Written not later than May 10, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

157
TELEGRAM TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

Code

Sovgovdel, London

The warrant for two million poods of grain issued to you must be started on at once. Buy the nearest even if small consignments wherever you can, without stinting the

price. You are free to buy any other food products and tinned stuffs under this warrant. Can anything be received from Canada right away? You may pay a moderate bonus for speedy delivery at Baltic ports. May 10.[140]

*Lenin**
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 10, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

158
ASSIGNMENT TO C.P.C. SECRETARY[141]

Enter on C.P.C. agenda, sending a copy to Bryukhanov *at once* (if he has not yet got it) *or giving him* **this** *copy until tonight*—to obtain his opinion. We must rob the others but *give these what they ask*.

10/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 10, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

159
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

Do you know whether at any time there has arisen the question of setting apart from among the membership of the R.C.P.

those of them who *do not take part* in administration, hold *no* command, administrative, government in general, trade union, co-operative posts, *no* posts at all,

* The telegram was also signed by L. B. Krasin, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.—*Ed.*

i.e., that section of the R.C.P. membership which is engaged *exclusively* in ideological work, agitation and propaganda, **outside** of any administrative posts.

Could this be done? Should not this be done?

The fact is that the Party suffers terribly from the abominable sh.. of our administrative apparatus. Perhaps, we should keep them apart in any voting *or count* the votes *separately*?[142]

Lenin

Written on May 10, 1921

First published in 1924 in the book, V. M. Molotov, *Partiya i leninskii prizyv* (The Party and the Lenin Enrolment), Moscow

Printed from the original

160
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

11/V.

Comrade Bryukhanov:

I am sending you the coded message.[143] Read it carefully, make a note of the figures and return to me.

You will have to draw up a *precise plan* of use, i.e., allocation of imported products from May 15 to June 15.

St. Petersburg and Moscow at the top of the list.

This plan should be reviewed after every cable of any *sizable* purchases.

Send me the first such plan.

Fish, *as follows*.

French beans (have you decided?), *as follows*.

Wheat, as follows.

Think about what could go *into the press* by way of reassurance.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on May 11, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

161
TO D. I. KURSKY

Top secret

Comrade Kursky, People's Commissariat for Justice

A petition No. 8086, dated 10.V.1921, enclosed in copy, has been received at the C.L.D. from the representative extraordinary for the supply of the Red Army and Navy, revealing strictly confidential information on the numerical strength of the Army. With a better choice of wording, the petition could have avoided giving information on the numerical strength of the Army. Besides, the correspondence did not arrive in a secret envelope or by messenger but was sent by post. As a result it was opened at the in-register of the managing department, and could have been made public in transit through the post.

Please conduct an inquiry.[144]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 12, 1921

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten copy signed by Lenin

162
TO M. I. KALININ

I fully support Osinsky's draft and request you to prepare your opinion for the Politbureau on Saturday, so as to have it go through the C.P.C. on Tuesday, and through the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on Wednesday.[145]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written in May, before the 14th, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a typewritten copy

163
TO Y. A. LITKENS

17.V.1921.

Comrade Litkens:

In view of the appointment of a "New broom" to *Tsentropechat*,*[146] an effort should be made to establish *precise administrative responsibilities*:

1) lay down most precisely in writing the responsibilities of the *head* of Tsentropechat and the *gubernia heads*,

2) ditto, in respect of the library network:
   (a) general state (Public and Rumyantsev) libraries
   (b) gubernia
   (c) uyezd
   (d) *volost libraries* (unless it is too early, unless you have decided to confine yourself to uyezd libraries for the time being)...

3) you (and we) must be *absolutely* sure *whom* we are to jail (both from Tsentropechat and the *library network*; from *both* institutions without fail), if within *one month* (2 weeks? 6 weeks?) after the publication of *every* Soviet book it is not available at *every library*. Send me a **short** report on this.

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

164
TO M. V. FRUNZE

Comrade Frunze

Copies to Comrades Petrovsky and Rakovsky and the Ukrainian C.P. C.C.[147]

18.V.1921

Comrade Bukharin says the crop in the south is excellent.

---

* Central Press Distribution Agency.—*Ed.*

The *main question for the whole* of Soviet power, a life-and-death question for us, is to collect 200-300 million poods in the Ukraine.

The main requirement for this is salt. Everything should be taken over, all the areas of extraction should be ringed with a triple cordon of troops, not a pound should be let through or allowed to be stolen.

This is a matter of life and death.

Put this on a military footing. Appoint persons specifically responsible for each operation. Let me have a list of them (everything through the Central Salt Administration).

You are the Commander-in-Chief of salt.

The responsibilities are all yours.[148]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in part in 1926 in the book I. K. Yeroshkin and A. F. Khavin, *Solepromyshlennost i soletorgovlya SSSR* (Salt Industry and Trade of the USSR), Moscow-Leningrad

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

165

TO V. M. MOLOTOV[149]

Comrade Molotov:

On the strength of the complaint

I propose that Bryukhanov should send a telegram *today*, signed by the Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and a C.C. secretary:

1) severe reprimand to the *heads* (chairmen of the gubernia executive committees, etc.),

2) threat of prosecution,

3) prosecution *at once* of those responsible *for local issues* before meeting central requirements.

Lenin

Written on May 19, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

166
TELEGRAM TO A. P. SEREBROVSKY

By telegraph

Serebrovsky,
Azerbaijan Oil Committee, Baku, or Tiflis,
or wherever he may be

19.V.1921

I have read your garrulous telegram to Sergo.[150]

Keep your reports short and more precise, state how much food and clothing you are getting for the workers of Baku. It is absurd to increase the number of workers so long as a smaller number of them have yet to be provided with food and clothing.

Lenin

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

167
TO V. P. NOGIN AND N. P. BRYUKHANOV

1) Comrade Nogin, Central Textile Administration
2) Comrade Bryukhanov, People's Commissariat for Food

19/V.

Rakovsky phoned to complain that the promised piece-goods *are not being supplied*. He says that in Nikolayev the peasants are willing to exchange grain for piece-goods. Please phone at once to clear up everything, apart from official inquiry, and have them get on with it, sending me the names of the persons responsible both at the People's Commissariat for Food and at the Central Textile Administration. Who is responsible for the shipment of the piece-goods? This is a disgraceful and criminal delay.[151]

Lenin

Written on May 19, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

168
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Assignment to Comrade *Smolyaninov*,
Assistant Business Manager of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D.

1) Keep in touch with regional economic conferences and follow their work from the telegrams, material and minutes coming in from them, informing the C.L.D. Chairman at regular intervals about the results of their work and their fulfilment of C.L.D. assignments, and also giving them, with Comrade *Lenin*'s knowledge or by agreement with the People's Commissariats concerned, explanations or instructions on any questions that may arise.

2) Look through the minutes and material of gubernia economic conferences from the standpoint of verification of execution of C.L.D. resolutions and general directives, closely following the work of the most important and typical gubernia economic conferences, a list of which is to be submitted for Comrade *Lenin*'s approval.

3) Keep in touch with the work of the collegium of economic People's Commissariats, Gosplan* and planning commissions, set up by C.L.D. decision.

4) Follow the country's economic life from newspapers, reports and special publications by economic and statistical bodies.

5) Follow the actual execution of the most important decisions and assignments of the C.L.D., and report on this to Comrade *Lenin*.

6) Carry out special assignments from the C.L.D. Chairman and the C.P.C. business manager on economic, administration and production matters.

7) Put the final touches to economic, administration and production questions coming up for the C.L.D. agenda, which are not sufficiently well prepared.

8) On your own initiative, with Comrade Lenin's consent, prepare and raise through the appropriate People's Commissariats or through the C.L.D. directly, the questions which arise from the material studied.

To enable Comrade *Smolyaninov* to carry out these as-

* The word "Gosplan" is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

signments, all correspondence, whether telegraphic or postal, from regional economic councils and gubernia conferences, must be delivered directly to Comrade *Smolyaninov*, who will then make the necessary reports to Comrade *Lenin*.

Secretary of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. shall carry on correspondence with the regional councils and gubernia conferences only in co-ordination with Comrade *Smolyaninov*, with the exception of notifications of C.P.C. and C.L.D. decisions, which are executed by the secretariat directly. C.L.D. agenda shall be circulated among C.L.D. members only after Comrade *Smolyaninov* has seen it.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C. and C.L.D.*

Added** to §3: "Gosplan".

Add §9: "Have regular consultations with the editor of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for the purpose of fully co-ordinating its work with that of the C.L.D."

19/V.1921. *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*
Chairman, C.L.D.

NB: Insert a short note on this in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*.

Lenin

First published in part in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's corrections, additions and signature

169

*TO THE S.E.C. PRESIDIUM

On February 2, No. 785/уп. I sent you, through Gorbunov,*** Comrade *Kotlyarov*'s letter, containing the proposal that idle lifts and all their equipment in the big

* The document is also signed by N. P. Gorbunov, C.P.C. business manager.—*Ed.*

** The text from the word "Added" to the end is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

*** The words "through Gorbunov" are written in N. P. Gorbunov's hand.—*Ed.*

cities should be used by the mining industry, with the following resolution:

"We should make inquiries and find out whether anything can be done in this case to help the mining industry. Take away what can be spared." The documents at the S.E.C. show that 5 commissions have worked on the assignment:

1) Conference at the Prodrasmet* on the use of lift equipment by the Donbas (February 11).

2) A special commission for the examination of lifts in houses (worked until February 23).

3) A technical conference of specialists under the Metals Technical Department (roughly about March 22-24).

4) A conference at the Mining and Technical Department of Central Coal Administration (April 16) on the question of using lifts in the city of Moscow and other big cities for mining purposes in the coal industry and, finally,

5) A meeting of the Central Production Commission on April 22, minutes 321, §238.

Commission No. 3 had already quite clearly established that the lift equipment could unquestionably be used in part for the mining industry. However, nothing has yet been done in practice; this business is being dragged out endlessly and to no purpose.

I propose that the question should be raised in the Council of Labour and Defence on May 25, with a draft resolution of roughly this content:

"To authorise the S.E.C. Presidium, by co-ordination with the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, to make use of parts of lifts in Moscow, Petrograd and other big cities, which are suitable for the mining industry, such as: winches, drums and cables.

"Parallel to this, the necessary tests should be made for using the lift equipment in conformity with the minutes of the March 24, 1921 conference at the Technical Section of the Metals Department, designating these tests, in view of their importance, as having top priority."

I add** (a) Appoint a responsible person.

---

* Chief Committee for the Allocation of Metals Under the Metals Department of the S.E.C.—*Ed.*

** From the words "I add" to "Report to N. P. Gorbunov" the text is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

(b) Punish for red tape (from March to May).
Report to N. P. Gorbunov.[152]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 20, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten
text with Lenin's additions
and signature

170
TO I. I. RADCHENKO

Iv. Iv. Radchenko, Central Peat Administration
from Lenin

Comrade Radchenko:

Here is an example of how you ignore my advice.

You sent in the papers on Shatura, in a great sheaf, on 14/IV. There were no clear-cut proposals *written out* separately.

I was busy and was not able to read them; they were pickled until 23/V.

All this while you kept silent!

This is outrageous!

You should have appended two papers:

a) We request the closure of the "Politbureaus",* because they are utterly useless (five lines). Adding that the documents had been sent to Lenin.

b) We request that the telegram (or the telephone message) should be signed: Why the 2 (4) boilers have not been issued, give reasons, do not allow red tape. *Lenin*.

Then, *both* **these** papers in copies to *Fotieva*, for her to give me a reminder.

Then we should have something done, and I might have signed them on 15 or 16/IV.

That is the only practice to follow in future.

* "Politbureaus"—uyezd organs of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission; in this case, a reference to such a body at the Shatura construction site.—*Ed*.

It is not hard to enclose two or three papers containing five lines each, with copies to Fotieva. You must draw the business conclusions yourself, instead of making me extract five lines of business conclusions from dozens of pages.

Read this out to Winter and send me his and your *receipts* stating that both of you have *understood* these instructions and *will act on them*.

23/V. *Lenin*

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

171

NOTE TO LYDIA FOTIEVA AND ASSIGNMENT TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade *Fotieva*:

You are clearly to blame for this business of the Shatura (No. 3 in folder).

Received on $\frac{14}{\text{IV}}$.

Today is $\frac{23}{\text{V}}$.

You have pickled it, without giving a reminder either to me or to Smolyaninov.

We can't have that sort of thing.

There must be no pickling. You must either read things yourself or ask Smolyaninov or Gorbunov to do so.

Please pass on this assignment to Smolyaninov now, using one of my letterheads:

α) verify at once whether anything has been done (by phone).

β) If not, at once set the thing going officially, letting me sign the business papers.

αα) dissolution of the "Politbureaus",

ββ) issue of 2(-4?) boilers (?), etc.[153]

23/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 23, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

172
TO R. E. KLASSON

Comrade Klasson:

I have received and read your paper of 20/V.1921.[154] I can hardly see you one of these days, as I am too busy.

Give a reminder to *Fotieva*, C.P.C. secretary, in one or two weeks' time.

In substance: your letter has surprised me. Usually such complaints come from the workers, who do not know how to fight red tape. But what about yourself? What about Starkov? Why didn't either you or Starkov write me in good time? Why has Starkov, who has been in Germany *for months*, not written to me a *single time*?? I think he should be penalised for that.

Why is it that he and you merely "lamented", without proposing any *precise changes*, such as having the C.P.C. (or the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade or someone else) adopt some decision. (To refrain from demanding of *all* the factories, etc.)

The question now is fully settled, isn't it?

(Has the Central Peat Administration already taken a decision?)

Regards,
Lenin

Written on May 24, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

173
TO G. I. BOKII*

24.V.1921

Comrade Bokii:

I have received your telephone message. Absolutely dissatisfied.[155]

* On the letter Lenin wrote: "To Fotieva: this is confidential, keep a copy."—*Ed.*

That's not right.

You must investigate the affair in detail and let me have precise information, and not just "a look and something"; you say "exaggerated" ... "it is impossible to stop the stealing altogether" (??!!)

It's not a report, it's an outrage.

1) Give me the names of *all* the persons responsible;
2) describe how the business is organised;
3) list the *cases of stealing*
   all of them, precisely;
   the time; the amount.
4) How many *staffs* altogether?
   (their rough composition? working records? etc.)
5) What measures are being specifically taken *there* to stop the stealing?
   State measures precisely.
6) Give date of trial and state punishment imposed there (IV. 1920?)? List all cases of major trials. How many have been punished?

Inform me of your receipt of this and the date of *fulfilment*.[156]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

174
ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY

N.B.

1) Give this to Smolyaninov to read.[157]
2) Find out what industries and enterprises and staffs (how many? and where?) there are in this uyezd.
3) Enter on C.P.C. or C.L.D. agenda in connection with the C.C. resolution of 10.V.1921.[158]

Lenin

Written on May 24, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

175

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

I have two secretaries (Kizas and Lepeshinskaya) taking a cure and having a rest in Riga. *At my request*, Hanecki helped to make arrangements for them at the seaside.* This has to be formalised. How? I propose a decision by the *Organising Bureau*: 1) either authorising Hanecki to make arrangements for a holiday in Riga (or Latvia in general) for persons sent from here by the *Orgbureau*, or 2) authorising Hanecki to set up *one or two* rest homes in Latvia, with accommodation made available through the Orgbureau, one-half to go to workers and one-half to government officials. **The second is better.**

What is your opinion?

Written in May, not later than the 25th, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

176

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV**

Comrade Bryukhanov:

The food committees seem to be growing lax, and very considerably, too.

This is absolutely intolerable.

Discipline must be tightened up to the utmost, and at once, otherwise we shall never be rid of the famine.

1) The People's Commissariat for Food must designate the responsible persons *in the gubernias* and *in the uyezds*, to know *who is to go to jail* (1) the uyezd commissar for food? 2) the chairman of the uyezd executive committee? 3) the uyezd military commissar?? There should be at least three responsible persons).

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* See Document 142 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** At the top Lenin wrote: "Make two copies on letterhead."—*Ed.*

2) Not a single violation (such as taking for the localities what is earmarked for the centre) should be allowed to go *without the arrest* of the guilty (through the All-Russia Central Executive Committee).

You keep writing long papers with complaints,[159] rather: *with wails*, instead of business proposals:

> "authorise the All-Russia C.E.C. to arrest the **persons concerned** for failing to carry out orders resulting in famine at the centre."

That is the kind of proposal the People's Commissariat for Food should bring up in the Politbureau.

3) A similar campaign of *relentless arrests* of members of local gubernia food committees, etc., should be started right away for negligence, failure to make due preparations, etc.

The People's Commissariat for Food will be held responsible for the unprepared state of the apparatus and for its lack of dispatch.

Written on May 25, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

177
TO A. B. KHALATOV

26/V.1921.

Comrade Khalatov:

I must state with deep regret that there has been *no improvement* in the running of the Allocation Administration of the People's Commissariat for Food.

There is the same old chaos of figures.

The raw figures have got hold of you, instead of the other way round.

You have given me a heap of figures, heaps of undigested raw material.

On the same day we have the Muscovites coming and wailing: not the slightest improvement.

I call up Bryukhanov and Svidersky. They bring along Vyshinsky. He gave these figures:

in 8 days (18-25.V) Moscow has received 165 carloads (excluding oats).

165:8=20⅝. The Muscovites say: we've not been getting even 18 regularly.

Furthermore: for five days, 26-31, there will be (says Vyshinsky) 90 of grain+*6 3 of oats*. The Muscovites say: we cannot handle more than 1,000 [poods] of oats a day!!!

|| This means there is actually a **worsening:**
!! || 26-31.V
|| as compared with 18-25.V!!!
!! || A worsening instead of the improvement you promised:
there were 20⅝ of grain,
there will be *1 8 of grain*+1(?) of oats (?).[160]

I repeat my request: *non multa sed multum*.* Fewer figures, but *more matter*.

Why not take *grain alone*? Only grain, *without the oats*. But precisely: how much Moscow is to get a day. Concentrate on that.

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

178

*DIRECTIVES TO THE "ALGEMBA" COMMISSION

(NOTED DOWN FROM MEMORY)[161]

28.V.1921

Check up with the utmost precision:

how much work exactly has been done (what part has been finished);

how much material, rails, etc., foodstuffs, etc., has actually been transported to the spot; where they are; the conditions in which all these materials and the delivered things are stored; the conditions and the concrete possibilities of returning all these materials, rails and all the rest, without losses, without stealing, or with minimum losses; the proportion of the possible and probable losses;

* Not many, but much.—*Ed.*

it is the most important task to carry out this on-the-spot assessment circumstantially and to verify it precisely.

With this problem solved, with the exact data in hand, a conclusion should be drawn up on the substance of the matter: is the "Algemba" construction to be stopped (if yes, how? by what date? etc.) or not to be stopped? and so on, and so forth.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

179

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO K. B. RADEK AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV

By phone

Radek
and *Zinoviev*

7.50 p.m. 28.V.

I have just received a telegram from Berlin signed by **Zetkin**, with the following text:

"Under various pretexts, the Party C.C. has refused permission for the departure of the delegates authorised by the opposition, Braß and Anna Geyer. That is why I refuse to go until my associates' trip is guaranteed."

I request Radek and Zinoviev to let me know their opinion by telephone: isn't it better to advise the Central Committee to agree to the departure of Braß and Anna Geyer? Or is it better for everyone, including myself, to say absolutely nothing?[162]

28/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 28, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

180
TO A. O. ALSKY

29/V.1921.

Comrade Alsky:

I draw your attention to this report, which has been submitted to me by a comrade from the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, who had been specially authorised by me, in agreement with Comrade Dzerzhinsky. I appointed the inquiry which has produced this report after a communication I had had from the most reliable Communists that things were not quite well at Gokhran.[163]

Comrade Bokii's communication fully confirms this.

I draw your most serious attention to this fact.

You, above all, and then **all** the members of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance, and Comrade Basha especially, must devote ten times more work to Gokhran. Unless things are reorganised at Gokhran within the shortest period in such a way as *absolutely to exclude* the possibility of stealing, while at the same time accelerating all the work and enlarging its scale, the Deputy People's Commissar and **all** the members of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance will be faced not only with Party, but also with criminal charges.

Because of the delay in the Gokhran work (it is harder to work in winter and *a great deal* has to be done before it sets in), and because of the stealing there, the Republic is suffering *vast* losses, for precisely at this time, in these hard days, we must obtain the *maximum* of valuables **quickly** for commodity exchange with foreign countries.

It is necessary:

1) to organise regular and frequent conferences with Bokii for the earliest reorganisation of Gokhran;

2) to bring the protection and surveillance to perfection (special railings, wooden partitions; lockers or partitions for changing; surprise searches; systems of double and triple surprise check-ups in accordance with all the rules of the art of *criminal investigation*, etc., etc.);

3) to recruit, in case of necessity, dozens and **hundreds** of responsible and absolutely honest Communists in Moscow

to participate (say, once a month or two months) in surprise, *day* and night, audits. The *staffs and the inspectors* must be given instructions in the *minutest detail*;

4) it shall be the duty of *every* member of the P.C.F. Collegium, without exception, to conduct *in person*, at least once a month, day and night surprise inspections of Gokhran, at the work places and wherever else stealing may occur. The Deputy People's Commissar shall keep a personal secret register of these inspections.

In view of the *secret* character of this paper, I request you to *return* it to me at once, and to have **all** the members of the P.C.F. Collegium sign *it* in person.

29/V *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

(P.S. If Chutskayev is still here, let him read it as well: he bears a considerable part of the blame!)

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181
TO Y. KH. LUTOVINOV

30.V

Comrade Lutovinov:

I have read your letter of 20/V, and it has left me with a very sad impression. I expected that in Berlin, having had a rest, having recovered from your illness, having taken a look "from outside" (you always get a clearer view from outside), and having thought things out, you would arrive at clear-cut and exact conclusions. Over here, you were in a "mood" of dissatisfaction. A mood which was almost unconscious, a blind feeling, not resulting from thought. So I expected you to have clear-cut and exact conclusions instead of the mood. Perhaps, I thought, we would differ over the conclusions, but these would still be clear-cut and exact conclusions drawn by one of the "founders" of the "opposition" (as you admit yourself to be in your letter).

Your letter leaves a sad impression because, instead

of clarity and precision, there is again this dark mood with the addition of "tough words".

You must not allow this.

Facts—you will recall this yourself—are stubborn things. So have a look at what are the facts you mention. I list *all* your *factual* statements:

1) The railwaymen's C.C. is made up of "old bureaucrats".

Is that a fact? The names? I don't know anyone except Rudzutak, but I do know that it was made up with care. There could have been mistakes. They must be corrected. But for that they should be first pinpointed, so as to leave no room for any dark moods (and the *gossip* which frequently lurks in this darkness: gossip loves darkness and anonymity).

You have not given any names. There are no facts.

Rudzutak? What's wrong with him as a worker? "He is physically worn-out"? Is there anyone among us who isn't? We shall get him back from Turkestan as soon as we put Joffe and Sokolnikov back on their feet.

What then does our "tendentious factionalism" consist of? Is it the fact that a supporter of the Party congress majority is put at the head of the railwaymen's C.C.? Is that what you call "factionalism"? If that is so, please explain to me what meaning should be given to factionalism and to the Party spirit.

Surely you will not declare that it was acting in the "Party spirit" for the leader of the former Workers' Opposition to introduce a C.C. list at the Metalworkers' Congress a few days ago, where of the 22 R.C.P. members, 19 are supporters of the old Workers' Opposition?[164] If that is not "tendentious factionalism", if that is not reviving the faction, then I must say that you have been using the concept of factionalism in a most specific way, most unusually, even out of the human context.

2) You say that at the head of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. there is a "physically worn-out person", i.e., Tomsky? He was to have been replaced by a trio of secretaries, and has now been removed altogether. Thus, your shot at factionalism has ricocheted against you. There's already a *fact* for you.

3) In your struggle against the outrages of the Berlin mission you have come up against "fierce resistance from Moscow all the way up to Ilyich".

You will pardon me if I say that this is an invention.

You gave excessive praise to Stomonyakov, who was defended by Krasin. Kopp was at the head of the old mission. Kopp was removed, Stomonyakov has remained.

What is this? Is it "fierce resistance from Moscow"?

Or is it a fierce lie about Moscow?

In the light of the "facts", which of these tough words is closer to the truth? What about that?

There have been scandalous practices at the Berlin mission, Moscow (and Krasin) did not hamper or resist you, but helped you to combat them, by giving more authority to Stomonyakov, whom *you* extolled most decidedly.

4) You say you have discovered there, in Berlin, a number of the "most brazen scoundrels and thieves", and Moscow has not removed them.

Their names? There is not a single one.

Is that a fact or a piece of gossip?

Perhaps you are not aware of the way complaints are addressed to the C.C.? to the Orgbureau? to the Politbureau? to the C.C. Plenary Meeting?

There has not been a single complaint from you either in the Politbureau or the Plenary Meeting. There's a fact for you.

(In brackets: you and I had a difference over Shklovsky, but you did not put it before the Politbureau.[165] I knew Shklovsky as a Bolshevik for years before the revolution. Being an honest man, he would have helped you to combat the "scoundrels and thieves". But you impeded Shklovsky's departure for Berlin, although over here he is not much of a worker, not doing anything important.)

5) Grzhebin. About him, and **only** about him, I read yesterday the protest you and Stomonyakov sent in to the C.C. We shall examine it at the earliest sitting.[166]

We in the C.C. have had our differences over Grzhebin. Some said: he should be removed altogether, because he might be cheating as a publisher. Others said: as a publisher he will publish at a lower cost. We prefer to have him cheat

us out of 10,000, but put out the cheaper and better publication.

A commission of both sides equally represented was elected. I was not on it, because of my "partiality" (some said) to Gorky, who defended Grzhebin.

The commission decided the case *unanimously*. I don't remember what it decided exactly. I think it was to buy from Grzhebin if it was cheaper.

Consequently, your conclusion: "they were not guided by state considerations", but were trying to pacify Gorky—is a downright untruth. And you write: "I am sure"!!! What do you call it when the people work out a "conviction" for themselves before checking on the facts, which are easily checked?

6) Lomonosov is a brilliant specialist, but has been "exposed by Krasin as engaging in the most criminal commercial transactions".

That is not true. If Krasin had exposed Lomonosov committing a crime, Lomonosov would have been removed and prosecuted. You heard a rumour and turned it into a piece of scandal.

Krasin wrote me and the C.C.: Lomonosov is a brilliant specialist, but is less suitable in trade and has made mistakes. Having come over here, and having met Lomonosov and examined the documents, Krasin said nothing about mistakes, let alone crime.

Here is your choice: either to start a serious case in the Control Commission (or wherever else you wish) about Lomonosov's crimes, or to retract the rumour you have so flippantly picked up.

7) "We are having appointments to the trade department here of rogues like this one: in the past a manufacturer whom the Soviet power deprived of all his furs, and he is now being sent to sell these furs. For pity's sake, what are things coming to?"

That is what you write. This is indeed good reason to feel sad. The founder of the whole opposition reasoning on such lines!

It's the same thing as an ignorant muzhik saying: "A thousand tsarist generals were deprived of their land and rank, and these generals have now been attached to the Red

Army"! Indeed, we have possibly over a thousand of those who had been generals and landowners under the tsar, serving in key posts in the Red Army. But it has won.

God will forgive the ignorant muzhik. Who's going to forgive you?

If you *know* that there is a "rogue", how can you, a person in office under the Soviet power, hush up his *name*? Not start proceedings against this *so-and-so*?

But if you don't know his name, it means this is just another rumour? just another piece of scandal?

I have gone over virtually everything in your letter that has any semblance at all of being a fact. The result is an absolute zero.

If I did not know you, then having received such a letter as yours, I should have said:

either this man has had a nervous breakdown and is hysterically snatching at scraps of gossip, and is quite unable to think, reason and verify;

or it is a man who is helpless because of his backwardness and ignorance, and who has fallen victim to scandal-mongering;

or it is a disguised Menshevik deliberately engaging in scandal-mongering.

Because I know you, I say to you that your letter is a remarkable "human document" which shows how the "founder of the opposition" has allowed himself to give way to a desire to play opposition at all costs, and to shout, for no good reason, about patronage, about stick-in-the-mud commissars, about the system, etc.

You write: "After all, it is not personalities, but the system itself that matters. Just now I raise this question: is this the proletariat or a demagnetised, declassed petty-bourgeois intelligentsia."

That is ridiculous. In fact, your own letter is a fine human document showing up the author as a specimen of the demagnetised petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. For the professional proletarians have repeatedly yielded up in actual life demagnetised petty-bourgeois intellectuals, according to their real class role.

The demagnetised petty-bourgeois intellectual keeps whimpering and wailing, is put out by any sign of evil

or scandalous practice, loses his self-possession, echoes any piece of scandal, and is all puffed up in his efforts to say something incoherent about a "system".

The proletarian (not one by reason of an old profession but one by his actual class role), when faced with evil, takes up the fight in a business-like manner: he gives open and official support to the candidacy of the good worker Ivan, proposes the removal of the bad Peter, starts a case—and conducts it vigorously, firmly and to the end—against the rogue Sidor, against the act of patronage on the part of Tit, against Miron's most criminal transaction, and (after two or three months of experience in his new job, and practical acquaintance with his new environment) works out business-like and practical proposals: to introduce such-and-such a system of commissars or political commissars, to make the following changes in the routine here, and to assign so many well-known Communists (with the following record) to the specified posts.

That is the kind of proletarians, who, even after they have lost their proletarian profession, were able to build the Red Army and to win with it (despite the thousand traitors and rogues, of whom thousands still remain among the military specialists and the military bureaucrats).

That is the kind of proletarians who will never descend to the class role of the demagnetised petty-bourgeois intellectuals, thrashing about in impotence, yielding to scandal, and calling scraps of gossip a "system".

There you have my frank answer. I can afford to reply in full once in a while—mostly I haven't the time to do so.

For old time's sake, let me tell you this: you need to do something about your nerves. Then the mood will give way to reasoning.

With comradely greetings,

Lenin

Written on May 30, 1921

First published in part in 1957 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Published in full in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

182
TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

30.V.1921

Comrade Sklyansky:

On the question of making use of the Army for economic purposes.

This must always be borne in mind.

A systematic plan for such use should be thought-out, prepared and elaborated, and unswervingly implemented .

Two aspects of this matter stand out especially:

1) the current, most urgent economic works (guarding and extraction of salt; fuel supply, etc.);

2) the work in implementing the general state-economic plan over a number of years. The electrification plan for ten years (the first part of the works) calls for 370 million working days. This gives an annual (37:1.6)=24 working days, i.e., *two days a month* per armyman.

Of course, a host of difficulties will arise from the conditions of the Army's billeting, the transportation to the place of work, etc., etc., but the Army still can and must (*with the aid of the Universal Military Training Board*) render vast assistance in this matter of electrification. The Army should be attached to this great undertaking—ideologically, organisationally and economically—and it should be an object of systematic effort.

Please raise this question in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, by reading out this letter. I should be glad to hear the views of the Council members or at least to have their short comments on this question.[167]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

183

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV[168]

30/V.1921

Comrade Bryukhanov, People's Commissariat for Food
Copy to Comrade Smolyaninov

There must be a speed-up in the shipment of sacks for Comrade Vladimirov, Ukraine's People's Commissar for Food, and also the shipment of goods for the *Ukrainian commodity exchange fund*. Please notify me of your subsequent instructions.* Give me exact information today, and keep me informed daily, formally and in writing, about what is being actually done. This is Bryukhanov's personal responsibility. Appoint persons responsible for detailed measures.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

184

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT, V. V. FOMIN, N. P. BRYUKHANOV

Comrade Unschlicht, All-Russia Extraordinary Commission;
Comrade Fomin, People's Commissariat for Railways;
Comrade Bryukhanov, People's Commissariat for Food

Set up the strictest surveillance over the most rapid movement of piece-goods from Moscow to Kharkov in the Ukraine for commodity exchange.

Issue instructions along railway lines. Most important question. Report execution.**

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on May 31, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

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* The following text is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

** The last two words are in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

185
TO G. K. KOROLYOV[169]

The C.C decision on responsible travelling personnel is a decision of the C.C. Plenary Meeting.

This means that it is not to be questioned.

(Personally, I quite agree with it.)

You yourself, I think, must do some of the travelling.

1) The C.C. apparatus should be reinforced and *brought closer* to the localities.

2) Your assistants should substitute for you in the gubernia. The young should be promoted.

3) You can (and will have to) make more frequent *personal* visits to Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia to check up, help, advance candidates in agreement with the Orgbureau, etc.

4) There is no need to be a theoretician. All you need to be is a *Party man*. You are an economic executive. What we do [need] is to have economic executives (on behalf of the C.C.) pull up the localities, verify and instruct.

Written on May 31, 1921

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Prozhektor* No. 2

Printed from the original

186
TO G. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa, Deputy Chairman, P.W.C.*
Copies: Comrade Sapronov, Chairman, P.W.C.
Comrade Bogdanov, Chairman, S.E.C.

Please inform me, in a few very brief lines, whether you have given exact directives concerning the urgent completion of the Kashira project (according to the Politbureau decision),[170] and when. To whom specifically?

Who is personally responsible on the spot for the timely fulfilment of this?

Is there any need of a special reminder from the centre or special measures to have this scrupulously done?

(I have personally seen the "gibbet" posts along the

* Public Works Committee.—*Ed.*

Kashira Highway already being toppled to the ground. This is a bad job. Might this not be the cause of some fatal cases?[171])

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on May 31, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

187

*TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

Copy: Secretariat of the Council of Labour and Defence

31/V.

In confirmation of the instructions telephoned by the C.P.C. business manager to Comrade *Nikolayev*, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs, I propose that a report should be given in the Council of Labour and Defence on Wednesday, June 1, on the time-table for the first section of the radio-telephone construction (i.e., installation of the radio-telephone receivers in gubernia and uyezd centres over an area with a radius of 2,000 versts around Moscow), and that the agenda for the same day should include all the matters connected with the radio-telephone construction, namely: transfer of former *Anosov* workshop to the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs, supply of radio-telephone works with bank-notes directly from the centre, etc.

The People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs is requested to determine precisely the man who will bear personal responsibility for the timely fulfilment of all the radio-telephone construction programme now being submitted for approval by the C.L.D.[172]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on May 31, 1921
First published in part in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

188
TO I. T. SMILGA

31.V.1921

Comrade Smilga:

The question of a possible firewood crisis in Moscow this winter season is of *exceptional* importance. It is a question of primary political importance. Moscow must not receive *less* fuel in 1921-1922 than in 1920-1921.

This, at all costs.

There is need 1) specially to impose responsibility for this on Danishevsky;

2) to make a detailed division of this task into component parts, and *assign* each part to a special *person*, precisely designated;

3) to send more men to work especially for Moscow Fuel Committee (perhaps you will take Goldberg? later recruiting Radchenko, even if only for a certain portion of time, etc.).

4) You *personally* must make repeated special and specific check-ups and inspections, and redouble your efforts to make a good job of it.

Be sure to give me an exact programme of all these urgent operations and pressures, and inform me of the time.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

189
TO A. M. LEZHAVA AND A. I. RYKOV*

Comrades **Lezhava** and **Rykov**

There must be something wrong over here (and at the *People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade*).

* In the left-hand margin Lenin wrote: "[the question of excavators]."—*Ed.*

After all there must be an entry: what has been requested? when? by whom? who *approved* the order?

It looks as if there is no record. This is total chaos. Time is running short.

There is an urgent need of the excavators.

Why have they not been ordered in Germany?

in America?

in Sweden?

Whom does *Reine* represent?[173]

Lenin

Written not before May 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

190

TO L. B. KRASIN

Code

Krasin

We are in very great need of all kinds of loans, because the main thing now is to obtain, and moreover at once, a stock of commodities to exchange for grain with the peasants. The whole policy of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade must now be subordinated to this immediate goal.

Let me have your reply.

Lenin

Written before June 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

191

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

How is Tukhachevsky doing?

He hasn't caught Antonov yet, has he?[174]

Are you putting on the pressure?

When is the report to the Politbureau?

Written between May and the first half of July 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

192
TO V. M. MOLOTOV[175]

Comrade *Molotov*:

In sending you Comrade Vasilyev's letter to me I ask you

1) either to arrange the check-up in the Orgbureau (of the fulfilment of the C.C. assignment to put an end to Antonov) or to have the C.C. Secretariat carry out this check-up by studying the documents and summoning Comrade Sklyansky and also some other person;

2) to send the enclosed *secretly and personally* to Comrade Sklyansky for him to read it and return it to me, adding (to you; a copy for me) what measures of pressure he has taken.[176]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

1/VI.1921.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

193
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY*

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky,
Gosplan Presidium

There are indications that the C.L.D., in issuing diverse partial assignments to Gosplan, has not always correctly allocated these assignments from the standpoint of the functions exercised by the planning commissions under the several People's Commissariats.

In view of this, and also to arrange all Gosplan work in general in a more purposeful manner, there seems to be a need to individualise the current work and responsibility of all Gosplan members.

All Gosplan members, with exemptions to be specially established in every single case by decisions of its Presid-

* There is a typewritten text of this document signed by Lenin.—*Ed.*

ium, shall be given assignments by the Presidium to make a systematic study of all the material relating to the exercise of specified economic functions from the standpoint of rational planning and actual fulfilment of plans (for example, fuel economies; transportation of fuel; underloading on railways; closure of inessential enterprises; allocation of foodstuffs from the standpoint of their economies and boosting of labour productivity, etc., etc.).

One and the same assignment may be given to two or more members, where the interests of the job require a study and verification of the plan from different angles or by different methods.

Under such a system, the C.L.D. will interrupt the whole Gosplan from its general work less frequently with its particular assignments, and this will also make for more productive Gosplan operations and for the establishment of more precise responsibilities of its members.

Please have this proposal put up for discussion by the Presidium, and inform me of its decision.[177]

Written on June 2, 1921

First published in 1939 in the magazine *Krasny Arkhiv* No. 5

Printed from the original

194

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT[178]

Copy
Urgent. Secret

Comrade Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman,
All-Russia Extraordinary Commission

Make inquiries and let me have precise and exhaustive answers to the following questions not later than tomorrow:

1) Is it true that arrests were made in Petrograd on May 27 of: Prof. *P. A. Shchurkevich* (Electrotechnical Institute), Prof. *N. N. Martinovich* (University and Oriental Institute), Prof. *Shcherba* (University, Professor of Comparative Linguistics), Prof. *B. S. Martynov* (University, Professor of Civil Law), Senior Zoologist *A. K. Mordvilko*

(Academy of Sciences), Prof. *Tikhanov*'s wife (Institute of Civil Engineers) and Prof. *B. Y. Vorobyov* (First Polytechnical Institute)?

2) Is it true that Prof. Pantelei Antonovich Shchurkevich is being arrested for the fifth time, and Prof. Boris Yevdokimovich Vorobyov, for the third?

3) What is the reason for the arrests, and why is arrest used as the measure of suppression—after all, they will not run away?

4) Do the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, the Gubernia Chekas or any other Chekas issue warrants not for personal arrests, but for "discretionary" arrests, and if they do then specify to which personnel (degree of responsibility, post, political maturity)?

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on June 2, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

195
TO A. O. ALSKY

3.VI.1921

Comrade Alsky:

I should like to help Comrade *Gastev*, Director of the Institute of Labour.

He needs to make additional purchases worth 500,000 in gold. That is, of course, something we cannot afford just now. Could something be bought in Germany with the Romanov funds?

Think about this, find out more exactly and try to get him a certain amount. We should, all things considered, give support to such an institution, even with the situation as difficult as it is.[179]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Organizatsiya Truda* No. 1

Printed from the original

196
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

Please have a look at the enclosed letter from Shklovsky.

I believe there is a *C.C.* decision—isn't there? a formal one in writing (Politbureau)—"to work at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in Berlin".

This decision is being *sabotaged* by Lutovinov and now by Stomonyakov as well. Why? I don't know for sure, but I can guess: Lutovinov has accused Lenin of extending "patronage" to Shklovsky (!!). Some people are dissatisfied with the fact that the Orgbureau decision preventing Shklovsky from going abroad has been cancelled by the Politbureau.[180]

An absurd web of intrigue has taken shape. Shklovsky is absolutely of no use in Russia. His family (many children, a sick wife) has *not* adjusted in Russia. Over here it's nothing but fret and worry. He is undoubtedly an honest man, a Bolshevik since the first (1905) revolution; Zinoviev, all the Bolsheviks and I knew him personally in Switzerland. Chicherin is satisfied with his work abroad. Krasin too.

The sabotage by Lutovinov (and now by Stomonyakov) is a downright scandalous *wrecking* of the C.C. decision. When one is dissatisfied, one should lodge a complaint with the plenary meeting or with the Central Control Commission. That is one's sacred *right*. They have *failed* to lodge a complaint, but have *engaged in secret sabotage*, pushing Shklovsky close to thoughts of suicide. They refuse to see that this *amounts* to mean, dishonest, underhand harassment of the man.

There are thieves all over the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade; Kopp has clearly been breeding thieves. It looks as if Kopp has to be removed. That makes it all the more important to value honest men with a knowledge of the language and of commerce.

I ask you *to seriously bring home* to Stomonyakov (better in writing?) either through the C.C. Secretariat (or—

more appropriate perhaps?—by sending to *Solts* at the C.C.C.) the following: stop your sabotage or it may come to your expulsion from the Party. Make him apologise to Shklovsky, and stop the sabotage.

Drop me a line.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written in June,
not before the 4th, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

197
TO M. I. FRUMKIN

5/VI.

Comrade Frumkin:

I blame both the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (what a scandal!) *and you* for this absurd affair with the fund for the South-Eastern Economic Council.[181] You did nothing but whimper, although you should have brought your precise *proposals* to the C.L.D. back in April: 1) such-and-such a calendar programme for the shipment of gold; 2) such-and-such for wool, *etc*.

What you did, however, was to whimper from April to June.

We now have to complete what has not been done.

A calendar programme of *detailed* measures, which is elaborated with the greatest precision, must be placed before the C.L.D. by Wednesday (I can appoint the commission tomorrow, 6/VI—it can be appointed by agreement between the People's Commissars).

Make arrangements about this with Khinchuk (he seems to know something about trade. *No one* at the People's Commissariat for Food does).

Write me at once whether you can pledge now to get things *going* and what exactly.

Will you manage to arrange *efficient* trade with Constantinople? Or will you run into another Ancona?[182] into

speculators, swindlers (and bankrupts: there are *hordes* of them in Constantinople), and merely bring shame upon yourself and the entire "commodity-exchange operation" of the South-Eastern Economic Council?

The South-Eastern Economic Council must display *more* initiative, but also shoulder more responsibility.

(If you are not going there again, get Beloborodov or Kaganovich on the direct line and tell them *everything I have written you about*; it's time you *got things going* and showed *something* for your effort.)

Let the South-Eastern Economic Council stop whimpering and start making *timely business* proposals to the C.L.D. and taking care not to be late with supervising their fulfilment.[183]

Awaiting your letter.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on June 5, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

198

TO A. M. LEZHAVA

5/VI.

Comrade Lezhava:

Things are thoroughly bad with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

During your illness, Krasin once again tried out his weak side: excessive self-assurance, sometimes verging on adventurism.

He seems to say: "I can get away with everything, there is nothing I can't do."

He has that sort of trait.

Yet, despite his "good luck", and his dexterity and skill, and art, I would not wager that one fine day this will not land him in a great scandal with ignominious dismissal.

It's not right. Krasin was over here; he saw that you were ill but *did nothing*.

He left one man, Voikov, who was clearly unfit, rather, unable to cope.

On 3/VI, things at the C.L.D. were close to collapse. On 25/III, 1921, the C.L.D. decided that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade *had the duty to* supply the South-Eastern Economic Council with 7 million in gold by 15/IV.

Nothing has been done. Voikov keeps referring to statements he had allegedly heard Krasin make that it is impossible to trade with Constantinople: he says it is full of swindlers.

If Krasin has said this, it will one day land him in the dock. It was Krasin's duty *either* strictly to implement the C.L.D. decision of 25/III, *or* table a proposal at the C.C. to have the C.L.D. decision rescinded, *or* satisfy the South-Eastern Economic Council in some other way, not through Constantinople (this No. 3 in the hope of his "luck").

By failing to do either the first, or the second, or the third, Krasin is committing a breach of the law and is disrupting all the work. We can't have that sort of thing.

I ask you to:

1) send a copy of this (or the original) to Krasin,

2) have a personal talk with Frumkin and Khinchuk,

3) check up personally on the execution of C.L.D. decisions, *without relying* on Voikov.

4) give serious thought to replacing Voikov by Taratuta or Paikes, or any other person you may find who is an efficient and *conscientious* executive.

Concerning Serebrovsky and Baku, I very much fear now that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade will repeat the South-East story.

That is something I will absolutely refuse to tolerate.

I propose that Serebrovsky and Rabinovich should be sent the following telegram in my name. Please let me know at once of your objections or amendments.

"Serebrovsky, Baku; Copies to Rabinovich and Orjonikidze, Baku or Tiflis.

"I am extremely anxious about the agreement concluded by Serebrovsky with Socifross, and am surprised that this was reported by Rabinovich, unfortunately, without comments or practical proposals, while Serebrovsky himself

has failed to report it.[184] This agreement is a strange one. Where is the guarantee that Socifross will not cheat us? How can it be allowed to have a monopoly? I do not at all object to Azvneshtorg and Azneftkom trading directly with Constantinople, I am prepared to support Baku's autonomy within considerable limits, but we must have guarantees. Please reply at once whether a detailed list of everything Serebrovsky has bought in Constantinople has been sent by reliable courier; when exactly it was sent, and the details of the agreement and when. I put Serebrovsky under an obligation to send me a letter with every courier, informing me by telegram of his name and date of departure. What exactly has now been ordered from Socifross? All three addressees must reply to me by telegram.[185] *The secret sections in code.**

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D."

Any news from Sammer? What is going on there? Is he sending you his reports? How frequently? Are they detailed or short? Drop me a line.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on June 5, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

199
TO I. I. RADCHENKO

5.VI.1921.

Comrade Radchenko:

Don't pick on Gidrotorf. This business has been recognised *by law* as being of *exceptional* importance.[186]

Glavtorf *must* carry through this law for more than formal reasons.

---

* Lenin underlined the words "The secret sections in code" and added: "(Code the underlined words)."—*Ed.*

This is a great invention. We should learn to deal with the inventors, even when they fret a little.

In this case I see no fretting for the time being.

Kirpichnikov is an inventor. He should be allowed to go and sent. Objections could arise only *from the political side*: If you have any, let me know them *in confidence*.

If you have none, be sure to send Kirpichnikov.

I am very well aware and highly value your services in setting up Glavtorf. You have set it up on model lines. I earnestly request you: *do not make* **a mistake**, do not pick on Gidrotorf.

Regards,

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

200
TO R. E. KLASSON

5/VI.1921.

Comrade Klasson:

Please inform me (or Smolyaninov when I am not there or when I am busy) of the **exact** proposals concerning assistance to Gidrotorf.

You are also slightly to blame for letting 1921 go by.

See that 1922 does not.

Why did you fail to award prizes of 10,000-50,000 rubles *in gold* for the invention of the dehydration method in Germany? You will recall that we had spoken of this before your departure!

Is it because you had no money (this should have been placed before the *C.L.D.* in advance)? or because that sort of prize calls for very much? How much? Or is there any other reason? Is it possible just now to offer such and similar prizes in Germany, Canada, and America through a notary public?

Regards,

Lenin

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

201
TO A. M. LEZHAVA[187]

Urgent!
Comrade Lezhava:

Please add the word *unconditionally* ("I do not at all object *unconditionally* to Azvneshtorg trading directly with Constantinople", etc.) and send with this addition.

Awaiting your letter. (P.S. What's this contract I hear about involving 35 million francs in Rostov?)

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on June 6, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

202
TO I. I. RADCHENKO

(Secret)

Comrade *Radchenko*, Central Peat Administration

7/VI.

Dear Ivan Ivanych:

I quite understand that it pains you to see how non-Soviet people—some of them possibly even enemies of the Soviet power—are making use of their inventions to profiteer. I quite believe you that Kirpichnikov is that kind of man. Of course, Klasson is not a supporter of ours either.

But the whole point is that while your feeling of indignation is quite legitimate, you must not make the mistake of succumbing to it.

The inventors are not our men, but we must use them. It is better to let them have more, let them make money, make a killing—so long as *we*, *too*, can advance an undertaking which is of exceptional importance for the R.S.F.S.R.

Let's think out our *assignments* to these men in greater detail. Perhaps we can adopt this plan:

1) Allow Kirpichnikov to go on the trip, provided precisely specified assignments are carried out; draw up a list of them.

2) Send along with him two or three men who are reliable politically (a worker, one of our engineers, etc.) as some kind of "commissars". Give them precise instructions. Let us approve §1 and §2 by agreement with Krzhizhanovsky.

3) Establish over here in Russia a special centre, order Gidrotorf's best machines, set up this special centre with these special machines, i.e., a special enterprise, and get it to advance this business *in its own way*.

Would you find the men to do this?

4) Offer *on Glavtorf's behalf* prizes (10,000-30,000 rubles *in gold*) in Canada and in Germany for the best methods of dehydrating peat, and for the best models of machines for Gidrotorf, etc.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I wonder why Klasson has *failed* to award any prizes in Germany, although he and I had spoken about it. Could he be dragging things out? Perhaps we should do this directly through *Glavtorf*? We should spare no money for this.

Written on June 7, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

203
TO P. I. STUČKA[188]

Comrade Stučka **(Secret)**

7/VI.

Comrade Stučka:

In fulfilment of your request, I wrote this very day to Chicherin, asking him to put more pressure on the Latvian Government, and to send a telegram to Hanecki telling him

of my request to exert pressure without fail and rescue the workers.

Best greetings and congratulations on the successes of the communist movement in Latvia!

Yours,
Lenin

Written on June 7, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

204
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

1) About Paikes, please circulate *all* the members of the Orgbureau and the Politbureau.
   See Paikes personally for 15 minutes. I think he would do well for top supply work (*not* for the University). If he will not do here, perhaps we could let I. N. Smirnov in Siberia have him *in exchange* for someone?
2) I *don't* know M. Z. Manuilsky. I abstain. I suggest you *ask the people at Ivanovo-Voznesensk*, and inquire from the People's Commissars.
3) The question of farming out the port of Petrograd as a concession has been decided *in the C.P.C.* (without me) only *in principle and has been referred to a commission*.[189] Both Chicherin and Dzerzhinsky *have* to fight it out in the commission.
   Write them (and **Zinoviev**) about it.

From the commission this will go once again to the *C.P.C.* This means it is early to take it to the Politbureau: Chicherin and Dzerzhinsky are displaying haste for small reason, without seriously going into the matter in the usual, Soviet administrative manner.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written in June, after the 7th, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

205
TO Y. M. YUROVSKY

Comrade Y. M. Yurovsky
(address: *All-Russia Cheka* or the People's Commissariat for Finance)

Comrade Yurovsky:

Because of a secretarial error, I received your letter of 2/VI only today, 10/VI.[190]

You must act through all the bodies (the C.C. especially), introducing precise proposals on the best way to run the business.

You are a participant, and the responsibility is yours.

If things are badly run, set them right by introducing formal proposals.

That you have already told me is not at all enough.[191]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on June 10, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

206
TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. SECRETARIAT

11/VI.

Comrade Molotov:

All the workers of the Party's centre and I myself knew Suren Spandaryan in 1908 and 1909. He was a very valuable and prominent worker. Stasova and possibly the Caucasians (perhaps Yenukidze as well) should know him. Suren's father was receiving our help in Paris in 1910 and 1911 at Suren's request.*

I propose to the C.C. Secretariat:

1) have the enclosed letter translated[192];

* See present edition, Vol. 43, Document 235.—*Ed.*

2) make inquiries from Stasova and Yenukidze and others who had known Suren and his father (if the Secretariat should recognise the additional inquiry to be necessary); inquire about dispatch to Tiflis;

3) authorise *Bagotsky* (Red Cross?) in Switzerland or *Klyshko* in London to write to Suren's father and give him monetary help by reason of his being the father of a prominent revolutionary.[193]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on June 11, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

207
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev

Urgent
11/VI.

Comrade Zinoviev:

I have just read Kuusinen's theses and one-half of the article (the report).

I have returned them to him with my remarks.[194]

I do insist that he *and* he *alone* ((i.e., not Béla Kun)) should be allowed to give a report at this congress without fail.

This is necessary.

He knows and **thinks** (*was sehr selten ist unter den Revolutionären**).

What needs to be done right away is to find *one* German, a real one, and give him strict instructions
to make stylistic corrections at once,
and dictate the corrected text to a typist.

And at the congress read out for Kuusinen his article-report (tell Kuusinen to complete the second half within three days).

* Which is a great rarity among revolutionaries.—*Ed.*

The German will read it out well. The benefit will be enormous.[195]

The question will be *posed*: and this will be very much more than enough for a start.

Greetings,

Lenin

P.S. You have not returned to me the copy of my letter to Levi.[196] *Do so without fail*. If you don't, I will not makeup.

Written on June 11, 1921
Sent to Petrograd

First published in part
on October 4, 1931
in *Pravda* No. 274

Published in full in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

208
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

This business of a draft C.P.C. decision on *collective supply* (of food to enterprises) in connection with the closure of inessential establishments and concentration of production at the major enterprises has been pickled.

Larin and Holtzmann (All-Russia Central T.U.C.) tabled the draft in the Politbureau. On 10/V, the Politbureau resolved: redraft and *introduce in the C.P.C.*[197]

There was *also* a resolution by the trade union congress.[198]

Yet, it's been pickled!

Phone Larin and the All-Russia Central T.U.C., take the text of the Politbureau resolution of 10/V, and *speed up the business to the utmost*. I fear that it has been hushed up because of the change of the All-Russia Central T.U.C.

It must be moved forward *at a faster rate*.

Be sure to phone me the *results* of your efforts and reconnoiterings tomorrow, Monday, 13/VI.

Greetings,

Lenin

Written on June 12, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

209
TO Y. LARIN[199]

Add:

Be sure to pay out bonuses for economies of fuel and economies of foodstuffs.

Written between June 14 and 18, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

210
TO WILHELM KOENEN, AUGUST THALHEIMER AND PAUL FRÖHLICH

16/VI.

Comrades Koenen
Thalheimer
Fröhlich

Dear Comrades!

I have received a copy of your letter to our Party's Central Committee. Thank you very much. I communicated my answer orally yesterday. I take this opportunity to emphasise that I do most resolutely withdraw the rude and impolite expressions I used, and hereby repeat my oral apology in writing.[200]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on June 16, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

211
TO P. A. BOGDANOV

Comrade Bogdanov, Chairman, S.E.C.
Copy to Comrade *Sapronov*, Chairman, P.W.C.

June 16, 1921

Winter has sent me a letter pointing out the need to take a series of *special measures* to have the Politbureau directive concerning the urgent completion of the Kashira project scrupulously fulfilled. A copy of this letter has

been sent to you. I propose that this question should be urgently examined, the appropriate measures taken and all the required proposals placed before the C.L.D. right away. Please let me have a precise statement of what has been done under each head, through the C.P.C. business manager Comrade Gorbunov not later than 22.VI.1921.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1961 in the magazine *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5

Printed from a typewritten copy

212

TELEGRAM TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE[201]

Send at once by direct line

Orjonikidze,
Baku

Serebrovsky should not take offence at the tone of my telegram: I was worried over the future of Baku. I consider Serebrovsky a most valuable worker. I demand that you keep me supplied with exact information about the results of the work in improving the oil industry in Baku, and also about the results of foreign trade operations. Let Serebrovsky see this telegram.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on June 18, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

213

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Molotov

I am entirely *in favour*. This should be done in formal terms: the Politbureau decision should be entered in the minutes.[202]

18/VI. *Lenin*

Written on June 18, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

214

TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

19/VI.

Comrade Sklyansky:

Please assign your office worker, Lydia Dmitriyevna Gribanova, for work in our secretariat. A part of our secretarial personnel has been sent to the localities. Experienced and loyal workers should be promoted. I hope that you will agree to this promotion of Gribanova, who has worked with us to everyone's satisfaction.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on June 19, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

215

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION IN LONDON[203]

Point-by-point explanation of your letter of 20.VI:

1) Agree to grant concessions for all four enterprises (Kyshtym, Ekibastuz, Ridder, Tanalyk). 2) We allow sidings to the concessions; we shall accept some form of ensuring the concessionaire's interests on the main line. 3) Bargain about the term. 4) We shall make available some Soviet money; bargain. 5) Bargain about the royalties. Never mind the oil.[204] 6) Agree to guarantees of immunity.

We shall not grant concessions unless they agree to let us have 50-100 per cent of the foodstuffs and equipment they bring in for themselves, with guaranteed payment.

Written between June 20 and July 21, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

216

TO A. O. ALSKY

Comrade Alsky:

Have any measures been taken to *speed up* and *intensify* Gokhran's work?

Have any Communists been mobilised?[205]

Result: within *how many months* and *what exactly* will be done? *You* will be to blame if the question keeps "sticking", because in that case it will be your duty to lodge a complaint *speedily*, taking it up *to the very top*, i.e., the Politbureau.

But I mean speedily.

The *summer* must be made use of, and you are letting it slip by: I warn you that the responsibility will fall entirely on you. Hurry, and complain to me (about the C.L.D.) and where I am not competent, to the Politbureau.

Written in June,
before the 21st, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

217
TO I. A. TEODOROVICH

21/VI.

Comrade Teodorovich:

The meat tax has now been carried through.[206]

Would you consider it timely just now to do everything possible to develop beef cattle husbandry on the *suburban* state farms, the industrial state farms (i.e., those attached to industrial workers), in the army, etc., etc.

You once said that the specialists believe it possible to develop rabbit-breeding and pig-breeding (without the use of cereals). Why not have some measures legalised in this sense right away.

Drop me a line.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on June 21, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

218
TO L. K. MARTENS

22.VI.1921

Comrade Martens:

I must reproach you for having misdirected the papers on the American colonies in Russia.[207]

I read them only on 20/VI. You should not have sent them through Bukharin, but should have formulated some 20 lines of practical proposals in Russian, and sent them up to the C.L.D., and a copy for me personally and a short letter.

The delay was due to the misdirection of the file.

In substance: I am in favour, *provided* the American workers and settlers in general will bring along with them:

1) foodstuffs for two years (you say that this has been done before, which means that it is possible);

2) clothes, for a similar period;

3) implements of labour.

No. 1 (and No. 2) are the most important. The $200 is less important. If we have No. 1, I agree *to give every support*.

To speed things, draw up a draft C.L.D. decision right away and table it today (if you can, before 3.00 p.m.), this very day in the C.L.D., and we shall decide at 6.00; even if you are late, table it in the C.L.D. at 6.00, we shall set up a commission and decide it on Friday, 24/VI.

Draft decision: 1) terms—the three afore-mentioned, 2) management (you+1 American worker+1 from the People's Commissariat for Labour?), 3) we help (give land, timber, pits, etc.), 4) financial relations such-and-such.

Please reply by bearer.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. After writing this letter, I saw that the question is on today's C.L.D. agenda. Please elaborate the points I have indicated.[208]

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

219
TO M. V. RYKUNOV

Comrade Rykunov:

I have read your letter and agree absolutely *on almost every point*.[209]

You are so right about recruiting the merchants.

I am sending this on to the C.C. members.

Keep up the pressure.

Regards,
Lenin

Written on June 22, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

220
TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[210]

To the Narrow Council

I request an **urgent** examination. We must help them and be sure to give the money.

There is an *imperative* Politbureau directive to have Kashira completed in 1921. The *execution* needs *checking*.

22/VI. *Lenin*

Written on June 22, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

221
TO G. I. BOKII

25/VI.21.

I have received your report of 23/VI.[211]

This business must be finished at all costs, and not later than this summer. Yesterday, Basha tabled some of your wishes in the C.P.C., and after being co-ordinated, they will be adopted.[212]

Draw up as *precise* a *calendar* programme of the necessary reforms as you can. Let me have it (after co-ordinating it with Basha or Alsky, better with both) and inform me once a week about its execution.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from a copy in Lydia Fotieva's hand

222

TO M. I. FRUMKIN

25/VI.

Comrade Frumkin:

I have read your proposals. I agree. We shall table them in the Politbureau today.[213] I have one other request. Elaborate the addendum: "authorise a small commission, Lezhava, Khinchuk, Frumkin+??, immediately to work out a plan to cover this amount (100) with a special export fund, raw materials, timber, etc., and to do this covering most rigorously, with weekly reports. Designation: special cover of urgent expenditure."

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on June 25, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

223

TO V. D. KAISAROV AND I. I. IONOV

1) *Commission Chairman Kaisarov*
2) *Ionov*
Petrograd

25/VI.1921

Concerning the School Atlas

I have received the material on the atlas. I scanned it and made some additions (red ink in the text).

Please send me:

1) A calendar programme of the work (not under the best conditions—"if" we are supplied this and that—but under the *present*); in particular: when the work will be finished.

2) Allocation of the work between the members of the commission.

3) Text and maps, when ready, before they are sent to the printers.

4) Conclusion on the question whether it is desirable and possible to enlist Anuchin and Borzov for this work (for what reasons—in the event of a positive and a negative answer to the questions).

5) Conclusion on whether the members of the commission or its chairman will undertake the additional work described in the attached copy of my letter to Pavlovich. Pavlovich has refused. I have asked a comrade in Germany to do this, but have not yet had his reply.* It would be fine if the commission did this.[214]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

224
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.:

A reminder:

Concerning the electric-power-station. Together with the *Moscow Committee* or its commission + the Moscow Cheka you should draw up a *calendar programme* for purging it of all Mensheviks by 1.XII.1921, or some other such date.

For the Gosplan—a *practical* programme of work:

α) practical verification of current plans (the items and methods);

* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 283.—*Ed.*

β) reduction in the number of institutions (also the period of work);

γ) ditto—the number of staff, *etc.*

A precise and *practical* programme.

Regards,

Lenin

Written on June 25, 1921

First published on January 21, 1931 in *Pravda* No. 21

Printed from the original

225
ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY[215]

11.00 p.m., 25/VI.

This matter should be promoted more *intensively* through *Martens*, a member of the Supreme Economic Council Presidium.

Give me a reminder on Monday.

Lenin

Written on June 25, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 52

Printed from the original

226
TELEGRAM TO SAMARKAND COMMUNISTS[216]

Shafransky, Gubernia Party Committee,
Samarkand

I thank the group of friends for their greetings. The main thing just now is an immediate improvement in the conditions of the workers and peasants. On the vigour and skill of the workers in the localities now depends everything: the tax in kind, the development of turnover between agriculture and industry, and the development of small-scale industry. We have no fear of capitalism, because the proletariat has the power, transport and large-scale industry firmly in its hands and will succeed, through its

control, in channeling it into state capitalism. Under these conditions, capitalism will help to combat red tape and the scattering of the petty producers. *We shall win out because we know what we want.*

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on June 27, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

227

TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD OF THE TURKMEN REPUBLIC

Having just returned from a trip to your parts, Comrade Badayev told me something of the good reception given to him by the local comrades and their whole-hearted sympathy for the cause of the Moscow and Petrograd workers.

Will you kindly convey to all your local comrades my deep gratitude and request to continue giving the most vigorous and every possible assistance in food supplies to the workers of the two leading cities.

The situation is difficult. The utmost assistance is required. I am sure that you will do everything you can.

I send you communist greetings.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on June 27, 1921
Published on August 24, 1921 in the newspaper *Izvestia Polnomochnogo Predstavitelstva RSFSR v Khorezmskoi Sovetskoi Respublike* No. 20

Printed from the newspaper text

228

TO L. K. MARTENS[217]

Comrade Martens:

I ask you to give full and resolute assistance in the organisation of garment factory No. 36 by American workers.

Eliminate all delays in obtaining the necessary mate-

rials, especially pipes and fittings for them (T-joints, couplings, etc.), and electric wiring.

Help the collective of workers to obtain housing, a matter that must be settled without any delays on the part of the housing department.

The completion and the earliest starting of the factory must be achieved in the shortest possible period. Inadmissible negligence and red tape have been displayed in this whole business.

Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on June 27, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten copy

229

*TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

27.VI.

I enclose Comrade Bryukhanov's telephone message concerning the fisheries telegrams.

I draw your attention to the *particular* importance of the fishing industry and the *prompt* dispatch of telegrams dealing with this business.[218]

I insist that you do your *utmost* and *reach agreement* with Bryukhanov.

Inform me of this.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on June 27, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from a copy in Lydia Fotieva's hand

230

TO B. S. STOMONYAKOV

30.VI.1921

Comrade Stomonyakov

I recommend to you the bearer of this, Comrade Georgi Dmitriyevich *Tsyurupa*.

the builder of the Kashira electric-power station, which is of the *utmost* importance to us.

He needs advice, etc., and money especially, so as to place the necessary order in Berlin *swiftly*, pay for it, and secure its fulfilment *without the slightest delay*.

Please do everything you can to help.

Is it possible to contact Krasin by telegram in Berlin en route (from London to Moscow)?

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Sent to Berlin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

231
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY[219]

2/VII.

G. M.:

It hasn't come out.

Here is the general impression of the "first reading":

Page 1: "many" see an "obvious" deviation...
(why admit that the rebuke comes from "many"? This sets the wrong tone and is a "move" ... in favour of the enemies).

Page 2: "the overall reorganisation of the People's Commissariats, which is inevitably connected"...
("inevitably"? There is *nothing inevitable* because there is *NO overall* reorganisation taking place at all. It turns out that the author refers the reader to the "overall" *which does not exist*).

Page 3: emphasis on the principal element, concentration on the large enterprises, etc...
"But a little thought will show that it is impossible to do this *piecemeal*" ... "piecemeal-ism".

(Untenable: *Piece-by-piece* is the only possible way. The start should be modest, with *one* case.)

Page 4: ... Extremes are intolerable
(indisputable, but academic)
Osadchy at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (already named twice)
"Gosplan **members** (Osadchy alone?) find themselves doing the spade-work **continuously**"...

35—1=34

Page 5: ...
Fuel ... Larin (why quote him *without giving* a single figure? Encouraging the enemy! One should either say nothing about him, discussing one's own work in words other than Larin's, with one's own facts, or attack hi m. Any other tactic=sure defeat).

Page 6: "a group of workers to combat the famine has been hastily set up"
(? that is not the business of Gosplan at all!)

Page 7:

Page 8: instructions of C.L.D. Chairman
(? Which? the reader does not know)
Supreme Council for Transportation+
Special Transport Commission
People's Commissariat for Railways ... "*will perhaps not fail to make itself felt*" (the italicised words are also in favour of the enemies).
Neopikhanov...
(what has he done anyway? Not a single clear word.
There is not a single example. How did he help?
Economised? Discovered an error? Helped to avoid it? how precisely?)

8-9: ... "*Assignments*"...
Everyone is so fed up with assignments that the less said of them the better. Everyone has a host of assignments.
General, universal, all-encompassing assignments which are *clearly* not going to be fulfilled.

This has been a partial or even a total failure. It is better to say nothing in the press for the time being. But for a report in the C.L.D.

(α) bring out clearly something *that has been actually achieved*, even if it is only three or four small but precise and factual examples, a thing that has been achieved instead of assignments, something that has been concretely implemented instead of the general and the projected.
What has Ramzin done in Petrograd?
" " Neopikhanov in Moscow?
Strumilin
Popov
and others.

(β) Has the work been allocated to the individual members? When?
To how many of the 35?

(γ) Of the ten commissions of the People's Commissariats, relations are *correct* with *one* (? fuel).
How is this expressed?
What are the real achievements in the plan for the second half of 1921?
Fuel economies?
Conclusion: carry forward the *merger* with the 10, overcome the inertness of the 9 which are doing *nothing*?

(δ) *Prepare* plan for the second half of 1921?
People's Commissariat for Agriculture (crop?) Central Statistical Board?
Current section
Supreme Economic Council

That is how, I think, the material should be roughly arranged for a report in the C.L.D.

The general and consolidated plan will apparently be ready not earlier than the autumn of 1921, and it *cannot* be given until the crop is estimated.

Let that be so. (But the crop is one thing, and the quantity of tax *collected* and grain *obtained* is another. You will know this quantity in 1922, post factum.)

This means that we shall *still* have to proceed from **the estimated minimum figures.**

The partial plans have been drawn up (fuel?); half completed (People's Commissariat for Railways?). I suppose here we can give something factual.

A quarter completed? The number of mouths? (this is the business of the Central Statistical Board *and not* of Gosplan. Everyone will be heaping *their* own work on Gosplan. It must not let them do it).

But the main thing still is: immediately, right away, "piece by piece" *eliminate all the obviously irrational*, *all that clearly contradicts the state economic plan*.

(close down such-and-such establishments in such a branch...

close down or half-close down such-and-such railways ...

build such-and-such fuel lines...

designate the tract of forest which, according to Ramzin, will yield m ore than any Algemba, and give a plan: how it should be felled, cut and transported....

Of 1,000 good factories start 10 by a given date, 50, by another, etc., going all the way up to 100 or even 200).

Yours,

Lenin

Written on July 2, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

232

TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT[220]

Comrade Unschlicht:

There is bad news about Petrograd. It is said that the S.R.s are making redoubled efforts, and that the Petrograd Cheka knows nothing about the S.R.s! They are said to be a new lot, with an excellent secret organisation and their own agents.

We must look sharp, so as not to miss another Kronstadt.

Please devote more of your attention, and write me *this very day*.

Perhaps we should send some experienced Cheka men from here to Petrograd?

S.R. peasants are said to be sent by the S.R.s to Petrograd. Is that so?

What is your information, what are your plans?[221]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written between July 4 and 7, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy of I. S. Unschlicht's reminiscences

233

TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[222]

I propose that this be approved by telephone with this addition: an assignment to buy the greatest possible quantities of wheat and rice.

5/VII.

Lenin

Written on July 5, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

234

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

7.VII.1921

Comrade Molotov:

Following my talk with Unschlicht I propose that the C.C. should resolve:

order Comrade *Menzhinsky* to go on holiday and take a rest at once, until the *doctors* give him a health certificate *in writing*. Meanwhile, he should be in attendance for two or three hours, not more than two or three times a week.

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

235
TO A. I. RYKOV AND V. M. MOLOTOV

Rykov and *Molotov*

I have a mortal fear of shuttling. Mekhonoshin is not fit at all for work in the centre.

I feel that Babkin and Avanesov are overdoing it with the "inquiries". I think that your commission should take *no more than three hours to complete the case*:

Bryukhanov
and Potyaev

should both *be* (*politely*) *told off*: another *quarrel* between you two and we shall dismiss and jail both.[223]

That's all.

Written on July 7, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

236
TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN A SITTING OF THE COMMISSION ON TACTICS OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

To Comrade Zinoviev, with a request to communicate the following to the members of yesterday's Commission:

Dear Comrades:

I have been informed that what I said in the Commission yesterday against—rather, against some—Hungarian Communists has aroused dissatisfaction.[224] I hasten therefore to inform you in writing: when I was an émigré myself (for more than 15 years), I took "too Leftist" a stand several times (as I now realise). In August 1917, I was also an émigré and moved in our Party Central Committee a much too "Leftist" proposal which, happily, was flatly rejected.[225] It is quite natural for émigrés frequently to adopt attitudes which are "too Leftist". It has never

entered my mind, now or in the past, to impute this to such fine, loyal, dedicated and worthy revolutionaries as the Hungarian émigrés, who are so much respected by all of us, and by the whole Communist International.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

7/VII.1921.

First published in part in German on January 27, 1924 in the newspaper *Vorwärts* (Reichenberg) No. 23

First published in Russian in part in 1924 in the book, *Lenin v svete inostrannoi pechati* (Lenin in the Light of the Foreign Press)

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

237

TO THE ORGBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

I request the Orgbureau or the C.C. Secretariat (with subsequent approval by the Politbureau over the telephone) to allow me a month's holiday, in accordance with Dr. Getier's orders, with attendance of Politbureau, C.P.C. and C.L.D. sittings for two or three hours a day, two or three times a week. I shall inform Comrade Molotov (within a few days) about the date of my holiday.[226]

Lenin

8/VII.

Written on July 8, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

238

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[227]

Comrade Zinoviev:

I think we should agree, **as an exception**, with the exception strictly specified. Please have this put through the Politbureau *by telephone* **right away.**

Lenin

Written in July,
not before the 9th, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

239

TO I. T. SMILGA

Comrade Smilga:

I have read the draft. I enclose my amendments.[228]

My *insistent* advice is

1) not to make the move in *your* name (why tease the geese? Why *make* the possible *unanimity* of one and all *more difficult*?).

2) Make the move only on behalf of the S.E.C. *Presidium.* S.E.C. Chairman Bogdanov will introduce it in the C.C.

3) Another piece of advice: agree with Krzhizhanovsky the wording of the point on Gosplan (your wording is *wrong*; I shall not accept it).

The basic point can be easily agreed, and then the thing should be moved on behalf of the two presidiums: the S.E.C. Presidium + Gosplan Presidium.

Please reply on $\frac{11}{\text{VII}}$.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. Perhaps it should also be shown to the People's

Commissariat for Food and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

Think this over and reply on $\frac{11}{VII}$.

Written on July 10, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

240
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky

(Secret)
10/VII.

G. M.:

Please read this as soon as you can. Compare this draft with my amendments (in pencil).

Tell me what you think.

I have crossed out the §§ about Gosplan. Perhaps you will replace them by one paragraph: say, there is need to accelerate, increase and intensify in the precisely specified direction.

The theses could then perhaps go over the signature of the S.E.C. Presidium + Gosplan Presidium?

Return and reply as soon as you can.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on July 10, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

241
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV, A. M. LEZHAVA AND V. A. AVANESOV

For the time being please do not show this draft to anyone, read it at once, if you can, with especial attention, and phone me or (if you can't get me on the phone) write

me a line this very day: do you find this acceptable? Which amendments would you like to make (very briefly)?

I believe it is extremely important to have this put through speedily and *unanimously*.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*
Printed from the original

242
TO I. T. SMILGA

Comrade Smilga:

I think Krzhizhanovsky's text will fully meet with your requirements. I very strongly advise you to place before the S.E.C. Presidium today (the S.E.C. Presidium does meet today, doesn't it?) the *draft* (with my amendments, i.e., without the § on Gosplan), *taking as a basis*, say, Krzhizhanovsky's text, and send it to me **together with the draft.**

11/VII.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

243
TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[229]

I am in favour of *both* proposals.

1) Start supply of coal and foodstuffs to Petrograd right away; sign right away.

2) Accept Nansen's terms: he will send one man.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53
Printed from the original

244
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[230]

1

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I *very much* fear that Lezhava's optimism is *groundless*. Ask for the **facts** and check them. Do the checking personally and *twice*. Then have a direct-line talk with Chutskayev and Ivan Nikitich Smirnov. Otherwise I will *not* believe that the matter has been *secured*.

11/VII.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

2

Comrade Smolyaninov:

This is a matter of *exceptional* importance and **urgency.** You are responsible for its execution. Press on with it in every possible way. Krasin will be here on 13/VII. Place before the *C.L.D.* before 13/VII.

11/VII.

Lenin

Written on July 11, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

245
TO N. A. SEMASHKO[231]

Semashko, my pretty one!

Don't fret, sweetheart! We shall leave the Quakers to you, to you *alone*. You mustn't be jealous of Kuskova.

Today's directive to the Politbureau: Kuskova must be strictly rendered harmless. You are in the "communist cell" and will have to be on your toes, *keeping a strict watch over this.*

We shall get Kuskova to give us her name, her signature and a *couple of carloads* from those who sympathise with her (and **others of her stripe). Not a thing more.**

It is really not very hard to do this.

Written on July 12, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

246
TO A. A. KOROSTELEV

Comrade Korostelev,
Member of the Collegium,
Workers' and Peasants' Inspection

13/VII.

Comrade Korostelev:

Why have you not yet done anything about the matter on which we had agreed?[232] L. B. Kamenev says: You have put off your report to the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet of Deputies.

Where's the hitch?

Are there any special reasons? Or is it that you have changed your mind? Perhaps you have failed to reach agreement with someone?

Please let me have an answer to these questions as soon as possible, and also telephone me, in case of need. This is an extremely important and urgent matter.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 13, 1921

First published in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from the original

247
TO LYDIA FOTIEVA[233]

Comrade Fotieva:

1) *Urgently* find the author, have a talk with him, reassure him and tell him that I am ill but will see to it that the matter is dealt with.

2) Please have his letter typed in several copies:
1 for Molotov
1 for Solts, Central Control Commission.

3) When sending the letter to Molotov add on my behalf: I propose that a Control Commission should be sent to the Don consisting of a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee + 10 (or 20) of Sverdlov men (taking the author along with them), and that everyone found guilty of plundering should be *shot on the spot*.

13/VII. *Lenin*

Written on July 13, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

248
TO M. M. BORODIN

Comrade Borodin

Dear Comrade:

Could you get me some material relating to the American third party of the workers' and peasants', or the workers' and farmers', union, or the non-partisan party, and its activity in the State of North Dakota, which is in this party's hands.[234] I should like to have a few but the most important documents on this party and its activity in North Dakota and, what would be even better, a short note from you on this question, in addition to these documents. If it is not too much trouble, write me soon, whether you are able to do this and when.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on July 13, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

249
TO G. L. SHKLOVSKY

Comrade Shklovsky:

I have spoken both to Stomonyakov and Krasin. I enclose a note from Krasin. He promised to see you. Lutovinov gave me his "word of honour" that he would treat you "impartially". I have done *everything I could*. I reaffirm what I have told you personally: you should "make a fresh start" in Berlin and *gain* a position *for yourself by your work*. This happened to *some* old Party members after 1917. Best wishes to you and your whole family!

Lenin

Written between July 13 and 19, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

250
TO A. A. KOROSTELEV[235]

Comrade *Korostelev*:

Of course, the whole point is *to help the enterprises*. You are right. We shall start switching individual enterprises to collective supply *immediately*. Both L. B. Kamenev and myself are in favour of this. We shall get through the *C.L.D.* the list which *you* will hand in, by agreement with the Moscow presidium (or *against* the Moscow workers, if they prove to be obstinate). Please reply by messenger.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 15, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

251
TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY AND I. S. UNSCHLICHT

Dzerzhinsky, People's Commissariat for Railways
Unschlicht, All-Russia Extraordinary Commission

I draw your attention to the following telegram which

I have received.[236] Please take the most vigorous measures to combat this and let me know what exactly you have done and how you have arranged to check up on the measures actually taken.

Lenin

Written on July 15, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

252
*ADDITION TO LETTER ON FRANCE

France very much wants to know whether there is an English translation of the latest decrees.

(Taxes, freedom to trade, lease of enterprises, etc.)

Could this be arranged for him?

Lenin

Written in July, not before the 15th, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

253
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

Rothstein is complaining about Baku. What is your decision? Perhaps this should be put through the C.C., to make it binding on Orjonikidze (a member of the C.C.).

Give Molotov the finished *draft* (text) of the C.C. resolution, we shall get it through by phone.[237]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 16, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

254

ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY

Please let me have a set of the newspaper *Rudè Pravo* (*Red Right*)[238] of the Czech Communist Party, relating to the Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in May 1921[239] (ask Axelrod or the Czechoslovak delegate Šmeral).

The same thing, with the German newspaper *Vorwärts*, which is published in Reichenberg in Czechoslovakia. (Ask Axelrod or Krejbich, the delegate of the German Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.)

Dictated by phone in July, before the 17th, 1921

First published in October 1958 in the magazine *World Marxist Review* No. 2

Printed from a typewritten text

255

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. D. TSYURUPA

G. D. Tsyurupa, Public Works Committee

Please take the opportunity of Stomonyakov's and Krasin's presence in Moscow to make the final arrangements together with them on the purchase in Berlin of what is still required to complete the Kashira project and also to pay for the orders. Let me know in brief whether everything has been quite settled in this matter, and when the ordered things are to arrive.

Dictated by phone on July 17, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

256

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

Iv. Iv. Skvortsov-Stepanov:

Please let me know how you are getting on with the work you promised, the one we spoke of last time, and when it will be ready.[240]

Dictated by phone on July 17, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten text

257

*TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ROGOZHSKO-SIMONOVSKY SOVIET OF DEPUTIES

Comrades K. Ukhanov and N. Borisov

17/VII.

Dear Comrades:

I thank you very much for the book you have sent me[241] and for your friendly letter. I have read the book with interest. It will undoubtedly be important for the history of how the Soviet power was organised.

I am sending you a copy of the just published law on the district economic councils and the "Mandate". I hope that you will get a statistician in advance, give him the material, verify his work, add to it yourself (together with essays by some other local Rogozhsko-Simonovsky comrades, if any are willing to write them) and publish next autumn a report on the *content* and the *results* of local economic work by your district Soviet of Deputies. I hope that you will display initiative in this and that your district will be among the first in developing local economic construction.

I thank you once again, and send you communist greetings.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on July 17, 1921
First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

258

TELEGRAM TO THE SIMBIRSK UYEZD CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

Twelfth Simbirsk Uyezd Congress of Soviets
Simbirsk

This is to inform you that the Soviet Government is taking the most urgent and resolute measures to render

assistance to those who have suffered from the crop failure. Collections have been started everywhere. On 12/VII the All-Russia Central Executive Committee appealed to the whole population of Russia to do everything to help the starving. A special famine relief committee has been set up under the All-Russia C.E.C. A similar committee has been set up to obtain assistance in the form of grain from abroad. Authorised representatives of the All-Russia C.E.C. are leaving for your parts within a few days. We are doing everything we can.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on July 18 or 19, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from notes
in Lydia Fotieva's hand
and signed by Lenin

259

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO M. I. KALININ AND L. B. KAMENEV

Kalinin has told me of the idea to make a special collection of one pound per pood of collected grain in aid of the starving in the Volga area. Let me know whether this matter has been pushed through and when you intend to have it passed by the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C.[242] I think we should: 1) have this passed at once; 2) demand, as a matter of the greatest urgency, that each uyezd should send a few carloads of grain to the Volga area, and that every consignment of grain must be accompanied by two or three local peasants who will see for themselves the scale of the disaster and tell their fellow peasants about it; 3) we should consider the institution of some kind of order or honorary cross for intensified assistance to the starving in the Volga area.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Dictated by phone
on July 19, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten text

260

ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY AND NOTE TO L. G. LEVIN

To the doctor who is to be in charge of Comrade Béla Kun's treatment (address to Comrade Zinoviev, via the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, at the sanatorium where he is, and where Comrade Béla Kun will also be)

Please report to me in brief about Comrade Béla Kun's state of health, and also how long the treatment will take, and what sort of treatment you propose.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Dictated by phone
on July 19, 1921

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from
a typewritten text

261

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO B. S. STOMONYAKOV*

Orders for the Kashira electric-power station are of especial importance. There is a C.C. decision on the unconditional need to accelerate this matter, so as to have the station started with 12,000 kw not later than December of this year. Find out about these orders everything you can before you leave, and upon your arrival in Berlin take all steps to speed and check up on accurate execution. I regard this as your personal responsibility. Please telegraph me from Berlin about the measures you take, when exactly the orders will be ready, and when exactly they will be delivered in Moscow.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 20, 1921
Sent to Berlin

First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the text
in Lydia Fotieva's hand

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* For the draft of this telephone message see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 214-15.—*Ed.*

262

TO THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE COAL INDUSTRY

Glavugol, S.E.C.

Please let me know without delay how far the things have gone with the purchase abroad of coal-cutting machines for the Donets Basin.

Comrade Smolyaninov has informed me that he has established from his telephone conversations with Comrade Grigoryev that there are some doubts at Glavugol about the proven advisability of making extensive use of coal-cutting machines in the extraction of coal, or at any rate, that the production effect expected by Comrade Pyatakov from the use of coal-cutting machines is exaggerated.

Please let me have absolutely precise and definite information about Glavugol's opinion on the advisability of coal-cutting machines in the extraction of coal in the Donets Basin, and on the effect their use in production can have on boosting output.

Also let me know where, and where best, coal-cutting machines can be bought—in Germany or in Britain, and how soon this can be done.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 20, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

263

TO M. I. FRUMKIN

Frumkin

20/VII.

I have read your letter on 20/VII.

I agree with you that co-operatives cannot be allowed to *increase* the prices of agricultural produce. But there you must make fully practicable and concrete proposals.

The same thing applies to the meat agreement. Keep an eye on the results of the co-operative work and bring in concrete proposals.

Lenin

Written on July 20, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

264
TO RICHARD MÜLLER AND HEINRICH MALZAHN

20/VII.1921.

Comrades Richard Müller
and Heinrich Malzahn

Dear Comrades:

I was able to read your letter of 18/VII only today.[243] I have spoken with Comrade Heckert on the question you raised only once and quite briefly. When he asked what I thought about it, I told him that I was too inadequately informed to judge, that those expelled should of course be organised in some way, and that *in this sense* Heckert's proposal *seems* to be correct.

That is all.

I know *nothing* about "unions", or the tactless actions of individual Communists (which made expulsion easier for the social-traitors).

The resolution adopted by the congress (which you have sent me) tells me that the unions are *not* approved ("insignificant", "diffuse", "sow confusion"). The practical slogan is: "Do not pull out more workers' groups from the centralised free unions."

What is there to be said against it?

Moreover, you yourselves hope to secure control of the unions.

I shall send your letter to Comrades Lozovsky and Zinoviev, to obtain fuller information.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

265
TO I. S. LOBACHEV AND A. I. RYKOV

Comrade Lobachev
Comrade Rykov, Commission of Workers' Supply

Chicherin complains that the foreigners are being deprived of state supplies. He insists that this is absolutely impossible. I find his arguments serious. Please discuss whether it would not be desirable to buy certain quantities of foodstuffs abroad for the arriving foreigners, and to charge them at a rate that would quite cover our expenditures.

Chicherin has an even stronger complaint over the 100 rations taken away from the personnel of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. I think that these rations should in fact be left with the P.C.F.A.

Please let me know what you decide.

Lenin

Written on July 20, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from a typewritten copy

266
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

I have just read yesterday's C.P.C. decision on the matter of the Petrograd port. The text shows that the decision has been adopted and that the contract is to be framed by a special Commission with the participation of the P.C.F.A., the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, and the Petrograd Soviet. Introduce your concrete proposal and try to get it through in this Commission.[244]

Lenin

Written on July 20, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

267

TO Y. M. STEKLOV, MARIA ULYANOVA, V. A. KARPINSKY, G. I. KRUMIN

21-VII-21

Comrade Steklov, *Izvestia VTsIK* Editorial Board
Comrade Ulyanova, *Pravda* ” ”
Comrade Karpinsky, *Bednota* ” ”
Comrade Krumin, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* ” ”
Copy to Comrade Smolyaninov

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

I should like to draw your attention to the “Collection of Government Statutes and Decrees” No. 44 of 1-VII-1921, “On Local Economic Conferences, Their Reports and Guidance by the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. Order” (All-Russia Central Executive Committee resolution).

There is need to insert a number of articles, stating and giving a detailed explanation of the importance of this All-Russia C.E.C. resolution, with special emphasis that no reporting machinery may be set up, because the law designates the gubernia and uyezd statistical bureaus as the only machinery.

Give a detailed exposition of the fundamental importance of local economic conferences and their reports, which are published for the information of the public, both for conducting the new economic policy in general, and for correct economic operations.

Special stress should be laid on the commodity exchange, then on the development of local economic initiative, on combating red tape and on enlisting non-Party people for economic construction.

I request that ROSTA should send two or three short wires on this subject to inform all gubernia and uyezd towns at once, asking them to carry reprints in all local Party and Soviet newspapers.

I ask the editorial boards of the Moscow papers to send me either cuttings of articles inserted in accordance with my present request or separate issues with articles on this subject, specially underscored.

It will be Comrade Smolyaninov's duty to see that this is done and to inform me of any questions that may arise in the process.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in part in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from
a typewritten copy

268
TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO A. I. RYKOV

Send the following telephone message to *Rykov*:
(*Copy* to Smolyaninov)

I consider quite correct your decision to authorise the People's Commissariat for Food to set up a special shop (store) for the sale of foodstuffs (and other things) to foreigners and Comintern visitors. I propose that it should be passed through the *C.L.D.* and *expedited* in every way.[245] The shop should be run on strictly commercial lines, with an individual manager. Purchases at the shop should be allowed only to those who arrive from abroad, presenting their special identity cards and consumer drawing cards. I assign Smolyaninov to keep a special check on this matter.

Lenin

22/VII.

Written on July 22, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

269

TO V. M. BAZHANOV AND S. A. GETSOV

Comrades Bazhanov or Getsov,
Central Coal Administration, S.E.C.

Please take all resolute measures to secure the earliest purchase of coal-cutting machines abroad. To expedite procurement and to clarify all matters connected with the purchase make use of the presence in Moscow of Comrade Stomonyakov, the authorised representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in Germany.

Please keep me informed through Comrade Smolyaninov about all the measures you take to expedite procurement and purchase of the machinery.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on July 22, 1921
First published in 1957 in the magazine *Sotsialistichesky Trud* No. 10

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

270

TO M. A. KRUCHINSKY

23/VII.1921.

Comrade Mikh. Kruchinsky:

I have received your letter with all the documents concerning Gukon.[246]

I am very sorry to say that while you have accused others of being hysterical, you yourself have (to put it mildly) succumbed to the mood. Will you please write in future with greater restraint and *deliberation*.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on July 23, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

271

MARKINGS ON A TELEGRAM FROM INZA AND A NOTE TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV, V. A. AVANESOV AND V. M. MOLOTOV

× × ... The peasants of Samara and Simbirsk gubernias have expressed a great desire to work in harvesting teams in the grain-producing gubernias, and are acting as inspector-agitators in the collection of the tax in kind in the grain-producing gubernias. The speediest solution of the question is desirable. Inform Samara and Simbirsk of this....

Belkin
Chairman, All-Russia C.E.C. Commission

Bryukhanov, Avanesov and Molotov

Please arrange a small conference on the underscored (× ×) most important question: Bryukhanov + Avanesov + Molotov and *pass through* the **C.L.D. right away.** This is extremely important.

It is necessary and useful.

24/VII. *Lenin*

Written on July 24, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

272

TO A. I. POTYAEV AND V. A. AVANESOV

Comrade Potyaev
(and Comrade Avanesov)

Comrade Potyaev:

I am sure you have read this already?[247] Have a look at my remarks and send *at once* (this very day) to Avanesov.

You should arrange a short conference with Avanesov on Monday or Tuesday, interrogate the accused ((Nepryakhin and someone from the leading workers at the All-Russia Central T.U.C.)), and have them (both accused) give *short depositions in writing* and introduce in the *C.L.D.* on Wednesday, 27/VII.

1) Severe reprimand and, I think, *personal arrest* for Nepryakhin and the person from the All-Russia Central T.U.C. guilty of red tape, mismanagement, and *breach* of the *C.L.D.* order.

2) A number of *precise* proposals, practical and business-like, to expedite the shipment of fish, and *to assure the success of the autumn fishing* in Astrakhan district.

24/VII.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 24, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

273
TO A. I. POTYAEV

Comrade Potyaev:

Has your squabble with the People's Commissariat for Food been entirely eliminated? Every trace of it must be wiped out.

Write me about this.

I send you Babkin's report with my remarks and proposals.

I hope your relations with Babkin have not been spoiled by this squabble.

On Wednesday, a number of precise and urgent measures for the autumn fishing season must be passed through the *C.L.D.*

Buy some of the things abroad if this cannot be avoided.

Phone me on Tuesday or Wednesday morning—you can do this from my office.

And what about the sale of caviar abroad?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

24/VII.

Written on July 24, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

274
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

Comrade Bryukhanov:

Have you quite normalised relations with Potyaev? Have you erased every trace of the *squabble*? That is imperative.

I am not blaming you for the squabble, but someone (? who?) on the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food. I don't know who was chiefly to blame. I think your fault lies in weakness: you should have found the squabbler and given him a severe drubbing in public, letting me sign a paper issuing him a reprimand. I believe there is a trouble-maker on the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food!

With communist greetings,

Lenin

24/VII.

Written on July 24, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

275
TO I. P. BABKIN

Comrade Babkin:

I have received and read your papers.

Give your business proposals concerning the shipment of fish and the success of the autumn fishing *right away* (25/VII) to Avanesov for introduction in the C.L.D. (and to *Potyaev*, of course, in the first place).

We shall let you have a holiday, if the doctor says so, and puts it in writing that the holiday cannot be deferred until the winter. Otherwise you can have it in winter.

I advise you to have a *personal* talk with Potyaev and to remove his doubts about "rivalry" on your part. Everything will be settled *if you want it*.

Who is it specifically of the "local" workers that is dissatisfied with Potyaev? Why? When and where has this been stated?

I don't believe it: this is nothing but a squabble; we shall settle it.

24/VII.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 24, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

276
TO A. I. RYKOV

Secret

Comrade Rykov (return to me)

Comrade Rykov:

I think Babkin should be reproved and left to do his job (since he agrees to have Potyaev at the S.E.C., the whole thing is nothing but a squabble and a lot of gossip).

Obtain a paper on Babkin's illness from a *good* doctor: put off his holiday until the winter, if possible; if it cannot be put off, let him go at once, but put an *obligation* on him to receive serious treatment.

I am writing separately to Potyaev and Avanesov* about his business proposals for introduction in the C.L.D. on 27/VII.

Lenin

24/VII.

Written on July 24, 1921
First published in 1932
in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

277
TO N. OSINSKY

Comrade Osinsky
(with a request to read and pass on to Comrade Teodorovich)

The author, Comrade Fofanova, has been a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture.

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* See Document 272 of this volume.—*Ed.*

I am not proposing her for this post.

She is a Party comrade who had passed the supreme test *even before* October 1917.

She is an agronomist.

I think we must make use of her: ask her to come and see you, have a talk, and think it over. She could be put to local work or as an inspector.

There are so few Party comrades among agronomists, and the milieu (agronomists) is so "alien", that a Party member should be grasped at with both hands to help us to keep an eye on this milieu, check up on it, and *attract this milieu* towards us.

Drop me a line when you decide what to do.

Lenin

P.S. Please return Fofanova's letter.

Written in July,
after the 24th, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

278

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO N. L. MESHCHERYAKOV[248]

I have learned from Chicherin's letter that you have prepared a pamphlet or a series of articles on the Georgian question.[249] Have you made use of the resolution of the 1919 Menshevik conference, holding the bloc between the Georgian Mensheviks and the Entente to be inadmissible and condemning this bloc?

If you do not have this resolution, I could get it for you.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on July 25, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten text

279

TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

Roughly this resolution must be got through the *Orgbureau* (with confirmation by the Politbureau):

1) charge Meshcheryakov to make haste;
2) *appoint a person responsible* for *speedy* publication;
3) directive to the press;
4) assignment to Scheinman to *expedite* matters;
5) ditto—*Yenukidze* on *all* these questions.

25/VII.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on July 25, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

280

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET

Presidium of the Moscow Soviet
Copies to Sorokin, Gubernia Statistical Bureau,
Gubernia Economic Council
and Gubernia Trade Union Council

1. There is very great doubt about the correctness of the data submitted to me by Sorokin today concerning the 30 per cent reduction.[250]

2. There is equal doubt about it being right to carry out the cuts, in the sense that the axe is being put to the wrong groups. The reduction should fall on the enterprises and establishments which are not absolutely essential.

3. Sorokin's reference to there allegedly being no data about the groups of enterprises and establishments which are not absolutely essential shows that things at the Gubernia Statistical Bureau, the Gubernia Trade Union Council and the Gubernia Economic Council are extremely unsatisfactory.

Please let me have exact data and a precise explanation for tomorrow's sitting of the Council of People's Commissars (26.VII.21).

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on July 25, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten text

281

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

Re: the draft agreement concerning the Dashnaks which Joffe initialled in Riga.[251] I quite agree with Chicherin's arguments and propose that the agreement should be resolutely and immediately rejected. I propose the immediate passage by phone of this resolution: "The draft agreement signed by Joffe and other comrades in Riga concerning the Dashnaks is hereby resolutely and immediately rejected."

I believe Chicherin is absolutely right when he says that such an agreement is not only wrong, but dangerous.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on July 25, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from
a typewritten copy

282

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO L. B. KRASIN

Comrade Krasin
Copy to Comrade Chicherin

Klyshko has sent a telegram to your address on the 21st, saying that substantial assistance to Russia can be got through only in the event of a more or less favourable attitude to the Soviet Government on the part of Britain's government circles.[252] I very much fear that Klyshko is taking the wrong approach and is allowing himself to be involved in inadmissible promises or statements. We don't care about Britain's government circles. Klyshko should be taken to task, and made to use his head.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on July 25, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from
a typewritten text

283
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[253]

Comrade Chicherin:

1) If Lunacharsky+Krasin were *in favour*, *they* should have been made to carry the whole thing.

2) Why are *you* being burdened with these trifles? Where is Gorbunov or his *deputy*? After all, it is **their business!!**

3) A decree was adopted (a few days ago): to set up a shop (store) for foreigners. Gorbunov (or his deputy) should handle this and the *flats* (+**Krasin**).

With communist greetings,

Lenin

25/VII.

Written on July 25, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

284
TO M. M. BORODIN

Comrade Borodin

Comrade Borodin:

Your note is very interesting. I think you should put the finishing touches to it (as you yourself hope to do) to turn it into an article for *Communist International* or a pamphlet.

Collect all the material. Throw out the polemics against Communists. Make it explanatory, not polemical—it could be a most useful thing.*

With communist greetings,

Lenin

26/VII.

Written on July 26, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* See Document 248 of this volume.—*Ed.*

285

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD

Central Statistical Board

I request the head of the industrial statistics department to let me have the following data as soon as possible:

1) what data are coming in to the department of current industrial statistics and how often;

2) from how many big establishments;

3) the percentage (even if only a rough one) of correct reports and short statements coming in;

4) for which recent months there are satisfactory data;

5) when can I have the shortest abstract of the latest data relating only to the main branches of industry;

6) are the few very big establishments brought together under a separate head, if they are, how many are there of them and what data are available on them.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Dictated by phone
on July 28, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten text

286

TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

28/VII.1921.

Comrade Zinoviev:

In view of a number of statements made by Zetkin, I regard the conversation I had with her yesterday, before her departure, to be so important that I must inform you of it.

She wants to set Levi two conditions:

1) resign his parliamentary seat;

2) close down his organ (*Sowiet*[254] or *Unser Weg*, as I believe it is now called), issuing a statement of loyalty

in respect of the decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International.

Furthermore, she is afraid that it could occur to some friend of Levi's to publish Rosa Luxemburg's manuscript against the Bolsheviks (which I think she wrote in prison in 1918). If anyone should do this, she intends to make a statement in the press that she is quite sure such an act is disloyal. She would say that she had known Rosa Luxemburg best of all, and is sure that she herself admitted these views to be erroneous, that she admitted, upon her release from prison, that she had been insufficiently informed.

In addition, Léon Jogiches, Rosa Luxemburg's closest friend, in a detailed talk with Zetkin, two days before he died, told her about this manuscript of Rosa Luxemburg's, and about Rosa Luxemburg herself admitting that it was wrong.[255] Zetkin was going to write you about this at my request.

If she has done so, please send me her letter.

Another interesting point, according to her, is that there is a wave of unification of *all* workers (both S.D.P. and U.S.P.-Leute) in the struggle against Lohnabbau,* etc. Of course, Zetkin was *quite right* in saying that the Communists should *back* this unification *in the struggle against the capitalists*. If the "Lefts" should object, they should be made to see reason.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Zinoviev

P.S. Lozovsky *has already published* the Congress resolutions of the Red International of Trade Unions. Well done!

What about *you*?? Appoint *a person to be responsible* for editing, and get *Lozovsky* to publish the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Communist International.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* Wage-cuts.—*Ed.*

287

TO L. B. KRASIN[256]

(secret)
(to be returned)

Krasin

My opinion is:

Set up a small commission to work out the plan in detail. *Approve in substance.* Ascertain more precisely the amount of the loan, the dates and the terms of repayment *in raw materials and timber* (first year, in *our* gold: 30 million rubles in gold; we could make it *two* years at 30 million rubles in gold). Ten per cent a year with *repayment*? Isn't that too much?

Etwa:
Krasin.
Alsky,
+
?Avanesov?
or
Trotsky?

28/VII.

Lenin

Written on July 28, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

288

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[257]

Comrade Molotov:

Trotsky and other members of the Politbureau must be *urgently* asked. I am inclined to agree provided *strict* conditions are worked out and the moment *put off*.

29/VII. *Lenin*

Written on July 29, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

289
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

I wrote you about the need to *punish* Badayev (for frustrating the *C.L.D.* decision; fulfilled by the Muscovites).* You have not replied.

Such things must be settled speedily.

Kamenev and *Zinoviev* agree. Write the minutes of the *Politbureau* decision for the passage through the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C.: "For failure to fulfil a *C.L.D.* decision (on reducing rations by 30 per cent)—which the Muscovites have carried out—Comrade Badayev+*two of* his *closest assistants* shall be placed under *detention* for one Sunday."

That will give us "control"!!

Lenin

Written in July, not before the 29th, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

290
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[258]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

Please have a talk with Potyaev and Avanesov. See below Point *1* concerning Nepryakhin.**

Why have you failed to introduce it in the *C.L.D.*?

This business should not have been salted away while Nepryakhin was in Moscow. Such things should not be left without punishment.

This is carelessness, and not management of economic work.

30/VII. *Lenin*

Written on July 30, 1921

First published in 1932 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the original

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* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 94.—*Ed.*

** See Document 272 of this volume.—*Ed.*

291

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO N. N. VASHKOV

Comrade Vashkov, Electrical Department, S.E.C.
Copy to Comrade Krzhizhanovsky

I thank you very much for the article, "Electrification of Russia" in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* of 10/VII.[259]

It is highly important that such information should appear in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* and in the popular press from time to time. If you happen to have it, please send me the following additional information: 1) your table shows the electric-power station capacity in 1920 as being 7.670 kw. Does this include Shatura's 5,000 kw?

2) Your article shows that in 1920 the Tula group yielded 3,000 kw. Is that reflected in the table, or is such information not included?

3) Is it possible to bring out the larger stations which are of real industrial importance, say, those of 1,000 kw or those of a size which could be classed as large and which are of importance to industry?

4) For how many months of 1921 do you have consolidated tables in which 1921 is shown at all?

5) Do you happen to have any details on the early stages of organisation of the Shterovka, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhni-Novgorod and Chelyabinsk stations?

6) Your article says that the combination of several large stations could give Moscow 10,000 kw. Please let me know whether it has actually done so, exactly how much and when?

7) Could you let me have some details about the power stations in Bolshevo district, near Mytishchi, and the Detskoye Selo station, which supplies Petrograd, and more exact information about the time of their expected completion?

Please let me know also whether the forthcoming Electrotechnical Congress in October[260] could be used to collect fuller and more precise information about all the existing electrotechnical stations, their distribution by uyezd and gubernia, the time of their establishment, the number of

stations being used to teach electricity and electrification, etc.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 1, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

292
TO G. I. MYASNIKOV

1/VIII.

Comrade Myasnikov:

I read your article, which Bukharin passed on to me, only today, and very cursorily.

I should like to have a talk with you. I hope to be in Moscow one of these days and find time for a half-hour talk with you.

The beginning of your article is good and business-like.

But there are some obvious errors in your conclusions.

Perhaps there is some misunderstanding: it looks as if you *have failed to say* in the article what you had told N. I. Bukharin. What sort of "freedom of the press" do you want? Under the law? For workers too—S.R.s and Mensheviks? Just now? The article does not make it clear.[261]

Drop me a line.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on August 1, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

293
TO L. K. MARTENS

Martens

I have received a telegram from Riga about the congress of societies in the United States and Canada for tech-

nical aid to Soviet Russia, which *Golos Rossii*[262] of New York says was held there early in July.[263]

According to this report, the congress sent a telegram of greetings to Martens and the People's Commissars, and announced in this telegram its decision to start organising technical teams for dispatch to Soviet Russia right away.

I think I should send them a telegram on these lines:

"Having learned from the New York *Golos Rossii* about your congress and its telegram of greetings to Soviet Russia, I express, on behalf of the C.P.C., our heart-felt gratitude.

"Let me add, on my own behalf: we are greatly in need of technical aid from the United States and Canada. If teams are to be sent without agreement in advance concerning the place of settlement, factory, etc., the team must have a two-year supply of food, clothing, etc. Each team must be prepared to do both agricultural and industrial work. The best thing is to have delegates sent ahead for an on-the-spot inspection of land tracts for settlement, forest tracts, mines, factories, etc., for lease."

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

This requires the signatures of Martens and the People's Commissariat for Labour, and Bogdanov's and Chicherin's are also desirable.

Written on August 2, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

294

*TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD

I have received your communication No. 7772 of July 29. Please let me have the information available at the C.S.B. for 1920 (and for a part of 1921, if also available) in the most concise form, namely: 1) to how many gubernias and to what period do the data apply; 2) totals for manufactured output; 3) total fuel consumption.

Only these three figures and only for the key branches of industry (for instance, textile, metallurgy, paper, electrotechnical goods, salt and rubber).

Total results if available. Show data from central boards and those direct from the factories separately.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 2, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten text

295
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

3.VIII.1921

Comrade Chicherin:

Who is this Ionov?

How can he propose Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries?[264]

This seems to show or reveal something thoroughly evil.

What do you think?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

296
TO M. I. FRUMKIN

4/VIII.

Comrade Frumkin:

The whole thing now seems to hinge on the speedy collection of the tax in kind.

Perhaps we should, in addition to what has been done, undertake something on these lines:

1) reinforce military units (assign half the *trainees* in

Moscow Gubernia to this),* i.e., assign them to food supply work?

2) the same thing, especially in Moscow and neighbouring gubernias?

3) *feed these units* (and food detachments, which I think now have some different name: "militia promoting the collection of the tax in kind" or something like that?) *at the expense of the local peasants at two pounds a day? or three pounds a day?*

You don't want this, comrades peasants, do you? Let's have the *grain tax* fast. As soon as you deliver 50-75 per cent, we shall *start* pulling them out!

4) pass a resolution (or perhaps, instead of a "resolution", *stage* an experiment and set up a *model* in Moscow Gubernia);

mete out instant, exemplary and highly severe punishment to 10 of the *richest* peasants per volost *for any delay*, however slight, over the tax in kind or for *slack* delivery of the tax in kind;

— — — ditto—mete out *exemplary* punishment to one volost per uyezd, or two-three per gubernia, for *slack* deliveries of the tax in kind?

5) issue a **bonus** for 100 per cent collection of tax (grain) within two or three weeks. Bonus in what form? In *gold or silver things*. We can get them at *the State Depository of Valuables*.

6) make an effort to mobilise for the collection of the tax in kind in *Moscow* Gubernia another 2 or 3 hundred of the most responsible Party members, if only for *raids* (check-ups, pressure) twice a week?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. I am writing you and not Bryukhanov in the hope that he has already gone on holiday. If he has not, of course, read this out to him as well.

Written on August 4, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

* The words in brackets were added by Lenin in the margin.—*Ed.*

297

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Smolyaninov

In view of the detailed and formal protest lodged by Comrade Chicherin against the dispatch of the enclosed telegram[265] please call an additional conference consisting of Comrade Martens, a representative of the People's Commissariat for Labour who is informed on the question, and a representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, also informed on the question. A total of four persons, including yourself.

Please have the conference discuss Chicherin's objections and pay special attention to the demand stated in the telegram that enough food should be brought along for two years.

I think that if we were to add a few words about the fight against hardship and privation in Russia and the uselessness of sending over people who are unable to bear them, the telegram would be only to the good. Please send me a very short resolution in writing not later than tomorrow night.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 4, 1921

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a typewritten copy

298

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov

I have received from Chicherin the draft theses relating to the policy in Bukhara which has been agreed with the Turkestan Commission and our representative in Bukhara.[266]

I vote for approving these theses immediately, polling all the members of the Politbureau by phone.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 4, 1921

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in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

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a typewritten copy

299

RADIO MESSAGE TO ALL GUBERNIA AND UYEZD ECONOMIC CONFERENCES

To All Gubernia and Uyezd Economic Conferences

Tsentropechat* is sending to the localities No. 44 of the Collection of Statutes, containing the C.L.D. Order. The Order is first of all intended for gubernia, uyezd, district and volost economic conferences. I insist most strongly that you should make a special and strict check-up to see that the C.L.D. Order is received by the volost and district economic conferences; and wherever such do not exist, by the volost executive committees. It shall be the personal responsibility of the chairmen and the secretaries of gubernia economic conferences and uyezd economic conferences to see that the volost executive committees receive the Order. I emphasise the absolute necessity of taking the C.L.D. Order all the way down to the volost and the village, to give the broad masses of peasants an opportunity to learn of the latest All-Russia C.E.C. resolution. The gubernia economic conferences are ordered to take steps to dispatch telegrams to the uyezd economic conferences, and the gubernia and uyezd Tsentropechat branches.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written in August,
not before the 4th, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten text

* Central Press Distribution Agency.—*Ed.*

300
TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO L. B. KRASIN

Comrade Krasin

I have received a copy of your letter to Dzerzhinsky concerning shipbuilding. I agree with you that we should not now build seagoing steamships. I believe that military considerations indicate the same thing. It is undoubtedly necessary to intensify the construction of tankers for the oil fleet, especially in the Caspian Sea and on the Volga. I ask you to:

1) request an official Gosplan opinion on this matter;

2) ratify a precise decision at an official conference of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the People's Commissariat for Railways, and, if there is any other department concerned, include it as well.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 5, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

301
TO A. I. POTYAEV

Comrade *Potyaev*

I have been heaping curses on your head for your whining and unbusiness-like attitude. Concerning Meisner, you should have made a formal and written inquiry of Bryukhanov and, given his disagreement, introduced (a copy of his reply) in the C.L.D.

There is no point in dragging it out: this is what helps to spread gossip to which you succumb. You must make use of your rights and stop whimpering. I expect you to let me have your official telephone message about Meisner tomorrow.

Concerning the Party request, table it officially in the Orgbureau, as soon as possible. This has nothing to do with me. You can lodge an appeal in the Politbureau.

I have not yet read the "plan". Set out for me on two pages the differences between N. M. Knipovich and Meisner.[267]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

5-VIII-21

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

302

TELEGRAM TO N. M. KNIPOVICH

Secret

Nikolai Mikhailovich *Knipovich*
(8 Bolshoi Kozikhinsky)

I regret very much that because of my illness I was unable to talk with you when you came to see Nadezhda Konstantinovna. Will you let me have in a few short words: 1) your assessment of Meisner a) from the standpoint of honesty, b) from the political standpoint, c) business qualifications, d) executive capacity and 2) your differences with Glavryba. 3) Your proposals, if you have any, concerning decentralisation in the fishing industry and its organisation in Murmansk.

Regards,

Lenin

Dictated by phone on August 5, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

303

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

You have handled this matter in a very poor way, ignoring the formal side, and displaying a slack, non-military approach.[268]

Henceforth I shall have to take a *more formal* attitude towards you.

Written on August 5, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

304

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV AND C.L.D. MEMBERS[269]

Urgent

Comrade *Smolyaninov*

Please read my letter on the back of this and get it through the *C.L.D.* (with a Gosplan opinion) with the **utmost** speed, in two to four days.

5/8.

Lenin

N.B.:

To get it through fast do the following:

1) Make 2-3 copies. Send one right away to Krzhizhanovsky, asking him for an opinion *by Tuesday*;

2) Circulate to *C.L.D.* members at once, and see to it that they read it fast, making their remarks on their copies right away;

3) Ask the *C.L.D.* members by telephone whether they agree to hand in the preliminary project to a commission—Krasin + Avanesov + Bogdanov (or someone specially authorised by him).

Lenin

I consider the plan correct and subject to *immediate* approval. Perhaps it may be desirable to have some further specifications and additions, such as:

1) let them have the circulating capital *in gold*, but only from our *export earnings* for 1921, *charging* the group in question to expedite the realisation of this export;

2) specify *with greater precision* the "leased" area for the given group, taking mostly, or even exclusively, the very far north (this is more convenient for us, because it will spare us the need to send food over there; it is more convenient politically, because the preferential terms for the workers—up to 50 kopeks *in gold!!*—will cause less envy and fewer collisions among the other workers);

3) give *more precise* definitions of the group's *obligations*: fulfil no less than a given programme (both in production and in *export* in 1922 and especially 1923);

4) bind the "group" to try to abide by the interests of

electrification (buy more foreign equipment for the electric-power stations, make use of saw-dust, etc.)—the interests of Russia's fuel supply (fuel branch-lines; increased supplies of fuel and firewood to Moscow, **etc.**);

5) let the group have what it asks in the sphere of financial and material independence.

5/VIII. 1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

305

DIRECT-LINE TALK WITH M. K. VLADIMIROV ON AUGUST 6, 1921

(Moscow-Kharkov)

Vladimirov: We have established high rates in the Ukraine on the west bank of the Dnieper. This entails heavy risks. We are taking the following measures: to involve the volost economic conferences in the work of discussing a number of questions of interest to the countryside, but we are simultaneously faced with the question of salt, considering its present shortage. The question comes to this: are we to give salt regardless of the payment of tax (this is official), actually, however, giving it first of all to those volosts which have successfully started to collect the tax; let me add that I think it right to sell for ready cash even now. Let me have your opinion.

Lenin: *First*: I advise the sale of salt only for grain, and not for cash in any case.

Second: Sell salt only to those volosts, villages or individual farmers who have paid in at least a quarter or half the tax.

Third: I think that the successful collection of tax requires military units to help it, with these military units receiving larger rations at the expense of the local peasants, until the tax has been paid.

Fourth: Let me know what the food situation is in the Donbas, how well it is supplied, and for how long.

Vladimirov: On the first two questions I maintain the same stand.

Concerning military force, please have a talk with Frunze, who has gone to Moscow.

As for the Donbas, we have four routes for it. We are taking steps to get some locomotives. I believe we shall be able to start regular supplies not later than the 12th.

Lenin: Maintaining the first stand is not enough. You must have a formal C.C. decision. If you cannot obtain it from your C.C. you must get it through the C.C. here. The same applies to the rules of using armed force.

Concerning the Donbas, let me have the briefest and most precise reports twice a week about the quantity of foodstuffs in hand.

Vladimirov: I think this matter can be best decided with Rakovsky and Frunze, who have gone to Moscow. My opinion is on record.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten text

306
TO M. P. TOMSKY[270]

7/VIII.

Comrade Tomsky:

Thank you very much for the letter which is very clear.

Of course, you are right that we in Moscow *must* have "9 million sheep".[271] They must be obtained at all costs! Send us at the *C.L.D.* a calendar programme of their receipt *at once*.

The same about grain.

We are sending Comrade Joffe in an attempt to settle your differences with Comrade Safarov.

I believe the two tendencies *can* and *must* be combined:

1) the *first* priority is grain and meat for Moscow;

2) (for this) a number of concessions and bonuses to the "merchants ";

3) no question about the *new economic policy* (10th Congress, Conference of May 1921, etc.);

4) Moslem *poor peasants' committees* indispensable, and

5) the *Moslem poor* should be treated with care and prudence, with a number of concessions.

It is possible and necessary to combine and *consolidate* the line of wisdom and prudence, maintaining the interests of our "world policy" *throughout* the East.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. The C.C. will probably agree to your request concerning the half-year. We shall have a talk with Rudzutak.

Written on August 7, 1921
Sent to Tashkent
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

307

TO THE NARROW COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS[272]

1

Our houses are *terribly* fouled up. The law is not worth a damn. There must be a tenfold *more precise* **and fuller** indication of the persons *responsible* (not one, but many, one after another), and *remorseless* incarceration.

Written between August 8
and 11, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

2

I do not agree without these additions:

1) apart from the manager, the responsibility shall also fall on his "deputy".

There must be a deputy;

2) apart from them, the responsibility shall also fall on a *control commission* consisting of tenants. There must be such a commission. At least three persons, who should *always be available*, or *their deputies*.

3) All these persons shall be subject both to legal and to *administrative* responsibility.

11/VIII.

Lenin

Written on August 11, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

3

That is not enough.

This must also be added:

1) responsibility of the tenants for failure to elect a manager and his "deputy";

2) ditto, for failure to elect a control commission;

3) it shall be the duty of the manager and his deputy and the control commission to see that a responsible person (either the manager himself or his deputy or a member of the control commission) is on duty *daily*

apart from specially employed persons (yard-keeper, etc.) **where** such *are employed*;

4) responsibility of tenants in houses of less than 10 flats.

How is the tenants' responsibility to be established? This must be considered, and a way found.

19/VIII.

Lenin

Written on August 19, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

308
TO G. I. BOKII

9.VIII.1921

Comrade Bokii:

In your letter about *Shelekhes* (Yakov Savelyevich) you say: "many are putting in a word for him", *including* Lenin, and you request "permission to ignore all petitions and pressures on the Gokhran case".[273]

This is something I cannot allow.

The *inquiry* I sent in is *neither* "intercession", nor "pressure", nor even "petition".

It is my duty to inquire, once *doubt* about the correctness of the proceedings has been brought up with me.

It is your duty to give me a reply *in substance*: "the reasons or the evidence are serious, they are *such-and-such*,

I *object* to his release, to any *mitigation*" and so on and so forth.

Those are the lines, *in substance*, on which you must reply to me.

You are free to *reject* any petitions and "intercessions"; "pressure" is an **unlawful** act. But, I repeat, it is a *mistake* on your part to have confused an *inquiry* from the Chairman of the C.P.C., and a petition, intercession or pressure.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

309
TO MAXIM GORKY

9/VIII.1921

Alexei Maximovich:

I have sent your letter on to L. B. Kamenev.[274]

I am so tired that I am unable to do a thing.

Just think, you have been spitting blood, but refuse to go!! This is truly most shameless and unreasonable on your part.

In a *good* sanatorium in Europe, you will receive treatment, *and also do three times as much useful work*.

Really and truly.

Over here you have neither treatment, nor work—nothing but *hustle*. **Plain empty** *hustle*.

Go away and recover. I beg you not to be stubborn.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1924
in the magazine
Russky Sovremennik No. 1

Printed from the original

310

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

11/VIII.

Comrade Molotov:

It is absolutely necessary to appoint a special commission from the Politbureau:

Kamenev

Trotsky

Molotov (with the right of his substitution by Chicherin) for the day-to-day *handling* of matters connected with aid to the starving from America and the League of Nations.

This game is an extremely intricate one. There is rank duplicity on the part of America, Hoover and the League of Nations Council.

Hoover must be punished, he must be *slapped in the face publicly*, for *all the world* to see, and the League of Nations Council as well.

This is *very hard* to do, but it *must* be done.

I can't work. There is absolute need of help from Trotsky, who has a capacity for these things (both diplomatic experience and a military and political instinct).

Please have a vote taken in the Politbureau **at once** by telephone.

Show this note to *everyone* and get their votes.

Lenin

The German and Norwegian governments could be taken as models.

Any other approach should be rejected with a motivation which is clear to all, and this should be *loudly* proclaimed to the whole world.

The disguised interventionists must be *caught* (have Unschlicht help out).

The Kompomoshch* apparatus must be tightened up (if there is a shortage of men, *borrow* some from the *military* for two months).

---

* A reference to the Central Famine Relief Commission under the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.—*Ed.*

Collegial work is of especial importance in the next few days, because the political responsibility for this *very difficult* matter is *enormous*.

Lenin

P.S. Our moves must be subtle. A number of especially strict measures. Hoover and Brown are liars and brazen-faced fellows.

The conditions must be of *the strictest:* arrest and deportation for the slightest interference in our internal affairs.

Written on August 11, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

311
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Zinoviev, copy to Radek

Can you send me a selection of the smallest possible number of the most important documents and articles relating to the latest events in the French party, connected with the party's attitude to the revolutionary syndicalists.

The same about the events in Rome, when workers of all parties rallied round the Communists in a demonstration against the fascists last July.

Lenin

11/VIII.

Written on August 11, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

312
TO P. A. BOGDANOV

Bogdanov, copy to Smolyaninov

I consider it necessary that all lease-holders, without exception (private persons, societies, Soviet establishments,

etc., etc.), should be subject to the law on accountability relative to the C.L.D. Order and the general rules of accountability. Please see whether there are any precise instructions about this, and, if not, please carry it through the C.L.D. at once.

Lenin

Written on August 11, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

313

TO TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO P. A. BOGDANOV

Bogdanov, copy to Kursky's Deputy

I have great doubts about S.K.F. (Swedish Ball-Bearing Company). Has there been an adequate statement of the legal side of the matter, i.e., has our interest been maintained?

This interest requires that we should not allow the slightest relaxation of the principle that we are the owners of all the nationalised enterprises and warehouses. These enterprises and warehouses could pass into the hands of their former owners only through their formally buying these warehouses from us. We may sometimes make a concession by letting them have these enterprises and warehouses at a low price, but we can never waive our right in the property.

Please have this matter verified with especial care from the said angle. It is my special request that the verification should be carried out at the People's Commissariat for Justice, where Kursky himself was informed of and handled the matter, and it is necessary either to look for Kursky or find someone at the People's Commissariat for Justice who is at least as knowledgeable as Kursky.

Lenin

Dictated by phone on August 11, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

314
TO V. M. MOLOTOV[275]

Comrade Molotov

I am *against*.

The audit game should not be played that hard; Lutovinov is engaged only in auditing. Shlyapnikov will not do.

11/VIII.

Lenin

Written on August 11, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

315
TELEGRAM TO THE PERM GUBERNIA COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)*

Gubernia Committee of the R.C.P., **Perm**

Please have both articles by Myasnikov and my reply letter to him read out at a sitting of the Gubernia Committee.[276] Do the same at a sitting of the Motovilikha District Committee. Ask Myasnikov to make two copies of my reply letter, one for me and the other for the Gubernia Committee.

Lenin

Written on August 12, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

316
TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND L. B. KAMENEV

In view of the fact that the low-down American hucksters are trying to create the impression that we could be expected to cheat,

---

*A note on the original in Lenin's hand says: Sent by phone on 12/VIII."—*Ed.*

I propose that we should immediately telegraph them officially, on behalf of the government, over the signatures of Kamenev and Chicherin (and if necessary Kalinin's and mine as well),

the following:

we shall deposit with a New York bank an amount in gold constituting 120 per cent of what they will supply in the course of a month for one million starving children and sick persons. But in that case, considering such a complete material guarantee, we stipulate that the Americans must absolutely refrain not only from political but also from administrative interference, and must make no claims whatsoever. This means that in that case all the terms of the treaty giving them the least right to interfere even if only administratively shall be void. On-the-spot check-ups are to be made by parity commissions (representing our government and them).[277]

This proposal will show the hucksters just where they stand, and subsequently disgrace them in the eyes of the whole world.

We should not forget that we have never had rationing of any kind in the countryside. If we are to make no mistake on this score, I suggest we invite someone from the People's Commissariat for Food to discuss the matter.

13/VIII-21

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original verified with a typewritten copy

317
TO THEODORE ROTHSTEIN

13/VIII.

Dear Comrade Rothstein:

I received your letter of 17/VII only yesterday.

I seem to be in full agreement with your circumspect policy in Persia. I have not heard the "other side", but I do not think that your main considerations could be refuted.

Why don't you write a work on Persia, to give us all a

chance to make a study of such an interesting subject, which is so obscure for all of us?

It is extremely important to elaborate a *line* of work in the East.

I write no more, as you will know the news from the newspapers, I am now on holiday: I have overworked and am taking a cure.

I hope that Belgov has already reached you.

With him I wrote you about Alexander Alexandrovich and Varvara Alexandrovna Armand, who went with him, and about whom I am very anxious. I hope that they will prove to be useful in Persia, and that you will be able to devote some little time to them.

My best regards and wishes.

Lenin

Written on August 13, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

318

TO A. S. KISELYOV[278]

Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C.

I wonder if there isn't some reduction in the penalty? This should be put before the *Full* C.P.C. and checked. The penalties may only be **increased.**

13/VIII. *Lenin*

Written on August 13, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

319

TO A. M. LEZHAVA

Lezhava

Why is the exchange of Norwegian fish for Russian products at a standstill?[279]

14/8. *Lenin*

Written on August 13, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

320
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

16/VIII.

G. M.:

Please return all this with your opinion in a couple of words.

I find Vashkov's reply unsatisfactory.[280]

Perhaps we should send a telegram from the *C.L.D.*:

to all *gubernia executive committees* for their electrical departments, etc.

Do not fail at once to appoint two or three responsible persons for submitting to the Electrotechnical Congress in X. 1921 full statistics on electric-power stations with data on the time of their establishment, number of kilowatts, fuel, consumption, arrangement of lectures or readings at the stations, etc.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

I think we should send this, shouldn't we?*

Yours,
Lenin

Written on August 16, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

321
TO THE EDITORIAL BOARDS OF *IZVESTIA*, *PRAVDA* AND TO V. N. IPATIEV

The Editorial Boards of *Izvestia* and *Pravda*
and Comrade Ipatiev

The newspapers *Izvestia* and *Pravda* carried an item a few days ago about the unused resources of Kara-Bugaz.[281] May I ask you to tell the author or to let him know through

* See Document 327 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the newspaper, that it is very important for me to have detailed information both about how well the author is technically prepared for this matter, and about how long he had studied the question on the spot.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 17, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

322

TO M. I. FRUMKIN, V. A. AVANESOV AND J. V. STALIN

Comrades Frumkin, Avanesov and Stalin

I have read your draft decree on salt. I am surprised by the great number of points which, in my opinion, are already to be found in the legislation in force, which are an unnecessary repetition, and which do not come within the competence of the C.L.D. Unless I am mistaken, the only new and practically useful point is the prohibition of bonuses in salt. I think the draft needs to be carefully collated with the laws of the People's Commissariat for Justice which are in force, and rewritten. I would advise that the prohibition to issue bonuses in salt should be passed through the C.L.D. as a separate decision right away.[282] What in my opinion is the main thing is not to be found in the draft at all, namely, a number of immediate practical measures for the stricter guarding of salt in the hands of the state, and for a maximum reduction of all manner of issues of salt to industrial and office workers, urban residents and all the population in general. This last measure must be put through, at least for the current autumn and the early winter, in the harshest proportions, as otherwise we shall not get any grain from the peasants in exchange for salt.

Lenin

Written on August 17, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

323
TELEGRAM TO P. L. LAPINSKY

Lapinsky, Berlin

Report what has been done under the assignment you have undertaken to publish an atlas and to study imperialism for this atlas. Give the exact date on which you intend to send us the plan of your work and the deadline for its execution.

Lenin

Written on August 17, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

324
TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO SECRETARY

Please find out whether it is possible to obtain the full German translation of Šmeral's paper at the Congress of the Czechoslovak party in the spring of 1921. I gave this translation to Comrade Axelrod during the congress. It turned out that the first part of the paper, up to the paragraph on moral crisis, is not there. This translation had been given to me by Comrade Krejbich. Please find out whether the missing part of the translation can be found.[283]

Has my pamphlet on the tax in kind been published in any foreign language in Russia or abroad? If it has, please let me have one copy of each.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 17, 1921
First published in 1958
in the magazine
World Marxist Review No. 2

Printed from the text
in Maria Glyasser's hand

325
TELEGRAM TO M. K. VLADIMIROV

Vladimirov, Ukrainian People's Commissariat for Food
Copy to Special Food Committee,
Central Ukrainian Health Resort Administration,
Simferopol

Simferopol reports extremely grave food condition of patients at the Crimean health resort, especially with respect

to bread. Ukraine alone can help out. Try most urgently to send the CUHRA, Simferopol, ten carloads of grain, part of it in flour, and two carloads of fodder. Inform Bryukhanov and me about the measures taken.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on August 17, 1921
Sent to Kharkov
First published in 1960
in the magazine
Voprosy Istorii KPSS No. 2

Printed from
a typewritten text

326
TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

Bryukhanov (enclosed with a copy of telegram to Vladimirov)

The number of patients in the Crimea must be limited to accord with the fully available food supply. The medical authorities seem to ignore this, but the People's Commissariat for Food should strictly and unconditionally cut down their number.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 17, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the text
taken down by Lydia Fotieva

327
TELEGRAM TO GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES FOR THEIR ELECTRICAL DEPARTMENTS

To All Gubernia Executive Committees
for Their Electrical Departments

I hereby propose that all persons delegated to the forthcoming Electrotechnical. Congress in October shall be in duty bound to submit to it statistical information on the date of establishment of electric-power stations, the kw installed, annual supply of kwh, consumption of fuel, reasons for interruption of courses organised at power stations, number of lectures on electrification given by personnel.. The responsibility for urgent fulfilment and full collection

of information concerning each power station, without exception, is to be immediately placed personally on each delegate or on persons specially appointed by the Gubernia Executive Committee.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Dictated by phone
on August 18, 1921

First published in 1924
in the magazine
Elektrifikatsiya No. 4

Printed from the text written
by G. M. Krzhizhanovsky
and Lydia Fotieva

328
TO P. I. POPOV

Comrade Popov:

I am afraid I cannot accept your resignation.

As you are, of course, aware, you are entitled to appeal against my instructions, but your appeal does not suspend the necessity of performance. Please let me have a short list of what you are doing in accordance with my instructions, specifying the dates (roughly, of course, from—to).

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. Certainly, you can and must take sick leave to recover. But in that case write separately to me or, if you want to expedite matters, to Fotieva, and she will read it out to me over the telephone (about the leave and a "deputy"). There must be a formal appointment of a *temporary* "deputy".

P.P.S. Let me add that your letter is much too polemical. I do not object to polemics, but it should be brought out specially. You have been arguing against something that I have never said or thought. Your argument implies that I deny the usefulness of what has been done, etc. But I have never said or thought so.

Please inform me of what you are undertaking in accordance with the points of my letters of June 4* and August

* The letter has not been found.—*Ed.*

16* (for instance: "brief monthly reports on industry will be delivered from *such-and-such* a date", on the *distribution* of foodstuffs on *such* a date, etc.).

Written on August 20, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

329

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky

I draw your special attention to the question of Leslie Urquhart's concession (Kyshtym works and other numerous copper mines).

Krasin and Bogdanov, together with you, must study the terms of the concession and draft an agreement. It is of exceptional importance for us to arrange things in such a way that the concessionaire, who wants to take over nearly all the copper mines in Russia, should, first, guarantee our royalties and our early receipt of them, and, second, that we should have the possibility of obtaining from the concessionaire the necessary equipment to develop the operation of our own mines. After you have studied the matter, please inform me to what extent you believe the one and the other condition are guaranteed, and what is in general the importance of the proposed concession from the standpoint of developing Russia's supply and her electrification in particular.

Lenin

Written on August 22, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

330

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.:

Please *return* this to me after reading.[284]

I may be partly to blame, having caused this bout of hysterics by excessive strictness.

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* See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 30-32.—*Ed.*

But I am-essentially right and will continue to insist, and have *not* accepted his resignation.

What do you think: perhaps we should pass all these measures *through the State Planning Commission* and *specially* confirm them in the *C.L.D.*?

(Read my letter to Popov of 4.VI. 1921: there is a list of 8 points.)

Note in particular: analysis of food distribution; fuel, its saving, etc.

A precise plan for the work of the **Central Statistical Board** and the *State Planning Commission*.

What is your opinion?

Lenin

22/VIII.

P.S. Phone me when you have read this. We shall have *precisely* to agree on all this. Circumstantially and precisely.

Lenin

P.P.S. Don't show Popov's letter to anyone.

Written on August 22, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

331
TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev

1. Is it possible to find and send me my preface to the German edition of my book on imperialism?* I sent the preface to Petrograd a year ago. It seems to have been lost somewhere.

2. I am very anxious about whether our slogan of collecting donations in aid of Russia only directly to our address, i.e., not through the governments, has been brought out quite clearly and prominently in the foreign work-

* See present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304.—*Ed.*

ers' press in general, and in the communist press in particular.

We signed an agreement with the American Secretary of Commerce, Hoover, in Riga on Saturday (do not publish anything about this yet) and Harding has been calling on the American people to send in all donations through Hoover.

It would be extremely important for the Comintern to put forward a definite slogan, without coming out against the American Government for the time being, saying that the workers should send in their donations only directly to the address of Soviet Russia's representatives abroad.

For any donations sent through the bourgeois governments necessarily carry for us, directly or indirectly, to a greater or lesser extent, some sort of strings, whereas the workers will undoubtedly agree to send their donations to us without any strings, and this is a distinction of tremendous importance for us.

Is it possible to check whether the Comintern and the trade union press sympathising with us have accepted the need to send in donations to the Soviet Government's address without any strings, and to start a broad campaign to have all workers set aside a day's earnings in aid of the famine-stricken in Russia?

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on August 22, 1921

Printed for the first time
from a typewritten copy

332

LETTER TO I. T. SMILGA AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY

Very urgent
22.VIII.21.

Comrade Smilga:

I think that one of the gross mistakes in the Donbas, i.e., in all the effort to rehabilitate the Donbas, is that there is no proper co-ordination of local work—industrial, agricultural and commercial.

There seems to have been some friction, on the one hand, between Pyatakov and Rukhimovich, and on the other, between Pyatakov and the local trade unions.

I consider it extremely important for you not to confine yourself to purely industrial matters, relating only to the coal-mining industry, but to devote attention to the need to eliminate the above-mentioned friction.

It is necessary, at all costs, to get the gubernia economic conference of Donets Gubernia working intensively and harmoniously.

Special measures should be taken to have Pyatakov and all his apparatus direct their efforts to raise local agriculture and carry on trade with the peasants, and with foreign countries via Taganrog. In particular, attention should be given to measures to boost local agriculture by introducing irrigation through the use of the Donets River sluice-gates. This plan, which promises to be highly practicable, has been put forward at Gosplan.

In general, it is quite wrong for the coal-mining industry administration to *regard itself as being unconnected* with agriculture in Donets Gubernia.

I am sure that if the forces of the labour army, which are available in Donets Gubernia, as well as the forces of local miners and the coal-mining industry administration, were to be thrown into the joint endeavour with the workers of Donets Gubernia, it would be possible to secure not only the earliest collection of the tax in kind, but also to acquire undoubtedly large quantities of foodstuffs through a correctly organised commodity exchange, both an exchange of goods for salt, and of grain for coal.

I'll be expecting you to send me, first, a telegram containing a short notification that you have received this letter and that you will do your utmost in this direction, and, second, a detailed communication on the constitution and work of the gubernia economic conference of Donets Gubernia after your arrival.

Concerning the coal-cutting machines about which Pyatakov wrote, I have a precise and detailed report from specialists saying that even the coal-cutting machines already available in the Donbas cannot be put to use for a number of reasons, and that it is quite impractical to buy new

coal-cutting machines, because these machines will be doomed to lie idle.

Please make a circumstantial study of this question with the help of real specialists who have a thoroughly good knowledge of the business.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Send this letter to the Gubernia Executive Committee at Bakhmut, for C.L.D. representative Smilga who is due to be at Bakhmut from August 27 to September 5, 1921. Send it through the War Department with an especially fast courier and obtain a personal signature for it. If Smilga is not yet at Bakhmut, deliver it through the Gubernia Executive Committee.

Phone Stalin to find out whether he will be sending a letter to Rukhimovich. Let Stalin read a copy of this letter, and if there is a letter to Rukhimovich from him, send it along with this one *not later than tomorrow*.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

333

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY

Very urgent

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky,
Gosplan Presidium

I must have before Krasin's departure the shortest pos-. sible outline of all works being carried on at Gosplan as regards economic operations required to boost agriculture in the famine-stricken gubernias.

Please order this outline for me to have it ready within two or three days.

Please bear in mind that this should be confined to the briefest information, a few lines about each of the proposed works, with an estimate of their volume and cost.

Please let me know when I can have this report.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Send this urgently, and check up by phone when it is received by Krzhizhanovsky.

Dictated by phone
on August 23, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

334

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov

I fully support the proposal made by Comrade Trotsky relating to the trip to the border area by the persons he named.[285] I believe that a number of circumstances really demand the adoption of the most vigorous measures in this sphere, which are inconceivable without a trip of this kind.

Please record my vote "for".

Lenin

Written on August 23, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

335

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

23-VIII-21

Trotsky
Kamenev
Stalin
Molotov
Zinoviev

Concerning Zinoviev's proposal to reprove Steklov for his tactless article "On Leftism"[286]—I think this should not be done just now.

It seems to me that Solts's item in *Pravda* on this matter was sufficient. Steklov will undoubtedly draw the right conclusion from this item, so that the Politbureau's intervention just now would be premature.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from
a typewritten copy

336

NOTE ON N. N. YAKOVLEV'S LETTER AND MEMO TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT[287]

A professor of the geological institute. In 1890, Nadezhda Konstantinovna knew him personally as an honest and revolutionary-minded man. His son is a Communist.

Comrade Unschlicht:

Please order a check-up. It looks very much as though the scientists will have to be released.

Sapropel is an important thing for our economy.

23/VIII.

Lenin

Written on August 23, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

337

NOTE TO LYDIA FOTIEVA AND LETTER TO MATYAS RAKOSI, K. B. RADEK, I. S. UNSCHLICHT AND B. I. REINSTEIN[288]

To Fotieva: Please ring up *Rakosi* (Secretary of the Communist International) and find out whether there is a written decision by the Executive Committee of the Communist

International. See yourself that this is done; if need be send copies of the following to *Rakosi*, *Radek*, *Unschlicht*, *Reinstein*, and to whomever else it may be necessary.

23/VIII.

Lenin

I have received *Adolphe* **S. Carm's** English letter ("Dresden", Room No. 37) bitterly complaining that he has been slandered over factional hostility by Heywood, who has informed on him as a spy. He says the commission (of the Comintern) has cleared him, but though he has been released from prison, he is not being allowed to leave Russia, his letters have been confiscated, etc., etc.

He says that he is known to Boris Reinstein, the Swede Kilbom, the Finnish Communist Allan Wallenius and many others.

He says he is a delegate from the Socialist *Labour* Party of the United States.

Lenin

Written on August 23, 1921

First published in part in 1958 in the book, V. I. Lenin. *O sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti* (*1917-1922*) (V. I. Lenin, On Socialist Legality)

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

338

TO J. V. STALIN AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Stalin:

Nansen's most brazen proposal (to appoint a Cadet from the Relief Committee),[289] the behaviour of these "Kukishi" and the enclosed telegram clearly reveal that we have made a mistake, or if we did not make one earlier, we are going to blunder badly unless we keep our eyes peeled.

You will recall that Rykov, shortly before he left, came and told me that someone called Runov, one of our men,

had informed him about a meeting at which Prokopovich had held forth against the government. The meeting had been arranged by Prokopovich, who had used the Famine Relief Committee as a screen.

What else is there to wait for now? Are we going to tolerate their obvious *preparations*?

This is absolutely inconceivable.

I propose: this very day, Friday, 26/8, "Kukishi" should be dissolved by a decision of the All-Russia C.E.C. —motive: their refusal to work and their resolution. *Appoint* one *man from the All-Russia Cheka* to take over the money and to supervise the liquidation.

Prokopovich should be arrested this very day on a charge of anti-government speech-making (at a meeting attended by Runov) and detained for about three months, while we make a *thorough* investigation of the meeting.

The other members of "Kukishi" should be expelled from Moscow at once, this very day, and settled singly in uyezd towns, preferably without railways, *under surveillance*.

Really and truly it would be a bad mistake to wait any longer. The whole thing will be done before Nansen leaves. Nansen will be faced with a clear "ultimatum". That will be an end to this playing (*with fire*).

Not later than tomorrow we shall publish five lines of a short dry "government communique" dissolved because of unwillingness to work.[290]

We shall issue an order to the newspapers: the same day, tomorrow, start ridiculing "Kukishi" in a hundred ways. These whiteguards and sons of the landed gentry wanted to take a trip abroad and refused to go and work in the localities. Kalinin has gone, but the Cadets find it "unbefitting". They should be ridiculed and harassed in every possible way at least once a week in the course of two months.

The sore tooth will be extracted right away, and with great benefit in every respect.

There must be no wavering. I suggest that we get this thing over and done with at the Politbureau today.

Foreigners will start arriving, and Moscow should be "cleared" of the "Kukishi", and their playing (with fire)

FROM MARX TO MAO MARX TO FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

should be stopped. Show this to the members of the Politbureau.

26/8. *Lenin*

Written on August 26, 1921
Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

339
TO BHUPENDRA NATH DATTA[291]

Dear Comrade Datta,

I have read your thesis. We should not discuss about the social classes. I think we should abide by my thesis on colonial question. Gather statistical facts about Peasant leagues if they exist in India.

Yours...

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on August 26, 1921
First published in 1952 in the book Bhupendra Nath Datta, *Dialectics of Land-Economics of India*, Calcutta

Printed from the text of the book

340
TO THE NARROW C.P.C.[292]

Comrade Kiselyov or his Deputy
as Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C.

August 27, 1921

Comrade Kiselyov:

A number of statements indicate that the introduction of charges (for services, etc.) frequently creates an intolerable situation for the *workers*.

There is need to elect a commission:

1) two from the All-Russia Central T.U.C.

2) one representative each from the Petrograd and the Moscow Soviet of Deputies

3) two members of the C.P.C.

4) Chairman of the Narrow Council (Comrade Kiselyov) —to preside.

Assignment to the commission:

all-round preparation of the question (and relevant decrees) to the effect that the introduction of charges should be made conformable to the workers' wages and their condition in general (exemptions for workers, etc., or something of that kind, the dates and conditions on which charges are to be introduced, etc.).

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. All these questions should be passed *only* through the Full C.P.C.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

341
*TO THE NARROW C.P.C.

27.VIII.1921

In forwarding the resolution of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet of Deputies I request both the Chairman and all the members of the Narrow C.P.C., *especially Comrade Goikhbarg*, as a lawyer, to pay particular attention to the need for *more circumspect*, *thorough and considered drafting* of the text of decrees.

Corrections without end are intolerable.

I also have the impression that a number of recent Narrow Council decrees show signs of haste.

The most serious measures have to be taken against this disorder, so as to prevent even worse protests from the population and the raising in the C.C. of the matter *against* the Narrow Council.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

342

*TO THE ORGBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

29.VIII.1921

I request that Gosplan Chairman Comrade *Krzhizhanovsky* should be *put under an obligation*

to leave for *Riga* with Krasin, so as to spend *one month* there in a sanatorium or a private home, receiving treatment and taking a rest.

I strongly request that this should be done today, because I am convinced, in my capacity as Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence, that the Gosplan Chairman is *very nearly worn out. It is necessary*, *urgently* necessary, *to have him repaired.*

Nothing can be done unless there is an Orgbureau decision.[293]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

343

TELEGRAM TO V. N. KAYUROV[294]

Concerning the purging of the Party, I shall convey your considerations to the Central Commission for Purging the Party. My opinion is that the first serious experience in purging the Party will give us a number of practical indications which we shall subsequently use to draft the conditions of enrolment. When you have collected enough material, send me a letter with your considerations. Everything that you have reported about the conditions of economic work will be discussed by me in connection with all the material available over here. Your recall from Siberia is apparently to be put off until the work of purging the Party is over.

Lenin

Written on August 30, 1921
Sent to Novonikolayevsk

First published in 1924
in the magazine
Proletarskaya Revolutsia No. 3

Printed from
a typewritten text

344

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov

I agree with Bryukhanov.

I propose a vote: suspend the work of the commission.[295] This is a game of commissions.

30/8.

Lenin

Written on August 30, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

345

TO R. E. KLASSON

Engineer Robert Eduardovich Klasson
Gidrotorf, 11 Sadovniki

Copies: Smolyaninov, I. I. Radchenko, Krasin, and Gosplan Presidium

I have received and read your report of August 31. If the news you report that you have fully solved the problem of the industrial dehydration of peat is quite true, this is of tremendous importance. It is necessary at once to carry out a check-up or a technical expertise and then to settle the question of allocating to you the requested foodstuffs and foreign currency. You must let us know how much food and foreign currency you are requesting.

I am surprised at your communication that the powers conferred upon you by the C.P.C. had been withdrawn long ago, because no one could have done that.

Please arrange a conference with the participation of Comrade Radchenko, a representative of the State Planning Commission, Smolyaninov and Krasin.[296] Since Krasin is leaving on September 7, it is desirable to have things

finished before he goes. The assignment to the conference is to take measures to verify your report and to determine the amount of foodstuffs and foreign currency to be issued, together with the terms of issue.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on August 31, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

346
TO V. V. ADORATSKY

Comrade Adoratsky:

I have sent Lavrentyeva's application[297] to Smolyaninov (who is acting for Gorbunov as the C.P.C. business manager) for *dispatch to the proper address*.

I am not supposed in any sense to interfere in this and similar other cases; and all the assistance you can give to applicants should consist in "*legal*" aid to them, i.e., *teaching* them (and helping them) *to fight for their rights* according to all the rules of the legitimate *fight for rights* in the R.S.F.S.R.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on August 31, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

347
TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[298]

I find Kissin's and Bryukhanov's arguments correct. I vote for them. You can't raise the question in the C.C. before introducing it in the C.P.C.

31/8

Lenin

Written on August 31, 1921
Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

348

NOTE TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV AND TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO P. A. BOGDANOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

Please send *P. Bogdanov* (*S.E.C.* Chairman) in *Kharkov* the following telephone message:

S.E.C. Chairman Bogdanov
Kharkov
Copy to *Chubar*

In *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, Kaktyn has described monstrous cases of stealing and ugly mismanagement in the Krivoi Rog basin. Give your attention to this and try to establish more precisely who is personally responsible.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

1/IX.

Written on September 1, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

349

NOTE TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[299]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

This question has to be prepared for introduction in the *C.L.D.* (who is Bogdanov's *deputy*? Sapronov? This should be agreed with him).

It is not clear whether *only* the best mills have been brought out. Has the *number* of mills been properly reduced?

Or perhaps the "requirement" is earmarked for a *heap* of sickly and hopeless mills?

This and other questions should *be clarified with greater precision*.

1/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 1, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

350
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[300]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

There is need: (1) to find out whether the Georgian comrades have abided by the condition (there has been one, hasn't there? a Party one?) not to sign any concessions without our consent?

(2) To study whether the terms of this contract (in particular, who is the super-arbiter?) are in substance advantageous. To do this, appoint 1 to 3 experts through the C.C., and instruct them to submit an opinion in writing.

Do the one and the other (through the C.C.).

Lenin

1/IX.

Written on September 1, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

351
NOTE TO A. S. YENUKIDZE AND LETTER TO PERSIAN ARTISANS[301]

Comrade Yenukidze:

I am sending you the requested confirmation. Perhaps you know to whom and how it can be forwarded.

1/IX. *Lenin*

Dear Comrades:

I confirm the receipt of the gift from the Persian artisans and send them my heart-felt gratitude and best regards.

1/IX.1921. *Lenin*

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

352
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[302]

This Skobelev should be "**cut down to size**". Noulens's appointment is a piece of impudence.

1/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 1, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

353
MARKINGS ON G. O. GRAFTIO'S LETTER AND ASSIGNMENTS TO N. P. GORBUNOV

... If you have the time, you will find out (from the statement.—*Ed.*) about the incredible conditions of the bureaucratic irresponsible confusion, and frequently of what looks like deliberate resistance, in which we have to carry on the building of the Volkhov hydroelectric power installation, inaugurated by you through Comrade Smidovich three years ago. NB

... It pains me very much to waste your valuable time, but I have decided to do so only because of my strong conviction that the Volkhov installation must be completed as soon as possible at all costs. NB

Urgent

Comrade *Gorbunov*:

Will you undertake this business (or pass it to Smolyaninov by agreement with him).

The statement and report by the chief engineer of the Volkhov site, Comrade Graftio (of 25/8), expose both *crime* (red tape) and a number of mistakes by the S.E.C. or the Petrograd Soviet of Deputies, or the *C.L.D.*, or all these establishments together.

Therefore I suggest that you:

(1) at once instruct the People's Commissariat for Justice, on my behalf, to investigate the red tape and to bring *the guilty to trial*. Introduce at the *C.L.D.* within a week.

(2) Call a conference (S.E.C.+Petrograd Soviet+State Planning Commission inviting other departments concerned) to work out, within a week, a draft *C.L.D.* decision on measures to accelerate the works and arrange them properly[303] (perhaps, on the model of the flax trust, giving Graftio more powers?).

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Inform me of execution.

Lenin

2/IX.

Written on September 2, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

354

REMARKS ON N. N. KRESTINSKY'S REPORT AND ASSIGNMENTS TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

... In fulfilling the duties assigned to the central and local financial organs, they have recently been coming up against exceptionally unfavourable obstacles, chiefly the fact that the executive organs of the Soviet power have completely forgotten the injunctions of the Constitution on the drawing up of estimates and the making of expenditures in accordance with them, which is having an extremely harmful effect on the general state of the budget, and is the cause of exceptional upheavals in the system of monetary circulation.

NB

To illustrate this, one need merely point out the following circumstances: 1) in some districts, wages are issued to workers not in accordance with the tariff rates, but at free market prices, sometimes amounting to as much as 700,000 rubles per man a day (Privolzhsk district, and the western and eastern gubernias); 2) actors and workers of Soviet theatres are remunerated not according to tariff salaries, but with additions, coming to many hundreds of per cent over and above the latter (besides, under the estimates of the People's Commissariat for Education the cost of

maintenance of the theatres comes to 29,000 million, and of institutions of higher education, to 17,000 million); 3) it has become commonplace, and very much the rule for Soviet institutions and enterprises to purchase the things they need on the free market and, naturally, at its prices....

outrageous!!

A proximate confirmation of the irregularity of demands for bank-notes from treasure institutions is provided by the practice, which has been adopted by Soviet establishments even in Moscow, under which the organs of the Moscow Soviet strive to have the Moscow Finance Department hold for them bank-notes to the amount of 3,000 million rubles a day, i.e., 75,000 million a month, whereas, according to the data of the budget department and the Central Treasury of the People's Commissariat for Finance, the Moscow Finance Department has up to now been granted credits of only 188,000 million rubles, i.e., an average of not more than 27,000-30,000 million rubles a month....

How did they manage to "adopt" it without the P.C.F.?

Comrade **Gorbunov:**

Please send the following paper on my behalf: *People's Commissariat for Finance*+*People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*+Chairman of the *Narrow C.P.C.*

I authorise the People's Commissars for Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (or their deputies) to call a conference right away with the participation of the Chairman of the *Narrow C.P.C.*, and the C.P.C. Business Manager Gorbunov to work out and put before the *C.P.C.* within a week draft decisions to combat the afore-mentioned breaches of the law. I draw the attention of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to this oversight.

How has it been possible to tolerate the outrageous practices described in this paper? In particular, the overrun spending by the People's Commissariat for Education on the theatres?

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

2/IX.

Comrade **Gorbunov:**

Please see to it that this is done within a specified period. You may send Smolyaninov instead of yourself, if

you want to, or let the conference be a three-sided affair.

2/IX.

Written on September 2, 1921
First published in part
in 1928 in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

355
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

I read in today's papers that a *megaphone* amplifying the telephone and carrying the voice to a *crowd* has been tested (and has given fine results) in Kazan.

Check through Ostryakov. If this is true we must have it installed in Moscow and Petrograd, and incidentally, check up on all their work.

Let them give me a short *written* report:

1) calendar programme of their work;

2) ditto—a speaking telephone exchange for 2,000 versts in Moscow.

When will it be ready?

3) Ditto—receivers. *How many* being made?

4) Ditto—megaphones.

Regards,
Lenin

Written not later
than September 2, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

356
NOTE TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV AND TELEGRAM TO KH. G. PESTUN[304]

Comrade Bryukhanov:

Today I am sending a dispatch to Pestun; take a copy of it from Glyasser. If there is also need for a C.C. direc-

tive, let me have a *draft* of the whole text of the directive.

Return this to the C.P.C. Business Manager.

3/IX. *Lenin*

Pestun, Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee, Gomel

I propose that you should carry out the directives of Svidersky and Reske in the most precise manner. I have information concerning a number of breaches by you of the rules of the central authority in the sphere of the People's Commissariat for Food work. I warn you that I will hold you personally responsible if even a single breach of the rules and decisions of the centre is established, and if you fail to organise correct and concerted work together with Reske. Reply in a couple of words by telegram and give details by letter.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on September 3, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

357

NOTE TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV AND LETTER TO N. M. KNIPOVICH

V. A. Smolyaninov

Comrade Smolyaninov:

Please read this and keep *strictly secret* without showing to anyone.[305]

N. M. Knipovich is not only a scientific force of the first order, but unquestionably an honest man.

There must be check-ups from time to time to see how things are going on at the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry (Glavryba).

Send this letter on a letterhead (typed) to N. M. Knipovich through his son Boris N. Knipovich (who lives here, in Moscow, and works at the *People's Commissariat for Agriculture*);

N. M. Knipovich

Dear Nikolai Mikhailovich:

I thank you very much for your detailed letter of 6/VIII. You are, of course, keeping an eye on Glavryba's work. I earnestly request you to send me from time to time your remarks on the course of its work and any practical proposals, if for any reason they should be "dragged out" at Glavryba.

Sincerely yours,
Lenin

3/IX.1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

358
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Smolyaninov

A man called Lapinsky (find him through Radek) has arrived from Berlin and is now staying here. He had undertaken to fulfil one of my assignments concerning the compilation of a school atlas, especially for the study of modern imperialism. Please have a talk with him, find out how his work is going (date of completion, etc.) and co-ordinate this work with what is being done by the Petrograd commission chaired by Kaisarov, and compare with the papers which are at the secretariat.

3-IX-21 *Lenin*

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

359
NOTE TO SECRETARY

§ 21.

I am not signing this.

It is too *early* to publish the collection.[306]

The first thing to do is to print a *short* summary in the newspapers indicating where to find? what is important? etc.

In the course of the month, September 3 to 30, the collection should be edited *three times*, and *only then* approved for publication.

Lenin

3/IX.

Written on September 3, 1921
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*
Printed from the original

360

TO N. P. GORBUNOV AND V. A. SMOLYANINOV[307]

Gorbunov and Smolyaninov

This should be given special attention:

1) demand *precise* reports from the Byelorussian People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade;

2) use their experience for the whole **Central Union of Consumers' Societies** of the R.S.F.S.R.;

3) take steps to reduce the shortage of goods also outside the boundaries of Byelorussia.

Consult with Kissin, take measures and let me know.

Lenin

3/IX.

Written on September 3, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

361

TO N. P. GORBUNOV[308]

Comrade Gorbunov:

Send an inquiry to the *All-Russia Cheka*.

There is **nothing** "accidental" in Tikhvinsky's arrest: chemistry and counter-revolution are not incompatible.

3/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 3, 1921
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

362

*TO THE SECRETARY OF THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

It is highly important for us to have exact and regular information about the collection of donations by foreign workers in aid of the starving in Russia. The Politbureau yesterday adopted a decision* which has been sent to you. I believe that responsible persons should be appointed for each country, or group of countries, to follow the labour press of various parties, taking down the exact figures, and naturally, confining themselves only to: 1) the results of the collection of donations; 2) exact indication of currency in which the donations have been made; 3) indication of date on which the donations have been collected; and 4) name of newspapers from which information has been taken, and the party or organisation making the collection.

There is need to bring out under a separate head any resolutions by parties and trade unions about one-day wage contributions.

I should very much like to have a reply about what exactly has been done by the Executive Committee and when we could hope to have the first summarised results.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on September 3, 1921

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a text
in Maria Glyasser's hand

363

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

One other thing should be done:

1) restrain Melnichansky and the Moscow Gubernia T.U.C. by means of an *extra strict* reprimand (the trial of Skvortsov-Stepanov and Litkens). This is the height of

* See present edition, Vol. 42, p. 240.—*Ed.*

impudence and shamelessness!! I insist on a reprimand with publication on behalf of the *Politbureau*[309];

2) revoke the *All-Russia C.E.C. Presidium* decision on the issue of **1,000 million** (milliard) for the theatres. It is quite illegal to do this *in circumvention of the People's Commissariat for Education*!! This is outrageous. I demand its revocation through the *Politbureau*.

Lenin

4/IX.

Written on September 4, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

364
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[310]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

The question of *commodity exchange* is the *most important* one. You are to give it *top priority*.

In particular:

1) find *Prodovolstvennaya Gazeta* No. 97 and *include* in this file;

2) propose that the *Central Union of Consumers' Societies should amplify these* data of Khinchuk's and **print** them;

3) send me what has been printed, stepping up the printing;

4) insert an item in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* giving all manner of encouragement to the *collection* and publication of *factual* data on the commodity exchange (the *quantities*, or the *equivalents* of some quantities).

Lenin

4/IX.

Written on September 4, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

365

NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY[311]

Urgent

Comrade Molotov:

In view of the *extreme* importance of this question and its (I hope) indisputable nature, I propose that this should be circulated for reading by all members of the *Politbureau*, and approved by phone (I consider my amendments adopted, if they are *not* questioned *either* by the C.C. members or the members of the commission: if they are questioned, I suggest adoption *without* these amendments, so as **not to drag things out**). Be sure to pass it also through the *All-Russia Central T.U.C.* and to publish it on behalf of the *C.P.C.*, with this **obligatory** indication: approved by both the *All-Russia Central T.U.C.* and the *R.C.P. Central Committee*.

I am sending these theses to *Oborin* in Petrograd on Monday, 5/IX, asking him to phone his opinion. It is important to have the opinion (and I hope consent) of the Petrograd trade union functionaries.

Comrade *Molotov*: A list of these *30 persons* should be obtained and kept at the *C.C.* archives together with the *date* of this conference.

Lenin

4/IX.

Send urgently to Molotov after Lepeshinskaya's entry of the amendments.

Lenin

4/IX.

Written on September 4, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

366

TELEGRAM TO THE SIBERIAN REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE[312]

Sibrevcom, Omsk.

Take urgent measures to see that the local authorities do not hold up the Yamal expedition at Omsk, giving every possible help in its instant dispatch to the place of work. Telegraph execution.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 4, 1921
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text

367

*TO N. I. SOLOVYOV, HEAD OF THE STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT, C.C.[313]

5/IX.

Comrade Solovyov:

Is it possible to bring out more detailed data on the distribution of Communists by *Soviet government* office (except the Red Army):

People's Commissariat,
department,
subdepartment,
etc.
with more details about nature and type of work.

Let's have this for Moscow, at least (the most important thing is to separate Moscow from the uyezd, if possible; Moscow is the main centre), and for Petrograd.

My impression is that the statistics of the R.C.P. members deal with too many details, which are "common" to any statistics, but are unimportant. The important thing for us is to have details about the distribution by *Soviet government* office.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on September 5, 1921
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

368
TO A. O. ALSKY[314]

Secret
5/IX.

Comrade Alsky:

There must be a close watch on the spending of the gold stock.

Perhaps you could do the following:

have this table compiled.

	In hand	Of this allocated (=issue allowed #)	Unallocated stock in hand
Gold Stock			
by 7.XI.1917			
7.XI.1918			
" " 1919			
7.XI.1920			
1.I.1921			
1.VII.1921			
or 1.IX (7.IX).1921			

In other words, the table should give a full picture of the amount issued and the *available stock* (by a definite date).

Let us draw up the table in such a way that the horizontal graphs should run on (*current statistics*) by months. Let us have this mobile and regularly filled-in table be kept over at your People's Commissariat for Finance.

Send me a copy of it by 1.IX.1921, and then send in weekly additions (current expenditure).

The total must include **all** gold *without any* exceptions.

Please write me when you can let me have it.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

#Perhaps here we shall have to add two or three vertical graphs: amount already sent out of Russia, i.e., paid out. Also perhaps: refused payment or reduced amount, etc.

Written on September 5, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

369
TO Y. I. VISHNYAK[315]

"Maly Parizh" Room 5

Dear Comrade:

I thank you very much for news of Lalayants. I am very sorry to hear that he is outside the ranks of the R.C.P.

Please write me if you can in greater detail about why he is outside the Party, when he left it, how he lived under Kolchak in Siberia, etc.

Since you think it worth while involving him in Soviet government work, may I ask you to write me whether you believe that we should find him work in Irkutsk or, perhaps, it is possible and expedient to do so elsewhere, say, Moscow.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on September 3, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

370
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

5/IX.

Comrade Chicherin:

I attach no importance to Berzin's opinion about the decline of the British labour movement.[316] Berzin knows little and is always "pessimistic".

I am very much worried about the search of his luggage. I think we should make a **strict** application of the "eye for an eye" rule to British representatives. Pedantically: treat them just as **badly** and a little worse. Is this being done?

Then, concerning the "Hooverites",[317] their every step should be watched (by the *People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs* through the press and perhaps some "ties"); while the worst of them (someone called Lowrie?) "tracked down" and caught, so as to land them in a scandal.

This calls for relentless, *persistent* warfare.

Do all our representatives abroad know that everything should be done to support workers' collections (in aid of the starving) *directly to us*? Send a dispatch (circular) with this demand: their every report must state in code: "workers' collections in Britain (France, Sweden, etc.) for fortnight so much."

Collections only straight to our address.

We must have prompt, accurate and regular information about this;

The "for Nansen" and "against Nansen" campaign[318] clearly shows (the extracts from the *Daily Chronicle* which you have sent me are extremely interesting) that we must reply to Noulens with a strictly sharp rejection: an outright rejection. Then and only then shall we gain by winning over the "pro-Nansen" elements and *put an end* to the game of the anti-Nansenites.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on September 5, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

371

TO A. O. ALSKY

Comrade Alsky:

I asked you for data only from August.* Henceforth:

1) keep a special record of expenditures and issues from the gold stock in a strictly chronological order (of course, apart from the grouping by People's Commissariats or under specified heads, where such are required);

2) be sure to set apart the expenditure out of the gross amount appropriated by a general decision (say, the appropriations of 100 million for foodstuffs) from the additional spending not provided for by any general decisions.

Unless you observe these rules you will not have a re-

* See Document 368 of this volume.—*Ed.*

port but chaos in which you yourself will be snarled up. Before issuing any further instructions, I shall await your reply which you are to give me tomorrow.

Lenin

Written on September 7, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

372
TO A. M. NIKOLAYEV

Top secret

Comrade Nikolayev
People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs

I propose that you urgently appoint a commission of three radio specialists to carry out the final trials of the results achieved at the laboratory in Bogorodskoye Village, of which you are aware.[319]

It is desirable to have at least one responsible Communist on the commission.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on September 7, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from a typewritten copy

373
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev:

I have received the eight drafts of the People's Commissariat for Education which you have sent me.[320] I cannot agree with you that this should not be a matter of urgency or that there is anything wrong in the drafts. I am afraid that you have not taken enough care to read them. There is nothing in the drafts about applying the commercial principle to the schools. There is only a point about attracting the local population, especially peasants,

to participation in the maintenance of schools. I believe this to be absolutely correct, and certainly an urgent necessity. Of course, amendments may be required on some particulars, and these could be made during the discussion of the draft, but I repeat that they are essentially quite correct. Signs of anything like the commercial principle can be found in the eighth draft only, namely, the right to organise and lease enterprises to supply institutions of the People's Commissariat for Education. But even this draft, and it is the one which you have failed to underline, I consider to be absolutely correct, because without such measures it is impossible to improve the maintenance of schools, or to alleviate the starving of teachers. I absolutely fail to see where you have spotted any relaxation of the principle of retaining the schools in our hands. I have found nothing to that effect in the points you have underscored, nor in the eighth project, in particular. More and more should be taken from the peasants for the maintenance of local schools.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on September 8, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the text
in Lydia Fotieva's hand

374

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE S.E.C. PRESIDIUM

Very urgent

S.E.C. Presidium, copies to the People's Commissariat for Finance and the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and Engineer Graftio (home telephone 1-72-49. 22/3 Povarskaya St.)

According to Graftio's report, the Volkhov construction site is provided with foodstuffs for September-December, but the work is at a standstill because of lack of banknotes. The Public Works Committee is issuing only 125 million for September, whereas, according to Graftio, the requirement is more than 1,000 million.

I propose that the Volkhov construction site should be immediately supplied with the necessary amount of banknotes to ensure the accelerated conduct of operations in accordance with the number of rations issued under the All-Russia C.E.C. decisions of May 30 and November 5.

Send me your report of execution not later than September 10.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

September 8, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

375
TO N. P. GORBUNOV[321]

Comrade N. P. Gorbunov:

Please reply to him as follows:

(1) we shall let him have the legal reply soon (the formulation has to be given after *verification* by agreement with Kursky, Chicherin, Goikhbarg, *after very thorough verification*, with, perhaps, the help of Vladimirsky as well);

(2) for the *atlas*, all these republics are to be included: the neighbouring, the friendly, etc., a *general* formula (for the atlas, for the statistics, and for the geography).

9/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 9, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

376
TO N. P. GORBUNOV[322]

We should learn to *track down* and punish red tape which is **un**intentional, because you can never catch the "deliberate" one.

11/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 11, 1921

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

377

*TO N. P. GORBUNOV[323]

Important

1) Write a letter to the *S.E.C.*; let me sign it;
2) draw up a *plan* (calendar programme) to check up executions;
3) ditto—on orders in Germany.

11/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 11, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

378

*TO N. P. GORBUNOV[324]

This is a most important business. My assignment to you is *to keep track* of the execution and report to me twice a month.

11/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 11, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

379

TELEGRAM TO ALL REGIONAL AND GUBERNIA ECONOMIC CONFERENCES[325]

S.E.C. Chairman for all Departments and Branches of Industry, Copy to Central Statistical Board

One of the most important tasks of economic construction, and undoubtedly the most pressing one just now, is to reduce the number of establishments and enterprises on state supply. Only a minimum of the largest, the best

equipped and organised enterprises, factories, plants and mines should be left on state supply, with strict verification of available resources. You are hereby ordered immediately to carry out another check-up and to make another reduction in the number of enterprises on state supply; draw up right away a list of enterprises being left on state supply, and send it on to the *C.L.D.* by October 1 of this year.

Execution shall be the personal responsibility of all members of economic councils, especially the Gubernia Statistical Bureaus. I shall prosecute those who fail to make sufficiently thorough reduction in the number of enterprises.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

September 12, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original
verified with a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

380

*TO THE ELECTRICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE S.E.C.

Copy to S.E.C. Presidium

I propose that you carry out the supply of the Kashira construction site with the required electrotechnical materials absolutely precisely, making sure fully to meet the dates fixed by the project.

I categorically demand that no delay should be allowed in this matter which could lead to the non-fulfilment of the construction work by the established date.

Inform Comrade Smolyaninov, C.L.D., about the progress in supply.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on September 12, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

381
TO S. S. DANILOV[326]

12/IX.

Comrade Danilov:

It is absolutely *necessary* to develop a sense of "mutual assistance", etc., both "within the class" and towards the *working people* of *other* classes.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on September 12, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from a text in a secretary's hand

382
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

Lunacharsky
Copy to Litkens

12.IX.1921.

§ 10 of the September 9 law on measures to improve the supply of schools makes it binding on the People's Commissariat for Education to issue instructions.

There must be especial caution over § 6 (the end, the right of exchange).[327] This should be allowed not otherwise than with full submission of accounts by a given date; detailed rules; otherwise, imprisonment for stealing.

Co-ordinate with the People's Commissariat for Justice and show me before signing.

The same on § 8—fees for libraries and clubs.

There should be extreme caution; we can't hamper attendance. Show me *before* signing.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

383
TO A. A. JOFFE

13.IX.1921

Comrade Joffe:

You will find that today's Politbureau decision (which I enclose) largely meets your dispatch of 9/IX.[328]

Please be so kind as to send me a written report with more details.

In addition, as a personal request, *to enable me to sort things out in this matter*, I ask you to devote special attention (in your report or in a special annex to your report) to the question of protection of native interests against "Russian" (Great-Russian or colonialist) exaggerations.

What is the attitude of the natives to Safarov? **Facts,** facts and more facts.

Who are the natives themselves (Safarov's supporters)? Names? Record? Prestige? (Facts, facts....)

Will they be able to stand up for themselves? Is that sure? Even against such a subtle and firm and stubborn man as Tomsky?

How many of them are there?

"The Union of the Poor" (set up by Safarov?)—its composition? importance? strength? role? Is it true that the natives were "*forcibly*" stratified?

Cotton? Its future? Is it true that Safarov is ruining the cotton? *Facts*, *facts*.

The fronts in Ferghana? The Basmachi? Their attitude to the Tomsky and the Safarov "line"? Facts and exact decisions by Turkestan C.E.C. concerning the Basmachi? The facts on what and when Tomsky and Safarov or their supporters differed *in this question*? (Extracts from relevant decisions, to show exactly when and on what precisely the formal differences occurred.)

There are some differences on this question inside the C.C.

More exact information is highly important.

I personally **very much** suspect "Tomsky's line" (perhaps it would be more correct to say Peters's line? or Pravdin's line? *etc*.) of engaging in Great-Russian chauvinism, or, to put it more correctly, in **deviating** in that direction.

It is terribly important for all our Weltpolitik* to **win** the confidence of the natives; to win it over again and again; *to prove* that we are *not* imperialists, that we shall *not* tolerate any *deviation* in that direction.

This is a world-wide question, and that is no exaggeration.

There you must be especially strict.

It will have an effect on India and the East; it is no joke, it calls for exceptional caution.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in part in 1956 in *Pravda* No. 193

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

384
TO E. M. SKLYANSKY

13.IX.1921

Comrade Sklyansky:

Please let me have the information on the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic relating to my letter of May 30 and the reply of the R.M.C. of the Republic about ordering the material within a week.[329]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

385
TO N. A. SEMASHKO[330]

13.IX.1921

Comrade Semashko:

I have been receiving more and more indications about the abominable state of our health resorts in the Crimea and the Caucasus: bribe-taking, privileges for the bourgeois

* World policy.—*Ed.*

and disgusting attitude to the workers, and, what is important, total disorder in the treatment, and what is most important, complete lack of supplies.

Please let me have exact information, whatever you have on hand, at once.

And then let me know in greater detail about the modes of checking up: how many health resorts (out of how many?) submit correct reports (quantities of foodstuffs for the number of patients? for the number of personnel, etc.?)—the number of baths (mud baths), etc.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

386

*TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE C.P.C. OFFICE[331]

Copy to N. P. Gorbunov

13.IX.1921

I discovered yesterday that an urgent document which I gave to Fotieva for L. B. Kamenev was dispatched the "usual", i.e. idiotic, way and was delayed for many hours, and would have been held up for days but for my interference.

It is intolerable for the office to work in this way, and if I find another case of such typical red tape and spoiling of business, I shall resort to strict punishment and removal of personnel. These are my instructions:

1) on every document or package which I hand in for dispatch, a *personal* check-up must be made by the secretary on duty (who must leave a deputy, if she goes away, and who must make arrangements with the telephone operators on 24-hour duty, about a substitute);

2) check up to see whether *all* the inscriptions are there (personal delivery; urgent; signature on envelope, etc.);

3) check up to see whether the parcel has gone to the messenger at once;

4) be sure *to check up by phone* with the addressee;

5) *show* me the return envelope with the signature;

6) these rules shall also be carried out by the telephone operators in the booth, in the event of assignments during hours when the secretary is absent.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

387
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please subject the guilty persons to punishment: a reprimand to start with; a warning of possible dismissal unless they show more care, the second time, or where there are aggravating circumstances.

Establish check-ups: once in *100 cases* or one day *in 15*, etc.

Lenin

Written on September 13, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

388
TO N. OSINSKY

Comrade Osinsky, People's Commissariat for Agriculture

Please urgently inform me about the arrangements for the distribution of seeds in the famine-stricken gubernias, stating:

1) The principles of distribution of seeds among the population (whether they are issued to everyone or only to those whose land has been prepared for sowing, whether inspection of the ploughed-up area has been organised and how, etc.).

2) Actual participation by organs of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture in accepting delivery of the seed

freights, their storage, their transportation from the railway stations to the localities, sorting of seeds, and, if information is available, the pace of work in moving the seeds from the central points of delivery to the localities.

3) Whether and how the inventory of the delivered seeds has been organised (are there any lists, stating the names—of persons or collectives—receiving the seeds, and the quantities).

4) Whether and how control has been organised to verify whether the seeds are actually used for sowing and not for food.

The question of correct distribution of seeds is of especial importance.

Meanwhile, Judging by K. Myaskov's item, entitled "The Spring and Autumn Sowing Campaigns", in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 202 and by other reports, not all is well in this sphere.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on September 14, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

389
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[332]

Comrade Chicherin:

I think we should break this habit of theirs. Perhaps we could do it this way: reply formally and in writing with reference to the "note". They will then realise that we shall (soon) mock at them *in public* and gifler* for their unsigned notes.

Yours,
Lenin

Written in the second half
of September 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* Slap them down.—*Ed.*

390
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

17.IX.1921.

Comrade Gorbunov:

It turns out that Kursky and Cherlyunchakevich have gone, *without officially handing over* their business, namely, the signing of the Narrow C.P.C. minutes. This is the height of lawlessness. Order must be restored at once: a) draw up a protocol, b) telegraph demand for a reply from Kursky and Cherlyunchakevich, and c) appoint and start a *case* on breach of duty by Kursky and Cherlyunchakevich.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original
verified with a typewritten
copy

391
TO KH. G. RAKOVSKY

Comrade Rakovsky, Kharkov
Copy to Comrade Vladimirov

The People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R. has remitted to you bank-notes worth 20,000 million rubles, of which 10 are for Kiev, and 10 for Kharkov for the purchase of grain and cattle. We intend in the near future to send to you, over and above the Ukrainian monetary allocation, regular monetary remittances up to 50,000 million a month for the special designation of grain purchases. The R.C.P. Central Committee proposes that you should: 1) firmly reserve these remitted amounts for the said purpose under the personal responsibility of all organs of the People's Commissariat for Finance; 2) bind the food organs, on the responsibility of the Ukrainian Commissariat for Food and gubernia food supply commissars, to expend the remitted resources exclusively for the purchase of grain and cattle. The R.C.P. Central Committee proposes that you should enter the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's

Commissars decree of August 23 in your register, with the addition of the All-Russia C.E.C.'s on the salt monopoly.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on September 19, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

392
TO THE KIRSANOV UYEZD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE[333]

Copy to the Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee

Dear Comrades:

I join in the expression of gratitude for the submission of your report earlier than those of the others, and request you to continue setting a model in accounting in the future.

Lenin

19/IX.

Written on September 19, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

393
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV[334]

If Bryukhanov is not there, to Frumkin
(Copy to N. P. Gorbunov)

19.IX.1921.

Comrade Bryukhanov:

Today I signed a telegram concerning $1._2$ million poods of hay for Moscow.

I think it is wrong to have me sign *all* such telegrams. We must go over—perhaps gradually, but *go over* we must to have people (including gubernia executive committees) carry out orders even without my signature—to have them obey normally and not only in extraordinary cases.

Send out 2 or 3 telegrams by way of urgent order. Follow up. If they are not carried out—inflict double punishment and check up on the infliction.

Please let me know the precise plan (and *calendar* programme) for switching local establishments to *normal* discipline.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

394
TO Y. Z. VOLKOV

19/IX.1921.

Comrade Volkov:

I have read your letter.[335] You are wrong. Our policy will not wreck our (trade) relations with France, but will accelerate them.

We have already made a gain by *getting* France *away* from the intervention plans, and shall gain even more.

We have a way to trade negotiations with France.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

395
TO V. V. KUIBYSHEV

19.IX.1921

Comrade Kuibyshev:

I have just had a visit from
Rutgers,
Calvert
and Heywood
representing the American workers' colony group who wish to take the Nadezhdinsk Works and *several* enterprises in the Kuznetsk basin.[336]

They want their representative (with an interpreter) to attend the *Council of Labour and Defence* on Friday. I think we should let them come.

I also draw your attention to and request you to inform *all* members of the commission and subcommissions of the following:

(1) The Nadezhdinsk Works, in their opinion, is both economically and technically *connected* with a group of enterprises in Kuzbas, for it will provide tractors for their farms; tractors and all other farming implements for the peasants; repair of machinery for their group's enterprises in Kuzbas; equipment for water transport communications with Siberia, etc.

(2) In Kuznetsk basin they are taking 12,000 dessiatines of land and *several* enterprises, wishing to set up a large and *complete* economic whole.

(3) They want only 300,000 dollars in cash. It would be wrong to think otherwise.

(4) In addition, they want grain and clothing, in order to start the necessary building operations *at once*. They say work should be started *this very* winter to have time to finish it by the spring of 1922.

(5) They stress that they will have a firm *administrative set-up* for their workers' group; and the whole group (3,000-6,000 workers) selected from among the *best* workers, mostly young and unmarried men, who have had *practical* experience in their line, and have lived in a climate similar to that of Russia (Canada and the Northern United States).

(6) They want to be directly subordinate to the *Council of Labour and Defence*. Something like an autonomous state trust consisting of a workers' association.

They say, by the way, that 200 American lumberjacks are living here in the "émigré house". Most of them are without work. They are itching to get to work. They say that if you send about 30 of them to the Nadezhdinsk Works and 15 to Kuznetsk basin *at once*—with full equipment and food, they will start building log cabins *immediately*. (The rest of the 200 will go there later.) They want us to hurry up with sending them off.

They say that Gerbek (? I did not quite catch the English

pronunciation of the name) from the Urals Industrial Bureau had agreed to their plan verbally, and the Siberians (the Siberian Industrial Bureau), in writing.

They intend to take along 10-15 per cent of Russian-speaking workers. They could take more.

Please take all this into account.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

396
TO I. I. MIROSHNIKOV

Comrade Miroshnikov
Copy to Comrade Gorbunov

I have been informed that the lift will not work on September 20, 21 and 22.

This is utterly scandalous. There are people with ailing hearts for whom it is harmful and dangerous to walk up. I have repeatedly ordered to have an eye kept on the lift by appointing a responsible person.

I hereby issue you a strict reprimand, and order you to find out who has been guilty of failure to give a timely warning; let me have again a list of responsible persons and the measures of punishment to be applied to them.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on September 19, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

397
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

20. IX.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please issue an order to have the following literature collected:

1) *everything* in Russian on electrification *over and above* the book, *Plan of Electrification*.

The reports by Krzhizhanovsky and Ramzin in Petrograd.—Kushner's pamphlet.—Other pamphlets on electrification—the publication by the *Vladimir* Gubernia Executive Committee on electrification *and other local publications*.

2) The new literature (1915-1921) in German on the state of electrification in various countries and its tasks, etc. (through Krzhizhanovsky, etc.).

Get me a1l this within one or two weeks for a period of two months for Iv. Iv. Skvortsov (Stepanov).[337]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

398

TO V. V. ADORATSKY

Comrade Adoratsky:

Could you help me find the following two things:

1) the article (or extract from the pamphlet? or letter?) by Engels where he says, on the strength of the experience of 1648 and 1789, that there is apparently a law demanding that the revolution should advance *beyond the point where it can cope*, to consolidate the less significant transformations?

I recall that this was published in our Bolshevik newspaper (*Proletary*?) abroad during the 1908-1912 epoch, but my recollection is hazy[338];

2) Engels's letter to Weydemeyer of 12.IV.1853. I shall be very grateful for any hints.

Yours,

Lenin

Written on September 20, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

399
TO THE ORGANISATIONAL BUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

C.C. *Orgbureau*

I have personally known Comrade Shapovalov for a long time, in exile at the end of the 19th century, and in the early 20th abroad. I hereby certify that he is a thoroughly loyal and honest representative of the best men in the old Party guard. I therefore consider it my duty to support his request for a chance to go abroad to receive treatment and work for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

22/IX.

Written on September 22, 1921
First published in 1960 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 2

Printed from the original

400
TO V. A. AVANESOV

Comrade Avanesov, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection

About Red Tape in Supplying the Kashira Site

I am enclosing herewith three letters from the Kashira site. The C.L.D. has been receiving almost daily complaints from it about red tape and interruption in food supply. Instead of doing their job, the Kashira builders have been wasting a considerable part of their energy on getting the food supply in. We must put a stop to this. Considering the exceptional conditions created for the Kashira site, this can well be done even with our state of food supply being what it is.

I propose that you should appoint a responsible man with the urgent assignment to investigate the food supply arrangements for the Kashira site, and find out who is to blame for the red tape, charge the guilty with responsibil-

ity, and, if necessary, work out a draft C.L.D. decision regulating the supply arrangements for the Kashira site.[339]

Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on September 23, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

401
TO D. B. RYAZANOV

Comrade Ryazanov:

I *very strongly* support Comrade Adoratsky's request, who has done a great deal of useful work.[340] It is important to collect *all* the letters of Marx and Engels, and no one will do this better than you.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on September 23, 1921
Sent to Berlin
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

402
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL BERLIN COMMISSION FOR THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN ORDERS FOR GIDROTORF[341]

I request that this should be done with special thoroughness, so as to have everything ready in Berlin by 1.II.1922, and delivered in Moscow *without fail* by 1.III.1922. The reports should be brief, but regular, once a month. The commission should be responsible for the technical verification. Prizes will be awarded, if necessary. *See that the opportunity is not missed again, as it has been repeatedly in this matter.*

Lenin

Written on September 24, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

403
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev

Copy: To Radek
" To Rakosi
" To *Pravda* secretary

24.IX.1921

Pravda has started to publish reports about the collections by foreign workers in aid of the starving in Russia.[342]

That is *not* the kind of reports we need. What you have is a *story*. We have no paper for "stories" and no time to read them. They are quite useless.

What we need is very short tables twice a month on the following lines:

Germany	—10 million marks	= about ( )	gold rubles
Austria	—10 " kronen	= about ( )	gold rubles
Total — — —		about ( )	gold rubles

This will take 20 or 30 lines twice a month.

That is not much.

That is the only thing we need. *A total in gold rubles*. I very strongly request you to do this and let me know.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

404
TELEGRAM TO N. N. NARIMANOV

Code
26/IX.1921.

Narimanov
Baku

Do not, by any means conclude any treaty with either the Germans or anybody else on foreign trade without the consent of the Regional Foreign Trade Administration or the sanction of the R.C.P. Central Committee. Cable receipt

and execution, and follow up with all details by letter.

*Lenin**

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

405
TO K. B. RADEK

Comrade Radek:

I thank you very much for the material you have sent me. I return it. I cannot express my opinion, because I am not clear on the matter: I cannot form an opinion after reading the very little that you have marked off.

By the way, if you see Gennari, thank him for his letter to the "Comrades members of the Executive Committee of the Communist International" of 18/IX.1921.

It is clear, precise and *fully* convincing.

Serrati is a blend of petty-bourgeois spinelessness and politicaster swindling. *I am quite* prepared to repeat this in the press if Gennari and other comrades—you and Zinoviev among them, of course—consider it useful. In that case, let Gennari send me the *original* of Serrati's article in *Avanti!*, and I shall write him a 20-line letter for the press. But it is hardly worth while to do this.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on September 26, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

406
DRAFT TELEGRAM OF ORGANISING A THREE-WEEK FIREWOOD DRIVE, AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY[343]

To All Territorial, Gubernia and Uyezd Economic Councils,
Regional, Gubernia and Uyezd Party Committees,
Gubernia and Uyezd Executive Committees,
Gubernia and Railway Timber Committees
and to All Railways Superintendents

The season for hauling the firewood from the woods is near-

* Then follows J. V. Stalin's name written in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

ing its end. Within two or three weeks, the autumn slush and total lack of roads will halt the transportation of the stock-piled fuel from the forests until the sleigh-roads can be used. Meanwhile, the quantity of firewood available at the railway lines at present and that to be brought out under the plan of the Chief Timber Committee in the brief period of transportation remaining fall very far short of the quantity required for the normal operation of transport. There is a threat of complete stoppage on the most important railway lines.

To prevent a possible transport disaster, the C.L.D. hereby orders that, beginning from October 1, a three-week fuel transportation drive should be announced involving the mobilisation for this period of all facilities and means for the haulage of fuel to the railway lines, and attaching to this work the same importance as to the collection of the tax in kind.

Call at once a meeting of the economic conference, with the participation of railway representatives, to adopt all measures to secure the maximum transportation of firewood over and above the established targets, in an effort to increase the transportation to double the set targets, keeping the consumption of fodder strictly in accordance with warrants simultaneously dispatched, in no case allowing departures from these warrants. Notify the C.L.D. at once about the measures taken.

Among the railways in the most disastrous state are the Kazan, North-Western, South-Western, Kiev-Voronezh, Nikolayevskaya, and the railways in Siberia. That is why, all energy, resources and facilities must be strained to the utmost in the gubernias through which these key railway lines run, in order to achieve the maximum results.

Vigorous execution is hereby declared to be the personal responsibility of chairmen of the gubernia executive committees, chairmen of the gubernia timber committees, and chairmen of the gubernia Cheka, in accordance with Soviet and Party procedures.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.*

* This is followed by the signatures of M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the All-Russia C.E.C., and V. M. Molotov, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C.—*Ed.*

I propose that this should be co-ordinated by phone at once, to give us time to get this also by phone through the Politbureau and the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. tomorrow, 19/IX.

19/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 27, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

407
TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

28.IX.1921

Comrade Orjonikidze:

Please *make an arrangement* with Comrade Krumin, editor of the C.L.D. organ, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, about correspondents' reports from the Caucasus:

a) regular,

b) from time to time, *especially* from workers and peasants.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

408
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev:

The three of us (Molotov, Stalin and I), in our capacity as a commission appointed by the C.C., have discussed your letter.

We still cannot agree with you.

In Moscow, there were major differences on principle, there was the Workers' Opposition, which the Party Congress condemned for its "deviation", one which was not

only on a Moscow but on an all-Russia scale, with a long history behind it.

In Petrograd, there are no differences on principle, nor is there even a deviation towards a deviation. There is nothing of the sort about Komarov or Uglanov, who were most reliable at the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. and at the metalworkers' congress as well. These comrades could not have plunged into a deviation so suddenly. We find not a trace of the facts to prove this.

There is a legitimate desire on the part of a majority to be the majority and to substitute another group for the one through which you have been "running things". The people have gained in stature and that alone makes their desire legitimate.

They should not be pushed into a deviation by talk of "differences on principle". *Ideological* guidance should be exercised carefully, *fully* allowing the new majority to be a majority and *to run things*. We are sure that if you want this you could very well do it, and help the "old group" to move to another city and refresh themselves.

*Lenin**

Written on September 29, 1921
Sent to Petrograd

First published in 1965
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Printed from the original

409
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

29.IX.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

There is no doubt about the importance of the matter set out in the enclosed documents.

I feel that our press—Belyakov's articles in *Izvestia*, Sosnovsky's in *Pravda*, and a number of other articles and reports—has fully clarified and proved that a number of

* The document was also signed by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov.—*Ed.*

state farms of the Central Agricultural Administration have been working on model lines. The outstanding work done by Comrade Runov, who is at the head of this endeavour, is also reported by Comrade Muralov, a competent man. The successful development of a truly proletarian agriculture is of tremendous importance in principle.

It is as, or perhaps *even more*, important in practical terms.

That is why I ask you urgently to prepare this matter for the Narrow C.P.C. today (bank-notes) and for the *C.L.D.* tomorrow (enter on the agenda, make all the necessary inquiries by phone, etc.).[344]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. If nothing else can be done, let them have what they ask (*to the maximum* amount) *on loan for a year*. These people have deserved our confidence many times over.

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410
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

29.IX.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

This business of Kara-Bugaz must be clarified. If you are too busy, you may put this off for a few days, but not more.

Lacis insists in Pravda of 19/IX. that it is a "Gold Mine".[345] Take at the C.P.C. Secretariat my recent correspondence* with Professor Ipatiev (member of the S.E.C. Collegium), a specialist and the head of our chemical industry.

His answer to me was: can't be started at present.

Is it the Central Salt Administration that is making a mistake or someone else?

* See Document 321 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Do you think that we should take a look at the Administration's data to see how solid they are, or do something else?

Find out and let me know.

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

411
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

30.IX.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

I sent out (through Smolyaninov, I believe) a telegram to all gubernia electrical departments* ordering them to send with their delegates to the All-Russia Electrotechnical Congress *statistical data* on *all* electric-power stations in Russia.

Be sure to find a copy and *while the Electrotechnical Congress is in session* carry out a stringent documentary check-up on the execution of this.

We **must** have this done, because the matter is of enormous economic and political importance.

If need be, circulate a *questionnaire* among the delegates to the Congress, *detaining* all those who fail to fill it in.

Secure execution and information, and carry out a strictly cavilling check-up!

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

412
ASSIGNMENT TO N. P. GORBUNOV AND LETTER TO K. KH. DANISHEVSKY, V. M. MOLOTOV AND A. S. KISELYOV

30.IX.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please have this letter sent out in copies to

1) Comrade Danishevsky (Chief Timber Committee)
and 2) Comrade Molotov, C.C. Secretary
3) Comrade Kiselyov, Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C.

---

* See Document 327 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The C.C. has decided to assign *15* responsible men for fuel (firewood, to be more precise) work for the three-week period.*

I should very strongly request comrades undertaking this extremely important work to devote especial attention to the following circumstances:

1) Verification of how the *accounting* (of the stockpiling, haulage and carriage to the stations) is arranged in the localities.

This business is run badly. The *C.L.D.* is aware of this, but does not know how to help. Comrades observing it *at the grass roots*, on the spot, can do a great deal to help, if they *make* a thorough *study* of the thing on the spot.

2) Stealing methods.

The stealing of firewood is very widespread (and this is understandable in a cold ruined peasant country). Bureaucrats and contractors very frequently cover up this stealing and carry it through "artistically".

It is extremely important to make a *much more detailed* study *from below* of the *methods* of cheating (from entries in the books, receipts, etc., etc.). The *C.L.D.* is badly in need of this.

I earnestly request *all* 15 comrades who are going, to read this and drop me a couple of lines; if the need arises, *to agree* to remain on the spot for an extra week or so to make a more thorough study of the business.[346]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

413

*TO THE S.E.C. PRESIDIUM

Please submit information about the number of groups, trusts and associations, and autonomous enterprises under each central board.

* See Document 406 of this volume.—*Ed.*

List the name of each association and group, stating the number of enterprises within each group, and the number of engineers and technicians employed in each:

a) central board, group, trust and association (each separately),

b) enterprises (all together).

Send information not later than October 2.

If the groups, trusts and associations have not yet been finally designated, let us have a projected list.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on September 30, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

414

TO THE FOREIGN LITERATURE COMMITTEE[347]

Forlitcom

Forlitcom's report shows that it has managed to do virtually nothing as yet.

The main task that Forlitcom should set itself is to have the special libraries in Moscow, Petrograd and the major cities of the Republic concentrate in their hands one copy each of all the latest technical and scientific (chemistry, physics, electrical engineering, medicine, statistics, economics, etc.) magazines and books for 1914-1921 published abroad, and to have regular receipt of all periodicals arranged. I shall appraise the whole of Forlitcom's work primarily from the standpoint of the actual fulfilment of this assignment.

By the way:

a) the report says that Forlitcom has decided to transfer all credits from all the departments to Forlitcom's account. Has this decision been carried out? How much credit has been received from each department?

b) Page 3 of the report says: "The boxes with scientific and technical literature tended to contain a mass of what

was absolutely not important or remarkable in any way—fiction and expensive de luxe editions, purchased no one knows whom for (for private persons) as a personal favour."

This is an incredible outrage and a crime. What has Forlitcom done to punish the guilty persons? Let me know at once the names of the guilty persons and how they have been punished.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on September 30, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

415
TO P. A. KRASIKOV

Comrade Krasikov, Deputy People's Commissar for Justice

On September 3, I sent to Comrade Kursky, his deputy and all members of the Collegium my letter No. 809,* in which I set them the binding assignment to stage the trial in Moscow of four or six cases of Moscow red tape, this autumn and in the winter of 1921-22, selecting the most "striking" cases and turning each trial into a political affair.

I enclose here a report from the chairman of a Centrosoyuz special commission for aid to the starving, Comrade Khinchuk, in which he says that the Centrosoyuz assignment to deal with the procurement of seeds was frustrated only because of red tape in the central establishments. This is a sufficiently "striking" case. I propose that you appoint an inquiry. Inform me weekly in writing through Comrade Gorbunov about the results of the inquiry.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. Please arrange beforehand with Comrade Gorbunov about the composition of the commission (or person) to be

* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 298.—*Ed.*

appointed (rather whom you intend to appoint) to carry out the inquiry.[348]

Lenin

Written on September 30, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

416

ASSIGNMENT TO N. P. GORBUNOV AND LETTER TO V. V. KUIBYSHEV

30.IX.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please have this letter sent to Comrade *Kuibyshev* (member of the S.E.C. Presidium) and arrange with him and let him have our stenographer to enable him to dictate to her by phone.

Comrade Kuibyshev:

You saw at the *C.L.D.* yesterday[349] how Rutgers was levelling charges against us and you specifically. This is a very important matter. It will undoubtedly be publicised *internationally*. That is why special care should be taken to *keep a record* of the case, to *prevent* any gossip and distortions in the future.

I very earnestly request you to write down or dictate to our stenographer (this will save some of your time) all the developments in this matter, especially what you told me on the phone about Rutgers's incredible behaviour, his rapid change of terms, etc.

Of course, we shall not show this to anyone, for the time being, but there is need to make provision immediately, just in case.

The matter has also been raised in the C.C. We shall have to give exact and full information both to the C.C. and the Red International of Trade Unions. Comrade Gorbunov will make the arrangements for you with the telephone operator, etc.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

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Printed from the original

417

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Krzhizhanovsky

Do not forget:

1) to put through at the electrotechnical congress (directly or through an *authoritative* commission) the amendments and addenda to the "Electrification Plan" for its *final* approval;

2) calendar programme *for working out plans* (primarily the *basic* ones) for the current year by the State Planning Commission.

(There is a *campaign* against S.P.C. for its actually refusing to have any plans and for its being unable to draw them up.)

Lenin

Written at the end of September 1921

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418

TO L. D. TROTSKY

The wail about the lack of money is general and universal. We could very well blow up. In all the localities there is a feverish (they say) effort to sell everything, and every imaginable thing is being offered for sale. Everyone everywhere is howling. I don't know what else can be done and how. Perhaps you will personally go to see the Preobrazhensky Commission[350] or have a talk with him? Here is a small example: In October, Rukhimovich will supply up to *5 million poods* of coal from the small leaseholders in the Donbas. How are we to pay them? Where is the money to come from?

We are late. The commercial tide is stronger than we are. The *Finance Commission* and all of us are behindhand. I have just sent over to Comrade Preobrazhensky your note about the bills.

Written in September 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

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419
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

The question of cancelling the C.P.C. decision of 6/IX, increasing the tax on potatoes, must be introduced in the Politbureau tomorrow (with Frumkin summoned).[351]

Lenin

What did you agree with *Stalin* about Petrograd?*

Written on October 2, 1921

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420
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

3.X.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please inform Comrade Radchenko that I am very much afraid of any mistakes in this matter: how can I sign any *technical* conclusions? This should be sent to the departments for their endorsement and *speeded up* in passage through the Narrow C.P.C. or through the *C.L.D.* I can help in speeding this up in every way.[352]

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

421
INQUIRY ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE SOWING CAMPAIGN

Circular

Telegram

Simbirsk, Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, Saratov, Samara, Ufa, Uralsk, Vyatka

Gubernia Sowing Committees: Marxstadt, Cheboksary, Krasnokokshaisk, Astrakhan, Izhevsk

---

* See Document 408 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Regional Sowing Committees: Kazan, Orenburg, Sterlitamak

People's Commissariat for Agriculture

Over the last month, you have stopped sending in any information on the progress of the sowing campaign and the combating of famine. The People's Commissariat for Agriculture, at present engaged mainly in the work of overcoming the after effects of the crop failure, is more than in the past few months in need of regular and the fullest possible information about your activity and the actual state of agriculture in the gubernia. Accordingly, I categorically reaffirm earlier instructions on dates of information reports, and propose that you should raise the information apparatus up to the mark and, by way of urgent order, within 48 hours from the receipt of this telegram, telegraph the following information: 1) the approved area under winter crops; 2) the area under winter crops sown; 3) the number of dessiatines left for winter fallowing; 4) the quantity of seeds received under warrants from the centre and through commodity exchange; 5) the quantity of seeds actually distributed; 6) the distribution procedures; 7) measures taken to save livestock, results achieved; 8) measures taken to save dead stock, results achieved; 9) planned social activity, its implementation; 10) state of resettlement; 11) state of village committees, their participation in overall work. After telegram send special messenger with full report. The responsible leaders of gubernias failing to reply within the specified period will be subjected to disciplinary punishment.

On points 6 to 11 cable the shortest possible reply or the exact date of dispatch of a written reply.[353]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence*

Written on October 4, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

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* The telegram is also signed by N. Osinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture.—*Ed.*

422

TO A. S. KISELYOV

Comrade Kiselyov, Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C.

I wrote you concerning A. P. Smirnov's memo* that I resolutely object to any waste of potatoes on making alcohol and said that alcohol could and should be made of peat.

It now turns out that the problem of distilling alcohol from peat has not yet been finally solved. The method has not been verified on an industrial scale and is economically unclear (there is no precisely verified calculation and no data to draw it up precisely). That is why it is still too early to speak of the mass production of alcohol from peat.

Take all measures to accelerate in every way the starting of the experimental plant to make alcohol from peat—the former Givartovsky yeast plant in Moscow.

I strongly object to Smirnov's proposal that we should pay the peasants in alcohol for their potatoes. If Smirnov insists, let him take the matter to the C.C.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 5, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

423

INSTRUCTIONS ON A LETTER FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE ACADEMIC CENTRE[354]

Supply the party with clothing for eight persons.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

5.X.21

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text written
in N. P. Gorbunov's hand
and signed by Lenin

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* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition Vol. 53, Document 295.—*Ed.*

424

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR RAILWAYS

P.C.R.

I direct you to settle within two days the matter of carrying the Kashira-Moscow electric line over the bridge across the Oka.[355]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 6 or 7, 1921
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

425

*BUGUN FISHERMEN'S AND WORKERS' SOVIET OF THE NORTHERN COAST, ARAL SEA[356]

To Comrades Workers, Fishermen of the Aral Sea

Dear Comrades:

You must have heard by now about the great disaster, the unprecedented famine which has hit the whole of the Valga area and a part of the area west of the Urals. The drought has almost entirely scorched the cereals and the grasses everywhere from Astrakhan Gubernia and all the way up to the Tatar Republic and Perm Gubernia. Millions of people—toiling peasants and workers—and millions of head of cattle are already dying or are about to die.

Russian and Moslem, nomad and settler—all are equally faced with cruel death unless help comes from their comrades—workers, toiling peasants, shepherds and fishermen from the more prosperous localities. Of course, the Soviet power, for its part, hastens to help the starving. It has already urgently sent them more than 12 million poods of grain for winter sowing, and is now sending them food, organising eating places, etc. But all of this is not enough. The disaster is so great, and the Soviet Republic has been so ruined by the tsarist war and the whiteguards, that

hardly a quarter of the needy can somehow be fed from state resources until the next harvest.

Nor can we expect help from the wealthy capitalists. It is true that the capitalists who now govern the strongest states in the world—like Britain, America and France—have told us that they allegedly want to help our starving peasants, but on terms which are tantamount to handing over to them all power over our Workers' and Peasants' Republic. We can well understand this. Has a bloodsucker, a capitalist and a usurer, ever helped a toiler without expecting something in return? The capitalist class has always used the toiling man's hunger to enslave him, body and soul. They now want to make use of our famine to destroy the freedom we have won at the price of our blood, to wrest power from the workers and peasants for ever, and to saddle them once again with the tsar, the landowner, the master, the police officer and the official.

The only hope of the starving in Kazan, Ufa, Samara and Astrakhan lies in the great proletarian solidarity (sympathy) of toiling men, like themselves, with toil-hardened hands, earning their daily bread by their own hard work, and not sucking anyone's blood. You have a good catch of fish on the Aral Sea, and you will be able to live without great need. So please set aside part of your catch for the old men and women bloated by starvation, for the 8 million exhausted toilers, who, after all, will have to do all the heavy work in tilling the land on an empty stomach for almost a whole year, and finally, for the 7 million children who may be the first to die.

Dear comrades, fishermen and workers of the Aral Sea, I urge you to give with a generous hand! In so doing you will not only be acting in human conscience, but will be strengthening the cause of the working-class revolution. For you will demonstrate to the whole world, and to al] the working people above all, the invincible strength of the Soviet workers' state, built on the broadest mutual assistance between proletarians in areas most remote from each other.

Let the whole working class rise as a man to heal this deep wound of the Volga area, and the fertile Volga area will repay us with its grain in future years. That is the

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

only way for us to preserve the Soviet power and safeguard the freedom we have won against all the villainous attempts of the capitalists of the world.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 7, 1921
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

426
TO P. A. KRASIKOV

8/X.

Comrade Krasikov:

Yesterday, the Orgbureau suspended the case (Moscow disciplinary court) and referred it to the People's Commissariat for Justice.

Now you must let me have your opinion on Monday.

I advise:

(α) a brief report in the press (whom can we ask to do it?) *beginning* with the case of Mayakovsky versus Skvortsov*;

(β) the law must without fail be specified or *amended* in a legislative procedure. Memo about this on Monday.

Could this be done *together* with the All-Russia Central T.U.C.?

Awaiting your reply,**
Lenin

Written on October 8, 1921
First published in 1965
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* See Document 363 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 413.—*Ed.*

427
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY[357]

G. M.:

If you approve, return this, and I shall have it retyped and sent (to whom? to you?). I wonder whether it is worth doing this at all? Perhaps, this is *unnecessary* "pomp"? Is it of any *practical* benefit?

Lenin

Written on October 8 or 9, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

428
TELEGRAM TO A. I. POTYAEV AND NOTE TO SECRETARY

(Check address with Meisner at Glavryba)

Glavryba Chairman *Potyaev*
Astrakhan

9.X.1921

Received your letter of 21/9.[358] Give description of new methods to the press both in Astrakhan and Moscow. Telegraph to C.L.D. proposals concerning cooperage.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Replied by telegram on 9/X.

Check Potyaev's reply and introduce in the *C.L.D.*

9/X. *Lenin*

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

429
*TELEGRAM TO ALL GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES, GUBERNIA PARTY COMMITTEES, GUBERNIA TRADE UNION COUNCILS, GUBERNIA LABOUR COMMITTEES

October 10, 1921

Under the influence of the food supply situation in the Donbas, which was aggravated last May-July, tens of thousands of workers have abandoned the pits and have

dispersed, some of them beyond the boundaries of the area. The flight is especially strong among coal-hewers, whose numbers dropped from 16,000 to 10,000 in August, and also among skilled boiler-men. The food supply situation in the Donbas has now been stabilised, namely, a three months' supply of grain has been delivered and is to be increased. I propose that you start extensive agitation for a return to the pits of the underground workers who have left Donbas, namely, coal-hewers, sledders, timberers, drillers, drifters, haulers, and also boiler-men and machinists. No need to send workers others than those in the stated categories. In conducting agitation explain: 1) full provision of grain; 2) introduction of new rules of payment in food and cash by productivity, and abolition of levelling issues of food and money; 3) on the return of the workers largely depends the success of the food campaign in the Ukraine, which had been slowed down by a shortage of fuel for food transportation.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.*

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

430

TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.

C.P.C. Chairman, Byelorussia
Copy to Economic Conference

Teumin's report[359] at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade does not answer the C.L.D. inquiry because it fails to give any figures. The Economic Conference of Byelorussia has been sending formalistic or unsatisfactory replies to the C.P.C. business manager's telegrams 01090 of September 8; 01134 of September 14; 01161 of September 19; 01204 of October 1 and 01220 of October 5. Please

* The telegram is also signed by V. M. Molotov, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee.—*Ed.*

at once demand and obtain these telegrams from the economic conference, investigate the matter, and prosecute those guilty of red tape and sabotage. The required report, signed by the economic conference chairman, must be dispatched at once. Telegraph receipt of this telegram and execution.

October 10

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 10, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

431

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Received after Politbureau sitting.
Please circulate urgently to all members
of Politbureau for a written vote

10.X.

Comrade Molotov:

I have an arrangement with Comrade Unschlicht to delay execution of the sentence on Nazvanov, and am taking the question to the Politbureau.

In the summer of 1921, I had a letter about Nazvanov from Krasin (before Nazvanov's arrest). Krasin requested that this very valuable engineer, as he put it, should be recruited for our work.

Krzhizhanovsky told me that he, being acquainted with Nazvanov, had repeatedly had sharp arguments with him after 25.X.1917, and had very nearly thrown him out of the house for his anti-Soviet views. He said, however, that in the spring or summer of 1921 he had noticed a change in Nazvanov, and had taken him to work at the *State Planning Commission*.

After this I had two comrades from the C.C. of the sugar industry workers who, in reply to my question, gave a positive opinion of Nazvanov, an opinion which they

confirmed in writing as well. On the strength of the aforementioned, I am taking the matter to the Politbureau.

I propose: if necessary, Krasin's letter and a written reference of the two workers should be found. I shall find both these documents if the Politbureau so decides.

For my part I propose: to cancel the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka's sentence and apply the sentence proposed by Agranov (it is here in the record of the case), i.e., two years with the possibility of *conditional* release.[360]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 10, 1921

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432

TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[361]

I consider the matter of exceptional importance and urgency, because to conclude a loan with Italy, *which is not demanding recognition of the old debts*, might mean a break through the financial blockade.

I propose a secret commission from the Politbureau **right away** with a **short** term (2-4 days). Let us say, with the following on it: Litvinov, Scheinman, Radchenko, Krestinsky (with the right of his substitution by another member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance), and Bogdanov (with the same right).

The guarantee may be: timber (concession in the north); oil on the Ukhta; oil on the Emba; copper mines, etc.

11/X.

Lenin

(Commission's assignment (2-4 days):
the Italian proposal *specifically*
and then *general* basis of guarantees.)

Written on October 11, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

433

NOTE TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[362]

This is urgent! I propose that either we vote right away in writing or convene the Politbureau for half an hour.

I propose: agree to *Marchlewski* and *Paikes* (let Chicherin decide who is going to Dairen and who to Chita).

Yaroslavsky won't do for the conference in Washington. Meshcheryakov—*not too suitable*. I propose: authorise the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Orgbureau to look for *more* candidates (24 hours).

11/X

Lenin

Written on October 11, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

434

TO M. L. RUKHIMOVICH[363]

11/X.

Comrade Rukhimovich:

I have read your report and am cursing you most severely.

The report is done carelessly. Why not take 2 or 3 hours here in Moscow (if you had no time in the Donbas) *to put* it *into good shape*?

It is unfinished and unclear.

The required table is not there, but the report itself is cluttered up with figures.

There is need for a short table: the price in terms of flour or in gold rubles, etc.

1,000 poods of coal net at the pit head or at the station, etc.

Before the war...———

Now at the Central Board of the Coal Industry————— (big pits).

There again, on the condition you mentioned (complete success of the whole programme of collective supply?)————

At small pits of leaseholders————

The whole point is to have such a table!

Yet that is the one you have failed to give.

All your tables should be in a special little chapter, giving the details and precise proof of the main and basic table.

Furthermore, there is no clear statement: the authorities (name, record, rank?) *say* the small pits are harmful.

So-and-so (names, etc.) are against this.

This is important, but it has been glossed over.

Thirdly, the conclusion? You should take what is controversial.

The leasing of small pits?

This is *now* beyond doubt.

In your report this is slurred over and it is not clear what *now* remains controversial.

Apparently,

it is that:

1) whether or not there is need right away for *repairs* on a number (*such-and-such? names*) of big pits, and their stoppage for repairs with transfer of their targets to the small pits?

2) The leasing of *medium* pits *as well*?

3) —— precisely *through* the Donets Economic Conference?

There is no clear statement about this. I or any other person reading the report has to *complete* it *in your stead*.

That is the way to ruin even a good case!

To clear things up we would need *your plan*: close down for repairs so and so. Within two years (or how many?) to have small pits yield 900 million, etc.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 11, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

435
TO M. L. RUKHIMOVICH

12/X.

Comrade Rukhimovich:

Stalin tells me that you have taken strong offence at my letter.*

You are quite wrong to take this attitude. I had not the slightest intention of being offensive.

I had to swear because I took your ideas *in earnest*. I personally made a call yesterday about it to *Ramzin* (a first-class, and most honest scientist) and *Smilga*. Smilga *promised* me to call a commission: Bazhanov + Ramzin + yourself.

You must know how to *fight* instead of taking too modest an attitude as you are doing.

I have *not* shown *anyone* my letter to you.

Make the best preparation you can for the commission; and if you are voted down, let me have your "minority opinion" precisely and clearly stated.[364]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 12, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

436
TO V. V. KUIBYSEEV[365]

12.X.1921

Comrade Kuibyshev:

Please let me have the following additional explanations on the Rutgers case:

1) everyone seems to think we shall have to spend 300,000 dollars.

But §4 *a*) says:

---

* See previous document.—*Ed*.

"The Soviet Government shall allocate 100 dollars *for each worker coming to settle*",
while §5 a) and b) say that 2,800 + 3,000 = 5,800 are due to settle.

Doesn't that make our expenditure 600,000 *dollars*?

Or should we add clearly: 100 dollars each for *3,000* men for the Nadezhdinsk Works and nothing more?

2) Why is there no *written* statement from all three, Rutgers, Heywood and Calvert, that they are *willing to sign* the enclosed "undertaking"?

Please order this today and be sure to have it done *in English*.

3) End of §8 (our pledge to repay expenses) should be set out more precisely in a special §: "The Soviet Government undertakes to reimburse expenses only on the following principles and in the following cases."

4) Is there any sign of an ultimatum in the amendments made by Rutgers and the others to the text adopted by the Supreme Economic Council Presidium?

Please send me your reply (+ the English pledge) *and return this letter to Molotov*, C.C. Secretary, *tomorrow*, *Thursday*, *October 13*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

437

TELEGRAM TO ALL TIMBER COMMITTEES AND GUBERNIA CHEKA

To All Gubernia, District, Regional and Railway Timber Committees, to All Gubernia Cheka
(Copies to the All-Russia Cheka and to Comrade Avanesov, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection)

Despite constant reminders from the Central Administration of the Timber Industry, the timber committees continue to delay their progress reports, or are submitting

them incomplete or drawn up in the wrong form. It is high time that everyone should understand that the absence of precise information on the replenishment of the firewood and material stock greatly hampers the centre's planning and distribution work, and has a grave effect on every branch of the national economy, because wood fuel is the basis for the operation of all state industry and the railways, while timber, apart from meeting the country's acute domestic needs, serves as a real basis for our foreign trade, without which the economic revival of the Republic is impossible. This is a categorical order to all timber committees at once to regulate their reports on the stocking, carting out and delivery of firewood, charcoal and timber; all gubernia Cheka must see to the precise observance of the deadlines and forms laid down by the C.A.T.I. Under the personal responsibility of all timber committee chairmen I demand precise and speedy replies with a list of all those personally responsible for the submission of reports.[366]

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars*

Written on October 13, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten
text with Lenin's additions
and signature

438
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

13.X.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

1) The pamphlet must be returned to the author (after making a note of its title and the author's place of work).[367]

2) Try to find out in which libraries the book is available.

---

* The telegram is also signed by V. A. Trifonov, deputy chief of the Central Fuel Administration and K. Kh. Danishevsky, chief of the C.A.T.I.—*Ed.*

3) Write to engineer N. S. Vetchinkin, asking him whether he could write an *article* on this question for *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* or *Izvestia*.

Write a small pamphlet with the addition of conclusions from the latest (1914-1921) foreign literature.

4) Propose that the S.E.C. Presidium should establish:

(a) the keeping of a correct inventory of our road-building machinery, by agreement with the War Department;

(b) persons responsible for the inventory and use of these machines (perhaps, these responsible persons should be at the S.E.C.'s *Public Works Committee*?);

(c) discuss whether or not a small number of tractors should be assigned to this work to carry it on regularly.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

439

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Attention, all members of the C.C.

Reinstein informed me yesterday that the American millionaire *Hammer*, who is Russian-born (is in prison on a charge of illegally procuring an abortion; actually, it is said, in revenge for his communism), is prepared to give the Urals workers *1,000,000 poods of grain* on very easy terms (5 percent) and to take *Urals valuables* on commission for sale in America.

This Hammer's son (and partner), a doctor, is in Russia, and has brought Semashko $60,000 worth of surgical instruments as a gift. The son has visited the Urals with Martens and has decided to help rehabilitate the Urals industry.

An official report will soon be made by *Martens*.

Lenin

14/X.

Written on October 14, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

440
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[368]

Comrade Chicherin:

I doubt whether any other People's Commissariat would stand for that sort of thing. I think the business manager P. P. Gorbunov is to blame. He should have worked out and got through the Politbureau a precise statute of the Moscow Committee's powers, and to cover the fact that without your consent the Moscow Committee is not empowered to remove anyone ("remove" in the broad sense of the word).

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written in October,
not before the 14th, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

441
TO L. K. MARTENS

15.X.

Comrade Martens:

Can *Hammer* (Reinstein told me about him*) be persuaded to

undertake the financing of the Rutgers group to save the Urals, *improving* the composition of the group? by including, say, four *efficient* Americans?

Let me have an answer to this as soon as possible.

Second. Can you get Hammer to take an interest in a scheme to electrify the Urals, so that Hammer should provide not only the grain, but also the electrical equipment (naturally on a loan basis)?

---

* See Document 439 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Rutgers's plan must be *corrected* (try to do this through Hammer), and not simply rejected.[369]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on October 15, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

442
TO N. A. UGLANOV

15/X.

Comrade Uglanov:

I am sending this to you and Komarov *secretly*.

Bear in mind that this has been decided *before* the arrival of the commission of Kamenev + Orjonikidze + Zalutsky and *independently* of them. The Petrograd Gubernia Cheka is no use, it is not up to the mark, it is not clever. We have to find better men.[370]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on October 15, 1921
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

443
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

16.X.

Comrade Chicherin:

I do not agree with you in the assessment of the situation or on the steps you propose.[371] There can be no question at all of Trotsky and myself withdrawing from the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

It is quite enough for Krasin to make a statement on the debts.

Urquhart has *so far* disagreed with the percentage level:

he offered 5 per cent of gross output, our commission demanded 10 per cent.

The British and the French want to plunder us. That we shall not allow. We shall pay no attention to their "dissatisfaction" over this.

There is one concession: timber in the Caucasus. Trade arrangements with the Germans are under way. They are starting with Italy: she has offered a loan. **This** matter should be speeded up and pushed forward by every means.

There is a contract with Armstrong on the boilers. There is a contract with Norway.

The *only* "sharp turn" is with Britain and France, and I do not see that we should make *any* concessions or steps. *Hoover* is a real asset.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 16, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

444

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Copy to Comrade Osinsky,
copy to Comrade Avanesov
for all C.L.D. members, circulate for all to read
and sign upon reading

17/X.1921

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky:

I draw your attention to Comrade Rakovsky's article, "The Famine and Maize", in *Pravda* No. 231 (14.X.1921).

In the light of this article, I feel sure that the *conclusion* of the State Planning Commission's agricultural section on maize (of 13.IX.1921, signed by Comrade Sereda) is inadequate.

The advantages of maize (and beans) appear to be *proven* in several respects. Since this is so, faster and more vigorous measures should be taken. Of especial importance is

the fact that the seed requirement is between *one-tenth* and *one-fifteenth* of the normal quantity.

This appears to be the *crucial* consideration.

It should be decided right away that the *total* quantity of maize required for the *full* sowing of *all the spring* area *throughout* the Volga region should be purchased in good time for the sowing in the spring of 1922.

To attain this aim, this should be paralleled by:

1) elaboration of very precise and very circumstantially considered measures for the propaganda of maize and the **teaching** of peasants to grow maize with the meagre resources *now* available;

2) urgent discussion of whether practical ways and means can be found to *make maize a part of the people's diet*, under the *existing* conditions in peasant farming, *their habits and way of life* (cf. page 35, the State Planning Commission's memo).

I request an immediate discussion of these questions in the agricultural section and the presidium, making sure to collect *every* shade of opinion on maize.

Report to the *C.L.D.* on Friday, 21.X.1921.[372]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published on April 15, 1930 in *Pravda* No. 104

Printed from the original

445

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Copy to Comrade Preobrazhensky

17.X.1921

Comrade Krestinsky:

I should like to know your opinion about whether or not it is time to make these two kinds of calculations:

first, a plan (a quite rough and general plan, by way of the first approximation) for restoring our currency. Say: under such-and-such conditions, over a period of so many years, it would be possible by consistently applying such-and-such measures to achieve so-and-so.

Do you (and the finance commission) believe that such a calculation is possible or that even an approximate calculation of this kind is premature and impossible *for the time being*?

Second, is it possible to convert our *expenditure* budget into gold and compare it (*on the main* heads—and perhaps by departments and regions, gubernias, capitals, etc., as far as possible) with *pre-war* figures?

We should make a start, and as soon as possible, on a reform, through such or similar calculation, of our quite neglected and irrelevantly, spontaneously, and irregularly inflated budget.

I request you to let me have your opinion on this matter and—if you have no special objections—to raise it in the finance commission.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1924 in the book *Veliky Vozhd* (Great Leader)

Printed from the original

446

TO P. I. POPOV

Comrade Popov:

I have received the statistical tables of population by administrative division of the R.S.F.S.R.

1) I request that they be specified in publication (for instance, it is not said that they are after the census of August 28, 1920).

2) The autonomous regions and republics (the Karelian Labour Commune, the Bashkirian, the Tatar, etc.) should be brought out from the list of gubernias and given separately, checking (when in doubt) with the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Justice.

3) The summing-up should bring together the large divisions, repeating them

approximately in this way
- European Russia,
- R.S.F.S.R. proper;
- autonomous republics
- Ukrainian S.S.R.,
- Turkestan,
- Caucasian Republic,
- Far-Eastern, etc.

4) Check up once again whether *the same* territories, e.g., the Bashkirian Republic, have been taken for 1914 and 1897

1920	1,268,132
1914	357,700 (?? obvious error)

5) Add a short text (in accordance with the pamphlet issued by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) on the changes (within the uyezds and volosts) in the gubernias and regions.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

P.S. Another desirable addition, *if that is not too much trouble*: the area, population 1897 and 1914 (if available) of the *states* within the old Russian Empire which have seceded from the R.S.F.S.R.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

P.P.S. Is it possible also to add the number of uyezds, volosts, towns and villages has in the 1914-1915 yearbook).

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on October 17, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

447

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

17/X.

G. M.:

This is secret.

Read it and return this very day, tomorrow morning, at the latest.

The author[373] is partly right: I shall change the assignment to the State Planning Commission in the *conclusion* (assignment to the People's Commissariat for Agriculture).

Please think about the way to co-ordinate and *specify* S.P.C. tasks and let me have your plan (draft decision on drawing a line of distinction between S.P.C. and the planning commissions) *in writing*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 17, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

448

TO PROPOSAL TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. AND NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV[374]

To Politbureau *Members*

For my part, I propose that we agree with Chicherin.

18/X. *Lenin*

18/X.

Comrade Mikhailov:

I propose that the enclosed should be *circulated* to all members of the Politbureau, that is, each should read, make his remarks, and send it on to the next person (or to you).

If no one insists on a *discussion* in the Politbureau, then the decision of the majority should be entered in the minutes right away.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 18, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

449

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To all members of the Politbureau

I am against the underlined proposal.[375] Such steps will merely create an impression of our weakness: as has always happened in such cases, the opponent will become impudent. I consider Krasin's interview and polemics in the press to be enough. I request Comrade Mikhailov to ask Comrade Chicherin for my previous note to him on this matter, and to have it circulated also among the Politbureau members.*

18/X. *Lenin*

Written on October 18, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

450

*TO THE S.E.C. PRESIDIUM

I propose that the information and material on the construction of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk District Electric-Power Station (on Lake Rubskoye) should be urgently sent to me.[376]

1) The statute of the state district Ivanovo-Voznesensk electric-power station or of the construction of this station.

2) Have the projects for the construction of this station, the basic data of the project: capacity, type, etc., been worked out and approved?

3) How the project administration is organised; the number of offices; their location; relations with each other and the centre; to whom the construction is directly subordinate here, at the centre; relations between the construction bodies and the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Soviet establishments; the name, office and record of the chief persons responsible for construction; those here, at the centre, directly responsible for the whole undertaking.

---

* See Document 443 of this volume.—*Ed.*

4) The number of industrial and office workers employed by the project administration and at the building site on May 1 and October 1, including the staffs of all the central and local construction offices (Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Teikovo, Lake Rubskoye); separately—how many:

Building and other workers:

a) skilled,

b) unskilled;

Office workers;

Administrative and technical personnel:

a) engineers,

b) other technicians.

5) What tasks have been set before the project administration, the building programme for 1921 and 1922; the calendar programme and its execution over these two years.

6) The state of the building operations on October 1, 1921; what has actually been done since the start of construction.

7) Supply of the building site for 1921 and 1922 with:

food,

building and technical materials, and manpower, etc.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 19, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

451

TO L. K. MARTENS

Comrade Martens:

If Hammer is in earnest about his plan to supply 1 million poods of grain to the Urals (and it is my impression from your letter that your written confirmation of Reinstein's words makes one believe that he is, and that the plan is not just so much hot air), you must try and give the whole matter the precise juridical form of a contract or *concession*.*

* See Document 473 of this volume; also *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 511.—*Ed.*

Let it be a *concession*, even if a fictitious one (asbestos or any other Urals valuables or what have you). What we want to show and have in print (later, when *performance begins*) is that the Americans *have gone in* for *concessions*. This is important politically. Let me have your reply.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 19, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

452

LETTER TO I. I. RADCHENKO AND NOTE TO F. V. LENGNIK

19.X.1921

Comrade Radchenko:

I recommend to you the bearer of this, Nikolai Alexandrovich *Yemelyanov*. Please let him have a *6-month assignment for work abroad*, so as to give him a chance to recover from the hard labour in Petrograd, and have a change of work.

I know Nikolai Alexandrovich very well personally, and am sure that this comrade, this absolutely honest and most loyal Communist, with vast human, industrial and Party experience, can and must be used for cleansing the Augean stables of stealing and sabotage by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade officials abroad. Please phone me today.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Comrade Lengnik:

Please read this letter and phone me (we shall later also show this letter to Iv. Iv. Radchenko). It is my earnest request that Yemelyanov should be given a suitable assignment abroad soon.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in part in 1934 in the book *Lenin na khozyaistvennom fronte* (Lenin on the Economic Front)

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

453

*TO THE MOSCOW REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL

Under a decision of the Moscow Cheka Collegium, a case of red tape at the People's Commissariat for Food (the case of Yakov Stepanovich Artyukhov) was referred to you.[377]

Please have this important case tried as soon as possible and let me know the judgement.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. It is of exceptional importance—both from the Party and the political standpoint—especially in pursuance of the decision of the Eighth Congress of Soviets,[378] to have the proceedings in the red tape case arranged with the greatest solemnity, making the trial *educational*, and the sentence sufficiently impressive.

Lenin

Written on October 20, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten
text with additions
in a secretary's hand

454

TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

Have a look at this, please, and if possible, inquire from some of the old Party men, Armenians, perhaps. I knew *Lalayants* from the *1890s* on as a Marxist and then a Bolshevik. He is undoubtedly a loyal revolutionary, *who must be used despite our political differences*.[379]

20/X.

Lenin

Written on October 20, 1921
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

455

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[380]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

We must press forward with the question of *cotton* in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan (Mugan Steppe) and in Armenia.

Tell Rykov and see to it that the State Bank should issue *as big* and as easy a loan *as possible*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 21, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

456

TO V. Y. CHUBAR AND KH. G. RAKOVSKY

Chubar and Rakovsky

Today, on a report concerning the transportation of foodstuffs from the Ukraine, the C.L.D. decided that considering that you have undertaken to load the grain for the centre with your own means, and considering that it has reached hardly a quarter of the established rate, we shall be forced to appoint our own representative to the Ukraine, unless there is a radical improvement in this matter within the next three days. The C.L.D. requests an immediate reply to this C.L.D. telegram.*

21/X.21

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Sent to Kharkov

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a text written in Lydia Fotieva's hand and signed by Lenin

* In the upper right-hand corner of the page there is the following note by Lydia Fotieva: "Comrade Gartman. This must be sent off at once and the reply receipt seen to."—*Ed.*

457
TO A. O. ALSKY

Secret
21.X.

Comrade Alsky:

Please have information sent me on the *reserve*, emergency fund of bank-notes:

(1) monthly, so long as the fund is not <1,000,000 million,

(2) twice a month, if it is not < 500,000 million,

(3) weekly, if it is not < 250,000 million,

(4) daily, if less.

Also let me know *the procedure governing the expenditure* of the emergency fund (who has the right to make disbursements? what are the formalities involved? etc.).

Think this over and let me know with the utmost secrecy, in a sewn-up and sealed envelope, addressed for **personal** delivery, into Lenin's own hands, from Alsky.[381]

Lenin

Written on October 21, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

458
TO THE ORGBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[382]

Comrade Mikhailov, **C.C. Orgbureau**

In view of the request from Iv. Iv. Skvortsov (Stepanov), please cancel his business trip and *banish* him instead *to one of* the state farms *near Moscow*, on a milk ration, to enable him to complete within four or six weeks, the writing he has undertaken, without being distracted by other business. (Find the state farm through the Moscow organ concerned.)

Lenin

Written on October 21, 1921
First published in 1929
in the magazine
Proletarskaya Revolutsia No. 10

Printed from the original

459

TO A. A. NOVITSKY

Comrade Novitsky:

Perhaps, it will be clearer this way:

(+)

column *3*: actual amount in hand
and *issued* (—),
this *will* then *give below* the figure:
remaining in hand
+

and next to this
columns *6* and *6 bis*, to whom, where,
when, whose decision.

Then
allocations 4+8+9
10th in the 4th from the top

and **then**
amount in hand *minus* allocations,
i.e., *5th column*.

Such tables (as you have been sending me) must be top secret.*

For this, I think, *only* two copies must be made (one for you+one for me for the Politbureau) without retyping.

Add another column: *earmarked by the C.C.*, perhaps under this head:

Earmarked under a report by
Comrade Molotov:
when earmarked,
how much,
aim.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. Return this to me with your mark and the enclosures.

Written in October,
before the 22nd, 1921

Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

* See Document 457 of this volume.—*Ed.*

460
TO A. A. NOVITSKY

Secret

Comrade Novitsky:

Add to your reports on the gold fund another column: earmarked by the Politbureau, but not yet passed in Soviet government procedure, and not issued; arrange with Comrade Mikhailov, C.C. Secretary, on your receipt of this information and enter it personally into the reports.

22/X.

Top secret.

Lenin

Written on October 22, 1921
Published in full in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

461
TO L. S. SOSNOVSKY[383]

22/X.

Comrade Sosnovsky:

I have received your letter concerning Yezhov.

I very much doubt that we could afford to let 1,000-1,500 warehouse and office workers get

1,250,000-1,500,000 (Soviet) rubles a month.

Hardly.

I think: work out bonuses for rapid clearing of warehouse in economic enterprise (state plant, factory, state farm, etc.).

It is up to Yezhov to put through your other proposals (and a copy for me).

Let us have a precise and short draft.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 22, 1921
First published in 1928
in *Lenin Miscellany VIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

462

TO TELEGRAM TO ALL REGIONAL AND GUBERNIA ECONOMIC CONFERENCES

To all Regional and Gubernia Conferences.
Special Committee, Kharkov

In view of the reported cases of regional and gubernia economic organs making unwarranted changes in the distribution plans based on decisions by the Central Committee of the Fuel Workers' Union, and in some instructions issued by the Central Fuel Administration, which tends to ruin the rhythm of the fuel supply operation, I propose that no more arbitrary changes should be allowed in the future in any case. When such are necessary, however, agree matters beforehand with the Central Fuel Administration or introduce in the C.L.D. Execution of this shall be the personal responsibility of the economic conference chairmen. Inform of receipt and execution.[384]

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on October 22, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

463

TO D. I. KURSKY

22/X.

Comrade Kursky:

I enclose material on the *S.K.F.* concession (Bogdanov has the contract and the other material).

You are aware of this matter.

Please return this to me with your opinion.

You will recall that you objected to it *over the warehouse.*

Couldn't we do it this way: find the form (suitable, convenient) for *two* transactions: under one transaction, the *S.K.F.* **will purchase** the whole warehouse from us. (Recognition of *our* title: that is the essence, after all.)

Under the other—we shall buy from them items to the amount stated in the contract.

As a result, *we* pay them this amount.*

Is it possible to ensure our interests *in any other way*? I doubt it.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 22, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

464

MARKINGS ON A MEMO FROM AND LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

See letter,
p. 4
and over.

Lenin

October 22, 1921

Dear Vladimir Ilyich:

Today's coded message from Comrade Krasin, a part of which has reached us, on Urquhart's statements and campaign shows that the matter is much more serious, and cannot be explained solely by bluff designed to secure 5 per cent royalties on the concessions. There has apparently been some disappointment over our new line. Naturally, in the establishment of such a complex historic combination, as concessions to West European capitalists under a Bolshevik government, the arranging of these combinations does not proceed smoothly or at once. The more reason, therefore, for us to see to it that these
? frictions are overcome. I personally am quite unaware of the
? springs of our policy which caused a certain turn in our line
? at the end of August, so that I am altogether not competent to say whether such a turn had been necessary....

Comrade Chicherin:

There was not the slightest shadow of a "turn in our line" in August (see page 1). We have never taken a pledge and will never take a pledge not to arrest swindlers, not to shoot plotters, not to reject excessively greedy proposals by concessionaires.

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* See Document 471 of this volume.—*Ed.*

On the debt question, I advise you to put through the Politbureau the appointment of a commission (your candidates?) to check up on the state of work of the Groman and Goikhbarg commissions.

I personally see nothing in "Krasin's facts", etc., except Urquhart's blackmail.

They *will* hazard an intervention in spring, if they can *force* Poland: nothing can be done to prevent this except strengthening our defence capacity.

Mikhalsky writes about new turns by Britain. What is the point there? What do you think? Is it that they are afraid of Washington, and want to "placate" France and intimidate Russia?

Agreements and concessions with the *Americans* are of *exceptional importance* to us: we have **something** (not a little) with Hoover. We almost have something with *Hammer*. **Amruss** is on the way.[385]

Everything should be done (by you especially) to eliminate **all** friction (regrettable and harmful) between Litvinov and Martens.*

Yours,

Lenin

Written on October 22, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 53

Printed from the original

465

TO J. V. STALIN[386]

Comrade Stalin:

The estimate seems to be exaggerated. But, I must admit, I am not acquainted with the scope of the Orgbureau's "distributive" work. I think the motivation is correct. The first thing to do is to reduce the "indent" in respect of the non-economic People's Commissariats.

Lenin

Written between October 22 and 31, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 424.—*Ed.*

466

NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND REMARKS ON A DRAFT SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLARATION ON DEBT RECOGNITION[387]

October 24

Comrade Chicherin:

I am sending you my amendments and request you to return them with your comment.

No. 1) We do not have 150 but *130* million including the Far-Eastern Republic.

No. 2) Not to "yield", but to make *a number of concessions*.

No. 3) **The main thing:** *our* claims to them should be stated *subtly* and precisely.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Draft Declaration

The Brussels Conference of representatives of the Powers, according to the West European press, has set as a condition for granting credits to the Government of Russia in aid of the starving its recognition of the debts of the former Russian governments. Nothing has yet been communicated to the Government of Russia about the decisions of this conference. However, the Government of Russia, in face of the starving masses, refuses to abide by the subtleties of diplomatic etiquette and feels it to be its bounden duty to declare here and now its attitude to the Brussels decisions. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech in the British Parliament on August 16, said that the proposal to use the famine in Russia to force her to recognise the tsarist government's debts was a devilish scheme. Nevertheless, the Brussels Conference, being quite aware that, in view of the scale of the famine disaster in Russia, the Soviet Government is incapable, with its own resources, to save the famine-stricken population, has made the granting of credits to Russia, without which serious aid to the starving is impossible, contingent on the Soviet Government's recognition of the old debts.

Drawing the attention of the toiling masses in all countries and of all citizens who cherish humanitarian considerations, to these acts of the Brussels Conference, the Government of Russia hereby declares that the proposal to have the old debts recognised on certain terms now meets its own intentions. Since its inception, the Soviet Government has set itself economic co-operation with other Powers as one of the main aims of its policy. It has always declared its readiness to make available sufficient profit to foreign capitalists who would

help it to work Russia's natural resources and rehabilitate her economic apparatus. At present, it says that the official statements of the President of the United States of America and of the Ministers of Great Britain have repeatedly expressed the idea that three years after the end of the world war there is still no real peace, the plight of the masses is becoming ever more acute, state debts are increasing and there is growing economic dislocation.

It is quite obvious that it is inconceivable to establish full peace without Russia, with her 150 million population, that the economic dislocation cannot be overcome, so long as Russia is left in ruins, and that the question of relations between Russia and the rest of the world, which is a paramount world question, cannot be solved without an agreement with the Soviet Government. From the standpoint of the long-term interests and constant requirements of all states and all peoples, the economic rehabilitation of Russia is a prime necessity not only for her but for them as well. Without economic co-operation with other countries, the task of Russia's economic revival proves to be exceptionally difficult, and its fulfilment is sure to be dragged out over a much longer period.

No. 1 130

This task can be best carried out by a workers' and peasants' government. It is not hampered in its work of rehabilitating the national economy by the private self-seeking interests of separate groups of capitalists. A workers' and peasants' power is guided immediately by the interests of the broadest masses of people which, in essence, amount to the interests of society as a whole. With its purpose of satisfying the interests of all the toiling people of Russia, the workers' and peasants' power, which has emerged victorious from the incredible ordeals of the Civil War, holds out to private initiative and capital the opportunity of co-operating with the workers' and peasants' power in developing Russia's natural resources. The Soviet Government has restored private trade, private property in small enterprises, and the right of concession and lease of large enterprises.

The Soviet power holds out to foreign capital a sufficient part of the profit to satisfy its interests, so as to attract it to participation in economic work in Russia. Following this path, the Soviet Government strives to have economic agreements with all the Powers, for which purpose there is ultimately a need to conclude a final peace settlement between Russia and other states. With this task before it, the Soviet power has met with the demand on the part of the other Powers for recognition of the tsarist government's old debts.

The Soviet Government declares that it is firmly convinced that no people is obliged to pay the cost of the chains it has worn for centuries. But in its firm resolve to reach full agreement with the other Powers, the Government of Russia is prepared to yield on this cardinal question. In this way it also meets the desires of many small holders of Russian state loans, especially in France, for whom its recognition of tsarist debts is of substantial interest. On the strength of these considerations, the Government of Russia declares that it is prepared to recog-

No. 2 make a number of substantial concessions

nise its obligations to other states and their citizens on state loans contracted by the tsarist government before 1914, provided it is granted easy terms, giving it a practical possibility of meeting these obligations. It goes without saying that an indispensable prerequisite of such recognition shall be the simultaneous obligation on the part of the Great Powers unconditionally to end all acts threatening the security of the Soviet Republics and the immunity of their boundaries. In other words, the Soviet Republic will undertake these obligations only in the event the Great Powers conclude with it a final general peace, and if its government is recognised by the other Powers.

No. 3 reciprocal claims ∨ on each other ∧ on each other Powers

With that end in view, the Government of Russia proposes the early convocation of an international conference to deal with the tasks indicated above, to examine the reciprocal demands of the other Powers ∨ and the Government of Russia ∧ and work out a final peace treaty between them. Only after the convocation of this conference will it be possible to reach a general peace settlement. This will in no sense be achieved by the Washington Conference, whose decisions will not be recognised by the Republic of Russia, which has not been invited to attend the conference.

On the fourth anniversary of the Soviet Government, to be marked in a few days, everyone will have to recognise that the efforts of its numerous external and internal enemies have merely served to consolidate the workers' and peasants' power in Russia, as the true defender and representative of the interests of the toiling masses of Russia, and of her independence. The fresh interventionist designs against Soviet Russia, whose existence is evident from the numerous statements by the leading organs of the press in the Entente countries, will merely help to strengthen the indissoluble bonds between the toiling masses of Russia and the workers' and peasants' power, which represents their will, but any attempt to implement these schemes can merely increase the suffering of the toiling masses, and delay the moment of Russia's eventual economic rehabilitation, thereby also delivering a blow at the economic interests of all other peoples.

The proposal being put forward by the Government of Russia is the best evidence of its urge for peace with all states, and the establishing with them of undisturbed economic relations. It is in the interests of all states and peoples that this proposal should be realised.

The Government of Russia expresses the firm hope that its proposal will shortly result in the achievement of a final settlement of economic and political relations between Russia and the other states.

Written on October 24, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed: Lenin's note and remarks from the original; draft declaration, from a typewritten copy

467
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[388]

Comrade Chicherin:

I think that the Government should not, must not deny such silly rumours. The thing to do is to give them to the press and to *ridicule*, *make a laughing-stock* of those who believe these rumours and circulate them. This is blackmail on the part of the Urquharts and the Curzons: such rumours are designed to hamper agreement at present. This is patent blackmail.

24/X.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 24, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

468
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

Please read this and pass on to Comrade Mikhailov.

I very strongly recommend the bearer of this, Comrade Nikolai Alexandrovich *Alexeyev*.

I have known him since *1902*, when we worked together on *Iskra* in London.

He is a very well-educated Marxist, a Bolshevik and a comrade who is remarkably honest in doing his duty.

He has been tossed out into Siberia for about 10 years, and would now like to make his way back to the centre. He should be helped to move to the centre, because a ten-year stay in Siberia is too much; worse than too much.

He should be replaced in Siberia by someone of the absolutely reliable, honest old Party men: the "Communists" in Siberia have been committing **a host** of shocking things and **stupidities**.[389]

Lenin

Written on October 25, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

469

*DESIRABLE LITERATURE (PUBLICATIONS FROM GERMANY)

I. Pamphlets and proceedings of all parties and conferences of the following political trends:

1) Communists,
2) Kommunistische Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands,*
3) anarchists and syndicalists,
4) from among the Partei independents (Leftists and Rightists).

II. Novels and stories of the *Clarté* group[390] trend (like Latzko, etc.)—pacifist-critical, assessment of the imperialist war, conclusions, etc.

III. Economics of the present day: results of the war, economic rehabilitation, post-war problems in industry, in agriculture, etc. (especially pamphlets, books and proceedings).

IV. *Subscribe* to several copies
{ for the Comintern,
for 4-6 university
and other libraries
etc.
{ *Rote Fahne***
KAPD***
Hamburger Volkszeitung,****
list of new books in every branch
etc.

25/X.

Lenin

Written on October 25, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

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* Communist Workers' Party of Germany.—*Ed.*
** *Red Banner.—Ed.*
*** Kommunistische Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands.—*Ed.*
**** *Hamburg People's Newspaper.—Ed.*

470
TO N. P. GORBUNOV[391]

Comrade Gorbunov:

N. M. Knipovich is an outstanding scientific authority and an *unquestionably honest* man, a man of rare honesty. That is why we should show *full* confidence and *accept* his proposal *immediately*. Get it through the Narrow C.P.C. *quickly*, and let me know if there is the slightest delay.

26/X.

Lenin

Written on October 26, 1921
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Printed from the original

471
TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To *Politbureau* members

I consider Comrade *Kursky*'s conclusion the only correct one. I propose that it be passed as a *supplemental* C.P.C. decision.[392]

26/X.

Lenin

Written on October 26, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

472
TO V. A. TRIFONOV

Comrade Trifonov:

I do not believe the plan for a paper to be rational just now. *That is not what* the Central Fuel Administration should be tackling just now.[393]

26/X.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 26, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*
Printed from the original

473
TO L. K. MARTENS

Copy to Comrade Bogdanov

27.X.1921

Comrade Martens:

I have received both contracts.[394] I am returning them.

Why are the *additional points* which Reinstein and Hammer showed me (in the draft) not there?

They should be given the final drafting and passed as soon as possible.

Special attention must be given to our thorough *actual* fulfilment of the terms.

There must be no reliance on orders!

Without a triple check-up our men will spoil everything and will fail to do anything right.

An intelligent, competent man should be appointed as personally responsible and checked up on.

We must make a special effort to *nurse* the concessionaires: this is of exceptional economic and political importance.

Let me know precisely what measures you or the S.E.C. Presidium are taking.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. A point to be specially cleared up whether this should be made public.

There is much indication that it is of great importance for us to have this concession and the contract publicised as widely as possible.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

474
TO I. I. RADCHENKO

27.X.1921

Comrade Radchenko:

Comrade Martens has sent me the contract with the American company (Hammer and Mishell) signed by you.

I believe this contract to be of enormous importance, as marking the beginning of trade.

It is absolutely necessary that you should give *special* attention to the *actual* fulfilment of *our* obligations.

I am sure that *not a damn thing will be done* unless there is *exacting* pressure and supervision. Take measures of triple precaution and *check up* on the performance.

Let me know whom you appoint as responsible executive; which goods you are preparing; whether you are making a special emphasis on art and Gokhran* items, etc.

Send me reports two or three times a month: what has come into port.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. Arrival in Petrograd on 25.XII.1921? That's not too late, is it?

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

475

NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV WITH A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN[395]

28/X.

Comrade Mikhailov:

Please have this *urgently* circulated among the Politbureau members (if they approve, agree with Bogdanov and Chicherin and send off this very day).

Recognising it as being vastly important that Krasin should manage to go to America before the Washington Conference;

—recognising it as being *equally* important that American capital should take an interest in our oil, I *propose* that the following reply telegram should be sent to Krasin *this very day* (coded, of course):

"Agree to appropriate up to 100,000 dollars to pay for

* State Depository of Valuables.—*Ed.*

exploration by the Foundation Company, provided our workers and specialists take part and all the details of the exploration are delivered to us. We believe it to be vastly important to attract American capital for the construction of a paraffin separation plant and an oil pipeline in Grozny. We request that this matter be got under way with utmost speed and vigour, because your trip before the Washington Conference opens is of especial importance."

Lenin

Written on October 28, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

476
TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY

28/X.

Comrade Preobrazhensky:

Read this and return to me.[396]

I see that your optimism is refuted by the facts with increasing frequency.

There is need at all costs to work out:

1) calendar programme and

2) planned estimate:

(α) a given minimum of workers at such-and-such a rate so many thousand millions;

(β) debts coming to so much;

(γ) will cover by the following date, in this priority.

But, *what is more*, we must work a *radical* change in the **whole pace** of our monetary reform.

*Periculum in mora.**

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on October 28, 1921
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

* There is danger in delay.—*Ed.*

477
TO M. V. RYKUNOV

28/X.

Comrade Rykunov:

I have received your packets, yesterday's and today's,[397] and must point out your incorrect dispatch of business.

All such matters must be agreed with the People's Commissar (now with Radchenko).

To have business conducted haphazardly by individual members of the collegium is wrong not only under the Constitution, but also in essence, and tends to introduce red tape and chaos.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on October 28, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

478
ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY AND TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

Send this telephone message to Bryukhanov

I have been informed that the collection of the tax in kind is proceeding with remarkable ease and speed in Orel and Tula gubernias. Preobrazhensky, who has been to Orel Gubernia, assures me that the whole tax in kind will be brought in within three weeks. Please let me know in a few words what your information is, and how frequently you have been receiving telegrams about the collection of the tax in kind. The model gubernias or uyezds will have to be specially rewarded.

What measures are being taken to concentrate the salt stock and also to see that the salt is not sold otherwise than for grain either in the R.S.F.S.R. or the Ukraine. Perhaps we should also limit the issue of salt in the towns, to hamper the anarchic exchange of goods for salt;

Lenin

Dictated by phone on October 31, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

479
TO G. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade *Tsyurupa*, Chief Engineer,
Kashira Construction Site

Not enough foresight was shown in the receipt, without any delay, of transformers and transformer oil from Sweden.

It is intolerable for foreign equipment to "be lying about" at the Moscow customs house, as Vishnyak says it has been.

You are to blame for having failed to take all measures actually ensuring the rapid receipt of the equipment (receipt at Revel of the precise specification and addresses should have been seen to).

Your reference to the fact that the specification says "for the Kashira station" turned out to be invalid, and you failed to make special contact with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

Measures must be taken for the future to have the precise addresses at every point and direction indicated, and the men personally responsible designated.

Inform Comrade Smolyaninov about the measures taken.[398]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

Written on November 2, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

480
TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY[399]

1

Let's have the figure:

1) **how many-fold** will *your* denomination increase the emission?
2) Why not (later) *worsen* the quality of the bank-notes to speed up their self-liquidation?

2

Your arguments against the module 1 : 50,000:
1) the worker will receive 25,000 rubles = ¼ ruble!!
2) the price of gold will be disproportional.
And with 10,000?
1) the worker will receive 25,000 rubles = 2½ rubles. All-Russia C.E.C. members receive 27,000 = 2 rubles 70 kopeks a month,
2) gold?
Does not your argument boil down *in essence* to the need to keep open the possibility to yet another "retreat" when we *put* paper *on a par* with gold (within a year, two, etc.) *only* after the exchange rate of the ruble is *consolidated*?
Meanwhile
a) there is need for an emission
b) 1 : 10,000 = cautious *probe*, "probing the soil".

3

1) Semyon Yenukidze has calculated:
roughly the same quantity of paper (13,000 and 12,000 poods) gives
4,500 thousand million old rubles, and 457 million new ones, i.e., the same 4,500 thousand million old ones.
Is that so?
What does it give us?
2) Isn't it better to use *bad* paper to allow the issued money *to be self-liquidated faster*?

Written before November 3, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

481

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NARROW C.P.C

Comrade Chairman, Narrow C.P.C.

3.XI.1921

Comrade Litvinov has very earnestly requested me to ask you to examine today

the agreement with the Mongolian Government.[400]

Drop me a line, please, to say whether or not you can.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

482
TO ARMAND HAMMER

3.XI.1921

Dear Mr. Armand Hammer!

Comrade Reinstein tells me you are leaving Moscow tonight. I am very sorry I am occupied at the session of the Central Committee of our Party. I am extremely sorry I am unable to see you once more and greet you.

Please be so kind and greet your father, Jim Larkin, Ruthenberg and Ferguson, all best comrades now in American gaols. My best sympathy and best wishes to all them.

Once more best greetings to you and your friends in connection with flour for our workers and your concession. The beginning is extremely important. I hope it will be the beginning of extreme importance.

With best wishes,

Yours truly,

Lenin

P.S. I beg to apologise for my extremely bad English.

First published in Russian and English (facsimile) on January 21, 1926 in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 17

Printed from a photocopy of the English original

483
TO D. I. KURSKY

Comrade *Kursky*, People's Commissariat for Justice

In my letter No. 809 of September 3, I made you personally responsible for a number of assignments and re-

quested that you should inform me regularly about their execution.*

Please let me know how the following tasks have been fulfilled:

1) to pull up the judges through the C.C. so that they punish red tape more severely;

2) to arrange a conference of the Moscow people's judges, members of tribunals, etc., to work out *effective* measures to combat red tape;

3) without fail, this autumn and winter of 1921-1922, to bring up for trial in Moscow 4-6 cases of Moscow red tape, selecting the more "vivid" cases, and making each trial a political affair;

4) to find some, if only 2-3, sensible "experts" on questions of red tape, among the more fierce and militant Communists (get hold of Sosnovsky), so as to train people to *weed out* red tape;

5) to publish a good, intelligent, non-bureaucratic letter (a circular of the People's Commissariat for Justice) on fighting red tape.[401]

Chairman of the C.P.C.

Written on November 4, 1921

First published on February 6, 1927 in the newspapers *Pravda* No. 30 and *Izvestia* No. 30

Printed from a typewritten copy

484
TO A. O. ALSKY

Comrade Alsky:

I am sending this request of Shvedchikov's on to you.

Unless we pull it out *now*, the paper industry will collapse *for a whole year*. We must do our utmost.

Let me know what you are doing. Perhaps I should appoint an emergency commission?[402]

5/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 5, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 298.—*Ed.*

485
TO P. A. BOGDANOV

Comrade *Bogdanov*

Copies to Comrades Khinchuk and Radchenko

Comrade Bogdanov:

Steinberg's "concession" (buying up of hides and skins plus import of commodity-exchange fund from abroad) is being examined, as I heard in the C.L.D. yesterday, in the S.E.C. Commission for Utilisation.[403]

Strictly speaking, it is not a concession in the usual sense of the word, and both the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and Centrosoyuz must be brought in for its examination (especially since Khinchuk declared yesterday that he takes a negative view of Steinberg).

Be sure to have Khinchuk take part in the discussion, and, while we are about it, let's think over a statute for a somewhat different make-up of commissions to discuss "this type" of "concession".[404]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on November 5, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

486
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

Perhaps I should appoint a commission:

1) Pokrovsky
2) Khalatov
3) Novitsky, to report to the *Narrow C.P.C.* on Monday night and the Full C.P.C. on Tuesday?*

Phone them up and let me know.[405]

5/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 5, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

* That is November 7 and 8.—*Ed.*

487

NOTE TO P. P. GORBUNOV AND TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please send to *Krasin* in code.

Your dispatch of 1.XI is almost hysterical. You have forgotten that even you yourself had not proposed that we should give in to Leslie Urquhart right away, while the Politbureau decision is very well considered and is not a refusal. Concerning the Foundation Company full consent and an assignment to press on was sent you on 29.X. Steps should be taken to arrange for a much speedier exchange of telegrams between us: the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade is generally rather bad.

Lenin

Written on November 7, 1921
Sent to London

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

488

TO L. B. KAMENEV[406]

Secret

Comrade Kamenev:

I think Chicherin is wrong. The condition we must lay down is that the grain should go **only** to our starving peasants; we *have to accept*. We in the C.P.C. decided on 5/XI to give gold only for *9 million poods* (33—15 = 18. 18:2 = 9[407]. We must try to help in every way, even if in exchange for the British rubbish.

We shall make a provisional reservation on security.

7/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 7, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

489

*TO CENTRAL PRESS DISTRIBUTION AGENCY, PUBLISHING DEPARTMENTS OF THE S.E.C., PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE, PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR RAILWAYS, PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD[408]

I authorise Comrade Smolyaninov to call a commission consisting of: C.P.D.A., publishing departments of the S.E.C., People's Commissariat for Agriculture, People's Commissariat for Railways and People's Commissariat for Food to work out practical measures regulating delivery of publications to the localities and to bring up for approval by the C.L.D.

Please appoint responsible persons.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on November 8, 1921
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

490

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I am sending this for your information.[409] Could we give someone (Strumilin?) an assignment to report twice a month on *the final data on production growth in Donbas*?

9/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 9, 1921
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

491

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

Have a look at this and return to Avanesov.

The first diagram (loading of Donets coal) should be taken as a model for diagrams for the C.L.D.*

* See present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 356-57 and the Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 44, pp. 467-69.—*Ed.*

Only:
1. all diagrams must be filed and not wrapped up,
2. so the size of the diagrams should be smaller,
3. the number of lines in the diagrams not > 3.

9.XI.21 *Lenin*

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

492
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

10.XI.1921

Comrade N. P. Gorbunov

The industrial and office workers of the *Bryansk* Works have made *7 electric ploughs*. By 1.I.1922, they will make *20*.

The difficulties involved were incredible.

That is why it is necessary to give a special reward to some 70 industrial and office workers. This is certified by Comrade *Zheltov*, director of the Bryansk Works.

Please raise this question in the *C.L.D.* tomorrow, after discussing with Comrade Zheltov the types of reward (Order of the Banner of Labour, cash or kind).[410]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

493
TO I. I. RADCHENKO

Comrade Radchenko:

This is a Party veteran.

Such men will be of undoubted use in combating dishonest elements abroad.

He is not a merchant but, according to people experienced

in commerce, will be of unquestionable benefit as an honest man.

I request his appointment.[411]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on November 10, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

494

TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT

Comrade *Unschlicht*, Deputy Chairman, All-Russia Cheka
Copy to the Narrow C.P.C.

I authorise you to call and chair a conference consisting of the People's Commissars for Foreign Trade, Internal Affairs and Defence urgently to examine the problem of combating smuggling.

Make your report to the Narrow C.P.C. within a week.[412]

Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on November 10, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

495

*TO THE STATE PUBLISHERS

Today I received a copy of my article, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution",* which you have published in 50,000 copies. In future, will you, please, consult with me whether a separate edition is necessary and in how many copies.

Please print the enclosed article in 5,000 copies.[413]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 10, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

* See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 51-59.—*Ed.*

496
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

12.XI.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

Please read the enclosure and send on to Comrade Alsky for a study by him and members of the People's Commissariat for Finance Collegium, and then on to Comrade Kamenev, chairman of a commission which will probably deal with the matter as well.[414]

I first met Chebotaryov in the 1880s, in the case of my elder brother, Alexander Ilyich Ulyanov, who was hanged in 1887. Chebotaryov is undoubtedly an honest man. In the epoch of the first revolution and after he was politically a Cadet, but not an active one. I believe that his honesty can and must be relied upon. He now seems to be politically close to *Smena Vekh*.[415]

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

497
*TELEGRAM TO ALL ECONOMIC CONFERENCES[416]

Copy to *Statistical Bureau*

You have missed the deadlines for submitting reports to the C.L.D. as established by law—October 15-November 1. Your reports have not been received at the C.L.D. I hereby reprove you for your unpunctuality and delay, and demand that you should meet the deadlines. At once let the C.L.D. know the full names and the offices of the persons responsible for the timely compilation and submission of reports. Pass the same instructions on to the uyezds.[417]

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

Written on November 12, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

498

TO N. I. BUKHARIN[418]

Comrade Bukharin:

Please read this. We need to have (regardless of this particular article, which, however, appears to be good) *more* publications of Indian comrades in order to encourage them and to collect more information about India and her revolutionary movement.

14/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 14, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

499

ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE JUDICIAL AND INVESTIGATION ORGANS[419]

NOTES TO V. M. MOLOTOV

1

Comrade Molotov:

What is the state of this matter?

I think §§ *4* and *5* are *harmful*.

Please, return this to me with a comment in a couple of words.

Lenin

14/XI.

Written on November 14, 1921

2

19.XI.1921

Comrade Molotov:

I am taking the matter on to the Politbureau.

It is altogether wrong to decide such matters in the Orgbureau: this is a **purely** political, an entirely political question.

And it calls for a different solution.

Please have the secretary type out the *old* and the *new* version on one page.

(1) I think §4 should be deleted.

(2) — the *legal* responsibility of Communists should be enhanced.

(3) the Party Committee's "opinions" should be allowed *only* with dispatch to the centre *and verification by the Central Control Commission*.

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

500
TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY

15/XI.

Comrade Lunacharsky:

I should very much like to fulfil Comrade Zinoviev's request and scold Serrati.[420]

Could you help me?

You could help in two ways:

1) let me have the manuscript of your pamphlet (16.XI, did you say? or later, retyped?),[421]

2) let me have *two or three* original documents in Italian, the better to "brace" me up. Let's have the most eloquent documents.

Incidentally, Serrati appeared to have asked Lazzari: "Have you been swindled?" "Who is the swindler?" Do you happen to have the *original* of this question?

P.S. Return the enclosure.

Regards,
Lenin

Written on November 15, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

501
TO V. I. SAMARIN[422]

15.XI.1921

Comrade Samarin:

I have been informed by absolutely honest people who have been to the Crimea that *everyone* there is *stealing wine*. They say the situation is utterly scandalous, there is bribe-taking and hard drinking. You are *responsible* for a full and impartial check-up. By the way: the controversial issue between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the People's Commissariat for Public Health about whether wine should be sold abroad (I think that this should be done and fast) or left for the hospitals. You must collect all the facts on this question *quickly*. If there is anything urgent, cable me directly. I shall expect very short dispatches weekly.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

502
TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT

Comrade Unschlicht:

Since permission was issued to go to America—this means there are no obstacles, are there? Please give instructions (and appoint a responsible person: *secretary*) to issue *at once*, without the slightest delay or any formalities.[423]

15/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 15, 1921

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

503
TO L. K. MARTENS

Comrade Martens *Urgent*

Comrade Martens:

Be sure to inform Petrograd and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Unless there is a **triple** check-up, not a damn thing will be ready, and we shall be in a mess.

Raise the question of preparatory measures in the *C.L.D.* and the Narrow C.P.C.[424]

17/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 17, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

504
REFERENCE TO N. A. YEMELYANOV

19.XI.1921

To Comrades Stomonyakov, Lutovinov, Krasin, Vorovsky, Kerzhentsev, Lomonosov, Litvinov, and others

I strongly recommend the bearer, Comrade Nikolai Alexandrovich Yemelyanov. I have known him personally since July 1917, as one of the best among the old Party guard in Petrograd. I request that you show him *full* trust and give him every assistance. I believe that it is highly important to bring him into closer touch with the affairs of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, because, first, we are short of experienced Party men among the P.C.F.T. personnel abroad. Second, I have a number of documents saying that workers abroad often resent the fact that the P.C.F.T. of the R.S.F.S.R. has not sought ways of drawing closer to them.* In this context, Yemelyanov's role should also be very big.

It is my earnest request that those of you who meet Comrade Yemelyanov should write to me.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 45.—*Ed.*

505
TO D. I. KURSKY

19.XI.1921

Comrade Kursky:

Krasin very much fears that Goikhbarg has made a hash of the records of Groman's commission (amount of our losses from the intervention).

Comrade Goikhbarg appears to be ill.

That is why a *thorough* check-up must be made:

(1) whether the records have been well preserved?

(2) what is their result?

(3) who is responsible for their integrity and safekeeping?

(4) is *any additional work* required?

(5) to whom should this be assigned?

Please, check up *personally* and reply to me without delay.[425]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

506
TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

19.XI.1921

Comrade Molotov:

Today Comrade Teodorovich brought in his resignation. I refused to accept it.

It is plain that he wishes to clear himself of the odium of any possible conflicts and friction with Osinsky.

I am sure, however, that the matter will be settled for the greater benefit of the People's Commissariat.

Please circulate this among Politbureau members to find out whether they confirm my refusal to accept Teodorovich's resignation.[426]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

507
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

19.XI.1921

Comrade Gorbunov:

It is absolutely wrong on your part to put before me such an important paper on 17/XI (!!) with such an empty note.

It should have been brought before the *C.L.D.*!

You are responsible if a mistake has been made because of Avanesov's departure and if neither you nor Smolyaninov had made timely contact either with Ivan Nikitich Smirnov (which is easily done: he is in Petrograd) or with Chutskayev. *It is your fault.*

Why is it that some Krasinsky is hustling, while Smolyaninov and you are doing nothing?[427]

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

508
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

Will you let me have a copy of your reply to Chicherin? I think he is right.[428]

20/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 20, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

509
TO V. M. MOLOTOV, KH. G. RAKOVSKY, I. I. SCHWARZ, G. L. PYATAKOV, M. L. RUKHIMOVICH

21.XI.1921

Comrade Molotov
Comrade Rakovsky
Comrade "Semyon" (Schwarz) of the All-Russia Miners' Union C.C.

Comrade Pyatakov
Comrade Rukhimovich } in Donbas

Dear Comrade:

I enclose Comrade Remeiko's pamphlet.[429]

You need only run your eye over a page and a half (13 and 14) to see the gist of the matter: struggle and squabbling in Donbas.

To the conflicts and disagreements between Pyatakov and Rukhimovich are added the disagreements between Remeiko (and the comrades he names on p. 14) and Pyatakov and Kalnin.

These discords and dissensions in Donbas, which is our *fortress*, are highly dangerous.

Please, have a look through the pamphlet (or the two pages, 13 and 14, which is quite enough) and write me at least a couple of words on the measures which could (and should) be taken to eliminate discords and frictions in Donbas.[430]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

510

TO REFERENCE TO J. S. HANECKI[431]

I have known Comrade Hanecki since 1903, when he was a representative of the Polish Social-Democrats at our Party Congress. I later knew him all the time as a member of the Polish C.C. I had an opportunity of watching him work at close range in 1912-1914, when we lived together in Cracow. From there Comrade Hanecki repeatedly travelled for underground work in Poland, carrying out C.C. assignments both abroad and in Russia. I fully recommend him for the Party.

Member of the R.C.P. C.C. V. *Ulyanov* (*Lenin*) 21.XI.1921.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

511

RESOLUTION ON LETTER FROM THE MOSCOW PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION TO MOSTEXTIL[432]

This is highly suspicious!

Comrade Unschlicht must appoint a *perfectly reliable* man, whom he knows *personally*, *to carry out a check-up*. This is ingenious robbery. Perhaps this is being done everywhere?

21/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 21, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

512

TO S. S. PILYAVSKY

22/XI.

Comrade Pilyavsky:

Please let me have a short report in writing concerning the amount of Entente debts to us your commission has calculated* of the order of

a) fully proved and substantiated in detail;

b) } in lesser detail;

c) } less substantiated

etc.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on November 22, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

513

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

Please prescribe for *Comrade Kiselyov*, Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C., a holiday and treatment, *on doctors' orders*, for at least *2 months*.

---

* See Document 505 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Semashko has held a consultation (including Minor) whose opinion is extreme overwork, etc., etc.

I enclose the certificate.

He should be found a sanatorium according to doctors' orders: a written obligation can and should be got from Semashko.[433]

22/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 22, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

514

TO J. V. STALIN AND I. S. UNSCHLICHT

22.XI.1921

Comrade Stalin and Comrade Unschlicht:

I was handed the enclosed by Comrade Kiselyov.[434] This is the scandalous way we handle our leases.

The inventory is *fictitious*, like this one. Or there is none at all.

A host of the most valuable goods—fabrics, machines, belts, etc., etc.—is being stolen by the lessees, and by the reception and delivery men. I wrote about this to Unschlicht before.

Perhaps we should call some *highly reliable* men for a *secret* conference on measures of combating this?

(a) Detection of several cases and shooting;

(b) working out of additional instructions;

(c) ditto—measures of verification

etc.[435]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

515

TO THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE C.P.C.

23.XI.1921

L. B. Kamenev
Copy to Comrade Khinchuk

Yesterday the C.P.C. referred to your commission the question of an agreement with Steinberg.[436] In *Izvestia*

today, Gorsky has estimated that Steinberg will make 194,000 million Soviet rubles on 100,000 kilograms of saccharin (this will cost him 600,000 rubles a kilogram, i.e., all the 100,000 kilograms will cost him 60,000 million= *60 milliard*; this means the percentage of profit 194:60= 323 per cent).

If Gorsky's estimate is right, this is a vast profit. I think the R.S.F.S.R. has a share of super-profits, reckoning super-profits as over and above 250 per cent?

Perhaps we could

(1) drive a bargain so as to have a special share of the super-profits, reckoning super-profits at 100 or 200 per cent?

(2) secure by special arrangement the possibility to *train* our own men (especially in Centrosoyuz) in the methods and organisation of trade?

(3) specifically assure ourselves of the possibility of cancelling the agreement earlier, *as soon as* we fools have learned enough from the clever people.

I think that after driving a hard bargain and checking everything over and over again, we *should* conclude the agreement, because fools *must* pay a high price for being taught.

Let's have your opinion.

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

516

*TO THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

Please raise these questions in the State Planning Commission:

1. acceleration of construction and starting of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk district electric-power station (on Lake Rubskoye) and

2. inclusion in the Central Peat Administration programme for 1922 of the working of the Rubskoye peat bogs or transfer of their working to the power-station project.

On the strength of the available material resources, it is necessary right away to establish and approve a programme

for construction and peat bog working for the Ivanovo-Voznesensk station, and their priority, for 1922.

I think it is desirable to secure participation in the discussion of this matter, apart from the central departments concerned (Commission for Utilisation, Public Works Committee, and Central Peat Administration), a representative of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk gubernia economic conference and the chief engineer of the construction project.[437]

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

In general, we should hurry up with the working out of a plan for state electric-power construction for 1922 so as to have it ready for the Congress of Soviets.[438]

Written on November 23, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

517

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

I am sending you this for the information of the Politbureau members.

Please, put this on the agenda.

23/XI. *Lenin*

My reply:

Comrade Okulov:

I am very sorry that I cannot send the recommendation you request. I should very much like to do this if it entailed only a personal recommendation. But that is not what is involved. This is a political matter, and I am sending it on to the Politbureau.[439]

23/XI. With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on November 23, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

518

*TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE KREMLIN

26.XI.1921

Copy to Comrade N. P. Gorbunov

It turns out once again that visitors coming to see me are being detained by the guards.*

Today, Comrade Sokolnikov, a member of the All-Russia C.E.C., was detained for about 10 minutes as he was coming to see me.

The guard was apparently right when he did not let Sokolnikov use the phone, because, they say, it was a "house phone". But there is said to be *another* telephone, and the guard should have let him use that! At any rate, I have repeatedly demanded of the Kremlin Commandant, and insist, that he should make arrangements under which *people coming to see me*, *even if they have no passes at all*, should have the possibility *to phone through*, *without the slightest delay*, *both from the Kremlin gates and from the C.P.C. entrance*, to my secretariat and the telephone operators of the second-floor exchange.

I hereby reprove you for neglecting my demands. Once again I propose that you should make all the necessary arrangements right away, installing, in case of need, two additional telephones for visitors (one in the Kremlin gates, and one at the C.P.C. entrance) and reply to me at once. Work out special instructions for those coming to see me.[440]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

519

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

1

26.XI.1921

G. M.!

What's this I see in *Pravda* today about Cheiko's invention?[441] Is this another canard? If this is in earnest, why

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 54.—*Ed.*

print anything about remote-controlled explosions? Write me a couple of words; perhaps we should send an inquiry to Kharkov, or summon Cheiko, or have some specialist phone Kharkov?

Yours,
Lenin

2

26/XI.

G. M.:

I have spoken with Chubar. It turns out that he knows about this invention and says that the specialists and professors over there have discussed it and found it to be a serious one. He says he can send over the materials and the inventor himself.

We have to decide whether we should get the materials or the inventor himself over here; perhaps we should send them to Bonch-Bruyevich in Nizhni-Novgorod?[442]

Think about this and write me or N. P. Gorbunov, to whom I shall give an assignment to keep an eye on the execution and verification.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on November 26, 1921

First published on January 21, 1925 in the newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 17

Printed from the original

520
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

Take this matter under your supervision. Send a cyclist over to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky and get my notes on the Kharkov "invention" and Chubar's opinion.*

27/XI. *Lenin*

* See previous document.—*Ed.*

(P.S. We should get the inventor to come over here; show him to Lazarev; take him to Nizhni, etc.)

Written on November 27, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

521
*TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NARROW C.P.C.

I request the Narrow C.P.C. to be sure to examine and take a final decision today on the matter of urgently issuing 70 million rubles to organise an exhibition in Berlin. I appoint Comrade N. P. Gorbunov as rapporteur.[443]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 28, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

522
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev:

My view is closer to yours than to Dzerzhinsky's. I advise you not to give in and to take it to the Politbureau. Then we shall secure the maximum of maximums. We shall also impose on the People's Commissariat for Justice *responsibility for failing to inform* the Politbureau (or the C.P.C.) about the All-Russia Cheka's defects and irregularities.[444]

29/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 29, 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

523
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky:

Please, take the enclosed into consideration, and return to me (together with this note)—I shall send it to a few other people.[445]

Ad 1. What is there to be "cautious" about?? There is nothing at all in practice, nothing but talks. Unfortunately, the *Germans* are *excessively* "cautious". Here Chicherin is wrong.

Ad No. 3... I think that is a piece of gossip. We should face Hartwig (and the other Ger---mans) with this flat and precise question: what is it you want of us? a treaty *without* Britain? Very well, then! Let's have a *draft* as soon as possible and we *shall sign* it.

Until now, the Germans have come forward with nothing but words.

For the sake of diplomacy, Krasin **had to** avoid showing his cards to Stinnes, and even had to be amiable with him.

30/XI. *Lenin*

Written on November 30, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

524
TO A. D. METELEV

Comrade *Metelev*,
Superintendent of All-Russia C.E.C. Houses

Please be sure to make available a room in the 1st House of Soviets to Comrade *Cecilia Samoilovna Bobrovskaya*, whom I know very well as an old Party worker. She is now living in absolutely intolerable conditions, and the doctors have ordered her to be transferred at once to one of the Houses of Soviets.

Inform my secretariat of execution.[446]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. I have known Bobrovskaya since the epoch *before* 1905, and know that she is capable of living in great hardship and be reticent about it excessively. That is why she needs urgent help.*

Written on November 30, 1921
First published in part in 1924 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* No. 3
Published in full in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

525
TO A. A. BELOV

30/XI.

Comrade Belov:

I agree with you on the idea.

Give this thing a push *in practice*, i.e., draft a decision (perhaps it is better this way: *first*, select the *personnel*, and then write a draft decision).

I think there is no need to leave the Party. *I object*.

You should remain in the *Department Store* and get things running on model lines.[447]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. Concerning release from the Narrow Council, get Kiselyov's opinion.

Written on November 30, 1921
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

526
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

G. M.:

I have had a call from Kritsman.

I enclose his notes and mine on his plan.

Please read them and return with a couple of words of comment.

I am worried (especially) about two aspects of the matter:

* P.S. is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

(1) Is it possible to transfer the *Commission for Utilisation* to the State Planning Commission otherwise than as a *whole*?

if not, is it possible to reduce its staffs in transferring it as a whole?

(2) shall we not in fact leave the *People's Commissariats without control* if the Commission for Utilisation is transferred to the State Planning Commission?

(what are the measures against this? what are the guarantees against this? This backing by the departments of the plan to transfer the Commission for Utilisation to the State Planning Commission, is it perhaps *self-seeking* in the worst sense?)

30/XI. *Lenin*

One other thing: is it possible not to combine (in one way or another) the distribution of foodstuffs with the distribution of bank-notes?[448]

Written on November 30, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

527

LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Members of the Politbureau 2/XII.

Having now fully read the platform "We Are Collectivists" (*Vperyod*-ites, Bogdanov-ites, Proletcult people, etc.),[449] I have finally come to the conclusion that it would be unquestionably useful for us and necessary *to print* it as a pamphlet in 2,000-3,000 copies, with the *most circumstantial* critique, with an addition of an article on Bogdanov's political statements in 1917, etc.

I propose that *a number of authors* should be asked to write a pamphlet under the editorship of Bukharin, who should be authorised to share it out between the authors, obtain their manuscripts within two weeks and *show the Politbureau in proof*. (This is also necessary for *foreign countries*.)

1) C.C. circulars about Proletcults.

2) "We Are Collectivists".
3) Bukharin's article from *Pravda*.
4) **A few more articles** analysing the platform.

Lenin

Written on December 2, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

528

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE

To the P.C.F.T.
Copy to Comrade *Pyatakov*—for his information

I propose that we order for the Central Board of the Coal Industry of the Donets Basin catalogues from foreign—German, American, British—companies supplying:

a) mining equipment in general,
b) wire rope,
c) pumps,
d) electrotechnical materials,
e) coal-cutters, conveyers, etc.,
f) tools,
g) metal articles in general and wire in particular.

Please send a report on execution to Comrade *Gorbunov*, C.P.C. business manager.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 2, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

529

TO THE FOREIGN LITERATURE COMMITTEE[450]

Forlitcom

Copy to Comrade *Pyatakov*—
for information and co-ordinating with Forlitcom
the question of allocating the necessary credit
in gold for periodical subscriptions

I propose for, and for the account of, the Central Board of the Coal Industry of the Donets Basin

1) urgent subscriptions for sets of all mining magazines —German, British and the United States, for 1917-1921;

2) regular subscriptions for and mailing to the Central Board of:

a) all mining magazines issued in German, French and English;

b) new publications of the most important books on mining;

c) *The Economist* magazine.[451]

Please send a report on execution to C.P.C. business manager Comrade *Gorbunov*.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 2, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

530

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev:

I was given this yesterday by Khinchuk.[452] Have a look at it and show to all members of the United Economic Commission.[453]

It looks as if the business is growing, isn't it? Will someone suggest methods of *stricter* check-up?

2/XII. Lenin

P.S. Please also send this to all members of the Politbureau.

Written on December 2, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

531

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[454]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

Please look through regularly and collect *everything* about Centrosoyuz.

There is need to work out *a number* of time-tables for their monthly reports ((the same for *GUM*=State Department Store)).

Roughly: (1) turnover { bought / sold } by main groups of products
(2) by gubernia
(3) % of gubernias reporting inaccurately.
Without fail (4) Unpunctual gubernias up on the list of shirkers which should be **published**,
etc.

2/XII. *Lenin*

P.S. Let me have these tables at the *C.L.D.*
See if any conclusions can be drawn from them about the procurement of raw materials and their *type*.

Written on December 2, 1921
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

532

LETTER ON THE USE OF "PERSONAL CONTACTS"[455]

Comrades Yenukidze, Karpinsky, Dzerzhinsky, Zalutsky, Mikhailov and Molotov

Dear Comrade:

It has become clear from the C.P.C. office practice in dealing with complaints and applications that in specially serious and urgent cases it helps to use "personal contacts", i.e., *personal* communication with various Party comrades holding sufficiently influential positions in the localities. This serves to reduce the delays which are inevitable in the usual departmental routing of business, and generally enhances the required effect.

An example is provided by the case of terrorism by the kulak "lair" in the (new) Yelan Uyezd of Saratov Gubernia, which had made up to the Soviet power and the Party. *Within 10 days* we obtained a reply telegram from the plenipotentiary All-Russia Cheka representative in the Volga area saying that "all measures to detect the guilty have

been taken", when the inquiry was sent in this "comradely" manner. There are similar results in other cases.

But this method can be applied more extensively only where there is sufficient knowledge of the responsible functionaries actually on the spot. Our request is, therefore, urgently to draw up and send to the *C.P.C. office* at 4 Vozdvizhenka, appropriate lists of reliable comrades with a good record, from among members of Executive Committees, Gubernia Cheka, etc., one or two per gubernia, who, you believe, are especially suitable for applying such "pressure".

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

P.S. There is need for the fullest guarantee that such comrades are honest, namely: give in the greatest possible detail their Party and Soviet government record, and a *personal* warranty of their absolute honesty by *several* Party veterans.

3/XII.-21 *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

533
TO A. I. RYKOV

3/XII.

Dear Alexei Ivanovich:

So the decision on your trip has been taken. It has been passed through the Politbureau.[456] You will have to remain until the second operation and full recovery. I have seen Tsyurupa and have his opinion—an excellent one—about treatment by the Germans. I have no doubt that you *will be fully cured* (I saw a doctor's report about you) provided you display just a bit of patience. — — — — I am sending you the decision on Tsyurupa and my outline of a *plan for the organisation* of his work and yours.[457]

The first and second deputies, as you will see from the plan, will have to break *new* ground. We have decided,

for the time being, until your return and the *experiment* with Tsyurupa, that this plan is *not* to be turned into a decision. We shall first try it out and check it in practice. Let me know what you think.

Good-bye for the time being, and take your treatment seriously.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on December 3, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

534

*TO THE MOSCOW GUBERNIA COMMISSION FOR CHECKING AND PURGING THE PARTY

I am very sorry that my request to inform me about the case of Comrade *Shapiro*'s expulsion from the Party has caused the cancellation of the examination of his case by the Moscow Gubernia Commission scheduled for 18.00 hours today, December 3. This is a result of a misunderstanding and mistake, because the most important thing, of course, is the speedy examination of the case.

On the substance of the case, I apply to the Moscow Gubernia Commission for Checking and Purging the Party to take into account the following of my considerations.

1) Over a period of several years I have repeatedly heard from N. K. Krupskaya that Shapiro was an exceptionally honest worker, but was not liked for his *stringent demands*. That is why when the purging began I warned N. K. Krupskaya that attention should be paid to a possible and probable intrigue connected with this.

2) My article in the press that the Mensheviks and the Bundists who joined the R.C.P. were unreliable was frequently taken to mean that they should all be expelled.* I feel it to be my duty, therefore, to state that I have always considered that each case must be dealt with individually, and in confirmation refer, for instance, to the

* A reference to the article "Purging the Party" (present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 39-41).—*Ed.*

former Menshevik Chirkin, who joined the R.C.P. much later than Shapiro, and about whose wavering we had precise facts, and not just rumour or hearsay. Still, after an all-round examination of Chirkin's case, I agreed with the Ukrainian comrades who were defending him, that Chirkin should be left in the Party.

3) Shapiro's application has Comrade A. Yenukidze's inscription of 3.IX.1921, saying: "I fully certify everything set out here by Comrade Shapiro for the 1917 period."

And what Comrade Shapiro has stated about this period is of exceptional importance, because the meaning of it is that the Menshevik Shapiro *had started to oppose* the Mensheviks *even before* the October Revolution.

In reply to my special inquiry about Shapiro addressed to Comrade Yenukidze the latter told me today that he had worked with him on the front-line commission of the old, Menshevik All-Russia C.E.C., from April to August 1917. Having been in close contact with Comrade Shapiro in that period, Comrade Yenukidze told me that he had absolutely no doubt about Comrade Shapiro's sincerity, and that he, Yenukidze, would certainly be in favour of leaving Comrade Shapiro in the Party.

Comrade Yenukidze gave me this additional characteristic fact: after the July 1917 days, when the Bolsheviks were being fiercely harassed, Shapiro put up such a defence of the Bolsheviks at the meeting, that Vainstein, a member of the Menshevik C.C., all but used his fists against Shapiro.

Let me add that Comrade Yenukidze, a Party member since 1898, is one of the old Party guard, who in fact should check and purge our Party. I believe that any evidence coming from the ranks of this old guard deserves triple attention. I feel therefore that it is quite wrong for the district commission to expel Comrade Shapiro without summoning Comrade Yenukidze. It is my request to the Moscow Gubernia Commission to summon Comrade Yenukidze, Secretary of the All-Russia C.E.C., in Shapiro's case.

4) Comrade Shapiro's application says that he is the author of a pamphlet on the agrarian question issued in 1907, under the pseudonym of M. Shanin. As Comrade Shapiro has said, I analysed this pamphlet in my book,

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution 1905-1907 (2nd ed., Petrograd, 1919, p. 84 et seq.).* While criticising Shanin for a number of Menshevik errors, I noted even at the time, over 10 years ago, that he *differed* from the Mensheviks. For instance, on p. 85 of the said book, I noted that Shanin "prompted, of course, by the very best motives, defends confiscation against redemption payments".**

This is a very essential fact, indicating that more than ten years ago, Comrade Shapiro had had a tendency to move away from the Mensheviks *to the revolutionary side.*

5) My fears that the purging of the Party could provide some people with a pretext for an intrigue against Comrade Shapiro—fears about which I told N. K. Krupskaya long before the start of the purging in the city of Moscow—have been borne out by the following circumstance. The District Commission has expelled Shapiro without summoning Yenukidze, without naming anyone who knows Shapiro well at his work, and who could cite facts about his unreliability. The commission has called Shapiro "unstable and wavering", without offering the least proof, without the slightest concrete indication. One cannot help thinking that someone's far from impartial reference (from among his fellow workers, for instance) to the effect, let us say, that he is "not one of us", that he is "alien" to us, could very well have played a part.

Let us recall, however, that the *Party cell* at the Chief Committee for Political Education *unanimously* came out *in favour* of Shapiro (as I learned from Comrade Anna Ivanovna Meshcheryakova, an old Party member, whom I have known since the émigré period, and a member of the cell who attended the meeting). Shapiro was in charge of one of the six departments of the Chief Committee for Political Education. Consequently, the persons subordinate to him were in a small minority at the Party cell meeting. No one could have had a closer view of Comrade Shapiro's day-to-day work than the cell of his establishment. If that cell had unanimously come out for Shapiro, the weight

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431.—*Ed.*

** Ibid., p. 288.—*Ed.*

of such a vote should, I think, be regarded as very great. I believe it is highly probable that Shapiro has become a victim of an intrigue, rumour to the effect that he is "not one of us", without there being a shred of evidence, without any *direct* statement by a *single* Party member, who has had an occasion to observe Comrade Shapiro's work at close range.

On the strength of what I have stated, I request the Moscow Gubernia Commission for Checking and Purging the Party that it should summon Comrade Yenukidze, take what I have said into consideration, and check up on who precisely has spoken out against Shapiro, and whether this is not an intrigue.

It is also my request to let me have a copy of the decision on this case by the Moscow Gubernia Commission.[458]

3.XII.1921. Member of the R.C.P. *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)

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535

*TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Please pay attention to this, because the author of the letter is a man of absolute integrity.

Please have a thorough check made about *speeding up* the tests, to see how *solid* they are, and to *help* the inventor as soon as possible.

Phone me *at the village* on the results not later than about 13/XII.[459]

Lenin

Krzhizhanovsky knows him (without knowing about his invention). Have a talk with Krzhizhanovsky as well.

Written on December 5, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

536

LETTER TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE, THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FINANCE, THE S.E.C. AND THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR EDUCATION

December 5, 1921

Comrade Lezhava, P.C.F.T.
Comrade Alsky, P.C.F.
Comrade Bogdanov, S.E.C.
Comrade Litkens, P.C.E.
Comrade Voyevodin

In Moscow now is the Communist Comrade Caroti, an agent of the Italian film producers, Cito-Cinema, with whom our mission in Italy has been carrying on preliminary talks about a concession on the filming and purchase of films in Russia and the showing of these films in Italy.

The talks with Comrade Caroti could be based on the draft contract which he has and which leaves much room for any necessary changes.

According to a report from the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in Italy, the Cito-Cinema company is a solid Italian film-producing enterprise which is financed by the Italian Bank of Discount and about which there must be a reference at the Financial and Accounting Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

I consider this business extremely important *and urgent*.

You are hereby instructed to call at once a conference to examine Comrade Caroti's proposal, to look into the whole matter and draw up a relevant decision by the Council of Labour and Defence.

Comrade Voyevodin will arrange the conference and report to the C.L.D. on Wednesday, December 7.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten
copy signed by Lenin

537

*TO COMRADES BALLISTER AND CARR[460]

5/XII.1921.

Dear Comrades,

I send you my book about the evolution of agriculture in the United States.

I should be very much obliged if I could have the opinion of Comrade Carr, if my book can be read by him with the aid of an English or German translator.

I should like also to receive from Comrade Ballister, if possible, official publications of the census 1920 (I have analysed in my book two censuses: 1900 & 1910).

If any publisher would like to publish my book in English in Un. States, I should like to write small preface.

Yours truly,
Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the English original

538

TO V. M. MOLOTOV AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov with a request to circulate it among all members of the Politbureau.

It is necessary (1) to find out who is "Kurzhnir"?

Could he be Kushner, the author of the pamphlet on electrification?

(2) There is need to devote more attention to Myasnikov's agitation, and report about him and about it to the Politbureau *twice a month*.

(3) The *Politbureau* should have a special *discussion on how to respond* to this letter.[461]

5/XII. *Lenin*

Written on December 5, 1921

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

539

TO V. M. MOLOTOV AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

5.XII.1921

Comrade Molotov:

Orlov (the author of an excellent book about the *food supply work* of the People's Commissariat for Food) has addressed an unusual request to the C.C.

I am *in favour*.

Tsyurupa (who knows Orlov *personally*; I know him *by his book*) is also *in favour*.

We must poll the Politbureau members.

If they *do not object*, we must cable Krestinsky: "C.C. approved Orlov's plans about his book."[462]

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

540

TO A. M. LEZHAVA

Comrade *Lezhava*:

A few days ago I saw in one of the papers (it may have even been *Pravda*) an item about the turnover of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (in the Crimea) involving 20 million rubles in gold.[463]

Where does this come from?

Have you an arrangement for the local accounting of turnover, with a division into purchases and sales, and then by the main groups of products?

Please reply to N. P. Gorbunov and write in the greatest possible detail about the state of the accounting.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on December 6, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

541

TELEGRAM TO M. KH. POLYAKOV

6.XII.1921

Polyakov,
Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Council of People's Commissars, Simferopol

Please help Alexei Andreyevich Preobrazhensky, an old revolutionary, whom I have personally known since the 1890s, and who is in poor conditions. Address: District Sanitary Health Resort Administration, Yalta.[464]

Lenin

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

542

TO MAXIM GORKY

6/XII.

Dear A. M.:

I am very sorry to write in haste. I am terribly tired. I've got insomnia. I am going away for treatment.

I have been requested to write to you: would you write to *Bernard Shaw* asking him to go to America, and to *Wells* who is said to be in America now, to get them both to help us in collecting aid to the starving?

It would be a good thing if you wrote them.

The starving will then get a bit more.

The famine is very bad.[465]

Make sure to have a good rest and better treatment.*

Regards,
Lenin

Written on December 6, 1921
Sent to Berlin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

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* On the envelope Lenin wrote: "To P.P. Gorbunov, with the request to send this on to *Berlin* for *Alexei Maximovich Gorky* (from Lenin) {return the envelope with Gorky's signature}." On the other side of the envelope Maxim Gorky wrote: "Received 24.XII. *M. Gorky*."—*Ed.*

543

*TO N. P. GORBUNOV

When the inventor (I believe his name is *Cheiko*), whom you have summoned from Kharkov, arrives, he must be asked for a formal and exact report in writing on all the points indicated in the newspaper *Pravda*, making sure that the report comes 1) from Lazarev or some other leading scientist in Moscow or Petrograd and 2) from Bonch-Bruyevich and other specialists at the Nizhni-Novgorod radio laboratory.[466]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on December 7, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

544

TO I. I. MEZHLAUK[467]

Mezhlauk
Send copy to Comrade Gorbunov

Comrade Mezhlauk:

I shall give the C.L.D. business manager an assignment to check up on the fulfilment of what has been promised you. You will be informed in writing or when you come to the congress about the results of the check-up. I am afraid that you may go to extremes, in some way, especially in allowing excessively high salaries to some individuals. Let me know to what extent your enthusiasm has run in this respect and perhaps in some others as well.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on December 9, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

545

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade *Molotov* for circulation among Politbureau members

Krestinsky writes me that Gorky has left Riga without any money at all and is looking forward to receiving from

Stomonyakov royalties for the publication of his books. Krestinsky believes that Gorky should be included among the comrades receiving treatment abroad at the expense of the Party or the Council. I suggest that the Politbureau should pass a proposal that Krestinsky should include Gorky among such comrades and see to it that he has all the money he needs for the necessary treatment.[468]

Lenin

Written on December 12, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

546
TO N. OSINSKY[469]

Comrade Osinsky:

I have read and reread your letter with all possible attention. I resolutely disagree, and cannot bring it up at the Politbureau. It is, of course, your unquestionable right to bring it up at the plenum.

You have not a shred, literally not a shred, of business-like and organisational arguments.

You have made a mistake by insisting on Muralov's removal, seeing an "intrigue" where there was not a bit of it. But in order to direct such a People's Commissariat, as the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, and to do it in such dreadfully difficult conditions, one must not see "intrigues" or "counter-weights" in those who take a different view of matters or have a different approach, but must value independent-minded men. You must try out the trio in practice: you + a peasant (we do not yet know who and what kind of man he will be) + Teodorovich. There must be no haste to change it before it has come to life. Your *priority* influence is assured by the *law* and by many other things.

I have seen Mesyatsev at the *C.L.D.* and the *C.P.C.*, but very little. No one can prevent him from attending (and voting) if neither you nor Teodorovich is there. This could be formalised in a couple of minutes.

But there is no reason to change the Politbureau decision. It must be tried out; it is *organisationally* correct.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written between December 14 and 18, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

547

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev:

I am sending you the letters of Osinsky and Teodorovich to me, of which we spoke today.

Osinsky has not a shred of "business-like" argument. It is nothing but a case of nerves and a repetition of the mistake of his sacking Muralov.

I strongly object to taking the question to the Politbureau as well, and am writing Osinsky about this. Let him take it to the plenum if he wants to. That is his right.[470]

Please, show this material and my letter to Stalin and Zinoviev, and return them to me.

Salut!

Lenin

P.S. I read Teodorovich *not* the whole of Osinsky's letter, but only its practical part, as marked off in red ink.

Written between December 14 and 18, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

548

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade *Molotov*:

Please prolong my leave, according to the doctor's orders for a period up to two weeks (depending on the course of treatment).[471]

I shall attend the C.C. Plenum on some questions, at any rate.[472]

In accordance with the Politbureau decision, I shall give a short report at the Congress of Soviets.[473]

16/XII-21 *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

549
TO Y. A. LITKENS

Comrade *Litkens*
Copies to Comrade *Bogdanov* and Comrade *Lezhava*

In connection with the projects put forward by Comrade Voyevodin and Comrade Lezhava, I authorise you to set up a commission chaired by you, consisting of Comrade Bogdanov, with the right of substitution, Comrade Lezhava, with the right of substitution, and Comrade Voyevodin—to examine the question of establishing a cinema industry in Russia.[474]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on December 16, 1921

First published in 1925 in the book: G. Boltyansky, *Lenin i kino* (Lenin and the Cinema), Moscow-Leningrad

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

550
*TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Please read this and give it *special* attention, doing everything possible to fulfil it (probably, through the Narrow Council).

Let me *know in advance* if there are any difficulties.[475]

17/XII. *Lenin*

Written on December 17, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

551
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

I draw your attention to this report from Krasin (enclosed) which I think is plausible and highly important.[476] As soon as Orjonikidze returns, there must be a conference with Chicherin on this question to work out a number of proposals for passage through the Politbureau.

17/XII-21 *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

552
INQUIRIES SENT TO PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS OVER THE PREPARATION OF A REPORT BY THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C. AND THE C.P.C. AT THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS[477]

The most concise information possible (2-3 figures) and so precise (or with a reservation of how close it is to the real thing) as to make it *worth while* for me to insert it in my speech at the Congress of Soviets?

please let me have the shortest possible replies, one or a maximum of two pages

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1. *To Comrade Chicherin* (or, if he is unable to reply, to Litvinov) and to *Comrade Radek*

Will it be enough to say, in characterising the international position of the R.S.F.S.R., that from the side of Poland and Rumania, it is only their war party that threatens and not all their ruling classes?

— that the alliance of the four Powers (Britain, the United States, France and Japan) concluded at the

Washington Conference is, first, highly unstable, like all imperialist alliances; and, second, hostile to all the other peoples?

Should anything be added to this?

Is it all right to tell about the plan to invite Russia and Germany to the second conference in April 1922?[478] What source should I quote? How authentic or probable is this to be considered?

2. *To Comrade Chicherin* (Litvinov)

Is it all right to characterise our progress for 1921 by the increase in the number of trade treaties with European powers? If it is, list them (in 1920 only with Britain, and in 1921 with such-and-such countries).

If not, is it all right to characterise progress in this respect by means of data other than the volume of trade exchange (about which I shall inquire from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade)?

3. *To Comrade Lezhava*

Is it possible to characterise our progress for 1921 in terms of developing trade with other countries by means of two or three figures, however general and approximate? For instance, purchases and orders in 1920—*about* so much; for so many months of 1921, to an *approximate* figure, giving a *probable* total of *up to* so much?

Is it possible to bring out Germany in this respect?

Is it possible to give two or three final figures on the volume of our exports in 1921 as compared with that in 1920?

4. *To Comrade Fomin*

Could you let me have the exact or rough figures about the number of new locomotives (and cars? and tank cars?) brought in from abroad in 1921? compared with 1920? and other products for transport?

ditto: ordered in 1921 for the amount of?

Is it possible for me to give in my report at the Congress of Soviets facts about the state of transport in 1921 compared with 1920, in the briefest form, stating the essential (one page)?

5. *To Comrade Trotsky*

Is it possible to add to your theses and your report something about the army's economic work? about the uninterruption of continuous ties with the labour army councils?[479] and in general according to the assignment formulated in a decision either by one of the C.C. plenums in 1921, or one of the Politbureau sittings in the autumn of 1921?[480]

6. *To Comrade Khinchuk*

Could you supplement the figures for the development of Centrosoyuz turnover which you have given me (1 million; 3 and 6 million in gold for August, September and October 1921),* first, with approximate figures for November? second, the figure for grain purchases? third, the figure for the number of gubernia societies which have submitted their reports out of the total? fourth, any other very brief results which I could cite in my report at the Congress of Soviets?

7. *To Comrade Osinsky*

Could you give me for my report at the Congress of Soviets 2-3 summary figures, first, on our fulfilment of the task of supplying peasants with seed for the autumn of 1921; second, on other tangible results or successes already in evidence in 1921 ?

8. *To Comrade Smilga* (or Trifonov)

Could you let me have, for insertion in my report at the Congress of Soviets, the most concise figures on fuel:

I have Pyatakov's report on Donbas. Could I have the results for 1920 and 1921?

ditto on oil?

ditto on peat?

ditto on firewood for 1920 and 1921?

9. **To Comrade Bogdanov**

Please let me have for my report at the Congress of Soviets the briefest information (not more than ½-1 page on each point)

on metallurgy for 1921 in comparison with 1920?

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* See also Document 530 of this volume.—*Ed.*

on Yugostal?*
on the importance and prospect of the enterprise of Rutgers and his group?
on assistance to the Urals (Hammer's concessions)
on the textile industry?
on some results of the work of the Central Administration for the Farms of Industrial Enterprises
(task: the shortest, most indicative figures which could be cited in the report to show both the great difficulty of the situation and any small signs of improvement).

10. *To Comrade Gorbunov*

On electrification
the end of Levi's article[481]
increase in the number and capacity of electric-power stations
for 1918, 1919, 1920 and 1921.
The importance of Kashira and Utkina Zavod and their forthcoming start in the spring of 1922.
ditto about Volkhovsite.[482]

11. *To Comrades Lunacharsky, Pokrovsky and Litkens*

Please let me have for my report at the Congress of Soviets the briefest data for a graphic picture of the growing thirst for knowledge, for learning, and progress in this sphere (not more than 2 or 3 figures on the number of students, number of libraries, etc.; the most salient points).

12. *To Radchenko: about the hydraulic extraction of peat:*
what has been ordered in Germany? prospects for 1922?

Written on December 17, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from the original

553
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

Comrade *Bryukhanov*, People's Commissariat for Food

Please let me have the briefest replies, one or two pages, not more, to some of the questions to enable me to give a

*A mining and steel trust with mills in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Crimea.—*Ed.*

more precise formulation of the corresponding sections of my report at the Congress of Soviets and to insert some of the most characteristic figures.

What results in your opinion would it be useful for me to cite in my report at the Congress of Soviets? On the results of the tax in kind? On the concealment of arable land? Or about the most vital and pressing tasks in this sphere?

It would be well if we could show, briefly and visually, the relief for the peasants from the tax in kind as compared with the surplus-requisition system.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 17, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

554
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade *Kamenev*:

I am sending you this letter as a supplement to our last talk. I believe it to be absolutely necessary to have as many C.C. members as possible make a personal acquaintance with Yakovenko[483] at the forthcoming congress. Please send this letter to all the members of the Orgbureau first, and then pass it on to the other C.C. members. Ask Molotov to phone me after he reads the letter.

17/XII-21 *Lenin*

Dictated by phone
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

555
TO P. A. ZALUTSKY AND A. A. SOLTS

Comrade Zalutsky and Comrade Solts

I have learned about the expulsion from the Party of Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva. I have personally seen

her work as a secretary of the C.P.C. Managing Department, i.e., at very close range. However, I consider it necessary to point out that I have known the whole Alliluyev family, i.e., the father, the mother and the two daughters, since before the October Revolution. In particular, during the July days, when Zinoviev and I had to hide out and the danger was very great, it is this family that hid me, and the four of them, with the complete confidence of the Party Bolsheviks at the time, not only gave us both asylum, but also rendered a number of other secret services without which we would not have been able to escape Kerensky's bloodhounds. It could very well be that in view of Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva's youth, this circumstance has not been made known to the commission. Nor am I aware whether the commission was able, in examining the case of Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva, to make a comparison of the facts about her father, who had worked in various capacities in assisting the Party long before the revolution, and had, I have heard, rendered important services to the illegal Bolsheviks under tsarism.

I consider it my duty to inform the Central Commission for Purging the Party of these circumstances.[484]

20.00 hours, December 20, 1921. *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

556

TO P. A. ZALUTSKY AND A. A. SOLTS

Comrade *Zalutsky* and Comrade *Solts*

I have had a letter from Comrade Kasparova-Popova (address: 3 House of Soviets, Flat 63, telephone 58-97). She writes that she is absolutely desperate about her expulsion from the Party, and asks me to intercede with the Central Commission for Purging the Party and request them to make a thorough verification of her case, referring to her brother Slava Kasparov and her husband Popov, who had been sent to the Far East by Comrade Sverdlov

and was killed there. She writes that, together with her brother, she began to take an interest in the Party at the age of 14, was a member of school study circles, and joined the Party at the age of 17, doing purely technical work.

I do not know this Kasparova personally, or have forgotten her, but I knew her brother very well abroad, where he was an émigré after the first revolution of 1905, was a member of the Bolshevik organisation, and enjoyed the well-deserved respect of all Bolsheviks with whom I had occasion to meet and who had seen Kasparov work. This Kasparov died in Switzerland before the 1917 revolution (his health being overtaxed by the difficult conditions of émigré life).

I shall try to collect information about anyone who may have known Kasparov's sister better.

For my part, I request the Central Commission for Purging the Party to verify the case of Comrade Kasparova's expulsion from the Party.[485]

Lenin

20.00 hours, December 20, 1921.

Dictated by phone

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

557

TO THE *IZVESTIA VTsIK* EDITORIAL BOARD

Comrade Steklov, Editor,
and Comrade A. Belyakov,
Izvestia Editorial Board

On December 20, *Izvestia* carried A. Belyakov's article, "New Ways of Reviving Railway Transport".[486] Will the author of the article inform me, giving the most precise indication possible of the corresponding publications:

1) What is the source of the information that the method of using the ordinary, slightly modified, lorry instead of a railway locomotive has been tested abroad and has produced excellent results in general?

2) The same thing concerning the fact that in America such lorries have been used on sidings.

3) About such lorries being successfully used in the American army during the war (there must be information about this, if the use was successful, in the American, French and British press).

4) About the fact that trials were staged in London on the Russian engineer Kuznetsov's idea, which have proved that a 30 h.p. lorry easily pulled a 9-10 car train at a speed of 20 versts an hour.[487]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on December 21, 1921

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

558
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade *Molotov*:

I think that we should agree right away, and to make sure send a telegram about this both through Krasin, and via Berlin, and also via Christiania, by open text and not in code.

I am not quite clear about the terms of payment and control from the telegram read out to me. If the deadline is on the 26th, it is perhaps still possible to have this checked and clarified, but still we should not in any case let such an opportunity go by. It would be especially important to secure the possibility of using this grain not only to aid the starving, but also for the spring sowing.[488]

I request Molotov and Kamenev to phone me tonight.

21/XII-21 *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

559

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO V. M. MOLOTOV AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade *Molotov* and all members of the Politbureau

1. Please acquaint all members of the Politbureau as soon as possible with Teodorovich's communication concerning the Siberian peasant Yakovenko, which I have sent you.*

2. The same thing concerning today's memo from Eiduk on the American Government's proposal to let us have $20 million worth of grain on condition that we spend $10 million.[489]

Lenin

December 22, 1921

Dictated by phone

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

560

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV[490]

Comrade Sokolnikov:

I am sending you this **secretly.**[491]

I think that Safarov is right (*partially*, *at any rate*).

I earnestly request you to examine this objectively to prevent any squabble, quarrel or revenge from spoiling the work in Turkestan.

Write me a couple of words.[492]

22.XII.

Greetings,

Lenin

Written on December 22, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* See Document 554 of this volume.—*Ed.*

561
TO L. B. KAMENEV

I consider Sokolnikov's pamphlet, *State Capitalism and the New Financial Policy*, a great success. I think that you should direct all efforts to do away with our Supreme Economic Commission and all its subcommissions with maximum speed.[493] I very much fear that we have been dragging out this business by holding forth, while the need was to concentrate all attention on immediately taking practical steps and verifying the results.

Lenin

Written on December 24, 1921

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from a typewritten copy

562
TO G. I. SAFAROV[494]

Comrade Safarov:

Don't lose your nerve, this is intolerable and shameful, you are not a 14-year-old miss.

I passed your letters on to Sokolnikov, whom I shall recommend in the C.C. for dispatch to Turkestan to sort things out.

I have spoken with Sokolnikov, and have established (*entre nous!*) his consent to regard the case started against you as absurd.

Don't lose your nerve.

Carry on your work, and don't give up any of your duties. You must learn to collect the facts, calmly and purposefully, against those who have started this absurd case.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on December 24, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

563

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

I absolutely insist on an immediate Politbureau decision by telephone about Rudzutak's *urgent* dispatch (immediately after the plenum on the trade unions) to *Germany*: he is running a temperature and is spitting blood. Clearly, his TB is getting worse.

Over here, he won't be cured and, what is most important, he won't be given a strict regimen.[495]

Lenin

Written on December 24, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

564

TO Y. M. YAROSLAVSKY

Comrade Yaroslavsky:

Please let me have your own *opinion*, and collect that of all the responsible and influential Siberian comrades now here, about the peasant *Yakovenko* (I think he is chairman of the Kansk Uyezd Executive Committee, Yeniseisk Gubernia). The opinions should be as detailed as possible. They are for the purpose of discussing in the C.C. Yakovenko's appointment as *People's Commissar for Agriculture*.*

Age? — About 40 years old.**
Experience? — Direct experience in Soviet work.
Respect of peasantry? — Great.
Knowledge of economics? — Middle peasant, never had a very big farm.
Strength of mind? — Authoritative, firm.
Brains? — Intelligent, quick-witted.

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* See Document 554 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** In brevier are Yaroslavsky's replies which he wrote into the typed copy of the published letter.—*Ed.*

Loyalty to the Soviet power? — Proved his loyalty both in the partisan period and after.

Will you do this *fast* and properly.

Lenin

Written on December 24, 1921

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

565
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky:

I have not yet seen your letter with the amendment to my draft resolution, I have only heard about its content from the secretary. I quite agree with the main idea. I think, however, that the concept of specialists must include not only engineers and agronomists, but also merchants. If you can, get someone to send me a copy of your conclusion which is being sent to the C.C., because I shall be in Moscow today.[496]

Lenin

Dictated by phone on December 26, 1921

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

566
TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO A. M. LEZHAVA

Comrade *Lezhava*, People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade

The report of Comrade Yemelyanov, who can and must be regarded as absolutely reliable, concerning the stealing during the discharge at Revel, is a source of extremely great apprehension and raises a question of tremendous importance.*

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 201.—*Ed.*

I draw the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to this fact, for the purpose of taking the most vigorous measures, with check-ups through reliable men, informing me of the results of the check-up and the measures taken. Send the reply to Comrade Smolyaninov.

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 26, 1921
First published in 1933
in *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

567

EXCHANGE OF MEMOS WITH Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY[497]

If this is true, it is not bad.[498]

Perhaps these two things could be done:

1) a weekly (monthly for a start) inventory for the whole R.S.F.S.R.

a) of the quantity of commodities held by the state (exchange fund)

b) quantity of bank-notes

2) by way of experiment in one or two uyezds issue (through co-operative establishments?) *exchange bonds*, fully secured by the commodity fund?

Inventorying the commodity fund is not the business of the People's Commissariat for Finance. This calls for some additional structuring or restructuring to take account of all the material budget. Still, we have authorised Syromolotov to do this.

The bonds could be issued when the commodities are available, and, I think, they will be all right, but in the initial period there will be little benefit for our own pocket.

{My purpose is not "benefit for the pocket", but experiment, *experience*.}

Written on December 26, 1921
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

568
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, copy to Comrade Smolyaninov

I am sending on to you, for your information, G. B. Krasin's opinion. This opinion confirms me in the view I wrote to you about yesterday.[499] I fear that the convocation of a conference was a strategically incorrect measure on your part. It would have been more correct to demand an opinion in writing from the solid specialists numbering two or three, no more, for each of the three establishments (Gosplan. People's Commissariat for Railways, and the S.E.C.'s Scientific and Technical Department). I believe the task is above all to "catch out" the scientists who have missed the foreign experience, as being idle and pedantic. I think neither Krasin's opinion, nor this memo of mine should be shown to anyone. Unless your conference reaches an absolutely negative conclusion, then we should think about who should be assigned the immediate practical performance. Please phone me about this.[500]

Lenin

27/XII-21

Dictated by phone

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

569
TO BÉLA KUN

Comrade Béla Kun:

I have received your letter, in which, as my secretary tells me, you request acceleration of my article about Serrati. Unfortunately, because of my ailment I have been unable up to now to start carrying it out on the basis of the material which has been sent to me, unfortunately, in excessive abundance.

It looks as if I shall be unable to write it by the stated deadline.[501]

Write a note to Fotieva about how things are, what

you are writing, and how you have arranged things for the 400 Hungarian Communists who have arrived.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on December 29, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

570

TO THE HEADS OF CENTRAL SOVIET ESTABLISHMENTS

Dear Comrade:

It is necessary that an end should be put once and for all to the scandalous red tape and delays in your establishment. Time and again, there is neither reply to nor execution of the important and urgent matters being directed to you by the C.P.C. office for the purpose of settling the numerous complaints and applications addressed to the C.P.C. and its Chairman.

My suggestion is that you pull yourself together at once. The machinery of Soviet administration must work accurately, smoothly and swiftly. Any slackness in it does damage not only to the interests of individuals but to the whole business of administration, which becomes illusory and imaginary.

Assuming the real measure of labour productivity in each given establishment to be above all the extent to which all business passing through it is actually executed without delay, I demand that henceforth you submit the quickest and most exhaustive replies to all the cases and inquiries directed to you. To confine yourself to formal replies and dispatch to other establishments also means breeding red tape and wasting paper.

I warn you that if this manner of action continues the C.P.C. office is authorised to start proceedings against the guilty persons without regard for "rank".

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written in December 1921

First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

571
TO P. A. ZALUTSKY

Comrade Zalutsky:

I am sending on this letter to you. Pass it on where it belongs, if it has nothing to do with you.

The charges against such an old Party member and revolutionary, known to every Latvian, and then to Trotsky and many others during the war, are clearly incredible. I have known Danishevsky *throughout* the Party's *history*, *years and years* before the revolution, and I request that everything should be checked carefully, rigorously and comprehensively.[502]

Yours,
Lenin

Written in December 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

572
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Put emphasis on the fact that Trotsky's mistakes at the Tenth Congress are being all repeated.

Another thing I forgot to say: in his "amendments", he *takes* an administrative approach ("threat", "shake up"—rearrange everything, "*one-man* responsibility") to that which should be dealt with

(a) through propaganda,
(b) through long *experience*.*

Written in 1921
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

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* The subject-matter has not been ascertained.—*Ed.*

1922

573
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Kamenev
Copies: *Bukharin* and *P. P. Gorbunov*

Comrade *Kamenev*:

I have just learned about Goldenberg's death. They say he had a heart attack. I very much fear, am almost sure, that it is our negligence that is to blame in this case, because he was an extremely sickly man, and we failed entirely to take care of him. It is my earnest request that you make arrangements: 1) for the funeral to be held properly (I wonder if it is convenient to do this through the Moscow Soviet or the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs); 2) then we should look after his wife, who is probably absolutely without any money and who, I happen to know, is absolutely helpless and unadapted to the present Russian life; 3) we should also have the press carry an obituary.

He was obviously sent to his grave by his life as an émigré and by our Russian negligence. We have been losing valuable workers in an absolutely unpardonable manner.[503]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 1, 1922

First published on February 13,
1924 in *Pravda* No. 35

Printed from
a typewritten copy

574

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov for all members of the Politbureau (concerning Chicherin's reference to Bogdanov's letter to Urquhart)

I think it would be useful to appoint an inquiry, but we should not disavow Bogdanov's move, let us consider; first, let all Politbureau members have a text of Bogdanov's letter; second, let us await the results of the inquiry; third, we still have enough time to decide on our terms after the resumption of the talks. [This]* does not bind us in any way, and may to some extent be useful to us.[504]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 3, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

575

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

To Comrade Molotov (concerning Chicherin's reference to the declaration proposed by Lloyd George)

I think that, far from it being necessary for us to make haste, the terms are in general absolutely unacceptable. Inform Krasin of this in strict secrecy, or perhaps we need not inform him at all, but wait for the conference at which we shall make a concrete statement.[505]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 3, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

* Omission in the text restored according to meaning.—*Ed.*

576

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

Comrade Preobrazhensky told me by phone that he would resign if Krasnoshchekov is appointed second deputy, and that is also the opinion of the whole Collegium with the exception, it seems, of Sokolnikov. Stalin believes that the decision should be confirmed but its execution held up until Sokolnikov's return, otherwise Krasnoshchekov may be badly badgered. I think that this danger will remain, unless the Politbureau comes out at once with full force against the Collegium, and unless it backs up and supports Krasnoshchekov to the hilt. I consider this question extremely important because a crying mistake is being made not only by the whole collegium, but also by Preobrazhensky, who are unable to see the need for making all-round use of a man who, with solid experience of work in America and in the Far-Eastern Republic, takes a practical approach to financial matters. That is the most important thing. That is precisely what Preobrazhensky and the other members of the collegium lack. Their whole opposition to Krasnoshchekov is a tissue of harmful prejudices. That is why I should favour immediate passage of the decision on Krasnoshchekov through Soviet channels.[506]

Lenin

Dictated on January 4, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

577

TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY

Comrade *Preobrazhensky*

Please write me a couple of words about Nazar Uralsky. Has he settled down, how and where, and what are his

present political attitudes, and have they been changing at all over the recent period or remain the same?[507]

4-I-22

Lenin

Dictated by phone

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

578
TO M. M. LITVINOV

9.I.22

Comrade *Litvinov*:

I am sending you Mikhailov's, letter. Perhaps, you will find it appropriate to arrange a conference with Scheinman and Lezhava or with anyone Lezhava may authorise, to prepare at once a draft decision on this urgent matter.[508]

Lenin

Dictated by phone

First published in 1961 in the magazine *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5

Printed from a typewritten copy

579
TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov

Having learned from Kamenev that the C.P.C. has unanimously adopted Lunacharsky's absolutely improper proposal to preserve the Bolshoi Opera and Ballet, I suggest that the Politbureau should resolve:

1. To instruct the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. to rescind the C.P.C. decision.

2. Of the opera and ballet company, to leave only a few dozen actors for Moscow and Petrograd so that their

performances (both operatic and choreographic) should pay,* i.e., by eliminating all large expenses on properties, etc.

3. Of the thousands of millions saved in this way at least one-half to be allotted to wiping out illiteracy and for reading rooms.

4. To summon Lunacharsky for five minutes, to hear the last word of the accused, it being pointed out to him and to all People's Commissars that in future introducing and putting to the vote of resolutions like the one now being rescinded by the C.C., will entail stricter measures on the part of the C.C.[509]

Lenin

12/I-22

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

580

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE ORGBUREAU AND THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

In sending you Comrade Krestinsky's letter, I propose, for my part, to the Orgbureau, and to the Politbureau on some points, that we resolve:

1. To appoint, by agreement with the People's Commissariat for Health, one or two doctors to make regular examinations of Sokolnikov, Tsyurupa, and other comrades who have returned after treatment, instructing them to issue their orders in writing concerning the necessary regimen. This to be the personal responsibility of the doctor. Bind him to submit a short report to the C.C. Secretariat, or, if the C.C. Secretariat agrees, then to the C.P.C. Secretariat.

2. To impose on some definite person the responsibility for seeing that Sokolnikov abides by the regimen.

3. To bind Tsyurupa to spend three days a week (Saturday, Sunday and Monday) in Kashira at the home of his

* For instance, through participation by opera singers and ballet dancers in all kinds of concerts, etc.

brother G. D. Tsyurupa, under his supervision, in the sense of complete rest and good nutrition.

4. To place upon Tsyurupa the duty to reduce the amount of his work, in particular, to relieve himself almost entirely from work on commissions, concentrating his activity on supervising the practical execution of some of the most important decisions of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D.

5. To put upon Tsyurupa the duty to limit C.P.C. and C.L.D. sittings to no more than three hours in general.[510]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 12, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

581

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN

Krasin
Soviet Government Delegation
London

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade announced in December that 8 million poods of grain had been purchased but not shipped. Having received new credits, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade has undertaken the obligation to deliver 15 million poods of food grain by April 1, at five million a month. In January so far, not a single pood has been received, and there is no news of any ships sailing or of proposed shipments. In view of the extremely grave food situation, I propose that you inform us within two days: first, how much grain has been purchased; second, how much has been shipped, on which ships and to which ports; third, how much and when is to be shipped shortly; fourth, plan for meeting obligation to purchase 15 million poods.*

Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 12, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

* See Document 593 of this volume.—*Ed.*

582
TO A. S. YENUKIDZE

13.I.1922

Comrade Yenukidze:

Comrade Lalayants tells me that his family needs assistance through a grant to be able to carry on until March. Have a talk with Stalin: how could this be done? On behalf of the C.C.? or of the All-Russia C.E.C. Presidium? Please write to me through Fotieva—whether or not this can be arranged (Lalayants should be asked about the amount)? If there are any difficulties, which are they? where?

I shall then seek ways and means. Please, pass this on to Stalin: incidentally, I request him *to make an arrangement* with Lalayants about work for Lalayants. I see, after my talk with Lalayants, that I cannot settle this. It has to be decided by Stalin in the Orgbureau or with the Orgbureau's help.[511]

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

583
TO P. S. OSADCHY

Comrade Osadchy:

In reviewing the plan for purchases in gold abroad, we must keep to the figure of *130* million in gold *a year*.

It should not be exceeded. Inform me *at once* if there is the slightest danger that *we may break out of this ceiling*.

13/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 13, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

584
TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT AND V. V. FOMIN

16.I.1922
Personal
Secret

Comrade Unschlicht, All-Russia Cheka
and Comrade Fomin, People's Commissariat for Railways
Copy to N. P. Gorbunov

A few days ago, I had occasion to see for myself the state of the All-Russia Cheka *railway trolleys*, which are apparently in the joint charge of the All-Russia Cheka and the P.C.R. I think that railway trolleys are absolutely indispensable for the All-Russia Cheka, and the People's Commissariat for Defence (I have heard that the All-Russia Cheka has two) at the Moscow Junction for very fast assignments, for highly urgent and highly secret dispatch of small (5-10 men) detachments, etc.

I found the railway trolleys in the worst state possible. I saw utter neglect, semi-ruin (very many things have been stolen!), total disorder, the fuel appears to have been stolen, there is water in the kerosene, the engine running excruciatingly, stoppages on the way every minute, the traffic wretched, delays at the stations, station-masters completely uninformed (apparently without any idea at all that the All-Russia Cheka trolleys should have special travelling warrants, and that they should go through with maximum speed not in the sense of running speed—these machines are apparently "Soviet", i.e., are very bad ones—but in the sense of the shortest possible delays and waste of time, *with military precision*), there is chaos, slovenliness and absolute disgrace. Fortunately, being incognito on the trolley, I was able to hear and did hear, frank and truthful (and not the officially honeyed and lying) talk of the officials, and I understood from their talk that this was no exception, but that the whole organisation was incredibly disgraceful, with complete dislocation and clumsiness.

This was the first time I travelled along the railway lines not as a "dignitary", getting all and sundry to hustle with dozens of special telegrams, but as an unknown per-

son travelling with All-Russia Cheka men, and the impression I got was one of depressing hopelessness. If such is the state of a special small gear in the mechanism under the special supervision of the All-Russia Cheka *itself*, I can well imagine the state of things in the P.C.R. in general! The disorder there must be incredible.

I propose: to appoint at once, by agreement between the All-Russia Cheka and the P.C.R. (perhaps also getting the People's Commissariat for Defence to join, if it has any trolleys?), a responsible person who would be close to the actual thing, and not a high-ranking official. This person to be strictly responsible for any negligence.

Issue a short military-worded instruction about the All-Russia Cheka trolleys, about their secret and rapid movements, maintenance in good repair, storage of fuel, traffic without delays along the Circular Road, the junction *and everywhere*, etc., etc. Add to the instruction, by the way, that at the request of N. P. Gorbunov (who will be doing this only with my consent) a railway trolley is to be made available promptly and run to the place he designates.

Send detailed report on execution to N. P. Gorbunov, C.P.C. business manager.

I also authorise Gorbunov to verify execution from time to time, i.e., make unannounced trips on railway trolleys, noting down the minutes required for each operation (summons, running time, stops, etc.) and inspection.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

MARXIST ROMMARX ROMAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

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585

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[512]

Secret

To Comrade Molotov, at the Politbureau:

1) Perhaps we should demand special guarantees against the fascists (e.g., either an Italian warship with a

wireless at our disposal? the names of responsible persons in the Italian army and police, etc.)?

2) Perhaps we should at once inform them that *our delegates will number* from ... to ... ((+ staff))? When shall we call the All-Russia C.E.C. session?

3) On the whole (and about the rest) Chicherin is right.

4) Perhaps we should appoint on behalf of the All-Russia C.E.C. (as a subtle point):
Lenin —Chairman
Chicherin—Deputy with **all** the powers of the Chairman, in the event the latter cannot go.
{ Joffe ?? and ?? Krasin ?? } *2 assistant deputies*? or 3-4 *assistant deputies*?[513]

5) Perhaps we should start *at once* only personal talks (without any papers) in Berlin and Moscow with the Germans about *contacts* between us and them at Genoa?

6) Perhaps we should at once suggest secretly to *all* the plenipotentiary representatives to put out feelers with the governments concerned to find out whether or not they are prepared to start *unofficial* secret talks with us on a *preliminary* marking out of the *line* at Genoa?

16/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 16, 1922
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586

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

16/I.1922

To Molotov
for all **members of the Politbureau**

1) Chicherin's papers show that he is sick.[514] We must ask the *best* doctors urgently whether it is better to

a) postpone his whole leave (six months) until after Genoa?
Will he be able to stand the pace?

b) or let him have a rest right away for one month or five weeks, from 18.I. to 22.II., which leaves two weeks until 8.III., and special leave after Genoa? (**b** seems to be the only correct approach).[515]

2) Things at the P.C.F.A. appear to be in a state of dangerous chaos. Is it not risky to dispatch all the best men from the P.C.F.A. to Genoa, leaving a hole at the P.C.F.A. here?

This question should be placed under the most immediate, *direct* supervision by the Politbureau.

3) Special responsibility must be placed on someone (perhaps Litvinov + Vorovsky + Joffe + P. P. Gorbunov?) for seeing that when Chicherin and the whole delegation leave for Genoa, *all* P.C.F.A. affairs are handed over to **specified** persons in *complete* order.

Someone of the most experienced diplomatists should be left to head the P.C.F.A. for the entire Genoa period.[516]

4) The best and completely reliable cipher clerks should be found right away with the assignment to prepare the most reliable codes for Genoa (with keys *changed every day*) for the entire Genoa period.

Lenin

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587

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

17.I.1922

Comrade Molotov:

I am sending on to you Vorovsky's inquiry and Axelrod's application. This needs a decision.

Axelrod has worked here in the Comintern and for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. I have known him as a Bolshevik since 1916 in Zurich, and support his application for assistance to him and his wife in one form or another.[517]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

588

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

17.I.1922

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I am sending you G. D. Tsyurupa's reports.*

This is shocking red tape.

The work of the People's Commissariat for Railways is wretched.

And to think that this is for Kashira, an establishment of exceptional importance! An establishment about which there is a *special* Politbureau directive, concerning the obligatory nature of all sorts of pressure and acceleration! And to think that this should happen after dozens of telegrams, etc., from me about Kashira!

What, in that case, happens to the *ordinary* freight? Apparently something quite crazy!

I propose to you:

1) to start proceedings for red tape, and take the case all the way to the strictest punishment;

2) put *pressure* on the P.C.R. and, *apart from the trial*, secure *measures* for enhancing responsibility and improving the work.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published on January 21, 1931 in *Pravda* No. 21 and *Za Industrializatsiyu* No. 21

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589

LETTERS TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. ON THE STEINBERG CONCESSION

1

17.I.1922

To Comrade Molotov for the Politbureau

I enclose Lezhava's report on the Steinberg concession. Please have this matter raised in the *Politbureau* on

* See Document 595 of this volume and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 218.—*Ed.*

Thursday, so as to allow the *C.P.C.* to pass the C.C. decision through Soviet government channels on Friday.[518]

Appoint two rapporteurs on this question for the Politbureau: A. D. Tsyurupa and a representative of the C.P.C. majority.

This is an important business, and I very much fear that the C.P.C. majority (opposing Tsyurupa) is about to make another mistake in the spirit of "communist conceit": they are afraid to allow a merchant who knows how to trade to make money, and their overriding *concern* is only to secure a majority for the Communists, most of whom may bawl a bit, but then they never touch the stuff.[519]

I draw your attention to §5: *three Communists* (ignorant of trade? I know of only two Communists who have shown an ability to trade: *Belov* (GUM) and *Serg. Malyshev*) are about *to teach* two merchants *how to trade*.

I am afraid that this "majority" will look very much like Shchedrin's accoucheurs.[520]

Perhaps §5 should be amended as follows: Steinberg, as representative, be empowered to decide everything *alone*, while the majority of the board should have the right *to know everything* and to complain to us about Steinberg's acts, *without suspending them* (i.e., the majority of three against two will nominally retain the right to reverse Steinberg's decisions, but we *shall tell* him that we shall not reverse anything without a *special C.L.D.* decision).

Meanwhile, the three Communists will be given the duty, by a special C.C. decision, to study and to learn the business in three years or so, otherwise they will be expelled with ignominy.

Lenin

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Printed from the original

2

To Comrade Molotov (for members of the Politbureau)
To Comrade Tsyurupa and Comrade Lezhava with a request for their opinion

The C.L.D. is meeting in plenary session today. Perhaps, it could be possible, so as not to put off the matter,

to adopt by phone the following proposal concerning the Steinberg concession (Politbureau decision mandatory upon the C.L.D.): "To accept the Lezhava commission's proposal with an addendum of this kind: Steinberg, as representative of the board, shall act on his own, with decisions by the board majority (3 representatives of the board, 1—Steinberg, 1—capitalist), without suspending Steinberg's order, only referable to the C.L.D."[521]

This addendum should be adopted by the C.L.D., but not written into the board's charter. Then, by informing Steinberg of this decision, we shall, on the one hand, provide the possibility of really doing business commercially to a man who knows commerce otherwise than from reading communist booklets and, on the other, in the event of Steinberg committing any crime, we shall assure ourselves of the possibility of revoking our decision through the C.L.D., without altering the Society's charter in any way. I think that such a guarantee is quite sufficient.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 23, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial notes

590
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[522]

Comrade Smolyaninov

Having looked over some of the tables, I propose that

1) **clear** additions in ink, in a fine hand, should always be made of *absolute* monthly *figures* (thousands or millions) (as in Table V, 4).

2) The same *always* in the margins of the table
pre-war figure (1913 or 1916, etc.)
such-and-such (absolute figure).

3) The whole importance of these tables lies in their being visual and comparable. That is why tables for *3 6* months: 1920-1921-1922, should be made to fit in *the same form*
(have all the *3 6* months 1920-1922 in *one* table).

17/I. *Lenin*

+ 4) Instead of *heavy lines* (∧) light lines (∧) will do: this will be simpler, clearer and easier to draw and will require fewer officials.

5) A bit of day-dreaming: have all the tables clipped into one *sheaf* (2 or 3, if it is too thick) to facilitate paging.

17/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 17, 1922

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591

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. SECRETARIAT

Comrade Molotov:

I am applying to the C.C. Secretariat (and if that is not within its competence, then to the Orgbureau) with a request about two comrades:

1) The daughter of Margarita Vasilyevna *Fofanova*, 15 years old, is afflicted with a grave form of bone tuberculosis. Please have her sent (with her mother, if necessary), to our sanatorium in Riga. Of course, they have no means.

I have known M. V. Fofanova as a vigorous and loyal member of the Bolshevik Party since the summer of 1917. In the autumn of that same year, before the October Revolution, she hid me at her flat in the most dangerous period.

Since the October 1917 Revolution, she has been working hard all the time, without a break. Her daughter's grave illness is putting a terrible strain on her and upsets her work.[523]

(Fofanova's address: 4 House of Soviets, 5 Vozdvizhenka, Flat 31.*)

2) I request that Nina Kotovich-Sammer, 14 years old, be placed at a model boarding school of the People's Commissariat for Education.

She should be admitted in the first form of the upper school.

* The address is in a secretary's hand.—*Ed.*

Address: Centrosoyuz hostel, 2/15 Maroseika.

I knew her father, the late Ivan Adamovich *Sammer*, very well: an old revolutionary and a Bolshevik. A member of the C.C. even before the first (1905) revolution. He died in the Ukraine in 1920, his health broken by overwork.[524]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written on January 17, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

592

TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

January 18, 1922

Comrade Bryukhanov
(Copies to Comrade Kamenev and Comrade Tsyurupa, to Comrade Stalin)

I most definitely disagree with you. I think that in view of the terrible disorder at the Commissariat for Food in the Ukraine, Frumkin is needed there. It is my firm conviction that the Commissariat for Food in general has to pull itself together most decidedly. Perhaps, Klyshko or someone else will do for the purchases abroad. We must send a very strict telegram to Krasin.*

Lenin

Dictated by phone
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a typewritten copy

593

TO J. V. STALIN

19/I.

Comrade Stalin:

If you decide to send Frumkin to the Ukraine, Krasin should be sent an extra-vigorous telegram:

> Unless you buy 15 million poods of grain in January and February, we shall dismiss you from your

* See next document.—*Ed.*

office and expel you from the Party. There is a desperate need for grain. Red tape is intolerable. The Vneshtorg apparatus is bad. There are delays over foreign currency. Do everything you possibly can. Telegraph precisely on the execution twice a week.

Approve this tomorrow, 20/I, and send on behalf of the Politbureau,[525] in addition put all the pressure possible on Litvinov (for the sake of currency) and check up **personally** 2 or 3 times a week.[526]

Lenin

Written on January 19, 1922

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Printed from the original

594

TO L. B. KRASIN

19.I.1922.

Comrade Krasin:

Concerning Larin, to the Politbureau decision of 17.I.[527] I add:

1. Keep him in London *as long as possible*.
2. If you take any of his figures on trust, we shall sack you.
3. Take care of his health, provide better treatment, appoint a *responsible* doctor.
4. Give him a **long** *literary* job with *German* and **English** sources (if he does not know English, teach him).

Carry out points 1, 3 and 4 with especial strictness and *especial tact*. Point 2—three times as strictly.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

P.S. The Vneshtorg apparatus is downright bad. Lezhava is **weak**. There is need for a better man. The grain is needed desperately and urgently. Put into this **everything** you have. *It is your responsibility*.*

Lenin

Sent to London

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

* See Documents 581 and 593 of this volume.—*Ed.*

595

TO V. A. AVANESOV

Comrade *Avanesov*

The chief engineer of the Kashira project, *G. D. Tsyurupa*, reports shocking delays of cars in their dispatch from Moscow to Kashira. There is red tape at the People's Commissariat for Railways.

With respect to the Kashira project, in view of its exceptional importance for the state, there are a number of the strictest directives on the extension of all kinds of assistance and binding all the departments to carry out assignments for the Kashira project with especial urgency and especial care.

Please appoint the strictest inquiry into these delays, to establish exactly who is to blame for the red tape, and be sure to institute legal proceedings against the guilty persons.

Carry out the inquiry in the most *urgent manner*. Communicate the results to Comrade *Smolyaninov* for reporting to me.[528]

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 20, 1922

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596

TO A. D. TSYURUPA

Comrade Tsyurupa:

Having looked into the whole situation and the doctor's written orders, which you had shown me,[529] etc., I most insistently request you to take the following into consideration.

I shall be unable to return before three or, perhaps, four weeks. This is the most difficult period, and C.C. members cannot set aside other business so as to take a most direct part in C.P.C. and C.L.D. work. The doctor gave you permission to work for 8 hours. I absolutely insist that over

the next four weeks you confine yourself to 4 hours of work a day, and besides take a complete rest on Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays. The rest of the time should be spent on a sanatorium regimen, for which purpose I expect to find a room in Sokolniki for you and your wife, so that you may have your usual sick-nurse, good food, etc. I am quite sure that otherwise you will not be able to stand the four weeks of work, and that is something we need very badly because of the political situation. Of these four hours, you must spend 2 hours a day in attending the C.P.C. and C.L.D. meetings, which we shall hold twice a week, the other two hours being devoted exclusively to the signing of minutes and the necessary minimum of conversation in person and by phone. If things are arranged this way, our apparatus will not be weakened in any way within these four weeks. You will be getting intensive help on the technical side from Gorbunov and Smolyaninov, and on the political side, from Kamenev and Stalin, and I have already made arrangements with all of them. Once again I ask you to accept this plan and to carry it out punctiliously, because it is absolutely utopian to hope to protect your flat against an influx of friends from the Commissariat for Food, etc.

Please send your reply through Fotieva as soon as possible.[530]

21/I.22. *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

597

TO L. D. TROTSKY[531]

Comrade Trotsky:

I have no doubt that the Mensheviks have now intensified and will go on intensifying their most malicious agitation. I think, therefore, that there is need to intensify surveillance over and reprisals against them. I have already spoken about this with Unschlicht, and request you to find ten minutes or so for a conversation with him not by telephone. As for the substance of the matter—I think I

agree with you. I now seem to be developing an urge to write an article on topics close to those you have referred to, but I shall nevertheless be hardly able to do this before a fortnight is out. Therefore, it would be perhaps extremely useful if you were to join open battle in the press right away, naming this Menshevik, explaining the malicious whiteguard character of his speech, and issuing an impressive call to the Party to pull itself together. The term "state capitalism" is, in my opinion (and I have repeatedly argued with Bukharin about it), the only theoretically correct and necessary one to make inert Communists realise that the new policy is going forward in earnest. But, of course, such malicious helpmates of the whiteguards, as all Mensheviks are, can pretend that they do not understand that state capitalism in a state with proletarian power can exist only as limited in time and sphere of extension, and conditions of its application, mode of supervision over it, etc.[532]

21/I.22. *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

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Printed from the text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

598

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

Sunday, 22/I.

Comrade Sokolnikov:

Concerning your letter of 18/I.[533]

About Basha and the State Depository of Valuables. I very much fear that you have been carried away here by the apparent "harmony" of the reorganisation plans. Basha, who had been recommended to me by reliable men, and who has *proved* his ability to safekeep, can (I felt) only safekeep, safeguard and no more. That is enough. That is a great deal. Under Trotsky's general supervision and pressure, let them safekeep, safeguard, fight stealing and realise. That is enough. That is very much.

Why then "reorganise Gokhran"? Why reorganise it into a "gold—currency—administration"?

I very much fear that reorganisation will be the death of us, without bringing any of the practical jobs to completion.

Let Trotsky and Basha carry out the State Depository of Valuables job to the end: which is to collect, to safeguard and to realise.

The currency administration must be separate. It was in Litvinov's charge. There is some mix-up between him and Krasin—the most painful question which caused a Politbureau decision a few days ago.[534]

At all costs this mix-up should be eliminated and their (Litvinov's and Krasin's) work made concerted *swiftly*, *immediately*.

If Litvinov is unable to devote himself entirely to this (because of the diplomacy), and if (you) intend to have Krasnoshchekov head the currency administration, why not bring this up before the Politbureau: the State depository of Valuables—safekeeps, collects and assigns for realisation; Krasnoshchekov—currency administration (instead of Litvinov or together with Litvinov?)?

I am in mortal fear of reorganisations. We are always reorganising things, instead of getting on with the practical business. You will do well to bear my words in mind: if the Commissariat for Finance does have a bitter enemy, it is the overdoing of reorganisation, and the underdoing of the *practical* business.

I cannot agree with you that the restructuring of our budget is at the centre of our work. Trade and restoration of the ruble is at the centre.

It is true (as you write) that Larin is "undoubtedly" the "father" of the monstrous confusion of the budget. It is also true that Preobrazhensky is the second guilty one. And what about O. Y. Schmidt? He has not got Preobrazhensky's excuses! This O. Y. Schmidt should he removed. He is a most harmful fumbler, and is the more dangerous because he fumbles with "pomposity" and is "superklug"*....

I think you should not engage in "restructuring" on the question of the budget: hand nine-tenths of it to the State Planning Commission and reduce all this to *practical*,

* "too clever".—*Ed.*

prudent amendments. Otherwise, the "restructuring" will run away with you, and in any case it is **impossible** just now, right away, to have a tolerable budget, and we shall perish because of the collapse of the monetary system, scattering our attention on tasks which are not feasible just now.

At the centre of everything just now is trade, first, domestic, and then, foreign trade; in connection with trade and on the basis of trade—a restoration of the ruble.

All attention should be concentrated on this. The important, the most important, the basic task is to make a *practical* start on this.

Development of trade, organisation of the State Bank's trade department, to have it **moving** *the whole* of trade, instead of sleeping—is the main thing.

What I mortally fear is that you, now *actually in charge* of the *most important* People's Commissariat, will be carried away with restructuring, reorganisation, and the theoretical line (you do have a weakness on this score)—instead of practice, practice and practice: raising trade, *increasing* and *collecting taxes*, restoring the ruble. Really and truly I am in mortal fear of this; do not succumb to this weakness, otherwise we shall collapse. Go on promoting Krasnoshchekov: he appears to be a practitioner.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on January 22, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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599

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov for circulating **secretly** (without making a copy) all members of the Politbureau *together with Radek's letter**

I propose:

1) to adopt Radek's proposal and to suggest right away to Krasin and Krestinsky to put out feelers, in a circular

* Karl Radek's letter has not been found.—*Ed.*

dispatch, with several powers separately (I once made this proposal: I don't understand why my *written* proposal has been lost. It was sent to Molotov*).

2) To hasten Rakovsky's arrival in Moscow and departure for Prague (having him return here a fortnight before Genoa).

3) To summon Krasin to Moscow by the same date.

4) To be highly careful and not to write abroad about our plans concerning Genoa, even in code, and to put off everything until the delegation conference in Moscow on 23.II (a fortnight before Genoa). This conference should also be attended by Chicherin, Krasin and Rakovsky (and Litvinov, and Vorovsky and Joffe, i.e., the *whole* delegation).

5) To issue a preliminary directive from the Politbureau:

(a) under no circumstances shall we recognise any debts, except those promised by Chicherin[535];

(b) we shall recognise these debts *only* provided they are *covered* by our own counter-claims;

(c) we give guarantees (if we are given a loan) only with timber in the north, and so forth;

(d) we put the most extensive interpretation on §1 of Bonomi's terms[536];

(e) we protect Germany and Turkey, etc.;

(f) we try to separate America, and in general to divide the powers.[537]

6) We instruct *each* member of the delegation to work out on that *basis* a plan for negotiations in detail by 23.II.

7) I propose that we *reverse* the decision permitting Chicherin to engage *Sukhanov* and Jordansky.[538]

Radek is absolutely wrong.

The windbag Sukhanov will do nothing but *harm*. Jordansky too. It *is extremely harmful*.

8) Considering that we here in Moscow are surrounded by *spies*, Mensheviks and semi-Mensheviks, this (and similar) proposals should not be entered into the Politbureau minutes, but taken down separately, getting all the members of the delegation to sign on the same sheet and to return this sheet to Molotov, undertaking *not* to mention the

* See Document 585 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Politbureau directives *anywhere*, either in their papers, or in coded messages.

22/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 22, 1922

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600

TO A. M. LEZHAVA[539]

January 23, 1922

To Comrade Lezhava

About the project for Harriman's entry, let me tell you the following: unless I am mistaken, the main provision of the Derutra contract was that we and the Germans have an equal number of votes on the board. If Harriman joined up with the Germans, i.e., as part of the German half, that would, of course, be acceptable, but if the Germans plus Harriman have two-thirds of the votes, and we—one-third, that is, of course, unacceptable, In that case, a second society should be set up alongside Derutra, in which we and Harriman would have an equal number of votes. In these circumstances, the combined operations of the two societies would fully ensure our interests and those of Harriman.

Lenin

Dictated by phone

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Printed from a typewritten copy

601

TO A. M. LEZHAVA, P. A. BOGDANOV AND V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrades Lezhava, Bogdanov and Molotov (for Politbureau members)

January 23, 1922

I believe that it is absolutely necessary for us to accept Krupp's proposal just now, before the Genoa Conference.[540] It would be immensely important for us to conclude at

least one, and what would be even better, several concession contracts, with German firms above all. That is why there must be the most relentless struggle against the prejudice among the top section of the S.E.C. against concessions, whether involving oil, agriculture or anything else.

Lenin

Dictated by phone

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602

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

1

To Comrade Molotov
(for Politbureau members)

I have just received two letters from Chicherin (dated the 20th and 22nd). He has raised the question of whether we should agree, for a proper compensation, to some small changes in our Constitution, namely, representation for the parasitic elements on the Soviets. He says this should be done to please the Americans.

This proposal of Chicherin shows, I believe, that he should 1) be immediately sent to a sanatorium, as any connivance in this respect, any allowance of delay, etc., will, in my opinion, be the greatest threat to all negotiations.* 2) This shows how timely my proposal (which I here enclose) is to have a formulation at once of our preliminary and approximate, but precise terms, for all members of the Genoa delegation.**

Lenin

Dictated by phone on January 23, 1922

Published in 1961 in the book, *Leninskiye idei zhivut i pobezhdayut*, Moscow

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* See Document 586 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 390-93.—*Ed.*

2

To Comrade Molotov for all Politbureau members:

This and the following letter from Chicherin clearly show that he is sick and very much so.[541] We shall be fools unless we force him to go to a sanatorium **right away**.

24/I.1922. *Lenin*

First published in 1965
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603
TO L. B. KAMENEV AND J. V. STALIN

Comrades Kamenev and Stalin:

I have just learned—to my horror—from Sokolnikov that he *rejects* (!) the Politbureau's directive concerning the trio (he + Preobrazhensky + Krasnoshchekov).

This is chaos!

This is a scandal!

This means that the C.C. apparatus is not working! This should be reaffirmed not later than tomorrow.[542]

And—I insist again and again—that no question should be allowed to go to the *Supreme Economic Commission* without the written proposals and counter-proposals of the People's Commissars and their deputies or assistants *concerned*. Otherwise this is chaos,

red tape,
empty talk,
irresponsibility.

9.30 p.m. 25/I.

Lenin

Written on January 25, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

604
TO A. M. LEZHAVA

People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade

Comrade *Lezhava*:

Comrade Lomonosov informs me that there has been fresh delay with the ordering of turbines for the Volkhov project.

I propose that this question should be immediately clarified and finally settled with Comrade Lomonosov, so as to avoid the slightest delays in the future over a matter that has been shockingly dragged out.

Send me the decision through Comrade Gorbunov not later than 26/I.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on January 26, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

605
LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Comrade Chicherin:

1. Please send me, if possible, the official text of Bonomi's proposals in the language in which you have received it (it is important for me to have the text of the provisions as formulated by them).[543]

2. Do you know if any influential Entente newspaper has carried the text of Clause 1 of these terms, which was initially published in our newspapers, namely: with the words "system of property" and not just "system", as, I believe, the official text sent by Bonomi puts it.[544]

I should also ask you to have the Russian Telegraph Agency's Foreign Press Service check up whether the words "system of property" have appeared in any foreign newspaper, and if they have, to let me have the issue.

Lenin

Dictated by phone on January 23, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial notes (typewritten copy)

606
TO I. T. SMILGA*

Comrade Smilga
Copies to Comrades N. P. Gorbunov
and Smolyaninov

For considerations not only economic but also political, it is absolutely necessary for us to have a concession with the Germans at Grozny, and if possible, at other fuel centres as well. If you sabotage this, I am going to regard it as a downright crime. We must act quickly to have some positive results before Genoa. Please reply. Briefly by telegram, details by letter.[545]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 26, 1922
Sent to Berlin

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Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

607
TO G. V. CHICHERIN

26/I.1922.

Comrade Chicherin:

Do you remember sending me Sun Yat-sen's letter?

The one in which he said something about his *friendship* for me, and you asked me whether I knew him?

Was the letter addressed to you or to me?[546]

Have you got it in the archives? and my reply with your inquiry?

If you do, could you send it to me (addressed to Fotieva)?

If not, what do you *remember* about it?

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

* Typed on top of the text is the following: "Send in code through Krestinsky, with P. P. Gorbunov's special concern for accurate delivery."—*Ed.*

608
TO MARIA GLYASSER

26/I.1922.

Comrade Glyasser:

It is absolutely necessary that I have all the minutes of the Politbureau (and the "Duet")[547]

at the proper time
and *in full order*.

Order means *completeness*:

(a) *all* minutes
(b) *all* papers in each set of minutes, and not references to **absent** letters, "proposals", remarks, etc.

Make sure to arrange everything with Burakova and with anyone else concerned,

put everything in order (and get *all* the lacking documents in)

all the minutes during my absence (this means from 6.XII.1921?[548])

and send me everything.

I enclose the minutes.

Lenin

First published in part
in 1944 in the magazine
Partiinoye Stroitelstvo No. 1

Published in full in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

609
NOTE TO A SECRETARY WITH ASSIGNMENT TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Tell Smolyaninov to make a record of the following arrangement with Krzhizhanovsky:

Nazvanov will be appointed to an economic job by Krzhizhanovsky, with a full report submitted on the results of this work within two months, and this work should be arranged in such a way as to have every possibility of assessing Nazvanov's efficiency and qualities. Let Comrade

Smolyaninov give me a reminder of this upon my return to work.*

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on January 26, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

610

FROM A LETTER TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT

Publicity for revolutionary tribunals should not be a rule; their panels should be augmented by "your" men, and their ties (of all sorts) with the All-Russia Cheka strengthened; the *force* and speed of their reprisals should be intensified and the C.C.'s attention to this increased. The slightest increase in banditry, etc., should entail martial law and shootings on the spot. The C.P.C. will be able to pass this swiftly, if you look sharp, and it could be done by phone.

Also have a talk with Stalin, and if you consider it necessary, show him this letter.[549]

Written between January 26 and 31,
1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten
text of I. S. Unschlicht's
reminiscences

611

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO Y. V. LOMONOSOV

Comrade Lomonosov
Copies: *to Professor Ramzin, Transport Section, State Planning Commission*
Comrade Fomin, People's Commissariat for Railways

Please arrange with Gosplan, P.C.R. and the Thermal Technical Institute about the terms of a competition for diesel locomotives, taking account of the C.L.D. decision of 4/I-22. It is highly desirable not to lose time for using

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 143.—*Ed.*

funds which may happen to be available during the fulfilment of orders for steam locomotives, to obtain diesel locomotives which are much better for us. Please inform me personally without delay about the results of any agreement you may reach.[550]

27/I.22 *Lenin*

First published on January 31, 1922 in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 25

Printed from a typewritten copy

612
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

This should be backed up. Have a talk with Scheinman. If he does not agree, tell Tsyurupa and me.

Collect references about Belov (Kiselyov's; did Nesterov collect them?) and keep them on file, after showing Tsyurupa.

Either you or Smolyaninov should give Belov *regular* help.[551]

28/I. *Lenin*

Written on January 28, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

613
*TO N. P. GORBUNOV[552]

Comrade Gorbunov:

Either you or Smolyaninov must keep this matter under special supervision. *This is very important*. Make a file of everything- relevant (the *C.L.D.* bonus decision, etc.). Have a talk with Lomonosov. He and Krzhizhanovsky and others will hold a meeting at Gosplan on Wednesday.* The

* February 1.—*Ed.*

minutes must be in your hands. Let me know the result. I have read this to Krzhizhanovsky. He says that the competition and Lomonosov's plan do *not* exclude each other.

29/I. *Lenin*

P.S. I believe Styunkel has some material about this. Someone should be collecting all the scientific literature on this question.

Written on January 29, 1922
First published in part in 1933 in the book, V. V. Fomin. *Lenin i transport* (Lenin and Transport), Moscow

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

614

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov
for Politbureau members

I quite agree with Trotsky.[553]
I propose:

1) Radek should be *censured* for giving in to the Mensheviks.

2) The reprisals against the Mensheviks should be intensified, and our courts should be instructed to intensify them.

3) Accept this proposal of Trotsky's.

4) Authorise Trotsky to accelerate in every way a fierce attack on the Mensheviks over Georgia.[554]

30/I.1922. *Lenin*

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

615
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV[555]

January 31, 1922
Top secret

Comrade Zinoviev

I received only today your letter in reply to my application sent in many days ago about withdrawing my report.* You are entirely to blame for this incredible red tape. I find it ridiculous to read that you cannot see your way to agreeing to the withdrawal of my report on the economic situation. Unfortunately, my illness cannot accord with this. Unless you prepare another rapporteur in good time, the blame will fall entirely on you. I have not received any reply to my proposal to let Pyatakov give this report, although I made this proposal to Kamenev and you many days ago.** I began writing an article on this subject, but I now see that I can in no way guarantee its completion in time.[556] You are certainly right about the Mensheviks that the reply must be absolutely negative. I think that you, too, are at fault on this point with unwarranted indulgence. For instance, it was decided not to release Rozhkov. But he has been released without any Politbureau decision.[557] I think that nothing but harm will come of such a policy.

Lenin

Dictated by phone

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten
copy verified with a text
in Lydia Fotieva's hand

616
TO I. S. UNSCHLICHT

31/I.

Comrade Unschlicht,

I am quite unable to be in the Politbureau.[558] I am feeling worse.

---

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 232 (1, 2).—*Ed.*

** Ibid., Document 232 (3).—*Ed.*

I believe you can do without me.

The whole point now is the purely *technical* measures leading to our courts *intensifying* (and making swifter) reprisals against the Mensheviks.

Both the courts and the C.P.C. or the All-Russia C.E.C.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on January 31, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten text of I. S. Unschlicht's reminiscences

617

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov for the Politbureau

Since Zinoviev insists on my fulfilling the assignment of the Comintern's Executive Committee to give a report on the New Economic Policy at an enlarged sitting of the Comintern Executive Committee on 12-II, and since I am quite unable to do this, because I am unwell,* as I have repeatedly told Zinoviev, I request the Politbureau to resolve:

1) To take into consideration Lenin's statement that he is quite unable, because of illness, to fulfil the Executive Committee's assignment.

2) To authorise the Russian members of the Executive Committee to cancel the decision appointing Lenin's report.

3) To authorise the said members of the Executive Committee to have Comrade Pyatakov appointed rapporteur on this subject.

4) To put on Pyatakov the duty to prepare, not later than next Sunday, first, detailed theses of his report, second, an outline of his report and a summary of the principal figures which are to be cited in the report, and to have

* See Document 615 of this volume, and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 232.—*Ed.*

Pyatakov conform his theses to those submitted by Lenin to the Third Congress of the Comintern, and earlier approved by the Party C.C.*

5) To authorise Comrades Zinoviev, Bukharin and Lenin to correct and make a final editing of Pyatakov's theses and his outline report.

6) To have Pyatakov make his report about an hour long, at most one hour and a half.

7) To instruct Comrade Pyatakov to cite the most concise principal figures showing the successful development of industry and trade under the New Economic Policy, and the significance of this for rehabilitating the Republic's economy.

8) To take into consideration Lenin's statement that if his health allows him, he will attend Pyatakov's report and will take the floor after him for a short supplementary statement or communication, not in the nature of a report.[559]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on February 2, 1922

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in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

618
TO N. I. BUKHARIN

1

Comrade Bukharin

1. I am surprised and indignant at not having heard a single word from you in reply to my telephone message on a joint conference with the II and II½ Internationals.[560] Such things should be answered at least in a couple of words without delay.

2. Could you arrange for me to have someone who is a regular reader of European newspapers and those of the II and II½ Internationals to draw up for me a very short list

* See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 453-61.—*Ed.*

(not more than two pages for newspapers in each language) of arguments used by them over our New Economic Policy. It would be enough for me to have such a list separately from the German, French and English papers, but only, I repeat, in the shortest telegraphic style, not more than two pages for each of these languages.

Please reply.[561]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on February 2, 1922

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in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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a typewritten copy

2

Comrade Bukharin

Since there is now an answer in your letter, it is superfluous to argue that one had been necessary.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on February 3, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

619

TO J. V. STALIN AND L. B. KAMENEV

Only
to Comrade Stalin and Comrade Kamenev

Please have a look at this short report from Sokolnikov, which he has given me in reply to my inquiry of yesterday. First, the report is incomplete, and I have demanded additional information,* second, if it is correct, the implication is that Novitsky has been giving us downright incorrect figures. We must find out the whole truth on this matter, and, if it turns out that Novitsky gave us incorrect

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 253.—*Ed.*

figures, the question must be raised in the Politbureau of prosecuting him.

4/II.22. *Lenin*

Dictated by phone

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

620

*TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Will you check up on the basis of which laws and rules over 143 private publishers are registered in Moscow, as *Izvestia* of 5/II reports, what are the administrative and editorial staffs responsible for each publisher, what is their civil liability and also responsibility in law generally, who is in charge of this business at the State Publishers, who is responsible for it.

Also have a secret talk about how and what kind of supervision of this business is organised on the part of the People's Commissariat for Justice, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the All-Russia Cheka. All this is strictly confidential. Get a reply ready for me, even if only a preliminary one, by Wednesday.[562]

Lenin

Dictated by phone on February 6, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

621

TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov

Comrade Molotov:

The papers say that an emergency conference of heads of gubernia and regional public education departments has been set for 20/III. I think that the following circular telegram, signed by you and me, should be issued:

"Every gubernia and regional department of public education is hereby bound to send in with their delegate or by mail for the conference precise and detailed information about outstanding local public educators of gubernia departments. This should include the delegates to the

conference. Information about each should contain his detailed record before the revolution and since, and a reference from local gubernia executive committees and local Gubernia Party Committees. The number of workers to be covered by such information—at least 2 Party and 2 non-Party men for each gubernia.

"Non-fulfilment or improper fulfilment of this proposal shall entail responsibility in Party and Soviet government procedures.[563]

In addition to this telegram, I propose the demand that Comrade Litkens should also submit reports on at least 10 workers of the People's Commissariat for Public Education among those who have been most outstanding at the centre in the last few years or months.

I consider all these reports to be absolutely necessary, because the People's Commissariat for Education has been quite incapable of enlisting workers from the localities, whereas we must find candidates for it to renew the Collegium.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on February 6, 1922

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

622

ON DISTRICTING THE UKRAINE

The Ukrainian comrades are worried about the plan for districting the Ukraine. They are convinced that the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic should be preserved as a single district.[564]

What is the state of the matter? Where and when is the final decision to be taken?

Lenin

Find out *urgently*, today, by telephone
from Krzhizhanovsky
Yenukidze
Kamenev?
Tsyurupa?

Written after February 6, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

623

LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN ON THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. DIRECTIVES FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE GENOA CONFERENCE

7/II.

Comrade Chicherin:

All your numerous assumptions are, I think, basically incorrect and spring, so to say, from polemical ardour.[565]

The directives do not say that we should not agree to *cover* in any form whatsoever any random claims of the adversary with our own counter-claims.

The chairman of the delegation (and the deputy chairman, in this case) seems to have a host of powers, which gives him almost autocratic power.

Your letter (and Krasin's even more so) shows—rather showed—signs of panic. That is the most dangerous thing. We are not the least bit afraid of a break-down: we shall have an even better conference tomorrow. Isolation and blockade will no longer intimidate us, nor will intervention.

We are proposing a broad agenda, and are hinting at our own "palliative" programme of general measures.

Suppose they reject it?

As they please! (we might publish our extensive programme on behalf of some member of the delegation, who may even resign (with the C.C.'s consent, of course).

You do not want an extensive one, let's have a narrower one: Wir nehmen auch Abschlagszahlung!*

We shall accept even the narrowest one, but we shall not accept anything disadvantageous. We shall not submit to ultimatums. If you want only "to trade"—let's have it, but we shall not buy a pig in a poke, and will not make any deal without calculating any "claims" *to the last kopek*.

That is all.

---

* We also accept payment by instalments!—*Ed.*

We must prepare and deploy all our guns—there will always be time enough to decide which are to he used as a show, and which are to be fired off and when.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on February 7, 1922

First published in part in the book, *V. I. Lenin. Biografiya* (V. I. Lenin. Biography), 1960

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 44

Printed from the original

624
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

Give this the *most serious attention*.[566] I think, we should *allow everything* that is asked, i.e., 4 m.r. × 0.2 (?)= 800,000 *million*. That is the first thing.

Second. Do *not* separate from the Central Board for the Peat Industry (since Radchenko is not here, ask Morozov and Menshikov). Why separate? The need is to give *autonomy inside* the Central Board for the Peat Industry. It should be defined precisely, in writing, and established through the *C.L.D.*

Third. There is, after all, a *number* of *C.L.D.* decisions on priority for the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction, etc., etc. These have been definitely "forgotten". That is a scandal! Those who are guilty of "forgetfulness" should be *found* and *prosecuted*. Without fail! (Let me know the result: what *has been done*.)

10/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 10, 1922

First published in 1934 in the book, *Lenin na khozyaistvennom fronte. Sbornik vospominanii.* (Lenin on the Economic Front. Collection of Reminiscences), Moscow

Printed from the original

625
TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

11.II.1922

Copy to Comrade A. D. Tsyurupa

Comrade Sokolnikov:

1) Gorbunov has told you about Belov. We have the best references about Belov both on the Party side and on the *commercial* side. I feel that unless we give support to our "own" businessmen *of this caliber*, we shall be doing nothing but talk and talk. Those guilty of delays and red tape (at the State Bank) must be *punished*. Otherwise there will be no results. (Gorbunov has the references.)

2) The foreign trade theses have been pickled. A long, long time ago, I gave this two or three days.

Such delays should not be allowed to go unpunished.

3) Has any thought been given to the ways and means of bringing to book members of trust boards for incorrect accounting *and for operating* business *at a loss**? I wonder if our People's Commissariat for Justice is asleep? This calls for a number of *model* trials with the application of the *fiercest* chastisement. It looks as though the P.C.J. has failed to realise that the New Economic Policy demands *new* modes of the *greater infliction of fiercer* penalties.

4) In Smolensk Gubernia private capital is said to *have beaten* the co-operatives, and driven them to closure.

What about prosecutions for illegal trade?

What about taxes on private trade? etc., etc.

The Soviet bureaucrats have also missed all this?

Who at your place is responsible for this? Perhaps, we should set up commissions

1) from the People's Commissariat for Finance
2) " " People's Commissariat for Justice
3) anyone else

} for supervision measures

* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 313.—*Ed.*

and reprisals for incorrect trade, etc.?[567]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

626
TO A. S. YENUKIDZE

Comrade Yenukidze:

From talks and reports here in Moscow, I conclude that there is something like slackness in the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. and its work. This is not surprising, because all its members are loaded with 20 jobs, as is the practice in our "Oblomov"* republic.

This tends to strengthen the influence of men like Larin. He is a good fellow—as poet, as journalist, as lecturer. But we are fools to appoint him to legislative work, thereby spoiling and *ruining* both him and the job.

For Christ's sake, keep a stricter watch over him. Keep Larin in check. If he has already got somewhere, do not believe any of his plans or projects—do not let any pass without a triple check-up.

See that there is not the usual chaos, when efforts are made to get something through the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. (by means of half-truths) in circumvention of the C.P.C. and the State Planning Commission.

Keep both your eyes peeled, and inform me (or Stalin with Kamenev) *in good time*.

Two other points:

1) Stalin's flat. Well, when? What red tape!

2) Lalayants. How is he? If he is going to Siberia, I must give him a letter and arrange a place for him in the car through Sklyansky and Fomin.

Regards!

Yours,

Lenin

* The sluggish hero of A. I. Goncharov's novel of the same name.—*Ed.*

P.S. I have just sent you a paper about flats for Strumilin and Ramzin. Please do your best about this, get it done, and write me.[568]

Yours,
Lenin

Written after February 13, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

627

LETTER TO V. M. MOLOTOV ABOUT THE WORK OF THE STATISTICAL, AND REGISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION DEPARTMENTS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

14.II.1922

Comrade Molotov:

Having filled in the questionnaire or the form of the last census of R.C.P. members,[569] I have come to the firm conclusion that the business of statistics at the C.C. (and probably, the whole of the registration and distribution) is very poorly organised.

Either we have a fool in charge of statistics, or there are fools and pedants sitting in important posts somewhere in these "departments" (if the said institutions under the C.C. are so called), and you have apparently no time to look into what they are doing.

1. The head of the Statistical Department should be fired.
2. This and the Registration and Distribution departments must be given a *thorough* shake-up.

Otherwise, we ourselves ("combating red tape"...) breed the most disgraceful and stupid red tape under our very noses.

The C.C. has vast powers. Its possibilities are gigantic. We are distributing 200,000-400,000 Party workers, and through them thousands upon thousands of non-Party men.

And this gigantic communist undertaking is being dead ruined by stupid red tape!

All the censuses must be finished in a month.

Their processing should be reduced to a minimum, so as also to complete it within a month.

After that nine-tenths of the Statistical and an equal proportion of the Registration and Distribution departments

of the C.C. should be disbanded, and their organisation started anew.

You *yourself* should *get rid* of minor problems (shift them on to your assistants and assistants' assistants) to concentrate entirely on the business of being a *political secretary* and *superintendent directing* the work of organisation, registration, etc.

Has there been a census of "responsible workers"? The result likewise appears to be a zero; it is worse, probably being a minus.

Write or phone me, and we shall talk it over in greater detail.

We need cards for several **hundred** (for a start) leading Party workers, classifying them as propagandists, administrators, agitators, teachers, etc., and containing *references* about their work (say, a record of the last five posts) given by *such-and-such* (4-6) persons. We have been chasing after thousands and hundreds of thousands, trifling our time away bureaucratically, *without learning* to place these men.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

628

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov for the Politbureau

I propose that we resolve:

1) Not a word about the amount or categories of our counter-claims .
   Write about the counter-claims in general;
2) in general write about the conference and about our pacifist programme as well.
   (Write = print.)[570]

14/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 14, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

629
TO D. I. KURSKY[571]

February 14, 1922

Comrade *Kursky*:

Please let me have, at the earliest possible date, an official report about the powers the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection has, under the legislation in force, concerning the inspection of private (non-state) enterprises.

I recall it being repeatedly said that the W.P.I.'s powers should not be restricted in any way as to any enterprises whatsoever which do not fall into the category of state enterprises.

Lenin

Dictated by phone

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

630
LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN

15.II.1922

Comrade Chicherin:

A telegram from Krasin dated 13.II (File No. 1466/c) says (Lloyd George): "If the Soviet Government refuses to recognise the Cannes resolutions that will *threaten* the break-down of the entire conference and will, *in any case*, make it easier for Poincaré to walk out...."

That is formulated more "threateningly" than accurately!

But the whole British press, judging by our papers, has made frequent statements to the effect that the invitation to the Genoa Conference *does not require* and *never has required the preliminary* acceptance of the Cannes terms and that the contrary opinion held by the French is-an incorrect one.

All the material must be collected to establish *precise* and *formally* indisputable facts.

It seemed to me that three facts were indisputable:

(1) when we were invited it was *not* required that we make a precise, clear and formal declaration of *acceptance* of the Cannes terms;

(2) we did *not* make any such declaration in our reply, and we have *not been informed* that our reply is *incomplete*;

(3) *the entire* British bourgeois press in its dispute with the French *recognised* that the preliminary acceptance of the Cannes terms is not obligatory.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

631

LETTER TO D. I. KURSKY AND ASSIGNMENT TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Kursky:

I enclose Koblents's reply to me.* After reading, please, return to N. P. Gorbunov:

1) I very strongly suspect that Koblents is poor, and that the whole of this department is poor too.

Koblents has clearly "forgotten" that an enterprise leased from the Soviet power is *still* a *Soviet* enterprise;

2) — — confused the question about subsequent or preliminary audit with the question of whether or not it is liable to auditing at all;

3) he has apparently "forgotten" that the rights of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection are *not narrower* than the State Control's old powers (Collection of Statutes, 1920, No. 16); he has forgotten many other things as well.

Conclusion: Koblents's opinion must be checked up, and if a careful study shows that Koblents has told a lie, he should be replaced by a more solid lawyer.

Let me know whom you will appoint as responsible for this check-up.

— — — If our laws are "contradictory" (of which there is no doubt), what are the People's Commissariat for Justice and the Legislative Proposals Department for?

---

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Supplement, Document 16.—*Ed.*

What then is being done towards codification?—towards removal of contradictions?

In particular, *this is* just *the time* for *urgently* working out a clear and precise law on the extension of the W.P.I.'s powers to audit and inquire to all manner of establishments and enterprises (private, co-operative, concession, etc.).

Let me know who will be given this assignment.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Comrade N. P. Gorbunov:

Please read this and *make a note of it for yourself* to keep an eye on execution.

Have this typed and sent to Comrade Kursky.[572]

Written on February 15, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

632

ON REORGANISING THE WORK OF THE C.P.C., THE C.L.D. AND THE NARROW C.P.C.[573]

LETTER TO A. D. TSYURUPA

February 15, 1922

Comrade Tsyurupa:

I believe you are right.

We should get the Politbureau's consent and start "reducing"[574]:

Roughly || 1) composition: *five* men as indicated by you, plus 2 non-departmental (Belov + ?) = 7.

2) appropriations under the state estimates, first, to the People's Commissariat for Finance and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection;

to the Narrow C.P.C. only by way of protest;

the rest, as you have it.

Think over once again and set down in writing these *principles for reducing* the Narrow C.P.C., obtain the opinion of the Narrow C.P.C. Chairman, get these *principles* through the Politbureau, and then swiftly elaborate them into a new statute.

Perhaps the commissions should also be reduced? their role in actual verification enhanced? *all* the work subordinated directly to the deputies of the C.L.D. Chairman?

With communist greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

633
TO V. G. YAKOVENKO

Comrade *Yakovenko*,
People's Commissariat for Agriculture

On January 26, *Izvestia VTsIK* carried an article by Comrade A. Belyakov entitled "Yearning Motors and Proletarian Agriculture".

I advise you to give serious attention to this item. It turns out that 770 brand new motors with spare parts, in good condition, in their foreign packaging, with a total of almost 117,000 h.p., and costing over 14 million pre-war gold rubles, have been lying about at the war department for five years. These motors are of no use to the War Department, and are being handed over by it to the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, which can very well use them for the needs of agriculture. It is four months now since the P.C.A. has been informed of this, but not a thing has yet been done, apart from exchanges on paper.

This is sheer mismanagement and helplessness.

I propose that:

1. the P.C.A. should give me a written explanation;
2. those guilty of delays and red tape should be found, and a trial of this business should be arranged with wide publicity;
3. this thing should at once be got going in practice most resolutely, informing me within a month of what has been actually done (when the motors were accepted, how

used, to whom handed over, when and how they will start operating, etc.).[575]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 15, 1922
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

634
TO D. I. KURSKY

15-II-1922

Comrade *Kursky*
Copy to Comrade Tsyurupa
" to Comrade Gorbunov

Comrade *Kursky*:

I am unable to have a look at the draft decree on bills of exchange and civil obligations. I think it is absolutely necessary for us to have in this law complete guarantees of the rights of our state not only to full audit and control, but also to annulment on serious state grounds. Please let me have your opinion on this matter (a few lines, not more than one page) and send me two or three extracts of articles giving us such guarantees. I conclude from Comrade Gorbunov's words that there must be such articles in the draft.[576]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

635
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade *Gorbunov*

In conformity with doctor's orders, I instruct you:
1. To improve Comrade Miroshnikov's nutrition.

2. To arrange his departure, on April 1, for the Crimea for a three months' course of treatment.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 15, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

636
TO I. I. MIROSHNIKOV

Comrade *Miroshnikov*

On the strength of the orders issued by Dr. Levin, resident physician of the Kremlin Hospital, I instruct you:

1. To restrict your working hours to eight.
2. To get a deputy for yourself by April 1, and put him in touch with your duties, so as to leave for a long holiday on April 1.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 15, 1922
First published in 1965
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Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

637
LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARIES

Please show Stalin and Molotov and send on to Chicherin this reply of mine:

Comrade Chicherin!

You are letting your nerves run away with you. We shall still have time on 22 or 23/II to discuss the plan of conduct at Genoa.

You and I have both fought against pacifism as a programme for the revolutionary proletarian party. That much

is clear. But who has ever denied the use of pacifists by that party to soften up the enemy, the bourgeoisie?[577]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on February 16, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

638
TO Y. A. LITKENS

Comrade *Litkens*
Copy to the Narrow C.P.C.

At the end of last December, I wrote to the People's Commissariat for Education about Prof. Krug's request to provide the Moscow Higher Technical College with premises for its electrotechnical department and Electrotechnical Institute, and asked that special attention should be given to it, and everything done to meet the request.*

On February 9, I received another letter from Prof. Krug, in which he says that the People's Commissariat for Education has not yet helped the College. Prof. Krug says that it would be quite possible, without causing any inconvenience at all, by way of more efficient use of space by others, to give the electrotechnical department and the Experimental Electrotechnical Institute some of the premises of the former Yelizavetinsky Institute, and have the Radishchev School, now housed at the Institute, transferred to another place by the spring, when the warm weather sets in.

If you do not agree with this proposal of Prof. Krug's—I instruct you on your personal responsibility to find and make available to the Institute premises within a fortnight.

Inform me of execution by March 3.

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on February 16, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

* The letter has not been found.—*Ed.*

639

LETTER TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. ON CREDITS TO THE SHATILOV OATS TRUST[578]

To Comrade Molotov for Politbureau members
Copy to Comrade Osinsky

Comrade Osinsky writes to me to say that the Politbureau has cancelled all sorts of credits made available in addition to the initial budget, and that the credits to the Shatilov Oats Trust have also been cancelled. I have made a point of looking into this business, and I must say that according to my information this is an exceptionaliy important undertaking which must be supported by way of exception at any cost. Unfortunately, Osinsky does not give the figures in question. Please obtain from Osinsky, Sokolnikov and Tsyurupa a short report, running to a few lines, about this matter by tomorrow morning, and have another examination of this question at the Politbureau tomorrow, summoning Osinsky to attend in the event the data submitted by Comrades Tsyurupa and Sokolnikov do not clear up the question entirely.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on February 17, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial notes
(typewritten copy)

640

*TO COMRADE N. P. GORBUNOV

Despite my letter,* I have yet to receive a report on the expedition to clarify the Ridder concession. Get such a report from a representative of the commission which has been there by tomorrow, but under no circumstances should it be longer than two pages.

I fear that, as usual, the report will run to a whole tome, which no one will read.

---

* The letter has not been found.—*Ed.*

Make formal contact with the chairman of the commission and Krzhizhanovsky, who had given me a host of unfulfilled promises.[579]

17.II.22. *Lenin*

Dictated by phone
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

641
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

18/II.

1

Comrade Tsyurupa:

When I was writing my book on imperialism,* I read about *two* systems for state banks (and banks in general) in the capitalist countries. One of the systems—the State Bank's great proximity to *trade*.

Perhaps we should get a couple of our "fin-scholars" (I feel like making a pun—fie-scholars?) to make a study of this question.

We need a State Bank which is a hundred times closer to trade than the most commercial of the state banks of capitalism. Our State Bank must have a *network* of commercial agents, starting from the top (something like a travelling bank inspector for commerce, in charge of thousands of millions in turnover) and ending with small and very small commercial agents at the bottom. If this whole network operates on the commission system and learns (and teaches us) to trade well, we shall have control of nine-tenths of the total amount of the trade turnover. This is the only way to restore the gold circulation and to *transform the New Economic Policy* from a system of fooling communist fools, who hold power but are incapable of using it, into a *base* for socialism, a base which, this being a peasant country, no power on earth can vanquish.

* *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see present edition, Vol. 22, pp. 185-304).—*Ed.*

Show this to Sokolnikov. We should *harass* the State Bank and the People's Commissariat for Finance, until we *get* this *going*.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on February 18, 1922
First published in 1937
in the magazine *Bolshevik* No. 2

Printed from the original

2

Comrade Tsyurupa:

I should like to draw your attention especially to my letter to Sokolnikov on trade, the State Bank and the State Bank's Trade Department.*

The crucial thing is trade and its control by the State Bank.

It looks as though the State Bank's Trade Department has nothing to do with "*commerce*", and is just as sh..... bureaucratic as everything else in the R.S.F.S.R. I believe that we should concentrate *all our efforts* on this and *secure* the introduction of commission fees, veri fication by practice, and the *expulsion from* the State Bank's *Trade Department* of everything that is flabby, everything that is not commercial, everything that is unable to secure success in trade.

We do not need a "department for internal trade" (we have enough of such sh.. as *departments*), but one or two dozen *men* at the State Bank *who know* how to trade (and teach others to do so). This is crucial, without this the monetary system cannot be put straight.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on February 20, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

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* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 314.—*Ed.*

642

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

No copy

Comrade Molotov

Please show this letter to all members of the Politbureau and return it to me with their remarks. I think Chicherin is quite right that Radek has given fresh proof in this case that, for all his numerous merits, he is absolutely unfit to be a diplomatist.[580]

Lenin

20/II.22.

Dictated by phone

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

643

TO L. B. KAMENEV AND J. V. STALIN

21/II.

Comrades Kamenev and Stalin

It is quite ridiculous to say that you are at fault or anything like it because of our long conversation. There are no objective symptoms in my illness (today, after an excellent night I am quite unwell), and I alone could estimate just how much strength I had. It was also my own fault, because you had repeatedly asked me whether I was tired or not.

I would very strongly advise that you should not forget

1) to remove Radek from diplomacy without fail*;

2) Lapinsky as well.

3) Over the enclosed letter from Smilga give someone (N. P. Gorbunov?) stricter instructions to get the thing *actually* done.[581]

4) This should be added about Myasnikov: either print the whole of my letter or meaningful and complete extracts

* See previous document.—*Ed.*

from it (otherwise it looks vague, and no one will understand anything: perhaps Lenin wrote in *favour* of Myasnikov?).[582]

5) I sent A. D. Tsyurupa my opinion of his project on the Narrow C.P.C. It needs *careful* thought, checking up and weighing again and again.*

6) I contest §8 of the Politbureau decision of 20/II. **It is not right**, *not right* at all to take Sokolnikov.[583]

7) The draft decree on Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be rewritten, thought out, specified, *enlarged* and presented as an *interpretation and summary* of the laws *in force*.**

Lenin

P.S. We should have *Pravda* and *Izvestia* carry a dozen articles on "Milyukov merely contemplates". *Pravda* of 21/II.

If this is confirmed, make sure to sack 20-40 professors.

They are fooling us.

This should be thought out, prepared and *a strong blow delivered*.[584]

Lenin

Written on February 21, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

644

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

21/II.

Comrade Gorbunov:

Both results are drawn up *badly*.[585] These people don't know how to distinguish technology from economics, conclusions from premises.

I propose that you:

1) have both the S.E.C. and the State Planning Commission separately give their conclusion signed by responsible persons, as soon as possible;

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* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 309.—*Ed.*

** See Documents 629, 658 of this volume, and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 306.—*Ed.*

2) at once take exploratory measures to enable us to obtain a written and signed conclusion from *all* the members of the Mikhailov commission *one by one*, *and leaving them the least possibility to make arrangements with each other* (it's up to you to do this cleverly: phone up everyone, find out who is free at what hour, send cyclists to "catch" them, **etc.**);

3) the conclusion should be drawn up in accordance with the following programme (explanations and notes separately)

1. Possible extraction worth ... million gold rubles
   α) now
   β) with additional expenditure of ... million gold rubles over a period of ... years
   (separately for Kyshtym, Ridder, Ekibastuz, Tanalyk).

2. Shall we manage without the concessionaire (probably) or not? if not, why?
   α) due to lack of capital?
   β) due to the impossibility of buying and bringing in first-class equipment?
   γ) due to the impossibility of employing first-class engineers?
   δ) due to the impossibility of buying and bringing in foodstuffs? clothes? workers?
   or for any other (which?) reasons?

3. Conclusion: α) shall we accept Urquhart's terms?
   β) modify them? how?
   γ) reject them altogether?

You must first manage (swiftly) to *catch* all the members of the commission *separately*, and get their written replies to these questions.

Then let me know the results, and *after* this we shall put pressure on the S.E.C. and the State Planning Commission.[586]

Lenin

Written on February 21, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

645
TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

22/II.
Secret

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky:

In one of his letters to the C.C., Comrade Trotsky writes about the failure of our planning organs.

This is true insofar as, for instance, the *administrative* side of the work at Gosplan* *is* definitely *not organised*.

The *personal* responsibility of every member of Gosplan for *such-and-such* (principal) functions has not been established. There is no distribution between Gosplan members of the work of "general supervision" over the plan's fulfilment, without which everything = 0.

Etc.

Conclusion: we must hasten with the draft decisions (let's have them as soon as possible), both about Gosplan's staffs and its Presidium (of 15 men?? I think this will make it worse, because then there will be *even less* personal responsibility), and the 3-man *Presidium Bureau* (let's see your arguments: I think this Bureau should be the Presidium itself). I wonder who could substitute for Pyatakov for a time (until 15.V)?

The three members of the Bureau (if the C.C. confirms three: you + Pyatakov + Osadchy) should set up the administrative section anew. If Pyatakov + Osadchy are to be the administrators, *they will answer* with their heads for any "slip" (failure to appoint some Gosplan member to do such-and-such a job, failure to check up on his work, failure to bring some shortage to notice in good time, etc.).**

Hurry on with the final draft of the relationships with the planning organs of the People's Commissariats, the composition of the Bureau, etc.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on February 22, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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* The State Planning Commission.—*Ed.*

** See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 333.—*Ed.*

646

*TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE C.C. OF THE RED CROSS SOCIETY OF RUSSIA[587]

23/II.1922.

Dear Comrades:

I am very sorry and hope that you will excuse me for being unable, because of my illness, to let you have an article or a letter for your collection, something that ought to have been done. The Soviet power has been doing everything possible and a few impossible things, is doing and will continue to do this to help the starving. Best regards and wishes for the complete success of your publication.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

647

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov:

I believe that Chicherin is *absolutely* right, and propose that the *Politbureau* should decide: confirm Chicherin's standpoint. Pay out in time what has been promised without fail.[588]

24/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 24, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

648

TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev:

Write me briefly about the mandate.[589] We can't have this pickled. Perhaps, we could decide it this way: leave the old text. Add five lines: trade instead of commodity

exchange. Accept the dates (twice a year or *even less often*), as the local people have decided.

Lenin

P.S. Reply about the German doctor.

About Peshekhonov, I propose that the Politbureau adopt the following decision: 1) instruct Popov to give him work involving trade and sanitary statistics, and no other; 2) impose on Popov personally the responsibility to see that Peshekhonov keeps out of politics; 3) inform Popov of §§1 and 2 orally, against his signature, without giving him any paper, with the serious warning that if he divulges this, he will be dismissed and prosecuted; 4) set Unschlicht the task of keeping a strict watch on Peshekhonov; 5) issue a reprimand to the Kharkov Gubernia Committee and the Ukrainian C.C. (for making this public) with an entry in the Party card.[590]

Lenin

Written in February, before the 25th, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

649

MEMOS TO J. V. STALIN AND L. B. KAMENEV WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

1

Comrades Stalin and Kamenev

Please reply on this memo:

1. Do you agree with Chicherin about the immediate payment to the Turks of what has been promised?[591]

2. I have read Chicherin's proposal concerning the presidium of the Genoa delegation. I resolutely question this and insist on my earlier proposal.[592]

Please, make a note here of your opinion on both points and pass it on to me through my secretary.

Lenin

2

Comrades Stalin and Kamenev

Today I read in tho papers Italy's announcement concerning the postponement of the Genoa Conference.

I maintain with especial vigour the proposal I sent yesterday: authorise Chicherin to send as soon as possible a highly acid Note, proposing that the exact date should be set for March 15.* Show the draft Note to the Politbureau members before its dispatch.

I am awaiting your reply through my secretary.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on February 25, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial notes
(typewritten copy)

650

TO G. V. CHICHERIN[593]

Comrade Chicherin or Litvinov
Copy to Comrade *Molotov*
(for Politbureau members)

February 25, 1922

Having read, apart from the telegrams, the leaders in today's newspapers, I come to the conclusion that the Note concerning the postponement of the Genoa Conference without any indication of date should be couched in the most insolent and derisive tone, so that the people at Genoa should feel the slap in the face. It looks as though the only way to create an actual impression is to be superinsolent. In particular, we could say that among our counterclaims we include the expenses incidental to the fact that these powers have failed to fulfil their initial obligation—to convene the conference at the appointed time. We must not miss the opportunity when we can, through an insolent and mocking Note, help bring about a situation

* See present edition, Vol. 42, p. 404.—*Ed.*

in which all the pacifist elements of the bourgeoisie will be strengthened all over the world.[594]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
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in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

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a typewritten copy

651
*TO THE SOCIALIST ACADEMY[595]

In reply to No. [577] of [February 23, 1922]*

Thank you very much. Unfortunately, I am quite unable, because of my illness, to perform the duty of member of the Socialist Academy, if only in the slightest degree. I do not want to be a fictitious one. I ask you, therefore, to delete my name from the list of members or not to enter it at all.

27/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 27, 1922
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

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652
NOTE TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV AND ASSIGNMENT TO N. P. GORBUNOV[596]

Comrade Bryukhanov:

It now remains to work out *practical* proposals:
Sell the People's Commissariat for Food so much?
For commodity exchange for grain give (on credit?) so much on such-and-such terms?
Use warehouses in this way?
Agreement on such terms?

27/II. *Lenin*

---

* Square brackets indicate space left by Lenin for number and date.—*Ed.*

Comrade Gorbunov:

Send this off and keep track.

27/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 27, 1922
Note to N. P. Bryukhanov
first published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Assignment to N. P. Gorbunov
first published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

653
TO A. D. TSYURUPA

1

27/II.1922.

A. D. Tsyurupa, C.L.D. Deputy Chairman. S.E.C. Chairman

Copies: Pyatakov (GUT*)
Morozov (Glavtorf**)
People's Commissariat for Finance
People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection

I hereby issue a *reprimand* for failure to perform their official duty and for allowing red tape on the Gidrotorf*** case.

To Comrade Pyatakov
Comrade Morozov
Comrades Zaks and Gorbunov.

Comrade Pyatakov, acting head of GUT, should not have "requested me to believe" (his paper of 22/II) or "requested me either to satisfy Gidrotorf over and above the estimates, or allow a reduction of its activity"—such a "request" addressed to me is failure to understand the elements of state relations—he should have given *thought* as to how to *fulfil the C.P.C. decision* (and not mine) on Gidrotorf of 30.X.1920.[597]

---

* S.E.C. Central Fuel Administration.—*Ed.*
** S.E.C. Central Peat Administration.—*Ed.*
*** Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction.—*Ed.*

If Pyatakov had not been informed of this decision, it is necessary to arrest the numerous GUT specialists and red tapists, whose duty it was to know, to inquire, and to give Pyatakov a reminder. Not to put such scoundrels under arrest is to encourage red tape, which is stifling us.

The C.P.C. decision of 30.X.1920 makes it clear that, finding himself in a quandary, Pyatakov should not have written an empty paper No. 00770 (of 22.II), but should at once have called (or should have asked the S.E.C. Chairman or A. D. Tsyurupa to call) a conference of the People's Commissars for the S.E.C.+Finance+Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for the purpose of at once working out a draft C.L.D. and C.P.C. decision (to take so much from Tsutorf* or Glavtorf, so much from GUT for Gidrotorf, to allocate so much over and above the estimates, and to reduce the Gidrotorf programme by so much).

It was Pyatakov's duty to do this in pursuance of the C.P.C. decision of 30.X.1920, which *binds* all People's Commissariats in fact to recognise Gidrotorf as "*being of exceptional state importance*", and apply "*all privileges*" to it....

Comrade Morozov should have urgently requested the convocation of such a conference (and complained about any delay), instead of writing a purely squabbling piece of paper on 22.II (No. 184/л, in Register: 22/II.1922) in which the author engages in indecent whimpering instead of making business-like proposals.

Comrades Zaks and Gorbunov, if they had had any idea of their duty as members of the *Managing Department*, instead of being guided by the spirit of exchange of the most empty pieces of paper, should have found the C.P.C. decision of 30.X.1920, and should have themselves read from it the only correct, *the only lawful* way: immediate convocation of a People's Commissars' conference. The papers in the charge of Zaks and Gorbunov are even outwardly in disorder, because there is no reference to the law, nor a concise summary of the Gidrotorf application, nor any record of the date of this summary, or of my mark-

* Central Board for the Peat Industry of the S.E.C. Central Fuel Administration.—*Ed.*

ing. If such negligence is shown once again, I shall dismiss both Zaks and Gorbunov from their posts.

Comrade Tsyurupa, I ask you to have the above-named comrades sign immediately that they are aware of the reprimand issued to them, and to prescribe to the People's Commissars for the S.E.C., Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to convene, at once, if possible on Tuesday, 28/II, but not later than Wednesday, 1/III, in any case, an early morning conference with the personal participation of the People's Commissars (who may send in comrades who are quite competent and capable of deciding in their stead, to substitute for them, if they are absolutely unable to attend for a good reason) and of a representative from Gidrotorf, and also, of course, of GUT and Glavtorf.

The task of the conference: to carry out not only the letter, but the meaning of the C.P.C. decision of 30.X.1920, and try to give maximum satisfaction to Gidrotorf (if it is impossible to do so 100 per cent, then make sure anyway that the bulk of its 1922 work should be completed). Gidrotorf should be satisfied partly at the expense of Tsutorf and GUT, and partly over and above the estimates. Be sure to complete the work by the evening of 1.III, and bring it up at the C.L.D. administrative sitting on the evening of 1.III for subsequent approval by the C.L.D. and the Council of People's Commissars.[598]

Please, strictly instruct the Secretariat and keep a personal check on the speed and correctness of the execution of this order.

Conscious revolutionaries should, apart from their official duties, give thought to the economic reasons which had made the C.P.C. recognise Gidrotorf as "being of exceptional state importance".

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

2

Comrade Tsyurupa:

I am sending you a specimen of our vile red tape and obtuseness!

Just think—these are *our best* men, Pyatakov, Morozov and others!

If it weren't for the knout, they would have ruined the whole cause.

It is my *earnest* request that you do everything you can right away, hit those who are guilty once again more painfully and *get* the thing done *at once* (through Gorbunov and Lepeshinskaya, whom I told to prepare the 30.X.1920 decree, etc., for you). Let Gidrotorf have 90 per cent if not 100 per cent.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

654

*TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Show this to Sokolnikov and Scheinman and send to the archives. (Rigidity and sham science. Dead stuff.)[599]

28/II. *Lenin*

Written on February 28, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

655

NOTE TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV AND ASSIGNMENT TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Sokolnikov:

The whole point is 1) in these "guarantees". The *first* thing to do is to work them out and *check* twice and thrice;

2) in our "apparatus". Can we manage to keep track? Shall we manage to keep an eye? No, everything imaginable will be *taken out* of the country.[600]

28/II. *Lenin*

To N. P. Gorbunov:

Send a copy of my remark to Kamenev
+Molotov,
Stalin,
Tsyurupa.

Give me another reminder.

Written on February 28, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

656
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Gorbunov:

I cannot go into this in detail.[601] Put the finishing touches to this (yourself or through Zaks, Smolyaninov or Nesterov) and show to A. D. Tsyurupa, and then to me again with his opinion.

N.B. *Here are, I think*, the main **points** which should be verified, copied out and kept track of.
The rest **seems** to be noodles.

28/II. *Lenin*

1) Area? Dessiatines?
2) Value of annual product? Roughly.
3) Our predominance? (Krasin's §XIII)
Check up!
4) Foreigners' share? (Krasin's § XIV)
Check up!
5) Krasin's §XV is *important*.[602]

P.S. Find out and let me know whether these agreements are *final*? Have they entered into force?

Lenin

Written on February 28, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

657
MEMO TO D. I. KURSKY AND ASSIGNMENT TO N. P. GORBUNOV

Comrade Kursky:

Prepare its draft together with the State Political Administration.[603]

28/II. *Lenin*

The legislating must be done with triple circumspection. *Look before you leap!* **I very much** doubt concerning Yakhontov. Make a personal check twice, three times and many more times.

Lenin

Comrade Gorbunov:

Have a copy made of my note and send it on to Kursky.

Lenin

Written on February 28, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

658

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

February 28, 1922

To Comrade Molotov
(for Politbureau members)

Please inquire from the Politbureau members by phone about the following: to speed up the question on the C.C. directive [to the delegation]* to the Genoa Conference, I propose that the initial draft of this directive, as apparently not meeting with great objections from the Politbureau members, should be sent this very day to Chicherin, telling him not to make a copy and to keep the document in total secrecy, while taking steps to have all the members of the delegation informed of this draft today, either at a general meeting or in some other way. Then, the discussion of the question may very well win a great deal in terms of time and definition. Let us have written amendments submitted to this draft.[604]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

* Missing word inserted according to meaning.—*Ed.*

659

REMARKS ON A DRAFT ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C. DECISION ON THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION AND LETTER TO J. V. STALIN[605]

Draft

DECISION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The All-Russia C.E.C. has resolved:

1)

To entrust the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection with control and supervision over the activity of all public and private organisations, establishments and enterprises, without exception, from the standpoint of fulfilment of the obligations they have undertaken from state organs.

2)

In pursuance of this, the P.C.W.P.I. shall have the power of:
1. Subsequent control over all monetary and material

3)

resources, allocated by the state to the said organisations, enterprises and establishments, by way of financing, subsidy and credits, extended to them, or made available to them on the strength of contracts concluded by them with the state, and verification of all acts flowing from these obligations....

To Comrade Stalin

That won't do.

1) Not to "entrust", but to *explain* the laws in force and their incompleteness in the given sense.

2) Not only from this standpoint. But also from the standpoint of legality. And from the standpoint of collecting material for new laws. And from many other standpoints.

3) Not only "allocated by the state".

Very urgent!! This should be rewritten once again. Thought out three times more thoroughly. Many more details given. Everything set out so that the

whole should not have the appearance of a new decree, but of an elucidation and summary of the *old* ones.

Pass through the *C.P.C.* and *confirm* by the *All-Russia C.E.C.* on someone's complaint.

This is urgent! **Very urgent !!**

Please let me have ***both* this** and the new draft after reworking.

Lenin

Written between February 28 and March 16, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

660

*TO THE COMRADES WORKING AT GIDROTORF

With my help you have now obtained what you need for your works.* For all our poverty and wretchedness, you have been allocated large amounts over and above those issued earlier.

You must make quite sure:

1. that nothing is done to no purpose,
2. that you do not bite off more than the allocated resources allow,
3. that the experiments you stage should be backed up with all possible proof and should produce final answers on the practical and economic fitness of the new method of extracting peat,
4. to devote special attention to accounting for the expenditure of the amounts allocated to you.

The accounting should be arranged in such a way as to make it possible to judge about the cost of the peat extracted.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 2, 1922

First published in 1934 in the book, *Lenin na khozyaistvennom fronte. Sbornik vospominanii*, Moscow

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

* See Document 624 of this volume.—*Ed.*

661

LETTER TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. WITH REMARKS ON THE THESES OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FINANCE

To Comrade Molotov for the Politbureau members

March 3, 1922

Sokolnikov's theses ("Basic Provisions of the Financial Programme") are, I think, not bad, but on the theoretical side.

I am making a special study of one point (beginning of §12) and shall write about it separately.

For the rest, I propose: submit for opinion to the State Planning Commission, Preobrazhensky and Krasnoshchekov. Then print with cuts (*for the time being* throw out the point on substituting the cash tax for the tax in kind, etc.).

Now, on the substance of the matter. I think these two things are pivotal:

1) how to find fierce and clever men for *harassing* all the People's Commissariats (plus the Moscow, plus the Petrograd Soviets): reduce staffs in practice and severely;

2) how to teach our bureaucratic "*torgs*" (including the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, Mostorg, Petrotorg, etc., etc.) to trade instead of engaging in red tape.

Perhaps we should authorise the All-Russia C.E.C. Presidium to adopt this decision:

All People's Commissariats plus the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets shall have the duty to submit within a week a draft decision transferring their staffs (all who are connected with economics) to percentage payments from turnover and from profits, with fierce penalties for losses, flabbiness and bungling, and with the obligation to reply to commercial inquiries within 3-6 hours, under penalty of prison terms of not less than 5 years.

For the best draft decision—a prize of 100,000 gold rubles, to be paid after a year's *successful* trial of the decision, so that payment is *proportional to the success* (100% success = 100% prize, 1% success = 1% prize).

Lenin

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

662
LETTER TO L. B. KAMENEV[606]

3.III.1922

Comrade Kamenev:

I have been thinking for some time about our talk (with you, Stalin and Zinoviev) on Vneshtorg* and the Krasin and the Sokolnikov line.

My conclusion is that Krasin is absolutely right. We cannot now afford to retreat on our foreign trade monopoly beyond what Lezhava has proposed and is proposing in his theses. Otherwise, foreigners will buy up and carry away everything that is valuable.

Here and in all of his work, Sokolnikov is making a great mistake, which is sure to ruin us, unless the C.C. corrects his line in time, and actually secures implementation of the corrected line. His mistake is abstract enthusiasm for a scheme (something of which Sokolnikov has always been guilty, as a talented journalist and a politician who is easily carried away). An example: Sokolnikov has proposed a draft decree on importing foreign foodstuffs to Russia. In the decree he says, in passing: as for the "guarantees", special provision will be made for them (i.e., guarantees that the values taken out of Russia allegedly in exchange for foodstuffs do really and entirely go for food).

This is downright childishness!

The whole point is in the guarantees, and it is this point that Sokolnikov "puts off", shrugging it off with an empty phrase or a pious wish.

What are the real guarantees?

Is it to be a pledge?

Just think what this means:

1) I want to buy 100,000 gold rubles' worth of foodstuffs abroad. I deposit *this amount* at the State Bank ax a pledge?

In that case, all the red tape is still there (unless we "teach" Vneshtorg & Co. how to get rid of the red tape).

Furthermore, where are the "guarantees" that in remitting 100,000 gold rubles abroad, I am not remitting 20,000

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* The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.—Ed.

gold rubles of them fictitiously? A check-up on the prices? By whom? How? This is a bureaucratic utopia!

Sokolnikov's project shows that our kind, talented and most valuable Comrade Sokolnikov knows nothing at all about practical commerce. And it is going to ruin us if it is set in motion.

It is the greatest mistake to think that *NEP* has put an end to terrorism. We shall yet return to terrorism, and it will be an economic terrorism.

The foreigners are already buying up our officials with bribes, and "carting out what there is left of Russia". They may well succeed.

Monopoly is a polite warning: my dear sirs, the time will come when I shall hang you for this.

The foreigners, knowing that the Bolsheviks are in earnest, have to reckon with this seriously.

That is why

1) the foreign trade monopoly should not be undermined, in any case;

2) Lezhava's theses should be adopted not later than tomorrow;

3) publish right away (we have lost heaps of time), on behalf of the All-Russia C.E.C. Presidium, a firm, cold, fierce statement that we do not intend to retreat in the economy any farther, and that those who attempt to cheat us (or circumvent the monopoly, etc.) will face terrorism; this word should not be used, but the likelihood of it should be "hinted at subtly and politely".

If this is not done through the All-Russia C.E.C. Presidium, it can be done otherwise (a letter of mine? that is worse!); but it *needs* to be done and fast. Then, here is an example.

The Moscow Gubernia Economic Conference offers to buy tinned food (or any kind of food) for Soviet rubles. The talks with Vneshtorg last for two weeks. It objects.

The deal falls through.

Conclusion?

Are we to give the Gubernia Economic Conference the necessary rights? This would mean "duplicating" a bad Vneshtorg with bad little Vneshtorgs, of which the capitalists will *buy up* 90 per cent.

Another conclusion: stop this game of decrees (there was an indispensable *period of propaganda by decree*; that was necessary for the success of the revolution. *This is over*).

There should not be the slightest trust in decrees or institutions. The only thing is to verify practice and *take* people *to task* for red tape.

That is the only thing clever people should engage in. Anything else should entail ... prison *for the rest*.

Here is what I would propose: authorise the All-Russia C.E.C. Presidium to adopt the following decision right away:

In view of the scandalous red tape on the deal (such-and-such) involving the purchase of food for Soviet rubles, order the State Political Administration (*they need a little scaring!*) to find those guilty of red tape and incarcerate for 6 hours those working for the Moscow Gubernia Economic Conference, and for 36 hours those working at Vneshtorg (of course, with the exception of All-Russia C.E.C. members: after all, we enjoy almost parliamentary immunity).

After this, instruct the press to ridicule both groups and *pour dirt on them*. For the disgraceful thing here is that Muscovites (in Moscow!) have failed to cope with the red tape. For this they should be beaten with a stick.

They "did not know how" to send a telephone message saying:

> "urgent advantageous deal. Demand Vneshtorg's reply within 3 hours. Copy to Molotov for the C.C., to Tsyurupa and Yenukidze for the C.P.C. and the All-Russia C.E.C."

No reply within 3 hours? Another 4 lines of complaint by phone.

But we find these idiots walking around and talking for two weeks! They deserve to be left *to rot in gaol* instead of being given exemptions. The Muscovites deserve 6 hours in the bughouse for stupidity. The Vneshtorg people, 36 hours in the bughouse for stupidity plus for "central-responsibility".

That is the only way to *teach* them. Otherwise, Soviet personnel, local and central, will never learn. We cannot afford to trade freely: that is Russia's ruin.

But we can and will learn to transfer our red tapists

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

on to a percentage basis: on every deal you get so much per cent (fraction of a per cent), and jail—for failure to work.

And the men at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade need to be changed. The same applies to our state trusts, which are "headed" by holier-than-thou members of the All-Russia C.E.C. and "famous" Communists, who are being duped by businessmen.

Order to the People's Commissar for Finance: either you will manage to expel these holier-than-thou Communists from the state trusts through the State Bank (no credits; I prosecute you for delinquency, for inefficiency, etc.), or, the whole of your People's Commissariat for Finance and the State Bank are quite useless, being nothing but empty talk and a paper chase.

That is how the work both of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. (I have already written to Tsyurupa, and have worked out the draft of a relevant directive*) *and of the Politbureau* should be re-arranged; otherwise, our ruin is inevitable.

Please, let the members of the Politbureau and Molotov read this *in secret* and return to me with each one's remarks in a couple of words at least.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959
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Printed from the original

663

LETTER TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

March 3, 1922

To Comrade Molotov for the Politbureau members
Copies: to Comrades Pyatakov and Sokolnikov

I am sending you the minutes of the conference on the question of financing industry, called on March 3, at the request of C.P.C. Deputy Chairman, Comrade Tsyurupa.

* See present edition, Vol. 35, Document 310.—*Ed.*

Please have this circulated to all members of the Politbureau and raise urgently in the Politbureau the question of financing industry.

Summon Comrades Pyatakov and Sokolnikov as rapporteurs.[607]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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a typewritten copy

664

MEMO TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[608]

To Politbureau members

Sokolnikov is missing the mark. What are the guarantees that everything valuable will not be *hauled out*?

There are none.

Stealing is now going on; it's true; let's *learn to catch people* for stealing, instead of making it easier for rich foreigners to steal.

5/III. *Lenin*

Written on March 5, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

665

TO N. P. GORBUNOV

5.III.1922
Secret

Comrade Gorbunov:

I wanted to speak with Unschlicht about the enclosed book.[609]

I think it looks like a "literary screen for a whiteguard organisation".

Have a talk with Unschlicht, not by phone, and let him write me confidentially and return the book.

Lenin

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

666
TO G. L. PYATAKOV

Comrade *Pyatakov*, *Head of the Central Fuel Administration*
Copy to the *State Planning Commission Presidium*

In view of the large appropriations for *Gidrotorf*, your *Glavtorf* estimates should have some released credits, which had been earmarked for *Gidrotorf* before this appropriation went through.

It is my request that you devote special attention, through the use of a part of these released credits, to intensifying the working of peat in the area of the projected construction site of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk District Electric-Power Station, about which there are appropriate decisions taken by the Presidium of the S.P.C. in December 1921 and in February 1922.*

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 5, 1922

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in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

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a typewritten copy

667
TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Comrade Molotov

I propose that we get the votes of the Politbureau members to have a vote without delay on the following proposal (about which I have already had a short preliminary exchange with Stalin and Kamenev, and Zinoviev):

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* See Document 516 of this volume.—*Ed.*

1) Put upon Comrade Rudzutak the duty to start out immediately for a sanatorium and not to leave it until the congress,* strictly keeping to the established regimen.

2) Put the duty upon Dr. ... (what is the name of the one who is working at the C.C.? And if he is not there, then upon Semashko) to arrange at once a high-calory diet and treatment against TB for Rudzutak, in one of the better sanatoriums, to give him a chance to receive as much treatment as possible and rest, before the Party Congress and the plenary meeting (24/III).[610]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on March 6, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

668

TO S. Y. CHUTSKAYEV

Comrade Chutskayev, Siberian Revolutionary Committee

I am sending you *M. Bagayev*'s letter. Have a check carried out of the facts given in his letter, and an investigation of the reasons for the establishment of rates out of all proportion to the crop, meting out punishment to those guilty of abusing power in the collection of the tax in kind and the harassment of the peasants, and also show the picture of tax collection in other volosts of Novonikolayevsk Gubernia.

The most vigorous steps have to be taken for the full provision of seeds to the areas which have suffered from the wrongful collection of the tax in kind.

Write me about execution.[611]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on March 6, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

* A reference to the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).—*Ed.*

669

TO L. M. KHINCHUK[612]

Copies to Gorbunov and Smolyaninov

Comrade Khinchuk:

I am unable to see the co-operative men because I am unwell. My speech in which I tell about this ailment is to be published tomorrow.* About the co-operative men. I fear that they may have fictitiously blown up their liabilities, when handing them over to you. I am passing your memo on to Gorbunov and Smolyaninov, and request you to send also to them the final exact calculation of the assets and liabilities, to enable them to tell me the results.

How are things with the loan which you were expecting before your departure, from the co-operative societies abroad?

I shall be expecting short reports from you about the development of the co-operative apparatus in Russia (I have only the old figures: September—1 million, October—3, November—6 million gold rubles). Do you now have the 10-day figures? Are there any precise data on how many gubernia societies have and have not been submitting correct reports to you? Do you apply the remuneration of co-operative workers depending on the volume of their turnover and the success achieved, and expressed in a reduction of the percentage cost of our apparatus?

Please reply as briefly as possible to these questions and inform me in addition about any serious measures the Centrosoyuz Board has taken to see that our co-operative establishment is truly a commercial and not a bureaucratic organ. Tikhomirov's letter, which I received a short time ago and to which I have replied,** produced quite a few doubts in my mind on this score, just as did the attempt to publish a weekly newspaper called *Kooperativnoye Dyelo*.*** It looks as if you have bureaucrats and intellectuals

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* A reference to Lenin's speech "The International and Domestic Situation of the Soviet Republic" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 212-26).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 36, p. 569.—*Ed.*

*** Ibid., Vol. 42, pp. 398, 399.—*Ed.*

sitting in unduly high places, who are capable of carrying on a paper and a newspaper game, but are incapable of trading.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on March 7, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

670
TO Y. S. VARGA[613]

8/III.

Dear Comrade Varga:

I am ill. I am quite *incapable* of undertaking any work at all.

If you compile a collection (of quotations from my works or parts of them) I do not, of course, object to this, but you must state that you are responsible for the selection.

Here is my request:

1) quote as fully as possible my works of the spring of 1918 against the "Leftists", about "state capitalism" and the difficulties of *administration*, as a *specific* task;

2) (quote more fully) my pamphlet against "Infantile Disorder" (general rules of tactics and strategy)*;

NB 3) **never** quote my speeches (their text is always bad, always imprecisely conveyed); quote only my **works.**

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

P.S. *Nor* can I promise an afterword. *You* will declare yourself responsible for the selection of the quotations.[614]

Written on March 8, 1922

First published in part
in 1923 in German
in *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiterbewegung 1922-1923*, Hamburg

Published in full in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

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* A reference to the book, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder* (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 17-118).—*Ed.*

671
TO L. B. KRASIN

Top secret

Comrade Krasin

Comrade Krasin:

You told me at one of our latest meetings that you had had a talk with an English merchant about setting up a mixed society for the sale of precious stones, etc.

Please write me a few lines: has this plan produced anything? The same concerning Germany.

Then I ask you to answer this question: can you order from anyone a short (not more than 2 or 3 pages) summary of actual data characterising the development of our foreign trade over the last few months, for instance, over the last 6 months. I would find such a thing extremely necessary for my report at the Party Congress.* Here is a rough list of the questions:

The number of trade treaties with other powers, stating the month and year of their conclusion.

The number of mixed societies set up for trade with the capitalists of various nations.

The monthly turnover of exports and imports in pre-war rubles over the last few months.

Orders and imports with a division into foodstuffs and items of industrial equipment.

The number of merchants enlisted by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade on a commission basis, Russian and foreign separately, etc.**

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on March 10, 1922

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a text
in Natalya Lepeshinskaya's hand

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* A reference to the forthcoming Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 283-84.—*Ed.*

672

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONCESSIONS COMMITTEE UNDER THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION[615]

11/III.1922

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky
Copy to Comrade Smolyaninov

The S.P.C. Concessions Committee is to have the duty of collecting and keeping on file detailed material on *all* concession negotiations and concession matters of the R.S.F.S.R. with foreign capitalists, which are being carried on both in Russia and abroad. The material should also be collected for the past period.

The Concessions Committee must keep a precise register of this material under the following heads:

a) agreements concluded;
b) serious negotiations on which agreements may be concluded in the immediate future;
c) broken-off negotiations (give reason);
d) all other negotiations.

The list should give a short summary of the content of the matter (roughly: state of negotiations, object of concession, name of those seeking concession, rough or precise amount of capital, and number of the case on file).

A copy of this list is to be sent to the C.L.D. Managing Department, with monthly additions of new information.

The Concessions Committee should appoint a person responsible for the collection of material and compilation of the list (business manager, Secretary), whose name should be urgently communicated to the C.L.D. Managing Department.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy signed by Lenin

673

LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN

14.III.1922.

Comrade Chicherin:

I have read your letter of 10/III. I think yours is an excellent exposition of the pacifist programme.[616]

The whole point is to have the skill to expound it and our commercial proposals loudly and clearly *before* the fold-up (if "they" do try to fold it up in haste).

You and our delegation have enough skill to do this.

I think you have made some 13 points (I enclose your letter with my remarks), which are excellent.

We shall have everyone intrigued by saying: "We have a most broad and comprehensive programme!" If they prevent us from making it public, we *shall print* it with our protest.

In every case we make this "little" reservation: we Communists have *our own* communist programme (the Third International); *nevertheless* we consider it to be our duty as *businessmen to support* (even if the odds are 10,000 to 1) the *pacifists in the* **other**, i.e., bourgeois, camp (taking account **of its** Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals[617]).

This will be "genteel" and have teeth, and will help to demoralise the enemy.

If we adopt such tactics we shall win out, *even if* Genoa is a failure. We shall *not accept* any unprofitable deal.

With communist greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

14/III.

P.S. Comrade Chicherin:

Why not add even more "genteel" bite and say the following:

We propose (§14) abolition of *all* war debts and (§15) *revision* (on the basis of the 13 §§) of the Versailles and *all* military treaties,[618]

but not through the majority riding roughshod over the minority, but on the basis of an *agreement*, because **in this case** we are businessmen and *cannot* put forward any other principle *here* than the commercial one! We don't want to have it all our way with the United States through a majority; we are businessmen; we want to *persuade* it!! A *poll* **of all** the states and **an attempt** *to persuade* those who do not agree. This is both genteel and unacceptable to the bourgeois. We shall disgrace and humiliate them in a very "genteel" way.

Here is a variant: submission of a minority of countries (in population) to the majority can be proposed *separately* within each of the two camps: the bourgeois and the Soviet (the one recognising private property, and the other not recognising it).

Let us put forward both the project and the variant.

*Les rieurs seront avec nous!**

×)** an additional point: an exemption to be made for small-holders *insofar as* it can be precisely proved that these are not fictitious but actual toiling small-holders.

MARGINAL NOTES ON A LETTER FROM G. V. CHICHERIN

COMRADE LENIN

March 10, 1922

Esteemed Vladimir Ilyich:

I earnestly request you to read through the proposals made below and let me have your instructions. We have to put forward "a broad pacifist programme", that is one of the most important elements of our forthcoming act; we have not, however, got one. We have only the separate fragmentary points in the first directives of the Central Committee. I am here making a first attempt to approach the task.

The chief difficulty is that the present international political and economic forms serve as permanent fig-leaves covering the predatory acts of the imperialists; in particular, these forms serve as a weapon against us. The League of Nations is simply a tool of the Entente, which has already used it against us. You have yourself pointed out that arbitration between the bourgeois and Soviet states is impossible; nevertheless arbitration is an indispensable weapon in the pacifist arsenal. The internationalisation of the Chinese-Eastern Railway is a euphemism for its alienation from us and from China and its seizure by the Entente. A foreign bank of issue in Russia and the introduction of the dollar into Russia, like the introduction of a universal single gold unit in general, would be the most effective weapon for complete economic bondage to America.

We have to introduce something new into the customary modern international forms to prevent those forms from being turned into a tool of imperialism. This new something is provided by our experience and our creative activity as

* We shall have the last laugh.—*Ed.*

** This symbol is not to be found in the text.—*Ed.*

well as by the creative action of life itself in the process of the growing ruin and break-up of the imperialist world. The world war has resulted in the intensification of the liberation movement of all oppressed and colonial peoples. World states are coming undone at the seams. Our international programme must bring all oppressed colonial peoples into the international scheme. The right of all peoples to secession or to home rule must be recognised. The African Conference of 1885 resulted in the horrors of the Belgian Congo, because the European powers at that conference indulged in philanthropy towards the Negroes and that philanthropy turned out to be a fig-leaf covering the most barbaric exploitation. The novelty of our international scheme must be that the Negro and other colonial peoples participate on an equal footing with the European peoples in conferences and commissions and have the right to prevent interference in their internal affairs. Another novelty is the obligatory participation of working-class organisations. The demand for trade unions to take part in a future European congress was very popular in British working-class literature during the world war. We have actually realised this by including three members of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. in our delegation. We must lay down that one-third of the votes in the international organisation we are going to propose should belong to the working-class organisations represented in each delegation. These two novelties, however, are not sufficient to protect the oppressed peoples and downtrodden countries from the domination of the imperialists because the upper stratum of the colonial peoples may well be puppets in the same way as treacherous labour leaders are. The inclusion of these two opens up the way for future struggles. Working-class organisations will be confronted with the task of struggling for the liberation of the colonial peoples, for aid to the Soviet power and against imperialist depredation. The leaders, however, will try to betray them. Therefore another thing to be established is the principle of non-intervention on the part of international conferences or congresses in the internal affairs of various peoples. Voluntary co-operation and aid for the weak on the part of the strong must be applied without subordinating the former to the latter.

1) true! 2) 3)

As a result we have a very bold and completely new proposal—A WORLD CONGRESS with all peoples of the world participating on a completely equal footing, on the basis of the declaration of the right to self-determination,

the right to complete secession or home rule for all oppressed peoples, and also with the participation of working-class organisations to the extent of one-third of the entire congress. The purpose of the congress will not be compulsion of the minority but complete agreement. The congress will help by its moral authority. In practice it will set up technical commissions for the implementation of our extensive economic programme of world-wide rehabilitation.

4))

precisely

All the projects for a League of Nations or Association of Nations contain only two types of proposals concerning methods of compulsion to ensure fulfilment of the decisions of an Association of Nations—either the establishment of composite armies with contingents from all states or the investment of a punitive mandate in a certain power or several such powers. In the first case we would have something incompetent because a composite army made up of contingents from numerous countries is of no use. In the second case the League of Nations or Association of Nations is nothing but an excuse to justify fresh conquests by the more influential powers. And so it is essential to eliminate completely the element of compulsion or punitive expeditions and leave to the World Congress only its moral authority, allowing it to be an arena for discussions aimed at reaching agreement. The prevention of war is a matter for arbitration. There are two types of arbitration—the voluntary appeal of the two parties to an arbiter, to The Hague Tribunal, for instance—in such cases the decision of the arbiter is binding—or the second method, an example of which is to be found in the article on arbitration contained in the treaty between Great Britain and the United States according to which, in the event of there being a danger of war, special conciliation commissions are set up to which the two parties must appeal but whose decision is merely advisory although for a definite period, for instance a year, the proceedings of the commissions continue; this second method has as its purpose the postponement of the beginning of military action to enable the passions of both parties to subside in the legally established interval and lessen the conflict. In the first case appeal to the arbiter is not obligatory but decisions are binding. In the second case appeal to the arbiter is obligatory but decisions are not binding, and the parties are bound only for the legally established period.

correct!

At the present moment we cannot avoid this alternative. The proposed World Congress could take over The Hague Tribunal with its advisory arbitration and other services. We shall, however, consider that the only court of arbitration between a capitalist state and the Soviet state can be that

(5)
in which an equal number of members is appointed by each 5)
party so that half the members will be imperialists and half will be Communists. At the same time we shall propose a gen-
(6)
eral reduction of armaments based on the theses we have 6)
established with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic; developing the traditions of The Hague and Geneva conventions we shall propose adding a number of pro-
hibitions to the rules of war—the abolition of submarines, 7)
chemical gases, mortars, flame-throwers and armed air battles.

The technical commissions set up by the World Congress 8)
will guide the implementation of a broad programme of world-wide rehabilitation. This programme will not be imposed by force. It will be a voluntary proposal that appeals to the advantage of every participant. Aid will be given
to the weak. In this way world railways, river and sea 9)
routes must be laid down. The internationalisation of those routes will be a matter of gradual development since the compulsion of those who resist will not be allowed. International technical commissions will propose to individual countries economic and technical aid for the creation of super-main lines, for the regulation of traffic on international rivers, for the use of international harbours and for the technical improvement of world sea routes. We shall propose that the capital of the advanced countries should build a super-main line London-Moscow-Vladivostok
10)
(Peking) and we shall explain that it will open up the incalculable wealth of Siberia for the use of all. In general, aid from the strong for the weak will be the basic principle of world rehabilitation which must be based on economic geography and the planned distribution of resources. A world gold unit can make its appearance only as a result of the improvement of the economically weak countries with the aid of the strong: this improvement is in the interest of all since world ruin affects the strong countries as well, giving rise to unparalleled unemployment, even in America. The strong, by helping the weak, are opening up for themselves markets and sources of raw materials. Proceeding from these premises we shall propose the planned distribution
11)
of the gold that is at the moment lying idle in the vaults of the American banks. This planned distribution of gold

in all countries must be combined with the planned distribution of orders, trade, supplies of scarce materials, in general, with all-round economic aid for the ruined coun-
12) tries. This aid may take the form of loans, since under a planned economy the return of the money would begin in a few years. Under this heading we place the Barter Institute plan (Keynes), or the Zentralstelle, or national trade centres. If Germany opposes us by a single Zentralstelle in place of individual merchants it will be bad for us since it would be a means of imposing bad goods on us at high prices. If, however, the Zentralstellen are instruments for the planned, world-wide distribution of essential commod-
13) ities and a means of rendering aid to weak countries by the strong, they would be essential components of an extensive programme of economic rehabilitation. The grain sent to us by America is the beginning of the international distribution of food. Within the Entente there was a partially planned distribution of fuel during the war; one of the chief elements of the broad programme should be the systematic distribution of oil and coal, but in this case, too, the element of compulsion and repression must be eliminated. The international technical commissions must elaborate, in very general outline, a programme for the planned distribution of fuel and energy resources. All these points, taken together, provide a picture of what is theoretically possible under the bourgeois system, but which in historically conditioned reality will come up against national egoism and the predatory acts of the capitalist oligarchy.

With communist greetings,

Georgi Chicherin

First published in part in 1945 in the book, *Istoriya diplomatii*, Vol. 3, Moscow-Leningrad

Published in full in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

674

TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

Comrade *Sokolnikov*
People's Commissariat for Finance

Considering that the press, both Soviet and Party, had earlier, namely, in connection with the Glavzemkhoz*

* See Note 619.—*Ed.*

exhibition from September 18 to 25, 1921, unanimously assessed Comrade *Runov*'s work as being exceptionally successful in founding proletarian agriculture, and considering that this assessment had been confirmed by a decision of the Council of Labour and Defence of 30/IX-1921, I think that Runov's enclosed application should be unconditionally and fully satisfied.[619]

I ask Comrade Sokolnikov to reply to me without delay, in substance, through Comrade Gorbunov.[620]

Dictated by phone
on March 15, 1922

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on February 14, 1924
in *Pravda* No. 36

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675

TELEGRAM TO THE TERRITORIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF THE SOUTH-EAST

To South-Eastern Territorial Economic Conference
Copy *to Salsk District Executive Committee*,
Don Region

Krupp's concession for 50,000 dessiatines, to deal with which People's Commissariat for Agriculture representatives Adamovich and another comrade, and Krupp's representatives Klette and Fulte, Zechgau, have left for *your* parts, is of enormous economic and political importance. You must do everything you can to help conclude the concession, and I shall regard as a crime any lack of zeal in this case. Telegraph execution in brief. Send all details by mail.[621]

Lenin
Chairman, C.L.D.

19/III-22

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676
TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV

20.III.1922

Comrade Sokolnikov:

Please write to me,

1) whether you have received and read Comrade Belov's note: "Plan for Financial Campaign until the New Harvest of 1922", and your opinion.

2) How is supervision of the collection of cash taxes arranged?

Give the facts on one page. What about the 10-day reports? telegraphic or postal?

How many gubernias submit accurate reports?

Average percentage of arrears and *from—to*?

3) What is the arrangement for the State Bank's supervision over our lousy state trusts, in which adroit swindlers dupe conscientious and totally canonised Communists, chairmen of boards, etc.?[622]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

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677
TO L. B. KRASIN[623]

20/III.

Comrade Krasin:

I do not agree with you. Lezhava is a very nice comrade, but he has fully demonstrated his weakness.

There is need for a different collegium (Politbureau), and a trio inside it: you + Frumkin + Radchenko, because you are away very often, and *authority* should reside in Russia. What is more, you are *also* a diplomat. And you are not doing any of the spade-work, purging the swindlers, seeing to the order, flogging and thrashing for non-fulfilment. You are responsible for the direction, but the

spade-work needs **strong-minded** men, and not Lezhava. They will learn how to work.

Yours,
Lenin

Written on March 20, 1922
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678
TO M. I. FRUMKIN AND I. I. RADCHENKO[624]

21/III.1922.

Comrades Frumkin and Radchenko:

In a talk with me yesterday, Comrade Krasin expressed the fear that both of you are freetraders, which is why the future of the foreign-trade monopoly is being predetermined in a negative sense. I protested most vigorously; I referred to the fact that both of you are old Party men, tried and tested in every way, and that there was not the slightest ground for assuming that an absolutely precise directive from the C.C. Politbureau (which confirmed the theses recognising the foreign-trade monopoly) could be unfulfilled by you. In addition, I expressed great doubt about Comrade Frumkin being a "freetrader". If Comrade Radchenko had earlier spoken out (something I, too, had heard from him) in the sense that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade could "*not cope*" with the monopoly, what he had in mind, first, was the unsatisfactory apparatus of the P.C.F.T., which is the very thing we are now going to improve, and, second, apparently, the "absolute" monopoly of foreign trade, now substituted by a *liberal* monopoly, a monopoly unconditionally and in any case.

I consider it my duty to inform you about that talk with Krasin. Write me a couple of words. I hope that on the basis of "mixed societies", if we all, you especially, see to it that there are no "compuppets", communist puppets, up there on top for the sake of appearances, while specialists, swindlers, etc., handle all the business—that on this basis we shall restructure the whole economy of trade and

restructure it precisely in the way necessary to ensure socialist construction.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

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Printed from the original

679

TO M. I. FRUMKIN

Comrade Frumkin:

I had just finished writing to you and Radchenko,* when I received your letter.[625] I cannot agree with you. The Politbureau decision is precise, clear and, I believe, correct.

What are your "differences of principle with Krasin"?? I should like to know. Are there any? What are they about? Which are they?

Even if there are any in fact, that is no hindrance.

With Stomonyakov, you and Radchenko will make arrangements here, now. You and Radchenko will each *travel* abroad at least once a year. It is not far from here to Berlin, and Berlin is the centre.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on March 21, 1922

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680

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN AND L. B. KAMENEV

Comrades Stalin and Kamenev

I have received the draft of an additional resolution by the congress.[626]

I agree on the main points. After a first reading, I propose these amendments:

---

* See previous document.—*Ed.*

1) away with the word "new" (page 1, line 1 from bottom),

2) at the end, instead of "the congress authorises the commission" say: "the Congress authorises the Central Committee, with the enlistment of Comrades Tsyurupa and Kiselyov (two non-members of the C.C.)."

I think:

a) also to propose less essential amendments;

b) add something on the subject of trying out men and checking up on performance.

We shall arrange the details by phone.

How is this to be introduced?

I shall prepare a letter for the C.C. Plenum (by 24.IV?).

In this letter I will

1) give a brief plan of the report,

2) refer to Trotsky's letter,[627] saying that I am basically in favour,

3) tell about my arrangement with Tsyurupa and Rykov,*

4) add your draft on my own behalf,

5) ask the C.C. Plenum to take a vote: do they approve this? do they permit me to say all this on behalf of the C.C. in my report?

P.S. This is the best form.

Add: against inflating the All-Russia C.E.C.: not more than 3 per gubernia.

21/III-1922 *Lenin*

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681

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

To Comrade Molotov for Politbureau members

I have a letter from Solts, who has come out, on the basis of the available experience, against the newspaper

* See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 247-48.—*Ed.*

Rabochy. He says it is used only to feed superfluous writers, without in any sense producing a new type of newspaper or a different readership. I think it would be more correct to close down the newspaper, allowing it a short period for liquidation, and to make use of the released manpower and facilities to improve the existing newspapers.[628]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on March 23, 1922

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682
TELEGRAM TO Y. V. LOMONOSOV

Code

Lomonosov, Plenipotentiary Representation,
Berlin

I propose that you strictly abide by the following: do not enter into any negotiations on loans, do not conclude any loans or other credit transactions without special C.P.C. permission in every case.

The Kremlin, Moscow.
27/III-22

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten
copy signed by Lenin

683
TELEGRAM TO N. N. KRESTINSKY

Do everything you can to obtain at once a visa for Avanesov, Deputy People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Visiting German doctors have found him to be dangerously ill. The spring is especially dangerous for him. He must go immediately. Do your best. We give all guarantees. Reply at once.[629]

Lenin

Written on March 29, 1922
Sent to Berlin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

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684

TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

30.III.1922

To Comrade Molotov for *Politbureau* members

I have had a talk with Krasnoshchekov. I see that we, the Politbureau, have made a big mistake.

We have harassed this man, who undoubtedly has brains, energy, knowledge and experience, to a state when one is quite capable of abandoning everything and getting away from the whole thing.

He knows all the languages, English excellently. He has been in the movement since 1896. Fifteen years in America. Started out as a house-painter. Was headmaster of a school. Knows commerce. Has shown himself to be an intelligent chairman of the government in the Far-Eastern Republic, where he organised virtually everything.[630]

We took him away from there. Here we placed him in the People's Commissariat for Finance, where complete anarchy reigns. Now, just when he was down with the typhus, he has been dismissed!!!

We have done everything possible and impossible to repulse this highly energetic, intelligent and valuable worker.

He has had differences both with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the People's Commissariat for Finance, because he favoured *greater* "freedom to trade".

He says: "Let me prove myself at work, allow *me* to complete it without keeping on at me." That is, of course, a legitimate desire.

We must make efforts to give him a job at the S.E.C. At any rate, we *must strive* at all costs *not to lose* this worker, but to meet his *most legitimate* desire: give him a *specified* job and allow him, *say*, *at least one year* of trial, to test him without harassing him. (He says he is willing to work anywhere, provided he is not pulled about.)

(He would like to work at the People's Commissariat for

Foreign Affairs. He has had some differences with Chicherin on the foreign policy of the Far-Eastern Republic.)

Lenin

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Printed from the original

685
TO N. P. GORBUNOV

March 31, 1922

Comrade Gorbunov:

The German doctors who have examined you say that you need to be taken off your work at once, in view of which I propose that you immediately hand over your duties for the period of your leave and carry out all the doctors' orders.

Comrade Tsyurupa has been assigned the task of seeing that these instructions are carried out.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

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686
TO A. I. RYKOV

4/IV.1922

Comrade Rykov:

Please see to the business indicated by Comrade Martens.[631] If it is confirmed that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had impeded things, they should be given exemplary punishment. Of course, we should be very cautious about the immigration of workers to Russia, for, on the other hand, we have very inadequate experience. When all the formalities in the restrictive sense have been

observed, it is downright criminal to allow any delays, for if the economic work is to be started, the immigrants must arrive just now, before the spring operations begin.

Lenin

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a typewritten copy

687
TO A. I. RYKOV

4/IV.1922

Comrade Rykov:

I am sending on to you a letter from Yezhov,[632] who has been recommended to me as an extremely reliable and efficient worker. Unfortunately, I have been unable to carry out my intention of making a closer acquaintance with him. The warehouse business is in a shocking state and, I believe, the whole is in the charge of Troyanovsky, whom I remember as a Bolshevik during my stay abroad. Subsequently, he went over to the Mensheviks, and now, it seems, has deviated from the Mensheviks. I strongly suspect that he is doing nothing about the warehouses, but is engaged in politics, and that nothing good will come of his warehouse activity. I think that Troyanovsky's efficiency should he thoroughly checked.

Lenin

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688
TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV[633]

4/IV.

Comrade Sokolnikov:

I am sending you this *confidentially*; please return to me with your reply.

I think that Alsky should be chased out (he is of no use);

Krasnoshchekov should be returned. He is right. The policy has now been laid down; he can do nothing against you.

He will arrange the *apparatus*. There is *no* apparatus. Alsky will never do this. I have a similar reference about him from A. D. Tsyurupa. You are to give direction; you will have no chance of dealing with the apparatus. You do *not* have to appoint Krasnoshchekov to the Narrow C.P.C.

Please reply today, because I want to leave tonight.[634]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on April 4, 1922
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689
TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade *Rykov*
Copy to Comrade *Tsyurupa*
Copy to the C.P.C. Managing Department

This business of a concession granted to *Rutgers* and a group of American workers, as *Martens* informs me, is in a very bad state. This requires a check-up and serious attention. It is an exceptional concession granted by us to American workers by special permission of the Politbureau.

The whole undertaking may go to pieces without special support and check-up.

Please ask *Martens* for information and strictly check up on the whole course of this business.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on April 5, 1922
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in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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a typewritten copy

690

TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade *Rykov*

Copy to Comrade *Tsyurupa*
Copy to the C.P.C. Managing Department

Please pay attention to the concession of the American *Hammer*, who is now in Russia, as *Reinstein*, who knows him personally, has informed me.

According to *Martens*, we've already made one great blunder, to put it mildly, namely: the *goods* sent to America under the contract with *Hammer* by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade turned out to be of bad quality. We must demand information about this business both from the P.C.F.T. and the S.E.C. and also from Comrade *Reinstein*, who knows *Hammer* personally. We must see to it that our obligations under this concession are performed with absolute strictness and accuracy, and in general we must pay greater attention to the whole business.*

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on April 5, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

691

TO A. I. RYKOV[635]

Comrade *Rykov*

Copy to Comrade *Tsyurupa*
Copy to the C.P.C. Managing Department

I draw your attention to the exceptional importance of the work of exploring the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. Comrade *Krzhizhanovsky* has informed me, that, according to the engineers with whom he has talked, it has been virtually proved that we have there an incredibly rich reserve of pure iron. Comrade *Martens* believes that it has been proved already. He intends to go there within three weeks. We must discuss whether we should send along with him some engineer from the State Planning Commission with a better

* See Document 503 of this volume.—*Ed.*

knowledge of Russian conditions and who is capable of checking up whether there is no exaggeration of any sort there.

I think we should not let the press have any information about this and should take steps to see that nothing is said about this in the press, because otherwise we may expect that the interventionist plans may very well be intensified. For the same reason, perhaps, it would be better not to have *Martens*'s report made either to the C.P.C. or the C.L.D., but to have it heard only by both deputies, Bogdanov and some C.C. members.

If the report of *Martens* and the engineer who is to go with him on behalf of the S.P.C. confirms that the matter is serious, we must get the work going as fast as possible, without in any case stinting the necessary gold appropriations, and establishing special supervision to have the necessary equipment received from abroad (diamond, drilling, etc.) with the maximum speed. I very much fear that this business will be carried out without sufficient energy. But the fact is, according to *Krzhizhanovsky* and *Martens*, that we have there almost surely a stock of wealth unequalled anywhere in the world, and capable of revolutionising the whole of metallurgy.*

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on April 5, 1922

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a typewritten copy

692

TO G. I. KRUMIN, G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY, P. I. POPOV AND V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Krumin, *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*
Comrade *Krzhizhanovsky*, *State Planning Commission*
Comrade *Popov*, *Central Statistical Board*
Comrade *Smolyaninov*

There has been no practical solution to the question of studying local experience from the reports of the economic conferences. The reports received by October 1 have not

* See Document 726 of this volume; present edition, Vol. 35, Doc. 316; and Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Doc. 365.—*Ed.*

been sufficiently made use of for practical work or for the press and have not been processed by the Central Statistical Board. The fact is that only given a correct and regular study of the reports (by the C.S.B., the S.P.C. and *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*) and publication of the results of the study in the press is it possible to make the reports truly most-valuable material suitable for political and economic conclusions. This task should be set before the S.P.C., *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, the C.S.B. and the C.L.D. Managing Department, and its fulfilment secured.

I authorise you to call a special conference and to outline a programme for studying the reports.[636]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on April 10, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

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text signed by Lenin

693
TO Y. S. VARGA

10/IV.1922

Dear Comrade Varga:

Unfortunately I am still ill and unable to work. Please reprint only my articles (the old ones); extracts from my spring 1918 article* (already printed in the pamphlet on the tax in kind**) would be important. Perhaps, too (by way of exception), some passages from my speech at the 1922 Party Congress: *but I myself have been unable to read the speech* in the press: the whole thing might be terribly distorted. Please make sure that you show me beforehand the extracts (well edited by some competent comrade!) you intend to reprint.***

Best regards,
Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

* A reference to the article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (see present edition, Vol. 27, pp. 323-54).—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 329-40.—*Ed.*

*** See Document 670 of this volume.—*Ed.*

694

TO V. V. KUIBYSHEV

C.C. Secretary
(for the Agitation and Propaganda Department)

I recommend Comrade Adoratsky, a writer, and a *knowledgeable Marxist*. He should be given every possible assistance.

He has submitted the manuscript of a "Programme for a Study Circle on the Basic Questions of Marxism".

Please have it published quickly; with the author's name; *do not pickle it*.[637]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on April 10, 1922

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Printed from a typewritten copy

695

*TO THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION[638]

I confirm the above. I have known Comrade Adoratsky (and I know him well) since the post-1905 period of reaction. In face of the trend to the right, he was a Bolshevik already at the time, and has remained one. He arrived from Germany in 1919 in very poor health. He is a theorist and propagandist. I should think it absolutely right to date his membership in the R.C.P. from 1904.

10.IV.1922. *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

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696

*TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SOCIALIST ACADEMY

I hereby certify that the bearer, Comrade Vladimir Viktorovich Adoratsky, is a Bolshevik, whom I have personally known since 1911; he deserves full trust; he is a member of the R.C.P.; and a writer.

He is working on a collection of Marx's selected letters, a work we have discussed together.

It is my earnest request that he be rendered all possible assistance, supplied with the necessary books, and, in particular, that he be given the opportunity of working at the Socialist Academy for about 4 hours every morning, and of using its library.

10.IV.1922. *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

697
TO V. V. ADORATSKY

10/IV.1922.

Comrade Adoratsky:

I am enclosing what you have requested.* I am writing to Kamenev.** I am ill and will probably be unable to see you or help with Marx's letters. Kamenev will help you; so you will have someone to consult with. Concentrate on the letters: this is an important *international* undertaking. Select the *most important* ones. The notes should be brief, clear and precise (+ a comparison of Marx's comments with those of *such-and-such* "authoritative" bourgeois *reactionary* scientists).

Regards!

Yours,

Lenin

First published in part
in 1924 in the magazine
Proletarskaya Revolutsia No. 3

Published in full in 1933
in the book, V. V. Adoratsky,
K voprosu o nauchnoi biografii Lenina (Some Ideas About a Scientific Biography of Lenin), Moscow

Printed from the original

* See previous document.—*Ed.*
** See next document.—*Ed.*

698

NOTE TO L. B. KAMENEV AND REMARKS ON V. V. ADORATSKY'S LETTER

Comrade Kamenev:

This is from Comrade *Adoratsky*. See him and help him.

Yours,
Lenin

Dear Vladimir Ilyich:

... I should very much like to carry on and complete the initial plan, namely, to compile a collection of "Selected Letters of Marx and Engels on Questions of Theory and Politics". I am now much more confident, because I have gained greater mastery of the subject....

× I should like to see you and discuss some of my doubts. If this is possible, call me. I am always at the Central Archives, 8 Vagankovsky, telephones 1-78-38 or 1-75-86.

Vladimir Viktorovich Adoratsky

It would be well if you wrote me a paper or something, saying that I have been authorised to do this work, and that I should be given assistance at the Socialist Academy in my studies there. If I were able to devote 4 hours or so to the work at the Socialist Academy every morning, I could have everything ready for the printer's within a couple of months. I do not quite understand what means assigning "the concern" about the letters to Comrade Kamenev. If it means giving me a shove now and then to keep me from forgetting about them, that is not necessary—I remember it very well. If it means assistance, consultation and help—that would be really fine. I should be very glad to be able to consult with someone. But I should like to have your final review and sanction...

have written*

Sometimes it also pays to do this!

× I'm afraid I can't.

I have a general outline of the plan of this book, and I should like to make a final arrangement. The publication is to be in chronological order. Some letters, for instance, the one to Annenkov—in full, others—only in extracts.

×× Quite right!

* See Document 696 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The material to be selected on theory: philosophy, economic theory, the theory of history, the revolution, the class struggle, historical remarks; on politics: the proletariat and other classes, the labour movement in the various countries, assessment of political leaders, petty-bourgeois democracy.

Am I to confine myself to theory and politics, or devote some space to letters shedding light on Marx's life, and being of interest for a biography? I think this is not necessary.

And so do I. (*Lenin*)

There is to be an introductory article dealing briefly with all the questions and indicating the most important parts of the letters relating to them.

To make the letters *understandable*, they must have notes.

Written on April 10, 1922

Remarks on V. V. Adoratsky's letter first published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Note to L. B. Kamenev first published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

699

TO A. I. RYKOV AND A. D. TSYURUPA

April 12, 1922

Comrades Rykov and Tsyurupa

I request you to call a conference of deputy commissars this very day to work out practical and most vigorous measures for getting the Kashira Station to start supplying electric current to Moscow. It is quite an intolerable outrage when a ready station, with all the lines strung up, is unable to supply the current because of our administrative muddle.[639]

Lenin

Dictated by phone

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten copy

700
TO P. M. KERZHENTSEV

13.IV.1922

Comrade Kerzhentsev:

It is my earnest request that you show the fullest trust in, and give *every* assistance to, Comrade Béla Kun and his family in settling in Stockholm and obtaining rest and treatment (which he *very much* needs) and everything else.

Best regards!

Yours,

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

701
TO BÉLA KUN

Dear Comrade Béla Kun:

I enclose herewith letters to Kerzhentsev and Smirnov. I have written to Karakhan. If you need anything else, please write me at once (at *Fotieva*'s address).

Best regards!

Yours,

Lenin

Written on April 13, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original
Translated from the German

702
NOTE TO J. V. STALIN, L. B. KAMENEV AND L. D. TROTSKY

Comrades Stalin, Kamenev and Trotsky

Litvinov's telegram on the signing of the agreement with Germany[640] raises the question of whether it is appropriate to

publish this right away or to postpone it until there is more clarity on whether or not a break at Genoa is inevitable.[641] I believe this question should be settled this very day.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on April 18, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial notes

703
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev

Top secret
Not to be retyped

Comrade Zinoviev:

Please raise at the Executive Committee of the Comintern (I am not sure whether it should be raised at an enlarged Sitting or at a sitting of the narrow bureau) the question of sending a special correspondent or several correspondents from the Comintern to South Africa to collect the most detailed information and the fullest set of local literature, both legal and illegal, relating to the recently suppressed workers' uprising. This should be done as soon as possible, and not otherwise than with the maximum precautions because the British are sure [to do everything]* to prevent the slightest possibility of any contact between us and the insurgents who have not yet been shot or jailed.[642]

We, for our part, should at all costs establish the rule that Comintern agents should manage to put in a secret appearance at all places of such uprisings to make timely collection of the fullest material on the history of the uprising.

Please reply in a couple of words.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on April 18, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a text
in Natalya Lepeshinskaya's hand

* Omitted words inserted in accordance with meaning.—*Ed.*

704

NOTE TO J. V. STALIN, L. B. KAMENEV AND L. D. TROTSKY WITH A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO GENOA

Comrades Stalin, Kamenev and Trotsky

I propose that we send the following telegram (and communicate to the editorial boards of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* as a directive to our press):

"To Chicherin and Sosnovsky

"All information from Genoa indicates that we are succumbing to deceit. Lloyd George, who is making noises against France, is covering up his main urge—to force us to pay debts in general and those to the former owners in particular. It is time we started a systematic exposure of this old manoeuvre by British diplomats, doing this both in our press and the communist press abroad."[643]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on April 21, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial
notes (typewritten copy)

705

NOTE TO J. V. STALIN WITH A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN[644]

Comrade Stalin

Please have the following telegram of mine sent to Chicherin, if the Politbureau members have no objection.

"To Comrade Chicherin

"I have never had any doubts that Lloyd George is acting under the pressure of British sharks and that Britain will not stay on without France, but I think that this should not alter our policy in the slightest, and that we should not be afraid of the conference breaking up. We

cannot accept recognition of the private debts under any circumstances. I think I know the actual situation.

Lenin"

Dictated by phone
on April 21, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial
notes (typewritten copy)

706

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. POLITBUREAU WITH A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN

April 24, 1922

Comrade Stalin for the Politbureau

Rudzutak's telegram protesting against the letter sent to Lloyd George shows, I believe, that Chicherin either has already made or is quite capable of making an obvious mistake and of violating a C.C. directive. The mistake consists in the fact that Chicherin, without achieving anything in practice, could well deprive us of the only explanation of a break-up which is quite advantageous and important in principle and which gives us a sure gain in the future: namely, a break-up over our refusal to restore the private property of foreign capitalists.

I propose, therefore, that the Politbureau members should be polled by phone today, and that the following telegram should be sent on my behalf:

"To Chicherin for all the members of the delegation

"I consider Rudzutak's opinion, stated in his telegram of April 22, to be quite correct. I regard as a very dangerous mistake any step and any phrase capable of depriving us of the only advantageous ground for a break-up, which, besides, assures us of complete diplomatic and commercial victory in the very near future, namely, the ground that we absolutely refuse to restore the private property of the foreign capitalists.

"I repeat once again that we have communicated to you the absolutely exact text of our maximum concessions, from which we will not depart in the least. As soon as it becomes quite clear that agreement on the basis of these concessions is impossible, we authorise you to break-off, retaining for agitation and for a subsequent diplomatic offensive two trumps:

"1) The fundamental importance of the Russo-German treaty.

"2) Our divergence on the question of restoring the capitalists' property."

Please, let me know the opinion of all or at any rate of a majority of the Politbureau members.[645]

At 7 o'clock tonight let us meet together, and if possible with Kamenev as well, for a quarter of an hour.

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

707

TO A. I. RYKOV AND A. D. TSYURUPA

26.IV.1922
Top secret

Comrades Rykov and Tsyurupa

I am sending you Varga's German letter.

I am sure that we have *a great many* scandalous things of this kind.

Varga is apparently right (I have written to him to say that in future he must let me know his informant's name). Please appoint (through Krestinsky? or otherwise) a *strict* inquiry at Berlin to *catch* the guilty persons at this B.F.S.T. and then to reorganise it *radically*.

Make sure that Yevgeny *Varga* is on the commission for inquiry and restructuring.[646]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

708

*TO THE C.C. SECRETARIAT

Comrade Stalin:

I am sending on to you a letter from Comrade Shklovsky (G. L. Shklovsky). I knew him very well while abroad (1908-1914), where he emigrated being already a Bolshevik and a Party member. He wants to work in Russia and in the Party. He used to work in Moscow—in the city administration (Vladimirsky saw him on the job), and at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and at the People's Commissariat for Agriculture; it seems he quite "hit it off" only with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where he was valued. In the other places he was either not in tune or not in full tune, or something of that sort, for it turned out that it was impossible for him to arrange for work in Russia. Shklovsky is a veteran Party man, and he is extremely upset (as his letter shows) that he is "not being allowed" to work in Russia. He is nervous, he has fears that he is being "put off", etc. (He has a family and children; it is not easy to adapt oneself to cold and starving Russia. Both Zinoviev and Safarov and all those who were in Switzerland in 1908-1917 knew Shklovsky abroad.)

Please write yourself or have your secretary write to Shklovsky (through Krestinsky in Berlin), asking him what he would like, and then raise the question in the Secretariat. People should not be "squandered", he should be given the closest attention.[647]

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on April 27, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

709

PROPOSAL FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.[648]

Only one thing should be done right away: send a coded telegram to Chicherin requesting a summary or theses for a manifesto.

Lenin

Written on April 28, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from
a typewritten copy

710

TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.*

I propose the dispatch of the following telegram:

To Stomonyakov

"Discuss with Krestinsky and Lomonosov measures to influence Krupp. Inform about decision. Act only on unanimous decision of all three."[649]

Written on April 29, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

711

TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN[650]

The best thing for us is another conference in about three months or so. At the closing of the Genoa Conference do not in any case undertake the slightest financial obligation, do not make even a semi-recognition of the debts, and do not be afraid of a break-up in general. Comrade Krasin's minority opinion shows that his line is absolutely wrong and inadmissible. Regardless of the course and out-

* There is a typewritten copy of this document with a printed signature of Lenin.—*Ed.*

come of the financial negotiations, once again bring out strongly to the fore the question of the mutual obligation to maintain peace, and support it even if it has the unsatisfactory form given to it by Lloyd George.

Written on April 30, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from a typewritten copy

712

NOTES TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. WITH A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN[651]

In view of the unprecedentedly disgraceful and *dangerous* hesitations of Chicherin and *Litvinov* (to say nothing of Krasin) I propose this *castigation*.

My draft:

"We highly regret that both Chicherin and Litvinov in part have slid down to Krasin's *absurdities*. In view of such hesitations we order the delegation to break unconditionally and as soon as possible, clearly and precisely motivating it by the refusal to restore private property, and to declare that we agreed to make partial concessions only on condition of a very advantageous and immediate loan, unconditionally insisting on a treaty between two systems of property, as between equals. (In the event of the slightest further hesitations we shall disavow you publicly in the Central Executive Committee and dismiss you from your office.) Litvinov's open telegram clearly shows that they want to fool us."

Lenin. 2/V

I do *not* agree with Stalin's amendment to delete the threat of disavowal. *Lenin*

Comrade Stalin:

I propose another addition to the telegram to Genoa: A session of the All-Russia C.E.C. has been set for May 12. By then, at least three members of the delegation must

be in Moscow with all the material. Chicherin is to stay in Germany and complete his treatment.[652]

Lenin. 2/V

Written on May 2, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from the original

713
TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

2.V.1922

Copies to Comrade Rykov and Comrade Tsyurupa

Comrade Dzerzhinsky:

Please inform me—in the *briefest* form—whether anything is being done and how quickly to carry out the C.L.D. decision on classifying the railways in three categories and closing down the railways in the third category.

The closure should be speeded up to the maximum, and secured quickly and at all costs. How else are we to fight the crisis?[653]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.L.D.

First published in 1924
in the magazine
Vestnik Putei Soobshchenia No. 6

Printed from the facsimile

714
TO A. D. TSYURUPA AND A. I. RYKOV

This is a request to Comrades Tsyurupa and Rykov for support in the *C.P.C.* on Thursday,* and if necessary, to carry on to the Politbureau.[654]

2/V.1922. *Lenin*

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

* May 4.—*Ed*.

715

TO LETTER TO G. Y. SOKOLNIKOV ON QUESTIONS OF FINANCIAL POLICY

Copies to Comrades Tsyurupa,
Rykov and Stalin (for the Politbureau)

Comrade Sokolnikov:

I have heard Comrade Tsyurupa's account of your project for an internal grain loan, and have looked over the draft text myself. This looks to me like self-deception. How can you prove that this will yield anything practical at all? It seems to me that, on the contrary, we should conclude that this will worsen our situation by wrecking the emission, i.e., inducing the speculative market to resort to the very measure of fighting against us which it has been using with such success. In fact, the market has learned, it seems, to inflate prices following the growth of emission so fast that the emission has ceased to extract any real values from the population whatsoever, becoming an empty game and empty self-consolation on our part. (By the way, there should be precise data about the real values being extracted through the emission. They should be summed up in the briefest form at least weekly. Is this being done?)

I think it is time we abandoned the harmful self-consolation, and turned to really revolutionary measures, on the one hand—an increase in the collection of all taxes; on the other hand—a most rapid and vigorous reduction of staffs. In doing this, we should not stop at closing down, partly without any designation of date, partly until the autumn, of a number of the largest departments in some People's Commissariats, and even of this or that People's Commissariat.

I wrote to Dzerzhinsky today to check up on whether we are seriously working to close down the third category railways. I very much fear that without revolutionary measures of this kind the congress resolution on financial policy[655] remains on paper, and that in general we are

lagging behind life, risking to find ourselves helpless in face of the impending disaster.

Let me have your opinion.[656]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on May 2, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from secretarial notes
(typewritten copy)

716
TO Y. A. PREOBRAZHENSKY

At present, *before* the question *has been prepared*, this will be purely bureaucratic and harmfully bureaucratic.

Preparations should be started at once in every way in *a number of* commissions.[657]

Written on May 3, 1922

First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

717
DRAFT TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN

Be sure to make a break and quickly over the new allied memorandum,[658] because we shall allow no concession to the owners, and a better opportunity will not be found. Delays weaken us. With the German treaty in hand, we shall now never abandon a long-term effort to stand only on its basis. Start a highly circumspect flirtation with Italy separately.

Written on May 5 or 6, 1922

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from the original

718
TO J. V. STALIN

This telegram has been directed to the Politbureau quite wrongly. This matter should be decided through Soviet government channels. Such a telegram must be dispatched

with the signature of both deputy chairmen, the chairman or deputy chairman of the Concessions Committee and, finally, the head of the Central Fuel Administration. These are the persons who are alone responsible, and should normally be responsible for the accuracy of the figures given here, and for seeing that the instructions issued here conform with statutes and decrees issued by the Soviet institutions concerned. I therefore refuse to vote on the substance of this telegram.[659]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
at 9.00 on May 6, 1922

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from
a typewritten copy

719
TELEGRAM TO M. M. LITVINOV[660]

We should think that the generally unacceptable nature of the latest memorandum of the powers is a suitable pretext for a break-off, but if you do not agree with this, we consent, considering a break-up predetermined, to leave it to your discretion to find the most suitable moment for the break.

Written on May 8, 1922

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from
a typewritten copy

720
TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN[661]

Considering the importance of the Russo-German treaty, its acceptance by Germany, its influence on Italy, and the dogfight between the powers over oil concessions, we arrive at the conclusion that it would be most correct for us now to build up all our foreign policy on everything resting, over a certain period of at least a few months, only on the Russo-German treaty, declaring it to be the only specimen from which we shall depart only for the sake of exception-

ally great advantages. Try to prepare this through the form of break. Together with the ratification of the Russo-German treaty we want to include such a statement in the declaration of the All-Russia C.E.C. Urgently telegraph your opinion.

Written on May 9, 1922
First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from a typewritten copy

721

CONCERNING THE DRAFT LIST OF NARROW C.P.C. MEMBERSHIP[662]

About Goikhbarg, I have had a number of complaints saying that as chairman he browbeats and intimidates the public. In other *respects*, I personally value Goikhbarg highly. Perhaps this could be checked or he *specially cautioned*.

10/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 10, 1922
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

722

TO ARMAND HAMMER

11.V.1922

Dear Comrade Hammer!

Excuse me please; I have been very ill; now I am much, much better.

Many thanks for Your present—a very kind letter from American comrades and friends who are in prison. I enclose for You my letter to Comrade Zinoviev or for other comrades in Petrograd if Zinoviev has left Petrograd.

My best wishes for the full success of Your first concession: such success would be of great importance also for trade relations between our Republic & United States.

Thanking You once more. I beg to apologise for my bad English. Please address letters & telegrams to my secretary (*Fotieva* or *Smolianinoff*). I shall instruct them.*

Yours truly,
Lenin

First published on January 21, 1926 in *Krasnaya Gazeta* No. 17

Printed from a photocopy of the English original

723
TO LYDIA FOTIEVA AND V. A. SMOLYANINOV[663]

Fotieva and *Smolyaninov*

Have this translated for you both, read it; make note of *Armand* **Hammer** and *in every way help* him on my behalf if he applies.

11/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 11, 1922
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

724
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1

11.V.1922

Comrade Zinoviev or his deputy

Petrograd
To Comrade Zinoviev
(to Comrade Zinoviev or his deputy)

I beg You to help the comrade Armand Hammer; it is extremely important for us that his first concession would be a full success.

Yours,
Lenin

* See next document.—*Ed.*

I beg you to give every assistance to the bearer, Comrade *Armand Hammer*, an American comrade, who has taken out the *first concession*. It is extremely, extremely important that his whole undertaking should be a complete *success*.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a photocopy
of the original
(the first half—in English)

2

11.V.1922

Telephone message to Zinoviev and his deputy in Petrograd (make sure this is not lost in the event of Zinoviev's departure or absence)[664]

Today I wrote a letter of reference to you and your deputy for the American Comrade *Armand Hammer*. His father is a millionaire and a Communist (he is in *prison* in America). He has taken out our first *concession*, which is very advantageous for us. He is going to Petrograd to be present at the discharge of the first wheat ship* and to arrange for the receipt of machinery for his concession ((asbestos mines)).

It is my earnest request that you issue orders at once to see that there is no red tape and that reliable comrades should personally keep an eye on the progress and speed of all operations for this concession. This is of the utmost importance. Armand *Hammer* is travelling with the director of his company, *Mr. Mishell*.

Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

* See Document 503 of this volume.—*Ed.*

725
TO V. S. DOVGALEVSKY

Comrade *Dovgalevsky*
Copy to the C.P.C. Managing Department

Comrade Dovgalevsky:

I read in *Izvestia* today that the Nizhni-Novgorod City Soviet has petitioned the All-Russia C.E.C. to award the Order of the Red Banner of Labour to the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory, and to enter the names of Prof. Bonch-Bruyevich and Prof. Vologdin on the Honour Board.

Let me know your opinion. I, for my part, would consider it necessary to support the petition.

Incidentally, in connection with your letter to me, please let me know whether you are quite satisfied with the work of the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory; also send me, if possible, the briefest comment from Bonch-Bruyevich about the progress of his work in making the megaphones capable of broadcasting to the masses what comes in over the wireless telephone. This work is of exceptional importance for us because its success, which Bonch-Bruyevich promised long ago, would be of enormous benefit to agitation and propaganda.

It is necessary, therefore, to make some sacrifices to back this work. In particular, I have heard that in America such work has already resulted in practical success.

There should be a check to see whether the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory has at its disposal all the latest American literature on this question.

Please let me have your opinion as soon as possible, to give me time, in case of need, to sign any required communication or petition at the All-Russia C.E.C. session which opens tomorrow.[665]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Also please inform me in a separate confidential letter about some of the details of Nikolayev's removal from the office of head of the radio department to another post; and also about what qualification Comrade Trofimov, who,

I believe, is now in charge of the department, has for doing so; also about the qualification of the specialist who is directly responsible for this work at the central department.[666]

Written on May 11, 1922

First published in part in 1934 in the book, A. M. Nikolayev, *Lenin i radio* (Lenin and Radio), Moscow

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

726

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

May 13, 1922

Comrade *Smolyaninov*:

Please check up whether I am being correctly informed in private that Academician Lazarev, who has long been working on the Kursk Anomaly, is discouraged by the reported refusal of any financial support.

Find out the amount he expected to receive and what he has been given.[667]

Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

727

TELEGRAM TO L. B. KRASIN, G. V. CHICHERIN AND V. V. VOROVSKY[668]

Krasin, Chicherin and Vorovsky
Genoa

I attach enormous importance to such a treaty. I think we should offer the Italians a coal price lower than that which they pay to their usual suppliers. Please speed up reply.*

Lenin

Written on May 13, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

* See Document 733 of this volume.—*Ed.*

728
TELEGRAM TO G. V. CHICHERIN[669]

If we have correctly understood the press comments over the situation created by our reply, Lloyd George is prepared to separate an immediate political agreement on peace from financial-economic agreements which are to be referred to a long commission.[670] This would be the best outcome and an unquestionable victory, that is why we recommend: 1) to continue the absolutely uncompromising line in the economic sphere, agreeing to a long commission, 2) to give every support to Lloyd George in his urge for a political agreement (guarantee treaty), 3) in every way to strive for separate agreements with various countries, 4) to make every possible use of Lloyd George's approach to the question of the eastern boundaries of Poland and Rumania, indicating that these boundaries are obstacles to the establishment of peace, but this should be done cautiously, so as not to draw criticism about departures from the Riga Treaty.[671] We repeat our request that you urgently communicate to us basic propositions for an All-Russia C.E.C. resolution on Joffe's report, especially in connection with the Rapallo Treaty—see our telegram No. 3535/c.*

Written on May 14, 1922
First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from
a typewritten copy

729
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV**

15/V.

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I have to reprove you and Comrade Zaks—with the warning that stricter penalties will be applied next time—over the fact that having checked up on the work of Comrade Ulrikh, who for several months now has been following the

* See Document 720 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Over the text Lenin wrote: "Have this retyped on a letterhead in 4 copies and let me sign it. 15/V. *Lenin*."—*Ed.*

execution of the C.P.C. and C.L.D. decisions, I discovered immense disorder.

The card, which is here enclosed, defines the form and order of Comrade Ulrikh's work. You will see, however, that this is not being fulfilled; neither you nor Zaks have seen to this, although it is your primary duty to do so. I have instructed Comrade Ulrikh to fill in the card with the *strictest* accuracy, severely to the point of pedantism.

I charge you, together with Comrade Zaks, to secure the most precise fulfilment of this; if Comrade Ulrikh fails to learn, she should be replaced, and an absolutely accurate worker found.

The enclosed cards show that Comrade Fotieva has also started, like Comrade Ulrikh, to alter the card on her own. This I absolutely do not allow. *Only deputy* chairmen, by their joint signatures, have the right to prescribe or permit any alteration of the card. Any other alterations should entail dismissal from office.

It is better to verify only a *part* of the C.P.C. and C.L.D. decisions (as marked off by the deputies or business manager), but they should be verified with pedantic accuracy.

It is the duty of every People's Commissar at once to appoint several comrades with responsibility for verifying execution (business manager, his assistant; secretary, his assistant, etc.) and to communicate their names to the *C.P.C.* and *C.L.D.* business manager. For negligence these persons should be relentlessly punished by arrest or dismissed by order of the deputies. For carelessness, a People's Commissar should be punished by a reprimand, simple or with entry in his Party card. To watch over this—most strictly—is the duty of the C.P.C. business manager, and I will not hesitate to dismiss him from his post, unless he fulfils this with pedantic precision.

The task is to teach the People's Commissariats to be accurate, jailing and dismissing the careless workers.

What has been said about the People's Commissariats applies to all the separate institutions (State Planning Commission, Central Statistical Board, Concessions Committee, People's Commissariat for Internal Trade, etc.) and to the gubernia executive committees, regional economic conferences, etc.

You and Zaks shall have the duty twice a month to write me (briefly, in telegraphic style) about how the accurate verification of execution is organised. Failure to do so will entail dismissal.

I enclose the cards filled in by Comrade Fotieva (which she has done carelessly and inadmissibly) and the clean cards corrected by me: don't dare dirty them, don't dare make any unnecessary entries, don't dare make the slightest departures. Otherwise, I shall sack both the secretaries and all the business managers.

Show this paper to both deputies at once. Have them sign (before my departure, i.e., within not more than 3 or 4 days) a most precise order on how, in accordance with my instructions, they are to verify execution, fill in the cards, and punish for carelessness.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on May 15, 1922
First published in 1942
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

730

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN AND M. I. FRUMKIN AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY

Comrades Stalin and Frumkin:

I think that we should issue an *official ban* on all talks and conversations and commissions, etc., on weakening the foreign trade monopoly.

I do not agree with Frumkin that state trade will always be beaten. Throughout the world it is the department stores that beat everyone else. Yet, in what way are they better than state trade?

There is need systematically to go over to *bonuses* for employees for turnover and profit. Unless this is done the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (and all of us) will be a flop. Frumkin does not think about this, and that is his fault.

15/V. *Lenin*

Send this confidentially to Stalin and Frumkin, requesting them to return it with a couple of words of comment. See that it is returned as soon as possible (2-3 days).[672]

15/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 15, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

731
TO A. I. RYKOV AND A. D. TSYURUPA[673]

For comment by Rykov and Tsyurupa.

I object to the merger of the People's Commissariats. We should confine ourselves to uniting and simplifying the apparatus and the departments. Introduce *bonuses* for simplifying the apparatus and for rapid expansion of turnover.

15/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 15, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

732
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV[674]

Comrade Smolyaninov:

V. M. Smirnov's figures are quite different. I propose that we pass through the C.L.D.:

1) People's Commissariat for Finance
2) Central Statistical Board
3) State Planning Commission
4) *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*

shall have the duty to submit *confidentially* to the *C.L.D.* monthly data on the revenue from the emission (in the briefest form).

Show this to Rykov and Tsyurupa.

15/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 15, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

733
TO A. I. RYKOV[675]

Comrade Rykov:

It is necessary to carry through by phone the C.L.D. decision on sending two shiploads of the *best* Donets coal and to *press* on with execution (Frumkin's *personal* responsibility). Designate responsible persons *by name* at Bakhmut and Taganrog.

Lenin

Written on May 16, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

734
TO N. OSINSKY[676]

16-V-22
Secret

Comrade Osinsky:

I think the editor of *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Zhizn* should be removed, and Vainstein and Oganovsky placed under special surveillance. Such is my conclusion after reading *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Zhizn* No. 34 (75). Show this letter in strict secrecy to Comrades Yakovenko and Teodorovich (the latter is especially to blame) and return to me with the addition of information about the editor, A. N. Morosanov (?), and the other two in greater detail. Their record, etc., in more detail. They are probably Right-wing S.R.s to whom you three "have fallen" victim.

What measures are you three taking to prevent a repetition of this?

Lenin

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

735

LETTER TO A. V. LUNACHARSKY AND ASSIGNMENT TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV*

17.V.1922

People's Commissar for Education

I have received some information showing that the high price of books, considering our "enthusiasms" and the exaggerations of *NEP*, is depriving the people of useful books.

I should think it is necessary to lay down some kind of rule or pass a law on roughly these lines: specified amounts should be apportioned from local taxes to be paid to a centre for a fund to cover the cost of several thousand books (say, Skvortsov, *Electrification*, etc.) for *distribution to all uyezd libraries*.

Please discuss this and let me know your opinion.[677]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

To Comrade Smolyaninov for Comrades Lunacharsky, Pokrovsky, Rykov and Tsyurupa.**

Letter to A. V. Lunacharsky first published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Assignment to V. A. Smolyaninov first published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

736

LETTER TO A. I. RYKOV AND REMARKS ON HIS TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Comrade Rykov:

If the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and its men are "confusing" everything(×××), we should make sure

* Over the text Lenin wrote: "*See to the reply*."—*Ed.*

** A copy of the letter was also sent to G. Y. Sokolnikov, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance.—*Ed.*

not to do likewise. And if we write "reportedly"(×) and postpone things "until the question is cleared up"(××), it looks as though we are *encouraging the confusion*. Why not put an end to the confusion by having Smolyaninov (or someone else, but someone definite, to enable you too to make a personal check *right away*) get on the direct line to find out immediately and without any "reportedly". Who is responsible at the Ukrainian People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade? What has he been doing? Has he sent, is sending or will send one or two ships? When? to whom? how many?

We seem to have the P.C.F.T. in a terrible state of chaos, yet we *are encouraging the chaos* instead of carrying on any *real* fight against it. Is that how you used to work under the "Chuso"? And is it possible to overcome the chaos unless the methods of the old "Chuso" are used?[678]

18/V. *Lenin*

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO V. I. LENIN

Vladimir Ilyich:

We discussed at the C.L.D. the question concerning the dispatch of the two ships to Italy. We established that the Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Trade has a special organisation for the sale and export of coal to Italy which has reportedly[x)] sent out one ship. That is why we confined ourselves to a decision on selecting the best brands of coal for the needs of export to Italy—for the purpose of winning the Italian market. As for the question of the two ships itself—we have postponed it until the question of how much coal has already been sent to Italy is cleared up.[xx)]

Please note that our representatives at Genoa have been confusing[xxx)] us all the time, making demands which they cancel within a few days. I shall send a telegram tomorrow asking them to bring up with Moscow only motivated and considered questions and proposals, as it is quite impossible to do one thing at the request of Litvinov and Chicherin only to abandon it on Krasin's proposal. Krasin's telegram shows that he himself is out of touch and does not know that the coal is already on the way and has been partially sold. The telegram on which you have made an inscription does not even say

to which of the Italian ports the coal is to go, where the buyer is to be found, and who is to be responsible for the sale of coal in Italy.

A. I. Rykov
Deputy Chairman, C.L.D.

19.25, May 17, 1922

Written on May 18, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

737
TO V. A. PAVLOV

18/V.1922

Comrade Pavlov:

I have received a communication from M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich. Please find out from him by phone what amount (in pre-war rubles) would be required *all together* for running the business well. If he cannot give you one figure, let's have no more than two (from—to; or minimum and maximum). Please send reply by telephone message or urgent note addressed to my secretary, Comrade Lepeshinskaya.[679]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

738
TO J. V. STALIN[680]

Comrade Stalin:

In sending on to you this letter of Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov, I strongly support his request. He is a sickly person, but an especially valuable worker. He should be given a rest in accordance with his request; I strongly support this. Once he has recovered and taken a rest, he will be of very great use both as a *professor*, nota bene, and a writer.

18/V.1922. *Lenin*

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

739
TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY[681]

Comrade Dzerzhinsky:

On the question of deporting the writers and professors helping the counter-revolution.

This needs more thorough preparation. Without it we shall make mistakes. Please discuss these measures of preparation.

Call a conference of Messing, Mantsev and some other persons in Moscow.

Put the duty on the Politbureau members to devote 2-3 hours a week to looking through a number of periodicals and books, *verifying* execution, *demanding reviews in writing*, and securing the dispatch to Moscow of all non-communist publications without delay.

Add to this the reviews by a number of Communist writers (Steklov, Olminsky, Skvortsov, Bukharin, etc.).

Collect *systematic* information about the political record, work and literary activity of the professors and writers.

Assign all this to an intelligent, educated and scrupulous man at the *G.P.U.*

My opinion on the two Petrograd publications:

Novaya Rossiya No. 2.[682] Closed down by the Petrograd comrades.

Perhaps it has been closed down too early? Circulate it to the *Politbureau* members and discuss *more thoroughly*. What is its editor *Lezhnev*? Is he from *Dyen*? Could information about him be collected? Of course, *not all* the people working on the magazine are candidates for deportation.[683]

The Petrograd magazine *Ekonomist*, published by the XIth Department of the Russian Technical Society, is another matter.[684] I think this is clearly a whiteguard centre. Its No. 3 (*only* No. 3!!! this *nota bene!*) carries a list of its members on the cover. These, I think, are *almost all* the most legitimate candidates for deportation.

These are all patent counter-revolutionaries, accomplices of the Entente, an organisation of its servitors and spies and corrupters of the student youth. We should make arrange-

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ments to have these "military spies" caught and once caught constantly and systematically and deported.

Please show this confidentially, without making any copies, to the *Politbureau* members, *returning it to you and to me*, and inform me of their opinion and your conclusion.

19/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 19, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

740
TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY

Comrade Dzerzhinsky:

I have a serious apprehension: there seems to be some "excess" in the expenses on my garage, which I believe is under particular *G.P.U.* supervision. Isn't it time that this establishment is "compressed" and the expenditures on it reduced? Everyone is reducing all expenditures.

Please show this to my "deputies" Rykov and Tsyurupa, and assign a reliable, intelligent, knowledgeable man to check up on whether the expenses under this head can be reduced and compressed, and reduced to the utmost.[685]

19/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 19, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

741
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

I am sending on to you a letter from Comrade Anikst, who attacked me yesterday (18/V). He is offended, embittered, alarmed. He is nervous, he is sick. I advised him to complete his treatment and to keep a grip on his nerves. He seems to be a good worker. His treatment should be

completed in Germany or in Riga. (Nothing will come out in Russia.)[686]

19/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 19, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

742

TO J. V. STALIN FOR THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. SECRETARIAT

Comrade Stalin:

Please pass on for decision by the C.C. Secretariat (or the Orgbureau; I do not know whose competence this is) the following petition of mine:

to send the surgeon, V. N. Rozanov, physician of the Soldatenkovskaya Hospital, for leave *in Riga in July*, together *with his son*.

This is the request I had from V. N. Rozanov, who has not charged me any fees now, as he had not done in 1918, although he has been to see me repeatedly. Comrade Semashko says that he is the best surgeon, but has little rest.

This is why I request that he should be granted this holiday, and ask that a secretary should be assigned to inform me of the decision of the Orgbureau or the *C.C.* Secretariat.[687]

21/V.1922. *Lenin*

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

743

TO THE HEADS OF ALL CENTRAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND ORGANISATIONS

Secret. Personal

To All People's Commissars (to the deputies of those who are absent)

Also to *all* separate establishments: Central Statistical Board, State Planning Commission, Concessions Committee, People's Commissariat for Internal Trade under the C.L.D.,

Centrosoyuz, etc., All-Russia Central T.U.C., Comintern, Profintern, etc.

As I am going on holiday for several months, it is my earnest request that you should keep me informed of the most important matters and the fulfilment of the most important decisions, plans, campaigns, etc., as follows:

—send me once or twice a month the briefest (not more than 2 or 3 pages) communications on the subject, and give instructions to send me the most important of the current publications by the People's Commissariat and also the texts of the most important published decrees and drafts. If the People's Commissar should find it inconvenient to do this work himself, please inform me who specifically (deputy, member of collegium, business manager or secretary, etc.) is to have this duty, instructing that person to maintain regular contacts with my secretary (Fotieva, Lepeshinskaya). Through these same secretaries it is always possible to send inquiries by telegraph or by mail, with the current and urgent inquiries addressed not otherwise than to my deputy (Rykov or Tsyurupa) and only copies sent to me.

21/V. *Lenin*

The secretaries will have the duty to watch accurately that this is done, informing me of the incoming publications, not sending in the whole lot, but only the most important ones (the rest—only a list).

Of the Russian newspapers supply regularly *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*.

Maintain regular contacts with the *Communist International* and the *People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs*, asking them to supply the *most important* foreign publications, especially pamphlets on current questions.

Of the Russian publications abroad send in *Nakanune*,[688] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Menshevik), *Zarya* (Menshevik), *Sovremenniye Zapiski* (S.R.), *Russkaya Mysl*[689] and a *list* of the other publications, pamphlets and books.

Written on May 21, 1922

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

744

TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin

I think this should be shown *in strict secrecy* (without making any copies) to Dzerzhinsky and *all the members of the Politbureau*, and a directive issued: "Dzerzhinsky (*G.P.U.*) is authorised to work out, with Semashko's assistance, a plan of *measures* and report to the Politbureau within a period of ——— (2 *weeks*?)."[690]

22/V. *Lenin*

Written on May 22, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

745

TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. POLITBUREAU

Urgent
Secret

To **Comrade Stalin** with a request to circulate all Politbureau members (being sure to include Comrade Zinoviev)

On the strength of this information from Comrade Reinstein, I am giving both Armand *Hammer* and B. *Mishell* a special recommendation on my own behalf and request all C.C. members to give these persons and their enterprise *particular* support.[691] This is a small path leading to the American "business" world, and this path should be made use of *in every way*. If there are any objections, please **telephone** them to my secretary (Fotieva or Lepeshinskaya), to enable me to clear up the matter (and take a final decision through the Politbureau) before I leave, that is, within the next few days.[692]

24/V. *Lenin*

P.S. 27/V. I have held this back pending a reply from Comrade Zinoviev. The reply came in on 26/V.

Lenin

Written on May 24 and 27, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

746
TO LYDIA FOTIEVA

Lydia Alexandrovna:

You can congratulate me on my recovery. The proof is my handwriting, which is *beginning* to look human again. Start preparing books for me (and sending me lists) of 1) science, 2) fiction, 3) politics (the latter last of all, because it is not yet allowed).

Will you complain to Rykov (Tsyurupa has left, hasn't he?) about all the secretaries: they are misbehaving, suffering from malaria, etc. Let him arrange for their rest in Riga, in Finland, near Moscow, etc. I think Rykov should issue a reprimand to Smolyaninov and yourself for failing to take good care of the secretaries.

Regards,

Lenin

Written on July 13, 1922

First published in part in 1942 in the book *Lenin Vladimir Ilyich. Kratky ocherk zhizni i deyatelnosti* (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Short Essay of His Life and Work), Moscow

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

747
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

I have given your reply very careful thought, and do *not* agree with you.[693]

You can congratulate me; I have been permitted *to read the papers*! Old papers from today, and *new ones* from Sunday*!

Yours,
Lenin

Written on July 13, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

748
TO M. K. VLADIMIROV

21/VIII.

Comrade Vladimirov:

As regards the apparatus, you are being unjustly aggrieved. I quite agree with you, and am informing both Stalin and Rykov about it.—— As regards catching out "NEPmen" I advise that we give very careful thought (perhaps, assign to this in a highly secret manner Rozengolts and another one or two comrades) about what we should do shortly: either introduce an income tax or a compulsory loan? or: which earlier?

Local finances have already yielded considerable data. They should be systematically collected and processed, *winkling out the names* and then deciding the matter raised.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on August 21, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

749
TO A. I. RYKOV

Comrade Rykov:

I am sending you a cutting from *Izvestia* (of 25.VIII, I believe).[694] I advise that you issue instructions to have this given particular attention. Check up (through the business manager or a secretary).

If it is true, *give every support*.

Has Rutgers achieved anything? I doubt it.

If anything has been achieved here, we should award the Order of the Banner of Labour;—send a letter to America (on your behalf or mine);— make the *State Bank* work out easier *loans* for such enterprises; and make the People's Commissariat for Finance or the People's Commissariat for Agriculture **urgently** work out easier terms for recruiting more tractors (in the autumn; now, to manage in time).

This appears to be an efficient example; business-like assistance; while we over here have *no end* of red tape!

Instruct secretary or business manager to write me a reply.[695]

Yours,
Lenin

N.B. *Carry out Getier's orders strictly!*

Written between August 25 and September 1, 1922

First published in 1942 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*

Printed from the original

750

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. OVER LESLIE URQUHART'S CONCESSION*[696]

Urquhart should be given a concession only provided we get a big loan.

All members of the Politbureau should acquaint themselves with the report of the Mikhailov Commission, which had gone out for an on-the-spot inspection of the plants to be handed over under concession to Urquhart, and which expressed a negative opinion.

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*At the top of the document Dzerzhinsky wrote: "V. I.'s directives—4.IX." and "To Comrade Stalin", and after the text: "Correct. Dzerzhinsky." There is also Stalin's remark: "Comrade Lenin's opinion."—*Ed.*

Our enemies hope to see the fixed capital in our transport and industry completely ruined. It is necessary to find the resources to rehabilitate this capital by imposing taxes on all articles of consumption, raising them to the maximum on such articles as sugar and *beer*.

Bear in mind an internal compulsory loan and an income tax.

Dictated on September 4, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a record made by F. E. Dzerzhinsky

751

TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I thank you for your information.[697] Will you be so kind as to find out the *exact* address of Comrade Zhidelev in the Crimea. I want to send him a letter (it would be more reliable to send it along with someone; please find out when there is an express train for the Crimea).

With communist greetings,

Lenin

I forgot another assignment (1) send me *I. Besprozvanny*'s pamphlets: (a) *Planning Bureau at a Small Industrial Enterprise Organised on the Taylor System*, Nizhni-Novgorod, 1915.

and (b) *also his*: *Modern Organisation of American Plants*, Moscow, 1919.

Also *find out* at the S.E.C. archives *who* gave permission or submitted for publication this *latter* pamphlet, the 1919 one. *It is* the S.E.C. that has published it.[698]

Written in September, not later than the 7th, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

752
TO N. I. BUKHARIN

7/IX.1922.

Comrade Bukharin:

I have read (in *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik*) Gorky's vile letter.[699] At first I thought of attacking him in the press (over the S.R.s), but then decided that this would be too much. Let us consult about this. Perhaps you see him now and then and talk with him? Please, write me your opinion. I have seen few newspapers (almost no foreign ones). This means that I have scant knowledge of the "situation". Write me your opinion in the greatest possible detail.

Best regards from all of us to your wife and yourself.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. I am almost well.

P.S. I am writing to *Krestinsky* to get me the *original* of Gorky's letter published in *Sotsialistichesky Vestnik* of 20/VII.1922.*

If he forgets, will you send it along.

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

753
TO M. P. TOMSKY

9/IX.

Dear Comrade Tomsky:

I shall fulfil your request with great pleasure.[700] Please write me whether or not there are any special subjects that you want me to deal with in my letter. I have fallen very far behind, and don't know whether it is all right to confine myself to a general and plain message of

* See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 444.—*Ed.*

greetings, or whether I should discuss more or less circumstantially any special subject.*

With warm communist greetings
to the whole Presidium,

Lenin

Written on September 9, 1922 Printed from the original

754

TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. ON REJECTING THE AGREEMENT WITH LESLIE URQUHART

12/IX.

Comrade Stalin:

Having read Krasin's agreement with Urquhart, I express my objection to its approval. While promising earnings for us within two or three years, Urquhart is taking our money just now. This is absolutely inadmissible. Mikhailov, chairman of the commission, who had made a special on-the-spot study of the Urquhart concession, has proved that it is not we *but the foreigners* who are guilty of the destruction. And after this it is we who have to pay!! We shall allegedly obtain relief within *X* years, but we ourselves have to start paying right away!

I propose that this concession be *rejected*.

This is bondage and plunder.

I remind you of the conclusion of the Mikhailov commission. It was against the concession.

Not a single serious argument has been added. It should be rejected.

I ask you to communicate this to the Politbureau members.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

P.S. It is a ruse to say that this concession will not be a precedent.

* See also Document 755 of this volume.—*Ed.*

It is bound to be and is sure to be a precedent. That is how it is sure *actually* to shape out regardless of all the talk and assurances.

And in general, absolutely no account has been taken of *everything* uncovered by the Mikhailov commission. There are a *number* of arguments against such a concession.

Lenin

Written on September 12, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

755
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade Stalin:

Please show Comrade Tomsky this draft letter (and if necessary, also to Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, etc.) and please *return to me*, *retyped*, *not later than tomorrow*.

I shall send it in to the congress by the 16th, or whenever necessary.[701]

Lenin

Written on September 13, 1922

Printed from the original

756
TO A. I. RYKOV

17/IX.

Comrade Rykov

Comrade Rykov:

I see from the papers that the situation over Donbas and Baku is desperate. What do you think? Shall we risk taking *a few millions* from the gold stock? Will not things be made worse if we miss this business and leave it without assistance? Perhaps you will ask Smilga or his

deputy to prepare a *short* report (no more than 5-10 lines) to help me get a *clear* view of the situation?[702]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on September 17, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

757
TO M. K. VLADIMIROV

17/IX.

Comrade Vladimirov

Dear Comrade:

Will you be so kind as to inform me

1) how much gold we have left? (a) total, (b) including that free from any obligations?

2) how many other valuables (*very briefly*, in the most general terms);

3) the size of the deficit now (the last quarter or month);

4) have you thought about the income tax and the compulsory loan? **Briefly**: what are your conclusions (only the final ones).[703]

With communist greetings,
Lenin

Written on September 17, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

758
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev:

About the rapporteur I agree *conditionally*: 1) Trotsky must also be there as a substitute (*and for his own* report as well); 2) I should be allowed to *back out*, but only if my health or my work *prevents* me.[704]

Concerning Urquhart, I withdraw my hesitations. There are already some American proposals. Baku is much better and more important. There is a *decision* by a C.C. com-

mission (Smilga + Andreyev + Krasin) which has been *directly* violated by Krasin. There are all the other minuses (99 years; the immensity of the dimensions, etc.).[705]

P.S. Let the Politbureau members read this.

Yours,

18/IX. *Lenin*

Written on September 18, 1922
First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

759
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

Please get together 1) the *decisions*, as they are published in the newspapers (*C.P.C.* and *C.L.D.*), and newspaper cuttings,

2) part of the especially important *minutes*.

3) *all* the old C.C. minutes (the Politbureau and the plenum).

Then **keep** a close **watch** on the business of the American oil concessions[706] and inform me by notes and by phone through my sister.*

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on September 19, 1922
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

760
TO V. A. SMOLYANINOV

Comrade Smolyaninov:

I am coming on 1 or 2.X. Will be in the chair on Tuesday, 3.X.[707] Meeting 5-9 hours. With a 1/4-hour break.

Warn smokers. *No smoking. Strictly.* Tea and smoking during the break (in the adjoining room).

---

* Maria Ulyanova.—*Ed.*

Is Tsyurupa here? When he returns, arrange a *meeting here* of all three deputies.

If he does not arrive, have a 2-3 hour meeting *on Monday*: either from 11 to 2, or from 5 to 7.

You should arrange all this *properly*.

On Tuesday *morning* have the *material* prepared for me on the *whole* of the agenda.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Find out about a congress on the questions of *normalisation*. When? Try to attend. I am *extremely* interested. Have a man from the State Planning Commission attend who takes a *very great* interest.[708]

Written on September 23, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

761

TO MARIA GLYASSER

1

Comrade Glyasser:

I am writing to Smolyaninov.

Let him show it to you and to *all* the secretaries.

I shall come on 2/X (or 1.X). Please have everything ready by Tuesday.*

I have received the C.C. minutes. They are *almost* in order (some enclosures are missing). But this is quite enough for the time being. It will be well to have extracts from the C.P C. and C.L.D. minutes (*newspaper cuttings*) arranged *conveniently* for looking through.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Written on September 23, 1922

First published in 1958 in the magazine *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 4

Printed from the original

* October 3.—*Ed.*

2

Comrade Clyasser:

I have not yet received the *exracts* from the C.L.D. and *C.P.C.* minutes? I have written to Smolyaninov.* Please arrange this with him. and send them on right away.

Second: find out from Svidersky what Tsyurupa has written. If he does not know, find out from *Stalin*. I must know *exactly*; let them give me an extract from Tsyurupa's *letter*, saying why he is not coming back, *for how long* he has put it off.[709]

Regards,

Lenin

Written in September, later than the 23rd, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

762

TO G. L. PYATAKOV

25/IX.

Comrade Pyatakov:

Here is a rough record of our conversation of yesterday.

1) Comrade Pyatakov is to organise (and tighten up in a military fashion) the State Planning Commission apparatus itself (or tbe apparatus of the State Planning Commission itself); mainly through an executive business manager. He himself should give this matter some 30 minutes a day as a maximum.

2) Comrade Pyatakov's main task is: a) verification of the state-wide plan, above all the economic plan, chiefly from the standpoint of the apparatus as a whole; b) reduction of the apparatus, including our trusts; c) verification of the proportion between the various sections of the state apparatus; d) work to reduce the cost of the state apparatus on the lines of an American trust: eliminate all unproductive expenditures.

3) Comrade Pyatakov is to be released from the State

* See Document 759 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Planning Commission's current work to a maximum (roughly, an hour a day).

Think this over, show Krzhizhanovsky and reply to me.[710]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on September 25, 1922
First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

763
TO N. V. KRYLENKO

25/IX.

Kursky's Deputy (if Kursky is absent)

Comrade Krylenko:

What are you doing for the publication of a code of laws of the Soviet power? Is the codification department asleep or is it preparing something for the fifth anniversary?

Will you wake it up and write me a couple of words.[711]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on September 25, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

764
TO A. I. RYKOV

25/IX.

Comrade Rykov:

I think it is absolutely necessary to carry out a one-day census of all officials and employees of the city of Moscow. We had one, but too long ago.

To do this at the minimum expense (only on paper, and even this can be obtained partly from the general stock of the Central Statistical Board), put an obligation on all those who are on the payroll of the Soviet government and the *trusts* to submit information on personal

cards *themselves* (in accordance with a *short* programme which the Central Statistical Board must work out *within a week*, *together with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*, *the State Planning Commission*, etc.). *No one is to be paid any salary until this is properly done.*

Then we shall get this quickly (fines for delays and unsatisfactory performance).

Our apparatus is such an abomination that it has to be radically repaired. This cannot be done without a census. And the Central Statistical Board deserves being taken to task for its academism: there they are sitting and writing their "tomes", giving not a thought to the vital problems.

Reply or pass the reply on to Comrade Smolyaninov.

Yours,
Lenin

Mobilisation should be applied, if necessary, but under a special law. All the employees of the Central Statistical Board should be mobilised and a certain percentage of the others as well.[712]

Written on September 25, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

765
TELEGRAM TO V. Y. CHUBAR

Bakhrnut, *Chubar*

Please inform me urgeutly about the bank-note requirements in Donbas. How much was promised and how much was actually received. Give data for the latest period.[713]

Lenin
Chairman, C.P.C.

The Kremlin, Moscow,
28/IX-22

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten copy

766

TO L. B. KRASIN

Comrade Krasin:

You have working for you a man called *Yermakov* (head of the transport-materials department?) with the rights of member of the Collegium. I saw him two or three times during the Civil War years, carrying out the most difficult, responsible and dangerous assignments. He is no ordinary man. It turns out that he is *most gravely* ill (bleeding from the throat). He has tried to receive treatment, but has *never* completed the full course, because the local "boys" have always diverted him to local work. He has a big family; his salary is 200 million—next to nothing.

This won't do. It is our duty to provide treatment for such men and see that it is completed. He should be sent to Germany for a few months, and his family should be helped. (Write me a couple of words confidentially.)[714]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on October 4, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

767

TO L. B. KAMENEV

1

Kamenev

Comrade Kamenev:

I have just seen Mikhailov. I am having second thoughts *again*. I am *against* the Urquhart concession. Let's get together at my place at 9.30 today (I shall be at the dentist at 8.30).[715]

Lenin

Written on October 4, 1922

2

Comrade Kamenev:

Today I have a swollen cheek and am running a temperature. I plan not to leave either for the C.C. this morning or for the *C.L.D.* tonight.

Let's keep in touch by paper.

Then, could I see Comrade *Chubar*?

Ask him whether he can come to see me this morning, now, before 2 o'clock?[716]

Yours,

Lenin

Written on October 6, 1922

3

Comrade Kamenev:

You haven't forgotten to take from Krasin the formulations of the *second* argument against the Urquhart concession (our dissatisfaction with the trade agreement, its defects)? You must take it.

Lenin

P.S. What's new at the plenum?[717]

Written on October 6, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

768

LETTER TO G. L. PYATAKOV ON LESLIE URQUHART'S CONCESSION

Comrade Pyatakov:

Yesterday you spoke out, like myself, against the Urquhart concession. That is why I think you are able and will agree to check once again the matter of this concession (especially since our decision of yesterday in essence puts off the question once again).

It is my opinion that the check-up should deal *mainly* with the question of monopoly; that is the central point of the matter. Then there is the question of the financial benefits from the concession.

1) A map of the concession should be obtained at the Mining Council—I. K. Mikhailov (chairman of the commission which went to the place) says that he gave them the map.

2) There is need to compile a table: a list of the main products; percentage of their production at our other plants (copper, zinc, and other products); where else they are produced, *whether very far* from the centre or nearer, etc.

3) Conclusion: in what branch, for what product Urquhart is to get a monopoly, its significance.

4) The chief of all the questions—Ekibastuz and its importance for the Urals.

I was very surprised at Bogdanov's slip: "Kuzbas is nearer" (it is much farther), while Comrade Krzhizhanovsky said that I was adhering to Mendeleyev's obsolete and rejected views. What is there to argue about when Ekibastuz has a branch-line running to the Irtysh, and provides much shorter and cheaper water transport to the Urals? What is the essence here?

If Kuzbas is much more expensive and distant (no water transport), we *have no right* to let Urquhart have the *whole* of Ekibastuz; he is welcome to take one-half.

Please show this letter only to Krzhizhanovsky; do not assign this check-up to anyone else; do it yourself (of course, any official will let you have all the statistical figures about the volume and place of extraction of zinc, copper, etc., without knowing what they are for); write me whether you undertake to do this, and how soon you expect to finish it.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

6.X.1922.

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

769

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER *PUT MOLODYOZHI*[718]

6/X.1922.

Dear Friends:

I thank you whole-heartedly for your message of greetings. For my part, I send you my best regards and wishes.

Yours,
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Smena* No. 2

Printed from the original

770

TO B. G. ZAKS

Comrade *Zaks*

I want you to make an absolutely exact check-up and let me have by 10.X a statement of our gold stock, signed by you and by a responsible worker from the People's Commissariat for Finance whose duty it is, in virtue of his official status, to report on the gold stock.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Stock of all types and all origins from the People's Commissariat for Finance, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, etc.*

Lenin

Written in October, before the 10th, 1922

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

* This sentence is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

771

TO B. G. ZAKS

Comrade *Zaks*

I want you, together with ths People's Commissariat for Finance, urgently to work out a draft secret decree on the accounting of our *overall* monetary fund as of the first of each month.

Introduce this draft at the C.L.D. or pass it on for signature by Deputy Chairman of C.L.D. Comrade *Kamenev*.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on October 16, 1922
First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

772

*TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE

I propose that you let me have, through the C.P.C. business manager Comrade Gorbunov, a short monthly table of the P.C.F.T. turnover and earnings. This item of our revenue budget is most important.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 16, 1922
First published in 1945
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten
text signed by Lenin

773

TO G. K. ORJONIKIDZE

16/X.1922

Comrade Sergo:

Both Stalin and Sokolnikov have turned out to be against appropriations for an electric-power station near Tiflis.

Compromise: Tumanov's trip.

Pay *particular* attention to this (it also involves the question of *tea*, etc.).

Collect all the material (for the business manager).

Send me both the material and a **short** summary (for me personally). This will be a hard fight.[719]

Yours,
Lenin

First published in part in 1925 in the book, M. D. Orakhrlashvili, *Lenin i ZSFSR* (Lenin and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), Tiflis

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

774

TO L. B. KAMENEV AND N. P. GORBUNOV

17.X.1922

Comrades Kamenev and Gorbunov

I support Comrade Shotman's application for the construction of a paper mill in Karelia and the working of mica. If there are no special obstacles, please speed up the matter.[720]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

775

LETTER TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. ON AN AGREEMENT WITH A CONSORTIUM OF GERMAN FIRMS[721]

Comrade STALIN for the POLITBUREAU
Copy to Comrade KAMENEV

I have given a careful reading to the agreement with Otto Wolff. I find that Comrade Kamenev's objections are

based entirely on a misunderstanding, and I believe the question should be brought up for decision by the Politbureau not later than tomorrow, because the difference between Kamenev and myself calls for an authoritative and final decision.

Kamenev writes in his note that "we are under an obligation to Wolff to buy his goods". This is a complete misunderstanding. When reading the agreement, I saw in several clauses that we have the right to check the list of goods given us by Wolff. We do not undertake the slightest obligation to buy Wolff's goods. If Wolff fails to draw up a list of goods which we agree to buy, then the agreement extends only to that part of Wolff's goods which we have agreed to buy. I clarified this matter in detail today both with Lezhava and Frumkin, and both have confirmed that not the slightest obligation in any sense falls on us to buy Wolff's goods.

A similar misunderstanding on Comrade Kamenev's part explains his allegation that Lezhava has "enhanced" his doubt. Actually there is quite a different explanation to Stomonyakov's proposal, which is formulated on page 2 of Protocol No. 62, and which was unanimously accepted by all our economic executives. The proposal is that, in the interests of our reviving industry, Wolff should develop to the utmost the delivery to us of machine-tools and other implements necessary, for example, for the electric trust. Wolff may accept this because such an order will also give him earnings, and it happens that the German metal industry is in need of orders in general. We are absolutely in need of machine-tools and machinery for the electric trust, let us say, because this industry of ours is beginning to revive, and it is of extreme importance for us to develop this industry here, by finally reinforcing it with German means of production.

Consequently, the amendment tabled by Lezhava flows from the correctly understood economic interests of Russia, which now needs protectionism, especially for her whole light industry, because then it will be easier for us to rehabilitate this industry, thereby ensuring the interests of our proletariat. Lezhava's amendment has nothing in common with free trade of any sort or even with the open-

ing of frontiers, assuming the retention of customs tariffs. At the end of his note, Comrade Kamenev writes:

"The result: for a deferment of our payments to Wolff for a year, for unknown goods, we are now giving him a monopoly right to purchase and export raw materials. That is cheap."

This is total misunderstanding. It is impossible to imagine a more advantageous agreement than the one we are concluding with Wolff. We pay him 10 per cent a year, whereas even Britain now pays 7 per cent, and the German Government pays 12 per cent. That's the first thing. The second is that we are not buying from him any unknown goods, but only those we have checked by list and permitted for import. The third fact is that we are giving him a monopoly right to buy and export for a sharing of the profits which can have nothing to do with any kind of customs tariffs. Namely: first, we receive a 10 per cent dividend, second, we receive a 10 per cent profit, like Wolff, and third, if the profit is in excess of 40 per cent, we receive 75 per cent of the rest, whereas the consortium receives only 25 per cent.

I think the agreement with Wolff is a typical agreement with German capitalist enterprises.

Such an agreement is immense]y advantageous to us if only because we receive a half share of the profits which might go up to hundreds of per cent. In the process, the interests of our reviving industry and consequently of our industrial enterprises are fully protected. There is not a trace of the devastating consequences which would flow for us even from a conditional, even from a temporary opening of the frontiers. That is why I absolutely insist on approval of the agreement with Wolff, and in view of the extreme urgency of the matter I request that this question should be raised in the Politbureau tomorrow, and enclose herewith the agreement with Wolff and Comrade Kamenev's note.[722]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on October 18, 1922

First published in 1964
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from a typewritten
copy with Lenin's corrections
and signature

776

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PERM GUBERNIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

October 20, 1922.

The American tractor team, led by Comrade Harold Ware, which is working in Okhansk Uyezd, on the territory of Perm Gubernia, has achieved considerable results, although it has been working only a short time. Altogether, up to 1,500 dessiatines has been ploughed up, of which almost 1,000 dessiatines has been sown to winter grain crops.

But for the usual drawbacks in our practice, the said group would have undoubtedly succeeded in achieving even greater results.

Your report, however, mentions the shortage of gasoline and lubricating oil, and the shortage of building workers, but says nothing about what the Gubernia Executive Committee has done to straighten things out.

It is absolutely intolerable that such a useful undertaking does not meet with every possible support, especially on the part of local organisations, which are in a better position to analyse any obstacles and help to remove them.

Please give the maximum support to this group, and, in particular, help implement their proposals for the efficient use of tractors, supply of gasoline, establishment of a repair shop, housing construction, etc.

The assistance being extended to us by the American agricultural groups is most desirable and timely. Our task in all this is mainly to help them carry out their ideas with the least possible delay.

Please inform me of the results of your measures through Comrade Smolyaninov, and also of any specially important current needs which you are unable to meet yourself.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten
text with Lenin's corrections
and signature

777

TELEGRAM TO K. M. TSINTSADZE AND S. I. KAVTARADZE[723]

21/IX-22
Code

Tsintsadze and Kavtaradze, C.P.G. C.C., Tiflis
Copy to Orjonikidze, C.C. member and
Orakhelashvili, Secretary of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee

I am surprised at the indecent tone of the direct wire message signed by *Tsintsadze* and others, which was handed to me for some reason by Bukharin instead of one of the *C.C.* secretaries. I was sure that all the differences had been ironed out by the *C.C.* Plenum resolutions with my indirect participation and with the direct participation of *Mdivani*.[724] That is why I resolutely condemn the abuse against *Orjonikidze* and insist that your conflict should be referred in a decent and loyal tone for settlement by the R.C.P. C.C. Secretariat, which has been handed your direct wire message.

Lenin

First published in 1927
in the book, M. Kakhiani, *Partiya i trotskistsko-uklonistskaya oppozitsiya v Gruzii*
(The Party and the Trotskyite-Deviationists Opposition in Georgia), Tiflis

Printed from
a typewritten copy

778

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

24/X.1922

A number of newspaper articles have noted the absolutely extraordinary success scored by some American agricultural communes and teams who had brought their tractors along with them. It has been established in a special check-up that excellent work has been done by the

tractor team led by Harold Ware in the Toikino State Farm, Perm Gubernia. Besides, the Industrial Immigration Department of the Supreme Economic Council is in possession of similar information concerning the work of agricultural communes in Kirsanov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, and in the village of Migayevo, Tiraspol Uyezd, Odessa Gubernia.

The American Society for Technical Aid to Russia is now organising nearly 200 artels with 800-1,000 tractors for dispatch to Russia. If this goes through, we shall have at least one model farm with American machinery in each uyezd, which I believe to be of great importance.

With the object of encouraging this undertaking, I have written letters of thanks to the American Society of Friends of Soviet Russia and the American Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia, telling them that no type of aid is as important to us or as timely as that which they are extending to our agriculture.* In these letters I told them that I was sending a recommendation to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee that they should declare the Perm and other leading farms model ones and give them special and extraordinary assistance, both in respect of building operations, and in the supply of gasoline, metal, and other material necessary for the extension of operations and the starting of repair shops.

Please consider this question and grant my request.[725]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten
copy signed by Lenin

779

TO L. S. SOSNOVSKY

Comrade *Sosnovsky*

I am sending you a copy of Comrade Osinsky's letter from Berlin dated 14/X, in which he writes about the

* See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 380, 381.—*Ed.*

Shatilov Trust.[726] Please make a study of the work in selecting improved varieties of oats and insert an item in *Pravda* about the importance of this work, in general, and the work of the Shatilov Trust and the Russian selectionist Lisitsyn, in particular. You will probably be able to obtain all the necessary information from Comrade Teodorovich. Through him, too, you will be able to establish direct contact with the Shatilov people and Lisitsyn. As a preliminary, I recommend that you should acquaint yourself with the book published here in a translation by Timiryazev entitled *The New Earth*.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

P.S. Earlier I personally heard Osinsky give a *very* good opinion about the new (or old?) selectionist at the Shatilov Trust. *Check* this if convenient!

Yours,
*Lenin**

Written on October 25, 1922

First published in 1924 in the magazine *Khochu Vsyo Znat* No. 8

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and signature

780

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY AND G. L. PYATAKOV

26.X.1922

Comrade Krzhizhanovsky
and Comrade Pyatakov

I am sending you the enclosed.[727] I have no copy.
This requires an opinion *fairly soon* (2 or 3 days, I think).
That is the first thing.
The whole matter is to be solved officially.
That is the second.
Please hurry.

* The P.S. is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

Ivan Ivanovich Radchenko is an old Bolshevik: he must be *helped*.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

781
TO V. N. MAXIMOVSKY

27.X.1922

Comrade Maximovsky:

You may have heard about yesterday's C.C. decision.[728] In this connection it is perhaps also necessary to review some of the other sections of the estimates of the People's Commissariat for Education in order to co-ordinate the whole thing, fill in the gaps, etc.

Since you are at the head of the administrative and financial work of the People's Commissariat, I ask you to start at once a review of the estimates of the P.C.E., trying to reduce the unnecessary elements in general (part of the C.C.I.L.C.S.,* some of the higher schools, many of the top sections, etc.), to increase appropriations for the schools and the liquidation of illiteracy. Phone me about this or write a couple of words.

Yours,
Lenin

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

782
TO L. B. KAMENEV

Comrade Kamenev:

Krzhizhanovsky has told me that Pyatakov had made a slip and had allowed an *increase* in the estimates

* Central Commission for Improving the Living Conditions of Scientists under the C.P.C.—*Ed.*

(People's Commissariat *for Defence*) instead of a reduction. We should perhaps *put it off* for a day or two to try to *correct* Pyatakov?[729]

Yours,
Lenin

Written between October 27 and 30, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

783
TO V. M. MOLOTOV

Comrade Molotov:

Please read this, give it your *attention* and return to me. Write briefly to tell me whether the gold has been sent to Armenia (1.5 million rubles, the decision was, I believe)?

What about the other measures to help the Armenians?

This should be *speeded up and verified*.[730]

Awaiting your reply.

Lenin

Written on October 28, 1922

First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from the original

784
TO G. L. PYATAKOV AND M. I. FRUMKIN

Comrades *Pyatakov* and *Frumkin*
Copies to Comrades Stalin and Kamenev

The telegram received about Comrade Krasin's meeting with Urquhart's agent makes us hasten with the insertion of the discussion articles on this question. That is why request that Pyatakov's article should be inserted in *Pravda* tomorrow, with the reservation that it is being carried by way of discussion. The day after, insert Frumkin's article, or anyone else's according to his choice.

I think it would be better for us to have both articles signed, but this requires a re-decision on what was decided by the Politbureau, that is why the question of signing the article should be left open until tonight.[731]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on October 30, 1922

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in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

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a typewritten copy

785

TO L. B. KAMENEV

30.X.1922

Comrade Kamenev:

Krzhizhanovsky informed me on Friday night* that Comrade Pyatakov erroneously passed the military estimates at a figure several tens of trillions of rubles higher than agreed.

Yesterday I learned that you had failed to correct this mistake in the C.P.C. You propose, as you say, to leave it for the time being. Having thought about this I find that this is an extremely dangerous and unreliable way, which is incorrect in principle, and is inconvenient in every respect.

I propose that we meet at my place today, on Monday, either from 1 to 2, or from 6 to 7, together with Stalin (Zinoviev and Molotov) and agree on convening the Politbureau, I think, this very day.

The C.P.C. decision should be reversed at once, and Pyatakov reprimanded. Otherwise, we shall find ourselves entangled for a long time; I am very sorry for my proposal (which is a late one), but I cannot do otherwise.

I am sending a copy to Comrade Stalin.**

With communist greetings,

Lenin

First published in 1965
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Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

* October 27.—*Ed.*

** See next document.—*Ed.*

786

TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. POLITBUREAU[732]

Krzhizhanovsky has told me that this was a mistake on Pyatakov's part (the State Planning Commission Deputy Chairman). Such mistakes should not be allowed. I think Pyatakov should be politely requested not to make any such mistakes in the future.

30.X.1922. *Lenin*

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

787

LETTER TO G. V. CHICHERIN AND MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C. ON A NOTE TO THE ENTENTE POWERS CONCERNING THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE[733]

31/X.1922

To Comrade Chicherin and all members of the Politbureau

I have no time now to weigh with sufficient consideration all the expressions in the draft Note to the Entente, which I believe to be very important. I think that every word should be checked two or three times to see that it does not mean that we shall refuse to attend the conference.

In that sense, the Note should be especially "diplomatic". It seemed to me that at the end of the Note, which I gave a very cursory glance, there are expressions which are not sufficiently diplomatic in this sense.

Lenin

First published in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from a typewritten copy

788
TO K. B. RADEK

It would be well to have a book published as a textbook: a review of *all* the countries of the world; who owes whom how much; the advantageous and essential sources of *revenue* in each country.

In sum, a vivid and laconic picture of shameless domination by *four* imperialist powers (we shall translate it into all the languages; turn it into a textbook, making additions every two years).

The map should be clear.

The map should show the chief values;

—the chief *debts*;

all this presented visually, in diagrams, etc.

Written in 1922, not later than October

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the original

789
*TO THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

Copy to Comrade Teodorovich

Upon examining the estimates of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, the inter-departmental conference has refused to include the Gossemkultura estimates in the P.C.A. budget, proposing that it request a loan from the State Bank, which, instead of the 3.5 trillion rubles required for the first quarter, is prepared to give only one trillion.

Attaching great state importance to the work of the Shatilov Trust, and being sure that improvement in plant varieties on the American model is a most important basis for increasing the productivity of our agriculture, I request a review of the decision taken by the inter-departmental conference, so as to satisfy the needs of Gossemkultura as far as possible.

I enclose as material a copy of Comrade Teodorovich's statement and a copy of Comrade Osinsky's letter, with which I am in full agreement.[734]

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

Written on November 4, 1922
First published in part in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*
Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

790
TO N. P. BRYUKHANOV

Comrade *Bryukhanov*
People's Commissariat for Food

I have been informed that, because of the rainy summer, great quantities of grain are being delivered to the grain-collecting stations in a moist state. It is feared that it will easily heat up and lose its economic value.

Please let me know whether this is true, and whether the necessary measures have been taken to safeguard the collected grain, and also who is personally in charge of this on the all-Russia scale.

Gleb Maximilianovich informs me that a great threat to the tax in kind lies in the delayed delivery of considerable quantities of food, reaching 10,000 carloads at the points of destination—Moscow, Petrograd, Samara, Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, Kostroma and others, which is due to a shortage of storage space at the points of destination and general delays in discharging.

It looks as though no favourable results have yet been achieved by re-routing freight from one point to another, because even after re-routing to other points, the freight cars are kept under discharge for weeks, waiting for sacking and storage space.

An especially dangerous moment now seems to be coming up because the warehouses are full up.

Please let me know the present state of the unloading

of grain, and the measures being taken by the People's Commissariat for Food to accelerate it.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 6, 1922
First published in 1945 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

791

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY

Comrade *Krzhizhanovsky*, *State Planning Commission*
Copy to Comrade *Sokolnikov*, *People's Commissariat for Finance*

I am sending you copies of two letters from Comrade Chubar, in which he argues that the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence, of October 13, about Donbas has been overthrown by life itself.[735]

The question should be urgently reviewed in full, with the participation of the People's Commissariat for Finance and the All-Russia Central T.U.C. It is necessary, at all costs, to find a solution for all questions, ensuring the normal operation of Donbas, and making it independent of the continued decline in the ruble's rate.

I consider this to be of exceptional urgency and request the State Planning Commission specially to concentrate on this work.[736]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 6, 1922
First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

792

*TO THE G.P.U.

Copy to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
" to Comrade Eiduk

I have information about heavy illegal immigration at the present time (of Russians and Americans) through

various border points, especially through the Black Sea ports.

The S.E.C. department of industrial immigration reports that up to 200-300 persons are coming in every month. (Among those coming in are profiteers, counter-revolutionaries and people of that sort.)

Please take the most resolute measures to stop such immigration.

Inform Comrade Gorbunov about the measures you take.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 6, 1922

First published in 1959 in the book, *V. I. Lenin, O sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti* (*1917-1922*), Moscow

Printed from a typewritten copy

793
TO G. V. CHICHERIN[737]

Comrade Chicherin:

Perhaps we should kick at Mussolini and have *everyone* (Vorovsky and the whole delegation) *leave Italy*, starting to *attack* her over her fascists?

Let us stage an international demonstration.

This provides a very convenient pretext: you have beaten our men, you are barbarians, diehards *worse than those in Russia in 1905*, etc., etc.

I think we should do this.

Let us give the Italian *people* some serious help.[738]

Yours,
Lenin

Written in November, not before the 8th, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

794

TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade *Trotsky*, copies to *Zinoviev*, *Bukharin*, *Radek*, *Stalin* and *Kamenev*

1. About Bordiga, I very strongly advise the adoption of your proposal that we send a letter from our C.C. to the Italian delegates and insistently recommend that they adopt the tactics you have outlined, otherwise the actions of the latter will be highly harmful for the Italian Communists in everything they subsequently do.[739]

2. I have read your theses concerning NEP and on the whole find them very good, and some formulations extremely felicitous, but a small part of the points seemed to me to be dubious. I would advise their publication in the newspapers for the time being, and then re-issue in a pamphlet without fail. With some comments, they will be especially appropriate for informing the foreign public about our New Economic Policy.

Lenin

Dictated by phone
at 11.00 a.m. on November 25, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

795

TO L. D. TROTSKY, G. Y. ZINOVIEV, N. I. BUKHARIN AND K. B. RADEK[740]

Comrades *Trotsky*, *Zinoviev*, *Bukharin* and *Radek*

I have read the document which you have sent me, namely, the draft in German entitled "Outline of Agrarian Action Programme", compiled mainly by Varga and approved by the commission, and I very much hesitate to support it. I feel that the draft gives virtually nothing new in comparison with the resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the agrarian question. I very much fear that some formulations, diverging, perhaps even accidentally, from the Second Congress resolution, may cause

misunderstanding and breed artificial talk about a discrepancy between this draft and the Second Congress resolution. There also seems to be a distinct element which weakens what was said there about supporting the peasant movement, and which is capable of producing some dissent between the needy peasantry and the rural proletariat.

I am unable to go into this question in greater detail and make a sentence-by-sentence collation between Varga's draft resolution which you have sent in and the Second Congress resolution. I consider it necessary to warn that we should not let ourselves accumulate numerous resolutions on one and the same question which are capable of producing misunderstanding and confusion.

As a minimum, I would propose:

1) To collate the new resolution with the Second Congress resolution sentence by sentence.

2) To give the new resolution the character of something like a partial commentary.

I personally feel that the new resolution is of very doubtful value.[741]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
at 12.00 a.m. on November 25, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

796

*TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C.

Copy to Comrade *Bogdanov*
" to Comrade *Fomin*

On November 14, the Council of People's Commissars examined the question of handing over the sleeper-impregnation factories from the S.E.C. to the People's Commissariat for Railways, and it was decided to do so.

Because I have some doubts about this decision being correct, I am asking the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. to make a detailed re-examination of this matter in substance, giving each side at least 20 minutes to present their case.

A representative of the S.E.C. will report for one side, and a representative of the People's Commissariat for Railways, for the other.

All the material in this case will be presented to you by the C.P.C. business manager, Comrade *Gorbunov*, to whom I have given an assignment to that effect.[742]

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on November 29, 1922

First published in 1933 in the book, V. V. Fomin, *Lenin i transport*, Moscow

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

797
ON N. M. KNIPOVICH'S NOTE[743]

His request for a ship for the Azov Sea should be supported (I enclose his note).

3/XII-22 *Lenin*

I know *N. M. Knipovich* personally as an absolutely honest man. At one time, he was politically a Plekhanovite, before that and later, a non-factional Social-Democrat. His opinion can and *must* be regarded as being fully reliable. *Knipovich* has a thorough and scientific knowledge of the fishing industry: he has been studying it for 37 years.

Lenin

Written on December 3, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten copy

798
TO I. I. KHODOROVSKY

Comrade Khodorovsky:

Comrade Molotov informs me that you have had experience in Novo-Nikolayevsk in arranging help from city cells to rural cells and vice versa. Will you collect material about this—written or printed—or, if you have no time to do this before the Congress of Soviets, will you write a

couple of words, or perhaps we shall find time to talk it over.[744]

Lenin

4/XII-22

Dictated by phone

First published on April 22, 1930 in *Izvestia* No. 111

Printed from a typewrttten copy

799

TO A. I. SVIDERSKY

Comrade Svidersky, People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection

1. I have information that the Administration for the Island Economy of the Arctic Ocean is selling alcohol to the Novaya Zemlya settlers and is making drunkards out of the natives.

It is alleged that the Administration sets such plunderous prices that the settlers try to sell the products of their industry to visiting Norwegian trappers, who offer less plunderous prices for their goods.

2. I have been informed that as a result of the sharp decline in the fishing industry during the war the sea-roach, vvhich had almost lost its commercial importance through rapacious fishing, has once again appeared in commercial quantities in the Sea of Azov. Much young fish of the sturgeon species, including the almost extinct white sturgeon, has also appeared. But on the one hand, there has been started at once unchecked and unrestricted plunderous catching of young sturgeon, which could quickly cancel out the favourable effect of the war. On the other hand, something inconceivable has allegedly been happening, and perhaps is still happening, in the lower reaches of the Don. As an example I have been told that even the water guards of the Don Food Committee have engaged in plunderous fishing in the restricted zone, with a sort of charge allegedly being levied for permission to catch fish in the restricted area—between 400 and 500 million rubles for one net casting.

The chief of the water guard service of the Don Food Committee has been removed from his post for plunderous

fishing in the lower reaches of the Don. This gentleman has *merely* been removed from his post. It is necessary to find out where he is and to make a *more serious* check up on whether he has been sufficiently punished.

Please appoint an inquiry into both cases and inform me through Comrade *Gorbunov* of the results in a short note.

These people should not just be given a scare, but should also be brought to book and taken to task for these scandalous practices.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written on December 5, 1922

First published in part in 1934 in the magazine *Rybnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR* No. 1

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from a typewritten text signed by Lenin

800

TO CHARLES PROTEUS STEINMETZ

To the highly esteemed Charles Proteus Steinmetz, one of the few exceptions to the united front of representatives of science and culture opposed to the proletariat.

I hope that a further deepening and widening of the breach in this front will not have to be awaited long. Let the example of the Russian workers and peasants holding their fate in their own hands serve as an encouragement to the American proletariat and farmers. In spite of the terrible consequence of the war destruction we are going ahead, though not possessing to the extent of one tenth the tremendous resources for the economic building of a new life that have been at the disposal of the American people, for many years.[745]

Vladimir Oolianoff
(*Lenin*)

Moscow. 7.XII.1922.

First published in English in July 1923 in the magazine *Soviet Russia Pictorial*

First published in Russian on April 21, 1961 in *Izvestia* No. 96

Printed from a photocopy of the English text in an unknown hand and signed by Lenin

801
TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

Comrade Zinoviev:

I do *not in the slightest* suspect you of being biased about Rozhkov.

Not in the slightest!

But in substance I very much fear that he will lie all he can, *even if it is in the press*. He will lie and we shall be circumvented.

That is what I fear.

Their slogan is: lie, leave the Party, remain in Russia.

That is what we must think and *talk about*.[746]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on December 7 or 8, 1922

First published in part in 1957 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Published in full in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the original

802
TO J. V. STALIN

Comrade *Stalin*

Comrade *Stalin*:

I question the legality of yesterday's decision about Rozhkov, because:

first, this decision, contrary to custom and rules, had not been entered on the agenda before 12.00;

second, the documents were not communicated to C.C. members beforehand;

third, there was no ground for haste after a twofold discussion of the question, especially since I was present at the first part of the sitting, and the question came up just when I had to leave. That is why I insist on referring the matter to the plenum, especially because only a week remains before it meets.[747]

On the question of Lozovsky, I propose that the time which has been made available should go into a more thorough search for the necessary candidates.[748]

We, as a Party, have already devoted an unconscionable amount of energy to the Comintern, and, consequently, to the Profintern as well. If Lozovsky has proved to be independently not quite satisfactory, there is need to recruit fresh forces either from among the foreigners, or among workers who would in no case be used otherwise, i.e., either for organisational, or practical, or administrative work. That is why it is quite impossible to take Kalnin who, I have heard, has started rather important and, unless I am mistaken, rather successful work in Donbas. On no account either should there simply be an appointment of Tomsky, because he is swamped with work at the All-Russia Central T.U.C., which is rendered extremely difficult by the shortage of men. If necessary, I propose the appointment of Tomsky and Rudzutak to have them devote to this new duty not more than 30 minutes a day, with the compulsory engagement of two or more secretaries who know foreign languages and who are capable of keeping Tomsky and Rudzutak informed in every detail. I propose that an assignment to find such secretaries be given to the Orgbureau or the Secretariat, provided they are not removed from any post which our Party needs.

I draw attention to the fact that if men like Rothstein are not used, this is a clear indication of crying anarchy in the administrative arrangements of the Profintern and the Comintern, because, at any rate, such men have proved by their long work that they are quite suitable for literary activity, for example, in the old *Neue Zeit*[749]; there is no doubt that given the necessary secretarial assistance these men will be of exceptional benefit, and the required secretaries can and must be recruited not from among Russians but foreigners. It is high time that an end should be put to the drawing of forces from our Party for the benefit of the Comintern and the Profintern.

I propose that a relevant proposal should be sent to the C.C. Secretariat or the Orgbureau.[750]

Lenin

Dictated by phone
on December 8, 1922

First published in 1965
in *Collected Works*,
Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from
a typewritten copy

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

803

LETTER TO CONSTANTINO LAZZARI AND ASSIGNMENT TO SECRETARY

The Kremlin, Moscow, December 11, 1922

Dear Comrade Lazzari,

I thank you very much for the kind greetings you have sent me through Comrade Maffi, and send you my best wishes.

Unfortunately, because of my illness,* I have not been able to follow your activities since the Third Congress of the Communist International. There is now the most delicate task to cope with. The congress has decided upon the merger and it should be promoted to the best of one's abilities.[751] I am sure that you will use all your authority and the enthusiasm of the old devoted revolutionary to achieve the great purpose which we set ourselves, that of establishing a solid and sincere union of all true revolutionaries.

I count on you especially in case Serrati may create obstacles, even though against his will: the distrust from the past is so gleat that he must not only be most loyal (this goes without saying), but must prove this in every way. What is more, he must especially find all possible methods (he is rather adroit and flexible in this) to avoid giving any pretext for mistrust on the part of the Communists. Unfortunately, my illness has prevented me from saying this personally to Serrati.**

Best regards, wishing you good health,[752]

Lenin

To **Fotieva** or the secretary on duty

Please retype, *correcting my* French, and return to me.

First published in 1959 in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from a typewritten text with Lenin's additions and corrections
Translated from the French

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* The words "Unfortunately, because of my illness" are in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

** This paragraph is in Lenin's hand.—*Ed.*

804
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky:

I am sending you Krestinsky's letter. Write me as soon as possible whether you agree; at the plenum, I am going to fight for the monopoly.

What about you?

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. It would be best returned *soon*.[753]

Written on December 12, 1922 Printed from the original

805
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky
Copy to Frumkin and Stomonyakov

Comrade Trotsky:

I have received your comments on Krestinsky's letter and Avanesov's plans.[754] I think that you and I are in maximum agreement, and I believe that the State Planning Commission question, as presented in this case, rules out (or postpones! any discussion on whether the State Planning Commission needs to have any administrative rights.[755]

At any rate, it is my request that at the forthcoming plenum you should undertake the defence of our common standpoint on the unquestionable need to maintain and consolidate the foreign trade monopoly. Since the preceding plenum passed a decision in this respect which runs entirely counter to the foreign trade monopoly, and since there can be no concessions on this matter, I believe, as I say in my letter to Frumkin and Stomonyakov,* that in the event of our defeat on this question we must refer the question to a Party Congress. This will require a brief exposition of our differences before the Party group of the

* The letter has not been found.—*Ed.*

forthcoming Congress of Soviets.[756] If I have time, I shall write this, and I would be very glad if you did the same. Hesitation on this question is doing us unprecedented harm, and the negative arguments boil down entirely to accusations of shortcomings in the apparatus. But our apparatus is everywhere imperfect, and to abandon the monopoly because of an imperfect apparatus would be throwing out the baby with the bath water.

Lenin

13/XII-22

Dictated by phone

Printed from a typewritten copy

806
TO V. A. AVANESOV

Comrade Avanesov:

I am sending you my letter.* Return by 7.00.

Think out thoroughly what should be added or eliminated. *How should the struggle be arranged?*[757]

Yours,
Lenin

Written on December 14, 1922

First published in 1957 in the magazine *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 4

Printed from the original

807
LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

I am now through with putting my business in order, and am in a position to leave without worry.[758] I have also come to an arrangement with Trotsky to stand up for my views of the foreign trade monopoly. There is only one thing that is worrying me extremely—it is that I am unable to speak at the Congress of Soviets.[759] On Tuesday, I shall have the doctors in to see me and we shall discuss whether

* See present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 455-59.—*Ed.*

there is any chance at all of my doing so. I would regard my missing it as a great inconvenience, to put it no stronger. I have had the outline of my speech written several days ago.[760] I propose, therefore, without suspending preparations by some other speaker in my place, to keep open until Wednesday the possibility that I will perhaps personally make a speech, much shorter than the usual one, say, lasting 45 minutes. Such a speech would in no way prevent a substitute (whomsoever you would authorise for that purpose) from making a speech, but I think it would be useful both in the political and in the personal sense, because it would remove any cause for great agitation. Please have this in mind, and if the opening of the congress should be further delayed, inform me in good time through my secretary.[761]

Lenin

15.XII.1922

I am resolutely opposed to any delay on the question of the foreign trade monopoly. If the idea should arise, for whatever reason (including the proposition that my participation in the question is desirable), to postpone it until the next plenum, I should most resolutely object to this, because I am sure that Trotsky will be able to stand up for my views just as well as I myself. That is the first thing. The second is that your statement and Zinoviev's and, according to rumour, Kamenev's as well, confirm that some members of the C.C. have already altered their earlier opinion; third, and most important: any further hesitation on this highly important question is absolutely intolerable and will tend to frustrate any work.

Lenin

15.XII.22

Dictated by phone

First published in part in 1930 in the second and third editions of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXVII

Published in full in 1964 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 45

Printed from secretarial notes (typewritten copy)

808
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade Trotsky:

I consider that we have quite reached agreement. I ask you to declare our solidarity at the plenum. I hope that our decision will be passed, because some of those who had voted against it in October have now partially or altogether switched to our side.*

If for some reason our decision should not be passed, we shall apply to the group of the Congress of Soviets, and declare that we are referring the question to the Party congress.

In that case, inform me and I shall send in my statement.

Yours,
Lenin

P.S. If this question should be removed from the present plenum (which I do not expect, and against which you should, of course, protest as strongly as you can on our common behalf), I think that we should apply to the group of the Congress of Soviets anyway, and demand that the question be referred to the Party congress, because any further hesitation is absolutely intolerable.

You can keep all the material I have sent you until after the plenum.**

Written on December 15, 1922

Printed from the original and the text in Lydia Fotieva's hand

809
TO L. D. TROTSKY

Comrade *Trotsky*

Comrade *Trotsky*:

I am sending on to you Frumkin's letter which I have received today.[762] I also think that it is absolutely necessary to have done with this question once and for all. If

* The words "to our side" are in Lydia Fotieva's hand.—*Ed.*
** P.S. is written in Fotieva's hand—*Ed.*

there are any fears that I am being worried by this question and that it could even have an effect on my health, I think that this is absolutely wrong, because I am infinitely more worried by the delay which makes our policy on one of the most basic questions quite unstable. That is why I call your attention to the enclosed letter and ask you to support an immediate discussion of this question. I am sure that if we are threatened with the danger of failure, it would be much better to fail before the Party congress, and at once to apply to the group of the congress, than to fail after the congress. Perhaps, an acceptable compromise is that we pass a decision just now confirming the monopoly, and still bring up the question at the Party congress, making an arrangement about this right away. I do not believe that we could accept any other compromise either in our own interests or the interests of the cause.

Lenin

15.XII.22

Dictated by phone

Printed from a typewritten copy

810

TO DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE C.P.C. AND C.L.D.[763]

*Letter to the Deputies**

1. Rykov should be given the State Planning Commission.**

2. I think that we should employ 6 shorthand writers recording every interview briefly, in 3 or 4 lines, naturally confining this only to the essence of what is agreed and to the main—two or three—figures.

I think this is necessary to have the work of the three deputies concerted, and second, to make it possible to

* The typewritten copy says: "To Comrades Kamenev, Rykov and Tsyurupa."—*Ed.*

** Then follows a crossed-out text which is not in the typewritten copy: "2. I have not yet had time to give sufficient thought to the other points of the distribution, and I shall reply today, if I have time to reread and think them over."—*Ed.*

think again about the decisions taken on the run, and to compare the results of the measures taken after a few weeks.

Gorbunov should be assigned the organisation of this whole apparatus of stenographic note-taking, and strict supervision to see that it works quite well.

3. Please make a brief record—roughly on one page—of the decision you have finally taken with respect to the statistician Popov. I do not intend to question this decision just now, but believe that within a few weeks we shall need a precise record of the charges and the defence.*

N. Lenin

Dictated on December 16, 1922

First published in 1965 in *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Ed., Vol. 54

Printed from the text in Nadezhda Krupskaya's hand

811
TO L. D. TROTSKY[764]

It looks as though it has been possible to take the position without a single shot, by a simple manoeuvre. I suggest that we should not stop and should continue the offensive, and for that purpose put through a motion to raise at the Party congress the question of consolidating our foreign trade, and the measures to improve its implementation. This to be announced in the group of the Congress of Soviets. I hope that you will not object to this, and will not refuse to give a report in the group.

N. Lenin

December 21, 1922

Printed from a typewritten copy

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* The point at issue has not been established.—*Ed.*

1923

812
TO L. D. TROTSKY[765]

Top secret
Personal

Dear Comrade Trotsky:

It is my earnest request that you should undertake the defence of the Georgian case in the Party C.C. This case is now under "persecution" by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Quite to the contrary. I would feel at ease if you agreed to undertake its defence. If you should refuse to do so for any reason, return the whole case to me. I shall consider it a sign that you do not accept.[766]

With best comradely greetings,

*Lenin**

Dictated by phone
on March 5, 1923

Printed from
a typewritten copy

813
*TO J. V. STALIN

Top secret
Personal

Copy to Comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev

Dear Comrade Stalin:

You have been so rude as to summon my wife to the telephone and use bad language. Although she had told

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* A separate sheet, appended to the present letter, contains this note by a secretary: "Comrade Trotsky: To the letter communicated to you by phone, Vladimir Ilyich asked to add for your information that Comrade Kamenev is going to Georgia on Wednesday, and wants to know whether you wish to send anything there yourself. March 5, 1923."—*Ed.*

you that she was prepared to forget this, the fact nevertheless became known through her to Zinoviev and Kamenev. I have no intention of forgetting so easily what has been done against me, and it goes without saying that what has been done against my wife I consider having been done against me as well. I ask you, therefore, to think it over whether you are prepared to withdraw what you have said and to make your apologies, or whether you prefer that relations between us should be broken off.[767]

Respectfully yours,
Lenin

March 5, 1923

Printed from secretarial notes
(typewritten copy)

814
TO P. G. MDIVANI, F. Y. MAKHARADZE AND OTHERS

Top secret

Comrades Mdivani, Makharadze and others
Copy to Comrades *Trotsky and Kamenev*

Dear Comrades:

I am following your case with all my heart. I am indignant over Orjonikidze's rudeness and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing for you notes and a speech.[768]

Respectfully yours,
Lenin

March 6, 1923

Printed from secretarial notes
(typewritten copy)

NOTES

[1] In his articles sent to S. P. Sereda Prof. V. A. Michelson of the Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy (now the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy in Moscow), basing himself on scientific data, wrote about the periodical succession of dry and rainy years. Predicting the advent of an early drought, he said it could be combated by higher labour productivity both in industry and agriculture. On Lenin's instructions, Michelson's article was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 258 on November 17, 1920, under the title "Important Warning", and the following day the paper carried Sereda's article, "About the Article 'Important Warning'", which dealt with the concrete measures necessary to prevent a crop failure.

On November 25, 1920, Sereda wrote to Lenin: "Vladimir Ilyich, I have carried out your instructions concerning the publication of Prof. Michelson's article on the coming drought (*Izvestia* No. 258) and my own item about his article (*Izvestia* No. 259, which I enclose).

"I also sent them to *Pravda*, but they were not published because *Izvestia* had carried both earlier." A short note was sent to the Telegraph Agency of Russia (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 47

[2] Written on a resolution adopted by the Narrow Council of People's Commissars on November 4, 1920, which was typed on a C.P.C. letterhead and sent in for Lenin's signature. It dealt with an extra-budgetary credit of 5 million rubles for the C.P.C. Managing Department to buy vegetables for the C.P.C. hospital. p. 48

[3] In an effort to avoid further bloodshed, M. V. Frunze, commander of the troops on the Southern Front, radioed an offer to Wrangel on November 11, 1920, to cease resistance, promising an amnesty for those who laid down their arms. Wrangel did not reply to Frunze's proposal and concealed it from his troops. p. 48

[4] The Siberian Concessions Committee was set up by a C.P.C. decision of October 30, 1920, and on November 16 it submitted its

draft decree to the C.P.C. The latter appointed an ad hoc committee (V. I. Lenin, D. I. Kursky, A. M. Lezhava, V. P. Milyutin and S. P. Sereda) to rework and edit the draft decree within a week. On November 23, the C.P.C. adopted a decree on concessions and approved the committee's proposal to publish a pamphlet on concessions. At the end of 1920, it appeared under the title *O kontsessiyakh. Dekret Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov ot 23 noyabrya 1920 g. Tekst dekreta. Obyekty kontsessii. Karty.* (On Concessions. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 23, 1920. Text of the Decree. Concessions' Objects. Maps.)
p. 49

5 Written in connection with a letter sent to Lenin on November 7, 1920, by Y. G. Parfyonov, extraordinary and plenipotentiary Uyezd Commissar for Food of the Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee, who said that engineer A. A. Baryshnikov's invention was not being tested fast enough and asked Lenin to issue instructions to have it applied in production as soon as possible.

On November 19, 1920, Lenin received a reply to his inquiry (see next document) which stated that the Inventions Committee of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council had examined Baryshnikov's application submitted to the Committee on September 15, and had on September 30 issued to him a claim certificate. The Committee said Baryshnikov's invention differed little from earlier ones, while the quality of the leather was to be ascertained by means of tests; the initial tests carried out by the Central Administration of the Leather Industry (Glavkozha) had been unfavourable, and Baryshnikov was working to improve his invention. The final conclusion would be drawn as a result of further tests. p. 50

6 Lenin received a detailed official reply to all his questions from the Inventions Committee of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council on November 20, 1920. Appended were: 1) a record of the inventions examined by the Committee's sections, 2) the major inventions recognised as useful and partially applied, 3) a list of inventions deserving government attention, 4) preliminary opinion of expert F. Blistanov on the leather substitute invented by engineer A. A. Baryshnikov, 5) the Committee's report as of November 1, 1920, 6) information about V. A. Petrov, military engineer and technologist, chairman of the Technical Department.

At the same time, Lenin received an additional report from A. K. Kaufman, member of the Committee Collegium, who dealt with the shortcomings in the Committee's work and their causes.
p. 51

7 A reference to the remarks and additions made by Nadezhda Krupskaya to the draft letter of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, "On the Proletcults" (Proletarian Culture Organisations), whose initial variant had been drawn up by G. Y. Zinoviev and

further elaborated on the basis of remarks by the members of the Central Committee and the People's Commissariat for Education. Krupskaya proposed the following fundamental addition to the letter: "The Proletcult emerged *before* the October Revolution. It was proclaimed an 'independent' workers' organisation, unconnected with the Ministry of Public Education under Kerensky. The October Revolution changed the prospect. The Proletcults continued to remain 'independent', but now they were 'independent' of the Soviet power." The following was also accepted in her wording: "Instead of helping proletarian youth to engage in serious study and making its communist approach to all the aspects of life and art more profound, artists and philosophers essentially remote from and hostile to communism, but proclaiming themselves to be truly proletarian, hampered the workers...." And further: "Far from wishing to constrict the initiative of the working-class intelligentsia in the sphere of creative art, the Central Committee wants to create for it a healthier and more normal atmosphere and to enable it to leave its mark on the whole of creative art" (*Voprosy Istorii KPSS*—Questions of the C.P.S.U. History—1958, No. 1, p. 36). Nadezhda Krupskaya also made various other minor corrections in the draft letter.

Lenin directed and took a personal part in working out the C.C. letter, an important Party document, based on the instructions which he set out in the draft resolution, "On Proletarian Culture" and in the "Draft Decision for the Plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on Proletcult" (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 316-17; Vol. 42, p. 226). On December 1, 1920, the letter was published in *Pravda*. p. 51

[8] A reference to the decision, "On fuel and food supplies to the factories being restarted in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia, included in the shock group of textile enterprises", which was adopted on Lenin's report by the Council of Labour and Defence on October 1, 1920. G. K. Korolyov's report erroneously gave the date as October 5. p. 51

[9] The letter was sent out by Lenin after his talk with G. K. Korolyov, Chairman of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Executive Committee, who had been dispatched to Moscow in connection with the food crisis in the gubernia, the stoppage of fuel supply for shock textile mills and delays in wage payments to workers. On November 15, 1920, Korolyov told Lenin about the gubernia's hardships and submitted a report listing the necessary measures to overcome them.

On November 16, the C.P.C., on the report of a commission appointed by Lenin, adopted a decision on the supply of money and food to the workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The following day, November 17, the Council of Labour and Defence, on the strength of a report by the same commission, adopted a resolution on the supply of food and fuel to Ivanovo-Voznesensk. On the

question of assistance to the factories of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, see Document 240 in Volume 52 of the Fifth (Russian) Edition of the *Collected Works*. p. 52

[10] Written by Lenin after a talk on surplus-food requisition with N. S. Bodyakov, a delegate of the peasants of Mosalsk Uyezd, Kaluga Gubernia, on November 16, 1920. p. 52

[11] Lenin got the requested report on November 18, 1920. p. 53

[12] The Soviet Government concluded a trade agreement with Britain on March 16, 1921. p. 54

[13] A reference to the occupation of Batum by British troops planned with the consent of the Georgian Menshevik government. On November 16, 1920, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, sent a Note to the representative of the Georgian Menshevik government Makharadze and a radio telegram to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, stating that the Soviet Government regarded the occupation of Batum as an attempt to start another war in the Caucasus and to create a direct threat to the security of the Soviet Republic. He drew attention to the possible dire consequences, the responsibility for which would fall entirely on the invaders and their accomplices. p. 54

[14] In a speech at a peasant meeting in the village of Yaropolets on November 14, 1920, Lenin dealt with some aspects of electrification in the area, improvement of public education and industrial development. A general meeting of the Electrotechnical Co-operative Society on November 18 was attended by representatives from 14 villages of Volokolamsk Uyezd, Yaropolets Volost. The meeting sent Lenin a letter requesting assistance: 1) in obtaining the necessary resources and materials to electrify Yaropolets Volost; 2) in assigning teachers to the area to improve public education and 3) in developing flax growing.

The first document was written by Lenin on November 19 after he had read the letter. That same day, he inquired about the quantity of non-ferrous metals in stock at Myza-Raiovo (Central Artillery Administration). The second document was written on the reply to his inquiry which he received on November 20. p. 54

[15] The report on the electrification of Yaropolets Volost, Volokolamsk Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia, was received by Lenin on November 29, 1920. p. 54

[16] A reference to the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence of October 8, 1920, concerning the supply of clothes to the Donbas miners. p. 55

[17] At a sitting on November 24, 1920, the Council of Labour and Defence set up a Provisional Conference, consisting of represen-

tatives of the People's Commissariat for Food, the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Defence, the Chusosnabarm (Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Red Army and Navy Supplies), the People's Commissariat for Railways, the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council, and the Central Committee of the Miners' Union, and assigned it the task of supervising the regular and urgent supply of everything necessary to restart the coal industry in the Donets Basin. p. 55

[18] Written by Lenin in connection with §4 of the draft resolution of the C.P.C. on the "Moscow Higher State Art and Technical Studios". Lenin's proposal was adopted and §4 was approved in the following wording: "Enrolled students shall be deemed fulfilling their academic obligations under study control on the strength of special rules which must be established by the Chief Labour Committee together with the People's Commissariat for Education within the fortnight and submitted for approval to the Council of People's Commissars."

Lenin made the following correction in the note to §3 of the draft: instead of the words "in their preparatory year" he inserted "in all years". With Lenin's amendment, the note read: "In all years, the teaching of political science and the fundamentals of the communist world outlook shall be obligatory."

In this form, the C.P.C. resolution was approved on December 18, 1920. p. 56

[19] During the talk with Deputy People's Commissar for the Affairs of Nationalities, A. Z. Kamensky, Lenin drew attention to the need to issue literature on the national question.

On November 26, 1920, Kamensky sent Lenin a letter, informing him that the State Publishers were delaying the issue of a prepared collection of Soviet government decisions on the national question over a period of three years, and requested Lenin's personal intervention. The note published here was written by Lenin on Kamensky's letter.

Shortly after this, in December 1920, the State Publishers put out the collection of the People's Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities, *Politika Sovetskoi vlasti po natsionalnym dyelam za tri goda. 1917—XI—1920* (The Policy of the Soviet Power on National Affairs for Three Years. 1917-XI-1920). p. 56

[20] A reference to the last paragraph in G. V. Chicherin's dispatch to L. B. Krasin of November 27, 1920, which said: "Re-establishment of the Groman Commission by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and ourselves is being delayed by statistician Popov who wants to take part. For some reason, the C.P.C. has supported him. The friction continues. We hope soon to get the commission going." Lenin underscored the paragraph, drew three lines in the margin and put two exclamation and two

question marks (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). The letter in question was written by Lenin on the dispatch. p. 56

[21] A reference to the draft statute of the People's Commissariat for Education written by V. I. Solovyov and the draft theses on reorganising it prepared by Y. A. Litkens. Both drafts were sent by the authors to Lenin. On the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Education see also present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 120-22, 123-32; Vol. 42, pp. 237-38; and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 42, p. 376. p. 57

[22] The question of abolishing cash taxes was discussed at sittings of the Council of People's Commissars on November 3 and 30 and December 18, 1920. On November 3, the C.P.C. set up a commission consisting of S. Y. Chutskayev (chairman), N. I. Bukharin, N. N. Krestinsky, D. I. Kursky, S. P. Sereda, F. F. Syromolotov and O. Y. Schmidt; later M. F. Vladimirsky and A. D. Tsyurupa were also included in the commission. On November 30, the C.P.C. adopted the decision on direct taxes written by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 42, p. 230). On December 18, the C.P.C. adopted, in principle, Chutskayev's draft decree on the abolition of cash taxes, and referred it to a commission consisting of Chutskayev, Kursky and T. V. Sapronov, instructing it to rework the draft on the strength of the directions which had been given, and, in the event of a unanimous decision, to submit the decree for Lenin's signature and place it before the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. On February 3, 1921, the latter adopted a decision in principle, suspending the collection of all existing taxes, both state and local. The transition to the new financial policy in connection with the introduction of NEP once again brought out the tax problem. p. 58

[23] A reference to a resolution by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted on November 27, 1920 (see present edition, Vol. 42, p. 228). p. 59

[24] A reference to a decision of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. of December 11, 1920, concerning the work of the organising commission for convening the First All-Russia Congress of Transport Workers (the decision to call the congress was passed by the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on December 7), and the agenda of the congress and the rapporteurs. The congress was held in Moscow from March 22 to 31, 1921. Lenin delivered a speech at the congress (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 272-84). p. 59

[25] On December 8, 1920, a Plenary Meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided to release A. I. Svidersky from his post of member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food and to appoint A. B. Khalatov in his stead. Besides the Plenary Meeting ordered the People's Commissariat for Food to

take more vigorous steps to enlist workers to the running of all the departments and to recruit even more workers to the Commissariat and at a faster rate.

Svidersky's release was opposed by A. D. Tsyurupa, who threatened to resign from his post of the People's Commissar for Food. At its sitting on December 9, 1920, the Plenary Meeting reaffirmed its decision and rejected Tsyurupa's resignation. p. 60

[26] A reference to the resolution on the food question adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, on N. P. Bryukhanov's report, on September 26, 1920. Its point 12 said: "In order to make the work of the governing centre of the People's Commissariat for Food more flexible, the Council of People's Commissars is to be authorised to limit the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food to seven members (the People's Commissar and his deputy included), instructing the People's Commissariat for Food to give a precise definition to the functions and responsibilities of each" (*Postanovleniya i rezolutsii sessii VTsIK sedmogo sozyva* [Decisions and Resolutions of the Seventh All-Russia Central Executive Committee Session], Moscow, 1920, p. 77).

A Plenary Meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on December 9, 1920, adopted a decision to reduce the number of members of the Commissariat's Collegium to seven, including the People's Commissar, in accordance with the resolution of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. On December 14, the C.P.C. approved the new Collegium: People's Commissar A. D. Tsyurupa, Deputy People's Commissar N. P. Bryukhanov and members I. S. Lobachev, N. Osinsky, A. P. Smirnov, A. B. Khalatov, L. M. Khinchuk. p. 61

[27] On December 13, 1920, Lenin received S. M. Ter-Gabrielyan, who had been sent to Moscow by the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia to report to Lenin on the political and economic situation in Armenia.

As a result of the reckless policy of the Dashnaks, who had started a war against Turkey in late September 1920—with the approval of the Entente—the Turkish army occupied the towns of Sarykamysh, Kars, Alexandropol and others. On the occupied territory, the Turkish troops massacred great numbers of Armenians. Many Armenians died from starvation and epidemics, and thousands of families fled from their homes, seeking refuge in other parts of Armenia.

The Dashnak government of Armenia rejected the R.S.F.S.R.'s mediation and preferred to sign the enslaving Alexandropol Treaty on December 2, 1920, under which Armenia was declared a Turkish protectorate. But the treaty did not enter into force, because the Dashnak government was overthrown on November 29, 1920, and the Soviet power was proclaimed in Armenia. On March 16, 1921, the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey signed a treaty which virtually nullified the Alexandropol Treaty. The question of

the Soviet-Turkish border in the Caucasus was finally settled with the signing of the Kars Treaty on October 13, 1921. p. 62

[28] The letterhead of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, on which this order was written, contains these inscriptions: "Comrade Peterson. Please issue instructions that this work should not be hampered. 18/XII. *A. Yenukidze*" and "Snigiryov instructed personally. *Peterson*. 18/XII" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 63

[29] A reference to the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets held in Moscow from December 22 to 29, 1920 (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 461-535). p. 63

[30] A reference to the "Outline of the Administrative Map of the R.S.F.S.R." Lenin's instructions were fulfilled on February 7, 1921. There were two printings of the map in 1921, the first in monochrome, and the second with the additional data and in various colours. Copies of the maps are at the V. I. Lenin State Library of the U.S.S.R. p. 64

[31] A reference to N. A. Semashko's assignment to V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich to organise a committee for setting up sanitary check-points at Moscow railway stations to handle the trainloads of demobilised Red Armymen. p. 65

[32] Written on E. M. Sklyansky's letter, which said that some workers of railways and military communication offices were divulging secret information. p. 65

[33] Written on the reverse of the last page and on the inside back cover of the pamphlet by Béla Kun (Kolozvari) entitled *Von Revolution zu Revolution* (From Revolution to Revolution) published in Vienna in 1920. On the cover Lenin wrote: "Lenin. See last page", and made various remarks, markings and underlinings on pages 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21-27, 29, 35, 41-43, 48-55 (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 66

[34] A reference to Lenin's draft reply to a letter from the Central Committee of the Board of the Swedish Red Cross No. 2371 of November 9, 1920, requesting that I. P. Pavlov should be given permission to "go to Sweden where he will have the possibility of conducting his great research in a calm and favourable atmosphere", and stating that "the idea arose in the scientific circles of the Nobel Prize Institute and was caught up by the Swedish Red Cross; Prof. Pavlov knows nothing about it" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* [Documents of U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy], Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 682).

Lenin put a very high value on Pavlov's scientific achieve-

ments and treated him with very great attention and concern. On January 24, 1921, the C.P.C. adopted the decree written by Lenin "Concerning the Conditions Ensuring the Research Work of Academician I. P. Pavlov and His Associates" (present edition, Vol. 32, p. 69). Also see this volume, Document 40. p. 67

[35] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter to Lenin of January 3, 1921, informing him about the negotiations between A. A. Joffe, Chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian delegation, and Jan Dombski, Chairman of a delegation from the bourgeois Polish Republic, on the conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other. Dombski demanded that the Soviet Republic should compensate Poland for military expenditures running to 73 million gold rubles, while Joffe agreed to only 30 million.

The peace treaty concluded on March 18, 1921, stated that both sides waived any compensation for their military expenditures and losses caused by the war. p. 67

[36] This is written on G. V. Chicherin's letter concerning the forthcoming talks with Horthy's Hungarian government over the exchange of People's Commissars of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, whom it had arrested, for hostages in Soviet Russia. Chicherin said that these talks could become more general, and that the Hungarian Communists had earlier expressed dissatisfaction over the Soviet Government's agreement with the reactionary Horthy government on the repatriation of prisoners of war. Chicherin wrote: "... I should like to know the attitude you take, in principle, on whether it is admissible for us to conduct political negotiations with reactionary governments, when the issue is our external security" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 68

[37] At the invitation of peasants from the village of Modenovo, Bogorodsk Volost, Vereya Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia, Lenin gave a report on the current situation at a meeting of the inhabitants of the villages of Modenovo, Shalikovo and others, on December 15, 1920. At their request, Lenin signed a record of the minutes. When the peasants complained about their excessive quotas in the delivery of surplus corn and hay, Lenin said that he was unable to decide the matter on the spot and asked them to send a representative to Moscow.

In fulfilment of an assignment from Lenin, N. P. Gorbunov got the actual condition of the peasants in the village of Modenovo thoroughly verified, and on March 5, 1921, their deliveries were cancelled. Before this decision had been taken, a general meeting of Modenovo peasants on January 29, 1921, discussed the matter of surplus deliveries and decided that the quotas could not be met in full. They added: "Realising the critical state of the country, however, we have decided to help with food and fodder, reducing our own stocks to the bare minimum. In addition

to our earlier fulfilled quotas, we have decided to add 3 poods of rye, 10 poods of oats, 31 poods of potatoes and 24 poods of hay" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 68

[38] A reference to the request from the peasants of the village of Gorki, Sukhanovo Volost, Podolsk Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia, submitted to the Moscow Economic Council on January 9, 1921, for assistance in arranging the supply of electric power to their village from the electric-power station at the neighbouring Gorki state farm. They enclosed an estimate and an explanatory note giving a detailed list of the necessary materials. p. 70

[39] A reference to the resolutions of the Party conference on public education held in Moscow from December 31, 1920 to January 4, 1921. Because the matter of reorganising the People's Commissariat for Education had been dealt with in general terms, Lenin ordered the implementation of its resolutions to be suspended. On January 26, the matter was discussed by a Plenary Meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee which set up a special commission headed by Lenin. For the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Education see this volume, Documents 19 and 68, present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 120-22, 123-32; Vol. 35, Document 270; Vol. 42, pp. 237-38 and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 42, p. 376; Vol. 52, Documents 418, 440. p. 70

[40] In a letter to Lenin of January 14, 1921, Dvosya Shklovskaya (G. L. Shklovsky's wife) wrote that since their return to Russia from exile abroad in October 1920, she herself and her children especially were constantly unwell and could not adapt to local conditions. She asked Lenin for help in having Shklovsky sent to work abroad to enable his family to go with him.

On her letter, Lenin wrote: "Comrade Gorbunov. This is a fair request; I earnestly ask you to meet it. In Russia, this family *will not survive. Lenin*. Please make a note of the address. Send on to Krestinsky" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). On the question of Shklovsky's departure for abroad, see this volume, Documents 44, 72 and 196 and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 52, Documents 138, 139, 250, 284, 314, 407, 408, 409, 424, 466. p. 71

[41] Lenin was on holiday from January 1 to 22, 1921, and lived at Gorki, coming to Moscow for meetings of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and the Council of Labour and Defence. p. 71

[42] A reference to the memorandum and report on the state of and prospects for fuel supply in the Soviet Republic submitted by A. V. Eiduk, a special representative of the Council of Labour and Defence for central fuel administrations. On January 20,

1921, N. P. Gorbunov and Eiduk formulated practical proposals on this question. On January 28, the C.L.D. set up a plenipotentiary commission on fuel, headed by V. A. Avanesov, and on January 31, following an examination of Eiduk's report about the disastrous state of the railways, the C.L.D. included him in the commission as well, adopting a decision on fuel on February 2. p. 72

[43] At a joint sitting of R.C.P.(B.) members who were delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, members of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. and the Moscow Gubernia T.U.C. on December 30, 1920, a dispute arose over whether Y. E. Rudzutak was the author of the theses on "The Production Tasks of the Trade Unions". In this context, Lenin requested the All-Russia Central T.U.C. to provide documentary evidence on the origin of the theses. He was given an extract from the minutes under No. 44 of the sitting of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. of November 1, and a covering memo by S. A. Lozovsky. Lenin sent the material collected, together with Rudzutak's theses, to the *Pravda* Editorial Board and these were published on January 21, 1921, with Lenin's covering letter. p. 72

[44] The Council of People's Commissars decided: "To authorise Comrade Gorbunov to establish thorough supervision over the fulfilment of C.P.C. decisions, especially those not specifying dates of execution" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 74

[45] Written on Y. Larin's note to V. I. Lenin and A. I. Rykov of January 26, 1921, informing them that in view of V. V. Fomin's appointment as Chairman of the Supreme Council for Transportation (C.P.C. decision of January 25), the writer was resigning as deputy chairman of the Council.

On February 5, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee discussed the question of the Supreme Council for Transportation and decided to accept Larin's resignation, authorising Rykov to implement the decision in the most appropriate form, and putting the Council's administration entirely in the hands of Fomin. p. 75

[46] Written on a letter from P. N. Lepeshinsky to Lenin of January 26, 1921, requesting assistance in obtaining living quarters. p. 75

[47] Lenin received detailed fortnightly reports on the work on a caterpillar peat crane at the Sormovo Works. On June 24, 1921, he was informed that the assembly was in its final stages and that the crane would be tested in the latter half of July. p. 76

[48] The decree on concessions was approved by the Council of People's Commissars on November 23, 1920. p. 76

[49] On January 27, 1921, Lenin received Maxim Gorky and a delegation of the Joint Council of Scientific Institutions and Higher Schools of Petrograd, consisting of Academician S. F. Oldenburg, permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences of Russia; Academician V. A. Steklov, Vice-President of the Academy, and Prof. V. N. Tonkov, President of the Military Medical Academy. During their talk, they handed in a draft decree on ensuring scientific research work in the Republic. Together with Lenin's note written on the draft it was sent on to N. P. Gorbunov. On February 1, 1921, the C.P.C. discussed the draft decree, submitted by the Narrow C.P.C., on the means required to normalise the work of educational research and technical research institutions in the R.S.F.S.R. p. 76

[50] Written on a letter from the Academy of Sciences of Russia to the C.P.C. of January 21, 1921, petitioning the nationalisation and transfer to the Academy of a former estate of Academician A. A. Shakhmatov, called Gubanovka-Shakhmatovka (Saratov Gubernia), for use as a rest home for scientists. On January 31, 1921, the Narrow C.P.C. passed a decision to send an inquiry on the matter to the Saratov Gubernia Executive Committee. p. 77

[51] Lenin received the necessary information on establishments of the People's Commissariat for Education and on school premises occupied by various establishments, texts of the laws in force, resolutions and instructions on secondary schools, on vocational and technical training, and material of the Party conference on public education. p. 78

[52] Written in reply to a communication from M. A. Kruchinsky, member of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, to Lenin, expressing dissatisfaction with the work of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, notably, that of N. Osinsky. p. 78

[53] Written on a letter from G. Kotlyarov, a representative of the miners, to Lenin of January 24, 1921, suggesting that the steel cables on lifts in Moscow dwelling houses should be dismantled and handed over for use in mines, where mechanisms were idle because of a cable shortage. See also this volume, Document 169. p. 79

[54] A. V. Peshekhonov, one-time Minister for Food in the bourgeois Provisional Government, worked at the Central Statistical Bureau of the Ukraine in 1921. On January 20, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided to dismiss him from his job. In July 1922, Peshekhonov was arrested for participation in the counter-revolutionary League of Regeneration and deported. p. 79

[55] The register of outgoing documents, kept by Lenin's secretaries, had this entry: "2.II. No. 159. Two books by Engels and a let-

FROM MARX TO MAO
NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

ter to Ryazanov" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 80

[56] On February 1, 1921, the C.P.C. adopted a decision authorising the Narrow C.P.C. to verify execution by People's Commissariats of decisions and assignments from the C.L.D. and the C.P.C., bringing to the notice of the C.P.C. the question of execution of decisions having fundamental importance. p. 81

[57] The text of the telegram proposed by Lenin was approved by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on February 14, 1921. p. 84

[58] The working people's armed uprising, led by the Georgian Bolsheviks, against the Menshevik government of Georgia began on the night of February 11, 1921. At the request of the Georgian working people, Soviet Russia's Government ordered units of the 11th Army to support the insurgents. Relying on the support of these units, the workers and peasants of Georgia fought a heroic struggle and routed the Menshevik forces, liberating Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, on February 25, and proclaiming Georgia a Soviet Socialist Republic. See this volume, Documents 66 and 86. p. 84

[59] The text of the telegram proposed by Lenin was approved by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on February 15, 1921. p. 84

[60] Reciprocal territorial claims over Borchalo and a part of Akhalkalaki uyezds, Tiflis Gubernia, resulted in a war between Menshevik Georgia and Dashnak Armenia in December 1918. After "peaceful mediation" by the British command, which pursued its own colonialist aims, military operations were stopped, the northern part of Borchalo Uyezd going to Georgia, the southern, to Armenia, and the central—Lori district—was declared a neutral zone with a mixed Georgian-Armenian local administration subordinate to the Entente military command. In November 1920, in view of the war between Dashnak Armenia and Turkey, the neutral zone was occupied, with the Entente's consent, by the troops of Menshevik Georgia. The working population of the neutral zone, which was being subjected to savage plunder and violence, staged an armed uprising under the leadership of the Communists against the oppressors on the night of February 11, 1921. It was the start of a general victorious uprising by the working people of Georgia against the Menshevik regime. p. 84

[61] On April 18, 1921, the C.P.C., on a proposal of the Narrow C.P.C., approved a decree entitled "On the Provision of Hostels for Workers' Departments". It was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 93 on April 29, 1921. p. 85

[62] *The Academic Centre*, or the centre for general theoretical and programme direction, was one of the organs of the People's Commissariat for Education. On the strength of the "Statute of the People's Commissariat for Education", approved by the C.P.C. on February 11, 1921, the Academic Centre was to consist of a scientific section (State Scientific Council) with three subsections—scientific-political, scientific-technical and scientific-pedagogical—and an arts section (Chief Arts Committee) with five subsections: literature, theatre, music, figurative arts and the cinema. In addition, the Central Archives Board and the Central Museum Board were part of the Academic Centre. p. 86

[63] Lenin wrote these two notes at a sitting of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. The first was written in reply to Krestinsky's note saying that the *Pravda* Editorial Board had received an article on the advantages of the tax in kind over the surplus-food requisitioning. L. B. Kamenev had passed on the article to Krestinsky requesting that it should be printed without fail on February 17. N. L. Meshcheryakov, a member of the *Pravda* collegium, had doubts about the need for its urgent publication. Krestinsky wrote to say that he was essentially in agreement with Meshcheryakov.

The second note was in reply to Krestinsky's communication that he was doubtful about the official character of the article, which was being presented almost on behalf of the Moscow Soviet, because the authors had signed: "Moscow Gubernia Food Commissar Sorokin and Head of Moscow Gubernia Agricultural Department Rogov." On February 16, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee passed a decision permitting the publication of the article.

The article entitled "Surplus Appropriation or Tax" signed by P. Sorokin and M. Rogov, was carried by way of discussion in *Pravda* Nos. 35 and 43 on February 17 and 26, 1921. It was mentioned by Lenin in his speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies on February 28, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 156). p. 86

[64] On February 18, 1921, N. I. Muralov, in a positive reference about V. Z. Yesin, wrote: "I believe it to be highly useful to appoint him to a commission under the C.L.D." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On Lenin's proposal, Yesin was approved a member of the C.L.D.'s General Planning Commission (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 24). p. 87

[65] E. M. Sklyansky informed I. N. Smirnov about the advance of the troops sent to fight the kulak bands in Siberia. p. 88

[66] Written in connection with the fact that on February 19, 1921, L. B. Krasin submitted a report to Lenin entitled "Concessions

for the Working of Oil in Baku and Grozny, and the Attitude to This Question of the Central Oil Administration". For details see this volume, Documents 95, 104, 105 and 112, and also present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 134-35. p. 88

[67] The telegram was sent on February 25, 1921, in reply to Kh. G. Rakovsky's telegram No. 672 of February 22, 1921, informing Lenin about the existence in the Ukraine of food stocks which he proposed should be used mainly for local needs, and a part of them for commodity exchange with other countries in return for agricultural machinery and implements for the Ukraine, and requested Lenin's opinion on this question. p. 89

[68] After his talk with I. A. Chekunov, Lenin made the following inscription opposite Chekunov's name in the margin of the visitors' register: "This old man has a good head, but is not in the Party because of his religious convictions" (*Ogonyok* No. 29, July 15, 1962). p. 89

[69] Written on the strength of A. D. Tsyurupa's report on the grain balances as of February 1, 1921, saying that there were 40.3 million poods of food grain and 5.4 million poods of groats in European Russia, Siberia and the Caucasus. p. 90

[70] A reference to a telegram received by the People's Commissariat for Food on March 2, 1921, reporting great difficulties in the work of the Ukraine's food bodies due to raids by Makhno's bands. The telegram said that in these circumstances supplying Donbas and the Red Army "becomes an almost insoluble task" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 92

[71] A reference to a draft C.P.C. decree "On the Admission of Russian Workers and Émigrés Returning from Abroad and of Their Belongings", which was prepared by the Narrow C.P.C. on March 2, 1921. It strictly limited the quantity of things—suits, footwear, linen, etc.—which the workers arriving in Russia could bring with them. Following Lenin's remarks in this note, the Narrow C.P.C. decided, on March 3, to delete the clause restricting the quantity of personal belongings brought in. p. 92

[72] In Minutes No. 55 taken at the sitting of the bureau of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. Party group on March 3, 1921, Lenin marked off in the margin and underlined the text of points "g" and "l". Point "g" said: "The agenda of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. Party group set for March 4, shall include a report by the People's Commissar for Food on the Republic's food supply situation, and the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food shall be asked to appoint its rapporteur on this question." Point "l" spoke of the need to bring to the notice of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee the decisions taken by the group's bureau (Central

Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On March 3, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted Lenin's proposal. p. 93

[73] Written in reply to the following proposal of M. N. Pokrovsky: "Vladimir Ilyich: we at the First Moscow University are now setting up a social science department. We have appointed all the Communists who could be allowed to lecture. But there is little hope of their *actual* participation. It is highly tempting to make use of Mensheviks (Groman, Yermansky, Sukhanov, Cherevanin and Martov). What do you think about this?" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.) p. 93

[74] An apparent reference to statements by some members of the Workers' Opposition. p. 94

[75] The document was written on a report by A. G. Goikhbarg, Deputy Chairman of the Narrow C.P.C., about breaches by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the C.P.C. decision of November 30, 1920, concerning the work of the commission on the question of the losses inflicted on Soviet Russia by the imperialist war, the armed intervention of the Entente and the blockade. The C.P.C. decision put the duty on the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to place at the commission's disposal all the available material on this question. But in a letter to Lenin on March 5, 1921 (which Lenin passed to Goikhbarg the same day), Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. M. Karakhan said that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was also working on the question of the losses and requested that the material should be handed over to a commission of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

On April 14, 1921, the Narrow C.P.C. examined the question of the P.C.F.A.'s violation of the C.P.C. decision and took into consideration Karakhan's statement that the P.C.F.A. had stopped working on the question of the losses. p. 94

[76] A reference to A. G. Goikhbarg's report of March 7 and L. M. Karakhan's letter of March 5, 1921. p. 94

[77] A reference to the commission set up at the Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on March 7, 1921, to draft a law substituting a tax in kind for the surplus-food requisitioning, which was then adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) On the commission were Lenin (Chairman), A. D. Tsyurupa, L. B. Kamenev and G. I. Petrovsky. p. 94

[78] A reference to the opening of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). p. 94

[79] This refers to the Moscow Conference for the Conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty (February 26-March 16, 1921), which ended with the signing of the treaty of friendship and brotherhood between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey.

The question of Batum arose in connection with the fact that the Menshevik government of Georgia, which was on its last legs, had, on the advice of the Entente, concluded in the first ten days of March a secret agreement with the Turkish Government under which the city of Batum together with the district and two other districts were to be handed over to Turkey. Under this agreement the Turkish troops advancing on Batum occupied it on March 11, 1921. On March 19, the Turkish troops were forced to retreat from the city. p. 95

[80] Lenin dictated the letter by phone to Lydia Fotieva. It had Stalin's remark about his disagreement with Lenin's proposal and also the signatures of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, L. B. Kamenev, V. M. Molotov and L. D. Trotsky signifying that they had read the document. p. 96

[81] Written on a letter from F. I. Makharadze reporting the military and political situation in Georgia. On the letter Lenin wrote: "Return to me." On page 3 of the letter, Lenin underscored the passage where Makharadze speaks out against the dispatch to Georgia of a great number of authorised agents from the centre.

On March 14, 1921, the Narrow C.P.C. passed a decision prohibiting all the People's Commissariats from sending their agents to Georgia without special C.P.C. permission in each case. p. 97

[82] A reference to the negotiations by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade on a 40-year 100-million kronen loan from Sweden. The Swedish side wanted 7 per cent during the first two years and 6 per cent during the rest of the period, until the repayment of the loan. Negotiations on large credits from Sweden were also conducted in the autumn of 1921, but were fruitless. p. 97

[83] In the autumn of 1920, Washington Vanderlip, representing the Vanderlip Syndicate, a large American concern, came to Moscow for talks on a concession for fisheries, and exploration for and extraction of oil and coal in Kamchatka and the rest of Eastern Siberia to the east of longitude 160°. A draft agreement was worked out at the end of October under which the syndicate was to receive a 60-year concession. After 35 years the Soviet Government was to have an option to buy out all the concession enterprises, and upon the expiry of the whole period, the enterprises and equipment in full running order were to be transferred free of charge into the ownership of the R.S.F.S.R. However, the syndicate failed to obtain support either from its own government or from influential financial groups in the U.S.A., and the draft agreement was not signed. p. 98

[84] In a letter to Lenin on March 15, 1921, A. A. Joffe, who was then in Riga as chairman of the Soviet peace delegation negotiating with Poland, expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that despite his extensive experience in political and especially diplomatic work, the Party's C.C. kept transferring him from one job to another. p. 99

[85] A probable reference to the Plenary Meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on December 7, 1920, which discussed the conflict between the water transport union and Tsektran (Central Committee of the Joint Trade Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers). During the discussion of this question, Lenin and his supporters were left in a minority, and the resolution proposed by N. I. Bukharin was carried with L. D. Trotsky's support. Lenin analysed this episode in his article "The Party Crisis" (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 45). p. 99

[86] A reference to the Party Central Committee elected at the 13th sitting of the Tenth Party Congress on March 14, 1921. On March 16, after the Congress had closed, a plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee met to elect the governing organs of the C.C. p. 100

[87] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of March 18, 1921, saying that, according to information received through Washington Vanderlip, the new U.S. President William Harding (who succeeded Woodrow Wilson in March 1921, as a Republican President) was allegedly in favour of establishing trade relations with Soviet Russia. In this connection, Chicherin proposed that the session of the All-Russia C.E.C., which was to open, should adopt a Message on the desirability of establishing trade relations between Soviet Russia and the U.S.A. On March 20, the All-Russia C.E.C. sent a Message to the Congress of the U.S.A. and President Harding. However, this and other friendly acts by the Soviet Government did not meet with any response from the U.S. Government which persisted in refusing to recognise the Soviet state. This hostile U.S. stand delayed the normalisation of diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries for many years. p. 101

[88] A reference to the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) "The Soviet Republic and the Capitalist Encirclement" (see *Desyaty syezd RKP(b). Mart 1921 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet* [The Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 1921. Verbatim Report], Moscow, 1963, pp. 610-12). p. 101

[89] In connection with preparations to switch from the surplus-food requisitioning to the tax in kind, Lenin was collecting and studying peasant opinion on ways to boost agriculture. In early March 1921, on his invitation, Moscow was visited by peasants A. R. Shaposhnikov, T. G. Kondrov and I. G. Kondrov, who

had talks with Lenin, M. I. Kalinin and A. D. Tsyurupa, and attended a sitting of the All-Russia C.E.C. which approved the substitution of the tax in kind for surplus-food requisitioning. Upon their return home, the peasants reported on their trip and meeting with Lenin to the gubernia non-Party peasant conference at Ufa. The conference sent Tsyurupa a telegram declaring that they "noted with satisfaction the promulgation of new land tenure laws" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 102

[90] A reference to Tsyurupa's proposal to postpone the confirmation of the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources of the R.S.F.S.R. under the C.L.D., which had been set for March 25, 1921, until the next sitting of the C.L.D. This question was left on the agenda for the C.L.D. sitting of March 25; the confirmed commission consisted of L. N. Kritsman, A. Z. Holtzmann and V. M. Smirnov. p. 103

[91] A reference to the C.L.D. decision of December 15, 1920, approving the oil transportation plan, submitted on December 14 by the Supreme Council for Transportation. The decision set out a number of practical measures connected with the transportation of oil, ranging from the repair of tank cars and their efficient use, to the establishment of running rates. Special measures were outlined for supplying food and clothes to the workers in the oilfields and the railways. p. 104

[92] In reply to this note, Dzerzhinsky sent Lenin a short report the same day describing the circumstances of the unsuccessful purchase of foreign tacks. On Dzerzhinsky's report Lenin wrote: "(*About tacks*). Keep and give me a reminder" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 211). p. 106

[93] A reference to the Finance Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and the C.P.C., set up on Lenin's proposal soon after the Tenth Party Congress to work out financial policy in connection with the switch to the New Economic Policy. Its chairman was Y. A. Preobrazhensky. p. 106

[94] On March 28, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and on March 29, the C.P.C. adopted a decision to include Y. A. Preobrazhensky in the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance. p. 106

[95] A reference to the draft of the basic principles of concession agreements, whose working out was assigned to A. I. Rykov, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. p. 107

[96] A reference to the C.P.C. decision on oil concessions of February 1, 1921 (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 146). p. 107

[97] Lenin made a number of additions and corrections in his outlined draft of the basic principles of concession agreements (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 148). Lenin's draft was adopted as the basis for the C.P.C. decision of March 29 (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 302-13). p. 107

[98] A reference to G. L. Pyatakov's letter of March 22, 1921, requesting Lenin's assistance in sending S. I. Syrtsov for Party work in Donbas, which, he said, was being opposed by the Ukrainian Communist Party C.C., because during the trade union discussion Syrtsov had sided with the Trotskyites. On March 30, Lenin sent a telephone message to G. I. Petrovsky and M. V. Frunze, in Kharkov, asking them to look into the matter and reply (see this volume, Document 109).

Pyatakov also objected to any concessions in Donbas. p. 108

[99] See Note 91. p. 108

[100] A reference to Chicherin's letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, received by Lenin, in which Chicherin proposed that a special circular, urging the need for tact and care not to offend the Moslems' religious feelings in conducting anti-religious propaganda, should be sent to the Party organisations of the republics and regions with a Moslem population. Chicherin referred to a speech by N. N. Narimanov as a model of the tactful approach to Moslems. In Chicherin's letter Lenin underscored the passages proposing the publication of the circular and characterising Narimanov's speech (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 113

[101] On April 16, 1921, a telegram was received from Chairman of the Oil Committee, A. P. Serebrovsky, asking Lenin "To send in an official recognition of some independence for the Oil Committee to exchange oil products in Persia, Turkestan and Europe for articles of equipment and supply of workers with clothes and foodstuffs" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On April 18, Lenin requested A. I. Rykov, V. P. Milyutin and A. M. Lezhava to give their opinion and an agreed draft C.P.C. decision on this matter. On April 19, the C.P.C. appointed a special commission to work out a draft decision enlarging the competence of the Azerbaijan Oil Committee in this sphere. p. 113

[102] That same day, April 2, 1921, People's Commissar for Labour, V. V. Schmidt, called an interdepartmental conference to discuss the questions brought up by Lenin. Its decision said: "In the event of a balanced reduction in the total number of unproductive workers listed as employed in the given production, the quantity of foodstuffs assigned for it by the People's Commissariat for Food before the reduction of the unproductively em-

ployed workers shall be retained for this production" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 114

[103] A reference to G. K. Orjonikidze's reply to Lenin's telegram of March 30, 1921 (see this volume, Document 108). p. 115

[104] The question of Gidrotorf (Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction) was discussed at C.P.C. sittings. On April 5, 1921, the C.P.C. heard reports by V. D. Kirpichnikov and I. I. Radchenko on the progress of Gidrotorf operations, and adopted a decision on the need to satisfy its requests in view of the exceptional importance of these enterprises. A special commission, consisting of A. Z. Holtzmann, A. B. Khalatov and I. I. Radchenko, was given two days to determine in detail the volume and priorities for meeting Gidrotorf's requests. Its report was heard by the C.P.C. on April 7. It was decided that Gidrotorf should be allocated 25 million rubles for distribution of individual bonuses to skilled technical personnel over a period of five months.

On April 6, the C.L.D. discussed the general question of measures ensuring the supply of food for the peat campaign. p. 116

[105] A reference to the letter and draft decree on improving the conditions of workers and employees engaged in transport, industry and the major public enterprises, sent to Lenin by E. V. Luganovsky, head of the S.E.C.'s Construction Department. p. 118

[106] On April 7, the C.P.C. passed a decree on bonuses in kind for workers, which said: "To introduce, by way of experiment, bonuses in kind for the workers of some of the most important industries, by issuing to the workers a part of the products they manufacture for exchange for agricultural produce" (*Izvestia VTsIK* No. 76, April 9, 1921). p. 118

[107] The telegram was in reply to a message of greetings received by the C.P.C. on April 9, 1921, from the Yakutsk Conference of the Poor (Second Churapchinsk Non-Party Conference). p. 119

[108] *Toyons*—Yakut princelings (tribal chiefs). p. 119

[109] In addition to an earlier circular, the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee published a letter in *Pravda* on April 21, 1921, urging that in celebrating May Day "nothing should be done or said to offend the religious feelings of the mass of the population". p. 120

[110] The Eighth Congress of Soviets, held from December 22 to 29, 1920, approved a 600 million pood plan for the extraction of coal in Donbas in 1921. p. 121

[111] According to the instructions issued by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in connection with Lenin's letter, the Executive Committee of the Kaluga Gubernia Soviet conducted an inquiry into the peasants' complaints and took steps to remove the abuses. p. 121

[112] Written on a telegram from P. K. Kaganovich, C.L.D. agent and Omsk regional food commissar, declaring that, following the publication in the press of the All-Russia C.E.C. decision and other material on the lifting of the surplus-food requisitioning, it was impossible to fulfil the targets for the procurement of the foodstuffs in Siberia. p. 123

[113] A reference to the decision of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of April 14, 1921, about the state of affairs in the Moscow Higher Technical College. The Politbureau reversed the decision to the effect that the college board was to be appointed by the Central Administration for Vocational Training, and suggested that the People's Commissariat for Education submit for consideration by the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee a draft statute for institutions of higher learning and a new composition of the board, and also a draft directive on the role and relationships of the communist cells, the non-Party students, the faculty and the People's Commissariat for Education. The Politbureau also asked the People's Commissariat for Education to issue a condemnation of the college lecturers who had suspended classes. p. 123

[114] A reference to the communication from the People's Commissariat for Education on the state of affairs at the Moscow Higher Technical College, which was published in *Pravda* on April 19, 1921, and was signed by the People's Commissar for Education A. V. Lunacharsky and Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee V. M. Molotov. A reprimand was issued to the members of the faculty who had suspended classes, and it was pointed out to them that such methods of protest were inadmissible. At the same time, the communist cells at the college and at all institutions of higher learning were invited to establish relations with the faculty and non-Party students promoting normal academic life in their institutions and the development of science in Soviet Russia. p. 123

[115] The "*Open Letter*" ("Offener Brief") from the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany to the Socialist Party of Germany, the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, the Communist Workers' Party of Germany, and to all trade union organisations was published in *Die Rote Fahne* No. 11 on January 8, 1921. The letter urged all workers', trade union and socialist organisations in Germany to join efforts in fighting

the growing reaction and the capitalist offensive against the working people's vital rights.

Although the workers came out in favour of the united proletarian front, the proposal for joint action with the Communists was rejected by the Right-wing leadership of the organisations to which the "Open Letter" was addressed. p. 124

[116] A reference to armed action by the proletariat of Germany in March 1921.

The Left-wing majority of the C.C. of the United Communist Party of Germany, proceeding from the so-called "theory of the offensive", whose supporters held that offensive tactics were the only correct ones in any situation, regardless of the concrete political conditions, pushed the workers towards a premature uprising. Making use of this, the German bourgeoisie provoked armed action at an unfavourable moment. An uprising broke out in several areas of Central Germany in March 1921. Despite the workers' heroic action, the uprising was put down, because the majority of the working class had not been prepared for the action and had not taken part in the fighting. p. 124

[117] A reference to Béla Kun, then member of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee. p. 124

[118] Paul Levi attended the Seventeenth Congress of the Italian Socialist Party as a representative of the United Communist Party of Germany. The congress was held at Livorno from January 15 to 21, 1921, and marked a split in the Party. Upon his return to Germany Levi came out in defence of the Italian Centrists headed by Giacinto Serrati. On February 24, 1921, after the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany adopted a resolution against Serrati and his supporters, and welcomed the establishment of the Communist Party of Italy, five members of the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany (Otto Braß, Ernst Däumig, A. Hoffmann, Paul Levi, and Clara Zetkin) withdrew from the C.C., saying that they disagreed with the Central Committee. p. 124

[119] On March 29, 1921, Paul Levi wrote Lenin a letter to which the present document is a reply. Levi condemned the March action and declared that he was withdrawing from the Party leadership and would write a pamphlet setting out his views.

In early April 1921, Levi issued a pamphlet entitled *Unser Weg. Wider den Putschismus* ("Our Way. Against Putschism"), in which he called the struggle of hundreds of thousands of German proletarians a "Bakuninist putsch". Levi urged the workers to condemn the Communists, alleging that they were responsible for the defeat of the uprising. On April 15, 1921, the Central Committee of the U.C.P.G. expelled Levi from the Party for a gross breach of the Party discipline and the harm done to the Party by the publication of his pamphlet, and demanded that he give

up his parliamentary seat. On April 29, the Comintern Executive Committee endorsed the decision of the U.C.P.G. Central Committee expelling Levi from the Party. The question of the tactical differences which arose in connection with the March action was referred to the Third Congress of the Comintern, which confirmed Levi s expulsion from the Party. Subsequently Levi went over entirely to Social-Democratic positions and carried on a fight against the Communist International. p. 124

[120] A reference to the Third Congress of the Communist International which opened in Moscow on June 22, 1921. p. 124

[121] This assignment to V. M. Molotov was written on a memorandum from a group of members of the interim presidium and the scientific methods commission of the Moscow State University to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on the training of Soviet specialists. They criticised the old faculty opposing any renovation of the higher schools, and made their own proposals to amend the draft statute of institutions of higher learning adopted by the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Education.

On April 20, 1921, the Politbureau asked the People's Commissariat for Education to refrain from publishing the statute for the time being, for the purpose of elaborating and discussing the question additionally. p. 125

[122] Written in connection with the telegram from Deputy People's Commissar for Railways, V. V. Fomin, proposing that Georgian and Abkhazian ports (Batum, Poti and Sukhum should be placed under the Administration of Marine Transpor of the R.S.F.S.R at Rostov or Novorossiisk. The Georgian Revolutionary Committee opposed the idea.

On April 19, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee supported the Georgian Revolutionary Committee and decided to place the organisation of Georgian and Abkhazian ports within Georgia's competence. The decision put the duty on the Administration of Marine Transport to render every kind of material assistance to these ports. p. 127

[123] See Note 113. p. 127

[124] *Cadets*—Russian abbreviation for the Constitutional-Democratic Party, a party of the big bourgeoisie, which existed in Russia from 1905; in this case the word is used as a synonym for diehard counter-revolutionaries. p. 127

[125] This is in reply to a letter from the Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee Y. M. Yaroslavsky, asking Lenin: "Do you think it is advisable to have Deborin and L. Axelrod lecture on philosophy (history of philosophy and historical materialism)? This is an inquiry from the Academic Council of Sverdlov University. We in the Orgbureau took a negative

decision concerning L. Axelrod, and it is now being raised again by the group of lecturers" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 129

[126] A reference to a draft decree of the All-Russia C.E.C. "On the Principles Underlying the Organisation of Economic Life in the Karelian Labour Commune" and the draft C.L.D. decision "On the Immediate Economic Tasks of the Karelian Labour Commune". On April 26, 1921, the C.P.C. approved the former and accepted the proposals contained in the latter. p. 131

[127] On April 27, 1921, the C.L.D. discussed a draft decision on measures to combat the drought, tabled by Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture I. A. Teodorovich. The three general points of the draft decision were adopted, it being decided that the other points, relating to concrete practical measures, should be immediately discussed with the departments concerned, and approved at the next C.L.D. sitting. On April 29, the C.L.D. adopted the whole decision. Its first point emphasised: "To recognise the struggle against the drought as being of primary importance for the country's agricultural life and measures taken in that direction as highly urgent" (*Izvestia VTsIK* No. 95, May 5, 1921). p. 134

[128] At the C.P.C. sitting on April 26, 1921, the report on promoting the fisheries campaign was given by Deputy People's Commissar for Food, N. P. Bryukhanov. The C.P.C. decisions ensured the swift movement of goods for the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry (Glavryba) and authorised it (with the knowledge of the People's Commissariat for Food) to refer its problems directly to the C.P.C. and the C.L.D. A commission, consisting of representatives of the People's Commissariat for Food, the All-Russia Central T.U.C., the Central Union of Consumers' Societies, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and Glavryba, was set up to examine the question of developing the fishing industry and drawing up a plan for a fish procurement campaign. p. 135

[129] Lenin sent G. M. Krzhizhanovsky Y. M. Shatunovsky's pamphlet on April 24, 1921. On the cover Lenin wrote: "Comrade Krzhizhanovsky! Your opinion? Return with your opinion. I shall send it to Zinoviev." On p. 14, Lenin marked off these words: "To have electric power within a few months in order to start the remaining plants", and made this remark: "This looks like the gist. How many months? How much power? Is this possible in practice?" On p. 15, Lenin marked off the author's words about the opinion of hydraulics specialists and wrote: "Which? When and where has this been printed?" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.)

On the question of possible measures to restore the economy of Petrograd, Lenin sent an inquiry to the Chairman of the

Petrograd Soviet, G. Y. Zinoviev, on May 3 (see this volume, Document 147). p. 137

[130] Written on L. D. Trotsky's letter, in which, replying to Lenin's letter of April 30, 1921 (see this volume, Document 146), he tried to stand up for Shatunovsky's pamphlet, *White Coal and Revolutionary Petrograd*. Lenin made a number of remarks on Trotsky's letter (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 208-09). p. 137

[131] In reply to Lenin's inquiry, G. Y. Zinoviev informed him on May 5 about the decision to suspend construction on the Svir, concentrating all the efforts on completing the operations on the Utkina Zavod sector in 1921, and not stopping construction on the Volkhov under any circumstances. p. 137

[132] In reply to this note, Lenin was informed that the graves of G. V. Plekhanov and Vera Zasulich had been put in order, and that the Public Works Committee promised to supply the sculptor I. Y. Gintsburg with the gypsum required for his work on a monument to Plekhanov.

On July 16, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided to render assistance in setting up a monument to Plekhanov, and gave N. A. Semashko an assignment to arrange this with the Petrograd Soviet. p. 138

[133] In a reply telegram received by Lenin on May 6, 1921, K. Y. Voroshilov said: "Have received your No. 108/III. All the necessary instructions have been given. Strict fulfilment of your assignment will be seen to" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 138

[134] The poem "150,000,000" had signs of V. V. Mayakovsky's early futuristic trend: it was written in a mannered style and cast in a complicated form; he denied the classical heritage and extolled futurism as the only literary trend consonant with the times. p. 138

[135] A reference to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's letter of April 12, 1921, on the inadvisability, in that period, of extending the Emba oilfields.

Algemba—Alexandrov-Gai-Emba branch-line. p. 139

[136] Written on a press bureau bulletin of May 6, 1921, under a report from the French newspaper *L'Echo de Paris* of May 1. The author of the item, Dr. Legendre, who had visited the major industrial centres of China and Japan, reported on the situation in the Far East and on the danger of a spread of Bolshevik influence in Eastern Asia.

Sending the bulletin on to G. V. Chicherin, Lenin made this remark: "See p. 2" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

In connection with Lenin's instructions, *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 99 of May 10, 1921, carried an article entitled "The Fears of the French Bourgeois in the Far East". p. 140

[137] A reference to A. A. Belyakov's article, "No Progress", in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 95 of May 5, 1921, saying that because of red tape and delays, the Narofominsk Textile Mill, started in February 1921, was not supplied with fuel and ran only for one month. The author spoke of the need to restart it as soon as possible.

V. A. Smolyaninov recalled later that as a result of the measures taken by the C.P.C. Managing Department, he reported to Lenin the following day that the fuel had been delivered and the mill was running. p. 140

[138] Together with this note, Lenin sent L. B. Krasin G. V. Chicherin's letter of May 8, 1921, informing Lenin that he had suggested that N. K. Klyshko should not respond to any statements by the British Government and the press until Krasin's return to London. p. 141

[139] In reply to this note, L. B. Krasin sent Lenin P. L. Voikov's memo on the food which could be quickly purchased abroad for gold and on credit. Krasin added the following: "There is *nothing* in Sweden, Denmark, and Holland. Tsyurupa told me that the grain would be needed *in June*. The 'catastrophic' nature of the requirement is usually discovered at the very last moment" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Lenin crossed out Krasin's note, and on May 10, 1921, sent the document on to N. P. Bryukhanov (for Lenin's markings on the memo see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 234).

On May 10, Voikov drew up the memo on the distribution of food and consumer goods bought abroad by C.L.D. decision. On the back of this memo Lenin wrote:

"Into the file *on the purchase of food* abroad. (Give me *daily* reminders)" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 141

[140] A reply telegram from N. K. Klyshko, deputy of the R.S.F.S.R.'s official representative in Great Britain, of May 12, 1921, said that the urgent warrant, mentioned in the present document, was being started on at once. p. 142

[141] This is written on a report to the C.P.C. from Y. A. Preobrazhensky, Chief of the Central Administration for Vocational Training under the People's Commissariat for Education, who pointed out that a reduction, under the C.P.C. commission's decision, in the number of rations for his administration during the spring and summer months of 1921 down to 110,000, would result in a closure of classes at many educational establishments, and asked the C.P.C. to increase the number of rations.

The C.P.C. decision of May 10, 1921, rejected this petition. On May 19, after a second examination of this question, the C.P.C. instructed the People's Commissariat for Food to allot 165,000 rations for workers in education. p. 142

[142] That same day, May 10, 1921, Molotov informed Lenin that it was not the practice of Party organisations to group or classify separately Party members not taking part in administration. p. 143

[143] An apparent reference to N. K. Klyshko's telegram of May 9, 1921. Replying to the telegram from Lenin and Krasin of May 7 (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 52, Supplements, Document 33), Klyshko informed them about the purchase in America of 20,000 poods of wheat flour, with delivery at Revel by May 15, and 200,000 with delivery at Petrograd by mid-June, and about delivery at Revel of 125,000 poods by the end of April. ("Where are these *125,000*? How have they been distributed?", Lenin wrote over this report.) Klyshko also promised to supply additional information about the possibility of further grain purchases, requested the sending of the warrant and the currency, and asked: "Is it all right, in order to speed up and reduce the cost, to send in up to 25 per cent of maize and bean flour as an admixture to the wheat flour?" "Of course!" replied Lenin, underscoring the word "admixture" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 143

[144] On May 19, 1921, P. A. Krasikov, a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Justice, who had been conducting an inquiry into the case on D. I. Kursky's instructions, proposed that a reprimand (with publication in the press) should be issued to N. B. Eismont, Deputy Chairman of Chusosnabarm (see Note 678), that Comrade Angert, who was at the special disposal of Chusosnabarm and who was directly to blame for dispatching the letter to the C.L.D., containing the secret information, without taking the necessary precautions, should be dismissed, and that a disciplinary penalty should be applied to the secretary who had sent out the letter to the C.L.D. p. 144

[145] A reference to the draft decision of the All-Russia C.E.C. prepared by N. Osinsky on extending the rights of the peasant committees in improving the agricultural production (village committees) set up under the Village Soviets.

On May 14, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee invited the People's Commissars to send in their opinion of the draft for its discussion by the C.P.C. On May 19, it was passed by the C.P.C. with some amendments. On May 27, the decree was approved by the All-Russia C.E.C. and published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 115 on May 28, 1921. p. 144

[146] A reference to L. A. Liberman, who was appointed head of Tsentropechat. p. 145

[147] In connection with M. V. Frunze's request that a copy of this directive should also be sent to the Crimean Regional Committee, Lenin wrote the following instruction: "Send a copy of my letter to Frunze to the *Crimean Regional Committee*, obtaining the exact address from *Bukharin* and *making a special check on its receipt*" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 145

[148] That same day, May 18, 1921, Lenin signed the Narrow C.P.C. decision "to authorise the People's Commissariat for Finance to place at the disposal of Comrade Frunze, representative of the Council of Labour and Defence, 100 million rubles from the S.E.C. funds for urgent expenditures in May on the transportation of salt from the Ukraine and the Crimea" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Another of Lenin's notes to Frunze appears to refer to this period:. "What have you managed to do about the salt? Who is responsible for the *salt*? *Lenin*" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 414): At the Central Party Archives there is also a memo sent in by Frunze to the C.L.D. Chairman in July 1921, reporting on the state of transporting salt from the Crimea and the Ukraine and giving the actual figures for May and June and prospects for July 1921. On the memo is Lenin's remark: "To the archives, on salt transportation, from Frunze." p. 146

[149] This was written in connection with a report sent in on May 18, 1921, by N. P. Bryukhanov and A. B. Khalatov to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and Lenin. Reporting that, despite the measures being taken by the People's Commissariat for Food, Party and government bodies in Siberia, the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine were violating the Politbureau decision of May 7, 1921, concerning the rates of daily dispatch of grain to the centre and the satisfaction of regional requirements only after these rates have been met, Bryukhanov and Khalatov proposed that leading workers in these regions should be influenced by measures of Party discipline. p. 146

[150] A reference to A. P. Serebrovsky's telegram to G. K. Orjonikidze about the trade talks which he had been conducting in Constantinople with Turkish, French and Italian firms. Without giving any exact information, Serebrovsky reported the conclusion of contracts with a number of firms on allegedly advantageous terms, the dispatch of goods to Batum for Baku, and the possibility of sending Wrangel soldiers desiring to return to Russia for work on the Baku oilfields. p. 147

[151] That same day, May 19, 1921, N. P. Bryukhanov sent Lenin a copy of the report on the shipment of piece-goods to the Ukraine.

V. P. Nogin and B. P. Pozern reported that even before the C.L.D. decision, Trekhgornaya Textile Mill had been ordered to prepare two million arshins of piece-goods for shipment to the Ukraine, but that the People's Commissariat for Food had failed to supply the packing material.

On May 23, having obtained from V. I. Velman, who was responsible for the Central Textile Administration, detailed explanations for reasons of the delay, Lenin wrote to V. A. Smolyaninov: "Look into this and check up. 23/V. *Lenin*" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). On May 31, Lenin demanded that the strictest supervision should be established over the most rapid movement by rail of the piece-goods sent to the Ukraine (see this volume, Document 184). p. 147

[152] On May 25, 1921, the C.L.D. adopted Lenin's draft resolution, with small amendments, and instructed the People's Commissariat for Justice "to carry out an inquiry and punish those guilty of the red tape, owing to which the assignment to the Presidium of the S.E.C., issued by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars on February 2, 1921, through the C.P.C. business manager under No. 785/уп, remains virtually unfulfilled to this day" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 151

[153] On May 24, 1921, V. A. Smolyaninov, on Lenin's instructions, sent a telephone message to I. S. Unschlicht and a letter to V. M. Molotov at the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee requesting speedier examination of the question of the "Politbureau" at the Shatura construction site. p. 152

[154] Enclosed in R. E. Klasson's letter to Lenin of May 20, 1921, was a brief report on his trip abroad on Gidrotorf business (see Note 104), and a draft C.L.D. decision on an order to the Madruk company.

Klasson spoke about the red tape and delays at the Russian railway mission in Berlin which had been assigned the formalisation of orders for Gidrotorf. p. 153

[155] On May 16, 1921, a worker of Gokhran (State Depository of Valuables of the R.S.F.S.R.), Y. M. Yurovsky, told Lenin about cases of theft of valuables at Gokhran. Making a note of this, Lenin, the same day, instructed a member of the All-Russia Cheka Collegium, G. I. Bokii, to carry out a strict inquiry.

In a telephone message on May 23 (in reply to which the present letter was written), Bokii alleged that Yurovsky's information was highly exaggerated and that measures were being taken together with the All-Russia Cheka to bring the stealing at Gokhran down to a minimum. Lenin's remark on the telephone message says: "Give me a reminder."

Lenin subsequently returned to the matter repeatedly (see this volume, Documents 180, 205, 216 and 221, and *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 288, 298, 370, 403-05). p. 153

[156] On May 28, 1921, G. I. Bokii submitted to Lenin a detailed report about the state of affairs at Gokhran—the personnel, structure, cases of stealing and a list of court cases at Gokhran. The report proposed some measures to improve the work and prevent stealing. On May 29, Lenin sent this report, together with his covering letter, to Deputy People's Commissar for Finance, A. O. Alsky (see this volume, Document 180). p. 154

[157] This refers to a resolution on the new rating policy adopted on May 11, 1921, by the Seventh Skopin (Ryazan Gubernia) Uyezd Trade Union Conference.

It stated that the inefficient distribution of manpower and the low labour productivity were one of the main reasons hampering economic rehabilitation in Skopin Uyezd. A switch to collective supply of workers and employees was proposed as one of the measures to remove these shortcomings. The conference delegates were instructed to stand up for the propositions set out in the resolution at the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions. p. 154

[158] On May 10, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee rejected the draft decision moved by Y. Larin (S.E.C.) and A. Z. Holtzmann (All-Russia Central T.U.C.) on collective supply of workers and employees at some state enterprises, and proposed that it should be reworked and brought up at the C.P.C. The draft Politbureau decision was written by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 142). It seems that in connection with the discussion of this matter in the C.P.C., V. A. Smolyaninov, on June 14, 1921, sent the resolution of the Skopin Uyezd Conference to the representative of the All-Russia Central T.U.C. on the C.P.C. commission on the workers' supply. On June 14, 1921, the C.P.C. handed over the reworked draft for the examination by the C.L.D. On June 17, this was adopted by the C.L.D., on June 18, it was signed by Lenin, and on June 19, it was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 132.

On June 22, the C.L.D. approved the first list of enterprises to which the decision applied. The factories and enterprises of Skopin Uyezd were not included.

On this question see also this volume, Documents 208 and 209. p. 154

[159] See Note 149. p. 156

[160] At the Central Party Archives there is a note giving information about the actual supply of grain to the Moscow Consumers' Cooperatives from May 18 to 25, 1921. It contains calculations, apparently made by Lenin during the report by A. Y. Vyshinsky, Chief of the Allocation Administration of the People's Commissariat for Food, and included in this letter. p. 157

[161] On May 11, 1921, the Council of Labour and Defence approved

Lenin's draft assignments to the commission to check up on railway construction in the Emba area. p. 157

[162] In a reply letter, the same day, May 28, 1921, K. B. Radek and G. Y . Zinoviev advised Lenin to pass on Clara Zetkin's telegram to the Comintern Executive Committee. The latter rejected Clara Zetkin's demand. Later, after a conference with delegates from the United Communist Party of Germany to the Third Congress of the Comintern (before it opened), the Executive sent the C.C. of the U.C.P.G. a telegram proposing that Anna Geyer and Otto Braß should not he prevented from attending the congress.

However, the two did not attend the congress. The C.C. of the U.C.P.G. objected to their going to Moscow, apparently because they approved the stand of Paul Levi, who had repeatedly violated Party discipline and had been expelled from the Party by the C.C. on April 15, 1921 (see Note 119). p. 158

[163] See Notes 155 and 156. p. 159

[164] A reference to A. G. Shlyapnikov.

The Fourth All-Russia Congress of Metalworkers' Union was held in Moscow from May 26 to 30, 1921. The composition of the C.C. of the Metalworkers' Union was discussed by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on May 28 and 31, 1921. At the Central Party Archives there is a list of candidates with Lenin's remarks and this inscription: "19 of the old Workers' Opposition." p. 161

[165] A possible reference to Y. Kh. Lutovinov's reply to Lenin's telegram of May 7, 1921. Lutovinov said that he considered as incorrect the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision to send G. L. Shklovsky to work in Berlin at the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and would protest against it. p. 162

[166] In a statement to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of May 25, 1921, B. S. Stomonyakov and Y. Kh. Lutovinov protested against the Politbureau's decision on the desirability of Z. I. Grzhebin's printing "Vsemirnaya literatura" books in Germany. They said that the publishing apparatus set up by the R.S.F.S.R. trade mission in Germany would print the books cheaper than Grzhebin, who had been artificially raising the prices for Soviet orders.

On this statement, Lenin wrote a note to G. Y. Zinoviev: "Write me a couple of words: what is the decision of your commission? Has the C.C. endorsed it?" (This was a reference to the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision on the Grzhebin case. It was approved by the Politbureau on April 27, 1921.) In reply, Zinoviev wrote: "The commission was deciding mainly on the past (old orders). No new assignments have been given. We have agreed only to have last year's order completed" (Central Party Archives of the

Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On May 31, the Politbureau examined the statement by Stomonyakov and Lutovinov, and instructed Zinoviev to send them the exact text of the commission's decision on the Grzhebin case which was approved by the Politbureau, together with his explanations. p. 162

[167] On instructions from E. M. Sklyansky, copies of this letter were sent to members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. On June 16, 1921, the R.M.C. decided on the question "Comrade Lenin's letter on the Army's labour use" as follows: "To suggest to all the members of the R.M.C.R. to submit, within a seven-day period, their concrete considerations and proposals in writing to the R.M.C.R." Lenin underlined this decision in the minutes of the R.M.C. sitting, and wrote: "Give me a reminder after the *C.I.* Congress" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On July 4, 1921, Lenin pointed out that the army's economic work should be taken into account in drawing up the state national economic plan (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 497-98). p. 166

[168] Written in connection with a complaint of the People's Commissar for Food of the Ukraine, M. K. Vladimirov, over the unsatisfactory supply of the Ukraine with goods and the lack of sacks which slowed down the procurement of grain in the Ukraine.

On June 1, a telegram signed by Lenin was sent to Vyazniki (Shuya Uyezd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia) on the dispatch of 500,000 food sacks to the Ukraine by uyezd factories within a week. p. 167

[169] Written in reply to an inquiry from G. K. Korolyov concerning the advisability of his recall from Ivanovo-Voznesensk in May 1921 to work as a responsible instructor of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee for Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Vladimir and Kostroma gubernias. p. 168

[170] A reference to the decision taken by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on May 10, 1921, to have the Kashira Electric-Power Station completed by the autumn of that year.

It was started in February 1919. On April 14, 1919, the Council of Labour and Defence designated the construction as "work for the country's defence and of exceptional importance for the defence of the rear".

Lenin attached great importance to the Kashira Electric-Power Station, and gave constant attention to the progress of building operations, taking a direct part in solving all the problems, keeping a check on the supply of the site with the necessary materials, manpower and equipment (see this volume, Document 220). p. 168

[171] A reference to the posts for the electric transmission line to run

between Kashira and Moscow. V. A. Smolyaninov wrote in his reminiscences that after Lenin's note to G. D. Tsyurupa, the necessary precautionary measures were taken. p. 169

[172] On June 3, 1921, the Council of Labour and Defence decided to issue to the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs five million rubles for the technical facilities required to run a broadcast newspaper with the aid of loudspeaker telephones in six Moscow squares.

By its decisions of June 24 and July 6, 1921, the C.L.D. put the duty on the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs to build, by March 1, 1922, four radio telephone transmission stations (Moscow—Tashkent—Kharkov—Novonikolsk) and 280 gubernia and uyezd receiving stations within 2,000 *kilometres* around Moscow. p. 169

[173] At the Central Party Archives there is a note from A. M. Lezhava to Lenin saying that the purchase of excavators abroad had been assigned to L. B. Krasin, but that it was not known what he had done. The note added that engineer T. Y. Reine, who had been sent abroad by the Mining Council, was authorised to make independent purchases for his department. p. 171

[174] M. N. Tukhachevsky was appointed Commander of the Tambov Military District, and was set the task of wiping out the Antonov bands. p. 171

[175] This was written in connection with a letter sent to Lenin on May 12, 1921, by the Petrograd Communist worker V. A. Vasilyev, who was military commissar of Boguchar Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia. He reported that some of those who had taken part in the mutiny against the Soviet power in Boguchar Uyezd in November 1920 had escaped and had organised a gang which was killing Party and government workers. Vasilyev urged the need to organise a volunteer cavalry unit to fight the bandits, and asked for three or five motorcycles to arrange liaison. p. 172

[176] On April 27, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee issued a directive to M. N. Tukhachevsky to liquidate the Antonov bands in Tambov Gubernia within a month.

On Lenin's assignment Tukhachevsky wrote a report to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on July 16, 1921, saying that as a result of the operations carried out from May to July, the kulak mutiny in Tambov Gubernia had been liquidated, the Soviet Dower restored everywhere and that only about 1,200 men were left in Antonov's bands, as compared with almost 21,000 at the beginning of May. p. 172

[177] On June 2 and 3, 1921, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) Presidium heard G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's report on the content of Lenin's letter and approved a draft circular to the chairmen

of all sections and subcommissions of Gosplan, which was written by P. S. Osadchy on the strength of Lenin's proposals. An extract from the minutes of the Presidium's sitting was sent to Lenin. p. 173

[178] The document was apparently written in connection with P. S. Osadchy's report. On the list of those arrested on the night of May 27, 1921, in which the names of P. A. Shchurkevich and B. Y. Vorobyov were underlined, Lenin made a number of remarks: "Osadchy personally knows both the underlined"; "Same as I am"; "Perhaps they could be placed only under house arrest? Couldn't other measures of suppression be applied? After all they are not running away", etc.

At the same time, Lenin wrote the following note: "1) In the recent period warrants have been issued for 'arrest at discretion'. 2) *Personal* warrants are desirable."

On June 3, the Chairman of the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka informed I. S. Unschlicht that all the persons mentioned in Lenin's telegram had been released, the arrests in Petrograd were carried out among former members of the Cadet Party, because some of them had taken part in a plot uncovered in Petrograd; persons without compromising material were released. Those detained were kept under arrest from 12 hours to 36 hours (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 173

[179] In a reply letter, A. O. Alsky said that, given Lenin's consent, he could carry through Soviet administrative channels a decision to sell £50,000 worth of Chinese loan coupons for the needs of the Institute of Labour. On this letter Lenin wrote: "Please direct through Soviet administrative channels. 14/VI. *Lenin*" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee)

On June 8, 1921, the C.L.D. approved the Institute of Labour application for 100,000 gold rubles, directing it for realisation to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. p. 174

[180] On February 2, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee gave G. L. Shklovsky permission to find work abroad by agreement with L. B. Krasin and G. V. Chicherin, thereby countermanding the Orgbureau's decision of January 21, under which Shklovsky was invited to look for work in Moscow or the Crimea. p. 175

[181] On March 23, 1921, the C.L.D., in accordance with M. I. Frumkin's report "On the Supply of the Northern Caucasus with Raw Materials and Money", put the duty on the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the Supreme Economic Council to submit their opinion on this question to the Narrow C.P.C. On March 24, the latter made it obligatory upon the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to place at the disposal of the Commis-

sariat's agent in the south-east, not later than April 15, 10 million gold rubles worth of currency, valuables and raw materials for the purchase, on foreign markets in the south, of the goods required for commodity exchange in the Northern Caucasus. It turned out at the end of April that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade had failed to carry out the C.L.D. assignment.

On June 3, after repeated discussions of the matter in the C.L.D. and the C.P.C., the C.L.D. authorised a commission, consisting of L. M. Khinchuk, D. I. Kursky and V. A. Smolyaninov, to inquire into the failure to fulfil the C.L.D. decision of March 24 and immediately to take the necessary measures to ensure the commodity exchange operations in the south-east. Having heard the commission's report, the C.L.D. recognised, on June 8, the need to increase the commodity fund for the south-east, and instructed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to submit a report on execution of the decision by all departments. p. 176

[182] A reference to the inquiry into the case of an agreement concluded with the owners of the cargo on board the Italian ship *Ancona*. This agreement was concluded without the sanction of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and M. I. Frumkin, in his capacity as the Deputy People's Commissar, was empowered to annul it, but had failed to do so. As a result, goods of inferior quality were received, and Frumkin was given a reprimand. p. 176

[183] In a reply letter of June 7, 1921, M. I. Frumkin explained that the P.C.F.T. had failed to carry out the C.P.C. decision of March 24, 1921, on a commodity-exchange fund for the south-east, because L. B. Krasin and A. M. Lezhava had been unwilling to give the South-Eastern Territorial Economic Council the opportunity of trading independently with foreign markets. Frumkin said that contrary to Moscow's instructions, the Economic Council had concentrated an export fund valued at 2.5 million gold rubles and had concluded an agreement with the French "Optorg" for the purchase of goods for the south-east on the Constantinople market (see Note 187). On Frumkin's letter Lenin wrote: "*To the archives*. NB. Important" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 177

[184] A reference to the agreement between the Azerbaijan Oil Committee and the Société Commerciale Industrielle financière pour la Russie (Socifross), concluded at Constantinople on May 9, 1921.

Upon receiving the documents from A. P. Serebrovsky, Lenin instructed a special commission to study the agreement and make the necessary corrections. p. 179

[185] On June 11, 1921, A. P. Serebrovsky sent Lenin by messenger the documents relating to the purchases and agreements with the Socifross and a French company for trade with Russia.

On Serebrovsky's telegram Lenin wrote: "*To Smolyaninov*. **Confidential**. Read. Remember. Get hold of the messenger without losing an hour. 11/VI. *Lenin*" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Reply telegrams were also received from G. K. Orjonikidze and F. Y. Rabinovich, agent of the C.L.D. and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in the Transcaucasian republics. p. 179

[186] On October 30, 1920, the C.P.C. adopted its decision, "On the Hydraulic Method of Peat Extraction", which qualified this method as of especial urgency and exceptional state importance, wherever it was being applied. The S.E.C. Presidium was instructed to organise under the Central Peat Administration (Glavtorf) an Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction (Gidrotorf), with R. E. Klasson appointed as head. p. 179

[187] Written in connection with A. M. Lezhava's letter of June 6, 1921.

Lezhava proposed to Lenin that the following passage should be deleted from the draft telegram to A. P. Serebrovsky: "I do not at all object to Azvneshtorg [Azerbaijan People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade] and Azneftkom [Azerbaijan Oil Committee] trading directly with Constantinople, I am prepared to support Baku's autonomy within considerable limits, but we must have guarantees" (see this volume, Document 198). He argued that the Azerbaijan Oil Committee did not have a smoothly running trade apparatus and referred to the prepared agreement on merging the foreign trade of the three Transcaucasian republics.

Lezhava also mentioned the agreement concluded on April 22, at Rostov-on-Don, on the basis of the C.L.D. decision of March 24, between the South-Eastern Territorial Economic Council and the French "Optorg" on the purchase of 35 million francs worth of goods at Constantinople through this company. The agreement was economically unprofitable and was not approved by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. p. 181

[188] Written in reply to P. I. Stučka's letter to Lenin of June 6, 1921, requesting help in exchanging two workers, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia, up before a military tribunal in Riga for persons arrested in the R.S.F.S.R. for anti-Soviet activity, whom the bourgeois government of Latvia would like to see released. In the final part of his letter, Stučka said that the influence of the Communist Party in Latvia was growing. p. 182

[189] On May 7, 1921, L. B. Krasin sent Lenin a letter setting out a British bank's proposal for a concession agreement to set up a free port in Petrograd. On Krasin's letter Lenin wrote: "Put on *C.L.D.* agenda for Wednesday, 11/V (appoint commission). *8/V. Lenin*" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). On May 11, the C.L.D. decided to set up a commission consisting of representatives from the S.E.C.,

the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and the People's Commissariat for Railways, to examine the question raised by Krasin. This question was repeatedly discussed by the Narrow C.P.C. and the C.L.D., but the proposal for a concession agreement was not accepted. p. 183

[190] In a letter of June 2, 1921, Y. M. Yurovsky, assigned to work at the State Depository of Valuables (Gokhran), asked Lenin whether he should work through the C.P.C., the C.L.D., the All-Russia C.E.C., and the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. and also through the press, to secure implementation of his proposals to reorganise Gokhran, or wait for the results of an inquiry into the theft of state valuables. See this volume, Documents 173, 180, 216 and 221. p. 184

[191] A reference to Lenin's talk with Y. M. Yurovsky on May 16, 1921. See also Note 155. p. 184

[192] A letter from Spandar Spandaryan, the father of Suren Spandaryan, written in Armenian. Spandaryan asked Lenin and Kamenev to give him material assistance and help him return home from Paris. Spandaryan's request was also set out in a covering letter from B. Mirimanyan, on which Lenin wrote the document here published. p. 184

[193] On a translation of Spandaryan's letter there is a remark dated July 26, 1921: "200 gold rubles remitted..." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 185

[194] On June 6, 1921, O. W. Kuusinen sent Lenin a part of his article on the organisational question and the theses of the whole article. Lenin asked Kuusinen to give the report on this question at the Third Congress of the Comintern and made a number of remarks for the theses (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 316-18).

On the strength of this, Kuusinen reworked his theses and, on June 17, sent them to Lenin again (without paragraphs 25-29, relating to the Party press); on June 21, he sent in the remaining paragraphs. Lenin must have read this variant of the theses. On June 27, Kuusinen sent to Lenin a third variant of the theses. Wilhelm Koenen, a German Communist, also took part in elaborating the theses. On July 9, Lenin approved the theses and made his final remarks and additions to them (ibid., pp. 318-19). The draft of the "Theses on Organisational Principles of Communist Parties, on Methods and Content of Their Work" was submitted to the congress and discussed in committee. On July 12, the draft was adopted with some amendments by the Third Congress of the Comintern (see *Kommunistichesky Internatsional v dokumentakh. Resheniya, tezisy i vozzvaniya kongressov Kominterna i plenumov IKKI. 1919-1932* [The Communist International in Documents. Decisions, Theses and Appeals by Congresses of the Com-

intern and Plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International], Moscow, 1933, pp. 201-25). p. 185

[195] The report on the organisational question was read out at the Third Comintern Congress by Wilhelm Koenen, a member of the United Communist Party of Germany, on July 10, 1921. p. 186

[196] A reference to Lenin's letter to Clara Zetkin and Paul Levi of April 16, 1921 (see this volume, Document 129). p. 186

[197] See Note 158. p. 186

[198] A reference to the resolution of the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions entitled "Rating Policy" (see *Rezolutsii IV Vserossiiskogo syezda profsoyuzov (18-25 maya 1921 goda)* (Resolutions of the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions (May 18-25, 1921), Moscow, 1921, pp. 20-21). p. 186

[199] Lenin wrote this proposal on a draft C.P.C. decision "On Collective Supply of Workers and Employees of Some State Enterprises". Lenin made a number of markings in the text of the draft (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 305-06). Lenin's addition was included in "The Basic Instruction on the Application of the Decree on Collective Supply of Workers and Employees of Some State Enterprises", which, together with the C.L.D. decision on this question, was signed by Lenin on June 18, 1921. p. 187

[200] In a letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on June 16, 1921, Wilhelm Koenen, August Thalheimer and Paul Fröhlich declared that the German delegation at the Third Congress of the Comintern, while approving the theses on tactics worked out by the Russian delegation, demanded that in the event of the congress adopting a special resolution on the March action, it should include the following propositions: 1) the March action was not a putsch, but a step forward in the development of the German revolution and the Party, and it is wrong to characterise it as an offensive without sufficiently extensive preparation; 2) Paul Levi's expulsion from the Party is correct; 3) all factional activity in the U.C.P.G. is prohibited, etc.

In saying that he had given a verbal reply to the letter, Lenin must have meant his speech at the sitting of the German delegation with the members of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on June 15, 1921, in which he sharply criticised representatives of the "Left" wing of the U.C.P.G. There is no record of his speech, but the notes of the speeches by Karl Radek, Wilhelm Koenen, August Thalheimer, Béla Kun and others, which Lenin made at the sitting, contained the following remark: "cursing of the German Leftists of the VKPD (15/VI. 1921)" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

For the section of the theses on tactics "Lessons of the March

Action" and the resolution "The March Events and the United Communist Party of Germany", adopted by the Third Congress of the Comintern, see *Kommunistichesky Internatsional v dokumentakh. 1919-1932.* Moscow, 1933, pp. 194, 225. p. 187

[201] Written on the reverse side of G. K. Orjonikidze's telegram to Lenin of June 11, 1921. Orjonikidze informed him that A. P. Serebrovsky regarded Lenin's telegram of June 6 (see this volume, Documents 198 and 201) as an expression of mistrust in him and was planning to resign, and advised Lenin to send Serebrovsky a telegram to calm him down. p. 188

[202] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of June 15, 1921. Referring to the Emmott commission's report to Parliament over the state of affairs in Soviet Russia, Chicherin suggested that a similar "inquiry" should be made into "Britain's domestic conditions". He proposed that "Comrade Radek should be officially authorised to start implementing this plan" (underscored by Lenin).

On June 19, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee resolved: "To adopt the draft and to authorise Comrade Radek to start implementing the proposed plan, with the right to enlist other comrades in the work at his discretion" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 188

[203] Written in connection with the talks started in London in mid-June between People's Commissar for Foreign Trade L. B. Krasin and British industrialist and financier Leslie Urquhart, who before the October Revolution had been Chairman of the Russo-Asiatic Consolidated Company and the owner of large mining enterprises in Russia (Kyshtym, Ridder, Tanalyk and Ekibastuz), on the granting to the latter of concessions for the working and extraction of minerals. The draft telegram, with some additions, was approved by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on July 2, 1921.

From August to September, the talks were carried on in Moscow. Lenin marked out the principal terms of the concession and kept a close watch on the course of the negotiations and the activity of the commission set up to study the enterprises to be leased (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 188; *XXIII*, pp. 63-69; *XXXV*, pp. 219-23; *XXXVI*, pp. 311-12).

A draft concession agreement was worked out in the course of the talks. But in October 1921, Urquhart broke off the talks and joined the anti-Soviet campaign, in the hope of pressuring and blackmailing the Soviet Government into making serious concessions.

The talks with Urquhart were resumed in 1922. See this volume, Documents 750, 754, 768, and also present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 387-88, 404-05. p. 189

[204] Referring to the 29 per cent royalties on the oil concessions, L. B. Krasin believed 25 per cent royalties to be acceptable. p. 189

[205] A reference to the fulfilment of the decision taken by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on June 4, 1921, to mobilise about 2,000 Communists to work in shifts at the State Depository of Valuables (Gokhran).

On June 29, 1921, the C.L.D. adopted a decision declaring this work to be urgent, and instructed all establishments and People's Commissariats, on the personal responsibility of their heads, to carry out all orders and warrants from the State Depository of Valuables within 24 hours and ahead of all others, and set out a number of measures to improve its work. p. 190

[206] The decree on a meat tax in kind was passed by the C.P.C. on June 14, 1921, and published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 133 of June 22, 1921. p. 190

[207] On June 10, 1921, L. K. Martens, a member of the S.E.C. Presidium, submitted to Lenin a copy of his report to the S.E.C. Presidium, which urged the need to enlist for work in Soviet industry foreign workers, chiefly Russian émigrés in America, many of whom were eager to go to Soviet Russia in view of the industrial crisis in America at the end of 1920 and early 1921. His report also contained a number of practical proposals on organising the immigration of foreign workers.

On page 1 of the report, Lenin wrote: "NB: p. 9, bring along food" and on page 9, he underlined Martens's words: "They have brought with them food for six months", and wrote in the margin: "NB" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

The report was appended to Minutes No. 224 of the C.L.D. sitting on June 22, 1921. A detailed article about this appeared in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 157 of July 20, 1921, and was then reprinted in the monthly information journal *Soviet Russia* (Vol. V, No. 4, 1921, pp. 156-58). p. 191

[208] Having received this letter, Martens replied to Lenin that he would immediately start working on the draft C.L.D. decision concerning the industrial immigration of Russians from America and would have it ready by six o'clock.

That same day, June 22, 1921, the C.L.D. declared that it was desirable to "develop separate industrial enterprises or groups of enterprises by leasing them to groups of American workers, and industrially developed peasants, on contractual terms assuring them of a measure of economic autonomy" (*Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 202). The C.L.D. also recognised the need to regulate the industrial immigration of workers from other countries, and instructed the S.E.C. to work out the terms for leasing enterprises to these workers. p. 191

[209] In a letter of June 21, 1921, M. V. Rykunov, a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, proposed that more Communists should be enlisted for improving the work of the People's Commissariat, with two or three practitioners added to the Collegium, that former private exporters should help to organise the marketing of goods abroad, that permission should be given to pay commission fees to workers in trade, etc.

On the letter are Lenin's underscorings, the word "correct!" under some of Rykunov's proposals and the note: "*From Rykunov*. 22/VI. To Comrade *Molotov*" (Central Party Archives). The letter was retyped and sent to all members of the Orgbureau and the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. At the same time, Rykunov submitted a memo on the formation of an export fund. For Lenin's remarks and underlinings see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 249-50. p. 192

[210] This is written on a telephone message from G. D. Tsyurupa, chief engineer of the Kashira Power Station construction site, sent to Lenin on June 22, 1921. He reported that the project had no money, which is why there were delays in the supply of building and other materials, and of wages to workers.

On June 23, 1921, the Narrow C.P.C. examined Lenin's proposal and authorised the People's Commissariat for Finance to order the finance department of the Moscow Soviet to provide the Kashira site with the necessary amount of money, as a matter of top priority. p. 192

[211] In his report on June 23, 1921, G. I. Bokii informed Lenin of the measures taken by him to prevent stealing at the State Depository of Valuables (Gokhran). At the same time, Bokii sent Lenin a copy of the preliminary report, submitted by a commission which had made an inquiry into its work, and containing the proposals for improving it. On July 8, Lenin was sent a calendar plan for work to reorganise Gokhran. p. 192

[212] A reference to the draft decision, "On Classifying the Work of Gokhran as Urgent", which the People's Commissariat for Finance introduced in the C.L.D. on June 24, 1921. It was adopted by the C.L.D. on June 29. p. 192

[213] A reference to a draft decision of the commission, consisting of A. M. Lezhava, L. M. Khinchuk, P. L. Voikov and M. I. Frumkin, which it took on June 24, 1921, on the need to buy grain in foreign markets and to make available a 100-million ruble credit for this purpose.

On this draft Lenin made the following remarks: "secret", "to the archives", and added in the margin: "Two additions: 1) Weekly reports on the execution and course of this operation from Lezhava + Frumkin + Khinchuk. 2) Sent to Frumkin" (Central

Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

The Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee took account of these additions in its decision "On Grain Purchases", adopted on June 25. In a telegram to Krasin in London, Lezhava stressed that Lenin "specially requests more speed with the purchase and delivery of the big consignment of grain" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 193

[214] In a reply letter on July 5, 1921, V. D. Kaisarov said that a special scientific commission for compiling a geographical atlas undertook to elaborate the questions outlined in Lenin's letter to M. P. Pavlovich (see present edition, Vol. 35, Document 283), and asked that two of its members should be sent to Berlin to acquire new material on the West European economy, noting that it was desirable to enlist Moscow specialists in compiling the atlas. The letter said that the commission's programme and calendar plan of work would be sent to Lenin shortly.

On this letter Lenin made his remarks and underlinings and wrote a number of instructions to Lydia Fotieva (see this volume, Document 140, and *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 321-22). p. 194

[215] This was written in connection with a resolution sent to Lenin by a general meeting of workers of the Moscow Garment Factory No. 36 named after the Third International (émigrés from America).

They wrote that for a month they had been unable to start their factory equipped with the latest machines and devices which they had brought along from America, and asked Lenin to help them to obtain the materials necessary to complete the equipment of the factory and the repair of the premises, and also to obtain housing.

On June 27, 1921, Lenin signed letters to L. K. Martens and V. T. Likhachov, Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Economic Council, ordering them to remove all red tape in this matter and to help the émigré workers to start the factory as soon as possible (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 201). p. 195

[216] Written in reply to a letter from a group of Communists of the Samarkand organisation on June 15, 1921, "To the First Soldier of the World Communist Revolutionary Army", in which they sent their whole-hearted greetings to Lenin and expressed their approval of the New Economic Policy. On the envelope Lenin wrote this assignment to his secretary dated June 27, 1921: "**Urgent.** Send them a telegram of thanks and approval. Give me the draft" (*Lenin Miscellany XX*, p. 117). The draft of the reply telegram was written by the C.P.C. Secretariat on the basis of Lenin's instructions. p. 195

[217] In the spring of 1921, a group of American garment workers collected money, bought industrial equipment and left for the

Soviet Republic. They were given the opportunity to organise their garment factory No. 36 in Moscow, which was housed in a four-storeyed building, made available on Lenin's personal instructions.

On June 16, 1921, the American workers wrote Lenin a collective letter asking him to help them to complete the building of the factory. Lenin took the most active part in preparations to start the factory (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Supplement, Documents 2 and 3). p. 196

[218] On July 20, 1921, the C.L.D. passed a decision providing for measures designed to eliminate delays in the dispatch of telegrams relating to the fishing industry and the transportation of fish. p. 197

[219] In the first part of the letter Lenin made remarks on the first variant of G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's article "To Our Critics", written in reply to Y. Larin's article in *Pravda* on June 9, 1921, which was entitled "The Mysteries of Soviet Industry", and which criticised the work of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). Krzhizhanovsky wrote to Lenin: "On the spur of the moment, I sketched out an article 'To Our Critics', but then found it too flippant and decided to shelve it. If you have a moment to spare for light reading, run your eye over it..." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). Krzhizhanovsky subsequently rewrote his article (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 298).

The second part of the letter (from the words: "But for a report in the C.L.D.") contains Lenin's proposals for Krzhizhanovsky's report at the C.L.D. on Gosplan's work. The report was heard on July 8, 1921. p. 198

[220] Lenin must have written this letter in connection with L. B. Krasin's telegram of July 4, 1921, in which Krasin reported on the congress of Russian counter-revolutionaries (monarchists, Cadets and Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries), which was held in Paris at the end of June 1921. It adopted a decision to organise revolts at Kronstadt and in Petrograd at the end of July or in early August to overthrow the Soviet power. p. 201

[221] On July 7, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee instructed the All-Russia Cheka to take the necessary precautionary measures and also decided to send "to Petrograd within the next few weeks a number of Communist metalworkers from among veteran Party members" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 202

[222] Written on a memo to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee from Deputy People's Commissar for Food N. P. Bryukhanov and Dep-

uty People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. M. Lezhava, reporting the possibility of purchasing 5 million poods of wheat in North-Eastern Persia, and requesting the allocation of 4 million silver rubles for that purpose. On July 6, 1921, this was approved by the Politbureau.

On July 18, the Narrow C.P.C. appropriated 4 million rubles for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. p. 202

[223] A reference to the conflict between the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry (Glavryba) (Chairman A. I. Potyaev) and the People's Commissariat for Food, in which the former insisted on its inclusion in the system of S.E.C. administrations, while the latter wanted to retain its own control over it.

On July 7, 1921, a commission of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, set up to settle the conflict, decided that the Administration was to be left under the People's Commissariat for Food, and ordered the heads of the two establishments to work in close contact and maintain normal relations.

Lenin wanted the conflict settled as soon as possible, because friction at the centre had a negative effect on work all down the line. See this volume, Documents 272, 273, 274, 275, 276 and 290; and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Documents 50 and 119. p. 203

[224] A reference to Lenin's speech on the Czechoslovak question on July 6, 1921, in the commission on tactics at the Third Congress of the Comintern. p. 203

[225] It has been impossible to ascertain the subject. p. 203

[226] On July 9, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted the following decision: "To allow Comrade Lenin one month's leave with the right in that period of attending only meetings of the Politbureau (but not those of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D., except for special cases—by decision of the C.C. Secretariat)." p. 204

[227] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter of July 9, 1921, reporting the proposal of Fridtjof Nansen, representing the International Red Cross, to send food to the population of Petrograd, provided its distribution was supervised with the participation of a foreign representative (see Note 229). p. 205

[228] A reference to Lenin's amendments to the draft theses of the S.E.C. on implementing the principles of the New Economic Policy; the draft was adopted by the S.E.C. Presidium on July 6, 1921 (see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 102-06). The text of the draft with Lenin's amendments was sent to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, I. T. Smilga, N. P. Bryukhanov, A. M. Lezhava, V. A. Avanesov and V. V. Schmidt. On July 11, the S.E.C. Presidium again examined the draft theses, approved them and passed them on for discussion by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee.

On July 12, 1921, the S.E.C. theses were examined by the C.P.C., and on July 16, by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. The latter adopted the theses as a basis and appointed a commission to edit them. The commission produced a new variant, to which Lenin also made his amendments (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 44, p. 73). This draft was discussed on July 23 at a meeting of the communist group of the Central Committees of the trade unions, the Presidium of the Moscow Gubernia T.U.C., and representatives of Petrograd trade unions. The meeting adopted the theses as a basis and appointed a commission which, together with the Party C.C. commission, worked out a final text. On August 9, this was adopted by a plenum of the Party Central Committee, and on the same day given legislative form through the C.P.C. as "C.P.C. Instructions on Implementing the Principles of the New Economic Policy" (see *Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitelstva po khozyaistvennym voprosam* [Directives of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government on Economic Questions], Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, pp. 254-59).

See also this volume, Documents 240, 241 and 242. p. 205

229 Written on a letter from V. M. Molotov, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., who put to the vote of the Politbureau members two proposals: 1) to authorise a commission of P. A. Bogdanov and G. V. Tsyperovich to draft an agreement with the German consortium on its participation in rehabilitating the metal industry of Petrograd; and 2) Fridtjof Nansen's proposal to send food to the population of Petrograd. Both were adopted by the Politbureau on July 11, 1921. p. 207

230 The notes to V. A. Smolyaninov were written in connection with the fitting out of the Kara expedition to deliver goods to the mouth of the Ob and the Yenisei in Siberia for commodity exchange with a Swedish company. S. Y. Chutskayev, Deputy Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, in a telegram to Lenin on July 8, 1921, expressed doubt concerning the successful outcome of the Kara expedition, in view of L. B. Krasin's cancellation of the agreement with the Swedes and the purchases of goods from the British.

On July 14, 1921, on Lenin's assignment, V. A. Smolyaninov, together with L. B. Krasin, wrote a reply to Chutskayev informing him of the measures taken to ensure the expedition. p. 208

231 Written at a sitting of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on July 12, 1921, in connection with the discussion of the question of an All-Russia Famine Relief Committee. N. A. Semashko objected to the establishment of the committee, saying that the Mensheviks and the S.R.s could use it for hostile activity against the Soviet power. To prevent this, the Politbureau approved a plan to set up a communist group in the Committee and decided to bring into its Presidium only a limited number of bourgeois "public figures". p. 208

[232] In a talk with A. A. Korostelev, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, in early July 1921, Lenin proposed that a Commission for Assisting the Economic Bodies should be set up under this People's Commissariat. Korostelev was to report on the matter to the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet. However, the report was not heard at the scheduled time because of the simultaneous opening of the Third Gubernia Congress of Soviets, and was given to the new executive committee of the Moscow Soviet on July 15, 1921.

Attaching great importance to the work of the Commission, Lenin insisted on having regular progress reports (see present edition, Vol. 35, Document 291; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 133). p. 209

[233] Written in connection with a letter from I. A. Semyannikov, a Communist Red Armyman, who informed Lenin about cases of mismanagement, stealing and abuse of power by food supply workers and responsible Communists in the Don region. He requested immediate measures to stop these scandalous practices which were arousing indignation among the workers and peasants. p. 209

[234] For Lenin's assessment of the American third party—the workers' and peasants' or workers' and farmers' union see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 146-47.

In a reply letter of July 14, 1921, M. M. Borodin wrote that he would prepare a report within five days on the strength of the available material. On Borodin's letter Lenin wrote this assignment to his secretary: "Please give me a reminder within a week. 14.VII. *Lenin*", which he later crossed out and wrote: "To the archives."

Upon receipt of Borodin's report, Lenin wrote a reply (see this volume, Document 284). p. 210

[235] Written in reply to a letter from A. A Korostelev, in which he explains why the Commission for Assisting the Economic Bodies has failed to start work, in particular referring to the fact that collective supply for workers has not yet been introduced at enterprises in Moscow and Petrograd. p. 211

[236] A telegram from the Chairman of the Yaroslavl Gubernia Executive Committee on July 14, 1921, reported the stealing of food during loading and discharge of cargoes on the Volga. p. 212

[237] A reference to the draft resolution of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee warning Baku officials against violations of the Soviet Government's policy in respect of Persia (Iran). It was adopted by the Politbureau on October 3, 1921. p. 212

[238] *Rudè Pravo*—a daily, initially the organ of the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party (Left) and then the Central Organ of

the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, published since September 21, 1920. p. 213

[239] A reference to the *Congress of the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic Party* (*Left*), held in Prague from May 14 to 16, 1921, which inaugurated the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Lenin made a thorough study of the proceedings of the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (see this volume, Document 324; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 65). p. 213

[240] A reference to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov's pamphlet, *Electrifcation of the R.S.F.S.R. in Connection with the Transitional Phase of the World Economy*, which was published in 1922 with a foreword by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 245-46). p. 213

[241] A reference to a pamphlet by K. Ukhanov and N. Borisov, *Life and Activity of the Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies of the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District of Moscow* (*March 1917-January 1921*), a copy of which with Lenin's markings is at the Central Party Archives. On the document there is the following inscription in Lenin's hand: "Former Dynamo Works, Leninskaya Sloboda (Simonovo), Moscow." p. 214

[242] On August 1, 1921, the Central Famine Relief Commission under the All-Russia C.E.C. issued an appeal to the peasants and all toiling citizens of the R.S.F.S.R., urging a contribution for the famine-stricken areas of one pound per pood of threshed grain. On August 4, the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. adopted a decision on deducting, for the benefit of the starving, one per cent per pood of foodstuffs procured through commodity exchange (published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 172 on August 6, 1921). p. 215

[243] A letter sent to Lenin by Richard Müller and Heinrich Malzahn, members of the German trade union delegation at the First International Congress of Revolutionary Trade Unions (July 1921), over the resolution of the congress on the organisational question relating to the trade unions in Germany.

Following its establishment, the United Communist Party of Germany set up communist groups in all the trade unions. In an effort to isolate the Communists from the trade union membership, the trade union bureaucrats expelled leading Communists and some local organisations in toto. p. 218

[244] A reference to G. V. Chicherin's protest against the proposal to conclude a concession agreement with the British Bolton Company to set up a free port in Petrograd. Chicherin said that this would create a grave threat to the Republic's external security.

This question was repeatedly discussed by the C.L.D. and the Narrow C.P.C. Eventually, the proposal was not accepted. p. 219

[245] On July 22, 1921, the C.L.D. examined this question and adopted a decision under which all foreign missions and individuals arriving in Russia would be supplied with food at a private distribution centre set up by the People's Commissariat for Food, when presenting special cards registered at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. p. 221

[246] A reference to a letter from M. Kruchinsky, Deputy Head of the Central Administration of Horse Breeding (Gukon) of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, who said the horse-breeding Industry was in a grave state due to the bad work of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. p. 222

[247] A reference to the report, "*The Present State and the Immediate Prospects of the Astrakhan State Fishing Industry*", given on June 16, 1921, by I. P. Babkin, the C.L.D. agent for the fishing season in Astrakhan.

For Lenin's remarks and markings on Babkin's report see *Lenin Miscellany XX*, pp. 293-98.

On July 27, 1921, the C.L.D. adopted its decision, "On Measures to Improve the Fishing Industry and Transportation of Fish", which also established the forms of relations between the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry and the People's Commissariat for Food. p. 223

[248] This and the following documents were written in connection with G. V. Chicherin's letter to M. M. Scheinman on the need to speed up the writing of an article exposing Georgian Mensheviks, and a request for some partial sketches of the diplomatic aspect of the Georgian conflict. p. 227

[249] A reference to N. L. Meshcheryakov's pamphlet *In the Menshevik Paradise. Impressions of a Trip to Georgia*, published in 1921. p. 227

[250] A reference to the report from the Moscow Gubernia Food Commissar P. S. Sorokin on the fulfilment by the Moscow Consumers' Commune of the C.P.C. decision of July 12, 1921, to reduce by 30 per cent the number of persons on the supply list in view of the grave food situation. On July 26, the C.P.C. set up a commission to verify the work by the Moscow Consumers' Commune. It was authorised, in particular, to find out whether it was expedient to remove from the ration list the categories of persons as designated by the commune, or whether it was possible to remove all non-working persons of Moscow. p. 228

[251] A reference to the draft agreement with the nationalist Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party of July 14, 1921, which provided for the

integration with Soviet Armenia of Turkish territory inhabited by Armenians and the establishment of an "independent" Armenia. On July 26, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee rejected this draft agreement. p. 229

[252] The deputy Soviet representative in Great Britain, N. K. Klyshko, reported in the telegram mentioned above that, upon receipt ol a proposal to set up an Anglo-Russian Committee for the Collection of Funds for Famine Relief in Russia, he had stipulated definite conditions for its establishment, including a favourable attitude to the Soviet Government on the part of Britain's ruling circles. p. 229

[253] Written in connection with G. V. Chicherin's letter of July 24, 1921, saying that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had had to make arrangements for Isadora Duncan, the actress who had arrived in Russia at the invitation of A. V. Lunacharsky and L. B. Krasin. Chicherin argued that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did not have the duty to make arrangements for foreigners coming to Russia who were not connected with official missions. p. 230

[254] *Sowiet*—a monthly published in Berlin from 1919 to July 1, 1921, under the editorship of Paul Levi. Following Levi's expulsion from the United Communist Party of Germany, the journal, from July 1, changed its orientation and was published under the name of *Unser Weg*. At the end of 1922 it ceased publication. p. 231

[255] Rosa Luxemburg's manuscript was published in 1922 by Paul Levi, with his foreword *Die russische Revolution. Eine kritische Würdigung. Aus dem Nachlaß von Rosa Luxemburg* (The Russian Revolution. A Critical Essay. From Rosa Luxemburg's Legacy). In response, Clara Zetkin published a book in 1922 entitled *Um Rosa Luxemburg Stellung zur russischen Revolution* (Rosa Luxemburg and the Russian Revolution, Moscow-Leningrad, 1922), showing that Levi was a renegade, and setting forth Rosa Luxemburg's true views of the Russian revolution.

For Lenin's assessment of Paul Levi see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 207-11. p. 232

[256] This was written on L. B. Krasin's letter of July 27, 1921, reporting on the terms of an agreement with the British shipbuilding companies, who were prepared to grant Soviet Russia a long-term credit for the building of ships for the Black Sea, Caspian and the Volga merchant fleet and the Mariinsk Waterway. In this connection, Krasin proposed that these companies or the British Government extend an additional credit to cover the purchase of equipment, and suggested that a plan should be worked out to use the credit for the rehabilitation of the national economy. p. 233

[257] Written on a report from I. S. Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka, who proposed that in order to demoralise the whiteguard troops interned in Poland and Czechoslovakia, on which S. V. Petlyura and B. V. Savinkov pinned their military hopes, an amnesty should be extended to all interned soldiers, provided that they abided by certain conditions and limitations. This proposal was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. p. 233

[258] On the document Lenin wrote: "Why has this not been done?" This refers to instructions given in a letter to A. I. Potyaev on July 24, 1921 (see this volume, Document 272). p. 234

[259] In the article referred to, N. N. Vashkov gave a short review of what had been done in the sphere of electrification, giving a table to show the growth of urban and rural electric-power stations from 1917 to 1921. He also spoke of the work started locally to explore the power resources and the requirements in the electrification. p. 235

[260] A reference to the *Eighth All-Russia Electrotechnical Congress*, which was called on Lenin's initiative in pursuance of the resolution of the Eighth Congress of Soviets, to hold a comprehensive discussion of technical and economic problems connected with the implementation of the GOELRO plan. Before the congress, a telegram was sent to all the Gubernia Executive Committees instructing their electrical departments to send in, with their delegates, information about an the existing electric-power stations (see this volume, Document 327). p. 235

[261] A reference to G. I. Myasnikov's article "Vexed Questions", written on July 27, 1921. In a letter to Myasnikov on August 5, 1921, Lenin sharply criticised his views (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 504-09) p. 236

[262] A reference to *Russky Golos*, a progressive daily published in Russian by the Russo-American publishing company in New York since 1917. p. 237

[263] The *Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia* was organised in May 1919 by Russian emigres in New York. Similar societies were set up elsewhere in the U.S.A. and Canada. The aim of the Society was to promote the rehabilitation of the Soviet economy by sending skilled workers and technicians.

The first congress of the societies for technical aid to Soviet Russia was held in New York from July 2 to 4, 1921; it united local societies in several American and Canadian cities into a single Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia. From the end of 1921 to October 1922, the Society sent to Soviet Russia seven agricultural, two construction and one mining communes and a number of groups which brought with them equipment, seeds and

foodstuffs worth nearly $500,000. The Society was extending its activity, and by 1923 it had more than 75 branches with over 20,000 members. Its second congress in June 1923 adopted a decision to intensify its work of organising and sending in communes and preparatory groups of skilled workers to Russia. The Society continued its active economic aid until 1925.

Lenin regarded this activity as a striking expression of proletarian internationalism and fraternal solidarity of the working people. p. 237

[264] A reference to a proposal made by Ionov (Koigen F. M.) to have Mensheviks and S.R.s included in the branches abroad of the Central Famine Relief Commission under the All-Russia C.E.C. On Ionov's telegram to Chicherin, setting out the proposal, Lenin wrote: "Under no circumstances." p. 238

[265] A reference to a telegram to the American Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia, which was drafted by Lenin (see this volume, Document 293). The question of sending this telegram was discussed at a conference of representatives of the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and the People's Commissariat for Labour on August 6, 1921. Because the votes were split, a vote was taken, on Lenin's proposal, among the members of the C.P.C., most of whom came out in favour of sending the telegram.

The following text was added to the telegram on Lenin's proposal: "One should not forget about the difficulties existing in Russia, which have to be overcome, food supply difficulties and others. The people coming to Russia must be prepared for this. It is necessary to be guided by the instructions of the industrial emigration department under the S.E.C., which are being sent to you." For the final text of the telegram see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, p. 261. p. 240

[266] The draft theses provided that the whole of Soviet policy in Bukhara and Khiva should be implemented only through the plenipotentiary representatives of Russia; the measures taken by the Turkestan Commission were to be agreed with these representatives and, on especially important matters, with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

On August 5, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee endorsed the draft theses. p. 240

[267] N. M. Knipovich, an industrial research specialist, was of the opinion that V. I. Meisner, Head of the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry, was hampering the initiative of other establishments in scientific-industrial research, and that his Administration was conducting an incorrect policy on fisheries. Knipovich said all this in a letter to Lenin on August 6, 1921, on which Lenin made his remarks (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 164-67). p. 243

[268] A reference to the fulfilment of orders for the manufacture of electric ploughs. Back in December 1920, the Narrow C.P.C., on Lenin's instructions, approved a plan for the manufacture of electric ploughing machines. It was being realised by the Extraordinary Commission for the Making of Electric Ploughing Implements ("Elektroplug") which consisted of representatives of the S.E.C. and the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. Later, its functions were transferred to the S.E.C.'s Central Administration for Agricultural Machinery. Lenin kept a close watch on the making of electric ploughs and demanded that the members of the commission supply him with regular and exact information about the fulfilment of the orders (see present edition, Vol. 36, p. 531; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 52, Document 34). p. 243

[269] These documents were written in connection with the report of July 20, 1921, from S. I. Liberman, an expert of the Concessions Committee under the State Planning Commission, proposing that the administration of the Archangel forest district be transferred to a group of forestry specialists, who were to operate with the rights of a state establishment while retaining some freedom commercially.

On August 17, 1921, the C.L.D. adopted a decision on the administrative organs for the timber industry of the Severo-Belomorsky District, under which a special body—Severoles—was set up within the system of the Chief Timber Committee. p. 244

[270] This was written in connection with a letter from M. P. Tomsky, Chairman of the Commission of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the C.P.C. of the R.S.F.S.R. for Turkestan affairs, of July 23, 1921, setting out his differences with G. I. Safarov, member of the Turkestan Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, on implementing the New Economic Policy in Turkestan. Tomsky insisted on introducing the tax in kind and believed it was impossible to combine the New Economic Policy with the establishment in Turkestan of Committees of Poor Peasants and their sharing out of the property, cattle and stock requisitioned from the kulaks. Safarov, for his part, insisted that the tax in kind and free exchange were not quite applicable to Turkestan conditions, and laid emphasis on organising unions of the poor and the class stratification of the local population.

For details on this question see also this volume, Document 383; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Documents 175 and 259. p. 246

[271] A reference to the purchase of sheep from cattle-breeding traders in Turkestan and China to supply meat to the population of Moscow. It later turned out, however, that the deal was disadvantageous. In a telegram sent to M. P. Tomsky on September 19, 1921, which was signed by Lenin, he was ordered to stop further purchases of cattle (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 136). p. 246

[272] These notes were written by Lenin in connection with the regulations "On House Management", adopted by the Narrow C.P.C. on August 8, 1921, which made the house manager most responsible for the good repair of housing facilities. On August 12 and 22, 1921, the Narrow C.P.C. examined the question of elaborating the additional measures proposed by Lenin to enhance responsibility for the maintenance of houses in good repair. p. 247

[273] The Gokhran (State Depository of Valuables) case mentioned in the letter arose as a result of the discovery of a large shortage of diamonds. Gokhran valuer, Y. S. Shelekhes, was accused of stealing valuables and was arrested by the All-Russia Cheka. On August 8, 1921, Lenin sent an inquiry to Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka, I. S. Unschlicht, over Shelekhes's arrest and received a reply on August 9, from G. I. Bokii, a member of the Collegium of the Cheka. The present letter was written by Lenin in connection with his unsatisfactory reply.

See this volume, Documents 173, 180, 216 and 221; and also *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 215. p. 248

[274] A probable reference to Maxim Gorky's letter connected with the proposal from ARA (American Relief Administration) to conclude an agreement with Soviet Russia. Lenin sent this letter to L. B. Kamenev on July 31, 1921. p. 249

[275] Written on a report from the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee requesting its sanction for the dispatch abroad of auditing groups to inspect R.S.F.S.R. trade missions. p. 253

[276] A reference to G. I. Myasnikov's report to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and his article "Vexed Questions". For Lenin's reply letter see this volume, Document 292, and present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 504-09. p. 253

[277] The telegram proposed by Lenin was sent to M. M. Litvinov to Riga the same day, August 13, with some editorial changes. Litvinov was negotiating with ARA on behalf of the Soviet Government. See also this volume, Document 310. p. 254

[278] Written in connection with the discussion by the Narrow C.P.C. on August 12, 1921, of a draft decree to combat bribe-taking. On August 16, the decree was approved by the C.P.C. and published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 184, on August 21, 1921. p. 255

[279] Subsequently, through V. A. Smolyaninov, Deputy Business Manager of the C.L.D., Lenin repeatedly inquired of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade about the purchases of Norwegian fish. Import operations were started in December 1921. p. 255

[280] A reference to the reply from N. N. Vashkov, head of the S.E.C.'s Electrical Department, to Lenin's telephone message of August 1, 1921. p. 256

[281] A reference to Goldebayev's article "Our Resources" (*Pravda* No. 178, August 13, 1921). In a reply letter to Lenin on August 20, 1921, V. N. Ipatiev, Chief of the S.E.C.'s Chemical Industry Department, said that despite the vast raw material resources of the Gulf of Kara-Bugaz, their practical use was being made difficult because of the lack of water and the shortage of fuel and transport facilities in the area.

The commercial extraction of sodium sulphate was started in 1924. Today, the area has become a major source of mineral raw materials required for the chemical industry and other branches of the national economy. See also this volume, Document 410. p. 256

[282] In addition and amendment of the decree of May 31, 1921, on the state monopoly for salt, the C.P.C. adopted a decision on August 23, 1921, setting out practical measures to ensure the salt monopoly and the balanced distribution of salt in the national economy. The decision was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 194, September 2, 1921.

The All-Russia C.E.C. and C.L.D. decision prohibiting bonuses in salt, and laying down penalties for breaches of the salt monopoly, was approved on August 29, 1921, and published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 194, September 2, 1921. p. 257

[283] A reference to the report given by Bohumir Šmeral at the Inaugural Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party which was held from May 14 to 16, 1921.

Having received the note from secretary Maria Glyasser saying that Šmeral's speech had been found and was being translated, Lenin made this remark: "To my library." p. 258

[284] A reference to the letter from P. I. Popov, Chief of the Central Statistical Board, of August 19, 1921, offering his resignation from the Board. For Lenin's reply letter see this volume, Document 328. p. 261

[285] On August 23, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted a decision on trips by members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to the western border to study the state of its security and defence. p. 266

[286] A reference to Y. M. Steklov's article "Leftism But Within Reason", carried in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 182, on August 18, 1921. A. A. Solts's article "Uncalled for Alarm" was published in *Pravda* No. 184, on August 21, 1921. p. 266

[287] This document was written by Lenin in connection with the letter from Prof. N. N. Yakovlev, of the Geological Institute, about

the arrest of academic geologists working on the study of sapropel (organic and inorganic depositions on the bed of reservoirs) Yakovlev said their arrest had been unjustified and requested their early release.

In a reply letter on August 25, I. S. Unschlicht wrote that one geologist had been released, while the others could not be released, because it had been established that they had connections with the counter-revolutionary organisation in Petrograd. p. 267

288 On Lenin's manuscript there is this note by a secretary: "Talked with Comrade Rakosi: he promised to find out and give a written reply." On September 9, 1921, I. S. Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka, informed Lenin that in view of Adolphe Carm's release, he was being allowed to leave the territory of the R.S.F.S.R., and his case had been quashed. p. 267

289 About Fridtjof Nansen's proposal see Notes 227 and 229.

The "Kukishi" were members of the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee. "Kukish" is the Russian for fig, and is an acronym coined from the names of Yelena Kuskova and N. M. Kishkin, two of its members. p. 268

290 The government communiqué on the dissolution of the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee was published in *Pravda* No. 191, on August 30, 1921. p. 269

291 Written by Lenin in reply to the thesis on the national liberation movement in India sent to him by the progressive Indian political leader Bhupendra Nath Datta, who later wrote that Lenin's letter "came as a revelation to the writer. That the 'peasant movement' is of importance for the movement for national freedom has never struck a national-revolutionary. Sentimentalism is the backbone of nationalism. The middle class considers itself to be the representative of the nation and sees every movement in that perspective. Hence, the instruction of Lenin not to discuss the social classes but to get interested in peasant movement set the writer athinking. It changed his *Anschauung* regarding the means and methods of Indian fight for freedom" (Bhupendranath Datta, *Dialectics of Land-Economics of India*, Calcutta, p. III).

In his letter to Datta, Lenin mentioned his theses on the national and colonial questions for the Second Congress of the Communist International (see present edition, Vol. 31, pp. 144-51). p. 270

292 In contrast to the practice of providing free economic services (transport, including urban transport, housing, posts, newspapers, etc.), established during the War Communism period, charges for rail and water transportation were introduced on July 9, 1921, postal charges on July 18, prices on goods, including food, on August 5, and charges for municipal services on August 25.

In the second half of 1921, the C.P.C. took a number of meas-

ures to improve the workers' material conditions: it introduced new principles for wage payments in accordance with quantity and quality of labour, payment in money instead of in kind, guaranteed wages (in commodity rubles), etc. As a result, the real earnings of workers had already increased by the end of 1921. p. 270

[293] On August 30, 1921, Lenin was sent an extract from the minutes of a sitting of the Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. of August 29, 1921, on the granting of leave to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky. p. 270

[294] This document contains Lenin's reply to a telegram from V. N. Kayurov, who had been appointed chairman of the Commission for Purging the Party in Siberia. The exchange of direct wire telegrams took place on August 30, 1921, when Kayurov said that he doubted the need for purging the Party, and proposed that greater attention should be given to the Communists in day-to-day practical work. At Lenin's request, the Siberian commission submitted its considerations on this matter to the Central Commission for Purging the R.C.P.(B.). p. 272

[295] A reference to the commission of representatives of the All-Russia C.E.C. of the R.S.F.S.R. and the C.E.C. of the Ukrainian S.S.R., with the participation of representatives from the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R. and the People's Commissariat for Food of the Ukraine, set up to inquire into the state of food supply work in the Ukraine. Objecting to the formation of this commission, N. P. Bryukhanov wrote to Lenin: "It is not likely that the commission will propose any new measures. But there is no doubt at all that it will divert some of the food workers' energy and attention from the fulfilment of their work, which is urgent and brooks no delay" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 273

[296] A commission consisting of representatives of the State Planning Commission, the Central Peat Administration and the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction met on September 7, 1921, with L. B. Krasin in the chair, to discuss the report about the new way of extracting peat, and adopted a number of measures to promote this work. Having acquainted himself with the commission's material on September 11, Lenin instructed N. P. Gorbunov to establish regular supervision over the execution of the decisions (see this volume, Document 378). p. 273

[297] A reference to the application addressed to Lenin, asking him to help recover the requisitioned things. p. 274

[298] This is written on a note from the Managing Department of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee to Lenin, putting to the vote the

question of authorising the Moscow Workers' Co-operative to procure potatoes directly from the peasants.

A. A. Kissin and N. P. Bryukhanov took a negative attitude to this, believing, however, that the Moscow Co-operative could have its agents and acceptance stations under the gubernia societies. They held that procurement in circumvention of gubernia societies would tend to breed speculative commodity exchange. p. 274

[299] This assignment arose from a letter sent in by B. P. Pozern, Chairman of the Central Textile Administration, concerning the organisation of work of textile mills. Pozern's letter of September 17, in reply to an inquiry from the C.P.C. and C.L.D. Managing Department, said that supplies were earmarked only for the best organised textile mills. In September 1921, the S.E.C. Presidium allocated funds for the Central Textile Administration to buy food and fuel and carry out capital repairs at enterprises. p. 275

[300] Written in connection with the receipt of the text of a concession agreement concluded by the government of Georgia for the working of the timber resources in two areas of the Republic. On September 30, the C.L.D. decided to accept the agreement. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade was instructed to collect information on the credit-worthiness of the concessionaires. p. 276

[301] Written at the bottom of a letter from Y. P. Figatner, a member of the Caucasian Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, in which he informed Lenin about the gift of a portrait embroidered by a Persian Communist artisan. The author of the letter requested written confirmation of the receipt of the portrait. p. 276

[302] Written on a telegram from J. A. Berzin addressed to G. V. Chicherin, saying that M. I. Skobelev, who had started negotiations with the French Government as a representative of the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee, was requesting powers from the Soviet Government as well.

Below is the reference to the appointment of Joseph Noulens, one-time French Ambassador to Russia (1917-18), one of the organisers of counter-revolutionary plots against the Soviet power and of foreign armed intervention, to the Chairmanship of the International Relief Commission. The commission (Britain, France, Italy and Belgium) was set up by a decision of the Allied Supreme Council and was in fact a cover for implementing anti-Soviet plans. p. 277

[303] By a decision on September 16, 1921, the C.L.D. qualified the Volkhov project as a "top priority construction project". All departments were instructed to give top priority to indents from

the Volkhov project. The progress of construction was repeatedly discussed by the All-Russia C.E.C. See also this volume, Document 374; present edition, Vol. 35, Document 298; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Documents 288 and 293. p. 278

[304] Written on a telegram from A. I. Svidersky, a member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food and All-Russia C.E.C. agent for Gomel Gubernia, to N. P. Bryukhanov, Deputy People's Commissar for Food, reporting the non-fulfilment of warrants from the People's Commissariat for Food by Kh. G. Pestun, Chairman of the Gomel Gubernia Executive Committee. p. 280

[305] A reference to N. M. Knipovich's letter of August 6, 1921, addressed to Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 164-67). p. 281

[306] A reference to a systematised collection of decrees on railway tariff which the Narrow C.P.C. intended to publish on September 1, 1921. On September 20, 1921, the C.P.C. refused to approve its publication. p. 282

[307] Written on L. B. Krasin's letter setting out the measures which the Byelorussian People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade was taking to develop trade with foreign countries. p. 283

[308] Lenin wrote this note in connection with the petition from the Russian Physico-Chemical Society requesting the release of M. M. Tikhvinsky, professor of chemistry, and other scientists arrested in the case of a Petrograd counter-revolutionary organisation. p. 283

[309] A reference to the legal proceedings for the recovery of royalties started by V. V. Mayakovsky against I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, director of the State Publishers. On August 25, 1921, the Moscow Disciplinary Court under the Moscow Gubernia T.U.C. ruled that I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov was to be disqualified from union membership for 6 months. On September 8, the case was reviewed, and the judgement rescinded.

Deputy People's Commissar for Education, Y. A. Litkens, and member of the collegium of the Academy of Labour Education, F. V. Lengnik, were accused of dismissing a group of workers and employees. The Moscow gubernia comrades' disciplinary court under the Moscow Gubernia T.U.C. issued a reprimand and deprived them of the right to hold elective office for six months. A commission of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee examined this case on September 26 and decided: "1) To ask the gubernia disciplinary court under the Moscow Gubernia T.U.C. to re-examine the case 2) On the substance of the accusation ... to confine itself to a trade union and a Party reprimand" (Central Party

Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Concerning Lenin's proposal, set out in point 2 of the document, the Politbureau of the C.C. drew the attention of the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. on September 6, 1921, to the need to refer the matter of appropriating 1,000 million rubles for the theatres for the examination by the C.P.C. p. 285

[310] Written in connection with a note from L. M. Khinchuk, Chairman of the Central Union of Consumers' Societies, about improving commodity exchange in Orel, Bryansk and Gomel gubernias.

On June 17, 1921, No. 97 of *Prodovolstvennaya Gazeta* carried an article entitled "Experience in State Commodity Exchange". p. 285

[311] Written on A. S. Kiselyov's letter, saying that he had sent Lenin a draft of the "Basic Propositions on the Rating Question" drawn up by members of the Narrow C.P.C. (A. S. Kiselyov, A. A. Belov and Y. I. Gindin) and approved by a conference of heads of the major production associations, attended by nearly 30 men. This draft was based on the directives of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. Having acquainted himself with the draft theses, Lenin made his corrections, emphasising the direct connection between remuneration for labour and the results of production (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 258-60). After an all-round discussion by the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, the C.L.D., at a joint sitting of the bureaus of Party groups of the All-Russia Central T.U.C., the Moscow gubernia T.U.C. and the Party group of the S.E.C. Presidium, the "Basic Propositions on the Rating Question" were approved by the C.P.C. on September 16, and published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 207, on September 17, 1921. See also *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Documents 277, 278 and 279. p. 287

[312] A reference to a polar expedition to explore waterways on the Yamal Peninsula and find a route to the ocean, which would be of great importance in developing Siberia's economy. p. 286

[313] Written in connection with statistical material received from the C.C. Secretariat about R.C.P.(B.) members. A reply letter from N. I. Solovyov, Head of the Statistical Department, on September 8, 1921, reported that the material on Moscow and Petrograd Communists in Soviet government office would be sent to Lenin shortly. p. 287

[314] A report on the gold stock and its expenditure was submitted to Lenin by the People's Commissariat for Finance. On September 14, 1921, the C.C. Politbureau instructed A. O. Alsky to see that all expenditures of the gold stock were strictly accounted for. See also this volume, Document 371; present edition, Vol. 42, p. 342. p. 288

[315] On Y. I. Vishnyak's letter there is this remark by Lenin: "Vishnyak about Lalayants 5. IX. 1921, p.t.o." On the other side of the page, written in Lenin's hand, are the beginning of the document here published and the remark "by phone" (see Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 289

[316] This opinion was expressed by J. A. Berzin in a note, which he sent from Britain, apparently to G. V. Chicherin. p. 289

[317] A reference to officials of the American Relief Administration (ARA) which was headed by Herbert Hoover. Lenin's proposal that a number of restrictive measures should be taken in respect of them was due to the fact that the staff of this organisation, consisting mainly of U.S. army officers, engaged in espionage and gave support to counter-revolutionary elements in Russia (see this volume, Documents 310, 331 and 370). p. 289

[318] Nansen's activity in collecting donations from public organisations and private persons to render aid to the starving in Russia aroused-dissatisfaction in the reactionary circles of some capitalist countries. The Soviet people appreciated his efforts, and on December 25, 1921, the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets carried a vote expressing deep gratitude to him.

The Daily Chronicle, a newspaper of the British imperialist bourgeoisie, published in London from 1855 to 1930. p. 290

[319] A reference to S. I. Botin's experiment in the remote control of powder explosions in 1920 and 1921. In October 1921, a specialists' commission gave a negative opinion on his trials and proposed that they should be stopped because of inadequate preparation. See present edition, Vol. 36, p. 526; Vol. 44, Documents 623, 630, 721 and 740; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 51, Documents 477 and 532. p. 291

[320] A reference to the drafts prepared by the People's Commissariat for Education which served as a basis for working out the decision "On Measures to Improve the Supply of Schools and Other Educational Establishments". It was passed by the C.P.C. on September 15, and was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 212 on September 23, 1921. See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 304. p. 291

[321] Written in connection with an inquiry from V. D. Kaisarov, chairman of a special scientific commission for compiling an academic atlas, on the exact definition of the boundaries of the R.S.F.S.R. and its relations with the republics formed within the boundaries of the former Russian empire. p. 293

[322] This instruction arose from N. P. Gorbunov's letter, in which he communicated the results of an inquiry into the delay over

M. P. Sazhin's business trip abroad and added that "there was no deliberate red tape on the part of the People's Commissariat for Education". Lenin underlined the word "deliberate". p. 293

[323] Lenin wrote the assignment on a letter from G. D. Tsyurupa, chief engineer of the Kashira Electric-Power Station, requesting assistance in obtaining the electrotechnical materials required for the construction site from the S.E.C.'s Electrical Department, to which Lenin sent a telegram on September 12, 1921 (see this volume, Document 380). p. 294

[324] Written on the minutes of the September 7, 1921 sitting of a commission dealing with the Gidrotorf questions (see Note 104). In the margins and in the text there are various remarks and underlinings made by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 90 and 91). p. 294

[325] At the top of Lenin's manuscript of the draft telegram a note in Lydia Fotieva's hand says: "To Bogdanov, Bryukhanov and Avanesov for urgent comment." p . 294

[326] Written in reply to a letter from military commissar S. S. Danilov, of September 8, 1921, urging the need to develop a sense of "love, compassion and mutual assistance *within the class*, within the working people's camp". p. 296

[327] §6 of the decision dealt with the granting to schools of the right to exchange articles of state supply they did not need for the necessary foodstuffs. §8 included the point about voluntary "self-assessment" by those who used libraries and clubs. p. 296

[328] A telegram from A. A. Joffe dated September 9, 1921, said that the differences between M. P. Tomsky, Chairman of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia C.E.C., and G. I. Safarov, a member of the Turkestan Bureau, tended to incite hostility between the Russians and the local population, and between individual nationalities. On September 13, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided to discuss the question of policy in Turkestan after receiving Joffe's written report, and after the Politbureau members had studied all the material. Having discussed the work in Turkestan, on October 14, 1921, the Politbureau appointed a new Turkestan Bureau and a Turkestan Commission and outlined the principal tasks of Party and Soviet government work in Turkestan. It emphasised the need for circumspection in implementing the New Economic Policy in Turkestan, which was to ensure the task of involving the toiling masses in socialist construction. p. 297

[329] In a letter of May 30, 1921, Lenin proposed that the Revolutionary Military Council should work out a plan for using the army for economic work, and gave concrete instructions in which spheres

of the national economy its assistance was required above all (see this volume, Document 182). p. 298

[330] Lenin wrote a letter to N. A. Semashko in connection with the report about the atrocious state of the Crimean health resorts, which he had received from Margarita Fofanova (who was on an All-Russia C.E.C. commission sent to the Crimea by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture). In a reply to Lenin on September 15, Semashko set out the measures being taken by the People's Commissariat for Health to improve the work of health resorts in the Crimea and the Caucasus. p. 298

[331] Having received this letter from Lenin, N. P. Gorbunov, C.P.C. Business Manager, on September 13, 1921, made the following entry in the assignment register: "Draw up instructions to the Secretariat of the Full C.P.C. on Vladimir Ilyich's assignments and packets. Fulfilled. See Order of September 20" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 41). See also this volume, Document 387. p. 299

[332] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter about the Note from Britain's Foreign Secretary, Curzon, of September 7, 1921, alleging that the Soviet Government had violated the Russo-British Agreement of March 16, 1921. The Note had no heading, address or signature. In a reply Note of September 27, 1921, the Soviet Government rejected the unwarranted accusations. p. 301

[333] This was added by Lenin at the bottom of a letter from N. P. Gorbunov, C.P.C. Business Manager, to the Kirsanov Uyezd Economic Conference, expressing, at Lenin's request, gratitude for the timely submission of its report. p. 303

[334] In reply to this letter, M. I. Frumkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Food, informed the C.P.C. Managing Department on September 27, 1921, that "Vladimir Ilyich's letter has been taken into consideration and will be fulfilled". N. P. Gorbunov, C.P.C. Business Manager, made the following entry in the assignment register: "Fulfilled December 14. N. P. Bryukhanov informed that the Gubernia Executive Committees 'are obeying'" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 42). p. 303

[335] In a letter to Lenin Y. Z. Volkov, Head of the Information Sub-Department of the Famine Relief Commission under the All-Russia C.E.C., expressed doubts concerning the advisability of dissolving the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee, arguing that the dissolution of the Committee and the arrest of its members could have a negative effect on relations with France. p. 304

[336] During the second half of 1921, a group of American workers, led by a Dutch Communist engineer, Sebald Rutgers, negotiated with the Soviet Government on the lease of a part of the Kuznetsk

Coal Basin in Siberia and the establishment of an industrial colony there. Rutgers's proposal was examined by the C.P.C. on September 13, 1921, and referred to the S.E.C.

On September 19, Lenin saw representatives of the American workers' colony and had a talk with them. There is a record of this talk made by Lenin (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 39).

On September 23, 1921, the C.L.D. decided to recognise the agreement with the Rutgers group as desirable and instructed a special commission to draft its text. The agreement was finally approved on October 21 by the C.L.D. and on October 25 by the C.P.C. The colony operated in Kuzbas as an enterprise directly subordinate to the C.L.D. See also this volume, Documents 416 and 436; present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 344-45, 348-49, 350, *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Documents 353 and 374. p. 304

[337] The literature mentioned by Lenin in the document was required by I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, who was working on the book *Elektrifikatsiya RSFSR v svyazi s perekhodnoi fazoi mirovogo khozyaistva* (Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. in Connection with the Transitional Phase of the World Economy), Gosizdat, 1922.

There is this entry on September 20, 1921, in the register of Lenin's C.P.C. and C.L.D. assignments: "Collect literature on electrification for I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov. Fulfilled October 21" *(Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 42). p. 307

[338] A reference to the following passage in F. Engels's article "On Historical Materialism" (English introduction to *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*): "In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for gathering at the time, the revolution had to be carried farther—exactly as in 1793 in France and in 1848 in Germany. This seemed, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society." Quoted from Lenin's article "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" published on May 10 (23), 1908 in *Proletary* (see present edition, Vol. 15, p. 58, and also Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1962, p. 105).

For *F. Engels's letter to Weydemeyer* see Marx and Engels *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 74-78. p. 307

[339] On October 26, 1921, the Council of Labour and Defence heard the question of food supply for the Kashira project and approved a draft decision introduced by V. A. Avanesov. p. 309

[340] V. V. Adoratsky, who, on Lenin's assignment, was working on a collection of selected letters of Marx and Engels, asked D. B. Ryazanov, then in Germany, to collect all the published letters of Marx and Engels and send them to Russia. The collection was published in 1922 under the title *Pisma. Teoria i politika v perepiske Marksa i Engelsa* (Letters. Theory and Politics in the Correspondence of Marx and Engels). Translation, introductory article and notes by V. V. Adoratsky. p. 309

[341] This letter is written at the bottom of "Instructions to the Provisional Berlin Commission for the Issue of Foreign Orders for Gidrotorf" in the text of which Lenin made a number of markings (see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 92).

R. E. Klasson's report, addressed to Lenin on February 11, 1922, shows that these orders of the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction (Gidrotorf) were fulfilled in time. p. 309

[342] The collection of funds among foreign workers in aid of the starving in Russia was started after the "Appeal to the International Proletariat", which Lenin wrote on August 2, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 32, p. 502). In reply to this letter Mátyás Rakosi, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, wrote Lenin on September 27, 1921, that his proposal was "taken into consideration and would be implemented" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 310

[343] The draft telegram was heavily edited by Lenin: he altered the date of the start of the three-week fuel drive from September 25 to October 1; instead of "increase the transportation by 100 per cent" he wrote: "increase the transportation to double the set targets"; and wrote the final paragraph about the personal responsibility.

Appended to the telegram is a list of a telephone poll on September 27, 1921, on which the secretary marked off the votes of I. T. Smilga, E. M. Sklyansky, N. B. Eismont, M. I. Frumkin, A. A. Andreyev, L. B. Kamenev, A. M. Anikst, V. M. Molotov, J. V. Stalin, L. D. Trotsky, A. S. Yenukidze (for the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C.) and V. A. Avanesov.

The telegram was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 219, on October 1, 1921. See also *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 101. p. 311

[344] The register of Lenin's C.P.C. and C.L.D. assignments contains the following entry dated September 29, 1921: "Urgently get through the C.L.D. the draft decision on land improvement work on state farms in Moscow Gubernia (L. S. Sosnovsky's letter to Vladimir Ilyich). Fulfilled September 30 (see C.L.D. Minutes No. 254, § 9)" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 43).

On a report by T. A. Runov, Chief of the Glavzemkboz (see Note 619), the C.L.D. decided on September 30, 1921, to allocate the money and food required for these land improvement operations on state farms near Moscow, instructions were also issued for the People's Commissariat for Agriculture to allocate tractors for ploughing up grubbed areas. p. 315

[345] The article by M. I. Lacis, Chairman of the Central Salt Administration, entitled "A Gold Mine", spoke of the importance of Kara-Bugaz, which could yield Glauber's salt as a major export item. He estimated that it would take 1,500 million rubles in capital investment which would be speedily recouped. p. 315

[346] The register of C.P.C. and C.L.D. assignments has the following entry about this document, dated September 30: "See to the fulfilment of Vladimir Ilyich's assignment to 15 responsible workers mobilised for the three-week fuel (firewood) drive: a) check up on how the accounting has been arranged in the localities; b) study methods of stealing. Fulfilled 29.XII.21. 8.X collect their record. Fulfilled 11.X" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 43).

In their reports addressed to Lenin, the workers mobilised by the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee communicated the results of the three-week fuel drive, and also exposed the serious shortcomings in the work of timbering organs and the methods of stealing, and outlined measures to combat them (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 327. p. 317

[347] The *Foreign Literature Committee* was an interdepartmental committee under the People's Commissariat for Education for the purchase and distribution of foreign literature. The reply letter from O. Y. Schmidt, Chairman of the Committee, on October 10, 1921, said that the distribution of new books bought abroad was being carried out in line with Lenin's instructions (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 318

[348] The P.S. to the typewritten text is in Lenin's hand. p. 320

[349] The document is dated by Lenin September 30, 1921. The C.L.D. meeting, said here to have been held the previous day, was also held on September 30. Lenin must have written the document late at night on September 30, expecting the letter to V. V. Kuibyshev to be sent only on October 1. A typewritten copy of this letter, dated October 1, 1921, is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 320

[350] *The Preobrazhensky Commission*, a Finance Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. and the C.P.C., was set up on Lenin's proposal soon after the Tenth Party Congress to work out aspects of financial policy in connection with the switch to the New Economic Policy. p. 321

[351] The Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., having discussed the matter on October 3, adopted the following decision: "To instruct Comrade Frumkin to draw up a draft resolution of the communist group of the All-Russia C.E.C. session.... To have the resolution stress the need of correcting the excessive burden laid on the peasants which was necessitated by the need to aid the starving, and also indicate measures for its correction" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

The Fourth Session of the All-Russia C.E.C., having examined the circumstances which had forced the C.P.C. to increase the rate of substitution of potatoes for rye, decided that such an increase could only be allowed as an emergency measure and only in view of exceptional circumstances (famine), and expressed confidence that the rural population would accept the new rate of substitution as a duty to the starving (see *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 224, October 7, 1921). p. 322

[352] I. I. Radchenko asked Lenin to sign the minutes of the Council of the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction (Gidrotorf) which, on September 29, 1921, decided to postpone the date of the Gidrotorf orders for caterpillar cranes from March 1 to May 1, 1922.

The register of C.P.C. and C.L.D. assignments contains an entry dated October 3, which says: "Find out: 1) whether Vladimir Ilyich has the juridical right to sign personally, without the C.P.C. and C.L.D.; 2) whether Vladimir Ilyich has to endorse the Gidrotorf Council minutes of September 29, as I. I. Radchenko requests. Fulfilled October 3" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 43). p. 322

[353] The last sentence of the text was written by Lenin. p. 323

[354] A reference to the supply of equipment to a special party which was to determine the site for an astronomical observatory in the Northern Caucasus. Academician V. G. Fesenkov recalls that on October 4 he informed Lenin by phone that he had been unable to secure equipment for the party over a period of three months. The next day, October 5, the matter was settled. The party was fully equipped within a few days and left for the Northern Caucasus. p. 324

[355] This was written in connection with a complaint from the Kashira project about the slow removal of the railway telegraph line from one side of the bridge to the other, across the Oka River, close to Kashira, to make way for the brackets supporting the transmission line between Moscow and Kashira.

That same day, V. V. Fomin, Deputy People's Commissar for Railways, telegraphed an order to the Ryazan-Urals Railway Administration to have the switch carried out immediately. p. 325

[356] In 1927, this document was handed in by a worker to the Aralsk District Party Committee, which at once sent it on to the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. p. 325

[357] Written on Lenin's message of greetings to the Eighth Electrotechnical Congress (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 49-50). p. 328

[358] A letter from A. I. Potyaev of September 21, 1921, reported a sharp increase in the fish catch as a result of new forms of wage

payments to fishermen. He wrote: "Every fisherman delivers the fish to us at 1913 prices (in gold currency) with some adjustments (according to the market) and receives a special order which he realises in our store or shop.... We have established a piece-rate scheme for the workers engaged in fishing.... Strict commercial accounting has been introduced both for the goods in the stores and the shops and for fish products.... It is my deep conviction that we shall manage to overcome difficulties and achieve a maximum of productivity only by giving the fisherman, the worker, the employee, direct material incentives in the results of his labour" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 328

[359] A reference to a report from I. V. Teumin, an agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade under the Byelorussian C.P.C., concerning commodity operations by the Byelorussian P.C.F.T. (see also this volume, Document 360). p. 329

[360] *M. K. Nazvanov*, a technological engineer, a specialist in the sugar industry, and the State Planning Commission's consultant, was arrested by the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka, together with a group of professors and engineers, on charges of having connections with V. N. Tagantsev, head of a counter-revolutionary combat organisation in Petrograd. Nazvanov was sentenced to be shot.

Lenin must have learned about the case from a letter sent in by Nazvanov's father on June 26, 1921, requesting clemency for his son (Central Party Archives). Another request for Nazvanov's release came from G. M. Krzhizhanovsky in his letter of September 18.

Members of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee who took a vote on October 10 came out for Lenin's proposal. On October 14, the Politbureau confirmed its decision of October 10 to have the decision of the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka reversed. On December 17, after the investigation of the Tagantsev case was completed, Nazvanov was released. On January 26, 1922, Lenin phoned an assignment to his secretary to ask V. A. Smolyaninov to check up whether Nazvanov had been given a job at the State Planning Commission, and to require it to submit a report within two months about Nazvanov's work and to remind him about this. p. 331

[361] Written in connection with M. M. Litvinov's letter of October 10, 1921, which said: "Comrade Vorovsky several times telegraphed and wrote to us about the Italian banks being prepared to grant us a loan with the knowledge of the Italian Government." On the letter are Lenin's markings (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 331

[362] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter to the Politbureau of the

R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of October 10, 1921, requesting the earliest possible appointment of a delegate for negotiations with China over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and expressing apprehension that delay in appointing the delegate could give the forthcoming Washington Conference a pretext to internationalise the railway. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs proposed that Julian Marchlewski should be the delegate. Chicherin also said that Japan had agreed to have an R.S.F.S.R. representative take part in discussing various matters at a conference of the Far-Eastern Republic and Japan in Dairen (it was held from August 26, 1921 to April 16, 1922), and proposed that A. K. Paikes should be sent to the conference. Chicherin proposed that Y. M. Yaroslavsky and N. L. Meshcheryakov should be sent to the Washington Conference as representatives of the Far-Eastern Republic.

The same day, the Politbureau adopted Lenin's proposal.

On October 13, 1921, the Politbureau confirmed A. A. Yazykov as the representative of the Far-Eastern Republic at the Washington Conference. p. 332

[363] Lenin gave much energy and attention to the rehabilitation of the coal and the iron and steel industry in the Donets Basin, which he said was "the main centre of our large-scale industry" and a Soviet bastion (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 157 and *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 81-87). p. 332

[364] In a report to Lenin on October 13, 1921, M. L. Rukhimovich described the results of the work by the C.L.D. commission set up to decide on the matters arising from the revival of the coal industry in Donbas. p. 334

[365] Lenin's remarks refer to the draft "Basic Propositions for a C.L.D. Agreement with the Rutgers Group", which the S.E.C. Presidium approved on October 10, 1921.

"*The undertaking*", a draft engagement concerning the terms on which the American workers were to travel to and work in Soviet Russia, which Lenin drew up on September 22, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 344-45). p. 334

[366] The last sentence was written by Lenin. p. 336

[367] A reference to a pamphlet by V. D. Batyushkov and N. S. Vetchinkin, *Tverdiye gruntoviye dorogi* (Hard-Cover Roads). The register of Lenin's assignments to the C.P.C. and C.L.D. contains the following entry dated September 23, 1921: "Collect information about American machines for the fast laying of highways. Vladimir Ilyich heard about these machines from Comrade Bogdanov. Establish: 1) How many machines do we have, where and how are they working? 2) What is the price of such machines abroad? 3) How far have they been improved? Get this thing going. Fulfilled October 3" (*Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 5, 1961, p. 42). p. 336

[368] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, saying that the Moscow Party's Committee had without the knowledge of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, sent the Head of the Baltic and Scandinavian Department on an assignment abroad. p. 338

[369] A reference to L. K. Martens's negative attitude to the plans of the Rutgers group. In a letter to the C.L.D. on October 10, he said that these plans revealed immaturity, lack of careful thinking and lack of knowledge of the state of affairs in the localities he objected to the financing of these plans, because he doubted that they would succeed. p. 339

[370] Written on an extract from the minutes of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of October 14, 1921, on the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka. Having heard I. S. Unschlicht's report about the unsatisfactory composition of the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka, the Politbureau decided: "To authorise Comrade Unschlicht, together with the Orgbureau, to submit for approval to the Politbureau, within three days, a list of candidates for heads of the Petrograd Cheka" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

About the Kamenev, Orjonikidze and Zalutsky commission see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 361. p. 339

[371] On October 15, 1921, G. V. Chicherin wrote Lenin that the dissolution of the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee, for its counter-revolutionary activity, and the break-down of the concession talks with Urquhart have worsened the international position of the R.S.F.S.R. He proposed a number of steps which he believed would improve relations with the capitalist countries, namely, Lenin's and Trotsky's withdrawal from the Comintern Executive Committee, a statement by the Soviet Government on recognition of tsarist Russia's debts, etc.

In the final sentence a reference is to the 1921 agreement with ARA, which was headed by Herbert Hoover, on aid to the starving in the Volga area (see this volume, Document 370). p. 339

[372] The Gosplan (State Planning Commission) report on the raising of maize was on the C.L.D. agenda for October 21, 1921, but was put off in order to have the People's Commissariat for Agriculture also take part in deciding this question, in connection with the letter of October 17 from Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture, N. Osinsky, who objected to the Gosplan's agricultural section submitting such important farming questions to the C.L.D. on its own (see also this volume, Document 447). p. 341

[373] The *author* is N. Osinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture, who in his letter of October 17, in reply to Lenin's letter (see this volume, Document 444), insisted on a legal settlement

of the relations between the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and Gosplan. He proposed that Gosplan's role should be confined "only to a general co-ordination of plans submitted by the departments; Gosplan is not to work out any plans on its own, everything being done in the planning commissions of the Commissariats" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

In reply, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky wrote that N. Osinsky was right "in the sense that Gosplan's work should have a follow-up character. But it is wrong to interpret this as meaning that the people at Gosplan should in some way engage in 'summarising', without having special sections which make use of some of the departmental specialists. I have already raised with all the sections the question of transforming and delimiting the work of primary planning organs and our own work" (ibid.). Krzhizhanovsky went on to set out a number of measures to improve the work of Gosplan. p. 344

[374] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee in connection with the request from the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, S. P. Natsarenus, for instructions concerning the line of behaviour over the French proposals to President Kemal of the Turkish Republic to conclude an agreement containing articles aimed against the Soviet country. Natsarenus communicated his talks with Kemal, who had reportedly rejected all articles aimed against Soviet Russia. Natsarenus wrote that he had intimated to Kemal that Turkey's conclusion of an agreement containing such articles would force the Soviet Government to take steps to have Britain withhold recognition of the agreement and, in addition, to reinforce the troops on the Soviet-Turkish border. Chicherin proposed that the Politbureau should adopt a decision confirming the correctness of the action taken by Natsarenus and recognising it as adequate. p. 344

[375] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter of October 17, 1921, reiterating his proposal that the Soviet Government should issue a statement on recognition of tsarist Russia's debts (see this volume, Documents 464 and 466). p. 345

[376] This was written in connection with the report from N. N. Kolotilov, Chairman of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Executive Committee, about mismanagement and the fact that the construction site was run by several offices with many employees and few workers.

That same day, N. P. Gorbunov, on Lenin's assignment, had a talk with N. N. Kolotilov.

On October 20, 1921, the Administration for Electrotechnical Structures sent in detailed replies to Lenin's questions. p. 345

[377] At the end of July, Y. S. Artyukhov, Head of the Planning Sub-Department of the Procurement Administration of the People's

Commissariat for Food, was sent a petition requesting a reduction of the tax in kind in two volosts of Novokamenka Uyezd, Moscow Gubernia, which had suffered from a fall of hail. Artyukhov did nothing about the petition until October 1921. p. 348

[378] Having discussed the question of improving the work of Soviet organs in the centre and in the localities, and the struggle against red tape, the Eighth Congress of Soviets (December 22-29, 1920) adopted a comprehensive decision on Soviet government organisation. p. 348

[379] This was written on Y. I. Vishnyak's letter to Lenin of September 10, 1921, about I. Kh. Lalayants.

By political differences Lenin meant the following passage in Vishnyak's letter: "After the liberation of Irkutsk, Comrade Lalayants tried to understand what was taking place in Soviet Russia at the time, and to analyse the R.C.P.'s tactics. He often used to quote to me that part of your report on the agrarian question at the Stockholm Congress, in which you pointed out that a social revolution in the West was the only guarantee against any restoration after the victory of the revolution in Russia. Our state of isolation, the discrepancy between our political strength and the economic foundation, and a number of other questions to which he has not yet found an answer, prevent him from joining the R.C.P." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On Vishnyak's letter is also J. V. Stalin's reply: "I, too, favour *summoning Lalayants for work in Moscow*" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 278).

I. Kh. Lalayants was summoned to Moscow and worked at the People's Commissariat for Education. p. 348

[380] On October 21, the C.L.D. decided: to authorise the People's Commissariat for Finance immediately to issue the required funds for the irrigation of the Mugan Steppe. p. 349

[381] Documents at the Central Party Archives show that beginning from November 1, 1921, Lenin received reports on the reserve emergency fund twice a month (see also this volume, Documents 459 and 460). p. 350

[382] This was written in connection with a letter received from I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov on October 18, 1921, concerning his work on the book *Electrification of the R.S.F.S.R. in Connection with the Transitional Phase of the World Economy*. He asked to be relieved of all his duties until he finished the book. p. 350

[383] Written in reply to L. S. Sosnovsky's letter, setting out his plan to improve the work of the S.E.C.'s state warehouses. Among the measures he proposed were: to secure a salary of from 30 to 50 gold rubles for 1,000-1,500 warehouse workers and employees,

and up to 75 rubles for executive workers; to set deadlines for the storage of goods, etc.

[384] The last sentence and the words "or introduce in the C.L.D." are in Lenin's hand. p. 353

[385] *Amruss*—apparently the Russo-American Trade and Industrial Association, later renamed the Russo-American Industrial Corporation (Rusaminco or RAIC). It was set up by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. On October 12, 1921, a model agreement was concluded between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Russo-American Trade and Industrial Association. p. 353

[386] Written in reply to J. V. Stalin's letter to the Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee (copy to Lenin) of October 22, 1921, suggesting a redistribution of Communists in government office in the People's Commissariats, so as to concentrate the best part of them at the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which, he estimated, would require 1,000-1,200 fresh workers or 250 at the very least. p. 355

[387] The question of repaying Russia's old debts was raised at the Brussels Conference, which was held from October 6 to 8, 1921, and was attended by 19 states, including Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Rumania, China and others, and also by representatives of the International Red Cross and ARA.

The conference recommended that the governments should extend credits to Soviet Russia to combat the famine only if she recognised the debts of the old governments and allowed a commission to control the distribution of food.

On October 27, the question of recognising the debts of the old governments was discussed by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, which decided "to adopt the text proposed by Comrade Chicherin with Comrade Lenin's amendments as a basis, and to authorise Comrade Chicherin to publish it over his signature" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). The Soviet Government's statement on the recognition of the old debts, with Lenin's amendments, was sent to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the U.S.A. on October 28 (see *Pravda* No. 243 of October 29, 1921). The official text differs slightly from the wording of the draft published in this volume. p. 356

[388] This was written on G. V. Chicherin's letter, setting out the news dispatch by the American correspondent to the effect that foreign capitalists were unwilling to take out concessions in Soviet Russia because of the stubborn rumours that the Soviet Government would shortly return to foreign businessmen full title in their old factories. Chicherin proposed a denial of these rumours,

On the document is also Lenin's note: "Why did you send me *The Times* of 12.IX?" p. 359

[389] On October 28, 1921, the Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided to recall N. A. Alexeyev and place him at the disposal of the Central Committee. p. 359

[390] *Clarté*, an international group of progressive West European writers, set up by Henri Barbusse in 1919 on the basis of the Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants of France which was later joined by similar groups in other countries to form the Internationale des Anciens Combattants. The group published a monthly journal under the same name (it appeared in Paris at intervals from October 1919 to January 1928). When Barbusse resigned as its editor (in April 1924), the journal ceased to be progressive and in 1928 went out of circulation, while the group broke up. p. 360

[391] This was written on N . M . Knipovich's letter, setting out a request of the Conseil Permanent International pour l'exploration de la mer for a return, as Russia's contribution for the budget year of 1914/15, of 14,000 rubles on deposits with the Azov-Don Bank. Knipovich noted the great scientific importance of the Council's work and said that Russia should not "remain outside this endeavour when international relations were normalised" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 288. p. 361

[392] Written in connection with D. I. Kursky's conclusion on the question of a concession for the Swedish S.K.F., proposing two variants for an additional agreement on the controversial issue of ball-bearing warehouses nationalised by the Soviet state. On October 27, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee recognised as desirable the continuation of the talks with the Swedish company and conclusion of an agreement on the basis of one of Kursky's variants. p. 361

[393] A note to V. A. Trifonov, Deputy Chief of the S.E.C.'s Central Fuel Administration, is in reply to his proposal to start a paper for commercial information. p. 361

[394] A reference to the agreements on an asbestos concession and the purchase of a million poods of grain from Armand Hammer.

Additional points—amendments to the concession agreement proposed by Hammer. A draft additional decision, adopted by the C.L.D. on October 28, 1921, provided for the extension of guarantees to the concessionaires that their property would be protected, that their personnel would have the right of free movement in the country, free entry into and exit from the country when dealing with concession business, etc. p. 362

[395] In a telegram from London on October 19, 1921, L. B. Krasin reported the talks he had started with an American building company, the Foundation Company, which had contracts with the leading oil corporations. A spokesman of this Company declared that it was prepared to undertake the construction of a paraffin separation plant, and a pipeline between Grozny and the Black Sea, provided the Company's engineers carried out the explorations. Krasin proposed that the necessary funds should be allocated for this purpose. The draft telegram to Krasin here published was approved by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on October 28. See also *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 357-58. p. 363

[396] A reference to I. S. Unschlicht's letter about new salary rates for All-Russia Cheka officials. p. 364

[397] A reference to the theses and letter of M. V. Rykunov, Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission for Export. p. 365

[398] G. D. Tsyurupa reported to Lenin that the delay in the delivery of the materials was due to the fact that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade failed to inform the Kashira construction site about the arrival of the cargoes to Moscow.

On November 14, S.E.C. Chairman P. A. Bogdanov sent on this letter from Lenin and G. D. Tsyurupa's reply to the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to conduct an inquiry into who was actually to blame for the red tape. p. 366

[399] The notes were written in connection with the preparation for denomination as a means of regulating the currency of money and stabilising the ruble. Under a C.P.C. decree of November 3, 1921, one ruble of the new issue was equal to 10,000 of the old issues (see *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 266, November 26, 1921). p. 366

[400] A draft agreement between the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. and the People's Government of Mongolia was examined and approved by the Narrow C.P.C. the same day, November 3, 1921.

On November 5, Lenin received the delegation from the Mongolian People's Republic and had a talk with it (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 360-61).

The communique of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the signing of the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty was published in *Pravda* on November 11, 1921. p. 368

[401] In reply to this letter, People's Commissar for Justice, D. I. Kursky, on November 14, 1921, sent Lenin a report from the investigation department of the People's Commissariat for Justice over the first half-year of 1921 on 18 cases involving red tape. Kursky wrote that most of these cases ended with the imposition of disciplinary penalties, a part of them were wound up and "cases could be referred to the courts (Revolutionary Tribunal and the People's

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Courts) only by way of exception". Reporting the preparation of exemplary trials, he said they were now considering the renewal of the panels of the people's judges in Moscow (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Kursky's reply did not satisfy Lenin and he wrote to him once again (see present edition, Vol. 35, Document 306). p. 369

402 Written on a note from the C.P.C. agent for the paper industry and printing production, K. M. Shvedchikov, who requested the "setting aside of a reserve monetary fund for the publishing business (Gosizdat, Glavbum, Poligrafotdel and Tsentropechat) in the amount of up to 319,000 million rubles"; and "that an advance payment of 60,000 million rubles be made before the 15th of November proportional to the applications of separate establishments".

This question was examined by an emergency commission under the Budget Estimates Administration of the People's Commissariat for Finance on November 9. It said the request was not sufficiently well grounded, and instructed representatives of the S.E.C. and the People's Commissariat for Finance to verify it and give their conclusion.

On November 9, Shvedchikov sent another letter to Lenin (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 33). p. 369

403 *The Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources* was set up by a C.P.C. decree of November 21, 1918, under the S.E.C. A C.P.C. decision of March 17, 1921, transferred the Commission to the competence of the C.L.D. It was the highest authority for the distribution of material resources, and its decisions entered into force unless protested against in the C.L.D. within three days of the decision and rescinded by the C.L.D. All the departments had the duty to submit well-founded estimates for consideration by the Commission. See this volume, Document 526. p. 370

404 "*Concession agreement for the collection and trade in hides and skins with P. B. Steinberg*" was submitted by the S.E.C. for the C.P.C.'s approval on November 21, 1921. On November 29, the C.P.C. instructed a commission, consisting of V. V. Gombarg, A. M. Lezhava and A. L. Scheinman, to review the agreement and to continue talks with the other party. For the decision on this question Lenin made the following proposals by way of directives for the commission: "α) amount of duties (the point is crossed out and is not included in the decision.—*Ed.*); β) check-up on the actual amount of leather procured by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade up to now... γ) check-up on the possible and probable development of operations by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and Centrosoyuz, given the expenditure of a definite amount of bank-notes" (*Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 187). After repeated discussion, the C.P.C. on January

10, 1922, rejected the concession and authorised a specially appointed commission to work out a statute for organising the procurement of hides and skins at home on shareholding principles. On January 24, the C.P.C. approved the basis of the draft rules of the "Joint-Stock Company for Domestic and Export Trade in Hides and Skins" ("Kozhsyryo"). On February 1, 1922, the C.L.D. approved the rules of the Company and its articles of association. See this volume, Documents 515 and 589. p. 370

[405] Written in connection with the forthcoming C.P.C. discussion, on November 10, 1921, of a report by A. B. Khalatov, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food, on improving the living conditions of scientists. The C.P.C., taking Khalatov's report into consideration and approving it as preliminary, set up a standing commission for an all-round inquiry into and improvement of scientists' living conditions. p. 370

[406] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter reporting that the British famine relief committee intended to deliver to the Ukraine and other areas goods for exchange for grain, so as to send the grain obtained to the famine-stricken areas. Chicherin proposed that the plan should be rejected, believing that the British would supply old goods and that there was danger of bandit attacks on British shop assistants. p. 371

[407] The figures are a calculation of the seed required for spring sowing in the famine-stricken gubernias in the spring of 1922. The necessary quantity was 33 million poods, of which 15 million poods were to be supplied to the People's Commissariat for Agriculture by the People's Commissariat for Food; to obtain one-half of the remaining 18 million poods, that is, 9 million poods, the C.P.C. allocated gold; the other 9 million poods were to be obtained by the People's Commissariat for Food through procurements over and above the plan. p. 371

[408] Written in connection with the report sent to Lenin by V. A. Smolyaninov, assistant C.L.D. business manager on economic matters, to the effect that In any gubernia economic conferences and other local bodies complained that they were not receiving publications from the centre. p. 372

[409] A reference to an item, "Revival of Donbas", published in the newspaper *Vserossiiskaya Kochegarka* on November 1, 1921, and reporting that the rehabilitation of factories in Konstantinovka had started. p. 372

[410] The question of remunerating the workers of the Bryansk Works for their successful manufacture of electric ploughs was examined by the C.L.D. on November 25, 1921. The C.L.D. resolved that the case should be referred to the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union. In view of the fact that by November 1 the

Bryansk Works had made only 8 of the 20 electric ploughs planned, the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union ruled that there was no reason to issue any special rewards, adding that the workers, who distinguished themselves, could be rewarded from the resources allocated for the manufacture of the electric ploughs. Having studied the conclusion of the Central Committee of the Metalworkers' Union, the C.L.D., on December 14, 1921, resolved to accept it. p. 373

[411] A reference to L. S. Rivlin, whom Lenin recommended for work in establishments of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade abroad. p. 374

[412] The question of combating smuggling was examined at several Narrow C.P.C. sittings in November 1921.

On November 21, the C.P.C. approved a draft decree "On Rewards for Detention of Smuggled Goods" (the decree was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* on December 3, 1921). On November 23, the Narrow C.P.C. discussed the measures for combating smuggling, and on November 28, having adopted as a basis a draft C.P.C. decree on combating smuggling introduced by the All-Russia Cheka, it instructed the commission, within five days, "to carry out an additional reworking of the draft and also work out a statute of organs to combat smuggling" (Central Party Archives). The draft decision submitted by the commission was adopted with amendments by the Narrow C.P.C. on December 8 (the decision was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* on December 29, 1921). p. 374

[413] A reference to the article "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 109-16; *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 27). p. 374

[414] A reference to a report from I. N. Chebotaryov, a member of the Governing Committee of the State Savings Banks before the October Revolution, addressed to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars on November 7, 1921. Chebotaryov said there was need to reopen the state savings banks in order to attract money in the hands of the population.

The savings banks were established by a C.P.C. decision of December 26, 1922 (published in *Izvestia VTsIK*, December 29, 1922). p. 375

[415] *Smena Vekh* (Change of Landmarks)—a weekly journal published in Paris from October 1921 to March 1922 by a group of white-guard émigré intellectuals, which also issued a collection entitled *Smena Vekh* in Prague in July 1921. The *Smena Vekh* trend was named after the collection and the journal. Realising that it was quite hopeless to overthrow the Soviet power through foreign armed

intervention, the *Smena Vekh* followers came out in favour of co-operation with the Soviet power in the hope of its degeneration into a bourgeois state. Some of them were honestly desirous of promoting Russia's economic rehabilitation. p. 375

[416] *Regional Economic Conferences* or councils were local C.L.D. organs set up in early 1921, under the decision of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (December 1920). p. 375

[417] The deadlines for the reports were determined by a decision of the All-Russia C.E.C. of June 30, 1921, entitled "On Local Economic Conferences, Their Reporting and Complying with the Instructions of the C.P.C. and C.L.D.", which was drafted by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 303-04). p. 375

[418] This note was written on a letter from the Indian Communist Abani Mukherji, who sent Lenin his article on the Malabar uprising in India in 1921. p. 376

[419] The first note was written in connection with a protest by the People's Commissariat for Justice against the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. circular of June 16, 1921, on the relationships between the Party and the judicial and investigation organs, which gave Communists judicial immunity without the sanction of the local Party Committees.

The People's Commissariat for Justice asked that §§4 and 5 should be deleted from the C.C. circular.

§4 put the duty on the judicial authorities to release Communists up for trial under the personal warranty of individuals delegated by Party Committees. §5 put the duty on the Party Committee to study the case within three days and to have an opinion on the substance of the case, so that the committee's decision would be a Party directive for the court and would predetermine the judicial decision.

In reply to his first note, Lenin received the C.C. Orgbureau decision of November 11, 1921, approving the circular, and V. M. Molotov's letter saving that the circular was modified and that the question could be considered settled.

Since these changes did not affect the main shortcoming of the circular, Lenin wrote another note.

In early January 1922, the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee published a circular "On the Relationships Between Party Committees and Judicial and Investigation Commissions" which cancelled the June 16 circular. The new circular emphasised the imperative need to enhance the responsibility of Party members in the event of their committing any offences falling under the jurisdiction of the civil court or the Revolutionary Tribunal (see *Spravochnik partrabotnika*, Part II, 1922, p. 177). p. 376

[420] G. Y. Zinoviev asked Lenin to write an article or a letter against the Italian reformists and Serrati 's double-dealing behaviour,

believing this to be of great importance. See also this volume, Document 569. p. 377

[421] A reference to A. V. Lunacharsky's pamphlet which he was then writing on Lenin's proposal (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Document 518). The pamphlet was published in Petrograd in 1922 under the title *Citizen Giacinto Serrati, or a Revolutionary-Opportunist Amphibian*. p, 377

[422] A C.L.D. decision of November 4, 1921, confirmed V. I. Samarin as special agent for dispatch to the Crimea to put a stop to the stealing of wine and to organise its strict accounting. p. 378

[423] Written on a letter from the People's Commissar for Education, A. V. Lunacharsky, reporting that Academician I. P. Pavlov had refused to go to America and wanted to spend a month in Finland. However, Lunacharsky wrote, although there was a decision giving Pavlov permission to go to America, and to issue the money he needed, he was unable to obtain a visa for a trip to Finland.

I. S. Unschlicht informed Lenin that on November 15 he had issued instructions that I. P. Pavlov was to be given a visa for a trip to Finland without any formalities. On Unschlicht's note there is the following instruction by Lenin to his secretary: "Phone *Semashko*. Please check up fulfilment. *Lenin*" (*Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 329). p. 378

[424] Written on a report from L. K. Martens saying that the first shipload of wheat for Russia, under an agreement with the Allied Drug and Chemical Corporation, was to leave New York on November 17, 1921.

The agreement between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and this corporation on the delivery to Soviet Russia of one million poods of wheat was concluded in Moscow on October 27, and approved by the C.L.D. on November 4, 1921 (see this volume, Documents 439, 441, 451, 473, 474, 482 and also *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 53, Documents 428 and 511).

On November 25, 1921, the C.L.D. instructed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the People's Commissariat for Railways to submit a report on the measures necessary for the "acceptance of grain without any delays" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 379

[425] On November 21, 1921, D. I. Kursky informed Lenin that the materials of the commission to estimate the losses had been preserved, that they were at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and were being completed by a commission set up by a C.P.C. decision of November 1, 1921. Kursky proposed a C.P.C. decision to appoint S. S. Pilyavsky to be responsible for safe-

keeping the material and to fix December 1, 1921, as a deadline for completing the work of the commission.

On Kursky's letter there is the following note by Lenin: "**To Gorbunov**. Introduce tomorrow, 22/XI, in the C.P.C. 21/XI. *Lenin*."

On November 22, the C.P.C. heard Kursky's report and accepted his proposal. See also this volume, Document 512. p. 380

426 The letter here published is connected with the conflict at the People's Commissariat for Agriculture between V. V. Obolensky (N. Osinsky) and I. A. Teodorovich. Having discussed this question on November 18, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted the following decision:

"a) To recognise that for the correct direction of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture it is necessary to carry out the following combination in the top posts: the political-administrative direction should be in the hands of Comrade Osinsky, the People's Commissar should be a peasant engaged in practical work in agriculture, and Comrade Osinsky's deputy should be Comrade Teodorovich. b) To leave Comrade Teodorovich as head of the animal-husbandry department" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On November 21, the Politbureau reaffirmed its decision concerning Teodorovich.

On November 22, Osinsky asked the Politbureau either to cancel its decision on Teodorovich or to accept his resignation as Deputy People's Commissar. On this letter, Lenin wrote: "I propose that we reject both parts. *Lenin*." Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Politbureau on November 29, 1921. See also this volume, Documents 546 and 547. p. 380

427 A reference to a letter sent to Lenin by G. D. Krasinsky, special agent of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for Siberia and the Urals, on December 16, 1921, arguing that the C.L.D. decision of November 11 was not appropriate. It was a decision to transfer for temporary exploitation an unfinished railway line between Kolchugino and the Prokopyevsk mines from the Siberian Public Works Committee to the People's Commissariat for Railways.

That same day, November 21, the C.L.D. reaffirmed its decision and instructed N. P. Gorbunov to "send the Siberian Revolutionary Committee and the Siberian Railway District a direct wire notification that the C.L.D. decision of 11/XI should be implemented at once" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 60. p. 381

428 Written under the text of G. V. Chicherin's letter to J. V. Stalin of November 19, 1921, in which Chicherin said that the Soviet state should not confine itself to giving political support

to the national liberation movement in the East, but should help the young national states to develop their economy and train their personnel. Pointing to the positive results of this policy in respect of Afghanistan, Mongolia and Persia, Chicherin suggested the same policy in respect of Turkey. p. 381

[429] A reference to a pamphlet by Y. Remeiko, a member of the Presidium of the C.C. of the Mineworkers' Union, entitled *Decisions of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P., the Trade Union and the Donbas Workers* (*Report*). *MS*, published in Moscow in November 1921. p. 382

[430] The differences between executives in Donbas were discussed at several sittings of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee.

On November 26 and 27, 1921, the Politbureau outlined a number of measures to ensure normal relations between and efficient work by executives in Donbas.

On December 22, 1921, the Politbureau approved the decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, dismissing Pyatakov from the post of Chairman of the Central Board of the Coal-Mining Industry, and appointing V. Y. Chubar instead. The Politbureau's decision was confirmed by a plenary meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on December 28, 1921.

Lenin spoke of the differences in Donbas in his political report of the C.C. to the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 296-99). p. 382

[431] The reference was written in connection with a purge of the R.C.P.(B.) in 1921.

It was written on the autobiography of J. S. Hanecki, and also contained a reference from F. E. Dzerzhinsky. p. 382

[432] In its letter, the Moscow Production Administration asked Mostextil (the Moscow Committee of the Textile Industry) to stop issuing indents for the removal of raw materials, components and goods from the textile mills, and also to suspend the indents issued earlier, pending clarification of the circumstances of the lease of these mills to an initiative group of lessees. This measure was caused by the fact that the lease of these mills had been effected virtually without control and had resulted in the stealing of state property with impunity. See this volume, Document 514. p. 383

[433] The question of granting leave to A. S. Kiselyov was considered by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on November 24, 1921. The Politbureau decided: "To prescribe for Comrade Kiselyov a long leave in exact conformity, concerning the place and time, with Comrade Semashko's instructions and

the opinion of the doctors he had brought together" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 384

[434] A reference to the following material: a copy of a letter from the Moscow Production Administration to Mostextil of October 15, 1921 (see Note 432), "Inventory of structures and equipment of Mostextil Znamensk Textile Mill No. 115 as of November 15, 1921", and "Inventory of finished goods, raw materials, components and semi-finished products as of November 15, 1921, at Mostextil Znamensk Textile Mill No. 115". p. 384

[435] For J. V. Stalin's reply to this letter see *Lenin Miscellany XXXIV*, p. 427. p. 384

[436] On November 21, 1921, the S.E.C. submitted for the C.P.C.'s approval "Concession agreement for the collection and trade in hides and skins with P. B. Steinberg". See also this volume, Documents 485 and 589. p. 384

[437] In its reply letter of December 15, 1921, the State Planning Commission wrote that its Presidium had heard a representative of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Executive Committee about the progress of construction at the Ivanovo-Voznesensk District Power Station. Gosplan's conclusion said that there were not enough data to decide on the urgency of the project and that its work was not covered by the extraction of peat in the Teikovo bog, where the station was to be sited. In view of this, Gosplan asked the Central Board for the Peat Industry (Tsutorf) to take urgent steps to intensify the extraction of peat, and the Ivanovo-Voznesensk economic conference to work out, in order to set the exact date for commissioning the electric-power station, a scheme for developing and restructuring industry and other branches of the economy from the standpoint of the requirements in electric power and fuel. See also this volume, Document 666.

The construction of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Electric-Power Station was started in 1926. p. 386

[438] A reference to the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 386

[439] The note to V. M. Molotov and the reply to A. I. Okulov were written by Lenin on Okulov's letter. Okulov wrote to Lenin that he had applied to the State Publishers for a permission to publish, on his personal responsibility, a weekly scientific and literary newspaper, and asked Lenin to give him a reference.

On January 17, 1922, the Politbureau decided: "To permit Okulov to publish a weekly journal in accordance with the programme he initially submitted" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 386

[440] In connection with this letter, the register of Lenin's assignments contains the following entry by N. P. Gorbunov on November 28, 1921: "Work out a public instruction on entry into the Kremlin. Fulfilled 14.XII." p. 387

[441] A reference to an item, "Remarkable Invention", which reported that electrical engineer I. A. Cheiko of Kharkov had discovered "new rays" emanating from a magnetic field, whose thermal effect made it possible to explode mines, artillery depots, etc., by remote control. These rays, the author said, could also be used in mining and the chemical industry, geodesy, medicine, etc. See this volume, Documents 520 and 543. p. 387

[442] A reference to the radio laboratory in Nizhni-Novgorod under M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich. p. 388

[443] That same day, the Narrow C.P.C. decided to let the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs have 70 million rubles to arrange a Soviet exhibition in Berlin, and instructed the People's Commissariat for Finance to provide the bank-notes to cover the credit. p. 389

[444] This was written in connection with the working out of a new statute of the All-Russia Cheka under the New Economic Policy.

Having sent Lenin the basic provisions drawn up by the Collegium of the All-Russia Cheka, with which the People's Commissar for Justice D. I. Kursky had agreed, and a draft statute of the All-Russia Cheka (substituting the existing decisions on the All-Russia Cheka and its local organs) to be submitted for approval by the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C., and other material, Kamenev wrote: "Have a look at this. This is the maximum Dzerzhinsky will agree to, and that which Kursky is, *of course*, *satisfied with*. I insist on this maximum: 1. Unburden the Cheka, leaving political crimes, espionage, banditism and the protection of railways and warehouses in its charge. Not more. The rest—to the People's Commissariat for Justice. 2. The Cheka's investigation apparatus to be merged with the People's Commissariat for Justice, handing it over to the revolutionary tribunals."

The Collegium of the All-Russia Cheka objected to the "transfer to the various organs of inquiry and investigation", and considered it "premature to separate from each other (to transfer to various organs) political cases and cases involving large-scale stealing of the public property and official misconduct" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On December 1, 1921, Lenin introduced in the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. a proposal to reform the All-Russia Cheka, narrowing down the scope of its activity (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 366-67). Having adopted Lenin's proposal, the Po-

litbureau set up a commission, consisting of L. B. Kamenev, D. I. Kursky and F. E. Dzerzhinsky, to discuss the matter within five days, on the strength of the adopted decision. p. 389

445 A reference to G. V. Chicherin's letter, who, with the economic negotiations with Germany in mind, wrote: "I would recommend very great caution in respect of the proposed grand German prospects" (the underlinings and remarks here and below are Lenin's). Chicherin went on to describe the improvement of relations with Poland (here Lenin put "2" in the margin, but did not deal with this question in his letter). Returning to the negotiations with Germany, Chicherin continued: "What Hartwig said made it clear that Krasin in Berlin supported the Stinnes line of trustification with Britain for work in Russia, that he held himself very close to Stinnes, and even agreed with him about his trip to Britain. Over here in talks with us Krasin kept yessing us and agreeing with the opposite line—supporting in every way the tendency in Germany for separate work (without Britain) in Russia. While abroad he was doing the opposite!" No. 1 ?? ? ? ?? No. 3 p. 390

446 On December 1, 1921, A. D. Metelev informed Lenin that Cecilia Bobrovskaya had been given a room at the First House of Soviets. p. 390

447 Apparently written in connection with the question of giving the State Department Store (GUM) permission to work together with foreign capitalists in export-import trade, and to set up a joint-stock company for that purpose.

GUM was set up -by a Narrow C.P.C. decision of October 3, 1921, on organising an inter-ministerial department store. p. 391

448 A reference to the plan to transform the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources under the C.L.D., drawn up by its chairman, L. N. Kritsman. For Lenin's remarks on this plan see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 44, p. 482. p. 392

449 This platform was an anonymous document expressing the views of some intellectuals, and was issued for the Second All-Russia Proletcult Congress held in Moscow in November 1921. They cast doubt on the socialist character of the October Revolution and came out against the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; in philosophy they stood up for Machist and Bogdanovite "theories", and in politics adopted the views of the opportunist Workers' Opposition. The communist group

of the Second Proletcult Congress condemned the "collectivist" platform and dissociated itself from it

Proletcult (Proletarian Culture Organisation) was set up in September 1917 as an independent workers' organisation. Proletcult, whose direction was in the hands of A. Bogdanov and his supporters, continued, even after the October Revolution, to maintain its "independence", thereby setting itself up in opposition to the Communist Party and the proletarian state. It was not a homogeneous organisation: alongside bourgeois intellectuals, who dominated many of its organisations, there were young workers who were sincerely desirous of taking part in cultural construction. In a number of his works, Lenin sharply criticised Proletcult's erroneous views. Proletcult organisations were most widespread in 1919, but declined in the early 1920s and were dissolved in 1932.

Lenin's proposal for a pamphlet exposing the "collectivist" platform was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on December 3, 1921.

The "C.C. circulars" mentioned in the text are the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. letter "On the Proletcults" (see *Pravda* No. 270, December 1, 1920) and the Politbureau's decision on the Proletcults of November 22, 1921, published in *Izvestia R.C.P.(B.) C.C.* No. 36 for 1921. p. 392

[450] See Note 347. p. 393

[451] *The Economist*, a British economic and political weekly, an organ of the big industrial bourgeoisie, published in London since 1843. p. 394

[452] This letter was written at the bottom of a typed copy of a report entitled "Centrosoyuz turnover in relations with gubernia societies and district sections. Data on commodity turnover of the sections for September-November 1921 in millions of rubles of present currency". p. 394

[453] *The United Economic Commission*, mentioned by Lenin, was a commission for "bringing together all economic and financial questions" on whose establishment the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. adopted a decision on December 1, 1921. L. B. Kamenev was confirmed as its chairman. In accordance with the Politbureau decision, the C.P.C. resolved on December 6: "To consolidate and accelerate the work in systematising and adding to economic legislation, an economic commission of the C.P.C. is to be established" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 394

[454] Written on a typed copy of a report: "Centrosoyuz turnover in relations with gubernia societies and district sections. Data on commodity turnover of the sections for September-November 1921

in millions of rubles of present currency". Lenin drew four pencilled lines under the word "Centrosoyuz". p. 394

[455] In the calendar "Entry of the secretarial information on V. I. Lenin's assignments" an entry on December 5, 1921, says: "To Yenukidze, Karpinsky, Dzerzhinsky, Zalutsky, Mikhailov and Molotov (through Divilkovsky).

"Please designate the men who could be used for 'personal contacts' in the event of need in more serious and thorough investigation."

An entry on January 4, 1922, says: "N. P. Gorbunov is dealing with it. Everything is going well. The men are being designated" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 395

[456] A reference to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decision of November 27, 1921, concerning A. I. Rykov's medical treatment in Germany. p. 396

[457] A reference to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decision of December 1, 1921, relieving A. D. Tsyurupa of his post of People's Commissar for Food and appointing him Second Deputy of the C.L.D. Chairman.

Lenin outlined the plan for the work of the deputies of the C.P.C. and C.L.D. Chairman in a letter to A. D. Tsyurupa on November 28, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 365-66). p. 396

[458] The question of L. G. Shapiro was examined by the Moscow Gubernia Commission for Checking-up, Reviewing and Purging the Membership of the R.C.P.(B.) on December 5, 1921. By a decision of the Commission he was reinstated in the Party, but issued a reprimand for losing contacts with the workers. Lenin was sent an extract from the Commission's minutes. p. 400

[459] Written in connection with a letter from T. I. Sedelnikov of the People 's Commissariat for Agriculture concerning the invention of a new building material called "torfite" (for Lenin's markings on the letter see *Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, pp. 95-96).

Lenin was on sick leave from December 6, 1921, and was living at Gorki near Moscow. p. 400

[460] Ballister (Robert Minor) and John Carr (L. Cutterfeld), representatives of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. on the Executive Committee of the Comintern, were received by Lenin on December 3, 1921.

That same day, a C.P.C. secretary made the following entry of Lenin's verbal inquiry in the card register of his assignments: "When is Comrade Manucharyants able to get for Vladimir Ilyich two copies of his book *New Data on Capitalism in Agriculture* (*North American United States*)." On December 5, the same card has this addition: "The books have been received and passed on

to Vladimir Ilyich" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 402

[461] Written on a copy of G. I. Myasnikov's letter to engineer B. A. Kurzhner, a Party member in Petrograd, in which Myasnikov proposed to intensify, in connection with the forthcoming Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), subversive activity against the Party's policy.

The Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee discussed G. I. Myasnikov's case at several of its sittings, and on February 20, 1922, approved the proposal of a Politbureau commission to expel him from the Party for gross breach of Party discipline and anti-Party activity. p. 402

[462] N. A. Orlov, author of the book *Prodovolstvennaya rabota sovetskoi vlasti* (The Soviet Power's Food Supply Work) (1918), was in charge of the economic department of the journal *Novy Mir*, which was published by the Soviet embassy in Berlin. Orlov requested permission to write a book, *Economic History of Soviet Russia* (Research Essay), and to publish it abroad under a pen-name in several foreign languages. He believed it was better to have the book written not from an openly communist standpoint, but in the tone of an objectively minded non-Party researcher, taking a favourable view of the Soviet power. For, argued Orlov, writing in "a clearly apologetic vein ... fails to produce the desired impression" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on December 7, 1921. p. 403

[463] An apparent reference to the item "Vneshtorg Activity in Sevastopol" which appeared in *Pravda* on December 6, 1921. p. 403

[464] In reply to Lenin's telegram, Deputy Chairman of the Crimean C.P.C., Polyakov, reported that A. A. Preobrazhensky was receiving an increased ration, that he would be given assistance in the future, and that he and his wife had now been placed at a sanatorium. p. 404

[465] In reply to Lenin's letter, Maxim Gorky said that he had written to H. G. Wells, who was in America, asking him to have a talk with the organisations and persons concerned about helping the famine-stricken. He wrote: "I have no reply from Wells, but I am sure that my letter found him in America, because he quoted extracts from my letter in one of his articles..." (V. I. Lenin and A. M. Gorky, *Pisma, vospominaniya, dokumenty* (Letters, Reminiscences, Documents), 2nd ed., 1961, pp. 184-86). p. 404

[466] On Lenin's instructions, I. A. Cheiko's materials were sent to a number of scientists and research institutions. See also this volume, Documents 519 and 520. p. 405

[467] This is in reply to a letter from I. I. Mezhlauk, Chairman of the Yugostal Board, of November 27, 1921, about delays in the issue of working capital earmarked for the trust. He said the trust had succeeded in getting together skilled miners, and described their wage rates and the intensified work of the enterprises, adding that in 1922 the latter would produce 10 million poods of ferrous metal (6 million poods of pig iron and 4 million poods of rolled metal), provided Yugostal received the working capital earmarked for it by the S.E.C. Presidium on October 27, 1921.

Yugostal, the joint board of the Petrovka, Makeevka and Yuzovka state factories and mines with all their subsidiary enterprises and lands in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Crimea. It was set up under the Ukrainian Economic Council to effect the production, technical and economic unification of combined enterprises of the metallurgical industry. It was in operation until 1929. p. 405

[468] Having examined on December 21, 1921, Lenin's proposal, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided: "To include Comrade Gorky among the comrades receiving medical treatment abroad, and to instruct Comrade Krestinsky to see that he has all the money necessary for the treatment" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 290. p. 406

[469] A reference to N. Osinsky's letter of December 14, 1921, connected with the conflict in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture (see this volume, Document 506). p. 406

[470] A protest against the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decision of November 18, 1921, about the conflict in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture was brought in by N. Osinsky at the Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, which, having discussed this question on December 28, confirmed the Politbureau decision by a unanimous vote (with one abstention). While preparing for the Plenum, Lenin requested a number of documents connected with the state of affairs in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Documents 147 and 148). p. 407

[471] On December 21, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided: "To take Comrade Lenin's application into consideration. To prolong his leave to two weeks" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 407

[472] A reference to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee Plenum of December 18, 1921, which approved the agenda for the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and appointed Lenin as rapporteur

on the first question—the report of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the C.P.C. on domestic and foreign policy of the Republic. p. 408

[473] A reference to the following Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decision of December 8, 1921: "To recognise as necessary the maintenance of absolute quiet for Comrade Lenin and to prohibit his secretariat from sending him any papers whatever, to enable Comrade Lenin to make a short (say, at least 30-minute) speech at the Congress of Soviets" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

The Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets was held from December 23 to 28, 1921. Lenin gave the All-Russia C.E.C. and C.P.C. report on December 23 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 143-77). p. 408

[474] The commission, set up on Lenin's instructions, worked out the proposals included in the C.L.D. decision of January 4, 1922, under which camera and film production was transferred from the People's Commissariat for Education to the S.E.C.

Later, on March 8, 1922, the C.L.D. reversed the January 4 decision and approved the decision of the S.E.C. Presidium of February 24, under which the S.E.C. took over the production of finished and semi-finished products of the camera and film industry. The People's Commissariat for Education remained in charge of the making of films and their distribution, the operation of cinemas and the slide business. p. 408

[475] A reference to Prof. K. A. Krug's letter, asking Lenin for help in obtaining for the Electrotechnical Department of the Moscow Higher Technical College (now the M.H.T.C. named after Bauman), and the State Experimental Electrotechnical Institute set up under the S.E.C. Scientific and Technical Department, premises and funds for the purchase of the necessary equipment abroad. p. 408

[476] In a telegram from London, L. B. Krasin said that, according to the information received from reliable sources, the Angora Treaty (a Franco-Turkish Agreement signed in October 1921) contained secret clauses providing for Turkey's seizure of the whole of the Transcaucasus. Krasin wrote that this plan "is supported by the bloc of former bourgeois Transcaucasian governments, which are backed by Briand, who is advising French financiers to abstain from any deals with the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus in view of the imminent changes there" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 409

[477] The materials received to the inquiries sent to the People's Commissariats and other central establishments were used by Lenin

in his All-Russia C.E.C. and C.P.C. report at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 143-77).

The text scored off with double lines was included, in a somewhat modified wording, into each inquiry when they were retyped for dispatch. See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Supplements, Documents 6-9. p. 409

[478] A reference to the proposed International Economic and Financial Conference at Genoa (Italy). p. 410

[479] *Labour Army Councils* were set up on the basis of the Military Army Councils in view of the transfer of some of the Red Army combat units to the status of labour armies during the breathing-space in 1920. On the Labour Army Councils were representatives of the People's Commissariats for Food, Railways, Agriculture, and Labour, and the Supreme Economic Council. p. 411

[480] A reference to the decision of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee Plenum of August 9, 1921, adopted on Lenin's proposal, which "recognises the need to raise the question of more intensified transfer of the Army to economic work, and authorises the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to hold several sittings specially to discuss and prepare this" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On the plenum's instructions the question of the Army's labour tasks was considered by the C.L.D. on August 12, 1921. Under its decision these matters were referred to the C.P.C. Having heard on August 16, 1921, the reports of the commissions set up by the C.L.D., the C.P.C. approved the draft decisions with some amendments. p. 411

[481] A reference to the article by engineer V. L. Levi, "Russia's Electric-Power Supply (General Review)", which appeared in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* on December 8, 1921, and described Russia's electric-power supply from 1917 to mid-1921.

On December 20, 1921, there was published a table entitled "The Growth in the Number of Stations in the Period from 1917 to July 1, 1921" under the caption "Russia's Electric-Power Supply" with the following introductory sentence: "In addition to the general review of Russia's electric-power supply (see *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* No. 276 of December 8, 1921), the editorial board publishes the following table which characterises the growth in the number of electric-power stations from 1917 to July 1, 1921." p. 412

[482] A reference to the electric-power stations then under construction.

Kashira, the State Kashira District Electric-Power Station.

Utkina Zavod, the Krasny Oktyabr Electric-Power Station near Petrograd, whose first 10,000 kw section was started on October 8, 1922.

The Volkhov site, the Volkhov Hydro-Electric Power Station. The decision to build it was taken by the C.P.C. in July 1918, and the work was started after the Civil War, in 1921. It was run in at the end of 1926. p. 412

[483] A reference to a letter from I. A. Teodorovich, Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture, giving a detailed characteristic of V. G. Yakovenko, Chairman of the Kansk Uyezd Executive Committee of Yeniseisk Gubernia, and recommending him for the post of People's Commissar for Agriculture. See this volume, Documents 559 and 564, and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 164. p. 413

[484] Nadezhda Alliluyeva was reinstated in the Party. p. 414

[485] Yevgenia Popova (Kasparova) was reinstated in the Party.

On the document there is the following inscription by C.P.C. secretary Natalya Lepeshinskaya: "Vladimir Ilyich earnestly asks Comrades Stalin, Safarov, Zinoviev and Kornblyum urgently to give information about Comrade Kasparova and also to find out who else of the comrades knows her well and what they could say about her." p. 415

[486] The article described the use of diesel locomotives abroad and expressed the opinion that they could and should be widely used on railways in Soviet Russia. p. 415

[487] Over the text of Lenin's letter, C.P.C. secretary Natalya Lepeshinskaya wrote: "To the State Planning Commission (Presidium), to the S.E.C.'s Scientific and Technical Department, to the People's Commissariat for Railways. P.S. Comrade Lenin wants to know whether anything has been said about this in scientific and technical literature and what is the view taken of this by specialists?" See also this volume, Documents 568, 611 and 613. p. 416

[488] In a telegram on December 19, 1921, L. B. Krasin said that William Brown, a representative of ARA, had conveyed to him the following proposal from Herbert Hoover: the American Government is prepared to spend $20 million to buy grain and seed for the famine-stricken gubernias of Russia, provided the Soviet Government undertook, within three months, beginning from January 1, 1922, to buy $10 million worth of U.S. food and seed for the famine-stricken areas. It stipulated that the purchases were to be made by the Hoover's Commission (ARA).

The Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. examined this proposal on December 22, 1921, and decided to accept it, instructing M. M. Litvinov to reply to Krasin. That same day, Litvinov urgently cabled Krasin that the proposal had been accepted, and asked "to set the earliest date for the delivery of grain in view of the increasingly acute famine situation" (Central Party

Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 416

[489] A reference to a letter from A. V. Eiduk, the Soviet Government's representative with ARA, of December 21, 1921. Eiduk considered the Hoover proposal disadvantageous both economically and politically and recommended its rejection, because it would result in an extension of the ARA apparatus, which was engaged in hostile activity against Soviet Russia.

Having discussed the question "of political measures in connection with ARA", the Politbureau on December 31, 1921, authorised a commission, consisting of I. S. Unschlicht, A. V. Eiduk and V. M. Mikhailov, "to work out measures of special precaution in the event of excessive extension of ARA's apparatus and its recruitment of unreliable elements" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also this volume, Document 558. p. 417

[490] By a Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision of October 14, 1921, G. Y. Sokolnikov was appointed Chairman of the Turkestan Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars. p. 417

[491] A reference to G. I. Safarov's letter to Lenin about distortions of the Party's national policy in Turkestan. On December 22, 1921, the Politbureau set up a commission to examine the question of Turkestan affairs. See this volume, Documents 306, 383 and 562. p. 417

[492] On December 24, 1921, G. Y. Sokolnikov informed Lenin about the charges levelled against G. I. Safarov and his opinion of the case. A copy of Sokolnikov's letter with Lenin's remarks was sent out to members of the Politbureau. p. 417

[493] About the Supreme Economic Commission see Note 453. p. 418

[494] This is in reply to G. I. Safarov's letter. In particular, on December 20, 1921, Safarov informed Lenin that, in view of the examination of the material concerning his activity in Turkestan by the Central Control Commission, he had handed in an application to the Party C.C. to the effect that he intended to abstain from any responsible work (at the time Safarov was consultant on Eastern affairs in the Comintern). See also this volume, Document 560. p. 418

[495] On December 26, 1921, the Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., in accordance with Lenin's proposal, recognised the need to send Y. E. Rudzutak for medical treatment in Germany and asked People's Commissar for Public Health N. A. Semashko to give

his conclusion concerning the place and time of the former's leave, and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to expedite his departure. See also this volume, Document 667. p. 419

[496] A reference to the draft "Instructions on Questions of Economic Activity" submitted for examination by the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. On December 26, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. approved the draft in substance. On December 28 the Instructions were adopted by the congress (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 178-81). p. 420

[497] These memos were apparently written at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets during the discussion of the question "On Finance and the Budget". p. 421

[498] A reference to the gold ruble revenue from the issue of money and the surplus-food requisitioning for 1918-19 and 1920. p. 421

[499] A reference to the review by engineer G. B. Krasin of A. Belyakov's article "New Ways of Reviving Railway Transport", which was written at Lenin's request (see this volume, Document 557). Krasin wrote that "the use of diesel locomotives could probably be highly fruitful" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

The letter addressed to G. M. Krzhizhanovsky on December 26, 1921, has not been found. p. 422

[500] On January 4, 1922, the C.L.D., having recognised that the introduction of diesel locomotives was of especial importance, instructed the Thermal Technical Institute, with the assistance of the Technical Committee of the People's Commissariat for Railways and other establishments, to organise the outlining of projects and technical specifications for diesel locomotives and "to announce a competition for the best diesel locomotive design with the award of a prize...." By the same decision, the State Planning Commission, together with the Thermal Technical Institute and the People's Commissariat for Railways, was instructed to work out, within ten days, "detailed terms for prizes and a competition for subsequent extensive publication of them in Russia and abroad" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 422

[501] Lenin did not write a special article on Serrati; he described Serrati's stand in his article "Notes of a Publicist" (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 211). p. 422

[502] On the strength of unverified accusations, K. Kh. Danishevsky was expelled from the R.C.P.(B.), at the end of 1921, by the Khamovniki District Commission (Moscow) for Purging the Party.

The Central Commission for Checking up on the Membership of the R.C.P.(B.) rejected the groundless accusations and reinstated Danishevsky in the Party. p. 424

[503] At the top of the document, C.P.C. and C.L.D. secretary Lydia Fotieva wrote: "To N. P. Gorbunov. Nikolai Petrovich, Vladimir Ilyich wants you to see that what Kamenev undertakes should be fulfilled as soon as possible, that is, to put pressure wherever necessary. 1/I-22. *L. Fotieva*."

The obituary on "Iosif Petrovich Goldenberg (Meshkovsky) " was published in *Pravda* on January 3, 1922. p. 425

[504] A reference to G. V. Chicherin's letter to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. of December 2, 1921, saying that, according to information received from L. B. Krasin in London, S.E.C. Chairman P. A. Bogdanov had allegedly written a letter to Leslie Urquhart about resuming the concession talks which he had broken off. Chicherin felt that Bogdanov's letter could be interpreted as the Soviet Government's surrender to private capital, and requested a repudiation.

This question was examined by the Politbureau on January 12, 1922. In accordance with Lenin's proposal, the Politbureau instructed I. S. Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka, to investigate how Bogdanov's letter to Taube, which had been sent on to Krasin in London, got into Urquhart's hands. The Politbureau agreed with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that Bogdanov had made a mistake by addressing himself to Taube in circumvention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and recognised that it was "inadmissible to bring up at the Politbureau questions sharply affecting responsible workers (Comrade Bogdanov) without obtaining the necessary information beforehand" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 426

[505] A reference to G. V. Chicherin's letter to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. of December 30 and L. B. Krasin's telegram from London of December 28, 1921.

Krasin communicated the following approximate text of the Soviet Government's declaration proposed by Lloyd George as a condition for the recognition of the R.S.F.S.R. by the capitalist countries and extension of economic assistance to it: "The Soviet Government, with the proviso of its *de jure* recognition and the extension of assistance to Russia in her rehabilitation, agrees to recognise as binding on itself all the financial obligations of the tsarist and the Provisional Government. It is furthermore proposed that the Soviet Government should pay the losses of foreign governments and private persons, in so far as these losses resulted from the Soviet Government's acts or omissions on its part, provided the foreign governments made good the losses inflicted by them on Russia, with the settlement of

all matters involving losses to be effected by an arbitration tribunal on the basis of the generally recognised principles of international law and the principles of trade relations prevailing in civilised countries."

In the opinion of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin wrote to the Politbureau, "this proposal is an attempt to blackmail us once again before the session of the Supreme Council", and it should be rejected, with the declaration that the Soviet Government is prepared to discuss the question of the private debts at a conference. The Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs considered the arbitration tribunal to be absolutely unacceptable, "because there cannot be any impartial arbitration tribunal between the Soviet Republic and the capitalist states".

Having discussed on December 31, 1921, Krasin's telegram about Britain's proposals, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decided "to agree with Comrade Chicherin" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 426

[506] On December 31, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decided to appoint A. M. Krasnoshchekov Second Deputy People's Commissar for Finance. On January 10, 1922, the C.P.C. confirmed him in this office. p. 427

[507] *Nazar Uralsky*—N. N. Nakoryakov. On November 30, 1921, Lenin instructed his secretary: "Arrange for me a meeting with *Nazar Uralsky* (through the Central Administration for Vocational Training)" (*Lenin Miscellany XXIII*, p. 310). Nakoryakov was received by Lenin that same day. p. 428

[508] The R.S.F.S.R. plenipotentiary representative in Norway, L. M. Mikhailov, reported that the Norwegian Council of Ministers had decided to pass through the Storting a loan to Soviet Russia for the purchase of herring, with the proviso that, when the transaction was concluded, 50 per cent of the cost was to be paid in cash and the rest in equal instalments by October 15, 1922, and January 1, 1923. Mikhailov asked for a telegram stating the amount of the transaction.

After additional negotiations and specification of the terms, the agreement was signed. p. 428

[509] Lenin's proposal sprang from the country's grave financial position and the need to increase appropriations for schools and the wiping out of illiteracy.

That same day, January 12, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted a decision "To authorise the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. to rescind the C.P.C. decision on preserving the Bolshoi Opera and Ballet", and by a subsequent decision on January 17 authorised the All-Russia C.E.C. "to examine Comrade Lunacharsky's application in sub-

stance". On February 6, 1922, the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. adopted the following decision: "To bring to the notice of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee that the group of the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C., having examined Lunacharsky's letter and heard the explanations given by Malinovskaya (Director of the Bolshoi Theatre.—*Ed.*), has found that it is economically inexpedient to close down the Bolshoi Theatre." In connection with this proposal, the Politbureau instructed the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection "to submit an exact calculation of the maintenance of the Bolshoi Theatre in its present state, and of the reduction of expenditures which could be obtained on its closure". On March 13, the Politbureau, having heard the report by V. A. Avanesov, Deputy People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, decided to "satisfy the 6/II-22 petition of the All-Russia C.E.C." p. 429

[510] The Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee agreed with Lenin's proposal on the first and second points of the published document, and on January 13, 1922, adopted the following decision: "To instruct the People's Commissariat for Public Health to appoint one or two doctors to carry out regular examination of all comrades who have returned from abroad. To place the responsibility on the doctor, putting on him the duty to submit a short report to the C.P.C. Secretariat."

Points 3, 4 and 5 were agreed by the Politbureau members by phone and were included as a whole in the Politbureau decision of January 18, 1922 (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also this volume, Document 596. p. 430

[511] I. Kh. Lalayants was given a job at the People's Commissariat for Education.

See also this volume, Documents 369, 454 and 626. p. 431

[512] Written under the text of G. V. Chicherin's proposals concerning a reply to the Allied Supreme Council, which on January 6, 1922, adopted a resolution on the convocation of an All-European Economic and Financial Conference, and on the main conditions which the Supreme Council believed were necessary for its success. p. 433

[513] The question of a reply to the Supreme Council of the Entente about the international conference at Genoa was discussed by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on January 17,1922, which decided: "To agree in general with Comrade Chicherin's proposals, with Comrade Lenin's additions and amendments taken down by Comrade Chicherin" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On January 27, 1922, an Extraordinary Session of the All-Russia C.E.C. approved the composition of the Soviet delegation to

the Genoa Conference. On the delegation were L. B. Krasin, M. M. Litvinov, N. N. Narimanov, V. V. Vorovsky, Y. E. Rudzutak, A. A. Joffe, Kh. G. Rakovsky and others. V. I. Lenin was appointed chairman of the delegation, and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin, his deputy (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, pp. 66-67). p. 434

[514] In two letters to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. of January 15, 1922, G. V. Chicherin, in connection with the holiday offered to him, characterised the state of affairs at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

He said the work was not going smoothly because of a shortage of trained personnel and added that there was no one at the Commissariat who was informed about the whole range of questions. He wrote that it was impossible for him to go on holiday just then. It would take him several months to hand over his affairs and introduce someone to all his duties at the Commissariat, something it was absolutely impossible to do during the intense preparation for the Genoa Conference. Chicherin insisted that "a holiday at the present time is tantamount to my total departure" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 434

[515] The question of Chicherin's leave and medical treatment was examined at several sittings of the Politbureau, and he was given leave after the Genoa Conference. p. 435

[516] On January 26, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. instructed A. A. Joffe, J. A. Hanecki and P. P. Gorbunov "to prepare the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for being in a state of complete clarity and precision of work by the time Comrades Chicherin and Litvinov leave.... To bear in mind the possibility of Comrade Karakhan's being summoned in the absence of Chicherin and Litvinov, and also the possibility that one or two comrades from the diplomatic section of the delegation will have to take turns staying in Moscow to carry on" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 435

[517] The question of material assistance to T. L. Axelrod was examined by the Secretariat of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on January 21, 1922. His request was met. p. 435

[518] Lenin's letter to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on January 17, 1922, was discussed on January 20. The Politbureau decided to have the question of granting Steinberg a concession finally settled by the C.P.C. (see also this volume, Document 515). p. 437

[519] These words are from Ivan Krylov's fable, "The Musicians",

which tells of a choir of serf peasants who sang very poorly, but were a model of sobriety. p. 437

[520] Meaning people who are prepared to engage in any activity regardless of their qualification, so long as they have the authority and the assignment. "I am prepared to be an accoucheur at any time," is a sentence from an introduction by the Russian satirical writer Saltykov-Shchedrin to his novel *The Golovlyov Family*. p. 437

[521] Lenin's proposal was adopted the same day by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. On January 24, the Council of People's Commissars approved in substance the draft statutes of the Joint-Stock Company for Domestic and Export Trade in Hides and Skins (Kozhsyryo). On February 1, the statutes of the company and the articles of association were approved by the C.L.D. p. 438

[522] On Lenin's initiative and instructions, the Managing Department of the C.L.D. set up tables characterising the development of the main branches of Soviet Russia's national economy for 1920-21 and 1922. For the correspondence between V. A. Smolyaninov and P. I. Popov, Business Manager of the Central Statistical Board, in connection with this proposal of Lenin's, see *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 1, 1962, pp. 51-52 and 54-55, and also No. 3, 1961, p. 71. p. 438

[523] On February 1, 1922, the Secretariat of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decided to send Margarita Fofanova's daughter for treatment abroad, together with her mother if need be. p. 439

[524] On January 23, 1922, Lenin was informed by the bureau of the Secretariat of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee that N. Sammer-Kotovich had been placed in the experimental model school of the People's Commissariat for Education as a boarder. p. 440

[525] On January 20, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee recognised the need to intensify the delivery of grain from the Ukraine and adopted a decision to send Deputy People's Commissar for Food, M. I. Frumkin, to the Ukraine with special powers.

The same decision also approved, with some amendments (instead of "dismiss from office and expel from the Party"—"the Party will be forced to take the most drastic measures of punishment") the draft telegram to L. B. Krasin proposed by Lenin (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 441

[526] Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, was concurrently C.P.C. representative for currency operations. p. 441

[527] On January 17, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decided to satisfy L. B. Krasin's request "concerning Comrade Larin's recall at his disposal".

The published letter was sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with the following inscription by Lenin: "*To the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. To P. P. Gorbunov:* for dispatch *as soon* and *as* confidentially *as possible*. Return the envelope to me with *Krasin's signature*. 19.I.1922. *Lenin*. **To Comrade Krasin** *in London* (19.I.1922 from Lenin)" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 441

[528] The case involving red tape in the movement of freights for the Kashira project was examined by a team of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. The guilty persons were tried by the Revolutionary Military Tribunal. p. 442

[529] A reference to the daily regimen established for A. D. Tsyurupa by his doctor. p. 442

[530] The same day, A. D. Tsyurupa replied to Lenin, thanking him for his care. He wrote that he was feeling better, and promised to carry out the doctor's orders. He also said that he preferred to remain in the accustomed environment of his home where he had the necessary care, and promised "to go to Kashira or the Chaika country house for two or three days". p. 443

[531] This is in reply to L. D. Trotsky's communication that the youth conference, where he had given a report, was addressed by the Menshevik Gurvich, who, referring to Lenin's pronouncements on state capitalism, asserted that the New Economic Policy was a return to capitalism. p. 443

[532] Lenin shed light on the question of state capitalism in the political report of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and in the summing up speech on the report at the Eleventh Party Congress, and also in an interview with a *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, in a report at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, and in his article "On Co-operation" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 279, 310-13, 402-04, 418-22, 472-73). p. 444

[533] In the letter here mentioned, G. Y. Sokolnikov argued the need to reorganise Gokhran (the State Depository of Valuables of the R.S.F.S.R.) into a Currency Administration. With this in mind, he suggested the appointment as its head an executive of greater stature than the head of Gokhran, N. A. Basha. Sokolnikov also dealt with various aspects of restructuring the budget. p. 444

[534] A reference to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision of January 20, 1922, on the delay in the purchase of food abroad. p. 445

[535] A reference to the R.S.F.S.R. Government's Note to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the U.S.A. of October 28, 1921, which was signed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, pp. 445-48; for Lenin's remarks on the draft Note see this volume, Document 466). p. 447

[536] The first paragraph of the resolution on convening the international economic conference at Genoa, adopted at the Cannes Conference of the Allied Supreme Council on January 6, 1922, read: "Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other regarding the principles on which they are to regulate their system of ownership, internal economy and government. It is for every nation to choose for itself the system which it prefers in this respect" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, p. 58). See also this volume, Document 605. p. 447

[537] In February 1922, Lenin worked out detailed directives for the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference, which were adopted by the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee (see this volume, Documents 623 and 630; present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 390-93, 394-95, 396-98, 401-04). p. 447

[538] A reference to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision of January 20, 1922: "Not to object to Comrade Chicherin's proposal to enlist as 'specialists' Sukhanov and Jordansky for preparatory work" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 447

[539] Written in connection with a telegraphic inquiry addressed to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade by B. S. Stomonyakov, the R.S.F.S.R. trade representative in Germany. Reporting that HAPAG (Hamburg-America Line) had come to an arrangement with the Harriman concern on transferring to the latter one-half of its interest in the German-Russian Transport Company (Derutra), Stomonyakov asked whether this should be agreed to. A. M. Lezhava, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, in a letter to Lenin on January 14, 1922, expressed the opinion that this was advantageous not only for HAPAG but also for Soviet Russia, because it was "a very major fact, the first business agreement between us and American capital" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Derutra, the German-Russian Transport Company was set up on the basis of a protocol signed in Berlin on May 13, 1921, by

Stomonyakov and Director Theodor Ritter, a member of the board of HAPAG (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, pp. 114-19). p. 448

[540] A reference to the proposal made by "Friedrich Krupp in Essen" on a 50,000-dessiatine concession. See also this volume, Documents 675 and 710. p. 448

[541] Written at the bottom of G. V. Chicherin's letter of January 20, 1922. Chicherin had written to Lenin: "... If the Americans should harp on the demand for representative institutions, don't you think that it could be possible, for a sizable compensation, to insert a small amendment into our Constitution...?" Lenin underscored the words "could be possible" with four lines, put three interrogation marks in the margin, and wrote: "This is madness!!" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 450

[542] On February 2, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. adopted a decision to the effect that questions having a fundamental bearing on R.S.F.S.R. financial policy or going up for decision by the Politbureau were to be examined beforehand by a trio consisting of G. Y. Sokolnikov, A. M. Krasnoshchekov and Y. A. Preobrazhensky. p. 450

[543] A reference to the radio telegram from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy, Bonomi, on January 13. 1922, in which, under a decision of the conference of the Allied Supreme Council, held at Cannes from January 6 to 13, he invited, on behalf of the Supreme Council, a Soviet Government delegation to take part in an international economic and financial conference which was to meet at Genoa in early March 1922. p. 451

[544] Clause 1 of the Cannes resolution, as published in the Soviet press, said: "No state can claim any right to dictate to another state the principles on which the latter is to regulate its system of ownership, and internal economy and government" (*Izvestia VTsIK* No. 6, January 10, 1922). This text corresponded with the text of the resolution published in *Petit Parisien* No. 16385 on January 8. On January 26, G. V. Chicherin wrote, enclosing the issue of the paper: "I am sending you *Petit Parisien* with the Cannes resolution and a copy of Bonomi. The latter has dropped 'Système de propriété'."

Lenin attached great importance to the formulation of §1 of the Cannes terms, regarding it as an indirect admission of the bankruptcy of the capitalist system of property, and of the inevitable existence of a communist system of property alongside it. Lenin pointed out that the other paragraphs of the Cannes terms, designed to enslave Soviet Russia by foreign capital, were clearly at odds with clause one (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 356-57). p. 451

[545] On January 31, 1922, I. T. Smilga, reporting his and B.S. Stomonyakov's talk with representatives of the Deutsche Bank about oil concessions, wrote: "...We have agreed in principle to negotiate on the whole of Grozny and on the Bibi-Eibat district in Baku. " Smilga requested instructions about the terms of the talks. In order to expedite this matter, Smilga suggested that the right to sign the agreement should be vested in him, N. N. Krestinsky, A. I. Rykov and B. S. Stomonyakov, with subsequent confirmation by the C.P.C. The letter was also signed by Krestinsky (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 452

[546] A reference to Sun Yat-sen's letter of August 28, 1921, addressed to G. V. Chicherin, informing him of the situation in China, and of Sun's election to the post of President of the National Government. He ended by saying: "I am taking a great interest in your cause, especially in the organisation of your Soviets, your Army and education. I should like to know everything you and others may tell me about these things, especially about education. Like Moscow, I should like to lay the foundations of the Chinese Republic deep in the minds of the young generation—the toilers of the morrow.

"With best wishes to you, to my friend Lenin and to all those who have done so much for the cause of human freedom" (see *Bolshevik* No. 19, 1950, pp. 46-48). Having sent on this letter to Lenin on November 6, 1921, Chicherin asked him whether he was personally acquainted with Sun Yat-sen. Lenin replied the next day, saying that they had never met, and that until then they had not corresponded. p. 452

[547] *Duet*—two members of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee who outlined its agenda, gave a preliminary reading of the material for the sittings, and in some cases submitted their conclusions. p. 453

[548] Lenin was given leave under a Politbureau decision on December 3, 1921; he was away on leave from December 6. p. 453

[549] This is in reply to a letter from I. S. Unschlicht, Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka, of January 26, 1922, in which he stood up for the new draft statute of the All-Russia Cheka, worked out by its Collegium, and insisted that it should retain its punitive functions. The letter is quoted in his reminiscences of Lenin. He sets out the beginning of the letter as follows: "Lenin did not agree with my arguments and sent me a reply saying that my proposals could and should be realised not my way but through a C.C. commission draft.... Lenin ended his letter by noting that on the basis of the decisions taken by a Politbureau commission 'an increase in the speed and force of reprisals can and must be achieved'" (*Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1965, No. 4, p. 97). See also this volume, Document 522. p. 454

[550] On January 28, 1922, Y. V. Lomonosov sent a telephone message informing Lenin of a conference he had had with G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, Prof. L. K. Ramzin and Deputy Head of the Technical Committee of the People's Commissariat for Railways P. S. Yanushevsky, about the construction of diesel locomotives. See also this volume, Document 613. p. 455

[551] This was written in connection with a report by GUM, the State Department Store, on its operations for two months, and a memo from its director, A. A. Belov, about its immediate plans and the need to increase its capital.

The Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance, having discussed the petition, decided to increase its capital by three million real values, and to take steps to promote its commercial activity. See also this volume, Documents 525 and 625. p. 455

[552] This is written on a telephone message from Y. V. Lomonosov to Lenin on January 28, 1922 (see Note 550).

On February 3, 1922, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, submitted a detailed memo giving Lenin a progress report on implementing the C.L.D. decision of January 4, 1922, concerning diesel locomotives (see Note 500).

He believed that it was necessary, along with building diesel locomotives to Russian blueprints, to announce an international competition. He wrote that the work was being carried on in two directions: the drafting of the terms of the international competition and the "working out of outline blueprints of diesel locomotives for their subsequent construction through the allocation of orders to factories" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

On March 10, 1922, the C.L.D. approved the terms of the competition for the construction of diesel locomotives for the R.S.F.S.R., which had been worked out by the State Planning Commission together with the Thermal Technical Institute and the People's Commissariat for Railways, and set March 1, 1924, as the date of the competition (see this volume, Documents 568 and 611). p. 455

[553] On January 29, 1922, the newspapers carried two radio messages from the Italian Foreign Minister Torretta addressed to G. V. Chicherin, one dated January 22, containing a reply to Chicherin's inquiry about the agenda of the Genoa Conference, and the other dated January 27, on the composition of the conference. In the latter he said that, in accordance with the Cannes decisions of the Supreme Council, among those invited to the conference were "apart from the members of the Supreme Council and Russia, all the states of Europe with *de jure* recognition" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, p. 59). This "explanation" of Torretta's was taken by some quarters to imply the invitation to the conference of the expelled whiteguard governments of Kolchak and Denikin, the Menshevik government of Georgia,

the Dashnak government of Armenia, the Musavat government of Azerbaijan and others (which had earlier been recognised by the Entente, and whose recognition had not been revoked). In this context, L. D. Trotsky proposed a categorical declaration saying that the invitation of émigré counter-revolutionary organisations would make it quite impossible for the R.S.F.S.R. to attend such a conference. p. 456

[554] The Menshevik leaders were carrying on a malicious campaign of lies and slander against Soviet Russia, accusing her of violating "democracy", "the self-determination of nations", expulsion of the "legitimate" (Menshevik) government of Georgia, and "occupation" of her territory, etc. In view of the forthcoming Genoa Conference, the Mensheviks intensified their attacks on the R.S.F.S.R., demanding the Red Army's withdrawal from Georgia, the staging there of a referendum, etc. The Mensheviks in Russia were supported by émigré Mensheviks.

Lenin's proposals published here were adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. p. 456

[555] On January 31, 1922, Lenin received G. Y. Zinoviev's reply to his letter of January 26 (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 232). Zinoviev wrote that the Executive Committee of the Comintern, not expecting Lenin to deliver a speech on the question of a united front, wanted to have an article by him on this subject. As for his speech on the question of NEP and its initial results, it was considered highly important by the Executive Committee of the Comintern in view of the fact that the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals were distorting the meaning of NEP and agitating against the Communists. See this volume, Document 617. p. 457

[556] Lenin did not write a special article on NEP or the country's economic position. He dealt with these questions in the first part of his article "Notes of a Publicist", which remained unfinished (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 204-07). p. 457

[557] Prof. N. A. Rozhkov was arrested in February 1921 as a member of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks). At his interrogation he said that while he shared the Menshevik view of the Soviet power's inevitable debacle, he did not wish to take part in the political struggle and intended to withdraw from the Menshevik Party. In this connection, the Petrograd Gubernia Cheka suggested his release. On May 31, 1921, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decided not to release him.

Rozhkov was later released under a decision of the Presidium of the All-Russia Cheka. See also this volume, Documents 801 and 802. p. 457

[558] I. S. Unschlicht asked Lenin to take part in the sitting of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on February 2, 1922, during

the discussion of the question of the All-Russia Cheka, in view of the differences between its Collegium and the commission set up by the Politbureau.

On February 2, the Politbureau approved a draft Statute on the Dissolution of the All-Russia Cheka, and instructed Unschlicht to submit for preliminary approval by the Politbureau a Statute of the State Political Administration (G.P.U.). On February 6, 1922, the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. adopted a decision on this question (see *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 30 of February 8, 1922). See also this volume, Documents 522 and 610. p. 457

[559] Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. that same day, February 2, 1922.

In connection with G. L. Pyatakov's request that he should be released from making the report at the Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the Politbureau, on February 9, authorised the representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) on the Comintern Executive Committee to propose that the report on NEP should be given by L. B. Kamenev.

The report was given by G. Y. Sokolnikov. p. 459

[560] A reference to Lenin's letter to N. I. Bukharin and G. Y. Zinoviev of February 1, 1922, in which he wrote about the Comintern's attitude to the forthcoming conference of representatives of the three Internationals: the Second, the Two-and-a-Half and the Comintern (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 393-94).

At the top of the text of the letter, a secretary had written: "Keep track and hurry on with the reply." p. 459

[561] On February 3, 1922, N. I. Bukharin replied to Lenin that he and G. Y. Zinoviev agreed with Lenin's proposals in connection with the conference of the three Internationals. Bukharin also wrote that Lenin would shortly receive material on the attitude of the various groupings in the West to the New Economic Policy. p. 460

[562] On February 7, 1922, N. L. Meshcheryakov, chairman of the editorial board and head of Gosizdat's political department, informed Lenin that "private publishers were operating under the decree of December 12, 1921"; to supervise their activity a political department had been set up under Gosizdat; there were political departments in Moscow and Petrograd. Meshcheryakov also sent in copies of circulars on organising local political departments. These circulars said that publishers were to submit manuscripts to the political departments for examination; printing shops were not entitled to publish any book "unless the manuscript had been passed by the political department" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 461

[563] The circular telegram with the text proposed by Lenin was, that same day, February 6, 1922, sent to all the regional committees, regional bureaus and gubernia committees of the R.C.P.(B.), and to the regional and gubernia departments of public education. On February 9, the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) informed them, in an additional telegram, that the said conference was to meet on February 20 instead of March 20.

The Second All-Russia Congress of Gubernia Departments of Public Education was held in Moscow from February 22 to 28, 1922. See also *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 284. p. 462

[564] Under the project for the country's economic division worked out by the State Planning Commission, the Ukraine was to have two parts: the South-western Region with its centre at Kiev, and the Southern Industrial Mining Region with its centre at Kharkov, and this division representatives of the Ukraine considered inappropriate. During the subsequent districting, the Ukraine remained a single economic area. p. 462

[565] In a letter to Lenin G. V. Chicherin expressed his doubts about the success of the Genoa Conference and the possibility of reaching agreement there with the capitalist circles. p. 463

[566] A reference to a report from R. E. Klasson, executive head of the Administration for the Affairs of Gidrotorf (the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction) under the Chief Peat Committee, dated February 9, 1922. He described the state of affairs, said that Gidrotorf did not have the money to buy the necessary materials for the 1922 season, and requested the approval of estimates to the amount of 4 million gold rubles. He also asked that Gidrotorf should be separated from Tsutorf (Central Board for the Peat Industry) and transferred to the Central Fuel Administration or another establishment, at the C.P.C.'s discretion, where Gidrotorf could obtain the money it needed.

On February 28, 1922, the C.P.C. decided to allocate to Gidrotorf 1.2 million prewar rubles from the C.P.C. reserve fund, under the estimates and with a set off of the funds already received by Gidrotorf in 1922. See also this volume, Document 653. p. 464

[567] On February 12, 1922, G. Y. Sokolnikov informed Lenin that the People's Commissariat for Finance would support A. A. Belov, and also replied to all the questions which Lenin posed in the letter here published. p. 466

[568] The following day, February 14, 1922, A. S. Yenukidze informed Lenin that the flat for J. V. Stalin was ready, and that he had issued another written order to A. D. Metelev, the All-Russia C.E.C. house manager, about flats for S. G. Strumilin and L. K. Ramzin. Yenukidze wrote that housing and food arrangements had been made for I. Kh Lalayants, who intended

to go and fetch his family at the end of March (after the Party Congress). Yenukidze also asked Lenin to see him about the work of the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. Yenukidze later reported that he had written to V. V. Fomin at the People's Commissariat for Railways about carriage arrangements for Lalayants.

On the first page of Yenukidze's letter, Lenin wrote: "**To Fotieva p. 3**", and on the third page—"check up fulfilment of § 3", in which he underscored with a double line the words "about flats for Strumilin and Ramzin" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 467

[569] A reference to the All-Russia census of the R.C.P.(B.) members in early 1922, for the purpose of establishing the membership composition and making an exact count of Party members. In Moscow it was held from February 6, 1922. For the questionnaire filled in by Lenin see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 457-61.

The census of responsible workers mentioned in the letter was carried out in July 1921 to determine the number and qualifications of the governing section of the Party in gubernia and uyezd centres, their territorial distribution and efficiency of use. p. 467

[570] This proposal was written at the bottom of G. V. Chicherin's letter of February 11, 1922, to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. Chicherin objected to L. D. Trotsky's instructions that, in connection with preparations for the international economic and financial conference (Genoa Conference), experts of the military department should discuss in the press concrete material and the amount of counter-claims on the capitalist countries for compensation of the losses inflicted on Soviet Russia by the foreign armed intervention and blockade.

On February 15, 1922, the Politbureau adopted Lenin's proposal. p. 468

[571] This letter to D. I. Kursky and the documents given below (see this volume, Document 657), as well as Lenin's markings on the draft decision of the All-Russia C.E.C. on the People s Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and his letter to J. V. Stalin on this question (see this volume, Document 659), were written in view of the need to legislate more precisely on the rights of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to control the activity of private enterprises. This is due to a revival of private enterprises under the New Economic Policy, a growth in the number of transactions between state organisations and private lessees and various types of abuses on that account."

[572] The following day, February 16, 1922, D. I. Kursky replied to Lenin's letter, informing him that he had instructed V. I.

Yakhontov, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Justice and head of the Codification Department, to verify I. G. Koblents's conclusion. Kursky wrote about the draft Statute of Obligations, Criminal Code, etc., which had been submitted for approval by the C.P.C., and about the elaboration of a number of laws at the People's Commissariats for Agriculture, Labour, and Justice. He admitted that there were contradictions in the existing laws. Sharing Lenin's view on the "need to guarantee the state full auditing and control", Kursky wrote that he would "consider highly useful a C.C. directive in this respect for the Narrow C.P.C..." (underlined by Lenin) (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, p. 326). p. 471

573 On December 1, 1921, having heard Lenin's report on A. D. Tsyurupa's work, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decided to confirm him in the post of Second Deputy Chairman of the C.L.D., and on December 5 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the C.P.C. by a Politbureau decision.

The country's transition to peaceful economic construction made it necessary to improve and restructure the whole Soviet state apparatus. The programme for this was set out in the letters to A. D. Tsyurupa (see present edition, Vol. 35, Documents 307, 308, 309 and 310). p. 471

574 This document is written in connection with A. D. Tsyurupa's letter reporting the shortcomings in the work of the Narrow C.P.C.

Tsyurupa proposed that the Narrow C.P.C. should be reduced from 22 to 5 persons: a chairman and four representatives of departments (People's Commissariat for Justice, People's Commissariat for Finance, Supreme Economic Council, and People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection). All matters relating to appropriations, provided for in the state estimates, were to go to the People's Commissariat for Finance, and went to the Narrow C.P.C. only by way of protest against the acts of the Commissariat. The Narrow C.P.C. examined the questions provided for by the order. p. 471

575 In reply to this letter, People's Commissar for Agriculture, V. G. Yakovenko, informed Lenin on February 21, 1922, that he had ordered an inquiry in connection with A. A. Belyakov's article in *Izvestia VTsIK*. Yakovenko wrote that he had handed over the material on this to D. I. Kursky at the People's Commissariat for Justice to have proceedings started against those guilty of red tape if he found this necessary.

On May 15, 1922, Yakovenko submitted to Lenin a report on the use of the aeroengines for mechanising agriculture (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 473

[576] In a letter to Lenin on February 16, 1922, D. I. Kursky wrote that the guarantee of the state's rights was provided for in the articles of the general part of the Statute of Obligations, which specified the cases when contracts were invalid, and in the article of the draft Statute of the Administration of State Enterprises, which laid down that there could be no adjudication from the fixed capital of a state enterprise; in addition, the draft Criminal Code contained an article "inflicting punishment for mismanagement by a state enterprise manager of the business assigned to him". Kursky wrote: "As a preventive measure there is need for control by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and specification of the statute of the W.P.I.'s right to audit the leased enterprises, for which there is already a C.C. assignment" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also this volume, Documents 629 and 657. p. 473

[577] Written under the text of G. V. Chicherin's letter of February 15, 1922. With the directives of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. and Lenin's instructions in mind concerning the nature of the programme with which the Soviet delegation was to come out at the Genoa Conference (see this volume, Document 623, and also present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 396-98), Chicherin wrote: "I don't know how we shall manage with the 'broadest programme'. All my life I have cursed petty-bourgeois illusions, and here is the Politbureau making me invent petty-bourgeois illusions in my old age. None of us knows how to compose such things, we don't even know on which sources we are to rely. Perhaps you will let us have more detailed directions?" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.)

See also Vol. 42, pp. 401-04. p. 475

[578] Lenin believed the work of the Shatilov Oats Trust in improving plant crops to be of great importance for the state, because he regarded it as a way of increasing agricultural productivity. On the strength of Lenin's proposal, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., on February 18, 1922, reviewed the question of issuing a long-term loan to the Shatilov Trust, and adopted a decision to give it financial support. On March 4, the Politbureau put the duty on the People's Commissariat for Finance to let the People's Commissariat for Agriculture have funds for the Shatilov Trust.

The Trust was set up on the basis of the Shatilov Agricultural Experimental Station, founded in 1896. Today, it is the Orel State Agricultural Experimental Station, a scientific research establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 476

[579] A reference to the C.L.D. commission to examine the enterprises earmarked for lease under a concession to Leslie Urquhart. See this volume, Document 644. p. 477

[580] This is written on G. V. Chicherin's letter of February 18, 1922, saying that K. B. Radek, in an interview published in the French bourgeois newspaper *Le Matin*, described the negotiations with the French Government, and in so doing made some attacks against Britain. Chicherin believed this was premature and said that Radek's interview had done Soviet Russia diplomatic harm.

On the letter are remarks by members of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., expressing agreement with Lenin's opinion. p. 479

[581] In a letter from Berlin on February 12, 1922, I. T. Smilga, head of the Central Fuel Administration of the Supreme Economic Council, reported about the unsuccessful demands for remittances to Germany of funds for the Administration, as a result of which equipment for the coal and oil industries was purchased only to "an insignificant amount". He requested the earliest remittance of the funds (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 479

[582] A reference to Lenin's letter to G. I. Myasnikov of August 5, 1921 (see present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 504-09). The proposal related to a Politbureau decision on Myasnikov of February 20, 1922. Having heard the report of a commission set up by the Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on July 29, 1921, to inquire into Myasnikov's anti-Party activity, the Politbureau approved the commission's proposal to expel him from the Party. p. 480

[583] A Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision of February 20, 1922, included G. Y. Sokolnikov in the R.C.P.(B.) delegation to the "international communist conference", the first enlarged plenary meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which was held in Moscow from February 21 to March 4, 1922. p. 480

[584] The above-mentioned article reported a strike by lecturers of the Moscow Higher Technical College, who had taken their cue from the Cadet *Poslednie Novosti*, published by the whiteguard émigrés in Paris.

On February 24, 1922, *Izvestia VTsIK* carried an article "Cadets at Work" (On the Lecturers' Strike at the Moscow Higher Technical College). p. 480

[585] A reference to the conclusions of the I. K. Mikhailov commission on whether to grant a concession to Leslie Urquhart. p. 480

[586] The Mikhailov commission had reached the conclusion that foreign capitalists were to blame for destroying the indicated enterprises, and came out against granting a concession to Urquhart. Replying to Lenin's questions, the commission emphasised that these enterprises could be restored by the efforts of the Soviet state. See this volume, Document 758. p. 481

[587] Written in reply to a letter from A. P. Golubkov, Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Red Cross Society of Russia, of February 21, 1922, which said that the Society was publishing for famine relief, an illustrated collection in Russian and three foreign languages for distribution in Russia and abroad. The letter said its Central Committee requested Lenin to let them have "a few lines of your facsimile" for the collection (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 483

[588] Written on G. V. Chicherin's letter in which he resolutely objected to G. Y. Sokolnikov's proposal to delay the payment to Turkey.

On February 27, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. adopted Lenin's proposal to pay Turkey the amount involved noting that "there are no other financial obligations on the R.S.F.S.R." (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 483

[589] What the reference is to has not been established. p. 483

[590] A reference to the fact that the Kharkov Gubernia Committee and the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had divulged the afore-mentioned decision of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. The Politbureau adopted Lenin's proposal on February 25, 1922. See also Note 54. p. 484

[591] See Note 588. p. 484

[592] A reference to Lenin's proposal adopted by the Politbureau to invest G. V. Chicherin, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference, with all the powers of the Chairman of the delegation, adding that in the event of Chicherin's illness or departure powers would be delegated in turn to one of the following two trios: a) Litvinov, Krasin, Rakovsky, b) Litvinov, Joffe, Vorovsky (see present edition, Vol. 42, p. 402). p. 484

[593] Lenin wrote this letter, as well as the note to the Politbureau members of February 24, and the notes to J. V. Stalin and L. B. Kamenev of February 25, 1922 (see this volume, Document 649, and also present edition, Vol. 42, p. 404), in connection with a radio message from the Italian Foreign Minister Torretta to G. V. Chicherin of February 24, 1922, saying that the Italian Government was forced to postpone the Genoa Conference in view of a ministerial crisis. The radio message was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 45, on February 25, 1922. p. 485

[594] That same day, February 25, 1922, Chicherin sent Italian Foreign Minister Torretta and British Foreign Secretary Curzon a telegram on the date of the Genoa Conference, and it was published

in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 47, on February 28, 1922 (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, pp. 113-15). p. 486

[595] This is in reply to a communication from the Presidium of the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences on February 23, 1922, informing Lenin of his election as member of the Academy on February 5.

Lenin wrote the published document under the text of the communication, and there is also on it his remark: "Reply on letterhead and let me sign." p. 486

[596] This was written in connection with a letter from M. I. Frumkin, Deputy People's Commissar for Food, on February 20, 1922, who objected to the plan for trading in salt, which he believed to be wrong. Frumkin requested that the reply to his letter should be sent to Bryukhanov.

N. P. Bryukhanov, replying on March 6 to Lenin's note, wrote that the People's Commissariat for Food had organised the trade in salt "in the very direction" suggested by Lenin. Bryukhanov reported the preparation of an agreement with the Supreme Economic Council and other measures (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 486

[597] A reference to the C.P.C. decision of October 30, 1920, "On the Use of the Hydraulic Extraction of Peat". p. 487

[598] The conference which was held on February 28, 1922, with A. D. Tsyurupa in the chair, decided to let the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction have 1.2 million gold rubles from the C.P.C. reserve fund. This decision was incorporated in the C.P.C. decision taken the same day. See this volume, Document 624. p. 489

[599] Written in connection with "Summary of Opinions on the Question of the State Bank's Active Participation in Trade Enterprises" submitted by various executives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the State Planning Commission, members of the editorial board of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, etc. Referring to the principles of banking and all kinds of formal considerations, they objected to the State Bank's participation in trade. p. 490

[600] Written under the text of the "Draft C.P.C. Decision on the Free Entry of Foodstuffs into the Russian Soviet Federation", proposed by G. Y. Sokolnikov and circulated among the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. members. The final point of the draft said: "To permit the People's Commissariat for Finance, on grounds by agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, to issue permits to state establishments and enterprises and enterprises of the state trustified industry, and to co-operatives and private persons, for the right to remit and export cash, currency and all kinds of valuables for the purpose

of acquiring abroad foodstuffs, with adequate guarantees granted for their subsequent importation." Lenin underscored the word "guarantees" with four lines (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See this volume, Document 662. p. 490

[601] A reference to the "Basic Provisions of an Agreement with the British Company 'Russangloles-Limited'" and "Basic Provisions of an Agreement with the Dutch Firm 'Alcius & Co.'", signed by L. B. Krasin, on the establishment, together with "Severoles", of the joint-stock companies "Russangloles" and "Russgollandles" for the purpose of developing the timber industry and intensifying timber export operations in Archangel Region and the adjacent areas. p. 491

[602] The material submitted to Lenin showed that the proportion of the assets being returned to their former owners constituted 35-40 per cent for "Russangloles" and 20-30 per cent for "Russgollandles", adding that even this share of the property was not conveyed to their ownership, but was placed at the disposal of mixed companies on whose boards the Soviet side was assured of predominant influence (§§ XIII and XIV). § XV said that the former owners, both British and Dutch, had waived in writing any claims on the R.S.F.S.R.

Having studied the material, Lenin considered that it was possible to conclude an agreement on these terms.

The basic provisions of the agreement with "Russangloles-Limited" and "Alcius & Co." were approved by the Council of People's Commissars in April 1922, and the agreements, in March 1923. p. 491

[603] A reference to the draft directive of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on the working out of a draft All-Russia C.E.C. decision on the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. See this volume, Document 629. p. 491

[604] A reference to the "Draft Decision for the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on the Tasks of the Soviet Delegation at Genoa", which was approved by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on February 28, 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 401-04). Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Politbureau also on February 28. p. 492

[605] Lenin's remarks on a draft All-Russia C.E.C. decision on the tasks of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection under the New Economic Policy were taken into account in the final drafting of this decision (see *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 67 of March 24, 1922). For Lenin's correspondence on the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection control over the activity of private enterprises see *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*, pp. 324-29. p. 493

[606] Written in connection with a discussion of the question of the foreign trade monopoly which was carried on in the Party's governing circles at the end of 1921 and throughout the whole of 1922.

The foreign trade monopoly, established by the C.P.C. decree of April 22, 1918, was repeatedly confirmed by Soviet Government decisions. The transition to the New Economic Policy and the extension of trade ties with foreign countries called for various additions to legislation on foreign trade. The "Theses on Foreign Trade" prepared on Lenin's instructions by A. M. Lezhava, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, emphasised the need to consolidate the foreign trade monopoly, and defined the terms for the export and import of goods in the new conditions. The theses were endorsed by Lenin and adopted by the Supreme Economic Commission of the C.P.C. on January 4, 1922. The retention of the foreign trade monopoly was opposed by G. Y. Sokolnikov, N. I. Bukharin and G. L. Pyatakov. J. V. Stalin, G. Y. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev favoured an easing of the foreign trade monopoly.

On March 4, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. adopted, with some amendments, the "Theses on Foreign Trade" approved by Lenin. In their final form they were approved on March 10. On the basis of these theses, the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. on March 13 adopted its decision "On Foreign Trade", which was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 60, on March 15, 1922.

Despite the Politbureau decision of March 4 and 10, Sokolnikov again put forward the plan to allow the trusts, co-operatives and others to purchase food abroad; Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, M. I. Frumkin, also came out in favour of easing the foreign trade monopoly, suggesting that only the wholesale trading in four or five products should be left in the hands of the state as a firm monopoly. The inner-Party struggle over the foreign trade monopoly was having a negative effect on business negotiations with foreign capitalists. In connection with this, Lenin proposed on May 15, 1922, the following Politbureau directive, which was adopted on May 22: "The C.C. confirms the foreign trade monopoly and resolves to stop everywhere the elaboration and preparation of the question of integrating the Supreme Economic Council with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade" (*Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, p. 484).

However, the struggle did not cease. On October 6, 1922, the C.C. Plenum, with Lenin in and absent, adopted, on a motion by G. Y. Zinoviev, a resolution on the basis of Sokolnikov's theses allowing freedom of import and export for some types of goods or across some frontiers. On October 11, L. B. Krasin sent in a request to the Party Central Committee that the October 6 decision and the "Theses of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade on the Foreign Trade Regime" should be rescinded. Lenin supported Krasin and protested the decision of the C.C. Plenum, pointing out that it was in fact thwarting the foreign trade monopoly, and proposed that the question should be

referred for settlement to the next C.C. Plenum in December 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 375-78). N. I. Bukharin came out with objections to Lenin's letter and L. B. Krasin's theses.

Attaching great importance to the stability of the foreign trade monopoly, but being unable, because of his illness, to attend the C.C. Plenum on December 18, 1922, Lenin addressed a letter to it on December 13, in which he sharply condemned Bukharin's stand. Considering Lenin's insistent demands and the Politbureau decisions, J. V. Stalin was forced to abandon his erroneous stand. The C.C. Plenum condemned the standpoint of Bukharin and Sokolnikov, rescinded the C.C. decision of October 6, and reaffirmed the absolute necessity of maintaining the foreign trade monopoly, without allowing any departures from it. The Party's Twelfth Congress, which was held from April 17 to 25, 1923, and in which Lenin was also unable to take part because he was unwell, resolved: "The congress categorically reaffirms the stability of the foreign trade monopoly and the inadmissibility of any circumvention of it or hesitations in implementing it, and instructs the new C.C. to take systematic measures to consolidate and develop the regime of foreign trade monopoly" (*KPSS v resolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, conferentsii i plenumov TsKa*, Part 1, 1954, p. 682). p. 496

[607] The question of financing industry was discussed by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on March 9 and 13, 1922. The Politbureau invited the People's Commissariat for Finance to provide the Supreme Economic Council with all the necessary funds for the needs of industry. p. 500

[608] Written on G. Y. Sokolnikov's letter in reply to Lenin's note of February 28 (see this volume, Document 662).

In his letter, Sokolnikov suggested that the trusts, co-operatives and others should be allowed to purchase food abroad. In his opinion, the guarantee that an excess of valuables would not be taken out of the country and that food instead of other goods would be imported in return was these organisations' extreme need of food, and control by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the State Bank, through which all operations should be conducted. p. 500

[609] A reference to a collection of articles by N. A. Berdyaev, Y. M. Bukshpan, F. A. Stepun, S. L. Frank, *Oswald Spengler and the Decline of Europe*, published in Moscow in 1922. p. 500

[610] That same day, Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. It instructed Comrade Voitsik to organise medical treatment and a high-caloric diet for Y. E. Rudzutak. p. 502

[611] In reply to this letter, which was sent to Novonikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk) on March 6, 1922, S. Y. Chutskayev, Chairman of

the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, on March 13, reported to Lenin by direct wire that an inquiry had been appointed into the abuses during the tax in kind collections in Novonikolayevsk Gubernia, and that its results would be reported later.

Chutskayev subsequently informed the C.P.C. that the facts stated in M. A. Bagayev's letter were true and that a number of food agents had been committed for trial. p. 502

[612] This is in reply to a letter from L. M. Khinchuk, Chairman of the Centrosoyuz Board, of March 7, 1922. Khinchuk wrote that the co-operative delegation, consisting of the representatives of the International Co-operative Society, members of the British Co-operative Wholesale Society and representatives of the French and Czechoslovak co-operative societies, which had arrived in Soviet Russia at the invitation of Centrosoyuz, was asking Lenin to receive it. Khinchuk also said that an agreement had been reached with the old Russian co-operators living abroad, who had handed over to Centrosoyuz their valuables and apparatus in Western Europe and America and declared that they were no longer representatives of Russian co-operative societies abroad. "This," Khinchuk wrote, "was in fact the beginning of our recognition abroad." He gave a list of the valuables handed over (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 503

[613] Written in reply to Y. S. Varga's request for an article in the Comintern's *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiterbewegung*.

At the top of Varga's letter is this note by Lenin: "To the archives. Replied 9/III.1922. p. 504

[614] See also this volume Document 693.

On Lenin's proposal, Y. S. Varga made a selection of extracts from Lenin's works which was published in German under the title, *Die neue ökonomische Politik*, under the name *N. Lenin*, in *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaft*, *Politik und Arbeiterbewegung 1922/23*, Hamburg, S. 328-344. In his introduction, Varga wrote that he was guided by Lenin's directives as set out in letters addressed to Varga. p. 504

[615] A similar letter, signed by Lenin, was also sent to G. Y. Sokolnikov, chairman of the commission for the affairs of mixed (credit and joint-stock) companies (see *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*, pp. 449-50). p. 506

[616] On February 28, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. approved, with slight amendments, Lenin's "Draft Decision of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on the Tasks of the Soviet Delegation at Genoa", and instructed the delegation to work out in detail the programme which it was to present at the conference (see present edition, Vol. 42, pp. 401-04). In accordance with these directives,

Chicherin worked out the programme and set it out in a letter to Lenin.

Lenin's additions to the programme were taken into account in the draft declaration prepared by Chicherin on March 21. For the amendments and remarks on this draft, see present edition, Vol. 42, p. 410. p. 506

617 *Two-and-a-Half International* (official name: International Association of Socialist Parties)—an international organisation of Centrist Socialist Parties and groups which had withdrawn from the Second International under the pressure of the revolutionary masses. It was formalised at a conference in Vienna in February 1921.

In May 1923, the Second and the Two-and-a-Half Internationals merged into the so-called Socialist Workers' International. p. 507

618 *The Versailles Peace Treaty*, in which the imperialist world war of 1914-18 culminated, was signed on June 28, 1919, by the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the allied powers, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other.

Lenin assessed the Versailles Treaty in these words: "It is an unparalleled and predatory peace which has made slaves of tens of millions of people, including the most civilised" (see present edition, Vol. 31, p. 326). It was designed to fix the redivision of the capitalist world in favour of the victor powers and to create a system of relations between countries aimed at strangulating Soviet Russia and routing the revolutionary movement throughout the world. p. 507

619 T. A. Runov, head of Glavzemkhoz, in a telephone message to Lenin, requested the urgent appropriation of 115,000 pre-war rubles to cover the cost of repairing seven machines for land improvement operations, which had been obtained from the Far-Eastern Republic with Lenin's help.

Glavzemkhoz—Central Administration for the Farms of Industrial Enterprises of the Republic—was set up in the spring of 1919.

Among the participants in its exhibition which Lenin mentions were 73 state farms, with over 15,000 dessiatines of farmland, situated closest to Moscow, from Moscow, Ryazan, Tula, Smolensk and Kaluga gubernias. The exhibition was a great success and in a week was visited by over 100,000 persons (see this volume, Document 409). p. 513

620 On March 20, N. P. Gorbunov received a report from Maisky, head of the financial and accounts department of Glavzemkhoz (see Note 619), saying that the issue of funds to Glavzemkhoz would be examined by the State Bank Board on March 21, 1922.

Sokolnikov's reply has not been found. p. 513

621 On March 23, 1922, the R.S.F.S.R. Government and "Friedrich Krupp in Essen" concluded a concession agreement on the lease

to the latter of 50,000 dessiatines of land in Salsk District of Don Gubernia for 24 years, "for farming on rational lines". Under the agreement, the concessionaire was to provide the implements, materials, and the necessary structures, and by way of royalty payments was to deliver to the Soviet Government 20 per cent of the total annual crop. It was signed by the company's representative, but the board refused to approve it (see this volume, Documents 601 and 710). p. 513

622 On March 21, 1922, G. Y. Sokolnikov sent Lenin his reply; in his letter Lenin underlined several passages and made these remarks:

"Dear Vladimir Ilyich:

"1. I have read Belov's note. In my opinion there is nothing worth while in it, but much confusion. The purchases in the countryside should be started not before but after the new crop.	Belov needs to be read again.
"2. Our supervision over the collection of cash taxes is very badly organised...	That's the **whole point.**
most taxes have just been announced—there was fumbling over the kerosene and the salt for over two months, now there's the same fumbling over the sugar....	# Now that's dangerous! This must be expedited at all costs!
The main difficulty: the tax revenues are being intercepted by the "localities" to plug their holes....	NB
"3. The State Bank is studying (in a well organised manner) the business of the trusts which apply to it for credit... two trusts have been examined...; I have ordered the enlistment of leading accountants for this business to act as 'balance controllers'."	Their names should be found out and from their number the *best* "selected", to *have them in reserve.*

"With comradely greetings,

"*G. Sokolnikov*"

At the top of Sokolnikov's letter, Lenin wrote to his secretaries: "Show to Comrades Tsyurupa and Rykov and return to me. 28/III. *Lenin*." p. 514

623 This was written in reply to a letter from L. B. Krasin, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, of March 18, 1922, objecting to the new composition of the Collegium for the People's Commissariat which was being suggested by the Politbureau of the

R.C.P.(B.) C.C., Krasin insisted that Lezhava should remain in the post of Deputy People's Commissar.

On March 20, 1922, the Politbureau, having discussed the matter, recognised that "it is absolutely necessary both in the interests of foreign trade itself and for considerations of foreign policy to keep Comrade Krasin in the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Trade", and appointed M. I. Frumkin to the post of Deputy People's Commissar. On March 27, the C.P.C. approved the following Collegium: People's Commissar—L. B. Krasin; Deputy People's Commissars—A. M. Lezhava and M. I. Frumkin; members of the Collegium—I. I. Radchenko, P. S. Sorokin, A. V. Barsky and K. M. Begge (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 514

[624] See also this volume, Document 729. p. 515

[625] M. I. Frumkin set out in the letter here mentioned of March 21, 1922, his opinion of the state of affairs in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. He held that the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision, including him on the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and appointing Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, was not appropriate for several reasons, chiefly because of his "differences of principle with Krasin on the main question—the nature of the foreign trade monopoly". Frumkin requested that he should be allowed to continue at the People's Commissariat for Food (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 516

[626] An apparent reference to the addition to the draft resolution on the political report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the Eleventh Party Congress on demarcating the functions of Party and Soviet government organs (the text of the addition has not been found). This question was inserted by Lenin into the plan of the C.C.'s political report presented to the C.C. Plenum which was held on March 25, 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 251-53). p. 516

[627] An apparent reference to Trotsky's letter of March 10, 1922, on the question of relations between Party and Soviet government bodies, and the need to demarcate their functions, which was sent to members of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. in connection with the discussion of Zinoviev's draft theses, "On Consolidating the Party". p. 517

[628] This letter was the result of a protest sent to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. by K. S. Yeremeyev, editor of the newspaper *Rabochy*, over the directives issued by the Orgbureau of the C.C. of March 6, 1922, to have the size of the paper reduced and its nature, content, etc., changed.

On March 23, the Politbureau confirmed the Orgbureau deci-

sion, and instructed the Central Committee's Department for Agitation and Propaganda to call a conference with the participation of delegates to the Eleventh Party Congress to discuss the publication of a popular newspaper for workers.

Rabochy (The Worker) was published by the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee from March 1, 1922; beginning with No. 98 of July 1 it was called *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and was published until January 1932. p. 518

[629] On March 31, 1922, the R.S.F.S.R. mission in Germany reported that the German Foreign Ministry was prepared to grant V. A. Avanesov a visa immediately, provided his trip was for purely health reasons. p. 518

[630] *The Far-Eastern Republic*, a democratic state founded under Bolshevik leadership during the working people's struggle against the foreign armed intervention in the Far East. It existed from April 6, 1920 to November 14, 1922. The establishment of the Far-Eastern Republic, a "buffer state" with a bourgeois-democratic system, but essentially conducting a Soviet policy, was in Soviet Russia's interests as she was anxious to avoid an open armed clash with the Japanese imperialists and wanted to assure herself of a long breathing-space on the Eastern Front.

Following the expulsion of the Japanese interventionists, the People's Assembly of the Far-Eastern Republic, on November 14, 1922, requested the All-Russia C.E.C. to integrate it with the R.S.F.S.R. and to extend the Soviet Constitution to its territory. On November 15, 1922, the All-Russia C.E.C. declared the Far-Eastern Republic to be an inseparable part of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 519

[631] An apparent reference to the permission for entry into the R.S.F.S.R. issued to the American tractor team organised by the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia (in the United States). p. 520

[632] A reference to a letter from I. K. Yezhov, head of the S.E.C.'s Administration for State Warehouses, to Lydia Fotieva on April 3, 1922, asking her to have a talk with Lenin and secure the passage, at a C.P.C. sitting, of the draft decision, which he had sent in at Lenin's proposal, on the transfer, in accordance with a definite list, of warehouse premises from the charge of local authorities to that of his Administration.

See this volume, Document 461, and also present edition, Vol. 35, Document 299; Vol. 36, p. 548. p. 521

[633] This was written at the bottom of A. M. Krasnoshchekov's letter to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. and to Lenin on April 3, 1922. He described the state of affairs at the People's Commissariat for Finance and spoke of his differences over some

questions with Deputy People's Commissar G. Y. Sokolnikov, which, however, he did not consider serious enough to warrant his departure from the People's Commissariat. He requested that the decision on his work should be expedited, and that if it was impossible for him to stay on at the People's Commissariat for Finance he should be appointed a member of the S.E.C. Presidium. p. 521

[634] On April 6, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. adopted the following decision: "a) To instruct the C.C. Secretariat to inform Comrade Krasnoshchekov that it has been decided to send him to work either at the People's Commissariat for Finance or the S.E.C., allowing him a fortnight's leave for his complete recuperation.

"b) To refer the question of reinforcing the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance and of using Comrade Krasnoshchekov to the Orgbureau" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

By a decision of the Politbureau on April 13, 1922, Krasnoshchekov was made a member of the S.E.C. Presidium. The Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance was determined at the same sitting. p. 522

[635] This letter deals with the exploration of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly (KMA).

Lenin displayed great interest in this work. His attention to the KMA and his help in its exploration can be seen from these documents and from the reminiscences of contemporaries, among them I. M. Gubkin and V. N. Rozanov (see *Vospominaniya o V. I. Lenine*, Part 2, Moscow, 1957, pp. 357-79, 402-04).

The C.P.S.U. Programme adopted by the Twenty-Second Party Congress provided for the establishment of a metallurgical base in the central European part of the U.S.S.R. using the ores of the KMA. p. 523

[636] V. A. Smolyaninov's notes show that the study of the reports submitted by the local economic conferences was assigned to responsible workers of the State Planning Commission and the Central Statistical Board. Lenin agreed to this with the proviso that the arrangements would be efficient and business-like, and asked for a list of these workers to be submitted to him at once. p. 525

[637] V. V. Adoratsky's book, *Programma po osnovnym voprosam Marksizma*, was published in 1922. p. 526

[638] Written at the bottom of the autobiography of V. V. Adoratsky, who was asking the Central Control Commission to date his Party membership from 1904. His request was met. p. 526

639 On April 21, 1922, the C.L.D., having recognised "the need, in the interests of supplying electric power to Moscow, to have the Kashira Power Station switched into Moscow's general power supply system as soon as possible", instructed the Supreme Council for Transportation and the People's Commissariat for Railways urgently to provide the Kashira Power Station with fuel to ensure its uninterrupted operation (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 92. p. 529

640 A reference to the treaty concluded by Soviet Russia with Germany on April 16, 1922, at Rapallo, near Genoa, during the Genoa Conference.

Lenin gave an assessment of the Rapallo Treaty in his "Draft Decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Delegation to the Genoa Conference" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 356-57).

The All-Russia C.E.C., in a decision on the delegation's report adopted on May 17, 1922, recognised "only this type of treaty as being normal for the R.S.F.S.R.'s relations with capitalist states" (*III sessia Vserossiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta IX sozyva*. Bulleten No. 5,19 maia 1922 goda, p. 17). The report on the signing of the Rapallo Treaty was published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 85 of April 19. p. 530

641 A reference to the situation which had taken shape at the Genoa Conference.

On April 11, 1922, the Soviet delegation was handed the "experts' report" worked out at a conference of experts from Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan in London in March (London Memorandum). It contained demands that the Soviet Government should pay all the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments and all the authorities which had existed in Russia, return to foreigners their former property which had been nationalised by the Soviet state, or compensate them for the damage inflicted on their property, or for the loss of it, and establish economic and legal privileges for foreigners, and a number of other demands which in fact meant abolition of the foreign trade monopoly.

The official reply of the Soviet delegation to the "experts' report" was set out in its memorandum of April 20. The Soviet delegation firmly rejected these demands, qualifying them as an attempt to "introduce in Russia a system of capitulations encroaching on her sovereignty" (*Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, p. 235), and put forward counterclaims for compensation of the losses inflicted on Russia by the foreign intervention, stressing that the R.S.F.S.R. Government was prepared to negotiate on compensation of the losses of foreign citizens only on the basis of reciprocity. p. 531

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

[642] A reference to the uprising of white miners in Witwatersrand, Union of South Africa, in March 1922, which was sparked off by the mining companies' intensified exploitation of the miners. Following a drop in the world price of gold, the companies tried to maintain their old profit margins by pressing down wages and massive sackings. The workers took over the cities of Benoni and Branpan, and the suburbs of Johannesburg—Fordsburg and Jeppe. The young Communist Party of South Africa took an active part in the uprising. Many Communists, including the strike leaders, Fischer and Spendiff, died as heroes in the armed struggle. p. 531

[643] Lenin's proposal, which is contained in the published document, was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on April 19, 1922. That same day, the telegram was sent through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to G. V. Chicherin and L. S. Sosnovsky, and also to the editorial boards of *Pravda* and *Izvestia VTsIK*. p 532

[644] This telegram of Lenin's sent to Genoa on April 21, 1922, was in reply to G. V. Chicherin's telegram of April 20, objecting to Lenin's assessment of the situation at the conference and saying that it was "in fact mainly Lloyd George himself who had an interest" in the question of compensating foreigners for the losses arising from the nationalisation of their property, "because pressure was being brought to bear on him by the almighty British sharks" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 532

[645] On April 24, 1922, the text of the telegram to G. V. Chicherin proposed by Lenin, was approved by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C.

Lenin's assessment of the stand taken by Lloyd George and other British leaders, given in the telegrams to Genoa (see this volume, Documents 704 and 705), was borne out in the course of the conference. The British delegation subsequently even went back on the understanding that Chicherin's letter of April 20 would be taken as a basis for continuing the talks. In a letter addressed to the conference chairman on April 28, Chicherin pointed out that if the Western Powers repudiated their agreement to consider the points in the April 20 letter as a basis for negotiations, the Soviet delegation would not regard itself as being bound by this letter and would return to the standpoint set out in its April 20 memorandum (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, pp. 276-77). p. 534

[646] On the commission to examine the activity of the B.F.S.T. (Bureau for Foreign Science and Technology) were Y. B. Pashukanis, Y. S. Varga (representing the embassy), V. N. Ipatiev,

M. Y. Lapirov-Skoblo, B. E. Stuynkel (representing the S.E.C.) and V. V. Starkov (representing the foreign trade mission).

In its conclusion, the commission described the state of the B.F.S.T., making a number of criticisms, and came out in favour of retaining it but on a much smaller scale. p. 534

[647] The following day, April 28, 1922, C.P.C. secretary Natalya Lepeshinskaya wrote under the text of Lenin's letter: "Sent to Comrade Shklovsky a letter signed by Stalin, inquiring what kind of work he would like to do, and saying that the C.C. would always meet his wishes in this respect."

The register of Lenin's outgoing documents contains the following secretarial entry under the head "Execution": "Replied 17.V.22. Shklovsky is satisfied with Stalin's offer." p. 535

[648] Written in connection with the following proposal introduced by Trotsky in the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on April 28, 1922: "1) to issue a statement for agitational purposes to the effect that if the Entente governments should confiscate all the capital of the Russian capitalists abroad, the Soviet Government would undertake not to raise any protest, 2) to issue a manifesto to the population in the event of a break-up of the talks at the Genoa Conference." Lenin underlined this sentence from Trotsky's note: "We should ask our delegation to let us have an outline of their main ideas for such a manifesto (otherwise we may well miss some important aspects)" and wrote in the margin: "I agree only with the last sentence."

That same day, the Politbureau adopted this decision: "To send a telegram to Comrades Chicherin and Litvinov to this effect: 'In the event of a break-up we consider it necessary to issue a manifesto to the population on behalf of the C.P.C. or the All-Russia C.E.C. Please outline a draft of the manifesto or the main ideas for one, and send urgently to Moscow'" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

In the subsequent course of the talks, the need for a manifesto disappeared. p. 536

[649] The telegram was drafted by Lenin under the text of a letter from B. S. Stomonyakov, R.S.F.S.R. trade representative in Germany, to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., of April 22, 1922. Stomonyakov reported that the directors of "Friedrich Krupp in Essen" had refused to approve the agreement on an agricultural concession in Salsk District, Don Region, which their representative had signed in Moscow on March 23, 1922 (see Note 621). In view of the fact that Krupp plants were working on the railway mission's orders for locomotives for Soviet Russia, Stomonyakov requested that instructions be sent to the head of the mission, Y. V. Lomonosov, to join the trade mission in finding "ways of influencing Krupp and to start applying them".

The same day, the Politbureau decided to send Stomonyakov the telegram here published.

After additional talks with the company, and specification of the terms of the agreement, the C.P.C. on January 16, 1923, approved the agreement with Krupp which was presented by the Chief Concessions Committee, and on March 17, the agreement was signed by Krupp. The concession was in force until October 1934. p. 536

650 The telegram was received by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on April 30, 1922, and sent on to G. V. Chicherin. It was in reply to Chicherin's telegrams saying that the "Russian question" was to be referred to another conference to be held within three months, and also in reply to Chicherin's telegrams communicating L. B. Krasin's minority opinion on the talks at the Genoa Conference. Krasin suggested some serious concessions.

In reply to Lenin's telegram, Chicherin admitted that another conference within three months was preferable to a complete break-up, but added: "Lloyd George is working for an agreement with us, and three months from now the situation in Britain may be much worse for us." He went on to say that the Allies were prepared to have concrete discussions on granting Soviet Russia a credit only after the Soviet Government agreed to pay compensation to all foreigners who had formerly owned property in Russia (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 536

651 This was written in connection with the receipt from Genoa of a number of communications which aroused the fear that in their talks with the Allied powers Chicherin and Litvinov might make concessions not provided for in the C.C. directives. p. 537

652 On May 2, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. discussed this proposal. It adopted the following amendments motioned by Stalin to the draft telegram introduced by Lenin: 1) delete the sentence about disavowal; 2) end the telegram with these words: "The C.C. categorically demands fulfilment of this directive." On Stalin's motion, the word "absurdities" in the first sentence was replaced by the word "mistakes". The Politbureau adopted the addition to the telegram without any changes. p. 538

653 By a C.L.D. decision on October 21, 1921, the railway network was classified in three categories with respect to supply.

In reply to Lenin's inquiry, the People s Commissar for Railways, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, sent him on May 4, 1922, a detailed report drawn up at his Commissariat, and also a letter informing him of implementation of the C.L.D. decision. For Dzerzhinsky's letter see *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 1, 1962, pp. 58-59. p. 538

654 Written on Nadezhda Krupskaya's letter saying that she, in

her capacity as member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Education, had objected to the decision taken by the Budget Conference under the Politbureau on a sizable cut in the People's Commissariat for Education budget, and emphasised the need to provide for the people's school system.

On June 22, 1922, the C.P.C. approved the People's Commissariat for Education estimates in substance. p. 538

[655] A reference to the resolution of the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), "On Financial Policy" (see *KPSS v rezolutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsKa*, Part I, 1954, pp. 613-18). p. 539

[656] In a reply letter to Lenin on May 4, 1922, G. Y. Sokolnikov argued that the issue of a grain loan would facilitate implementation of the effective measures proposed by Lenin to produce a balanced budget, reduce the amount of newly issued money (the bank-note emission), and withdraw a part of the money already in circulation.

On May 13, 1922, the C.P.C. approved the draft decision on the grain loan, and submitted it for examination by the Third Session of the All-Russia C.E.C. The first internal short-term grain loan was issued by the People's Commissariat for Finance, under a decision of the All-Russia C.E.C. of May 20, 1922, to a total amount of up to 10 million poods of rye (in grain) with repayments by the state from December 1, 1922 to January 31, 1923 (see *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 112, May 21, 1922). p. 540

[657] Written in connection with the project to set up a People's Commissariat for Internal Trade.

Having discussed this question on May 3, 1922, the C.L.D. found it necessary to appoint a special commission for internal trade. On May 5, the C.L.D. resolved: "For the purpose of regulating questions of internal trade, to set up under the C.L.D. a three-man commission to be appointed by the C.L.D." This was approved by the C.P.C. on May 9, 1922 (*Sobraniye uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii rabochego i krestyanskogo pravitelstva*, 1922, No. 34, p. 400).

On May 19, 1924, a decision of the Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. transformed the commission into the People's Commissariat for Internal Trade. p. 540

[658] A reference to the memorandum of the Allied countries of May 2, 1922, presented to the Soviet delegation at the conference on May 3. p. 540

[659] A reference to the draft telegram circulated to Politbureau members in reply to the inquiry from G. V. Chicherin and L. B. Krasin at Genoa about the possible scale of loading and discharge of fuel and scrap metal in connection with talks on trade and concessions agreements.

The reply was sent on May 8, 1922, and was signed by Deputy C.P.C. Chairman, A. I. Rykov. p. 541

[660] The telegram, adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on May 8, 1922, was written in reply to M. M. Litvinov's telegram of May 6, saying that the Allied memorandum of May 2 was not an ultimatum, but left open the possibility of continuing negotiations, and that the Soviet delegation at Genoa was making efforts to avoid a break-up of the talks, and spoke of the need to have Politbureau directives on the line the delegation was to take. p. 541

[661] The telegram of May 9, 1922, proposed by Lenin, was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. and sent to G. V. Chicherin. p. 541

[662] Written under the draft list of members of the Narrow C.P.C. circulated to Politbureau members for a vote.

On May 18, 1922, the Politbureau approved the composition of the Narrow C.P.C. It appointed A. G. Goikhbarg to the Narrow C.P.C. with the duties of chairman during the period the chairman, A. S. Kiselyov, and deputy chairman, G. M. Leplevsky, were receiving medical treatment. p. 542

[663] Written by Lenin on a letter from Armand Hammer, representing the American Allied Drug and Chemical Corporation (see also Note 424). Hammer said B. Mishell, a director of the company, and he himself were going to Petrograd, and requested a letter of introduction. See also next document. p. 543

[664] The telephone message was written at the request of Armand Hammer made on May 11, 1922. Over the text Lenin wrote: "Make a note of *who* is to receive them in **Petrograd**." There is also this secretarial note: "Read over the phone to Zinoviev personally." p. 544

[665] V. S. Dovgalevsky informed Lenin the same day that "Prof. Bonch-Bruyevich's radiotelephone would be installed for operation in Moscow in early June", adding that he considered it "desirable and just to give special mention to the work of the Nizhni-Novgorod Laboratory and of Professors Bonch-Bruyevich and Vologdin, and to support the petition of the Nizhni-Novgorod Soviet...".

On September 19, 1922, the Secretariat of the All-Russia C.E.C. resolved: "To award the Order of the Red Banner of Labour to the Nizhni-Novgorod Laboratory and, giving special mention to the services of Professors Vologdin and Bonch-Bruyevich and senior mechanic Shorin, to express gratitude to them on behalf of the All-Russia C.E.C." p. 545

[666] The next day, May 12, 1922, People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs, V. S. Dovgalevsky, gave a detailed account of

A. M. Nikolayev's removal from the post of head of the technical administration, and described the efficiency of K. V. Trofimov who was appointed instead. He said Nikolayev was charged with general administration, whose functions included finance and organisational questions. p. 546

[667] The funds required for the purchase of equipment abroad to explore the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly were assigned. Academician P. P. Lazarev later reported that the financial side of the undertaking was in order.

On the KMA see also this volume, Document 691, present edition, Vol. 35, Document 316, and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 365. p. 546

[668] This is an addition, headed "From Lenin", to the telegram signed by A. I. Rykov. Rykov reported the difficulties in transporting coal from Donbas because of a shortage of rolling stock and locomotives and the bad state of the railway tracks. He asked that measures should be taken to conclude an agreement with Italian companies for the sale of coal to them at favourable prices. p. 546

[669] The telegram proposed by Lenin was adopted by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on May 14, 1922, and sent to G. V. Chicherin. p. 547

[670] A reference to the memorandum of the Soviet delegation of May 11, 1922.

In pursuance of the directives of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., the delegation rejected the demands of the Entente countries, declaring that unless they recognised the principle of reciprocity, Soviet Russia would not make concessions. It proposed that a mixed expert committee should be set up to study the controversial financial matters.

Thus, the negotiations at Genoa were broken off through the fault of the Entente powers, which refused to repudiate their colonialist attitude towards Soviet Russia.

The activity of the Soviet delegation was approved by the All-Russia C.E.C. session, which on May 17 adopted a resolution on A. A. Joffe's report. The resolution was drafted by Lenin (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 356-57). p. 547

[671] The Riga Peace Treaty was signed on March 18, 1921, by Russia and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, p. 401). p. 547

[672] This letter and also the draft decision of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. confirming the foreign trade-monopoly (see present edition, Vol. 42, p. 419) were written in connection with Lenin's receipt on May 15, 1922, of material from N. N. Krestinsky, R.S.F.S.R. Plenipotentiary Representative in Germany, tes-

tifying to the negative effect on business negotiations with foreign capitalists exercised by the internal Party differences over the foreign trade monopoly question.

Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, M. I. Frumkin, in a letter of May 10, 1922, proposed that wholesale trade in four or five products should be left in the hands of the state (People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade) on the basis of a firm monopoly, with all the other products freely exported by the mixed companies which were to set aside a part of their profits for the state, without it making any capital outlays. Frumkin argued that state trade was being carried on at a loss, and that under free competition it would be beaten by private trade.

Under the text of Lenin's letter, there is Stalin's reply of May 17, 1922. While not objecting to a formal ban on steps towards a relaxation of the foreign trade monopoly "at the *present* stage," he added that nevertheless "a *relaxation* is becoming inevitable."

On May 22, the Politbureau adopted Lenin's draft decision confirming the foreign trade monopoly. p. 550

[673] Written in connection with a proposal by Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, P.A. Bogdanov, that the functions of administering trade and industry should be united in one commissariat. He suggested that the Commission for Internal Trade, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the S.E.C. should be merged in a Commissariat for Trade and Industry. p. 550

[674] Written on a communication from the Deputy People's Commissar for Finance, G. Y. Sokolnikov, about the issue of banknotes from January to April 1922. See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 399. p. 550

[675] Written on a telegram from L. B. Krasin proposing, in connection with the talks with Italian companies on the sale of coal to them, that one or two shiploads of Donets coal should be sent to Italy to arouse the interest of Italian industrialists.

By its decision of May 17, 1922, the Council of Labour and Defence put the duty on the Central Fuel Administration of the S.E.C. to provide best grades of coal for shipment to Italy.

A preliminary agreement with Italian companies for the sale of coal, signed by L. B. Krasin, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, in May, was discussed by the C.L.D. on June 2, and was referred for urgent consideration by the Concessions Committee. On June 21, 1922, the agreement was signed. See also this volume, Document 736. p. 551

[676] Written in connection with the following circumstances.

On May 6, 1922, *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Zhizn*, No. 34 (75), the newspaper of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the Central Committee of the Land and Forest Workers' Union, carried several articles criticising the decree of the All-Russia

C.E.C. and the C.P.C., "On the Consolidated Tax in Kind on Agricultural Produce for 1922/23" dated March 17, 1922. This attitude on the part of the newspaper drew a protest from the People's Commissariat for Food.

Having discussed on May 11, 1922, the statement by the Secretariat of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on the campaign being conducted by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture for a reduction of the tax in kind, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. expressed censure of the collegium of the P.C.A., and instructed the Orgbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee to examine the question of the editorial board's composition and "to take steps to prevent such inadmissible editing of *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Zhizn* from recurring in the future" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Selskokhozyaistvennaya Zhizn (Agricultural Life) was published in Moscow from July 18, 1921 to June 1, 1922, a total of 86 issues appearing. p. 551

677 The question of reducing the price of literature was discussed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and Soviet government bodies.

The Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee worked out the following proposals: transfer to the major publishers (Gosizdat, Glavpolitprosvet, etc.) the necessary minimum of printing shops, lift the taxes on foreign paper for political publications, and grant a subsidy to Gosizdat, Glavpolitprosvet and the newspapers to lower the cost of political publications, which they were to expend under special C.C. control. Having examined these proposals on May 12, 1922, the C.C. Secretariat added to them a point about a rebate on the wholesale price of literature for Party organisations, and referred them to the Politbureau for approval as directives to the Soviet government organs concerned. p. 552

678 *Chuso* (Chusosnabarm)—Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Red Army and Navy Supplies appointed by a decree of the All-Russia C.E.C. of July 8, 1919, to merge all the supply operations, raise the productivity of factories working for defence, and to secure speedy and correct distribution of the supplied products in the rear and at the front. The office of Chusosnabarm and his apparatus were eliminated by an All-Russia C.E.C. decision of August 16, 1921, while the assets and personnel were transferred to the Supreme Economic Council organs. p. 553

679 A reference to the appropriations for the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory headed by M. A. Bonch-Bruyevich.

On May 22, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., on Lenin's proposal, adopted a decision on financing the laboratory (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism

of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 360-61. p. 554

680 Written on a letter from I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee requesting that he be released from the post of deputy chairman of the Editorial Collegium of Gosizdat, leaving him a member of it, and to allow him a substantial holiday in view of his poor health. He was granted leave by a decision of the C.C. Secretariat. p. 554

681 Written in connection with preparations for deporting anti-Soviet-minded intellectuals. p. 555

682 *Novaya Rossiya* (New Russia)—a socio-literary and scientific monthly inclining to the *Smena Vekh* trend (see Note 415), published from 1922 to 1926 under the editorship of I. G. Lezhnev; the first two issues appeared in Petrograd in March and June 1922. Subsequently, from August 1922, it was published in Moscow under the title *Rossiya*. See next note. p. 555

683 Having examined on May 26, 1922, on Lenin's proposal, the question of the journal *Novaya Rossiya*, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. instructed the Central Press Board "as the highest instance to permit the further publication of the journal *Novaya Rossiya*, rescinding the decision of the Petrograd Executive Committee on its closure" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee).

Dyen (Day)—bourgeois literary daily; published in St. Petersburg from 1912. Among those participating in its publication were Menshevik-liquidators, who secured full control after the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917. It was closed down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 555

684 *Ekonomist*—a journal of the industrial and economic department of the Russian Technical Society, whose membership consisted of bourgeois technical intellectuals hostile to the Soviet power and former owners of enterprises. It was published in Petrograd from December 1921. In his article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism", Lenin called the journal "an organ of modern feudalists" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 227-36). In June 1922, the journal was closed down. p. 555

685 On the note is the following conclusion written by F. E. Dzerzhinsky: "I consider reduction here inadmissible. The pool has 6 cars and only 12 men. Wage rates normal. Car maintenance—good. No idle running of cars." The conclusion was also signed by A. D. Tsyurupa and A. I. Rykov. p. 556

686 Written on the reverse side of a letter from A. M. Anikst, Deputy People's Commissar for Labour, of May 18, 1922, asking Lenin,

"in conformity" with their talk, to take steps to have the question of his nominal removal from the Collegium of the P.C.L., in view of his recruitment for local work, left open pending his return after receiving medical treatment. He also asked that his dispatch for medical treatment should be expedited.

On May 27, 1922, the Secretariat of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee confirmed the foregoing decision to send Anikst and his wife for medical treatment to the Caucasus for a period of six weeks. p. 557

[687] On May 23, 1922, the Secretariat of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee decided to meet Lenin's request to send surgeon V. N. Rozanov and his son for a holiday in Riga. Rozanov later recalled this in his reminiscences of Lenin (see *Vospominaniya o V. I. Lenine*, Part 2, Moscow, 1957, pp. 406-07). p. 557

[688] *Nakanune* (On the Eve)—a newspaper published in Berlin with the participation of the *Smena Vekh* group (see Note 415). p. 558

[689] *Russkaya Mysl* (Russian Thought)—a journal published in Prague in 1922 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. p. 558

[690] Written under the text of a note from N. A. Semashko, People's Commissar for Public Health, to members of the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. about "important and dangerous (Lenin's emphasis.—*Ed.*) trends" in the medical world, which had come to the surface at the Second All-Russia Congress of Medical Sections under the C.C. of the Medical and Sanitary Workers' Union (held in Moscow from May 10 to 14, 1922). Reporting the anti-Soviet speeches by some "top" doctors, who were Mensheviks and S.R.s, Semashko said it was necessary to take resolute measures against them.

On May 24, 1922, the Politbureau adopted Lenin's proposal instructing Dzerzhinsky and Semashko "to work out a plan of measures and to report to the Politbureau within a week" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 559

[691] A reference to B. I. Reinstein's report giving detailed information about Dr. J. Hammer and his son Armand Hammer and their Allied Drug and Chemical Corporation. See also this volume, Documents 503 and 690. p. 559

[692] Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Politbureau on June 2. 1922. p. 559

[693] What the reference is to has not been established. p. 560

[694] On August 25, 1922, *Izvestia VTsIK* carried an article entitled "Real Aid from 'Friends of Soviet Russia'", describing the work

of the tractor team organised by members of the American Society of Friends of Soviet Russia, at the Toikino State Farm, Okhan Uyezd, Perm Gubernia (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 470). It was led by the American Communist Harold Ware. On a newspaper cutting, Lenin underlined the caption and wrote "NB" in the left margin.
p. 561

[695] V. A. Smolyaninov informed Lenin that he had sent a telegram to the Chairman of the Perm Gubernia Executive Committee asking him to acquaint himself with the work of the American tractor team, give his opinion about it, and help the team. Smolyaninov wrote that the talks on modifying the agreement with the Rutgers group were to be held when Rutgers returned from Kuzbas.

Having received the material from Perm, Lenin sent letters to the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia (in the United States), the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia, to the Chairman of the Perm Gubernia Executive Committee, and to the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. (see this volume, Documents 776 and 778, and also present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 380, 381).
p. 562

[696] A reference to the talks on a concession for the working and extraction of minerals to the British industrialist and financier Leslie Urquhart, who had been Chairman of the Russo-Asiatic Consolidated Company and an owner of large-scale mining enterprises in Russia (Kyshtym, Ridder, Tanalyk, and Ekibastuz) before the October Revolution. See also Notes 705 and 715.
p. 562

[697] A reference to V. A. Smolyaninov's reply on September 1, 1922, in connection with Lenin's letter addressed to A. I. Rykov (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 440). p. 563

[698] V. A. Smolyaninov fulfilled Lenin's assignments; he supplied N. A. Zhidelev's address, and sent in the books and an extract from the minutes of Gostekhizdat publishers on the publication of I. M. Besprozvanny's book. p. 563

[699] A reference to Maxim Gorky's letter to Anatole France on July 3, 1922, over the trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries on charges of counter-revolutionary activity. Gorky missed the essence of the case, and wrote that the trial was a preparation for "the murder of people who had sincerely served the cause of the Russian people's emancipation", and asked France to write to the Soviet Government to tell them that it was "intolerable to allow the crime". Perhaps, "your weighty word will save the valuable lives of socialists". He also sent France a copy of his letter on this question to Deputy Chairman of the C.P.C., A. I. Rykov,

warning that the passage of death sentences on the accused would result "in a moral blockade of Russia by socialist Europe". p. 564

[700] Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central T.U.C., M. P. Tomsky, asked Lenin to write a letter to the forthcoming Fifth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions. p. 564

[701] A reference to a draft letter to the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions, with the initials of members of the C.C. Politbureau and this note by M. P. Tomsky: "It would be good to bring out the workers in greater relief, and a couple of words about large-scale industry being the basis of socialism." Apparently in connection with this remark, Lenin added to the third sentence this insertion: "and it is precisely that part of industry known as heavy industry which is the main basis of socialism" (present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 370-71).

Lenin's letter was read out at the first sitting of the congress on September 17, 1922. p. 566

[702] On September 27, 1922, A. I. Rykov informed Lenin that the C.L.D. had decided to issue 14,000,000 million rubles for the needs of the main fuel areas (Baku, Grozny and Donbas), that from October on fuel prices for planned supply were to be almost doubled, and that other measures would also be taken. p. 567

[703] In reply to this inquiry, M. K. Vladimirov, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance, sent Lenin reports on the gold stock and the tax revenue from the beginning of 1922 to September 17. He gave the budget deficit for the quarter July to September, and added that the deficit for September would be especially large because of the expenditure on the People's Commissariat for Railways and industry, and would reach 250,000,000 million only in emission, the probable deficit for the quarter October to December was being estimated. Vladimirov also reported the measures being taken to cut back expenditures. p. 567

[704] A reference to Lenin's speech at the forthcoming Fourth Congress of the Communist International.

At the morning sitting on November 13, 1922, Lenin gave a report "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 418-32). p. 567

[705] The talks with Leslie Urquhart, which he broke off in October 1921, were resumed in 1922. A preliminary agreement was signed by L. B. Krasin on September 9, 1922 (for the terms see this volume, Document 750). Having acquainted himself with the agreement, Lenin found it to be patently disadvantageous for the Soviet state, and in a letter to Politbureau members on September 12 came out against its approval (see this volume,

Document 754). Lenin wrote about this in the note to Zinoviev here published.

The commission mentioned by Lenin was set up by the Politbureau on August 24, 1922, to specify and put the finishing touches to the draft agreement with Urquhart.

By "American proposals" Lenin apparently means the talks between Krasin and the International Barnsdoll Corporation, with which two agreements were signed on September 20, 1922: one for the exploitation of the Balakhany oil wells in Baku for 15½ years, and the other for the sinking of new wells. See also this volume, Documents 767 and 784, and *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Documents 483 and 485. p. 568

[706] See foregoing note. p. 568

[707] Lenin returned to Moscow from Gorki on October 2, 1922; on October 3, he presided at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars which adopted a decision motioned by Lenin on organising the work of the C.P.C. See also the two following documents. p. 568

[708] A reference to the first conference in Russia to normalise the organs of administration, which was held in Moscow from September 21 to 23, 1922. In its resolution, the conference noted the unsatisfactory nature of the existing administrative techniques and organisation (dispatch of business, administration, accounting, storage facilities, etc.) and supported the experimental methods of studying administrative questions, and also recognised the need "gradually to develop a network of scientifically based experimental stations and normalisation bureaus under the People's Commissariats and major economic establishments closely connected with the central research organisations on the questions of administration and labour". p. 569

[709] At the time A. D. Tsyurupa was receiving medical treatment abroad. p. 570

[710] On October 2, 1922, G. L. Pyatakov informed C.P.C. secretary Maria Glyasser that he had not replied to Lenin's letter because G. M. Krzhizhanovsky had not yet returned to Moscow.

The register of Lenin's outgoing documents has the following entry under the "Execution" head: "Settled by a personal talk between Vladimir Ilyich and Pyatakov." p. 571

[711] On September 26, 1922, N. V. Krylenko gave a detailed reply to Lenin's letter, informing him that in addition to the already adopted criminal and criminal procedure codes, the next session of the All-Russia C.E.C. to be held in October is to consider the adoption of a code of laws on the judicial system and a code on civil substantive law. p. 571

[712] On September 29, 1922, the C.L.D. approved the programme for a one-day census of Soviet government employees, employees of syndicates, trusts and other state establishments and trade unions in Moscow, which had been worked out at a conference of representatives of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, the Central Statistical Board and the State Planning Commission. On October 3, the C.P.C., having approved the programme and the census procedure, assigned its implementation to the Central Statistical Board of the R.S.F.S.R. It was held in mid-October 1922. The results were used by Lenin in his speech at the Fourth Session of the Ninth All-Russia C.E.C. on October 31, 1922 (see present edition, Vol. 33, p. 394). Lenin also mentions the census in his "Outline of Speech at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets" (see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 588-89). p. 572

[713] The reply telegram said that a detailed indent for October had been sent to the Central Fuel Administration. p. 572

[714] That same day, October 4, 1922, L. B. Krasin replied to Lenin that he had no objections to sending V. S. Yermakov abroad, to give him a chance to go to Italy and receive medical treatment while making a study of the operation of ports, unloading mechanisms, etc. On October 16, Lenin instructed his secretary to check up whether Yermakov had received the money, and was informed by him that all the necessary arrangements had been made. p. 573

[715] On October 5, the Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee and on October 6, the C.P.C. adopted decisions rejecting the preliminary agreement with Leslie Urquhart (see *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 226, October 7, 1922).

However, Lenin, the Party C.C. and the Soviet Government did not rule out the possibility of returning to the question of granting Urquhart a concession. In this connection Lenin believed it to be necessary once again to verify most thoroughly all the terms of the concession. In particular, he proposed a reduction in area of the concession and the amounts Urquhart was to receive (see this volume, Document 768, and also present edition, Vol. 42, p. 424). p. 573

[716] On October 9, 1922, Lenin saw V. Y. Chubar, head of the State Coal Industry of Donbas.

Lenin attached great importance to the rehabilitation of the Donets Coal Basin, showed a constant interest in its work and did everything to help restore and develop it. On October 6, 1922, V. A. Smolyaninov sent Chubar a letter containing Lenin's request to reply briefly to questions about the supply of Donbas. "Let us know the result of your talks. How much do you want and how much are they giving you?"

To the letter is attached a note from Smolyaninov addressed

to Lenin. It says: "Vladimir Ilyich, I have sent off the letter to Chubar. Perhaps I should send copies to Kamenev and Rykov? 6/X." Below that Lenin wrote: "You should" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U Central Committee). p. 574

[717] The Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee was held from October 5 to 7, 1922. Lenin attended the October 5 sitting, but not the others because of illness

The register of Lenin's outgoing documents, under the head "Execution", has a secretarial note saying that L. B. Kamenev's reply was received on October 7 and "handed to Vladimir Ilyich" (the reply has not been found). p. 574

[718] Written on the following printed message of greetings sent to Lenin by the editorial board of the Young Communist newspaper of Bauman District of Moscow: "Dear Teacher! We send you our greetings and await a word in reply. *Editorial Board*. October 3, 1922." p. 576

[719] During the discussion of appropriations for the construction of the Zemo-Avchal Hydropower Station near Tiflis, A. S. Svanidze, agent for the People's Commissariat for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R. and the People's Commissariat for Finance of the Transcaucasian Federation, declared that the Tiflis Soviet had enough resources to build the station without Moscow aid. This standpoint was upheld by Stalin and Sokolnikov. In view of the differences on this question, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. on October 12, 1922, instructed N. G. Tumanov, senior controller of the People's Commissariat for Finance, to find out at the Georgian C.P.C. whether local resources would suffice, how much was necessary and how far a loan could be covered by Georgian tea.

This question was finally settled later. On March 1, 1923, the Politbureau, taking into account the protest of the Georgian C.P.C., the Tiflis Soviet and the power-station construction committee, and also G. K. Orjonikidze's proposal, decided to let the Tiflis City Executive Committee have a 750,000 gold-ruble loan to cover the needs of the power station (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 578

[720] Written after a talk with A. V. Shotman, representative of the Karelian Labour Commune, about economic development in Karelia.

The application from the Karelian Labour Commune for a loan to build a pulp mill and work mica deposits was examined by the Narrow C.P.C. on November 15, 1922. It decided the long-term loan was necessary and instructed the People's Commissariat for Finance and the State Planning Commission, with

A. V. Shotman's participation, to determine the exact amount and the terms of repayment.

Through Shotman Lenin conveyed his comradely gratitude to the Congress of Soviets of the Karelian Commune and the Party conference for their message of greetings, and sent his best wishes to the Karelian working people. p. 578

[721] A reference to the agreement between the R.S.F.S.R. Government and a consortium of German firms headed by Otto Wolff, which was concluded in Berlin on October 9, 1922.

The protocol setting up the company was signed in Berlin on November 16, 1922. By the spring of 1923, the company had opened its branches in a number of Soviet cities, among them Moscow, Petrograd and Rostov-on-Don. The conclusion of the agreement with the Wolff consortium and its ratification created a strong impression abroad and produced a favourable atmosphere for talks with other businessmen and companies.

However, the consortium subsequently became remiss in its obligations under the agreement, and in 1924 withdrew from the Russo-German Trading Society. p. 578

[722] The agreement with the Otto Wolff consortium was approved by a C.P.C. decree of October 19, 1922. That same day, Lenin spoke on the agreement in the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., which decided: "To remove the question, in view of the agreement reached. To circulate the material on the case to Politbureau members for their information."

The communique on the C.P.C.'s approval of the agreement (published in *Izvestia VTsIK* No. 237, October 20, 1922), which is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, contains these resolutions: "Publish in the papers tomorrow, 19.X.1922. C.P.C. Chairman, *V. Ulyanov* (*Lenin*)" and "Telegraph abroad. *Lenin*". p. 580

[723] This telegram was sent out in connection with a conflict between the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), headed by G. K. Orjonikidze, and the P. G. Mdivani group in the Communist Party of Georgia (it included K. M. Tsintsadze and S. I. Kavtaradze, to whom Lenin's telegram is addressed).

The Territorial Committee was conducting a fundamentally correct line, working to bring together the Transcaucasian Republics into the Transcaucasian Federation, and resolutely supporting the idea of uniting all the Soviet Republics into a single state. But Orjonikidze did not always display the necessary flexibility and caution in pursuing the nationalities policy, allowed some peremptory actions and haste in putting through some measures, not always considering the views and rights of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). This was used by the Mdivani group, which took a basically wrong

approach to the most important aspects of the Party's nationalities policy.

Mdivani and his supporters, constituting a majority on the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, virtually slowed down the economic and political union of the Transcaucasian Republics, and were intent, in essence, on keeping Georgia isolated; at first the group opposed the formation of the U.S.S.R., but when the October 1922 Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee adopted its decision to set up the U.S.S.R., they tried to have Georgia enter the U.S.S.R. directly instead of through the Transcaucasian Federation. This played into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists and the Georgian Mensheviks, and at their congresses, conferences and meetings of Party activists, the Georgian Communists justly regarded this as a deviation towards nationalism.

Tsintsadze and a number of other supporters of Mdivani addressed to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee a direct wire message, in reply to which Lenin sent the telegram here published. p. 582

[724] A reference to the resolution on relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the independent republics adopted by the Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee on October 6, 1922. p. 582

[725] On November 9, 1922, the Presidium of the All-Russia C.E.C. adopted Lenin's proposal and took this decision: "To recognise as model farms the Perm and other outstanding farms led by teams of the American Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia." p. 583

[726] In a letter to Lenin on October 14, 1922, N. Osinsky objected to the refusal of the interdepartmental conference to include the Shatilov Oats Trust estimates in the budget of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture on the grounds that it was operating on a profit-and-loss basis. Osinsky recalled that when the Trust was set up the need was recognised to subsidise it for three to five years, and pointed out that refusal of material support for the Trust would entail the loss of already invested resources. He asked Lenin "to exert his personal influence in the sense of fully supplying the Shatilov Trust". Osinsky also wrote about the selectionist P. I. Lisitsyn, who was in charge of the whole project, and who had abandoned purely academic work in order "to see his oats spread far and wide..." (see *Istorichesky Arkhiv* No. 1, 1962, pp. 60-61). See this volume, Document 639. p. 584

[727] A reference to a letter from I. I. Radchenko, Chairman of the Central Board for the Peat Industry, of October 26, 1922, asking Lenin for help in acquiring abroad an improved peat-extracting machine made by Strohl & Co. in order to mechanise peat operations, and for allocating the necessary funds for its purchase and to cover the cost of sending a commission for

testing the machine on the spot. On October 27, 1922, the Council of Labour and Defence decided to allocate from its reserve fund 7,000 gold rubles for the purpose. p. 584

[728] A reference to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision of October 26, 1922, reducing state subsidies to Proletcult and the academic theatres. p. 585

[729] A reference to the fact that G. L. Pyatakov, in his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission, signed military estimates for 26,000,000 million rubles (in terms of 1922 banknotes) over and above the amount proposed by the People's Commissariat for Finance. On October 28, 1922, these estimates were approved by the C.P.C. See also this volume, Documents 785 and 786. p. 586

[730] A reference to the C.L.D. decision of October 27, 1922, allocating funds to Armenia to develop cotton growing. p. 586

[731] A probable reference to the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. decision of October 26, 1922, in connection with the proposal to issue a popular pamphlet on the Urquhart agreement. The Politbureau decided to set up a commission "to review and write as soon as possible articles on the Urquhart agreement" consisting of G. L. Pyatakov and B. S. Stomonyakov and approved instructions for the commission in which it defined the content of the articles.

The discussion articles under the general title, "On the Question of the Urquhart Concession Rejected by the C.P.C.", were published in several issues of *Pravda* (October 31, and November 1 to 3, 1922). p. 587

[732] Written on L. B. Kamenev's letter to Lenin of October 30, 1922, proposing, in the event of Lenin's agreement: "1) to ask the Politbureau to rescind the C.P.C. decision, restoring the figure proposed by the People's Commissariat for Finance, i.e., 599,000,000 million minus 26,000,000 million equals 573,000,000 million; 2) suggest that the Politbureau should appoint a special commission to review the allocation of the appropriated funds under the estimates between the various People's Commissariats in order to reduce expenditures in shipbuilding, etc." Under this proposal, Lenin wrote: "I quite agree. 30.X.1922. *Lenin*." There are also remarks by G. Y. Zinoviev, J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov saying that they agree, and one by L. D. Trotsky, abstaining (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 588

[733] A reference to the R.S.F.S.R. Government's Note to the Governments of Britain, France and Italy of November 2, 1922 (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, pp. 650-53). p. 588

[734] See Note 726.

On November 18, 1922, the C.P.C. Financial Committee, having examined on Lenin's proposal the estimates of Gossemkultura, set it at 2,500,000 million for the quarter from October to December 1922. p. 590

[735] A reference to the C.L.D. decision of October 13, 1922, setting prices for fuel for planned consumers.

In his letters, V. Y. Chubar, head of the State Coal Industry of Donbas, pointed out the discrepancy between the established firm price for coal and the declining rate of the ruble, adding that the State Planning Commission's calculations lagged behind life and placed the industry in an impossible situation. He requested a settlement of this question. p. 591

[736] On Lenin's instruction, the State Planning Commission submitted to the Council of Labour and Defence a report on the financing of Donbas. This question was discussed by the C.L.D. on November 15 and 17, 1922, and by the C.P.C. on November 24. The C.P.C. noted the especial importance of regular operations in the coal and oil industry for the country's economy, and recognised the need "firmly to provide those branches of the fuel industry with the full amount of real funds required for the implementation of their production programme, and for that purpose to establish, by way of exception, special terms of payment for coal and oil" (*Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii rabochego i krestyanskogo pravitelstva*, No. 79, 1922, p. 993). p. 591

[737] Written in connection with the following circumstances. On November 1, 1922, a group of fascists armed with pistols and bombs raided the Trade Department of the R.S.F.S.R. Mission in Italy. They broke into the office of the foreign trade agent and at gun point led away one of the officials and shot him on the stairs. p. 592

[738] On November 1, 1922, the R.S.F.S.R. Mission in Italy sent the Italian Foreign Ministry a Note of protest over the raid by a group of fascists on its Trade Department (see *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1961, pp. 648-49). p. 592

[739] The Fourth Congress of the Comintern discussed the merger of the Communist and Socialist Parties of Italy. The leadership of the Italian Communist Party, at the time in the hands of the sectarian Bordiga group, came out against the merger.

The R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee sent the Italian Communist Party delegation a letter advising it not to vote against the merger resolution which was worked out by a commission. The I.C.P. delegation accepted the advice.

The congress adopted a unanimous decision on the merger and set up a special organising committee to put it through. See this volume, Document 803. p. 593

[740] Written after a reading of the draft resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, "Outline of Agrarian Action Programme", which had been sent him. In a covering letter G. Y. Zinoviev wrote that he felt that he could not submit the draft for discussion by the congress without Lenin's comment. p. 593

[741] In accordance with Lenin's suggestions, the draft resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern on the agrarian question was rewritten. In his report to the congress on November 30, Y. S. Varga set out the content of the letter here published and said that the commission elected to complete the draft "was guided in its work above all by Comrade Lenin's letter". Changes were introduced into the "Outline of Agrarian Action Programme", the most important of these being the addition of a subtitle, "Instructions on the Application of the Agrarian Theses of the Second Congress of the Communist International", which specified the nature of the resolution (see *Bulleten IV kongressa Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala*, No. 27, 1922, pp. 11-12). p. 594

[742] Having heard both sides, the All-Russia C.E.C. decided in favour of the People's Commissariat for Railways. p. 595

[743] These are apparently extracts from two letters which have not been found. They must have been written in connection with Lenin's talk on December 2, 1922, with Prof. N. M. Knipovich, head of the scientific and industrial expedition to the Azov Sea. Knipovich was requesting assistance in securing the ship *Besstrashny* for scientific exploration by the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry (Glavryba) under the People's Commissariat for Food.

On December 15, 1922, the Narrow C.P.C. recognised that "it is fundamentally necessary to let Glavryba have the free use of the ship *Besstrashny* for the expedition", and instructed the Budget Commission of the People's Commissariat for Finance to review the question of allocating funds to Glavryba for the purpose. p. 595

[744] I. I. Khodorovsky soon sent Lenin a reply, saying that this had been done by way of experiment only in Novonikolayevsk Gubernia and uyezd (now Novosibirsk Region) and that the question of the rural cells helping out the urban ones had not come up. See his article, "From Reminiscences about Ilyich", published in *Izvestia TsIK and VTsIK* on April 22, 1930.

Lenin used the material received from Khodorovsky in the plan of his speech at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (which he did not deliver because of ill health) and also in his article, "Pages from a Diary" (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 465-66). p. 596

[745] This letter to Charles P. Steinmetz was taken to the U.S.A. by the American Communist Harold Ware, who in 1922 led a tractor

team on the Toikino State Farm in Perm Gubernia. See *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 54, Document 354. p. 597

[746] A reference to the deportation of a once active Menshevik, N. A. Rozhkov. The question of Rozhkov was repeatedly discussed by the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., which on October 26, 1922, adopted this decision: "Rozhkov to be deported." On December 7, reversing the decision of October 26, the Politbureau decided to postpone his deportation and published in *Izvestia VTsIK* his article on Menshevik activity and announcement of withdrawal from the Menshevik Party, together with comments by the editor Y. M. Steklov (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also next document. p. 598

[747] On December 14, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. rescinded its decision of December 7 and decided to exile Rozhkov to Pskov, and to deport him from Soviet Russia at the first anti-Soviet act. p. 598

[748] On November 30, 1922, the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. instructed the Orgbureau of the C.C. to place at the disposal of the Comintern up to 10 functionaries within a week. p. 598

[749] *Die Neue Zeit*—a theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Lenin is referring to the period up to the mid-1890s, when Frederick Engels was helping the journal. p. 599

[750] On the question of the Profintern (Red International of Trade Unions) the Politbureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., on December 19, 1922, adopted Lenin's proposals as set out in this letter. p. 599

[751] A reference to the resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (held from November 5 to December 5, 1922) on the Italian question providing for the merger of the Communist and Socialist Parties of Italy (see *Kommunistichesky Internatsional v dokumentakh. Resheniya, tezisy i vozzvaniya kongressov Kominterna i plenumov IKKI. 1919-1932*. Moscow, 1933, pp. 356-60).

At the time, the merger did not take place. In 1924, some groups of socialists which had formed the Left wing of the Italian Socialist Party broke with it and entered the Communist Party (see this volume, Document 794). p. 600

[752] On January 2, 1923, C. Lazzari sent Lenin a reply letter thanking him for the trust placed in him and promising to do everything he could to implement the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. However, he objected to the outlined methods for merging the parties and, referring to the services of the Italian Socialist Party, suggested that the unified party should have the old name—Italian Socialist Party (Central Party Archives

of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 600

[753] A reference to a letter from N. N. Krestinsky, R.S.F.S.R. Plenipotentiary Representative in Germany, of December 3, 1922. He gave a positive evaluation to the work of the trade mission in Berlin, reported agreements with some German firms, described the talks being conducted and the great prospects in this respect. He wrote that these would be destroyed with the lifting of the foreign trade monopoly. It is indicative, he added, that "some comrades who have been abroad are becoming supporters of the monopoly (Tsyurupa, Vladimirov, Rykov, Avanesov)". On the strength of the experience gained abroad, Krestinsky took a firm stand in favour of the foreign trade monopoly (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). See also next document. p. 601

[754] A reference to L. D. Trotsky's letter of December 12, 1922.

By "*Avanesov's plans*" Lenin means the "Proposals of the C.P.C. Commission of Inquiry into the Work of R.S.F.S.R. Missions Abroad on the Question of the State Monopoly of Foreign Trade".

Its main conclusion was that the foreign trade monopoly must not be abolished for both economic and political reasons, "either fully or even in part" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). p. 601

[755] In his letter, L. D. Trotsky wrote that there was need for a flexible regulation of foreign trade, adapted to overall economic requirements, and said he believed it was the State Planning Commission's job to do this. p. 601

[756] A reference to the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 602

[757] A reference to the struggle against violations of the foreign trade monopoly. p. 602

[758] A reference to Lenin's removal to Gorki, as ordered by his doctors in view of a deterioration in the state of his health. p. 602

[759] A reference to the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. p. 602

[760] For the plan of Lenin's speech at the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 588-89. Preparing for the speech long before the congress, as far back as November 1922, Lenin began to collect the necessary material: he asked for books and newspaper cuttings, read the report of V. P. Milyutin, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, on the state of trade, finance and industry, and wrote a letter to I. I. Khodorovsky asking him for information about the assistance given to each other by urban and rural cells of the Party. Judging by the plan,

he intended to deal with a number of questions which he later analysed in his last articles. p. 603

[761] Lenin's health took a turn for the worse and he was unable to participate in the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. On the night of December 16, Nadezhda Krupskaya asked the secretary on duty "to inform Stalin, on behalf of Vladimir Ilyich, that he will not speak at the Congress of Soviets" (see *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 45, p. 473).

The Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets opened in Moscow on December 23, 1922. It was attended by 2,215 delegates. Lenin was elected honorary chairman; to stormy applause and the singing of *The Internationale* the congress adopted a telegram of greetings to Lenin.

On December 26, the congress heard a report on the unification of the Soviet Republics, and the next day, at its final sitting, adopted a decision declaring the need to establish a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. p. 603

[762] The letter has not been found. The reference is to the foreign trade monopoly. p. 604

[763] This is one of Lenin's letters about the distribution of work between the deputy chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D., and about the most rational organisation of work of the C.P.C. apparatus (see present edition, Vol. 33, pp. 247-48, 335-43; Vol. 42, pp. 428-29, 430-32, 432-33). p. 605

[764] On December 18, 1922, the Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee rescinded a decision taken by the plenum in October, and reaffirmed "the absolute need to maintain and effect the organisational strengthening of the foreign trade monopoly" (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee). The Twelfth Party Congress, held in Moscow from April 17 to 25, 1923, also confirmed that the foreign trade monopoly was not to be tampered with. p. 606

[765] The letter is connected with the "Georgian question".

After the October (1922) Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, there was a sharpening of the conflict between the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Mdivani group (see Note 723). Having met with resistance from the Georgian Communists, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia, on which the Mdivani group had a majority, resigned on October 22 on the plea of its differences with the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee. Mdivani's supporters lodged a complaint with the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. On November 25, 1922, the Politbureau adopted a decision to send a commission to Georgia, with F. E. Dzerzhinsky at its head, to examine urgently the statements by members of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party who had

resigned, and to work out measures to establish tranquility in the Georgian Communist Party.

Lenin was highly anxious over the "Georgian question". On December 12, Dzerzhinsky reported to Lenin the results of his trip. Lenin was dissatisfied with the work of the commission, believing that it had taken a biased approach to the conflict, and had failed to note the grave errors made by G. K. Orjonikidze. Lenin connected the "Georgian question" with the general question of establishing the U.S.S.R., expressing alarm over whether the principles of proletarian internationalism would be consistently implemented in the unification of the Republics. In his letter, "The Question of Nationalities, or 'Autonomisation'", he censured Orjonikidze's action and the connivance at it on the part of the Dzerzhinsky Commission, and of Stalin. Lenin placed the political responsibility for the whole affair chiefly on Stalin, who was the C.C. Secretary General, with reference to his grave mistakes in unifying the Republics (see present edition, Vol. 36, pp. 605-11).

Lenin, far from supporting, in fact criticised the fundamentally erroneous stand of Mdivani and his supporters on various aspects of the Transcaucasian Federation and the formation of the U.S.S.R. (see this volume, Document 777); but considering that at the time the main danger lay in dominant-nation chauvinism, and that the task of fighting the latter was to be shouldered mainly by the Communists of the formerly dominant nation, Lenin concentrated attention on the mistakes made by Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Orjonikidze on the "Georgian question". He pointed out that in this matter, especially when, in connection with the unification of the Republics, there was need for "particular circumspection, tact and tractability", and that "in this case it is better to overdo the tractability and mildness in treating the national minorities than to underdo them". That is the context in which to view Lenin's words about his being "on the side of the 'offended' in the 'Georgian conflict'" (see this volume, Document 814, and also *Collected Works*, Fifth (Russian) Edition, Vol. 45, p. 486).

Lenin's letter to Trotsky was written in connection with the forthcoming discussion of the "Georgian question" at a Plenum of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. p. 607

[766] This letter was read to Trotsky the same day on the phone by Maria Volodicheva, assistant secretary of the C.L.D. and the C.P.C. On the plea of ill health, Trotsky said he could not undertake such an obligation. p. 607

[767] A reference to the following fact. After Lenin, with the permission of his doctors, had, on December 21, 1922, dictated a letter to Trotsky on the foreign trade monopoly (see this volume, Document 811), J. V. Stalin, whom a C.C. Plenum decision of December 18 had made personally responsible for the observance of the medical regimen ordered for Lenin, used offensive language

against Nadezhda Krupskaya and threatened to take the case to the Control Commission for having taken down the said letter. On December 23, 1922, Krupskaya sent Kamenev a letter asking for protection from "the gross interference in my personal life, offensive language and threats".

Nadezhda Krupskaya apparently told Lenin of this fact in early March 1923. Having learned about this Lenin dictated the document here published.

Maria Ulyanova later wrote in a letter to the presidium of the July (1926) Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.), at which the question had been raised by G. Y. Zinoviev, one of the leaders of the "new opposition", that Stalin had offered his apologies. p. 608

[768] See Note 765.

Lenin was unable to prepare the letter and the speech on the "Georgian question". On March 10, 1923, there was an acute deterioration in his condition.

This letter is the last document dictated by Lenin. p. 608

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Agranov, *Yakov Saulovich* (1893-1938)—Socialist-Revolutionary in 1912-14; from 1915, member of the Bolshevik Party. In 1921, Secretary of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars. From 1923 to 1937 held responsible posts in the O.G.P.U. and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs—331

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Alsky, *Arkady Osipovich* (1892-1939)—Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution, was on Soviet government and Party work in Voronezh, Lithuania, Byelorussia and Moscow. From 1921 to 1927, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., then of the U.S.S.R. In 1927 was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activity—159, 174, 189, 193, 233, 288, 290, 350, 369, 401, 521-22

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Axelrod, *Tovii L.* (1888-1938)—Party member from 1917; earlier, member of the Bund. In 1920-21, head of the Comintern's Press Department. From 1922, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, later, worked on editorial and publishers' staffs—213, 258, 435

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Babkin, *Ivan Petrovich* (1885-1940)—Party member from 1902. From 1918 to 1921, head of the Labour Department of the People's Commissariat for Food; extraordinary representative of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence in the Volga-Caspian area. From September 1921, member of the Presidium of Centrosoyuz (the Central Union of Consumers' Societies)—203, 224, 225, 226

Badayev, *Alexei Yegorovich* (1883-1951)—Party member from 1904. Member of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Petrograd Food Department, Commissar for Food for Petrograd and the Northern Region, and subsequently held other posts—103, 196, 234

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Belgov, *Vladimir Petrovich* (1884-1936)—Party member from 1905. After the October Revolution, engaged in diplomatic,

administrative and Party work. From 1921, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade; was trade representative in Persia, director of the U.S.S.R. trade mission in Austria from 1922 to 1924, and held other posts—255

Beloborodov, *Alexander Georgievich* (1891-1938)—Party member from 1907. From August 1920, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Caucasian Labour Army, Secretary of the South-Eastern Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C., Chairman of the South-Eastern Economic Council. From the end of 1921, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R.—122, 177

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sars. Later, headed a state farm, Lesniye Polyany, near Moscow and engaged in scientific work—65

Bonomi, *Ivanoe* (1873-1951)—Italian statesman; Right-wing socialist. In 1921-22, headed a coalition government of representatives of bourgeois parties and social-reformists—447, 451

Bordiga, *Amadeo* (b. 1889)—Italian political figure. In 1921, one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party, and member of its governing bodies until 1926; conducted a Left-wing sectarian policy, and came out against the Comintern tactics of establishing a united anti-fascist front—593

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Bukharin, *Nikolai Ivanovich* (1888-1938)—member of the Bolshevik Party from 1906. After the October Revolution, Editor of *Pravda*, member of the C.C. Politbureau, and of the Comintern Executive Committee. Repeatedly opposed the Party Leninist policy: in 1918, headed the anti-Party group of "Left Communists"; in 1920-21, supported the Trotsky group during the discussion on the trade unions, from 1928, headed the Right-wing opposition in the Party; in 1929 was removed from the C.C. Politbureau; in 1937 was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activity—98, 145, 191, 236, 376, 392-93, 425, 444, 459-60, 555, 564, 582, 593

Buniat-zade, *D. Kh.* (1888-1938)—Party member from 1908. In 1920, member of the Azerbaijan C.P.(B.) Central Committee and of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan. From 1921, People's Commissar for Food, People's Commissar for Agriculture, then

Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Deputy Chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars—109

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Caroti, *A.*—agent of the Italian firm of "Cito-Cinema"—401

Carr, *John* (*Cutterfeld*, *L.*) (b. 1880)—in 1921, representative of the U.S. Communist Party on the Comintern Executive Committee—402

Chebotaryov, *Ivan Nikolayevich* (1861-1934)—member of the Narodnaya Volya group, joined the revolutionary movement in 1886, arrested in connection with the case of Alexander Ulyanov; friend of the Ulyanov family in Simbirsk. From 1906 to 1922, taught at the Popovka railway station school—375

Cheiko, *I. A.* (*Cheika*)—power engineer—387-88, 405

Chekunov, *Ivan Afanasyevich* (d. 1928)—peasant from Fominka, a village of Vladimir Gubernia. In 1919-21, was repeatedly received by Lenin. From 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture—89, 90, 91, 92

Cherlyunchakevich, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1876-1938)—lawyer; Party member from 1907. After the October Revolution, worked in the Moscow People's Court; later, member of the Collegium of the R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Justice—302

Chicherin, *Georgi Vasilyevick* (1872-1936)—R.S.D.L.P. member from 1905; member of the R.C.P.(B.) from 1918. From 1918 to 1930, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, headed Soviet delegations to the International conferences at Genoa and Lausanne. Member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee; member of the Party's Central Committee—54, 56, 62, 64, 67, 68, 88, 94, 95, 99, 101, 111, 140, 175, 182, 183, 212, 219, 227, 229, 230, 237, 238, 240, 250, 253, 254, 277, 289, 293, 301, 338, 339, 344, 345, 354, 356, 359, 363, 371, 381 390, 409, 410, 426, 434-35, 447, 449-50, 451, 452, 463, 469, 474, 479, 483-84, 485, 492, 506-12, 520, 532, 533, 536-38, 540, 541, 546-47, 553, 588, 592

Chirkin, *Vasily Gavrilovich* (1877-1954)—at first Menshevik, member of the Bolshevik Party from 1920. From 1920 to 1922, member of the Presidium of the Southern Bureau of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council, member of the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee, Deputy and then Chairman of the All-Ukraine Union of Consumers' Societies—398

Chubar, *Vlas Yakovlevich* (1891-1941)—Party member from

1907. From 1920 to 1922, Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Economic Council and member of the Presidium of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Economic Council; Director of the Central Board of the Donbas Coal-Mining Industry—349, 388, 572, 574, 591

Chutskayev, *Sergei Yegorovich* (1876-1946)—Party member from 1903. From 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance; Chairman of the Commission for Abolishing Cash Taxes; in 1921-22, Deputy Chairman and then Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee—53, 58, 96, 160, 208, 381, 502

D

Danilov, *Stepan Stepanovich* (1877-1939)—Party member from 1904. After the October Revolution, served in the Red Army; was staff commissar, and from July 1921, member of the Red Army's Revolutionary Military Council—296

Danishevsky, *Karl Khristianovich* (1884-1941)—Party member from 1900. From the end of 1906, was on the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. from the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish region. After the October Revolution, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and of the R.M.C. of the Eastern Front, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Republic. In 1920, Chairman of the Soviet peace delegation at the Minsk Conference for putting an end to the war and establishing friendly relations between the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine and Poland. From March 1921, head of the Chief Timber Committee; later, engaged in executive administrative work—170, 316, 336, 424

Datta, *Bhupendra Nath* (b. 1880)—Indian sociologist, active participant in the Indian national liberation movement. In August 1921, at the invitation of the Comintern visited Soviet Russia and handed to Lenin his article containing theses on the national liberation movement in India—270

Dosser, *Zinovy Nikolayevich* (1882-1938)—oil engineer; Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Collegium of the Central Oil Administration of the Supreme Economic Council, manager of the Oil Syndicate, representative of the Syndicate in China, and U.S.S.R. trade representative in Italy—107

Dovgalevsky, *V. S.* (1885-1934)—Party member from 1908. In 1921-24, People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs of the R.S.F.S.R., then of the U.S.S.R. Later, engaged in diplomatic work—545

Dzerzhinsky, *Felix Edmundovich* (1877-1926)—Party member from 1895. One of the organisers of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. Carried on Party work in Poland and Russia. Member of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee from the Fourth Party Congress. On the eve of and during the October Revolution, member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and of the Military Revolutionary Centre for directing

the uprising, which was set up by the Party Central Committee. After the October Revolution Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka). In 1921, People's Commissar for Railways, and concurrently People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Cheka. From 1924, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council—95, 105, 159, 183, 211, 242, 389, 395, 538, 539, 555-56, 559, 562, 607, 608

E

Eiduk, *A. V.* (1886-1938)—Party member from 1903. In 1919-22, member of the Collegium of the All-Russia Cheka; special representative of the Council of Labour and Defence on the fuel administrations; Soviet Government representative on the American Relief Administration—72, 417, 591

Engels, *Frederick* (1820-1895)—80, 81, 307, 309, 528

F

Falkner, *S. A.* (1890-1938)—economist. In 1918-21, worked in the Economic Research Department of the Supreme Economic Council, on the Council's Price Committee, in the Central Fuel Administration of the Supreme Economic Council, and in the Socialist Academy. From mid-1921 to 1927, worked in the State Planning Commission—107

Ferguson, *A. E.*—368

Fofanova, *Margarita Vasilyevna* (b. 1883)—Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution until 1925, worked in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture—226-27, 439

Fomin, *Vasily Vasilyevich* (1884-1942)—Party member from 1910. From January 1921, Chairman of the Supreme Council for Transportation, Deputy People's Commissar for Railways—127, 167, 410, 432, 454, 466, 594

Fotieva, *Lydia Alexandrovna* (b. 1881)—Party member from 1904. From 1918, secretary of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence, and concurrently Lenin's secretary—102, 119, 151, 152, 153, 193, 197, 209, 215-16, 259, 260, 267, 299, 349, 422, 431, 443, 444, 452, 457, 461, 479, 530, 543, 548-49, 558-60, 600, 604

France, *Joseph Irwin* (1873-1939)—American Senator in 1917-23. In the summer of 1921, visited Soviet Russia. Dealt with foreign trade—212

Fröhlich, *Paul* (1884-1953)—member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany from 1919 to 1924. Delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern from the United Communist Party of Germany. In 1928 was expelled from the Party for factional activities—187

Frumkin, *Moisei Ilyich* (1878-1939)—Party member from 1898. From 1918 to March 1922, member of the Collegium, then Deputy People's Commissar for Food. From April 1922, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the R.S.F.S.R.—59, 61, 79, 84, 122, 176, 178, 193, 217, 238, 257, 303, 322, 440, 514-16, 549-51, 579, 586, 601, 604

Frunze, *Mikhail Vasilyevich* (1885-1925)—Party member from

1904. During the Civil War, Army Commander, Commander of the Southern group of the Eastern Front, Commander of the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern fronts. After the Civil War, Commander of the Ukrainian and Crimean troops. In 1925, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs—66, 111, 145, 245-46

Fulte—Krupp's agent—513

G

Gastev, *Alexi Kapitonovich* (1882-1941)—scientist poet, public figure. In 1917-18, Secretary of the All-Russia Metalworkers' Union Central Committee. In 1920, organised the Central Institute of Labour under the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council, which he headed until 1938—174

Gennari, *Edigio* (1876-1942)—Secretary (from 1918), and then General Secretary (in 1920) of the Italian Socialist Party. Favoured its joining the Comintern. From 1921, when the Italian Communist Party was set up, member of its Central Committee. Delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern, and member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International—311

Gerbek, *Georgi Gugovich* (b. 1890)—in 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Urals Industrial Bureau under the Supreme Economic Council, and Deputy Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Red Army and Navy Supplies—305

Getsov, *S. A.* (1883-1937)—in 1920-23, Deputy Chairman of the Central Coal Administration and head of the Moscow Coal Committee—222

Geyer, *Anna*—in 1920-21, headed the press agency of the Communist Party of Germany, editor of *Die Rote Fahne*—158

Gintsburg, *Ilya Iakovlevich* (1859-1939)—sculptor, author of monuments to G. V. Plekhanov and D. I. Mendeleyev in Leningrad—138

Gittis, *Vladimir Mikhailovich* (1881-1938)—colonel of the tsarist army; after the October Revolution, sided with the Soviet power. During the Civil War, Commander of the Western and Caucasian fronts; later, held various commanding posts in the Red Army—84

Gleb Maximilianovich—see *Krzhizhanovsky*, *G. M.*

Glyasser, *Maria Ignatyevna* (1890-1951)—Party member from 1917. From 1917 to 1924, worked on the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars—280, 453, 569-70

Goikhbarg, *Alexander Grigoryevich* (1883-1962)—before 1917, Menshevik; from 1919 to 1924, member of the R.C.P.(B.). In 1920-21, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Justice, member, Deputy Chairman and then Chairman of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars—81, 85, 96, 271, 293, 355, 380, 542

Goldberg, *Boris Isayevich* (1884-1946)—Party member from 1902. In 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Chief Public Works Committee, then representative of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and held other posts—170

Goldenberg, *Iosif Petrovich* (1873-1922)—journalist; Social-Democrat, after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), Bolshevik. During the 1905-07 revolution, member of the editorial boards of all Bolshevik publications. At one time, he deviated from Bolshevism, but in 1920 was readmitted to the Bolshevik Party—425

Gorbunov, *Nikolai Petrovich* (1892-1938)—Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution, Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars; from August 1918, Manager of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council of the R.S.F.S.R. From 1920, Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. (then U.S.S.R.) and the Council of Labour and Defence, member of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 122, 126, 135, 149, 150-52, 186, 188, 243, 274, 277-79, 280, 283, 293-94, 299, 300, 302-03, 306, 314, 315-16, 319, 320, 322, 324, 336, 361, 370, 373, 375, 381, 387-89, 393-94, 400, 403, 405, 408, 412, 432-33, 443, 451 452, 455, 461, 464, 465, 470-71, 473, 476, 479, 480, 486, 487-92, 500, 503, 513, 520, 577, 578, 592, 595, 597, 606

Gorbunov, *Pavel Petrovich* (1885-1937)—Party member from 1918. From February 1921 to February 1922, Business Manager of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and concurrently, from September 1921, member of the Collegium of the P.C.F.A. Later, filled various posts at the People's Commissariat for Finance, the Party Central Committee, the State Bank, etc.—230, 338, 371, 404, 425, 435, 452

Gorky, *Maxim* (*Peshkov*, *Alexei Maximovich*) (1868-1936)—Russian writer, founder of Soviet literature—97, 163, 249, 404-06, 564

Gorsky, *B.*—author of the article "The Danaans Whose Hands Proffer Gifts" published in *Izvestia* on November 23, 1921—385

Graftio, *Genrich Osipovich* (1869-1949)—scientist, power engineer. Member of GOELRO (State Commission for the Electrification of Russia). In 1921-27, Chief Engineer of the Volkhov and then the Nizhni-Svir hydroelectric power stations—277-78, 292

Gribanova, *Lydia Dmitrievna* (b. 1890)—in 1919-21, typist and business secretary of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. From May 1921 to 1934, technical secretary of the Council of Labour and Defence; later, worked in the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences —189

Grigoryev, *G. I.* (b. 1894)—from January 1921 to October 1922, Deputy Chief of the Central Coal Administration—217

Groman, *Vladimir Gustavovich* (b. 1874)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. In 1920, Chairman of the Commission for Studying the Losses to Russia's National Economy inflicted by the Imperialist and civil wars; from 1921, engaged in planning and administrative work—56, 130, 355, 380

Grzhebin, *Zinovy Isayevich* (1869-1929)—head of the Publishing House for fiction, scientific lit-

erature and science fiction, organised in 1919 in Petrograd with branches in Moscow and later in Berlin—162-63

Gubkin, *Ivan Mikhailovich* (1871-1939)—geologist, Party member from 1921. From 1918, held key posts in various central departments dealing with oil industry and geological research in Soviet Russia—88, 117

Gylling, *Edward Otto Wilhelm* (1881-1944)—active participant in the Finnish working-class movement. From 1905, member of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland. From 1918, member of the Communist Party of Finland and of its Central Committee. Active participant in the 1918 workers' revolution in Finland. From 1920, member of the R.C.P.(B.). From July 1920 to February 1921, Chairman of the Karelian Revolutionary Committee, then Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Karelian Labour Commune, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Karelian A.S.S.R., member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—131

H

Hammer, *Armand J.*—Secretary of the American Allied Drug and Chemical Corporation, which in 1921 obtained an asbestos-mining concession in the Urals—337, 338-39, 346, 362, 368, 412, 523, 542, 543, 544, 559

Hammer, *Julius* (b. 1874)—from 1921 to 1927, Chairman of the Board of a U.S. concession, Alamerico, for developing the Alapayevsk asbestos mine in the Urals—337, 368, 544

Hanecki (*Fürstenberg*), *Jakob* (1879-1937)—prominent figure of the Polish and Russian revolutionary movement. In 1917, member of the R.S.D.L.P. C.C. Bureau Abroad. In 1920-21, plenipotentiary and trade representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Latvia; in 1921-23, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs—134, 155, 182, 382

Harding, *Warren Gamaliel* (1865-1923)—American statesman, President of the United States from 1921 to 1923—98, 263

Harriman, *William Averell* (b. 1891)—American statesman and businessman—448

Hartwig, *H.*—390

Heckert, *Fritz* (1884-1936)—prominent figure in the German and international working-class movement. During the First World War, one of the founders of the Spartacus League. Played a great role in setting up the Communist Party of Germany; was a member of its Central Committee. A delegate to the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth congresses of the Communist International—218

Heywood, *William* (*Bill*) (1869-1928)—prominent figure in the U.S. working-class movement; a founding member and leader of the Industrial Workers of the World. Became a member of the U.S. Communist Party soon after its establishment. Persecuted for his revolutionary activity, emigrated to the Soviet Union in 1921—268, 304, 335

Holtzmann, *A. Z.* (1894-1933)—Party member from 1917. In 1920-21, member of the Presidium of the All-Russia

Central Trade Union Council and of the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources of the R.S.F.S.R. under the Council of Labour and Defence. During the discussion on the trade unions, supported Trotsky's platform—104, 130, 186

Hoover, *Herbert Clark* (1874-1964)—American politician, big capitalist; took an active part in the plunderous exploitation of mineral resources in Siberia, and later in organising the anti-Soviet intervention. From 1919, Chairman of the American Relief Administration (ARA). In 1921-28, Secretary of Commerce, and in 1928-33, President of the United States—250-51, 263, 340, 355

I

Ignatov, *K. M.* (1872-1939)—from 1918 to 1924, professor of the Moscow Higher Technical College. From 1921, principal of the College; scientific adviser to the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Labour, and a number of other organisations—128

Ilyushin—83

Ionov, *Ilya Ionovich* (1887-1942)—Party member from 1904. From 1918 to 1926, head of the Petrograd Soviet's Publishing House, later head of the Petrograd Department of the State Publishers—193

Ionov (Koigen, *F. M.*) (1870-1923)—Social-Democrat, a Bund leader. After the October Revolution, member of the R.C.P.(B.). Worked at the Soviet mission in Berlin—238

Ipatiev, *Vladimir Nikolayevich* (1867-1952)—professor of chemistry, academician. In 1921-22, member of the Presidium and Chief of the Chemical Industry Department of the Supreme Economic Council—256, 315

J

Joffe, *Adolph Abramovich* (1883-1927)—Social-Democrat from the end of the 1890s; in the Bolshevik Party from 1917. In 1919-21, head of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in Petrograd, delegate to the peace conferences with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. From August 1921, extraordinary representative of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm—67, 99, 161, 229, 246, 297, 434-35, 447, 547

Jogiches, *Léon*—see *Tyszka*, *Jan*.

Jordansky, *Nikolai Ivanovich* (1876-1928)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, joined the R.C.P.(B.) in 1921. From November 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Education—447

K

Kaganovich (*Koganovich*), *P. K.* (1887-1942)—Party member from 1905 to 1933. In 1920-21, representative of the People's Commissariat for Food and Chairman of the Siberian Food Committee, member of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee; from May 1921, representative of the People's Commissariat for Food in the Northern Caucasus, and member of the South-Eastern Bureau of the

R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee —177

Kaisarov, *V. D.* (1878-1942)—author of articles and books on military history and geography. In 1921, Chairman of the Special Scientific Commission for Compiling a Geographic Atlas—193, 282

Kalinin, *Mikhail Ivanovich* (1875-1946)—Party member from 1898. Member of the first illegal Marxist study circles and the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. At the Sixth (Prague) Conference in 1912, elected candidate to the Central Committee and then became member of the Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee in Russia. A founder of *Pravda*. During the February revolution of 1917, member of the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee. After the October Revolution, city mayor, then Commissar of the Municipal Services of Petrograd. From March 1919, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. After the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, member of the Central Committee, and from 1926, member of the Politbureau of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Central Committee—49, 110, 144, 215, 254, 269, 312

Kalinnikov, *Ivan A.* (1874-1942)—from 1917 to 1924, professor of the Moscow Higher Technical College; in 1920, its principal; from 1921, member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission; from 1922 to 1930, Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Industrial Section of the R.S.F.S.R. State Planning Commission, then of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission. From January 1925, lecturer at the Red Army's Air Force Academy—127

Kalnin, *Ans Ernestovich* (1883-1950)—joined the Lettish Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1904, member of the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish region. Emigrated to Australia in 1912, was a member of the Australian Socialist Party; returned in May 1917, and joined the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). After the October Revolution, Secretary of the Primorye Miners' Union and Commissar for Labour and Industry in the Far-Eastern Council of People's Commissars; Chairman of the Southern Bureau of the Miners' Union in 1920-21, head of the Organising Department of the Miners' Union Central Committee in 1921-24. Later, engaged in administrative work—382, 599

Kamenev (*Rosenfeld*), *Lev Borisovich* (1883-1936)—R.S.D.L.P. member from 1901. Joined the Bolsheviks after the Second Congress in 1903. Member of the editorial boards of the newspapers *Proletary* and *Pravda*. Elected member of the Central Committee at the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) in 1917. After the February 1917 revolution opposed the Party's course towards the socialist revolution. In October 1917, together with Zinoviev, revealed the C.C. secret decision to start an armed uprising by publishing their statement of disagreement with this decision in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*, thereby betraying the revolu-

tion. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Moscow Soviet; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars; member of the C.C. Politbureau. Repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy. In 1927, was expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) as an active participant in the Trotsky opposition; then twice reinstated and expelled again for anti-Party activity—86, 93, 95, 103, 110, 118, 120, 209, 211, 215, 234, 249, 250, 253, 254, 266, 299, 339, 371, 375, 384, 389, 394, 407, 413, 416, 418, 424, 425, 428, 440, 443, 450, 457, 460, 462, 466, 479, 483-84, 485, 490, 496, 501, 516, 527, 528, 530, 532, 534, 566, 573-74, 578-80, 585, 586, 587, 593, 603, 607, 608

Kamenev, *Sergei Sergeyevich* (1881-1936)—colonel of the tsarist army. After the October Revolution, sided with the Soviet power. Commander of the Eastern Front from September 1918; Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic from July 1919 to April 1924. In 1925-26, Chief of the Headquarters, chief inspector of the Red Army, member of the U.S.S.R. Revolutionary Military Council; from 1927, Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs—66

Kaminsky, *Grigory Naumovich* (1895-1938)—Party member from 1913. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Tula Gubernia Party Committee and the Gubernia Executive Committee. Member of the 2nd Army Revolutionary Military Council. From 1920, Secretary of the Party Central Committee of Azerbaijan, Chairman of the Baku Soviet. From 1922, engaged in Party, trade union and Soviet government work—112

Karakhan, *Lev Mikhailovich* (1889-1937)—took part in the revolutionary movement from 1904. Joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917. Secretary and member of the Soviet peace delegation in Brest-Litovsk. From 1918, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Deputy People's Commissar; plenipotentiary representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Poland in 1921-22—94, 530

Karpinsky, *Vyacheslav Alexeyevich* (1880-1965)—Party member from 1898. Prominent Party writer and propagandist. In 1918-27, member of the Editorial Board of *Pravda*, editor (with intervals) of the newspaper *Bednota*, and contributor to other newspapers and magazines—220, 395

Kasparov, *Vyacheslav Minasovich* (1883-1917)—Party member from 1904. In 1907-11, member of the Baku Committee. In 1913-14, lived in Berlin, acting as an intermediary through whom the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee carried on secret correspondence with some organisations in Russia. During the First World War lived in Berne was a member of the Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Organisations Abroad—414-15

*Kasparova-Popov*a—see *Popova*, *Y. M.*

Kavtaradze, *Sergei Ivanovich* (b. 1885)—Party member from 1903 (with interruption from 1927 to 1940). After the establishment of the Soviet power in Georgia, People's Com-

missar for Justice. In 1922-23, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia. Later, engaged in Soviet government and diplomatic work—582

Kayurov, *Vasily N.* (1876-1936)—Party member from 1900. In 1921-22, Chairman of the Siberian Territorial Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Control Commission on Purging the Party—102, 272

Kerensky, *Alexander Fyodorovich* (1881-1970)—Socialist-Revolutionary. After the February 1917 revolution, Minister for Justice, Minister for the Army and Navy, then Prime Minister of the bourgeois Provisional Government and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. After the October Revolution, fought against the Soviet power, and fled abroad in 1918—414

Kerzhentsev (*Lebedev*), *Platon Mikhailovich* (1881-1940)—Party member from 1904. In 1918-20, deputy editor of *Izvestia VTsIK*, and chief of the Telegraph Agency of Russia. In 1921-23, plenipotentiary in Sweden and, in 1925-26, in Italy. Later, engaged in administrative and scientific work—379, 530

Khalatov, *Artemii Bagratovich* (1896-1938)—Party member from 1917. In 1918-23, member of the food supply department of the Moscow Soviet, Commissar of the Moscow Regional Food Supply Committee, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R., Chairman of the Council of People's Commissar commission on workers' supply—156, 370

Khinchuk, *Lev Mikhailovich* (1868-1944)—Party member from 1920. From 1921 to 1926 Chairman of the Centrosoyuz Board—176, 178, 193, 285, 319, 370, 384, 394, 411, 503

Khodorovsky, *Iosif Isayevich* (1885-1940)—Party member from 1903. In 1921-22, Secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. From 1922, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Education later, Deputy People's Commissar for Education—595

Kilbom, *Karl* (b. 1885)—Swedish Social-Democrat, member of the Communist Party of Sweden, its representative on the Comintern Executive Committee—268

Kirillin, *P. N.* (1888-1955)—in 1918-24, teacher, initiator and organiser of the Yaropolets Electric-Power Station on the Lama River in Volokolamsk Uyezd and of a number of other rural electric-power stations. Later, hydrologist of the Central Rural Electricity Administration—55

Kirpichnikov, *V. D.* (1881-1940)—technologist. In 1920-24, Deputy Chief of the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction of the Supreme Economic Council. Together with R. E. Klasson, worked out a hydraulic method of peat extraction—180, 181

Kiselis, *P. Y.* (1890-1940)—artist; worked in the People's Commissariat for Education. Later, a leader of the Artists' Association of Revolutionary Russia—139

Kiselyov, *Alexei Semyonovich* (1879-1938)—Party member from 1898. In 1921-23, Chairman of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars. Elected

candidate to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee at the Tenth and Eleventh Party Congresses. At the Twelfth Party Congress, elected member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.). Later, People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the R.S.F.S.R. and Deputy People's Commissar for W.P.I. of the U.S.S.R. From 1924 to 1938, Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—255, 270-71, 316, 324, 383-84, 391, 455, 517

Kissin, *Abram Ananyevich* (1885-1938)—Party member from 1920. Trade agent, member of the Board and Deputy Chairman of Centrosoyuz—274, 283

Kizas, *Anna Petrovna* (1899-1959)—Party member from 1919 to 1935. From November 1917 to August 1922, worked in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars—134, 155

Klasson, *Robert Eduardovich* (1868-1926)—specialist in electric-power engineering. Took an active part in working out the GOELRO plan, Director of the First Moscow Electric-Power Station. Together with V. D. Kirpichnikov and others worked out a hydraulic method of peat extraction—153, 180, 181, 182, 273

Klette—Krupp's agent—513

Klyshko, *N. K.* (1880-1937)—Party member from 1904. In 1921-22, secretary of the Soviet trade delegation in London—64, 141, 185, 229, 440

Knipovich, *Boris Nikolayevich* (1880-1924)—economist and statistician. From 1917 to 1921, worked in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture; from 1922, in the State Planning Commission. Lecturer at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy—281

Knipovich, *Nikolai Mikhailovich* (1862-1939)—prominent Soviet zoologist and public figure. In 1911-30, professor of zoology and general biology of the St. Petersburg (First Leningrad) Medical Institute. Head of the Russian school of ichthyologists, organiser of scientific fishery and marine research of the European part of the U.S.S.R.—243, 281-82, 361, 595

Koblents, *Izrail Girshevich* (1882-1935)—in 1922, legal adviser of the People's Commissariat for Justice—470

Koenen, *Wilhelm* (b. 1886)—prominent member of the German and international communist movement. From 1920, member of the United Communist Party of Germany, delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern—187

Kolchak, *Alexander Vasilyevich* (1873-1920)—tsarist admiral. In 1918-19, a leader of the counter-revolution in Russia. With the support of the imperialists of the U.S.A., Britain and France, proclaimed himself supreme ruler of Russia and headed the military dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landowners in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. His troops were routed by the Red Army and the partisan movement. He was taken prisoner and shot on February 7, 1920, under the decision of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee—289

Komarov, *N. P.* (1886-1937)—Party member from 1909. During the Civil War, battalion commissar at the Eastern Front, Chairman of the Petrograd

Gubernia Cheka. From 1921, Secretary of the Petrograd Gubernia Executive Committee. Elected member of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee at the Tenth Party Congress. Later, engaged in Party and administrative work—314, 339

Kopp, *Viktor Leontyevich* (1880-1930)—Party member from 1917. From 1919 to 1930, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; from May 1921, R.S.F.S.R. representative in Germany on POW affairs—76, 162, 175

Korolenko, *Vladimir Galaktionovich* (1853-1921)—Russian writer and publicist—97

Korolyov, *G. K.* (1884-1927)—Party member from 1905. After the October Revolution, engaged in Soviet government, administrative and trade union work in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. From 1921, worked in the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee—51, 52, 168

Korostelev, *Alexander Alexeyevich* (1887-1937)—Party member from 1905. From May 1921 to April 1922, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; headed the Commission for Assisting the Economic Bodies. From 1922 held trade union and administrative posts—209, 211

Kotlyarov, *G. I.* (b. 1875)—Party member from 1917, mining foreman by profession—149

Kotovich-Sammer, *Nina Ivanovna* (b. 1907)—daughter of I. A. Sammer—439

Kozlov, *Pyotr A.* (1891-1959)—68

Kozmin, *P. A.* (1871-1936)—technologist. After the October Revolution, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food, Deputy Chairman of the Special Defence Council. From 1920 head of the production department of the Central Flour Administration. Took part in working out the GOELRO plan—127

Krasikov, *Pyotr Ananyevich* (1870-1939)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1892, Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry for Combating Counter-Revolution, then member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Justice of the U.S.S.R. and head of its department dealing with the drafting and enforcement of measures and decrees aimed at the disestablishment of the Church—319, 327

Krasin, *Herman Borisovich* (1871-1947)—prominent inventor and design engineer. In 1920-22, Chairman of the Council of the Administration for Hydraulic Peat Extraction—273, 422

Krasin, *Leonid Borisovich* (1870-1926)—Social-Democrat from the 1890s. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, joined the Bolsheviks. In 1918, took part in negotiations on economic agreement with Germany, then headed the Extraordinary Commission for Red Army and Navy Supplies; member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, People's Commissar for Trade and Industry. From 1919, diplomat. In 1922-24, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade—54, 64, 101, 107, 111, 112, 141, 142, 162, 163, 171, 175, 177-78, 198, 211, 213, 229, 230, 233, 242, 244, 261, 265, 272, 273, 330-31, 339, 345

354-55, 363, 371, 379, 380, 390, 409, 416, 426, 430, 434, 440-41, 445, 446, 447, 463, 469, 491, 496, 505, 514-16, 536-37, 546, 553, 565, 568, 573-74, 586

Krasinsky, *Georgi Davydovich* (1890-1955)—in 1921, special representative of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in Siberia and the Urals. Later worked in the Central Arctic Route Administration—381

Krasnoshchekov, *A. M.* (1880-1937)—Party member from 1917. In 1920-21, member of the Far-Eastern Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Government of the Far-Eastern Republic. From the beginning of 1922, Deputy People's Commissar for Finance; from April 1922, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council; in 1923, Chairman of the Board of the Industrial Bank of the U.S.S.R. From 1929, worked in the U.S.S.R. People's Commissariat for Agriculture—427 445-46, 450, 495, 519, 522

Krejbich, *Karel* (b. 1883)—prominent figure in the Czechoslovak and international communist movement; played an active role in setting up the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern. In 1922, 1924 and 1925, member of the Comintern Executive Committee—213, 258

Krestinsky, *Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1883-1938)—Party member from 1903. In 1918-21, People's Commissar for Finance; from December 1919 to March 1921 Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. From October 1921, plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. in Germany—57, 60, 84, 85, 86, 97, 278, 331, 341, 403, 405-06, 429, 446, 452, 518, 534, 535, 536, 564, 601

Kritsman, *Lev Natanovich* (1890-1938)—Party member from 1918. In 1921, member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission and Chairman of the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources of the R.S.F.S.R. under the Council of Labour and Defence —104, 130, 135, 391

Kruchinsky, *M. A.* (b. 1894)—in 1920, member of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. From 1920 to March 1921, Chief of the Central Administration of Horse Breeding under the People's Commissariat for Agriculture; later, engaged in scientific, pedagogical and administrative work in agriculture—78, 222

Krug, *Karl Adolfovich* (1873-1952)—prominent specialist in electrical engineering. Took part in the working out of the GOELRO plan . From 1905 lecturer at the Moscow Higher Technical College where after the October Revolution he set up the electrotechnical department. In 1921-30, principal of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute, founded with his participation—475

Krumin, *Garald Ivanovich* (1894-1943)—Party member from 1908. From 1919 to 1929, executive editor of the newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*—220, 313, 524

Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, *Gustav* (1870-1950)—German monopolist, head of the military-metallurgical concern in 1906-43—448, 513, 536

Krupskaya, *Nadezhda Konstan-*

tinovna (1869-1939)—member of the Party from 1898, associate and wife of V. I. Lenin. Started revolutionary activity in 1890 in the Marxist students' circles in St. Petersburg, then conducted Social-Democratic propaganda among the workers. In 1895, joined the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In August 1896, was arrested and sentenced to three years' exile. Served her sentence in the village of Shushenskoye, then in Ufa. In 1901, emigrated, worked as secretary of the Editorial Board of *Iskra*. Took part in organising the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Was secretary of the Editorial Board of the Bolshevik papers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*. After the October Revolution worked in public education bodies—51, 243 267, 397, 399, 607, 608

Krylenko, Nikolai Vasilyevich (1885-1938)—Party member from 1904. Member of the Committee for Military and Naval Affairs under the first Soviet Government. In November 1917, appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. From 1918, worked in judicial bodies. In 1922, Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal under the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Deputy People's Commissar for Justice, and Senior Assistant Procurator of the Republic—571

Krzhizhanovsky, Gleb Maximilianovich (1872-1959)—Party member from 1893; together with Lenin organised the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. After the February revolution of 1917, member of the Bolshevik group in the Moscow Soviet. After the October Revolution, headed the rehabilitation and development of the power economy in Moscow; in 1920, on Lenin's assignment, headed the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). In 1921-30, head of the State Planning Commission—86, 87, 137, 172, 182, 194, 198, 205, 206-07, 235, 244, 256, 261, 265, 266, 272, 307, 321, 328, 330, 340, 343, 387-88, 391, 400, 442, 453, 455-56, 462, 477, 482, 506, 523, 524, 571, 575, 584, 585, 587, 588, 590-91

Kuibyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich (1888-1935)—Party member from 1904. Active participant in the October Revolution, leader of the armed uprising in Samara. In 1918-19, Commissar and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front; later, Deputy Chairman of the Commission on Turkestan Affairs set up by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. and R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee; in 1920, R.S.F.S.R. Plenipotentiary with the Bukhara Government; later, member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council. In May 1921, became member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and appointed superintendent of the Central Electricity Administration. From April 1922, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. From 1926, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. From 1934, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission

under the C.P.C., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence of the U.S.S.R.—304, 320, 334, 526

Kun, *Béla* (1886-1939)—founder and leader of the Hungarian Communist Party. In 1919, headed the Soviet Government in Hungary. After the defeat of the Soviet power in Hungary, emigrated to Austria and then to Russia. Member of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee—66, 68, 185, 216, 422, 530

Kurayev, *Vasily Vladimirovich* (1892-1938)—Party member from 1914. From 1920, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council—97

Kursky, *Dmitry Ivanovich* (1874-1932)—Party member from 1904. People's Commissar for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R. from 1918 to 1928. From 1921, member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—144, 252, 293, 302, 319, 353, 361, 368, 380, 469-71, 473, 491, 571

Kurzhner, *Boris Abramovich* (b. 1896)—Party member from 1916. In 1921-22, chairman of the technical commission at the Baltiisky Shipbuilding and Mechanical Plant in Petrograd—402

Kushner, *Boris Anisimovich* (1888-1937)—writer, Party member from 1917. In 1920-21, Deputy Chairman of the Electrotechnical Department of the Supreme Economic Council—307, 402

Kuskova, *Yekaterina Dmitrievna* (1869-1958)—bourgeois public figure and publicist. Took part in the co-operative movement. In 1921, member of the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee; together with some other members of this organisation tried to use it against the Soviet government. In 1922 was expelled from the country—106, 208-09

Kuusinen, *Otto Wilhelmovich* (1881-1964)—prominent leader of the Finnish and international working-class movement, the Communist Party and the Soviet state; a founding member of the Communist Party of Finland. From 1921 to 1939 member and Secretary of the Comintern Executive Committee. From 1940, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Chairman of the Presidium of the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. From 1941, member of the C.P.S.U. C.C.; from 1957, member and Secretary of the Presidium of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee—185

Kuznetsov, *Nikolai Grigoryevich*—railway engineer, author (together with A. I. Odintsov) of the world's first works on diesel engines with electrical transmission and separate traction electrical engines—416

L

Lacis, *Martyn Ivanovich* (*Sudrabs*, *Jan*) (1888-1938)—Party member from 1905. In 1921 member of the Collegium and later Chairman of the Central Salt Administration—315

Lalayants, *Isaak Khristoforovich* (1870-1933)—active participant in the Russian Social-Democratic movement; Bolshevik after the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903; C.C. agent in

Russia. At the end of 1913, exiled for life to Eastern Siberia; withdrew from politics until 1922. From 1922, worked in the Chief Committee for Political Education of the R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Education—289, 348, 431, 466

Lapinsky, *Pavel Ludvigovich* (*Levinson*, *Y.*, *Mikhalsky*) (1879-1937)—Polish Communist, economist and publicist member of the R.C.P.(B.) from 1919. From 1920 to 1928, official of the Soviet embassy in Germany—258, 282, 355, 479

Larin, Y. (*Lourie*, *Mikhail Alexandrovich*) (1882-1932)—Social-Democrat Menshevik; in August 1917, joined the Bolshevik Party. After the October Revolution worked in Soviet government and economic bodies. In 1920-22, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council for Transportation, member of the State Planning Commission and member of its Presidium—75, 186, 187, 199, 441, 445, 466

Larkin, *James* (1878-1947)—active member of the Irish working-class movement. In 1914-23, lived in the United States where he was persecuted for his revolutionary activity. On his return to Ireland, organised the Left-wing Irish Workers' Union, which for a time was in the Red International of Trade Unions—368

Lavrentyeva—274

Lavrik—73

Lazarev, *Pyotr Petrovich* (1878-1942)—physicist, biophysicist and geophysicist; academician from 1917. In 1912-25, professor of the Moscow Higher Technical College; in 1920-31, Director of the State Biophysical Institute, which was set up on his initiative—389, 405, 546

Lazzari, *Constantino* (1857-1927)—prominent figure in the Italian working-class movement; a founder of the Italian Socialist Party, member of its Central Committee. Took part in the work of the Second and Third Congresses of the Communist International—377, 600

Lengnik, *Friedrich* (1873-1936)—Party member from 1898, member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class; in the early 1900s, in *Iskra*. Participant in the 1905-07 revolution; engaged in Party work in the south of Russia, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. After the October Revolution, worked in the People's Commissariat for Education, the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and in the GOELRO Commission. From 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—347

Lepeshinskaya, *Natalya Stepanovna* (1890-1923)—worked in Lenin's Secretariat from 1918 to 1923—134, 155, 286, 490, 505 554, 558, 559

Levi, *Paul* (1883-1930)—German Social-Democrat. Elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany at its Inaugural Congress. In February 1921, was expelled from the Party for breach of Party discipline; subsequently returned to the Social-Democratic Party—124, 186, 231-32

Levin, *Lev Grigoryevich* (1870-1938)—therapeutist; in 1896-97, worked in Berlin and Paris

clinics, from 1897, in Russia. From April 1920, head of the therapeutic department of the Kremlin Hospital—216, 474

Lezhava, *Andrei Matveyevich* (1870-1937)—Party member from 1904. After the October Revolution, held responsible government and economic posts. In 1918-20, Chairman of Centrosoyuz; from 1920 to 1925 Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade—117, 131, 136, 170, 177, 181, 193, 206, 208, 255, 401, 403, 408, 410, 420, 428, 436-38, 441, 448, 451, 496-97, 514, 515, 579

Lezhnev, *Isai Grigoryevich* (1891-1955)—journalist, Bolshevik from 1906. In 1918-21, editor of a number of magazines, head of the information department of *Izvestia VTsIK*. In early 1922, founded and edited the magazine *Novaya Rossiya* published in Petrograd and then in Moscow until May 1926—555

Lisitsyn, *Pyotr Ivanovich* (1877-1948)—selectionist, worked at the Shatilov State Experimental Selection Station in Orel Region from 1908 to 1929—584

Litkens, *Y. A.* (1888-1922)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1904, of the R.C.P.(B.) from 1919. In 1920, deputy head of the Chief Committee for Political Education; from 1921, Deputy People's Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—57, 70, 77, 83, 86, 145, 284, 296, 401, 408, 412, 462, 475

Litvinov, *Maxim Maximovich* (1876-1951)—Party member from 1898. After the October Revolution, Soviet diplomat; in 1921, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs—331, 355, 367, 379, 409, 410, 428, 435, 441, 445, 447, 485, 530, 537, 541, 553

Lloyd George, *David* (1863-1945)—British statesman, leader of the Liberal Party. From 1916 to 1922, Prime Minister—356, 426, 469, 532-33, 537, 547

Lobachev, *Ivan Stepanovich* (1879-1933)—Party member from 1917. From 1920, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R.; from February 1922, People's Commissar for Food in the Ukraine—219

Lomonosov, *Yuri Vladimirovich* (b. 1876)—railway expert, professor. In 1920-21, headed a mission supervising the fulfilment of orders for locomotives railway and other technical equipment in Sweden and Germany—163, 379, 451, 454, 455-56, 518, 536

Lomov, *A.* (*Oppokov*, *Georgi Ippolitovich*) (1888-1938)—Party member from 1903. People's Commissar for Justice from the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Member of the Presidium and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—107, 117

Lozovsky (*Dridzo*), *Solomon Abramovich* (1878-1952)—Party member from 1901. In 1920, Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Trade Union Council. From 1921 to 1937, General Secretary of the Red International of Trade Unions; later, diplomat—218, 232, 598-99

Lunacharsky, *Anatoly Vasilyevich* (1875-1933)—took part in the Social-Democratic movement from the early 1890s. After the October Revolution and up to 1929, People's Commissar for Education of the

R.S.F.S.R.; then, Chairman of the Academic Committee under the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—57, 70, 83, 123, 128, 138-39, 230, 296, 377, 412, 428-29, 552

Lutovinov, *Yuri Khrisanfovich* (1887-1924)—Party member from 1904. From 1920, member of the Metalworkers' Union Central Committee and of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council. During the discussion on the trade unions in 1920-21, one of the leaders of the anti-Party Workers' Opposition group. In 1921, dismissed from responsible trade union posts and appointed deputy trade representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Germany—175, 211, 253, 379

Luxemburg, *Rosa* (1871-1919)—outstanding figure in the Polish and German working-class movement, leader of the Left-wing of the Second International. One of the sponsors of the *Internationale* group in Germany, subsequently renamed the Spartacus group and then the Spartacus League. During the November 1918 Revolution, was one of the leaders of the revolutionary German workers. Took part in the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Germany. In January 1919 was arrested and murdered —232

Lyubovich, *A. M.* (1880-1939)—Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Posts and Telegraphs Workers' Union, from March 1920, People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs. Later, Chairman of the State Planning Commission and Deputy Chairman of the Byelorussian Council of People's Commissars—53

M

Maffi, *Fabrizio* (1868-1955)—prominent figure in the Italian working-class movement, socialist. In 1921, set up and headed within the Italian Socialist Party the "Third International" group which later merged with the Communist Party. Delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern from the Italian Socialist Party. From 1924, member of the Italian Communist Party Central Committee—600

Makharadze, *Filipp Yeseyevich* (1868-1941)—Party member from 1903. From March 1921 to February 1922, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, People's Commissar for Agriculture in Georgia; from 19-22, Chairman of the Georgian Central Executive Committee—608

Makhno, *Nestor Ivanovich* (1884-1934)—leader of the anarchist and kulak bands in the Ukraine which fought the Soviet power in 1918-21. His bands were routed by the Red Army in the spring of 1921 - 66, 92

Malikov—73

Malyshev, *Sergei Vasilyevich* (1877-1938)—Party member from 1902. After the October Revolution, worked in the People's Commissariat for Labour and the People's Commissariat for Food. In 1918, organised an expedition to the rural areas along the Volga and the Kama to exchange con-

sumer goods for grain. Later, Chairman of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce, official in Centrosoyuz—437

Malzahn, *Heinrich* (b. 1884)—German Social-Democrat, later, Communist. In 1921, delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern from the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany and delegate to the First Congress of the Red International of Trade Unions from the Central Council of German Trade Unions. The same year was expelled from the Party as a Centrist—218

Mantsev, *Vasily Nikolayevich* (1888-1939)—Party member from 1906. In 1922, Chairman of the Ukrainian C.P.(B.) Central Committee, and member of the Collegium of the All-Russia Cheka. From 1923 worked in Moscow in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Finance of the U.S.S.R.; from 1936, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.—82, 555

Manuilsky, *Mikhail Zakharovich* (1892-1955)—member of the Party from July 1917. From March 1919 to May 1922 worked at Ivanovo-Voznesensk as Gubernia Commissar for Food (until January 1921), Deputy Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee and head of the Land Department. In 1921, a member of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—183

Marchlewski, *Yulian* (1866-1925)—prominent figure in the Polish and international working-class movement. In 1918, came to Soviet Russia; elected to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. As diplomat, took part in negotiations with Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Japan and China—332

Martens, *Ludwig Karlovich* (1875-1948)—Party member from 1893. From 1921, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and Chairman of the Central Metal Administration; later, Chairman of the Inventions Committee under the Supreme Economic Council and engaged in pedagogical work—191, 195, 196, 236-37, 240, 337, 338, 346, 355, 362, 378, 520, 522-24

Martinovich, *N. N.* (1883-1937)—orientalist, specialist in Turkic languages; in 1917-22, professor of the Institute of Living Oriental Languages and lecturer at Petrograd University, research worker at the Russian Museum. In 1922, emigrated to Finland, then to the United States—173

Martov, *L.* (*Tsederbaum*, *Yuli Osipovich*) (1873-1923)—a leader of the Mensheviks. Joined the Social-Democratic movement in the 1890s. In 1895 took part in organising the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. At the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903, became a Menshevik leader and from then on was head of the Mensheviks' central organs and editor of their publications. In 1920, member of the Moscow Soviet. Later, emigrated to Germany—126

Martynov, *B. S.* (1882-1951)—scientist and lawyer. From 1908 to 1950, worked at Leningrad State University and other higher schools of Leningrad—173

Marx, *Karl* (1818-1883)—80, 81, 309, 527, 528, 529

Maximovsky, *Vladimir Nikolayevich* (1887-1941)—Party member from 1903. After the October Revolution, Secretary of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. In 1922, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Education, Deputy People's Commissar for Education—585

Mayakovsky, *Vladimir Vladimirovich* (1893-1930)—Soviet poet—138, 139, 327

Mdivani, *Polikarp Gurgenovich* (*Budu*) (1877-1937)—Party member from 1903. In 1922, member of the Presidium of the Georgian C.P.(B.) Central Committee. In 1928 was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activity; in 1931, reinstated, and in 1936, expelled again—582, 608

Meisner, *Valerian Ivanovich* (1879-1938)—fish breeder; from July 1920, Deputy Chief and Chief of the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry—242, 243, 328

Mekhonoshin, *Konstantin Alexandrovich* (1889-1938)—Party member from 1913. In 1921, member of the Collegium of the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry; later, engaged in organising general military training; worked in the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—203

Melnichansky, *Grigory Natanovich* (1886-1937)—Party member from 1902. In 1918-24 Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Council of Trade Unions and member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council—284

Mendeleyev, *Dmitry Ivanovich* (1834-1907)—great Russian scientist—575

Menshikov, *Yevgeny Stepanovich* (1883-1926)—engineer and technologist, specialist in peat extraction—464

Menzhinsky, *Vladimir Rudolfovich* (1874-1934)—Party member from 1902. After the October Revolution, People's Commissar for Finance, then Consul-General of the R.S.F.S.R. in Berlin. From 1919, worked in the All-Russia Cheka—87, 202

Meshcheryakov, *Nikolai Leonidovich* (1865-1942)—Party member from 1901. In 1920-24, Chairman of the Editorial Board of the State Publishers and member of the Editorial Board of *Pravda* (1918-22)—227-28, 332

Meshcheryakova, *Anna Ivanovna* (1866-1948)—took part in the revolutionary movement from the 1890s, joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917. After the October Revolution, worked in the People's Commissariat for Education, in the library department of the Chief Committee for Political Education headed the library of the Kremlin Central Club—399

Messing, *Stanislav Adamovich* (1890-1946)—Party member from 1908. After the October Revolution, Secretary of the Sokolniki Executive Committee in Moscow; later, worked in the Cheka, the State Political Administration and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—555

Mesyatsev, *P. A.* (1889-1938)—Party member from 1906. In

1921-24, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. Later, worked in the co-operative movement, the Agricultural Bank and the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—406

Metelev, *Alexander Denisovich* (1893-1937)—Party member from 1912. In 1921, superintendent of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee houses. Later, engaged in administrative work—390

Mezhlauk, *I. I.* (1891-1941)—Party member from 1918. In 1921, Chairman of Yugostal (the mining and metallurgical trust) Board—405

Michelson, *Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1860-1927)—physicist. From 1894 to 1927, professor of physics and meteorology in the Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy (now named after K. A. Timiryazev), and head of the Observatory of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences—47

Mikhailov, *Ivan Konstantinovich* (b. 1881)—Party member from 1897. In 1921-22, Chairman of the Special C.L.D. Commission on examining the former Urquhart enterprises in the Altai and the Urals—486, 562, 565-66, 573, 575

Mikhailov (*Yelinson*), *L. M.* (1872-1928)—Party member from 1900. In 1922, plenipotentiary in Norway; in 1923-24, representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Turkestan, member of the Central Asian Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee —428

Mikhailov, *Vasily Mikhailovich* (1894-1937)—Party member from 1915. In 1921-22, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. From 1922, Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, Secretary of the Zamoskvorechye District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Council of Trade Unions—344-45, 350, 352, 359, 363, 395

Mikhailovsky, *I. O.* (b. 1876)—engineer and technologist. In 1919-28, head of the Patent Department; Deputy Chairman, then Chairman and chief expert of the Inventions Committee under the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council—129

Mikhalsky—see *Lapinsky*, *P. L.*

Milyukov, *Pavel Nikolayevich* (1859-1943)—leader of the Cadet Party, historian and publicist, active whiteguard émigré—480

Milyutin, *Vladimir Pavlovich* (1884-1938)—Party member from 1910. From 1918 to 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council—76, 131, 134

Minor, *Lazar Solomonovich* (1855-1942) — neuropathologist —384

Minor, *Robert* (*Ballister*) (1884-1952)—American socialist, journalist and artist. In 1920, joined the U.S. Communist Party and became one of its leaders, editor of the Party's Central Organ Daily Worker—402

Miroshnikov, *Ivan Ivanovich* (1894-1939)—Party member from 1917. From 1921 to 1937, Deputy Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence—306, 473-74

Mishell, *B.*—representative of the American Allied Drug

and Chemical Corporation, head manager of the Alamerico concession in Soviet Russia—362, 544, 559

Molotov (*Skryabin*) *Vyacheslav Mikhailovich* (b. 1890)—Party member from 1906. From 1918 engaged in Party and Soviet government work: Secretary of the Ukrainian C.P.(B.) Central Committee, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee; from 1926, member of the Politbureau and then of the Presidium of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, in 1930-41, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of People's Commissars; from 1939, People's Commissar and later Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. In June 1957, by decision of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee Plenary Meeting, he was removed from the C.C. Presidium and the C.P.S.U. Central Committee for factional activity, and in 1962, expelled from the Party—110, 119, 123, 125, 142, 146, 155, 172, 175, 183, 184, 188, 202, 203, 204, 207, 210, 212, 223, 229, 233-34, 240, 250, 253, 266, 273, 274, 284, 286, 313, 316, 320, 330, 335, 351, 376, 380, 381, 383, 386, 395, 402-03, 405, 407, 413, 416-17, 419, 426-27, 428-29, 433, 434, 435-36, 437, 439, 446, 448-50, 456, 458, 461, 467-68, 474, 476, 479, 483, 485, 490, 492, 495, 498, 499, 501, 517, 519, 586, 587, 595

Mordvilko, *A. K.* (1867-1938)—zoologist. From 1911, worked at the Zoological Museum of the Academy of Sciences—173-74

Morosanov, *A. N.* (b. 1892)—Party member from 1918. In 1921-23, Chairman of the Publishing Committee of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. and head of the Novaya Derevnya Publishing House, editor of the newspaper *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Zhizn* (Agricultural Life)—551

Morozov, *Mikhail Vladimirovich* (1868-1938)—Party member from 1901, Bolshevik. In 1922, worked in the Central Peat Administration of the Supreme Economic Council—464, 487-89

Müller, *Richard* (b. 1880)—German worker, Social-Democrat, member of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, then of the United Communist Party of Germany. Took part in the November 1918 Revolution in Germany. In 1921, came to Soviet Russia for the First Congress of the Red International of Trade Unions as a delegate from the German Metalworkers' Union—218

Muralov, *Nikolai Ivanovich* (1877-1937)—Party member from 1903. From August 1920, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture; from March 1921, Commander of the Moscow and then the North-Caucasian Military District, also held other posts. In 1927, the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) expelled him from the Party for his active support of the Trotskyite opposition—86, 315, 406-07

Musabekov, *G. M.* (1888-1938)—Party member from 1918. From the spring of 1920, People's Commissar for Food of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. In 1921,

Extraordinary Commissar of Kuba Uyezd. From 1922, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars —122

Mushketov, *Dmitry Ivanovich* (1882-1938)—geologist; from 1919 to 1936, Director of the Leningrad Mining Institute—118

Mussolini, *Benito* (1883-1945)—fascist dictator in Italy (1922-43)—592

Myaskov, *Konstantin Gavrilovich* (1881-1958)—Party member from 1912. After the October Revolution, Commissar for Food in Samara; Chairman of Agricultural Bank of Russia, member of the Presidium of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, member of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission; worked in the C.P.S.U. C.C. apparatus—301

Myasnikov, *G. I.* (1889-1946)—Party member from 1906. In 1921, engaged in Party work in Perm Gubernia, then in Petrograd. In 1922 was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activity. Later, emigrated abroad—236, 253, 402, 479-80

N

Nadezhda Konstantinovna—see *Krupskaya*, *N. K.*

Nakoryakov, *Nikolai Nikandrovich* (*Nazar Uralsky*) (b. 1881)—began his revolutionary activity in 1901. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, a Bolshevik. In 1912-16, editor of the newspaper Novy Mir (New World) published by Russian émigrés in the United States. After the February 1917 revolution, returned to Russia; was deputy military commissar of the Provisional Government in the First Army. Came out against the Bolsheviks. Later, worked in publishing houses in Kharkov, Siberia and Moscow. From 1922 head of the Goslitizdat Publishing House. In 1925, joined the R.C.P.(B.)—427

Nansen, *Fridtjof* (1861-1930)—Norwegian scientist, Arctic explorer and well-known public figure. After the First World War, High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Prisoners of War. In 1921, organised the International Famine Relief Commission—207, 268-69, 290

Narimanov, *Nariman Kerbalai Najaf-ogly* (1871-1925)—Soviet statesman and writer. In 1921, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of People's Commissars. From 1922, Chairman of the Union Council of the Transcaucasian Federation, and then a Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.—65, 109, 111, 310

Nazvanov, *M. K.* (1872-1934)—engineer and technologist in the sugar industry. After the October Revolution, adviser of the Board and Chairman of the Technical Council of the Central Sugar Administration. In 1919-21, adviser in the Production Department of the Supreme Economic Council and later in the State Planning Commission. From 1922, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—330, 453

Neopikhanov, *Alexander Alexandrovich* (b. 1884)—engineer and economist. In 1919-21, Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Railway Trans-

port Workers' Union; later, member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission —199, 200

Nepryakhin, *Mikhail Grigoryevich* (b. 1887)—Party member from 1918. In 1919-21, gubernia commissar for food in Astrakhan. In 1921-22, Chairman of the Gubernia Co-operative Board, Chief of the Transport Department of the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry. From 1922, Chief of the State Fishery Administration—223-24, 234

Nesterov, *Boris Pavlovich* (1894-1937)—Party member from 1918. From 1922, worked in the Managing Department of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars—455, 491

Nikolayev, *Akim Maximovich* (1887-1938)—Party member from 1904. In 1918-24, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs, and Chairman of the Radio Council—126-27, 169, 291, 545

Nogin, *Viktor Pavlovich* (1878-1924)—Party member from 1898. In 1921, member of the International Bureau of the Red International of Trade Unions, member of the Supreme Economic Council Presidium, member of the All-Russia C.E.C. Turkestan Commission, Chairman of the Chief Cotton Committee—147

Noulens, *Joseph* (1864-1939)—French politician and statesman. In 1917-18, ambassador to Russia. After the October Revolution, one of the organisers of the Allied countries' intervention and counter-revolutionary activity in Soviet Russia—277, 290

Novitsky, *Alexander Adolfovich* (b. 1894)—financial worker, R.C.P.(B.) member from 1918. From 1921, head of the R.S.F.S.R. Budgetary Administration, secretary of the gold and currency commission, member of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars, representative of the People's Commissariat for Finance in the Council of Labour and Defence. In 1922, P.C.F. representative in the Ukraine and member of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, then of the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee. From 1923, Chief of the Finance Control Administration of the U.S.S.R. People's Commissariat for Finance —351, 352, 370, 460

O

Oborin, *Vasily Pavlovich* (1887-1939)—Party member from 1904. After the October Revolution, engaged in Party and trade union work in Petrograd. In 1921, secretary of the Collegium of the Electrical Department of the Petrograd Economic Council. At the Fifteenth R.C.P.(B.) Congress in 1927 was expelled from the Party for participating in the anti-Party Democratic Centralism group —286

Oganovsky, *Nikolai Petrovich* (b. 1874)—statistician and economist. Before 1917, Socialist-Revolutionary. In 1921-24, head of the Statistical Department of the R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Agriculture. Later, worked in the People's Commissariats for Finance and for Trade, on the Supreme Economic Council and on the State Planning Commission—551

Okulov, Alexei Ivanovich (1880-1939)—man of letters Party member from 1903. In 1920-21, Commander of the Eastern Siberia armed forces and member of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal. Later, engaged in Soviet government and literary work—386

Olminsky, Mikhail Stepanovich (1863-1933)—Party member from 1898, took part in the revolutionary movement from the early 1880s. In 1920-24, head of the Party History Department of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee—555

Orakhelashvili, Mamia Dmitrievich (1881-1937)—Party member from 1903. From March 1921, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Soviet Georgia, then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, Secretary of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). From December 1922, Chairman of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars—582

Orjonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (1886-1937)—Party member from 1903. After the October Revolution, Extraordinary Commissar for the Ukraine, then for the South of Russia. During the Civil War, member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of the 16th and 14th armies, and of the Caucasian Front. In 1921-26, Chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee, then First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Territorial Party Committee. From 1926, Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and People's Commissar for the U.S.S.R. Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. From 1930, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Economic Council and, from 1932 People's Commissar for Heavy Industry—109, 110, 115, 122, 125, 147, 178, 188, 212, 313, 339, 409, 577, 582, 608

Orlov, N. A.— in 1918-19, secretary of the magazine *Izvestia Narkomproda* (News of the People's Commissariat for Food); in 1920-21, assistant editor and editor of the magazine's publishing department; then head of the economic department of the journal *Novy Mir* (New World) published by the Soviet embassy in Berlin—403

Osadchy, Pyotr Semyonovich (1866-1943)—specialist in electrical engineering. After the October Revolution, Deputy Chairman of the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission and Chairman of the Central Electrotechnical Council of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Economic Council—199, 431, 482

Osinsky, N. (*Obolensky, V. V.*) (1887-1938)—Party member from 1907. After the October Revolution, Manager of the R.S.F.S.R. State Bank and Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1918, sided with the "Left Communists". In 1921-23, Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture—78, 87, 90, 97, 144, 226, 300, 323, 340, 406-07, 411, 476, 551, 584, 590

Ostryakov, Pyotr Alexeyevich (1887-1952)—radio engineer. In 1918-27, worked in the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory; in 1921, headed the construction of the radio station in Moscow—280

P

Paikes, *A. K.* (1873-1958)—Party member from 1918. In 1921-22, plenipotentiary representative in China and later in Lithuania. From 1923, worked on the Supreme Economic Council—178, 183, 332

Pavlov, *Ivan Petrovich* (1849-1936)—prominent Russian physiologist—69

Pavlov, *V. A.* (1890-1942)—radio engineer; in 1921-24, Chief of the Radio Department of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs—554

Pavlovich, *Mikhail Pavlovich* (*Veltman*, *M. L.*) (1871-1927)—orientalist. After the October Revolution, Deputy People's Commissar for Education in the Ukraine. In 1921-23, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities and Chairman of the Scientific Orientalogy Association. Later, principal of the Institute of Orientalogy—194

Peshekhonov, *Alexei Vasilyevich* (1867-1933)—in 1917, Minister for Food in the bourgeois Provisional Government. In 1921, worked on the Central Statistical Bureau of the Ukraine. In 1922 was expelled from the country for participating in the counter-revolutionary League of Regeneration—79, 82, 484

Pestun, *Kh. G.* (1889-1939)—Party member from 1918. In 1920-21, Secretary of the Gomel Gubernia Party Committee. In 1921-22, representative of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee in Bashkiria—280-81

Peters, *Jan Khristoforovich* (1886-1938)—Party member from 1904. From 1920, member of the Turkestan Bureau of the Central Committee, then member of the Collegium of the Joint State Political Administration, of the Central Control Commission, of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Chairman of the Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), member of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—297

Petrov, *Grigory Semyonovich* (b. 1886)—chemical technologist, an organiser of production of plastics in the country. From 1932, professor of the Moscow Chemical and Technological Institute—129

Petrovsky, *Grigory Ivanovich* (1878-1958)—Party member from 1897. From 1919 to 1938, Chairman of the All-Ukraine Central Executive Committee, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee—111, 145

Pilyavsky, *Stanislav Stanislavovich* (1882-1937)—Party member from 1903. From October 1921, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as a member and rapporteur of the C.P.C. Commission dealing with negotiations on debts—383

Plekhanov, *Georgi Valentinovich* (*G. V.*, *X.*, *Nemets*) (1856-1918)—outstanding figure in the Russian and international working-class movement, first propagandist of Marxism in Russia; in 1883, founded in Geneva the first Russian Marxist organisation, the Emancipation of Labour group. In the early 1900s, member of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and the journal *Zarya*.

From 1883 to 1903, Plekha-

nov wrote a number of works which played an important part in the defence and propaganda of the materialist outlook. After the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903, he adopted a conciliatory stand towards the opportunists, and afterwards joined the Mensheviks. In 1907-14, he came out against the Machist revision of Marxism and against liquidationism, and headed the group of pro-Party Mensheviks. During the First World War, took a social-chauvinist attitude. He disapproved of the October Revolution, but did not take part in fighting the Soviet power—138

Poincaré, *Raymond* (1860-1934)—French politician and statesman. From 1893, was repeatedly a member of the French government. In 1912, Prime Minister; from 1913 to 1920, President of France. After the October Revolution, one of the organisers of the foreign military intervention against Soviet Russia. In 1922-24 and 1926-29, Prime Minister of France—469

Pokrovsky, *Mikhail Nikolayevich* (1868-1932)—historian, Party member from 1905. From November 1917 to March 1918, Chairman of the Moscow Soviet. From 1918, Deputy People's Commissar for Education of the R.S.F.S.R.—67, 69, 77, 83, 93, 128, 139, 370, 412, 552

Polyakov, *Mikhail Kharitonovich* (1884-1938)—Party member from 1918. In 1921, Chairman of the Crimean Revolutionary Committee—404

Popov, *I. K.* (1887-1918)—in February 1918, sent to Vladivostok by the All-Russia C.E.C. and the Council of People's Commissars to organise the unloading of the port. Shot by the Japanese interventionists—414

Popov, *Pavel Ilyich* (1872-1950)—statistician. From 1918, head of the Central Statistical Board, member of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission—48, 200, 260, 262, 342, 484, 524

Popova (*Kasparova*), *Yevgenia Minasovna* (1888-1963)—took part in the revolutionary movement from 1903, Party member from 1919. In 1918-22, head of the Housing Department of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; later, Executive Secretary of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission—414-15

Potyaev, *A. I.* (b. 1888)—Party member from 1917 to 1923. In 1920-21, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food, Chief of the Central Administration of the Fishing Industry. Later, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—135, 203, 223-24, 225-26, 234, 242, 328

Pravdin, *Alexander Grigoryevich* (1879-1943)—Party member from 1899. After the October Revolution until 1923, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Later, Deputy People's Commissar for Railways, Chairman of the Northern Railways Board, Chief of the Transport Group of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection—297

Preobrazhensky, *Alexei Andreyevich* (1863-1938)—from 1902, worked on the Samara-Zlatoust Railway; from 1918, chief of the office; from 1919, business manager and then head of the

administration of the railway. In 1922, on Lenin's recommendation, was appointed business manager of the Gorki state farm—404

Preobrazhensky, *Yevgeny Alexeyevich* (1886-1937)—Party member from 1903. From March 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance, then Chairman of the Central Administration for Vocational Training under the People's Commissariat for Education. During the discussion on the trade unions in 1920-21 backed Trotsky—106, 127, 321, 341, 364-66, 421, 427, 445, 450, 495, 540

Prokopovich, *Sergei Nikolayevich* (1871-1955)—bourgeois economist and publicist. Took part in the co-operative movement. In 1921, member of the All-Russia Famine Relief Committee; together with some other members of the organisation tried to use it for counter-revolutionary aims. In 1922 was expelled from the country for anti-Soviet activity—106, 269

Pyatakov, *Georgi Leonidovich* (1890-1937)—Party member from 1910. After the October Revolution, member of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. From 1920, engaged in business and Soviet government work: Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission and the Supreme Economic Council, trade representative in France, Chairman of the Board of the U.S.S.R. State Bank. Repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy. In 1927 was expelled from the Party for factional activity; reinstated and once again expelled in 1936—111, 121, 217, 264, 381, 393, 411, 457, 458-59, 482, 487-89, 499, 500-01, 570, 574, 584-85, 586, 587-88

R

Rabinovich, *F. Y.* (1885-1937)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1902, Menshevik; from 1919, Bolshevik. In 1920-22, Business Manager of the Secretariat of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, deputy representative of the Council of Labour and Defence and of the P.C.F.T. in Transcaucasia. In 1922-25, member, then chief, of the "Arcos" Association Board, deputy trade representative in Britain—178

Radchenko, *Ivan Ivanovich* (1874-1942)—Party member from 1898. From 1918, organiser and leader of the peat industry in the U.S.S.R. In 1921-22, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. In 1927-30 and in 1934-35, principal of the Scientific Research Institute for the Peat Industry—116, 151, 170, 179, 181, 273, 322, 331, 347, 362, 365, 370, 373, 412, 464, 514-16, 585

Radek, *Karl Berngardovich* (1885-1939)—member of the Bolshevik Party from 1917. After the October Revolution, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; Secretary of the Comintern Executive Committee; contributor to *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. Repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy. Expelled from the Party for anti-Party activity—158, 251, 267-68, 282, 310, 311, 409, 446, 447, 456, 479, 589

Rahja, *Eino* (1886-1936)—Party member from 1903. Participant

in the revolutionary movement in Russia and Finland. In July 1917, helped to arrange Lenin's passage to Finland to escape persecution by the bourgeois Provisional Government, and back again to Russia in October. In 1918, commanded Red Guard detachments during the workers' revolution in Finland. In 1919, commander of the troops fighting Yudenich. Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland —87

Rakosi, *Mátyás* (b. 1892)—member of the Communist Party of Hungary from 1918. After the establishment of the Soviet power in Hungary in 1919, member of the revolutionary government. From 1920 to 1924, worked in the Comintern Executive Committee; in 1921, was elected its Secretary—267-68, 310

Rakovsky, *Khristian Georgievich* (1873-1941)—Party member from 1917. From 1918, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine; from 1923, engaged in diplomatic work in Britain and France. Active member of the Trotskyite opposition, for which was expelled from the Party—89, 94, 96, 145, 246, 302, 340, 349, 381, 447

Ramzin, *Leonid Konstantinovich* (1887-1948)—heat engineer From 1920, professor of the Moscow Higher Technical College. In 1921, member of the State Planning Commission later, principal of the Moscow All-Union Thermal Technical Institute—200-01, 307, 334, 454, 466

Reine, *T. Y.*— engineer. In 1919, head of the Bureau of Accounting and Supply, and member of the Collegium of the Mining Council under the Supreme Economic Council—171

Reinstein, *B. I.* (1866-1947)—Bolshevik from 1918. Worked mainly in the Comintern and the Red International of Trade Unions—267, 268, 337, 338, 346, 362, 368, 523, 559

Remeiko (*Tikhomirov*), *A. G.* (1894-1938)—Party member from 1914. In 1920-23, head of the Organising Department of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council; member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Miners' Union Central Committee; Chairman of the Kursk and Odessa Gubernia Councils of Trade Unions—382

Reske, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1887-1956)—in 1921, representative of the Council of Labour and Defence, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in the Northern Caucasus; in 1921-22, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Later, extraordinary representative of the All-Russia C.E.C. and the People's Commissariat for Food in conducting the tax in kind campaign in Gomel, Bryansk and Kaluga gubernias—281

Ringo, *I. A.* (1883-1946)—engineer; in 1918-22, head of the Moscow Gubernia Electrical Department; later, director of the electrical assembly office of the Moscow Economic Council and the department of local electrification under the Supreme Economic Council—55

Rothstein, *Theodore* (1871-1953) —Party member from 1901.

In 1890, emigrated to Britain, where he took an active part in the labour movement and in establishing the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1920. Wrote for the Russian and foreign socialist press. In 1920, returned to Russia, and from 1921 to 1930, engaged in diplomatic work—212, 254, 599

Rozanov, *Vladimir Nikolayevich* (1872-1934)—surgeon. From 1910, head of the surgical department of the Soldatenkovskaya Hospital (now named after S. P. Botkin). Took part in the treatment of Lenin. Founder and editor of a number of magazines on surgery—557

Rozengolts, *Arkady Pavlovich* (1889-1938)—Party member from 1905. During the October Revolution, member of the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee. During the Civil War, member of the Revolutionary Military Councils of a number of armies and fronts; later, was engaged in military, diplomatic and government work. In 1922, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance. In 1937 was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activities—561

Rozhkov, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1868-1927)—historian and publicist, Menshevik. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War fought against the Soviet power. Later, broke with the Mensheviks and was engaged in teaching, scientific and administrative work—457, 598

Rudzutak, *Jan Ernestovich* (1887-1938)—Party member from 1905. From 1919, member of the Turkestan Commission. From 1920, member of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee; member of the Presidium and General Secretary of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council. In 1921-24, Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. In 1924-30, People's Commissar for Railways. From 1932, Chairman of the C.P.S.U.(B.) Central Control Commission and People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the U.S.S.R.—72, 161, 247, 419, 502, 533, 599

Rukhimovich, *M. L.* (1889-1939)—Party member from 1913. In 1921, Chairman of the Donets Gubernia Executive Committee and Manager of the "Donugol" and "Khimugol" trusts. From 1925, Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Economic Council; later, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Economic Council. From 1930, People's Commissar for Railways; from 1936 People's Commissar for the Defence Industry—264, 265, 321, 332-34, 381

Runov, *Tikhon Alexandrovich* 1886-1941)—agronomist. From 1919, Chairman of the Central Administration for the Farms of Industrial Enterprises of the Republic. In 1921, one of the organisers of the first All-Russia Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow; worked on land improvement in the Moscow area—268-69, 315, 513

Rutgers, *Sebald J.* (1879-1961)—Dutch engineer, Communist. In 1921-26, headed the international autonomous industrial colony in the Kuznetsk Basin—304, 320, 334-35, 338, 339, 412, 522, 562

Ruthenberg, *Charles Emile* (1882-1927)—a founder and leader of the Communist Party of the United States. Member of the Comintern Executive Committee. In 1921, elected Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party's Central Committee—368

Ryazanov (*Goldendach*), *David Borisovich* (1870-1938)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik; joined the Bolshevik Party in August 1917. After the October Revolution, worked in the trade unions; during the discussion on the trade unions in 1920-21, took an anti-Party stand and was removed from trade union work. From 1921, Director of the Institute of Marx and Engels. In 1931 was expelled from the Party for his support of the Mensheviks' counter-revolutionary activity—80, 309

Rykov, *Alexei Ivanovich* (1881-1938)—Party member from 1899. After the October Revolution, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence. In 1919-20, Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Red Army and Navy Supplies; Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R.; member of the C.C. Politbureau. Repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy. In 1937 was expelled from the C.P.S.U.(B.) for anti-Party activities—65, 75, 96, 104, 107, 114, 115, 116, 123, 170, 203, 219, 221, 226, 268, 349, 396, 517, 520, 521-23, 529, 534, 538-39, 550, 551, 552, 554, 556, 558, 560, 561, 566, 571, 605

Rykunov, *M. V.* (1884-1937)—Party member from 1903. In 1921-22, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade; from 1922, Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture and Chief of the Water Economy of Turkestan and later Chief of the Central Asia Water Resources Administration and deputy representative of the Council of Labour and Defence in Central Asia—192, 365

S

Safarov, *G. I.* (1891-1942)—Party member from 1908. In 1921, member of the Turkestan Bureau of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee, then member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern. At the Fourteenth C.P.S.U.(B.) Congress, joined the New Opposition, then the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. In 1927 was expelled from the Party; in 1928, reinstated and in 1934 expelled again for anti-Party activity—246, 297, 417-18, 535

Samarin, *V. I.*—378

Sammer, *Ivan Adamovich* (1870-1921)—joined the revolutionary movement in 1897; Social-Democrat, Bolshevik. From 1919, worked in Centrosoyuz; later, President of the All-Ukraine Union of Consumers' Societies and representative of the Ukrainian People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—179, 440

Sapronov, *Timofei Vladimirovich* (1887-1939)—Party member from 1912. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Moscow Gubernia Executive

Committee, Chairman of the Kharkov Gubernia Revolutionary Committee. In 1920-21, Chairman of the Building Workers' Union Central Committee; Chairman of the Chief Public Works Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. During the discussion on the trade unions, headed the anti-Party Democratic Centralism group. Later, repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy. In 1927 was expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth C.P.S.U.(B.) Congress—168, 187, 275

Scheidemann, *Philipp* (1865-1939)—a leader of the extreme Right-wing of German Social-Democracy—80

Scheinman, *Aron Lvovich* (b. 1886)—Party member from 1903. From 1920, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. In 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance and the State Bank Board, then Deputy People's Commissar for Finance of the U.S.S.R.—228, 331, 428, 455, 490

Schmidt, *Otto Yulyevich* (1891-1956)—Party member from 1918; scientist, Arctic explorer, public figure. In 1921-22, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance. From 1932 to 1939, head of the Central Arctic Route Administration—77, 445

Schmidt, *Vasily Vladimirovich* (1886-1940)—Party member from 1905. In 1918-28, People's Commissar for Labour, Secretary of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council—114

Schwarz, *Isaak Izrailevich* (1879-1951)—Party member from 1899. In 1921, Chairman of the All-Russia Miners' Union Central Committee—381

Semashko, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1874-1949)—Party member from 1893. Participant in the 1905-07 revolution and the October Revolution. In 1918-30, People's Commissar for Public Health of the R.S.F.S.R.—65, 67, 69, 89, 97, 128, 208, 298, 337, 384, 502, 557, 559

Senin, *V. I.* (1886-1943)—in 1918-23 uyezd commissar for food, chief of the grain and fodder administration and the state purchases administration of the People's Commissariat for Food; later, chief of the farming department of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture—105

Serebrovsky, *Alexander Pavlovich* (1884-1943)—Party member from 1903. In 1920-26, Chairman of the Board of the Azerbaijan Oil Committee in Baku; Chief of Glavzoloto, and Deputy People's Commissar for Heavy Industry—109, 112, 147, 178-79, 188

Sereda, *Semyon Pafnutyevich* (1871-1933)—Party member from 1903. After the October Revolution, People's Commissar for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. (1918-21); from 1921, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and the State Planning Commission, Deputy Manager and Manager of the Central Statistical Board of the R.S.F.S.R. From 1930, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission—47, 52, 53, 340

Sergo—see *Orjonikidze*, *G. K.*

Serrati, *Giacinto Menotti* (1872-1926)—a leader of the Italian Socialist Party, later,

Communist. In 1915-23, Director of the Socialist Party's Central Organ, the newspaper *Avanti!*—124, 311, 377, 422, 600

Shafransky, *Ivan Osipovich* (1891-1954)—Party member from 1917. In May-June 1921, Executive Secretary of the Samarkand Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan; later, Chairman of the Samarkand Regional Party Control Commission—195

Shapiro, *L. G.* (*Shanin*, *M.*) (1887-1957)—took part in the revolutionary movement from 1902; in 1903, joined the Riga organisation of the Bund; Menshevik; from 1918, Bolshevik Worked in the People's Commissariat for Education, and did political work in the Red Army. From 1920 to 1921, member of the Presidium of the Chief Committee for Political Education. Later, worked in the People's Commissariat for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R —397, 400

Shaposhnikov, *Alexei Romanovich*—peasant from Beketovo Village, Bulgakov Volost, Ufa Uyezd-in early March 1921 came to Moscow, together with some other peasants, on Lenin's invitation to discuss the substitution of a tax in kind for surplus grain appropriation—101-02

Shapovalov, *Alexander Isidorovich* (1871-1942)—a veteran of the revolutionary movement in Russia, member of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class from 1895. After the October Revolution, engaged in Soviet government and Party work—308

Shatilov, *Iosif Nikolayevich* (1824-1889)—from 1864, President of the Moscow Farming Society, a founder of the Petrovskaya Agricultural and Forestry Academy (now named after K. A. Timiryazev); founder of the experimental station in Tula Gubernia (now Shatilov State Selection Station in Orel Region)—584

Shatunovsky, *Yakov Moiseyevich* (1876-1932)—Party member from 1918. From 1920, member of the Transport Commission under the Council of Labour and Defence, member of the Industrial Section of the State Planning Commission—137

Shaw, *George Bernard* (1856-1950) —English playwright and publicist—404

Shcherba, *Lev Vladimirovich* (1880-1944)—Soviet linguist. In 1916-44, professor of Leningrad University—173

Shchurkevich, *Pantelei Antonovich* (1873-1942)—professor of the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute—173-74

Shelekhes, *Yakov Savelyevich*—248

Shklovskaya, *Dvosya Zelikovna* (1880-1956)—wife of G. L. Shklovsky—70, 71, 88

Shklovsky, *Grigory Lvovich* (1875-1937)—Party member from 1898. In 1918, adviser of the R.S.F.S.R. plenipotentiary at the Swiss Government in Berne. In 1919-21, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture; Party worker in Moscow; representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd and in the Northern area of the R.S.F.S.R.; member of the trade mission of the R.S.F.S.R. in Germany —71, 88, 162, 175, 176, 211, 535

Shlyapnikov, *Alexander Gavrilovich* (1885-1987)—Party member from 1901. After the October Revolution, People's Commissar for Labour. In 1919-22, Chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Russia Metalworkers' Union; from May 1921, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1920-22, organiser and leader of the anti-Party Workers' Opposition group. Expelled from the C.P.S.U.(B.) during the Party purge in 1933—114, 253

Shotman, *Alexander Vasilyevich* (1880-1989)—Party member from 1899. In 1922, Chairman of the Economic Conference of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic—578

Shpektorov, *N. L.* (1890-1937)—Party member from 1920. From 1918, served in the Red Army. In 1922-25, member of the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic—130

Shvedchikov, *Konstantin Matveyevich* (1884-1952)—Party member from 1904. In 1918-24, representative of the Council of People's Commissars for the paper industry and the printing industry. Later, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—369

Sklyansky, *Efraim Markovich* (1892-1925)—Party member from 1913. In 1918-24, Deputy People's Commissar for Military Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic —48, 65, 66, 83, 88, 138, 166, 171, 172, 189, 298, 466

Skobelev, *Matvei Ivanovich* (1885-1939)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1903, Menshevik. After the February revolution, Minister for Labour in the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the October Revolution, broke with the Mensheviks and worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. From 1921 to 1925, representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in France—277

Skvortsov—see *Skvortsov-Stepanov*, *I. I.*

Skvortsov-Stepanov, *Ivan Ivanovich* (1870-1928)—Party member from 1896. In 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Slate Publishers. Author of many economic and historical works, translator and editor of the three volumes of Capital and other works of Marx and Engels—213, 284, 307, 327, 350, 552, 554-55

Šmeral, *Bohumir* (1880-1941)—prominent figure in the Czechoslovak and international working-class movement, a founder of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, member of its Central Committee; member of the Comintern Executive Committee—213, 258

Smilga, *Ivar Tenisovich* (1892-1938)—Party member from 1907. After the October Revolution, representative of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissar in Finland. In 1920-21, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and of the R.M.C.s of the Western, Southern and Caucasian fronts; Chairman of the Council of the South-Eastern Labour Army. From 1921 to 1923, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council and Chief of the Central Fuel Administration—84, 116, 170, 205, 207, 263, 265, 334, 411, 452, 479, 566, 568

Smirnov, *Alexander Petrovich* (1877-1938)—Party member from 1896. From 1919, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Food; later, Deputy People's Commissar for Food, etc.—324

Smirnov, *Ivan Nikitich* (1881-1936)—Party member from 1899. In 1920-21, Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee. In 1921-22, worked in the Supreme Economic Council; later, People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraphs —88, 96, 183, 208, 381, 530

Smirnov, *N. N.* (b. 1880)—oil engineer. After the October Revolution, worked in the oil industry; later, professor of the Moscow Oil Institute and the Mining Academy—63, 88

Smirnov, *V. M.* (1887-1937)—Party member from 1907. After the October Revolution, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council; in 1921-22, member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission; from March 1921, member of the Commission for the Utilisation of Material Resources of the R.S.F.S.R. under the Council of Labour and Defence. In 1923 joined the Trotskyite opposition, and was expelled from the Party for factional activity—104, 550

Smith-Falkner, *Maria Natanovna* (1878-1968)—economist and statistician, Party member from 1918. After the October Revolution, worked in a number of research institutions. From 1939, Associate Member of the U.S.S.R Academy of Sciences —107

Smolyaninov, *Vadim Alexandrovich* (1890-1962)—Party member from 1908. From April 1921, Deputy Business Manager of the Council of Labour and Defence on economic matters; later, Business Manager of the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R.—140, 148-49, 152, 154, 167, 180, 208, 217, 220, 221-22, 234, 240, 244, 251, 273, 274, 275-77, 279, 281-82, 283, 285, 295, 316, 349, 366, 372, 381, 394, 421, 422, 436, 438, 442-43, 452, 453-55, 491, 503, 506, 524, 543, 546, 547, 550, 552, 560, 563, 568-70, 572

Sokolnikov (*Brilliant*), *Grigory Yakovlevich* (1888-1939)—Party member from 1905. From August 1920 to March 1921, Commander of the Turkestan Front and Chairman of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee; from November 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance, from 1922, People's Commissar for Finance; from 1926, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission; later, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1936 was expelled from the Party for anti-Party activity—161, 387, 417-18, 427, 429, 444, 450, 460, 465, 476, 478, 480, 490, 495, 496-97, 499-500, 512, 513, 514, 521, 539, 552, 577, 591

Solovyou, *N. I.* (1870-1947)—Party member from 1900. In 1921, head of the Statistical Department of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee—287

Solovyov, *V. I.* (1890-1939)—Party member from 1913. In 1920, member of the Commission Working Out a Project for Reorganising the People's Commissariat for Education. In 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Chief Committee for Political

Education. Later, engaged in diplomatic and other work—57

Solts, *Aron Alexandrovich* (1872-1945)—Party member from 1898. From 1920, member and, from 1921, Chairman of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Control Commission; later, member of the Supreme Court—176, 210, 267, 413, 414, 517

Sorokin, *Pyotr Sergeyevich* (1886-1933)—member of the R.C.P.(B.) from 1918. From 1921 to 1923, Moscow Gubernia food Commissar. Later, worked in the Moscow Consumers' Commune, the People's Commissariat for Home Trade, and Centrosoyuz—228

Sosnovsky, *Lev Semyonovich* (1886-1937)—Party member from 1904, journalist. In 1918-24, editor of the newspaper *Bednota* (The Poor). In 1921, head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. Later was expelled from the Party for his activity in the Trotskyite opposition—314, 352, 369, 532, 583

Spandaryan, *Suren Spandarovich* (1882-1916)—Party member from 1902. At the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. elected member of the Central Committee and the Bureau of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee in Russia. Worked on the newspaper Zvezda. In 1912 was exiled to Siberia for life and there died—184-85

Stalin (*Jugashvili*), *Joseph Vissarionovich* (1879-1953)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1898. After the October Revolution was elected to the Council of People's Commissars, where he headed the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. During the foreign intervention and Civil War was active on several fronts as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. In 1922, was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). As of 1941 he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, later, also of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) was Chairman of the State Committee for Defence, People's Commissar for Defence, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the position of General Secretary of the Party C.C., which he held for a long time, Stalin, together with other leading functionaries, exerted great efforts for the building of socialism, and played a major role in smashing various anti-Party trends, especially Trotskyism and Right opportunism.

At the same time, associated with his name are the distortions in the life of Soviet society, which the Communist Party qualified as manifestations of the personality cult alien to Marxism-Leninism.

The C.P.S.U. decidedly condemned the personality cult and took measures to prevent similar mistakes and distortions in future—65, 95, 100, 127, 136, 257, 265, 266, 268, 311, 313, 314, 322, 334, 348, 355, 359, 381, 384, 407, 409, 427, 431, 440, 443, 450, 454, 460, 466, 474, 479, 484-85, 490, 493, 496, 501, 516, 530, 532-33, 535, 537, 539, 540, 549, 554, 556-57, 559-61, 562, 565, 566, 570, 577, 578, 587, 588, 593, 598, 602, 607, 608

Starkov, *V. V.* (1869-1925)—took part in the Social-Democratic movement from the early 1890s. After the October Revolution, worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, deputy trade representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Germany—153

Stasova, *Yelena Dmitrievna* (1873-1966)—Party member from 1898. From February 1917 to March 1920, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. In 1920-21, engaged in Party work in Petrograd and Baku—184-85

Steinberg, *P. B.*—Russian capitalist, émigré; in 1922-24, one of the founders and Manager of the Joint-Stock Company for Domestic and Export Trade in Hides and Skins in the R.S.F.S.R.—370, 384-85, 436-38

Steinmetz, *Charles Proteus* (*Karl* August Rudolf) (1865-1923)—prominent American scientist in the field of electrical engineering—597

Steklov, *Yuri Mikhailovich* (1873-1941)—in Social-Democratic movement from 1893, Bolshevik after the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903. After the October Revolution, member of the All-Russia and the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee, editor of the newspaper *Izvestia VTsIK*—220, 266-67, 415, 555

Stinnes, *Hugo* (1870-1924)—German businessman and financier, founder of the Stinnes industrial concern in Germany—390

Stomonyakov, *Boris Spiridonovich* (1882-1941)—Party member from 1902. From 1920 to 1925, Soviet trade representative in Berlin—162, 175, 197, 211, 213, 216, 222, 379, 406, 516, 536, 579, 601

Strizhov, *I. N.* (b. 1872)—geologist. From July 1920, deputy manager of the technical department of the Central Oil Administration; later, technical director of the Grozny Oil Committee and held other posts in the oil industry. From 1923, professor of the Moscow Mining Academy—88

Strumilin (*Strumillo-Petrashkevich*), *Stanislav Gustavovich* (b. 1877)—prominent Soviet economist and statistician, member of the Party from 1923. In 1921-37, worked on the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences lecturer at Moscow University and other higher schools—200, 372, 467

Stučka, *Pyotr Ivanovich* (1865-1932)—Party member from 1903. In 1918-19, Chairman of the Soviet Government in Latvia; later, Deputy People's Commissar for Justice of the R.S.F.S.R. Member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and its representative in the Comintern—182

Styunkel, *Boris Ernestovich* (1882-1938)—electrical engineer. From 1920, member of the GOELRO Commission, working on the project for electrifying the Central Industrial area. In 1920-22, Chairman of the Technical Council and member of the Collegium of the Central Metal Administration of the Supreme Economic Council—456

Sukhanov, *N.* (*Gimmer*, *Nikolai Nikolayevich*) (b. 1882)—economist and publicist, Menshevik. After the October Revo-

lution, worked in Soviet economic establishments—447

Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925)—outstanding Chinese revolutionary democrat and statesman—452

Sverdlov, *Yakov Mikhailovich* (1885-1919)—prominent leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, member of the Party from 1901. Took an active part in preparing and carrying out the October Revolution. Member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee and the Military Revolutionary Centre for directing the uprising set up by the Party's Central Committee. In 1917-19, headed the Central Committee Secretariat. From November 1917, Chairman of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—414

Sviderskу, *Alexander Ivanovich* (1878-1933)—Party member from 1899. From May 1921 member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Repeatedly elected to the All-Russia and the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee—60, 61, 62, 156, 281, 570, 596

Syromolotov, *Fyodor Fyodorovich* (b. 1877)—Party member from 1897. After the October Revolution, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, member of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission—421

Syrtsov, *Sergei Ivanovich* (1893-1938)—Party member from 1913. In 1920-21, Secretary of the Odessa Gubernia Party Committee. During the discussion on the trade unions in 1920-21, supported Trotsky's platform. In 1921-26, worked in the Central Committee's apparatus. In 1929, Chairman of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of People's Commissars—111

T

Taratuta, *Viktor Konstantinovich* (1881-1926)—Party member from 1898. In 1919-26, Business Manager of the Supreme Economic Council, Deputy Chairman of the Chemical Department of the S.E.C., Chairman of the Mossukno Trust Board; Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Trade Bank—178

Teodorovich, *Ivan Adolfovich* (1875-1940)—started his revolutionary activity in 1895, Bolshevik. From 1920, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture—134, 190, 226, 380, 406-07, 417, 551, 584, 589-90

Ter-Gabrielyan, *Saak Mirzoyevich* (1886-1937)—Party member from 1902. After the February 1917 revolution, member of the Presidium of the Baku Soviet of Workers' Deputies from the Bolshevik group. Later, worked in Moscow as a member of the Collegium of the Central Oil Administration, member of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia and of the All-Russia Cheka. From 1921, permanent representative of Armenia and then of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R. in Moscow. From 1928 to 1935, Chairman of the Armenian Council of People's Commissars—62

Teumin, *Isaak Vladimirovich* (1872-1936)—Party member from 1920. From July 1921, representative of the Peo-

ple's Commissariat for Foreign Trade in Byelorussia; later, in the Kirghiz Republic—329

Thalheimer, *August* (1884-1948)—German Social-Democrat, publicist. In 1918-23, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany and editor of its Central Organ, *Die Rote Fahne*. From 1923, one of the leaders of Right-wing opportunists. In 1929 was expelled from the Party—187

Tikhanov, *A. S.* (1865-1940)—from 1917 to 1932, professor of the Institute of Civil Engineers and other higher institutions in Leningrad. From 1920, worked at the State Institute for the Designing of Metalworking Plants—174

Tikhomirov, *Vladimir Alexeyevich* (1895-1955)—Party member from 1919. In 1921-24, member of the Centrosoyuz Board—503

Tikhvinsky, *M. M.* (1868-1921)—chemical engineer. After the October Revolution, professor of the Petrograd Technological and Mining Institute and head of the Laboratory Department of the Central Oil Administration under the Supreme Economic Council. Took part in a plot against the Soviet power in 1921—283

Timiryazev, *Kliment Arkadyevich* (1843-1920)—Russian naturalist, prominent botanist and physiologist—584

Tomsky, *Mikhail Pavlovich* (1880-1936)—Party member from 1904. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Moscow Council of Trade Unions. From 1919, Chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Trade Union Council. Member of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee from the Eighth Party Congress (March 1919), later, member of the R.C.P.(B.) C.C. Politbureau. Repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy. In 1928-29, a leader of the Right-wing opportunist deviation in the Party—114, 135, 161, 246, 297, 564, 566, 599

Trifonov, *V. A.* (1888-1938)—Party member from 1904. From June 1921, Deputy Chief of the Central Fuel Administration under the Supreme Economic Council and Chairman of the Board of the All-Russia Oil Syndicate—84, 336, 361, 411

Trofimov, *K. V.* (1894-1937)—Party member from 1917. From 1921, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs—545

Trotsky (*Bronstein*), *Lev Davydovich* (1879-1940)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1897, Menshevik. Returned from emigration after the February revolution in 1917, joined the Mezhraiontsi group with whom he was admitted to the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Congress in 1917. However, Trotsky did not adopt the Bolshevik stand and continued to lead an open and secret fight against Lenin and the Party's policy. After the October Revolution, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, People's Commissar for Railways, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, member of the Central Committee Politbureau and of the Comintern Executive Committee. In 1920-21, headed the opposition in the discus-

sion on the trade unions; from 1923, fought against Lenin's programme for building socialism and argued the impossibility of winning socialism in the U.S.S.R. In 1927 was expelled from the Party and in 1929 deported from the U.S.S.R. for his anti-Soviet activity. Abroad, continued his fight against the Soviet state and the international communist movement—48, 55, 92,100, 108, 110, 114, 137, 233, 250, 266, 321, 339, 390, 411, 420, 424, 443-45, 456, 482, 517, 530, 532, 567, 593, 601-04, 606-08

Troyanovsky, *Alexander Antonovich* (1882-1955)—R.S.D.L.P. member from 1907, Bolshevik. In 1917-21, Menshevik. In 1923 rejoined the R.C.P.(B.). From 1921, worked in the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; later was engaged in the diplomatic service and held other posts —521

Tsereteli, *Irakly Georgievich* (1882-1959)—a Menshevik leader. From May 1917, Minister for Posts and Telegraphs and then Minister for Internal affairs in the bourgeois Provisional Government. Later, a leader of the counter-revolutionary Menshevik government in Georgia. From 1921, whiteguard émigré —126

Tsevchtnsky, *A. I.*— specialist in the oil industry and trade. From 1889, worked for the Nobel Brothers' Association. From 1918 to 1929, worked at the Chief Oil Committee under the Supreme Economic Council, Central Administration of the Oil Industry, Oil Trade Administration and Oil Syndicate—88

Tsintsadze, *Kote Maximovich* (1887-1930)—Party member from 1904 to 1927. After the establishment of the Soviet power in Georgia, Chairman of the Georgian Cheka, member of the Georgian C.P.(B.) Central Committee, member of the Georgian Central Executive Committee—582

Tsyurupa, *Alexander Dmitrievich* (1870-1928)—Party member from 1898. After the October Revolution, Deputy People's Commissar and, from early 1918, People's Commissar for Food. From the end of 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence—60, 89, 90, 94, 96, 97, 103, 104, 114, 123, 396-97, 403, 429-30, 437, 440, 442, 455, 462, 465, 471, 473, 476, 477-78, 480, 487-89, 490, 491, 498-99, 517, 520, 522, 523, 529, 534, 538-39, 550, 556, 558, 560, 569, 570

Tsyurupa, *Georgi Dmitrievich* (1885-1940)—electrical engineer. In 1919-26, Chief Engineer of the Kashira Hydroelectric Power Station; from May 1921, Deputy Chairman of the Chief Public Works Committee—168, 197, 213, 366, 430, 436, 442

Tukhachevsky, *Mikhail Nikolayevich* (1893-1937)—Party member from 1918. Prominent military leader and statesman, Marshal of the Soviet Union. In 1921, as Commander of the Tambov Military District, assigned to liquidate the Antonov bands—171

Tumanov, *Nikolai Gavrilovich* (1887-1936)—Party member from 1917. In 1922-23, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., then Peo-

ple's Commissar for Finance and member of the Central Executive Committee of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R. Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Bank Board, member of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission and of the Supreme Economic Council, trade representative to France and Manager of the U.S.S.R. Industrial Bank—578

Tyszka, *Jan* (*Jogiches*, *Léon*) (1867-1919)—prominent figure in the Polish and German working-class movement: one of the founders of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, an organiser of the Spartacus League. After the November 1918 Revolution in Germany, took part in establishing the Communist Party of Germany and was elected Secretary of its Central Committee—232

U

Uglanov, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1886-1940)—Party member from 1907. In 1920-21, member then Secretary of the Petrograd Gubernia R.C.P.(B.) Committee, Secretary of the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions—314, 339

Ukhanov, *Konstantin Vasilyevich* (1891-1937)—Party member from 1907. From the February 1917 revolution, member of the Moscow Soviet. In 1921, Chairman of the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky Soviet in Moscow—214

Ulrikh, *Anna Ivanovna* (b. 1892)—Party member from 1909. In 1921-24, worked in the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence—547-48

Ulyanov, *Alexander Ilyich* (1866-1887)—Lenin's elder brother, revolutionary, member of the Narodnaya Volya group. Took part in preparing the attempt upon tsar Alexander III's life. Executed in 1887—375

Ulyanov, *Dmitry Ilyich* (1874-1943)—Lenin's younger brother, member of the Party from 1894, physician. In 1920-21, member of the Crimean Regional R.C.P.(B.) Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Council of People's Commissars. From 1921, worked in the People's Commissariat for Public Health of the R.S.F.S.R.—117

Ulyanova, *Maria Ilyinichna* (1878-1937)—Lenin's younger sister, Party member from 1898. From March 1917 to the spring of 1929, member of the Editorial Board and executive secretary of *Pravda*—220, 568

Unschlicht, *Iosif Stanislavovich* (1879-1938)—Party member from 1900. From April 1921 to the autumn of 1923, Deputy Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka (later, of the State Political Administration). Subsequently, worked on the Supreme Economic Council and the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. headed the Central Civil Air Force Administration—167, 173, 201, 202, 211, 267-68, 330, 374, 378, 383, 384, 432, 443, 454, 457-58, 484, 500-01

Uralsky, *Nazar*—see *Nakoryakov*, *N. N.*

Urquhart, *John Leslie* (1874-1933)—British financial magnate and industrialist. In 1921-22, held negotiations with the Soviet Government to obtain concessions on his former enterprises in Russia—261, 339, 354-

55, 359, 371, 426, 481, 562, 565, 567, 573-75

V

Vainstein, *A. L.* (b. 1892)—economist, statistician. In 1918-21, head of the Statistical Department of the Moscow Gubernia Economic Council, deputy head of the Statistical Department of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1921-23, head of the Economic Department of the Planning Administration of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R. Later, engaged in scientific work and teaching—551

Vainstein, *S. A.* (1876-1923)—Menshevik. After the February revolution in 1917, member of the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee. During the Civil War, fought against the Soviet power, then emigrated—398

Vanderlip, *Washington B.* (b. 1866)—engineer, representing U.S. industrial circles; in 1920, came to Soviet Russia to negotiate oil and coal concessions in the Kamchatka—98

Varga, *Yevgeny Samoylovich* (1879-1964)—economist, member of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party from 1906. After the victory of the Soviet power in Hungary in March 1919, Varga was People's Commissar for Finance, and then Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. After the downfall of the Soviet power in Hungary, Varga, who had joined the Communist Party, went to Austria and in 1920 to Soviet Russia, where he joined the R.C.P.(B.). Worked in the Comintern. From 1927 to 1947, headed the Institute of World Economy and Politics of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences—504, 525, 534, 593, 594

Vashkov, *Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1874-1953)—electrical engineer. In 1920-21, head of the Electrical Department of the Supreme Economic Council, member of the Central Electrotechnical Council and of the GOELRO Commission. From 1921, member of the State Planning Commission—235, 256

Vasilyev, *V. A.* (b. 1885)—Party member from 1905. In 1921, military commissar of Boguchary Uyezd and then Korotoyak Uyezd of Voronezh Gubernia—172

Vetchinkin, *Nikolai Sergeyevich* (1886-1960)—highway engineer. In 1921-27, worked in the Central Production and Economic Administration of the Supreme Economic Council, then in the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. Engaged in scientific work and in teaching—337

Vishnyak, *Yakov Izrailevich* (1886-1948)—electrical engineer. Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution, engaged in military work in Siberia and the Crimea. In 1921-24 and in 1928-30, worked in Soviet trade missions abroad—289, 366

Vladimirov (*Sheinfinkel*), *Miron Konstantinovich* (1879-1925)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1903; in the Bolshevik Party, from 1917. In 1921, People's Commissar for Food, and then People's Commissar for Agriculture in the Ukraine; in 1922, People's Commissar for Finance of the R.S.F.S.R.; from November 1924, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Eco-

nomic Council of the U.S.S.R. —167, 245-46, 258, 259, 302, 561, 567

Vladimirsky, *Mikhail Fyodorovich* (1874-1951)—Party member from 1895, Bolshevik. After the October Revolution, member of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., Secretary of the Ukrainian C.P.(B.) Central Committee—48, 121, 131, 293, 535

Voikov, *Pyotr Lazarevich* (1888-1927)—from 1903, Menshevik; from August 1917, Bolshevik. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Urals Factory Conference. From 1919, C.P.C. representative on the Centrosoyuz Board. From 1920, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, head of the Severoles trust. From October 1924, plenipotentiary representative of the U.S.S.R. in Poland—129, 130, 178

Volkov, *Yevgeny Zakharovich* (b. 1883)—Party member from 1920. From September to October 1921, head of the information subdepartment of the Central Famine Relief Commission under the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. At the same time, headed the Library-Science Section of the State Planning Commission under the Council of Labour and Defence —304

Vologdin, *Valentin Petrovich* (1881-1953)—prominent scientist, one of the founders of the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory where he worked in 1918-23. From 1939, Associate Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences—545

Vorobyov, *Boris Yevdokimovich* (b. 1887)—electrical engineer, scientist, took part in working out electric-power station projects, worked on the GOELRO Commission and the Public Works Committee of the Northern area, in the Leningrad Power Administration etc. —174

Voroshilov, *Kliment Yefremovich* (1881-1969)—Party member from 1903. Active participant in the October Revolution and the Civil War. In 1918-19, Commander of the Tsaritsyn Front, Deputy Commander and member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, Commander of the 10th Army. In December 1918, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs in the Ukraine, then Commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District; Commander of the 14th Army and the internal Ukrainian Front. In 1919-21, member of the Revolutionary Military Council and one of the organisers of the First Mounted Army. From 1925, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R.; later, People's Commissar for Defence. From 1953 to May 1960, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.—138

Vorovsky, *Vatslav Vatslavovich* (1871-1923)—Party member from 1894, professional revolutionary. In 1917-19, plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet Republic in the Scandinavian countries; in 1919-20, head of the State Publishers, in 1921-23, on diplomatic work in Italy—118, 379, 435, 447, 546, 592

Voyevodin, *Pyotr Ivanovich* (1884-1964)—Party member from 1899. In 1921, headed the Photography and Cinema Department of the Chief Committee for Political Education under the People's Commissariat for Education of the R.S.F.S.R.; later, engaged in publishing and library work—401, 408

Vyshinsky, *Andrei Yanuaryevich* (1883-1954)—member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1903, Menshevik; from 1920, Bolshevik. In 1921, Chief of the Allocation Administration of the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R. Later, worked in education and law. From 1931, Procurator of the R.S.F.S.R.; from 1935, Procurator of the U.S.S.R. In 1939-53, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Deputy Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.—156, 157

W

Wallenius, *Allan* (1890-1942)—Finnish Communist. Participant in the 1918 revolution in Finland. Took part in the Third Congress of the Comintern, and soon was elected member of the Comintern Executive Committee, where he worked until 1925. From May 1925 to 1939, lived and worked in America and the Scandinavian countries, and was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. From 1930, headed the Scandinavian Department of the Communist University of the National Minorities of the West and held other posts—268

Ware, *Harold* (1890-1935)—agronomist, member of the U.S. Communist Party. In the summer of 1922, visited Soviet Russia as head of a tractor team (21 tractors) he had organised. The money for the tractors was collected by American workers. The team worked on the Toikino State Farm, Perm Gubernia. Ware later visited the Soviet Union several times as consultant on the organisation of big state farms—581, 583

Wells, *Herbert George* (1866-1946)—English writer. In the autumn of 1920, visited Soviet Russia and interviewed Lenin—404

Weydemeyer, *Joseph* (1818-1866)—prominent figure in the German and American workers' movement, friend and associate of Marx and Engels. Took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Germany. After its defeat, emigrated to the United States. Started the propaganda of Marxism in the U.S.A.—307

Winter, *Alexander Vasilyevich* (1878-1958)—prominent Soviet scientist and specialist in the construction of electric-power stations. After the October Revolution, headed the construction of the peat-fired Shatura District Electric-Power Station, and then the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. In 1932, was elected member to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences—152, 187

Wrangel, *Pyotr Nikolayevich* (1878-1928)—tsarist army general. During the Civil War and foreign military intervention, one of the leaders of the counter-revolution in the South of Russia and henchman of British, French and American imperialists. In April-November 1920, Commander-in-Chief of the whiteguard

"armed forces of the South of Russia"—48

Y

Yakhontov, *Valerian Ivanovich* (1877-1926)—Party member from 1917. From 1922, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Justice, member of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars—491

Yakovenko, *Vasily Grigoryevich* (1889-1938)—Party member from 1917. From 1920 to 1922 Chairman of the Kansk Revolutionary Committee and the Uyezd Executive Committee Deputy Chairman of the Krasnoyarsk Gubernia Executive Committee. In 1922 and 1923, People's Commissar for Agriculture of the R.S.F.S.R.—413, 417, 419, 472, 551

Yakovlev, *Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1870-1966)—geologist, scientist. In 1921, professor of the Geological Institute—267

Yaroslavsky, *Yemelyan Mikhailovich* (1878-1943)—Party member from 1898. Took part in the October Revolution. In 1921, Secretary of the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee. Author of a number of works on the history of the Communist Party and the revolutionary movement in Russia—129, 332, 419

Yemelyanov, *Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1871-1958)—worker, Party member from 1904. In July-August 1917, fulfilled Party assignment to hide Lenin at Razliv from the Provisional Government's secret police. At the end of 1921 worked in the R.S.F.S.R. trade mission in Estonia—347-48 379, 420

Yemshanov, *Alexander Ivanovich* (1891-1941)—Party member from 1917. In 1920-21 People's Commissar for Railways and in 1921-22, Deputy People's Commissar for Railways —108

Yenukidze, *Avel Safronovich* (1877-1937)—Soviet statesman, Party member from 1898. In 1918-22, member of the Presidium and Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee—184, 185, 228, 276 395, 398-99, 400, 431, 462 466, 498

Yenukidze, *Trifon Teimurovich* (*Semin*) (1877-1937)—Party member from 1899. From 1919 Director of Goznak (the Administration of Factories for the Issue of Bank-Notes) —367

Yermakov, *Vladimir Spiridonovich* (b. 1888)—Party member from 1917. Commissar of the Southern Front in 1919, and of the Eastern Front in 1920; representative of the Council of Defence Special Committee on Effecting Martial Law on the Railways and a special agent in the campaign against banditism in the south in 1922. In 1922-25, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade—573

Yesin, *Vasily Zakharovich* (1888-1960)—electrician, Party member from 1913. Participant in the October Revolution and the Civil War. In 1920-21, member of GOELRO Commission and the State Planning Commission. From 1921 to 1957, worked in Soviet government and economic agencies—86, 87

Yezhov, *Ivan Kallinikovich* (b. 1885)—Party member from 1918. In 1918-24, head of the Central Administration for State Warehouses of the

Supreme Economic Council—352, 521

Yurovsky, *Y. M.* (1878-1938)—Party member from 1905. In 1921-23, worked in the State Depository of Valuables—184

Z

Zaks, *Berngard Genrikhovich* (b. 1886)—in 1918, worked in the People's Commissariat for Finance, in 1921-22, Deputy Business Manager of the Council of Labour and Defence—487-89, 491, 547-48, 549, 576-77

Zalutsky, *Pyotr Antonovich* (1887-1937)—Party member from 1907. In 1921, member and Secretary of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Later, held responsible Party posts. From 1925, an active participant in the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. Expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in 1927; reinstated in 1928, and expelled again in 1934—339, 395, 413-14, 424

Zasulich, *Vera Ivanovna* (1849-1919)—prominent participant in the Narodnik and later the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. Took part in the establishment and the activity of the Emancipation of Labour group. From 1900, member of the Editorial Board of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. After the R.S.D.L.P. Second Congress in 1903, a Menshevik leader—138

Zechgau—representative of Krupp—513

Zetkin, *Clara* (1857-1933)—outstanding leader of the German and international working-class and communist movement, a founder of the Communist Party of Germany. Elected by the Third Congress of the Comintern to its Executive Committee, headed the Comintern's International Women's Secretariat—124, 158, 231-32

Zheltov, *I. I.* (1890-1939)—Party member from 1917. After the October Revolution, Chairman of the Bauman District Soviet in Moscow, director of a plant in Bezhitsa (Bryansk), Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Uzbekistan, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Labour of the U.S.S.R., etc.—373

Zhidelev, *Nikolai Andreyevich* (1880-1950)—Party member from 1903. In 1921-23, worked on responsible assignments from the Council of People's Commissars, then an economic executive—563

Zinoviev (*Radomyslsky*), *Grigory Yevseyevich* (1883-1936)—Party member from 1901. From 1908 to April 1917, an émigré; member of the Editorial Board of the Party's Central Organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, member of the Central Committee. During the preparation and carrying out of the October Revolution, hesitated and opposed the armed uprising. Together with Kamenev, revealed the secret C.C. decision to start an armed uprising by publishing a statement of disagreement with this decision in the semi-Menshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*, thus betraying the revolution. After the October Revolution, held responsible posts. Repeatedly opposed the Party's Leninist policy; an organiser of the New Opposition in 1925; a leader of the anti-Party Trotsky-

Zinoviev bloc in 1926; in November 1927 was expelled from the Party for factional activity, twice reinstated and expelled again—51, 131, 137, 138, 158, 175, 183, 186, 203-205, 216, 218, 231-32, 234, 251, 262, 266, 291, 310, 311, 313, 377, 407, 414, 457, 458-59, 496, 501, 531, 535, 542-44, 559-60, 566-67, 587, 593, 598, 603, 607-608

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 45

На английскот языке